Abrogation in the Qur'an and Islamic Law 9781136217289, 9780415631983

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ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN RELIGION

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law A Critical Study of the Concept of “Naskh” and its Impact Louay Fatoohi

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law A Critical Study of the Concept of “Naskh” and its Impact

Louay Fatoohi

NEW YORK

LONDON

First published 2013 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Louay Fatoohi The right of Louay Fatoohi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fatoohi, Louay. Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic law / By Louay Fatoohi. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-63198-3 (alk. paper) 1. Koran—Abrogator and abrogated verses. 2. Islamic law— Interpretation and construction. I. Title. BP130.3.F38 2012 297.1'22612—dc23 2012010792 ISBN13: 978-0-415-63198-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-09620-8 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by IBT Global

For my beloved wife Shetha . . . with deep gratitude for everything

Contents

List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgments Introduction

xi xiii 1

1

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation”

12

2

Abrogation in Scriptures before the Qur’an

32

3

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an

37

4

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an

55

5

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation

73

6

Legal Abrogation

92

7

The Verse of the Sword

114

8

Does the Mushaf Contain All of the Qur’an? ˙˙

122

9

Did the Prophet Forget Verses?

129

10 Legal-Textual Abrogation

138

11 Textual Abrogation I: The “Stoning Verse”

156

12 Textual Abrogation II: The Five-Suckling Verse and the Anomalous Reading of the Oath Breaking Verse

200

13 Abrogation of the Sunna

207

x

Contents

14 Islamic Law: A New Reading

219

15 Conclusion: The Myth of Abrogation

238

Appendix A The Meaning of “Hadīth” and “Sunna” ˙ Notes Bibliography Glossary Index of Qur’anic Verses Index of Names and Subjects

247 249 269 277 281 285

Figures and Tables

FIGURES 14.1 Sharīʿa: A divine system. 14.2 Fiqh: Human effort to understand Sharīʿa. 14.3 Fiqh (interpretation and application) of Sharīʿa.

226 236 237

TABLES 1.1 5.1 5.2 15.1

The Three Modes of Abrogation The Number of Alleged Abrogated Verses and the Number of Chapters That Contain Them The Confi rmed Number of Abrogated Verses The Main Differences between the Three Modes of Abrogation

26 88 89 242

Acknowledgments

Like all my previous works, this book has benefited from the valuable and detailed feedback of my wife, Dr. Shetha Al-Dargazelli. Shetha’s insightful comments on earlier drafts of the book helped me improve it substantially. Without her constant support and patience, this as well as most of my other books would not have been written. I am endlessly indebted to Shetha. The book greatly benefited from three reviewers. Many thanks to Professor Angelika Neuwirth of Freie Universität Berlin for her support for the book and her helpful feedback. Her remark that the provisional title of the book was too narrow for the topics it covers has helped me choose a more appropriate title. She also made me aware of two works that I had not consulted. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer who helped me significantly expand and improve the last two chapters of the book. Adding a glossary to the book was also their suggestion. The second anonymous reviewer did not agree with the thesis of the book, its approach, or conclusions. They also did not think that abrogation deserved a dedicated book. While I thought some of the criticism was unjustified and reflected assumptions favored by the reviewer, their comments still helped me to considerably improve the book. Chapter 1 has particularly benefited from their comments. The reviewer also drew my attention to two works that I was not aware of. I am grateful for their feedback. I would also like to thank the Routledge staff, who made the publication of this book possible. Special thanks to Laura Stearns for supporting the publication of the book and Stacy Noto for managing the project. I would also like to thank Carey Nershi for managing the production work and John Rogers for copyediting the book.

Introduction

In this introduction, I fi rst review the role of abrogation in Islamic law and the history of the Qur’an. I then discuss how this principle is seen from both Muslim and non-Muslim perspectives. Next, I briefly contrast the enormous interest in abrogation in writings in the Arabic language with the scarce treatment of this phenomenon in English writings, before explaining where this book fits in the literature. I strongly recommend reading these three sections before starting with Chapter 1. In the last two sections of the introduction, I review the contents of the book and explain conventions and stylistic preferences it uses.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ABROGATION “Naskh,” or “abrogation” as it is translated, has been the subject of numerous studies by Muslim scholars down the centuries. As the mechanism describing how divine rulings from the Qur’an and the actions and teachings of the Prophet (Sunna)1 were superseded by others from these sources, it is natural for naskh to acquire such prominence in Islamic sciences, particularly in Islamic law. Scholars, naturally, needed to know the chronological order of the revelations in order to identify which rulings were abolished and which ones were still operative. The latter, then, are seen as the rulings that should be followed by Muslims. So while abrogation is very much a scholarly subject, it touches on the daily life of every Muslim. As we shall see, abrogation has played a major role in Islamic law, and thus its influence on the life of the average Muslim cannot be exaggerated. Scholars have quoted a number of reports attributed to prominent early Muslims in support of the importance of studying naskh. One report states that ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib (40/661), the Prophet’s cousin and the fourth caliph ˙ after him, once asked a judge he came across whether he had knowledge of the “nāsikh (abrogating [rulings])” and the “mansūkh (abrogated [rulings]),” to which the man answered “no.” ʿAlī told him that he was fatally deluded and misleading others. This narrative is found in the earliest

2

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

surviving book on abrogation, which dates back to the second decade of the 3rd century Hijri. 2 In his early collection of Hadīth, Dārimī (255/869) has a narrative stating that one should consider˙ giving rulings to people only if he has distinguished “the abrogating verses from the abrogated ones in the Qur’an” or is a ruler who needs to enact laws.3 In his book on naskh, Ahmad al-Nahhās (338/949) also quotes a ˙ the necessity ˙ ˙ of learning the science of number of accounts emphasizing naskh. ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib once saw a man in a mosque who made people ˙ fearful. ʿAlī asked about what the man was doing and he was told that the man was making people fear Allah. ʿAlī said that the man was instead showing off. He asked for the man to be brought to him and questioned him on whether he knew the science of the abrogating and abrogated rulings to which the man answered in the negative. ʿAlī told him to leave the mosque and to not preach in it again.4 Nahhās also says that Ibn ʿAbbās ˙˙ (68/687) is said to have interpreted the Qur’anic verse “and anyone who is given Wisdom has been given much good” (2.269) as referring mainly to the science of naskh.5 The 5th century Hijri scholar Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Bir quotes Yahyā bin ˙ of a Aktham (242/857) as having said that “none of all sciences is more duty [to learn] on the scholars, students, and all Muslims than the science of the nāsikh and mansūkh.”6 He explains that it is necessary for the Muslim to know which rulings should be implemented and which had been abolished. The renowned 9th century scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī quotes ˙ the consensus of earlier scholars that “no one should try to interpret the Book of Allah before learning its abrogating and abrogated verses.”7 But there is at least one hadīth suggesting that a well-known Companion ˙ of the Prophet did not believe in naskh. In a hadīth in Bukhārī (256/870), ˙ tāb (23/644) has said: Ibn ʿAbbās has reported that ʿUmar b. al-Khat ˙˙ The best Qur’anic expert among us is Ubayy and the best legal expert among us is ʿAlī. But we ignore some of what Ubayy states because he says: “I will never abandon anything I heard from the Messenger of Allah,” yet Allah has said: “Whatever āya We nansakh (abrogate) or cause to be forgotten (nunsihā)” (2.106).8 ʿUmar here denounces Ubayy’s rejection of the concept of abrogation.

Verse 2.106 is seen as one of the main verses that confi rm the principle of naskh.9 Muslim scholars see abrogation as a mechanism that perfectly reflects God’s omnipotence. God can change any ruling with another at any point in time He sees fit. This does not contravene God’s omniscience, because He knows the temporariness or permanence of any ruling from the time He issues it. Abrogation does not reflect any change in God’s knowledge. It is one way in which He delivers His commandments and runs the affairs of the world.

Introduction 3 The significance of abrogation is not confi ned to its important role in the development of the Islamic legal system. Assessing this concept and its historicity is critical to understanding the process of transmission and compilation of the Qur’anic text and its integrity. In my view, a researcher cannot write unambiguously about the history of the Qur’anic text without clarifying their position on abrogation, whether they accept it as a genuine Qur’anic principle or no, and explaining the implications of this position for their assessment of the various claims in the primary sources about the Qur’anic passages that are not part of the written Qur’an. Even presuming the historicity of abrogation while overlooking the fact that it has meant very different things to different scholars undermines the value of any work on the history of the Qur’anic text. This is a serious flaw I fi nd in works such as Muhammad al-Aʿzamī’s The History of the Qur’anic Text From ˙ Compilation.˙ 10 Revelation to Other legal principles, such as “qiyās (analogical reasoning),” are concerned only with the hermeneutics of the text but not its history. Abrogation, therefore, is unique in its implications for the history and transmission of the Qur’anic text as well as its meanings and objectives.

ABROGATION FROM MUSLIM AND NON-MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES The overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars, past and modern, have accepted abrogation in both the Qur’an and the Sunna as an indisputable fact. Only a very small minority has rejected Qur’anic abrogation. We know this opposition existed because it is condemned and vilified in the earliest works on abrogation. But this ostensible consensus of the majority conceals enormous differences in the way abrogation is understood. For instance, some scholars have identified over two hundred Qur’anic verses that they claim to have been abrogated by other Qur’anic verses or by sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad, whereas others have reduced the number to a single digit! How many and which verses were the subject of abrogation is only one aspect of the enormous disagreements between scholars. Differences about abrogation date as far back as the earliest surviving writings on the subject. In the late 4th to early 5th century Hijri, Hibat Allāh b. Salāma explained that he wrote his book on abrogation because “exegetes ignored this science, did not preserve it, and have been confused about it.”11 Western scholars, on the other hand, have held a completely different view of abrogation and its origins. They see it as a mechanism that Muslim scholars had to introduce to explain away intrinsic contradictions within the Qur’an: Of immediate concern to these men were certain passages that bore on the same issues but that seemed mutually contradictory. Their attempts

4

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law to harmonize such Qur’anic texts marked the rudimentary beginnings of the theory of abrogation (naskh), a theory that later stood at the center of legal hermeneutics.12

Abrogation was later used to deal with contradictions between the Qur’an and the Sunna as the literature of the latter grew along with the contradictions between the two. Burton, however, has shown that the perceived contradiction within the Qur’an is often the result of misinterpretation of verses. The contradiction is not intrinsic in the Qur’an but is the result of unsuccessful attempts at interpreting the text.13 This view was earlier suggested by a Muslim scholar in the fi rst half of the 20th century who rejected the concept of abrogation.14 Another established concept among Western scholars is that the practices of the early Muslim communities did not always reflect the Qur’an’s teachings. Ingenious interpretation of specific verses was one way of dealing with these conflicts. Exegetes sought to reconcile those differences between the Qur’an and practice using the Qur’an itself, thus interpreting verses in a manner that would give practice Qur’anic foundations and, therefore, remove any suggestion that it contradicted the Book of Allah. Western scholars have identified another approach that grew in the decades after the Prophet which is the authoring of statements attributed to him, his Companions, and their Successors to support the legitimacy of such common practices. The Prophet’s sayings are seen by Muslim scholars as extra-Qur’anic revelation from God. Teachings attributed to the early pious Muslims are considered to have been influenced by and originated from Muhammad. This extra-Qur’anic material was then used to supplement the Qur’an, becoming over time the second source of Islamic law. The theories of abrogation then used exegesis and this secondary source to present any practice as genuinely Islamic. If practice contradicted the Qur’an, the supportive statements by the Prophet are considered to have abrogated the Qur’an and to have been the bases for the practice. More broadly, many Western scholars believe that the study of Islamic law focused on reconciling practices that had developed in the regional Muslim communities with the Qur’an and the Prophetic legacy: Legal scholars appealed to the principle of abrogation continually to resolve the apparent contradictions between the legal practice of the various regions of the Islamic world and between all of these and their putative sources in the revelation.15 Burton has rightly pointed out that another source of abrogation theories has been the belief that the written record of the Qur’anic revelation, the “mushaf,” does not contain all of that divine revelation. The missing ˙ ˙ said to have been abrogated. verses were

Introduction 5 THE LITERATURE OF ABROGATION Numerous books in Arabic have been published on abrogation. Writing in the 9th century Hijri, Suyūtī talks about “countless people” who wrote ˙ about abrogation.16 One modern scholar has observed that more works have been written about abrogation than any other subject in Islamic studies.17 Yet despite their interest in studying various aspects of Islamic law, Western scholars have shied away from the topic of abrogation. It is often mentioned in passing and dealt with in the course of studying other elements of Islamic law. At best it may be given a single chapter in some books on Islamic law and the history of the Qur’an. There is no better witness to this lack of interest than the fact that there has been only one book in the English language dedicated to the study of abrogation. One author recently surveyed as many as twenty-five early Arabic works on abrogation, but he also pointed out that the total number of such works is significantly higher.18 He expressed his surprise at the large number of books written by Muslims on abrogation.19 I think this reflects an underestimation of the significance of abrogation in Islamic law and Qur’anic exegesis. Another scholar, on the other hand, has rightly noted that “if, as Muslim scholars maintain, an understanding of naskh is essential to a proper understanding of the Qur’an, it behoves on us to try and appreciate the complexity and sophistication of this phenomenon.”20 Powers goes on to explain that “the great complexity of the naskh phenomenon” combined with its importance “for determining the law” has made specialists in the Qur’an and Islamic law write short reference works that provide an overview of this phenomenon. 21 The confusing nature of the literature on abrogation and the complexity this doctrine has developed over the centuries make writing about it clearly and coherently quite challenging. Indeed, this is a problem with the only English title on the subject. John Burton’s The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation was published over twenty years ago. While comprehensive, detailed, and worthy of praise for at least being the fi rst book in English on the subject, the work has major limitations. First, it is too technical to be accessible to those who do not have a good background in the history of Islamic law, let alone the more general reader. It reads like a lengthy technical paper written for a small group of scholars. Second, its highly technical nature was not helped by the author’s less-thanfriendly writing style and convoluted presentation of the material. Indeed, reading Burton’s book can be a challenge even for the expert. Third, it puts too much emphasis on reconstructing the history of the development of the abrogation theories, using specific claims of abrogation as a tool for this purpose. Reconstruction of this history was always going to involve a good deal of speculation; studying the credibility of any specific instance of abrogation, on the other hand, can be done with far more certainty and clarity using available sources.

6

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

Fourth, Burton’s book fails to quote some of the earliest sources on abrogation, which are necessary for understanding the early development of this doctrine. 22 My book addresses the four issues. First, I have written the book to be readable by the general intellectual, as well as the expert. The book studies all aspects of abrogation in the depth required to develop a full picture of the nature of this phenomenon and determine whether it is a genuine Qur’anic principle. The reader is given all the required information and is carefully guided through the subject matter so that no prior knowledge or external readings are needed. Second, the book is structured in a logical way that makes it easy for the reader to see at any point where they are in the overall journey through the subject. Third, I focus on examining the credibility of abrogation by studying the concepts behind its various forms and how they were applied. I have avoided trying to reconstruct the history of the development of these theories by trying to draw their timelines in detail or defi ne the role played by specific scholars in the emergence of these theories. The conclusions of such attempts would have been fraught with too much uncertainty and are of little relevance to the question of the veracity of abrogation and the implications of the answer for Islamic law. I have confi ned myself to identifying the chronological order of the three modes of abrogation, which can be concluded with relative ease from the available sources. This would not be possible without consulting the earliest sources on abrogation, which addresses the fourth shortcoming of Burton’s book. The book also examines specific abrogation claims in various Islamic sources and assesses them in the light of the Qur’an, treating the latter as the reference source. Alleged sayings of the Prophet will be shown to present and deal with abrogation in a random and unintelligible way that dents the credibility of this principle. More significantly, abrogation will be shown to be absent from the Qur’an and even inconsistent with it, thus testifying to its non-historicity even from an Islamic perspective. Burton also has discovered that abrogation is a concept alien to the Qur’an. While the Qur’an does not support the claim that any of its verses was abrogated, it does not exclude the possibility that divine, non-Qur’anic instructions to Muhammad were later annulled by Qur’anic verses. The change of the “qibla” or direction of prayer to the mosque in Mecca seems to favor this possibility.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK’S CONTENT Chapter 1 begins with a brief introduction to the generic meaning of the term “naskh” in Arabic before it moves to focus on the technical meaning of this term. Tracing it in the earliest sources, the chapter discusses how this concept developed from its most basic form to the complex principle it

Introduction 7 became. It demonstrates that the technical meaning of the term as the abrogation of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling was unknown to the fi rst generation of Muslims, is a later development, and that the three different modes of abrogation developed at different stages. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the three types of abrogation and the main points of difference between scholars about this doctrine. Abrogation is one of the mechanisms that guided the development of Islamic law. Chapter 2 considers whether changes to the laws of previous religions can be seen as cases of abrogation, i.e. whether abrogation is a concept that operates within Prophet Muhammad’s divine message only or whether it existed in the messages of previous prophets also. We will study such changes from the point of view of the Qur’an, not their respective religious laws, as we are interested in examining whether the concept of abrogation, even in reference to changes involving pre-Islamic religious laws, exists in the Qur’an. There are four variants of the term “naskh” in as many verses in the Qur’an, and these are the subject of Chapter 3. Two use the term in the generic sense of “transcribe,” but the other two have been seen by scholars as providing support to the principle of abrogation. A detailed examination of both verses shows that neither refers to the concept of abrogation. In other words, the term “naskh” never appears in the Qur’an in the meaning it acquired in Islamic law. There are two other verses that do not use the term “naskh” but which have been seen as referring to abrogation. Chapter 4 shows that, like the verses that have the word “naskh,” these verses have nothing to do with the principle of abrogation. Chapters 3 and 4 leave no doubt that abrogation is not a Qur’anic concept. This concept did not originate from the Qur’an but was read into it. The shaky conceptual grounds on which abrogation stands must have had inconcealable practical consequences for the development of this principle. There must have been a lot of confusion about what abrogation exactly means and how it is applied. This, indeed, is what Chapter 5 illustrates. It fi rst discusses differences between scholars about the concept of abrogation and then examines the type of mistakes scholars have made when applying their defi nitions of this concept. It then presents statistics showing the significant differences in identifying the number of abrogated verses according to a select group of scholars from different times. Chapter 6 deals with the fi rst of the three modes of abrogation: the abrogation of the ruling but not the wording of a Qur’anic verse or what I call “legal abrogation.” Many verses are said to have been abrogated in this manner. In this chapter, I review the six cases that have attracted the most agreement among scholars. All of these claims turn out to be based on misinterpretations of the verses in question. One case may be claimed to be an instance of abrogation, but even in this solitary instance the nonabrogation interpretation is more plausible.

8

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

One verse that is claimed to have abrogated numerous verses is what scholars have called “the verse of the sword.” This verse is claimed to have abrogated many verses that instruct Muslims to be tolerant to non-Muslims, accommodate other religions, show forgiveness, and seek peace. These abrogation claims have been used in modern times by terrorists who have committed various atrocities under the name of Islam. Chapter 7 shows that all those abrogation claims have no foundations in the Qur’an. They take the application of abrogation to a new level of absurdity. Although the subject of this chapter represents a specific alleged case of legal abrogation, I have given it its own chapter because of its significance in today’s world. The case of the verse of the sword is particularly useful in elucidating how the principle of abrogation became itself a major driver for the growth of claims of abrogated verses. The list of verses that this verse is supposed to have abrogated continued to grow over time. Once the concept of abrogation was accepted, it started to be the source of various abrogation claims. Abrogation became one tool that could be called upon in legal and exegetical debates to substantiate one’s position. The Hadīth makes a critical difference between the content of the ˙ and the “Qur’an.” It claims that the mushaf does not contain “mushaf” ˙ ˙ ˙˙ all Qur’anic verses, as some of these were “withdrawn” by God during the life of the Prophet and consequently not recorded in the mushaf when ˙˙ it was compiled after his death. This withdrawal was at times performed by God making the Prophet and the Muslims forget verses that had been revealed, and at other times by the divine will ensuring that those verses were not included in the mushaf. Chapter 8 demonstrates how the concept ˙ of withdrawn verses, which ˙translates into the conclusion that the mushaf ˙˙ does not contain all Qur’anic verses, is fundamentally flawed. The chapter also explains how one of the three modes of abrogation was introduced to present the alleged absence of some verses from the mushaf as a divine act, ˙ ˙ the mushaf and, thus averting any questioning of the process of compiling ˙˙ ultimately, the integrity of the latter. The claim that the Prophet was made to forget some Qur’anic verses is a major driver in the development of the theory of abrogation, leading to the formulation of the legal-textual mode of abrogation. Indeed, it has broader implications for the history of the Qur’anic text. This is why I have dedicated Chapter 9 to a detailed discussion of it. I first show that the claim of forgotten verses has no foundation in the Qur’an. I then examine the Hadīth ˙ narratives that promote this notion and expose their serious problems. One of the anonymous reviewers of the book suggested combining Chapters 8 and 9. The two chapters are related and can be combined. But whether the text of the mushaf contains the whole of the Qur’an, which is ˙ ˙ not depend only on whether Prophet Muhamaddressed in Chapter 8, does mad forgot some verses, which is discussed in Chapter 9. It also depends on when the text was recorded, how it was transmitted, the reliability of the transmission process, etc. I chose to focus Chapter 9 on whether

Introduction 9 Muhammad forgot verses because this is at the heart of the argument of abrogation—hence my preference for separating the two chapters. Chapter 10 discusses the second mode of abrogation: the abrogation of the wording and ruling of a Qur’anic verse. I call this “legal-textual abrogation.” In Chapter 8, I explained that this mode of abrogation was developed to explain why the mushaf does not contain certain Qur’anic verses. ˙ ˙ view is promoted by various hadīths and I In Chapter 10, I show how this ˙ discuss problems in this concept. I also study the main relevant hadīths and show that they lack credibility. ˙ of these alleged verses are non-legalisWe will see, for instance, that most tic, yet all modes of abrogation imply that they deal with verses that introduce legal rulings. Using legal-textual abrogation to explain the absence of the alleged verses from the mushaf is not only doomed to fail, but is also ˙ ˙ by defi nition, cannot be applied to those self-contradictory as abrogation, missing passages. The abrogation of the wording but not the ruling of a Qur’anic verse is the subject of Chapters 11 and 12. There are two passages that are not found in the mushaf and a missing word from a verse in the mushaf that ˙˙ ˙ abroare claimed to represent “textual abrogation,” as I call this mode˙ of gation. I examine the so-called “stoning verse” separately in Chapter 11, because of the length of this discussion, and I deal with the other two cases in Chapter 12. Again, Hadīth narratives are used to support these claims. Yet my ˙ of these hadīths will show that they cannot be linked to the examination Prophet. As is the case˙ with the instances of legal-textual abrogation, the alleged passages are not historical, i.e. they were never part of the Qur’an. Their absence from the mushaf is not due to abrogation, another mecha˙ ˙ or accident. It is simply a reflection of the nism, deliberate manipulation, fact that none of them is a Qur’anic verse. Having reviewed the three modes of abrogation, my conclusion is that abrogation is a phenomenon that lacks any support from the Qur’an. The three modes were developed to address three different concerns. Legal abrogation, which was probably the fi rst mode of abrogation to appear, was the result of perceived contradictions between certain Qur’anic verses. These misinterpretations were at times chosen by exegetes to explain the prevalence of certain practices that contradicted Qur’anic rulings. Legal-textual abrogation was needed to rationalize the belief driven by certain narratives that the mushaf did not contain all verses of the Qur’an. ˙ ˙ which is the last mode of abrogation to be In the case of textual abrogation, proposed, the alleged two passages and one missing word from the mushaf ˙ ˙ In were invented to give Qur’anic support to widely accepted legal rulings. the case of stoning, this ruling was in confl ict with verses in the mushaf. ˙˙ The fact that the rulings of the two passages and the word are operative meant that they could not be covered by legal-textual abrogation, so they had to be given their own mode of abrogation.

10

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

The three modes of abrogation were driven and supported by a large number of hadīths. The fact, however, is that there is nothing in the Qur’an ˙ to substantiate abrogation, let alone portray it as a major principle in the formation of Qur’anic law. While this book is focused on abrogation in the Qur’an, for completeness, Chapter 13 tackles briefly abrogation in the Sunna. The term “Sunna” denotes all that the Prophet said, did, and approved and disapproved of. These include not only non-Qur’anic instructions from God but personal opinions of Muhammad the man. It is natural, therefore, to expect the Prophet to have changed his mind at times, permitting something he had once banned, prohibiting something he had allowed, or, generally, replacing one instruction with another. This conclusion has no implications for the non-historical concept of abrogation in the Qur’an. Some of the flaws in the principle of abrogation reflect a fundamental misunderstanding by Muslim jurists of the concept of Islamic law in the Qur’an and the role of the Prophet in implementing it. There are at least serious inconsistencies in how these have been understood and used in formulating Islamic law. This critical issue is discussed in Chapter 14. A coherent model for understanding the concept of Islamic law is presented. The fi ndings of this book are summarized in Chapter 15. The chapter draws together the main conclusions of this study. Appendix A explains the concepts of “Hadīth” and “Sunna” and the ˙ differences between them, as this understanding is essential for reading the book. I have added a Glossary covering the technical terms used in the book for easy reference. For the reader’s convenience, the book has two indexes, one for the Qur’anic verses and the other for names and subjects.

CONVENTIONS AND STYLES As explained in Appendix A, the book uses the term “sunna,” with a small “s,” to refer to any one practice of the Prophet. The term “Sunna” is used for the Prophetic practices as a whole and to mean the way of life of the Prophet. Similarly, the book uses the singular “hadīth” to mean a single narrative about the Prophet and “Hadīth,” with ˙a capital “H,” to denote ˙ ˙ the literature of hadīths. ˙ The book uses a dual system of dating. The Hijri calendar places each event on the timeline of Islamic history. The equivalent Gregorian date puts the event in the calendar system that is more familiar to the general reader. For reference, the fi rst Hijri year, which marks the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina escaping the animosity of the Meccans, corresponds to the year 622 CE.

Introduction 11 In order to clearly place any important figure and scholar in his historical context, I have mentioned when I fi rst cite his name his year of death. Most names of classical scholars start with the defi nite article “al.” I have used it when I fi rst mention the name or when I cite the full name but dropped it elsewhere. This is more convenient and the standard way of printing these names. The translations of the Qur’anic verses are mine. Translation is a form of interpretation and therefore reflects the translator’s understanding of the text. This is why I always use my own translations of the Qur’an, even though I usually consult some existing English translations. The translations of hadīths and Arabic sources are also mine. I have˙ used square brackets to enclose explanatory texts that are needed to clarify quotations from the Qur’an or the Hadīth. Alternative texts, such ˙ as the English meaning of a term that is quoted in its Arabic origin, are enclosed in parentheses. A different font has been used for the excerpts from the Qur’an for better readability of discussions involving Qur’anic texts. Roman transliterations of Arabic terms are in italics.

1

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation”

According to the oldest Arabic lexicon al-ʿAin of al-Khalīl b. Ahmad ˙ al-Farāhīdī (ca. 173/789), the noun naskh (abrogation) has two meanings. The fi rst, which is shared by the related term intisākh, is copying a book from a source. The second meaning is replacing a practice with another. He gives as an example “a verse that introduces a particular commandment that is later made easier so that verse is abrogated (tunsakh) by another.”1 In this case, the replacing verse is known as nāsikh, which is the active participle of naskh, whereas the replaced verse is referred to with the passive participle mansūkh. The example of the second meaning of naskh that Farāhīdī gives shows that the term had already developed its Islamic legal meaning by the time he wrote his lexicon. Farāhīdī also mentions two meanings for the related term tanāsukh. It is applied to the heirs who die before dividing their inheritance. It is also used for the succession of any units of time, such as a century or era. This particular meaning is close to the second meaning of “naskh” that Farāhīdī mentions, as the concepts of “succession” and “replacement” are close. Another old lexicon by al-Sāhib b. ʿAbbād (ca. 385/996) known as ˙ He adds that the derivative naskhatan al-Muhīt agrees with Farāhīdī. ˙ ˙ means “in vain” or “illegal” as in his death has been in vain or illegal. He also states that the verb nasakha is the same as masakha, which means “to metamorphose” or “to transform.” It is interesting that Ibn ʿAbbād does not mention the technical meaning of “naskh” in Islamic studies. 2 The same meanings of the term are found in Tahdhīb al-Lugha by Abū Mansūr al-Azharī (ca. 370/980).3 This work cites other linguists ˙ and also mentions the technical meaning of the term in Qur’anic studies. Later lexicons, such as the highly regarded Al-Qāmūs al-Muhīt of ˙ ˙ al-Fayrūzābādī (816/1414), assign the same meanings to the term “naskh” and its derivatives.4 One point worth highlighting here is that some linguists have restricted the meaning of naskh to replacing something with another whereas others have given it the broader meaning of removing something. An example of the fi rst use of the term would be how old age replaces youth, whereas an instance of the other use is how the wind removes the traces of something.

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 13 This difference is also found in how different Muslim scholars understood the technical term “naskh,” which we will now focus on. Over the centuries, scholars have understood the term “naskh” to mainly mean the abrogation or annulment of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling. This legalistic defi nition covers only one of the three modes of abrogation, but it is the most common defi nition, because abrogation has been mainly a legal principle developed and used by jurists. I will consider this point in more detail in the last section of this chapter, but for now we only need to remember that the annulment of divine rulings by other divine rulings is the most common, i.e. the standard, defi nition of abrogation. While always keen to make the claim that abrogation originated from the Qur’an itself, scholars have differed about when and how this divine legal mechanism for managing religious law operated. The differences in understanding various aspects of abrogation combined with poor application of those defi nitions led different scholars to amazingly different conclusions as to which Qur’anic verses are involved in abrogation.5 The history of development of the concept of “naskh” is long and far from clear, not least because of the scarcity of early sources. A detailed historical review of how the theories of abrogation developed is beyond the scope of this book. Our focus here is whether abrogation has any basis in the Qur’an, the forms it took, the problems it tried to solve, and how it has been used. Nevertheless, an overview of the history of this doctrine and the chronology of its three modes is necessary.

1.1

NASKH IN THE FIRST MUSLIM GENERATIONS

Dating the appearance of the concept of “naskh” is not possible at this point in time. Sources from the second half of the 2nd and 3rd centuries Hijri suggest that the fi rst generations of Muslims used the Arabic word “naskh” in a manner far more general than the technical, legal defi nition it later acquired. Those early Muslims employed the term not only for the complete abolition of one divine ruling by another, but also for any change made to a ruling, such as a general ruling being made applicable to specific cases only. There are a number of examples of this early general use of the term “naskh” in the Hadīth literature. For example, verse 2.282 commands the ˙ down the amount of money that is loaned. This verse is Muslims to write followed by another that states “but if you are on a journey, and you do not find a writer, then let a pledge be taken ” (2.283). In his Hadīth collection, Ibn ˙ Māja (273/887) informs us that this instance was called “naskh” by Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (74/693)—a Companion of the Prophet and one of the earliest narrators of the Hadīth.6 ˙ Yet verse 2.283 explains an exceptional case to an otherwise general commandment. Rather than abolishing the ruling in 2.282, verse 2.283

14

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

makes that “general” ruling more “specific” as a written agreement remains required when one is not travelling and a writer can be found. Furthermore, there is no evidence that these two verses were revealed at two different occasions to suggest that 2.282 was in operation for a certain period of time before the law was modified and an exception was made for travelers with no access to someone who can write down the loan agreement to use a pledge instead. Given that 2.282 and 2.283 were revealed together, there is no exemption involved, let alone abolishment of any law. The two verses explain details of one legal ruling. The 8th century Hijri scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya said that the early Muslim authorities used the term “naskh” in a broader sense than it later developed into. In addition to using it to mean replacing a divine ruling with another, they used this term for the specification of general rulings, qualification of absolute laws, and clarification of statements.7 Mujāhid b. Jabr (103/721) is one of the Successors (Tabiʿīn), who represent the fi rst generation of Muslims after the Companions (Sahāba) of the Prophet, who ˙ is said to have used the term “naskh” in this˙ general sense.8 Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī (790/1388) lists over twenty cases of naskh attributed to ˙the ˙ Companions and Successors to show that they used the term “naskh” in a much more general way than its technical meaning.9 I will discuss a number of these cases later in the book and show that none of them represents an instance of abrogation. In his comprehensive study of abrogation, the 20th century scholar Mustafā Zaid has the following to say about the use of the term “naskh” ˙ ˙ Companions and the Successors: by the [They] considered naskh to cover any change that occurs to a ruling. This includes replacing a ruling with another, making specific a generalization in a ruling, or qualifying the absoluteness of a ruling. They included cases where the abrogating text immediately followed the abrogated one, as in the cases of exception and qualification, or where the abrogator was separate from what it abrogates and was revealed after it, as in the case of totally replacing a previous commandment (which is how all scholars of fiqh and usūl al-fiqh [later] understood ˙ abrogation).10 The Successors are also reported to have discussed the question of naskh in their writings on the Qur’an. In the oldest surviving specialist exegetical work of the Qur’an, al-Tabarī (310/922) quotes a number of Successors on ˙ his book on this concept, Hibat Allāh b. Salāma abrogation. At the end of (410/1019) mentions books by a number of Successors among his sources. He concludes by saying that his work is based on seventy-five books of exegesis of the Qur’an, although many are late works.11 These early writings, which have not reached us, are unlikely to have been in the form of books. Muslim scholars started writing books around

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 15 one and a half centuries after the Prophet’s death. Ahmad b. Hanbal (241/855) is reported to have said that Ibn Juraij and Saʿ˙īd b. Abī ʿ˙Arūba were the fi rst scholars to write books.12 It has also been claimed that Ibn Abī ʿArūba was the fi rst to classify material into chapters in a manual in Basra.13 These two died in 150/767 and 156/773, respectively. This rules out the possibility that any of the Successors, who lived earlier, wrote any books, but we cannot say that with total certainty because of the lack of documentary evidence. Zaid thinks that the quotations from the Successors are sayings attributed to them that were later referred to as if they had written them down. It is perfectly possible, of course, that these narratives are anachronistic. These sources, in particular those about the Companions, were written much later than the events they describe. The suggestion that the early Muslims linked the term “naskh” to changes to the law might well have been influenced by how this term came to be used later on. A book attributed to the Successor Qatāda b. Diʿāma al-Sadūsī14 (117/735) would have been the earliest book on naskh if it was indeed his work. Its ascription to Qatāda is considered to be reliable by many on account of the fact that parts of it match quotations attributed to Qatāda by later scholars who wrote about naskh. However, this attribution has been questioned.15 Interestingly, the editor of the only edition of this book that I am aware of dismisses the suggestion that Qatāda wrote the book, accepting Dhahabī’s statement that Ibn Juraij and Ibn Abī ʿArūba were the fi rst to author books.16 Ibn Salāma has also suggested that Qatāda’s book, which was one of the sources of his own book on abrogation, was actually compiled by Ibn Abī ʿArūba.17 Qatāda’s very short book discusses cases of abrogation in seventeen different chapters of the Qur’an. All of them fall under “legal abrogation” whereby the ruling of one verse replaces the ruling of another while both verses remain in the “mushaf” (pronounced mus-haf) or the “written ˙ ˙ “legal-textual” and “textual” ˙ ˙ record of the Qur’an.”18 The modes of abrogation are not found in Qatāda’s work. The book focuses on the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an. There is one instance where the author mentions the established practice regarding the punishment for adultery which differs from what the Qur’an says. Interestingly, the author does not use the term “abrogate,” preferring to say “the sunna has become (sārat) such that ˙ book and its . . .”19 Putting aside the uncertainty about the author of this compilation date, it is worth noting that the number of verses it discusses is relatively small. While praised by some scholars for his knowledge, Qatāda was also strongly criticized by others. His reliability and integrity have been called into question, having been accused of involvement in tadlīs. This term denotes the notorious practice of falsely claiming to have heard hadīths from transmitters one had met or dishonestly claiming to have˙ heard hadīths from contemporary transmitters one had not met. ˙

16

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

There is another old book on abrogation that is attributed to Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (124/741). 20 This work discusses cases of legal abrogation in thirteen Qur’anic chapters. It does not mention instances of the legal-textual or textual modes of abrogation. In all discussed cases the abrogated passages are also from the Qur’an, so there is no reference to the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna. The editor of a modern edition of this work has suggested the plausibility of its attribution to Zuhrī but has also conceded that the possibility of misattribution cannot be ruled out.21 Zaid has rejected the authenticity of this book on the basis of the unreliability of one of the transmitters of the accounts in the book. 22 A detailed analysis of this manuscript has confi rmed that the manuscript cannot be attributed to Zuhrī with any reasonable degree of certainty: It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that there is in the text at least a remnant of early material; the process by which it reached its fi nal form is still far less than clear and may well remain beyond any form of historical reconstruction. That fact in itself implies that the text cannot be relied upon to provide a source of early material because of the multiplicity of writers involved. 23 However, given that the book mentions only legal abrogation, which is the oldest of the three modes of abrogation, I am inclined to believe that the book is quite old, possibly from the fi rst half of the 2nd century. This observation applies to the book attributed to Qatāda also. The next oldest discussion, but not whole work, of abrogation that has reached us is by ʿAbd Allāh b. Wahb (197/812). This author died a few years before Shāfiʿī’s main treatment of abrogation was written, but it is not possible to know how much earlier he might have written his work. Ibn Wahb’s discussion of abrogation occupies only two small chapters in a large book on the exegesis and sciences of the Qur’an.24 These chapters, called the “nāsikh and mansūkh” and the “nāsikh in the Qur’an,” identify around forty abrogated verses and their abrogators in the Qur’an. The author lists the verses by topic rather than by the Qur’anic chapter. Apart from starting the fi rst of the two chapters by quoting three Qur’anic verses that are supposed to confi rm that abrogation is a Qur’anic phenomenon, Ibn Wahb does not discuss the concept of abrogation, confi ning himself to listing instances of its occurrence. All the instances he quotes fall under the mode of legal abrogation. One text that is considered by later scholars an instance of legal-textual abrogation appears as a saying of the Prophet, so Ibn Wahb treats it instead as a case of abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an.25 There is no mention of legal-textual abrogation or textual abrogation. One interesting feature of Ibn Wahb’s understanding of abrogation is that he treats exception or specification as a form of abrogation. In six cases

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 17 he talks about verses being abrogated and made specific by exception by others and in another three he talks about specification by exception.

1.2

NASKH ACCORDING TO SHĀFIʿĪ

The second century after the revelation of the Qur’an (610–632 CE) witnessed the formation of “fiqh” or the science of “Islamic jurisprudence.” This discipline focused on the understanding of “Sharīʿa” or “Islamic law” in its revealed sense. The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence that became accepted by Sunni Muslims were established by Abū Hanīfa al-Nuʿmān ˙ ʿī (204/819), and (150/767), Mālik b. Anas (179/796), Muhammad al-Shāfi ˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal (241/855). The Shia Muslims have accepted the legal ˙ system of Jaʿ˙ far al-Sādiq (148/765). ˙ We fi nd the concept of naskh in the writings of these jurists. In his famous Muwatta’, Mālik stated that verse 2.180 concerning bequests was ˙˙ abrogated by other verses. 26 He also quoted a hadīth 27 suggesting that the ˙ the same woman would Qur’an fi rst stated that ten breast-feedings from establish a marriage ban between those she suckled and between her and any male she nursed, but that this was later abrogated to five sucklings. 28 The text of the Muwatta’ according to Muhammad al-Shaibānī adds a ˙˙ ˙ third mention of abrogation in a hadīth in which a verse that banned the ˙ believers from marrying male and female adulterers is said to have been abrogated. 29 Significantly, the term “naskh” does not appear anywhere else in the Muwatta’. Yasin Dutton has tried to explain away this near˙ the term “naskh” in the Muwatta’ by drawing attencomplete absence ˙of ˙ ˙ cases of abrogation tion to the fact that Mālik quoted hadīths that identify ˙ even though they do not use this term. 30 However, the fact that the term “naskh” occurs only two or three times in the Muwatta’ shows that this concept was in its early development at that time. We˙ ˙ should, therefore, strongly doubt the authenticity of a statement attributed to Mālik in which he says that knowledge of the abrogating and abrogated laws is a necessity for issuing rulings. 31 But the development of the study of naskh was advanced by the emergence of yet another science: “usūl al-fiqh” or the “roots/sources of Islamic jurisprudence.” This science is ˙concerned with the sources of Islamic law and the general principles for drawing legal rulings from those sources. Naskh became one of those principles. Shāfiʿī is credited as the founder of usūl al-fiqh. His renowned work ˙ al-Risāla is the fi rst attempt ever by a Muslim jurist to write down his legal theory. Shāfiʿī is known to have twice written a treatise that came to be known as Risāla after him, but only the second version has reached us. The new Risāla was written sometime in the last five years of his life, i.e. at the end of the 2nd century and the beginning of the 3rd, which he

18

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

spent in Egypt. In his book on the virtues of Shāfiʿī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (606/1209) highly praised Shāfiʿī’s legal reasoning and methodology: Before imām Shāfiʿī, they used to speak about issues of fiqh, presenting proofs and objections. But they did not have a comprehensive framework that they can resort to for identifying the proofs of Sharīʿa and their counterarguments and probabilities. Shāfiʿī developed the science of usūl al-fiqh and established for people a comprehensive framework that˙ can be referred to for ranking the proofs of Sharīʿa. It has been established that Shāfiʿī to the science of usūl al-fiqh is like the sage Aristotle to the science of reasoning. People˙ agree that developing the science of logic is an elevated status that no other human being shares with Aristotle. Similarly, they have to accept that Shāfiʿī has attained elevation, nobility, and distinction over all other scholars because of this noble status (of introducing usūl al-fiqh).32 ˙ In Risāla, Shāfiʿī relentlessly confi rms the special role of the Sunna as the second source of the law after the Qur’an. He rejects any suggestion that the Qur’an and the Sunna may contradict each other and stresses the role of the Sunna in explaining the Qur’an. Indeed, he was called the “supporter of the Hadīth” by the people of Mecca.33 The fi rst usūli (i.e. scholar ˙ of usūl al-fiqh)˙ also touched on a number of legislative principles. This is ˙ how Shāfiʿī’s contribution is described by John Burton: As a formal discipline, the subscience of usūl al-fiqh did not exist until ˙ defi nitions and rules. SimiShāfiʿī laid down for the fi rst time the basic lar principles and rules, it is asserted, had governed the deductions of the pre-Shāfiʿī scholars. He is therefore not seen as having “invented” the rules of usūl, any more than Aristotle “invented” the rules of logic, but rather, as˙ having extracted and codified them.34 Risāla was a pioneer work that ultimately led to the development of usūl ˙ al-fiqh. Its legal theory was so advanced that it has been suggested, albeit by a small minority of scholars, that it might have been wrongly attributed to Shāfiʿī and that it was written approximately one century later. 35 I agree with the view that the status of Risāla and its contribution to this science have been overstated. As has been noted, it was over a century after its writing that Risāla started to attract attention and the term usūl entered ˙ the jargon of jurists: Shāfiʿī’s achievement must not be carried too far. He advanced or, to put it more accurately, proposed an unprecedented synthesis of rationalism and traditionalism, but his proposal was not to become relevant until a century later, thanks not to him but to such jurists as Ibn Surayj, Sayrafi, and Qaffal whose achievement was the product of a

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 19 combination of circumstances that arose at the end of the 9th century and the beginning of the 10th. In other words, Shāfiʿī’s law and jurisprudence represented not the pivotal point of Islamic law, but rather a middle stage between the crude beginnings at the outset of the 8th century and the true culmination that took place nearly a century after his death.36 But Risāla’s detailed discussion of the concepts of nāsikh and mansūkh in deducing the law certainly stands out. Some scholars believe that Shāfiʿī was the fi rst to speak about the concept of “naskh” in the more specific sense in which it ultimately came to be known. Indeed, no work on the concept of naskh can afford not to give special attention to Shāfiʿī’s contribution. Shāfiʿī’s Risāla discusses various verses and sunnas that either acted as abrogators or were abrogated, and his book Ahkām al-Qur’an discusses eleven instances of abrogation.37 But his writings˙ do not contain an attempt to defi ne the term.38 The closest that he comes to a defi nition of abrogation is his following statement in Risāla: The meaning of “nasakha” (to abrogate) is “to abolish it as a legal obligation.” When it was operative, obeying it was dutiful; but after God nasakha (abrogated) it, abandoning it became dutiful. So those who were alive when it was enacted would have shown obedience by following it and [later] by abandoning it; and those who were not alive when it was legislated would have shown obedience by following the obligation that acted as its nāsikh (abrogator).39 Some have stated that Shāfiʿī differentiated naskh from cases like the specification of general rulings, qualification of unqualified rulings, and explanation of ambiguous ones.40 I shall discuss these concepts later.41 But I think this is rather inaccurate, as Shāfiʿī’s discussions of these different legal concepts are often intermingled. This too-generous view is probably driven by Shāfiʿī’s established reputation as the founder of usūl al-fiqh. It would be unwise to underestimate Shāfiʿī’s contribution, but˙ it would be unjustified to suggest that his writings were of the depth, consistency, and sophistication that later works in usūl al-fiqh attained. He did, however, pave the way for those who followed˙ him. Risāla does not discuss the different modes of abrogation. It mentions examples of legal abrogation in the Qur’an. But we know from Shāfiʿī’s other writings that he accepted one case of textual abrogation, so he implicitly accepted this mode of abrogation.42 There is no indication in his works that he accepted the legal-textual mode of abrogation. Shāfiʿī’s theory of naskh proposes the following principles: (1) A Qur’anic ruling can be abrogated by a Qur’anic ruling only. It cannot be abrogated by a sunna, because the Sunna follows the Qur’an:

20

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Whatever He abrogated of the Book, He abrogated by the Book. The Sunna cannot abrogate the Book. It rather follows the Book, as stated in the revealed text, and it explains in detail the meaning of what God has revealed in general terms.43

However, we will see how, in his support for the penalty of stoning for adultery, Shāfiʿī has implicitly accepted that a sunna can abrogate a Qur’anic ruling, even though he repeatedly says the opposite.44 I will revisit Shāfiʿī’s position and the views of other scholars on the question of the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna later in the book.45 (2) A sunna can be abrogated by a sunna only: This is the situation with any sunna of the Messenger of Allah. It can be abrogated only by a sunna of the Messenger of Allah. If God inspired the Messenger with a ruling that is different from what the Messenger of Allah had enacted with a sunna, he would issue a new sunna in line with what God revealed to him, to explain to the people that he has a sunna that abrogates the old one and which is in confl ict with the new one.46 But Shāfiʿī’s treatment of the subject of naskh has not always reflected this principle. One example that he cites to show his point is the change of the qibla to al-Masjid al-Harām in Mecca. The Qur’an states that the Mus˙ lims had a different qibla (2.142) before it changed it to al-Masjid al-Harām ˙ (2.144, 2.149–150). But the fi rst qibla was not introduced by a Qur’anic verse. The Qur’an mentions it only indirectly in the context of replacing it with the new qibla, but it still ascribes the choosing of the fi rst qibla to God.47 So the fi rst qibla was chosen by the Prophet as a result of nonQur’anic inspiration, i.e. it was introduced by the Sunna. This is a clear instance of a Qur’anic ruling abrogating a Sunna ruling. Shāfiʿī quotes two hadīths on the change of qibla to show that whenever a sunna was abro˙ gated by a Qur’anic verse, the Prophet issued a sunna confi rming that. This is one of the hadīths Shāfiʿī quotes: ˙ While people were in Qubā’ performing the morning prayer, someone came and said: “A new Qur’anic revelation was sent down to the Prophet last night. He has been ordered to face the qibla, so face it.” They used to face the direction of Syria, so they turned toward Mecca.48 The only way to reconcile Shāfiʿī’s principle that a sunna can be abrogated by a sunna only with the historical facts is to suggest that the change of the qibla was fi rst announced through a sunna and that the Qur’anic confi rmation came afterward, but Shāfiʿī does not say that. In fact, this hadīth confi rms that the sunna was abrogated by Qur’anic revelation. ˙ He argues elsewhere:

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 21 If someone asked: “Can a sunna be abrogated by the Qur’an?” The answer would be: “If a sunna was abrogated by the Qur’an the Prophet would have another sunna explaining that his previous sunna was abrogated by the later one, so that people would know that a ruling is abrogated by a ruling of the same type.”49 It may look like the possibility of the Qur’an abrogating the Sunna is being used rhetorically, but that is not certain. Shāfiʿī repeats this argument later to stress that if a sunna was abrogated by the Qur’an and there was no second sunna confi rming the abrogation of the fi rst, people would be confused about the latest ruling. One example he gives is the Qur’anic verse “Allah has made selling lawful and usury unlawful” (2.275) and the Prophetic saying that prohibits certain forms of trade even when there is mutual agreement between the buyer and seller. 50 Shāfiʿī’s argument is that the apparent contradiction between the Qur’an’s absolute permissiveness of selling and the exceptions introduced by the Prophet would make people drop any Prophetic ruling that seems to contradict the Qur’an as having been abrogated later by the Qur’an, presumably because they would not consider the possibility that it was the Sunna that abrogated the Qur’an. But this argument has a fundamental flaw, because it implies accepting that there is a contradiction between the Qur’anic and Prophetic rulings, which is something that Shāfiʿī vehemently denied! Otherwise, why would people not accept both rulings as operative? Also, Shāfiʿī does not position the Prophet’s ruling as contradictory to the Qur’an, but simply as clarifying it. It appears that what Shāfiʿī is arguing for here has nothing to do with abrogation, because the two rulings are reconcilable anyway. His real objective is to support the authenticity of such sunnas. Put differently, Shāfiʿī introduced the principle that a sunna can be abrogated by a sunna only in order to preserve the reported sunnas and confi rm them as the second source of Islamic law. After all, he argues that most of the abrogators in the Qur’an are known through the Sunna.51 All of these arguments occur in Risāla in the context of discussing abrogation! If these verses and sunnas are not involved in abrogating each other, then why are they being discussed in that context to begin with? One way to reconcile Shāfiʿī’s confusing and contradictory arguments is to suggest that he used the concept of naskh inconsistently. He took it at times to mean the total abrogation of one ruling by another, as in the case of the change of qibla, and at others as clarifying certain aspects of the law, as in the case of the ruling on selling, which often meant making a “general” law more “specific.” The explanation that makes sense of more of this confusion is that Shāfiʿī fully accepted that the Sunna can be abrogated by the Qur’an, but that he also believed that every time this happened, a new sunna was issued. But being an ardent defender of the position of the Sunna as the second source of Islamic law, he could not get himself to concede the

22

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

obvious, that there are instances in which the Sunna was abrogated by the Qur’an. In other words, Shāfiʿī’s statement that the Sunna cannot be abrogated by the Qur’an is false even in his own reasoning. His separation of the abrogation of the Qur’an and the Sunna is fraught with contradiction. He sacrificed the clarity of the concept of abrogation for establishing the authenticity of the reported Sunna, thus making it join the Qur’an as a source of Islamic legislation. There is one last point I should clarify. Since the Prophet implemented the Qur’an’s rulings like every Muslim, and given that his practice is considered Sunna, it may be argued that naturally every sunna that the Qur’an abrogated has a new sunna confi rming the abrogation. This can then be seen as a case of a sunna being abrogated by another sunna rather than by the Qur’an, which is another way of understanding what Shāfiʿī is proposing. But this view mistakes the real role of the new sunna as an implementation of the Qur’anic ruling for its being the source of that ruling. When scholars, including Shāfiʿī, talk about the Sunna being the abrogator they mean the Sunna is the source of the ruling. For instance, when the Muslims fi rst prayed in the direction of Jerusalem, a sunna must have been the source of this practice because this ruling is not mentioned in the Qur’an. But when Muslims later started praying in the direction of Mecca, that was due to a Qur’anic ruling. The fact that Muhammad also prayed in the direction of Mecca does not make this practice a sunna in the sense of it being the source of the ruling, which is what matters for the discussion of abrogation. Similarly, no scholar would call the fasting of Ramadan a sunna, despite the fact that it was observed by the Prophet, because it was introduced by the Qur’an. On the other hand, the practice of fasting other days in the year which is not found in the Qur’an but which the Prophet is reported to have done or recommended to the Muslims is rightly called Sunna. (3) An obligatory duty cannot be abrogated without being replaced by another one.52 For Shāfiʿī, abrogation meant substitution. Shāfiʿī’s three principles have been adopted by a minority of scholars only.53

1.3

NASKH AFTER SHĀFIʿĪ

Another important scholar who wrote about naskh is Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām (224/838). He was a well-known scholar of Hadīth, Qur’an, and jurisprudence. His special contribution to abrogation ˙is that he authored the earliest surviving book dedicated to discussing this concept, 54 as the attribution of Qatāda’s book is questionable. Burton has pointed out that Abū ʿUbaid’s book was compiled in the latest stages of his life, 55 which places it around the end of the fi rst quarter of the 3rd century. Abū ʿUbaid was a contemporary of Shāfiʿī and is said to have had the latter as one of his teachers. But his treatise on abrogation shows no

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 23 knowledge of or influence by Shāfiʿī, nor does it even mention him. Indeed, Abū ʿUbaid continues the tradition attributed to the early Muslims of using the term “naskh” in a very broad sense, including that of superseding one ruling by another, making a general ruling specific, and introducing exceptions. Unlike Shāfiʿī’s Risāla, which focuses on the principles of abrogation and uses examples mainly to illustrate them, Abū ʿUbaid’s book concentrates on discussing specific claims of abrogation related to certain verses and what different scholars thought about them. He classifies these instances of abrogation into approximately thirty chapters, each dedicated to a different subject, such as prayer, almsgiving, fasting, marriage, divorce, and so forth. Unlike Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbaid does not address the question of abrogation between the Qur’an and the Sunna. The term “naskh,” Abū ʿUbaid explains, is used in three ways in the Qur’an and the Sunna.56 First, the superseding of the ruling of one Qur’anic verse by another, with both verses present in the mushaf. This is legal abro˙˙ gation. Second, the removal of a revealed verse, including its ruling, from the mushaf and from the memory of the people. This is legal-textual abro˙ gation. ˙Abū ʿUbaid does not mention the textual mode of abrogation, even though another book of his reports the “stoning verse,”57 which scholars take to represent an instance of textual abrogation. This might mean that he did not take this passage to be the source of stoning and attributed this penalty to the Sunna. Third, the process of copying, as in copying a book. Abū ʿUbaid cites a large number of scholars who were involved one way or another in discussing abrogation-related issues. This makes it clear that by the second decade of the 3rd century, abrogation was a well-established concept with a long history of scholarly debate. Like Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbaid makes no effort at defi ning naskh. The next oldest substantial discussion of abrogation is found in a book on the Qur’an by al-Hārith b. Asad al-Muhāsibī (243/857). 58 The editor of ˙ this book thinks that ˙ this book was written in the the modern edition of second part of the second decade of the 3rd century, 59 which would place it around the time of the writing of Abū ʿUbaid’s book or a few years before it. Muhāsibī was a student of Shāfiʿī and Abū ʿUbaid before he turned his ˙ to Sufism. He quotes Abū ʿUbaid a few times in the discussion attention on abrogation. Muhāsibī mentions all three modes of abrogation—the earliest author to ˙ do so. However, as he distinguishes between abrogation claims using more criteria than the ruling and wording of a verse, he ends up categorizing them into as many as fifteen different groups! For instance, in the cases of claims of abrogated texts of the Qur’an that are not in the mushaf, he distinguishes between verses that people could still remember and˙ ˙those they could not. Even more interesting is his use of differences between scholars as classification criteria, which mainly applied to cases of legal abrogation. For example, one of his abrogation groups includes the verses on which scholars could not agree whether they were abrogated, and another covered

24

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

the claims that “the people of reason” could clearly see to be false.60 Even more interesting is the group of verses on which the Companions disagreed whether they were abrogated and the group of verses on which the Companions disagreed but which later Muslims agreed had been abrogated. Muhāsibī’s grouping system of abrogation claims demonstrates how con˙ abrogation was and how contested claims acquired more acceptroversial tance over time. It also shows that by the second decade of the 3rd century, abrogation was well established as a subject in Qur’anic and Islamic studies. The next oldest available source on abrogation is a book by ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Husain al-Zaidī (300/912).61 Burton has noted the substantial similarities˙ between Zaidī’s work and Abū ʿUbaid’s book.62 He concludes that Zaidī is likely to have relied on the writings of earlier authors and used Abū ʿUbaid’s book for the main materials and followed the same format whereby each chapter deals with a certain subject. Zaidī also accepts legal abrogation but, unlike Abū ʿUbaid, he completely rejects the mode in which a “chapter,” and presumably a verse, is removed from the mushaf ˙˙ and is made to be forgotten by people. It is only a century after Shāfiʿī that we encounter evidence of some scholars trying to defi ne naskh. In his commentary on 2.115 in his exegetical work, Tabarī mentions one of his books in which he discusses the mean˙ and mansūkh. These terms, as we have already seen, describe ing of nāsikh the abrogating and abrogated passages, respectively, but not the concept of abrogation as such. In referring to his book on naskh, Tabarī says: ˙ A Qur’anic verse or a report about the Messenger of Allah can be considered to be an abrogator only if it negated an established ruling that had been made obligatory on people and cannot be interpreted explicitly or implicitly otherwise. If it can accommodate a different interpretation—in the way of introducing an exception, making a generalization specific, or providing more details to something less detailed—then it has nothing to do with the concepts of abrogating and abrogated texts. . . . Nothing can be considered as having been abrogated unless it is established that it used to be an obligatory ruling.63 This defi nition is similar to what Shāfiʿī says. Tabarī’s renowned exe˙ getical work also quotes previous scholars on the possible abrogation of a number of verses. The reports of abrogation discussed in Tabarī’s exegesis ˙ thesis.64 The of the Qur’an were compiled and studied in a recent master’s author concluded that Tabarī reported ninety-five claims of abrogation but ˙ agreed with only thirty-seven cases, rejected fi fty-two, and did not address another six. Tabarī accepts legal abrogation and legal-textual abrogation. He makes no˙ mention of textual abrogation or the alleged verses that are associated with it. In his two-volume doctoral thesis on abrogation, which fi rst appeared as a book in 1963, Mustafā Zaid reviews the names of scholars who are ˙˙

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 25 claimed to have written about abrogation in the fi rst twelve centuries Hijri.65 This long list, however, is still limited by the number of resources he consulted.

1.4

NASKH AS A FULLY DEVELOPED PRINCIPLE

Had the work on abrogation attributed to Qatāda been really his, it would have indicated that by the second decade of the 2nd century one mode of abrogation had been identified. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām’s treatise, which was compiled one century later, mentions two of the eventual three modes of abrogation—legal and legal-textual. Around the same time, Muhāsibī wrote his book on the Qur’an in which he mentions all ˙ of abrogation. Muhāsibī’s is the earliest work to accept the three modes ˙ three modes. Ibn Qutaiba (276/889), who died about half a century after Abū ʿUbaid, accepts claims about Qur’anic verses that were not written in the mushaf but whose rulings remained valid.66 This is textual abrogation. Nah˙h˙ās, writing in the fi rst third of the 4th century Hijri, confi rms ˙ ˙ scholars have added a third mode to the two mentioned by that some Abū ʿUbaid.67 Nahhās does not seem to be in favor of the legal-textual ˙ abrogation because they claim that some Qur’anic and textual modes˙ of verses are not in the mushaf. A book attributed to Muhammad b. Hazm ˙ ˙ modes of abrogation.68 However, ˙ ˙ (320/932) defi nes the three the ascription of this book is questionable and so it cannot be used for dating.69 Nevertheless, this work will be referred to in this book under the name of Ibn Hazm for convenience. ˙ These are the three modes of abrogation, listed in their chronological order of formation: (1) Legal abrogation: the abrogation of the ruling of a verse but not its wording (naskh al-hukm dūna al-tilāwa). In this case, the verse exists in the mushaf, so it˙ is recited, but its ruling is inoperative and therefore is not˙ ˙implemented. This mode is acknowledged by every work on abrogation. (2) Legal-textual abrogation: the abrogation of both the ruling and wording of a verse (naskh al-tilāwa wal-hukm). This means that a ˙ verse that was revealed at some point as part of the Qur’an was not recorded in the mushaf, so it is not recited like the verses in the mushaf ˙ ˙ invalid. ˙˙ and its ruling became (3) Textual abrogation: the abrogation of the wording of a verse but not its ruling (naskh al-tilāwa dūna al-hukm). Such a verse is not found ˙ its ruling remains operative. in the mushaf, so it is not recited, but ˙˙ The naming convention I have introduced for the three modes of abrogation is simpler and clearer than the original Arabic names. It focuses on

26

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

Table 1.1

The Three Modes of Abrogation

Subject of Abrogation

Legal

Legal-Textual

Textual

Ruling

Yes

Yes

No

Wording

No

Yes

Yes

the subject of abrogation in each mode. The three modes of abrogation are shown in Table 1.1. Instances of legal abrogation are covered by the most common defi nition of naskh as the abrogation or annulment of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling. But other cases of the same mode fail to meet the requirements of this defi nition in a number of ways.70 The ten-suckling verse and stoning verse are the only cases of the legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation, respectively, that comply with the standard defi nition of abrogation. Nevertheless, this defi nition of abrogation gained universal adoption by scholars. Having the law as the focus of the standard defi nition is not surprising as abrogation has mainly been a legal principle used by jurists to deduce Islamic law. The three modes of abrogation are very different from each other. Using the term “abrogation” without identifying which mode is meant can be confusing in certain contexts. Yet this unhelpful practice is widespread and has contributed a great deal to the confusion that permeates the abrogation literature. I will use the term “abrogation” to refer to its standard defi nition, i.e. the annulment of a divine ruling by a new one, which covers mainly legal abrogation. But I will be specific when I need to identify specific modes of abrogation. In the standard defi nition of abrogation, the term “divine ruling,” which is my translation of the Arabic term hukm sharʿī, refers to any ruling set by ˙ are considered to be forms of divine the Qur’an or the Sunna, because both revelation. For an instance of naskh to be established, the standard defi nition stipulates that the following five conditions need to apply: (1) The abrogated law is revealed by God. (2) The abrogating law is revealed by God. (3) The abrogated ruling has been abolished by the abrogating ruling completely, not partially. (4) The abrogated and abrogating rulings have to be completely contradictory, i.e. they cannot be reconcilable so there is no possibility of both of them being valid at any one point. (5) The abrogating ruling is revealed after the law that it abrogates. The condition that both the abrogating and abrogated rulings have to be divine, i.e. belonging to the Qur’an or the Sunna, means that abrogation

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 27 could only have happened during the life of Prophet Muhammad. No method of deriving legislation can replace this requirement. Abrogation cannot be established by the “ijmāʿ (consensus)” of any number of scholars or by “qiyās (analogical reasoning).” This means that there has to be unequivocal evidence from the Qur’an or the sayings and doings of the Prophet for any case to be considered an instance of abrogation. Yet, as we shall see later, there is not a single case of alleged abrogation that cannot be seriously questioned. The same can be said about the abrogation of the text of a verse. A verse whose wording is said to have been abrogated, which in this case means withdrawn and excluded from being written down in the mushaf, could ˙˙ only have been withdrawn during the life of the Prophet. Only Muhammad could have told the Muslims if a verse had been withdrawn because that would have happened by divine revelation only. Scholars stress that abrogation applies only to practices, not to beliefs. This means that in the Qur’an it applies only to “imperative” verses, i.e. verses that carry commandments, but not to “indicative” ones. Revealed prescriptions and prohibitions can be abrogated, but not revealed information or reports. For instance, the permission in verse 2.184 to any Muslim to forgo the fasting of Ramadan in return for feeding one needy person for every forgone day is said to have been abrogated later by verse 2.185 for those who are capable of fasting.71 On the other hand, verses such as those recounting the story of Moses cannot be abrogated because they relate history, and this cannot change. The formulation of the three modes of abrogation demonstrates its focus on legalistic verses. Even in the case of textual abrogation, the verse is supposed to be legalistic, as the Arabic name of this mode refers to the “ruling” of the verse. Because abrogation is about overriding one divine ruling by another, if a new ruling did not replace a previous divine one then it does not represent a case of abrogation. For instance, the introduction of the daily prayer did not substitute a previous ruling but added a completely new practice to the life of the Muslim, so this is not an instance of abrogation. The consensus on the standard defi nition of abrogation is still accompanied with differences on further details of the concept. For instance, some scholars stipulate that the abrogated law must be replaced with a different ruling and not simply be abolished with no replacement. Shāfiʿī was one of these scholars. Some scholars require that the abrogated law must have been practiced before it was abrogated. But other scholars consider none of these a requirement for establishing the case of abrogation. We will see later that there is much more confusion and disagreement about various aspects of abrogation.72 While most scholars admitted the three modes of abrogation, there has never been consensus on all three. Al-Shawkānī (1250/1835) has claimed that some scholars rejected legal abrogation on the basis that there would have been no point in verses being in the mushaf if their rulings had been ˙˙

28

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

replaced.73 But this solitary claim may be ignored, as virtually all scholars who believe in the historicity of abrogation have accepted legal abrogation. This should not be surprising as this mode of abrogation is by far the less controversial of the three, as accepting or rejecting a particular abrogation claim boils down to how one interprets the allegedly abrogated verse and its abrogating text. It was also the fi rst to appear. The legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation, however, have failed to achieve unanimity. Some scholars accepted the former but rejected the latter. Others took the opposite view, rejecting legal-textual abrogation but admitting textual abrogation. This disagreement is due to a highly controversial aspect of these modes of abrogation. Legal-textual abrogation and textual abrogation both imply that the mushaf does not contain ˙˙ the complete revelation of the Qur’an. This is a fundamental difference between these modes of abrogation and legal abrogation, which does not make this claim. The overwhelming majority of scholars believe there are four types of abrogation between the Qur’an and the Sunna: (1) The abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an. (2) The abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna. (3) The abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an. (4) The abrogation of the Sunna by the Sunna. Shāfiʿī’s view that the Qur’an and the Sunna cannot abrogate each other was always accepted by a minority of scholars only. As discussed earlier, there is no evidence that the doctrine of abrogation was known to the fi rst generation of Muslims. It was developed by later scholars, gradually given more complexity and substance in the 2nd and 3rd century, and reaching its complete and standard form early in the 4th century. Naturally, as abrogation acquired more acceptance and appeal, more scholars resorted to it in their exegetical and legal works, so the number of abrogated verses continued to go up.74 After it became fi rmly established, abrogation always enjoyed the support of almost all scholars in the past. The only exception that is mentioned by name in the literature is Abū Muslim al-Isfahānī, who died around the ˙ Hijra. Some Muslim scholend of the fi rst quarter of the 4th century of the ars have argued that Isfahānī differed only in terms of seeing abrogation as a form of specifying˙ a general commandment or in the terminology he used.75 This reconciliatory attempt has been rightly rejected by others on the basis of Isfahānī’s clear statements and their fundamental disagreement ˙ with the principle of abrogation.76 It has recently also been suggested that Isfahānī might only be a “literary creation personifying the extreme posi˙ of the argument” on abrogation,77 but this is not a popular view. tion Isfahānī is not the only scholar of the past who rejected the concept of ˙ abrogation. There were always scholars who refused to accept this doctrine.

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 29 Nahhās complained that “some of the late scholars have said that ‘there is ˙˙ no abrogating or abrogated [verses] in the Book of Allah,’ challenging the elite and following other than the believers’ path.”78 Abū Bakr al-Jassās ˙˙ ˙ (370/980) referred to “the group of the people of prayer (Muslims) that denied abrogation,” whom he accused of “contradicting the Book, successive traditions, and the consensus of the predecessors and those who followed them.”79 Later Ibn Salāma talked about people who “have turned away from the truth and turned back from Allah with their lies” because they have claimed that “there are no abrogating and abrogated verses in the Qur’an.”80 The 6th century scholar Rāzī spoke about “some Muslims” who denied the existence of abrogation in the Qur’an.81 Commenting on verse 2.106 in his famous interpretation of the Qur’an, the 7th century exegete Qurtubī stated the following: ˙ Some late groups of those who belong to Islam have denied that it (abrogation) is possible. But they are refuted by the consensus of the past generations on its occurrence in Sharīʿa.82 While the supporters of abrogation argued that those who rejected it were a small minority, they could not convincingly trace this principle to the Prophet. All they could call upon were a few hadīths that have certain ˙ Companions explicitly confi rm the veracity of abrogation. Significantly, since the middle of the 19th century more Muslim scholars started breaking ranks with the near consensus of the scholars of old. These modernists have been willing to be more critical of the concept of abrogation and point out the various problems in this doctrine that the uncritical and dogmatic acceptance of the past centuries has glossed over. One such scholar is the Indian educator and thinker Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1917–1998), who took the term “naskh” in verse 2.106 to refer ˙to the abrogation of previous divine messages, not Qur’anic verses.83 Other subcontinent scholars who followed Ahmad Khān in rejecting abrogation include ˙ Ghulām Ahmad Parwēz (1903–1985).84 Aslam Jairājpūrī (1882–1955) and ˙ In Egypt, the reformist Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) did not ˙ reject abrogation but he proposed alternative interpretations for the verses that are seen as mentioning abrogation. His student Muhammad Rashīd ˙ teacher in his Ridā (1865–1935), who covered the exegetical views of his ˙ renowned Tafsīr al-Manār, agreed with him.85 Muhammad Khudarī (d. ˙ 1927) accepted that abrogation is possible, but he ˙also showed that all twenty instances of abrogation that Suyūtī listed can be explained without resorting to the concept of abrogation.86 ˙ One particularly important modern work that refutes the concept of abrogation is that of ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl al-Jabrī, a close follower of Hasan ˙ al-Bannā (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In 1949, Jabrī submitted to an Egyptian university a study that deals exclusively with abrogation in which he concluded that there is no abrogation

30

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

in the Qur’an or the Sunna. This controversial work became popular when it was published as a book in 1961, attracting both praise and severe criticism. A second edition of the book, in which the author responded to some of the criticism, was published a quarter of a century later.87 Jabrī discussed conceptual flaws in the doctrine of abrogation and used specific claims of abrogation as examples. His work inspired other scholars to reject the historicity of abrogation. A contemporary of Jabrī and another follower of Bannā who dismissed the doctrine of abrogation is the highly influential revivalist preacher and bestselling author Muhammad al-Ghazālī (1917–1996). Ghazālī did not dedicate a book to the ˙subject of abrogation but he covered it in a number of his works. He included a section on abrogation in his book Naz arāt fī al˙ several Qur’an, which he fi rst published in 1958.88 He revisited this subject times in his later writings89 but with no significant additions to his arguments, with his fi rst treatment of the subject remaining the most detailed. Ghazālī does not show awareness of Jabrī’s book. This turn against the concept of abrogation has resulted in the publication of more works. Another anti-abrogation work that is worth mentioning is the provocatively titled Lā Naskh fī al-Qur’an (No Abrogation in the Qur’an) by Ahmad Hijāzī al-Saqqā.90 In this work, more limited than ˙ ˙ scope, the author focused on examining and Jabrī’s in both depth and rebuffi ng all abrogation claims that Ibn Hazm reported in his book on ˙ this subject. Another contribution to the reassessment of the concept of abrogation that I should mention is that of the Shia Imām Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī (1899–1992). He rejects abrogation, and in particular the legal-textual and textual modes, on the basis that it is a form of tampering with the text of the Qur’an. But this rejection is not unqualified. He considers abrogation to be “possible, but only the Prophet or one of the imāms can determine what has been abrogated and when.” He “discusses all the alleged abrogated verses, whether they be purely textual or legal percepts, and shows that they actually stand unchanged.”91 Daniel Brown has dismissed this reassessment of the doctrine of abrogation as “apologetic.” This is what he has to say: The context of almost all of modern Muslim treatments of naskh is apologetic. Virtually all modern treatments of naskh apply the idea primarily to an inter-religious context. The classical understanding of naskh was, frankly, an embarrassment, especially in polemics with missionaries. It implied that the Qur’an was not consistent, not perfect, and perhaps not even complete.92 This wholesale dismissal of extensive scholarly efforts is driven by Brown’s disappointment that this modern trend among Muslim thinkers did not “lead to greater willingness to subject sources of authority to scrutiny—to

A History of the Concept of “Abrogation” 31 usher in more critical approaches to the text of the Qur’an.”93 His view is influenced by his conviction that the literature on abrogation suggests that “the text of the Qur’an was not fi xed and universally accepted within twenty-four years of Muhammad’s death, but rather was still fluid and the subject of controversy into the early eighth century.”94 While Brown accuses all Muslim scholars who rejected abrogation of being driven by their keenness to confi rm the integrity of the Qur’anic text, his criticism is driven by his own view that the Qur’an was fi nalized after the Prophet. That Brown’s criticism is itself driven by his own view of the history of the Qur’anic text is further confi rmed by his failure to note the following: 1) All available evidence suggests that abrogation appeared well after Muhammad and gradually developed over centuries. This points to its non-historicity rather than its being a genuine doctrine. 2) The rejection of abrogation is not a new phenomenon, as Brown’s analysis suggests. This doctrine faced objection from Muslim scholars, albeit by a minority, throughout its history. 3) The only Western scholar who has published a detailed study of abrogation, John Burton, dismissed abrogation as a tool introduced by early Muslim jurists and scholars for a number of reasons. Surely, Burton cannot be accused of being an apologist for the Qur’an! 4) Finally, abrogation should be discussed on its merits, regardless of what conclusions it leads to about the Qur’an. Brown should have criticized any shortcomings in the way Muslim scholars discussed and rejected abrogation, not what this rejection means for the history of the Qur’an. Regardless of the motives of those Muslim scholars, they are not more relevant to their works than Brown’s own motive for his assessment of those works. Despite the increasing number of the opponents of abrogation, including high-profile figures such as Ghazālī, most scholars still consider abrogation a genuine phenomenon. In fact, many think that denying the veracity of abrogation is a major creedal sin that amounts to the repudiation of Islam. Naturally, new works confi rming the historicity of abrogation continued to appear. 95 Often, though not always, authors have confi ned themselves to rehashing the centuries-old arguments.

2

Abrogation in Scriptures before the Qur’an

In its accounts of previous prophets, the Qur’an mentions legal rulings of previous religions that were changed by later revelations. This chapter examines whether these can be seen as instances of abrogation, i.e. whether there is evidence in the Qur’an that abrogation operated in revealed scriptures before Muhammad’s. The answer will be shown to be in the negative, as I will conclude that these cases do not meet the technical definition of any mode of abrogation. Muslim scholars have suggested that Jewish groups have denied the principle abrogation because they thought it would admit the possibility of the abrogation of the Mosaic law by the Qur’an. Some have identified certain Mosaic laws that were abrogated in the Old and New Testaments and discussed how Jesus in the New Testament is said to have changed some of his own rulings.1 This chapter, I should clarify, does not discuss how previous scriptural laws might have changed from the points of view of these religions. It rather focuses on how the Qur’an presents such changes, as the current study is interested in assessing whether abrogation is a Qur’anic concept. The term “Islam” is used by the Qur’an to refer to every religion that God revealed to His prophets, not only Muhammad. All prophets received from God and delivered to people the same universal message.2 The fundamental beliefs were the same in the religions taught by Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, and all other prophets. They all taught, the Qur’an stresses, the oneness of God, the worship-worthiness of God only, and the necessity of the belief in the Day of Resurrection, all of His messengers, and all divine Books that He revealed. For instance, God did not tell one prophet to teach people to worship one God and another to preach that his followers should worship more than one. Nor did He exclude the requirement to believe in the Day of Judgment from any message He sent. These beliefs were never subject to change. They are the core and common message of every religion He revealed. Similarly, certain fundamental moral principles that underlined various legislations did not change. For instance, adultery is considered a moral offense by all religions. Similarly, murder and theft were criminalized in every divine message. Nevertheless, different religions dealt with violations

Abrogation in Scriptures before the Qur’an 33 of such common moral fundamentals differently, prescribing different punishments and penances for the same offense. Unlike the doctrinal part of religion, which is the same in all religions, the legal system, which covered various rituals, practices, and codes of conduct, changed from one religion to another. The religions of different prophets had different legal codes that governed how the respective peoples they were sent to were required to behave. These legal rulings usually reflect changing human, societal, economic, and cultural conditions. This means that what applied to one culture, group of people, or era may not be applicable to another. Another category of differences in the legislations in different religions includes religious practices and rituals. For instance, the way Muhammad’s followers were commanded to pray is not exactly the same as Moses’ and so on, even though all prayed to the same God and used prayer as an expression of surrender to the will and might of the Divine One. But it is another category of differences that is most relevant to our current discussion. It is the prohibitions that God imposed to test people and help them develop a sense of submission and obedience to Him, not because the banned things or practices are intrinsically wrong. One example of this category of differences is the different kinds of food that were made illegal for the believers of different religions.3 It should now have become clear that changing the divine law cannot be dismissed as being in confl ict with the nature of that law or God’s action. It is a false argument to think that such changes depict God as changing His mind each time. Any change in the divine law is perfectly consistent with the image of God as the all-knowing supreme ruler of the world. God does not change His laws because He later realizes that they were wrong or because something new comes to His knowledge. When God introduces a law, He already knows how long this law will last, when He will change it, and for what reason. His foreknowledge of what is to come encompasses all His actions. So if abrogation is rejected, this cannot be done on the basis of its alleged contradiction with the nature of God’s actions. Even nonMuslim scholars who reject the concept of abrogation accept that it cannot be dismissed on theological grounds.4 The Qur’an reports from pre-Muhammad’s messages instances of legal rulings that were changed by later revelations. For instance, prophet Jacob had declared certain kinds of food illegal and the Israelites followed him. But that was later changed by the Torah that God revealed to Moses, so a new list of foods was disallowed: All food was lawful to the Children of Israel except that which Israel had forbidden to himself, before the Torah was revealed. Say [O Muhammad!]: “Bring then the Torah and recite it, if you are truthful.” (3.93)

This verse is even more explicit in stating that God made certain things unlawful to the Jews after He had declared them lawful:

34

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Because of the wrongdoing of the Jews We made unlawful to them good things that had been made lawful for them, and because of their hindering many [people] from Allah’s way. (4.160)

This is not the same change that happened by the revelation of the Torah, because the term “Jews” is applied in the Qur’an from the time of Moses only, 5 whereas Jacob lived three centuries before Moses. This change of the law from permission to prohibition was intended as a reminder of guilt. But the reverse can also happen to remind people of God’s favor. This is shown equally unequivocally in Jesus’ words to the Israelites that one aspect of his mission was to legalize for them things that had been made illegal: I have come to confirm that which was revealed before me of the Torah and to make lawful some of that which was forbidden to you. I have come to you with a sign from your Lord, so keep your duty to Allah and obey me. (3.50)

According to the Qur’an, prophets do not prohibit or allow what they like, but they act as instructed by God. For instance, Jesus annulled a previous divine ruling because he received a divine communication to this effect, i.e. a replacing ruling. Jesus here is acting only as a medium for conveying God’s commandments. This relaxation of the Mosaic law is likely to have been included in Jesus’ book, the Injīl, as shown in this verse that states that the Injīl, like the Torah, had to be observed by the People of the Book, i.e. those to whom the two Books were revealed: If they (the People of the Book) had observed the Torah, the Injīl, and that which was sent down to them from their Lord, they would have been nourished from above them and from beneath their feet. There is a moderate nation among them, but many of them follow an evil course. (5.66)

Verse 3.50 states that Jesus was commanded to declare legal only “some of that which was forbidden” to the Jews. Jesus’ Book modified and complemented the Torah, so the two should be seen as essentially one legal system. It is important to clarify and stress that the Qur’an’s description of the role played by Jesus in relaxing certain aspects of the law bears no resemblance to the process in which Christianity came to almost completely abolish the Mosaic law. The Qur’an describes a situation whereby a divine ruling that had declared certain things illegal was replaced by another that legalized them. Christianity, on the other hand, has developed an almost wholesale abolition of the Mosaic law. This rejection of the law was presented and promoted as being the result of the faith in Jesus replacing the need to follow the divine law as a way to gain God’s satisfaction. Furthermore, this change had nothing to do with Jesus or any divine revelation,

Abrogation in Scriptures before the Qur’an 35 but it was instigated by St. Paul and other early theologians. So the change to the law that was communicated by the historical Jesus had nothing to do with how Christianity—the religion that has almost nothing to do with Jesus and all to do with Paul and other early theologians—put the Mosaic law out of use.6 Unlike the Injīl, which complemented a previous law, the Qur’an represented a new legal code. The Qur’anic law is completely different from the Mosaic law and its modified form after Jesus’ revelation. This can clearly be seen in these two verses: Say [O Muhammad!]: “I do not find in that which has been revealed to me anything forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it, unless it is a dead animal, [poured] blood, the flesh of swine—for these are abomination—or impurity which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for other than Allah.” But whosoever is forced by necessity, without exceeding the limit or transgressing, [for him] your Lord is forgiving, merciful. (6.145) And for the Jews We forbade every animal with claws (undivided hoof), and We forbade them the fat of the oxen and the sheep except what adheres to their backs or their entrails or what is mixed up with a bone. Thus We recompensed them for their rebellion. And We are Truthful. (6.146)

The specific foods listed in verse 6.145 seem to have been prohibited for the Jews also. In other words, the Qur’an has a shorter list of proscribed food than that of the previous legal code. The fat of oxen and sheep, for example, is lawful for the followers of the Qur’an to eat. A more detailed list of foods that are prohibited for the believers of the new revelation is found in this verse: It has been made forbidden to you [the following for food]: The dead animal; blood; the flesh of swine; that which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for other than Allah; that which is killed by strangling, by a violent blow, by a headlong fall, or by the goring of horns; that which has been [partly] eaten by a wild animal, unless you are able to slaughter it [before its death]; and that which is slaughtered [as a sacrifice] on stone altars. (5.3)

The verse ends with an exception similar to the one in 6.145 for Muslims who are in difficult situations: “But as for him who is forced by necessity [to eat any such meat] by severe hunger, with no inclination to sin, then surely Allah is forgiving, merciful.” So the Qur’an introduces its own list of banned foods rather

than inheriting one from the Mosaic law or its modified version by Jesus. The fact that the Qur’an has a more relaxed law is seen in this verse: “The food of the People of the Book is lawful to you and your food is lawful to them ” (5.5). This implies that the food that was made lawful to the Jews and Christians did not contain any of the foods that were made unlawful to Muslims. The Jews and Christians had been given stricter dietary laws.

