Abortion and Reproductive Rights in Slovenia: A Case of Resistance 1032561521, 9781032561523

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“Opponents of women’s reproductive rights have evolved numerous techniques to combat abortion over the past three decades, but never have they been more sophisticated than in recent years. Social media, fake news, and the rise of the anti-gender movement pose significant new barriers to the protection of rights that have already been established. The methods presented in this monograph to effectively defend women’s rights to make decisions about their own bodies, as well as the precise and profound genealogy of reproductive rights, are of the utmost importance in a post-Trump world, for it is now more true than ever that no right won is won forever”. Roman Kuhar, Professor of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia “This new book by a team of distinguished Slovenian social scientists should be of high interest to anyone who cares about women’s reproductive rights and women’s equal rights in general. Taking Slovenia as their case study, setting it in a comparative context, they show how a conservative backlash, led in Slovenia by the Catholic Church, instrumentalized the term ‘gender ideology’ concocted by Pope John Paul II, in order to claim, falsely, that one cannot speak of a person’s gender identity separate from that person’s sexual organs and to insist that only heterosexual relationships should be sanctioned. Based on ­extensive research, including interviews with local pro-choice activists, this volume makes a significant contribution to understanding the struggle over women’s access to abortion”. Sabrina P. Ramet, Professor Emerita, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway “This is a much needed book in light of the coercion by populist-authoritarian politics, religious institutions and conservative groups who aim at regaining control over reproductive rights all over the world. It is refreshing to read a book that moves beyond the analysis of conservative reversals to foreground rebel against the reinstating of classical patriarchal family order. Analyzing the struggles in Slovenia, the authors show how these succeeded in obtaining access to safe and legal abortion, stimulating us to consider the options we have for the present and the future. This is a must read for anyone wanting to learn about why and how sexual and reproductive rights must constantly be defended”. Mojca Pajnik, Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and Senior Research Adviser at the Peace Institute, Slovenia “A right to abortion has historically always been denied to women, not least to discipline women and their bodies. To this day, reproductive rights are contested around the world. The book on abortion in Slovenia is therefore timely and provides paradigmatic insights into arguments against abortion as well as resistance to prohibition. In doing so, it also points to ways of resisting discipline. An important volume to think about women’s bodies, rights, and resistance”. Birgit Sauer, Professor of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria

“This set of well-researched essays offers a breath-taking vision of the way reproductive rights depend on the way feminist movements challenge and resist political regimes, whether socialist or, more recently, combinations of ­neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism. The book combines careful and impressive historical analysis of women’s struggle for abortion rights with insightful interpretation of contemporary national and international public opinion data. The core is formed by a chapter based on a rich range of interviews with feminist activists and political activists in Slovenia. Their voices make the struggle for reproductive rights tangible and inspiring”. Berteke Waaldijk, Professor of Language and Culture Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands

Abortion and Reproductive Rights in Slovenia

Abortion and Reproductive Rights in Slovenia: A Case of Resistance provides a detailed and in-depth analysis of the situation of sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia. This important intervention comes at a time when sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia and around the world are assailed by populist and neoconservative discourses. The authors provide a detailed account of the history of the struggle for reproductive rights, particularly the struggles for access to safe abortion, insights based on interviews with fellow activists and an analysis of Slovenian public opinion on abortion in a temporal and comparative perspective. The scholaractivist authors put the issue of sexual and reproductive rights at the forefront of the social, political and scientific agenda in the name of collectivity and solidarity, reinforcing the potential apparent within civil society and social movements. This work will be of interest to researchers and activists with an interest in gender and reproductive rights in contemporary Europe. Ana Kralj is assistant professor of social work at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Her main areas of research and teaching focus on migration, interethnic relations, nationalism, “othering” and gender studies. Tanja Rener is emeritus professor of sociology of families and women’s studies at the University of Ljubljana, where she teaches Utopistics: alternatives of social development. Vesna Leskošek is professor of social work at the University of Ljubljana. She teaches courses on gender and violence, care regimes and social movements. Her main research interests are poverty, social inequality, welfare state and gender, and her latest research project focuses on the poverty of women in old age. Metka Mencin is assistant professor of social psychology at the University of Ljubljana. Her research interests include processes of subjectivation and identity construction in the context of dominance and subordination, neoliberal governmentality and the genealogy of critical psychology.

Mirjana Ule is professor of social psychology and founder of the Center of Social Psychology at the University of Ljubljana. Her main research topics are youth studies, gender studies, health studies, life course and identity studies, and studies of marginalization and discrimination. Slavko Kurdija is senior scientific associate of social science methodology at the Center for Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research at the University of Ljubljana. He is also the national coordinator of the European Social Survey in Slovenia and the head of the Infrastructure Center (IC): Program for the Comparative Social Research, part of the Network of Infrastructure Centers at the University of Ljubljana.

Abortion and Reproductive Rights in Slovenia A Case of Resistance

Edited by Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin, Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin, Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija The right of Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin, Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kralj, Ana, author. | Rener, Tanja, author. | Leskošek, Vesna, author. Title: Abortion and reproductive rights in Slovenia : a case of resistance / Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2024. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Abortion and Reproductive Rights in Slovenia: A Case of Resistance provides a detailed and in-depth analysis of the situation of sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia. This important intervention comes at a time when sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia and around the world are assailed by populist and neoconservative discourses. The authors provide a detailed account of the history of the struggle for reproductive rights, particularly the struggles for access to safe abortion, insights based on interviews with fellow activists, and an analysis of Slovenian public opinion on abortion in a temporal and comparative perspective. The scholar-activist authors put the issue of sexual and reproductive rights at the forefront of the social, political, and scientific agenda in the name of collectivity and solidarity, reinforcing the potential apparent within civil society and social movements. This work will be of interest to researchers and activists with an interest in gender and reproductive rights in contemporary Europe”— Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2023025443 (print) | LCCN 2023025444 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032561523 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032561530 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003434139 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Abortion—Social aspects—Slovenia. | Abortion—Law and legislation—Slovenia. | Reproductive rights—Slovenia. Classification: LCC HQ767.5.S57 K73 2024 (print) | LCC HQ767.5.S57 (ebook) | DDC 304.6/67094973—dc23/eng/20230814 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023025443 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023025444 ISBN: 978-1-032-56152-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-56153-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-43413-9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Introduction

ix xi xiii 1

ANA KRALJ, TANJA RENER, VESNA LESKOŠEK, METKA MENCIN AND MIRJANA ULE

  1 The history of the struggle for the right to abortion

11

VESNA LESKOŠEK

  2 The right to access safe abortion during the transition to a multiparty system and beyond

39

METKA MENCIN

  3 Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective

68

ANA KRALJ AND TANJA RENER

  4 “What do you think about abortion?” Slovenian public opinion on abortion in longitudinal and international perspective

126

MIRJANA ULE AND SLAVKO KURDIJA

Conclusion

153

ANA KRALJ, TANJA RENER, VESNA LESKOŠEK, METKA MENCIN AND MIRJANA ULE

Index

157

Figures

4.1 European value study 2017. Ranking of countries according to the level of support that abortion is justified (sum of answers 7, 8, 9, 10 on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means: abortion can always be justified; by country). Source: EVS (2020) 4.2 Slovenian public opinion (SPO) 1992–2018 Positive and very positive attitudes toward: right to abortion (%). Source: Hafner Fink et al. (2019) 4.3 EVS 1992–2017, data for Slovenia 4.4 Attitudes toward the right to abortion in the sex-age combination. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.5 Attitudes toward the right to abortion and education. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia (%) 4.6 Attitudes toward abortion rights and religion. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.7 Attitudes toward the right to abortion and attitudes toward foreigners. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.8 Abortion rights and attitudes toward immigrants. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.9 Attitudes toward abortion and gender roles. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.10 Attitudes toward the right to abortion and abortion-related value orientations. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia 4.11 Attitudes toward abortion rights and “autonomy”. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia

134 138 139 140 141 142 143 143 144 146 147

Tables

4.1 International comparison (ISSP) on the question: “Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?” Source: ISSP Research Group (2020)

133

Preface

We decided to publish a revised version of the book Pravica do abortusa (The Right to Abortion), originally published in Slovenian in the late fall of 2021, because in the spring of 2022, the issue of the right to safe abortion became very relevant again. The leaked draft document, which indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court would overturn the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, the landmark ruling that established the constitutional right to abortion in the United States, had a very ominous ring to it. Indeed, in June 2022, in a controversial and far-reaching decision, the U.S. Supreme Court dismantled 50 years of legal protection and paved the way for individual states to restrict or outright ban the right to abortion. As of writing this preface, in the spring of 2023, abortion is banned in 14 states (in some with few exceptions, i.e., threat to patient’s life or physical health, rape and/or incest), and many others are expected to attempt to enact abortion bans or gestational limits on the procedure. In some of these states, however, the battle over abortion access is still being fought in courtrooms, where advocates have sued to block enforcements of laws restricting the procedure. Abortion remains legal in 27 states and many of them have expanded access to abortion by adding legal protections in response to the Supreme Court’s fateful ruling. Another important abortion-related issue around the world is the availability of medication abortion. The pills – mifepristone, followed by misoprostol – can be taken in the comfort of one’s own home. Decades of studies have shown that medication abortion is safe and effective. Moreover, even in countries where abortion is banned, women who have access to the pills can self-manage abortion safely and in privacy. No wonder that the religious institutions and the political right are doing their best to ban abortion-inducing drugs or at least make access to them as difficult as possible. In November 2022, abortion opponents in the United States filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, challenging the FDA’s initial approval of mifepristone and its more recent actions to increase access to the drug. If ­successful, the lawsuit would end access to the most common medication abortion regimen throughout the United States, even in states where abortion rights are protected. The U.S. Supreme Court’ s decision in Roe V. Wade case is unlikely to have a major impact in Europe, but it will provide a tailwind for opponents of

xiv Preface abortion in countries outside the United States. We can expect them to make it harder for women to get safe abortions wherever they can. Women will be left to fend for themselves, with the poor having to go to the cellar and the rich being able to fly wherever they want. We believe that the events related to reproductive rights in Slovenia, and ­especially the fact that the right to safe abortion has been preserved despite many attempts to prevent it, would be interesting and instructive for non-Slovenian ­readers. This book aims to show why Slovenia is different from some other former socialist countries, where after the change of the political system in the early 1990s, religious opponents of reproductive rights gained a lot of social and economic power, while neoliberalism and populism added fuel to the fire. The original version of this book was written because of one of the many threats to the constitutional right to abortion, which is all the more dangerous because it comes from a place of privileged knowledge. Some well-known conservative jurists have publicly taken the position that the Slovenian Constitution does not necessarily guarantee this right because they have deliberately kept silent about the fact that its Article 55 on the freedom of choice in childbearing was adopted together with an explanatory memorandum stating that this right includes the right to safe abortion. We also wrote the book because of two self-commitments. At the funeral of Dunja Obersnel Kveder, Slovenian gynecologist, reproductive health researcher, activist and tenacious public health advocate, we told ourselves that we must find a way to continue her work and honor her memory. The second pledge has to do with anniversaries; we do not usually pay much attention to them, but this one is really important. Thirty years ago, the Women for Politics collective, in which some of the authors of this book participated, published the book Abortion – the right to choose?! and in the same year, the Constitution was adopted, including the article guaranteeing the right to decide whether to bear children and obliging the state to ensure that people have every opportunity to exercise this freedom, including the right to safe abortion. After three decades, and looking at European countries where it is still increasingly necessary to fight for it, it is so obvious how historically important this achievement was. Let this book be a proud tribute to it.

Introduction Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin and Mirjana Ule

Perhaps Slumil K’ajxemk’op1 after all? Let us start on an optimistic note. On 24 June 2021, 378 Members of the European Parliament called on European Union countries to assure access to reproductive and sexual health for everyone. 255 MEPs voted against, and 42 abstained. In the resolution Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in EU in the Frame of Women’s Health,2 MEPs called on member states to protect and strengthen sexual and reproductive rights, which must not be jeopardized in any way, as they are the basis for gender equality. The adopted resolution is important; it is also historic and does not in any way belong in the register of bureaucratized European politics that is here today, gone tomorrow. For reasons discussed later in this introduction, it is worth dwelling on this resolution for a moment. First, let us see how unambiguously the European Parliament wanted its appeals to be understood: sexual and reproductive rights are fundamental human rights; jeopardizing them means violence against girls and women and prevents gender equality, which is one of the most important European values. Equally clear is the call for member states to ensure safe and legal abortion and to abolish taxes on all products related to menstrual care. Some EU countries, the report notes, still have restrictive attitudes toward abortion and limit the right to abortion to very narrow circumstances, forcing women to have illegal abortions or give birth against their will, which is a violation of basic human rights. It is regrettable that some countries allow for medical practitioners, and in some cases entire medical institutions, to refuse to provide health services on the basis of so-called conscience clause which leads to the denial of abortion care on grounds of religion or conscience, thereby putting women’s lives at risk. Member states should ensure a wide range of quality contraceptives, family planning counseling and comprehensive information on contraceptive options. The European Parliament encourages member states to provide comprehensive sex and sexuality education in primary and secondary schools, as this contributes significantly to reducing sexual violence and harassment. The resolution is not a legally binding document, but the words have been written and spoken and the positions adopted by the rather conservative European establishment. This is another reason why they are worth remembering.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-1

2  Ana Kralj et al. Predrag Matić, head of the group that prepared the report on the basis of which the above conclusions were then adopted in the plenary session of the Parliament, is convinced that the adopted text is so important because it represents the first serious and institutional rebellion at the European level against the threatening conservative and regressive tendencies that have been so aggressively asserting themselves in recent decades. The majority of European elected representatives have now spoken out quite clearly on the need for safe and accessible abortion and the realization of sexual and reproductive rights. Attacks on these rights in general and on women’s rights in particular are not just a European issue, they are a global trend. Therefore, the European Parliament, in a separate resolution directly referring to the conclusions of the 2019 UN Summit in Nairobi, which celebrated the 25th anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, emphasized the rights of women around the world to adequate health care and respect for their reproductive and sexual rights.3 It is noteworthy that instead of using general and vague terms about sexual and reproductive health, in this ­resolution, MEPs once again used bolder vocabulary and directly and explicitly called for the right to safe abortion. For this political courage, too, it is worth remembering this resolution. However, the most important reason why we have chosen to draw attention to the European Parliament’s resolutions in the area of reproduction and sexual health is that they represent the highest political level of reaction against what we call the conservative turn. In Europe, the conservative turn, which goes far beyond mere opposition to reproductive and sexual rights, even if these are the first and most directly under attack, has so far been resisted mainly by the LGBTQIA+ movement and by what some authors call “the European feminist project” (Verloo and Paternotte, 2018; Walby, 2011). Sylvia Walby, one of the most insightful contemporary feminist ­sociologists, understands the project as “a set of civil society processes and practices that emerge from past discursive and material sources, but create new ­meanings, understandings and social goals” (2011: 6). She defines the feminist project as a general desire to change societies and social actors toward of equality and social justice, regardless of gender or sexual orientation. Although the term feminist project is used in the singular, it should be understood as an interweaving of different conceptual ideas and ideological fields, all of which include many internally diverse feminist groups. If we exclude the aforementioned feminist and LGBTQIA+ responses, we can once again note that the social sciences and humanities have responded late and relatively modestly to threats to reproductive and sexual rights. As if they were not really affected or concerned, as if these are less important things that could be left to partial identity politics. In our opinion, this is a serious omission and amounts to a blind underestimation. On the contrary, it is necessary to pay full attention to the epistemic, discursive and symbolic processes at work here, because attitudes toward women and sexual minorities are once again the litmus test of the ­conservative turn we are currently experiencing. The increasing political polarization and populist dilution of politics is not just a local or European phenomenon, but can be observed all over the world.

Introduction  3 In the conservative turn we are currently witnessing, gender issues have been ­instrumentalized in a harsh, Machiavellian manner and politicized in a frightening way. What an irony, given the feminist slogans of the late 1960s about the necessity to politicize privacy and sexual relations! Because of the memory of the cultural revolution of 1968 and what it meant and what it caused, we are not talking about neoconservatism here, but about a conservative turn. It is exactly the turn; it is not only the opposite of what the cultural revolution meant and wanted, but a fierce opposition to what it brought about. Anyone old enough to remember the 1970s and 1980s, no matter where they lived in Europe, will not be able to recall such blatant gender binarisms or such capillary-imposed gender-specific body ­mortification as can be observed today in every shopping mall, which – from Stockholm to Tirana – are alike as two peas in a pod. The 1968 revolution was a single revolution, despite the fact that demonstrations, riots and violence took place for at least three years in many places around the world. Its legacy cannot be properly analyzed by referring to the particular circumstances of the local manifestations of this phenomenon. In retrospect, it was one major, formative event in the history of the modern world-system, the kind we call a watershed. It means that the cultural realities of the world-system were definitively changed (Wallerstein and Zukin, 1998: 431–449) – cultural, not political realities, as was expected by its protagonists. There are forms of social power worth conquering other than political power, e.g., economic power, cultural power and power over self (individual and group autonomy). More than 50 years after the 1968 cultural revolution, it seems that its slow but fundamental transformation of our everyday culture was the result of an accretion of improvements that, piece by piece and over time, brought about important changes in lifestyles and interpersonal relations in everyday practices. In other words, we believe that the 1968 cultural revolution had ­paradoxical effects in the long run: when it was happening, the political ambitions of the youth and workers’ movements that constituted it were extraordinary. They wanted to change the very centers of political and economic power, they aimed at the ­impossible, and of course, they failed. Not a single political regime has changed as a result of their protests and the capitalist global economy has remained intact. And yet, we could observe, feel and experience that these movements have produced powerful structural changes at the level of values, lifestyles and interpersonal relationships, regardless of whether individuals directly participated in these protests or not. We argue that the real effects of the libertine movements and the 1968 ­cultural revolution are not to be found on the public stage, on the barricades or in political slogans, but where the weary protesters returned to, namely at home, in privacy and intimacy, in mutual relations, generational, gendered and sexual. Perhaps only these changes in everyday life can really generate significant changes in the public arena. Therefore, the thesis we present here is that the current conservative turn, which is so fiercely directed precisely against gender equality and sexual ­preferences, is a response to the tectonic shifts the 1968 cultural revolution triggered at the level of interpersonal relations. Two objections are readily at hand: first, interpersonal relations matter for individuals and are not socially very

4  Ana Kralj et al. relevant, and second, these events occurred half a century ago and the reaction is more than late. Interpersonal relations become very relevant when they are institutionalized in social practices, when they become structural shifts that change the world. This is also the argument that explains the alleged “obsolescence”: the conservative turn appeared and intensified precisely when the ideas of the cultural revolution began to be institutionalized at high (mainstream) levels on a massive and global scale. In this argument, we are not entirely alone. Some authors believe that the global anti-gender counter-revolution is an ­organized and networked response to the UN’s policies in the 1990s on reproductive rights, introduction of gender mainstreaming in key societal spheres and the recognition of the equality of sexual orientations. The World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development were particularly important in this regard. John Paul II launched the concept of “gender ideology”, which has been flying on the banners of this ­counter-revolution from 2001 on when he spoke about “misleading concepts concerning sexuality and the dignity and mission of the woman regard” (Corredor, 2019: 615). The Pontifical Council for the Family was even more precise in pointing out the culprit: the feminist ideology with the concept of gender, which misinterprets the complementary difference between man and woman and creates confusion about sexual identity (Corredor, 2019; Paternotte and Kuhar, 2017). At this point, we think it is useful to apply the concept of anti-systemic ­movement, as used by Wallerstein (2006), who used it to denote a strong opposition to the existing historical system, including the desire to overthrow it. Gender equality movement and LGBTQIA+ movements are anti-systemic movements because they oppose the historical system of patriarchy. Neither feminist theory nor the various movements for the rights of women and sexual minorities have significantly undermined this system. The system was not truly shaken until feminist beliefs successfully penetrated the global mainstream, the economic and political institutions of major nation-states and supranational bodies such as the UN ­platforms. The category of gender as socially constructed appeared in social theory as early as the beginning of the 20th century. The movements for women’s rights were perhaps at their strongest in the mid-1970s, but it was not until a different understanding of gender became a powerful analytical tool and a cultural and civilizational asset, which did not happen until the 1990s, that a violent ideological counter-revolution began. It can be understood as a belated response to the tectonic shifts in mentality of the cultural revolution of 1968. This counter-revolution is a systemic counter-movement. Systemic counter-movements occur when anti-­ systemic movements are successful enough to influence key institutions and public opinion on particular issues to the point that the policies affecting those issues begin to change. When the threat to the existing system is serious, the forces that are trying to keep it alive come together in a systemic counter-movement. Their ideology is conservative, their tactic is populist nationalism and their interests, though camouflaged behind the veil of a culture war, are in fact particularistic, class-based and deeply economic. The latter also explains why they have such strong political allies and are able to mobilize enormous resources.4

Introduction  5 In the last decade, protests against same-sex marriage, the Istanbul Convention, restrictions on abortion and on gender and sexuality education have taken place all over Europe, not just in its “less developed areas”, raising serious doubts about the validity of the modernization thesis, which until now has mainly explained gender and sexual conservatism. In a sense, the modernization thesis presupposed the optimistic linearity of the emancipatory project, which meant that non-modern deviations were not to be taken seriously or were limited to the “less developed” European East or South and it was only a matter of time when they would jump on the modernization bandwagon. Events from the 1990s onward disproved this. In European countries where nationalist and populist movements are gaining strength, such as France, Italy, Hungary, Croatia and Ukraine, proposals for more restrictive reproductive rights legislation have been increasingly voiced in public. Where these political forces are in power, as is the case in Poland, they have all but banned abortion – it is allowed only exceptionally in cases of rape, incest or when a pregnant woman’s life is in danger.5 Finally, if the modernization thesis was valid, how could we possibly explain what is happening in the USA? Unlike in the USA, where the rapid rise of “alt-right” movements and forces has shocked social scientists and pro-choice movements, political Europe has greatly underestimated these signs and, more often than not, has simply waited for them to subside on their own. There is nothing to suggest that, on the contrary, in many European countries, we can observe a growing international alliance, a real global organization of the opponents of reproductive rights. It is necessary to abandon methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism, i.e., the idea that (Western) Europe is superior to other parts of the world when it comes to ­reproductive and sexual rights. The European feminist project has interesting opponents, the worst of whom, as the well-known joke goes, are its allies. On one side is neoliberal corporatism, which takes a declaratively liberal stance on gender equality and sexual diversity. On the other side is conservative and populist nationalism, which opposes gender equality and queer politics. At the same time, conservative populist nationalist politics self-identifies as anti-systemic because it opposes neoliberal hegemony and political and economic elites, including “feminist and gay lobbies”. Moreover, in the supposed alliance between feminist and LGBTQIA+ projects and ­neoliberalism, it sees a breakdown of traditions and a decadent threat to national substance. What links feminism and neoliberalism, they say, is the “ideology of gender”, involving capitalists, left-liberal politicians and non-governmental organizations. Such a somewhat complex, but extremely dangerous political patchwork, some say, is a global example of the ideological struggles of the present and the most important one in the future. We disagree: these are apparitions from the past, from 1930s, when fascism and national socialism were similarly portrayed as deeply patriotic and at the same time as anti-elitist and anti-liberal movements on the side of the “common people”. And indeed, for some time now, neoliberal corporations have been embracing feminist rhetoric and championing women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights. As has often been the case, emancipatory elements have been confiscated, recycled and offered

6  Ana Kralj et al. in commercial packaging for benign use. They have become an integral part of marketing strategies that peacefully coexist with their own opposite, for example, with the emphasized and stereotypical binariness of some children’s clothing programs and toys. If anyone, it is the corporate politicians who are the masters of commercial inclusivity in the “something for everyone” strategy. Therefore, it’s just a sales pitch and not a tribute to emancipatory politics. Recently, for example, IKEA in Ljubljana loudly encouraged customers to buy rainbow bags, thus ­contributing to LGBTQIA+ empowerment and visibility. In this relatively new field of ideological confrontation, corporate politics seems stronger and more visible than those we used to call the progressive left. For ­example, in 2018, the ice cream giant Ben and Jerry’s promoted a new ice cream called Pecan resists, communicating its anti-Trump orientation “with a peaceful resistance to Trump’s regressive and discriminatory policies and a desire for a better future with more equality, inclusiveness and justice for black people, women, LGBT people, refugees and migrants” (Payne and Tornhill 2021: 2). Thus, left feminism today is confronted with two seemingly contradictory ­tendencies: on the one hand, with neoliberal discourse and policies, in which gender equality and sexual diversity have been stripped of any potential radicalism and have become part of a benign, business-friendly corpus of “political ­correctness”, thereby delegitimizing feminist political struggles; and, on the other hand, with contemporary neoconservative populism, in which the very concept of gender is articulated as an ideological construct of privileged and decadent elites. This is something new: the old conservatism was limited to opposition to reproductive and sexual rights while the new conservatism has a much broader thematic scope and claims much wider acceptance because it presents itself as an anti-elitist and antiglobalization movement. But never as anti-capitalist. Capitalism, they say, merely needs to be reformed to make it more compatible with traditional family values. Family caregiving (for elderly) is certainly one of them. It fits in well with the neoliberal privatization of reproduction and the accompanying dismantling of the welfare state. These are usually emphatically nationalist and sovereigntist movements, which, and there is no contradiction here, somehow organize and network t­ ransnationally, because nationalist sovereignism is a cover rather than a serious concern for the welfare of the nation. Their agenda is fully in line with the neoliberal strategies of capital accumulation, that are rapidly deteriorating the living conditions of the workforce, which is increasingly dispersed in the global precariat. Anti-gender right-wing populism flourished all over the world precisely at the time of the institutionalization of gender equality on the one hand, and on the other hand at the time of the global economic crisis and increasing precarization of labor. However, it sees no major problems in capitalism itself and in the methods of its ­accumulation. The problems lie only in “bad capitalism”, which does not sufficiently take into account Christian values and is driven by individuality and sexual promiscuity. But why are these movements so attractive and how do they mobilize? It seems that they are so attractive because of their anti-corporate and anti-elite rhetoric. That is, because they pervert and abuse popular anti-systemic sentiments, and they cling to psychological mechanisms of compensation for the supposed losses

Introduction  7 of men, and especially poor white men, who are beset by supposedly excessive demands for equal rights for women and all other social minorities, from gender to ethnic and racial. In some countries, sexual conservatism has become associated with anti-colonial rhetoric. Gender theory, it has been argued, is a Western construct propagated by imperialist organizations such as the UN and the EU, with the help of donations and development funds, to undermine the traditional ways of life of indigenous peoples. There, feminist projects are under even more pressure from all sides than they are in the Euro-American world. Under the conditions in which right-wing populism flourishes virtually ­everywhere, neoliberal corporations (and their subordinate governments around the world), with their rhetoric of plurality, tolerance, democracy and human rights are seen as the lesser evil, in fact no longer evil at all, but potential allies of emancipatory movements. If the feminist project agrees to such an alliance in any form, it risks a historical defeat and the victory of identity politics over the real issues, which are not necessarily class issues, but certainly issues of radical reformulation, first of production and then of all other relations in the society of the future. The latter need not be called socialist, but it will have to be radically more equal and much freer than the present one. Given the current counter-revolution of illiberal and authoritarian movements, whose symbolic glue is precisely the attitude toward women’s and LGBTQIA+ equality, it will be necessary to re-form alliances of all radical and progressive movements as soon as possible and to formulate a new social contract with as little presumptuousness as possible, with great hope and effort that this can be done with as little violence as possible. The scope of the book Before presenting the content, we would like to address the key concepts and ­terminological conundrums we have faced while writing. We are aware that terminological dilemmas in the field we deal with are only an indication of other ­dilemmas, which are seemingly linguistic but actually substantive. Let us start with a minor issue. The Slovenian language does not differentiate between the concepts of sex and gender; gender is usually described by the phrase “social sex”. In contrast, the English language emphasizes the difference between sex and gender by attaching sex to an assumed biological basis and gender to the social circumstances and meanings of this biological basis. It is not (yet) evident in English language what Judith Butler wrote about when she convincingly showed that even the “biology” of gender is always already social and historical. It is interesting that “spol” (sex/gender) in Slovenian clearly shows that it is a social construct. Unlike in English, we use it for all nouns, things, animals and people. We do not think that Slovenian language is in any way disadvantaged because of this; rather, it is the opposite. The fact that gender is a social status is already implied by the existing word in Slovenian; hence, there was no need for a new one. English has exported its problem to languages that did not have knowledge “about the difference” and are now striving servilely to harmonize linguistically with dominant language. The problem is not a lack of words, but our reluctance to use some of them or to use them in inappropriate ways. This applies especially to those derivations of the

8  Ana Kralj et al. term gender/sex that imply sexuality and sexual practices. For example, when we talk about the necessity of sex education in schools, we should consistently refer to sex/gender and sexuality education if we intend to discuss both, the meaning of sex/gender and sexual preferences and practices. We should insist on this distinction because we tend to avoid discussing sexuality in public, especially in important public institutions such as schools. The problems we have with talking about sexuality in public are revealed by linguistic discomfort we feel: the terms we have at our disposal are either strictly medical (e.g., vulva, vagina, penis), vulgar or infantile. We are not entirely comfortable with any of these modes of expressions. There is something strange and awkward about each of them. Once again, it turns out that we do not speak the language – the language speaks us. In this book, we write about reproductive and sexual rights, although we mainly focus on the right to abortion which is perhaps the most important ­reproductive right. We associate reproduction and rights because reproduction is always so tightly embedded in social norms and political decisions in both ­directions, as incentives to procreate and restrictions not to. In this book, we use the concept of reproduction in the narrow sense, as a person’s right to decide whether and how to exercise her or his reproductive capacity. Usually, we understand the concept of reproduction more broadly in line with the classic historic-materialist understanding of “the determining factor in history”, which is the “production and ­reproduction of the immediate essentials of life”, as defined by Engels long ago. Even if the terms “reproductive”, “sexual”, and “sexuality” were ever used in a way we didn’t think was right, we did not change them if they were written that way in the original texts. In Chapter 1, Vesna Leskošek presents a socio-historical study on the development of reproductive rights in the area now called Central Europe. Women started writing about reproductive rights at the end of the 19th century, although, of course, they didn’t call them that at the time, and then more and more courageously from the early 20th century. It really took a lot of courage, because those who demanded the legalization of abortion were subjected to severe personal attacks and even death threats. They were facing opposition not only from solid clerically backward political phalanxes but also fierce resistance from the medical profession, the judiciary and sometimes from within their own families and friends. In addition to the development of the normative regulation of reproductive rights, the author is also interested in how the discourses on reproduction and related rights developed. The way they are discussed, how, where, by whom and why arguments and counter-arguments are formulated, reveals the dynamics of social power. It is here we must look if we want to observe how this discourse feeds into normative regulations, medical doctrines and educational programs slowly shaping what we then call a­ ttitudes, public opinion, and mentalities. The right to abortion became a huge subject of controversy in the mid-1980s, as Metka Mencin points out in Chapter 2. She sheds light on the circumstances in which criticism of the previous socialist system was expressed at the same time as the rise of nationalism. The alleged threat to the Slovenian nation was attributed not only to the hegemonic aspirations of other ethno-nationalisms but also to the supposedly too feeble will of Slovenian women to bear children. In the 1990s, with

Introduction  9 the restoration of capitalism and the rise of nationalism, patriarchal ideology also gained strength, which even today interprets the emancipatory legacy of socialism as the opposite of what should be the true task of women. As one of the most important protagonists of the fight for Article 55 of the Slovenian Constitution, which preserves the right to abortion, Mencin’s contribution is the first detailed reflection on the events of that time, which constitutes a valuable historical ­document. Today, the author notes, opposition to this right is more or less limited to the Catholic media, institutions and civil society initiatives connected to the Roman Catholic Church and to far-right political forces, but it would not be surprising if, in one of the next election campaigns, the demand to limit access to safe abortion would once again become an important issue in party struggles. In Chapter 3, Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener contribute to the story of reproductive and sexual rights in Slovenia over the last three decades. They are particularly interested in how feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups and organizations view these rights, how they fight for them, what problems they encounter and how they overcome them. This chapter is a narrative with a rather broad time frame, as a large, indeed overwhelming, part of civil society activism after Slovenia’s independence was, in fact, dedicated to the struggle to preserve for old accomplishments in the area of reproductive rights from the socialist era. In recent decades, activists have been more involved in constant vigilantism than in efforts to expand rights, because the rights already achieved were constantly in danger. Not only were they in danger but the new political class has managed to actually tear some of them apart. In order to understand what is happening, we need not only good theoretical concepts but also good empiricism, which never arises spontaneously and in a conceptually empty space. Good empiricism is therefore always contextual, historical and comparative. What’s more, good empiricism ultimately verifies itself. Are the original concepts and theoretical extensions still relevant and valid? If so, why, and if not, why not? This is what Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija have done in Chapter 4 with their longitudinal analysis of public opinion data and in a ­comparative European perspective. Notes 1 In June 2021, a delegation of Zapatista women, children, men and the elders arrived in Europe, not to conquer it, as their ancestors had been conquered centuries ago, but to find people who, like them, fight for social and political justice and against capitalism as a world-system that makes such goals impossible. Mariajosè, one of the women in the delegation, said that the land that the natives now call Europe will henceforth be called Slumil K’ajxemk’op, which means “Rebel Land” or the “Land that doesn’t yield, that doesn’t fail” (Baschet, 2021). 2 Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021IP0314 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 3 Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021 IP0315&from=EN (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 4 Really worth reading is the report of the European Parliamentary Forum for Reproductive and Sexual Rights, which published a report in June 2021 titled “Tip of the Iceberg: Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights for Sexuality & Reproductive Health in Europe”. The report provides precise and very specific findings on who is funding the anti-gender counter-revolution in Europe.

10  Ana Kralj et al.

5 However, the overwhelming global trend has been toward greater respect for reproductive rights and for liberalization of abortion laws. According to the data, collected by the Center for Reproductive Rights, over the past 30 years, 59 countries across all regions of the world have liberalized their abortion laws and increased access to abortion services, among them Colombia, Argentina and Mexico – traditionally conservative Catholic countries – where abortion was decriminalized following a wave of protests and campaigning by women’s rights and pro-choice groups. Only four countries have rolled back abortion rights over that period: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Poland and now the United States. 576 million (36%) women of reproductive age live in countries that allow abortion on request, 386 million (24%) women live in countries that allow abortion on broad social or economic grounds, 186 million (12%) women live in countries that allow abortion on health grounds, 358 million (22%) women live in countries that allow abortion to save the life of the woman and 91 million (6%) live in countries that prohibit abortion altogether. Available at: https://­reproductiverights.org/maps/worlds-abortionlaws/ and https://reproductiverights.org/global-trends-abortion-rights-infographic/ (Accessed 17 April 2023).

Bibliography Baschet, J. (2021) The “Zapatista Invasion” Has Begun! Available at: https://roarmag.org/ essays/zapatista-mexico-europe-trip/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Corredor, E. S. (2019) ‘Unpacking “Gender Ideology” and the Global Right’s Antigender Countermovement’, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 44(3), pp. 613–638. Datta, N. (2021) Tip If the Iceberg: Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights for Sexuality and Reproductive Health in Europe. Brussels: European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights. Available at: https://www.epfweb.org/node/837 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). European Parliament resolution of 24 June 2021 on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health (2020/2215(INI)) (2021) Official Journal of the European Union, C 81/43. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021IP0314 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). European Parliament resolution of 24 June 2021 on the 25th anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD25) (Nairobi Summit) (2019/2850(RSP)) (2021) Official Journal of the European Union, C 81/63. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021IP0315&from =EN (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Kuhar, R. and Paternotte, D. (eds.) (2017) Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing against Equality. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. Lešnik, B. (2005) ‘Spodobnost fašizma in fašizem spodobnosti’, in Mosse, G. L. (ed.) Nacionalizem in seksualnost. Ljubljana: Založba /*cf., pp. 287–303. Payne Gunnarson, J. and Tornhill, S. (2021) ‘The Enemy’s Enemy: Feminism at the Crossroads of Neoliberal Co-Optation and Anti-Gender Conservatism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 28(1): pp. 62–82. Verloo, M. and Paternotte, D. (2018) ‘The Feminist Project under Threat in Europe’, Politics and Governance, 6(3), pp. 1–5. Walby, S. (2011) The Future of Feminism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Wallerstein, I. and Zukin, S. (1989) ‘1968, Revolution in the World-System, Theses and Queries’, Theory and Society, 18(4), pp. 431–449. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/ stable/657747 (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

1

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion Vesna Leskošek

Introduction Women’s freedom depends on the extent to which they are able to control their reproductive and sexual health and to decide independently whether and when to have children, if they choose to do so. The authors of the monograph Our Bodies, Ourselves (Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, 1970, 1998) define this freedom as the right to shape and control one’s own life course, the right to express sexuality and the right to sexual pleasure. To enjoy these rights, women (as well as men) must have access to early knowledge about the body, sexuality and violence (sex education), reproductive health (universal access to public health care), abortion (as a right) and free contraception. They must also have access to treatment for diseases that threaten their reproductive health, whether sexually transmitted or not, and they must be informed about new contraceptives, so they can decide what is best for them. The enjoyment of women’s reproductive rights depends on the normative and institutional frameworks of nation-states that regulate access to medical ­assistance for abortion and thus to an intervention in a professionally safe environment. However, a look at the history of struggles and efforts to recognize the right to abortion shows that women’s greatest enemies in terms of access to safe abortion are found primarily among socially powerful actors. The main opponents of the right to abortion are the Roman Catholic Church (hereafter RCC) and the organized right, which have influenced state’ decisions both in the past and in the present. The RCC has made great efforts in the last century, and especially in the last decades, to influence governments to prohibit and criminalize abortion. In doing so, it gives the impression that it has always taken an anti-abortion position, but the historical evidence shows quite different picture. For a long time, the RCC has tolerated abortion up to: “…the point to which developing embryo becomes a human being (hominization), the unity of mind and body as making up the total nature of human being” (Hurst, 1981: 1). St. Augustine determined that abortion is not a crime but is a mortal sin if its purpose was to cover up fornication or adultery: The law does not provide that the act (abortion) pertains to homicide, as there cannot yet be said to be a live soul in a body that lacks sensation when it is not formed in a flesh and so is not endowed with sense. (Hurst, 1981: 1) DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-2

12  Vesna Leskošek It was not until Pope Sixtus V in 1588 that any abortion was declared a crime and punishable by excommunication (Hovey, 1985; Ranke-Heinemann, 1990). Contraception was also prohibited. Only three years later, pope Gregory XIV found the prohibition too harsh and even contradictory to the theological view on ­ensoulment. He made the punishment for early abortion less severe based on a distinction between animated and unanimated fetus, and abortion of the latter had milder consequences. He also employed the test of quickening, which equated the beginning of life with the first movement of the fetus. This decision reignited the debate on whether the fetus has a soul (Lopez, 2010). In the Irish canon, adultery was a greater sin than abortion. It took under consideration the woman’s circumstances and forbade abortion once the fetus was already formed. Thomas Aquinas understood it as the third stage in the development of the fetus. First the embryo had a vegetative soul, then an animal soul and finally a rational soul when the body was formed (Hurst, 1996). In 1869, Pope Pius IX declared abortion to be murder. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church has not always taken a stand against abortion; rather, the persecution of abortion has a relatively short history. In Catholic doctrine, sexual pleasure is also considered a mortal sin, not just abortion. Since sexuality is permitted only for procreation, sexual pleasure is a sin, as Uta RankeHeinemann (1990) writes, discussing the RCC’s position on abortion in the context of the mortal danger to the pregnant woman and the fetus when medicine must decide whether one lives or the other. In this case, Ranke-Heinemann is referring primarily to the RCC’s attitude toward women: the RCC labels a woman as worthless if she does not reproduce, and even if she does, she is merely an object in which “new life” is created. Her womb is a “flowerpot” (Katz Rothman, 1989) into which a man plants his seed, which then produces a child. The opinion of the RCC in times of separation of church and state would not be a problem (except, of course, for the position of women, people with diverse sexual identities and minorities who are members of the RCC) if the RCC did not have so much power and influence on the normative and institutional framework of the state, especially on the regulation of reproductive rights and on the medical treatment of abortion. Separation of church and state is important because it enables and promotes personal freedom for all, both non-believers and believers (Ercolessi and Hägg, 2012). Despite the separation of church and state, however, the RCC has the influence to regulate public affairs in transnational and international institutions, as well as in nation-states with conservative, neoliberal or populist/nationalist governments (see Chapter 4 for more information on this “banal triumvirate”). Poland is the most visible example of the blurred boundaries between the RCC and the state, and women and minorities in particular suffer the consequences. Polish legislation on abortion is becoming extremely restrictive and the power of the RCC is increasing. The case of Ireland shows that the opposite trend is also possible. The Irish Catholic Church is losing power, but in this case mainly because of the history of sexual and other abuses that came to light in the last decades of the 20th century (Cullen and Korolczuk, 2019). The Irish Catholic Church has thus lost its position as the moral authority that is supposed to decide life and death and everything in between.

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  13 Calkin and Kaminska (2020) note that the RCC in both countries justified the restriction of women’s reproductive rights on the basis of national identity. Nationalism and Catholicism (including masculinism) are admittedly old tropes based on the ideology of the unity of nation and religion (only Catholic, of course), and with the belief that religion is embedded in cultural identity, culture and Catholicism are virtually one and the same. Meyer Resende (2015) analyses the position of the Polish and Spanish RCCs, with the former becoming part of national Catholicism after political changes in the early 1990s. The RCC in Poland still has a direct influence on the decisions of the state, while Spain abandoned national Catholicism after the collapse of the Franco regime. Both situations are reflected in the status of women’s reproductive rights: while women in Poland are losing their rights, they have gained them in Spain. A study of historical sources shows how women resisted the power of the Church and the state (and also the medical profession) to gain control over their bodies and life course. The development of discourse from abortion to reproductive rights can also be traced and the consequences women had to bear because of their fight for the right to abortion. Women have been attacked and even had their lives threatened for demanding the regulation of abortion. Even though they knew well that they would face ostracism and the risk of physical and not just verbal attacks, they spoke out, organized rallies and demonstrated. This struggle eventually influenced political change and changes in professional doctrines. Politics cannot be relied upon to sort out issues, where it stands to lose. Nor can science be relied upon to advance the realization of rights regardless of prevailing cultural and religious beliefs and societal expectations. In Slovenia, the gynecological profession has been one of the main opponents of the possibility of assisted artificial insemination for single women at the beginning of the 21st century. This is particularly important as throughout history there have been categories of unwanted pregnancies and unwanted children due to racial or eugenic policies, poverty, pregnancies out of wedlock and in current time due to gender identities other than heterosexual. So not every life is sacred, and not every child is appreciated, to paraphrase r­ ight-wing religious slogans. The historical development of the right to abortion is similar in many respects but also different between countries in Europe and around the world. The Slovenian case is interesting because the abortion-rights movement took place quite early. The Slovenian case also shows how the right to abortion affects women’s entire life course, in particular their ability to control their own lives and their possibilities to make autonomous decisions about themselves in all spheres of life, both private and public. It affects the family relationships they form, the opportunities they have for education and paid employment, what they can do, how they pursue their ­interests, ambitions and aspirations, and how autonomous they are in all these. The historical overview will be structured along three complementary streams, the political claims, normative frameworks and the conceptual developments. The analysis is focusing on the period from the beginning of the 20th century till the mid-1980s, when discourses on the nation and the fertility intensified, since women were interpolated to have children in order to preserve the nation and its identity, what will be thematized in the next chapter in this book.

