Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics: With a Foreword by Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Prefaces by ... Science, Engineering, Practice, 26) [1st ed. 2022] 3031139046, 9783031139048

Citation preview

Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26

Nathan C. Funk Meena Sharify-Funk Editors

Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics With a Foreword by Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Prefaces by Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice Volume 26

Series Editor Hans Günter Brauch, Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES-PRESS), Mosbach, Germany

http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/PAHSEP.htm http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/PAHSEP_AzizSaid.htm

Nathan C. Funk · Meena Sharify-Funk Editors

Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics

With a Foreword by Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Prefaces by Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

Editors Nathan C. Funk Department of Peace and Conflict Studies Conrad Grebel University College University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON, Canada

Meena Sharify-Funk Department of Religion and Culture Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, ON, Canada

Acknowledgement: This photo is from the personal photo collection of Elena Turner (spouse of the late Abdul Aziz Said), and is used with permission. More on Prof. Abdul Aziz Said, his books, other publications and links to selected media are found at: http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/PAHSEP_AzizSaid.htm. ISSN 2509-5579 ISSN 2509-5587 (electronic) Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice ISBN 978-3-031-13904-8 ISBN 978-3-031-13905-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Copyediting: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

We dedicate this book to the next generation of scholars aspiring toward a global, compassionate, and intercultural outlook on the human condition. May you explore new frontiers of knowledge and practice in the spirit of Abdul Aziz Said. May you be guided by creative imagination, authenticity, the courage to challenge conventional assumptions, and an abiding humanistic commitment to a future of dignity and well-being for all peoples.

Foreword

Selected Stops in Abdul Aziz Said’s Peace Journey It is truly an honor to be able to introduce Abdul Aziz Said for this biographical project. I was lucky and privileged to play a small part in his long and magnificent academic and applied journey of building and contributing to the field of peace studies. For more than half a century, Abdul Aziz Said dedicated himself to the advancement of theory and practice in the fields of international relations (IR) and international peace and conflict resolution. During his many years as the senior ranking professor at American University in Washington, D.C. and as the director of the School of International Service’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution Division, Said was responsible for developing a wide range of innovative educational, research, and outreach programs. These programs include a Master of Arts degree

vii

viii

Foreword

and four dual or joint degree options, as well as concentrations at the doctoral and undergraduate levels. Introducing Professor Said is a challenging and uncomfortable task. Challenging because he did so much in his academic and professional career, but beyond the life in academia he touched the lives of so many people. So it will not be wise to claim that this foreword comprehensively covers his work—thus the uncomfortable dimension of feeling guilty that I have certainly left out important publications, organizations, declarations that he has started, or a journey with an influential peacemaker. I have contemplated how to introduce him as one of the pioneers in IR who pushed the limits of the discipline on many fronts. In his 57 years of teaching and researching, he contributed in many ways to the peace studies and IR fields. I have opted to illustrate here a few of the major stops in his academic career path and contextualize them to be able to understand the significance of his lifelong work. The following essay is not going to list his 19 books and the hundreds of articles, op-eds, and other publications that Abdul Aziz Said produced. It will not list the conflict areas that he has worked in as a peacemaker throughout his life. (But, he has been involved in peacemaking efforts in most conflicts in the Middle East since the 1960s. And as you know between the 1950s and 2015, there were plenty of these opportunities in the Middle East.) Instead, I have chosen a few areas that I think capture some aspects of his contributions to peace studies and IR and peacemaking. This might give the reader a glimpse of the stature of Abdul Aziz Said, the mualim (teacher).1

Culture and Religion in International Relations In the 1960s and 1970s, the study of culture was not part of the mainstream IR theories or research, however that did not prevent Said from conceptually advocating cultural analysis through his earliest books and articles for IR students and scholars. This theme—the role of culture in the study of IR and its influence on diplomacy—is one that the field of IR only began exploring in a more serious way twenty years later. In two early pieces, “Non-Western Traditions and the Western World” (Free World Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1 [Spring 1960], pp. 3–5) and “The United States and the Middle East and North Africa” (Naval War College Review, Vol. 22, No. 10 [June 1970], pp. 41–47), he already stated his lifelong hypothesis that the Western policy paradigm is biased and neglects the local, traditional cultural forces that are in play. For over 50 years, Said would continue to write about the inadequacies of Western diplomacy and the ways it has proposed to handle conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and the rest of the world. In his writing, Said has tackled this issue through a number of central prisms, including human rights, cultural and traditional identity, religion and spirituality, Islam, and Arab national identities. Above all, he 1

In Arabic, the term mualim literally means “teacher,” and has traditionally been used in an honorific sense for an esteemed and learned mentor or a wise elder.

Foreword

ix

has utilized these analytical lenses to confront the power politics paradigm of IR as it has manifested itself in his home city: Washington, D.C. Throughout his journey, he used a universal and humanist framework as a larger umbrella for engagement across cultural differences. In a similar manner, Said embraced the study of ethnicity in politics. He included it in his early writings as far back as 1964 and went on to publish Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (edited, 1977) and Ethnicity in an International Context (edited with L. R. Simmons, 1976). His approach continued to provide a space for marginalized voices, even when the pressure of the dominant paradigm in academic institutions and society was to emphasize assimilation and denial of differences. Said’s writings called for the creation of Ethnic Studies within IR and pointed toward pluralism. This emphasis on recognition of and respect for ethnic identity was very timely. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, following the civil rights movement and the decolonization of Africa and the Middle East, Ethnic Studies was beginning to emerge in academic institutions. The struggle then was how the Ethnic Studies was going to be framed. Said advocated for a space based on recognizing the human dignity of marginalized communities. Dominant majority societies in the United States and in European states debated the models of assimilation and integration versus pluralism and diversity. Ethnic and cultural assimilations were put forward as ideal models to deal with racial and linguistic differences. Said landed on pluralism and diversity and not with the proponents of full assimilation. To fully understand and appreciate the journey that Said undertook in his career, one has to recognize his origins. He arrived in Washington as a young student from the eastern desert of Syria (al-Hasakah area). Born to a Christian family, he was educated in Muslim culture and French-run schools, and he was the son of a tribal leader who opposed the French colonial system in Syria for many years. He moved to Washington just after the Second World War. America was in one of its peaks, having defeated both Germany and Japan using its massive military power and even dropping the nuclear bomb on Japanese cities. It only took him a few years after earning his degree from American University to begin voicing his critical views on issues related to human rights abuse and on applying top-down development models in African and non-Western contexts. Such critiques became clearer in the late 1980s and early 1990s in his statements on U.S. foreign policy in the Arab region. During the 1980s and 1990s, Said advocated that American policy toward the Islamic world should target some of the root causes of terrorism—exclusion, maldistribution of resources, absence of legitimate and genuinely participatory political authority—rather than Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. For example, after Israel’s April 1996 campaign in Lebanon, the United States government donated $100 million to Israel to combat terrorism. This money could have been better spent for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Furthermore, U.S. officials needed to make clear that support for Middle Eastern governments, including Israel, is contingent not on mere political and economic expediency, but on criteria such as civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural human rights—especially cultural due process, protection of the human person and human dignity, and the promotion of authentic, participatory community.

x

Foreword

Many Muslims are sensitive to perceived double standards in United States foreign and domestic policies and question American sincerity on issues of non-proliferation, international law, and human rights for all peoples. The U.S. should attempt to take this into account when formulating policies, making every effort to pursue a balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, and demonstrate that it is committed to reconciliation with the Iranian people (Said and Funk 1996). Abdul Aziz’s critique of the Western foreign policy paradigm did not prevent him from being critical of governance and policies of Muslim and Arab regimes. On the contrary, his analysis and diagnostics of the conflicts and problems in the Middle East always began with the call to recognize the institutional and structural challenges. The establishment of nation-states in the Middle East accompanied intellectual and political institutional discontinuity with the basic values of the dominant religion of Islam. The efforts by Middle Eastern governments to assimilate and modernize produce a crisis of alienation (mobilization, coercive assimilation, and imperialism) and the rise of ethnicity. The traditional Islamic institutions have lost their effectiveness as organizing principles and as safeguards for social justice and political participation. The Shariah (Islamic Laws), which served as a protective code for individual Muslims since the seventh century, is suffering near total neglect. The universalism of Islam has not found expression in the new nation-states. (Said 1989, p. 620)

Rooted in his human rights paradigm of the 1960s, he continued to write about the obstructions of economic and social development in Africa and the Middle East. The resulting dilemma for Muslims is that, when they reject Western political, economic and social values as inappropriate to their needs, the West views them as xenophobic and reactionary. They become isolated internationally—Khomeini and Qadhafi are two glaring examples. However, when Muslims compromise their own values and traditions and adopt those of the West, they suffer internal displacement. They are rejected domestically. The Shah and Sadat are two tragic victims. (Said 1989, p. 621)

Voicing human rights narratives and discourse during the McCarthy era was another step in Said’s professional life. During the Cold War, the U.S. government had launched a fierce campaign to restrict any form of sympathy with the Soviet regime or communist ideology. The dominant paradigm was democracy and capitalism. Academics and practitioners were expected to sing the same song. The McCarthy machine was successful in recruiting and pressuring faculty members from around the country. But at the American University, Said with some of his colleagues stood their ground and did not allow the U.S. government to interfere with their academic freedom. The prism of human rights and freedom was the lens which he utilized in that period to voice his rejection of the mainstream paradigm. His book on Human Rights and World Order (1978) illustrates such trends in his approach to peace, as he carried them forward across several decades. In responding to Middle Eastern conflicts, many policy-makers came to ask for Abdul Aziz Said’s perspective on their plans to fix the region. His analysis of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict emphasized the power of perceptions and cultural factors. In this respect, his Middle East analysis was similar to his other analyses of IR-related and political problems, in which he gave weight to legacies linked to culture and identity while also noting the capacity for dynamism

Foreword

xi

and authentic local agency. “We would therefore propose that the future can promise more than linear evolutionism and cultural collision, to the benefit of East and West, Arab and Israeli, Muslim, Christian, and Jew. We can choose to view culture not merely as an obstacle, but also as a dynamic resource” (Said & Funk 1996, p. 30). Calling for dialogue and a needs-based negotiation approach was the main message that he repeated to bring a viable solution to the deep-rooted conflict in that region. With Funk (a frequent academic collaborator in the 1990s and early 2000s), Said asserted that: A more cooperative conflict resolution approach would incorporate three components: first, settling the atmosphere, which gives the participant a feeling of comfort; second, developing effective conflict resolution power—shared positive power rather than “negative” power— which gives the participant a sense of safety; and, finally, moving toward effective conflict resolution steps, which creates a coordinated pace. (Said & Funk 1996, p. 36)

Bringing God into International Relations As early as the 1970s, Said introduced the need to consider religion in diplomacy and development. In his early work on African and Middle Eastern development models, he advocated for a different way to view the role of religion in such contexts. Where some saw religion as irrelevant to development, as an obstacle to change, or as a vehicle for reactive discourse that minimizes the potential for self-critique, Said proposed underscoring the crucial role of local values and traditions—together with the sense of identity, continuity, and dignity that they provide—and affirming their compatibility with intentional processes of change predicated on social dialogue. Particularly concerned with the impact of colonialism and its resultant social schisms between those inclined to either “reject” or “reflect” the West, Said argued that development needed to be a locally driven process with room for multiple advocates and cultural self-determination. With respect to Islamic contexts, Said suggested that the word “development” in Islam refers to the development of the soul in its return back to God. Divine Will continues to function in all phases of human history and in all instances of human life. In contrasting Muslim society and culture with Western: Divine Will for Muslims is the equivalent of the law of nature in the Western context…. In the Islamic perspective, history has never been taken to be the ultimate matrix of reality; history is not reality—God is reality…. Islam has never divorced the material from the spiritual life; making one’s bread is as much an act of faith as saying one’s prayers. (Said 1989, pp. 621– 622) The Islamic idea of development cannot easily be reduced to any of the existing models that prevail in the West today. It cannot be reduced to the models advanced by modernized Muslim thinkers…. Development is a process through which human beings choose and create their future within the context of their environment to achieve a creative society. It is concerned with the dignity of the individual, a secure level of self-esteem, and the establishment of institutions appropriate for these ends. The goals of development are to realize the potential for human societies and for the total human being. (Said 1989, p. 623)

xii

Foreword

Such framing of international and national development was being debated in the early 1960s and 1970s with a strong push toward participatory models. Said joined the voices that called for further localization of development models and for genuine engagement with cultural and religious actors on the ground.

Localizing Peace Localizing peace is another theme that Said tackled in his later years at American University. Beyond teaching courses on it and working with graduate and undergraduate students who arrived at the School of International Service (SIS) wanting to launch a career outside the United States, Said’s course came to convey a strong message of localizing peace—looking for peacebuilding opportunities in your own neighborhood. This also fits well with the humility of “do what you can where you are,” a Sufi Muslim value that calls for service and localized engagement. In his framing of the concept with Funk, they emphasized the need for utilizing traditional and local cultural frameworks in responding to conflicts (Funk & Said 2010). Although they did not devote great efforts in the operational implications of such approach in international development, they nevertheless emphasized three main concepts: “peace as a locally constructed reality,” “culture as a resource,” and “outsider as facilitator” (ibid.). These concepts need to be articulated in greater detail, in relation to the types of time commitment and results criteria that are appropriate to this type of engagement. “Limits of interventionism” is indeed a factor that is facing many peace workers in the field. To what extent do we have the right to travel outside of our own countries and societies to work in conflict areas in which we have very little understanding of their culture and religion? Also to what extent do the United States and other superpowers have the capacity to fully transform the local dynamics without damaging the infrastructure and the lives of many people? “Act local and think global” is the slogan and path that advocates and practitioners in the field suggested to increase the impact or effects of our intervention. The idea of the slogan is that since we are all interdependent and interconnected, then peacebuilding intervention in Washington, D.C. will affect the peace in Mindanao, Philippines and Sri Lanka. Changing domestic policies in Washington and London can have effects on other parts of the world, too. In addition, localizing peace has immediate impact on the acting individual. For starters, it requires humility to work within your own community in which you know its language and cultural norms. Abdul Aziz Said’s most recent initiative at American University advocated for such a path of intervention, with a stronger focus on domestic intervention which can also avoid the conflict tourism which certain intervention models have de facto encouraged (spending a period of 1–2 years in a conflict area and then moving to another one with the cycle of funding or donor policies).

Foreword

xiii

Unsurprisingly, Said put forward a similar principle in the 1980s when he discussed development approaches in the Islamic context. Returning to the Middle East, and the larger context of the Third World, three possibilities must be examined: either retake the road of “Westernizing” the world, assuming the contradictions in the Western camp (among liberals, Judeo-Christians and Marxist-Socialists) can be resolved; or accept the hegemony of one of the Western groups, or of a non-Western worldview; or build a truly eclectic world humanist culture. Such an eclectic humanist culture would provide space for the growth of a truly Islamic model. (Said 1989, p. 624)

According to Said, in the long run: It is better for the Middle East to develop through its own Islamic traditions. Otherwise, the people of the region will remain torn between traditionalism and secularism, between fundamentalism and westernism. A change through continuity is both safer and more viable than a change through discontinuity. The challenge is how to develop the Middle East through its own traditions, not through Western secular ideologies. The first is deep-rooted in the heart of the masses as mass culture and mass behavior. The second is uprooted from mass culture and can easily be seen as external penetration. (Said 1989, p. 625)

Where many scholars have seen forces such as religious revivalism as threats to the established world order, Said saw revivalism as an expression of the search for human dignity and a cultural future.

Institutionalizing Peace and Conflict Resolution The third area to be highlighted is the journey of creating a peace and conflict resolution program at American University (AU). Said began offering his first courses in peace studies at AU in the early 1980s. Following that, it took him and his committed students another 13 years before the School of International Service agreed to create a Master’s program of International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). The story of launching that program reflects Abdul Aziz’s spirit of advocacy and compassion. A number of his students marched into a faculty meeting and demanded from the administration and faculty to approve such a Master’s degree. The fight at that time was whether IPCR could be an academically rigorous program compatible with the international relations power paradigm. In the context of the peace and conflict resolution field, this program was within the first wave of new graduate programs to be created in the United States. George Mason University created the International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) program; Syracuse University created their own program, too. Insisting on having peace studies as an integral part of the conflict resolution graduate program was certainly Said’s vision. Other faculty members and the school wanted to name it conflict management or settlement (assuming that such a designation would earn them more academic and professional credibility in Washington circles). However, combining and bridging peace and conflict resolution approaches was the path which Said pushed with the students in the early 1990s.

xiv

Foreword

Looking at his work in the early 1970s and 1980s, one can understand the values and means which Abdul Aziz Said had been advocating when confronting traditional and mainstream theoretical and practical constructs in the IR field. Conflict resolution is not a mechanical process, and conflict cannot be solved through tools and techniques. As he would always repeat, in this field, “we need human spirit and values.” I joined Said in 1997 to build the foundation of the graduate program. Today this has become one of the largest Master’s programs at the School, attracting many high-achieving students. For over 10 years, Said steered the program with gentle and compassionate leadership to become one of the flagship programs for the SIS, which is one of the largest IR schools in the country. Building a peace studies program within a Washington, D.C.-based international affairs school is no easy task. It requires being able to fight and stand your ground against many forces that negate the very foundational values of peace and conflict resolution studies. In particular, it means confronting both the offensive and the just war theorists, researchers, and policy-makers who perpetuate the culture of violence discourse. In the middle of this, Said has always spoken and written of the need for an alternative paradigm based on nonviolence and justice policies.

Overcoming the Dilemma of Engagement with the Other Abdul Aziz’s academic accomplishments can also be better understood and appreciated if examined within the context of his life in Washington, D.C., and teaching at SIS, where at least 30% of the students aim to join the foreign service. In this setting, being critical of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Muslim world and being a foreign-born citizen during the Cold War imposed certain challenges on a scholar seeking to engage in policy practice. Said made his decision early in his career to actively engage with the policy-maker circles. In addition to offering himself as a mentor to many international students from around the world, Abdul Aziz Said frequently lectured and participated in national and international dialogue and peace conferences. His public service included consulting the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United Nations and (under President Jimmy Carter) the White House Committee on the Islamic World. He served as the president of the regional chapter for the International Studies Association and as the moderator for the Ecumenical Council of Washington. He advised and served on the Board of Directors for various international non-governmental organizations including Search for Common Ground, Global Education Associates, the National Peace Foundation, the International Youth Advocate Program, the Omega Institute, Nonviolence International, the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, and Jones International University-University of the Web. He was also a member of the editorial boards for Human Rights Quarterly and Peace Review. But beyond these traditional engagements, his office convened many backchannel meetings from opposing diplomatic

Foreword

xv

sides, especially from the Arab world. Said also offered advice to many U.S. government officials who were assessing certain shifts in their policy-making toward the Middle East. The capacity to express in a gently critical voice and yet maintain continuous engagement lines is one of the principles that Abdul Aziz Said preached in his scholarly work on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. He also practiced it with U.S. government officials. In his description of dialogue and its function in dealing with the Muslim world, Said always emphasized the need to be authentic and convey the reality as perceived by all parties (Said 2007; Said, Abu-Nimer, & Sharify-Funk 2006; Said, Funk, & Kadayifci 2001; Said 1979; Said & Sharify-Funk 2003).

Islam and Peace Since the late 1980s and in particular throughout the last three decades of his work, Said embraced his spiritual identity as a humanist and universalist with strong roots in Sufi tradition. His references to Ibn ‘Arabi, Rumi, and other Muslim Sufi masters were an integral part of his scholarship and practice. In one of his last writings, “The Universal Transcendent Dimension of Peace,” this theme is highly visible and connected to an emphasis on interconnectedness and holistic approaches to peacebuilding. In his own characteristic fashion, underscoring unity in diversity, he continues to highlight the value of localized peacebuilding frameworks even while also communicating the underlying message that we all need each other to live in genuine peace. Statesmen, civil society, religious actors, youth, women, etc., are all connected in the web of life that requires us to cooperate in resolving and addressing our human challenges. For Said, consensus and cooperation are the two core values that should guide IR and diplomacy, and “[t]he new frame of reference of world problems is an artifact of the minds and hearts of people” (Said, Lerche, & Lerche 1995, p. 280). Consistently, he sees differences and divisions as points of departure for moving toward unity: First, Second and Third Worlds must become one world. Oppressors and oppressed must be seen as people; reason and intuition become faces of truth; planning and spontaneity become reality; civilization and barbarism become culture; propositional knowledge and anecdotal knowledge become the root of knowledge. World order becomes a historical process whereby human beings choose and create their future within the context of their environment to achieve a humanist and creative society. (Said 1989, p. 627)

Said articulated this call for new world order in the early 1990s, in response to the Washington realist worldview. The vision of an equitable and inclusive world order, however, has accompanied Said for five decades of his work. His new world order is to be founded on human solidarity and the wholeness of planetary life. As a young Syrian immigrant to the United States, Said carried his cultural and religious identity with him. The study of culture and its relations with politics was a cornerstone in his work since the 1960s. However, as he accumulated more experience in Washington circles and globally, he moved closer to spirituality and explored

xvi

Foreword

its link to international relations. Advocating and introducing such a dimension in mainstream academia—and in particular in international relations which is governed by power politics—is no easy task. We can only imagine the level of cynicism and resistance Abdul Aziz received from strangers and even from colleagues. Nevertheless, he continued to “push the cart” (as he loved to say in describing these circumstances). One of his stories illustrating this position and the criticism it garnered refers to a “pile of peas.” Said related that an old friend met him and mocked him for continuing to work with peace and idealism by saying, “Are you still at the end or back of the bus? What are you doing, Said? Are you still working with piles of peas?” Answering him, Said stated, “I am mining a pile of gold.” Thus, a major area of research and teaching that Abdul Aziz Said pioneered at AU and beyond is the area of religion and peace, specifically the relationship among Islam, peace, and pluralism. In the early 1990s, in what is typically referred to as the post-Cold War period, a new set of negative labels emerged and became widespread among U.S. foreign policy and Western policy-makers who were searching for a new enemy to replace the Soviet Union. These labels framed America’s new strategic challenge in terms such as “Islamic terrorism,” “Jihadism,” and “Islamic fundamentalism.” In the “heart of the Empire” and during the early rise of Islamophobic sentiments, Said succeeded in launching a special endowed academic chair, the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace. This provided him with an opportunity and space to build a major research agenda and to place Islamic peace, diversity, and pluralism in the center of one of the major international relations schools. The path was open to mentor and explore new hypotheses in the study of peace, conflict resolution, and Islam. In collaboration with rising scholars who have a similar passion, Abdul Aziz Said contributed several important publications in this field. These publications include Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, Not Static (co-edited with Meena SharifyFunk and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Routledge, 2006), Bridges, Not Barriers: Essays on Exploring a Global Dream (The Fetzer Institute, 2006), The World of Islam (with Abdul Karim Bangura, Pearson Publishing, 2003), Cultural Diversity and Islam (coedited with Meena Sharify-Funk, University Press of America, 2003), and Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam (co-edited with Nathan C. Funk and Ayse Kadayifici, University Press of America, 2001). Building the groundwork for a new subfield in peace studies is not an easy task. But Abdul Aziz moved with a close group inspired by his leadership; they hosted the first international conference on such a theme in 1996 at American University.2 In addition to U.S.-based colleagues, he brought voices like Sheikh Jawdat Said from Syria, where this thinker and activist had been jailed for many years for nonviolent resistance and standing against the Assad regime since the early 1980s, and eminent Sufi sheikh M. R. Bawa Muhaiyaddeen from India and Sri Lanka, to the classrooms and podiums of Washington, D.C. These were not typical academic scholars who easily fit into the empirical evidence-driven culture of the School of International 2

Mubarak Awad (Nonviolence International), Karim Douglas Crow, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Michael Beer, Ayse Kadayifci, Nathan Funk, Meena Sharify-Funk, and Betty Sitka are a few of the scholars and practitioners who worked with Abdul Aziz Said on this vision of Islamic peace.

Foreword

xvii

Service. Thus, it was both a struggle and a bold move to bring the voice of a Muslim religious leader into such a space and during such an era in Washington, D.C. Observing State Department and U.S. government officials listening to a Muslim religious leader on how to handle the crisis with Saddam Hussein or how to relate to the Muslim world in more just and compassionate ways was an amazing sight, especially a few years before and after 9/11. Abdul Aziz Said’s leadership was behind multiple international conferences on Islam and peace and allowed such a vision to unfold. Introducing religion in IR is still a challenge even today, and it was only in 2014 that the International Studies Association (ISA) launched its first section on religion, interfaith relations, and peace. However, Abdul Aziz has been championing the need to integrate the study of religious identity into IR theories and policy-making for at least three decades. From 1997 through 2015, he was the occupant of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at American University, which is supported by the only endowment in the West and maybe globally that focuses on such a theme in an academic setting. It was during this period that he led the creation of a set of courses on Islam and peace which included Islamic Peace Paradigms, Islamic Sources of Conflict Resolution, and Islam and Democracy. The introduction of spirituality in IR and peace studies is another area that Said has introduced through his courses and recent writing (Said 2001). His special paper on spirituality which was published by the Fetzer Institute (Bridges, Not Barriers: Essays on Exploring a Global Dream, 2006) provides a guiding map for scholars and practitioners in peacebuilding on the need to expand our conceptual understanding and framing of spirituality and a path toward forgiveness and love. In this paper and his other publications, Said has reiterated his global and humanist appeal to see harmony and cohesion within the rich human diversity. This theme of rejecting cultural superiority and domination by embracing diversity has been his lifelong message. As he expanded on the notion of cultural triumphalism, he stated: Cultural imperialism is an attitude of superiority over, and insensitivity to, other cultures. In the Western instance, a literary, abstracting, generalizing, scientific culture is thought of as presenting a “higher” form of truth than oral-aural, folk anecdotal cultures. Yet a retreat to a cultural ghetto by any group—be it Muslim, Christian, Buddhist or whatever—is not only a denial of the rich diversity of the modern cultural experience, but also a rejection of responsibility for future generations. The inexorable dynamics of modern history rule out pretensions by any one group or cultural tradition of establishing a world hegemony. We have moved from a humanity that experienced its collective life as fragments of the whole to a humanity experiencing itself as whole. We are the heirs of the Old World order; but our legacy would be much greater if we could be the architects of a new order founded upon human solidarity and the wholeness of human life. This is true to the geniuses of all human traditions. (Said 1989, p. 627)

xviii

Foreword

Teacher and Mentor In his 57-year academic journey, Said mentored and touched the lives of thousands of students, scholars, and practitioners. When working in this field of peacebuilding, it is hard not to meet his mentees. In many of the cities that I have visited in the last 20 years around the world, every time I introduce myself as a professor from American University, one person will ask me: “Is Abdul Aziz Said still there? Please tell him I said hi.” In 2014 at the International Studies Association’s annual convention, I stepped into a small hotel shop on the corner to buy coffee. There was a man who was in his late sixties who, when he read my name tag, said, “I am an alumni of AU and I remember a Middle Eastern professor and he was on fire when he taught me in 1961.” (I noted in my head that 1961 was before I was born.) In a remote city in southern Mindanao, Philippines, where I was doing a training in peacebuilding, a man approached me and asked me to pass his greetings to Professor Said, who taught him in 1972. Said’s legacy extends beyond classrooms, books, articles, and magazines; his work touched the hearts and minds of many, carrying a spiritual message of peace and harmony. A core belief and lifelong message of Abdul Aziz Said was the notion that instead of masking spirituality in the terminology of objectivism, empiricism, or mechanical separation of the human from the scholar, we should not shy away from our spiritual path, even as academics. Thus, the academic story of Said’s contribution to the field of peace and conflict resolution cannot be accurately captured without acknowledging his work as a teacher and mentor. Beyond his rich scholarly contribution and influence on policy-makers all over the world, especially in the Middle East region, the story will not be complete if I do not share with you that Said was learned in the Sufi way and has hundreds of students who have followed his path and sought his knowledge and wisdom for their lives. In his basement or office surrounded by his spirituality and peace library, icons, artwork, and traditional Arab crafts, Abdul Aziz Said spoke about peace, tranquility, inner strength, and his sources of inspiration. Being a Sufi master, scholar, advocate, and peacemaker were all qualities that he carried with him on a daily basis. I witnessed many manifestations of these qualities every time I encountered him in the last 20 years. His work was always guided by the famous saying of Ibn ‘Arabi about spirituality and humanism: My heart has become capable of every form: It is a pasture for gazelles, And a convent for Christian monks, And a temple for idols, And the pilgrim’s Ka‘ba, And the tables of the Torah, And the book of the Koran.

Foreword

xix

I follow the religion of Love, Whatever direction its caravans may take, For Love is my religion and my faith. —Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi (1165–1240)

August 2021

Mohammed Abu-Nimer American University Washington, D.C., USA

References Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: An agenda for sustainable peacebuilding. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1978). Human rights and world order. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Said, A. A. (1979). Precept and practice of human rights in Islam. Universal Human Rights, 1(1), 63–79. Said, A. A. (1989). The paradox of development in the Middle East. Futures, 21(6), 619–627. Said, A. A. (2001). The whole world needs the whole world. Kosmos: Journal for Global Transformation, 1(2), 5–6, https://www.kosmosjournal.org/article/the-whole-world-needs-thewhole-world/. Said, A. A. (2006). Bridges, not barriers: the American dream and global community, Essay Number 1 in the “Essays on exploring a global dream” series. Kalamazoo, MI: The Fetzer Institute. Said, A. A. (2007, Apr. 28). Making peace with Islam. Keynote speech presented at Conflict and Resolution Institute Gala. University of Denver. Denver, CO. Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2006). Contemporary Islam: dynamic, not static. London: Routledge Publishers. Said, A. A., & Bangura, K. (2003). The world of Islam: County-by-country profiles. London: Pearson Publishing. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). The Middle East and United States foreign policy: searching for reality. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 3(3), 27–37. Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.). (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Concepts of international politicsin global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Said, A. A., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2003). Cultural diversity and Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Prof. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, is the director, Peacebuilding and Development Institute, American University, Washington, D.C..; Ph.D., Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; M.A., Hebrew University in Jerusalem; B.A., Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has conducted inter-religious conflict resolution training and interfaith dialogue workshops in conflict areas around the world, including Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Northern Ireland, the Philippines (Mindanao), and Sri Lanka. In addition to his articles and publications, Abu-Nimer is the co-founder and co-editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development.

Preface and Acknowledgments

Abdul Aziz Said’s contributions as a scholar, teacher, and mentor are difficult to summarize in a single essay or commemorative volume. When he retired from the American University School of International Service in 2015, Said was the longest-serving professor at this Washington, D.C.-based university. After his death on January 22, 2021, amid a global pandemic, former students, colleagues, and friends gathered online to honor his contributions, mark his passing, share stories, and reflect. Although comments varied widely in theme and many revolved around personal mentoring, the spirit of the term “pioneer” (as it refers to a person “who is among the first to research and develop a new area of knowledge or activity”3 ) figured prominently in the reflections offered. Said was a pioneer in multiple ways, pushing the frontiers of intellectual inquiry and inspiring thousands of people to think differently about peace and peacemaking in a dynamic and changing world. There is a remarkable story behind Said’s impressive career and far-ranging impact—a story this volume will present in outline form. While selections from Said’s rich and varied writings form the centerpiece of the book (see Part II), readers seeking to understand the creative impulse behind these writings will no doubt find the biographical chapter and photo essay (which, together with the bibliography chapter, comprise Part I) intriguing. As these chapters will make clear, Said’s unique contributions as a socially engaged and indeed activist scholar emerged both from his dedication to academic pursuits and from a deeply human response to diverse experiences. In addition, testimonials we have received from his global network of colleagues and former students (see Part III) will shed further light on how Said was a model for what a boundary-crossing, pioneering, multifaceted academic life can look like.

3

Oxford English Dictionary definition 1.1 of “pioneer,” as recorded. xxi

xxii

Preface and Acknowledgments

Abdul Aziz Said invited us to prepare this volume in the spring of 2016. Honored to receive this opportunity to collaborate with him once again, we commenced work on a project that would take several years to complete. Having already collaborated extensively with Said for approximately two decades, we began our efforts with an understanding of his thought and especially of his late-career manner of formulating responses to major issues. Considerable labor was nonetheless necessary to collect and select representative writings from Said’s impressive corpus of scholarship on an exceptional range of related yet distinct topics. Our intent was to construct a composite representation of Said’s career and of the many innovative lines of research he pursued, while still communicating both the range and coherence of his vision. Throughout this process, editing work was also necessary, to reduce the size of some selections and to thereby create a more compact, streamlined, and accessible volume. Although some decisions concerning what to include or exclude proved challenging, we believe that the materials represented in Part II of this volume convey the insightfulness of Said’s intellectual engagement with multiple subject areas across the span of more than half a century. For most of the time we were producing this book, we were fortunate to have access to Said to solicit his input and share our progress. We were particularly thankful to have the opportunity to interview him at his home in Washington, D.C., in October 2017, August 2018, and March 2019. These interviews were invaluable for constructing a narrative of major life experiences that shaped his outlook, ideas, and scholarly endeavors. As the editors, both of us would like to express how fortunate we feel to have worked with and learned from Abdul Aziz Said since 1994. It has been an honor to represent his life and work through this volume and to do this at his request. We have done our very best to present a comprehensive and holistic understanding of his work as a scholar, humanist, and public intellectual. We hasten to acknowledge responsibility for any limitations or gaps the reader may find in our summary of his long career, extensive writings, and manifold accomplishments. We would not be the professors and scholars we are today without Said’s support, guidance, and example. From the time of our arrival in Washington, D.C., in 1994, he helped us to understand what an academic vocation can be at its very best. We are grateful for his guidance throughout our respective journeys through graduate training; both of us benefited profoundly from being his teaching assistants, from being invited to collaborate on research and writing projects, and from completing our respective doctoral dissertations under his supervision. This volume would not have been possible without the kind and unflagging support of many other individuals, and we happily acknowledge our debts to all who enabled us to complete it. We would like to offer our heartfelt thanks to Hans Günter Brauch, external Editor for the Pioneer Series books published by Springer Nature, for his

Preface and Acknowledgments

xxiii

steady, kind, and patient support for this book, and for his enthusiasm in affirming the contribution this particular volume makes to the larger series. With Springer in Heidelberg (Germany), we are also grateful to Johanna Schwarz, Christian Witschel, and Johannes Glaeser, and in Chennai (India), we want to thank Mrs. Jayanthi Krishnamoorthi, Project Coordinator, and the rest of her team at Total Service for Books Production. This book simply would not have been possible without Elena Turner, the wife of Abdul Aziz Said. She has always welcomed us as if we were members of the Said family and has offered loving and knowledgeable support for the project. We are profoundly thankful not only for her gracious hospitality, but also for her indispensable assistance. She provided access to archival resources such as rare photos, news articles, letters and certificates, and meticulously sought out important facts that helped us to refine the biographical narrative. She has an excellent eye for detail and offered valuable insights into Said’s life experiences. Another member of Said’s family we would like to acknowledge is his brother Bassam Said Ishak. Ishak’s generosity in sharing his knowledge of family history and of Syria’s Jazira region added depth and dimension to the biographical chapter. Special thanks are due to Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a colleague of Abdul Aziz Said and a pioneering scholar in his own right who supported this project by writing a valuable and insightful Foreword to the book. Appreciation is also owed to those who offered statements for our “Reflections” section (Part III), all of whom were eager to share their unique experiences with Said as a scholar, teacher, colleague, and mentor. Their insights give this pioneer volume a distinctive character and testify to Said’s lasting influence on countless people, intellectually as well as vocationally. Thanks are therefore due to Oya Akgonenc, Mubarak Awad, Nike Carstarphen, Ronald J. Fisher, Louis Goodman, Hrach Gregorian, Fuad El-Hibri, Sister Adrienne Kaufmann, Lynn Kunkle, Charles O. Lerche III, Colman McCarthy, Mohammed Mughisuddin, Rev. Daniel Ngoy Mulunda-Nyanga, May Rihani, Keith Rosenberg, Oussama Safa, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Sallama Shaker, Betty Sitka, Srimati Karuna (Trybulec), Joshua N. Weiss, and Barbara Wien. Many other people offered valuable assistance that significantly advanced our work on this project. Elysia Guzik has provided superb, timely, and dependable editing assistance. She put scanned and draft materials into the appropriate format and offered helpful observations about the contents of the volume. Shane Glosnek also exerted significant efforts to advance the project through his work as a research assistant; he photocopied necessary materials and managed communications with the contributors to Part III. William Rory Dickson and Jan Potter read the draft manuscript and offered perceptive feedback.

xxiv

Preface and Acknowledgments

A very special debt of gratitude is owed to Mikael Aziz Sharify-Funk, whose unending patience with the book production process has been both exemplary and indispensable. May this book provide an example to you of the difference one life can make. June 2022

Nathan C. Funk Associate Professor University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON, Canada [email protected] Meena Sharify-Funk Associate Professor Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, ON, Canada [email protected]

Contents

Part I

Abdul Aziz Said’s Pioneering Life and Works

1

Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

3

2

Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

45

3

Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

87

Part II

Selections from Abdul Aziz Said’s Writings

4

Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

5

Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

6

A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations . . . . . . . . 171 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

7

Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

8

Middle East Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

9

Making Peace with Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

xxv

xxvi

Contents

Part III Abdul Aziz Said’s Impact, Influence, and Legacy 11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk On American University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 On the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 On Wilfrid Laurier University and the Department of Religion and Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 On Abdul Aziz Said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 Nathan C. Funk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Meena Sharify-Funk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475

Part I

Abdul Aziz Said’s Pioneering Life and Works

Chapter 1

Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

1.1 Introduction Abdul Aziz Said was born in a small village in northeastern French Mandate Syria in 1930 and died ninety years later in Washington, D.C., after a career as a university professor that spanned seven decades – from the 1950s through the second decade of the twenty-first century. A larger-than-life figure to many who knew him, Said’s journey bridged divergent worlds of culture, politics, and experience, and produced a style of academic engagement that was at once unique, vibrant, humane, and relevant to global challenges. Said’s pathway to academia was neither direct nor obvious. Although his family was prominent, the houses in his village were built of mud and had no electricity or running water; diseases like smallpox and dengue fever were still commonplace. Furthermore, his youth was disrupted by conflict and marked by repeated instances of displacement. He was raised, however, to take interest in politics and in leadership, and pursuing education abroad was in some respects a natural consequence of his family’s station. The decision to commit to the path of a scholar, though, was a somewhat less natural choice, and was taken at a time when it was becoming increasingly clear that a political career in his country of birth was not in the cards for him. As it turned out, Said’s early life experiences endowed him with deep experiential knowledge of what is at stake in matters of conflict, violence, and peaceful change – knowledge that would later help propel him into an exceptional career as a scholar, teacher, public intellectual, activist, and mentor, and that would motivate him to build a global network of colleagues, students, and friends.

Nathan C. Funk is Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo; Email: [email protected]; and Meena Sharify-Funk is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University; Email: [email protected].

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_1

3

4

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

This chapter is labeled as a biographical overview because it seeks to highlight formative influences and notable phases in Abdul Aziz Said’s life and academic career, and significant personalities who supported him in his journey. Drawing on extracts from his writings, direct personal experiences of the authors, information from family members as well as associates, and in-depth interviews with Said himself, we will structure our account in terms of significant life phases, experiences, influences, and pursuits, following a loosely chronological order. Our intent is to paint a portrait of the professor both as a scholar and as a person, in a way that communicates his status and accomplishments as an academic pioneer. Although we are unable to cover every significant milestone or achievement in the space of this chapter, we will seek to document the impressive range of his contributions to scholarship as well as to practice, with special but not exclusive attention to the subject areas of peace, intercultural dialogue, and cooperative global politics.

1.2 Family Roots Although born in Syria in 1930, it was only years later, upon immigration to the United States and further investigation with his family, that Abdul Aziz Said1 designated September 1 as his birthdate. His hometown, Amuda, was in the northeastern part of Syria, just three kilometers from the Turkish border. Situated in a region between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers known as al Jazira (literally, “the island”), the land in which he was raised has a storied ancient history but in modern times came to be regarded as rural, agrarian, arid, and remote. Said nonetheless came to identify with the deeper history of this region, and sometimes introduced himself to a new batch of students as a man who – despite his “Scandinavian appearance” – actually came from Mesopotamia. Though stated partly in jest, Said appeared to appreciate having been born in the Fertile Crescent, the cradle of human civilization. His father, Said Ishaq (b. circa 1900–d. 1989), was a businessman and political leader who rose to prominence during the French Mandate period of colonial rule over Syria (1923–1946).2 The family’s roots, however, were across the newly defined northern border, in what is now Turkey. World War I brought about the political demise of the centuries-old Ottoman Empire, as well as the state-sponsored demolition of the religious and cultural pluralism upon which the empire had been based. Suspicions of disloyalty had led to the direct and systematically violent targeting of Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, and members of other minority Christian communities (Gaunt 2006). Today the Armenian Genocide is the best-known part of a broader campaign which commenced in 1915. Being a member of the Syriac Orthodox community, Said Ishaq was forced to seek refuge from the Suqiyat (literally, “the driving out”) by leaving his home in Qal‘at Mar‘a, a village east of Mardin, and 1

As we will note later, in his youth Said typically went by the name, Abdul Aziz Said al-Ishaq. For an analysis of some key political dynamics during the French Mandate period, see Khoury (1987), Reilly (2019).

2

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

5

settling in Amuda where members of the local Kurdish community had agreed to protect him, and where his family had business interests. By the time of his arrival in Amuda, Ishaq already had experience as a trader, and soon became a prosperous and influential member of the local community. He was elected mayor in 1928, and in 1932 – two years after Abdul Aziz Said’s birth – he was elected to the first session of Syrian Parliament under French Mandate colonial rule, and would remain a national political figure until the mid-1950s. To become a leader in the town of Amuda and the broader region of Jazira, Said Ishaq had to establish rapport with people from many different ethnic and religious communities. Jazira had a Muslim majority, but was populated by a rich mosaic of peoples: Kurds, Sunni Muslim Arabs, Christians of various ethnicities and denominations (including Syrian Orthodox, Syriac, Assyrian, and Armenian), Jews, and Yazidis. Ishaq’s success in engaging this diversity, and his willingness to reach beyond more narrowly defined concerns of his root community, positioned him for a larger role in the politics of French Mandate Syria and later in the government of independent Syria. A religious man, Ishaq grew up in a pious household. He first learned to read and write by studying in a monastery, and in Amuda he acquired fluency in the Arabic language through studies at the local mosque, where he also gained knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic values. This knowledge served him well in navigating relations between the Christian and Muslim communities, as he understood Muslim religious sensibilities better than most other Christians. He was able to form positive relationships with Arab tribes in the region, which like the Kurds were Muslim. He interacted regularly with people of the Shammar tribe in particular (which to this day straddles the Syrian, Iraqi, and Saudi borders), as well with members of the Tayy, Jubur, and Baggara tribes. Though the Aramaic language was used by some of Amuda’s Christians, Arabic was the first language spoken in Abdul Aziz Said’s home. Abdul Aziz Said’s mother, Shamsa Khacho, was of mixed Arab and Armenian heritage. Because he often experienced poor health as a child, Abdul Aziz spent much time in the home with her; later in life he was particularly struck by how she had always put her children’s needs before her own (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021). Her death in childbirth at the age of 37 – amid the disruption that came to Syria during World War II – was a profound blow not just to young Abdul Aziz, but also to his two older siblings – Fayek and Rose – and three surviving younger siblings – Widad, Fadiya, and Adelle. Although his father’s example played a profound role in shaping Abdul Aziz’s interests and horizons, the women in Aziz’s life exercised a more immediate influence through their daily presence and guidance. “My grandmother Maryam, my mother Shamsa, and my sister Rose,” Said observed, “were the greatest formative influences of my life. They were the protectors who kept me safe. And it was Rose who encouraged me to go to college” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Maryam became particularly important after the death of his mother Shamsa, and did much to keep the family together. Maryam fasted regularly, and was regarded by many in the family as a saint.

6

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

1.3 Formative Experiences Despite the turbulence of the times, which would force the family to relocate on more than one occasion, being raised in rural Syria also had its advantages. Looking back on his childhood environment, Said believed that the open horizon and the expansiveness of the countryside prepared him to refuse to accept intellectual limits. There were no frontiers – the way I was raised I did not see frontiers. I was born in a desert or semi-desert. I would often feel restless, and as I was growing up, I intellectually experienced what I call “wild imagination,” which could be described positively as creative imagination. Later this helped me as a faculty member as I started creating new courses, different courses. I remember as a student – it may have been in a course of philosophy I was taking – the professor said to me, “You really have an imagination. No that’s not the way it is.” But I have never accepted frontiers. During my upbringing in Jazira I was not around big or tall buildings. Everything was open. That may explain how I have been attracted to people like Rumi and Ibn ‘Arabi. As the Arab writer Ameen Rihani put it, “I am not from East or from the West/ No boundaries exist in my breast.” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

As a youth growing up far from mechanized civilization – he and a friend once traveled ten miles on a donkey to see a train for the first time – Abdul Aziz had to imagine and “create” the wider world for himself, within his own mind. Despite the remoteness of Jazira from major urban centers such as Damascus, the times were bringing rapid change, not just in technology and material culture but also in political programs and ideas. The people of Jazira were divided in their visions for the future, in their attitudes towards French colonial control, and in their answers to emerging questions about national identity and regional autonomy. Abdul Aziz soon became aware that not all members of Jazira’s Christian community were impressed by his father’s political choices or by his increasing alignment with the cause of Arab nationalism; some referred to Said Ishaq dismissively as “Muhammad Said” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Ishaq’s efforts to build bridges did have a protective function, however, and proved especially important when divergent visions for the future of Jazira led to intense factionalism during the mid-1930s. In 1937, escalating political and intercommunal tensions led to an attack on the Christian community of Amuda by a Kurdish force from neighboring tribes; there were many casualties and much of the village – including the Ishaq family home – was burnt to the ground. Allies from the Shammar tribe sent men to offer protection and reassurance, and escorted the family to safety in al-Hasakah, the provincial capital. A significant number of Abdul Aziz’s favorite playmates, including his best friend Khalil al-Hadi, were Sunni Muslims from the Shammar tribe. As it happened, Khalil was son of the Shammar tribe’s highly influential leader, Shaykh Daham al-Hadi. Such lasting friendships no doubt influenced Abdul Aziz’s worldview. Late in life he commented on how as a youth he grew to admire Jazira’s Arab tribal leaders, and developed confidence in their goodwill, independence, and integrity. Tribes such as the Shammars, he believed, did not allow themselves to be manipulated by the French or by other foreign powers (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

7

Other lasting relationships that were forged during this period of Abdul Aziz’s life included friendships with community members associated with the Sufi tradition of Islamic spirituality. When Said Ishaq was imprisoned for his political activities by French colonial administrators, his family benefitted from the support of an esteemed Qadiri Sufi leader known as Shaykh Ahmad. At a young age, Abdul Aziz witnessed a gathering in which Shaykh Ahmad admonished his associates and followers not to invest Arab hopes for liberation from French or English colonialism in the rising power of Germany’s Adolf Hitler, whom he denounced as an evil man who could not be trusted. Young Abdul Aziz perceived Shaykh Ahmad as a wise elder, and played with the Shaykh’s son Muhammad as if he were a brother.

1.4 French Schooling The onset of World War II marked the beginning of a particularly challenging period of Abdul Aziz’s youth – a period that overlapped with the absence of Said Ishaq from his family “for at least six years” (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018). Imprisoned and exiled after first going into hiding to avoid arrest for defiance of French authorities, Said Ishaq was sent first to the Miyya prison in south Lebanon and later to Madagascar. His prolonged absence brought much hardship to the family, and coincided with Abdul Aziz’s exposure to the “civilizing mission” (“mission civilisatrice”) of French schools in Damascus and Aleppo. Imparting French culture to the occupied population, particularly its more elite members, was a key part of the French colonial strategy. Because his father was a leader, Abdul Aziz Said was required to spend much of the year far from his original home to attend French schools – first the Lycée Français for elementary school in Damascus (until fall of Paris to German forces in World War II), and then in Aleppo for middle school with the Freres Maristes/Marist Brothers and more advanced studies at Aleppo College. Attending these schools while living with his family in local apartments, Said learned to read and write in French before reading and writing in Arabic. He was required by the dress code to exchange traditional galabiyyas and other regional clothing for foreign styles such as shorts, which were considered undignified in Arab culture because they failed to cover the legs. Said also found these shorts quite uncomfortable. To further instill a sense of French culture, students were taught to sing the French national anthem, “La Marseillaise,” and faced a strict disciplinary system that punished any transgression of the rules. This system included corporal punishment as well as shaming (e.g., holding a sign called “Signal” after an incident of disobedience). Abdul Aziz recalled one occasion when his older brother Fayek grew very angry about his treatment in school, confronted his teachers, and faced a stern reprimand. Though their father was absent from daily life during most of this period, Said and his siblings were proud of him and could not dishonor him. He was their role model for courage, leadership, respect, and good behavior. Ishaq’s imprisonment and exile

8

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

were costly to the family, however, and forced the children to make do without the good shoes and new clothing they saw others receiving. At one point, Said’s mother Shamsa gradually sold her jewelry to support the family. The extent of her sacrifice started to become clear to him one day when she sold her gold bangles to fulfill his request for a good pair of shoes like those worn by other boys. Though the family still possessed wealth in the form of land, they had no liquid assets.

1.5 Life During Wartime As a French colony that fell under the rule of the pro-German Vichy regime after its installment in 1940, Syria was not insulated from the impact of the Second World War. Instead, Syrian lands became a theater of armed conflict between Vichy French and Allied forces. Abdul Aziz and his family were directly affected. One of Abdul Aziz’s most painful experiences occurred soon after moving to Aleppo with his family. In the middle of a soccer match with other children, a stuttering boy appeared and called out to him, asking him to come quickly. Abdul Aziz extricated himself from the game and followed the boy to the scene of an accident. His brother Riyad, the baby of the family and just 3 years old, had been hit by a passing French military truck. He was bleeding and there were no signs of life. Abdul Aziz carried young Riyad back to the house, to their mother Shamsa. Riyad had been Shamsa’s favorite. The memory of this loss, and of the taste of his brother’s blood in his own mouth, stayed with Abdul Aziz for the rest of his life. Shamsa died later that same year, while her husband was still away in exile. The family said she died of a broken heart, but in truth she died in childbirth. Responsibility for holding the family together now fell to Abdul Aziz’s grandmother Maryam, and to his elder sister Rose. Abdul Aziz was one of two sons; when his elder brother Fayek suffered an injury in an automobile accident at a relatively young age, Abdul Aziz found himself taking on additional responsibility as the second-oldest male. During Abdul Aziz’s schooling in Aleppo, air raid sirens sounded on many occasions, forcing children and families from the city to take refuge in underground shelters. He disliked the time spent in shelters intensely, and remembers the darkness, the smell of urine, and even cases when women gave birth. On one occasion he was so repulsed by the idea of returning to the shelter that he hid under a bed. A British bomb landed nearby, sending a piece of shrapnel through a window and into the room. In addition to the convulsions of World War II, the tragic death of his younger brother, and loss of contact with his father, Abdul Aziz witnessed various other forms of colonial violence during this challenging period of his life. These events would have a profound effect on him, shaping his worldview for decades to come. The following vignettes communicate patterns in his experiences:

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

9

• In one instance, Said watched as his mother Shamsa confronted and challenged armed French soldiers who tried to force their way into the house. They were looking for Said Ishaq at a time when his father had gone into hiding. • Once his father became an adversary of colonial administrators, the entire family paid a price. “Nobody would welcome my family,” Said recalled, “[and] everyone wanted us out, because they were afraid of the French” (Said, personal interview, March 16, 2019). • He recalled one incident in which a Vichy French soldier grabbed the ‘iq¯al (rope circlet) that held his headdress in place, threw it on the ground, and then proceeded to urinate on it. • Another encounter with British forces (who remained in Syria until 1946) occurred back in Amuda at the end of the war. Young Abdul Aziz had a confrontation with a soldier who was involved in appropriating Amuda’s wheat harvest. A teenager now, Abdul Aziz was the only “man” on hand to protect the family and its wellbeing. He attempted to shoot the soldier during an escalating confrontation, but the pistol locked. He was arrested, and subsequently dismissed by the commanding officer as a mere “kid” who could not be held accountable. Although not all of his encounters with soldiers were negative, such interactions were usually infused with tension. One exception to this pattern occurred in an encounter with soldiers from the United Kingdom, the USA, New Zealand, and Australia after their successful campaign to repulse the Vichy French and take control of the country. In an attempt to demonstrate positive intentions, they offered chocolate to children in Aleppo after capturing the city. Overall, however, Said’s youthful experiences left him with an unsettling taste of violence, a revulsion to war, and a deep-seated appreciation for the value of nonviolence. Late in life, Said offered the following reflections: While I was growing up we repeatedly experienced being dislocated by force…. It affected me, and the experiences of refugees today remind me of it. I was raised in the context of violence and war. From the beginning I unconsciously became pro-peace and anti-violence. I had seen Amuda burning and I was helpless to do anything about it. I had no control over my place of residence. They kept moving us. I was raised in a context of total disempowerment. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

Vivid memories of these experiences were no doubt major sources of motivation for Said as he developed a passion for peace and peacemaking, which was evident throughout his career and especially in his work founding and building American University’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution program. In his final years, these memories took on added significance for him as he observed the Syrian civil war and refugee crisis from afar. He found that his personal encounters with death, destruction, and disunification of a family had not faded from memory over time. Rather, the experiences were immediately available and enabled him to resonate deeply with the emotional and psychological impact of war on the Syrian people. He recalled a dynamic tension he had felt as a youth between two of the most powerful human emotions: fear and love (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

10

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

1.6 A Model of Leadership After the war, Said Ishaq returned to Amuda and became increasingly prominent in the politics of the new Syrian Republic. In December 1949 he was elected to the independent Syrian Republic’s first national assembly, the Ja‘ayat Assassiyya or “Establishing Committee.” This institution became the National Parliament in 1951; later that year, on October 1, he was elected as the first vice head (or deputy) to the head of parliament. According to the Syrian constitution of the time, the head of the parliament was to become president in the absence of the president, and the vice head of Parliament was to become president if both were absent. Because of these rules, Said Ishaq briefly rose to the top of the Syrian governmental structure when Colonel Adib alShishakli launched a military coup on Nov. 29, 1951. After other top leaders were forced to resign, Ishaq was effectively made the acting President of Syria for one day – until Shishakli issued Declaration Number One (Balag Raqam Wahida) on December 3, instituting a new order of military rule in which voices of opposition would be silenced. Said Ishaq persisted in his political engagement despite the coup, but resigned from Parliament in 1954. The turbulence of Syrian politics had brought too much instability to national political life. Ishaq’s family members have passed down stories concerning his dislike for military interference in civilian politics. He ran for Parliament one more time during the United Arab Republic period, in 1961, but withdrew before the election and then formally retired from politics. With the military repeatedly intervening in the political process, and with rival officers waging coups against one another, there was little scope for civilian leadership. Beyond the example he set as a man who was fully engaged with community life and public affairs, Said Ishaq influenced his children in many lasting ways. “He raised us,” Abdul Aziz Said noted, “to be open, without taboos. I never heard him badmouth anyone from other religions or other sects.” He elaborates: Growing up my father encouraged me to spend time with spiritual people. Religious people. He did not think of himself as a spiritual or religious person, but the more I think of him I now realize that he was but he did not wear the garment so to speak. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

Said Ishaq encouraged tolerance and respect for spirituality, while maintaining an attitude of skepticism towards religious leaders who encouraged their followers to think in narrow, exclusivist, or fanatical terms. He showed affection for local Muslim personalities such as Shaykh Ahmad, and raised no objections to his son sitting out in the desert at night amongst Rifa‘i Sufis who were dancing to the beat of drums. In his public engagement Ishaq embraced all of his diverse constituents, reaching across denominational, religious, and social boundaries. Looking back, Abdul Aziz recalls that his father was always available when people came to him for help and never said no (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Family members remember Ishaq as a man who modeled not only service, but also courage and many other positive qualities. He intentionally raised Abdul Aziz

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

11

to become a leader, and took him to Parliament as well as to meetings in Amuda and Damascus. He was skilled at negotiation, and offered an example of integrity, dignity, and honesty as well as generosity and a disinclination to pass judgment on other people (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021).

1.7 Seeking to Transcend Boundaries Growing up as a member of a minority community had an undeniable effect on Abdul Aziz Said’s outlook, and gave him keen insight into the ethnocentric blindness to other people’s experiences that can accompany majoritarian sentiments. Being a religious minority may explain it, why I became attached to the notion [as stated by Ibn ‘Arabi, that] Hubbu dinni wa imani, “Love is my religion and my faith.” It has always been hard for me to say I am or I am not. Christian or not a Christian. Muslim or not a Muslim. Jew or not a Jew. Who am I to say I am or I am not? (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

This desire to connect with others without regard for differences persisted as Said ventured forth to pursue studies outside Syria, as a student at the American University of Beirut and very briefly at the American University of Cairo. As a student in Beirut, Said and a couple of friends acted as the protectors of a group of Jewish students during the Arab-Israeli war. Although he and his friends accepted cigarettes as a reward for this service, he also felt pride about standing up to offer protection for the underdog – for people from a minority community whose status had changed almost overnight, and who were now being singled out and subjected to abuse. Later, while living in Cairo, he was disturbed by the depth of anti-Coptic sentiment among many Muslims. Although in Syria his family and friends had often addressed him informally as “Aziz” rather than as “Abdul Aziz,” he chose to emphasize the latter to escape prejudice and avoid being excluded. This enabled him to move back and forth across the Muslim-Christian boundary, escaping the stigma of outsider or minority status. Said explained why this was important to him in simple terms: “For me removing boundaries was more important than defining boundaries. But when you remove boundaries you have to be careful that you are not going into a wasteland” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

1.8 University Education in Washington, D.C. Abdul Aziz Said entered into the world beyond Syria during the aftermath of World War II, as major shifts were underway in Arab politics and in the growing ArabIsraeli conflict. Studying at the American University of Beirut in the late 1940s, he earned the equivalent of a high school diploma from the International College in 1949. After a transitional period that included studies at the American University of

12

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Cairo in Egypt and then at Howard University and George Washington University in Washington, D.C., he settled into undergraduate studies at the American University (AU) in Washington in Spring 1953. Entering America under the name “Abdul Aziz Said al-Ishaq,” he experienced excitement as well as challenge while adjusting to life in a very different culture. He had already visited Rome and London, yet entering the United States after landing in New York’s Idlewild Airport was a different experience altogether – “Like seeing the movie after reading the book.” He was particularly impressed by the spirit of enterprise, as manifest in seemingly small differences. In a story he sometimes shared with students, Said described his surprise upon encountering a New York vendor selling watermelon in pre-cut slices. As he paused for a moment to take this in (he had never seen watermelon sold this way before), the vendor pushed for a sale: “If you don’t like watermelon in slices I’ll sell it to you by the pound.” In such simple exchanges, Said saw signs pointing not just to a culture of commercialism, but also to a spirit of pragmatism and innovation. While some of the cultural differences Said encountered were positive or easily navigated, others clearly were not. In the early 1950s, Washington, D.C. was still by law and by practice a deeply segregated city, with separate schools for Blacks and Whites, racially exclusive housing covenants, and a history of mandating separate (and unequal) facilities for Blacks and Whites (Pritchett 2005; Smithsonian n.d.) Said recalled an incident in which he and two friends went to the movies together. Khaled, a student from Lebanon, bought movie tickets for Abdul Aziz and for Abbas, a Black student from Saudi Arabia. Abbas was excluded as they tried to enter the theater together. Life as an international student was also challenging. Despite his familiarity with U.S.-oriented institutions in the Middle East, Abdul Aziz still found distinctive aspects of America’s educational system disorienting. In French schools back in Syria, essays and short, written answers had been the principal way to demonstrate knowledge. In America he encountered multiple-choice tests, which he at first found confusing. In addition to stress related to studies, there was the challenge of subsisting on a low budget. He took various jobs to support himself, but frequently found himself experiencing a scarcity of resources. Fortunately, biscuits and ketchup were free in the university cafeteria. Taking creative advantage of this reality, he discovered that it was possible to use ketchup to make tomato juice.

1.9 Roads Not Taken Shortly after his arrival in the U.S. for university studies, Abdul Aziz experienced an opportunity to steer his life in an alternate direction when an Arab-American friend invited him to pursue a promising Hollywood acting opportunity. Impressed by his personality, charisma, and striking appearance, this friend and some other acquaintances sought to persuade him that by embracing this opportunity and going to Hollywood, he could become a movie star – like the next Rudolph Valentino. Although

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

13

flattered and tempted by the idea, Said ultimately declined the offer. Many times in later life he looked back at this juncture, deeply thankful not to have abandoned his studies and passed through this open doorway. He developed a clear understanding that it would not have taken him down a fulfilling pathway, especially considering the content of most Hollywood films involving Arabs and the unlikely prospect of a genuinely long-term acting career. There was at least one other occasion when Abdul Aziz considered leaving American University for a very different reason – to return to the world of politics and practice back home. Dramatic changes were unfolding in the Arab world as European colonization of the region gave way to newly independent states, competing nationalist visions, intense political contestation, and military subversion of civilian politics. It was not easy to stand back and observe the political tumult and ideological ferment, with its coups, countercoups, and new political movements. At one point he seriously considered abandoning his academic goals in America and ensconcing himself within the underground opposition to an increasingly autocratic Syrian government. After arriving at the conclusion that such a pursuit was ill-conceived, he nonetheless continued to ponder a more conventional pathway involving a future political career in Syria. By the time Abdul Aziz completed his undergraduate B.S. degree in Social Science at American University in 1954, it was increasingly clear that he would be unable to return to Syria, start a political career, and follow in his father’s footsteps. Realizing that he was more strongly inclined towards academic studies than various other pursuits, and receiving encouragement to pursue further study not just from his AU professors (who saw great promise in his intellect) but also from Shaykh Ahmad back in Amuda (who affirmed that knowledge has no limits), he opted to pursue master’s and then doctoral degrees in Political Science at the university. In choosing to establish himself in Washington, Abdul Aziz realized that he was living in a very different world than the world of his upbringing, and he often asked himself how his personal “East” and “West” might meet and coexist within himself. In such questions he found inspiration from early Arab-American writers such as Kahlil Gibran and Ameen Rihani, the latter of whom he had begun reading while in Beirut. In his pocket, he carried a paper with some of Rihani’s statements. One memorable quote that resonated with him later in life came from Rihani’s 1921 poetry anthology, A Chant of Mystics and Other Poems: “We are not of the East or the West/No boundaries exist in our breast/We are free” (Rihani 1970: 106).

1.10 Graduate Education and Key Influences at American University Said pursued his graduate studies in American University’s Department of International Relations and Organization from 1954 through 1957. While completing his master’s and doctoral degrees, he developed an interest in international law and

14

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

organization, as well as in the United Nations system and the political processes of decolonization. He excelled in his studies, earning accolades and high marks from his instructors. As he sought a professional path in American academia, Said turned to his professors for wisdom and role models. A series of mentors offered their support, preparing him for a successful career in the university system. He was particularly inspired by those who exhibited strong ethical commitments in their scholarship, teaching, and advocacy. Said’s doctoral thesis supervisor, Pitman Benjamin Potter, was one of these early mentors. Potter was a graduate of Harvard Law School, but unlike classmates who became profitably involved in business he had a more idealistic bent and was inclined to take on challenges that appealed to his sense of moral purpose. After Mussolini’s Italy attacked fellow League of Nations member state Ethiopia in 1935, Emperor Haile Selassie appealed for help. Potter volunteered to serve in the legal defense. An expert on international law and organization, Potter’s scholarship sought to outline bases for a more just and peaceful international system (see, for example, Potter 1922, 1932). Professor Samuel L. Sharp was another important influence. At a time of intense Cold War politics, typically packaged in ideological language, Professor Sharp brought a critical edge to his scholarship and teaching. Regarded by some as a cynic, he sought to unmask imperialism and the struggle for power among states that were motivated more by self-interest than by the ideals they proclaimed (see, for example, Sharp 1950, 1953). Sharp publicly questioned the idea that communism was the enemy of America, and drew the attention of Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Red Scare. Convinced that he might be placed in prison “at any time,” Sharp entrusted Abdul Aziz with his lecture notes. There were many other mentors whose examples appealed to Said. These exemplary scholars included Edgar Robinson, an idealistic professor of political science in American University’s School of Government and Public Administration; Marian Irish, who taught American foreign policy; Mary Eloise Bradshaw, who taught international organization.

1.11 Becoming an Innovative and Committed Professor Said taught his first course as an adjunct faculty member in 1956, and completed a doctoral thesis in 1957, assessing the United Nations mandate system and its efficacy in facilitating decolonization. As it turned out, 1957 was an opportune time to complete his doctorate. By 1958, he was Assistant Professor at American University’s new School of International Service (SIS), the opening ceremonies of which were presided over by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ernest Stacey Griffith, a political scientist and former government official, was selected as first dean. Like the professors who had supported his learning during his graduate studies, Dean Griffith became an important guide and supporter who opened doors for Said and

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

15

made him feel protected. At a time when he might have felt vulnerable on account of his minority status and youth, this mattered a great deal to him. Said was made assistant to the dean, while also serving as an assistant professor – the youngest American University professor at that time. He progressed through the professorial ranks quickly, with a promotion first to Associate Professor in 1960 and again to Professor rank in 1964. Said made his mark rapidly as an insightful scholar and popular teacher with distinctive, memorable, and effectively communicated ideas about world politics. Recognizing this young scholar’s impressive abilities, Dean Griffith asked Said to represent SIS on television through a local station, CBS Channel 9; Said would teach an innovative and complete correspondence course on world politics for a program entitled “Classroom 9.” The show aired in 1959, with Said’s teaching broadcast live to a general audience; those who wished to take the course for university credit could formally enroll and acquire the requisite coursebooks. For his efforts, Said received a Sylvania Award. He became sufficiently well known in the Washington, D.C. area that people would sometimes recognize him in drugstores (Said, personal interview, March 16, 2019). Teaching politics and international relations in Washington, D.C. offered many opportunities to meet intriguing people and to learn from their examples. One such individual was Loy W. Henderson, a former diplomat and accomplished State Department official who occupied a chair at American University after his retirement. As an assistant professor at the time, Said was assigned to be Henderson’s understudy and also to help this former diplomat become a professor. Said was fascinated by how well he was able to get along with Henderson, and was impressed by Loy’s personal qualities of generosity and concern for other people – qualities that surprised him given Henderson’s high-power role in formulating and implementing U.S. foreign policies. Although some of his positions had been quite acceptable to the Middle Eastern political and diplomatic community, others – such as his involvement in U.S. support for the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 – were deeply unpopular. Yet, in occasional lunches at the Cosmos Club, where Henderson was a member, the man demonstrated himself to be a serious and thoughtful person. In one instance a fellow club member approached and greeted Henderson, and then moved on. Henderson confided that this well-known man “served more ambassadorships than any U.S. diplomat” but at the same time “was never committed to anything” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Abdul Aziz internalized this lesson about commitment, and about the difference between professionalism and careerism. A meaningful and purposeful life is not to be had if one is overwhelmingly preoccupied with building up a CV.

1.12 Collaboration with Charles O. Lerche, Jr. If Said’s principal lesson from Henderson was commitment, Charles O. Lerche, Jr. reinforced this lesson while also teaching him to become a more collaborative and

16

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

productive scholar. Lerche, who arrived at SIS in 1959 from a teaching appointment at Emory University (“Charles Lerche, Jr.” 1966), was an expert in international relations with a focus on central and northern Europe. Originally from Connecticut, he had studied to become a minister and had also served as a captain during World War II. Said’s elder by twelve years, Lerche was close enough in age to become a close friend while also being senior enough to have valuable wisdom and experience to impart. Said described his relationship with Lerche in the following terms: We had a great relationship, and he was my best friend. He was 12 years older than me but we made a great team. We were called the 206ers, because our shared office was SIS 206. We wrote and lectured together. We had great respect for each other and cared for each other. He helped me learn to write. Make an outline. You spend more time writing an outline than writing. Don’t be superfluous; use economy of words. He could sit for a week and write a book. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

In their shared office space, Said and Lerche created a lively node of collaborative activity, and developed a style of academic teamwork and partnership that would influence Said for the rest of his academic career. Together, Said and Lerche wrote the first edition of the book, Concepts of International Politics (Lerche & Said 1963) to create a textbook on international relations that was in their view suitably comprehensive. Other major authors, they believed, were too Western and European-centric in their accounts of the field, too narrowly preoccupied with the concept of power, and too inclined to articulate a limiting worldview of Realpolitik. For Said, a central contribution of the Concepts of International Politics text was its emphasis on values. He described the goals and reception of the book in the following terms: What distinguished Charlie and me was [our commitment to talking about] values. As contrasted from other writers… [with their emphasis on] power. For us power was just a value. This stood out for people who reviewed the book: these guys were not afraid to talk about values. This was our contribution. [Hans] Morgenthau actually respected the approach – he told me, and understood that power was a value and we were not negating his position. I invited Morgenthau to lecture to my classes. (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018)

In an intellectual milieu that had been profoundly impacted by Hans Morgenthau’s classic text on power politics, Politics among Nations (1954), Lerche and Said offered a more expansive and hopeful vision that highlighted the necessity of moral reflection and choice in a changing, fragile, and increasingly pluralistic world. Lerche’s emphasis on the need for an ethical grounding in foreign policy and international relations motivated him to take a strong stance against the Vietnam War, which in his view was contrary both to American values and to American interests. He lectured against the war, even though this opposition created enemies at the university (in Said’s judgment, adversely affecting his ability to receive a promotion) and resulted in frequent check-in visits from the FBI. In addition to the emotional stress associated with his unpopular views, Lerche’s physical health began to deteriorate, leading to death from lung cancer in 1966. The loss of this close friend had a powerful impact on Said, who had grown close not just to Charles but also to the family. “During the last days of his life,” Said

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

17

stated, “I would take him to dinner. I helped his wife Margaret [as well]…. She was teaching at… Marymount College in D.C…. Lerche offered a great example of being committed, a profile in courage. I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to meet with Charlie.” Said also became a mentor to Lerche’s teenage son, Charles O. Lerche III, offering support and advice as he progressed through high school and college (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021).

1.13 “Big Times at AU” During the latter part of his career, Said sometimes liked to remind his colleagues and students about aspects of the American University experience that he found distinctive – particularly in instances when faculty members appeared to be looking elsewhere (and often towards the most elite east-coast universities) for ideas about what their strategic vision ought to be. Rather than aspire to be Harvard on the Potomac, Said suggested, AU should keep trying to be itself and build on its inherent strengths. He emphasized the word service in School of International Service, and further noted that while there were many international studies programs in North America there was only one international affairs school whose founders had chosen to emphasize an ethos of service by naming it in this manner. He proposed that AU could pursue excellence in this area by taking advantage of its proximity to government and being a center for innovative thinking about public policy.3 He perceived this as a strategic niche that had (surprisingly) been left unoccupied by Washington, D.C.-area universities, and believed it could provide a comparative advantage for the school. He wrote several briefs and letters to university presidents, advocating this vision. When seeking to remind colleagues about how their university could remain distinctive by following its best traditions, Said was inclined to share reflections on what he called the “big times at AU” – episodes in history that had distinguished the institution as more progressive than many other North American and capitalarea universities. As an example, he pointed out that some schools at the university had refused to cooperate with Senator Joseph McCarthy during his hunt for people with communist sympathies during the 1950s Red Scare (SIS did not participate, he emphasized). Said had witnessed firsthand how paranoia and pressure associated with the Red Scare had impacted his mentor Sam Sharp. Teaching in Washington, D.C. during the 1960s meant being near the center of major historical events, and Said was not an idle bystander. Together with a group of others from AU, he participated in the March on Washington that became famous for the “I Have a Dream” speech of Martin Luther King, Jr. “It felt great,” he reflected, “to 3

One model Said invoked for its instructive potential was the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Though he did not share the conservative politics of the Hoover Institution, he believed that the Hoover Institution’s approach to being a university-based, public policy think tank could be gainfully adapted at AU (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021).

18

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

be part of that. You could feel a major change in consciousness of Americans” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Said also witnessed and attempted to learn from early feminist activism, anti-Vietnam War activism, and other campus protests. He encouraged student activism, helped bail out students who had been arrested at anti-war rallies, and was for decades considered an obvious person to invite to speak about major issues at campus assemblies. When students approached him to ask if they might skip class to attend a protest march or demonstration, he happily granted permission and affirmed that such activities were an intrinsically valuable form of experiential learning.4 He was also proactive in his efforts to mobilize faculty for important campus causes, such as raising the pay rate of janitors. Throughout his career, Said always felt a need to support people from minority groups whose rights were being suppressed or violated, or who were regarded as deviant. In many instances, the doctoral students who were assigned to him as teaching and research assistants were individuals whom other professors would not accept. “Those who would work with me,” Said stated, “were often nonconformist or of minority background.” He encouraged independent behavior and supported the dignity of such students. On one occasion, in the late 1950s, he accompanied gay students who were coming out to a Georgetown club – “to be seen with them as they made this brave move” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). In another episode, from the 1960s, Said was approached by a group of Jewish students who wanted to found their own fraternity chapter, because the existing fraternities on campus had sectarian clauses. Said made a motion at University Senate to delete sectarian clauses but the motion was defeated. After reflecting on what else he could do, he then proceeded to introduce a second, successful resolution: that Jewish students be allowed to create their own fraternity. He went on to become the official faculty sponsor for a local chapter of Phi Epsilon Pi (a historically Jewish fraternity which later became part of ZBT, a larger fraternity organization). In addition to creating a Greek association on campus that was free of sectarian clauses, Phi Epsilon Pi was racially inclusive as well – unlike the other campus fraternities. Members of the fraternity went on to became leaders on campus for diversity, attracting international students, Black students, and athletes. Said has often spoken about how the experience taught him the value of diversity. “When we lose fear of the unknown,” he said, “we embrace the known. The unknown becomes known” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). For his willingness to be outspoken on matters he deemed important to the integrity of the university, Said became well known on campus, if not universally appreciated. From the beginning he had not fit into White/Black binary categories, and had often felt a degree of prejudgment and discrimination at the university. Such experiences, together with prior experiences in the Middle East, made it easy for him to relate to the Phi Epsilon Pi students and to other people who had experienced marginalization. “I could relate,” he said, “because I have always felt discrimination – but I also refused to develop a victim mind or mentality. I was too proud for that. While I was on the 4

N. Funk, observation while serving as Said’s teaching assistant from 1994 through 1997. Said placed a high value on class attendance and participation but made clear exceptions in such instances.

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

19

periphery I always felt that I was at the center. For me the periphery and the center were connected” (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018).

1.14 Engaged and Relevant Scholarship By the mid-1960s, Said grew convinced that traditionalist as well as emerging positivist approaches to the study of international relations were facing a “crisis of relevance”: they were either too backward looking or excessively preoccupied with methodology, and failed to provide understanding of contemporary issues that were critical to meaningful political engagement. Said described his growing perception at that time in simple terms: “I looked out the window. Authors in the field were not addressing these issues” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Charles Lerche shared this judgment and offered a model for being a public intellectual through op-eds, commentary, up-to-date teaching, and preoccupation with crucial, emergent issues that called out for intellectual analysis. One way Said tried to keep his finger on the pulse of these emergent issues involved frequent travel supported by U.S. government agencies (primarily for public diplomacy programming) and by charitable foundations. From the 1960s through the 1990s, officials in the State Department and later the United States Information Agency (USIA) saw him as an ideal person to showcase abroad. After all, he was not only a charismatic public speaker able to lecture in a candid yet non-polarizing manner using Arabic and French as well as English, but also a living illustration of how an immigrant to America could succeed within the country’s open and democratic system. Said was sent on multiple international lecture tours – first in west Africa, east Africa, north Africa, and the Middle East, and later in a broader range of destinations that included Brazil, Ecuador, France, and India. While travelling, he was able to have rich intellectual discussions and deepen his grasp of political debates, ideological currents, and processes of social change, especially in post-colonial settings. Conversations in the field built on prior understandings developed through involvement with foreign-born students and expatriates in Washington, D.C., and often revealed inadequacies in the existing academic literature. Western scholars, he was convinced, were often hampered by a “cultural understanding gap,” and were too quick to impose generic models with implicit normative assumptions. He expounded on these themes in his 1968 book, The African Phenomenon (1968), and sought to translate African realities, perceptions, and concerns for a Western academic audience. “My intention,” he said, “was to look at Africa in its own rights – who they are and what they contribute, not through the lenses of colonialism” (Said, personal interview, March 16, 2019). The same year Said also published the edited volume, International Relations Theory: The Crisis of Relevance (1968), which offered similar arguments concerning the study of the non-West as well as an expanded critique of positivism. Too many scholars, Said believed, “were not looking at important questions like poverty [and]

20

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

racism,” and were preoccupied with abstractions centered around Western models of the nation-state and of political development (Said, personal interview, March 16, 2019). These volumes helped to set Said’s longer-term trajectory, as he developed an approach to scholarly engagement, writing, and teaching that he later described as “what to think about next” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). He wanted his work to help set a relevant agenda for theory and practice, and to consciously keep his teaching and research dynamic. “I was reinventing myself,” Said reflected, “when I felt secure.” I wanted to address issues in the periphery that were not being addressed. Drugs and diplomacy. Multinational corporations… I addressed them as actors [even though] they were not being addressed as actors. I remember in one of the publications I wrote I said RCA has more implications for war and peace than Germany and Spain. … [I was] trying to look in the dark, in the right places. People always wanted to look where the light was shining. That’s where I saw myself. Shed light there. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

As he pursued these new lines of research, Said sought to establish complementarity between his teaching, his writing, and his public lecturing. “Every book,” he said, “was also a course…. I would be invited to lecture on these topics that others were not lecturing on” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Said did hope to influence broader academic thinking, of course, and succeeded in recruiting well-established scholars for contributions to his edited volumes. At the beginning of the 1970s, Said continued to pursue his preoccupation with post-colonial trajectories of change, with an added emphasis on revolutionary movements and on U.S. policy choices in a changing world. In his edited volume, America’s World Role in the 70s (1970), he underscored the urgency of moving beyond hegemonic and status quo-oriented approaches to security, and of avoiding clashes with the impetus for change manifest in revolutionary movements, particularly in formerly colonized world regions. He expanded on these themes and offered deeper commentary on the transnational appeal of revolutionary political movements in a work co-authored with Daniel M. Collier (himself a U.S. Army officer and an instructor at West Point 5 ), Revolutionism (Said/Collier 1971). Said’s next six books, three of which were co-edited with Luiz R. Simmons,6 continued to unpack themes of dramatic social change, critique prevailing approaches, and identify newly salient issues and actors in the international system. Protagonists of Change (Said 1971) began a longer-term project of deconstructing dominant ideas of development, and offered instead a cultural angle on the subject, highlighting global contestation of social values by divergent subcultures. Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy (Simmons/Said 1974) highlighted issues that had become salient in U.S. political discourse, but which were absent from academic thinking

5

See Miller (2007). Luiz R. Simmons was a law student at AU’s Washington College of Law when he began collaborating with Said; in addition to working as an attorney, he served many years as an elected representative to the Maryland House of Delegates.

6

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

21

about international relations, while The New Sovereigns: Multinational Corporations as World Powers (Said/Simmons 1975) sought to place major corporate actors within the context of international theory. Ethnicity in an International Context (Said/Simmons 1976) and Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (Said 1977, 1981) questioned social science assumptions about the consolidation of national identities through communications and development, long before preoccupation with ethnicity and ethnic conflict reached the center of international relations thinking in the early 1990s. In Human Rights and World Order (Said 1978), Said affirmed the new prominence of human rights in international political discourse, while noting international pluralism (with liberal, socialist, and Third World perspectives) on the subject of human dignity. While working to identify leading-edge issues in international relations, Said recognized that his students were especially attuned to emergent challenges and concerns. He listened carefully to their insights and frequently partnered with doctoral candidates and emergent scholars. Said described the role of students in his creative process: I was helped a great deal by my students; because of who I am I attracted TAs and students who think out of the box…. They would hang around me. Lots of interesting and non-conformist personalities. I am very much a product of my friends and my environment – of the people I worked with and dealt with.… I attracted people who were gay, who were unacceptable. We used to call them 206ers…. [I remember a] man with an Eden hat, sandals, shorts, and tie. That kind of people. Activists definitely. I was very much influenced by colleagues and students who opened the door for me. I followed in their footsteps. The way I did that was to write about it. I was good at getting to a subject before it got big. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

For decades after the passing of Charles Lerche, Jr., SIS Room 206 remained a busy hub of conversation and creative activity. Said aspired towards intellectual innovation and agenda setting, prioritizing the identification and analysis of substantive issue areas over methodology. In an interview for this volume, he offered the following advice to young scholars and graduate students: “Take epistemology in small doses and don’t take it to bed with you” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

1.15 Middle East Expertise Throughout his career Said was consistently engaged with Middle Eastern affairs, and frequently authored scholarly writings as well as public lectures and commentary on the subject. He did not, however, see himself as a Middle East specialist, in the narrow sense of that term. In fact, he consciously avoided such a categorization of himself as a scholar: Academically I resisted strongly becoming a Middle Eastern expert, despite strong pressures. I resisted that, thank God. I am always grateful to my colleagues and students who advised me against this…. I felt I would be very much under the influence of the government. And

22

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk as [my professor] Pitman Potter said, “with your name everyone will think you are a Middle East expert anyway.” I did not major in Arabic studies either. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

Not wishing for his interests to become narrowed by assuming the status of a Middle East expert, Said nonetheless tracked Middle Eastern issues closely and shared his insights on the subject, often in relation to his more broadly defined research interests such as ethnicity and politics, revolutionary movements, and international peace and conflict resolution. During the 1960s, Said became increasingly aware that offering commentary on Middle Eastern affairs could be costly. In one instance, he publicly criticized Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and provoked controversy from the Egyptian embassy. He was relieved and heartened when, upon being summoned to the dean’s office, he received support for acting on the basis of academic freedom.7 In another case, his family’s interests were harmed by his critical comments about the Syrian government; his brother Fayek needed medical treatment for his son outside the country, but was informed by authorities that he could not leave because of Said’s writing against the government. Henceforth, Said resolved to think carefully before committing criticism of Syrian policies to print. “Anytime I spoke they put pressure on the family” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Given that the lack of political and civic space in Syria presented problems for Said even as a U.S.-based professor, it was not realistic for him to seriously contemplate a long-term return to the country. Upon withdrawing from Syrian political life and advising Abdul Aziz to put aside political dreams as well, Said’s father had even warned his son against coming home to Syria. Said followed this advice (returning only for short visits), but it was not uncommon for him to reflect on what a full return to the country might have entailed. He described his assessment of such scenarios in the following terms: I always wanted to be open about the possibility of going back to Syria. But I never did. With the political situation – I couldn’t. I thought you could never be free to teach in Syria. Although I have lectured in all of the Syrian universities, being an academic in Syria would have involved accepting many limitations. I would not last after the second or third lecture because speaking freely and independently was not tolerated. (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018)

Said recalled one incident when, while offering a well-attended lecture in Damascus in 1992, he was asked a question about prospects for democracy in the Middle East. His official host immediately ascended the stage, offered brief words of thanks, and declared the lecture over (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018). Though he did not define himself as a Middle East expert, many of Said’s contacts in government – and especially in the State Department – perceived him as exactly that, and frequently sought his input and perspective. As convulsive change gripped the Middle East in the late 1970s, Said was asked to join President Jimmy Carter’s Commission for the Islamic World. Said’s in-depth insights into the dynamics of 7

American Weekly, 12 April 2005, Vol. 8, No. 28.

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

23

various subregions, together with his impressive rolodex of contacts in many different countries, were highly valued even if his judgments about higher-order policy choices were not generally followed. He nonetheless continued to cultivate relationships with interested government officials, and participated in public diplomacy programs that involved travel and lecturing. Convinced that even modest improvements in policy and reductions of cultural misunderstanding were worth pursuing, he persisted in engaging both U.S. officials and Middle Eastern diplomats posted to embassies in Washington, D.C. Said also sought to ensure that his observations of the region remained up-todate and responsive to emerging trends. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Said adjusted his Middle East commentary to account for the growing prominence of Islamic revivalism within and beyond the region. He became more active in his support for a diplomatic resolution of what he called the “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian” conflict, while conducting research and writing about Islam and human rights, Islam and development, and eventually (in the 1990s) Islam and peace. Drawing on connections to the Saudi ambassador (whose wife was a Syrian who sent two sons to AU), he successfully worked to establish the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at the university, which was named for a distinguished and well-known classical Arab scholar.8 Over the course of several decades, the Ibn Khaldun Chair would attract a number of notable academics to AU. The prominent Turkish sociologist Serif ¸ Mardin, whose thinking influenced Said’s conceptualization of historical processes of change within Islamic societies, was one of these scholars.

1.16 A Search for Meaning I never knew the purpose of falling because every time I fell I was consumed by the pain. But one time when I fell I understood the purpose of falling was to see more clearly – to realize that all is one. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

From an external perspective, everything in Abdul Aziz Said’s life appeared to be in good working order throughout the early years of his career. He received multiple promotions in rapid succession; he became an academic star and sought-after professor at the School of International Service; he rubbed shoulders with prominent scholars of political science and international affairs; he found supportive interlocutors in government and traveled the world as a distinctive voice of U.S. academia; and he received grants, awards, and recognition while producing an impressive number of innovative publications. In addition, he was extraordinarily charismatic and had the twin gifts of good looks and charm. Said was clearly driven to succeed in his professional life, achieving a level of public engagement, productivity, and connectedness that many scholars would consider enviable. 8

Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) is widely regarded as one of the foremost thinkers of the Middle Ages, who exerted an influence on the development of subsequent historiographical and social thought. See Rosenthal (1967).

24

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

However, Said’s success and impressive range of accomplishments did not come without a cost and in certain aspects of his life Said struggled. Despite all his achievements, he felt existentially unsatisfied and spiritually unfulfilled. On the one hand, his outward focus, multiple ongoing projects, and regular travels had greatly enriched him. On the other hand, his commitment to these same endeavors had a negative impact on certain close personal relationships. In 1970, Said’s life would change dramatically. He was diagnosed with what his doctors believed was lung cancer – the same disease that had killed his mentor and best friend. At that time there were no CT scans or MRIs so surgery was the only way to confirm a diagnosis. Said’s surgery was extremely serious and the surgeon deemed it necessary to remove the affected lobe of the lung. He nearly died. Despite the gravity of his post-surgery condition, there was some good news: the growth in his lung was not cancer but a mass caused by the aspiration of a watermelon seed which over the years became inflamed and infected. After his complete recovery, Said firmly believed he had been given a second chance at life and was determined to pursue personal transformation and spiritual growth. This decision would subsequently have an enormous impact on the directions his life and career would take. Having already been inspired by relationships with Sufi Muslim personalities that began during his youthful experiences in Jazira, Said applied himself with dedication to a Sufi path of transformation. This would involve years of focused study and the disciplined practice of exercises learned from a spiritual guide based in Syria. In Sufism, Said found a current of spirituality that spoke directly to his need for inner freedom, spiritual uplift, and universal embrace of humanity beyond sectarian and ideological distinctions. Though expressed in a mystical Islamic language, he felt that the Sufi tradition connected him to the heart of all religions.9 On his international lecturing and research trips he became more intentional about meeting with Sufis. I was looking for Sufis every time I traveled to Muslim countries. In those travels I connected with as many Sufi leaders as I could identify. “Please take me to the Sufis”.... I would say this to my hosts. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017) In my travels in the Middle East, for example when I go to Algeria or Morocco or Tunisia, the first thing I try to do is identify the Sufis and meet with them. It was a great experience. …. I developed a course on Sufism and International Relations. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)10

Said was also very interested in Christian mysticism, and by the late 1970s he would occasionally take weekend retreats in Berryville, Virginia at a Trappist monastery (Our Lady of the Holy Cross). “For me,” he stated, “visiting the monastery was like going home, being with the Sufis…. I would go there and Father Stephen 9

Sufism is frequently defined as the Islamic mystical tradition, as detailed in texts such as Schimmel (1975). Said felt a particularly strong resonance with classical Sufi personalities such as Ibn al-‘Arabi and Jalal ad-Din Rumi, who expressed strongly universalistic and pluralistic outlooks emphasizing the transformative significance of divine love. For an exploration of Ibn al-‘Arabi’s legacy in relation to understandings of religious diversity, see Chittick (1994); for a scholarly introduction to Rumi, see Schimmel (2001). 10 Said taught a course entitled “Sufism and Intercultural Relations” at SIS in Spring 1975.

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

25

would be seated on the steps of the guesthouse waiting for me. I would spend weekends in prayer… for me that was going home” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

1.17 Activism for Human Dignity and Peace Always present in his writings as thematic areas of concern, human dignity and peace became increasingly central for Said over time – especially from the late 1970s forward. In 1978 he produced his timely edited volume, Human Rights and World Order, during the days of Carter administration. Reflecting on his rationale for writing on human rights, Said observed that there was “a great deal of discrimination at that time against Islam and Muslims. And I had felt discrimination against me as an Arab Christian” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Also during the mid-to-late 1970s, Said became involved with investigating human rights violations, and took multiple trips to Iran to visit prisons. He recalled that at one point, after seeing evidence of systematic abuses and hearing evasive answers, “I felt like pushing the U.S. Ambassador in Tehran into the pool” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Said related the strength of his emotional response to the fact that his own human rights had been violated as a child and young adult, creating pressure to blend in and conform rather than manifest a different identity. Recalling anti-Christian attitudes he had occasionally encountered in Syria and especially antiCoptic sentiments in Egypt, Said emphasized the importance of treating people with equal respect. “I would definitely call myself a humanist” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). Said also cited the example of a close friend from his AU student days, Khaled Saghieh, who was assassinated in Tripoli, Lebanon during the 1970s for using his legal training to defend the rights of poorer people, some of whom had been unjustly imprisoned. “[His murder] affected me deeply because we were very close. I felt it personally. Khaled was a real leader when we were students” (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018). When asked if he would consider himself to have been a scholar activist, Said agreed that this was an apt designation. We were not there to be people who wanted to make money…. We worked with lots of people who were activists. I attribute that to my father because he was an inspiration of helping, supporting. Minorities viewed me as someone who gives them access. (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017)

One of Said’s former students who became a life-long activist was Petra Kelly, who went on to co-found and lead the German Green Party. During the 1980s, Kelly was twice elected to the German Bundestag. She stayed in touch with Said as she became an internationally recognized campaigner for ecological sustainability, human rights, social justice, and disarmament. Decades after her premature death in 1992, Kelly’s ideas and example continue to inspire activists in many different national contexts (Kelly 1994).

26

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Another former student, Brady Tyson, became Said’s colleague at SIS and a co-author of many articles from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. He was a Methodist minister and peace activist who had participated in U.S. civil rights movement through the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. It was in this context that he became a friend of Andrew Young, for whom he eventually served as a foreign policy advisor. A Latin America specialist who had been expelled from Brazil in 1966 for his human rights advocacy (Pearson 2003), Tyson worked with Said to formulate statements on a humanistic approach to development as well as on the importance of synthesizing different global human rights traditions in ways that enhance democracy (Said/Tyson 1978; Tyson/Said 1993). One more colleague who contributed to Said’s thinking about peace and justice issues was the Palestinian nonviolence activist Mubarak Awad. As Awad notes in his reflections for this volume (see Part III), they met at a track-two diplomacy workshop in Rust, Austria in 198511 and quickly became fast friends. After their meeting nonviolence became a more prominent theme in Said’s teaching and scholarship. Said and Awad traveled and lectured together in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, and became increasingly involved in collaborative activities. Awad invited Said to serve on the board of his NGO, Nonviolence International, and became an instructor in the new International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) concentration Said was initiating at SIS. Though Said’s engagement with peace issues became more expansive in the 1980s, he had been teaching on the subject since the 1960s. His interest in peace studies as a field was advanced by meetings with Kenneth and Elise Boulding – both Quaker scholars and pioneers in the field – starting in the 1970s. Together, he noted, “they had an influence on me.” By the 1980s Said’s involvement with the field was evident in his contributions to Washington, D.C. deliberations concerning the establishment of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). These were by no means Said’s only significant relationships and activities during the 1980s and early 1990s. He continued to work actively in several areas, including: • Travel on behalf of the USIA to almost every country in the Levant and the Arab Gulf states as well as to countries outside the region such as Romania; • Engagement with conflict resolution initiatives in a few Central American countries, the Middle East, and Ireland; • Lecture circuit speaking to a wide range of private organizations in countries ranging from the U.S., Australia, Thailand, and Eastern Europe to South Africa, where he met with F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela; • Participation in unique gatherings like an interfaith peace meeting at Mount Sinai organized by Rabbi Zalman Schachter in 1984, and the previously mentioned 1985 workshop in Rust, Austria, where he met the noted humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers, witnessed a breakthrough between U.S. and Nicaraguan interlocutors, and deepened his insight into the role of dialogue in fostering empathy and openness to change. 11

An account of the conference can be found in Rogers (1989).

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

27

As a sought-after speaker throughout the United States, Said showed enthusiasm for sharing his views in diverse contexts, including venues that were not strictly academic. He found staff and students at U.S. military academies to be intellectually curious, and consistently open-minded about hearing a fresh perspective. Futurist conventions contributed to his own creative thinking, and gave him the opportunity to communicate his cumulative insights on topics such as peace and spirituality to new audiences. A meeting with Stanford University futurist Willis Harman at a conference outside Los Angeles inspired him to place a stronger emphasis on ways in which spirituality and changes in human consciousness have a bearing on politics, and enriched his perspective on ways in which a shift in social paradigms could have major consequences. Tom Cotton, a Stanford-trained economist and former staff member at the Office of Technology Assessment, offered further inspiration by sharing deep theoretical work on the bases of human cooperation. As his network of relationships continued to widen, Said saw value in the friendships themselves and not just in the instrumental value of having high-quality contacts. “I wasn’t interested just in having books in the library,” he stated. “I was interested in relationships… [and being] an activist academic” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017).

1.18 International Peace and Conflict Resolution It was in the mid-1980s that Abdul Aziz, working with support from colleagues such as Adrienne Kaufmann and Nike Carstarphen (see both of their “Reflections” in Part III), moved to establish International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) as a graduate-level concentration at SIS. Kaufmann, a Benedictine nun who at that time was studying at the School of Education, was first assigned to work with Said as a teaching assistant, though she went on (like Carstarphen) to serve as the program coordinator. She would later become the instructor for an undergraduate course entitled “Approaches to Peacemaking,” and partner with Said to develop a summer program for teachers and graduate students called “Educating for Global Citizenship.” In formulating a rationale for IPCR, Said and his colleagues argued that new approaches to the study and practice of world politics were needed. After the Cold War détente of the 1970s, the 1980s had brought heightened international conflict, characterized by preoccupation with nuclear deterrence and the instrumentalities of power politics. Heightened confrontation had also motivated a countermovement of peace initiatives and advocacy, with much creative yet also unheralded effort at the level of informal, track-two diplomacy that helped to pave the way for successful superpower summits between President Reagan of the U.S. and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. In Said’s view, the dynamics of the decade ultimately provided vindication for the principle of communication with adversaries – sustained dialogue – and the pursuit of new approaches to world politics.

28

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Not all of Said’s colleagues saw things this way, however, and promoting a peace program amid traditional approaches to international relations meant enduring critical scrutiny, skepticism, and at times a dismissive position. Some, for example, were inclined to assert the view that “marriage counseling” had little place in the competitive, materialistic world of international politics. Said persisted despite such lines of criticism, because “The message was more important than me. I didn’t mind being on the periphery” (Said, personal interview, August 8, 2018). In response to the critics, Said advanced the thesis that the onset of a genuinely post-Cold War era was creating opportunities to broaden and reconfigure the international relations field. There was a need for new approaches to deal with the collapse of distance and intensification of identity issues wrought by processes of economic and technological globalization that weakened the nation-state from above, while empowering sub-national actors from below. It was time for fresh approaches, he argued, and new maps. A time had come to attend to “forgotten victims” of the Cold War such as human rights (Tyson/Said 1993), and to make the world safe for diversity (Said 1995). “Peace Paradigms” was in many respects Said’s signature IPCR offering. The course began with a critical reappraisal of the traditional, power politics approach to international relations, and the contextualization of this approach within a larger global frame of reference emphasizing the development of political theory across cultures. The course then considered reformist approaches to global governance through international institutions and law (the “world order” paradigm), a paradigm of nonviolence exploring the theory and practice of social and political change through civil resistance and “people power,” a “conflict resolution” paradigm examining the power of communication to improve relationships between adversaries, and a “transformation” paradigm foregrounding the role of education, ethics, and spirituality in establishing the foundations for a more peaceful world. Once IPCR offerings became available, student demand grew rapidly and often outstripped supply. Students lobbied for increased offerings, to expand on themes of core courses that had first been introduced to the SIS curriculum during the 1980s, such as peace paradigms, conflict analysis, negotiation, and nonviolence. This cleared the way for further program development, leading to a full, master’s-level degree program in 1995. Over time, IPCR grew to become one of the largest programs within SIS, with high levels of student enrollment and fifteen tenure line and term faculty (see reflections by Ronald J. Fisher in Part III). As the new IPCR program was becoming established, Said pursued a new, thoroughly revised version of the original Concepts of International Politics book, this time working with Charles Lerche Jr.’s son, Charles Lerche III, who was now a professor of international relations in his own right. The result was a fourth edition, published in 1995 with the title, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. Particularly noteworthy in this new edition was a section on cooperative global politics that crystalized core principles for navigating the post-Cold War world, and a postscript that audaciously called for unifying forms of spirituality to inspire efforts towards a more humane and sustainable world order. Though his administrative load increased considerably with the launch and growth of the IPCR program, Said remained active not only in research, writing, and public

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

29

speaking but also in his engagement with the domain of practice. He served on the boards of various NGOs, including Search for Common Ground and several others. He also launched the Center for Global Peace (CGP) at American University, with Betty Sitka as the Associate Director, in December 1996. The mission of this Center was to provide “a framework for programs and initiatives that advance the study and understanding of world peace within a sustainable world order” as well as “a forum for analysis of a wide range of multi-disciplinary and cross-cultural approaches to peace and conflict resolution and sustainable development” (Said 2005b). The CGP went on to host numerous conferences and projects. Some of its many notable efforts and initiatives included a track-two diplomacy program for Turkey and the Caucasus region, the establishment of a Mustafa Barzani Scholar of Global Kurdish Studies position at SIS, civil society capacity building in Aceh, Indonesia, and the launch of the Journal for Peacebuilding and Development. CGP-hosted conferences led to the publication of books on Muslim women, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, ArabAmerican understanding, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and Islamic peace studies.

1.19 Islamic Peace As the 1990s progressed, the optimism associated with the end of the Cold War slowly gave way to heightened anxiety about “new” forms of conflict and political violence fueled not just by global inequalities but also by ethnic, nationalist, and religious ideologies. One influential framing of the post-Cold War era was proposed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington in a Foreign Affairs article entitled, “The Clash of Civilizations,” which painted a possible landscape of future geopolitical conflict in broad brushstrokes and argued that the next security threats to the United States were likely to emerge from the Islamic and Confucian worlds (Huntington 1993). Concerned that actions based on this way of thinking could easily inflame identity-related conflict issues and detract from practical efforts to address the roots of conflict, Said saw a need to actively promote Islamic-Western peacemaking. Having commented on such matters during the 1980s, Said underscored the importance of accurately perceiving the historically rooted identity politics of Islamic revivalism, and the existential situation from which it arose. He already had frameworks for explaining the impetus behind contemporary Islamic movements and the importance of policies prioritizing de-escalation of conflicts, culturally appropriate development models, and the promotion of dignity as a response to historically rooted forms of disempowerment and marginalization. He saw this work as all the more urgent as Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts faltered, and as incidents such as the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 led to the increasing prevalence of security barricades interposed between roadways and monuments in Washington, D.C. Additional activities followed another significant development, when Said’s former student Hani Farsi (now a highly accomplished businessman and philanthropist) endowed the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at SIS in 1996. Said was appointed as the first occupant of this chair. Working with Islamic scholar

30

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Karim Crow and with various collaborating graduate students such as Nathan C. Funk, Ayse Kadayifci, and Meena Sharify-Funk, Said initiated efforts to define a curriculum for Islamic peace studies and to convene conferences addressing important issue areas. The launch of courses entitled Islamic Peace Paradigms and Islamic Sources of Conflict Resolution soon followed, as did writings calling for “a new story” in Islamic-Western relations (Said/Funk 1998). Conferences convening scholars and promoting public education were another important activity area for the Farsi Chair. He convened scholarly conferences on “Nonviolence in Islam” (February 14, 1997), “Islam and Peace in the 15th/21st Century” (February 6–7, 1998) and “Cultural Diversity and Islam” (November 20–21, 1998), and was a keynote speaker for a major interfaith conference at the Washington National Cathedral (“Islam and Christianity: Two Sacred Paths”) on November 6–7, 1998. The latter occasion was the first time Christians and Muslims had gathered in such a manner at the symbolically important cathedral, for an event featuring other distinguished speakers such as Anglican Bishop Kenneth Cragg (an expert on Christian-Muslim relations) and a muezzin issuing a call to prayer. In the meantime, Said continued his involvement in public speaking, which revolved more and more around Islam, peace, and interfaith dialogue. He produced new publications including Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam (2001, co-edited with Nathan C. Funk and Ayse Kadayifci) and Cultural Diversity and Islam (2003, co-edited with Meena Sharify-Funk).

1.20 Responding to Post-September 11 Realities The shocking and tragic events of September 11, 2001 gave a new sense of urgency to this work, as commentators increasingly described the world as “post-9/11” rather than “post-Cold War,” and as the Bush administration launched a new “war on terror” that included the invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime that had hosted al-Qaeda, as well as the invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it presented a future threat to U.S. security. Reasserting U.S. hegemony in the Middle East was formulated as the only solution to the possible intersection of extremist ideology and weapons of mass destruction. Discussion of the deeper history of U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim-majority countries was often viewed as a distraction from immediate security challenges posed by terrorism. One of Said’s more immediate responses to escalating dynamics of war and confrontation involved convening a conference on the pioneering Arab-American writer Ameen Fares Rihani (1876–1940), entitled “Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West.” Held at American University’s Washington College of Law on April 19 and 20, 2002, this international conference brought together experts on Rihani’s diverse contributions to literature, progressive Arab nationalism, and American understanding of Arabs. Attention was given to Rihani’s prescient warnings about the potential for future U.S. confrontation with Arab national aspirations, and to the relevance of his universalistic outlook in an era of increasing cultural and political

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

31

tensions. Proceedings of the conference were published in a 2002 edited volume, Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: A Pioneering Call for Arab-American Understanding (Funk/Sitka 2004). As he had done in the past, during multiple U.S. administrations, Said responded to inquiries from government officials and did not hesitate to offer input on policy issues. When the Bush administration hired public relations expert Charlotte Beers as the Under Secretary of Public Affairs and Diplomacy, Said and several other experts were consulted on how to improve the image of the U.S. in Arab and Muslim countries. Said presented her with a detailed list of ideas for how the U.S. might improve its image while also seeking common ground on issues related to extremism and political violence. Although he readily acknowledged that little of his advice was implemented, he believed he had done his best to offer a relevant, culturally sensitive set of proposals. The Bush administration called upon Said again after invading Iraq in 2003. Said had been opposed to President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, certain that it would only increase the capacity of extremist groups to mobilize support in Muslim communities. Although he strongly disagreed with the administration’s policy, he was nonetheless willing to participate in the “Iraq Project on Democracy.” Said felt it was important that he have a voice in the project given the extremely high stakes for the Iraqi people. In many ways, he was able to make unique contributions to this group of high-profile Mideast experts, senior U.S. State Department officials, and various officials and tribal leaders from Iraq; his family’s longstanding relationships with tribal Arabs and Kurdish groups, for example, gave him credibility with the Iraqis involved in the project. His family’s history of friendship with the Shammar tribe proved particularly useful, given that it was one of the most influential actors left in the country. As part of the project, Said was asked to sponsor a conference at American University on Iraqi Federalism. Again, Said’s reputation and relationships in the region ensured the conference was well attended by a highly diverse group of influential Iraqis. The conference offered a forum for leaders from the various ethnic groups that comprise Iraq to meet—some for the very first time. After many months of meetings and much effort, the Iraq Democracy Project produced what it hoped would be a viable path to democracy for the country. Unfortunately, at this writing (2022) continued ethnic strife, difficult social conditions, and complex political rivalries mean that the road to a more functional Iraqi democracy will be long. Despite difficult problems besetting much of the country, conditions in the Kurdish Region of Iraq have to date (2022) been much more stable and amenable to pluralism. The current Prime Minister Masrour Barzani received his undergraduate degree and a master’s degree in International Peace and Conflict Resolution at American University. Barzani selected AU because of his family’s connection with Said’s family dating back to the 1930s. During the 1990s, Said closely mentored Barzani and encouraged him to meet with U.S. officials to broaden their understanding of the Kurdish situation in Iraq. Barzani acted on this advice and also supported AU in establishing the Barzani Scholar-in-Residence Program to advance Kurdish studies (E. Turner, personal communication, August 23, 2021).

32

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Two additional book projects from the post-9/11 period also responded to vital issues, albeit from a more traditionally academic angle: Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, Not Static (Said et al. 2006), and Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Funk/Said 2009). The former was premised on the vital need for more dynamic, creative, and life-affirming modes of Islamic thought, and on the proceedings of a major international conference convened at the Library of Alexandria in Alexandria, Egypt in 2003. The latter outlined Islamic peace paradigms previously explored in a course at AU, while also providing a diagnosis and prescriptions for paths forward in Islamic-Western and especially U.S.-Middle Eastern relations.

1.21 Teaching as a Vocation A quick survey of awards Said received throughout his career (see list below) will reveal that many of the recognitions he received were for teaching. Although accomplished in scholarship and service (chairing the University Senate for three terms, and often volunteering for committees) and in his later years carrying program administrative responsibilities, Said never ceased to prioritize teaching and mentoring. More than once, Said had opportunities to turn away from teaching and put his energies into university administration. In the mid-1960s, however, he turned down an invitation to serve as dean of SIS. Although he was highly involved with the University Senate and well-known on campus, in the 1980s he turned down an opportunity to serve as university president. He chose not to follow the path of a career administrator and continued to value his status as a teaching faculty member. Said’s commitment to his students was exceptional. He hated to miss class, even in the name of some seemingly higher priority like an invitation to meet with government officials at the State Department (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021). In addition to cultivating a dynamic classroom experience (for which he received an impressive number of teaching awards), he went far beyond regular office hours in his work counseling students and was frequently visited by former students as well. Many students particularly appreciated being invited to his home for a celebratory meal at the end of a stimulating and memorable course experience with high expectations for reading and weekly engagement. When asked about positive memories with respect to teaching, Said confided that the course he enjoyed teaching the most was the freshman course, “Introduction to World Politics.” With respect to advice about teaching, he suggested that instructors should “Be conscious that the classroom is an extension of themselves… [and remember] to be part of it” (Said, personal interview, March 16, 2019). The most profound goal of teaching, he proposed, is transformation. “I wanted,” he said, “to create around me an open environment… [because] for me transformation is to create an environment where people can change. It’s a spiritual context” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). He sought to apply this principle in the classroom by declaring that every person present

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

33

in the room was a resource and source of knowing for others, and by acknowledging that the student-teacher relationship is at its best when the roles of teacher and student are repeatedly inverted. He encouraged students to regard learning as a lifelong journey, and often started the term with a handout of Constantine Cavafy’s (1863–1933) poem, ‘Ithaka’: As you set out for Ithaka hope the voyage is a long one, full of adventure, full of discovery. […] Keep Ithaka always in your mind. Arriving there is what you are destined for. But do not hurry the journey at all. Better if it lasts for years, so you are old by the time you reach the island, wealthy with all you have gained on the way, not expecting Ithaka to make you rich. […] (Cavafy 1991)

While teaching on a given subject, Said actively sought to harvest the ideas and experiences of the students present in the room. He further animated the classroom by sharing personal stories from his own remarkable experiences and encounters. Many former students would fondly remember these stories years after graduating, taking note of resonant themes like “surrendering to the grace of the moment” in any life circumstance, and “learning to live between footsteps” amid the precarious realities of armed conflict.12

1.22 Sharing and Celebrating a Vision Abdul Aziz Said remained a professor at AU until 2015. He continued to work full time well into his 80s – teaching courses, pursuing academic projects, and serving in various capacities. Shortly before retirement, he conducted an extensive (and exhausting) fundraising tour throughout Arab Gulf states on behalf of AU, connecting with multiple generations of alumni from his long service to the university. He had earned the distinction of having been the youngest professor to receive tenure as well as the oldest tenured professor, and retired with the longest service as a tenured faculty member in the history of the institution. His final research and writing projects were very much concerned with communicating a vision of peace to contextualize peacebuilding strategy and inspire sustained 12

For statements about Said as a colleague and mentor (beyond those included in this volume), see “Abdul Aziz Said Tributes” at https://www.facebook.com/AbdulAzizSaidTributes/.

34

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

activity in the field. He wrote, for example, on the need for a multifaceted understanding of “total peace” as a necessary framework for humanity in an era that was emerging from the shadow of total war (Said 2005a). At the same time, he advocated “localizing peace” as a complementary approach emphasizing the vital importance of rooting peace efforts in specific cultural contexts and sustaining traditions that could be “carried forward” and updated in the spirit of the appropriate technology movement and of the vernacular architecture pursued by the distinguished Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy (Said/Funk 2010: 130–131). Like many scholars, he left unfinished manuscripts and projects at the time of his passing. Notable among them was a manuscript entitled Minding the Heart, which explored his ideas about the personal as well as social relevance of spirituality. He became greatly concerned about the educational losses of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and recognized the growing impact of regional conflict on minority communities. After seeing what was happening to Christian communities in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, he wrote up a proposal for the establishment of a Center for the Study of Christians in the Middle East. Unfortunately, he was unable to secure the funding required for this initiative. The Syrian civil war (2011-) troubled Said greatly. At one point, he even wondered aloud to his spouse Elena Turner if it had been wrong for him not to return to Syria after pursuing his education (E. Turner, personal communication, August 14, 2021). He felt helpless and heartbroken watching the destruction from afar, and wondered if there was anything more he might have done. He also expressed concern that the Middle East had receded too much from the “map of interest” of influential countries, drawing attention only through fear of destructive groups such as ISIS but rarely becoming a focus of sustained, constructive attention (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). At a time when internal regional leadership was also lacking, there were few forces to prevent drift and galvanize the efforts required to address priorities such as those outlined in the Arab Human Development reports. Even after his retirement, Said remained engaged with applied aspects of international relations and peacebuilding. He was still sought after by U.S. State Department officials for his perspective on events in the Middle East (especially in Syria), and continued to provide board service to various non-governmental organizations. The latter included the El-Hibri Foundation, the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, Nonviolence International, IREX, the Mohamed S. Farsi Foundation (MSFF), and Search for Common Ground. Having invested so many years of service at American University, and in the building of the IPCR program, it was not easy to step back. As he withdrew from his long-held program-director role and moved towards retirement, Said witnessed major administrative changes at SIS that effectively downgraded the status and teaching capacity of IPCR in the name of eliminating “silos” of separate activity. He would have felt heartened, however, to learn about moves taken by a new SIS leadership team to restore the IPCR program to its previous status. During his last decade in academia Said was honored at multiple events convened to express appreciation for his long, dynamic, and productive career. The first major event was an impressively well-attended private celebration of 50 years of teaching

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

35

in 2007, at which he was presented with the El-Hibri Foundation Peace Education Award. Seven years later, in March 2014, he received a Distinguished Scholar Award presented by the International Studies Association’s Peace Studies Section at the 55th Annual Convention in Toronto, Ontario. During his last semester before retirement, Said was further honored by a festschrift conference (“Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, the Inspiration”) convened on March 19, 2015 by AU professors Abdul Karim Bangura and Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Bangura/Abu-Nimer 2018). Large numbers of former students, teaching assistants, and colleagues stepped forward with verbal and written statements of deep appreciation for the inspiration and guidance he had provided. Said’s prepared comments for the festschrift provided the basis for a selection provided in Chap. 10 of this volume, and say much about the priority he put on personal spirituality in peacebuilding practice.

1.23 Pioneering Contributions Settling on the title of this book required much deliberation. Said was a pioneer in many different ways, and in multiple subject areas. He played a significant role in the development and diversification of the international relations field, through his writings as well as through future scholars who benefited by his mentoring and support. Though he emphasized that it is highly difficult for a political scientist to predict trends more than five years in the future (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017), his scholarship was bold in its efforts to capture unfolding dynamics, and often prescient. Many of his ideas anticipated areas of research that would soon become popular, and others call out for further exploration. His scholarship has offered enduring insights into a great number of substantive topics, including: • The impetus behind political change in post-colonial contexts; • The limitations of positivism for grappling with value questions at the center of politics and political choices; • New (or under-theorized) actors in world politics, from ethnic groups to multinational corporations; • (Mis)communication among cultures as a key dynamic of international relations; • The culturally constructed and intersubjective nature of development visions; • Historical and contemporary factors driving Middle East politics; • Islamic peace traditions and resources; • Principles of dialogue and cooperation across cultures; and • The relevance of human dignity and spirituality to peacemaking. As varied as these contributions may be, our efforts to assemble this volume have revealed coherence among the diverse ideas Said explored in his writings, which are organized here (see Part II) in a partially chronological and partially thematic manner. Within the extensive and varied writings Said produced, we have found three general areas in which his contributions are particularly rich, and in which he developed and

36

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

adapted ideas over time. As the title of this book suggests, these general areas are peace, intercultural dialogue, and cooperative global politics.

1.23.1 Peace Visitors to Said’s office were often struck by a prominently displayed picture of a young girl who had been displaced by war and political violence in Cambodia. When asked about the photo, Said recounted that it was given to him on an airplane and that he had chosen to display it as a “reminder of real stakes” and of the human cost of war. “It was a reminder of what I must be doing, the work, to stop violence. I came to realize and feel that violence is also vulgar, the vulgarity of violence” (Said, personal interview, October 10, 2017). From his trenchant analyses of the Cold War nuclear stalemate to late-career commentary on pillars of peace for a cooperative and humane world order, peace was a priority for Said throughout his career. It was both a central value concern, and a concept that warranted creative exploration in the manner of peace studies. To the traditional peace studies dichotomy of “positive peace” and “negative peace,” Said offered his own unique formulations, often in ways that sought to expand understanding of “peace as presence” and not merely as an absence of overt violence. It was Said’s view that international relations theory, and political science more generally, cannot escape normative judgments, and that a decision to actively pursue peace had become more vital than ever in a world order threatened by weapons of mass destruction, ecological limits, threats to human dignity, and failures to embrace the pluralism inherent in the human cultural environment. From the height of the Cold War to détente, and from the post-Cold War milieu to the post-9/11 environment, concern for peace was threaded through Said’s academic works. Having lived through total war, he invited readers to envision a more total peace, to be built as a mosaic of local peace contributions. At the same time, he recognized that peace is not a destination one can expect to conclusively reach; rather it is “a dynamic process of doing and being” (Said et al. 1995: 288).

1.23.2 Intercultural Dialogue Throughout his life, Said was acutely aware of issues related to identity, culture, and difference. Coming from a minority experience within the Arab world to a minority experience in America, while also receiving colonial education in the French Mandate system, Said readily recognized that a dominant group’s answers to questions of meaning and value are not shared by all. Moreover, studying the impact of ethnicity on political behavior, while exploring the impact of culture on perception in the field during extensive travels, equipped him to recognize politics as a cultural activity

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

37

and to appreciate the need for intercultural dialogue as a vital component of peacebuilding. Said had a visceral understanding of what it means to be colonized or excluded, and recognized the widespread nature of such experiences. He also knew, from his own experiences, that it is possible to straddle the divergent tectonic plates of different cultures – to bridge seemingly incompatible cultural worlds within oneself and to become culturally competent at navigating multiple contexts. Moving beyond dominant paradigms of international relations, Said came to understand global politics as intercultural communication in disguise, and development as a process that must take on the texture of particular cultures if it is not to become alienating or self-defeating. Perceiving respect for cultural selfdetermination as a vital expression of respect for human dignity, he challenged dominant paradigms even while proposing that every culture has both something to learn and something to teach. Particularly if one is coming from a powerful or privileged culture, he suggested, it is vital to avoid ideological impositions and to allow space for change from within in other cultures. Recognizing complexity in his own identity and cultural influences (e.g., Arab and American, Western and non-Western), he was accustomed to seeing from more than one angle, and perceived broad applicability in the humanistic principle that knowledge of one’s authentic individuality is a vital basis for genuine appreciation of the other’s uniqueness (Said 2005a: 240). Furthermore, appreciation for cultural diversity reveals both the inescapable particularity and the underlying unity inherent in the human experience (Said 2005a: 237). It is on this basis that cultural empathy can become a valuable tool of analysis, a means of perceiving differences clearly while also discovering commonalities. Various late-career writings place particular emphasis on a formula that Said had long found useful for communicating the idea that unity, learning, and coherence can emerge through respectful encounter and equitable exchange among world cultures: “The whole world needs the whole world.” This message was central to his 2005 book chapter, “Achieving Peace”: This information revolution has set in motion two contradictory trends in the world: increasing localization, leading to self-assurance and the strengthening of each culture’s own traditions, and globalization which spans the sheer diversity of human expression. This context defines the nature of our contact in a broader sense. Through this growing awareness of our diversity lies our unmistakable unity: our humanity and our common values and needs. It is up to us, at this crucial time in our shared history, to determine how we will know and relate with each other, how we will define and benefit from our relationship, and how we will cope together with the teeming diversity of our global community. (Said 2005a: 235) Dialogue, as a new paradigm in global relations, is based on knowledge to achieve new knowledge, to see each other with different eyes, in a different light, looking together toward a shared future in a global community to make the world safe for diversity. (Said 2005a: 242–243)

Ever one to seek a complementarity of principles where others saw an unbridgeable opposition, Said perceived differences among global cultures as sources of deeper insight into a shared human condition. As his track record of writings on human rights suggests, he was both a universalist and a particularist. To the principle that

38

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

“the whole is greater than the parts,” he added the proviso, “though only when the parts are taken into account” (Said 1995: 7).

1.23.3 Cooperative Global Politics From the first edition of Concepts of International Politics to his late-career writings on the goals and bases of international cooperation, Said was actively concerned not just with diagnosing challenges in the IR field but also with setting the agenda. He effectively synthesized views about bases for confidence-building and the development of cooperation through reciprocity, and offered his own distinctive constructs and formulations (Said 1988; Said et al. 1995). Recognizing the necessity of strengthening international organization, he also emphasized that intentional effort to build consensus is indispensable for sustainable cooperation. The crucial importance of seeing cooperation as a global social process is aptly communicated by the title of his article, “Is the U.N. Ready for the World? Is the World Ready for the U.N.?” (Said 1994). From Said’s perspective, a crucial step towards building a more authentic consensus on value areas suitable for cooperation is first recognizing that agreement cannot simply be assumed. When some nations fail to recognize that “all nations are developing nations” (Said 1983) and presume their answers to be intrinsically universal, cooperation is likely to falter. A more thoroughgoing dialogue on different models of democracy and human rights, however, may prove capable of developing an expanded agenda in which more nations and constituencies perceive vital stakes or relevant trade-offs. New value syntheses and more authentic forms of human solidarity have the potential to emerge, enabling efforts to confront the daunting challenges that face humanity as a whole. Potentially, cooperative global politics entails not just the provision of public goods (e.g., security, peace, health, economic equity, ecological balance) but also “exchanging the best for the best” (Said 2015).