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The reciprocal permission to eat each other’s food means that, like Jesus’ mission, Muhammad’s relaxed the law for the Jews. Now, do these four cases of changing divine legislations represent instances of abrogation? First, verse 3.93 suggests that Jacob declared certain food forbidden using his own judgment, rather than as a result of God’s instructions. In this case, the Torah did not replace a divine ruling. But even if we presume that Jacob’s forbidden foods were identified to him by God in some way rather than by his reasoning, the modification to this law was revealed to a different and later prophet, i.e. Moses. The changed law would not have occurred to a scripture. In the second case of verse 4.160, it is difficult to tell when those lawful foods were made illegal for the Jews. It may refer to changes during Moses’ life. In this case, the Torah may have been modified at some point with the addition of new foods to the list of prohibitions. This would have been a case of abrogation in the scripture. But the verse may equally refer to a change that occurred after Moses, i.e. at the hand of a later and different unnamed prophet. The verse does not allow us to form a fi rm view. Third, Jesus clearly modified the legal code that was in place before him, but here also we have an instance of a change to a scriptural law by a later and different prophet and scripture. The last and fourth case is that of the Qur’an. But this is an instance of the revelation of a completely new legal system, so it obviously involved a later and different prophet, Muhammad. Only the second case may involve the possibility of an instance of a legal ruling that was revealed in a Book to a prophet being changed or annulled by revelation to the same prophet in the same Book. But what is certain is that there is no evidence in the Qur’an that this has happened. On balance, I am inclined to say that it did not happen, i.e. the modifying laws were given to a prophet after Moses, so not in the same scripture. The significance of this conclusion is that there is no evidence in the Qur’an that other scriptures had anything similar to abrogation in the Qur’an as defi ned by Muslim scholars. The latter is about the annulment of Qur’anic rulings by others, all of which were revealed to the same Prophet, Muhammad. The examples we discussed above involve different prophets and scriptures modifying the rulings revealed to earlier prophets. These changes are cross-law rather than intra-law activity. One may call this “external abrogation” as opposed to “internal abrogation,” but I would rather not use those terms because of the ambiguity and confusion that the term “abrogation” has developed. As is the case with legal abrogation, there is no evidence that any form of textual abrogation took place in previous scriptures. In order to confi rm the authenticity of the Islamic jurisprudential principle of abrogation in the Qur’an, we have to look for examples and references in the Qur’an. This is what the following chapters will examine.

3

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an

There is a highly important fact that we need to keep on our minds while we study abrogation: the Qur’an does not contain a single verse explicitly stating that any verse was abrogated by another! Similarly, there is no statement attributed to the Prophet confi rming that a verse was abrogated by Qur’anic or non-Qur’anic revelation.1 All abrogation claims are indirectly concluded using certain interpretations of Qur’anic verses and/ or from hadīths that imply the occurrence of abrogation. But this did not ˙ stop scholars from trying to fi nd references to the concept of abrogation in the Qur’an. Some of these attempts have focused on the use of the term “naskh,” which appears in four derivatives in as many verses. In this chapter, I will show how none of these occurrences of “naskh” is related in any way to the concept of abrogation of Qur’anic verses.

3.1

THE VARIANT “NUSKHATIHĀ (THEIR INSCRIPTION )”

The fi rst variant of “naskh” occurs in the following verse, which talks about the Tablets of the Torah that God wrote for Moses: And when Moses’ anger calmed down, he took the Tablets and in nuskhatihā (their inscription) was guidance and mercy for those who fear their Lord. (7.154)

The noun “nuskhatihā” may be translated as “their copy” or “their inscription.” So “naskh” in this verse is different from the technical meaning of this term.

3.2

THE VARIANT “NASTANSIKHU (TRANSCRIBING )”

The second variant is the verb “nastansikhu,” which means “[We were] transcribing (copying).” It occurs in a verse that forms part of a speech to people by God and those in charge of executing His commands on the Day of Resurrection:

38

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law And you shall see every nation kneeling, every nation being summoned to its Book: “Today you shall be recompensed for what you were doing. (45.28) This is Our Book speaking against you the truth; We were nastansikhu (transcribing) all that you were doing.” (45.29)

Like 7.154, verse 45.29 uses the term “naskh” to mean “record” or “transcribe.” The technical meaning of “naskh” as “abrogation” cannot be concluded from any of these two verses.

3.3

THE VARIANT “YANSAKHU (ANNULS )”

The third form of the term is “yansakhu.” It is met in verse 22.52, where it may be translated as “annul” or “annihilate.” This is the verse along with the two verses that follow it: We have not sent any messenger or prophet before you but that when he wished, Satan cast into his wish. But Allah yansakhu (annuls) what Satan casts, then Allah confirms His verses. Verily, Allah is all-knowing, all-wise. (22.52) So that He may make what Satan casts a trial for those in whose hearts there is a sickness and those whose hearts are hard. Verily, the wrongdoers are in a wide schism [from the truth]. (22.53) And so that those who have been given knowledge may know that it is the truth from your Lord and believe in it, and so their hearts be humble to Him. Allah will surely guide those who believe to a straight path. (22.54)

Concluding his citation of similar or identical interpretations of several scholars of 22.52, Tabarī confi rms that he adopts the same understanding ˙ of this verse: We have not sent before you a messenger or a prophet but that when he recited the Book of Allah, read it, narrated, or spoke, Satan insinuated into the Book of Allah that he recited and read or into the speech he narrated and spoke. Then “Allah annuls what Satan casts.” God (glory be to Him) says that He would remove what Satan casts of this onto the tongue of His prophet and annuls it.2 The interpretation of verses 22.52–54 has been linked to an unhistorical story that was reported by a number of exegetes and historians, including Tabarī. One modern scholar has noted that this incident “seems to have ˙ constituted a standard element in the memory of the early Muslim community about the life of Muhammad.”3 Like many other stories in early Islamic sources, the story is found in a number of versions with different wordings and details. I will cite here the most reported form of the story. The event in question is named after the term gharānīq that appears in the

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 39 story. This vague term is said to refer to “cranes” or “young ones,” or to have some other meanings, but its generic meaning is of little interest as what interests us is its specific referent in this story. According to this fiction, Muhammad was upset that most of his people had shunned the Qur’an and he wished that God would reveal to him verses that would attract them to the new religion. Satan took this opportunity and managed to put in Muhammad’s mind certain words that the Prophet mistook for new Qur’anic revelations, so he recited them to people after genuine, new Qur’anic verses. More specifically, the story is connected with the revelation of the early verses of chapter 53, up to verse 20: He (Prophet Muhammad) has seen of His Lord’s greatest signs. (53.18) Have you [O you who disbelieve!] seen Lāt, ʿUzzā, (53.19) and Manāt, the third, the other one? (53.20)

The Qur’an here sarcastically contrasts the Arabs’ powerless female idols Lāt, ʿUzzā, and Manāt, who could offer nothing to their believers (53.19– 20), with the all-powerful Allah and the miracles He showed to Prophet Muhammad (53.18). It is claimed that after receiving these verses and reciting them to people in Mecca, the Prophet was tricked by Satanic suggestions that sounded to him like a continuation of these verses. They were something like “those are the gharānīq (cranes) whose intercession is hoped for.” These words would have glorified the idols which the Peninsular Arabs before Islam used as intermediaries to God, so the polytheists approved of them and even joined the Prophet in prostrating themselves after he read to them the newly revealed verses. It would have been the fi rst time that the polytheistic Arabs heard the Prophet say anything positive about their idols, let alone confi rm their status. In the evening, the angel Gabriel, who used to communicate the Qur’an’s revelations to the Prophet, came to Muhammad to listen to his reading of the newly revealed verses, as he used to do. When the Prophet uttered that passage after verse 20 Gabriel told him that he never communicated to him these words. The Prophet got very upset with himself for having lied about God and attributed to Him words He did not say. God then revealed to him verse 22.52 to comfort him that such confusion happened to all prophets and reassure him that He stamps out the Satanic suggestions and affi rms His words. The Prophet went on to publicly retract the false verses. This repudiation angered those who had become more willing to accept the new religion, so they relapsed to their rejection of the Qur’an. This is the story in brief. Not surprisingly, this story is particularly popular among critics of the Qur’an and the Prophet. One good example of the strong link of this story to the concept of abrogation is that Tabarī discusses it in his commentary on 22.52, not the chap˙ ter that it allegedly relates to, i.e. 53.4 As noted by Burton, “it was solely in order to justify these interpretations of what this verse was thought to

40

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state that Tabarī introduced the infamous hadīths alleging Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ incredible compact with the Meccans.”5 Tabarī used the story to explain ˙ the concept of abrogation. Most Western scholars have noted that the story of the gharānīq contradicted the Qur’an’s doctrine and would have, therefore, been “embarrassing” to the Muslims. The incident, they conclude, could not have been made up by Muslims and must, therefore, be historical. For instance, William Montgomery Watt insists that “Muhammad must have publicly recited the satanic verses as part of the Qur’an; it is unthinkable that the story could have been invented by Muslims or foisted upon them by non-Muslims.”6 This is how the same view is expressed by Alfred Guillaume: It is impossible to suggest a motive that would induce them to write such a story about the prophet unless it were true .  .  . if historical evidence is to be given any value, we must hold that Muhammad pronounced these words in the middle of Sura 53. Whether they were even existent in a written copy is impossible to say.”7 But this argument is based on an assumption that the Orientalists themselves know to be untrue, which is the claim that all reported stories in the Islamic literature must have originated with Muslims. While it seems logical to think that “it is impossible to imagine a Muslim inventing such an inauspicious tale,”8 the reality is that a report could have easily been created by someone who wanted to discredit Prophet Muhammad and his religion, such as the disbelievers of Mecca and Muhammad’s opponents in Medina, and there was no shortage of either. The reported “Satanic Verses,” as the 19th century Scottish Orientalist Sir William Muir called them,9 were one such invention. This expression and the story behind it were recently popularized by the novelist Salman Rushdie in his controversial 1988 novel that carried that expression as its title. One may counterargue that the suggestion that these words were the creation of an enemy of Islam does not change the fact that they were transmitted by Muslim scholars. But Orientalists would also agree that there are numerous instances of Muslims scholars accepting evidently contradictory accounts that could not all be historical yet choosing to deal with them by a process of rationalization that seems to them to have neutralized those irreconcilable differences. This approach was applied even to derogatory claims that conflicted with other historical accounts. So the Orientalists’ main argument employs a feeble logic. But, more importantly, there are also a number of strong arguments that the gharānīq incident is wholly fictitious, which is why some Western scholars, including Burton,10 have rejected it. First, this fable has been reported, accepted, and propagated by a small number of scholars and exegetes, including Tabarī in his exegetical work11 ˙ and al-Wāhidī (468/1075) in his renowned classic Asbāb al-Nuzūl.12 But it ˙

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 41 is not mentioned by the overwhelming majority of scholars. Significantly, it is not found in any of the main collections of the Hadīth. Furthermore, the authenticity of the line of transmission of the story˙ has been rejected by most scholars.13 Leone Caetani is one Western scholar who agrees with this view.14 The various accounts of the story disagree on many of its details, including the wording of the gharānīq passage. So while a minority of scholars tried to rationalize and neutralize the story, the majority rejected it outright. Second, scholars have logically argued that it is impossible that the Prophet could have got confused about the most fundamental element of his religion: the oneness of God. This was the essence of his message from day one and the main reason of its rejection by the polytheists of Mecca. Muhammad was seeking reconciliation, not confl ict, with his people, so it is plausible that he might have wished for divine revelation that would reduce the growing conflict and bring his people closer to his message. But it is preposterous to think that he could have hoped for something like accepting the divinity of his people’s idols. This would have been the equivalent of rejecting the Qur’an and the new religion and going back to the idolatry of the Arabs. One variation to the story that was introduced to address this problem is the suggestion that the false verses were not uttered by the Prophet but by Satan. Satan is said to have read them aloud after Muhammad’s reading of verse 53.20, confusing those present into thinking that they were uttered by Muhammad. This variation of the story is found, for instance, in Qurtubī’s ˙ commentary on 22.52.15 The attribution of the notorious verses to Satan in some versions of the story is an acknowledgment that those false verses could not have been said by the Prophet. Third, even if it were possible for the Prophet to confuse Satanic inspiration with divine revelation for a while, sharing this confusion with others would have caused irreparable damage. It would have created in the minds of the Muslims a state of uncertainty about the authenticity of any reported revelation that would have been almost impossible to get rid of. Anytime a new revelation was communicated, people would have wondered whether it was genuine Qur’an, i.e. inspired by God, or the result of Satanic influence, because it would have been the Prophet himself who was communicating both. Furthermore, verse 22.52 seems to suggest that Satan tries this trick whenever a prophet starts to develop that kind of wishful thinking about his people. Given that this is unlikely to have been a one-off state of mind for the Prophet, if Satan had once succeeded in confusing him, it is unlikely that this would have been his only successful attempt. This, in turn, would mean that the Prophet would have confused people with a mix of divine revelation and Satanic suggestion every time he was confused! Yet any repeat of such incidents would have made the task of any prophet to convince people of the authenticity of his message simply impossible. Additionally,

42

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

there are no reports of incidents similar to the gharānīq story, contrary to what one would expect on the basis of that story. Burton, who disagrees with the consensus of Western scholars on the historicity of the gharānīq episode, has noted the logical fallacy implied in this story. He argues: This was why scholars like Qurtubī and Baidāwī scornfully rejected the ˙ ‘pious Mussulmans,’ ˙ legend, not just because they were but because, as sensible men, they detected the logical impossibility of the stories.16 Fourth, if the gharānīq story were historical, the Qur’an would have addressed directly and explicitly the consequences of the suggestion that non-divine verses, let alone Satanic suggestions, were falsely presented as Qur’an, even if temporarily. Yet there is no verse in the Qur’an that deals with the fallout of the alleged incident. On the contrary, there are verses that categorically and absolutely confi rm that the Qur’an is protected from any external intervention: Verily, it is We who revealed the Remembrance (the Qurʾan), and verily We are its Guardian. (15.9) Surely, those who disbelieved in the Remembrance (the Qurʾan) when it came to them [were wrong]. Surely, it is an impregnable Book. (41.41) Falsehood cannot come to it from anywhere; [it is] a revelation from One who is Wise and Praised. (41.42)

These verses suggest the exact opposite of what the gharānīq incident claims. This absolute protection of the Qur’an from any non-divine intervention is emphasized again with reference to the Prophet himself. The following verses stress that Muhammad would have been swiftly and severely punished had he attributed to God words that were not genuine revelation: No! I swear by that you [O people!] see (69.38) and by that you do not see. (69.39) It (the Qurʾan) is the speech of an honorable Messenger. (69.40) It is not the speech of a poet that little you believe (69.41) or the speech of a soothsayer that little you remember. (69.42) It is a sending down from the Lord of all people. (69.43) Had he falsely attributed to Us some sayings, (69.44) We would have seized him by the right hand (69.45) and We would have cut his life-vein (69.46), and no one of you could have protected him. (69.47)

As Muhammad was not killed by God, these verses imply that he did not commit the grave mistake of making up false verses. Verses 69.44–47 reminded all that the entire Qur’an that the Prophet was reciting to them was revealed from God. These verses draw a completely different picture from that of the story of the gharānīq.

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 43 This is another set of relevant verses: They (the disbelievers) were close to seducing you [O Muhammad!] from that We revealed to you to falsely attribute to Us something else in which case they would then have taken you as an intimate friend. (17.73) Had We not established you, you were about to incline to them a little, (17.74) [in which case] We would have made you taste double the torment of life and double the torment of death and you would not have found a helper against us. (17.75)

These verses also confirm that the Prophet was protected by God against being seduced by the disbelievers. The Qur’an has verses discussing mistakes by Muhammad, such as his giving little time to a blind man who visited him as he was focused on winning over Mecca’s more powerful leaders to his cause (80.1–10). This confi rms that had the Prophet committed the mistake outlined in the story of gharānīq the Qur’an would have addressed it, if that was not going to be the end of him or at least of his mission as a prophet. Fifth, it is equally unconvincing to argue that Muhammad would have hoped for the reported kind of compromise with the polytheists. It is true that it could have made those who rejected the Qur’an more willing to accommodate it, but it is equally true that it would have alienated those who had already embraced the new religion. This would have been nothing short of a fatal blow to the new religion as its very followers would have turned their backs on it. The sixth argument is that the alleged Satanic words contradict the verses that they are supposed to follow and proceed. Verses 53.18–20 talk sarcastically against the worship of the named idols, so it would have made no sense for them to be followed by words that glorified them! If such an incident were possible, such a passage praising the Meccan deities would not have been mentioned following verses that ridicule these idols. Satan’s words that the Prophet allegedly read after 53.20 would have been seen by all to be completely out of place and would not have done much to reduce the very strong tone of the earlier verses that rejected the idolatrous beliefs of the Arabs. Furthermore, the Qur’anic verses that follow 53.20 are completely in line with the earlier verses as they continue the same theme, with no trace of any disruption caused by any missing text: He (Prophet Muhammad) has seen of His Lord’s greatest signs. (53.18) Have you [O you who disbelieve!] seen Lāt, ʿUzzā, (53.19) and Manāt, the third, the other one? (53.20) So the male is for you and the female is for Him? (53.21) This is an unfair distribution! (53.22) They are nothing but names that you and your fathers have named; Allah has sent down no authority attesting to them. They (the disbelievers) follow only conjecture and what the souls desire, yet guidance has come to them from their Lord. (53.23) Or shall man have

44

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law whatever he fancies? (53.24) But Allah’s is the hereafter and the present. (53.25) How many an angel there is in the heavens whose intercession can have no benefit except after Allah gives permission to whom He pleases and chooses. (53.26) Those who do not believe in the hereafter call the angels with female names. (53.27) They have no knowledge of that; they follow nothing but conjecture, and surely conjecture can never replace the truth. (53.28)

Verses 53.21–22 continue the sarcastic tone as they remind the Arabs that it is unfair of them to attribute to God females and take to themselves males, as the Arabs saw the female as inferior to the male. They even practiced female infanticide, which the Qur’an abolished (81.8–9). The Qur’an then rejects the polytheists’ unfounded claims (53.23) and reminds people that one’s wishful thinking bears no relation to the truth (53.24), confi rming that it is God who dictates the truth (53.25). The false claim about the intercession of the Meccan idols is then contrasted with the real intercession of angels (53.26). Verse 53.27 goes on to link the untrue claim about the divinity of the Meccan female idols to the equally false claim that the angels were females. All such claims are based on conjecture that is not supported by any authority from God (53.28).17 Let’s remind ourselves of the relevance of this rather detailed discussion of the gharānīq incident to the subject of this book. This story links the Qur’anic statement “Allah annuls what Satan casts, then Allah confirms His verses ” to a passage that was supposedly wrongly deemed to be part of the Qur’an for a period of time, regardless of how short, before it was annulled. Admittedly, the text in question was never genuine Qur’an, but the event is still reminiscent of one form of naskh—legal-textual abrogation—whereby revealed Qur’anic verses were excluded by God from being in the mushaf. Indeed, Burton has argued that the gharānīq hadīth was introduced˙ ˙to support the legal-textual mode of abrogation.18 ˙It is undeniable that Tabarī used this to justify his mistaken interpretation of the ˙ in verse 22.52, but this story cannot be justifiably linked to term “naskh” legal-textual abrogation. The latter presumes the withdrawal of a genuine Qur’anic text, whereas the alleged Satanic suggestions in the gharānīq story were never accepted by Muslims, including those who reported the incident, as genuine Qur’anic revelation. In fact, it was a cynical Orientalist who called that infamous passage “Satanic Verses,” and only non-Muslims referred to it as “verses.” But what is, then, the correct interpretation of verse 22.52? Burton has suggested a rather weak one. He notes that the verses preceding 22.52 talk about the Day of Judgment and observes that the Qur’an emphasizes in several places that the time of the Hour was unknown even to the Prophet. He cites 22.47, which reminds people that one day in God’s reckoning is as a thousand in theirs, before opining that 22.52 might refer to the fact any prophet would have “laid himself open to be misled into error by Satan” if he was “tempted to offer his own human opinion on some matter

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 45 discoverable only by means of revelation.” Like all prophets before him, Muhammad was taunted for not knowing the time of the Day of Judgment but “any attempt on Muhammad’s part to be specific about the date of the Hour must inevitably fail, and had therefore best be avoided, and the challenge of the unbelievers permitted to pass unanswered.”19 I fi nd this interpretation extremely weak, not least because the link between verse 22.52 and the Prophet’s lack of knowledge of the time of the Day of Judgment is completely speculative and lacks any evidence. In fact, chapter 22 does not even contain any of the verses that confi rm that the Prophet did not know the time of the Hour! One possible interpretation of 22.52 is that the verse shows that a prophet’s keenness to receive specific revelations makes him vulnerable to suggestion from Satan. The latter tries to mislead the prophet by insinuating to him thoughts that would sound like divine revelation. The Devil cannot communicate with the prophet through the same spiritual and mental channel that God uses for His revelation, but the prophet’s wishful thinking opens up another channel that Satan can take advantage of to communicate to the prophet what he wants, emulating in some way God’s communication. He tries to get the prophet to confuse such thoughts with genuine revelation. But God foils Satan’s attempts by removing his insinuation. In order to preserve the integrity of His revelation, the annulment of those Satanic thoughts must happen before they are treated as divine revelation by the prophet and be acted on their instruction. The communication from Satan is removed before the prophet becomes even aware of it, so it is not the prophet who verifies that certain thoughts were suggested by Satan and do not represent divine revelations, but it is something that God does to protect His message and prophet at a time in which the latter is more susceptible to the influence of Satan. It may seem to some that 22.53 talks about the same Satanic insinuation mentioned in verse 22.52: We have not sent any messenger or prophet before you but that when he wished, Satan cast into his wish. But Allah annuls what Satan casts, then Allah confirms His verses. Verily, Allah is all-knowing, all-wise. (22.52) So that He may make what Satan casts a trial for those in whose hearts there is a sickness and those whose hearts are hard. Verily, the wrongdoers are in a wide schism [from the truth]. (22.53) And so that those who have been given knowledge may know that it is the truth from your Lord and believe in it, and so their hearts be humble to Him. Allah will surely guide those who believe to a straight path. (22.54)

This cannot be the case because it would mean that Satan’s suggested falsehood would become public, which I have shown could not have happened without irrevocable damage to the mission of the prophet. Verse 22.53 creates a contrast between the protection of the channel of communication of

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

God’s revelation to people—i.e. the prophet—against any Satanic intervention, on one hand, and the vulnerability of the disbelievers to the Devil, on the other. Put differently, the things that Satan casts in 22.52 are not the same as those cast in verse 22.53. The fact that what Satan casts into the prophet’s mind to confuse him is obliterated before it materializes makes possible the situations described in verses 22.53 and 22.54, both of which talk about people, not the prophet. By ensuring that the revelation is communicated to the people as it was revealed by God and with no confusion with any other words, those who follow Satan and reject the divine message would have no excuse (22.53) and those who are willing to accept the revelation would have the opportunity to do so (22.54). In his outstanding exegetical work al-Mīzān, Muhammad al-Tabatabā’ī ˙ ˙ 22.52– ˙ (1892–1981 CE) offers two other plausible interpretations for verses 53. Unlike my explanation and the standard ones, which presume that the prophet is the subject of Satan’s action in 22.52, Tabatabā’ī’s interpreta˙ prophet ˙ tions presume that Satan’s target is the people that the targets with his message. The fi rst is based on interpreting the term “tamannā” as “wished,” as most scholars, and my translation above, do. 20 In this case, the verses mean that when a prophet wishes for success in spreading his message, Satan tries to undermine that wish by influencing people to reject the prophet. But God annuls Satan’s actions and grants the prophet his wish by allowing his message to be embraced by people. The second interpretation employs the suggestion of some scholars21 that “tamannā” in this context means “recited” as in reading divine revelations. Tabatabā’ī suggests that 22.52 would mean that when the prophet recites ˙ ˙ has been revealed to him, Satan influences people to argue with the what prophet and throw doubts in the hearts of the believers. But God enables the prophet to repel Satan’s attack and win the debates with his doubters by inspiring him with new revelations. Regardless of which interpretation is the right one, I fully agree with Tabatabā’ī in rejecting the gharānīq incident. This story is absurd, prepos˙ ˙ and unfounded. Any attempt to show it to be historical is bound to terous, ignore the substantial arguments to the contrary and replace them with the weakest of assumptions.22 Like the derivatives of “naskh” in 7.154 and 45.29, the variant of this term in 22.52 cannot be related to the concept of abrogation of Qur’anic verses. This verse seems to come closest when it is taken to mean the removal of false verses. But in addition to being a misinterpretation, this wrong understanding of the verse is still completely different from the concept of abrogation as the annulment of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling. That misinterpretation turns naskh into the annulment of false verses or Satanic insinuations—a concept that has nothing to do with the technical meaning of naskh.

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 47 3.4

THE VARIANT “NANSAKH (REMOVE )”

We are left with one verse to see whether the use of the term “naskh” in the Qur’an may be linked to the concept of abrogation. This is the verse in question: Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten (nunsihā) We bring a better or the like of it. Do you not know that Allah is powerful over everything? (2.106)

The overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars have accepted the concept of abrogation, and virtually all of those who have done so see this verse as clear evidence that abrogation was a real Qur’anic mechanism for changing divine rulings. These scholars fi nd support for their view in the many reports about various Companions and Successors who understood 2.106 to denote abrogation of Qur’anic verses. Tabarī lists almost thirty ˙ for example, acquainsuch quotes in his commentary on 2.106. He quotes, tances of the Companion Ibn Masʿūd who stated that the phrase in question means the confirmation of the text of a verse and the abrogation of its ruling. Tabarī explains his interpretation of “Whatever āya We nansakh” as follows: ˙ He (praise be to him) means by “Whatever āya We nansakh” whatever ruling of a verse that We change to another, thus changing and substituting it. This happens by making the permissible proscribed, the proscribed permissible, the allowed disallowed, and the disallowed allowed. This applies only to the commandment and proscription, prohibition and permission, and prevention and allowance. As for the reports (indicative verses), there can be no abrogating or abrogated passages in them.23 But there are a number of serious flaws in linking 2.106 to abrogation. First, let’s recall that there are three different modes of abrogation: the abrogation of both the text of a verse and its ruling, the text of a verse but not its ruling, and the ruling of a verse but not its text. Given that 2.106 makes the term “āya” the subject of the alleged abrogation, in order for the three modes to be covered by this verse, “āya” has to be interpreted as meaning the text and its ruling in the case of the legal-textual mode, the text but not its ruling in the textual mode, and the ruling but not its text in legal abrogation! This stretching of the term “āya” is necessary to make 2.106 refer to abrogation; otherwise the verse would be linked to one of three modes of abrogation at most, leaving the other two with no support. This is no more than convenience that has no justification in the Qur’an. Indeed, this interpretation seems more of a manipulation of the meaning of the Qur’anic text than a genuine attempt to understand it. This is a case of one unambiguous Qur’anic term whose appearance in one particular verse

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is given a number of different meanings by scholars in order to force on the Qur’an a concept that is alien to it. Second, the term “āya” in the Qur’an has the general meaning of “proof,” “sign,” or “miracle.” This is what the term means in most of its occurrences in the Qur’an. For instance, any natural phenomenon that points to God, such as the growth of various plants, the alteration of the night and day, the two luminaries, and the stars (16.11–13), is called “āya.” For the same reason, Mary’s miraculous conception of Jesus resulted in their description as an “āya” (21.91). There are a number of verses in which various prophets were challenged by their respective peoples to come up with an “āya,” meaning a “miraculous sign,” to confi rm that they were sent by God. For instance, prophet Sālih ˙ an˙ was told by his people: “You are not but a human being like us, so bring us āya (sign), if you were one of the truthful” (26.154). Given that a verse of the Qur’an is also a divine miracle that points to God, the term “āya” is also used in the specific meaning of “verse” of the Qur’an. But nowhere in the Qur’an is this term used to specifically mean “divine ruling” or indeed any kind of ruling. A Qur’anic verse may or may not convey a legal ruling. The overwhelming majority of Qur’anic verses are indicative, i.e. not associated with the enactment or annulment of any ruling. At most, less than 10% of the verses may be seen as legal in nature. Yet as we saw above, legal abrogation and legal-textual abrogation both require taking “āya” to mean “ruling.” Third, the Qur’an has a term for “ruling” or “judgment” that is different from the feminine “āya.” This term is the masculine “ḥukm” (e.g. 6.57, 6.62, 12.40): But how can they make you [O Muhammad!] their judge when they have the Torah which contains Allah’s judgment (ḥukm)? They then turn away after that; such are not believers. (5.43) Is it the judgment (ḥukm) of the time of ignorance that they seek? Who is better than Allah in judging for people who have certainty [of faith]? (5.50)

One derivative of this term is “ḥikma,” which occurs in many verses (e.g. 2.129). This term, which may be translated as “wisdom,” indicates a divine gift of knowing right and wrong and being a just judge. Variations of the verb “yaḥkum” occur in numerous verses (e.g. 2.113, 5.58). Fourth, this fundamental problem is further highlighted by the application of the word “nunsihā” or “cause to be forgotten” to the term “āya.” It does not make sense to suggest that the ruling of a verse, which would be part if not all of its meaning, but not its text can be made to be forgotten, which is what legal abrogation states. It is equally nonsensical to suggest that the text of a verse can be rendered forgotten but not the ruling that was derived from it, which is the case in textual abrogation! These preposterous

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 49 conclusions are inevitable results of the combination of understanding “nansakh” to mean “abrogate,” taking “āya” to mean “verse,” and having two abrogation modes where only the wording or the ruling of a verse is abrogated. Fifth, the clause “We bring a better or the like of it” further exposes the problems in understanding “āya” as meaning “ruling.” Exegetes have suggested explanations as to how a ruling can be “better.” For instance, it can be lighter, to make it easier for people to carry out, or it can be harder, which would make them earn more rewards from God for implementing it. But what does it mean to replace a ruling with “the like of it”? Only the same ruling would be similar to the old one, and that creates an obvious circular logic in the Qur’anic statement. Sixth, when taking the term “āya” to mean a verse of the Qur’an, the clause “We bring a better or the like of it” poses a similar problem. One may opine that bringing a similar verse means bringing a different wording with the same meaning, but that kind of replacement sounds rather meaningless. But even more difficult is the suggestion that one verse can be “better” than another. Scholars agree that all divine verses are miraculous and equal. This is why, Burton argues, 24 scholars have interpreted the term “āya” as “ruling” to avoid this problem, although as we have seen in the first point above, the adherents of abrogation are forced to use the term “āya” to mean both “verse” and its “ruling.” The concept of a verse being better than another does not exist in the Qur’an. Interestingly, there are hadīths that promote the non-Qur’anic claim ˙ than others. For instance, one hadīth states that certain verses are greater that the Prophet indicated that verse 2.255 is “the greatest ˙verse in the Qur’an.”25 Another hadīth suggests that chapter 112, which consists of four ˙ in importance “a third of the Qur’an.”26 Such narverses only, represents ratives appear among the large number of hadīths on the virtues of specific ˙ of taking the praise of those verses and chapters and seem to be the result verses too far. In any case, such claims are not supported by the Qur’an. These six arguments undermine the case for seeing 2.106 as supporting the concept of abrogation. While the reading of the majority of scholars is “nunsihā,” this is not how this word is read by some. Abū ʿAmrū (118/736) and Ibn Kathīr (120/738), whose readings are among the approved “seven readings” of the Qur’an, 27 have instead the word “nansa’hā” which is derived from the root “nas’,” a variant of which appears in verse 9.37 in the Qur’an.28 The word “nansa’hā” then means “We defer it” or “We leave it,” i.e. it excludes the word “āya” from the action of the verb “nansakh.” In this alternative reading, “nansa’hā” is taken to refer to those verses that have been excluded from being the subject of abrogation. So the verse would then mean something like “whatever āya We abrogate (nansakh) or leave (nansa’hā) without abrogation .  .  .” However, there is an obvious problem with any reading that takes the fi rst verb in the verse to mean “abrogate” and at the same time gives the second

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verb an exceptive function. This is seen in the text following the second verb: “We bring a better or the like of it.” This part applies to the actions of both verbs, so both must mean some form of “removal,” “disappearance,” “nullification,” or something similar. If one suggests that the second verb excludes some verses from the first one, and that this exclusion means that those verses remain unchanged, then applying the clause “ We bring a better or the like of it” to those exempted verses would make no sense. Tabarī accepts that the correct reading is “nunsihā,” but he also accepts the ˙ claims of some that this term means “We leave it,” i.e. “We do not abrogate it.”29 This interpretation makes the difference between reading the word as “nunsihā” or “nansa’hā” immaterial. Worse still, it has the flaw explained above, as the full meaning of the verse would be something like: “Whatever āya We abrogate or leave unchanged We bring a better or the like of it.” Clearly, the last part of the verse is talking about replacing a verse, so it is not possible that the earlier verb meant “leave unchanged.” Shāfiʿī also understood the verb in question to mean delaying its revelation.30 Two other readings that Tabarī mentions are “tansahā” or “you forget ˙ made to forget it.” But he rejects both variit” and “tunsahā” or “you are ants because they are not in any of the approved readings of the Qur’an.31 In a paper dedicated to the interpretation of 2.106, John Burton chose to use the term “nansahā” or “We forget it.” He accepts Tabarī’s claim that both Medinese and Kufan scholars read it as “nunsihā,”˙32 but he does not tell us where he got his reading from. His choice looks even more strange and unjustified when we note that while he uses Tabarī as his main source, the latter does not list “nansahā” among the six˙readings that he covered, including those he rejected. Burton theorizes that “nansahā” was abandoned in favor of “nunsihā” by those who wanted to avoid attributing forgetting to the Prophet.33 But then most scholars, including those who use the reading “nunsihā,” think that the Prophet did forget revelations that God wanted him to forget anyway. Furthermore, “nansahā” does not attribute the forgetting to the Prophet but to God, because God is the speaker in the Qur’an, not the Prophet! Had the reading “nansahā” been accepted, exegetes would have found a way of understanding it so that it did not imply that God may forget. But there is no evidence that this reading was used anyway. In another paper that he had published fifteen years earlier, Burton theorized the following: There are strong grounds for suspecting that the reading nunsi is a development from an earlier reading nansa. Such suspicions are supported by the existence of a parallel “variant reading” tradition, nansa’, meaning “We defer.” Only nansa could simultaneously underlie both variants, especially since the reading nansa’ is rationalized as requiring the insertion of the hamza which the Qur’an script is alleged to have initially lacked.34

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 51 He repeats this speculation in his book on The Collection of the Qur’an.35 But while he continues to use “nansahā” in his 1985 study of verse 2.106, he does not reiterate that theory, possibly because he realized that it was too weak. Furthermore, Burton used “nunsihā” rather than “nansahā” in the wording of the verse in the 1970 paper and in his 1979 book. He did not assign any particular significance to his preferred reading in his later book on abrogation.36 But how do those who deny Qur’anic abrogation interpret verse 2.106? The most famous such scholar is the Muʿtazilite Abū Muslim b. Bahr ˙ al-Isfahānī (322/933). His exegetical work has been lost, but it is quoted ˙ by the scholar and scientist Rāzī, who lived three centuries after him. This seems to be the source of the perception of some that Rāzī himself denied abrogation, but he actually disagreed with Isfahānī.37 These quotations were ˙ collected in a book published in the first quarter of the 20th century. Three views dismissing linking 2.106 to the concept of abrogation in the Qur’an are attributed to Isfahānī.38 First, he interpreted the term “āya” to mean any ˙ legal system, such as the laws of the Torah, that was ruling in a previous replaced by another ruling in the Qur’an. This interpretation means 2.106 talks about the replacement of previous religious laws with the new ones introduced in the Qur’an. One example on this is the Qur’an’s changing of the qibla of prayer from Jerusalem to the al-Masjid al-Harām in Mecca.39 ˙ has been attribA variation of this understanding of “āya” in 2.106 that uted to Isfahānī is that this term meant the Sharīʿa or all legislations of previous ˙religions. In this case, the verse would be talking about the abrogation of all legal rulings of one religion by those of a newer religion, such as the abrogation of the Mosaic law by the law of the Qur’an. This is the interpretation favored by Jabrī, who points out that verse 2.106 refers to the partial or total abrogation of the previous laws.40 Other modern scholars who share this view include Saqqā41 and Hasan.42 It has been pointed out that the term “āya” is never used in the Qur’an to mean Sharīʿa or the whole set of laws of any religion, but Jabrī argues that the term “āya” has been used in verse 28.36 to mean Moses’ law: “So when Moses came to them with Our āyas they said, ‘This is nothing but a forged sorcery. We never heard of this among our fathers, the ancients.’” 43 The term is clearly

a more general reference to Moses’ message and teachings rather than the legal system he presented. Both variations of this interpretation by Isfahānī suffer from the second ˙ and third of the six flaws of the classical interpretation that connects the term “āya” to abrogation. This term is not used in the Qur’an to mean “divine ruling” and the Qur’an has a different term for rulings. Ironically, linking the term “āya” to the law—as Isfahānī, Jabrī, and others do— ˙ reflects influence by the concept of abrogation. It makes Qur’anic verses “abrogators” of previous legal divine rulings but excludes internal abrogation in the Qur’an.

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Isfahānī’s second interpretation links the word “nansakh” to the meaning ˙of the term “naskh” as “copying.” This alternative view argues that the term here stands for God’s copying of any divine Book off the al-Lawh al-Mahfūz or the “Preserved Tablet.” The latter is supposed to be a divine˙ ˙ contains everything that God wants to happen. Any divine record˙ that Book, such as the Qur’an and Torah, is thought to have been derived from the Preserved Tablet. One objection to this interpretation of “nansakh” is that the copying off the Preserved Tablet describes the production of the whole of any divine Book whereas verse 2.106 seems to talk about specific verses or whatever the term “āya” is understood to mean. Another is that the structure of the verse clearly suggests that “āya” is the subject of some kind of removal or forgetting that would result in the introduction of a replacement, rather than a process of copying. Third, Isfahānī has argued that 2.106 does not confi rm the occurrence ˙ in the Qur’an but simply states it as a possibility. This arguof abrogation ment does not exclude the occurrence of abrogation. So one of the views attributed to Isfahānī took the term “naskh” to ˙ denote the overriding of verses or rulings from previous religions by Qur’anic ones. He did not accept that a Qur’anic verse may be abrogated by another. He also rejected the suggestion that a Qur’anic verse may abrogate a ruling set by Prophet Muhammad. He maintained that the Muslim can still pray facing the old qibla if he could not identify the direction of the new qibla.44 Isfahānī agreed that some verses whose rulings were gen˙ eral were made more specific by later verses, but of course that is the legal principle of specification, not abrogation. A different interpretation of 2.106 that does not link it to abrogation comes from the renowned 19th century reformer Muhammad ʿAbduh.45 This view, which Ghazālī agrees with,46 does not take “˙ āya” in 2.106 to mean a “Qur’anic verse” but understands it in its broader sense in the Qur’an of “miracle” or “sign.” More specifically, ʿAbduh thinks that the term here refers to the miracles that God reveals to support the claims of any prophet. This would then make the verse mean that should God remove or bring to an end a supportive miracle, He would bring about another divine sign that is at least as good but might be even better. ʿAbduh’s interpretation makes use of the context of verse 2.106, so here are the verses that surround it, which talk about the Jews: Those who disbelieve among the People of the Book and the polytheists do not wish that any good should be sent down upon you from your Lord. But Allah chooses for His mercy whom He wills. Allah is of great favor. (2.105) Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten We bring a better one or the like of it. Do you not know that Allah is powerful over everything? (2.106) Do you not know that to Allah belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth? And you have no protector or helper apart from Allah. (2.107) Or do you desire to demand of your Messenger what was demanded of Moses in the past? He who

The Term “Naskh” in the Qur’an 53 exchanges faith for disbelief has surely strayed from the right way. (2.108) Many of the People of the Book wish that they can turn you back as disbelievers after you have believed, in envy from themselves, after the truth has become clear to them. So do pardon and forgive till Allah brings His command. Truly Allah is powerful over everything. (2.109)

ʿAbduh notes that 2.108 is further evidence to support his interpretation of the term “āya.” This verse, it seems to me, refers to the Jews’ request to Moses to enable them to see God: The People of the Book asked of you [O Muhammad!] to cause a book to come down on them from heaven. They asked of Moses a greater thing, saying: “Show us Allah openly.” So the thunderbolt caught them because of their wrongdoing. They then took the calf [for a god] after the proofs had come to them, but we forgave that. We gave Moses a manifest authority. (4.153)

Moses’ followers asked him to make them see God as proof of what he was preaching, i.e. that he was God’s messenger and that he communicated with Him: “And when you [O Children of Israel!] said: ‘O Moses, we will not believe in you until we see Allah openly!’ So the thunderbolt caught you while you looked on” (2.55). This indicates that verse 2.108 also talks about people

challenging Muhammad to produce a proof. This, in turn, means that the term “āya” in 2.106 might well mean divine “sign,” “proof,” “miracle,” etc. In this case, the naskh of a sign means removing every trace of it so it cannot be seen; causing it to be forgotten is self-explanatory. This is a plausible interpretation of 2.106 and the term “āya” in it. To the term “nansakh,” it gives the meaning of “remove,” “bring to an end,” and any such meaning that would make it useable with the term “āya” in its broad meaning as a divine sign. Verse 2.106 uses the term “naskh” to mean “remove” a sign but not “replace” it. The sense of “replacement” is not implied by the verb “nansakh,” which is why it is mentioned separately in the second part of the verse: “We bring a better or the like of it.” Yet the concept of abrogation means not only the removal of the older text or ruling, but also replacing it with another one. The term “naskh” as used in 2.106 cannot be the source of the legal concept of abrogation. Even those who disagree with the interpretation of 2.106 above have to concede this fact. They also have to accept that there is nothing in the verses surrounding 2.106 to suggest that it may be talking about the technical concept of the abrogation of Qur’anic verses. The same can be said about the term “naskh” in 22.52, where “replacement” is never implied. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely for such a critical concept to be mentioned in a single verse without further details being given in the surrounding verses. The real power of this argument becomes clear when one compares the verse in question with verse 16.101, which clearly talks about

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the replacement of āyas yet does not use the term “naskh.” Several verses that surround 16.101 discuss related issues.47 So whether one understands the term “āya” in 2.106 to mean specifically a Qur’anic “verse,” which is the view of most scholars, including those who believe in abrogation, or more broadly as a “divine sign,” which is how I understand it in agreement with ʿAbduh’s view, the context of the verse does not support linking it to the concept of the abrogation of Qur’anic verses. It is clear that none of the four occurrences of the term “naskh” in the Qur’an is linked in any way to the technical meaning of “naskh” as developed by Muslim scholars. None of the four verses uses the term to mean the abrogation of Qur’anic verses. But is it possible that “naskh” is the wrong term to use for a phenomenon that is confi rmed in the Qur’an but under different terminology? This is what the next chapter looks into.

4

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an

Support for the concept of abrogation has also been sought from verses that do not contain any variant of the term “naskh” but that it seemed possible to link to the concept. These are verses 16.101 and 13.39 specifically. In this chapter, I will examine the merits of understanding these verses as proofs on the Qur’anic origin of the concept of abrogation. I will show that linking these verses to abrogation is not derived from an objective reading of these verses but is forced on them. It is the result of an already established belief in abrogation. Furthermore, the verses in question talk about the two different concepts of “replacement” and “withdrawal” of divine revelation. These two have been conflated by linking the two verses to the concept of abrogation.

4.1

ABROGATION AS “REPLACEMENT” OF VERSES

This is the main verse that is seen as establishing the Qur’anic basis of the concept of abrogation: When We baddalnā (replace) an āya with another āya—and Allah knows better what He sends down—they say: “You [O Muhammad!] are only a forger!” No, rather most of them have no knowledge. (16.101)

Let’s start with what Tabarī has to say about this verse: ˙ [“When We replace an āya with another āya” means]: When we abrogate the ruling of a verse and replace it with the ruling of another. “And Allah knows better what He sends down ” [means]: And Allah knows best what better suits His creation regarding what He replaces and changes of His rulings. “They say: ‘You are only a forger’” [means]: Those who took associates with Allah and accused His Messenger of telling lies said to His Messenger: “O Muhammad! You are but a liar,” i.e. “you tell lies by falsely attributing things to Allah.” Allah (High is He) says: “Rather, most of those who say to you ‘O Muhammad you are making

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law false attributions to Allah’ are ignorant that anything that is abrogated or abrogating that you bring is from Allah. They do not know its real truth. Most exegetes have made a comment similar to ours about “When We replace an āya with of another āya.”1

Tabarī then goes on to quote a number of early Muslims. Mujāhid b. Jabr˙ said the fi rst half of 16.101 meant “We withdrew it so we sent down another (verse) instead.” In another quote Mujāhid is reported to have interpreted that verse as follows: “We abrogated it, replaced it, withdrew it, and confi rmed a different one.” Qatāda is quoted to have equated “When We replace an āya with another āya” with “Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten.” Finally, Tabarī states that Ibn Zaid said that the disbeliev˙ of verses by saying: “You are a liar; you introers reacted to the changing duce something then you annul it, bringing something different.” Ibn Zaid went on to say: “This replacement is abrogation. No verse is replaced with another but by abrogation.”2 Nasā’ī also attributes to Ibn ʿAbbās a quote linking verses 2.106, 16.101, and 13.39 to abrogation.3 This is another typical interpretation of 16.101, this time from the Muʿtazilite scholar Zamakhsharī (538/1144): The replacement of an āya with an āya: This is naskh. God abrogates (yansakhu) religious rulings with others because they are public interests. What was public interest yesterday can become harmful today and its opposite beneficial. God (high is He) knows what is beneficial and what is harmful, so He confi rms what He wants and abrogates (yansakhu) what He wants according to His wisdom. This is the meaning of “Allah knows better what He sends down—they say: ‘You are only a forger!’” They found a way to make accusations, so they did, but that is due to their ignorance and distance from the science of the abrogating [rulings] (nāsikh) and abrogated [rulings] (mansūkh). They used to say: “Muhammad makes fun of his Companions. Today he commands them to do something, and tomorrow he commands them not to do it, introducing an easier command.” But they have lied, because the harder used to be abrogated (yunsakh) by the easier, the easier by the harder, the easier by the easier, and the harder by the harder, because the ultimate goal was the public interest, not easiness or hardness.4 Tabarī’s and Zamakhsharī’s views are representative of the belief of ˙ almost all of those who accept abrogation. The term “āya” in 16.101 is interpreted as meaning “verse of the Qur’an” and so the replacement referred to is taken to mean replacing one Qur’anic verse with another. This, in turn, is considered a form of abrogation, so 16.101 is presented as Qur’anic evidence on the abrogation of Qur’anic verses.

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 57 Linking 16.101 to abrogation still fails to provide full support for what this concept has developed to be. The verse, according to this interpretation, talks about the replacement of one verse with another, yet the overwhelming majority of scholars believe that the Qur’an can be abrogated by the Sunna also. Even those scholars cannot claim that 16.101 supports this concept, because no saying or action of the Prophet is ever called “āya.” A criticism that I noted about linking verse 2.106 to abrogation applies to seeing 16.101 as being about abrogation. In order to suggest that 16.101 covers all three modes of abrogation, the term “āya” would have to be understood at times as meaning the wording of the verse and its ruling, at others the wording of the verse but not its ruling, and at yet others the ruling of the verse but not its wording!5 Also, replacing one verse with another must mean at times that the replaced verse is left in the mushaf and at others removed from it in order to the cover the three modes of˙ ˙abrogation. The scholars who interpret 16.101 as referring to abrogation have a problem that they consistently ignore, because it is insurmountable. Almost all scholars agree that verse 16.101, like the chapter it belongs to, was revealed in Mecca. Yet “no Muslim scholar has alleged that any instance of naskh affecting Islamic enactments occurred during the Meccan period of the Prophet’s ministry.”6 Actually, Shātibī went as far as saying that “most ˙ abrogation occurred in Medina,”7 implying that it occurred in Mecca also. He explains that “the Sharīʿa rulings that were revealed in Mecca consisted mostly of general legal principles and fundamentals of religion, which is why there was little abrogation in them.” He does not give any examples, however. He mentions, but not in the context of confi rming that abrogation occurred in Mecca, that the daily prayer used to be performed twice and that the number was later changed to five. It is generally accepted by Muslim scholars that the latter commandment was revealed to Muhammad in his “miʿrāj (heavenly ascent),” which occurred in Mecca, but there is nothing in the Qur’an about when the obligatory prayer was introduced or linking it to abrogation. Furthermore, while there are verses that command the Muslims to pray at different times of the day, there is no Qur’anic verse stating that they must pray twice a day nor a later increase of the number to five. Ghazālī argues that there was not a single instance of a permissible thing that was made forbidden or a proscribed thing that was allowed before the revelation of chapter 16 or,8 more generally, in Mecca.9 Such a phenomenon could not have become the subject of the ridicule of the disbelievers of Mecca. He rightly points out that the biography of the Prophet does not contain any indication to the objection of disbelievers to abrogation or enquiring of believers about it.10 Indeed, even when scholars suggested that some Meccan verses were abrogated, they could not show that these verses were revealed before 16.101, they used report-verses which are not supposed to be subject to

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abrogation,11 and they had to attribute the abrogation to verses that were revealed later in Medina anyway. One example is the claim that the following Meccan verse was abrogated by the beginning of a chapter (48) from the Medina period: “Say [O Muhammad!]: ‘I am not an innovation among the messengers, and I do not know what shall be done with me or with you. I only follow what is revealed to me; I am only a manifest warner’” (46.9).12 This verse,

however, does not contain any legal ruling to be the subject of abrogation. Almost all scholars agree that the fi rst instance of abrogation was the change of the qibla of prayer to the al-Masjid al-Harām. Tabarī, in his ˙ 13 Yet the commentary on verse 2.115, attributes this view to˙ Ibn ʿAbbās. change of qibla happened in the second year after the immigration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina! Verse 16.101 states that the replacement of āyas was already taking place by the time it was revealed, so it could not be argued that the verse is discussing a future event. The replacement of āyas in this Meccan verse cannot be referring to abrogation. As he did when insisting that 2.106 had nothing to do with abrogation,14 Abū Muslim al-Isfahānī has rejected the suggestion of the overwhelming ˙ talks about abrogation. The basis of his rejection and majority that 16.101 alternative interpretation is the fact that 16.101 is Meccan, yet the fi rst instance of abrogation, which is the change of qibla, happened in Medina. As he did in his interpretation of 2.106, he did not accept that the term “āya” here denotes a Qur’anic verse. He explained: What is meant here [in this verse] is that “When We replace an āya with another āya” in previous Books, as He did when he moved the qibla from Jerusalem to the Kaʿba, the polytheists say: “You have lied in this replacement.”15 This understanding of “āya” looks similar to one of Isfahānī’s two inter˙ to mean a legal pretations of this term in verse 2.106, as it may be taken ruling. I have discussed in my comment on that verse the flaws in this view. Alternatively, Isfahānī may have meant to say that Jerusalem and al-Masjid ˙ al-Harām in Mecca are themselves the āyas here, but this overstretches the ˙ term “āya” even further. Jabrī argues that 16.101 documents the fact that the Qur’anic verses were not revealed in the order in which they are found in their respective chapters in the mushaf.16 A newly revealed verse might, following God’s ˙ ˙ before one that had been revealed earlier. A verse instruction, be placed may even be moved from one chapter to another. This process of changing the positions of the verses is the act of replacement that 16.101 refers to. The difficulty with this view is that the verse talks about replacement, not displacement. There is a sense of something being completely removed, not only moved by something else. A second possible interpretation according to Jabrī is that this verse is a response to the disbelievers’ following challenge to Muhammad: “Bring a

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 59 Qurʾan other than this or replace it” (10.15). He argues that 16.101 states that

even if God replaced the Qur’an with a book less critical of the polytheists’ beliefs and with a more reconciliatory tone, they would still demand that the new book be replaced with another.17 While I appreciate the logic Jabrī tries to develop, I fi nd the proposed link far-fetched. As he interpreted 2.106, Saqqā claims that 16.101 talks about the replacement of the Mosaic law with the Qur’anic one.18 This is the position of Hasan also with respect to both verses.19 The problem with this interpretation in the case of both verses is that it takes the term “āya” to mean the whole legal code of a religion, but this understanding is not supported by the Qur’an. Furthermore, the Qur’anic laws were introduced in Medina, not Mecca, yet 16.101 is Meccan. There is another observation supporting the view that the replacement of an “āya” with another in 16.101 should not be taken to mean the replacement of Qur’anic verses. There are eight verses stating that God’s words cannot be changed, using variations of the word “baddalnā (replace/change)” which is used in 16.101. Significantly, none of these verses employs the term “āya” as the subject of the change or replacement. Four of these verses use the term “kalimāt (words)”: Recite [O Muhammad!] what has been revealed to you of the Book of your Lord; no one can replace His words. You shall not find a refuge apart from Him. (18.27; see also 6.34, 6.115, and 10.64)

Another two verses have the word “qawl (saying)”: Then the evildoers brought as a replacement a saying other than that which had been said to them, so We sent down on the evildoers wrath out of heaven for their ungodliness. (2.59; see also 7.162)

One verse talks about replacing the Qur’an: But he who replaces it after hearing it then the sin of doing that will be on those who replace it. Allah is hearing, knowledgeable. (2.181)

These seven verses use the terms “words,” “saying,” and, indirectly, “the Qurʾan,” but never the term “āya.” The eighth verse has the term āyas, but it does not appear in connection with the verb “replace.” Like 2.181, this verse also talks about replacing the Qur’an: When Our manifest verses (āyas ) are recited to them, those who do not look forward to Our meeting say: “Bring a Qurʾan other than this or replace it.” Say [O Muhammad!]: “It is not for me to replace it of my own accord. I do not follow but what is revealed to me. I fear the chastisement of a dreadful day if I should disobey my Lord.” (10.15)

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None of the eight verses uses the term “āya” when talking about the replacement of Qur’anic verses. It is highly unlikely that the replaced āyas in verse 16.101 refer to Qur’anic verses. As I explained earlier, 20 “āya” has the broad meaning of “proof,” “sign,” or “miracle,” and it is used in a smaller number of verses in the specific meaning of “verse.” In order to take a position on what the term “āya” means in any specific verse we need to look at the context, and that means the verse in which it appears and the surrounding verses. But I should point out fi rst a very important observation which is necessary to understand the term “āya” in the verse in question: the Qur’an contains those “āyāt (āyas),” in the sense of the term “āya” as “verse,” and the Book is itself an “āya,” in the sense of “sign” and “miracle.” The Qur’an is an “āya” or “divine sign or miracle” which consists of a number of “āyāt” or “verses.” Let’s now look at the context of 16.101: When you [O Muhammad!] read the Qurʾan seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. (16.98) He has no power over those who believe and trust in their Lord. (16.99) His power is over those who take him for a patron and who associate with Him [other gods]. (16.100) When We baddalnā (replace) an āya with another āya—and Allah knows better what He sends down—they say: “You are only a forger!” No, rather most of them have no knowledge. (16.101) Say: “It was sent down from your Lord in truth by the Spirit of Holiness (Gabriel), to establish those who believe and as a guidance and good news for the Muslims. (16.102) We know that they say: “He is being taught by a human being.” The tongue of him they hint to is foreign, but this (the Qurʾan) is in manifest Arabic. (16.103) Those who do not believe in the āyāt (āyas ) of Allah, Allah will not guide them and there will be a painful torment for them. (16.103) The only ones who forge lies are those who do not believe in the āyāt (āyas ) of Allah, and those are the liars. (16.105)

Verse 16.98 talks about reciting the Qur’an and commands the Prophet to seek refuge from Satan before doing so. This verse is the source of the Muslims’ practice of saying “I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan” before they start reading the Qur’an. Verses 16.99–100 then talk about Satan’s lack of influence on the believers and the effect he has over the disbelievers. Then we have the verse under study, followed by verse 16.102, which talks about the revelation of the Qur’an. Verse 16.103 continues the theme as it quotes one accusation by the disbelievers that the Qur’an was not divine revelation but was being taught to Muhammad by another human being. The Qur’an seems to be referring to a specific man. Exegetes have tried to identify him, giving him different names and descriptions. One assumption is that it was Salmān al-Fārisī, a Persian convert from fi re worshiping to Christianity and then to Islam. As is the case with numerous other details in exegetical works that attempt to expand a Qur’anic brief reference, these speculations are not supported by

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 61 any Qur’anic evidence. Verse 16.103 then goes on to refute this accusation against the Prophet by pointing out that Muhammad’s alleged teacher was not even an Arab whereas the Qur’an was revealed in perfect Arabic. It is worth noting that the Qur’an has addressed a number of accusations that were made against the Prophet. These include the claims that the Qur’an was based on ancient stories that were being written down for him (25.5), that he made up the Qur’an out of confused dreams or authored it himself (21.5), that he was mad (15.6), and that he was a soothsayer (52.29).21 The term āya appears again, but in its plural form “āyāt,” in verse 104 in the context of warning those who do not believe in God’s “āyāt.” The term then appears in the following verse, which stresses that the real liars are those who do not believe in God’s āyas. One significant observation is that the term used in verse 105 for forging lies is the same one used in verse 16.101 in the disbelievers’ accusation that Muhammad was a liar. Verse 16.101 states that when one “āya” is replaced with another, the disbelievers accuse Muhammad of telling lies; verse 16.105 clarifies that it is those who reject the āyas who are telling lies. This suggests that the term “āya” is likely used in the same sense in both verses. Our discussion of the verses surrounding 16.101 indicates that the context is focused on the Qur’an. The term “āya” refers to its general meaning of divine sign but where the Qur’an is the intended sign. The reference is to the Qur’an as a whole as a sign, not to any verse or verses within that Book. The Qur’an is the replacing sign in the passage “when We replace an āya with another āya” whereas the replaced sign represents any previous signs, such as previous divine Books or miracles that God granted to older prophets. Verses 2.181 and 10.15, which I discussed earlier, talk about the reverse concept of replacing the Qur’an, which they reject. God made the Qur’an, as a divine sign, replace previous signs, but He also confi rms that it may not itself be replaced by people. The fact that there is no prophet after Muhammad (33.40) means that God also was not going to replace the Qur’an. My interpretation of 16.101 is consistent with Ghazālī’s following commentary on that verse, in which he considers the replacing āya to be the Qur’an: The disbelievers were not satisfied to consider the Qur’an a miracle that attested to Muhammad’s prophethood. They looked for a paranormal feat of the kind that previous prophets used to do. This, in their view, is what would be a true wonder. As for the Qur’an, it is only words; Muhammad could have made it up, or he might have learned it from some of the People of the Book who had knowledge of the Torah and the Injīl. 22 The typical objection to our interpretation of 16.101 is based on the fact that chapter 16 and the verses in question were revealed in Mecca. The Prophet’s antagonists there were the Arab polytheists. While these people

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objected to Muhammad’s claim that he was receiving revelation from God that exposed the falsehood of their religion, it would not have bothered them a bit that the new revelation was replacing another religion or religious claims that had nothing to do with them. This would have been a problem for the believers of those previous Books, i.e. the Jews and Christians, whom the Qur’an calls the “People of the Book.” Yet these were living mainly in Medina, the city which the Prophet later migrated to from Mecca. It is then argued that the replaced “āya” in 16.101 could not refer to previous Books or divine signs because the protestors against the replacement must have been Arab polytheists, not People of the Book. But this argument stands completely on the assumption that Jews and Christians had not become sufficiently aware of the Qur’an to take issue with it. This is an unrealistic assumption. Mecca and Medina, which are about 340 kilometers away from each other, were not completely isolated, and people of the two cities visited each other. The Prophet’s oldest surviving biography, by Ibn Hishām (218/833), which is a freely edited version of Ibn Ishāq’s (151/768), states that Muhammad’s claim to prophethood must ˙ have attracted the attention of the Jews and Christians, even those living outside Mecca, because they were expecting the appearance in Arabia of a prophet as mentioned in the Torah and Injīl. 23 It also claims that the Meccan polytheists at some points consulted the Jews of Medina about Muhammad’s claims, 24 Abyssinian Christians visited him in Mecca, 25 and there was additional contact between the Muslims and non-Muslims of Mecca with Jews and Christians inside and outside Arabia in relation to the new religion. Ibn Ishāq was a controversial figure, so much so that Shāfiʿī recom˙ writings but Mālik, who was Ibn Ishāq’s contemporary, called mended his him a charlatan, although this accusation was ˙in reaction to Ibn Ishāq’s claim that he can judge the quality of Mālik’s knowledge. There are˙ certainly strong reasons to doubt the accuracy of Ibn Ishāq’s biography of Muhammad, 26 but it seems logical to think that the Jews˙ and Christians in the Arabian Peninsula were not completely isolated from what happened in Mecca and that they took interest in Muhammad’s claims. This must have certainly been the case in Muhammad’s later years in Mecca, when it became clear that the new religion was not a passing event. Even in the unlikely case that the Jews and Christians ignored Muhammad, it is almost certain that he would have contacted various groups of them. After all, his religion had a lot more in common with Judaism and Christianity than the idolatrous religion of the Arabs, and if he was seeking to convert the heathen Arabs he would have been at least as keen on getting Jews and Christians to accept his mission. Verse 16.101 shows that People of the Book objected to the new āya—the Qur’an—which brought new revelations, introduced new laws that differed from those that were in the older āyas, the Torah and Injīl, and replaced them as the main scripture.

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 63 Having said that, it is still possible that 16.101 refers to Arabs of Mecca. The Meccans would have seen Muhammad’s new religion as close to the Jews’ and Christians’, which, naturally, they had some knowledge of. When looking at the “implied context of the Qur’anic message,” as noted by one scholar, “there is no expectation that the stories we call Biblical are anything but familiar to the Arabian listeners, whether they are pagan, Jewish, or Christian.”27 The pagan Arabs’ reaction in the verse would then be reflective of their belief that Muhammad was trying to start a religion like Judaism and Christianity while still changing certain established practices, so their accusing him of lying was in response to those changes. Either way, I do not see the reply of Muhammad’s accusers in 16.101 as in conflict with my interpretation of the verse. But I think the accusers in 16.101 are People of the Book rather than pagan Arabs. This verse is also relevant to our discussion: Ask the Children of Israel how many a manifest sign (āya) we gave to them. Whoever replaces Allah’s favor after it has come to him, then Allah has severe retribution. (2.211)

This verse uses the term “āya” in its broader sense of “sign,” but it also has the concept of people replacing an “āya.” This is close to the concept of the “āya” of the Qur’an replacing another “āya,” which is done by God. The concept of Qur’anic verses replacing each other, as the adherents of abrogation erroneously interpret 16.101, would have been too important to be mentioned only once in passing. Furthermore, I think it would have been impossible for Muhammad to retain credibility if Qur’anic verses were being replaced every now and then. I have discussed a similar problematic implication in the gharānīq story. Nevertheless, the proponents of the concept of abrogation have used 16.101 as one of the main building blocks of their theories. They have equated the concept of the replacement of Qur’anic verses with the term “naskh” in 2.106. Verses 16.101 and 2.106 are, thus, seen as referring to one and the same phenomenon of abrogation. But this misleadingly straightforward-looking link hides fundamental flaws. First, as explained in the previous chapter, the term “naskh” in 2.106 does not mean “substitution” or “replacement,” even if “āya” is interpreted to mean a Qur’anic verse, which is not the case. “Āya” in 2.106 means a “divine sign,” and the term “naskh” in that verse refers to the removal or bringing to an end of such a sign. Second, verse 16.101 explicitly talks about the concept of “replacement” but it does not have the term “naskh”! This is why any attempt to individually link any of these verses to the concept of abrogation is inherently flawed. This is, of course, in addition to the fact that 2.106 cannot be linked to abrogation as understood by the legal experts.

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The term “baddal” can be linked to abrogation only if the belief in this concept had already and independently been established. Linking the verse that includes a term that means “replace” to the legal meaning of abrogation is the result of prior belief in this concept. Some may argue that it is not possible to use the wording of 16.101 to conclusively show that this verse does not talk about the replacement of Qur’anic verses. They may maintain that its wording could accommodate that interpretation, as well as others. However, I consider this interpretation to be highly unlikely for the various reasons I discussed above. Linking this verse to the concept of abrogation as developed by the usūlīs is very ˙ replacing weak indeed. Furthermore, I have shown that understanding the “āya” in 16.101 as the whole of the Qur’an and the replaced “āya” as any previous divine sign, including divine Books, is compelling and completely fits in the context in which this verse occurs.

4.2

ABROGATION AS “ERASING” OF VERSES

The second verse that has been claimed to establish the Qur’anic basis of the concept of abrogation comes from a chapter that is thought to have been revealed in Medina: Allah erases what He wills and confirms and with Him is the Mother of the Book. (13.39)

Tabarī, whom we saw confi rm the historicity of abrogation in his com˙ mentaries on verses 2.106 and 16.101, attributes to Ibn ʿAbbās the interpretation of 13.39 as being about abrogation: “Allah erases what He wills” [means] of the Qur’an. Allah changes what He likes so He abrogates it, and confi rms what He likes so He does not change it. “And with Him is the Mother of the Book” [means] that all of this is with Him in the Mother of the Book—that is the abrogating and what is abrogated, what is changed and what is confirmed, are all in the Book. Tabarī also quotes Qatāda as having said: ˙ “Allah erases what He wills and confirms” is like His words: “Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten (nunsihā) We bring a better or the like of it.” His words “and with Him is the Mother of the Book” mean the whole

of the Book and its source. He also states that Ibn Juraij has interpreted “Allah erases what He wills” as meaning “He abrogates.”28

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 65 But Tabarī’s quotes from Ibn ʿAbbās, Qatāda, and Ibn Juraij are men˙ tioned among a much bigger number of quotes from other authorities who interpret the verse in ways that do not link it to abrogation. These interpretations refer in various ways to God’s changing of the affairs of His creation and their destinies, although most have suggested that good luck and misfortune are the only things that God does not change. Typical of Tabarī’s attribution of contradictory quotes to the same individual, quotes ˙ ecting this interpretation are attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās also! More sperefl cific interpretations that have been quoted by exegetes include the suggestion that the verse denotes removing old generations and creating new ones, removing the sins of the believers as a favor and confi rming those of the disbelievers as a punishment, and erasing the times of death of some and confi rming others. So while verse 13.39 has come to be considered evidence of abrogation almost as strong as 16.101 by the adherents of this phenomenon, Tabarī shows that this was not the majority’s opinion in the past. Indeed, T˙ abarī ˙ the himself thinks that the verse talks about God’s removal of people when time of their death comes about and His confi rmation of the continued life of those whose time had not come yet. 29 Still, only a minority of modern scholars who believe in abrogation do not link 13.39 to it. Mustafā Zaid ˙ 13.39 is one such scholar; he accepts that verses 2.106 and 16.101 but ˙not refer to abrogation.30 Verse 13.39 contains the word “Book” but it does not use the term āya as the subject of the removal and/or confi rmation. The expression “Mother of the Book (Umm al-Kitāb),” in which “Book ” appears, is rather vague. Because the verse does not specify what is being erased or confi rmed, studying this expression is necessary. We need to look at the context of the verse to see whether it is likely to be talking about Qur’anic verses or something else. These are the verses leading to 13.39: Those to whom We brought the Book rejoice in that which has been sent down to you [O Muhammad!], and some parties deny a part of it. Say: “I have been commanded to worship Allah and not to associate any with Him; to Him I call and to Him is my recourse.” (13.36) Thus We have sent it down as wisdom in Arabic, but if you follow their wishes after the knowledge that has come to you, you shall not have a patron or protector against Allah. (13.37) We sent messengers before you and We assigned to them wives and seed. It was not for any messenger to bring an āya but by Allah’s permission. Every term has a decree. (13.38) Allah erases what He wills and confirms and with Him is the Mother of the Book. (13.39)

Verse 13.36 talks about Jews and Christians who were happy at the revelation of a new divine Book, but it also mentions others who rejected aspects of it that they did not like. For instance, the Qur’an has refuted some claims by the Jews and Christians and rejected practices they developed over time.

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The next verse fi rst confi rms that the Qur’an is a revelation in Arabic from God. It then reminds the Prophet that he must never accede to the demands of those who would rather have him follow or introduce teachings that are different from the Qur’an. The verse differentiates between the divine “wisdom (ḥukman)” that the Qur’an represents and the “wishes (ahwāʾāhum)” of those People of the Book who did not like the Qur’anic teachings. So both 13.36 and 13.37 refer to the Qur’an. Verse 13.38 mentions the term “āya,” but the question is whether this denotes “verse” or “divine sign” or “miracle.” The verse states that the messengers of the past were, like Muhammad, human beings who got married and had children. The verse ignores the angels, although they act at times as messengers, because the emphasis of the verse is on those messengers who lived among and interacted with ordinary people, like Muhammad. The angels appeared very briefly to a small number of special individuals, such as during their short visit to inform Abraham about the birth of Isaac and save Lot and his family before punishing his people (29.31–34). The emphasis on the human nature of the messengers occurs in a number of places in the Qur’an, with two purposes. The fi rst is to emphasize that the messengers of God are not divine or non-human beings, so the concept that God should send a human being as a messenger should not sound strange or suspicious. Second, being a human who is supported by God, a messenger should not be expected to perform miraculous feats without God’s permission. The messenger cannot simply do whatever is asked of him, whenever he is asked to do it, to prove that he is sent by God. These verses are instructive: Their messengers said: “Is there a doubt about Allah, the Creator of the heavens and the earth? It is He who calls you, in order that He may forgive you your sins and give you respite until an appointed term.” They said: “You are no more than human beings, like us! You wish to turn us away from what our fathers used to worship; bring us then some clear authority.” (14.10) Their messengers said to them: “True, we are human beings like you, but Allah confers His favor on such of his servants as He pleases. It is not for us to bring you an authority except as Allah permits. And on Allah let all believers rely.” (14.11)

The messenger’s reply explains that God appoints whom He wishes as His messenger, so the fact that the messenger is a human being is irrelevant. The demanded “clear authority” is a miracle that would confi rm the messenger’s claim. The messengers argue that it is up to God to choose whether to support any of His messengers with a miracle and to choose what that miracle is. One verse that is particularly relevant to our discussion is 26.154, because, like verse 13.38, it uses the word “āya.” The verse quotes an argument by the people of prophet Sālih against him: ˙ ˙

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 67 You are not but a human being like us, so bring us an āya if you were truthful. (26.154)

The term “āya” here clearly means “miracle” or “divine sign.” This suggests that “āya” in 13.38 means the same, rather than a verse from a divine Book. After all, Muhammad’s main difficulty was that his doubters did not believe that the verses of the Qur’an were revealed by Allah, so they could not have asked him to bring “verses”! They demanded to see something miraculous that would make a compelling case for his claim that he was receiving communication from God and that the Qur’an was divine revelation. While verses 13.36–37 mention the Qur’an but do not have the term “āya,” 13.38 has this term but unambiguously uses it in its broader meaning of “miracle” or “divine sign.” The three verses are completely coherent given that the Qur’an as a whole is itself a divine sign. It is logical, then, to conclude that verse 13.39 also talks about the divine sign of the Qur’an erasing older divine Books. I briefly mentioned earlier comments of old exegetes on the “Mother of the Book ” in 13.39, but this expression needs a more detailed discussion. This is one of the other two verses in which it appears: It is He who has sent down to you the Book, of which there are perfected (muḥkamāt ) verses which are the Mother of the Book and others ambiguous (mutashābihāt ). Those in whose hearts is perversity follow what is ambiguous, seeking sedition and interpreting it; but none knows its interpretation except Allah. Those who are well grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in it; it is all from our Lord.” None will remember save those who have minds. (3.7)

There has been disagreement about what the “perfected” and “ambiguous” verses meant.31 One opinion attributed by Tabarī to Ibn ʿAbbās, Qatāda, and others is that the former represent the˙ abrogators whereas the latter stand for the abrogated verses.32 This view, which was rejected by most exegetes, 33 is an outcome of the belief in the concept of abrogation rather than based on the wording of the verse. A different view that is based on the linguistic meanings of “muḥkamāt” and “mutashābihāt” is that the former stands for those verses each of which can have only one interpretation whereas the latter stands for verses that appear to accommodate a number of different interpretations. A variation of this understanding of the terms takes the verses that are “muḥkamāt” to be those that can be interpreted by the scholars whereas the “mutashābihāt” verses are those whose meanings are known only to God. I agree in general with the direction of this view, but my interpretation is different. I take a muhkama (singular of “muḥkamāt”) verse to be one that ˙ can be studied and understood by means of reason, just like any secular text. Of course, this does not mean that an interpretive attempt would

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necessarily lead to a correct interpretation of the verse. This is natural as different people have different levels of knowledge, intellectual skills, and biases. Indeed, scholars have suggested a number of different interpretations for every verse in the Qur’an. In fact, this can be said of many words, let alone verses, in the divine Book. It is instructive that interpretations that might look utterly absurd to most scholars are taken perfectly seriously by their adherents. I should also clarify that being muhkama does not mean the verse must ˙ have one meaning only. The divine text is very rich in meaning and it is natural that it has multiple, non–mutually exclusive meanings. I understand the mutashābiha (singular of “mutashābihāt”) verse to mean one that cannot be understood by means of reason only. Such verses can be understood with the help of God only, so interpreting these verses is not merely an intellectual exercise. This interpretation can be drawn from the statement “none knows its interpretation except Allah” and the reference to the people of knowledge’s declaration of faith that all of the Qur’an is from God. Examples of “mutashābihāt” verses include the combinations of separate letters that occur 29 times in the Qur’an, such as 2.1 and 19.1. 34 This discussion of the terms “muḥkamāt” and “mutashābihāt” has been a diversion from our study of the expression “Mother of the Book.” But this diversion was relevant to the topic of the book because these two descriptions of verses have been mistakenly linked to the concept of abrogation, as we have seen. While the exact meaning of these two terms is likely to continue to be the subject of disagreement among scholars, linking them to abrogation is probably among the weakest interpretations that may be proposed. It may seem possible to understand the “Mother of the Book” in 3.7 as meaning “the core verses” of the Qur’an. But the third verse that mentions this expression suggests that it refers to a more specific concept and entity: By the manifest Book. (43.2) We have made it an Arabic Qurʾan that you may understand. (43.3) It is in the Mother of the Book with Us high and wise. (43.4)

It looks like the “Mother of the Book” is some form of a master or source Book from which the Qur’an and other divine Books are drawn. This is confi rmed by the description in 13.39 of “Mother of the Book” as being “with Him,” which is how 43.4 also describes it. The significance of this conclusion is that it makes it highly likely that verse 13.39 also talks about divine Books. It looks that “Allah erases what He wills and confirms” refers to the revelation of the Qur’an and the disappearance of previous divine revelations. Divine revelations are erased by sending down new revelations that override them or by making their records disappear over time, which is what happened to the Torah and the Injīl. Significantly, this is the same concept that verse 16.101 talks about. The replacing “āya” or “divine sign” in 16.10 and the erasing sign in 13.39 both refer to

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 69 the Qur’an as a whole. The difference between the two verses is that the subject of replacement in 16.101 is previous divine signs in general whereas the subject of erasing in 13.39 is specifically previous divine Books. The Qur’an states that the Torah and the Injīl were available in Arabia when the Qur’an was being revealed. There are verses that confirm the operativeness of both divine Books at the time, as Muhammad himself was commanded by God to refer the Jews and Christians to their scriptures (5.43, 5.68). But at some point these Books disappeared, leaving the Jewish and Christian communities with only secondary sources. None of the Jewish and Christian writings that have survived meets the description of the Torah and Injīl as given in the Qur’an, so the authentic copies of these Books have disappeared. Similarly, in verse 87.19 the Qur’an implies that the scripture of prophet Abraham, which it calls “ṣuḥuf Ibrāhīm (Abraham’s pages),” disappeared at some point after the revelation of the Torah. Both the Torah and Injīl contained verses that prophesied Muhammad’s mission and confi rmed its authenticity (7.157, 48.29). This is one function that these Books served. Some Jews and Christians obeyed what their scriptures said and accepted Muhammad’s prophethood, and thus that function of the Torah and Injīl was fulfi lled. For those converts, the Qur’an replaced their older scriptures. These converts might have kept copies of the older scriptures as proof of their new Prophet, but these Books had no such function for their children and anyone who was brought up as a Muslim. For those who rejected the references to Muhammad in the two Books, the latter became more of a threat as they exposed their deviation from the teachings of their divine Books. It is easy to see how both groups started to lose interest in the Torah and Injīl. For the converts, the Qur’an became the only scriptural focus of their religion and devotion; for the rejectionists, the Torah and Injīl had to be pushed aside and replaced by secondary sources. The ultimate outcome in both cases is that the revelation of the Qur’an led to the disappearance of the Torah and Injīl. This interpretation is consistent with the Qur’an’s description of the Jewish and Christian scriptures that were available those believers in Arabia at the time of Muhammad. Let’s recap now. Verse 13.36 clearly referred to the people who had received divine Books from God. Verse 13.37 talks about the revelation of the Qur’an and refers to those who did not like the Qur’an. Verse 13.38 stresses that no messenger can bring an “āya” unless God decides so. An “āya” here means “miracle” or “divine sign” but with references to divine Books specifically. Then verse 13.39 emphasizes that God erases and confi rms what He likes and that He has the Mother of the Book. Verse 13.39 has nothing to do with the concept of abrogation, because it does not talk about erasing verses from the Qur’an. It rather contrasts older revelations with the Qur’an. It is those older revelations that are the subject of the erasing and it is the new revelation—the Qur’an—that was confi rmed and established.

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This interpretation is further confi rmed by the fact that this verse does not talk about the concept of “āya” but mentions only the concept of “Book,” doing so in the expression “Mother of the Book.” Each divine Book is derived by God from the master Book that the Qur’an calls “Mother of the Book.” Let’s complete our discussion of the context of 13.39 by looking at the verses that follow it, up to the end chapter 13: Whether We show you [O Muhammad!] some of what We have promised them or We call you to Us, your duty is only to deliver the Message and Ours is the reckoning. (13.40) Do they not see that We come to the land and diminish its the borders? Allah judges and there is none to reverse His judgment; He is swift at the reckoning! (13.41) Those who were before them devised, but Allah’s is the devising altogether. He knows what every soul earns. The disbelievers shall know whose will be the abode. (13.42) The disbelievers say: “You are not a messenger.” Say: “Allah suffices as a witness between me and you, and whosoever possesses knowledge of the Book.” (13.43)

In verse 13.40, God tells the Prophet that regardless of whether or not He would make him witness what He had planned for those he was preaching Islam to, he should focus on delivering the message. What ultimately comes of the people he was calling to God is not the Prophet’s business. God is in charge of the reckoning. The next verse then reminds Muhammad how God causes people to die one way or another. The expression coming to the land and diminishing its borders refers to the fact that God causes people to die regularly. It is used in another verse where it is preceded by a reference to those who live long: We have rather given provision to these and their fathers till life grew long for them. Do they not see that we come to the land and diminish it from its borders? Shall they then prevail? (21.44)

Verse 13.41 concludes with confi rming God’s unchallenged power and that His reckoning is fast and near. This theme of discussing the disbelievers continues in the following verses. Verse 13.42 stresses that previous generations behaved in the same way, but that they were not going to outstrip God and that He was always in control. Muhammad is then reminded in verse 13.43 that God is a sufficient witness of the difference between him and those who rejected him, and so are those who know and can recognize the divine Book. This verse completes the context of 13.39 and chapter 13. Unlike verses 13.36–39, verses 13.40–43 do not discuss the revelation of divine Books. There is only a mention at the end of 13.43 of those who have “knowledge of the Book.” So verse 13.39 ends that particular multi-verse discussion of the revelation of divine Books.