14  Vesna Leskošek The struggle for the right to abortion and legal restrictions between the two wars The abortion-rights movement

The development of reproductive rights in Slovenia dates to the 1920s, but the beginnings can be traced in the articles that were published in the first Slovenian women’s journal Slovenka (Engl. Slovene woman) at the end of the 19th century. This journal highlighted important themes of women’s equality and emancipation struggles (Leskošek, 2002; Verginella, 2013, 2017), which also influenced the founding of the first women’s associations in Slovenia at the end of the 19th century. The struggle for the right to abortion began with the establishment of the Association of Working Women and Girls (hereafter AWWG) in 1924. Initially a worker’s organization, it later joined the Socialist Party of Slovenia (hereafter SPS) (cf. Vidovič Miklavčič, 2004), but the AWWG members have always stressed their independence, as they often lacked the support of the SPS for their demands and found it difficult to enforce their agenda. They published the journal Ženski list (Engl. Women’s Journal), in which they wrote articles on the right to ­abortion. The journal was published from 1925 to 1935. The issue of abortion was first raised in 1925 because the problem of illegal, “backstreet” abortion was most acute for working-class women, the unemployed and peasant women, who did not have enough money to pay for the expensive but somewhat safer professional ­procedure.1 Only wealthier women could pay for it, which is why disability or death rates were lower among them.2 AWWG activists argued for abortion based on their right to make their own decisions about births, “because they know best how many children they can feed and raise”.3 They pointed out that while the “elimination of a fetus”4 is tantamount to killing, the same injustice is to give birth to human beings who will live in misery and slowly perish. They demanded the amendment of Article 144 of the Austrian Criminal Law5 of 1852 on Felonies and Gross and Petty Misdemeanors, which prohibited the elimination of fetus. The demands of the AWWG were met with strong negative reactions and a counter-campaign organized by the Slovene Catholic Church immediately after the first writings on abortion in Ženski list. RCC claimed that the demand for abortion is a sin and a rejection of motherhood, i.e., a conscious renunciation of the essence of womanhood and of the basic social function of women. In 1925, the Catholic Church stepped up its campaign against the AWWG, publishing an article in the journal Cerkveni glasnik za Tržiško župnijo (Engl. Church Journal of the Parish of Tržič)6 entitled “This time, they went too far!” in which they accused the AWWG activists of “publicly calling for murder; publicly calling for legal approval of murdering children!”, since abortion was equated with murder, because once a child is conceived, it has the right to life.7 Women had to promise in confession not to read Ženski list because it was faithless. The AWWG activists were condemned as murderers and labeled as “swine and harlots”.8 Women responded decisively to the attacks, but they also stressed that their struggle was not against the Catholic Church, but for women’s rights. They pointed to the

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  15 paradox between the Church’s worship of motherhood and the persecution and contempt of voluntary and involuntary “illegitimate mothers”, who, together with their children, were thus exposed to misery and deprivation. They highlighted the double moral of the RCC, i.e., humiliation of “illegitimate” children, the advocacy of the death penalty, the turning of church bells into cannons and the blessing of weapons that kill children.9 In 1927, AWWG started to organize public rallies in support of abortion and began to talk about contraception, which was to be suggested and recommended by medical doctors. They also drew attention to a Scottish doctor who recommended anesthesia at childbirth. The clergy denounced him as working against God. It is God’s will for the women to suffer.10 In 1928, the journal stressed that, in addition to abortion, birth control was needed by improving women’s health care.11 Since the illegal “elimination of a fetus” is dangerous to women’s health, it should be carried out without penalty by a doctor. The journal started to publish examples on how abortion was regulated in different counties. The movement for the right to abortion had partial effects, reflected in the amendments to the criminal legislation of 1930, when the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1929, came into force, what will be presented in the section of this chapter on normative regulation of abortion. AWWG continued to organize protests in the early 1930s. They began to stress the right to personal freedom: “The most important is that a woman has the right to ‘self-­ownership’, that is, the right to personal freedom”.12 On 7 May 1933, three associations, the Association of Working Women and Girls, the Association of Academically Educated Women and the Association Women’s Movement, organized a rally in Ljubljana for the right to abortion, at which Henrik Tuma13 was one of the speakers. Speakers at the rally were talking about the medical, eugenic and social indications for abortion. They stressed that social indications should be more important than medical ones when deciding on the abortion rights; they called for accessible and inexpensive contraception and the provision of abortion in hospitals. They mentioned three conditions necessary for the decision to have a child: work, housing and social protection of mothers and children and proposed the commission to decide about the right to abortion in a particular case. They issued a resolution with demands to amend the Penal Code and called on the Ministry for Social Policy and National Health to draw up a directive to regulate the production and sale of contraceptives.14 Following this event, Catholics organized an anti-contraception march in Ljubljana, demanding a fine for contraceptive manufacturers and a total ban on abortion. The magazine Ženski svet (Engl. Women’s World)15 did not join the abortion debate until 1935, when it reported on the congress of the Yugoslav Medical Association in Belgrade.16 They noted that the number of illegal, “backstreet” abortions was increasing, and they demanded a revision of the Penal Code to allow abortion for eugenic reasons and to consider socio-economic factors as well. They proposed the establishment of a central office for the protection of mothers and children and families under the Ministry of Social Policy and National Health. They also demanded higher taxes for the wealthier classes in order to better organize

16  Vesna Leskošek health care for women and children. These suggestions were not u­ nanimously accepted. The President of the Slovenian Medical Association was against the right on religious, ethical, and national grounds. A Serbian doctor argued in favor of the right to motherhood for unmarried women. The issue of the possibility of sterilization was raised, as it was seen less dangerous than abortion. Some doctors were in favor of “natural” contraception, such as abstinence or following the natural cycle.17 A Slovenian gynecologist advocated for considering social indications for abortion. For him, the biggest problem was illegal abortion, which caused a large number of deaths mostly due to misery and poverty, and he therefore believed that abortion for social indications should be allowed. In 1936, the magazine Ženski svet opened a public debate on abortion and ­published a series of letters from women with their opinions on the right to ­abortion.18 Some women believed that religion is the best protection against unwanted pregnancies, whereas others believed that women themselves should be able to decide what they will do with their bodies. They stressed that no one knows what it is like to have a bunch of “hungry and naked” children. Would a woman feel “motherly happiness” when looking at them? They also highlighted the justification for abortion in cases of rape or incest and mental illness. A few letters opposed abortion on the grounds of lower birth rates and the threat to the nation. The question of the existence of the nation has been raised before, but it only came to the fore toward the end of the 1930s, probably also under the influence of fascism and the ideas of the purity of the nation. The abortion-rights movement slowly faded away after 1935 for several reasons. The most important is the abolition of the AWWG, a consequence of the absolutist power of King Aleksandar Karađorđević after 1931. Two years before, in 1929, he had established a royal dictatorship and banned political parties. As the AWWG was formally part of the Socialist Party, it was abolished in 1935. The journal Ženski list ceased to exist, and the subject of abortion was silenced. Another reason was the start of the Second World War and the radicalization of nationalisms. The development of the legislation on abortion

As already emphasized, Slovenia seceded from Austrian-Hungarian empire in 1918, but some Austrian laws were still in force. The Austrian Criminal Law on Felonies and Gross and Petty Misdemeanors of 1852 (Kavčič, 1889: 62), provided for penalties in respect of abortion in Chapter 16 on the Elimination of the Fetus (or conception), which is labeled as a serious crime in the first part of the law on felonies. Article 144 stated: “A woman who, with malice aforethought, commits any act by which a fetus is aborted, or so causes the child to be born dead, shall be guilty of a felony”. The penalty was determined in Article 145, which provided for a prison sentence of between six months and one year for an attempted ­abortion, which did not result in the aborting of the fetus. The aborting of a fetus was punishable by a rigorous prison sentence of between one and five years. Article 146 provided for the same penalty for the father of the child if he is an accomplice to

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  17 the crime. Article 147 provided for foreign guilt in the event of the fetus being expelled or attempted to be expelled without the mother’s knowledge or consent. The penalty was determined in Article 148, and was between one- and five-year ­imprisonment. However, if the mother’s life was endangered or her health was injured, the penalty was between five- and ten-year rigorous imprisonment. The specifics of this law were that it did not criminalize the providers if the abortion was requested by the woman, but only if the abortion was performed against her will. It recognized at least partly male responsibility. In addition, there was a draft amendment to this law, written in 1910, which would have partly introduced medical indications for abortion, but this amendment was not adopted, and the Austrian criminal law remained in force in Slovenia until the adoption of new Penal Code in 1929 (Cergol Paradiž, 2013: 233–235). However, an analysis of the court trials shows that practices have been different. Ratej (2020) studied the court files of the Maribor19 court and found indictments against doctors who had performed abortions as early as 1921 (Ratej, 2020: 43). She describes the case of an accused doctor who defended himself by citing a medical indication for abortion (a narrowed pelvis), claiming that childbirth would endanger the woman’s life. The doctor was acquitted because of the support he received from his colleagues. Ratej states that even at that time, in medical and judicial circles, the debate on abortion was much broader than the restrictive legal provisions and, as a result, a variety of practices emerged. Judges were supposed to take the opinion of the gynecological profession into account when deciding cases in which a doctor was charged (Ratej, 2020: 44). The prevailing opinion at the time was that doctors should be involved in the drafting of new criminal legislation. Some judges referred to the newly emerging criminal code in their acquittals, even though it was not yet adopted (Cergol Paradiž, 2013: 237). The movement for the right to abortion, together with expert opinions in medicine and law, had partial effects, which were reflected in the amendments to the criminal legislation of 1930, when the Penal Code of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1929, entered into force. Minor yet important changes were introduced regarding abortion. In Chapter XVI, the law regulated offenses against life and the body, and in Articles 171–174, it dealt with abortion. Although the law was considered one of the most modern and introduced a number of new penalties and the possibility of lighter sentences and rehabilitation, this was not the case for the offense of abortion. Abortion was in this Penal Code considered a more serious offense against life and body than infanticide, for which higher penalties had been imposed under the previous legislation (Srpak, 2006). Article 171 stated that: A pregnant woman who aborts her own fetus or allows another to do so shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. In particularly simple cases, the court may mitigate the sentence at its discretion and, if the illegitimate mother aborted the fetus herself, may also acquit her of any guilt. Article 172 sets out the penalty for an abortionist who is punished if he/she performs an abortion at the woman’s request: “If a doctor, pharmacist, midwife or

18  Vesna Leskošek anyone who performs it for a reward does so, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years”. Article 173 says: “Whoever gives a pregnant woman a means of aborting a fetus or uses it himself against her without her will, and the fetus comes from her, shall be punished with imprisonment for up to five years”. The article also stipulates that no punishment shall be imposed on doctors who perform an abortion, after prior notification to the authorities and after a hearing at the medical commission, in order to save the woman’s life or to avert an imminent danger to her life, if this is not possible in any other way. Medical commissions were established by the Ministry of National Health with a special decree. Article 174, however, provided for a penalty of strict imprisonment for up to one year for anyone “who publicly advertises, covertly or overtly offers, publicly explains or praises the means and instruments for abortion, or offers his own or another person’s services for this purpose”. Progress has been made in particular in the recognition of the partial justification of abortion on medical grounds, most notably through changes in legal and medical doctrine. Doctors could be exonerated from blame under the conditions laid down by law. Judges were given the possibility to exonerate women who were not married or cohabiting, i.e., “illegitimate mothers”. Srpak (2006) writes that this possibility was abolished by an amendment to the Code in 1935. These changes have generated a heated debate among doctors and lawyers, including concerns about the size of the nation. Slovenian lawyer and university professor in criminal law August Munda wrote that the legal beneficiaries protected by the law are not individuals (women) but the community. The mother, therefore, should not have a choice to abort a fetus. The community, however, has an interest in the population multiplying and not falling behind the size of the population of neighboring countries (Munda, 1935: 17). Munda advocated for eugenic indications for abortion because only healthy citizens benefit the state, while sick citizens are a burden, and therefore these indications should be included in the law. He believed that abortion should be allowed in cases of rape, incest and the ­criminal abuse of a girl under the age of 16. The opposite was stated by Croatian lawyer and judge Ferdo Čulinović,20 who thought that while the changes to the Code were positive, they were too modest for women’s benefit. The provisions on the abolition did not respond to women’s needs and were in direct contradiction to their basic human right to be i­ndependent bearers of rights (Čulinović, 1934: 37). In particular, he considered that the fetus could not be a person and a bearer of rights, because this creates a conflict between the fetus and the woman who carries it in her body. The previous criminal legislation protected the fetus and criminalized the woman, thus labeling her as an opponent of the fetus in her body. This guaranteed the autonomy of the fetus and deprived the woman of the right to decide about her own body, as she had to respect the rights of the fetus. Čulinović describes as a paradox that future life was protected more than the already existing one. He illustrated this with the example of a foreign body (parasite), which upset his colleague lawyers, including Metod Dolenc, a prominent Slovenian lawyer, judge and university professor who, as a legal expert, wrote several interpretations of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  19 While he praised Čulinović for his previous works, he considered this one outrageous because he advocated for “the legal elimination of the fetus […] and the rights which a woman should be given to decide freely over her pregnant body” (Dolenc, 1935: 53). He posed a rhetorical question: “Should a married woman from whom her husband wants a child also have such a right?!” (ibid.). Čulinović opposed precisely these views, which still considered the woman as the property of the man and not as an equal bearer of rights and responsibilities, as an autonomous person with the right to bodily integrity. On the basis of the new Penal Code, a decree was issued on the composition of the Medical Commission for Abortion (Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 105/1930: 783, in Čulinović, 1934: 49), which consisted of two members from the field of medicine. After examination, the commission had to decide unanimously on the admissibility of abortion. However, it was permissible for the physician to decide in urgent cases in the presence of another physician without a commission procedure. We can conclude that in the period between the two wars, most of the major issues and themes relating to the right to abortion were raised. In particular, the argument about the right to decide over one’s own body and life, raised by Angela Vode,21 is important and goes beyond ideologies of motherhood or nationalism. Given the time in which the struggle took place, only the vocabulary or the way in which the demands were formulated is slightly more awkward, but the content is relevant and follows the debates on the right to abortion that were also taking place in other countries at the time. Although in some countries the abortion legislation was more liberal at the time (cf. Cergol Paradiž, 2013), the activities of the AWWG and other women’s associations who campaigned for the right to abortion could be placed within the broader international women’s movement. Certainly, the issue of women’s right to control their biological reproduction was an important one in the emancipation movement across Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the 1920s, birth-control clinics were opened in the United States (Cott, 1994), Great Britain and the Netherlands,22 but in Great Britain, the propaganda of contraception was prosecuted by the authorities for obscenity; it was abolished only in 1924 by the first Labor Party government (Anderson and Zinsser, 1988: 416). A year later, in 1925, working-class women founded the Workers’ Birth Control Group, which demanded access to contraception. The issue of abortion was brought up later, in the mid-1930s, when the Women’s Co-operative Guild demanded it (Anderson and Zinsser, 1988: 417). Thébaud (1994: 9) mentions that the international movement for sexual reform was most active in the 1920s and 1930s, i.e., at a time when it was also relevant in Slovenia. Toward the legalization of the right to abortion after World War II After World War II, Slovenia was part of the federative Yugoslavia, in which r­epublics had a certain degree of autonomy in setting the normative framework. Hence, there were some differences between the Yugoslav republics, what also stands for the legislation on abortion. The whole situation surrounding the legal

20  Vesna Leskošek regulation of abortion after World War II becomes very varied and complex and shows why this right is important for the entire life course of women. Slovenia was one of the most successful countries in developing women’s reproductive health, which was influenced at the time by socialist policies and the rather marginal role of the RCC. In this part of the chapter, the political background to the regulation of abortion will be presented, followed by the normative framework and finally the professional issues about abortion, to give a more comprehensive picture of the development toward legalization. The politics on abortion

In the Communist Party, the right to abortion was first mentioned by Vida Tomšič23 at the 5th National Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1940, when she spoke about the demands concerning maternity (Gerk, Križnar and Ravnikar-Podbevšek, 1970: 14), but there were no significant changes in the legalization on abortion until the early 1950s. This is also because, after World War II, attitudes toward abortion in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereafter CPY) and in the medical and juridical professions were still similar to those before World War II. Abortion was a controversial issue debated at the intersection of health, natality, population trends and women’s rights. Simic (2018) states that abortion was considered an evil in the CPY, but it was thought to be necessary to regulate it because it had its origins in poverty and misery. Tomšič also speaks of discomfort with abortion in CPY, she claims that the majority of its members did not understand women’s rights. The prevailing opinion was that “the real right to decide on the birth of children can only be discussed before conception and that the aim of the politics is to create the conditions for this” (Geč-Korošec 1981: 10, as cited in Rožman, 2009: 305). The CPY also argued that abortion would not be safe because of poor systemic conditions, such as small number of gynecologists, poorly ­developed health facilities and poor living conditions. It is indeed true that abortion rates were quite high after World War II. Abortion numbers were already high before World War II, but since it was illegal, the extent cannot be ascertained. The number of births started to fall after 1900 with a small upswing after World War I (cf. Šircelj, 2006). Budna Kodrič (2003, as cited in Rožman, 2009: 303) estimates that the number of abortions in Yugoslavia in the 1930s was around 100,000 per year, which may also be a conservative estimate. Borisov notes that from 1920 to 1926, 25.2% of women admitted to the Hospital for Women’s Diseases in Ljubljana24 had an abortion, and the number increased in the following decades, and by 1930, 32.5% of pregnancies ended in ­abortion. There were also many deaths related to abortion, mainly due to sepsis from ­unprofessionally performed abortions (Borisov, 1995: 191). After World War II, the number of abortions increased, mainly due to the ­unavailability of safe contraception. Due to the extent of the problem, there was already talk of a “white plague”25 before World War II (Ratej, 2020) and an “abortion epidemic” (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019). Figures from the 1950s speak of around 250,000 abortions per year in Yugoslavia (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019),

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  21 probably again a conservative estimation, and in the 1960s, the official estimate was 277,000, while Vida Tomšič states that another 200,000 could be added (Tomšič, 1980:138). The number of registered artificial terminations of pregnancy26 rose sharply after the partial change in legislation in 1951. There were also many women who came to the hospital because of complications after an illegal abortion, and among them more married than single women (Krajnc Simoneti, 1974). This problem had already been pointed out by pre-war women activists, who argued that it was more of a problem for married than unmarried women, because married women could not control their reproduction, since there were no reliable contraceptives available. In 1951/52, 91% of women who aborted had an illegal abortion and only 9% were considered by commissions (Šegedin, 1964: 75). However, the number of legal abortions was rapidly increasing. In 1952, 54% of all abortions were legal, in 1955 84%, in 1958 74% and in 1960 81% (Borisov, 1995: 232). In 1962, 64% were permitted and 36% were illegal, the peak in the numbers of abortions was between 1962 and 1965, with more than 15,000 a year, compared to 5,451 in 1955 (Krajnc Simoneti, 1974: 4). Borisov (1995) writes that one of the major problems at the time was the cost of abortions for the social and health insurance funds as the numbers were so high. As the number of abortions was high and increasing, medical doctors proposed in 1963 to legally prohibit ­abortion for the first-time pregnant women and for those who come to the abortion committee more than once a year (the so-called “returnees”)27 (Bole, 1964), but they were not successful, and the proposition was never adopted. The increase in the number of abortions also led to an increase in sterilizations for social reasons. Between 1957 and 1961, 2,122 sterilizations were performed in Slovenia, of which 1,606 were for social indications and the majority for the reason of large number of children (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019: 124). Due to the increasing trend, the 5th Congress of Gynecologists and Obstetricians in 1964 adopted the position that sterilization was only justified for medical reasons. On 19 and 20 November 1963, the organization Conference28 for the Social Activity of Women (hereafter CSAW) organized a Yugoslav conference entitled ”Problems of Abortion and Contraception” in response to the increasing number of abortions on the one hand and the tendency to outlaw abortion on the other. They considered that abortion in general was undesirable and should be abolished, not by persecution and criminalization, but by more equal relations between the genders and by improved living conditions. They saw the prevalence of abortion as a problem whose causes must be tackled. It was stressed that health professionals tend to seek a solution just for the consequences of “unauthorized abortions”. The problem was also that some of them (medical doctors) make concessions to people and do not sufficiently discourage them from seeking abortions, while others again are not convincing enough to insist that people should immediately take the other way, which is safer and only humane - the contraceptive method. (Bole, 1964: 25)

22  Vesna Leskošek The CSAW also responded to the misunderstanding of the problem that is still ­present conservative opinion that women themselves are causing the rise in abortions and consequently cause the fall in birth rates because they do not want to give birth and therefore it would be better for women to stay at home, caring for their families. CASW stated that the main reason why abortion was the most widely used method of birth control was to be found in patriarchy29 and religion, and that population policies were also based on nationalism and religion and were therefore not acceptable (Bole, 1964). This emphasis is important, because it shows ­women’s awareness of the pitfalls behind the talk of fertility, demographic problems and the extinction of the nation. Although abortion was the political issue, any other specific debates than those mentioned so far can be found. The main reason is that the debate was mainly transferred from politics to professions and mainstream into law, health care and social policy. The development of the legislation

Criminal legislation was amended a few years after the end of World War II. The general part of the Penal Code, which did not regulate specific offenses, was adopted in 1947 and entered into force in 1948, while the criminal offenses were included into Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted on 2 March 1951 and entered into force in June of the same year. Prior to its adoption, there was no consensus on how the abortion should be regulated. The new Penal Code was intended to punish only the abortionist, but on the initiative of doctors, the draft code also included punishment for the woman who aborted the fetus or permitted the abortion to be done by another person. A total ban was therefore to be introduced, which was prevented by a last-minute amendment just before the law was passed in Yugoslav Assembly by Slovenian gynecologist and obstetrician Pavel Lunaček. He proposed the liberalization of abortion and a ban of punishments and was party successful. Nevertheless, the case showed that the right to abortion did not have much support in the CPY either, as some members felt that the father of the child should have a right to decide, and that it was necessary to increase the population and promote birth rates (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019: 121). Finally, Article 140 of the Penal Code of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Official Gazette of the FLRJ, 13/51) read as follows: (1) Whoever, with the consent of a pregnant woman, performs an abortion, begins to perform an abortion or assists her to perform an abortion, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than three months. (2) Whoever, against her will, performs an abortion or begins to perform an abortion on a pregnant woman, shall be punished by rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than eight years. (3) If, during the acts referred to in first and second paragraph a woman dies, a person that committed the offense from the first paragraph shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than six months and from the second paragraph with strict imprisonment not shorter than two years. (4) No punishment shall be imposed for an abortion if it is performed to prevent danger to the life or health of the pregnant

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  23 woman or for other justifiable reasons. These reasons will be determined by special regulations. Thus, for the first time in Slovenian history, women were not legally persecuted for having an abortion. In 1952, the Decree on the Procedure for the Execution of Permitted Abortions (Official Gazette of the FLRJ 4/52) allowed abortions to be performed for ­medical, eugenic, legal-ethical and socio-medical indications, which were decided by commissions composed of three physicians, one of whom had to be a gynecologist (Rožman, 2009). Although the legislation remained unchanged until 1969, when the General Law on Termination of Pregnancy (Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – SFRY, No. 20/1969) was adopted, on the basis of which the republics were to adopt their own laws, there was progress in the understanding of abortion. This is already reflected in the 1960 Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Permitting Abortion (Official Gazette of the FLRJ, No. 9/1960) and in the Instruction for the Enforcement of the Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Permitting Abortion (Official Gazette of the FLRJ, No. 9/1960). The regulation mirrored progress in the understanding and formulation of social indications, stipulating that abortion was justified in all situations where it was reasonable to expect that the pregnant woman would, by giving birth to a child, be placed in difficult personal, family or material circumstances that could not be prevented in any other way (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019: 122). First- and second-level commissions have also become more understanding, less burdensome for women and have contributed to a reduction in illegal abortions. Commissions granted abortion in 98 per cent of requests (Rožman, 2009: 311). The regulation determined that the commission, in its discretion but fully considering known facts, would grant an abortion only if the trouble into which the pregnant woman had fallen could not otherwise be averted. Very important was the provision in Article 1, paragraph 3, of Regulation No. 9/1960 that abortion is justified in cases of rape, abuse of a helpless person, abuse of a minor, abuse of an official position, seduction and incest (Lovreković, 2018). By the 1960 Regulation also, the membership of the commission that decided on the access to safe abortion changed. It was composed of three persons, two from internal medicine and gynecology, and a social worker with an equal power as medical doctors (Šegedin, 1964). The regulation also provided for the issuance of a social report, which was produced by a social worker. According to Pečaver, who provided training for social workers, who were members of the committees, the women seeking abortion were classified into three groups (Pečaver, 1964). The first group consisted of applicants who live in poor housing conditions and whose economic situation is very serious, and who also have a difficult personal and family situation and a family history of illness, conflicts (e.g., violence), alcoholism, etc. In these cases, the social worker or the social welfare service should write a social report without delay. The second group were applicants who also have a difficult life situation, who cannot resolve it themselves, but in fact want to give birth. It was emphasized that this is where the role of the social and care professions is very important. In such cases, it is necessary to make every effort to improve woman’s social situation. Social workers

24  Vesna Leskošek should use all the possibilities available to them in administrative, social, political, economic organizations and services and help the woman to get through the most difficult crisis. They should also involve a husband or boyfriend. The third group consists of applicants who do not have sufficient social reasons to be permitted an abortion, but whose personal desire to terminate the pregnancy prevails. Pečaver (1964) states that a special group of applicants were single women and minors, especially those who have become pregnant for the first time. She states that the main obstacle to having a child for them is shame and fear of the responsibilities that motherhood will bring. Pečaver also stresses that the requests of ­under-age applicants must be taken separately and dealt with jointly with the parents, which is what the girls feared most. In most cases, they wanted not to inform parents at all, which was not possible. This explanation shows that abortion was seen as a “necessary evil”. The belief that abortion was a means to avoid responsibilities related to having children and that women were refusing motherhood out of convenience, was also very much present. Such attitudes should be discouraged because they were morally unacceptable. There was therefore indirect pressure on women not to have an abortion. In 1969, the Resolution of the Federal Assembly on Family Planning (Official Gazette of the SFRY 20/1969) and the General Law on Termination of Pregnancy (Official Gazette of the SFRY 20/1969) were adopted. Although the republics were supposed to adopt their own laws based on the federal one, this did not h­ appen. The Executive Council of the Assembly of the Socialist republic of Slovenia, at its 34th session on 14 June 1973, did consider a draft Law on Termination of Pregnancy, but it was not adopted. This act partly restricted the access to abortion with ­determining conditions under which abortion is allowed even though they were broadly defined. The new addition was a strong focus on preventative measures and on the professional advice to pregnant women on how they can prevent unwanted pregnancy, which is all about the contraception, what will be discussed later in this chapter. A fundamental turn in the regulation of abortion took place with the 1974 Constitution of SFRY, which provided in Article 191: “It is the right of a person to decide freely on the birth of children. This right may be restricted only on medical grounds”. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the SRS, 6/74) regulated this right in Article 233, which states: It is the right of a person to decide freely on the birth of children. This right may be restricted only for health reasons. With regard to the exercise of this right, the society shall provide the necessary education and appropriate social welfare and medical assistance in accordance with the law. The holder of the rights was a woman because rights are individual. The exercise of this right is not subject to the consent or acquiescence of the partner. It is an individual human right, not a right of couples, and therefore consent is not required. A fetus does not have the constitutionally guaranteed inviolability of human life.

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  25 The fetus itself has no legal significance in this context. As long as it is in the womb, it is part of the mother’s body (Zupančič, 1990). With the Constitution, women gained unconditional right to abortion on their request without any restrictions. After the adoption of the Constitution, these changes were specified in the Law on Health Measures in Exercising Freedom of Choice in Childbearing (Official Gazette SRS 11/77), which regulated not only artificial termination of pregnancy but also other measures, ways and means of birth control. It stipulated that this right included the right to instruction, counseling and information on the procedures, means and methods of birth control and the consequences of these procedures, which must be provided not only by health services but also by social services and other institutions, which must do everything possible to enable men and women to exercise rights assured by the new law. In addition to abortion, the law regulated access to contraception, sterilization, the diagnosis and treatment of reduced ­fertility and artificial insemination. Regarding the exercise of the right to contraception, the law did not set conditions for access, as it must be universal. Sterilization is a medical measure that permanently deprives a person of the capacity to procreate or become pregnant, and the conditions for sterilization are therefore more precisely defined in the ­legislation. Zupančič (1978) states that sterilization is only carried out voluntarily, at the request of the person if the person is capable of taking informed decisions. The most important change in this law is that the pregnant woman no longer has to apply for an abortion (what is actually already assured with 1974 Constitution), but rather request it, and the second important change is the abolition of commissions in case of up to the 10th week of pregnancy. The first- and second-level commissions remained in place to decide about abortion only after the 10th week of pregnancy. In this period abortion is only possible if the risk of the intervention to the life and health of the pregnant woman and to her future maternity is less than the risk to the pregnant woman or her child of continuing the pregnancy and giving birth. The Level I Commission was composed of a social worker and two doctors. The legislation was amended only once before the political changes in 1991, by the Act on Amendments to the Act on Health Measures in the Exercise of the Right to Free Choice in Childbirth (Official Gazette of the SRS, 42/86), which did not make any substantial changes. The law is still almost identical in current times, with the exception of the provisions of the chapter on the diagnosis and treatment of reduced fertility, which are now regulated in the Act on Infertility Treatment and Assisted Reproductive Technology (Official Gazette of the SRS, 70/2000). This act has significantly restricted access to the artificial insemination for single women, as Tanja Rener and Ana Kralj write in this monograph. Mainstreaming the right to abortion – the role of the professions

From 1948 to 1951, several medical conferences and meetings on abortion were organized and the debates were heated and controversial, but the issue of abortion was not silenced.30 Eugenic reasons were still strongly present at the time.

26  Vesna Leskošek Some gynecologists felt that abortion should be allowed for single mothers and mothers with intellectual or moral “defects” (Simic, 2018: 75). Doctors also felt that abortion should not be a method of birth control, but only possible in cases of emergency, where only medical reasons were present. In 1953, the Association of Gynecologists and Obstetricians of Yugoslavia organized a congress at which they adopted a resolution, proposing to exclude social indications for abortion from the draft criminal legislation (i.e., to ban abortion altogether) and to introduce “less harmful” methods such as contraception and sterilization (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019). Contraception should also be restricted as it can have negative population effects. It was also proposed that abortion should be re-criminalized for women that want to abort the fetus (Rožman, 2009). The resolution was met with strong public opposition. On the intervention of Vida Tomšič,31 the legislation was not restricted, but the opposite happened – the interpretation of social reasons included broader range of situations that might influence the decision on abortion (Simic 2018: 75). In the 1960s, the professionalization of the issue of abortion was intensive and provoked the development of much broader network of services, including research institutions. Tomšič (1980) writes that a complex action was needed, i.e., a broader provision of conditions aimed at preventing abortion and promoting popularization of contraception, what was considered the best means against unwanted p­ regnancies. It increases parental responsibility and thus also reduces infant mortality. In 1961, the Scientific Research Department on Abortion and Contraception32 was established as a special unit of the Clinical Hospital for Obstetrics and Gynecology, headed by Lidija Andolšek Jeras who was one of the most important persons in the development of reproductive rights. In the same year, the Coordination Committee for Family Planning was established in Slovenia, which was renamed the Department for Abortion Prevention in 1963 (Rožman, 2009). In 1967, this department was again renamed the Institute for Family Planning. It was considered to be the cornerstone institution for the protection of women’s reproductive health in Slovenia (Lukanović, 2020), as will be discussed later. Its director was Lidija Andolšek Jeras. The issue of abortion was also mainstreamed to other sectors and departments apart from gynecological clinics. In 1964, a seminar was organized for nurses in the nursing service on their role in abortion prevention (Prevention of abortion, 1964). In the key-note speech, it was argued that abortion was harmful to women, but that it was a “necessary evil” that had to be eliminated by concerted social action. It was also stressed that encouraging births for national, economic, strategic or other reasons was wrong, as was reducing births in order to eliminate material misery. The conditions must be created so that people can freely decide to have children: Progress in economic and social relations also brings changes in gender relations. […] Conscious and free motherhood and fatherhood, the conscious responsibility of parents who want a child and prepare for it mentally and materially, are at the same time an indispensable basis for a happy childhood and the optimal development of the child. (Bole 1964: 30)

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  27 The following measures were proposed to improve social conditions and reduce the number of abortions: – access to contraception, which is not a technical means but a new concept with a new social value, it means giving birth to the child one wants if the necessary conditions are provided. Contraception must therefore be a woman’s right; – to make people aware of modern means of preventing conception, to develop their production and to recommend their use; – to provide professional assistance when it is judged that abortion avoids a greater evil; – to develop health education and hygiene instruction in health and educational institutions; – to educate all classes, especially the young, in humane relations between people and therefore between the genders; – to create better conditions for happy parenthood in society and the family: strengthen health services for pregnant women so that they come earlier and have regular check-ups, develop childcare, increase access to housing, modernize households, regulate access to quality food, etc. Social services were also addressed as the living conditions such as poor housing, unemployment, poverty, and others were recognized as important social indicators for abortion. Their role in the committees that decided on the access to ­abortion was particularly emphasized. The power of the committees was indeed great, since they hold control over women’s reproduction and over their future life as they were gatekeepers of the access to safe abortion. Rozman (2009) writes about the humiliating procedures and the decision-making process, which was very difficult for women and in which they felt guilty and devalued. She quotes Vasilij Cerar, one of the most important Slovenian gynecologists, as saying that the committees were “a God’s whip” for women (Rožman, 2009: 307), who had to write applications to convince the members of the committee that they were eligible for the procedure and then had to make an oral defense before the committee. In his article ‘Abortus and contraception’ (1954, in Simic, 2018: 75), Franc Novak noted that many women avoided the committee by having the fetus aborted themselves and then going to hospital. It was also easier for rural women to prove eligibility on social indications than for urban women. The data show that most applications were approved, with a percentage of 88.9% in 1962 and 95.5% in 1972, and that 95% of the reasons given were social (Krajnc Simoneti, 1974: 7). Regardless of how restrictive the committees were and what their attitude toward women was, the procedure was a burden for them and a reason to look for other options to terminate their pregnancies. This changed only with the fundamental change in the 1974 Constitution and 1977 legislation, when the abortion ­committees were abolished up to the 10th week of pregnancy. This significantly reduced the influence of medicine and the extent of its power over women’s reproduction (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2019). Committees were replaced with the counseling ­service, which some hospitals still have today (Ličer, 2004; Maček, 1982: 50).

28  Vesna Leskošek In 1974, the “Conference on the elimination of obstacles to the exercise of the human right to decide freely on the birth of children” was held in Slovenia, which aimed at improving conditions for exercising these rights and the emphases were not just on birth control but also on enabling births by diagnosing and treating reduced fertility and by artificial insemination. A married woman who wishes to be inseminated does not need her husband’s consent (Zupančič, 1978). All these changes reflect a fundamental shift in the understanding of abortion as a right that guarantees women’s autonomy to make decisions about themselves, their bodies and their lives in general and have resulted in the full liberalization provided for in the 1974 Constitution. Abortion was therefore not an isolated point of women’s struggle since the early 20th century but was recognized as having important influence on the quality of life and living conditions that allow for a ­dignified life in which people can plan their personal or family life courses. The development of family planning in Yugoslavia and Slovenia The concept of family planning developed in Yugoslavia under a strong ­influence of United Nations. It was a result of the recognition that reproductive rights are not an isolated issue but should be understood as part of the human relations and ­concrete living conditions and cultural believes and practices. The first International Conference on Family Planning Programmes was organized already in 1965 in Geneva and delegates from Yugoslavia were present. Nevenka Petrić33 writes in the 1980s that the “free parenthood movement” (Petrić, 1980: 145)34 began to develop in Yugoslavia between the First and Second World Wars, especially from the 1930s onwards. The movement was shaped “…from the work of progressive social forces who put forward demands in this field in the framework of the political struggle to improve the individual’s social position” (ibid.). After World War II, the shift came with intense debates on the right to abortion, which were increasingly interdisciplinary and led initially to the development and widespread promotion of ­contraception. As early as 1953, Franc Novak lectured on modern contraception to medical students in gynecology and obstetrics, and in 1956, the topic was included in the postgraduate training of general practitioners (Krajnc Simoneti, 1974). Already in 1955, contraceptives began to be produced in Slovene pharmaceutical company Lek. The Slovenian company Sava Kranj, which was specialized in rubber products, started to produce diaphragms in 1955 and Lek produced the paste Genosan (Borisov, 1995). In 1964, just four years after it was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in the USA, the contraceptive pill was available in Slovenia. In 1963, the Coordinating Committee for Family Planning of Yugoslavia was established, and in 1969, the Resolution on Family Planning was adopted. Petrić (1980: 146) writes: “The Yugoslav concept of family planning as a human right does not subsume only the prevention of unwanted pregnancy but responsible, socially active and desirable parenthood, which is the foundation for happy family life and harmonious social development”. In addition to Nevenka Petrić, Vida Tomšič was heavily involved in international relations. She was Yugoslavia’s

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  29 representative in the UN Commission for Social Development and, in 1963, its chairperson. She participated in the UN meetings on family planning and the role of women (Nedlog, 2013) and published widely on the issue, including several short brochures in English. Judging by the number of publications on family planning in Yugoslavia, it was one of the central topics of the time and several research institutions were involved, among them the Centre for Demographic Research at the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, which was founded in 1957. They have published a monograph in English in 1980 entitled Fertility and Family Planning in Yugoslavia. This was quite comprehensive Yugoslav comparative study with a large part devoted to abortion and contraception. In this monograph, Petrić writes that the right to decide freely about the birth is an individual right, not a couple’s right, and it does not merely entail the decision for or against having a child, but about creating the conditions in which the psychosocial and material needs of children can be met. “Both parents enjoy this right as an individual right, but their mutual agreement from the standpoint of responsible parenthood, their acceptance of parental responsibilities is a prerequisite” (Petrić, 1980: 147). It may sound very idealistic, but it was a sign of socialist optimism in pursuing a new society of equal individuals. The concept of fatherhood is also becoming increasingly important, and the role of men changed with the possibility of taking parental leave to care for their ­children. There is also visible shift from the discussion on motherhood toward discussing parenthood. Petrić writes that in implementing family planning, Yugoslavia did not have in mind a certain desired number of children or family size. What they tried to achieve were certain relations in society, in the family and especially humane relations between the genders and the relationship to children. “The very concept of free and responsible parenthood resolves the conflict, that is in fact only apparent, between exercise of the human right to freely decide on childbirth and the possibilities of society’s influence on demographic developments” (1980: 148). So, the family planning is not only a problem of women, but is above all the concern of contemporary society as a whole. However, due to the biological constitution and the maternal role, in practice it often becomes a “woman’s problem”. “The times in which we live are the times of women’s emancipation. Emancipation of women and planned parenthood constitutes an intricate complex of closely interwoven issues that have profoundly social connotations” (1980: 149). For Petrić, the main factor of women’s emancipation apart from gender equality was the employment as it provided women with financial means that assured their economic independence. “Planned parenthood then arises from women-work-maternal realization” (ibid.). As already mentioned, the Institute for Family Planning (hereafter IFP) was founded in Slovenia in 1967 under the leadership of Andolšek Jeras. The ­preventive health activities included a contraception clinic, a clinic for male and female subfertility and a counseling service for young people and spouses. They had a special team researching issues related to abortion and sterilization, composed of experts in sociology, statistics, psychology, gynecology and social work.35 By 1974, more than 50 major and minor studies had been conducted in the area of fertility control, abortion and infertility treatment. The results were published in national and

30  Vesna Leskošek international journals and in Institute’s publications. Preventive work was also a special area of the Institute’s activity, which included its own laboratory, a center for the early detection of breast cancer, a sex education counseling center and a commission for the permission of abortions within the IFP (Sodelavci IND, 1974). The Institute is considered one of the most advanced institutions in the field of women’s reproductive health, both nationally and internationally. Andolšek Jeras was an internationally recognized scientist and expert. As early as 1964, she participated in a professional training program in the USA and later in the UK, and the Institute became one of the World Health Organization’s centers for clinical research in human reproduction. In 1974, the monograph The Ljubljana Abortion Study 1971–73 was published in English as part of the Yugoslav-American Cooperation Programme in Medical Research. The study compared the success of two methods of induced abortion, the vacuum aspiration (VA) method, developed at the University Clinic of Obstetrics and Gynecology Ljubljana in 1964, and the curettage method (scraping out the uterus). The results showed that the VA method was preferable because it was faster, had a lower perforation rate, caused less blood loss during the procedure and resulted in fewer infections requiring hospitalization. In 1981, the Institute completed a large longitudinal study entitled Investigation on the influence of oral contraceptives on premalignant and malignant lesions of the cervix, which was funded by the US Food and Drug Administration. In a sample of more than 30,000 women who were followed by regular medical checks over several years, no link was found between the use of hormonal contraception and cervical cancer. Andolšek Jeras also wrote about family planning as a human right in the 1970s, arguing that family planning primarily affects women’s reproductive habits, thereby improving their health, the health of their children and the health of the entire family. The concept of family planning, however, should be interpreted as the right of each individual to decide freely and responsibly about the birth of his or her children, and his or her right to the knowledge and living conditions that enable him or her to make such decisions. At the same time, it also means the child’s right to parental love and to everything he or she needs for his or her development. (Andolšek Jeras 1974a: 1) Conclusion A historical overview of the struggle for the right to abortion makes it possible to trace the evolution of the discourse on reproductive rights and thus to understand the present while also throwing a glimpse to the future. It seems important to know how arguments for and against have evolved and how they have been translated into normative acts and institutional practices. Discourse reflects mentalities; it also points to centers of power and reflects the position of women in society. The issue of reproduction is certainly not only biological but also reflects the most important social relations. The relations between the state, politics, social ­institutions (in our

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  31 case, the RCC) and women fundamentally determine their position and their ability to control their own bodies and their life course. The historical overview of the struggle for abortion in Slovenia has shown that it contributed not only to the legalization and regulation of abortion but also to the development of reproductive rights more broadly. It also contributed to the development of defamiliarization social policies, as the state had partly taken over caring responsibilities while creating conditions for family planning and inclusive parenthood. Over a long period of time, the whole process (the activities of women’s associations, professionalization, de-clericalization after World War II and the social doctrine of the socialist regime) led to the liberalization of abortion in the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY. When women began writing about the right to safe abortion in the 1920s, they did so as a right to decide unconditionally about themselves and the number of children they would have. Over time, they wrote more about indications for abortion because it was more likely to achieve change through partial regulation on medical or eugenic grounds than to expect that women’s sovereignty to decide for themselves would be accepted unconditionally in a patriarchal context. Eugenic reasons became especially important after 1933 and were considered the most important for almost a decade, due to fascism spreading over Europe. In 1935, the journal Eugenika (Engl. Eugenics) was launched in Slovenia, in which one can read several articles justifying the sterilization of the mentally ill and the “feeble-minded”, as well as praise for Hitler’s population policy.36 Despite the change in discourse, women never gave up their demands for the right to autonomous control over their lives. They have claimed the right to abortion as a moral case against patriarchal control over them and against systemic subordination to the power of the Catholic Church and the state. As Furedi (2021) writes, the fundamental values of human life are autonomy and self-determination, which provide a moral ground for justification of abortion as a right. The moral high grounds were left free for occupation by small, but loud, minority of those who are fundamentally against reproductive choice for reasons based on faith and doctrine. A moral case as it relates to abortion is assumed to be a case against it, not an argument […], that morally defends its choice. (Furedi, 2021: 6) Furedi goes on to say that there can be no moral justifications against a woman’ right “to call her body her own and to shape her own future” (ibid.). This view resonates with Slovenian situation very well. Only when the RCC lost its power as a moral authority controlling people’s lives, and when socialist politicians, influenced by women’s organizations, accepted the idea of women as sovereign human beings, did the prevailing resistance collapse and was transformed into the right to abortion. The concept of family planning was introduced by women’s organizations before World War II because they believed that women should be educated about the prevention of unwanted pregnancies and about methods to prevent conception, and that these means should be free of charge or provided at low cost by health

32  Vesna Leskošek insurance. They also demanded better living conditions such as housing, work and protection for mothers and children, as a way out of poverty, which were the main reasons for the high number of illegal abortions. This debate continued after World War II, first within the framework of the Women’s Antifascist Front37 and later within the framework of the Conference for the Social Activity of Women, which organized debates on abortion, but the medical profession seemed to have more power than the women’s socialist organizations, which also led to disagreements over positions on abortion within the ruling Communist Party (Tomšič, 1980). Fundamental changes and breaks with the past did not occur until the ­activities surrounding contraception and the emergence of the concept of family planning in the late 1950s and early 1960s.38 They shifted the issue of abortion from its traditional roots in the field of medicine and the questions of how much right can be granted and under what conditions, and who is to blame for an unwanted ­pregnancy, to the much broader context of the life course of young people who are just starting a family and who need to be given the right conditions to do so. This is a fundamental shift that should not be overlooked. In this context, abortion has become only a small part of a complex and inherently multisectoral field that has included, in addition to health care, social protection, poverty eradication, labor market regulation, social policy, housing policy, the establishment of ­kindergartens, sex education in schools, etc. At the academic and research level, medicine was joined by the social sciences and humanities, with a range of research and debates that have also influenced the regulation of abortion. The intersection of positive approach of providing people with the conditions for a dignified life, the state sharing the caring responsibilities with the family and the liberalization of abortion have also led to a gradual decline in the abortion rate, which peaked in 1982 at 41.3 per 1,000 women of childbearing age (15–49 years) (Meden Vrtovec, 2004) and has since declined sharply to 8.1 per 1,000 women in 2017.39 The ratio of births to abortions was 7:10 in 1982 and 1.8:10 in 2017 (Mihevc Ponikvar, 2019). Another important point is the rapid decline in maternal mortality due to abortion. Borisov (1995: 238) notes that in 1961, maternal mortality due to abortion was 6.7% and in 1968, it decreased to 1.5%. Several other factors have contributed to the decline in abortion rates, the most important being women’s economic independence, as the employment rate of women in Slovenia in the post-World War II period was among the highest in the world. However, the important role played by the Institute for Family Planning and the international involvement of women researchers from the mid-1960s onward, as well as the active role of Yugoslav women politicians in international organizations in the field of family planning and women’s human rights, must be acknowledged. The historical overview of the development of reproductive rights continues in the next chapter with the analysis of the 1980s, a politically turbulent era in Central and Eastern Europe and also in Slovenia. In the second half of the 1980s, the issues around Slovenian national identity resurfaced, and the power of the RCC was growing. Both had an impact on the resurgence of patriarchal ideas about motherhood as the primary role of women with responsibilities toward the nation, which also led to stronger pro-natalist policies, as Metka Mencin will discuss in the next chapter.

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  33 Notes

1 2 3 4

Ženski list (1925) 2(9), p. 1. Ženski list (1926) 3(6), p. 2. Ženski list (1925) (2)9, p. 1. This was a common expression used for abortion in those times. Cf. Ženski list (1925) 2(9), p. 1. 5 Slovenia was part of the Austrian-Hungarian empire till 1918, but some of the laws were still in power after the secession from the empire. 6 Journal of the local parish Tržič published by the Church clergy in the years 1924–1941. 7 Daleč so zašle! (1925) Cerkveni glasnik za Tržiško župnijo¸13, pp. 2–3. 8 Ženski list (1927) 4(5), p. 3. 9 Ženski list (1925) 2(10), p. 1. 10 Ženski list (1927) 4(4), p. 3. 11 Ženski list (1928) 5(10), p. 1. 12 A.V. (1932) ‘O umetnem splavu’, Ženski list, 9(8), pp. 2–3. 13 The support of Henrik Tuma was important because he was a prominent judge, lawyer and politician. He was a member of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. 14 Za ureditev porodov (1933) Ženski list, 10(6), pp. 1–4. 15 The magazine Ženski svet was published from 1923 until the beginning of World War II in 1941. 16 Grahor, O. (1935) ‘Važno žensko vprašanje’, Ženski svet, 13(12), pp. 281–284. 17 The Knaus-Ogin method has been widely written about, although articles about its ­unreliability were already appearing at that time. 18 Anketa “Važno žensko vprašanje” (1936) Ženski svet, 14(2), pp. 42–44. 19 Second largest city in Slovenia. 20 He advocated for women’s rights, wrote a monograph on the position of women in criminal law and several articles on the position of women in legislation. 21 Vode, A. (1932) ‘O zakonu’, Ženski svet, 10(7–8), pp. 234–236. Angela Vode has ­written extensively on the right to control one’s body and on women’s autonomy and has published several books related to social position of women and women’s rights. 22 Although illegal in the Netherlands, they were not pursued too vigorously (Anderson, Zinsser, 1988). 23 Vida Tomšič was an important politician in Yugoslavia, active also in the UN ­committees on women and family planning. She is the author of several books on women and the family, some of which have been published in English. For further information on the work of Vida Tomšič, see Bonfiglioli, C. (2016) ‘On Vida Tomšič, Marxist Feminism and Agency’, Aspasia, 10, pp. 145–151; Jeraj, M. (2006) ‘Vida Tomšič’, in de Haan, F., Daskalova, K. and Loutfi, A. (eds.) A Biographical Dictionary of Women’s Movements and Feminisms: Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, pp. 575–579. 24 Ljubljana is the capital of Slovenia. 25 Dobaja (2015), states that before World War II, the term “white plague” was used as a synonym for mass abortions in newspapers and politics as well as in professional circles. Ratej (2015: 31) mentions that the term was also used by politicians in 1940 and they referred to abortion as the “white plague”, which they considered not only a social but also a moral disease of the nation. 26 This term has become part of the professional vocabulary. 27 So-called recidivism was a recurring theme in the 1960s, suggesting that abortion was a method of birth control. In 1963, the proportion of women who had abortions three times a year was 32% (Pečaver, 1964), and in 1961, it was 23% (Bole, 1964). 28 Here, the term conference is used to denominate the organization or assembly and not an event.