1.24 A Final Note: The Importance of Affirmation From the beginning to the end of his academic career, critique was integral to Abdul Aziz Said’s scholarship. He was keenly aware of the need to identify and question hidden agendas, unthought assumptions, and the cultural triumphalism inherent in believing that one’s own experience ought to be universal. Moreover, he recognized that even attempts to promote “scientific” approaches to the study of international politics readily fall back on pre-existing social models and value positions. To this end, he saw critical thinking as vital to the educational process. At the same time, Said also believed that meaningful political agency is not possible without awareness of the values one wishes to affirm. Being conscious of the values that animate one’s critique and prescriptions – and working to deeply

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

39

integrate them at a personal level – is therefore crucial for lasting and constructive social change. Exposing the shadow side of the existing political and intellectual order is a vital step towards social change, but it is not the end point. One also needs to engage the human capacity for creative imagination and offer a constructive program – a set of ideas that might inform different forms of practice. In many respects, Said anticipated the “normative turn” in International Relations (associated with more openly prescriptive and value-laden theorizing) and the development of support for more activist approaches within the field. Peace and cooperation, he recognized, could not be delivered through “politics as usual” or through analytical constructs developed solely through the empirical and critical study of the status quo. There is also a need, he suggested, for vision, imagination, and affirmation. Affirmation supports empowerment, and inspires actions sustained by the possibility of peace – even if that peace is “always in the making” (Said 2004: 117).

1.25 Awards, Recognitions, and Memberships Throughout his career, Abdul Aziz Said received an impressive number of awards and recognitions (Box 1.1) and involved himself extensively in board service and advising (Box 1.2). The following lists were compiled using Said’s CV as the principal point of reference. The recognitions noted in Box 1.1 are not exhaustive, and the scope of his informal advising and consultation work was undoubtedly much broader than is suggested by the more formal relationships detailed in Box 1.2.

Box 1.1: Selected Awards and Recognitions • • • • • • • • • • •

Omicron Delta Kappa Honor Society, 1964 AU Cap and Gown Chapter of Mortar Board Distinguished Faculty Award 1966 Ugly Professor on Campus Award AU Outstanding Professor Award, 1968–69 Chairman of the University Senate, 1975–76 AU College of Public Affairs Annual College Award in recognition of Distinguished Service to the University, May 13, 1978 AU University Faculty Award 1978 African Student Association 1980 Award 1989–1990 Faculty Honor Award for Lasting Contributions to Graduate Student Community, Graduate Student Council, American University AU Outstanding Service to the University Community, 1996 Multicultural Affairs Distinguished Faculty Award (AU, 1990s)

40

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

• Phi Epsilon Pi 100th anniversary committee, in recognition of contributions made to society honors Dr. Abdul Aziz Said, “A Living Legend of the Phi Epsilon Pi Fraternity,” and creates the Abdul Aziz Said Phi Epsilon Pi Scholarship, October 2004 • El-Hibri Peace Education Prize, 2007 • Mahatma Gandhi Foundation Fellowship of Peace Award, 2007 • AU Professor of the Year, 2007–2008 • Honorary Chairman, Golden Eagles Reunion, American University (2009) • AU Award for Outstanding Scholarship, Research and Professional Contributions, 2009 • International Studies Association’s Peace Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award, presented at the 55th Annual Convention in Toronto, ON, March 2014 • American University Award for Distinguished Service in the School of International Service 1957–2015 (2015) • Recipient International Political Science Association’s Teh-Kuang Chang Award for Outstanding Scholar on Asian and Pacific Studies (2018) • Abdul Aziz Said Scholarship in Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies (named in 2020).

Box 1.2: Board Service and Advising • Center for Democracy and Election Management (CDEM) • Center for Peace Building International • Center for the Study of the Presidency: National Committee to Unite a Divided America • Council on Foreign Relations: Power-Sharing and Minority Rights in Iraq • Council on US-Syrian Relations • Creative Peace Building Initiatives • El Hibri Charitable Foundation • Findhorn Foundation, Scotland • Fulbright Senior Specialist Program • Global Alliance for Transnational Education (GATE) • Global Education Associates • Human Rights International • International Association of University Presidents: U.N. Commission on Arms Control • International Center for Religion and Diplomacy • International Youth Advocate Foundation • International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

41

Jones International University – University of The Web Joint Program on Conflict Resolution (Institute for Victims of Trauma) Karamah – Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights Mohamed S. Farsi Foundation National Peace Foundation National Youth Advocate Program Nonviolence International Peacebuilding and Development Institute Search for Common Ground Seven Pillars House of Wisdom The Omega Institute Washington National Cathedral Interfaith Curriculum Advisory Council Youth Advocate Program International.

References Bangura, A. K., & Abu-Nimer, M. (Eds.). (2018). Abdul Aziz Said: The mualim, the inspiration. New York: Nova Publishers. Cavafy, C. P. (1992). Collected poems (2nd ed.). E. Keeley & P. Sherrard, Trans. G. Savidis, Ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Charles Lerche, Jr. of Capital School. (1966, August 30). The New York Times, https://www.nyt imes.com/1966/08/30/archives/charges-lerche-jr-of-capital-school.html Chittick, W. C. (1994). Imaginal worlds: Ibn al-‘Arab¯ı and the problem of religious diversity. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: An agenda for sustainable peacemaking. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. Funk, N. C., & Sitka, B. J. (Eds.). (2004). Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: A pioneering call for Arab-American understanding. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Gaunt, D. (2006). Massacres, resistance, protectors: Muslim-Christian relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. Kelly, P. K. (1994). Thinking green! Essays on environmentalism, feminism, and nonviolence. Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press. Khoury, P. S. (1987). Syria and the French mandate: The politics of Arab nationalism, 1920–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1963). Concepts of international politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Miller, S. (2007, April 6). Daniel Collier, 70, former army colonel. The New York Sun, https://www. nysun.com/obituaries/daniel-collier-70-former-army-colonel/51984/ Morgenthau, H. (1954). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace (2nd ed.). New York: Knopf.

42

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Pearson, R. (2003, February 2). Brady Tyson, 75, dies. The Washington Post. https://www.washin gtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/02/02/brady-tyson-75-dies/95a43df6-df92-460b-94fe-185a7c 5386ee/ Potter, P. B. (1922). An introduction to the study of international organization. New York: The Century Co. Potter, P. B. (1932). A manual and digest of common international law: With theoretical and historical introductions and a discussion of the future of international law. New York: Harper & Brothers. Pritchett, W. E. (2005). A national issue: Segregation in the District of Columbia and the Civil Rights Movement at mid-century. Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, 1226. https://scholarship. law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1226 Reilly, J. A. (2019). Fragile nation, shattered land: The modern history of Syria. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rihani, Ameen. (1970). A chant of mystics and other poems. Beirut, Lebanon: The Rihani House. Rogers, C. (1989). The rust workshop. In H. Kirschenbaum & V. Land Henderson (Eds.), The Carl Rogers reader (pp. 457–477). New York: Houghton Mifflin. Rosenthal, F. (1967). The muqaddimah: An introduction to history (2nd ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Said, A. A. (1968a). The African phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1968b). Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A.(Ed.). (1970). America’s world role in the 70s. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1971). Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1977). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1978). Human rights and world order. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1981). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy (rev. ed.). New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A. (1983). All nations are developing nations. Global Futures Digest, 1(1), 18–19. Said, A. A. (1988). Cooperative global politics. The Acorn: A Gandhian Review, 3(2)/4(1), 14–17. Said, A. A. (1994). Is the U.N. ready for the world? Is the world ready for the U.N.? U.N. Vision, November/December, 3–6. Said, A. A. (1995). Cultural diversity: The whole world needs the whole world. American Senator, 10(2), 7–8. Said, A. A. (2004). Understanding peace through Rihani’s spirituality. In N. C. Funk and B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: a pioneering call for Arab-American understanding (pp. 113–119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A. (2005a). Achieving peace: The whole world needs the whole world. In Prince N. von und zu Liechtenstein & C. M. Gueye (Eds.), Peace and intercultural dialogue (pp. 235–251). Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter. Said, A. A. (2005b). Center for Global Peace: Program history and fundraising efforts as of December 2005. Unpublished document. Said, A. A. (2015, March 19). Peace, the inside story [paper presentation]. Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, The Inspiration (festschrift conference), American University, Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2017, October 10). Personal interview. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2018, August 8). Personal interview. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2019, March 16). Personal interview. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2006). Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not static. London: Routledge. Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (Eds.). (1971). Revolutionism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1998). Islam and the West: Three stories. In S. T. Hunter (Ed.), The future of Islam-West relations: A CSIS Islamic Studies conference report (pp. 9–18). Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

1 Abdul Aziz Said’s Journey: A Biographical Overview

43

Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.). (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Said, A. A., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2003). Cultural diversity and Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1971). The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1976). Ethnicity in an international context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1978). Development: Goals and measurements. Communications and Development Review, 2(1), 24–28. Schimmel, A. (1975). Mystical dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Schimmel, A. (2001). Rumi’s world: The life and works of the greatest Sufi poet. Boulder, CO: Shambhala. Sharp, S. L. (1950). New constitutions in the Soviet field. Washington, DC: Foundation for Foreign Relations. Sharp, S. L. (1953). Poland: White eagle on a red field. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Simmons, L. R., & Said, A. A. (Eds.). (1974). Drugs, politics, and diplomacy: The international connection. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Smithsonian National Museum of American History. (n.d.). Washington, D.C.: A challenge to Jim Crow in the nation’s capital. https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/washington-dc1.html Tyson, B., & Said, A. A. (1993). Human rights: A forgotten victim of the Cold War. Human Rights Quarterly, 15(3), 589–604.

Chapter 2

Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

Prose and photographs communicate in different ways. To enrich their portrayal of Abdul Aziz Said and to invite reflection on his academic works within larger contexts of significance, the editors have selected images that provide different angles of vision on his life as well as on the web of relationships that constituted his reality. The following photos were chosen for ways in which they can provide added insight into who Said was both as a person and as a scholar, at diverse points in time. They speak to his formative experiences as well as to important relationships, major pursuits, and modes of activity. When considered in relation to the biographical narrative provided in Chap. 1, the photos can enrich one’s understanding of Said’s ideas, research priorities, activism, and sense of purpose. Except where noted, these photos have been taken from Abdul Aziz Said’s personal photo collection and are published with the permission of his spouse, Elena Turner, who retains the copyright.

Nathan C. Funk is Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo (email: [email protected]), and Meena Sharify-Funk is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University (email: [email protected]).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_2

45

46

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said (left) with brothers Riyad (center) and Fayek (right), circa 1940. Riyad was struck by a French military truck and died in Said’s arms as he carried him home. Said later named his first son Riyad to honor the 3-year-old brother he lost. His brother’s death gave him a visceral sense of war’s horrors, and figured prominently in stories he told later in life – both about hardships and losses during World War II, and also about the necessity of peace.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

47

Abdul Aziz Said’s mother, Shamsa Khacho, and his older sister, Rose. Shamsa’s mixed Arab and Armenian heritage reflected the diversity of the Jazira region. When asked who the most influential people in his life had been, Said mentioned his mother Shamsa, his grandmother Maryam, and his sister Rose.

48

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said’s father, Said Ishaq, was a well-known trader, large landowner, and politician. During the French Mandate period he became involved in the anticolonial movement, and was imprisoned for several years. After independence he became prominent in national politics, despite being from a rather remote region and a member of the Christian minority. Respected for his diplomatic skills and for his opposition to colonial rule, he played a significant role in Parliament until repeated military coups caused him to withdraw from political activity.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

49

Said Ishaq (center) with Said Aga al-Daqoori (right) and Shaykh Mizr Abd al-Muhsin (left). All three were Parliamentary representatives from Jazira during the early postindependence period of the Syrian Republic. Together, they represented a diverse, predominantly Muslim constituency that included Kurds and Arab tribes as well as Christian communities. An influential member of the Parliament, Ishaq was recognized as interim president for one day amid the turbulence of a coup in 1951. From the personal photo collection of Bassam Said Ishak (published with permission).

Said Ishaq (third from right), then serving as the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, standing with the President of Syria, Adib al-Shishakli (second from right), and Dr. Maamun al-Kuzbary, Speaker of Parliament (far right) in 1954. Shishakli was driven from power by a coup in February 1954. From the personal photo collection of Bassam Said Ishak (published with permission).

50

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said Ishaq (second from left) at a “national unity” event in Amuda, Syria during the United Arab Republic period of Syrian union with Egypt – between 1958 and 1961. Syrian political parties were suppressed during this period, and Ishaq was not active in national politics. This withdrawal from politics became permanent with the rise of the Ba‘ath Party in Syria during the 1960s. From the personal photo collection of Bassam Said Ishak (published with permission).

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

51

As a youth in French Mandate Syria, Abdul Aziz Said was educated in a series of French schools – first in Damascus, where he attended the Lycée Français for elementary school, and then in Aleppo, where he attended the Freres Maristes/Marist Brothers and later Aleppo College. These photos were taken in 1946 (left) and 1945 (right; he is in the front row wearing sunglasses), when he was a student at Aleppo College. Because the philosophy of the schools was rooted in bringing “mission civilisitrice” to youth in Syria – and to children from prominent families in particular – Said learned to read and write in French before reading and writing in Arabic, and was required to follow a dress code that favored Western clothing over traditional Syrian garb such as the galabiyya.

52

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

These photos present Abdul Aziz Said as a young man (in his late teens) in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria, dressed in traditional clothing, in the latter years of the French Mandate period. It was a time of rapid change – in technology as well as in social norms and styles – and of urgent questions related to colonialism, identity, and politics.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

53

After completing his studies at French schools in Syria, Abdul Aziz Said sought the equivalent of a high school diploma at the American University of Beirut’s International College. He is pictured here with a friend in Beirut in 1947 (above left) and on the Corniche in Beirut in 1949 (below center). His subsequent educational journey would take him to Cairo and Washington, D.C.

54

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said (third from left) with a group of Middle Eastern friends in Washington, D.C. in the early 1950s, while he was pursuing his undergraduate studies.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

55

Two of Abdul Aziz Said’s most influential mentors at American University were Pitman Benjamin Potter and Samuel Sharp. His doctoral thesis supervisor, Pitman Benjamin Potter (above left), was a graduate of Harvard Law School and a prominent scholar of international organization. He served as dean of the Graduate School of American University and had a reputation for supporting idealistic causes, such as the legal defense of Ethiopia when it was attacked by Mussolini’s Italy in 1935. Professor Samuel Sharp (above right) was another important influence. Professor Sharp was known for his critical scholarship and teaching, which challenged imperialism as well as predominant understandings of the threat posed by communism. When he drew the attention of Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Red Scare, Sharp entrusted Abdul Aziz with his lecture notes for safekeeping. Photo of Pitman Potter from the collection of Deborah Ann A. Michaels-Yavuz (geni.com).

56

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said on his first day of teaching as an Assistant Professor at American University in September 1958. Said received all of his post-secondary degrees at American University: his B.A. in 1954, His M.A. in 1955, and his Ph.D. in 1957. He began working as an instructor at American University in 1957, shortly after completing his doctorate. Though his family had originally hoped he would return to Syria and assume his father’s seat in Parliament, a series of coups foreclosed that possibility by the time he finished his undergraduate degree.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

57

Abdul Aziz Said’s communication skills and charisma did not go unnoticed at American University, and he quickly became a popular and innovative professor. In addition to regular classroom teaching, he was also selected to lecture for a television series entitled, “Classroom 9: World Politics,” which aired three times per week on WTOP-TV (Channel 9) in the Washington, D.C. area from June through August 1959. The series allowed viewers to register if they were interested in completing the full course (with a mail-delivered study guide) for university credit. A review of the course printed in Washington’s Evening Star newspaper on June 29, 1959 observed that “there is a fresh quality to his lecturing that rivets the student’s attention.”

58

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said (left) with School of International Service Dean Ernest Griffith (center) and co-author Charles O. Lerche, Jr. (right), marking the publication of the book, Concepts of International Politics in 1963. Lerche became Said’s closest colleague, and the Concepts text (Said’s first published book) went through multiple editions, with the fifth and final revision and update (co-written with Dr. Lerche’s son Charles O. Lerche III) published in 1995. At a time when scholars of international politics increasingly emphasized power and material interests, Said and Lerche underscored the role of social values and morality in politics, amid consideration of more traditional factors and elements of analysis.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

59

Having delved deeply into political processes of decolonization during his graduate studies, Abdul Aziz Said was keenly interested in the emergence of newly independent states in Africa and other world regions. Living in Washington, D.C. facilitated contact with government agencies and with opportunities to become involved in public diplomacy programming. In 1964, the U.S. State Department supported a lecture tour in Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Algeria and Libya; Said drew on experiences from these and other travels while writing his book, The African Phenomenon (1968), exploring post-independence political dynamics on the continent.

60

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said (standing with white jacket) and several U.S. State Department officials with the Oba of Benin (center) in 1964.

Abdul Aziz Said in a Jamaican television studio for an interview in 1965, during a State Department-supported trip.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

61

By the 1960s, Abdul Aziz Said received frequent invitations to deliver lectures for many institutions within and beyond the Washington, D.C. area, including the National War College (pictured here). Although his public engagement was broad in scope and highly varied, he enjoyed opportunities to address military officers and academies; during the course of his career he addressed audiences at West Point, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Department of Defense, the InterAmerican Defense College, the U.S. Air Force Academy, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Naval War College, and the U.S. Army Infantry Academy at Fort Benning. He received numerous letters of appreciation for these lectures, often with comments about how he had expanded soldiers’ understandings of international relations.

62

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said in his office at American University’s School of International Service circa 1966. A founding member of the International Studies Association, Said was well connected with a range of prominent international relations scholars, including Karl W. Deutsch and Hans J. Morgenthau, both of whom contributed chapters to his 1968 edited volume, Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

63

While teaching in Washington, D.C. during the late 1960s, Abdul Aziz Said found himself inspired by the energy of his students and by movements for justice, peace, and social change. He attended anti-war demonstrations near the American University campus and in several instances bailed out students who had been arrested for protesting. One of his notable students during the 1960s was Petra Kelly (class of 1970; pictured above, on the right), who co-founded the West German Green Party in 1979. His writings in the early 1970s – on “protagonists of change,” revolutionary movements, and emerging actors in international politics – reflect efforts to ground theorizing about global politics in timely issues, and in dynamics that were challenging traditional forms of power politics.

64

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Throughout his long career at American University, Abdul Aziz Said was actively involved in university governance, serving three consecutive terms as Chairman of the University Senate during the 1970s. Many remember him as a strong advocate for fellow faculty members, for university staff, and for students. In this image, Said is leading a procession of faculty members at a graduation convocation, and holding the ceremonial mace.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

65

In the late 1970s, Abdul Aziz Said served on the White House Committee on the Islamic World, as the attention of President Jimmy Carter’s administration turned to the Iranian Revolution and related foreign policy developments. Said’s major preoccupations during the 1970s included human rights, and preventing destructive clashes between the U.S. and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, and as new dynamics began to unfold in the Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g., Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, and the emergence of Hezbollah), he became increasingly focused on the challenge of preventing further escalation of tensions between the U.S. and predominantly Muslim countries. Photo taken February 7, 1980.

66

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Throughout his travels within and beyond the Middle East, Abdul Aziz Said embraced opportunities to meet with Sufi practitioners as well as with individuals who shared his belief that the world’s spiritual traditions contained transformative wisdom that was vital for peace. In 1983, Said was invited to attend an international gathering of spiritual leaders at Mount Sinai in Egypt, to support aspirations toward Middle East peace. The event was organized by Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, a dynamic figure in contemporary Jewish spiritual renewal. Said (right) is pictured here with Pir Vilayat Inayat Khan, former leader of the Sufi Order of the West (left). Permission to use this photo was given by Hamil Tavernier.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

67

Abdul Aziz Said traveled and lectured widely during the 1980s, and was a featured speaker not just in academic forums on international politics, but also in gatherings exploring themes related to spirituality and social change and featuring speakers such as the futurist Barbara Marx Hubbard (a personal friend) and Ram Dass (right). One frequent venue, where he would offer workshops on spirituality and the Sufi tradition, was Omega Institute in the state of New York. Photo taken in 1983.

68

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

During the 1980s, two collaborators who impacted Abdul Aziz Said’s work and outlook were Brady Tyson (left) and Mubarak Awad (center). This picture was taken in 1983 at al-Khalil (Hebron), Palestine near the tomb of the Prophet Abraham. Brady Tyson, a Methodist pastor, American University professor, Latin America specialist, and former civil rights campaigner, was a frequent co-author of writings on human rights, development, education, diversity, and transcending the legacy of the Cold War. Mubarak Awad, sometimes known as “the Gandhi of the Middle East,” was a Palestinian nonviolence practitioner and campaigner who founded the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence, before being imprisoned and deported from Israel in 1988 for his role in starting the nonviolent dimension of the First Intifada. Awad enlisted Said as a co-founder when he launched his next organization, Nonviolence International, in 1989. By this time Said was becoming increasingly involved with a number of different advocacy organizations; additional involvements have included Human Rights International, the National Peace Foundation, the National Youth Advocate Program, and Search for Common Ground.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

69

During the latter part of the 1980s, Abdul Aziz Said perceived an opportunity to start one of the first peace studies programs within a school focused on international relations. Sister Adrienne Kaufmann (right), a Benedictine Catholic nun, educator, and dialogue practitioner, became an active partner in the subsequent efforts to develop an International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) program within the School of International Service, as a current expression of the school’s founding ethos. The IPCR program, which became active in the early 1990s, sought to prepare students to become actively involved in peacemaking processes, and to participate in the construction of a more humane world order. In their collaborations, Said and Kaufmann formulated a “peace paradigms” framework for a central course in the curriculum, and also organized a summer institute entitled Educating for Global Citizenship, which drew graduate students from the School of International Service as well as teachers and activists from the U.S. and around the world.

70

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said traveled frequently throughout his life for conferences, public diplomacy lecturing, university fundraising, peacebuilding workshops, and special events. He is seen here at the Taj Mahal in 1991, during a U.S. State Department-sponsored trip to India. From academic paper presentations to track-two diplomacy sessions and meetings with foreign dignitaries (including, for example, a 1991 trip to South Africa where he met F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela), Said was a global traveler and sought-after public speaker.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

71

Hillary Rodham Clinton greets Abdul Aziz Said and his wife, Elena Turner (back center), at a White House reception in 1997.

Abdul Aziz Said was invited to give the keynote address (“Civil Conflicts: Global Consequences and Concerns”) at the 22nd Annual UNIS-UN International Student Conference. The event was held within United Nations General Assembly Hall in New York, in March 1998.

72

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said often invited School of International Service students and staff members to his home. This photo was taken at one such gathering in 1996. Back row: Betty Sitka (International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program Coordinator and later Associate Director of the Center for Global Peace), Heather Prichard (staff member then working on a school conflict resolution initiative, Project Pen). Middle row: Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan Funk (Ph.D. in International Relations, 2000), Meena Sharify-Funk (Ph.D. in International Relations, 2005), Rev. Daniel Ngoy Mulunda Nyanga (MA/MTS, 1996; subsequently Youth Secretary for the All Africa Conference of Churches), Shimba Mulunda (spouse of Rev. Mulunda Nyanga), Elena Turner (spouse of Abdul Aziz Said). Front: Chad Perkins (office manager and B.A. student).

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

73

One prominent SIS faculty member and colleague of Abdul Aziz Said during the 1990s was Professor Serif ¸ Mardin (left). Dr. Mardin came to American University to occupy the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, for which Said had secured funding in the 1980s. Dr. Mardin, an influential Turkish sociologist, occupied the Ibn Khaldun Chair from 1988 through 1999.

74

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

In 1996, Abdul Aziz Said became the first occupant of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at American University’s School of International Service. The Chair of Islamic Peace is the first chair at any university in the United States dedicated to the study of Islam and peace; its purpose is to promote the study and understanding of Islamic values and traditions, and of Islamic contributions to the quest for global peace, community, and human solidarity. The Chair was endowed by a gift from Mohamed Said Farsi (left), former Lord Mayor of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Also depicted: Abdul Aziz Said (center) and his former student, Hani Farsi (right), Founder and CEO of the Corniche Group.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

75

Abdul Aziz Said (left front) with invited colleagues at the conference, “Cultural Diversity in Islam,” held at American University in 1998, sponsored by the American University’s Center for Global Peace and the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace. Twenty scholars of Islam from different parts of the Muslim world were brought together for a two-day conference to explore cultural diversity and Islam from civilizational perspectives, in relation to tolerance and pluralism. In this image are, from front row, left to right: Abdul Aziz Said, Mohammed Arkoun, Suad alHakim, Farid Esack, Widad al-Qadi, Sachiko Murata, Chaiwat Satha-Anand; and from back row, left to right: Richard Khuri, Mustafa Pasha, John O. Voll, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Ali Dessouki, Reza Sheikholeslami, Robert D. Lee, Yvonne Haddad, and Karim Crow.

76

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

In September 1998, Abdul Aziz Said (right) meeting His Royal Highness King Abdullah of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during an event hosted by the U.S.Saudi Arabian Business Council. Throughout his career, Said worked with a variety of embassies and ambassadors based in Washington, D.C., often in an advisory capacity or as a consultant on different projects and issues. Other notable figures whom Said worked with in the 1990s and 2000s include: His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz (Ambassador of Saudi Arabia), His Excellency Shaykh Abdulrahman Al-Thani (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from the State of Qatar), His Excellency Mohammad bin Hussein Al-Shaali (Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates) and His Excellency Abdulwahab A. Al-Hajjri (Ambassador of the Republic of Yemen).

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

77

Having been raised among Syrian Kurds in the Jazira region northeast of the Euphrates River, at a time when the Syrian-Iraqi border was effectively open, Said was attuned to the Kurdish predicament in the modern Middle East, acquainted with Kurdish communities, and keen to promote greater understanding of Kurdish aspirations. He sought the establishment of the Mustafa Barzani Scholar for Global Kurdish Studies position at American University’s School of International Service; in June 1999, Lebanese-American scholar Edmund Ghareeb became the first occupant of this new position. Said (second from left) is depicted here with Masoud Barzani (right), who served as Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan from 2005–2017. Also pictured is Masoud’s son, Masrour Barzani (far right), Said’s former student.

78

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Through a lifetime of engagement with the Middle East, and ongoing cultivation of relationships originating from early experiences in Syria, Abdul Aziz Said developed a wide-ranging network of friends and acquaintances. Said is pictured here with Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (left), an Iraqi political leader from the Shammar tribe, which has branches in Syria as well as Iraq. Al-Yawer served as interim President of Iraq from 2004 to 2005 and also as Vice President of Iraq from 2005 to 2006.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

79

Abdul Aziz Said in his “second classroom,” sitting on a bench outside of the School of International Service at American University. He could often be found here, reading or grading papers, but always had time to meet with passing students, colleagues, and friends.

80

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said’s students pursued diverse paths after graduating from American University, working in government, academia, the private sector, law, and many other professions. Said is pictured here with former teaching assistants who had gathered in 1997 to help him celebrate forty years of teaching at American University. From left to right: Hal Lipmann (late 1960s), Abdul Aziz Said, Marlene Regelski (mid1970s), Eddie Feinberg (1970s), and Luiz (Lou) Simmons (1960s, with ongoing writing collaborations into the 1970s).

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

81

In 2007, at a celebration of his 50 years of teaching at American University, Abdul Aziz Said was also honored as the first recipient of the El-Hibri Peace Education Prize. From right to left: Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Karim El-Hibri, Abdul Aziz Said, and Mubarak Awad. More than 350 people from around the world were in attendance; the majority were American University alumni.

82

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

In the 1960s, Jewish students approached Abdul Aziz Said to complain about racial biases and sectarian clauses that maintained exclusivity in the membership of fraternities at American University. Said agreed to champion their cause, first by challenging the exclusivity of existing Greek organizations, and then by serving as the faculty advisor for a new AU chapter of the Phi-Eps, a historically Jewish fraternity. In October 2004, the Phi-Eps officially honored Said as “A Living Legend of the Phi Epsilon Pi Fraternity.” He is pictured here with Keith Rosenberg (left), a lawyer who studied under Said and who was among the Phi-Eps. This picture was taken in 2010 at Rosenberg’s wedding.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

83

In February 2015, Abdul Aziz Said undertook his last trip to the Gulf states on behalf of American University. In this photo, he is with one of his former students, Prince Ali Al-Sabah of Kuwait (left).

84

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Abdul Aziz Said was the longest serving Professor at American University. He walked with his last Ph.D. student and was recognized for 57 years of service at the 2015 Commencement ceremony. The year before, in March 2014, he had received the Distinguished Scholar Award from the International Studies Association’s Peace Studies Section, presented at the association’s 55th Annual Convention in Toronto, Ontario.

2 Photo Essay on Abdul Aziz Said

85

Abdul Aziz Said in his office during the late 1990s or early 2000s. The map behind him was drawn by the 12th-century cartographer al-Idrisi; the hat was purchased for him by his wife, Elena, during a trip to New Mexico – one of his preferred vacation destinations – where he was lecturing for the Young Presidents Organization. Said often spoke about the desirability of bringing together “the best of the East and the best of the West.”

Chapter 3

Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

3.1 Books Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1963). Concepts of international politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (1968). The African phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1968). Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1970). America’s world role in the 70’s. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1970). Concepts of international politics (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1971). Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (Eds.). (1971). Revolutionism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Simmons, L. R., & Said, A. A. (Eds.). (1974). Drugs, politics, and diplomacy: The international connection. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1975). The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Nathan C. Funk is Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo; Email: [email protected]; and Meena Sharify-Funk is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University; Email: [email protected].

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_3

87

88

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1976). Ethnicity in an international context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1977). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1978). Human rights and world order. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1979). Concepts of international politics in global perspective, (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1981). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy (Rev. ed.). New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Said, A. A., & Rouleau, E. (Eds.). (2000). Vision 2020: Middle Eastern outlooks on the future of the region. Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground. Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.). (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2003). Cultural diversity and Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2006). Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not static. London: Routledge. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

3.2 Selected Peer-Reviewed Articles and Chapters in Books Said, A. A. (1959). Iran’s historical legacy. Free World Forum: A Bi-Monthly Journal on Foreign Affairs, 1(4), 51–63. Said, A. A. (1960). Non-Western traditions and the Western world. Free World Forum, 2(1), 3–5. Said, A. A. (1970). The United States and the Middle East and North Africa. Naval War College Review, 22(10), 41–47. Said, A. A. (1971). Clashing horizons: Arabs and revolution. In M. Curtis (Ed.), People and politics in the Middle East: Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East (pp. 278–292). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

89

Said, A. A. (1977). Pursuing human dignity. Society, 15(1), 34–38. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1978). Development: Goals and measurements. Communications and Development Review, 2(1), 24–28. Said, A. A. (1979). Precept and practice of human rights in Islam. Universal Human Rights, 1(1), 63–79. Said, A. A. (1980). Asian Islamic political systems and human rights. Asian Thought & Society, 5(14). Said, A. A. (1980). Human rights in Islamic perspectives. In A. Pollis & P. Schwab (Eds.), Human rights: Cultural and ideological perspectives (pp. 86–100). New York; London: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A., & Nassar, J. (1980). The use and abuse of democracy in Islam. In J. L. Nelson & V. M. Green (Eds.), International human rights: Contemporary issues (pp. 61–84). Stanfordville, NY: Human Rights Publishing Group: A division of Earl M. Coleman Enterprises. Nachmanovitch, S., & Said, A. A. (1987). Global thinking: a call for reinvestment in sacred values. The Acorn, March, 13–16. Said, A. A. (1988). Cooperative global politics. The Acorn: A Gandhian Review, 3(2)/4(1), 14–17. Alin, E. G., & Said, A. A. (1988). Arabs and Israelis: changing perceptions and political attitudes. In Y. Lukacs & A. M. Battah (Eds.), The Arab-Israeli conflict: Two decades of change (pp. 370–385). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Said, A. A. (1989). The paradox of development in the Middle East. Futures, 21(6), 619–627. Said, A. A., & Barnitz, L. A. (1990). The dialogue between peace and human rights. Peace Review: The International Quarterly of World Peace, 2(1), 27–31. Said, A. A. (1991). A Middle Eastern peace strategy. Peace Review: The International Quarterly of World Peace, 3(3), 22–26. Said, A. A., & Bangura, A. K. (1991). Ethnicity and peaceful relations. Peace Review: The International Quarterly of World Peace, 3(4), 24–27. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1991). American leadership in a changing world. Swords and Ploughshares: A Chronicle of International Affairs, 1(1), 22–24. Said, A. A. (1992). American pragmatism: its leaders, history, and impact upon America. In M. Dahbi, N. Tahri, and T. Miller, American Studies in North African universities: An interdisciplinary approach. Rabat: Editions Guessons. Said, A. A. (1992). Islamic fundamentalism and the West. Mediterranean Quarterly 3(4), 21–36.

90

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A. (1993). Beyond geopolitics: ethnic and sectarian conflict elimination in the Middle East and North Africa. In P. Marr & W. H. Lewis (Eds.), Riding the tiger: The Middle East challenge after the Cold War (pp. 163–185). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tyson, B., & Said, A. A. (1993). Human rights: a forgotten victim of the Cold War. Human Rights Quarterly, 15(3), 589–604. Said, A. A. (1994). A Middle East peace strategy. In R. Elias & J. Turpin (Eds.), Rethinking peace (pp. 166–172). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Said, A. A. (1996). Islam and development. In J. Danecki, J. Krycki, & D. Markowska (Eds.), Insights into maldevelopment: Reconsidering the idea of progress. Warsaw: The University of Warsaw. Said, A. A., & Hubers, P. (1996). The convergence of global nonviolence in the Middle-East. International Journal of Nonviolence, 3, 182–194 Said, A. A., & N. C. Funk. (1996). The Middle East and United States foreign policy: Searching for reality. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 3(3), 27–37. Said, A. A. (1999). Rihani’s spirituality unites precept and practice. In N. Oueijan, A. Eid, C. Kfoury, & D. Salamit (Eds.), Kahlil Gibran & Ameen Rihani: Prophets of Lebanese-American literature (pp. 221–227). Louaize, Lebanon: Notre Dame University Press, 1999. Said, A. A. (2001). The whole world needs the whole world. Kosmos: Journal for Global Transformation, 1(2), 5–6, https://www.kosmosjournal.org/article/thewhole-world-needs-the-whole-world/ Abu-Nimer, M., Said, A. A., & Prelis, L. S. (2001). Conclusion: the long road to reconciliation. In M. Abu-Nimer, Reconciliation, justice, and coexistence: Theory and practice (pp. 339–348). London: Lexington Books. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2001). Islamic revivalism: a global perspective. In P. M. Mische & M. Merkling (Eds.), Toward a global civilization?: The contribution of religions (pp. 308–330). New York: Peter Lang Publishing. Said, A. A. (2002). A framework for Muslim-American dialogue. The Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2002). The role of faith in cross-cultural conflict resolution. Peace and Conflict Studies, 9(1), 37–50. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2003). Making peace with the Islamic world: an alternative strategy for achieving national security. Peace Review, 15(3), 339–347. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2003). Peace in Islam: an ecology of the spirit. In R. C. Foltz, F. M. Denny, & A. Baharuddin (Eds.), Islam and ecology: A bestowed trust (pp. 155–183). Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard Divinity School.

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

91

Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kunkle, L. M. (2003). Cross-cultural conflict resolution. In N. Kittrie, R. Carazo, & J. R. Mancham (Eds.), The future of peace in the twenty-first century (pp. 1028–1034). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Said, A. A. (2004). Understanding peace through Rihani’s spirituality. In N. C. Funk & B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: A pioneering call for Arab-American understanding (pp. 113–119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2004). Introduction: Ameen Rihani’s imagination liberation movement. In N. C. Funk & B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: A pioneering call for Arab-American understanding (pp. xvii–xx). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A. (2005). Achieving peace: The whole world needs the whole world. In Prince Nikolaus von und zu Liechtenstein & C. M. Gueye (Eds.), Peace and intercultural dialogue (pp. 235–251). Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter. Said, A. A. (2006). Bridges, not barriers: The American dream and global community, Essay Number 1 in the “Essays on exploring a global dream” series. Kalamazoo, MI: The Fetzer Institute. Said, A. A. (2006). Peace as a human right: Toward an integrated understanding. In J. Mertus & J. W. Helsing (Eds.), Human rights and conflict: Exploring the links between rights, law, and peacebuilding (pp. 129–149). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O. III., & Funk, N. C. (2006). “For the need for new thinking,” International Journal of Peace Studies, 11(2), 105–120. Said, A. A. (2009). Educating for global citizenship: Perspectives from the Abrahamic traditions. In M. Ma’oz (Ed.), The meeting of civilizations: Muslim, Christian and Jewish (pp. 177–186). Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press. Said, A. A. (2009). Journey toward world community. Kosmos, 8(2), 10–11. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: An agenda for sustainable peacemaking. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2010). Toward a global community: Sufism and world order. Religious Studies and Theology, 29(1), 93–107. Jafari, S., & Said, A. A. (2011). Islam and peacemaking. In S. A. Nan, Z. C. Mampilly, & A. Bartoli (Eds.), Peacemaking: From practice to theory, vol. 1 (pp. 228–243). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International.

92

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

3.3 Selected Non-Peer Reviewed Publications Said, A. A. (1961, Nov. 6). Caught in the cross-fire at Bizerte. The New Republic: A Journal of Opinion, 145(19), Issue 2453, 13–18. Said, A. (1981). As old order dies, pangs precede birth of new global politics. American: Magazine of The American University, Winter, 8–9. Said, A. A. (1983). All nations are developing nations. Global Futures Digest, 1(1), 18–19. Said, A. A., & Turner, E. (1986). Beyond Lebanon: 4: The West and Islam: Need for a dialogue. New Directions: The Howard University Magazine, 13(3), 33–36. Said, A. A., & Turner, E. (1986). Western arrogance, Islamic fanaticism, and terrorism. Breakthrough, 8(1–2), 28–31. Said, A. A. (1988). A note about language: What do we mean by “Third World” and “developing”? Breakthrough, 10(1), 44. Said, A. A. (1988). Tawhid: The Sufi tradition of unity. Creation, 4(4), 24–25, 39. Said, A. A. (1989). The Islamic context for human rights. Breakthrough, Winter/Spring, 39–41. Said, A. A. (1990). Crisis in the Gulf: Opportunities for conflict resolution. Capital Area Peace Studies Chronicle, 2(1), 1–2. Said, A. A. (1990). U.S. Middle East policy: Outdated premises in a new strategic context. The Return, June/July, 18–20. Said, A. A. (1994). “Is the U.N. Ready for the World? Is the World Ready for the U.N.?” U.N. Vision, November/December, 3–6. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1994). The problem of development in Muslim countries. Fellowship, May/June, 6–7. Said, A. A. “Cultural Diversity: The Whole World Needs the Whole World,” American Senator, 10(2), May 1995, pp. 7–8. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). Conflict resolution and spirituality: Reflections on teaching, theory, and practice. The Fourth R, 74(1), 4–6. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1998). Islam and the West: Three stories. In S. T. Hunter (Ed.), The future of Islam-West relations: A CSIS Islamic Studies conference report (pp. 9–18). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Said, A. A. (2000). Memorandum to: The next president from: Abdul Aziz Said re: Islam and democracy. Middle East Insight, November-December, 58, 74. Awad, M., & Said, A. A. (2001). The road to Arab-Israeli peace. Tikkun, 16(1), 13–14.

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

93

Said, A. A. (2005). Growing global citizens. Shift: At the Frontier of Consciousness, 8(20), 21–23.

3.4 Selected Media Articles and Editorials Said, A. A. (1969, February 2). Our Mideast policy is archaic colonial. The Washington Post, Outlook page B1. Said, A. A. (1977, April 6). For the record: from a speech by Prof. Abdul A. Said at the conferring of an honorary degree on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by American University. The Washington Post. Said, A. A. (1986, August 3). No: Violence no solution to terrorism. Special to The Sentinel. The Orlando Sentinel (pp. H-1, H-4). Lukacs, Y., & Said, A. A. (1991, August 13). Middle East: A constructive vision of the future is still lacking. International Herald Tribune. https://www.nytimes.com/ 1991/08/13/opinion/IHT-middle-east-a-constructive-vision-of-the-future-is-still-lac king.html Said, A. A. (1993, July 28). Islam for solidarity of people. Special to Riyadh Daily. Riyadh Daily. Said, A. A. (1993, September 5). The Jericho exchange: to promote peace, the U.S. must sacrifice the profits of war. The Washington Post. Said, A. A., & Cotton, T. (1993, December 14). Shared Arab-Israeli vision needed. Riyadh Daily, 7. Said, A., & Drake, L. (1996, September 6). Lebanon first, Syria last? Netanyahu’s flawed policy. Weekend Review, 11–12. Said, A. A. (2003, September 14). Transforming Arab-American discourse. Al Hayat (London). Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. M. (2003, September 26). The American concept of security. Al Hayat (London). Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2003, November 12). Give the Syrians creative choices. The Philadelphia Inquirer. Said, A. A. (2004, March 25). Peace and democracy: Arab talking points for Tunis. The Daily Star: Regional Edition. https://studylib.net/doc/13884845/peace-and-dem ocracy--arab-talking-points-for-tunis Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2004, August 24). Muqtada al-Sadr, dramatist. The Philadelphia Inquirer.

94

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2004, August 30). The ghosts of old revolutions. Al Hayat (London). Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2004, November 2). Losing the Cold War, one election at a time. The Daily Star (Beirut). https://studylib.net/doc/13884853/losing-the-coldwar--one-election-at-a-time Said, A. A. Common ground: What Arabs, Israelis found in Madrid. Special to The Sentinel. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2005, April 12). Beyond the democracy debate: Time to make decisions. Al Hayat (London). Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2005, May 6). The “road map” is dead: Here are some ways to resurrect it. The Daily Star (Beirut). Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2005, January 28). A late revision can help Iraq’s election. The Daily Star (Beirut). Said, A. A., & Jensen, B. (2006, February 9). Islam and the West trapped in lies told about each other. The Philadelphia Inquirer, A19. Said, A. A., & Zanotti, J. (2006, July 10). What happened to land of the brave? The Philadelphia Inquirer. Said, A. A., & Zanotti, J. (2006, August 18). New space for Arab public life. The Philadelphia Inquirer.

3.5 Selected Speeches and Presentations Said, A. A. (1979, March). Democracy as a goal of American foreign policy. Presented at the 20th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Said, A. A. (1979, May 24). Political concepts in an Arab context. Presented at the Second Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1980, July 20–24). Transformation in Sufi perspectives. Presented at the First Global Conference on the Future. Sponsored by the Third General Assembly of the World Future Society and the Fifth Annual Conference of the Canadian Future Society. Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Said, A. A. (1981, October). Memorial on the death of Anwar Sadat. Kay Spiritual Auditorium, American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1982, July). Development as seen from a cooperative perspective. Presented at the Fourth General Assembly, World Future Society. Washington, D.C.

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

95

Said, A. A., & Sister Paulette, S. C. (1982, September) Global arms sales: Development or under-development? Panel presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Denver, CO. Said, A. A. (1986, November 15–17). Converging, paradigmatic nonviolence in the Middle East. Presented at Conference on Nonviolent Political Struggle. Amman, Jordan. Al-Muhanna, I., & Said, A. A. (1987, September 5). Conducting social science research in the Middle East: a proposed outline. Presented at the American Political Science Association Convention. Barnet, L., Pendergrass, J., Koulik, S., & Said, A. A. (1989, February 24–26). Development structures. In J. R. Stewart (Ed.), Structures for peace convocation: Summary of proceedings. A working conference to explore global security initiatives for the 1990’s. Washington, D.C.: World Federalist Association. Said, A. A. (1992, July 13–15). Trends in conflict resolution. Conflict Resolution Conference. United States Institute of Peace. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1994, February 4). A Sufi response. Religion and world order: Proceedings of the Symposium on Religion and Global Governance. Sponsored by The Religion Council of Project Global 2000. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1994, May 3–4). Political and cultural issues. Presented at “North Africa: Current Trends and Policy Challenges” (International Symposium organized by The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in collaboration with The Government of Tunisia). Tunis, Tunisia. Said, A. A., & Safa, O. K. (1994, May 3–4). Development through reconciliation in North Africa. Presented at “North Africa: Current Trends and Policy Challenges” (International Symposium organized by The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in collaboration with The Government of Tunisia). Tunis, Tunisia. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1994, October 22). Is the world ready for the U.N.? Is the U.N. ready for the world? Keynote address, “The United Nations in a Changing Global Environment,” Fifth Annual Global Community Day Symposium. United Nations Association of the National Capital Area. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1995, November 6). Thoughts presented at Meeting on Religious Persecution. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1996, December 6), Islam: Peace and reconciliation. Remarks on the occasion of the announcement of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace. American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1997, April 10). State of the discipline: Teaching international affairs. Guest lecture delivered at Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Political Science Department, Howard University. Washington, D.C.

96

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A. (1997, August 3–5). Conflict resolution in the Middle East. Lecture at First Annual Student Symposium on International Relations: The New World Order in Europe, the Middle East, and the Developing World. Institute for Conflict Resolution Studies. Brussels, Belgium. Said, A. A. (1997, August 13). The nature of conflict in the Middle East and prospects for peace. Panel presented at the United States Institute of Peace. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1997, November 5). Globalization: Social and cultural shifts. Panel presented at the Institute of International Education. New York, NY. Said, A. A. (1997, November 13). Our debt to the past and our responsibility to the future. Lecture delivered at the School of International Service’s 40th Anniversary Dinner honoring Professor Said for his 40 years of service to the American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1997, December 8). Psycho-social situation of the Middle East and Arab Africa. Lecture delivered at the Inter-American Defense College. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1997, May 4). Understanding revivalism: The case of Islam in global perspective. Presented to Global Education Associates for the May 1997 Symposium on Religion and World Order, sponsored by Global Education Associates with the Maryknoll Center for Mission Research and Study and Fordham University’s Institute on Religion and Culture, Maryknoll, NY. Said, A. A. (1998, March 5–6). Keynote address delivered at the 22nd Annual UNIS/UN Student Conference, “Civil Conflicts: Global Consequences and Concerns.” New York City. Said, A. A. (1998, August 17–18). Ameen Rihani’s spirituality: Unity in diversity. Prepared for the First International Conference on Lebanese-American Literary Figures “Kahlil Gibran and Ameen Rihani: Prophets of Lebanese-American Literature.” Notre Dame University-Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1998, June 30). Islam and the West: Three stories. Prepared for the Conference on “The Future of Islam-West Relations” in response to the question: “Is Islam inherently incompatible with Western civilization?” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., & Sharify-Funk, M. (1998, November 6). “Islam and the West: Beyond confrontation, toward complementarity” keynote address delivered at “Two Sacred Paths, Christianity and Islam: A Call for Understanding” conference. Washington National Cathedral. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., & Sitka, B. (1998, December 4). “Universal Declaration of Human Rights 50th Anniversary Symposium.” American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1999, January 20). Can the U.S. redefine its national security to lead to international common security? Panel presented at Building a Peace System for the

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

97

21st Century: Abolishing War, Poverty and Racism. George Washington University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (1999, April 30–May 4). Islamic concepts of peace. Lecture delivered at the first International World Religions and Peace Conference. Nicosia, Cyprus. Said, A. A. (1999, November 2). Challenges to leadership in an independent world: Diversity and conflict resolution. Panel presented at the Institute of International Education. New York, NY. Said, A. A. (1999, November 14–16). Islamic conceptions of peace. Lecture delivered at Religious Bridges to Peace in the 21st Century. Point Loma Nazarene University. San Diego, CA. Said, A. A., Goodman, L. W., & Ghareeb, E. (2000, April 17–18). The Kurds: Search for identity: An international conference. Center for Global Peace and Mustafa Barzani Scholar of Global Kurdish Studies. American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2001, September 11). Remarks made at the Teach-In for the American University. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2001). The role of faith in cross-cultural conflict resolution. Presented at the European Centre for Common Ground. Brussels, Belgium. Said, A. A. (2002, March 9). The whole world needs the whole world: From religious to spiritual politics in the 21st century. The World Meeting of Religions and Cultures. Sponsored by the Cultural Foundation of the Holy Monastery of Cyprus in cooperation with Panteion University. Nicosia, Cyprus. Said, A. A. (2002, March 19). The whole world needs the whole world: Establishing a framework for a dialogue of civilizations. Assad Library in Damascus, Syria. Said, A. A. (2002, October 10–11). What makes a strong leader?: The power of the 99 names. Democratic Principles Working Group Conference. Wilton Park, England. Said, A. A. (2002, October 14–15). Beyond static images, toward Abrahamic dialogue. Presented at the Abrahamic Trialogue Conference at the United States Institute of Peace. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2003, June 12–13). What went wrong?: Reconciling American historical legacy and the Middle East. The Center for the Study of the Presidency Conference. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2003, September 11). Ensuring free press and improving media communications in Iraq. The Center for the Study of the Presidency. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2003, September 25–28). A dialogue on healing. On the Frontiers of Social Healing: An International Learning Community. Nicosia, Cyprus.

98

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A. (2003, October 4). Contemporary Islamic synthesis. Introductory remarks for the Contemporary Islam Conference in Alexandria Governorate, Egypt at the Library of Alexandria. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2005, July). Islam and democracy. Presented at Year of Pericles: Democracy, Ancient Drama, Contemporary Tragedy. Delphi, Greece. Said, A. A. (2005, September 26–27). From competition to cooperation: Redirecting the American dream towards a global community. Presented at Fetzer Institute forum on the American Dream. Kalamazoo, MI. Said, A. A. (2007, April 28). Making peace with Islam. Keynote speech presented at Conflict and Resolution Institute Gala. University of Denver. Denver, CO. Said, A. A. (2008, September 16). Peace in Islam. Keynote speech presented at iftar celebrating the holy month of Ramadan. United States Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C. Said, A. A. (2009). Localizing peace. Presented at Al-Azhar and the West: The scope and governing principles of dialogue. Al-Azhar University, Alexandria, Egypt. Said, A. A. (2009, October 14). A paradigm of spiritual engagement. Presented at Building an Alliance of American Contemplatives. Osprey Point Retreat Center, Maryland. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2010, February 21). Islamic-Western peacemaking: Partnerships for a better world. Prepared for A New Beginning: UW-Muslim Relations Workshop at Yale Divinity School. Plenary Session III: Search for Common Ground and Partnerships for a Better World. New Haven, CT. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2011, February 8). Islam and Western peacemaking: Partnerships for a better world. Distinguished Lecture in International Affairs. Prepared for Wheatley Institute, Brigham Young University. Provo, UT.

3.6 Selected Reports and Memos Said, A. A. (1969, April 26). Education for what? Address dedicated to Richard Eurich and Edward Feinberg. Said, A. A. (1986, April). Decontaminating development: A call for a new world intellectual order. Washington Chapter Report, Society for International Development Newsletter. Awad, M. E., & Said, A. A. (1992, March). Syrian and American understanding: Plan and strategy. Proposal sponsored by Wafic R. Said, Said Trust, SA. Washington, D.C.: Nonviolence International.

3 Bibliography of the Works of Abdul Aziz Said

99

Mardin, S., Pasha, M., & Said, A. A. (1996, March 28). Thoughts on Islam and United States foreign policy. Prepared for Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to the President. Washington, D.C.: The White House. Said, A. A. (2001, November 2). Action memo: Communicating the US message abroad. Prepared for Charlotte Beers, Under Secretary, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Said, A. A. (2001, November 14). To: State Department, Office of Religious Freedom From: Strategic Coordinating Islamic Roundtable Group Re: Suggested Recommendations for Islamic Roundtable. Said, A. A. (2001, November 28). To: Secretary of State Colin Powell Re: Need for in-house expertise on Islam in the State Department. Said, A. A. (2001, November 28). To: Secretary of State Colin Powell Re: Proposals for peace. Said, A. A. (2001, November 30). To: Nina Shoucraii-Rees, Office of the Vice President, Domestic Policy Re: Domestic policies toward American Muslims and Arabs. Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (2002). Islamic approaches to conflict resolution and peace (Occasional Paper No. 48). Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Said, A. A., & Bangura, K. (2003). The world of Islam: County-by-country profiles. London, UK: Pearson Publishing. Said, A. A., & Kunkle, L. (2003). Reconciling America’s historical legacy and the Middle East: An initiative: Strengthening U.S.-Muslim communications (pp. 180– 186). Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency. Said, A. A. (2012, June 7). Compassion and youths in foster care. Submitted to National Youth Advocate Program. Matteson, IL.

3.7 Selected Video and Media Links Celebrating 30 Years of Nonviolence International: Professor Abul Aziz Said, March 23, 2020, https://www.nonviolenceinternational.net/abdul_aziz_said Celebration of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace, Dr. Abdul Aziz Said, March 19, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azdrl_inRqc&list=PLk5rsCy6 KcBp6XYM5f1GmlUU31Of-d7rK&index=5

100

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

“Contextualizing Politics” (lecture), Bulgarian Embassy, Sponsored by the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, February 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= v8XiCE4eoh0 “Islamic-Western Peacemaking: Partnerships for a Better World – Abdul Aziz Said,” sponsored by the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young University, February 8, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJ3oVzNbNRs Kaitie Catania, “SIS’s Peace Legend: Abdul Aziz Said,” American University, January 9, 2018, https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20180501-siss-peace-legendabdul-aziz-said.cfm “Political Transition in Iraq” (moderator), C-SPAN, February 18, 2014, https://www. c-span.org/video/?317834-1/political-transition-iraq “What Peace Will Look Like” (lecture), sponsored by the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, September 29, 1994, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O67hgz PPcsc “Winning (or Losing) Hearts and Minds?” (panel discussion), The Wilson Center, July 9, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/dialogue-program/winning-or-losinghearts-and-minds

Part II

Selections from Abdul Aziz Said’s Writings

Chapter 4

Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

If measured from the time of his doctoral studies in the mid-1950s to the year of his retirement in 2015, Abdul Aziz Said’s academic career spanned six decades. He lived through, engaged, and responded intellectually to profound changes in the world: • from the McCarthy era and paranoia about Communist infiltration to the post-9/11 era of foreign wars and widespread anxiety about Islam; • from the civil rights, women’s rights, and anti-Vietnam War activism of the 1960s to the Black Lives Matter movement; • from the decolonization of Africa to the post-Cold War dissolution of the Soviet Union; • from political enthusiasm for economic globalization to the onset of reactionary populist backlash; • from Arab nationalist revolutionary movements seeking liberation and change to the rise of Islamic movements and eventually the Arab Spring. Along the way, Said witnessed a series of military coups in Syria, multiple ArabIsraeli and post-Arab Spring wars, and major shifts in U.S. diplomatic and military engagement with the Middle East region. In the international relations field, Said engaged intellectually not just with political realists, liberals, traditionalists, and positivists, but also with post-positivists and several generations of peace researchers. Throughout this journey, Said found himself challenging mainstream approaches, with the intent to not merely critique dominant paradigms but also to advance a new and more inclusive agenda. At times this took form as a critique of culturebound assumptions or of tendencies toward methodological purism that, in his view,

Nathan C. Funk is Associate Professor at University of Waterloo; Email: [email protected]; and Meena Sharify-Funk is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University; Email: msharifyfunk@ wlu.ca.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_4

103

104

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

distracted scholars from more important tasks: grappling with the substance of critical political issues, comprehending the complex and contextual nature of politics in different world regions, and reflecting on vital questions related to human dignity, survival, and betterment. Convinced that scholarship in the social sciences is inevitably animated by normative societal purposes, Said concerned himself with research and writing in the service of a more egalitarian and less colonially imbalanced world order, and insisted that basic questions like “politics for what?” should take priority over methodological debates. Said’s agenda as a social scientist was avowedly humanistic, in the sense that it was oriented towards human flourishing, skeptical of technocratic futures, and confident that intellectual analysis could support more just, nonviolent, and sustainable choices. Although this agenda was consistent throughout his career, Said was also responsive to changing issues and willing to develop and refine his central concepts. He readily took on new issues over time, from challenging the waste and danger inherent in nuclear deterrence to supporting political self-determination in the Global South , to rethinking the value-driven cultural logic of development. He did not, however, see these concerns as separate from one another. During the second half of his career, when promoting International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) as a field of studies at American University, he perceived it as a new way of doing international relations and not merely as a subfield of a larger discipline. Considered as a pioneer of peace, intercultural dialogue, and cooperative global politics, Said’s contributions lie less in a specific, narrowly focused area of research than in his overall example of engaged and dynamic scholarly activity. Although there are some who might fault him for refusing to “settle” upon a singular area of specialization, a careful analysis of his contributions reveals both an overall stability of vision and an impressively dynamic ability to unfold diverse elements of that vision over time. More of an academic explorer than a scholar inclined to the settled life of a singular thematic homestead, Said manifested a pioneer spirit throughout the many forays of his intellectual career. Persistently concerned with “what to think about next,” he intentionally sought to utilize the privilege of his academic position creatively – to look ahead, identify uncharted issue areas and territories, and map themes calling for further investigation. In these endeavors of exploration, however, he did not travel alone, but rather sought to assemble teams of established and budding scholars to join him in collaborative work – whether this was convening a conference on an innovative topic, contributing new and original papers to an edited volume, or producing conference papers or op-eds. For Said, this collaborative mode of scholarly activity – generating joint publications at a rate similar to his single-author productions – was a way of promoting ideas, training young scholars, and exercising leadership. Although such an approach is less conventional in the social sciences and humanities than in the physical sciences, Said embraced it as a creative process that reflected both his personal training (his first book was co-authored with a more senior scholar, Charles O. Lerche, Jr.) and the cooperative ethos he promoted. Working in such a manner also increased the number of fresh ideas and inspirations he was able to pursue and explore.

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

105

Said’s cumulative output – measured in terms of books, book chapters, and journal articles as well as conference papers, op-eds, and policy proposals – was impressive, and covered a broad range of topics. It is arguable that his works anticipated some highly contemporary trends in international studies – for example, by encompassing angles of critique that align with decolonial and postmodern scholarship as well as with critical security studies; by pointing to the rising salience of identity, culture, and religion in world politics long before the themes became mainstream; by underscoring the value of scholarship that is transparent about its normative priorities; and by embracing non-Western perspectives on projects such as development and peacebuilding. At the same time, he was among the first members of the International Studies Association (ISA) and was engaged with leading scholars and theorists of international relations when the field was still considered new. He was honored with a Distinguished Scholar Award by the Peace Studies Section of the ISA in 2014 in an event that also recognized the contributions of influential scholar-practitioner John Paul Lederach. As the biographical chapter in this volume notes, Said was also a public intellectual and an advocate who did not see academic work as siloed off from larger social and political processes. As a close observer of policymaking and a participant in public diplomacy activities who took interest in what could be learned from conversations with officials, diplomats, and military officers, he saw debates on policy as dynamic and potentially subject to the influence of new ideas and relationships. He also engaged with practitioners outside government, as well as with activist students and alumni, and served on the boards of NGOs and educational organizations. Living in Washington, D.C. and traveling widely put him in contact with diverse audiences, providing rich experiences that complemented his academic training and research. He never lost sight, however, of what might be learned from meaningful exchanges with everyday people – for example, a Syrian taxi driver or a university custodian – and in the classroom he would often share wisdom he had gleaned from such “ordinary” sources. Said’s broad experiences and varied social connections no doubt heightened his interest in writing for the public as well as for other scholars. The op-eds (in North American and Arab newspapers), magazine articles, and policy thought pieces in his bibliography are a testament to his conviction that multiple varieties of output have value for shaping the landscape of ideas. His engagement with practitioners and the wider public also contributed to his creative processes for academic writings. It is incontestable that Said’s identity as an Arab-American played a major role in shaping the content of his scholarship. Formative experiences within Syrian Arab and French cultural contexts, as well as in America, helped to ensure that he could always view the horizons of world politics from more than one perspective. His multiple socialization experiences also gave him a heightened awareness of underlying assumptions and worldviews. Likewise, lived experience of revolutionary turmoil and war deepened his understanding of peace and conflict issues. Being a visible minority in racially segregated and polarized American contexts also gave him a keen sensitivity to outsider perspectives.

106

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

A close reading of Said’s works reveals not only a rich diversity of themes, but also patterns of connection and consistency as well as development of key thoughts over time. Although his later writings manifest ideas that were not present in his earliest publications, there are clear connections between where he started (highlighting the political emergence of the non-West) and the destination to which his intellectual journey led (a call for dialogue, complementarity, and cooperation across cultures). Throughout his career, he challenged conventional wisdom, invited a conceptual and philosophical retooling of international relations, offered commentary on U.S. foreign policy, mapped trajectories of social change movements as well as changes in the landscape of world politics, and explored normative horizons such as peacemaking, intercultural dialogue, and spirituality. He blazed new trails, but in ways that are patterned, coherent, and connected rather than random. The breadth and diversity of Said’s writings, together with the presence of variations on certain recurring themes, made the selection process challenging. Our central goal, however, has been to produce a collection of writings that reveals not just the substantive range of his thought and research, but also the unfoldment of his thinking over time in various key thematic areas. In addition, while we have often given priority to academic publications such as books, book chapters, and journal articles, we have also chosen to share writings that reflect other aspects of his journey as a scholar, publicly engaged thinker, and teacher – writings that illuminate key aspects of his worldview and his manner of engaging multiple audiences. Our organization of Said’s writings proceeds along both thematic and chronological lines, with each of the next six chapters picking up a key subject area of Said’s thought and then following the development of his ideas about that subject in a loosely chronological manner. Chapter 5 offers a collection of writings from the beginning of Said’s career, demonstrating early lines of thinking during the 1960s, including distinctive emphases in formative writings that provided a baseline for further scholarly work. Chapter 6 highlights a range of different contributions during the 1970s that are collectively related to the idea of a world passing through a time of rapid transition. Chapter 7 offers selections from writings produced between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s on themes related to human dignity, cooperation, and peace. Middle East politics is the theme of Chap. 8, with selections chosen to represent the range of Said’s contributions from the early 1970s through the 1990s. Chapter 9 offers a sampling of writings from 2001 through 2009 on the subject of “Making Peace with Islam,” while Chap. 10 covers writings from the late 1980s until his retirement, on interrelated themes of dialogue, spirituality, and transformation.

4.1 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics Chapter 5, “Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics,” features chapters and articles published by Abdul Aziz Said in the 1960s. These selections highlight his engagement with classical International Relations thinking, the development of his unique perspective on the field, and an early articulation of his vision of international

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

107

relations as a cultural activity that involves a search for consensus as well as more competitive dynamics. Said’s first published book, Concepts of International Politics (Lerche/Said 1963), was a collaboration with Charles O. Lerche, Jr. This successful textbook was directly relevant to Said’s teaching in the School of International Service, and evolved over time through three subsequent editions. The third and fourth editions, published in 1979 and 1995 respectively, took on the expanded title, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective (Lerche/Said 1979; Said et al. 1995). Although later editions expanded treatment of new substantive issues, the foundational conceptual orientation of the text remained consistent with the original, 1963 edition, from which four selections have been extracted. The selections presented here are intended to convey enduring themes in Said’s scholarship, with its emphasis on the constitutive role of considerations related to values and morality in both domestic and international politics. Throughout his long career, Said would frequently return to this understanding of the political in a wide range of different writings. The first selection, “The Nature of Foreign Policy” (5.1.1), is notable for its clear placement of values and morality at the center of political analysis. In taking this stance, Said and co-author Charles O. Lerche Jr. advanced a framework that ran counter to predominant trends of thought, which were more narrowly interest-based, increasingly focused on themes of coercive power, and often inclined to privilege formal models over analytical and normative engagement with specifically political concerns. Later writings by Said on themes ranging from Islam and democracy to the bases of international cooperation would invoke central ideas about politics that were first expressed in the Concepts text: the role of social values, the nature of political community, the irreducible dynamism of historical and political processes, and the imperative of aspiring toward consensus on key norms required to secure human well-being. In the next passage from Concepts of International Politics, “Limitations on State Action” (5.1.2), Said and Lerche explore the theme of morality and international politics in a manner that renders problematic certain assumptions of the “political realist” school of thought, which had become increasingly influential in the study of foreign policy decision-making amid intense competition of the early Cold War era, and had been used to rationalize increasing reliance on nuclear deterrence. While acknowledging genuine tensions between personal morality and demands made by modern states, the authors nonetheless refuse to accept the tendency among many analysts to minimize the significance of these moral frictions or to insist on analyzing the logic of power politics in its own terms. Rather than underscore and construe as inevitable the instances in which the foreign policy of a state diverges from the internal moral consensus of society, the authors assert that the moral context of a society constitutes an important constraint on foreign policy decisions. In a similar manner, the gradual emergence of areas of moral consensus on the international plane represents a potential source of constraint on state action, and a mitigating force in a world still impacted by nationalist rivalries and ideological divides. “[T]he logic of technology and the evolving mutual awareness of more and more men,” the authors

108

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

conclude, “have combined to make moral judgments again relevant to the course of international politics” (Lerche/Said 1963: 175). This content on morality and international politics is followed by a brief excerpt on the role of international law in constraining and shaping state action. The selected passages communicate themes that are familiar in scholarship on international relations, albeit with distinctive emphases that a reader can find threaded through Said’s future works as well. One such emphasis is the analytical choice to highlight changing conditions and realities of international relations, together with a commensurate requirement for dynamic thinking in the field of international law and in other areas. Another distinctive emphasis concerns the weight given to moral considerations and evolving international norms, and to the importance of consensus as a principle governing global politics. While acknowledging the limitations of international law and other normative systems, as well as the centrality of interest in political relations, Said and Lerche point to the manner in which emergent norms in international relations have a restraining and guiding influence. Furthermore, they signal that this reality is vitally important in efforts to secure peace and prevent the potentially calamitous destruction that might be wrought by modern technology in international warfare. In the following passages, from “War in the Modern World” (5.1.3), Said and Lerche challenge the traditional assumption that war constitutes the “ultima ratio” (final argument) in disputes among states, and argue that advances in technology must fundamentally change thinking about the wisdom and utility of military force (Lerche/Said 1963: 193). The advent of total war, together with the bifurcation of the world into competing Cold War blocs, creates a new reality in international relations. Given the possibility that coercive assertion of state power could produce confrontations escalating into thermonuclear war, there is a need for reliance on new instrumentalities derived from the gradual institutionalization of international consensus. The next item, “The State Form in Transition” (5.1.4), comes from the conclusion of Concepts of International Politics, and reflects a concern with the precarious aspects of the Cold War order that had become highly apparent at the time of publication, in 1963. In this final passage of the volume, Said and Lerche attempt to identify an agenda for international solidarity and collaboration to “cope effectively with the new forces of world politics” (Lerche/Said 1963: 302) understood here to include the potential for mass destruction, the post-colonial emergence of the non-West on the international stage, and “the challenge of communism” (Lerche/Said 1963: 301– 302). The authors call for “[n]ew ways of organizing human effort across national lines” (Lerche/Said 1963: 302); the aim of these innovative efforts must be not just to avoid the very real dangers of a nuclear disaster, but also to enable a “better life on this planet for everyone” (Lerche/Said 1963: 303). The next major selection, “Non-Western Traditions and the Western World” (5.2), was published in the journal Free World Forum (Said 1960). Although to some degree bound by the context of a particular historical moment, the article captures themes that have permeated Abdul Aziz Said’s academic writings throughout his career, and communicates central concerns and perceptions that have motivated his

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

109

scholarship. Conscious of himself as a “non-Western” scholar (having been born in French Mandate Syria) speaking into a Cold War foreign policy conversation (academic as well as political) that objectified the non-West and proceeded on the basis of assumptions that he considered parochial, Said attempted to act as an intellectual mediator or translator who could communicate underlying needs, aspirations for change, and existential realities. In this sense, his response to the realpolitik and ideological discourse of the day was twofold: first, to refocus attention on the internal dynamics of lands that U.S. and Soviet thinkers were inclined to view as a strategic chessboard, and second, to promote movement towards a more genuinely relational conception of international politics, within which culture assumed a prominent role, alongside recognition of power imbalances, colonial legacies, and too-frequently thwarted aspirations for social progress and development. We see Said’s critical engagement with matters of theory and epistemology in the next pair of selections (5.3.1 and 5.3.2), from his edited volume, Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance (Said 1968b). For political science and related social science disciplines, the 1960s was a time of increasing preoccupation with formal approaches to theorizing and with systematically empirical methods inspired by the physical sciences. Although it has now become commonplace to acknowledge that the aspirations of this “behavioral revolution” have been imperfectly realized at best, and can have the effect of depoliticizing politics or failing to appreciate the “constructed” character of social reality, Said was among the early writers offering such critiques, and calling for forms of political analysis that foreground the complex, changing, contextual, and inescapably value-laden nature of political analysis and engagement. In editing and contributing to this volume, Abdul Aziz Said projects his own voice alongside commentaries by other highly influential scholars of the time, including Kenneth W. Thompson, Roger Fisher, Karl W. Deutsch, and Hans J. Morgenthau. The first selection from this text, “Recent Theories of International Relations: An Overview” (5.3.1) communicates Said’s thesis that theories of international relations faced a “crisis of relevance.” While noting potentially creative new directions and trends in the field, he expresses an overriding concern that efforts to make scholarship more systematic and scientific have not enhanced understanding of political phenomena, and have instead been afflicted by problems such as reductionism, methodological formalism, and “failure to encompass human purposes as they are expressed in terms of values and ideologies” (Said 1968b: 22). The second reading from the volume, “The Impact of the Emergence of the Non-West upon Theories of International Relations” (5.3.2), communicates what Said saw as one of the foremost challenges of his time: conceptualizing the significance of the “emergence of the non-West” for international relations theory, and avoiding the imposition of generic theoretical frames that were inadequate for understanding the specific political aspirations and dynamics of particular societies. Citing a tendency for Western-based researchers to misconstrue the meaning of events in non-Western contexts and to impose exogenous models, Said counsels that “one should not approach political research with a model to which the behavior must conform” (Said 1968b: 106).

110

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

As noted in Chap. 1, exploring African political dynamics was a significant part of Said’s scholarly engagement during the 1960s, and a natural extension of his doctoral research on the United Nations Trusteeship Council and global decolonization processes, as well as of his lifelong preoccupation with dynamics related to the emergence and development of non-Western states in international affairs. The two selections from his 1968 book, The African Phenomenon (Said 1968a), provide an introduction to his intellectual critique of Western scholarship on African politics, together with his efforts to offer a more suitable framework for analysis. Although the prefatory comments (5.4.1) note the publication of “many books on Africa… in recent years,” few of these books had been written by scholars of international relations, let alone by political scientists “of non-Western birth” (Said 1968a: vii). Said dedicates himself to overriding questions concerning the adaptation of the international system to African states, and of African states to the Western-created system. Also notable is his call for nuanced attitudes towards African political developments, including willingness to critique abuses of civil and political rights in new African polities – even while challenging the views of those who “see nothing of value coming out of independent Africa” (Said 1968a: viii). In “Africa’s Impact Upon the International System” (5.4.2), Said reflects on major themes of post-colonial African politics, such as anti-colonial and anti-Western nationalism, Cold War neutralism, and a strong emphasis on state-led modernization (often invoked through politically symbolic public works projects). Said questions the frequently made distinction between modernization and Westernization, and suggests that over time incremental Westernization and integration into the international system can be expected, presumably with a corresponding decline in emphasis on African uniqueness (Said 1968a: 157). Said’s exploration of such themes in The African Phenomenon anticipates some of his later writings on development in the 1970s, in which he articulates a somewhat different conclusion – that development paradigms need to accommodate cultural values in a more expansive and contextual manner, and balance modernization with a humanistic perspective on desirable forms of social change. His overall message, however, seeks to counteract pessimism about African political and economic development, contextualize post-colonial dynamics, and affirm the potential for convergence between the global and African state systems.

4.2 A World in Transition The writings selected for Chap. 6, “A World in Transition,” testify to the dynamism of Said’s thinking about global politics during the 1970s. Published writings from this period illustrate a collaborative and boundary-pushing mode of inquiry, driven by an overriding concern to move the international relations field beyond state-centrism and traditional approaches to security, and towards an approach that highlights the roles played by identity groups, transnational processes, economic actors, and revolutionary movements in reshaping the global landscape during an “age of transition” (Said/Collier 1971: 180). Together with various co-editors and with a range of

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

111

fellow scholars who contributed to his volumes, Said articulates an intent to realign theorizing about international politics with complex dynamics of a changing world. Through diverse early contributions in various substantive areas, Said sought to play a role in setting the agenda for an evolving field, by encouraging further investigation into phenomena such as the persistence of ethnicity, the influence of multinational corporations, and the impact of the international drug trade. These writings communicate much about processes of rapid social change that were evident throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, manifesting in revolutionary politics, civil rights struggles, and changes wrought by student activism and anti-Vietnam War campaigns on university campuses. The first selection (“Commentary: Changing Requirements of U.S. Security,” 6.1) has been taken from Said’s introduction to his edited volume, America’s World Role in the 70s (1970). Writing from the premise that traditional security issues were declining in salience due to the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, Said challenges U.S. policy thinkers not to define the national interest in terms that favor maintenance of the international status quo in the face of new issues such as the rise of revolutionary movements. Instead, he calls for the U.S. to embrace the inevitability of change as political currents in formerly colonized regions of the world assert new visions for their societies. The justicecentered values and egalitarian vision that inspired this selection and the volume as a whole are noticeable in the book’s dedication, which expresses gratitude to a custodian at American University. (“For Paul A. Bullock – In appreciation for a job so necessary, so overlooked, and so well done.”) The next two selections, from a book entitled Revolutionism (Said/Collier 1971), continue this line of thinking while delving more deeply into the revolutionary politics of the era – in non-Western settings as well as among various subcultures of Western countries. Though the topic of revolution was not a novel one to political science or to the social sciences more broadly, Said and Collier were convinced that many approaches to the study of revolution privileged methodology over the pursuit of meaning, and failed to speak to the existential realities of a time in which a profound hunger for change had surfaced not just on university campuses in the United States, but also throughout much of the world. The stakes of this historical moment were amplified by the intellectual inertia of the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet geopolitical rivalry, which drove a tendency to apply a security frame to revolutionary movements – particularly in so-called “Third World” countries where the superpowers sought influence. In the preface (6.2.1), introductory chapter (“Revolutionism: An Ideology,” 6.2.2), and concluding chapter (“Directions of Revolutionism,” 6.2.3) of Revolutionism, Said and Collier seek coherence and underlying patterns within the revolutionary mood of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While noting the diversity of revolutionary movements and their origination in specific contexts, the authors also see elements of an overarching ideology of ‘revolutionism’ that is existentially rooted in the human search for relevance, purpose, and faith. Speaking especially to non-Western contexts, they note the widespread emergence of a gap between contemporary experiences and traditional institutions supported by myth. “When man can no longer believe in

112

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

the old,” the authors suggest, “the search for faith becomes a condition in seeking something new to fit his altered or transformed circumstances” (Said/Collier 1971: 4). The result, they argue, is a widespread recourse to new, hybrid ideologies that aspire to novelty as well as authenticity, even while borrowing from Western sources and seeking to rebuild nations on the basis of an ethos that is “antisupremacist, socialist, and nationalist” (Said/Collier 1971: 5). While noting contradictory tendencies and vulnerabilities in revolutionist ideology and movements, Said and Collier nonetheless admonish U.S. policymakers to resist the temptation to take a rigid stance driven by fear of Communist subversion. The conditions driving revolutionary sentiments are likely to persist in much of the globe, and the U.S. should not provoke unnecessary confrontations or define “stability” as an end in itself. The third set of selections (“Theoretical Considerations,” 6.3.1, and “Conclusion,” 6.3.2) have been extracted from Said’s edited volume entitled Protagonists of Change: Subcultures in Development and Revolution (Said 1971b). In this volume, Said seeks to expand upon themes articulated in his studies of revolutionary politics and of U.S. foreign policy objectives, while broadening the framework of analysis to challenge some basic assumptions of prevailing political and economic theories. In “Theoretical Considerations” (6.3.1), Said observes that expectations concerning political and economic development in formerly colonized regions of the world were not being fulfilled. Simultaneously, new behavioral social science methodologies for studying and guiding development were proving unsatisfactory to the task at hand; despite scientific pretensions, those advocating such approaches had nonetheless imported normative assumptions linked to Western experiences. Noting that even in the West, technocratic development models prioritizing economic growth are increasingly subject to criticism on ecological and other grounds, Said proposes decentering the Western experience and placing cultural context and values at the center of development conversations – in effect arguing for what contemporary scholars would refer to as “decolonization” of development programs. In his concluding chapter to Protagonists of Change (6.3.2), Said underscores a theme that recurs in his other writings during this period, concerning the “‘domestication’ of international politics and the internationalization of internal politics for those pluralist societies, such as the United States, that have not acknowledged the internal contradictions of their foreign policies, nor the social sources of these incongruities” (Said 1971b: 174). In the place of the world predicted by traditional theories of international relations, political development, and economic development – a world characterized by greater convergence of experiences across diverse national experiences, together with the emergence or persistence of strong nation-state units – Said envisions a more polycentric world order in which subcultures proliferate and often find common cause across national borders, unsettling the status quo. Said’s investigations during the early 1970s were impressively varied, and yet connected by an underlying focus on the need to reshape international relations theory to acknowledge new forces and changing conditions. The next two selections, 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, were published in a co-edited volume entitled The New Sovereigns: Multinational Corporationsv as World Powers (Said/Simmons 1975). Together with his collaborator Luiz R. Simmons, Said argues that the era of geopolitics is declining,

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

113

and that the growing prominence of multinational corporations (MNCs) is indicative of dynamics in the international system that are not adequately explained by statecentric international relations models. While arguing for a nuanced treatment of the subject matter – MNCs are neither altruistic nor inherently evil, and exert varying forms of influence in different regions of the world – Said and Simmons nonetheless assert that “decision-making by these companies has as much or more impact on the emerging arenas of international conflict and cooperation as do the foreign policy decisions of nations that are receding in significance as actors” (Said/Simmons 1975: v). Selections 6.5.1 (“Introduction”) and 6.5.2 (“The Ethnic Factor in World Politics”) have also been drawn from a collaboration of Said and Simmons, Ethnicity in an International Context (Said/Simmons 1976), an edited volume that explores the role of ethnic groups as actors in world politics. Together with the contributors to the volume, Said and Simmons point to a trend that was regarded as novel and counterintuitive by many political scientists at the time – the political resurgence of ethnic communities and ethnonationalist movements. In traditional international relations thinking, factors such as religion, culture and ethnicity were typically framed as inconsequential or irrational factors, with the homogenizing and rationalizing influence of nation-state actors largely taken for granted. Said and Simmons challenge this presumption, and assert the lasting significance of traditional ethnic identities as well as the emergence of new forms of “neoethnic” behavior even in societies that have successfully achieved a high level of economic development. Positing the search for community as an enduring factor in human behavior and proposing that “our perceptions of international relations and the causes of war and peace lag behind the men and nations we study” (Said/Simmons 1976: 14), Said and Simmons suggest that mass communications and economic change do not inevitably work in favor of the consolidation of nation-state communities and identities, and can even serve to reinforce ethnic identification. In addition, the decline of the nation-state’s ability to assert the primacy of traditional security issues may also contribute to the fragmentation of national consciousness. While making their argument about ethnicity in world politics, Said and Simmons evoke themes present in two other edited volumes produced during this period – Simmons and Said’s Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy: The International Connection (1974), and Said’s Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (1977a; Said 1981, revised edition). Due to considerations of space and overlapping themes, no excerpts from these books have been included in this collection. Ideas explored in the former volume are nonetheless reflected in Said and Simmons’ observation that some ethnically based political struggles become entwined with the international drug trade, and that “prodigious efforts” to suppress drug production and trafficking “are predestined to fail” (Said/Simmons 1976: 31). Furthermore, themes from the latter volume are evoked by Said and Simmons’ hypothesis that “the concept of national interest may become more nebulous and less useful in predicting political behavior” (Said/Simmons 1976: 44). This second assertion anticipates contemporary debates (often informed by postmodernism) about how “national interest” is constituted, and over who speaks as “we” in international affairs. Though the thesis that ethnic politics

114

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

plays a role in defining national interest was contested in the late 1970s, the notion that factors such as ethnic, cultural, or racial identity and activism affect the definition of national policy has become considerably more mainstream among academic analysts in recent decades.

4.3 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace Published from the 1970s through the 1990s, the writings featured in Chapter Seven demonstrate the centrality of concerns related to human dignity in Said’s scholarship, and the ways in which he connected these concerns to the advancement of human rights, the adaptation of development paradigms to cultural contexts, the pursuit of cooperative approaches to global politics, and the strengthening of local peacebuilding practices. The selected materials show Said building upon the framework for understanding global politics he had been formulating in previous decades, and seeking to highlight pathways for constructive social change – pathways that became central to his leadership of the international peace and conflict resolution studies programming he promoted at the School of International Service beginning in the 1980s. Selection 7.1, “Pursuing Human Dignity,” was published as the introductory chapter to Said’s edited volume, Human Rights and World Order (1978). As Said underscores at the beginning of the piece, “Human rights are concerned with the dignity of the individual – the level of self-esteem that secures personal identity and promotes human community” (Said 1978: 1). Seeking to avoid conventional dichotomies positing an inherent opposition between universalist and particularist approaches to human rights, Said manifests a concern for cultural relativity and context while still affirming the importance of rights traditions. In a type of formulation he would use in many subsequent writings, he asserts that the “pursuit of human dignity is universal,” even while also noting that “its form is designed by the culture of a people” (Said 1978: 1). Furthermore, politics is “a cultural activity” shaped by traditions and a specific environment (Said 1978: 1). Concerned both with avoiding cultural imperialism and also with promoting dialogue over different approaches to essential transnational ideas like human rights and democracy, Said intentionally leaves space for differences in his assessment of critical issues. In this particular writing, Said offers analysis of Western human rights themes and traditions, and of contrasting emphases within Marxist and Third World perspectives. He also notes the consequences of the Cold War for human rights in Third World countries, as well as challenges and opportunities inherent in promoting human rights as an American foreign policy value. Said co-authored the next selection, “Development: Goals and Measurements” (7.2), with fellow American University professor Brady Tyson in 1978, as a journal article in the Communications and Development Review (Said/Tyson 1978). Building on his past work underscoring culture as a framework for defining human meaning and value, Said partners with Tyson to present a bold new paradigm for rethinking

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

115

development. Contrary to dominant, materialistic approaches that center gross national product, Said and Tyson’s approach defines the development process in openended, humanistic terms. Development, they suggest, is about how people living communally in particular cultural contexts identify their ideal goals and reorganize themselves to pursue these aspirations. Said and Tyson do not gainsay the benefits of working for modernization and greater efficiency, but stipulate that development programs should not be imposed and must also include “humanization.” Said and Tyson give further definition to these ideas in relation to themes of human rights and democracy in their co-authored article, “Human Rights: A Forgotten Victim of the Cold War” (7.3), first published in Human Rights Quarterly in 1993 (Tyson/Said 1993). Together, they call attention to the manner in which the Cold War prevented the emergence of a holistic and integrated human rights agenda, and invite dialogue over what might be gained from more comprehensive efforts that embrace the core values of competing human rights traditions. Making an argument that often appears in Said’s commentary on Middle East affairs, Said and Tyson differentiate between the substance of democracy and specific forms of democracy such as the U.S. model. “Democracy,” they assert, “is built on participation, not institutions” (Tyson/Said 1993: 603). The fourth selection, “Conclusion: Toward Cooperative Global Politics” (7.4), was published in 1995 within the fourth and final edition of Abdul Aziz Said and Charles O. Lerche’s Concepts textbook, extensively revised through a collaboration of Said with Charles O. Lerche III, who had stepped into the role previously occupied by his father (Said et al. 1995). The chapter begins with an assessment of continuity and change in the post-Cold War world order. The authors note persistent divides of wealth, influence, and power; enduring forces of ethnicity, religious identity, and nationalism (as observed in Said’s prior writings during the 1970s); clearer-thanever ecological challenges; and a prevailing uncertainty about “whether the world is coming together – or falling apart” (Said et al. 1995: 278). Although the prevailing trends are not new, they propose that changes are nonetheless taking place at a global, intersubjective level, as the world’s “first global civilization” slowly takes shape. The authors’ call for a new commitment to ecological, feminist, and spiritual values and efforts to transcend the materialist assumptions that have limited vision within past “left versus right” value polarities. In addition, they enjoin a shift from competitive statist politics towards a model of cooperative global politics enabled by consensus building on critical issues, with the goal of providing public goods and preventing a possible systemic breakdown. Cooperative approaches to building a sustainable world order require a basic ethical foundation of fairness as well as moral leadership and a “new diplomacy” that “sees world politics as a struggle for world peace in the broadest sense that peace is more than an absence of war, but also is the presence of justice and freedom for all” (Said et al. 1995: 288). The final selection in this chapter, “Localizing Peace: An Agenda for Sustainable Peacebuilding” (7.5), is the product of a collaboration between Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk (Funk/Said 2010). This excerpt from a longer journal article highlights themes that were important to Said during his last decade at American University, but which fully reflect his longstanding commitment to the empowerment

116

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

of people in their own cultural contexts. As early contributors to a broader “local turn” in the peacebuilding field, Said and Funk emphasize the importance of engaging dynamically and creatively with cultural traditions as resources that can be “carried forward” in ways that support human dignity and peace. Rather than framing peace and peacebuilding as “expert” processes through which knowledge diffuses from the West to the rest of the world, Said and Funk call for a “mosaic approach to peace” that has many centers of activity and inspiration.

4.4 Middle East Politics As the biographical chapter of this text observes, although Said built his academic career in North America and pursued wide-ranging interests in political science and international relations, he engaged with Middle Eastern realities throughout his career. He regularly traveled to various countries in North Africa and Southwest Asia, kept tabs on events in the region through an extensive range of contacts and personal relationships, and explored timely developments as well as enduring issues in his research. Chapter 8 features writings that capture his longstanding concern for peace and conflict issues in the region, through selections from works published from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s. Collectively, these writings communicate his abiding interest in dynamics of social change and in matters of foreign policy. The first writing, “Clashing Horizons: Arabs and Revolution” (8.1; Said 1971a), was originally a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, and begins with illuminating first-person testimony from Said about how his formative experiences in French Mandate Syria shaped his interest and personal investment in issues of change in Arab countries. He endeavors to explain the lack of meaningful political development and addresses himself to cultural aspects of resistance to change. The second item, “Subcultures in the Arab World” (8.2; Said/Farzanegan 1971) was one of Said’s contributions to his own edited volume, Protagonists of Change: Subcultures in Development and Revolution. The chapter, co-authored with Bahram Farzanegan, focuses attention on three key types of actors that Said recognized as influential subcultures in the Middle East at the beginning of the 1970s: students, the military, and guerrillas. His predictions of further revolutionary activity and instability proved correct, although the ideological form of this activity changed over time in ways that he did not fully anticipate at the time of writing. The next two selections (8.3 and 8.4) are excerpts from public addresses offered during the first half of 1977, on the granting of American University honorary doctorates to King Hussein of Jordan (Said 1977c) and to Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Said 1977b) respectively. In both of these statements, the latter of which was published (in shortened form) in The Washington Post, Said embraces the role of an advocate calling for peace with justice and dignity. Said recognized that his position as a professor at the School of International Service in Washington, D.C. afforded him a platform that could be used not just for analytical observations of Middle

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

117

East politics, but also for citizen diplomacy and other forms of engagement. He was exceptionally well traveled, and frequently lectured within and beyond the region in invited presentations and public diplomacy programs. Despite new efforts to address the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s choice to actively involve the U.S. as a mediating party, the years that followed Said’s ceremonial comments proved highly turbulent. Three unanticipated developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s changed regional dynamics and heightened the stakes of Middle East policy debates: first, the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis following the occupation of the U.S. embassy in November 1979; second, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which began in December 1979, and the subsequent U.S. decision (in conjunction with important regional allies) to actively support armed guerrilla groups, the mujahidin; and third, the escalation and internationalization of the Lebanese Civil War, which brought such consequential events as the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982, the Beirut bombings of the U.S. embassy in April 1983 and of the U.S. Marine barracks (as well as the French paratrooper barracks) in October 1983, and the rise of the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement. Said and co-author Elena Turner respond to this cascade of events in their article, “Western Arrogance, Islamic Fanaticism, and Terrorism” (8.5; Said/Turner 1986) and articulate a number of points that became central to many subsequent writings and statements about Middle East political dynamics. Said and Turner highlight the failure of regional elites to meet the needs and expectations of their peoples, the consequent disillusionment of Arabs and Muslims with Western development models, and the emergence of widespread interest in alternative ideological frameworks that seek to end dependence on foreign cultures and ideologies. They also underscore the negative interaction of Western power (interested in perpetuating the status quo) and movements seeking dignity through revolutionary change, and warn against promoting a spiral of conflict that some contemporary scholars would characterize as mutual radicalization (Moghaddam 2018). “Beyond terrorism,” they suggest, “the West and Islam need to break the cycle of arrogance, which breeds contempt, and fanaticism, which breeds paranoia – the cycle sustaining the flow and currents of terrorism” (Said/Turner 1986: 31). Said delves more deeply into the subject of the Islamic revival and its implications for development models in his 1989 article, “The Paradox of Development in the Middle East” (8.6). The article begins by observing that Middle Eastern leaders are in many respects caught between two visions of development – a vision shaped by Western models that are increasingly rejected by the people (as in the tragic cases of the Shah of Iran and Egypt’s President Sadat), and more assertively Islamic visions that lead to rejection by the West (as in the cases of Khomeini and Qadhafi). Noting that Islamic traditions are deeply rooted in the region, and that the top-down application of Western development models is not generating positive results, Said seeks to clarify key premises of an Islamic framework for development – ideas that might provide additional options beyond a superficial “imitate or reject the West” dilemma (Said 1989: 621). In the process, Said draws upon arguments he has previously made about the nature of the development process and the necessity of

118

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

pursuing development within a cultural as well as humanistic context (see selection 7.2 in Chap. 7, “Development: Goals and Measurements”). Seeing positive potential in creative engagement with values and beliefs that are deeply embedded in Middle Eastern cultural contexts, Said proposes that thoughtful engagement with Islamic sources has the potential to equip Muslim peoples with a vision of social betterment that is not derivative of a contemporary Western worldview, and that meets the criteria of modernization as well as humanization. A 1993 book chapter entitled, “Beyond Geopolitics: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict Elimination in the Middle East and North Africa” (8.7) provides a glimpse of Said’s thinking about Middle East politics in the early 1990s, in the wake of the first Persian Gulf War. Here we see an application of his 1970s scholarship on ethnicity and conflict to the Middle Eastern context, and a broad (albeit abridged for this volume) analysis of patterns across the region. In his suggestions for U.S. policy, Said advises that policymakers eschew maintenance of the status quo in favor of “encouraging the process of change to proceed with minimal violence” (Said 1993: 183). Writing with co-author Nathan Funk, Said offers an interpretation of regional dynamics as well as a critique of the U.S. Middle East posture in the 1996 article, “The Middle East and United States Foreign Policy: Searching for Reality” (8.8). Notable in this article is an underlying concern that the U.S. was failing to adequately support and facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace processes, and perpetuating a “status quo” regional posture informed by a misunderstanding of regional movements and an element of hubris towards Middle Eastern peoples and cultures.1 Said and Funk articulate a concern that this posture is not sustainable, and that processes of change need to be supported if popular currents such as Islamic revivalism are not to drift into narrower and more combative channels. For context, it is important to recognize that Said had already been active for many years promoting Arab-Israeli peacemaking and Palestinian nonviolent activism, within public and citizen diplomacy efforts as well as op-eds in North American and Middle Eastern newspapers. In this article, Said and Funk emphasize how negotiation becomes problematic when the mediating party is implicated in perpetuating a power imbalance, and articulate a concern that “the very real despair of many Arabs and Muslims— particularly of the oppressed and exploited—perpetuates the attractiveness of a fundamentalist alternative which, when marginalized politically or placed under heavy pressure… can give rise to violence” (1996: 36).

1

Said practiced “multiple critique” in his Middle East commentary – distributing responsibility for problems to regional parties as well as to policies of powerful external states such as the U.S., and often devoting more energy to promoting what he saw as positive U.S. policy options than to critiquing past policy choices. However, he had a longstanding concern about the U.S. policies that served to bolster an unsustainable status quo in the region. See, for example, his op-ed entitled “Our Mideast policy is archaic colonial,” published in the Washington Post (1969).

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

119

4.5 Making Peace with Islam In 1996, Abdul Aziz Said became the first occupant of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at American University. Having written on topics related to Islam and Sufism since the 1970s, he now delved more deeply into topics related to Islamic peace studies and Islamic-Western dialogue. His approach to these topics mirrored his past emphasis on the importance of allowing cultural space for nonWestern peoples to articulate their own values and visions, within a broader context of global interaction and dialogue. Such themes are present throughout Chap. 9 and are reflected in writings such as “Introduction: Islamic Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution” (9.1.1), which was published in the anthology, Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice (Said et al. 2001). After challenging notions of exceptionalism that may detract from the study of Islamic approaches to peace, the introductory chapter of this volume (by Said, Funk, and Kadayifci) proposes that Islam possesses not one but several different peace paradigms – including an Islamic version of power politics, a reformist and ecumenical world order paradigm, a conflict resolution paradigm, a framework for the nonviolent pursuit of justice, and a universalist paradigm of spiritual transformation. The transformation paradigm, in which Said held particular interest, relates to the contemplative traditions of Sufism and is the subject of “Peace in the Sufi tradition” (9.1.2, Said/Funk 2001). Said and Funk place particular emphasis on the potential of Sufism to offer a vision of unity and ecological harmony, together with a deeply internalized understanding of peace. As the Islamic Peace Chair, Said convened a number of conferences on themes he regarded as central to peacebuilding in an Islamic context, including an initial conference on Islam and peace in 1996, a conference on cultural diversity in Islam in 1998, and a conference on dynamic approaches to the interpretation and practice of contemporary Islam in 2003. The 2003 conference, convened at the newly completed Library of Alexandria in Alexandria, Egypt, was the source of the paper upon which the “Introduction” (9.2) to the edited volume, Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not Static (Said et al. 2006), was based. Among the key themes of this chapter are the common roots and historical intersections of Islamic and Western cultures; the idea that “Islam is not only a theological doctrine, but also a historical dynamic” (Said et al. 2006: 4); and the premise that “every historical period and cultural milieu has drawn forth a different synthesis of Islamic commandments from the rich texts of Islamic faith and experience” (Said et al. 2006: 9). Characteristically, Abdul Aziz Said sought to practice multiple critique in his writings on subjects such as Islamic-Western relations. Rather than write solely on threats posed by militant Muslim organizations or by errant Western policies, he sought integrative frameworks that highlighted destructive processes of interaction as well as the potential for transforming problematic relationships. “The Need for a New Story” (9.3.1), written with co-author Nathan C. Funk for the book, Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Funk/Said 2009), maps the historical legacy of Islamic-Western relationships using a narrative analysis approach, and outlines three

120

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

types of stories that inform political action – stories of confrontation, of compatibility, and of complementarity. The third story – the story of complementarity – was central to his own mode of engagement, which highlighted the potential gains as well as the transformative potential of intercultural and interreligious dialogue. The excerpt from another chapter in the Islam and Peacemaking book (“Preparing for Peace,” 9.3.2) highlights “choices” facing Americans as well as Muslims navigating the post-9/11 era. Americans, Said proposed, face a choice between two postures towards Muslims – “America the Strong” and “America the Brave.” Muslims, in turn, face choices over how they wish to engage the West and over the extent to which they are willing to nurture the “flowering of the individual” within the context of Muslim communalism (Funk/Said 2009: 243).

4.6 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation Chapter 10 offers a medley of writings from 1988 through 2015, all highlighting the centrality of spirituality in Said’s thinking when addressing topics such as global politics, teaching, human development, and intercultural dialogue. All of these writings underscore the principle that engagement across cultural and national boundaries is vital for humanity today – not just for the purposes of planetary survival but also for the development of the whole human being. Said’s dedication to this premise is reflected in his oft-repeated maxim, “The whole world needs the whole world.” The chapter begins with the 1995 postscript (10.1) to Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective, co-authored by Said and Charles O. Lerche III. This statement deepens the references to spiritual values in the book’s concluding chapter, and invites students of international affairs to reflect on the relevance of nonpartisan spiritual values to the contemporary world situation. Describing spirituality in humanistic terms as “an experience of a sense of unity that overcomes the principle that divides humanity on the bases of religions, races, genders, and classes” (Said et al. 1995, p. 291), Said and Lerche propose that spiritual values – which may or may not be linked to membership in a particular religious community – can speak to “the universal need for transcendence, unity, and justice” (Said et al. 1995, p. 292). Although discussion of spirituality and the pursuit of the public good has become more common in recent years (Horwitz 2011), the invitation to consider such matters marks the fourth edition of Concepts as an unconventional textbook, with authors bold enough to highlight issues of personal meaning that other authors would more often address indirectly. As noted previously, the contemplative traditions of Sufism, understood in a global, ecumenical, and universal context, were central to Said’s spiritual convictions and vision of human flourishing. The second selection in this chapter, from “Tawhid: The Sufi Tradition of Unity” (10.2) offers insight into how Said (1988) understood essential insights and practices of Sufism within the context of advocacy for social change. In this piece, Said cites ego involvement, fixation on results, and excessive attachment to narrowly construed ideals as impediments to productive

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

121

social change work. In the face of such obstacles, spirituality can offer an expanded perspective emerging from inner freedom and heightened awareness of one’s own internal processes. Since his early works in the 1960s, Said’s scholarship contained critical statements concerning the limitations of positivism and the so-called behavioral revolution, which attempted to apply the methods of the behavioral sciences to the study of social phenomena and political processes. In “Complementary Ways of Knowing” (10.3), an unpublished paper written for a presentation to doctoral students at the School of International Service, Said (1996) offers further embellishment of points that occur elsewhere in his writings. Of particular note here is his call for better theory, informed by a deep understanding of the human condition, and for selection of methodologies that are well-suited to exploring particular theoretical questions. “Empirical research,” Said suggests, “should be regarded as the fruit of the theoretical tree, which falls from that tree only when it is ripe, and then grows a new theory. If nutrition is denied to the tree of theory, if its roots are not sunk deeply in rich intellectual, philosophical, and even spiritual ground, the fruit that appears will be sickly and sour. It will not nourish understanding” (1996, p. 5). Said also saw spirituality as an integral part of teaching and mentoring students. His thoughts on this subject, developed in collaboration with Nathan C. Funk, are recorded in “Conflict resolution and spirituality: Reflections on teaching, theory, and practice” (10.4). This essay highlights Said’s convictions concerning the importance of relational pedagogy and dialogical process in education, and his belief that education about peace and conflict resolution should reflect the values being advocated. This education should be empowering and responsive to student insights rather than alienating and indifferent to the dignity, interests, and potential of students (Said/Funk 1996a, b). One Arab thinker who influenced Said’s worldview at an early age was the Lebanese-American public intellectual Ameen Fares Rihani (1876–1940). Selection 10.5, “Understanding Peace through Rihani’s Spirituality” (Said 2004), provides insight into how Said found inspiration in his early 20th century predecessor’s efforts to bridge the divides not just between America and the Arab world but also between East and West. Building bridges was central to Said’s efforts as the Islamic Peace Chair during the first decade of the 21st century, and the next two writings (10.6, “Achieving Peace: The Whole World Needs the Whole World” and 10.7, “Defining Peace: The End of Separation”) explore this theme from various angles. Central to the message is the idea of intercultural dialogue as a vehicle for fostering a more comprehensive vision of peace through intercultural complementarity and personal spiritual development (Said 2005, 2006). The final selection, “Peace: The Inside Story” (10.8), was originally written for a March 19, 2015 festschrift conference (“Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, The Inspiration”) at American University, organized by Abdul Karim Bangura and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. This paper was among Said’s last writings, and contains the most indepth available presentation of his ideas concerning personal spirituality and its relevance to conflict transformation. Said also shares a personal, retrospective account

122

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

of several powerful encounters during his many decades as a teacher, scholar, and practitioner concerned with matters of peace and peacemaking (Said 2015).

4.7 Said’s Enduring Contributions When read collectively, Said’s writings offer fascinating insights not just into his personal intellectual journey, but also into major historical developments and changes in the field of international relations. Said was a witness to these developments and changes, but also an active and prescient contributor to consequential debates and a pioneer of new, leading-edge perspectives. He took risks, and proposed unconventional frameworks for understanding that often anticipated areas of significant intellectual change in later years. He sought to identify consequential forces and new dynamics in a changing world, and invited others to join him in “thinking outside the box.” A multifaceted scholar if ever there was one, Abdul Aziz Said was many things while still being a singular person with a lasting intellectual legacy. He was a former colonial subject who sought to project a vision of how a fully decolonized world might function. A youth who lived through a period of total war in the 20th century, and who invited reflection on the need for comprehensive understandings of “total peace” in the early 21st century. A man from a remote region of rural Syria who challenged American academics and multiple generations of students to appreciate cultural diversity, embrace a “big enough” view of the world, promote internal as well as external disarmament, and cooperate to secure public goods within an emergent global civilization. An Arab born to a Christian family who appeared to move seamlessly among Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and secular academic colleagues, and who cited a 13th century Sufi philosopher as a cherished intellectual influence. A political scientist with ambitions to influence foreign policy frameworks and academic paradigms for development and democracy, while also instilling an ecumenical spiritual vision. A pioneer in peace, intercultural dialogue, and cooperative global politics.

References Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: An agenda for sustainable peacemaking. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. Horwitz, C. (2011). Civil society and spirituality. In M. Edwards (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of civil society (pp. 270–284). New York: Oxford University Press. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1963). Concepts of international politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1979). Concepts of international politics in global perspective, (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

4 Abdul Aziz Said’s Contributions to Scholarship

123

Moghaddam, F. M. (2018). Mutual radicalization: How groups and nations drive each other to extremes. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Said, A. A. (1960). Non-Western traditions and the Western world. Free World Forum, 2(1), 3–5. Said, A. A. (1968a). The African phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1968b). Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (1969, Feb. 2). Our Mideast policy is archaic colonial. The Washington Post, Outlook page B1. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1970). America’s world role in the 70’s. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (1971a). Clashing horizons: Arabs and revolution. In M. Curtis (Ed.), People and politics in the Middle East: Proceedings of the annual conference of the American Academic Association for peace in the Middle East (pp. 278–292). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1971b). Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1977a). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A. (1977b, Apr. 6). For the record: From a speech by Prof. Abdul A. Said at the conferring of an honorary degree on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by American University. The Washington Post. Said, A. A. (1977c, Apr. 27). Introduction honoring King Hussein. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1978). Human rights and world order. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1981). Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy (Rev. ed.). New York: Praeger Publishers. Said, A. A. (1983). All nations are developing nations. Global Futures Digest, 1(1), 18–19. Said, A. A. (1988). Tawhid: The Sufi tradition of unity. Creation, 4(4), 24–25, 39. Said, A. A. (1989). The paradox of development in the Middle East. Futures, 21(6), 619–627. Said, A. A. (1993). Beyond geopolitics: Ethnic and sectarian conflict elimination in the Middle East and North Africa. In P. Marr and W. H. Lewis (Eds.), Riding the tiger: The Middle East challenge after the Cold War (pp. 163–185). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Said, A. A. (1994). “Is the U.N. ready for the world? Is the world ready for the U.N.?” U.N. Vision, November/December, 3–6. Said, A. A. (1995). Cultural diversity: The whole world needs the whole world. American Senator, 10(2), 7–8. Said, A. A. (1996, Spring). Complementary ways of knowing. [Unpublished manuscript.] Said, A. A. (1999). Rihani’s spirituality unites precept and practice. In N. Oueijan, A. Eid, C. Kfoury, & D. Salamit (Eds.), Kahlil Gibran & Ameen Rihani: Prophets of Lebanese-American literature (pp. 221–227). Louaize, Lebanon: Notre Dame University Press. Said, A. A. (2004). Understanding peace through Rihani’s spirituality. In N. C. Funk and B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West (pp. 113–119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A. (2005). Achieving peace: The whole world needs the whole world. In Prince Nikolaus von und zu Liechtenstein and C. M. Gueye (Eds.), Peace and intercultural dialogue (pp. 235–251). Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter. Said, A. A. (2006). Bridges, not barriers: The American dream and global community: Essay Number 1 in the “Essays on exploring a global dream” series. Kalamazoo, MI: The Fetzer Institute. Said, A. A. (2015, March 19). Peace, the inside story [paper presentation]. Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, The Inspiration (festschrift conference), American University, Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2006). Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not static. London: Routledge. Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (Eds.). (1971). Revolutionism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Said, A. A., & Farzanegan, B. (1971). Subcultures in the Arab world. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution (pp. 83–91). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

124

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996a). Conflict resolution and spirituality: Reflections on teaching, theory, and practice. The Fourth R, 74(1), 4–6. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996b). The Middle East and United States foreign policy: Searching for reality. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 3(3), 27–37. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2001). Peace in the Sufi tradition. In A. A. Said, N. C. Funk, and A. S. Kadayifci (Eds.), Peace and conflict resolution in Islam (pp. 247–262). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.). (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1975). The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1976). Ethnicity in an international context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A., & Turner, E. (1986). Western arrogance, Islamic fanaticism, and terrorism. Breakthrough, 8(1–2), 28–31. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1978). Development: goals and measurements. Communications and Development Review, 2(1), 24–28. Simmons, L. R., & Said, A. A. (Eds.). (1974). Drugs, politics, and diplomacy: The international connection. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Tyson, B., & Said, A. A. (1993). Human rights: A forgotten victim of the Cold War. Human Rights Quarterly, 15(3), 589–604.

Chapter 5

Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

5.1 Concepts of International Politics Lerche, C. O., Jr. & Said, A. A. (1963). Concepts of international politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

5.1.1 The Nature of Foreign Policy Lerche, C. O., Jr. & Said, A. A. (1963). The nature of foreign policy. Concepts of international politics (pp. 1–8). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. This book is a guide to the ideas that men1 use when they discuss, study, or practice international politics. Our subject matter is in the first place “international”; that is, it will deal almost entirely with the relationships that different national groups (“states”) have with each other. It is also a “political” study: the kinds of relationships in which we are primarily interested are those that we shall define as political. There are many international relations other than political – economic, cultural, interpersonal, and

Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, was the longest serving professor at American University and founder of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at the institution’s School of International Service. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume. 1

Note from the editors: Said’s early writings frequently use terms such “men,” “man,” “mankind,” and “statesman” where contemporary usage (including usage in Said’s later writings) would employ language such as “people,” “humans,” “human,” “humanity,” and “statesperson.” In this respect, Said’s usage reflected the conventions that prevailed at the time of writing. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_5

125

126

A. A. Said et al.

so on – but we shall consider them less on their own merits than in terms of their impact on the political behavior of peoples, governments, and states. Politics can usefully and instructively be analyzed from any of three points of view. We can, in the first place, inquire into the motivations and tactics of the individual political actor as he moves within the political system. Secondly, we can examine the political system itself – the social structure within which the political actor moves – in order to understand the processes of political action and the opportunities and limitations affecting its members. Lastly, we can focus on the substance of political action to discover what it is that the actors are concerned with and what the social consequences of their political maneuvering might be. […]

5.1.1.1

Politics: The Struggle to Maximize Values

“Politics” is a common word in the English language that refers to an equally familiar phenomenon. Everyone knows what he means by “politics,” yet precise definition is usually rather difficult. Individuals have strong emotional responses to the concept; any definition cannot help but reflect the definer’s biases. The words “politics” and “political” will appear repeatedly throughout this book. It is important at the outset that we make explicit what we mean. Our first undertaking, therefore, is a definition of politics and a demonstration of how political concepts find their eventual international expression in a state’s foreign policy. The Nature of Politics Politics consists of the organizational activity men engage in to maximize their deeply felt convictions about social values. By political action men attempt to realize their differing notions of the “public good.” Thus politics is really a process – a means to a value-centered end – but the process is meaningless except in terms of the values that give rise to political action. Such a definition of politics is broad in its applicability to the acts men perform in a political context; as indeed it must be, since political acts include virtually the entire spectrum of human activity. The definition is, however, quite explicit in emphasizing social values as the roots of politics. Since these shared ideas of “the good” are what make political action unique, almost any human action can, with an appropriate value motivation and organizational setting, be termed political. Without the value drive or the organizational nexus, the same action is in the strict sense apolitical. Human beings do not, furthermore, agree on any single inclusive set of social values. Struggles reflecting differing value judgments are an integral part of the political process. Conflict and disagreement are the milieu of politics. When anyone achieves a political goal, it is normally at the expense of other political actors who have their own goals and aspirations. Thus the range of political action may extend from agreement and cooperation between political actors at one end through to the various twilight zones of partial agreement or total opposition and conflict at the other. The experienced political practitioner has at his command strategies and tactics to help him attain the highest feasible level of value satisfaction.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

127

These two ingredients of politics – the value-rooted ends of action and the political climate of struggle and disagreement – are as clearly demonstrated in international politics as they are in the more familiar environment of electoral politics in a democracy. Foreign policy consists of a society’s attempt to realize on the international plane certain notions of what it conceives as good. It is the value root of foreign policy that makes nationalism so intense today and that makes the resolution of conflict so difficult. That international politics takes place in a climate of disagreement and conflict would seem to require no demonstration. In its key aspects, then, international politics is the same sort of social process as politics at any level; with appropriate conceptual adjustments, insights derived from international politics are broadly applicable to internal political relations and vice versa. One additional point should be made here. Within any political system, disagreement and conflict over value choices takes place within a larger value consensus that helps hold the system together. It is, indeed, such an agreement on fundamentals that gives rise to the system in the first place and makes political action possible. We shall see later that the international system incorporates such a consensus (although only imperfectly grasped by many states) and that political action on the international plane is feasible only in its terms. Social Values and Foreign Policy Each society, especially when it deems itself a “nation” and is organized into a state, has a social code that contributes to its peculiar identity. These value preferences activate and energize all political action. If the prevailing concepts of “good” and “evil” could be rationalized within the boundaries of the society itself, they would have little or nothing to do with international affairs. Ever since the Industrial Revolution and the dawn of modern nationalism, national value structures have impinged upon the world outside their borders. At this point, social values come to relate intimately with questions of foreign policy. Certain aspirations, needs, and wants are widely shared in any society. Many of these require governmental action to attain even partial fulfillment, and men look to their political leaders to act on their behalf in attaining these goals. Obviously, one of these areas of value preference in which only public agencies can act effectively is that of international relations. Individuals or sub-groups of a society cannot adequately function in the interest of the entire group; only officials armed with the authority and the sanctions of the society at large can deal with extra-societal problems. Foreign policy, therefore, is the exclusive province of government because only government can act on behalf of all the people individually and of the society collectively. The content of governmental action in the international arena is determined by the set of social values controlling the society at large. Before the birth of political consciousness in the states of Europe, international politics consisted only of the relations of kings; mass attitudes and preferences had no foreign-policy relevance. The rise of nationalism made foreign policy in one sense “democratic”; governments became obliged to structure their international efforts so as to reflect the mass value judgments of the people they represented. The analytical apparatus of statecraft is no

128

A. A. Said et al.

more than a standardized technique for translating the value preferences of a society into a workable frame for governmental action. The Value Content of Foreign Policy From an analytical point of view, we must avoid becoming overly specific about the “social values” that underlie foreign policy. Values are seldom self-evident, and the particular concepts of good and evil that a government chooses to pursue always stem from a mixture of sources within the society. We can identify at least five differing versions of the “good” that are usually combined in a single foreign policy. (1) The good of the individual citizen: primarily the wish to be secure in his person, his beliefs, and his property as they become threatened by forces outside his society. (2) The good of the society at large: collective values, normally including the preservation of the social system, the augmentation of its prestige, the protection of its ideology, and so on. (3) The good of the state (the juristic personality) as such: the more common ingredients include self-preservation, security, well-being, and the “strength” of the political unit. (4) The good of “special interest groups” in the state/society: these tend to be included to the maximum extent possible within the operative notion of the general interest and contribute largely to the shaping of public policy on specific issues. (5) The good of the government itself and of its personnel: values peculiar to membership in a public community that inescapably find expression in the actualities of policy. Thus the values the state maximizes in foreign policy are varied in their origin and their substance. It is the task of the officials charged with policy-making to shape this broad spectrum of needs and wants into some semblance of integrity and to apply the resulting value synthesis to the phenomena of international politics. The statesman may compromise among competing values, he may accept some at the cost of rejecting others, or he may find some other rationalizing device. He cannot, however, avoid the necessity of building his approach to world affairs on a foundation of value choices. Foreign Policy and International Politics The base of any foreign policy is a state’s mission to maximize its value synthesis. Once it moves onto the international scene, however, it encounters other states, each seeking the accomplishment of its own value-derived goals. Thus international politics is at bottom an exercise in the prosecution of value differences and grows less from objective environmental conditions than it does from the judgments men make about those conditions. In this respect, as mentioned previously, international politics is not dissimilar to domestic politics. There is, however, a significant difference between the two types of politics that makes the international variety peculiarly perplexing and fascinating

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

129

to its students. Although domestic politics – at least in a stabilized society – goes on within a well-understood set of rules that cover the range of permissible action and are enforced by social and governmental mechanisms, no such structure inhibits the practice of international politics. States are free to pursue their value purposes as far as their wishes and their strength will permit; they are normally checked by the strength of other states and only occasionally by institutional mechanisms. International politics, due to the highly internalized motivations of its practitioners and the lack of universally efficacious limitations on approved action, is ever on the verge of explosion. The values that go into foreign policy are deeply held and powerful; the restraints are relatively few and of imperfect effect. In many respects, therefore, international politics is a manifestation of the political process in its simplest form.

5.1.1.2

Interests, Goals, and Objectives

Our discussion up to this point has established that foreign policy is purposeful and that value judgments are the bases upon which a state proceeds in international politics. The state, however, must act in the real world; it cannot function effectively on behalf of values that remain abstract, absolute, and undefined. No foreign policy can really achieve “freedom,” “power,” “justice,” “honor,” or even “peace” – to cite a few of the more common values of foreign policy – except in concrete terms and in relation to specific situations. The statesman must, in a word, translate “values” into “objectives” before he can begin to act. From “Social Values” to “National Interest” The key concept a policy-maker uses in applying value judgments to the realities of political action is “national interest.” Notoriously vague and difficult to define, the notion of national interest is nevertheless central to policy-making. It may be considered as the general, long-term, and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving. It is rooted in the deepest soil of social consciousness and cultural identity of a people, and it includes all the disparate ideas of the good that we have earlier noted. In practice it is synthesized and given form by the official policy-makers themselves. We cannot be more specific in defining the content of national interest, since both its value roots and the process of its synthesis are peculiar to a society, its history, and its institutional makeup. We can, however, be quite explicit about its function. As the overriding purpose governing the state’s relations with the outside world, it serves two purposes: it gives policy a general orientation toward the external environment, and, more importantly, it serves as the controlling criterion of choice in immediate situations. The dominant view of national interest, in other words, dictates the nature of a state’s long-term effort in foreign policy and governs what it does in a short-term context. National interest thus flows from the application of a highly generalized value synthesis to the over-all situation in which a state is placed in world politics. It is

130

A. A. Said et al.

thus, within the terms of its social origin, relatively slow to change, and change is “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” National interest provides the necessary measure of consistency to national policy; a state, consciously adhering to its national interest in a rapidly changing situation, is more likely to maintain its balance and continue to progress toward its goals than it would if it changed its interest in adapting to each new situation. Ends and Means in Foreign Policy The development of national interest (even if it is never verbalized) is the first step in formulating a foreign policy, even though it remains an abstract concept. Before the concept may actually serve as a guide to action, the statesman must grapple with a classic problem: the reconciliation of ends and means. The ends of state action in international politics – the national interest and such national goals as may be derived from it – are postulated a priori. Before policy can be made, the statesman must somehow mesh the facts of his problem, including whatever means he has at his disposal, with the conceptual system formed by his set of ends. In specific policy situations, one of the most difficult problems policy-makers face is the determination of the most appropriate relationship between abstract ends and concrete means. Ends, in theory, determine means; in a situation permitting several possible courses of action, that one should be chosen which most directly advances the national interest. In practice, however, there is always a real temptation to allow means to determine ends, to decide that that objective which is the most feasible to attain is actually the one that the state should seek. Intermediate ends – ends that, if achieved, are intended only to serve as means to still further ends – tend also to acquire an absolute relevance in themselves as ends. Any confusion in the ends-means relationship, any loss of appreciation of the value roots of policy, or any reluctance to remain firmly committed to long-range concepts of interest, cannot help but deprive a foreign policy of vigor, effectiveness, and flexibility. Governments that succumb to these dangers quickly find themselves thrust on the strategic defensive and, to a major extent, placed at the mercy of others who know more precisely what it is they are trying to accomplish. There is no substitute for a clearly-rationalized and thoroughly understood purpose in foreign policy. This is especially true in the contemporary period, an era of great change in the international milieu.

5.1.2 Limitations on State Action Lerche, C. O., Jr. & Said, A. A. (1963). Limitations on state action. Concepts of international politics (pp. 167–175). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

131

In spite of the deceptively simple logic of sovereignty that derives complete freedom of state choice from the postulate of absolute power, the international system could not survive unless states accepted and acted upon a well-understood set of restraints. The limitations on state action that all governments acknowledge to be the price they pay for the continued viability of the international system are only partially formed. To a large extent they rest upon tacit agreement and the force of practice. To ignore these almost amorphous and illogical considerations, or to deduce an overrigorous mechanistic doctrine of blind power as the energizing factor in international politics, is to condemn oneself to system-building in a vacuum. The limitations on the freedom of the state to act in international politics are not only as intrinsically important as that freedom itself, but also serve to give it form and direction. […]

5.1.2.1

Morality as a Limitation: What Is a Moral Consensus?