The Concept of “Naskh” in the Qur’an 71 It must have become clear that linking verse 13.39 to abrogation is driven by the a priori acceptance of this concept as a fact. Scholars read this interpretation into rather than from the verse.

4.3

FORCING ABROGATION ON THE QUR’AN

This and the previous chapters have shown that abrogation has no foundation in the Qur’an. None of the few verses that have been linked to the concept of abrogation, including those that use variations of the term “naskh,” provides any support for it. The concept of abrogation has stood solely on a corpus of Hadīth. Without this extra-Qur’anic literature, the concept of ˙ abrogation would not have survived, nor would the misinterpretation of some verses that supports abrogation. The efforts to show that this concept is rooted in the Qur’an are in reality attempts to protect the credibility of the hadīths and the enormous literature on abrogation that has developed over˙ the centuries. Many Islamic concepts, practices, and laws are understood in terms of abrogation, so denying the authenticity of this principle poses many difficult questions. There is another extremely significant observation: there is not a single verse in the Qur’an or even a hadīth that confirms explicitly and unequivo˙ been abrogated by another or by a sunna! cally that a particular verse has All instances of abrogation in the Qur’an are concluded indirectly from certain Qur’anic verses or sunnas. The question that we need to ask, then, is this: given the major role that abrogation has played in Islamic law, is it really logical to believe that abrogation was left without any explicit mention in the Qur’an or the Hadīth? Even if the majority of abrogation cases are supposed to be deduced˙ indirectly, how can one explain the absence of a single verse confirming the occurrence of abrogation? The attempt to find a basis for abrogation in the Qur’an has always looked like an exercise to force this concept on the Qur’an rather than conclude it from the Book of Allah. John Burton has argued that the concept of abrogation was introduced by jurists to explain three uncomfortable phenomena, two of which highlight related forms of contradictions.35 First, the existence of practices that seemed to contradict commandments in the Qur’an or, more accurately, the mushaf. ˙˙ Such practices, which were established by various jurists after the Prophet, were justified by claiming that the Qur’anic rulings that conflicted with them had been abrogated. Hadīths were at times introduced in order to give Pro˙ phetic origin to these practices and make them the abrogators of the Qur’anic verses in question. The standard case here is the conflict between the penalties for adultery in the Qur’an and in the law developed by Islamic jurists. Practices of the people of Medina in particular were considered to have come from the Prophet. Medina is the city where the Prophet lived his last ten years, where most legislations of the new religion were revealed in the

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Qur’an or devised by the Prophet, and where the first three caliphs and most Companions continued to live. The assumption, which was effectively promoted by Mālik, is that Medinese practice could not have come from other than the Prophet. Even what is attributed to Companions is linked to the Prophet on the assumption that these elite Muslims could have only behaved and legislated in accordance with what they learned from their Master. Abrogation, in its standard defi nition, has focused on legal rulings that formed parts of the legal code that governed the Muslim life. This is consistent with the suggestion that explaining contradictions between community practices and legislations in the mushaf is one source of the theories of ˙ ˙ been applied to indicative verses abrogation. The fact that abrogation has that have no legal function36 may be seen as a misuse of abrogation. Second, perceived contradictions between the mushaf and the Sunna ˙ and within each of these sources. Burton sees this as an˙ outcome of the fi rst issue above. He thinks that different local Muslim communities had different practices, and some of these contradicted the mushaf. This led jurists to ˙ interpret Qur’anic verses in a way that supported the ˙practices they favored. So the tool here is Qur’anic exegesis. They also made up hadīths that linked ˙ Hadīth, and the these practices to the Prophet. Jurists used exegesis, the ˙ theory of abrogation to legitimize the legal practices they advocated. This, of course, meant the formation of confl icting interpretations of the Qur’an and contradictory hadīths. The reality is that any perceived contradiction ˙ in the Qur’an or between the Sunna and Qur’an is the result of misinterpretation of those verses, the use of inauthentic sunnas, or a mix of both. In addition to the perceived contradictions in and between sacred texts and the contradiction between such texts and widespread practices, Burton has pointed out a third phenomenon that abrogation theories were needed to address. This is the belief that the mushaf, which is the written record ˙ ˙ all verses that were revealed to of the Qur’anic revelation, does not contain the Prophet. I will deal with this Muslim belief in detail in Chapters 8 and 9. My fi ndings about why each of the three modes of abrogation developed will confi rm and refi ne Burton’s three general conclusions. Burton and other Western scholars have put forward some highly speculative views when trying to reconstruct the early history of Islam. But regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with their hypotheses, one has to accept that speculation here is inevitable because of the lack of almost any resources from the fi rst century and a half after the Prophet. Also, if one does not accept the unfounded and evidently false claims that abrogation was derived from the Qur’an, that it was known to the Prophet, or that early Muslims knew it, it is legitimate to try to understand how the theories of abrogation have developed. In the following chapter I will show that abrogation is more of a problem than a solution in Islamic law and Qur’anic exegesis. I will review how various scholars have differently defi ned and applied it.

5

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation

Scholars of Qur’anic sciences have disagreed, as scholars in any discipline usually do, about numerous things. Various combinations of different sources, methodologies, personal opinions and biases, and personal skills have led to different conclusions. Still, the scale of the disagreement between scholars on the subject of abrogation makes it stand out. I am not talking here about the differences between the majority that accepts the concept of abrogation and the very small minority that rejects it. I am referring to the fundamental differences between the views expressed by those who believe in abrogation. The concept of abrogation has always suffered from the lack of adequate clarity, with various scholars understanding it differently. These theoretical differences have expressed themselves in two ways. First, not all scholars have accepted all three modes of abrogation. Second, while most scholars are in agreement with the standard defi nition of abrogation, they have differed on other requirements and details of this principle. The effects of these theoretical differences have been exacerbated by poor and inconsistent application of the accepted defi nitions and requirements of abrogation by the very scholars who hold these views. Scholars have often misapplied their own defi nitions of abrogation, thus mistakenly identifying abrogating and abrogated verses. The combined effect of theoretical differences and poor implementation of the concept has meant that the number of abrogation cases identified by different scholars has varied from over two hundred to a mere few! Overreliance on and unconditional acceptance of Hadīth narratives have ˙ often been influential, if not in initiating the differences about abrogation then at least in maintaining and increasing them. The Hadīth has played a ˙ crucial role in the development of a highly messy situation. It is no exaggeration to call the state of scholarship on abrogation embarrassing. In this chapter, I will fi rst address the two theoretical sources of differences. I will then examine the implementation failures in the third section. In the fourth section, I will present statistics quantifying the differences between scholars.

74 5.1

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE THREE MODES OF ABROGATION

While most later scholars have accepted the three modes of abrogation, some have differed. Legal abrogation has been admitted by all who see abrogation as a historical phenomenon. The other two modes appeared later and never commanded the unanimity of legal abrogation. Legal-textual abrogation has failed to be accepted by all scholars. Shāfiʿī, for instance, acknowledges only the other two modes of abrogation. I think the main reason for this is that almost all verses that are considered under this mode of abrogation are non-legalistic, i.e. they do not contain any commandments or prohibitions.1 Abrogation was mainly seen, in particular by the legal experts, to be about the replacement of laws by others, so the non-legalistic nature of the passages affected must have made this form of abrogation look alien to this mainly legal principle. Textual abrogation has also been the subject of some disagreement. Tabarī does not anywhere acknowledge textual abrogation. This lack of ˙ unanimity on this mode of abrogation is probably due to the fact that, as we shall see in Chapters 11 and 12, only two passages that are not in the mushaf and only one word linked to a verse that exists in the mushaf ˙ ˙ to have been the subject of this form of abrogation. There˙ are ˙ are alleged Hadīth narratives claiming that the two passages and the word used to be ˙ part of the Qur’an, but there are others that suggest otherwise. In contrast, many passages are alleged to not be in the mushaf as a result of legal-tex˙ ˙ haf are reported to have tual abrogation and many other verses in the mus ˙˙ been involved in legal abrogation. The standard defi nition of naskh that is accepted by almost all scholars, which reflects what is usually meant by the term “abrogation,” is the abrogation of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling. Yet only legal abrogation has a significant number of cases that comply with this defi nition. Legaltextual abrogation and textual abrogation have only one case each. These two modes do not fall under the standard defi nition of abrogation. They represent different phenomena altogether. Even in the case of legal abrogation, a large number of its alleged cases fail to conform to the standard defi nition one way or another. The development of three different modes of abrogation attests to the differences that have always reigned in abrogation studies.

5.2

DISPUTED DETAILS OF THE STANDARD DEFINITION OF ABROGATION

While agreeing on the standard defi nition of abrogation, scholars have disagreed about its auxiliary details. These differences are the subject of this section.

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 75

5.2.1 Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna Ahmad b. Hanbal, according to one of two variant reports, agreed with his ˙ ˙ ʿī that the Qur’an can be abrogated by the Qur’an only and teacher Shāfi the Sunna by the Sunna only. 2 On the other hand, Abū Hanīfa and Mālik permitted the abrogation of the Qur’an and the Sunna˙ by one another. This is also the opinion of the majority of scholars. Among these is a group that thinks that no Qur’anic verse was ever abrogated by a sunna, although they maintain that this kind of abrogation is possible. This, for instance, is how the 20th century scholar Zarqānī concludes his study of the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna: “The abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna is not ruled out by reason or religious law. However, it has not occurred, as the claimed proofs on its occurrence are incorrect.”3 Even though its adherents would probably not admit it, I think this compromise is intended to ensure that the absence of any instance of abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunna is not interpreted as meaning that the Sunna is of a lower authority than the Qur’an. The problem of the scholars who believe in the abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an is that unless they also allow the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna, even if theoretically, then the implication would be that the Sunna is inferior to the Qur’an. This, in turn, is seen as likely to result in the diminishment of the status of the Sunna over time. This is not only unacceptable on ideological grounds, but it would also call into question many aspects of Islamic law, much of which is based on the Sunna, not the Qur’an. This is exactly why Shāfiʿī was so adamant that the Sunna cannot be abrogated by the Qur’an. Shāfiʿī worked hard to establish the authority of the Sunna, combining the approach of the traditionalists, who thought highly of the Hadīth, and the rationalists, who relied on the Qur’an and their ˙ in interpreting it. The sign of the success of Shāfiʿī and others reasoning who fought hard to establish the authority of the Sunna is the status that the Hadīth was ultimately elevated to and the development and spread of many˙ thousands of such narratives. There is also almost a total consensus between scholars that a report of a particular sunna has to be of certain quality, known as mutawātir, for its abrogation of a Qur’anic verse to be accepted.4 A hadīth, and accordingly ˙ literally means “sucthe sunna it reports, is described as mutawātir, which cessive” or “consecutive,” if it was reported by many reliable people at each level of the chain of narration, such that it would be unreasonable to doubt its authenticity. The number of narrators required to make a hadīth attain the status of mutawātir ranges from four to several hundred, ˙according to different scholars. The opposite of mutawātir is ahād, which literally means “isolate” or ˙ “solitary.” A hadīth, and so the sunna it documents, is described as ahād ˙ ˙ if it was transmitted by a very small number of narrators, which is usually less than four.

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The reason that only a mutawātir sunna can abrogate a Qur’anic verse is that the Qur’an itself is mutawātir, having been transmitted by numerous people. The general rule is that a weaker text or report cannot abrogate a stronger one, and an ahād text or report is weaker than a mutawātir one. ˙ Differentiating between the two kinds of Sunna for the purpose of accepting or rejecting their possible involvement in abrogation is fundamentally flawed. It conflates two completely different things: the level of confidence in the authenticity of a hadīth and its possible involvement in abrogation. Being isolate rather than˙ successive does not make a hadīth a ˙ been forgery. It only makes it less likely to be authentic. A hadīth that has ˙ reported by only one or two sources can, therefore, be as authentic as any other authentic hadīth that has been narrated by many. Similarly, a suc˙ be a complete forgery like any fake isolate hadīth. It is cessive hadīth may ˙ illogical to set a rule whereby an isolate hadīth cannot abrogate˙ a Qur’anic verse or whereby a successive hadīth can.˙ Such a rule means that the abro˙ gation of a specific Qur’anic ruling by a certain sunna is being admitted or rejected not on the basis of the knowledge of whether that sunna actually abrogated the Qur’an but on the basis of the level of confidence, or the lack of it, in its attribution to the Prophet. But there is another problem with the view that the Sunna can abrogate the Qur’an. The Qur’an describes itself as being preserved and protected by God from being tampered with (15.9, 41.41–42). This is accepted by all Muslims. But the Qur’an does not make a similar statement about the preservation of Hadīth.5 Indeed, Muslim scholars have introduced a complex ˙ system to test the authenticity of hadīths. This is how some categorization hadīths are accepted and others are rejected. But˙ this human effort cannot ˙ claimed to be infallible; hence scholars, even within the same school of be thought, disagree on the authenticity of certain hadīths. The authenticity ˙ of a hadīth is established by human effort and is open to error whereas the ˙ integrity and authenticity of the Qur’an are guaranteed by God and are, therefore, unquestionable. How can one, then, state with confidence that a hadīth has abrogated a Qur’anic verse? How can one be confident that the ˙ intrinsically uncertain abrogate the inherently certain? Going by the logic of the Qur’an, surely God would have protected the Sunna had He wanted to use it to abrogate the Qur’an! Interestingly, there are references in the Qur’an suggesting that one of the Prophet’s functions is to “clarify” the Qur’an, but there is no mention that the Prophet can abrogate or override the Qur’an. Why would God say that the Prophet’s duty is to clarify the Qur’an but not also say that he may be at times commanded to change it, if this is really something the Prophet was going to be instructed to do? This is a serious problem that is glossed over and never discussed by the adherents of abrogation. Not unexpectedly, both those who reject the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna and those who allow it have tried to show that the Qur’an supports their respective views. One verse quoted by those who allowed

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 77 cross abrogation in support of their view is this: “Nor does he speak out of caprice. (53.3) This is but a revelation revealed” (53.4). Their argument is that the Sunna is itself inspired by God, so there is no theological difficulty with it abrogating the Qur’an, as the two represent different forms of divine revelation. One obvious counterargument is that these verses talk about the revelation of the Qur’an. The supporters of the abrogation of the Qur’an and the Sunna by each other also adduce verses that command the Muslims to follow the Prophet. Scholars who reject the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna often quote this verse: When Our manifest verses are recited to them, those who do not expect to encounter Us say: “Bring [O Muhammad!] a Qurʾan other than this, or alter it.” Say: “It is not for me to alter it of my own accord. I do not follow but what is revealed to me. I fear if I should rebel against my Lord the chastisement of a grave day.” (10.15)

This verse shows without qualification that the Prophet could not change the Qur’an, which means the Sunna cannot abrogate the Qur’an. This argument is rebuffed by the proponents of the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna by agreeing that the Prophet could not change the Qur’an of his own accord but pointing out that the Sunna is not the Prophet’s personal judgment but divine revelation, as in “I do not follow but what is revealed to me.” The two factions read from the same verse two completely opposite views. There are other verses that each side quotes to support its view. The question of whether the Qur’an may be abrogated by the Sunna cannot be settled by simply trying to call on certain verses as these can be interpreted differently to support opposite views. As we have learned in the last two chapters, the concept of the abrogation of Qur’anic verses is itself missing from the Qur’an, so the reality is that the textual basis of abrogation is the Hadīth, not the Qur’an. Qur’anic verses are interpreted to ˙ because this confi rmation is critical for establishing its support abrogation verity. Looking at this from a different angle, scholars have had to choose between rejecting the many hadīths on abrogation and interpreting some ˙ verses in a way that would support this idea. The overwhelming majority has found the latter more reassuring. But as I have also discussed above, even if the concept of abrogation is admitted, there are serious flaws with the view that the Sunna can abrogate the Qur’an. On the other hand, the change of the qibla may be seen as an instance of abrogation of a sunna by a Qur’anic verse.6

5.2.2

Replacement of the Abrogated Ruling

Shāfiʿī stated that an abrogated ruling must be replaced with a new one:

78

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law No obligation is ever abrogated without another obligation put in its stead, as is the case when the qibla of Jerusalem was abrogated and the Kaʿba was established in its place. Every abrogated thing in the Book or the Sunna is likewise.7

He was followed by some scholars who sought support for this view in 2.106: Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten We bring a better or the like of it. Do you not know that Allah is powerful over everything? (2.106)

They argue that this verse makes it clear that when a verse is abrogated a better verse or at least one like it is brought in its stead. But this interpretation is rejected by some who argue that not revealing a replacement ruling is itself something brought by God and is better than the abrogated ruling. These arguments are spurious, as I have explained that this verse has nothing to do with abrogation.8 Most scholars do not consider replacing the abrogated ruling with another a condition of abrogation. They argue that there is no such indication in the Qur’an and the Sunna, and that there is no reason to expect such a condition to exist. The standard example that is usually cited to support this view is the alleged abrogation of the command to make a charity donation before having a private audience with the Prophet: O you who believe! When you confer in private with the Messenger, give charity before such conference. This is better for you and purer. But if you do not have the means, then Allah is forgiving, merciful. (58.12) Do you hesitate to give charity before such conference? As you failed to do that and Allah forgave you, perform prayer, give alms, and obey Allah and his Messenger. Allah is aware of what you do. (58.13)

It is claimed that the requirement for making a payment in 58.12 was abrogated in the following verse without a replacement. But I will show later that this is not an instance of abrogation anyway.9

5.2.3

Application of the Abrogated Ruling

Scholars agree that no ruling was abrogated before it became known to people, as rulings are introduced in order to be communicated to people to follow. They differ, however, on whether there have been instances of rulings being abrogated after they were announced but before people had the opportunity to apply them. Most scholars, including most Shāfiʿites, think that a ruling can be abrogated before people could have applied it, whereas most Hanafites and some Hanbalites stipulate the opposite. ˙ ˙

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 79 Those who do not require Muslims to have had the opportunity to follow a ruling before its abrogation cite a number of instances that they claim support their view. The fi rst is the giving to charity before having a private audience with the Prophet. It has been argued that the commandment in 58.12 was abrogated by 58.13 before anyone applied it. The counterargument is that there are a number of hadīths stating that ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib ˙ implemented this ruling. There are ˙ other reports suggesting that other Muslims also did the same.10 Another example of an order that was not implemented before it was abrogated is God’s order to Abraham in his dream to sacrifice his son. Abraham and his son agreed to carry out the command, but as the father was about to sacrifice his son God intervened and stopped Abraham, having seen him pass the test (37.101–107). But this example has been rejected on the basis that Abraham and his son went ahead with the order and, had God not stopped them, they would have fully implemented it. Reports of abrogated Sunna have also been used as arguments. One example comes from the Hudaybiyya peace treaty that the Prophet made ˙ the terms of the treaty is that the Prophet, who with the disbelievers. One of had by then immigrated to Medina, would turn back any converts from the disbelievers of Mecca who came to join him. It has been claimed that this agreement was abrogated by this verse before it was executed: “O you who believe! When believing women come to you as emigrants, test them. Allah better knows their belief. Then, if you know them to be believers, do not return them to the disbelievers ” (60.10). But Zaid has pointed out that there is no evidence

that no believer was ever sent back to Mecca before the revelation of the ruling of this verse.11 In fact, Bukhārī states that the Prophet did send back men who migrated from Mecca during that time.12

5.3

CONTRADICTIONS WITH THE DEFINITION OF ABROGATION

Most alleged cases of abrogation contradict parts of the standard defi nition of abrogation as the abolishment of a divine ruling by a later divine ruling. Even if abrogation were a real phenomenon, such cases are not proper instances of it. This is why most alleged cases of abrogation are rejected by other scholars who also accept abrogation. In this section, I will categorize such mistakes and give examples of each. It should be noted that at times the differences between those categories are a bit subtle, because they all represent different forms of misinterpretation of the verses in question. Some of these abrogation claims have been rejected by scholars on the basis on the unreliability of the Hadīth narratives they are based on. But ˙ for rejection for two reasons. First, I I have not used this as an argument do not consider the quoted, old Hadīth reports as reliable sources for the ˙

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case for or against abrogation. Second, my goal here is to show the flaws in implementing the defi nitions of abrogation. I recommend Zaid’s detailed study for a comprehensive list of verses that have been mistakenly identified as having been abrogated.13

5.3.1

Report-Verses

The standard defi nition of abrogation means that only imperative verses, i.e. those that include commands and prohibitions, can be involved in abrogation. Indicative statements, by defi nition, are not supposed to abrogate other verses or get abrogated because they do not introduce any laws. Also, indicative verses often state unchangeable facts. Verses detailing past or future events, for instance, are not subject to abrogation. Such abrogation would mean that God wrongly described a past or future event, which contradicts God’s omniscience. Nevertheless, a large number of non-imperative verses have been made the subject of abrogation.14 In the following example, verse 19.71, which says that on the Day of Judgment every person will have to pass through hell, is claimed to have been abrogated by 19.72:15 There is not one of you who will not go down to it. That is for your Lord a decided decree. (19.71) We shall then save those who are pious [toward God] and leave the wrongdoers therein on their knees. (19.72)

Yet 19.72 does not annul or even modify the future event reported in 19.71. It rather adds the new information that the pious would be taken out of hell, leaving only the evildoers there. This fact is already known from other verses that stress that the believers will go to paradise. Other report-verses that are said to have been abrogated include these descriptions of a group of people who will be admitted into paradise on the Day of Resurrection: “A crowd of the first generations (56.13) and a few of the later ones (56.14) .” These verses are claimed to have been abrogated by these descriptive verses of a group of the people of paradise: “A crowd of the first generations (56.39) and a crowd of the later ones (56.40).” More specifically, verse 56.40 is supposed to have abrogated 56.14,16 increasing the number of the inhabitants from later generations. The mistake in this claim is that these two sets of verses talk about two different groups of people. These groups are even given different names (56.10, 56.38). In addition to confusing the two groups, scholars have failed to realize that claiming that 56.40 abrogated 56.14 means that the future description given in 56.14 was wrong! Most of the verses that I will discuss in this section are indicative rather than imperative, so they contradict this requirement of abrogation in addition to the category they are listed under, and at times others also.

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 81

5.3.2

Non-Conflicting Verses

Most scholars agree with the principle that a case for abrogation may be made only if the verses in question cannot be reconciled at all. If two verses can be interpreted so that there is no contradiction between them, then there would be no case for considering one of them as abrogating the other. Yet there are over fifty claims of abrogation that involve perfectly reconcilable verses that have been turned by scholars into abrogator-abrogated pairs by suggesting a nonexistent conflict between the verses of each pair. This is often the result of accepting Hadīth claims that are traced back to ˙ Companions of the Prophet or Successors. In these alleged cases of abrogation the abrogating and abrogated verses are often from different chapters. This is one example: Those who believe in the unseen, keep up prayer, and spend out of what We have given them. (2.3)

Some have claimed that the last part of this verse, “spend out of what We have given them,” was abrogated by the “verse of alms”: The alms are for the poor, the needy, those who work for them, those whose hearts are brought together, the ransoming of slaves, debtors, in Allah’s way, and the wayfarer; so Allah ordains; Allah is knowing, wise. (9.60)

This view might be influenced by a statement attributed to Abū Jaʿfar Yazīd b. al-Qaʿqāʿ (130/747) that “the verse of alms has abrogated all earlier rulings about alms and the fasting of Ramadan has abrogated all earlier forms of fasting.”17 Even if 9.60 is related to 2.3, it would simply be an explanation of 2.3, in which case this would still not be a case of abrogation. Some verses have wrongly been claimed to abrogate verses that they actually explain, which I will discuss later in the chapter. One obvious problem in this case is that 2.3 and 9.60 are unrelated. The clause “spend out of what We have given them” is a general, factual statement that is always true. It describes and praises a set of behaviors of the believers, including their willingness to give to the needy. The verse does not introduce any commands as to how alms should be spent, which is what verse 9.60 explains. This is why verse 2.3 could not have been abrogated by verse 9.60. It could be abrogated only by an instruction to the Muslim not to spend on charity, and there is no such command in the Qur’an. Almost exactly the same situation is met with in the verse “prosperous is he who purifies himself” (87.14), which is also claimed to have been abrogated by the subsequent revelation about the spending of alms.18 Again, this verse is a general factual statement. Furthermore, while it uses the term “tazakkā,” which has the same root as “zakāt (alms),” this term has a broader use in the Qur’an, which is why I have translated it as “purifies himself.”

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Let’s look at another example: Those who believe, the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabaeans—whoever believe in Allah and the Last day and does good—they shall have their reward from their Lord, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve. (2.62)

It has been claimed that this verse was abrogated by this divine statement: Anyone who desires a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted of him, and he shall be among the losers in the next world. (3.85)

Tabarī traces this claim back to Ibn ʿAbbās, but he dismisses it.19 As I ˙ explained elsewhere, verse 2.62 means that “people are not judged have by how they label themselves or are labeled by others, but by their beliefs and deeds.”20 This is why the verse makes the combination of the belief in Allah and the Day of Judgment and doing good works the requirement of salvation. The term “Islam” is used in the Qur’an for the core message of submission to God’s will which all religions, including Moses’ and Jesus’, taught. So any Christian, Jew, or member of any other monotheistic religion who combines faith with good works is effectively a practicing Muslim. Verse 2.62 is not in conflict with 3.85 to be abrogated by it. They are both operative at the same time. There is another significant fact to point out. Verse 5.69 has a wording almost identical to 2.62, differing only in the grammatical case of the word for “Sabaeans.” Verse 5.69 was revealed after 2.62, and it obviously has exactly the same meaning, yet no one has suggested that it was abrogated!21 One case that shows the careless use of the concept of abrogation is the claim that the verse “if you try to count Allah’s favors you cannot count them. Man is unjust and ungrateful” (14.34) has been abrogated by “if you try to count Allah’s favors you cannot count them. Allah is forgiving, merciful” (16.18). 22 These verses are not only indicative and do not conflict with each other, but they are also very similar. The fi rst parts are even identical. The alleged abrogation can only mean that “Man is unjust and ungrateful” was abrogated by “Allah is forgiving, merciful.” Yet the inclination of man to commit sins is confi rmed in the Qur’an. Indeed, this state of sinfulness is the very reason why man needs God to be forgiving and merciful. The list of scholars who have made this claim of abrogation and attributed it to ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ˙ Zaid includes Ibn Hazm, Ibn Salāma, Karmī, and Ajhūrī. ˙ This is the fi nal example of this category of false abrogation. The subject of this claim of abrogation is this verse: Allah’s is what is in heaven and in the earth, and if you show what is in your souls or hide it, Allah will call you to account about it. He forgives whom He wills and punishes whom He wills. Allah is powerful over everything. (2.284)

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 83 Tabarī has reported, in one of several variants of this story he quotes, that ˙ this verse was revealed, Muslims were terrified. They rushed to tell the when Prophet that if they would be called into account for their hidden thoughts then they were surely doomed. God then responded to their concern by revealing “Allah will not burden any soul beyond its capacity” (2.286), which is the fi rst part of the last verse in the same chapter.23 Tabarī mentions also a number of counterreports that state that 2.284 was˙ not abrogated, which he agrees with.24 The claim that 2.284 was abrogated by 2.286 is confi rmed in the Hadīth collections of Ahmad b. Hanbal, 25 Bukhārī, 26 and Muslim. 27 The ˙statements of 2.284 and˙ 2.286 are˙ perfectly reconcilable. It is not possible that the individual’s responsibility for his intentions and hidden thoughts is ignored by God. After all, faith itself is essentially an invisible activity although it has visible manifestations. Furthermore, the claim of abrogation is targeted at the invisible thoughts or intentions, but visible actions can be equally difficult to control. Similarly, hidden thoughts and intentions as well as visible behaviors can also be controllable. Verse 2.286 is making a general statement that is always true and that is not targeted at annulling any other statement, let alone another permanently true statement like that of 2.84.

5.3.3

Specification

Other victims of overzealous scholars to establish as many cases of abrogation as possible are verses that are involved in a textual phenomenon known as “takhsīs (specification).” Over thirty such verses have mistakenly ˙ been claimed to˙have been abrogated. Scholars have used the word “ʿāmm (general)” for any term that denotes all members of a certain group. Examples of such terms include “Muslims,” “men,” “women,” “people,” “humankind,” and “animals.” The term “khāss (specific),” on the other hand, applies to any one particular member or˙ ˙subgroup of a general group. So a particular woman or group of women is considered to be a “specific” subcategory of the “general” category of “women.” The process of identifying a specific member or group of members of a general group is known as “takhsīs” or “specification.” ˙ ˙ A related textual phenomenon that I should touch on here is “taqyīd (qualification).” The term “mutlaq (unqualified)” is applied to any word that refers to any one unidentifi˙ ed individual member of a group, such as “animal,” “man,” “bird,” and so on. “Taqyīd” or “qualification” is the process of qualifying an unqualified term by combining it with a restrictive word, often an adjective. For instance, the unqualified noun “animal” may be qualified by including it in a phrase such as “carnivorous animal,” the noun “man” by including it in the phrase “tall man,” and so on. Each restricted referent is known as “muqayyad (qualified).” So the “muqayyad (qualified)” is a subset of the “mutlaq (unqualified),” which is a subset of the “khāss (specific),” which itself˙ is a subset of the ˙˙ “ʿāmm (general).”

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Like specification, qualification has been mistaken for abrogation. 28 As specification suffered more from this confusion, I will focus on it in this section. There are a number of differences between abrogation and specification. First, the latter, by defi nition, applies only to general rulings whereas abrogation can occur to a general or specific ruling. Second, in the case of specification, the older ruling remains operative, but its domain is restricted, whereas the new ruling applies to the cases that have been exempted. In other words, there is no contradiction between the two laws as they apply in different circumstances. In abrogation, the abrogating and abrogated texts are contradictory and cannot be reconciled. They cannot be operative at the same time. Third, abrogation can be identified by the revelation itself only, i.e. the Qur’an or the Sunna. It is not determined by rational analysis and personal judgment. Specification, on the other hand, can also be identified by unanimous agreement (ijmāʿ), analogical reasoning (qiyās), or personal reasoning (ijtihād) in general. This difference is not as clear as it may look, because deciding whether a verse or sunna abrogates a verse employs an element of judgment in interpreting the text as there is no verse or sunna that explicitly states that it or another verse or sunna abrogates a certain verse. The fact that no such statement is found in the Qur’an has always been one major argument for the opponents of abrogation. 29 Fourth, the abrogator must be later than the abrogated text. This is not a requirement in the case of specification as the general and specific texts can occur in any chronological order. Hanafite scholars, though, have differed from the majority, stipulating that˙ the specific and general texts must be simultaneous. If the specifying verse was revealed some time after the general verse then this, they argue, is a case of “partial abrogation (naskh juz’ī).” In this kind of abrogation, as opposed to “total abrogation (naskh kullī),” the old ruling is abrogated only partly, leaving it still operative. But this distinction between partial abrogation and specification is not as clear as the Hanafite scholars suggest. The standard example of partial ˙ rulings on slanderous accusation:30 abrogation is the Those who accuse chaste women [of sexual misconduct] and do not bring forward four witnesses, whip them eighty lashes and do not accept any testimony from them. Those are the renegades. (24.4) Except those who repent after that and make amends. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (24.5) Those who accuse their wives without having witnesses other than themselves, then the testimony of one of them is to testify by Allah four times that he is truthful. (24.6)

It is claimed that 24.4 set a “general” ruling that applied to all of those who accused chaste women of unchastity without backing their claims with enough witnesses. This ruling, it is further suggested, was partly abrogated in 24.6, which introduced a new ruling that is specific for those who accuse

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 85 their wives. Thus the original ruling is said to have been partially abrogated, i.e. when the accuser and the accused are married. The overwhelming majority of scholars, however, see this as a case of specification. Indeed, those verses might well have even been revealed at the same time, which violates a requirement of partial abrogation. There is no evidence to support the Hanafites’ rejection of specification in the case of slanderous accusation or ˙their broader argument on the existence of “partial abrogation.” But even ignoring the Hanafite concept of partial abrogation, there are ˙ cation that have been mistaken for abrogation. plenty of examples of specifi Let’s review some of them: And the poets are followed by those who go astray! (26.224) Have you not seen how they wander in every valley (26.225) and say what they do not do, (26.226) except those who believe, do good works, remember Allah much, and help themselves after they have been wronged? Those who do wrong will know what fate they will face. (26.227)

It has been claimed that the statement “except those who believe, do good works, remember Allah much, and help themselves after they have been wronged” has abrogated verses 26.224–226.31 However, what we have here is a description applied to an “ʿāmm (general)” group, which is “the poets,” followed by an exceptive statement (26.227) that excludes a “khāss (specific)” subgroup from that description. This is not an instance of ˙ ˙abrogation, not least because that description still applies to “the poets” who are not covered by the exemption. Most scholars who accept abrogation consider exception as a form of specification, not abrogation. This is another case of specification by exception that has been misrepresented as abrogation: Those who conceal the clear signs and the guidance that We have sent down, after We have expounded them clearly in the Book, shall be cursed by Allah and the cursers, (2.159) except those who repent, make amends, and make known; toward these I shall show forgiveness; I am the forgiving, the compassionate. (2.160)

Verse 2.159 is said to have been abrogated by 2.160. But the latter simply introduces an exemption to the statement made in the former. The general group identified in 2.159 is subjected to specification whereby a subgroup, which is those who change their ways and repent, is excluded from it. Let’s take one last example: Surely the human being is in loss, (103.2) except those who believe, do good works, exhort one another to uphold the truth, and exhort one another to be patient. (103.3)

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

Some scholars have claimed that the exceptive statement in 103.3 abrogates 103.2.32 Yet the statement in 103.2 remains a valid statement that applies to every human being other than those described in 103.3. This is an instance of specification that is applied to the general term “human being.” One difference between these three false cases of abrogation is that unlike 26.224–226 and 2.159, the alleged abrogated verse 103.2 represents an incomplete statement that could not have been made without its second part, i.e. 103.3. It is not possible that God revealed the statement “the human being is in loss,” and only later continued the incomplete statement with “except those who believe, do good works, exhort one another to uphold the truth, and exhort one another to be patient.” The clause “the human being is in loss” applies to most but not all people, which is why it could not have been revealed without the clarifying exception in 103.3. Verses 103.2–3 do not represent a case of abrogation. There is one other argument to add as to why these three cases are not examples of abrogation. Verses 26.224–226, 103.2–3, and 2.159 are all indicative, yet abrogation is supposed to operate on imperative verses.

5.3.4

Explanatory Verses

Another category of verses that have unjustifiably been dragged into the abrogation debate are those that explain other verses and, therefore, are not in conflict with the verses they allegedly abrogate. The differences between this category of verses and the specification verses can look rather subtle at times as specification can be seen as a form of explanation. This is one instance of mistaking explanation for abrogation: It is the duty of people toward Allah to perform pilgrimage to the House, for anyone who is able to make his way to it. (3.97)

It has been suggested that “it is the duty of people toward Allah to perform pilgrimage to the House” was abrogated by “for anyone who is able to make his way to it.”33 However, the second part of the verse only explains its fi rst half. The duty to go as a pilgrim to Mecca was always only for those who could afford it. This is another example: He has only forbidden for you what is dead, blood, flesh of swine, and whatsoever has been consecrated to other than God. But he who is forced by necessity, neither revolting nor transgressing, there is no sin for him. Verily, Allah is forgiving and merciful. (2.173)

The subject of the claim of abrogation in this verse is “He has only forbidden for you what is dead, blood, flesh of swine, and whatsoever has been consecrated to other than God ” and the alleged abrogating statement is “but he who

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 87 is forced by necessity, neither revolting nor transgressing, there is no sin for him.”34

What this statement really does is to add more details to the proscription. The permission to eat the forbidden foods when one is compelled by necessity does not make these foods permissible in normal circumstances, so the ban has not been abrogated. The permission clarifies the prohibition, so both the proscription and the permission are operative. This is confi rmed by another verse: Say [O Muhammad!]: “I do not find in that which has been revealed to me anything forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it, unless it is a dead animal, [poured] blood, the flesh of swine—for these are abomination—or impurity which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for other than Allah.” But whosoever is forced by necessity, without exceeding the limit or transgressing, [for him] your Lord is forgiving, merciful. (6.145)

Interestingly, both the ban and the permission are mentioned in the same verse in both 2.173 and 6.145. Both the proscription and the permission are intrinsic parts of the ruling.

5.4

STATISTICS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES

One powerful way to appreciate the substantial differences between scholars in their understanding and application of the concept of abrogation is to look at certain statistics about the alleged abrogated verses. I will quote figures mainly compiled by Mustafā Zaid, 35 with minor corrections as in ˙ ˙ totals were off by one or two verses. some cases his calculations of the Let’s start fi rst with a survey of the number of abrogated verses that a selection of nine scholars has each discussed.36 These are not the total number of abrogation claims each scholar was aware of but only a selection of them. Someone like Ibn al-Jawzī might have covered most if not all claims that were known to him, but this is defi nitely not the case with Suyūtī and ˙ ʿAbd al-Qāhir, each of whom discussed a relatively much smaller number of cases. Also, the considered claims are not necessarily accepted by that scholar as genuine cases of abrogation.37 The scholar at times rejected a claim he discussed or did not express a clear view. For instance, of the 247 cases he discussed, Ibn al-Jawzī accepted only 7 explicitly and 15 implicitly, did not state his position clearly in 20 other cases, and rejected the remaining 205.38 Suyūtī discussed 22 verses but confi rmed the abrogation of only 20.39 ˙ in Table 5.1 show a wide range of numbers. The 6th century The figures scholar Abū al-Faraj b. al-Jawzī reported as many as 247 verses40 whereas Suyūtī discussed only 22 cases three centuries later. ˙ table also shows the scale of the differences between the various The sources in terms of how many chapters contained abrogated verses. Zaid

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

Table 5.1

The Number of Alleged Abrogated Verses and the Number of Chapters That Contain Them

Scholar

Death

No. of Verses

No. of Chapters

Ibn Hazm ˙ Nahhās ˙˙ Ibn Salāma

320/932

213

63

338/949

133

46

410/1019

213

65

‘Abd al-Qāhir

429/1137

66

24

Ibn Barakāt

520/1126

210

65

Ibn al-Jawzī

597/1200

247

62

Suyūtī ˙ Karmī

911/1505

22

11

1033/1623

214

67

Ajhūrī

1190/1776

214

67

notes that most of these scholars agree that the number of chapters that have alleged abrogated verses only is 40 and the number of chapters that have both abrogated and abrogating verses is 25, yet in total 72 different chapters are reported in the various sources.41 The fact that the total number of verses and the total number of chapters do not increase in the same proportion for each scholar must mean that scholars often did not report the same number of verses from the same chapter. For instance, Ibn Hazm, who reported a total of 213 verses, had 26 ˙ of them from chapter 2, whereas Nahhās who reported almost half of the ˙ total of Ibn Hazm had as many as 30˙verses from chapter 2.42 ˙ The differences do not stop here. Even when scholars report the same number of verses from any one chapter, they at times identified different verses! This is why, for instance, although the highest number of identified verses in chapter 2 is 37, the number of different verses is actually 42. Because of this, although the highest number of abrogated verses reported by any one scholar is 247, the total number of different verses from these nine scholars is as many as 294. Incredibly, this is as much as 4.7% of the mushaf’s 6,236 verses! ˙ I˙ should point out that the figures reported in Zaid’s study may not agree with figures taken from those sources directly. For instance, while Zaid reports that Ibn Salāma discussed 213 verses, the edition of this work that I have access to lists 237 verses, taking his total very close to the highest total of Ibn al-Jawzī. Also, Zaid states that Ibn Salāma mentioned 26 abrogated verses in chapter 2, but the source I have seen has 30. Another example is ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s book. While Zaid reports 66 verses, a different edition of ʿAbd al-Qāhir’s work reports a total of 75 cases.43 Of these, 34 show an agreement between scholars regarding

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 89 their having been abrogated and which verses abrogated them; another 35 verses show a disagreement between scholars regarding whether they were abrogated; and 6 show an agreement between scholars regarding their having been abrogated but a disagreement regarding which verses abrogated them. Such differences are probably due to a number of reasons. At times, for instance, Zaid focused on reporting the number of “subjects” that included abrogation rather than the number of individual “verses.” But the exact figures are not what concern us here. What is significant is the scale of the scholars’ disagreement on the number of the supposedly abrogated verses, the number of these in each chapter, and what these verses are. It is clear from the broad range of figures that some of those who accept the authenticity of abrogation think that many scholars have highly exaggerated its scale. I have focused so far on the number of supposedly abrogated verses that various scholars have chosen to consider. But how many verses have these scholars accepted to have been abrogated? Not surprisingly, here also disagreement prevails. Some of the scholars mentioned above have accepted most of the verses they reported whereas others have rejected most of the reports. Table 5.2 summarizes the views of three old scholars—Ibn al-Jawzī, Suyūtī, and Shāh Waliyy Allāh al-Dihlawī (1176/1762)—and another three from ˙the 20th century. Some of the verses reported in this table are about the same subject, so they are often treated as one. For instance, ʿAbd Allāh al-Shinqītī says ˙ that he accepts only 9 verses to have been abrogated, but that is because he treats verses 73.2–4 and 4.15–16 as one verse each, because they are consecutive verses in the same chapter and deal with the same subject. The total number, therefore, is in fact 12. Shinqītī notes that 58.12 is the only verse on whose abrogation all schol˙ ars who accept abrogation have agreed.44 But he qualifies this statement by saying that “there may be disagreement about this verse also but I have not come across any, despite my search for such disagreement in the books of

Table 5.2

The Confirmed Number of Abrogated Verses

Scholar

No. of Verses

No. of Chapters

Ibn al-Jawzī

22

N/A

Suyūtī ˙ Dihlawī

20

N/A

5

5

Zarqānī

12

N/A

Zaid Shinqītī ˙

8

5

12

6

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

exegesis and Qur’anic studies.” Jabrī, however, asserts that there is not a single verse that is unanimously accepted by the adherents of abrogation as having been abrogated.45 These are the verses in question: O you who believe! When you confer in private with the Messenger, give charity before such conference. This is better for you and purer. But if you do not have the means, then Allah is forgiving, merciful. (58.12) Do you hesitate to give charity before such conference? As you failed to do that and Allah forgave you, perform prayer, give alms, and obey Allah and his Messenger. Allah is aware of what you do. (58.13)

It is claimed that the command to not approach the Prophet with a request without giving charity was too hard for the Muslims to follow, so God abolished it and relieved them of this obligation. But even this solitary scholarly consensus on the abrogation of 58.12 has been tempered with disagreement on the identity of the abrogating verse. Most reports and scholars identify the latter as verse 58.13, but Tabarī attributes to Qatāda its identification as the second half of 58.12, “˙but if you do not have the means, then Allah is forgiving, merciful,” and to Ibn ʿAbbās the statement that the revelation on almsgiving abrogated it!46 Shinqītī also singles out verse 73.2 as having been accepted by the major˙ ity of scholars, although it has not achieved total consensus like 58.12:47 O you cloaked one (Muhammad)! (73.1) Keep vigil the night long, except a little, (73.2) half of it, or a little less, (73.3) or add to it, and chant the Qurʾan chanting! (73.4)

The command to perform the night prayer in these verses is claimed to have been abrogated by this verse: Your Lord [O Muhammad!] knows that you keep vigil nearly two-thirds, half, or a third of the night, and [so do] a party of those with you. Allah determines the night and the day. He knows that you would not be able to count its hours, so He relented toward you. So read of the Qurʾan so much as is feasible. He knows that some of you would be sick, others journeying in the land seeking the bounty of Allah, and others fighting in the way of Allah. So read of it so much as is feasible, perform the prayer, pay the alms, and lend to God a good loan. Whatever good you send forward for yourselves, you shall find it with Allah—better and greater a wage. Ask for Allah’s forgiveness; Allah is forgiving, merciful. (73.20)

But ʿAbd al-Qāhir mentions two different abrogators for the night prayer.48 One is verse 30.17, which he claims is the verse that introduced the five obligatory daily prayers. The other is the Prophet’s sunna that there

Conceptual and Implementational Differences of Abrogation 91 is no obligatory prayer other than the five daily prayers. So even when there is agreement among scholars, it is never total agreement.49 We have seen in this chapter that the subject of abrogation has been highly controversial and has generated much more disagreement than consensus. Scholars have disagreed on what abrogation exactly is, what verses have been abrogated, which verses or sunnas abrogated them, and the numbers of those verses. The scale of this unfortunate mess can be summarized in a very simple observation: apart from accepting that abrogation is a real phenomenon, scholars have not agreed on any aspect of this concept!

6

Legal Abrogation

We have already seen that the concept of abrogation is never referred to in the Qur’an. The absence of any Qur’anic reference to a concept that would be critical to understanding that Book and to Islamic law can only point to its nonhistoricity and that it was developed on the basis of extra-Qur’anic material. In this and Chapters 10, 11, and 12, I am going to examine the three modes of abrogation in their chronological order. I will look at the merits of each mode and examine verses that are considered the strongest cases of abrogation in each mode. My examination will lead me to completely reject the two modes of abrogation that involve the withdrawal of Qur’anic texts. This rejection is the result of studying both the concepts and specific alleged cases of abrogation. Legal abrogation may be possible to entertain conceptually, but it lacks unequivocal evidence. None of the supposed instances of this mode of abrogation needs to be so seen. This mode of abrogation does not imply the existence of Qur’anic texts that are not part of the mushaf, so it is free from one of the major conceptual ˙ ˙ and textual modes. It does not question the problems in the legal-textual mushaf’s being the complete record of the Qur’anic revelation as the other two˙ ˙modes do. All the alleged abrogating and abrogated verses of this mode are in the mushaf. ˙˙ Does this version of the concept of abrogation, where a Qur’anic ruling is replaced by another Qur’anic law, contradict any fundamental principle in the Qur’an? The answer is no. We have already seen that God has changed certain commands in the laws that He revealed to different prophets. There are aspects of any divine law that are designed specifically for certain societal, economic, political, and cultural situations. These can change over centuries, as explained earlier,1 but they can also change within much shorter periods of time, including during the lifetime of a prophet. As these may change, so would the divine laws that govern them. While the legal principles underlying these laws do not change, the laws themselves can change. This mode is based on particular interpretations of the verses concerned. It presumes that there are a number of verses in the mushaf whose rulings ˙ ˙ insist must be have been superseded by later rulings, which some scholars Qur’anic while others allow them to be Sunna. In each case, two specific, related interpretations are presumed by this mode—an interpretation of the

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abrogated verse and another of the abrogator. There is nothing intrinsically controversial about legal abrogation, except when the abrogating law is said to be a sunna. Given this and its purpose, one would expect legal abrogation to have been the first mode of abrogation to be formed. This is indeed what the early sources show. Burton describes this mode of abrogation as “the rationalization worked out by the usūlīs to explain instances in which they perceived certain Qur’an ˙ verses or certain sunnas to be inoperative.”2 The critical term in Burton’s view is “perceived.” Every alleged instance of legal abrogation depends on a specific interpretation of the Qur’anic verses involved but, as we shall see, there is always a more convincing interpretation or at least one that is at least as plausible. These alternative interpretations undermine the case for abrogation. This particular mode of abrogation has developed as a result of misinterpreting Qur’anic verses. Put differently, this mode of abrogation is the fruit of misunderstanding the Qur’anic text—the perceived “contradictions” in the Qur’anic text, as pointed out by Burton and others.3 These misinterpretations were often needed to explain the adoption of certain practices that would have been challenged by the proper interpretations of the verses in question. I consider extra-Qur’anic literature, including the Hadīth, to be too unre˙ any interpreter who liable to use on its own for interpreting the Qur’an. For takes this view, choosing one potential interpretation of a verse over an alternative interpretation often reflects the nature of the analysis of the Qur’anic text and which of the possible interpretations is considered to be more likely. It is based on the balance of arguments. In contrast, those who rely on the Hadīth to interpret the Qur’an end up manipulating the text of the Qur’an ˙ fit what the Hadīth says. to ˙ verses that scholars have put under this mode of abrogaThere are many tion. Going through all those claims is outside the scope of this book, and there is no particular benefit to doing that anyway. I will, rather, examine the instances that have attracted the greatest scholarly consensus as representing genuine cases of abrogation. My conclusion is that none of these cases is likely to reflect a change in the ruling, let alone represent a definite instance of abrogation. There is one case that may be seen as linked to abrogation, but even this solitary situation can be easily understood without the need for abrogation. This conclusion remains true when other claims of legal abrogation, which have left scholars in much disagreement, are considered. The image of abrogation as a major principle that affected many Qur’anic verses has no foundations.

6.1

OFFERING CHARITY FOR AN AUDIENCE WITH THE PROPHET

According to Shinqītī, 58.12 is the only verse that all scholars who accept ˙ abrogation have agreed to have been abrogated.4 Indeed, even scholars who have reduced the alleged instances of abrogation in the Qur’an to a

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minimum—including Dihlawī, Zarqānī, and Zaid—agree that verse 58.12 is a genuine case of abrogation. It is claimed that people used to crowd the Prophet with questions and requests, so God revealed that those who wanted to have an audience with the Prophet had to give charity fi rst: O you who believe! When you confer in private with the Messenger, give charity before such conference. This is better for you and purer. But if you do not have the means, then Allah is forgiving, merciful. (58.12) Do you hesitate to give charity before such conference? As you failed to do that and Allah forgave you, perform prayer, give alms, and obey Allah and his Messenger. Allah is aware of what you do. (58.13)

As I explained earlier, 5 the agreement among scholars that verse 58.12 was abrogated is not complete. While most have suggested that verse 58.12 was abrogated by 58.13, some scholars have pointed to the second part of 58.12 while others mentioned the revelation on almsgiving as the abrogator. Verse 58.12 consists of two parts, the fi rst of which contains the command to the Muslims to offer charity when seeking an audience with the Prophet: “O you who believe! When you confer in private with the Messenger, give alms before such conference.” This command is explained as “this is better for you and purer,” because giving charity is intrinsically good and linking that to seeking to see the Prophet is a recognition of the spiritual value of such a meeting. But the Qur’an takes into account that this command, like others it contains, might be too hard for some to implement. The poor clearly could not afford to give to charity. The verse, therefore, goes on to excuse those who were incapable of implementing the command: “But if you do not have the means, then Allah is forgiving, merciful.” This passage does not abrogate the fi rst part of the verse as suggested by some scholars. It only exempts the poor. Verse 58.13 starts by reminding those who can pay charity that they should not “hesitate to give alms before such conference.” It then informs those who failed to perform the command that God has forgiven them: “As you failed to do that and Allah forgave you.” Finally, reminding them of this favor, it stresses that they should continue to “perform prayer, give alms, and obey Allah and his Messenger.” When understood in this way, there is no need to invoke the concept of abrogation to understand any part of these two verses. A command to spend on charity has been enacted for those who can afford it. Those who failed to do so are told that this failure to obey God has been forgiven and are then reminded of other duties that include spending their money on charity. The latter is particularly significant. Many if not most Muslims would not have had the opportunity to have an audience with the Prophet anyway, and most of those who did would have had very few opportunities

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to do so. It does not make sense to say that God abrogated the Muslims’ duty to give to charity on this small number of occasions just to remind them of their permanent duty of charity donation! The command to pay to charity before having an audience with the Prophet must have remained in effect for those who can afford it. Khudarī sees verse 58.13 as clarifying that the charity imposed in 58.12 ˙ have to be an additional monetary gift, reminding the believers does not that praying and giving alms are sufficient.6 But this uncommon interpretation, which also rejects the case for abrogation, does not deal with the fact that 58.12 introduced a specific command. I do not see any differentiation in these verses between specifically spending in charity before meeting the Prophet and the general almsgiving duty, i.e. for those who have the means to do so. It is not as if those who did not want to give their money found it difficult to do so because the command specifically related to meeting the Prophet! Annulling the ruling to give to charity before having an audience with the Prophet would not have dealt with the underlying issue of the failure of those capable Muslims to give to the needy. In their keenness for seeing and presenting this instance as evidence of abrogation, scholars have ignored or missed the significant fact that God does not talk in 58.13 about the abolishment of a command but about forgiveness for those who failed to execute it. Interestingly, forgiveness is mentioned also in 58.12 in reference to those who were incapable of executing the command. Now, the scholars who take the abrogating verse to be 58.13 would have to accept that the concept of forgiveness in verse 58.12, which also addresses the failure of some to carry out the divine order, does not mean the abolishment of the command. So why would the forgiveness in verse 58.13 be seen as the equivalent of abolishing the command? Furthermore, forgiveness is applied in the Qur’an to the committing of a sin when one does something that they should not do or fails to do something that they were commanded to do, which is the case in this instance. It is never used to mean the abolishment of the command itself. Indeed, nowhere in 58.13 does God abolish any ruling. But, as is often the case with views that the Qur’anic text does not support, this popular oversight and misinterpretation has other reports to support it. Tabarī reports on the authority of Mujāhid that only ʿAlī b. Abī ˙ Tālib performed the command in verse 58.12 as he gave charity of one ˙dinar before conferring with the Prophet. In another report that Tabarī also attributes to Mujāhid, ʿAlī is claimed to have referred to verse ˙58.12 as follows: There is a verse in the Book of Allah that no one before me executed and no one after me will do. I had a dinar which I changed into ten dirhams. I used to donate one dirham every time I came to visit the Prophet. It was later abrogated so no one executed it before me.7

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There is another report, also quoted by Tabarī, that suggests that other Muslims also implemented this command,8˙ another stating that the command was valid for only one hour, and other such reports. Nevertheless, the majority of scholars think that this verse shows that a ruling can be abrogated before it is implemented, which means that they reject the reports that ʿAlī and other Muslims implemented the command before it was abolished. Tirmidhī reports a hadīth on the incident of verses 58.12–13. He attributes the following to ʿ˙Alī: When “O you who believe! When you confer in private with the Messenger, give charity before such conference” was revealed, the Prophet asked me: “What do think of one dinar?” I said: “They cannot afford it.” He said: “Half a dinar then?” I said: “They cannot afford it.” He said: “How much then?” I said: “The weight of one hair of gold.” He said: “You are stingy.” Then “do you hesitate to give charity before such conference?” was revealed. Things were made easier for this nation through me.9 It is interesting how this report10 contradicts the other reports about ʿAlī’s role in the incidents associated with verses 58.12–13. It goes as far as having the Prophet accuse ʿAlī of being miserly whereas the other reports present him as being exceptionally generous, which is in line with ʿAlī’s image in the various historical sources. As rightly noted by John Burton, the alleged abrogation of verse 58.12 by 58.13 was of no practical use for Muslim jurists.11 The command to make an offering before conferring with the Prophet was a “special prerogative and prerequisite of the Prophetic office” which must have come to an end by his death. Scholars have shown considerable interest in the purely theoretical question of whether a command can be abrogated before its implementation. While the case of verses 58.12–13 belongs to this debate, the special interest in it stems from the fact that it is considered the clearest evidence of abrogation. It is often used for rebuffing any rejection of the historicity of abrogation, which is probably why the relevant Hadīth narratives developed over time. This is, for instance, what Shinqītī ˙says: ˙ This verse is a clear argument against those who have denied abrogation. It clearly indicates an abrogating verse and an abrogated one. There has been an agreement on accepting it as a case of abrogation. Any disagreement appeared only later.12 Further, and in relation to my earlier point, it is not necessary to conclude from the verses that 58.12 was revealed some time before 58.13. It is perfectly possible to understand the two verses as having been revealed at the same time. This would mean that this pair of verses cannot be seen as a case of an abrogating verse and an abrogated one.

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Had the hadīths that confi rm 58.12–13 as a case of abrogation not ˙ think scholars would have thought of these verses in terms existed, I do not of abrogation. At least, any such suggestion would not have gained popularity or endured. The verses would have been seen as referring to a command that some Muslims failed to obey and which remained operative, possibly for certain meetings with the Prophet. This is another example of the common phenomenon of the obvious interpretation of a verse being compromised by the need to accommodate hadīths and the concept of abrogation. ˙ 6.2

THE NIGHT PRAYER

Another case of abrogation that has been accepted by the majority of scholars is that of the verses about qiyām al-lail or praying in the night: O you cloaked one (Muhammad)! (73.1) Keep vigil the night long, except a little, (73.2) half of it, or a little less, (73.3) or add to it, and chant the Qurʾan chanting! (73.4)

These verses are claimed to have been abrogated by the last verse in the same chapter: Your Lord [O Muhammad!] knows that you keep vigil nearly two-thirds, half, or a third of the night, and [so do] a party of those with you. Allah determines the night and the day. He knows that you [O you who believe!] would not be able to count its hours, so He relented toward you. So recite of the Qurʾan so much as is feasible. He knows that some of you would be sick, others journeying in the land seeking the bounty of Allah, and others fighting in the way of Allah. So recite of it so much as is feasible, perform the prayer, pay the alms, and lend to God a good loan. Whatever good you send forward for yourselves, you shall find it with Allah—better and greater a wage. Ask for Allah’s forgiveness; Allah is forgiving, merciful. (73.20)

In verses 73.2–4, God orders the Prophet to pray for a long part of the night. Verse 73.20 fi rst confi rms that the Prophet and a group of Muslims were in the practice of keeping vigil. It then acknowledges that they could not know accurately the time of the night, before it goes on to state that God has therefore forgiven them. As I pointed out in my commentary on 58.12–13, the mention of forgiveness means that the commandment remains valid and that God is talking about a failure to implement the command that He responded to with forgiveness. There is no suggestion that the commandment has been abolished. In fact, the command in 73.2–4 is for the Muslims to recite the Qur’an in the night as much as they can, which is exactly what 73.20 also states! This verse confirms rather than supersedes the earlier command.

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Furthermore, note how God mentions specifically those who “would be sick, others journeying in the land seeking the bounty of Allah, and others fighting in the way of Allah.” Now, why would He mention those for whom the night vigil would be particularly difficult if He had abolished the command? Looking at this differently, if the reason for abolishing the commandment is those three excusable categories, then why would He abolish the commandment for all? Also, people were not going to be in those three categories forever, so why would He abolish the commandment? I think one factor that influenced the thinking of those who see this as a case of abrogation is the misperception that the prayer in 73.2–4 is obligatory. Given that the five daily prayers were the only obligatory prayers in Islam when the Prophet died and, obviously, remained so afterward, it is concluded that the prayer mentioned in 73.2–4 must have been abrogated. But there is no reason to believe that this command, or indeed that of 58.12, is obligatory. These are good practices that God has ordered the Muslims to do when they can. He did not say that they have to do them in the same way that, say, the daily prayer or the fasting of Ramadan must be performed. Note, for instance, the following command: Perform the prayer from the declining of the sun until the dusk of the night and perform the Qurʾan recital of dawn; surely the Qurʾan recital of dawn is witnessed. (17.78) And as for the night, keep vigil a part of it, as a work of supererogation for you; it may be that your Lord will raise you to a laudable station. (17.79)

This is another command to keep night vigil, but it is not obligatory in the same way that the daily prayer is. The command in 73.2–4, which is confi rmed in 73.20, is no different from this command. Shāfiʿī has agreed that the command in 73.2–4 was abrogated by the command in 73.20 but, strangely, he claimed that the latter was in turn abrogated by the non-obligatory prayer duty of 17.79!13 Shāfiʿī took this view in order to explain why the night vigil was not obligatory, as according to the Sunna there are five obligatory daily prayers. He resorted to 17.79 as the ultimate obligator because it uses “nāfilatan (supererogation)”—a term that the jurists have turned into a technical term that means non-obligatory act of worship. But the real culprit in spreading the misconception that 73.20 abrogates 73.2–4 is, unsurprisingly, the Hadīth. The influence of these hadīths on ˙ ˙ scholars is unambiguous, with almost all of them citing these narratives. It has been reported that someone visited ʿĀ’isha, the Prophet’s widow, to ask her about the witr prayer, which is a night prayer with an odd number of prostrations: I said: “Describe for me the night vigil of the Messenger of Allah.” She replied: “Do you not read ‘O you cloaked one’?” I said: “Yes.” She said:

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“Allah imposed the vigil night in the beginning of this chapter, so the Prophet of Allah and his Companions performed it for a year. Its (the chapter’s) end was kept for twelve months in heaven until Allah sent down at the end of the chapter the reduction, so the night vigil became optional after it was obligatory.” This version of the hadīth is from the compilation of Muslim14 but it is ˙ found with slight differences in a number of other early sources of Hadīth. ˙ with Nasā’ī15 and Ahmad16 conclude the clause “performed it for a year” ˙ “until their feet got swollen.” Dārimī further differs from the other three by having “sixteen” instead of “twelve” months.17 In his commentary on 73.1, Tabarī reduces this period to eight months in a different hadīth that he also˙ links to ʿĀ’isha. Another report he quotes increases the˙ period to ten years, but he also quotes reports identifying the period as one year. 18 Abū Dāwūd has a hadīth that he attributes to Ibn ʿAbbās confi rming that ˙ 73.20 abrogated 73.2–4, and that the abrogation occurred twelve months after the revelation of the command.19 Must afā Zaid claims that the night vigil was abrogated as a duty for ˙˙ the Muslims but remained obligatory for the Prophet. He relies in this view on yet another hadīth to this effect reported on the authority of ˙ Dahhāk. 20 Ghazālī thinks that the night vigil command in the fi rst verses ˙ ˙ ˙ of chapter 73 was for the Prophet only but some Muslims voluntarily applied it. Verse 73.20 then stressed that for the reasons mentioned the Muslims did not have to apply that command. So the original command, which applied to the Prophet only, remained operative, and so there is no abrogation. 21 There is no doubt that the verses of the night vigil do not involve any form of abrogation.

6.3

DRINKING ALCOHOL

There are a number of verses on drinking alcohol which are considered as having involved abrogation: Of the fruit of the palms and the grapes you take from them intoxicants and a goodly provision. This is a sign to a people who comprehend. (16.67) They ask you [O Muhammad!] about intoxicants and gambling. Say: “There is so much sin in them and also benefits for people, but their sins are greater than their benefits.” They also ask you what they should spend, say: “What you can spare.” This is how Allah explains the verses so that you may think. (2.219) O you who believe! Do not draw near to prayer when you are intoxicated until you know what you are saying. (4.43)

100 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law O you who believe! Intoxicants, gambling, sacrificing for idols, and divining arrows are an abomination of Satan’s work so avoid it that you may prosper. (5.90) Satan would like to cause enmity and hatred between you by intoxicants and gambling and turn you away from remembering Allah and from prayer. Will you not then desist? (5.91)

The fi rst verse, which is the only one of these verses to be revealed in Mecca, reminds people of the fact that they use palm and grapes to make wines as well as other provisions. The latter but not the intoxicants are described as “good.” This is taken to be an implicit reference to the fact that intoxicants are not considered “good.” But other scholars have rejected this point. They argue that 16.67 was revealed in the context of reminding people of God’s favors to them, so it must be referring to good things only. They take the term “sakaran,” which is translated as “intoxicants” above, to mean good, permissible drink products of palms and grapes. Tabarī, who quotes a large number of scholars ˙ on this issue, adopts the minority view that “sakaran” refers to permissible drinks of palms and grapes rather than intoxicants.22 In this case, “sakaran” would be a particular product of palms and grapes whereas “a goodly provision” refers to the rest. As my translation shows, I understand “sakaran ” to mean intoxicating drinks. Unlike 16.67, the other verses have unambiguous warnings against drinking alcohol. Verses 2.129, 5.90, and 5.91 use the term “khamr,” which some translate as “wine” and others more generally as “intoxicants,” as I do. Verse 4.43 uses the term “sukārā,” which seems to share the same root as “sakaran,” and which is usually understood as meaning “intoxicated” or “drunk.” This is one reason for my view that “sakaran” means “intoxicants.” Verse 2.219 is believed to be the next of the verses on intoxicants to be revealed. While stating that intoxicants have some benefits, the verse explicitly stresses that there is more harm associated with alcohol. Verse 4.43 is thought to have followed. This verse introduces the fi rst, limited prohibition on drinking alcohol as it commands the believers not to pray while drunk. Scholars claim that after the revelation of this verse, Muslims could drink alcohol only after the prayers of dawn and night, because there is not enough time after any of the other three prayers for the influence of the intoxicants to disappear before the time of the next prayer. At this point alcohol could still be drunk for many hours in the morning and night. Finally, verse 5.90 introduced a complete ban on the use of intoxicants, describing them as an “abomination of Satan’s work.” Verse 5.91 explains the social and spiritual damage that intoxicants can cause. This gradual prohibition is seen as having made it easy for the new Muslims to quit drinking alcohol, which was popular among the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. There have been a number of views on what abrogation occurred in these verses. The view of the majority is that verses 16.67, 2.219, and 4.43 have

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all been abrogated by 5.90. Another view excludes 16.67 from the claim of abrogation on the basis that the term “sakaran” does not refer to intoxicants. A third view states that there is no abrogation in the verses on intoxicants. The minority supporting this view argues that while verses 16.67, 2.129, 4.43 do not prohibit drinking alcohol, they do not legalize it either. So when 5.90 unequivocally prohibits intoxicants, it does not override another Qur’anic ruling in any of the other verses and hence does not make this a case of abrogation. I share this view. Verse 16.67 differentiates between intoxicants and good products. Verse 2.129 makes a stronger and clearer statement that drinking alcohol is associated with sins. Verse 4.43 then introduces a partial ban as it commands the Muslims to not pray while drunk. Verse 5.90 fi nally enacts a total ban. Neither of the statements in 16.67 or 2.129 legalizes alcohol, nor does the partial ban in 4.43. Drinking alcohol was already widespread in the Arabian Peninsula, so these verses were merely dealing gradually with this issue, leading to the total ban in 5.90. What the other three verses state is encompassed in 5.90. This verse has revoked a number of pre-Islamic practices, including drinking intoxicants, rather than things that the Qur’an had introduced. This is why I do not see it is a case of abrogation. Ghazālī points out the similarity between the gradual ban of drinking alcohol and that of usury. 23 One Meccan verse (30.39) states that increasing one’s wealth through usury would not earn the person any benefits with Allah, whereas giving alms would increase the value of what is spent in the eyes of Allah. While condemning the practice of usury, this verse does not ban it. However, three verses that were revealed later in Medina (2.275–276, 2.278) declared usury illegal. In the same way that there is no abrogation in the case of banning usury, there is none in the process of banning the drinking of alcohol.

6.4

FIGHTING FEWER ENEMIES

These verses are also accepted by most scholars as representing a case of abrogation: O Prophet! Urge on the believers to fight. If there be of you twenty who are patient they can defeat two hundred, and if there be of you one hundred they can defeat one thousand of those who disbelieve for they are people who do not understand. (8.65) Now Allah has lightened it for you, knowing that there is weakness in you. If there be of you one hundred who are patient they can defeat two hundred, and if there be of you one thousand they can defeat two thousand by Allah’s permission. Allah is with the patient. (8.66)

Bukhārī 24 and others report on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās that when the fi rst verse was revealed the Muslim fighter was commanded not to escape

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if he had to fight up to ten enemy fighters. This was later followed by the easier command of 8.66, where the Muslim fighter was ordered to stand his ground against two men. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī (211/826) reports ˙ Successor al-Dahhāk b. a similar but briefer hadīth that he attributes to the ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ that Muzāhim. 25 Quoting the hadīth of Ibn ʿAbbās, Tabarī explicitly states ˙ ˙ ˙ verse 8.66 abrogated 8.65. 26 In dismissing the suggestion that this is a case of abrogation, Khudarī, 27 ˙ with whom Ghazālī agrees, 28 suggests that verse 8.66 introduces a rukhs a ˙ (concession) to the commandment in 8.65, i.e. it gives the Muslims the permission to escape if the enemy force is greater in number. He argues that a concession is never seen as a form of abrogation. Saqqā follows a similar line. He interprets the fi rst verse as referring to the individual Muslim’s ability to defeat ten enemies provided that he has patience and faith and the second as indicating that the Muslim can defeat one enemy (rather than two as the verse states!) if his faith is weak. He suggests that the second verse gives the Muslim the permission to escape if he meets a larger enemy.29 I do not find this interpretation convincing. The 5th century scholar ʿAlī b. Hazm accepts that verse 8.66 introduces a concession, but he understands it˙ to mean giving the Muslims the option of not attacking an enemy force that is more than double the size of their army. He strongly disagrees with the suggestion that it gives the Muslim fighter the permission to escape. Interestingly, Ibn Hazm is in the minority ˙ of abrogation.30 of scholars who do not consider verses 8.65–66 a case I agree that there is no abrogation involved as I see these two verses as informational rather than imperative. The fi rst starts with the command to the Prophet to urge the Muslims to fight. This command is not specific to these verses, as it is mentioned in verse 4.84 also. There is nothing imperative in the following passage, in which the two sets of numbers are mentioned. It reminds the Muslims of the extreme fighting conditions of the past when they were massively outnumbered by the enemy. Verse 8.66 highlights God’s favor to the Muslims as they will now face an enemy army that does not outnumber theirs as dramatically as enemy forces did in the past. The numbers twenty, two hundred, one hundred, and one thousand should not be understood as being exact but rather figurative, reflecting the significant change in the relative sizes of the Muslim army and its enemy. It might look as if the verse points out a change in the balance of power due to a substantial increase in the numbers of Muslims and decrease in the size of their enemy. But the statement “knowing that there is weakness in you” does not support this interpretation, indicating a temporary situation. It rather suggests that God is referring to His intervention in a certain battle or battles so that the Muslims do not have to take on an enemy that outnumbers them by as much as their enemies did in the past. The two verses remind the Muslim fighters of God’s favor to them and instruct them to show patience and stay steadfast; they do not explain

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when those fighters are allowed to escape! There is no verse on fighting that focuses on when escape becomes legal. These verses must have been revealed together after a change in circumstances, so this is not a case of verse 8.65 being revealed at the time when the Muslims were heavily outnumbered by their enemies and 8.66 being inspired later to abrogate 8.65. The two verses show that for the Muslim fighters to be victorious in their forthcoming battle(s) they would need much less effort than they needed in the past. There are two other verses from the same chapter that confi rm this view: O you who believe! When you confront those who disbelieve marching to battle, do not turn your backs to them. (8.15) O you who believe! When you confront a group [of your enemies] stand firm and remember Allah much that you may prosper. (8.45)

Both of these verses order the Muslim to always stand his ground when fighting the enemy. There is no indication anywhere that the Muslim fighter is allowed to escape before or after facing any specific number of the enemy. Interestingly, none of these verses is said to have been abrogated. Yet if we are to believe that verse 8.66 abrogated 8.65, then that has to mean that 8.65 had itself abrogated 8.15 and 8.45. Interpreting 8.65–66 as being about the number that the Muslim has to fight before he is allowed to escape is extremely weak. Once the numbers in 8.65–66 are seen as figurative, the case for abrogation collapses. 6.5

FASTING PENANCE

Another popular claim of abrogation is found in this set of verses: O you who believe! Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you that you may become pious. (2.183) [It is for] a certain number of days, but he amongst you who is sick or on a journey, then let him fast a number of other days. And those who are able to do it they must redeem it by feeding a poor person; but he who volunteers [to do it] as a good work it is better for him; and if you fast it is better for you, if you know. (2.184) The month of Ramadan in which the Qurʾan was sent down as a guidance to people and as clear signs of guidance and discrimination [between right and wrong]. He of you who witnesses this month then let him fast it; but he who is sick or on a journey, then let him fast a number of other days; Allah desires ease for you and does not desire hardship for you, so that you may complete the number [of days] and say “Allah is great” for that He has guided you and that you may give thanks. (2.185)

Tabarī has compiled the various views on abrogation in these verses, so ˙ summarize them here.31 I will

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Verse 2.184 gives every Muslim, including those who can fast, the option of not fasting in return for feeding one needy person for every forgone fasting day: “Those who are able to do it may redeem it by feeding a poor person.” This permission was later revoked for those capable of fasting in 2.185: “He of you who witnesses this month then let him fast it.” Only the sick and the travelers were left excused. This is the abrogation in these verses according to the majority of scholars. Some early Muslims thought that the permission in 2.184 was restricted to the old men and women who could fast, so it was not applicable to all Muslims. In this case, the abrogating statement in 2.185 is thought to have made fasting obligatory even for the old men and women who can fast, so only the elderly who are incapable of fasting are excluded. Some have added the pregnant and nursing women to those given the permission. Tabarī further reports the rare view that the permission not to fast was ˙ abrogated not by verse 2.185 but by the ending of 2.184: “If you fast it is better for you, if you know .” However, the overwhelming majority of those who accept the case for abrogation in those verses see the statement in 2.185 as the abrogator of the permission in 2.184. Paradoxically, Tabarī has also mentioned the view of many that the per˙ never abrogated! In this case, the permission is undermission in 2.184 was stood to have been applicable only to those who cannot afford to fast for health reasons, which is something confi rmed again in 2.185. In one version of this interpretation, the exegete quotes a number of authorities who used to read the Qur’anic word “yuṭīqūnahu (able to do it)” as “yutawwaqūnahu,” ˙ view because which means “be difficult to do,”32 but Tabarī rejects this ˙ it contradicts the standard spelling of this word in all known mushafs.33 ˙ ˙ who This reading is used to confi rm that the permission is granted to those fi nd fasting too difficult. Yet another variation of this view is to suggest that “yuṭīqūnahu” actually refers to those who cannot fast, but the negative article is implied, meaning those who cannot do it! It has also been suggested that “yuṭīqūnahu” means “able to do but with difficulty.” However, the word “ṭāqa,” which shares the same root with “yuṭīqūnahu,” is used twice in same chapter (2.249, 2.286) to mean “capability.” This is why “yuṭīqūnahu” must denote those with the capability to fast. There are other variations of each of the different views above, but there is no need to go through them. Tabarī agrees with the view of the majority that the permission in 2.184 was˙ granted to all Muslims and that it was abrogated in 2.185 for those who can fast, leaving it operative only in the case of those incapable of fasting. This interpretation is supported by hadīths in Bukhārī,34 Muslim,35 and others, but ˙ there are other hadīths that clearly state that 2.184 was not abrogated.36 ˙ My view is that there is no abrogation in these verses. Verse 2.183 makes a general statement that fasting was made obligatory for the Muslims as it was for previous believers. Jews, Christians, and any religious group that followed a prophet from God had a form of fasting decreed for them.

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Verse 2.184 then explains that fasting is for certain days in the year. Those who are ill or travelling during the time of fasting are given the permission to not fast then but the requirement to compensate for it on other days. Travelling even close distances was very hard then. I am inclined to understand “it” in “those who are able to do it” to refer to the extra command that follows, which is “feeding a poor person.” So the verse encourages those who can afford it to feed one poor person for every day of fasting they have to delay. Most authorities see “it” as a reference to “fasting,” but Tabarī states that some linguists have seen it a referent to the feeding. The˙ ending of verse 2.184 encourages the ill and the travelers who can still fast to do so. Verse 2.185 starts by identifying the “certain number of days” of fasting as the month of Ramadan in which the Qur’an was sent down. It then commands the Muslims to start the fasting once they ascertain the beginning of the month. Next, it repeats the permission of 2.184 for those who cannot fast as a result of illness or travel to postpone the fast. This repetition of the exemption is used to remind the Muslims that God’s law makes it easier rather than more difficult for them to follow and that fasting on other days would ensure that they would fast a whole month. Verse 2.185 does not abrogate anything in 2.184. Even the optional feeding of the poor remains operative, although it is not repeated again in 2.185 as the repetition of the permission to postpone the fasting is focused on reminding people of God’s favors for them and the fact that His law takes into account their human weaknesses. Mustafā Zaid is one modern scholar ˙˙ who agrees that there is no abrogation in these verses.

6.6

WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Verses 2.234, 2.240, 65.4, and other verses have been dragged into a very complex and convoluted web of abrogation claims. These misinterpretations confused different concepts in these verses, wrongly presuming that they discussed the same topics. I will try here to present such claims and the confusions they represent as clearly and concisely as I can.37 The main verses in question are 2.234 and 2.240. A number of hadīths ˙ one claim that the widow had the right to lodging and maintenance for year, as stated in 2.240, but that this was later abrogated and reduced to four months and ten days by 2.234. Those of you who die and leave wives shall bequeath to their wives provision (matāʿ ) for a year, without expulsion from their homes. But if they leave, there is no fault on you for what they do with themselves, in reason. Allah is mighty and wise. (2.240) Those of you who die and leave wives let the widows wait ( yatarabbaṣna) by themselves for four months and ten days. When they have reached their

106 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law prescribed term, there is no fault on them for what they do with themselves, in reason. Allah is aware of what you do. (2.234)

This abrogation claim is supported by hadīths in ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 38 Nasā’ī, 39 and others. Tabarī confi rms this view.˙40 But there ˙is a hadīth in Bukhārī that makes exactly the opposite claim, suggesting that it˙is 2.234 that was abrogated by 2.240.41 The emphasis of this hadīth, however, is not as much on the length of the waiting period as ˙ on changing the latter from being obligatory to being optional. This is another hadīth in Bukhārī on verse 2.234, attributed to Ibn ˙ al-Zubair: I said to ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān [when he was compiling the mushaf]: ˙˙ “‘Those of you who die and leave wives’ was abrogated by the other verse, so why do you write it or leave it [in the mushaf]?” He said: “O my ˙ place.”42 nephew! I would not move anything of it from˙ its So this hadīth also confi rms that 2.240 is supposed to have abrogated ˙ 2.234. Incidentally, this hadīth indirectly rejects the legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation,˙ which state that the wording of Qur’anic verses can be absent from the mushaf. ˙ the minority of scholars who rejected this It has been pointed out˙ by abrogation claim that verse 2.234 comes before 2.240 in the mushaf, ˙˙ whereas the abrogator should have been revealed after the verse it abrogates. Many scholars have identified 33.50 and 33.52 as another pair of verses where the abrogator precedes the abrogated verse,43 but some have mentioned a few more.44 It has been pointed out that there are at least one hundred such cases, including over eighty verses that are said to have been abrogated by the verse of the sword45 which is found in the mushaf before ˙ ˙ retorted those verses.46 The adherents of abrogation have also justifiably that the order of verses in the mushaf is not reflective of their chronological order. They argue that 2.234 was˙ ˙revealed after 2.240. Isfahānī, however, has counterargued that putting an abrogating verse before˙ the verse it abrogates would have been poor organization, which could not be attributed to God.47 Muhammad Rashīd Ridā agrees with Isfahānī’s reasoning.48 ˙ Verses 2.234 and 2.240 have˙ been linked by˙ abrogation to each other in more than one way. First, the periods mentioned in both verses have been claimed to be the subject of abrogation. The overwhelming majority of scholars agree that the period of one year in verse 2.240 was abrogated by the term of four months and ten days in verse 2.234. Naturally, this implies that both periods refer to the same thing. But there is disagreement on what that referent is. This period is taken by most scholars to be the time after the death of the husband in which the widow is entitled to maintenance. This provision is technically called “matāʿ,” although this is a general term as the Qur’an

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also applies it to the provision made to the divorcée (2.241). It is, thus, claimed that verse 2.240 had allowed the widow a full year of maintenance and that this matāʿ was later abrogated and reduced to four months and ten days in 2.234. The word matāʿ is used in 2.240 but not in 2.234. It has been claimed that the Arabs before Islam used to allow the widow to remain in her matrimonial home for a year before she had to leave it, so the Qur’an continued and endorsed this practice in verse 2.240, before it changed it in 2.234. Mālik49 and Abū Dāwūd50 report a hadīth in which the ˙ Prophet is claimed to have said that the widow before Islam used to stay in her house a whole year after the death of her husband. While this view interpreted the periods in 2.234 and 2.240 as referring to a right of the widow, a different view interpreted it as a duty. According to this view, these periods denote the time the widow must wait after the death of her husband before she can get married again. I will call this the “widow’s wait.” Second, the periods mentioned in 2.234 and 2.240 were not the only abrogation link that scholars have established between the two verses. A different view has connected them through the question of whether the widow had the right to choose to stay in her matrimonial home or leave it. The clause “but if they leave” in 2.240 is taken to have given the widow this right, but the command “let the widows wait” in 2.234 is read as meaning that this right was later rescinded and that the widow has now to complete the “prescribed term,” i.e. stay in the matrimonial home. Because the expression “prescribed term” refers to the four months and ten days and is linked directly to the right in question, scholars have suggested that fi rst verse 2.240 gave the widow the right to leave her matrimonial home immediately after the death of her husband or stay there up to a year. This right was then revoked and superseded by the command in 2.234 to stay in the matrimonial home for four months and ten days. One famous hadīth that is seen as supporting this interpretation is ˙ 51 Nasā’ī, 52 Abū Dāwūd,53 and others. The husband reported by Mālik, of Furaiʿa bint Mālik bint Sinān chased slaves of his who had run away, but when he caught up with them they killed him. Furaiʿa went to the Prophet and told him that her husband had not left her a house he owned or money to support her. She asked him if she could go back to her family. The Prophet fi rst said yes, but he later changed his mind and told her “stay in your house until the prescribed term,” using the same expression in 2.234. She then said that she spent the widow’s wait of four months and ten days there. Furaiʿa also claimed that she later told the caliph ʿUthmān about this story so he used to adjudge similarly, which means that this ruling was never abrogated. But Zaid54 has rightly pointed out that this hadīth does not mean, as Tabarī55 and others have concluded, that the period˙ associated ˙ with the widow’s right to stay in the matrimonial house was reduced. It only states that the widow has a duty to stay in the matrimonial house for four months and ten days.