34  Vesna Leskošek 29 Bole believes that equality between the genders must be advocated, and a patriarchal double morality should be exposed, which includes not only conservative but also anarchic views of free love – women should imitate the habits of patriarchally raised men, while men frivolously and recklessly exploit women’s love without any consequences or obligations. The same goes for women who take marriage as a lifetime career. Only equality, economic independence, which liberates a woman in love as well, can make her independent (Bole, 1964). 30 On the issue of abortion, and later reproductive rights in general, regular and frequent consultations, seminars and conferences have been organized at very different levels, both in politics and within various professions, first in medicine and law, but later also in social work and health care. Since the 1970s, the topic of abortion and family planning has become increasingly important in research and science. This is also the reason why there is a lot of archival material to be found, as well as books, brochures and articles. 31 Simic (2018) notes that in the few years after 1952, several articles by gynecologists were published on the need to criminalize abortion, in widely read daily newspapers such as Politika and Večernje novosti. The counter-opinion was published in the article by Vida Tomšič in newspaper Borba of 17 January 1954, entitled “Is the legalisation of abortion the right solution?”, in which she criticizes the conservative views of gynecologists and explains why abortion should be allowed for reasons other than medical ones. She writes mainly about male domination and opposes the belief that women are the source of the problem. She also stresses that abortion is not the right solution, that it is socially unacceptable, and that contraception should be available and prescribed instead. 32 In 1955, the first contraceptive outpatient clinic in Ljubljana was opened (Borisov, 1995). 33 Petrić was the chairwoman of the Yugoslav Committee for Family Planning and, like Tomšič, was very involved in international institutions and UN bodies. 34 The term “free parenthood” is explained by Petrić as having the freedom of choice in childbearing. 35 In 1976, Katja Boh from the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana completed a study entitled The Regulation of Fertility in Different Sections of Slovenian Society, which was carried out in the first part by the IFP. The aim of this part was to determine to what extent the data collected in the patients’ registration cards were useful for analyzing changes in contraceptive behavior. Based on the study, methodological changes in the collection of patient data were proposed. In the second part of the study, they covered a wider population of women in Slovenia (Boh, 1976). 36 Zakonodaja, Drobne vesti (1935) Evgenika, 1(1), p. 11. 37 More about the organization can be found in Dugandžić, A. and Okić, T. (eds.) (2018) The lost revolution – Women’s Antifascist Front between myth and forgetting. Sarajevo: Association for Culture and Art CRVENA. 38 In a personal interview with Mateja Kožuh Novak, a Slovenian gynecologist and researcher at the Institute for Family Planning, she said that the widespread availability of contraception in Slovenia had virtually erased the diagnosis of “frigidity”, as women no longer had to avoid sex for fear of unwanted pregnancies. It was only contraception that made sexual pleasure possible for women (Kožuh Novak, M. (2021) ‘The role of the Institute for Family Planning in the development of reproductive rights’. Interview by: Vesna Leskošek [e-mail correspondence], 3 May). 39 This compares with 13.4 per 1000 women of childbearing age (age 15–49) in 1955, rising to 37.9 in 1965 and declining thereafter to 27.6 in 1971 (Krajnc Simoneti, 1974: 5).

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The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  35 Andolšek, L. (ed.) (1974) The Ljubljana Abortion Study: 1971–1973. Ljubljana: National Institute of Health. Andolšek, L. (1974a) ‘Medicinski vidiki načrtovanja družine’, in Svetovno populacijsko leto 1974. I. slovenski demografski simpozij. Ljubljana: Demografski inštitut, Raziskovalni center Ekonomske fakultete. Anketa, V. (1936) ‘Važno žensko vprašanje’, Ženski svet, 14(2), pp. 42–44. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-FL6URWIS/89e2aa2e-ea31-463c-a2b18e81dffe505a/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Anketa, V. (1932) ‘O umetnem splavu’, Ženski list, 9(8), pp. 2–3. Available at: https:// www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-XJN9BBCH/352c39a3-6407-4c4a-8997607cfd1a4d77/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Boh, K. (1976) Regulacija fertilnosti v različnih slojih slovenske družbe. II. del. Poročilo o pilotni raziskavi. Ljubljana: Inštitut za sociologijo in filozofijo pri Univerzi v Ljubljani. Bole, C. (1964) ‘Problematika splava v luči družbenega razvoja’ in Kukovec, S., Bole, C., Pečaver, A, Tekavčič, B. and Šegedin, R. (eds.) Prevencija splava: gradivo seminarja za medicinske sestre v patronažni službi, februarja 1964. Ljubljana: Zveza društev medicinskih sester Slovenije, pp. 25–39. Bonfiglioli, C. (2016) ‘On Vida Tomšič, Marxist Feminism and Agency’, Aspasia, 10, pp. 145–151. Borisov, P. (1995) Ginekologija na Slovenskem od začetkov do leta 1980. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti. Boston Women’s Health Book Collective (1970) Women and Their Bodies. A Book By and for Women. Somerville: New England Free Press. Boston Women’s Health Book Collective (1998) Our Bodies, Ourselves for the New Century. New York: Touchstone. Calkin, S. and Kaminska, M. E. (2020) ‘Persistence and Change in Morality Policy: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Politics of Abortion in Ireland and Poland’, Feminist Review, 124(1), pp. 86–102. Cergol Paradiž, A. (2013) ‘Ženske reproduktivne pravice – pravna regulacija abortusa’, in Verginella, M. (ed.) Dolga pot pravic žensk: pravna in politična zgodovina žensk na Slovenskem. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Studia humanitatis, pp. 231–252. Cott, N. (1994) ‘The Great War and the Triumph of Sexual Division’, in Thébaud, F. (ed.) A History of Women in the West, Volume V: Toward a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press, pp. 21–75. Cullen, P. and Elżbieta, K. (2019) ‘Challenging Abortion Stigma: Framing Abortion in Ireland and Poland’, Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters, 27(3): 6–19. Čulinović, F. (1934) Žena u našem krivičnom pravu. Beograd: Globus. Available at https:// web.archive.org/web/20181209165416/http://www.uzzpro.gov.rs/doc/biblioteka/ digitalna-biblioteka/1934-zene-u-nasem-kriv-pravu.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Daleč so zašle! (1925) ‘Cerkveni glasnik za Tržiško’, župnijo¸13, pp. 2–3. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-6H0ETGST/d3fd2b63-1746-4266-8a431f57041cff51/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Dobaja, D. (2015) ‘Rojstva, smrti in strah pred “belo kugo” v Dravski banovini v obdobju med obema vojnama’, Kronika, 63(1), pp. 89–100. Dobrivojević Tomić, I. (2019) ‘Trajnost i promena. Abortusna kultura, liberalizacija propisa i pokušaji seksualne edukacije stanovništva Jugoslavije (2018–1991)’, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, LVIX(3), pp. 113–131. Dolenc, M. (1935) ‘Recenzija knjige Ferda Čurilovića Žena u našem krivičnom pravu’, Slovenski pravnik, 49(1–2), pp. 53–54.

36  Vesna Leskošek Dugandžić, A. and Okić, T. (eds.) (2018) The Lost Revolution – Women’s Antifascist Front Between Myth and Forgetting. Sarajevo: Association for Culture and Art CRVENA. Ercolessi, G. and Hägg, I. (2012) ‘Towards Religious Neutrality of Public Institutions in Europe’, in de Beaufort, F. and van Schie, P. (eds.) Separation of Church and State in Europe: With Views on Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom & Ireland, The Netherlands, France, Portugal, Italy and Slovenia. Brussels: European Liberal Forum, pp. 5–22. Furedi, A. (2021) The Moral Case for Abortion: A Defense of Reproductive Choice. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Geč-Korošec, M. (1981) Družinsko pravo Jugoslavije. Ljubljana: Center za samoupravno normativno dejavnost. Gerk, S., Križnar, I. and Ravnikar-Podbevšek, Š. (1970) Slovenke v narodno-osvobodilnem boju I. knjiga. Ljubljana: Borec. Grahor, O. (1935) ‘Važno žensko vprašanje’, Ženski svet, 13(12), pp. 281–284. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-F0XAR6LV/79aed3d6-6362-4b09-9cbf7b00a251bdad/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Heinemann, U. R. (1990) Eunuchs for Heaven: The Catholic Church and Sexuality. London: Deutsch. Hovey, G. (1985) ‘Abortion: A History’, Planned Parenthood Review, 5(2), pp. 18–21. Hurst, J. (1989) The History of Abortion in the Catholic Church: An Untold Story. Washington: Catholics for a Free Choice. Hurst, J. (1996) ‘The History of Abortion in the Catholic Church: The Little Known History’, Conscience, 17(3), pp. 2–5. Jeraj, M. (2006) ‘Vida Tomšič’, in de Haan, F., Daskalova, K. and Loutfi, A. (eds.) A Biographical Dictionary of Women’s Movements and Feminisms: Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, pp. 575–579. Katz Rothman, B. (1989) Recreating Motherhood. Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society. London: W.W. Norton & Company. Kavčič, J. (1889) Kazenski zakon o hudodelstvih, pregreških in prestopkih z dne 27. maja 1852 št. 117 drž. zakonika z dodanim tiskovnim zakonom z dne 17. Decembra 1862 št. 6 d. z. ex 1863 in drugimi novejšimi zakoni kazenskopravnega obsega. Ljubljana: Društvo Pravnik, Narodna tiskarna. Available at: http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc5L5PWKC2/b3a5ba76-991f-405f-8b41-345afc850e01/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Kazenski zakonik Federativna Ljudska Republika Jugoslavija (1951) Uradni list FLRJ, no. 13/51. Available at: https://www.sistory.si/cdn/publikacije/46001-47000/46510/UL_ FLRJ_1951-03-09_013.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Krajnc Simoneti, S. (1974) ‘Splav in njegovo preprečevanje v Sloveniji’, in Svetovno populacijsko leto 1974. I. slovenski demografski simpozij. Ljubljana: Demografski inštitut, Raziskovalni center Ekonomske fakultete. Leskošek, V. (2002) Zavrnjena tradicija: Ženske in ženskost v slovenski zgodovini od 1890 do 1940. Ljubljana: Založba. Ličer, Z. (2004) ‘Svetovanje pred umetno prekinitvijo nosečnosti’, in Pintar, B. and Pretnar Darovec, A. (eds.) Umetna prekinitev nosečnosti v Sloveniji. 1. spominski sestanek prof. dr. Lidije Andolšek Jeras. Ljubljana: SPS Ginekološka klinika, Klinični center, Ljubljana, katedra za ginekologijo in porodništvo Medicinska fakulteta Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovensko društvo za reproduktivno medicine, pp. 27–29. Lopez, A. (2012) ‘Pope Gregory XIV (1535.1591)’, The Embryo Project Encyclopedia (2010–06–22). Available at: https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/pope-gregory-xiv-1535-1591 (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

The history of the struggle for the right to abortion  37 Lovreković, A. (2018) Žena se nada diskreciji – Bilješke o povijesti pobačaja, 2. dio. Available at: https://www.libela.org/sa-stavom/9866-zena-se-nada-diskreciji-biljeske-opovijesti-pobacaja-2/#_ftn6 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Lukanović, A. (2020) ‘Etične dileme pri delu komisije II stopnje za umetno prekinitev nosečnosti’, in Lukanović, A., Požun, P. and Lukanović, D. (eds.) Etični izzivi v ginekologiji, perinatologiji in reproduktivni medicini. Ljubljana: Univerzitetni klinični  center, Ginekološka klinika, pp. 31–34. Available at: https://www.kclj.si/ dokumenti/ETICNI_IZZIVI_V_GINEKOLOGIJI_brosura_210x260_net.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Maček, M. (1982) ‘Uloga socijalnog radnika na području planiranja porodice’, in Todorović, L. (ed.) Uloga socijalniog radnika u ostvarivanju ustavnog prava čoveka da slobodno oslučuje o rađanju dece. Beograd: Savezna konferencija SSNRJ, Savet za planiranje porodice Jugoslavije, pp. 48–51. Meyer Resende, M. (2015) Catholicism and Nationalism: Changing Nature of Party Politics. London, New York: Routledge. Mihevc Ponikvar, B. (2019) Kazalniki reproduktivnega zdravja žensk. Ljubljana: NIJZ. Available at: https://www.nijz.si/sites/www.nijz.si/files/datoteke/strokovno_srecanje_ kazalniki_reproduktivnega_zdravja.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Munda, A. (1935) ‘Indicirana odprava telesnega plodu in naš kazenski zakon’, Evgenika, 1(2), pp. 17–21. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-XZIRZCPH/ f9abff37-02d3-4724-be54-3e3544e025be/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Pečaver, A. (1964) ‘Naloge socialnega delavca in vloga patronažne službe v sistemu dela komisij za dovolitev splava’, in Prevencija splava: gradivo seminarja za medicinske sestre v patronažni službi. Ljubljana: Zveza društev medicinskih sester Slovenije, pp. 40–57. Petrić, N. (1981) ‘Family Planning in Yugoslavia and Its Development’, in Breznik, B. (ed.) Fertility and Family Planning in Yugoslavia. Beograd: Institute of Social Sciences, Demographic Research Centre. Potrč, J. (1935) ‘Socialne indikacije splava’, Evgenika, 1(5), pp. 70–73. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-JVTGSPZZ/8ff576b5-c95f-4fb9-926fbfaabcae2a36/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Ratej, M. (2020) ‘Zastrta bolečina: abortus na območju Maribora med obema svetovnima vojnama’, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, 91(2–3), pp. 40–52. Resolucija o planiranju družine (1969) Ur. l. SFRJ, no. 20/1969, leto XXV, (8.5.1969). Rožman, S. (2009) ‘Geneza pravice do umetne prekinitve nosečnosti v nekdanji Jugoslaviji’, Ars & Humanitas, 3(1–2), pp. 301–325. Simic, I. (2018) Soviet Influences on Post-War Jugoslav Gender Politics. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Splošni zakon o prekinitvi nosečnosti (1969) Ur. l. SFRJ, no. 20/1969, year XXV (8.8.1969). Sodelavci IND (1974) ‘Razvoj in delo Inštituta za načrtovanje družine’, in Svetovno populacijsko leto 1974. I. slovenski demografski simpozij. Ljubljana: Demografski inštitut, Raziskovalni center Ekonomske fakultete, (no pagination). Srpak, N. (2006) ‘Kazneno pravo u doba nezavisne države Hrvatske’, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, 13(2), pp. 1117–1144. Šegedin, R. (1964) ‘Komisije za dovolitev splava, njih pomen in metode dela’, in Prevencija splava: gradivo seminarja za medicinske sestre v patronažni službi. Ljubljana: Zveza društev medicinskih sester Slovenije, pp. 58–77. Šircelj, M. (2018) Rodnost v Sloveniji od 18. do 21. Ljubljana: Statistični urad Republike Slovenije.

38  Vesna Leskošek Thébaud, F. (ed.) (1994) A History of Women in the West, Volume V: Toward a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press. Tomšič, V. (1980) Ženska v razvoju socialistične samoupravne Jugoslavije. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, Naša žena. Uredba o postopku za dovoljeno odpravo plodu (1952) Ur. l. FLRJ, no. 4/1952 (19.1.1952). Uredba o pogojih in postopku za dovolitev splava (1960) Ur. l. FLRJ, no. 9/1960. Ustava Socialistične republike Slovenije (1974) Ur. l. SRS, no. 6/1974 (28.2.1974). Verginella, M. (ed.) (2013) Dolga pot pravic žensk: pravna in politična zgodovina žensk na Slovenskem. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Studia humanitatis. Verginella, M. (ed.) (2017) Slovenka: prvi ženski časopis (1897–1902). Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete. Vidovič Miklavčič, A. (2004) ‘Zveza delavskih žen in deklet’, in Žižek, A. (ed.) Ženske skozi zgodovino. Zbornik referatov 32. zborovanja slovenskih zgodovinarjev. Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, pp. 185–188. Vode, A. (1932) ‘O zakonu’, Ženski svet, 10(7–8), pp. 234–236. Available at: https:// www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-4MIY4RO3/651b748e-dac0-4d61-bda44b486485f84e/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Zakonodaja, Drobne vesti (1935) Evgenika, 1(1), p. 11. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/ details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-ZOPYLADU/?euapi=1&query=%27keywords%3devgenika %27&sortDir=ASC&sort=date&pageSize=100 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Zakon o prekinitvi nosečnosti. Predlog iz leta 1973. (no date). Available at: https://obzornik. zbornica-zveza.si/index.php/ObzorZdravNeg/article/download/957/906/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Zakon o zdravstvenih ukrepih pri uresničevanju pravice do svobodnega odločanja o rojstvu otrok (1977) Uradni list SRS, no. 11/77. Zakon o spremembah zakona o zdravstvenih ukrepih pri uresničevanju pravice do svobodnega odločanja o rojstvu otrok (1986) Uradni list SRS, no. 42/86. Zakon o zdravljenju neplodnosti in postopkih oploditve z biomedicinsko pomočjo – ZZNPOB (2000) Uradni list RS, no. 70/00. Za ureditev porodov (1933) Ženski list, 10(6), pp. 1–4. Available at: https://www.dlib.si/ stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-7HHSUJNS/8903929e-8490-47f5-bb62-d02f3d7f3a3a/PDF (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Zupančič, K. (1978) ‘Sposobnost za uresničevanje pravice do svobodnega odločanja o rojstvu otrok s pomočjo zdravstvenih načinov in sredstev’, Zbornik pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 26(1–2), separat. Zagreb: Pravni fakultet. Zupančič, K. (1990) Pravica ženske do umetne prekinitve nosečnosti. Separat. Ljubljana: Zveza društev pravnikov Republike Slovenije.

2

The right to access safe abortion during the transition to a multiparty system and beyond Metka Mencin

Introduction The constitutional and legal guarantee of access to safe abortion was not publicly problematized in Slovenia until the mid-1980s, but since then, it has often been the target of more or less open, even hostile opposition in the interrelated ideological contexts of nationalism, anti-socialism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, biologism and sexual binarism. Why has abortion become a target of public opposition in the mid-1980s? This is despite the fact that women’s1 right to abortion enjoys great support in public opinion and the percentage of those who condemn abortion as an immoral act is low, as Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija note in this monograph. This is partly related to the growing conflicts in the then Yugoslavia between the federal and republican authorities, which increasingly legitimized disputes over the economic and political powers of the republics through nationalism, while at the same time criticism of the one-party system and socialist economic policies increased. In S ­ lovenia, a group of intellectuals2 increasingly turned to the public with assessments of the threat to the Slovenian nation: the Slovenian nation was allegedly threatened above all by Serbian hegemonic aspirations and communism; later, the low birth rate (of Slovenian women) was added to the list of threats. The ideologues of the alleged threats to the nation initially worked in peaceful coexistence with the alternative politics of the new social movements3 that opened up civic space. The new social movements were based on an understanding of politics as a space of civic initiative; they advocated equality, political freedoms and human rights. With the strengthening of the ideological power of the so-called national intelligentsia in the run-up to the 1990 elections (Mastnak, 1992), including notions of Slovenia as an independent state, their exclusionary efforts to preserve “national substance” began to dangerously undermine the rights of ethnic, sexual and gender minorities in ­society. The independence project itself played on the mobilization of emotions that were ­supposed to be triggered by the assessment of the threat to the nation: from longing for ­freedom to hatred of everything associated with Yugoslavia and socialism, including the emancipatory achievements in the field of gender and sexuality. With the rise of nationalism, intensified and consolidated in the 1990s by the armed conflicts on the territory of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, and the restoration DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-3

40  Metka Mencin of capitalism, the last decade of the 20th century in Slovenia (as in other post-­ socialist countries) also brought a strengthening of patriarchal ideology (Gradskova in Asztalos Morell, 2018; Jalušič, 1998; Lukić, Regulska and Zaviršek, 2006), which even today interprets the emancipatory legacy of socialism as an attack on the “natural essence” of women. This also includes the more or less vocal, resounding and explicit demands to restrict the right to abortion that stem from the same interrelated ideological contexts: nationalism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, biologism, anti-socialism, and anti-communism. Since 2000, opposition to abortion rights, condemnation of abortion and denunciations of advocates of the right to safe and accessible abortion have multiplied, sometimes dangerously approaching the line between the right to freedom of speech and hate speech. The topics and audiences to which these demands and denunciations are directed have also ­multiplied – they increasingly target young women. The moral panic over abortion in the post-independence period was confined mainly to (pro)Catholic media and organizations. However, an analysis of the political contexts in which they organize their campaigns (Mencin Čeplak, 2017) and the alliances they form with political and other social actors, as well as their straightforward links to the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church, point to slow but persistent attempts to build a social and political network that also aims to limit access to safe abortion. The beginnings of political institutionalization of this goal can be seen in the establishment of the political party Voice for Families and Children – GOD (which remains well below the parliamentary threshold), as well as in other parties and program platforms of conservative government coalitions that revive the idea of a national threat due to the alleged low birth rate of Slovenian women, as discussed below. Slovenians, be fruitful! In the mid-1980s, articles about the allegedly too low birth rate in Slovenia began to appear in the media, sometimes even leading to theories about the extinction of the Slovenian nation, and some of them also problematized the legislation that guaranteed women access to safe abortion on their request (Bahovec, 1991). Concerns about the declining birth rate (and also about the changing ethnic composition of the population) were publicly expressed by some experts as early as the 1970s, but at that time, there were no catastrophic predictions about the extinction of the Slovenian nation (Knežević Hočevar, 2003). As late as 1984, demographer Malačič only cautiously pointed out signs that “indicate that the Slovenian birth rate is likely to fall in the future below the level that ensures stable reproduction of the population”, and that therefore “in our society we need to think about these issues and relate them to the issues of social activity that influence demographic trends, which we will discuss a little later” (Malačič, 1984: 689). But not at the expense of human rights, such as the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to decide on the birth of children (ibid.: 698). In the article, he points out the positive influence of the Catholic Church on fertility, but also warns that the Church “does not stop at recommendations, but even explicitly forbids some things (e.g., abortion)” (ibid.:

The right to access safe abortion  41 696). However, at that time most demographers were trying to relativize the gloomy forecasts about the “extinction of the Slovenian nation” that filled the pages of magazines and newspapers in the 1980s (Knežević Hočevar, 2003). The fact that this could develop into a moral panic was recognized early on by part of the Slovenian public. Thus, as early as 1986, the front page of one of the issues of TNT – a local newspaper of the Municipal Conference of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia Grosuplje4 – caricatured the concern about the low birth rate with a menstrual calendar on which the fertile days were marked and which was accompanied by an appeal: “Slovenians and Slovenian women! Slovenian children are the salt of the Slovenian earth, therefore: let us be fruitful!” The dark side of the call to procreation was highlighted on the back of the newspaper by a stylized female body with bowed head and wrapped in barbed wire (author S. Mencin). In the late 1980s, the low birth rate was problematized by the media mainly in connection with the ageing of the population; it was the subject of demographic analyses and was frequently on the agenda of most political parties in the run-up to the 1990 elections (Bahovec, 1991). In the summer of 1989, for example, the daily newspaper Delo published in its Saturday supplement a full-page article by T. Kunstelj (physician, pediatrician) entitled Proposal for a programme for the survival of the nation. By this time, the nationalist movements, with their project of national emancipation, had already overruled the principles of the alternative critical movements, which based their activities on the principles of equality and respect for human rights. The ideology of national threat was also embraced by part of the socialist authorities of the time: a working group of the Executive Council of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia5 (headed by E. M. Pintar) prepared a document entitled Expert Guidelines for Population Policy (hereinafter referred to as the Guidelines). The document expressed widespread concern at the time about the allegedly insufficient birth rate in Slovenia: among the fundamental objectives of population policy, therefore, the guidelines emphasized “preserving national identity” and increasing the “net fertility coefficient”, and among the measures to increase the birth rate and “stabilize our population”, it envisaged a tax on “nonparenthood” and allowances for children of “higher birth order”6 to motivate people to have children. But not to motivate everyone: the documents explicitly warned that while measures are being taken to increase the birth rate, “intensive immigration” must be prevented: /…/ in view of the urgency and sensitivity of the problems, a special proposal for a migration policy must be elaborated, which must be coordinated and integrated with the population policy, since there is a constant danger that the measures intended to lead to a higher reproduction rate of the Slovenian population will lead mainly to intensive immigration. (Guidelines, 1990: 24) The immigrants defined as undesirable in the Guidelines were “the unskilled and uneducated persons from other Yugoslav republics and abroad” (ibid.). In order

42  Metka Mencin not to close the borders, take discriminatory measures or violate human rights, Slovenia was to resort to “economic means of stimulation or destimulation” (ibid.: 9). One version of the Guidelines also proposed to restrict the right to abortion, although this right had been implicitly enshrined in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia since 1974. At the request of the gynecologist Mateja Kožuh Novak, this proposal was later withdrawn (Zajc, 1990). Feminist, gay and lesbian movements, and the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS) strongly opposed the Guidelines on the basis of patriarchal and ethno-nationalist assumptions and the imposition of fertility behaviors, and the magazines Teleks and Mladina in particular published a number of articles criticizing the Guidelines. It is worth mentioning the detailed analysis by Snežana and Janez Šušteršič (1989): among other things, they pointed out a number of unacceptable methodological errors that helped the authors of the Guidelines to confirm the hypothesis of (biological and cultural) endangerment of the Slovenian nation. The Guidelines are a textbook example of a nationalist, pro-natalist policy interested in stimulating or at least maintaining, as ethnically homogeneous a population as possible. Such policies use a variety of strategies to motivate ethnically “suitable” women to engage in fertility behavior that is supposedly “good for the nation”. At least implicitly, therefore, they derive from the thesis of the biological reproduction of the nation, which generates ethnocentric and nationalist (and thus racist) policies that treat women as “bearers of the collective” (Yuval Davis, 1997: 26). Concern for the nation’s present and future, expressed in the ideology of “endangered nation”, justifies a normative order that supports patriarchal relations, strict gender binarism and heteronormativity (Peterson, 1999; Yuval Davis, 1997), which can also lead to formalized or informalized forms of restrictions on women’s reproductive rights, even in cases where policies of gender equality are declaratively endorsed.7 Although the measures proposed in the Guidelines were not implemented by the socialist government, they served as a prop for those political parties and groups that saw in nationalism a sufficiently strong social and political bond that could help them in their struggle against socialism. In this struggle, everything that could strengthen this bond was being used: with the support of the “totalitarian” regime, immigrants from the other Yugoslav republics were allegedly as much a threat to the Slovenian nation as emancipated (Slovenian) women, because they did not bear children in sufficient numbers, and the state, with its liberal abortion legislation, was enabling them (Bahovec, 1991). However, the ideologues of the “endangered nation” miscalculated with their condemnation of the right to abortion: the data of Slovenian Public Opinion8 polls showed a strong preference for the existing liberal legislation (more on this in Chapter 4 by Ule and Kurdija). However, these polls also pointed to a partial success of the ideology of the “endangered nation”: the level of agreement with the statement “immigration of workers from other republics endangers Slovenians” increased in three consecutive polls from 35.4% in 1980 to 53% in 1990 (Komac, 2007: 49).9 All these debates in the run-up to the Assembly elections in April 1990 raised serious concerns about the direction of development of the “new democracy”: they

The right to access safe abortion  43 heralded a political turn in which the rights of women, ethnic minorities ­(especially the Roma and those from the territory of the then still common SFRY) and sexual and gender minorities in particular would be put to the test. As already mentioned, women’s rights and empowerment were one of the areas in which attempts were made, even before the elections, to impose a radical break with socialism. In doing so, the right-wing populists not only used the language of the ideology of the (biologically and morally) endangered nation and invoked the rights of the fetus but also reinterpreted the emancipatory policies and practices of socialism: they interpreted them as intrusive and restricting women’s freedom. Thus, in contrast to the “free world”, socialism was supposed to force women into employment and deliberately tear them away from their families, gynecologists allegedly propagated abortion, and all of this endangered not only the Slovenian nation but also women themselves (in Bahovec, 1991). The right to abortion, or women’s reproductive rights, thus became – ­predictably – one of the most complex political dilemmas to be resolved after the Assembly elections: the balance of power between the supporters and opponents of the controversial Article 55 in the Assembly was uncertain until the last vote in the joint session of the three assemblies on 23 December 1991.10 The battle for Article 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia The April 1990 Assembly elections were won by an ideologically relatively heterogeneous coalition of political parties founded in the second half of the 1980s, called Demos. The right wing of this coalition based its program on the ideology of endangered nation and spread fear in the Assembly and beyond about ethnic and sexual minorities, women’s emancipation, and other “remnants of the totalitarian regime”, as they called the policy results of the socialist system. Among these undesirable “remnants” they included, at least covertly, legislation guaranteeing women access to safe abortion upon request. We say covertly because, with the exception of the Slovenian Christian Democrats, no party explicitly opposed this right in its election program, even though it was the right to abortion that became the subject of the most bitter political battles in the drafting of the new constitution. In our discussion, we analyze those articles of the draft and the proposal for the new Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia that directly or implicitly concern access to safe abortion: the preamble with the sentence on the sanctity of life, and the articles on conscientious objection and the freedom to decide on the birth of children.11 After the 1990 elections, the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia established a 25-member Commission on Constitutional Affairs (hereafter referred to as the Constitutional Commission), composed of members of Parliament (at that time formally still delegates at the assembly), and whose meetings were attended from time to time by members of the expert working groups established by the Commission. The political top brass hoped that the new constitution would be adopted by the end of 1990, or at least in the spring of 1991, but the process was delayed until the end

44  Metka Mencin of December 1991 because of a number of outstanding issues. The t­oughest nut to crack was the provision defining the freedom to decide on the birth of ­children: because of that provision, it was unclear until the vote in the joint session of the assemblies on 23 December 1991, whether the constitution proposal would even receive the required absolute two-thirds majority. The initial optimistic expectations for the adoption of the Constitution were based on the fact that the Constitutional Commission did not start its work from scratch: at the end of the 1980s, when the aspirations for an independent state and a new social and political order were intensifying, the Slovenian Writers’ Association and the Slovenian Sociological Association prepared the Theses for the Slovenian Constitution.12 This was a solid basis for all subsequent versions, including the official Draft Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.13 Along with the draft, the Constitutional Commission published a list of dilemmas, including two that are closely related to our debate: the dilemma regarding the wording of the preamble, which referred to the sanctity of life, and the dilemma regarding conscientious objection (the draft only provided for conscientious objection against military service, but many called for it to be defined as a fundamental human right). Some political parties (especially the ZSMS-LS) saw in the text of the preamble the danger that the invocation of the sanctity of life could be used as a justification for restricting (women’s) freedom of choice over the birth of their children and therefore proposed that the preamble be deleted (the Constitutional Commission later actually drafted a new text of the preamble).14 That this topic was by no means a marginal issue in the public debate is shown by numerous letters to the editor, and newspaper and magazine articles (Bahovec, 1991). The proposal to extend conscientious objection to obligations and duties “in certain other professions”15 was seen by some advocates of access to safe abortion primarily as a door-opener for conscientious objection to abortion by medical personnel. In fact, subsequent discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that conscientious objection by health personnel was one of the main motives for defining conscientious objection as a fundamental human right in the Constitution. Already at the end of 1990, the Constitutional Commission adopted a kind of compromise that, while extending the admissibility of conscientious objection to other cases defined by law, added an important condition at the request of the ZSMS-LS and the Assembly’s Commission for Women’s Politics: that this right must not be used to restrict the rights of other persons (Cerar and Perenič, 2001: 491–492).16 The importance of this amendment became clear in early 1992. At that time, the Executive Council of the Republic of Slovenia (as the government was officially called) submitted to the Assembly a draft Law on health care activities, which included a provision on the right of health care personnel “to refuse a medical intervention if they consider it incompatible with their conscience and the international rules of medical ethics”. By referring to the Constitution, we were able to obtain, that this provision be supplemented by a safeguard clause requiring the health facility where health ­personnel exercise this right is obliged to “ensure that patients can exercise their health care rights without hindrance” (Health Care Act, 1992).

The right to access safe abortion  45 The process of drafting a constitutional provision on the right, i.e., freedom to decide on the birth of children was much more complex. In the official draft, it was defined in Article 52: Everyone has the right to decide freely on the birth of a child. This right may be restricted only for health reasons.17 The Constitutional Commission also drafted a variant proposal on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the original text (ibid.): Parents have the right to freely decide on family planning. The second paragraph is deleted. With regard to the exercise of this right, the Republic shall provide adequate education, social welfare and medical assistance in accordance with the law. The very existence of the different versions was indicative of the conundrums faced by the Constitutional Commission (and of the disagreements between and within parties).18 The debate on the draft constitution in the Assembly chambers showed – predictably – diametrically opposed positions of the political parties, although only three parties proposed amendments: the ZSMS-LS, the Greens of Slovenia and the Slovenian Christian Democrats (SKD). The ZSMS-LS proposed that a woman’s right to an abortion be explicitly enshrined in the Constitution and that the sentence limiting this right be deleted (the deletion of this sentence was also proposed by the Greens of Slovenia), while the state would be obliged to guarantee the exercise of this right; a member of the SKD proposed a text guaranteeing only the freedom to decide on conception (Rapporteur of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia and the Assembly of the SFRY XVI/17: 27). Political negotiations and discussions followed in the Constitutional Commission, and the divide between (and within) the political parties became increasingly clear. On one side were those who found the wording “deciding on the birth of children” too explicit and who wanted the Constitution to “protect” against any suggestion of abortion. They therefore proposed two alternatives: either amending Article 52 (or 55: namely, Article 52 became Article 55 in the course of the redrafting) to speak of family planning instead of the right to decide on the birth of children or deleting the article. They did not advocate a ban on abortion and rarely explicitly opposed liberal legislation even in the Assembly sessions, but took the position that the provision did not belong in the Constitution because abortion was a social evil and/or because the Constitution could not be adopted by consensus because of the provision (Cerar and Perenič, 2001: 569–641). On the other side were those of us19 for whom the syntax “deciding on the birth of children” was not clear enough, and who called for an unequivocal constitutional guarantee of access to safe abortion. The supporters of Article 55 (mainly the ZSMS-LS, the Party of Democratic Renewal, the Socialist Party, and the Greens of Slovenia) invoked women’s rights and the agreement reached at the very beginning of the constitutional debate that the new constitution would not lower the level of rights guaranteed by the then current constitution (Mencin Čeplak, 2005). This position was also strongly defended by the Assembly’s Commission for Women’s Politics. In between, there were those whose primary concern was the timely adoption of the Constitution – and who were willing to accept any version of the controversial article to achieve that goal. The most adamant supporters of Article 55 were urged

46  Metka Mencin by these “liberal” colleagues (mainly from the ranks of the Slovenian Democratic Alliance/SDZ) to back down from their demands, otherwise they would be held responsible for any political complications that might arise if the Constitution had not been adopted by the end of 1991. Alternatives to Article 55 were offered, such as a constitutional guarantee that existing abortion laws could be changed only by an absolute qualified majority, i.e., a two-thirds majority of all delegates; even the idea of a referendum was floated.20 The initial “unwavering” determination of the left of the political spectrum to defend the provision, even at the cost of not adopting the Constitution, began to erode due to this accusation, which is why it took great effort and perseverance to reestablish and maintain the initial unity. All of this was reflected in the work of the Constitutional Commission, which could not find consensus on the dilemma of providing an unequivocal constitutional guarantee for the availability of safe abortion at the woman’s request on the one hand, and avoiding any reference to abortion on the other. The Christian Democrats insisted on the deletion of Article 55 until the very end of the constitution drafting process, and while the supporters of Article 55 backed away from the demand for a direct reference to abortion, we were able to prevail with a proposal (by ZSMS-LS and the Commission for Women’s Politics) to vote on a mandatory interpretation of Article 55 along with the text of the Constitution, which would make it clear that the freedom provided for in this article also includes the human right to diagnosis and treatment of reduced fertility, the right to prevent conception, including contraception and sterilization, and the right of women to abortion. The State shall ensure the availability of health care and other services for the exercise of these rights. On 19 December 1991, barely five days before the Assembly was due to adopt the Constitution, the Constitutional Commission made the final corrections to the text of the draft Constitution. All “additions and amendments were unanimously adopted by the Commission, but one member of the Commission refused to comment on the rewording of Article 55” (Cerar and Perenič, 2001:175). By majority vote, the Commission adopted the following text of Article 55: Everyone shall be free to decide whether to bear children. The state shall guarantee the opportunities for exercising this freedom and shall create such conditions as will enable parents to decide to bear children. In discussing this article, the Commission adopted, inter alia, the above interpretation, which makes it unequivocally clear that this freedom includes the right to abortion (Cerar and Perenič, 2001: 588). The day after the Constitutional Commission drafted the text of Article 55 and its explanatory memorandum, high-ranking representatives of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference (Stres, Valenčič and Žužek, 1991) expressed their indignation in a public letter that the draft constitution “in one of its articles grants parents unrestricted

The right to access safe abortion  47 freedom to decide whether their child will be born or have his/her life taken away”. They called this a “huge disgrace” and depravity that, in their view, makes the draft constitution morally flawed. They accused the Commission of having “bowed to pressure from some political and other factions, which was also exerted in an unfair manner, with generous support from the majority of the media”. Although the members of the Constitutional Commission were largely in agreement with the final wording of Article 55, the future of the right to abortion remained highly uncertain. Namely, at the last moment, just before the decisive vote in the sessions of the Chambers, some members of the Commission suggested some ingenious procedural tricks: according to one of them, the Chambers should vote first on the withdrawal of the disputed articles (in reality, they had in mind only Article 55) and only then on the entire Constitution (Cerar and Perenič, 2001: 221–223). Of course, that would not provide a solution since they almost certainly would not get the majority needed for withdrawal – at least judging from the ­public statements made by parliamentary groups. However, since much persuasion and even accusations were made behind the scenes, we would not be surprised if one day it turned out that behind the proposal to vote on the disputed articles (i.e., Article 55) before voting on the entire Constitution was the presumption that some delegates from the factions that had publicly defended Article 55 would relent and vote for its withdrawal for purely pragmatic and politically expedient reasons. The chairman of the Constitutional Commission who was also president of the Assembly at the time, rejected this proposal. But only because he was convinced that a constitution without Article 55 “cannot get a two-thirds majority”. A short time later, he added, “If we could have achieved something with it, I would have supported it right away” (ibid.: 222–223). The aforementioned Commission for Women’s Politics played an important role in the struggle for women’s rights, although it was more or less openly ridiculed in institutional politics because of its name and the fact that it was composed exclusively of women. Nevertheless, it played a crucial role in the strategy of the struggle for the maintenance of Article 55, not only because of its strong and unified political position but also because it brought together autonomous women’s groups and movements, political parties and their women’s caucuses,21 experts and scholars – in these struggles, the Commission was an important link between the Assembly and the feminist public. Preserving the constitutional guarantee of access to safe abortion has become a focus of broad mobilization of women’s groups and other collective and individual protagonists. Given the events since the second half of the 1980s and the victory of the Demos coalition, which was a kind of conglomerate of political conservatism and pragmatism combined with strong ethno-nationalism and anti-socialism, we were actually prepared in advance for the problems related to abortion rights. With great certainty, we foresaw political changes that could seriously threaten women’s emancipatory achievements, including the availability of safe abortion. This is one of the reasons why our mobilization was so effective. Through a series of activities outside and inside the Assembly, outside and inside the political parties, in public debates and through publications in the mass media, we have increased the pressure for the adoption of this constitutional guarantee.