The state is composed of human beings, all of whom accept and act upon a set of moral principles. All human action may be judged with varying degrees of accuracy and relevance in moral terms. These two factors – the moral base of government action in the international order, and the application of norms of morality to the behavior of states – constitute the basic elements of any discussion of morality as a limitation on international political action. The Moral Problem in International Politics Central to this perplexing issue is the intrinsic morality of the state and the relative claims of public purpose and private morality on the consciences of individuals. It has long been obvious, for example, that the foreign policy of any national state has no necessary nexus with any absolute or universal moral code. Whether the state is viewed as an amoral agent destined to function in an order beyond and irrelevant to moral codes, or whether it is judged as the architect of its own moral principles that are higher and more binding on individuals than private ethics, the result is the same. Individuals – particularly those subscribing to the Judeo-Christian code – are generally held to be disqualified from passing meaningful moral judgments on state action. As long as the political sphere of human action does not impinge on private morality, such a duality raises few problems other than abstract ones. The moral issue becomes poignant, however, when the commands of the state to the individual represent a direct contradiction of what he has been taught to regard as right and good. The classic instance is, of course, the taking of human life. The Ten Commandments stipulate that “Thou shalt not kill,” but killing enemies of the state on command of one’s government is an act of the highest patriotism. Modern states have not felt themselves seriously inhibited by this contradiction. Nationalist codes of all types either emphasize that ordinary moral scruples do not apply to public purposes or else assert that killing, stealing, or lying on behalf of the state are in themselves moral acts. Somewhat more sophisticated versions of these arguments suggest that moral principles might apply in ordinary circumstances, but

132

A. A. Said et al.

the demonic nature of the enemy (be he fascist, communist, Japanese, or whatever), and the special sacredness of the national mission, are ample reasons for individuals to suppress any qualms they might have. Theologians, philosophers, and psychologists of all schools of thought and methods of analysis have grappled with the problem of reconciling the requirements of foreign policy with the absolutes of personal morality, or at least of reducing the clash between them to a bearable level. The public is sometimes told, for example, that since man is inherently sinful he should not worry overmuch about committing what he might consider to be immoral acts for public reasons. It is argued that a sufficiently worthy end justifies any expedient means. Morality and conscience are no more than semi-suppressed guilt feelings, runs another argument, and “mental health” is attained by a cheerful support of political leadership and performance of whatever tasks are assigned to the citizen. The ingenuity of these arguments has in no way relieved many adherents of Western cultural values from the dilemma in which they feel they are placed. Traditional morality at many points contradicts the pretensions of the state and no completely satisfying rationale of reconciliation can be found. The enormity of the world crisis and the cataclysmic strategies many states have adopted have sharpened this acute sense of moral crisis. The Rupture of the Moral Consensus The problem, always inherent in international politics itself, has been exaggerated by the trends of development of the state system in the past two centuries. Modern international politics was born in Europe in the aftermath of the universal moral code of the Middle Ages. The monarchs who played the game in its early stages operated within a clear moral consensus and a fully understood set of principles of action. Czar Alexander’s “Holy Alliance” of 1815 that proposed joint action by the rulers of Europe in a spirit of Christian brotherhood was startlingly inappropriate for its age; but in another sense was no more than a platitudinous evocation of the implicit assumptions of international politics a century earlier. The moral consensus that served to restrain international politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth century no longer exists. Its disappearance is due to two related historic forces, nationalism and universal ideology. Nationalism of the modern sort, born in the era of the French Revolution, replaced “mankind” or “Christendom” as the supreme moral unit, with the concept of the “nation.” The national group became invested with the special moral superiority and sacred mission that had formerly been much more widely dispersed. From this atomization of a once-universal moral code came a congeries of differing political moralities, all phrased in absolute terms but each incorporating a distinct national point of view on questions of good and evil. Universal ideologies of the contemporary type stem from a particular world view unique to each, and develop much more sweeping interpretations of human action than do nationalist exegeses; but their effect is even more divisive. Nationalism proceeds from a moral base but has a generous admixture of crass and concrete calculation; modern ideologies, however, fit all human experience within a moralistic

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

133

framework and deduce action programs rigidly from postulates about the moral nature of man. Today, therefore, two additional sets of moral codes vie with traditional Western morality for the allegiance of individuals. Nationalist morality and ideological morality often join forces – as in the case of communist states – but as often conflict. Judeo-Christian principles with clear universalist implications are commonly modified, stretched, or even perverted to serve one or the other newer moralities. The political consequences of this moral pluralism are obvious. No state admits publicly today that its policy has any other but a moral base. Political conflict between mature states has an inescapable moral dimension as both sets of participants insist that their goals are no less than the achievement of the highest good. The inescapability of such moral disputation is equaled by its futility. Only very occasionally does a moral argument advanced by one side even receive a hearing, let alone acceptance, by the other. The international order today is not suffering from too few moral referents, but rather from far too many. Morality and Foreign Policy The ubiquity of moral discourse has an immediate and important effect on the choices states make. Decision-making, as we pointed out earlier, goes on in a social context, and a large portion of this milieu flows from the moral orientation of the society. The objectives of policy are derived from social values the moral basis of which is self-evident. A moral code generates a world view, a way of observing, classifying, and giving meaning to phenomena in the real world. Thus what we have called situational analysis by any government is obviously limited by the prevailing moral predispositions of the society. The tactics of policy are again in their turn clearly affected by social considerations of what is right and permissible and what is wrong and prohibited in public action. At every turn, internal morality guides and inhibits the policy-maker. If a policy is developed by men who partake of the consensus themselves and if it is commensurable with public interpretations of absolute good, its implementation is greatly strengthened. Any contradiction or ignoring of mass moral expectations, on the other hand, raises the prospect of internal divisions or at the least of reduced public vigor and zeal. Such matters as nuclear testing, espionage, strategic bombardment, and compromise bargaining with communists have, for example, spawned serious moral problems for Americans in the past few years. Morality, Interest, and Power Two questionable dichotomies have plagued the discussion and analysis of moral issues in international politics, especially within the orbit of Western culture. The first draws a distinction between morality and national interest; the second between morality and power. Although these conflicts are far too complex either to detail or to solve here, some observations would seem to be in point. The alleged clash between morality and national interest would seem to be false on its face. There is no necessary reason why the teachings of any moral code and the formulation of national interest by any state should conflict. National interest is based

134

A. A. Said et al.

on a controlling value system. If a state chooses to make the advancement of moral principles its highest political value, its national interest is no less a valid criterion for that reason. In many states those who profess to discover such a contradiction are in reality pressing a particular policy in the face of opposition and – especially in the United States – are convinced that their case is strengthened by casting aspersions on “idealists” who advance moral principles in support of different policy prescriptions. Morality and power constitute a more formidable contrast. Power in this sense is, of course, understood to be brute force, alleged often to be a manifestation of man’s inherent sinfulness. Thus power is deprived of moral neutrality and instrumental character and is elevated to a positive factor in a moral equation. A state, it is alleged, can be either moral and therefore ineffective in a power-dominated world, or it can be powerful and effective. Such an embrace of power is a compromise with strict morality, to be justified only on the basis of the duality of man’s nature. Absolute moral solutions cannot be found in an amoral (often immoral) system, so men are urged, albeit sometimes regretfully, to eschew strict moral principles in the interest of the effective use of power. Analytically, this position is illogical and indefensible. There is no reason to equate power with force or to strip it of moral content. A state is concerned with winning consensus in the international order in support of its purposes. It is not difficult either to imagine or to cite many examples of cases in which moral principles have proved to be important to the achievement of that necessary consent. In this sense, morality becomes itself a part of power – or, more accurately, of capability. The role of morality in strengthening or weakening a state’s international competence is therefore a function of particular situations and is not subject to any generalizations in advance of action in a concrete context. Neither as a basis for calculating capability nor as a pretext for suspending individual moral scruples is the distinction between morality and power a meaningful one. Power may be used for immoral purposes or for moral ones. Morality may be exterior to capability or one of its key components. The lack of absolute moral solutions to international problems does not free man from his responsibility to remain a moral being, even when considering questions of foreign policy. Power and morality are concepts that belong in different analytical frames of reference and cannot be joined in any prescriptive way. The Rise of International Morality One of the dreams that has energized the efforts of many would-be reformers of international politics is that of a rebirth of an international moral consensus. If some way could be discovered to recreate the common moral ground rules that had governed the course of international politics prior to the birth of modern nationalism, the political system and mankind itself would be enormously better off. The danger that differing but equally deeply-felt moral outlooks might precipitate catastrophe would be sharply reduced, and the possibilities for finding common ground for mutually acceptable solutions to important problems would be correspondingly increased. It is some such idea of what was called in the nineteenth century a “natural harmony

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

135

of interest” among all men that motivated a large part of the effort that culminated first in the League of Nations and later in the United Nations. An international moral consensus is a crucial prerequisite to an orderly and stabilized world. Both more efficient international organization and safer international politics must remain illusory hopes so long as the human species, bound increasingly into one tightly-packed political space by an inexorable technology, continues to break up into quarrelsome and mutually exclusive factions on moral issues. Any significant improvement in the tension climate of world affairs will require that men reach some agreement on their basic moral terms of reference. Put this way, the proposition has traditionally been felt to be self-cancelling; a world divided into a set of sovereign states each of which is busily perfecting and promoting its own nationalistic morality has long been held to be incapable of mustering adequate agreement on any set of propositions broad enough to permit the formulation of “international morality.” Ideologies, cutting across national and ethical lines as they do, provide a broader base of moral action than state morality, but ideological conflict represents movement away from consensus rather than toward it. The failure of Woodrow Wilson’s dream of the “Parliament of Man” as epitomized in the League of Nations and the deep and bitter divisions of the cold-war era seem conclusive proof of the unattainability of international moral consensus short of a divine miracle or a destructive cataclysm. But the patterns of contemporary international politics are developing in such a way as to throw doubt on this long-standing generalization. The technology that has made war so destructive has also brought nations physically into closer contact with each other. In the United Nations especially, but generally in all manner of conferences, meetings, and assemblies, men and governments are jointly exploring the larger issues of the age and discovering, often to their surprise, that the moral judgments they make are astonishingly similar. From this nascent awareness of a common interest in a single destiny has emerged the beginnings of a true international morality. Its root is, of course, expediential: the deeply sensed urge to survive in a world of great danger. No moral code makes a senseless death a morally justifiable act, and sanity argues that the continued existence of the human species is itself a highly desirable goal. Sheer biological survival is not, however, the crux of this new moral outlook. It is not so much that men deny that there are things worth dying for but rather that they insist that they die for something rather than merely expire in a Wagnerian immolation. Dying for a cause is frivolous unless the cause is in some way advanced or defended by death. Beyond this fundamental moral judgment, the new morality is slowly proceeding to develop a more elaborate rationale on which to base state behavior in a less political world. Inevitably, any international morality must weaken the monistic bonds of nationalism. Although ours is still a highly nationalistic age, the character of mass national identifications is perceptibly changing. In some areas a clear decline has set in, in others nationalism is still seeking a new direction, and in still others it is seeking larger units of loyalty. Only a few states espouse the old, militant, integrating impact of nationalism. In like fashion, the signs of a relaxation in the impact of ideologies on

136

A. A. Said et al.

the behavior patterns of mass man, detectable only in very recent years, is a hopeful sign. The Restraining Effect of Moral Consensus The new, and as yet peripheral, force of international morality is given such form as it may assume by means of an international consensus. Whether expressed formally in the General Assembly of the United Nations or informally by the intangible of “world opinion,” collective moral judgment is now a situational factor with which policy-makers in all states must reckon. International moral restraint is, of course, powerless to prevent a great power from taking a single overt step or even from launching a particular policy. It is not, and probably never will be, an instrument for casting an effective veto on a unique event. Its role up to the present has been to help condition the climate of decision for large and small states alike, developing ever clearer and more restrictive parameters within which the state system can move. Nor is it likely that its negative restraining function will ever be overtaken in importance by a positive and goal-postulating role. Morality may define the permissible for states but will never define the mandatory. But the logic of technology and the evolving mutual awareness of more and more men have combined to make moral judgments again relevant to the course of international politics. There is now being born a supranational and suprastate criterion of evaluation available to men everywhere. On balance, its usefulness to this point, although admittedly limited, argues for its continued and more extensive application. Morality, international as well as internal, is and will continue to be a limitation on state action, difficult to define but impossible to ignore.

5.1.2.2

International Law

International law consists of that body of rules and principles of action intended to regulate relations among states. This definition applies to what is known as ‘public’ international law. […] Natural Law Law and its political institutions reflect the ideological and normative order of the society in which they operate. Law can exist only in a society. There is no law in a community without norms. Law is effective in a society only when its positive laws (commands issued by officials) correspond to its “living” laws: customs, traditions, and experience. During medieval and early modern times many jurists advanced a theory of natural law which was intrinsic in God and nature and was discoverable by human reason. We see today, however, that the idea of natural law which was advanced in their writings was almost entirely an historical development with origins in Greco-Roman philosophy and jurisprudence, and in Christian ethics. It was influential in the era of the “medieval synthesis,” helping to provide a common moral, religious, and philosophical basis for a unified society. The increasing extension of international

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

137

contacts to non-European cultures has made this concept of natural law, rooted as it was in European philosophical, legal and religious principles, no longer valid as a basis for the evolution of a universal international law. The Nature of International Law Whether international law is “law” in the true sense has been a subject of long and constant debate among jurists. Certain theoretical aspects of the nature of law must be understood in order to grasp the significance of this problem. Law in the abstract suggests a fixed relationship between or among certain entities. Two types of law may be distinguished in terms of their subjects: natural law (in the technical sense) and human law. Natural law is the law of natural causes of human or non-human phenomena and thus contains no element of volition. In human relations, however, volition is omnipresent. Human law covers the relations among persons or groups governed by rules which the subjects admit to be binding upon themselves in that they have explicitly or tacitly agreed to conform their actions to its terms and to be subject to official demands for obedience. Human law rests ultimately on agreement. International law is a branch of human law. In spite of the implications of sovereignty to the international behavior of states, the international system is generally regarded by all its members as having a legal base. Such a base is deemed to rest on the consent (in theory explicit) of all states bound by the law. International law is a product of the operation of the international system itself. Its growth is almost accidental in that it seldom is the result of deliberate planning. Instead it develops slowly from international practice and often a particular rule has attained near-maturity before statesmen appreciate that there has been an addition to the total corpus of the law. Probably the greatest inspiration for the continued growth of international law throughout history has been the demands of states for reciprocity, uniformity, and equality of treatment by all of their fellows. In international practice this demand approximates the ideal of “justice” in that each state expects the law to give it its due. The legal rights a state may enjoy (as apart from the freedom of action they may have to influence or coerce other states) depend upon the willingness of other states to recognize them in practice. The divergence that may and usually does exist between this idea of justice and the working principles of international intercourse may be bridged only by the effective application of the rule of consent. […] International Law as a Regulatory Mechanism International law undoubtedly functions as a regulatory and limiting mechanism in international politics, but only in an intermittent and partially effective fashion. In large measure this incomplete effect is due to certain key characteristics of international law as a legal system. First, its exact content is still and will probably always be indeterminate, since states define their legal rights and duties themselves with a sharp eye to their own interests. Second, international law is still largely a self-help system and is thus not enforced in the fashion of municipal law by a socially sanctioned international

138

A. A. Said et al.

institution. Third, obedience to law is in legal theory a voluntary act on the part of any state, for any lesser doctrine would do irreparable damage to the foundation stone of sovereignty. Fourth, international law is an incomplete system with many aspects of interstate life clearly beyond the scope of the law. The political judgments of states are generally regarded as beyond legal restraint. In spite of these shortcomings, however, the great bulk of normal and routine international and intergovernmental relations takes place within the framework of principles of international law. Such key notions as the rights and duties of states, the conduct of diplomacy, and the negotiation, ratification, and application of treaties have been all brought solidly under legal control. In general we may conclude that procedural law is very well established in the relations of states, but that substantive law (that gives concrete content to abstract matters of right) is still amorphous. It is at the latter point that law begins most obviously to fail as a regulatory technique. The Sanctions of International Law International law, like international politics, emphasizes self-help and the unilateral enforcement of legal rights. The international order does not provide automatic and effective social sanctions for the principles of law which it identifies. Yet it is a mistake to conclude that there are no sanctions at all to contribute to the enforcement of the legal rights of states. The greatest sanction of all, the one that led to the birth of the legal order in the first place and has constantly stimulated its growth, is expediency. An international legal code exists because states find it more rewarding to develop and apply generalized legal rules to their relations than to live always in a condition of unregulated anarchy. States, in other words, are impelled toward obedience to the law because the positive advantages of obedience are usually considered to be relatively greater than those arising from disobedience. A second category of sanction is inertia, or habit. Long-standing legal procedures have become so well established in state practice that conformity to them is usually a matter of unthinking but conditioned response. The possibility of disobedience simply does not become one of the realistic action alternatives considered by the policy-maker. Finally, as at least a semi-coercive sanction today we may cite here the international consensual apparatus to which we made reference earlier in this chapter. We must of course be on our guard not to overestimate the effect or the extent of world public opinion, but we must also be most careful not to underestimate it. A legal sanction, after all, is primarily a method of securing obedience to law rather than of punishing disobedience, and it is undeniable today that the only occasionally articulated demand of much of mankind for greater order in world relations has resulted in much greater attention to legal niceties by all types of governments. State decisions to “bow” to world opinion on legal issues may be expediential rather than principled, but the effect is the same: a greater conformity of state behavior with the rule of law. This is in essence the function of all sanctions.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

139

Recent Trends in International Law Contemporary trends in international law demonstrate a closer nexus with international politics. It has proved impossible to adjust life to law, so today the controlling emphasis is upon the adjustment of law to life. The international law of the nineteenth and earlier centuries assumed the sovereignty of states. Its object was not to eliminate war, but rather to restrict it in time, place, and method, and hence to establish an equilibrium of power. In the twentieth century international law has acquired instead the goal of establishing an equilibrium of justice, and assumes the interdependence of states and the integration of power. The technological revolution has produced both a positive and a negative effect on international law. The progressive development of the positivist view secularized the entire concept of international law and weakened its moral foundations. This development heightened the role of power by making it more difficult to subject states to rules of law. In a power-oriented society law maintains the supremacy of force and hierarchies established on the basis of power, and gives legal respectability and sanctity to the system. In recent years many new states have joined the international system that do not share in the historic tradition of international law. Hence, they are not at all sympathetically inclined to limit their claims to what is legally defensible under the old system, a system that they feel is biased in favor of older, more developed, and more powerful states. In this sense, modern trends already have begun to weaken the universality of law. On the other hand, the logic of the technological revolution and its by-products compels states to establish a better balance between law and politics. It has driven into the minds of statesmen the need for a more cohesive international system. International law today is formulating these demands in terms of new standards of justice. The relationship between international law and the dynamics of the international political system is more apparent today than at any previous moment in history. Law and social organization, after all, operate upon each other reciprocally: law sets limits to the structure, functions, and effectiveness of a social system, while the organizational dynamics of a society control the development, formulation, and application of legal rules. Modern technology, by making this two-way relationship obvious and by demonstrating the necessity for much greater cohesiveness in the international order, thus emerges as a positive force for the elaboration of international law. A more effective legal system in interstate relations will be an automatic function of an increasingly interdependent world society.

5.1.3 War in the Modern World Lerche, C. O., Jr. & Said, A. A. (1963). War in the modern world. Concepts of international politics (pp. 189–195). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

140

A. A. Said et al.

[T]oday, the process of international politics is in the grip of a strange paralysis…. Foreign policies, particularly those of major powers, do not receive the vigorous and powerful implementation one would expect them to; interstate disputes only seldom reach the clean-cut resolution in power terms that the system would seem to demand. […] The major reason for this unprecedented state of affairs is, of course, the blighting effect of new theories of warfare on interstate political relations and the weapons that have given birth to these theories. Statesmen wrestle almost in a frenzy with the problem of fitting modern military doctrines and techniques within the framework of foreign policy and international politics. Up to this point, they have not succeeded; the old ways of war are outmoded, and the new warfare has not yet found its political niche. It is no wonder that international relations carry a larger and larger cargo of futility and that statesmanship frequently finds itself in a vacuum. In this chapter we shall examine the nature of the military dilemma, both in terms of its own components and of its impact on the political process. […]

5.1.3.1

Total War and the State System

What have been the specific effects of total war upon the state system? How has the new warfare affected the general pattern of international politics? In general terms we have already answered both questions, but certain basic considerations merit a second look. The Possibility of Catastrophe It is often overlooked that war became a normal and regular aspect of international politics because it provided a final answer to problems within the system itself . That is to say, war balanced the political process but never endangered it. Even World War II, with all its destructive and disruptive results, nevertheless ended with a recognizable political system still in existence. Modern total war with nuclear missiles and other technological niceties, now raises the grim possibility of destruction of the political system and perhaps of civilized existence itself. Advocating a technique for the resolution of an international dispute that might effect complete disaster for mankind is too much like recommending decapitation as a cure for headache. No purely political goal is so important as to justify risking survival. Put thus starkly, it would seem obvious that considerations of risk – assuming an optimistic cost calculation – would be absolutely prohibitive of a decision for total war. At least, it has seemed obvious to all statesmen who have faced the choice since the dawn of the nuclear era. There are, of course, many learned and persuasive arguments that total war would not in fact obliterate mankind or the monuments of his civilization, but rather that the recuperative capacity of industrial society would permit the world to recover relatively rapidly from a thermonuclear holocaust. These contentions receive a moderately sympathetic hearing as long as they remain no more than intellectualized speculation. No government, however, has been willing to gamble its existence (and

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

141

that of the entire world) on the validity of these hypotheses. The possibility of utter catastrophe looms large in all military calculations today. The Invalidation of “Victory” With the possibility ever in mind of utter debacle, and with the certainty of monumental devastation no matter what the course of the war, the classic military objective of “victory” has been substantially stripped of any meaning. Victory in battle has always meant the submission of the enemy; victory in war has always meant the achievement of the positive or negative political goal for which the war was fought. These classifications verge on the meaningless with respect to total war. The destructiveness of thermonuclear war is simply beyond belief. If one state loses 75% of its people and 90% of its productive capacity, will the survivors be consoled by realizing that the enemy lost 85% of its people and all its productive capacity? Will victory in such a case be sweet or – in the words of a leading theorist of nuclear war – “will the living envy the dead?” One possibility of achieving victory continues to tantalize military theorists. If a state can gain enough initial striking power in one blow to eliminate an enemy’s capacity to retaliate, perfect dominance will have been achieved with no damage in return. But – as we shall see in our discussion of the arms race – this margin of superiority is exceptionally difficult to acquire, and its employment so contingent upon the attainment of absolute surprise, that it remains an illusory goal. In any other terms, “victory” in total war today is a notion without content. This also exercises an inhibiting effect, since no war comes unless some statesman makes a decision to initiate it. With no likelihood of bringing about a real triumph, the urge to begin combat never will grow very strong. Total war is unattractive enough at best; without victory to give it point, it finds no political justification today. The Rethinking of Political Values International politics has long depended for its motive force on the primacy of political values over all competing notions of good. Men were expected to support the state’s efforts at whatever cost to themselves, even to sacrificing their lives. Now that war may have lost its point, the justification for patriotic death is no longer selfevident. Men might die for God or for posterity with good consciences, but to die knowing that only nothingness will follow has thrown the entire process of mental and emotional commitment out of plumb. An empty death in a fiery cauldron seems like a poor reward for all the panoply and collective enthusiasms of nationalism. In much of the world a serious rethinking of political values has been launched. With the greatest sacrifice a man can make for his state, his very life, reduced to a mockery, many once self-evident truths about the purpose of foreign policy are undergoing reanalysis and drastically different answers are being advanced to old questions. If traditional national interest and diplomacy can promise only a fireball followed by cinders as the seal of negotiation, some men are suggesting that perhaps the content of political life needs overhauling in the direction of making it more directly responsible to individual needs and aspirations. Although no more than a

142

A. A. Said et al.

ripple at the present time; this trend could conceivably develop into a wave that would sweep away many of the underpinnings of traditional international politics. The Disappearance of Decision With war no longer a good policy investment, the state system is deprived of its only efficacious method of reaching a clear decision in a direct confrontation between states. States today repeatedly get themselves in positions from which only a successful war could extricate them, but the inhibitions on warfare prevent them from taking the critical step. Unable to go forward and unwilling to retreat, the contestants remain locked in an uneasy and unwilling embrace and the issue remains stalemated and unresolved. International politics since the end of World War II has seen one issue after another go to the point of maximum bearable reciprocal pressure and then remain hanging there in an agonizing and unrewarding suspension. Cultural lag prevents most states from recognizing and acting on the implications of the loss of decision capability in the system. They persist in embarking on policies whose full fruition might require war, and remain condemned to baffled annoyance when they feel themselves trapped. Some smaller states, recognizing both the opportunities and the limitations inherent in such an era, however, have had great success in pursuing active policies that are clearly cast in a frame of implementation that excludes the possibility of war. Decision by Consensus With war stripped of its role as ultima ratio – “ultima” it may be today, but “ratio” never – some effective substitute is obviously necessary if the international political system is not to collapse from sheer inanition. The most broadly applicable alternative to war has been found in the institutionalization of consensus. Speaking primarily through the General Assembly of the United Nations but on occasion through special conferences or other ad hoc instrumentalities, from time to time a cohesive and articulate body of supranational consensus has exercised a controlling effect on crisis situations. Although the method of its formation and the general direction of its influence are often unpredictable and capricious, there is little doubt that consensus has to a considerable extent taken over the final-decision capability once monopolized by military power. Obviously if this process goes to completion the international political system will become a vastly different phenomenon than it was for three centuries.

5.1.4 Organization: The Escape from Disaster? Lerche, C. O., Jr. & Said, A. A. (1963). The state form in transition. Concepts of international politics (pp. 301–303). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

143

An assumption implicit in the entire discussion in this book, made explicit as well at many points, is that the political world today is undergoing extensive, rapid, and in some cases, violent change. New forces of far-reaching import have been released on mankind, and statesmen are grappling with the consequences. The structures and patterns of international politics, like those of any social system, were developed originally on the basis of and in response to certain prevailing social conditions. Now that conditions have changed so drastically, serious questions must be asked about the relevance of familiar institutions to unfamiliar circumstances. The international political system, as we have remarked often, is a relatively loose and under institutionalized order, nicely calculated to limit without nullifying the inescapable dynamics of state interaction. The inhibitions on state freedom of choice were long ago set at the precise minimum necessary to preserve the integrity of the system while allowing for a wide range of adjustment and stability. Created in the era of absolute monarchy and the musketeer, the systems and processes of world politics proved capable of adapting to such explosive forces as the rise of nationalism, the development of world empire, and the creation of mass armies. Why then are we suggesting here that their viability has been seriously compromised today? This question also has been repeatedly answered in the preceding pages. Contemporary challenges overtax the competence of the state form and international conflict threatens constantly to spill over the limit of tolerability and safety. The new means of action open to states are too dangerous to use, while the old techniques are inappropriate to the problems. The great questions of international life today find no answers within the traditional confines of the state system. Nor can it suffice merely to write off such insistent problems as the escape from destruction, the demands of the non-West, the challenge of communism, and the implications of nuclear energy as insoluble and therefore not fit matters for concern. So powerful are the new dynamics of international life that either answers will be found for them or they will find their own answers. The simple issue facing political man is whether he will discover methods and mechanisms to dominate and shape events or whether he will ultimately be dominated by them. In these terms the problem of organizing human effort for the solution of these long-term problems becomes central. The familiar state form has both legal and mystical underpinnings, but in the last analysis its only rational justification is utilitarian. It must, in other words, get the job done; if it fails, other structures and other principles must be found to replace it. The process of experimentation has already begun. New organizational forms have been developed, new processes initiated, and new solutions attempted. Only a very few of these, however, incorporate a fundamental break with the past; most remain tentative and reluctant steps that seek to preserve the psychic component of sovereignty while restricting its actual force. It is a tribute to human ingenuity that so many ways have been found to have man’s cake of sovereignty and eat it too. But no serious observer feels today that such half measures have proved their effectiveness or demonstrated their efficacy. Such proof may yet be forthcoming; it is premature to argue flatly for the outright abandonment of the sovereign nationstate in favor of an unproved vision of world government. But it is crystal clear that

144

A. A. Said et al.

no over-all rationale for international politics yet suggested or attempted meets the requirements of the contemporary era. What has taken place up to now is a massive purchase of time, time for innovation and – hopefully – time for hard thought. The era of difficult decision and new ways of action lies ahead. Some way must be discovered to cope effectively with the new forces of world politics if man is to win release from the excruciating tension of contemporary life and to move out from under the mushroom cloud of nuclear destruction. New ways of organizing human effort across national lines must precede any direct attack on the problems. History teaches that both success and renown are the rewards of those that most quickly and most powerfully respond to the challenges civilization faces. To this end students of international politics can enthusiastically dedicate themselves. The penalty for failure may mean disaster; the reward for success may be a better life on this planet for everyone.

5.2 Non-Western Traditions and the Western World Said, A. A. (1960). Non-Western traditions and the Western world. Free World Forum, 2(1), 3–5. While the conflict between the Communist and Western systems is real enough to Western peoples, as its sparks touch the non-West it has developed into a struggle waged by two parties over the destinies of disinterested recipients of protection, and has created thorough confusion and anxiety. In this context the Cold War has produced at least one result. The two contending parties have mobilized their ranks, pronounced their mutual beliefs and disbeliefs, muddied the waters with moral indignation, darkened their minds with self-righteousness and clarified their respective positions to one another. The would-be protégées have become, at the same time, more and more isolated – strangers to their own fate. While the Communist position and attitude can be rationalized and, for that matter, accepted for what it is – a policy based on self-interest – the West seems to be going for the ride armed with an ideological foreign policy, not fully aware of independent, fundamental problems which exist. The West is finding itself unable to generate widespread support, incapable of providing needed leadership to the millions of slower-moving non-Westerners. The non-West consists of peoples who are disunited geographically, but united in their sense of destiny and desire to achieve greater ends. The mood of the non-West is not defensive; rather, it is creative. Non-Westerners consider themselves a part of societies aspiring for completion, with further great business to transact: developing India, uniting the Arabs, giving dignity to Africa. The methods, the trials, the errors, the agonies, as well as the results, are important to them. They are searching for internal, political, economic and social cohesion. They are developing new social appetites and expectations for economic

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

145

self-improvement. Non-alignments, non-dependence, non-participation, and positive neutralism are all pleas for time during which the non-West hopes to put its structures in order and establish its own identity. The foreign policies of the non-Western nations reflect uncertainty as well as determination, expediency as well as ambivalence. Yet this is natural, for as there exists a conflict between the West and the non-West, an even greater conflict exists between the mind and the body of the non-West. The primary causes of this internal crisis are indigenous in origin and are rooted in the demographic, economic, social and political development in the non-West. The conflict brings into collision traditional values and the realities and characteristics of the present environment in which these must now operate. The struggle within the non-West revolves around the method or methods through which a coexistence of the traditional and modern can be achieved. This is a period of transition in the non-West and, as in periods of accelerated transition, the pressure of new ideas becomes explosive. The passing of the old order is fraught with upheavals and disturbances which are in themselves manifestations of intolerable stress. The conservative forces render smooth transition difficult. The traditional values remain relatively unimpaired until the crumbling process reaches completion and new theories begin to find spontaneous acceptance. While acceptance of new ideas is now strong in the non-West, reluctance to relinquish the older concepts is stronger. Yet, in spite of all these difficulties, changes have been occurring. During recent years most of the non-West has been freed from European domination. Unfortunately, this independence has been reached at a time when circumstances created by scientific progress have rendered the time-honored dream of the non-West – complete independence – a thing of the past, and a stepping- stone to interdependence. Nor was this their only misfortune; their lack of self-sufficiency makes it almost impossible for them to enjoy their new status of self-responsibility. Political advancement in recent decades has outrun cultural enlightenment and non-Western self-consciousness has not caught up with its political emancipation. The non-West is searching for new allegiances, outlets, and sufficient resources to establish a new sense of direction and momentum. The short roads are long and hard and the tolls for a speedy crossing are more than they can afford to pay. Non-Westerners are searching for a mobilizing force. This search, however, is intensified by the fact that old allegiances have lost much of their sacred authority by virtue of the emergence of new dimensions of individual life in the non-West. No satisfactory philosophy has been found yet and non-Westerners are living with conflicting values and emotions. They are easily side-tracked into moral and intellectual skepticism. The search for new allegiances and self-sufficiency has led non-Westerners to find in nationalism a means of sustenance. Non-Westerners are working toward a resurgence of their respective civilizations through the reconciliation of old aspirations with new values. Hence, an agonizing process of self-accommodation has been initiated. While this process has not proffered any practical remedies, it is serving a purpose in deepening and broadening the understanding by non-Westerners of the dilemma from which the practical needs arise. It is this phenomenon which holds

146

A. A. Said et al.

great promise for the non-West. For the deeper this understanding becomes, the more people of the non-West will be capable of responding successfully to practical needs for adjustment. Thus, it seems, that the area of conflict between the West and the non-West is both spiritual and material and is characterized by an atmosphere full of mistrust and bewilderment. This may explain the fact that the lines of communication between the West and the non-West are still closed. The West, which discovered the land of the non-West centuries ago, should now discover its soul and peoples. This discovery must not be motivated by charitable liberalism, but rather should be moved by a spirit of appreciation, sympathy, and acceptance. The West must refrain from making uncomfortable demands on the non-West, and remember that its own transformation since the Renaissance was due to many factors which, together with the relatively small population over a period of 500 years, produced the present-day results. The non-West, over-burdened with hundreds of millions of peoples and surrounded by Soviet “sabre-rattling” and American demands for collective security, is trying to telescope in one lifetime the achievements of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. Nehru, Nasser, U Nu, Nkrumah and Sukarno are neither Communists nor naive victims of Soviet propaganda. These leaders are very much impressed with the spirit responsible for creating the West. They are for that glory which was the West, the ideals of its founding fathers. However, they are against what they consider to be the manifestations of a declining West. They are not against what the West preaches, but are opposed to what they believe to be continuous inconsistencies between Western ideals and Western actions. Non-Westerners admire the achievements of the West. They would fain have their people benefit by the fruits of these accomplishments, but they realize with a sense of agony and painful pride that their own countries are underdeveloped, poor, and suffer from disease and ignorance. Confronted by what they see around them and what they sincerely desire to achieve for their own people, they are filled with a sense of hopelessness and frustration. Thus, they project their feelings of disappointment and prostrate awareness against the West. If communication is to be established between the West and the non-West, both sides must be realistic. The West must be more patient and the non-West more tolerant. The West must remember that it is not because the non-West is decaying, but because the non-West is awakening that it finds itself in the present dilemma. The non-West must not forget that the West is not without its own internal struggle and conflicts.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

147

5.3 Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1968). Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

5.3.1 Recent Theories of International Relations: An Overview Said, A. A. (1968). Recent theories of international relations: An overview. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance (pp. 18– 25). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 5.3.1.1

State of the Discipline

Today the prominent students of international relations are all theorists. They analyze data not for their intrinsic significance but rather in attempts to develop empirical theories. The discipline of international relations is a particularly exciting field of study. It is alive with ideas, hypotheses, schemes, and theories. There are as many theories as there are theorists and a host of ideas seek advocates. The discipline of international relations is characterized by a healthy ferment. It is young in the freshness of its approaches and in the age of its students. Its students are iconoclasts, attacking each other’s theories with abandon; the academic scene is littered with the debris of repudiated theoretical schemes. Oriented to causal rather than normative theory, the discipline’s immediate purpose is understanding, not concocting prescriptions to rectify the ills of international relations. Eclecticism has replaced the closed shop of political science. As contemporary theorists try to marshal data to support empirical theories, the dimensions of theory increase. They include many new concerns that can be placed conveniently into five categories. First, present-day theorists are concerned with the theory of theory. They raise ontological and epistemological questions. They ask how “scientific” the discipline of international relations can and should become. A second concern of theorists is what has been called “systems analysis”: the development of hypotheses about the international system itself. Systems analysis has two primary foci: the first, dealing with the state as a responding unit within the international system; the second, concerning itself with the configuration of the international system as a whole. A third important emphasis is action theory: the analysis of the ways states and their decision makers conduct foreign policy. Within action theory are found analyses

148

A. A. Said et al.

of ends and means, decision making, capabilities, institutions, and the interaction of the political system and national society. A fourth concern is interaction theory. In this area there is much less agreement on definitions and premises than in action theory. Such theories attempt to generalize about the “patterns” of interaction and the internal behavior of the interacting units. The varieties of interaction theory deal with the balance of power, world equilibrium, gaming, “challenge and response,” and such international processes as competition, cooperation, bargaining, and conflict. Finally, many theorists are applying new research techniques, often appropriating methods from other disciplines. One example is content analysis, borrowed from the study of communications, which has opened new vistas in areas such as threat perception and symbol communication. Another is psychometrics, useful in measuring such attitudes as “friendship” or “hostility” among states. Some effort has been invested in “political gaming”: the creation of controlled situations or games played by subjects.

5.3.1.2

Recent Theories of International Relations and Traditional Political Theory: A Comparison

The direction in which this vast array of theoretical enterprise is taking the discipline of international relations can be appreciated best against the backdrop of the discipline’s primary source, traditional political theory. Two logically related trends are discernable in the transition that has taken place from traditional political theory to recent theories of international relations. The first trend is the revision of the traditional image of political man. According to the prior image, political man is rational in either political, economic, or moral terms. Such classically oriented theorists as Charles Beard, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Jacques Maritain retain this image of political man derived from Platonic, Thomist, or liberal sources. Influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the behavioral sciences, such recent leading figures in international relations theory as Kenneth Boulding, Herbert Kelman, Harold Lasswell, David McClelland, and Charles Osgood have rejected for purposes of analysis the classical image of political man and are attempting to understand him in terms of his psychological motivations or sociological conditionings. They speak of the images, cognitive structures, values, needs for achievement, and stereotypes that govern the behavior of the political actors. Dismissing the doctrine of human reason, they assume that human consciousness is a function of fluid settings. The second trend is the revision of the image of political community held by traditional political theorists. The classical image was formalistic. Traditional theorists dealt in grandiose abstractions such as national ethos, the state, realism, sovereignty, and the public philosophy. Such recent political theorists as Raymond Aron, E. H. Carr, Louis Hartz, A. D. Lindsay, and Walter Lippmann continue to employ concepts gleaned from classical sources.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

149

Recent theorists in international relations such as Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Karl Deutsch, David Easton, and Richard Snyder have discarded the classical image of political community as inappropriate for analysis. They attempt to reify the traditional abstractions. The state is considered a decision-making process. Sovereignty becomes no more than the state’s situational capabilities. The public philosophy is simply those values that the political system allocates. They look for linkages between the social, economic, and cultural systems of collectivities and the political systems. They employ indices, variables, and empirically based concepts to analyze all political communities. Several illustrations of systems theory and action theory are discussed below for the purpose of demonstrating several of the consequences of the transition from traditional political theory. Systems theorists have turned the traditional concept of an international system into an analytic concept. When traditional political theorists considered the international system, they were concerned generally with the problems of building a stable world order. They disseminated the ideologies of internationalism based upon monarchism, nationalism, democracy, etc. Reviving the ideas of Sully, Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant, the peace movements in Europe of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for instance, condemned evil parochialism and preached the blessings of a peaceful international order built upon morality expressed by public opinion. Legal monists like Hans Kelsen also discussed the international system as an imperfectly realized legal system based upon a global Grundnorm. Students of international organization like Pitman Potter similarly stressed the politically unifying potential for the international system of cosmopolitanism, global scientific and technological norms, and factual interdependence. The methodologies of recent systems theorists like Morton Kaplan and Karl Deutsch represent a thoroughgoing repudiation of the moralism and legalism of the traditional systems theorists. Kaplan (1957) conceives of the international system as an “analytical entity” for explaining the behavior of international actors and the “regulative,” “integrative,” or “disintegrative” consequences of their policies. For Karl Deutsch, the international system consists of “clusters of settlement, modes of transport, centers of culture, areas of language, divisions of caste and class, barriers between markets, sharp regional differences in wealth and interdependence” (1953, p. 161). In short, what had been an ideological commitment of the traditional theorists became a devaluated hypothesis to analyze causation in the real political world for recent theorists in international relations. Recent action theorists have revolutionized the traditional theories of political action. Classically oriented theorists have continued to avow the economic, power political, or moral impetus of foreign policies. For Charles Beard, American foreign policy has been primarily the tool of economic interests. The territorial and commercial expansion across the North American continent and into Latin America and the Pacific demonstrated the power of American capitalism. Hans J. Morgenthau has attributed the issues of war and peace to that corollary of man himself, the struggle for power. Unable to transcend his static nature, according to this formulation, the political actor necessarily pursues power as a means and an end in itself. Both pious

150

A. A. Said et al.

Communists and professing anti-Communists like Robert Strausz-Hupe believe that foreign policies are manifestations of moral commitments expressed in ideological terms. Given their objective communist and democratic identities, these schools of thought agree, Russian and American leaders are compelled to pursue foreign policies based upon their avowed sacred principles. Today single-factor action theories are deemed insufficient. The decision-making analysis of Richard Snyder et al. deals with the multiple psychological and sociological determinants of foreign policies. Implicit in the concept of “issue area” proposed by Rosenau (1967) and others is the idea that the strength and content of an individual’s motives and roles are variables determined by the issues at hand. Human means and ends are situationally determined rather than universally operative. The traditional, facile action theories have given way to multicausal, “middle-range” action theories. As illustrated by revisions of systems and action theories, the new directions in theory of international relations have resulted in greater awareness of political reality. Empiricism has replaced the moralism and legalism that cloaked the substantive political collectivity from the traditional political theorists. Multilevel analyses of causation have replaced simplistic economic, power political, and moral interpretations of political action. In a sense, recent theorists may pride themselves for having liberated the discipline of international relations from the strictures of traditional political theory. They do see themselves clearing the musty attic of antiquated political dogmas bequeathed by the traditional theorists. At the basis of their selfimage is the claim to address themselves to the “things, themselves.” They scrutinize reality and infer relationships among its constituent parts. Knowledge of these relationships is considered tentative, susceptible to further tests of reliability and validity. They explore every corner of the political universe and seek to unite the modes of understanding of all relevant disciplines. They travel great distances through time and space to discover the constants and variables of politics. Nonetheless, the progress that has been made has been purchased at a price. Only when the liabilities are counted can the value of recent directions in theory of international relations be assessed fully.

5.3.1.3

Recent Theories of International Relations: A Critical Assessment

A primary weakness of recent theory is its failure to encompass human purposes as they are expressed in terms of values and ideologies. Perhaps recent theorists have overreacted to the traditional political analyses of such “isms” as constitutionalism, democracy, nationalism, communism, or imperialism. Yet, political theorists need to recognize the methodological significance of values and the substantive relevance of ideologies. In his important book, Deadly Logic, Green (1966) discusses the false pretensions of moral neutrality of the deterrence theorists. He exposes the ethical assumptions of the systems theories, games theories, and decision-making theories of Herman Kahn, Richard Snyder, Morton Kaplan, Thomas Schelling, and

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

151

others. Henry Kariel (1966) has examined in a similar vein the justification of the status quo implicit in such devaluated behavioral approaches as illustrated in Edward C. Banfield’s Political Influence and Robert Dahl’s Who Governs? Theorists must always explicate all the assumptions upon which their analyses are predicated. Theorists must recognize also that ideological factors are crucial determinants of political realities. Louis Hartz and Hannah Arendt urged and demonstrated in their substantive works that theorists cannot ignore such ideational factors as liberalism, racism, imperialism, etc. Many theorists, however, seem to overlook the fact that the political world is not free of values. Another weakness of recent theorists is their penchant for reductionism. Once theorists acknowledged that political reality did not consist of rationally “innerdirected” actors and metaphysical entities like the state or the public good but rather of elements, interests, processes, and systems, the political universe began to expand. It became increasingly complex. A survey of the precursors of the recent theorists in international relations demonstrates this ever-increasing proliferation of the political universe. Nineteenth-century forerunners like Marx, Michels, and Mosca considered political phenomena to be the interaction of a few easily identifiable elements. They counterpoised the elites and the masses, the ruling class and the other ones, the government and the subjects. Early in the twentieth century, social scientists like A. F. Bentley turned to group theory. They saw politics as the interaction of tensions, conflicts, and diffuse pressures stemming not only from groups and subgroups but also from individuals. Many recent theorists of the behavioral persuasion have discounted even the individual. Each individual consists of a series of tensions and pressures, internal and external. Man as the real actor is abolished; only his interests, desires, frustrations, and pathological tendencies remain. As a result of the reductionist trend, recent theory has developed with an uncertain worldview that lacks stability and boundaries. Such factors as childhood fantasies, swaddling practices, and mail flows that are of doubtful political relevance are among the considerations of such recent theorists as McClelland, Gorer, and Deutsch. Of course, the problem today is that there is no commonly accepted criterion of what is germane to politics. Green (1966) has attacked the concept of such a criterion by asserting that only when the theorist is unimpaired by any prescription of a discipline’s scope can he make progress. Nonetheless, without certain assumptions perhaps only given for ad hoc purposes of analysis, theorists cannot proceed from methodological to substantive concerns. This is not to say that theorists in international relations should return to the rationalistic and formalistic womb of traditional political theory. Nonetheless, every theoretically inclined discipline has to include some constants and the study of international relations is no exception. The scattering of theorists’ interests has resulted not only in new substantive insights but also in methodological formalism. At times, it seems that modelbuilding in the social sciences has become an end in itself. In refuting the accusation of “scholasticism,” theorists argue that their approach is by its intrinsic nature antischolastic and antiformalistic. That is, it disdains universals and is concerned only with the real, specific things that are found in life.

152

A. A. Said et al.

This argument cannot be accepted. When recent theorists have proposed general theories, formalism of one type or another has crept in. The disorderly accumulation of data is another example of theoretical sterility that has yielded only statistical profiles and collections of empty stereotypes. Methodological formalism has led also to a fragmentation of the discipline of international relations. Communication among methodological cults does not take place because there is no common ground. For instance, many content analysts, systems theorists, and decision-making analysts speak in jargon that is unintelligible to all except the thoroughly initiated. While some devotees of conceptual rigor promise that time will yield a new synthesis for analyzing international politics, the fruits of recent years do not imply this happy ending. Finally, many of the approaches and methods of recent theorists have tended to distort political realities. Having invested so much of their effort in developing methodologies, theorists who turn subsequently to substantive analyses are often trapped; they have built reality within the limits of their theoretical frameworks. By subsuming all political realities within their models, they have confounded reality and the products of their own minds. Theorists in comparative politics, for instance, have squeezed such diverse realities as Eskimo, British, and Russian politics into a common framework of political structure and culture, interest articulation and aggregation, governmental functions and structures, patterns of communication and political capabilities, assuming that all these variables are, in some degree, relevant to all politics (Almond/Powell 1966). Since this assumption is not valid, distortions result that are hardly consistent with the dictum of recent theorists to address themselves “to the things, themselves.” Rather than confront reality, recent theorists often merely refine their techniques, retest their theorems one against the next, strengthen the logical coherence of their models, and close every possible gap or hole left in their systems. Their closed methodological systems preclude examination of many substantive factors of political relevance that the traditional, historical, institutional, or ideational approaches might have encompassed. To be sure, empiricism has led often to an examination of nonpolitical, even trivial, phenomena. Reductionism has tended to cloak political reality behind a behavioral metaphysics. Logical consistency has resulted at times in rigid formalism. Pretensions of value-free analysis generally have only disguised the judgmental assumptions and resolved (and perhaps unresolvable) moral issues. These weaknesses, however, are not intrinsic to the theoretical study of international relations. The pitfalls can be overcome when theorists reconcile their methodological fervor with the imperatives of substantive analysis. One path that theorists might take would be a blending of traditional and contemporary images of man, the community, and politics. The concept of political community is still relevant. However, in certain defined contexts, it is helpful to view the polity from a skeletonized framework. Extreme caution must be exercised because it is not possible to analyze all actors by using the same methodology. There is no single method for every situation. This does not deny the utility of exploring what methodology would be useful when examining substantive problems.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

153

In this sense, the key to the effort is discovering the relevant method. To exclude whole images of political man and the political community snaps at the continuity that the discipline should preserve. However, to deny the new approaches and images limits our horizons in this field. The answer is not so much a synthesis as a selection of relevant concepts and methods to analyze substantive problems on an ad hoc, not a formula, basis.

5.3.2 The Impact of the Emergence of the Non-West upon Theories of International Relations Said, A. A. (1968). The impact of the emergence of the non-West upon theories of international relations. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance (pp. 93–106). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. In the past two decades, the states of the non-West have managed to establish themselves as influential factors in international politics. In response to their newly acquired position of importance, considerable speculation and inquiry has been directed to the problems of modernization and nation-building. While the pre-World War II political literature on the non-West consists largely of memoirs colored by the attitudes of missionaries and colonial administrators, the more recent non-Western studies have been distinguished by the utilization of a broad spectrum of analytical approaches and research techniques.

5.3.2.1

Development of Scholarship on the Non-west

Prior to and immediately following the Second World War, popular notions of underdevelopment were dominated by a stereotyped image of the non-Western states. A given state was considered to be underdeveloped if it failed to fit a model structured by Western notions of politics and community; if the state lacked democratic, competitive political parties and a high standard of living, it was by definition underdeveloped. Few scholars gave serious thought to the dynamic nature of the modernization process, and it was generally believed that a people emerging from colonialism would naturally express their independence in a systematic effort toward the construction of a modern nation-state. To some extent, non-Westerners accepted this interpretation and shared with Westerners the simplistic view that traditional societies could automatically be refashioned on the modern, Western model. This optimistic approach was reflected in the few early postwar analyses of the non-West. These were largely historical, administrative, and anthropological studies. Historians were generally preoccupied with the origin and evolution of particular states. Political scientists engaged in comparative analyses of newly formed constitutional, electoral, and legislative processes, employing the conceptual baggage of

154

A. A. Said et al.

the Western political tradition. Perhaps alone among the social scientists, anthropologists rejected the normative patterns of thought that characterized most of the studies produced in this initial period. As inveterate defenders of cultural values, the relativistic ethic of anthropologists had always implied an opposition to the imposition of alien rule on weaker societies. However, because of their commitment to cultural relativism, few anthropologists managed to contribute very much to the understanding of the confrontation of traditional societies with modernization. Because the early transitional period in the non-West was characterized by stubbornly persisting political instability and social discontinuity, early enthusiasm for independence and the happy anticipation of non-Western states evolving along modern democratic lines began to fade. The disappointingly unrestrained revolutionary momentum and turmoil that maintained themselves, instead of the expected development of stable institutions and economic growth, led to a re-examination of prior assumptions. Some observers attributed such difficulties to an international communist conspiracy.2 Others viewed them as the inevitable consequence of premature independence. Using such indices as per capita income, literacy rates, and levels of industrialization, economists and sociologists associated political with economic backwardness.3 Some emphasized the need for economic and military assistance to countries threatened by communist aggression and infiltration. Political scientists often limited their approach to the context of the Cold War. As the U.S.U.S.S.R. rivalry intensified, the practice of international development and alternative approaches to the problems of modernization (communist vs. democratic) acquired considerable status as important foreign policy issues. With the organization of the International Cooperation Administration in 1955, there was a marked acceleration in the growth of the entire body of development literature. Primarily descriptive and often oratorical, these studies dealt usually with the economic and procedural aspects of modernization. There were few attempts to analyze the problems of modernization within a theoretical framework (Miller 1964). Western social scientists were reluctant to think about the issues of modernization in a meaningful pattern. Having conceived the problem in terms of the unprecedented speed and intensity of social change, they found it difficult to make explicit or to relate theory to specific issues. However, the resulting concern with modernization problems, as issues in themselves, had the salutary effect of forcing the social sciences to devise new categories and techniques for analysis of the phenomena of rapid social and political change. One outgrowth of this trend was a “revolution” in the social sciences.4 Like the independence of new states from colonial rule, the liberation of the social sciences 2

This dominant view has been held by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, among others. See Strausz-Hupe (1959). 3 See Staley (1954), Future of the underdeveloped countries. One of the pioneering efforts on international economic development advocating assistance to achieve “successful” economic development based on modern democratic values. 4 For a comprehensive survey on the nature of current and prospective social research on the developing areas, see, for example, Lystad (1965), The African world: A survey of social research. See also, Binder (1963, Sept.).

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

155

from the restrictive normative approach was a postwar development. And it was equally beset by anarchy and confusion. Many of the theoretical and methodological innovations in the social sciences rivaled in degree, if not in intensity, the parochial nature of the nationalism of emerging states. In many ways, the scholars who concentrated on the underdeveloped areas often appeared to be more interested in the states of their disciplines than in the state of the non-Western world.5 Nonetheless, there was widespread optimism that social science research on the non-West stood on the threshold of considerable achievement; this was a result of the increasing use of comparative analysis techniques and of cross- and interdisciplinary cooperation. To this end, students of the non-West began to devote themselves to the broadening of research methodologies and to the construction of developmental theories which produced useful predictive hypotheses. Captivated as they continued to be by the notions of predictability, political scientists were most ambitious in this area of inquiry.6 This optimism was also reflected in the more recent growth of functional and behavioral theories which attempt to relate political and governmental institutions to other dimensions of the social system. This trend was further manifested in the development of the so-called “dynamic” theories of the future political evolution of the non-Western world. Social scientists integrated the sociological, economic, and political theories and methodologies focusing on the emerging states. During the past few years, scholars and policy-makers in the United States have become increasingly interested in this new approach. It originated with the general need of research on economic development and related problems of foreign aid administration. At the same time, political scientists proclaimed that their discipline was overburdened with narrow and often perfunctory approaches to development problems. It was felt, in particular, that a combined and comprehensive social science approach was necessary to assess and order effectively the phenomena of rapid social change in environments of astonishing diversity and variety. Only in this way, it was argued, could knowledge of the modernization process be broadened and valid generalizations be developed. This combined effort toward a deeper understanding of non-Western political development, as contrasted with the exclusively technical problems of economic development, is regarded as one of the most significant advances in social science research on emerging states. Resting on the assumption that a significant relationship exists between social, economic, and political development, this approach has been praised for providing the policy-maker with a fresh and more realistic method of assessing the long-range problems of development.

5

This is characterized by a plethora of theoretical analyses devoted to “long-range” problems, social structures, functions, etc. See, for example, Asher et al. (1962), Development of the emerging countries: An agenda for research; and Deutsch (1961), Social mobilization and political development, American Political Science Review, 55, 483–514. 6 Prime movers in the search for an understanding of “political development” from an integrated theoretical social science approach for the purpose of establishing predictive hypotheses, see the now classical study, Almond/Coleman (1960), Politics of the developing areas. See also, the study by Almond (1963), Political systems and political change, American Behavioral Scientist, 10, 2–10.

156

A. A. Said et al.

Because of the often extreme difficulties encountered by the non-West in building modern, politically viable entities out of their transnational societies, the primary importance of political development was recognized as the key to the overall process of modernization. It is now generally assumed that political development is a precondition of fully successful economic development. Accordingly, social scientists have attempted systematically to analyze the problem by converging on theoretical and methodological interests. The manner in which political scientists use such concepts as “legitimacy,” “stability,” “adaptation,” “articulation,” “aggregation,” “integration,” in place of “constitutions,” “elections,” “interest groups,” and “legislatures” is indicative of the shift toward functional and behavioral theory. This new method of inquiry, it is claimed, provides the analyst with insights into political systems characterized by unstable institutions and groups that perform differently from those in the more stable, and more familiar, Western societies.7 New classifications and typologies serve as the building blocks of new theories and, ultimately, provide predictive hypotheses on the political evolution of the non-West. A prime mover in this search for an understanding of political development was the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. In an endeavor to analyze the significance of political change in the developing and developed countries, committee social scientists systematically collected worldwide data to test the hypothesis that states which enjoy a high degree of urbanization, education, industrialization, and wealth, tend to be stable and democratic. From these investigations, a theoretical framework was constructed and applied to six areas of the world. The committee’s findings indicate that a “positive correlation exists between economic development and political competitiveness.” Nonetheless, as one direct consequence of the outgrowth of functional and behavioral theory, assorted models of underdeveloped countries are being constructed by anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and sociologists, with a view toward contributing to a deeper understanding of political development. Scholars in these disciplines assert certain, not necessarily valid, causal relationships. Economists, for example, utilize a multitude of readily available, objectively quantifiable criteria. These include gross national product, per capita income, rates of economic growth, output of electricity. Countries are classified according to obvious economic indicators, and the degree of “progress,” if any is measured. In contrast, the assessment of political development is a difficult and highly complicated undertaking. The most fundamental difficulty concerns the criteria of development. There is no agreement regarding what constitutes a “developed” polity. Most descriptions of development are, in themselves, either dubious or controversial. Comparisons between the developed and the underdeveloped sectors of the world are generally made on the basis of Western norms and values. Another difficulty arises from incomplete understanding of the political processes in emerging states. Investigations of these processes are frequently based on prior interpretations of non-Western elites. But because they tend to be emotionally and intellectually preoccupied with the issues of imperialism, 7

Cutright (1963) presents a classification of states according to degree of democratic political development and a statistical index of development.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

157

residual colonialism, neocolonialism, pan-ism, and the like, the non-Western elites have seldom provided the Western scholars with an objective appraisal of internal factors relevant to the local political process. However, as a beneficial by-product of the behavioral approach, such informational deficiencies are being gradually reduced; scientific method requires the intensive analysis of social units and social problems of limited scope. But if the problem is to be approached in terms of political structure, no particular model can be claimed to represent a necessary or ideal precondition for economic and social development. Even in the present century, advanced Western states have experimented with or accepted divergent governmental institutions. These have ranged from monarchies to multiparty democracies, from oligarchic capitalism to democratic centralism. It has also been argued that the new and emerging states may require innovative forms of governmental institutions, perhaps related to their own societal values and traditions. Western analysis of the non-West often begins with the proposition that a similar corollary of social and economic conditions among emerging states is a discrete mode of political development. Despite the improvement in analytical methods and techniques, the problem is often approached with unconsciously implied normative definitions. The most popular approaches are based on the assumptions that democracy is a synonym of modernity, that it is the ideal form of political development, and that it is a prerequisite of development. But democracy has produced so many hybrids, and derivations, and is applied to such a multitude of aphorisms that it has lost its meaning—unless precisely defined within the organic framework of the given state. Such value-laden definitions and approaches to the problems of political development are currently criticized or challenged by non-Westerners who reject many Western norms and standards as irrelevant to their experience. By rejecting Western competitive democracy non-Western politicians and elites claim that more relevant political ideals and “realities” are to be found within their own traditional societies. Some prominent American political scientists have sought to integrate the ideas of system, culture, function, structure, and action in a conceptual scheme particularly designed for comparative analysis. This approach is an obvious improvement on the narrower and more provincial studies of political behavior; it avoids petty inquiries into voting behavior, legislation, and other rituals of democratism. It seeks to identify and analyze the politico-cultural systems and subsystems in states of whatever level of political sophistication. Its method of inquiry, relying on sociological and anthropological theory, rejects the earlier separation of comparative politics into East-West, American, African, Asian, Middle Eastern area studies (Almond/Powell 1966; Almond/Verba 1965; Pye 1966). This approach advocates an empirical analysis of political functions and the processes of change and modernization without regard to culture or geographical peculiarities. Because of its more precise analytical framework, the behavioral approach has provided a strengthened conceptual unity in the study of comparative politics. But, at the same time, the behavioral approach has minimized the importance of values and goals by placing its primary emphasis on processes. Its methods preclude as yet significant treatment of the subjective dimension of modernization.

158

A. A. Said et al.

It is admitted that behavioral methods of research readily enable political scientists to construct refined inventories, detailed charts, and useful models of the political system. Operationalized concepts yield quantitative data on the national political body and provide a means for testing hypotheses. However, the question remains whether the behavioralists’ scattered interest in such a variety of analytical methods and their grandiose display of statistical data provides meaningful results. All too often, a great deal of effort is expended in confirming previous – and rather obvious – expectations. In their attempt to analyze all political systems in terms of one universally applicable set of concepts, they confound realities with concepts while, on the other hand, they ignore existing realities. By dismissing the traditional political concepts of rule, authority, and power, behavioralism has smothered political science in a psychological – or more frequently, sociological – wet blanket. By adopting a battery of “unifying” concepts, the behavioralist attempts to refocus political science on non-political objects. One unfortunate consequence of this new approach has been the attempt to understand political relations more in terms of “consensus” and less in terms of power and coercion. Unfortunately, many general theories of political development are crippled by the invalid assumption that the consensual model is the only useful model of advanced political behavior and the underdeveloped countries remain so because they have failed to achieve political integration. The behavioralist bases his generalization on distinct societal types. He distinguishes the integrative from the coercive society; the first is based upon a moral order, or, consensus; the second involves elements of power, interests, coercion, change, and conflict. It is more useful to view societies as combinations of integrative and coercive types. It is evident that, as an unhappy consequence of the recent and contemporary emphasis on behavioral methodologies, the study of international relations in the United States is culture-bound. The “New Scientism” is deeply colored by the American experience and relies overly on extrapolation from American norms (Moore 1965). This is the central weakness of contemporary American studies on non-Western politics.

5.3.2.2

Limits of Theorizing on the Non-West

On the surface, the task of constructing relevant theories about the non-West appears to be reasonably simple. The emerging non-Western states seem to react to the intrusion of traditional European values. They serve the same particularistic, valuemaximizing function that was the raison d’être of all European nationalist movements and states. The nationalist movements of nineteenth-century Europe had the immediate goal of replacing alien dynasties with republican, locally oriented governments. The emerging bourgeoisie simultaneously pursued an internally pluralistic goal: the breakdown of rural-based control over the economy and polity. The bourgeoisie hoped to rationalize these dimensions of life according to middle-class standards.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

159

In the recent non-Western experience, the democratization of society by means of increased commercial participation and secular education was accomplished by an elite hostile to traditional values. Thus, the emergence of the new states of the non-West operates well within the generic framework of most modern revolutions.8 In the sense that the non-Western political elites are attempting to consolidate their economies, educate the masses in national consciousness, and suppress irredentism, they are responding to the same revolution in thought that has accelerated the development of modern Western civilization. Because of arbitrary boundaries, ethnic diversities, and fresh memories of colonialism, the modernization effort is excessively parochial in approach. The essential point, however, is that the non-Western state serves as a vehicle for the values of a new political elite. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the Western states have become administratively dominant; they assist or protect continuing value satisfaction. With the decline of the old, particularistic values as a result of manifest abundance and increases in education, communication, and cultural exchanges, the Western states have shed much of their original value-maximizing function. The values they now assert are materialistic; and materialistic values are more readily harmonized among states. The particularist, value-maximizing role of the non-Western state differentiates it from the Western state. And it is the performance of this function in the nonWest that perpetuates autarchic nationalism. In short, the new states of the non-West have given the concept of the nation-state a new lease on life. We may say, then, that the phenomenon of the emerging non-West can be largely understood because of its similarity with past events in the West. That it has occasioned few seminal, unified theories or even new generalizations about specific aspects of state behavior might partially indicate that patterns of state action in the non-West can be understood in terms of the same concepts as historical patterns of state action in the West. The absence of new theories about the non-West might also mean, however, that the nature of the non-West is so radically different that no one has understood it yet. The truth of the matter probably is that while the non-West seems to have similarities with the West’s international political experience, it is somehow different enough to prompt new research in the general field of comparative politics, especially in the methodological dimension. To put it another way, unified theories of international politics or partial generalizations have not been affected by the emergence of the non-West; however, analyses and comparisons of country development have gained new prominence in the literature of the discipline of international politics. There do seem to be many novel features of the new countries that have had little if any bearing on the theory of international politics. This is not to say that these novelties will never affect theory construction – they may. It is merely to say that nonWest peculiarities make difficult the prediction of states’ behavior in this area of the world. Some of these features include: the lack of traditional broad-based nationalist 8

For recent elaborations of the thesis that the development of Western and non-Western politics can be understood in terms of common theoretical variables, see Lipset (1963), The first new nation (pp. 15–98); and Moore (1966), Social origins of dictatorship and democracy.

160

A. A. Said et al.

underpinning of the older European and American states; the absence of the working institutions of the Western states; the retention of many of their traditional values. Absent, then, are many of the traditional “constants” upon which past predictions of international state behavior from domestic sources have been based. Contemporary studies of the non-West are definable more in terms of their broad generalizations about development rather than their relevant analyses. Facts have been confused with issues and theory with reality. Comparative politics has become synonymous with crisis politics. The international system is dissected in an attempt to accept or reject what is described as “prescribed” or “achieved” behavior. Generalizations about traditional and revolutionary forces have appeared all encompassing in their attempt to unlock new doors of understanding. Western thinking about the non-West has become systematized. By sacrificing accuracy for the sake of simplicity, there has been a tendency to reduce diagrammatically the maze of interrelationship of forces, concepts, and ideas in the development of nations. While we must be aware of the difficulties that would ensue when theory would confront and be confronted with the realities of history, we should neither become “theory enamored” or “history captivated.” […] In the non-West mind, democracy is not synonymous with modernization or communism with exploitation. The non-West finds its identity by comparing itself to East and West and rejecting most of both. The non-Westerner defines himself by contrast with others and then concluding that he is different. The skeletal structure of the political modernization process should be identified. As professor Rupert Emerson has suggested, the basic qualifications of a “modern” state are the ability to live, to produce, and to organize in a fashion that satisfies the needs and aspirations of its society. On a higher level of generalization, the most trustworthy indices of the success or failure of any political system – Western or non-Western – can be abstracted from the advance made toward the goal of need satisfaction. The maintenance of internal order and the preservation of the state’s external security are minimal, if not fundamental, requirements. For some of the emerging states, a major source of difficulty, and even potential disaster, is the absence of any kind of national solidarity. The broad gap between old and new, modern and premodern, and radical and conservative elements of society forms a formidable barrier to political transition. The ultimate result is permanent disjuncture between the cosmopolitan and the local, the literate and the illiterate, and the rulers and the ruled. National unity is further impeded by the divisive effects of the incorporation within a single political framework of differing racial, tribal, caste, religious, and linguistic communities. When substantial sectors of the population are barely aware of the existence of either the state or its government, it is nearly impossible to enlist the active participation of the people in the creation of a viable state, much less to set in motion the processes of economic development. For this reason, Afro-Asian political leaders have continually emphasized national unity, the symbols of sovereignty and independence, and enlarging the state apparatus. Although the social and political integration of diverse elements demands first priority, the Afro-Asian states have assumed the broader task of seeking to exercise power and influence as active participants in the international system.

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

5.3.2.3

161

Prospects for Theory

The discussion of the state of scholarship and the limitations inherent in theorizing about the non-West was a wrecking operation. This can be accounted for partially by the factor that both Western and non-Western scholars and theoreticians have based their concepts on linkages thought to have existed in the past. The expectations as well as the fears of serious students and statesmen during the pre- and immediate post-independence phase of the majority of new states were based on a connection between democratic theory, stability, and modernization. This equation has been articulated in many variations. It generally states that stability plus democratization (broadening the base, interest aggregation, etc.) equals at minimum the necessary preconditions for political modernization. An equation of this sort has apparently served as a model for many scholars. The assumption being that if one examined a national actor against the model, the stage of development could be revealed and point the direction in which further study could proceed. While this was logical methodology, it has not proved useful in understanding the political phenomena of the non-West. Perhaps, the most important reason for this was based on the factor that these three concepts are normative in nature and lack precision. They are also Western concepts evolved from the political evolution intimately connected with Western nation-states. Since their value to the West is hard to define, the attempt to superimpose these on a framework for non-Western studies was doomed to failure from the start. […] In spite of the temptation, the problem of political development must be approached in a less-grand manner. As suggested above, a more useful method of inquiry would be to determine to what extent the minimum requirements of political modernization are met by means and practices actually employed in a given national or regional context. In the study of the non-West, there should be an attempt to cut away, or at least to deemphasize, some of the more misleading generalities employed by contemporary non-Western leaders in their search for identity. Questions of particular national destinies ought to be placed in a more accurate historical perspective. There should be an examination concerning the extent of the non-West’s preparation for the task of adapting to relevant contemporary conditions, the underlying assumptions and postulates of their situation as they conceive it, its attitudes toward the process of change, the problem of direction in their history, and the concept of the nature of the non-Western personality. It is difficult to generalize about the non-West because of this lack of criteria. Modernization has as many meanings as there are national actors in the non-West. In one-party states, it may mean broadening the party base; in others, it might well take on a revisionist form by striking alliances with hitherto traditional powers. Additionally, modernization may take the form of acquisition of a transistor radio or a Western suit. There are no commonly agreed upon criteria about what being modern means or implies. In this sense, the constitution of political reality in the non-West is relevant. The nature of political reality varies from actor to actor. For some, the concept of

162

A. A. Said et al.

modernization might be perceived as politically inimical to his interests. Thus, the theory, as well as some of the methods, need reconsideration. The input used by many scholars has not been relevant politically. While the essence of politics differs from actor to actor, there are similarities as well as differences. One starting point for theorizing in this area may well be an exploration of these factors. In the non-West, such common ground consists of the wish to build (not necessarily modernize) nations, the belief that there is a difference between themselves and the West, and a rejection of the traditional international system. They have a desire to participate but under different, often ill-defined rules. There is a shared rejection of generalized models, especially those of the United States and Soviet Union. […] Research in these areas should be especially rewarding in the next decade. The thrust of theorizing should take the form of trying to uncover the true similarities of the non-West. At the same time, exposing the differences and divergencies will come as a concomitant in the following manner. As previously stated, the non-West is involved in nation-building. From Gambia to Indonesia, this is a similarity at once obvious but occasionally elusive. The differences appear in the approaches to this problem as well as the hierarchy of underlying values. Some of these values come from the traditional sector, some come from the West, and still others represent a synthesis that blends the two. It will be necessary to explore this facet with the analytical and methodological tools appropriate to the subject. Content analysis of written communications, for example, would have an imperceptible statistical base when dealing with a state which has traditionally not made very much use of written materials. One must consider what is researchable in the non-West. The systematic political science research possible in the West becomes problematic in the non-West. Discovery of roots of power and its uses are easily obscured by assumptions having no relevance to the subject. The behavior of actors is observable and more attention should be given to the actual rather than the rhetorical behavior of these states. This should be analyzed in a structure that emphasizes political phenomena. If the behavior indicates a quest for democracy, stability, and modernization; then these concepts have relevance. However, one should not approach political research with a model to which the behavior must conform. Rather, allow the political patterns to dictate the concepts that may or may not evolve. In the final analysis, it is the theoretician who must devise a research model. If, in the past, this has been conditioned by some academic placing of the cart before the horse, it is hoped that the future will not be characterized by Don Quixote’s galloping after windmills. While the results of past effort seem frustrating and the contradictions inherent in approaching the non-West seem insurmountable, theorists have an opportunity to break with the academic past in these studies. This can be accomplished by limiting exploration to that which can reasonably be discovered. Theorizing should be viewed against a backdrop of understanding. Theories of the recent past have not met this criterion. The gap between theory and understanding vis-à-vis the non-West is widening. It is now the task of the theorist to narrow it. The relevance of political phenomena ultimately is politically,

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

163

not economically or socially based. One should always approach the non-West with the inquiry, Politics for What?

5.4 The African Phenomenon Said, A. A. (1968). The African phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

5.4.1 Preface Said, A. A. (1968). Preface. In A. A. Said, The African phenomenon (pp. vii–viii). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Because so many books on Africa have been published in recent years, it is necessary to justify this undertaking. To this analysis of the African phenomenon I bring a background of non-Western birth and American academic training in political science. In the past six years I have made several long and short trips throughout East, North, West and Central Africa. My role in Africa ranged from Rockefeller research scholar to American Specialist for the U.S. Department of State. During these visits I lectured in almost every major institution of higher learning in independent Africa. I have discussed foreign policy issues and the problems of nation-building with Africans from various walks of life. Having observed the realities of what are usually referred to as “underdeveloped” states of the world – sometimes euphemistically categorized as “emerging” or “developing” states – I became increasingly aware that there is a wide gulf between image and realities in prevalent thinking about Africa. The present confrontation between the modern, developed West and Africa has brought face to face hundreds of millions of Whites, “natives” of the traditional international system, and Blacks, “intruders” to the system. Both “natives” and “intruders” speak a language unintelligible to one another, yet both speak ever more loudly in an effort to make themselves known. Scholars and diplomats of the West are engaged in a massive attempt to understand the nature of Africa. They have produced increasingly provocative studies and have advanced a cacophony of exotic theories on the “African mystique.” Yet, in trying to understand the continent, both men of learning and men of action are discouraged by the striking disproportion between effort and reward. Though vastly impressed by the excitement of the African adventure, many wellmeaning American liberals have failed to serve their subject matter well. On one hand, they have led the public to expect too much of the fledgling states; on the other,

164

A. A. Said et al.

they have been too quick to forgive the excessive African indulgence in what might be called “political cannibalism.” Americans must recognize the contradictions inherent in the double standards which they so readily apply in their comparative view of Africa and their own country. Logically, a sincere concern for civil rights and civil liberties in the United States should be matched by an equivalent concern for individual freedoms in Africa. One would expect the general attitude of anti-extremism in the United States to have its parallel in some degree of reservation about African extremism. Black supremacy in Africa should not be ignored by the liberal opponents of White supremacy in the United States. To continue to apply double standards and dual practices is to engage in a strange sort of intellectual witchcraft in which the “uncivilized” nations are scarcely judged at all. At the other extreme, many American conservatives see nothing of value coming out of independent Africa. They readily condemn contemporary African growing pains as incurable diseases. They regard the African as totally incapable of controlling his own political destiny. This book considers Africa as a unified phenomenon. While it recognizes that Africa is a continent of manifold diversities, it stresses the common denominators of independent Africa. The emphasis on patterns and theories, however, must not do violence to the facts. While the men and events that I have chosen as illustrations of theories are few in number, I believe that they reflect the African reality. I have not attempted to analyze the international relations of the African states. Rather, I have attempted to examine the implications of the presence of an independent Africa in world affairs by raising the following issues: How will the international system respond to the impact of Africa? How will Africa act to fit itself, find its place, and, in general, adapt itself to an essentially Western international system? In other words, I have sought to determine whether the traditional international system will become appreciatively different as a result of the impact of Africa, or whether Africa will find it necessary to become more and more Western.

5.4.2 Africa’s Impact upon the International System Said, A. A. (1968). Africa’s impact upon the international system. In A. A. Said, The African phenomenon (pp. 144–159). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. The emergence of the non-Western African states has had an undeniable, yet not easily measurable, impact on international politics. In the past, the international system has undergone considerable change and readjustment. In this sense, the emergence of numerous new states poses simply another challenge to a system fully accustomed to challenge and sufficiently flexible to respond. It is readily apparent, however, that two crucial differences make the African states’ impact on the system unique. Most evident is the more than doubled number of actors on the international

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

165

scene since 1945. The international political stage has been beset by a virtual horde of new “bit players” whose demands for prominent roles remain unfulfilled. At the same time, the number of “lead players” has been drastically reduced. Prior to 1945 the system seldom, if ever, faced the task of so quickly absorbing changes of such far-reaching consequence. The second crucial difference between past and present challenges to the system is the nature of the challengers, as perceived by the system itself. The numerous and culturally dissimilar Afro-Asian states are too handily identified by the established members of the system as obviously “non-Western.” But, to lump the new states together into such a facile category clearly demonstrates the magnitude and meaning of the Western world’s misunderstanding of, and maladjustment to, the new challengers. When confronted by the unfamiliar, an individual tends to react in a manner which least disturbs his sense of self. He is especially inclined to apply his own self-image as a criterion of comparison in the evaluation of others and is often satisfied with the conclusion that “they” are somehow “different.” The peoples of the Western world have reacted with such pattern of behavior to the unfamiliar aspects of the new African states. Because the Western peoples are not yet capable of isolating and identifying the positive aspects of the African states, the underdeveloped states are negatively perceived as non-Western in their heritage, their value and belief systems, and their orientation to their own societies and to the rest of the world. As no longer tractable dependencies or colonies, the new states clearly fail to fit the collective Western self-image and are automatically assigned to the antithetical category – the “non-West.”

5.4.2.1

The Ideologies of African Uniqueness

As a creation of the Western world, the international system reflects the values, beliefs, ideals, realities, and experiences of those nations normally referred to as “Western.” (It should be noted here that “Western” is employed not as a geographical designation, but as a label under which all nations sharing basic characteristics are included. The Soviet Union, for example, comes under this category.) The peoples and states of non-Western origin and heritage have only recently come to play – or attempt to play – a significant and independent role in world affairs. For centuries, the “relations of states” was taken to mean – and in a very real sense could only be conceived as meaning the relations between Western states. Political relations between the West and other parts of the world were usually the result of pressures by a particular Western state against one or more non-Western peoples. There was, therefore, no established pattern of interaction between the West and the non-West. In the years prior to general independence in Africa, nationalism provided the most effective driving force for political action, and anti-colonialism served as the keystone of nationalism. It provided by far the most solid and most central basis for nationalistic fervor. It was necessary for African leaders to provide their cadres and their peoples with an ideal around which they could rally and in the service of which they could

166

A. A. Said et al.

establish unity. Though independence was stressed as a positive goal, it derived much of its appeal from the negative vector of anti-colonialism. Indeed, history suggests that it is far simpler – and far more effective – to unify the masses and arouse them to action by emphasizing the necessity of eradicating an evil, than by stressing the desirability of establishing a new order. Elimination of an existing visible enemy, destruction of the “old order,” provides a people with an immediate and readily perceived objective. The often vague and nebulous concept of national identity is less easily grasped, requires projection into the future, and cannot, by itself, adequately sustain mass action. In the pre-independence period, then, anti-colonialism was employed as a tool with which to forge and enforce nationalism. In the post-independence period, anti-colonialism lost its effectiveness as an adequate support of the artificial and essentially negative nationalism of the new African states. But the old slogans of anti-colonialism were not completely discarded. They were employed instead in the performance of a new function and in the service of a new cause. […] The new states claim to be fearful of penetration and takeover by their former colonial masters. Furthermore, any form or degree of penetration of their societies by a member of the Western world is interpreted as an encroachment upon their sovereignties. Charges of neo-colonialism are directed against the United States, as well as against the traditional European colonialists. The United States has been judged by many Africans to be guilty of neo-colonialism by virtue of its ties and associations with Europe and its short-lived imperialist adventures in other parts of the world at the close of the nineteenth century. And because the United States is clearly stronger and more powerful than any of its European allies, it usually is assigned a position high on the list of those powers which are to be watched and dealt with cautiously. As a result of these attitudes, the new African states draw a clear-cut distinction between “modernization” and “Westernization”; they deny any degree of congruence between the two concepts. All the new states seek to modernize themselves, to build viable economies, to establish new political institutions to become, in a word, a part of the developed world. This intense concern with rapid development is clearly evidenced throughout Africa. Enormous and expensive dams, shiny new steel mills, and unnecessarily extensive airlines and shipping lines are only the more conspicuous manifestations of this preoccupation with modernization. Relatively little effort is directed to the less ostentatious, but more essential, requirements of modern state development. The reason for this obsession with the conspicuous is obvious. The vast physical and fiscal dimensions of dam construction projects add immeasurably to their usefulness as symbols of modernization. In contrast, long-range conservation programs are not as exciting to the imagination, nor do they lend themselves to direct, visual appreciation by the masses of the people. And it is not only for the benefit of the peoples of their own countries that the more flamboyant showpiece projects are selected: the developing African states are equally concerned with impressing the West. In addition to its function as a prestige symbol, modernization is recognized by contemporary African leadership as a useful means of strengthening the forces of

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

167

internal cohesion. It can serve to maintain popular passions, loyalties, and willingness to make sacrifices. And these, of course, are essential ingredients of a fully developed sense of national consciousness. Westernization, on the other hand, has been singled out for attack. It is interpreted by Africa as a value-laden concept, whereas modernization is perceived as a neutral term, devoid of all such connotations. Modernization is seen as the heart of the African problem, while Westernization is dismissed as inappropriate to the African environment. Africa is, in effect, saying to the West: “We seek to be as modern as you are, but we reject your mode of development in favor of a form or forms which we ourselves will determine and which will reflect our own heritage and cultural patterns.” In this fashion, anti-Westernization is promoted for both internal and external consumption. And as a corollary of modernization, it contributes effectively to the intensity of nationalism in the new African states. The remaining facet of contemporary African nationalism is neutralism. The projection of a neutralist image is equally important as a means of enhancing the prestige of African leadership and of increasing the sense of national identity. Commitment to either bloc of the contemporary bi-polar configuration of the international system is interpreted as weakness; however, non-alignment is conceived as an expression of both the will and the ability to stand alone as a people and as a state. The prestige factor is a crucial one, and the fact that non-alignment encourages, rather than discourages, the cheerful acceptance of material assistance from any and all sources does not diminish its effectiveness as a manipulative political tool. The state posture of non-alignment continues to reflect the forces of nationalism which were implicit in the slogans and policies of anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism, and it retains the driving force of modernization without commitment to Westernization. […]

5.4.2.2

A View of the Future

The African world has not settled upon a clearly organized attitude toward the West. Whether it is rational neutrality, in the case of the uncommitted, or simply confused state leadership, the point is that Africa finds it difficult to identify, much less articulate, her proper role in the world. The international system was characterized above as a distinctly Western system, and as a system currently adjusting to internally precipitated or directed changes. Two crucial developments were emphasized: the far-reaching drive towards integration, and the growing interdependence of states. These are, of course, closely related phenomena, and they suggest that the system will continue to undergo fundamental changes in the next two or three decades. For example, it can be expected that new and varying types of regional organizations will emerge, and that the military function of existing international organizations will be displaced by developmental functions. It can be safely assumed that the operational system of the foreseeable future – though fundamentally different in some respects from that which exists today – will remain a distinctly Western system. The major forces of change and readjustment

168

A. A. Said et al.

are centrifugal and derive most of their energy from the Western world. And it can be expected that the evolving system will continue to reflect its original Western orientation. What then of the impact of the African and other non-Western nations who are only now seeking to establish their place and assume their roles within the international political system? Two effects of their impact have already been discussed: the greatly increased number of actors on the international scene, and the emergence to a place of prominence of peoples with a distinctly non-Western background. It was argued further that the non-Western states bring to the international political scene two forces which currently operate in direct opposition to interdependence and integration: rigidly defined independence and contrived ideologies of uniqueness. It is clear that the new states will, in the short run, exert some pressure for change on the system. They will continue, for example, to raise new issues and question the relevance of others. It is probable, however, that the impact of the non-West in the system will be both limited in time and peripheral in effect. Africa is not capable of drastically altering the system or forcing it to change the direction of its development. The forces of integration and interdependence are strong enough, and their momentum high enough, to oppose and eventually overcome the non-Western forces of uniqueness and independence. In the long-run, the Western system – whatever its future form – will force Africa to change, to adjust, and to conform. Despite their loudly voiced claims to the contrary, the African states will find it impossible to modernize without becoming more and more Westernized. The very direction and intensity of their preoccupation with modernization acts to accelerate the Westernizing process; each developmental goal achieved is an intermediate step towards Westernization. As they continue to operate within the international system and involve themselves in increased contacts and more complex relationships with the Western states, the African states will necessarily respond to forces within the system; in doing so, they will begin to conform to the Western pattern. They will find it virtually impossible to maintain their imagined separateness from a system of increasingly integrated, supranational actors. As modernizing members of the system, they will eventually discover that independence is a relative term and that the characteristic interdependence of the system is inescapable – and profitable as well. The Western system was superimposed upon Africa for a full colonial century, roughly 1850 to 1950. During this period, Africa was dominated by the Western states and played no independent international role. Upon attaining their freedom, the African states separated from the West, asserting their independence and uniqueness. This state of affairs may last beyond 1975; yet, it is likely that before the close of the century, the African states will find their place within the changing, but essentially Western, international system and will conform more closely to Western patterns of state behavior. It is no longer a question of how the international system will absorb the impact of an emerging Africa; nor even whether it will do so. The more relevant issue is how the new African states will adapt themselves to a changing, Western system of

5 Toward a Global Perspective on International Politics

169

international political action. The consensual basis of the international system has been only temporarily disturbed by the emergence of Africa. It will reassert itself as the new African states find it necessary to conform to the Western pattern of political behavior. The international system has been affected only peripherally by an onslaught of peoples who will soon cease to appear as “intruders” to the system and will eventually take their place beside the “natives” of the system.

References Almond, G. A. (1963). Political systems and political change. American Behavioral Scientist, 10, 2–10. Almond, G. A., & Coleman, J. S. (Eds.). (1960). Politics of the developing areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Almond, G. A., & Powell, G. B. (1966). Comparative politics: A developmental approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1965). The civic culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Asher, R. E., et al. (1962). Development of the emerging countries: An agenda for research. Washington: The Brookings Institution. Banfield, E. C. (1961). Political influence: A new theory of urban politics. New York: Free Press. Binder, L. (1963, September). National integration and political development. Paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Cutright, P. (1963). National political development: Measurement and analysis. American Sociological Review, 28, 253–256. Dahl, R. A. (1971). Who governs?. Paris: Armand Colin. Deutsch, K. W. (1953). Nationalism and social communication. Cambridge, MA: Institute of Technology Press. Deutsch, K. W. (1961). Social mobilization and political development. American Political Science Review, 55, 483–514. Green, L. S. (1966). Comments on Professor Van Dyke’s paper. In J. C. Charlesworth (Ed.), A design for political science: Scope, objectives and methods (pp. 18–23). Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science. Green, P. (1966). Deadly logic: The theory of nuclear deterrence. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Kaplan, M. (1957). System and process in international politics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Kariel, H. S. (1966). The promise of politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Said, A. A. (1963). Concepts of international politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lipset, S. M. (1963). The first new nation. New York: Basic Books. Lystad, R. A. (Ed.). (1965). The African world: A survey of social research. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Miller, A. R. (1964). Review articles – The underdeveloped study of political development. World Politics, 16(3), 468–482. Moore, B., Jr. (1965). Political power and social theory. New York: Harper and Row. Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Boston: Beacon Press. Pye, L. W. (1966). Aspects of political development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Rosenau, J. N. (Ed.). (1967). Domestic sources of foreign policy. New York: The Free Press. Said, A. A. (1960). Non-Western traditions and the Western world. Free World Forum, 2(1), 3–5. Said, A. A. (1968). The African phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

170

A. A. Said et al.

Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1968). Theory of international relations: The crisis of relevance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Staley, E. S. (1954). Future of the underdeveloped countries. New York: Harper and Row, Inc. Strausz-Hupe, R. (1959). The protracted conflict. New York: Doubleday and Company.

Chapter 6

A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

6.1 Commentary: Changing Requirements of U.S. Security Said, A. A. (1970). Commentary: changing requirements of U.S. security. In A. A. Said (Ed.), America’s world role in the 70s (pp. 1–15). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. For the past twenty-five years, the United States has been groping for a meaningful framework to guide its foreign policy. It has invoked rhetoric to compensate for objectives and has sought parameters without defining a scope or specifying a magnitude. It has acknowledged its radically altered world role and yet has not departed from its provincial prejudices. The United States has perceived itself as waging a war for the “minds of men” and has done little to instill confidence in the minds of the men for which it is warring. The 1960s have demonstrated the successive failures of our flounderings. Our military and economic prowess has not reduced international turbulence, nor has our surplus of commitments and pledges brought stability and security. We seek alliances to preserve ideals that don’t exist. We seek victories against elusive and often unknown enemies. Implicit in our confusion, we seek ordering principles that will provide a foreign policy outlook to give us a clear perspective of ourselves and our role in the world. Until the recent disenchantment with the Vietnam war, we had convinced ourselves that our world role or “mission” was to act as the defender of democracy, with its assorted synonyms. We took on a contemporary “White man’s burden,” Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, was the longest serving professor at American University and founder of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at the institution’s School of International Service. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_6

171

172

A. A. Said et al.

shielded by the pacifying verbiage of an American foreign policy tradition that we interpreted as benevolent and primarily concerned with the preservation of “free institutions.” The basic tenet of this providential policy was a distorted and virulent anticommunism. Every indication of any disequilibrium in the international system somehow became related to communism. As a corollary assumption, we maintained that every nation saw this ideological struggle with the same intensity that we did. Neutrality thus became a preposterous stance and we rallied to the cause of anticommunism, supporting regimes professing it regardless how sordid they might be. At the very time we were undertaking new global responsibilities and assessing world conditions, profound transformations were occurring in the international system that were to make anachronistic many of our perceptions. The emergence of non-Westerners as independent participants in the international system, the decline of Britain and France, and the reappearance of a bold China in Southeast Asia disrupted the Europocentric world view to which we were accustomed. We failed to understand the magnitude of these changes and continued to devise policies applicable to the world of the past. “Containment” for example, became extended until we were attempting to “contain” most of the world. A policy devised as a response to aggression in one part of Europe became so universalized and all-inclusive that it demonstrated blatant disregard for worldwide political and cultural peculiarities, assumed that our fears and goals were shared by all nations, and further assumed that nations act with primary concern for ideology. Ideology has been the tragic element of American foreign policy. By picturing ourselves as the enlightened saviors of all that is noble, we have been able to rationalize our world involvement not in terms of the preservation of a dubious balance of power but by seeing the United States as the champion of freedom against the nefarious force of communism, with the Soviet Union and China as its tangible manifestations. The world thus becomes a battlefield between God and Satan. Compromise is unthinkable, because collusion with the Devil is ungodly. Only complete elimination of evil is a just goal. As in the two world wars, America sought to transform, not ameliorate, the system. Unable fully to exercise its righteous wrath without nuclear holocaust, the United States had to accept the notion of limited war with limited goals, limited success, and little transformation of the world. MacArthur’s phenomenal reception in the United States after his return from Korea, the McCarthy mania of the early fifties, and the pronouncements of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles illustrate the frustration and internalized compensations that accompanied our inability to employ total force for total change. By the early sixties, we had begun to accept reality and hesitantly called for a world made safe for diversity, which presumably meant that we were not about to annihilate the Soviet Union. Yet we persisted in an intransigent refusal to analyze realistically a world not nearly as concerned with ideological professions as we. The United States substituted a fantasy of constitutional parliamentarianism for the alleviation of poverty, disease, and human misery – the real concerns of the non-West.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

173

The seventies will mean a confrontation with radically altered conditions from those that prevailed in the sixties. The legacy of Vietnam will finally convince us that our own security is not endangered by indigenous ideological quarrels thousands of miles away. What endangers us most is the continued irrelevance of our world perspective in an international system that no longer subscribes to our concerns nor sympathizes with our goals. In analyzing the changing conditions of international relations, the concept of value-free analysis has not served U.S. policy makers well. Security is too much a part of human life to be placed in a vacuum free of human values. When security is considered, emotions, prejudices, and the biases of individuals and groups play a part in every political system. Political considerations, not economic, social, or even physical ones, are most important in determining the objectives and goals of security. The question of the purpose to which the security is to be put is above all political. In a similar manner, the question of how much one values security is also political. Answer these questions and a political framework for security can be determined. Then, input from other disciplines can enter the picture: likewise, value-free analysis can be of use in determining which systems can be most effective. These two stages may be viewed as policy determination and implementation. In past years, an enormous number of books have appeared using other than political forms of analysis. Their authors have used a high degree of academic abstraction in their discussions of various aspects of U.S. security policy. They would have us believe that they can write calmly about such subjects as the number of casualties in a nuclear attack, or the moves of great powers as a game. Their abstractness has reduced most of these theories to meaninglessness. From hindsight, we can say that their approach misses the heart of the problem of security and some, caring more for method than substance, have constructed theoretical worlds more speculative than those of the medieval scholastic contemplating the angels on a pinhead. The problems of theorizing about security, however, are intractable to the best efforts of the political scientists; its elusive nature restricts the range of effective conceptualization about it. As a concept, security combines two essential ingredients joined in a complex relationship: an objective ingredient dealing with an actual physical set of conditions, and a subjective one dealing with the feeling of being safe, or the perception of security. The first set of factors is quantifiable, the second defies measurements. Perception of security, as it relates to foreign-policy making, has historically demonstrated the subjective ingredient of security. The enemy, the x-factor, has always been the paramount fear catalyst in policy formulation. The unknown nature of another nation’s capabilities serves to distort security requirements of the perceiving state and create fear. The threat posed by a foreign state is not necessarily congruent with reality. States often react or overreact for reasons unrelated to the realities of the situation. The idea of reaction to threat is reinforced with the fusion of capabilities and intentions, which leads a government to conclude that everything a foreign state is capable of doing unto it, it intends to do unto that state. This was the rationale behind the NATO land force in Western Europe: that the Russian army stationed in Eastern

174

A. A. Said et al.

Europe intended to sweep into the West. Whether valid or not, such a perception is a prime example of the subjectivity of security, whereby capabilities are conclusively interpreted as intentions. The perception of threat is not restricted solely to fear of one particular national actor within the international system. Fear of a breakdown in the system-process is another source of insecurity. The extensive system of alliances and treaties as described by Kautilya was an outgrowth of sociopsychological drives, rather than a reflection of political necessities. In addition, rising levels of expectation on the part of a state have historically produced illusions of national missions and hence perceived security roles that are boundless. Neither our ideas nor our attitudes regarding security have changed much since antiquity. We need to go through the painful exercise of applying, in the words of an old colleague, “massive detergent” to our thinking about security and its problems. The state that defines its security in the old terms and seeks it by the old methods must reconcile itself to living indefinitely with frustration. This volume of essays returns, often imperfectly, security studies to their rightful place in the political spectrum of things and events. The contributors are not detached scholars separated from real considerations. All of them are well acquainted with the problems of policy making in security. A good number have been consultants, lecturers, and even officials who have undertaken missions on behalf of U.S. departments most concerned with national security. […] Security arrangements in the seventies necessitate a sophistication that may well be alien to our diplomatic tradition. We are inadequately prepared to respond to a world asserting itself and in the process of these assertions, condemning their onetime allies and benefactors. Confusion and a policy lacking ends and publicizing dubious means have characterized the past twenty-five years of our security perceptions. A drastic reassessment of a world in the throes of constant change will convince us that a new self-image, stressing moderation and acknowledging the pluralism of the seventies, must be forged. The messages of a bygone era cannot continue to be our clarion. As we enter the seventies the international system will become less burdened by political constants. The accelerated pace of developments in technology and communications will claim heavier tolls in political stability. The responsibilities of the future will continue to forfeit the debts of the past. Nations will suffer an even greater fragmentation of their world views. Fragmentation drives states – especially the great powers – into an obsession with isolated parts: national interests narrowly defined and threats vastly exaggerated. Innocuous ideas – battles for the minds of men – are substituted for painful ones – food for their stomachs. The perception of the national purpose becomes increasingly self-centered. In such a climate, ends are forgotten, as states find themselves compelled to redouble their efforts to devise new and greater security roles. International politics becomes an enormous “caucus race” that forces everyone to run faster and faster just to stay in place. The means become all-absorbing, and national actors become blind

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

175

to the very concept of ends. The idea grows that ends must wait upon the discovery of means. Hence proceeds a willful and proud commitment to better and bigger guns – a drive that involves escape, substitution, and the undercurrents of anxiety. If the substitution of means for ends is the essence of the self-centered image of national purpose, we can better recognize the perils in which the search for security has and will continue to place states. Sanity is in proportion with placed purpose. There is no standard for sanity or for reasonable perception of security when the whole question of ends is omitted. The obsession, however, is a great comfort to the obsessed – it is a retreat from the real ordeal. Let us not question the genuineness of the relief when men are allowed to go back to their test tubes and facts, to their bombs and alliance systems. Ends without means add up to futility; means not related to ends culminate in frustration. Power balancing power, as has been the case traditionally, is nothing more than power challenging power. It is no wonder that the international system has never been more than conditionally stable. It is the peculiar responsibility – and privilege – of the United States to dare to be different from the imperial powers of the past: to relate our means to the ends of a better world. Only we are reasonably satisfied in the security of our national interest and therefore can perceive the direct relationship between self-interest and international order. The United States must refashion its outlook toward revolution, supplanting the current notion of synonymity between revolution and an outdated monolithic communism. The United States must adopt a less provincial philosophy that doesn’t project its hallowed value of stability qua stability as a goal for a world essentially in turmoil. Most of the world is experiencing the heavy pressure of powerful forces and ideas, often accompanied by violence. If the United States persists in classifying all violent change as evil and sanctifies “order” for its own sake, then Americans will have to face the surprising fact that for all its weaponry and technological sophistication, the United States exercises little ideological influence and our identification as a friend of sometimes ruthless and reactionary regimes has greatly discredited us. This will be difficult for United States policy makers because stability has had built-in societal value for so long. Because of domestic unrest, the desire to project this value into the international system could become an irresistible temptation in spite of the fact that these policies were ineffective in the past. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to perceive a world whose problems may resemble those of the United States, but Americans are nevertheless fundamentally committed to a universalization of their peculiar domestic milieu. The gap appears to be widening and will, in all probability, continue to do so. Hopefully, however, a comprehension of the situation will allow a compensation factor to be applied toward the many areas of the world caught in the throes of upheaval. The primary conditioning element toward revolution will be the domestic rather than the international environment. There are three fundamental reasons for this: (1) The United States is in a stage of development that is substantially different from that of the rest of the world. (2) The problems associated with this stage of development have not been previously experienced in the context of this stage of development. (3)

176

A. A. Said et al.

The third reason is an outgrowth of the preceding two and turns on their conditioning the United States’ perception of revolution in the international context. Regardless of what values the United States may or may not hold vis-à-vis revolution, its ability to influence revolutionary trends in the world has been and will be limited. American power in international politics has not been particularly relevant or useful in dealing with revolution because it has focused on its manifestations rather than its nature. If revolution is to be influenced, a great deal of effort and energy is required, which may make the cure unduly prohibitive or even counterproductive. Furthermore, the domestic sources of support for the United States involvement and intervention in revolutionary situations in the world is limited now and probably will be in the foreseeable future. […] Unless our policies reflect a realization that the United States is in a stage of development that far exceeds that of most nations of the world and that problems will be handled in a manner that is alien to the idealized American notions of law and “Christian justice,” we shall continue to decline as a major power. A rational assessment of the sources of revolution, and a framework of response that lacks the paranoia and ideological obsession that have been our customary reactions, must be sought. These essays do not represent all the issues of United States security in the seventies. It would be foolhardy to claim that they do. They raise questions to which there are no “right” answers, only judgments of preferability. Even in these judgments, the editor and contributors to this volume differ among themselves. If the seventies have anything in common with the sixties, it will be that the perspective from which we view these issues in the first year of the decade will change vastly by its end. This is the lesson of our era: change is rapid. Concepts of security that are valid one year are scattered on the refuse heap the next. If it is the task of the state to survive, then those who ponder security problems should not become enamored with their own alternatives. This must be so because in the final analysis, requirements of security depend on terms of reference as well as a state of mind. Both the perspective and the mentality must be flexible enough to meet the changing demands of the seventh decade of this century. For the world is not about to eat cake.

6.2 Revolutionism Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (1971). Revolutionism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

177

6.2.1 Preface Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (1971). Preface. In Revolutionism (pp. vii–viii). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. The exploration of the philosophical implications of revolution has not been exhausted. With overemphasis on methodology and detail, authors have pursued the many theoretical and situational variables. The questions “Revolution – why?” and “Revolution for what?” continue to prove intractable to the best efforts of analysts. Symptomatic of contemporary emphasis on specific events and indifference to a total perspective on man,1 many writers have provided a more insightful knowledge of various revolutions and revolutionary situations. The necessity for a perspective within which to order the data must be reinforced. Revolution is not exclusively the result of a situation. While a particular situation may serve as a revolutionary spark, the essence of revolution is found in man’s quest for relevance. Revolution is a highly subjective phenomenon whose manifestations have often obscured its essential nature. The over-romanticized view of revolution prevalent in our age has distorted the reality of revolution; we tend to be captured by the romantic mystique. If one rejects the concept of revolution as the beginning of something new, then a rather simple but pertinent truth is being ignored. Whether violent or nonviolent (Mao Tse-tung or Gandhi), the goal of revolution is rebirth and the affirmation of life. The quest for faith is one which all beliefs share from the secular (communism and nationalism) to the theological (Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity). On this ground, mankind shares an affinity. We consciously avoid the terminological clichés found in many works of political scientists; many are but traps couching partial evidence. We submit a number of concepts and generalizations – more than ever we need perceptive simplifications to gather more relevant matter. The authors are deeply indebted to the empirical studies of social and political scientists. Without their illustrious labors we would have a still cruder understanding of our world. But in the realm of interpretation and basic meaning, they deserve more elaboration. We maintain that without a meaningful perspective the important questions of existence, which are the real problems of modern man, would go unnoticed in a barrage of fragmented detail. Now, more than ever, we must seek commonalities among those things that have been arbitrarily regarded as diverse. We must confess that we do not fight shy of normative judgments in our discussion of man and politics. It is only when the minds of students of politics are turned to the problems that divide men that the task of building a better world may begin. To approach these problems with human compassion, the tools of the laboratory and the problems induced by one’s own system of inquiry must be put into proper 1

Note from the editors: Said’s early writings follow the conventions of the time in employing terms such ‘man’ where contemporary usage (including usage in Said’s later writings) would substitute more inclusive terminology.

178

A. A. Said et al.

perspective. The cause of scientific truth is no more advanced than that of human freedom if “frontier thinking” implies a suspension of moral judgment on the objects of inquiry. By a philosophical approach to the phenomenon of revolution, we hope to illustrate the blending of the past and present and to demonstrate that modern man suffers equally from philosophical dislocation and tangible changes in the environment. Our theme will concentrate on revolutionary activity in the non-West. The United States is used as a point of reference and comparison. We dismiss as arbitrary and artificial the usual topical subdivision into chapters focusing on different regions – as if each had completely exclusive problems. Our labor is part of a larger effort that can be classified only as an intangible “attitude.” We feel that man must be put back into politics and that alienation is partially a result of the isolation of man from a meaningful environment. Man cannot yield his creativity to the impersonality of society and sustain his individuality. Revolution results when society loses the delicate equilibrium that enables man to develop and maintain his individuality with a fulfilling social identity. Hopefully, as long as man survives, revolution will always remain a threatening and promising phenomenon.

6.2.2 Revolutionism: An Ideology Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (1971). Revolutionism: An ideology. In, Revolutionism (pp. 1–11). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Revolutionism has become institutionalized. It is no longer a transient phenomenon characterized by massive political upheaval that acts as an interlude between the disparities of one age and those of the next. Revolution is not simply a political or military action. It is a state of mind that sees man and the state in a process of constant change. As such, it assumes a permanence that cannot be captured within the traditional political order. The credo of revolution has become divorced from the execution of revolution; the intangible and seductive concept of change has succumbed to the idiosyncrasies of the political system. A world characterized by accelerating change dramatically illustrates the shortcomings and inherent inadequacies of the accepted political order. Revolution is an attempt to attack the vestiges of past ages and to inaugurate a philosophy that meets the challenges of the present and the projected possibilities of the future. The fallacy of most revolutionists is that in their commitment to political change they seldom achieve an authentic departure from the old institutions. Revolution is often a synthetic masquerade that outwardly hides the frustrations internally experienced by a state. It usually effects only a temporary institutional departure. In its attempt to formulate a philosophy that will convincingly resolve the dichotomy between tradition and innovation, it assumes the stature of an ideology. This systematic attempt to solve the complexities of the world provides an ideational framework to an essentially

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

179

value-free political milieu. The ideology of revolutionism is a political offspring of an age floundering between the luxury of a self-assured past and the immensity of an uncertain future. Revolutionism – the ideology of constant and total political change – seeks to incorporate the perplexities of an era that is largely reflective of political events, cultural upheavals, and technological advances in the West, into a political philosophy that will have relevance and appeal in the non-West. It is also heralded by the disaffected and disenchanted in the West who are dissatisfied with the by-products of an age of maximum transition. When discussing the non-West, we can only use the West as a point of reference. For the tone and character of Western revolutionism originates in a vastly different environment from the non-West. Westerners are therefore concerned with posing an alternative to conspicuous consumption and the unforeseen problems of technological affluence amid still-existent poverty. Atomization, automation, and alienation are the watchwords of a philosophy that has little relation to a revolutionism that still views technology as a socio-political panacea and cannot yet foresee its devastating by-products. Revolutionism is not simply an outgrowth of the turmoils of the twentieth century. It originates in man’s search for rebirth and is intensified by his reservoir of faith. With the breakdown of the Church as a primary ordering principle, man views life with confusion and the knowledge that the only certainty in life is death. His quest for rebirth, contrasted to his impulse to adhere to an eschatological vision or a charismatic leader, illustrates the precarious dichotomy between individual liberation and enslavement to the state. Revolution still enables man to fulfill his yearnings for the “ought” and to commit himself to the achievement of an earthly paradise. Revolution appeals to the hidden essence of man that rebels against order and is captivated by abstract assurances of achievement and satisfaction in the present life. Many men who once considered their existences fixed refuse to accept the philosophy of things as they are, things as they were, and things as they are destined to be. Man is ever more determined to become master of his own destiny. In this endeavor he is limited only by his intellect and imagination. The belief in change has been conditioned by the primary circumstances of our era. The human condition can be altered. The nature of revolutionary phenomena is bound to the nature of man and his never-ending quest for relevance during the finite period allotted to him on this planet. Born with an irrevocable death sentence, man is engaged in a search for faith that will endow his short-term lease with a deeper, more satisfying meaning. Whether the wellspring has its source in Judaic-Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, or animist origins, man’s quest for faith has common features: it is situational, dynamic, and subjective. Man’s quest for faith is situational in that its interpretations, its manifestations, and the degree of its conscious pursuit are variables dependent upon the operational environment. It is the quest and striving which is universally evident. The spark of faith which man pursues may be manifest or elusive. The faith which he seeks may be founded in the past or the present; its exploration may be facile or arduous.

180

A. A. Said et al.

Paramount, however, is man’s search for human strategy in his attempt to intervene in the human condition. […] Man intrinsically abhors utter rationality, and scientific politics cannot satisfy his intangible valuational needs. In an age when so many people mirror Prufrock’s life “measured out with coffee spoons” and so many more live on the edge of economic despair and the threshold of an age that is alien and frightening, the politics of chaos have startling appeal. Revolution is thus pacifying and electrifying to the human spirit. Life becomes simplified. The world becomes understandable. And the expectations of rebirth and utopia lose their abstractness and become tangible goals worth fighting for. The abstract myths that man has created become the foundations of his economic, political, and social structures. When man begins to doubt these myths, his confidence in the structures undergoes a commensurate decline. Man never ceases his quest for faith although changes of direction and emphasis of manifestation may occur. Man relates himself to the facts of life by creating myths which shield him from, and make comprehensible to him, the realities of social life. Political society is invariably sanctioned by myth. Even such theorists as Hobbes and Locke, who appeal to reason for a basis of political society, posit such notions as “rational man” and “natural right.” The widening of the gap between the environment and the institutions supported by myth provides a revolutionist situation. The revolutionist process becomes heightened when the old beliefs become distorted and their once self-evident meaning clouded with uncertainties. When man can no longer share the beliefs of his ancestors, a break with the past usually translates to disruption of the present. Man’s quest for faith then leads him to abrupt processes of change. Revolutionist changes may be recognized by the demands for a new beginning and the affirmation of rebirth. Most of the time the result is violence, but there have been nonviolent revolutions. In man’s quest for faith and his desire for rebirth, the passion of the human spirit knows no limits in its exuberance. As the gulf between the environment and structures deepens, the search for tomorrow becomes more compelling. When man can no longer believe in the old, the search for faith becomes a condition in seeking something new to fit his altered or transformed circumstances. It is from this symbolic stance that we speak of rebirth. […] Contemporary revolutionism differs from past revolutionary ideology in that it no longer seeks to affirm the power of the West. Though non-Western revolutionists have not as yet formulated an alternative doctrine to the tradition that originated in the Enlightenment, they are philosophically opposed to the supremacy of the West. Both the French and Russian revolutions were peculiarly Western movements that sought to return to, or inaugurate, a form of government and outlook toward man that was rooted in the fabric of Western society. The secularized French trinity, “liberté, egalité, fraternité,” was not a rejection but a glorification of a progressive and virile Western Weltanschauung – a celebration of individualism and nationalism. The French Revolution liberated man from the hierarchy of Church and Empire and permitted him to express his new individualism within the political doctrine of nationalism. The Russian Revolution liberated man from economic enslavement

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

181

by transforming this individualism into a class identification that sought to make synonymous the notions of class emancipation and individual freedom. Contemporary revolutionism is a mixture of this Western thought with an instinctual philosophical disdain for Western culture. While verbally celebrating an alternative to Western civilization, few comprehensive doctrines have been put forward that have widespread appeal and that marshal indigenous cultural resources to be considered authentic non-Western philosophies. Thus, revolutionism is at best a type of revisionism, an attempt at a new blending of Western philosophy to the needs of non-Western culture. Yet the non-Western revolutionists persist in their dream of creating a completely novel political philosophy that will have relevance to their nations, inspire technological achievements, and demonstrate to the West that mere emulation of the onetime colonial powers is not the exclusive ambition of the new elites. Revolutionism is antisupremacist, socialist, and nationalist. It seeks to assert a romantic vision of the past which is both idealized and irrelevant to the contemporary international milieu. It condemns ideology yet adheres to dogma. It doctrinally lauds the collective power of the people but is reflective of the elites. It at once emulates and rejects the West. It aspires to a nationalism that can only artificially arouse the populace. Revolutionism is partially premised on strict political order and partially on an unstructured nihilism. Most importantly, it has features that cannot be generalized. For revolutionism is dependent upon specific political circumstances operating within a particular political environment. […] In the twentieth century the United States has tended to view revolution abroad as essentially an unsettling experience, both from its own standpoint and from that of the international system. It did, however, dichotomize revolutions into those that could be attributed to the communist camp and those that could not. From the first intervention in a communist-oriented revolution (the Archangel campaign in 1918) to Vietnam, the United States has tended to view revolution as a kind of sub rosa back door utilized by communists to gain illegitimate power. However, little thought has been given to the local basis for revolution in those countries in which it occurred. Were the pre-revolution institutions of Russia and China relevant to the then-prevailing conditions of those two societies? The same question might also be raised regarding Vietnam, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Indonesia. The United States has applied a rigid international legal doctrine to many contemporary revolutions, frequently neglecting an examination of possible internal justifications. The antecedents of this attitude have their roots in the abrupt manner in which the United States was expelled from the international paradise of the pre-Wilsonian era. The British Navy could no longer protect the sea lanes; the United States could not remain aloof from European wars. It was the Wilson doctrine which assumed a moralistic stance on the recognition of regimes where it was perceived that power was wrongly acquired. This was also the era of international law and organization which hopefully could be utilized to order the system. The United States subscribed to this aspiration, but remained outside the League of Nations in the belief that it could once again return to a Jamesian state of innocence. When the United States realized that expulsion from paradise precluded any eventual return, its foreign policy

182

A. A. Said et al.

became more rigid, first regarding the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, then in its response to communism, and presently in its attitude toward all revolutions whatever their justification. […] Although individual revolutions, large and small, are not likely to be repeated, the cry for revolution will be heard with increasing frequency in the next third of the century. Environments will become more fragmented, as the consensual basis of domestic and international institutions will continue to narrow. In such an environment, the trend toward authoritarianism, even in democratic societies, will acquire greater momentum. Contemporary revolutionist experience has opened a floodgate which cannot easily be closed; the ideology of revolution has become too strongly embedded in this permissive and paradoxically egalitarian era. […] Revolutionism is […] a logical political phenomenon in an environment of instability and unknown constants. Its dream of unlimited and undefined change has attracted those who in other times would have followed other systems that demanded total belief and unswerving faith. In posing this thesis of revolutionism, we have merely formulated several related questions which must be considered within the context of contemporary revolutionist experience. Present phenomena of style and environment, types of revolutionists, patterns of revolutionist thought, revolutionist visions and models, and the revolutionist perception of politics will be identified. This skeletal structure establishes the setting and constitutes the frame of reference for the examination of revolutionism in the chapters that follow.

6.2.3 The U.S. Response to Revolutionism in the Future Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (1971). Directions of revolutionism. In Revolutionism (pp. 176–180). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. For twenty years following World War II, the United States tended to view revolution in two frameworks which were not always conceived as mutually exclusive. There was the nationalist context associated with Algeria and several African and Asian states, and there was the revolution in the operation arena of the Cold War such as China, Indochina, and Cuba. The United States perceived revolution to be closely associated with, if not the handmaiden of, communism. Regardless of changed circumstances and perception, the United States tended to be skeptical of revolution to the extent that the U.S. became identified as a conservative state in the eyes of world opinion. During this period, Americans attempted to project their concept of order on the international system to compensate for their own fear of disorder and insecurity that was being manifested in the United States. As a consequence, stability qua stability became a value for its own sake and a justification for actions. The attitudes fostered by this stance lacked flexibility and did not discern between the various categories

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

183

of revolution. In a more succinct sense, there was a near-paranoid feeling toward the consequences of revolution. With the increased commitment in Vietnam, the American perception began to change because revolution, or at least its framework, had started to make its appearance in the U.S. The level of credibility in the system dropped considerably as more citizens lost faith in the myths. Thus, the U.S. experienced some of the manifestations of revolutionism without undergoing revolution. In addition to perceiving revolution as an outgrowth or by-product of the Cold War, the U.S. viewed revolution more as a product of its manifestations than it viewed its manifestations as a product of the revolutionist spirit. This, of course, should be altered. For, above all, revolution is a political and social phenomenon that may take on other trappings. In order to understand the nature of revolution, our vision should not be obscured by its more sensational physical characteristics. Revolution is neither good nor bad; it is irreversible in certain places at certain times and anticipated by the perception of man’s dislocation. It must be recognized that change takes place. Revolutionist change has no fixed value in itself. The U.S. should treat it as neither good nor evil until its direction and values conflict with those of the U.S. In this connection, the values of conserving the status quo should be selective to allow far greater flexibility in policy formulation. More discernment should be exercised with respect to the revolutionist experiences of the future. […] From this analysis, it is in the interest of the United States to adopt a pragmatic posture toward revolution in general. In order to do this, a mental attitude stressing a realistic rather than an ideological approach should be used. The U.S. policy-maker should look at revolution as a socio-political phenomenon over which his influence is limited. From this viewpoint, we are suggesting that change – whether revolutionist or other – be accepted and left alone unless a concrete threat indicates otherwise. For in evaluating the criteria for U.S. support for revolution, we must not invert the ideological xenophobia of the fifties and narrowly embrace the revisionist dogma that has poured from disgruntled academics during the sixties. Rather than suggesting that we happily commit ourselves to all revolutions – regardless of origin or purpose, and thus act as dogmatically as the proponents of orthodox anticommunism – we must evaluate the role of morality that has heretofore been regarded as a phenomenon that political scientists, certainly since the waning days of the Great Debate, hardly take seriously. As the nineteenth-century expounders of American foreign policy have stated, America is still a moral exemplar to the world. Our actions in the domestic sphere influence the worldwide reception accorded to our foreign policy ventures. The Vietnam war, for instance, encouraged many critics to indict its moral cruelties rather than debate its strategic implications. The U.S. political response to revolution should be discriminating. In some cases, short-term instability can lead to long-term stability. At some time in the future, the U.S. may well support preventive revolution in opposition to weak regimes whose repressive measures often cause violent swings of power. This is not to say that the U.S. should seek out alternatives for revolution in these countries, but should always be ready to act in its own interest. Consider, for a moment, the benefits of having had revolutions that supported the aspirations of the people in the hands of other than

184

A. A. Said et al.

Castro in Cuba and Mao in China. The regimes that they replaced were no longer relevant, but the U.S. supported them. In future situations, the U.S. may choose to aid no side, but it certainly should not support a faction which cannot gain support from its own population. But economically we must take more dramatic measures to alter our economic perception of the world in order that we might pre-empt hostile domestic public opinion to the imminent nationalization of American investments abroad. It will become the duty of the statesman and the policy maker to prepare American public opinion to receive these changes. This can be accomplished with a minimum of McCarthyite hostility if we begin to do so now. If the United States can remain politically distant from those processes of change over which we have no control, it is relatively inconceivable that American security interests will demand military intervention in Latin America, Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. However, the prevailing danger, and possibly the most significant threat to American relations with the Third World, is that an unprepared public opinion will interpret the seizure of American economic interests in a political context, thus encouraging another series of roguish misadventures. Economic issues will emerge as the most visible US. preoccupations in these regions. They must be identified and isolated as such. A factor that compels another “agonizing reappraisal” in our current foreign policy is the suggestion – distant and penetrating – that our nation might not be able to alter its outlook toward worldwide revolution without a far-reaching alteration of our domestic milieu. The questions that rebound in radical caucuses on American campuses ask whether capitalist, quasi-democratic America can evolve a foreign policy that essentially violates its most revered domestic values. If we accept the dominance of American industry with a shrug that the “business of America is business,” then it will certainly be difficult to understand, accept, and support the nationalization of industry abroad – or to welcome state-controlled industrialization. It is this provincial adolescence that America has experienced which prohibits us from adopting a policy that even begins to approximate the realities of the world condition. The present and future revolutionary temper turns on the expectations of man. Stability will be difficult to achieve if these expectations are suppressed. When this has occurred in the past, the result has always produced a more undesirable change from the standpoint of the international system. Where there is a desire for change, there are reasons which must be explored. Stability bought at the expense of change results in a greater evil. We must not forget that every era is an age of transition. Although the specific nature of the historic challenge may vary, the need for adequate response remains constant. Failure to measure up to the challenges of one’s age invites tragedy; success contributes to growth. Although ecologists have abounded in gloomy predictions in recent years, political scientists also must take note of the darkening prospects that confront our nation. We are faced with the dilemma that our expectant subcultures – the poor, the Black,

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

185

the young – might become so articulate that a Constitution designed for an essentially homogeneous society undergirded by an aura of consensus, might become unworkable. Or else, the politics of positive polarization might bear some negative results – and our society could very well become unprecedentedly suppressive – enforcing a homogeneity that has faded with the disruptions of revolutionism. The political scientist, then, must be arduous in his search for new ways to meet the politics of maximum transition. Reliance on political parties, regional and national studies, as exclusive tools for analysis, must not be the sole preoccupation of the seventies. Political scientists, until now, mere theoreticians of a revolutionary world, must now become the vanguard of devising rational alternatives for a world in danger of being overtaken by a polarization of tragic proportions. A great danger that political scientists must find frightening is that protagonists of change have no vision or model for the future. The traditional critiques of the recent past – the American liberal ethos, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist models – seem unduly influential in contemporary thought and expectation. When we forget that yesterday’s ideas might not conform with today’s perceptions, we shall be constantly surprised by historical dislocation tomorrow.

6.3 Protagonists of Change: Subcultures in Development and Revolution Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1971). Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

6.3.1 Theoretical Considerations Said, A. A. (1971). Theoretical considerations. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution (pp. 1–9). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. The ebullient optimism which kicked off the 1960s as the “decade of development” has degenerated into theoretical and policy frustration. Some development did, of course, take place. The optimistic theses of gradual peaceful change and the rise of social democracy espoused by Western liberals have not been justified. Nor has there been an increasing tempo of revolution held as an article of faith by various Marxist schools of thought. It is true, of course, that the declining intensity of the Cold War has contributed to a lowering priority toward sponsoring development in advanced countries. More recently the growing world ecological crisis has raised doubts as to the adaptive value of advanced industrialism in its present form, even for advanced nations. […]

186

A. A. Said et al.

There is more than one viable human value system; therefore, no transcultural standard exists with which to judge the relative merits of one system against another. Accordingly, it makes little sense to divide mankind into “traditional” and “modern” cultures. All human cultures are constantly evolving, while none stands still. If present evolutionary trends continue, the “developed” nations that now dominate the world will either destroy themselves in a nuclear holocaust or suffocate in their own waste. From our “culture-centric” point of view, we call the struggle of former colonies to emulate the technology, lifestyles, economic practices, and other characteristic behavior of the dominant states “development” or “modernization,” as if we were in a position to judge the adaptive value of other societies when our own seems nonadaptive even to us. It is quite conceivable that those societies putting up the greatest resistance to the technocratic mentality will be vindicated by history as having refused to go down a blind alley. We may believe or hope that the present transformation from agriculture to “techniculture” (for want of a better word) now sweeping the planet will eventually produce modes of behavior consistent with the ecology of the earth, but such an outcome is neither inevitable nor self-evident. The only historical analogue to the rise of techniculture is the agricultural revolution itself, a process that began some nine to eleven thousand years ago in ancient Mesopotamia. The initial transition from the earlier stage of pastoral or huntergatherer culture lasted between three and five thousand years; and even today, this fundamental transformation is still expanding to incorporate isolated cultural enclaves in remote jungles. This early change in man’s relationship with the natural world also created the first “eco crisis.” Initially affected societies failed to follow ecologically sound practices and quickly exhausted the natural vitality of the soil, while simultaneously building up a surplus of population far beyond the availability of arable land. The first “farmers” were, in fact, not quite farmers; they did not plant crops, but merely harvested wild plants in a systematic, exploitative manner reminiscent of the way industry obtains raw materials. These early experimenters succumbed by the thousands when the environment caught up with them. The survivors learned that they had to make a bargain with nature; they could not consume more than the earth could replenish. Modern techniculture has yet to make this discovery. The agricultural revolution is instructive in other ways. It brought with it a multitude of side effects that transformed the quality of human life: the rise of cities, the development of writing and the creative arts, the social inventions of imperialism and transethnic religion. The current phase of societal adaptation originated only three hundred to five hundred years ago, before the existence of any modern political actor except the Catholic Church; and it appears that we are yet in the unbalanced transitional stage. It seems probable that this process will continue far longer than anyone now alive can imagine; and before this new phase of cultural evolution is over – if it ever is – all existing political regimes will have passed from the scene, and there may well be changes in man’s institutions sufficient to alter what it means to be human. The usual focus of the study of development on the nation-state as the unit of analysis seems to be parochial, given the scale of the phenomenon we are investigating.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

187

And the issue of whether modernization can be achieved on an incremental, nondisruptive, and above all peaceful basis appears to be the height of wishful thinking. The average regime has a life span of only a few years or even a few months, with the oldest regime – the United States of America – only two hundred years old; and even the U.S. appears to undergo a serious internal war about once a century, a record that it now appears interested in maintaining. The other major complex of issues, what ideology or strategy of development will be adapted, seems to suffer from the same myopia. The state of present knowledge is that any regime which invests heavily in mass education and industrial investment begins to look more like other industrialized nations; the process appears to relate more to changing the behavioral repertoire of a culture than to the adoption of a new political program. Russia began modernization (by emulating the European states) with Peter the Great. By the year 1912, five years before the Revolution, Russia was already the fourth-ranking industrial power. It may be that former colonies had merely exchanged the forced feeding and indignities associated with being imperial wards for the less-direct exploitation implicit in becoming disciples of one developmental guru or another. Japan consciously chose to emulate Great Britain in her drive for techniculture. Does anyone seriously think it would have made any difference over the next five hundred years if she had chosen France or Germany? The economic standard commonly used as the primary criterion of development is being increasingly questioned by both emerging societies and the West. Radical states (such as China) who claim that they are not emulating the West’s pattern of growth view the Western concept of development as a residual form of imperialism and as a cover for a continuing exploitative arrangement between imperial powers and their former colonies. Western ecologists point out that it is per capita GNP and energy consumption in industrial countries – both usually seen as indices of development – rather than overpopulation which is creating a worldwide environmental crisis. Some long-range planners have even begun to talk about advanced societies in which declining population, dropping energy consumption, and negative aggregate GNP growth will be viewed as “progressive.” On balance, it seems fair to say that most specialists view the emergence of a distinctive literary, legal, administrative, and political subsystem within the Soviet Union as more significant from a developmental point of view than the U.S.S.R.’s rising GNP. Our view is that “development,” with its connotation of “bigger is better,” is a misnomer. A more appropriate term might be adaptation thus an adaptive economy in a closed environmental system would have stability (stasis) as its ideal rather than uncontrolled growth. It is quite possible that the twenty-first century will find Western extractive industry and pollution as more repellent and blameworthy than either imperialism or racism. This growing noneconomic view of social transformation requires that alternative formulations of the concept of development be examined and made more rigorous. “Expectant subcultures” is a generally neglected frame of reference for discussions of real national growth. Called “minorities” or “interest groups” by political scientists, “microsystems” by the new behavioral theoreticians, a subculture is any group whose shared, mutually reinforcing sets of expectations have led to stereotyped behavior

188

A. A. Said et al.

distinctive enough to warrant separate entries within the literature. This stereotyped behavior may range from lifestyles to clothing or language. It must encompass some sense of distinctive group identification. The function of stereotyped behavior and distinctive subcultures in stable societies is conflict reduction or simple survival. When driving down the highway, the individual driver can make instantaneous probability judgments from such superficially exogenous factors as the date, model, color, and exterior condition of surrounding cars – estimates vital to safe driving. Each distinctive subculture within a society, with its customary behavior patterns and stereotyped sets of expectations, generates its own internal pecking order that minimizes the probability of inter-group clashes: the Black militants have more hatred for “Uncle Tom” than for George Wallace. Given this function, it is clear that true social transformation requires the creation of new social stereotypes – the “new man” of Marxist and Falangist literature. The study of subcultures – especially those whose pattern of expectation and vision of the future is changing – is thus a useful starting point for a noneconomic understanding of evolving societies. The newly emerging expectant subculture is perhaps a real “vanguard” of prospective social change, and the identifying characteristics of a particular subculture may tell us more about the future of a society than the beliefs of the current elite or all kinds of silent majorities. By focusing on these emerging groups whose visions and expectations are at significant variance with the national norm of a given society, we wish to draw attention to their critical role in adaptation; and we are suggesting that social differentiation and the appearance, growth, and expansion of expectant subcultures is, in itself, a better index of development than the usual standards. To a great extent, probably because most elites had their advanced education in either the West or the U.S.S.R., the image of the future has been dominated in the past by the use of only two models of development – the Western model and the Soviet model. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the international system was, in fact, viewed as one where the East and the West competed in selling their own prescriptions for development to emerging nations. With the decline of bipolarity, the rise of China, and the more recent emergence of Japan, the “image” of what development is needs to be re-examined. The new international system in which post-industrial states are re-examining their own basic programs (and in which major actors such as the United States will probably be more interested in domestic affairs) could conceivably affect the role of various nations as “models” of development. Our approach treats the development process in both normative and moral terms, rather than from the traditional economic viewpoint or the more current, purely formalistic approaches; and by doing so, it attempts to refocus public attention on the questions of value that ought to be central to our international policy. Given the lack of a value consensus in the United States, how realistic is it for us to attempt to impose our view of development and progress internationally? In the absence of a more realistic assessment of our own internal social, economic, and political goals, can we successfully impose a monolithic image of the future on a resisting world? We need to have a plausible product before going into the retail market.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

189

The value of choosing a particular frame of reference for any inquiry is not that it gets one any closer to the ultimate “truth” of the matter, but that it provides a ground on which to stand. The choice of a frame of reference is a strategic issue, and must be determined by its utility to the researcher – in terms of manipulative convenience, commonality with viewpoints familiar to prospective readers, dramatic impact, or whatever. In any event, selection of a frame of reference for research is a value choice, with all the responsibilities that it entails. This is not to say that all frames of reference are equal. Predictive models ought to predict. Hortatory models induce policy changes, and so on. It is merely to reassert the ultimately enormous basis for any purposeful human activity. This collection of essays represents a response to a failure of “predictive” policyoriented development models current during the last decade, by treating a single aspect of development usually examined only incidentally: the differential impact of change on different social systems. We believe this lack of focus in the past has led to much of the disappointment with the “Decade of Development” and even the growing orgy of self-doubt affecting independent countries. We are deliberately avoiding any pretense that this cultural (as opposed to political or economic) approach to development represents a new comprehensive theory. We do feel, however, that this approach to the protagonists of change will deepen in the years ahead, and hope this volume will be viewed in retrospect as seminal – a protagonist of change in itself.