108 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Abū Dāwūd has a hadīth in which the Prophet says: ˙ It is not permissible for any woman who believes in Allah and the Last Day to mourn a dead person for more than three days unless it is her husband in which case it is four months and ten days. 56 Another hadīth in Mālik claims that the Prophet decided that a widow who needed ˙kohl to treat an eye ailment had to wait for the full four months and ten days before she could do that.57 The use of kohl here is seen as a form of cosmetic. Strangely, the hadīth goes on to show the Prophet link ˙ the widow to a pre-Islamic practice in this ban on the use of cosmetics by which the widow would stay in her house for a whole year during which she wears her worst clothes and does not wear cosmetics or perfumes. As mentioned earlier, Bukhārī has a hadīth that goes against the view ˙ claim by making 2.240 abroof most scholars, reversing the abrogation gate 2.234! Here Ibn ʿAbbās states that “this verse (2.240) abrogated the widow’s requirement to spend her widow’s wait with her husband’s family so she can now spend it wherever she wanted.”58 Verse 2.234, in fact, states nothing about where the window should stay. In the same hadīth, Bukhārī attributes to Mujāhid the view that the ˙ 2.234 that the widow must spend her widow’s wait of stipulation of verse four months and ten days with her husband’s family remained valid after the revelation of 2.240. The latter introduced a new period of seven months and twenty days, which is the difference between the two periods mentioned in 2.240 and 2.234, as a bequeathal from the late husband during which the widow has the right to stay in the matrimonial house or leave, i.e. as matāʿ or provision. In other words, Mujāhid seems to suggest that 2.240 merely “extended” the period introduced in 2.234. In his commentary on 2.240 in his voluminous exegesis of the Qur’an, Rāzī attributes to Mujāhid another interesting view that accommodates both 2.234 and 2.240 without resorting to abrogation by suggesting that they describe two different situations. Mujāhid says that 2.234 is about the widow who decides not to stay in her dead husband’s house and not to use money he left for her living expenses. The wait of this widow is four months and ten days. But verse 2.240 describes the case of the widow who chooses to continue to live in her matrimonial house and rely on his money for her living expenses. In this case, the waiting period is twelve months.59 So Bukhārī has hadīths suggesting that 2.240 abrogated 2.234 and ˙ the other. Hadīths reported in other compilations that neither abrogated ˙ 2.234 that abrogated 2.240. Obvicover the third possibility that it was ously, these three possibilities are mutually exclusive, so two of them must be wrong. But the confusion does not stop here as abrogation links have been suggested between those two verses and yet more verses. For instance, Bukhārī says that ʿAtā’, commenting on Ibn ʿAbbās’ view, claims that the verse of ˙

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inheritance (4.12) abrogated the right of the widow to stay in the matrimonial house.60 This hadīth is also found in Nasā’ī61 and Abū Dāwūd.62 This verse tells men that˙ if they had no children, their widows would inherit a quarter of what they left, but only an eighth if the husband had children. So ʿAtā’ thinks that the widow could have her widow’s wait wherever she ˙ but she lost her right to maintenance, including the right to stay in wanted, her deceased husband’s house. Of course, this claim contradicts Furaiʿa’s narrative, which suggests that spending the widow’s wait in the matrimonial home was mandatory by the time the Prophet died, which is why ʿUthmān continued the practice, so it was not abrogated. While Rāzī fi nds the Mujāhid view that he reported more plausible than the abrogation claim, he prefers the view of Abū Muslim al-Isfahānī. The latter thinks that verse 2.240 talks about a right introduced not˙ by God but the husband, who had made a will in favor of his wife before his death.63 The confusion and misinterpretations of 2.234 and 2.240 were made even deeper as exegetes and usūlīs linked the widow’s wait to pregnancy. ˙ linking those verses to yet another verse: This was achieved by unjustifiably As for your women who have despaired of further menstruating, if you are in doubt, their term (ʿiddatahunna) shall be three months, and so is the case for those who have not menstruated [who had menstruated before]. Those who are pregnant, their term is when they give birth. He who fears Allah, He will appoint for him, of His command, easiness. (65.4)

The fi rst seven verses of chapter 65 discuss issues related to divorcing women. One concept mentioned in these verses is what I will call the “divorcée’s wait.” This is the time that the divorcée has to wait before she can marry another man. This waiting period of three months is to check whether the woman is pregnant, as can be seen in this verse: The divorced women shall wait by themselves three periods, and it is not lawful for them to hide what Allah has created in their wombs, if they believe in Allah and the Last Day. (2.228)

Another confi rmation of this interpretation comes in a verse stating that the divorcée’s wait does not apply if the marriage had not been consummated: O you who believe! If you marry believing women and then divorce them before consummating the marriage, you will have no right for a proscribed term (ʿidda) that you [make them] wait (taʿtaddūnahā ). So give them provision and release them amicably. (33.49)

If she is pregnant, then the divorced couple would have the opportunity to consider remarrying, as the expected arrival of a new child can make

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the parents reassess their relationship and try to make it work. But even if they decide to remain divorced, pregnancy gives the divorcée certain rights, substituting the period of three months for the remainder of her pregnancy: Let them (the divorced women) live where you (O men!) live, according to your means, and do not harm them to make life difficult for them [to force them to leave]. If they are pregnant, spend on them until they give birth. If they suckle your children, then give them their wages, and consult among yourselves amicably. But if you disagree then you may hire another woman to suckle him. (65.6)

The fi rst part of the verse ensures that the ex-husband does not behave in a way that would effectively annul his divorcée’s right to spend her wait period in her matrimonial house and be provided for by him. Then the verse makes it clear that if the divorcée turned out to be pregnant and the couple decided not to remarry, the divorcée will have the right to remain in her matrimonial house and be provided for by her ex-husband for the duration of her pregnancy. The last part of the verse then states that should the parents agree that the mother would suckle the child, the father must pay her fair wages for that. The divorcée’s wait is technically known as “ʿidda” (33.49, 65.1, 65.3). But because this is a generic word that means “term” (2.184) or “number” (18.22, 74.31), it has been applied by scholars to the widow’s wait also. This, in turn, has contributed to confusing the two waiting periods. The Qur’an uses a derivative of the term “tarabbus,” which means “wait,” for the wid˙ ow’s wait in the verse on this subject (2.234), although it uses this term for the divorcée’s wait also (2.228), as it is a general word (e.g. 4.141, 9.24). The divorcée’s wait of three months ensures that the divorced couple would know if there is a pregnancy so that they may decide to remarry or, if that does not happen, so that certain rulings protecting the rights of the child, mother, and father would apply. The widow’s wait of four months and ten days, on the other hand, is intended to ensure that the widow is not put under pressure to remarry while she is still grieving. The two periods are completely different and unrelated. Confusing the divorcée’s wait and the widow’s wait is clearly seen in a famous hadīth reported by Mālik: ˙ Subaiʿa al-Aslamiyya gave birth half a month after the death of her husband. Two men, one young and the other old, then proposed to her. She chose the young man, so the old man told her: “It is not yet permissible for you to get married” [meaning that her waiting period had not ended yet]. Her family were away and he hoped that when her family comes back they would choose to marry her to him. She went to the Prophet to consult him and he said: “It is now permissible for you to marry whoever you want.”64

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Another form of the hadīth makes the date of birth a few days after the ˙ mad,65 Muslim,66 and others have other versions death of the husband. Ah ˙ conclusion is the same. Shāfi ī concludes from of Subaiʿa’s story, but the ʿ Subaiʿa’s hadīth that the widow’s wait, like the divorcée’s wait, was appli˙ cable to non-pregnant women only, and that for the pregnant woman the wait ends when she gives birth.67 Shāfiʿī’s conclusion is not supported by the Qur’an but is based completely on this hadīth. This hadīth identifies ˙ ˙ latter is fi xed giving birth as the end of the widow’s wait when in fact the at four months and ten days and it is the divorcée’s wait that ends when the woman gives birth. This hadīth, at least in its current form, is a forgery, as it carelessly conflates two˙ completely different Qur’anic concepts. Mālik quotes another hadīth in which ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar says about ˙ dies while she is pregnant that her waiting the woman whose husband period ends as soon as she gives birth.68 ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb is claimed to have said that if the widow gave birth while her dead husband is still on the bed and has not been buried, her waiting period still ends immediately.69 ʿAbd al-Razzāq has a hadīth that confi rms that giving birth ends the wait˙ 70 A different view attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās by ing period of the widow. Mālik, but which clearly did not prevail, states that the widow should serve the longest of two periods: four months and ten days or the time until she gives birth.71 Despite all these narratives, there is nothing in 2.234 and 2.240 to suggest that they refer to non-pregnant woman only! This confusion is the result of linking 65.4 on divorced women to these verses and hadīths which ˙ bequeathal confi ned 2.234 and 2.240 to non-pregnant women.72 Verses on and inheritance were also unjustifiably linked to these verses. Burton has noted that only a mind burdened by “the need to establish the fact of naskh” would fail to notice that these verses treat independent topics.73 Burton seems to contradict his general thesis that abrogation is the result of misinterpreting the Qur’an, as he presents it here as the cause of misinterpretation. I see no evidence that the confusion created in this area is the result of the scholars’ keenness for proving the concept of abrogation. The latter is not an end but simply a rather convenient means and tool they resort to when they need help to interpret—or, more accurately, misinterpret—the Qur’anic text to endorse a view that the Qur’an, when taken in its entirety, actually does not support. Verses 2.234, 2.240, and 65.4 address completely differently topics but these were confused by scholars because of that most misleading approach—reading the Qur’anic verses in the light of hadīths. Such hadīths were themselves originally brought into existence in ˙order to link ˙certain concepts and practices to the Prophet. Reading the Qur’an while wearing Hadīth glasses often makes the meanings of the clearest verses invisible to ˙the most experienced eye and leads to misinterpretation of the Qur’an. The problem with the hadīths above, ˙ as is the case with many hadīths that allegedly interpret Qur’anic verses or ˙

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concepts, is that they change the meanings of the relevant verses and concepts rather than expound them. This becomes very clear when we revisit the verses in question without considering the Hadīth narratives. ˙ to wait four months and Verse 2.234 states that the widow has a duty ten days after losing her husband before she can remarry. This waiting period ensures that the widow would know if she was pregnant, so that any decision she later makes about her life, and any potential marriage proposal from someone, would happen with full knowledge of this. Also, if she was found to be pregnant before she remarries, the attribution of the child to his/her deceased father and accordingly his/her inheritance rights cannot be denied by the husband’s other heirs. But the fact that the waiting period for pregnancy in the case of divorce is only three months suggests that this is not the primary reason for the introduction of the widow’s waiting period. The period of four months and ten days is a right that ensured that the widow has a grieving period during which she cannot be coerced into marrying again. But it is also a duty of the woman to observe this period. The Qur’anic term for this period is “tarabbus (wait).” ˙ Verse 2.240 introduces a different right for the widow. This is the right to continue to live in her matrimonial house for a whole year. This would secure accommodation for the widow long enough to give her a good chance to fi nd an alternative by the time she might have to move out. It is natural that this period is longer than the grieving period of four months and ten days. It is clear that verse 2.240 is introducing a right, not a duty as most usūlīs have wrongly claimed. First, what is being introduced is described as˙ “matāʿ (provision).” Second, the verse proscribes the “ʿikhrāj (expulsion)” of the widow. Third, the widow can leave at any point: “But if they leave.” Fourth, the right/duty period in 2.234 has to be observed in full, whereas the stay in 2.240 can be cut short at any point by the widow. Khudarī, who ˙ dismisses the suggestion of abrogation in these verses, briefly points out that they talk about different issues.74 Verse 65.4 discusses yet another concept, which is the time that the divorcée must wait before she can marry again. This is a duty the purpose of which is to ensure that the divorced couple knows if there is pregnancy before they move on with their separate lives. The Qur’an calls this period “ʾidda (term),” which is the word it uses in the divorce verses. These interpretations are completely consistent with any Qur’anic verses on similar topics. There is no abrogation whatsoever in these verses. The meanings of these verses, as well as the rights of the widow they introduce, were victims of the work of Muslim scholars. Although it was the Qur’an that gave these rights to women, they were persistently ignored and unfairly taken away by the masculine mentality of a male-dominated society. Hadīths were authored to serve this objective. These hadīths may not be as ˙ as the hadīth that makes women the “majority of the ˙ people of hell” and bad ˙ describes them as “lacking in reason and religion”75 and similar narratives

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that demean women and confirm their second-class status in society, but they all reflect the same masculine domination and control. These reports are also in sharp contrast with the Qur’an’s presentation of both genders as being equal in terms of their capabilities to follow God’s commands. The six cases that we have reviewed are seen as the strongest in establishing the abrogation of the ruling of a verse but not its wording. They have been accepted by more scholars than other cases. Yet my analysis has shown that none of these alleged instances of abrogation survives close scrutiny. Probably the case that is closest to satisfying the claim of abrogation is the offering of charity for an audience with the prophet. But even in this case, the non-abrogation interpretation is more convincing and more likely. These abrogation claims are based on the misinterpretation of Qur’anic verses. This form of misunderstanding is the source of the legal mode of abrogation. While this form of abrogation was created by misinterpretation of the Qur’an, it facilitated the misunderstandings of other verses. Burton has made the following observations: On such occasions where the Qur’an appears to indicate Muhammad’s exercise of the right to modify or even withdraw regulations he himself had introduced, no general principle is stated. Instances such as the night prayer, or the fee for a private audience, must, therefore, be treated strictly as ad hoc decisions, with no implications whatever for any other statement in any other Qur’an context. Thus, even if we conceded that, in these two instances, the Prophet seems to have modified or withdrawn a ruling previously made, we do so solely on the reading of the relevant Qur’an texts. This is to concede that in these instances there may appear to have occurred what the post-Muhammadan scholars were to call naskh. That is not, however, to concede that the Qur’an contains or that it endorses any justification of the wholesale generalization of the “modify/withdraw” concept which the Islamic scholars’ use of the term naskh represents. The Qur’an may contain instances of naskh, but the Qur’an does not expound a theory of naskh. That was the creation of those who assumed the task of reconciling the Islamic Fiqh with its putative sources.76 My analysis of the three modes of abrogation will agree with Burton’s conclusion. Even in the unlikely case that the Qur’an contains an instance or two of abrogation—which I can accept as a possibility only in the case of legal abrogation—there is absolutely no ground to suggest that the Qur’an introduces abrogation as a principle of any prominence in Islamic law.

7

The Verse of the Sword

There is one particular claim of legal abrogation that deserves to be given special attention and more detailed examination, not the least because its significance goes well beyond Islamic theology and law. This claim involves a verse known as “āyat al-saif” or “the verse of the sword.” It has been claimed that the verse of the sword has abrogated many Qur’anic verses. But the significance of this claim has to do with the nature of the abrogated verses. The latter include numerous verses that call on the Muslims to be tolerant, forgiving, and patient, and to display such positive attributes toward non-Muslims that allowed Muslims to live peacefully with various religious groups for fourteen hundred years. The verse of the sword, which commands Muslims to kill certain enemies, has superseded, it is claimed, all these verses. For instance, Makkī b. Abī Tālib (437/1045) ˙ “all pardonclaims that most scholars believe that this verse has abrogated ing, amnesty, and forgiveness that the believers had been commanded to show toward the polytheists.”1 Ibn al-ʿArabī (543/1148) agrees that the verse of the sword abrogated every mention in the Qur’an of showing amnesty and forgiveness to the disbelievers and ignoring and turning away from them.2 This claim has become particularly relevant in recent times as it has been used by terrorist groups and individuals to justify their atrocities. Indeed, this has popularized the concept of “abrogation” and turned it from a rather academic concept of interest to Muslim scholars and students of Islamic law to something that even laypeople—not only Muslim but non-Muslim also—can claim to know and use in debates. The abrogation claims about the verse of the sword have, inevitably, associated it with the distortion of other Islamic concepts such as jihad. Critics of Islam have made the most of these claims by portraying Islam as an intolerant religion that does not allow other religions to coexist with it. This is the verse of the sword:3 When the Inviolable Months have passed away, kill the polytheists wherever you find them. Seize them, besiege them, and wait for them at every place of observation. If they repent, observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms then let them go their way. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (9.5)

The Verse of the Sword 115 According to the renowned 8th century Hijri exegete Ibn Kathīr, al-Dahhāk b. Muzāhim said that this verse “abrogated every treaty between ˙˙ the˙ Prophet and any˙ one of the polytheists, and also every agreement and period of peace.”4 Furthermore, it has been claimed that the verses that have been abrogated by the verse of the sword include revelations that command the Prophet and the Muslims to be patient, tolerate those who did not share their beliefs, show leniency toward their enemies, and forgive those who hurt them. Verse 9.5 has been used to claim that Muslims should not show forgiveness toward their enemies and tolerance toward non-Muslims and should be rather strict and aggressive. This is an example of a verse that commands the Muslims to be patient with those who hurt them that has allegedly been abrogated: You [O you who believe!] shall surely be tried in your possessions and yourselves, and you shall hear from those who were given the Book before you and from the polytheists much hurt. But if you show patience and piety then surely that is high resolve. (3.186)

One example on the verses that command the Prophet to turn away from the disbelievers that has been subjected to the claim of abrogation by verse 9.5 is this: So withdraw [O Muhammad!] from him who turns away from Our remembrance and desires only the life of this world. (53.29)

Finally, this is one of the verses that command the Prophet to forgive the disbelievers: So forgive them and say “peace,” for they shall know. (43.89)

Zaid counted over 140 verses that are claimed to have been abrogated by the verse of the sword.5 This is as much as 2.24% of the Qur’an! So this verse alone is alleged to have abrogated almost half of the supposed 294 abrogated verses.6 Zaid has shown that all claims of abrogation by verse 9.5 are false. I will focus here on discussing the serious flaws with the suggestion that this verse has abrogated others. First, in order to show that verse 9.5 has abrogated verses that command the Muslims to show tolerance to non-Muslims, this verse has had to be taken completely out of context. To see how blatant that distortion is, I have quoted 9.5 with the verses that surround it: A proclamation from Allah and His Messenger to people on the day of Greater Pilgrimage that Allah is clear of the polytheists, as is His Messenger. If you repent that is better for you but if you turn away then know that you are not beyond the power of Allah. And give [O Muhammad!] glad tidings of a painful

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law chastisement to the disbelievers. (9.3) Except those of the polytheists with whom you have a treaty and they did not break its terms or aid someone against you, so abide by their treaty until their term. Allah loves the pious. (9.4) When the Inviolable Months have passed away, kill the polytheists wherever you find them. Seize them, besiege them, and wait for them at every place of observation. If they repent, observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms then let them go their way. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (9.5) If anyone of the polytheists seeks your protection [O Muhammad!], then protect him so that he may hear the Word of Allah, and escort him to his place of safety. That is because they are a people who do not know. (9.6) How can there be a treaty with Allah and with His Messenger for the polytheists, save those with whom you [O you who believe!] made a treaty at the Inviolable Mosque? So long as they are true to you, be true to them. Surely, Allah loves the pious. (9.7) How [can there be any treaty for the others] when if they would get an advantage over you they would not honor any relation or treaty with you? They satisfy you with their mouths while their hearts refuse. Most of them are backsliders. (9.8) They have purchased with the verses of Allah a little gain, so they have turned away from His way. Surely, evil is what they do. (9.9) They do not honor any relation or treaty with a believer; these are the transgressors. (9.10) But if they repent, observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms, then they are your brethren in religion. We detail Our verses for the people of knowledge. (9.11) If they break their oaths after their treaty and assail your religion, then fight the heads of disbelief. Surely, they have no binding oaths, so that they may desist. (9.12) Will you not fight a people who broke their oaths, set out to drive out the Messenger, and attacked you first? Do you fear them? Allah is more worthy of your fear, if you are believers. (9.13)

The verse immediately before 9.5 commands the Muslims to honor any peace treaty they had with disbelievers. As for the verses that immediately follow 9.5, I will quote from my analysis elsewhere: The fi rst verse (9.6) shows that Islam does not consider a peaceful disbeliever an enemy. The Qur’an even commanded the Prophet to give protection to any polytheist who sought his help. Verse 9.7 commands the Muslims to honor their treaty with the polytheists as long as the latter honored it. God considers this to be an act of piety: “Allah loves the pious.” He reminds the Muslims in verses 9.8–10 that the polytheists used to break their peace treaties whenever they felt they had the upper hand and that they showed a similar disregard for their relations with the Muslims. He explains that the polytheists made peace with their mouths but did not embrace it with their hearts. Muslims were commanded to forgive the polytheists, live with them in peace if the latter honored peace, and forgive and consider them brothers if they convert to Islam (9.11). God then emphasizes that the

The Verse of the Sword 117 aim of fighting the heads of disbelief is to make them desist and establish peace (9.12). Finally, verse 9.13 urges the Muslims to fight aggression, reminding them of the background of the confl ict with the disbelievers. First, it was the polytheists who broke the treaty they had with the Muslims. Second, like the Meccans who forced the Prophet to immigrate to Medina, the polytheists were trying to expel him from Medina. Third, it was the polytheists who attacked the Muslims fi rst.7 These are the verses that surround the verse that is alleged to command the Muslim to kill non-Muslims if they do not convert to Islam! There is as much distortion in taking the verse out of context as in picking the word “kill” from a Qur’anic verse out of its sentence and interpreting it as stating that one may kill the way one wishes. How can a verse be claimed to effectively have abrogated the verses that precede and follow it? The verses on both sides of 9.5 imply that the Muslims were ready and even commanded to live peacefully with the non-Muslims who were willing to live in peace with them. Verse 9.5 talks about a certain group of disbelievers, not all non-Muslims, who would not accept peace with the Muslims. This is what Zaid notes: The disbelievers that the verse of the sword talks about are, therefore, a special group. There was a treaty between the Prophet and them, but they broke it and allied themselves with enemies of the Prophet. Allah and His Messenger disowned them and warned them of war unless they abandon their disbelief and believe in Allah as the one God and in Muhammad as a Prophet and Messenger. These, who were enemies of Islam and its Prophet, do not represent all of the disbelievers.8 Second, there are verses in other places in the Qur’an commanding the Muslims to establish peace with any party that wants peace (e.g. 4.90, 8.72). The Qur’an even has clear references to the Prophet continuing to make peace with people who repeatedly violated their peace treaties with the Muslims (8.55–62). Another verse explicitly warns the Muslims against using the fact that someone is a non-Muslim as a pretext to kill them and take their property: O you who believe! When you travel in the way of Allah, investigate and do not say to someone who offers you peace: “You are not a believer,” seeking riches of this world, for with Allah there are abundant spoils. You too were so before (disbelievers), then Allah conferred favors on you. So investigate. Allah is aware of what you do. (4.94)

I have discussed in detail in my book on jihad the various verses that relate to the subject of violence against non-Muslims and have shown that

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this was commanded only as a means of self-defense. It did not have any element of forced conversion. Third, verse 9.5 is claimed to have abrogated even verses commanding the Muslims to be patient in general, not specifically when dealing with the polytheists or their enemies! This is one example:9 So be patient [in waiting] for the judgment of your Lord for you are in Our eyes. And celebrate the praise of your Lord when you get up [in the morning]. (52.48)

This is a general command to the Prophet that he should be patient and wait for God to make everything take its course. The alleged abrogation of this verse can only mean that God gave the Prophet the freedom to be angry with Him for not doing quickly what he wished to happen! It is the uncompromising commitment to present verse 9.5 as nullifying all instructions in the Qur’an to be tolerant with non-Muslims that has led some scholars to this self-evidently absurd interpretation of such verses. These verses explain aspects of the general code of conduct of the Muslim. These apply when dealing with non-Muslims also, but they are much broader instructions. Fourth, those who argue that 9.5 has the power to override other verses ignore the fact that this verse targeted certain groups of polytheists, as they apply it to all idolaters. They make an even bigger mistake by claiming that it applies to all non-Muslims, including even the Jews and Christians. Yet the verse talks about the “mushrikīn,” which is the term the Qur’an applies to the polytheists of Arabia, whereas the Qur’an calls the Jews and Christians “Ahl al-Kitāb” or the “People of the Book.” Even when referring to Jews and Christians behaving like “mushrikīn,” the Qur’an still calls them “Ahl al-Kitāb,” as we shall see shortly in verse 9.29, from the same chapter as the verse of the sword. This misrepresentation of the referent of the term “mushrikīn” in 9.5 is often used today in portraying Islam as being in inherent confl ict with the Christian West. Writings critical of Islam’s alleged intolerance that quote verse 9.5 rarely fail to gloss over the fact that the verse talks about polytheists, not the People of the Book. This is an example of how the distinction that the Qur’an makes between “mushrikīn” and “Ahl al-Kitāb” in 9.5, other verses in that chapter, and indeed throughout the Qur’an is ignored to prove that the Qur’an declares jihad against all non-Muslims: The proclamation of the adhān [verse 9.3] brings the idea of jihad against non-Muslims to its utmost extremity. Henceforth, non-Muslims should be fought just because of their disbelief, irrespective of time, territory or their actual attitude toward the Muslims . . . Muhammad, shortly before his death, declared that war should be made on all non-Muslims till they embraced Islam.10

The Verse of the Sword 119 Here we have double-layered distortion. First, the fact that the verses at the beginning of chapter 9 talk about a certain group of polytheists is ignored. Second, the polytheists are taken to mean all non-Muslims. Actually, there is no mention anywhere in the fi rst twenty-eight verses of chapter 9 of “Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book)”, whereas the “mushrikīn (polytheists)” are mentioned in eight verses. The fi rst time that the People of the Book are mentioned is in verse 29. Significantly, this verse states that the People of the Book had only to pay the special tax that the Qur’an called jizya: Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day, do not forbid what Allah and His Messenger have made forbidden, and do not practice the true religion among the People of Book until they pay the tribute (jizya) on their wealth while they are in submission. (9.29)

It should be noted that some Medinese Jewish tribes allied themselves with the Arab polytheists of Mecca and got involved in aggressive acts against the Muslims in Medina. It is interesting that there is no mention in the verse that the Christians and Jews had to convert to Islam. As for the tax, all Muslims are required to pay a tax as part of their religious duties. The People of the Book lived in the same society with the Muslims, so they also had to contribute to the funding of the state. A special law was introduced to make them pay this contribution while leaving them free to practice their religions. This verse further undermines the claim that 9.5, or indeed any other verse in the Qur’an, forces non-Muslims to embrace Islam. Many scholars think that chapter 9 is the last or one of the last chapters of the Qur’an to be revealed—usually dated to the ninth year after the migration to Medina, i.e. one year before the death of the Prophet. But some non-Muslim scholars have suggested that this chapter contains verses from different periods and that they might not be listed in their chronological order.11 This, then, may seem to accommodate the possibility that verse 9.5 was revealed after 9.29 and abrogated it. Such attempts to restructure chapter 9 are driven by an a priori view of the teachings of the Qur’an rather than by reliable information about the history of the mushaf. ˙ ˙ 9, Ghazālī12 makes the significant observation that the last verse of chapter which makes it a very late verse, commands Muhammad to turn away in peace from those who disagree with him: But if they turn their backs, say [O Muhammad!]: “Allah is enough for me. There is no god but He. In Him I have put my trust. He is the Lord of the mighty throne.” (9.129)

Furthermore, the history of Muslim rule of Christians and Jews rejects the suggestion that the Qur’an commanded its followers to fight those who did not follow their religion. The fi rst conquests of Muslims of lands

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occupied by non-Muslims, such as the conquest of Jerusalem (15/636) by ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb, unequivocally show that Muslims did not understand ˙ ˙ commanded them to convert people to Islam by force. the Qur’an to have It only gave them the right to impose a tax on them. The pact that caliph ʿUmar is said to have made with the people of Jerusalem ensured the protection of the non-Muslim places of worship and religious symbols such as crosses, and the right of non-Muslims to continue to follow their religions in return for paying the jizya tax. Some Western scholars have rejected the authenticity of this pact. What no one can deny, however, is that nonMuslims continued to live safely under Muslim rule in every land Muslims ruled. Had verse 9.5 or any other verse been understood to have abrogated the right of the People of the Book to practice their religion of choice, as some scholars insist, history would have been very different indeed. The centuries-long history of non-Muslims living under Muslim rule would not have existed. Fifth, as is the case with other abrogation claims, scholars have disagreed about how many verses were abrogated by the verse of the sword and what these verses are. For instance, Ibn Hazm claimed that it abrogated 94 verses but Ibn Salāma13 and Ibn al-ʿArabī˙14 put the number at 124. Zaid counted over 140 verses, but he also showed that the claims were baseless.15 This is the view of the overwhelming majority of scholars. The number of claims of abrogation by 9.5 grew over time, which clearly shows that the claims were based on the opinions of certain later scholars rather than sources that go back to the Prophet or even his Companions or the Successors. Significantly, Tabarī mentions less than 15 verses as having been claimed ˙ to have been abrogated by verse 9.5. In his commentary on 9.5, Tabarī does ˙ not call it the verse of the sword or make any claim about it abrogating any other verses. Also, commenting on 9.6, he mentions the view of some that verse 9.5 was itself abrogated by verse 47.4, which states that polytheists who are captured in battle may be released as an act of charity or freed in return for a payment. But he also reports that others claimed that it was 9.5 that abrogated 47.4.16 Finally, Ibn al-ʿArabī has mentioned that some have even suggested that the second half of verse 9.5 abrogates its fi rst half,17 although he rejects this claim.18 In this case, the commandment to kill the polytheists is thought to have been abrogated by the order to forgive them if they repent, observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms. As we have seen with other cases, there is a considerable confusion about which verse abrogated what verse. Sixth, if 9.5 really abrogated tolerance and forgiveness for the disbelievers, it would have abrogated all of the many verses that promote such concepts. Yet even when considering all the verses that are claimed to have been abrogated by 9.5, there are still many other verses that command the Muslims to live peacefully with the disbelievers left uncovered by abrogation claims. This abrogation of some verses but not others that promote the same concepts means that the claim of abrogation is unfounded.

The Verse of the Sword 121 It should now be clear that the claim that verse 9.5 has abrogated other verses, let alone such a large number of them, is absurd. Even the title “verse of the sword” is a late invention. While the “verse of flogging” has been given its name by scholars because it mentions the ruling on flogging the adulterers, and other verses have been given names after words that occur in them, the expression “verse of the sword” is very much a misnomer because the term “sword” is not found in the verse. Even more telling is the fact that this word does not exist anywhere in the Qur’an!

8

Does the Mushaf Contain ˙˙ All of the Qur’an?

For many Muslims, the terms “Qur’an” and “mushaf” refer to one and the same thing. They are often used interchangeably.˙ ˙Yet there are significant differences between these two terms. Some of these differences are real and reflect the fact that these terms denote different, albeit related, entities. But other alleged differences that are deeply anchored in the concept of abrogation are not genuine. This link between abrogation and the nature of the mushaf makes discussing the difference between the Qur’an and the ˙ mushaf˙relevant to this book. As we shall later see, the concept of mushaf is ˙ ˙ at the heart of the legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation. ˙ ˙

8.1

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “QUR’AN” AND “MUSHAF” ˙ ˙

God talks in the Qur’an about different kinds of revelation that He made to prophets. These include “Hukm or Hikma (wisdom)” and “ʿIlm (knowl˙ edge).” The type of revelation˙ that concerns us here is called “Kitāb (Book).” He has revealed this divine knowledge to mankind in the form of certain Books in human languages so they can understand them. Every divine Book that God revealed to a prophet represents an embodiment or manifestation of that source Book in a particular human language, and it was sent to people who spoke that language. This source Book is the “Mother of the Book (Umm al-Kitāb)” which we studied earlier.1 The recipient of the revelation would then have the responsibility of spreading what they learn from the revealed Book to other peoples who did not speak that language. The “Torah” which God revealed to Moses (2.53) and the “Injīl” which He revealed to Jesus (19.30) are two such manifestations of the Kitāb. The Book was also revealed to Prophet Muhammad in the form the Arabic Qur’an: He has sent down to you [O Muhammad!] the Book, in truth, confirming what was before it, and He has revealed the Torah and the Injīl. (3.3) We have sent it down as an Arabic Qurʾan that you [O people!] may understand. (12.2)

Does the Mushaf Contain All of the Qur’an? 123 ˙˙ As its name suggests, the content of any Book forms one unit. This is another difference between the Book and other kinds of revelation which, even if collected together, do not have a hidden or visible theme linking them all together.2 The term “Qur’an” is derived from the same root as the Arabic word “qara’a (read).” Indeed, the fi rst word of the Qur’an to be revealed was “iqraʾ” or “read” (96.1). The name of this particular divine Book, “Qur’an,” is derived from the fact that it was “read” to the Prophet by the archangel Gabriel. However, classical Muslim scholars have suggested a number of different meanings and etymologies.3 So the term “Qur’an” refers to all verses that the Prophet received and which form the Arabic manifestation of the source Book. But the Qur’an states that Prophet Muhammad received other forms of revelation also: Thus have we sent among you a Messenger from among you to recite to you our verses, purify you, teach you the Book and wisdom, and teach you what you did not know. (2.151)

The term “mushaf” (plural: “masāhif”) is related to “Qur’an” but is not ˙ ˙ is derived from˙ the ˙ Arabic “sahīfa.” This word is not the same. This term ˙ ˙eight times. In all eight found in the Qur’an, but its plural, “ṣuḥuf,” occurs of its occurrences “suhuf” means “written pages” of something. Note that ˙ ˙ is “safha,” which is clearly a variant of “sahīfa.” “page” in modern Arabic ˙ ˙ the term is used in an expression ˙ ˙ that In two of these eight verses, means “early pages” (20.133, 87.18), in reference to divine revelations to earlier prophets. This expression is further clarified in the following verse: “The pages of Abraham and Moses” (87.19). The “pages of Moses” is how the term occurs in the fourth verse (53.36). It is also used twice to refer to the Qur’an, once in the expression “honored pages” (80.13) and another in “purified pages” (98.2). In its seventh appearance, the term is used in a verse that ridicules the disbelievers for behaving as if each would like to have divine “open pages” sent to him in order to believe in the revelation that has come from God (74.52). In the eighth and last verse in which “ṣuḥuf” is found, it is used to mean the pages of the record of every human being that will be examined on the Day of Resurrection (81.10). So, the literal meaning of the Arabic term “mushaf” is “collection of ˙˙ pages.” Its technical meaning is, therefore, the “compiled, written pages of the Qur’an.” In other words, the term “Qur’an” refers to the “revelation that was read to Prophet Muhammad” whereas the term “mushaf” denotes ˙˙ the “written form” of that revelation. Each mushaf follows a particular “qirā’a (reading)” of the Qur’an. A “reading” is˙ ˙a way of writing or pronouncing the Qur’anic text. There are seven readings of the Qur’an that are considered authoritative, another three that are accepted by the majority of scholars, and another four that some accept and others reject as unconfi rmed. This is an example of the differences between two readings. In the third verse of the first chapter of the

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Qur’an, some readings have the word “māliki,” with a long “ā,” while others have “maliki.” Both mean “owner,” “master,” or “possessor.” Another example is found in verse 1.6, where the word “aṣ-ṣirāṭa” may be written and pronounced as “as-sirāṭa,” i.e. replacing the letter “sād” with “sīn.” Again, ˙ ” or “way.” But some both pronunciations have the same meaning of “path differences are more significant, like the different readings of “nunsihā” and “nansaʾhā” we studied earlier.4 A mushaf may be written using any of a number of different Arabic ˙ ˙ instance, one mushaf may be written using the Kūfī script and scripts. For ˙˙ another using Thulth. Furthermore, Arabic scripts developed over time, which means older mushafs that were written using the same script look ˙ ˙ For instance, the use of diacritical marks (dots different from new ones. above or under letters), known as “iʿjām,” and the use of signs representing short vowels, “tashkīl,” were both introduced later into Arabic scripts, so early mushafs did not have them. ˙˙ The availability of a number of readings and scripts means that different mushafs may look different. ˙ ˙ mushafs have the same organization of chapters and of the verses All ˙ ˙ chapter. For instance, every mushaf starts with the chapter within each ˙ chapter of “al-Nās (The of “al-Fātiha (The Opening)” and ends with ˙the ˙ People).” However, chapters and verses are not listed in the mushaf in the ˙ ˙ of the chronological order of their revelation. For instance, the fi rst verses Qur’an that were revealed to the Prophet are from chapter 96 in the mushaf. One aspect of this is that some chapters that were revealed in Medina˙ ˙are listed before others that were revealed earlier in Mecca.5 Scholars agree that the organization of the verses within any chapter was determined by Prophet Muhammad. This consensus is based on a number of hadīths, like this one, which is transmitted by ʿUthmān b. Abī al-ʿĀs ˙ and˙ reported in the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal: ˙ ˙ I was sitting with the Messenger of Allah when he looked forward without focusing on something, then he looked downward as if he was piercing the floor, and he again looked forward without focusing on something. He said: “Gabriel (peace be on him) came and commanded me to put this verse in so-and-so position in this chapter: ‘Allah commands justice, doing good, and giving charity to relatives, and He forbids indecency, evil, and oppression. He admonishes you so that you may remember .’”6

Another example is found in the Hadīth compilation of Muslim where the Prophet is said to have been asked˙ about the law on inheritance in certain situations and he referred the person to “the verse of summer at the end of the chapter of al-Nisā’,” identifying the position of the verse.7 There are also hadīths stating that the Messenger used to tell the recorders of the revelation˙ in which chapters to place newly revealed verses. Other hadīths ˙

Does the Mushaf Contain All of the Qur’an? 125 ˙˙ have the Prophet referring to the fi rst and last ten verses of the chapter of al-Kahf and so on. But there is no such consensus on the source of the order of the chapters in the mushaf. Some scholars think it was determined by the Prophet, others suggest˙ ˙it was the Companions, and a third group reckons that it was a combination of both.8 This is why there is only one Qur’an but different mushafs. But the dif˙ ferences between those mushafs are minimal, as they are˙ written compiled ˙ ˙ records of the one and same Qur’an.

8.2

IS THE MUSHAF AN INCOMPLETE ˙ ˙THE QUR’AN? RECORD OF

None of the aspects of the mushaf above questions its being the complete ˙ ˙ Muslim scholars hold two beliefs accordwritten record of the Qur’an. But ing to which the mushaf does not contain the entire revelation of the Qur’an. ˙ ˙ Prophet and the early Muslims forget certain verses First, God made the that He had revealed earlier. I will discuss this in detail in the next chapter. Second, the texts of certain verses have been withdrawn by God, not through making them forgotten. At times the ruling was also retracted but at others it was left operative. These two forms of withdrawal have been represented by the legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation. Legaltextual abrogation has also been used to explain the process of forgetting verses by the Prophet even when the alleged verses were often non-legalistic, i.e. they had no rulings attached to them. The belief that some Qur’anic verses that had been revealed to Muhammad were later withdrawn by God, including those that the Prophet and the Muslims were made to forget, means that these passages were not recorded in the mushaf when it was compiled. This unquestionably makes ˙˙ the mushaf an incomplete record of the Qur’an. Muslim scholars managed ˙ ˙ this alarming concept by pointing out that while the mushaf is an incom˙ all the verses plete record of the Qur’an, it is complete in the sense it ˙has that Qur’an wanted to be written in the mushaf. ˙˙ As put by Burton, the term “mushaf” refers to the Qur’an document ˙ ˙ whereas the term “Qur’an” refers to the Qur’an source.9 He argues that “the theories of naskh had been devised to bridge this gap between two aspects of the ‘revelation’: the source and the texts.”10 Burton means that the concept of abrogation was introduced to rationalize the incompleteness of the mushaf. Because some verses are believed to have been made to be forgotten by˙ ˙the Prophet and the Muslims, Muslim scholars have tried to understand this forgetting of verses as a genuine divine mechanism for affecting change in the revelation. Introducing abrogation was necessary to quell any uncomfortable and doubt-triggering questions resulting from the Prophet’s forgetting of verses and the mushaf’s exclusion of some verses. ˙˙

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Muslims might view Burton’s suggestion that abrogation was introduced to deal with the problem of the incompleteness of the mushaf with cyni˙˙ cism. But the Muslim belief that abrogation is a divine modus operandi merely positions abrogation as the cause rather than, as Burton claims, a result of the differences between the Qur’an and mushaf. The critical fact ˙ ˙ revelation is fully that the mushaf does not contain all of the Qur’anic ˙ ˙ endorsed by both sides. One serious problem with textual abrogation, whereby the wording but not the ruling of a verse is abrogated, becomes clear when we recall the reverse mode of naskh, legal abrogation. Scholars who accept both modes of abrogation, a group that includes most scholars who have subscribed to abrogation, have not offered any convincing explanation as to why the text of an inoperative ruling should stay in the mushaf while the text of an ˙ ˙ that claims to explain operative ruling should not be there! Any argument the removal of an operative verse from the Qur’an would be undermined by the presence of inoperative verses, and vice versa. There can be no rational, let alone convincing, explanation for this phenomenon. Legal abrogation means that inclusion in the mushaf does not necessar˙ ˙ abrogation implies ily mean the operativeness of a verse. Similarly, textual that excluding a verse from the mushaf does not imply that it is inoperative. ˙ ˙ abrogation that presume the removal As we shall see,11 both modes of of Qur’anic texts from the mushaf—i.e. the legal-textual and the textual ˙˙ forms—are unhistorical. However, the two modes deal with two different problems. Legal-textual abrogation tackled the problem of the “forgotten” verses, rendering this forgetting the mechanism of their withdrawal by God. But it also addressed the broader problem of Hadīth narratives ˙ have no operamentioning Qur’anic verses that are not in the mushaf and ˙ ˙ tive legal rulings, as some of these reports do not talk about the Prophet forgetting verses but simply highlight the fact that some verses are not in the mushaf. ˙ ˙ abrogation addresses three specific legal issues: the punishment Textual for adultery, the minimum number of breast-feedings from the same nursing mother that establishes the marriage ban between a male and female who would otherwise be eligible to marry each other, and whether the three days of fasting in penance for breaking an oath should be successive. The three rulings are still operative, even if there is no consensus among scholars on the required number of sucklings, the successiveness of the three days of fasting, and whether the sources of the three rulings are actually Qur’anic passages. The operativeness of the three rulings has meant that these passages could not be claimed to have been made to be forgotten by the Prophet and people. This also meant that textual abrogation had to be introduced as a different mode of abrogation and could not be rolled into legal-textual abrogation.12 Scholars could have rejected the authenticity of the hadīths that pro˙ those that are mote the idea of missing verses—those that are forgotten and

Does the Mushaf Contain All of the Qur’an? 127 ˙˙ not, the legal and non-legal ones. There are very good reasons to take this position. But this logical and plausible solution lost to the highly questionable choice of abrogation. Once the claims about the missing passages were accepted as authentic, jurists had no option but to introduce a formal principle that explains their absence from the mushaf. Without it, the absence ˙ would have cast serious of those passages would have looked casual ˙and doubt on the integrity of the recorded revelation. There is another difference between the Qur’an and mushaf that would ˙ ˙ mushaf. The have implications for the question of completeness of the Qur’an was revealed in full during the lifetime of the Prophet. The˙ ˙mushaf, ˙ ˙ by on the other hand, is believed to have been compiled after the Prophet his Companions. It is accepted by all that the Qur’anic verses were written down by Muslims as they were being revealed. Leather, parchment, shoulder-bones, and leaf stalks of date palms were used as writing material.13 But the consensus is that the mushaf, as a set of pages that contain the complete ˙ ˙ the withdrawn verses, was compiled only record of the Qur’an excluding after the Prophet. According to Muslim history and the Hadīth, an attempt ˙ the death of the at compiling the Qur’an was made within two years after Prophet in the caliphate of Abū Bakr (13/634), but the full compilation was undertaken by the third caliph, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (35/656) over fifteen years after the Prophet. ʿUthmān’s master copy was believed by the classical authors,14 and this belief continues to this day,15 to be the basis of the copies of the mushaf that we have today. ˙ ˙ that the mushaf was left unwritten during the lifetime I do not accept ˙ of the Prophet. This is not the˙ place to discuss this major topic, and any detailed discussion would distract us from our focus on abrogation. I would like, however, to highlight one serious problem in combining the view that the mushaf was compiled after the Prophet and the view that ˙ ˙ were abrogated in the sense that they were not to be some Qur’anic verses included in the mushaf. Because its operativeness was no guarantee that ˙˙ a verse should be included in the mushaf and its inoperativeness did not ˙ it would have been extremely difnecessarily indicate its exclusion from ˙it, ficult for the compilers to be completely certain as to which verses should or should not be in the mushaf. If even operativeness or inoperativeness were no indication of whether˙ a˙ verse should or should not be in the mushaf, the ˙˙ already extremely difficult task of compiling the mushaf after the Prophet, ˙ ˙ which is further supposed to have taken place years after his death, would have become even more difficult and unreliable. This leads me to another point. There is a fundamental contradiction between the concept of “mushaf” as the complete record of all unwith˙ drawn verses of the Qur’an ˙ and the standard history of collecting the Qur’an. I have already noted that some of the “withdrawn” verses are operative and some unwithdrawn verses are inoperative, but all verses belong to the Qur’an. The only way to understand the concept of verse withdrawal is in relation to the mushaf, not the Qur’an. In other words, when God ˙˙

128 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law withdrew any verse during the lifetime of the Prophet, He would have changed the status of this verse with respect to the mushaf, not the Qur’an. ˙˙ But the problem is that the concept of mushaf, according to Muslim his˙ ˙ torians, did not exist at the time of the Prophet, because the mushaf was ˙ compiled after him! Put differently, the withdrawal of verses means˙ that the concept of mushaf is from God, yet allegedly the Prophet did not implement ˙ ˙ it was some of his Companions who decided to implement this concept, and it about a decade and a half after him. I fi nd this anachronistic and absurd. Furthermore, the concept of mushaf is not found in the mushaf! The ˙ Qur’an is, understandably, one major˙ ˙focus point of the revelation˙ recorded in the mushaf. But the concept of mushaf as the record of some but not all ˙ ˙ is not attested anywhere ˙ ˙ in the mushaf! The Qur’an is also of the Qur’an ˙˙ described in the mushaf as the Book that was revealed to Muhammad. ˙ ˙ There is no other concept of a Book associated with Muhammad’s message, including a Book containing a subset of the Qur’anic revelation. To recap, the Hadīth claims that the mushaf does not contain all ˙ ˙˙ Qur’anic verses, including some that were excluded when God made the Prophet and the Muslims forget them. The majority of these passages were lumped under the phenomenon of legal-textual abrogation because their rulings were not operative or, more accurately, they were not legalistic verses. But two other passages and a word from a verse in the mushaf are ˙ ˙ abrosaid to remain operative, so a different form of abrogation—textual gation—had to be introduced to accommodate them. The formalization of the absence of passages from the mushaf as a divine plan through the ˙˙ mechanism of abrogation rebuffed the suggestion that the verses were casually lost. Rather than characterizing those passages as “lost” or “dropped” by those who compiled the mushaf, abrogation positioned them as having ˙ ˙ overworked and convoluted solution was been “withdrawn” by God. This preferred to the simpler and more credible view that the hadīths making the ˙ claims about missing verses are inauthentic.

9

Did the Prophet Forget Verses?

In this chapter, I will show that the idea that God made the Prophet and other Muslims forget verses of the Qur’an is unfounded. I will fi rst demonstrate that this suggestion has no foundation in the Qur’an. I will then examine the source of this claim in the Hadīth literature and show the ˙ unreliability of these narratives.

9.1

THE QUR’AN’S TESTIMONY

We should discuss in some detail the phrase “cause to be forgotten” in 2.106 because it has been used as further evidence by those who interpret this verse as referring to Qur’anic abrogation: “Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten We bring a better or the like of it.” This view has been taken by scholars such as Tabarī. Their argument links that phrase to a misunder˙ standing of the following verses: We shall make you [O Muhammad!] read [the Qurʾan] so that you do not forget (87.6) except what Allah wills. He knows what is spoken aloud and what is hidden. (87.7)

Scholars suggest that these verses indicate that God made the Prophet forget some of the Qur’an that He had revealed to him.1 They then argue that the phrase “cause to be forgotten” in 2.106 is another reference to this phenomenon. This, in fact, is a multiple misunderstanding of 87.6, 87.7, and 2.106. I have already discussed one of those misunderstandings, which is the assumption that the term “āya” in 2.106 means “verse,” when in fact it means “sign.”2 This interpretation totally excludes any possibility that “cause to be forgotten” is a reference to the Prophet being made to forget verses. But I will focus here on other interpretational mistakes. Contrary to this misinterpretation, verse 87.6 stresses that God inspired the Qur’an to Muhammad in such a way that ensured that he never forgot it. This is why although Gabriel delivered the Qur’an to Muhammad, the verse attributes the act of inspiring the Qur’an to the Prophet to God—“We

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shall make you read”—to emphasize the divine source of this protection for

the Messenger against forgetting any of the revelation. As for 87.7, it does not make an exemption from the confirmation set in 87.6. It is rather a reminder that this protection against forgetting any of the Qur’an is a divine gift and that God can withdraw it should He decide to do so. This interpretation is confi rmed by a set of verses that uses an almost identical conditional phrase: As for the wretched, they shall be in the Fire, in which there shall be for them moaning and sighing, (11.106) staying therein so long as the heaven and earth endure, except what your Lord wills. Your Lord does what He wants. (11.107) As for the happy, they shall be in paradise, staying therein so long as the heaven and earth endure, except what your Lord wills—an endless gift. (11.108)

There is only one other verse where the mention of the eternal life in hell is followed by an exceptive expression identical to the one in 87.7: On the day when He gathers them all together [He shall say]: “O company of jinns! You have got much out of mankind.” Their companions from among mankind shall say: “Our Lord! We have enjoyed each other’s company and we have reached our set term which You had set for us.” He shall say: “The Fire is your abode, staying in it forever, except what Allah wills.” Your Lord is wise, knowledgeable. (6.128)

All of the other many verses about this subject confi rm that the life in paradise and hell will be eternal. The Qur’an repeatedly and unequivocally stresses this. So the phrases “except what your Lord wills” and “except what Allah wills” in those three verses do not represent an exception from this fact. They are rather a reminder of God’s unlimited power and that He can do whatever He wishes. Any inevitability continues to be so only because He has made it so and He can change it if He so decides. Emphasizing the same point, there are two other verses that command the Prophet to say that he cannot repel any harm or bring any good to himself without God’s prior approval: “Say, ‘I have no power over myself for harm or for benefit, except what Allah wills’” (7.188, 10.49). The phrase “except what Allah wills” confi rms the negative statement it follows, which is exactly the case in 78.6–7. There are also these related verses: If We willed, We could take away what We have revealed to you, then you would find none to guard you against Us, (17.86) except for a mercy from your Lord. His favor to you has been great. (17.87)

Again, here God confi rms His preservation of the revelation that He made to the Prophet while reminding him that should He want, He can take back all that He revealed.

Did the Prophet Forget Verses? 131 In his commentary on verse 2.106, Tabatabā’ī makes an excellent observation about verses 87.6–7.3 He notes˙ that˙ had the exception represented by the phrase “except what Allah wills” been intended to confi rm that the Prophet experienced forgetting, then the earlier statement “so that you do not forget” would have been meaningless. All people forget and remember by God’s permission anyway, so singling out the Prophet by the statement “so that you do not forget” must be confi rming the special favor from God that Muhammad was not going to forget anything revealed to him, as opposed to what would normally happen. God’s words “so that you do not forget” carried a unique promise to the Prophet that ensured his memorization of every verse as it was revealed without forgetting or becoming unsure about the wording of any verse. In his commentary on 87.6, Qurtubī reports that the Sufi Shaikh Junaid ˙ al-Baghdādī (297/910) was once asked about the meaning of forgetting in that verse. He replied that it meant forgetting to apply the Qur’an.4 This interpretation, which is usually ignored by scholars, is also perfectly plausible. Indeed, there is a verse that commands the Prophet to remember to apply God’s instructions should he forget, “And remember your Lord when you forget ” (18.24), which I shall revisit later in this section. Having studied the meaning of 87.6–8, it is clear that the phrase “cause to be forgotten” in 2.106 does not refer to the Prophet’s forgetting of verses of the Qur’an. It is also worth noting that when God spoke about His protection of the Prophet against forgetting any verse, He referred to that issue directly and explicitly. Conversely, the expression “cause to be forgotten” does not identify the Prophet as the subject of this forgetfulness. Aware of this problem with the popular interpretation of this phrase but still overzealous in promoting it, a minority of scholars have even suggested that the Qur’anic Arabic word “nunsihā (cause to be forgotten)” in 2.106 was instead “tunsahā (cause you [O Muhammad!] to forget it)” or “tansahā (you [O Muhammad!] forget it).” They make use of the fact that the three words would have looked exactly the same in the original script used for writing the Qur’an, i.e. that ancient Arabic script did not have vowelling marks and dots, which are the differentiators between those three spellings. Tabarī has ˙ 5 rightly rejected both alternative spellings as unsupported by evidence. Linking the phrase “cause to be forgotten” to the Prophet cannot be concluded from verse 2.106. It is rather the result of the prior assumption that the Prophet forgot verses which itself is derived from the Hadīth, not the Qur’an. ˙ Prophet forget verses As I mentioned earlier, the claim that God made the of the Qur’an led to the development of the principle of legal-textual abrogation. So this claim was dressed up as a formal doctrine. It is not some failure of the human memory, as this should not happen to the Prophet with respect to verses of the Qur’an. It was rather presented as a divine instrument called abrogation that caused this forgetting. Linking the forgetting mentioned in 2.106 to abrogation was made easier by the fact that the verse mentions the term “naskh” and the concept

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of forgotten āya and exegetes mistakenly understood this term to mean “verse” rather than “sign”: Whatever āya We nansakh or cause to be forgotten (nunsihā) We bring a better or the like of it. Do you not know that Allah is powerful over everything? (2.106)

But even if this misinterpretation of “āya” is admitted, “nansakh” and “cause to be forgotten” are clearly mentioned as two different things, even if related by context. So if “nansakh” referred to abrogation, “cause to be forgotten” must denote something else. The Qur’an portrays Muhammad, and every prophet, as an individual whom God has endowed with great spiritual attributes that differentiated him from other people. But the Prophet remained, nevertheless, a human being who was liable to the various weaknesses that any human may experience. Indeed, the Qur’an refers to Muhammad’s susceptibility to forgetting: Do not say regarding anything “I am going to do that tomorrow” (18.23) without saying “Allah willing.” And remember your Lord when you forget and say: “it may be that my Lord will guide me to something nearer to guidance than this.” (18.24)

The verse talks about moments in which the Prophet forgets his “Lord,” not verses of the Qur’an. Forgetting God means to think or act without Him on one’s mind. Another Qur’anic story shows prophet Moses making a promise not to question the actions of a wise man he was following only to fail to make good his promise. Moses is reported as saying the following to his guide: “Do not take me to task that I forgot, and do not impose on me too difficult a command” (18.73). Prophets experienced the human frailty of forgetting, but they did not forget the revelations they received from God and did not lose verses permanently. There is no evidence in the Qur’an that the Prophet forgot verses temporarily or was made to permanently forget any revelation. I also share the view held by some scholars, such as Muhammad ʿAbduh,6 that this unfounded suggestion is in contradiction with God’s assertion in the following verses that it is He who collects and forms the Qur’an and He who preserves it: It is We who collect it and turn it into Qurʾan. (75.17) So when We have made it Qurʾan, follow such Qurʾan. (75.18) Verily, it is We who revealed the Remembrance (the Qurʾan), and verily We are its Guardian. (15.9)

Did the Prophet Forget Verses? 133 ʿAbduh also shares with other scholars the view that the claim that Muhammad could have forgotten verses conflicts with the concept of “ʿisma” or “inerrability” of the Prophet. ˙Finally, I think the concept that God revealed verses just to withdraw them is completely illogical.

9.2 THE PROBLEM OF THE HADĪTH NARRATIVES ˙ The claim that Prophet Muhammad forgot verses stems from the Hadīth literature. One saying attributed to him clearly suggests that at some˙ point he was made to forget some verses. This hadīth appears in almost all major ˙ variants, all of which trace it compilations and in a number of different back to ʿĀ’isha, the Prophet’s wife.7 This is one version of this hadīth from ˙ the collection of Bukhārī: The Messenger of Allah heard a man reciting a Qur’anic chapter in the night so he said: “May Allah show mercy to him. He has reminded me of so-and-so verses that I had been made to forget (unsītuhā) from chapter so-and-so.”8 There are obvious aspects of casualness about this story. First, the hadīth ˙ does not try to identify the verses in question. This complete lack of interest in the forgotten verses despite the importance of this piece of information reflects the fact that the hadīth author was fully focused on establishing that the Prophet was made˙ to forget verses. Second, the Prophet is supposed to have been reminded of the forgotten verses accidently as he listened to some unknown person praying in a mosque! Third, the person was clearly not important enough to be identified in the hadīth, yet he is supposed to have remembered Qur’anic verses ˙ that the Prophet had himself forgotten. This hadīth has all the hallmarks of a narrative that was put together ˙ to emphasize a particular point—a common phenomenon in the Hadīth literature. The point that the author of this hadīth is trying to stress ˙is that Muhammad was made to forget parts of the˙ Qur’an. This hadīth still cannot be seen as emphasizing the misinterpretation of “cause˙ to be forgotten” and the concept of Qur’anic abrogation. This misunderstanding meant permanent forgetting of Qur’anic verses which is caused by God because He withdrew them. Yet the reported incident contradicts all three of the conditions. The forgetting is temporary, the verses were not withdrawn as the implication is that they remained in the mushaf, ˙˙ and the forgetting is portrayed as a failure of human memory even though it is said that the Prophet was made to forget. Significantly, the passive voice verb unsītuhā in this hadīth is replaced ˙ in other versions, albeit not in Bukhārī, with the active voice verb nasītuhā

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or “I forgot it.”9 Bukhārī,10 as well as others,11 has another version of the hadīth in which the active voice verb asqattuhā, which literally means ˙ dropped it,” is used instead. At times the ˙ ˙ verb appears in the plural “I asqattuhunna.12 While some versions of the hadīth may be read to refer ˙ ˙ verse, this and other versions are clearly˙ talking about a number of to one verses. The alternative active voice verb unquestionably implies inadvertently forgetting it. This alarming issue is dealt with in the versions of the hadīth that explicitly state that the Prophet was made to forget. It is also ˙ interesting to see how the critical term in the hadīth appears in significantly ˙ of the hadīth. different forms, casting doubt on the reliability ˙ (cause to be forgotUnsītuhā, unlike asqattuhā, can be related to “nunsihā ˙ ˙ ten )”. It is unlikely that this was the original term and it was later replaced with asqattuhā, because the latter breaks an obvious link with a Qur’anic ˙ ˙ would have been useful to those who believed in the authenticverse which ity of the concept behind this hadīth. It is more likely that asqattuhā was the ˙ been introduced to emphasize ˙ ˙ the Prophoriginal term which would have et’s liability to forgetting verses of the Qur’an, albeit temporarily. This term was then later revised to nasītuhā or unsītuhā to link it to the verse that allegedly confi rms the concept of the Prophet’s forgetting of verses. So this change to link the forgetting to the term “nunsihā” in 2.106 must have happened after this verse started to be interpreted as meaning that God made the Prophet permanently forget some of the Qur’anic revelation. As explained earlier, the principle of legal-textual abrogation was used to make the Prophet’s forgetting of Qur’anic verses look to be driven by a divine purpose rather than by failings of human memory. But Ahmad b. ˙ Hanbal quotes a hadīth that exposes a problem with this view: ˙ ˙ The Prophet performed the dawn prayer but he left out a verse. After fi nishing the prayer he asked: “Is Ubayy b. Kaʿb among you?” Ubayy said: “O Messenger of Allah! Was verse so-and-so abrogated or did you forget it?” He replied: “I was made to forget it.”13 This hadīth confi rms that the Prophet was made to forget by God, but it ˙ explicitly decouples the act of forgetting from abrogation, thus leaving it without divine purpose. As in the earlier hadīth, forgetting is not presented ˙ had not been withdrawn. Why as a mechanism for abrogation, as the verses God would want to make His Prophet forget verses after He revealed them to him is left a mystery. This is made even more meaningless as at least one Companion was able to remember the verse that the Prophet had forgotten! In his Muwatta’, Mālik quotes the Prophet as saying “I forget or am caused to forget˙ ˙ in order to enact [a sunna].”14 Some scholars think the word “or” indicates the original narrator’s uncertainty about what exactly the Prophet said, but others think it is one of the words of the Prophet’s indication that he may forget in two different ways. For the sake of argument, let’s presume that the hadīth refers to forgetting “verses,” although ˙

Did the Prophet Forget Verses? 135 it does not say that. On the face of it, this hadīth appears to give a purpose as to why the Prophet forgot or was made˙ to forget verses. But all it actually does is make the forgetting equally meaningless but in a different way. What is the point of forgetting a Qur’anic verse to introduce a sunna that performs the same purpose? This narrative belongs to the genre of hadīths ˙ that were made up by traditionists who wanted to stress the high status of the Sunna and make it a source of Islam as authentic and indispensable as the Qur’an. Significantly, Mālik does not give the chain of narration of this hadīth, which leaves it further exposed as being without any foundation ˙ history. in The Hadīth literature reports a different incident that also describes ˙ the Prophet’s forgetting as the normal kind of forgetting that happens to any human being. This incident has been reported by a number of scholars, including Ahmad b. Hanbal,15 Muslim,16 Abū Dāwūd,17 Ibn ˙ is one of˙ the versions of this hadīth as found in Māja,18 and Nasā’ī.19 This ˙ Bukhārī’s collection: The Prophet prayed and (the sub-narrator) Ibrāhīm said: “I do not know whether he prayed more or less than usual.” So when he read the greetings [at the end of the prayers] he was asked: “O Messenger of Allah! Has there been any change to the prayer?” He said: “What do you mean?” The people said: “You have prayed so and so.” The Prophet bent his legs, faced the qibla, performed a two-prostration prayer, and fi nished with the greetings. Then when he turned his face to us he said: “If there had been any change to the prayer I would have informed you. But I am a human being like you, so I am liable to forget like you. If I forget then remind me. If any one of you becomes in doubt about his prayer, he should try his best to determine how much he had done and complete his prayer accordingly and do the greetings. Then let him do two prostrations [as a penance for forgetting].”20 Most of the hadīths about the Prophet’s forgetting of a verse were meant ˙ to stress his human nature and that he was also liable to memory lapses. Its authors did not mean to link it to the concept that the Prophet was made by God to forget parts of the Qur’an. This concept developed later, and so did the hadīths that promote it. By the time the concept of abrogation established ˙itself, more hadīths had appeared to link the divinely guided ˙ forgetting of verses to abrogation. Al-Tahāwī (321/933) has reported this ˙ ˙ on the authority of Abū Amāma b. Sahl: One night a man tried to read a chapter of the Qur’an that he had, but he could not. Another man tried to read it, but he also could not. Another man also tried to read it but failed. In the morning, they went to the Messenger of Allah and gathered there. One of them said: “O Messenger of Allah! Yesterday night I tried to read chapter so-and-so

136

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law but I could not.” The other said: “I have come for this very reason.” The third man said: “Me too.” The Messenger said: “It was abrogated yesterday.”21

Tahāwī has another variant of the hadīth with a different chain of nar˙ ˙ but also on the authority of Ibn ˙Sahl. The latter said that a group of rators Muslim immigrants from Mecca told him the following: One night, one man of them tried to start reading a chapter of the Qur’an that he had memorized. But he found that he could only read: “In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate (bism Allah al-Raḥmān al-Rāḥīm).” In the morning, he went to see the Prophet to ask him about that. Then another man came, then a third, until they gathered there. They asked each other about what brought them there, just to discover that they all had the same experience with that chapter. When the Prophet gave them permission to see him, they told him what happened to them and asked him about the chapter. He went silent for a while, saying nothing. Then he said: “It was abrogated yesterday.” So it was abrogated from their chests and from everything it was in.22 This late hadīth was clearly introduced after the concept of legal-textual abrogation˙ had been developed. Forgetting verses has now become the result of erasing those verses from the memories of all who knew them and from any source that recorded them. It is a complete removal whereby the text can never be retrieved by anyone. Significantly, these two hadīths are ˙ not found in the major, earlier sources of the Hadīth. 23 ˙ An even later hadīth reported in the late 4th century by Ibn Salāma in ˙ his book on abrogation crystallizes this concept even more strongly. This hadīth is reported on the authority of the Companion ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd: ˙ The Prophet taught me how to read a verse, so I memorized it and wrote it in my mushaf. In the night, I went back home and I found out ˙˙ that I could not remember any of it. I went to check my mushaf just ˙˙ to discover that the paper was blank! When I informed the Prophet he said: “O Ibn Masʿūd, it was withdrawn yesterday!”24 Some scholars argue that the Prophet was made to forget verses that he had not conveyed to people but never ones that he had made public. This exclusion was probably introduced to deal with the implications and scale of an act of forgetting that involves other people, not only the Prophet. But as we saw above, other appropriate hadīths were introduced to deal ˙ removal of verses from every with this concern by reporting that such mass memory and record did take place. What do the hadīths that we have reviewed in this section show us? They demonstrate˙ that they were introduced to provide support for the

Did the Prophet Forget Verses? 137 development of various interpretations and views. The hadīths originally ˙ of memory of presented the Prophet’s forgetting of verses as normal lapses the kind experienced by all people. These hadīths talked about temporar˙ ily forgetting Qur’anic verses which the Prophet later remembered or was helped to remember. They could have only been intended to question the credibility of the Prophet and the integrity of the mushaf. The interpreta˙ ˙ verses stemmed tion of 2.106 as meaning God made Muhammad forget from and led to the development of hadīths that portrayed the forgetting as ˙ the paranormal result of God’s intervention. The emergence of the concept of abrogation was the third and fi nal driver for introducing such hadīths. ˙ These hadīths are clearly worded to confi rm specific details of this concept. ˙ Abrogation talks about the withdrawal of verses after their revelation, and so do those hadīths. ˙ But the confusion does not stop here. There are other hadīths that contradict the hadīths above, clearly stating that forgetting ˙ the Qur’an ˙ was a serious, punishable sin! This is one which can be found in various Hadīth collections: ˙ The sins of my nation were paraded in front of me and I did not see a graver sin than that of a man who forgets a chapter or verse after it was made known to him. 25 Nūr al-Dīn al-Haithamī (807/1404) reports the following hadīth on the ˙ authority of ʿUthmān b. Abī al-ʿĀs which also shows that forgetting the ˙ Qur’an was caused by the Devil: I used to forget the Qur’an so I said: “O Messenger of Allah! I forget the Qur’an.” The Messenger of Allah tapped me on the chest and said: “Go out, O Satan, from ʿUthmān’s chest!” After that, I never forgot anything that I wanted to memorize. 26 Ibn Abī Shaiba (235/849) has reported in his Musannaf three different ˙ 27 hadīths confi rming the graveness of forgetting the Qur’an. ˙ The view that the Prophet forgot verses is the result of a combination of acceptance of inauthentic hadīths, misinterpreting Qur’anic verses influenced by these hadīths, and˙uncritical submission to previous scholars who promoted such˙ misunderstandings, including legal-textual abrogation. This influential trinity of misfortune, I should stress, is behind the survival of many dogmas whose lack of credibility would have otherwise clearly been seen.

10 Legal-Textual Abrogation

This chapter will focus on the mode of abrogation whereby some Qur’anic verses do not exist in the mushaf and their rulings have also been sup˙ ˙ in detail and mention a number of othpressed. I will cover two passages ers whose wordings are at times specified and at others not. But actually only the passage of Bi’r Maʿūna, in some of its Hadīth versions, and the ˙ ten-suckling passage are said to have been abrogated. None of the other passages are described as having been abrogated by the hadīths that men˙ and the theotion them! This confi rms my conclusion that such hadīths ˙ ries of abrogation developed separately before they were brought together by scholars. I have collected these hadīths here because of two good reasons. First, they are often quoted by˙ scholars in the context of discussing the mode of abrogation of both the text and its ruling. Second, I have already explained that this mode of abrogation was the devise used by Muslim scholars to explain all missing verses which are not said to have operative rulings. These include verses that God is said to have made the Prophet forget. Verses that are still operative but are not found in the mushaf will be dealt with in the next two chapters. ˙ This˙ chapter is the most appropriate place in this book to collect and discuss these passages, but not because they are genuine cases of legal-textual abrogation. These verses, in reality, share three things only: they are missing from the mushaf, their absence lacks any credible explanation in ˙ ˙ they are not legalistic, except for the ten-suckling the Hadīth sources, and ˙ passage. One problem, of course, is that abrogation is a concept that, by defi nition, applies to legalistic verses yet none of these verses, apart from one, introduces or abolishes a commandment or prohibition! The concept of legal-textual abrogation, which developed after legal abrogation, was introduced to explain in an acceptable way why, according to various hadīths, certain Qur’anic verses are not in the mushaf. However, ˙ that once this mode of abrogation got established ˙˙ it is plausible it might itself have become the source of further such claims about Qur’anic material missing from the mushaf. ˙˙

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THE BI’R MAʿŪNA PASSAGE

This passage is linked to an incident that happened at a place called “Bi’r Maʿūna” or “the well of Maʿūna.” Bukhārī reported on the authority of Ishāq b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Talha that Anas b. Mālik has said: ˙ ˙ ˙ The Prophet sent seventy of the people of Banī Salīm to Banī ʿĀmir. When they approached them, my maternal uncle said: “Let me get close to them fi rst, so hopefully they will grant me safety until I have conveyed to them the message of the Prophet, otherwise you will be close to me [for help].” He went forward and they granted him safety. But while he was talking to them about the Prophet, they signaled to one of their men and he stabbed him fatally. He said: “God is greater! I have won, by the Lord of the Kaʿba!” They then turned to his companions and slaughtered them, except one lame man who went up to the top of a mountain. Hammām (a sub-narrator) said: “I think another man escaped with him.” Gabriel informed the Prophet that they have met their Lord and that He was pleased with them and He has pleased them. So we used to read: “Tell our people that we have met our Lord. He has been pleased with us and He has pleased us (ballighū qawmanā an qad laqīnā rabbanā fa-radiya ʿannā wa-ardānā).”1 This ˙ ˙ was then abrogated. 2 The Arabic verb “qara’a” means in general “read,” but it is also used specifically to mean “read as part of the Qur’an.” At times the text explicitly states that reading referred to reading as part of the Qur’an, but at times that is clearly implied, as is the case in this hadīth and other hadīths we ˙ ˙ will encounter. Another version of this hadīth explicitly states that the passage was sent ˙ down as Qur’an that the Muslims used to recite and that it was later “abro3 gated.” A third version reports only the second part of the passage and says it was “abrogated,”4 but yet other versions claim that the passage was “withdrawn.”5 In his commentary on verse 2.106, Tabarī mentions a slightly different ˙ change its meaning or English variant of the alleged verse that does not translation. He does not give any details of the story, though. He quotes on the authority of the Successor Qatāda that the Companion Anas b. Mālik said: We read about the seventy Ansār6 who were killed in Bi’r Maʿūna as part of the Book (Qur’an): “Tell˙ our people that we have met our Lord. He has been pleased with us and He has pleased us (ballighū ʿannā qawmanā annā laqīnā rabbanā fa-radiya ʿannā wa-ardānā).” That ˙ ˙ was then withdrawn.7

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Tabarī quotes this story in the context of stressing the authenticity of ˙ abrogation. Here and later I translate the various forms of the passive participle “rufiʿ” as “to be withdrawn.” Literally, this term is the opposite of “unzil” or “to be sent down,” and may also be translated as “to be removed.” In his commentary on 3.169, Tabarī has another report that details the story, albeit with differences from˙ the reports in Bukhārī. He attributes the following report to Ishāq b. Abī Talha: ˙ ˙ ˙ Anas b. Mālik praised the Companions of the Prophet whom the Prophet sent to the people of Bi’r Maʿūna. He said: “I do not know whether they were forty or seventy.” He said: “ʿĀmir b. al-Tufail al-Jaʿfarī was in charge of that water.” This group of the Prophet’s˙ Companions travelled until they arrived at a cave that oversees the water and they sat there. They asked each other: “Which one of you will deliver the message of the Prophet to the people of this water?” Someone—whom he (Anas) said “I think was Abū Milhān al-Ansārī”—said: “I will deliver ˙ the message of the Messenger of Allah.” He ˙then left. When he arrived to an area there he sat in front of the houses and said: “O people of Bi’r Maʿūna! I am the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to you. I bear witness that there is no god save Allah and that Muhammad is His servant and Messenger. Believe in Allah and His Messenger!” Then a man came out from among the houses carrying a spear, and he stabbed him in the side until the spear came out of the other side. He said: “God is greater! I have won, by the Lord of the Kaʿba!” They then traced his footsteps until they found his comrades, so ʿĀmir b. al-Tufail killed them all. ˙ He (the sub-narrator) said: “Ishāq said: ʿAnas b. Mālik told me: ˙ “Allah sent down Qur’an about them: ‘Tell our people that we have met our Lord. He has been pleased with us and He has pleased us.’ It was then abrogated so it was withdrawn after we read it for a while as Qur’an. Then Allah revealed: ‘ Do not consider those who are killed in the way of God as dead, but they are living with their Lord—being provided for

(3.169).’”8 References to the alleged verse and the story are also found in other sources such as Muslim,9 Wāqidī (207/822),10 Baihaqī,11 and various Hadīth and exegetical works. Some reports refer to the withdrawn verse but ˙do not quote it. The reports of this story state that the alleged verse was “withdrawn (rufiʿa)” or “abrogated (nusikha).” Both of Tabarī’s12 accounts use the former whereas Bukhārī has four reports that ˙use the latter13 and two14 narratives that use the former. Ahmad b. Hanbal has one version stating that the passage was “abrogated,”15˙ but two˙ other versions say that the passage was “abrogated or withdrawn.”16 This interchangeable use of the two terms

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suggests that “naskh” is used in its generic sense of “withdraw” rather than in the technical sense that it ultimately acquired. Indeed, we will later see that this alleged withdrawal of a verse does not meet the requirements of any defi nition of abrogation as developed by the jurists. The incident of Bi’r Maʿūna might well be based on real history, but it is impossible to know which details in the reported accounts, which have differences, are historical and which are not. But there are a number of reasons for rejecting the historicity of the supposed revelation and its subsequent withdrawal. First, the beginning of the alleged verse is very significant. The opening words “tell our people” read very much like a statement by those killed addressed to someone rather than a revelation made by God about them. The Arabic verse that is translated as “tell” here is for addressing a group of three or more. The Qur’an mentions martyrs a number of times, but it does not contain any statement made by them in which they address their people or others. This point is made clear when one compares the wording of the Bi’r Maʿūna passage with a genuine verse: “Do not consider those who are killed in the way of God as dead, but they are living with their Lord—being provided for.” This is the typical Qur’anic style, where God speaks about those

killed rather than quotes them addressing the living. The closest account in the Qur’an to the story of Bi’r Maʿūna is this statement by someone who was taken to paradise by visiting angels: It was said: “Enter into Paradise!” He said “O, I wish my people know (36.26) how my Lord has forgiven me and made me one of the honored.” (36.27)

Note how the quoted words are not addressed to someone as there is no means of communication between this person and his people. Second, one of Bukhārī’s reports states that the passage in question was a prayer by those killed for their people to know about what happened to them.17 There is no suggestion that this passage was part of the Qur’an. The hadīth states that God “informed them (the other Muslims) on their (the ˙ martyrs’) behalf” about what happened to them. The implication seems to be that God informed the Prophet who in turn let the other Muslims know that God was pleased with the martyrs and they were pleased with Him. Third, adherents of abrogation argue that some verses were overridden and withdrawn by other verses or sunnas when God decided to change certain rulings. But the Bi’r Maʿūna text is not a legalistic statement. It is supposed to describe a historical event that happened in paradise after the death of those martyrs. In fact, indicative verses, like this passage, are explicitly excluded from the definition of abrogation by scholars. Withdrawing the revelation of such a verse is nonsensical. This is why the scholars who write about abrogation and discuss in detail why certain verses were superseded and others withdrawn never try to apply the same thinking to this alleged verse.