48  Metka Mencin We have strengthened the persuasive power of the defense of Article 55 by responding in a timely manner to the arguments of our opponents, and we have strengthened our social and political power through coordinated and numerous joint activities. The result of the outstanding commitment of feminist groups is the monograph Abortion – the right to choose?!, published in June 1991 by the group Women for Politics. It contains original texts, the positions of the political parties on Article 55, reprinted letters to the editor and articles from the Slovenian media. Even today, 30 years later, the work has not lost its relevance, as similar arguments keep coming up in the abortion debate. It can still be used today as a handbook for defending women’s rights, with access to safe abortion occupying a particularly important place. The contributions gathered in this work show that the extremes of condemnations of abortion and the right to abortion outside the Assembly have reached proportions incomparable to the restraint of the opponents of Article 55 in the Assembly: the labeling of abortion as “murder”, as “white murder”, as a threat to the nation; the condemnation of all who are associated with it as “murderers”.... A particularly important role in the public debate was played by gynecologists, whose most active representatives were Mateja Kožuh Novak, Lidija Andolšek, Dunja Obersnel Kveder and Vasilij Cerar, who advocated the constitutional guarantee of access to safe abortion and opposed the counter-arguments of their ­colleagues from the medical profession, among whom the leading figure was the forensic pathologist Anton Dolenc. Among lawyers, Karel Zupančič, a professor at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana, was the most vocal supporter of Article 55. All of this engagement (with strong media support) culminated in the mass demonstrations in support of Article 55 organized by non-partisan and partisan women’s groups on 11 December 1991 in front of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (a week before the last session of the Constitutional Commission, which was preparing the final text of the draft Constitution) (Jalušič, 2002). Debates over Article 55, i.e., the constitutional guarantee of maintaining liberal abortion legislation, were often more heated outside the Assembly than inside, where opponents of Article 55 refrained from harsh condemnations precisely because of the broad public support for existing liberal legislation. The extraordinary social and political mobilization on both sides of the debate on these issues deepened the anxiety, especially among those in between. Public pressure was undoubtedly one of the key factors in the success of the struggle to retain this article, which would not have been defended without the hard work within the Assembly and the parties: the Constitution – including Article 55 – was ­nevertheless adopted on 23 December 1991, by all three Chambers, with 179 votes out of 240 (160 would have been enough) – a figure that also proves that the adoption of the Constitution was not unequivocal. It is particularly noteworthy that the Constitution was adopted including the explanatory memorandum, in which the Constitutional Commission, after lengthy negotiations, explicitly stated that the freedom provided for in Article 55 also includes the right of women to abortion. This is also confirmed by the verbatim minutes of the debates in the Constitutional Commission in 1990–1991. However, this official interpretation has been consistently ignored by opponents of the right

The right to access safe abortion  49 to abortion, who to this day argue that Article 55 does not include abortion or deny it any formal legal meaning, saying that only the Constitutional Court can judge whether the right to abortion also derives from Article 55 (Erznožnik and Zwitter, 2020). It is significant, however, that even high-ranking representatives of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) understand Article 55 of the Constitution in the same way as its defenders; otherwise, they would not oppose it so vehemently. In 1997, the then Archbishop of Ljubljana and Metropolitan of Slovenia, now retired Cardinal Franc Rode, conveyed the most vociferous outburst of ire against Article 55 in a sermon at the Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary: There is the shameful Article 55 of the Slovenian Constitution, which is actually a disgrace to our country. For no other country has such a thing written into its constitution. And it allows thousands and thousands of deaths every year, dead, unborn children, so that in recent years our very existence is at stake; where in the past plagues, famines and Turkish invasions failed, we may succeed in killing ourselves because we no longer love life, because we no longer accept life, because we treat unborn life so irresponsibly and shamefully. (Rode in Petrovčič, 2011) This outrage, however, cannot be attributed solely to ecclesiastical morality: it probably has at least as much to do with the fact that Article 55 is a constant reminder to the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia of the limits of its admittedly considerable political power. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, women’s rights became the subject of heated partisan and non-partisan debates (and commentaries by church leaders) once again when the Infertility Treatment and Assisted Reproductive Technology Act was proposed. In their opposition to the right of “single” women to IVF, some MPs used the same arguments they used against the right to abortion: for example, they treated the fetus as a child and asked the rhetorical question, “where are the rights of the man in this law, and what about the man who wants to have a child?” Indeed, the man’s right to decide about abortion was (Brumen, 1990) and still is (Markovič, 2020) a popular argument in the abortion debate against legislation that grants the woman the right to decide.22 Anti-abortion initiatives Given the fact that in Slovenia the right to abortion is guaranteed by the fundamental legal act of the state, i.e., the Constitution, which can be amended only with a high degree of parliamentary and public consensus, the right to abortion itself is rarely the subject of explicit opposition. In recent years, anti-abortion initiatives have been increasingly calling into question whether the Constitution really guarantees a right to abortion. More often than not, however, they employ tactics that appeal to the “conscience of the nation” (the protection of the unborn child and even the assumed suffering of women after abortion), invoke the idea of the

50  Metka Mencin common good (budget cuts and the biological reproduction of the nation), propose measures that do not explicitly address abortion or appear to take a neutral stance on it. The first high-profile attempt of this kind was a legislative proposal tabled in parliament in 2002 by three members of the conservative Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), which was then a member of the otherwise liberal governing coalition. The proposal introduced a new list of services to be covered by compulsory health insurance, omitting services related to childbirth, contraception, sterilization and abortion (Matos, 2002). The proposal was rejected, but four years later, a similar measure was envisaged in the Strategies for Increasing Fertility in the Republic of Slovenia,23 prepared by the Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Affairs in the government of Janez Janša. Among the proposed measures to increase the birth rate was that the cost of abortions should be borne entirely by women themselves, unless there were medical reasons for doing so. In parliament, the Strategies were rejected after fierce resistance from feminist groups, professional associations and opposition parties (Marn, 2006, Kralj and Rener in this monograph). Although Minister Drobnič left the government at the suggestion of Prime Minister Janša, Janša did not comment on the controversial document. By allowing the minister to resign “voluntarily”, he avoided a polemical interpellation that would have led to an awkward debate about the performance of the entire government and forced the government or the coalition parties to clarify their stance on reproductive rights. The idea of limiting access to abortion by requiring women to pay for it out of pocket is still alive and kicking. In 2012, the Iskreni Institute,24 which opposes abortion in the name of protecting “unborn children”, proposed to the government the introduction of a self-pay method for hormonal contraception and abortion (Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1379), this time with an argument that refrained from moral judgments about abortion: the measure was supposed to reduce the national debt and was more just because it is unfair to burden all citizens with charges that are a consequence of the irresponsible behavior of individuals. It is a typical neoliberal argument that individualizes responsibility and refrains from moral judgments or maintains the appearance of value neutrality – this argument should convince even “enlightened” neoliberals who swear by human rights and advocate gender equality but reject policies of solidarity and reciprocity. In Slovenia, the parliamentary parties in particular are still quite reluctant to speak out against abortion and do not address the issue in public on their own initiative. For example, the abortion polemic in the run-up to the 2014 parliamentary elections was triggered by letters to the editor in the daily newspaper Delo asking the political parties whether abortion legislation violated the constitutional principle of the inviolability of human life. The most politically relevant response was provided by Party of Miro Cerar (SMC), as opinion polls had predicted a relative victory for the party in the elections (a prediction that actually came true). In its statement, the party referred to an alleged contradiction between the constitutional principle of the inviolability of human life and the constitutionally guaranteed ­freedom to decide on the birth of children. It did not explain the alleged contradiction between these two principles, but we assume that its interpretation derives from the Christian assumption that life begins at conception. But the question of

The right to access safe abortion  51 the beginning of life is a complex philosophical and cultural (and also religious) question (Copelon et al., 2005; Zupančič, 1991),25 over which Christianity does not or should not have a monopoly in a secular state. The second revealing feature of this statement is related to the first: namely, the party simultaneously patronizes “women with unplanned pregnancies” and argues that they “should be counselled about the benefits of childbirth” (Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1378). This part of the statement is insulting to women, as it denies them the ability to make rational judgments and decisions. No one objects to the possibility of counseling if a woman so desires, but any mandatory and, above all, highly biased “counseling” is nothing but a form of unacceptable pressure.26 With its statement, SMC placed itself in the same ideological sphere as Catholic groups that make a misleading “pro-life” appeal to women. When asked by Mladina magazine about the party leader’s opinion on the right to abortion, the SMC responded that he believes that the issue of abortion is adequately regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia and in the laws in force. He would not limit this right enshrined in the Constitution, because, as already stated, the legislation in force is adequate. (Mladina, 2014) Significantly less evasive in this regard was Matej Tonin, the leader of the c­ onservative New Slovenia party, who stated in a 2018 interview that he was “not in favor of a legal ban on abortion /…/” but that he was “very much in favor of making the path to abortion more difficult, so that it not a routine, easygoing procedure, but that there are at least two stages” (Božič, 2018). He did not explain how this would be done without violating women’s constitutional and legal rights, nor did his party propose any measure restricting access to safe abortion when it was part of the conservative government under Janez Janša in 2020–2022. Nevertheless, this statement shows that at least some politicians believe that a situation has arisen in Slovenia where a step backward is becoming legitimate and possible. Coincidentally or not, Tonin’s statement partly coincides with the resurgence of the thesis of the extinction of the Slovenian nation, which is prone to ideas and practices of limiting women’s reproductive rights: in 2018, the National Council (the second chamber of the Slovenian parliament) organized an “expert” panel with a title that is a textbook example of nationalist moral scaremongering: How to prevent the extinction of the Slovenian nation. One of the organizers and moderators of the event, Matjaž Gams, senior research fellow (!) and Head of the Intelligent Systems Department at the Jožef Stefan Institute (IJS),27 accompanied the event with a “thesis” on the “decline of the Slovenian nation”,28 allegedly caused by the following factors: liberalization of women, contraception, abortion, women’s rights, women’s education, prohibition of proactive male courtship, forcing women into ­masculine roles and men into feminine roles, making motherhood and childhood arduous. The important thing is that having a child is ‘no longer worth

52  Metka Mencin it’, that it means a lot of work, a lot of expenses, a lot of hassle, and few direct incentives. Then we have the permissive education, the glorification of homosexuality, etc. The prohibition of corporal punishment also falls into this category. (Gams in Be and Mo, 2018) Following a public letter of protest from a group of citizens, Gams’ views were publicly rejected by its director on behalf of the IJS, while many members of other associations who had supported Gams’ election to the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia called for his resignation (Opara Krašovec, 2018; Petrovčič, 2018). The assumed threat of national extinction produced institutional results in 2020: the right-wing government headed by prime minister Janša established the Office for Demography by decree in 2020, but it was not set up until April 2022, shortly before the parliamentary elections. The Office’s main task was to promote fertility and the traditional family. During this period, the prime minister repeatedly expressed concern about the allegedly low birth rate in Slovenia, while the leader of the Konkretno political party, then minister of the economy, promised in December 2021, a few months before the parliamentary elections, that Slovenia’s population would grow from just under two million to three million in ten years “because of what will happen in Slovenia, not because of immigration”.29 It is indicative that his statement was also shared by the government’s official Twitter account, but even more alarming is the fact that on the same account appeared a copy of a newspaper article published on 5 December 1991, regretting that the provision on the freedom to decide on the birth of children would remain in the final draft of the new Constitution. However, the sexism and racism that the government of the day took for granted was not taken for granted by voters in April 2022, and the (temporary) defeat of this politics led, among other things, to the abolition of the controversial Office for Demography. Nevertheless, civil society initiatives in the fight against the right to abortion are more visible, vocal and outspoken than politicians (which by no means excludes their connections), with the exception of some state councilors and the non-­parliamentary party Movement for Children and Family – GOD.30 The public polemic about the right to abortion in Slovenia is triggered mainly by (pro)Catholic groups, organizations, “institutes” (God’s Children, Institute Živ!m, Institute Iskreni, March for Life) and the (pro)Catholic media (among the most aggressive is the web portal 24kul.si). It is worth mentioning that in Slovenia, anti-abortion movements, who call themselves the pro-life movement, implicitly present their positions as positions shared by all Catholics. In doing so, they conceal the fact that there are strongly committed “pro-choice” groups of Catholics in the world. For example, since 1973 in the United States, there has been the Catholics for Choice movement, which has developed into an international movement.31 In Argentina, Catholic groups actively participated in the movement to legalize abortion at the end of 2020; also in Poland, declared Catholic women who joined the Women’ s strike movement publicly protested against the law that further restricts the possibility of abortion (Snyder and Hoffman, 2020). Although initiatives mentioned

The right to access safe abortion  53 above equate abortion with murder, most of them do not call for any change in the existing laws; even women who choose to commit “murder” are “only” implicitly condemned. However, this makes them all the more aggressive toward advocates of liberal legislation. They are known to the Slovenian public as part of a network that has consolidated its social and political power in referendum campaigns against same-sex marriage (Mencin Čeplak, 2016; Kralj and Rener in this monograph). Among the initiatives that treat abortion as murder, the prayers in front of the gynecological clinic in Ljubljana received the most media attention (including criticism and opposition). When they were first held in 2015, the organizer, God’s Children Institute, called them prayers “for life – for abortion to be stopped at the Ljubljana hospital”. They are part of the internationally coordinated “40 Days for Life” project, which was launched in the U.S. in 2004 and is enthusiastically supported in Slovenia (and elsewhere) by Catholic media and Church authorities. In 2016, organizers hailed the prayers as “a sign of hope for women in crisis pregnancies”, a support “on the path of healing and conversion for all who are in any way involved in the problem of abortion”.32 In 2015 and 2016, a group of abortion rights activists responded to the prayers by writing a public letter to the Slovenian president and governmental institutions, warning of the unacceptable pressure on women and medical staff and calling on the relevant authorities to protect constitutional rights. The management of the clinic has also repeatedly warned about the intolerable pressure on women (Knavs, 2015), and the ombudswoman has labeled the prayers as a form of violence against women (Košir, 2016), which has led to accusations of bias and even calls for her resignation. Her position was also made clear in the 2016 Ombudsman’s report, which stated, inter alia: In any case, the Ombudsman considered that the prayers in front of the gynecological clinic could constitute harassment for women, which (at that time) was still defined as discriminatory as per ZUNEO.33 (Annual Report of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia for 2016) These critical responses have not gone unanswered, and the most aggressive of them have even been taken to court. In 2016, when a group of 165 citizens and 14 organizations reacted to the prayers with the Initiative for the protection of women’s constitutional rights, the portal www.24kul.si published an article titled List of members of the abortion lobby opposing the right to life of unborn girls and boys! The author, who used the pseudonym Tine Belin, accused the signatories of advocating “the extinction of the Slovenian nation and culture”, of being responsible for the “culture of death” and “promoting the execution of unborn girls and boys”, of being responsible for the abortions performed by 350,000 women and for their suffering from the “post-abortive syndrome”. A group of 15 signatories saw in the text a public incitement to “hatred, violence and inequality” and filed a criminal complaint against the author of the text, against the director of the Institute for Family and Culture of Life, Tadej Strehovec,34 and against the Institute. i.e., the owner of the website www.24kul.si (criminal complaint, personal archive). The proceedings

54  Metka Mencin ended with the withdrawal of the indictment because, as the p­ rosecutor explained, “it was not possible to prove that the defendant was responsible for the publication and authorship of the disputed article” (Kirn in Stojiljković 2019; Kralj and Rener in this monograph). The very fact that the prosecution has taken up this case and thus identified in the content of the aforementioned article an incitement to ­violence, and the fact that Strehovec has not proven his innocence, is an important step in the efforts to uphold constitutional “prohibition of incitement to discrimination and intolerance and prohibition of incitement to violence and war” (Article 63 of the Constitution).35 Among initiatives condemning abortion (and the advocates of safe and accessible abortion), the most overt political ambitions are, or were, those of the Movement for Children and Families (GOD), which in its program For the Hope of Children and Families36 proclaimed the biological bonds of the family and traditional marriage as the basic foundation of the family, committed itself to the Slovenian nation and state as well as to Christianity, and accordingly called for the enforcement of the right to life of “every unborn child”. The predecessor organizations of GOD (Civil Initiative for Family and Children’s Rights and the Coalition The Children Are at Stake!) played a key role in the campaigns against LGBT equality and samesex partnerships in 2012–2015. GOD leader Primc, who has expressed high political ambitions in his public appearances, is a vocal opponent of abortion, but like many of his associates, he avoids answering directly whether he supports the abortion ban. Instead, he reiterates that GOD supports the right to life of every unborn child. In a TV appearance in the spring of 2016, he demonstrated his talent for psychological propaganda while clarifying GOD’s position on abortion: he held up a photograph of a 12-week-old fetus to the camera and asked viewers to recognize a child in it (Mencin Čeplak, 2016). Živ!m Institute performed a similar but even more manipulative gesture in October 201637 when it projected a film on the walls of the Franciscan Church in Ljubljana that depicted abortion as murder: a spokesperson for the Institute claimed that they were spreading “a beautiful message of joy in life, /…/ love for oneself and for others” (Hočevar and Hanžič, 2016). The film is about conception but shows the child at birth; it also portrays the fetus as a child in psychological terms.38 The film ends with the slogan “Choose life”, accompanied by a photograph of a heavily pregnant woman that manipulatively suggests that abortion will be performed at the woman’s request, even when she is heavily pregnant. The Živ!m Institute’s screening campaign was endorsed by the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, which emphasized in a press release that in supporting this project they are following the principle of “zero tolerance of violence against the unborn child” (Strehovec, 2016), and the GOD responded to protests against the public screening of the film by calling for the right to life of the unborn child to be enshrined in the constitution (Hočevar and Hanžič, 2016). The strategies of personifying a fetus with photos of the fetus sucking their thumb and smiling; the stories told to the “mother” by her “unborn child” just before being aborted; the stories of abortion “survivors”39 and the images of dismembered fetuses are highly manipulative: they give the impression that they are telling the

The right to access safe abortion  55 truth, that they speak for themselves. But they are even more m ­ anipulative when, as Salecl (2002) puts it, they encourage, even enforce, the viewer’s identification with the fetus. In the image of a fetus that looks like a child, the viewer recognizes a human form – like our own (Bracher, 1993: 111); on the other hand, images of dismembered, bloody fetuses threaten his or her fragile bodily integrity (Bracher, 1993: 114; Mencin Čeplak, 2016). The God’s Children Institute presumably assumed exactly this effect when, in 2014, it organized a rally with large billboards with photos of aborted fetuses to represent the “real truth about abortion” in protest against the conference of the International Federation of Professional Associations for Abortion and Contraception in Ljubljana (Kajtazović and Kranjc in Mencin Čeplak, 2016). The spectrum of condemnations of abortion is thus very broad, but they all share a common basic assumption: that the fetus is a person and therefore a rights-bearer, and that any abortion is therefore murder. For those who condemn abortion, any abortion is an offense against the “unborn child”, as they consistently call the fetus; for some, it is also an offense against the nation and even an offense against the woman who chooses to have an abortion. From here on, the condemnations of abortion differ in their severity or in the way they express their views on abortion, depending on the addressee on whom they are trying to make a very ­specific impression. As an analysis a few years ago showed (Mencin Čeplak, 2016), pro-life advocates, as they call themselves, can be divided into two groups. The first group is openly aggressive and hostile in their condemnation of abortion as murder, a crime against the child, against nature, against the nation and against women, unrestrainedly manipulating facts and (intentionally) creating a moral panic. As a rule, they do not condemn women who choose abortion, but they do condemn the advocates of women’s right to safe and accessible abortion, often calling them murderers (a typical example is the above-mentioned text in 24.kul.si, which was the subject of a criminal complaint). Despite their extremism, they rarely condemn women who have abortions: it is the wicked, the vile and foul who mislead them and “forced” them to have abortions. For example, in its 2016 programmatic declaration For the Hope of Children and Families, GOD rejects the “outpatient ‘abortion bullying’ of pregnant women” (cf. GOD website) and repeats the false accusation that under socialism gynecologists persuaded women to have abortions. The second, seemingly empathetic group denounces abortion in a patronizing and more or less polite manner, disparaging the moral and professional credibility of advocates of access to safe abortion and/or appealing to the vulnerability of women and the “unborn child”. They often appeal to the rationality of the undecided by accusing abortion rights advocates of having a poor knowledge of the history of feminism, claiming that the first feminists opposed abortion or the legalization of abortion (N. Ž., 2018);40 that they do not understand Article 55 of the Constitution because it allegedly does not refer to the right to abortion (as mentioned at the beginning of this article, the constitutional debate and the vote on the Constitution clearly show that Article 55 also guarantees access to safe abortion); that they have a poor understanding of the scientific research that proves how psychologically

56  Metka Mencin and physically traumatic (life-threatening) abortion is for women.41 By attempting to morally discredit abortion rights advocates, they are actually appealing to the ­emotions of their supporters and the ambivalence of those in between, convincing them that they are merely proclaiming a suppressed truth about the suffering of “unborn children”, their “mothers and fathers”. This is usually done through personifications of the fetus (which is repeatedly referred to as the unborn child or simply as a child) and/or through emotionally charged intimate stories of women suffering from the so-called post-abortive syndrome. This immense, patronizing (pretended) empathy is a proven trick of pastoral authority: it “helps” women discover the “truth” about themselves. About the suffering, they do not even know is hidden inside them; about their desire to be mothers, which they have repressed because of difficult circumstances and unsympathetic people. This apparent empathy also implies that abortion is a sin, an evil and that women must suffer for it: the suffering itself is to prove that they are not totally depraved. If they do not suffer, they either pretend not to suffer or they are so immoral that they do not care. In either case, they are guilty (of course, this is not explicitly stated by those who present themselves as compassionate champions of women). Suffering is the punishment for a sin that is rarely named by compassionate pro-life activists in direct contact with a suffering woman, and yet the name of this sin hangs unambiguously in the air: murder. Abortion is a sin that can be mitigated by deep, sincere repentance and penance. And/or accusations against those who, in their blind arrogance, ignore the dark side of abortion in order to spread the “culture of death”. In that context, it is not surprising that opponents of abortion rights in Slovenia, as well as over the world, misused the information about the death of Argentine activist Maria del Valle Gonzalez Lopez, a socialist who campaigned for the legalization of abortion. Abortion rights opponents took the advantage of her tragic death after medication abortion as an evidence that safe abortion doesn’t exist42 and as an argument against liberal abortion laws. It is also worth mentioning the manipulation of the anti-choice campaigns, which claim that many doctors in Slovenia are not yet aware of the medication abortion, while deliberately concealing the fact that this method has been successfully used for many years and the protocols that ensure the safety and care of women are in place. In fact, the pills are available only in gynecological outpatient clinics or hospitals, and only healthy women over 18 who have already given birth and are less than eight weeks pregnant (confirmed by ultrasound) can terminate their pregnancy at home. The woman is advised that for the first six hours after taking the pill, an adult should be by her side who can arrange for immediate transport to the hospital in case of complications. Under some protocols, during the second trimester, the first part of the termination of pregnancy takes place in an outpatient setting, while the second part is performed in the hospital, where the woman receives misoprostol in several successive doses and, after the abortion, an ultrasound examination of the uterus and, if necessary, scraping of the uterine cavity is performed. Before the procedure, each woman receives a detailed written description of the procedure and its effects, advice on self-care and recovery after the procedure, information on professional help in case of complications and advice on post-abortive contraception.43

The right to access safe abortion  57 The tactics used by anti-abortion campaigners who present themselves as c­ hampions of women is, above all, a form of patriarchal patronage that insists on controlling women. It is indicative that the fight against abortion is at the heart of their “pro-life” slogan, and that in their efforts to protect the unborn, they forget those already born. And while supposedly protecting women from abortion risks, they are silent about social inequalities and insecurities and the suffering in places where women cannot access safe abortions. One of the culminations of their hypocrisy is the glorification of natural contraception, scaremongering about socalled unnatural contraceptive methods and equating some contraceptive methods with abortion (e.g. equating emergency contraception or the morning-after pill44 with the effects of Mifepristone) – which is consistently done by Iskreni Institute.45 At first glance, this discourse may seem naïve, even ridiculous, but what has already happened in the U.S. since the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, which served as the basis for the right to abortion, and in Poland after the introduction of one of the most restrictive laws in the world, show that legal restrictions on abortion can quickly lead to limiting the availability of contraceptives and, in extreme cases, even to direct control over women and sexuality in general.46 Last but not least, in 2017, Slovenian media reported an incident in a pharmacy where a pharmacist refused to dispense hormonal contraceptives on prescription due to conscientious objection.47 While the Chamber of Pharmacists acknowledged that the refusal was unjustified (it was an informal conscientious objection, and there was no one in the pharmacy who could have dispensed the pills to the customer), any such action is in fact a direct interference with women’s rights, regardless of the legislation that protects her rights. The United Nations and the European Union: breaking the silence In the struggles for and against the legalization of abortion, the standpoints of i­nternational organizations (the United Nations and the European Union are of ­particular interest here) played no role for a long time, leaving this area entirely to the member states. This did not change until after 1990, when reproductive rights were recognized as human rights at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. The conference also called on states to ensure that all women receive quality medical care after an abortion. A year later, the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, in its Platform for Action, was already calling on governments to reconsider laws that criminalize women who have illegal abortions. But neither conference explicitly called for legal reforms (Fine et al., 2017). Nevertheless (or perhaps because of this), UN committees and commissions increasingly point to the need to loosen restrictive legislation in member states: all countries should allow access to safe abortion, at least for victims of rape and incest and in cases of medical necessity. In recent years, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern about restrictive laws, particularly in Peru, Ireland, Poland and Malta. In fall 2018, the Committee also published its comments on Article 6 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which relates to the right to life. Among other things, it states that member

58  Metka Mencin states should not introduce new obstacles to women’s and girls’ effective access to safe and legal abortion, but should remove existing obstacles (conscientious objection by health professionals was cited as one of the obstacles). Like WHO (2012), the Committee’s recommendations and appeals call not only for the legalization of abortion, as legalization alone will not improve the situation of women until the state and relevant institutions ensure that all women and girls have access to safe abortion. This is also in response to the reactions of opponents of abortion legalization to the death of Argentine activist Maria del Valle Gonzalez Lopez. After her death, they have insisted that she died as a result of a legal abortion and have used the tragic event as an argument against Argentina’s liberal law. But del Valle did not die because the abortion was legal; if she died as a result of the abortion, it was because, unfortunately, something went very wrong. What and why will hopefully be clarified by the investigation. No one claims that abortion is safe because it is legal, but it is true that legal abortion is also “safe in most cases” (Pinter, 2014: 15). As WHO points out, there is a higher risk when outdated methods or methods inappropriate for the gestational age are used, when the woman is not adequately informed and does not have access to help, if complications occur, when the procedure is performed by people who lack the necessary knowledge and skills, and/or in conditions that do not meet minimum health standards. All this is more common in countries where abortion is illegal: legalizing abortion undoubtedly improves access to safe abortion (WHO, 2020). While the European Union advocates for women’s equality and equal rights, autonomy, political and social power, etc., it relegates the thorniest issues of women’s rights – reproductive rights and reproductive health – to the member states. Any mention of the abortion issue in the European Parliament, any criticism of restrictive laws, any criticism of attempts to tighten existing laws, is an opportunity for fetal rights advocates in member states to whip up moral panic. One such example is the 2013 Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights,48 better known as the Estrela Report (authored by Portuguese MP Edite Estrela for hearing before the relevant parliamentary committee). The report makes a number of ­recommendations for actions and policies, including the introduction of comprehensive sex education in schools and access to safe and legal abortions for women and girls. Although it was a non-binding resolution, the European Parliament rejected it, deciding instead that everything related to sexual and reproductive health and rights should be dealt with at the level of member states.49 However, this did not prevent the adoption of the recent Report on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health (the so-called Matić Report, more on which in the introduction to this monograph). For those who are most optimistic, this is a prediction of changes in EU policy; for others, it is just another document showing the current balance of power in the European Parliament; for still others, it is a cause for moral panic. The hope that it is the former is fueled by the resolution adopted in July 2022, on the occasion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the right to abortion, proposing to call on the European Council to amend the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to include the right to safe and legal abortion.50

The right to access safe abortion  59 The comments, reports, recommendations, appeals and proposals of the international institutions to which we refer may indeed be a paper tiger; no country has or will suffer any specific sanctions for violations. Perhaps they are really just a break in the silence. One might even say that for all their advocacy for accessible and safe abortions, international institutions are just trying to salve their consciences by arguing that they have done everything in their power to protect women from the consequences of unsafe abortions. But they are also the result of pressures from human rights movements. The length and complexity of negotiations in these institutions suggest that they are little more than a dead letter on paper. And they can also be used in struggles for sexual, gender and reproductive rights. Abortion is not explicitly recognized as a human right in the documents of UN, but the human rights committees consider the unavailability of safe abortion a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women (UNHRC, 2019). Conclusion “The history of pregnancy is also the history of abortion”, Nika Kovač (2020: 15) titles one of the chapters of her book My Decision, in which she reflects on the rights and prejudices against abortion that women experience firsthand. We should add, however, that the abortion ban has a short history. Just a little over 200 years. The history of abortion prohibition is as short as the history of the nation-state, or rather, it is as old as the governments’ attempts to control the population (Foucault, 2007). In contrast to these facts, calls for tightening liberal legislation and resistance to measures that would provide access to safe abortion implicitly present the abortion ban as a kind of natural state of affairs. Natural and (therefore?) naturally moral. In Slovenia, alongside the restoration of capitalism and the rise of nationalism, a strengthened patriarchal ideology interprets the emancipatory legacy of socialism as an attack on the “natural essence” of a woman; as an undermining of a social order conducive to life that was replaced by a “communist abortion culture” whose goal is seen as destroying the family, the nation and Christianity. Anti-abortion discourses in Slovenia remain within the ideological frameworks in which they appeared in the 1980s and 1990s: nationalism, patriarchy, gender binarism, heteronormativity, biologism, anti-socialism and anti-communism. However, they have multiplied, extended their network and reinforced their ideological foundations and diversified their strategies to gain access to the broader public space. The current anti-choice activists in Slovenia are sometimes openly aggressive in their defense of the judgment that abortion is murder, a crime against the child, nature, nation and women, and even more aggressive against the liberal legislation and the advocates of abortion rights, who are assumed to be part of a communist conspiracy. On the other hand, the anti-choice movements often use a passive-aggressive patronizing discourse to interpellate the moral majority, particularly sensible, good, real women. After all, who could legitimately oppose the wish that every conceived child also be born? Even feminism, which insists on women’s right to legal, accessible and safe abortion, wants there to be no unwanted pregnancies. But this of

60  Metka Mencin course is not the same as what is demanded by an anti-choice activist using the image of a fetus being held, by someone praying outside a clinic using the “real truth” about abortion, or by a counselor who implicitly tells a woman that in fact she wants a baby, not an abortion. Reference to “the real truth about abortion” and to motherhood as the essence of womanhood paves the way to a considerably narrower goal, if necessary, also via a shortcut: limiting access through what at first sight seem to be justified arguments (formal or informal conscientious objection of medical staff or making abortion payable), if not through the outright banning of abortion. The feminist’s truth about abortion is nothing like that: abortion is neither evil nor an emergency way out, it is simply one of two ways of exercising a woman’s right to decide freely about the birth of her children. Notes 1 In this text, the noun woman/women and the adjective woman’s/women’s refer to (a) person(s) with a female gender identity (regardless of their assigned sex) and/or (b) all persons who can become pregnant (e.g., abortion at the woman’s request, women’s reproductive rights, etc.). 2 The core of the group was formed by the staff of the journal Nova revija. The journal gained prominence in 1987 with a special issue entitled Contributions to the Slovenian National Programme. 3 The movements of the 1980s, which we in Slovenia have called the new social movements, must be distinguished from the social movements of the 1960s: compared to the latter, they were distinctly political, articulating political goals and demands, and addressing political actors. 4 The Socialist Youth League (ZSM) was one of the four socio-political organizations (along with the League of Communists, the League of Associations of Fighters of the National Liberation War, the Trade Union Confederation and the Socialist League of Working People, which was also a kind of umbrella organization for all the above-mentioned sociopolitical organizations) that had representatives and delegates in one of the three chambers of the Assembly (the Socio-Political Assembly). It was formally organized at the federal, republican, municipal and local levels. Until the 1980s, it was considered a kind of transmission of the League of Communists and an “incubator” for its cadres, but in the 1980s, it became increasingly autonomous in some republics and, over time, developed into a serious critical political force that, for example, in Slovenia, contributed significantly to the opening of the political space through its support for new social movements (peace, environmental, women’s, gay and lesbian movements…). Before the 1990 elections, it was transformed into a political party in Slovenia called ZSMS-Liberal Party, which was renamed Liberal Democratic Party the following year (and after 1994, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) and was the leading political party in Slovenia from 1992 to 2004. 5 The Executive Council was then called what has been called the government since the 1992 elections. The Assembly at that time is today’s Parliament and was composed of three chambers with equal powers: The Chamber of Municipalities, the Chamber of Associated Labor and the Socio-political Chamber. Delegates to the Assembly were elected in the multi-party elections of 1990. 6 All phrases are quoted from the document “Population Policy Guidelines in the SR Slovenia”. 7 The fact that many people do not see any contradiction in this is also shown by the votes in the European Parliament: documents that declaratively advocate gender equality easily get the necessary majority as long as they do not include a demand for access to safe

The right to access safe abortion  61 abortion and/or sex and sexuality education in schools; the situation is quite different in the debates and the votes on document proposals that include both (e.g., the Estrela Report in the European Parliament in 2013). 8 Since 1986, the Slovenian Public Opinion surveys (SJM) have been conducted annually (usually twice a year) by researchers from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Since the early 1990s, they have been providing internationally comparable data. The surveys are designed similarly to the General Social Survey NORC in the USA and the ALLBUS survey in Germany. Surveying public values and orientations in the decades before the transition was a unique historical phenomenon among societies of the former Eastern bloc. From the outset, the program’s goal was to create and collect a time series of subjective well-being and quality-of-life indicators and employ them to measure and – if possible – explain general patterns of political, social, cultural and economic attitudes and behavior of the population. 9 The less than exemplary brotherly relations are also reflected in the SJM survey data from 1970/71 (before immigration from other Yugoslav republics increased): almost 43% of respondents answered that immigration from other Yugoslav republics to Slovenia was a bad thing (Komac, 2007: 47). 10 In 1990–1992, the parliamentary system in Slovenia was regulated by a law that adapted the socialist delegate system to the multiparty system: the tripartite assembly continued to consist of the Socio-political Chamber, the Chamber of Municipalities and the Chamber of Associated Labor, but unlike the previous system, elections were held directly (the Socio-political Chamber and the Chamber of Associated Labor were elected by proportional representation, the Chamber of Municipalities by majority vote). The Socio-political Chamber was composed of representatives of the political parties, but there was also party division in the other two Chambers. In 1990, the following parties met or exceeded the electoral threshold: ZKS – SDP/Party of Democratic Renewal; ZSMS – LS/ Socialist Youth League – Liberal Party; SZS/Socialist Union of Slovenia; SKD/Slovenian Christian Democrats; SKZ/Slovenian Farmers’ Union; SDZ/Slovenian Democratic Alliance; ZS/Greens of Slovenia; SDZS/Social Democratic Union of Slovenia and SOS/Slovenian Craftsmen’s Party. The first three were the descendants of the socialist socio-political organizations, while the others were founded only toward the end of the 1980s – before the 1990 elections, they joined forces to form the coalition DEMOS, which won a majority in the elections. 11 We focus here mainly on the verbatim, unauthorized transcripts of the discussions in the sessions of the Commission for Constitutional Affairs of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (Cerar and Perenič, 2001), whose main task was to draft the text of the new constitution. 12 Cf: Korsika, B. (ed.) (1988): Gradivo za slovensko ustavo. Ljubljana: ČKZ. 13 Rapporteur of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia and the Assembly of SFRY XVI/17. 14 The text of the preamble of the current Constitution states: Proceeding from the Basic Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia, and from fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the fundamental and permanent right of the Slovene nation to self-determination; and from the historical fact that in a centuries-long struggle for national liberation, we Slovenes have established our national identity and asserted our statehood, the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia hereby adopts The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13). 15 Rapporteur of the Assembly of the RS and the Assembly of the SFRY XVI/17: 26–27. 16 Article 46 of the Constitution reads: Conscientious objection shall be permissible in cases provided by law where this does not limit the rights and freedoms of others (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13). 17 Rapporteur of the Assembly of the RS and the Assembly of the SFRY XVI/17: 6.

62  Metka Mencin 18 The supporters and opponents of Article 55 were not strictly divided along party lines: for example, the split within the Greens and the Slovenian Democratic Alliance was particularly clear. 19 The author of this text was at the time a member of Assembly and chairwoman of the Commission for Women’s Politics. 20 Most parties rejected this idea on the grounds that human rights could not be decided by referendum, so there was no formal proposal for a referendum. 21 Non-partisan feminist groups were also instrumental in the creation of women’s caucuses of political parties, as they appealed to political parties to articulate their women’s policies. 22 Zupančič justifies this by stating that men and women “play an equal genetic role only in the process of procreation, and the male body is not necessary for the further development of the embryo or the fetus. Therefore, the woman’s right to decide whether or not to give birth to the child is stronger than the man’s and must give precedence to the latter” (Zupančič, 1990: 138). Abortion at the woman’s request is one of the fundamental features of any liberal legislation; it is also advocated by the United Nations Human Rights Committees. 23 Increasing the birth rate was one of the programmatic goals of the governing coalition led by J. Janša (for more on this, cf. Mencin Čeplak, 2016). 24 The Institute is one of the organizations actively involved in anti-abortion initiatives and is well known to the Slovenian public because it received 130,000 euros in 2021 from the Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (while the government was headed by Janez Janša) as part of a call for projects to support the most vulnerable populations in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic. This is controversial for two reasons. First, because of the close ties between the Institute and the then Minister of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Janez Cigler Kralj, who was one of the co-founders of the Institute and a member of its board before becoming Minister, and who still volunteers for the Institute. Second, because of its exclusionary policies, although inclusivity was one of the basic conditions for awarding funds in the call for proposals: the Institute actively opposes equal rights for LGBTQIA+ people, it is involved in anti-abortion campaigns that stigmatize women who have had or choose to have abortions, and it is known for its (former) anti-vaccination stance. 25 Copelon et al. (2005: 125) conclude their discussion of human rights by noting that demands for legalization of fetal rights are at odds with women’s human rights-in the name of fetal rights, control over women is justified, their freedom is radically curtailed, they are denied respect and even their lives are threatened. 26 The controversial reference to the Christian belief about the beginning of life and the condescending attitude towards women was also pointed out in a public letter by the feminist group FemA (in Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1378). 27 The Jožef Stefan Institute is the leading Slovenian scientific research institute, covering a broad spectrum of basic and applied research in natural sciences, life sciences and engineering. 28 In his talk at the panel discussion, he also put the “problem of extinction” in a racist context, claiming that Europeans and white people are in danger of extinction. Available at: https://kvarkadabra.net/2018/06/gams-predavanje/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 29 Cf. https://www.mladina.si/212585/cez-desetletje-nas-bo-3-milijone/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 30 The March for Life, organized by the initiative of the same name and the Živ!m Institute, was attended, among others, by MPs Alenka Jeraj and Tadeja Šuštar from SDS and NSi (cf. Radio Ognjišče, 2020). We have already mentioned the political connections of the Iskreni Institute in endnote 24, but the non-parliamentary party Voice for Children and Family (GOD), led by Aleš Primc, who is the most vocal opponent of abortion (and was the main actor in the fight against the Family Code), is closely connected to SDS and

The right to access safe abortion  63 NSi, as evidenced (among other things) by Primc’s call to the party’s voters to vote for SDS or “another party of the Slovenian spring” (see Kos, 2018). 31 Cf.: https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 32 See https://40dnizazivljenje.wixsite.com/40dnizazivljenje (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Similar efforts are being carried out by the March for Life initiative, about which more in Chapter 3, written by Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener. 33 Law on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment. 34 At the time, Strehovec was also the Secretary of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference. Needless to say, the accusation against him was not brought because of this position, but because, as the director of the Institute that owns the website, and as the editor-in-chief of the website, he was responsible for publishing an article that incites and inflames hatred. 35 Article 63 reads: Any incitement to national, racial, religious or other discrimination, and the inflaming of national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance are unconstitutional. Any incitement to violence and war is unconstitutional (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13). 36 Available at: http://www.zaotrokeindruzine.si/programska-deklaracija (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 37 Intentionally or not, this film was screened on the walls of the Franciscan Church at the time of the massive protests in Poland, organized by women against the further tightening of abortion legislation. 38 E.g., reflex responses are portrayed as emotional reactions, even though the child has yet to learn them through social interaction; it emphasizes the uniqueness of DNA, as if all the key characteristics of a human being are determined at conception. 39 See 24kul.si; https://www.iskreni.net/; https://www.zavod-zivim.si/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 40 Not all women’s movements are feminist; among women’s movements, there have been and still are also decidedly conservative movements that have little in common with feminism. It is true that even some radical feminists (who did not call themselves feminists at the time) opposed abortion in the 19th century in the United States, but as Thompson (2012), an expert on the history of women’s movements in the United States, writes, abortion was not the main issue on their agenda. Radical activists’ opposition to abortion must be understood in the context of their concerns about women’s sexual vulnerability, which they saw as a consequence of women’s economic dependence. Moreover, not all women opposed abortion: for example, one of the most prominent women’s rights activists, E.C. Stanton, unequivocally defended women’s right to control and even terminate their own pregnancies (Gordon, 1982, 1990; Mencin Čeplak, 2016; Thompson, 2012). 41 In this context, they often refer to Coleman, who has been accused of deception by many researchers. In one study, for example, Coleman and her colleagues manipulated readers by claiming that they had found a causal relationship between abortion and mental disorders in women. Since they did not present data on participants’ mental health before abortion (it is not known whether they even had a mental health screening) and after abortion, they clearly had no scientific basis for concluding that women who had abortions suffer from the so-called post-abortive syndrome (APA in Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1381). 42 Cf. https://www.zavod-zivim.si/vodilna-argentinska-zagovornica-umetnega-splavaumrla-med-opravljanjem-splava/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 43 Cf. General hospital Novo mesto, Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Early pregnancy termination with medicines – medication abortion. 44 In Slovenia, emergency contraception is not covered by health insurance and is available in pharmacies for adolescents under 16 with a doctor’s prescription and for all others without a prescription. 45 Cf. https://www.iskreni.net/dejstva-o-kontracepciji-ki-bi-jih-morali-poznati/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

64  Metka Mencin 46 E.g., the statement by Chief Justice Clarence Thomas “that the Supreme Court ‘should reconsider’ its past rulings codifying rights to contraception access, same-sex relationships and same-sex marriage” (Forgey and Gerstein, 2022). In Poland, the government has passed a decree requiring the registration of pregnancies in a central health registry, which will allow comprehensive control over pregnant women. In such circumstances, even period tracker apps, especially those associated with anti-abortion organizations, can quickly turn into surveillance tools (e.g., Femm). 47 Cf. https://www.mladina.si/181189/vest-proti-kontracepciji/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 48 Cf. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-7–2013–0426_EN.html (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 49 Cf. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013IP0548 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 50 Cf. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022IP0302& from=EN (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

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66  Metka Mencin Malačič, J. (1984) ‘Demografske razmere v Sloveniji (in z njimi povezana vprašanja družbene aktivnosti po demografskem prehodu)’, Teorija in praksa, 21(7–8), pp. 68–701. Marn, U. (2006) ‘Plačaj ali trpi’, Mladina, 24 July. Available at: http://www.mladina.si/ arhiv/200648/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Markovič, E. (2020) ‘Splav: moški, ki želijo obdržati svojega otroka, so brez moči in pravic’, Iskreni, 24 July. Available at: https://www.iskreni.net/splav-moski-ki-zelijo-obdrzati-­ svojega-otroka-so-brez-moci-in-pravic/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Mastnak, T. (1992) Vzhodno od raja: civilna družba pod komunizmom in po njem. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije. Matos, U. (2002) ‘Omejevanje pravice do splava’, Mladina, 10 September. Available at http://www.mladina.si/93964/omejevanje-pravice-do-splava/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Mencin, S. (1986) TNT, glasilo Občinske konference ZSMS, 1986 (7). Mencin Čeplak, M. (2005) ‘Referendum proti načelu enakosti pred zakonom’, in Leskošek, V. (ed.) Mi in oni: nestrpnost na Slovenskem. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut, pp. 111–129. Mencin Čeplak, M. (2016) ‘Abortion, or An Everlasting Problem with/for Women?’, Teorija in praksa, 53(6), pp. 1369–1385. Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve (2006): Strategije za dvig rodnosti v RS, osnutek. Available at: https://mddsz.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Mladina (2014) ‘Protestno pismo FemA ob izjavi stranke SMC o abortusu’, Mladina, 7 November. Available at: https://www.mladina.si/158404/protestno-pismo-fema-ob-izjavistranke-smc-o-abortusu (Accessed 17 April 2023). N. Ž. (2018) ‘Prve feministke so bile za razliko od današnjih zagovornice življenja’, NOVA24TV, 6 January. Available at: https://nova24tv.si/sprosceno/zanimivosti/zgodnje-­ feministke-so-bile-za-razliko-od-danasnjih-zagovornice-zivljenja/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Osnutek Ustave Republike Slovenije (1990) Poročevalec Skupščine Republike Slovenije in Skupščine SFR Jugoslavije za delegacije in delegate XVI/17 (Rapporteur of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia and the Assembly of the SFRY XVI/17). Available at: https:// sistory.si/11686/36842 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Peterson, V. S. (1999): ‘Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1(1), pp. 34–65. Petrovčič, P. (2011) ‘Krivica do splava? Pravica do ugovora vesti v zdravstvu in njeni botri’, Mladina, 17 February. Available at: https: //mladina.si/53192/krivica-do-splava/ ­(Accessed: 17 April 2023). Petrovčič, P. (2018) ‘Demagogija, ne pa demografija’, Mladina, 8 June. Available at: https:// www.mladina.si/185891/demagogija-ne-pa-demografija/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Podlage prebivalstvene politike v SR Sloveniji (1990) Delovno gradivo. Dokument št. 212-I/89–90. Ljubljana: Republiški komite za zdravstveno in socialno varstvo. Radio Ognjišče (2020) Pohod za življenje: “Me slišiš, mama? Živel bi rad, to te prosim”. Available at: https://radio.ognjisce.si/sl/230/novice/32127/foto-pohod-za-zivljenje-meslisis-mama-zivel-bi-rad-to-te-prosim.htm 3.10.2020 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Report on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights – A7-0426/2013 (2013) Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-7-2013-0426_EN.html (Accessed 17 April 2023). Salecl, R. (2002) The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Ideology after the Fall of Socialism. London, New York: Routledge. Snyder, D. and Hoffman, I. (2020): ‘For Catholic Supporters, Poland’s Abortion Protests About More Than One Issue’, National Catholic Reporter, 13 November. Available at: https://www.ncronline.org/news/catholic-supporters-polands-abortion-protests-aboutmore-one-issue (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

The right to access safe abortion  67 Strehovec, T. (2016) Stališče SŠK o predvajanju filma Čudež življenja v Ljubljani. Available at: https://katoliska-cerkev.si/izjava-ssk-o-predvajanja-filma-cudez-zivljenja-v-ljubljani (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Stres, A., Valenčič, R. and Žužek, M. (1991) Ne strinjamo se z ustavnim predlogom glede splava. Available at: https://katoliska-cerkev.si/ne-strinjamo-se-z-ustavnim-predlogomglede-splava (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Šušteršič, J. and Šušteršič, S. (1989) ‘Kaj se dogaja z mojim ljudstvom?’, Problemi-Eseji 1989, 11–12, pp. 129–143. Thompson, C. (2012) ‘Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and Politics of Abortion’, Seattle University Law Review, 36(1), pp. 1–68. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) (2019) General Comment No. 36, Article 6 (Right to Life), 3 September 2019, CCPR/C/GC/35. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/ docid/5e5e75e04.html (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Ustava Republike Slovenije (1991): Official Gazette RS, Nos. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13. Available at: https://www.us-rs.si/media/constitution.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). UŠK (2019) ‘Na posvetu o demografiji tudi Gams in Jelinčič’. Dnevnik, 26 March. Available at: https://www.dnevnik.si/tag/matja%C5%BE%20gams (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Varuh človekovih pravic (2017) Letno poročilo Varuha človekovih pravic Republike Slovenije za leto 2016. Available at: https://www.delo.si/assets/media/other/20170519// Porocilo_VCP_2016_koncno_za_www.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Volk, L. (2021) ‘Čez desetletje nas bo 3 milijone!’, Mladina, 10. December. Available at: https://www.mladina.si/212585/cez-desetletje-nas-bo-3-milijone/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). WHO (World Health Organization) (2012) Safe abortion: Technical and policy guidance for health systems. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/70914/9789241548434_eng.pdf;jsessionid=C4C1153BE78B982143E224C91 16E1AA8?sequence=1 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). WHO (World Health Organization) (2020): Preventing Unsafe Abortion. Available at: https:// (Accessed: 17 www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/preventing-unsafe-abortion ­ April 2023). Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) Gender & Nation. London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi: SAGE Publications. Zajc, M. (1990) ‘Naprej v srednji vek’, Mladina, 16 February (7), pp. 16–17. Zakon o zdravstveni dejavnosti (1992) Uradni list RS, no. 9/1992. Available at: https:// www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/1992-01-0460/zakon-o-zdravstveni-dejavnosti (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Zupančič, K. (1991) ‘Pravica ženske do umetne prekinitve nosečnost’, in Bahovec, E.D. (ed.) Abortus – pravica do izbire?!: pravni, medicinski, sociološki, moralni in politični vidiki. Ljubljana: Skupina “Ženske za politiko”, pp. 129–147. Živ!m (2021) Vodilna argentinska zagovornica umetnega splava umrla med opravljanjem splava. Available at: https://www.zavod-zivim.si/vodilna-argentinska-zagovornica-umetnega-splava-umrla-med-opravljanjem-splava/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

3

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener

Introduction The chapter presents the dynamics of social mobilization for and against sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia. It documents the emergence of an organized anti-gender movement in Slovenia, its modus operandi and successes and examines its intricate connections with the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the key player in the debates over reproductive and sexual rights. Due to low public trust, the Slovenian RCC establishes and/or supports satellite organizations in the form of civil society initiatives and organizations that work on its behalf to assert its influence and ideology. Opponents of sexual and reproductive rights therefore present themselves as movement of concerned citizens who want nothing but the best for “us”, “our children” and “our nation”, but are neglected and ignored by corrupt elites and other morally decadent people. This imagery is an indispensable toolkit of contemporary populist rhetoric, uniting numerous similar movements across Europe (Dietze and Roth, 2020; Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017). Feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups and organizations remain the most important and consistent supporters of sexual and reproductive rights in Slovenia. To gain further insight into how social mobilization for sexual and reproductive rights has been articulated over the past decade, we conducted 12 anonymized semi-­structured interviews with activists engaged in some of the most visible and relevant feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups or organizations, namely: Legebitra, Slovenian Sexological Association, FemA, City of Women – Association for the promotion of women in culture, Wild Hags Festival, Association DIH – Equal Under the Rainbow, Kvartir, Transfeminist Initiative TransAkcija Institute, the Red Dawns Collective, Spol.si and the 8th of March Institute. The interviews shed light on their tactics and repertoires, reflecting on their capacity-building needs, the issue of cooperation and solidarity among them and with other progressive social movements and the problems related to anti-gender mobilization in Slovenia and beyond.1 We have chosen to begin with a historical overview of Slovenia’s socialist period for a simple but very important reason: socialist doctrine, and to a significant extent also its practice, represented a revolutionary change in the social position of women and, consequently, in the area of reproductive rights. Without knowing DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-4

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  69 this context, it is difficult to understand subsequent events and the (d)evolution of reproductive and sexual rights against which equality and human rights are measured. Moreover, to know the future, as Giambattista Vico wrote in his Principles of the New Science (1744/1982), it is necessary to look back and re-examine the past, not in order to understand it better, but in order to understand the possibilities we have in the future. Social and historical context: family planning, reproductive rights and sexual rights in socialist times Since the end of World War II until today, the social position of women in Slovenia, which we believe is crucial for family planning and reproductive rights, has been in a process of constant change. In the socialist constitution of 1946, women were given the right to vote, equal rights to work and pay, equal right to leave of absence, social security and education, in short, they were declared equal citizens and their social status was protected by a number of policy measures. This led to a series of institutions and measures, aimed at facilitating the everyday life of mothers and children, such as paid maternity leave, maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens, milk bars, counseling services… All of them did indeed improve women’s lives, albeit modestly, according to the living conditions of the post-war period. These measures also had positive effects on reproduction: medical and hygienic standards gradually improved, although infant and maternal mortality rates remained rather high in the early post-war years and did not decline significantly until after a decade (Obersnel Kveder, 1999). The 1946 Matrimonial Act ensured equality between men and women, as well as equality for unmarried mothers and children born out of wedlock. It also established the duration of maternity leave (12 weeks). Companies were obliged to ensure that expectant mothers could perform less strenuous work and to provide time and space for nursing mothers to breastfeed (Bahovec, Vodopivec, Salecl, 2002). In the post-war period, the women’s employment rate in Slovenia was among the highest in the world, especially in the period from the 1960s to the present.2 According to researchers, this was a consequence of the economic need for labor in the period of intensive industrialization, but also of the interest and needs of women themselves for economic autonomy as a prerequisite for personal emancipation. The employment rate of women of childbearing age between 22 and 44 years was only 5% lower than that of men in the same age group in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Bahovec, Vodopivec and Salecl, 2002; Kralj and Rener, 2015; Repe, 1999). The greatest shortcoming, as far as the situation of women in socialist Slovenia is concerned, was probably in the area of politics and the lack of an independent civil society. Although the regime constantly propagated the need for women’s political participation, this mostly resulted in their formalistic and ritualistic presence in the lower strata of the political power structure, while their participation at the top of the political power pyramid was drastically minimized (Antić Gaber, 2006; Rener, 1986; Rener and Ule, 1998;). Moreover, there was no particular reason for women to participate in such content-less and ritualized political activities,

70  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener that only consumed their already scarce free time. In our opinion, the fundamental failure in the political structure of socialist Slovenia, similar to other ex-socialist countries, was the lack of an independent civil society until the 1980s, when it became possible for civil society and social movements, including feminist, gay and lesbian, to emerge. Like all radical social changes, the post-war socialist revolution in Slovenia, as part of the former Yugoslavia, had its own privileged subjects who replaced the old ones and the choice is never accidental. Women, youth and the working class were these chosen subjects on which the socialist political and economic regime placed its hope for survival and development precisely because of their weak and precarious position in a relatively underdeveloped, agrarian and patriarchal pre-war state. In this new era, the reproductive function of women was embedded in a new ideological framework and thus acquired a different social meaning than before World War II. The new image of women was an ambiguous mixture of the old, traditional “feminine essence” and a brave new “socialist woman” who was able to transfer her selflessness from the individual life into the public sphere for the sake of the emerging “socialist community”. Men achieved social status through work/employment and loyal political activity, while the model woman citizen was framed as a working mother. Family planning, reproductive rights and sexual education

Family planning programs began in Slovenia in the mid-1960s. From the very beginning, family planning was understood as a basic human right. It included the right to freely choose one’s partner, the number of children and intervals between them, to freely choose the way to achieve a satisfying and safe sexual life, and the opportunity to make all other fundamental choices in this area, such as access to informed choice and to effective contraceptive methods and ways of diagnosing and treating infertility (Obersnel Kveder, 1999: 255).3 The leading role in conceptualizing and monitoring these activities in the years between 1972 and 1981 was played by the Family Planning Institute in Ljubljana, which thereafter lost its independent status and became part of the Gynecological Clinic. A critical review conducted by the pioneers of family planning in Slovenia themselves revealed a lack of coordination among health care institutions and insufficient monitoring of these activities, both of which resulted in the fact that the efficiency and implementation depended on the experience and commitment of individual health care professional (Andolšek, Kožuh Novak and Obersnel Kveder, 1991). At that time, conscientious objection to abortion and contraception was not legally possible.4 The Institute was the main actor in promoting the adoption of a comprehensive legislation regulating family planning and reproductive rights in Slovenia during the socialist period. The Law on Health Measures in Exercising Freedom of Choice in Childbearing (1977) introduced the right to abortion on the sole request of the pregnant woman, thus ending the existence of special commissions that approved (or not) women’s requests for abortion.5 This law was considered one of the most progressive regulations on reproductive rights in the world. It introduced modern methods, measures and means of birth

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  71 control: contraception, sterilization, abortion and methods of medical ­treatment for infertility, including medically assisted insemination upon a woman’s request. The effects of these progressive policies are still being felt. One of our interviewees, a gynecologist, points out that the low number of teenage mothers in Slovenia, second only to Switzerland, is probably due to relatively good information and affordable contraceptives: These numbers are still low. I think that the credit goes to the old system, even though the current system claims credit for it. After independence, nothing was done in terms of reproductive rights that didn’t already exist in the former system. (Interviewee 1) At that time, there was also strong opposition to family planning and modern contraceptive methods among some health professionals. However, data on abortion proved its importance and its human value: in 1970s, the abortion rate was still high and abortion-related deaths occurred (40 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–49 years and 11 deaths in 10 years), whereas in the 1980s, the abortion rate dropped by half to 20 per 1,000 women and there were no abortion-related deaths. The main reasons for this were early decisions to have abortions, performed by qualified doctors in numerous and easily accessible medical institutions. After the abortion, women received information and counseling on sexual and contraceptive behavior (Obersnel Kveder, 1999: 257). In the post-war period, there is another feature worth mentioning. Sexuality education was introduced in the 1960s as part of the elementary school subject called Health education, and when this subject was abolished in 1985, the topic of sexuality education was transferred to biology in elementary, secondary and grammar schools. It was taught either by biology professors or by invited experts from local health institutions, mostly nurses. It proved to be very important for the generations of post-war youth.6 A qualitative study of sources of information on family planning and contraception among three generations of women in Slovenia showed that the first generation, born before World War II, had almost no information about sexuality and reproduction. The post-war baby-boom generation was mostly satisfactorily informed through sexual education in schools, while the third generation currently relies almost exclusively on the Internet and peer communication (Sapru and Rener, 2016).7 Sexual rights?