6.3.2 Conclusion Said, A. A. (1971). Conclusion. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution (pp. 174–177). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. The first two decades of the “American Century” have come to an end. A widespread feeling, with some preliminary justification, now exists that the United States will revert to a quasi-isolationist international posture. In our view, this is unlikely, but more to the point, immoral. What is about to happen is the “domestication” of international politics and the internationalization of internal politics for those pluralist societies, such as the United States, that have not acknowledged the internal contradictions of their foreign policies, nor the social sources of these incongruities. The United States, with a GNP of a trillion dollars (somewhat inflated to be sure) and nearly 40% of the world’s industrial production (and 75% of its computer capacity), cannot abdicate its leadership responsibilities to help solve the world crisis it helped create. What is required is introspection: the conflicting experience and diversity of goals pursued over the past twenty-five years must be reintegrated into a policy. What has occurred is not the failure of a policy (there were contradictory policies) but a failure of philosophy, and now, regrettably, a failure of nerve.

190

A. A. Said et al.

The contradictory aspects are obvious: while the Peace Corps, A.I.D., and some C.I.A. operatives have attempted to promote social change on the village and local level, military, police advisors, and other C.I.A. operatives have actively aided reactionary governments in identifying those emerging local leaders sympathetic to change and then eliminated them. Such a foreign “policy” could not succeed (or fail, for that matter), since it simply is not possible to supply peasants with the tools and techniques to change their lives and at the same time leave intact political regimes whose power rests on unchanging social realities. “Giving aid to people, not governments” is a philosophy of promoting revolution. “Supporting friendly legitimate governments in their efforts to control domestic insurgency” is a philosophy of counterrevolution. This contradiction is not simply the aberration of successive, myopic anticommunist national administrations. It runs deep in the American character. This contradiction has placed the national administration in a domestic cross-fire between mayors and the O.E.O., between governors and federally subsidized legal assistance for the poor. The belief that peaceful social and economic transformation can take place without changing the allocation of power is untenable on its face. The essential contradiction is that planned intervention to stimulate local participation decreases the political autonomy of the target area in exact proportion to its success. America must decide whether it desires to help governments or peoples. If its decision is to help governments, then America will see the steady erosion of its influence (already underway) as these governments are replaced – and their replacement is a certainty in a world in which the average lifespan of a regime is less than seven years. If we desire to help people – as we must as moral beings – then this must take place against the will of many national governments. […] We have attempted to demonstrate, both on a theoretical and specific level, that subcultures may be a more unifying conceptual frame of reference for discussing problems of development than the traditional nation-state. There is more than a theoretical purpose to this endeavor. We are entering an era when ‘nationalism’ as it has been known for the past few hundred years is undergoing serious, and perhaps fatal, stress. It may seem presumptuous to talk of the end of the nation-state in an era of rising “nationalism,” but of such contradictions is history made. After the successful defense of monarchy and aristocracy in the upheavals of 1848, the victors could not know that the defeated parliamentarians of the “new left” were, in fact, destined to be vindicated within two generations. In our era, the defeat of Biafra, the hopelessness of the Quebec liberation front, or the Basque independence movement masks a fundamental shift in history. The sudden proliferation of new states after World War Two has obscured the problem of scale and underscores the absurdity of describing the People’s Republic of China and Monaco as “nations.” The real international system consists of no more than twenty or thirty international actors who have any significant impact, and the “top five” nations (along any dimension you wish to select) have over half of the world’s human and natural resources. The ‘nation-state’ as a unit of analysis makes differences of degree so vast as to constitute differences in kind. Subcultures, on the

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

191

other hand, appear to be far more comparable anywhere on the earth’s surface, and therefore constitute a real as opposed to juridical construct for analysis. If we can focus on key subcultures in both the United States and the Third World, rather than on the juridical fiction of the “nation-state” as the primary unit of international relations, the problems posed by the “contradictions” in American objectives over the last two decades disappear. Simply put, there will be no unified American foreign policy unless one or another of the competing subcultures in America crushes its domestic opponents irrevocably. The Jewish Defense League, the Black Panthers, and the National Association of Manufacturers have opposed foreign policy interests. The only reason subcultures did not exert more visible influence during the middle part of this century was the temporary (and aberrational) Cold War consensus that permitted relatively free action by the President in office at the time. The dominant causal agent behind the international political system that is beginning to emerge is the technological revolution in communication that permits previously isolated subcultures to interact systematically. The recent wave of simultaneous airline high-jackings carried out by the Palestinian guerrillas was coordinated on three continents. Mass communication, instead of unifying mankind, is paradoxically differentiating him into progressively smaller communities. In the world of the communications satellite, it is the distinctiveness of a message, not its volume, that determines the allocation of air time. With an explosion of information, the commonplace experience gives way to the unusual under a kind of perverted reverse natural selection. Power, in a world of mass communication, goes to whoever has something unusual or disturbing to say. It is our belief that the new international system will be both more parochial and simultaneously “less geographic” than before. Subcultures will find more affinity across national boundaries rather than within nations. The human need for a sense of community will dissolve the bonds of geography that unite Haight Ashbury and the suburbs of San Francisco; community in this sense is the community of the subculture. At the same time, the citizens of the hippy communes of Arizona and California will find their interests coinciding. What this means in practical terms, is that the Welfare Rights Organization and the Black Panthers will rejoice at Pathet Lao victories, since the defeat of Richard Nixon’s United States will be a victory for Bobby Seale’s vision of America. The internal struggle within each nation seeks its analogue in external politics. The domestic dispute requires the creation of a foreign policy dispute. The fundamental point to be grasped is that there need be no logical connection between the Panthers and the Palestinian guerillas, only psychological relatedness. We have entered the international politics of style. In such an environment, clothing, length of hair, and preferences in music or drugs (bourbon versus pot) become political acts. This promises to be a disturbing time; choosing one’s tie (if one wears a tie) becomes an existential commitment. If this seems absurd compared to the politics of ideology in the world we are leaving, consider that we are trading glib talk of incinerating continents for the problems of insecurity on our block. But our opponents in the new world of international relations will be real men and women, people who live in our neighborhood (or even members of our family), rather than abstractions dying from bombs dropped from unseen planes built by unknown technicians. More specifically,

192

A. A. Said et al.

we are becoming more concerned with our personal security and with the fight for the private life. Man wants to preserve his individuality and what he considers important from the tyranny next door. A further postscript and a prognostication: in the coming era, the criterion of a successful foreign policy will be the maintenance of a coherent signal transmission from the community articulating the policy. Nations with more homogeneous constituencies such as Japan, Sweden, France, and Mexico will successfully gain “air time” at the expense of incoherent conglomerates such as the United States, the U.S.S.R. and perhaps even China. This collection of essays has been designed to outline the theoretical underpinnings at the cultural level that will dominate the new international politics, while at the same time providing case studies of the variety of subcultures whose influence is bound to become more decisive.

6.4 The New Sovereigns: Multinational Corporations as World Powers Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1971). The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

6.4.1 Preface Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (1971). Preface. In A. A. Said and L. R. Simmons (Eds.), The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers (pp. v–vi). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. It has become a cliché to say that we are entering a new era of international relations. […] Despite some continuity, the operating environment – the stage setting – of international relations is undergoing a shift from its historic focus on nation-states as the predominant actors in a world environment organized around coalitions, blocs, and ideological groupings to a more complex, differentiated, even “metropolitan” order in which other kinds of actors wield significant influence. This new system deemphasizes the importance of geopolitics and elevates issues like development, pollution, and economic growth to pre-eminence. New institutions such as multinational corporations (MNCs) have increasingly become the focus of interest of these emerging concerns. This change appears warranted, because several of the larger MNCs exert more collective influence than all but a handful of nationstates. The pattern of investment and activity of these corporations affects issues of war and peace, intervention and non-intervention, and may even determine the long-term prospects for world economic development.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

193

Little is known about decision-making processes and their underlying rationale within and among these new (and not so new) corporate endeavors, considering their intrinsic importance. The tools of inquiry are alien to national intelligence efforts, because they focus on balance sheets, reports of board meetings, stock market quotations, and so on rather than official government white papers or biographies of statesmen. We are not accustomed to thinking of the foreign policy of Standard Oil or General Motors. But decision-making by these companies has as much or more impact on the emerging arenas of international conflict and cooperation as do the foreign policy decisions of nations that are receding in significance as actors (such as Brazil). The nature of power is undergoing a truly radical transformation. It is increasingly defined in terms of the maldistribution of information. Inequality, long associated primarily with income, is coming to be associated with technological factors and the political and economic control over the international exchange of information. The advanced industrial nations have come to rely less and less on such markets as extractive industries and are bound together in fierce competition to secure new technologies to make good on domestic promises. It is of more than passing interest that the Institute for Politics and Planning notes that within the next decade the value of information exports from the United States to Europe will exceed the value of material exports. The United States, despite Vietnam, the urban crisis, and ethnic unrest, remains the predominant protagonist in the emerging metropolitan system. But America’s power is increasingly exercised by a pluralistic, diffuse, and differentiated elite, residing throughout the world but increasingly Americanized in style and outlook. The rise of a global system perhaps best characterized provisionally as “industrial feudalism,” with power emanating from no single cohesive center, places the United States in a role analogous to Rome during the Middle Ages: a nominal center of power forced to exercise influence through indirect diffused means concentrating on long-term trends, in an international environment characterized by the proliferation of progressively smaller and more parochial local centers. […] The general model proposed for this study is three-dimensional – structural, functional, and developmental. The structural dimension includes a conceptual analysis of the phenomenon of the multinational corporation as an actor in the international system and a general overview of its historical evolution and present characteristics. The functional dimension focuses on the processes of international corporationnation-state interaction, including the impact of multinational corporations on nationstates, the political, social, and economic consequences to nation-states, and the nature of influence and decision-making processes involved. Finally, the developmental dimension analyzes changing patterns over time and future consequences to the international system.

194

A. A. Said et al.

6.4.2 The Politics of Transition Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (1971). The politics of transition. In A. A. Said and L. R. Simmons (Eds.), The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers (pp. 1–29). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 6.4.2.1

The Syllogism of Geopolitics

It is disconcerting to ask ourselves questions that touch the foundation of our beliefs. The prospects of obtaining candor in our inquiry become fitfully complicated when those beliefs have been rationalized into a functional ideology attended by an effusion of literature that seeks to legitimize it. […] Perhaps it is fantasy to believe that any of us can relieve ourselves of these impostures, and yet as students of international relations that is what our theories and methodologies should be oriented to discover. Yet too often they become predicates to the study of international relations that evolve a separate identity and life of their own. […] What do we mean by foreign policy? How do we measure it? Certainly our determination of these two variables will influence our decisions regarding who are the influential actors, what are the important issues in the international system and which ones to study. A reconsideration of the fundamental assumptions upon which international relations has flourished is very much needed. Yet it is no small endeavor. It is only marginally connected with counting the pieces of mail which pass between nations or professors between international universities. Yet even these measurements, associated with these kinds of transnational exchanges, reveal how different perceptions have shaped our thinking regarding the content of foreign policy in the past while challenging us to devise new measures to determine what the content of foreign policy should be in the future. The growth of the multinational corporation with its diverse activities in marketing, research, manufacturing, and extraction compels us to understand the changing nature of foreign policy sooner rather than later. The nation-state is an inchoate development in the political milieu. Its development encouraged a transformation of moral and political centers of authority, emasculating the political authority of the church and the family. It also inherited many of the primary functions which these social organizations provided, most importantly, the maintenance of security. Since the nineteenth century the foreign policy of nation-states has been preoccupied with this quest for security from external sources of disequilibrium. Political and cultural millennialism – what Edmund Burke once described in reference to the French Revolution as an “armed doctrine” – has been a persistent, unsettling feature of the international system. The apprehension of one nation by another has been the gravamen of international politics. George Lichtheim is quite correct in delineating the symbiotic relationship that developed between nationalism and imperialism:

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

195

Imperialism as a movement – or if one prefers, as an ideology – latched on to nationalism because no other popular base was available. But this statement can also be turned around: nationalism transformed itself into imperialism wherever the opportunity offered. (Lichtheim 1970, p. 81)

The celebration of the nation-state was not the only impetus to political messianism, the idea of empire, both temporal and spiritual, being traceable to the first stirrings of history. But it did furnish focus and rationale and organization for the conflicting aspirations of men which earlier mass movements, such as the religious millennialism of Western Europe, had lacked. The mercantile aspirations of the Portuguese and the Spanish, which could not be arbitrated by a Pope, the development of British capitalism and the British empire in India, a French empire in Africa, a Russian imperium in Central Asia, American imperial expansion beginning in the 1890s, Japanese and German militarism in the 1930s – all share a universal theme in world politics which the German academic Schmoller inadvertently captured by observing the phenomena in his own time and noting that: The course of world history in the twentieth century will be determined by the competition between the Russian, English, American and perhaps Chinese world empires, and by their aspirations to reduce all the other, smaller states to dependence on them. […] (Fischer 1967, p. 9)

Lebensraum is not a concept peculiar to World War Two, and it places the conflict of nations on a historical continuum. Misperception of the expansionist tendencies of nations has been as important a factor in the international environment as the expansionist impetus itself (White 1970). The Revisionist historiography concerning American and Russian conflict after World War Two makes no attempt to grasp the point. Stalin was not a revolutionary, and the Americans were not maddened by some ideological commitment to sanitize the world. Yet as Adam Ulam has remarked while analyzing the casus belli of the Cold War, The struggle over Berlin was a struggle over phantoms which existed in the imaginations of both sides; in the West those phantoms were Soviet soldiers ready to sweep to the English Channel; in Stalin’s mind they were millions of West German soldiers who were going to materialize in the near future. (Ulam 1971, p. 151)

These phantoms have always informed the apprehension of nations. Foreign policy and international relations have been characterized by a compulsive preoccupation with the physical vulnerability of the state. If, as students of international relations, we were to seek out a common denominator that transcends the foreign policy formulations of both the strong and the weak, it would be the concern for geopolitics. External security was conceived as a function of geopolitics, and the foreign policy of nation-states has invariably been a function of the geopolitical context. It has been concerned with the exercise of a particular species of politics-geopolitics, a strong compelling emphasis on the control of strategic land masses and waterways and, of course, alliances. As one writer has reminded us:

196

A. A. Said et al.

Alliances have traditionally been a major technique in the balance-of-power politics engaged in by states perceiving common threats. The obvious reason is that allies constitute an addition of the power of other nations to one’s own. (Spanier 1972, p. 191)

This proposition was first afforded its finest expression by the American geopoliticist Nicholas Spykman, who observed that: In a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at the improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power position of the state. Power is in the last instance the ability to wage successful war, and in geography lie the clues to the problems of military and political strategy…. Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent. (Spykman 1942, p. 41)

An environment that placed inordinate emphasis on the role of geopolitics also invested its analytical concepts and methodologies with this narrow historical experience. The study of international relations became the study of transactions between territorial states. The drama of international relations became, in Palmerston’s celebrated observation, the pursuit of permanent national interests, so defined in geopolitical terms. The content of international relations was merely a reflection of the content of foreign policy, threats, compromises, the creation of alliances and buffers, the cultivation of an elite foreign service, peregrinations by navies to show the flag, economic and cultural imperialism, ideological competition, and awakening nationalism – all of which have revolved, if only tenuously at times, around the quest for external security by the nation-state. The indices that have been used to measure the velocity of specific foreign policies have been derived often from geopolitical bases of analysis, such as measuring conflicts and interventions between territorial states. The rationale behind giving foreign aid to less developed countries, a preoccupation of recent years which originally was cast in terms of buying security and preventing the export to other states of worrisome political and economic models, still lingers on in subtle, yet uncontroverted forms. Most importantly, the concept of capability in international politics, however illusive, was cast in terms of the military and economic power of nation-states. Military power is still a dominant reality in the relations between near equals…. [I]t is the keystone of that essential part of our foreign policy which is directed toward the containment of the Soviet Union. (American Assembly 1957, p. 32)

This statement of U.S. strategic policy is as influential today as it was in 1957, the year in which it was written (Nixon 1971). Thus the constants and variables which have dominated the discussion and analysis of international relations since the nineteenth century continue to enjoy currency. The theoretical foundations of such concepts as national interest, nation-state, our conception of power and balance of power, which are invoked to explain contemporary international phenomena, are artifacts of a remote international environment concerned with the rivalries between states. The nomenclature of politics has changed remarkably little but the international environment from which the terminology derives its significance has experienced

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

197

a major transformation, which can be explained by the declining role of external security issues in the affairs of many nations. Political messianism is no longer an important factor in international relations. Although the world has not moved beyond ideology, the possibilities of transnational geopolitical movements designed to subjugate one nation to another is a declining factor in the decision-making calculus of nations. Since 1945 the two nation-states that have established capabilities to pursue their legitimate aspirations for security – as well as their fantasies – have been the United States and the Soviet Union. These two nations have dominated international relations because of their uncontested capability to influence and transform the political and economic transactions of other states. They have been the only actors in the international system able to furnish the guarantees and commitments to other states through their creation of and participation in vast security arrangements (“pactomania”). Only these two nations have been consistently able to satisfy the expectations and demands of client states in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America in their quest for security. The fact that security fears were largely aroused by the ominous competition between the two super-powers themselves does not diminish the point, however comical it now seems. The stabilization of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States which occurred prior to the Cuban missile crisis has induced an international consciousness which apprehends the irony that the great powers possess nondisposable power. Nuclear weaponry does not lend itself to strategic uses, and tactical deployment is, despite a body of academic literature to the contrary, too speculative in conceptualization for policy-makers who must actually make these decisions. Outside a very narrow transmission belt of influence in geographically contiguous regions, the Great Powers must develop other forms of disposable power in order to influence the affairs of other territorial actors in the system. But the credibility of overt or covert threats postulated against the identity of the state itself is but a bold and non-compelling probability; the expectation of the emergence of a twenty-first-century variation of the “armed doctrine” is a virtual impossibility. Whether or not the emergence of such a movement may defy the stability of a nuclear-guaranteed peace is something else again. As long as such an occurrence is not perceived to be probable, nation-states will refocus their efforts on a host of non-security objectives. The rise and fall of the technique of the national war of liberation, in reality more a religious dispute between Russia and China over doctrine than a serious political and military technique, was the last attempt by the Great Powers to make credible the fading canons of threatmanship against the identity of the state. Coincident with the decline in the probability of an international messianic movement has been the declining threat of the physical subrogation of less developed countries by the medium and Great Powers. Analysis of direct investment by world region reveals some significant trends. Historically, the less developed areas were considered attractive for investment, particularly in the extractive industries (50%) and manufacturing (25%) with all other fields accounting for the remaining 25%. But since 1945 the ex-colonial world has been of less and less importance to Western investors. The percentage of total

198

A. A. Said et al.

overseas investment funneled into low-income countries fell from 36.4% in 1960 to 31.4% in 1964. One-fifth of 1968 exports of high-income nations went to less developed areas, contrasted to one-third in 1948. The drop in imports from lowincome countries to high-income countries shows a similar disengagement. Even these statistics tend to overstate the importance of the Third World to the developed nations, for they consolidate petroleum with all other economic categories. If, for example, petroleum is not considered in the United States direct investment abroad, then U.S. investment in less developed countries constitutes only one-sixth of American overseas investment and provides only one-seventh of the income from these transactions (Harrington 1968, 1971). In 1968 exports comprised 4% of the Gross National Product of the U.S., 19% of Japan, 14% for Great Britain, and 12% for Germany. However, the percentages of U.S. exports to Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany were 3.6, 6.3, and 5% respectively. The percentages of exports of these states to the U.S. was 3.2, 14, and 19%. Increasingly, it is the developed nations that are exporting to each other and engaging in reciprocal investment. Although their relationship to less developed countries is still dominant, it is not colonial. Indeed, the divisions between the developed and less developed countries and the elimination of original sources of great and medium power confrontation over them has imperceptibly been declining. The traditional foci of international relations, geopolitical subrogation, and economic colonialism, however indistinguishable they have occasionally become, are in decline as strategic variables that affect the decision-making process of states. One measure of this can be inferred from the decrease in the tempo of violence between states. Of the 164 outbreaks of significant violence within states between 1948 and 1966, only 15 were military conflicts involving two or more states (Seabury/Wildaysky 1969, p. 5). External security issues have not become unimportant, but it would be myopic to concentrate on subsystems of objective conflict at the expense of an understanding of the new international environment. In such an environment, statistical violence between states should be expected to rise, however remaining well below a threshold which poses a threat of external disequilibrium to the identity of a state. It is also likely that as we approach the twenty-first century and nuclear weapons begin to diffuse in the international environment so that international terrorist groups may yet acquire them, we face an unprecedented juncture in our historical understanding of the definition of power. Military power will not be pursued as much as simply taken for granted. As military power becomes increasingly nondisposable, our conception of the nature of power in the twenty-first century will be radically transformed. In this regard it is interesting to note the possibilities that are developing for conceptualization of power in the international system as criteria other than geopolitics begin to creep into our discussion of power politics. Japan furnishes us with one example of how military power in the current system is increasingly unrelated to “power.” According to a table compiled by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

199

Agency from 1970 GNP data, Japan at that time was thirteenth in military spending yet third in economic ranking. By placing some historical distance between ourselves and the geographic theories of international relations, with their emphasis on the nation-state as the preeminent actor in politics between nations, the task of analyzing the significance of the multinational corporations becomes easier. The primary characteristic of this system is its emphasis on non-security issues, of which development is primary. The newspapers, speeches, and journals which emanate from both the less developed and developed areas echo this preoccupation with satisfying the rising expectations of national consumers. In the developed nations, including the Soviet Union, the emergence of international consumerism can hardly be ignored. Indeed, regimes seem more apt to fall over automobile production gaps than over missile gaps.

6.4.2.2

Historical Evolution and Present Characteristics of the MNC

Regrettably, the multinational corporation has become a popular subject for the mythologizers, some of whom see it as the insidious “el pulpo,” others who would describe its putative achievements in verse. The multinational enterprise is not a recent phenomenon in international relations. In 1902 F. A. MacKensie’s The American Invaders appeared in London, analyzing the impact of American direct investment abroad, and stimulated by many American companies, among them Otis Elevator, Singer Company, and General Electric. Before the coming of the Industrial Revolution, international financial institutions flourished in the fourteenthand fifteenth-century cities of Venice, Barcelona, and Genoa. In 1689 the Bank of Amsterdam was established to finance the explorations of the Dutch East India Company. The Compagnie d’Occident was created in 1717 to foster trade with the Louisiana territories, and by the nineteenth century the center of banking activity in Europe had moved to Germany, which had established affiliates in South America, the Far East, and Eastern Europe. Multinational banking saw its golden age in nineteenth-century England, where much of the economic development of the United States (particularly railroads) was subvented from capital originating in London. It was the failure of the British banking house of Baring Brothers that precipitated the first international financial crisis, a consequence of which was the massive depression in the United States of the 1890s (Hidy 1949). Another early form of multinational business was the seventeenth-century trading company, which obtained grants from the crowns of Europe to monopolize colonial trade. Such companies were chartered by the competing mercantile powers – England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain – and were manipulated as appendages of the political and economic policies of the country that chartered them. However, it has only been since the end of World War Two that the multinational corporation began to emerge as a pervasive force in international relations. […] The world seems to be moving to a situation where a major portion of its industrial output will be dominated by several hundred large corporations (Hymer 1970).

200

A. A. Said et al.

The multinational corporation is in an excellent position to facilitate capital transfers between nations, stimulate capital formation, and serve as a conduit for the transfer of technology. The emergence of non-security development-oriented issues has naturally focused on the activities of these economic entities, as a focal point of international relations becomes how nations can preserve their political, economic, and cultural identities while still sharing in the benefits of rapid industrial growth. A working definition of the multinational enterprise is a “cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy” (Vernon 1968, p. 114). The majority of the world’s multinational corporations are American-based; of the 500 largest corporations in the world, 306 are American and 74 are from EEC countries. Almost 250 of Fortune’s 500 largest corporations had overseas investments totaling $50 billion (Vernon 1967, p. 156). Not all large American corporations have extensive foreign holdings. General Motors has relatively few foreign assets abroad compared to Ford, which is a network of 60 corporations of which 40 are abroad. Thirty-six percent of Ford’s $8 billion in assets is located in 27 foreign countries. In 1966 alone Ford spent $180 million expanding overseas operations. Other American corporations with significant foreign components include Standard Oil, Colgate-Palmolive, and Anaconda. Moreover, 187 U.S. multinationals account for one-third of the sales and one-half of the assets of U.S. enterprises […]. Sixty percent of the sales of the Parker Pen Company, nearly $75 million, represents foreign business. Parker maintains 62,000 overseas dealers, uses 66 advertising agencies, and conducts business in 100 currencies; it operates in every non-communist country and has plants in Canada, Britain, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Australia, Rhodesia, and West Germany. But not all the large multinational enterprises are American; Phillips Lamp Works, headquartered in the Netherlands, employs 167,000 abroad and 85,000 in the Netherlands. Its affiliated companies operate in some 68 countries. Japanese-based multinational corporations have expanded rapidly so that today Japan is the second largest center of multinationals in the world. In 1965 this position was held by Britain (55 companies), but in 1970 the Japanese had 51 companies to Great Britain’s 46 (Modelski 1972, p. 411, note 4). What, however, do these statistics suggest about the multinational enterprise as an actor in the contemporary international environment? Is it of political significance that the aggregate sales of General Motors are larger than many nation-states’ GNP? Should we inquire how many divisions General Motors has, or does this merely beg the question? Is General Motors a sovereign actor in the international system, or are most multinational corporations merely appendages of nation-states’ foreign policies? Is the multinational corporation an independent actor or a reflection? First, let us make an elementary observation. The multinational firm is an actor that possesses considerable influence but little power in the system. The little power it exercises exists in the ability to inadvertently trigger international financial crises. Multinational corporations control such vast quantities of money that they can precipitate international monetary crises by moving only a small proportion of their funds from one country to another. A study made at the request of the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee estimates that some $268

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

201

billion of short-term liquid assets were held at the end of 1971 by “private institutions on the international financial scene” and that the “lion’s share” of this money was controlled by U.S.-based multinational corporations and banks. The $268 billion was “more than twice the total of all international reserves held by all central banks and international monetary institutions in the world at the same date” (Committee on Finance 1973). Because of the enormity of the multinationals’ assets, only a fraction of money needs to move for a serious crisis to develop. That these largely American multinational corporations precipitated the devaluation of the American dollar in the monetary crisis of March 1973 as speculators unloaded dollars and purchased German marks and Japanese yen is beyond doubt. […]

6.4.2.3

The Crisis of Development Theory

The basic rationales that have been invoked to explain or encourage direct investment by nation-states and multinational corporations in less developed countries of the world have been overtaken by events. The national interest of the major nation-state actors in the international system lies increasingly in the economic interdependence of consumer markets and the limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ideological competition for the Third World appears to have been an idea whose time has come and gone. The geographic investment patterns of the multinational corporations reflect similar realities. Even where multinational enterprises have made investments, they are usually in extractive industries which do little to encourage growth in agricultural or industrial markets within the nation. Throughout, the division between the rich and poor nations appears to widen. […] The multinational corporation is neither inherently evil nor beneficent. Its movements are governed by a narrow frontier of economic impetuses. Some writers suggest that the multinational enterprise is the best hope for the LDCs, but for the reasons we have already explored this does not seem very likely. In the final analysis, it will have to be the nation-state acting through multilateral organizations, bilateral arrangements, perhaps through the multinational corporations themselves, if development assistance is to be made to the LDCs on the necessary scale. The multinational corporation is not a substitute for development theory. It can be an agent for growth but little else. Only people, acting through their governments, and governments acting upon their ideals, can furnish commitment and direction. Only the nation-state can base its motivations on a spectrum of concerns which include humanitarianism. Thus it is that while the territorial nation-state is slowly losing its function as a guarantor of security, it can acquire and reemphasize a different function if it so chooses. But it is a decision that only states or organizations of states can make. Multinational corporations provide possibly one means toward that end.

202

A. A. Said et al.

6.5 Ethnicity in an International Context Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1976). Ethnicity in an international context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

6.5.1 Introduction Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (1976). Introduction. In A. A. Said and L. R. Simmons (Eds.), Ethnicity in an international context (pp. 9–14). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. The nation-state is no longer regarded as the paradigm of human organization. Curiously enough, while philosophers and political scientists since Bodin have pointed to the need to move beyond the nation-state into supranational legal, economic, and political organizations, it is difficult to identify an experiment, such as the European Common Market, where a supranational political consciousness has been achieved. Not only has the movement toward supranationalism been averted in environments conducive to theories of supranationalism, but also the emergence of a politics of disassociation – a disenchantment with the political institutions of the nation-state and an emphasis on ethnic, cultural, and political sovereignty – has persisted and occasionally exploded in many parts of the world. The reasons for the conspicuous rise in ethnic politics are not always apparent. Ethnic movements have developed in environments that our theories and methodologies have told us are unlikely spawning grounds for secession and violence. Communication theory with its contribution to our perception of the processes of nationstate building has become increasingly suspect as a touchstone for interpreting the dynamics of nation building. There seems to be a normative renaissance insofar as the recognition that a nation-state is an intuitive expression of a people’s perception of proper social and political organization. That such perceptions can and do change despite the social cement believed to be supplied by good communication networks and economic integration is one profitable inference to be drawn from the resurgence of ethnic activity. The decline of geopolitics in international relations is another factor. The state, as an organizational expression of the historical preoccupation with physical security, has been progressively undermined by the development and proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons. The state is essentially a territorial form of organization in a century where security is no longer a function of geopolitics but of technology. No longer the central organizing principle of physical security, the social psychology of authority, as it manifests itself in state patriotism, is undergoing a historical transformation. Anti-statist politics as it appears in ethnic disassociation is one expression of this transaction.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

203

Liberal theories of development have never embraced the idea of ethnic diversity with intellectual enthusiasm. Diversity was seen in terms of the coexistence of political systems, not ethnic nations. Quite often the modus operandi of the quintessential nation builders encouraged if not insisted on the detribalization of world politics, which is no doubt a source of discomfort, for theories of development emphasize the necessity of rationalizing economic and political systems to achieve economic growth. The future of ethnic conflict is, of course, closely tied to the future of the multiethnic state. A sample of 132 states shows that only 12 (9.1%) can be considered ethnic-free. Twenty-five states (18.9%) are comprised by an ethnic group that represents more than 90% of the state aggregate population, and in another 25 states the largest ethnic group accounts for possibly 75–89% of the population. However, in 31 states (23.5% of the total) the significant ethnic group constitutes only 50–74% of the population, and in 39 states (29.5%) the largest group does not account for half the state’s population. It has been estimated that in 53 states (or 40.2%) the population is comprised into five or more significant ethnic groups. In the West it is, as Raymond Aron correctly predicted, ethnic conflict that has replaced class conflict as an image through which to understand future behavior. In Belgium, the government of Premier Gaston Eyskens fell after ten months in office. Eyskens had formed a coalition of Social Christians and Socialists and had agreed to grant special status to approximately 5000 French-speaking residents in the Flemish province of Limbourg. Walloon ministers had consented to delimit the economic region of Brussels as a gesture to relieve Flemish fears of a northward expansion of French language and culture. After a concord had been reached to these points, the Flemish wing of the Social Christian party escalated their demands by asking for more autonomy for a small Flemish community near Mons in Wallonia. In Spain, Basque activists are again operational in northern Spain. In Bilbao, according to the New York Times, “Fear and tension have risen perceptibly as young radicals, organized into a small but determined group called Basque Nation and Freedom, keep a step ahead of the police and the paramilitary Civil Guard.” It is estimated that 190 Basques have been sentenced to prisons outside the Basque provinces. Basque terrorist activities have included throwing a bomb into a Civil Guard headquarters, burning the offices at the Ministry of Information and Tourism at Zarauz, and holding up a bank car for almost $192,000. According to reliable reports, a significant problem for the Spanish government is that “other regions, such as Catalonia and Galicia, might increase their agitation if it showed a more tolerant attitude toward the Basques.” In Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalists whom the government has described as “Fascist terrorists” have been identified with airline hijackings and terrorist attacks on Yugoslav diplomats. In Jasenovac, southeast of the Croatian city of Zagreb, the infamous Jasenovac camp was operated by the Ustashi, where perhaps as many as 800,000 people – primarily Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies – are thought to have been exterminated. The Yugoslav government has been careful not to press a vigorous campaign against the exiled Ustashi in apprehension of offending the four and onehalf million people of Croatia, and reinvigorating enmities between Serbs and Croatians. Ethnic conflict is not confined to random or systematic acts of terrorism; it

204

A. A. Said et al.

radiates in the social and cultural life of the state. The Serbian Philosophic Society’s quarterly journal, Filosogiya, has a circulation of 1500 copies. A Yugoslav court recently imposed a ban on an issue for making “false and alarming statements.” The objections surrounded an editorial and article that the government alleged contributed to efforts to “disrupt the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nationalities.” In Canada, one-fourth of the 22 million Canadians are French speaking, but most of them are in Quebec and the surrounding Eastern provinces – only three percent are west of Ontario. This distribution forms the basis for language and regional resentments. Bilingualism was an important issue in the October 1972 elections in which Trudeau’s Liberals lost their majority in the House of Commons and gained only three of the forty-five seats in the prairie provinces. In the October 1972 Parliamentary elections, Quebec and bilingualism were issues throughout the country. The issues reflect the traditional hostility between segments of Canada’s French-speaking minority who feel exploited and discriminated against. Prime Minister Trudeau, who worked assiduously to upgrade the French language to be on a par with English, was an easy target for opposition party spokesmen who attacked him for deepening the divisions within the country. In India, the fissiparous language issue remains more portentous for Indian society than her relations with China or Pakistan. Hindi is the national language as designated by the constitution, but English remains the dominant language in education, the courts, and industry. R. N. Mirdha, Minister of State for Home Affairs, has stated, “We cannot close our eyes to reality… the bulk of the work in the central secretariat is carried on in English. Naturally we have to recruit people who have a knowledge of English.” The language divisions are evident in a state where Hindi is understood by almost forty-five percent of the population and English is spoken by less than three percent and understood by almost fifteen percent. Violence has occurred in recent years in response to government efforts to press the use of Hindi. Not all of the initiatives in the past five years have been pursued by ethnic minorities seeking to assert local patriotisms. The Soviet Union has quietly begun a controversial consolidation of its national planning regions that may ultimately erode the significance of individual Soviet ethnic republics as economic planning and management areas. This new consolidated system is being introduced despite persistent ethnic consciousness and as part of an effort to integrate the interests of ethnic republics into a more efficient economic scheme. Soviet information agencies have also been working to generate an overall “Soviet” nationalism and national pride in economic achievements to replace the fragmented ethnic loyalties across the country’s hundred-odd nationalities. In Africa, the introduction of modern technology and communication in the modernization process has not prevented what Ali Mazrui describes as “the retribalization of politics, the resurgence of ethnic loyalties in situations of rivalry in the arena of resource allocation and domestic power politics.” In Kenya, the leaders of the formidable Kikuyu people must be careful not to aggravate the sensibilities of local notables. In July 1969, President Kenyatta chose to appoint three ministers from Nyanza province in order to appease the grievances of the Luo people following the assassination of Tom Mboya. Kenya may be taken as an example of a society where

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

205

inter-ethnic conflict is managed along lines similar to conflict management among nations. Since its independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda has been plagued by political instability created by intertribal rivalries. The struggle for power between former President Milton Obote and General Idi Amin is prefigured by shifting tribal coalitions and ethnic bargaining. Obote had alienated the formidable Buganda, whose political kingdom he abolished in 1966. The ascendancy to power of General Amin was characterized by the repression of Acholi and Langi tribesmen within the army who continued to support Obote. Political instability in Uganda is certain to develop as Langi tribesmen and Acholi – who populate the region bordering on Sudan – accelerate their efforts against Amin. Since ethnicism was hardly studied in the last decade, it is difficult to speculate on the depth and future of ethnic feelings or whether the ethnic group can still provide the communal satisfaction that the explosions of smaller and lesser neoethnic communities and subcultures are offering to Americans. But, during the sixties, an ethnic reformation may have been much in evidence, however much neglected. Observe that many did not conceal their envy of the Black students’ “peoplehood.” Jewish activists, too, have acquired valuable lessons from the tactics of Black ethnic politics. This collection of essays should serve as an invitation to the student of politics to raise questions with himself and methodological questions with his discipline. Never before have issues of human rights and cultural self-determination attracted so much popularity and scholarly attention. What are the human rights of these ethnic nations? What should the position of the political scientist be in response to secessionist movements such as those that occurred in Pakistan and Nigeria? Should the prerogatives of the sovereign state swallow the rights of the ethnic nation? Can the two be reconciled? Despite one’s position on this dispute, the ethnic and the emerging neoethnic group will not disappear from world politics. As emerging actors in the international system, they are indications that our perceptions of international relations and the causes of war and peace lag behind the consciousness of the men and nations we study. The ethnic nation cannot yet compete with the state in nuclear warheads and warships, but it continues to exercise formidable influence over the primary authority patterns of men. It is from this exercise of power that revolutions are born.

6.5.2 The Ethnic Factor in World Politics Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (1976). The ethnic factor in world politics. In A. A. Said and L. R. Simmons (Eds.), Ethnicity in an international context (pp. 15–47). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

206

A. A. Said et al.

A revived sense of ethnic identity has grown in the last few decades, and ethnic politics has emerged as a significant factor in the international political system. In recent years the antagonisms of indigenous ethnic communities in Cyprus, Iraq, Malaysia, Guyana, Uganda, and Canada (to name only a few) have wrought important changes in the international relations of nation-states. There is an increasing tendency of ethnic peoples to think fundamentally in terms of the ethnic group and to demand separate political status for the group that is global in scope; and this is effectively challenging the political demography of Africa, Europe, and the Americas, as well as Asia. The ethnic conflicts of Ireland, the bloody struggle of Biafra and the secession of Bangladesh, the unsettling race riots in the United States, and the transformation of ethnic discontents into ethnic nationalism have placed their mark on the domestic and international politics of nations in persistent and conspicuous emanations. Yet both traditionalists and behavioralists continue to rely upon the nation-state as the analytical tool for understanding international politics. According to this framework, states are political systems exhibiting community, consensus, and a monopoly on the means of violence. The incidence of war is a direct consequence of the lack of community and consensus between and among nation-states. War and the lesser tensions and hostilities are consequences of the improvident transactions of total identities, that is, nation-states. That few such total identities appear to exist in international politics has not changed the foci of analyses or perceptions of the international system. Out of an estimated 164 disturbances of significant violence involving states between 1958 and May 1966, a mere 15 were military conflicts involving two or more states. The most significant violence after 1945 has found its casus belli in ethnic, tribal, and racial disputes that have often exerted a spillover effect in international politics. The ethnology of the planet is too often a subject of inquiry limited to anthropologists and sociologists. The political scientist has not approached the study of societies to any extent because the focus of international relations since 1945 changed from nation-state to the possibilities of world federalism, regionalism, and multilateralism. Coincident with this development was the introduction of popular scholarly literature emphasizing the detribalization of multiracial states, the disappearance of ethnic loyalties (particularly in the postindustrial United States), and, finally, the emergence of transnational subcultures. In sum, the “vanishing ethnic” did indeed vanish, but only from the minds of students of international relations as theories of nation builders and supranationalism rose in attention and influence. Why then, statistically, has much of the present serious violence involving states been the consequence of the unresolved differences of these “vanishing ethnics”? Why do the ethnics persist? What accounts for their sensational impact on international politics in the past five years? There are perhaps as many as 862 ethnic groups (nations) living within the nationstates of the world: Africa (sub-Sahara)

239

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

Circum-Mediterranean

95

East Eurasia

93

Insular Pacific

128

North America

218

Central and South America

89

207

(Murdock 1967)

What future impact will they have as and if the nation-state continues to be a declining form of economic and political association? Raymond Aron has noted recently that ethnic conflict will replace class conflict in the latter third of the twentieth century. We believe that this is because the legitimacy of the modern state is struggling to overcome an international challenge to its supremacy rooted in the internal contradictions between the nation and the state. These contradictions become fully visible when loyalty to the state and loyalty to one’s nation conflict. In this conflict are forged the incandescent passions of secession, civil war, and the unconscionable talent of some ethnic nations to completely destroy others. The state can be defined in terms of territory, population, and government, and its formation can be predicted in contemporary international relations, since it signifies the victory of positivism in the political affairs of men. One is generally recognized as a state when one exerts political control over a specific geographical area. Sovereignty is not a derivative of natural or divine law. Control is accompanied by international recognition in the transactions among nations; loss of control is invariably a precursor or loss of recognition. The state is a positivist contraption, both artifice and artificer of the nineteenth-century fruition of the positivist approach to human affairs. But the nation is a conscious expression of people’s shared sense of “peoplehood,” reflecting what Kurt Lewin has described as the “interdependence of fate.” The political self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth century. Sir Ernest Barker stated the issue with enviable precision: “a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force” (Barker 1927, p. 173). […] We have entered the age of ethnicity in international politics. In such an environment, where distance as a barrier to national and transnational culture groups is a diminishing consideration and relationship becomes paramount, man relies less and less upon the nation-state as an agent for fulfillment. A politics of ethnicism is beginning to dominate the behavior of divergent and anthropomorphically different cultures that will have wide impact upon their respective nation-states and demand new theoretical models explaining their respective nation-states, plus demanding new theoretical models explaining their interaction. Ethnicism confutes the viability of a national ethic and suggests the use and importance of ethnic groups to the understanding of international relations. The vitiation of concepts of national interest, such as status and faith have become dominant neologisms in explaining politics among nations.

208

A. A. Said et al.

The domestication of international politics is no doubt a disturbing trend for the decision-makers who must plot the course of the modern state. Many governments now predicate their internal legitimacy, the maintenance of which is first priority, on the performance of external policies. That is, there is an increasing trend by many governments to justify their domestic policies by reference to foreign commitments and antagonisms. The conflict politics among states of the future will often be a response to the politics of ethnic disassociation. The present phenomenon of ethnic conflicts cannot be adequately analyzed within the context of traditional concepts of international relations. Concepts of balance of power, bipolarity, or even polycentrism as loci of conflict obscure the fact that, as Andrew Greeley has observed: “The conflicts that have occupied most men over the past two or three decades and which have led to the most horrendous outpouring of blood have had precious little to do with this ideological division. […] In a world of the jet engine, nuclear energy, the computer, and the regionalized organization, the principal conflicts are not ideological but tribal. Those differences among men which were supposed to be swept away by science and technology and political revolution are destructive as ever” (1971, p. 343). The nation-state is no longer viewed as the ultimate community, nor is it even the primary source of loyalty in many instances.

6.5.2.1

Ethnicity Versus Assimilation

Core cultural values persistently reject absorption into a higher level of identification. This is not to deny the role of conflict in retribalization. Awareness of one’s ethnicity may well be, to a great degree, a function of coercive assimilation. Thus, when social groups are mobilized, congeniality and cooperation do not necessarily occur. Increased contact, exposure, and communication may exaggerate one’s self-image, magnify cultural differences, produce conflict, and induce political disassociation. Additionally, economic development – an increase in material goods and services – does not immunize a society from ethnic conflict. The concomitants of economic growth – urbanization-secularization-industrialization – may lead to competition over limited opportunities and resources. Previously stable interethnic differences have fit patterns of comparative advantage or coexistence, while the industrialtechnical society tends to have a commonizing effect on economic behavior and produces competitive channels of achievement. Critics of ethnicism assert that it is dysfunctional, uneconomical, and irrational. Such criticism is hardly substantiated. Ethnic distinctions may in effect serve useful functions in cross-cultural relations. Larger states do not necessarily develop more rapidly than smaller ones. Smaller states have developed at least as rapidly as larger states since World War II (compare Taiwan, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Hong Kong to India, Indonesia, and Pakistan). Conflict is not necessarily irrational but the roots of cultural expression that produce conflict are psychosociological (Leff 1971). Cultures and ethnic groups have an inner logic that determines behavior, values, and attitudes that confound objective description or absolutism. The complexity of cultures necessitates a multidimensional appreciation of the intertwining institutions and people

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

209

that synthesize a political, cultural, and collective consciousness. Concurrently, one must be sensitive to heterogeneity between and among ethnic groups. […] Ethnicity reveals a structure analogous to that of culture. Fredrik Barth sees atomic groups “biologically self-perpetuating, their members share fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural form; they make up a field of communication and interaction and their membership identifies itself and is identified by others” (Barth 1969, p. 10). An ethnic group is a culture and yet may belong to a larger culture. A static concept of ethnic groups conceives their cultural differentiation as a function of social isolation, ecological factors, adaptive measures, invention, and selective borrowing (p. 11). Such an approach negates the high import of cultural interaction. Ethnic consciousness is as much an objective process of diacritical realization as it is a subjective self-ascription vis-à-vis other social groups. A complex hierarchy of potential identification exists, but Barth stresses that “ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines a way an individual operationalizes and externalizes his reference group’s norms” (p. 17). Adherence thus entails the analyzing of social life, and “implies a recognition of limitations or shared understanding, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest” (p. 15). As structural anthropology accentuates the dynamic relationship between man and culture and its divergent consequences, social anthropology concentrates on the dynamic relationship of ethnic groups as they define social-psychological boundaries between and among themselves. Barth’s insights are particularly useful here: “boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them…. [C]ategorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact, and information” (p. 9). On the other hand, adds Barth: “[S]table interethnic relations presuppose a structure of interaction: a set of prescriptions governing situations of contact, and allowing for articulation in some sectors or domains of activity, and a set of proscriptions or social situations preventing interethnic interaction in other sectors, and thus insulating parts of the cultures from confrontation and modification” (p. 16). Thus begin to emerge the anthropological roots of ethnic conflict: the fluid relationships existing between ethnic groups catalyze socio-psychological identification and boundaries and do not necessarily induce conflict. Shared values are sometimes a component but not a sufficient condition of mutual understanding; the sectors of mutual activity entail competition as well as cooperation. Conflict and cooperation alike are indicators that man is living on the same plane; communication is thus predicated on a certain degree of community as illustrated in structural anthropology. What configurations and matrixes of ethnic interaction result in conflict? […] One might not expect ethnic conflict even if ethnic group A has a predominant advantage in political representation if ethnic group B is not politicized. Internecine behavior is as much a function of commonality of values as of a multiplicity of values. Thus, viewed from an ecological perspective, ethnic transactions are dependent on: (1) minimal competition for scarce resources (be they natural or occupational) where the area of articulation will be in trade; (2) territorial claims (in which articulation is politicized); (3) symbiosis and interdependence where articulation is multiple; and

210

A. A. Said et al.

(4) partial competition for the same niche, where conflict is most likely (Barth 1969, pp. 19–20). Structural and valuational motifs of interaction are integral to understanding the roots of ethnic conflict. As a corollary, the milieu of interaction is defined and redefined by sociopsychological boundaries that may involve cultural ascription, social prescription, and political proscription. Emerging from this contention is the concept of ethnopolitical culture, which reflects the structural and salient milieu as well as the values involved in interethnic communication and articulation. Admittedly such an analysis of ethnic conflict can lead the investigator in many different paths depending on his proclivities. The rich legacy of scholarly studies on ethnicism deepens our understanding at the micro level. But, even then, what is catalytic in one conflict may be either nonexistent or peripheral in another. Thus, Catholicism is an important factor in Northern Ireland, but the Flemish and Walloons are Catholic in Belgium where language is the issue. The Copts are not proportionately represented in governmental decision making in Egypt, but no civil war has yet developed; yet denial of constitutional rights provoked a war of secession in Pakistan.

6.5.2.2

Ethnicism and Development

Is it conflict that causes tribalism or tribalism that causes conflict? We hope to demonstrate that the biases of Western ideologies and methodologies have consistently led us to accept the former, while treating the latter as a casualty for the trash heap of history. Our religious faith in progress has prevented us from recognizing that while there is nothing inevitable about ethnic conflict, neither is it evident that nation builders will discover the precise formula to absorb so formidable an antagonist. Thus we are compelled to posit the ethnic nation as an irreducible dilemma for the state, one that under the proper (or dysfunctional) conditions can emerge as a truculent divisive force. Conflict, such as economic scarcity or political or cultural repression, can exacerbate these tendencies, but it is not demonstrable that an absence of these conflicts (were it possible?) would mean the withering away of the ethnic nation. Professor Milton Gordon has reminded us that the term ethnic group has been used to embrace the unities of race, religion, and national origin. However, the common denominator of these categories is a “common social-psychological referent,” which acts to create a consciousness of peoplehood. Thus the term ethnic is invested with a broader significance than it has been given by some sociologists who use the term ethnic group as a typology of national origin. Obviously, the raising of such a consciousness has direct implications in social, economic, and of course political behavior. How difficult it must be, for example, to persuade an ethnic group to reweave the values, attitudes, and norms that characterize a group’s authority patterns since, as Milton Gordon states: Common to all these objective bases, however, is the social-psychological element of a special sense of both ancestral and future-oriented identification with the group. These are the “people” of my ancestors, therefore they are my people, and they will be the people of my children and their children…. [I]n a very special way which history has decreed, I share a

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

211

sense of indissoluble and intimate identity with this group and not that one within the larger society and the world. (Gordon 1964, p. 29)

Clifford Geertz (1963) has elaborated upon the contrast inherent in such a definition, which he refers to as communalism. In India, it is based on religious contrasts, in Malaya we are primarily attracted to racial differences, and in the Congo by tribal affiliations. Divisions based on economic, class, or political disaffection may be the harbinger for civil strife, but alienation based on culture, language, race, and nationality are elements that comprise what Professor Shils has called the primordial ties and are the foci of authority and patriotism within the state that it often seeks to replace or from which it seeks to disassociate. Geertz identifies several ascriptive characteristics around which much ethnic conflict has revolved: Assumed Blood Ties, like those that characterize the “hill tribes” of Southeast Asia and the Kurds; Race, a volatile element in the transactions between the ex-colonial powers and the ex-colonial states; Language, such as that which served as the basis for the political crisis that toppled the Belgian government and threatens the Canadian unity; Religion, of which Indian partition is an outstanding example of these divisive passions – and the turmoil in Ireland a disturbing reminder – and Custom, examples of which are the Bengalis in India and the Javanese in Indonesia. Throughout this patchwork of social organization and behavior patterns, the ethnic group is self-consciously defined by the kind of social-political differentiation and cultural autonomy that we usually associate with candidates for statehood. Thus it would be surprising after reviewing the literature about the ethnic group as well as the literature written by ethnic spokesmen if the theorists of modernization and nation building did not dedicate themselves to constructing a viable paradigm that recognized the tenacity of these social organizations and their logical implications for theories of modernization. But curiously this has not been the case. Standard works on development have addressed themselves to analysis of the military, the bureaucracy, social classes, and urbanization. In fact, as Andrew Greeley has wryly observed regarding the United States, throughout the 1960s articles on ethnic groups and ethnic behavior were scrupulously ignored by journals of scholarship. Perhaps the proclivity of Western scholars to treat the ethnic group and ethnic politics as a transitional social organization in the stages of political growth is rooted in the scientific rationalism of the post-feudal European period. Floyd Matson has traced the intellectual history of the application of the Newtonian model to the social sciences from the applied science of “social mathematics” invented by de Witt through the zealous initiatives of the Saint-Simonians to apply the Newtonian world view to the study and manipulation of society: Their vision was of a society wholly made over in the image of the new mechanics – technically rationalized in every detail, predictable in every activity, and hence brought under total scientific management. The religion of science was a faith in the existence of an objective reason, impersonal and mechanical, harmonious and determinate, existing entirely apart from individual men and indifferent to their purposes. (Matson 1966, p. 17)

212

A. A. Said et al.

This ideal of progress – linear, rational, and positivist – was canonized by the development of the political economy of the nation-state, which as Jacques Ellul has pointed out: was constructed little by little, and all of its individual techniques were improved by mutual interaction…. Who was to coordinate this multiplicity of techniques? Who was to build the mechanism necessary to the new economic technique? Who was to make binding the decision necessary to service the machines? The individual is not by himself rational enough to accept what is necessary to the machines. He rebels too easily. He requires an agency to restrain him, and the state had to play this role. … To this end, the state itself must be coherent. (Ellul 1964, p. 115)

Ellul’s framework of analysis – shared to an important degree by contemporary expositors of a “counterculture” – is a stark analysis and projection of the impact of scientific rationalism on the varieties of human behavior and social organization. But the early theorists of the nation-state were not attracted by its potential to control and predict human behavior within political and economic schemata. Thomas Hobbes is one of these writers who exerted a great deal of influence on the development of the state. The Leviathan was forged in the crucible of disorder – religious wars and so forth – that plagued seventeenth-century Europe. As Professor Nisbet has written: In Hobbes’s conception of the State and its law, in his treatment of the foundations of social order, and in his theory of internal associations, there are few if any remaining evidences of the medieval image of society. … Gone, in Hobbes, is the troubled affection for associations based on locality, interest, and faith. Gone also is the profound veneration for kinship, for the inviolable household, for the imprescriptible authority of the house-father. Neither the family, the church, nor any other system of authority is allowed by Hobbes to intervene in any significant way between the individual and the absolute power of the State. (Nisbet 1953, p. 130)

But we should pause to consider that for Hobbes the concentration of power was not an end in itself. It was a means to seduce and eliminate the parochial social barriers of custom, religion, and ethnic fratricide that he perceived to be the foremost obstacle to human fulfillment in his century. Whether we are dealing with the extermination of Brazilian Indians or the contemporary ethnic conflict in Uganda, Ireland, or Pakistan, we are naturally attracted to the anomaly of the twentieth century – the impulse for Western modernization and the accelerating consciousness for self-determination among varieties of linguistic, religious, and geographical ethnic groups. The questions that such a conflict poses for a normative political scientist may be phrased in this manner: Although I believe that states must assimilate ethnic nations Y and Z in order to provide the modern economic, health, and social services that they deserve as citizens of the twenty-first century – what about the possibility that nations X and Y resist the devaluation of sovereignty? What rights if any do they have under my scheme for modernization? What limitations, if any, should be placed on the central authority in their attempts to force secessionist ethnic-nations to adapt to the political economy of the state? Each of us can pose a different question that places more or less emphasis on the fruits of modernization or the political or cultural exhilaration of ethnic sovereignty,

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

213

but finally we must confront the root question of how we shall balance our commitment to human rights with the contemporary experience of “nation building” – often a bitter by-product of civil war. Then again, as we are rediscovering in the social sciences, our view of the controversy may be considerably influenced by the state we are living in at a particular point in history. States wracked by ethnic conflicts are probably less inclined to view secession and civil war as expressions of some transcendent human struggle than states that experience an acceptable level of ethnic conflict that does not approach disassociation. […] The response of the state to disaffected ethnic minorities has not been generous by most Western standards. The Tibetans with the Chinese, the Montagnards in South Vietnam, and the examples of Iraq, Cyprus, Rwanda, and the Sudan are indispensable reference points for predicting the state response to ethnic conflict and the politics of disassociation. Self-determination movements are invariably viewed as threats to the survival of the state. States threatened by such acts of disassociation have treated the leaders of these movements as traitors and have interned them without even the casual regard for their own concepts of due process. […] States can usually expect to lend covert or overt assistance to other states confronting ethnic dissidents unless, of course, the dissident ethnic elements are perceived as instrumentalities in the foreign policy armamentarium of one state to disrupt the internal affairs of another state. Basque nationalism furnishes a good example of the former, Chinese foreign policy in Burma, the latter. The Basque region is on the border of Spain and France. Although the French deny providing assistance to the Spanish government, since 1970 France has increased the expulsion of Basque political refugees. Basques, on either side of the border, note that improved French-Spanish relations that culminated in the French sale of armaments to Spain have contributed to growing collaboration of the governments on the Basque problem (Kamm 1972).

6.5.2.3

Ethnic-nations and Foreign Policy

While it should by now be becoming increasingly evident that ethnic conflict in Uganda can make itself felt in the diplomatic struggle in the Middle East or that Basque terrorism that ignores the French-Spanish border can pave problems between two states, there is another dimension to the study of ethnic conflict that demands a brief inquiry. The nation-state has been forced by historical circumstance to share the stage with other actors, such as multinational corporations, transnational subcultures, and, of course, ethnic nations. Quite often these ethnic nations, dissatisfied with political and social conditions at home, have begun to pirate international passenger flights, assassinate diplomats in foreign lands, and even to extort ransom from multinational giants such as Ford Motor Co. Kidnappings of businessmen and diplomats have become a familiar feature in international politics. The mobility of ethnic nations in the international environment and the highly integrated state of our technology makes disruption of international services an easy mark. This, naturally, should and undoubtedly will call forth a response by

214

A. A. Said et al.

nation-states, communist, socialist, capitalist, and so forth, manifesting itself in new conventions and bilateral treaties with procedures for extradition and perhaps even international accords. This is only one local consequence of ethnic conflict for politics among nations. Another is the manipulation of ethnic conflict in one state by another state. […] Concomitantly, it is, in our estimation, becoming increasingly evident that these rebellious secessionist-ethnic nations will turn to illicit trafficking in contraband in order to finance guerrilla activities or to maintain their bases of political and cultural sovereignty within a state. This raises a fundamental question about the processes through which our foreign policy takes shape. The United States still continues to pursue – with only slight deviation – practices formed in the nineteenthcentury crucible of diplomacy. This procedure calls for direct transactions among governments who exercise political control over a geographical area. In an age of political consciousness characterized by retribalization and neoethnic behavior, this is a myopic posture. Difficult a task as it may be, foreign policy must be able to learn how to communicate with different ethnic-nations within a single state if it wishes to achieve its objectives. This will require differentiation of messages on a scale as impractical and as improvident as a century ago. It will also require political contacts with dissident ethnic-nations occasionally, at the expense of political relations with the constituted central government. Much, of course, will depend on the objectives to be achieved, and so the drawing is offered. The United States has a major heroin-addiction problem that is the cause of significant social disorganization in its large urban centers, such as New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles. President Nixon has stated that, “If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us.” Large sums of money have been appropriated by the U.S. Congress to finance the overseas activities of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, as well as Research and Rehabilitation programs at home. Through a vigorous and systematic recall of American ambassadors and personnel in designated regions of the world, the United States has raised the issue of narcotics to an issue of foreign policy. It has relied upon the traditional techniques of foreign policy in dealing with countries such as Thailand, Laos, Burma, Turkey, and Afghanistan, such as A.I.D. assistance to help farmers grow alternative crops to the poppy, technical and enforcement assistance, threats to discontinue foreign assistance, and exchanges of scientific and enforcement information. These prodigious efforts are predestined to fail for a variety of reasons that we have explored elsewhere. However, the point that concerns us here is the nature of the illicit traffic in opiates, and which groups are intimately involved in these international transactions. It is incontestable that there is a high degree of involvement in the illicit traffic by disaffected ethnic or tribal groups throughout the world. Leaving aside for the moment the powerful French-Corsicans who have dominated the Turkish-French-American axis, we find that the illicit trafficking networks are heavily influenced by regional ethnic-nations. […] United States foreign policy will remain ineffectual with regard to arresting the illicit traffic in narcotics as long as it continues to negotiate with central governments who cannot control the activities of their ethnic nations. Should the U.S. negotiate

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

215

with Kabul or the Afridis? No doubt relations with the central governme nt would be impaired, but the advantages and disadvantages of such a trade-off should be fully explored.

6.5.2.4

Neoethnic Behavior

[…] [A]n ethnic revival or a rediscovery of diversity, as Andrew Greeley has described it, is quite underway in a society least susceptible – in theory of course – to such blandishments. If we accept the proposition that an ethnic group is a “collectivity based on presumed common origin, which shapes to some extent the attitudes and behaviors of those who share that origin, and with which certain people may freely choose to identify at certain times of their lives” (Greeley 1971, emphasis added), we are able to certify our understanding of behavior whose roots extend no further than the demography of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. If we were to accept the hypothesis that to the extent that conscious self-definition permits ethnicity as a means of relating to the physical and social environment, a formula for self-definition – an “option” – then what of those who seek to experience the nexus of community but who demonstrably lack the connection of blood or land? […] Modernization has often served as the precursor to mass movements and war as men have sought to re-establish the social psychology of community in a radically altered environment. But as we approach the twenty-first century, men seem to have wearied of the millennial visions promised by the ideologies of the nineteenth century. […] We venture to suggest that no new intellectual radicalism has risen like the phoenix from the ashes of ideological fires but that a popular radicalism, a neoethnic response to the depersonalization and rationalization of the postindustrial society and certain changes in the traditional function of the nation-state, has diffused into political and cultural sensibilities that assume many forms of expression. […] The sociological landscape in the United States is prefigured by both ethnic and neoethnic behavior. Thus, we are anxious to suggest that neoethnicism is a neologism that describes both a model of social organization in postindustrial society as well as identifiable actors within it. A politics of neoethnicism is investing itself in the styles, politics, and social organization in America that will have a wide impact on theories of national development and integration. Neoethnicism as a system is a transition from the national consciousness of the nation-state to more communal forms of identity and organization characterized by cultural patriotism, ethnic nationalism, and a revolt against anxiety. A primary agent of this transformation is the primacy of communication in the process of mobilizing unassimilated minorities and subcultures, the growth of particularistic and minority nationalism, in a redefinition of national consciousness. It has been described at its farthest points by a process of retribalization, the philosophical concession to communal imperatives characterized by the “interdependence of fate” and a proliferation of related lifestyles. In its paramount expression, it is the apostasy of the nation-state, an exhaustion with the cumulative preoccupations

216

A. A. Said et al.

of national and world institutions and the preference for the pursuit and study of personal and parochial problems. It is expressed in a variety of ideologies, among a variety of classes. It has assumed both subtle and overt expressions and is stimulated by structural changes in the function of the state. Neoethnicism is not an exercise in the apocalyptic. It is an articulation of the crisis in the expectation and promise of national institutions. It confutes the viability of state institutions to respond to the social-psychological needs of community, and it has found its expression in political and cultural themes and motifs as seemingly diverse as civil disobedience, the chants of La Raza, ethnic consciousness, youth ghettos, subcultures,2 decentralization, community control, rural and professional communes, and the growth of the modern university. It is not the expression of the disenchanted but rather it is becoming the basis for a major reorganization of American life. […] The intensity of neoethnic politics among the young reflects the changing sensibilities in an age of maximum weaponry where the utility of the state as a territorial instrument for preservation has lost its cogency, and where security has become a function of technology, not of geopolitics. This reorganization of security has acted as a catalyst in the re-examination of other state institutions and functions and has revealed an extraordinary degree of weariness with the institutions of the nation-state. In such a system, where the nationstate is no longer regarded as the “highest” form of organization, interest groups… not receiving satisfaction from the processes of the state, are easily mobilized to pursue non-national alternatives to political and cultural communities. […] Thus, privatism, ethnicism, the occult, community-oriented protest, consumer unionism, and communes testify to the decline of the nation-state ethic and the absence of the subscription of diverse national, ethnic, neoethnic preferences to the creation of state initiatives and ideology. The de-authorization of the symbols and the ideology of the nation-state is not a temporary phenomenon, nor is it primarily a casualty of the Vietnam war. […] No longer convinced that national or state administrative bodies were prepared or capable of developing efficient responses to local conflicts and the social-psychological needs of the individual, ethnicity and neoethnicity have become for many the prime foci of political and cultural concern and have eroded the foundations of the theories of national integration. Why this transition in collective behavior has occurred now must be a subject for further definitive inquiry, but therein lies the emphasis of the real conflict in a post-industrial society. Rationalization or community? What this will augur for the formulation of national priorities, for theories of national development, when many Americans are clearly soliciting and pushing for answers in a variety of neoethnic, ethnic institutions, is difficult to assess now. But the action has moved to another game insofar as the nation-state is concerned. Robert Nisbet has written that

2

We have dealt with the phenomena of subcultures elsewhere – see Said, Protagonists of change (1971). We have tended to treat the subculture as a transnational parochialism and the neoethnic as a national parochialism.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

217

The quest for community will not be denied, for it springs from some of the powerful needs of human nature – needs for a clear sense of cultural purpose, membership, status, and continuity. Without these, no amount of mere material welfare will serve to arrest the developing sense of alienation in our society, and the mounting preoccupation with the imperatives of community. (Nisbet 1953, p. 73)

Robert Lifton has expressed this human need in another way. Reflecting on the impact of nuclear weapons that “alter and blur the boundaries of our psychological lives, our symbolic space, and in ways crucial to our thought, feelings and action,” he suggests that our sense of the continuity of life is profoundly threatened and, “They are no longer certain where anything begins or ends” (Lifton 1970).

6.5.2.5

Conclusion

This essay hopes to identify and explore a trend in international politics. It is, then, to a degree, an exercise in social forecasting and as such its hypotheses deserve to be rigorously tested by the empiricism of political transactions. These hypotheses are that: i.

ii.

iii. iv.

v.

vi.

The intensification of ethnic consciousness and the subsequent fragmentation, rather than political consolidation and social integration, may well be a function of economic development and mass media exposure; The concept of development, long considered to be an increase of GNP and PCI or a rise in production and consumption, may be redefined in terms of “liberation” from externally imposed values, socioeconomic-political inequities, or suppression of cultural expressions; The energies and attentions of nation-states may become absorbed by intense ethnic division resulting in less effective domestic and foreign policies; As security becomes increasingly a function of technology and the imperatives of national security are viewed less in geopolitical terms, the lack of “external” threats may catalyze ethnic consciousness and negate those forces previously contributing to social cohesion; Post-industrial societies may not be immune from neoethnicism because the causes appear to be anthropologically, sociologically, and psychologically rooted and seemingly not assuaged by positivism or “progress”; The nation-state may become less an entity of reference and perceived less as the Primum Mobile of development and sine qua non of political identification. Consequently, the concept of national interest may become more nebulous and less useful in predicting political behavior.

218

A. A. Said et al.

References American Assembly. (1957). International stability and progress: United States interests and instruments. New York: American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. Barker, E. (1927). National character and the factors in its formation. London: Methuen. Barth, F. (Ed.). (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Committee on Finance, United States Senate. (1973, Feb.). Implications of multinational firms for world trade and investment and for U.S. trade and labor. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 531–546. Ellul, J. (1964). The technological society. New York: Vintage. Fischer, F. (1967). Germany’s aims in the First World War. New York: Norton. Geertz, C. (1963). The integration revolution. In C. Geertz (Ed.), Old societies and new states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa (pp. 105–157).New York: Free Press. Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origin. New York: Oxford University Press. Greeley, A. (1971). The rediscovery of diversity. The Antioch Review, 31(3), 343–365. Harrington, M. (1968). Toward a democratic left. New York: Macmillan. Harrington, M. (1971). Do the rich nations need the poor? New York: Center for International Studies, New York University. Hidy, R. W. (1949). The house of baring in American trade and finance: English merchant bankers at work, 1763–1861. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hymer, S. (1970). The efficiency (contradictions) of multinational corporations. American Economic Review, 60(2), 441–448. Kamm, H. (1972, December 13). For Basques, the French-Spanish border is an affront. The New York Times, 14C. Leff, N. (1971). Bengal, Biafra, and the Bigness Bias. Foreign Policy (3), 129–139. Lichtheim, G. Imperialism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Lifton, R. J. (1970). Boundaries. New York: Vintage. Matson, F. (1966). The broken image. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Modelski, G. (1972). Multinational business: A global perspective. International Studies Quarterly, 16(4), 407–432. Murdock, G. Peter. (1967). Ethnographic atlas. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Nisbet, R. A. (1953). The quest for community. New York: Oxford University Press. Nixon, R. (1971). United States foreign policy for the 1970’s: Building for peace: A report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1970). America’s world role in the 70s. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A. (Ed.). (1971). Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Collier, D. M. (Eds.). (1971). Revolutionism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1976). Ethnicity in an international context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A., & Simmons, L. R. (Eds.). (1971). The new sovereigns: Multinational corporations as world powers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Seabury, P., & Wildaysky, A. (Eds.). (1969). U.S. foreign policy: Perspectives and proposals for the 1970’s. New York: McGraw-Hill. Spanier, J. (1972). Games nations play: Analyzing international politics. New York: Praeger. Spykman, N. (1942). America’s strategy in world politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Ulam, A. B. (1971). The rivals: America and Russia since World War II. New York: Viking Press.

6 A World in Transition: Rethinking International Relations

219

Vernon, R. (1967). Multinational enterprise and national sovereignty. Harvard Business Review, 45(March/April) 156–172. Vernon, R. (1968). Economic sovereignty at bay. Foreign Affairs, 47(1), 110–122. White, R. K. (1970). Nobody wanted war. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books.

Chapter 7

Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

7.1 Pursuing Human Dignity Said, A. A. (1978). Pursuing human dignity. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Human rights and world order (pp. 1–21). Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Human rights are concerned with the dignity of the individual – the level of selfesteem that secures personal identity and promotes human community. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are part of the process of enlarging freedom, social justice, and the opportunity for perfectability, and the development of an environment and appropriate structures to promote these goals.

7.1.1 Traditional Cultures, Present Conditions While the pursuit of human dignity is universal, its form is designed by the culture of a people. Politics is a cultural activity and reflects tradition and environment. The debate on human rights assumes that in spite of the differences which characterize the diversity of cultures, political conduct can be conceptualized by certain common norms and attitudes. In the modern global system Westerners have concentrated on Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, was the longest serving professor at American University and founder of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at the institution’s School of International Service. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_7

221

222

A. A. Said et al.

discovering common denominators rooted in the Judeo-Christian traditions from which a calculus of human rights would emerge. This emphasis on Western common denominators projects a parochial view of human rights exclusive of the cultural realities and present existential conditions of Third World societies. What has occurred is the reshaping of politics to accommodate various theories of political behavior gleaned from Western traditions. These theories of politics proceed from the assumption that all states share a common agenda of goals – reinforcing the perception of the universality of Western values. Western states assert their interests in an unequivocal litany of demands, including human rights; the character of these demands is determined in the crucible of the Western experience. The problem with such analogies is that they seek to reduce to formula the internal behavior of governments without examining the internal milieu, a wholly arbitrary and artificial separation of the political organism. The fact of the matter is quite different. The character and nature of human rights is determined in the crucible of a specific sociopolitical culture. Politics is essentially an ascriptive phenomenon. It is culture specific. The goals which states maximize are a reflection of these factors. Human rights is no exception. The development of a global conception of human rights is retarded by the lack of agreement on sources of human rights, including the very foundation of international law. The uncertainty about the content of the doctrines of human rights – including the lack of a philosophical common core – poses additional obstacles. In fact, the very conception of the organization of society differs from one culture to another. The West places more emphasis on rights, while much of the Third World values obligations. The Western tradition posits freedom in order to avoid the outcome of a despotic system, while the Third World emphasizes virtue as a goal to perpetuate tradition of society that often supports a coercive system. The West emphasizes individual interests, while much of the Third World values collective good. In the areas where natural rights transcend cultural values, as in the right to survival, the vested interests of foreign policy elites serve as a basis for disagreement in the exercise of human rights. Such political use of human rights increases the possibility of the perversion of the concept.

7.1.2 Western Context The fundamental problem of political life – the tension between rights and duties of the individual and obligations and powers of the government – has characterized the development of the state. Since ancient Greece the West has approached this polarity within the framework of Platonic organicism and Sophistic nominalism. For the Platonists, the individual beyond a political community had no rights; it was through the polis that individuals gained the spiritual and political attributes which made them human, rather than barbarians. Therefore, concern for the whole of the political community preceded the claims of any individual. This type of political community

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

223

was organic, since the individual functioned merely as a part of an organic whole and gained significance only in reference to that whole. The Sophists, on the other hand, based the state upon a contract acknowledging that the individual had natural rights apart from the political community; the state arose only when individuals saw that it was to their interest to surrender their purely selfish interests in order to better secure them. For the Sophists the community was predicated upon a philosophy of nominalism; the members did have an identity beyond the political community. The rationale of the state was not to achieve an organic harmony and a common good, but rather to maximize the interests of the members of the state. The Platonic-Sophistic dichotomy was reproduced with greater sophistication by the nominalists of the seventeenth century and the organicists of the nineteenth. Seventeenth century nominalism represented a final break with medieval organicism, which, following the dissemination of Aristotelian doctrines, provided the philosophical basis of political life in Europe. By the seventeenth century the community had become dissolved into a discrete mass of individuals with distinct self-interests. Hobbes built his state upon the selfishness of individuals; even Locke makes the individual enter political life for the benefits that accrue therefrom. Individuals left the “state of nature,” in which life – Hobbes and Locke concurred – was “short, nasty, and brutish,” through the social contract. The political community was then held together by an intricate balance of power which gave rise to a harmony of interests and became the basis of laissez-faire economics and liberal politics. The interests of the individual and the community coincided. The return to the organic notion of political community from seventeenth century nominalism took place in the works of Kant, Hegel, and Rousseau. Kant asserted that human values and perception were structured by objective categories which one brought into the world at birth. Accordingly, the individual had a categorical identity – a member of a class, nation, race – which ultimately determined one’s actions. Rousseau substitutes the general will for the will of all. The difference between the will of all and the general will was that the latter had a transhistorical origin, which bore no necessary relationships to the interests of the members of the political community to which it applied. The will of all, on the other hand, was simply the will of the majority of the people. Finally, Hegel formalized the course of history. There was an absolute in history which dictated human action. Freedom was simply action in accord with historical necessity. Human values and human purpose were rendered operationally irrelevant by the inalterable course of history. The transition from seventeenth century nominalism to nineteenth century organicism began with the reversion against the French Revolution and developed during the Industrial Revolution. With the emergence of the reign of virtuous terror in France, Europeans who had supported the original ideals of the Revolution recoiled to doctrines of organicism. The exponents of the new organicism – Burke, de Maistre, and Fichte – argued that political community was given by nature and could not be altered by political action. The values of the group to which the individual belonged were transhistorical. The course of history determined the significance of the group.

224

A. A. Said et al.

Thus nineteenth century conservatives advanced the concept of the absolute. Burke found it in tradition, Fichte in the nation, Gobineau in the race, and Madison Grant in the aristocracy. Individuals’ denial of a transcendent absolute, conservatives have imagined, has rendered them incapable of sustaining political order. Even Marx, for instance, adopted all the trappings of nineteenth century organicism. The individual for him was born with an objective identity dictated by the division of labor, a corollary of the prevailing system of production which was a by-product of historical necessity. An eventual classless society was assured by the inalterable course of the historical absolute. In the twentieth century the conservative longing has found its articulate and learned exponents. William Y. Elliott has written of the attack by pragmatism and pluralism on the absolute sovereignty of the constitutional state. Henry Kariel has lamented the twentieth century image of the political individual whose actions are environmentally determined and who is consequently incapable of positing transcendent political values. Richard M. Weaver, a consistent enemy of relativism, argues that the individual is dehumanized without the tyrannizing norms of culture. The evidence of political life in the twentieth century, however, seems to refute the diagnosis of the conservatives. The paramount reality of twentieth century politics, the “true believer,” is distinguished precisely by a penchant to grasp an absolute through selfless dedication to the movement which embodies it. The selfless individual has appeared as the Bolshevik, the Nazi, the American, the Maoist. It is not the lack of absolutes, but the institutionalization of these absolutes, which has underscored the tension between the individual and the state. The twentieth century lacks a public realm, as the classical Greeks understood it. The realm of freedom where individuals render their notions of the good political order has narrowed. The trend is toward ideological, “consensus” politics; membership in the political community of rights and duties is denied to those who remain beyond the pale of the prevailing dogma. In the absence of this realm of freedom, twentieth century man has been reduced to an instrument of necessity. Now, however, necessity appears in the guise of ideologies, surrogates of true political expression. Thus the erosion of individual rights, the fruits of which were left for twentieth century individuals to bear, took place in the nineteenth century; Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel supplied the tools of the erosion. Freedom in the classical sense, in other words, has been the victim of the expression of nineteenth century attitudes and ideologies in the twentieth century political realm. The present crisis of human rights in the West is a function of ideological politics. The need for a new relationship between a freedom which recognizes a person’s essential spiritual nature and an expanded necessity imposed by the nineteenth century heritage exerts strong pressure upon present society in the West. […]

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

225

7.1.3 Marxist and Neo-Marxist Views Marxism is an elaboration of the concept of humanism developed during the Renaissance asserting the basic dignity and worth of the individual and a person’s capacity for self-realization through reason. Karl Marx emphasized economic rights, affirming that the collapse of the capitalist system was inevitable and that the proletariat (the working class) would seize the means of production and establish a new socialist system. This socialist system would then work toward the attainment of communism under which all would share equally the benefits of the new society. The exploited proletarian class would construct a new classless society where all individuals would be treated equally and justly. The global character of Marxism has produced a diversity of opinion on the subject of Marxist humanism. In the Marxist societies (led by the Soviet Union), a more “traditional” approach to the subject of Marxist humanist thought has been emphasized. Traditional Marxist humanism focuses on class struggle and the liberation of the working class. The class struggle is the force that molds the consciousness of the working class and allows it to free itself from the oppression of the exploitative classes. As one traditional Marxist, Shtoll (1958), writes, “It will not be amiss to recall Engels’ The Condition of the Working Class in England where it is stressed that the workers can maintain their human dignity, their human countenance, only if their whole life is filled with a burning hatred for the exploiter class.” The traditional Marxists contend that there is no genuine humanism under the capitalist system because of the oppressed condition of the working class. Under the capitalist system the worker is viewed only in terms of market value, not as a human being with a myriad of needs and cares. Thus, under such a system the basis for a humanist society could never be constructed. As another traditional Marxist writer, Garaudy (1957), phrased it, “The problems of humanism . . . are, in the final analysis, reduced to the need for a just organization of society.” While the traditional Marxists stress the class struggle and the monolithic unity of the communist movement, other Marxists are beginning to explore new routes to communism. These “neo-Marxists” are devoted to developing a more humane socialism independent of the present centers of Marxist thought in Moscow and Peking. The neo-Marxists are opposed to the harsh and repressive Stalinist system and demand autonomy for each national Marxist movement. The slogan of the neoMarxists has been “Socialism with a human face.” Leonhard (1974) has observed, “Humanist Marxists reject the Soviet idea that a socialist society must be based on a planned state economy and be characterized by “moral and political unity” under the leadership of an all-powerful party and its apparatus.” Neo-Marxists view socialism as a free society based economically on the self-management of producers and characterized politically by democratic liberties and freedom of speech. Obviously many of these ideas contradict the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of a strong, centralized Communist party and the dictatorship of the proletariat as the method of government in a socialist state.

226

A. A. Said et al.

It is also significant that the neo-Marxists do not emphasize the class struggle. They are not exclusively concerned with changing the economic structures of society. Rather, the neo-Marxists stress democracy, freedom of discussion, and the problem of alienation. Michael Harrington observes, “In communist society, alienation persists; indeed, it is writ large. The totalitarian state becomes the very incarnation of all those powers which weigh upon man, which rob him of his individuality and personality. There is anticapitalism, to be sure, but an anticapitalism which is corrosive of human dignity in much the same way as its antagonists” (1970, p. 145). Harrington goes on to add, “As soon as one realizes that socialism is not simply directed against economic irrationality but that its deepest springs flow from a positive humanism whose task is the conquest of alienation, it becomes obvious that Russian society has nothing to do with socialism” (p. 150). Neo-Marxist thought has risen to prominence in Western Europe (among the Eurocommunist parties) and in Tito’s Yugoslavia, where exception from the Soviet model was taken in 1948. The neo-Marxist stress on democratic methods of governing and greater freedom could be interpreted as a reaction to the rigidity of Stalinism; it could also be viewed as the fear, on the part of other Communist parties, of being dominated by the Soviet Communist party. This fear is based on the historical experience of communism in Russia and of Soviet politics vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Following the death of Lenin, Stalin seized control of the party and purged many of the old Bolsheviks who disagreed with the party orthodoxy he set forth. Stalin followed a similar philosophy as Louis Antoine de Saint-Just did following the French Revolution when he observed, “A patriot is one who supports the republic as a whole; whoever resists it in detail is a traitor” (Merleau-Ponty 1969, p. 34). As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it, “Either this means nothing at all, or else it means that in a period of revolutionary tension or external threat there is no clear-cut boundary between political divergencies and objective treason. Humanism is suspended and government is Terror” (p. 34). Clearly the neo-Marxists wish to avoid such an occurrence in their theoretical path toward communism. The traditional Marxists reject the possibility of other paths to communism – that is, democratic elections versus violent revolution. They believe that only by changing the economic structure of society and economic relations between individuals can a new humanity be founded and a more humane society emerge. While neo-Marxists recognize that the economic structures must be changed to promote the new humanism, they emphasize values of individuality and freedom.

7.1.4 Third World Existential conditions in the Third World differ considerably from those in the West. Increased institutionalization of the nation-state has accentuated the confrontations between the Western individual and the state. In the West human rights tensions derive from the frustrating efforts to fit the contemporary environment into the nation-state;

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

227

tensions in the Third World represent their equally frustrating effort to fit the nationstate into their traditional institutions. Human rights concerns in the Third World center more around the nature of the social structure and less around life styles. Poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, low productivity, mass unemployment, glaring disparities in the distribution of benefits – all underscore the existential plight of the Third World. The nation-state, and a progressive as opposed to a static vision of reality, have caused explorations, and sometimes conflagrations, in the relationships between traditional cultural patterns and the structures of government. The Third World is in a marked intellectual and political institutional discontinuity with the old. The family and the community have outlived their usefulness as organizing principles and as safeguards for certain basic human rights. Nothing has replaced them, except perhaps angry and sometimes ugly cynicism. Human rights in the Third World are thus in a stage of ferment. There is confusion and, at times, anarchy. The nation-state model has required governments to enter into competition with traditional authority. This in turn has prompted the attempt to inject new values, interests, and goals in an effort to supplant those traditionally held or accepted. While the old has been destroyed, the new has not yet appeared. The reasons are technical as well as ideological. The new states have no commonly accepted values; hence their new national structures are easily perishable. Political systems in the Third World merge in the overriding context of Leninism and militarism with an everwidening public sector. Hardly any of the Third World governments has been able to institutionalize itself firmly, to establish liberal or popular institutions, or to relax its vigil against subversion, imagined or real. The central structures of government are modern in form only, not in substance. Government is minimal in organization and effect. […] Environmental changes in the Third World have outstripped the institutional structures of the traditional era. The promise of higher stages of material growth competes with the negative conditions of underdeveloped existence to push down human rights priorities. The collision of old values, new concepts, and foreign exploitation underlies the problem of modernization and development. Third World states are attempting to telescope the achievements of the Industrial Revolution into one generation. Their people have discovered themselves in unfamiliar ways. They are forced to choose between affecting change within their political system or renouncing the relevance of their values to their present existence. Since they cannot do the latter, they must choose the former. This is a period of maximum transition in the Third World, in contrast to the previous three hundred years when it remained much outside the political forces operating in the West. The pressure of new ideas is explosive. While receptiveness to new ideas is strong, reluctance to let go of older ones is still greater. The processes of change have blurred the distinction between modernization and development. The development process is the way the potential for society and its members is sought. It is a process with a goal – even if this goal is perceived as an ever receding one. True, there is always a utopia by which the development process is measured. Utopias are extracted from a people’s experience and generalized into a

228

A. A. Said et al.

vision of the desired society. But since experience is constantly enlarged, it is natural that the utopia changes. How a person manages the tension between theory and practice, reflection and experience – this praxiological style helps keep the dreams alive. Otherwise the dream becomes a nightmare. Modernization is the adoption of modern technology for the increase of productivity. In the Third World societal values are not integrated into the emerging designs of development. Modernization is not a substitute for development. What is occurring in the less developed countries is that development is simply latched on to modernization because no other popular base is constructed. The vitality of the vision of development can derive only from its cultural reality, neither from Western liberalism nor from the variety of Marxist experiences. Human rights in the Third World are sacrificed for modernization. Regardless of time and place, individuals must sweat out their own development to the greater expansion of their dignity.

7.1.5 World Order The entire global system today is gripped by frustrations and crises. At first glance, it appears as if the rapprochement of the superpowers has produced peace. In fact, the superpowers’ reconciliation purchases minimal security in exchange for vital interests of the less developed countries. Already exponents of a new world order are asserting that the new detente of the superpowers (the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the People’s Republic of China), demonstrates superpower indifference toward the rapidly growing gap between the rich and powerful states and an indifference to the humanist ideals of peace and equality that were framed in the declarations and covenants on human rights. As Brady Tyson has remarked, rather than a liberal, democratic, egalitarian order of law to replace the anarchy of the nation-state system, an international corporatist order appears to be developing, which is neither liberal nor democratic. A corporatist system is one where interest groups are represented by their elite in concert with other interest group elites, and the concert of elites develops its own interest while maintaining control over their respective groups. That is, the heads of several interest groups (the army, big business, and banks) form an alliance to preserve stability in their common universe and to create stability, and thereby virtually eliminate or severely limit competition among the groups they head. The security managers of the three superpowers, in pursuit of their respective interests, form an informal network of understanding and communication to assure that competition among them will not be allowed to become destructive, and that potential rivals will be contained before they can threaten the dominance of the big three or any one of them. It is sort of an international cartel for the restraint of competition, and to limit the power to change the rules of the game to the three major actors. And, of course, there is no international antitrust legislation of any significance. […]

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

229

From the standpoint of world development, it is tragic that the period of superpower conflict was very often used to enhance the prosperity of the superpowers and militarize rather than develop the Third World. The era of the emerging rapprochement may tend to deescalate the international military conflicts in the Third World, but it is not likely – on the other hand – to increase development assistance from the rich to the poor states. For one thing, the development process tends to be destabilizing, and that is apparently not a goal of any of the superpowers at this time. Thus the inevitable tendency in such a three-superpower arrangement will be to reduce the area of maneuver of the less developed countries, and to maintain or force them into client relations with one of the superpowers. Military modernizers who will avoid exciting “extravagant” popular expectations such as those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will probably continue to appear and flourish in the Third World, sponsored by one or the other of the superpowers. In his work on human rights, Brady Tyson has compared the 1930s to the 1970s. Like the thirties, the seventies are times of severe testing of liberalism and constitutionalism. In both cases the reasons are near identical: social dislocations caused by unplanned and unregulated changes provoked by technological change, national and corporate competition, and power – and profit – hunger. Liberalism and constitutionalism have easily become the prisoners of their own traditional processes, and have failed to keep up with the necessity to adapt to new conditions. In the 1930s the challenge of international communism created a counterrevolution from the Right, which was only contained by World War II. In the 1970s the challenge of protest movements without a program has been taken advantage of by a counterrevolution (the “New Right”) that is yet to be contained. While the global political system is dominated by corporatism, the global economic system assumes the form of industrial feudalism. The present global system consists of no more than about twenty-five states and fifty multinational corporations who have any significant impact, and the top five states have over half of the world’s human and natural resources. […] This maldistribution of wealth is accompanied by a maldistribution of information. The same industrial states and multinational corporations also enjoy the political and economic control over the international exchange of information. The advanced industrial states have come to rely less and less on such markets as extractive industries and are bound together in a fierce competition to secure new technologies to maintain their superiority. With the abatement of unregulated competition among the superpowers, the appeals and publicity about the plight of the Third World, about hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment, will probably die down. But given the continuing population growth, and the capital- and technology-intensive nature of the usual post-industrial modernization process, these problems are hardly likely to diminish. In the face of the new situation the United Nations and the international agencies can hardly be expected to maintain even their present low level of impact, since these agencies exist – or act by the sufferance of – the major powers in key issues.

230

A. A. Said et al.

7.1.6 American Foreign Policy The last quarter of the twentieth century has dramatized the issue of human rights in American foreign policy. In his Inaugural Address, President Carter underscored the importance of a U.S. commitment to and respect for human rights. The human rights initiatives of the Carter administration, however, have produced both support and criticism. Opponents wonder whether it is realistic to emphasize human rights in a U.S. foreign policy which deals with sovereign states and whose purpose is to promote national interest and safeguard national security. They assert that the United States cannot apply a single human rights standard to all states regardless of levels of development and degree of friendship with the United States. They argue that it is not correct for the United States to be the moral arbiter for a world where Western concepts of human rights differ markedly from the human rights priorities of other cultures. Exponents of the Carter initiatives, however, assert that violations in some countries are excessive and threaten such basic human needs that they transcend cultural and political differences among states. They emphasize that without ensuring minimum survival for every citizen of the globe, the rights that Americans cherish become endangered. […] In his March 17, 1977 speech at the United Nations, President Carter called for strengthening of the UN Human Rights Commission and for the implementation of a twelve-year-old proposal for the establishment of an independent UN commissioner for human rights. He also declared his intention to seek approval for U.S. ratification of four UN human rights instruments – the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the UN Genocide Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Recent administration actions and statements on human rights seem to reflect a more cautious position than was the case earlier. On April 6, 1977 the House of Representatives agreed to two human rights amendments authorizing U.S. contributions to international lending institutions. The first required U.S. officials of all international financial institutions to vote against extending financial assistance to any member state found to have a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The second required the secretaries of state and treasury to negotiate with other states to develop viable standards for meeting basic human needs and protecting human rights. The first amendment was agreed to despite the opposition of President Carter, who describes such an approach to human rights as “at once too lenient and too rigid.” The president had favored an amendment which encouraged (but did not require) American representatives to international financial organizations to seek to channel loans to countries other than those engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. On April 20, 1977 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed with the president’s position not requiring automatic rejection of aid to nations found violating human rights. More recently, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has emphasized limits on U.S. action in this area. In a speech on April 30, 1977 Secretary of State Vance, while restating the U.S. commitment to human rights, explained that the promotion of

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

231

human rights must be realistic, and must not include imposition of American values on others. He noted that there are constraints on U.S. policy in this area and that American policy should be determined flexibly on a country-by-country basis. Secretary Vance specified human rights as consisting of three parts – integrity of the individual, fulfillment of basic human needs, and civil and political liberties. […]

7.1.7 Competing Foci There are many views of human rights, but hardly a clear focus. Human rights in the West are expressed in demands for the redress of grievances and for the satisfaction of new needs, while in the past they represented a desire to be left alone. The Greco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian traditions asserted both rights and duties, as expounded in the “natural law” arguments of the times. Thus in the West we see a movement away from the individual’s obligations to the state in favor of demands that the state perform more duties. As each stage develops, the number of individual rights expands while the province of individual obligations narrows. On the other hand, the demand for the expansion of the duties of the state is satisfied only through the enlargement of state powers. These contradictory aspects run deep in the present human rights debate in the West. This contradiction has placed the state in crossfire between individuals and groups demanding equal rights. The essential contradiction is that government intervention to meet demands of an individual or a group decreases the rights of other individuals or groups in exact proportion to its success. The trend will persist until such time when there occurs a change in the allocation of power. We must also recognize the connection between the type and number of rights and the nature of the environment. In the West there has been a definite shift from an abstract concept of universal rights toward a concrete concept of essential rights. The shift is indicative of societal conditions that must be taken into consideration in the dialogue on human rights. The West is in a stage of development substantially different from much of the Third World. The problems associated with Third World development have not been experienced in the recent history of the West. In the Third World human rights focus upon such essentials as hunger, inadequate sanitation, and lack of shelter. In the meantime, protagonists of change in the less developed countries suffer indignities of torture and political imprisonment. Their demand for human rights continues to expand. Eventually the Third World will experience a cycle of evolution of human rights similar to that of the West, but in reverse order – from concrete essential rights to abstract universal rights to concrete rights again. In the process certain human rights conflict in specific circumstances, the reasons for the differences in particular lists of rights being both historical and functional. The need for trade-offs between the ideal and the possible forces the Third World to assign priorities. However, it is not too early for the Third World to assess the price of modernization. It is imperative to ask which value will cost the least.

232

A. A. Said et al.

7.1.8 Responding to Challenge The United States, with a GNP nearing $2 trillion, enjoys leadership responsibilities to meet the challenges of human rights, both domestically and internationally. The domestication of international politics and the internationalization of domestic politics gives the struggle for human rights global affinity. The human need for a sense of community transcends the barriers of geography that separate American affluence from Third World poverty. The glib talk of incinerating continents should be traded for global reform. America is still a moral exemplar to the world. There is no inherent contradiction between power and morality. Power becomes destructive only when committed to the service of a narrow conception of morality. Power may be used for moral or immoral purposes. U.S. power provides the possibilities to overcome the despair of the Third World or the mindless optimism of advocates of technocratic images of the future. American power can serve such foreign policy goals as the development of harmonious interaction between the individual and nature and the promotion of human solidarity. Lack of moral absolutes to world politics does not free us from our responsibility to remain human beings. The issue confronting U.S. foreign policy is not intervention versus nonintervention. The commitment to human rights requires a foreign policy process to promote them. It is the style of American intervention that is at issue. What is required is dignity that corresponds to our stature. This entails a posture where U.S. foreign policy reflects its observed rank among states. A powerful and rich country is not obsessed with the politics of scarcity in dealings with the world. Only small and poor states are motivated by survival, and rightly so. A great country deals with great crises. The political viability of humanity, not of a political regime, must be a criterion of American commitment. The ecology of the planet, not shrimp beds off a remote coast, must be the focus of American interest. America enjoys a broad spectrum of action appropriate to its commitment. Otherwise Americans dedicate their foreign policy to the noble purpose of making ends meet. The base of any foreign policy is a state’s mission to maximize its value synthesis. The inclusion of human rights among American foreign policy values requires a sophistication that is beyond the rightful idealism of some of us or the cold cynicism of others. A national interest narrowly defined and external threats vastly exaggerated create a poor foreign policy vision. Only we are reasonably satisfied in the security of our national interest and therefore can perceive direct relationship between selfinterest and a dignified world order. If it is the task of the state to survive, those who ponder security problems should not become enamored with their options. This must be so because security is as much a state of mind as it is a physical condition. The American hard talk about human rights is not a substitute for acting hard. The boundary of sacrifice does not stop at the American shores. When we adjust our domestic growth and share our international growth with the less developed countries, we join the partnership of human rights. The foreign assistance legislation enacted by the Congress in 1973 and 1974, the International Development and Food

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

233

Assistance Act of 1975, and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976 mark the road for new directions in U.S. foreign policy. The footsteps of present-day Americans could become the trodden path of human dignity.

7.2 Development: Goals and Measurements Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1978). Development: Goals and measurements. Communications and Development Review, 2(1), 24–28. […] We must treat the development process in both normative and moral terms, rather than from the traditional economic viewpoint or the more current, purely formalistic approaches.

7.2.1 The Goals of Development […] Development is a process whose goals are to realize the human potential for total societies and for the total human being and whose success hinges upon the satisfaction of those goals. The most reliable sources of goals common to humanity are the various documents on human rights including United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Pope Paul’s Pacem in Terris; and Third World Declarations. Obviously these documents reflect the weaknesses and strengths of the United Nations, their historic context and often their Western cultural milieu of origin. A developed country is one where the obstacles to human freedom, community, and creativity have been as nearly eliminated as possible; where the social, economic, political and cultural institutions and structures of societies permit, support and stimulate freedom, community and creativity for all persons; where there is a nearly approximated norm of equal dignity and respect for all persons and groups; and where there is a nearly equal and adequate level of living for all persons. Development goals are the furthest projection of human hopes and ideals, the components of the best possible or the best “ideal society” that can be imagined. Development objectives are the concretely defined goals, considered reasonable and realizable within the limits of technology and resources available, that are established as aspirations between an existing situation and the goals of development. Development targets are short-range objectives, usually those that are selected as the target level of a particular program (e.g., to raise the literacy rate from 30% to 70– 70% would be the immediate development target). Development targets are tenable objectives between existing situations and the development objectives. Development

234

A. A. Said et al.

targets and development objectives should be consistent with and build towards the realization of consciously chosen and explicit development goals. Modernization is the process of adapting technology for the uses of the society; and attempting to make that society more rational, efficient and predictable, especially through the use of comprehensive planning, rational administration, and scientific evaluation. Modernization also carries the connotation of a more productive society at least in economic terms. Like development, modernization is always at least partially a conscious effort on the part of some, who therefore have some vision or model of what a “modern” society would look like. Humanization is the process of enlarging and making more equal the dignity, freedom, opportunity for creativity and community, and welfare of persons in society, as well as the restructuring of the institutions and culture of that society to support these goals. Therefore, modernization plus humanization equals development. A three-dimensional model of society underlies the pursuit of “development” goals as previously defined in this essay. The first dimension is the diminution to the largest possible level of all impediments to human self-realization (hunger, disease, war, externally produced anxiety, etc.). The second dimension is the provision of the skills necessary for self- and community-expression and realization (communications and organization skills). The third dimension is the support and stimulation of human realization by positive action, through cultural creation. The goal of the development process thus understood as three dimensional is a free world society, always renewing itself through cultural action for freedom and dignity (P. Freire). The general world situation has tended to focus most development efforts and thought on the elimination of the direct forms of deprivation; on “increasing the size of the pie” (economic growth) to provide more goods to be distributed; and – more lately – on “stabilizing the population at the world banquet table” (Zero population growth) to avoid undermining economic growth by a continuous increase in demand. Lately, there has been an attempt to focus on “jobs and justice” as necessary concomitants of economic growth and population control. Furthermore, the terms of economic growth have been recently challenged by a growing ecological awareness that sees the earth as a spaceship that must consciously plan the consumption and recycling of its limited resources. There is also an older, more ideological concern, that is still present in development thought, though less in the forefront now than in the days immediately following World War II. It is the identification of human development with political freedom (a dominant tradition in Western, capitalist societies), and the identification of human development with economic equality (the ideological position of the Socialist nations). Both of these quests (which may not be necessarily mutually exclusive or contradictory) contributed to the rise of anti-colonialism and antidependence thought, and hence discussion about the language of “development.” These tendencies tend to talk about “justice,” “freedom,” and “liberation” as the goal of development. The key word in this exercise in the definition of the goals of development is probably “freedom,” but implicit in the use of this word is a conscious rejection of a purely liberal and individualistic doing of one’s own thing as the meaning of life,

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

235

or as the goal of society. The final goal of freedom, and of the development process, as used here, is human cultural creativity, both of the individual and of the group. Freedom of thought, expression and communication are seen as absolutely necessary to achieve the highest level of self-renewing creativity, as are social, economic and political equality of opportunity, and dignity. In this sense, freedom is defined as “belonging to the people” (Rosa Luxemburg), and participating with the people in cultural creation. (“People” is here defined as that great majority of the world’s population who, because they are not sick with a longing for power, have been and are abused by those with this sickness. “The People” is that vast majority who want neither to be subjugated nor to subjugate, and who long for true equality and dignity.) To some, such an egalitarian, community-oriented approach will deny some of the essential characteristics (so they believe) of freedom. And it is true that belonging to a community consciously demands some discipline and some self-sacrifice. But it is here argued that individualistic liberalism is probably a luxury that cannot be provided for all human beings, at least for ecological reasons. Furthermore, it is here contended that the cultural anarchy of individualism has been oversold as a creative seedbed of culture, and we have failed to understand the potential for creativity of non-coercive communities. Societies have so often been repressive in one way or another, and sometimes nearly completely, that there has emerged in the West a strong tradition that sees the elimination of repression and want as the chief ends of society, and the chief goal of humankind. There has thus emerged a false dichotomy between the individual and society, with the former seen constantly as the victim of the latter, and the ideal task of the latter defined as being the servant of the individual. Too often – indeed, almost entirely – the cultural community in which a major portion of human realization must take part has been ignored. It is true that cultural systems – like political, economic and social systems – have also usually contained much that impeded human development (prejudice, chauvinisms, competitiveness, racism, sexism, etc.). This does not change the fact that the cultural community must be served (rather than the other way around) by the political, economic and social systems. Pluralist cultural communities, each one enhancing creativity (individual and group), must be “developed” in the sense of becoming more humanistic and open. There are many roads to humanistic, cultural pluralism; there are many potential styles of communitarian, free, creative life; there are many potential languages, arts, musics, dramas, literatures, that are compatible with humanist ethics. No doubt, every cultural community needs some “cultural revolution” to destroy those things that dehumanize society and its members, and that impede or inhibit human development. There are many cultural, as well as other impediments to security, dignity and freedom. But only as the primacy of the cultural community as the principal source of human realization is made clear will creativity have a chance to replace conformity, and will cooperation replace competition. Several characteristics of cultural creativity for freedom and dignity must be listed: First, it is primarily communitarian in the sense that it is cultural creation directed towards other human beings, and designed to be celebrated or participated in by a community.

236

A. A. Said et al.

Second, it is at least as much “oral-aural” as literary. That is, it stays close to existential communication among people, and never is just literary abstraction. If the purpose of culture is not only to express our common humanity, but to make us more human, it follows that it must be designed to facilitate our communication and participation in common humanity on the person-to-person and face-to-face group level as well as on the mass-public and literary level. Third, it is always contemporary, although always respectful and willing to borrow from the past and therefore aware of the past. Fourth, it is always particular as well as always humanist. Fifth, it delights in pluralism and variety, but seeks to discover the human in everything, and seeks to maintain communication with all other varieties of cultural action for freedom and dignity. “Freedom” in the sense used here means the ability, skills and security (both inward and outward) to express oneself (individual and group) affirmatively and creatively. It implies community, because to create is to communicate, and every artist (and in this paper the goal of development is to liberate the artist in every person) must have respectful and understanding co-participants in his or her creation. “Dignity” means self-love and self-respect as a creative and free person, the fruit of such dignity being the ability to allow all other human beings the same dignity. If development is defined as a conscious process directed towards some sort of goal as outlined above, it alters somewhat the way it is planned and administered than if it is simply thought of as stimulating economic growth, or national political independence, or the growth of parliamentary forms of government. Several of the key differences need to be emphasized: Development must be participatory. It cannot be planned from above, nor imposed from above. There is no single standard for development, there are many roads to a society that supports and stimulates “cultural action for freedom and dignity.” But there are some guidelines that must be derived from our common humanist ethic that will make any agreement on such a definition of development possible. For instance, it is a rejection of cultural chauvinism, or of elitism of any sort. It affirms that anyone and any group can do what to them seems good and creative, but that this cannot be done at the expense of anyone else’s dignity and freedom, and that the cultural creation (which should be understood as “the new phrase for work”) should be always subject to the criticism of others, for its failure to support or stimulate the general cultural creativity. Furthermore, it is a strict social obligation of all members of society to take criticisms from others, and to take seriously their obligations to criticize the work of others if such seems necessary to them. Development thus defined is a quest for added dimensions of being human. It is a quest directed to the potential for humanity of all human beings, and it demands the participation of all human beings to achieve it for all. Human solidarity is a positive virtue, to be cultivated and expected, for only through it can any of us realize our own full potential, and only through solidarity can we hope to achieve it for all human beings. The goals of development are divided into two broad categories.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

237

I. The Human Quality and Level of Life, and II. The Infrastructure of the Development Process. 7.2.1.1

The Human Quality and Level of Life

1. Physical and Mental Health – that state of life and consciousness that permits, supports and stimulates the greatest self-and-community-knowledge and realization through the maximization of physical and mental energy and creativity and the maximum diminution of physical and mental malfunctions, diseases and suffering. a. Nutrition – the level and quality of food and drink necessary to sustain good health and permit the maximum realization of the physical, mental and emotional capacities of the individual. b. Physical Health c. Mental Health – that level and quality of mental and emotional functioning that most permits an open perception of reality, an open interaction with other human beings, and the most group and individual creativity. d. Shelter and Housing – that level and quality of shelter and housing that provides the necessary warmth, hygienic facilities, protection from the weather, and privacy for the individual and family. e. Work Safety – that level and quality of safety devices and training necessary to protect the worker at home, office, factory or other places of work. f. Recreation and Leisure – that level and quality of recreation and activities that will provide for the fullest possible mental and physical health for the individual and society. g. Community Participation – that level and quality of interaction with other human beings consistent with dignity and mutual respect and responsibility to and for the community that stimulates and encourages creativity and openness. 2. Security, Dignity and Freedom – that state of life of the individual and the group that permits, supports and encourages the greatest self- and communityrealization through the maximum possible reduction of external threats to the integrity of the individual and group. a. Equal Protection under law before the state and the law – that state of security, equally shared by all the members of a society, that every person’s rights will be fairly treated before the law and courts, and that all persons will be treated with equal dignity and fairness, according to established and known procedures. b. Security of the person from crime, assault/vilification – that social situation where the dignity, integrity and safety of all persons shall be reasonably safe and protected from criminal, irresponsible and anti-social behavior, with the sanction of the state and of society behind such protection.

238

A. A. Said et al.

c. Equal respect and dignity for every person, including children, women, minorities, elderly people, mentally ill persons, retarded persons, “deviants,” dissenters, and handicapped persons – that state, quality and level of national culture, law, and institutions where the general norm expressed is strongly supported and enforced on every level of society, and in all its institutions. d. Equal respect, dignity and protection for all cultural, religious, ethnic and racial communities, subject only to the restraints of enforced respect for the rights and dignity of all persons and other groups. e. Freedom of expression, communication and peaceful assembly. 3. Education and Training – that quantity and quality of facilities and resources available to individuals and communities necessary to provide the various kinds of skills necessary for the preservation, enhancement and continuous re-creation of culture, and the development of the talents and skills of the individual and group to the maximum degree possible. a. Social and Political Information and Skills – that quantity and quality of information and skills necessary for the members of a society to understand the political and social processes, imperatives and pressures on groups and individuals in a given society, and to develop alternatives and choose from among them for themselves, among themselves, for their nation and community. b. Cultural and Communication Information and Skills – that quantity and quality of common history, rituals, symbols and values made equally available to a people, and the skills to appropriate it for oneself and one’s group, and to re-express and re-create it, and to communicate with a sense of dignity and respect on all questions of cultural, political, social and economic import. c. Cultural Heritage and Skills – the level and quality of knowledge of one’s group and national heritages, and the level and quality of skills necessary for the learning, transformation and re-creation of culture. d. Production and Service Skills – the level and quality of skills for production and service available and diffused in a society that give everyone a socially useful and creative task and role, undergirded by the necessary skills. 4. Culture and Leisure – the quantity and quality of time and cultural opportunities afforded, as well as the facilities and resources, for group and for individuals, for cultural development and enrichment, for cultural creation, and for group and individual fulfillment. 7.2.1.2

The Infrastructure of the Development Process

1. The System of Ecosystemic Utilization and Maintenance. a. The system of the conservation (including utilization and recycling) of natural and human resources. b. The system for avoidance of pollution and waste. c. Health (mental and physical) and safety support systems.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

239

i.

Mental and physical health, and safety, education systems – “health education.” ii. Remedial systems: Hospitals, clinics and public health programs. iii. Research, evaluation and investigation programs into problems of physical and mental health, work safety. 2. Social, Cultural, Educational and Communications Support Systems. a. The adequacy of the cultural and educational systems to achieve and support the goals of a developed society. b. The sense of community, human solidarity, and acceptance of public culture – the level of commitment to be a creative member of the human, national, and group community, the adequacy to preserve, support, and stimulate humanist goals of the public culture, and the level of commitment to it. c. The adequacy of communications and information systems to support, protect and stimulate cultural creativity and responsibility. 3. The Political System a. The level and quality of participation in setting social, economic, and political guidelines for the society and the group, and the level of self-management within a larger cultural community. b. The level and quality of responsiveness, review and accountability of the political officers and groups to its society. c. The efficiency of administration of public programs. d. The level and quality of research and planning in the allocation of social resources and values. 4. The Economic System a. The quality and adequacy of research planning in the use of human and natural resources for purposes of the production of goods and services, and to insure their use for humanistic purposes. b. Efficiency and adequacy of the quantity and quality in the production of goods and services, including administration and working conditions, and the distribution system. c. The level and quality of accountability of the economic system to the public community and political society for its research, planning, efficiency, administration and allocation of resources.

7.3 Human Rights: A Forgotten Victim of the Cold War Tyson, B., & Said, A. A. (1993). Human rights: a forgotten victim of the Cold War. Human Rights Quarterly, 15, 589–604.

240

A. A. Said et al.

7.3.1 Introduction The end of the Cold War lifts the semantic fog of ideology that obscured many of the real forces that have been busy reshaping the international scene for some time. While the most obvious of these forces are ethnic nationalism, the pressure of human numbers and activities on the physical limits of our planet, and the disquieting situation facing the Global South, the Cold War left a tragic and cruel legacy in the area of human rights. It left a world divided over four areas of conflict: first, a conflict between civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights; second, a conflict among liberty, equality, and fraternity; third, a conflict between two versions of the modern democratic state; and fourth, a new conflict between the rich and the poor. While the concepts of human rights and democracy have become accepted norms or aspirations – at least on the global and national public level – for every society, definitions of those concepts are seriously challenged. The very language and meaning of human rights and democracy are becoming lost in the deep shifts of economic, social, and political structures of the world that do not yet reflect the emerging, post-modern, post-Cold War, post-Industrial Revolution society. We are in the midst of a global tectonic shift, a loss of paradigmatic guidelines, a “shaking of the foundations.”1 Bobbio (1992) may be correct; the “era of rights” may not be over. But it is no less possible that we are beginning a search for global stability and order, or that we are launched on a “Sustainable Development Decade.”2 We may be entering a new world order where the powerful technologies of 1984 (Orwell 1982) and Brave New World (Huxley 1946) are at the disposal of the few rich and powerful to manipulate the great majority of the people of the world, and in which the global growing gap (“GGG”) between the rich and the poor is written off as inevitable. This risk means that the various foundations and assumptions of democracy and human rights need to be reformulated and our human rights movements must be reorganized.

7.3.2 The Rise and Fall of the Modern Democratic State Europe was asleep, or tossing under the heavy burden of an oppressive, rich, insensitive feudal elite, when the Industrial Revolution swept in and the Dark Ages grudgingly slipped out. The Revolution began first in Europe, and then in the United States, where it stimulated profound social and political changes, and from where it spread throughout the entire world. These changes were not always for the good of society – neither in Europe, the United States, nor in the rest of the world. Indeed, the 1

This phrase, the title of a book by Paul Tillich talking about the experience of World War II, is still a good phrase, and much more global now than in the time that it was written. See Tillich (1948). 2 The “Decade of Sustainable Development” is a phrase that was legitimized by the Brundtland Commission (1987) and was given more exposure at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

241

first nations to industrialize quickly accumulated more power, wealth, and know-how, which tempted them to exploit other nations lagging in the industrial process. Perhaps the Industrial Revolution was stimulated by the voyages of Marco Polo; perhaps it developed from the invention of the steam engine. But for whatever reason, it was the Industrial Revolution that created an industrial class, a commercial class, and then soon a proletariat in the new factories. A skilled working class and an energetic middle class caused commercial and imperial greed to quickly spread. Soon the positions of monarchy, feudal lords, knights and cavaliers, and a very authoritarian clergy, were challenged everywhere. The “era of rights” (Bobbio 1992) and the modern democratic state came into being. A. D. Lindsay’s The Modern Democratic State (1962), first published in 1943,3 still provides a classic definition of democracy, its practice, and its problems. Following Lindsay’s definition, the modern democratic state is a type of state that came into existence in the nineteenth century in Western Europe, America, and the British Dominions, largely as a result of the French and the Industrial Revolution’s effect on the absolutist nation-state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Lindsay 1962). The “era of rights” focused on political and civil rights, which made democracy accessible to the middle class, but which threatened to spread to all classes and all nations, and to overcome racism, ethnocentrism, and national rivalries. Two of the most basic premises of the modern democratic state, rooted in the Industrial Revolution, were – and still are – (1) the equation of consumerism with happiness and economic growth, and (2) the trickle-down theory of democracy, cultural enlightenment, and social and economic development. The model of the modern democratic state was – and still is – a capitalist, mercantilist, middle-class system and society, emphasizing civil and political rights, and arguing that cultural, economic, and social rights will come later, that they will have to wait, because after all, “these things take time,” as old segregationists in the south of the United States used to say. The socialist revolutions, especially the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban Revolutions, introduced an alternative model of the modern democratic state to compete with the capitalist model. While the capitalist model emphasized individual, competitive, middle-class political and civil rights, the latter model, socialist democracy, sought to redress the balance and to promote equality – especially economic equality. The socialist dream of equal economic rights and dignity was a reaction to the prior emphasis on political and civil rights that had virtually ignored other kinds of basic human rights. The czarist Russian empire was characterized by massive poverty, was subjected to an aristocratic elite, and suffered great inequities of wealth and welfare. When the “vanguard party”4 of the new socialist state became an entrenched state 3

A. D. Lindsay (who became “Lord Lindsay of Birker”) was the articulator of the Labour Party in Great Britain. 4 The phrase, “vanguard party,” is used to distinguish the Communist Parties, among the Marxist movements in the first thirty years of the twentieth century, and by definition the “Marxist-Leninist” party is the vanguard party […]. A “vanguard party” assumes the responsibility to be the guiding organization of the “masses,” provoking and planning revolution even though the population may not be convinced of the need for a social revolution.

242

A. A. Said et al.

bureaucracy, part of the vision of a full democracy was deferred; and like the capitalist democratic camp, the socialist democratic camp always spoke about democracy, but their system decidedly was not democratic. These two models of the modern democratic state, the capitalist, liberal modern democratic state and the one-party leadership, socialist modern democratic state, sought to advance human rights in their different ways, addressing different problems according to different priorities. While these two distinct versions were both products of the Industrial Revolution, they created two radically different models of the modern democratic state – two versions of modern democracy. Both models, however, are incomplete. One emphasizes political and civil rights, arguing that if these juridical rights are established and enforced, the other rights (economic, social, and cultural) will naturally follow in society, and cannot at any rate be enforced by law. The other advances the primacy of economic rights over political rights. These two approaches to democracy, as expressed by their best-known and by far most powerful adherents, the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, finally canceled each other out; the two states spent their energy and wealth in an ideological and weapons production war, resulting in tremendous waste, and failing to expand democracy or promote justice in either society. Neither state was able to achieve its nominal goal to impose, in one way or another, its way of life on the rest of the world. Today they are both facing ideological, as well as economic and political, bankruptcy. They consumed each other in the ideological and militaristic Cold War, which weakened them financially and technologically at the cost of the welfare of their own peoples.