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Fourth, the reports of this incident fi rst recount the massacre on the authority of Anas and then mention that Anas has also said that there used to be a Qur’anic revelation about this incident. The account about the alleged verse reads more like an addendum to the original story. The event of the murder of the messengers that the Prophet sent could be historical, but the claim that the Bi’r Maʿūna passage was part of the Qur’an mushaf is not. ˙˙ 10.2

THE SON OF ADAM PASSAGE

In his Musnad, Ahmad b. Hanbal reported on the authority of Ibn Juraij on ˙ ā’ the following: ˙ the authority of ʿAt ˙ I heard Ibn ʿAbbās say: “The Prophet of Allah said: ‘If the son of Adam possessed a valley of gold he would want another. Nothing fills the soul of the son of Adam but dust. Allah forgives whom He likes.’” Ibn ʿAbbās says: “I do not know if it was part of the Qur’an or not.”18 Another report in the Musnad quotes this passage in a different wording, but with another alleged passage that also does not exist in the mushaf. Zirr b. Hubaish said that Ubayy b. Kaʿb claimed that the Prophet ˙ commanded him to read some Qur’an to him, so he told˙ ˙him that God read the following: The disbelievers among the People of the Book and the polytheists were not going to waver until the evidence has come to them—(98.1) a Messenger from Allah reciting to them pure pages (98.2) in which there are true scriptures. (98.3) Those who were given the Book did not divide until the evidence came to them. (98.4) The [true] religion in Allah’s sight is monotheism, not

polytheism, Judaism, or Christianity. Whoever does good will not be left unrewarded. The fi rst four verses of chapter 98 are followed by a passage that is not found in the mushaf. The report then goes on to state: ˙˙ Shuʿba said: “Then he (the Prophet) read verses after it, then he read: ‘If the son of Adam possessed two valleys of property he would ask for a third. Nothing fills the son of Adam but dust.’” He (Shuʿba) said: “He (the Prophet) fi nished it with the rest of it.” 19 Unlike Ibn ʿAbbās’ uncertainty whether the son of Adam passage was part of the Qur’an or not, Ubayy’s report implies that it was. Interestingly, the hadīth suggests that the son of Adam passage was still ˙ as late as after the revelation of chapter 98. Ahmad being recited in Medina ˙

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reports this hadīth over twenty times in various wordings, most of which are attributed˙ to Anas b. Mālik. 20 Bukhārī has five hadīths in which the son of Adam passage appears in ˙ hadīth similar to that in the Musnad of Ahmad, different forms. In one ˙ ˙ of Ibn ʿAbbās expresses uncertainty about whether this passage was part the Qur’an. 21 The second 22 , third 23, and fourth 24 have Ibn ʿAbbās, Ibn alZubair, and Anas bin Mālik, respectively, quote the passage as a saying by the Prophet, not as a verse. The fifth hadīth claims that Ubayy b. Kaʿb said about this passage: “We ˙ this was part of the Qur’an until ‘increasing in numbers has used to think occupied you’ (102.1) was revealed.”25 This hadīth, which is also quoted by Tabarī in his commentary on 102.1, 26 does˙ not explain why the revelation ˙ this verse removed this confusion. There is no suggestion that this verse of abrogated the passage of the son of Adam. It also suggests that the latter was not part of the Qur’an. In his Hadīth collection, Muslim has three hadīths on the son of Adam ˙ hadīth mentions Ibn ʿAbbās’ uncertainty ˙ passage. One whether the passage ˙ was Qur’anic, although Muslim notes that another report does not name the person who expressed the uncertainty.27 The second Muslim hadīth, which he reports in three versions, is attributed to Anas b. Mālik.˙28 One version states that Anas was unsure about whether the passage of the son of Adam was part of the Qur’an. The other two versions present the passage of the son of Adam as the words of the Prophet, not as Qur’anic in origin. The third hadīth is rather different, reporting the following on the ˙ al-Aswad: authority of Abū Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī was sent to the readers of the Qur’an in Basra, so three hundred men who have read the Qur’an came to him. He said to them: “You are the elite of the people of Basra and its readers so continue to recite it, so that your hearts do not grow hard over time [as a result of not reciting it] as the hearts of those before you grew hard. Before you, we used to read a chapter that we used to liken in length and strength to [the chapter of] Barā’a which I was made to forget, but I have memorized this of it: “If the son of Adam possessed two valleys of property he would want a third valley. Nothing fills the son of Adam but dust.” We also used to read a chapter we likened to one of the musabbihāt 29 which I have been made to forget but I remember this of it: “O you˙ who believe! Why do you say what you do not do? It will be written as a testimony against you and you will be asked about it on the Day of Resurrection.”30 This hadīth moves the story of the son of Adam passage to a different level. ˙ The chapter of Barā’a, which is also known as the chapter of Tawba, is one of the longest chapters of the Qur’an; it has 129 verses. This hadīth makes ˙

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the extraordinary claim that the son of Adam passage is only one verse in a very long chapter that is not in the mushaf! Except for this passage, Ashʿarī ˙˙ was made to forget that chapter. He mentions yet another chapter that he claims to have been made to forget. As the alleged chapters do not exist in the mushaf, scholars who accept ˙˙ the historicity of this hadīth and uphold the integrity of the process of ˙ recording the mushaf have to conclude that they were withdrawn by God, ˙˙ i.e. they were abrogated. The suggestion that Ashʿarī “was made to forget” them leaves these scholars with no option but to accept that this happened by divine intervention that would have made the Prophet, and accordingly all Muslims, forget those chapters. I have already discussed and rejected the claim that God made the Prophet and the Muslims forget Qur’anic revelations. But there are other problems specific to understanding Ashʿarī’s hadīth in the light of this mechanism. ˙ First, Ashʿarī’s mention of the forgotten chapter comes immediately after his advice to the reciters of Basra that they must continue to recite the Qur’an to avoid their hearts hardening. This positions the forgetting of those chapters as some form of punishment, which would mean that it cannot be explained as a form of abrogation! Solving this problem by presuming that Ashʿarī’s warning has no connection to his reference to the forgotten chapters would make the hadīth rather unintelligible. ˙ Second, Ashʿarī says that the alleged chapter was recited in the past by Muslims, but he talks about forgetting it as something that happened to him only. Third, the forgetting was not complete, as Ashʿarī was still capable of remembering passages from the forgotten chapters. This forgetting cannot be said to be the act of God as it was clearly not completely successful! Fourth, Ashʿarī does not state that forgetting the chapter was a form of abrogation. He does not use the term “naskh,” “withdrawal,” or any other term or suggest even remotely that this was a form of abrogation. In his commentary on 2.106, Tabarī notes Ashʿarī’s claim that they used to recite the son of Adam passage˙ as a Qur’anic verse, but he goes on to add that it was “withdrawn,” although this is not found in the hadīth.31 Using abrogation to explain the absence of any Qur’anic verse from˙ the mushaf is ˙˙ a standard practice among Muslim scholars, but in most cases the concept of withdrawal by God or abrogation is never part of the Hadīth narrative. ˙ ʿarī hadīth that There are also other weakness and confusions in the Ash are not related to the concept of forgetting the alleged chapters. ˙ Fifth, Ashʿarī was talking to the Qur’an reciters in a major city, hence there were hundreds of them. Yet his words imply that they did not have the slightest idea about those chapters that he had been made to forget! Sixth, the passage that Ashʿarī quotes as being from the second chapter that he was made to forget starts with “O you who believe! Why do you say what you do not do?” This is the same wording with which verse 2 of chapter 61 in the mushaf starts! This chapter starts with glorifying God, as ˙˙

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indicated in the hadīth: “All that is in the heavens and in the earth glorifies Allah; ˙ He is almighty, wise” (61.1). Ashʿarī’s account is confused. He was supposed to have been sent to the Qur’an reciters of Basra as an authority on the Qur’an, but clearly he was far from it. Also, the reciters of Basra must have known chapter 61, so it is difficult to make sense of this part of the hadīth. ˙ Leaving this specific hadīth aside, there are two fundamental problems ˙ with the very suggestion that the son of Adam passage was abrogated. Seventh, there is a significant difference between the Bi’r Maʿūna and son of Adam hadīths. The former always state that the passage was abro˙ gated or withdrawn, but the hadīths of the son of Adam passage do not ˙ suggest that the passage was a Prophetic state that. Many of the variants saying and the others reflect uncertainty about whether it was Qur’an or a Prophetic saying. Tabarī links this passage to abrogation through his inter˙ pretation of the hadīth but that is not part of its text.32 Ancient and modern ˙ scholars have rushed to present the son of Adam passage as an instance of abrogation when the text itself never claims that. One hadīth reported by Tahāwī states that the son of Adam passage was ˙ was ˙ later withdrawn. It has that passage prepart of a˙ whole chapter that ceded by the following: “Allah supports this religion with people who will have no share of good (inna Allaha yu’ayyidu hadhā al-dīni bi-aqwāmin lā khalāqa lahum).”33 Interestingly, this very passage is reported in the Musnad of Ahmad34 and Nasā’ī35 in completely different hadīths as words of ˙ ˙ the Prophet! Eighth, Like the Bi’r Maʿūna passage, the son of Adam one is not associated with any commandment or prohibition; it is indicative. The withdrawal of a non-imperative text contravenes the very definition of the abrogation of the wording and ruling of a verse, which implies that it applies to legalistic verses. Scholars have conveniently and systematically glossed over this problem. I can only conclude that the son of Adam “verse” and the self-contradictory hadīths in which it appears are complete forgeries. ˙ Prophet might well have said something similar to any of the versions The of the son of Adam passage, but that would make it a Prophetic saying, not a verse. Indeed, this is how it is described in most hadīths, and some Hadīth ˙ as such.36 Interestingly, ˙ compilers have confined themselves to reporting it the oldest mention of this passage in a work on abrogation treats it as a Prophetic saying and presents it as a case of abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an.37 In addition to the fact that there are fundamental flaws in the view that the mushaf does not contain all Qur’anic revelations, there are equally ˙˙ serious problems in the hadīths that try to enforce this view. ˙ 10.3

OTHER SPECIFIED AND UNSPECIFIED PASSAGES

The Bi’r Maʿūna and son of Adam passages are not the only ones that hadīths have claimed to be part of the Qur’an but not the mushaf. There ˙ ˙˙

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are many hadīths that mention certain passages as well as unspecified ones, ˙ including whole chapters. In this section, I will review some of these claims. First, one of the son of Adam passage hadīths in Muslim which is ˙ this passage was part of a attributed to Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī claims that whole chapter that was as long as the 129-verse chapter of Barā’a. 38 Ibn Salāma makes a similar claim but he attributes it to Anas b. Mālik. 39 That same hadīth of Muslim states that there used to be another chapter that is not in˙ the mushaf that starts with a variation of the term “sabbaha ˙˙ ˙ (glory be to)” and contains this verse: “O you who believe! Why do you say what you do not do? It will be written as a testimony on you and you will be asked about it on the Day of Resurrection (yā ayyuhā al-ladhīna amanū lima taqūluna mā lā tafʿalūn fa-tuktab shahādatan fī-aʿnāqikum fa-tus’alūna ʿanhā yawma al-qiyāma).” As I explained earlier, verse 61.2 starts with “O you who believe! Why do you say what you do not do?”, so the hadīth seems confused here. ˙ Second, one of the son of Adam passage hadīths quoted by Ahmad ˙ in Allah’s sight is mono˙ implies that this was a verse: “The [true] religion theism, not polytheism, Judaism, or Christianity. Whoever does good will not be left unrewarded (inna al-dīna ʿinda Allah al-hanafiyya ghaira al˙ mushrika wa-lā al-yahūdiyya wa-lā al-nasrāniyya. Wa-man yafʿal khairan ˙ fa-lan yukfaruh).”40 The fi rst four Arabic words of this passage are identical to those of verse 3.19,41 but the word identifying the religion is “Islam” not “monotheism”: “The [true] religion in Allah’s sight is Islam. Those who were given the Book disagreed only after knowledge was given to them, out of injustice toward each other. As for he who disbelieves in Allah’s signs, Allah is prompt at reckoning.” Its ending has some similarity with verse 3.115: “Whatever good they do will not go unrewarded. Allah knows the pious.” Here also, the hadīth

˙ are seems to confuse actual verses in the mushaf with supposed ones that ˙ ˙ absent from it. The hadīth implies rather than states explicitly that this passage was a verse. ˙This passage is said to have preceded the son of Adam passage. I have already explained that if the latter was historical, then it must be a Prophetic saying. This makes me conclude that the other passage in question is also a Prophetic saying, not a verse that is missing from the mushaf. ˙ But that would be the case only if the hadīth is historical to start with.˙ Sig˙ nificantly, this hadīth is not found in any of the major Hadīth compilations, including those˙ that quote the son of Adam passage. ˙ Third, one of Bukhārī’s hadīths in which ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb talks ˙ ˙ ˙ used to about the stoning verse attributes to ʿUmar the statement that they recite as part of the Qur’an the following: “Do not disown your fathers for it is disbelief on your part to disown your fathers (lā targhabū ʿan abā’ikum fa-innahu kufrun bikum an targhabū ʿan abā’ikum)” or “it is disbelief on your part to disown your fathers [to relate yourselves to others] (inna kufran bikum an targhabū ʿan abā’ikum).”42 This claim is also found in the Musannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq43 and Ahmad.44 But Bukhārī contradicts ˙ ˙

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this version elsewhere as he reports, this time on the authority of Abū Huraira, the same passage as a saying of the Prophet rather than a Qur’anic verse: “Do not disown your fathers for anyone who disowns his father is a disbeliever (lā targhabū ʿan abā’ikum fa-man raghaba ʿan abīhi fa-innahu kāfir).”45 Muslim46 and Ahmad47 also report this hadīth. As a rule, if a pas˙ ˙ and in others a saying sage is claimed in some reports to be a Qur’anic verse of the Prophet it must be taken to be the latter, if it is historical of course. It is highly unlikely that a genuine passage of the Qur’an would have been left out of the mushaf when it was so well known that it survived in the memory ˙ ˙ it was recorded in the 2nd or 3rd century with hadīths. of people until ˙ a new form The confusion of the hadīths that quote this passage takes ˙ in a report in Ibn Abī Shaiba. He attributes to ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb telling ˙˙ people the following: Allah kept His Messenger among us with the revelation coming down to him from Allah with which He permits things and proscribes others. Allah then took His Messenger, so He withdrew of it (the revelation) what He wished to withdraw and left what He wished to leave. So we hang on to some and we missed some.48 This hadīth introduces the new concept that some of the Qur’an was withdrawn˙ by God when the Prophet died, i.e. it disappeared after the death of the Prophet! This has nothing to do with abrogation. The concept suggested in this hadīth is not recognized by Muslim scholars as it can only ˙ point to the casual loss of Qur’anic revelation. Fourth, Tahāwī reported the following hadīth on the authority of ˙ Makhrama: ˙ ˙ Musawwar b. ʿUmar b. al-Khat t āb said to ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. ʿAwf: “Did we not have among what˙ ˙was revealed to us this:˙ ‘Do jihad as you did jihad the fi rst time (jāhidū kamā jāhadtum awaala marra)?’” He (Ibn ʿAwf) said: “Yes.” He (ʿUmar) asked: “But it is not there!” He replied: “It was dropped with what was dropped of the Qur’an.” He said: “Do you fear that people might go back as disbelievers?” He said: “Whatever Allah wills!” He said: “Should people go back as disbelievers, their rulers would be so-and-so people and their ministers would be such-and-such people 49.”50

This hadīth and the claim it makes are not found in any of the major Hadīth ˙ compilations. This fact did not prevent Tahāwī from quoting it some˙ three ˙ ˙ about Qur’anic verses that are centuries after the Prophet. When talking not in the mushaf, scholars do not show anywhere as much care as they do ˙ when talking ˙about the revelations recorded in the mushaf. ˙ ˙ Musannaf of Ibn Fifth, chapter Barā’a is the subject of a hadīth in the ˙ ˙ Abī Shaiba: “Hudhaifa said [to some Muslims]: ‘You read [today] only a ˙

148 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law quarter of it (meaning Barā’a).’”51 Given that this chapter has 129 verses in the mushaf, it implies that as many as 387 of its verses were lost! ˙ ˙ Ahmad reported the following hadīth: Sixth, ˙ ˙ [Ubayy b. Kaʿb asked]: “How long is the chapter of Ahzāb that you read?” He (Zirr b. Hubaish) replied”: “Seventy-odd ˙[verses].” He (Ubayy) said: “I read it˙ with the Prophet and it was like the chapter of Baqara or even longer. It contained the stoning verse.”52 In another form of the hadīth in which the so-called “stoning verse”53 is ˙ quoted, Zirr specifies the number as “seventy three” verses.54 In one version of this hadīth in the Musannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Zirr makes the chapter ˙ 73 or 74 verses, ˙ 55 but in another he is claimed to have said that it of Ahzāb ˙ had eighty-odd verses.56 The chapter of Baqara, which is the second chapter in the mushaf, is ˙ the longest chapter in both the number of verses and the length of ˙text. It has 286 verses. The chapter of Ahzāb, which is number 33 in the mushaf, ˙ one-quarter the length of the chapter ˙˙ consists of 73 verses and is less than of Baqara. What this hadīth alleges, therefore, is that over 200 Qur’anic ˙ in the mushaf! verses have not survived ˙ ˙ which ʿĀ’isha is reported to have said: Abū ʿUbaid has another hadīth in ˙ In the Prophet’s lifetime, the chapter of Ahzāb was read as 200 verses, ˙ but when ʿUthmān wrote the mushafs he could not compile more than ˙ ˙ what it currently has.57 The suggestion that as many as 127 verses, or over 213 according to the earlier hadīths, of Ahzāb have not survived in the mushaf is rather absurd. ˙ explains the disappearance of ˙the ˙ alleged verses. In None of˙ these hadīths ˙ fact, the hadīth above clearly indicates that those verses were not abrogated ˙ life of the Prophet but were lost during the process of compiling during the the mushaf. ˙ The ˙chapter of Ahzāb is the subject of yet a different hadīth. It is reported ˙ that some time after˙ the death of the Prophet, Abū Bakr appointed Zaid b. Thābit to compile the mushaf. The latter said that he looked for a verse ˙ ˙ he used to hear the Prophet recite but he from the chapter of Ahzāb that ˙ found it preserved only with Khuzaima b. Thābit al-Ansārī. The verse in ˙ Hadīth collecquestion is number 23. This narrative is found in various tions including Ahmad, 58 Bukhārī, 59 and Tirmidhī.60 This ˙hadīth is not ˙ merits, but directly related to ˙our current subject, so I will not discuss its I am citing it as it is about the same Qur’anic chapter that the hadīths we ˙ number are examining discuss. I would only like to point out that the large of early Muslims who memorized the Qur’an makes the claim that a verse should have been preserved by only one Companion preposterous.

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Seventh, Abū ʿUbaid has a hadīth stating that the mushaf of ʿĀ’isha ˙ His angels pray on the Prophet. ˙˙ had the following verse: “Allah and O you who believe, pray on him and salute him with a salutation and on those who pray in the fi rst rows!”61 The fi rst part is verse 33.56 but the passage “and on those who pray in the fi rst rows (wa-ʿalā al-ladhīna yusallūna fī al-sufūf al-’ūlā)” ˙ to quote ʿ˙Ā’isha as saydoes not exist in the mushaf. The hadīth goes on ˙ ˙ ˙ ing that this was the case “before ʿUthmān changed the mushafs.” This hadīth has the Prophet’s wife accuse his third successor, who ˙is˙ tradition˙ credited with compiling the mushaf, of tampering with it! This is not ally ˙ ˙ of a verse, but fraud. This narrative a case of a withdrawal or abrogation is not found in any of the major Hadīth compilations, although some later ˙ scholars have quoted it.62 The addition about ʿUthmān looks distinctly to have been added to attack him. Interestingly, it is missing from the variant of the same hadīth in the collection of Ibn Abī Dāwūd (316/928).63 ˙ Eighth, various Hadīth collections have attributed the following state˙ ment to ʿĀ’isha: In what was sent down of the Qur’an there used to be ten attested sucklings setting the ban, then they were abrogated by five attested ones. ʿĀ’isha claims that there used to be a verse that identified the number of breast-feedings that would ban the marriage of those who were suckled by the same mother as being ten. This was later abrogated, ʿĀ’isha continues, by another verse that reduced the number to five. As the ten-suckling verse does not exist in the mushaf and its ruling has been superseded, the hadīth ˙ ˙ indicates that this verse˙ has been the subject of legal-textual abrogation. The abrogating five-suckling verse itself is said to have been the subject of textual abrogation, as it is still operative but is not in the mushaf. Later, I ˙ 64 will discuss this hadīth in detail and show that it could not be˙ authentic. ˙ Ninth, Ibn Abī Shaiba mentions two short chapters which were in the mushaf of Ubayy.65 Some narratives claim that ʿUmar or ʿAlī used to recite ˙ ˙ in the morning prayer. Suyūtī quotes another scholar who claims them ˙ that these two chapters, which are named as khalʿ and hafd after two vari˙ ants of these words in their respective texts, had been withdrawn, so they were not included in the mushaf, but were not withdrawn from people’s ˙ memory.66 However, other h˙adīths present these texts as prayers rather ˙ than Qur’anic chapters.67

There are other forms of the hadīths that I quoted in this chapter and there ˙ are other allegations of Qur’anic verses that are not found in the mushaf. ˙˙ ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s version of ʿUmar’s hadīth about the stoning verse does ˙ not have the alleged verse “do not disown your fathers . . .” which I discussed earlier. But this variant attributes to ʿUmar the claim that the stoning verse “went with a lot of Qur’an that went with Muhammad.”68 Abū

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ʿUbaid attributes to Ibn ʿUmar the following words that summarize all

such reports: No one of you should say: “I have the whole Qur’an,” when he does not know what the whole of it is. So much of the Qur’an has disappeared (dhahaba). Let him rather say: “I have of the Qur’an what is visible (z ahara).”69 ˙ The hadīths we reviewed in this section talk about missing verses that add up ˙to many hundreds. Jabrī has estimated that the total number of verses that have been abrogated and therefore do not exist in the mushaf reaches 571 or just over 9% of the mushaf.70 As “missing” from the mus˙ h˙ af ˙ ˙ not to be seen as having carelessly ˙˙ must mean “abrogated” for such verses been lost, the real figure of Qur’anic verses that do not exist in the mushaf is ˙ ˙ is as even higher. They include 129 verses from an unidentified chapter that long as Barā’a, 387 from Barā’a, and 213 from Ahzāb. These alone add up to 729 verses, but there are other alleged missing ˙chapters and verses to be added. The suggestion that 10.5% or even significantly more of the Qur’an could have been lost is absurd in the extreme. In his commentary on 2.106, Tabarī quotes the hadīths of the Bi’r Maʿūna and son of Adam passages ˙ ˙ before stating that “there are so many such reports [of Qur’anic verses being withdrawn] the listing of which would make the book too long.”71 So what are we to make of such allegations about Qur’anic material that disappeared, that was withdrawn, abrogated, or lost, or whatever term is used to describe its absence from the mushaf? ˙˙ 10.4

LEGAL-TEXTUAL ABROGATION: A NON-SOLUTION FOR AN UNHISTORICAL PROBLEM

As is the case with the available hadīths on many other topics, the ones ˙ that we have reviewed in this chapter represent a collection of confused and contradictory narratives. Not only are completely contradictory views expressed by different individuals, but we fi nd contradictory statements attributed to the same person. What draws particular attention is the casual way in which Qur’anic verses that are not in the mushaf are reported ˙˙ and discussed. This lax attitude shows that scholars considered the mushaf ˙ only—i.e. the Qur’an the document, not the Qur’an the source—to be˙ the subject of the preservation of God. Muslim scholars always express complete veneration for the Qur’an when they really mean the mushaf. They ˙ is not would not mind quoting various claims about Qur’anic material˙that in the mushaf even when this material lacks credible supportive evidence. ˙ These h˙ adīths mention the absence of certain verses from the mushaf in a ˙ ˙ ˙at best cold way without elaborating on the implication. Yet this, which can be described as indifference, is impossible to reconcile with the centrality

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of the belief in the divine preservation of the Qur’an which, all agree, is promoted in the mushaf itself. If any Muslim heard a hadīth suggesting, ˙ for instance, that the˙ ˙chapter of Ahzāb had originally over two hundred ˙ more verses than it has in the version preserved in the mushaf, then surely ˙ ˙ How did this one would expect this Muslim to at least bother to ask: Why? happen? Yet the Hadīth narratives completely ignore this as if these claims ˙ would not have raised any questions! Such hadīths have been authored to make the claims they propagate, so naturally˙ they are not interested in fi xing other details that reveal weaknesses in them. Any attempt to look more closely at these claims would have exposed their falsehood. Those hadīths ignore the issues they would have ˙ raised, which would have been bound to develop into questions, and which the hadīths—meaning their authors—could not give credible answers to. ˙ these questions could not be ignored forever. Someone had to face But up to their implicit presence. Answering them was left to those scholars who formulated the legal-textual mode of abrogation. The development of this mode of abrogation was probably facilitated by the already existence of the concept of legal abrogation. This ingenious solution allowed scholars to accommodate the claim that the mushaf does not contain all Qur’anic ˙ ˙ the authenticity of the hadīths verses, thus excusing them from questioning that promoted this suggestion and which gradually grew to become˙ indisputable, and the mushaf’s claim that God promised to preserve and protect ˙˙ it. Legal-textual abrogation was ultimately the answer that scholars came up with to those legitimate questions that the Hadīth narratives suppressed. ˙ instance of the wording of Significantly, the literature does not report any a verse being withdrawn after its ruling was abrogated.72 This is how legaltextual abrogation would have worked, had it been a real phenomenon. These hadīths do not tell us anything about the history of the Qur’an, differences˙ between the Qur’an and mushaf, or the supposed withdrawal or ˙ development of those hadīths by abrogation of verses. They rather show ˙the many people with a variety of motives over a long period of time. ˙They ultimately expose the unreliable state of the Hadīth literature. Unsurprisingly, ˙ went wrong with the process these narratives do not claim that something of compiling the Qur’an in the mushaf, as this would have denied God’s promise to preserve the Qur’an and˙ ˙protect it from being tampered with. The authors of these hadīths were clever enough not to make this mistake. ˙ mainly on the concept of abrogation to reconcile Scholars have relied that confusing heap of hadīths with beliefs such as the preservation of the Qur’an by God. But ˙ the large number of such hadīths and the various claims they make, including the very different ˙verses they mention, mean any such attempt was always doomed to fail. The desperation of such attempts is clear as the concept of abrogation is stretched in all directions to fit all Hadīth narratives. Abrogation is conveniently manipulated to the point that˙ the concept loses any comprehensible meaning, becoming anything and nothing at the same time.

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Some scholars have even found themselves forced to split legal-textual abrogation into two different types to differentiate between different cases. One group includes the abrogated verses whose wording is still remembered, and the other is for the unspecified verses. The latter could then be claimed to have been made to be “forgotten” by the Muslims. This, for instance, is the approach taken by Muhāsibī 73 and Tahāwī.74 ˙ ˙ defi ˙ nition of abrogaNot even the broadest and most accommodating tion can be of any help with, for instance, those narratives that claim that Qur’anic material was dropped from the mushaf after the Prophet. Abrogation is accepted as a phenomenon that was˙ ˙driven by God through the Prophet, so it cannot be called upon to explain any event that took place after the Prophet. Similarly, it makes no sense to invoke abrogation to explain the absence from the mushaf of non-legalistic verses. Yet this has been practiced ˙ by Muslim scholars ˙regularly over the centuries. Bizarrely, some scholars have tried to get around this difficulty by declaring that such passages have no abrogators.75 The simple fact is these passages could not have abrogators because they are not legal in nature. Even stories like the accusation of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān of intentionally dropping Qur’anic passages from the mushaf he complied are quoted as scholars discuss abrogation! ˙ I˙ noted earlier that most claims of alleged verses discussed in this chapter have nothing to do with the principle of legal-textual abrogation. But Muslim scholars have systematically addressed them in the context of discussing abrogation. This kind of abrogation has no purpose whatsoever other than explain those hadīths, i.e. neutralize them and ensure that they do ˙ the integrity of the Qur’an and the mushaf. Formunot pose any threat to ˙ ˙ that are lating legal-textual abrogation made it easy to present the verses not in the mushaf as having been “withdrawn by God” rather than being ˙˙ casualties of purposeful human manipulation or unintentional error when compiling the mushaf. ˙ ˙ is that no concept or phenomenon can be called upon The simple reality to explain all those nonsensical hadīths. Scholars have to accept either that ˙ the mushaf is not a reliable record of the Qur’an or that the Hadīth is ˙ ˙ not a reliable record of history. It is the keenness to preserve the ˙integrity of the Hadīth that has forced Muslim scholars to try to combine these ˙ irreconcilable objectives. But what scholars seem to have failed to notice is that this can be done only at the cost of the integrity of the Qur’an and mushaf. The only credible solution is to accept that the hadīths in question ˙ ˙ are ˙inauthentic. Unsurprisingly, there is a hadīth stating that, when compiling the Qur’an, ˙ ʿUthmān refused to drop any abrogated verse, insisting that all should be in the mushaf. Ibn Zubair tried to convince ʿUthmān that he should not ˙ ˙ 2.240 in the mushaf because it had been abrogated by 2.234: include verse ˙˙ I said to ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān: “‘Those of you who die and leave wives’ was abrogated by the other verse, so why do you write it or leave it [in the

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mushaf]?” He said: “O my nephew! I would not move anything of it ˙ ˙ its place.”76 from Interestingly, Ibn Zubair’s suggestion and ʿUthmān’s reply do not make any distinction between legal abrogation and the other two modes in which the text is abrogated. They show no knowledge of the legal-textual and textual forms of abrogation. One critic has suggested that the concept of abrogation has serious implications for how the mushaf is perceived: ˙˙ Naskh involves a frank admission of contradiction in—and possibly even omissions from—revealed texts. The acceptance of the full theory of naskh implies that a good deal may have been revealed to Muhammad that never showed up in the Qur’an (sic), and that even what is in the Qur’an was subject to change. The doctrine thus seems to challenge the integrity, completeness, and immutability of divine revelation.77 It is true that the acceptance of abrogation implies the admission of contradictions in the Qur’an and the incompleteness of the mushaf. But abrogation was not the source of these two claims. Rather, the˙ ˙emergence of abrogation was the result of the existence of these beliefs and the fact that certain Qur’anic laws were contradicted by established legal practices and views in the Muslim communities. The theories of abrogation were devised, although unsuccessfully, to deal with and neutralize the serious implications of these three issues for the integrity and preservation of the Qur’an and the soundness of Muslim belief and practice. It was the Hadīth litera˙ ture that played a critical role in establishing all three issues. Legal-textual abrogation had no chance of rejecting the suggestion that some Qur’anic passages were lost due to human error. This would have required rejecting the hadīths that promoted this idea. Once abrogation established itself as ˙ an authentic principle, it started to become the source of yet more narratives and claims of abrogation. But why do we have many Hadīth narratives making claims about Qur’anic material that is missing˙ from the mushaf? These hadīths devel˙˙ ˙ oped from a core of narratives that were fabricated by individuals who wanted to discredit the holy Book of the Muslims. The Qur’an claimed for itself a unique status among the surviving divine Books by stating that the other scriptures had been corrupted by people. Some decided to respond with the counterclaim that the Qur’an itself did not fully survive and that the mushaf does not contain all of its verses. The ˙fi˙rst century and a half after the Prophet was a non-literary period for Muslims. The absence of authoritative literature about what the Prophet really said and did meant that fabrications could go unnoticed and unchecked. In such an environment, the process of spreading such material would have only made things worse. Inaccurate and embellished reporting

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by various transmitters, some of whom had their own agendas in pretending to be authorities on the Prophetic tradition, must have contributed to the proliferation of hadīths. Those individuals who tried to undermine the ˙ needed to fabricate only a small number of hadīths. relatively new religion ˙ these Unsuspecting, careless, and unscrupulous Muslims who accepted narratives and propagated them ensured that this small core of hadīths ˙ continued to grow over time. The problems with the Hadīth literature aside, any suggestion that any ˙ been lost because of human error is unrealQur’anic material could have istic and incredible. No one during the lifetime of the Prophet or after him could have erased, unwittingly or deliberately, any Qur’anic material and ensured that it did not make it into the mushaf. The Qur’an always was, ˙ Muslim worship. Qur’anic as it continues to be today, the material used˙ in verses had to be recited in every one of the obligatory five daily prayers and in any supererogatory ones. The person had to recite the verses perfectly accurately, not simply use approximate wordings. The Hadīth, on the other hand, was never used in the prayer. The Prophet also ˙used to be quoted by early Muslims, but the fact that they did not need to quote his exact words meant that his sayings were open to unwitting change and distortion over time. Also, from the early days, Muslims took to the habit of memorizing the Qur’an. Then if we take into account the fact that gradually more people were converting to Islam in various parts of Arabia and beyond, it becomes clear that no one central person or authority could have changed the mushaf. The fact that there has always been only one mushaf that is ˙ ˙ by all Muslims must mean that the Qur’an was preserved ˙˙ accepted from its early days. That both Sunni and Shia Muslims accept the same mushaf is partic˙ ularly instructive. The two denominations believe in two ˙very different versions of the history of Islam after the Prophet. Shias accuse the fi rst three caliphs after the Prophet of illegally seizing power, which, according to them, should have gone to ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib. They argue that the ˙ his death. According to Prophet had named ʿAlī as his successor before Muslim historians, those three caliphs—Abū Bakr, ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb, and ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān—managed the compilation of the Qur’an in˙ ˙the mushaf. If these rulers had made any change to the mushaf, ʿAlī’s follower ˙ ˙ have ended up having their own mushaf, yet both ˙ ˙ Sunnis and Shias would ˙ ˙ have one and the same mushaf. Furthermore, ʿAlī would have revoked any ˙ ˙ mushaf when he was installed as the fourth illegal changes made to the ˙ caliph, but nothing of this sort is˙ reported to have happened. The strength of the fact that Sunnis and Shias have the same mushaf becomes clearer when we remember that the two major branches˙ ˙ of Islam have substantial differences about which Hadīth collections are ˙ difference about the authentic and which are forged. Yet there is no such mushaf. As far as the mushaf is concerned, the differences between the ˙˙ ˙˙

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two denominations have completely focused on the interpretation of the Qur’anic text. For instance, Shia scholars see in many verses references to ʿAlī and the Prophet’s family, whereas Sunni scholars do not accept this view. Despite the substantial differences between the Sunnis and Shias, which include very different readings of history and interpretations of the Qur’an, both branches of Islam have the same mushaf. This is a unique ˙ phenomenon and a fact that cannot be ignored when˙ discussing the history of the Qur’an and mushaf.78 ˙ ˙ of making up the stories about some of the verses Jabrī has accused Shias that are said to have been the subject of legal-textual or textual abrogation.79 This suggestion lacks credibility as it flies in the face of the facts above. If it was Muslims who developed such stories they would also have developed their versions of the mushaf. The fact that this did not happen ˙ confi rms my view that such hadīths˙ originate with non-Muslims who tried ˙ to undermine Islam. The growth and spread of these narratives, however, may be attributed to Muslims only, but accusing Shia or Sunni scholars in particular is unfounded. Having quoted hadīths that make various accusations about missing Qur’anic material, it˙ is only appropriate to end this chapter with a hadīth that ˙ ʿ said: contravenes such stories. Bukhārī reports that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Rufai Shaddād b. Maʿqal and I visited Ibn ʿAbbās. Shaddād b. Maʿqal asked him: “Has the prophet left anything?” He replied: “He has not left other than what is between the two covers [of the mushaf].” We also visited Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya and asked him ˙ ˙the same. He ˙ than what is between the two covers [of replied: “He˙ has not left other the mushaf].”80 ˙˙ Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya is one of the sons of ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib and is ˙ regarded, in ˙particular by Shias. ˙ highly This hadīth does not deal with the question of whether any Qur’anic material ˙was withdrawn in the lifetime of the Prophet, but it explicitly rejects that any Qur’anic material was lost after the Prophet. It also implies that no Hadīth material was available at that time. The reference to a physical book ˙ may also imply that the mushaf was compiled in the Prophet’s lifetime. ˙˙

11 Textual Abrogation I The “Stoning Verse”

Like legal-textual abrogation, the mode of abrogation we will study in this and the following chapter involves passages that are allegedly part of the Qur’an but not the mushaf. The difference between the two is that textual ˙ abrogation deals with ˙passages that are still operative, i.e. their legal rulings are still in effect. There are only two main passages whose texts but not rulings are said to have been abrogated. One passage is about the stoning penalty for adultery and the second states that five is the minimum number of breast-feedings that render the male infant prohibited from marrying the woman who nursed him and any girl nursed by her. Some scholars accept a third case of textual abrogation. The difference between this and the other two passages is that it does not involve the abrogation of a whole passage but only one word in a verse the rest of which exists in the mushaf. The verse is 5.89 and ˙ ˙ that discusses the fast the word in question is said to belong to the passage that should be performed in expiation for breaking an oath one had taken. Significantly, only the stoning verse is said to abrogate a Qur’anic ruling. The other two cases explain rather than abrogate the respective laws. This excludes these two from the standard defi nition of abrogation whose focus is the replacement of a divine ruling by another. The inclusion of textual abrogation under the aegis of abrogation is one testimony to the extent to which confusion reigns in the study of abrogation. What we will study in this chapter is a phenomenon that is completely different from the other two modes of abrogation, although it has also been called “abrogation.” Shāfiʿī shows no knowledge of the alleged stoning verse or the extra word in the verse on oath breaking. But he mentions the hadīth that states ˙ that a Qur’anic ten-suckling ruling was abrogated by a five-suckling verse, which itself is not in the mushaf, and he accepts the operativeness of the ˙ abrogating verse.1 So Shāfiʿī ˙implicitly acknowledges one instance of textual abrogation. Abū ʿUbaid, who was contemporary with Shāfiʿī, does not mention textual abrogation in his book on abrogation. 2 In his book Fadā’il al-Qur’an ˙ he dedicated a section to compiling a number of hadīths about Qur’anic ˙ passages that were not recorded in the mushaf, and which scholars treat as ˙˙

Textual Abrogation I 157 cases of legal-textual abrogation. But he also mentions the stoning verse. 3 All scholars who accept the authenticity of this passage consider it a case of textual abrogation. Abū ʿUbaid seems to have considered the Sunna to be the source of the stoning penalty, which is why he did not mention textual abrogation in his book on abrogation. This leaves his mention of this passage unexplained. Unlike his teacher Abū ʿUbaid, Muhāsibī mentions textual abrogation. ˙ of the “stoning verse,” without Tabarī mentions only once the beginning ˙calling it so, in his commentary on verse 5.42.4 Interestingly, he presents it as a verse in the Torah, not the Qur’an. He does not mention textual abrogation. But textual abrogation was mentioned by Ibn Qutaiba, who lived half a century before Tabarī.5 Textual abrogation˙is probably the last of the three modes of abrogation to be formed. This is why there are only three instances of it. It appears that the acceptance of the concept of legal-textual abrogation was exploited by those who made the claims of textual abrogation. The hadīth about the ˙ a number of existence of an abrogated verse on stoning, which developed versions later, seems very much to have followed the invention of several earlier Hadīth narratives that attributed the introduction of the stoning to ˙ the Prophet. It was intended to trace this penalty to the Qur’an, not only the Prophet. Because of the length of the discussion of the passage on the punishment of adultery I will discuss the cases of the number of sucklings and the verse on the breaking of oaths in the following chapter. I will show that all three claims are no more reliable than the reports about passages that are claimed to have had both their texts and rulings abrogated. I will conclude that the two passages and the missing word from verse 5.89 were never part of the Qur’an. I will fi rst study the reports in which the stoning verse (āyat al-rajm) is mentioned. I will then review the hadīths that suggest that the Prophet ˙ sentenced adulterers to death by stoning. Next I will study the conditions for applying the penalty of stoning in the Hadīth. Following that I will ˙ hadīths. I will then study discuss in detail the various problems in those ˙ further problems in the the Qur’anic rulings on sexual offenses and expose stoning hadīths in the light of what the Qur’an says. Finally, having rejected ˙ Prophet to the penalty of stoning, I consider how this practice linking the might have emerged and established itself in Islamic law.

11.1

THE STONING PASSAGE

I should fi rst say that all hadīths on adultery call the male adulterer zānī ˙ are the Qur’anic terms for those who commit and the female zāniya. These adultery. The verb used in the Hadīth is yaznī, which is also the one used ˙ by the Qur’an.

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In the previous chapter6 I quoted a hadīth in the Musnad of Ahmad that ˙ introduced the penalty of ˙ stoning refers to an alleged Qur’anic passage that for adultery. In another form of the hadīth, Ahmad reports the following narrative on the authority of Zirr b. H˙ ubaish: ˙ ˙ Ubayy b. Kaʿb asked me: “How do you read the chapter of Ahzāb” or “how do you count it?” I said: “Thirty-seven verses.” He ˙ said: “Enough! I have seen it when it was as long as the chapter of Baqara. We read in it this: ‘If the shaikh and the shaikha7 commit adultery then stone them, absolutely, as a punishment from Allah, and Allah is mighty, wise (al-shaikhu wal-shaikha idhā zanayā fa-irjimūhumā albatta nakālan mina Allahi wa-Allāhu ʿalīmun hakīm.’”8 ˙ This hadīth is also found in Nasā’ī.9 The wording of the alleged Qur’anic ˙ appears with some variations in different hadīths. One variant passage ˙ 13 does not have “as reported in Mālik,10 Ahmad,11 Ibn Māja,12 and Nasā’ī ˙ a punishment from Allah, and Allah is mighty, wise.” Another, found in Nasā’ī, replaces it with “for the pleasure they enjoyed.”14 Another hadīth ˙ in Ahmad that I quoted earlier15 states that the chapter of Ahzāb contained ˙ ˙ the “stoning verse” but it does not quote it. There is another interesting hadīth that is designed to emphasize that the ˙ even though it is not in the mushaf. This stoning verse is part of the Qur’an ˙˙ hadīth is found in Muslim16 and Abū Dāwūd,17 among others. According to ˙Bukhārī’s version of the hadīth, Ibn ʿAbbās said that ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb ˙ ˙˙ said the following while sitting on the pulpit: Allah sent Muhammad in truth and He sent down on him the Book. Among what Allah sent down is the stoning verse. We read it, understood it, and memorized it. The Messenger of Allah stoned and we stoned after him. I fear that after some time someone might say “we do not fi nd the verse of stoning in the Book of Allah,” so they go astray by abandoning a commandment that Allah revealed. In the Book of Allah, stoning is the true judgment on any muhsan man or woman who com˙˙ mits adultery when there is evidence, pregnancy, or self-confession.18 The Qur’anic term muhsan is critical to understanding the issue of ston˙ more detail later. For now, it may be taken to ing, so I will deal with it ˙in mean “married” in the Hadīth literature. ˙ ʿUmar’s concern that people might not apply the penalty of stoning indicates two significant facts. First, people were unaware that stoning was applied by the Prophet or did not believe such stories, which means that they were either unaware of the relevant reports or did not accept them as authentic. Second, people were not aware of the concept of textual abrogation or did not believe it!

Textual Abrogation I 159 Jabrī has suggested that lapidation was a sunna by the Prophet and ʿUmar might have used the word “verse” figuratively to reflect the significance of the Prophet’s words.19 I fi nd this attempt to reject the stoning verse while accepting the authenticity of this hadīth completely unconvincing. ˙ to confuse the Qur’an with any Muslims were always extremely careful not text, including the Hadīth. The suggestion that ʿUmar deliberately referred ˙ goes against everything we know about how Muslims to a hadīth as a verse ˙ treated the Qur’an. Significantly, Bukhārī has also this briefer variant of ʿUmar’s words in this hadīth: ˙ I fear that after some time someone might say “we do not fi nd stoning in the Book of Allah,” so they go astray by abandoning a commandment that Allah revealed. Stoning is the true judgment on any muhsan who commits adultery when there is evidence, pregnancy, or ˙˙ 20 self-confession. It is interesting how this version leaves out all statements that link stoning to the Qur’an! Either the reference to the passage in the other version was removed in this variant or it was added later to that version. The fi rst possibility points to doubts about whether stoning is derived from the Qur’an, whereas the second means that the reference to the stoning verse was invented later. Mālik’s version of this hadīth attributes to ʿUmar the following amaz˙ ing words: By the One in whose hands my soul is, was it not for fearing that people would say “ʿUmar has added to the Book of Allah,” I would have written it: “As for the shaikh and the shaikha, stone them, absolutely,” for we read it.21 This addition shows that ʿUmar was so keen on the stoning penalty’s continued application that he considered adding it to the mushaf although he ˙ ˙ it,” which is knew that it should not be there! The ending “for we read found in the Baihaqī’s variant also, 22 makes it clear that the stoning passage was a Qur’anic verse. This hadīth caused untold problems for scholars who acknowledged ˙ the implications of what ʿUmar is supposed to have considered. It forced them to come up with various arguments to dismiss the unambiguous statement of the text that ʿUmar was tempted to add the stoning passage to the mushaf even though it did not belong there. 23 ˙˙ Tirmidhī has yet another version of ʿUmar’s temptation to add to the mushaf. This variant does not have anything suggesting that the passage in ˙˙ question belonged to the Qur’an, implying that it was a sunna of the Prophet:

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law The Messenger of Allah has stoned, Abū Bark has stoned, and I have stoned. Had it not been for my reluctance to add to the Book of Allah, I would have written it (the stoning ruling) in the mushaf, for I fear that ˙ ˙ of Allah so they some groups of people would not fi nd it in the Book would not believe in it. 24

But how is the absence of this passage, which some hadīths confi rm was ˙ a verse, from the mushaf then explained? Unsurprisingly, another hadīth ˙ ˙ ˙ exists to provide the answer. Ahmad reports on the authority of Kuthair ˙ b. al-Salt the following event that took place during the compilation of the ˙ after the Prophet: mushaf ˙˙ Ibn al-ʿĀs and Zaid b. Thābit were writing down the mushafs when they came˙ across the following verse so Zaid said: “I have˙ ˙heard the Messenger of Allah say ‘If the shaikh and the shaikha commit adultery then stone them, absolutely.’” ʿUmar said: “When this verse was revealed I went to the Messenger of Allah and said to him: ‘Let me write it.’” Shuʿba said: “As if he (the Prophet) was reluctant to do that.” ʿUmar said: “Do you not see that if the shaikh was not muhsan he should be flogged whereas if the young man commits adultery˙ ˙having been made muhsan he should be stoned?”25 ˙˙ One problem with this hadīth stems from the fact accepted by the over˙ whelming majority of scholars that the Qur’an was being recorded as it was being revealed. Why would, then, ʿUmar ask the Prophet for permission to write that particular verse? This unhistorical request has been introduced to confi rm that there was such a verse and explain that it was the Prophet’s reluctance to have it written down that rendered it absent from the mushaf. ˙ Furthermore, given that Muslim scholars think that the mushaf ˙ was ˙ ˙ compiled after the Prophet, his refusal to have the verse written down is rather meaningless. At the time, traditional history tells us, there was no mushaf, so whether a verse was written down or not had no practical impli˙ ˙ This hadīth is making an anachronistic mistake, projecting onto cation. ˙ the past an event that would have made sense only later. This hadīth must have been authored after the distinction between mushaf and ˙Qur’an had ˙˙ developed, but the event involving the Prophet it describes is supposed to have taken place at a time when the concept of mushaf did not yet exist!26 ˙ ˙ to fit any theory of The explanation provided by this hadīth also fails ˙ abrogation. But the bigger problem is its contravention of the consensus that the inclusion of Qur’anic revelations in the mushaf and the exclusion ˙ ˙ that it was merely of others were determined by God. The hadīth suggests ˙ the Prophet’s reluctance to have a verse written down in the mushaf that ˙ ˙ verse ensured its exclusion. The Prophet’s alleged reluctance to get the recorded is left unexplained, but it might have been meant to be linked

Textual Abrogation I 161 to his reluctance to apply the stoning penalty, which is reported in other hadīths, as we shall see later. This hadīth shows the intrinsic flaw in the ˙ ˙ revelations that are not included in claim that there are operative Qur’anic the mushaf. In the attempt to explain this problem, the hadīth introduces ˙ equally˙ ˙serious problems, without really solving the original one. This hadīth is a fabrication. ˙ A version of the hadīth of Umar’s sermon on the pulpit of the Prophet ʿ in the Musannaf of˙ ʿAbd al-Razzāq explains the absence of the stoning verse from˙ the mushaf completely differently but even more crudely and ˙˙ awkwardly: O people! Do not be deceived about the stoning verse for it was sent down in the Book of Allah and we read it. But it went (dhahabat) with a lot (kathīr) of Qur’an that went (dhahaba) with Muhammad. The proof on this is that he stoned, Abū Bakr stoned, and I stoned after them. There will come people from this nation who will deny stoning. 27 This hadīth suggests that the stoning verse was one of many Qur’anic ˙ went missing and did not survive in the mushaf after the death verses that ˙˙ of the Prophet. This, of course, contradicts the other variants of the hadīths ˙ not that quote the exact wording of the stoning verse. The hadīth does ˙ talk about the absence of these verses as being the result of abrogation. The unintended implication is that these verses disappeared because of the negligence of Muslims, including the Prophet, in preserving the revelation. It depicts the compilation of the Qur’an in the mushaf as an uncontrolled ˙ ˙ that the Qur’an was and poorly managed process. This contravenes the fact extremely revered by the believers from the very beginning, it was memorized by many, every verse was recorded, and the stoning verse is rather short and easy to remember anyway. Furthermore, it insists that lapidation continued to be applied after the Prophet yet claims that the source of this ruling had gone missing. This hadīth displays the kind of absurdity that, ˙ of the Hadīth literature. unfortunately, blights a large part ˙ The examination of the hadīths that mention the stoning verse shows ˙ that they lack credibility.

11.2

STONING BY THE PROPHET

We have seen hadīths that stress that stoning is derived from a Qur’anic ˙ that present it as a sunna. There are others that emphasize verse and others that the Prophet ordered the stoning of adulterers. I have already quoted one such hadīth in which ʿUmar claims that the Prophet stoned. Bukhārī reports on˙ the authority of ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar that the Prophet ordered the stoning of Jewish adulterers:

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Some Jews brought to the Prophet a man and woman of theirs who had committed adultery. The Prophet asked them: “What do you do to those of you who commit adultery?” They replied: “We bathe them and then we flog them.” He said: “Do you not fi nd stoning in the Torah?” They said: “No, we do not fi nd in it anything of that sort.” But ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām said: “You have lied! ‘ Bring the Torah and recite it, if you are truthful (3.93).’” But the rabbi among them who teaches it put his palm on the stoning verse and started to read what is before and after it, without reading the stoning verse. He (Ibn Salām) removed his hand from the stoning verse and said: “What is this?” When they (the Jews) saw that they said: “It is the stoning verse.” So he (the Prophet) gave his order so they (the adulterers) were stoned next to the coffins place in the mosque. I saw the male adulterer incline toward his mistress to protect her from the stones with his body.28

Bukhārī 29 has another three versions of this incident, which is also reported with varying details in other sources, including Mālik,30 Ahmad, 31 Muslim, 32 Abū Dāwūd,33 Nasā’ī, 34 Ibn Māja, 35 and Dārimī.36 One˙ difference between these variants is the alleged alternative punishments that the Jews said applied to the adulterers, which include flogging them, blackening their faces, getting them to carry weights, and disgracing them publicly. One of Tabarī’s reports, which is found in his commentary on 5.41, adds ˙ to confi rm the divine origin of stoning as the punishment for another twist adultery. In this account, the Jews asked the Prophet about the punishment of the adulterers as a test of his claim to prophethood. They thought that if he ruled that the adulterers should be flogged, had their faces blackened, or get carried around on two donkeys for public disgrace, then he was a king rather than a prophet. But if he ruled that they should be stoned, which is what happened, then he must be a prophet.37 Muslim reports on the authority of the Companion al-Barā’ b. ʿĀzib a different incident that also stresses that stoning was the penalty for adultery in Judaism as specified in the Torah: The Prophet once came across a Jewish man who had been bathed and flogged. The Prophet called on them (the Jews) and said: “Is this the penalty for the adulterer in your Book?” They replied: “Yes.” He then called one of their scholars and asked him: “I appeal to you by Allah who sent down the Torah to Moses, is this the penalty for the adulterer in your Book?” He replied: “No. Had you not appealed to me in this way I would not have told you. The penalty is stoning. But adultery had spread among our aristocrats so we became used to not applying it to the aristocrats but only to the helpless. Then we said let’s agree on a penalty that we apply to both the aristocrats and the common people, so we decided on bathing and flogging instead of stoning.” The

Textual Abrogation I 163 Messenger of Allah said: “O Allah! I am the fi rst to revive Your commandment after they have rendered it dead.” So he gave his order and the adulterer was stoned. Then Allah revealed “O Messenger! Let not them grieve you, those who hasten to disbelief” to “if you are given this, take it, but if you are not given it, then beware” (5.41). He (Allah) means [the Jews said]: “Go to Muhammad, so if he orders you to apply bathing and flogging, then follow the order, but if he rules with stoning, then beware.” Then Allah sent down: “Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, those are the disbelievers” (5.44); “whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, those are the wrongdoers” (5.45); and “whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, those are the renegades” (5.47). These apply to all disbelievers. 38 Both stories are intended to show that the stoning of adulterers was a divine ruling in the Torah, the Jews had abandoned God’s ruling for their own convenience and tried to conceal it, Muhammad enforced God’s ruling, and the Jews knew that he was a Prophet. In its focus on stressing these claims, the fi rst narrative ridiculously claims that the teacher of the Torah tried to cover the stoning verse with his palm. The second makes the equally absurd suggestion that adultery had become widespread among the upper class of the Jews. This hadīth is also used to explain the causes of ˙ the revelation of a number of verses in chapter 5. Islamic sources, including Tabarī, contain other narratives about the punishment for adultery in Juda˙ and how the Jews would not apply God’s command. ism The narratives quoted by Tabarī 39 about the Jews’ concealment of the ˙ penalty of stoning are discussed in the context of explaining verses that accuse the Jews of concealing and changing parts of the Torah: O People of the Book! Our Messenger has come to expound to you much of that which you have been hiding of the Book and to forgive much. Here has come to you a light from Allah and manifest Book. (5.15) O Messenger! Let not them grieve you, those who vie with one another in the race to disbelief, among those who say with their mouths “we believe” but their hearts did not believe, and of the Jews who listen to falsehood, listen to other folks who have not come to you who alter words from their contexts. (5.41)

Similarly, stoning is said to be the referent of the judgment that this verse talks about: So if they (the Jews) come to you [O Muhammad!], then judge between them or turn away from them. If you turn away from them, then they shall not harm you at all, and if you judge, then judge between them equitably. Allah loves the equitable. (5.42)

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The penalty of stoning is linked to another verse that talks about the Torah and ends by declaring that “those who do not judge by what Allah has sent down are the disbelievers” (5.44). Such interpretational attempts are typical outcomes of a widespread reductionism in Qur’anic exegesis. Verses that have broader meanings are linked by exegetes to specific events or issues, thus narrowing their meanings. This branch of Qur’anic studies is known as asbāb al-nuzūl or “the causes/occasions of revelation.” Scholars would identify an event that triggered the revelation of the verse in question, and this event was then used to interpret that verse. There are many instances in the Qur’an of verses the revelation of which were triggered by certain events, but that is the not the same as saying that the verse should be interpreted completely in the light of that particular event. This mistaken approach is in opposition to the view, which is also shared by exegetes, that the Qur’an is a Book whose message transcends place and time. This methodology makes the domain of application of the Qur’anic revelations time and place bound, which the Qur’an rejects. The message of the verse—i.e. its interpretation—must be broader than the trigger event. This understanding is in line with that of Muhammad Ghazālī.40 Indeed, in the science of ˙ for the revelation of a particular verse is usūl al-fiqh, the specific cause ˙ never considered as a “limiting factor in its general application,” so “the cause never specifies a general ruling.”41 Let’s take an example. Chapter 80 starts with verses that reprimand the Prophet for ignoring a powerless blind man who came to see him as he was focused on converting other people, probably influential individuals whose conversion would strengthen the Muslims. While these verses were triggered by that event, they convey a general message to the Prophet and Muslims about how to give every person seeking the truth the attention and care they deserve regardless of their social status and potential contribution to the Muslim cause. The universality of this message can also be seen in the fact that Noah is said in the Qur’an to have given plenty of time and attention to the weakest of the people who followed him. He resisted the attempts of the elite, who rejected his message, to turn away those poor believers as the wealthy did not want to be treated like the poor by Noah (11.27–31). Another problem with the reductionistic approach is that the source of linking a verse to a certain event is often extra-Qur’anic and potentially unhistorical. For instance, verses such as 5.42 and 5.44 are general and there is nothing in the text that links them to any particular event. But a link is provided in the Hadīth, exegetical sources, or historical sources. ˙ Yet such accounts might well be unhistorical. This has implications for the credibility of asbāb al-nuzūl. There is another famous hadīth reported in Ahmad,42 Ibn Māja,43 Abū ˙ 46 and others that makes ˙ Dāwūd,44 Tirmidhī,45 Baihaqī, death the penalty for those who get involved in male-male sex:

Textual Abrogation I 165 When you fi nd some doing what the people of Lot did, kill both the one playing the male and the one playing the female. While this hadīth does not say that the offenders should be killed by stoning, other h˙adīths state that. ˙ to Umar’s enthusiasm for stoning, hadīths have consistently Contrary ʿ shown the Prophet trying to avoid applying the ˙stoning penalty until no option was left. This is one such narrative transmitted by Abū Huraira and reported in Bukhārī47 and Muslim:48 A man came to the Messenger of Allah when he was in the mosque and addressed him: “O Messenger of Allah, I have committed adultery!” The Prophet turned away from him. But the man faced him again and said: “O Messenger of Allah, I have committed adultery!” The Prophet turned away from him. But the man faced him again. After the man had confessed four times, the Prophet called him and said: “Are you mad?” The man replied: “No.” The Prophet asked: “Are you muhsan?” ˙ ˙ and The man replied: “Yes.” The Prophet then said: “Take him away stone him.” The act of confessing four times is intended to link the Prophet’s ultimate ruling to Qur’anic verses that deal with sexual offenses where four witnesses or oaths are required to establish or reject the offense (24.4, 24.8, 24.13, 24.6). The Prophet’s reluctance to stone is seen in a hadīth reported by Abū ˙ Dāwūd on the authority of Yazīd b. Nuʿaīm b. Hazzāl, which may or may not be a very different form of the hadīth above: ˙ Māʿiz b. Mālik was an orphan in my father’s house when he had sexual intercourse with a slave girl in our area. My father told him: “Go to the Messenger of Allah and tell him about what you have done that he may ask forgiveness for you.” His intention was for him to have a way out of this predicament. He went to him and said: “O Messenger of Allah! I have committed adultery, so apply the ruling of the Book of Allah to me.” The Prophet turned away from him. But he tried again saying: “O Messenger of Allah! I have committed adultery, so apply the ruling of the Book of Allah to me.” This continued until he said it four times. The Prophet said: “You have said it four times. Who is the woman?” He said: “so-and-so.” The Prophet asked: “Did you lay with her?” He said: “Yes.” The Prophet asked: “Did you have sexual contact with her?” He said: “Yes.” The Prophet asked: “Did you have sexual intercourse with her?” He said: “Yes.” The Prophet then ordered that the man should be stoned, so he was taken away to a rocky place. When he started to be stoned, he was terrified, so he came out of the hole [in which he was put] fighting. But ʿAbd Allāh b. Unais confronted

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Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law him, having seen his mates fail to stop him, and threw at him a camel’s hoof, killing him. He then went to the Prophet and told him what happened. The Prophet said: “You should have released him that he may repent and Allah may forgive him.”49

The Prophet is seen here trying to make sure that the sexual offense was not short of full sexual intercourse before he ordered the man to be stoned. In a much briefer version of this hadīth in Abū Dāwūd the Prophet is said ˙ to have suggested to the man: “Maybe you only kissed her?”50 Another variant has the Prophet asking the self-confessed adulterer: “Maybe you only kissed, winked, or looked?”51 But the man adamantly rejected the mitigating suggestions. When the Prophet asked him if he had intercourse with her, the man replied in the affi rmative. In one version of this hadīth ˙ for in Muslim, the Prophet gets the self-confessed adulterer to be checked possible drunkenness. 52 The famous hadīth about the adultery of Māʿiz b. Mālik has survived in a great number˙ of different variants. There is a large number of hadīths showing the Prophet giving the ˙ every chance to claim that his offense accused or self-confessed adulterer did not amount to adultery. In one hadīth, also reported in Abū Dāwūd, ˙ after hearing a man’s confession of adultery, the Prophet asked the female partner about the allegation. When she denied the accusation, he had the man flogged only for false accusation.53 According to Mālik, someone asked the Prophet: “Suppose that I caught my wife having sex with a man, should I wait [and not do anything to him] until I have found four witnesses?” The Prophet replied: “Yes.”54 This hadīth confi rms that the case for adultery can be established only if the ˙ legal number of required witnesses are available, regardless of how damning the evidence provided by a smaller number of witnesses is. The ending of Abū Dāwūd’s version of the Māʿiz b. Mālik hadīth goes even as far as suggesting that the Prophet was ready to abandon ˙the stoning of a confessed adulterer! To counter this, another hadīth was authored as ˙ of the majority that a commentary on that hadīth to confi rm the opinion ˙ stoning is God’s imposed punishment and that the Prophet would never have considered ignoring it. According to this remedial report, someone went to the Companion Jābir b. ʿAbd Allāh and enquired about how the Prophet could have said “You should have released him” about that adulterer. Jābir is then reported to have replied: I am the most knowledgeable of all people about this hadīth. I was one of those who stoned the man! We took him away to˙ stone him, but when the stones started to hit him, he called on us: “O people! Take me back to the Messenger of Allah. My people have killed me, having fooled me and told me that the Messenger of Allah would not kill me.” But we did not stop until we killed him. When we went back to the Messenger of Allah and told him, he said: “You should have released

Textual Abrogation I 167 him and brought him to me.” But that was so that the Messenger of Allah would confi rm with him [whether he committed adultery or not], not to abandon the ruling [of stoning].55 This hadīth, which was introduced to deal with the serious issue raised ˙ by the earlier hadīth, has the enquirer comment: “Now I understand the ˙ hadīth.” It ensured that the other hadīth is not taken to mean that the ˙Prophet could have ignored the penalty ˙ of stoning. But the original hadīth ˙ the in Abū Dāwūd, which is also found in Baihaqī, 56 does not say that Prophet asked for Māʿiz to be brought back to him for a new questioning. He clearly wished that Māʿiz would be set free and not stoned so that he could repent. In other words, the Prophet was not doubting Māʿiz’s guilt when he made that statement. The Prophet’s inclination to ignore stoning is reported in yet another narrative in Muslim: A woman from [the clan of] Ghāmid from the [tribe of] Azd came to the Prophet and said: “O Messenger of Allah, purify me!” He said: “Woe to you! Go back, ask God for forgiveness and repent to Him.” She said: “You seem to want to turn me back as you did to Māʿiz b. Mālik!” He said: “What is it?” She replied that she had become pregnant as a result of an adulterous relationship. He said: “You?” She replied: “Yes.” He said: “We will wait [and not apply the penalty] until you have given birth.” So a man from the Ansār took custody of ˙ the woman until she gave birth, at which point he came to the Prophet and said: “The woman from Ghāmid has given birth.” He said: “Let’s then not stone her and leave her little son with no one to suckle him.” But a man from the Ansār stood up and said: “I take the responsibility of ensuring that the ˙boy is suckled.” So the Prophet ordered her to be stoned. 57 But there is what looks like another form of this hadīth, although ˙ Prophet tried through a different chain of transmitters, denying that the to fi nd an excuse to avoid applying the stoning penalty, although he still delayed it. According to this version, which is reported by Mālik, 58 when the pregnant woman came and confessed to the Prophet, he ordered her to go away until she had given birth. When she did and came back, he ordered her to go back to suckle the child. After weaning the child she came back so he ordered her to leave her son with someone else. She did that and came back, at which point he ordered that she should be stoned. Some hadīths suggest the Prophet did not pray over stoned adulterers, 59 ˙ whereas others claim that stoning results in the forgiveness of the sin and that the Prophet prayed over the stoned person.60 Some hadīths even have the Prophet say about certain stoned adulterers that they ˙had gone to paradise, having been purified by the stoning.61

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The suggestion that the Prophet applied stoning only reluctantly and that he even tried to find excuses to avoid it is particularly interesting. This image is in sharp contrast with ʿUmar’s keenness on applying this penalty. I will revisit this potentially significant observation later in the chapter. I should also note that I have not come across any report of the Prophet himself taking part in the flogging or stoning of an adulterer. Even when a slave girl of the Prophet had an adulterous relationship, he asked ʿAlī to flog her.62 The editorial changes that each hadīth on stoning has gone through, ˙ the questions and issues that early as seen in its various variants, reflect Muslims were dealing with. These hadīths tell us nothing about what the ˙ Prophet thought or did about stoning. This point will become clearer as we continue our investigation of the subject, consider more hadīths, and ˙ examine the hadīths in the light of the Qur’an. ˙ 11.3

THE CONDITIONS FOR STONING

We have already seen a number of hadīths in which the Prophet is said to ˙ have ordered male and female adulterers to be stoned. A close look at the hadīths shows that this penalty was not applied to all adulterers. Stoning ˙ reported to have been applied only when three conditions applied to the is adulterers. First, the adulterer must be muhsan. I have already quoted a narrative stating that before deciding what to˙ ˙do to a confessed adulterer the Prophet asked him if he was muhsan. When the man replied in the affi rmative, ˙ should be stoned. This hadīth suggests that the Prophet ordered that˙ he being muhsan was a requirement for the application of ˙stoning penalty. In a ˙˙ hadīth conveying the same message, which was also quoted earlier, ʿUmar ˙b. al-Khattāb said: “In the Book of Allah, stoning is the true judgment on ˙ man or woman who commits adultery when there is evidence, any muhs˙an ˙ ˙ pregnancy, or self-confession.” Abū Dāwūd reports that the Prophet once ordered that an adulterer be flogged because he did not know that he was muhsan. When he later learned that he was, he had the man stoned.63 Bukhārī˙ ˙has another hadīth that he traces to more than one source in which the Prophet is said to˙ have ruled that the adulterer who was not muhsan should be given one hundred ˙˙ lashes and a year’s banishment.64 Some versions of the hadīth about the two Jewish adulterers describe them as muhsan, to confi rm˙that stoning applied ˙˙ to them because of that.65 There is another hadīth, reported by Mālik, about an incident after the Prophet, during the ˙rule of Abū Bakr. The latter came across a man who confessed to have impregnated a slave virgin. As the man was not muhsan, ˙˙ Abū Bakr had him flogged and banished rather than stoned.66 All of these hadīths use the term muhsan without explaining it, so the ˙ it was a standard term ˙ ˙ that people knew the meaning implication is that

Textual Abrogation I 169 of. It is unanimously understood by scholars to mean “married” in these hadīths. I will discuss this term in more detail in the next section. ˙ Second, the adulterer must be “thayyib.” In a hadīth found in Mālik67 ˙ whether a confessed and Baihaqī,68 the Prophet is said to have enquired male adulterer was “bikr” or “thayyib.” When it was confi rmed that he was thayyib, he had him stoned. As bikr means “virgin,” thayyib must mean “non-virgin.” Abū Dāwūd mentions an incident of a male virgin (bikr) confessing to the Prophet that he committed adultery with a woman so the Prophet had him given one hundred lashes rather than stoned.69 This hadīth implies that ˙ the non-virgin has a different penalty, which we know from other hadīths to have been stoning. This narrative also implies that thayyib is the˙ opposite of virgin. Mālik understood the terms “shaikh” and “shaikha” in the stoning verse as meaning “thayyib” and “thayyiba,”70 respectively.71 This again links the term thayyib to stoning. Also, shaikh and shaikha, as we will see later, mean “old man” and “old woman,” respectively, so here also the implication is that “thayyib” and “thayyiba” denote non-virgin male and female. The application of stoning to those who are thayyib only and not to virgins is made completely clear in a most famous hadīth. In one variant in ˙ words to the Prophet: Muslim, ʿUbāda b. al-Sāmit attributes the following ˙ Take from me, take from me: Allah has made a way for them (the adulteresses). The bikr (virgin) [committing adultery] with the bikr, [their penalty is] one hundred lashes and a year’s banishment; and the thayyib (non-virgin) [committing adultery] with the thayyib, [their penalty is] one hundred lashes and stoning.72 This hadīth about heterosexual adultery is usually named after ʿUbāda, but I will˙ call it the dual-penalty hadīth in reference to the different penalties for the virgin and non-virgin. ˙ Another form of this hadīth has a very similar wording but is preceded ˙ by the following: When the Prophet would receive revelation he would feel grief and his face would frown. One day revelation was sent down to him, so he looked this way, but when he later relaxed he said: “Take from me, take from me . . .”73 It is not clear whether the hadīth is intended to suggest that the said pen˙ another form of revelation that the Prophet alty was Qur’anic revelation or received from God. However, this penalty is not treated as part of the Qur’an by scholars, probably because the Prophet’s words “take from me” clearly suggest that what was going to follow is a statement by him, not a Qur’anic revelation. Also, there is no explicit mention of this statement

170 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law being Qur’anic and most variants of the hadīth are not preceded by the reference to the revelation to the Prophet. ˙ There is another variant of the dual-penalty hadīth that does not state ˙ 74 the length of banishment or the number of strokes. The distinction between the penalty of the married and unmarried persons is seen in a story reported by Bukhārī,75 Muslim,76 Dārimī,77 Abū Dāwūd,78 Baihaqī,79 Nasā’ī,80 and others. It is about two disputants who came to the Prophet asking for his judgment about a case of adultery. This is Mālik’s version: [One of the two men said]: “My son was hired by this man but he had sexual intercourse with his wife. He told me that my son is subject to the penalty of stoning. I ransomed him with one hundred she camels and a slave girl of mine. But when I asked knowledgeable people they told me that my son’s penalty should be one hundred lashes and banishment for one year and that it is this man’s wife who should be stoned.” The Prophet said: “By He in whose hands is my soul, I will judge between you according to the Book of Allah. As for your livestock and slave girl, take them back.” He ordered that the son should be flogged one hundred stripes and banished for a year. He then ordered [his Companion] Anīs al-Aslamī to visit the wife of the other man, question her, and stone her if she confessed. She confessed, so he stoned her.81 There is no explicit statement on the marital status of the man, but it is clear that he was not stoned because he was unmarried whereas the woman was stoned because she was married. The term “thayyib” is not used to describe the woman, but stoning her implies that she was thayyib. This, in turn, means that this term includes married women, not only non-virgins. I have already noted that scholars understand the term “muhsan” as ˙˙ meaning “married,” so this makes this term a subcategory of thayyib, as a non-virgin may be married, divorced, or widowed. The understanding of “muhsan” as a form of “thayyib” explains why they seem to be treated more or˙ ˙less as synonyms in the hadīths on adultery and stoning. ˙ This broader meaning of thayyib can also be seen in Nasā’ī’s form of the narrative of the pregnant woman who came to the Prophet asking him to apply the penalty for adultery to her. He asked her whether she was “thayyib” and she confi rmed that so the Prophet decided that she should be stoned after giving birth.82 The context implies that the woman had no husband, as someone volunteered to look after her until she gave birth. She must have been a divorcée or widow. My analysis of the term “thayyib” explains why I do not agree with the popular view that stoning in the Hadīth is the penalty for adultery but not ˙ fornication, i.e. for illicit sex involving married but not unmarried people. This distinction is based on the misunderstanding that “thayyib” means “married.”

Textual Abrogation I 171 Third, the adulterer must be a free person, not a slave. According to Bukhārī, the Prophet said: If a slave girl commits adultery and that is established beyond doubt, then her master should flog but not taunt her. If she commits adultery again, he should flog but not taunt her. If she commits adultery for the third time, he should sell her even if for a rope made of cattle hair.83 A different version of this hadīth—which is found in Mālik,84 Bukhārī,85 Abū Dāwūd,86 Dārimī,87 and ˙others—seems to introduce the condition that this penalty applies to the slave girl who is “not muhsan”: ˙˙ The Prophet was asked about the slave girl who commits adultery and is not muhsan. He said: “If she commits adultery, flog her. If she com˙ ˙ again, flog her. If she commits adultery again, flog her, mits adultery then sell her, even if for a lock of cattle hair. However, the consensus of scholars is that this penalty applies to all slaves, thus implying that the qualifying term muhsan here is spurious. Muslim ˙˙ has a hadīth in which ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib commands the Muslims to apply ˙ ˙ the penalty to the slaves whether they were muhsan or not, before citing an incident in which the Prophet ordered him to˙ ˙flog a slave girl that the Prophet had who had committed adultery.88 Another variant of this hadīth ˙ drops any mention of the slave being muhsan or not. ˙˙ Having reviewed the Hadīth literature on stoning, we are now ready to ˙ we set out to deal with: Did the Qur’an really answer the question that include a verse on stoning which, for whatever reason, is not found in the mushaf? We will see that the answer must be a resounding no for a number ˙˙ of reasons.

11.4

TERMINOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THE STONING HADĪTHS ˙

There are at least three major problems with the terminology used in the stoning hadīths. They involve the use of the following terms, which play ˙ critical roles in those hadīths: “shaikh” and “shaikha”; “muhsan”; and ˙ ˙ ˙ is incon“thayyib” and “thayyiba.” The use of these terms in the hadīths ˙ sistent with their use in the Qur’an, resulting in conceptual differences between the Qur’an and the Hadīth. This mismatch between such terms and concepts in the Qur’an and˙ the Hadīth points out a number of things. ˙ First, those hadīths cannot be linked to the Prophet. Second, such ˙ hadīths could not have been in circulation at the time of the Prophet or even ˙ some time after his death. They must have appeared only after those for

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who could point out the flaws in those hadīths had all gone or were not in ˙ the vicinity in which their circulation started. Third, reflecting misunderstandings of important Qur’anic concepts, these hadīths cannot be seen as ˙ credible sources of Islamic teachings. Let’s now examine the three terms that show those flaws in the Hadīth. ˙ First, all different wordings of the stoning passage use the masculine term “shaikh” and its feminine form “shaikha,” and this is a problem. The former appears in the Qur’an three times. In one verse, Prophet Jacob’s sons describe their father as being a “very old man (Shaikhan kabīran)” (12.78). They do so when trying to convince a powerful ruler in Egypt, whom they failed to recognize as their brother Joseph, not to take one of them hostage, which would harm the health of their very old father. In the second, the daughters of Prophet Shuʿaib refer to their father with the same description, explaining to Prophet Moses why they had to water their cattle with no help from a man (28.23). The last instance occurs in the story of Prophet Abraham. When the angels brought to Abraham and his wife the good news of the birth of Isaac, the pleasantly shocked woman could not help asking: Shall I give birth when I am an old woman (ʿajūz ) and this husband of mine an old man (shaikh)? This is a wonderful thing! (11.72)

So the Qur’an uses of the term “shaikh” to mean “old man,” which is what the term would have meant in the stoning passage, if it really belonged to the Qur’an. But this makes the stoning passage nonsensical. Why would the verse single out the adultery committed by old men and women only when they usually have very little sexual drive anyway? Furthermore, all hadīths and jurists treat all instances of adultery in the same way, without ˙ erentiating between whether the offenders were young or old men, yet diff “shaikh” means “old man” specifically. Mālik understood the term “shaikh” differently, as shown in one hadīth ˙ in his Muwatta’. After claiming that ʿUmar pondered adding the stoning ˙ ˙ passage to the mushaf, this hadīth goes on to attribute to Mālik the state˙ ˙ and ‘shaikha’ ˙ ment that “‘shaikh’ mean ‘thayyib’ and ‘thayyiba.’”89 So he took these terms to mean non-virgin. There are two problems with Mālik’s view. First, he gives the term “shaikh’” a meaning that is different from its Qur’anic one. Second, inexplicably, he mistakenly equates “shaikha” with the Qur’anic term “thayyiba.” The masculine term “thayyib,” which Mālik equates to “shaikh,” does not exist in the Qur’an. Ahmad, on the other hand, understood “shaikh” in the stoning passage ˙ the same meaning as in the Qur’an. One hadīth in the Musnad I to have ˙ if the shaikh was not quoted earlier has ʿUmar say: “Do you not see that made muhsan he should be flogged whereas if the young man commits ˙˙ adultery having been made muhsan he should be stoned?”90 Here “shaikh” ˙˙

Textual Abrogation I 173 is contrasted with “shābb (young man),” so it means “old man.” Accordingly, Ahmad took “shaikha” to mean “old women.” He, however, glosses over the˙ illogical suggestion that the stoning passage focuses on the very old adulterers. It has also been noted that “the stoning verse does not offer a clue on how to punish transgressors who fall outside the age group meant by sheikh.”91 But there is yet another problem with the use of the term “shaikha” in the stoning passage. As verse 11.72 shows, the feminine of “shaikh” is not “shaikha” but “ʿajūz.” The latter term is used in another two verses (26.171, 37.135) for the old wife of Prophet Lot. Finally, it is found in a verse that repeats the question of Abraham’s astonished wife to the carriers of the good news as she asks how she could become pregnant again when she is “ʿajūzun ʿaqīm” or “a barren old woman.” So, the terms “shaikh” and “shaikha” give away the non-Qur’anic origin of the stoning passage. But the Hadīth literature on stoning gives other ˙ to the Qur’an. strong reasons to reject its attribution Second, “muhsan” is used inaccurately in the Hadīth to imply the status ˙ of being married˙ ˙and to refer in the same way to both men and women. The root of this term is “ihsān.” One of its derivatives is “husn,” ˙ ˙ ˙ which means “fortification” or˙ “protection.” Other than in the context of male-female relationships, this root appears in the Qur’an in the forms “ḥuṣūnuhum (their fortifications)” (59.2) and “muḥaṣṣana (fortified)” (59.14), where it denotes physical fortresses. It also appears in the forms “tuḥṣinūn (you protect)” (12.48) in reference to the protection of crops, “lituḥṣinakum (to protect you)” (21.80) in a description of war armor, and “aḥṣanat (she protected )” (21.91, 66.12) in references to the protection of Mary, Jesus’ mother, from losing her virginity and from having a relationship with a man. This consistent use of all of these derivatives of “ihsān” makes me con˙ ˙ and women must clude that those used for describing relationships or men also denote a form of protection. Ibn Qutaiba states that “ihsān” means “to protect something and defend it.”92 There are twelve such˙ ˙occurrences of this term in six different verses. These are the verses with the terms in question left without translation: And [forbidden for you are] the muḥṣanāt women, except those whom your right hands own. So Allah decrees for you. He has made lawful to you beyond this that you seek with your wealth muḥṣinīn rather than musāfiḥīn (seeking passing sexual relationships). As for the enjoyment you get from them, give them their wages as an obligation. There is no fault in you whatever you agree between you after this obligation. Allah is knowledgeable, wise. (4.24) As for he of you who does not have the means to get married to believing muḥṣanāt , he should seek from among your believing girls. Allah knows best about the faith of each one of you. Marry them with the permission of their families, and give them their standard wages, as muḥṣanāt not as musāfiḥāt (being in passing sexual relationships) or taking akhdān (lovers). When uḥṣinna (they have

174 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law been made muḥṣanāt ), if they commit an indecency then their penalty is half of what is on the [free] muḥṣanāt . That is for he among you who fears harm. And if you be patient then that is better for you. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (4.25) Today the good things are permitted for you. The food of those who were given the Book before you is permitted to you and your food is permitted to them. And so are the muḥṣanāt of the believing women and the muḥṣanāt of those who were given the Book before you, if you give them their wages, muḥṣinīn rather than musāfiḥīn (being in passing sexual relationships) or taking akhdān (mistresses). Whoever disbelieves in the faith his work will be in vain and he will be a loser in the hereafter. (5.5) Those who accuse muḥṣanāt [of sexual misconduct] and do not bring forward four witnesses, whip them eighty lashes and do not accept any testimony from them. Those are the renegades. (24.4) Those who accuse the unwary believing muḥṣanāt [of sexual misconduct] are cursed in this world and the hereafter and they will have a mighty torment. (24.23) Do not force your girls into prostitution if they seek taḥaṣṣunan to target riches of this world. As for those who force them, Allah shall be forgiving, merciful [to these women] after their compulsion. (24.33)

The term occurs eight times in five verses in the feminine plural passive participle “muḥṣanāt” (4.24, 4.25, 5.5, 24.4, 24.23), twice in the masculine plural active participle “muḥṣinīn” (24.4, 5.5), once in the feminine passive verb “uḥṣinna” (4.25), and once in the noun “taḥaṣṣunan” (24.23). I agree with the following observation by Burton: All Qur’anic instances of the root ihsān involve the meaning of “to ˙ ˙ could with ease be extended to guard, protect, store, or shelter.” This the idea (not unconnected with, yet not restricted exclusively to, the married state) of offering shelter and accommodation.93 He notes that this is one of the meanings that Shāfiʿī assigned to this term as he repeatedly talks about the woman being made muhsana by ˙ ˙ use of accommodating her in a house. This meaning is consistent with the the other derivatives of “ihsān” in the Qur’an, as a shelter is a form of both ˙˙ physical and moral protection. These can be provided for the woman either by a husband or a male family member such as the father or a brother. If we check all twelve instances of the term against this meaning, we will fi nd that the term refers to the provision of shelter and permanent accommodation for the woman.

Textual Abrogation I 175 Let’s start with “muḥṣanāt.” In 4.24, “muḥṣanāt” are included among those whom the Muslim is prohibited from marrying because the reference is to those who have been made “muḥṣanāt” through marriage, i.e. they are living in a marital home. This is also the meaning of the term in its second appearance in 4.25. The fi rst “muḥṣanāt” in verse 4.25 and the two appearances in 5.5 denote the unmarried women who live in accommodation provided by their families. The other two occurrences of the term in 24.4 and 24.23 seem to apply to both married and unmarried women, as calumny against “muḥṣanāt” is being absolutely condemned. The use of the term in its second appearance in 4.25 implies that the slave woman’s living in accommodation provided by her master is not considered a form of ihsān. Unlike freewomen who live in accommodation ˙˙ provided by their families, such women are not considered as “muḥṣanāt.” But when a slave girl gets married to a freeman, which includes his offering her matrimonial shelter and accommodation, she becomes muhsana. This ˙ change is obvious from the use of the verb “uḥṣinna” (4.25) to describe˙ the of status that the marriage brings to the slave girl. The term “muḥṣinīn” in 4.24 and 5.5 refers to men who offer accommodation to women in matrimony. It is the act of men making women “muḥṣanāt.” Finally, the noun “taḥṣṣunan” (24.33) describes a status that women seek. There are two critical observations that confi rm my understanding of these terms as signifying the provision of shelter and accommodation by men to women. First, in all twelve cases, men are the doers of the act of ihsān whereas women are its recipients. This is in line with the Qur’anic ˙˙ family fi nancial system where the males are the bread earners and provide for the females. The writers of hadīths have failed to notice this consistent ˙ sān,” thus introducing terms such as the Qur’anic use of all variants of “ih ˙ ˙ san,” which wrongly suggest that the masculine passive participle “muh ˙ ˙ the man its recipient. woman can be the doer of ihsān and ˙ ˙ This confusion in the Hadīth has propagated into the works of the usūlīs ˙ law, as the latter is based more on the Hadīth ˙ who developed the Islamic ˙ than the Qur’an. This is the result of the fact that the Qur’an often enacts general legal principles but without furnishing specific implementation details. The fact that there are numerous hadīths that provide such details has proved too tempting. The Hadīth often˙ escapes proper scrutiny when it ˙ details. Jurists believed that most aspects is the only source of sought-after of Islamic law must have been fleshed out and elaborated by the Prophet if this was not done in the Qur’an, and that compromised their ability to scrutinize the Hadīth.94 ˙ 4.25 positions men offering women ihsān as the opposite Second, verse ˙ ˙ like prostitutes or of the women being involved in offering sexual services taking lovers. Contrasting ihsān with the two other statuses reflects the ˙ ˙ there is no long-term relationship in a perfact that in the latter two cases manent residence. The provision of accommodation signifies the marital relationship.