The two words, “sexual” and “rights” were almost unrelated in the public discourse of the socialist Slovenia until the end of its existence in the early 1990s. Of course, homosexuality was discussed, both in public and in private, but it was mostly limited to either gossip in private circles or to the media reporting some sensational undertone about a public figure or a criminal offense. Before World War II, the Penal Code criminalized homosexuality as a “crime against nature” and punished “every act of the perpetrator who seeks and finds

72  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener sexual satisfaction with a person of the same sex” (Greif, 2005:150). After the war, homosexuality was still considered a crime by the Yugoslav Penal Code, but it was very rarely applied in Slovenia until 1977, when Slovenian Parliament removed this paragraph from its Penal Code and sanctioned homosexuality only if it involved violence or abuse of vulnerable persons or children under the age of 14. An organized gay and lesbian movement began in the 1980s, when the first festival of gay culture called Magnus8 was held in Ljubljana (1984), and a lesbian group called Lesbian Lilit was formed in 1987. In 1984, at a large feminist feast to which men were not admitted – an event that provoked years of ridicule and ironic discussions in the media, including the liberal and leftist ones – female sexuality was discussed publicly for the first time by a group of feminists. The two words, “sexual” and “rights” finally found each other. In the area of family planning and reproductive rights, the socialist period in Slovenia is still considered a model of comprehensive legislation for other reasons, as well. Pregnant women and women on maternity and care leave were protected from losing their jobs, mothers and pregnant women were not required to work night shifts, there was full wage compensation during the absence from work due to maternity or care leave, and the network of pre-school childcare facilities was well organized and affordable. All these circumstances provided very good conditions for women’s autonomy, but – from a historical distance and with a dash of irony – they were also to some extent counterproductive. A prominent Slovenian feminist noted: I was born in the late 1950s, and lived through times of liberal attitudes toward contraception and abortion, when reproductive rights were not being ­challenged by the state or politicians. Being able to make decisions about one’s own body was taken for granted. But that was only one side of the coin. Since the old socialist legislation came ‘from above’, many women felt that they did not have to fight for these rights. When the anti-abortion campaign began, no one really believed that these long-standing rights could be taken away. (Jalušič, 1997: 213) As the idealized democratization carried with it many promises of freedom and prosperity for all, no one thought that the “newborn” democrats of the new nationstate would seriously challenge reproductive and sexual rights in particular. This is exactly what happened in the early 1990s.

The new nation-state: reproductive rights in question The neoconservative turn: home, nation and god

In the first multiparty elections in 1990, the political coalition called Demos won with 53% of the vote (within the coalition, the Christian Democrats were the leading

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  73 party). The issues of gender equality and women’s rights were certainly not at the top of the political agenda in Slovenia in the 1990s. However, the same cannot be said for the issue of reproduction: on the contrary, reproduction became a leitmotif of the newborn state, albeit in the sense of duties, rather than rights. According to Jalušič, women lost many of the social advantages they had enjoyed in the socialist era, but nevertheless managed to retain some old rights and incorporated them into the new state (Jalušič 1993: 123). We claim that in the early years of the transition, the most important change – in terms of women’s social position – occurred in the ideological domain and had far-reaching consequences. Post-socialist Slovenia reclaimed the status of a privileged subject, once held by the working class, youth and women, and bestowed it on new groups and classes: entrepreneurs, new political parties and the Roman Catholic Church. Women experienced a particular shift in their social status, which became closely bound to the nation and nationalism. In post-socialism, women were once again the target of a special ideological interpellation, albeit of a radically different nature. They became the target of an interpellation into “mothers who should ensure the biological survival and progress of the nation” and the “guardians of the home and privacy”. The former economic “proletarianization” and politically enforced “emancipation” were thus replaced by an ideological model of women’s domestication. Most important here is a long-term connection between the ideological domestication of women and traditional conservative views about the social role of gender, the relation between the private and the public, and the role of women in politics in general and in a newborn nation-state in particular. We see this connection in the notion of a society that has pledged itself to a kind of organic whole (this whole is represented by the “nation”) that overcomes all internal conflicts through a process of enforced social homogenization (Rener and Ule, 1998). The trinity of home, nation and god was ideally suited to the organic selfunderstanding of society. The “home” stood for the illusion of a protected and organic community, free of conflicts; the “nation” for an extended family to which all individual actions had to be subordinated and god for the transcendental selfunderstanding of one’s own life as unforeseeable fate. Thus, all the fundamental ideological conceptions and premises of social reform in a post-socialist society coincided with one another. They represented a defense mechanism against the challenges Slovenia faced in the 1990s: the establishment of a market economy, a massive increase in unemployment, unregulated property relations, an underdeveloped rule of law, the dismantling of the welfare state, social conflicts and political instability. In ideological as well as economic and political terms, social and ethnic minorities paid the highest price for the transition period of the 1990s. However, the most evident setback in the social position of women in Slovenia, as in almost all post-socialist countries, occurred in the area of reproductive rights. The abortion dispute

When the nationalist parties came to power, programs to increase the birth rate and against abortion intensified. Party leaders, supported by some academic

74  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener demographers, began making catastrophic projections of national failure if the birth rate did not rise. The main daily newspapers ran headlines such as “Two children are not enough” or “Fewer and fewer Slovenians” (Jalušič, 1997: 212). The media discourse, especially the print dailies, has clearly adopted an alarmist rhetoric regarding low fertility rates in Slovenia, invoking no less than the “dying-out” of “autochthonous” Slovenians. In the years immediately preceding and the decade following the independence, an archaic notion was reinvented, according to which an “autochthonous” population “naturally” merges with its habitat and consequently enjoys special “primordial rights and duties”. The academic voices of the time – with the exception of a few academic ­feminists – completely failed to redress these imageries, probably because of a possible stigmatization in a very tangible nationalist fervor of the time. (Knežević Hočevar, 2003). The anti-abortion campaign began before independence, when it became clear that a new political and economic order was emerging. The campaign gained strength when the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church (RCC) joined the effort in 1987 with the public screening of the infamous anti-abortion movie The Silent Scream. This set the stage for the subsequent, much more widespread anti-abortion campaigns in the early 1990s, when the Constitution of the new Slovenian state was being deliberated. The question thus is: who dared to oppose and resist such pressures? In this case, the answer is rather simple: women themselves, women’s and feminist groups, liberal-left political parties and critical intellectuals who showed that any attempt to deliberalize the abortion legislation passed back in the 1970s would encounter stiff resistance (Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1376). Opposition to the suggestions of banning abortion did not occur in a vacuum; women, most of them employed and economically independent, empowered by at least de jure equality and a series of policies from the socialist era, were not ready to accept the new nationalist and patriarchal ideology without resistance. Despite a number of differences in ideology, opinions and worldviews in general, despite the fact that some were feminists and others were not, even despite the fact that some were members of right-wing political parties, women decided to initiate a concerted action.9 It is safe to say that this was the zenith of women’s and feminist history in Slovenia. An alliance was forged between women’s groups, feminist scholars, who at the time rushed to publish the now legendary book Abortion – the Right to Choose?! (Bahovec, 1991) and people engaged in street protests that took place in front of the Slovenian Parliament in 1991. The “abortion issue” was a unique opportunity for the various women’s groups to stand together for a common cause. Women knew that the pressure would not stop with the right to abortion, but would continue until they became obedient subjects of the new rulers. Therefore, the resistance to the proposals to ban abortion was not just a particular, women’s protest. It was also a general protest that succeeded in delegitimizing the political forces aimed at limiting the basic human rights of women (Kralj and Rener, 2015: 49–50). These events hold an important hope for the present: when a critical issue such as a basic human right is at stake, we can reasonably expect a similar

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  75 convergence of forces from progressive civil society, NGOs, social movements, certain political parties and critical individuals: The era and post-socialist society in which we live is not conducive to collectives and collective action. However, I have high hopes that, in the event of a threat to Article 55 of the Constitution, the progressive forces will find this missing moment of mobilization and organize effectively to defend women’s fundamental rights. As we did in 2016, when we joined forces to protest against attempts to introduce paid contraceptives.10 (Interview 2) Attempts to limit freedom of choice in childbearing did not stop after the adoption of the constitution, as shown by the occasional but recurring critical moments over the next three decades. One of the strategies used to subvert the constitutional provision was to reduce access to abortion by removing it from the list of services covered by compulsory health insurance, which was proposed by several People’s Party MPs in 2002 (Mencin Čeplak, 2016: 1377). In 2006, the Christian democrat Minister of Family, Labour and Social Affairs put forward a similar measure in his proposal, called the Strategy for Increasing the Birth Rate in the Republic of Slovenia. Both proposals were rejected. They triggered protests from feminist groups, pro-choice activists and professional associations, such as the Slovenian Sociological Association. Sharp criticism of such attempts was initially expressed by activists in the form of various “street protests” and performances. For example: on November 2006, the Feminist Initiative in Support of Abortion Rights entered Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Affairs with statements against the proposed strategy: “We strongly reject the proposed strategy and wonder how it is possible that the Slovenian government systematically violates and abolishes human rights. Who will be next?” With posters and banners, the activists surrounded the building of the Ministry, thus exposing it to the public as a violator of women’s rights. The slogans “Women = birth machines”, “Defend abortion rights – tomorrow it will be too late”, and “Yesterday migrants and Erased citizens, today Roma people and women; who is next?” placed the discriminatory policies against women in the context of institutionalized violence against marginalized minorities. In November, the Initiative together with the Peace Institute and the Red Dawns Festival, organized a public discussion about the proposed strategy. Some public protests followed in the form of burlesque performances ridiculing the minister (Hvala, 2012). Soon after, the prime minister asked the Minister of Labour, Family and Social Affairs to resign and the misogynistic strategy was slowly forgotten. Limiting access to artificial insemination

In 2000, the new right-wing government passed a law making artificial insemination available only to couples. This serious violation of women’s reproductive choice was met with fierce resistance from a wide range of feminist, lesbian and

76  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener other groups. It culminated in the Festival of Resistance on 16 June 2001 (Hvala, 2008). Soon after, the government changed, and the new liberal government proposed an amendment to end discrimination against single women and to make medically assisted artificial insemination formally available again to single, disabled and lesbian women. However, right-wing parliamentary parties demanded a public referendum on the issue. In June 2001, a referendum was held, which resulted in single women, including lesbians, being deprived of right to artificial insemination, which had previously been granted to all women, not just for medical reasons. Since then, artificial insemination has been an exclusive right for married or cohabiting heterosexual women as part of medical treatment for infertility. At the same time, in June 2001, two poets, a Slovenian and a Canadian, both attending the Ljubljana Literary and Music Festival, were denied entry to a pub by a bouncer who stopped them and told them to get used to the fact that “This pub is not for your kind of people”, the latter meaning homosexuals. When the incident hit the headlines, it generated a strong reaction, leading to the first gay and lesbian pride parade a month later, with about 300 people in attendance. In the relatively short period of three decades of Slovenia’s independent existence as a state, the patterns of change have always been the same. Whenever a centre-right political coalition is in power, regardless of the power structure among the constituent political parties, one should expect a series of attempts to change, transform, roll back, limit or erase achievements in the area of sexual and reproductive rights. The 2001 referendum on medically assisted insemination, described by its critics as the “mother of all referendums that shouldn’t take place” in Slovenia because they limit or deny human rights (the 2004 referendum about the “erased” people being the most notorious one in the series), had the same historical pattern.11 The rise and fall of a good practice: Women for Politics, Commission for Women’s Politics and Office for Women’s Politics

We will briefly present the case of the civil society women’s group called Women for Politics, the parliamentary Commission for Women’s Politics and the governmental Office for Women’s Politics for several specific reasons: – we believe that they represent an example of good practice in which the women’s movement, feminist civil society groups and a formal political institution worked together. It could serve as an example of a fairly effective “coalition” with executive results in the area of women’s human (and reproductive) rights; – at the same time, the herstory of all the main actors involved shows how fragile the historical opportunities for implementing human rights are, especially when it comes to issues such as reproductive and sexual rights. It shows that these rights can never be taken for granted and are never secure, as they prove to be critically dependent on political marketing, power plays and interests of powerful actors to control reproductive issues.

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  77 The Women for Politics group was founded in 1989 and played an important role in opening the political space to women. It focused primarily on preserving certain achievements that were in fact the result of the socialist “state feminism”, but at the same time were also an important foundation for a modern and autonomous life of women. Women for Politics was a mixed group of old and new feminist activists and members of other women’s groups. In April 1990, the group initiated the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which, unfortunately, was not realized. However, the Parliamentary Commission for Women’s Politics was established, and its first president was Metka Mencin, a member of the parliament and a member of the feminist group. She contributed significantly to the openness of the Commission’s work and to the implementation of certain initiatives in the legal sphere. The group played a crucial role in the campaigning for the preservation of Article 55 of the Constitution on the freedom of choice in childbearing (Jalušič, 2002: 74). Instead of the Ministry, called for by the group, the Office for Women’s Politics was established, whose second director was one of the founding members of the Women for Politics group. This was the first step toward implementing gender equality at the highest political levels. The Commission was established as the authority to monitor the situation of women and to submit proposals for its improvement. The Commission’s powers also included making proposals to the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia and its bodies, individual ministries, and other institutions for the establishment of equal opportunities for women at work, in education, and in politics (Report on the Work of the Parliamentary Commission 1996: 155). The Commission’s proposal to establish the government Office for Women’s Politics was accepted in 1992. In the course of their activities, the Commission and the Office regularly cooperated. They discussed the Penal Code (Article 141 which regulates equality), the Political Parties Act, the Act on the Organization and Financing of Education, the Matrimonial and Family Relations Act, the Health Care Plan (especially reproductive health), the report of the Council for the Protection of Human Rights, etc. They organized conferences, issued a number of publications and funded and co-funded research projects on women-related issues. Organization that cooperated with the Office included women’s groups within political parties, trade union and a number of various NGOs from feminist groups to rural women’s union (Bahovec, Salecl and Vodopivec, 2002: 311). As a governmental body, the Office formally performed its duties correctly. Feminist groups and intellectuals, however, were rather critical of its activities. They acknowledged that the Office was quite successful in acting as a watchdog in passing certain laws, in upholding women’s rights that had already been achieved, and in reporting internationally on the situation of women. However, in their view, the Office failed in a function it was supposed to perform, given the legacy from which it emerged: namely, strengthening women’s NGOs during the transition period, as only these organizations can effectively monitor any government. On the contrary, the Office took the implementation of a large part of these activities into its own hands, which ultimately meant that we were dealing – once again! – with a kind of “state feminism”.

78  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener Nevertheless, Slovenia was the only former socialist country in Central and Eastern Europe that had such an Office, which was not part of another ministry and was established by a special parliamentary act. The reason why Slovenia established both institutions as early as in the time of the introduction of the multiparty system is considered to be precisely in “the powerful feminist movement that was part of the civil society resistance in the 1980s” (Jalušič and Antić, 2001: 21). But the story does not end here. The existence of the Commission was first called into question in the process of establishing the agencies after the 1996 parliamentary elections. After the 2001 parliamentary elections, the Commission for Equal Opportunities (the former Commission for Women’s Politics) was dissolved. At the same time, the Office for Women’s Politics was renamed the Office for Equal Opportunities, presumably because the term “women’s” was reductive and the Office was supposed to have a broader agenda. This was certainly not just a linguistic matter or a wordplay but rather a symptom of events that followed. The Office of Equal Opportunities first lost its organizational autonomy by being incorporated into the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, and was finally abolished as such in 2012, ­presumably due to rationalization efforts in government spending. What remains now is a department within the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities with a very modest public voice and even less power to influence important policy decisions (Kralj and Rener, 2015: 45–47). The last decade: two steps forward, three steps back Our title, of course, does not refer to three or any other number of events that have set back the situation of reproductive and sexual rights in Slovenia. We only want to point out how fragile the area of these rights is proving to be. Nowadays, it often seems that most of the time and energy devoted to these issues, is being spent on preserving what was achieved during socialist times and during the “golden age” of social movements in the 1980s. Let us begin with what we consider to be a few steps forward: the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, the decriminalization of prostitution, the tentative but steady revival of sexuality education in schools and the availability of medication abortion. Istanbul convention

In the field of domestic violence and violence against women in general, the women’s movement and in particular the feminist movement has played a decisive role since the 1980s. In the late 1980s, the first important developments in regard to services for victims took place as a direct result of demands from these movements. In 1989, feminist activists set up a telephone helpline for women and children, victims of violence. In the mid-1990s, the first shelters were established by the Centres for social work, public institutions providing social services, and by feminist NGOs. In 2003, the Police Act was amended, giving the police the power

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  79 to issue restraining orders in case of crimes or misdemeanors involving violence. In 2013, this act was replaced by the Police Tasks and Powers Act, which retained these provisions. The new Criminal Code, adopted in 2008, introduced a specific criminal offense for family violence, while the Family Violence Prevention Act, adopted in 2008, was the first comprehensive legislative response to the needs of victims. One of the goals of this act was to shift the focus in criminal proceedings from offenders to the victims and the support they need. In 2011, Slovenia signed the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (i.e., Istanbul convention) and ratified it in 2015 (Humer and Panić, 2015). The Convention is the most powerful legal instrument against domestic violence, according to the representatives of the two most important NGOs in the field, the Association SOS Helpline for women and children, victims of violence and the Association for non-violent communication. In October 2021, the first evaluation report of Slovenia’s implementation of the Istanbul Convention has been published by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO, 2021). The report notes that significant progress has been made by the Slovenian authorities toward building a comprehensive legal, policy and institutional framework in the field of prevention of domestic violence, but that less attention has been paid to forms of violence against women that do not involve domestic violence. While GREVIO acknowledges with satisfaction the efforts made by NGOs to address the specific needs of vulnerable women exposed to multiple discrimination (Roma and other national minorities, women with disabilities, women without permanent residence and migrant women with irregular status), these women still face negative stereotyping and difficulties in accessing support and information about their rights. Therefore, GREVIO strongly encourages the Slovenian authorities to continue to address the rights and needs of all women and girls. Decriminalization of prostitution

Until recently, prostitution in Slovenia was not associated with the concept of sexual rights. On the contrary, prostitution and prostitutes were traditionally seen as a moral problem and considered in a mental matrix of Christian morality, closely linked to the concept of weakness (from the client’s side) and moral degradation and sin (from the prostitute’s side). There is hardly any official data on prostitution in Slovenia, but some general remarks can be made on the basis of the information available from a few research studies and articles by investigative journalists: – after the independence, prostitution was on the rise: there was an increase in the number of night bars occurred, employing artistic dancers, some of whom also engaged in prostitution. Likewise, the number of erotic massage parlors increased;

80  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener – prostitution is mainly understood as female and heterosexual. Of course, male prostitution also exists, but it is more temporary and hidden. The majority is believed to be homosexual prostitution; – street prostitution is rare in Slovenia. The most common form of prostitution is the so-called “mobile prostitution” (“call-girls”). Other forms include escort prostitution and prostitution in hotels and bars; – almost nothing is known about the clients. While there is some official data on prostitution, and the police keeps records on bars and night clubs and monitor working conditions there, but they do not deal with clients (Pajnik and Kavčič, 2006: 7–8). According to NGOs’ estimates, there are about 2,000 people who make a living from prostitution. A significant number of them are immigrants, mostly from the former Yugoslav republics. Prostitution was a criminal offense before the independence of Slovenia. The first attempts to decriminalize prostitution were made in the mid-1990s, but were rejected by the parliament on the grounds that the social context in the country did not allow for changes in this direction. In 2003, the prostitution was decriminalized with the Act Amending the Act on the Protection of Public Order and Peace with the support of all parliamentary parties, which does not happen very often. One can wonder how it was possible, first, to reach a political consensus on such a controversial issue, and second, why public opinion, which is very divided on issues such as abortion, single motherhood, LGBTQIA+ persons and especially their parental rights, wasn’t really involved in public debates on the decriminalization of prostitution. In the political debates and consequently in the media reports, the issue was mostly approached in two ways: on the one hand, prostitution was reduced to an economic activity, to a business like any other, which was in line with the new hegemonic entrepreneurial ideology, and on the other hand, to a controversial behavior that threatens public morality but is mostly practiced by “others”, i.e., non-Slovenians. Women engaged in prostitution were consequently portrayed as either “professional call-girls who know exactly what they want” – these images were contrasted with depictions of women from abroad who were described as “naïve girls from problematic countries in Southeastern Europe”. We believe that this is still the prevailing mindset regarding prostitution in Slovenia. In 2017, Pajnik and Radačić edited a book Prostitution in Croatia and Slovenia: Sex Workers’ Experiences, which is the first systematic sociological and legal study of sex work in Croatia and Slovenia. Through interviews that give voice to sex workers themselves, the authors show that the majority of sex workers in both countries engage in sex work to survive, because the income from employment does not allow for decent living. They mostly reject the prevailing stereotype of the victim and it is important to emphasize that some of them perform sex work with pleasure, although they admit the work is very demanding, both physically and psychologically. Sex workers differ significantly in terms of education, employment, housing situation, partner relationships and personal histories. However,

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  81 they share a number of experiences related to their work: they are stigmatized and marginalized, socially invisible and silenced. Gender and sexuality education

Sexuality education cannot be considered as a major achievement in the field of family planning and sexual rights as it is not compulsory in Slovenian educational system. There is no systemic sexuality education in Slovenian schools after the subject health education was abolished in 1985 and its topics were transferred to other subjects, mainly to biology. Therefore, the organization of sexuality education depends on the individual school as there are no national guidelines except those provided in the biology curriculum. A gynecologist and promoter of sexual education explains why it is almost non-existent in the current Slovenian education system: No one is interested in it. It is simply not on the agenda of politicians’, not even on the agenda of progressive politicians’. On the other hand, there are politicians who are strictly against it. Supposedly because it spoils the youth. It is not a priority of the ministries and public institutions that should deal with this issue. (Interviewee 1) There are almost no studies on sexuality education in Slovenian schools. In 2013, the National Institute of Public Health published the results of an empirical research study on sexuality education. Eight hundred and ninety secondary school pupils participated in the study. The research pointed to the need to introduce sexuality education in schools in a more comprehensive and systematic way, as 70% of the respondents said they would prefer to have a sexuality education course, while another 25% would prefer to participate in sexuality education workshops organized by schools. According to the study, students believe that sexuality education should include a variety of topics, with sexually transmitted diseases, contraception and sexual intercourse issues being the most frequently mentioned. They are quite satisfied with their sexuality education and feel that they were informed mainly through school (60.2%) and the Internet (58.7%) (Žalar et al., 2013). In 2015, the National Institute of Public Health introduced the Care for Health program in elementary schools, which includes two hours of sexuality education for pupils, aged 13–15. The quality of this rather modest program depends primarily on the skills and attitudes of individual teachers though it is usually delivered by nurses from the local community health center. However, the program is based almost exclusively on biological aspects of the anatomy and physiology of sexual activities, reproduction and contraception. It does not include psychological, cultural, social and emotional aspects and does not address sexual rights. Nevertheless, it looks as if sexuality education in the educational system could improve at least a little. As a part of regular medical checkups in primary and secondary schools, there

82  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener is currently an opportunity to participate in sexuality education workshops. They are based on a much more open and comprehensive understanding of ­sexuality and sexual rights than in the recent past. However, sexual education for the LGBTQIA+ population remains a problem and a major challenge for the future. Sexuality education in schools completely ignores individuals with non-normative sexual orientations, sexual identities, sexual expressions and sexual characteristics. The lack of sexuality education for LGBT people within the school system is often highlighted. Many interviewees pointed out the lack of sexuality education about LGBT sex, and consequently unfamiliarity with methods of practicing safe (lesbian) sex. (Interviewee 3)12 The consequences of the lack of inclusive sexual education were insightfully described by another interviewee: At the systemic level, it is not regulated for the general population and is left to the ingenuity and value system of individual principals and teachers. Not to mention sex education which would include positive education for satisfying and safe sex for the LGBT population. In general, there is still no educational environment that would provide LGBT youth a positive milieu for creative personal development. (Interviewee 2) It seems that society, or more precisely, the state, only reacts with its apparatuses, and almost exclusively when there are real or perceived problems, for example, when it comes to fear of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV, or when the LGBTQIA+ population demands equal rights. The same interviewee commented in detail as follows: The issue of sexual and reproductive rights thus revolves more or less around prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections for men who have sex with men. Aside from NGOs, and even they do so sporadically and inadequately, almost no one addresses in an affirmative and supportive way questions like: how do I, as a gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender person, have a satisfying sexuality outside of the traditionalist matrix. How do I have, for example, a sexual relationship with someone who is not gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender? How to have a successful open and polyamorous relationships, how to meet the sex needs of living-apart-together families, how to cope in a non-monogamous relationship? How to disclose my homosexual orientation to my personal doctor, gynecologist so that she can make informed decisions about prevention, diagnosis and treatment? How to develop satisfying gay or lesbian sex, how to have anal sex, how to take care of my anal health, what are the satisfying non-procreative sexual

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  83 practices? What to look out for in terms of prevention, how to take care of my sexual health? What are the possibilities of artificial insemination for lesbian couples, how to manage the sex life in long-term relationships, in long-distance relationships? What are the pitfalls and advantages of chemsex. In the absence of these affirmative practices, we are confronted with phenomena such as: the abandonment of sexual health care by lesbians as a result of bad experiences with gynecologists (e.g. delegitimization of lesbian sex, assumption of virginity, forced contraception, etc.), non-disclosure with primary care physician, which can lead to inadequate diagnosis because the doctor “didn’t think of it”, delay in seeing specialist care when symptoms of sexually transmitted infections appear, resulting in late diagnosis and thus poorer prospects for successful treatment. We are confronted with psychological and verbal (active and passive) violence by physicians (e.g., deliberate mis-gendering of transgender people, lack of support for lesbian motherhood, moralizing about non-mainstream sexual practices or partnerships…). There is severe lack of expertise on LGBT sexuality and LGBT sexual health (e.g., when treating transgender or intersex persons) among urologists, gynecologists, dermatologists, infectious disease specialists, psychologists, psychiatrists, psychotherapists and other professionals… We are witnessing self-­destructive behavior of LGBT persons as a consequence of social stigmatization (self-harming, ‘bug chasing’, drug abuse…). The area of sexual and reproductive rights of LGBT people is, of course, underresearched in our country, so I cannot confirm my observations with quantitative data. (Interviewee 2) The changing terrain of abortion provision – medication abortion

From a feminist perspective, medication abortion (MA) in the form of mifepristone (RU486) and misoprostol represents an almost revolutionary change in the provision of abortion worldwide. It allows women to have more control over their abortion as it can be a self-managed and emancipating procedure that does not affect their autonomy and dignity. The abortifacient RU-486 was born in the laboratory in the late 1960s. It was first approved in France and China in 1988. Its history has been shaped by legislators, corporate marketing executives and protesters on both sides of the abortion debate. It was fiercely and dramatically resisted from the very start, labeled as the “human pesticide” by Christian ecclesiastic authorities around the world and by moralists who claimed that it will trivialize sex and human relations since it could be easily compared to “taking an aspirin” (Alta Charo, 1991). Half a century after its invention, and after having been used safely by millions of women worldwide, medication abortion is recommended by the World Health Organization, which has included it in the list of essential medicines as a safe and effective method of terminating pregnancy in the first trimester. It usually consists of two phases: a dose (pill) of mifepristone and a day or two later a dose of misoprostol, with the combination of the two inducing abortion. Today, medication

84  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener abortion is one of the most common and safest medical procedures and represents an important medical advance for women as it offers greater privacy and flexibility. Therefore, the question immediately arises as to why there are still EU countries where medication abortion is illegal (Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Malta) and why the proportion of medication abortion compared to surgical abortion is very different among European countries where it is legal (for example, 97% ratio in Finland versus 20% ratio in Germany and Italy). A feminist approach to medication abortion offers some explanation for the second question, according to Celine Miani (2021), who hypothesized that this ratio may be partly explained by country-level dimensions of gender equality. She took into consideration several country-level gender equality indices and medical abortion ratios in 23 European countries. The analyses showed that in countries where men and women are more equal in terms of economic participation and political representation, there are proportionately more medication abortions compared to surgical abortions although few countries do not fit this pattern. Slovenia, where medication abortion has been available since 2013, is among the European countries with the highest medication abortion ratio: in 2022, the medication abortion ratio was 75% according to data, provided by the National Institute for Public Health. Medication abortion is administered on an outpatient basis; while it is possible for women to take the second dose at home, it is recommended that the entire procedure be performed in a health care facility. In many countries, medication abortion can be self-managed, i.e., occurring outside of a medical setting and without being under (direct) supervision of a medical professional. This often involves self-sourcing abortion pills and taking them at home or another preferred location. Some people may choose to self-manage their abortions because it provides them privacy and a greater sense of autonomy and agency in ending their pregnancies. Moreover, self-managed medication abortion can be crucial in contexts where access to abortion is limited due to legal restrictions, procedural barriers or because abortion services are otherwise difficult to access. However, when asked about their opinion on medication abortion, one of our interviewees expressed concern: Contrary to what some feminists say, which is that MA should be widely available to all women even without any involvement of medical or health professionals… I think that abortion is not…, should not be completely ­personal. Not just for safety reasons. Health care facilities should be involved or some other form of individual or collective solidarity. I know it is like a strong menstruation, nothing more…However, I cannot imagine being alone at home waiting for the bleeding to start. For me, this is not autonomy, it is loneliness. (Interviewee 11) Another emphasized the issue of safety: I don’t see many problems here as far as the MA is concerned. It is safe because it is only available under medical supervision and you usually take

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  85 both pills in the health care facility and go for a control visit after a couple of weeks. Nevertheless, I read about MA available over the counter in pharmacies or obtained on internet or on the black market… It seems too risky, I don’t approve of it. (Interviewee 7) The controversies surrounding medication abortion are far from over, as evidenced by recent events in the United States, where a lawsuit brought by antiabortion groups is challenging the FDA’s approval of mifepristone. An ultimate decision to invalidate approval for mifepristone would represent a major victory for the anti-abortion movement and would have significant ramifications for future access to medication abortion not only in the United States, but likely in other parts of the world, including the EU. The main opponents to abortion and LGBTQIA+ rights and their modus operandi It is safe to say that the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church (RCC), after its rehabilitation in the 1990s, has firmly positioned itself as the most important actor in debates on issues of reproductive and sexual rights. The Slovenian RCC has intensified its promotion of patriarchal family patterns against any form of family plurality and has portrayed abortion as evil from the mid-1980s. This process has continued for decades, especially since the early 2000s, when it issued a policy document Choose Life on the new evangelization of Slovenia for the 21st century. Among other recommendations, it envisioned the creation of a variety of lay organizations to help spread the message of the Church. This action plan reflected the Vatican’s anti-gender strategy,13 which had been in the making since the mid1990s and was applied politically when the opportunity arose (Kuhar, 2017: 216). Negative attitudes toward homosexuality and attempts to abolish or at least restrict reproductive rights have thus been part of Slovenian history since the beginning of its independence in the 1990s, and they are intensified whenever a central-right political coalition is in power, for a rather simple reason. Namely, the right-wing political parties, especially the Slovenian Democratic Party and New Slovenia – Christian Democrats, maintain excellent relations with the local authorities of the RCC. The broader ideological framework within which the RCC and the rightwing political parties cooperate is the same and is particularly evident during election campaigns: nationalism, anti-immigrant rhetoric and appeals to privatize the economy and services. At the same time, whenever right-wing political forces are in power, the erosion of democratic institutions is accentuated in the form of strong political pressure on the mass media, the judicial system, NGOs, cultural production and independent academic and research institutes. There is a peculiarity in the modus operandi of the Slovenian RCC when it comes to anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQIA+ rights issues that should be pointed out. Due to article 7 of the Slovenian Constitution, which stipulates the separation of Church and state, the RCC is working on the “secularization” of its public image and discourses by establishing or supporting satellite organizations (civil

86  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener society movements, civil initiatives, etc.) working on its behalf, in order to exert its influence and ideology on the public opinion, thus effectively clericalizing society. Another important insight why the RCC works “under cover” of its satellite organizations could be found in the fact that Slovenia is characterized by a distinctly low level of trust toward the Church14 and political institutions, while the public trust toward the NGOs and civil society organizations is markedly higher. According to Standard Eurobarometer (2019), 61% of respondents in Slovenia tend not to trust the national government, 66% tend not to trust the national parliament, while 85% of respondents distrust political parties. According to the Slovenian Public Opinion Poll (2019), the share of respondents who tend not to trust the Church and religious organizations is 77.5% (of whom 27.8% declare that they have no trust at all).15 Probably the most effective strategy of the anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQIA+ rights movements is that they manage to portray themselves as civil initiatives of “concerned citizens”, a voice of the silenced majority who want nothing but the best for “us”, “our children” and “our nation”. Even though most of them present themselves as non-confessional movements, there is always the big shadow of Slovenian RCC lurking behind the curtain.16 Whenever there were interventions by liberal governments to reframe traditional naturalistic legal frameworks of marriage and family that aimed to go beyond the heteronormative assumptions of both institutions, the abortion and LGBTQIA+ opponents seized these opportunities and skillfully based their counter-discourses on reinforcing the essentialist and naturalistic frameworks as matters of common sense, while appealing to strong emotional undertones of the heteronormative beliefs and values regarding the family, children or the nation. This allowed their arguments to resonate widely and mobilize larger audiences: People are not persuaded by facts, they are persuaded by emotions. Traditionally, the political right is strong here, they play on much stronger emotions like anger and fear. /…/ Something else is also very important. The right has much better propaganda. We on the left have not yet realized that it is not enough to be do-gooders, to have all the arguments on our side, you also have to know how to present them in a way that attracts the masses. (Interviewee 3) Another interviewee expressed a similar opinion, adding a new moment, i.e., the role of the EU: But the opponents /…/ fawn upon the advocates of the so called “lean state” by suggesting that health services related to reproductive rights should be removed from the list of services covered by health insurance. And they suck up to the anti-socialists by labelling the right to abortion as a remnant of the ‘communist totalitarianism’. They are also objectively supported by the European Union’s policy of leaving the regulation of reproductive rights to the member states themselves. (Interviewee 7)

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  87 As noted by Kuhar (2017), opponents apply various strategies to spread their ­messages, including web portals, online petitions, roundtable debates and public rallies. During the referendum campaigns against marriage equality, they used the tactic of e-mail chains to spread their messages among “unsuspecting citizens”, e-bombarding politicians, academics and other public figures who support sexual and reproductive rights. They have received hundreds of identical e-mails every hour, in some cases causing their inboxes to be completely blocked. Another arena, where opponents of abortion and LGBTQIA+ rights are very good, is networking with important state or state related institutions and bodies. They have managed to become members of the Expert Council for Families at the Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and the Expert Council on Aids at the Ministry of Health. They also manage to be regularly invited to parliamentary readings of the proposals for new legislation on family policy, reproductive health and anti-discrimination and gender equality policies (Kuhar, 2017). In the following sections, we will present the most relevant events (case studies) regarding the mobilization against abortion and sexual rights in Slovenia in the last decade. The Family Code referendum (2012)

In the fall of 2009, the Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the then ruling centre-left coalition presented to the public a new Family Code to replace the outdated (more than 30 years old) Marriage and Family Relations Act. A lively public debate ensued for three years, and although the Family Code regulated a wide area of family and partner life (the proposed law also expanded provisions protecting children’s rights, such as banning corporal punishment and establishing a children’s ombudsman), the debate focused on three articles that introduced a new, inclusive definition of the family,17 legally and symbolically equated same-sex and heterosexual partnerships and granted samesex couples the possibility to adopt children. Although the Family Code received public support from several Slovenian professional organizations (the Chamber of Clinical Psychologists, the Department of Social Pedagogy at the Faculty of Education, the Slovenian Association of Psychologists, the Slovenian Sociological Association, the Slovenian Association of Social Workers), it seemed that an atmosphere of moral panic prevailed in the public discourse and eventually led to the compromise version of the Family Code, in which the institution of marriage was reserved for heterosexual couples, while a special institution (civil partnership) was introduced for same-sex couples, granting the same legal consequences as marriage with the exception of adoption rights, which were denied to same-sex couples. The main protagonist against the Family Code was the Civil Initiative for the Family and the Rights of Children (CIFRC), founded in 2009 by Aleš Primc, a former member of the conservative Slovenian People’s Party, who usually presents himself as a concerned father. The central framework of their campaign was the creation of homosexuality as a multidimensional threat: Family Code with its

88  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener “novelties” poses a threat to children, the (traditional) family and gender roles, and thus to the future of the Slovenian nation itself. The Civil Initiative launched a public campaign to collect the signatures necessary to force a referendum on the Family Code, invoking the constitutional right to challenge laws passed by parliament. Its main channel of mobilization was the web portal 24kul.si, set up jointly with KUL.si – Association for the family and the culture of life, a self-proclaimed grass-root and non-profit organization, whose founder and director was dr. Tadej Strehovec, the Secretary of the Commission for Justice and Peace of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference (at the time he was spokesperson and the Secretary General of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference).18 Strehovec made public comments on the Family Code on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church and participated as its representative in the second reading of the Family Code in the Committee on Labor, Family, Social Policy and Disability in the National Assembly. The fact that the campaign against the adoption of the Family Code was jointly orchestrated by the Roman Catholic Church and the Civil Initiative was also evident when the Civil Initiative’s leader, Aleš Primc, gave lectures and speeches in churches and rectories, urging churchgoers to vote against the Family Code in the referendum (Kovač and Maljevac, 2018). The campaign for the referendum was successful and the Civil Initiative submitted the required signatures on 3 February 2012. After the referendum was called, the campaign intensified until the last moment and sometimes manifested an indecently low level of political culture. Two examples come to mind: the distribution of flyers with semi-pornographic images of homosexuals, captioned with “Do you want these people to be parents?” Another example was the attempt to target other segments of the population, such as anti-vaxxers. The victimization discourse was: if you don’t want to vaccinate your children, the repressive state will take them away from you and give them up for adoption to homosexuals who will abuse them. In the 2012 referendum, the Family Code was rejected with 55% of the vote. The voter turnout was 30%.19 The same-sex marriage referendum (2015)

Since the adoption of the Family Code was rejected in the referendum, the existing Marriage and Family Relations Act remained in force. In December 2014, the United Left party submitted an amendment to the third paragraph to the parliamentary procedure, which stated that a marriage is a “legally regulated life union between a man and a woman”. The new definition defined marriage as a “legally regulated life union between two persons”, thus granting same-sex and heterosexual couples the same rights and obligations. The parliament passed the amended act on March 2015, with 51 votes in favor and 28 against. In February 2015, two right-wing activists founded a new civil initiative called Coalition “The Children are at Stake!”, which presented practically the same arguments against the adoption of the proposed amendment as they did when they opposed the adoption of the Family Code. In early March, the initiative, strongly supported by the Catholic Church, organized a public gathering in front of the

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  89 parliament, attended by several thousand people who expressed their disapproval of the legislative changes. Soon after, the Coalition “The Children are at Stake!” began collecting signatures in front of administrative units to submit a request for a legislative referendum, and succeeded in collecting the required number of signatures within a few days. The parliament tried to prevent the referendum, arguing that the law in question protects fundamental rights, and that Article 90 of the Slovenian Constitution specifically protects laws concerning fundamental rights from referendum challenges. In April, the Coalition “The Children are at Stake!” filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court challenging the parliament’s decision to reject the referendum. The Constitutional Court granted the group’s appeal in October 2015, thus allowing the referendum to proceed. In late October 2015, the Coalition submitted its request for a referendum to the parliament with 48,000 collected signatures (Kovač and Maljevac, 2018: 12). The referendum was held in December 2015, and the amendment was rejected by a majority of those who voted (63.5%). The voter turnout was 36%. In 2016, the Coalition “The Children are at Stake!” renamed itself into the Movement for Children and Families and announced their intention to form a political party. In 2017, they formed the party The Voice for Children and Families (GOD) as an electable arm of the movement. Their 38-point party platform primarily advocates a return to traditional and Christian values (stating the need to a return to “the respect of life, motherhood and fatherhood, Slovenian culture, work, Sunday’s rest, and Christianity”), binary gender identity and a traditional marriage and family structure. Although some right-leaning political commentators at the time predicted the party could become a serious political player in the 2018 parliamentary elections, it soon became clear that the party’s electoral efforts would end in a flop. The party’s leader declared that the party would no longer contest the election and instructed the party’s voters to vote instead for the Slovenian Democratic Party or any other conservative party that had stand a chance of entering parliament in the upcoming elections.20 The March for Life 2020

In early January 2020, several “pro-life” initiatives formed the Organizational Committee for the March for Life in order to organize the second March for Life in Slovenia.21 The coordinator of the Organizational Committee was a self-described “mother, wife and a devoted Christian” who joined the Committee at the invitation of Tadej Strehovec, the director of the Association for the Family and the Culture of Life and the Secretary of the Commission for Justice and Peace of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference. The announcement of the March, posted months before the event on the news portal 24kul.si, encouraged people to fill out an application form for the March, to participate in the upcoming rally with homemade banners and bring their children. The event was initially scheduled for May but had to be postponed due to national lockdown measures during the Corona virus pandemic. After the new date was set for October, the initiative launched a well-­organized public campaign for the rally, mainly by posting numerous articles on the web