7.3.3 The Post-industrial, Post-Cold War Period We are now in a post-modern world, which is no longer dominated by industrial technology, but rather by electronic technology. We are increasingly more dominated by monopolies of information and analysis than by military power, concentrated wealth, or the new global elites. The old debates of the era of industrial technology have been superseded by new technology and the global society now appearing. The old debate was between laissez-faire or liberal capitalism, and social democracy or socialism. Now, neo-liberalism, or neo-corporatism,5 is the dominant theory, largely 5

Some attempts of “compared definitions” are necessary since the language of politics is sensitive to cultural and historical changes – especially in the moment of fluidity like the present. It is more important to understand the evolving concepts than to freeze or create new dogmas in such a situation. […] To that point, it is necessary to be free, and to let concepts and perceptions evolve. We have inherited a language of theory of politics and society that itself betrayed reality, but today we have an opportunity to develop a new language, though this will take some time. Here are some of the old concepts that are subject to reinterpretation in light of the “New Revolution.” “Liberalism” – In the United States, “liberalism” is considered a mildly reformist, paternalistic government that often seeks to intervene in favor of more equality within the “pluralist” (competitive) capitalist system. In continental western Europe and Latin America, and in much of the United

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

243

in the absence of new analyses and new theories. We are beginning to glimpse the electronic age new world order. The trickle-down theory of the Industrial Revolution has been replaced by the reconcentrationist dynamics and practice of the electronic revolution. While feudalism concentrated power, the Industrial Revolution diffused power, education, and technology. The liberal and capitalist modern democratic state owed its existence to the sometimes dynamic balance between capital (banks and corporations), labor (especially trade unions), and government, and to a self-confident, relatively autonomous middle class. These forces stimulated a system of law and human individual rights to protect all of the major actors. The social, economic, political, cultural, and civil foundations of society have been badly shaken; and, the process of transformation which began with the advent of the electronic revolution, promises to be more startling and more widely diffused than that of the Industrial Revolution. The process is one of diffusion of new technologies among global elites. It hangs in the balance whether this new, post-modern age will be good or evil for the world. Today the middle class is besieged, has lost its nerve, is increasingly afraid of the poor, the blacks, the browns, and foreigners, tends to imitate and be more subservient to the rich, and has upset the balance between the three classes.6 Organized labor is also declining, and what is dynamic and significant today is the new balance between corporations and government. This explains why Kingdom, liberalism is laissez-faire capitalism, the state as a guardian of social order and a protector of the “free market system.” “Neo-liberalism” – In continental western Europe and Latin America, neo-liberalism is laissezfaire capitalism, with an alliance with some of the governments or states, integrating itself in the global economy. In many areas of the United States and in the United Kingdom the use of the phrase “neo-liberalism” is being used for “neo-corporatism.” “Trilateralism” – “Trilateralism” has elements of both “neo-liberalism” and “neo-corporatism.” “Corporatism” – Originally from the Mediterranean medieval system, “corporatism” was a “club” of the elites of powerful “corporations” that – usually informally – made the major decisions and plans of the society, using the state apparatus as a tool, not as a decision-making system, but as a representative of the whole society. “Neo-corporatism” – “Neo-corporatism” is the emerging alliance between some transnational corporations and banks, some national corporations and banks, and some governments or states. “Neo-corporatism” is new in the sense that some of the states or governments have become major partners of the elite of the global economy, whereas in “old” corporatism the state was a junior partner, and was more national than global. It is still a question whether some of the major financial actors (banks, corporations) will ally themselves with a state or whether they will seek to be free from all national regulation. “Social Democracy” – “Semi-regulated” – “Welfare State” – “Social Democracy” can be considered as a society with a “mixed economy,” with some state planning and some “free market” dynamics. See Assman (1985), Clamor dos pobres e “racionalidade” economica. Assman has given a basic outline of the various contemporary “schools of thought” of global economic and political order. 6 The emergence of an underclass in the industrialized nations has also undermined the balance. Furthermore, the advent of the information era, or the “electronic revolution” (supplanting the Industrial Revolution) has made the upper class richer, and has spawned the emerging global elite, that is more integrated and transnational. The middle class, afraid of the rising tide of poverty around the world, is tending to become timid, imitating the rich, using police power, racism, etc.

244

A. A. Said et al.

some are now arguing that the re-constitution and re-vitalization of the civil society is necessary to balance the state and the corporation (Wolfe 1991). In the meantime, the emerging globally integrated financial and corporate elite is less and less dependent upon or regulated by any nation-state, and more and more oriented towards the emerging global economy. The United States and Russia are beset with their own domestic problems, having nightmares about their new rivals – Japan, Europe, and the Asian Tigers.7 The basic conflict between the two approaches to democracy, because of the deep mutual distrust between their adherents, spilled over from the beginning into the forums of the United Nations. In the area of human rights, the conflict was between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other. The argument was between the juridical approach (middle-class, individualistic, and liberal) and the economic approach (one-party, revolutionary, and advocating class war). The United Nations was one of the first victims in its struggle to develop and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”). The democratic capitalist camp advocated trickle-down, reformist theory, which was rooted in the middle class, in classic law, and in the protection of property and of the individual. The concentration of wealth in a few nations (for example in the United States, which nation had and still has a great human resource bank and abundant natural resources) tended to protect the rich against equality. Some have argued that capitalism needs the poor, and thrives upon the exploitation of others; regardless of whether this is true, perhaps human nature in every social system tends to tempt the powerful to be corrupted by power.8 In the name of freedom, this system exalted the powerful and the rich, and denied equality and community. The socialist camp advocated class conflict, the dictatorship of a vanguard party, and revolution; it sought to create a new socialist person, thus forming the basis of a new culture of security and equality for all, before political liberty was to be established. Of course, the establishment of a new class of managerial bureaucrats from the roots of soviets impeded the functioning of the transmission belt theory.9 In the name of equality and dignity, an over-sized, arbitrary, usually insensitive bureaucracy formed, and became the major obstacle to freedom and a sense of community. During the Cold War, then, the vision of the French Revolutionaries was swept away, and an imaginary conflict among liberty, equality, and fraternity – which emphasized the conflict between liberty and equality and ignored fraternity – took root in both Cold War camps. All of these responses weaken the reformist mentality of the middle class that has often softened the conflict between the poor and the rich. 7 “Asian tigers” are described as ferocious competitors in the international trade market, noted by their high quality, relatively inexpensive labor but high performance, and shrewd and ubiquitous merchants. The usual list of the “Asian tigers” includes South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan (Republic of China) and Singapore, though Thailand and Indonesia are increasingly being added as “comers.” 8 Acton’s famous phrase: “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887 in Bartlett’s familiar quotations, 16th ed., p. 521. 9 “Transmission belt theory” is a Marxist phrase that refers to intra-party, two-way communication.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

245

The Cold War undercut the efforts to promote full democracy, full humanism, and full human rights. Further, the Cold War undermined development10 in the global South. The expansion of full democratization and full humanization was undercut by the two systems in different ways. The Cold War took precedence and the result was the failure of both models of development. The two superpowers competed for global hegemony, undercutting efforts to strengthen the already weak international system, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This resulted in the neglect of human rights and human rights protection systems. The two superpowers of the Cold War devalued the concept of democracy. Neither one has benefitted from implementing its model of democracy, and neither has been able to realize their own nominal goals. The two former superpowers had conflicting, but incomplete and inadequate visions of democracy and human rights. One can, however, imagine the two visions as complementary rather than conflicting. We now need such a vision, a new global vision of human rights, and of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The first step is to give flesh to the bare bones that we have inherited, the general principles of human rights. We need a sense of global solidarity, a sense of community. The driving force in the global community today is economic and technological power. The dominant models are those of North America, Japan, and Western Europe, which are all tainted by racism, cultural arrogance, and imperialism. Thus, in the world today, human rights laws benefit the rich, but not the poor. Today, after the Cold War, there is a great vacuum in the center of the discussion of theories on human rights and democracy. The world lacks a new democratic paradigm, a new set of global core values, and an integrated view of all human rights. Presently, nations face a double threat; first, they must survive global competition; and second, they are driven to seek neo-corporate, economic super-power status, to become the technological and economic Japan or USA, Inc. As a result, neoliberalism or neo-corporatism are the dominant views – largely in the absence of new analyses and new theories. It is too early to be able to describe the post-Cold War, post-modern, electronic age profile. We do not have even an adequate language to discuss what is happening now, much less what will happen in the next twenty years! The history of the struggle for human rights has been characterized by a lack of attention to the issue of fraternity, or community, thus failing to alleviate the tension between liberty and equality. The French Revolution began with its great theme of liberty, equality, and fraternity. It sought to bring those three themes into balance, well aware that liberty without equality would lead to tyranny, that equality without liberty would finally suffocate society, and that only community would make the other two live together creatively. 10

“Development” is still a suspect term, and it does not appear to be an auspicious moment to talk about “revolution” either. Let us define “development” as modernization plus humanization, a process encompassing more than a revolution.

246

A. A. Said et al.

Lindsay also attempted to reconcile the two major themes of democracy – equality of economic access and security, and individual rights and freedoms. He was the first theoretician of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom to assert from the beginning, “the state is the servant of the community, and its purpose is to make it more truly a community” (Lindsay 1962, p. 24). Clearly, Lindsay put community even before liberty and equality, knowing that the two can only prosper when there is a strong sense of community (Lindsay 1962, p. 24). Finally, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations sought to make the five categories of human rights (political, civil, economic, social, and cultural) interdependent, interrelated, and equally important, but the United States and the former Soviet Union undermined this attempt to develop a world community. In summary, human rights theorists and activists, faced with new technologies and post-industrial modernization processes, have become concerned that the modern, technologically competent, wealthy state can impose a new form of oppression. They are thus seeking a counter-balance to the power of the neo-corporatist state – the alliance between the state and the large banks and corporations. The discussion among human rights theorists and activists today focuses on strengthening the civil society, and picks up the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and of the participatory democracy period of the 1960s in Europe and the United States.11

7.3.4 Integrating Human Rights Theory and Practice: A U.S. Agenda The distance between human rights principles and their application is great. The world today, however, provides four tremendous opportunities to relate the theory of human rights to its practice. These are summarized as follows: First, it is possible to integrate and invigorate the human rights, ecological, and environmental development movements and NGOs, to combine the environmentalists’ Earth Charter (Bobbio 1992, p. 83) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Second, the world community is presented with a great opportunity for a global “learning experience.” December 10, 1998 will be the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the eve of the third millennium, the world community should pull together a global educational campaign, integrating in this campaign not

11

This is not the place to begin a discussion of the weaknesses and strengths of the practice and theory of the civil society, but its many names – volunteerism, private sector, “nation views the state,” communitarianism, mediating structures of old-fashioned corporatism – suggest some of the major issues. Perhaps a good source in which to find a serious discussion is another book by Bobbio (1976), Gramsci e la concezione della societa civille. See also Wolfe (1991).

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

247

only the five components of human rights in the Universal Declaration, but also the components contained in the Global Charter on Ecology and Development.12 Third, the increasing awareness of widespread poverty, affecting every nation in the world to some degree and probably more than half of the world’s total population, is leading to a new focus on human rights. The greatest and most widespread violation of human rights today is poverty. We cannot imagine anything more cruel, vicious, or obscene than letting small babies and children die of hunger in the midst of material abundance. Latin America, at least, is sending forth a rising tide of literature on the rights of the poor,13 and there is no doubt that the United States will continue to debate this issue in the years to come. Fourth, the world community has been made painfully aware that nation-states, previously thought of as isolated cultural islands, are increasingly obsolescent. During the “liberal” years, global awareness and sensitivity to other cultures were often considered to be optional exercises. Today, multiculturalism is a present reality, and must be more widely understood and practiced. The United States of America is itself a living laboratory of multiculturalism, and could give the tired world a new vision of the core values associated with diversity. Seemingly decades ago, but actually in 1990, two well-known American academics buttressed then-President George Bush’s appeal to the United States to lead the “new world order,” arguing that the United States is “bound to lead,” and stating that the United States would lead “the world economy into the 1990s” (Nye 1990; Nau 1990). These academics thought that the United States would lead the world in terms of its military and economic power. Since then, this nation has become sadder and wiser, and is beginning to withdraw from its pretensions of being schoolmaster, boy scout leader, and sheriff with a posse to send throughout the world. A wise European observer of the United States has written: It is a paradox of America’s role as an example for others that its effectiveness as a model has become weaker, the stronger the country has become as a world power. The democratic creed began to jar increasingly with the interests of an imperial America, aiming to maintain the worldwide status quo. The strength of Goliath began to be superimposed on the ideals of a David. (von Beyme 1987, p. 119)

The United States, destined by its founding dream of an ongoing quest for equal justice under law, is indeed “bound to lead,” but not as the vanguard of the global police, and not by its genius for diplomacy, its wealth, its natural resources, or its technological skills, but rather by its example in dialogue and problem solving. United States foreign policy and its impact on the world present two historical trends. First, there is the United States as the first modern democratic nation, perhaps best described by Alexis de Tocqueville. Second, there is the United States as the overbearing, insensitive, messianic Cold Warrior that protected United States economic 12

The proposed “Global Charter on Ecology and Development” is part of the preparation process and is included in the Rio Declaration, adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The proposed Charter will, according to the aspirations and plans of the environmental movement, be adopted in 1995. 13 For example, see Aguirre/Boff (1992); Aguirre/Mosca (1990); Balera (1982); and Boff et al. (1991).

248

A. A. Said et al.

interests and allied itself with repressive governments. It can only be hoped that the United States is returning to the former. Perhaps the United States will rebuild its “city on a hill.”14 The United States might be able to capture the “American Dream,” as described so eloquently by Martin Luther King, Jr.15 If so, the United States might yet respond to President Clinton’s trumpet of hope, and be a beacon rather than a bludgeon to the rest of the world. Probably no nation in the world is better able to confront and overcome its cultural arrogance and elitism, to realize multiculturalism, and to set new standards of equal justice under law16 in education, health, and housing. The best way in which to contribute to human rights and democracy is to join the theory, dream, or vision, and the identification of appropriate practices in immediate challenges, an approach many Americans have called “pragmatism” (Dallek 1983). Former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick (1990) has argued for the United States to be a normal nation in normal times. A “normal” nation would forswear messianic missions and protect its interests, not its grandiose dreams. But these are not normal times, and extraordinary times may demand extraordinary dreams. The United States might realize such a dream by promoting progressive development within its own borders, and equal justice under law for its own people. The study of how to participate in a community, and of actual community participation, are probably the essential basis for a national and global democracy .17 Martin Luther King, Jr. knew very well the need for a sense of community, using the phrase, “the beloved community” in the struggle to put together the old visions of liberty, equality, and fraternity. One major task toward forming a world community, as professional diplomats and United Nations officials well know, is to practice “trust building.”18 The nations 14

This was the original vision of the Puritans, fleeing old Europe and English Kings, to build “a city that is set on a hill cannot be hid” (Matthew 5:14). The image of the Puritans would be a city of virtue that would be an example to the whole world. 15 The speech, “I Have a Dream” by King on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963 is reprinted in A testament of hope: The essential writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. (King/Washington 1986, pp. 217–220). 16 “Equal justice under law” is the inscription on the great portals over the Supreme Court of the United States, and in many ways is a summary of the Constitution. It is, of course, a dream in progress, and like building the city on a hill, an ongoing and opening vision, not a dogma that has been frozen. As the old Puritans used to say, “the Church Reformed, always in need of Reform.” A nation should also think of itself as a “reformed nation, always in need of reform.” […] 17 As Lindsay (1962, p. 10) argued, “[m]odern democracy can be understood by reference to the experience of the small religious society with which it began,” the religious society in question being the Puritans. He [also] argued that democracy “needs thinking and discussing as well as willing—co-operative thinking and co-operative willing” (p. 23). 18 “Trust-building” or “confidence building” is considered as one of the major components of “peacemaking” and “peacekeeping,” a phrase used often by professional diplomats, “developmentalists,” international peacekeepers, and UN officials. “Trust-building” is considered a social, cultural, and political progress. This assumes the process is usually a prolonged, difficult process in which “conflict resolution” is considered a set of skills that is necessary. Often, third party “interventionists” are considered necessary or helpful. Of course, there are other components of building a peaceful (and just) society, but permanent “trust-building” is an important and critical factor.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

249

of the world lack mutual confidence, have few mediators and moderators, and have not yet adopted acceptable “ground rules.” Few international procedures are fair and can be relied upon, and only when these procedures have been developed and used will trust come about. Further, we need to develop global core values and processes that will enable the many peoples of the world to enter dialogue with one another, and upon which these people can develop common, cooperative global programs. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights vision – and the Earth Charter – may lead to and will benefit from an integrated mentality that makes human beings the primary goal of social endeavor, but with due respect for nature.19 Full democracy must embrace all three of the components of the motto of the French Revolution and all five of the components of the Universal Declaration. Without all of these components, democracy will be skewed. We have a sense (from England, the United States, and France) of the virtues of freedom from political tyranny and of individual freedoms. We have a sense (from the U.S.S.R., the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, and several African nations) that economic equality can provide security in education and health. There are many versions of the liberty, equality, and fraternity models – but no one has yet been able to put together all three in a dynamic profile. Perhaps it cannot be done by only one nation or a few – perhaps it can only be a global achievement. Humankind for centuries has struggled for liberation, peace, and justice. We have finally reached an understanding of modern democracy, based on the dreams and principles of the United Nations, and the imperfect and incomplete democratic visions and experiences of the English, the Americans, the French, the Russians, the Chinese, and the Cubans, among many others.20 Now, the industrial society that bred much of our thought has been overtaken by events. And we are finding it difficult to retool intellectually, to develop new concepts. We are finding it even more difficult because we are being required to invent the new tools on the road, in the midst of vast changes. The age-long division between the rich and the poor is not improving. Post-modern technology, inherited fears, and existing concentrations of wealth and power are exacerbating the growing gap between the rich and the poor. We can see already the tendencies in the post-industrial era: more poverty, greater wealth among the rich, more repression of the poor, the growth of the global luxury class (characterized by expanded tourism and fortress subdivisions and condominiums), and the rising tide of defensiveness, dependence, and timidity in the corporate middle class. The best recent statement is the report to the Security Council by the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), Agenda for peace. See especially Chap. 4, “Peace-keeping,” 32–34. 19 Teilhard de Chardin, the French Jesuit who argued that the dominant thrust of history is towards a higher level of consciousness and integration with life and nature, and St. Francis, who sought a higher level of harmony between human beings, animals, and nature, are the real pioneers of today’s environmentalist movement. 20 It is a pity that Lindsay died before he could write the book he had planned. In the last paragraph of his The modern democratic state, he writes “I propose, therefore, to discuss in the next volume the problem of democratic control along with a discussion of the various methods by which in modern times and faced with the modern situation a democratic government performs its task of ‘making the community more truly a community’” (1962, p. 286).

250

A. A. Said et al.

The world community is still struggling to encompass the three components of liberty, equality, and fraternity, for all persons of all genders and all ages, to embrace interrelatedness and interdependence, and to give equal importance to the five categories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The failure of the two competing views of human rights and democracy – the capitalist and the socialist visions – showed that civil, economic, social, cultural, and political rights are interrelated, interdependent, and equally important. Human rights are indivisible. The two models have failed, and it remains to be seen if the world can become a community, or will slip into chaos. Martin Luther King, Jr. entitled his last book Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (1967), and this question is still on the table today. Or, as others have noted, if the darkness deepens, and if we are on the edge of the New Dark Ages, then we need to think hard and to come up with some new ideas.21

7.3.5 Conclusion The common bonding culture of the world today – such as it exists – is the product of the acculturation of non-Western elites that occurred as the result of the political and economic dominance of the West. The common language of the world is then largely western in form and content and the result of what must be described as political, economic, and cultural conquest of the peoples of the Global South. This “conquest” has a different style for each of the three major “conquering” subcultures of the West, specifically the Europeans, the Russians, and the Americans. However, all have generally assumed their own superiority in contact with non-Western cultures and have usually entered into such contacts on the back of power. The experience of unequal political and economic relations has naturally colored the cultural exchange; while it left the West feeling even more superior and more insensitive, it left nonWestern cultures defensive and unsure of themselves. With the passage of the last fifty years the internal conflicts of the West and the assimilation and diffusion of Western technology by the Global South, have redressed the balance somewhat. Among other adjustments that have taken place, a tide of greater non-Western self-confidence has slowly grown, and many non-Western peoples have rediscovered the inherent worth of their own cultures. Furthermore, the mounting problems of the world have induced at least the beginnings of humility in the West, and also the beginnings of a still embryonic sense of interdependence in all sectors of the world. While it is commonplace to note it, only through global cooperation can the world survive and become human. As was discussed earlier, such cooperation is only possible if the world develops a greater fund of common values. Neither the West, nor anyone else, can continue to impose common values on the world. These 21

See especially Chapter IV, “Cataclysm and Tragic Conflict in History” and Chapter V “Providence and Process” in Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and history (1957).

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

251

values must be invented and developed through a consensus-making process. Such a process demands respect by and for all cultures and also demands the participation of all peoples. We need to move beyond the capitalist, socialist, and industrial technology visions of human rights and democracy. The capitalist, socialist, and industrial technology visions project a parochial view of human rights that excludes the cultural realities and present existential conditions of the Global South, and that rests on the premise of an industrial society which has been overtaken by events. The traditional debate about democracy and human rights assumes that in spite of differences which characterize the diversity of cultures, political systems can be validated by criteria derived from the capitalist and socialist experiences. However, politics is essentially an ascriptive phenomenon. It is culturally specific. The assertion by certain Western scholars and practitioners that the Global South is not ready for democracy shows that these persons see democracy exclusively as a form. For many years, scholars have equated Western institutional forms of democracy with the substance of democracy. The substance of democracy, however, is not a form; it is a human society that has a sense of common goals, a sense of community, a process of participation in making decisions, and protective safeguards for dissenters. The form of democracy is cast in the mold of a people’s culture. Democracy is built upon participation, not institutions. […]

7.4 Conclusion: Toward Cooperative Global Politics Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., and Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Conclusion: Toward cooperative global politics. In Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.) (pp. 278–289). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

7.4.1 A New Frame of Reference As the new millennium approaches, it is not clear whether the world is coming together – or falling apart. Our morning newspaper may trumpet the worldwide triumph of consumption-based capitalism or the emergence of Western-style democracy in unexpected places. But when we turn on the evening news, it appears that religious or ethnic fanaticism, rampant nationalism, or the raw ambition of some regional dictator is creating chaos rather than anything remotely like “order” of any kind. Which is it: chaos or a new world order? World chaos, in an increasingly interdependent and crowded world, is an invitation to disaster, with the great accumulation of nuclear, chemical, and biological arms in many nations (including the United States and Russia), creeping famines and pestilence in the world, and adventurist political and military leaders. Yet, the existing

252

A. A. Said et al.

world order is detrimental to the great majority of the poor and the weak. The existing system – the present distribution of power is really “disorder” – favors the rich who are getting richer and the powerful who are getting more powerful. It might be helpful if we acknowledged that the collapse of Soviet-style socialism lifts the “semantic fog” of ideology that obscured many of the real forces that have been reshaping the international scene for some time. Among these forces is “nationalism.” At the beginning of the twentieth century, the world was basically organized into European-style empires or spheres of influence that ignored underlying ethnic aspirations for self-expression. The Soviet empire turns out to have been the last gasp of a dying worldview, rather than the beginning of a new one. The demise of the Soviet empire in 1989 is the end of a long process that witnessed the passing of similar hegemonies whose metropolitan centers at one time included England, France, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Japan, and – with respect to the Philippines, Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico – the United States. These empires, for the most part, have devolved into constituent parts, sometimes founded on common ethnicity or religion, sometimes not. The number of independent “nation-states” more than tripled during the postwar period, becoming, in the process, the “norm” of the global system. The dominant ethical value in international discourse was sovereignty; the violation of this norm aggression. The Soviets, of course, defined aggression differently than did the Americans. Where the old imperial lines drawn on the maps coincided with “natural” ethnic communities, the decolonization process served stability and order; where it did not, it caused wars. As the ideological fog of the Cold War lifts, the enduring organizing power of ethnicity and religious belief as the central reservoir of meaning for human communities is thrown into the bold relief it has long deserved. The artificial boundaries drawn by European explorers are legacies more often perceived as forces for division or civil war than for unification – as in the former Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and former Yugoslavia. An important point to stress is that the motivating force behind what is generally termed factional or sectarian violence is no different, in principle, from that which motivates the aspirations for self-governance within nations whose existence is sanctioned by diplomatic recognition. The status quo’s “tribalism” is the revolutionary’s “nationalism.” The motive behind terrorism in Ulster or Sri Lanka is, for those who carry it out, no different from the “patriotic” drive for independence that only a century ago forged modern Italy and Germany out of constituent entities that shared an ethnic heritage. This same impulse allowed Brazil, Algeria – and the United States – to throw off a hated imperial yoke. Despite the emergence of so many new nations, it is important to note that the relative status of nations and regions has been relatively stable. At the beginning of the twentieth century the list of major powers included the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Japan. China and Brazil were accepted as future major powers. As the end of the century approaches, if we substitute the European Union for the European powers – acknowledging that relative rankings have altered somewhat – the names on this list have changed not at all. China and Brazil are still future major powers. If we step back a thousand years, Europe, the Islamic Crescent, and China’s sphere of influence already dominated

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

253

human history. If we grant that Japan and the emerging Pacific Basin still acknowledge China as their cultural home, only the Middle East, as a region, has experienced a fundamental decline in its global influence – a decline that understandably motivates present resentment in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. The emerging “new world order” is as much a redefinition of what is important as it is the discovery of new forces at work. While most experts on international relations will readily acknowledge the continuing power of national and ethnic identity as a major shaping force within the global system, many will argue that there are some fundamentally new forces at work. But this is as much a matter of perception as it is descriptive of the underlying reality. Take, for example, the rise of the ecological ethic and green politics. The negative ecological consequences of industrialization are not new. They go back to the earliest phases of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. And criticism of the rape of the environment goes back almost as far. The fine system of national parks in the United States is the result of green politics at work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What is new is the growing organizational and political power of the critics. More of us accept the tenets of the Gaia hypothesis than in the past. What is beginning to shift are our values – and our knowledge of just how damaging our behavior has been all along. As a species, we’ve actually traveled this road before. Some 10,000 years ago, when agriculture was invented – in what is now western Turkey – Neolithic ‘farmers’ at first planted nothing. The first 300 years or so of the agricultural revolution consisted of a breakthrough in the systematic gathering of the natural produce of the Earth. This innovation resulted in the creation of the world’s first true villages and a sudden, rapid rise in population. But systematic exploitation without returning seed to the land led to mass starvation. The survivors learned that we must return to the Earth what we take from it. The modern Industrial Revolution started about 300 years ago. Again, we are systematically reaping what we have not sown. Once again, our numbers have exploded. And, once again, we face mass starvation. The present poverty in the Global South and in parts of industrial societies is also the by-product of economic and political structures and belief systems grounded in uncontrolled materialism. The ecological ethic is not new, nor is it necessarily a modern discovery. The question is “Will we come to our senses in time?” Take the case of technology itself – often portrayed as a “new” independent force for change. Has the relative speed and scale of technological change really become more salient? Of course. Is it really new? Of course not. Roman engineering reshaped the world order of the ancient world, and tens of thousands of Romans died of poisoning caused by drinking water flowing through the “high technology” of lead pipes. What is changing is not so much the basic forces shaping events; they have been here all along. What has changed is how we feel about them and the relative weight we assign to them. More of us refuse to accept that 13–18 million human beings, most of them children, die each year as a result of hunger, while our planet has enough resources and know-how to provide enough for every person on Earth. This new attitude has an important consequence. The new frame of reference of world

254

A. A. Said et al.

problems is an artifact of the minds and hearts of people. It is not something that is happening to us, or that we are discovering through observation. We are creating it.

7.4.2 The First Global Civilization The Cold War political order has dissolved faster than visions of a new order to replace it are being developed. For all its unpleasantness, the bipolar Cold War at least offered predictability and stability for half a century. The current fluid situation offers both the potential for evolution into a stable, peaceful relationship at a much lower level of tension and armaments, and the risk of devolution into instability like that of pre-1914 Europe. The end of the Cold War may usher in another specter of balkanization among nations, competing with and fearing one another. The new concentration of power on the world level – globalization and privatization – may leave us in an even more desperate situation. The likelihood of a good outcome will be greater if nations are guided by a vision of a more stable, peaceful political order. But it is not enough for each nation to have its own vision of a better future. Unless the vision is shared by nations whose independent actions must be coordinated to bring it into being, their actions in pursuit of their own visions are not likely to produce a result that is desired by any of them. Today, such a vision does not seem to exist. We are not going to get a viable global order by bringing the poor of the world up to the ever-ascending material standard of living of the industrialized countries. Even if this were a feasible goal, the planet would not stand it. And the crisis we face will probably not be resolved by the industrial societies descending to the Global South’s poor standard of living. We certainly are not in a stable situation so long as these disparities remain between those who are living quite well and those that are barely living. We have moved from a humanity that lived its collective life as fragments of the whole into a new context of humanity as a whole. We are living in the first global political community. As we stated earlier, the first global industries are emerging, and, along with them, the foundations for a global economic system. We have entered the first truly global civilization since the days of the Roman Empire. World politics is shifting from a horizontal axis of right versus left or West versus East to a vertical axis of economic materialist values versus ecological, feminist, and spiritual values. These issues for the near future focus on who controls the system of technology and who controls the system of beliefs. At present the material beliefs underlying the world economy prevail. On the surface, policy seems to be the critical issue. That is an illusion. The belief system is the issue. Likewise, on the surface, equity seems to be the issue. The real issue is the belief system. We are driven to contribute to the starvation of the Global South because of unconscious belief systems. In the currently dominant world economy, we have some assumptions that are being challenged by a majority of people of the globe. The first is that it is perfectly

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

255

appropriate that the rich should use whatever they want if they can pay for it. Second, there is an assumption that it is appropriate to resolve social issues – issues that may affect other peoples around the globe and future generations – by economic rationality. In other words, it is ultimately economic reasoning that guides our development policy. There is an assumption – the consumption ethic – that somehow we are better off if we consume more and more. All the economic indicators we use are essentially indicators of resource consumption. They go under different names, and they may look a little different. But when we come right down to it and see the correlation between resource consumption and indicators such as GNP, we have built a premise that increased consumption is increased economic growth, and it is the desired positive direction of development. The culture of the industrialized nations dominates the globe with that type of thinking. Implicit to a great extent is the assumption that all of the world’s religion-based cultures are predicated on illusion because they cannot be supported by materialistic science, which is the best knowledge the world can have. All of the cultures of the world are overrun by this ideal. They all have to become materialistically and economically westernized if they want to play the game. In development, human needs, human rights, and the quality of human interactions are all sacrificed in pursuit of the elusive goal of economic development. The development policies in industrialized countries are based on these premises too.22 There is an increasingly disquieting situation facing the Global South. It was not very long ago that we spoke confidently of the Global South moving through a process of development analogous to that through which the West had moved. It was widely accepted that the Global South was experiencing a takeoff, like an airplane moving down a runway, gradually gathering speed, and eventually reaching a selfsustaining velocity, where it is able to make its own way under its own power. It just seemed to be taking a little longer than expected for the assistance, the foreign aid, the investments, and that sort of thing from the West to have their intended effect. We are facing a situation where there is no realistic prospect that a large number of countries of what we call the Global South are in fact going to approach anything like sustainable development or modernization in the Western sense. There are a variety of reasons for this situation. Population pressures on the land, people having to leave rural areas as a consequence, growing urban agglomeration, massive unemployment, urban unrest – these are only a few of the reasons. The result is political instability – governments and populations under siege. Additionally, increasing energy costs have hit the Global South very hard. The annual energy bill now facing the Global South is considerably larger than the entire aggregate flow of assistance to the Global South. Finally, the kind of environmental limits that we have now begun to recognize as part of the physical makeup of the planet simply will not permit a replication of Western patterns of development.

22

For an insightful study of transition see Willis Harman, Global mind change (1988).

256

A. A. Said et al.

7.4.3 Cooperative Politics The illusion of independence has been replaced by the paradox of interdependence. Interdependence provides increased points of leverage for the rich and powerful, but it also raises the costs of exercising that influence and reduces the freedom of action of the privileged. There is a particular irony here for the industrialized countries in that interdependence implies global issues, necessitating a global response, but interdependence also circumscribes the exercise of global power. The uninformed or careless use of power – particularly military power – in such circumstances can easily be self-defeating. All of this suggests the utility of a non-traditional approach to national security – an approach that is beginning to receive attention. This strategy calls for a state to strengthen mutual dependencies and cooperative linkages between itself and other states – that is, to exploit existing tendencies toward interdependence. Security from this perspective is achieved less by placing a potential adversary state at a power disadvantage than by circumscribing its freedom and incentive for hostile actions. But, as previously noted, such ties constrain the actions of all states involved. Consequently, adoption of an interdependence strategy carries with it an implied willingness to downgrade sovereign freedom of action as a defining characteristic of national security. A fully developed interdependent system, however, carries the promise of security that is durable – not the elusive kind with which we have been familiar. This statement is true because from an interdependence perspective, world politics assumes non-zero-sum characteristics. Enhanced security for one state requires improved security for all. Hence, the concept of common security postulates the existence of common interests that, if served, result in increased security for all states. The maintenance of the system as a whole thus becomes a priority goal of national policy. A mere handful of states can no longer control what goes on in the world. Hegemony has become a historical curiosity. The superpowers have been deposed, the victims of their own technological breakthroughs. The only workable instrument for the ratification of interstate decisions in the emerging world order will be a broad consensus of peoples and governments. Consensus – the distinctive political tool in relations among equals – has already gone far to replace armed force as the preferred instrument of national policy. “Realists” may object to the naiveté, the instability, or the short-sightedness of some manifestations of the consensus, but it would be sheer folly to challenge either its existence or its power. The process of consensus is so new a method of reaching binding international decisions, that mistakes and contradictions in its application are inevitable. But we have little choice: The emerging global order will either learn to live with mass opinion or it will not survive. Trial and error – seasoned by patience – will teach the elements of an operational code to govern the new process, and consensus will become a more efficient and predictable instrument. Consensus does not demand a radical transformation of the global system. Most of the old ways of thinking and acting in world politics will be useful in the future.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

257

Negotiation, persuasion, accommodation, and even certain forms of coercion will remain as standard features of interstate life. The loss of the ability to force a verdict by war will do little more than impose one more limitation on the practice of statecraft – a more fundamental inhibition than any the system has accepted up to this point, it is true, but nevertheless one that will leave room for vigor, imagination, and skill in framing and executing national policy. The process of consensus, however, underscores the obsolescence of the competitive model of world politics that has long served as the basis of international economic and political structures. It is a model predicated upon the assumption that competition among nations, all pursuing their own self-interest, will through Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” miraculously lead to the increasing betterment of everyone. Consensus introduces a cooperative model of world politics that focuses on the benefits of international stability in the global system. No one country can achieve it by itself. In fact, everyone has to make sacrifices. The cooperative model departs from the zero-sum competitive power-politics model where one nation gains and the other loses, and moves toward common action resulting in mutual benefits. In economics, the competitive model has functioned well to explain the provision and distribution of private goods. It served the very important function of guiding the stimulation of economic expansion and development. The problem is that the model failed to explain voluntary cooperation to provide public goods, as opposed to private goods. Public goods are those that are shared and enjoyed by a large number of people. Two key characteristics distinguish public goods from private goods. The first characteristic is that, in general, they cannot be provided by any single individual or small group of individuals. A major, concerted effort by a large number of people is needed. The second key characteristic of public goods is what is referred to as nonexcludibility, that is, each person can benefit from the public good even if that person does not contribute to the provision of the good (as with public television programming).23 In other words, there is a self-interested temptation for each person to take a free ride on the efforts of others: to simply sit back, let other people provide the public goods, and enjoy it without having contributed to it. Of course, if everybody always did that, we would not have any public goods. The important point to note here is that, because of these two key characteristics of public goods, the unrestrained pursuit of individual (or corporate or national) self-interest cannot in general provide public goods. Public goods cover a wide area. Some obvious ones are an ecologically sound environment, international management of food and energy resources, national defense and the avoidance of Armageddon, and morality. Public goods require the correction of the aggregate negative side effects of the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest. In other words, the avoidance of what we might call public bads is a public good. This is a key area in which international cooperation is going to be necessary. Carbon 23

For a thoughtful study of cooperative relations, See Thomas Arthur Cotton, “Public Man: A Model of Rational Cooperation,” a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of EngineeringEconomic Systems, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1978.

258

A. A. Said et al.

dioxide pollution that contributes to global (“greenhouse”) warming, mass hunger, energy shortages, arms transfers, and ocean pollution are problems that no single country can solve. Each country is tempted to say, “Well, my contribution to this problem is minimal, so I’ll go ahead with my polluting activity and let other people work to clean up the environment.” Of course, we are aware that major polluters are not limited to nations. Each person, each arms-merchant country, can always say, “Well, I might as well go ahead and sell those weapons to such and such a country, because if we don’t sell them, another nation will.” Morality (ethical rules to guide our conduct) is something that everyone benefits from and that no individual can provide alone. It requires continued cooperation by everyone holding that ethical system in order to maintain it. Yet, in general, everyone has a temptation to let everyone else behave ethically and to exploit that behavior by taking advantage of the other people. So, the class of public goods clearly covers a wide range of important examples. Voluntary cooperation to provide public goods, it seems, cannot be explained by simple self-interested behavior. It requires some minimal ethical assumption. Ethics can be seen as motivated not by pure altruism, but by a more enlightened selfinterest based upon a more inclusive conception of the self (or of the community), in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world. An ethical assumption to begin with is the existence of a norm of fairness, a norm that requires an individual to bear a share of the cost that is borne by those who are also cooperating in an action, rather than simply taking a free ride, as self-interest would dictate. What are some of the characteristics of cooperation based on fairness that would be relevant to global cooperative politics? In the first place, to have cooperation of that sort requires the identification and acceptance of shared objectives that can only be reached through cooperative efforts. Second, each of the potential cooperators has to have an expectation of personal benefit from this cooperative effort. They are not obligated by fairness to contribute to an enterprise from which they expect to get nothing back. A third important aspect of voluntary cooperation based on fairness is that there must be a fair distribution of the benefits and costs of cooperation. Questions of international social justice cannot be avoided. We simply cannot expect a person or a group – a minority group, for example, or a nation that feels it is being exploited – to be willing to make any significant sacrifice of their own self-interest to benefit their perceived exploiter. Let us emphasize that fairness is an ethical norm, and at times it requires that we set aside simple self-interest in order to adhere to the norm. However, the norm of fairness does not require unilateral self-sacrifice. It is not a norm of pure altruism. Fair individuals are obligated to contribute to a cooperative effort only if they can expect to receive benefits from the like contributions of others. This is a key characteristic of the underlying concept of reciprocity, the obligation to return the favor, or, in other words, the obligation not to take advantage of someone who has done you a favor. For example, fairness would not require unilateral disarmament, although it would obligate one not to take advantage of disarmament by another nation. Similarly, fairness does not require contribution to a futile enterprise. We really have to have an expectation of receiving benefits from the cooperation of others.

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

259

Because of the mutual expectation of benefits, cooperation based on fairness requires mutual trust. Since no one party can force any of the others to cooperate, and since each one has a selfish temptation not to cooperate, each must trust the others not to take advantage of both the opportunity and the temptation to cheat. Cooperation, then, requires mutual expectation of a willingness to sacrifice short-term self-interests for the common good. Cooperation based on fairness involves some risk because there is a need to rely on mutual trust. The more confidence one has in the trustworthiness of the other cooperators, the less this risk will be. The role of fairness in the game is to obligate cooperators not to take advantage of each other in a risky situation. It is sometimes necessary to build a basis for trust by starting with relatively low-loss, lowrisk cooperative ventures and working up to bigger, higher-payoff, but higher-risk enterprises. A related problem is the double standard of morality often used. People often have one standard of ethics with regard to their in-group, however that is defined, and a different standard of ethics with regard to their perceived out-group. This may be one of the greatest challenges in building international cooperation, because people tend to draw their in-group lines, at the farthest extent, at their own national borders. Though having shared objectives that benefit everyone is a necessary precondition for cooperation, it is not sufficient. There is a crucial role for leadership in converting shared objectives and a shared norm of fairness into effective cooperation. Leadership is needed to establish the mechanisms for cooperation and to insure that efforts will be coordinated and that they will succeed. Leadership also has an important part in the formulation of common objectives in the first place. Mechanisms for cooperation must be established that determine the fair allocation of benefits and burdens, and that identify the roles and responsibilities of the various actors in the cooperative enterprise. Another role of leadership is to promote the development of solidarity. Solidarity is necessary for the underlying norm of fair reciprocity to be effective. Leadership has the role of setting an example of sacrifice of immediate self-interest in furtherance of common goals.

7.4.4 Premises for a New World Order World events and trends will continue to underline the precariousness of a national security strategy based on separateness in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. Moving beyond such strategies will require basic reformulations of our dominant worldview. To make the world safe for humanity, we must accord to each other and to the Earth the exalted place previously reserved in our thinking for such things as states, ideologies, and economic growth. The emerging view expands the dominant Western perspective to incorporate traditional cultures. This broader view means freeing people from the dominance of economic logic over their lives, as well as freeing cultures from being driven off the globe by economically based institutions. There is a great deal more emphasis on

260

A. A. Said et al.

humane values. They are assumed to have some sort of reality, and economic values are assumed to be subservient to others – less fundamental in that they are after all, only models or constructs whose primary usefulness is the extent to which they accurately express and aggregate the human values. Economic institutions, technology, and analyses then are viewed as a means to an end, not as ends in themselves. Technology and economic growth are not the end goals in this view. Rather, the goals of a society must relate to the culturally based goals of its people. The materialist worldview implicit in the institutions of modern industrial nations is not a promising base on which to construct a viable new world order. A suitable new world order should enhance the four pillars of our existence: the natural environment in which we live, our planet; the human environment, that is, us; the political environment, that is, our institutions and the way we organize ourselves; and finally, the cultural environment, the way we live our lives. Our natural environment is the basis of our existence, and the key value is ecological balance. If we lose our ecological balance, we lose everything. Our human environment is the source of human life. Our basic needs include survival and material well-being, identity, something that gives meaning to life, and freedom. The key value in the human environment is human dignity. Our political environment refers to our belief systems and institutions. The key value in the political environment is coexistence. A viable political environment is one that is able to sustain pluralism, a thousand and one beliefs and institutions. It is where capitalism, socialism, tribalism, and communalism can supplement one another. Finally, our cultural environment refers to our lifestyles and the way we deal with ourselves. The key value in the cultural environment is diversity. Tolerance becomes the governing principle of human cultural expressions. Culture becomes a resource because culture provides for deep-rooted human needs (Galtung 1987). The four key values of a new world order require change through developing more effective laws and through restructuring or responsive governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Different actors, different power configurations, and plausible alternatives to the present system are needed. We need also a consciousness of transition processes. Change occurs most effectively through evolving consensus. A new world order represents a shift in our perspectives and worldview from the nation-state to one world; from balance of power to justice; from national interest to human interest; from the rights of states to human rights; from independence and sovereignty of states to interdependence; from economic growth as a central value to transformation; from materialism to human progress through spiritual evolution; from an environment to be exploited to an environment that has rights of its own; and from coercion and war to collaboration and nonviolence. Such a vision of a new world order requires a new system of diplomacy. We need to change the diplomatic method, and quite consciously so. The new diplomacy has a more hopeful view of what can be done than the traditional one. It is more concerned with social change than with merely preserving the international order as it exists and protecting national interests. The practitioners of the new diplomacy should be more problem solvers than philosophers, and they must possess some inherent distrust of

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

261

overall theories and plans. But they must also possess a surer sense of values than there is in a game plan. The new diplomacy must operate on a world vision other than the old diplomacy. The old diplomacy saw world politics as a struggle of nation-states to survive and to protect their national interests. The best that the old diplomacy hopes for is to oil the inevitable changes that occur, thus avoiding the destruction of (Western) civilization. The new diplomacy sees world politics as a struggle for world peace in the broadest sense that peace is more than the absence of war, but is the presence of justice and freedom for all. Peace is not seen as an abstract goal to be pursued; peace is a dynamic process of doing and being. Peace is a process. Peace includes both the absence of direct physical violence and war, and the elimination of structural violence. The latter refers to the consequences of social, political, cultural, economic, and civil structures – institutions and processes that lower the material and spiritual quality of human life and degrade the natural environment. Success in this struggle for world peace is dependent upon transcending in the critical areas the provincialism of the nationstates and making more real a world community. The new diplomacy assumes that all peoples desire and are capable of selfgovernment, that all peoples will find their own form of protecting their own dignity and freedom if they are allowed to do so, and that only in a world of freedom and social justice are the freedom and social justice of all really secure. To deny others and ourselves the legitimacy of caring for other people is to deny part of our own humanity. Likewise, to deny governments as agencies of society the legitimacy to promote humanist goals is to subject our corporate life to the ethic of the jungle, without a struggle. The prizes to be won under the new diplomacy are novel and unprecedented, but they are worthwhile all the same. Success in the new diplomacy will go as it did in the old to those who best learn and apply the rules. The penalty for failure may be a disaster; the reward for success may be a better life on this planet for everyone. We are the heirs of an old order of violence. Our legacy would be much greater if we become the architects of a new world order founded upon human solidarity and the wholeness of planetary life.

7.5 Localizing Peace: An Agenda for Sustainable Peacebuilding Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: an agenda for sustainable peacebuilding. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. It has become commonplace for commentators on world affairs to observe that we are entering a period of profound social stress and of extreme pressures on often ineffective national as well as international governance systems. Globalized patterns of inequality, economic volatility, and resource scarcity are exacerbating localized

262

A. A. Said et al.

social cleavages among ethnocultural groups, in ways that often outstrip the capacities of already-weak states to preserve social peace and stability. In some world regions, local and national conflicts increasingly spill over borders, presenting severe challenges to multilateral initiatives charged with containing violence and establishing security. While ambitious and multi-faceted peace operations have helped stabilize deeply fractured societies and reduce direct violence (Bellamy/Williams 2010), few have proved capable of addressing root causes of conflict or sustainably empowering the local population. Critics of contemporary stabilization and reconstruction missions have observed that the top-down nature of major international missions mirrors imbalances within the larger world order, and frequently results in a low-quality or “stalled” peace (Mac Ginty 2006). The introduction of a large foreign presence to a conflict zone tends to engender dependence on outsiders, friction between “internationals” and “locals,” and ambivalence about the trajectory of political change. Because the psychological residues as well as social and economic correlates of violent conflict persist despite the brokering of accords by external actors and the initiation of standardized institutional reforms, contemporary peace processes often suffer from deficits in the areas of local empowerment, ownership, and legitimacy (Donais 2009). Peace becomes a series of events that happen to the general population rather than a participatory initiative that enables members of a divided society to tap local resources, rediscover their own vernacular language for peacebuilding, and become active agents in the construction of a new reality. To meet the peacebuilding needs of the 21st century and create a more sound and equitable basis for addressing global governance challenges, genuinely empowering forms of grassroots mobilization and local-international partnership are needed. Though humanitarian missions endorsed by the United Nations and backed by leading states are likely to remain necessary, practitioners and scholars of peacebuilding must be careful not to resign themselves to a “trouble-shooter” role within a largely Western, “liberal peace” (Richmond 2008) framework that narrows discussion of international conflict issues and under-represents actual as well as potential contributions to peace from non-Western cultures. Instead, they must explore ways of broadening and deepening international dialogue about the nature and sources of peace, and underscore the value of context-sensitive peacebuilding efforts that seek to activate local resources and revitalize indigenous peacemaking capacities. As global conversations about peace, governance, and human security move forward, there is a vital need to reassert the value of local solutions. In a world of diverse, non-interchangeable cultural and religious contexts, there can be no singular, formulaic approach to sustainable international peacebuilding. Where homogenizing, generic approaches are at best indifferent to local culture and are premised on the need for a clean break with the conflict-afflicted past, newer approaches must adopt a humbler attitude which regards conflict resolution as a cultural activity and seeks forms of partnership that energize and support local efforts. This means rethinking the role of context in shaping peacemaking practice, balancing the need for innovation with the necessity of historical continuity, and emphasizing the renewable and potentially dynamic nature of local cultural resources. […]

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

263

7.5.1 Activating Local Resources At the core of the “localizing peace” agenda is concerted effort to activate local cultural resources in response to locally felt needs and aspirations. A key premise of the approach is that both international peacebuilders and local populations often underestimate or neglect local resources, and fail to appreciate ways in which capacity to deal with conflict constructively might be enhanced through a process of cultural introspection and renewal. While the principle of localism should not be applied with ideological purism or excessive rigidity – peacemakers in all parts of the world can benefit from cross-cultural learning – there is a need for further thinking about the nature of readily available “local materials” and resources, and for reflection on the many different types of resources that can be constructively utilized to enhance the vitality, sustainability, legitimacy, and resilience of peacebuilding efforts. Though religious and cultural identities often serve as markers of “difference” and are at least partially co-opted by the systems of confrontation that develop amidst protracted conflict, they are also sources of values, beliefs, and narratives that can be of profound importance for peacemaking (Coward/Smith 2004). In many parts of the world, the vernacular language for speaking about peace and conflict is infused with religious content, and conversations about aspirations toward peace and reconciliation almost inevitably lead toward discussion of religious values, texts, and traditions. Indigenous peacemaking events regularly feature references to religious scriptures and to the words of exemplary spiritual figures, and may also – like the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – evoke a sense of religious symbolism and ritual (Shore 2009). The broader sweep of historical experience should also be recognized as a local peace resource. Mining this experience can bring to the surface not only memories of past conflicts and traumas, but also narratives of conflicts resolved, stories of peacemaking, and knowledge of indigenous (and often informal) processes of community dispute resolution. People’s familiarity with traditional peacemaking stories and methods may provide a basis for rich dialogue with respect to the values, skills, and processes that are required to make peace, articulated in the cultural vernacular rather than in the vocabulary of international social science or diplomacy. In some settings, such dialogue may direct attention to past peacemaking methods that have been marginalized during a current conflict, but which nonetheless constitute a valuable frame of reference for renewed efforts. As Lederach (1995) notes, the language, metaphors, and proverbs people use to describe their reality can be an especially rich source of insight into implicit knowledge, and can provide a basis for surfacing local models of peacemaking. Local social capital and commonsense knowledge should also be regarded as resources. When taking inventory of local assets, a wide variety of existing institutions, organizations, social movements, skilled individuals, and stakeholders merit recognition. On-the-ground experience with the dynamics of a unique political situation is also an identifiable resource that newcomers do not possess, as is the detailed,

264

A. A. Said et al.

fine-grained knowledge that people have of their own reality, needs, and immediately available means. Awareness of the value inherent in local cultural resources has begun to increase in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities, yet there remains a profound need for research-backed efforts to develop practical frameworks for identifying, tapping, and harnessing these resources to enhance capacity for local solutions to challenges of social conflict and human security. Because every culture has unique strengths when compared to other cultures, attention to diverse peace traditions has the capacity to enrich peacemaking at a global level. Comparing the peace traditions of multiple societies can contribute to the discovery of cross-cutting themes as well as positive precedents that might help reinvigorate peace practices in other contexts (Fry et al. 2009). In some cases local resources may need to be rediscovered or revalorized. The legacy of Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy (1900–1989) provides a powerful illustration of what is possible when a profound and dynamic concern for human needs – in particular the needs and dignity of the poorest – provides motivation for active partnerships grounded in respect for traditional materials, motifs, values, and skills (Serageldin 1985). Fathy, now recognized for his considerable contributions to the appropriate technology movement and to forms of architecture that creatively synthesize traditional and modern elements, found motivation for his work in a learned skepticism of homogenizing tendencies within modernist architectural practices that sought to universalize Western styles of building, without regard to local culture, climate, and needs. Rather than follow a larger trend toward embracing imported, standardized forms of design, Fathy sought inspiration in the “vernacular architecture” of his own society – architecture which was not only culturally authentic, but also uniquely adapted to environmental conditions and built with readily available, energy-efficient materials, such as mud brick. Entering into a mutually rewarding partnership with rural communities, Fathy endeavored to update traditional designs to suit the needs of contemporary Egyptians, while continuing to draw upon traditional materials and existing skill sets that could be applied to the task at hand in a manner conducive to self-reliance. Amidst his creative efforts to make architecture serve human needs, restore cultural pride, and advance universally significant values, Fathy was fond of pointing out that “human beings are not interchangeable” (Serageldin 1985: 17) – there is no single mode of design that can work for all societies and all individuals. In addition, he found significance in the fact that the word “tradition” comes from the Latin tradere, which literally means “to carry forward” or “to transfer,” and suggests a “cyclical renewal of life” (Steele 1997). Examples such as Fathy’s provide a compelling illustration of what might be gained by more consciously embracing diversity and the principle of localization in peace research and applied peacebuilding. Affirming the desirability of multiple “nodes” for theorizing and practice – and for non-identical yet mutually relevant ways of working for peace – holds potential for making the field more creatively responsive to peacebuilding challenges. It also opens space for new advancements in peacemaking knowledge: every cultural community arguably has values, insights, and practices that can contribute to the development of peace within their own cultural

7 Human Dignity, Cooperation, and Peace

265

milieus, and which can arguably contribute to a larger, “mosaic” approach to international or global peace based on inclusive intercultural dialogue. Different communities have the potential to contribute their own “local exceptionalisms” – that is, their own distinctive ways of operationalizing universally recognizable values such as peace, human dignity, communal solidarity, and harmony with the natural environment – to a shared and richly cosmopolitan inquiry into the unity and diversity of peacemaking. […]

References Aguirre, L. P., & Boff, C. (1992). Para leer la enciclica en clave de sur. Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce. Aguirre, L. P., & Mosca, J. J. (1990). Direitos humanos: Pautas para uma educacao libertadora. Petropolis: Vozes. Assman, H. (1985). Clamor dos pobres e “racionalidade” economica. Edicoes Paulinas. Balera, W. (1982). O direito dos pobres. São Paulo: Edições Paulinas. Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2010). Understanding peacekeeping, 2nd edition. Malden, MA: Polity. Bobbio, N. (1976). Gramsci e la concezione della societa civille. Milano: Feltrinelli. Bobbio, N. (1992). A era dos direitos. Rio de Janeiro: Campus. Translated from the Italian into Portuguese by C. N. Coutinho. The original is entitled L’eta dei diritti (Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1990). Boff, L., et al. (1991). Direitos humanos, direitos dos pobres. Petropolis: Vozes. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations. Brundtland Commission. (1987). The World Commission on Environment and Development on our common future. New York: Oxford University Press. Butterfield, H. (1957). Christianity and history. New York: Fontana Books. Cotton, T. A. (1978). Public man: A model of rational cooperation. (Publication No. 7905835) [Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University]. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global. Coward, H., & Smith, G. S. (Eds.). (2004). Religion and peacebuilding. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Dallek, R. (1983). The American style of foreign policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict peace-building processes. Peace and Change, 34(1), 3–26. Fry, D. P., Bonta, B. D., & Baszarkiewicz, K. (2009). Learning from extant cultures of peace. In J. de Rivera (Ed.), Handbook on building cultures of peace (pp. 11–26). New York; London: Springer. Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2010). Localizing peace: An agenda for sustainable peacebuilding. Peace and Conflict Studies, 17(1), 101–143. Galtung, J. (January 25, 1987). Solidarity in a global perspective, an unpublished presentation at The Ethnical Platform, New York City. Garaudy, R. (1957). Marxist humanism. Paris: Edition Sociales. Harman, W. (1988). Global mind change: The promise of the last years of the twentieth century. Indianapolis: Knowledge Systems, Inc. Harrington, M. (1970). Marx as humanist. In M. Curtis (Ed.), Marxism (pp. 144–151). New York: Atherton. Huxley, A. (1946). Brave new world. New York: Harper and Brothers.

266

A. A. Said et al.

King, M. L., Jr. (1967). Where do we go from here: Chaos or community? New York: Harper and Row. King, M. L., Jr., & Washington, J. M. (1986). A Testament of hope: The essential writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper and Row. Kirkpatrick, J. J. (Fall 1990). A normal country in a normal nation. The National Interest, 21, 40–44. Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Leonhard, W. (1974). Three faces of Marxism: The political concepts of Soviet ideology, Maoism, and humanist Marxism. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Lindsay, A.D. (1962). The modern democratic state. New York: Oxford University Press. Mac Ginty, R. (2006). No war, No peace: The rejuvenation of stalled peace processes and peace accords. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1969). Humanism and terror: An essay on the communist problem. Boston: Beacon Press. Nau, H. R. The myth of America’s decline: Leading the world economy into the 1990s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Nye, J. S., Jr. (1990). Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. New York: Basic Books. Orwell, G. (1982). 1984. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Richmond, O. P. (2008). Peace in international relations. New York: Routledge. Said, A. A. (1978). Pursuing human dignity. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Human rights and world order (pp. 1–21). Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Tyson, B. (1978). Development: goals and measurements. Communications and Development Review, 2(1), 24–28. Serageldin, I. (1985). An Egyptian appraisal. In J. M. Richards, I. Serageldin, & D. Rastorfer (Eds.), Hassan Fathy (pp. 15–24). London: Concept Media. Shore, M. (2009). Religion and conflict resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Shtoll, L. (1958). The class struggle and humanism. World Marxist Review, 1(3), 26–54. Steele, J. (1997). An architecture for people: The complete works of Hassan Fathy. London: Thames and Hudson. Tillich, P. (1948). The shaking of the foundations. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Tyson, B., & Said, A. A. (1993). Human rights: A forgotten victim of the Cold War. Human Rights Quarterly, 15, 589–604. von Beyme, K. (1987). America as a model: The impact of American democracy in the world. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Wolfe, A. (1991). “Tres caminhos para o desenvolvimento: Mercado, estado e sociedade civil”. In F. C. Weffort (Ed.), A democracia como proposta (pp. 35–64). Rio de Janeiro: IBASE.

Chapter 8

Middle East Politics Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

8.1 Clashing Horizons: Arabs and Revolution Said, A. A. (1971). Clashing horizons: Arabs and revolution. In M. Curtis (Ed.), People and politics in the Middle East: Proceedings of the annual conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East (pp. 278–292). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. The task of analyzing revolution in the Arab world initially appeared to me to be a simple one. Literature on Arab revolutionary phenomena is both rich and abundant, and my training as a political scientist had prepared me to handle a wide spectrum of analytical tools. However, things did not work out this way. My mind kept wandering back to memories mixed with pain and tears, for revolution was as much a part of my formative years as Captain Kangaroo and Ranger Hal have been part of my son’s. I was only six years old when the wise men began tampering with my childhood. As my elders resisted French designs to separate their province of al-Jazirah from the rest of Syria, French airplanes leveled Amuda, my hometown. My family escaped to Damascus, where the French caught up with us and sent us into exile in Aleppo. In the French school, where my brother and I were enrolled, we took to soccer, but World War II and the bombing raids took care of that. We became experts at running into bomb shelters and stealing bread from military vehicles. We also became “revolutionaries.” I was barely 13 years old when I began my career as a street demonstrator which lasted through my college days; our chant, “The army is our

Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, was the longest serving professor at American University and founder of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at the institution’s School of International Service. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_8

267

268

A. A. Said et al.

army and Paris is our horses’ stable” still resounds in my ears. More family tragedies followed, and finally, an armed confrontation with the French to liberate Syria. I remember our lengthy meetings in the street corners of Damascus, Beirut and Cairo, our heated debates in coffee shops and our constant arguments over Arab unity and socialism. In the meantime, Israel defeated the Arabs. The Arab world was outraged. We demonstrated for the restoration of Arab honor. Colonel Husni alZaim answered our prayers with a military coup and a promise of Utopia. President al-Kuwatli, founding father of Syria, was declared a traitor. No sooner did we learn to dance to Colonel Zaim’s baton, then he was executed for treason. We cheered our new messiah, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi. But he too did not last. We demonstrated again. Arab streets are filled with the debris of frustrated dreams and abandoned schemes, as each new prophet attacks his predecessor with gay abandon. Much has happened since then. The men in uniform have “redeemed” the governments of Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Sudan and Libya. Attempted coups have shaken Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Tunisia, and there have been more coups in Syria. The Arabs and the Israelis fought two more wars, in 1956 and 1967, and the Arabs were humiliatingly defeated. The Mediterranean has since become a crowded bathtub, littered with American and Soviet boats. Some of my classmates have become theorists of revolution, while others have become accomplished practitioners. Some are in prison, others have lost their lives. And I am in Washington, D.C., making a living teaching political science. During the last two decades, I have visited almost every Arab state, from Morocco to Iraq, from Lebanon to Yemen. Much has changed, but more has remained the same. The Arabs are caught up in a “caucus race” which forces them to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place. Like the inhabitants of an island who have been promised that the ship of deliverance will soon arrive, they have buried their tools and packed their meager belongings; but when the ship arrives, it is a slave boat. Theirs is a tragic fate, painful for me because I do not hear their laughter; I see only tears. Paper and pen are often such an ineffective method to convey the impressions of eyes that have seen and endured more than paper can ever record or reveal.

8.1.1 Between Two Horizons The story of Arab expectations is a tragic one. It mirrors the enigmas of deserts, seas and mirages. The Arabs are clustered in isolated settlements, thrust between the sand and the shore, bound to a geographical inheritance of barriers to community and communication. There is much debate about the notion of revolution, and little concern with its content. The trimmings of revolution mask a non-revolutionary tradition; and unlike Asia, where there is a Mao Tse-Tung, or Latin America, with Fidel Castro, the Arabs have no dominant revolutionary who can personify the revolution. While such men as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yasir Arafat have been symbols of conviction, Arab lifestyle favors conservative institutions such as the military and Islam. The Arab remains comfortable with his identity, making it difficult for him

8 Middle East Politics

269

to entertain revolutionary ideas. Even when he does, he wages his revolution on the battlefield of rhetoric. In a region where there have always been appropriate audiences and garrulous orators, the faces are the same; only the masks are new. The structures have donned new colors and leaders have affected revolutionary postures, but there has been little departure from the old institutions. In the Arab world, revolution is merely a medium, and the medium is the message until a new medium appears. As a medium, it is a justification for the rivalry of pretenders for power rather than a process of significant change. Rejecting the political messianism of Western philosophies of history and unwilling to abandon his lifestyle, the Arab is not easily won to radicalism in action. Imprisoned in seemingly hopeless economic and social conditions, his response is similar to the howling of a caged wolf, for it is less a demonstration of virility than a function of self-preservation and a release of frustration. The Arab revolutionary glosses over the impotence of the present by idealizing the past. The messianism of his vision carries to the immediate present what was, in the past, the rewards of the other world. His quest for new faith and rebirth is transformed from the universality of Islam to the universality of such secular movements as PanArabism and nationalism, and the latter has yet to cut the bonds that tie it to the underlying aspirations of Islam.

8.1.2 Search for an Arab Revolutionary Vision In the pre-nationalist years, from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century, Arab revolutionary vision was exemplified by the expansion of the Prophet Muhammad’s thought by the reformers of the time: Rifa‘ah al-Tahtawi, Khayr al-Din Tunisi, Abd alRahman al-Kawakibi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Mustafa Kamil and Rashid Rida. These men conceived of Western superiority over the Muslim world as a function of superior Western political organization and systems, rather than Christian ethics, which they viewed as apolitical. Christianity, many of these reformers concluded, was not concerned with temporal and political matters, and it therefore represented no barriers to rationalism and secularism. Yet Islam, corrupted by non-Arab, superstitious elements that were unworthy of the Islamic message, combined worldly and religious matters under the one and only law, al-Shariah (Islamic Law), thus inhibiting the Islamic trend towards rationalism and secularism. They argued for the establishment of secular institutions sustained by a purified and revived Islamic doctrine. Their writings served as a revolutionary Bible for the alienated Arab intelligentsia following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Arab alienation found expression in Arab societies which turned from cage literary clubs to political groups such as Fatah and al-Ahd and to the Arab insurrection of 1916. The Arab revolt of 1916 has appeared highly symbolic in the eyes of Arab nationalists, as the first concrete manifestation in modern times of their desire to recreate an independent and unified Arab state. The insurgency arose not in the land of the intellectuals of Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, but in the desert of Arabia.

270

A. A. Said et al.

A synthesis of Arab nationalist aspirations, dynastic ambitions and British strategic interests in World War I, the revolt sparked a movement which claimed the temporary liberation of Damascus, the ancient center of Arabism, from centuries of Ottoman domination. Amir (prince) Faisal’s entry into Damascus for a brief moment made the dreams come true, but was soon smashed by the Western division of the area into the mandate system. Certain geographic regions and religious groups in most intimate contact with the ideas and techniques of the West provided a disproportionate share of leadership in the process of change. The regional foci of westernization – Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, Iraq – assumed central roles in the first nationalist movements in defiance of the authority of the Ottoman Empire. These areas became centers for Western missionary and educational efforts and resource places for political leadership and nationalist movements. […] Christian Arabs spearheaded the movement to define the emerging Arab personality. In Lebanon, in the middle of the nineteenth century, such Christian Arab scholars as Nasif Yaziji and Butrus Bustani, attempted to reform Arabic as a vehicle of change within the Arab community of the Ottoman Empire. From the Syrian Scientific Society in 1857 to the secret societies of the early twentieth century, literary groups became politically active. The interwar developments added to the frustrations of the fledgling Arab nationalist, with his meager means and unlimited ends. Western concepts were introduced into a society just set free from scholastic theology, but ambivalent about the direction of its goals. While Arab nationalists called for rationalism and secularism, they did so not in repudiation of Islam, but rather to reform it. They maintained that Islam should return to its roots in its Arabic background. Aside from its remote possibility, this seemed an outmoded explanation of the ills of the Arab society. […] The first victories in the Arab national struggle at the conclusion of World War II, the independence of several Arab states and the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945, all helped to renew the search for an Arab political personality. The ideas of Abd Allah Abd al-Daim, Constantine Zurayk and Musa al-Ami became a new source of inspiration among Arab youth. It was recognized that Arab society had been weak and corrupt prior to the imperialist onslaught. Governments were urged to produce changes in the societal and economic spheres. While these men attempted to formulate new myths to sustain new structures, environmental changes lagged behind, rendering the new institutions mere empty shells. […]

8.1.3 Arab Political Development Nowhere else is the definition of an internal affair more anomalous than in the Arab world. Independence and anti-colonialism could perhaps be vehicles for selfdetermination and modernization, but they become conflicting ones in the milieu in which energies are channeled toward redefinition of the national policy. Consequently, there is an interaction over the major issues of nationhood and Pan-Arabism

8 Middle East Politics

271

among movements, political parties such as the Ba‘ath (Resurrection) Party in Syria and Iraq, and such prominent groups as the army, students and religious leaders. Within this sociological and intellectual setting, political development in most Arab states during the early period of independence was stunted, thwarted and diverted into conspiracy, violence and personal interests. The nationalist parties that struggled for independence were generally non-doctrinaire parliamentary bloc parties. The Wafd and the Sa‘dis in Egypt, the National and the People’s parties in Syria, the Independence and National Democratic parties in Iraq, the Constitutional and National blocs in Lebanon, the Destour party in Tunisia and similar parties in other Arab states were frustrated by internal struggles for power after independence. The secular doctrinaire parties, the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), the Ba‘ath and Arab communist parties consisting mainly of Christians, Jews and other national and religious minorities all made a little ideological impact. […] The Ba‘ath Party founded in 1941 by Michel Aflaq, a Christian, evolved into the most important secular doctrinaire party in the Arab world. Similar to the SSNP, the Ba‘ath emphasized secularism, a mass-party organization, and social and political action programs. Unlike the SSNP, it advocated Pan-Arabism. While the Ba‘ath has been in the ascendancy in Syria since 1956 and is presently ruling in Syria and Iraq, it suffers from serious factionalism and remains little more than a tool manipulated by the military elites of these two states. The acquisition of independence revealed the latent differences and antagonisms among Arab states. The Arab response to their new challenges stimulated the rapid rise and equally rapid decline of competing unity schemes: the Fertile Crescent Plan advanced by Nuri al-Said of Iraq and the Greater Syria blueprint of King Abdullah of Jordan. The League of Arab States degenerated into a powerless debating forum. The Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948–49 dramatized the need for change. Prominent Arab scholars such as Constantine Zurayk, Hasan Sa‘ab and others termed it the great tragedy of modern Arab history. Along with many others they attempted to examine the ills of Arab society and the means best suited to alleviate them. But their pleas for a rebirth of nationalism and spiritualism, and the adoption of new attitudes to effect modernization merely served to reveal the moral bankruptcy of the Arab ruling elites, and the ideological power vacuum in the Arab world. Arab political movements had failed to come to grips with the internal contradictions of Arab society. In many societies, the resolution of such contradictions had set free a dynamic spark, purging them from the shackles of parochialism with its attendant misconceptions, prejudices, biases and subjectivism. […] In the Arab world, however, the takeover of power has always preceded an objective understanding and articulation of the revolutionary goals. […]

272

A. A. Said et al.

8.2 Subcultures in the Arab World Said, A. A., & Farzanegan, B. (1971). Subcultures in the Arab world. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution (pp. 83–91). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. The Arab world is an ornate mixture of groups, each of which cherishes its distinct sets of expectations as well as a stereotyped behavior. It is a patchwork of life styles and a diversity of identities. The Arab world is a mosaic of subcultures within subcultures. There are many Arab worlds, no uniquely Arab view of the future, no common dreams, only shared frustrations. We will examine only three of the subcultures in the Arab world: the students, the military, and the guerrillas. While each of these groups displays a stereotyped behavior distinctive enough to warrant designation as a subculture, none of these subcultures possesses identical characteristics in every Arab state. Accordingly, we will focus upon the common elements of each.

8.2.1 The Students Students, for long the vehicle of ideological movements and the backbone of revolutionary rhetoric in the Arab world, now face political emasculation because of reversals in the very process of political relationships that brought them to power. The process began with the Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948, which resulted in the call for Arab nationalism and Arab unity. At that time, the overriding force of the period seemed to be the preservation of the newly won independence and the strengthening of national unities in the most politically conscious countries of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The Arab defeat in Palestine resulted in the influx of about one million refugees into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. This represented a highly political force that proved capable of influencing trends, especially among the students and the youth of the host countries. The alliance of the Palestinian intelligentsia with the political and intellectual circles in Beirut, Damascus, and Amman was inevitable. Both centers of social and political dissent had one inevitable link in common: changing the sociopolitical order from the feudal-aristocratic alliances that had shaped the course of events in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan during the Ottoman rule and in the postindependence era. […] Thus, it was not difficult for Arab youth and Palestinians to view the succession of military coups in Syria as a natural element in the struggle against a corrupt, self-perpetuating aristocracy whose survival depended upon the commitment of a Western power. These coups d’état seemed to be the first and only expression of selfdetermination, and they were internally inspired, internally carried, and internally supported. This is a significant fact of life in an area where Western embassies had the power of life and death over national governments.

8 Middle East Politics

273

By the mid-1950s, especially with the advent of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, youth movements in the Arab world, especially in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, became an inseparable part of any power equation that affected political moves and relationships in the area. This alliance between students and established centers of power contributed in some considerable part to the union of Syria and Egypt in 1958. The military in Syria became so dependent on ideological and intellectual bases for political survival that inevitably the first communiqué of any coup d’état made extensive use of ideological jargons (usually leftist, of course) in order to command a popular base among the restive intellectuals and the politically active Palestinians who were resentful of Western participation in the creation of Israel. Student-intellectual support for union between Egypt and Syria made the union and its survival possible for over three years, in spite of the overwhelming geographical odds and external pressures. Yet the absence of such a power base, in spite of Western and government support, caused the sterility of the Iraqi-Jordanian union, which remained no more than a dream. Contrasted to the Iraqi-Jordanian union, that of Syria and Egypt went as far as merger of governmental operations and administrative laws. Changes in currency were also seriously underway at the time of the breakup in September 1961. Thus, while the intellectuals and students were powerful enough to help bring about union between Egypt and Syria, they were not powerful enough to preserve it. The result was that the governments in power in Egypt and Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, tried to retain power without student-intellectual support. The isolation of this power component did not result in an appreciable decline in the leadership of the established regimes. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, however, proved that Arab governments were incapable of remaining in power and that governments were not very effective sources of leadership. The Arab defeat in 1967 proved beyond any reasonable doubt that more than ideology and intent are needed for a restoration of the Arab dream, let alone the recovery of Palestine. This elusive dream – a progressive, unified Arab world – was at best betrayed by its own apostles and at worst ignored by its converts as unattainable. The Arab defeat drastically altered the power equation that for well over a decade had made it possible for Arab regimes to command significant popular support by socialist slogans and the promises of “unity and liberation.” This was as much true of President Nasser in Egypt as it was of the socialists in Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. It is with the help of such popular support that these regimes, with reliance on the army, could afford to pay lip service to students and the intellectual movements in the Arab world. The War of 1967, however, exposed the shaky basis of Arab programs; and public apathy was the stable diet on which they fed and found their strength. The emergence of the Palestine guerrilla movement brought a new factor to the power equation as well as a new element to Arab politics. The movement seemed to be organized along respectable ideological lines, and its ideology could command the brute power from which political power would someday emerge. The Palestinian movement, however, was too divided within itself to satisfy the necessary requirements of cohesion and unity of goal. So far the guerrilla movement has proven inadequate in its efforts to attract wide support from the youth movements in the

274

A. A. Said et al.

Arab world. Support only comes in the form of sympathy and contributions; but that can hardly provide the basis for the guerrillas to force a course of action on Arab governments contrary to their stated policy of seeking a “peaceful settlement” for the Arab-Israeli conflict. […] Arab students (and here one can only talk about those mostly in the Arab East) tend to confuse their goals with their means. This predicament has been the product of events and not muddled thinking. The establishment of a socialist, democratic society can only be made possible, if at all, when a nation diverts its energies to that goal. But the Arabs must first decide whether liberation of Israeli-occupied lands or socialism is what they are after. The policy of guns or butter is nowhere more evident than here. […]

8.2.2 The Military […] Beginning in the early fifties in the Eastern Arab states and the early sixties in North Africa, a revolutionary wave swept the Arab world. A political complex of norms and values, organization and aspiration, was hastily put together. A spectacular display of radical pronouncements of policy and showpiece projects was exhibited to attract popular support and justify the sacrifices needed to effect development. The Ba‘ath party in Syria and Iraq, the Neo-Destour (renamed the Destourian Socialist Party) in Tunisia, the Front of National Liberation in Algeria, and the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt – all competed for revolutionary leadership. These Arab revolutionaries failed to focus their strength, let alone rally popular support among the people. They developed goals of societal change, but failed to mobilize the internal resources, human and physical, to approximate such goals. With the exception of the Destourian Socialist Party in Tunisia, all of these movements turned to the army, the country’s sole cohesive force capable of any action. The party-army coalition provides a combination of force and intellectual theoretical criticism – the prerequisite for raising a movement to a revolutionary level in the Arab world. Shifts in balance of the uneasy coalition are commonly recurring because both parties to the coalition are themselves victims of the antagonistic sectional, religious, and minority groupings. Every new shift produces moves for another ‘revolution,’ either to redress the imbalance caused by its predecessor or to create new alignments. Each new revolutionary vanguard maintains a set of societal goals, a collection of those promissory notes of rebirth considered long overdue, to justify to the masses – and above all to the army, the main source of support – the concentration of power and the sacrifices called for. Although these revolutionary goals, be they land reform, industrialization, or nationalization of foreign interests, are presented in the form of an ideology that holds little promise of galvanizing or cementing the population, they nevertheless become a vehicle for the consolidation and perpetuation of the

8 Middle East Politics

275

revolutionary elite. Their realization is indeed secondary; the goals become ends in themselves. After every coup those revolutionaries who survive the internal consolidation of the ruling elite base their claims to continued leadership upon their past glories. The revolution (or more accurately, the coup d’état) is made to substitute for history; it becomes a national myth that ensures the “demonization” of the former regime. If today Westerners burn what they worshiped at the end of the last century – the nation as the masterpiece of modern history – the Arab revolutionary’s collective pride turns upon the assertion of his cultural superiority. Unconsciously seeking diamonds in ashes, he reinforces his drive by believing that the fate of his culture will be decided on the battlefield simultaneously with the fate of his aspirations. The resulting revolutionary doctrine in the national context relies on an eclectic pragmatic borrowing. Militarism, Leninist one-party organizations, long-range economic plans, token agrarian reforms, superficial Western liberalism and fascism – are all adapted from this amalgam to perceived local needs. The revolutionary doctrine tries to answer basic questions of social hierarchy and human purpose without providing solutions to the problems these questions raise. In a decade and in a milieu where inherited institutions and customary relationships no longer appear natural, inevitable, or immutable, that which is borrowed assumes an indigenous character for lack of alternatives. In the search for new institutions and remodeled relationships, hierarchy and control remain as vital as they have been in the past. The complex coordination of human effort needed to meet the promises of the revolutionary leadership is attempted in an economic-demographic set of conditions that predicates a pessimistic result. These conditions make it plausible for the few to defy these principles during the democratic socialist experiment. The few must manage and foresee developments. The majority must obey, sacrifice, and endure, as they are impotent to change or validate the direction of society. Bound together by their repudiation of the traditional political and social structures, the revolutionaries find themselves even more frustrated in the social aspect of the revolution. At least in the realm of rhetoric, the concept of revolution in the early sixties shifted the focus of ideological attention of the regime in Syria and the Arab socialist regime in Egypt from political processes to class structure and the economic organization of their respective states. Because that parliamentary democracy was frustrated for the lack of a middle class, these regimes developed under army control and without the firm base of a working class. […] The manifestation of military regimes in the Arab states reveals that revolutions occur there mainly for military and political considerations and rarely for economic or social reasons. The legitimacy of these regimes is derived from their predecessor’s inability to make good on their political and military promises: modernization, and the liberation of Palestine. The inability to fulfill promises results from a serious and recurring imbalance in the means-ends relationship of these regimes, whether they are military or civilian. […] In the conventional Arab state ruled by one man, there was no politics. To oppose the ruler was not politics but treason. The army was the traditional source of support

276

A. A. Said et al.

for the ruler. Frequent military coups d’état are the result of attempts to introduce democratic party politics into a system where there has been no traditional foundation for them, where the army has traditionally been employed as much in the internal affairs of the state as in external defense. The cessation of military coups will occur only when some outstanding personality restores one-man rule, the traditional form of Arab government. The Arab military politicians have no single outlook and no uniform ideology uniquely theirs. They are divided in their opinions, and their views are more or less identical with those of the civilians. The military politicians are generally unwavering nationalists who favor social reforms. Zealous supporters of the state’s independence and prestige, they are indifferent to the values of individual freedom. The common element in their views is the general “ideology” of Arab nationalism. This ideology, however displayed, is far from being a well-formulated doctrine or system of beliefs and opinions. It glorifies war and struggle against internal and external enemies. It showers praise on the brave who defend the Arab lands, and it emphasizes the historical role of the military but not its absolute supremacy, nor does it sanctify war for its own sake. The army officers who take over their countries hardly ever mention the army itself as a reason for the coup. They announce that the army assumes control to eradicate corruption, prevent anarchy, establish a regime based on freedom and justice, liberate the country from dependence on imperialists, advance the cause of Arab unity – all of these being general social and political goals. They consider themselves the pioneers of national liberation and social reform for the entire nation.

8.2.3 The Guerrillas The defeat of the military in 1967 introduced a new outlook in the Arab world. There could be no excuses; and none were accepted as readily as they had been in 1948 and 1956. The prestige of governments reached a new low in the Arab world. The problem was increasingly seen to be not just the liberation of Palestine – a distant goal to which all Arab governments pay lip service – but also the liberation of the Arab states, revolutionary or otherwise, and the best methods by which to achieve it. The traditional approach has proven to be fallible, and a far more radical alternative is sought. The infatuation of Arabs with the Palestinian liberation movement is in part an appreciation of mass participation as the means to action and goal fulfillment. Palestinians, aware of this new climate in the Arab world, and of the general inability of Arab regimes to restore their rights in Palestine, have moved on their own. For the first time since 1949, the Palestinians have been free and willing to act militantly, independent of their hosts. The success of the Palestinians, however, will depend on whether they can unite into a single revolutionary movement and elicit the participation of the restive Arab intelligentsia. They must also overcome the restraints imposed by Arab regimes and, in some cases, the open hostility of those regimes. […]

8 Middle East Politics

277

In refugee camps, Fatah represents the willingness of the Palestinian Arab to seize the initiative in securing what he believes to be his rights. In relation to the rest of the Arab world, it represents a re-evaluation, if not an outright rejection, of Arab governments; and the increasing student unrest in the “revolutionary” Arab states must be viewed from this context. The approach of Fatah has been fashioned according to two propositions suggested by Regis Debray; namely that guerrilla action leads to political action and political structures, and that the former is not dependent on the latter for success. Thus it is only now that Fatah is beginning to come to grips with the cultural inputs to what may become its ideological orientation and platform. Two trends appear: one calls for a reconciliation of Islamic tradition with the requirements of the day through the reform of Islam – reopening the doors to Ijtihad (religious interpretation and jurisprudence) – while the other trend suggests a completely secular left-of-center approach.

8.2.4 The Future The seventies will make the sixties seem like a picnic in the Arab world. Enough changes have occurred to affect the Arab psyche and to produce more “misfits.” There is emerging an estrangement from the self in the Arab world generating a need for rebirth. The present Arab military rulers and the recent revolutionary movements have failed to provide opportunities for individual advancement in their societies. The future will be attended with convulsions and explosions. Perhaps for the first time in contemporary Arab history, the stage is set for revolution. Accordingly, a new script, a new drama, a new set of actors may appear on the scene in the near future. The military, preferring facile ideological speculation to the reconciliation of conflicting interests and the enhancement of public welfare, will find itself fighting for its neck. It will grow increasingly conservative and status quo oriented. The more conservative guerrilla elements will lose the upper hand to the radical groups. On the other hand, a radical, left-of-center coalition, consisting of junior military officers, guerrillas, and students will challenge the increasingly conservative military dictatorships as well as the Ba‘ath, the Arab Socialist Union, and others. The Arabs may have a revolutionary experience coming, one that will rank among those of Russia and China in the first half of this century.

8.3 Introduction Honoring King Hussein Said, A. A. (1977, Apr. 27). Introduction honoring King Hussein. Comments offered by Prof. Abdul Aziz Said at an American University event conferring an honorary degree on King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan.

278

A. A. Said et al.

Your Majesty King Hussein... Welcome to the American University. God said in the Quran: “On no soul do we place a burden greater than it can bear.” Your Majesty... Your endurance is strong as your lineage is noble. The Arab spirit is generous in prosperity, and the Arab soul shines through adversity. It is not that the fortitude of the Arabs is wavering, their convulsion betrays their passion. Their sighs spread across the seas to carry the explosion of their pain. An orphan crying in the refugee camps of Lebanon. A widow mourning upon the shores of the river Jordan. Wars have ravaged their dignity, while fear has shattered their hopes. Theirs is a tragic fate, painful to me, a fellow Arab. Your Majesty... As your ancestors crossed the desert on camelback bearing gifts of inspiration, today Arabs are engaged in something that matters in the here and now, and in the awful scales of truth. The promise of dignity and development for the people of the Middle East smarts under the tyranny of fear. The Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer normal. It has its political meaning and has become pathological. Those who attempt to salvage the old order of conflict should ponder the cost before they launch rescue expeditions. We can hope more in desperation than certitude, that we shall overcome. We have loved our dream of peace too fondly to be fearful of the present dark. Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, Israelis – we are all Semitic peoples. We are too proud to recognize our resemblance and too righteous to admit our errors. Your Majesty... Let it not be said about us the people of the land of revelation that we could not see the light upon our path. As the footsteps of your forefathers marked the road of a great Arab civilization, may your destiny become the trodden path of a just peace. We must not permit the message of the Prophet Muhammad to wane into decay... “Send peace, you will be saved.” Al-Salam Alaykum.

8 Middle East Politics

279

8.4 For the Record Said, A. A. (1977, Apr. 6). For the record. The Washington Post. From comments offered by Prof. Abdul Aziz Said at the conferral of an honorary degree on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by American University. As fellow Semites you and I – typical of Israelis and Arabs – have more in common than we acknowledge. Foremost among our commonalities is the desire for peace in the Middle East. Both Arabs and Israelis have come to realize – however reluctantly – that there must be an alternative to the battlefield; that the old order of mutual reprisal must end; that the old strategy of tightrope has been a monumental exercise in futility. We are the heirs, actors and soldiers of the old order. But our legacy would be that much greater if we could also be the architects of dispassionate negotiation and just resolution. Three decades of war and recrimination are testimony to the need for a humanist vision as an alternative to the reliance on guns. We cannot go on making the same old gestures. We must convince ourselves and then each other that we cannot remain entwined in the narrow parochialism of the past. Arab and Israeli cannot achieve peace without accepting a limitation on their respective national ambitions. Fortunately, the Semite – Arab and Jew – is an adaptable creature with a highly developed genius for survival. Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, Egyptians and Israelis have little choice. Either they learn to live with the new order or that order will be destroyed. And let us remember – war has become a luxury of the past, peace a necessity of the future. … Let it not be said about us that the people of the land where man has killed his first brother has learned so little since the beginning of time….

8.5 Western Arrogance, Islamic Fanaticism, and Terrorism Said, A. A., & Turner, E. (1986). Western arrogance, Islamic fanaticism, and terrorism. Breakthrough, 8(1–2), 28–31. The dialogue between the West and Islam today is like a dialogue of the deaf. Terrorism and tragedy have sharpened our words, but not our understanding. Muslims are saying to the West: “We want to be free of Western domination.” The Islamic world has been under siege since the eighteenth century, when Russians and Europeans began exacting economic, political and territorial concessions from Muslims. The West, in turn, sees Islamic revival as a threat to Western civilization. Most Westerners have little appreciation of Islamic values, and the fact that some aspects of Islamic revival represent a fossilized Islam arouses their contempt. Western reactions feed into the vicious cycle and hasten the self-fulfillment of a distorted prophecy; Muslims react with more zeal and violence while the West becomes more sanctimonious. As both sides become dehumanized, Western arrogance and Islamic fanaticism feed off each other.

280

A. A. Said et al.

8.5.1 Conflicting Images The Muslim image of the West is colored simultaneously by envy and admiration, fear and suspicion. Western technological, economic and political achievements strongly appeal to Muslims, while the assertion of Western military, political and economic power, constant American support for Israel, and pervasive Western cultural penetration underscore Muslim fears. Muslims look at Western materialism and call it cultural decadence. The Western image of the Muslim world focuses on the underdevelopment and inefficiency of Islamic economic and social organizations in the midst of fortuitous wealth. Muslims are seen as aliens whose incomprehensible religious fanaticism has not advanced beyond making religious beliefs a cause for political action, especially in an international context. The Islamic world evokes in the subconscious Western mind the memory of warlike, un-Christian hordes threatening Europe from the East and South during the Middle Ages. The creative contributions of Islamic civilization – especially to the classical scientific tradition – have apparently left no impression upon the Western mind. Thus, Muslims and Westerners are hostages to their own misperceptions. Westerners choose to believe the worst of Muslim statements, and Muslims interpret Western civilization mindlessly. Reduced to mutual recrimination, communication is becoming an exercise in futility. What appears to each party as a “win-lose” situation, in which whatever is seen as a gain for one side is seen as a loss for the other, produces an outcome whereby both parties inevitably lose.

8.5.2 The Role of Israel Whether by Western design, Zionist effort or Arab attitude, Israel is in the middle: it divides the Eastern and Western components of the Arab-Islamic world; the West abuses Islam through Israel and mobilizes Western Jewish and Christian populations in misperceiving the Arabs and Muslims; Israel diverts and absorbs Islamic reaction against the West toward itself and, suffering from it, continues to demand compensation from the West. Yet both Islam and Christianity acknowledge Judaism as their predecessor religion, sharing prophets, common roots and many values. The Muslims see Israel as a racist intruder whose very existence is an affront and a constant reminder of Arab and Islamic powerlessness. The Israelis do not see themselves as another Middle Eastern people, but as a superior community; Arabs and Muslims are caricatures. The stage has been set; periodic hijackings, near-daily car bombings and kidnappings of Westerners and Arabs in Lebanon, the popularization of martyrdom on the streets of Beirut and on the battlefields of the Iran /Iraq war, the institutionalization of political assassination, frequently justified by religious precept – these are only a

8 Middle East Politics

281

few scenes, but not the final act in the play. The future direction of the plot holds few surprises: arrogance and fanaticism are receiving wide acclaim.

8.5.3 Imitation or Reaction The zealous drive is gaining momentum throughout the Muslim world because Islamic fanaticism is at the opposite end of the spectrum from imitation of the West. When the Muslim world gained independence, the West – and the Muslims – expected the newly emerging Islamic countries to become imitations of the West. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s new Pakistan, the first country to declare itself Islamic, was only so in name: in essence it was an adaptation of a Western system. After Jinnah came Presidents Muhammad Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Muhammad Ziaul-Haq; Jinnah’s imitation of the West prepared the way for Zia’s zealotry. Iran saw the Shah, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; a less Western Shah could perhaps have kept Khomeini in his Western exile. The adoption of Western political structures has led to the establishment of nationstates devoid of Islamic values and principles of social justice and political participation. Although several Islamic states have Shura (Islamic consultation councils), the councils do not function according to Islamic doctrine. The Shariah (Islamic law), which served as a protective code for the individual Muslim for centuries, continues to apply in half the Islamic states, but is limited to religious matters and does not apply to the political system. […] The universalism of Islam has not found expression in the new political structures, and as the Islamic world has lost to Western imperialism, the erosion of Islamic values has accelerated the pace of fanaticism.

8.5.4 The Refuge of Fundamentalism Not unlike their Christian counterparts in some Western nations, many Muslims view a return to fundamental – but not necessarily authentic – values as a way to shelter themselves from the forces of change. Modernization threatens the survival of Islamic lifestyles; advances in communications and transportation have progressively broken down the isolation in which Muslims formerly shielded their cultural “purity” from perverting outside influences; and these same advances have increased Muslim awareness of the distinctions between themselves and Westerners. Yet neither the zealous nor the imitative responses of Muslims to the challenge of the West represent a genuine revival of Islamic civilization. Both represent negativism and identification with the “enemy.” What is required is neither a superficial compromise nor a schizophrenic response, but a third way: a contemporary, yet genuinely Islamic, alternative.

282

A. A. Said et al.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Muslim world was reduced to passivity in world politics. The rules and practices of current world affairs, developed in nineteenth-century Europe, are largely Western in form and content and center on certain dominant geopolitical concepts which to the Islamic experience are alien abstractions: balance of power, territorially based nation-states, nationalism and national interest. The common culture of our world today, such as it exists, is the product of the conquest – and acculturation to industrialism – of Muslims and other non-Westerners as a result of the West’s political and economic vitality and expansion. Thus the West is outraged because terrorists do not “play by the rules”; however, the rules favor the West. The deployment of the Sixth Fleet fits the rules; car bombings and hijackings do not. This is not to justify terrorism; it is merely an attempt to explain terrorist actions. […]

8.5.5 The Emerging Islamic Consciousness In recent years, however, the internal conflicts of the West, and the assimilation and diffusion of Western technology in the Islamic world, have begun to redress these imbalances. Among Muslims, a slow growth of self-confidence and a rediscovery of the inherent worth of their own tradition has engendered a greater degree of independence and detachment from the West. This is a period of rediscovery and assertion in the Islamic world; there is a changed mood. Following World War II, as “development” became synonymous with industrialization, be it communist or capitalist, Islamic leaders imitating the West prevented or precluded the rise of other leaders who might have been able to develop alternative paths. But by the mid-Seventies, an increasing number of Islamic voices began to speak of an Islamic adaptation of industrialization strategies bypassing both the capitalist and communist modes. The emerging Islamic consciousness sees industrialism as a cultural wave which, as it spreads from Western Europe, has demonstrated its ability to overwhelm and transform Islamic culture. The new consciousness is suspicious of the omnipresent materialistic worldview implicit in the institutions of industrialized nations, capitalist and communist alike. The modern Western concept that weds human progress with material growth produces tension in the Muslim mind. Implicit in this concept are normative assumptions particular to Judeo-Christian thinking. The Muslim mind seeks to rediscover the utility of Islamic experience and to formulate development concepts particular to its own creative genius; but Muslim fanaticism and Western arrogance now stand in the way.

8 Middle East Politics

283

8.5.6 Development and Islam A tremendous amount of thinking needs to be done by Muslims concerning development and Islam. Approximately two-thirds of the Islamic governments of the world have military or quasi-military regimes; nearly one-third are absolute or nearabsolute hereditary systems; hardly a one is politically viable. About two-thirds of the Islamic states lack workable structures for representation and legislation; only fourteen have universal suffrage. Viewed in the context of present world economic standards, twenty-one Islamic countries rank as “poor”; about nine are “less poor”; only a half dozen are classified as “well-to-do,” and these are oil-producing countries. Even in the well-to-do Islamic states, one finds serious excesses instead of moderation or balance; the disparity in wealth between social classes is glaring. Westerners, too, need to do a great deal of thinking. Western civilization has become more of a servant of the ruling elite and less of the creative, self-critical movement it used to be. While the vitality of Western culture has not dissipated, there is much evidence that it is turning inward, against its intrinsic values and openended quest for truth. The insensitive innocence of imperialism is being replaced by the cynicism of self-interest, leading the West to the rejection of its own dreams, its own search for universal humanism; and its refusal to abandon cultural arrogance and move away from its current privileged position makes Western civilization a mockery of its own values. Attempts to catechize the Muslims, or impose Western liberal concepts or scientific socialism on them, will continue to meet with violent resistance.

8.5.7 The Promise in Independence Islamic revival is perhaps the most dramatic example of the changing conditions in world politics. Growing interdependence among nations, fostered by rapidly advancing technology, holds forth the promise of the first authentic global civilization. In fact, it is no longer accurate to speak of the West as sharply distinct from Islam or even to speak of the North as opposed to the South: these distinctions are now more appropriate as generalizations for popular mythology than as descriptions of actual world politics. The current revival of neoconservatism in the Western world is masking the scale of global transformation. Political rhetoric is essentially backward-looking, translating contemporary issues into the political distinctions of the past. This reactionary bias is not the monopoly of the West: Soviet leaders, European socialists and Muslim fundamentalists are as much – if not more – the victims of rhetorical anachronism as anyone. The premises on which the doctrines of Western statecraft were founded have been largely invalidated. Machiavelli and Clausewitz have little to say to us today; their kind of world no longer exists. Does this mean that the lessons of “power politics”

284

A. A. Said et al.

are useless? It means exactly that. The apocalyptic visions of those who have lost faith may, tragically, be prophetic: their world is, after all, really coming to an end. […]

8.5.8 Rethinking Security Historically, threats to national security have been attributed almost solely to the deliberate policy choices of national governments, and not to terrorist groups. Now the United States faces the necessity of broadening the conceptual formulation of its national security to deal with a variety of political activities, including terrorism, that jeopardize the stability of world politics. The American response to terrorism is limited to the supply side of terrorism – combating symptoms – but it does not extend to its causes. Terrorism is used by disempowered Muslims to accomplish aims not otherwise possible in the existing environment of world politics. The call to deterrence and counterterrorism popularized since the TWA Beirut tragedy in June 1985 is a retreat from the real ordeal. A return to arms may provide emotional relief for its advocates, but does not check terrorism. Terrorism highlights the lack of institutionalization of grievance procedures, social change and law and order in world politics. The remedy for terrorism requires the creation of regional and international standards to promote greater social justice and provide workable international mechanisms for dealing with terrorism. The United States can take the initiative in the United Nations and in regional organizations to establish institutions to deal with the “demand” side of terrorism – grievances of nongovernmental groups, arms transfers and violations of human rights. […]

8.5.9 Beyond “Reflect or Reject” Beyond terrorism, the West and Islam need to break the cycle of arrogance, which breeds contempt, and fanaticism, which breeds paranoia – the cycle sustaining the flow and currents of terrorism. The United States should take the initiative because it is secure enough to do so. On the other hand, Muslims should not be so insecure as to believe that they can only reflect or reject the West. The enduring strength and creative genius of true Islam can absorb the shocks of Western intrusions. Muslims can accept those creations of the West that are sure to complement the inevitable revitalization of Islam. There is a real opportunity for significant leadership as Muslims seek to harmonize the Islamic spirit of communalism with the changing conditions of our present world. Although this is an awesome task, it is not impossible. Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful precepts of social justice with implications for all humanity. Today’s challenge for Muslims is no more than the expansion of the original ideals of Islam.

8 Middle East Politics

285

[…] We must have a new beginning: we need to meet again, this time on different ground, far away from arrogance and fanaticism and closer to the roots of JudeoChristian-Muslim traditions.

8.6 The Paradox of Development in the Middle East Said, A. A. (1989). The paradox of development in the Middle East. Futures, 21(6), 619–627. At a time of rapid change in the Middle East, the enforcement of Western models of development has eroded traditional Islamic values and undermined Muslims’ confidence in themselves and their cultural heritage. The Islamic idea of development cannot be reduced to any of the models prevailing in the West, which are based on concepts of progress and evolution alien to the Islamic worldview. Middle Easterners need to reconstruct an Islamic concept of development rooted in their own cultural values and reflecting the historical development of Islam. Islamic traditions provide a set of political precepts with universal implications, and Islam can make an important contribution to an integrative world order. […]

8.6.1 Westernization of the Middle East Robert Heilbroner has suggested, in his work The Great Ascent (1963), that the dominant event of recent centuries is the westernization of the world. So complete was this process that until a few years ago only two models of development seemed worthy of serious consideration. One was development patterned after the capitalist model; the other development following the socialist/communist path. Both models of development rest on a number of assumptions: (a) the nation-state is the entity of reference, primum mobile of development and sine qua non of political identification; (b) secularization of values, which takes the form of materialism; (c) industrialization of production, which involves specialization, rational management, centralization, bureaucratization; (d) economic rationalization of activity, which is the monetization of society, making labor a commodity and raising the standard of living, leading towards the consumption ethic; and (e) technification of knowledge – the most important form of knowing is reductionist science, which generates manipulative technology. The establishment of nation-states in the Middle East accompanied intellectual and political institutional discontinuity with the basic values of the dominant religion of Islam. The efforts by Middle Eastern governments to assimilate and modernize

286

A. A. Said et al.

produce a crisis of alienation (mobilization, coercive assimilation, and imperialism) and the rise of ethnicity. The traditional Islamic institutions have lost their effectiveness as organizing principles and as safeguards for social justice and political participation. The Shariah (Islamic Laws), which served as a protective code for individual Muslims since the seventh century, is suffering near total neglect. The universalism of Islam has not found expression in the new nation-states. […] The resulting dilemma for Muslims is that, when they reject Western political, economic and social values as inappropriate to their needs, the West views them as xenophobic and reactionary. They become isolated internationally – Khomeini and Qadhafi are two glaring examples. However, when Muslims compromise their own values and traditions and adopt those of the West, they suffer internal displacement. They are rejected domestically. The Shah and Sadat are two tragic victims.

8.6.2 Islam and Development There is little doubt that the idea of human progress, as it has come to be understood since the eighteenth century in Europe, is one that is confined to Western philosophy, especially in the form of the wedding of the idea of progress with material evolution. Islam does not provide for a model of growth as understood in the West. Islam views materialism as detrimental to human dignity and as undermining the nobility of the human species. Perhaps the most basic factor which gave rise to the modern idea of human progress through material evolution was the reduction of the person to the purely physical which took place in the Renaissance. Traditional Christianity saw the individual as being born for immortality; born to go beyond physical self. Renaissance humanism, which is still spoken of in glowing terms in certain quarters, bound the individual to the earthly level and in doing so imprisoned one’s aspirations for perfection by limiting them to this world. Until that time, progress had been associated with the perfection of the human soul and society, the establishment of the kingdom of God on Earth, the coming of the Messiah and the new Jerusalem. Renaissance and postRenaissance humanism and secularism made the traditional idea of the progress of the human soul towards its perfection – which resulted in its ultimate wedding with the spirit – illusory and inaccessible. What is the Islamic view of development? To Muslims, putting the words “Islam” and “development” together is strange. The word development in Islam refers to the development of the soul in its return back to God. In the Islamic world today, the debate on development is informed by words and ideas borrowed from westerners. The present Arab vocabulary combines translations of Western terms with Islamic concepts of spiritual growth. Certain themes can help us understand what development is to Muslims: “Divine Will,” “Reality,” “Time,” and “Evolution.” Divine Will continues to function in all phases of human history and in all instances of human life. Divine Will for Muslims is the equivalent of the law of nature in the Western context. […]

8 Middle East Politics

287

In the Islamic perspective, history has never been taken to be the ultimate matrix of reality; history is not reality – God is reality. This might appear as an abstract philosophical question for Westerners, yet it is central for understanding the Islamic concept of development. To what extent does what we do in each generation matter? The answer is determined to a large extent by what society considers to be reality. Closely aligned to the Islamic idea that history is not ultimate reality is that the march of history/time is neither linear nor uniform in movement. The idea that we can have a perfect society if we get together and work for it is not acceptable to Islam. We can obviously understand the power of this idea for economic development and progress because of the religious tinge to it. Many Protestant denominations, which collaborated closely with the growth of capitalism, took this idea in the nineteenth century, advancing the belief that to make money was to contribute to a perfect state and constitutes a pious religious act. Islam has never divorced the material from the spiritual life; making one’s bread is as much an act of faith as saying one’s prayers. The idea of evolution, which is central to development, is another Western concept, alien to Islamic thought. In the West, evolution and development go together. Muslims do not think that the simple march of time by the very process of what is called historical determinism makes things better and better. There is not necessarily automatic betterment through the change of historical conditions.

8.6.3 Reactions of Middle Eastern Countries The response of contemporary Middle Eastern states to development has taken two general expressions – capitalism and socialism. The states that have adopted capitalism, including Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and North Yemen, accept the Western material ethos and claim to limit its dangers. In practice, however, it is a corrupted form of capitalism and is inefficient. The Islamic states based on socialist models, the Marxist variety as well as the national socialist models, including Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, South Yemen and Sudan, are poor imitations. In most of these states, the planned state economy and the emphasis upon moral and political unity has dehumanized society. The economic doctrine of the Shariah is compromised by traditionalist states (including Iran and Saudi Arabia), secularist and socialist states alike. Present-day Middle Eastern states do not practice Islamic precepts patterned after the Shariah. The socialists and secularists deny that the Shariah has strategic usefulness in modern materialism. The traditionalists have twisted the Shariah out of its original shape. This perceived irrelevance of Islamic tradition to present conditions, whether implicit or explicit, has not been accompanied by indigenous intellectual development. While many of the traditional values have been eroded, a new economic consciousness is slow to develop. The perceived incompatibility between Islam and present economic requirements has resulted in frustration and cynicism. Lip service to Islam, capitalism and socialism, combined with the failure to conform to the precepts of any of the three,

288

A. A. Said et al.

underscores economic uncertainty in today’s Muslim world. Within this context, the development of the economic rights of the Muslim individual is thwarted and diverted by the personal interest of ruling elites. The present Middle East does not bear much resemblance to Islamic precepts, nor to Western liberalism or Marxism. This tension between precept and practice has resulted as much from slow adaptation to rapidly changing conditions in Islamic societies as from the impact of powerful ideas and forces from outside the Islamic world. Indigenous intellectual developments have been few and frequently suppressed and squashed by governments, thus underscoring the contradictions of the contemporary Middle East. Khomeini’s Shiite fundamentalism and the assortment of Sunni revival movements in the Arab world are a creation of these contradictions.

8.6.4 Many Paths to Development There is a tremendous amount of thinking to be done about development and Islam, precisely because Muslims are forced by today’s conditions to make the connection between these two words. The Islamic idea of development cannot easily be reduced to any of the existing models that prevail in the West today. It cannot be reduced to the models advanced by modernized Muslim thinkers. At the close of the nineteenth century in Egypt, when Muslim liberal thinkers began to talk about these concepts, they accepted the Western norm as reality. In so doing, they began to hang an Islamic garb on these concepts. It did not work then, and it is doubtful that it will work now. Especially today, when many people in the West are trying to rethink the meaning of development, Middle Easterners need to re-examine and reconstruct an Islamic idea of development. Islam and development can be reconciled when we free development from the linear, rational idea of progress canonized by the Western mind. The European Age of Enlightenment postulated progress as the person’s domain of nature through reason and science. Progress was abandoned when the concept became a little too hollow to use, a little too obviously laden with Western superiority, and the concept of development was substituted. Development is a process through which human beings choose and create their future within the context of their environment to achieve a creative society. It is concerned with the dignity of the individual, a secure level of self-esteem, and the establishment of institutions appropriate for these ends. The goals of development are to realize the potential for human societies and for the total human being. […] Individual human and societal growth are one, and the development process is open-ended. Development thus defined is a quest for added dimensions of being human directed to the potential for all human beings. Development, understood in a world context and based on universal humanist values, can only flourish if it is based upon, and actively promotes, a world humanistic culture. Such a culture will recognize that there are “many roads to humanism” and there need be no established agreements as to why all humans are equally valuable.

8 Middle East Politics

289

Returning to the Middle East, and the larger context of the Third World, three possibilities must be examined: either retake the road of “Westernizing” the world, assuming the contradictions in the Western camp (among liberals, Judeo-Christians and Marxist-Socialists) can be resolved; or accept the hegemony of one of the Western groups, or of a non-Western worldview; or build a truly eclectic world humanist culture. Such an eclectic humanist culture would provide space for the growth of a truly Islamic model. […] “[T]riumphalism” is really untrue to the genius of all three Western subcultures. The Judeo-Christian tradition insists that believers must always be open to new revelations of truth. Liberals believe that reason and science march hand-inhand towards a world brotherhood and sisterhood in which all will participate. And the Marxist-Socialists believe in a scientific method which, if truly open-ended and able to move forward dialectically, will abandon dogmas outflanked by the advance of knowledge and the extension of the human community. There are no “more developed” and “less developed” human beings or states— only individuals and societies “in development.” “Development” then becomes the permanent quest of every person; of all societies. […] In the long run, it is better for the Middle East to develop through its own Islamic traditions. Otherwise, the people of the region will remain torn between traditionalism and secularism, between fundamentalism and westernism. A change through continuity is both safer and more viable than a change through discontinuity. The challenge is how to develop the Middle East through its own traditions, not through Western secular ideologies. The first is deep-rooted in the heart of the masses as mass culture and mass behavior. The second is uprooted from mass culture and can easily be seen as external penetration. Distinguished Egyptian al-Azhar University physician Mohammed Shaalan, in a letter dated 22 September, 1986, states a simple truth: The gap between the two worlds in which we dwell seems to be increasing; the rich and the powerful are having more of the same while those looking up to them are becoming more helpless and frustrated in their fruitless efforts to catch up. So they look for an answer in religion; an opium which could be positive in the sense of relieving fatal pain, or negative in the sense of offering an escape.

8.6.5 Islam and World Order Because the Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful political precepts and practices with universal implications, Islam can make important contributions to an integrative world order – one which affirms the unique value of all cultural traditions. In particular, Islam prescribes a strong sense of community and solidarity of people; it postulates a collaborative concept of freedom; and it demystifies the Western myth of triumphing material progress and development. Islam sees the individual as the trustee of God’s bounty. Individuals are required to lead a good life and promote good deeds in the community (Ummah). Promotion

290

A. A. Said et al.

of the community is an act of faith (Iman) advocated in the Qur’an (the holy book of Islam) and Sunnah (practices of the Prophet Muhammad). The community is to be based upon social justice (‘Adalah Ijtima’yiah), solidarity (Takaful or Tadhamun) and community welfare. This principle of social fraternity (Ikha Ijtima’i) defines the way Muslims organize themselves. Islam sees the community as a group of people cooperating for the sake of the common good, relying upon the use of common resources to achieve viability and creativity. A community is based on production to satisfy its needs; production requires regulations; regulations lead to the establishment of a political system. The Islamic political system is the form of authority designed to regulate, direct and create just laws applied equally to all persons. The application of laws requires power. Power is the ability to make peace. The purpose of peace is the creation of harmony. The Islamic political system must be self-sufficient; it must satisfy the needs of the community. Self-sufficiency is achieved when supplies equal demands; community members must not demand the undesirable or the impossible. Self-sufficiency is essential since need and hunger create unrest. The Islamic political system must be stable, and stability bestows power. The Western liberal emphasis upon personal freedom from restraint is alien to Islam. While in the Western liberal tradition personal freedom signifies the ability to act, in Islam it is the ability to be, to exist. In Islam, human beings are created in the image of God and seek perfection by following the perfected. They are God’s representatives on Earth, empowered by the Divine Being to govern themselves. The human being as the reflection of God, who is complete freedom and complete necessity, participates in both this freedom and this necessity. Personal freedom lies in surrendering to the Divine Will and must be sought within oneself. It cannot be realized through liberation from external sources of restraint. Individual freedom ends where the freedom of community begins. The Islamic concept of freedom implies conscious rejection of the individualistic philosophy of “doing one’s own thing.” Freedom means the ability, skills and security (inner and outer) affirmatively and creatively to express oneself, individually and as a group. It implies community, because to create is to communicate. Dignity means self-love and self-respect as a creative free person; its fruit is the ability to allow all others the same dignity. Being free means belonging to the community, and participating with the people in cultural creation. Freedom of thought, communication and expression are seen as absolutely necessary to achieve the highest level of self-renewing creativity, as are social, economic and political equality of opportunity and dignity. Western liberalism posits freedom in order to avoid a despotic system; Islam emphasizes virtue to perpetuate the traditions of society – which often support a coercive system. Western liberalism emphasizes self-interest; Islam values collective good. To some, such an egalitarian approach denies the essential characteristics of freedom; for belonging to a community consciously demands some discipline and sacrifice. But the cultural anarchy of individualistic liberalism is inconsistent with

8 Middle East Politics

291

an ecological balance. Furthermore, it has been oversold as a creative seedbed of culture and does not take into account the potential for creativity of non-coercive communities. Societies have so often been repressive that a strong Western tradition has emerged which sees the elimination of repression and want as the chief goal of society. A false dichotomy has emerged, with the individual seen constantly as the victim of society, and the ideal task of society seen as serving the individual. Too often – indeed, almost entirely – the cultural community in which most human realization must take part has been ignored. It is true that cultural systems, like political, economic and social ones, have usually contained much to impede human development: prejudice, chauvinism, competitiveness, racism, sexism, and so on. This does not change the fact that the cultural community must be served by political, economic and social systems, rather than the other way around. […] In the Western pluralistic tradition, diversity is seen in terms of coexistence of political systems, but not cultures. Cultural pluralism is rooted in an Islamic tradition of ethnic diversity that fosters a universalist tendency towards cultural broadness and flexibility. This heritage has allowed autonomous non-Muslim cultures to flourish within Islam to this day, while the West has succumbed to the destruction of native cultures and, in recent years, to anti-Semitism.

8.6.6 World Order as Creative Community There is here a real opportunity for significant leadership for all. Today’s challenge for Muslims is no more than the expansion of the original ideas of Islam. As Muslims seek to harmonize the Islamic spirit of communalism with the changing conditions of their own societies, they contribute to the betterment of our world. The afflictions of triumphalism and cultural imperialism undermine the viability of development – nationally, regionally and globally. Triumphalism – a pervasive attitude in Western civilization, usually attributed to the melding of Hebraic Messianism with Hellenic rationalism—asserts that what is right, true and real here and now, is the same for anyone else, past, present and future. Cultural imperialism is an attitude of superiority over, and insensitivity to, other cultures. In the Western instance, a literary, abstracting, generalizing, scientific culture is thought of as representing a “higher” form of truth than oral-aural, folk anecdotal cultures. Yet a retreat to a cultural ghetto by any group – be it Muslim, Christian, Buddhist or whatever – is not only a denial of the rich diversity of the modern cultural experience, but also a rejection of responsibility for future generations. The inexorable dynamics of modern history rule out pretensions by any one group or cultural tradition of establishing a world hegemony. We have moved from a humanity that experienced its collective life as fragments of the whole to a humanity experiencing itself as whole. We are the heirs of the Old World order; but our legacy would be much greater if we could be the architects of a new order founded upon human solidarity and the wholeness of human life. This is true to the geniuses of all human traditions.

292

A. A. Said et al.

First, Second and Third Worlds must become one world. Oppressors and oppressed must be seen as people; reason and intuition become faces of truth; planning and spontaneity become reality; civilization and barbarism become culture; propositional knowledge and anecdotal knowledge become the root of knowledge. World order becomes a historical process whereby human beings choose and create their future within the context of their environment to achieve a humanist and creative society.

8.7 Beyond Geopolitics: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict Elimination in the Middle East and North Africa Said, A. A. (1993). Beyond geopolitics: Ethnic and sectarian conflict elimination in the Middle East and North Africa. In P. Marr and W. H. Lewis (Eds.), Riding the tiger: The Middle East challenge after the Cold War (pp. 163–185). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ethnicity and sectarianism are major political and human fault lines in the Middle East. For centuries before the arrival of European colonialism, ethnic and religious allegiances determined the boundaries of communal loyalties and the framework in which political dynamics transpired. The Europeans helped to create new frameworks for interaction beyond the ethnic group and religious community in the Middle East, but they failed in many instances to fully integrate diverse people with a distinctive tradition and history of separateness into the newly created nation-states. As a result, throughout the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the northern third of Africa, ethnicity and sectarianism have become forces for political instability that threaten the fragmentation of the nation-state in several regions. It is not clear whether, during the coming decade, nation-states will persist or whether fissiparous forces will be able to reconstitute themselves as viable new entities. The nation-state is the arena in which ethnic and sectarian conflicts normally occur. Within its ambit, governments often try to ignore or, where necessary, suppress the aspirations of domestic ethnic and religious groups or to impose values of a dominant ruling class. Under such circumstances, ethnic and sectarian groups feel impelled to mobilize and to place demands upon the state ranging from political representation and participation in decision making to protection of human rights, autonomy, and even separation. Ethnic and sectarian activism takes a variety of forms, from formation of political parties to adoption of violent strategies. The context of international relations may be changing from the historic focus on nation-states as the predominant actors toward a more complex order in which ethnic and sectarian groups compete, as actors, for influence. The present global system is simultaneously more parochial and more cosmopolitan than the international system of nation-states we are leaving behind. On the one hand, Western Europe is moving toward economic unity and close political association; on the other hand, Eastern Europe is undergoing several processes of decomposition – most

8 Middle East Politics

293

notably in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The Baltic Republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have already become members in good standing in the United Nations. Fragmentation of the former Soviet Union is potentially destabilizing for neighboring states in the Middle East. Bonds of culture, language, and religion affect people in the Iran-Transcaucasus and Central Asian regions, as well as in Turkey and Afghanistan. As a counterpoint, the Kurds cross the borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Alawis are found in Turkey and Syria, and Shiites inhabit a region separated by the borders of Iraq and Iran. The latter are also located in Lebanon and in several Persian Gulf emirates. Ethnicity, geography, and religion are not always unifying factors, however. Geography actually separates the Berbers of northern and southern Morocco, as well as Berber communities in Algeria, thus precluding effective political coordination. Even where propinquity exists, a common people can fall into rivalry of such depth and dimension as to destroy both the nation and the state – as in the tragic instance of the Republic of Somalia. Even where separatist impulses exist – as among the NiloHamitic people of the southern Sudan or the Kurds in northern Iraq – local rivalries erode effective political action. Throughout the region, sectarian and ethnic challenges to the nation-state concept pose particularly serious issues for the international community. The legal foundations of international order rest on the principle of sovereignty and full recognition of territorial integrity; ethnic separatists argue in favor of the common “folk” principle and their inherent right of self-determination. At issue is the need for integration, on the one hand, and the desire for local self-determination, on the other. […] There has been some reconciliation between the competing interests of state and ethnic groups in the Middle East, but strong identification with one’s ethnic group and disdain for others remain. Dispute resolution techniques among competing groups occasionally fail, and governments, charged with internal order, are inclined to turn to coercive instruments to stifle dissent. As a result, stability and order merge into issues of legitimacy and self-determination. […]

8.7.1 Explanations of Ethnic and Sectarian Politics Analyses of ethnicity and sectarianism have favored ethnic over religious explanations and have placed sectarianism within the context of ethnicity. The boundaries of ethnicity are both broad and fluid. […] Other scholars have their own unique perspective. Some see ethnicity and sectarianism as interwoven; others see ethnicity as mythic in character; still others contend that religion is the most cohesive element of ethnicity because it is associated with community and diminishes political and ethnic boundaries. Common among all these perspectives is the raising of people-consciousness – a sense of communalism, a shared identity, and a feeling of common aspiration (Esman/Rabinovich 1988). Ascriptively, the ties may involve blood, language, religion, and custom.

294

A. A. Said et al.

The processes of state-building and modernization can play a moderating role among domestic groups if they are conducted without penalty to any particular people; alternatively, they can exacerbate endemic rivalries and tensions. All too frequently, governing institutions are viewed by ethnic minorities as the preserve of elite groups, concerned with the preservation and protection of special interest groups, clans, and others loyal to the leadership. Such arrangements of power and influence are patrimonial and rarely provide a solid foundation for processes of political development and modernization, as experienced and understood by the West in general and the United States in particular. Indeed, awareness of one’s ethnicity may be, to a great degree, a function of coercive assimilation that is fostered by modernization. When social groups are involved in the processes, cooperation does not necessarily occur. Increased contact, exposure, and communication may well exaggerate one’s self-image, magnify cultural differences, produce conflict, and induce political disassociation. Expatriate Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians in the Arab Gulf states feel alienated from the tribal setting there. Economic development – an increase in material goods and services – does not immunize a society from ethnic conflict. Oil revenues in the Arab states of the Gulf have created a class of wealthy Arabs and a new class consciousness on the part of the less privileged population. […] Policymakers, if they are to fashion a coherent approach to the problem, must evaluate the nexus between government strategies and the distribution of resources and rewards in Middle Eastern societies. Involved are majority and minority rights and the building of broad-based loyalties in pluralistic nation-states. What appears to be parochialism in American eyes, has far more dramatic meaning within the Middle Eastern context. Debates over the official language of government, religious foundations of the state, educational curricula, or the directorship of a state-run enterprise all too often mask deeper issues of culture, religious rights, or opportunities for group access to the ladder of social mobility or economic advantage. How the processes unfold determines whether modernization generates crosscutting, coinciding, or conflictual identities within the nation-state (Geertz 1963). Conceptually at the opposite extreme, ethnic consciousness may produce a broadened sense of common identity. This form of exclusivity may be expressed in a way that flattens out narrow geographical boundaries – as in a feeling of Egyptian or even Iraqi “Arabness.” Indeed, an ethnic group is a culture. The Turkish inhabitants of the former Soviet Union also identify with the larger Turkic culture. Psychology plays an important role in the configuration and matrices of ethnic interaction. It focuses on the roots of ethnic conflict and the fundamental differences between ethnic groups, and it requires exploration of human beings, their levels of interaction, and crosscurrents such as social change and economic development (Hsu 1971). Predictability of ethnic conflict is determined by a wide range of factors. “Competition” is critical among them. Although competition is inevitable and, in some instances, constructive, how it is managed and the issues and outcomes that are involved frequently determine whether competition achieves fruitful interaction or merges into outright conflict. Coptic Christian and Islamic reformist interaction in Egypt, for example, is of the constructive variety on most occasions. In

8 Middle East Politics

295

neighboring Sudan, by comparison, competition between Muslim northerners and Christian southerners after independence from colonial rule has led to widespread armed conflict of the state-threatening variety. Conflict is almost inevitable where political representation is denied or when a particular community is economically disadvantaged. In such circumstances, the state most often is found to have recourse to instruments of repression, which in turn generates deeper conflict. Whether we are dealing with the suppression of the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, or Turkey, the present ethnic conflicts in Lebanon, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we are naturally attracted to an anomaly of the twentieth century – the impulse for Western modernization and the accelerating drive for self-determination among various linguistic, religious, and geographical ethnic groups. These conflicts underscore the tension between state-building, modernization, and human rights. When a state must assimilate ethnic groups within its borders in order to provide the modern economic, health, and social resources that citizens of the twenty-first century deserve, the same ethnic groups resist the devaluation of their ethnic identity. Middle Eastern governments have responded by forcing secessionist ethnic groups to adapt to the political economy of the state. Middle Eastern states wracked by ethnic conflicts, such as Lebanon, the Sudan, Iraq, and Israel, are less inclined to view the claims of self-determination and secession as expressions of some transcendent human struggle than are most other states that experience an acceptable level of ethnic conflict that does not approach disassociation. The extent to which human rights of most minority groups are compromised is almost uniformly beyond reasonable levels.

8.7.2 Regional Ethnic and Sectarian Conflicts The likelihood of widening ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East is closely related to resources – financial and economic – and to their distribution, to processes of modernization, to development, and to prospects for political pluralism. Increasingly, issues of economic equity, political participation, and retention of traditional cultural values arise. Where governments are found wanting, either through misunderstanding, arrogance, or misapplication of resources, alienation between central authority and ethnic and sectarian forces crystallizes. The result, almost ineluctably, is conflict, violent expression of opposition, or the emergence of separatist movements that not only threaten national cohesion but also spill across borders, destabilizing neighboring states. In such circumstances, ethnicity and sectarianism are transformed into security issues, and military establishments are called upon to suppress dissident sentiments. The Iraqi government suppresses the Kurds and the Shiites in the name of national security and the Syrian government suppresses the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in the name of national cohesion.