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We see the same command in verse 5.5 but this time addressing men. They are commanded to provide ihsān to women rather than use them as prostitutes or mistresses. There is˙ ˙another interesting observation about the wording of this command in 4.25 and 5.5. The prohibitions of having passing sexual relationships (“musāfiḥāt” and “musāfiḥīn”) and taking lovers (“muttakhidhāti akhdānin”) or taking mistresses (“muttakhidhīna akhdānin”) are both in the active voice. These are actions that the man or woman can commit. But the two verses differ in the wording of the commandment about ihsān. Verse 4.25 talks about women being offered ihsān whereas ˙ ˙ talks about men providing ihsān to women. This further ˙ ˙ confi rms verse 5.5 ˙ ˙ the observation I made earlier about the Qur’an’s reference to ihsān being ˙˙ in the passive voice when referring to women and in the active voice when men are mentioned. Similarly, ihsān is contrasted in 24.33 with prostitution in reference to ˙ ˙ be forced to sell sex when they would rather be in a marital those who may relationship. Unlike marriage, the relationship with a prostitute or a mistress can both take place anywhere. The confusion of the use of ihsān in the Hadīth, including presenting it ˙ ˙ or actions˙ that can be done to men has as an action that women can take resulted in this term being understood in a number of different ways to accommodate all the various hadīths. In his commentary on 4.25, Tabarī ˙ states that ihsān was understood to mean embracing Islam, getting˙ mar˙ ˙ ried, staying chaste, and even being liberated in the case of slaves.95 So rather than being understood, as in the Qur’an, as meaning a woman who has shelter and accommodation provided by her family or husband, the term “muhsana” is claimed to mean “Muslim woman,” “married woman,” ˙˙ “chaste woman,” and “freewoman.” Ibn Qutaiba does not include “Muslim woman” in the meanings he lists.96 Shāfiʿī conceded that he had to use ihsān to mean different things. He ˙ ˙ from doing what is prohibited. explains that Ihsān means the prevention ˙ ˙ He goes on to say:97 Islam is a preventer, liberty is also a preventer, so is the husband and the sexual relationship with him, and so is the imprisonment at home. Everything that acts as a preventer causes Ihsān.98 ˙˙ Scholars had to give ihsān such a diverse set of meanings not because this ˙ is what it means in the ˙Qur’an, but because they wanted to accommodate hadīths that use this term in different ways. Yet only one of these meanings ˙ be applied in any one case! For instance, there is a hadīth that calls Jewcan ˙ mean “Muslim.” ish adulterers muhsan. Obviously, the term here cannot ˙ ˙ The third term in the Hadīth literature on stoning that reflects a misun˙ use is “thayyib.” This term makes one appearderstanding of its Qur’anic ance in the Qur’an as the feminine plural “thayyibāt.” It is used as the

Textual Abrogation I 177 opposite of “abkār.” The latter means “virgins,” so the former must refer to “non-virgins”: Should His (Muhammad’s) Lord divorce you [O wives of the Prophet!], He may give him in exchange wives that are better than you: Muslim, believing, devout, penitent, worshipful, given to fasting, thayyibāt and abkār . (66.5)

This verse follows others that refer to problems some of the Prophet’s wives were causing him. Given that the verse talks about the possibility of God making the Prophet marry “abkār” and “thayyibāt,” the implication is that those are unmarried women. So “thayyibāt” must mean “nonvirgin widows” or “non-virgin divorcées.” The Qur’an’s use of “thayyibāt” is almost exactly the opposite of how it appears in the Hadīth! The latter uses the masculine and feminine forms of the term mainly˙ for married men or women, whereas “thayyibāt” in the Qur’an denotes previously married but currently unmarried women. Furthermore, there is no masculine form of this term in the Qur’an, i.e. it is a status that applies to women only, whereas the Hadīth uses it for men also.99 So the use ˙of the terms “shaikh,” “ihsān,” “thayyib,” and their derivatives in the Hadīth is inconsistent with˙ ˙how these terms are used in the ˙ contradicts concepts that the Qur’an associates with these Qur’an and even words. They are used in a way that reflects a misunderstanding of the Qur’an. The terminological and conceptual problems represented in these uses mean that these hadīths could not be linked to the Prophet. ˙ 11.5

OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE STONING HADĪTHS ˙

The problems with the hadīths on stoning do not end with their misleading ˙ underlines a misunderstanding of Qur’anic conterminology, which itself cepts. There are other significant flaws with how those hadīths deal with the alleged stoning verse and other narratives on stoning.˙ First, while found in various versions and different wordings, there are four hadīths that claim that the stoning verse was part of the Qur’an. But ˙ of these had its own problems, as we have already discussed. One each one that identifies the chapter of the verse as being the Ahzāb makes the absurd ˙ claim that the chapter in the mushaf is over two hundred verses shorter ˙ ˙ than its full Qur’anic revelation.100 As I noted earlier, this claim is preposterous, and so the hadīth has no credibility.101 The hadīth is so focused on ˙ of the stoning verse that it completely ˙ explaining the absence ignores saying anything about those other alleged missing verses! The second has ʿUmar stress that the early Muslims recited, memorized, and understood the stoning verse.102 Yet while it has to concede the absence of this penalty from the mushaf, it fails to explain that absence. It ˙˙

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also acknowledges that people doubted that it was ever part of the Quran. It shows ʿUmar desperate to convince people that stoning is a divinely imposed penalty. This desperation is particularly clear in one variant of this hadīth that states that ʿUmar was tempted to add it to the mushaf while ˙ ˙ ˙ be tamalso implying that it should not be there. As the mushaf could not ˙ ˙ pered with, all this hadīth could do is to claim that ʿUmar was tempted to ˙ hadīth also insists that the Prophet stoned, in a clear add it the mushaf. This ˙ ˙ attempt to support the ˙unconvincing claim that this penalty is Qur’anic. Indeed, Tirmidhī’s variant of this hadīth presents the stoning penalty as a ˙ the Qur’an.103 sunna rather than being derived from The third and fourth hadīths both try to explain the absence of the stoning verse from the mush˙af very differently but in equally crude manners. ˙˙ They concede that an explanation is needed for this absence, but they fail to provide a credible one. One hadīth claims that the Prophet was reluctant to allow the stoning verse to be˙ written.104 The fourth hadīth has the more ˙ other verses after absurd suggestion that the stoning verse disappeared with the Prophet’s death.105 The hadīth confi rms the fact stated in the second ˙ existence of a stoning verse. hadīth that people rejected the ˙ Second, some forms of these hadīths do not quote the stoning passage. More critically, others quote it in˙ different wordings. Third, there is at least one report in Dārimī that quotes the stoning passage as words of the Prophet rather than a verse of the Qur’an.106 This narrative is attributed to Kuthair b. al-Salt, to whom also the hadīth ˙ the stoning verse written ˙ about the reluctance of the Prophet to have down is ascribed. Fourth, different versions of the same hadīth on stoning at times differ in including or excluding critical terms˙ or information. For instance, some variants of the narrative of the two Jewish adulterers describe them as muhsan whereas others do not. The same applies to the hadīth on the ˙ ˙ of the slave girls. ˙ penalty Fifth, the stoning penalty is based on the dual-penalty hadīth which ˙ for a year states that the virgin is given one hundred stripes and banished and the non-virgin is flogged one hundred lashes and stoned. However, the narratives of the Prophet’s application of the stoning penalty do not mention him having the non-virgins flogged before being stoned. So the stories of the application of stoning contradict the very hadīth where stoning came ˙ from, i.e. the dual-penalty hadīth. ˙ It is fascinating to see how this obvious contradiction is dealt with by Shāfiʿī, who was keen on confi rming the authenticity of both the dual-penalty hadīth and the narratives about the Prophet stoning but not whipping ˙ the non-virgins. He claims that the one hundred lashes penalty of verse 24.2 abrogated the detainment of the adulteresses in 4.15 and the hurting of the adulterers in 4.16. He adds that the Sunna “dallat (indicated)”107 that flogging is restricted to the virgin offenders. He explains this by quoting the dual-penalty hadīth, which states that the one hundred lashes penalty, ˙

Textual Abrogation I 179 as well as the banishment, is for the virgins. He notes that this hadīth also ˙ goes on confi rms that non-virgins should be flogged and stoned. He then to say that the fact that the Prophet stoned but did not flog Māʿiz and the wife who had committed adultery with her husband’s worker means that the whipping of the non-virgins in the dual-penalty hadīth was abrogated. There is some careful choosing of words by Shāfiʿ˙ī as he tries to accommodate the Qur’anic verses, the dual-penalty hadīth, and the reported practice of the Prophet on a particular timeline ˙without contradicting his doctrine that the Sunna cannot abrogate the Qur’an. But any such attempt was bound to fail, and Shāfiʿī’s did. In this explanation in Risāla, he uses the term “abrogate” in this context four times. The fi rst time is when he says that the detainment (4.15) and hurting (4.16) of the adulterers were abrogated by flogging (24.2).108 This is consistent with his doctrine as the abrogating and abrogated rulings are all Qur’anic. The fourth use of “abrogation” is in reference to the Prophet’s stoning but not flogging of the nonvirgin adulterers.109 Here also there is no doctrinal contradiction as the Sunna abrogated the flogging part of the penalty of the non-virgin adulterers in the dual-penalty hadīth, which is also a sunna. ˙ of the term he says that the one hundred lashes But in the second use penalty was abrogated for the non-virgins.110 But then flogging was introduced by the Qur’an, even if later confi rmed by the dual-penalty hadīth, and was abrogated by the practice of the Prophet, so this must ˙ be an instance of abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna. In his third use of the term “abrogation,” he suggests that the dual-penalty hadīth, which is a ˙ sunna, abrogated the detainment and hurting of the adulterers, which are Qur’anic rulings.111 Shāfiʿī repeats elsewhere his suggestion that the detainment was abrogated by the dual-penalty hadīth.112 The fact that elsewhere ˙ 113 he employed the carefully chosen verb “dallat or dalla114 (indicated)” to describe the Sunna’s role cannot hide the fact that the function of the Sunna here is one of “abrogation” of the Qur’an, which is confi rmed by his use of the term “abrogation.” Sixth, the hadīth that claims the Torah stipulated that stoning is the ˙ penalty for adultery is an attempt to link this penalty to a divine Book. This confi rms that stoning was never the subject of a Qur’anic revelation. Indeed, the supposed Torah passage is called the “stoning verse,” which is the exact term that is used for its alleged Qur’anic equivalent. This hadīth, with its different variants, presumes that there was no stoning verse˙ in the Qur’an and that the passage known under this name comes from the Jewish scriptures. The Old Testament has stoning as the penalty for different types of offenders. These are the spiritual medium and the person who communicates with the dead (Lev. 2:27), the blasphemer of the name of God (Lev. 24:16), the worshiper of other than Jehovah (Deu. 13:10, 17:5), the disobedient son (Deu. 21:21), the person who breaks the Sabbath (Num. 15:35), the woman who lost her virginity illicitly (Deu. 22:21), the male rapist, and

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his female married victim if she did not cry for help (Deu. 22:24). Details of stoning are also found in the Mishnah (Sanhedrin VI), which contains the written form of oral Jewish tradition. The Qur’an implies that the Old Testament is not the same as the Torah, so the mention of stoning in the Old Testament and the Mishnah is no indication that stoning was a Torah punishment. In any case, it is clear that the mention of the stoning verse in the Torah is intended to attribute this punishment to God, which itself means that there was nothing about stoning in the Qur’an, because otherwise the attribution to the Torah would not have been needed. The story of the adulterous hired man states that his father said to the Prophet “judge between us according to the Book of Allah.” This request was repeated by the other disputant. The hadīth then claims that the ˙ Prophet started his ruling by saying “I will judge for you according to the Book of Allah.” The repeated emphasis on linking the ruling to the “Book of Allah” is a blatant attempt to link stoning to the Qur’an. Scholars who do not accept that stoning comes from the Qur’an have naturally rejected this hadīth. In a book dedicated to tackling controver˙ has tried to respond to this criticism by sugsial hadīths, Ibn Qutaiba ˙ gesting that “Kitābu Allah (Book of Allah)” here means the “judgment of Allah” and is not a reference to the Qur’an.115 This is an example of the difference in opinion that the stoning penalty and its hadīths have ˙ generated as scholars scramble to reconcile or dismiss contradictory and controversial accounts. Seventh, the overwhelming majority of hadīths on stoning deal with ˙ the Prophet’s alleged application of this penalty. Only a small number of hadīths focus on the stoning verse. ˙ Eighth, none of the many versions of the hadīths on the Prophet’s alleged ˙ the stoning verse, let alone ordering of the stoning of adulterers mentions claim it to be the source of the penalty. Ninth, most narratives on stoning involve self-confessed adulterers and adulteresses. The authors of these stories seem to have thought that selfconfession might not be sufficient without having four witnesses confi rming the crime. The Qur’an requires the availability of four witnesses to establish guilt against those accused of sexual offenses. Indeed, those Hadīth narra˙ tives often say that the self-confessed adulterer “shahada” against himself, using a verb that means “bore witness.” But some hadīths, such as that of ˙ husband had hired, the wife who committed adultery with a man that her accept self-confession without having the culprit bear witness against herself four times. The 3rd century scholars Ibn Qutaiba tells us that this was seen as a problem by some scholars.116 But a more serious problem in these hadīths is that they do not show ˙ any interest in the partner of the self-confessed offender. Bizarrely, this is the case even when the Prophet is seen trying his best to confi rm whether the person had indeed committed adultery before ordering him or her to be stoned. One would expect the Prophet to have at least asked the person who his or her partner was in order to question the latter as another way

Textual Abrogation I 181 of investigating the veracity of the confession. Yet most hadīths show the ˙ Prophet taking no interest in the offender’s partner! Furthermore, in a society where adultery is considered a crime that is punished by capital punishment, as those hadīths claim, one should expect ˙ identity of the partner to have those who adjudicate to try to determine the him or her stoned as well. But no effort whatsoever is made in trying to identify the partner. Slaves are not subjected to stoning but they are still supposed to be flogged, so even in the case of slaves a full investigation would be expected. The father of the child was not sought even when a woman got illegally pregnant and was allowed to give birth before being stoned! This, again, goes against the expected natural behavior of those who administered the stoning penalty. One variant of the hadīth of Māʿiz b. Mālik has him questioned by the ˙ Prophet about the identity of the woman.117 But in addition to the fact that the woman, who is a slave girl, is not asked to confi rm or deny the story, no other action is taken with respect to her. The hadīth is completely silent ˙ on the woman. It might be argued that if those narratives were completely made up then the authors could have developed them further and added such extra details about the partners. They did not do that because they were completely focused on proving that stoning is a historical sentence which was applied by the Prophet himself. They did not need to introduce more details than they thought were necessary, which is a general observation that applies to many hadīths in various areas. Indeed, their judgment was spot on. They ˙ have managed to make the overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars believe in those hadīths and treat them as historical narratives. Additionally, ˙it has been noted that one problem with the hadīths that ˙ therefore involve confessions is that they are “tantamount to suicide” and go against Muhammad’s teachings.118 These arguments about the wording of the stoning passage and the Hadīth ˙ this literature on stoning in general should leave no doubt whatsoever that passage has nothing to do with the Qur’an. Furthermore, there is nothing in the hadīths about the alleged verse linking it to the concept of abroga˙ was developed later. Because those hadīths are problematic, textual tion that ˙ as legal-textual abrogation abrogation was developed to legitimize them, cannot explain them. They had been authored to explain the belief in and practice of the punishment of stoning that does not exist in the mushaf. In fact, those hadīths suggest that the disappearance of the verse was˙ ˙rather unplanned. ˙Only one hadīth claims that it was the Prophet who refused to ˙ down, yet even in this case the Prophet’s decisions have the passage written seem to be driven by emotion rather than reason, let alone divine inspiration. There is an even more astonishing hadīth than the one describing ˙ ʿUmar’s temptation to add the stoning passage to the mushaf. This hadīth, ˙ ˙ Ibn Māja: ˙ 120 which is traced to ʿĀ’isha, is reported by Ibn Qutaiba119 and

182 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law The stoning verse and suckling the adult ten times [ruling] were recorded on a sheet under my bed when the Prophet died. But when he died and we were busy with his funeral, a domesticated animal entered the area and ate that sheet. .

One aspect of the absurdity of this hadīth, which is reported in a slightly ˙ preposterously suggests a verse had different wording in Ahmad,121 is that it ˙ been recorded on a single sheet while implicitly acknowledging the survival of this passage in the memory of people. It may look as if it was introduced to explain the absence of the stoning verse from the mushaf. But it is more likely to be one of those hadīths that were concocted˙ ˙by someone who ˙ and attack the integrity of the mushaf. This wanted to degrade the Qur’an ˙ ˙this and is the position of ʿAlī b. Hazm, who launched a scathing attack on ˙ a couple of other suspicious hadīths.122 Ibn Qutaiba’s discussion ˙of the objections against the authenticity of this hadīth is a good example of the keenness of Muslim scholars for going ˙ through all kinds of trouble to confi rm the authenticity of hadīths even ˙ when they are self-evidently false. After mounting a stern defense of the hadīth, Ibn Qutaiba concedes that the hadīth might well be a forgery after ˙ accusing its transmitter, Muhammad ˙ b. Ishāq, of being a liar.123 all, ˙ ˙ be based on Qur’anic revThe stoning penalty can never be claimed to elation. This is why the overwhelming majority of hadīths suggest that ˙ in which ʿAlī b. stoning was a sunna. Interestingly, Ahmad has a report ˙ Abī Tālib flogged an adulteress on a Thursday and stoned her on the fol˙ Friday, saying “I flog her according to the Book of Allah and stone lowing her according to the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah.”124 This hadīth, ˙ which Nasā’ī also quotes,125 confi rms that the Qur’an’s penalty for adultery is flogging, and that stoning is a sunna. This hadīth should not be seen as establishing the case for stoning as a historical˙ sunna of the Prophet, but it shows the confusion of the Hadīth literature on stoning. ˙ But there are yet more cogent arguments against the historicity of stoning and the hadīths that promote it when we consider what the mushaf ˙ ˙˙ already says about adultery, as it has imposed a completely different penalty. This is what we will study next. We shall see that the suggestion that stoning originated from the Qur’an is no more credible than linking this penalty to the Prophet as a sunna.

11.6

THE QUR’ANIC PENALTY FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES

Occurring thirteen times in as many different verses, the term “fāḥisha” is used by the Qur’an for indecent, unacceptable behavior. The Qur’an condemns getting involved in “fāḥisha” as something that requires seeking God’s forgiveness (3.135), and it confi rms that God would never command people to do “fāḥisha” (7.28). It is a punishable offense, and if any of the

Textual Abrogation I 183 Prophet’s women commit it, when she should be a role model for the community, she should have double the punishment that other women would get for the same offense (33.30). It warns and threatens those who would like “fāḥisha” to spread among the believers (24.19). The remaining nine appearances of this term clarify that it is used specifically for improper sexual conduct. One specific example of “fāḥisha” is the homosexual conduct of the people of Prophet Lot (7.80, 27.54, 29.28). Getting married to women that one’s father had married before is another (4.22). Another verse describes “zinā (adultery)” as “fāḥisha and evil as a way” (17.32). Verse 12.24 describes the attempt of a married woman to seduce Prophet Joseph as “faḥshāʾ,” which shares the same root with “fāḥisha.” The former appears in seven verses, one of which suggests that “faḥshāʾ” is a broader term than “fāḥisha” or that they are simply synonymous: If they commit fāḥisha they say: “We found our fathers doing that and that Allah has commanded us to do it.” Say: “Allah never commands the practice of faḥshāʾ. Do you say about Allah what you do not know?” (7.28)

The remaining four verses on “fāḥisha” include one that deals with the inheritance of adulterous women (4.19) and another on divorcing them (65.1). The remaining two verses are the most relevant to the subject of this section as they deal with the penalty for “fāḥisha.” Verse 4.25, which we have already studied,126 explains the penalty for having illegal sexual relationships with married women who were slaves when they got married: As for he of you who does not have the means to get married to believing muḥṣanāt , he should seek from among your believing girls. Allah knows best about the faith of each one of you. Marry them with the permission of their families, and give them their standard wages, as muḥṣanāt not as musāfiḥāt (being in passing sexual relationships) or taking akhdān (lovers). When uḥṣinna (they have been made muḥṣanāt ), if they commit an indecency (fāḥisha) then their penalty is half of what is on the [free] muḥṣanāt . That is for he among you who fears harm. And if you be patient then that is better for you. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (4.25)

The last verse is quoted here with the one that follows it: As for those of your women who commit fāḥisha, call four witnesses from among you, so if they testify [against the offending women], then keep them in the houses until they die or Allah makes a way for them. (4.15) As for the two of you who commit it, then hurt them both. If they repent and amend, then let them be. Allah accepts repentance and is merciful. (4.16)

But to study these verses, we should also quote other verses that deal with the penalty for “zinā (adultery).” Variations of this term occur in five

184 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law verses. I have already referred to one of them, which describes “zinā” as “fāḥisha” (17.32). Another verse lists among the attributes of the believers the fact that “they do not commit zinā.” The third verse states that when women come to the Prophet to pledge their embracement of Islam they should pledge, among other things, that “they shall not commit zinā” (60.12). The last two verses deal with the penalty of those who commit zinā: As for the zāniya (adulteress) and zānī (adulterer), flog each one of them one hundred lashes. Do not have pity for them [by not applying the law] at the cost of Allah’s religion, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day. Let a group of believers witness their punishment. (24.2) The zānī (adulterer) shall marry only a zāniya (adulteress) or polytheist, and the zāniya (adulteress) shall be married only to a zānī (adulterer) or polytheist. This (marrying a person who has committed adultery) is prohibited for the believers. (24.3)

These two verses on “zinā” and 4.25 and 4.15–16 on “fāḥisha” are the only verses that deal with the penalty for these offenses. Let’s focus on the picture of sexual offenses painted by the verses before considering the hadīths on stoning and the jurists’ opinions in the next section. Allowing the˙ interpretation of the Qur’anic text to be influenced by those very different sources has ensured that the Qur’an’s penalties are misunderstood by scholars. Verse 4.15 states that the women who commit the illegal sexual behavior referred to as “fāḥisha” should be kept at home until they die or God fi nds a way for them out of that situation. Keeping the offenders at home must mean a form of home detention the purpose of which is to deny them the freedom and opportunity to commit further offenses. This probably means that these women may still be allowed to leave the house but only in the company of a family member who can monitor their behavior. It is significant that verse 4.15 commands the Muslims to keep the offending women in “the houses” without identifying those houses. In contrast, verse 65.1, which deals with divorce, stipulates that the divorced women must be allowed to stay in “their houses,” meaning their matrimonial homes, during the three-month waiting period to check whether there is pregnancy. Should the divorced women commit adultery, she is evicted from her house. Verse 4.15 does not use “their houses” but “the houses” because the detention may not be in the same house where the women lived. If they were unmarried, they would be kept in the family houses where they had been living, and the phrase “their houses” would have applied. But if they were married, the offense might result in the offending woman being sent back to her family house rather than being allowed to stay in the matrimonial home. In this case, the detention would be in a different house from the one she used to live in; hence the phrase “their houses” would not apply. This penalty of house detention is clear, but the second possibility that Allah may make a way for the offending women is ambiguous. Given that it is presented as a countersituation for the detention it probably refers to

Textual Abrogation I 185 any situation that would change the women’s status of house arrest. Those who detain the offending women must be those who provide accommodation for them. This indicates that the “way” that God may facilitate for them is an alternative accommodation where they can live normally. This, in turn, must refer to the possibility of men offering to marry those women, and accordingly, providing them with an alternative accommodation where they can regain their full liberty. Indeed, 24.3 explains that the person who is guilty of adultery may get married to another person who has committed a similar offense or to a polytheist. Shāfiʿī thinks that this verse was itself abrogated and that the Muslim adulterer can get married even to someone who had not committed adultery, provided that he or she is not a polytheist. He cites a hadīth suggesting that verse 24.3 was abrogated by ˙ single (āyāmā) among you to marry” (24.32). But his this verse: “Encourage the evidence is that when the Prophet dealt with adulterers he did not prevent the guilty husband or wife from continuing their marital relationship with their spouse.127 Verse 4.16 also has an element of ambiguity. The verse uses the dual pronoun “al-ladhān,” which may refer to two men or one man and one woman, which is why I have cautiously translated it as “two.” Tabarī says that both interpretations have been suggested. Mujāhid is said˙ to have understood the term to mean two men. ʿAtā’, Hasan al-Basrī, and ʿAbd Allāh b. Kathīr ˙ a man and ˙ a woman.128 Tabarī agrees are among those who took it to˙ mean ˙ with this interpretation, but he states that the two must be virgins and not muhsan,129 so he is clearly influenced by the Hadīth, as the verse imposes ˙ ˙ qualification. ˙ no such If “al-ladhān” refers to two men, then the verse would be on male homosexual behavior. If it rather denotes a man and a woman then the offense is heterosexual adultery. Let’s look into the implications of each of these to see which one looks more likely. If “al-ladhān” refers to a man and woman then the feminine plural pronoun “al-lātī” in 4.15 must refer to those who engage in lesbian relationships. Otherwise, the woman involved in illicit sex with a man would be covered in both adjacent verses with each stipulating a different penalty for the same offense. Furthermore, if the reference is to a heterosexual couple, the two verses would have nothing to say about male homosexuality. Yet there is no other verse that deals with the penalty for male-male sexual misconduct. Additionally, there is another verse (24.2) that deals specifically with heterosexual adultery, so this understanding of “al-ladhān” would result in three verses covering the same offense differently. If, on the other hand, “al-ladhān” means two men, then verse 4.15 is likely to refer to lesbian relationships, as this would make the two verses consistent in being about homosexuality—one on lesbianism and the other on male-male relationships. This is also how Abū Muslim al-Isfahānī ˙ understood these verses.130 In this case, adultery would be left unaddressed by the two verses. But this is what verses 24.2–3 cover.

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The lack of detention for the offenders in 4.16 is another reason to believe that the verse talks about men only. Man is the provider of accommodation and shelter for his family and himself, so detaining him would make no sense. One objection that may be raised against reading “al-ladhān” to mean two men is the use of the dual pronoun rather than the plural “al-ladhīn” as is the case with “al-lātī.” But I think the arguments above make a much stronger case for understanding the term to refer to two men. Verse 4.15 requires four Muslim witnesses for the offense to be established. Requiring this many witnesses for a sexual offense ensures that a false accusation would be very difficult to establish. The requirement for the witnesses to be Muslim increases their credibility and reduces the likelihood of false statements. For comparison, only two witnesses are required for witnessing a loan contract (2.282). The Qur’an goes further and introduces a penalty for those who accuse women of improper sexual conduct without being able to back their accusatory claims with four witnesses. In fact, the physical punishment for making an unsubstantiated claim is only 20% less than the one hundred lashes penalty for committing adultery (24.2): Those who accuse muḥṣanāt [of sexual misconduct] and do not bring forward four witnesses, whip them eighty lashes and do not accept any testimony from them. Those are the renegades. (24.4) Except those who repent after that and make amends. Allah is forgiving, merciful. (24.5)

This is intended to serve as a deterrent against making unproven claims which can involve innocent women. Even when the accuser is the woman’s husband, the Qur’an has made her denial override his accusation if the latter is not supported by four witnesses: Those who accuse their wives [of sexual misconduct] without having witnesses other than themselves, then the testimony of one of them is to testify by Allah four times that he is truthful (24.6) and the fifth [time] that the curse of Allah be on him if he was one of the liars. (24.7) But the punishment is averted from her by testifying by Allah four times that he is one of the liars (24.8) and the fifth [time] that the anger of Allah be on her if he was one of the truthful. (24.9)

So, there is no mention of stoning or any penalty that comes close to it in the Qur’an.

11.7

STONING IN THE LIGHT OF THE QUR’AN

In two earlier sections I discussed serious problems in the Hadīth literature ˙ concepts were on stoning. One section explained how Qur’anic terms and

Textual Abrogation I 187 mistakenly used by hadīths.131 The other focused on problems within those ˙ discussed the Qur’an’s penalties for sexual offenses hadīths.132 But having ˙in the previous section, I will show here the fundamental disagreement between the stoning penalty and the Qur’anic law. First, there is a crucial difference between the level of physical punishment against sexual offenders in the Qur’anic penal system and its counterpart in the Hadīth literature on stoning. The Qur’an includes the following penalties for˙ various forms of sexual misconduct: (1) Detaining the woman at home (4.15). (2) Taking away some of what the wife had been given by her husband (4.19). (3) Evicting the divorced woman from her matrimonial home before the divorce is fi nalized (65.1). (4) Prohibiting the male or female who commits adultery from getting married to a believer (24.3). (5) Flogging the adulteress and adulterer one hundred stripes each (24.2). (6) Flogging the man who makes an unproven claim of adultery against a woman eighty lashes (24.4). (7) Causing harm to the male offender (4.16). The fi rst four do not include any form of physical punishment against the offender. The last three do, but none of them includes the use of retribution that may threaten the life of the offender, whether man or woman. Actually, none of these punishments is supposed to cause any lasting physical damage. One report in Baihaqī explicitly states that a slave girl who had committed adultery was not flogged because it was feared that she might die as she had given birth recently.133 The penalty of causing harm to the offenders does not specify what that harm might be. But the fact that the verse talks about the possibility of the offenders repenting and amending their behaviors implies that this harm is not supposed to threaten their lives. The contrast between this low-level and limited physical punishment against certain offenders and the brutal and fatal penalty of stoning is stark. Some hadīths explain that the subject of stoning should be put in a ˙ hole in the ground covering him or her to the chest to leave the head and neck exposed to the hurled stones. One hadīth in Muslim,134 Dārimī,135 and others details how a stone thrower had ˙blood from the head of the victim splashing over his face. One can imagine the horror of stoning even without such graphical descriptions. Second, the Qur’an permits ending the life of a person only for a just cause: “Do not kill the soul, which Allah has prohibited the killing of, except in the course of justice” (6.151, 17.33). There are two legitimate forms of such a cause, and both are ultimately about preserving other lives, so they do not include the killing of adulterers. The fi rst is killing a violent enemy

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in self-defense. This is the verse that granted the early Muslims the right to fight: “Permission [to fight] has been granted to those against whom war is waged, because they are oppressed. Surely, Allah is well capable of assisting them [to victory] ” (22.39). All such verses talk about the Muslims’ right to kill

enemies who refused to allow the Muslims to live peacefully and tried to force them to abandon their religion or kill them. So the purpose of armed jihad is self-defense. I have discussed all such verses in more detail in my book on the concept of jihad in the Qur’an.136 More broadly, the Muslim is entitled to kill to protect his life. The second situation is having a person killed for committing murder: O you who believe! Equitable retaliation is prescribed for you in the case of murder: freeman for freeman, slave for slave, and female for female. But if one (the murderer) is pardoned by his brother (from the victim’s side), let the pursuing [of the matter] be according to the norms, and let the payment [of compensation] be with kindliness. That is a lightening and mercy from your Lord. Anyone who commits aggression after that—for him there awaits a painful chastisement. (2.178)

While the family of the victim is encouraged to forgive, seeking capital punishment for the murderer is permitted. The mention of “freeman,” “slave,” and “female” is in response to a pre-Islamic Arab custom whereby retaliation was not always sought against the murderer but reflected the different social standings of the people involved. So the family of a freeman who was killed by a slave might seek the master of that slave to be killed instead of the murderer. But the purpose of legalizing equitable retaliation is ultimately preserving human life, as the next verse confi rms: “In equitable retaliation, there is life for you, O you who have minds, that you may become pious” (2.179).

So in both cases in which killing is permitted, the intention is to preserve life and provide security. The hadīths that introduce killing by stoning as a penalty for a certain sexual off˙ense are completely at odds with the Qur’an’s specific and limited permission to the Muslims to kill. Not even rejecting God, the Qur’an, Islam, and the Prophet is punishable in the Qur’an, let alone by death. So how can any moral failure be punished by killing, never mind stoning? This brutal punishment is fundamentally against the penal system of the Qur’an. Third, the Prophetic hadīth that is considered to have established ston˙ ing is the dual-penalty hadīth: ˙ Take from me, take from me: Allah has made a way for them (the adulteresses). The bikr (virgin) [committing adultery] with the virgin, [their penalty is] one hundred lashes and a year’s banishment; and the thayyib (non-virgin) [committing adultery] with the non-virgin, [their penalty is] one hundred lashes and stoning.

Textual Abrogation I 189 The statement “Allah has made a way for them” has been introduced to link the hadīth to verse 4.15. The latter stipulates that the offending ˙ women are locked up at home until they die or “Allah makes a way for them.” This link allowed the positioning of the penalties in this hadīth as being the “way” that God had promised to find for those women.˙ This is universally accepted by Muslim scholars. Tabarī reports that Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAtā’, ˙ understood the promised “way”˙ to Dahhāk, and ʿAbd Allāh b. Kathīr all ˙be fl ˙ ogging ˙ and stoning as outlined in the dual-penalty hadīth. Qatāda is ˙ said to have considered the “way” to be flogging and banishment for the virgins and flogging and stoning for the non-virgins. Tabātabā’ī shares this ˙ the ˙ flogging of the linking of “way” to the dual-penalty hadīth but rejects ˙ non-virgins as he notes the reports that state that the Prophet sentenced them to stoning but not flogging.137 By linking the dual-penalty hadīth to the Qur’anic reference to the alternative to home detention, the ˙ hadīth author was able to imply that the ˙ future enactment of the stoning penalty. Qur’an had already referred to the This has been very successful as scholars have explicitly adopted this view. They argue that God introduced the home detention punishment fi rst and alluded at the time to the future change to the law, which was the introduction of the penalty of stoning. Mujāhid, on the other hand, is reported to have said that the “way” in 4.15 refers to the “hadd (legal punishment)” without elaborating further,138 ˙ Tabarī ascribes to Dahhāk also. Tabarī attributes to which is a view that ˙ ˙ which is ˙the penalty accordMujāhid the reading of˙ “way” as flogging ˙only, ing “the flogging verse” (24.2).139 He also states that Ibn ʿAbbās has said that verse 4.15 was followed by the flogging verse and that if the offenders were non-virgins then they were stoned. This view avoids a serious difficulty in the opinion of those who see “way” as a reference to the four penalties, which is the fact that the latter ignore the existence of 24.2, where the penalty for adultery is flogging. This alternative view proposes the following chronological order: 4.15, then 24.2, then the dual-penalty hadīth. My ˙ suggests interpretation of 4.15 and 24.2 that I explained earlier, however, that these verses talk about different offenses, with the former being about lesbian relationships and the second about heterosexual adultery, so they are not an instance of abrogation. Interestingly, there is a hadīth reported in Bukhārī in which ʿAbd Allāh ˙ b. Abī Awfā was asked: “Did the Messenger of Allah stone?” He replied in the affi rmative. But when he was asked whether the Prophet did that before or after the revelation of chapter 24, in a reference to verse 24.2, he declared that he did not know!140 This hadīth suggests that the author could ˙ not rule out the possibility that it is stoning that was abrogated by the flogging introduced in 24.2. One modern scholar has suggested the possibility that this hadīth might mean that the stoning punishment, which he argues ˙ had borrowed from the Jewish law, was later abrogated by Muhammad the Qur’anic penalty of flogging.141 This view, however, is not shared by

190 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Muslim scholars. But Abī Awfā’s hadīth does pose a big problem for the adherents of stoning and is another˙example of the confusion of the Hadīth literature on stoning. It is worth noting here that the dual-penalty h˙adīth, ˙ which plays a pivotal role in the legislation on adultery and fornication, is not reported by Bukhārī! It looks inconceivable that Bukhārī was not aware of it, having reported many other hadīths on stoning, so he must ˙ have rejected it. Taking “way” to mean the penalties in the dual-penalty hadīth or even ˙ the flogging in 24.2 is a complete misunderstanding of the Qur’an’s clause. As I explained earlier, Allah’s making a way for the women is presented as a countersolution to detention. This must mean some form of freedom, which could happen if they are offered shelter and accommodation by someone else. For instance, we have already seen that verse 24.3 states that the adulterous person may marry someone who has committed such an offense or a polytheist. This is clearly a way out of the sentence of life house arrest for women. The Qur’an’s use of the term “way” is a reference to changing the offender’s state of being locked up at home. Death by stoning cannot by any measure of reason be seen as a way out of the permanent detention at home. But there is yet another problem with interpreting “way” as referring to the dual-penalty hadīth or verse 24.2. This term occurs in a verse that ˙ speaks specifically about women, so “way” must refer to the penalty for women that was introduced in that verse, which is house arrest. Yet the verse and the hadīth that are claimed to have abrogated 4.15 are taken to ˙ and women! This is an obvious contradiction that I have cover both men not seen addressed by the scholars who interpret “way” as the flogging of 24.2 or the four penalties of the hadīth. ˙ The hadīth actually uses the plural feminine pronoun lahunna, meaning ˙ the adulteresses, which seems to contradict its application to both men and women. The author of this hadīth used the expression Allah has made a ˙ it to the command in verse 4.15 to keep the way for the adulteresses to link offending women at home, but because the offense in that verse is taken to mean heterosexual relationships, the ruling in the hadīth is made to apply ˙ to both men and women. Fourth, the dual-penalty hadīth states that the punishment of an illicit ˙ is one hundred lashes and a year’s banishvirgin-virgin sexual relationship ment. Banishment is the opposite of the house arrest in 4.15. Keeping the offending woman at home is understandable as it is a way of preventing her from committing more sexual offenses and causing damage to the society. But the penalty of throwing out a woman who commits a sexual offense means that she can continue having illegal sexual relationships. In fact, she might well fi nd selling sex her only option to make a living. So such a penalty is more likely to increase sexual offenses than reduce them. The hadīth adds even more absurdity by making the banishment limited for one ˙year. How can a woman who was thrown out on the street by her family because of a sexual offense be accepted back by them or into the

Textual Abrogation I 191 community that had stigmatized her after being on her own for a whole year? No wonder there is not a single narrative—at least not in the main collections of Hadīth—about an adulteress returning home after being ˙ banished for a whole year! This flaw in the dual-penalty law has forced scholars to interpret the banishment in various ways to avoid this difficulty: The Malikites and Shiites apply it, however, only to men, since the banishment of women means that they are forced to live far from their male relatives and may, therefore, lead to debauchery. The other schools, for the same reason, require that a woman who is sentenced to banishment must be accompanied, at her own expense, by a close male relative to stay with her and watch over her.142 These different implementations are arbitrary, focusing only on solving the problems introduced by this hadīth. ˙ and the various narratives on stoning disFifth, the dual-penalty hadīth ˙ tinguish between different sexual offenders on the basis of whether they are virgin or not or married or not, using a number of terms including muhsan ˙˙ and thayyib. In other words, the Hadīth differentiates between fornication ˙ and adultery. This contradicts the Qur’an, which does not make such a distinction. Sixth, the Hadīth has applied stoning to freemen and freewomen only and restricted ˙the penalty of the slaves to flogging.143 Abū Hanīfa, Mālik, ˙ It looks like Shāfiʿī, and Ibn Hanbal all agreed that slaves are not stoned. ˙ the Hadīth writers were forced into this distinction by the Qur’an’s ruling that ˙the penalty of the slave woman who commits sexual offenses is half that of the freewoman (4.25). Because the fatal penalty of stoning cannot be halved, halving the penalty was applied to the one-hundred lashes ruling in 24.2. But the latter is supposed to have been abrogated by the stoning for the muhsan offenders! In other words, the same verse is said to have ˙˙ been abrogated as the source of the ruling on muhsan freemen and free˙ ˙ as the source of the women, yet it remained, along with 4.25, operative penalty for the slaves. Actually, verse 4.25 makes it clear that the offending slave women are to receive half of the penalty of the freewomen if they were made muhsan, i.e. had accommodation provided for them by their ˙ of ihsān as a way to distinguish between the penalties husbands. Any ˙use ˙ ˙ in terms of type and not quantity contradicts the of freewomen and slaves very verse that introduced this distinction. So the Khawārij’s objection that the stoning penalty contradicts the Qur’anic penalty of 24.2, which can be halved, is more logical than the jurists’ ingenious but flawed use of 24.2 differently with respect to the freewomen and the slaves. Seventh, the dual-penalty hadīth introduces two penalties to two kinds ˙ of offending couples: two virgins and two non-virgins. But this ignores the relationship that involves a virgin and non-virgin. A better-thought-out

192 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law hadīth would have applied the penalties not to the couples, but to virgins ˙ non-virgins individually. and It must have become clear that stoning goes against the teachings of the Qur’an and the fundamentals of its law. It is only when the Qur’an and the stoning hadīths are looked at next to each other rather than using the ˙ interpreter of the Qur’an that the stark differences between Hadīth as the ˙ them become clear. The assumptions that those hadīths are authentic, that ˙ even that they abrogate they should be used to interpret the Qur’an, and Qur’anic rulings conceal the obvious problems in the Hadīth. There is no ˙ a matter of faith, argument that the stoning hadīths are being accepted as ˙ because that faith cannot be rationally reconciled with faith in the Qur’an. The two contradict each other. While misinforming about the Prophet’s words and practices, the biggest damage caused by false hadīths has been ˙ their success in becoming spectacles through which the Qur’an is read and understood. This has completely neutralized the scholars’ ability to use the Qur’an to identify forged hadīths. I have also shown that˙ even when looked at with no reference to the Qur’an, the stoning narratives, including the dual-penalty hadīth, contain ˙ serious intrinsic problems that completely undermine their credibility.

11.8

THE SOURCE OF THE STONING PENALTY

The penalty of stoning has been accepted by all Muslim scholars and is recognized by every legal school in Islam. The only Muslim groups that have rejected the penalty of stoning are the Khawārij, which appeared during the rule of ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib, and some of the Muʿtazila, which appeared ˙ flourished in the following few centuries. They early in the 2nd century and denied it on the grounds that it is not mentioned in the Qur’an. These two small groups of the past aside, stoning has been accepted by all jurists, including Abū Hanīfa, Mālik, Shāfiʿī, and Ibn Hanbal. The Shia scholars ˙ this penalty. ˙ have also accepted All also accept that the Prophet and his Companions applied the stoning penalty as they accept those Hadīth narratives. The fact that the Prophet ˙ stoned adulterers would have been sufficient for scholars to consider it the source of the stoning penalty. Stoning would have been seen as a sunna, and the Prophet’s Sunna is universally considered the second source of Islamic law, after the Qur’an. But Mālik and Ahmad both also quote hadīths mentioning the ston˙ conclude that they implied ˙ ing verses. We have to that this passage is the original source of the stoning penalty. In this case, the Prophet’s stoning for adultery becomes an execution of a Qur’anic ruling rather than a sunna introduced by him. This is a critical distinction between a sunna being an implementation of a Qur’anic ruling and being the source of a ruling, but it

Textual Abrogation I 193 is not uncommon to see these two different forms of Sunna being conflated. For instance, Dutton argues that the main reason for Mālik’s acceptance of the stoning penalty is that it was a sunna,144 but then Mālik’s acceptance of the stoning verse must surely mean that the practice of the Prophet in this case was an implementation of the Qur’an’s commandment, not the source of this penalty. Shāfiʿī never mentions the stoning verse. The source of stoning for him has to be the Sunna. But the problem here is that Shāfiʿī did not accept that the Sunna can abrogate the Qur’an. To deal with this difficulty, Shāfiʿī claimed that the stoning sunna indicated, rather than modified, the Qur’an’s ruling. Referring to verse 24.2, which ruled that the male and female adulterers should each be given one hundred lashes, and noting that the Prophet stoned rather than flogged the adulterous person who is thayyib, Shāfiʿī goes on to say that “the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah has indicated (dallat) that the intended subjects of the hundred stripes are the two free virgins” of the adulterous relations.145 The untenability of Shāfiʿī’s explanation of this radical change to the ruling is seen elsewhere as he contradicts his fundamental principle that the Sunna cannot abrogate the Qur’an. Noting that the Prophet stoned rather than flogged Māʿiz b. Mālik and the woman who slept with the man hired by her husband, he concludes that “the Sunna has indicated that flogging was abrogated for the two thayyib adulterers.”146 He also says that the home detention of verse 4.15 was “abrogated” by the dual-penalty hadīth. It may be argued that Shāfiʿī used the wrong word, but the truth ˙is that stoning cannot be seen as a clarification of the Qur’anic law, because the latter is unambiguous that it was applicable to all. Those who accept the historicity of the stoning by the Prophet have to see it as an instance of abrogation of the ruling in the mushaf. This abrogation must have been ˙ Sunna. This was not a problem for caused either by the stoning verse or˙the most scholars, as they admitted the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna. Even Ahmad b. Hanbal, who rejected this form of abrogation, managed ˙ ˙ this situation by accepting the stoning verse. But for Shāfiʿī, who rejected the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna and did not mention the stoning verse, stoning remained a problem. Muslim legal experts and scholars unanimously accept the stoning penalty, but they differ on its source. Yet we have seen that there are enormous problems in the stoning hadīths. The problems are so many and fundamen˙ be claimed to be historical only as a matter of tal that these hadīths can ˙ faith that ignores the many powerful arguments against their historicity. Any impartial examination of these narratives has to conclude that there is no chance whatsoever of any of them being authentic. This, in turn, must mean that there is no evidence that the Prophet administered stoning or that the Qur’anic penalties for adultery were abrogated by any of the reported hadīths. This is what a recent detailed study of the subject of stoning had to˙ conclude:147

194 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Between ca. 100 AH and ca. 250 AH the stoning narratives in Islamic exegesis had seen a considerable measure of evolution. As the existing sources show, at the beginning of the second century AH the penalty for zinā was considered in terms of Qur’an 2.15–6 and Qur’an 24.2. The surviving commentaries of Mujāhid b. Jabr (d. 100–104/718–722) and al-Dahhāk (d. 105/723)—so long as the attributions to these exe˙ genuine—show ˙˙ getes are little exegetical elaboration; no need is felt to explain the punishment for zinā by extra-Qur’an evidence. What is more, neither of the two exegetes is interested in the stoning penalty for zinā, nor do they seem to recognize different categories of sexual offenders (viz. adulterers and fornicators) . . . Muqātil b. Sulaimān’s (d. 150/767) Tafsīr is the earliest exegetical work that discusses stoning in some detail. It distinguishes between virgin and non-virgin offenders, and resorts to the prophetic sunna to elucidate the ordinance of Qur’an 2.15–6 and by extension that of Qur’an 24.2.148 This observation is in line with my analysis that stoning was first linked to the Prophet and later attributed to the Qur’an. The latter was facilitated by the already established concept of legal-textual abrogation. With this controversial mode of abrogation already accepted, at least by some, it was a relatively small move to make claims about a missing verse or two that would require the existence of another mode of abrogation, i.e. textual abrogation. But why and how did stoning become so accepted by Muslim scholars? I take the view of many Western scholars that various hadīths were ˙ authored to give legitimacy to practices and views that had already taken hold. I think this is what happened in the case of stoning. While stoning was rarely carried out, the penalty became unanimously accepted by scholars. This means that the stoning hadīths followed rather than preceded the ˙ adoption of the stoning penalty. With legal-textual abrogation already well established and accepted by many, making claims about operative verses that are missing from the mushaf, as in the case of the stoning verse, was ˙ not difficult to conceive. The ˙stoning passage tried to explain a clear conflict between the Qur’an and the Hadīth, which reflects a contradiction ˙ between the Qur’an’s law on adultery and the punishments for adultery that scholars adopted. This discrepancy was dealt with by inventing the stoning passage. Who exactly introduced the practice of stoning, as well as how and when after the Prophet it was introduced, is almost impossible to determine with certainty. We have almost no sources from the fi rst 150 years after Muhammad. We can only speculate, and this is what I will try here. One potentially significant observation is that ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb features particularly prominently and more than anyone else in the˙ ˙stoning Hadīth narratives. In one hadīth he confi rms that there was a stoning verse, ˙ that he was tempted to ˙ add it to the mushaf, and stresses that stoning says ˙˙

Textual Abrogation I 195 should not be ignored by the Muslims. Mālik is reported to have said that this incident happened shortly before ʿUmar’s assassination,149 which took place thirteen years after the Prophet’s death. ʿUmar is seen in another hadīth questioning the Prophet’s decision to ˙ the Prophet explained to him that she had pray over a stoned woman, but fully repented. In a third hadīth he says that he asked the Prophet to allow him to record the stoning˙ verse, which the Prophet was reluctant to do. ʿUmar also features in a number of other stoning hadīths. But one Bukhārī ˙ report is particularly interesting: Ibn Shihāb also said: “I was told by ʿUrwa b. al-Zubair that ʿUmar b. al-Khattāb banished [adulterers] and this has been the sunna since.”150 ˙˙ This hadīth claims that the banishment of the adulterer was started and ˙ established by ʿUmar as a sunna, i.e. regular practice. It uses the term “sunna” not to mean the practice of Muhammad but in a more general way to denote the “tradition” of the Muslims at the time. This is in line with the argument of Joseph Schacht and many Western scholars that the term “sunna” predates Islam and that during the early history of Islam the term was used broadly to refer to the community practice, which itself differed from one place to another.151 Shāfiʿī is usually credited with the eventual exclusive application of the term “sunna” to the example of the Prophet as he promoted the Prophet’s Sunna over any other practice. This view is in sharp contrast with the traditional Muslim belief that the term “sunna” was specifically used for the Prophet from his time. My theory is that it was ʿUmar who introduced the penalty of stoning. ʿUmar did not take part in the authoring of the hadīths on stoning. The ˙ after the penalty of likelihood is that these hadīths developed sometime ˙ stoning started to be adopted. But it is also possible that at times hadīths used claims made by ʿUmar linking the Prophet to this practice. ˙ This theory meets certain requirements that look necessary to explain how stoning managed to become universally accepted by Muslims. First, this practice must have started shortly after the Prophet. Indeed, Abū Bakr ruled for only two years after the Prophet before he died and ʿUmar took over. Second, the penalty must have been introduced by someone with moral and legal authority. ʿUmar was both as a Companion of the Prophet and the caliph of Muslims. Third, the person responsible must have been around long enough to turn stoning into the established penalty for adultery. ʿUmar ruled for ten years. Fourth, ʿUmar is known to have introduced laws regulating certain aspects of the man-woman relationship. He is famously claimed to have abolished the mutʿa, which is a form of temporary marriage that legalizes the sexual relationship between a man and a woman for the duration of the marriage contract and comes with very limited rights for the woman in comparison with the rights obtained through ordinary marriage.

196 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law There are around six decades between the assassination of ʿUmar and the birth of the founder of the oldest Islamic legal system, Abū Hanīfa. This ˙ time Abū is plenty of time for stoning hadīths to have developed by the ˙ Hanīfa was putting together the details of his legal system, in which ston˙ is acknowledged as having been established by the Prophet. ing There are other hadīths claiming that the Prophet and Abū Bakr, during ˙ the stoning, flogging, and banishment sentence. Some his caliphate, applied narratives suggest that Abū Bakr used to take ʿUmar’s advice, so it is a possibility that Abū Bakr might have stoned under the influence of ʿUmar. The latter, however, could not have influenced the Prophet. I think hadīths ˙ have suggesting that ʿAlī also stoned adulterers are unhistorical, and they been introduced to show that other Companions confi rmed that this is the right penalty for adultery. But why would ʿUmar introduce stoning as a penalty when he was well aware that the Prophet never practiced it and that it did not exist in the Qur’an? He might have taken the view that this would be the best way to prevent such a major sexual offense from spreading and damaging society. As the ruler of the new Muslim state and the leader of an emerging nation, ʿUmar had to introduce various legislations. Some if not most of these had no direct reference in the Qur’an or the Sunna, so human judgment had to be exercised. Perhaps, he reckoned that it would be better for the Muslim society if adultery was dealt with using capital punishment. I should also add that ʿUmar was known for being a hard man himself, before and after his embracement of Islam. It is important to stress again that the Qur’an set only a legal framework, and it is this framework that is eternal, not any specific ruling.152 ʿUmar, being a Companion of the Prophet, must have known this. He was aware that the Qur’an’s rulings on adultery could be specific to that time, so he might have reckoned that a different ruling was needed for the new Muslim community. The legal principle set by the Qur’an is that adultery is wrong and punishable. So I do not see ʿUmar’s attempt to introduce a new penalty for adultery as violating this Qur’anic legal principle. But it does violate another, which is the fact that the life of a person can be terminated only as a punishment for murder or to preserve the life of another, if the offender is found planning to unjustly kill someone. There is no moral code in the Qur’an the violation of which is punished with death. This is the fundamental flaw in stoning from the Qur’anic point of view. Also, stoning would not have been the only wrong penalty for adultery. Any justifiable alternative to the Qur’anic ruling must be of the same level of severity. For instance, if ʿUmar had replaced flogging with imprisonment or community service, that would have been reasonable. But one hundred stripes and capital punishment are not commensurate. I have already shown that the stoning and related hadīths are incredible ˙ historically. So using those very hadīths to draw a conclusion on what might ˙ have happened is fraught with speculation and uncertainty. But under the

Textual Abrogation I 197 presumption that these hadīths have retained some clue as to who might have started the stoning ˙penalty and related modifications to the Qur’anic law on sexual offenses, I would have to pick ʿUmar. But is it possible that ʿUmar’s name was simply used to establish the stoning penalty? We can never rule out this possibility. It is possible that those hadīths have had the name of ʿUmar added to them to give them authority, ˙ any link between ʿUmar and these hadīths is unhistorical. This, actuso ally, is the general position of Schacht ˙on the attribution of hadīths. He ˙ argues, for instance, that the name of ʿUmar was used by scholars in Iraq and Medina but that this does not mean that ʿUmar actually had any connection to these hadīths. More broadly: ˙ The use made of certain schools of the names of individual Companions as authorities for their doctrines accounts for the existence of common tendencies and characteristics, but it would be unwarranted to project these features back to the Companions themselves. It is significant that the earliest authorities of the Iraqians and the Meccans, respectively, were originally not Ibn Masʿūd and Ibn ʿAbbās themselves, but the “Companions of Ibn Masʿūd” and the “Companions of Ibn ʿAbbās.” This makes it pointless to consider the Companions of the Prophet personally responsible for the large-scale circulation of spurious traditions.153 Of course, this means that the Prophet is equally unconnected to hadīths ˙ that were ultimately linked to him. If the practice of stoning was not introduced by any of the Companions, then we have to conclude that it was introduced early in the Umayyad period, i.e. after the assassination of ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib. ˙ the Umayyad caliphate One argument against this later dating is that was established in highly controversial circumstances. Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufiān (60/679) was appointed Governor of Syria by ʿUthmān, ʿAlī’s predecessor. When ʿAlī was appointed as caliph after ʿUthmān’s assassination, he decided to remove Muʿāwiya from his position, as part of his effort to eradicate the corruption that had spread in the state during the rule of ʿUthmān. Muʿāwiya did not accept ʿAlī’s decision or his appointment as caliph, leading to an inconclusive civil war and ultimately a peace deal. Muʿāwiya established the hereditary Umayyad caliphate after ʿAlī’s murder. The Umayyad rulers never had the moral authority that the fi rst four caliphs had. They were also known for their secularism. This weakens the argument that an Umayyad ruler could have succeeded in establishing stoning as the penalty universally accepted by all Muslims. However, one can argue that a sexual offense such as adultery was so resented by the early Muslims that the introduction of a state penalty that is different and much harsher than that of the Qur’an could have been met with little reluctance

198

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

or opposition. Nevertheless, we have seen in one of the stoning hadīths ˙ ʿUmar himself expressing his deep concern that people might not be receptive to the stoning penalty because it is not in the Qur’an. This seems to make it more likely that this penalty was introduced by ʿUmar rather than by an Umayyad ruler. On balance, I fi nd the ubiquitous acceptance of the stoning penalty more likely to point in the direction of a higher moral authority than the Umayyad rulers, which would be ʿUmar. It is likely that ʿUthmān followed ʿUmar’s example. ʿAlī’s five years were focused on dealing with corruption in the state. Also, the wars and rebellions he had to deal with seriously undermined his authority as the caliph of all Muslims. This rendered him weaker and less effective than the fi rst three caliphs. This is one reason why he could not have abolished the non-Qur’anic penalty for adultery. There is another important observation. The Muslim community at the time of the Prophet was much smaller in size than during the time of ʿUmar. Later conquests brought more lands under Muslim rule and ultimately more converts to Islam. One would expect sexual offenses, including adultery, to have happened much more after the Prophet. So it is rather odd that most cases of adultery mentioned in the books of Hadīth are from ˙ penalty was the time of the Prophet! This suggests to me that the stoning not administered that often anyway, and would have happened only after the Prophet, of course. It was very rarely applied. This might be due to the fact that it took time for this ruling to gradually be accepted by all Muslim authorities. But it might also indicate that the severity of this punishment has deterred judges from applying it as often as they could have. We should also note how difficult it is to establish adultery without confession. In any case, accounts of stoning are almost completely absent from historical sources. One researcher has found only one instance of stoning to death in the records of the Ottoman Empire. This “case was regarded as so exceptional that it was recorded in the chronicles.”154 This can further explain why this penalty was not challenged by, say, ʿAlī. It is perfectly possible that he did not have to deal with any incident of adultery, so there was no opportunity for him to revoke the stoning punishment, which violated a legal principle of the Qur’an. Also, he might have applied the penalty of whipping, but that could have been interpreted as meaning that the offender was a slave. There is one particularly interesting narrative in the Muwatta’ of ˙ ˙ birth Mālik.155 ʿUthmān once sentenced an adulteress who had just given to death by stoning. When ʿAlī heard that he objected, arguing that the Qur’an has stipulated that the mother should give suck to her child for two years. ʿUthmān then sent someone to stop the execution, but it was too late. Yet there is already a hadīth claiming that the Prophet stoned a preg˙ child was weaned, although another version nant adulteress only after the claims that he stoned her after she gave birth. The hadīth about ʿUthmān ˙ shows that he was unaware of this second variant—otherwise he would

Textual Abrogation I 199 have disagreed with ʿAlī—or possibly that he had forgotten it. But any condition on the application of stoning is unhistorical anyway, because that punishment was never used in the Prophet’s time. This makes me think that if there is any seed of history in that hadīth, then it must be ʿAlī’s objection ˙ to stoning in general, not stoning before weaning the child. I have shown in this chapter that the so-called “stoning verse” was never part of the Qur’an and that this punishment contravenes the Qur’an’s law and cannot be attributed to the Prophet.

12 Textual Abrogation II The Five-Suckling Verse and the Anomalous Reading of the Oath Breaking Verse

Having dismissed the claim of textual abrogation in the case of the stoning verse in the previous chapter, I will continue in this chapter the investigation of textual abrogation by examining the other two cases. I will conclude that the allegations that the Qur’an contained a five-suckling passage and that an anomalous reading of the verse on breaking oaths had an additional word that is now inexistent in the mushaf are both unfounded. ˙˙ 12.1

THE FIVE-SUCKLING PASSAGE

Discussing divorce, verse 2.233 states that “mothers shall suckle their children two whole years, for those who wish to complete the time of suckling.” This command sets the length of the suckling period, should the divorced parents agree that the mother will breastfeed her child. During that period, the man has to provide for his divorcée. A separate verse lists the women that the man is prohibited from marrying. These include mothers-in-law and the following women that the man is related to by blood: mother, sisters, aunts, and nieces. The ban also covers breastfeeding relations, namely “your mothers who have given suck to you and your suckling sisters ” (4.23). As verse 2.233 is clear in that the length of the suckling can vary, so it is not either two years or none, jurists needed to decide what amount of breastfeeding would make it illegal for a woman to marry a man she suckled and for any girl she suckled to marry him, as mentioned in verse 4.23. The answer was provided in a hadīth attributed to ʿĀ’isha and is reported in ˙ many Hadīth collections including Nasā’ī,1 Tirmidhī, 2 Baihaqī,3 Dārimī,4 ˙ 5 and Dāraqutnī. This is the wording of this hadīth according to Muslim: ˙ ˙ In what was sent down of the Qur’an there used to be ten attested sucklings that set the ban [of marriage], then they were abrogated by five attested ones. The Prophet died and they (the five sucklings) were still being read as part of the Qur’an.6

Textual Abrogation II 201 As I explained,7 the absence of the ten-suckling verse from the mushaf ˙ combined with its inoperativeness indicates that this verse has been˙ the subject to legal-textual abrogation. The last part of the hadīth is what makes it relevant to our discussion ˙ five breast-feedings requirement was still in the here as it claims that the Qur’an at the time of the death of the Prophet. Given that there is no such verse in the mushaf and that its ruling is nonetheless considered to be ˙˙ still operative, scholars have had to conclude that this is a case of textual abrogation. This must also mean that the hadīth wrongly uses the term ˙ “Qur’an” instead of “mushaf.” ˙ ˙ But even this is no solution for the problem raised by ʿĀ’isha’s statement that the alleged verse was still being read as part of the Qur’an when the Prophet died. The Qur’an and the Sunna can be abrogated only by the Qur’an or the Sunna, but there can be no Qur’anic revelation or Sunna after the Prophet, so the alleged verse could not have been abrogated by another Qur’anic verse or a sunna. This would mean that the five-suckling verse could not have been abrogated and it must have been left out of the mushaf either by mistake or intentionally. No Muslim scholar, however, ˙ ˙ agree to this conclusion as it contradicts the verses that say that the would Qur’an is preserved by God and the belief by all that the compilation of the mushaf was a perfect, error-free process. ˙˙ Scholars have tried a number of solutions to get around this serious problem. Jassās has suggested that the hadīth is inauthentic or that it was not ˙ ˙ ˙transmitted.8 One ingenious ˙ attempt was to suggest that the fiveaccurately suckling verse was abrogated very late in the life of the Prophet, so ʿĀ’isha’s statement refers to those Muslims who had not learned about its abrogation by the time of the Prophet’s death and consequently kept reciting it.9 This desperate attempt at an explanation amounts to adding a qualifying condition to ʿĀ’isha’s statement that it does not have. If the term “Qur’an” in this hadīth can be interpreted as meaning the non-final Qur’an that some ˙ Muslims mistook for the final version, then any mention of this term in any hadīth can be open to such interpretation! This uncontrollable chaos is not ˙ something that Hadīth scholars would entertain. Another wild ˙attempt at a solution was to suggest that the hadīth did not mean that the Prophet had died but was about to die when ˙the verse was still in the Qur’an.10 This is an even worse suggestion as the hadīth could ˙ verse was not be clearer. In fact, the whole point of the hadīth is that the ˙ still there when the Prophet died. These attempts not only acknowledge the problem that ʿĀ’isha’s statement poses, but also show the impossibility of explaining it away. Other forms of this hadīth avoid this problem by cleverly removing the ˙ passage was still being recited when the Prophet claim that the five-suckling died. Such versions are found in Baihaqī11 and Dāraqutnī.12 In Muslim’s ˙ about the numvariant, ʿĀ’isha said the following in the context of talking ber of sucklings that bans marriage:

202 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law Ten attested sucklings were sent down in the Qur’an, then five attested ones were sent down.13 This version still does not exclude the possibility that the five-suckling verse was still part of the Qur’an when the Prophet died. I should also quote here a hadīth, also attributed to ʿĀ’isha, which I ˙ discussed earlier:14 The stoning verse and ridā’ al-kabīr ʿashr (suckling the adult ten times ˙ a sheet under my bed when the Prophet died. [ruling]) were recorded on But when he died and we were busy with his funeral, a domesticated animal entered the area and ate that sheet.15 John Burton and others have taken the clause “ridā’ al-kabīr ʿashr” to ˙ is partly based on mean the “ten-suckling verse.”16 This understanding linking this hadīth to ʿĀ’isha’s other hadīth in which she talks about the ˙ abrogation of˙ the ten-suckling and five-suckling verses. Also, the fact that this ruling was written down suggests that it was Qur’anic. Hadīth books ˙ have also listed the hadīth above with others that report the completely dif˙ ferent ruling that an adult can be put under the marriage ban by having him given ten breast-feedings.17 There is clearly confusion even in the Hadīth ˙ compilations as to what this hadīth exactly meant. ˙ Furthermore, ʿĀ’isha’s hadīth on the suckling verses states that the ten˙ suckling verse was later abrogated by the five-suckling one, so if the hadīth above is taken to refer to the ten-suckling verse, then this is in conflict˙ with the earlier hadīth as it suggests that this passage was still part of the Qur’an ˙ when the Prophet died. Actually, the suckling verses hadīth does not focus ˙ on the suckling of adults. As explained earlier, the hadīth on the suckling of the adults and its sup˙ an animal ate the sheet it was recorded on posed disappearance because is too absurd to be taken seriously. Also, its transmitter has been accused of lying.18 ʿĀ’isha’s hadīth about the ten-suckling and five-suckling verses later made its way˙ into most major Hadīth collections, but its ruling had been ˙ ignored by Abū Hanīfa and Mālik. The latter actually quotes the hadīth, ˙ but he hastens to add “the established practice is not like this.”19˙ They believed that one suckling establishes the marriage ban, which is how they interpreted verse 4.23. Some scholars have suggested that Mālik’s position is that the five-suckling verse, like the ten-suckling one, had both its wording and ruling abrogated. Opponents of abrogation have rejected the hadīth on the basis that it is isolate rather than successive, as it is reported ˙ ʿĀ’isha only, because no text can be considered to be Qur’anic unless it by was reported by many.20 Shāfiʿī, on the other hand, accepted ʿĀ’isha’s hadīth, so he believed that ˙ 21 the marriage ban is established by five breast-feedings. He thus implicitly

Textual Abrogation II 203 accepted textual abrogation, although he did not extend this to the stoning verse. He objected to Mālik’s position on the basis of yet another alleged saying of the Prophet that states that “one suckling or two do not establish the ban.” This is one example of how different hadīths were introduced to support different legal opinions and practices. ˙ Mahmūd Shaltūt, who was the Grand Imām of al-Azhar Mosque in ˙ 1958–1963, has made a significant observation about verse 4.23 that he rightly notes was ignored by scholars. He observes that the term “mothers” in “your mothers who have given suck to you” must indicate suckling the child for a long enough period for the wet nurse to feel like the child’s “mother.” This could not happen by breastfeeding the child a few times.22 This is further enforced by the fact that the child’s suckling period in the Qur’an is two years. For a wet nurse to feel like a mother to a child the nursing period must be quite long. However, Shaltūt stops short of making this logical conclusion as he opts for a traditional position, agreeing with Shāfiʿī’s opinion that the marriage ban is established by five sucklings. Shaltūt’s significant observation further undermines the hadīths on the two suckling ˙ Qur’an. passages as it shows their incompatibility with the

12.2

THE MISSING WORD FROM THE OATH BREAKING VERSE

This is the verse in question: Allah will not hold you to account for a casual word in your oaths, but He will hold you to account for making deliberate oaths. Its [the breaking of the oath] expiation is to feed ten poor persons with the average of the food you serve to your families, or to clothe them, or to set free a slave. He who does not find the means let him fast for three days (thalāthati ayyāmin). That is the expiation for your oaths when you have sworn [and broken them]. Keep your oaths. So Allah makes clear to you His signs that you may thank. (5.89)

The Muwatta’ has a hadīth that claims that the reading of the Qur’an of ˙ for “thalāthati ayyāmin mutatābiʿāt (three sucUbayy b. Kaʿb˙ ˙ had fasting cessive days)” instead of “thalāthati ayyāmin (three days).”23 ʿAbd al-Razzāq attributes the anomalous reading to Ibn Masʿūd instead of Ubayy. 24 The Musannaf of Ibn Abī Shaiba25 and the Sunan of Baihaqī 26 have narratives that˙ ascribe the reading that makes the three days successive to both Ubayy b. Kaʿb and Ibn Masʿūd. The additional term “mutatābiʿāt (successive)” is not found in the mushaf. At the same time, the word adds a description of those days that ˙˙ is otherwise not necessarily implied by the existing wording in the mushaf. ˙ This description is of legal significance. The combination of these two ˙facts with the claim that the word “successive” is of Qur’anic origin has led

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some scholars to consider it an instance of textual abrogation. 27 A hadīth in Baihaqī attributes to ʿĀ’isha the claim that the passage “a number of˙ other days” in 2.284, which gives the sick and travelers the permission to fast Ramadan at other times, also originally had the word “successive” but that later “saqatat (it was gone).” This prompted a comment to explain what ˙ meant: “She meant ʿnusikhat (it was abrogated).’ There is no she must have other appropriate interpretation.”28 Here abrogation is being called upon again to remedy an otherwise problematic claim. Without “abrogation,” ʿĀ’isha’s claim would have meant that the word “successive” was unintentionally lost from the mushaf, which suggests that the latter is incomplete. ˙ ˙ this implication. The comment acknowledges However, the suggestion that the word “successive” was included in the Qur’anic reading of one or two of the Prophet’s Companions is not found in the main Hadīth collections and is mentioned in only a few sources. These hadīths˙ have been rejected on the basis that they are isolate (ahād) ˙ whereas˙ the Qur’an is successive (mutawātir). 29 In his commentary on 5.89, Tabarī has completely rejected the hadīths about the existence of such a ˙ Qur’an’s reading, whether attributed˙ to Ubayy or Ibn Masʿūd.30 In fact, discussions of textual abrogation often mention only the cases of the stoning and five-suckling verses. Even Burton’s detailed study ignores the case of the anomalous reading of 5.89. I have covered this case in this chapter for completion. These Hadīth narratives developed originally from a view that interpreted the ˙three days of fasting as “successive” and promoted this practice. Somehow this view was turned into a Qur’anic reading that included this word as part of the verse. The source of this view itself is probably verse 4.92 which talks about the expiation for killing a believer by mistake. The alternative expiative act available to the believer who commits this sin but does not have the means to pay the fi nancial penalty is to fast for “two successive months ” or “shahrain mutatābiʿain.” The similarity between the two verses and cases of expiation led scholars to suggest that the three days in verse 5.89 were also meant to be successive. This interpretive view was developed into a narrative about an unhistorical reading of verse 5.89 that had the word “successive” in it.

12.3

THE FALLACY OF TEXTUAL ABROGATION

As we saw in the case of stoning, the suckling hadīth and the narrative ˙ about the missing word from verse 5.89 were used in order to address questions that the Qur’an seems to have left unanswered. But there is a significant difference between the case of stoning and these two. The “stoning verse” introduces a penalty that makes the flogging penalty “specific” to fornication, i.e. it changes the Qur’anic ruling on adultery. The ruling on the number of breast-feedings, on the other hand, can be

Textual Abrogation II 205 reconciled with the Qur’an’s ruling, as it can be seen as explaining in more detail the act of suckling in verse 4.23 that establishes the marriage ban. Similarly, the absence of the word “successive” from verse 5.89 does not mean that the three days cannot be successive. So while these two are still cases of textual abrogation, the abrogated texts do not abrogate any ruling in the mushaf. ˙ ˙ at the hadīths that mention the two passages and the A closer look ˙ 5.89 exposes their high degree of unreliability. anomalous reading of verse Yet only a few scholars have dared to reject the hadīths on the stoning and ˙ suckling passages, because those hadīths are mentioned in Muslim and, in ˙ the case of the stoning passage, Bukhārī, which are considered by Sunni Muslims the most “sound” Hadīth compilations. In fact, describing each as ˙ “sahīh (sound)” is usually understood to mean “totally sound.” ˙ ˙Alī ˙ b. Hazm has a rather strange position. On the one hand, he accepts ʿ ˙ 31 textual abrogation. On the other, he justifies the view of some that the stoning, five-suckling, and ten-suckling passages might not have been part of the Qur’an, 32 which deprives textual abrogation of its two main cases. Mustafā Zaid is in a small minority of scholars who rejected textual abro˙ ˙ He also rejected the five-suckling verse and stoning verse, as well as gation. the hadīth that suggests that ʿUmar considered adding the stoning verse to ˙ haf. But he still accepted that stoning was a sunna and that it specithe mus fied the˙ ˙ruling for a certain group of offenders mentioned in verse 24.2, which talks about those who commit adultery in general. Rejecting the stoning ruling would have required rejecting many hadīths and an estab˙ does not reject the lished ruling, which Zaid was not willing to do.33 He hadīths on the alleged anomalous reading of 5.89, but he accepts that this ˙ not a case of abrogation anyway. is Even Jabrī, who denied the occurrence of abrogation altogether and the existence of the stoning verse, did not go as far as rejecting linking this punishment to the Prophet. He suggested that this punishment was revealed to Muhammad in the form of a sunna rather than Qur’anic verse.34 He thinks that this sunna made the Qur’anic penalty of whipping specific to the unmarried adulterers and made stoning the punishment of the married offenders.35 The 20th century Shia Imām Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī has also rejected the stoning verse but failed to reject the attribution of this ruling to the Sunna.36 The stoning and five-suckling passages are the only two claimed to represent textual abrogation, although a very small minority of scholars add the anomalous reading of 5.89. Because their rulings are said to be operative, jurists could not explain the absence of these passages and the additional word of 5.89 from the mushaf as a result of legal-textual abrogation. ˙ They were forced to introduce a˙ new mode of abrogation. That aside, textual abrogation is like legal-textual abrogation in that both try to explain missing verses from the mushaf to shield the Qur’an against any accusation ˙ ˙ and the mushaf against the claim that it is of not being protected by God ˙˙

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incomplete. Abrogation is presented as a divine device that God used to manage His revelation. As I mentioned earlier, the existence of various claims that had been collated under legal-textual abrogation made it easy for the claims that fall under textual abrogation to be created. The operativeness of these passages required the introduction of a new mode of abrogation. Having shown that those two passages and the anomalous reading and the hadīths related to them are forgeries and have nothing linking them ˙ Qur’an or the Prophet, I have to conclude that the abrogation of a to the Qur’anic text but not its ruling is a complete myth. What sense would it make for the wording of an operative verse to be excluded from the mushaf? ˙˙ The lack of any logic in this form of abrogation becomes even clearer when we recall that there is another mode of abrogation whereby inoperative verses exist in the mushaf! Regardless of how textual abrogation should be ˙ ˙ conclude that this mode of abrogation is illogical, understood, one has to unhistorical, and the work of imagination. Scholars have realized the illogicality of textual abrogation so they tried to explain its existence. Suyūtī suggested that the removal of the stoning ˙ means it is not recited also, is to make the passage from the Qur’an, which matter easier for the Muslims, as this is the harshest of all legal penalties.37 Suyūtī ignores the fact that this already poor explanation does not apply to the˙ five-suckling passage anyway. Jabrī rejected Suyūtī’s explanation by ˙ quoting verse 5.67, which addresses the Prophet as follows: “Deliver that which has been sent down to you from your Lord. If you do not, you will not have delivered His message.” He argues that Muhammad’s failure to record any

Qur’anic verse would have amounted to a failure to discharge the responsibility expressed in this verse.38 As there were already narratives tracing stoning to the Sunna, further Hadīth reports were created about the existence of a verse from which ston˙ originated. These hadīths were needed to explain the fact that the coming ˙ of stoning had no basis in the Qur’an and even monly accepted penalty broke rulings in the mushaf. Textual abrogation was then formulated to ˙ found in the mushaf. explain why this verse is ˙not ˙ Similarly, the five-suckling verse and the ˙ anomalous reading of verse 5.89 are used to give a Qur’anic basis for the respective practices they promote, as jurists have disagreed on these practices. Unlike the case of stoning, these two pieces of text do not conflict with the mushaf and could have been presented as interpretations of the relevant verses in˙ ˙the mushaf. These ˙ Qur’an interpretations were instead claimed to have been hardcoded in ˙the to give them the edge over the competing interpretations and hadīths. ˙

13 Abrogation of the Sunna

While the focus of this book has been abrogation in the Qur’an, it would be fitting to round off our study with a brief examination of abrogation in the Sunna. In principle, there is no difficulty whatsoever associated with this concept. Indeed, it is only to be expected that the Prophet would at times change a command he had given or that God, through the Qur’an and/or other forms of revelation, would override an instruction that the Prophet had issued. It is important to note that any conclusion reached about the abrogation of the Sunna has no implications for the abrogation of the Qur’an. “Sunna” is a completely different concept from the “Qur’an” and, unlike the latter, cannot be accurately and clearly defi ned. As I explain in Appendix A, the term “Sunna” refers to the actions and views of the Prophet. These are at times guided by divine, non-Qur’anic inspiration and at others based on his reasoning, i.e. the kind of rational views that any person takes. But given that abrogation has developed to focus on the abrogation of one divine ruling by another, this would put the Prophet’s personal views outside the domain of abrogation. For instance, the Prophet may have told the Muslims to do something because of certain circumstances but later instructed them to do something else because of changes to those circumstances or because he realized something that he was not aware of earlier. Such a description implies that the Prophet opined like any human being. On the other hand, if these instructions were subtly inspired by God, then the case would meet the requirements of abrogation. It is impossible, of course, to completely rule out the possibility that something the Prophet said or did was not divinely inspired. One can never prove that God did not influence the Prophet to act in the way he did. The only exceptions are certain actions by the Prophet that God has criticized in the Qur’an, such as his behavior toward a blind person (80.1–10). But even these incidents may be claimed to have been designed by God to reveal specific verses and convey to the Muslims certain lessons. Even if these are excluded, the fact that the source of a Prophet’s actions can never, in the absence of any explicit evidence to the contrary, be ascertained not to be

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driven by subtle divine inspiration has resulted in the term “Sunna” being effectively applied to everything the Prophet did, said, approved, or disapproved. Muslim scholars make no distinction between the sources of the Prophet’s various actions. This must have contributed to the view of many Muslims, which is at times expressed explicitly and at others implicitly, that everything the Prophet said or did had God behind it one way or another.1 It must be said, however, that this is not a view one can draw from the Qur’an. Muhammad is portrayed as the recipient of divine revelation and as having the full support of God in his mission to deliver the message to people. But Muhammad is also seen as a human being who could make mistakes. The Sunna, therefore, has an element of divine inspiration behind it, but much of it reflects the thinking of Muhammad the man as he tries his best to follow and guide Muslims on the way that God chose for them. This view can be reconciled in two ways with the verse “nor does he speak out of caprice” (53.3), which is often cited to suggest that the Prophet’s action was always influenced by divine inspiration. First, this verse specifically denies that any Prophet’s teachings were driven by his desires; it does not make a general statement that he never took a view or decision that did not involve divine inspiration. Second, the next verse, “this is but a revelation revealed” (53.4), indicates that the subject of verse 53.3 is the Qur’an, i.e. 53.3 confi rms that what Muhammad claimed to be Qur’an revealed by God was indeed so. The popular broad defi nition of Sunna suggests that the literature must have identified numerous cases of abrogation of the Sunna, as the Prophet would have changed his instructions to Muslims in various situations many times over the twenty-two years of his mission. Surprisingly, this is not the case. There are only a small number of sunnas that are discussed as instances of abrogation. I see this illogical phenomenon as another indication of the gap between the history of the Prophet and Islam that has reached us and what really happened. I will focus in this chapter on the most famous of these cases of abrogation. Shāfiʿī, Ibn Hanbal, according to one of two variant reports, and some ˙ believed that the Sunna can be abrogated by the Sunna of their followers only. But the majority of scholars accept that the Sunna may be abrogated by the Qur’an or the Sunna. I will discuss both types of abrogation, dealing with them in separate sections.

13.1

ABROGATION OF THE SUNNA BY THE QUR’AN

In order to establish the occurrence of this type or abrogation, we need to fi nd a sunna that was overridden by a later Qur’anic verse. I shall consider four cases.

Abrogation of the Sunna 209

13.1.1 The Change of Qibla The term “qibla” appears seven times in the Qur’an. Verse 10.87 instructs Moses and Aaron to make their homes a “qibla” for their people in ancient Egypt before they all escaped from that country. We explained elsewhere that the term in this verse means “destination,” as God instructed the Israelites to gather where Moses and Aaron lived. 2 In the other six occurrences, this term denotes the direction that the Muslim should face when praying, which is what interests us here. These are the four verses in which the term appears: The foolish among people will say: “What has turned them (the Muslims) from the qibla they had?” Say [O Muhammad!]: “Allah’s is the east and the west. He guides whom He wants to a straight path.” (2.142) Thus We appointed you [O you who believe!] as a middle nation that you might be witnesses to the people, and that the Messenger might be a witness to you. We did not appoint the qibla that you [O Muhammad!] were following except so that We know who follows the Messenger from him who turns on his heels. It is difficult [to accept] but for those whom Allah has guided. Allah would never leave your faith [O you who believe!] to waste. Allah is gentle and compassionate with people. (2.143) We have seen your turning your face about toward the heavens, so we shall assign to you a qibla that you will be pleased with. Turn your face toward al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, and wherever you [O you who believe!] be turn your faces toward it. Those who were given the Book know that it is the truth from their Lord; Allah is not unaware of what they do. (2.144). If you should bring the People of the Book every sign they would not follow your qibla. You will not adopt their qibla and they will not adopt the qibla of each other. If you follow their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you will be one of the wrongdoers. (2.145)

These verses discuss the change of the qibla to al-Masjid al-Harām, which embraces the Kaʿba, in Mecca. The old qibla is not identifi˙ed, but Muslim scholars agree that it was in Jerusalem. This identification is based on various hadīths in Ahmad, 3 Ibn Māja,4 Baihaqī, 5 and others. ˙ ˙ Muslims asking the Prophet after the One hadīth in Ahmad talks about ˙ ˙ change of qibla about what would happen to the Muslims who died when Bait al-Maqdis, which is the name for Jerusalem often used by early scholars, was still the qibla.6 Tabarī also quotes Mujāhid as having said that the ˙ 7 fi rst qibla was Bait al-Maqdis. Scholars have pointed out that the people who were upset with the change of the qibla in verse 2.142 were the Jews, and that is because the early Muslims fi rst shared with them their qibla. However, it can also be argued that the objection in 2.142 seems to suggest that the fi rst qibla of the Muslims is not being referred to by the objectors as if it was the Jews’.