90  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener platform 24kul.si, while its leader, a young woman who declared to have met God, gave numerous interviews to various neoconservative media and web portals. Among other things, the Organizational Committee launched a prayer campaign for the unborn children, with the goal of saying 700,000 Hail Marys for the 700,000 unborn children who were supposed to die in Slovenia in the last 70 years (since the abortion was legalized in 1952). An initiative to sign a document titled “A Declaration for Life” advocating the protection of human life from conception to natural death was launched, emotional testimonies of women with “post-­abortion syndrome” and testimonies of women whose relationships ended because they decided to have an abortion were published along with articles describing the dangers of the so-called “gender theory indoctrination”. A handbook titled “For Life and for the Fight against the Culture of Death in Slovenia”, published by the Association for the Family and the Culture of Life was made available online a few days before the rally. The first part of the 40-pages manual contained an introductory statement by the coordinator, followed by the outline of the rally program and instructions for participants (wear a mask, follow the social distancing rules, hold Slovenian flags, banners and balloons, participate actively, take a photo or make a video recording of the potential provocateurs), the lyrics of the Slovenian national anthem and some hymns with religious themes and a “things to do list” before the next March for Life is organized (get acquainted with the arguments of the “pro-life” movements in order to counter the misleading media reporting, raise awareness among family members, friends and colleagues, regularly follow the “pro-life” websites, get involved in the organizing committee of the next rally, donate money to the “pro-life” campaigns). The second and more extensive part consisted of a series of “pro-life” arguments in the form of questions and answers designed to enable the reader to engage in a possible debate with “otherwise-minded people” “without ever feeling embarrassed but rather proud instead”, a long list of scientific facts about the “harmfulness of abortion for the physical and psychological well-being of women” and a list of selected bibliography. A week before the rally, the coordinator appeared on the conservative media outlet Nova24TV as a guest of the show Tema dneva (The topic of the day)22 alongside Tadej Strehovec. When asked where the idea for this march came from and why it is so important, she replied: It started in America, one year after they legalized abortion, and many people come to this event, especially young people. It is important that they convey to the world that the unborn child is a human being, that women who have abortions are in distress, that they need help, and that abortion is not their only option. But most of all, people come to the march to socialize, because this is also a celebration of life. According to her, the march is a joyful event that many families come to and look forward to. On this occasion, she also invited everyone watching the show to accept her invitation and come to the march, “so that we can stand together because

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  91 unborn children need advocates”. Tadej Strehovec announced to the audience that he will participate in the march for three fundamental reasons: First, because I want to support the efforts in our society to support the right to life of unborn children, second, because I want to support the so-called zero-tolerance policy towards all forms of violence against the unborn children, and third, by participating in the march, I am publicly expressing my support for all mothers who, for one reason or another, mourn the loss of their unborn children. He also stated that the country needs a march like this at this time and that participating in the march is one of the best ways to publicly stand up for the value of life. On 3 October 2020, the participants of the rally (the so-called Advocates for Life) gathered in front of St. James Church. Protective masks, T-shirts and the handbook “For Life and for the Fight against the Culture of Death in Slovenia”23 were distributed and the participants marched in a procession to the main square in Ljubljana. On the way, they encountered a dozen pro-choice activists (whom the right-wing media outlets quickly labeled anti-fa radicals, provocateurs and advocates of the death of the unborn children), who were removed from the scene by the security guards accompanying the rally. On the main square, the organizers gave speeches and presented A Declaration for Life, the Slovenian national anthem was sung and “pro-life” slogans were chanted. People were invited to publicly share their experiences with the trauma of abortion, and their thoughts and prayers for the unborn children and their parents. The rally was attended by some members of the then ruling coalition parties. According to the organizers, about 500–600 people attended the rally, while the police estimated the number of participants at about 200. The organizers and the conservative media called the rally a huge success, but at the same time complained that the event was not covered by the national broadcaster and other leading media outlets. Voices from the frontline: feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups advocating for reproductive and sexual rights The vast majority of feminist and LGBTQIA+ NGOs and grassroots groups operate in Ljubljana. Feminist groups focus their attention on sexual and psychological violence against women in the private and public spheres, the exploitation of unpaid domestic care, emotional and reproductive work, unequal treatment in public discourse and the media, systematic discreditation (e.g., “epistemological injustice”), objectification of women and their bodies in the public media, intersectional discrimination, changing legislation related to the crime of rape and the issue of reproductive rights. Over the years, the LGBTQIA+ movement has developed its infrastructure and engaged in a wide range of activities, from political activism to cultural activities, including a publishing house, magazines, radio programs, an LGBTQIA+ library archive, counseling and educational projects, anti-­ homophobia and human rights projects (Greif, 2005; Velikonja, 2017). More recently,

92  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener the movement has turned its attention to previously marginalized issues such as the stigmatization, delegitimization and discrimination of minority identities both within the LGBTQIA+ community and in society at large. In general, both movements work together when cases of misogyny and discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation occur. Their cooperation is often provisional and temporary, as there is no solid agreement among them to continue or expand their networking. In recent years, however, there have been more attempts to forge alliances with other movements and addressing issues that transcend gender frameworks, such as anti-capitalism, the rise of the precariat, gentrification, autonomous spaces, the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes, climate change…. Capacity-building needs

We explored the key needs for sound capacity building of groups/NGOs and linked this theme to two other sub-themes that we believe are closely related. Indeed, the issue of needs is probably the other side of the coin when it comes to the problems they face in their daily work. All but one of the activists we spoke with cited the lack of (regular) funding as the biggest problem, followed by the lack of time people can devote to activism and the lack of dedicated people who are often overworked and thus suffer of burnout. Some of them also mentioned the lack of suitable places. The other issue relates to time, or rather, to the question of the permanence of a particular group, informal association and even some formal organizations such as NGOs working in the field of reproductive and sexual rights. Often, they emerge when a critical event occurs, are very active and publicly present for a while, even a few years, and then disappear from the public stage. The temporary, or rather transient, status of feminist groups is quite predictable, says one of the interviewees: Feminisms as currents and activist activities are temporally, geographically, socio-politically and culturally soft and fluid formations, based on limited common interests and only one major common denominator, the intention to dismantle the existing gender system, the patriarchy. I believe that the transitivity of the statuses of formal and informal feminist groups is their inherent characteristic. (Interviewee 12) Of course, one could say that this is simply a normal modus vivendi of civil society groups and associations but when this happens repeatedly, one can speak of an unfavorable pattern. It means that a considerable amount of energy and experiences has been at least partially lost, although some members probably simply move from a less active group to a new one or to a more active and visible one. The problem of time is deeper than it seems at first glance, because it is a structural problem, rather than the inability of individuals to organize their time and adapt to the rhythms of time: The possibilities for action are limited primarily by the neoliberal construction of time, including information overload, the culture of psyching up with

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  93 ideologies and their constraints. For example, the principle of competition and the extremely rationalized use of time, which does not allow the normal course of the creative process, with an incubation phase and, and after the work is completed, a review, at least a double revision…. At the same time, the same principle of competition, the implementation of which sometimes becomes absurd, not only unethical and immoral, puts a strain on the possibilities of networking. (Interviewee 12) The same interviewee pointed to two very interesting and, at the same time, rather underestimated elements in feminist activism, which influence the duration of the groups: At the same time, I understand the emergence, decline and reemergence or dissolution of groups experientially as a never fully transparent thing in the intersection of personal, ideological and, ultimately, social choices and impulses. This latter factor is often overlooked, even though it is important in terms of the sustainability or sporadic nature of action. An even less thematized factor is the drive to work together, in fact a kind of passion, a social sense is too soft a term for me. (Interviewee 12)24 An interesting insight explaining the reasons for the limited duration of these groups was given by another interviewee: /…/people have no idea what activism actually means, and that there is really a lot more administration, non-glamorous behind-the-scenes work, responsibility and unpaid or underpaid hours than sexy media appearances and likes on Instagram. Activism takes consistency, empathy, knowledge, and ideally funding. If you fail to professionalize and provide funding in the short time of initial momentum, you end up in a situation where activists always have one foot at work or in college and activism always comes second. (Interviewee 3) One activist summed up the needs for capacity building: The minimum requirements for sustainable activity are: people willing and able to invest their time in the group/organization; a place to work and meet, to socialize; a regular flow of financial resources to cover rent, running costs and labor costs; fluidity of the core group, i.e., recruitment and openness to welcoming new people; mentoring new members and networking with related groups. These conditions are not limited to feminist informal groups: they are the basis for any informal or formally organized group. If they are not met and the group is run on an enthusiastic drive, it is difficult to sustain over time, although the example of the Red Dawns Festival shows that it can be done. But the price is high: we can speak of voluntary self-exploitation,

94  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener exhaustion and, finally, the fact that enthusiasm is only possible when the basic means of survival are obtained from other sources such as paid work, scholarship, etc. That is, if paid work does not consume all your time and if you are not engaged in unpaid reproductive work, such as caring for a child, a sick relative, parents, etc. The prerequisite for enthusiastic, unpaid activism is probably to be young. And healthy. (Interviewee 5)

Funding

Regular funding is usually associated with the institutionalization and professionalization of groups and initiatives, which can be a double-edged sword: Obtaining (regular) funding is one of the essential factors for the sustainability of an activity on the one hand and for its fading out on the other. Regular funding brings more structure, but not necessarily more success. But the struggle for funding can become too hard even for formally organized groups . (Interviewee 12) In addition, almost all tenders require applicants to have a lot of patience, bureaucratic and other rather special skills. These are precisely the skills they lack in the midst of all the other work they do, and so they are repeatedly condemned to “civil society poverty” and voluntary amateurism. One of the most common obstacles to obtaining funding is the requirement for co-financing: There is also the seemingly trivial clinch of a condition or expectation of financial participation. This is often not possible because of the poverty of the NGO sector. It would therefore be difficult to find a tender relevant to civil society that does not encourage pretense, fabrication and invention, in other words, all sorts of machinations… The solution can only be political, strategic, in the accumulation of the power of the non-governmental sector, because, as we know, it really performs the functions of the state, it makes democracy work in the social and cultural sphere, which is increasingly disappearing nationally and globally in the current economic-political situation. There are certainly several techniques to gather forces, but to mention two convenient ones, the pooling and cooperation of organizations and projects, which should be asserted as a necessary condition in the tender documents. At the same time, the tender condition of co-financing should be abolished. Otherwise, how is an NGO supposed to get on its feet and then consolidate its structure and scope of work? (Interviewee 12) Those whose work focuses on bisexuality, transgender and non-binary queer ­identities in their work particularly emphasized how difficult it is for them to obtain

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  95 funding for programs and projects. Could they also be saying that there is some sort of “internal” competition for funding among groups? Or were they actually saying that bisexual, transgender and queer people are discriminated against within “the scene”? Yes, unfortunately the LGBT community is not immune to the phenomena of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. Many non-dominant/non-­ homonormative minority identities thus also experience stigmatization, delegitimization, insult, exclusion and discrimination within ‘the scene’. These are mainly minorities within minorities: bisexual persons, transgender persons, gender non-binary persons, queer persons, androgynous persons, pansexual persons, etc. For the last 30 years, the movement has mainly focused on issues concerning gays and lesbians, especially the regulation of partnership rights and families, but it is only in the last five years that it has started to deal more intensively with issues of marginalized identities within the community. (Interviewee 2) One activist, interestingly, differed from the others and downplayed the problem of funding, that was so strongly emphasized by others, saying: I don’t think the lack of funding is really a problem. Nowadays, there are plenty of opportunities at the international, European, national and municipal levels for a good project to get sufficient funding…However, I believe that the weight of the problems the civil society has to deal with nowadays is simply too big for this work to be done in the afternoon, on a voluntary basis. So what would organizations need? My answer is: professionalization. (Interviewee 2) The activist who downplayed the funding problem and emphasized the need for professionalization may have only been explaining the other side of the funding problem. In our opinion, this is not really a contradiction, but rather a circulus vitiosus: volunteers in the field of sexual and reproductive rights usually deal with complex and time-consuming issues and are left with very little capacity for fundraising, which requires patience and special skills. Therefore, their activities may lack the professionalism that our interviewee emphasized as a prerequisite for successfully addressing complex issues. Professionalization of activities/services

Although most of the activists we interviewed are volunteers, they see the need for better organized, funded and skilled work. They have clear ideas about why professionalization is necessary and how it looks like. When you decide to professionalize your services, there are more opportunities to obtain funding and professional staff, it becomes easier (still, a lot of

96  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener effort is needed) to reach interlocutors at the decision-making level, at the policy-making level…easier, but still with a lot of effort, you start working with other professionals. (Interviewee 4) The complexity of the problems faced by NGOs/groups and the processes to solve them require daily work, expertise and regular, consistent activities over a long period of time. Expertise in sociology, political science, law, psychology, communication, journalism, finance, lobbying and project management is required. But all this can only be achieved by professionalizing one’s services, they say, and this decision is not made without (self-)reflection, (self-)criticism and can sometimes lead to quite intense tensions among people: But over time it has become a conscious decision, i.e., that we are a mainstream, professional organization working in the field of non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities, gender expressions and, in the last year or two, sexual characteristics. /…/ Our actions have become more acceptable, more digestible, more likable for a critical mass of the general population. Sometimes I have doubts about our ‘formalized’ approach, but at the same time I know that it makes it easier for us to offer support to a young transgender person who is being bullied at school. (Interviewee 4) The two, funding and professionalization, go hand in hand and we have heard pertinent criticisms of both, although this is not usually discussed openly within the NGO scene. However, the problem is very real – in fact, there are several, the first one being exploitation: “I also often find that invitations to ‘collaborate’ usually mean that organizations with full-time employees expect us, a grassroots collective with no employees, to do unpaid work for them” (Interviewee 3). The second is “activism by rote”, because: It seems to me that there is a lack of coherent systemic analysis from which collective goals, effective methods and greater solidarity might emerge. We all constantly talk about ’systemic change’, but in practice I see much more activism based on coopting American tactics and quoting American buzzwords of the month than activism based on sociological analyses and theories. (Interviewee 3) And third, perhaps the most serious problem: [What is lacking is] certainly money, although professional activism is also a trap, because it confines you in limited approaches that are acceptable to your funders, and because it is an oxymoron – the goal of activism should be

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  97 to improve the situation in such a way that it eliminates the need for activism itself, but who would want to eliminate their job and their career?. (Interviewee 3) The problem of the systemic entrapment of more radical groups was raised by another interviewee: There are great differences among groups and the resources available to them… but the fact is that the more politically strident and anti-capitalist a group is, the less likable and acceptable it is to potential funders, both public and private. Nowadays, it can quickly find itself on various lists of ‘extremist’ organizations and face public shaming or even prosecution. (Interviewee 5) A theorist and activist with many years of experience reflected on the complex relationship between funding and professionalization, where the real problem is hidden in the underbelly of the relationship, as follows: The chances of getting funding are disproportionately strengthened by a dose of positivity towards the system. The tendency to change the gender system is institutionalized through ‘gender mainstreaming’. When the funding mechanism is part of a state or supranational institution – which is the only stable and predictable source of funding – there is no escape from the doctrines and practices of neoliberal capitalism. It is not just a matter of overloading the application and management procedures, the substantive implementation of projects and the reporting with hyper-bureaucratization, but also of limiting one’s epistemic level. (Interviewee 12) In other words, if in the past, within the framework of historical materialism, it was considered that the “women’s question” could only be resolved within, or at least together with, the class question, today we will say that the “problem of gender and sexuality” can only be resolved beyond (neoliberal) capitalism. Everything else are “solutions” that do not change the essence: It seems that feminisms are being pushed into the sphere of social benignity through gender mainstreaming. Any socio-political change based on feminist reflection and action takes years and is coded in such a way that it does not really bring anything new at the systemic level. We count the number of men and women in certain positions, we talk about ‘inclusive’ language… but mostly it is those who are well adapted to the structures of patriarchy who get funding. The ‘governmentality’ has not changed one iota. Even when ‘affirmative action and measures’ bring more women into leadership and

98  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener management positions, these positions are still structured as they were, in a masculine way. (Interview 12)

The need for an umbrella institution/organization

The need for professional support in various areas was expressed by several interviewees, especially those who emphasized the great need for pedagogical skills and competences in gender and sexuality education or in conducting workshops on these topics. There is also a lack of comprehensive, inclusive didactic materials not only for the education of children and adolescents but also for the awarenessraising and training of health, education and social workers. In addition, there is a need for professional support, solidarity and advocacy skills, which has been most evident in the legal battle between advocates and opponents of reproductive and sexual rights. It became clear that individuals and groups defending these rights chronically lack the resources for activism, and particularly the specialized legal knowledge and comparative international advocacy skills. It is probably hard to achieve the aforementioned things on the activist scene without more solidarity and what Italian feminists in the 1980s called affidamento (adoption).25 Four interviewees explicitly pointed to the need for a larger, strong organization, that would coordinate feminist and LGBTQIA+ activities and help formulate strategies: I think you need a strong coordinating body for this kind of action, a group of people with organizational and logistical knowledge and skills to try to connect all these different groups with different views and different methods of work and find the lowest common denominator. (Interviewee 4) What this lowest common denominator might be is a debatable question, since all these more or less progressive entities apply very different methods and sometimes even differ in some fundamental points of view. There is another important issue that should not be ignored, as it may later become the subject of silent or even furious resistance: There is also the important issue of the representation of this lowest common denominator in public – that is, who can speak for whom, what can they say, when, where. At the same time, we should all be willing to find a compromise among ourselves, but we are not always willing to do so. It can easily happen that a compromise excludes someone or some aspect. All that I have mentioned also takes time, because every decision has to be carefully scrutinized and reexamined. But this is the only way that new, more progressive ideas and methods can emerge. (Interviewee 4)

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  99 Therefore, the lowest common denominator could be achieved by a (written) agreement on purely organizational/technical coordination and other infrastructural requirements, including space and ICT capacities, which some groups do not have. Three of our interviewees have a fairly concise idea of what is required in this regard. Most of the problems already mentioned, i.e., fundraising and certainly professionalization, could be solved by a publicly funded (perhaps more likely community funded) organization or some kind of focal point that would bring together existing, emerging and future groups. It would be a place for educational activities, lectures, meetings, events, etc. It should include “co-working” space for groups that do not have their own space because they cannot afford it. An office that would be part of the organization should employ enough staff to carry out fundraising activities and administrative tasks for its own operation as well as for (joint) initiatives of various groups that do not have the resources to do so themselves. Ideally, the office should have a coordinator, a project manager, an accountant/administrator, a librarian/archivist and a lawyer. Last but not least, it would necessarily need an organizational structure/legal entity that prevents centralization or contains safeguards against it, i.e., a kind of self-governing model of co-decision-making. Keeping in mind the anthropologist Mary Douglas and her insight into the emergence of entities that can actually change the socio-political and cultural environment, such a centralized organization would have to function by integrating as widely as possible not only groups but also individuals who are highly individualistic and libertarian. In short, the center should establish itself as a kind of multicellular, organizationally highly inclusive and heterogeneously functioning body. (Interviewee 12) Too complex? Daydreaming? Too expensive? None of the above, even the smallest government office far exceeds these relatively modest aspirations. Naïve as it may sound, such a centre should be enabled by the state. However, how to support progressive and radical civil society groups is something that this country has refused to learn, even when the most liberal and left-wing parties have governed it. Cooperation, support and alliances among groups/NGOs

There are several factors that contribute to the differentiation of groups and NGOs: at least a partial differentiation in terms of the thematic areas they address, the degree of professionalization, the content priorities and occasionally some “ideological” viewpoints.26 The vast majority of groups operate in urban areas, especially in Ljubljana and its environs, since much of the activism is based on the student population; political activism in particular has always been typically urban. One of the interviewees explained this from a different perspective: according to her, there is a lack of self-organized spaces in other regions, there are only a handful of alternative youth centers the activists could affiliate with,

100  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener and above all, there are no people willing to volunteer for alternative activist work in rural areas. On top of that, she says, the activist scene in Ljubljana is quite self-sufficient and to some extent pretentious, occasionally looking down on “outsiders” and patronizing them. It is hardly interested in the “provinces” and is not willing to do fieldwork there, so the urban-rural divide in activism is rather strong. Perhaps the most important level impacting collaboration and alliances between feminist/LGBTQIA+ groups and NGOs lies precisely in the differences between the last two words, groups and NGOs. By groups, we usually mean grassroots initiatives that are less organized compared to more formal and institutionalized NGOs: they are usually based entirely on volunteer work, have non-hierarchical structure, are located in precarious spaces that they share with other similar groups and have little or no financial resources. The tension between these two types of organizations was described by two of our interviewees. One of them, who works for an established NGO, nevertheless believes that less organized, grassroots and progressive groups are very important: Because of this decision [to professionalize], we have often received criticism from more grassroots, progressive groups and individuals. We try to take this criticism as constructively as possible. However, we have become less flexible as we carefully (re)consider each action and response. I think these smaller groups are important because they see certain shortcomings that we may overlook, they develop new approaches, new methods, new theories…. (Interviewee 4) The complex issue of differentiation/fragmentation in itself is not to be avoided at all costs, because it implies a diversity of content on which movements focus and around which they develop different forms of activities, approaches (tactics, strategies of action), political priorities, forms of organization and so on. However, the real issue lies elsewhere: What is problematic, at least from my point of view, is that in recent years all attempts to bring together existing feminist groups, media, etc. have failed. I am talking about attempts in ‘peaceful times’, when the mobilization was not needed in the sense of an urgent, mass reaction to a harmful political initiative, measure or government law, but an attempt to networking, getting to know each other, talking, etc. I am speaking of attempts in which I have been involved and I can only speculate on the reasons why the two initiatives to meet have not been successful. Was it because we are overburdened? Certainly. But it is also about disagreements and antipathies on a personal, not necessarily political level. Of course, there are conflicts on the latter level, as well. (Interviewee 5)

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  101 Despite organizational, financial, strategic and personal differences, all activists spoke of various levels of collaboration among groups and NGOs and an ongoing willingness to work together and support each other whenever an important issue, particularly sexual and reproductive health and rights, is at stake. We identified at least two levels of existing and hypothetical alliances and collaborations. The first level is the long-standing, almost “natural” or “traditional” alliance and collaboration between groups and organizations from the feminist scene on the one hand and the LGBTQIA+ scene on the other. Often, these groups are even merged, as their activists overlap and there is no clear distinction in terms of content, ideological matrix, specific projects or event-related activities. We have seen this kind of collaboration especially in recent years among a number of very active feminist/LGBTQIA+ groups and initiatives: Lesbian Feminist University (2010), The Wild Hags Festival (2013), Transfeminist Initiative TransAkcija (2014), Spol.si (2014), Kvartir (2014), Anarcho-Queer-Feminist Collective (2016) and the 8th of March Institute (2016). To our knowledge, there was no specific event or set of social/political circumstances that triggered the formation of these groups and NGOs. On the traditional collaboration between feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups, and the tensions between “indigenous” and new activism, one activist said: When people and groups work together, we are also working together on issues that are not primarily ‘ours’. Consider, for example, the appeal of androgynous gender constructions, which can easily be transformed into a political and theoretical affirmation of transgender identification, even if it is not our own gender identification. Despite the heterogeneity of Slovenian feminist movements, we also have a history of very good practice in bringing together homosexuality and feminisms. Again, based on my own experience alone, I can say that the problem lies elsewhere. For example, the beginner’s rush in a part of the transgender community that I kind of understand. Every beginning means rediscovering the world and forgetting or ignoring the knowledge upon which that ‘beginning’ can be built in the first place. Even within feminisms, we are not innocent. (Interviewee 12) One of our interviewees gave very concrete examples of recent collaboration between different groups and organizations: The two scenes collaborate, for example, on ad hoc interventions (e.g. petition against anti-abortion protests in front of the Gynecology Clinic, protests against paid contraception…) and on some established projects such as the City of Women festival, the Pride Parade festival. They collaborate in efforts to promote the ‘Only Yes Means Yes’ approach to the amendments to the Criminal Code, referendum campaigns, etc. (Interviewee 2)

102  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener Another mentioned the positive effect of multiplication: I do not feel any competition in feminist efforts, on the contrary, the more of us there are, the more we are heard. Moreover, my experience is that organizations are joining forces and looking for new forms of cooperation for new or existing projects. (Interviewee 8) The second level of collaboration mentioned by almost all interviewees is a broader one that links feminist and LGBTQIA+ civil society with other progressive NGOs, associations, trade unions, public intellectuals and some political parties. They described events or responses to events that threaten human, reproductive and/or sexual rights and are certain that all of these actors would come together and collaborate if a significant threat to these rights (re)emerged. The willingness to collaborate in the event of a major threat, expressed by all respondents, is certainly a positive phenomenon, but it also reveals a weakness: I often have the impression that only hostile action provokes reaction /…/ there is a lack of awareness that sexual and reproductive rights must be fought for constantly. But when you raise these issues in times when less conservative governments are in power, when these rights are not directly threatened, most people just dismiss these issues and do not take you seriously. (Interviewee 4) Strategies and power

The strategy is, as one of our interviewees says: …primarily a matter of priorities. For example, at some point, LGBT activism decided to place the regulation of rights deriving from partnership status at the top of its priorities. The whole activism, otherwise proverbially fragmented, has focused its central forces on this agenda. It took 27 years of work, 3 rulings of the Constitutional Court, 1 ruling of the Supreme Court, 8 legislative proposals, 4 of which were adopted, 2 referendums… but in the end, the issue was resolved. When civil society does the same in the field of sexual and reproductive rights, things will move forward, as these are, after all, issues that concern the majority of population. (Interviewee 2) Precisely because these issues affect the majority of the population, they are “the preferred object of ideologies” throughout modern history. It is not surprising, then, that generally speaking and with a hint of oversimplification, there are two major ideological blocs competing for (moral) hegemony within this ideological, biopolitical and economically motivated arena. While the conservative camp

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  103 strives for control and disciplinary regulation of the population through reproductive and sexual duties/constraints, the other camp which we will call progressive at the moment, seeks its field of action in opening up the possibilities of personal and collective freedom and jouissance as long as it doesn’t interfere with the freedoms and rights of others. Such a standpoint carries with it the greatest respect for the choices others might make. We believe that this is the biggest difference between the two ideological blocs. Some of our interviewees were concerned that the movements’ strategies are often defensive and reactive, rather than affirming the opening of plural possibilities mentioned above. Of course, the choice of a strategy of action depends largely on the resources available to a group/organization, as well as on the ideological and political context prevailing at a given time. The intersection of these two factors is described in the following statement: In practice, every initiative, open letter, and objection to reactionary legislative proposals is written late into the night and reviewed by a few dozen people, each with their own opinions and additional suggestions. We make considerable efforts to go public, flood the media and verify everything with the experts in the field. While the NGOs are taking action against the adoption of a particular law, a new one is already on the horizon… Such a cycle is very exhausting. (Interviewee 9) When asked why the (neo)conservative side is relatively successful, having won important referendums, and why the right-wing extremists in Slovenia are very vocal, but not very numerous, our interviewee reflected in detail: Behind them stands the Roman Catholic Church, a two-thousand-year-old hybrid of the state, an entity of international law, the religious community, civil society and business. As far as I know, it is the only institutionalized religion that has its own state. A state with an absolutist ruler, minister-­prefects, a worldwide consular network, its own legal system, billions of believers and thousands of churches scattered on the hilltops all over the world. And many allies in business, in secular authorities and in Catholic political parties. One of their central mechanisms for establishing power and control is the management of sexuality (the other is the management of death). They follow a monocultural matrix: 2 genders – heterosexuality – monogamy – reproduction – patriarchy. Reproduction, of course, has a salutary economic effect for them: more believers means more power. And the Roman Catholic Church has been close to power at least since emperor Constantine. In the wake of the successes of the emancipation of LGBT persons (based on decades of successful sexual revolution and women’s emancipation), this institution has identified as one of its important agendas, with the potential to ‘recruit’ many (new) believers, the so-called ‘gender theory’, which is, of course, closely linked to sexual and reproductive rights. At first, it all seemed

104  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener like a joke and we said to ourselves: ‘they surely aren’t serious with it!’, but then it took the form of an internationally organized network of ‘non-­ governmental’ organizations, national referenda and legislation that brought about a regression in this field, bishops’ letters, papal ecclesiastical documents, etc. Their sympathizers and followers, I observe, are in favor of the patriarchal matrix of governance, i.e., the matrix of ‘never question the father’s words’. That is, in fact, how their whole system of belief, child rearing and their socialization functions. And they have quite successfully transplanted this matrix into society and the state. Moreover, in times of economic, health and other crises, many people tend to retreat into ‘safe haven’ of tried-and-true conservative values. (Interviewee 2) Another interviewee referred directly to the issue of abortion: Slovenia is one of the few post-socialist countries that has maintained access to safe abortion. However, we must be constantly vigilant. The opponents are cunningly focusing on young people, by appealing to their conscience, for example with posters of a young pregnant woman whose fetus thanks her for its life. (Interviewee 7) When asked whether there are any concrete and well-defined common strategies of action within their circles and how do they assess their own persuasive power, we got divergent answers, ranging from rather critical and pessimistic introspections to very optimistic and self-confident views. A critical and realistic answer linked to the known shortcomings of (not only Slovenian) left political scene is the following: I don’t think we have them and I guess they would be useful, but I have no idea how they could be implemented and sustained, because we have never been part of a wider network that was not ad hoc or temporary. /…/ I think the right is better organized than the left because they can more easily agree on their goals. On the left, we are so obsessed with our individual beliefs and arguing about which of our social groups is the biggest victim that it is difficult to build broad coalitions, alliances and movements. In my opinion, the Internet itself is not a grist for our mills – the Internet creates isolated, alienated individuals who are much more useful to the right than to the left. The LGBT community, for example, has become completely individualized because of the Internet, where people create individual labels for gender and sexual orientation that describe only themselves and no one else in the world. For isolated individuals, each sitting behind their own screen, gender and sexuality are not social but individual. We do not analyze social circumstances, but rather pick on each other, wasting time on trivialities. We do not build broad alliances, but argue about who is more privileged and

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  105 that it is impossible to work with ‘privileged groups’. We are returning to ­determinism, where men, for example, are inherently bad, instead of asking how we can change things. Because playing the victim brings social capital. (Interview 3) Another critical insight regarding the difficulty of achieving common strategies and the lack of persuasive power is summarized in the following statement: We know what we don’t want: manipulation, populism, oversimplification, banalization, blind following. In other words, the very techniques that are most effective in the neoconservative scene when they are trying to mobilize like-minded people. What we progressives want, despite our heterogeneity, is also more or less clear. Unfortunately, we do not know how to achieve it. For to resign ourselves to the fact that only a sufficiently threatening ‘external enemy’ can mobilize us would be tragic… Progressive movements do not have a mastodon institution with a millennial tradition, with all its derivatives and potentials behind them, they do not have a monotheism, a monolithic value system, the ‘pater familias’ is not a safe haven for them, but a source of oppression that must be resisted. We, progressives seek our place in the spheres of balance between individual particularity and the common good of the collectivity, in the spheres of diversity, freedom, the promotion and acceptance of differences. In this area, we can only say with the utmost certainty that everything is uncertain, fluid. Everything is legitimate, right up to the limit of the freedom of the other. Disbelief, skepticism, criticism, questioning, analysis… these are the values of progressives. And this formlessness is impossible to manage, to steer, to converge around one truth. One idea. One leader. We have not yet found the right formula to mobilize this amoeboid organism. (Interviewee 2) Regarding the strategies and collective actions of activists for sexual and reproductive rights, one interviewee was very critical of the present, but by no means gloomy about the possible future: I don’t think there are any noteworthy visions, plans and commitments for networking; we are part of the left in the broadest sense of the word, and the left has become lazy. Despite weakly supported NGO sector, it seems that things worked out too well for us to fully realize what is going on and how we ourselves have contributed to it. We have forgotten the motto ‘Zero Tolerance!’ and downplayed those developments that we should have confronted together with all the resources at our disposal. This also applies to cases where our left-leaning but anti-feminist male colleagues or our overly competitive female colleagues have spread hate. However, I am not a pessimist. I am convinced that at the first obstacle that arises to undermine the already acquired and consolidated human rights of women, we will

106  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener collectively resort to all the means and weapons at our disposal. Given the multiplicity of our feminist spheres of interest and alliances, I believe that women’s fundamental rights, especially reproductive rights, are our only effective glue. (Interviewee 12) According to some of the other interviewees, some very active, self-confident, policy-oriented and well-planned activities are already taking place: For us, the “Time to say YES” campaign27 was a kind of revelation as we realized that we were not familiar with discursive techniques, methods of fieldwork and ways of establishing cooperation with the wider society. Since then, we have been working on trying out different support tactics: we rely on the power of personal testimonies (#MeToo Slovenia campaign),28 public petitions, innovative forms of events, political alliances, and so on./…/At the Institute, we have so far influenced some legislative changes: we prevented the abolition of the activity allowance,29 we initiated the process of changing the legislation related to the crime of rape /…/ We have been able to influence legislative changes mainly because we are very strong in the field of networking and collaboration. We work with environmental organizations, CNVOS,30 web influencers, humanitarian organizations and self-organized groups. So far, more than 100 NGOs have participated in our campaigns: we believe that because our issues are clearly articulated, we have tremendous mobilization power. (Interviewee 10) Several activists from other groups confirmed her statement as well: I see some new, young activists and groups31 that are extremely articulate, full of energy, knowledge, and above all I see the verve that my generation (40+) lacks a bit. I am impressed by this energy of theirs and I am happy to spread the word about their campaigns (like #MeToo, etc.) through my channels. (Interviewee 8) It is probably much too early to jump to a very optimistic conclusion. Nevertheless, we tentatively ask: is something new on the horizon? Will it last? Analysis of (media) discourses regarding reproductive and sexual rights As noted in the country report for Slovenia in the Media Pluralism Monitor (2016), conducted by the Center for Media Pluralism and Freedom, the functioning of the Slovenian media landscape and the conditions of state ownership and political

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  107 control of the media have been affected by the economic and political restructuring of the former socialist society. The ongoing economic crisis has left most media outlets weaker and more exposed to various pressures, including both political and advertising pressure from owners and other actors in society. Rules to ensure media pluralism are set out in laws and regulations, and there are authorities to monitor compliance. However, implementation is often inadequate and monitoring and sanctioning are inefficient and slow. There are some very high risks to media pluralism in certain areas, namely media literacy, the politicization of the control over the media, state advertising and the independence of news agencies and other providers of traditional and digital content.32 The neoconservative (media) discourse

The main channels conveying the neoconservative rhetoric to the public are the media outlets (in)directly linked to the RCC and the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS),33 although it is safe to say that the web portal 24kul.si acts as the main source of “information” regarding anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQIA+ issues, while the other media outlets mostly summarize, report and occasionally comment on the original sources.34 In the last decade, a number of discourse analyses on reproductive and LGBTQIA+ rights have been conducted by various researchers and academics (Greif, 2015; Kovač and Maljevac, 2018; Kuhar, 2015a, 2015b; Meh, 2015; Mencin, 2016; Sobočan and Pollak, 2015). Most of them focused on the neoconservative rhetoric that permeated the referendum campaigns on the Family Code and the Act Amending the Marriage and Family Relations Act. Most of the LGBTQIA+-related neoconservative discourse is conveyed through two basic concepts: homosexuality as a threat to children and as a threat to heterosexual families and thus to the (reproduction) of the nation. Analyzing this discourse reveals clear and simple problem-solution pairings, where a problem can be solved by eliminating (in legal terms, symbolically, or physically) those who constitute that problem (homosexuals). It ends up becoming a manifestation of hatred towards a certain social group, masked as care and fear for the children and the future of the Slovenian nation. This way moral panic and a discourse of endangerment were established, which are indeed part of the basic principles by which LGBT opponents work. The homophobic discourse was rarely directly hateful in public media, and ultimately anyone who was accused of being homophobic rejected such criticism, claiming they have ‘nothing against homosexuals, but…’. (Kovač and Maljevac, 2018: 21) It is worth pointing out that in his excellent analysis Kuhar (2015: 122) suggests that in the above-mentioned context, we should not accept the interpretation of

108  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener homophobia as merely a deep-rooted emotion, but rather understand it in terms of political homophobia a conscious political strategy of a state or a particular political movement such as Civil Initiative for the Rights of Families and Children (CIRCF), thus structuring the experiences of sexual minorities. Homophobia as a political strategy occurs in a variety of forms – from marginalization processes in which LGBTQIA+ human rights, like the rights of women or ethnic and religious minorities, are constituted as ‘special rights’ that are not a political priority, to interpretations that regulation of this area poses a threat to the nation and the future of humanity, which was clearly stated by the head of CIRCF in his first address to the parliament at the public presentation of the Family Code. Political homophobia can be understood as akin to nationalism, as something that presents itself as an integral, ‘natural’ part of the process of forming and preserving a nation or state: it is therefore a question of who belongs (who is a full citizen) and what a ‘good citizen’ is. In the article, Manifestations of moral panic in media images of the Act Amending the Marriage and Family Relations Act (2015), Sobočan and Pollak present a corpus-based analysis of media discourse in 69 texts from three online and print media. Qualitative analysis of the selected corpus examples showed that discourses about the Act refer to the “natural” family and “gender theory”, signal the breakdown of values in society, warn against the influence of ruling elites and point to the threat to the human rights of dominant social groups and the threat to the nation. The analysis has shown that some terms (“gender theory”) and discourses significantly characterize only the texts in one of the media (Demokracija). These discourses can be understood through the theory of moral panic, functioning as a symptom of tensions and culture wars in a context of wider social change and in the field of cultural and moral regulation. Moreover, the authors conclude that LGBTQIA+ rights advocates are often portrayed as members of liberal political/social elites who threaten the heteronormative social order and undermine the human rights of “normal” heterosexual people by attempting to gain themselves the “privileges” they are not (yet) entitled to (marriage, adoption etc.). The main characteristics of the neoconservative (media) discourses can be summarized in the following dimensions: – homogenization (sudden abolition of social differences within the majority population; creation of an “Us” versus “Them” matrix); – emotionalization (use of highly emotionalized language, creation of a moral panic); – victimization of the “heterosexual/“normal”/moral” majority (“Our” way of life and “Our” moral values are endangered, “We” are the real victims); – culpabilization of the State on the one hand and pro-choice and LGBTQIA+ community on the other (“They” threaten “Us”, the state should protect “Us”,

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  109 instead it gives excessive rights to LGBTQIA+ people and allow the murder of unborn children); – patologization of the LGBTQIA+ community (LGBTQIA+ people as carriers of infectious diseases, widespread use of derogatory denominators, e.g., “sick”, “abnormal”, “perverted”, etc.); – criminalization of the LGBTQIA+ community and the pro-choice advocates (“They” molest and rape innocent children, “They” murder baby boys and baby girls, “They” trade in the bodies of fetuses). It should be noted that several authors (Jalušič, 2001; Kralj, 2008) have found very similar features when analyzing political and media discourses related to immigrants and refugees. Racism and xenophobia have been woven into the antiabortion and anti-LGBTQIA+ rights movements for decades. Therefore, it is not surprising that the anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQIA+ and anti-abortion agenda has become the leitmotif of some of the most extreme right-wing political parties and neoconservative media in Slovenia.35 “Mainstream” and alternative media discourses

In the leading national media, issues related to sexual and reproductive rights appear sporadically and are only extensively covered only in times of “extraordinary” events (i.e., during referendum campaigns, after the public screening of an anti-abortion film on the facade of the Franciscan church in Ljubljana’s main square, in cases of homophobic attacks on LGBTQIA+ persons/community). In most cases, the media coverage was rather “neutral” in nature, applying the controversial strategy of “giving voice” to both parties concerned. Although, as Sobočan and Pollak (2015) observed when analyzing the media discourse during the referendum campaigns, they gave space to the moral panic that permeated the social atmosphere, in many cases they also tried to neutralize it by reframing the image of “normal” families, publishing interviews with experts (sociologists, psychologists, social workers, NGOs…) and public statements by professional associations (such as the Chamber of Clinical Psychologists, the Slovenian Sociological Association, the Slovenian Association of Social Workers, etc.). In 2016, after the Alive Institute organized a public screening of an anti-abortion film on the facade of the Franciscan church in Ljubljana’s main square, national television devoted a large portion of its prime-time broadcasting time to the debate on abortion rights. The talk-show entitled “Abortion – freedom to choose?” was organized in the “pro-et-contra” format, with prominent experts on reproductive rights and members of “pro-life” initiatives as guests. The show sparked a major public outcry: more than 70 viewers, some of the employees of the national television, a member of RTV Slovenia’s Program council, academics and numerous NGOs complained about the broadcast and demanded explanations from the editors, the management of the national broadcasting service and its Program council. The most critical response was issued by the Ombudsman for Listeners and

110  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener Viewers of RTV Slovenia who stated that the well-substantiated messages from the public accused national television of inadmissible problematization of the constitutionally guaranteed right to abortion and a return of Slovenia 50 years in the past, the re-Catholicization of Slovenia, the subordination of the public broadcasting service to the right-wing political option, inappropriate and unprofessional selection of participants among whom a commentator of reality shows on commercial television (and a wellknown anti-abortion campaigner, authors’ note) was not reprimanded by the host of the show, creation of conflicts, non-compliance with the standards of public service programming, irresponsibility and unprofessionalism of the editors of RTV Slovenia. In the following days, the director-general of the RTV Slovenia and the director of the television division issued separate statements saying the program was an editorial error and cited “lack of professional authority, professional working methods and communication that needed to be thoroughly discussed” (Košir, 2016). The media response to instances of homophobic attacks against individuals and/ or the LGBTQIA+ community has been mostly unanimous condemnation. Three events in particular attracted media attention: the rather peculiar attack on the actor who portrayed a gay character in a Slovenian sitcom, the attack on Cafe Open (2009) and the attack on Club Tiffany (2019). In the latest incident, the attackers smashed the front door of the building in the Autonomous Social and Cultural Centre Metelkova in Ljubljana, which houses the Tiffany and Monokel LGBT clubs, and stormed the Tiffany club. The staff of the club fled inside and barricaded the inner door. The attackers smashed the windows and the hallway, insulting and threatening: “Where are you pussies, come out, you faggots!” The staff were terrified, but fortunately, no one was injured. Police were immediately notified of the attack, and upon their arrival, the attackers fled. The attack on Cafe Open gained even more media attention, as most of the attackers were identified and the criminal proceedings were initiated. Mitja Blažič, an LGBTQIA+ activist, who suffered physical injuries during the attack, explained: The attack on Cafe Open on 25 June 2009 was /…/ an attempt at a brutal physical confrontation with the attendees of the LGBT poetry and prose event at the famous gathering place for the LGBT community during Pride Parade week. Nine masked young men, motivated by open hatred towards LGBT people, threw flares and torches into the cafe bar. The reaction of the LGBT community was overwhelming. In an instant, all factions united and immediately began planning a response. Virtually all of active civil society, all of politics and the media reacted. An analytical approach to reproductive and LGBTQIA+-related issues is taken by the weekly news magazine Mladina, considered one of the most influential political magazines in Slovenia. During the referendum campaigns, the authors of the

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  111 texts very systematically tried to neutralize the moral and sexual panic, explicitly addressing the danger it posed, while also introducing other reproductive and sexual rights related issues. In words of one activist: “I believe – also based on past experience – in the support of the public media and some large private media. At least some journalists unequivocally defend reproductive rights” (Interviewee 7). The most comprehensive and analytical coverage of issues related to reproductive and sexual rights is provided by Radio Študent, one of the oldest independent alternative radio stations in Europe, which hosts two monthly thematic shows – Sektor Ž, the only Slovenian radio show dedicated to feminist issues, and Lesbomania, which focuses on the everyday experiences of lesbians while opening space for resistance to negative prejudices related to homoerotic lifestyles. In recent years, LGBTQIA+-related issues began to appear more frequently in certain media outlets. In this context, it is worth noting that the Transfeminist Initiative TransAkcija Institute published a Handbook for Media Reporting on Transgenderism.36 It was developed in 2017, partly in response to the existing Slovenian media discourse and partly at the initiative of some journalists who expressed a desire to better understand how to respectfully report on transgender issues. Where do we stand and where might we go? In this section, we briefly present two recent developments, which at first glance, appear to be completely different, but which represented the recent situation in Slovenia quite well and can be interpreted together. The proposal of the Polish Minister of Justice to his Slovenian colleague in September 2020 to re-evaluate and possibly withdraw from the Istanbul Convention did not come out of the blue. Several Slovenian MPs from the then-leading right-wing party SDS had been campaigning against the Convention for a long time, even before receiving the Polish proposal and continued to do so via social media even after the proposal was officially rejected and demonstrations took place in front of the Polish embassy. The second event, the Friday’s protests, were demonstrations against right-wing government of Janez Janša, that took place every Friday for two years (2020–2022). They were remarkably massive events of resistance in spite of severe intimidation and repression, which conveyed an optimistic message, as they were not simply an uprising against the government, but presented a series of alternatives for the future of the country. Istanbul convention “revisited” (2020)

Unlike some other Central and East European countries, where the Istanbul Convention was a subject of heated political debate, the ratification process in Slovenia was relatively unproblematic. But not for long. When the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) with its leader Janez Janša came to power in 2020, the alliances between the right-wing government, the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church and the countries of the “Visegrad group” became increasingly clear.