296

A. A. Said et al.

8.7.3 Islam, Arabs, and the West Some states in the Middle East, including Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, are successors to European-administered colonial territories. Others, including Syria, Iran, and Iraq, are reconstructions of traditional entities. Communities in these states had status according to lineage and a role commensurate with work. When these states were consolidated following World War I and World War II, territorial arrangements were imposed by European powers, in many cases dividing ethnic groups indiscriminately. The establishment of modern nation-states in the Middle East companied discontinuity both with traditional organization and with basic precepts and practices of Islam. Islamic institutions lost much of their effectiveness as organizing principles and as safeguards for social justice and political participation. […] The present nation-states in the Middle East were created where previously there were no nation-states based on territorial sovereignty. Today, many states are artificial entities, territorially defined but internally divided, trying to develop into a cohesive unit. In most cases, a given concept of nationality is incongruent with the political boundaries of a given state. In the Arab world (Turkey and Iran are analyzed later), no state is free of major ethnic divisions except Egypt and Tunisia. Even in Egypt, sectarian conflict persists between the dominant majority of Sunni Muslims and the Christian Copts who constitute a significant minority. In Iraq, more than 50% of the population belongs to the Shiite sect of Islam, yet the Arab Sunni Muslims occupy dominant government positions. Approximately 20% of the population is Kurdish. The Iraqi Kurds are organized into a number of political parties including the Kurdish Democratic party of Iraq (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurdish struggle for self-determination continues to disrupt the national life of Iraq. In some Arab Gulf states, there is a large minority of Shiites and non-Arabs, ruled by Sunnis and Arabs. Here ethnic and sectarian conflicts intersect. In Bahrain, for example, the majority of the population is Shiite, ruled by the Sunni Khalifa family. Additionally, a large number of third-country expatriates, including Iranians, Baluchis, Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians, live throughout the states of the Gulf. Even in Saudi Arabia, until recently an ethnically homogeneous country, the principal cities of Jidda and Riyadh comprise large numbers of nonindigenous inhabitants. Most of the non-Saudis are Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Muslims from Asia and Africa. A large number of Shites live in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Calls by Shiites and expatriates for participation in the political systems of the Gulf Arab states continue to fall upon deaf ears. Ethnicity and sectarianism have also played an important role in the formation and evolution of political parties and movements in the Fertile Crescent, that is, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Ethnic groups have been successful in altering party agendas. For example, in Iraq and Syria, the Baath party was originally secular with a pan-Arab platform. When the Baathists consolidated their power in the early 1970s, in Syria the party became involved in a sectarian struggle with the Sunnis

8 Middle East Politics

297

and in an ethnic struggle with the Kurds. In Iraq, the Baath party became involved in a sectarian struggle with the Shiites and in an ethnic struggle with the Kurds. Furthermore, ethnic and sectarian groups have affected the way parties pursue their programs. The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria began as a political movement seeking Sunni domination of the government. Following the Alawi dominance of the Baath party and the erosion of political pluralism, the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to terrorism and violence. In Lebanon, ethnic and sectarian conflict have combined and have evolved into a regional conflict involving Syria, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and the PLO. The Lebanese civil war reflected the inability of the Arab states, Iran, Israel, and the United States to forge a workable settlement. The war ended in 1989, and elections were held in September 1992. Jordan experiences increasing challenges from the Palestinian population. Ethnic and sectarian conflict remains constant in contemporary Arab politics. Future developments in Lebanon, the course of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and the direction of democratization will be determined by the strength of ethnic and sectarian bonds. The decade of the 1990s could witness intensified struggles for power in the region. Secular ideology, such as state-centered nationalism, may also be under attack. The Baathist regime of Syria is becoming increasingly unpopular domestically, incapable of responding to emerging desires for privatization and democratization. In Iraq, the situation is far more serious. Here the Baath regime faced threats to its survival in 1991 from rebellions initiated by its Kurdish and Shiite populations in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. Similarly, the small Arab states of the Gulf find themselves increasingly pressured by local demands for democratization as well as Islamization and are caught in the rivalries between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. It is possible that the small Arab Gulf states could lose their independence in the process. The persistence of discrimination against Shiites in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia could lead to continued violence. The civil war continues to devastate the Sudan. Morocco and Algeria could experience increasing ethnic conflicts, as well as secular versus religious conflicts, as governments seek to resolve demographic, economic, and crosscutting class problems. […]

8.7.4 Implications for U.S. Security Policies The 1991 Gulf War resulted in victory for governments and defeat for people in the Middle East. The political contours of the Middle East will undergo major change in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. Global as well as regional forces will have a growing impact in the region. The wave of democratization sweeping Europe and Asia seemed to pass by the Middle East during the late 1980s. Now, broader public support will be demanded of all governments in the Middle East. There will be no more security in obscurity for the princes of the Arab states of the Gulf or for the military dictators around them. The Middle East will be in the limelight for many years to come.

298

A. A. Said et al.

The 1991 Gulf War created new political realities for ethnic groups in the region. It may give a new sense of purpose and opportunity to the region’s ethnic minorities and inspire them to rise up and resume their quest for autonomy and freedom. From the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict to the plight of Kurdish people, the possibility of reshaping the regional agenda on political reforms and the question of ethnicity and sectarianism has arisen. However, the Gulf War has created no real solution for these conflicts. Ethnicity and sectarianism have become a potentially destabilizing ingredient in North Africa, particularly in Algeria and Morocco, where Berber minorities dissatisfied with the performance of national governments have begun to agitate for the preservation of their language and cultural traditions vis-à-vis Arabic and Arabism. In Tunisia and Algeria, Islamic movements are mobilizing, seeking to gain power from what they see as secular governments. In the Sudan, where southern NiloHamitics have sternly resisted efforts by the Arab regime in Khartoum to impose Islamic law (Shariah) and Arab customs, ethnic strife is causing state disintegration. A new Islamic government in Khartoum has all but defeated separatists in southern Sudan, but the rebellion has not ended and peace is not at hand. Much depends on the tolerance extended by the Islamic government of General al-Bashir to the non-Muslim population of the south. In the Horn region, the Ethiopian empire is fragmenting in the wake of the collapse of the Mengistu regime. The dissidence found in ethnic and sectarian violence has produced large numbers of refugee communities. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that for the three regions of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia approximately five million people were to be found in refugee camps in 1991. As past experience has demonstrated, the raw recruits for insurgent movements and terrorist organizations are often to be found in these camps, thus adding to security problems. Several governments in these regions are themselves minority regimes. The Alawis, a religious minority, rule Syria; the Iraqi leadership is drawn primarily from the region of Tikrit; the Saudi ruling family belongs to the minority Wahhabi sect; and the Omani ruling family belongs to the minority Ibadi sect. The governments in the Gulf Arab states rule either religious or expatriate majorities. The governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria are secular military elites, ruling societies whose majorities are practicing Muslims. Various governments in the three regions have responded forcefully to ethnic dissidence. Iraq used chemical weapons and a resettlement program to constrain its Kurdish population. Syria surrounds its Kurds with Arab tribesmen. The efforts of successive Sudanese governments have been less successful in the suppression of Nilo-Hamitic insurgency. The Sudan as well as Lebanon face a lengthy period of uncertainty regarding their capacities to create unified nation-states. The outlook for both is problematic at best. Should these governments fail in their efforts to quell unrest or resolve ethnic and sectarian conflicts, we will continue to see multiplier effects in adjacent areas. The temptation for neighbors to intervene will increase, as with Syria’s “peacekeeping” and Israel’s “pacification” roles in Lebanon, Iran’s support of the Shiites in Iraq in

8 Middle East Politics

299

the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, and Turkey’s military attacks on Kurds in Iraq during the same period. Ethnic conflicts in the Middle East promise to complicate the implementation of national security policy for the United States. The declining utility of military power, alliances, and spheres of influence will compel the search for new instruments of power. These may include international, regional, and transnational institutions and coalitions to resolve these conflicts. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Iraq, where the United States and its allies are faced with a classic foreign policy dilemma that pits security interests against widely supported democratic values.

8.7.5 The Iraqi Crisis The defeat of Iraqi forces in the second Gulf war and their disorderly retreat from Kuwait was accompanied by popular uprisings in the Kurdish-inhabited region in the north of Iraq and by revolts by Shiite insurgents in the south. Initially, both groups were rejecting an unpopular and repressive government rather than expressing ethnic and sectarian separatism. The Shiites represent about 55% of the population; the Kurds about 23%. The government in Baghdad, dominated by an Arab Sunni minority, responded by employing draconian measures that reestablished government control over both regions. In the process, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey and Iran, and a smaller number of Shiites went to Iran. Roughly half of the Kurdish population of Iraq was left in mountain territory in harsh winter conditions that threatened their survival. Faced with a serious breach of human rights of a kind defined in UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 688, which requires Iraq to treat its population in accordance with internationally accepted standards of conduct, the UN, under impetus from Britain, France, and the United States, acted to protect the Kurdish minority. By mid-1992, counterattacks by Iraqi government forces against the Shiites drew international attention, and the United States, Britain, and France established an air reconnaissance mission over southern Iraq, forbidding Iraqi flights south of the 32nd degree parallel. Again they used the authority of UNSC Resolution 688 to justify their actions. This new exclusionary zone intensified fears in the Arab world and elsewhere of a diminution of Iraqi sovereignty and a further impetus to ethnic and sectarian separatism, this time on the part of the Shiites. In the Gulf, there was apprehension that singling out a part of Iraq’s Shiite population for protection would inspire calls for Shiite rights in such states as Bahrain, where Shiites are a majority, and Kuwait, where they are a significant minority. These protective actions carry with them unforeseen and unpredictable consequences. Although they are directed at a government grossly delinquent in human rights, if carried to extremes, they could result in a continued weakening – perhaps even in a collapse – of the Iraqi state. This, in turn, would endanger the stability and security of the Gulf region and the Middle East, leaving Iran, by default, the major power in the Gulf. Turkey, a country that plays a stabilizing role in the Mediterranean

300

A. A. Said et al.

and might play a similar role in the new Muslim republics of Central Asia, could be threatened. A weakened Iraq would also invite interference by Syria, Turkey, and Iran in its domestic affairs, further undermining the fragile state system in the Middle East. The Iraqi crisis is thus a test case for U.S. and Western policy, one involving two principles likely to be of critical importance in the coming decade. One involves the geostrategic imperative of national sovereignty and a recognition of territorial integrity – and the boundaries that go with it – as the basis of the international system. This may be difficult to maintain in a region where ethnic and sectarian groups, struggling for self-identification, cross these boundaries. The other is centered on a deepening commitment to universal standards of human rights and the values associated with more open, democratic systems. Although, in the Iraqi case, the UN has gone well beyond previous limits in approving human rights resolutions that limit Iraq’s sovereignty, it is by no means apparent that it will countenance the permanent weakening or the collapse of a member state. U.S. foreign policy will be further complicated by the “paradox of interdependence,” that is, although interdependence provides increased points of leverage to a superpower, in a superpower-small power relationship it also raises the costs of exercising the influence and reduces the freedom of action of each actor. There is a particular irony here for the United States in that interdependence also circumscribes the exercise of global power. The uninformed or careless use of power – particularly military power – in such circumstances can easily be self-defeating. The conduct of national security policy will require impressive sophistication, data, and skill if power is to be exercised effectively in what is an increasingly complex and challenging environment. The United Nations Charter may be instructive in this regard, when a country or nation is attempting to secure recognition of its right of self-determination. In a declaration stipulating how that right should be exercised (adopted by the General Assembly in 1970), the UN specifically stated that it should not be applied so as to jeopardize the territorial integrity of composite states: (1) if those states are based on democratic principles and respect for human rights; (2) provided that they allow for the development and assertion of those rights for their citizens and peoples. As previously indicated, the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War has raised new, humanitarian issues unwelcome to some governments in the United Nations. The intervention by the Western powers to create “safe havens” for protection of Iraq’s Kurds and other minority groups may have set a precedent with far-reaching consequences for traditional notions of state sovereignty. The policy implications of this type of situation for U.S. security interests will vary from region to region and country to country. Quite obviously, the ethnic conflicts in the Sudan and in Ethiopia have less immediate impact on U.S. interests than do rivalries in Southwest Asia. In some instances, Washington will wish to adopt an abstemious position as local forces sort themselves out. Elsewhere, the United States might wish to encourage regional organizations or the UN to serve as mediator or to play a peacekeeping role. Rarely should Washington intervene when ethnic problems have acquired a religious overlay. This cautionary note applies with special force

8 Middle East Politics

301

where Islamic revivalist movements have been intertwined with ethnic groups and organizations. Increasingly, forces of change will place burdens on governments in the Middle East to maintain national cohesion and stability. Where Middle Eastern governments fail to provide opportunities for ethnic groups to align themselves with national institutions and policies, the region will experience fragmentation of political life, growing recourse of governments to draconian security measures, and a challenge to the nation-state system. Friends and allies of the United States will be tempted to fill the growing vacuum, adding to rivalries and tensions in some instances. These prospects for the decade of the 1990s and beyond will pose painful policy choices for the U.S. government. As stated earlier, the application of military force (particularly by an outside power, that is, the United States) is of declining utility in addressing the challenges. The United States has traditionally cited regional stability as one of its primary objectives. The Middle East is a political seismic zone in which a degree of instability is probably inevitable. This situation is further exacerbated by Middle Easterners’ perceptions of actual or imaginary U.S. intentions in the region. The challenge facing the United States is that of encouraging the process of change to proceed with minimal violence. In the past, the United States has often found itself supporting the forces of the status quo. Other policy prescriptions need to be borne in mind for strategic planning purposes. Salient among them are the following: • When social class and religious affiliation crosscut with ethnic loyalty they tend to mute or soften conflict and build elasticity and staying power. This is the case in the Arab Gulf states where Shiites, though not in power, include a range of economic classes. When social class and religious affiliation coincide, however, the system becomes fragile and brittle and intense violence is often the result. Lebanon, where most Christians are in the higher economic strata while Shiites are in the lower strata, is a good example. • Modernization and economic development, laudable as overall goals, can be uneven processes of evolution that can add to friction and rivalry among competing groups. • Development as an economic goal may assume political dimensions. Questions about development of the GNP and the increase of per capita income may be supplanted on national agendas by questions revolving around dependency on external sources of assistance and derogation of national sovereignty. This is an increasing form of ‘scapegoating’ in the region. • Questions of national survival could overshadow humanitarian considerations. For U.S. policymakers this could pose painful dilemmas involving diplomatic condemnation and sanctions, on the one hand, and the provision of humanitarian assistance, on the other. • Questions of arms transfers and crowd-control equipment sales could arise in the same context. Here, once again, the United States will have to weigh with care the ties with traditional friends and allies, the costs of national collapse and

302

A. A. Said et al.

fragmentation, and the implications of such collapse on the overall stability of the region. • The future formulation and pursuit of U.S. interests in the Middle East should include the legitimate aspirations of the people of the region. The United States should play a positive role in regional affairs. In an effort to facilitate the articulation of social and political goals, the United States could assist Middle Easterners in the redefinition of democratic forms appropriate to their respective conditions; the rediscovery of the life-affirming side of Islamic precepts; and the development of economic and technological models that serve human needs and foster a social and cultural future. […]

8.8 The Middle East and United States Foreign Policy: Searching for Reality Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). The Middle East and United States foreign policy: Searching for reality. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 3(3), 27–37. One of the most poignant lessons of recent Middle Eastern history, and in particular of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the profound entanglement of image and reality, symbol and action. The recent Israeli bombardment of Lebanon, for example, seems to have been carried out at least as much for dramatic impact as for practical results. The same applies to what amounts to symbolic strikes by Hezbollah against northern Israel. Like so many previous episodes in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as bombings by “Islamic” terrorists and the destruction of Palestinian homes by Israeli “state terrorism,” these ritualistic exchanges are characterized as much by their symbolism of assertion and defiance as by the direct fulfillment of strategic objectives. Much has changed, of course, in the Middle East over the last several years, even many of the roles and scripts of important regional actors. Among many Arab leaders, increasing pragmatism is apparent, manifest both in diplomatic symbolism (Sharm el-Sheikh) and in plans for more cooperative relations with Israel. Both Israelis and Palestinians have (formally, at least) acknowledged each other’s rights to existence and even to political futures. Indeed, much has changed, yet the psychological foundations of peace are still being constructed. While the existential conditions of both Arabs and Israelis remain unsettled, enemy images persist, as do the belief systems which hold them in place. Without change in unconsciously held images, however, peace will remain elusive, and attitudinal adjustments in favor of rapprochement will prove ephemeral. […] Just as the Israelis’ intense preoccupation with security and survival is born of a desire for acceptance into the family of Middle Eastern nations, Arab reluctance is rooted in feelings of humiliation and in a need for respect. Israel feels threatened and despised; the Arabs perceive a danger of being culturally, politically, and economically overwhelmed. With the rise of disillusionment with existing elites, institutions,

8 Middle East Politics

303

and ideologies, the Arab desire for dignity and renewal is now finding expression in the much misunderstood language of Islamic revival. Thus, we are faced with a compelling need for a more expansive vision of what stability and peace in the Middle East could mean, and for a deeper historical as well as cultural understanding of the region. There is a need to move beyond the politics of misperception which fueled the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict and misdirected U.S. foreign policy. Let us, therefore, begin this task by reconsidering the legacy of Islam in the Middle East, and the challenges faced by the millions of Arabs and Muslims who live in poverty amidst affluence, with their cultural, political, and economic aspirations thwarted. This, in turn, will suggest alternative perceptions of the Middle Eastern peace process, with implications for U.S. leadership in the region. For a vision of peace which can become reality, we must face up to the reality – and potential creativity – of images.

8.8.1 Beyond “Civilizationism” U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and the peace process is handicapped by many unspoken premises inherent in the lens through which the region is viewed. In addition to the tendency to view the region in terms of short-term strategic imperatives and a commitment to Israel, there is an attitude of cultural triumphalism which filters Western perceptions of the Middle East. […] The cultural triumphalist traces in his or her own cultural heritage a “great ascent” from backwardness, obscurantism, and tribalism, qualities which are in turn associated with those non-Western cultures which encounter difficulties while modernizing. When assessing the Middle East, the cultural triumphalist concludes that the West and Israel have nothing to learn from the Muslims, who in turn have everything to gain by adjusting themselves to an already-defined reality, retiring tradition and culture to a museum to be preserved for curious secular eyes. To over-valorize cultural authenticity is to risk atavism; the resources for human betterment are to be found in the Western tradition. Some “orientalist” refutations of the relevance of conventional modernization theory in the Middle East internalize the cultural triumphalist’s oversimplified understanding of Western civilization and values as reality, retaining the same evaluations of the relative worth of modern vis-à-vis traditional culture, while appending a cruel exceptionalism for Muslim countries, which are held as “not ready for democracy.” Secular values are conflated with humane values, and Islamic values are associated with stasis.1 This point of view denies not only the extent to which life in Muslim countries has already been disrupted by the forces of modernity, but also the dynamism of Middle Eastern cultural and religious traditions and the possibility of democratic forms evolving organically out of a context of meaning familiar to 1

For a discussion of a dynamic yet authentically Islamic response to modernity, see Rahman (1982), Islam and modernity.

304

A. A. Said et al.

people at the grassroots.2 Politicized reactions to the cultural dislocation of modernity are mistaken for a dialectical confrontation between the forces of “progress” and “regression.” In recent years, much attention has been drawn to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis. […] [T]he notion of a “clash of civilizations” posits a fundamental contradiction between the epistemological and praxeological styles of the West and of the rest of the world. Although we would attest to the reality of cultural tensions in the modern world, we do so with a strong caveat against “civilizationism.” Indeed, it is precisely the notion of “superiority” implicit in “clashing civilizations” rhetoric, East and West, which renders cultural tensions destructive rather than creative. At the present historical moment, identification of the West with a vanguard of history which has nothing to learn from other cultures is particularly dangerous, making it difficult for weaker partners in the global cultural exchange – in the present case the Arabs and Muslims – to perceive that they can do something else other than merely reflect or reject the West and, by extension, Israel. Hence, we would argue that just as Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to peace and security in the Middle East, so too does the tone of fundamentalism latent in Western cultural triumphalism. Fundamentalism is a kind of pathology of culture that arises when a group takes part of the basic tenets of a tradition, and either under the pressure of insecurity (in the case of the Muslims), or the pursuit of hegemony (in the case of the West), uses them to either seek security by sealing off others, or to maintain dominance. In all conflict situations, people under stress react by reducing their own beliefs to a small workable subset in order to fight and protect themselves. Fundamentalism closes off the ability to hear and communicate. A return to the larger frame of the culture and its humane values, always present if sought for, can open up the space for understanding, cooperation, or at the very least, deeper respect. We would therefore propose that the future can promise more than unilinear evolutionism and cultural collision, to the benefit of East and West, Arab and Israeli, Muslim, Christian, and Jew. We can choose to view culture not merely as an obstacle, but also as a dynamic resource. Similarly, we can affirm with the contributors to the Center for Strategic and International Study’s important volume Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Johnston/Sampson 1994) that religion and spirituality are neither inherently conflictual, nor rendered defunct by modern conditions; their potentially positive role in conflict situations should be factored into analysis and policymaking.

2

See Hodgson (1974) for a balanced account of the challenges posed to the Islamic world by modernity.

8 Middle East Politics

305

8.8.2 Understanding the Islamic World The American media has often tended to portray the Islamic world, and various groups within it, solely as it is refracted through the prism of extremism and terrorism – so often, indeed, that some writers who attempt to debunk the notion of an “Islamic threat” perpetuate the simplistic “good (secular, moderate, or proWestern) Muslim”/“bad (militant, fanatical) Muslim” dichotomy. The governments of many Muslim countries even use this dichotomy as a political playing card, particularly when soliciting economic or military support from the United States. While perceiving the Islamic world in these terms may seem understandable in light of media accounts of events in Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran, the distinction between good and bad Muslims fails to do justice to the complex reality of Islamic revival and undermines the pursuit of American interests in the Middle East and the Islamic world. When we attack fundamentalism or Islamically oriented governments, we are assaulting, among others, allies of the United States such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states. Iraq, usually seen as among America’s most dangerous adversaries, is one of the most secular Arab states. Unfortunately, the tendency in the West to lump all Islamic movements together narrows Western understanding of the full range of Islamic forces at work. Islamic fundamentalism, a reaction to a perceived external threat, must be distinguished from the much broader movement of Islamic revivalism, which seeks to renew the community from within and must be understood in a broad frame of reference—in its social, political, economic, and cultural contexts. Islamic revival spans the political and ideological spectrum, influenced as much by local conditions as by religious faith (Azar/Moon 1987). Islamic revival is not the enemy of the West, but is rather a multifaceted movement in which Muslims seek to restore an old civilization, not to create a new empire. It is not even primarily a religious movement, nor is it, as some fear, expansive. Among the world’s historical powers, only the Muslims, as a people, have not reversed the decline in their global status. Muslim admiration of Japan as a model of effective, yet culturally authentic, modernization runs deep. Although there are scores of books which discuss the stamp of Calvinism on American culture – an influence which is accepted as normal – the stamp of Islam on the Islamic culture area is not appreciated with the same subtlety. Islam plays an important role in social organization, just as Protestantism did in the West (Walzer 1965). As there have been fundamentalist and revivalist movements in America, there have been fundamentalist and revivalist movements in the Islamic culture area as well. We have to accept the continued role of Islam in Islamic countries on its own terms, as a deeply embedded discourse. Contemporary scholarship exhibits an understanding of the role of political and economic institutions in democracy, but a less-sophisticated understanding of the mediating role of its social institutions. In the Middle Eastern context, we know that macropolitical institutions of democracy are not well grounded, and that economic maldistribution is pervasive, but we have not devoted enough attention to the study of

306

A. A. Said et al.

social organization at the local level. Although local social institutions are imperfect, they do allow for the discussion of issues affecting people’s lives. It is at this local level that the language and values of Islam are most significant and genuine, and at which the gap between the formal institutions of the state and the networks and realities of everyday life is most evident. Islamic social institutions are more dynamic and variegated than is genuinely recognized. Throughout the Islamic culture area, Sufi orders have functioned as social centers or clubs as well as spiritual brotherhoods, and still today fulfill some of these social functions alongside other networks. In Turkey, new Islamic intellectuals who have no affiliation with the Rifah (Islamic Welfare) Party are involved in reading and discussing ideas from the West. In Syria, women prefer to use the Islamic court rather than the secular ones for civil cases such as divorce because they have more confidence in the integrity of the Islamic court. Syrian Sufis have established the first private university in the country, the Islamic University. In addition to its social functions, religion serves an important and practical role in politics by offering recourse to a transcendental order—an order to which the Pharaoh can be held accountable. The oppressed can defend their rights by appealing to religious standards, to the divine will as it is understood. When the ruling regime persists in corruption and repression, Islam offers a vocabulary of resistance.

8.8.3 Policy Implications Throughout the Islamic world, demands are likely to increase for economic and social development, as well as for participation in political life. Democracy, Western or Islamic, is not practiced in the Islamic culture area today, but this is more the result of lack of preparation and less the lack of religious and cultural foundations. Democracy is not built upon a particular variety of electoral institutions, but upon genuine participation. In this regard, there are democratic precepts in Islam, as there are in other religions, which include both preservation and development of the community, and social justice and consultative mechanisms. The continued exclusion of the people of the Middle East from active participation in political life is certain to exacerbate tensions and undermine stability as societies strive to develop. Indeed, local customs and Islamic mores are still very strong among the majority of Muslims, despite the globalization of Western consumerist culture. It is particularly self-defeating to exclude Islamists if they are willing to participate in democratic politics. The central issues raised by Islamists are legitimate. Islamists attest to the realities of cultural, economic, and political marginalization, of corruption and over-centralization, and of repression. By repressing Islamic voices, governments in the Islamic world force the Islamic impulse into narrower channels characterized by violence and extremism. The United States can best support Middle Eastern development by promoting political participation within structures appropriate to the needs and culture of the people, and not by rigidly insisting on the transplantation of Western models. Within

8 Middle East Politics

307

the Middle Eastern context, this means an emphasis upon consensus both within and between nations, incorporating Arab-Israeli rapprochement, democratization in which cultural values are respected in modern political systems, and sustained economic growth prompted in part by the reallocation of military spending to domestic priorities. In an effort to facilitate the articulation of social and political goals, the U.S. and other industrial nations could support, both directly and indirectly, Muslim efforts to develop democratic forms that are appropriate to their needs. They can rediscover the life-affirming side of Islamic precepts, and can create structures that promise a cultural future for the people, not merely a technological future that negates their values. By setting this as the agenda, the industrialized nations could participate in the reconstruction of an Islamic world that is nonviolent, stable, and productive. American policy toward the Islamic world should target some of the root causes of terrorism – exclusion, maldistribution of resources, absence of legitimate and genuinely participatory political authority – rather than Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. For example, after Israel’s April campaign in Lebanon, the U.S. donated $100 million to Israel to combat terrorism. This money could have been better spent for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Furthermore, U.S. officials need to make clear that support for Middle Eastern governments, including Israel, is contingent not on mere political and economic expedience, but on criteria such as civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural human rights—especially cultural due process, protection of the human person and human dignity, and the promotion of authentic, participatory community. Through international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United States could promote initiatives and policies which support private, non-governmental institutions in Islamic countries. Moreover, the U.S. should encourage resource-rich but population-poor Arab states to be the keepers of their population-rich but resource-poor Arab brothers and sisters, perhaps through regional micro-lending projects patterned on the model of Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen Bank and the World Bank’s CGAP.3 Well-conceived micro-lending programs not only help to alleviate poverty, but also strengthen civil society. Many Muslims are sensitive to perceived double standards in U.S. foreign and domestic policies, and question American sincerity on issues of nonproliferation, international law, and human rights for all peoples. The U.S. should attempt to take this into account when formulating policies, making every effort to pursue a balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, and demonstrate that it is committed to reconciliation with the Iranian people. Moreover, greater sensitivity to the everyday ways of looking at things and the local meanings current among Muslims might enable U.S. officials to improve the image of the U.S. and would allow them to pursue policies which are more compatible with our long-term interests. Expressions of profound respect by U.S. officials for religious and cultural traditions might help in this capacity, especially recognition 3

For further discussion of this and other proposals, see Said (1994).

308

A. A. Said et al.

that real Islam is on the side of human dignity, and that Islam has an enviable tradition of cultural pluralism which could prove helpful if reinvigorated and extended to the political realm as well. The U.S. should make clear that it is interested in entering into dialogue with Islam, and that it does not view the religion of over one billion people as a “threat.” If peace is to come to the Middle East, it will not arrive solely through the instrumentalities of modern states. As Jay Rothman has suggested, we must accept the challenge of viewing politics “from the inside out”—that is, “from the perspective of how the hopes, hurts, values, and needs of people in the context of their primary communities have greatly shaped the course of their political confrontations” (Rothman 1992, p. xi). The state is a crude instrument for bringing about peace between peoples; yet, peace between peoples is the only lasting peace. Middle Eastern conflicts are not simply the province of states and governments, nor will policymaking in the “national interest” bring healing. We must recognize, therefore, that peoples—and not merely states, governments, and regimes—have rights and needs. Efforts at track two and multitrack diplomacy, therefore, are worthy of official participation and support. With respect to Iraq and Iran, the importance of making this distinction between people and regime is particularly evident. Existing policies towards these countries do more damage to people than they do to regimes. The policies of defining “rogue states” and, in the Middle Eastern context, prescribing “dual containment,” may require rethinking; present U.S. policy may succeed only in reinforcing stereotypes of Arabs and Iranians in the U.S. and of Americans throughout the Middle East.

8.8.4 The Importance of Active U.S. Leadership For the United States to respond effectively to the policy challenges of the Middle East, fundamental assumptions must be re-examined, assumptions which pertain not only to the religion itself and to Islam, but also to the United States’ basic sense of identity and purpose. On the one hand, Americans must act with humility, resisting the allures of self-congratulation and cultural triumphalism, and remaining open to learning and genuine multilateralism. On the other hand, America must not abdicate the responsibilities of leadership, of gaining deeper insight into the historical, cultural, and perceptual contexts of Middle Eastern conflicts, and of bringing a more penetrating realism to bear on them (Alin/Said 1988). Such a realism would reflexively comprehend the interplay between image and reality, symbol and action, and would thereby gain the imaginative leverage to envision a more hopeful future in which parties to conflict could come to realize, slowly and painfully, the relationship between their belief systems and their actions, reactions, and experiences. Although the strategic polarization of the Middle East has decreased and the need for a more comprehensive approach to regional conflicts remains, the hopes and fears of a great many people are still closely linked to the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite the fact that Arab leaders have never been so willing to accommodate the

8 Middle East Politics

309

state of Israel, the present situation is nonetheless fragile. The U.S. has done little to improve the future relationship of Arabs and Israelis. In fact, the United States is perpetuating a relationship in which Israeli predominance is rewarded. The preexisting asymmetry of power relations between Arabs and Israelis increases as a result of American support for Israel, disempowering the Arabs and slowing the peace process. The Syrians, in particular, feel that power relations are increasingly vertical. The lack of American even-handedness ultimately limits the way “power” is perceived and utilized, promoting the “negative” power of dominating and trying to weaken the other party. It becomes more difficult to bring about the creative changes the relationship may need since the American approach tends to perpetuate the status quo. The resulting competitive process polarizes positions and greatly restricts options for resolving conflict. A more cooperative conflict resolution approach would incorporate three components: first, settling the atmosphere, which gives the participant a feeling of comfort; second, developing effective conflict resolution power – shared positive power rather than “negative” power – which gives the participant a sense of safety; and, finally, moving toward effective conflict resolution steps, which creates a coordinated pace. For Arab and Israeli alike, the twentieth century has been traumatic. The Arabs have only begun to accept Israel as a Middle Eastern entity, and the Israelis have been reluctant to embrace the Middle East as the broader context to which they belong. At this stage, the peace process needs to produce not only technical agreements and formulaic treaties, but deeper symbolic gestures, understandings of shared values and needs, and visions of a more consensual and cooperative future based on reciprocity and trust. The generation of mutual respect, acceptance, and engagement will require broader participation from the populations involved, as well as certain concessions to the preferred Arab negotiating style, which emphasizes trust, relational concerns, and “face” before problem solving. […] Arab pragmatism is a significant development, but it is not yet grounded in deep conviction, and needs the encouragement of more balanced third-party intervention. While Islamic revivalism remains a much broader movement than fundamentalism, the very real despair of many Arabs and Muslims – particularly of the oppressed and exploited – perpetuates the attractiveness of a fundamentalist alternative which, when marginalized politically or placed under heavy pressure, as in Lebanon, can give rise to violence. The Israeli pursuit of peace is also marked by ambivalence. Although the existence of a Palestinian people is no longer denied, recent events have shown that “peace through strength” remains a more compelling theme to most Israelis than peace through reconciliation. For the United States to facilitate a genuine and lasting resolution to Middle Eastern conflicts, policymakers and leaders must be willing to examine the perceptual lenses which filter their understanding of the region and its peoples. Arabs, Israelis, and Americans need not typecast one another in familiar, projected roles, nor adhere to their present scripts which, when acted upon, generate the expected responses. Rather, they may choose a more creative path, in which insight into

310

A. A. Said et al.

images, perceptions, and expectations transforms stereotyped projections into relational understanding and analytic empathy (Rothman 1992), making possible the abandonment of ritualistic behavior and openness to new, more hopeful alternatives.

References Alin, E. G., & Said, A. A. (1988). Arabs and Israelis: Changing perceptions and political attitudes. In Y. Lukacs and A. M. Battah (Eds.), The Arab-Israeli conflict: Two decades of change (pp. 370– 385). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Azar, E., & Moon, A. C. (1987). The many faces of Islamic revivalism. In R. L. Rubenstein (Ed.), Spirit matters: The worldwide impact of religion on contemporary politics (pp. 75–123). New York: Paragon House. Esman, M., & Rabinovich, I. (1988). Ethnic politics in the Middle East. In M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (Eds.), Ethnicity and the state in the Middle East (pp. 12–23). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Geertz, C. (1963). The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments. In C. Geertz (Ed.), Old societies and new states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa (pp. 105–157). NewYork: Free Press. Heilbroner, R. (1963). The great ascent: The struggle for economic development in our time. New York: Harper and Row. Hodgson, M. G. S. (1974). The venture of Islam: Conscience and history in a world civilization (vol. 3). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hsu, F. (1971). Psychosocial homeostasis and jen. American Anthropologist, 73(1), 23–44. Johnston, D., & Sampson, C. (Eds.). (1994). Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press. Rahman, F. (1982). Islam and modernity: Transformation of an intellectual tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rothman, J. (1992). From confrontation to cooperation: Resolving ethnic and regional conflict. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE. Said, A. A. (1971). Clashing horizons: Arabs and revolution. In M. Curtis (Ed.), People and politics in the Middle East: Proceedings of the annual conference of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East (pp. 278–292). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Said, A. A. (1977, April 6). For the record. The Washington Post. Said, A. A. (1977, April 27). Introduction honoring King Hussein. Said, A. A. (1989). The paradox of development in the Middle East. Futures, 21(6), 619–627. Said, A. A. (1993). Beyond geopolitics: Ethnic and sectarian conflict elimination in the Middle East and North Africa. In P. Marr and W. H. Lewis (Eds.), Riding the tiger: The Middle East challenge after the Cold War (pp. 163–185). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Said, A. A. (1994). A Middle East peace strategy. In R. Elias and J. Turpin (Eds.), Rethinking Peace (pp. 166–172). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Said, A. A., & Farzanegan, B. (1971). Subcultures in the Arab world. In A. A. Said (Ed.), Protagonists of change: Subcultures in development and revolution (pp. 83–91). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). The Middle East and United States foreign policy: Searching for reality. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 3(3), 27–37. Said, A. A., & Turner, E. (1986). Western arrogance, Islamic fanaticism, and terrorism. Breakthrough, 8(1–2), 28–31. Walzer, M. (1965). The revolution of the saints: A study in the origins of radical politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 9

Making Peace with Islam Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

9.1 Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.) (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

9.1.1 Introduction: Islamic Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (2001). Introduction: Islamic approaches to peace and conflict resolution. In A. A. Said, N. C. Funk, and A. S. Kadayifci (Eds.), Peace and conflict resolution in Islam (pp. 1–26). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. The ideal of peace spans religions and cultures, incorporating conceptions of security as well as human dignity and wellbeing. Every major system of faith and belief […] has in some way or another promised peace as an outcome of the implementation of its precepts. While the character and content of ideals has differed, explicit as well as implicit conceptions of peace recur in the most diverse cultural, philosophical, and religious systems […]. These conceptions of peace serve as horizons of meaning and aspiration, and are associated with precepts and practices that direct human energies toward putatively desirable ends that have not yet been fully realized. Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, founded the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at American University’s School of International Service and occupied the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace from 1997 to 2015. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_9

311

312

A. A. Said et al.

Though conceptions of the actual and estimations of the possible differ, notions of peace, human dignity, and social harmony appear as points of reference and sources of edification for traditions as varied as Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, dialectical materialism, modern liberalism, and Islam. Needless to say, different points of view presuppose different ideals, both within and between major traditions. Each living tradition possesses a repertoire of precepts and practices that is in some sense both universal in significance and uniquely particular in form. Even where ideals converge within a single tradition, praxeological styles often diverge, leading to diverse ways of relating the essential precepts to daily practices. For example, Christians who share belief in the redemptive love of God through Christ have differed over the proper means of aspiring to create the peaceful City of God. Historically, some have viewed imperial power and centralized authority as an appropriate means to the sought-after ends; others have favored an approach centered on the witness of small communities of faith, and still others have underscored individual conscience and social renewal through the reform of institutions. Like Christians and followers of other traditions, Muslims share a common calling to work for peace. This calling is rooted in the Qur’an, which enjoins humanity to “strive as in a race in all virtues” (Qur’an 5:48). Within the Muslim community, or umma, this calling has manifested, and will no doubt continue to manifest, in diverse ways that reflect continuous efforts to interpret and apply Islamic values in specific historical, social and cultural situations. These efforts, and their relevance to the pursuit of peace and human solidarity on the global stage of the twenty-first century, are the principal concern of this volume. In this introduction, we will discuss the need for inquiry into specifically Islamic approaches to peace and conflict resolution. After identifying similarities and differences between Western and Islamic approaches to theory construction, peace, and conflict resolution, we will examine general conceptions about Islam and peace offered by scholarly and popular literature.

9.1.1.1

Islam and Peace: A Comparative Perspective

In the field of peace and conflict resolution studies, Western scholars have identified a diversity of praxeological styles, or paradigms, in which theory meets the challenges of practice, and practice provides information whereby theory is reconstructed. Advocates of power politics attempt to secure peace by augmenting the capability of their states to use and resist coercion; protagonists of a reformed world order organize for peace by promoting multilateral, value-maximizing institutions and covenants; facilitators of conflict resolution pursue peace by improving communications and building relationships; proponents of nonviolent social change work for peace through grassroots social movements and solidarity against oppression; and representatives of philosophical and spiritual traditions approach peace through transformation of human consciousness. Western traditions of peace studies and peace research have yielded important insights, such as the distinction between conceptions of peace that are premised on

9 Making Peace with Islam

313

no more than the absence of war and organized violence, and conceptions of peace that signify an additional presence of human dignity, economic wellbeing, and ecological balance. Scholars and activists alike have testified to the dangers and costs of pursuing peace through preparation for war and maintenance of hegemony. They have only just begun, however, to identify cultural pluralism as an essential resource for world order, and to develop a truly cross-cultural research agenda (Sponsel/Gregor 1994; Avruch 1998). While the development of peace history signifies an important effort to bring temporal depth to the field of peace and conflict resolution studies, there is also a pressing need to extend the range of scholarship further through the study of peacemaking in non-Western cultural and religious systems. Non-Western approaches to peace and conflict resolution are important not only for the development and refinement of existing theories derived in the Western cultural context, but also for the promotion of cross-cultural dialogue and understanding. Peace and conflict resolution are both universal and particular; similar as well as divergent approaches derive form and vitality from the cultural resources of a people. In a world where boundaries between cultures, religions, and civilizations have collapsed, there is a profound need for cross-cultural and multi-religious studies of peace, peacemaking, coexistence, and reconciliation. Given the persistent frictions between Western and Muslim societies, the need for careful study of Islamic traditions of peace and peacemaking becomes particularly evident. The urgency of studying Islamic approaches to peace and conflict resolution arises from the unfortunate estrangement between Islamic and Western societies and cultures, and the preponderance of studies of religious radicalism and militancy in academic and popular literature. In recent years, Western media and Western scholarship have tended to view Islam through the lenses of extremism and terrorist violence, and Muslim admiration for the West’s achievements remains tempered by a tendency to filter perceptions through the lenses of colonialism, imperialism, and contemporary grievances. In defining Islam and peace as a subject of inquiry, we have attempted to identify new ways of organizing knowledge about a great living tradition and its role in the world today. We have sought to present a selection from the best scholarly writings available on peace and conflict resolution in Islam, and organize them in one volume in relation to their differing interpretive, conceptual, and practical foundations. Epistemology and Purposes of Knowledge Many of the differences between Western and Islamic approaches to peace and conflict resolution relate to matters of epistemology. While most Muslims have refused to detach reason from a religious cosmology and a context of spiritual values, post-Renaissance Western thought posits a secular context for putatively “valuefree” knowledge. In the West, knowledge is organized within seemingly autonomous disciplines and then placed in the service of timely human interests. This approach has yielded much insight into the workings of the physical universe, and supported energetic Western expansion in technological, political, and economic fields. As thoughtful critics have noted, though, the Western approach has not eliminated the

314

A. A. Said et al.

necessity of moral choice, and has sometimes even obscured this necessity by casting the existing world order as an objective reality existing independently of intelligent human observers, their preferences, and their actions. In classical Islam, knowledge was understood to have one function: to know God (Nasr 1989). For Muslims, this function was not presumed to be impractical; knowing God meant living well, which meant internalizing precepts and putting them into practice. Putting precepts into practice inevitably required speculation, but speculation was never an end in itself. Rather, it was a means of approaching the divine. There are four levels of theorizing in Islam. The mutakalimun (from kalam, speech), or theologians of Islam, pursued speculative knowledge about the nature of the Qur’an. […] [D]ogmatic theology was never as popular a pursuit as that of the ‘ulama, the learned men who speculated about the nature of the laws and thereby produced a type of knowledge which was deemed useful to the ummah, the community of believers. The falasifah (philosophers) theorized on a third level, speculating on the nature of earthly, temporal life. Among them were such important figures as al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn Khaldun. A fourth level of theorizing was pursued by the mutasawwifa, or Sufis, the mystics of Islam who speculated about God and how to approach God. Such prominent Muslims as ‘Abd al-Qader al-Gilani, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Ibn ‘Arabi sought knowledge of this variety. In the pursuit of knowledge, Muslims have experienced a constant tension between theory and practice. The most theoretical fields of knowledge, theology and philosophy, flourished in particular times and places but never achieved broad popularity. In contrast, speculation in such applied fields as law and medicine was more highly regarded, as was the internalized knowledge and spiritual discipline of the Sufis. Muslim concern for practice is associated with deference to authoritative sources (such as the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet) and a tendency toward discomfort with maximal notions of theory, encompassing the power to predict the future. Muslims have, however, demonstrated receptivity to a more minimal notion of theory that entails an ability to understand and to organize knowledge in the service of humanistic and religious values. From this perspective, theory can help to enable the human being to come to terms with the most important challenges of existence. In the face of modern dilemmas of development and democratization, contemporary Muslims are placing a stronger emphasis on the latter variety of theory, seeking ways to reconstruct the classical heritage in all four fields of knowledge. They are attempting to account for new knowledge derived in the West while catalyzing creative effort to satisfy contemporary human needs and core precepts of Islam. Prevailing Western and Islamic Approaches to Peace The Islamic understanding of peace is not so different from the Western understanding as unsympathetic critics have sometimes proposed, nor is it as similar to the predominant Western conception as some casual observers might anticipate. In the dominant Western conception, which is apparent both in power politics and neoliberal institutionalism, peace is considered separately from justice, effectively reducing

9 Making Peace with Islam

315

peace to an absence of war and justice to an absence of gross violations of human rights. As an absence of war or organized violence, peace is maintained through the threat of coercion and the institutionalization of regulations and decision-making procedures. Peace is equated with stability and order guaranteed by uniform, authoritative legal rules and mechanisms of enforcement; where institutionalization cannot be guaranteed, as in politics among nation-states, preponderance of coercive power becomes a necessary, albeit arbitrary, arbiter of intractable disputes. The predominant Western tendency is to think about peace and conflict resolution in terms of rational order or problem solving predicated upon reason. Following the example of such Greek thinkers as Plato and Euripides, modern Western thinking regards reason as sacred. Passion has been posited as the opponent of reason (hence the putatively dispassionate quality of serious intellectual inquiry); passion is dangerous and destructive. Emmanuel Kant (1723–1804), for example, understood history as progress toward rationality (Reiss 1991). While it is true that modern advocates of realpolitik have disregarded the optimism of Kant’s rationalism, they have not rejected the underlying assumption that peace can only reign if reason continues to achieve triumphal victories in an ongoing war against passion. While proponents of Western liberalism have viewed the struggle between reason and passion as a cosmopolitan endeavor led by a Greco-European vanguard, more cautious Western thinkers have perceived a persistent gap between civilization (equated with reason and its most faithful representatives) and barbarism (equated with those nations and cultures that are presumably captive to passion). According to these thinkers, the aspiration to forge an enlightened international community that could operate according to shared norms and due process is misguided and potentially dangerous. Given that passion often prevails over reason, leaders must remain free to respond to emergencies according to “reason of state,” suspending or manipulating legal formalities and international conventions in a resort to power politics.1 In the absence of clear and present danger, both liberals and their critics perceive peace as a process that implies the skillful management of competition and conflict through the maintenance and propagation of a system based on checks, balances, institutions, minimal regulation, the invisible hand, and military enforcement.2 In effect, peace is not an end in itself, but rather a means to such ends as freer commerce and enhanced prosperity. The circle of security and prosperity is stabilized and widened through free market economies and electoral institutions – these being the 1

This is the classic argument of proponents of power politics, or political realism. Where liberalism seeks to coordinate the policies of nation states, increase provision for certain basic collective or humanitarian goods (e.g., peacekeeping, disaster relief, development, civil and political rights) and secure free competition in a global economy, political realism emphasizes the prerogatives and perceived vulnerabilities of each sovereign nation state. According to political realism, there can be no universal or universalizable set of human values; the denizens of each state will inevitably hold their own values most sacred. 2 Metaphors from classical political economy and modern economics thrive in the modern discipline of international relations. The greatest concern with such metaphors is manifest among those who cite the need for security, a putatively private good, as more pressing and more attainable than concerns for such public goods as disarmament, ecological balance, and sustainable development. Neorealists liken states to firms, maximizing their own profits. See Gilpin (1981).

316

A. A. Said et al.

most satisfactory models of social organization conceivable. The absence of warfare among Western-style democracies is heralded as a sign of the peacefulness of this paradigm,3 even if its record in relation to non-Western peoples and cultures4 and the biosphere itself is ambivalent.5 Historically, Islamic thinkers benefited from and even extended the thought of the Greeks, but speculative thought never declared independence from religious precepts and values. Moreover, most Muslim thinkers were reluctant to imitate the Greek inclination to sanctify reason while denigrating passion. Reason was rarely regarded as sacred in its own right, nor was passion viewed solely as a source of disruption and injustice. The general tendency was to view reason and passion as complementary aspects of the human being that can be integrated through the faith and practice of Islam, submission to the divine. Such an integration is suggested by the Qur’anic ideal of nafs al-mutma’inna, the “soul at peace” (Qur’an 89:27) in which deeply held values, conscience, and desire are in harmony.6 Practices of Islamic societies, of course, have often reflected aspects of the prevailing Western approach. Ever since Muslims first assembled themselves in political community, they have believed that a society guided by inspired laws, wise leadership, and extensive consultation is superior to a society governed by the arbitrary whims of a king, dictator, or oligarchy. As Muslim jurists developed the Shariah, or law of Islam, they responded both to the demands of governing a new empire, and to the abuse of power by caliphal authority. Many Shariah provisions, such as the rules of evidence, were understood as a protective code, ensuring that believers would be able to pursue the good life (hayat tayyiba) without fear. Peace was understood to imply not only an absence of oppression and tumult, but also a presence of justice and the conditions for human flourishing. While Muslim thinkers have given consideration to the same types of dilemmas that have preoccupied Hobbes and Locke,7 Islamic aspirations have long reflected 3

According to the increasingly popular democratic peace hypothesis, Western-style democracies do not make war against one another. Their behavior towards regimes that do not fit the Western pluralist model is often less peaceful. 4 Payne (1995) argues that the United States has been more likely to rely on force in its relations with “culturally distant” countries than in its relations with countries that are perceived to be more similar in their cultural characteristics. 5 A growing number of Western scholars have begun to question the “growth ethic” underlying the liberal democratic paradigm. In particular they have suggested that organizing communities and ecosystems for maximum production is a highly normative (and not merely scientific) endeavor. Other values besides net growth need to be integrated into the model of development, particularly if the integrity of human and ecological communities is to be preserved. See Berry (1988), Korten (1995), Wachtel (1989). 6 In the words of Mona Abul-Fadl, “it is wajh Allah, the Countenance of Allah, which [the sincere Muslim] seeks.... The serene and contented self, al Nafs al Radiya al Mardiya, and the self which has found its innermost sense of peace, al Nafs al Mutma’inna are anchored in that infinite and unassailable source from which they draw” (1987, p. 25). 7 From the beginning, Islamic rule was expected to have a contractual basis. The sovereign was to exercise power representing both the will of the community and the traditions of the Prophet. After experiences with political turmoil, de facto monarchy, and invasion, some Muslim thinkers began to

9 Making Peace with Islam

317

an expansive and holistic conception of peace. This conception is premised on the Qur’an and Sunnah. The keynote of the Qur’anic revelation could be characterized as integration and wholeness through surrender to God. This essential theme is expressed in a universalistic spirit, suggesting a world view premised on tolerance and inclusiveness. Peace in Islam begins with God; God is peace, for peace (al-Salam) is one of the “most beautiful names” of God (Qur’an 59:23–24). Peace in the world reflects higher realities. In the Qur’an, peace is affirmed as the greeting, language, and condition of Paradise (Qur’an 10:10, 14:23, 19:61–63, 36:58). God calls believers unto the abode of peace (dar al-salam; Qur’an 10:25), and the yearning for peace derives from the innermost nature, or fitrah, of humankind. Interestingly enough, the word Islam derives not from the name of a particular prophet or people, but from the same root as salam – silm – and suggests a condition of peace, security, wholeness, and safety from harm that is attained through surrender (taslim) to the Divine. Peace occupies a central position among Islamic precepts, where it is closely linked to justice and human flourishing. Peace in Islam therefore suggests a condition of order – a proper equilibrium of parts – from which a pattern of harmony can emerge. This condition is both internal and external; upholding it is the responsibility of every Muslim. The term jihad, often translated as “holy war,” literally means ‘striving,’ and the “greater jihad” (al-jihad al-akbar) in the Islamic tradition has always been the inner struggle to purify the self and behave in a manner which furthers rather than disrupts the divine harmony. Islam adopts a positive view of human nature, insisting that the original human constitution (fitrah) is good and muslim in character. There is no conception of original sin, but rather a hopeful conception of human potential that is integrally related to a status of stewardship towards creation. In contrast to the Western idea of free choice and freedom from constraint, Islam accentuates existential freedom – freedom to be – and locates the fulfillment of the human being in service. The dignity of the individual is underscored, within a broader context of social solidarity. While there are many debates regarding the most fitting and proper manner to interpret and apply Shariah in the modern world, the principal concern of Shariah is the maintenance of proper, harmonious relationships on and across all levels – between the individual and God, within the individual, within the family and community, among Muslims, between religions, and ultimately with all of humanity and creation. Law is expected to support and promote the fulfillment of lasting, deeply rooted human needs and discourage the pursuit of false satisfiers. Religious tolerance is built into Islamic precepts, which confer to the “People of the Book” a protected status. From the standpoint of Islamic universalism, particularly as it has been articulated by those who have contemplated the Qur’anic passage, “To every people (was sent) a Messenger” (10:47), humankind is ultimately one community; comparative evaluation of prophets is discouraged, for all are deemed messengers of one God (Qur’an 2:136). preoccupy themselves with duties of obedience to a sovereign who fulfilled certain basic minimum requirements with respect to the Shariah.

318

A. A. Said et al.

A striking feature of Qur’anic discourse is the emphasis on people’s use of their innate intelligence in comprehending the revealed guidance, which is accessible both in the Holy Book and in the Book of Nature. Time and again the Qur’an exhorts its hearers to ponder, reflect, think, and understand. Religion is armed with arguments designed to persuade through force of logic, emotional appeal, appeals to universal cosmic order and Divine providential purpose, and, failing these, promises of eschatological rewards or punishments. Above all, it is recognized that people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing the wrong course in this life through force or violence: “There is no compulsion in faith!” asserts the Qur’an (2:256). There is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, and for forgiveness (‘afu) over retribution. The Qur’an aims to regulate the commonplace, retributive responses of people to conflict and violence. Forgiveness is consistently held out as the preferred option for humanity in matters of requiting clear injustice or crime. “The recompense of an injury is an injury the like thereof; but whoever forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony, his reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers” (Qur’an 42:40). Neither naive pardon nor a mechanical retribution is urged; what is sought is a reformation or moral good accomplished by sincere forgiveness. Finally, the Qur’an frequently cautions people against going to excess when attempting to pursue rights or correct injustice. The Qur’an heaps utter condemnation on those who, by selfishly pursuing their own limited goals, bring destruction, oppression and violence (fitnah) down upon the rest of their fellows, “committing excesses on earth” (Qur’an 5:33). From an Islamic point of view, the achievements of the dominant Western approach to peace are impressive, but one-sided and perhaps unsustainable. From an Islamic perspective, the Western approach to peace puts too much faith in institutional formulas, scientific progress, and the “invisible hand” of competition, and too little emphasis on the need for shared values that might protect the individual and the community from misguided or harmful ventures. Where the Western approach celebrates human self-determination, Islam underscores divine purpose and human exertion. Where the Western approach affirms political pluralism and individual rights conjoined with consumerism as the substance of peace, Islamic perspectives frame communal solidarity, social justice, faith in the transcendent, and even cultural pluralism as the way of peace. […] A Communally Embedded Approach to Conflict Resolution The differences between Western and Islamic approaches to conflict resolution mirror some of the differences between Western and Islamic perspectives on peace, although it is important to remember that the dominant Western approach is not equivalent to the full range of Western theory and practice. Emerging Western perspectives on conflict resolution are usually based on a critique of traditional assumptions about conflict. Conflict is viewed as natural and potentially positive, and not merely as a source of instability and threat; attempts to merely suppress conflict through coercive power and authoritative rules are viewed with disfavor in contrast to attempts to

9 Making Peace with Islam

319

broker durable, mutually beneficial resolutions to problems, satisfying the interests of competing parties in a “win-win” solution (Fisher et al. 1991). While conflict resolution specialists have begun to develop these newer approaches in order to prioritize human needs and non-adversarial processes (Burton 1990; Laue 1988), Western conflict resolution most typically reflects a cultural outlook of pragmatic individualism and a style of instrumental problem-solving. Critics have suggested that overemphasis on expediency and technique can result in an engineering approach, predicated upon the isolation and mechanistic manipulation of variables (Scimecca 1991). Others have argued that, however suitable modern Western techniques may be in their original cultural milieu, their applications in more traditional or non-Western contexts are limited. John Paul Lederach, for example, has observed substantial differences between contemporary Western conflict resolution approaches and traditional Latin American approaches that are derived from indigenous culture and embedded in communal and religious values. On the basis of his work in the region, Lederach concludes that “insider partial” mediators – who are by definition well versed in local cultural meanings and expectations, and have vested interests in conflict outcomes, have better chances of making important contributions than mediators who play the North American role of the disinterested, impartial outsider (Lederach 1996; Wehr/Lederach 1993). Other scholars have also recognized the role that culture plays in conflict and peacemaking (Avruch 1998; Augsburger 1992) and have affirmed the potential contributions of diverse religious institutions and principles to conflict resolution within divided societies (Johnston/Sampson 1994; Gopin 1997, 2000; Lederach 1997; Assefa 1993). While the strongest current of the Western approach to conflict resolution prioritizes problems to be abstracted and solved, distinctively Islamic approaches resemble other non-Western approaches insofar as they frame conflicts as matters of communal, and not just individual concern and underscore the importance of repairing and maintaining social relationships. Muslim approaches to conflict resolution draw on religious values, traditional rituals of reconciliation (Irani/Funk 1998), and historical practices of communal and inter-communal coexistence. Strong emphasis is placed on linkages between personal and group identity, between individual and collective responsibility for wrongdoings, and between attentiveness to “face”-related issues (public status, shame, reputation for generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice. Conflict resolution efforts are directed toward the maintenance of communal or intercommunal harmony, toward the recognition of mutual rights and obligations, as well as toward the upholding of shared values and the need for public apology, compensation for losses, and forgiveness (Irani/Funk 1998; Satha-Anand 1996). Conflict resolution mechanisms are legitimized and guaranteed by communal leaders and village elders who facilitate a process of reconciliation. History is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common future for the society. These mechanisms aim to empower family groups and community members to participate in matters of common concern.

320

9.1.1.2

A. A. Said et al.

Problems of Representation

Clearly, Islam is not inarticulate on matters of peace and conflict resolution, yet the literature dedicated to exploring Islamic perspectives on these matters is relatively scarce. As contemporary writings by Muslim scholars attest, Islam has not been known as Muslims would like it to be known (Hussain et al. 1984; Nasr 1975; Ahmed 1993). Part of the misunderstanding, no doubt, is a product of genuine cultural and epistemological differences: Islam cannot mean the same thing to a secular intellectual as it does to a devout Muslim who adheres to the data of personal experience as well as scientific experimentation, and therefore refuses to accept the proposition that only propositional knowledge is valid. Yet sources of the difficulty run deeper. While Muslim writers almost invariably assert that Islam has something of unique value to contribute to international peace and human dignity, many non-Muslims have articulated visions in which Islamic participation in the contemporary world order can only be conceived as a serious challenge to stability (Falk 1997). In other words, Islam has been viewed as an actual or potential problem, and research questions have been framed around threat perceptions rather than potentially positive aspects of the intercultural encounter. Is Islam an Exception? Both conflict and cooperation characterize historical relations between Islam and the West, and some of these threat perceptions are understandable. Nonetheless, the tendency to view Islam through a lens of terrorism and violence tends to overwhelm efforts to communicate that, for most Muslims, Islam is a life-affirming religious vision with a rich cultural heritage and precepts that enjoin effort to advance peace. Few would dispute that Muslim societies are in the midst of profound and unsettling change, yet the sensationalism and selective perception which characterize much contemporary writing on Islam only contribute to an unhealthy cycle in which Western suspicion and insensitivity are met with defensive apologetics. Given the extent to which narratives of confrontation have defined the parameters of popular as well as academic literature on Islam, much contemporary debate about Islam revolves around issues of representation and misrepresentation. Advocates of assertive foreign policies toward Islamic (especially Arab-Islamic) countries have accentuated perceived differences between Islamic and Western worldviews and values, often portraying Islam as an exceptional, difficult-to-modernize seedbed for fanaticism, extremism, and terrorist violence (Kramer 1998; Lewis 1993). Islam, they suggest, is both inherently political and aggressive in ways that engender threats to peace (Lewis 1998; Huntington 1993; Pipes 1982; Rodman 1994; Dennis 1996). Another group of writers, attempting to counteract popular misperceptions and stereotypes, has presented Islam in a more subtle and variegated manner, with particular emphasis on the complex array of motivating forces and issues behind contemporary Islamic movements.8 According to this view, Islam is not inherently opposed 8

John L. Esposito, John Obert Voll, Yvonne Haddad, and many others approach Islam in this manner.

9 Making Peace with Islam

321

to peace or, for that matter, completely incompatible with Western culture; the repertoire of precepts and practices provided by the sources of Islam can be applied in ways that lead to peace as well as to conflict and war. Responsible scholarship lies not in broad generalizations, but in analysis of particular Islamic movements in their social, political, and historical contexts. These two schools of thought have significant historical precedents, and they frame the ongoing popular debate about Islam and its alleged compatibility or incompatibility with American and European cultures. The debate became particularly intense in the years following the Iranian revolution, when it became apparent to many scholars and journalists that conventional theories of modernization could not fully account for the continuing cultural and political vitality of religion in Islamic societies. Upon reflection, many scholars also began to notice manifestations of religious resurgence in Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Buddhist societies as well (Rubenstein 1987; Marty 1992; Westerlund 1996). The tendency to view Islam as an exception has deep roots. For many (but not all) early orientalists, Islamic civilization appeared to be an embodiment of what Western civilization was not. While the West was peaceful, progressive, dynamic, rational, and humane, Islam was aggressive, decadent, stagnant, steeped in tradition, and despotic.9 For certain varieties of contemporary scholarship as well, a comparable premise of exceptionalism still applies: the general laws that are presumed to apply in the West do not apply in the domain of Islam. Islamic countries, we have been told, are prone to one form of dictatorship or another, and are therefore not ready for democracy; Islamic social movements are driven by irrational extremism, and have little connection to discrete, legitimate issues that might be addressed through the inclusion of dissenting voices in the political process.10 Those security specialists who have framed Islam as a prospective challenge to their nation and civilization have given warning of such threats as “Green Peril”11 and Islamic-Confucian collaboration (Huntington 1993). Policy-makers have been advised to support authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries, and to oppose popular revivalist movements that rely on an Islamic idiom to express disenchantment with their domestic status quo as well as with the relative marginalization of Islamic societies in international relations, lack of economic opportunity, and the tendency of foreign culture to overwhelm domestic culture.12 9

See Said (1978), Orientalism. We should note, of course, that the tendency to project unclaimed aspects of the “self” upon the “other” is probably a universal human tendency, and that some Western “orientalists” (e.g., Louis Massignon, Henry Corbin) have produced remarkably perceptive and insightful works on Islamic spirituality and Islamic civilization. 10 In the waning days of the Cold War, Bernard Lewis, a learned but controversial historian, went so far as to proclaim a “clash of civilizations” – “the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both” (1990, Sept., p. 60). See also Pipes (1995). 11 Hashemi (1997) warns of “a transference taking place in Western security literature whereby the Soviet red menace has now been replaced, to varying degrees, by the Islamic green peril.” Salla (1997) explores a related theme. 12 See, for example, Zelikow/Zoellick (1998).

322

A. A. Said et al.

Literature on Islam and its political manifestations has proliferated in the last two decades, with a large proportion of studies focused directly on such phenomena as political Islam. While preoccupation with Islamic revivalism and political activism has sometimes distracted attention away from enduring and deeply rooted aspects of Islamic culture, such as Sufism (tasawwuf ), some writers have begun to portray Islam as a source of creativity and humane values.13 Cogent refutations of the “confrontation thesis” have induced many writers to proceed more carefully when generalizing about Islam and Islamic societies (Esposito 1992; Hunter 1998; Halliday 1996; Eickelman/Piscatori 1996). Accounting for the Absence of Peace Although peace has always been a core ideal of Islamic faith, scholarship on Islamic conceptions of peace is still in an emergent phase. Four key factors appear to have inhibited the study of Islam and peace: (1) the rootedness of social science narratives in the historical experiences of Western European and North American countries; (2) the tendency of scholarship to dichotomize secular and religious motivations for behavior, favoring structural, material, sociobiological, rational-choice based, or psychological explanations over explanations that conjoin analysis of such factors with consideration of cultural contexts; (3) the contemporary salience of Islamic revivalist movements in the Middle East and other regions; and (4) the still-embryonic nature of cross-cultural peace studies. First, because social science is rooted in Western historical experiences of technological change, modernization, social mobilization, urbanization, industrialization, secularization, and political centralization, social scientists have understandably looked to their own European and American experiences for predictive as well as prescriptive models of scientific evolution. Given a philosophical assumption that abstract forces drive history in ways that are independent of both the desires of individual human beings and of divine will, the natural interest of scholars has been to narrowly specify those forces in order to anticipate, cope with, and participate in expected changes. For example, when Karl Marx and Max Weber studied nonWestern cultures, they were not so much interested in understanding unique cultural realities as they were in building conceptual models of generic stages of human history. Marx posited that an “Asiatic mode of production” (also known as “oriental despotism”) exemplified primitive social class relations of domination; Weber canvassed writings on the world’s cultures and civilizations to understand why the West had moved forward into a presumably rational age of capitalism while the rest of the world had remained mired in traditions.14 Both presumed that, because 13

Marshall Hodgson’s overall approach in the three-volume series, The venture of Islam (1974) underscores the dynamism and multiformity as well as the underlying consistencies of Islam. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll emphasize the flexibility of the Islamic repertoire in their work, Islam and democracy (1996). 14 Weber associated Islam with worldliness, a warrior ethic, and unstable conditions of patrimonial domination. Where Christianity enjoined asceticism, Islam accommodated human passion. See Weber (1965), Turner (1974).

9 Making Peace with Islam

323

of the unique power of Western innovations in technology, social organization, and production, the West was unambiguously on the cutting edge of history. From the basic orientation of such pioneering thinkers as Marx and Weber, it follows that to study Islam is to study the human past – a past that presumably will not play a profound role in the human future. Weber, it is true, was ambivalent about a future shaped by rationalization and bureaucratization; subsequent social theorists, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that the future would quite naturally become more peaceful than the past, in no small part on account of the traditions that had been left behind. Second, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social theorists came to believe that the motivation behind most human social behavior could be understood in narrowly secular terms. Given the anticipated triumph of scientific, technocratic culture over all other forms of culture, a great number of scholars saw no significant or legitimate role for seemingly arbitrary religious belief and practice beyond those private and social niches provided by industrial life. It was assumed not only that separation of religious and political authority was good for both religion and politics, but also that public dialogue about matters of spiritual or religious significance was either dangerous (because it might conceivably lead to coercion) or simply unacceptable (because religious ideas are not subject to conventional forms of empirical verification). In effect, the idea of triumphant material progress held sway. This idea was clearly expressed in the work of the nineteenth-century sociologist Auguste Comte, who posited an historical progression of human knowledge, moving from mythical explanations to theological, metaphysical, and then scientific ones. The basic premise of Comte and like-minded thinkers was that, because the scientific, propositional knowledge of modern scholars trumps pre-existing forms of knowledge in precision and certitude, such knowledge renders the other forms obsolete and should therefore dictate the means by which societies and cultures are maintained and transformed. A corollary of this line of thinking was that because religious epistemology and traditional forms of anecdotal knowledge are non-scientific, they are nonsense. They can and should be replaced (and not merely complemented) by secular, technocratic knowledge, because such knowledge purports to satisfactorily explain them.15 Religious ideas, motivations, and behaviors can be shown to derive either from cognitive errors or from other forces of obfuscation, such as the material interests of a priestly class or the structural-functional requirements of a society. Operating within the framework of such assumptions, social science has tended either to ignore the vigorous Islamic revivalist movements of the twentieth century (the prevailing 15

Comte believed that definitive, generic, and transhistorical knowledge about collective human behavior is attainable, and that such knowledge is superior to all other forms of knowledge about human beings and their place in the universe. In positing a methodology through which the human mind might attain to pure theory capable of encompassing the dynamism of social life, Comte de-emphasized the subtle operations of human self-awareness and agency, through which human beings continually participate in the weaving of those webs of meaning that define and shape their reality. Moreover, his pre-analytical vision ruled out the contemplation of ineffable mysteries as a valid preoccupation of serious minds.

324

A. A. Said et al.

tendency until quite recently), to explain them away, or to identify them as atavistic reactions to modernization. Scholars who have resisted this trend have not generally contradicted the positivist narrative expressed by Comte, and have at times used it as the basis of intercultural polemics asserting the superiority of one culture over another. Third, the rise of Islamic revivalism, dramatized most emphatically by the events the Iranian revolution, has produced a great upsurge of scholarship on Islam and politics in such fields and disciplines as political science, international relations, area studies, anthropology, sociology, gender studies, and religion. The focus has been largely, but not exclusively, on the more militant expressions of Islamic identity, and on the extent to which they constitute a threat to Western interests. The dominant frame of reference is the “confrontation vs. compatibility” debate discussed above. Interestingly enough, Muslim thought has often reproduced this debate, as exemplified by the interaction between some strands of liberal Islamic thought with Islamic revivalism. Early Muslim writings on the topic of Islam and peace, for example, responded to Western ideas about Islam’s purportedly aggressive nature – ideas that tended to support missionary work and the assertion of imperialistic prerogatives (Daniel 1966). While some Muslim reformers implicitly accepted Western norms as Islamic, other interpreters became increasingly preoccupied with comparisons between blameworthy Western practices and virtuous Islamic precepts. Unfortunately, such Muslim responses to Western characterizations were often defensive, apologetic, reactive, or derivative. Problematic issues of translating precepts into contextually viable practices were often overlooked; areas of prospective complementarity between Western and Islamic traditions were neglected by Muslim and Western intellectuals alike. More recent efforts in interreligious dialogue have helped to focus new attention on the subject of Islam and peace, and have contributed to the development of a parallel tradition of commentary (Kung 1996; Bsteh 1996; Brohi 1980; Khan 1973; Saiyadain 1968).16 Finally, scholars have only recently begun to respond to the tenacity of identity conflicts and the problems of technologically driven progress (ecology, inequality, and anomie, among others) with serious exploration of the world’s rich and varied cultural resources for peacemaking. […] Scholars need not deny the positive contributions of the Western tradition to embark on cross-cultural explorations of peacemaking. Such inquiries require only affirmation of cultural pluralism, curiosity about opportunities for cross-cultural learning, and an epistemological commitment to dialogue. The future development of cross-cultural inquiry is of considerable importance, particularly insofar as it can help to provide both fresh contributions to theories of conflict resolution and constructive channels for the perennial religious impulse. Studies of Islamic approaches to peace and conflict resolution provide new angles 16

In addition, the Fellowship of Reconciliation has produced articles on Islam and peace (see the Islam, Peace and Nonviolence issue of Fellowship, 60[5–6], May/June 1994); conferences on the subject have also been convened in association with Nonviolence International, the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace, and the Center for Global Peace at American University in Washington, D.C.

9 Making Peace with Islam

325

of insight into universal human dilemmas, as well as important supplementation to studies that recognize contemporary Islamic activism not as a backward-looking rejection of the modern world, but as a deeply felt expression of cultural identity and a critique of domestic as well as international political orders.17

9.1.1.3

Five Islamic Approaches to Peace

Though writings specifically addressed the topic of Islam and peace are still relatively rare in English-language studies, a broad and differentiated body of literature on Islam is nonetheless available, including an increasing number of contributions by Muslims who are conversant with both Islamic and Western traditions of scholarship. It is from this rapidly growing body of literature that we have selected writings that represent the diversity of Islamic approaches to peace. These approaches include power politics, world order or cosmopolitan reform, communal conflict resolution, nonviolent resistance to oppression, and the transformation of human consciousness. Each approach has a basis in Islamic precepts and historical practices. Presumptions of uniformity to the contrary, the diversity of Islamic approaches to peace is as striking as their underlying unity in terms of basic sources. Like followers of other religious traditions, Muslims adopt different praxeological styles – ways of living and working within the tension between precept and practice – in response to differing conditions and varying interpretations of the same foundational principles. While there are some pundits who would question the Islamic authenticity of one approach or another, all five represent ongoing conversations as well as areas of experimentation. Simply put, efforts to apply Islamic precepts amidst the struggles and responsibilities of everyday life yield important differences in approach and emphasis. Islam is one, but its manifestations and practices are multiple. As the readings will make clear, Muslims have heard different overtones in their religion’s call to peace. Many have interpreted peace primarily as an absence of war, violence, and disorder that must be secured through the use of coercive power or force to compel and protect. Others have understood peace as a condition of justice achieved through virtuous governance or steadfast resistance to oppression. Still others have perceived peace as a state of social equilibrium or all-encompassing harmony. Power Politics: Peace Through Coercive Power To represent the range of Islamic approaches to peace, we have divided this volume into five sections. The first deals with what is admittedly the predominant paradigm in 17

Falk (1997) unequivocally defends the right of Muslims to equitable participation as Muslims in the contemporary world order, and suggests that contemporary Islamic movements manifest resistance to cultural as well as political marginalization. Salla (1997) has advanced a similar argument, suggesting that there is a need to move beyond both stereotypical “essentializations” and fragmentary models based on historical contingency, toward representations of Islam as a discourse that critiques the dominant liberal democratic paradigm in a manner similar to many other religious discourses.

326

A. A. Said et al.

historical practice: Islamic power politics. Based on a pessimistic reading of human nature, advocates of this approach use Islam as a language for legitimation of power and authority and for the preservation of social order. Expressed in the “mirror for princes” genre of medieval writings as well as in strains of juridical and philosophical thinking, this paradigm exalts state authority, views peace as an absence of war, and underscores political necessities created by the restlessness of political subjects and the threatening postures of external enemies. The power-political approach to peace takes a decidedly liberal view of religious limits placed upon the exercise of sovereign power, and often frames threats to a given political order as threats to Islam. Practices of power politics have therefore been invoked in the defense of Islam, but keen observers of these practices have noted that, in a power political environment, Islam often becomes a means to an end, and Shariah imperatives of social justice receive only modest or secondary consideration. […] World Order: Peace Through the Power of Law The second section of the anthology presents readings that fall within an Islamic world order paradigm. In contrast to the power political paradigm, the Islamic world order approach implies a conception of Islam as an ethical outlook and way of life, underscoring processes for institutionalizing values to shape a humane and just order. Islamic world order thinkers challenge idolatries of state and tribe, pointing beyond exclusivity and power politics to possibilities for affirming and creating more inclusive and participatory legal and political frameworks that can secure the well-being of the Islamic ummah (community) as well as the larger community of humankind. From the perspective of the world order approach, peace is a condition of order defined by the presence of such core Islamic values as justice, equity, human dignity, cultural coexistence, and ecological stability, and not merely by an absence of direct violence. A situation in which these values are not present may be characterized as disorderly, unstable, and un-Islamic. […] Conflict Resolution: Peace Through the Power of Communication The third group of readings introduce the reader to conflict resolution methods that have been influenced by or derived from Islam, particularly in Middle Eastern societies. They explore the vocabulary and practices associated with such traditional Islamic approaches to reconciliation as sulh and musalaha, as well as methods of mediation (wasta) and arbitration (tahkim) that have prevailed in Islamic cultural areas. Islamic approaches to conflict resolution underscore communal collaboration in efforts to open lines of communication, “set things right,” and restore a state of harmony or social equilibrium. They affirm a restorative conception of peace and justice, encompassing notions of compensation for losses, attentiveness to issues of “face” or social esteem, renunciation of retribution for the sake of the whole, and forgiveness. […] Nonviolence: Peace Through Will Power The next approach to peace, nonviolence, emphasizes that, while Islam forbids passivity in the face of oppression, tyranny, and injustice, it also discourages violence

9 Making Peace with Islam

327

and reckless subversion. From the point of view of Muslim proponents and pioneers of nonviolence, adherence to Islam requires nonviolent solidarity against oppression, the promotion of renewal through broad-based social movements, and training for programs of direct nonviolent action (Johansen 1997). A critical premise is that only a linkage of just ends with just means can secure authentic justice, peace, and human dignity. […] Transformation: Peace Through the Power of Love The last approach to peace, the Islamic paradigm for transformation of the human heart and mind, prescribes a deep internalization of Islam that leads to inner freedom and to the spiritual elevation of the individual. Based on principles and practices of tasawwuf (Sufism) that were widely diffused throughout the Islamic world by means of spiritual brotherhoods and fellowships, this approach defines peace as a condition of all-embracing harmony perceived through the inward renewal and transformation of human consciousness. The cultural community is the context and receptacle of human realization; renewal takes place within each person through inward cleansing and loving surrender to the divine. […] In this volume, we have endeavored to assemble in a single volume some of the best available English-language scholarly writings on Islamic approaches to peacemaking. Though we have attempted to be comprehensive in our coverage of Islamic approaches, we make no claim to having exhausted the many possible resources for inquiry into Islamic teachings and traditions, nor do we claim to have included all worthy writings that exemplify the chosen traditions. Rather, we offer this volume as a catalyst, a reader that suggests new ways of organizing knowledge about Islam, within the context of emerging global perspectives on the promotion of human solidarity and the full utilization of cultural and spiritual resources for the advancement of peace.

9.1.2 Peace in the Sufi Tradition Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2001). Peace in the Sufi tradition. In A. A. Said, N. C. Funk, and A. S. Kadayifci (Eds.), Peace and conflict resolution in Islam (pp. 247–262). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.18 The Sufi understanding of peace is rooted in tawhid, the principle of unity that provides a fertile soil for Islamic faith and spirituality. Unity is essential to Islam. Islam underscores the unity of God, the unity of the many streams of revelation, the unity of humanity, and ultimately the unity of existence. Unity embraces and sustains diversity; the Whole is reflected in the parts. As the Qur’an affirms, “To Allah belong the East and the West: whithersoever ye turn, there is Allah’s face. For 18

A longer version of this chapter was presented at the conference “Islam and Ecology” (May 1998) at the Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, and was later published in Islam and ecology: A bestowed trust (Foltz et al. 2003).

328

A. A. Said et al.

Allah is All-Embracing, All-Knowing” (2:115). The transcendent and the immanent are One, for God is both the Hidden (batin) and the Manifest (zahir), the Inward and the Outward (57:3). If unity is the truth (haq) or essence (dhat) of Islam, humans and other creatures approach this truth through harmony. The strength of Islam is its capacity to reconcile seeming opposites and harmonize diversity until the underlying unity is perceived and disharmony returns to peace. When proper relationships are established within and amongst created things, justice (‘adl) is established and peace becomes manifest. The Islamic understanding of peace suggests an ecology of the spirit predicated on tawhid, the fundamental unity of God and of all existence. In the consciousness of tawhid, humans are at one and at peace with one another and with nature. When tawhid is forgotten, relationships become unpeaceful.

9.1.2.1

Tawhid: An Affirmation of Wholeness

The Unity of Existence (Wahdat al-Wujud) The Sufi tradition (tasawwuf ) emphasizes that Islam is, at its core, a message of unity, peace, and reconciliation.19 This message applies to the inner person, to society, and to the cosmos. Islam is the process of submission to God, through which the part – the human microcosm – becomes reconciled to the Whole, to the Universe or macrocosm. The recognition of tawhid begins with belief, and culminates in faith (iman) and existential surrender. Surrender is not only a goal of Islamic ethics and law, but also a source of knowledge and activity and effort. Through the work of surrender, the part becomes reconciled to the Whole. The creature comes to know the Creator, and through the Creator, the unity of existence, wahdat al-wujud. Through knowledge, the knower is transformed, becoming peaceful. Tawhid, then, is a conception whose reality enters into human life at many levels, shaping Islamic thought, spirituality, and practice. Interpretations of the implications of tawhid distinguish jurisprudence and theology as well as philosophy, social and political thought, science, and theosophy. Beyond the doctrinal and ideological planes where the oneness of humanity is stressed, tawhid mediates the direct personal relation to the Absolute, and the maintenance of harmony with the universe. From a Sufi perspective, tawhid expresses the Islamic ideal of the fundamental unity of all humankind and of all life, and rejects a vision of reality rooted in exclusiveness. The universalism, tolerance and inclusiveness of Islam is beautifully evoked in the Qur’an (49:13) with the words: “Oh mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you peoples (or ‘nations’) and tribes that you may know one another.” At the heart of this message of universalistic Islam is a respect for cultural pluralism that is inextricably linked to a recognition of the fundamental solidarity and connectedness of all human beings. The unity of humankind is 19

“In most of their secret talks there is no good: but if one exhorts to a deed of charity or goodness or conciliation between people (secrecy is permissible): To him who does this, seeking the good pleasure of Allah, We shall soon give a reward of the highest (value)” (Qur’an, 4:114).

9 Making Peace with Islam

329

not premised on uniformity; rather, unity embraces myriad cultural and communal differences. From the standpoint of Islamic universalism, particularly as it has been articulated by those who have contemplated the Qur’anic passage, “To every people (was sent) a Messenger” (10:47) […]. For centuries, the Sufis have been among the most rigorous practitioners of Islam in its affirmation of pluralism, its prescription of respect in interreligious relations,20 and its condemnation of racial and ethnic discrimination.21 From a Qur’anic perspective, particularity and universality are not inherently contradictory principles. Particularity inheres in outward form and historical experience, and does not preclude universality of spirit. The distinctions and differences among individuals, as well as among cultures and communities of faith, fade in comparison to the majesty of God. […] The term, Muslim, at its most inclusive level of meaning, includes all human beings and all of creation, for all creatures necessarily submit to the will of the Creator. The more particular sense of the term, which receives capitalized form in English transliteration, refers to those who derive their religious precepts and practices from the prophethood of Muhammad. Sufism affirms that human beings and all other created things share in the existential condition of submission to the divine. All things are necessarily muslim because, consciously or unconsciously, they perform the will of Allah; Muslims are those who consciously adhere to the revelation given through the Prophet Muhammad, and to his example. Likewise, Islam is the natural religion of all creatures of the earth and the religion revealed by all prophets; Islam is the religion perfected in the Qur’an.22 The search for unity is a powerful impetus in Islam. Unity is to be sought within each human being, within the umma of Muslims, within the broader community of all peoples who have faith in God, and within context of the earth as a whole. From the standpoint of the individual believer, unity is both an essential premise about the deep nature of reality and a modality of faith which integrates task and experience. As the Qur’an repeatedly underscores, spiritual inspiration for sustaining the work of faith is available through keen observation of nature, which manifests the signs (ayat) of God. Behold! In the creation of the heavens and the earth; in the alternation of the Night and the Day; in the sailing of the ships through the Ocean for the profit of mankind; in the rain which Allah sends down from the skies, and the life which He gives therewith to an earth that is dead; in the beasts of all kinds that He scatters through the earth; in the change of the winds, and the clouds which they trail like their slaves between the sky and the earth; (here) indeed are Signs for a people that are wise (2:164). 20

“To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all it to Allah; It is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute” (Qur’an 5:48). 21 “There is no special merit of an Arab over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, nor a White man over a Black man, nor a Black man over a White, except by righteousness and piety.” Cited in Abu Laila (1991, p. 63). 22 Murata and Chittick discuss the levels of meaning associated with the words M(m)uslim and I(i)slam in their accessible work, The Vision of Islam (1994).

330

A. A. Said et al.

Human spirituality is informed by the wisdom, harmony, and beauty manifest in the diversity and wholeness of nature. Contemplation of these qualities brings a sense of stability, tranquility, and peace. The Practice of Peace in Islam’s Mystical Tradition For the Sufi tradition, peace is not a mere absence of war or tension, nor a condition derived from the defeat of an enemy or the maintenance of a particular social institution. Sufis recognize that, in Islam, peace (al-Salam) is one of the “ninety-nine most beautiful names” of God (Qur’an 59:23–24). To experience peace, then, the seeker must become passive with respect to the divine yet active with respect to the world. Peace requires not only outward human effort, but also a spiritual attitude of receptivity and continual inward cleansing. Purification of the self, remembrance of the divine, and proper attention to relationships creates a space for the presence of peace to manifest. […] [The Sufis] perceive that peace in Islam suggests an equilibrium of parts or a harmonious pattern, the internalization and upholding of which is the responsibility of every Muslim. They understand the essential jihad , or “striving,” to be the “greater jihad” (jihad al-akbar), the inner struggle to attain human dignity through a cleansing of the self and the establishment of harmony with God, humanity, and nature. […] Among Sufis, peace is integrally related to a vision of existential freedom – freedom to be – which is predicated a service ethos rather than on the more Western notion of freedom from constraint – freedom to do. In their understanding, human privilege and human responsibility are intertwined – it is a privilege to fulfill human responsibility, and responsibility to actualize human privilege. Human actions are outwardly constrained insofar as it is necessary to preserve the freedom of the community – human as well as non-human – and live in accordance with Divine Law. True freedom in found in service, for “doing what is beautiful” (ihsan) ennobles human character.23 Human beings, then, work toward freedom collaboratively. Freedom from constraint is experienced at the level of consciousness which, through cultivation of character and receptivity to divine grace, opens into the Infinite. Through a rigorous accounting for thoughts, words, and deeds (muhasiba), through complete presence in the moment, and through incessant remembrance of the divine (dhikr), spiritual guidance becomes increasingly accessible to the innate intelligence of the human being, as revealed both in the Holy Book and in the “book of nature.” The servant becomes creative, fulfilling a human dispensation to contribute to the work of peace. Though rigorous in their own spiritual practice, the Sufis recognize that the power of example is far more effective than religious compulsion in maintaining the spiritual integrity of a community. They therefore accept the Qur’anic injunction, “There is no compulsion in faith!” (2:256) at face value, and act on the premise that, in the long run, love is a more effective motivating force than fear. For all Muslims, compassion and mercy are integral and oft-repeated attributes of God, whom the Qur’an refers to as “al-Rahman, al-Rahim,” the Merciful and the Compassionate. In the Sufi tradition, 23

For an introduction to ihsan, see Murata/Chittick (1994).

9 Making Peace with Islam

331

these attributes are accentuated in order to inculcate an awareness of the nearness as well as the forbearance of God. God forgives and transforms those who turn toward him (tawba) with infinite mercy and graciousness. And God’s mercy extends to all worlds; the Qur’an describes the prophethood of Muhammad by stating, “We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures” (21:107). Sufis practice Islam not only as a religion of divine majesty (jalal), but also as a religion of divine beauty (jamal) and love.24 Islam directs attention both to the incomparability, omnipotence, and transcendence of God and to the omnipresence of God.25 God is both far (tanzil) and near (tashbih). The nearness of God is affirmed in the Qur’anic affirmation, “And He is with you wheresoever ye may be” (57:4). While the transcendence of God puts the trials and preoccupations of life in their proper perspective; the vision of the immanence of God alludes to the source and purpose of all creation. As is stated in the Hadith, “God has inscribed beauty upon all things.” The unveiling of the beauty of creation provides inspiration for ihsan, “doing what is beautiful” – the fulfillment of religion. Sufis have long recognized that, while political expediency often affects interpretations and applications of religious precepts, the essential theme of the Qur’anic revelation is surrender to and integration in God, suggesting a world view premised on universalism, pluralism, inclusiveness, and ecological harmony.26 Likewise, they recognize that intoxication with modern technology and the nationalist imperatives of the nation-state system have overridden traditional safeguards for cultural diversity, social justice, and environmental integrity. Nonetheless, they affirm that Islamic values and traditions remain vital, accessible, and relevant to contemporary challenges. They also affirm the clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, and for forgiveness (‘afu) over retribution.27 For Sufis, the real basis of peace in Islam is the transformative knowledge of unity. Islam does not exist to impose an idealized pattern upon the world, but rather to establish tawhid, and to promote harmony and justice through right relationships, moderation, and holistic integration of the human personality. Islamic precepts do not apply only to relations among human beings, but also to relations among humans and non-human creations. Islam underscores responsibility and the importance of respecting limits, as well as a positive, internalized sense of care and stewardship.

24

“Say: ‘If ye do love Allah, follow me: Allah will love you and forgive you your sins: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (Qur’an 3:31). 25 “For the pious Muslim, islam shows itself everywhere in the universe – in the blood circulation, the movement of the stars in their orbits, in the growth of plants – everything is bound by islam...” (Schimmel 1994, p. 255). 26 Religious tolerance is built into Islamic precepts, which designate the “People of the Book” as protected peoples. Though Muslims have often regarded non-Abrahamic religions with some ambivalence, such contemporary authorities on Islam as Seyyed Hossein Nasr emphatically include Buddhism, Hinduism, and Native American traditions within the circle of divine religions. 27 “It may be that Allah will establish friendship between you and those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all things); and Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (Qur’an 60:7).

332

9.1.2.2

A. A. Said et al.

Ecological Harmony: Upholding the Pattern of Existence

The Role of the Human Being Within Creation Sufi perspectives on ecology mirror their perspectives on peace. The ecological sensibility in Islam is derived from tawhid. There is a divine claim over human actions, and a sacred purpose in creation. Though human beings possess a unique dispensation and a special dignity, they are ultimately at one with the rest of creation through surrender to the presence of the divine. Sufis do not oppose nature to spirit or heaven to earth, because all created things are by definition muslim, in the sense that they live in submission to God (Murata/Chittick 1994, p. 135). Likewise, the original sources of Islam do not postulate an intractable opposition between passion and reason,28 but rather appeal to the innate human disposition, fitrah, the purity of which remains accessible, despite forgetfulness and ignorance. The vision of Islam is integral rather than dualistic. Even Satan, portrayed in the Qur’an as the one who misleads, cannot work contrary to the will of God.29 Notions of taming a “godless wilderness” are foreign to Islam. The Qur’an repeatedly points to the blessings conferred upon and through creation to inspire an attitude of gratitude and responsibility. The Most Gracious! It is He Who has taught the Qur’an. He has created man: He has taught him an intelligent speech. The sun and the moon follow courses (exactly) computed; and the herbs and the trees – both (alike) bow in adoration. And the Firmament has He raised high, and He has set up the Balance (of Justice), in order that ye may not transgress (due) balance. So establish weight with justice and fall not short in the balance. It is He Who has Spread out the earth for (His) creatures: therein is fruit and date-palms, producing spathes (enclosing dates); also corn, with (its) leaves and stalk for fodder, and sweet-smelling plants. Then which of the favors of your Lord will ye deny? (Qur’an 55:1–13)

Both human beings and other creatures partake in the blessings of existence; both are part of a single harmonious order. While human beings share with non-human creations in the common condition of submission, they are also endowed with special privileges and responsibilities which reflect their actual capacities. The human being is challenged to perform the role of khalifa, or vicegerent. The vicegerent of God fulfills amana, the covenant, the primordial bond of trust and recognition with the creator. The Earth and its resources are placed in the care of human beings as custodians for their preservation, development and enhancement. The Sufi tradition carefully links the stature and dignity of the human being to acceptance of responsibility, self-effacement, and active pursuit of knowledge. The 28

The tendency to elevate reason and denigrate passion was particularly characteristic of Greek thought. In contrast, the Qur’an emphasizes spiritual purification. Abraham, the one whom God “rendered pure in this world” (Qur’an 2:130), prayed for his descendants: “Our Lord! send amongst them a Messenger of their own, who shall rehearse Thy Signs to them and instruct them in Scripture and Wisdom, and purify them: For Thou art the Exalted in Might, the Wise” (Qur’an 2:129). 29 Evil has no essential existence in Islam; it is distance from the Source, a lack of essence which brings destructiveness and loss.

9 Making Peace with Islam

333

freedom of the human being is actualized through recognition of the divine, which encompasses and embraces all creatures, and through performance of the divine will. Ignorance of the divine and failure to live in a way which activates the higher faculties of the human being results in an actual loss of existential freedom and stature. Human beings must use the faculties which have been given to them, respecting the vital energies within a context of discernment and self-transcendence. As the Islamicist Karim Douglas Crow has suggested, the “Islamic anthropology” is reflected in the saying, “the person whose ‘intelligence’ overcomes their ‘cravings’ is superior to the angels and the person whose ‘cravings’ overcome their ‘intelligence’ is inferior to the beasts” (Crow, “Islamic Ethics”). A person who fails to subdue, refine, and efface his or her ego can do far more harm to creation than a predatory animal. The animal fulfills its ecological function; the human does not. In calling attention to human faculties and capabilities which transcend those of animals, the Sufi tradition of Islam warns that human beings can fall to a position lower than the animals through failure to fulfill the covenant and the duties of a servant of God. Unlike animals, trees, and mountains, human beings must consciously uphold God’s trust. Humans are entitled to feel privileged,30 but arrogance is a great folly and, indeed, a form of idolatry. Animals which act upon their instincts incur no blame, but human beings who fail to respond to the grace of their Creator with gratitude and service risk great loss to themselves and to others. The Sufi tradition recognizes and accentuates the interdependence of humankind and creation, and their mutual dependence upon God.31 These relationships of interdependence and dependence have moral corollaries, requiring on the part of humans due regard for the rights of nature, understood in light of the rights and purposes of God. To adapt a phrase used in contemporary ecological writing, “trees have standing” in Islam independent of their value to human beings. Animals, like human beings, form communities. They have their own forms of prayer, and they, too, will return to their Lord. There is not an animal (that lives) on the earth, nor a being that flies on its wings, but (forms part of) communities like you. Nothing have We omitted from the Book, and they (all) shall be gathered to their Lord in the end (Qur’an 6:38). Seest thou not that it is Allah Whose praises all beings in the heavens and on earth do celebrate, and the birds (of the air) with wings outspread? Each one knows its own (mode of) prayer and praise. And Allah knows well all that they do (Qur’an 24:41).

Nature provides positive lessons for human beings, demonstrating the proper relationship between creature and Creator. All of creation forms a harmonious pattern which, when viewed with eyes of faith, affirms the beauty, compassion and power of 30

The greatest human privilege is the capability to grasp the unity of existence. The human capability for knowledge of the most profound variety is compatible with the idea of a tawhidi episteme, as articulated by Dr. Mona Abul-Fadl. Abul-Fadl (1988) suggests that the greatest gift Islam can offer to the world is a truly integral perspective which renders the truths of direct experience (including mysticism and theosophy), philosophy, and science complementary rather than contradictory. 31 There is a symbiotic relationship between humans and their natural environment; the blessings of existence are a sign of God’s grace, for “His are all things in the heavens and on earth” (Qur’an 2:255).

334

A. A. Said et al.

the divine reality. As is said in the Hadith, “God is beautiful and He loves beauty” (Muslim, Iman 147). Nature satisfies genuine needs of humanity – physical as well as aesthetic and spiritual – but not the greed or caprice of humanity. The Sufi tradition reminds human beings of their ecological function – that is, of their place within a greater, spiritual context which transcends and embraces all things. Humans realize freedom by surrendering to the divine will and participating in the divine creativity, which renews creation in each instant. They purify themselves inwardly to become receptive, free of external conditions which constrain this creativity. Internally, humans are absolutely free; externally they are limited in their powers and rights in relation to God, nature and fellow humans. From a Sufi standpoint, the Qur’anic ethos challenges human beings to attain to a sense of proportion rooted in tawhid, the all-inclusive environment of the Divine (Chittick 1986). Sufis therefore recognize that the root meanings of wrong-doing and right-doing in Islam are not judgmental in a stereotypical sense; they indicate whether or not things have been put in their proper places.32 Individual beings and relationships among created things both veil and reveal the divine; the most proper, virtuous actions and conditions are those that mirror the divine in the most perfect and complete way. Humans are entitled to provide for their own sustenance and flourishing from nature, and, in turn, to develop nature in ways which are beautiful and contribute to the remembrance and glorification of God. The capabilities entrusted to human beings require commensurate humility and sensitivity, predicated upon respect and reverence for the divine purpose in every created thing.33 The Sacral Dimension of Nature While it is not difficult to derive an ethic of environmental stewardship from the Qur’an, the ultimate significance of nature in Islam is spiritual. The harmony of nature is a source of spiritual inspiration and edification. As the Qur’an repeatedly emphasizes, nature is filled with the signs of God. “The seven heavens and the earth, and all beings therein, declare His glory: There is not a thing but celebrates His praise” (Qur’an 17:46). Nature is both a medium and a receptacle of revelation. All reflect and partake in the Divine sakina, the harmony and peace of God. In the final analysis, the soundest basis of ecological ethics and responsibility in Islam is the experience of human integration through connectedness with the divine and with nature. This theme is integral to the Qur’an and is affirmed in Sufi literature and poetry. An Islamic attitude of love and respect for nature is exemplified in the following verse by Assad Ali, Professor of Arabic Literature at the University of Damascus: 32

The Qur’an contrasts justice (adl) with wrongdoing (zulm), “usually defined as putting a thing in the wrong place.... [P]eople can and do wrong themselves every time they put something in the wrong place. They distort their own natures, and they lead themselves astray” (Murata/Chittick 1994, p. 113). 33 While ecology was rarely an issue debated in the same manner as the political and religious legitimacy of various regimes and movements, the classical Islamic tradition nonetheless provided a context for discussing such unconventional subjects as the rights of animals. See Goodman (1978).

9 Making Peace with Islam

335

God, I love you and whoever and whatever loves You. I’ve recognized that every creature loves You in a certain way, so, I thought of loving every creature, too, for each is your creation. (Ali 1991, p. 70)

In Dr. Ali’s poem, created things are not oblivious to the divine presence; through love, nature partakes in and reflects the divine. In other poems, Dr. Ali follows the Qur’anic pattern of meditating on the spiritual significance of natural phenomena, evoking images of desert sands, rain, running water, and growth. In his imagery, he experiences identification with the desert, and portrays nature as a process associated with the sacred – that is, as a process within which human beings experience connection to the divine. For Assad Ali, as for such early Sufi writers as al-Muqaddasi (1980), nature is a mirror, a sign of God, a medium of remembrance (dhikr). Ali’s poetry suggests that remembrance of God, and concomitant recognition of the presence of the divine in the ecological harmonies of nature, is the surest guarantee of both human well-being and harmony between humanity and non-human creations. Faith is not a distraction from the world of time and place, but an all-encompassing awareness.34 Symbiosis with nature can uplift the human being when love for the divine wisdom and beauty reflected in living things is awakened. Contemplation of this ecology of the spirit brings peace through the unveiling of the sacred, which could be aptly described as the “pattern that connects” (Bateson/Bateson 1987).

9.1.2.3

Implications of the Sufi Outlook

While Islam retains power political traditions whose understanding of peace underscores the integrity and defensibility of a state as well as reformist and renewalist traditions that accentuate the role of social and cultural institutions, the Sufi tradition foregrounds the need for harmony in the relationship of the individual to the divine, which manifests in and through created things. Sufism approaches peace through the internal reform and renewal of the human being. Power political approaches to peace aim to preserve order and stability through coercive measures, reformist approaches underscore a process of interpretation and application, and renewalists ground reasoning in a passion for social justice and a spirit of community. Sufis recognize the merits and limitations of all these approaches, while highlighting the importance of creative imagination and the need for divine unveiling, spiritual maturity, vision, truth, beauty, and love. The Sufi tradition encourages believers to seek freedom through harmonizing themselves with the divine. There is a definite humanistic chord in Sufism. Emphasis is placed on inner freedom, the spiritual elevation of the individual, and integration 34

“So delicious is the juice of faithfulness to You throughout the ages, that it grants physical soundness and intellectual health; it restores the environment by conscious living; it opens the soul with truth” (Ali 1991, pp. 37–38).

336

A. A. Said et al.

of religious ideals with practice in everyday life. Spirituality is understood as the way to peace, through which the individual undertakes the challenge of putting received doctrines and ideals to the test of experience. Islam is understood as an internal state as well as an institutionalized religion; seemingly contradictory principles and realities, such as divine will and human responsibility, are reconciled within each practitioner of faith.35 The numerous Sufi orders (tariqas) of Islam have traditionally emphasized the internalization of the message of the Qur’an and the integration of precept, realization, and practice. Sufis have attempted to embody the Qur’anic injunction for Muslims to be a “Middle People” (2:143) – inclusively universalist in outlook and tolerant of the great diversity of humankind. From a Sufi perspective, cultural diversity is a manifestation of divine blessing that can be affirmed and not merely tolerated. Sufis are careful not to project their own shortcomings and fears onto others, and perceive that human behavior often reflects human expectations. While they do not necessarily criticize efforts to deter anti-social or anti-ecological behavior through inducing fear, they prefer to appeal to the creative capacity of human beings through affirmation. Such an approach is in accord with the conception of fitrah, primordially sound human nature. From a Sufi perspective, works of evil derive from alienation from the source of life; people become misguided and wicked not because of their innermost nature, but because their inner nature has become veiled or even deadened by the vicissitudes and distractions of life. Yet every human being is in principle redeemable by and through the mercy of God, capable of reawakening to fitrah through the trials of experience and an inward opening to the divine. Tasawwuf underscores the need for harmony and equilibrium in all relationships. […] Spiritual growth requires a sensitivity to the environment. As the individual purifies herself or himself, created things begin to appear more transparent to the Divine. Sufis therefore look for the signs of God in humans and in nature, and contemplate the divine beauty in creation. They have tended to resist all closed systems of thought – especially modern ideologies and “-isms” – and have therefore been hesitant to sacrifice aspirations toward peace, social justice, and ecological balance to one-sided conceptions of development.36 Feeling peaceful – full of peace – requires being empty of other things so that peace has a place to enter and be. This means, first and foremost, removing the idols, the delusive belief systems, which separate a person from the divine. Inner purification becomes joined to the consecration of life, and to the perception that God’s unity embraces creation. 35

The practice of Sufism is inspired by the faith that God guides unto Himself those who turn to Him – “Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of Allah: for without doubt in the remembrance of Allah do hearts find satisfaction” (Qur’an 13:28). Peace in the world is a reflection of peace in the inner worlds of human beings, and is founded on spiritual principles. 36 The breadth of heart represented by the Sufi traditions of Islam is suggested by Ibn al-‘Arabi’s verses: “My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks, and a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Ka‘ba and the tables of the Tora and the book of the Koran. I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith” (Ibn al-‘Arabi/Nicholson 1978, p. 67).

9 Making Peace with Islam

337

Like contemporary renewalism, tasawwuf is concerned with identity, but on the most fundamental, spiritual level more than on the collective level. The cultural community is not an end in itself, but rather the nurturing context within which human realization takes place. According to Sufi teaching, knowledge of the self is the basis for knowledge of God. Self-knowledge – knowledge of one’s own authentic individuality – is also the precondition for recognition of the authentic individuality of other beings. Such knowledge of authentic identity comes about through surrendering the illusion of separation for the truth of Unity. This results in experiences of connectedness, profound understanding of linkages between means and ends, and spontaneous loyalty to causes that uplift the human spirit and enhance the integrity of created things.37 Sufi teachings suggest that peace begins with the harmonization of the human being. Contemporary wars and environmental crises offer a warning – a reminder – that modernization and the celebration of technology are no substitutes for the sustainable and balanced development of human societies and personalities. Reformed conceptions of development could be premised on sufficiency, moderation, and spiritual values rather than on scarcity and consumerism. Islam does not demand the sacrifice of the material needs of humanity for higher, transcendent aims, nor does it sanctify the worship of the means of earthly subsistence. Islam does not oppose the spiritual to the material, but rather underscores the spiritual as the context of the material. From a Sufi perspective, social conflict and ecological imbalances demand responses inspired by love and identification, not fear. Humankind was once one community, and remains a community-in-the-making; the most excellent “use” of nature is for spiritual development and the consecration of life, through contemplation of the divine presence. Sufis therefore uphold a sense of proportion and discernment, and issue a call to imbue even the most mundane of human activities with a holistic, spiritual sensibility. Worshiping the idol of linear, technological progress demands the sacrifice of natural harmony and the atrophy of the spirit; appreciation for the divine blessing in creation and in humanity generates spontaneous loyalty to the integrity of the natural order and to the cause of human dignity. In the contemporary world, there is a need to renew the Sufi understanding of tawhid (unity). This understanding points to the presence of spirit within creation, and to the realization of peace as an ecology of the spirit that reconciles the apparent multiplicity of created things through the establishment of proper internal and external relations amongst them. Such a reconciliation is implicit in what the “Greatest Shaykh” (shaykh al-akbar, the equivalent of the Latin doctor maximus) Ibn al-‘Arabi referred to as “The Breath of the Merciful,” nafs al-rahman. Ibn al-‘Arabi depicted the manifestation of created multiplicity and its reabsorption into Primordial Singularity to be the Divine Being’s drawing a breath. Viewed from the perspective of the microcosm, God comes to self-realization in and through us. 37

This sense of spontaneous loyalty is aptly expressed by the Persian poet Saadi: “I am joyous with the cosmos, for the cosmos receives its joy from Him; I love the world, for the world belongs to Him” (Eaton 1993).

338

A. A. Said et al.

Islamic mystical teaching affirms that a person must cultivate in the self the character traits of God (takhalluq bi-akhlaq Allah). In the daily life of the veritable practitioners of Islam, there is a practical demonstration of how to cherish social, ethical, and ecological values leading men and women to the good life. Islam offers the stimulus and strength for performing deeds which are distinctively human in the deepest sense, to bring the human being nearer to God and to respecting the sanctity of human and ecological relationships, in which must be mirrored a glimmer of Divine attributes.

9.2 Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, Not Static Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., and Sharify-Funk, M. (2006). Introduction. In A. A. Said, M. Abu-Nimer, and M. Sharify-Funk (Eds.), Contemporary Islam: dynamic, not static (pp. 1–10). London: Routledge. Few contemporary topics are more controversial than Islamic interpretation. In the West as well as in the Muslim world, interpreting Islam has become a virtual “cottage industry.” The ranks of interpreters are incredibly diverse, including terrorism experts, government policymakers, and journalists as well as religious studies scholars, political scientists, Muslim ‘alims and religious fundamentalists of varied confessional backgrounds. Though many interpreters’ views would not be recognized as authoritative by traditional religious leaders, interest in how Islam is understood and practiced has expanded dramatically in recent years. Among Muslims as well as among non-Muslims, it seems that everyone has become a stakeholder in the future of Islam. For most Westerners, tragic events such as 9/11 in Washington DC and New York City, 3/11 in Madrid, and 7/7 in London provide the context of relevance for interest in Islam. Why has a significant minority of Muslims accepted radical teachings? What are these teachings, and how can they be counteracted? Though many Muslims share these concerns about the misappropriation of Islamic symbolism, the stakes for believers are different, and higher. Committed Muslims cannot be interested in Islamic interpretation for instrumental reasons alone; they must also think seriously about issues of truthfulness and authenticity: How can Muslims remain true to the essential teachings of a 1400-year-old monotheistic tradition, while also enhancing their ability to engage the modern world and overcome experiences of marginalization and decline? Whatever the context of our interest may be, there is one question that ought to precede all efforts to generalize about what Islam demands of those who adhere to it: Whose Islam? Just as there are many Christianities and Judaisms, so, too are there many formulations of Islamic piety and politics that contend for the attention of Muslims, and that represent themselves as the only “authentic” perspective to those who do not declare themselves believers. Only clear recognition of Islam’s internal diversity can prevent gross distortions of contemporary Islamic realities, and provide

9 Making Peace with Islam

339

a basis for exploration of more profound questions about how precepts of faith are translated into historical practices. […]

9.2.1 The Spirit of Alexandria On October 4–5, 2003, a group of distinguished scholars of Islam gathered at the newly renovated Library of Alexandria in Egypt to explore these questions and challenge conventional wisdom about Islam. United by their uniformly distinguished credentials and by a common conviction that Islam demands a current progressive outlook on politics and history, these scholars sought to contribute to the formulation of new narratives. The choice of venue was symbolic: The largest and greatest Hellenistic city in the ancient world, Alexandria has always been a cultural crossroads. Often a center of political power as well as a destination of those driven by intellectual curiosity, ancient Alexandria was a point of convergence for Greek, Roman, Jewish and Syrian culture that drew scholars from throughout the ancient world. Scholars proclaimed her Royal Library “a wonder to the world.” Though warfare and political turmoil resulted in the tragic loss of the original Library of Alexandria, Islamic and Western civilizations are deeply indebted to the knowledge that was preserved and transmitted there. The modern rebirth of the Library of Alexandria represents not only a retrospective effort to pay homage to Egypt’s universal city, but also a prospective affirmation of the best values that the library represented: openness, intellectual dynamism, and unity of knowledge and civilization. Conference attendees were energized by the experience of discussing Islamic interpretation within this universal context – a context that affirmed Islam’s many centuries of conversation with diverse systems of knowledge from many different cultures. Although the scholars’ responses varied, their reflections were informed by a shared assumption that the ideals of Islam are emergent rather than static. Like other religions, Islam is not only an abstract set of theological propositions, but also a historical dynamic that finds expression in the lived experiences and circumstances of people. Understanding the practical and existential meaning of Islam, then, requires willingness to discover opportunities for creativity amidst the tensions that give rise to acts of interpretation. What was authentically Islamic hundreds of years ago may not convey the spirit of Islam in today’s specific circumstances; each generation of Muslims has an obligation to engage in earnest dialogue about how to understand and implement the values of their faith. The conference discussion asserted the idea that Muslims are obligated to continuously re-examine and re-evaluate the impact of their changing environment (socio-political, economic, cultural, etc.) on the ways in which every Muslim views and lives his/her ideal and real Islam. This condition is a necessary step in the process of addressing the current decay in any Muslim society. By reflecting on Islam in such terms, the scholars assembled in Alexandria found themselves in direct contradiction to a great deal of Western as well as Muslim conventional wisdom, which posits a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic

340

A. A. Said et al.

and Western values. In the present context of conflict and insecurity (as viewed by many policy-makers in Western countries), it is easy to mistake the dominant narrative of Western-Islamic relations – a narrative that is being recounted by Muslims and Americans alike – for the only narrative. According to this story of confrontation, Western societies and Muslim societies share few common values, and are entrapped by an intensifying “clash of civilizations” with deep historical roots. In this “us versus them” story of conflict, opposition between contrary civilizations can only be resolved through the political defeat and cultural assimilation of one civilization by the other. […] As they challenged interpretations of Islamic values that posit irreconcilable conflict with the West, the scholars in Alexandria generally agreed that IslamicWestern relations have as much to do with politics as they do with cultural practices and religious interpretations. Many argued that Muslims share a significant cultural heritage with the West, and are capable of reconciling Islam with modernization and democratic values if given a chance by their political regimes and foreign forces to do so. Present difficulties in relations between Muslim and Western societies, they suggested, represent the tragic but not inescapable outcome of a complex historical process. Islam, as a set of theological beliefs, is capable of responding to the challenges of the modern world if given a chance to do so, especially by its gate keepers. This is possible because Islamic civilization is not an “exceptional” case among world cultures, uniquely predisposed to conflict or resistant to democracy. The human common denominators that unite the Islamic historical experience with the historical experiences of other world cultures are far more significant than the differences, and the problems of Muslims may be understood in terms that are similar to those used to explain challenges of political, cultural, and economic development faced by other peoples. There is undoubtedly a strong historical basis for this view. Islam and the West are joined by common roots within the Judeo-Christian and Hellenic cultural continuum. Classical Islamic civilization grew to maturity in the Fertile Crescent – the birthplace of Western civilization – and was constructed out of Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures. In Baghdad as well as in the distant cities of Muslim Spain, Islamic scholars often collaborated with Christians and Jews to translate, preserve, and enrich the legacy of classical Greek learning. Islamic civilization also cast a wider net by integrating Persian and Central Asian as well as Indian components within its cultural synthesis, becoming a bridge between East and West. Western thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, and Maimonides found great merit in the thought of Muslim philosophers such as Averroes and Avicenna – even as their Muslim contemporaries were rejecting what would become integral ideas of the Western Renaissance. […]

9 Making Peace with Islam

341

9.2.2 Theological Doctrine and Historical Dynamic The fact that so much has been integrated within Islamic cultures indicates that Islam is not only a theological doctrine, but also a historical dynamic. As a historical dynamic, Islam was often a quite inclusive enterprise, embodying a spirit of encounter with the other. Just as it is impossible to understand classical Islamic civilization without reference to the dynamic roles played by non-Muslim minorities, so too is it misleading to formulate an understanding of Western civilization that excludes the contributions of Islam. As many contributors to this volume have emphasized, affirming the richness and dynamism of historical Islam can provide a basis for new and constantly emerging Islamic syntheses that acknowledge essential theological affirmations that have remained constant throughout history (for example, doctrines concerning the unity of God, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the special nature of the Qur’an as a definitive summation of Abrahamic monotheism), while noting discontinuities and divergences in the conclusions Muslims have reached about the political and cultural implications of these beliefs. As many scholarly accounts have demonstrated, the cultural openness of Islamic culture often surpassed that of Europe during the Middle Ages and the early modern period. In Andalusia, the centuries of Muslim rule between the arrival of Abd al-Rahman in 711 and the fall of Granada in 1492 generated remarkable artistic and scholastic achievements through a symbiosis of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian cultures, and provided the conduit through which Aristotelian philosophy returned to the European intellectual milieu. Though often criticized when compared with modern norms for political pluralism and citizenship rights, the dhimmi system of Muslim empires granted considerable cultural and religious rights to non-Muslim minorities. Addressing diversity and pluralism has become a crucial aspect of most societies’ attempts to adjust to the incredible changes (technological and socio-cultural) that faced the world in the last century. Due to many factors, Muslim societies have struggled with great difficulties in constructively addressing these themes. Among Muslims, puritanical tendencies compete with progressive and reformist trends supporting democratic change, as well as with more traditional patterns of faith and belief that have proven far more tolerant of religious and cultural diversity than is generally acknowledged. Ironically, those who claim to defend Islam by rejecting pluralism negate the “genius of Islamic civilization,” which manifested greatness by harmonizing Islamic precepts with diverse intellectual and cultural influences. Although Western scholars sometimes resort to a simplistic “good Muslim”/“bad Muslim” dichotomy, there is a growing literature that is providing useful guidance for distinguishing between “Islamic terrorism,” a destructive and anti-pluralist reaction to perceived external threats, and Islamic revivalism, a reformist (islahi) movement to revitalize the community from within. Where violent Islamic movements attribute the ills of Islamic civilization almost exclusively to foreign infiltration and internal diversity of opinion, Islamic revivalists accept responsibility for internal sources of

342

A. A. Said et al.

malaise, and seek to adapt Islamic culture in ways that might help Muslims meet modern problems more effectively. From this perspective, both the call for radical measures and the call for reforms in the Muslim world stem from deep feelings of powerlessness fostered by governmental corruption, autocracy, inequality, and subservience to foreign masters. The difference between the two groups is in their fundamental interpretation of the appropriate measures that should be used in addressing these problems. Reformists rely on values and sets of beliefs that give an equal space for the “other” to exist and live among Muslims, and assume internal responsibility regarding the dynamics and perpetuation of the policies of oppression and discrimination against the other in every Muslim society. The exclusivists play down the internal responsibility and place the blame on external forces, adopt conspiracy theory, and withdraw from the current world by declaring their intention to return to the fifth and sixth century Arab cultural practices disregarding at least a thousand years of Islamic civilization. Western actions that help to restore the sense of security by collaborating to correct shared problems and providing Muslims with a sense of political efficacy might inspire creative thought and action. […]

9.2.3 A Call for Fresh Thinking As they sought to reframe problems in Western-Islamic relations, attendees at the Alexandria conference were by no means reluctant to call for fresh thinking on the part of Muslims. Troubled by what many perceived as a retreat from intellectual openness and dynamism in the Islamic world, they grappled with deeply important questions: How can Islam reclaim the best of its intellectual traditions, and revitalize them in a modern context? Can Muslims recover and build upon the spirit of intellectual openness that characterized Islamic civilization when it was at its historic zenith? This need for internal examination and self-reflection became a central focus for conversation once attendees asserted the importance of taking responsibility for the current state of Muslim societies. However unhelpful past Western policies may have been, Muslims should not further disempower themselves through a narrow focus on the misdeeds of others. As many scholars have noted, the habit of viewing Islam ahistorically, as an abstract theological doctrine, has complicated efforts to understand how Islamic values can be applied to contemporary contexts. Static conceptions of Islam make it difficult for Muslims to respond creatively to new forms of knowledge and new cultural experiences. If Islam is understood as an abstract set of commandments that lack a meaningful relationship to specific historical contexts and experiences, Muslims are bound to face difficulties when seeking to discover how Islamic principles can be applied to meet the challenges of contemporary societies. Rather than formulate creative yet substantively Islamic positions on issues like democracy, development, cultural diversity, and peace, Muslims will compete for an elusive “authenticity” and face inevitable intellectual fragmentation. Reformers will be

9 Making Peace with Islam

343

denounced as “outcasts,” in accordance with an intellectual framework that devalues innovation and discourages impartial investigation of non-Islamic cultural experiences. Efforts to resolve contemporary social problems will be driven by simplistic ideological formulas (“Islam is the solution”) and post-colonial identity politics rather than by disciplined programs for human and social development. In other words, Muslims will remain trapped by a defensive, reactive attitude that some scholars associate with a broader “psychology of the oppressed.” Only by responding differently to these challenges can Muslims liberate their ways of thinking from self-defeating assumptions that perpetuate external domination and internal decay. But how can Muslims respond differently as they confront the challenges of the modern world, while still preserving Islamic identity? Many of the conference participants concurred with the idea that Islam’s journey over the centuries reveals that it is not so much a static doctrine as a historical dynamic that finds expression in the lived experiences and circumstances of people. In other words, the history of Islam is a story of never-ending efforts on the part of Muslims to comprehend the ideals of the Qur’an, and then to transform their understandings into reality. In this dynamic process of interpretation and action, the ideals of Islam are emergent rather than static. From a theological perspective, this approach suggests that every historical period and cultural milieu has drawn forth a different synthesis of Islamic commandments from the rich texts of Islamic faith and experience. Every generation in the Muslim world has developed a unique and yet integral Islamic synthesis which distinguishes that generation from previous ones. Practicing Islam, then, requires creative management of tensions between the real and the ideal, as well as between expectations and achievements. In the contemporary historical context, it requires that Muslims wrestle with challenging questions: What is happening to the traditional synthesis of classical Islamic civilization as a result of changes and transformations in the world today – the challenge of modernity, the spread of literacy, the education of women, the emergence of more and more competing voices claiming Islamic legitimacy, the troubled relations of Muslim communities with the external world and with their own governments? What should Muslims aspire to preserve? What can they allow to change? To what extent do emerging syntheses, such as those of revivalists and reformists, succeed in manifesting the historical legacy and unfolding ideals of Islam? How can Muslims in the contemporary world find new meaning in their sacred texts? What are the most important issues that critical Islamic thought must address? What does it mean to apply Islamic ethics to today’s challenges? How can Muslims project an Islamic vision that is big enough for the reality they are experiencing – a vision that is neither a superficial reflection of current Western norms nor a short-sighted rejection? Where and how can Muslim scholars and practitioners expand their existing yet limited spaces for such open exchanges – spaces for self-examination and internal dialogue? […]

344

A. A. Said et al.

9.3 Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

9.3.1 The Need for a New Story Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). The need for a new story. In N. C. Funk and A. A. Said, Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East (pp. 21–46). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. As practitioners of mediation recognize, it is often more useful to help each disputant in a conflict dyad become more conversant with their counterpart’s unique perspective on events than it is to seek the truth adversarially by managing a process of debate. The task of the interpersonal mediator is to highlight points of convergence between narratives, to help the parties understand and if possible respect divergent claims, and to elicit “unstoried experiences” of past cooperation or even mutual affinity that might enable antagonists to shift from “conflict-saturated” narratives to stories that permit the formation of a new relationship (Winslade/Monk 2000). Such an approach applies to intercultural mediation as much as it does to interpersonal mediation, and holds out the promise of mitigating conflicts in which Islamic and Western identities have been activated. Listening to stories, and encouraging rivals to reflect on gaps in their own stories while giving more weight to the narrative of the “other,” provides a valuable basis for building trust and finding ways in which adversaries might cease to work at cross-purposes. Attentiveness to the stories being told by the many peoples who identify with the West and with Islamic culture – and, more specifically, by Americans and Middle Eastern Muslims – reveals an increasing salience of deeply polarized, conflictsaturated narratives about cultural conflict. At the popular level, narratives of intercultural rivalry are already dominant and more innocuous stories about “what went wrong” are clearly at a disadvantage. To escape the narrow confines of the dominant stories, we need to examine critically the contents and origins of polarizing narratives, while also giving serious consideration to the insights that can be found in counter-narratives of intercultural compatibility or complementarity.

9.3.1.1

The Power of Narratives

According to Marc Howard Ross, an influential theorist of cultural factors in conflict management, narratives may be defined as “frameworks for action” through which members of particular identity groups “understand the social and political worlds in which they live, and explain the conflicts in which they are involved” (2002, p. 303). Narratives are the stories that members of social and political groups tell about

9 Making Peace with Islam

345

themselves and their relations with selected “others,” to create or reinforce a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. Dynamic rather than static, narratives bind individuals together within an active and adaptive community, and change in response to traumatic events and new challenges. While dynamic and changing, narratives still tend to manifest internal consistency over time because group members draw upon a shared stock of cultural symbols and historical experiences (for example, Pearl Harbor, the Crusades, or September 11) to create meaningful bonds, shared goals, and maps of the world that are infused with emotion and metaphor.38 Though contested by rival factions and leaders within a group, the narratives which come to dominate public discourse are often those that serve most effectively to give definition to ingroup identity and values through reference to an out-group. Such narratives provide authoritative, commonsense understandings about the nature of perceived threats to the in-group and its values, while connecting the fears, insecurities, and problems of the moment both with past tribulations and with a favored political program. Analysis of narratives can provide considerable insight into conflict situations. First, narratives play a causal role in conflict dynamics, by ruling certain political options either “in” or “out” for communal groups and for those who claim to advance their interests. Narratives that promote exclusive in-group loyalties, negative images of adversaries, and escalatory conflict moves can easily exacerbate tensions, while narratives that highlight common ground shared by disputants can make resolution of conflict more likely. Second, narratives provide invaluable information about the understandings that disputants have concerning the nature of their conflict and the driving motivations of each party. They manifest the emotional fears and visceral threats experienced by conflict protagonists, and therefore provide criteria for effective settlements. An essential part of the search for constructive responses to conflict, Ross notes, is “the development of new narratives – narratives that do not directly challenge older ones, but reframe them in more inclusive terms that deemphasize the emotional significance of differences between groups and identify shared goals or experiences” (2002, p. 304). Reexamining narratives about “the West” and “Islam” is essential for contemporary peacemaking efforts. Prevailing narratives on each side of the cultural divide exhibit remarkably similar tendencies toward polarization of identity issues, adversarial framing of historical relations, and rejection of shared responsibility for contemporary conflict. Similarities between counter-narratives that may be found on each side are even more marked – exhibiting not only resemblance in form and style but also substantive agreement on matters pertaining to intercultural relations and historical memory. The existence of such positive narrative themes cutting across the lines of conflict provides insight into resources available to those who wish to “tell a new story” that aspires toward intercultural peace.