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The identity of the fi rst qibla is not of interest to us here. What is interesting, however, is the Qur’an’s clear statement that the qibla was changed. Another significant observation is God’s attribution of the appointment of the fi rst qibla to Himself: “We did not appoint the qibla that you were following except so that We know who follows the Messenger from him who turns on his heels .” The appointment of the fi rst qibla, then, was not a decision taken

by Muhammad as a result of some reasoning, but a commandment that he implemented. This command, however, is not mentioned in the Qur’an; only the change is. This must mean that the Prophet received the command to pray facing Jerusalem in the form of a non-Qur’anic revelation and that he communicated it to the Muslims accordingly. Consequently, the Prophet’s instruction to the Muslims to face the fi rst qibla falls under the defi nition of Sunna. The change of the qibla, then, is an instance of the abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an. Shawkānī has claimed that the change of the qibla represents a case of legal-textual abrogation. He has suggested that the command to face Jerusalem was revealed in the Qur’an.8 Shawkānī might be completely alone in taking this view. All sources that I have seen treat this as a case of abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an, i.e. it was the Prophet who instructed the Muslims to use the fi rst qibla. This would have been an ideal candidate for a legal-textual abrogation claim. Yet the command of the fi rst qibla was not claimed to be Qur’anic or, if it was, the claim did not endure despite the fact that this would have fit the defi nition of legal-textual abrogation perfectly. This confi rms my conclusion that this law-focused defi nition developed only later. Legal-textual abrogation developed as a way of explaining the claims about Qur’anic verses that are missing from the mushaf. All but one of the legal-textual ˙ ˙ non-legal verses. The only passage abrogation cases we reviewed involved that involved a legal ruling, which is the ten-suckling passage, seems to have survived because it also involved a case of textual abrogation, i.e. the five-suckling passage. Unlike legal-textual abrogation, textual abrogation was introduced to serve a legal function.

13.1.2 The Fasting of ‘Āshūrā’ There are a number of hadīths suggesting that the Prophet and early Muslims used to fast a day called˙ ʿĀshūrā’, which is the tenth day of Muharram—the ˙ authority first month of the Arabic calendar. One narrative in Bukhārī on the of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufiān states that the Prophet has said: “This is the day of ʿĀshūrā’, the fasting of which has not been commanded for you, but I am fasting it, so whoever wants can fast it and whoever wants can choose not to.”9 Another story in Bukhārī attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās states that when the Prophet came to the Medina he found the Jews fasting the day of ʿĀshūrā’. When he asked about it he was told: “This is an auspicious day. On this

Abrogation of the Sunna 211 day, Allah saved the Children of Israel from their enemy, so Moses fasted it.” The Prophet replied: “I have more of a right to Moses than you,” so he fasted it and ordered the Muslims to fast it.10 This account makes the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ obligatory rather than optional. Another hadīth in ʿAbd ˙ of ʿĀshūrā’ al-Razzāq attributes to the Prophet a description of the fasting as the “penance of the year.”11 Our interest in the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ stems from the existence of reports claiming that the command to observe it was changed when the obligatory fasting of Ramadan was revealed in the Qur’an: O you who believe! Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you that you may become pious. (2.183) [It is for] a certain number of days, but he amongst you who is sick or on a journey, then let him fast a number of other days. And those who are able to do it they must redeem it by feeding a poor person; but he who volunteers [to do it] as a good work it is better for him; and if you fast it is better for you, if you know. (2.184) The month of Ramadan in which the Qurʾan was sent down as a guidance to people and as clear signs of guidance and discrimination [between right and wrong]. He of you who witnesses this month then let him fast it; but he who is sick or on a journey, then let him fast a number of other days; Allah desires ease for you and does not desire hardship for you, so that you may complete the number [of days] and say “Allah is great” for that He has guided you and that you may give thanks. (2.185)

Muslim has a hadīth, on the authority of ʿĀ’isha, that makes the fast˙ ing of ʿĀshūrā’, which Muhammad observed, a pre-Islamic practice of the Quraish, Muhammad’s tribe, rather than something he took from the Jews of Medina. When he migrated to Medina he continued to observe it and ordered the Muslims also to do so. But when the fasting of Ramadan was revealed, he made the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ optional.12 The claim that the fasting of Ramadan made the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ optional is also found in Bukhārī,13 Tirmidhī,14 and Baihaqī,15 among others. Is this, then, a case of abrogation of a sunna? First, the accounts about the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ are confused. It is at times presented as a pre-Islamic practice, at others as something Muhammad introduced, and yet at other times as a practice he copied from the Jews. The significance of this is that if it was not introduced by the Prophet, then it cannot be claimed to have been commanded by God as a sunna, and so overriding it would not be a case of abrogation. Second, while some hadīths claim that the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ was made optional by the fasting˙ of Ramadan, others claim that it was originally optional. If it was already optional, then the defi nition of abrogation does not apply in this case either. Additionally, it means that the revelation about the fasting of Ramadan did not affect it anyway.

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Those who accept that the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ was abrogated, such as Zaid,16 ignore these serious issues. Yet only one version of the reported contradictory accounts can make a case for abrogation. There is no way, however, to confirm what the story of the fasting of ʿĀshūrā’ was. It is not possible to claim with reasonable confidence that this fasting was involved in abrogation.

13.1.3 Prohibiting Speaking during Prayer There are a number of hadīths stating that the early Muslims used to speak during the prayer until˙ the revelation of a verse that prohibited this practice. Bukhārī,17 Muslim,18 Tirmidhī,19 Abū Dāwūd, 20 and others report that Zaid b. Arqam said that the Muslims used to speak while standing next to each other during the prayer until the following verse was revealed: “Stand up for Allah in devotion” (2.238). Another narrative in Nasā’ī attributes to Ibn Masʿūd the statement that he used to greet the Prophet while he was praying and the Prophet used to reply. But after returning from his migration to Abyssinia, Ibn Masʿūd one day greeted the Prophet when he was praying but the Prophet did not reply. After the prayer was fi nished, the Prophet told him: “Allah introduces whatever He wants, and He has revealed that there should be no speech during the prayer.”21 Other hadīths confi rm that the Prophet did not answer people who ˙ while he was praying but without stating that this marked a spoke to him change in practice. Given that the prayer was introduced through the Prophet, the fact that the Muslims used to speak during the prayer is taken to mean that the Prophet himself must have allowed that. This would then make this permission a sunna. Accordingly, the hadīths that say that the permission to speak during the prayer was revoked ˙by the Qur’an are taken to represent a case of abrogation. The verse in question says nothing about its supposed stopping of this practice. Praying in total devotion must mean not to do anything that would distract the person from concentrating on the prayer, which would include not speaking to others. But the command is broader than being restricted only to the act of speaking during the prayer. This may be a case of abrogation, but only if the Prophet had indeed permitted the Muslims to speak to each other while praying and if this permission was rescinded by verse 2.238, and neither of these two is a certainty.

13.1.4 Sexual Intercourse in Ramadan The fasting of any day in Ramadan begins at dawn and ends at sunset. Once the sun has set, the Muslim can eat, drink, and have sexual intercourse with his spouse any time from then until dawn, when the next fasting day

Abrogation of the Sunna 213 begins. But various hadīths claim that the rules of fasting Ramadan were different in the early ˙days and that verse 2.187 abrogated the previous rules and changed them to how the fasting has since been observed. This is the verse in full for reference: It has been made permissible to you to go to your wives in the night of the fast. They are a vestment for you, and you are a vestment for them. Allah knows that you used to betray yourselves, and He has forgiven you and pardoned you. So now lie with them, and seek what Allah has prescribed for you. Eat and drink until the white thread shows clearly to you from the black thread at the dawn, then complete the fast to the night. Do not lie with them while you are retreating in the mosques. Those are Allah’s bounds so do not draw near to them. Thus Allah makes clear His signs to people that they may be pious. (2.187)

Those same hadīths, however, disagree on what rulings this verse abro˙ gated, suggesting three different alternatives. Strangely, but not surprisingly, these different variants are at times reported in the same compilation of Hadīth, which is what Bukhārī does. ˙ First, the right of the Muslim to eat, drink, and have sexual intercourse with his spouse in the night used to end as soon as he or she slept. In other words, the fasting of the following day started for this Muslim as soon as he or she slept rather than at dawn. This is suggested by a narrative on the authority of al-Barā’ b. ʿĀzib found in Tirmidhī, 22 Baihaqī, 23 and Dārimī. 24 This is Bukhārī’s version: The Companions of Muhammad were such that if a man was fasting and slept before he broke the fast then he would not eat later in that night and the following morning until the [following] night [which is the time to break the fast]. Once Qais b. Sirma al-Ansārī was fasting ˙ and at the time of breaking the fast he asked his wife:˙ “Do you have food?” She replied: “No, but I will go and do something for you.” As he had been working all day, he succumbed to sleep. Then his wife came and saw him asleep so she said: “Poor man!” In the middle of the following day he fainted [as he had not had any food the day and night before]. This was made known to the Prophet so the following verse was revealed: “It has been made permissible to you to go to your wives in the night of the fast.” So they (Muhammad’s Companions) were very happy by it. The following [continuation of the verse] was then revealed: “Eat and drink until the white thread shows clearly to you from the black thread at the dawn.”25 One problem in this story is that it presents the fi rst part of verse 2.138 as having solved the difficulty that Qais found himself in, which is not the case. That part of the verse talks only about permitting the husband to have

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sex with his wife in the night during the fasting month, yet Qais’ problem was the fact that he could not eat later in that night because he slept. This contradiction is absent, however, in Ahmad’s version of the hadīth ˙ above. 26 The hadīth has another narrative ˙ suggesting that ʿUmar b. ˙ al-Khattāb had sexual intercourse with his concubine or wife after he had ˙ ˙ went to see the Prophet and mentioned that to him, so Allah sent slept. He down: “It has been made permissible to you to go to your wives in the night of the fast . . . complete the fast to the night.” Abū Dāwūd27 and Baihaqī 28 report a rather strange hadīth that seems to ˙ combine both of the stories above: Our Companions have told us that it used to be such that if a man broke his fast and then slept before he had eaten, he could not eat until the morning. ʿUmar one day came to have sexual intercourse with his wife but she said that she had slept. He thought that she was making excuses, so he had intercourse with her. A man from the Ansār wanted food but ˙ for you,” but he they said to him: “Wait until we warm up something slept. When it was morning the following verse was sent down: “It has been made permissible to you to go to your wives in the night of the fast.” The role of the morning in this hadīth does not seem to make sense, ˙ because people fast in the morning, and rather contradicts what the other hadīths say. ˙ The second form of the abrogated rulings is reported by Bukhārī in the following hadīth, which he also attributes to al-Barā’: ˙ When the fasting of Ramadan was revealed, they (the married males) used to not approach their wives during the whole month of Ramadan. But some men used to betray that command, so Allah revealed: “Allah knows that you used to betray yourselves, and He has forgiven you and has pardoned you.”29

The hadīth must be using part of the verse to refer to all of it, as this part ˙ that God has pardoned those who broke his command, but it only states does not talk about changing any rulings. The latter are explained in other parts of the verse. The third variant is found in Baihaqī and is attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās: At the time of the Prophet, once people performed the night prayer, the consumption of food and drink and having sexual intercourse became prohibited so they had to fast until the next day. But one man betrayed himself and had intercourse with his wife after he performed the night prayer but he did not eat. Allah wanted to make this easier for the rest, lessening of the command, and a benefit so He said: “Allah knows that you used to betray yourselves, and He has forgiven you and has pardoned you.”30

Abrogation of the Sunna 215 The three versions of the abrogated ruling are mutually exclusive, so at best one of them can be right. But it is also possible that none is. The verse’s reference to the fact Muslims used to betray themselves and the expression “so now lie with them” suggest that this verse did change an established practice. Because what this verse permits is nowhere in the Qur’an reported to have been prohibited, any prohibition must have been a sunna introduced by the Prophet. So this is a possible case of abrogation of the Sunna by the Qur’an. There is no suggestion that the older ruling might have been Qur’anic. As in the case of qibla, the fact that such a passage would have been about an inoperative ruling means that there would have been no need to claim it once existed.

13.2

ABROGATION OF THE SUNNA BY THE SUNNA

I will study here the most cited narratives of abrogation of the Sunna by the Sunna. If these accounts are historical, then they may be seen as cases of abrogation.

13.2.1 Praying Standing instead of Sitting Bukhārī31 and Muslim32 report on the authority of ʿĀ’isha that one day the Prophet was at home not feeling well. He led the prayer sitting but the people behind him were standing, so he signaled to them to sit down. When he fi nished the prayer he said: “The imām is to be emulated. If he prostrates, you should prostrate; if he stands up, you should stand up; and if he prays sitting, you should sit.” Words very similar to these are also attributed to the Prophet in a different story, which is also found in both Bukhārī33 and Muslim.34 Anas b. Mālik is reported to have said that one day the Prophet fell off his horse, cutting his right side. He then performed one of the prayers while sitting, and the people behind him also prayed sitting. After the prayer he said those words confi rming that the praying people behind the imām should always emulate him. However, Bukhārī has a hadīth indicating that the Prophet changed this practice in his last illness.˙ ʿĀ’isha said that as the Prophet was too ill, he asked Abū Bark to lead the night prayer. One day later, the Prophet felt better so he decided to join the midday prayer. He asked to be seated next to Abū Bark, and then led the prayer sitting. Abū Bark was emulating the Prophet as the imām, but standing and sitting as usual, and the people were emulating Abū Bark. 35 Having the Muslims stand up as usual even if the imām was praying while sitting is considered to have abrogated the earlier Prophetic instruction to the Muslims to completely emulate the imām.

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13.2.2 Preserving the Meat of Pilgrimage Sacrifices A number of hadīths have claimed that the Prophet instructed the Muslims not to eat the˙ meat of the sacrifice of pilgrimage after three days of its slaughter. Other hadīths claim that the Prophet later removed that ban. The ˙ Qur’an has no legislation about this issue. One narrative in Mālik,36 Muslim,37 Abū Dāwūd,38 and Nasā’ī39 states that ʿĀ’isha said that the original ban was introduced because the Prophet wanted to make sure that there was enough food for some bedouins in hardship who came to visit the Muslims seeking help. By stopping the Muslims from eating the meat of animals that had been sacrificed over three days earlier, he ensured that there was still meat available for the coming guests. This suggests that the ban was intended to be in place for days or weeks at most, but there is no indication in that particular hadīth that this was the case. Another story in Muslim states that the˙ ban was imposed for one year during which people were struggling to fi nd enough food, so this move made those who had more than they needed share with the needy.40 A slightly different variant of the story in Ibn Māja confi rms that the ban was intended to help people with hardship but it does not state that the ban was in place for one year.41 All Hadīth collections that covered this topic have narratives claiming that the˙ Prophet later lifted that ban. Often such hadīths fi rst confi rm that the Prophet had banned people from eating their˙ sacrifices after the third day of their slaughter, and they then state that he later lifted the time limit and permitted them to store the meat for later use. Yet Muslim42 and Nasā’ī43 recount a narrative whereby ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib gave a sermon on a day of ʿĪd, i.e. after the pilgrimage, in which he ˙ said that the Prophet banned people from eating their sacrifices after three days. The context suggests that this sermon was delivered after the death of the Prophet, implying that the ban was still operative then. Ibn ʿUmar is also alleged to have confi rmed this ban, and the statement again seems to have been made after the Prophet. Of course, there is nothing to prevent the possibility that the Prophet introduced such a ban and at some later point removed it. But, again, the state of the hadīths does not allow us to be certain. However, some of ˙ those who accept this story do not consider it a case of abrogation. Zaid, for instance, points out that this ban was introduced for a temporary need, after which it was lifted, and that the ban could be put back if the same circumstances returned.44 Similarly, Ghazālī, who rejects abrogation, interprets the two rulings as applying to two different circumstances and claims that they do not represent a case of abrogation. The ban comes into effect when there is a famine to force the better-off to share with those who are in need and it is abolished so people can store meat again when the suffering has gone.45

Abrogation of the Sunna 217

13.2.3 Making Juices in Certain Vessels and Visiting Graveyards Some of the hadīths that confi rm the imposing of the ban on eating sac˙ rificial meat after three days of its slaughter and its later removal mention another two practices that were fi rst banned and later permitted by the Prophet. These are visiting graveyards and making date, apple, and other juices in certain vessels. Hadīth narratives state that the Prophet banned making drinking juice ˙ in certain kinds of vessels. Some versions only talk about the prohibition of “drinking” in these vessels. Hadīths in Bukhārī46 and others name four ˙ by the ban, although some versions of kinds of vessels that were covered these hadīths name only two. ˙ 47 Bukhārī and others report another hadīth in which the Prophet is ˙ they do not have vessels other informed that this ban is hurting people as than those he banned. This prompted him to abolish the ban. The ban is thought to have been introduced because these vessels were once used for fermenting drinks into intoxicants. It was introduced as a precaution so that no juice develops into an alcoholic drink. Indeed, some hadīths report the lifting of the ban followed by a reminder by the Prophet ˙ the Muslims not to drink any intoxicant. to Zaid, who considers this a case of abrogation, reckons that those vessels were banned early on when Muslims were still getting used to the ban on intoxicants, so such a ban helped them not to yearn for the old days as a result of the juice they were making developing a taste of alcohol.48 Visiting graveyards is also said to have fi rst been banned and later permitted. The hadīths do not explain the rationale of this ban, but this is ˙ usually explained as a precautionary measure to prevent the Muslims in the early days from deviating from their new monotheistic religion as they were originally polytheistic.49 This anachronistic interpretation is influenced by practices after the Prophet whereby the graves of certain righteous individuals started to be visited by Muslims to seek blessings from those shrines. Graveyards had no such status before Islam and were not part of the polytheistic practices of the time. One hadīth in ʿAbd al-Razzāq ˙ because “it reminds of explains that visiting the graveyards was allowed the hereafter.”50 Jabrī rejects the claim of abrogation in this case by arguing that the earlier ban on visiting graveyards and its later overturning represented “personal” opinions by Muhammad rather than divine revelations.51 As I explained earlier, if a Prophet’s ruling is not considered divinely inspired it would not qualify as a case of abrogation. All the hadīths that I have come across about lifting the ban on visiting graveyards˙ report at the same time the lifting of the ban on using those vessels for making juice and the time limit on the use of the meat of sacrificial animals. This is one example from Muslim:

218 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law I had prevented you from visiting the graves, but now you can visit them. I had prevented you from eating the meat of pilgrimage sacrifices after three days, but now you can keep what you like [and not have to give it away before the end of the three-day limit]. I had prevented you from making juices in other than siqā’, 52 but now you can drink in all vessels, but do not drink intoxicants.53 Mālik reports a very similar variant of this hadīth through a different transmission chain.54 The way these cases are ˙presented in such hadīths ˙ place them under the standard defi nition of abrogation. The possibility that the Prophet at times might have had to change an instruction he had given earlier should not come as a surprise. This could happen if his fi rst instruction was a view he took that proved either to be appropriate only temporarily or to not be the best view and that had to be changed. Also, in theory at least, the Prophet could have at times communicated a directive he received from God for which He later substituted another, whereby both were not revealed through the Qur’an. Ascertaining which category a change belongs to is often impossible. However, any such possible abrogation of the Sunna has no implications for or role in establishing abrogation in the Qur’an.

14 Islamic Law A New Reading

In this chapter I will discuss the fundamental differences in how Islamic law and its history are understood by Muslim scholars and their Western counterparts. I will then briefly demonstrate the problem that abrogation represents for certain aspects of the traditional Islamic view of the law. Then I will move to the main focus of the chapter, which is to present a coherent understanding of the concept of Islamic law in the Qur’an and the role of Sunna. This understanding addresses ambiguities, contradictions, and flaws in how Islamic law has been traditionally understood. The defi nition of Sharīʿa and the explanation of the contribution of the Sunna to Islamic law that I present here have fundamental differences with the established tradition.

14.1

MUSLIM TRADITION VERSUS WESTERN INTERPRETATION

Muslim tradition and Western scholarship fundamentally differ in their respective views of Islamic law and how it developed. Muslims argue that the Qur’an, which is the Book of God, and the Sunna, which explained and extended the Qur’an, have always been the main sources of Islamic law. Ijmāʿ or the unanimous agreement of the Muslim scholars is considered the third source. But ijmāʿ on any matter must derive from the Qur’an or Sunna in the fi rst place, although its need for that support in the two sources is said to cease as soon as it has been concluded.1 This is why its common designation as an independent source of Islamic legislation is unjustified. Furthermore, ijmāʿ is an ideal that can never be achieved or confi rmed to have been achieved, because it requires the unanimity of the Muslim scholars everywhere. This is a practical impossibility. I see ijmāʿ as a doctrine that was developed to provide the support scholars needed for whatever interpretations and legal practices they advocated. 2 So the Qur’an and the Sunna are in reality the only sources of Islamic law, as ijmāʿ is derived from these two.

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Mālik’s use of the practices of the people of Medina as a source of law is no exception, as he traced those practices to the Prophet who lived the last ten years of his life in Medina, and thus saw them as representing the Sunna. More broadly, jurists also sought recourse to views of Companions of the Prophet and their Successors as those views are themselves considered to have been influenced and driven by the two sources of legislation. The Qur’an and Sunna are the sources of specific laws and general legal principles that Muslim scholars considered to be immutable, as this immutability is seen as the embodiment of the applicability of the Qur’an, which the Sunna extended, to all times and places. Muslim scholars acknowledged that the Qur’an and the Prophet did not provide a direct answer for every legal situation that may arise. They needed to develop methods to extend the law to cover legal questions that do not have direct answers in the Qur’an or Sunna, i.e. they needed to address legal situations that neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet expressly legislated for. This led to the development of fiqh or the science of Islamic jurisprudence. But as Islamic law is considered to have been revealed by God, Muslim jurists perceived their duty to be the discovery of these rulings rather than the creation of them. In other words, fiqh is fundamentally the science of discovering and understanding Islamic law, not legislating it. Muslim usūlīs developed legal principles to deduce laws for any legal ˙ case. This resulted in the development of methods of reasoning, such as “qiyās (analogical reasoning)” and “istihsān (juristic preference),” and ˙ other jurisprudential concepts, such as ijmā ʿ and abrogation. This effort ultimately led to the development of the science of “usūl al-fiqh (the roots/ ˙ sources of Islamic jurisprudence).” These principles were derived from the Qur’an and Sunna but they were intended to extend the existing Qur’anic and Prophetic legislations to cover a much larger number of legal issues. One assumption of fiqh is that Islamic law has an answer for every legal question and the objective of the faqīh or “jurist” is to find that answer. Islamic law has then come to consist of specific laws that the Qur’an and the Prophet expressly introduced and other specific rulings that are indirectly deduced from general legal principles. Every time a new legal query arose, jurists called upon one or more of those principles to fi nd an answer. Some of these queries emerged as issues that people encountered in their lives, so the community needed to know how to deal with them. Jurists also preempted many questions, working out solutions for potential problems that had not yet been faced by anyone. Excessive theoretical speculation led to what might be described as an overelaboration of the law. The corpus of specific laws continued to grow in response to practical and theoretical questions. Needless to say, while all jurists claimed to derive their rulings from the Qur’an and Sunna, their interpretations of the Qur’an, the hadīths and traditions they accepted as a source of Sunna, and ˙ methods and jurisprudential principles differed. This led to their reasoning different scholars developing different rulings for the same legal issue. We

Islamic Law

221

have already discussed such cases, including the number of breast-feedings that establishes a marriage ban. While Muslim scholars have had differences about the methods they used to draw Islamic rulings from the Qur’an and the Sunna, they remained unanimous in identifying the Book of Allah and the practice of the Prophet as the only legitimate sources of Islamic law. This purist image, however, is largely rejected in Western scholarship. Two scholars who have been particularly influential in shaping modern Western scholarship on Islam and Islamic law are Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph Schacht. Both argued that the Sunna of the Prophet is a late invention that reflected the established community practice which Schacht called “living tradition”: The ancient schools of law shared the old concept of sunna or “living tradition” as the ideal practice of the community, expressed in the accepted doctrine of the school. It was not yet exclusively embodied in the tradition of the Prophet, although the Iraqians had been the fi rst to claim for it the authority of the Prophet, by calling it the “sunna of the Prophet.”3 Schacht further expounds his theory as follows: Generally speaking, the “living tradition” of the ancient schools of law, based to a great extent on individual reasoning, came fi rst, that in the second stage it was put under the aegis of Companions, that traditions from the Prophet himself, put into circulation by traditionists towards the middle of the second century A. H., disturbed and influenced this “living tradition,” and that only Shāfiʿī secured to the traditions from the Prophet supreme authority.4 Schacht equally minimizes the role of the Qur’an in the development of Islamic law, which he argues started in the latter part of the Umayyad period from the beginning of the 2nd century Hijri. He summarizes his position in two remarks: Firstly, legal practice in the several parts of the Umayyad empire was not uniform, and this accounts for some of the original differences in doctrine between the ancient schools of law. Secondly, although the dynasty and most of the Arab ruling class were Muslims, and although some elementary legal rules enacted in the Qur’an were more or less followed, the legal practice during the earlier part of the Umayyad period cannot yet be called Muhammadan law. Muhammadan law came into existence only through the application of Muhammadan jurisprudence to the raw material supplied by the practice. . . . [L]egal norms based on the Qur’an, which go beyond the most elementary

222

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law rules, were introduced into Muhammadan law almost invariably at a secondary stage. 5

But Schacht’s position, as well as Goldziher’s, has been attacked by others who see it as rather extreme and highly hypothetical.6 Schacht’s other major thesis is that Islamic law substantially borrowed from foreign legal systems, including Jewish law and Roman law.7 However, his attempt to link Islamic law to the Talmudic law has also been shown to be at best speculative and often factually wrong.8 His endeavor to show that Roman law was a source of Islamic law has been equally dismissed. As Fitzgerald has intelligently pointed out, “there is not a single reference in any Islamic law book to any Roman authority,” yet Muslim philosophers were “able to acknowledge openly a debt to Plato and Aristotle.”9 I see Schacht’s extreme view as unrealistic. It is common sense to expect the Muslims to have needed very early to start developing the law of their religion, for both religious and non-religious reasons. They must have also done so using the Qur’an and teachings of the Prophet as their sources, and Muhammad would have overseen this effort. The Qur’an records a number of legal, as well as non-legal, issues that Muslims had to ask the Prophet about and which were answered through later Qur’anic revelation (e.g. 4.176, 58.1). Of particular interest is this Qur’anic verse, which confi rms that studying and understanding religion, which must have included its legal aspects, was a standard activity for Muslims from the time of the Prophet in Medina: “The believers would not all march forth. A group of each section should march forth to study religion so they may warn their people when they go back to them that they may beware” (9.122). Tabātabā’ī thinks that this verse talks

˙ about the believers who did not live in˙ Medina. When they go out to fight, a group of them should instead visit the Prophet to be further educated about religion. Other exegetes offer different interpretations about what believers and marching forth here mean, but there is no disagreement on the clear reference to groups of believers dedicating time to the study of religion. The verb used to describe the activity of the believers is “yatafaqqahū,” which means “understand” or “study.” Its root is “fiqh,” which appears twenty times in the Qur’an in a number of variants. This term is used in the Qur’an to mean “understanding” or “studying” in general and is not restricted, as it was later, to the study of Islamic law. The biography of the Prophet mentions a number of instances in which he commanded certain Muslims to teach fiqh of religion to new converts.10 There is a relevant quote in one of the earliest references to the religion of Muhammad in a non-Muslim source dating back to 662 CE, i.e. only thirty years after the death of Muhammad. This source, whose attribution to the Armenian Bishop Sebeos has been questioned, mentions certain laws that Muhammad introduced for his followers: “He legislated for them not to eat carrion, not to drink wine, not to speak falsely, and not to commit

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fornication.”11 These laws have parallels in the Qur’an, although the source does not refer to a scripture, probably because it considers it to be the work of Muhammad. One Western scholar thinks that this statement indicates that “Muhammad upheld a law particular to the new religion, and distinct from other laws.”12 Hallaq also stresses that “Muhammad’s own sophisticated knowledge of legal practices comes across clearly in the Qur’an and the so-called Constitution of Medina.”13 The point here is that while there is no question that many of the details of Islamic law were worked out after the Prophet, the principles of this law were introduced in the Qur’an and some of its details were also mentioned there or elaborated by the Prophet. I will revisit this in more detail later. But I consider the Muslim traditional purist view of the history of Islamic law also unrealistic. In my view, there is no question that a considerable amount of the Hadīth literature is forgery and many practices that supposedly reflect the ˙Sunna of the Prophet had nothing to do with Muhammad. I have shown in this book that there are outright contradictions between alleged sunnas, as reported in the Hadīth, and the Qur’an. Yet such alleged ˙ in shaping Islamic law. sunnas have played a significant role I am not going to discuss here the much-debated history of Islamic law. I will rather focus on explaining the widespread misunderstanding of the nature of Islamic law and present a different reading of the concept of Islamic law in the Qur’an and the position and role of the Sunna. But I would fi rst like to use the principle of abrogation as an example of the incoherence of the traditional Muslim view of Islamic law.

14.2

THE ABROGATION PARADOX

I have discussed the many flaws in the way abrogation has been conceived and applied. It is clear that abrogation is not a principle of any significance in the Qur’an or Sunna but one that was created and developed by many usūlīs over centuries. But abrogation also contradicts one of the fundamen˙ of the traditional Muslim understanding of Islamic law. tals The specific laws that the Qur’an and the Prophet introduced are seen as immutable, and often so are the rulings that were added to them by jurists using the sophisticated methods and principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Once a specific ruling was identified, the legal issue it addressed is considered to have been answered once and for all, as that answer would not change. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islamic law as presented in the Qur’an, as I will discuss in the following section, but what interests us here is the fact that the principle of abrogation itself contradicts this assumption. The standard defi nition of abrogation not only states that Jewish laws were replaced by Qur’anic rulings, but it also stresses that divine laws given to Prophet Muhammad were changed by later divine laws he received. All

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cases of legal abrogation, the penalty for adultery, and the rulings on the number of sucklings that ban marriage reflect this conception. It is untrue, then, to suggest that specific laws are immutable; at least some of these laws can change. Of course, the same is true of the Sunna. Paradoxically, Muslim jurists worked hard over centuries to establish the principle of abrogation, which embodies the changing nature of divine law, just to identify what they considered the unchangeable laws of Islam! All legal changes that are represented by abrogation are supposed to have taken place during the Prophet’s life, as there was no other means for divine communication after him. The fact that the Qur’an was revealed over twenty-two years means that all those changes to the law happened during a very short period of time. In fact, as almost all legal rulings were introduced in the ten years the Prophet lived in Medina, those changes must have happened at most within a decade, but often over much shorter periods of time. Those changes, as identified by Muslim jurists, included various ritual, family, civil, and criminal laws. They varied from changes to how one should fast, to the introduction of capital punishment for adultery, to changing the entitlements and duties of the widow. How, then, can the same jurists who believe in these changes claim that specific laws could not change after the Prophet, i.e. that such laws remain the same forever? How can rulings change within a few years but stay the same for over fourteen centuries? There is an intrinsic contradiction between the concept of abrogation as understood by Muslim jurists and their belief in the immutability of specific laws. I have shown that abrogation is unhistorical but I will explain why specific laws can still change over time. The formulation of general jurisprudential principles that use the Qur’an and Sunna to deduce specific laws implies the recognition that these two sources represent a general legal framework that can be used to draw specific rulings. This most important fact is one that Muslim jurists came so close to yet, it could be argued, also missed by a mile. This serious mistake is the result of incoherent and inconsistent understanding, which amounts to fundamental misunderstanding, of the status of the specific rulings in the Qur’an and Sunna and, more broadly, the legal function of each source.

14.3

SHARĪʿA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC LAW

All jurisprudents would agree that the Qur’an presents a legal framework, but they did not treat it so. This is what I mean by the inconsistency of the thinking of Muslim scholars in this area. A framework would consist of guiding principles which, by being broad and general rather than narrow and specific, have the potential to provide answers to various questions. A legal framework is not a set of specific laws that transcend time, place, and circumstances. It rather takes temporal, local, social, and other variations into account to identify what specific laws apply. Muslim jurists realized

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that the Qur’an has introduced a legal framework, but they have misunderstood what it meant and its scale. This was partly caused by the failure to differentiate between the Qur’an’s legal framework, which is what I take Sharīʿa to mean, and some specific laws the Book contains. For example, the Zāhirite scholar Ibn Hazm claims that in the same way that the concept ˙ oneness of God is˙ not subject to abrogation the permission to eat of the the lamb and the prohibition to eat the swine cannot be abrogated.14 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya (751/1350) makes this broader statement: There are two kinds of rulings. First, a kind that does not change from its one state over time, with place, or by the personal reasoning (ijtihād) of the imāms. Examples of this are imposing what is obligatory, prohibiting what is impermissible, the penalties stated by Sharīʿa for specific crimes, and so on. This kind does not change and no personal reasoning can change it. Second, a kind that changes with what the public interest dictates in the given time, place, and situation. Examples of this are the various quantities set by taʿzīrāt,15 and the forms and types of the latter. So the legislator introduces variations according to the public interest . . . for instance, applying the death penalty to the person who drinks alcohol for the fourth time.16 Ibn Qayyim goes on to give various examples of the second type of ruling in the form of punishments that the caliph ʿUmar introduced, but which were not known at the time of the Prophet, due to changed circumstances. Like all jurists, he accepts the concept of “taʿzīr,” which stands for the ruler’s discretionary authority to introduce penalties for offenses that do not have specific penalties in the Sharīʿa. The problem in Ibn Qayyim’s view, however, is in what he says about the first type of ruling. He includes “penalties stated by Sharīʿa for specific crimes” in the unchangeable part of Sharīʿa. We may also cite the view of the 20th century scholar Mahmūd Shaltūt, ˙ c meanings, who differentiates between legalistic verses that have specifi and are therefore not subject to personal reasoning, and others that are not specific, and are thus open to speculation. He includes in the fi rst group not only verses that explain the worshipping practices, but also the verses that specify the shares of different heirs, thus making specific laws part of the unchangeable Sharīʿa when in fact they reflect the social circumstances of the time.17 By making the stated inheritance shares in the Qur’an belong to the same group of laws that command the Muslim to pray and pay alms, he makes them an intrinsic part of the creed. He then had to conclude that denying those rulings amounts to renouncing Islam. A contemporary scholar has summarized the consensus of scholars as follows: “Broadly speaking, the Qur’an is specific on matters which are deemed to be unchangeable, but in matters which are liable to change, it merely lays down general guidelines.”18 The problem with this view is

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that the specification of something in the Qur’an is no indication of its unchangeability. Specific laws may change whereas the general principles are the immutable foundations of Sharīʿa. Because this is the only coherent understanding of Islamic law in the Qur’an, the jurist every now and then may end up acknowledging it one way or another, although his main position is almost the opposite, as we have seen above. This confusion of Sharīʿa with specific laws was exacerbated by misunderstanding the function of the Prophet with respect to the Qur’an’s framework. I will explain this framework and how it works in this section and deal with the role of the Prophet in the next. Sharīʿa, as explained in Figure 14.1, regulates the two aspects of the life of the Muslim: First, his/her relationship with God, which is described by the “creed”; second, his/her relationships with other human beings, other creatures, and the environment, which is governed by what may be called the “moral code.” The relationship with God is based on a creed that consists of all doctrinal facts that the believer is required to believe in. The oneness of God and the inevitability of the Day of Judgment are two such beliefs. Any teachings that contravene doctrinal facts are considered by the Qur’an to be false and the believer is required to reject them. In addition to holding the doctrinal beliefs, the believer is also commanded to express them in four types of devotional practices: dhikr (remembrance of God), fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage. These are known as “ʿibādāt (worshipping acts).” Traditionally, “prayer” is listed instead of “dhikr,” but the former is a special case of the latter, as I explain below, so it is more accurate to use “dhikr.”

Immutable (Qur’an’s) legal framework

Relationship with God (Creed) Worshipping practices (৙ibƗdƗt)

Devotional legal principles and details

Figure 14.1 Sharīʿa: A divine system.

Relationships with others (moral code) Transactions with other people and the environment (mu৙ƗmalƗt)

Transactional legal principles

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As the doctrinal beliefs are presented as eternal facts, they do not change. They formed the core of the message of every Prophet sent by God. Similarly, the four devotional practices existed in the message of every Prophet. For instance, the Qur’an tells the believers that fasting was prescribed for them as it was prescribed for those before them, as a means to acquire piety (2.183). Also, some spiritual requirements for those practices do not change. For instance, the worshipper is required to be sincere in his practice and perform these acts of worship for the sake of satisfying God, he should be in state of veneration, and so on. However, the legal details of these devotional practices can change from one religion to another. The following verse fi rst states that the Qur’an confi rmed the message of the earlier Books that God revealed, which refers to unchangeable aspects of religions, before it goes on to confi rm that specifics of the legal systems of different religions differed: We have revealed to you [O Muhammad!] the Book with the truth, confirming that which is before it of the Book, and having authority over it. Therefore, judge between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their low desires instead of the truth that has come to you. For every one of you did We appoint a law and a way, and had Allah wished, He would have made you all a single nation, but that He might try you in what He gave you. (5.48)

So while the followers of all Prophets were commanded to believe in the oneness of Allah and express this belief in remembering Him, the forms this remembrance took might have changed. For example, the Muslim may remember God anytime, anywhere, and without performing any special rituals, but the obligatory daily prayers, which are a specific form of remembrance, have certain rules that have to be followed. For instance, there are five of these prayers, the person must perform special purification rituals known as “wudū’ (ablution)” before the prayer, each prayer is per˙ in the day, the person must face the Kaʿba when formed at a specific time they perform the prayer, they must kneel and prostrate in a particular way, and so on. These details are specific to the Muslim prayer in the same way that the prayer of the followers of any previous prophet had its own rituals. But the non-ritualistic remembrance of God and making supplication to Him applied to all believers, as did the broader concept of remembrance. But do the laws that govern the four worshipping practices change with time for the same religious message? We know that the qibla of prayer of the Muslims did change at some point. A different example we may consider is whether the way the Muslim fasts Ramadan is subject to change. Verse 2.187 states that fasting starts at dawn and ends at night. Because Ramadan follows the lunar calendar, it falls on different months on the solar calendar in different years, which means that the time between dawn and sunset can change significantly. For instance, in Medina, fasting lasts between around twelve hours in January to about fifteen in June. This

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fluctuation is manageable. But for locations with very high latitudes in both hemispheres, the fasting period can be extremely short or long. In some places, the sun may not rise or set at all during Ramadan, which clearly means that the law in verse 2.187 cannot be used everywhere. This, in turn, means that verse 2.187 introduces a specific law and the jurist has to understand the general principle that underlines it to use it to draw appropriate laws for those locations. For example, the jurist may conclude that the principle is that the fasting day cannot be longer than fifteen hours or shorter than twelve, as is the case in the place of revelation of the Qur’an, so when to start the fast at dawn and break it at sunset can be adjusted to maintain these two limits. Alternatively, the jurist may take the view that the fasting day can be longer and shorter than those limits by a margin that he decides using some reasoning methods. Here we have a specific law that is mentioned in the Qur’an and which all scholars agree cannot be implemented literally everywhere. The obvious broad conclusion to draw from this example is that rulings that govern the acts of worship must be seen as specific laws that point to more general principles. This logical, inevitable conclusion, however, is at odds with the general consensus that specific laws of the Qur’an and Sunna are immutable, as we saw earlier. Put differently, Muslim scholars have accepted that certain specific laws cannot always be implemented literally, yet they have also maintained that other specific laws are not subject to change. The moral code, the other component of Sharīʿa, has a similar structure to the creed. This part of the legal framework regulates the relationships of the human being with the world around him, including other people. There are various kinds of relationship that the person has, including those with his family, relatives, friends, acquaintances, strangers, and, in general, all inhabitants and elements of his environment. These are technically known as “muʿāmalāt,” which means “dealings” or “transactions.” This component of Sharīʿa expounds which behaviors are prescribed and which are proscribed when dealing with others. There are certain moral principles that do not change with time and are found in previous religions. For instance, the person is commanded to treat his parents with respect and show mercy to them (17.23–24, 29.8, 31.14, 46.15). Other examples of Qur’anic legal principles that govern the transactions involving Muslims include the following: the death penalty is permitted only in self-defense (6.151, 17.33) or as a punishment for murder (2.178); witnesses are essential to establish the occurrence of certain offenses (e.g. 24.4, 24.13) or the execution of contracts (2.282); certain agreements/contracts need to be written down or alternative material evidence of agreement should be provided (2.282–283); and non-Muslims must pay a certain tax known as jizya (9.29), which corresponds to the obligatory alms that the Muslims have to pay. While these permanent principles of Islamic law are not subject to change, the way they are implemented can change.

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According to Sharīʿa, every offense affects the spiritual status of the person and may contribute to his ultimate salvation in paradise or condemnation in hell. This fact underlines the oft-made observation that the difference between the Western legal system and Sharīʿa is that the latter does not differentiate between a crime and a sin.19 However, one difference between creedal offenses and misbehavior in relation to other people and the environment is that the former are not subject to punishment in this world, whereas some of the latter are. In general, the offenses that are subject to punishment in this world are those that directly affect the lives of other people. For instance, one significant Sharīʿa principle is that all sins are forgivable except polytheism (4.48, 4.116). Yet even the gravest of all sins, i.e. polytheism, is not punishable in this life. Similarly, eating pork is forbidden, but breaking this law does not incur any penalty in this world. On the other hand, stealing the property of another person or injuring them is punishable. The principles underlying the legal system of relationships and transactions do not change. But while the penal system determines the specific penalties in this world for various offenses, the punishments it assigns to each offense may change with time and circumstances. Sharīʿa is a legal framework, not a set of specific laws. The legal principles are immutable but the specific laws can change. This fundamental aspect of Islamic law is commonly misunderstood: Many Muslims and non-Muslims believe that since this law is discovered in unchanging sources, and not legislated, that Islamic law is, in a popular word, “immutable”; that it is necessarily inflexible and rigid, or at least permanent. In the hands of the conservative jurist, that certainly has been the case. Since, however, the fi nding of an act’s assessment is grounded in a complete understanding of an act, including its circumstances, through the recognition of new and changing circumstances, Islamic law maintains considerable scope for flexibility and changes in norms of conduct. 20 As has been rightly pointed out, “the alleged closure of the door of ijtihād is one of the factors which is held accountable for the gap between the law and its sources on the one hand, and the changing conditions of society on the other hand.”21 I would add that the idea that personal reasoning is closed is itself the result of the failure to recognize the fact that Sharīʿa is a legal framework, not a set of fi xed laws. Sharīʿa represents the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the law and the guiding principles on how to realize them. Let’s take sexual offenses as an example to explain the framework, its components, and how it works.22 The moral code of the Qur’an unambiguously condemns sexual offenses, using the related terms “fāḥisha” (e.g.

230 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law 3.135) and “faḥshāʾ” (e.g. 7.28). For instance, it describes “zinā” or adultery as “a fāḥisha (indecency) and evil as a way” (17.32). These moral judgments do not change with time. The Qur’an also has the legal requirement that four witnesses are needed to establish the occurrence of adultery. How this requirement is implemented in today’s world might be significantly different. For instance, today there is the possibility of recording such an offense using a camera, which can provide indisputable evidence. In this case, the concept of witness remains applicable, but it is no longer defined as four people. The Qur’an also contains specific penalties for various sexual offenses. For instance, the males and females who engage in adultery should be given one hundred lashes each in front of an observing public of believers (24.2) and they are allowed to marry only those convicted of adultery or polytheists (24.3). These penalties were introduced in a specific period and under specific social and cultural circumstances, so they may not be appropriate for all times and circumstances. Shāfiʿī, for example, thinks that verse 24.3 was later abrogated by verse 24.32 so that adulterers and those who have not committed adultery can marry each other. 23 Another offense that we may take as an illustrative example is robbery. The Qur’anic moral code labels stealing as an illegal act (60.12). While the legal principle that evidence is required to establish the crime against the accused is not mentioned in the case of this specific offense, it is logical to conclude from other Qur’anic contexts that the principle is applicable. The forms of admissible evidence, however, may change with time. The Qur’an also has a specific ruling on stealing: “The male thief and the female thief cut off their hands in recompense for what they committed—a penalty from Allah” (5.38). This extreme punishment was to be applied alongside

other laws that would ensure that the person’s necessary needs are provided for. This punishment should not be applied, for instance, in a society that allows individuals to be put in a position whereby they have to steal food to keep their starving family alive. In general, the circumstances under which this ruling becomes operative are subject to change. For instance, the Prophet is reported to have explained that “the hand of the thief is cut off for [stealing] a quarter dinar and above.”24 Obviously, the minimum value that makes the penalty applicable must change with time. ʿUmar is known to have suspended the cutting off of the hands of thieves in a year of famine. 25 The penalty is also subject to permanent change. More broadly, the exact penalty for the crime must change as a result of the development of society, to take into account the introduction of new methods and approaches to deal with offenders, control their potential for committing crimes, and reform and rehabilitate them. For instance, the modern prison systems and reform institutions have completely changed what specific laws are appropriate. The difference between the Qur’an’s legal framework and the specific laws its implementation yields may be likened to the difference between

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“natural law” and “positive law.” Natural law is set by nature and is considered to always be valid. Positive law, on the other hand, is developed by human beings. Sharīʿa is set by God and remains valid all the time, whereas its implementation is a human effort. There is one particularly important legal principle of Sharīʿa that I should mention, which is the fact that the default status of anything is “permissible” unless it has been forbidden. This principle is usually derived from the statement in italics in this verse: Why should you [O You who believe!] not eat of that over which God’s name has been mentioned, seeing that He has detailed to you what He has forbidden you, unless you are forced by necessity? Many lead [others] astray by their caprices, without any knowledge; your Lord [O Muhammad!] best knows the transgressors. (6.119)

The same principle is seen in this verse, which makes it clear that unless a food has been forbidden, it is lawful to eat: Say [O Muhammad!]: “I do not find in that which has been revealed to me anything forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it, unless it is a dead animal, poured blood, the flesh of swine—for these are an abomination—or impurity which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for other than Allah.” But whosoever is forced by necessity, without exceeding the limit or transgressing, for him your Lord is forgiving, merciful. (6.145)

We see the same principle also in the case in the Qur’an’s description of the Jewish law: “All food was lawful to the Children of Israel except that which Israel (Jacob) had forbidden to himself, before the Torah was revealed” (3.93). All food was permissible except what Jacob proscribed, and then the source of prohibition became the Torah, but anything that was not identified as unlawful remained permissible. While these verses talk about food specifically, the stated principle is considered to be universal. This is confirmed in the following verse, which states that the forbidden things are stated in the Qur’an: Say [O Muhammad!]: “Come, I will recite what your Lord has forbidden you: you must not associate anything with Him; be good to your parents; do not to slay your children because of poverty, We will provide for you and them; do not approach indecencies, whether apparent or concealed; and do not kill the soul, which Allah has prohibited the killing of, except in the course of justice. (6.151)

This verse does not capture all forbidden things, as the complete list should be compiled from all verses that mention things that are declared to be unlawful.

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Another Qur’anic statement that may be taken to refer to this principle is the repeated command not to declare unlawful what Allah had permitted (5.87, 6.140, 6.144, 7.32, 9.29, 9.37).

14.4

THE ROLE OF PROPHET MUHAMMAD IN ISLAMIC LAW

Muslim scholars agree that the role of the Prophet in Sharīʿa was both interpretative and legislative. He interpreted the Qur’an, including its legalistic verses. One verse addresses Muhammad as follows: “We sent down to you the Remembrance (the Qurʾan) so that you expound for people what has been sent down for them” (16.44). He also legislated through the Sunna, which is

considered to be the second of the two sources of Islamic law. His legislations are considered to complement the Qur’an, including the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna. Those who accept this form of abrogation see it as an intrinsic part of the divine revelation. The Qur’an has a relatively small number of legalistic and semi-legalistic verses. Scholars have differed in counting this number, depending on the criteria they used, but the highest estimate puts it at around six hundred, which is less than a tenth of all Qur’anic verses. The specific issues covered in these verses are rather limited in comparison with the legalistic narratives in the Hadīth literature. ˙ As explained earlier, 26 it is practically impossible to tell whether something the Prophet said or did was inspired by God or was the result of his own personal judgment. It may be presumed that this distinction would have been made by the Prophet. But the Hadīth narratives do not contain ˙ argued that the Prophet himsuch indications. Additionally, it could be self could have been unaware of all instances when he was being subtly guided by divine inspiration. The Qur’an was a clear and distinct kind of revelation that could not have been confused with something else, but a different form of inspiration could have been too subtle for the Prophet to distinguish from his own thinking. This uncertainty about the nature of the Sunna applies to both the Prophet’s interpretation of the Qur’an and his introduction of laws that are not found in the Qur’an. This ambiguity has led to a view of the Sunna not only as mainly divinely inspired but usually as completely inspired by God.27 Given that Muhammad is the perfect interpreter of the Qur’an and that he was being guided by God, it makes no practical difference whether any laws he introduced are regarded as interpretations of the Qur’an or additions to it. This is a serious issue, but it should have no implications for Sharīʿa, with which all legislations must comply. The critical point is that the Sunna—i.e. the genuine, historical Sunna—did not introduce new creedal or legal principles to the Qur’an’s legal framework, and of course it did not contradict any. The Sunna has only provided specific laws. This

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is why there are no practical implications for trying to determine whether a law enacted by the Prophet was an interpretation of the Qur’an or an addition to it. Even if the Prophet did not draw a particular law directly from a Qur’anic legal principle, if it was inspired to him by God, that law would still be consistent with the Qur’anic legal framework. This principle, I should stress, is presumed by all Muslim scholars. Even the abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunna was made compatible with this view by making abrogation itself a Qur’anic legal principle, i.e. a principle of Sharīʿa. So the Prophet was an interpreter and implementer of Sharīʿa. The specific laws that he introduced reflect what he thought were appropriate for the time and circumstances, but they were never intended to be the only way to implement Sharīʿa. If the hadīth on stealing is historical, it does not ˙ mean that the penalty is always applied if the stolen goods were valued at more than a quarter of a dinar. In fact, I have already argued that specific laws even in the Qur’an are not supposed to be permanent, so the penalty of cutting off the hand can itself change. Especially in the formative period of Islamic law and more recently in the 20th century, a minority of individuals and groups have rejected the interpretation and implementation of Sharīʿa that is attributed to the Prophet, i.e. the Sunna, because of the historical unreliability of its sources, preferring to use the Qur’an as the only source of legislation. Those holding this view are usually challenged by the majority of scholars, who are strong Sunna adherents, to explain how to ascertain certain information that is critical for the Muslim which the Qur’an does not cover but which is found in the Sunna only. This information is usually about the four worshipping acts, as these details cannot be deduced rationally. The standard example here is the number of daily prayers. There are certain verses in the Qur’an that may be used to establish that there should be five daily prayers, but this conclusion is likely to be influenced by the already established practice as these verses are open to different interpretations. It is argued that this shows that the Qur’an cannot be the only source of legislation for Muslims. One way out of this dilemma would be to challenge the suggestion that the number of the daily prayers should be five or fi xed at all. But this is a highly unconvincing view because while this number was set at the time of the Prophet there is no justification for denying its applicability today. The Qur’an has already made it clear that essential aspects of the daily prayers, such as the number of prostrations in each, can be shortened under certain circumstances (4.101). Similarly, the jurists have introduced a detailed set of rules that allows the Muslim to delay different daily prayers and perform them together at one time. In practical terms, this amounts to reducing the number of daily prayers under certain circumstances. But there is no reason to change this number in normal circumstances. What makes the number five special, however, is not the claim that it is established in the “Sunna” literature but the fact that is an agreed upon, established practice, which makes it a certainty that it was the practice of

234 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law the Prophet. To clarify this point we can call upon any aspect of the daily prayer that does not have the consensus of all scholars. For instance, the Shias and the Mālikites differ with the other Muslims on where to place the hands during the prayer. Each group traces its practice to the Sunna, which means each rejects the attribution of the other practice to the Sunna. Those who reject the Sunna as a source of legislation cannot be challenged on the basis that without the Sunna one would not know where to put his hands during the prayer. They can counterargue that at least one of the two Muslim camps is wrong, even though both claim to follow the Sunna. What makes the number of the daily prayers a significant example is the consensus it has, which itself suggests that it is genuine Sunna. This use of consensus is completely different in scope and scale from the position of the concept of ijmāʿ in Islamic jurisprudence, where it is treated as the third source of legislation in addition to the Qur’an and Sunna.28 I am using it here only as an indication of the historical authenticity of a practice that is not open to rational scrutiny. This is a very limited role for consensus. For instance, I have already rejected the consensus on the penalty of stoning, because it contradicts Sharīʿa and uses demonstrably unhistorical hadīths. Indeed, there is only a small number of issues that consensus can˙ help settle. These are cases of specific laws and practices; consensus cannot be used to establish the authenticity of any principle of Sharīʿa, even when it does so through interpreting Sharīʿa. To further clarify the argument about the significance of the consensus in the case of the number of the daily prayers, let’s consider four relevant facts about the position of the hands during prayer. First, different Muslim denominations have adopted one of two views. Second, the two positions are physically quite similar to each other. Third, the position of the hands is a very minor detail in the involved ritual of prayer. Fourth, neither of the two positions is in conflict with any Sharīʿa principle. Considering all these facts, one has to conclude the legality of praying with either position of the hands. Similarly, one has to conclude that the established practice of praying five times a day is an unchanging obligation. There is no justification for abandoning an agreed upon, established practice of the four worshipping acts that is attributed to the Prophet. The devotional practices relate to the relationship of the human being with God, not to his relationship with others, so rationality cannot be used to work out their details. It has been pointed out that ritual performances are not the proper subject of, for example, the principle of qiyās “because their effective causes cannot be ascertained by the human intellect.”29 There are no grounds for changing the Prophet’s interpretation and implementation of Sharīʿa in relation to these practices. Jurists, however, have already introduced rules that modify such practices in different circumstances when doing so is possible using reason. Similarly, any widespread practice that is claimed to be based on the Sunna but which cannot be completely dismissed or confi rmed may be applied as long as it does not contravene a legal

Islamic Law

235

principle of Sharīʿa. Any contradiction would indicate that the practice is not a genuine sunna, as is the case with using capital punishment for a reason other than self-defense or punishment for murder, as the Qur’an states. Muslim jurists have underestimated or even ignored the difference between the Sunna instructions of the Prophet about the worshipping practices and his rulings about relationships with others. The latter are completely subject to reason and reflect changing circumstances, so they can change. This is why there are countless possible alternatives although all these rulings derive from the one legal framework of the Qur’an. The Prophet showed the Muslims how to implement Sharīʿa but did not try to establish a single way to implement it or to claim that specific laws that he enacted were supposed to remain valid forever. Even the scholars who come very close to accepting this still fi nd it difficult to apply this thinking to all specific rulings in the Sunna or, of course, the Qur’an. This view makes a fundamental distinction between the Qur’an and the Sunna and contradicts the traditional Islamic belief. It considers the Qur’an the only source of Sharīʿa and treats the Sunna as an exemplary implementation and the source of knowledge of how to implement Sharīʿa. In other words, God is the only legislator whereas the Prophet is an interpreter and implementer, albeit the best one. The Prophet was not a colegislator with God but the fi rst “faqīh (jurist)” of the divine legislation. The traditional Muslim view, on the other hand, treats the Sunna as the second source of legislation. According to this understanding, no ruling in the Sunna should be seen as a law that adds to or extends the Sharīʿa of the Qur’an. It was rather derived from one or more of the Qur’anic principles that govern man’s relationship with God or with others. The Sunna is not an extension of the Qur’an but an outcome of it.

14.5

THE ROLE OF THE JURIST IN ISLAMIC LAW

Unlike the divine Sharīʿa, implementing this legal framework, i.e. fiqh, is a human effort that is likely to yield different results by different people. Different individuals have differences in their knowledge, methods of reasoning, and competencies. These differences include the Sunna narratives and other secondary sources they may use in addition to the Qur’an, their interpretations of the Qur’anic text and those secondary sources, their identifications of the circumstances for which specific laws are needed, the methods of reasoning they employ, and their skills in applying those methods. This is illustrated in Figure 14.2. The deduction work of different jurists is influenced by various preferences and decisions they make and their competencies and skills. Legal rulings cannot escape being the results of personal reasoning (ijtihād). Some of the preferences that the jurist has reflect his personal views, so no jurist

236

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

Variable jurist endeavor

Non-Qur’anic legal sources

Interpretation of the Qur’an and other sources

Jurisprudential principles

Competency

Figure 14.2 Fiqh: Human effort to understand Sharīʿa.

can practice fiqh without an element of ra’ī (personal opinion), regardless of how much later jurists tried to position fiqh as an objective science. This can be seen not only in the existence of five different schools of law, but also in the fact that a wide range of views exists even among the scholars of any one school. Furthermore, in the formative period of Islamic law there were more legal schools of thought, albeit in less developed forms.30 No two different instances of the application of principles of Sharīʿa can yield the same set of specific laws. Fiqh is not a perfect science. Although its domain is the perfect word of God, fiqh is bound to inherit the human weaknesses and limitations of the jurist studying the revelation. The jurist tries to do as well as he can what the exemplary jurist, the Prophet, did very well. But the jurist’s work will always be imperfect, which is why there can be no perfect implementation of Islamic law, i.e. no perfect application of the Qur’an’s legal framework. To be sure, the fact that Islamic law is derived from divine revelation does not make it less susceptible to the limitations of those applying it than any man-made law. The fact that the legal principles of Islamic law are of divine origin does not make the jurist of this law more competent than the jurist of any man-made law. In some way, Islamic law is, like the concept of justice, an ideal that may be realized only partially. I have explained in Figure 14.3 how Islamic law is implemented. The immutable legal principles of Sharīʿa are applied by the human fiqh, which is an activity that differs from one jurist to another, to changing societal circumstances to draw specific laws. Despite the fact that the Sharīʿa legal framework does not change, the fact that is being applied by a human being to changing circumstances means that the outcome is not one fi xed set of laws. These laws may look different when different jurists are involved and/or when temporal and local circumstances change.

Islamic Law

237

Immutable SharƯ৙a

Specific fiqh

Changing societal circumstances Changing and different specific laws

Figure 14.3

Fiqh (interpretation and application) of Sharīʿa.

The law in the Qur’an and the role of the Prophet in Islamic law as presented in this chapter have commonalities as well as fundamental differences with traditional views of Islamic law. I have presented Islamic law as a dynamic system whose rulings respond to changes in the domain of its application. This conclusion is compatible with the Muslim view of the Qur’an as being universal and applicable to the end of time. The widespread view that portrays Islamic law as a static body of legislations contradicts the universality of the Qur’an. It treats the legal system of the Qur’an as something that froze in time, whereas the reality is that it is a living system that can competently deal with the challenges of this ever more complex world.

15 Conclusion The Myth of Abrogation

Abrogation is often used by critics to attack the Qur’an but it is equally employed by Muslims to defend its integrity. This paradoxical use is in no small part due to the confusing defi nitions that this concept has developed over time and confl icting Hadīth narratives. This is seen in the large ˙ number of irreconcilable and inconsistent views about abrogation held by Muslim scholars. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the subject of abrogation represents a major crisis in Islamic scholarship. Yet this phenomenon has played a major role in the development of Islamic law, touching on the life of every practicing Muslim. Early Islamic sources suggest that the term “naskh” was used by the fi rst generations of Muslims to describe any change to a divine ruling. Even if these sources are authentic and that this term had legal meanings from that time, which is far from certain, this basic and general use is very different from the technical meaning that this term later acquired. The elaboration of the concept of abrogation in the Qur’an led to the development of three different modes. The subject of abrogation in any Qur’anic verse is its ruling, ruling and wording, or wording. These three correspond to the legal, legal-textual, and textual modes of abrogation, respectively. This complexity was made even worse by the way the term “abrogation” was carelessly and inconsistently used. Scholars usually use the term “abrogation” to mean the abolishment of a divine legal ruling by a later one. This, which I call the “standard definition” of abrogation, applies to legalistic verses, i.e. those that introduce commandments or prohibitions. But this definition covers properly legal abrogation only. In theory, it should also cover the legal-textual mode, but the problem here is that all alleged verses but one in this mode are non-legalistic! Similarly, there is only one case—i.e. of stoning—of textual abrogation that is covered by the definition of standard abrogation. Legal abrogation has also been used with many non-legalistic verses. Very little is known about the early development of the doctrine of “naskh,” but we know that the earliest works, such as Ibn Wahb’s from the second half of the 2nd century Hijri, mention instances of legal abrogation only. Abū ʿUbaid’s work on abrogation, which was written in the second to third decade of the 3rd century, is the oldest work in which legal-textual

Conclusion 239 abrogation is discussed. He also mentioned the stoning verse in a separate work on the Qur’an, thus implying his acceptance of textual abrogation, but he did not identify it as a distinct mode of abrogation. Shāfiʿī, who died two decades before Abū ʿUbaid, discussed cases of legal abrogation, did not mention legal-textual abrogation, and implicitly admitted one case of textual abrogation. Muhāsibī, who was a student of Shāfiʿī and Abū ˙ ʿUbaid, authored around the same time of Abū ʿUbaid’s book on abrogation the earliest work in which the legal, textual-legal, and textual modes of abrogation are all mentioned. Less than half a century later, Ibn Qutaiba mentioned, although very briefly, textual abrogation. By the beginning of the 4th century, the legal-textual and textual modes of abrogation had become established, although they were still not accepted by all scholars. Tabarī, for instance, did not mention textual abrogation at all but accepted ˙ legal-textual abrogation. The three forms of abrogation developed to address different problems. Two of the latter represented serious threats to fundamental Muslim beliefs. Legal abrogation was created in order to explain what looked to scholars like contradictions within the Qur’an. It was later used to explain confl icts between Qur’anic verses and hadīths. There is no question that ˙ Qur’an and the Hadīth, but the there is a great deal of confl ict between the apparent contradictions between verses are in fact confl icts˙ between certain interpretations of these verses. Misinterpretation of Qur’anic verses is the real source of legal abrogation. There is not a single case in the mushaf ˙ that can be said to be a clear case of legal abrogation. There are one or ˙two cases that may be interpreted in this way, but even these can be more convincingly understood in a way that reconciles their rulings so there is no need to suggest that any form of abrogation is in effect. Misunderstanding what certain Qur’anic verses meant and exegetical differences led to the creation of legal abrogation to defend the Qur’an against the suggestion that it has contradictions. Such misunderstandings were at times used to support popular practices that are in confl ict with the proper interpretations of those verses. That the earliest available works on abrogation suggest that legal abrogation was the fi rst mode to be developed is completely logical. First, this mode developed because of perceived contradictions between interpretations of Qur’anic verses, and such exegetical differences are bound to arise. Second, it is not intrinsically controversial. Saying that one ruling in the Qur’an was later superseded by another does not threaten any Muslim belief while, at the same time, rejecting any talk about contradictions between these rulings. This is simply a process of change. While abrogation was admitted into Islamic doctrine to explain perceived cases of confl icting laws, this principle became itself the source of many abrogation claims. The number of abrogation claims grew with time as more scholars made use of this doctrine in their exegetical and juristic works. The case of the verse of the sword is an excellent illustration of this

240 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law phenomenon. Earlier sources do not mention the involvement of this verse in abrogation, yet the number of verses that this verse is said to have abrogated continued to increase with time. The highest figure quoted by any one scholar was 124, but claims that this verse abrogated all verses that command the Muslims to show tolerance and forgiveness for non-Muslims imply that the figure is much higher. Legal-textual abrogation was the next mode of abrogation to emerge. It was introduced to deal with the claim of various hadīths that the mushaf ˙ claim could be seen ˙˙ does not contain all of the Qur’anic revelation. This as implying that the incompleteness of the mushaf is due to purposeful manipulation or unwitting human failure in the˙ ˙collection of the Qur’an in the mushaf. Using this mode of abrogation, scholars claimed that the ˙˙ Qur’anic verses that have not survived in the mushaf were “withdrawn” by God. Legal-textual abrogation was presented ˙as˙ the mechanism used by God to withdraw certain Qur’anic verses and exclude them from the mushaf. This way the absence of those verses from the mushaf became the ˙ ˙ of a divine plan, averting any questioning of the credibility ˙˙ result of the process of compiling the mushaf and the integrity of the people involved. ˙ ˙rmed that God’s revelation could not be lost Legal-textual abrogation confi casually or get removed intentionally by people. Abrogation in its second form was used to claim that the missing verses were withdrawn or removed by God. This approach also addressed the problem created by many hadīths that claimed that the Prophet forgot some verses. Obviously, this ˙idea can be used to discredit the Prophet or even accuse God of failing to protect the divine message. But covering these verses by legal-textual abrogation made that forgetting part of God’s plan. The separation between the Qur’an as the source of the revelation and the mushaf as its written form fails to survive close scrutiny. It is not sup˙ the Qur’an and it has inherent conceptual contradictions. Furported ˙by thermore, the sources that establish this separation are very questionable. These are in the form of hadīths that make claims about the absence of ˙ individual or groups of Qur’anic verses from the mushaf. Each one of these ˙˙ hadīths has its own problems that cast serious doubts over the claim it ˙makes. In their totality, these narratives suggest that there are several hundred missing verses. I have calculated over 729 missing verses, or around 10.5% of the supposed size of the Qur’an! Such reports must have been invented by individuals who wanted to discredit the Qur’an. This was seen as a particularly promising strategy given that the Qur’an claims that it was uniquely preserved by God and that the other divine Books either disappeared completely or, in their available versions, had been corrupted by people. One other problem with legal-textual abrogation is that all but one of the verses covered by this mode are non-legalistic. The fact that these verses are indicative rather than imperative means that there is no abolishment of any

Conclusion 241 ruling involved. This, in turn, points to a clumsy stretching of the concept of “abrogation” to these verses, as legal-textual abrogation is defi ned as the abolishment of the wording and ruling of a Qur’anic verse. For instance, one “abrogated” passage stresses the greediness of man and does not deal with any law. It is meaningless to talk about the abolishment of any ruling in this text. The existence of legal-textual abrogation made the introduction of textual abrogation a natural development that was useful to provide support for three legal issues. The most celebrated of these concerns the punishment for adultery. The Qur’an states that adulterers should be punished with flogging. But at some point after the death of the Prophet, attempts were made to confi ne the Qur’anic penalty to fornicators and introduce stoning as a punishment for adultery. I speculate that this was initiated by the second caliph ʿUmar bin al-Khattāb. As a result, at some point early in the 2nd ˙ ˙ introduced to support the view that adulcentury a number of hadīths were ˙ terers should be stoned. Views attributed to earlier scholars do not reflect knowledge of such reports. These Hadīth narratives were later followed by others that claimed that there was˙ a Qur’anic verse stating that adultery should be punished with stoning. The already existing Hadīth-based con˙ that adultery is sensus that flogging is the penalty for fornication only and punished with stoning, combined with the acceptance of legal-textual abrogation, which had already accommodated and rationalized claims about many verses that are not in the mushaf, provided the environment for the ˙˙ claim about the stoning verse to develop. Another claim that developed under textual abrogation is the suggestion that there is a verse that states that five is the number of breast-feedings that establishes the marriage ban. The third claim of textual abrogation, which has been mentioned by a small minority of scholars, relates to a word missing from the text of verse 5.89 in the mushaf. This word makes ˙˙ the three days of fasting performed as penance for breaking an oath successive. Unlike the case of the stoning verse, which makes the general ruling of a verse that is still in the mushaf specific to fornication, the five-suckling ˙ ˙ 5.89 may be seen as only explaining the verse and the missing word of verse relevant Qur’anic verse in the mushaf. ˙˙ The two verses and the one word involved in these three abrogation claims are imperative and their rulings are operative. They could not be put under the aegis of legal-textual abrogation. This forced the jurists to create an offshoot of the latter whereby the wording of a Qur’anic verse is abolished but its ruling remains operative. Had the stoning verse, the fivesuckling verse, and the missing word of 5.89 been indicative and/or inoperative, they would have been rolled into legal-textual abrogation and there would have been no need to formulate textual abrogation. A more logical alternative to the development of the flawed, problemriddled modes of legal-textual and textual abrogation would have been to reject the historicity of the Hadīth claims about missing verses from ˙

242 Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law the mushaf! The refusal of scholars to reject such hadīths, many of which ˙ ˙ listed in highly regarded but relatively late ˙ Hadīth compilations, ended up ˙ abrogation. Withis what ultimately led them to develop these modes of out this dogmatic loyalty to Hadīth narratives that were developed many ˙ decades after the Prophet, scholars would not have needed to adopt the preposterous position that the mushaf does not record verses whose legal ˙ ˙ it retains! If we reject the suggestion rulings supersede the rulings of others of the Hadīth that the Prophet forgot verses or, more broadly, that some ˙ verses are not in the mushaf, there would be no need to presume Qur’anic ˙ that the text of any verse has been˙ abrogated. This, in turn, means that the mushaf is a complete record of all Qur’anic verses. ˙˙ Furthermore, those who entertain the possibility of the existence of Qur’anic verses that were not recorded in the mushaf ignore the many ˙˙ insurmountable practical difficulties this view introduces. One very important observation is that the concept of abrogation is not found in the Qur’an. Four variations of the term “naskh” are found in the Qur’an, but only one (2.106) is linked by scholars to the concept of abrogation. Yet a close examination of this verse shows that it has nothing to do with abrogation. The absence of any use of the term “naskh” in the Qur’an to mean abrogation forced the usūlīs to look for this concept in verses that do not contain this term. This ˙led scholars to two verses. The fi rst, 16.101, talks

Table 15.1 The Main Differences between the Three Modes of Abrogation Attribute

Legal

Legal-Textual

Textual

Chronological order

First

Second

Third

Text of abrogated verse is in the mushaf ˙˙ Ruling of abrogated verse is operative

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Abrogated verses are legalistic

Some

Only one

All three

Origin and explanatory purpose

Contradictions in the Qur’an and between the Qur’an and established practices

The mushaf does ˙˙ not contain all Qur’anic verses

Acknowledged by Shāfi‘ī

Yes

No

Support rulings not or not explicitly mentioned in the mushaf ˙˙ Implicitly

Acknowledged by Tabarī ˙

Yes

Yes

No

Conclusion 243 about the replacement of one āya with another; the second, 13.39, speaks about the erasing of āyas. But neither of these talks about the abrogation of Qur’anic verses. The Qur’anic term āya has the broad meaning of “proof,” “sign,” or “miracle .” This is the sense in which it occurs in most cases in the Qur’an. The term is used at times specifically to refer to any verse of the Qur’an, as a verse is a divine miracle that points to God. Verse 16.101 talks about the Qur’an replacing previous divine signs such as older divine Books or miracles. Verse 13.39 indicates that divine revelations may disappear by sending down new revelations that override them or by making their records vanish over time. This is what happened to the Torah and Injīl. Authentic copies of these were available when the Qur’an was being revealed but they later disappeared. Those who converted to Islam have now a new Book, and those who rejected Muhammad’s call did not like the reference to the new prophet in those Books. Both old Books gradually went out of circulation. Neither 16.101 nor 13.39 talks about the abrogation of the ruling and/or wording of Qur’anic verses. While stating that certain messengers were instructed to abolish rulings introduced by previous ones, the Qur’an contains nothing confi rming that abrogation may happen in the same Book, and it does not contain a single unequivocal instance of abrogation. There is also no statement attributed to the Prophet confi rming the occurrence of abrogation in the Qur’an. Yet abrogation has played a big role in the formation of Islamic law and interpretation of the Qur’an. I cannot see how the Qur’an could have introduced such a major concept without making any clear and explicit reference to it. That the Prophet is also completely silent on this supposed phenomenon further undermines its claimed historicity. My conclusion is that the concept of abrogation has no basis in the Qur’an. It was fi rst developed by scholars, in the form of legal abrogation, in order to rationalize perceived contradictions between Qur’anic verses and differences between Qur’anic rulings and established practices. Malicious Hadīth narratives that represented serious threats to the integrity of ˙ the process of compiling the mushaf, and thus to the mushaf itself, were ˙˙ ˙ addressed by introducing legal-textual abrogation. Textual˙abrogation was then introduced to explain the inexistence of Qur’anic texts in the mushaf ˙ whose rulings were believed to be operative. Unlike the hadīths that˙ led ˙ to legal-textual abrogation which were authored to discredit the Qur’an, the hadīths that fall under textual abrogation were introduced to provide ˙ Qur’anic support for certain legal views. The foundations of abrogation are not to be found in history but in the creative imagination of Muslim scholars. The theories of abrogation started to be developed many decades after the Prophet, probably sometime in the fi rst part of the 2nd century. The three modes of abrogation represent three very different phenomena that were put under the one rubric of abrogation. The Muslim literature of

244

Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law

abrogation reflects this reality. It is full of unsubstantiated claims, ambiguity, confusion, and outright contradictions. All of this was an inevitable consequence of accepting the authenticity of hadīths that played a major ˙ role in the development of the abrogation theories. The state of these hadīths meant that any theories based on them were bound to be incoher˙ and poorly structured. ent Naturally, scholars who accept abrogation have showed major differences in both understanding and applying this many-in-one principle. There is no better evidence than the fact that the number of abrogation cases identified by different scholars has varied from almost 250 to a mere few! The so-called “verse of the sword” is claimed to have abrogated as many as 140 specific verses and many more unidentified verses. Today’s interest in this particular abrogation claim stems from the fact that it has been used by some terrorist individuals and groups to justify atrocities, as it is claimed to give Muslims the right to unjustifiably kill non-Muslims. The case of this abrogation claim embodies everything that is wrong with the unhistorical phenomenon of abrogation. Unlike abrogation in the Qur’an, a similar phenomenon must have happened in the Sunna. It is natural to think that the Prophet changed at times some instructions he had previously given to the Muslims. These, of course, do not include the principles of the creed, but certain behavioral details that are not outlined in the Qur’an. However, even in this case, it would be impossible to prove that the rulings that the Prophet changed were of divine origin, and if they were not, then the concept of abrogation could not be used to describe them. There is evidence in the Qur’an that it abrogated sunnas of the Prophet. The Qur’an changed the qibla that the Prophet had directed the Muslim to face when they pray. The Qur’an suggests that the command to pray facing Jerusalem was inspired by God but not through the Qur’an, so this can be seen as a case of abrogation of a sunna by a Qur’anic command. There is no evidence in the Qur’an that the Sunna can abrogate the Qur’an. If such abrogation were possible, the Qur’an would have included an unequivocal statement to this effect. Abrogation states that specific laws that religion imposes can change and stresses that they changed even during the twenty-two years of Muhammad’s mission. Yet this contradicts one of the fundamentals of the traditional Muslim understanding of Islamic law. It is the view that the specific laws that were in effect when the Prophet died are immutable and will continue to be operative until the end of times. This view itself reflects a serious misunderstanding of the Islamic law as expressed in the Qur’an and the role of the Prophet in explaining and implementing that law. The Qur’an introduced a legal framework, Sharīʿa, to be used dynamically for drawing laws relevant to time, place, and circumstance. The Prophet provided examples of how this process,

Conclusion 245 known as “fiqh,” can work as he deduced laws using the Qur’an’s legal framework. Sharīʿa is immutable but the specific laws that are derived from it are subject to change. Sharīʿa is of divine origin but fiqh is a human activity. This understanding is completely compatible with the Qur’an and presents Islamic law as being genuinely suitable for all times, as the Qur’an stresses.

Appendix A The Meaning of “Hadīth” and “Sunna” ˙

The term “hadīth” occurs in the Qur’an twenty-three times and its plural ˙ form “ahādīth” is found five times. In these twenty-eight verses, the term ˙ broadly means “narrative,” “story,” “speech,” or “news,” which may or may not be religious. For instance, God describes the Qur’an as “the best of ḥadīth” (39.23) and refers to the story of Moses as the “ḥadīth of Moses” (20.9). But when applied by scholars to the Prophet, the term “Hadīth” has ˙ acquired the specific meaning of narratives about what the Prophet said, did, and approved and disapproved of, explicitly or implicitly, or what is known as the “Sunna.” These narratives at times directly quote the Prophet and at others indirectly quote him by having one of his “Sahāba (Compan˙ Yet the term ions)” declare something he witnessed the Prophet say or˙ do. has an even broader usage, as some of the narratives referred to as “hadīths” ˙ impliare reports about what Companions of the Prophet said or did. The cation is that their behavior reflected what they learned from their master. In fact, even reports about the fi rst generation after the Companions of the Prophet, known as “Tabiʿīn (Successors),” have been classified as hadīths. ˙ A hadīth may or may not be authentic, and Muslim denominations do ˙ differ on which hadīths are authentic and which are not. Sunni Muslims have particularly˙ high regard for the two Hadīth collections of Bukhārī1 ˙ 2 (256/870) and his student Muslim (261/875). They call them “sahīh ˙ ˙ (sound)” to reflect their almost complete confidence that they contain ˙genuine hadīths only. Other highly regarded Hadīth collections are those of ˙ ˙ 4 al-Tirmidhī (279/892), 5 and Abū Dāwūd (275/888), 3 Ibn Māja (273/887), al-Nasā’ī (303/915).6 All six were compiled as late as about two and a half centuries after the Prophet. Shia scholars do not have as much confidence in those sources, in particular as they contain many narratives attributed to Companions of the Prophet that the Shias do not trust because of their perceived animosity toward ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib, the Prophet’s close Companion and cousin and the fi rst Shia imām.˙ The Shias rely on other compilations of the Hadīth ˙ and the accounts related through their imāms. One of the most respected Hadīth books by the Shias is al-Kāfī by Muhammad al-Kulainī (329/940). ˙ The disagreement about the Hadīth is not ˙only between the Sunnis and ˙

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the Shias. Scholars within any denomination have also differed on which hadīths are genuine. ˙ A concept related to hadīth is “Sunna,” which is the abbreviation of ˙ and means the way of life of the Prophet. The the “Sunna of the Prophet,” Hadīth is the main source of the “Sunna.” Another source is the “sīra” or ˙ “biography” of the Prophet. Mālik considered the practices of the people of Medina as the main source of Sunna. Like “hadīth,” the term “sunna” is derived from the Qur’an. It occurs ˙ fourteen times in nine verses. Its plural, “sunan,” is mentioned twice in two verses. The term means “way,” “tradition,” or “course.” It occurs eight times in the expression “sunnat Allah” or the “sunna of Allah.” This is an example: “[This is] the way of Allah (sunnat Allah) as in the past, and you shall never find any change to the way of Allah (sunnat Allah)” (48.23). Muslim scholars are unanimous that the Prophet received other forms of revelation from God in addition to the Qur’an. The Sunna is related to this extra-Qur’anic revelation. In this sense, the Sunna is, by and large, considered to reflect divine revelation in the same way that the Qur’an does, although this term may also cover the Prophet’s personal opinions. But then differentiating the latter from the former is often not possible, as hadīths do not identify which actions or words of the Prophet were directed ˙ God and which were his own judgments. So “Sunna” stands for the by actions taken and views expressed by the Prophet that are not derived, or at least not directly, from the Qur’an, as any Prophetic action that is directly derived from the Qur’an is attributed to the latter rather than seen as Sunna. The controversial nature of the Hadīth means that deriving the Sunna ˙ from this literature is often not a straightforward process. A practice that may be considered part of the Sunna of the Prophet by a group of scholars on the basis of a certain hadīth might not be seen so by others who might reject the authenticity of ˙this hadīth. This is why there have always been and will always be differences ˙between Muslim scholars about what is the Sunna of the Prophet. Distinguishing between the related concepts of Hadīth and Sunna is nec˙ term “sunna,” with a essary as they are used so often in this book. The small “s,” is used to refer to any one practice of the Prophet; I use “Sunna” for the Prophetic practices as a whole and to mean the way of life of the Prophet. Similarly, I use the singular “hadīth” to mean a single narrative ˙ and “Hadīth,” with a capital “H,” to denote the literature of hadīths. ˙ ˙ ˙

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 1. For the meanings of “Sunna” and “Hadīth,” see Appendix A. ˙ 2. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-ʿAzīz wamā fīhi min al-Farā’id wal-Sunan, p. 4. Some versions of this ˙ narrative, like Abū ʿUbaid’s, identify the person as a “storyteller” rather than a “judge,” whose arabic words are similar, but the context suggests that “judge” is the correct one. 3. ʿAbd Allāh al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, I, no. 178, pp. 272–73. 4. Ah mad b. Muh ammad al-Nah h ās, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb ˙ ʿAzza wa-Jall ˙ ˙ ˙ ʿUlamā’ fī dhālik, II, p. 410. Allah wa-Ikhtilāf al5. Ibid., II, p. 411. 6. Yūsuf Ibn ʿAbd al-Bir, Jamiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm wa-Fadlih, I, p. 767. ˙ IV, p. 1435. 7. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, ˙ 8. Muhammad al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4300, p. 8. ˙ discuss this verse in detail later ˙in ˙the ˙ book (pp. 47–54). 9. I will 10. Muhammad Aʿzamī, The History of the Qur’anic Text from Revelation to ˙ Compilation: A˙ Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments. 11. Hibat Allāh Ibn Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 8. 12. Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 66. 13. John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation. 14. ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 102. 15. John Burton, “Abrogation,” I, p. 16; see also Wael B. Hallaq, “Law and the Qur’an,” III, p. 154. 16. al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, IV, p. 1435. 17. al-Jabrī,˙ Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 108. 18. Andrew Rippin, “The Exegetical Literature of Abrogation: Form and Content,” p. 214. 19. Ibid., p. 213. 20. David Powers, “The Exegetical Genre Nāsikh Al-Qur’an Wa Mansūkhuhu,” p. 117. 21. Ibid., p. 120. 22. Christopher Melchert, “Qur’anic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbaid, Muhāsibī, and Ibn Qutaibah,” 25. ˙

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Al-Khalīl b. Ahmad al-Farāhīdī, Kitāb al-ʿAin, IV, p. 215. ˙ al-Sāhib Ibn ʿAbbād, “Al-Muhīt.” ˙ Mansūr Muhammad al-Azharī, ˙ ˙ Abū Tahdhīb al-Lugha, VII, pp. 181–82. ˙ Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzābādī, Al-Qāmūs al-Muhīt, p. 261. ˙ ˙ I will cover these differences in more detail in Chapter 5. Muhammad Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, III, no. 2365, p. 451. Muh˙ ammad Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn ʿAn Rab ˙ al-ʿĀlamīn, II, p. 66. Muhammad Abū al-Nīl, “Baʿd Daʿāwī al-Naskh ʿIndih,” p. 124. ˙ Abū˙ Ishāq al-Shātibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt fī Usūl al-Sharīʿa, III, pp. 108–17. ˙ Zaid, Al-Naskh ˙ ˙ Mustafā fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 73–74. ˙ Ibn ˙Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 346. Abī ʿAbd Allāh Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tadhkirat al-Huffāz, I, pp. 169–70. ˙ ˙ Ibid., I, p. 177. Qatāda b. Diʿāma al-Sadūsī, Kitāb al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah Taʿālā. Rippin, “The Exegetical Literature of Abrogation: Form and Content,” p. 214. Hātam al-Dāmin, “Kitāb al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh,” p. 23. ˙ Salāma, ˙ Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 346. Ibn I will discuss the difference between the “mushaf” and the “Qur’an” in ˙˙ Chapter 8. Qatāda b. Diʿāma al-Sadūsī, Kitāb al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah Taʿālā, p. 39. Muhammad b. Shihāb al-Zuhrī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an ˙ al-Karīm. Mustafā al-Azharī, “Tawthīq Nisbat al-Kitāb lil-Zuhrī,” p. 22. ˙ ˙ Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 286–87. Zaid, Andrew Rippin, “Al-Zuhrī, Naskh al-Qur’ān and the Problem of Early Tafsīr Texts,” p. 43. Rippin reiterated his doubts about the attribution of this work to Zuhrī in a later study; see “The Exegetical Literature of Abrogation: Form and Content,” p. 214. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Wahb, Al-Jāmiʿ, III, pp. 64–87. Ibid., III, p. 84. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by ˙ ˙ 1111. Yahyā b. Yahyā al-Laithī), IV, no. 2832, p. ˙ IV, no.˙ 2253, p. 878. Ibid., I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 12. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by ˙˙ Muhammad al-Shaibānī), no. 1004, p. 315. ˙ Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qur’an, Muwatta’, and Yasin ˙˙ Madinan ʿAmal, pp. 124–25. Ibn ʿAbd al-Bir, Jamiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm wa-Fadlih, II, p. 818. ˙ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Manāqib al-Imām al-Shāfi ʿī, p. 157. Ahmad Shākir, “Introduction,” p. 6. ˙ Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 15. Melchert, “Qur’anic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbaid, Muhāsibī, and Ibn Qutaibah,” p. 75. ˙ Wael B. Hallaq, “Was al-Shafi i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?,” p. 601. Muhammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Ahkām al-Qur’an. ˙ ˙

Notes 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

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Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 75. Muhammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, pp. 122–23. ˙ Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 75. Zaid, p. 83. see Chapter 12. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 106. p. 178. pp. 75–77. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 108. p. 209. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 124. Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., pp. 221–23. Ibid., p. 109. Chapter 5. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-ʿAzīz wamā fīhi min al-Farā’id wal-Sunan. John Burton, “The Author: Abū ˙ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām,” p. 48. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-ʿAzīz wamā fīhi min al-Farā’id wal-Sunan, pp. 14–17. ˙ Fadā’il al-Qur’an, p. 321. ˙ ārith b. Asad al-Muhāsibī, Fahm al-Qur’an. al-H ˙ ˙ Husain al-Quwwatlī, “Kitāb Fahm al-Qur’an wa-Haqiqat Maʿnāh,” p. 242. ˙ ˙ al-Muh āsibī, Fahm al-Qur’an, p. 473. ˙ al-Zaidī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh min al-Qur’an al-Karīm. ʿAbd Allāh

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. Burton, “Introductroy Esssay: ʿThe Meaning of Naskh,’” p. 35. 63. Muhammad b. Jarīr al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, ˙ ˙ p. 458.