112  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener In early September 2020, the Polish Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro – a supporter of the highly conservative catholic organization Opus Dei, according to Polish critical journalist Sebastian Klauzinski – sent a letter to his Slovenian counterpart suggesting that the Slovenian government reconsider ratifying the Istanbul Convention and possibly withdraw from it (Markeš, 2020). In his letter, he emphasized that (1) a child should be considered a child from conception, (2) a family should be understood as a union of a man, a woman and their children and (3) the institution of marriage should only be for persons of the opposite sex. The Slovenian Minister of Justice rejected the proposal, stating that there was no reason to either withdraw from the Convention or amend it, as the ministry believes that the Convention provides a good basis for addressing societal challenges and paves the way for values such as equality and decency for all citizens. But just a few days later, an MP from the ruling political party tweeted that Slovenia should withdraw from the Istanbul Convention, while pro-government media Nova24TV and Demokracija called the Istanbul Convention a cuckoo’s egg of the LGBTQIA+ lobby. The Women’s Forum of the parliamentary Social Democrats organized a protest in front of the Polish Embassy in Ljubljana, followed by feminists and NGOs a day later in the same place with a public reading of letters, written by victims of domestic and sexual violence, and collected as part of the project #MeToo, Slovenia. The difference between Polish situation regarding reproductive and sexual rights and the Slovenian was clearly expressed by one of our interviewees: Another thing that is also indicative is that the situation in our country is not critical yet. In other words, for the time being, the actions of the conservatives and the alt-right are directed mainly against the population of sexual minorities. The attack of the neoconservative, traditionalist and catholicist movements on the already acquired sexual and reproductive rights in our country is slower than in Poland and more gradual. (Interviewee 2) Fridays’ protests (2020–2022)

Fridays’ protests were peaceful demonstrations against the government of Janez Janša that took place in the capital Ljubljana and other Slovenian cities. The main reasons for the protests were accusations of Janez Janša’s usurpation of power, corruption allegations, mismanagement of the Covid-19 epidemic, Janša’s “Orbanization” of Slovenia, lack of media freedom, the government’s attacks on environmental groups, increased military spending and privatization of the health care system. Protests began during the March 2020 lockdown, when people placed banners and flags on their windows and balconies. In late April, they moved to the streets, with most people protesting on bicycles and many on foot. The first “cycling” Friday’s protest was organized on 24 April 2020, by the Facebook group “Resistance to the government of Slovenia”.37 On 17 July, the protesters created

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  113 “Protest People’s Assembly”, which by the end of July presented 245 demands, proposals and ideas to the government, focusing on social, economic and environmental issues. Thousands of people participated in the protests and at the height of the protests in May, 10,000 people gathered in front of the parliament. Protests took place every Friday between 24 April and 23 October, when further protests were canceled due to second wave of Covid-19 pandemic, while people were encouraged to continue their protests from home. On 24 July, scores of protesters gathered in the afternoon to demand zero tolerance for sexual harassment and violence against women and to express their support for the MeToo movement. The protesters, mostly women, carried slogans such as “Only yes means yes” and called for a redefinition of rape and crimes against sexual integrity by invoking the principle of consent. One of the organizers who addressed the crowd was among those we spoke with: Our institute organized a protest in Koper demanding a redefinition of the crime of rape, then a large demonstration in Ljubljana and public readings of testimonies of victims of sexual abuse. In our opinion, protests are effective when they clearly relate to the issue in question and serve to achieve broader social mobilization. (Interviewee 10) For our interviewees, Fridays’ protests were not just an angry reaction to the conservative government, but rather bearers of hope, a kind of potentia of the power of the people when they stop being afraid of repression and start articulating themselves in political terms: I think the protests are effective /…/ because every Friday they publicly articulate a specific political problem – the protests persist, they appropriate a public, political space that the authorities want to close under the pretext of the epidemic. They are creating an alternative political community, maintaining hope, encouraging critique and searching for political alternatives. A close-knit network of political actors is emerging, committed to the political principle of equality. (Interviewee 7) In an excellent analysis of the broader social context of the protests, Tjaša Pureber (2020) noted: If we want to understand their mobilizing power, we must be aware that the anarchist and anti-authoritarian initiatives that initially played a key role in the protests, have been part of the social movements since the time of the anti-globalization movement in the late 1990s. Their continuous demonstrations and consistent messages against capitalism, oppression, hierarchy, fascism and for solidarity and radical equality have been part of our space for two decades. This is probably one reason why the call for self-organized

114  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener uprising, which appeared in a social situation when the civil society was still trying to find a way to understand the new situation and its role in it during the complete lockdown, also resonated so much among the multitude. Despite a strict ban on public meetings and immediate repression. /…/ At the same time, a number of initiatives emerged that tried to establish solidarity networks of mutual support with the most affected parts of society and to organize communities based on mutual solidarity completely beyond the state structures. /…/Along with political messages, this represents an important gesture of resistance against the vehemently enforced repatriarchalization of society that accompanied the measures against the virus. Suddenly, the only supposedly safe place became the household: everyone outside of it was potentially infected, dirty, dangerous – the Other. The only argument given was the supposed common sense that this would prevent the spread of the virus, but the problem of domestic violence, inadequate housing and the problems of all those living in single-person households who were suddenly condemned to social death, were not allowed to be considered. Unlike some cases from abroad, where countries preferred to promote the concept of social bubbles, the household has become a disguised term for a patriarchal heteronormative family. It has become an instrument for imposing new social values.38 We mentioned the events surrounding the Istanbul Declaration, on the one hand, and the Fridays’ protests, which gradually became an institution of resistance and revolt, on the other, because they have a strong symbolic dimension in addition to the real one: in hypothetical cartographies of possible futures, they mark out where it might all lead. We are convinced that much of this will depend on the kind of civil society activism we have tried to outline here, at least in the area of sexual and reproductive rights. Conclusion In our contribution to this book, we focused mainly on the minimum requirements for more “efficient” and more “effective” long-term activities of Slovenian feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups and NGOs fighting for sexual and reproductive rights. It was not easy to find common features, as they differ in many ways: first, they differ in their level of professionalization, where grassroots groups with almost no funding and without their own premises work alongside well-established NGOs. Nevertheless, for most of them, it was possible to identify what they need most in order to strengthen their activities: committed people willing and able to invest their time and energy, a suitable workplace and regular inflows of funds to cover at least running and labor costs to ensure a minimum level of professionalization. Almost all interviewees believe that a more professionalized approach is needed as the ideological, political and policy aspects related to sexual and reproductive rights are becoming ever more complex.

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  115 There are different types of collaboration within the movement: the long-­ standing and almost “natural” alliance between feminist and LGBTQIA+ NGOs and groups, on the one hand, and a broader one that links them with other progressive NGOs, initiatives, trade unions and political parties. Usually, the first type of collaboration takes place when festivals, various cultural events, or manifestations such as the Pride Parade are organized, while the second type of collaboration is forged when alliances are needed to defend a particular issue (e.g., free contraceptives, ratification of the Istanbul convention) or to promote a legislative proposal (e.g., amendments to the Penal Code that redefine sexual consent in terms of the “only yes means yes” consent model, amendments to the Family code to provide for marriage equality). Indeed, new groups have emerged in recent years with a very active, articulate and policy-oriented approach that have succeeded in mobilizing broader progressive civil society movements and a large segment of the public, and in conducting effective campaigns and events that have put sexual and reproductive rights on the public agenda and led to important legislative changes. However, not without a fierce resistance. In December 2020, the Advocate of the Principle of Equality39 filed a petition with the Constitutional Court requesting a constitutional review of parts of the Family code and the Civil Union Act.40 In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled in a landmark decision that defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman and making it impossible for same-sex partners to adopt children is discriminatory and ordered the legislature to amend the Family Code accordingly. Parliament amended the Family Code to provide for full marriage equality, including with respect to adoption, in October 2022. In another attempt to prevent marriage equality, the “Children Are at Stake!” Coalition requested a referendum. Soon after, parliament adopted a resolution stating that such a referendum would be inadmissible because it would challenge a law ending discrimination against LGBT+ people. In November 2022, the “Children Are at Stake!” Coalition, petitioned the Constitutional Court to overturn the parliament’s decision not to allow a referendum on the issue, but failed. The Constitutional Court upheld the parliament’s decision, explaining that although the Constitution provides for the possibility of a legislative referendum, there are cases when this is impermissible – for example, referendums on acts which remove unconstitutional provisions in the area of human rights and basic freedom, or some other unconstitutional provisions. In February 2023, the amended Family Code entered into force, making Slovenia the first country in Eastern Europe to officially legalize same-sex marriage.41 On 8 March 2023, the March 8th Institute drew attention to the fact that abortion is not fully covered by the basic health insurance, as the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia (ZZZS) only pays 80% of the cost of the service, while 20% comes from supplementary health insurance which not everyone is paying for. In a letter to the government and the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia, signed by several prominent members of the public, the March 8th Institute called for abortion, artificial insemination, diagnosis and treatment of reduced fertility and sterilization to be provided free of charge from the public health budget. The members of

116  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener the ZZZS assembly almost unanimously supported the proposal and instructed the board of directors to prepare a proposal for 100% payment for the reproductive procedures in question. We must remember that we are talking about a constitutional category. Article 55 of the Constitution speaks of the freedom to decide on childbirth. This includes the right to abortion. If the exercise of this freedom is not possible because it depends on the financial situation of the individual, then we cannot say that the right is being exercised in the way that the Constitution provides, said one of the ZZZS assembly members. Representatives of the Alive Institute and the March for Life responded to the proposal by stressing that it was unacceptable, because “the availability of abortion forces women to make a decision that many of them regret throughout their lives”.42 When asked about effective common actions, coalition-building strategies and their own persuasive power in society, our respondents expressed a wide range of opinions. Some of them believe that there is a lack of any coherent strategy for action, others critically note that the prevailing strategy is still defensive and partial, instead of being affirmative in opening up plural possibilities for generating mobilizing identities. Still others are optimistic that effective strategies are emerging or are already in place, building on lessons learned from previous effective actions. However, not all actors feel the need to belong to a cohesive and united group with a common agenda, preferring to build collective action through heterogeneous but thematically focused actions. This is especially true for some of the “new” grassroots feminist and LGBTQIA+ groups that operate horizontally, without leaders, often cohabitating in autonomous spaces (squats) with migrants and refugees. These groups tend to be less visible than their institutionalized contemporaries and are often not in line with their (political) strategies. Some of them reject the need for professionalization, “formal hierarchies, legally prescribed responsibilities, and leadership positions based on project and funds acquisition, which is a feature inscribed into the very body of the organizational structure and the neoliberal project management” (Oblak and Pan, 2019: 48). They do not follow annual plans or strategies and prefer the DIY approach, organizing graffiti workshops or experimenting with ad hoc public interventions and direct actions. In terms of solidarity and alliances among the NGOs and groups, despite some of the problems mentioned by our interviewees, there seem to be a constant willingness to work together when there is a major threat to sexual and reproductive health and rights. Activists seem quite confident that “the scene” is able to mobilize quickly when rights are threatened. Moreover, they are no longer engaged merely in a struggle against, but increasingly frequently in a struggle for; a struggle for a new “democratized democracy” that is both plural and inclusive (Pajnik et al., 2020: 344) – through building coalition politics, united around common causes: emancipation, solidarity and equality. The most recent display of such coalitional solidarity happened on March 2023 when Slovenia’s Youth for Climate Justice joined worldwide youth climate strike and staged large-scale protests in Ljubljana

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  117 and Maribor, where environmental movements, LGBTQIA+ NGOs, feminist organizations, representatives of trade unions and progressive political parties marched side by side with autonomous feminist groups and anarchist collectives. We believe that such a coalitional solidarity is proving to be particularly important in the time of writing these lines, as the struggles for control over one’s own body are becoming ever more urgent. Notes 1 We would like to thank our interviewees for their time, intellectual rigor and determination to persevere. 2 At the beginning of the 1990s, the women’s employment rate was 47.4% of the total employment rate and among the highest in the world (Kozmik, 1994: 44). In 2022, the women’s employment rate was 45.2% of the total employment rate. The employment rate of women with children in Slovenia has always been one of the highest in the world: in the age group 18–64, 77% of women with one child, 83% of women with two children and 81% of women with three or more children are employed. Available at: https:// www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/News/Index/10969 (Accessed: April 17 2023). 3 Birth control pills were introduced in 1964 and soon became widely available. 4 Conscientious objection became legally possible after the end of the socialist period, based on Article 46 of the 1991 Constitution, which states that conscientious objection is possible only if it is regulated by specific law and if it does not interfere with the rights of others. The 1996 Healthcare Act in its Article 56 regulates the conscientious objection in medical practice (Blažič, Križaj and Žagar, 2016). One hundred and seventy medical professionals currently exercise this right, ten of whom are gynecologists. A medical institution that is unable to provide abortions due to the conscientious objection of its staff is obliged by law to outsource the performing professionals. 5 Before 1951, abortion was legal but could only be performed if the woman’s life was in danger. A year later, in 1952, The Decree on the Procedure for Permitted Abortion in the first three months of pregnancy for medical, legal and socio-medical indications was introduced. 6 As part of the health education program, sexuality education did not focus solely on the biological aspects of sexuality. Obersnel Kveder (1999: 261) notes that family planning has become a way of life among young people as a result of years of health education for good interpersonal relations and responsible sexual and contraceptive behavior. A representative sample of the population of Slovenia found that 75% of girls and 64.7% of boys used contraception during their first sexual intercourse, while their parents’ generation used contraception in only 12% of cases. 7 Satisfaction with sexual education in Slovenia was self-assessed by 97 women within 64 three-generation family histories in in-depth biographical interviews. 8 The Magnus festival was later renamed Ljubljana Gay and Lesbian Film Festival and is still held annually, making it the oldest LGBT film festival in Europe. 9 “I was invited as an expert to the meeting of the Parliamentary Commission for Women’s Politics, where Article 55 was hotly debated. A prominent woman, a member of the center-right Slovenian People’s Party, said with tears in her eyes that despite her personal beliefs and against her party’s directives, she will vote for the right to choose simply because she could not make a decision on behalf of other women, especially those who might suffer distress and misery as a result of her decision” remembers Tanja Rener. 10 In September 2016, the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia announced its proposal to remove hormonal contraceptives from the list of medicines available free of charge and to place them on another list where financial contribution is required. A number of individuals and groups, including the Women’s Lobby of Slovenia, the 8th of March

118  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener Institute, the United Left political coalition and the youth section of the Social Democrats, ­submitted a petition against the proposal. Shortly thereafter, the Administrative Board of the Health Insurance Institute withdrew its proposal, citing the need for a longer, more comprehensive debate on the issue. 11 On 26 February 1992, the Slovenian authorities erased 25,671 persons from the register of permanent residence. This mainly (but not exclusively) affected people who were born in other republics of the former Yugoslavia and had Yugoslav citizenship and/ or citizenship of another republic of the former Yugoslavia, but lived in the former Socialist Republic of Slovenia where they had their permanent addresses. The mass erasure had devastating effects: the “erased” were deprived of the right to work legally, to travel, to have a bank account, to vote and to be elected and to receive the pension they had earned for decades of their work in Slovenia. They also had no right to free medical treatment, for which they had paid contributions all their lives or to own real estate they had purchased. The erasure was an arbitrary act without any legal basis, as the Constitutional Court ruled in 1999. Right-wing parties, especially the Slovenian Democratic Party, and the media claimed that the “erased” were enemies of Slovenia and therefore not entitled to any benefits or rights. In April 2004, a referendum was held on the restoration of the basic rights to the erased and the motion was rejected by 96% of voters with a turnout of 31.5%. The issue was referred to the European Commission, which declared that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. A group of the “erased” made a collective appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled in 2012 that Slovenia had indeed violated their rights and that they were entitled to compensation. However, 30 years after the erasure, only a minority of the “erased” have been compensated by the state. For more on the erasure, see Dedić et al. (2003), Zorn and Lipovec Čebron (2008) and Kogovšek et al. (2010). 12 The research project focused on the sexual health of lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex people. The research study aimed to identify their problems, needs and experiences in ensuring sexual health and accessing health services while it also explored sexual practices, the practice of safe sex, HPV vaccination, PAP swabs, testing for STDs and experiences with sexual violence. The overall aim of the project is to educate gynecologists working with LGBT+ people (within and outside of Ljubljana) and develop workshops on lesbian and trans safer sex. Available at: https://kvartir.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/01/moja-roka-tvoja-roka-drustvo-kvartir.pdf (Accessed 17 April 2023). 13 The key word in the anti-gender strategy is “the theory of gender” or “gender theory (aka ideology)”, which emerged around the world in the 1990s as a conservative backlash against the UN, that promoted gender equality. According to anti-gender ideologues, the concept of gender is a Trojan horse for normalizing abortion and LGBT rights. In Slovenia, this syntax was promoted in the Catholic press and in politically right-wing journalism during public debates on marriage equality and the Family Code. The label “gender theory” is part of a well-connected and organized international doctrinal campaign against the equality of gender rights and sexual orientation, but it has local specificities. In Slovenia, conservative journalism likes to spread the idea that it is social engineering, the hidden agenda of radical feminists and homosexual activists, who together promote a cultural revolution of gender fluidity and gender identities against a binary natural order in which the sexes are clearly separate and complementary. When the fantasy of a hidden agenda is combined with common-sense notions of biological sex, it produces the desired populist effect: triggering feelings of threat, discomfort and moral panic. For more on this, see Kuhar, R. and Paternotte, D. (eds.) (2017) AntiGender Campaigns in Europe. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 215– 232; and Kuhar, R. and Pajnik, M. (2020) ‘Populist Mobilisations in Re-Traditionalized Society: Anti-Gender Campaigning in Slovenia’, in Dietze, G. and Roth, J. (eds.) RightWing Populism and Gender. European Perspectives and Beyond. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 167–184.

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  119 14 In the last decade, the public image of Slovenian RCC was compromised by sexual scandals and huge financial malversation. For more on this, cf.: Smrke, M. (2014) ‘Impact of the “Holy Crash” on Trust in the Church in Slovenia’, East European politics and societies [online], 28(1), pp. 119–136 and Smrke, M. (2016) ‘The Decapitation of Slovenia’s Catholic Church: Social Factors and Consequences’, Religion, State and Society, 44(2), pp. 152–171. 15 Slovenian Public Opinion Poll (2019). ADP – Social Science Data Archive. Available at: https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm191/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 16 There are probably more shadowy figures working behind the scene, namely, the international coalitions of abortion and LGBTQI+ rights opponents who might be providing organizational and/or financial backup. However, with rare exceptions, such international alliances are not publicly known. The God’s Children Institute is taking part in the international “pro-life” campaign “40 Days for Life”. In 2015, Robert Colquhoun, director of the division International Campaigns, visited God’s Children Institute and Matjaž Venta, the local campaign leader, during the preparations for the second 40 Days for Life campaign in Ljubljana (https://www.40daysforlife.com/2015/09/24/ljubljanaslovenia-2). Most of the neoconservative movements were also taking part in The European Citizens’ Initiative Mum, Dad & Kids, collecting signatures “in defense of the identity of marriage and family”. Among 14 EU countries, Slovenia managed to collect the minimum national quota of signatures. 17 The family was defined as a cohabitation of a child with one or both parents or another adult who is taking care of the child/ren. 18 Initially, the web portal 24kul.si was hosted on the official server of the Slovenian Roman Catholic Church. 19 Low turnout in referendums has become a habit in Slovenia. With the exception of the referendum on joining the EU and NATO, which had a turnout of 60.4% and the more recent referendum on the contested Water Act which had a turnout of over 46%, all other referendums had a turnout of between 15% and 38%. A referendum result is valid if it receives more than 20% of the votes of all registered voters. We believe that the series of low referendum turnouts in Slovenia can be explained by three main reasons: a boycott, the relatively high number of referendums in Slovenia and a protest against politicians who misuse the referendum instrument for issues that should be resolved in parliament. The Family Code referendum was not the subject of a collective boycott. 20 The GOD party formally still exists and is occasionally active in other political initiatives, such as campaigning against the Marrakesh Declaration, claiming that non-­ Christian immigrants threaten European culture and its way of life. 21 The first March for Life was organized by God’s Children Institute in October 2014, as a counter-gathering to the Conference of the International Federation of Professional Abortion and Contraception Associates, which took place on the same day in Ljubljana. The God’s Children Institute staged a protest with large panels of photographs of aborted fetuses to show “the real truth about abortion”. According to the organizers, the first March for Life was attended by about 50 people. Available at: https:// www.sta.si/2057201/strokovnjaki-na-konferenci-v-ljubljani-o-splavu-ob-robu-shod-­ nasprotnikov-splava (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 22 Cf. https://nova24tv.si/news/coordinator-of-the-march-for-life-2020-urska-cankar-soaresan-unborn-child-is-always-a-human-being-the-child-cannot-be-considered-a-humanbeing-only-when-the-mother-wants-it-but-not-a-hum/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 23 The handbook in e-format is available at: http://24kul.si/media/datoteke/knjizica%20 Pohod%20za%20zivljenje%202020%20(1)(1).pdf. The text was proof-read by Tadej Strehovec. 24 Rosi Braidotti once spoke about feminist sociability, about the joy and passion of being together, of working together in a feminist way without competition for intellectual or other prestige, about the deliberate nurturing of naivety in the passion for social justice, when she answered the question of what feminism is at the City of Women festival in Ljubljana. She said: “Feminism is /…/ a mixture of sexual anarchy, anti-dialectical

120  Ana Kralj and Tanja Rener passion and a lot of imagination, good humor, good wine and good jokes /…/. Whoever describes feminism as a boring, joyless movement has never known it” (Braidotti, 2000:16). 25 The feminist philosophical concept of “adoption” was born in 1984 in the Milanese philosophical group Diotima (named after Socrates’ teacher). It is based on the symbolic meaning of the mother-daughter bond, between which there is an “inner solidarity” as an unconditional, non-instrumental connection, and, above all, a transfer of knowledge and skills. Diotima still exists today, with the famous annual seminars, but the protagonists have wrapped themselves in a metaphysical spirituality. The critique of the group’s withdrawal from the political was present from the very beginning, and the feminists transformed the meaning of the concept of adoption into a collective practice of political struggles for equality, in which knowledge and skills are solidarized, strengthened and channeled to support anyone who needs them at a given moment in the political struggle for gender equality and the equality of sexual orientations. 26 Some feminist activists, for example, are strongly opposed to the decriminalization of prostitution because they believe that it solves nothing and only supports and legalizes sex work as an extreme form of exploitation of women’s bodies. Others believe that decriminalization is necessary because it will improve health and social protection options for sex workers, who are workers like any other. There are also major differences in attitudes toward pornography. 27 The campaign “Time to Say YES” was a joint initiative of several NGOs, professional associations, parliamentary (Social Democrats, The Left) and non-parliamentary parties (Slovenian Pirate Party, Solidarity Party) that supported same-sex marriage during the referendum campaign in 2015. 28 In February 2018, three promoters, university professors Darja Zaviršek, Irena Šumi and Renata Šribar, together with 8th of March Institute and other NGOs active in antiviolence campaigns, launched the #MeToo Slovenia project. Their initiative to take action against sexual violence and to collect personal testimonies from women who have experienced violence, was quickly and well received by the media. The project is still active in collecting personal stories. In the end of 2021, 8th of March Institute launched #Nisemprijavila (I didn’t report it) campaign, joining the #Nisamprijavila campaign initiated by Serbian activist Nina Stojaković, which collects personal testimonies from women who have experienced intimate partner violence. 29 The issue of activity allowance surfaced in 2019, when the Slovenian parliament adopted the amendment to Social Assistance Act, which would abolish the activity allowance. The activity allowance is granted to persons whose activity was unpaid (e.g., volunteers) or paid less than the amount of social assistance. According to the politicians, the abolition was intended to motivate people to become more active in the labor market, while opponents claimed that this would exacerbate poverty. The 8th of March institute and its director Nika Kovač were particularly critical of the proposed change, which was subsequently vetoed by the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia. 30 CNVOS is a national NGO umbrella network. 31 The 8th of March Institute was specifically mentioned by three of our interviewees. 32 The aforementioned high risks became a harsh reality under the last (2020–2022) rightwing government, led by Janez Janša. 33 Demokracija is a right-wing and neoconservative weekly, partly owned by the Slovenian Democratic Party. Nova24TV is a right-wing media conglomerate, that operates an eponymous television channel and an online news portal. It was founded by members and supporters of the Slovenian Democratic Party. 34 It is impossible to find out how much traction the website 24kul.si receives as the data is not publicly available. However, in addition to above-mentioned media, many local newspapers, radio and TV stations and web portals disseminate the “original articles”, so we can assume that their campaigns resonate with a wider (mostly rural) audience.

Reproductive and sexual rights – an activist perspective  121 35 The Homeland League is a Slovenian national-conservative, far-right political party. It was founded in April 2019 by former Slovenian Democratic Party politicians, economist Bernard Brščič and lawyer Lucija Šikovec Ušaj, both known for their previous active role in opposing the Family Code and the same-sex marriage legislation. Bernard Brščič also writes columns for Demokracija and appears regularly as a political commentator on Nova24TV. 36 The Handbook is available at: http://transakcija.si/medijski-prirocnik/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 37 The date was probably not chosen arbitrarily, as it is just a days before 27 April – a holiday in Slovenia, known as the Day of Uprising Against Occupation (formerly known as Liberation Front Day), which commemorates the founding of the Anti-imperialist Liberation Front, an organization that spearheaded the Yugoslav resistance movement against the occupiers during World War II. 38 Tjaša Pureber is a cultural producer, activist and researcher of social movements. In 2022, after the center-left coalition won the parliamentary elections, she became Director-General of the newly established Cultural Policy Development Directorate. The blog “Razpoke svobode” (“The Gaps of Freedom”) is available at: https://mesanec. si/kolesarski-protesti-2020-razpoke-svobode/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 39 The Advocate of the Principle of Equality was established in 2016 by the Protection Against Discrimination Act as an independent and autonomous state institution that provides assistance and support to persons subjected to discrimination when enforcing their rights regarding protection against discrimination in the form of counseling and legal assistance in administrative and judicial proceedings related to discrimination. The Advocate is also mandated to conduct a supervisory inspection and has the power to submit a request for a review of constitutionality or legality of a regulation or general legal act issued to execute public authorizations. 40 In April 2016, the parliament adopted the Civil Union Act which repealed and replaced the 2005 Civil Partnership Registration Act that was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in February 2016. The Civil Union Act established equal rights for opposite-sex and same-sex couples in all respects, apart from access to adoption of children and access to medically assisted reproduction procedures. 41 At the joint press conference of government and civil society representatives in January 2023, a LGBT activist and MP for the Left, said: On May 25 1997, on behalf of the Škuc Association, I submitted a petition to the government to amend the law on marriage and regulate the status of same-sex couples. At the time, I could not imagine that this would take until 2023, 26 years. As the next task, she highlighted the elimination of discrimination against single women in access to artificial insemination, which continues to be an example of legalized discrimination. Available at: https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/veljati-zacele-spremembe-druzinskegazakonika-zakonska-zveza-odslej-skupnost-dveh-oseb/656256 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 42 The official proposal, made by the ZZZS board of directors, must be approved by the government. Available at: https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/v-institutu-8-marec-­pozivajok-brezplacnemu-splavu-za-vse-nad-odgovorom-ministrstva-razocarani/664415 (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

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“What do you think about abortion?” Slovenian public opinion on abortion in longitudinal and international perspective Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija

Introduction At the beginning of the 1990s, when the constitutional and legal order of the newly established state of Slovenia was being built, when we were burying the socialist ideology and transitioning to a capitalist social order (read: neoliberal capitalism), there was a tendency to bury some of the democratic rights we had inherited from the socialist system along with it. When the constitution of the new country was adopted, there was a danger that the right to abortion would be removed from the new constitution (for more, see Chapter 2 in this book). Women got involved, and we organized discussions and demonstrations in front of the Parliament. We have used all possible mechanisms of civil society to defend this right. We, the group “Women for Politics”, have published all the positions of the political parties, the discussions in the media and the analyses of public opinion in the book Abortus – pravica do izbire?! Pravni, medicinski, sociološki, moralni in politični vidik (Abortion – the right to choose?! The legal, medical, sociological, moral and political perspective) (Dolar Bahovec, 1991). I remember that when the book was launched, a controversy broke out between staunch opponents of abortion and supporters of women’s reproductive rights. At the end of the debate, an elderly woman in a coat, with a bag in her hand and a headscarf on her head, stood up right next to the most vocal opponent of abortion rights and said, “Now I am going to tell you something”. I remember that moment well. I thought to myself, this woman is going to say, “I had eight children and I loved them all the same and I raised them all…”. We will not be able to counter this argument, and everything will come to nothing. But the woman said, “Girls, fight for this right: how many nights have we spent sewing... to avoid going to bed”. The constitutional right to abortion was defended. But for how long?! What is happening in the world and in our country has shown once again that no right is secured forever, that retrograde processes are always present. For this reason, after 30 years, we again analyze attitudes toward reproductive rights, especially the right to abortion. In this chapter, we analyze data on the Slovenian population’s attitudes toward the right to abortion over a 30-year period. We place their opinions in a broader European and global context and ­profile abortion supporters and opponents. DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-5

“What do you think about abortion?”  127 Attitudes toward abortion as a symptom of anti-democratic orientation and conservative mentality Voluntary termination of pregnancy has long been considered one of the ­typical points of contention where the differences between conservative and liberal social positions are clearly visible and where there is considerable overlap between ­patriarchalism, authoritarianism and conservatism (Altemeyer, 1996; Peterson, 2010). The rather stable and enduring connection between conservatism, authoritarianism and patriarchalism points to their common neuralgic point, namely the need to push women into the position of objects of dominant social actors. In earlier societies, these were primarily men from the leading social strata and classes. Those with strong authoritarian tendencies often live in rigidly divided “gendered worlds” with clearly defined and hierarchically reinforced roles for men and women as prescribed by the dominant traditions. The systematic link between opposition to abortion and a range of c­ onservative attitudes has long been known and well-studied in social psychology (Taylor and Whitehead, 2014). Since Adorno’s study of the authoritarian personality, attitudes toward abortion have emerged as one of the measures of the anti-democratic ­orientation that characterizes the so-called authoritarian character. Authoritarian personalities develop a very rigid but narrow and unyielding structure of attitudes. They are characterized by a strong polarization of views and an uncritical ­emphasis on their own views, as shown by the research of Adorno et al. (1950). Typical characteristics of an authoritarian personality structure are: rigid adherence to conventional morality and aversion to unconventional behavior, submissiveness and uncritical attitude toward an idealized authority, aggressiveness, rejection of everything subjective and imaginative, identification with those who have power, underestimation of humanism and human values, use of projections, attribution of one’s own unconscious impulses to others, rigidity of thought and tendency toward superstition, interest in “sexual deviance” and, at the same time, a tendency toward moralizing (Adorno et al., 1950). It is also true, however, that the context of conservative thought, which includes the rejection of abortion, has changed considerably in recent decades. While in Adorno’s time the conservative mentality was mostly associated with ­authoritarianism, today it is mainly an expression of mass conformity to neoliberal and neoconservative ideology and people’s contradictory reactions to the crisis of the value system. Parallel to the changes in subjectification and individualized life orientations, late modernity saw major changes at the level of community and social life. Above all, the bulwarks of social traditions and self-evident truths that governed the everyday order of things, e.g., traditional gender and intergenerational relations or the relationship between the public and the private, were ­crumbling down or were at least severely shaken. The regulation of gender relations, child rearing or sexuality became subjects of political debates. The private has become political (Ule et al., 2018). It is precisely in times of uncertainty and rapid social change when some groups feel they were unjustly targeted and are fundamentally threatened. This

128  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija can lead to an outbreak of discontent, often directed against even more vulnerable social groups and lifestyles. In this case, prejudice plays the role of transmitter of ­frustration, fears, feelings of threat and hatred. This is easily exploited by various political demagogues and populists who redirect the anger of the masses from the inability of authorities to solve social problems to stigmatized minorities or ­lifestyles. The construction and deconstruction of prejudices is therefore not primarily a cognitive act, but a process of constructing or deconstructing the social world. Both the construction and deconstruction of prejudice, however, take place in the public sphere and in everyday (private) discursive practices. According to Foucault (1984), discourses are dominant signifying and behavioral practices that uphold and legitimate power relations. A person who holds sexist views, for example, does not argue for his views, and he does not care about describing the world. He places himself in a certain relation to the world. Better yet, he constructs the social world in such a way that his group occupies a dominant position. Thus, prejudice functions not as a kind of fallacy or illusion based on erroneous human information processing, but rather as part of ideological narratives. Ideological here means that forms of speech and discourse must be understood as shaping patterns of social relations, especially power relations and inequality. Prejudices are part of ongoing dialogues and debates within social communities. They engage in collective forms of discourse addressing ­various authorities, dominant opinions and, above all, those patterns of ideologies that defend the existing balance of power in society. It would therefore be a mistake to consider prejudice as a discursive practice and only as a rhetorical form, as a linguistic or communicative reality. Discourses are not just the speech or writing practices of people, but are micro-practices that bring together language, communication and interaction, the symbolic systems and social relations in which speech or communication activities take place. They are the living relations between people that constitute the identity of individuals and groups and organize things into a meaningful social order. They are both the material and spiritual practices of people. They are not merely a conscious activity of human beings because they are largely driven by the spontaneous, unconscious and affective dynamics of our desires, caught in the split between phantasm and ­reality. Foucault’s metaphor of the microphysics of power (Foucault, 1977) is indeed relevant to them. Foucault stresses that contemporary forms of power are less ­violent and repressive but rather based on the self-control and self-­management of individuals. Abortion in contemporary nationalist and populist discourses Often the pressure on women to have or not to have children relate to them as members of national collectivities, as Nira Yuval Davis (1997: 22) puts it. A central dimension of nationalist politics is concern about the “genetic pool” of the nation. According to this logic, one is a full member of a particular national ­collectivity only if one is born into it. A characteristic feature of nationalist strategies is such homogenization of the ethnic community, which introduces undemocratic social relations in the community and oppresses ethnic, religious and social minority

“What do you think about abortion?”  129 groups. Birth control and sexuality are thus high on this nationalist agenda. The centrality of the reproductive role of women in nationalist discourses becomes clear when we grant the myth of collective origin a central role in the construction of the national collectivity, because one belongs to this collectivity when one is born into it. At the same time, many authors emphasize that there is no dichotomy between “natural” and controlled reproduction (Tabet, 1996; Yuval Davis, 1997). All so-called natural, biological reproduction takes place in specific social, political and economic contexts, that is, it is constructed by leading political and ideological powers. Since the outbreak of the great financial crisis in 2008, there has been a marked shift in many countries away from predominantly liberal attitudes and policies on gender relations toward more conservative attitudes and policies. This turn should not surprise us, given that the neoliberal agenda and the economic globalization that underpins it are already highly ambivalent developments. More precisely, ­liberalism and conservatism are the two accompanying and complementary poles of globalization in the neoliberal agenda. The third link in this contemporary conservative triumvirate is nationalism, which is increasingly manifesting itself in ­various forms of populist politics. Michael Billig presciently pointed this out as early as 1995 in his book on banal nationalism. He warned of the danger of the global presence of new forms of nationalism and populism (Billig, 1995). According to Billig, talk of a new world order, where the national and the international are to be integrated, is mostly empty talk. An important source of the growing ambivalence between liberal and conservative moments of globalization is the growth of ontological uncertainty and people’s different responses to it. The revival of national and ethnic mythologies, religions and patterns of life gives many who suffer from the experience of ontological ­insecurity some hope of regaining mental wholeness, a clear identity and feelings of security. In essence, it increases social inequalities and reinforces hegemonic relations, which, through exclusions, create groups of people totally subordinate and dependent for their survival on the holders of this power. Globalization has had national labels from the start, and American labels and symbols have played a key identity role, so that American symbols have often been considered universal symbols. If American nationalism seemed almost invisible to many until recently, at least after the shock of Trumpism, it lost its innocence, and here too Biden’s corrections in American politics will no longer be able to push this oversight into the political unconscious. For example, one recent US study examining the relationship between sexism and attitudes toward abortion noted that increased denial of abortion right is closely linked to hostile sexism and authoritarian nationalism (Patev et al., 2019), which is abundantly supported by the funding of anti-gender equality campaigns.1 Of course, these are regressive responses to the growing ontological ­uncertainty in the circumstances of late modernity. However, this uncertainty can also constitute a very solid base for various forms of conservative social and political agitation and mobilization in times of neoliberal globalization. Billig (1995, p. 138) warns of the danger of a massive reactivation of patriarchal-conservative ­mentality and authoritarian personality traits in persons who are unable or incapable of reflexively and rationally withstanding the growing ambivalence of life. We are all

130  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija similarly marked by the permanence and self-evident nature of national ­identity. The difference is that authoritarian personalities are characterized by a strong tendency toward a hot-headed nationalism, an emotionally and expressively accentuated and dramatized expression of commitment to a chosen national identity, while ­postmodern subjects tend to settle for what Billig (1995) calls a seemingly ­inconspicuous and unstressed banal nationalism. The image of the modern, individualized and decentered “postmodern” ­subject and the image of the authoritarian personality thus appear to us as a kind of ­complementary, but at the same time mutually complementary forms of the modern self. It is true, however, that social conditions and people’s personal characteristics are also becoming increasingly polarized, and that the space in the middle is becoming empty. The playfulness and plurality of identities is in fact the new myth of modern consumer society. The postmodern subject also does not consider all the identities offered by the contemporary market of identity definitions to be equal. In particular, the majority national identity is still taken for granted as primus inter pares. As the Finnish sociologists Elomäki and Kantola note, we are today dealing in many parts of the world with an increasingly pronounced neoliberalism-­ conservatism-nationalism triangle, where each side of the triangle supports the other two. All of them, however, find their privileged object in women, more precisely in the modern working, emancipated, autonomous woman (Elomäki and Kantola, 2018: 342). If we consider the thesis of the intimate triangularity of “­neoliberalism-­conservatism-nationalism” put forward by the above-mentioned Finnish sociologists Elomäki and Kantola, which constitutes the skeleton and the basic potential of ­contemporary patriarchalism, then it is worth extending Billig’s findings to a critique of the more general “banal triumvirate”: neoliberalism-conservatismnationalism. Like banal nationalism, the neoliberalism-conservatism-nationalism triumvirate is dangerous precisely because of its frequent invisibility, yet ubiquitous presence in all social spheres everywhere. It is dangerous because it takes little ideological and political impetus to transform it from a banal triumvirate and the naked potential of patriarchalism into some “hot” form of aggressive neoliberal, conservative and nationalist socio-political orientation, which manifests an overt authoritarian patriarchalism and seeks to deprive or restrict the rights of women in particular, and all other marginalized and stigmatized social groups and individuals, to freely regulate their lives and work. For, as the columnist Gabriel Yoram aptly spiced up his discussion of contemporary conservatism in the Berlin-based satirical newspaper Krautreporter with the slogan: “Konservativ sein, heißt heute: Alles, was den Männern Spaß macht” (being conservative today means everything that is pleasurable for men) (Yoran, 2019). Views on abortion in the international context Patriarchal-conservative cultures value control and domination, seeking to preserve and consolidate existing systems of hierarchical power and authority and segmentation of society by any means necessary. As a rule, they are firmly implanted in the

“What do you think about abortion?”  131 related class-oriented divisions of labor, property and social power. If a woman’s right to abortion is legally and institutionally guaranteed in a country, then it can be assumed that patriarchal conservatism is (at least temporarily) limited there. If, on the other hand, this right is not guaranteed, or if there are political, legal and other difficulties in the exercise of this right by women, then we can conclude that patriarchal conservatism is the dominant cultural, social and political force there. It can therefore be said that attitudes toward abortion are the very litmus test of patriarchal conservatism. Comparative research shows that the number of abortions worldwide has been on a slight decline since 1990 (Sedgh et al., 2007). While the number of “safe ­abortions”, i.e., those procedures permitted by law, has decreased, the number of “unsafe abortions”, i.e., those procedures performed illegally or in medically unsafe conditions, has remained high. Studies also repeatedly confirm what we know from everyday life practice, that restrictive legislation does not prevent ­abortion. Instead, restrictive regulations drive women abroad or underground (Sedgh et al., 2007). Thus, restrictive legislation does not lead to an increase in fertility, but rather to an increase in illegal and unsafe abortions. In countries with the least restrictive abortion policies, 87% of safe abortions are uncomplicated, while in countries with restrictive policies, only 25% of abortions are uncomplicated and as many as 75% of unsafe abortions have negative consequences for women (Singh et al., 2018). Unsafe abortion is one of the main reasons for maternal mortality. Therefore, there is no acceptable reason for women to die, become ill or infertile because of unsafe abortion if the global community has the knowledge and resources to prevent it (Bearak et al., 2020). More liberalized legislation leads to a sharp reduction in mortality and consequent health harms – as shown by the experience in South Africa and Nepal (Sedgh et al., 2014). In South Africa, for example, abortion deaths fell by 91% after liberalization in 1996. Studies also show that people in high-income countries have better access to sexual and reproductive health care than those in low-income countries, and that individuals seek abortion even in settings where it is restricted. Countries with higher GDP, where abortion is generally legal, had the lowest abortion rates and the lowest proportion of unintended pregnancies ending in abortion (Bearak et al., 2020: 1160). A comparative study of data on abortion policy in 22 OECD countries (not including Slovenia), found that more liberal legal regimes existed in countries where left-leaning parties had a significant influence on governing policy, and where other institutions (e.g., constitutional courts, referendums, etc.) did not inhibit the introduction of more liberal laws. However, more conservative legislation has been introduced in countries where conservative parties have been ­politically dominant, where the Catholic Church has been very influential, and where there have been no strong institutions that could veto proposals for more conservative legislation (Gindulis, 2003: 89). As the authors of a German study by Pro-Familia on German attitudes toward abortion note, attempts by conservative politicians to restrict women’s abortion rights have not led to a decline in abortions or an increase in births anywhere, but

132  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija only to an increase in illegal and medically unsafe abortion attempts (Pro-Familia Hintergrund, 2017: 12). For some time, several international surveys have concluded that Western European countries have the lowest rates of induced ­abortion in the world (Sedgh et al., 2007). In these countries, abortion is legalized and freely available. The use of various means of preventing pregnancy is also freely available in these countries. In Poland, which has had an explicitly conservative and restrictive policy on women’s right to abortion for the past decade, there were still around 100,000 abortions a year before the policy was tightened, but after 2014 there are (according to publicly available data) only approx. 1,800 per year (Leschewitz, 2022: 1) However, women’s rights organizations believe that the number of illegal abortions without proper medical assistance and equally risky abortions performed abroad has risen enormously (Busch, 2014: 16–17). The results of opinion polls on abortion in the USA are interesting. The Pew Research Centre surveyed 10,441 American adults in March 2022, at the time of the abolition of the right to abortion in the United States, to examine public ­attitudes toward abortion. The results showed that 61% of respondents said abortion should be legal in all or almost all circumstances, while 37% said it should be illegal in all or almost all circumstances. A large proportion of those who generally oppose abortion (46%) say that it should be legal in certain situations or say that their position depends on the circumstances. 72% of all respondents also agree that the decision whether to have an abortion should belong solely to the pregnant woman. The Pew Research Centre has tracked public attitudes toward abortion since 1995 and longitudinal comparative analysis of the data shows that the right to abortion is stable in public opinion. For example, in 1995, 60% of those surveyed agreed with a legal right to abortion and 61% of those surveyed in 2022 agreed with this right (Pew Research Center, 2022). The results of a survey conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion at Marist College on Americans’ views on abortion in January 2022 show similar trends. 55% of those respondents agree with a woman’s right to abortion, 40% are opposed and 5% are undecided. A longitudinal comparison carried out by the Institute also shows a slight increase of those in favor of abortion rights. Thus, in 2009, 48% of respondents were in favor of abortion rights, rising to 55% by 2022. The survey shows a strong polarization of public opinion on abortion rights in the USA. Partisan divisions are very clear. Among Democrats, 82% were in favor of a ­woman’s right to an abortion, only 17% were against and only 1% were undecided. Among Republicans, however, only 25% were in favor of abortion rights, 70% were opposed and 5% were undecided. Among the non-partisan, 57% were in favor of abortion rights, 40% were opposed and 4% were undecided (Conte and Carvalho, 2022: 2–4). It can be concluded that the liberal view of abortion rights is generally prevalent in the USA, but the party-political divisions, with the additional help of various religious institutions and congregations, create the impression of a great or growing polarization in American society. Table 4.1 shows data from the 2018 ISSP (International Social Survey Programme), which also includes Slovenia (Hafner Fink et al., 2021), which confirm the above findings.2

“What do you think about abortion?”  133 Table 4.1  International comparison (ISSP) on the question: “Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?” 1 – Always wrong Austria Bulgaria Chile Taiwan Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Georgia Germany Hungary Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea (South) Lithuania New Zealand Norway Philippines Russia Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa Spain Suriname Sweden Switzerland Thailand Turkey

% 16.4 24.0 60.5 26.2 30.2 13.8 7.4 12.0 9.4 48.8 27.2 18.5 10.8 40.6 35.5 10.8 19.7 30.0 18.9 10.5 86.8 22.6 18.9 16.9 59.8 21.6 67.3 6.4 19.5 71.2 53.9

2 – Almost always wrong % 22.8 15.7 9.2 17.7 18.8 19.7 8.3 10.8 4.7 15.5 16.1 22.0 11.6 11.3 20.0 28.5 17.7 21.8 8.7 11.2 11.1 18.2 26.7 11.3 13.1 10.2 8.7 8.7 16.3 18.6 10.8

3 – Wrong only sometimes % 33.6 30.2 14.3 32.1 18.8 39.2 23.8 19.0 21.1 30.3 24.1 25.1 24.3 22.1 28.6 50.0 32.0 31.3 12.4 20.3 1.5 29.1 28.1 19.8 12.4 22.8 18.9 14.1 32.6 6.7 25.0

4 – Not wrong at all % 27.1 30.2 16.0 23.9 32.2 27.3 60.5 58.2 64.8 5.3 32.5 34.4 53.2 26.0 15.9 10.8 30.6 17.0 60.0 57.9 0.7 30.1 26.4 52.0 14.7 45.4 5.1 70.7 31.6 3.4 10.3

Source: ISSP Research Group (2020).

The data support the thesis that in countries with a dominant neoliberal agenda, a high degree of individualism and the absence of a welfare state (e.g., Israel, USA), and in countries with a significant role of church and religious institutions in culture and politics (e.g., Turkey, Italy), there is a higher proportion of those who agree that “it is always wrong for a woman to have an abortion…”. Conversely, ­respondents in countries (mainly European) with legislation regulating abortion rights, egalitarian social policies, family policies and equal opportunities policies are the least likely to agree with this statement. These are mainly Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway) and France. Slovenia is also among

134  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija them, with 52% of those who fully agree with a woman’s right to an a­ bortion when the family has a very low income, like the Scandinavian countries. It is a worrying fact that opposition to women’s reproductive rights is growing precisely in the so-called rich and developed world, especially in the USA, in states with Republican governments, which have traditionally been centers of opposition to abortion, in Russia, in Japan, and in South Korea. Of course, we must not forget the “traditional” strongholds of patriarchal conservatism in the Islamic world, in India, in Latin America, in Africa and only somewhat disguised but very strong in “socialist” China. Opposition to women’s reproductive rights is also growing across Europe, especially in countries with a strong Catholic Church, for example in Poland and Croatia. The agenda of the new populist movements spreading across Europe is also patriarchally conservative, and women’s reproductive rights, especially the right to abortion, are on their agenda, overtly or covertly. Just take the strengthening of these tendencies in Hungary, where women who want to abort must first listen to the heartbeat of the fetus. The same trend is also shown by data from 2017 in the European Values Study3 (EVS, 2020). Figure 4.1 shows data from the EVS, which is conducted in repeated cycles and covers most European countries. Respondents were asked to rate their attitudes toward certain value and life orientations, including abortion, on a tenpoint scale (1–10). The question was: “Please tell me for the each of the following 100 90 80

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Figure 4.1 European value study 2017.  Ranking of countries according to the level of support that abortion is justified (sum of answers 7, 8, 9, 10 on a scale of 1–10, where 10 means: abortion can always be justified; by country). Source: EVS (2020).