38

The equation of September 11 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II (December 7, 1941) is a clear example of how experiences of one traumatic event can become the basis for stories about a new trial.

346

9.3.1.2

A. A. Said et al.

The Story of Confrontation

North American and European relations with the Muslim Middle East are mediated by images that each side has formed of the other. These images, in turn, are embedded within narratives about the history of cultural conflict between “Islam” and “the West.” When Americans and Arab Muslims interact, for example, the significance of the interaction is not limited to the manifest, external appearance of a political discussion or an economic transaction. The significance of the occasion is a function of the meaning that the protagonists give it. Adversarial Narratives and Images Dominant narratives about relations between Islam and the West define the two civilizations in opposition to each other and place particular emphasis on putatively irreconcilable differences. Though the narratives differ with respect to their invocation of historical facts, their overarching themes are so similar that we may refer to them as constituting a single “story” of intercultural confrontation. Despite centuries of relations defined as much by commerce in goods and ideas as by intermittent warfare and strife, historical memories and imaginings of Islamic and Western civilizations tend to emphasize adversarialism. Conceptions of the “other” as an inferior rival or shadow of the “self” have led to dehumanizing stereotypes as well as to habits of selective perception in which negative interactions are remembered while more positive encounters are forgotten.39 In the present context of acrimonious relations, memories of violent excesses – from the wholesale slaughter of the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem by the Crusader army in 1099 C.E.40 to the terrorist attacks that destroyed thousands of lives at the World Trade Center – easily displace recollections of “normal” intercultural relations. Narratives of competition between Islamic and Western civilizations derive their subject matter both from the geopolitical tensions of the present and from the cultural legacies of the past. For European Christians developing a sense of collective selfconsciousness amidst tumultuous internal rivalries, the idea of an Islamic “other” – be it “Saracen,” “Moorish,” or “Turk” – provided a basis for articulating a shared identity, a set of common values and, at times, a common political program. The more recent notion of a struggle between “the West” and “Islamic civilization” is a transmutation of this older theme, with terms of reference that have been redefined by secularization of the Western Christian public sphere, and by the simultaneous definition of a broader “East” or “Orient” against which Europeans and their descendants might come to recognize their own contrasting distinctiveness (Neumann 1999). Likewise, Muslims in the Middle East and beyond have developed a greater sense of their own identity and values through competition with “Frankish” (i.e., “Crusader”), “Christian,” and now “Western” “others.” The “other,” then, is integral to the way

39

For analysis of how images of ‘self’ and ‘other’ affect intergroup conflict, see Kelman (1997), Stein (2001). 40 Armstrong (1991, pp. 178–179), Maalouf (1984, pp. 50–51).

9 Making Peace with Islam

347

each cultural grouping has understood itself. The preferred label for the present-day “other” is applied retroactively, conjuring up images of continuity over time. Although the term “Middle East” is of quite recent provenance, it evokes rich and varied associations in what we may refer to as the “collective imagination” of Western cultures. These associations are laden with vivid and often contradictory images: peaceful desert oases and enormous oil refineries, fabulous newfound wealth and interminable religious conflicts, luxury vehicles and camel caravans, scimitar-bearing Arabs in traditional Bedouin dress and military leaders in starched khakis, silent veiled women and sensuous belly dancers, world-changing prophets and fanatical charismatic leaders, shrouded saints in sandals and tyrants in palatial estates. While more romantic and colorfully exotic images often prevailed during the colonial era, when European superiority was unquestioned, the return of Islamic discourse to the international political stage since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the eclipse of Cold War ideological rivalries in the late 1980s have cast these images in a darker hue. Though diverse, the images are united by the same idea of “otherness” that has haunted Europe’s past relations with the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, painting the Muslim Middle East as a land of harsh extremes. For many Americans and other Westerners, the Middle East is a part of the world that may justifiably be considered strange and even arbitrary – a place which runs in accordance with unfamiliar rules that only learned historians and foreign policy experts can understand. If Americans and others who identify with the West are tempted to regard the Muslim Middle East as a foil – as a means of defining themselves in relation to everything that they hope they are not – Middle Eastern Muslims frequently manifest a similar attitude toward a Western “other.” This attitude comes complete with an array of images and associations that most Westerners would not regard as flattering, particularly in the areas of sexual morality, family life, crime, and public safety. Like Western ideas about the Muslim Middle East, the images have at least a provisional basis in reality, but are often more representative of Hollywood than of day-to-day life. […] Without necessarily resorting to the outright fantasies and fabrications that can emerge in times of intense conflict, prevailing narratives in both the West and the Middle East neglect common ground and context in favor of events and arguments that symbolize the preconceived ideas about incommensurable, deeply opposed cultural value systems. Profound “otherness” is taken for granted, even at the level of basic preferences for violence or nonviolence. The “other” is inherently unstable or overbearing, while the “self” is by nature pacific yet placed on the defensive by adverse circumstances. Muslims and Westerners who narrate the story of confrontation seek to place Islamic-Western relations within an “us vs. them” framework that posits continuous historical antagonism from the rise of Islam in the seventh century to the present day. They project a world of protracted conflict between incompatible civilizations defined by religious allegiance, cultural affinity, and historical bonds. To underscore the allegedly violence-prone character of boundaries between civilizations and explain current tensions between America and contemporary Muslim movements,

348

A. A. Said et al.

they highlight instances of conflict between key members of each camp – the Arab tribes versus the Byzantines in the seventh century, the “Saracens” versus the Franks during the era of the Crusades, and Ottoman Turks versus European empires in more recent times. To support speculations concerning the future volatility of cross-cultural relationships, conflicts between groups identified with each civilizational camp are emphasized at the expense of more numerous conflicts within civilizations.41 As distasteful as crude enemy images may appear to the moderate and largely apolitical majorities in both cultural regions, sensational accounts of perennial confrontation and irreconcilable cultural divergence have a very real impact on public perceptions, particularly when they appear to correspond with televised portrayals of intractable, violent conflict. Narratives of inevitable confrontation offer a simple explanation of two Gulf wars (1991 and 2003), the attacks of September 11, and the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence that followed the breakdown of the Oslo process. They encourage observers to take competition and violence for granted as part of the natural state of things, rather than regard them as problems worthy of factfinding and soul-searching investigation. All who would seek to understand conflict between Middle Eastern Muslims and the West must therefore face widespread and powerful perceptions that “our reality” and “their reality” cannot meet, and that authentic security is to be found in cultural retrenchment combined with vigorous efforts to repress, repel, or convert the adversary. When conflicts between identity groups intensify, discussion of competing interests and areas of possible compromise gives way to a reframing of conflict in terms of opposed values and essences. “Our values” and “their values” are deemed mutually exclusive, and the latest frictions become yet another episode in a centuries-old chronicle of untoward events. Militant Muslim groups liken U.S. hegemony over the Middle East to Crusader occupation and cite Western speculations concerning a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993) as proof of hostile intent.42 For their part, influential American pundits have often floated references to the notion of an irreconcilable “clash of civilizations” before proposing that a World War II or Cold War analogy is more strategically appropriate: the appeal of militant Islamic ideologies and the capabilities of extremist groups signal a need for policies similar to those used to “roll back” fascism and communism (Goldberg 2001). Rather than engage their counterparts in dialogue to probe for underlying sources of tension, powerful voices in both cultural camps utilize strained historical analogies to argue that the necessary lessons for dealing with contemporary problems are to be found in epic struggles against the adversaries of times past. 41

As the Cold War waned, the historian Lewis (1990) proposed that Islam would become the next major rival of America and of Western civilization in general. He predicted a “clash of civilizations” – “the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both” (1990, p. 60). Political scientist Huntington (1993) embellished on this prediction in his much-debated article, “The Clash of Civilizations.” 42 Huntington’s credentials as a Harvard University professor and an advisor to past U.S. administrations inclined many to view his thesis as indicative of American perceptions more generally.

9 Making Peace with Islam

349

Three decades after the Iranian revolution, American doubts concerning the ability of Middle Eastern Muslims to govern themselves and Muslim mistrust of American intentions appear to be interacting in a more precarious manner than ever before, and the perceptual gap has widened (Halliday 2002). Middle Eastern Muslim analysts, on the one hand, tend to view militant groups such as al-Qa‘ida as byproducts of foreign hegemony, distorted change, and the defeat of secular Arab nationalist movements in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Americans commentators, on the other hand, are inclined to view extremist groups as evidence of inherent backwardness – i.e., of cultural intolerance and an associated inability or unwillingness to assimilate into the international system by adopting Western liberal models of thought and governance.43 Where Muslim voices argue that cultural and political change proceed best when people are allowed to learn from their own trial and error process, without external manipulation or control, a majority of American analysts call for tighter controls on Middle Eastern governments and societies, with some advocating forceful regime change in countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The manifest assumption behind such policy convictions is that Middle Eastern Muslim populations lack indigenous resources for democratic reform, understood in Western liberal terms. Change, then, must be exported to the region – first by combating subversive regimes and movements, and second by encouraging authoritarian leaders to adopt gradual economic and political reforms (Zakaria 2001). The Construction of Enduring Differences To understand narratives about confrontation between the West and Muslim peoples, we must be attentive not only to history and contemporary politics, but also to subtleties of human psychology and intercultural relations. As analysts of ethnic conflict recognize, members of communal groups tend to define their identity not only through the affirmation of positive qualities that are said to be manifest among their group’s members, but also through contrasting these positive qualities with the putatively inferior traits of out-group members (Cohen 1985; Northrup 1989; Stein 2001). This creates a sense of bounded identity, reinforces in-group solidarity, affirms shared values, strengthens individual and collective self-esteem, and facilitates cooperation to achieve common purposes. In short, “others” provide the collective “self” with a means of defining its own qualities and boundaries. The bonding culture that unites members of a group is formed by defining both “existential otherness” – what is normatively bad and therefore rejected in interactions among group members – and also “existential others” – who is, at best, outside the embrace of the community and, at worst, a threat to the in-group. This is another way of saying that, in intergroup relations, self-perception plays a role in conditioning the way the “other” will be perceived. Although down-to-earth, material issues and interests play a decisive role in any significant intergroup conflict, cultural differences powerfully affect the way conflict is symbolized and conducted. Culturally charged perceptions influence the meaning that estranged groups give to 43

Lewis’ arguments in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (1990), “Islam and Liberal Democracy” (1993), and What went wrong? (2003) are exemplary.

350

A. A. Said et al.

their conflict, and the meaning that groups give to their real and imagined differences defines the quality of relations between them. Similarly, actual history – to the extent that we are able to reconstruct it – plays a far less powerful role in shaping relations between communal groups than remembered history: the history that the recordkeepers, politicians, and storytellers of a community define as pertinent to challenges the group faces today. The way we remember the past – what it says about who “we” are, who or what our adversaries are, and what lessons we should apply to our present affairs – affects the way we construe the present, and vice versa. Because Islam appeared on the stage of world history shortly after the rise of Christianity to political prominence within the Roman and Byzantine empires, Islam has been a factor in the formation of Western identity for centuries, consistently playing the roles of political “rival” and theological “other.” Islam’s sudden breakthrough in Arab conquests of Byzantine and Persian lands, not to mention Spain, presented early Christians with a profound challenge, and gave rise to the conception of Islam as a “religion of the sword.” European Christians did not, however, immediately conceive of Islam as a source of religious ideas that could compete with Christianity on a level ideological playing field. From the beginning, their images of Islam were colored not only by the vicissitudes of relations between Muslim and Christian groups, but also by internal cultural and political preoccupations. The “Islamic other” was defined through largely ethnic distinctions – as a Moor, Saracen, or Turk – and used as a foil in debates about Christian virtue (Daniel 1993). Traditional Western images of Islam were based as much on imagination and presumption as on knowledge. In the Middle Ages, when the greatest hazards to Christians were political anarchy or failure to live up to religious ideals, European Christian writers represented Islam as a force of chaotic and violent passions of the flesh. At the time of the Crusades, Christian chroniclers referred to the “Saracens” as idolaters who worshipped the sun and Muhammad rather than as fellow monotheists; yet during the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, characterizations of Islam shifted to accentuate theological deviation, heresy, and corruption – the same sins that Protestants and Catholics were vigorously attributing to each other. By the time of the Enlightenment, a newer and more familiar Islamic “other” began to appear. This time it embodied fanaticism, intolerant backwardness, and obscurantist despotism in the face of rational faith and liberty. More recently, images of Islam have been shaped by the perception that Islamic culture represses women, encourages intolerant fundamentalism, and incites terrorism. Although the emphasis has differed in accordance with the salient issues of the day, the idea of Islam as “other” or as an “exception” to Western standards has remained constant. This idea grows in cultural prominence during times of direct political conflict, when Islam is viewed as alien, intrusive, and aggressive. Like Western impressions of Islam, Muslim images of the West have varied in accordance with cultural and political circumstances. Prior to the Western expansion in the modern age, Muslim thinkers lacked elaborate notions of a “Western other,” and indeed appeared to take little interest in their European neighbors. In contrast to initial Western ideas about Islam, which were shaped by insecurity in the face

9 Making Peace with Islam

351

of a theological and political challenge, early Islamic ideas about Europeans developed within a context of political success and cultural self-confidence. Muslims, after all, interpreted the rise of Islam to world-historical prominence as a sign of divine favor, just as Christian interpreters of Islam viewed the good fortunes of their counterparts with great existential discomfort. For Western chroniclers, the defeat of Muslim forces at Poitiers by Charles Martel in 732 was a watershed moment, while for most Muslims it was a relatively minor setback in a remote region of world. For medieval Muslims, then, the European “other” was perhaps a confirmation of relative Islamic greatness, just as Jews and Christians living under Islamic administration were viewed as generally non-threatening “People of the Book” who no longer possessed the divine mandate to rule in accordance with the word of God. Such, at least, was the state of affairs when Muslims felt secure in their worldly status, jeopardized far more by marauding Mongols emerging from Central Asia than by Europeans. The principal exception to this sense of security (some might even say complacency) vis-à-vis the West was the Crusades. Memories of invasion by Christian armies from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries have provided Middle Eastern Muslims with a major narrative motif for representations of modern colonialism. Muslim self-confidence vis-à-vis the West began to diminish with the loss of Spain in the late fifteenth century and, more significantly, with the collapse of Ottoman rule over a large swath of Eastern Europe. Americans remember 1492 as the year Columbus, sailing under the Spanish flag, “discovered” the New World. Contemporary Arabs and Muslims remember the year 1492 not for the voyage of Columbus to America, but rather for the fall of the kingdom of Granada, the last Arab Islamic presence in the West. In retrospect, this year marks the beginning of an era in which Islam receded to the East – to the periphery of an increasingly dynamic European state system – to become a non-Western phenomenon. With the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 and later the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarji in 1774, the Ottomans retreated from Europe and Muslims were reduced to passivity in world politics, leaving for European states the task of shaping the modern world. As Muslims see it, they were excluded from history; their destinies were now determined by increasingly intrusive Western powers. […] Recent decades have witnessed the slow and often painful reemergence of Muslim peoples in world politics. The end of colonialism brought Muslim “nation-states” into existence for the first time, but many of these states have faced great difficulty establishing political legitimacy. Challenges to the legitimacy of Muslim states have arisen not only from the cultural and ethnic diversity of their subject peoples, but also from Islam’s traditional subordination of principles of nationality, ethnicity, and territoriality to the bonds of religious solidarity. Especially in the Arab Middle East, the legitimacy of post-colonial states has been undercut both by longstanding Islamic affinities and by the crosscutting ties of ethnic and national feeling. Division among Arabs has frequently been attributed to the Western colonial legacy, and to the narrow self-interest of ruling elites. Middle Eastern Muslim images of the West are colored simultaneously by envy and fear, admiration and suspicion. Western technological, economic, and political achievements are appealing, while the assertion of Western military, political, and

352

A. A. Said et al.

economic power creates feelings of distrust, humiliation, and resentment. Pervasive Western cultural penetration generates deep ambivalence, in which attitudes of curiosity and even enthusiasm are coupled with a residual sense of inauthenticity or scandal associated with Western popular culture. Overall, Western civilization is seen as an example to be copied; but when Muslims of the Middle East examine Western culture through the lens of television and cinema, they see cultural decadence in the forms of sensuality, individualism, and materialistic disregard for religious values. […] Western pundits accentuate the value of individual freedom in their critiques of contemporary Islam. In the Islamic world, they suggest, the individual is subordinate to the collective and to clerical or charismatic leadership; in the West, freedom of the individual from political, religious, and cultural coercion is enshrined in a social system that limits arbitrary abuses of personal power (Lewis 1993). In response to such criticism, contemporary Muslims locate freedom at the level of the community and argue that the West has become estranged from itself, placing expediency ahead of all other values. These critiques of the “other” are deeply intertwined with political conflict, and frequently discolored by the taint of hypocrisy. Western rhetoric on freedom and democracy, for example, has often accompanied support for repressive leaders, just as invocations of Islamic values have been used to defend actions that appear contrary to their spirit (Tavakoli-Targhi 2002). […] Because the media gives priority to dangers posed by extremism and terrorism, the words and deeds of moderate and peaceful Muslims rarely capture headlines. In effect, Islam becomes known through news of intolerance and violence, as well as through simplistic political distinctions between “good Muslims” (pro-Western or secular) and “bad Muslims” (anti-Western or militant) (Mamdani 2004, p. 15). The governments of Muslim countries often play into this latter notion when soliciting economic and military support from Western sources. The dominant image of Islam in the West conveys the idea that the religion of approximately one-fifth of humanity is rigidly intolerant and prone to violence. Instead of taking critical analyses of Western attitudes toward Islam and the Middle East seriously, many who claim knowledge of the Islamic world focus overwhelmingly on threads of hatred and fear articulated through religious discourse. Though religious radicalism is indeed a legitimate and important focus of scholarly attention, much of the popular writing on this subject fails to account for the complex and deeply conflicted situations in which militant religious sentiments emerge. To a considerable extent, Islam has come to represent the “irrational” for Westerners – a symbol for that which cannot be understood. The Muslim world becomes known first and foremost as a security threat, and as a set of forms and images that appear in essence contrary to Western ideals, goals, and values. This can generate a temptation to recoil from all things Islamic, and to protect a self-image of superiority that affords little scope for acknowledging moral complexity. From such a standpoint – by no means universal among Westerners, yet influential in the political sphere – dialogue receives support as a public relations strategy, but not as a framework for political problem solving. […]

9 Making Peace with Islam

9.3.1.3

353

The Story of Compatibility

Fortunately, alternatives to narratives of confrontation exist, and have found expression in Western and Middle Eastern Muslim consciousness alike. The most common manifestation of these inclusive narratives is what we may characterize as a “second story” of compatibility. According to the narrators of this story, whose numbers include academics and diplomats as well as diverse protagonists of intercultural understanding, value differences between Western and Islamic civilizations do not predispose Muslims and Westerners to inevitable conflict. Insofar as both the West and Islam partake in a common human heritage of “civilization,” they share many values that provide a basis for cooperation. These values include respect for learning, desire for peace, esteem for toleration, and affirmation of human dignity. Shared Heritages For narrators of the story of compatibility, the existence of shared values is a result of historical relationships that protagonists of confrontation overlook. Not only is Islam an Abrahamic monotheist tradition in the same family as Judaism and Christianity; it is also a stakeholder in the classical tradition of ancient Greek learning. Medieval Islamic civilization, after all, was constructed out of Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures, and Europe benefited from knowledge garnered through interaction with Muslim lands.44 To speak of Islam and the West as perennial rivals distorts the actual historical record. In the words of historian Richard Bulliet, “The past and future of the West cannot be fully comprehended without appreciation of the twinned relationship it has had with Islam over some fourteen centuries. The same is true of the Islamic world (2004, p. 45)”45 Islam’s Hellenism was mediated primarily through Eastern Christian intellectual circles, and Muslim philosophical and scientific thought still remains an understudied field linking Late Antiquity with the Renaissance. Islamic contributions went far beyond mere preservation of the classical legacy, as is testified by the efforts which ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun made to tutor an Andalusian prince after the model of Plato’s Republic, or by the Heliocentric planetary theories that entered the scientific milieu of Copernicus by means of Arabic manuscripts. […] Europeans were willing recipients of much that [Islam] had to offer; Islamic civilization, in turn, profited from trade with Europe. The ubiquity of these linkages persuades narrators of the story of compatibility that Islam as a civilizational force has been an integral part of the Western tradition. While pointing out these bases for mutual appreciation, the compatibility story warns against polarizing misapplication of cultural labels. “Islam” and “the West” are heterogeneous categories; the diversity of each cultural region means that conflicts within civilizations are as significant as conflicts between them, and conflicts between 44

Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Averroes (Ibn Rushd), and other Muslim thinkers made notable contributions to the Western intellectual tradition in a range of fields that included medicine, philosophy, and chemistry. See Morgan (2007), Saliba (2007). 45 Emphasis in original.

354

A. A. Said et al.

particular Muslim and Western states or groups need not escalate to draw in entire civilizations. […] Islam is present in the West through large immigrant communities, and the West is commercially and culturally present in the Islamic world. Western models for higher education have been widely disseminated in the Muslim world, and many Muslim elites have been educated at Western universities. Because Islam and the West partake in common bonding cultures, they can coexist so long as a clash of symbols is not mistaken for a clash of substances. Preventing this cognitive error is possible, provided that spokespersons for Muslims and Westerners emphasize cultural commonalities while accommodating differences, and differentiate between constructive and destructive means of redressing grievances. Demystifying conflict is also important, because many problems in Muslim-Western relations have much less to do with religion or culture than with nationalism, gaps in levels of development, historical disadvantages of Muslim countries, and protracted rivalries over territory and natural resources.46 Such gaps can be bridged through goodwill, dialogue directed toward understanding, and practical problem solving (Ansari/Esposito 2001). Problematic Asymmetries Advocates of the story of compatibility seek to place a check on forms of cultural hubris and fanaticism that exaggerate differences, instill fear, and provide justification for misguided policies (Esposito 1999). […] While acknowledging that, from a historical perspective, both Middle Eastern Islamic and Western cultures have indulged in such self-referential moralizing, they propose that present tensions are complicated by the highly asymmetrical nature of relations. These relations have produced a dominant and a subordinate culture (Falk 1997). The persistence of this asymmetry, combined with a failure of Western leaders to internalize urgent feedback from Muslim spokespersons, has placed countries such as the United States on a collision course with contemporary Islamic movements. Whereas the confrontation story seeks to trace the roots of conflict overwhelmingly to cultural differences, the compatibility story attempts to combine cultural and political analysis. It proposes that Middle Eastern Muslims and Westerners are enmeshed in a complex, multidimensional conflict. On the one hand, the West remains unrivaled in terms of political, economic, and military capability. In the absence of a superpower competitor, the United States has become more deeply entwined in the politics and culture of the Middle East than ever before, alternately supporting or marginalizing various regimes and movements while also generating foreign satellite television images that are beamed into middle- and upper-class households on a daily basis. On the other hand, the increasingly pervasive American role in the region has engaged the political passions of Muslim activists; many of these activists hold the United States responsible, through sins of commission and omission, for the status

46

Canadian commentator Rick Salutin implicitly invokes the “second story” in his critique of the “clash of civilizations” idea as a totalizing concept that distracts attention from specific political conflicts that deserve our focused attention” (2006). For a related argument, see Halliday (1996).

9 Making Peace with Islam

355

of the Palestinians and the Iraqi people as well as for the corruption and incompetence of regimes that defer to Washington while resisting democratic participation and accountability. According to the compatibility story, cultural contact in a global context of unequal political and economic relations blemishes the exchange between Islam and the West, leaving the latter insensitively assertive and the former defensive and insecure. Many contemporary Muslims feel deeply threatened by what they perceive as an attitude in Western civilization that holds out the European and North American experiences of economic, political, and cultural development as models for the entire world. While most Muslims accept the idea that Western innovations in technology can be a source of great benefit for Muslim societies, many do object to what they view as the pretentious notion that the essential substance of democratic governance, development, human rights, and cultural enlightenment is embodied in the current practices of Western states and in the international norms these states have played a disproportionate role in shaping. […] Because of the current economic and political standing of Western countries, the West is often seen to control symbols of legitimacy and status. Elites in non-Western nations seek to acquire these symbols through degrees from Western educational institutions as well as through consumer goods. […] During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the assimilation and diffusion of Western technology within the Islamic world has begun to redress the imbalance between these two cultures, and the development of new satellite networks (e.g., Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya) and internet forums has provided Muslims in regions such as the Middle East with enhanced means of “telling their own story” without relying exclusively on state-controlled media outlets. These technological factors, combined with a determination not to submit any longer to the cultural humiliation of judging oneself by Western standards, has contributed to the growth in a tide of greater selfconsciousness as Islamic peoples in the Middle East and other regions have sought to rediscover the inherent worth of their own cultures. Probably the most dramatic example is the Islamic revival that is called Islamic fundamentalism by Westerners. Differentiating Between Revivalism and Terrorism While the story of confrontation attributes the political attitudes of militant factions to cultural and ideological factors, the story of compatibility proposes that mundane, political inspiration drives much of what is done in the name of Islamic or Western values. […] [T]he widespread appeal of Islamic movements depends heavily on political issues such as governmental corruption, autocracy, and apparent subservience to foreign masters. Likewise, Western policies toward Muslim and Middle Eastern countries have drawn more inspiration from Cold War geopolitics than from the Crusades, and have cast purportedly illiberal Islamic movements in the same mold as the communist insurgents of previous decades. Such perceptions underlie the increasingly popular idea that the Islamic world is gripped by a uniformly intolerant and militant ideology that must be contained and forcibly defeated. In addition to highlighting the contemporary political context within which the drama of Islamic-Western relations is unfolding, narrators of the compatibility story

356

A. A. Said et al.

actively seek to differentiate between moderates and hardliners in each cultural system (Moussalli 1999). With respect to Islam, they point out that those who argue for forcible defeat of Islamic activism often fail to differentiate between Islamic revivalism, a movement to renew the Muslim communities from within through public reaffirmation of Islamic values, and terrorism, the use of indiscriminate violence for political purposes. Whereas Islamic revivalism manifests a constructive concern with matters of social justice, political participation, and cultural authenticity – that is, with the practical challenge of constructing an “Islamic future” – terrorism channels feelings of crisis, besiegement, and despair into destructive and counterproductive acts. Where revivalism seeks to heighten the role of Islamic symbols and values in the public sphere, terrorism invokes a worldview of zero-sum identity conflict, in which Islam is under direct and deliberate assault by a powerful enemy against whom any means of combat are legitimate.47 As narrators of this second story observe, Islamic revivalism has far greater popular appeal than terrorism, and has become a broad-based social and political movement. First and foremost, it is a response to a widely felt malaise that has left Muslim societies weak and unable to meet the modern world on their own terms (Esposito 1987). Although its manifestations are remarkably widespread, Islamic revivalism is not a monolithic movement, nor is it equivalent to the militant fundamentalism and terrorism that capture most media attention. It is based in no small part on a widespread feeling among Muslims that, in comparison to such other historic centers of human civilization as China and Japan, they have not reversed the decline in their global status. Beset by a failure of secular nationalist movements to restore a sense of dignity and self-respect to the Islamic world, Muslim peoples of diverse nationalities have turned to Islamic revivalism as a way of defining who they are. Under conditions of cultural, economic, and political marginalization, large numbers of people have returned to deeply embedded religious discourses as they search for authentic values and alternative means of responding to their problems (Voll 1994). The issues that motivate Islamic revivalism are similar to those that provide impetus to popular revival movements in other religious and communal contexts. In fact, the tension between secular nationalism and alternative religious solidarities in the Islamic world bears a similarity to splits in Israel, India, and even the United States. In an increasingly “globalized” world, latent dissatisfaction with what materialist, consumer-oriented society offers has become remarkably widespread. When national governments are perceived as failing to offer their peoples more than a medley of technical “fixes” which amount to tinkering with inefficient political, social, and economic institutions, this sentiment comes to the forefront of cultural and often political life (Juergensmeyer 1993). Adherents of the compatibility story rightly note that contemporary Islamic revivalism is better understood as an attempt to “Islamize” modernity than as a backward-looking rejection of the modern world 47

As studies of popular opinion in the Arab world have indicated, the belief that Islam is under attack is a factor that correlates strongly with support for terrorism. See United States Institute of Peace, “Support for Terrorism Linked to Feelings of Threat” (2006); Fair and Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism?” (2006).

9 Making Peace with Islam

357

(Euben 1999). Instead, revivalists frame their advocacy as a strongly felt expression of cultural identity and as an ideological critique of domestic as well as international political orders. Representing Islam as a deeply embedded aspect of culture, they emphasize that it is natural for the idiom of politics in the Middle East and other predominantly Muslim regions to bear the imprint of Islamic symbols and values. Islam provides a language that addresses politics as well as social relations and worship ; Islamic revivalism equips Muslims with a vocabulary through which they may affirm their identity, project themselves politically, and protest conditions that they recognize as root causes of instability – social exclusion, maldistribution of resources, and absence of legitimate, accountable, and participatory governance. In this respect, the role of Islamic revivalism in the modernization process of predominantly Muslim countries lends itself to comparison with the role of religious movements such as Calvinism in the West during the Reformation and Industrial Revolution (Weber 1930; Walzer 1969). Extremism in the Islamic world should not be viewed as an autonomous phenomenon, but rather as a reaction to genuine political, economic, and cultural contradictions. Many contemporary Muslims feel that they are adrift in the modern world, cut off from the past by colonialism and yet also devoid of a hopeful future toward which they might confidently aspire. Many Western observers, unsettled by the broad appeal of Islamic slogans and failing to grasp the context of political action, have made the mistake of tarring all Muslim political movements with the same brush. When policymakers fail to discriminate between Muslim movements or recognize possibilities for them to play a positive role, there is a danger of sanctioning repressive actions that exacerbate conflict and radicalize opposition. […] Particularly in the Middle East, the lack of political space for the expression of dissident views is a leading source of radicalization; often the only “safe” space for dissent is the mosque. Opening political space and taking actions that ameliorate key grievances can help to correct this problem by providing a sense of political efficacy that inspires creative thought and action. The primary barrier to democracy in the Middle East is not an absence of desire for it, but rather a lack of opportunities for democratic practice. Fundamentalism as a Shared Problem From the standpoint of the story of compatibility, Islam and the West are dangerously out of touch with each other. Misperceptions and mistrust have led to an everdeepening estrangement, in which each civilization has transformed symbols of the “other” into receptacles for their own collective fears. A form of psychopathology is operating at this symbolic level, in which self-referential systems of meaning are constructed around images of “self” and “other,” without reference either to material conditions that heighten conflict or to common aspects of the Abrahamic spiritual heritage. Muslims are equating Western media productions with the substance of Western culture, while failing to recognize such subtle manifestations of Western morality as regulations requiring accommodation for the handicapped; Westerners are reducing Islam to a set of fundamentalist practices that denigrate women and reject religious tolerance. The result is a relationship based on competition and rivalry,

358

A. A. Said et al.

accompanied by cultural insularity, retreat, and a tendency to denounce the “other’s” lack of positive values.48 While fundamentalism is usually understood to have an exclusively religious denotation, the compatibility story suggests the possibility of a broader definition of this term that accounts for intellectual rigidities on both sides of the Islamic-Western relationship. […] In the midst of conflict, inclusive understandings of shared values often give way to narrow formulations insisting on intellectual closure. In the process, the ability to hear and communicate with others shuts down. Thus do identity groups react to repeated external challenges by reducing previously complex belief systems to minimalist sets of “fundamentals” that can be used to reassert uniformity and organize in-group members to fight and protect themselves. Each embattled community takes a subset of basic tenets from their tradition and, either under pressure of insecurity or in the pursuit of political dominance, uses these symbolic values and doctrines to seal off others or maintain control. For Middle Eastern Muslims, fundamentalist tendencies take on an explicitly religious coloration (religion being a genuinely indigenous framework, in contrast to past experiments with Western derivatives such as nationalism and socialism). These tendencies reject foreign influences and seek to mount a defensive cultural and political campaign to repel outside intrusions. To ensure authenticity, all cultural practices, past or present, must be reexamined for correspondence with a current understanding of Islamic correctness. For Americans, a fundamentalist impulse may be seen not only in the uncompromising attitudes of an assertive religious right, but also in a hegemonic outlook that views the export of a particular Western approach to democracy and free market economy as the key to promoting security. Both tendencies are willing to part with humbler and more flexible traditions in the service of “urgent” political objectives, and deny responsibility for humiliation or insecurity that others have experienced. Neither can imagine the adversary’s behavior as a response (however morally problematic) to their own, and both doubt that a more inclusive formulation of their own values might help defuse the confrontation. In each case, the world is divided into two opposing camps, with rival parties representing their own practices as righteous, authoritative, and final (Ali 2002; Euben 1999, p. 19). Significantly, both of these “fundamentalisms” project a triumphalist vision of their own culture and values. It is arguable, though, that Western thinkers should be particularly concerned that, given existing power asymmetries, cultural confrontation places non-Western traditions on the defensive. This pushes Muslims and other groups to conceive of their options dichotomously, as a choice between “authenticity” and “soulless” adaptation to practices defined by others. If it could be affirmed that non-Western cultures have something substantive to contribute to the advancement 48

In “The Clash of Civilizations is Really One of Emotions,” Moisi (2006) provides a quite compelling explanation for these dynamics, characterized as they are by superficial jingoism and increasing hostility: “In our globalized age, we have lost the privilege – and, paradoxically, the virtue – of ignorance. We all see how others react, but without the minimal historical and cultural tools necessary to decipher those reactions. Globalization has paved the way to a world dominated by the dictatorship of the emotions – and of ignorance.”

9 Making Peace with Islam

359

of peace and human solidarity, more constructive and mutually beneficial forms of dialogue would likely develop. […] Narrators of the story of compatibility suggest that destructive conflict between Muslim movements and Western states is not the result of cultural essences (Eickelman/Piscatori 1996, pp. 162–163). Rather than a “clash of civilizations,” it is a “clash of ignorance” (Said 2001) or a failure to appreciate the best values in each tradition.49 If Muslims were to hold themselves accountable to their tradition of ethical monotheism and Westerners were to adhere to democratic values in foreign as well as domestic policy, cultural and political tensions would be much less severe. Moreover, if dialogue were preferred to coercive measures, areas of convergence could be found. The story of compatibility questions the comfortable, self-exculpatory assumptions of the story of confrontation, and seeks to counteract misperceptions as well as double standards. This means replacing moralistic “self”-images and monochromatically negative “other”-images with images that are closer to the complexity of reality, and also requires putting brakes on habits of contrasting one’s own cultural ideal (be it “freedom” or “faith”) with the other’s practice. […] In addition to reconsidering perceptions of “self” and “other,” the compatibility story speaks of a need to reassert shared values and interests, in order to impose limits on conflicts and prevent the provocations of militants from expanding them (Gerges 1999, pp. 241–242). […] Fundamentalism implies a refusal to listen to the “other.” Yet a return to the larger frame of a culture and its humane values, always present if sought for, can open up the space for understanding, cooperation, or at the very least, mutual respect. Where the story of confrontation narrows options to coercion/resistance and assimilation, the story of compatibility focuses attention on ways of coping with conflict more effectively. The confrontation story – the dominant story in political and strategic analyses – informs us of tensions that do in fact exist, but it neglects the truths of the compatibility story: significant areas of compatibility and deep resonance between Islamic and Western civilizations exist, and many problems in Islamic-Western relationships have as much to do with politics as with culture. Where the first story portrays dialogue between the West and Islam as an exercise in futility, the second story provides a hint of what can be gained by moving beyond facile, stereotypical language and judgments.

9.3.1.4

Toward a Story of Complementarity

Although the story of compatibility offers hope and a less culture-bound frame of reference for understanding conflict, its appeal to shared values and aspirations may

49

Rauf (2004) offers the following formula: “What’s right with America and what’s right with Islam have a lot in common. At their highest levels, both worldviews reflect an enlightened recognition that all of humankind shares a common Creator…” (p. 282).

360

A. A. Said et al.

not be adequate to overcome the present impasse. As we have seen, much conventional discourse on “Islam and the West” is deeply laden with presuppositions of irreconcilable “otherness.” Implicitly, Western and Muslim narrators of the story of confrontation argue that “we” cannot work with “them” until “they” become like “us.” “Islam” and “the West” are regarded as exclusive, static categories, and cultural or religious factors are obstacles to peacemaking, not resources. In arguing that these differences can indeed be transcended, the story of compatibility tends not to provide an in-depth response to questions about how Western models for political and economic development might be reconciled with intense Muslim desires for authenticity and distinctiveness. The second story escapes what Gregorian describes as the “unwarranted support for prejudice and false generalizations” that can be found in stories of confrontation (Gregorian 2003, p. 115), but offers only limited guidance with respect to the process through which Westerners and Muslims might come to accept that their similarities are at least as important as their differences. Islam and the West may well be compatible, but how, for example, might non-Muslim Americans come to know Middle Eastern Muslims more deeply? What might make the necessary engagement and perceived risk worthwhile? To escape the present impasse, we need a way of thinking about relations between Islam and the West that frames cultural and religious difference not only as a challenge but also as an opportunity. Leaders on both sides of the Islamic-Western divide have much to gain from moving beyond preoccupation with tired images, symbols, and postures, and toward genuine openness to a new experience of the “other.” Narrow attachment to preconceived images, inflexible doctrines, and fixed political positions prevents dialogue. Most important for both communities at this time is the need to move beyond reactionary impulses triggered by symbols. To fixate on symbols that trigger an “us versus them” mentality is to endure a profoundly limiting psychological condition. This confusion of symbolic form with substance is precisely what drove the terrorists who struck at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the United States is not a series of buildings that can be brought down, and destroying external forms does not necessarily damage the spirit that built them. Similarly, Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the United States and U.S. foreign policy cannot be transformed simply by eliminating leaders such as Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. Preoccupation with defeating adversary leaders can lead to a self-defeating foreign policy – no matter how unsavory those leaders may be. Only active engagement through sustained dialogue can help us to transcend the fear, anger, and insecurity that foster conflict escalation, and discover the common humanity that these emotions conceal. And we are only likely to commit ourselves to such dialogue if we can begin to narrate a new story, a story about complementarity. Moving beyond reactionary attitudes and symbolic positions requires that the West and Islam know each another. Instead of retreating into deep subjectivity and strengthening the position of confrontationists, Muslims and Westerners need to develop processes of communication that generate new insights. There is an opportunity to develop awareness of experiences, practices, and visions according to which people operating within one cultural or religious framework are able to enrich and

9 Making Peace with Islam

361

support those living within another, enhancing the quality of human life through cooperation rather than detracting from it through destructive competition. The current estrangement between Islamic and Western cultures is unsustainable. The events of September 11 and the subsequent American military campaigns have left Muslims and Westerners increasingly distrustful both of each other and of the more humanistic and life-affirming values within their respective traditions. Rather than encounter in Islam a distinctive patterning of human life that enriches Western understandings of how cultural pluralism might be accommodated (Said/SharifyFunk 2003), Westerners are responding to political conflict with Muslims by reconsidering past experiments with cultural diversity. Muslims, in turn, are increasingly experiencing Western calls for greater political pluralism as a threat rather than as an opportunity to develop their own political systems. At the same time, there are many in both the Islamic world and in the West who recognize that remaining true to their own best values will require both political and cultural coexistence. Westerners are finding that they cannot retain a fully “Western” way of life without peaceful relations with Muslims – insofar as the term “Western” is intended to evoke respect for democracy, human dignity, and human rights. Likewise, many Muslims are discovering that they cannot fully realize the potential of their faith tradition as long as they find themselves defining Islam in opposition to a “Western other” (Said et al. 2006). Such relations empower extremist factions willing to jeopardize the rich and diverse heritage of Islamic civilization in their pursuit of an elusive ideal of cultural purity. Because the world no longer affords scope for authenticity in isolation or security through empire, Muslims and Westerners need to experience themselves “in relationship” rather than “out of relationship.” They have an opportunity to find meaning in the common tragedy of their estrangement as well as in the possibility of reconciliation. They can also reconsider traditional ways of construing the values that divide them in dichotomous terms – i.e., “individualism versus community,” “reason versus revelation,” “science versus faith,” “materialism versus spirituality,” “efficiency versus relationships,” “freedom to do versus freedom to be.” When cultures view these sets of values as polarities rather than as complementarities, they are more likely to find themselves in conflict with those who have different priorities. Recognizing that seemingly opposed values can actually reinforce each other opens new possibilities both for intercultural relations and for full development of the human personality. Establishing peace in the present climate of mutual recrimination will not be easy. […] As the story [of confrontation] suggests, war appears natural when parties to conflict remain barricaded in reactive and defensive states of awareness. Peacemaking, in contrast to war-making, is proactive and requires deliberate efforts to move from the superficial to the essential, from morbidity to creativity, from defensiveness to openness, from a competitive focus on the negative to a cooperative affirmation of positive possibilities, and from the politics of fear and projection to a politics of hope. Positive change requires full engagement of the “self” with the “other,” together with an awareness that Islamic and Western cultures bear within

362

A. A. Said et al.

themselves not just the burdens of past conflicts but also resources for change in the present.

9.3.2 Preparing for Peace Funk, N. C., & Said, A. A. (2009). Preparing for peace. In N. C. Funk and A. A. Said, Islam and peacemaking in the Middle East (pp. 231–250). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 9.3.2.1

The Need for New Thinking

Much of the vitality of Islamic politics in the contemporary Middle East reflects both anxiety about social change and a deeply felt need for a cultural future that provides Muslims with dignity and purpose. In the view of many Islamic activists, the erosion of traditional values is proceeding at an alarming pace, with no new life-giving values taking their place. This sense of anomie is compounded by conflicts such as those in Israel-Palestine and Iraq and by the perception that Muslims everywhere are hemmed in by numerous life-denying forces related to dependent globalization, foreign hegemony, and the failure of indigenous elites to provide viable strategies for democracy and development. To assert themselves politically and prevent a disintegration of social and cultural life, Middle Eastern Muslims have increasingly chosen a religious vocabulary to express their existential and practical concerns. […] A Choice for Americans While entertaining options about how to engage Muslims, Americans in particular must choose how they wish to conceive of their own national identity and project it in the world. The United States has the power to select between two paths – one likely to polarize the nations of the world further and one capable of transforming the existing transnational disorder. The first path is that of “America the Strong.” Because its actions are motivated by fear, America the Strong will continue to pursue an increasingly stark unilateral foreign policy predicated on ensuring its own security in ways that other nations regard as threatening and contrary to their interests. To reinstall order in a manner believed to be in line with its own narrowly conceived interests, the U.S. will continue to support its perceived friends and undermine its perceived enemies based on calculations of short-term strategic power politics, with little regard for proclaimed core values or long-term consequences. By choosing short-term security, America the Strong will use power in ways that ensure lasting strife and resentment. The path of “America the Brave” relies on the courage to make short-term, unilateral concessions as well as bilateral compromises to ensure long-term global prosperity. This path is one of leadership instead of control. In choosing this path, the U.S. response to mounting disorder will be a commitment to advancing a more

9 Making Peace with Islam

363

humane global community. The priority in maintaining security will be to address the root causes of disorder instead of concentrating on strategic advantage. Rather than building ever-higher barriers around itself America the Brave will explore options for constructing bridges to Arabs and Muslims. By recognizing that America needs the world and vice versa […] America the Brave will seek to engage Arabs and Muslims as partners and in doing so set the stage for a new era of cooperative relationship. […] A Choice for Muslims When invoking Islam, Middle Eastern Muslims are free to choose between competing discourses – most notably between a defensive, collectivist outlook that promises deliverance from external challenges through adherence to a narrow set of precepts underscoring Muslim uniqueness… and a more broadly inclusive framework seeking to make traditional Islamic prescriptions for social justice, human dignity, and cultural pluralism relevant to the contemporary world. Where the former uses of Islam are based on belief in an idealized, unchanging and monolithic Islam of times past, the latter uses […] are derived from belief that the practice of Islam must be as dynamic as the historical and cultural contexts within which Muslims have lived. […] One important prerequisite for unleashing the potential of Muslims as peacemakers is the development of new thinking about the empowerment of Muslims as active citizens in their community and in national as well as transnational contexts. There is a great need in the Muslim world to integrate deliberately the person, the citizen, and the Muslim. This involves a search for truth within Islamic traditions and contexts that begins at the level of the individual. Christianity has emerged from its own encounters with modern thought by closely linking personal behavior with citizenship and social values, while Muslims today may be on the threshold of discovering the responsibilities and deeper meaning of Muslim citizenship. Citizenship for Muslims offers similar opportunities, and can be recognized not in the carrying out of decisions handed down by political leaders, but rather in proactive and value-based engagement with one’s own society. There are many questions that Muslims may find it helpful to ask. What kind of citizens can Islamic values create? What Islamic values and social mechanisms can be applied for ameliorating the conditions of modern, urban living, or for enacting participatory social decision-making in the absence of authoritative guidance? How can Muslims improve upon the systems of education and develop new kinds of interactive relationships between teacher and student? How can new communications technologies be used to facilitate greater information dissemination among Middle Eastern Muslims, to present them with political alternatives and greater opportunities for participation in public life? The flowering of the individual as citizen within a more open and cosmopolitan conception of Islamic community could inspire new avenues for tapping the energies of future generations while providing richer, more vibrant expressions of Islam’s enduring values. […]

364

9.3.2.2

A. A. Said et al.

Reconciling Islam and Democracy

To create greater scope for resolving social conflicts and achieving change by nonviolent means, a reconciliation between Islam and democracy will likely prove necessary. There is a great and pressing need for a revitalization of participation in public life and decision-making in Islamic countries. Without appropriate cultural forms for democratic participation, the innovative thinking of reformists will be muffled or suppressed, and the dynamic energy of Islamic revival will be forced into narrower channels marked by extremism and violence. Fortunately, the subject of Islam and democracy is a vibrant area of contemporary Muslim thought. The practice of democracy is always less tidy and more dynamic than formal definitions can suggest or prescribe. There are democratic precepts in Islam just as there are in other religions. There are also Islamic traditions that, like traditions in other religions, result in transgressions against democratic ideals. The claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy equates Western institutional forms of democracy – particularly the notion of liberal democracy – with the substance of democracy. […] Nothing in Islam precludes common goals, community participation, and protective safeguards. It is true that Western liberal forms of democracy with their provisions for political parties, interest groups, and an electoral system are alien to Islamic tradition. But democracy is not built upon specific, universally prescribed institutions; it is built upon participation. The absence of democracy in Islamic countries has much less to do with a lack of religious and cultural foundations than with a lack of awareness, opportunity, and preparation. It is no exaggeration to state that, in most contemporary Muslim communities, a thick web of political problems and unresolved conflicts creates a deep sense of powerlessness and humiliation. The popularity of conspiracy theories that deny the capability of Muslims to determine their own future attests to disempowerment born of domestic authoritarianism, unaccountable security agencies, and unpopular Western foreign policies. In addition, unemployment and underemployment are experienced as grave problems by young men in much of the Muslim world, and can have a profoundly damaging impact by reinforcing despair and hopelessness. Presently, the door is open for a new thinking about Middle Eastern democracy, among both Western and regional analysts. There is a need to factor into this new thinking on democracy consideration of the roles of the community, the individual, the state, and religion in order to fashion a model for cooperative, participatory politics which is responsive to cultural needs. In particular, a model of Islamic civil society can be constructed – a model that could include diverse organizations which have not been founded by states and express themselves in an idiom that reflects regional culture: neighborhood associations, self-help groups, charitable and medical services, women’s organizations, professional organizations, and labor unions. It would be a mistake to exclude modalities of free, independent association from a conception of civil society simply because of their possible religious overtones, especially considering the disjunction between the theory and practice of civil society

9 Making Peace with Islam

365

in the West, where apathy, unequal access to financial resources, and the politics of interest groups detract from the vitality of civic life and ideals of democratic process. Arguing that Muslim countries are “not ready for democracy” amounts to denying the dynamism of cultural and religious traditions and the aspirations of a great many Muslims (Fattah 2006), and overlooking the possibility of democratic forms evolving organically out of a context of meaning familiar to people at the grassroots. Islamic values place a strong emphasis on the nobility of the person. With respect to gender rights, Islamic law granted legal personality to women before Western women were able to achieve this status.50 Islam also accentuates egalitarianism. Though political democracy, Western or Islamic, is rarely practiced in today’s Arab world, it does not therefore follow that Islam and democracy are incompatible. In this regard there are democratic precepts in Islam, as there are in other religions, to include both the preservation and development of the community, through concern for social justice, accountable leadership, and consultative mechanisms. Though contemporary Islamic movements are sometimes ambivalent in their commitment to securing a genuinely democratic political order, research on Middle Eastern Islamic social institutions has demonstrated that their internal practices can be at least as democratic as those used by their secular counterparts (Clark 2007). How might Muslims encourage the development of citizens animated by Islamic values and contexts? A new vision of democracy for the Middle East and other predominantly Muslim regions could include three components: (1) dynamic stability, (2) indivisible rights, and (3) inclusive justice. Such a vision would be particularly helpful in efforts to help diverse social and political actors avoid the “drift” that accompanies pursuit of short-term self-interest without regard for long-term consequences. A vision is also essential for fostering the emergence of imagination, energy, commitment, and mutual responsibility. The three elements of this vision are closely interrelated. Dynamic stability signifies the need for a social system that is orderly but not reactionary or static. Indivisible rights denotes a widening and deepening concept of equal justice under the law that embraces not only civil and political rights but economic well-being, efforts to advance the status of women, and the right to participate in the cultural life of one’s community. Inclusive justice links the local and national to the global, underscoring the need for an expanded international law that facilitates global security for all, including ecological security. Democracy in the Middle East, like democracy in other regions, needs to be rooted in a genuinely inclusive commitment to human dignity.

50

Although historical comparisons offer at best limited guidance for dealing with current disputes over gender norms, many Muslim commentators have found it meaningful to note that the rights accorded to women by early Islamic law compared quite favorably with those granted not just by pre-Islamic traditions of the Near East, but also by the more or less contemporaneous legal systems and customs of Rome, South Asia, and Africa. See, for example, Goolam (2006), Hanafi (2002). Many present-day Muslim feminists, such as Azizah al-Hibri (1997), argue that Islam itself offers powerful correctives for the patriarchal habits of traditional Muslim societies.

366

A. A. Said et al.

Democracy cannot be installed by a military coup or by a revolution from the top, because democratic behavior is a learned behavior. Both rulers and ruled have to learn it. […]

9.3.2.3

Opportunities for Mutual Learning

Historically, both the West and Islam have relied too much on the seemingly selfevident testimonies of their beliefs and accomplishments, without sufficient recourse to genuine interpersonal or intercultural dialogue and bridge building. A new, mutually rewarding relationship has the potential to emerge between Islam and the West, where accumulated wisdom and insights provide the basis for a valued coexistence. Such a relationship would be premised not on ideas of cultural autarky or triumphalism but on mutual respect and a desire for reconciliation. Much progress can be made in the pursuit of reconciliation when Muslims and Westerners approach one another with humility, in a spirit of dialogue. Past moments of intercultural and interreligious openness […] provide a glimmer of what might become possible if common ground were to be sought more actively by policymakers, elites, and concerned citizens. […]

References Abdul Rauf, F. (2004). What’s right with Islam: A new vision for Muslims and the West. New York: HarperCollins. Abu Laila, M. (1991). Islam and peace. The Islamic Quarterly, 35(1), 55–69. Abul-Fadl, M. (1987). Community, justice, and jihad: Elements of the Muslim historical consciousness. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 4(1), 13–30. Abul-Fadl, M. (1988). Islamization as a force of global cultural renewal or the relevance of the Tawhidi episteme to modernity. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 5(2), 163–179. Ahmed, A. S. (1993). Media Mongols at the gates of Baghdad. New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer, 10–18. Al-Hibri, A. (1997). Islam, law and custom. American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 2(1), 1–44. Ali, A. (1991). Happiness without death. Putney, VT: Threshold Books. Ali, T. (2002). The clash of fundamentalisms: Crusades, jihads, and modernity. London: Verso. al-Muqaddasi, I. (1980). The revelation of the secrets of the birds and the flowers, trans. Irene Hoare and Darya Galy. London: The Octagon Press. Ansari, Z. I., & Esposito, J. L. (Eds.). (2001). Muslims and the West: Encounter and dialogue. Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Armstrong. (1991). Holy war: The crusades and their impact on the today’s world. New York: Doubleday Publishers. Assefa, H. (1993). Peace and reconciliation as a paradigm. Nairobi, Kenya: Nairobi Peace Initiative. Augsburger, D. W. (1992). Conflict mediation across cultures: Pathways and patterns. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press. Avruch, K. (1998). Culture and conflict resolution. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

9 Making Peace with Islam

367

Bateson, G., & Bateson, M. C. (1987). Angels fear: Towards an epistemology of the sacred. New York: Macmillan. Berry, T. (1988). The dream of the earth. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Brohi, A. K. (1980). Contribution of Islam (considered as religio perennis) to the problems of world peace. In H. A. Jack (Ed.), Religion in the struggle for world community. New York: World Conference on Religion and Peace. Bsteh, A. (Ed.). (1996). Peace for humanity: Principles, problems and perspectives of the future as seen by Muslims and Christians. New Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing House Bulliet, R. (2004). The case for Islamo-Christian civilization. New York: Columbia University Press. Burton, J. (1990). Conflict: Resolution and provention. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Chittick, W. C. (1986, June). God surrounds all things. The World and I, 1(6), 671–678. Clark, J. (2007). Canadian interests and democracy promotion in the Middle East. In P. Heinbecker & B. Momani (Eds.), Canada and the Middle East: In theory and practice (pp. 91–115). Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Cohen, A. P. (1985). The Symbolic construction of community. New York: Routledge. Crow, K. D. (n.d.). Islamic ethics and values: Relevance for conflict resolution [Unpublished manuscript]. Daniel, N. (1966). Islam, Europe and empire. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Daniel, N. (1993). Islam and the West: The making of an image. Oxford: Oneworld Publishers. Dennis, A. J. (1996). The rise of the Islamic empire and the threat to the West. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press. Eaton, G. (1993). Islam and the environment. Islamica: The Journal of the Islamic Society of the London School of Economics, 1(2) 18–21. Eickelman, D. F., & Piscatori, J. (1996). Muslim politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Esposito. (1987). Islam and politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Esposito, J. L. (1992). The Islamic threat: Myth or reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esposito, J. L., & Voll, J. O. (1996). Islam and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. Euben, R. (1999). Enemy in the mirror: Islamic fundamentalism and the limits of modern rationalism: A work of comparative political theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fair, C. C., & Shepherd, B. (2006). Who supports terrorism? Evidence from fourteen Muslim countries. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29(1), 51–74. Falk, R. (1997). False universalism and the geopolitics of exclusion: The case of Islam. Third World Quarterly, 18(1), 7–23. Fattah, M. A. (2006). Democratic values in the Muslim world. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (2nd ed.). New York: Penguin Books. Foltz, R. C., Denny, F. M., & Baharuddin, A. (Eds.) (2003). Islam and ecology: A bestowed trust. Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard Divinity School. Gerges, F. (1999). America and political Islam: Clash of cultures or clash of interests? New York: Cambridge University Press. Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goldberg, J. (2001, October 26). A new cold war—With a twist. National Review Online. https:// www.nationalreview.com/2001/10/new-cold-war-twist-jonah-goldberg/. Goodman, L. E. (Trans.) (1978). The case of the animals versus man before the king of the jinn: A tenth-century ecological fable of the Pure Brethren of Basra. Boston: G. K. Hall & Co. Goolam, H. N. (2006). Gender equality in Islamic family law. In H. M. Ramadan (Ed.), Understanding Islamic law: From classical to contemporary (pp. 117–134). Lanham, MD: AltaMira. Gopin, M. (1997). Religion, violence, conflict resolution. Peace and Change, 22(January), 1–31. Gopin, M. (2000). Between Eden and Armageddon: The future of world religions, violence, and peacemaking. New York: Oxford University Press. Gregorian, V. (2003). Islam: A mosaic, not a monolith. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.

368

A. A. Said et al.

Halliday, F. (1996). Islam and the myth of confrontation. London: IB Tauris. Halliday, F. (2002). Two hours that shook the world: September 11, 2001—Causes and consequences. London: Saqi Books. Hanafi, H. (2002). Alternative conceptions of civil society: A reflective Islamic approach. In S. H. Hashmi (Ed.), Islamic political ethics: Civil society, pluralism, and conflict (pp. 56–75). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hashemi, N. A. (1997). From the red menace to the green peril: The enduring legacy of the Cold War and its links to political Islam. Middle East Affairs Journal, 3(1–2), 48. Hodgson, M. (1974). The venture of Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hunter, S. (1998). The future of Islam and the West: Clash of civilizations or peaceful coexistence? Praeger Press. Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. Hussain, A., Olson, R., & Qureshi, J. (Eds.). (1984). Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists. Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books. Ibn al-‘Arabi, M., & Nicholson, R. A. (1978). The tarjuman al-ashwaq: A collection of mystical odes by Muhyi‘ddin Ibn al-‘Arabi. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House Ltd. Irani, G. E., & Funk, N. C. (1998). Rituals of reconciliation: Arab-Islamic perspectives. Arab Studies Quarterly, 20(4), 53–73. Johansen, R. C. (1997). Radical Islam and nonviolence: A case study of religious empowerment and constraint among Pashtuns. Journal of Peace Research, 34(1), 53–71. Johnston, D., & Sampson, C. (Eds.). (1994). Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press. Juergensmeyer, M. (1993). The new Cold War? Religious nationalism confronts the secular state. Berkeley: University of California. Kelman, H. (1997). Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict. In I. W. Zartman & L. Rasmussen (Eds.), Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques (pp. 191–237). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Khan, S. Z. (1973). The fundamental of peace. In H. A. Jack (Ed.), Religion for peace: Proceedings of the Kyoto conference on religion and peace. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. Korten, D. C. (1995). When corporations rule the world. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. Kramer, M. (1998). Memorandum for the President: What you should know about Muslim politics and society. In P. D. Zelikow & R. B. Zoellick (Eds.), America and the Muslim Middle East (pp. 19–32). Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute. Kung, H. (Ed.). (1996). Yes to a global ethic. New York: Continuum. Laue, J. H. (1988). Contributions of the emerging field of conflict resolution. In W. S. Thompson & K. M. Jensen (Eds.), Approaches to peace: An intellectual map. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lederach, J. P. (1996). The mediator’s cultural assumptions. In J. Stutzman & C. Schrock-Shenk (Eds.), Mediation and facilitation training manual: Foundations and skills for constructive conflict transformation (3rd ed.) (pp. 80–82). Akron, PA: Mennonite Conciliation Service. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lewis, B. (1990, September). The roots of Muslim rage. Atlantic Monthly, 266(3), 47–60. Lewis, B. (1993, February). Islam and liberal democracy. Atlantic Monthly, 271(2), 89–98. Lewis, B. (1998). Memorandum for the President: What you should know about Islam. In P. D. Zelikow & R. B. Zoellick (Eds.), America and the Muslim Middle East (pp. 5–18). Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute. Lewis, B. (2003). What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East. New York: Perennial. Maalouf, A. (1984). Crusades through Arab eye. New York: Schocken. Mamdani. (2004). Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the roots of terror. New York: Pantheon.

9 Making Peace with Islam

369

Marty, M. E. (1992, October 28). Explaining the rise of fundamentalism. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 39(10), A56. Moisi, D. (2006, March 27). The clash of civilizations is really one of emotions. Daily Star (Beirut). Morgan, M. H. (2007). Lost History: The enduring legacy of Muslim scientists, thinkers, and artists. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society. Moussalli, A. (1999). Moderate and radical Islamic fundamentalism. Murata, S., & Chittick, W. C. (1994). The vision of Islam. New York: Paragon House. Nasr, S. H. (1975). Islam and the plight of modern man. New York: Longman Group Ltd. Nasr, S. H. (1989). Knowledge and the sacred. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Neumann, I. B. (1999). Uses of the other: “The East” in European identity formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Northrup, T. A. (1989). The dynamic of identity in personal and social conflict. In L. Kriesburg, T. A. Northrup, & S. J. Thorson (Eds.), Intractable conflicts and their transformation (pp. 55–82). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Payne, R. J. (1995). The clash with distant cultures: Values, interests, and force in American foreign policy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Pipes, D. (1982). In the path of God: Islam and political power. New York: Basic Books. Pipes, D. (1995). There are no moderates: Dealing with fundamentalist Islam. The National Interest, 41(41), 48–57. Reiss, H. (Ed.). (1991). Kant: Political writings. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rodman, P. (1994). Policy brief: Co-opt or confront fundamentalist Islam? Middle East Quarterly, 1(4). https://www.meforum.org/201/policy-brief-co-opt-or-confront-fundamentalist Ross, M. H. (2002). The political psychology of competing narratives: September 11 and beyond. In C. Calhoun, P. Price, & A. Timmer (Eds.), Understanding September 11 (pp. 303–320). New York: New Press. Rubenstein, R. L. (Ed.). (1987). Spirit matters: The worldwide impact of religion on contemporary politics. New York: Paragon House. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (2003). Peace in the Sufi tradition. In R. C. Foltz, F. M. Denny, & A. Baharuddin (Eds.), Islam and ecology: A bestowed trust (pp. 155–183). Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard Divinity School. Said, A. A., Abu-Nimer, M., & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2006). Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not static. Abingdon: Routledge Publishers. Said, A. A., Funk, N. C., & Kadayifci, A. S. (Eds.) (2001). Peace and conflict resolution in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A. & Sharify-Funk, M. (Eds.). (2003). Cultural diversity in Islam. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. Said, E. (2001, October 22). The clash of ignorance. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/art icle/archive/clash-ignorance/ Saiyadain, K. G. (1968). Islam. In H. A. Jack (Ed.), World religions and world peace. Boston: Beacon Press. Saliba, G. (2007). Islamic science and the making of the European Renaissance. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institue of Technology Press. Salla, M. E. (1997). Political Islam and the West: A new cold war or convergence? Third World Quarterly, 18(4), 729–742. Salutin, R. (2006, February 10). Muslims “r” us, not them. The Globe and Mail. Satha-Anand, C. (1996). The politics of forgiveness: Islamic teachings and Gandhi’s teachings. In C. Satha-Anand, The nonviolent crescent: Two essays on Islam and nonviolence (pp. 9–24). Alkmaar, the Netherlands: International Fellowship of Reconciliation. Schimmel, A. (1994). Deciphering the signs of god: A phenomenological approach to Islam. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

370

A. A. Said et al.

Scimecca, J. A. (1991). Conflict resolution in the United States: The emergence of a profession. In K. Avruch, P. Black & J. A. Scimecca (Eds.), Conflict resolution: Cross-cultural Perspectives (pp. 19–39). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Sponsel, L. E., & Gregor, T. (Eds.). (1994). The anthropology of peace and nonviolence. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Stein, J. G. (2001). Image, identity, and the resolution of violent conflict. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict (pp. 189–208). Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace. Tavakoli-Targhi, M. (2002, January). Frontline mysticism and Eastern spirituality. ISIM Newsletter (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World), 13, 38. Thompson, W. S., & Jensen, K. M. (Eds.), Approaches to peace: An intellectual map. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Turner, B. S. (1974). Weber and Islam: A critical study. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. United States Institute of Peace. (2006, January-February). Support for terrorism linked to feelings of threat. Peace-Watch, 12(1), 14–15. Voll, J. O. (1994). Islam: Continuity and change in the modern world (2nd ed). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Wachtel, P. L. (1989). The poverty of affluence: A psychological portrait of the American way of life. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers. Walzer. (1969). Revolution of the saints: A study in the origins of radical politics. New York: Atheneum. Weber, M. (1930). Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Routledge Publishers. Weber, M. (1965). The sociology of religion. London: Oxford University Press. Wehr, P., & Lederach, J. P. (1993). Mediating conflict in Central America. Journal of Peace Research, 38(August), 331–346. Westerlund, D. (Ed.). (1996). Questioning the secular state: The worldwide resurgence of religion in politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Winslade, J., & Monk, G. (2000). Narrative mediation: A new approach to conflict resolution. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Zakaria, F. (2001, December 24). How to save the Arab World. Newsweek. Zelikow, P. D., & Zoellick, R. B. (Eds.). (1998). America and the Muslim Middle East. Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute.

Chapter 10

Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Meena Sharify-Funk

10.1 Authors’ Postscript to the Fourth Edition in Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective Said, A. A., & Lerche, C. O. III (1995). Authors’ postscript to the fourth edition. In A. A. Said, C. O. Lerche, Jr., and C. O. Lerche III. Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.) (pp. 278–289). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Throughout this book we have discussed values, politics, and the global predicament. We have emphasized that old attitudes, models, and practices are largely outmoded, and that new ones are necessary. The current global situation reflects elements of both old and new. We live in an era of transition, one whose scope and depth goes beyond anything yet witnessed in human history. We live in the midst of suffering and hope, and efforts to make new beginnings. There is a striking parallel between the current global condition and the experience of an individual striving to overcome personal challenges in his/her life. With the individual, the first stage is a growing sense that something is not right. An introspective quest for more appropriate values follows, which may involve a systematic reexamination of old beliefs and habits, and a search for new ones. Once new value commitments are made, a constant effort is required to bring action into agreement with these values. From this perspective, we can discover, amidst the crises of contemporary global politics, a search for those values upon which a viable future for our planet can be built. Abdul Aziz Said, the primary author of the writings presented in this chapter, was the longest serving professor at American University and founder of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program at the institution’s School of International Service. Nathan C. Funk (Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo) and Meena Sharify-Funk (Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University) received Said’s guidance while selecting these writings and then edited them for optimal fit within this volume.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_10

371

372

A. A. Said et al.

Some commentators have further suggested that humanity is currently at an adolescent stage of development. Adolescents are physically adults but emotionally still very much like children. As a species, too, we have the physical and technical means to create a global civilization, yet we still tend to see the world in terms of limited group identities derived from the past. Just as adolescence can be a dangerous time, with new physical powers being tested and sometimes misused for childish ends, the current global era is characterized by agitation, violence, and upheaval as new technical capacities are employed to pursue traditional rivalries. The issues facing us demand a new set of answers, arising from a new pattern of faith and belief. We feel strongly that those values must be spiritual in nature. As should be clear from the chapters of this book, we do not believe that everything in the universe, our world, or human nature is fully accessible to positivist science. Many aspects of our inner reality and life, including consciousness itself, remain mysterious, especially the age-old quest of the human spirit toward transcendence, a reaching toward an ultimate reality. Throughout history, though admittedly for limited periods, various civilizations have demonstrated how spiritual values can engender social progress. At the same time, we would hasten to acknowledge that these same values have just as often been corrupted and manipulated to justify actions that represent their antitheses. This in itself, however, should not prevent an appreciation of the historic association between the emergence of a truly moral social order and widespread commitment to spiritual values. Therefore we do not hesitate to take a position in regard to André Malraux’s famous declaration that “the twenty-first century will either be religious or it will not be”; that is, we either face the choice of moving in the direction of creativity or of becoming even less so than we are today. We prefer to use the term spiritual instead of religious. Although these terms are often used interchangeably, we see a distinction between them. The term religion refers to an institutional framework within which a specific theology is pursued, usually among a community of like-minded believers. Spirituality, on the other hand, transcends the boundaries of religion, suggesting broader human involvement that comes from the inner essence of a person. At the level of the individual, it refers to action borne of a commitment that is not necessarily informed by allegiance to a particular religion. We agree with the definition of spirituality put forth by the Scottish Council of Churches (1977): “Spirituality is an attempt to grow in sensitivity to self, to others, to non-human creations and to God who is within and beyond this totality.” Spirituality is a shift in consciousness that sees the whole of existence contained in the parts, and from the parts the whole is constructed. Spirituality filters out the superficial, the changing, and so the essential emerges. The term holistic expresses another metaphor for the spiritual: holding all directions in simultaneous connection – including both the horizontal and vertical directions. The horizontal connects one person with another, with all people, and with all things. Vertically, higher and lower levels of consciousness are joined. This creative organizing force of spirituality has historically been funneled into Indian, Chinese, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean society through such well-known visionaries as Buddha, Krishna, Moses, Jesus,

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

373

Lao Tzu, Muhammad, Saint Teresa, Rumi, and many others. In modern times, this creative force has found expression in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu, Elie Wiesel, and many others. Spirituality starts from the individual – from our very essence. Yet politics also is inherently spiritual because our public life reflects our social values. The reconnection of politics to our highest and most worthy values is now the most important task in political life. World events and trends will continue to expose the precariousness of international relations based on separateness in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. Spirituality provides the possibility of experiencing and accepting human solidarity and, most importantly, the wholeness of human life: Spirituality is an experience of a sense of unity that overcomes the principle that divides humanity on the basis of religions, races, genders, and classes. Just as we find that the naive materialism of the post-Renaissance centuries is no longer working, changes have begun in the direction of a more inclusive epistemology. As we enter the twenty-first century, we are recognizing that the deeper we delve into the fundamentals of science, the closer we are to the fundamentals of many of the traditional mysticisms. We are now coming to recognize the reality of “the sacred,” which we define as any process that explicitly links us to the largest possible context to which we belong. Gregory Bateson, when once asked to define sacrament, said, “the recognition of the pattern which connects.” Buddha translates literally as “the one who woke up,” and refers not just to the historical personage but also to any human being in a state of full awareness, i.e., a person dedicated to the support of the total patterning and harmony of our world. Reinvestment of “the sacred” means both the humanizing of that state of being and the consecration of the human. It is the recognition that sacred activity is not separate from immediate personal and interpersonal experience. Reinvestment of the sacred acknowledges the presence of both human responsibility and divine will in our activity. When we develop the view that all being is one, that human consciousness comprises both analytical and intuitive modes, we begin to see the individual parts of reality as well as the whole of it. The complementary functioning of the rational and the intuitive is a measure of human creativity. When we reconcile the two, we come to terms with ourselves as a whole, and bridge the gap between appearance and reality, without which there can be no vision. […] A new ethic must allow humanity to experience itself as complete, as we already are. It must value acceptance of the self as a whole, embracing the unconscious as well as conscious. The integration of the personality at the individual level becomes a metaphor for the integration of humanity at the species level. We feel that inner commitment to a vision of humankind’s place in the universe that gives priority to ethical thought and values over mere physical existence is a fundamental prerequisite for survival and, ultimately, prosperity on the planet. Furthermore, we accept the testimony of saints, mystics, and millions of ordinary people through the ages that there are inner/higher forces that can be drawn upon for inspiration, courage, and perseverance. It may be that only this kind of inner strength

374

A. A. Said et al.

and creative energy can sustain us and enable us to, in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s classic phrase, “say yes to the twentieth [and in our case twenty-first] century.” Religious traditions and spirituality, however, must be reborn if they are to respond to contemporary spiritual needs. Though most religious and ethical systems promote reciprocity and goodwill, their institutions and outlooks are too frequently identified with just those aspects of the past that contribute to current division and conflict. Put very simply, spiritual values for the present and future cannot be partisan; they must speak to the universal human need for transcendence, unity, and justice. In conclusion, we affirm that achieving a unifying global consensus as the basis for a humane, ecologically viable, new global system is possible. The essence of such a vision must be felt as well as rationally argued, because it involves both the head and the heart. From this perspective, a new global system requires new political and social arrangements, a new (or renewed) vision of humankind’s existential reality and purpose, and an unrelenting effort to make the former truly reflect the latter. This is an agenda for world politics worthy of what we see as the best in human nature and experience. We invite you to consider this perspective as you try to comprehend and find a place in our world.

10.2 Tawhid: The Sufi Tradition of Unity Said, A. A. (1988). Tawhid: the Sufi tradition of unity. Creation, 4(4), 24–25, 39. Often people who are working honestly for transformation become so involved with the struggles that their work entails that they either become frustrated and burn out, or, if they are successful, they have become by then so angry that they are no better than those they replace. Ego involvement is the major problem. The self becomes identified with the work so that one’s perspective becomes narrowed in one of two ways. In one case one reduces one’s view to the extent that success becomes everything. One reduces the end to the means, and power becomes the fundamental concern. The archetypes of this pathology are the perverted revolutions in which the champions of the people during the fight for freedom and justice become the worst oppressors of all. The second case involves narrowing one’s perspective to one’s concept of the ideal to the extent that it becomes an obsession. This may simply lead to incompetence, where the individual is blind to concrete everyday concerns. It may also lead to factionalism with people becoming so uncompromising that they spend more time struggling over abstract ideological issues than they do serving for their cause. Reduction of one’s perspective to the ideal also creates frustration because it involves raising expectations beyond what is possible. This may result in people giving up and dropping out even when they are making important gains. Or the resulting anger may produce desperate or suddenly violent actions which may be

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

375

counterproductive. In the worst case, overconcentration on the ideal leads to a singleminded ruthlessness in which people sacrifice all other values in the search for an abstract concept of perfection. Tawhid brings an understanding of the importance of avoiding these common obstacles: by constantly seeking to maintain one’s balance, by opening the heart more and more to the essence of the great diversity of human beings around us. […] Sometimes we must retreat from daily life to remember the truth. We do this to be able to enter the life of the outer world without losing our inner freedom. Whether we retreat to the desert, to nature, or just to a quiet room for a while, we are building the basis for detached participation in everyday life. Through detachment we can work for transformation, for a global cooperative order, while constantly remembering God and not allowing ourselves to become identified with anything. Because inattention separates us from the Absolute, we must strive to become more and more awake. As we breathe we can place our attention on each breath and be aware of our own presence. We can watch each step we take and remember where we came from and where we are going. We can learn to remain watchful, to keep our attention on what we are doing, whether outwardly or inwardly. We can observe what catches our attention and why. At all times we live in the moment, yet our heart must remain in attention.

10.3 Complementary Ways of Knowing Said, A. A. (1996, Spring). Complementary ways of knowing [unpublished manuscript].

10.3.1 Introduction Cooperative education includes teaching cooperation among the parts of an individual’s mind. Competitive education has given one-sided emphasis to Aristotelian, subject-predicate, quantitative, linear, analytical thinking. That is not a problem about analysis, Aristotle, quantity, or subjects and predicates. It’s a problem about onesidedness. There are other ways of knowing. To develop them to the point where they can really influence an individual’s life and even have a global impact, we need to include them in education from the earliest to the highest levels. But first we need to know what they are. There’s a catalogue of different but complementary ways of knowing. It’s necessary to develop them all, because the rational mind can do its job but not the others’. Second, the need for more than one way to know has implications for research. Positivism has liabilities as the methodology of the social sciences. Its quantitative approach has to be guided by intellectual analysis. Good theory is the basis for good methodology, and good theory and methodology together can control, or at least

376

A. A. Said et al.

ride, phenomena. Social science should enable us to first understand, then influence, and even resolve, human and political conflicts. Understanding comes first. Linear thinking misses the interconnectedness – the ecology – of phenomena separated and compartmentalized by scholastic departments, disciplines, and specialists. Humanity has to mature emotionally beyond limited group sympathies, and intellectually beyond narrow and linear thinking. If we can see that the different parts of the mind are complementary and harmonious, we may see that the whole world is one system.

10.3.2 Ways to Know 10.3.2.1

Analysis

In living and in science we rely on our ability to make logical determinations. Have we picked out the determining features of a situation? Can we tell what they will lead to? When presented with an argument, we have to know whether the conclusion follows from the premises. Does the argument invoke authorities in the field discussed, or just impressive names from some irrelevant area? When a doctor proposes eliminating sweets from our daily diet, or an economist advocates cutting welfare from the government budget, we need to know what would actually happen. Analytical skills are important for this. But they are not the only way of knowing. Let’s develop all our powers. We’re constantly faced with situations where analysis doesn’t take us where we want to go, and can’t serve as a basis for our choices. Then we rely on other ways of knowing. Everybody forsakes analysis sometimes. When the logical rationale for an idea eludes us, we may still be attracted to it because it’s elegant, coherent, powerful, and penetrating. And even when a position seems reasonable and well argued, we may feel it “just doesn’t make sense,” even though we can’t quite say why.

10.3.2.2

Discrimination

Sometimes we have to choose between two actions, for which the reasons and arguments are equally compelling. Thinking is arrested. Analysis has brought us to the edge of a river, but cannot carry us across. This is the nature of the vehicle. Analysis is secure progress – step-by-step deductions – like walking on a street. Plenty of true premises for logical deductions are like sidewalks and solid ground to walk on. Analytical deductions are notoriously like steps. But life is as often a lake or a river as a street. Deciding what to do or making a forecast is like having to jump in and swim. We’ve done all the analysis we can, so now we draw on discrimination. Discrimination subsumes aesthetic judgments, intuitive knowing, creative imagination, and a sense of wholeness and “rightness.” It may include hunches, gut feelings, and sudden

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

377

insights. The essential characteristic of discrimination is an internal sense of things, not what we’ve been taught by others. It’s implicit knowledge. The subject and predicate are united in an effortless unity, coming up already accomplished from inside us. It’s not an explicit, time-taking exposition of a subject connected later to a predicate. But the fact that discrimination is internal doesn’t mean it’s arbitrary, irrational, or random. We can confirm it empirically. Internal discrimination can be tested externally. We confirm discrimination through experience; we develop it through practice. We can compare our conclusions to those of accomplished discriminators. We can even use logic and analysis to verify the conclusions that discrimination reaches effortlessly. Hardy (1992) has written that this is how great theorems are discovered in mathematics. He says it happens through “imaginative leaps.” After having seen the truth, you go back and work out the logical reasons. The proof is a kind of confirmation you were right; it’s a road taking others toward the same truth.

10.3.2.3

Inspiration

But what provides discrimination with its material? Discrimination allows us to pick the correct choice from a list, or evaluate an idea or position articulated by somebody else. But how do we originate ideas, positions, and alternatives? How can we gain access to material to which discrimination and analysis may subsequently be applied? One way is inspiration. Inspiration is the inverse of discrimination. With discrimination, we marshal all our information and alternatives, and deploy all our faculties and skills, applying them to the problem. We bring all these figures out upon our inner stage. With inspiration, we sweep the stage clean. We empty ourselves, creating a vacuum into which new ideas can come. Emptying does not guarantee an inspiration will come. But it makes it more likely. It is likelier and sooner coming the longer and deeper is our emptying. This has to be cultivated. Emptying means no thinking. What the mind is empty of is thoughts. That doesn’t mean we become stupid. We don’t forget how to do analysis and discrimination. We analyze and discriminate when that is appropriate, and stop when it’s not. There’s a time to analyze and discriminate, and there’s a time to empty. We have to learn when to do the one and when to do the other. We need to learn how to analyze and discriminate, how to suspend judgment, stop analyzing and evaluating, and open ourselves to the unexpected – surrendering to the grace of the moment. Through balanced use of analysis, discrimination, and inspiration, we can become wise, truly “knowing” human beings. Thus knowledge may not only be driven by logical inference, or built by rational construction, but also wooed by creative imagination, invited by calm reflection, cleared for and awaited by emptying, instantaneously seen in intuitive insight, or received as pure gifts of inspiration. There are all these ways of knowing.

378

10.3.2.4

A. A. Said et al.

Knowledge as Being and Transformation

Real knowledge, however, knowledge in the complete sense, is knowledge of the unity of existence. Doubt remains as long as the object seems different from the knowing subject. Real knowledge is relational, because it expresses a relationship between all of existence. The whole is reflected and replicated in the parts; and from the parts we gain the knowledge to construct the whole. Ibn ‘Arabi, a 12th century Muslim mystic and philosopher, defined knowledge as perceiving and being that which is. We normally don’t feel this, that we are what we perceive or regard. The purpose of real knowing, therefore, is transformation. To really know is to be transformed. It is to be united with the object of knowledge. This knowledge blends heart and head. The heart directs the head to its proper purpose – to know the unity of existence – and the head focuses the heart’s energies so the transformation can occur. Knowledge has the nature of being, of awareness. We think we are separate creatures, but this is not our real nature; it’s not our true being. Existence is one. Hence knowledge is one. So the search for real knowledge must start with the question, “How can I find the unity of existence?” The unity of existence is knowledge of the unity of existence. This frees us from our illusions. Knowledge liberates us from the illusion of separateness.

10.3.2.5

The Rational Mind and Post-positivism Are Equally Limited

Knowledge presupposes the capability of knowing. This means using all the senses we possess. When we limit ourself to the knowledge our rational mind can perceive, we limit our ability to know the unity of existence. The rational mind operates on the basis of subject/object dualism. Confining ourself to the rational mind therefore guarantees forgetting the real purpose of knowing – transformation, being that which is. Instead we worship the mind itself. That’s a very dry and dead end, it’s not the purpose of knowing or living, but we cannot ignore the mind. We have to develop its powers fully. But we should not allow our knowledge to be limited by the one instrument of the rational mind. That limitation was the root shortcoming of scientific positivism – the methodology of physics, so successful in the hard sciences. It was superseded by postpositivism. But the post-positivist movement did not bring us new or deeper ways of knowing. Post-positivism merely relocated the source of reality from the individual to society or culture. This position mistakenly assumed that society or culture is an entity existing independently of individual humans, and acting upon them apart from other individuals. Even if there were such a reified “culture” to blame for injustice and crime, there is a reality beyond individuals and cultures. There is a pre-existing reality.

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

379

10.3.3 Ways of Research 10.3.3.1

Quantitative and Qualitative Research

Complementary ways of knowing indicates complementary ways of research. The dominant research method assembles facts in an ordered fashion, then looks for an underlying pattern. Linear regression in statistics is one such quantitative method in the dominant research armamentarium. A different way of research picks up where quantitative methods stop. This is research for meanings. Quantitative methods work well where decisions and thoughts have no place – with atoms, stones, molecules, and gravitational and electromagnetic fields in physics, chemistry, and engineering. But where thinking and choices of goals and means occur, to understand the situation we must look at these qualities. They are not quantities. The quantitative research mode, where we investigate facts and reveal patterns, serves as the point of departure for research into meaning. In qualitative research, we look at the context of these facts, and we study the relationship between them. Suppose we are researching Anwar Sadat’s peace initiative with the Israelis in the seventies. The qualitative question, the question of meaning, has to be, “What were Sadat’s intentions?” What did he have in mind? What made him look on long-time national enemies as people he could work with? And what changes did he hope for? What did he intend to realize? In other words, what were Sadat’s internal, conscious processes in deciding to initiate peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel? To think we can apply positivist methodology to historical and social processes like the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel is to assume that human beings can be fully understood in the same way atoms and stones can. Positivism in sociology and history assumes that, for purposes of scientific knowledge, human actors may as well do no thinking, have no conscious alternatives, no sympathies for suffering nor wishes to end it, no affinities for equals or willingness to approach them, no aspirations to put an end to conflicts, and no mental ability to envisage means or decide to try them out – in a word, do not have internal processes, but for all scientific purposes are atoms and stones. No wonder positivism has not worked out in the social sciences. To understand human actions, it is precisely the internal, conscious processes that are enacted into historical turning points. It is these inner processes that we must understand. Positivism rules them out. To avoid positivism’s failures, we must not rule them out. We must emphasize them. We must give them the closest and most careful attention. How do we do this? In the case of Sadat, we look at the process that formed his views, i.e., his ethical training, his religious beliefs, and so on. We do a biographical and psychological study. We factor in the knowledge he had of the cultural possibilities of the Egyptian and Israeli populations. He assessed his political support and opposition. We take into account his appreciation of military capabilities. What did he know about the Israeli leaders, what was on their minds, what was important to their populations and political parties, and so on? Above all, how did he feel about the effect of war and hostility upon human beings? From all this we piece together

380

A. A. Said et al.

the experience Anwar Sadat may have had in reaching his decision to make a peace overture to Tel Aviv. This is qualitative research: Any qualitative endeavor is art, not a quantitative science. Yet it is more scientific, in the original sense of science – more truly knowledge – than the methodology of positivism so out of place in studying human action.

10.3.3.2

Intellectual Principles

Positivistic over-reliance on quantitative methodology betrays distrust of intellectual analysis – thought, imagination, and discovery of new possibilities. Quantitative and other data are important. But data can only be understood in terms of intellectual principles. What kind of principles are we talking about? The cardinal principle of scientific reasoning is that if empirical results can be deduced from a hypothesis, and these results occur, then the hypothesis is confirmed with some degree of probability. This principle is sound, but not all data can be understood this way. The premise of economics is that conscious human beings choose their actions as means to improve their situation. They perform their actions, or trade their goods, to create a better situation than the present one. This is not a hypothesis. It is an intellectual principle. It is an apodictic starting point, a datum in every person’s consciousness, true for every one of their actions. From this indisputable basis develops the entire body of classical and Austrian economics. Other principles of understanding include complementarity and integration of opposites, reduction of tension, reciprocity, simplicity, and harmonization. These must find a place in any theory of the social sciences which is not sterile.

10.3.3.3

Theory of the Social Sciences

Present emphasis in the social sciences is on empirical and quantitative methodology – positivism. The argument is that without empirical quantitative methodology, propositions are unsubstantial, a priori, even lacking any value whatsoever. This positivistic emphasis derives from the model of physics, mathematics, engineering, chemistry, etc. The great success of these disciplines is held to be due to their quantitative methodology, empirical testing and validation, and their practical implications. This appreciation, however, is based upon a certain naivete in regard to the actual practice of the hard sciences. Empirical and quantitative they are, but their actual practitioners put theory first. For physicists, theory is prior to experimentation, since theory raises the questions on which empirical data are needed, shows how experiments have to be designed, and provides the matrix in which to interpret the resulting data. Without a theoretical matrix, experimenters are like a blind person in a dark room looking for a black cat that isn’t there. No matter how rigorously and exhaustively she searches with her senses, straining, looking, groping, touching, weighing, and

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

381

measuring, she won’t achieve her objective. Theory is the “light” and “eyes” that guide empirical and experimental research. This isn’t to say new theory can’t arise out of experiment. It can and does. But theory is logically and procedurally prior to experimentation and empirical data-gathering. Theory is the context, both logical and practical, in which empirical investigation occurs. It is the happy convergence of theory and practice that accounts for the success of the hard sciences. To the degree that these sciences represent a model for the social sciences (a debatable, but supportable position), this model should not be applied in an oversimplified fashion. Empirical research should be regarded as the fruit of the theoretical tree, which falls from that tree only when it is ripe, and then grows a new theory. If nutrition is denied to the tree of theory, if its roots are not sunk deeply in rich intellectual, philosophical, and even spiritual ground, the fruit that appears will be sickly and sour. It will not nourish understanding. […]

10.3.3.4

Methodology of the Social Sciences: Prediction and Control of Events

In social science it is, for example, of paramount importance to predict, and practical necessity to prevent, unresolved conflicts blazing into war. Chronic conflict is the most profound threat to global stability and prosperity. Social and political conflict is material for social science, but what has been accomplished in either theory or practice? There is urgent practical need for conflict resolution methodologies which are (1) replicable, (2) effective, and (3) yield verifiable results. But the urgency of this need – let alone uncritical imitation of positivism – should not keep us from the essential first step: a rigorous theoretical foundation, implying a good methodology for quantitative research. Without sound theory of conflict we do not understand conflict. If we do not understand it, we will resolve it only by chance. Every discipline has an empirical methodology appropriate to it. The theoretician’s task is to articulate this methodology for the experimentalist, based upon the fundamental principles of the theory of the discipline. The theoretician must then review the empirical research which experiments bring in, criticize it, and help determine its implications and meaning in theoretical terms. This is the healthy synthesis of theory and empirical methodology. This is what lies behind the great success of the hard sciences. Intelligently adapted to human meanings, the same synthesis will work in the social sciences.

10.3.4 Global Thinking 10.3.4.1

Ecology and Dualism

Positivism has helped us design particle accelerators through physical theory. It has kept us from achieving social harmony through political doctrine. The methodology

382

A. A. Said et al.

helpful for charged or uncharged particles is unavailing for conscious or passionate human beings. We need thought-forms for international relations different from Aristotelian logic. We need representations structured the same way as the world. Charts of the circuits and chemical changes along the metabolic pathways in the body are a good example. We see an immensely complex network of loops representing interconnected, interdependent chemical reactions whose products all run back upon each other – a homeostatic system. There are no straight lines in such a chart. There is a continuous, unbroken flow and process of change. To think in terms of causes and effects here makes sense only if we cut out a portion of a circuit and treat it as though it were a whole entity. Changing one element in the complex of loops does not just change the next one. The entire complex is changed. Then the element that was manipulated is changed again by the changes it set in motion. It does not long remain the way it was manipulated to be at the start of the experiment. The entire system changes. An Aristotelian breakdown complicates and obscures international relations in the same way. We don’t perceive context and long-range consequences. We miss feedback effects. We don’t see the loops. Our information is always incomplete. So our interventions are always clumsy. Natural, biological, and social systems are more complex, circuitous, and integrated than our ideas about them. Using linear, cause-and-effect thinking to map a world that is a complex, interdependent network of feedback circuits leads to inappropriate actions that return to haunt us. We mistakenly regard the world as an object which we can manipulate rather than a home where we can live. […]

10.3.4.2

How to Achieve a Macro-understanding of World Affairs

There is a need for new thinking across the whole continuum of violent versus peaceful activity. We need to focus on small and large groups, organizations, and global networks, not only on relations between states. Our thinking should encompass a wider span of both space and time than do the more traditional approaches to international relations, which generally start with the creation of the nation-state system in 1648. New thinking should provide greater historical depth while moving forward through a systematic normative study of the future. New thinking should envisage alternative world systems. To do this, new thinking should incorporate more elements not only of the social sciences and humanities, but of the natural and physical sciences. Meteorology, climatology, demography, technology, culture, politics, epidemiology, economics, and military affairs all enter into human actions and have to be taken into consideration. Otherwise, the feedback loops are shortcircuited. Include these things, and the macro-understanding of world affairs sought by scholars of international relations for decades may become possible. In the process of new thinking, we shift from the truth of reason to the truth of images, from the truth of images to the truth of intuition, from the truth of intuition to the truth of feeling and from the truth of feeling to the truth of pattern. We shift

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

383

from truth to truth. Each one of us possesses a little piece of truth. Total knowing requires an in-gathering of pieces of truth. […]

10.4 Conflict Resolution and Spirituality: Reflections on Teaching, Theory, and Practice Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). Conflict resolution and spirituality: Reflections on teaching, theory, and practice. The Fourth R, 74(1), 4–6.

10.4.1 Introduction Many people in the field of conflict resolution are becoming increasingly interested in discussing the spiritual side of their discipline. Like people in diverse walks of life, they wish to render life whole, to bring ecumenical, nonpartisan spiritual values to bear on their work and experiences. They seek to move beyond adversarialism and towards reconciliation and healing, towards spiritually inspired goals and spiritually informed conflict resolution processes. The spiritual aspects of conflict resolution are most apparent in an inclination towards unity and wholeness – ends which can be fostered not only in mediation sessions which seek common ground, but also in an education which unites theory and practice, learning and teaching, skills and vision, training and empowerment. The requirements of effective conflict resolution are not different from the demands of transformative pedagogy, nor is spirituality something added to these processes from the outside; education about conflict resolution should also be education for conflict resolution. The spiritual dimension of teaching conflict resolution, therefore, emerges from a pedagogy which internalizes the values and processes which it seeks to impart – a pedagogy of peace and conflict resolution which is itself peace and conflict resolution.

10.4.2 Beyond Fundamentalisms […] The basic commitments of the conflict resolution movement endow it with an inherent sensitivity to a spiritual perspective. A priority is placed on relationships and persons and not merely on authoritative rulings or dogmas; an emphasis on positivesum solutions and principle-based action contrasts with the orientations of adversarial systems of justice, institutionalized and informal alike. Conflict resolution perspectives suggest that human beings have inherent value and affirm that empathy, intelligence, and persistence are better resources for dealing with conflict than egotism, strategic acumen, and deadly weapons. As those who teach conflict resolution are

384

A. A. Said et al.

well aware, conflict resolution implies a set of values, an ethic about how people ought to live together and relate to one another, about how they ought to resolve disputes, work with differences, and gain insight into the underlying motivations and needs of both others and themselves. Students who are drawn to conflict resolution often share a conviction in a happy convergence of principle and pragmatism, of idealism and realism, of ends and means. They believe that what really works in human relations ultimately converges with what is healthy and good for human beings. Unfortunately, the affirmation of these unities can easily be muffled by an overemphasis on expediency and the instrumentalities of “getting disputes settled.” Concern for formal techniques and tangible agreements can overshadow underlying values and concerns of the conflict resolution movement. Substantive concerns with human relations and empowerment are overlooked. “Have technique will travel” becomes the implicit assumption and operative modality of conflict resolution; this assumption is sometimes carried over into teaching and training. Although pragmatic concern for fundamentals is legitimate, a spiritual approach to the pedagogy and practice of conflict resolution alerts us to the dangers of fundamentalism. As is well known, fundamentalism prioritizes form over substance by selecting a few basic tenets of a tradition and manipulating them for hegemonic or defensive purposes. Just as there is concern about fundamentalism within the Islamic and American religious cultures, so too should there be concern about the fundamentalism of the dominant Western political culture, with its engineering, mechanistic, isolated approach to problem solving. This approach is powerful but is not effective in every situation, particularly when it becomes necessary to address the relational dimension of conflict, which includes human identity and belief systems. […] A mechanistic approach to conflict resolution happens to be the most easily promotable approach in the West, but it reduces conflict resolution to management or settlement and, in the process, attempts to ignore competing belief systems and associated enemy images. The relational and identity components of conflict are addressed only insofar as it is necessary to settle the instrumental issues. In contrast, a more spiritually oriented approach acknowledges the importance of the instrumental dimension without bypassing the human context of conflict. Such an approach recognizes the importance of establishing communication through genuine dialogue, and aims to bring about a return to a larger frame of the culture and human values. Spiritual conflict resolution moves beyond narrow schemas and opens up the space for understanding, cooperation, or at the very least, deeper respect. While teaching the more mechanistic, problem-solving approach to conflict resolution requires greater reliance on experiential learning (simulations, internships, etc.) than conventional models of pedagogy prescribe, actual classroom dynamics between teacher and students still imply that the educator is the expert and the student receives knowledge and skills in a unidirectional transmission. In contrast, the approach advocated in this article attempts to reduce the compartmentalization in which conflict resolution skills are applied primarily to isolated cases and simulations rather than to the entire educational process. The teacher becomes a facilitator;

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

385

the educational experience becomes more maieutic. Dialogue is valued not only as a means of resolving conflict, but also a principle of pedagogy and epistemology.

10.4.3 Dialogue as Pedagogy Because conflict resolution must be dialogic in nature and in practice, the primary methodology of conflict resolution education should be dialogue based on mutual respect among the teacher and students. The classroom can become a forum in which skills of clear communication and active listening can be developed. As John Paul Lederach has emphasized in Preparing for Peace (1995), the prescriptive and elicitive dimensions of conflict resolution training should be balanced. The teacher should not impose a hegemonic theory or over-socialize students and should encourage and recognize creativity and new insights, respecting intuitive perceptions as points of departure for further inquiry. The teacher must keep his or her ego in check; education for peace and conflict resolution requires a respect for human dignity, both inside and outside the classroom. Such a pedagogy of conflict resolution encourages students to see themselves as “co-learners” and “co-creators,” addressing problems which are relevant to their experiences and concerns. The content of education springs in large part from the learners themselves and their relations with each other and the world; everyone in the classroom is a resource for everyone else. Students relate texts and training to their more immediate contexts, building bridges between theory and practice, between reflection and action, and between classroom and world. The teacher becomes a facilitator rather than an ultimate authority; students are empowered rather than alienated. As a facilitator, the teacher must model conflict resolution behavior, not simply as a technique or set of rules to be used in social bargaining situations, but as a way of life in which the “other” is respected as a human being, regardless of differences. Ideas are discussed, but the person is understood to be more important than the idea, and dialogue is a tool for accessing deeply held beliefs, values, perceptions, and impressions. Active listening is stressed: students learn to hear and reflect back to the speaker not only the words expressed, but also the emotions and feelings behind the words. Conflict partnerships develop instead of conflict spirals; emotions become sources of valuable information rather than hindrances to dialogue. When we facilitate or enter dialogue empathetically, we become sensitive to power imbalances and, in particular, to the rights, claims, and stories of weaker parties. In the classroom, this means that the teacher respects the students, values their insights and experiences, and helps them to learn what they seek to learn: information is combined with liberation. In the field, awareness of power imbalances inherent in the social context of conflict is a prerequisite for genuinely evenhanded facilitation, for fairness, and for reconciliation. Sensitivity to power inequalities is based on humane concern for both sides, and on recognition that each human being has the same inner potentialities. Spirituality is neither “partisan” nor zero-sum, yet it affirms

386

A. A. Said et al.

human dignity and seeks to balance power relations rather than follow the path of least resistance, even while working to achieve clarity about the specifically human, personal, and cultural dimensions of conflict. A dialogical pedagogy of conflict resolution is, at root, an internalization and harmonization of the means and ends of conflict resolution. The instructor embraces the essential values of the field and seeks to implement them, as far as possible, in the classroom, by modeling behaviors and values, empowering students by acknowledging the truths they hold, facilitating rather than controlling the learning process, listening actively to both verbal and emotional content of discourse, and fostering student growth and cooperative learning. The process emphasizes the relational context of problem solving and learning and thereby moves beyond utilitarian individualism.

10.4.4 Conflict Resolution as a Way of Knowing As Plato affirmed, we may not be able to agree with each other, but, if we have open and honest conversation, we will be able to empathize with each other and with the human predicament because human life is so similar in its deeper significance and issues, whatever our society and culture. If we sustain dialogue and sincerity, we move beyond defensively articulated positions and superficial interests, beyond just scoring points and achieving egoistic ends. We learn to use empathy as a tool of analysis, to sense the internal condition of the other – what she or he believes and feels, and how she or he came to hold those beliefs and feelings. We gain another perspective on the subject into which we are inquiring, and achieve greater clarity about the values and needs of both the other person and ourselves. We find out both where self and other differ, and, at a more profound level, where self and other meet. Knowledge of other and knowledge of self unfold together. Conflict resolution becomes a way of knowing, being, and doing. A dialogical pedagogy has profound implications for epistemology. Dialogical conflict resolution education promotes a unity of analytical and intuitive modes of consciousness. Intuition provides us with meaningful points of departure and suggests important interrelationships and paths of investigation; analytical thinking enables us to make tight, sequential connections. Conflict resolution also embraces a unity of theory and practice. The process of knowing must always involve the transformation of the knowing subject and the world through meaningful action. Theoretical and abstract knowledge are complemented by experiment and experience, both in the classroom and out of the classroom. Finally, conflict resolution affirms the union of knower and known. Knowledge is built in the relationship between us and our surroundings. Because we are part of the systems we study, learning requires that we analyze our experiences, assess our conditioning and core beliefs, and explore the relationship between knower and known. With the help of self-knowledge, we refine our own understanding and learn about the world. Earnestness, openness, and concern for the clear communication of

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

387

ideas are better guarantors of academic integrity than rhetoric about “objectivity,” which can encourage competitive monologues, egotism, and incivility rather than dialogue and intersubjective understanding. A spiritually inspired pedagogy of conflict resolution, therefore, can offer an integral, synthetic, and humanistic approach to knowing. New insights and connections arise through a willingness to entertain multiple perspectives. Seeing through more than one lens trains the mind to be nimble and encourages students to find common ground and make new connections. A tendency to avoid unnecessary “either/or” dichotomies becomes possible, for learning involves both analytic and maieutic processes. We become willing to move from truth to truth, and see that the whole is reflected in the parts, and from the parts comes the ever-greater whole.

10.4.5 Conclusion Despite growing interest, we are only beginning to develop a language with which we can talk about the relationship between spirituality and conflict resolution, both to share our insights and experiences and to engage in dialogue about broader implications. Developing a language, however, will increase the vitality of the conflict resolution movement, as well as the transformative depth of conflict resolution pedagogy and practice. As we develop a language, we become aware of the profound interpenetration of spirituality, conflict resolution and teaching as ongoing processes. By expanding our notions of what conflict resolution is and can become, we move beyond our own fundamentalistic tendencies, and become more capable of facilitating dialogue as a process of reconciliation, as an empowering modality of education, and as a way of knowing. Genuine resolution of conflict depends on insights of a spiritual level; a spiritually informed conflict resolution pedagogy reflects the insights and process advocated. Even in disputes where basic human needs are not at stake and there is not a need to cross the boundaries of race, class, gender, religion or culture, a spiritual intuition of what Gregory Bateson called the “pattern that connects” helps to bring a sense of unity and possibility to conflict resolution efforts. Encouraging students to trust their humanistic and spiritual sensibilities, therefore, is an essential aspect of the reinvestment of the sacred in our lives, of the consecration of the human and the humanization of the divine. By infusing our work with our innermost humanity, we transform our social and educational dialogues into processes of peace through communication and relatedness.

388

A. A. Said et al.

10.5 Understanding Peace through Rihani’s Spirituality Said, A. A. (2004). Understanding peace through Rihani’s spirituality. In N. C. Funk and B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West (pp. 113–119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. The old ways of thinking are losing ground. The walls that separated groups of people from one another are collapsing, as are our concepts of time and distance. “What will divide us in the twenty-first century?,” wonder leaders, scholars, and activists. We are told that we will be divided as believers, pitted against those with presumably opposing beliefs. We are, according to this view, hurtling inexorably toward a religiously based clash of civilizations. Yet this proposition is old thinking. It comes from a position of scarcity: there is not enough truth, greatness, beauty, nobility, and creativity to go around. All of us cannot be stakeholders in the human project called “civilization.” Either I have it or you have it, but not both of us. Wedged into this thinking are reified conceptions of “us” and “them” as fundamentally different beings, with different essences, dreams and needs. To escape this narrow thinking, we need inspiration from those who have sought to manifest a different vision in their lives, and who have demonstrated the desirability of regarding the world from a standpoint of abundance rather than a standpoint of scarcity. This was, in essence, the spiritual vision that animated Ameen Rihani’s life – a vision whose relevance has only increased in the decades since he first articulated his personal synthesis of Eastern and Western virtues and his ethos of applied, “workaday” spirituality.1 Through his life and his vision, Rihani has helped to endow us with an understanding of peace that is appropriate to our age. As a migrant to a foreign land and an inhabitant of two cultures, Ameen Rihani experienced firsthand the collapse of borders and compression of time and space that contemporary writers associate with globalization.2 Rihani was also among the first to recognize what many of us have only recently come to appreciate: that our increasing social, economic, and political interconnectedness and interdependency are effecting a parallel transformation within human consciousness, as our ways of thinking begin to adapt and make the space necessary to include and incorporate the proliferating multiplicity of life, culture and being. For Rihani as for many of us today, this transformation suggests a shift from a religious perceptual framework to a spiritual one.3 The difficulty this transition poses for us – and the responsibility that 1

The most direct exposition of Rihani’s spiritual beliefs may be found in The path of vision: Essays of East and West (1970b [originally published in 1921]). 2 For discussion of general trends related to globalization, see Held et al. (1999). For analysis of existential aspects of globalization, see Rajaee (2000). 3 Rihani experienced spiritual freedom as liberation from any exclusivist attachment to a particular symbolization of the Divine or to a corporate formulation of personal loyalty. As he put it in The chant of mystics, “Nor Crescent Nor Cross we adore;/ Nor Buddha nor Christ we implore; / Nor Muslem nor Jew we abhor:/ We are free./ We are not of Iran or of Ind,/ We are not of Arabia or Sind:/ We are free” (1970a, p. 106).

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

389

facilitating this change entails – cannot be understated, particularly at a time when divisions of humanity along apparently religious fault lines have been reinforced by the idea that “you are either with us or against us.” A critic of both capitalist and revolutionary excesses,4 Rihani was able to see beyond the ideological struggle that preoccupied so many minds throughout the twentieth century, and thereby anticipated the shrinking attraction of both religious and secular doctrinal systems claiming universality and unquestioned adherence. He saw that the task of our age is to manifest spirituality in new social forms, human bonds and constructive activities. He affirmed that the challenges facing us demand a new set of answers, rising from a new pattern of faith and belief. The values that direct human endeavors must be spiritual in nature if we are not to “drift away from the path of vision.”5 For Rihani, spirituality meant reaffirmation of transcendence, the spirit’s quest for ultimate reality. Transcendence is one of the purest, oldest, and most mysterious aspects of human spirituality – a source of strength for humanity through which grace can be achieved under adversity. Rihani perceived the quest for transcendence as the foundation of all genuine and enduring human progress – the necessary complement of a progressive social vision.6 Spiritual transcendence balances power with humility, and provides connection with larger meaning and purpose. As Rihani recognized, moving from a religious to a spiritual framework allows us to relocate our most basic, inherited assumptions in ways which can free us to untangle ourselves from our present circumstances and move toward our shared, collective destiny. Ameen Rihani anticipated the contemporary tendency to perceive a distinction between spirituality and religion. Although these terms are often used somewhat interchangeably, there is a difference between them that is captured well in Rihani’s perception “we can be religious without religiosity.” [To] give without expecting a return of any kind, immediate or distant, is as natural as to accept the gifts of the sun and the air and the mountain streams. Indeed, we can be religious without being conscious of it – we can be religious without religiosity. To invest our heartcapital in the inherent goodness of humanity, to save a drowning swimmer, as Thoreau says, and go our way – this is the practical workaday spirituality which either points to us the path of vision or unfolds before us… one or more of its hidden secrets. (Rihani 1970b, p. 26)

[…] A spiritual framework involves understanding that we come from a place of abundance, not scarcity. We are not speaking about material resources (although in our society today we have the means to meet the basic human needs of our entire population), we are talking about the human spirit: here, your win is not my loss, for your 4

On capitalist excesses and exploitation of the poor, see Ar-Rihaniyat. On the dangers of the Russian Revolution, see The descent of bolshevism (Rihani 1920). 5 This phrase is adapted from a passage in Rihani’s Path of vision that seeks to admonish readers concerning the consequences of “drifting away from the path of vision” (1970b, p. 24). 6 “If we are concerned in breaking the fetters that are fastened upon our bodies and souls by external agencies only, we are doomed to failure. But if we become aware of the fetters, which we, in the sub-consciousness of centuries of submission, have fastened upon the spirit within us and strive to free ourselves of them first, then we are certain to triumph” (Rihani 1970b, p. 129).

390

A. A. Said et al.

greatness is cause for my celebration and marvel. Our dialogues are not characterized by one party being arrogant and insensitive while the other feels defensive and insecure. Rather, they affirm the equal dignity of all human beings. Moving from a religious to a spiritual framework breaks down “us” versus “them” dichotomies derived from old systems of power and their neat, zero-sum conceptual frameworks. These ways of thinking were based on fictions that could only be upheld through physical separation and deep existential anxieties that arose from entrenched positions of scarcity. It is precisely this “either/or” dichotomy which empowers fundamentalist opportunism, and undermines the intellectual discrimination required for individuals to create and direct their own community. In the old way of thinking, a “just cause” depended largely on who you were, distorting and undermining our essential sense of responsibility to one another. In Ameen Rihani’s spiritual vision, the seemingly opposed realities of “East” and “West” became complementary poles of the human experience: East needed West to realize its full potential, and vice versa. […] A spiritual perspective frees us from our preconceived identity commitments, and from our rigid adherence to metaphors and symbols that are all too easily appropriated in ways entirely different than those that were originally intended. Spirituality frees us from narrow commitments and allegiances by directing us to a truer, more essential scale of values. Rihani described this scale of values in non-exclusive, universal terms: It is the harmony we achieve within us; the satisfaction we feel in a healthy, strength-giving reaction; the knowledge and power that every noble, unselfish deed affords; the only reward, after all, in our triumphs and our only consolation in defeat.... Nay, there is no such thing as defeat for those who achieve harmony within. (Rihani 1970b, pp. 26–27)

A spiritual framework which no longer frames rightness or wrongness based on “us” or “them” frees us to grasp the real meaning of interdependency and mutuality. When we see anger and outrage we hear human dignity’s response to fear, and we must be secure enough physically, and mature enough spiritually, to hear it. Where concern for human dignity and social responsibility are manifest as global values, the exclusivism of religious extremists is defused. The real, embedded meaning of our interconnectedness is mutual responsibility, and the implicit trust that your safety and well-being is directly related to my own, whether you are a believer in my particular faith tradition or not. Our sense of accountability must be expanded in tandem with our influence and reach. An emerging globalized ethic of spirituality embraces the unity we see in diversity, which finally gives us permission to celebrate both. In celebrating we find comfort in our individuality as one unique expression of a larger sameness. Only from this position do we possess the freedom to recognize that the parts reflect the whole. A new perspective gives us permission to listen to and abide by our consciences, and cultivate an ever-emerging transnational consciousness, which is a meeting of the best of East and West, North and South. The transnational consciousness is not molded by the media, nor is it the creation of the elites and intellectuals: it is the cry for human dignity. It is an innate human expression. This transnational consciousness

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

391

has the power to generate new metaphors, symbols, practices, models and resources that represent new values and goals beyond outdated, arbitrary, artificial boundaries. We no longer have the choice of holding on to our habituated ways of thinking. Our inherited metaphors and older ways of thinking and believing do not encompass the traditions, history, and experiences of the rest of the world on their own terms. Recasting the world in one image would prove a bloody, violent and vain enterprise. Attempts to impose our own standard or retreat from dialogue are negative, fearpredicated reactions to our new reality – a reality that we have begun to experience as a shift from separateness to conscious connectedness. This shift is manifest in all the world’s social movements. There is also a shift underway in the location of authority, from the external to the internal. We are relying more on our own inner wisdom and conscience while simultaneously discovering the humanity and interdependence of all communities. We are witness to the affirmation of brotherhood and sisterhood as well as passion for social justice and political participation. We are discovering in this process that cultural and human diversity are our sources of strength and our greatest resources, for they are living expressions of the ultimate creativity. With this discovery, we no longer see one another as rivals; indeed, we discover that the whole world needs the whole world. The West gives the East the best it has in exchange for the best from the East. We can begin to shift our perceptual focus and attention in our politics toward creating a just and peaceful global society. It is then that we can redefine our conceptions and conditions of peace as not merely the absence of violence or conflict but rather a more spiritual definition that involves presence – the presence of justice, human dignity, freedom of expression and education, health, mutual dependency and well-being. A spiritual understanding of peace holds personal transformation as the model for and the catalyst of non-violent global change. […] In underscoring both the spiritual roots of authentic freedom and the human imperative of challenging unjust conditions, Ameen Rihani recognized that the journey of peacemaking proceeds along two parallel tracks. The task of what we shall refer to as “track one” is dealing with the structural conditions of violence. “Track two” is the spiritual approach to peacemaking – the experience of peace as self-knowledge. When these two tracks proceed together, peace becomes a unity of task and experience, a dual process of being and doing. We discover peace through inner experience and outer engagement, through a transformation of awareness. […] We discover a powerful new way of seeing and experiencing the universe and ourselves, and the relationship between them. We discover peace through a process of relearning, of seeing the world with fresh eyes and acting and responding in new ways. We discover peace through remembering, through waking up to what we really are and to what we are capable of. We discover peace through healing, through the restoration of wholeness by “pulling ourselves together,” individually and collectively. […] [Ameen Rihani] may have even been the world’s first global citizen. In thought, word and deed, he pledged allegiance to:

392

A. A. Said et al.

• Recognition of the inextricable interdependence of all human communities (a central, motivating force behind today’s social movements) • Spiritual appreciation of nature, leading to a non-exploitative stewardship relationship to the planet • Passion for social justice • Yearning for human dignity • Valuation of political pluralism • Celebration of cultural diversity’s richness • Forgiveness, tolerance, coexistence, and reconciliation. For Ameen Rihani, fulfillment and transcendence as a human being were to be realized through passionate commitment to spiritual values and active, unstinting engagement with the human prospect. Taking fusion of East and West as a metaphor for transformation, Rihani offered an inspiring new vision of global citizenship: We are not of the East or the West; No boundaries exist in our breast: We are free. (Rihani 1970a, p. 106)

10.6 Achieving Peace: The Whole World Needs the Whole World Said, A. A. (2005). Achieving peace: The whole world needs the whole world. In Prince Nikolaus von und zu Liechtenstein and C. M. Gueye (Eds.), Peace and intercultural dialogue (pp. 235–251). Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter. We are living in a world where borders have diminished as have our traditional conceptions of space, time, and distance. Cultures and communities are exposed and interact with one another in unprecedented ways as a result of revolutions in information, and we are discovering that our fates and futures increasingly depend on one another. Such realization makes mutual understanding, respect, and cooperation essential to realizing the positive aspects of our growing interdependency. Our greater capacity for learning and our broadening familiarity with the foreign represent a powerful growth in knowledge and mark a turning point in human civilization. This information revolution has set in motion two contradictory trends in the world: increasing localization, leading to self-assurance and the strengthening of each culture’s own traditions, and globalization which spans the sheer diversity of human expression. This context defines the nature of our contact in a broader sense. Through this growing awareness of our diversity lies our unmistakable unity: our humanity and our common values and needs. It is up to us, at this crucial time in our shared history, to determine how we will know and relate with each other, how we will define and benefit from our relationship, and how we will cope together with the teeming diversity of our global community. Total peace requires a new paradigm in

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

393

international relations in which we see each other as global citizens and recognize that the whole world needs the whole world.

10.6.1 Towards “Total Peace” Historically, peace has been defined by the dominant power in terms of its security and interests; thus, peace has come to be understood by elites primarily as an absence of violence. This has isolated the many voices of peace, arising from each culture and reflecting the best of humanity, and resulted in a separation of peace from justice. Alternatively, to move towards “total peace,” we must break the dialectical conceptualization of peace as security and move towards understanding peace as a dynamic defined in terms of the presence of: (1) social justice; (2) human security; (3) ecological balance; (4) equitable economic development; (5) human dignity; and (6) cultural diversity in terms of pluralism and coexistence. The polity that seeks a limited “peace as security” reduces peace to a notion of central order. Ultimately, the demand of absolute security creates not just insecurity but corruption. In contrast, human dignity is at the root of total peace; people can only find peace through feeling empowered. Likewise, “negative peace” focuses on the objective conditions of our reality at the expense of the subjective, undermining the merits of culture, identity, art, emotion, and spirituality; whereas total peace, or “peace as presence,” incorporates both the objective necessities of human needs and the subjective realm of human reflection and understanding. Total peace thus relies on the development of a common sense of global citizenship based on certain principles including: a belief in the primacy of human values in designing social spaces, a universal rather than limited approach to solving social problems, a utility of technology to increase communication, a recognition of the importance of community, a commitment to reestablishing pride and dignity through social development, and an acknowledgment of the essential role of diverse traditions.

10.6.2 Educating Global Citizens One of the key requirements for total peace is recognition of global citizenship within cultural diversity. Cultures can coexist without violent conflict, and cultural diversity is not a security threat. On the contrary, different cultures bear within themselves resources for grappling with fundamental problems of human existence. When we regard culture as a resource rather than as a threat, we begin to change the way we relate to our own traditions and to those of others. Our authenticity ceases to depend on replication of past forms and exclusion of outsiders. We become more comfortable with our own distinctiveness and simultaneously more capable of recognizing the genuine uniqueness of others. We recognize that the whole world needs the whole world – to survive and to become more human.

394

A. A. Said et al.

Because the inelasticity in our traditional ways of seeing and knowing the world is precipitating a global crisis of identity, we need new, synthetic approaches to education that permit us to experience ourselves as global citizens. The global citizen should access “knowing” as a mode of multi-perspective consciousness. Education should increase the boundaries of awareness and open new horizons to individuals in their search for truth, beauty, and order. Knowledge should liberate us from our presumptions and illusions. It should liberate our creativity to interact with the magnificent diversity and vibrancy of the many ways of knowing developed by different civilizations. It should enable us to harmonize multiple religious, social, and national identities. It should enable us to discover that the incommensurable insights of different knowledge systems may be complementary rather than contradictory. […] It is eminently possible to create, restructure, and redevelop the realm of education so that each human being can achieve self-awareness within a global context. Through creative approaches to education, students can move towards a global context of perception and citizenship without sacrificing their own sense of cultural dignity and identity. Recognizing the presence of truth in every language requires study and a reconsideration of received assumptions, but it need not mean ceasing to speak one’s own native tongue. Global citizens must walk a tightrope, balancing past with present. They preserve the values and accomplishments of the past while creating new possibilities for the future. Global citizenship, and thus total peace, is dependent upon the realization of social, economic, and ecological justice. […] We are confronted with bitter paradoxes: Our world has never been richer than it is today, but the scope and intensity of poverty is also unprecedented. The peoples of the world have never been closer together – and yet they have never been farther apart. Despite these grave problems with globalization, we should not ask how to reverse it. Simply put, there is no possibility of de-globalization. Instead we must ask how we can reshape and redirect globalization. How can we establish institutions and a process of world governance to accommodate both the universalizing and the localizing effects of globalization? How can we deal with the issues of massive inequality, unfair distribution of benefits, and marginalization of tradition and culture? How can we create a sense of global community that gives coherence, meaning, and purpose to our emergent reality of functional interdependence? Total peace requires a development of cooperative, rather than competitive, global politics. Developed and developing worlds – North and South – become one world. Oppressor and oppressed become people experiencing life in all of its vicissitudes. […] We learn that there are no developed or less developed states, only individuals and societies in development. Total peace also depends on cooperative global economics based on love, sacrifice, and cooperation supporting individual and communal self-reliance, a fair distribution of the earth’s limited resources, care for the planet, and control of large-scale human destructiveness. Global and personal human concerns become aligned. A cooperative global economy emphasizes sufficiency rather than scarcity. The purpose of production is to produce enough of the right goods rather than as much as possible of everything. In other words, the purpose is to provide everyone with enough to

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

395

serve as the basis for approaching the non-material aspects of human life. Human capacities, strengths, motivations, and attitudes become primary economic resources and the foundation of development. We complicate problems of world politics and hinder the realization of “total peace” when we are unable to perceive context and long-range consequences. The natural, biological systems and global, social interactions that constitute our world are always more complicated and circuitous than our ideas about them. Using lineal, cause-and-effect thinking to map a world that is an interconnected, interdependent network of feedback circuits inevitably leads to inappropriate actions that generate unanticipated results. Rather than perceiving the world as a home within which we reside, we “think the world apart” through abstractions that fragment knowledge and encourage manipulative relationships to nature and society. It becomes difficult to build a just, stable, and sustainable peace when we think that ecological values are somehow in conflict with economic values and that we are faced with an either/or choice between taking care of our environment vs. taking care of people. This is exactly what happens, however, when we attribute too much concreteness and autonomy to abstract concepts enshrined by linear thinking. Closer reflection on the words “ecology” and “economy” reveals that they share a common Greek meaning: “study of the house.” They refer to housekeeping. The physiology of the human body, the complexities of family life, the network of global trade, and the infinitely varied and delicate interdependencies of the totality of life of earth – are all alike in structure. Aristotelian logic would treat these concepts as distinct and perhaps even consign them to different departments of the university; whereas a total peace perspective would bring them together and probe their connections and interdependencies. It would help us to discover that sufficiency and not scarcity is the true condition of human life on the planet. There is enough for everyone provided that we accept standards of discernment and justice and supplant frantic accumulation with a search for means of satisfying deeper and more enduring human needs.

10.6.3 The Process of Dialogue Dialogue is the key to helping us recover and preserve authentic core identity beliefs in the context of new realities and circumstances. Too often individuals fear that they have much to lose and little to gain from engaging in a process of dialogue. This suspicion arises from a position of scarcity where there is not enough truth, beauty, or value to go around: either you have it, or I have it, but not both. Wedged into this thinking is the reproduction of “us” and “them” as fundamentally different beings with different essences, dreams, and needs. This way of thinking can only survive where differences are maintained, if only invented by or living in the imagination of one or the other. The poverty of this perspective is symptomatic of a belief system “under siege” and becomes rigid by the emergence of multiple truths, values, and ways of living.