64. Muhammad al-Ghāmidī, Al-Marwiyyāt wal-’Ārā’ fī al-Naskh min Khilāl ˙ Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī Jamʿan wa-Takhrījan wa-Dirāsatan. Tafsīr 65. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī ˙al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 279–328. 66. Abū Muhammad ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, p. ˙ ˙ 442. 67. al-Nahhās, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah ʿAzza wa-Jall wa-Ikhtilāf ˙ ˙ fī dhālik, II, pp. 434–35. al-ʿUlamā’ 68. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muhammad Ibn Hazm, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al˙ Qur’an al-Karīm, p. 9.˙ 69. Burton, “Introductroy Esssay: ‘The Meaning of Naskh,’” pp. 35, 44; Rippin, “The Exegetical Literature of Abrogation: Form and Content,” p. 218. 70. See Chapter 5. 71. For more details, see pp. 103–105. 72. Chapter 5. 73. Muhammad al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haq min ʿIlm ˙ ūl, II, p. 805. ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Us ˙ 74. Powers, “The Exegetical Genre Nāsikh Al-Qur’an Wa Mansūkhuhu,” p. 122. 75. e.g. Shaʿbān Ismāʿīl, Nazariyyat al-Naskh fī al-Sharā’iʿ al-Samāwiyya, p. ˙ 197. 76. e.g. Nādiya al-ʿImarī, Al-Naskh fī Dirāsāt al-Usūliyyīn: Dirāsa Muqārina, ˙ p. 113. 77. Andrew Rippin, Review of The Sources of Islamic Law, by John Burton, p. 364.

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78. al-Nahhās, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah ʿAzza wa-Jall wa-Ikhtilāf ˙ ˙ fī dhālik, II, p. 400. al-ʿUlamā’ 79. Abū Bakr Ahmad b. ʿAlī al-Jassās, Al-Fusūl fī al-Usūl, II, p. 217. ˙˙ ˙ ˙ 80. Ibn Salāma, ˙Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p.˙26. 81. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Mafātīh al-Ghaib: Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, III, p. 246. ˙ ʿ li-Ahkām al-Qur’an, II, p. 63. 82. Muhammad al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi ˙ ˙ 83. Johannes Marinus ˙Simon Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation 1880–1960, p. 50; Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 69. 84. Daniel Brown, “The Triumph of Scriptualism: The Doctrine of Naskh and Its Modern Critics,” p. 57. 85. Muhammad Rashīd Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār. ˙ Usūl al-Fiqh, p. 251. 86. Muh˙ ammad al-Khudarī, ˙ ˙ al-Sharī ˙ ʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh 87. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī. 88. Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, pp. 194–211. ˙ 89. e.g. ˙Kaifa Nataʿāmal maʿa al-Qur’an, pp. 82–85; Mā’at Sū’āl ʿan al-Islam, pp. 144–48. 90. Ahmad al-Saqqā, Lā Naskh fī al-Qur’an. ˙ 91. Mahmoud Ayoub, “The Speaking Qur’an and the Silent Qur’an: A Study of the Principles and Development of Imāmī Shīʿī Tafsīr,” p. 191. 92. Brown, “The Triumph of Scriptualism: The Doctrine of Naskh and Its Modern Critics,” p. 61. 93. Ibid., p. 60. 94. Ibid., p. 63. 95. e.g. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, originally 1963; Fātima Najjūm, Naskh al-Kitāb wal-Sunna bil-Kitāb wal-Sunna; al-ʿImarī, ˙ Al-Naskh fī Dirāsāt al-Usūliyyīn: Dirāsa Muqārina; Ismāʿīl, Nazariyyat al-Naskh fī ˙ ˙ al-Sharā’iʿ al-Samāwiyya; Al-Naskh fī alʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Matrūdī, ˙ ˙ Qur’an al-ʿĀzīm; al-Ghāmidī, Al-Marwiyyāt wal-Ārā’ fī al-Naskh min Khilāl Tafsīr ˙Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī Jamʿan wa-Takhrījan wa-Dirāsatan; ʿAbd Allāh al-Shinqītī, Al-Ayāt˙al-Mansūkha fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm. ˙

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1. Ismāʿīl, Nazariyyat al-Naskh fī al-Sharā’iʿ al-Samāwiyya, pp. 43–60. ˙ 2. Louay Fatoohi, Jesus The Muslim Prophet: History Speaks of a Human Messiah Not a Divine Christ, pp. 9–12. 3. The concept of law in the Qur’an is discussed in detail in Chapter 14. 4. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 20–21. 5. On the use of the term “Jew” in the Qur’an, see Louay Fatoohi and Shetha Al-Dargazelli, The Mystery of Israel in Ancient Egypt: The Exodus in the Qur’an, the Old Testament, Archaeological Finds, and Historical Sources, pp. 184–87. 6. More details on Jesus’ attitude toward the law can be found in Louay Fatoohi, The Mystery of the Historical Jesus: The Messiah in the Qur’an, the Bible, and Historical Sources, pp. 377–88.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1. Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 67.

Notes 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

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al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XVI, pp. 610–11. ˙ Shahab Ahmed, “Satanic Verses,” IV, p. 533. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XVI, pp. 602–09 ˙ Burton, “‘Those Are the High-Flying Cranes,’” p. 253. John W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p. 103. Alfred Guillaume, Islam, p. 190. Francis E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam, p. 161. William Muir, The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam, to the Era of the Hegira, II, p. 152. Burton, “‘Those Are the High-Flying Cranes.’” al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XVI, pp. 602–09 ˙ al-Hasan al-Wāhidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, pp. 232–33. Abū ˙ ubī, Al-Jāmi ˙ ʿ li-Ahkām al-Qur’an, XII, pp. 80–82. e.g. al-Qurt ˙ pp. 279–81; quoted in Burton, “‘Those Are L. Caetani,˙ Annali Dell’ Islam, the High-Flying Cranes.’” al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmiʿ li-Ahkām al-Qur’an, II, p. 81. ˙ Burton,˙ “‘Those Are the High-Flying Cranes,’” p. 254. See also Nicolai Sinai, “An Interpretation of Sūrat al-Najm (Q. 53).” Sinai has argued that, given that the gharānīq passage is said to have followed verse 20, it either “preceded verses 21 and 22, or verses 21 and 22 were not originally part of the sura and were only added later in order to replace” that passage (pp. 10–11). He rejects both possibilities as they do not fit with the arguments of the other verses. While agreeing that the gharānīq passage is fictitious and agreeing with Burton that its appearance was “certainly the immediate product of exegetical speculation” on verse 22.52, Sinai still argues that “there might after all be something like a ‘historical core’ to the gharānīq affair” so the later gharānīq tradition “could also draw on vague memories that some such sort of theological compromise had been formulated as a response to Q. 53, but had subsequently met with emphatic rejection in a further Qur’anic comment on the subject” (p. 20). However, as I have explained, the problems facing the assumption that Muhammad might have compromised the Qur’an’s outright rejection of the Arab goddesses are as big if not bigger than the problems of fitting the gharānīq passage into the structure of chapter 53. Burton, “‘Those Are the High-Flying Cranes,’” p. 264. Ibid., p. 256. Muhammad Al-Tabatabā’ī. “Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’an,” p. 7. ˙ ˙ ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qutaiba, Tafsīr Gharīb al-Qur’an, p. e.g. ˙Abū Muhammad ˙ 294.

22. For an example of such an attempt, see Uri Rubin, The Eye of the Beholder: The Life of Muhammad as Viewed by the Early Muslims—A Textual Analysis, pp. 155–56. 23. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 388. ˙ Burton, “The Exegesis of Q. 2:106 and the Islamic Theories of Naskh: 24. John mā nansakh min āya aw nansahā na’ti bi khairin minhā aw mithlihā,” p. 462. 25. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Fadā’il al-Qur’an, p. 230. ˙ 26. Ibid., p. 269. 27. For a discussion of the subject of the Qur’anic readings, see Ahmad al-Bīlī, ˙ Al-Ikhtilāf Baina al-Qirā’āt. 28. Qur’an, Mushaf al-Sahaba fī al-Qirā’āt al-ʿAshr al-Mutawātira min Tarīq ˙ ˙ wal-Durrā. ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Shātibiyya ˙ 29. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 397. ˙ 30. al-Shāfi ʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 108. 31. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, pp. 396–97. ˙

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Notes

32. Burton, “The Exegesis of Q. 2:106 and the Islamic Theories of Naskh: mā nansakh min āya aw nansahā na’ti bi khairin minhā aw mithlihā,” p. 459. 33. Ibid., pp. 460–61. 34. “‘Those Are the High-Flying Cranes,’” p. 261. 35. The Collection of the Qur’an, pp. 63–46. 36. The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation. 37. al-Rāzī, Mafātīh al-Ghaib: Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, III, p. 249. 38. Abū Muslim b.˙ Bahr al-Isfahānī, Multaqat Jāmiʿ al-Ta’wīl li-Muhkam ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Tanzīl, pp. 9–10. ˙ 39. See my discussion later: p. 209. 40. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, pp. 150, 152. 41. al-Saqqā, Lā Naskh fī al-Qur’an, p. 19. 42. Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 70. 43. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 153. 44. al-Isfahānī, Multaqat Jāmiʿ al-Ta’wīl li-Muhkam al-Tanzīl, p. 10. ˙ I, pp. 416–19. ˙ 45. Rid˙ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, ˙ 46. al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, pp. 204–05; Kaifa Nataʿāmal maʿa alQur’an, p. 84. ˙ 47. We will study this verse later: pp. 55–64.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XIV, p. 362. ˙ XIV, p. 363. Ibid., Ahmad b. Shuʿaib al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 3499, p. 370. Jār˙ Allah al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, III, p. 473. p. 47. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 190. al-Shātibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt fī Usūl al-Sharīʿa, III, p. 104. ˙ ˙ p. 202. al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, ˙ maʿa al-Qur’an, p. 83. Kaifa Nataʿāmal Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, p. 204. ˙ p. 80. This is attributed to some by Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, Al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’an, II, p. 40. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 450. ˙ p. 51. al-Isfahānī, Multaqat Jāmiʿ al-Ta’wīl li-Muhkam al-Tanzīl, p. 65. ˙ ˙ Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī˙ al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 182. Ibid., p. 183. al-Saqqā, Lā Naskh fī al-Qur’an, p. 20. Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 70–71. p. 48. Fatoohi, The Mystery of the Historical Jesus: The Messiah in the Qur’an, the Bible, and Historical Sources, pp. 45–47. al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, p. 202. ʿAbd al-Malik ˙Ibn Hishām, Sīrat al-Nabī, I, p. 261. Ibid., I, p. 378. Ibid., I, p. 489. Barakat Ahmad, Muhammad and the Jews: A Re-Examination, pp. 11–17.

Notes

255

27. Gordon Darnell Newby, A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse under Islam, p. 85. 28. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XIII, pp. 566–67. ˙ XIII, pp. 569–70. 29. Ibid., 30. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 236–44. 31. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, pp. 132–34. 32. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, V, pp. 193–96. ˙ 33. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 138. 34. For a discussion of the separate letters, see Louay Fatoohi, The Prophet Joseph in the Qur’an, the Bible, and History, pp. 21–28. 35. Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an; The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 1–8. 36. pp. 80–81.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

See Chapter 10. pp. 20–22. Muhammad al-Z arqānī, Manāhil al-ʿIrfān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, II, p. 190. ˙ the Zāhirite scholar ʿAlī b. Ahmad b. Saʿīd Ibn Hazm, One˙ exception is ˙ ˙ Al-Ihkām fī Ūsūl al-Ahkām, IV, p. 107. ˙ I, pp. 96–99; ˙ ˙ is an unconvincing attempt to prove the Qur’an Ibid., this implies that the Sunna of the Prophet is also protected by God. I shall discuss this incident further in Chapter 13. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, pp. 109–10. pp. 47–54. pp. 93–97. pp. 93–97. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 179. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2615, p. 107; no. 2626, p.111. ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Karīm. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an The scholars from whom I will quote the examples of abrogation claims in this section do not necessarily agree with those claims as at times they only mention them or even reject them. The point is to show that these claims have been made. Ibn Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 218. Ibid., p. 297. Ibid., p. 33. al-Nahhās, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah ʿAzza wa-Jall wa-Ikhtilāf ˙ ˙ fī dhālik, III, pp. 133–35. al-ʿUlamā’ al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 46. ˙ Fatoohi, Jesus The Muslim Prophet: History Speaks of a Human Messiah Not a Divine Christ, p. 66. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 407. Ibn Hazm, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, p. 42. ˙ al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, V, p. 130. ˙ V, pp. 143–44. Ibid., Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, III, no. 2070, p. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 497. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4362, p. 22. ˙ īh ˙ Muslim, I, no. 125, p. 115. Abū al-Husain Muslim, ˙Sah ˙ ˙ ˙

256

Notes

28. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 102. 29. e.g. Ibid., p. 8. 30. al-Jassās, Al-Fusūl fī al-Usūl, I, pp. 383–85. ˙ ˙ h˙ās, Al-Nāsikh ˙ ˙ 31. al-Nah wal-Mansūkh fī Kitāb Allah ʿAzza wa-Jall wa-Ikhtilāf ˙ ˙ fī dhālik, II, p. 572. al-ʿUlamā’ 32. Ibn Hazm, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, p. 67. ˙ 33. Ibn Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, pp. 105–06. 34. Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Rahmān Ibn al-Jawzī, Nawāsikh al˙ Qur’an, pp. 154–55. 35. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 386–92. 36. Ibid., I, p. 386. 37. Ibid., I, p. 393. 38. Muhammad al-Milbārī, “Khātimat al-Tahqīq,” pp. 515–18. ˙ ˙ pp. 1443–47. 39. al-Suyūt ī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, IV, ˙ 40. Ibn al-Jawzī, Nawāsikh al-Qur’an. 41. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 387. 42. Ibid., I, p. 388. 43. Abū Mansūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 249. 44. al-Shinqīt˙ī, Al-Ayāt al-Mansūkha fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, pp. 87, 97. 45. al-Jabrī, ˙Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 117. 46. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XXII, pp. 483–84. ˙ 47. al-Shinqīt ī, Al-Ayāt al-Mansūkha fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, pp. 87, 104–08. ˙ 48. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 248. 49. I will discuss 58.12 and 73.2–4 in more detail in Chapter 6.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

See Chapter 2. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 56. e.g. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 66. al-Shinqītī, Al-Ayāt al-Mansūkha fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, pp. 87, 97. p. 90. ˙ al-Khudarī, Usūl al-Fiqh, p. 256. ˙ Jāmi ˙ ʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XXII, p. 482. al-Tabarī, ˙ XXII, p. 484. Ibid., Muhammad al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, V, no. 3300, p. 329. It is ˙not found in the other five main compilations but it is reported in Ahmad ˙ b. Shuʿaib al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VII, no. 8484, p. 464. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 190. al-Shinqītī, Al-Ayāt al-Mansūkha fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, p. 87. al-Shāfiʿī,˙ Al-Risāla, pp. 113–16. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, no. 746, p. 513. ˙ ˙ al-Nasā’ī,˙ Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 1601, p. 189. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XL, no. 24269. p. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 315. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, II, no. 1516, p. 924. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XXIII, p. 359. ˙ Sulaimān b. al-Ashʿath Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, II, nos. 1304–05, pp. 474–75. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, pp. 302–04.

Notes

257

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, p. 211. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ˙ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XIV, p. 284. ˙ al-Ghazālī, Nazarāt fī al-Qur’an, p. 198. ˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi ʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4468, p. 54. ˙ ˙al-S ˙ anʿānī, Al-Musannaf, V, no. 9589, p. 171. Abū Bakr ʿAbd al-Razzāq ˙ al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan ˙Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XI, p. 269. ˙ al-Khud arī, Usūl al-Fiqh, pp. 254–55. ˙ ˙ arāt fī al-Qur’an, p. 210; Kaifa Nataʿāmal maʿa al-Qur’an, al-Ghazālī, Naz ˙ p. 83.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

al-Saqqā, Lā Naskh fī al-Qur’an, p. 165. Ibn Hazm, Al-Ihkām fī Ūsūl al-Ahkām, IV, pp. 89–92. ˙ ˙ Āy al-Qur’an, III, pp. 160–66. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ˙ al-Bayān˙ʿan Ta’wīl ˙ III, pp. 172–78. Ibid., Ibid., III, p. 180. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, nos. 4325–26, p. 14. ˙ ˙no. ˙ 1145, p. 802. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4324, p. 13. e.g. al-Bukhārī, ˙ ˙ technical ˙ For a more detailed but highly discussion of the various forms of misunderstanding of and misleading connections between these verses that exegetes and jurists created, see Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 57–80. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VII, no. 12147, pp. 28–29. ˙ min al-Sunan, ˙ no. 3543, p. 375. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, IV, p. 398. ˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4348, p. 18. ˙ ˙ ˙ Ibid. e.g. al-ʿImarī, Al-Naskh fī Dirāsāt al-Usūliyyīn: Dirāsa Muqārina, p. 162. al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān,˙IV, p. 1450. ˙ See Chapter 7. Powers, “The Exegetical Genre Nāsikh Al-Qur’an Wa Mansūkhuhu,” p. 134. al-Isfahānī, Multaqat Jāmiʿ al-Ta’wīl li-Muhkam al-Tanzīl, p. 29. ˙ II, p. 449. ˙ Rid˙ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, ˙ Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2217,˙ ˙p. 862. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, IV, no. 2299, p. 607. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2193,˙ ˙pp. 851–52. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 3529, p. 373. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, IV, no. 2300, p. 608. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 270. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, IV, p. 398. ˙ Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, IV, no. 2299, p. 606. Abū Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2217,˙ ˙p. 861. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4348, p. 18. ˙ ˙ Al-Tafsīr ˙ al-Rāzī, Mafātīh al-Ghaib: al-Kabīr, VI, p. 170. ˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi ʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4348, p. 18. ˙ ˙ al-Sunan, ˙ al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min no. 3543, p. 375. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, IV, no. 2298, p. 605. al-Rāzī, Mafātīh al-Ghaib: Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, VI, p. 171. Mālik b. Anas,˙ Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2188,˙ ˙p. 849.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

258 Notes 65. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XLIV, no. 26658, p. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 262. 66. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, no. 1484, p. 1122. ˙ ˙ 67. al-Shāfiʿī,˙ Al-Risāla, p. 200. 68. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2189,˙ ˙p. 849. 69. Ibid., IV, no. 2189, p. 850. 70. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VII, no. 12147, pp. 28–29. ˙ ˙ Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā 71. Mālik b. Anas, Muwat ta’ al-Imām ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2191,˙ ˙p. 850. 72. John Burton, “The Vowelling Of Q 65,1,” p. 270. 73. The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 73. 74. al-Khudarī, Usūl al-Fiqh, p. 252. ˙ ˙ 75. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi ʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 300, p. 126. ˙ ˙ ˙ Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 198. 76. Burton, The Sources of Islamic

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 1. Muhammad al-Makkī b. Abī Tālib, Al-’Īdāh li-Nāsikh al-Qur’an ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ wa-Mansūkhih wa-Maʿrifat Usūlih wa-Ikhtilāf al-Nās fīh, p. 309. ˙ 2. Muhammad Ibn al-ʿArabī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Al-Qur’an Al-Karīm, II, p.˙ 245. 3. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 5, has implied that some scholars have identified a different passage as the verse of the sword. However, I have not come across any such identifications. 4. ʿImād al-Dīn Abī al-Fīdā’ Ismāʿīl Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’an al-ʿAzīm, VII, ˙ p. 150. 5. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 9. 6. p. 88. 7. Louay Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an: The Truth From the Source, p. 37. 8. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 6. 9. Ibn Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, pp. 292–93. 10. Uri Rubin, “The Great Pilgrimage Of Muhammad: Some Notes On Sūra IX,” pp. 249–50. 11. Richard Bell, “Muhammad’s Pilgrimage Proclamation.” 12. Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Sunna Al-Nabawiyya Baina Ahl al-Fiqh wa-Ahl al-H˙ādīth, p. 129. 13. Ibn˙ Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, p. 169. 14. Ibn al-ʿArabī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Al-Qur’an Al-Karīm, II, p. 240. 15. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 9. 16. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XII, pp. 348–49. 17. Ibn˙ al-ʿArabī, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī Al-Qur’an Al-Karīm, II, p. 240. 18. Ibid., II, p. 245.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 1. p. 67. 2. For more on the concept of Kitāb, see Fatoohi, The Prophet Joseph in the Qur’an, the Bible, and History, pp. 28–30. 3. See al-Zarkashī, Al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’an, I, pp. 276–79. One scholar has recently argued that this Book was called “Qur’an” because it was

Notes

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

259

“read” as opposed to being “written.” He has suggested that understanding the Qur’an as a written revelation was a later development (William A. Graham, “The Earliest Meaning of ‘Qur’ān’.”) However, the Qur’an is called “Book” in the Qur’an itself, with references to its being written down during the time of the Prophet (29.48). p. 49. For more on this subject, see my two reviews of the views of scholars on the fi rst and last verses of the Qur’an: Louay Fatoohi, “The First Verse of the Qur’an”; “The Last Verse of the Qur’an”. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXIX, no. 17918, ˙ ˙ ˙ p. ˙441. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, no. 567, p. 396. ˙ ˙ Manāhil ˙ al-Zarqānī, al-ʿIrfān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, I, pp. 287–91. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 96. Ibid., p. 97. See Chapters 10, 11, and 12. I will discuss all three cases in detail in Chapters 11 and 12. al-Zarqānī, Manāhil al-ʿIrfān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, I, p. 202. e.g. Abū Bakr Ibn Abī Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Kitāb al-Masāhif, I, nos. 38–44, ˙ ˙ pp. 175–79. e.g. Aʿzamī, The History of the Qur’anic Text from Revelation to Compilation: A˙ Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

e.g. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XXIV, pp. 315–16. ˙ pp. 52–53. Al-Tabatabā’ī, “Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’an,” p. 4. ˙ ˙ al-Qurt ubī, Al-Jāmiʿ li-Ahkām al-Qur’an, XX, p. 19. ˙ Jāmiʿ al-Bayān˙ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, pp. 396–97. al-Tabarī, Rid˙ ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, I, p. 415. e.g.˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XLI, no. 25069, ˙ ˙ ˙ p. 515.˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4849, p. 182. ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XL, no. 24335, e.g. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad ˙ ˙ ˙ p. 392.˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4853, p. 183; no. 6110, p. 459. ˙ ˙ ˙ I, no. 788, p. 543; Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī e.g. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, ˙ 1331, ˙ ˙ p. 493. Dāwūd, II, no. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2574, pp. 92–93; III, no. 4848, p. 182. ˙ ˙ ˙al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXIV, no. 15365, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad ˙ ˙ ˙ p. ˙80; also XXXV, no. 21140, p. 77. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ 138. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), II, no. 331, p. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, VI, no. 3602, p. 87. ˙ ˙ īh Muslim, I, no. 572, p. 400. ˙ ˙ Muslim, Sah ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, II, no. 1020, p. 259. Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, II, no. 1203, pp. 268–69. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 1243, p. 147. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 397, p. 153. ˙ ˙ ah ˙ āwī, Sharh Muskhil al-Āthār, V, pp. 271–72. Ahmad b. Muhammad al-T ˙ V, pp. 272–73. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Ibid.,

260 Notes 23. Tahāwī describes such verses as having been the subject of ikhrāj (taking out) ˙ the ˙ Qur’an. We have to either presume that he wrongly used “Qur’an” of when he meant “mushaf” or that his understanding of this form of “abro˙ gation” differs from ˙how the other scholars understand it. The abrogation of any Qur’anic text, whether or not its ruling is also abrogated, does not change its status as being Qur’anic revelation. 24. Ibn Salāma, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh, pp. 11–12. 25. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, V, no. 2916, p. 179. 26. Nūr al-Dīn al-Haithamī, Bughyat al-Bāhith ʿan Zawā’id Musnad al-Hārith, ˙ ˙ II, pp. 932–33. 27. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Abī Shaiba, Al-Musannaf li-Ibn Abī Shaiba, X, nos. 30599– ˙ 601, p. 21.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 1. For easier reference, I have included the transliteration, in addition to the translation, of every alleged missing verse that I discuss in the chapter. 2. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2711, p. 140. ˙ ˙ ˙ 3. Ibid., II, no. 2724, p. 143. 4. Ibid., II, no. 3941, p. 442. 5. Ibid., II, no. 2962, p. 202; no. 3940, p. 442. 6. This term, which means “helpers,” refers to the Muslims of Medina who received and helped those who migrated from Mecca to Medina. 7. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 398. ˙ VI, pp. 234–35. 8. Ibid., 9. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, no. 677, p. 468. ˙ ˙ b. ˙ ʿUmar al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, I, p. 350. 10. Muhammad ˙ b. al-Husain al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, II, no. 3094, pp. 283–84. 11. Ahmad ˙ abarī, Jāmi ˙ ʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 398; VI, pp. 12. al-T ˙ 234–35. 13. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2711, p. 140; no. 2724, p. 143; no. ˙ ˙ 3941, p. 442; no. 3945, p.˙ 443. 14. Ibid., II, no. 2962, p. 202; no. 3940, p. 442. 15. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXI, no. 14074, pp. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 457–58. 16. Ibid., XIX, no. 12064, pp. 119–20; XXI, no. 13683, pp. 253–54. 17. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 3945, p. 443. ˙ ˙ al-Imām ˙ 18. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad b. Hanbal, V, no. 3501, p. 451. ˙ XXXV, ˙ no. 21203, pp. 131–32. ˙ ˙ 19. Ibid., 20. e.g. Ibid., XX, no. 12803, pp. 194–95; no. 13049, p. 344; XXI, no. 13552, p. 344. 21. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6209, p. 481. ˙ ˙ ˙ 22. Ibid., III, no. 6208, p. 480. 23. Ibid., III, no. 6210, p. 481. 24. Ibid., III, no. 6211, p. 481. 25. Ibid., III, no. 6212, p. 481. 26. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, XXIV, p. 599. ˙ 27. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, no. 1049, pp. 725–26. ˙ ˙ 1048, ˙ 28. Ibid., II, no. p. 725. 29. Chapters that start with a variation of the term “sabbaḥa (glory be to).” 30. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, no. 1050, p. 726. ˙ ˙ ʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 398. 31. al-Tabarī,˙ Jāmi ˙ II, p. 398. 32. Ibid.,

Notes

261

33. al-Tahāwī, Sharh Muskhil al-Āthār, V, p. 275. ˙ b. Hanbal, ˙ Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXIV, no. 20454, 34. Ah˙mad ˙ ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 104–05. 35. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, XIII, no. 8834, p. 147. 36. e.g. Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, V, no. 4235, p. 311. 37. Ibn Wahb, Al-Jāmiʿ, III, p. 84. 38. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, no. 1050, p. 726. ˙ ˙ Al-Nāsikh ˙ 39. Ibn Salāma, wal-Mansūkh, pp. 10–11. 40. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXV, no. 21203, ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 131–32.˙ 41. Ibid., XXXV, no. 21202, pp. 129–30, is another version with a slight difference. 42. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6589, p. 562. ˙ ˙ Al-Mus ˙ 43. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, annaf, VIII, no. 16080, p. 373. ˙ ˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal, I, no. 331, pp. 414– 44. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām ˙ ˙ 15;˙ no. 391,˙ pp. 450–51. 45. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 7528, p. 548. ˙ no. ˙ ˙ 62, p. 80. 46. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, ˙ 47. Ahmad b.˙ H˙ anbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XVI, no. 10813, p. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 475. 48. Ibn Abī Shaiba, Al-Musannaf li-Ibn Abī Shaiba, XIII, no. 38059, p. 199. 49. Meaning they would be˙ punished by having bad rulers and ministers. 50. al-Tahāwī, Sharh Muskhil al-Āthār, V, p. 273. ˙ Shaiba, ˙Al-Musannaf li-Ibn Abī Shaiba, X, no. 30699, p. 41. 51. Ibn˙ Abī ˙ 52. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXVI, no. 21206, ˙ ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 133–34. 53. I will deal with the stoning passage in Chapter 11. 54. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXVI, no. 21207, ˙ ˙ ˙ p. ˙134. 55. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VII, no. 13433, p. 236. ˙ 56. Ibid., III, no. 5990, ˙p. 365. 57. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Fadā’il al-Qur’an, p. 320. ˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXV, no. 21640, 58. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 501–02;˙ no. 21643, p. 505. 59. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2717, p. 141. ˙ ˙ ˙ V, no. 3104, p. 182. 60. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, 61. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Fadā’il al-Qur’an, p. 324. ˙ 62. e.g. al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, IV, p. 1458. ˙ 63. Ibn Abī Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Kitāb al-Masāhif, III, no. 238, p. 370. ˙ ˙ 64. p. 200. 65. Ibn Abī Shaiba, Al-Musannaf li-Ibn Abī Shaiba, III, nos. 7103–04, p. 241. ˙ 66. al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, IV, p. 1465. 67. Ibn Abī ˙Shaiba, Al-Musannaf li-Ibn Abī Shaiba, III, nos. 7101, 7105–06, pp. ˙ 241–42; al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, II, no. 3144, p. 299. 68. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VII, no. 13434, p. 263. ˙ b. Sallām, Fad ˙ ā’il al-Qur’an, p. 320. 69. Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim ˙ 70. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 115. 71. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 398. ˙ 72. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 90. 73. al-Muhāsibī, Fahm al-Qur’an, pp. 404–07. ˙ 74. al-Tahāwī, Sharh Muskhil al-Āthār, V, pp. 271–79. ˙ ˙ Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haq min ʿIlm al-Usūl, II, p. 75. e.g.˙ al-Shawkānī, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 807.

262

Notes

76. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4347, p. 18. ˙ ˙ 77. Brown, “The Triumph of˙ Scriptualism: The Doctrine of Naskh and Its Modern Critics,” p. 55. 78. See my discussion of this point in Fatoohi, The Mystery of the Historical Jesus: The Messiah in the Qur’an, the Bible, and Historical Sources, pp. 34–38. 79. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 111. 80. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4829, p. 178. ˙ ˙ ˙

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 1. Muhammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, VI, p. 72. 2. Abū˙ ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh fī al-Qur’an al-ʿAzīz wamā fīhi min al-Farā’id wal-Sunan. ˙ 3. Fadā’il al-Qur’an, p. 321. ˙ abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VIII, p. 439. 4. al-T 5. Ibn˙ Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, p. 442. ˙ 6. p. 148. 7. “Shaikha” is the feminine of “Shaikh.” 8. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXVI, no. 21207, ˙ ˙ ˙ p. ˙134. 9. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VI, no. 7112, p. 408. 10. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1203. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3044,˙ p. 11. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXV, no. 21596, ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 472–73;˙ no. 21643, p. 505. 12. Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, III, no. 2553, p. 558. 13. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VI, no. 7110, p. 407. 14. Ibid., VI, no. 7109, p. 407. 15. p. 148. 16. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1691, p. 1317. ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4418, p. 469. 17. Abū Dāwūd, 18. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6589, pp. 561–62. ˙ ˙ ˙ ʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh 19. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharī wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, pp. 45, 47. 20. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6588, p. 561. ˙ 21. Mālik b. Anas, Muwat˙ta’˙ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1203. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3044,˙ p. 22. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 16920, p. 370. 23. e.g. al-Jassās, Al-Fusūl fī al-Usūl, II, pp. 259–61. ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmi ˙ ʿ al-Kabīr, ˙ III, no. 1431, p. 101. 24. al-Tirmidhī, 25. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXV, no. 21596, ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 472–73.˙ 26. p. 127. 27. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VII, no. 13434, p. 263. 28. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi˙ʿ al-Sahīh, III, ˙no. 4371, p. 26. ˙ III, ˙ ˙ no. 7265, p. 727; no. 7598, pp. 564–65. 29. Ibid., II, no. 3510, p. 338; 30. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1195–96. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3035, ˙pp. 31. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, VIII, no. 4498, pp. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 87–88. 32. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1699, p. 1326. ˙ ˙ ˙

Notes 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

263

Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4446, p. 494. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VI, no. 7175, p. 441. Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, III, no. 2558, p. 592. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, III, no. 2367, p. 1495. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VIII, pp. 414–15. ˙ Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1700, p. 1327. ˙ ˙ ʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VIII, pp. 414–18, 262–63. al-Tabarī,˙ Jāmi ˙ al-Ghazālī, Kaifa Nataʿāmal maʿa al-Qur’an, p. 80. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 153. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, IV, no. 2732, p. 464. ˙ Māja, Al-Sunan, ˙ ˙ pp. 594–95. ˙ Ibn III, nos. 2561–62, Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4462, p. 510. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, III, no. 1456, p. 124. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 17022, p. 404. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6585, p. 560. ˙ ˙ no. ˙ 1691, p. 1318. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4419, pp. 470–71. Abū Dāwūd, Ibid., VI, no. 4422, p. 474. Ibid., VI, no. 4427, p. 477. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1695, p. 1322. ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4436, p. 484. Abū Dāwūd, Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1201. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3041, ˙p. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4420, p. 473. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 16958, p. 382. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1695, pp. 1322–23. ˙ ˙ Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā Mālik b.˙ Anas, ˙ 1199. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3039, ˙p. e.g. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4430, p. 480. e.g. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1695, pp. 1323–24. ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4428, pp. 477–78. e.g. Abū Dāwūd, al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 15803, p. 19. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4439, p. 486. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, nos. 6590–91, p. 563. ˙ ˙Dāwūd, VI, no. 4450, p. 499. e.g. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan ˙Abī Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1206. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3049, ˙p. Ibid., V, no. 3036, p. 1197. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 16926, p. 372. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4467, p. 515. Thayyiba is the feminine of thayyib. However, some hadīths use thayyib for ˙ the female also. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1204. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3044,˙ p. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no, 1690, p. 1316. ˙ ˙1690, pp. 1316–17. Ibid., III,˙ no. Ibid., III, no. 1690, p. 1317. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, II, no. 2638, p. 114. ˙ ˙ no. ˙ 1697, pp. 1324–25. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, ˙ Musnad ˙ ˙ al-Dārimī, al-Dārimī, III, no. 2363, p. 1492. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4445, p. 492. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 16924, p. 371. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 5409, p. 549.

264

Notes

81. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1199–1200. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3040,˙ pp. 82. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VI, no. 7148, p. 426. 83. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 2099, p. 559. ˙ 84. Mālik b. Anas, Muwat˙ta’˙ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1207. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3053, ˙p. 85. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 2100, p. 559. ˙ ˙ 86. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī ˙Dāwūd, VI, no. 4469, p. 517. 87. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, III, no. 2371, p. 1499. 88. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1705, p. 1330. ˙ ˙ Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā 89. Mālik b.˙ Anas, ˙ 1204. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3044,˙ p. 90. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXV, no. 21596, ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 472–73.˙ 91. Pavel Pavlovitch, “The ʿUbāda B. Al-Sāmit Tradition at the Crossroads of ˙ Methodology,” p. 154. 92. Abū Muhammad ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mushkil al-Qur’an, p. ˙ 511. 93. John Burton, “The Meaning of ʿIhsan,’” p. 74. 94. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 14. 95. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VI, pp. 595–98. 96. Ibn˙ Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mushkil al-Qur’an, p. 511. 97. See also al-Shāfiʿī, Ahkām al-Qur’an, I, pp. 309–10; Al-Umm, VI, p. 390 98. Al-Risāla, p. 136. ˙ 99. The term “bikr” is also never applied to males in the Qur’an. It is used in the singular once to describe a female cow (2.68) and twice in the plural to describe women (56.36, 66.5). 100. p. 148. 101. p. 148. 102. p. 158. 103. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, III, no. 1431, p. 101. 104. p. 160. 105. p. 161. 106. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, III, no. 2368, p. 1497. 107. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 129. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid., p. 132. 110. Ibid., p. 131. 111. Ibid., p. 132. 112. Ibid., p. 248. 113. Ibid., pp. 129, 131. 114. Ibid., pp. 132–33. 115. Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, pp. 145–56. ˙ 116. Ibid., pp. 274–76. 117. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, VI, no. 4419, pp. 470–71. 118. Scott C. Lucas, “‘Perhaps You Only Kissed Her?’: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Penalties for Illicit Sex in the Sunni Hadith Literature,” p. 412. 119. Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, p. 439. 120. Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, III, no. 1944,˙ p. 125. 121. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, XLIII, no. 26316, ˙ ˙ pp.˙ 342–43.˙ 122. Ibn Hazm, Al-Ihkām fī Ūsūl al-Ahkām, IV, pp. 77–78. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ adīth, pp. 443–44. 123. Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-H ˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal, II, no. 839, p. 204. 124. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙

Notes 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VI, no. 7102, p. 404. p. 173. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, VI, pp. 28–31. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VI, p. 500. ˙ VI, p. 501. Ibid., al-Isfahānī, Multaqat Jāmiʿ al-Ta’wīl li-Muhkam al-Tanzīl, pp. 34–35. ˙ ˙ pp. ˙171–177. pp. 177–182. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VIII, no. 15803, p. 19. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1695, pp. 1323–24. ˙ Musnad ˙ ˙ al-Dārimī, al-Dārimī, III, no. 2369, p. 1498. Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an: The Truth from the Source. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VI, pp. 494–97. ˙ Mujāhid b. Jabr, Tafsīr al-Imām Mujāhid b. Jabr, p. 269. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VI, p. 495. ˙ al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6573, p. 557. ˙ ˙ ˙Kissed Her?’: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Lucas, “‘Perhaps You Only Penalties for Illicit Sex in the Sunni Hadith Literature,” p. 413. Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century, p. 34. p. 171. Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qur’an, Muwatta’, and Madinan ˙˙ ʿAmal, pp. 123–24. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Risāla, p. 67. Ibid., p. 248; also pp. 131–32. See also Pavel Pavlovitch, “Early Development of the Tradition of the SelfConfessed Adulterer in Islam.” “The ʿUbāda B. Al-Sāmit Tradition at the Crossroads of Methodology,” p. ˙ 230. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1203. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3044,˙ p. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6591, p. 563. ˙ ˙ ˙of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. Joseph Schacht, The Origins See Chapter 14. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, p. 170. Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century, p. 93. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ 1204. ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), V, no. 3045,˙p.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

265

al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 3307, p. 349. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, II, no. 1149, p. 443. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VII, no. 15619, pp. 747–48. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, III, no. 2299, p. 1445. ʿAlī al-Dāraqutnī, Sunan al-Dāraqutnī, III, no. 4304, p. 415. Muslim, Sahīh ˙Muslim, II, no. 1425,˙ p. 1075. ˙ ˙ 10. ˙ See Chapter al-Jassās, Al-Fusūl fī al-Usūl, II, p. 268. ˙˙ ˙ ˙ al-Zarkashī, Al-Burhān fī˙ʿUlūm al-Qur’an, II, p. 39. al-ʿImarī, Al-Naskh fī Dirāsāt al-Usūliyyīn: Dirāsa Muqārina, p. 163. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, VII,˙ no. 15620, p. 748.

266 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Notes al-Dāraqutnī, Sunan al-Dāraqutnī, III, p. 415. ˙ īh Muslim, II, no. 1425, ˙ Muslim, Sah p. 1075. p. 202. ˙ ˙ ˙ Ibn Qutaiba, Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Hadīth, p. 439. ˙ Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 161. Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: e.g. Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan, III, no. 1943, p. 123. p. 202. Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), IV, no. 2253,˙ ˙ p. 878. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 37. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, VI, p. 72. Mahmūd Shaltūt, Al-Fatāwā: Dirāsa li-Mushkilāt al-Muslim al-Muʿāsir fī ˙ ˙ Hayātihi al-Yawmiyya al-ʿĀmma, pp. 243–46. ˙ Mālik b. Anas, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), III, no. 1079,˙ ˙p. 437. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, VIII, nos. 16382–84, p. 443. ˙ ˙ Abī Shaiba, V, no. 12494–95, p. 43. Ibn Abī Shaiba, Al-Mus annaf li-Ibn ˙ al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, X, no. 20008, p. 103; no. 20012, p. 104. e.g. al-Jassās, Al-Fusūl fī al-Usūl, I, p. 198; II, p. 254. ˙ ˙ Al-Sunan ˙ ˙ al-Kubrā, ˙ IV, no. 8234, p. 431. al-Baihaqī, Mahmūd Shaltūt, Al-Islam ʿAqīdatan wa-Sharīʿatan, p. 477. al-T˙abarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, VIII, p. 654. Ibn˙ Hazm, Al-Ihkām fī Ūsūl al-Ahkām, IV, p. 62. ˙ ˙ Ibid.,˙ IV, p. 79. ˙ Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 274–76. al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 42. Ibid., p. 43. Ayoub, “The Speaking Qur’an and the Silent Qur’an: A Study of the Principles and Development of Imāmī Shīʿī Tafsīr,” pp. 191–92. al-Suyūtī, Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, IV, p. 1468. al-Jabrī,˙ Al-Naskh fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 52.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 1. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 58–116. 2. Fatoohi and Al-Dargazelli, The Mystery of Israel in Ancient Egypt: The Exodus in the Qur’an, the Old Testament, Archaeological Finds, and Historical Sources, pp. 132–33. 3. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, IV, no. 2252, p. 117. ˙ Māja, Al-Sunan, ˙ ˙ ˙ 4. Ibn II, no. 1010, pp. 140–41. 5. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, II, no. 2190, p. 3. 6. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal, IV, no. 2691, p. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 426. 7. al-Tabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’an, II, p. 616. ˙ 8. al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haq min ʿIlm al-Usūl, II, p. 805. ˙ īh, I, no.˙ 1951, p.˙ 523. ˙ 9. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sah 10. Ibid., I, no. 1952, p. 523.˙ ˙ ˙ 11. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, IV, no. 7862, p. 220. ˙ ˙ p. 792. 12. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, II, no. 1125, ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmi ˙ 13. al-Bukhārī, ʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 1951, p. 523. ˙ ˙ ˙

Notes 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, II, no. 753, p. 118–19. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, IV, no. 8409, p. 476. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, II, p. 305. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 1170, p. 334. ˙ no. ˙ ˙ 539, p. 383. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmi ˙ al-Tirmidhī, ʿ al-Kabīr, I, no. 405, p. 430. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, II, no. 949, p. 206. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, II, no. 1145, p. 45. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, V, no. 2968, p. 79. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, IV, no. 7900, p. 337. al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī, II, no. 1735, pp. 1053–54. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 1869, p. 503. ˙ ˙ al-Imām ˙ Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad b. Hanbal, XXXVI, no. 22124, ˙ ˙ ˙ p. ˙439. Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, I, no. 506, p. 380. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, IV, no. 7902, p. 338. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 4327, p. 14. ˙ ˙ ˙ IV, no. 7901, pp. 337–38. al-Baihaqī, Al-Sunan al-Kubrā, al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 670, p. 216. ˙ no. ˙ ˙ 412, p. 309. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmi ˙ al-Bukhārī, ʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 671, p. 216. ˙ no. ˙ ˙ 411, p. 308. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, I, ˙ ˙ Al-Jāmi ˙ al-Bukhārī, ʿ al-Sahīh, I, no. 669, p. 216. ˙ Mālik b. Anas, Muwat˙ta’˙ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), III, no. 1766,˙ ˙p. 691. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1971, p. 1561. ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd, IV, no. 2812, p. 435. Abū Dāwūd, al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 4431, p. 463. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1974, p. 1563. ˙ ˙ Ibn Māja,˙ Al-Sunan, IV, no. 3159, p. 330. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1969, p. 1560. ˙ ˙ al-Nasā’ī,˙ Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, no. 4424, p. 462. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, p. 130. al-Ghazālī, Kaifa Nataʿāmal maʿa al-Qur’an, p. 81. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 7278, p. 730. ˙ ˙ ˙ Ibid., III, no. 5390, p. 309. Zaid, Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’an al-Karīm, I, pp. 129–30. Ibid., I, p. 129. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Al-Musannaf, III, no. 6714, p. 573. ˙ al-Jabrī, Al-Naskh ˙fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya Kamā Afhamuh: Al-Nāsikh wal-Mansūkh Baina al-Ithbāt wal-Nafī, p. 20. A certain kind of vessel. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim, III, no. 1977, p. 1564. ˙ ˙ Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik (Narrated by Yahyā b. Yahyā Mālik b.˙ Anas, ˙ ˙ al-Laithī), III, no. 1767,˙ ˙p. 693.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 14 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

267

Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 232–33. For more details on ijmāʿ, see ibid., pp. 228–63. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, p. 80. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid., p. 191.

268

Notes

6. e.g. Harald Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh Before the Classical Schools, pp. 10–49. 7. Joseph Schacht, “Foreign Elements in Ancient Islamic Law.” 8. e.g. Ze’ev Maghen, “Dead Tradition: Joseph Schacht and the Origins of ‘Popular Practice.’” 9. S. V. Fitzgerald, “The Alleged Debt of Islamic to Roman Law,” p. 86. 10. e.g. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat al-Nabī, II, pp. 50, 340. 11. Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam, p. 131. 12. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 24. 13. Ibid., p. 19. 14. Ibn Hazm, Al-Ihkām fī Ūsūl al-Ahkām, IV, p. 73. ˙ of taʿzīr. ˙ ˙ ˙ 15. Plural 16. Muhammad Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya, Ighāthat al-Lahfān min Masā’id ˙ ān, I, pp. 346–47. ˙ al-Shait 17. Shaltūt,˙ Al-Fatāwā: Dirāsa li-Mushkilāt al-Muslim al-Muʿāsir fī Hayātihi ˙ ˙ al-Yawmiyya al-ʿĀmma, p. 485. 18. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 39. 19. e.g. Kevin Reinhart, “Introduction,” p. xxxvi. 20. Ibid., pp. xxxvi–xxxvii. 21. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. xxi. 22. The Qur’anic penal rulings on sexual offenses are discussed in detail in Chapter 11. 23. al-Shāfiʿī, Al-Umm, VI, pp. 28–31. 24. al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh, III, no. 6549, p. 552. ˙ ˙ ˙ ʿat Fiqh ʿUmar b. Al-Khattāb, p. 491. 25. Muhammad Qalʿachī, Mawsū ˙ introduction to Chapter 13. ˙˙ 26. See the 27. e.g. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 58–116. 28. p. 219. 29. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 270. 30. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law.

NOTES TO APPENDIX A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Sahīh. Muslim, Sahīh Muslim. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙Sunan Abī Dāwūd. Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, Al-Sunan. al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr. al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan.

Bibliography

I have split the references used in the book into three sections. The fi rst section compiles the old, classical works of Muslim scholars, and the second and third sections list modern works in Arabic and English, respectively.

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274 Bibliography . “The Last Verse of the Qur’an.” Accessed February 18, 2012, http://www. quranicstudies.com/quran/the-last-verse-of-the-quran/. . The Mystery of the Historical Jesus: The Messiah in the Qur’an, the Bible, and Historical Sources. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009. . The Prophet Joseph in the Qur’an, the Bible, and History. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2005. Fatoohi, Louay, and Shetha Al-Dargazelli. The Mystery of Israel in Ancient Egypt: The Exodus in the Qur’an, the Old Testament, Archaeological Finds, and Historical Sources. Birmingham, UK: Luna Plena Publishing, 2008. Fitzgerald, S. V. “The Alleged Debt of Islamic to Roman Law.” The Law Quarterly Review 67 (1951): 81–102. Graham, William A. “The Earliest Meaning of ‘Qur’ān’.” Die Welt des Islams 23/24, no. 1/4 (1984): 361–77. Guillaume, Alfred. Islam. Penguin, 1990. Hallaq, Wael B. “Law and the Qur’an.” In Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, edited by Jane Dammen McAuliffe, 149–72. Leiden: Brill, 2003. . The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Themes in Islamic Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. . “Was al-Shafi i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (1993): 587–605. Hasan, Ahmad. The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1988. Hoyland, Robert G. Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1997. Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003. Lucas, Scott C. “‘Perhaps You Only Kissed Her?’: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Penalties for Illicit Sex in the Sunni Hadith Literature.” Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no. 3 (2011): 399–415. Maghen, Ze’ev. “Dead Tradition: Joseph Schacht and the Origins of ‘Popular Practice.’” Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 3 (2003): 276–347. Melchert, Christopher. “Qur’anic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbaid, Muhāsibī, and Ibn Qutaibah.” In Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard˙ G. Weiss, 75–98. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Motzki, Harald. The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Muir, William. The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam, to the Era of the Hegira. 4 vols, London: Smith, Elder, and Co, 1861. Newby, Gordon Darnell. A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse under Islam. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988. Pavlovitch, Pavel. “Early Development of the Tradition of the Self-Confessed Adulterer in Islam.” Al-Qantara 31, no. 2 (2010): 371–410. ˙ āmit Tradition at the Crossroads of Methodology.” . “The ʿUbāda B. Al-S ˙ Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 11, no. 5 (2011): 137–235. Peters, Francis E. Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. New York: State University of New York Press, 1994. Peters, Rudolph. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Powers, David. “The Exegetical Genre Nāsikh Al-Qur’an Wa Mansūkhuhu.” In Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur’an, edited by Andrew Rippin, 117–38. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Bibliography 275 Reinhart, Kevin. “Introduction.” In Encyclopedia of Islamic law: A Compendium of the Views of the Major Schools, edited by Laleh Bakhtiar, xxxi–xl. Chicago, IL: ABC International Group, 1996. Rippin, Andrew. “Al-Zuhrī, Naskh al-Qur’ān and the Problem of Early Tafsīr Texts.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 47, no. 1 (1984): 22–43. . Review of The Sources of Islamic Law, by John Burton. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 54, no. 2 (1991): 362–64. . “The Exegetical Literature of Abrogation: Form and Content.” In Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern Texts and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder, edited by G. R. Hawting, J. A. Mojaddedi, and Alexander Samely, 213–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Rubin, Uri. The Eye of the Beholder: The Life of Muhammad as Viewed by the Early Muslims—A Textual Analysis. Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1995. . “The Great Pilgrimage Of Muhammad: Some Notes On Sūra IX.” Journal of Semitic Studies 27, no. 2 (September 21, 1982): 241–60. Schacht, Joseph. “Foreign Elements in Ancient Islamic Law.” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 32, no. 3/4 (1950): 9–17. . The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. Sinai, Nicolai. “An Interpretation of Sūrat al-Najm (Q. 53).” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 1–28. Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Glossary

āmm (general): This juristic term denotes all members of a certain group. idda: The period that the divorced woman has to wait before she can remarry. The term is also used in the Qur’an with the general meaning of “term” or “number.” Ilm: Knowledge. ahād (solitary): A hadīth that was transmitted by a very small number of narrators, ˙ usually less than ˙ four. Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book): A Qur’anic term that refers to the Jews and Christians. al-Lawh al-Mahfūz (The Preserved Tablet): This term, which occurs in verse 85.22, ˙ to denote ˙ ˙ the source of the Qur’an and other divine Books. It is also taken is said by some to be a Book that contains everything that God has ordained to take place. It is claimed to be Umm al-Kitāb. al-Masjid al-Harām: The mosque that houses the Kaʿba in Mecca. ˙ The Muslims of Medina who supported and helped the Muslims Ansār (Helpers): ˙who migrated from Mecca to Medina. asbāb al-nuzūl: The science that studies the causes or occasions of the revelation of the various Qur’anic verses. āya: A verse of the Qur’an or, more generally, a divine sign. āyat al-rajm (the stoning verse): A passage that is claimed by some hadīths to be ˙ part of the Qur’an although it is not found in the mushaf. ˙ ˙ that is claimed by some āyat al-saif (the verse of the sword): A Qur’anic verse, 9.5, scholars to have abrogated many Qur’anic verses that command the Muslims to show tolerance for and accommodate non-Muslims. Bait al-Maqdis: An Arabic name for Jerusalem. Constitution of Medina: A formal agreement drawn up by Prophet Muhammad with all the tribes of Medina after his migration to that city. It details the rights and responsibilities of the Muslims, Jews, Christians, and pagans, treating them as one community. faqīh: A scholar of Islamic jurisprudence. fiqh: The science of Islamic jurisprudence. hadd: The penalty for a crime in the Qur’an or the Sunna. ˙Hadīth: Any one report or the whole literature of reports of sayings and actions of ˙ the Prophet but at times of his Companions also. Hijra: The migration in 622 CE, twelve years after the start of the revelation of the Qur’an, of Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims from Mecca to Yathrib (which consequently became known as “Medina”) as a result of the persecution they received in Mecca. Hukm or hikma: Wisdom. h˙ ukm shar˙ʿī: A ruling in the Qur’an or the Sunna. ˙

278

Glossary

iʿjām: The use of diacritical marks (dots above or under letters) in the Arabic script. ijmāʿ: The “unanimous consensus” of Muslim scholars, which is one of the main principles of Islamic jurisprudence, but which is treated as the third source of Islamic law. ijtihād: The process of “personal reasoning” to fi nd an answer to a legal, theological, or religious question for which there is no clear answer in the Qur’an or the Sunna. Injīl : The Book that God revealed to Jesus. istihsān: The “juristic preference” of a scholar. This method of reasoning denotes ˙the scholar’s choosing of one of a number possible solutions to a problem. jizya: The tax imposed by the Qur’an on non-Muslims living under Muslim rule as they are not subject to the zakāt tax that the Muslims must pay. Kaʿba: The cube-shaped building in Mecca that the Muslims face when praying. The Qur’an states that it was built by the prophets Abraham and his son Ishmael. khāss (specific): This juristic term refers to any one particular member or subgroup ˙ ˙ a general (ʿāmm) group. of Khawārij: A group that appeared during the rule of the fi rst caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib as a section of his army revolted against him after his acceptance of an off˙er to stop the battle of Siff īn (37/657) against the rebellious army of Muʿāwiya b. Abī ˙ Sufi ān. Kitāb (Book): This Qur’anic term refers to a type of divine revelation which takes the form of a book. legal abrogation: Known in Arabic as “naskh al-hukm dūna al-tilāwa,” this mode ˙ of abrogation denotes the cancellation of a ruling of a verse in the mushaf by ˙˙ another verse or a hadīth. ˙ Known in Arabic as “naskh al-tilāwa wa al-hukm,” this legal-textual abrogation: ˙ kind of abrogation refers to the cancellation of the ruling of a Qur’anic verse that is also not recorded in the mushaf. mansūkh: An abrogated ruling and/or˙ ˙text. matāʿ: The provision provided to the widow or divorcée. miʿrāj (heavenly ascent): The journey of Prophet Muhammad to heaven. Mother of the Book: See “Umm al-Kitāb.” mutlaq (unqualified): This juristic term refers to any one unidentified individual ˙member of a group. Muʿtazila: A movement of speculative theology that appeared in the 2nd century Hijri and flourished in the following few centuries. muhkamāt (perfected ones): This and mutashābihāt represent the two types of ˙ Qur’anic verses (3.7). The exact meanings of both terms are contentious. One popular view is that muhkamāt denotes the verses each of which has one inter˙ pretation only. muqayyad (qualified): This juristic term denotes an identified individual member of a group. mushaf: The written record of the Qur’an. There are Hadīth reports that claim that ˙ ˙ mushaf does not contain all of the Qur’an’s verses. ˙ the mushrikīn:˙ ˙The polytheists. mutʿa: The practice of temporary marriage. It remains valid for Shias but Sunnis believe it was abolished. mutashābihāt (ambiguous ones): This and muhkamāt represent the two types of Qur’anic verses. The exact meanings of both˙ terms are contentious. One popular view is that mutashābihāt denotes the verses each of which has more than one interpretation. mutawātir (successive): A hadīth reported by many reliable people at each level of ˙ The number of narrators required to make a hadīth the chain of transmission. ˙ mutawātir ranges from four to several hundred.

Glossary 279 nāsikh: An abrogating ruling and/or text. naskh juz’ī (partial abrogation): According to Hanafite scholars, this refers to cases where a ruling is later abrogated only ˙partly, leaving it still operative in other cases. The overwhelming majority of scholars consider this a case of specification. naskh kullī (total abrogation): In Hanafite jurisprudence, this denotes the total ˙ abrogation of a ruling. natural law: Law set by nature, so it remains valid. positive law: Man-made law, so it is subject to change. qibla: The direction the Muslim faces when praying, which is toward the Kaʿba in Mecca. qirā’a: A reading of the Qur’an. There are seven readings that are considered authoritative, three that are accepted by the majority of scholars, and another four that only some recognize. qiyās (analogy): The juristic principle of deducing a legal ruling from another by means of analogy. Qur’an: The Book that Prophet Muhammad received from God. It is the main source of Islamic teaching and law. ra’ī (opinion): An opinion on a legal issue. rajm (stoning): In Islamic law, this term refers to the practice of stoning adulterers to death. rukhsa: A “concession” in the law. ˙ Verses: The name coined by the 19th century Orientalist William Muir for Satanic a passage that apocryphal narratives claim Prophet Muhammad temporarily mistook for a Qur’anic verse. Sharīʿa: The revealed legal framework of Islamic law. Sunna: The way of life of Prophet Muhammad. It is considered to be the second source of Islamic teaching and law. sūra: Any of the 114 chapters of the Qur’an. Each chapter contains a number of verses. taʿzīr: The ruler’s discretionary authority to introduce penalties for offenses that do not have specific penalties in the Sharīʿa. tadlīs: Making a false claim to having heard hadīths from transmitters one had or ˙ had not met. takhsīs (specification): Making a general (ʿāmm) law “specific” (khāss). ˙ ˙ (qualification): Combining an unqualified (mutlaq) term with ˙ ˙ a restrictive taqyīd ˙ word, thus making it qualified (muqayyad). tashkīl: The use of signs representing short vowels in the Arabic script. textual abrogation: Known in Arabic as “naskh al-tilāwa dūna al-hukm,” this form of abrogation denotes the nonexistence of a verse in the mushaf˙ despite the ˙˙ continued operativeness of its ruling. Umm al-Kitāb (Mother of the Book): The source or master Book from which all divine Books are derived. usūl al-fi qh (roots/sources of Islamic jurisprudence): The science of the sources and ˙ principles of Islamic jurisprudence. usūlī: A scholar of usūl al-fi qh. ˙ Witr: A night prayer˙ with an odd number of prostrations. zakāt: The alms-tax that the Muslim must pay. zinā: The Qur’anic term for adultery and fornication.

Index of Qur’anic Verses

1.6: 124 2.1: 68 2.3: 81 2.15–6: 194 2.53: 122 2.55: 53 2.59: 59 2.62: 82 2.105: 52 2.106: 2, 29, 47, 49–54, 56–59, 62, 64, 65, 78, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137, 139, 144, 150, 242 2.107: 52 2.108: 53 2.109: 53 2.113: 48 2.115: 24, 58 2.129: 48, 100, 101 2.142: 20, 209 2.143: 209 2.144: 20, 209 2.145: 209 2.149: 20 2.150: 20 2.151: 123 2.159: 85, 86 2.160: 85 2.173: 86, 87 2.178: 188, 228 2.179: 188 2.180: 17 2.181: 59, 61 2.183: 103, 104, 211, 227 2.184: 27, 103–105, 110, 211 2.185: 27, 103–105, 211 2.187: 213, 227, 228 2.211: 62 2.219: 99 2.228: 109, 110

2.233: 200 2.234: 105–112, 152 2.238: 212 2.240: 105–112, 152 2.241: 107 2.249: 104 2.255: 49 2.269: 2 2.275: 21 2.275–276: 101 2.278: 101 2.282: 13, 14, 186, 228 2.283: 13, 14, 228 2.284: 82, 83, 204 2.286: 83, 104 3.3: 122 3.7: 67, 68, 278 3.19: 146 3.50: 34 3.85: 82 3.93: 33, 36, 162 3.97: 86 3.135: 182, 230 3.169: 139 3.186: 115 4.12: 109 4.15: 178, 179, 183–187, 190, 193 4.15–16: 89, 184 4.16: 179, 183, 185–187 4.19: 183, 187 4.22: 183 4.23: 200, 202, 203, 205 4.24: 173–175 4.25: 174–176, 183, 184, 191 4.43: 99–101 4.48: 229 4.84: 102 4.90: 117 4.92: 204

282

Index of Qur’anic Verses

4.94: 117 4.116: 229 4.141: 110 4.153: 53 4.160: 34, 36 4.176: 222 5.3: 35 5.5: 35, 174–176 5.15: 163 5.38: 230 5.41: 162 5.42: 157, 163, 164 5.43: 48, 69 5.44: 163, 164 5.47: 163 5.48: 227 5.50: 48 5.58: 48 5.66: 34 5.67: 206 5.68: 69 5.69: 82 5.87: 232 5.89: 156, 157, 203–206, 241 5.90: 100, 101 5.91: 100, 101 6.34: 59 6.57: 48 6.62: 48 6.115: 59 6.119: 231 6.128: 130 6.140: 232 6.144: 232 6.145: 35, 87, 231 6.146: 35 6.151: 187, 228, 231 7.28: 182, 183, 230 7.32: 232 7.80: 183 7.154: 37, 38, 46 7.157: 69 7.162: 59 7.188: 130 8.15: 103 8.45: 103 8.55–62: 117 8.65: 101–103 8.66: 101–103 8.72: 117 9.3: 116, 118 9.4: 116 9.5: 114–120, 277 9.6: 116, 120

9.7: 116 9.8: 116 9.9: 116 9.10: 116 9.11: 116 9.12: 116, 117 9.13: 116, 117 9.24: 110 9.29: 118, 119, 228, 232 9.37: 49, 232 9.60: 81 9.122: 222 9.129: 119 10.15: 59, 61, 77 10.49: 130 10.64: 59 10.87: 209 11.27–31: 164 11.106: 130 11.107: 130 11.108: 130 11.72: 172, 173 12.2: 122 12.24: 183 12.40: 48 12.48: 173 12.78: 172 13.36: 65–67, 69 13.36–39: 70 13.37: 65–67, 69 13.38: 65–67 13.39: 56, 64, 65, 67–69, 243 13.40: 70 13.40–43: 70 13.41: 70 13.42: 70 13.43: 70 14.10: 66 14.11: 66 14.34: 82 15.6: 61 15.9: 42, 76, 132 16.11–13: 48 16.18: 82 16.44: 232 16.67: 99–101 16.98: 60 16.99: 60 16.100: 60 16.101: 53–69, 242, 243 16.102: 60 16.103: 60 16.104: 60, 61 16.105: 60

Index of Qur’anic Verses 283 17.23–24: 228 17.32: 183, 184, 230 17.33: 187, 228 17.73: 43 17.74: 43 17.75: 43 17.78: 98 17.79: 98 17.86: 130 17.87: 130 18.22: 110 18.23: 132 18.24: 131, 132 18.27: 59 18.73: 132 19.1: 68 19.30: 122 19.71: 80 19.72: 80 20.9: 247 20.133: 123 21.5: 61 21.44: 70 21.80: 173 21.91: 48, 173 22.39: 188 22.47: 44 22.52: 38, 39, 41, 44–46, 53 22.53: 38, 45, 46 22.54: 38, 45, 46 24.2: 178, 179, 184–187, 189–191, 193, 194, 205, 230 24.3: 184, 185, 187, 190, 230 24.4: 84, 165, 174, 175, 186, 187, 228 24.5: 84, 186 24.6: 84, 165, 186 24.7: 186 24.8: 165, 186 24.9: 186 24.13: 165, 228 24.19: 183 24.23: 174, 175 24.32: 185, 230 24.33: 174–176 25.5: 61 26.154: 48, 66, 67 26.171: 173 26.224: 85 26.224–226: 86 26.225: 85 26.226: 85 26.227: 85 27.54: 183 28.23: 172

28.36: 51 29.8: 228 29.28: 183 29.31–34: 66 30.17: 90 30.39: 101 31.14: 228 33.30: 183 33.49: 109, 110 33.50: 106 33.52: 106 33.56: 149 36.26: 141 36.27: 141 37.101–107: 79 37.135: 173 39.23: 247 41.41: 42 41.41–42: 76 41.42: 42 43.2: 68 43.3: 68 43.4: 68 43.98: 115 45.28: 38 45.29: 38, 46 46.9: 58 46.15: 228 47.4: 120 48.23: 248 48.29: 69 52.29: 61 52.48: 118 53.3: 77, 208 53.4: 77, 208 53.18: 39, 43 53.19: 43 53.20: 39, 41, 43 53.21: 43 53.22: 43 53.23: 43, 44 53.24: 44 53.25: 44 53.26: 44 53.27: 44 53.28: 44 53.29: 115 53.36: 123 56.10: 80 56.13: 80 56.14: 80 56.38: 80 56.39: 80 56.40: 80

284

Index of Qur’anic Verses

58.1: 222 58.12: 78, 79, 89, 93–97 58.13: 78, 79, 89, 94–97 58.19: 39 59.2: 173 60.10: 79 60.12: 184, 230 61.1: 145 61.2: 146 65.1: 110, 184, 187 65.3: 110 65.4: 105, 109, 111, 112 65.6: 110 66.5: 177 66.12: 173 69.38: 42 69.39: 42 69.40: 42 69.41: 42 69.42: 42 69.43: 42 69.44: 42 69.45: 42 69.46: 42 69.47: 42 73.1: 90, 97, 99 73.2: 90, 97–99 73.2–4: 89

73.3: 90, 97–99 73.4: 90, 97–99 73.20: 90, 97, 99 74.31: 110 74.52: 123 75.17: 132 75.18: 132 78.6–7: 130 80.1–10: 43, 207 80.13: 123 81.8–9: 44 81.10: 123 85.22: 277 87.6: 129, 130 87.6–7: 131 87.6–8: 131 87.7: 129, 130 87.14: 81 87.18: 123 87.19: 69, 123 96.1: 123 98.1: 142 98.2: 123, 142 98.3: 142 98.4: 142 102.1: 143 103.2: 85, 86 103.3: 85, 86

Index of Names and Subjects

A

B

Ā’isha, 98, 99, 133, 148, 149, 181, 200–202, 204, 211, 215, 216 āmm, 83, 85, 278 Abd Allāh b. al-Husain al-Zaidī, 24 ˙ Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, 87, 88, 90 Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, 102, 106, ˙ 149, 161, 203, 111, 146, 148, 211, 217 Abraham, prophet, 32, 66, 69, 79, 123, 172, 173, 278 Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī, 30, 205 Abū Bakr, 127, 148, 154, 161, 168, 195, 196 Abū Dāwūd, 99, 107–109, 135, 149, 158, 162, 164–171, 212, 214, 216, 247 Abū Hanīfa al-Nuʿmān, 17, 75, 191, ˙ 192, 196, 202 Abū ʿUbaid al-Qāsim b. Sallām, 22–25, 148–150, 156, 157, 238, 239 ahād, 75, 67, 204, 277 ˙ mad b. Hanbal, 15, 17, 75, 83, 99, Ah ˙ 111, ˙124, 134, 135, 140, 142, 143, 145–148, 158, 160, 162, 164, 172, 173, 182, 192, 193, 209, 214 al-Ah zāb, chapter, 148, 150, 151, 158, ˙ 177 Alī b. Abī Tālib, 1, 2, 79, 95, 114, 154, 155,˙171, 182, 192, 197, 216, 247 al-Ashʿarī, Abū Mūsā , 143–146 At ā’, 108, 109, 142, 185, 189 ˙ meaning of, 48 āya, āyat al-rajm, 157, 277 āyat al-saif, 114, 277

al-Baihaqī, 140, 159, 164, 167, 167, 170, 187, 200, 201, 203, 204, 209, 211, 213, 214 al-Bukhārī, 2, 79, 83, 101, 104, 106, 108, 133–135, 139–141, 143, 146, 148, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 168, 170, 171, 189, 190, 195, 205, 210–215, 217, 247 Burton, John, 4–6, 18, 22, 24, 31, 39, 40, 42, 44, 49–51, 71, 72, 93, 96, 111, 113, 125, 126, 174, 202, 204

C Christianity, 34, 35, 60, 62, 63, 142, 146 Companions, 4, 14, 15, 24, 29, 47, 56, 72, 81, 99, 120, 125, 127, 128, 130, 139, 140, 192, 196, 197, 204, 213, 214, 220, 221, 247, 277

D al-Dah h āk b. Muzāh im, 99, 102, 115, ˙ ˙ 189, ˙ ˙ 194 al-Dāraqut nī, 200, 201 al-Dārimī,˙ 2, 99, 162, 170, 171, 178, 187, 200, 213 al-Dhahabī, 15 al-Dihlawī, Shāh Waliyy Allāh, 89, 94 G Gabriel, angel, 39, 60, 123, 124, 129, 139 al-Gharānīq, incident of, 38–44, 46, 63

286

Index of Names and Subjects

al-Ghazālī, Muhammad , 30, 31, 52, 57, ˙ 102, 119, 164, 216 61, 99, 101,

H ḥikma, 48, 122, 277 ḥukm, see ḥikma

I Ibn Abbās, 2, 56, 58, 64, 65, 67, 82, 90, 99, 101, 102, 108, 111, 142, 143, 155, 158, 189, 197, 210, 214 Ibn Abī ʿArūba, Saʿīd , 15 Ibn Abī Shaiba, 17, 137, 147, 149, 203 Ibn al-ʿArabī, 114, 120 Ibn al-Jawzī, 87–89, 225 Ibn Hazm, Alī , 102, 182, 205, 225 ˙ azm, Muh ammad, 25, 30, 82, Ibn H ˙ 88, 120 ˙ Ibn Hishām, 62 Ibn Ish āq, 62 ˙ Ibn Juraij, 15, 64, 65, 142 Ibn Māja, 13, 135, 158, 162, 164, 181, 209, 216, 247 Ibn Masʿūd, Abd Allāh, 47, 136, 197, 203, 204, 212 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya, 14, 225 Ibn Qutaiba, 25, 157, 173, 176, 180–182, 239 Ibn Salāma, Hibat Allāh, 3, 14, 15, 29, 82, 88, 120, 136, 146 Ibn Umar, Abd Allāh , 150, 216 Ibn Wahb, Abd Allāh, 16, 238 al-Is fahānī , 28, 51, 52, 58, 106, 109, ˙ 185 Islam, meaning of, 32 istihsān, 220, 278 ˙ ʿ, 27, 84, 219, 220, 234, 278 ijmā ijtihād, 84, 225, 229, 235, 278 Injīl, 34, 35, 61, 62, 68, 69, 122, 243, 278

J al-Jabrī, Abd al-Mutaʿāl, 29, 30, 51, 58, 59, 90, 150, 155, 159, 205, 206, 217 Jacob, prophet, 33, 34, 36, 172, 231 Jaʿfar al-Sādiq, 17 al-Jas s ās ,˙ Abū Bakr , 29, 201 ˙ 34–36, 48, 82, 122, 173 Jesus,˙ ˙32, Jews, 33–36, 52, 53, 62, 63, 65, 69, 82, 104, 118, 119, 162, 163, 209–211, 277 jizya, 119, 120, 228, 278

Judaism, 62, 63, 142, 146, 162

K Kaʿba, 58, 78, 139, 140, 209, 227, 277, 278, 279 khāss, 83, 85, 278 ˙˙ al-Khawārij, 191, 192, 278

M Mālik b. Anas, 17, 62, 72, 75, 107, 108, 110, 111, 134, 135, 158, 159, 162, 166–172, 191–193, 195, 198, 202, 203, 216, 218, 220, 248 mansūkh, 1, 2, 12, 16, 19, 24, 56, 278 al-Masjid al-Harām, 20, 51, 58, 209, 277 ˙ Mecca, 6, 10, 18, 20, 22, 39–41, 43, 44, 51, 57–59, 61–63, 79, 86, 100, 101, 117, 119, 124, 136, 197, 209, 277–279 Medina, 10, 40, 57–59, 62, 64, 71, 79, 101, 117, 119, 124, 142, 143, 197, 210, 211, 220, 222–224, 227, 248, 277 Mosaic law, 32, 34, 35, 51, 59 Moses, 27, 32–34, 36, 37, 51–53, 82, 122, 123, 132, 162, 172, 209, 211, 247 Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufi ān, 197, 210, 278 al-Muʿtazila, 192, 278 Muh ammad ʿAbduh, 29, 52–54, 132, ˙ 133 Muh ammad Rashīd Ridā, 29, 106 ˙ āsibī , 23–25, 152, ˙ 157, 239 al-Muh ˙ , 67, 68, 278 muḥkamāt Mujāhid b. Jabr, 14, 56, 95, 108, 109, 185, 194, 209 Muqātil b. Sulaimān, 194 muqayyad, 83, 278, 279 Muslim, Abū al-Husain, 83, 104, 111, ˙ 140, 143, 146, 147, 162, 166, 167, 169–171, 187, 201, 205, 211, 212 , 216 mutashābihāt, 67, 68, 278 mutawātir, 75, 76, 204, 278 mut laq, 83, 278, 279 ˙ al-Muwat t a’, 17, 134, 172, 198, 203 ˙˙

N al-Nah h ās , 2, 25, 29, 88 ˙ ˙ 56, 99, 106, 107, 109, 135, al-Nasā’ī, 145, 158, 162, 170, 182, 200, 212, 216, 247

Index of Names and Subjects 287 nāsikh, 1, 2, 12, 16, 19, 24, 56, 279 naskh, linguistic meaning of, 12–13

P Paul, St., 35 People of the Book, 34, 35, 52, 53, 61–63, 66, 118–120, 142, 163, 209, 277 Polytheists, 39, 41, 43, 44, 52, 58, 59, 61, 62, 114–120, 142, 230, 278

Q Qatāda b. Diʿāma al-Sadūsī, 15, 16, 22, 25, 56, 64, 65, 67, 90, 139, 189 qibla, 6, 20, 21, 51, 52, 58, 77, 78, 135, 209, 210, 215, 227, 244, 279 qiyās, 3, 27, 84, 220, 234, 279 al-Qurt ubī, 29, 41, 42, 131, 198, 214 ˙

R Ramadan, 22, 27, 81, 98, 103, 105, 204, 211, 212, 214, 227, 228 al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, 18, 29, 51, 108, 109 al-Risāla, 17–19, 21, 23, 179

S Schacht, Joseph, 195, 197, 221, 222 al-Shāfiʿī, 16–24, 27, 28, 50, 62, 74, 75, 77, 78, 98, 111, 156, 174, 176, 178, 179, 185, 191–193, 195, 202, 203, 208, 221, 230, 239 Shaltūt, Mah mūd, 203, 225 ˙ 40, 44, 279 Satanic verses, Sayyid Ah mad Khān, 29 al-Suyūt ī,˙ 2, 5, 29, 87–89, 149, 206 ˙ 14, 57 Al-Shāt ibī, ˙ 30, 154, 155, 192, 205, 234, Shia, 17, 247, 248, 278 stoning verse, the, 9, 23, 26, 146, 148, 149, 156–159, 161–163, 169, 173, 177–180, 182, 193–195, 199, 200, 202–205, 239, 241, 277 Successors, 4, 14, 15, 47, 81, 120, 220, 247 Sunni, 17, 154, 155, 205, 247, 278

T taʿzīr, 225, 279 al-Tabarī, 14, 24, 38–40, 44, 47, ˙ 50, 55, 56, 58, 64, 65, 67, 74, 82, 83, 90, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102–107, 120, 129, 131, 139, 140, 143–145, 150, 157, 162, 163, 176, 185, 189, 204, 209, 239, 242 al-Tabat abā’ī , 64, 131, 146, 147, 189, ˙ 222 ˙ al-Tah āwī, 135, 136, 145, 147, 152 ˙ ˙ al-Tirmidhī, 96, 148, 159, 164, 178, 200, 211–213, 247 Torah, 33, 34, 36, 37, 48, 51, 52, 61, 62, 68, 69, 122, 157, 162–164, 179, 180, 231, 243

U Ubayy b. Kaʿb, 2, 134, 142, 143, 148, 149, 158, 203, 204 ʿUmar b. al-Khat t āb, 2, 111, 120, 146, ˙ ˙ 154, 158–161, 147, 149, 150, 165, 168, 172, 177, 178, 181, 194–198, 205, 214, 216, 225, 230, 241 Umm al-Kitāb, 65, 122, 277–279 usūl al-fi qh, 14, 17–19, 164, 220, ˙ 279 ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, 106, 107, 109, 124, 127, 137, 148, 149, 152–154, 197, 198

V verse of the sword, the, 8, 106, 114, 115, 117–121, 239, 244, 277

W al-Wāqidī, 140

Z Zaid, Mus t afā, 14–16, 24, 56, 65, 79, ˙ 87–89, 94, 99, 105, 107, 80,˙ 82, 115, 117, 120, 148, 160, 205, 212, 216, 217 Zaid b. Thābit, 148, 160