“What do you think about abortion?”  135 whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between?” The relevance of the question is reflected in the wording of the question, which shows an open attitude toward the dilemma of abortion and, above all, in the possibility of a detailed comparison between European countries. Figure 4.1 shows a very clear picture of the divisions in Europe around the issue of abortion rights. Abortion is more acceptable especially for citizens of European countries with a higher level of equal opportunities and rights between the sexes and with a stronger welfare state. Denmark and Sweden in particular lead the way, with 90% of public opinion support for abortion. Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands follow with over 80% support. Finland and Slovenia are next with 78% and 72% support. These are the top eight countries with more than three-quarters of respondents supporting the right to abortion. Switzerland, the UK, the Czech Republic and Germany follow with 60%–70% support. Around the average (51% support for abortion) are Spain, Austria, Estonia with 56%–60% support. Just below average are Italy (50%), Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania with between 47% and 43% support. Even fewer respondents consider abortion justified in Russia (41%), some former Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Romania with 21% support) and the Balkan countries of the former Yugoslavia (North Macedonia – 35% support, Croatia – 32% support, Serbia – 29% support, Bosnia and Herzegovina – 23% support, Montenegro –13% support). Albania, Armenia and Georgia are at the bottom of the table with 4%–6% support. Comparing these divisions with the socio-cultural characteristics of the countries listed above, we can confirm the thesis outlined in the introductory section about the rejection of abortion as a symptom of a conservative-patriarchal culture. Thus, the first group of countries, including Slovenia, are characterized by societies with low levels of inequality, high levels of gender equality, a developed civil ­society and relatively favorable family and social legislation, all of which constitute a bulwark against neo-conservatism and patriarchalism. The second group, where support for abortion is still above average, consists mainly of Western European countries, which are advanced democracies, economically prosperous, but with a higher degree of conservatism and a greater role of religious institutions. The last group of countries that support abortion rights to a lesser extent (less than onethird of respondents) are those with a more pronounced role of religion (Poland, Croatia) and a patriarchal culture with nationalistic characteristics (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, etc.). In many European countries, ideological struggles are intensifying around ideas such as population control, the family, motherhood, sexuality. For example, in 2016, the conservative Polish government led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski launched a campaign to ban abortion. The abortion ban was proposed to the government at the time by the conservative Ordo Iuris Institute, which is backed by the Catholic Church. The institute officially presents itself as an institute for legal culture. It is a fundamentalist religious organization with an extensive network of international links, for example with the World Congress of Families, with the Russian Orthodox Church, with American fundamentalists, with the Italian right-wing Northern League. Ordo Iuris Institute fights to ban abortion, is against contraception and

136  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija divorce, persecutes and criminalizes the LGBT community, as Marta Lempart, founder and leader of the Women’s Strike movement, said in an interview. The Ordo Iuris Institute also launched an initiative calling on Poland to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention, which prohibits violence against women (Soban, 2021: 5). Although this campaign put millions of women on the streets across Poland, the government continued its campaign and in October 2020 the Constitutional Court banned abortion, except in cases when the woman’s life is endangered by ­continuation of pregnancy and when the pregnancy is a result of criminal act. Attitudes toward abortion over time 1969–2018 in Slovenia What do Slovenian opinion polls show? The Slovenian Public Opinion Research Programme, conducted by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana, provides insight into a series of time- and internationally comparable data that allow for the analysis of a wide range of relevant social science topics, including the issue of attitudes toward abortion. Importantly, the archive of data held by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre also allows for a historical and inter-temporal examination of attitudes toward this issue. The question of public attitudes toward abortion was raised in the survey “Slovenian Public Opinion” (SJM) as early as 1969. While we are aware that opinion polling data are never a completely faithful reflection of the attitudes of the population they survey, we assume that ­systematic and regular public opinion surveys of the same or similar populations reveal longterm and stable patterns of opinion that correspond to the social and value orientations of the population. In particular, the link between survey results and the distribution of opinions in society is meaningful when surveys address topics and issues that do not receive current public attention but are important in people’s everyday life. Attitudes toward abortion are certainly an example of this type. To get the best possible picture of public attitudes toward abortion in Slovenia, we have carried out a comparative analysis of attitudes toward abortion in opinion polls in Slovenia over a period of almost 50 years; from 1969 to 2018. Comparison of public opinion on abortion in Slovenia 1969–1990

In the monograph Abortus-pravica do izbire?! (Abortion-The Right to Choose?!), which was written by the Women for Politics group to defend the right to a­ bortion in the Slovenian constitution, we compared two points in time: the opinion of respondents in a 1969 survey and compared it with that of 1990 (Ule, 1991). A temporal comparison of public opinion data on attitudes toward abortion 1969– 1990 shows that over this 20-year period the percentage of those who “are totally against abortion in any case” has halved, from 15% in 1969 to 6.9% in 1990. The ­percentage of those who are exceptionally in favor of abortion has also fallen. However, the percentage of those in favor of abortion for medical and social reasons has increased. Above all, the percentage of those “in favor of abortion as a normal means of birth control” has practically tripled.

“What do you think about abortion?”  137 An analysis of the responses according to demographic indicators shows that between 1969 and 1990, women’s views on abortion became more liberalized. In particular, the percentage of women who were completely against abortion decreased (5.3% for women and 8.7% for men). A comparison by age shows that in 1969, the highest percentage of respondents against abortion was in the oldest category (over 61 years). In 1990, an interesting change occurred. The proportion of the elderly who are against abortion decreases slightly, but the proportion of those under 30 who are against abortion increases, equaling that of those in the ­oldest group. The highest support for abortion is shown by respondents aged 31–50. A comparison by sex and age shows that women, of all age groups, have become markedly more pro-choice than men have. However, the fact that especially younger men became less tolerant of abortion in 1990 stands out (Ule, 1991). The intersection by gender and education also shows that between 1969 and 1990, there were significant changes in all educational categories of women and no changes, especially in the lower educational categories of men. The fact that the refusal of the right to abortion was mainly characteristic of the lower educated supports the assumption made by the Croatian sociologist Josip Županov in 1986 that the lower classes follow the ruling ideology to a greater extent (Županov, 1986). During the period of ­socialism, the lower classes followed the egalitarian and centralist conceptions of the Communist Party. In the 1990s, when the new Slovenian ­government advocated a return to traditional values, again the lower classes expressed the highest support for this ideological turn. Interestingly, religiosity of the persons surveyed in Slovenia in 1969–1990 did not have a significant impact on attitudes toward abortion. However, the frequency of attending religious services did have an influence. Here, the associations are statistically significant (coefficient of contingency = 0.38). It seems that religiosity remained more a domain of personal attitudes, while attendance at religious services also implied adherence to Church doctrine and hierarchy and to the Catholic Church’s position on abortion. Largely those in favor of women staying at home also rejected abortion. Similarly, those in favor of restricting freedom of speech and thought and those against the equivalence of marriage and cohabitation, were more likely to reject abortion completely. There was also a statistically significant correlation between attitudes toward abortion and attitudes toward migrants and workers from other republics in Slovenia (the coefficient of contingency is 0.28). The more intolerant the respondents were toward migrants in Slovenia, the more they rejected abortion. A similar statistically significant correlation was also found when comparing the answers to the question “Should the Slovenian state grant asylum to foreigners who are persecuted in their own country?” with attitudes toward abortion. What is the attitude of public opinion toward abortion in Slovenia from 1990 to the present?

In other words, what has happened to public opinion in Slovenia in relation to abortion in the transition from socialism to neoliberal capitalism? Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of those who expressed positive or very positive attitudes toward

138  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija Positive + Very positive Linear (Positive + Very positive)

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Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) 1992 - 2018

Figure 4.2 Slovenian public opinion (SPO) 1992–2018 Positive and very positive attitudes toward: right to abortion (%). Source: Hafner Fink et al. (2019).

abortion in opinion polls (SJM) from 1992 to 2018, when respondents answered an identical question on attitudes toward abortion. Respondents answered how they felt about various values or concepts (related to values); among these concepts was the right to abortion. The question was “We will list some words or concepts and you...without thinking too long, rate whether you have a very positive, positive, negative or very negative attitude towards them”. Comparative data on the attitudes toward abortion in the post-1990 period, ­during the transition, which encompassed economic, political and cultural changes in Slovenia, show very stable positive support for the right to abortion. This support ranges with minor oscillations from 64% in 1990 to 66% in 2018. Interestingly, support did not drop even in 2014–2016, at a time when discussions on the beginning of life emerged from predominantly right-wing political parties. Support was not shaken in 2015 and 2016 when protests against abortion were organized in front of the Clinic for Gynecology and Obstetrics in Ljubljana by the God’s Children Institute, who prayed “for life – against abortion in the Ljubljana hospital”. In Figure 4.3, we show a comparison of the proportion of respondents for and against abortion from the European Values Survey (EVS, 2020) in 1992–2017 time perspective for Slovenia (Uhan et al., 2021). The longitudinal comparison of EVS data for Slovenia, as shown in Figure 4.3, also indicates a stable pattern of opinions. Despite occasional political twists and turns in attitudes toward abortion in Slovenia, the opinion structure is clear. In 2017, 72% of the surveyed population had a positive attitude toward abortion. This

“What do you think about abortion?”  139

Attitudes towards abortion (EVS 1992–2017) Proportion of respondents 'for' and 'against' abortion 100 90 80 70 60

%

68

54

62

62

58

72

72

50

'for' 'against'

40 30 20 10

32

46

38

38

42

28

28

0

Figure 4.3  EVS 1992–2017, data for Slovenia.

proves, firstly, that attitudes toward abortion are part of a value system that is not so dependent on daily political events and, secondly, that public opinion in Slovenia has a stable liberal orientation, regardless of the transition processes and political upheavals of the last 30 years since Slovenia’s independence. Liberal attitudes toward abortion are part of a complex of more liberal attitudes toward life, social and political issues, which was built in Slovenia by a great consensus of the public and civil society in the 1970s and 1980s. Structural analysis and value profiles of supporters and opponents of the right to abortion in Slovenia So far, we have found that Slovenia has a quite liberal attitude toward the right to abortion and that it is part of the majority public opinion value system. Now, we want to know what the psychosocial profiles of supporters and opponents of ­abortion rights are. We have further analyzed the data from the latest 2017 European Values Survey for Slovenia to identify the characteristics of the population surveyed in relation to the right to abortion.4 The age analysis shows that the differences in attitudes toward abortion rights between age groups have decreased compared to the 1990 analysis and are no longer statistically significant with just one age group exception. Attitudes toward the right to abortion have changed slightly in a more negative direction in the under-30 age group. Thus, the youngest age group (under 30) has now become fully equal to the oldest age group (over 61). It is not a good sign, of course, that the youngsters tend to reject the right to abortion. This may have an impact on changing the hitherto liberal space in Slovenia.

140  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija male / up to 30 years

80 70

62

60

56 56

% 50

40

40 30 20

52

30

27 21 15

20

25 17 16

30 29 23

21

male / 31 to 45 years

65 60 49

male / 46 to 60 years male / 61 years and over

24 26

female / up to 30 years

18 18

female / 31 to 45 years

10 0

against

neither for, nor against

for

female / 46 to 60 years female / 61 years and over

Figure 4.4 Attitudes toward the right to abortion in the sex-age combination. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

These changes are even more clearly illustrated by comparing combined age and gender with attitudes toward abortion. Figure 4.4 shows significant gender differences in the different age categories. Of all age categories, men under 30 are the most opposed to the right to abortion (30% of them), followed by men over 61 (27% are opposed). In the category of supporters of the right to abortion, men under 30 are the least opposed – 40% support the right to abortion. The average for all men is 52%, while the average for women is 58%. Even more differentiated attitudes toward abortion rights are shown by the level of education of the respondents (Figure 4.5). The differences are statistically ­significant (sig. 0.000, coefficient of contingency = 0.25), indicating a strong correlation between attitudes toward abortion and education. Those with higher education have the most positive attitudes toward the right to abortion (70% support), followed by those with secondary education (56%), while those with vocational education (47%) and primary education (37%) are least supportive of the right to abortion. Across all educational levels, slightly more men are against the right to abortion than women are. For example, 19% of men and 10% of women with higher education are against the right to abortion. 63% of men and 73% of women are in favor of abortion rights. Among less educated men (with primary or vocational education), the proportion of neutral men is the highest, indicating less stability of views in this educational category of respondents and the possibility of a further increase in the number of those opposed to the right to abortion. Among young men with lower education levels, there may be a potential for a rise in conservatism, authoritarianism and patriarchy, which might be activated in specific situations of crises and with additional ideological-political activation of conservative parties, policies and institutions.

“What do you think about abortion?”  141

Education level Higher

70

17

13

Secondary

for

17

Vocational

24

Elementary or less

10

20

neither for, nor against against

47

29

28

0

56

27

30

37

35 40

50

%

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 4.5  Attitudes toward the right to abortion and education. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia (%). Religiousness and the right to abortion

The link between religiosity and attitudes toward abortion rights is significant. In 1990, religiosity alone did not significantly differentiate respondents. However, the most recent data show statistically significant differences between religiosity and attitudes toward the right to abortion. Thus, the right to abortion is supported by 80% of convinced atheists, 70% of those who identified as non-religious and only 46% of those who identified as religious (Figure 4.6). Answers to the question about the importance of religion in their lives and the intersection with attitudes toward abortion rights also show statistically significant differences. The more important religion is to the respondents, the more likely it is that the respondent will have a negative attitude toward abortion rights. Further analysis of the degree of religiosity shows that the higher the degree of acceptance of religious dogma in the individual’s life (attending religious services, frequency of prayer, etc.), the higher the rejection of the right to abortion. Whereas in the 1990s it was not religiosity per se that was the ­differentiating factor in attitudes toward the right to abortion, but rather attendance at religious services, now religious ideology is taking the lead, in league with right-wing i­ dentitarianism. Here again, the proportion of “undecideds” is the highest and almost equal to that of opponents of abortion rights, indicating a greater instability of the undecided and the possibility of their shift toward opponents of abortion rights in the event of greater ideological and political pressure from conservative policies.

142  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija

Are you a religious person?

(*) The size of subgroup

% 80 Convinced atheist (*14%)

14 6 70

Not a religious person (*18%)

22 9 46

Religious person (*68%)

25

29 0

10

20

30

for

40

50

60

70

neither for, nor against

80

90

100

against

Figure 4.6  Attitudes toward abortion rights and religion. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia. Nationalism: the right to abortion and attitudes toward foreigners and refugees

Attitudes toward foreigners are also statistically significantly associated with ­attitudes toward abortion rights. In Figure 4.7, we show the answers to the two questions “To what extent do you trust people of other nationalities?” and “To what extent do you trust people of other religions?” Averages (on a scale from 1 – a lot to 4 – not at all) are shown for attitudes toward abortion rights. The relationship between attitudes toward people of other nationalities and ­religions and attitudes toward the right to abortion is clear and statistically significant. Those against the right to abortion have little or no trust in people of other nationalities or religions. In Figure 4.8, we show the relationships between nationalism and attitudes toward abortion rights across the two views. Specifically: the relationship between agreement with the statement “Immigrants are taking jobs away from Slovenians” and “Because of immigrants the crime rate is increasing” with attitudes toward abortion. Respondents could indicate their (dis)agreement on a ten-point scale, where 1 means strong agreement and ten strong disagreement.

“What do you think about abortion?”  143

To what extent do you trust these groups of people? (average on a scale: 1= trust completely ... 4= do not trust at all)

2.55

People of another nationality

for

2.67 2.80

neither for, nor against against

2.59

People of another religion

2.69 2.92

1

2

3

4

Figure 4.7 Attitudes toward the right to abortion and attitudes toward foreigners. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

(Average on a scale of 1 to 10)

10 9 8 7 6 5

5.11

5.79

6.15 4.69

5.77

5.37

4 3 2 1

immigrants take away jobs from Slovenians (scale 1= take away / 10= do not take a way)

against

immigrants increase crime problems (scale 1= make it worse / 10= do not make it wors)

neither for, nor against

for

Figure 4.8  Abortion rights and attitudes toward immigrants. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

144  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija The results show a very clear correlation between negative attitudes toward immigrants (attributing criminal acts, taking jobs) and attitudes toward abortion (sig: 0.000). The link between conservative and patriarchal mentality and nationalism that we have already discussed comes in mind here. This type of nationalism is mainly fostered by men, who feel threatened both by “foreigners”, especially immigrants, who allegedly threaten their jobs, and by increasingly emancipated women, who threaten their image of a dominant “masculine” identity (Albanese, 2004). Patriarchalism: attitudes toward abortion and attitudes toward gender roles

Patriarchalism as an attitudinal syndrome was tested through a series of statements about gender relations and gender roles, namely: – – – –

in general, men are better businessperson than women are; university education is more important for boys than for girls; overall, men make better political leaders than women; a man’s job in marriage is to make money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family; – when viewed as a whole, family life suffers when a woman is in full-time employment; – it is fine if a woman is employed, but what women want most is a home and children; – if the mother is employed, children suffer.

Agreeing with the statements

average on scale scale: 1= agree strongly ... 4= disagree strongly 3.20 3.02 2.84

Men make better business executives than women University education more important for a boy than for a girl

3.45 3.30 3.16 3.10 2.94 2.80

Men make better political leaders than women Man's job is to earn money; woman's job is to look after home and family

2.65

Family life suffers when woman has full-time job

2.19

Women really want home and children

2.61

2.56

1

2

3.18

for

2.61 2.42

2.36 2.19

Child suffers with working mother

2.90

2.92 2.82

neither for, nor against against

3

Figure 4.9  Attitudes toward abortion and gender roles. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

4

“What do you think about abortion?”  145 Respondents expressed their agreement with the statement on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (not at all agree). Figure 4.9 shows how each of the statements relates to attitudes toward abortion. Again, there are clear (and statistically significant) differences across all ­statements, showing that those who agree more strongly with patriarchal claims about gender roles are more likely to be against abortion rights, and vice versa, while those who agree less strongly (or not at all) with the above claims are more likely to be in favor of abortion rights. Those who support the right to abortion do not agree with the statement that ­university education is more important for men than for women. The mean value on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (not at all agree) for this statement is 3.35. There is therefore an almost perfect consensus on the equal role of education for both genders. Less than 1% (0.9%) of abortion supporters strongly agree with this statement. A comparison with the same question in 1995 shows that 5.2% of respondents agreed with this statement. The percentage of respondents who do not agree at all has also doubled over the same period, from 26% in 1995 to 41% in 2017. The overwhelming majority of respondents also disagree with the statement that men are better businesspersons than women are – the average score on the above scale (1–4) is 3.00. Respondents agree most with the statements that... what women want most is a home and children (mean value for this statement is 2.46) and... family life suffers when a woman works full-time (mean value for this statement is 2.47). The two statements most strongly associated with the right to abortion are: “A man’s job in marriage is to earn money, a woman’s job is to take care of the home and family” and “… what women want most is a home and children”.5 These findings implicitly show, among other things, that higher education and employment for both men and women are crucial for reflecting on gender positions and resisting discriminatory practices, for gender equality and, consequently, for defending women’s reproductive rights. Women’s education and employment make it possible for men and women to be equal partners within the common field of education, work and private life. Conservatism: the right to abortion and attitudes toward artificial insemination, euthanasia, divorce and homosexuality

Attitudes toward divorce, homosexuality, abortion and euthanasia are among the fundamental themes that have differentiated the conservative value system from the liberal one since Adorno’s studies on anti-democratic orientation and authoritarian personality. In the EVS 2017, respondents made their attitudes to these concepts on a ten-point scale, where 1 is a statement that “can never be justified” and 10 is a statement that “can always be justified”. Respondents are most tolerant of assisted reproduction, with an average of 8.27, followed by attitudes toward divorce (­average 7.29) and attitudes toward euthanasia (average 6.38). They are least tolerant of homosexuality, with an average of 5.77. However, attitudes have changed considerably over the last 30 years. Whereas in 1992, 54.5% of respondents

146  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija Please indicate for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (average on scale: 1= never ... 10= always) 8.97

artificial insemination

7.91 6.80 7.53

euthanasia

5.64

4.17 8.86

divorce

6.25

4.40 7.25

homosexuality

4.67 3.10

1

2

for

3

4

5

6

7

neither for, nor against

8

9

10

against

Figure 4.10 Attitudes toward the right to abortion and abortion-related value orientations. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

thought that “homosexuality can never be justified” (answer 1), in 2017 only 23.5% of respondents thought that “homosexuality can never be justified” (answer 1). Conversely, 7.9% of respondents in 1992 and 26.3% in 2017 strongly agreed with the statement “homosexuality can always be justified” (answer 10). Figure 4.10 shows how each of these value orientations relates to attitudes toward abortion. Figure 4.10 shows strong correlations between acceptance of each statement and attitudes toward abortion rights. The associations are statistically significant (sig. 0.000) and show a strong correlation between the rejection of these orientations and practices and the rejection of the right to abortion. Most opponents of abortion rights reject homosexuality. These results are certainly significant. Adorno has already reported the strong correlation between rejection of homosexuality, abortion rights and authoritarianism. It is certainly no coincidence that in Nazi Germany there was a special “Central Office for the Combating of Homosexuality and Abortion”, which was part of the Gestapo, as early as 1936 (Reich Central Office for the Combating of Homosexuality and Abortion, 2023). Even today, ruling conservative politicians, e.g., in Poland, Russia, Republicans in the USA, conservatives in the Islamic world, regularly link the rejection of abortion rights and the rights of the LGBT community. The right to abortion and the “locus of control”

The “locus of control” means the feeling of being free to make decisions about one’s own life; it implies a sense of freedom and autonomy and was already an

“What do you think about abortion?”  147 important variable in Adorno’s schema of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950). Autonomy and freedom of decision are the foundations of the liberal ethical and political stance. At least since Kant, they constitute the basis of human personal integrity and dignity. However, safeguarding one’s own integrity and dignity requires a similar respect for the integrity and dignity of other people. These two can only exist when they respond to mutual respect and mutual defense of the dignity of other persons. We can thus assume that persons with a strong sense of personal autonomy and freedom of decision-making, respect other persons’ autonomy in a similar way to their own, whereas persons with a weaker sense of personal autonomy and freedom of decision-making do not perceive this to be the case to the same extent and respect it less in other persons. Carol Gilligan has pointed this out in her writings on the ethics of caring for others as a necessary complement to caring for oneself (Gilligan, 1982). The locus of control is appropriately represented by the following question (statement) from the EVS 2017 survey: Some people feel they have quite a bit of freedom to make decisions about their lives, while others feel that their actions have little influence on what happens to them. Please rate the extent to which you have a say in your own life. Respondents could give their answers on a ten-point scale (1= not at all... 10= to a large extent). Figure 4.11 shows the relationship between the degree of autonomy and freedom of decision and attitudes toward the right to abortion. Respondents with low

10

Please indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. Average on scale: 1= None at all ... 10= A great deal

9 8

7.35

7.70

7.87

7 6

5 4 3 2 1

against

neither for, nor against

for

Figure 4.11  Attitudes toward abortion rights and “autonomy”. EVS 2017, data for Slovenia.

148  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija levels of autonomy and decision-making freedom (lower locus of control) are more likely to oppose abortion rights. Those with a higher sense of decision-making freedom (higher locus of control) are abortion supporters. Overall, the responses show that respondents have a fairly high sense of control over their lives and freedom to make decisions, with a mean score of 7.72. This may be, of course, also due to the pressure to individualize one’s life course but also to the fact that we must make decisions about our own lives, or that we are increasingly responsible for our own lives, which is socially rewarded in contemporary societies. Conclusion According to opinion polls, Slovenia is among the most liberal countries in Europe in terms of attitudes toward abortion rights. Comparative data from the 2017 European value survey (EVS) show that Slovenia ranks eighth in terms of acceptance of abortion rights, just behind the Scandinavian countries, France and Netherlands and ahead of other Western European countries. A comparison over time shows that attitudes toward abortion liberalized in Slovenia between 1969 and 1990 and have remained steadily positive since then. The results of public opinion analyses show that, despite occasional political reversals in attitudes toward the right to abortion, there has been a clear pattern of opinion over the last 30 years. 72% of the population surveyed has a positive attitude toward the right to abortion. This proves, firstly, that attitudes toward the right to abortion are part of a value system that is not so dependent on daily political events; and secondly, that public opinion in Slovenia has a stable liberal orientation, regardless of the transition processes and political upheavals of the last 30 years since Slovenian independence. However, a closer analysis of the 2017 EVS data for Slovenia reveals some significant trends. Education emerged as an important factor in changing attitudes toward abortion. Men in Slovenia, especially the less educated, are less tolerant of the right to abortion. However, it is worrying that the public opinion of younger respondents is changing to become less tolerant of abortion rights. The link with religiosity is also interesting. In 1990, there was no significant correlation between expressed religiosity and attitudes toward abortion rights. We only found a statistically significant association between attendance at religious services and attitudes toward abortion rights. Now the association between expressed religiosity and attitudes toward abortion rights is statistically significant. This shows that the church, and thus religion, has become an important ideological force, and that the religious are committed to the values propagated by the church, where there is no longer room for a personal religiosity free from ideological commitment to the church. In this circular way, the church also becomes a political force. The analyses further confirmed the thesis that the syndrome of anti-democratic orientation (patriarchalism, conservatism, nationalism) is linked to attitudes toward the right to abortion. The correlations of all these groups of attitudes with attitudes toward abortion rights are statistically significant which means that if there is political sympathy for illiberal views, there can also be a snowball effect of ­increasing erosion of rights and freedoms, including the right to abortion, as the

“What do you think about abortion?”  149 Polish experience shows. The financial crisis and the other crises that have followed it in the last two decades, in particular the intensification of the ecological crisis, the disintegration of inter-state alliances, the refugee crisis, up to the pandemic crisis of the whole of humanity, have strengthened ethno-nationalist and populist movements in many countries, which propagate the strengthening of national identity and the traditional dominant religion. Above all, they propagate a return to traditional gender roles, the subjugation of women and the confinement of their lives and their ambitions to the private circle of the family. The struggle against the right to abortion, which is today mainly represented by political and religious fundamentalists and populists in Europe and around the world, continues in the drive to push women out of the labor market and back into family privacy. This development is also in line with the contemporary neoliberal socio-economic agenda, usually justified by the need for economic sobriety and austerity. In essence, it is the progressive marketization of all the public services of the modern welfare state, and the transfer of costs and risks from the state and companies to individuals, or rather to individuals and families. This means, above all, the additional burdening and deprofessionalization of women, or the ­cheapening of social activities at the expense of women’s free care work. It is no wonder then that patriarchal-conservative circles everywhere are fiercely attacking women’s rights to abortion and contraception. It is the debate on abortion rights that has often become the center around which the whole struggle for control of the reproductive field and process is concentrated. The issue of abortion has thus become a central symbolic site for the clash between those who want to preserve traditional gender divisions and hierarchies in people’s lives and work, and those who problematize or seek to abolish these divisions. The right to abortion is therefore a key right that divides the patriarchal-conservative cosmos from the liberal egalitarian emancipatory one (Brenan, 2018). This is also what we have found in a closer analysis of opinion polling data in Slovenia. As political events in Slovenia, Europe and the world show, this right is indeed never forever granted. Notes 1 See, for example, the report Tip of the Iceberg: Religious Extremist Funders against Human Rights for Sexuality and reproductive Health in Europe, written by Neil Datta, Secretary of the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights in 2021. Available at: https://www.epfweb.org/node/837 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). 2 The survey was conducted in Slovenia by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana in spring 2019. 3 The European Values Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national, repeated crosssectional survey research program, covering a wide range of human values. The main topics concern family, work, environment, perceptions of life, politics and society, ­religion and morality and national identity. Available at: https://europeanvaluesstudy. eu/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). In Slovenia, the survey was conducted by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 4 The analysis by subgroup is based on the above-mentioned grouping, where attitudes towards the right to abortion (from the EVS survey) are synthetically presented on a

150  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija scale from 1 to 10 for the ‘for’ group (answers 7, 8, 9, 10), the ‘undecided – neither for nor against’ group (answers 5, 6), and the ‘against’ group (answers 1, 2, 3, 4). 5 In the ANOVA analysis, the Eta for the first statement is 0.08 and for the second 0.05.

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“What do you think about abortion?”  151 ISSP Research Group (2020) International Social Survey Programme: Religion IV – ISSP 2018. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. Leschewitz, L (2022): Recht auf Abtreibung wieder auf dem Prüfstand. Available at: https:// polen-heute.de/recht-auf-abtreibung-wieder-auf-dem-pruefstand-69701/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Pew Research Center (2022) America’s Abortion Quandary. Available at: https://www. pewresearch.org/religion/2022/05/06/americas-abortion-quandary/ (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Patev, A.J., Hall, C.J., Dunn, C. E., Bell, A.D., Owens, B.D. and Hood, K. B. (2019) ‘Hostile Sexism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism as Mediators of the Relationship Between Sexual Disgust and Abortion Stigmatizing Attitudes’, Personality and Individual Differences, 151(109528), pp. 1–9. Peterson, B. E. and Zurbriggen, E.L. (2010) ‘Gender, Sexuality, and the Authoritarian Personality’, Journal of Personality, 78(6), pp.1801–1826. Pro-Familia Hintergrund (2017): Schwangerschaftsabbruch. Fakten und Hintergründe. Pro familia Bundesverband. Available at: https://www.profamilia.de/fileadmin/publikationen/ Fachpublikationen/Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Hintergrund-Schwangerschaftsabbruch. pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Sedgh, G., Henshaw, S., Singh, S., Ahman, E. and Shah, I. (2007) ‘Induced Abortion. Estimated Rates and Trends Worldwide’, The Lancet, 370(9595), pp. 1338–1345. Sedgh, G., Singh, S. and Hussain, R. (2014) ‘Intended and Unintended Pregnancies Worldwide in 2012 and Recent Trend’, Studies in Family Planning, 45(3), pp. 301–314. Singh, S., Remez, L., Sedgh, G., Kwok, L. and Onda, T. (2018) Abortion Worldwide 2017. Uneven Progress and Unequal Access. New York: Guttmacher Institute. Available at: https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-worldwide-2017 (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Soban, Branko (2021): ‘Tramvaj ne gre več naprej! Vlada prosim, izstopi...’ Interview with Marta Lempart, leader of the Polish Women’s Uprising. Delo, Sobotna priloga, 13(March), pp. 4–6. Stetson McBride, D. (2001) ‘Conclusion: Comparative Abortion Politics and the Case for State Feminism’, in D. Stetson (ed.): Abortion Politics, Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 267–296. Tabet, P. (1996) ‘Natural Fertility, Forced Reproduction’, in D. Leonard and L. Atkins (eds.) Sex in Question: French Materialist Feminism. London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 111–181. Taylor, M.G. & Whitehead, G.I. (2014) ‘The Measurement of Attitudes Toward Abortion’, Modern Psychological Studies, 20(1), pp. 79–86. Thompson, J. (2019) Abortion Law and Political Institutions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Uhan, S., Malnar, B., Kurdija, S., Hafner Fink, M. and Miheljak, V. (2021) Slovensko javno mnenje 2017/1: Evropska raziskava vrednot [Data file]. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Slovenian Social Science Data Archives. ADP – IDNo: SJM171. https://doi. org/10.17898/ADP_SJM171_V1 Ule, M. (1991) ‘Javno mnenje o abortusu’, in Bahovec Dolar, E. (ed.) Abortus-pravica do izbire?! Pravni, medicinski, sociološki, moralni in politični vidiki. Ljubljana: Skupina “Ženske za politiko”, pp. 197–217. Ule, M. (ed.) (1999) Predsodki in diskriminacije. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče. Ule, M., Kamin, T. and Švab, A. (eds.) (2018) Zasebno je politično. Kritične študije ­vsakdanjega življenja. Ljubljana: Založba FDV. Županov, J. (1986) ‘Delavski razred in družbena stabilnost’, Teorija in praksa, 11(23), pp. 1152–1165.

152  Mirjana Ule and Slavko Kurdija Wikipedia (2023) Reich central office for the combating of homosexuality and abortion. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reich_Central_Office_for_the_Combating_ of_Homosexuality_and_Abortion (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Yoran, G. (2019) ‘Konservativ sein, heißt heute: Alles, was den Männern Spaß macht’, Krautreporter, 25 March. Available at: https://krautreporter.de/2821-konservativ-seinheisst-heute-alles-was-mannern-spass-macht (Accessed: 17 April 2023). Yuval Davis, N. (1997) Gender and Nation. London: Sage.

Conclusion Ana Kralj, Tanja Rener, Vesna Leskošek, Metka Mencin and Mirjana Ule

The internal fractures of the neoliberal agenda, intertwined with the economic ­globalization, lead to a search for firm footholds and points of control over increasingly fluid and contingent forms of social relations, identities and roles. Those relations, identities and roles that span both the public and private spheres are more exposed than others. It is no wonder that gender relations and gender identities are under pressure in cultural, ideological and political struggles, for they fundamentally determine the course of reproduction of the human species. Throughout the world, we are witnessing attempts by various ideological and political actors to strengthen or regain control over people’s emotional and reproductive lives. The most powerful among them are influential religious institutions and groups, various conservative associations, political parties and the media. Patriarchal cultures already value control and domination, as they seek to ­maintain and reinforce existing systems of social distinction and hierarchical ­segmentation of society in every possible way. They are firmly embedded in the related class-based divisions of labor, property and social power. In her comparative study of the legal regulation of abortion in contemporary political systems, Thompson (2019) notes that attitudes toward abortion highlight the inherently patriarchal nature of most contemporary legal systems. Indeed, most legal systems call for different treatment of women, often in the form of special rights for women, which the authors seek to justify as a way to affirm both, gender equality and difference in the public sphere. Particularly where men and women have traditionally played different roles, and where men’s roles have traditionally been more socially prestigious and financially rewarded, abortion has become a symbolic marker between those who wish to maintain this hierarchical distinction and those who wish to challenge it. For the adherents of patriarchal culture, reproductive rights, especially the right to abortion, are very threatening because, in their view, they undermine the classical patriarchal family order on which public patriarchy is based, threaten the dominance of ethnic (national, racial) belonging and undermine the values of religious ideology. Therefore, the adherents of conservative and anti-democratic ideologies attack not only the right of women to freely decide on abortion but also all practices and means that help people to exercise their reproductive activities in a freer and ideologically unencumbered way. A whole range of issues are thus put back DOI: 10.4324/9781003434139-6

154  Ana Kralj et al. on the table: contraception, gender and sexuality education, the right to divorce, equality of LGBTQIA+ people, etc. They want to rebuild a world where all things are “in their place”, where everyone knows their role, their position and their purpose in society, where it is clear who is in charge and who is obedient, and where women in particular know this and behave accordingly. Half a century ago, this kind of discourse would have sounded anachronistic and foolish. This is precisely the point made by the Canadian sociologist and feminist Patrizia Albanese (2004) in her research on abortion and reproductive rights in nationalist regimes in the 20th century. She notes that throughout Europe we have experienced both, a century of women’s emancipation and renewed oppression under various nationalist and authoritarian regimes. She points to the historical example of Germany, which had one of the most progressive constitutional abortion regimes under the Weimar Republic, but which was abolished virtually overnight and without much resistance after the Nazis came to power. The threat of patriarchal-conservative-nationalist reversals is ever-present. Once in power, such a politics can abolish all freedoms, all emancipatory achievements, practically overnight. Opponents of abortion rights are constantly inventing new arguments to defend their patriarchal-conservative cosmos. Lately, they often invoke the right to life of embryos, while forgetting to care about the lives of potential newborns, willingly and quickly agreeing to cuts in social assistance and support, and agreeing to the mantra that each person is responsible for their own life. They oppose contraception and sex education, even though these are the most effective ways to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies and abortions. If a woman cannot freely decide if and when she wants to have children, if consenting to sexual intercourse means being forced into motherhood, if distancing oneself from motherhood means moral degradation, then a woman simply cannot decide about her own life, or, more precisely, she does not have an open future, but only an imposed one. It is well known that for many women, a forced pregnancy means the likelihood of remaining in a forced partnership or single parenthood. Poverty or illness often adds to the burden. Children are inevitably affected by this prospect. The perversity of patriarchal conservatism usually finds innumerable ways to blame women, so that they end up feeling morally and socially degraded, even in front of themselves. The only way out of this form of social, moral and mental coercion is therefore to rebel against it, not only by the women directly affected but also by those men who are aware that the reproduction of this kind of coercion inevitably affects them too, and that the patriarchal-conservative image of masculinity is only a manipulative mask. So how do we fight to preserve these fundamental reproductive rights? Feminist and women’s movements, liberal and left-wing politicians, progressive medical personnel, especially gynecologists and the support of progressive civil society are of crucial importance, as we have tried to show in this book. In Slovenia, they all contributed to the right to abortion to be included in the constitution. In Slovenia, the opponents of the right to abortion interpreted it as an evil that socialism elevated to a social good. Something similar has happened in most other post-socialist countries, in some cases very “successfully”, in others less so. Slovenia is one of the few countries in this group that has succeeded in obtaining

Conclusion  155 access to safe and legal abortion, at least on a legal level. There are many reasons for this success: a relatively favorable political and economic situation before the collapse of socialism and a smooth initial transition to capitalism; a well-organized and agile democratic political opposition; a peaceful separation from Yugoslavia compared to Croatia and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina; the political power of the Roman Catholic Church has increased, but remains incomparably smaller than in Poland or Croatia. And yet, the events and developments analyzed in this monograph warn that the tendencies to restrict access to safe and legal abortion and the revival of the patriarchal order in Slovenia were not just a brief episode during the transition, but the beginning of a process fueled by each political victory of the far right and the racism, misogyny, homophobia, transphobia and class divisions that accompany it. Could what is happening in Poland or the USA also happen in Slovenia? It is not impossible. The introduction of restrictive laws and practices in the USA emboldens restrictionists around the world and is likely to further strengthen their financial, political and social power. It could intensify hate speech and harassment practices against women seeking gynecological care, as well as against physicians and pharmacists. In short, it will poison the social climate and create more and more victims. No legal restrictions are to be expected in Slovenia, at least not in the near future: this would require constitutional amendments, which would only be possible in the event of a significant change in the political landscape and public opinion. However, it is possible to make the situation worse by circumventing the law and even working against it: by slowly and surreptitiously introducing practices that restrict access to otherwise legal abortion; by increasing the number of conscientious objectors (the question is how to prevent the number of conscientious objectors from increasing so much that it undermines access to safe abortion); by invoking informal conscientious objection, which not only makes patients and users uncomfortable, but actually prevents them from exercising their rights (we assume that one of the goals of anti-choice movements is precisely to legitimize such forms of “resistance”); by gradually increasing fees for reproductive services…. In the struggles for access to safe abortion, we do not promote abortion: we do not warn against pregnancy and parenthood, and we do not spread fear of postnatal depression. We do, however, warn about the consequences of bans and barriers. Our struggle is by no means only about legalization, which is why we deliberately keep talking about the availability of safe abortion. Legalization alone is neither a guarantee of accessibility nor of safety: the state must also ensure that every pregnant person has access to safe abortion: without supervisory instances to assess the justifiability of their decision, without a mandatory period for introspection and (re)consideration, without any fees and, of course, without coercion and under conditions that minimize risks during and after the procedure. Unsafe abortions and the associated morbidity and mortality are preventable, according to the WHO (2012: 17). This is exactly what we demand from the state. But not only that: we also demand that the state, through its policies, creates conditions that do not force women who want to have children to have abortions or push them into unwanted

156  Ana Kralj et al. pregnancies through the unavailability of contraceptives and the tabooing of sexuality (e.g., prohibition of education about sexuality and gender). Finally, but importantly, it is up to advocates of reproductive freedom and rights not to be fooled by appeasing, paternalistic or judgmental responses to feminist demands for equality; we must reject the cronyism (paraphrasing de Beauvoir) that is also evident in the way gender mainstreaming policies persistently reproduce class or socioeconomic inequalities. To sum up, it can be said that only by linking the cultural modernization of a society with influential liberal-oriented parties and emancipatory social movements can a successful liberalization of state policies toward sexual and reproductive rights be achieved, and only when conservative and religious institutions do not have a strong influence on civil society in a given country. In European countries, first in the West and North and then in the South and East, this was the case in the second half of the 20th century, especially from the 1970s to the end of the century. It was during this period that feminist and women’s movements put issues of gender justice and, in particular, women’s reproductive rights, on the public agenda. They drew attention to the internal contradictions of the societies of that time, to the fact that, in an era of the development of modern technologies and modern democracy, one of the oldest problems of humankind – the problem of gender justice – remained largely unresolved. The right to abortion was placed at the heart of the emancipation and empowerment of women as social subjects and actors. Putting issues of gender equality and gender justice on the public and political agenda has undoubtedly helped to change political concepts and agendas for the better. For how long? Bibliography Albanese, P. (2004) ‘Abortion and Reproductive Rights under Nationalist Regimes in ­Twentieth-Century Europe’, Women’s Health and Urban Life: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, 3(1), pp. 8–33. Thompson, J. (2019) Abortion Law and Political Institutions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. World Health Organization (2012) Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems. World Health Organization. Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/70914 (Accessed: 17 April 2023).

Index

Note: Page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. abortion: illegal 1, 16, 21, 23, 32, 57, 132; medication xiii, 63, 78, 83–85; rates 20, 32, 131; related deaths 71 Adorno, Theodor 127, 145–147 Andolšek Jeras, Lidija 26, 29–30 anti-democratic orientation 127, 145, 148 Article 55 (of the Slovenian Constitution) xiv, 9, 43, 45–49, 55, 62, 75, 77, 116–117 authoritarian personality 127, 129–130, 145, 147 authoritarianism 127, 140, 146 autonomy 3, 18–19, 28, 31, 33, 58, 69, 72, 78, 83–84, 146–148 banal nationalism 129–130 Billig, Michael 129–130 birth control 15, 19, 22, 25–26, 28, 33, 117, 129, 136 capacity-building 68, 92 commission: Constitutional 43–48; for the permission of abortions 30; for Women’s Politics 44–47, 62, 76–78, 117 conservatism 5–7, 10, 47, 127, 129–131, 134–135, 140, 145, 148, 154 conservative: attitudes 129; backlash 118n13; mentality 127, 129; turn 2–4, 72 contraceptive behavior 34, 71, 117 cultural revolution 3–4, 118 decriminalization of prostitution 78–80, 120 discourse: anti-abortion 59; media 74, 106, 108–109, 111; nationalist and

populist 128–129; neoconservative 107; neoliberal 6 discrimination 54, 59, 63, 76, 79, 87, 91–92, 95, 115, 121 discursive practices 128 emancipation 14, 19, 29, 41, 43, 69, 73, 103, 116, 154, 156 ethics of caring 147 EVS (European Values Study) 134, 138–149 family planning 1, 24, 26, 28–34, 45, 69–72, 81, 117 feminism 5–6, 10, 33, 55, 59, 63, 77, 92, 97, 101, 119–120 Foucault, Michel 59, 128 freedom of choice in childbearing xiv, 25, 34, 70, 75, 77 Fridays’ protests 111–114 funding 9, 92–97, 114, 129 gender: identities 12–13, 82, 92, 94–96, 116, 118, 130, 153; roles 88, 144–145, 149; theory 7, 90, 103, 108, 118 heteronormativity 39–40, 42 identity/ies: fluid 153; marginalized 95; minority 95; mobilizing 116; politics 2, 7; sexual 12, 82 indications: eugenic 18; legal-ethical 23; medical 17, 23, 117; social 15–16, 21, 23, 26–27 Institute for Family Planning 26, 29, 32, 34

158 Index integrity: bodily 19, 55; personal 147; sexual 113 ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 132–133 Istanbul Convention 5, 78–79, 111–112, 115, 136

professionalization 26, 31, 94–97, 99, 114, 116 public opinion 4, 8–9, 39, 61, 80, 86, 119, 126, 132, 135–139, 148–149, 155

Kožuh Novak, Mateja 27–28, 34, 42, 48, 70, 121 Kuhar, Roman 4, 10, 68, 85, 87, 107, 118

referendum: on Family Code 87–88, 107–108, 115, 118n13; on medically assisted insemination 76; on same-sex marriage 88–89, 107–108 religiosity 137, 141, 148 responsible parenthood 29 rights: human 1, 7, 9–10, 32, 39–42, 50, 57, 59, 61–62, 64, 69, 74–77, 91, 105, 108, 115, 118, 149; LGBTQIA+ 5, 85–87, 107–109; reproductive xiv–2, 4–5, 8–14, 26, 28, 30–32, 34, 42–43, 50–51, 57–60, 68–73, 76, 82–83, 85–87, 91, 95, 102–103, 105–106, 109, 111–112, 114–115, 126, 134, 145, 149, 153–154, 156; sexual 2, 5–6, 8–9, 68–69, 71–73, 75–79, 81–83, 85, 87, 89, 91–93, 95, 97–99, 101–103, 105–107, 109, 111–113, 115, 117, 119, 121

liberal orientation 139, 148 life course 11, 13, 20, 28, 31–32, 148 locus of control 146–148 Matić, Predrag 2, 58 medically assisted (artificial) insemination 13, 25, 28, 71, 75–76, 83, 115, 145–146 Mencin, Metka 1, 8–9, 32, 39–42, 44–46, 48, 50–56, 58, 60, 62–64, 74–75, 77, 107, 153 microphysics of power 128 movement(s): anti-systemic 4; Catholics for choice 52; emancipatory 7; feminist 78, 101; LGBTQIA+ 2, 4, 86, 91; social 39, 60, 68, 70, 75, 78, 113, 121, 156; women’s 33, 63, 154, 156 neoliberalism xiv, 5, 130 Obersnel Kveder, Dunja, xiv, 48, 69–71, 117, 121 Office for Women’s Politics 76–78 patriarchal conservatism 131, 134, 154 patriarchal culture 135, 153 patriarchalism 127, 130, 135, 144, 148 policy(ies): population 22, 31, 41, 60; pro-natalist 32, 42; social 15, 22, 31–32, 88, 133 populism xiv, 6–7, 105, 118, 129 prejudices 59, 111, 128

queer: identities 94; people 95; politics 5

sex education 8, 11, 30, 32, 58, 82, 154 sexism 52, 129 sexual health 1–2, 11, 83, 118 sexuality education 1, 5, 8, 61, 71, 78, 81–82, 98, 117, 154 Slovenian Roman Catholic Church 40, 68, 74, 85, 111, 119 sterilization 16, 21, 25–26, 29, 31, 46, 50, 71, 115 traditional family 6, 52 Walby, Sylvia 2, 10 Wallerstein, Immanuel 3–4, 10 Women for Politics xiv, 48, 76–77, 126, 136 world-system 3, 9–10