396

A. A. Said et al.

Dialogue by nature stands as a testament to the existence of many ways of knowing and being and as a dedication to the spirit and presence of abundance. It is this spirit that values above all the preservation of authentic individual needs, ideals, and goals while at the same time providing new knowledge about how to express these basic human needs in community. Indeed, the true recognition of one’s authentic individuality emerges through the acknowledgment of the genuine individuality of the Other. Instead of losing one’s identity in the process of dialogue, dialogue can empower us to strengthen our essence of values while reorienting their expression or attachment in particular forms. This provides a crucially important means by which we can come to greater depth and understanding of our own character, ideals, visions for the future, and responsibilities in community that are in tandem with the changing nature of reality while shedding those attachments that no longer serve our interests or growth. Yet the position of abundance implicit to dialogue does not mean simply that compromises or win-win solutions represent the only possible, or even the most desirable or realistic, outcome. In fact, it is often through dialogue that areas of serious disputes and nonnegotiable interests are brought to light. But dialogue represents more than a series of debating maneuvers or adversarial jockeying for preferred outcomes. Engaging in the process itself provides a tangible demonstration of a respect for the other, a need for their goodwill and cooperation, and recognition of the importance of a commitment to a peaceful and fair problem-solving mechanism that presumes the inherent value and dignity of humanity. Even where outcomes fall short of expectations, engaging in the process itself has laid the foundation for relationship and confidence-building that may make future agreements and cooperation possible. In other words, dialogue represents one of the most powerful means by which to achieve authentic ends if not in the short run, where trust and mutual respect are only beginning, then in the long run when individuals come to recognize the contributions and value of others that do not threaten their core identity beliefs. The process of dialogue is as important as the commitment to peaceful resolution to conflict. One of the initial barriers that inhibits effective communication is the instinctual rejection of any form of self-reflexivity from the outset, out of loyalty to one’s ideals (to which these beliefs appear to be attached) and for fear that doubts could unravel the larger system of invested meaning. At this juncture, individuals often feel that any public expression of vulnerability, dependency, or weakness in one’s beliefs must be avoided for fear of being exploited, overpowered, or humiliated. Developing a process of communication is the key to transcending this deep subjectivity, one that involves active listening and a commitment to sustained dialogue, not rushing to achieve immediate rewards, transformation or understanding, but rather becoming invested in the learning process itself. How each communicates their shared concerns is as important to the dialogue process as the concerns themselves. The most effective and mutually rewarding dialogues unfold in a graduated manner that emphasizes and supports a learning process where terms and concepts can be carefully explored. For example, have we understood peace as being “left alone” or as “deeply interdependent”? If the terms of our coexistence have been

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

397

unacceptable to us, to what extent have they been founded on fictional fears or to what extent have they reflected genuine exploitation or structural violence? In this way we can discover, as well as create, shared meanings and find our common ground, while better understanding our values and ideals as we are challenged to share them in a new way. The process of dialogue requires the cultivation of skills such as active listening and empathy that represent expressions of goodwill, respect, and civility. Active listening is a communication skill which is developed when we move from hearing only words to hearing the emotions, feelings, and experiences behind words and ideas. This allows us to clearly reflect the intentions and meaning of the other and employ empathy as a constructive tool of analysis. This also begins to develop the ability to suspend one’s own beliefs on the principle of fair exchange and mutuality, opening up new possibilities for self-expression and cooperation, the clarification of one’s own beliefs, and new opportunities for relating. Through growing sensitivity and trust in the intentions and moral equality of the other, we can transform our relationships and perception of one another, in a gradual and respectful manner, and in the process reestablish the linkage between our most cherished ideals. Active listening is characterized by giving the speaker full attention and honoring his or her willingness and courage to present what is true for her or him. Civility is demonstrated by the ethical commitment to fair process and procedural ground rules, regardless of personal agreement (or lack thereof), whereby non-verbal communication while listening assumes as much importance as the willingness to listen. By cultivating these skills, dialogues become respectful and sustainable, leading ultimately to powerful experiences of transformation. In the process, the space is also created for spontaneous curiosity to emerge that is so essential to creating rewarding partnerships and perceptual transformation. We can soon begin to see that our values and ideals complement and enrich one another, and can develop healthier and more adaptive responses to difference. This is why we have difference: so that we may know one another, and better ourselves in the process, by being challenged to live up to the ideals we grow in touch with and come to represent. Dialogue has the power to reveal to us that cultural and human diversity is our source of strength and our greatest resource as living expressions of the ultimate creativity. Sustainable dialogues in particular are characterized by a growing willingness to honor and respect the vulnerabilities and openness of the Other as confidence and relationships are developed and emotions are shared. This profoundly healing stage of dialogue signals the ability to engage in effective joint problem-solving and a long-term commitment to peace, as well as the willingness to engage with one another on their own terms and according to their own needs. Each participant becomes a stakeholder not just in their community but in their shared individuality and well-being. It is then that we are most able to form sustainable linkages that satisfy our needs, agree on shared priorities, recreate community and actively embrace our unfolding reality. […]

398

A. A. Said et al.

10.6.4 Culture, Spirituality, and Transformative Ways of Knowing Culture is a resource whose function is to express our humanity in ways that make us more human. Cultural creation is essentially a communal process and cultural community becomes the primary source of human realization. In this way, creativity can replace conformity as the primary mode of political action. Freedom is defined away from a purely liberal and individualistic “doing of one’s own thing,” both for people and for societies. The individual is not seen as the victim of society. The goal of freedom and of development is human creativity. The communal nature of the cultural process involves a certain amount of discipline, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice. Cultural pluralism and freedom of expression are the basis of existence. Each individual is a powerful source of transformation. Each one of us can participate in the creation of harmonious global institutions and the restructuring of existing ones. Each one of us can help to transform cultural conflict by reframing value polarities into value complementarities. The impassioned mind and the informed heart can together call forth the energy to move the planet towards realization. A culture of total peace means unity in diversity, manifested in a global community. We must see and seek the whole in the parts. Rather than prejudice, we must call for attitudes of humility and deep respect. Every individual and every nation or culture is capable of celebrating divine qualities or eclipsing them. Within a context of divine transcendence and human responsibility, no individual or community can believe itself to be uniquely privileged or unconditionally favored. Much of my life’s work has been constructed in imagining a cooperative future. I have, through my studies in international relations, Islam, spirituality and Sufism, education, and sustainable development attempted to fundamentally transcend the violence of nations and create a blueprint for the essential qualities necessary to establish a “nation of nations”: a world order predicated upon global cooperative politics enshrined in a free and hence peaceful polity. This work has ranged from considering the ethical dimensions of international political exchange to questions of development (equitable and sustainable economic development) and education (educating for global citizenship.) Yet, the most critical issue and often the most misunderstood and even avoided aspect of imagining a nation of nations is the spiritual existence of human beings. There is a major dilemma in the role of spirituality within the context of modern political development. Modernity has tended to reject the sacrosanct role of essential reflection of the spirit and its role in enabling individuals to conceive of principled private and public action. Yet, at the same time history tells us that every individual needs an interpretive space in which to conceive of truth and ethics and through them what constitutes positive social interaction. Every culture maintains a system of divine interpretation and communion through which each individual is given a “map” to understand the principles of natural order or, in a Western lexicon, lex naturalis or natural law. What has driven every social

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

399

manifestation of human drive to create communities to seek a spiritual dimension? I believe this directly occurs because individuals are made whole through divine reflection. Just as individuals become (socialized) citizens through reflecting upon civic responsibilities and duties in an existing civic order, so too do humans substantiate their ontological understanding of themselves and their connection to their environment through larger questions of existence historically facilitated through spiritual reflection. The natural organizational tendencies of human cooperative behavior have tended to synthesize this reflection into organized communities which share narratives and symbols of the meaning of the individual in relation to a divine order. This need not fall under the auspices of organized religion. Many traditions disaggregate the social manifestation in favor of a more nuanced individual communion and dialogue. Spiritual reflection is an inescapable dimension of human thought. Even atheists engage in spiritual reflection by opting to define their spiritual existence as nonexistent. That is, by saying there is no higher order or divine essence, the atheist has still engaged in spiritual reflection to determine that they do not believe just as a member of a faith community has likewise engaged in spiritual reflection by embracing religious tradition. Each man or woman cannot escape asking “what else.” […] The spiritual, as a timeless place of principled reflection, offers an escape of the idolatry of ideology such as Plato’s mythic Great Beast: those social ideas that demand obedience and restrict cooperative evolution. Ideology represents the presentation of particular sets of interests and within them the frame through which individuals helplessly watch the omnipotent reason, the logic of ideology, paint its own end. Ideology has no exterior. It is closed as if an individual shut himself in his own coffin. When ideology rather than spirituality governs the political realm, the only operative calculus is the question of power. Ideology produces tautologies and, in the process, makes everything effectively relative in and of itself. […] In accordance with the pluralistic nature of total peace, spirituality is a consciousness that sees the whole of existence in its parts and constructs the whole from the parts. […] [B]y affirming a deep unity of soul and spirit, we see the world as a single integrated whole. The path of the Divine is thus a path of knowledge; one that promises redemption, transformation, and salvation. Because God is whole and knowable, human beings should seek to know the Divine as truth and beauty. This divine path to meaning manifests itself socially as the process of education. In line with this guiding moral and epistemological order housed within the Abrahamic traditions, institutions of education should concede that their purpose is to improve the human condition and serve the whole human community, not only understand it. Education as an institution should acknowledge its inherent role as a catalyst for social change. More than the accumulation of knowledge, education represents a dialogic guidance mechanism of social development. In this respect, education is not just the system of preparing individuals to become “citizens.” Rather, it is the space of integrating and creating a national, transnational and individual (essential) consciousness founded in the pursuit of meaning. As such, education shapes social

400

A. A. Said et al.

perception and thought in the construction of the boundaries of our knowledge. Whether these boundaries are elastic and open or inelastic and closed to new horizons of knowing is a function of our perception. To manifest a dialogic character of social development, the essence of education must be the expansion of our repertoire of behavior. We do not just learn the “right way” to do things but teach the many paths to knowing as they reflect unique cultural, historical, and individual experiences. As the seventeenth century German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz writes, “Nothing is more important than to see the sources of invention which are, in my opinion more interesting than the inventions themselves.” Whether we choose to see the invention or the process of inventing as the more critical point of inquiry, there are many ways of knowing. We think with reason, making tight sequential connections. We think with wonder, making connections of the random kind. We think with images, making connections of visual kind. Each of these forms of thought and their expression as knowledge is part of the larger search for meaning that encompasses human existence in the Abrahamic tradition. In the Abrahamic faiths, the divine is whole and as such is knowable. Since the divine is knowable, each individual has a responsibility to seek to know its essence through the search for meaning. Thus, in the moral tradition of the Abrahamic faiths and their articulation of this search as a guiding order, the global citizen should access “knowing” as a mode of perspective consciousness. Education increases the boundaries of this perspective consciousness thus opening new horizons to the individual in their search for truth, beauty and order. Knowledge liberates us from our presumptions and illusions. This liberation is balanced in dignity. In line with the belief in a just order guiding the Abrahamic tradition, the acquisition of knowledge should be predicated upon transforming the structural and relational basis of inequity and social polarization. Education is a public good whose effectiveness is predicated upon expanding the perceptual basis of any given society to exist simultaneously and harmoniously in a local and global context. We should reconcile the process of observation and participation creating educational institutions and processes that combine the roles of social participation and criticism. This is most readily achieved by liberating our creativity to interact with the magnificent diversity and vibrancy of the many ways of knowing developed by different civilizations. The Abrahamic tradition of the oneness of being expresses itself in this liberation. Because the inelasticity in our traditional ways of seeing the world is precipitating a global crisis of identity, we are unable to conceive of new forms of knowledge as social perception and through it, inclusive models of citizenship. The Abrahamic principle of oneness can facilitate the conceptual framework for expressing a transnational vs. a limited national consciousness which directly contributes to a culture of total peace. The movement from a national consciousness to a transnational consciousness is required to shift our understanding of citizenship from a local to a global context. To create a basis for global citizenship first entails acknowledging the capacity for social change as transformation at the individual and group level. The process of

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

401

transformation enables us to take a broader view of our world to integrate reason, feeling, sensing, and intuition. We experience an enlargement of consciousness in a fundamental sense and thus are able to exist simultaneously with multiple religious, social and national identities. The thirteenth century Islamic poet Rumi reminds us of the human experience of pluralism and coexistence as emerging from the individual: I am neither a Moslem nor a Hindu I am not Christian, Zoroastrian, nor Jew I am neither of the West nor the East...

The global citizen lives within the context of a world cultural system. The Abrahamic concept of unity implies that the global citizen exists in every political, cultural, and social network. At the same time, this global citizen balances past and present preserving the values and accomplishments of the past with the prospects of the future. In both its spatial (global) and temporal (nonlinear) manifestation, the coexistence that global citizenship strives for is predicated upon pluralism. Cultural diversity creates intellectual possibility. The pluralism necessary to create global citizens should reflect the natural progression of humanistic ethics. Different linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and national entities are all valuable. They flower in unique spaces and manners whose richness is only understood in juxtaposition with the whole. To embrace differences with a critical eye and an open heart is to increase the variables underlying the mind’s quantification of the heavens. The symphony of the spheres is heard when we take the time to listen to each and every voice. Harmony amid great cultural diversity is an exercise in awareness. This awareness reflects the progression of the individual’s search to know the wholeness and oneness of the divine in the Abrahamic faiths. It comes from acknowledging basic differences in worldview among different peoples. Acknowledgment of differences is appreciation, honoring the unique experience of each individual, citizen, believer, and civilization. This appreciation gains its wholeness through empathy. Once we are able through education to constantly shift subject and object, agent and structure in our dialogic analysis, we begin to experience the history of the other as our own without judgment and without regret or hate. In recognizing the authentic individuality of others, we truly begin to understand our own unique contribution to the world, the part our own identity plays in the global mosaic of beliefs. In addition to empathy, we should be conscious of the dual necessity of creativity and reason. If we do not interject reason in conjunction with creativity into the experience of knowing, we risk remembering only what has happened in our society rather than imagining what society is capable of becoming. The instability and negative experience of years of protracted social conflict and weight of structural violence in post-conflict environments has a tendency to produce a social anxiety and expectation of perpetual violence. The individual, conditioned by their environment, experiences the world as singularly violent and hence produces all individual and social knowledge in a state of conflict. The experience of violence becomes epistemic, reproducing ever greater monolithic claims and distancing itself from other forms of knowing in an attempt to

402

A. A. Said et al.

isolate itself and the social pain that it implies. Over time, social and especially national consciousness becomes a function of the experience of pain. You are a citizen to the extent to which you can claim a shared historical experience of exclusive deprivation and violence. To transcend this embedded cycle of experiencing and living violence will require that in constructing educational models for the global citizen we specifically acknowledge the necessity of a spiritual dimension. By spirituality, the point of reference is not the traditional sense of a set of religious principles or doctrines. Rather the emphasis is placed upon the act of imagining oneself in relation to a larger whole. Self-reflection increases our capacity for synthesis in public dialogue.

10.6.5 Conclusion […] With the concept of total peace, we are seeking to transform our world. It is from the world of struggle to the world of peace. In the former world, politics is a struggle of nation-states for survival and to protect their national interests. The best that can be hoped for is to seize the opportunity in the inevitable changes that occur, thus avoiding the destruction of civilization. There may be new opportunities for peace in our world, but we fail to realize them because of our involvement in and commitment to a militarization born of old fears and divisions. A simple lack of imagination prevents us from finding and implementing new solutions to old problems. The formulation of a new vision is long overdue. In the latter world, politics is a struggle for world peace in the broadest sense that peace is more than the absence of war but also is the presence of justice and political and spiritual freedom. Success in this struggle is dependent upon transcending […] the provincialism of the nation-state and making the world community more real. Peace is not a goal to be pursued. It is always in the making. It is a journey towards a place where there is trust, mercy, and justice. We may not get there, but the journey is important and is never ending. It is a process of being and doing. Peace is both task and experience. The task of peace is dealing with structural and cultural violence, as well as direct violence. The experience is self-knowledge. When we discover our authentic individuality we recognize the genuine uniqueness of others. We need to spiritualize our lives, in other words, we need to “sweat out” our spirituality, our personal experiences. With such experience, we can come to recognize that one’s personal ideals cannot be another’s ideal. Through forgiveness and coexistence, we can create a new humanity. Everyone becomes a new person when new relationships are found. Through education we discover the sacred. We come to reinvest the sacred in our lives. The sacred is any process that links us to the greatest context to which we belong. […] When peace emanates from us peace returns to us. It is well to think carefully about how we can build a world community – a just world order – one that is rooted in popular participation, that seeks to realize the dreams of the people of the world, and that creates mechanisms to regulate sustainable development. There are many

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

403

roads to a just world order – and none of them easy or amenable to quick resolutions. There is no one way, nor a magic formula. Preparation for the journey toward a world community begins with irrelevant dreams. Dreams are imperfect and subject to contextual, cultural, and historical biases, yet they open the way for a future where we can shield ourselves from the disaster of chaos, take at least some small steps towards the alleviation of the massive misery, reduce the burden of the world arms race, and decrease the burden of repression on hundreds of millions of people. Utopias are useful tools to design intermediate steps, to know what is our hope, but utopias cannot be used to divert the energy of the world from the intermediate, small steps that are possible.

10.7 Defining Peace: The End of Separation Said, A. A. (2006). Defining peace: The end of separation. In A. A. Said, Bridges, not barriers: The American dream and the global community (pp. 1–6). Fetzer Institute. Dominant cultures have always defined and projected their own conception of peace, be it through a Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, Pax Islamica, or today a Pax Americana. History also teaches that the pursuit and implementation of any monolithic, non-inclusive notion of peace can be ultimately reduced to and developed for the purposes of subjugation. It is these limited conceptions of peace that culminated in total war in the twentieth century.

10.7.1 Moving Beyond Pieces of Peace to Total Peace The co-optation of narrowly defined conceptions of peace by national governments who champion traditional power politics has vastly curtailed the ability of those who seek to reform the system to forward the ideals of harmonious coexistence and reconciliation. The reformers must redefine these outmoded, co-opted versions of peace if they are to meet the needs of a truly integrated, multicultural, and multireligious world. By encouraging even more awareness and interaction in our globalized environment, the reformers can draw attention to the fundamental limitations, conceptual narrowness, and unsustainability of projecting social norms and institutions onto other cultures and countries. The historically narrow and disorienting perspective on peace and human rights has resulted in a systemic thought pattern that focuses less on maximizing the potential of peace than on maximizing its use as another tool in the national toolbox to further short-term self-interest. Instead of demanding security, the system settles for an absence of war. Instead of requiring justice, the system accepts a legalized injunction against gross, physical torture. Within this framework, peace is thus limited to

404

A. A. Said et al.

negative and overly legalistic concepts and does not include positive visions that are broader and more integrative. In the West, particularly in the United States, there is a strong preoccupation with identifying peace through the role of institutions and national government. The official American formulation of peace, carried through from the Roman tradition, is closely aligned with order. The only legitimate order that tends to be recognized within this framework, and hence the one that tends to be projected abroad, is that of America’s institutionalized political structure.

10.7.2 Positive Peace In contrast to the politically oriented American disposition toward peace, there is another commonly held view of peace that is religious in character. Within this viewpoint, peace is equated with passivity and the tolerance of intolerable conditions. Internal well-being of the individual is more important than external conditions, as the harmony of the individual is preserved through direct identification and dialogue with the divine or transcendent (often God or a supreme being or beings). This vision of peace derives its primary inspiration from religious teachings. Both the institutional and the religious perspectives of peace have validity but, carried to their extremes, reveal excesses that undermine security and threaten human rights. These conceptual categories must be transcended in order to move peace beyond the absolutism of politics and religion. The traditional political and religious beliefs have stifled the emergence of new ideas and have contributed to continuing isolation among peoples. The same beliefs have also neglected to establish a proper relationship with our physical environment. Ideally, the momentum of transcending these traditional beliefs culminates in a global redefinition of self and community that is central to the attainment of peace and sets the foundation for the entire world’s justice and security. Total peace can exist only if conditions throughout the world facilitate human security.

10.7.3 Dialogue: Surfacing “Hidden Treasures” The achievement of peace is not for one nation to impose. Rather, it is an endeavor invoking the wisdom and the dreams of others through the process of learning and dialogue. Dialogue, as a new paradigm in global relations, is based on achieving new forms of knowing so that we see others in increasingly humanizing contexts, allowing us to look together toward a common future. Through dialogue, we surface our key presuppositions regarding the meaning and role of “self,” “other,” “conflict,” and “peace.” Accordingly, we adjust the worldviews that frame our reality and fashion responses to one another that are appropriate to our newly understood mutual values and goals. In dialogue, we can explore and conceptualize a shared vision of peace that

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

405

has depth and integrated meaning, embracing all of our understandings, experiences, needs, hopes, and fears. By sharing our vulnerabilities, we find the freedom and the power to transcend them. Furthermore, as we struggle to find our place and relationship with one another in a globalized world, we are discovering that each culture and tradition offers important solutions to questions regarding how to reach harmony. Dialogue is crucial to surfacing these “hidden treasures.” Once we are able to unlock the secrets of effective communication and pierce the walls of misperception and mistrust, we can gather these enriching insights, lessons, and opportunities, together building a vision that inspires and moves us toward a potential much greater than we could have realized as individuals.

10.7.4 Challenging Our Deepest Assumptions About Self and Other In the absence of dialogue, nations are not challenged to investigate deeply the assumptions that have traditionally guided their beliefs, even though those beliefs may not serve them well or accurately reflect their emerging values or goals. By themselves, these nations often lack the jolt of experience or insight needed to transcend outmoded ways of thinking and doing […]. Without a reflection to show them how they are seen by others, they may lack the vision and honesty to understand in what ways they have fallen short of their professed ideals. When societies are not challenged to identify and surface their most basic assumptions and relate them to their present circumstances, they may not recognize or admit to their errors and weaknesses or deal with these errors and weaknesses in a healthy or positive way. Societies that do not confront their own shortcomings often respond to problems or difficulties in unhealthy ways – acting irrationally to overcompensate for weaknesses, projecting feelings of societal guilt or inadequacy onto the population, and placing blame for difficulties on other, often weaker groups or societies.

10.7.5 Resisting the Pathology of Political and Religious Fundamentalism By refusing to engage in dialogue, nations do themselves a disservice, ensuring that other nations will view them narrowly through the zero-sum prism of power politics, and vice versa. In all conflict situations, people under stress react by reducing their own beliefs to a small, workable subset in order to protect themselves, assuming a rigidity and defensiveness that implicitly closes off the ability to listen to and communicate with others. When nations cut off communication with one another, they arouse feelings of fear, insecurity, and indignation and invite the emergence of

406

A. A. Said et al.

political or religious fundamentalism. This emergence only reinforces their estrangement from one another, and the narrow and short-lived sense of security derived from fundamentalist doctrine is unsustainable in an integrated world. Political fundamentalism is practiced when powerful nations in the international system – such as the United States at the present time – tend to react under pressure by adopting reductionist stances; entire political or cultural systems of thought are simplified and categorized according to a “with us or against us” framework that assumes the correctness of the powerful nation’s viewpoint. The nations deploy such stratagems to legitimize their dominion and hegemony. On the other hand, religious fundamentalism occurs when a people feeling powerless to determine the courses of their own destinies – such as some Muslims today – tend to reject the merit of any outside influence and to glorify mythologized and antiquated concepts of identity (usually ethnic, national, or religious). Fundamentalists, religious and political, become isolated, concentrating on their quest for so-called authenticity. In doing so, fundamentalists disregard the inner light and essential truths that permeate all cultures and faiths. Retreating by any group or nation from the challenges of active engagement brings with it costs greater than the lost opportunities for learning and community building. It is not only a denial of the rich diversity of all cultural experience but also a rejection of that group’s responsibility to face the choices that must necessarily be made for the long-term wellbeing of its own people. We should learn to see beyond the static and hostile images that have infiltrated our collective imaginations if we are truly to know one another and build a harmonized global community.

10.7.6 The Role of Spirituality Given the shrinking attraction of universal secular ideologies, spirituality has a vital role to play in efforts to fashion a new compass capable of guiding humanity toward a culture of peace. The visions offered by reductionist science to explain humanity’s place in the universe have failed because they could not bridge the tremendous material and cultural divides that define the world today, nor could they provide impetus for an ecologically sustainable future. Therefore, we must look to the world’s great contemplative traditions for the untapped spiritual resources and enduring wisdom necessary to construct new visions. […] Spirituality is a shift in consciousness that sees the whole of existence contained in the parts. A spiritual perspective filters out the superficial and ephemeral, allowing the essential to emerge. It is holistic, connecting all people and things. Many cultural and religious traditions – Indian, Chinese, Middle Eastern, African, American Indian, and Mediterranean – have channeled and institutionalized spirituality, and many great men and women throughout history have elevated and immortalized their causes by harnessing spirituality’s transformative power. Spirituality begins with the individual, and the values spirituality begets shape the nature of communities and political societies. International relations based on

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

407

fear-inducing perceptions of separateness reinforced by artificial boundaries and superficial differences (race, gender, religion, class) lead to increasingly precarious situations for all nations given the pervasiveness of interdependence. The reorientation of international relations to a moral framework derived from a spiritual perspective is the world’s best – and perhaps only – hope for transcending separateness and encouraging universal solidarity. The spiritual perspective truly acknowledges the concept of existing for the sake of others. This concept has been recognized recently by postmodern thinkers (see, for example, Bauman 2001; Levinas 2003) who centered their social theories around a concept of encouraging self-sacrifice for the Other. These thinkers explain that classical social contract theory does not hold individuals to the level of responsibility necessary for true morality to obtain, and deeper commitments involving self-sacrifice are necessary. Feminist theorists (for example, Robinson 1998; Gould 2004) support and augment the theories of self-sacrifice by advocating for the greater integration of care around the world to ensure that the needs and concerns of all are met. Yet the vision requires something even deeper than traditionally conceived care and self-sacrifice: it requires a spiritual conception of love. Love is a dynamic force which flows through us rather than a state we possess. To receive it, we have to give it to others. Everything on our planet has an ecological function, and love is the ecological function for humans. It demands that actions of outward care or selfsacrifice stem from an inner acceptance of and identification with the Other – whether the Other is defined by ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Indeed, when nations associate the Other with their own interests and consciousness, ultimately they experience a sense of oneness with the Other. A vision founded on a spiritual conception of love, which represents the pinnacle of “enlightened selfinterest,” emphasizes the benefits of international stability by expecting nations to ultimately realize that true, lasting peace cannot be achieved or maintained through the dominance or machinations of a single nation or bloc of nations. Because security is a shared benefit, requiring the caring and sacrificial efforts of all, hegemony is a self-defeating model.

10.8 Peace, the Inside Story Said, A. A. (2015, March 19). Peace, the inside story [paper presentation]. Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, The Inspiration (festschrift conference), American University, Washington, D.C. Abstract: Peace is a journey towards a place of mercy and justice, a process of being and doing. Peace is never made; it is always in the making. It is both inner experience and external task. It is a long hard path. By weaving together inside stories of people and events, this chapter throws light on how peace in the world is attainable only from

408

A. A. Said et al.

a state of inner peace. In order to achieve inner peace we need unconditional selfknowledge. When we discover and accept our authentic individuality we recognize and accept the genuine uniqueness of others. Peace is a transformational process, levels of our being. Once we change our conscious beliefs and the unconscious symbols, ideas, and abstractions that hold our world in place, our inner experience and outer engagement are transformed. This process of transformation shifts our perception and experience of the universe and ourselves. We see reality as a whole. We start learning again, because we’re seeing each moment with fresh eyes, responding to new situations in new ways. We integrate reason, feeling, sensing, and intuition. We experience ourselves as spiritual beings. Our consciousness expands in a fundamental sense. We grow in sensitivity to self, others, nature, and the Divine. Peace begins with me. Have wings that feared ever touched the Sun? I was born when all I once Feared – I could love.7 —Rabia al Adawiyya of Basra, c. 717–801

10.8.1 Background On my way to a conference intended to expand communication between Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem, Israel many years ago, I fell into conversation with the taxi driver. He asked me where I came from, and because I never underestimate the value of shock in bringing a conversation to a meaningful place, I told him Syria, a country officially at war with Israel. I have lived in the United States for over 60 years, and am American, but Syria is where I began this journey, so my answer was partially true. At this point he said that he would not be able to take me all the way to my destination from West to East Jerusalem, because it was in unfriendly, unsafe territory and that he would only take me so far. As we continued talking, and I told him more about my work with peace and the meeting I was going to, he told me that all he wanted when he went home at night was for his family to be out of harm’s way. “We keep killing our chances for peace,” he’d said. Then, changing his mind about leaving me to my own devices, he got on the radio and arranged for a Palestinian taxi driver to meet me and take me the rest of the way. En route home from the Jerusalem conference, I made a stop in Syria and had another profound experience with my taxi driver. It was as if they’d just hung up 7

From her poem “Die Before You Die” (Ladinsky 2002).

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

409

the phone with each other. The driver asked me where I was coming from, and so I answered Israel. Again, the power of shock broke through layers of small talk. As I told him more about my work, he told me that all he wanted for his family was to live in peace. When we reached the hotel, he wouldn’t take my money, saying simply: “Please, just continue your work.” These are the people I work for and these are the stories that propel me in my external work. Life has involved me in International Relations for over half a century, both in academia and in practice – working as advisor to the United Nations and governments, serving on advisory boards of national and international NGOs dealing with issues of conflict and peace building, and working with peace makers around the globe. I have met many remarkable people throughout my life. I had the good fortune to cross paths with several Nobel Peace Prize recipients and can share that two of them, Nelson Mandela and Jimmy Carter, are examples of peacemakers guided in large part by their spiritual compasses. My experience is influenced by my interpretation of Sufism,8 Islam’s answer to the metaphysical search for meaning found in every culture and religion. Yet Sufi mysticism has no more claims on Islam than physics does on Greece, for example, even though physics uses Greek terms of reference as Sufism uses Islamic terms of reference. Sufism is not a religion or specific doctrine; it simply underscores the purification of one’s inner self as the path to peace. It further affirms that the individual spiritual path is connected to our responsibilities in society. Peace is a process. Though some of us recognize the connection between inner and outer peace, few of us are already a Gandhi, a Mother Teresa, a Lao Tzu, Krishna, Moses, Buddha, Christ, or Muhammad. Peace is a journey, not a destination. It’s not an end goal, but inherently a process. This process involves endless transformation, a process of detachment and response, and daily challenges. 1. Endless transformation. There is no instant transformation. There are no instant transformers. In the same way that our limitations are inexhaustible, our growth in peace is limitless. Each moment when we see and detach from a selfish thought impulse, we deepen our peace by one step. This is how peace is transformative. It transforms consciousness from bondage to desire, into freedom to love and create. 2. The process of detachment and response. Peace has to recreate itself momentby-moment, in our lives of constant change, through detachment and response. This should be obvious with respect to the abrasions that punctuate everyday life, as well as the obstacles that oppose conflict resolution. But it also happens in meditation. Meditation starts by detaching the mind from the thoughts and memories of action, whether of that day, previous days or days to come. Detachment is letting-go. It keeps on letting go into the small stillness reached by the first detachment. In this way stillness deepens. In daily life each new moment and situation is accepted for what it is – not denied, and not resisted. Then follows a conscious response. Sometimes non-action is called for. This is the action of intentional stillness. But sometimes an act of speech or body 8

For further reading see Schimmel (1978).

410

A. A. Said et al.

is called for. Arising as an expression of inner peace, of inner knowing, then either action or stillness has the effect of reducing disturbances in self and others. Both types of spiritual action – (1) practice in daily meditation or prolonged retreat, and (2) practice in everyday life or conflict resolution – take right effort: that’s right attention plus detachment. This sweating out of our transformation is the only way inner and outer peace can be realized. No one can do this for us; we have to do it for ourselves and then model it for others. 3. The challenges of daily life. Once peace is touched, as a temporary state, then maintaining that state requires the work of incorporating peace into daily routine. This is another process. It is sweaty work because daily life is a relentless stimulus to our latent weaknesses – and a continuous challenge to our peaceful energy. The lives of saints, sages, and prophets were also processes – responding to small and large crises one after another, day after day. Spiritual experience is required for outer peace. Spiritual consciousness refers to the direct knowledge we have of the world and ourselves before any thoughts arise in the mind. Because all thoughts carry the sense of self – “I’m thinking about that” – and because the sense of self is itself a thought – only spiritual consciousness can circumvent the root of conflict. It can do this because it doesn’t recognize a distinction between self and other. Without a sense of separation between self and other, only unity remains. If this perspective were to form the basis of peace solutions, any number of specific approaches would be likely to work. This is all it would take to see that social and political peace depends on the experience of inner peace – if we understood what inner peace is: a quiet mind. But most of us don’t, so let’s sketch a formal argument for stillness of thoughts as a necessary condition for outer, social peace. Stillness of thought impulses occurs easily when we recognize them when we’re conscious of them. The problem is that we are not clearly conscious of the majority of our thoughts: 1. Constant subconscious thinking means we’re identifying with our thoughts. 2. Identifying with our thoughts means we’re investing a sense of self in them. 3. Investing a sense of self in thoughts means we’re creating the division of Selfversus-Other. 4. The division of Self-versus-Other is the germ of violence. 5. Therefore, constant subconscious thinking is the germ of competition and war. 6. Therefore, stillness of thought is a necessary condition for peace. The key concept here is the first. Why is investing a sense of self in our thoughts built into subconscious thinking? Because subconscious thinking means we’re not recognizing thoughts as impulses separate from consciousness. Clear recognition of thoughts as transitory impulses, no more a part of our self than an impermanent itch we feel, means we recognize them as separate from who we are. When we don’t clearly recognize our thought impulses as transitory “things” – separate from the field of consciousness which sees them come and go – then we feel identical with them: This is a subconscious sense of self, invested in our thoughts.

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

411

The metaphor of the mirror is a concept used by Sufis and the image of “polishing the mirror of the heart” is a common one. With expanded, sharpened clarity, we are able to recognize our thoughts. Because our thoughts appear to be a part of our self-identity, any individual or group who criticizes our beliefs is felt to be criticizing us. We take this personally. We feel threatened or angry, because we don’t see that our beliefs are just subtle objects, within our field of consciousness. They’re not who we are. But the “Other’s” criticism threatens to destroy our beliefs. So we feel the “Other” is destroying us. In ordinary language, they’re “shooting us down in flames,” “blowing us out of the water.” These are military metaphors for killing. And human beings do kill each other in wars over the ideas of Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Equality and Democracy, and more. Religion has never brought universal peace. This is true despite its role at different points throughout history as a powerful force for peace and cultural harmony. Confucianism, for instance, helped end the Warring States Period of Ancient China. Christianity helped reunify the decadent. Roman Empire, both East and West factions. Rabbinic Judaism blazed up as a force of peace in Exilic Babylon. Islam unified the truculent Arab tribes. Buddhism was the basis for instilling peace during Ashoka’s empire in the third century BCE. These religious groups pacified and unified broken and belligerent societies. But successor states tended to demand allegiance to their finite forms and methods. Inevitably, this brought a return of conflict and war. Religion becomes a pawn in the political games of nations. Religion, when twisted and corrupted, leads to exclusivity. It becomes closed, driven by fear of differences. Closed religion preaches total ownership of truth, when, in reality, we all possess parts of the truth and need each other to discover truth’s totality. When we stop identifying with our beliefs – because we see them clearly, as transitory objects – then we don’t take criticism personally. We retain our peace.

10.8.2 Peace as Inner Experience As mentioned earlier, inner peace is stillness of thought impulses. This is also clarity, the basis of wisdom, because thoughts distract consciousness from contact with reality. Reality is defined simply as our true nature, love. Here is already the connection between peace and transformation: peace is expansion of consciousness, because when conscious energy is not used up to form thoughts, desires, interpretations, prejudices, resentments, and day-dreaming and night-dreaming 24/7, then awareness is undimmed; it is enlivened. All thought impulses dim awareness of reality – just to make and maintain their own forms. Also, thought impulses prevent direct contact with reality; they’re a film or veil between consciousness and the world.

412

A. A. Said et al.

Thoughts not based on direct contact with reality are delusive. If we don’t see reality directly, we bump into it, or we miss it. So there’s already large or small conflict with reality when we’re in our heads, lost in thought. When stillness is deep enough, consciousness feels like ecstatic joy. The healing acceptance and fulfilling joy of love are always present in the depth of the mind. But we rarely experience these blessings, because of wave after wave of disturbing thought impulses – desire, fear, anger, and greed – all expressing our deep sense of an illusory separate self. Spiritual practices remove compulsive thought formations relentlessly agitating and disturbing our mind. Then awareness opens into deep, stable consciousness, transcending the false sense of self – born from thought, which is the source of all disturbing emotions. Our illusory individuality disappears in God’s unbounded wholeness. When the self is transcended, then the resulting energetic, but stilled, awareness is love – our True Nature. All living things on the planet have their ecological function; ours is love. When there is no self, there can be no “other.” Expanded, deep, transcendental consciousness realizes that self and other are delusions created by thought. The insight that we are one is love: We are connected: We are interdependent: The whole universe is One. In the accompanying joy of this love, conflict is recognized as coming from the emotional disturbances of the false sense of self. In contrast, actions arising from Realization are loving actions that dissolve conflict and suffering. Cooperation replaces competition. This is not utopian. This is the life experience of people who realize their true nature. They do not spend their lives in competition and conflict. But they often live intensely active lives. Gandhi and his contemporary Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Easwaran 1999) are good examples. Their wide-ranging work and countless friendships and social contacts carried peace. Their acts radiated compassion. That is why millions were open to them as they were to Rabia al Adawiyya, Mansur al-Hallaj, Abraham Maimonides and Bahá’u’lláh. In our era we can find many models too: Aung San Suu Kyi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Albert Einstein, Thomas Merton, Sakena Yacoobi, Thich Nhat Hanh, and Abdul Sattar Edhi.9 But all humans who experience inner peace spread it to others. This is a possibility for all of us. Peace is the doorway to compassion, and nonviolence is the first step to love.

10.8.3 The Love Triangle When we transcend our self-centered, desire-based thoughts, our actions reflect this peace. If not, our actions reflect conflict, because desire rejects the present moment, struggling or fighting for something else. Action from desire reflects inner conflict 9

For more information on this Pakistani legend hailed as both Mahatma Gandhi and Father Teresa, see Constable (2011).

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

413

Fig. 10.1 The love triangle

and reinforces it. Action from desirelessness reflects peace and love – and reinforces them. Action and inner being are interdependent, but doing is more dependent on being than being is on doing. This interdependence – with the priority of inner love and oneness – is represented by the Love Triangle, a Sufi image and the way to peace (Fig. 10.1). Thought is at the apex, and words and deeds are at the corners below, because our thoughts are the originators of our speech and actions. Thoughts are expressed in our words and enacted in our deeds. When our thoughts reflect our love, our words are those of a lover, and our actions serve the beloved. We are peace. This is a virtuous cycle. It is the opposite of the vicious cycle of violent action. In an “Unlove Triangle,” originating thoughts express the fearful, desire-carrying delusion of Self-versus-Other. Then conflict is communicated in our words, and violence is expressed in our actions. Based on conflicting words and violent actions, the delusion of Self-versus-Other gets reinforced. This delusion then leads to further conflicts.

10.8.4 The Relation of Peace and Love Inner peace deepens love, and love deepens inner peace. Both love and peace are acceptance of what is. The Love Triangle symbolizes this: The Triangle’s undivided

414

A. A. Said et al.

interior represents the oneness of inner peace – the unity of the individual and all the rest of the universe, in love. Here’s the logic of the connection between peace and love: 1. Unconditional love is acceptance of whatever is. 2. Acceptance of whatever is, is inner peace. 3. Therefore, Love = Unconditional acceptance = Peace. The deeper is our peace – our lack of aversion to anything, and our lack of desire for anything else than what is – then the deeper is our love. Lover, beloved, and the act of love become one. The knower, object known, and act of knowing are one. In Oneness is no conflict because there are not two to enter into conflict. As peace deepens, its nature as love becomes more palpable. In love and peace, conflicts dissolve. This is the point of the inner experience of peace for conflict resolution. If we look from the perspective of the Love Triangle at methods used in successful conflict resolution, we can see love everywhere.

10.8.5 Doing and Being The Love Triangle distinguishes inner – love, lover, and beloved – from outer – thought, word, and deed. Ultimately, Inner-versus-Outer is a false distinction, because the reality is One. But it is a useful distinction because of our deep-seated delusion of Self-versus-Other: As long as we labor under dualistic delusions, symbols like the Love Triangle are helpful because they use our delusions to grow us out of them. I have heard, too many times to count, one party in conflict say about the other: “We hate them for making us do what we do, because they bring out the beast in us.” In the final analysis, doing is one with being, and outer is one with inner. […] Physical and social forms are the outside of consciousness. And consciousness is the inside of physical and social forms. That’s why peace work is both inner and outer, inseparably. Working against structural violence – and for justice, abundance, and ecology – are peacemakers’ “external” tasks. “External” is in quotes because we are emphasizing here that inner peace is an energy inherently acting in these outer directions.

10.8.6 The Energy of Peace Dissolves Suffering Inner peace with whatever exists does not imply inaction. The nature of peace is action to eliminate suffering. Peace is a high energy state un-depleted by desires, chasing the objects of desire, and the resulting frustration, disappointment, or fighting. Any desire-carrying thought that arises in this high-energy field is burnt up. This is why Visdom, the combination of wisdom plus vision, or inner seeing, is a Fire, a field of still energy, dissolving suffering.

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

415

First, it dissolves latent desire impulses in the soul of the peaceful individual. But simultaneously it alleviates the suffering consciousness of other people. Nearby people get a “contact high.” Distant people are also helped. This is “nonlocal causation,” in accord with Quantum Nonlocality, proven by 20th century physicists David Böhm, John Bell, and Alain Aspect.10 In addition to the activity of burning away psychological suffering, energetic peaceful consciousness acts to alleviate suffering – from a child’s distress to the violent conflicts of nations. The ancient example – and still the best – is a mother’s love. A mother accepts her child’s limitations and pain – but acts to eliminate them both physically and energetically, as much as possible. The mere presence of the mother pacifies her child. Framework for conflict resolution – or “When I am peace, peace emanates from me and peace returns to me” The translation of peace as first inner transformation and only then external manifestation (you are peace and from you flows peace) creates a certain framework in my conflict resolution work. This framework can be broken down into five stages, each essential for the succeeding one: Step 1: Create for Them a Safe Space, or Getting Clear As facilitator I must create a safe space for the conflicting sides to meet. The issue here is that there is almost always a disparity in perceived power. It is difficult to feel safe when you feel powerless against the other’s power. The energy, the environment and setting, the idea that you are co-participating in creating a new perspective, a new way of looking, these are what create a safe space for the encounter. Because this is an inner as much as an outer space, it requires emptying unconscious desires, emotions, and attachment to the outcome. I need to quiet my mind. In other words, I have to get myself out of the way. It also requires surrendering to love. When I am connected to that state of grace within myself, it manifests externally as a calming, non-judgmental energy. This clear space invites the parties in conflict to recognize their unconscious baggage so that they can stop embracing their pain and start wrestling with it. Only by wrestling can we progress. This first stage tends to look like an everyday, lighthearted place that all people can connect with, such as an informal restaurant with music or dancing, or round tables with frequent coffee breaks. It involves modeling what it looks like to share inside stories of transformation and peace. I might start with an experience, perhaps the one involving the elderly woman on the bus who gave her seat to a pregnant woman and her small child. As soon as she stood, a man rose to give her his seat and 10

In quantum physics, it is measurement that collapses the wave of possibilities of two distant, correlated electrons. David Böhm’s interpretation was that measurement and electrons are not different from consciousness. They are holographic – each contains the other. The physical order is implicit in the conscious order. Böhm presented this theory in his 1980 book, Wholeness and the implicate order.

416

A. A. Said et al.

another man stood to offer him his seat and a chain reaction of kindness was set in motion by one woman’s standing. I could also share my experience waiting in a long line of over-heated, frustrated customers facing one cashier in a drugstore. People in the line became impatient and fidgety and the cashier became more and more flustered. One woman in the middle of the line, when her turn came, determined to engage the cashier in compassionate conversation. After looking at her name tag and addressing her by name, she said: “My dear, what a long day you’re having! You must be tired, especially with the weather being what it is….” At first the level of impatience in the line grew, but as she continued to chat and engage the cashier, the mood shifted. People in line started engaging each other and laughing and time became irrelevant. It took one person to shift the energy and open us all to a different experience of the moment. For this first stage, coming from a place of light-heartedness and humility is essential. I cannot grapple with the emotions in the group if I am weighed down by my own, or theirs. Nelson Mandela is the consummate exemplar of these traits. I remember when he entered a conference sponsored by the Young Presidents’ Organization in South Africa in the 90s, late and with a little girl in tow. He opened the discussion by explaining her presence. She had stopped him in the street on his way to the conference, he explained, to ask him if he was Mandela and when he’d confirmed her suspicions, she’d said, “but you look so old!” Only a humble man could share this story with laughter. Step 2: Collapse the Distance Between Them, or Making the Unseen Seen The second step is to change the way the parties in conflict see each other. When they enter, they see each other as different or separate. What they need to see is that they’re both victims and perpetrators, that both sides are traumatized. Spirituality enables us to connect with a deeper self and that’s the place from which attention originates. The implication is that you can then change what you give your attention to. I appeal to the commonality, that both sides are in a state of pain and both need healing. That is why I refer to them as, for example, “My dear Israelis and other Arabs” or “My dear Arabs and other Israelis”; “My dear Turks and other Greeks,” or “My dear Greeks and other Turks”; “My dear Irish and other English,” or “My dear English and other Irish.” This again narrows the disparity of power between them. It allows them to appreciate an understanding that they are equally powerful or equally powerless because they are partners in conflict. To do this, I must first collapse the distance within myself, the feeling of separation from wholeness, of separation from anything. I must work on avoiding selfcenteredness and distraction so that I can connect with the energy of the others. Once I can do this, it opens up a broader consciousness, an awareness of the before unseen, which is the only place that reconciliation can occur. There it becomes possible to mobilize the energy of others. For example, a retired lawyer once came to see me about how to begin doing peace work himself. As we walked and talked, I picked up a piece of trash from the sidewalk and put it in the garbage. He did the same a few steps later and understood what I wanted to tell him: that peace is about putting

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

417

things in their place. He went home and discovered what he had been unable to see before: homeless families in his own town who had lost their houses in foreclosures. “I didn’t see them before, but I see them now,” he said, and he began his work of putting them back where they belong. As for me, I can’t collapse this distance without first having experienced it. The founders of the first Peace Studies programs at American University experienced marginalization and scorn. Often we were viewed as “flaky” scholars and were not taken seriously. But leadership is the ability to stand up in the midst of laughter. We paid a price, but in the process discovered a better prize: both humility and awareness of what separation feels and looks like. That experience of marginalization, coupled with my inner work, collapsed my belief that there is a center and a periphery. Where you are is the center and because everything is inner-connected, there is no periphery. Without this experience, I would not be able to help the parties in conflict to shift their perception. Step 3: Build Trust, or Becoming Companions on the Journey This stage is when the parties can share their feelings and create empathy. On the surface is only blame, and they cannot get past this blame until they see each other as fellow sufferers on a journey of pain, rather than as the “other.” They can only see each other this way by recognizing their own state of grace and their own unconscious, thus the first two steps. It helps to focus on individual and shared needs and to identify the roles of individuals in the conflict. Stage three often looks like the peace conference that Dr. Carl Rogers, at the apex of his career at 85, convened in 1987 in Rust, Austria with the Peace Project staff and the co-sponsorship of the University for Peace in Costa Rica to end Nicaragua’s civil war. Some 50 political figures and diplomats from 17 nations couldn’t bring about reconciliation despite our best efforts. Then one night the Austrian government invited the delegates to celebrate a new season of wine. This night of wine and celebration brought Nicaraguans and Americans together at dinner creating the safe space necessary for sharing: the chief Nicaraguan delegate took a picture of his son from his wallet and showed it to the chief American delegate and said: “I don’t want you to kill my son.” The American delegate brought out a picture of his son from his wallet and said: “Let’s make a deal. Next summer we’ll make an exchange: my son stays with you in Nicaragua and yours will stay with my family in America.” And so entered trust and the humanity of understanding. The discussion moved from the abstract notions of national security and national interest to the concrete and personal: my family and your family. It was only then, when the sharing began and the two became companions on the journey back to understanding, that reconciliation became a possibility. A final story to demonstrate how this process of internal to external transformation works took place in Cyprus in 1990 under the auspices of a Seeds of Peace program. We took Greek Cypriot students to the Turkish side and brought Turkish Cypriot students to the Greek side and went together to restaurants. Through music and food and discussions, they found commonality, confronted their differences, and could

418

A. A. Said et al.

no longer deny the common humanity of their former enemies. By confronting their differences they discovered their similarities. Step 4: Create a Coordinated Pace, or Whirling Together 11 In laying out the conflict resolution steps, one side usually feels that it is being pushed too fast. This is a result of the power imbalance. Conflict resolution is a dance and the steps need to be in sync to work. One side must step back so that the other can step forward, in turns. This is where patience comes in. The only way the negotiations will end is if one side walks out; they have to give up before I give up. In the early 1990s, during a peace conference between Syrians and Israelis hosted by the U.S., the Syrian side felt it was being pushed too fast while the lsraeli side felt comfortable. The Syrian delegation felt powerless vis-à-vis the Israelis and thus unwilling to make concessions. Then something shifted to bring both sides onto a level playing field. The political parties governing Israel changed from Likud to Labor, and with a new Israeli chief negotiator, the climate of the conference changed as well. Before his arrival, the atmosphere had been tense, formal and uncomfortable. The new principal actor happened to be a leading expert on both Syria and the Arab world and was able to create a feeling of comfort to which the Syrians responded favorably. Together they began to develop a common perception and to whirl in sync. They set a coordinated pace for peace, and while the negotiations ultimately failed, it was not due to a perceived imbalance of power. Step 5: Pass it On, or a Few Seconds in Heaven This last stage of the transformation process is an ongoing one. The recipients of healing, once the process has been set in motion, become conduits of healing themselves. It becomes their duty to continue the work of conflict transformation, of continuing to face the trauma and help other fractured souls wrestle with their emotions. The only way for the facilitator to bring this stage about is through modeling. Again, modeling is only possible when your conscious and your unconscious are in alignment, and this is a state of humility. To give an example, one junior faculty member at my university many years ago was faculty advisor to the Earth Day Club, which approached him with an odd request to perform an “earth” dance. He in turn went to a senior faculty member and asked for help. The senior professor agreed, and to much laughter and amazement, danced on the quad in front of faculty and students alike. When the younger professor came to thank him, the senior professor put up a hand. “When you become a tenured professor, do the same thing for the junior faculty member who asks you.” This is a rare successful example of modeling; most are unsuccessful most of the time. It is the same way with the question of Heaven: Heaven is where love is flowing, and Hell is where love is blocked. It may not be possible to experience Heaven for 11 Whirling refers to the Sufi sect of Whirling Dervishes and was founded by Jal¯ al ad-D¯ın Rumi. Dervish is translated as “seeker,” or one on the Sufi journey.

10 Dialogue, Spirituality, and Transformation

419

more than a few fleeting moments in a lifetime, but those seconds are what sustain you and keep you going. With the Beloved’s water of life, no illness remains In the Beloved’s rose garden of union, no thorn remains They say there is a window from one heart to another How can there be a window where no wall remains?12 —Jalal ad-Din Rumi, c. 1207–1273

10.8.7 Conclusion […] Many years ago I accepted an invitation to speak at the Army Sergeants Major Academy and was met at the airport by an officer in uniform. The airport was crowded, the timing just before Christmas, and I kept losing sight of my guide in the jumble of people. Suddenly l would spot him to one side helping an elderly woman with her luggage, only to lose sight again a few steps later. The last time I lost him he was snapping a photo of a mother and child in front of Santa Claus. I asked him where he had learned to disappear and he answered that it was part of his grand strategy. As a minesweeper in Vietnam, he explained, he’d lost many buddies who didn’t know they were about to take their last step. “For me,” he’d said, “I learned to live between steps. And now, I celebrate life with every step I take.” We must be fully immersed and conscious in our inner world, the life between steps, in order to step out on the external path of peacebuilding with celebration and humility. As we make our way up the ladder of consciousness, from limitation to abundance, from human opportunity to divine proximity, changes open up. Then envy, resentment, paranoia, and desperate greed are transformed into trust, mercy, justice and their corresponding social forms – cooperation, innovation, and nonviolence. My heart has become capable of every form: It is a pasture for gazelles, And a convent for Christian monks, And a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Ka‘ba and the tables of the Tora and the book of the Koran. I follow the religion of love: Whatever way Love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith.13 —Muhyiddin Ibn Al-‘Arabi, c. 1165–1240 Acknowledgment Tara Alisbah gave “Peace, the Inside Story” valuable editing, support, and generosity of spirit. I am grateful. 12 13

From Rumi/Shiva (2000). Ibn al-‘Arabi/Nicholson (1978), The tarjuman al-ashwaq.

420

A. A. Said et al.

References Bauman, Z. (2001). The individualized society. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Böhm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the implicate order. Abingdon: Routledge. Constable, P. (2011). Playing with fire: Pakistan at war with itself . New York: Random House. Easwaran, E. (1999). Nonviolent soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, a man to match his mountains. Tomales, CA: Nilgiri Press. Gould, C. (2004). Globalizing democracy and human rights. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hardy, G. H. (1992). A mathematician’s apology (Canto ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ibn al-‘Arabi, M., & Nicholson, R. A. (1978). The tarjuman al-ashwaq: A collection of mystical odes by Muhyi‘ddin Ibn al-‘Arabi. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House Ltd. Ladinsky, D. J. (2002). Die before you die. In Love poems from God: Twelve sacred voices from the East and the West. New York: Penguin Compass. Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Levinas, E. (2003). Humanism of the other. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. Rajaee, F. (2000). Globalization on trial: The human condition and the information civilization. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. Rihani, A. (1920). The descent of Bolshevism. Boston: The Stratford Co. Rihani, A. (1970a). The chant of mystics. Beirut, Lebanon: The Rihani House. Rihani, A. (1970b). The path of vision: Essays of East and West. Beirut, Lebanon: The Rihani House. Robinson, F. (1998). Globalizing care: Ethics, feminist theory, and international relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rumi, J., & Siva, S. (2000). Rumi, thief of sleep: Quatrains from the Persian. Prescott, AZ: Holm Press. Said, A. A. (1988). Tawhid: The Sufi tradition of unity. Creation, 4(4), 24–25, 39. Said, A. A. (1996, Spring). Complementary ways of knowing [unpublished manuscript]. Said, A. A. (2004). Understanding peace through Rihani’s spirituality. In N. C. Funk and B. J. Sitka (Eds.), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West (pp. 113–119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Said, A. A. (2005). Achieving peace: The whole world needs the whole world. In Prince Nikolaus von und zu Liechtenstein and C. M. Gueye (Eds.), Peace and intercultural dialogue (pp. 235–251). Heidelberg, Germany: Universitätsverlag Winter. Said, A. A. (2006). Defining peace: The end of separation. In A. A. Said, Bridges, not barriers: The American dream and the global community (pp. 1–6). Fetzer Institute. Said, A. A. (2015, March 19). Peace, the inside story [paper presentation]. Abdul Aziz Said: The Mualim, The Inspiration (festschrift conference), American University, Washington, D.C. Said, A. A., & Funk, N. C. (1996). Conflict resolution and spirituality: Reflections on teaching, theory, and practice. The Fourth R, 74(1), 4–6. Said, A. A., & Lerche, C. O. III. (1995). Authors’ postscript to the fourth edition. In A. A. Said, C. O. Lerche, Jr., & C. O. Lerche III (Eds.), Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.) (pp. 278–289). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Schimmel, A. (1978). The mystical dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.

Part III

Abdul Aziz Said’s Impact, Influence, and Legacy

Chapter 11

Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students Nathan C. Funk and Meena Sharify-Funk

11.1 Testimonial by Dr. Mubarak Awad Dr. Awad is a Palestinian-American psychologist and advocate of nonviolent resistance. He is the founder of the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence, the National Youth Advocate Program, and Nonviolence International.

A historic event took place in Rust, Austria, November 1–4, 1985. Fifty leading figures in government and various fields, including former presidents, ambassadors, senators, authors, professors and psychologists, received an invitation from Dr. Carl Rogers – known for his influential client-centered psychotherapy, and one of the founding figures of humanistic psychology. Rogers focused on an area of crisis: “The Central American Challenge,” and wanted to use his knowledge in bringing peace to bring personal contact, deeper communication, greater closeness, searching and intimate dialogue using the power of person-centered therapy. I was invited as a Palestinian consultant, a psychologist who studied Rogerian psychotherapy at the International Graduate School in St. Louis, Missouri, and who started the Palestinian Counseling Center in 1974 in Palestine. This Center focuses on dealing with conflict between Israeli and Palestinian societies, and on dealing with children and families of Palestinians whose parents were killed or who are in Israeli military prisons for political activities against the Israeli Military Occupation of Palestine. Abdul Aziz Said and I were invited to the event in Rust. Being the only Arabs from Syria and Palestine, a quick introduction from the conference staff became a lifelong friendship. We were both assigned to be facilitators of small groups, and had to work with a distinguished gathering of ex-presidents of Central American countries, the Nathan C. Funk is Associate Professor at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo; Email: [email protected]; and Meena Sharify-Funk is Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University; Email: [email protected].

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5_11

423

424

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

current vice president of Costa Rica, seven ambassadors, seven legislators, and many other individuals from different parts of the world. Both of us committed to give our best to assist in making the conference successful and to bring peace to this conflict, even to those who were in attendance. As peace activists from the Arab world, we played a crucial part in making it safe to talk, argue, shout, embrace, and try for the participants to know each other deeply, come to trust one another more fully, and work together for peaceful solutions.1 Afterwards, Abdul Aziz left for American University and I went to Palestine. This first meeting and the work with Carl Rogers brought us close together; a few of the participants even felt that we are brothers. The best time I had with Abdul Aziz, however, was when I was deported in 1988. I was able to stay with him and his wife, Elena, and he asked if I could teach at the American University on methods and the strategy of nonviolence. I accepted, and have continued being an adjunct professor for more than 25 years. Out of the meeting in Rust came a discussion about helping Jewish people in Syria to move to their own chosen places in the world. Abdul Aziz felt the pressure in the United States, and many individuals and Members of Congress became the voice of Jews in Syria. The Middle East peace process and other factors, especially economic ones and resolutions in the United Nations, added difficulty to understanding the conditions of Jews in Syria. With Abdul Aziz’s personal connections in the Syrian government, a group of us put together a plan and strategic steps into place to end the harassment of the Syrian government. We followed our plan by focusing on the religious community in Syria as well as businesses and academics. Within three months, with high-level meetings in Syria, the Syrian government accepted our recommendation to treat Syrian Jews as any other Syrian, to give them the right to leave the country and to return to it. In fulfilling our task, the Syrian government requested to have a high-level meeting for several days to learn about the role of the USA. This was in 1987. Another episode when Abdul Aziz aided on a global level was during the Madrid Middle East Peace meetings in Washington, D.C., during George H. W. Bush’s administration. He was able to have the Syrian delegation participate in prayers for peace at the Greek Orthodox Church in Washington, D.C. and in prayers at the mosque, with dinner for all of the participants. Abdul Aziz insisted that religious and spiritual thoughts begin the negotiations. My thoughts and respect are to Abdul Aziz. He brought people together, helped students, and was not shy to ask others who had means to help students with limited financial resources. He always looked for his students around the world and kept in contact with them, traveling with them in different parts of the world. Students welcomed him and made his visits full of fun and meetings to help the American University. Abdul Aziz was able to make Peace Studies at the American University one of its main programs at the School of International Service, and he was able to bring teachers from around the world for peace education and to recognize peace makers 1

For more details on this meeting in Rust, see Rogers (1989).

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

425

from different countries. His living legend as a teacher, friend and caring person gave him the title, “leading light.”

11.2 Testimonial by Dr. Nike Carstarphen Dr. Carstarphen specializes in conflict analysis and resolution, conflict sensitive development, peacebuilding, organizational resilience, and monitoring and evaluation. She has designed and facilitated community-based intergroup dialogues and problem-solving processes, trained over 3,800 adults and youth from over 50 countries, taught at universities in Bolivia, Indonesia, Spain, Thailand and the U.S., and published book chapters and articles in forums such as Negotiation Journal.

I met Professor Abdul Aziz Said at American University in 1988 on the first day of his graduate class, Peace Paradigms. I knew the minute I walked into the classroom that this class would be different. Instead of the typical classroom layout, all the chairs were arranged in a circle, with unused seats pushed into a corner to make plenty of room. I sat down and waited anxiously. Finally, a tall, handsome, stylishly dressed man walked into the room. With a dark suit, crisp white shirt, and blue cravat, thoughts of Omar Sharif, the Egyptian film and television actor filled my mind. He sat down in the circle and silently surveyed our class, gently nodding his head up and down, quietly repeating “yes, yes, yes, beautiful” as he slowly made eye contact with each of us. What a powerful presence and gaze! Finally, he briefly introduced himself, starting with “I’m just a humble boy from the dessert,” a frequent mantra, I learned later, that magically made people more alert and open to listening to his viewpoint. He asked us to introduce ourselves. But rather than the typical introductory questions, he said, “Tell us a little about yourself. How do you serve the universe?” That weighty question has haunted me ever since. Early in the course, I knew I had finally found my people. I had come to American University to study in the MA in International Affairs program. The Peace Paradigms course was a refreshing contrast to the power politics of some of my professors. He talked of the failures of wars and of peaceful approaches to addressing the world’s conflicts and problems. He encouraged us to think of ourselves as global citizens with expansive visions, as “cathedral builders,” not bricklayers, regardless of the specifics of our jobs and careers. Taking his class changed the trajectory of my life. Prof. Said had been teaching in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University for over 30 years by the time I took his course. He and Adrienne Kaufmann, a Benedictine Sister who co-taught several classes with him, co-founded Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies (PCR) in the mid-1980s as a concentration within SIS. Prof. Said was the Director of the program and Adrienne was the Coordinator. By the end of summer 1991, Adrienne had decided to pursue other endeavors at Search for Common Ground. I applied and was honored to be selected as the new Coordinator of PCR in September 1991. I met with Prof. Said early on to discuss his vision for PCR. He and Adrienne had long dreamed of turning the PRC program

426

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

into its own master’s degree program. That became our primary goal for the next two years. Prof. Said was a visionary. He was an expert at getting things done. He was also happy to leave the details to others to help realize his vision. We knew there would be resistance to establishing a new MA program in PCR. Several key SIS faculty members dismissed peace studies outright or thought it didn’t warrant a new degree program. We embarked on several strategies to overcome these obstacles. One strategy was to address the perception by some SIS faculty that peace studies was “fluffy” and not a real discipline or field of study. One of our first decisions was regarding the title of the degree program. Initially, Prof. Said wanted to call it the MA in Peace Studies program. But we decided to name it MA in International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). We thought the addition of “international” fit better with SIS and that “conflict resolution” sounded “tough,” was in vogue, and would appeal more to the realpolitik crowd. To generate discussion and address misperceptions of peace studies, I wrote a brief article entitled “Peace Studies: Fluff or Tough?” for the local November/December 1991 newsletter issue of the Capital Area Association of Peace Studies (CAPS) Chronicle (a collaboration between peace and justice programs/faculty at Washington, D.C. area colleges and universities), making the case for a peace studies program. We spread copies of the CAPS Chronicle across SIS to ensure a broad range of faculty and students read it. Prof. Said brought some copies of it to the following SIS faculty meeting (I attended many meetings with him) and laid them on the conference table. He then casually remarked that an article in it might interest the faculty – an article that discussed the growing interest in peace studies and number of peace studies programs across the U.S. – and suggested that SIS explore such a program as well. This meeting was the first time I witnessed how he enlisted other’s support. He didn’t always directly raise an issue or argue a point. Rather, he focused on building relationships and often talked around a topic or indirectly nudged people in a particular direction through sharing information and using stories, metaphors, and analogies. A second strategy was to address the perception by resistant SIS faculty that the students who took various classes in peace studies and conflict resolution were either overly idealistic and naïve or not serious students and were simply looking for what they perceived as easy “As.” On a hunch, we enlisted the help of a staff person in the Admissions Office who gave us a report of the GRE scores of SIS graduate students. The report clearly showed that the students who had declared PCR as a concentration had higher aggregate GRE scores than the overall SIS student body. PCR students were serious, well-educated, and accomplished. Around the same time, we conducted a survey of graduate students in SIS, especially those who had or were taking PCR courses, to measure their interest in an MA in IPCR. The response was overwhelmingly in favor of a new IPCR degree program. In Spring 1992, Prof. Said presented the GRE research and survey results at an SIS faculty meeting and said he thought it was time to develop IPCR as a new master’s in SIS to meet student needs and interests.

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

427

There was both support and opposition voiced for a new program. As we sought to dispel the myths and stereotypes held by opponents, we also nurtured relationships with like-minded faculty. Prof. Said set up many meetings with supportive faculty to enlist their advice and identify opportunities for collaboration, further solidifying their support. A third strategy was to research colleges and universities in general, especially in the greater Washington, D.C. area, and other well-known universities offering programs in international affairs to find out how many offered peace and conflict resolution studies. After several months of research, I summarized my findings into a report for Prof. Said. He used that report at another faculty meeting to state that while there were over 250 colleges and universities across the U.S. that had majors, minors, or certificate programs in peace studies, almost all these were at the undergraduate level. He expressed that SIS was uniquely positioned to leverage its international expertise to develop one of the first graduate programs in peace and conflict resolution studies. He never promoted IPCR as something he wanted. He took his ego out of it. Instead, he framed the discussion as something “we need to do” to increase SIS’s competitiveness as the field attracted more and more students. He made a sincere effort to lay out a common goal. The fourth strategy was to put together a proposal for the new program, including an outline and description of the degree program, goals, credit hours, required classes, optional classes, and faculty. We gathered curricula from other universities. We met with AU faculty interested in having their courses cross-listed as IPCR, including faculty in SIS and across the university, such as faculty teaching about war, violence, and conflict from the lenses of political science, sociology, or anthropology. Part of our strategy was to minimize the new program’s cost by leveraging existing faculty and courses throughout AU. Prof. Said would continue to be the only faculty fully dedicated to IPCR, at least until the program grew sufficiently to support additional faculty. This stage of the strategy took the longest. We finally submitted the proposal during Spring 1993. Prof. Said presented the proposal at an SIS faculty meeting. It was discussed in at least two meetings and finally voted upon, with the overwhelming majority of faculty supporting the new program. The successful SIS faculty vote was the first big bureaucratic hurdle we had to pass. I left my job as Coordinator a few months later in summer 1993. My successors helped guide the process to its final completion, and the new IPCR program officially launched in 1995. Today, IPCR is one of the leading graduate programs in international peace and conflict resolution studies in the U.S. Working with Prof. Said to help found the IPCR program was an eye-opening and exciting experience. Watching him navigate the system to achieve his vision was inspirational. What had the most significant impact on me was watching how he did what he did – his process, approach, and way of interacting with others – which also helped me learn more about cultural differences and different ways of being in the world. Our weekly interactions were a source of wonder and learning. Many of our meetings took place in his office, or we met on his bench on the quad facing the old SIS building. He loved being outside, especially on a warm sunny day. He would lean back, close his eyes, smile, and soak up the sunshine. It never took long for

428

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

other faculty or students to stop by saying hello and chatting for a few minutes. Our meetings always went much longer than expected because he knew so many of the people walking by. Prof. Said always made time for others who called his office or stopped by to chat. There wasn’t a meeting that went by without at least one former student, from recent grads to now-retired ones, stopping by his office to say hello. Regardless of how busy he was, he always welcomed them and made time to talk and catch up or advise. It was amazing to me to see so many people from around the world come to AU just to visit with him. He always remembered who they were and something about their life. He made genuine connections with people, many of which lasted a lifetime. I accompanied Prof. Said to many meetings and speaking engagements he had off-campus. He participated in many panel discussions on peacebuilding. While I don’t remember the specifics of what he said, I remember him always telling stories and using metaphors to illustrate his points. He talked extensively about the role of culture, spirituality, compassion, love, and interconnectedness in international relations and diplomacy. “The whole world needs the whole world” was one of his common refrains. His message was always unique compared to other panelists. People’s eyes would pop, some in confusion, some in awe. Always, people would surround him afterwards to thank him and ask questions. While a humble boy from the desert, he’s built many cathedrals and inspired thousands of people whose lives he has touched to think in new ways and be global citizens.

11.3 Testimonial by Dr. Ronald J. Fisher Dr. Fisher is Professor Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Resolution at American University and Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Saskatchewan. He is currently Associate Faculty for the Conflict Analysis and Management Program at Royal Roads University.

I had the pleasure of meeting Abdul Aziz Said at the United States Institute of Peace in 1992 at the first major conference on conflict resolution that the Institute held. I presented my contingency model of third-party intervention and applied it to the conflict in Yugoslavia, and it was well received. Following the three-day conference, the Institute held a meeting of approximately 20 trainers and educators in peace and conflict resolution to discuss the challenge of transferring domestic training expertise in conflict resolution to the international domain. By chance and serendipity, I was seated next to Abdul Aziz, and as I was preparing to leave the meeting a bit early, he leaned over to me and said, “Why don’t you come and visit us sometime.” Abdul Aziz was good to his word, and secured a Visiting Professor position for me at AU with the support of SIS Dean Louis Goodman in the Fall of 1998. Years later after being appointed to a senior, tenured position, I used to joke that I was “still visiting.”

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

429

Joining the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, the School of International Service and American University was highly compatible with many of my personal values of egalitarianism, democratic participation, equity, justice, diversity, inclusion and collaboration. To make this point to my students and others, I would often quote a line from the John Denver song, “Rocky Mountain High”: “Coming home to a place he’d never been before.” Working with Abdul Aziz over some 15 years was like seeing and having these values reinforced on a daily basis. There was an openness to all ideas and respect for all individuals, and an approach to decision-making and managing differences through dialogue and consensus, with a clear refusal to force issues through the use of power. Thus, Abdul Aziz had a warm and supportive yet somewhat laissez-faire management style that placed considerable responsibility and flexibility on those working under him. His approach reminded me very much of what the famous counseling psychologist, Carl Rogers, posited as “unconditional positive regard,” an essential element in client-centered therapy and indeed in all close interpersonal relationships. In a few cases, Abdul Aziz’s approach was taken advantage of with negative consequences, but he confided to me that he preferred to be consistently trusting even if it meant being harmed by the odd exception. When I was appointed as Director of IPCR, Abdul Aziz presented me with a copy of the eight-pointed star of leadership, identifying and defining decency, integrity, compassion, courage, confidence, vision, conviction, and mercy. He indicated that I had earned this award through my years at AU, and it occurred to me that these qualities were embodied by him more than myself. During my six years as Director, I had a sense of unfailing support from Abdul Aziz as well as candor and wise advice on any issues that we encountered. My role was primarily as a manager of the program, while Abdul Aziz continued to serve as the senior statesman and roving ambassador within AU and beyond. During my time as Director, IPCR continued to come into full bloom with a balanced mix of 15 tenure-line and term faculty of considerable talent and diversity, along with one of the largest master’s program registrations in the School. My time at AU served as an enriching and productive capstone for my career in peace and conflict resolution, and I will always be grateful to Abdul Aziz for the opportunity and the support he provided to me. As a scholar and visionary thinker, Abdul Aziz has made significant contributions to knowledge and new ways of thinking in several areas, as will be made clear by the commentaries in this volume. Abdul Aziz has helped create and lobby for a forward-looking approach to the theory and practice of International Relations, focused on a new world order of cooperative relationships, common security, an equitable economic system and ecological balance. He has proposed intercultural dialogue to reveal basic assumptions as well as fallacies of existing systems and to bring forward positive contributions from all cultures into a multicultural world. He was one of the first to call for the integration of human rights into the context of positive peace and peace education. More recently, he has worked to reveal Islamic conceptions of peace, human rights and conflict resolution and to place them in the broader milieu of Peace Studies and peace education. On the practical side, Abdul

430

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Aziz has engaged in numerous initiatives of institution building, both directly and indirectly, to bring his vision of the new world order into reality. Abdul Aziz’s intellectual contributions have been passed on to thousands of students over the decades, hundreds of them in close supervision, and his radiating influence has persistently built respect for Peace Studies and conflict resolution within the academy and in policymaking circles. Without fail, he has moved forward with a pro-peace, nonviolent and collaborative stance, and we and the world are all richer for it as a result. It has been an honor and a pleasure to be his colleague and friend.

11.4 Testimonial by Dr. Louis Goodman Dr. Goodman is Professor and Dean Emeritus in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, D.C.

Strange as it may seem, during the 50+ years Abdul Aziz Said served on the faculty of the School of International Service (SIS), he had a boss. His experiences with an SIS boss began with SIS Founding Dean Ernest Stacey Griffith and ended with my successor, James Goldgeier. My experience was the longest, as I served as SIS Dean from 1986 to 2011, and Abdul Aziz Said served as Professor of International Relations at SIS for all of those years. It should come as no surprise to readers of this volume that for me, the privilege of supervising my esteemed colleague, Abdul Aziz, was a singular experience. This singularity began the moment I entered the SIS Dean’s Office on my first day, July 6, 1986. I was humbled to start as SIS Dean as I was succeeding an icon in the field of International Relations – the author of the fine pioneering International Relations textbook I had used as an undergraduate – William C. Olson. Bill was a stately and kind leader in the field and I knew that I had big shoes to fill. When I opened the door to the Dean’s Office concerned about meeting the high standard Bill had set, my gaze went to a beautiful display of orange tiger lilies in a vase on the coffee table in front of the office’s work desk. The flowers had a card attached which said, “Lou. Welcome to SIS. Abdul Aziz.” This was my welcome to a job that became a calling for me for more than two decades. Characteristically, Abdul Aziz Said let the striking flowers speak for themselves. I was welcomed to SIS with beauty. I was welcomed to a place, which I came to know, that Abdul Aziz Said considered to be “hallowed ground.” Later in the day, I walked to SIS’s second floor to thank Abdul Aziz. He was warm, gracious and dignified. We shook hands – we did not yet know each other well enough to engage in one of his famous supportive hugs. I thanked him for his floral welcome. We talked about the men who had occupied the SIS Dean’s Office (which was directly below Abdul Aziz’s office) since the School’s founding in 1986. All, except Abdul Aziz’s mentor, Charles Lerche, were alive in 1986, and I subsequently learned much from them thanks to Abdul Aziz’s guidance. Since I wanted to learn about SIS’s legacy – how it had been created to, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower at the SIS

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

431

Building groundbreaking, “bring the finest young women and men from around the world to learn how to wage peace” – I wanted to know just what waging peace meant to SIS and its community. That first day, Abdul Aziz and I talked about the peace visions of SIS’s founders, especially Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam (a prominent opponent of the McCarthyite House Un-American Activities Committee) and SIS founding Dean Ernest Stacey Griffith, a Rhodes Scholar who had created the modern U.S. government’s Congressional Research Service during a distinguished academic career. We returned to these themes and visions many times as we worked together throughout my time as SIS Dean. It seemed fitting that we did this together at American University, founded by the Protestant Methodist Church and chartered by the Congress of the United States, since Abdul Aziz (a Christian Syrian turned Sufi) and I (an American Jew; the first non-Christian Dean of SIS), share a deep conviction to building peace through the flourishing of diversity. Early into my tenure as SIS Dean, Abdul Aziz asked to meet with me to discuss the possibility of creating a Peace Studies Program at SIS. He had broached this topic with previous SIS Deans and AU Presidents but they had not been able to move on his proposal because the finances of AU had not been strong enough to support a new program. This was still the case in 1986, but Abdul Aziz suggested, and I quickly became convinced, that Peace Studies could give SIS a distinctive position among International Affairs schools worldwide and would add to the academic and financial strengths of SIS and AU. As we talked and planned, we concluded that such a program should reach out to the “waging peace” admonition of Dwight Eisenhower and that it also should embrace systematic social scientific knowledge creation. Hence the program we proposed was not simply “Peace Studies,” but the broader “Peace and Conflict Resolution.” The success of this program is described in other sections of this volume, but suffice to say, as the first Peace and Conflict Resolution program in a U.S.-based International Affairs school, it contributed and continues to contribute importantly to SIS’s distinctive culture. Its popularity among students has been critically important for making SIS the largest school of International Affairs in the United States. Abdul Aziz Said collected a dedicated team of faculty and students to develop the SIS Peace and Conflict Resolution Program while at the same time reminding his colleagues continuously that SIS, with its Oxnam/Griffith/Eisenhower peacewaging roots, was hallowed ground which we should honor accordingly. Furthermore, he continually sought out other important venues for waging peace. Critical among them was Islam and Peace. Many people inside and outside SIS thought that Abdul Aziz Said promoted the peaceful potential of Islam to promote his birth religion. While he practiced Sufism, Abdul Aziz was not born a Muslim. His family was an important Christian family from eastern Syria. What Abdul Aziz saw was a “de-contextualized presumption” (his words) of a “clash of civilizations” (Samuel Huntington’s unfortunate words) between Islam and other beliefs, which he believed was profoundly incorrect and which needed constructive correction. The result was the establishment of the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace at SIS, financed by the family of one of Abdul Aziz’s SIS student-mentees, Hani Farsi, son of the mayor of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It was no simple matter to establish this Chair and

432

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

the programs that it inspired. The result, of course, fully incorporated in the School of International Service, has provided special distinctiveness to the Peace and Conflict Resolution program and to the School and University that house it. While SIS’s Peace and Conflict Resolution Program and its Mohamed Said Farsi Chair are concrete legacies of Abdul Aziz Said’s commitment to realizing humanity’s highest aspirations, I cannot fail to mention the important other ways that Abdul Aziz Said elevated SIS throughout his association with the School. Much has been said about Abdul Aziz’s many scholarly works and his impressive recognitions. However I cannot end this essay without commenting on Abdul Aziz’s inspiring physical persona and his uplifting personality. When SIS began, the teacher of the School’s introductory World Politics course was Abdul Aziz Said. One can only imagine (and I have heard many firsthand accounts) how enthralled young students became with the ideas of world politics and waging peace with Abdul Aziz delivering their first academic course. So many of the SIS alumni who have made significant contributions to international service and waging peace were first inspired by Abdul Aziz’s uplifting teaching. Essential to this teaching was his inspired use of personal theater: Early SIS alumni could recount for me 50 years later images that Abdul Aziz communicated in their freshman courses. Members of Phi-Ep, the Jewish AU fraternity Abdul Aziz protected when it was threatened by anti-Semites, remember his standing with them dressed in a resplendent white Syrian naval uniform. Finally, when newcomers came to SIS looking for Abdul Aziz and first encountered me I would simply say, “Go to SIS’s second floor and look for someone who looks like Omar Sharif – only someone more handsome than Omar Sharif – that will be Abdul Aziz Said.” I was Abdul Aziz Said’s boss for 25 years. During all of that time it was a singular experience. I was privileged to watch Abdul Aziz nurture and mentor generations of students, to observe him playing a key role building the largest school of International Affairs in the United States, and to have learned from him continuously.

11.5 Testimonial by Dr. Hrach Gregorian Dr. Gregorian is the Hurst Senior Professorial Lecturer and Administrative Director of Graduate Programs in Ethics, Human Rights, International Communication, Peace and Conflict Resolution at the School of International Service, American University. He also heads the Institute of World Affairs and is a member of the graduate faculty at Royal Roads University. He served as one of the founding program directors of the United States Institute of Peace and is a co-founder of the Alliance for Peacebuilding.

I first met Abdul Said in the late 1980s, at which time I was a young director of the grant program at the United States Institute of Peace and he was a well-established leader in the field of peace studies and conflict resolution. He was on a fundraising campaign for projects administered by his Center for Global Peace based at the American University in Washington, D.C. Of course, I knew of him, but I was little prepared for the elegant gentleman who swept into my office looking every bit an Omar Sharif doppelgänger. His attire was impeccable, save for the missing socks,

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

433

in the dead of winter, a wonderful eccentricity that has been a source of inspiration during the thirty years I have known him. We never discussed it, not once, but the gesture has stuck with me as emblematic of his style – a classy, genteel expression of defiance. He was a visionary, and I always worried the funds we could make available were not nearly up to the requirements of the bold initiatives he had the courage to launch. Later, when I became his colleague at American University, I realized it was the temerity of others more than resource challenges that slowed his progress. We were always too busy to find time for collaboration on projects of mutual interest but being around him was an edifying experience far outweighing the learning that attends scholarly partnership. I learned the habits of a persistent mind. He never complained publicly about being turned down for a grant or contract. In fact, he seldom dwelled on the negative, which was a chief source of his strength. Instead, he pushed on to the next project, the next funder, until he had raised millions for his beloved program on international peace and conflict resolution (which he founded), his beloved center for global peace (which he established), and his beloved university (where he served longer than any members of the faculty and was also instrumental in securing three endowed chairs for the university). He was the quintessential company man, meant as a high compliment for his loyalty and dedication to American University. He trained several generations of undergraduate and graduate students who are now in leadership posts in the public and private sectors around the world. He is beloved for his dedication to them and lifelong loyalty. I can still hear him calling my name as I poked my head in his beautiful office overlooking the arboretum that is the American University campus. “Come in my dearrr,” rolling the “r,” he sounded every bit the worldly, multilingual scholar I had first encountered growing up in the Middle East not far from his native Syria. He always had time for me, and he made me feel special. Remarkably, he had the knack to make everyone, from a first-semester undergraduate to a senior, tenured professor, feel special. He had empathy and charisma, which made him irresistible. He also had the capacity for anger. I saw it when he disagreed with administrators who failed to appreciate his vision for the programs he had initiated at the university. Still, being a person of great character, he was able to quickly overcome negative emotions and draw on his limitless store of optimism to find new reason to hope. Said’s fertile mind produced scholarly work across a broad spectrum of topics ranging from theories of International Relations, to “revolutionism,” to Islam, Sufism, and world order. He was a consultant to U.S. government agencies, to nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations, and to international bodies like the UN. As he matured intellectually, his work took on a less conventional, more spiritual and experimental tone. It broke new ground in wedding Western and Eastern philosophies of peace. One of his lasting legacies was to empower contemporaries and younger scholars to strike out on new paths in the field of peace research. He was an inspiration for the current work of your correspondent on the application of neuroscience, internet and communication technology, and art and architecture in peacebuilding practice. Like other seers he kept his eyes on the horizon, leaving the myopic to wonder at bare feet in winter.

434

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

11.6 Testimonial by Fuad El-Hibri Fuad El-Hibri was a businessman and philanthropist and founder of Emergent BioSolutions. He also was the founder and Chairman of East West Resources Corporation and he sat on the Board of Trustees of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the International Biomedical Research Alliance, an academic joint venture of the National Institutes of Health, Oxford University and Cambridge University. He established the El-Hibri Foundation and the ElHibri Peace Awards.

I had the great privilege to meet Professor Abdul Aziz almost 20 years ago through a mutual friend. My son, Karim, was exploring attending college at the time, so we were hoping to receive some insights about universities and study programs from Professor Said. From the moment we shook hands, he welcomed us into his world with genuine and warm hospitality. It became immediately obvious that Abdul Aziz was a passionate individual who sincerely cared about helping my son. He started, as Abdul Aziz always does, by listening – he wanted to learn more about Karim’s background, interests and, most importantly, his spiritual condition. A few years later, Karim attended AU and graduated with a degree in International Service. A decade later, he became a successful entrepreneur leading a small venture capital firm. Ever since we met him, Karim and I have looked to the Professor to find life balance and inner peace. Over time, I continued to discover many additional attributes of Professor Said – kindness, patience, careful consideration, and an uncanny ability to read a person’s emotions and inner wellbeing. Abdul Aziz is truly an inspiration to everyone who has been fortunate enough to have been introduced to him. Over the past 50 years, the Professor has dedicated his life to the mission of peace education around the world. In fact, one of his lasting accomplishments was the founding of the Center for Global Peace at American University. He was a mentor to countless students during his tenure at the School of International Service (SIS). Over the years, I have met several of his students who expressed their gratitude for the impact the Professor had on their lives which they consistently described as profound and constructive. In 2007, we were honored to welcome Abdul Aziz to the Board of Trustees of the El-Hibri Foundation. Our foundation’s mission is to “envision a society where everyone can achieve the American Dream in a diverse and inclusive world,” and we could not have asked or hoped for anyone more capable in advancing inclusion. He has shared his deep insights and expansive knowledge on peace education and conflict resolution with our board of trustees, who recognize and appreciate the Professor’s dedication and commitment to the mission. The Foundation awarded our first annual Peace Education Prize to Abdul Aziz in 2007. He was selected for the award by an independent organization based on his impressive record of working to develop and advance Peace Studies at SIS and around the world. In my view, Abdul Aziz has lived his life as a Sufi, a mystical persona characterized as a teacher and observer of faith and benevolent practices – a leader who has truly found inner peace and has mastered spiritual meditation. By showing passion and

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

435

communicating with affection and transparency, the Professor rapidly engenders trust. Then, true mentoring ensues with an open heart, underscored by his intellectual prowess, deeply rooted core values and a commitment to enrich the lives of his scholars and friends alike. This is the legacy of Professor Abdul Aziz. He is a role model for the way we should all live our lives. I am fortunate to call him my friend and brother. I will never forget the impact he has had on my life. I am eternally grateful.

11.7 Testimonial by Sister Adrienne Kaufmann Sister Kaufmann is a Benedictine Catholic nun at Mother of God Monastery in Waterdown, South Dakota. From 1993 to 1996, she was co-director of the Common Ground Network for Life and Choice, a program of the international conflict resolution NGO Search for Common Ground. She has been an adjunct professor at American University and at Mount Marty College, and worked with Abdul Aziz Said to develop the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program and the Educating for Global Citizenship Summer Institute at American University.

There are no words to describe what it meant to me to hear Abdul Aziz Said’s booming voice shout out, “Adrienne, God loves us!” I knew those words meant that God had intervened once more to inspire someone to help us achieve our goals. There are also no words to describe the impact of this Sufi mystic gentleman upon this Benedictine Catholic woman. The hand of God brought us together to initiate the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies Program at American University in Washington, D.C. Abdul Aziz is a man of ideas, with a heart that longs for global peace, and who is willing to put his life’s energy into making peace and teaching peace. His mind can comprehend so many ideas, then rearrange them into a kaleidoscope of new concepts that make sense. We complemented one another’s skill sets well. He had the ideas; I had a pretty good sense of how, step-by-step, those ideas could be organized and implemented. I could also say, “That sounds like about 40 hours of work. Which of these things that I already have planned should I set aside to do that?” I loved hearing him say, “Really, would it take that long?” Somehow, ideas flowed faster than the time to implement; therefore we did a lot of prioritizing! For fifteen years we worked side by side constructing various facets of American University’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies Program. This program, at its outset, was inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental. Faculty members from every school of the university participated in crafting an integrated, cross-disciplinary program of study. He and I designed and co-taught the core courses in the program. One unique aspect of each course we taught was requiring each student to do a creative project – a work of poetry, dance, sculpture, a short story, a musical composition. We both understood that in academia there is a high concentration on left-brain learning. We also both understood that creating new thinking and behaviors requires engaging the imagination and human intuition – right-brain

436

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

learning. We also both believed in elicitive learning, and therefore we focused a great deal of our coursework on dialogue. Each student, and ourselves as co-leaders of a class, were both teachers and learners. Our Educating for Global Citizenship Institutes brought teachers from so many parts of the United States and the world together to design curriculum for elementary and secondary teachers – curriculum units that would empower students to be peace-makers, to work for justice, and to learn how to communicate constructively across cultural differences. These six-week institutes, above all, became a learning community. During these six weeks, American Jewish men and women worked side by side with Palestinian women and men. Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists found they had so much in common. The continents and countries from which people came mattered little, as they bonded in a common desire to educate toward a global community centered in cross-cultural understanding, and working together for the good of all on our planet. One of our favorite planning spots on campus was a bench on the Quad facing the sun. When I arrived in the morning, he was often there ahead of me, inviting me to sit for a few minutes, breathe in the fresh air, be warmed by the sun, and talk together about our day before we began our work. As I think back on those richly meaningful days, yes, I remember the course development planning times, the inter-departmental faculty meetings, the quick lunches we often shared at David’s Lebanese deli down the street; however, the most important things I learned were not academic. As we went through the cafeteria, I listened as he greeted the cashier, called her by name (he knew them all), and often inquired about a family member. One day he said, “You can learn a lot about people if you watch the way they treat those who serve them.” He dedicated a book that he authored to the janitor who cleaned the School of International Service – a man who could not even read his own name printed in that book. Yes, Abdul Aziz Said was a man of peace; because he taught peace by the way he lived, by the way he listened, by the way he brought out the best in those who worked with him and who learned from him. How do I know God loves us? God gave us Abdul Aziz Said as a companion on our one wonderful journey of life and learning. He has made indelible footprints on my heart and mind, and on the heart and soul of American University in Washington, D.C.

11.8 Testimonial by Dr. Lynn Kunkle Dr. Kunkle was Professor Said’s teaching assistant and a Hurst Fellow during the tragedies of September 11, 2001. A former Assistant Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution at American University, Dr. Kunkle has over two decades’ experience as an interfaith peacebuilding practitioner, advocate, funder, and researcher.

I knew in my first meeting with Professor Said that he was no ordinary professor. I was a young scholar of conflict theory, newly admitted into American University’s class of 2000 doctoral program, eager to meet the scholar whose reputation and

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

437

stature in the field of human rights and peacebuilding had drawn me to apply. In that meeting, discussing drivers of violent conflict, he described how participants account for their own behavior: “I would never do such things if it weren’t for them. I would be an angel were it not for them. They made me do it. So you see,” he said, fixing his eyes on me, “you must never let other people determine your behavior.” In that moment I knew that a far deeper life-changing journey had begun. Three years as his teaching and research assistant, and a decade and a half of close mentorship later, his influence on my life is far greater than I could ever fairly describe. Rarely does a day go by when I do not invoke Professor Said’s words, stories or example into my life. “When your heart and mind are integrated,” he would tell me, “that’s when you have integrity.” The transformative significance of meaningfully seeking a life of integrity is only one of the many powerful lessons I learned from my experiences with Professor Said. I was among the thousands of students who took classes with him to learn how to make positive, transformational change in the world. What made him different from every other professor, what made him “the Professor,” was that he reached the whole of the person. His philosophy and practice of teaching stretched our moral imagination, and facilitated our seeing the world with new eyes. In teaching us to see “the whole reflected in the parts,” he showed us how to enter into genuine solidarity with one another. He showed us how integrating the mind creates opportunities to bring beauty and justice into the world with integrity, clarity and purpose. Professor Said provided us with the conceptual maps, and then invited us to embark on our own journey of truth-finding and discovery. He understood these to be the essence of education, calling it “academic malpractice” for an educator to do otherwise. I saw first-hand how powerfully students responded to his teaching. In weekly class reflections, students shared their own experiences and insights on class topics in unique, remarkable, and often deeply moving ways. I saw it in the streams of students who daily called on him during his office hours, year after year, half of whom had taken his class years – if not decades – before, seeking him out to share with him how he had touched and changed their lives. I saw it in the bonds that developed among students, in the tears on the final day of classes, and always in the effusive admiration and affection students showed in their evaluations. Professor Said’s own experiences and commitment to practice allowed him to grasp an expansive, macro-level view of social and historical trends and trajectories, and articulate a vision of human development, dignity and community rooted in growing self-awareness, self-understanding and self-empowerment. He taught these concepts through paradigms and stories. Graduates of his classes tend to remember, above all, his stories and how these stories always tended to yield new insights and grow in personal significance over time. Never in my lifetime were his vision and leadership more valuable or more needed than in the dark and frightening days in the aftermath of the tragedies of 9/11. Struggling to make sense of what had happened, our campus turned to Professor Said for solace and guidance. That night, telling a crowd of students “that we need to prepare ourselves to face the new world,” he urged us to remember that “our suffering… has a counterpart in the suffering of those who perpetrated this,” and

438

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

urged us to participate in “new thinking [that finds] common responses to our common tragedy.” In the weeks and months that followed, I watched Professor Said shoulder enormous burdens of leadership, never once wavering from his call for mutual respect, human dignity and civilizational understanding. He used every platform and seized every opportunity to speak out against an American war in Iraq, which he presciently saw coming in the days after 9/11, in countless opinion pieces, interviews, meetings with officials, and conferences. He sought out allies as well as opponents of nonviolence to champion the virtues and pathways for constructive engagement. Once I wondered aloud after the Patriot Act had passed whether or not his phones were being tapped, and he flashed a wide smile: “Let us hope so. Maybe we can teach them something.” All the while pouring his energy into averting a pending war, he never once missed a class. He gave his full attention to students, maintained his long office hours, ran the International Peace and Conflict Resolution department, and routinely consoled and uplifted our small group of students who found refuge in his incense-rich office until the late hours. I learned in those days what true leadership looks like: never failing to show up, fully listening, truly empathizing, giving strength and hope to others, and holding an unyielding ethical and moral vision of unity. I also learned from my time with Professor Said what it truly means to be an ally. Professor Said always resisted the identity labels so frequently and readily assigned to him. “My heart is a gazelle,” he often said, paraphrasing Ibn al-‘Arabi. “It takes every form. The Torah, the Bible, the Quran.” He pushed back against identifiers which he saw as superficially divisive, when his message was focused on unity and solidarity. Rather than identify with a specific identity, he would say: “I am everything. But I am best when I remember I am nothing.” Instead, Professor Said saw it as everyone’s role and responsibility to “make the world safe for diversity,” which he modeled in safe classroom and campus spaces. This was integral to his message, which I heard him repeat more than any other: “The whole world needs the whole world.” As a mindful and committed ally, Professor Said actively and intentionally made spaces for traditionally excluded and marginalized individuals and groups, then stepped back to ensure they could be heard on their own terms. I heard him decline high-profile speaking invitations for a lack of diversity and gender representation, urging organizers to consider other speakers or participants – and then promptly sending along a long list of highly qualified names. I knew of a case where he staked his professional reputation to support a faculty member he believed was being overlooked due to sexual orientation. Even as a junior professor, he demonstrated courageous allyship in standing up for the rights of a Jewish fraternity to form on campus, defying the faculty senate by serving as its founding faculty advisor. When invited to consult with the State Department on the state of U.S. relations with “the Muslim world” in the weeks following 9/11, he agreed on the condition that he be allowed to bring a diverse team of Muslim experts with him. To that meeting, and the many others that followed, he organized Muslim leaders, men and women, representing the diversity of American Muslim communities across ethnic, racial and political lines to participate in these key policy discussions.

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

439

He also invited me to these meetings, and so many others, not just to sit behind him and quietly observe as his assistant. Rather, sitting beside him, he never failed to introduce me as “distinguished colleague” and pointedly ask me what I thought of the proceedings, and whether I had anything I wished to contribute. It was more than a gentleman’s good manners or professional courtesies; this was Professor Said finding every opportunity to lift others up, and help them find their voice. I owe my own professional development and growth as an ally and as a peacebuilder to his example, unfailing mentorship, and the countless opportunities he generously shared with me. It would be no exaggeration to say that I owe so much of my life’s happiness and personal mooring to what I learned from Professor Said, and his unfailing ability to see and nurture the very best and most beautiful in me, and everyone around him. Waiting in a long line at an airport in Singapore in 2005, a man behind me glimpsed my American University folder and asked if I knew Professor Said. I had just left Aceh, and was emotionally shaken to my core after having visited three mass graves holding tens of thousands in the aftermath of the tsunami. When I said that I did, this man beamed at me, and told me that he had taken a class with Professor Said twenty years ago that had changed his life. He had spent the last two decades building locally sustainable housing, and was on his way to Aceh to help rebuild. That perfectly let loose such a depth of gratitude for this stranger, for Professor Said, for the truly inextricable connection every one of us who has known him have with each other, and for the hope this gives me for this world. It is a bond, a love and gratitude for Professor Said that is, and will always be, truly beyond words.

11.9 Testimonial by Dr. Charles O. Lerche III Dr. Lerche is the current Associate Program Director for Academics for the Norwich University Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Master of Arts in International Relations programs. He has also taught for Troy University, The University of Maastricht, the Free University of Brussels, Boston University, The University of Benin, the University of Port Harcourt, and the University of Ibadan. His published work is in the fields of African Politics, International Relations and Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies.

My experience and relationship with Prof. Abdul Aziz Said might be rather different than many of the other contributors to this volume. I first met him early in the 1960s when he was a young assistant professor in the newly created School of International Service at The American University in Washington D.C. – and I was a young boy. Prof. Said shared an office for a few years with my father, Dr. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., who later became Dean of the School. Prof. Said was the first Arab I had ever gotten to know, and it was a culturally broadening experience for me right from the beginning. I remember Prof. Said during that period as being very debonair and very personable. Later, after my father passed away in 1966, Prof. Said made a sincere effort to fill the void of adult male presence in my life. Looking back, I

440

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

realize now that as I entered into quasi hippiedom, he was among the few adults my long-haired friends and I felt we could talk to and, in fact, trust. Later, in the early 70s, we both went through a period of what might best be called spiritual awakening. In his case, I remember just before this started that he had said something quite existential to me about how all that was left to him was “style” – and he was, indeed, very stylish. Then, not long afterwards, on one of my regular visits home to the D.C. area, I was walking on the AU campus and I saw him a little distance away, gesturing energetically to me to come talk to him. He then recounted to me his recent spiritual journey and burgeoning inner transformation. This, his friends and associates well know, led to him being deeply involved with the Sufi movement and participating in many conferences and symposia on spiritual themes. I have a memory of visiting him in his office when a former student or associate called him for spiritual advice and assistance. He had become, in effect, what Sufis call a Murshid, or spiritual guide, for many. What inspired me professionally, as a graduate student and later a new Ph.D., was how this inner change transformed his professional orientation and practice. He became a champion of peace, and a leading figure in the study of peace and conflict resolution. This emerged over time, and, again during my visits home and to AU I was able to observe the process. To me, this was what “engaged” scholarship should be, a vocation that emerges from a deep personal commitment and from the real inner self. The fact that he could create a graduate Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies at American University is a remarkable testimony to who he is and what he believed. Without going into detail, it should be appreciated that the mainstream study of international relations and American foreign policy has been for decades obsessed with power and, frankly, the often horrific application of military force; and at its worst was something of a quasi-academic rationalization for some of the ugliest aspects of Great Power Realpolitik. And yet, even in this kind of environment (and in Washington, D.C. itself) Prof. Said was able to successfully go against the (very strong) dominant current and create a context where young (and not-so-young) students could acquire the information and skills so critically needed (and still sorely lacking) in our era. And he did this as an Arab-American during a period when that identity presented its own challenges and difficulties. Prof. Said and I had many discussions about the field of international relations, peace and conflict studies, culture and spirituality. These led eventually to three major collaborations. First, there was the revision of the textbook Concepts of International Politics. This book was originally co-authored by Prof. Said and my father, Prof. Charles O. Lerche, Jr. It had gone through three editions, and when the publishers agreed that a fourth edition should be prepared, Prof. Said asked me to become the third co-author since my father had passed away some years previously. Also, since the world had changed significantly since the third edition, and more importantly Prof. Said’s thinking about what was important for students to understand about world affairs had evolved significantly, the title of the book had been amended to Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. Besides bringing the topics in the text up to date, the book included an introduction which put forth a different

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

441

context for the study of world affairs; a perspective summed up by Prof. Said’s compelling watchword, “the whole world needs the whole world.” These ideas were developed further in an article we co-authored along with Dr. Nathan Funk, in The International Journal of Peace Studies, entitled “For the Need for New Thinking” (Said et al. 2006). This article is a concise statement of how we saw (and still see) the state of thinking about world affairs and, more generally, the human condition. We briefly state what we saw as the most fundamental dimensions of the global problematique, those that arise from dominant patterns of belief and forms of identity; and how these were increasingly atavistic and dangerous in a world shrunken to a single neighborhood – or as the COVID-19 experience as shown us, a single petri dish. I think they merit being cited in full here: Consider these three observations, as an alternative starting point to think about our collective life: (1) The planet is small. We inhabit one planet, in one stellar system, in one galaxy among countless others. So, the planet is small. It is also one interdependent system. No borders can be seen from space: just the blue and green “marble.” The biosphere, that small layer of air that enables all that we think of as life to exist, is, in a cosmic perspective, an incredibly thin, fragile membrane that is found nowhere else in our solar system, as far as we can tell. Bluntly stated, it is all that stands between extinction and us. Seen from this perspective, the human condition seems both very special and rather tenuous: we could cease to be and the universe would certainly endure without us. (2) There is only us. There might well be life elsewhere in the cosmos, but we haven’t found it yet. So, for now “we” are it, as far as we are concerned. That alone gives us a lot in common, no matter what we look like; but we have to work harder at keeping this in mind (there are distractions). Humans have, in fact, evolved – or been created – as a single species, formed from the same cosmic dust that makes up the rest of the planet, its solar system, the galaxy and beyond. Furthermore, genetically speaking we are a single people. There is no such thing as “race” as that term is commonly used; just biological diversity. This suggests there is more – literally, infinitely more – which unites us than divides us. At both a physical and an existential level, we are one. (3) The whole world needs the whole world. If we exist in this world together, then we should work to make it easier for people to communicate, interact, and share what they know and who they are; to literally and figuratively open doors to mutual understanding. As a species we seem to be trying fitfully to emerge from a past of separation into a future of collective experience; from fragments of a whole into the awareness of the whole. This process marks the beginning of the first truly global civilization (Havel 1995). It is, however, up to us to determine whether this civilization will be peaceful, united and long-term or barbaric and short lived. (Said et al. 2006, pp. 108–109) These premises, if taken seriously, provide a lens for viewing the world – from the local to the global; a lens that highlights other issues and leads to different conclusions and prescriptions than more nationally or ethnically informed views. Seen from this

442

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

perspective, social life is an ongoing drama in which all people are protagonists, shaping their environment through decisions and actions. Every human being is a subjective participant in this process. No one is outside it, or has a truly objective viewpoint. Thus, public affairs are fundamentally about values and the effort people make to realize their values. The article goes on to argue that a renewed spiritual consciousness, freed from any form of parochialism or cultural superiority was an essential source of inspiration and motivation to accomplish the inescapable, challenging and trying tasks facing a global community trying to find a viable future. Lastly, we propose dialogue as method: a dialogue among peoples and cultures without preconceptions and freed from the historical baggage of imperialism and other structures of dominance inherited from the past. These themes also figured prominently in our third collaboration, “Peace as a Human Right: Toward an Integrated Understanding” (Said/Lerche 2006), which appeared in the volume Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding, edited by Julie Mertus and Jeffrey Helsing. Our central concern here was to show that while peace, as such, does not figure prominently in the main human rights covenants, it is in fact a prerequisite for the realization of the wellbeing which any and all lists of human rights seek to insure. We go on to show that positive peace, as opposed to the mere absence of violent conflict, requires, again, a re-thinking and re-organization of international relations in ways that would produce a world that works for everybody. An examination of the often cited Western bias in the current human rights regime shows that, in contrast with the much touted “clash of civilizations,” the only way forward to the promise of both human rights and positive peace is, as mentioned above, through a dialogue of cultures: Dialogue, as a new paradigm in global relations, is based on sharing knowledge in order to achieve new knowledge, to see each other with open and empathetic eyes under a different light, and to look together toward a shared future in a global community that will make our world safe for diversity. (Said/Lerche 2006, p. 143)

In conclusion, I can only say that I treasure my relationship with Prof. Said. His knowledge, love and compassion have enriched me personally and professionally, and I am sure he has had a similar impact on my colleagues and friends. Beyond being an accomplished teacher and scholar, Prof. Abdul Aziz Said is a rare human being, and quite simply a great soul.

11.10 Testimonial by Colman McCarthy Colman McCarthy is an American journalist, teacher, and peace activist. He is the Director of the Center for Teaching Peace in Washington, D.C.

I came to know Abdul in the early 1980s when he invited me to speak to one of his classes on nonviolence. It was the first of many invitations, and the more I came to

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

443

the campus, the more I admired Abdul and his many graces – both as an educator and as a man with a caring heart. I’m not sure how much the students may have learned from my visits, but I do know that I learned much from the many conversations I had with him and his sound sagacity that was like a needle ever-threading together truths that mattered. At the time, I was a columnist at The Washington Post and was beginning to broaden my knowledge about the politics and cultures of the Middle East, with Abdul and his Syrian background ever nudging me to dig deeper into the realities of the region and American military involvements. It wasn’t long before Abdul suggested I look into the possibilities of teaching a course on peace and social justice. The advice was sound, and the following semester I was aboard in the School of Government and Public Administration as an adjunct, with Abdul always crediting me as the pacifist who taught the first peace studies class at the university. Thanks to Abdul’s pushing and lobbying, more similar courses and more adjuncts were added, so much so that AU now offers undergraduate, masters and doctoral programs in conflict resolution. Not everything went swimmingly in my first semesters, however much I relished the company of my students, which Abdul predicted would happen. The university had a president who wanted AU to become the Harvard on the Potomac and a school where academic rigor prevailed. Somehow my teaching skills and methods were seen as not being especially rigorous. Accordingly, in 1986, I was sacked, with the department’s dean telling The New York Times that her decision was based “primarily on issues of quality and secondarily on procedural ones.” Abdul had a different take: it was my negative views of America’s rampant militarism that was offensive to university leaders, who were seeking to raise money from arms dealer Adnan Kashoggi at the time. Whether Abdul’s suspicion was correct or it was “issues of quality” that did me in, I was grateful that he took my side and joined the students who protested my being fired. After the AU president was found to be making obscene phone calls – rigorous ones – to women and was forced to resign, Abdul worked to bring me back to the university where I’ve been for more than three decades since, this stretch in the School of International Service which was Abdul’s home base. In addition to his kindness to me, my most favorable memory of this moral and intellectual giant is his resting on sunny afternoons on one of the quad’s benches and welcoming students to sit with him for a conversation. I often wondered, do those students know how fortunate they were to be with the university’s longest-serving professor? Do they have even a hint of his depth? Did they do any research of his glistening writings? All I can say is that whenever I lucked out and shared a bench with Abdul, I knew that the gods were showering me with rare blessings.

444

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

11.11 Testimonial by Dr. Mohammed Mughisuddin and Dr. Oya Akgonenc Dr. Mughisuddin and Dr. Akgonenc were former students of Abdul Aziz Said who received doctoral degrees in international relations from American University. Dr. Akgonenc has also served as a member of the Turkish Parliament.

Both Oya and I are pleased to know that our most dear and honorable professor Abdul Aziz Said’s academic and other intellectual activities will once again undergo scholarly appreciations. Both for my wife, Oya Akgonenc and me, the intellectual and social inputs of our honorable professor Abdul Aziz Said were limitless. For us, it is not possible to identify only a handful of events and characteristics induced by our professor that made us what we professionally became. It would be most difficult for us to focus on limited contributions Abdul Aziz made toward our fundamental intellectual developments that enhanced our professional and cultural lives. For Mohammed, Professor Abdul Aziz Said was, and still is, first a teacher who was easily approachable to a foreign student. He treated students with kindness, friendship and deep sincerity. For Abdul Aziz Said, welfare of students was the first and foremost goal of a good teacher. At several difficult and new academic and cultural conflicts faced by the university and its academics and students, Dr. Said provided solid and creative policy options. For many academics in the university, conflict resolution was not the primary objective in their careers. However, for Professor Said, working for the benefits of students – regardless of their national, cultural, and ethnic commitments – was a primary function. On several occasions, Professor Said raised large amounts of funds for the Islamic and Peace Studies programs at the American University. During the Vietnam conflict, Professor Said was solidly against U.S. participation in it. He was deeply involved in the anti-war movement. Several of his teaching assistants, following their successful completion of graduate studies, became distinguished political leaders in their respective countries and in international agencies. Prof. Said was a warm, sincere and helpful teacher for his students. He was easily approachable and an understanding person with a lot of empathy for his students. He gave good and practical guidance to them. He was also very much a corporate man doing a lot of beneficial work for the university. Prof. Said was an objective person in his teachings and taught us all how to be objective in the evaluation of even the most emotional international conflicts. Later in life, this practice helped us a lot when Oya Akgonenc was elected parliamentarian in the Turkish Grand Parliament and later a teacher and Chairperson of the International Relations Department. Prof. Said evolved his teaching and guidance towards peace and conflict resolution. He was very imaginative and persuasive in finding and establishing effective institutions, workshops, and centers that turned out to be effective think tanks. He knew how to capture the imagination and the enthusiasm of the public on important

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

445

issues. This is a rare ability, since it requires a futuristic approach which may not get acceptance easily. He himself, coming from one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world, understood the deep destruction of war and conflict on the societies and individuals who tried to find solutions through peace and negotiations. Besides his academic and professional work, he always had time for social contributions to friends, family and other close persons. Briefly, one may call Professor Said: • • • • •

Man of Action Man of Imagination Man of Social Conscience Man of Freedom Man of Peace.

Our comments are short but meaningful.

11.12 Testimonial by Reverend Dr. Daniel Ngoy Mulunda-Nyanga Dr. Mulunda-Nyanga is the General Superintendent of Nouvelle Eglise Methodiste, DRC (New Methodist Church). He also is the President of the Ecumenical Programme for Peace, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (PAREC) and past President and Chairman of the Congo’s Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) in 2011. From 1996–2001, he was the Youth Secretary for the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC).

Professor Said, as many of us love to call him, has made an indelible mark in the world which will survive him. I don’t know if he himself knows the extent of the impact he has made in the world – especially in Africa and particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, my country, where he has never been but where the impact of his teaching will last for generations. I am pleased to contribute to this book and thank Dr. Nathan Funk for giving me this opportunity to honor Professor Said. In fact, Professor Said, the faculty of the School of International Service of American University, and Professor Alan Geyer and the faculty of Wesley Theological Seminary must be recognized, acknowledged and respected for having had the courage to initiate the dual master’s degree program in International Peace and Conflict Resolution (MA) and Theological Studies (MTS). Allow me to give the genesis of this dual degree: I am an ordained elder from the New Methodist Church in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Currently I am the General Superintendent and Legal Representative of the New Methodist Church. My country, formally called Zaire, has been in a situation of instability and recurring rebellions since the assassination of its Prime Minister, Patrice Emery Lumumba, in 1961. Born in 1959, I grew up in the midst of the war for independence and other civil wars. Since my childhood, I saw people die, thousands of displaced people, and I saw millions of refugees fleeing

446

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

war from the neighboring countries. Every morning there was bad news of rebels entering houses and killing people. Two tragic events shaped my life and forced me to work for peace: First, the assassination of Jason Sendwe, the nationalist leader from North Katanga (Kabongo) who opposed the secession of Katanga from Congo for it to become an independent state. I was five years old. My father was working for the local government in Kalemie-North Katanga and we were living in the same compound with Jason Sendwe and his family. That dark morning of 19th July 1964, we got news that the rebels were entering the town with the objective of killing Jason Sendwe. He was advised to flee. He took a convoy of two cars and left with his close friends. Just outside the city center of Kalemie, the rebels ambushed him and killed him and all his companions. The rebels came to his residence dancing and celebrating his death. I remember crying and saying to myself that this has to be stopped, who can do it? I can’t because I am just a boy. Someone has to put an end to these atrocities. From that day, I said to myself that there is nothing more meaningful I can do with my life than bringing peace and preaching peace and the nonviolent gospel of Jesus Christ. Second, the attack of our house by what I can’t really call rebels but armed bandits. As my father was the state administrator in the small village on Nyemba in North Katanga, I remember that I was in my third grade in primary school. We heard gun shots toward our house and had to flee and go in the middle of the bush and spend a night there with nothing for cover. We sat there hearing the exchange of gun shots between the police and the assailants. The assailants overpowered the police and entered our residence, looted everything and torched the rest of the furniture and clothes. For over a week we had no clothes to change, we had to sleep on the floor. These two events were the landmarks of my commitment to peacemaking. From that moment I was looking for someone to teach me what to do to bring peace. Years later, in 1988, God responded to my prayers by giving me the opportunity to be hired by the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC). The 1984 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was then the President of the AACC from 1987 to 1997. That was a critical time for the African continent. One must remember that it was the time when many African nations were moving from a oneparty political system to multi-party politics. Africa was in turmoil, from northern Africa to South Africa. The fight against Apartheid and the call for the release of Nelson Mandela were the top agenda of the All Africa Conference of Churches and the international community. I saw how Archbishop Desmond Tutu was bringing peace in reconciling adverse political groups, talking fearlessly and prophetically to the African heads of states, rebel leaders, denouncing injustice, dictatorship and oppression, and promoting human rights and democratic values. One day I told him that I wanted to do the same kind of work he was doing. He told me that the first step was to go for further studies. That is how I landed at Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C., following his recommendation. At Wesley Theological Seminary I was welcomed by Professor Alan Geyer who became my advisor and good friend. Immediately upon arrival I shared my concern:

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

447

I wanted to have a degree that could enable me to bring peace to my country and not only to preach the kingdom of heaven. How could I bring good news to people who are being killed and others who are uncertain of their future because of wars and conflicts? I continued and said, if Wesley can offer that kind of training, I would study there, but without the component of conflict resolution in my curriculum, my training will not bring an impact in the life of my people and will not respond to my need and expectations. Big Al, as I enjoyed calling Professor Geyer, immediately reached out to Professor Abul Aziz Said of the School of International Service (SIS) at American University, who fortunately was in the office at that moment. After explaining my academic needs and my vision to Professor Said, my soul and the soul of Professor Said met and he loved me so much. He told me that Wesley and American University were two distinct institutions and there was not a joint degree between the two schools. Both professors concluded that my concern was genuine. I encouraged them to work so that they could produce for me a joint degree because that is what I wanted. Professor Said called upon the program coordinator of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, Ms. Betty Sitka (whom I will always thank for her commitment and hard work that led to the birth of this program), and asked her to start the process at American University to formalize a joint or dual degree with the neighboring institution, Wesley Theological Seminary. On the Wesley Theological Seminary side, Professor Alan Geyer worked with his office to convince the administration of Wesley Theological Seminary to accept and initiate a joint degree with American University. Meanwhile, I was taking classes in both institutions, trying to meet the requirements of each school. The process took over two years, mapping out the coursework required by each institution. I graduated and got a master’s degree from each school. Upon my graduation, the dual degree was formalized. I thank AU, who gave me the Trailblazer Award in 1996 for my contributions to the establishment of this program. I am happy that the program continues today, and has inspired a dual master’s degree program to be offered by AU and Wesley, in International Development (MA) and Theological Studies (MTS).2 Well-equipped and trained, after my double graduation from AU and Wesley in 1996, I immediately returned to AACC, where I was promoted as Executive Secretary for International Affairs, dealing with all the political conflicts of the continent. When my term ended, I returned home in 2001 and created a non-governmental peace organization called Ecumenical Program for Peace and Conflict Resolution (PAREC). With PAREC, I ended the Mayi-Mayi uprising in the provinces of Haut-Lomami and Tanganyika. The Mayi-Mayi were a civilian community-based militia group, who organized themselves to fight the aggression of the armies from Rwanda and Uganda that occupied large portions of the DRC between 1997 and 2002. The MayiMayi believed in the African ancestral tradition and deities. They were convinced that they were not vulnerable to bullets. After the withdrawal of Rwanda and Uganda, the 2

For more information about this program, please refer to: https://www.wesleyseminary.edu/aca demics/degrees/mts-dd-peace-and-conflict-resolution/.

448

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Mayi-Mayi started killing and terrorizing their own people. They committed horrible atrocities yet the national army could not fight them because they were literally armed civilians. I brought in PAREC, and negotiated and disarmed them by trading their guns against bicycles in 2005. I demobilized over 20,000 combatants and sent many young ones back to school.3 Some of them are now lawyers, a medical doctor, civil servants, and peaceful members of society. Today, I pay tribute to Professor Abdul Aziz Said, who accepted to accompany me and to make my vision a reality. With the skills acquired from Professor Said, I have made peace and continue to do so in my beloved country, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Professor Said, my friend, your impact is big and beyond your name and your person. Many people and institutions are enjoying and will enjoy peace and security because of your many former students scattered in the world. Your strong spirituality energized me to seek the guidance of the Holy Spirit in all my endeavors. If I had the necessary power, I could name that dual degree between the School of International Service of American University and Wesley Theological Seminary: “The Abdul Aziz-Alan Geyer dual degree on Peace and Theology”. Professor Said, my successful peace ministry is the fruit of your tireless efforts to teach. You did not labor in vain. I am your peacemaking disciple in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

11.13 Testimonial by May Rihani May Rihani was Director of the George and Lisa Zakhem Kahlil Gibran Chair for Values and Peace at the University of Maryland, College Park. She has several decades of experience in the field of international education development (with a focus on education for girls and for women’s empowerment), and is a published poet.

Abdul Aziz Said was an inspirational figure in the lives of all those who knew him. Even though he was aware that in his discussions with his students as well as his friends, everyone wanted to listen to his insights, he listened more than he spoke. He listened with such attention, he made his friends and students fully know that he valued everything he heard. He was an amazing active listener. As a professor, he was guided by the fact that teaching is really about inspiration and not just about information. He was interested in the why more than the what. As a friend he knew that discussions can expand the horizons and deepen the oceans. Talking with Abdul Aziz was synonymous with exploring new frontiers, new philosophies, and new spiritualties. Abdul Aziz knew how to reach the heart and mind of each one of his friends. For him, the paths to the depths of the heart and the limitless mind were through connections, memories, rationalities, imagination, explorations, stretching, windows, doors, new vistas, fresh air, deeper understanding, intentional searching, active listening, 3

For more information about this disarmament effort, please refer to: https://reliefweb.int/report/ democratic-republic-congo/drc-katanga-militias-agree-disarm.

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

449

long walks, loving poetry, erasing barriers, respecting the beyond, asking unexpected questions, dreaming of the future, and more. He was a master of all of these paths. The journey of friendship with Abdul Aziz remains one of the most beautiful and unique dimensions of one’s life.

11.14 Testimonial by Keith Rosenberg Keith Rosenberg is a Partner of Law for Meyer, Faller, Weisman and Rosenberg. He received his JD in 1973 from the Washington College of Law.

When I was a junior in high school, I read the Concepts book written by Professor and the late Dean, Charles Lerche. The book had a profound impact and I decided that I wanted to travel to Washington to meet the Professor. So I telephoned him and he graciously invited me to meet him at AU. In November of 1964, I visited the Professor and sat in on one of his classes. I was incredibly impressed with this then-young professor whose knowledge and demeanor captured my intellect and imagination. After sitting in on his class, he invited me into his office and we talked for an hour. We discussed my plans for college and he told me that if I wanted to come to SIS to send him my application and if I got in (which I did), he would see how I did my freshman year and we would talk again. Thankfully, I did well in his class and in school in general, and after my first year, Professor invited me to join his team as an undergraduate assistant, where I worked closely with him until graduation and then as a graduate assistant and teaching fellow. There was research and writing, but most of all there was exposure to this man of peace and grace. He taught me to love my fellow man, look to peaceful ways to resolve conflicts and listen to those who did not agree with me. I learned to take a broader view of mankind and the challenges that faced all humanity. Professor has had a profound impact on how I live, how I learn and how I think. There are countless stories which demonstrate the Professor’s character, but there is one which I will recount for you today. It was over 50 years ago that a small group of Jewish male students at American University in Washington, D.C. approached him, a young untenured assistant professor, to ask for his help with a problem – because they were Jewish they could not join any fraternity on campus. Every fraternity on campus at that time had a charter that precluded admission of members on the basis of race or religion. Professor quickly recognized the fundamental unfairness of this practice and approached the University with a proposal that the fraternities delete their “exclusionary clauses” and admit members regardless of race or religion. That request was denied. Undaunted, he approached the University with an alternative proposal. If the fraternities would not be required to remove their exclusionary clauses, then these young Jewish men should be permitted to form their own fraternity. That request was granted and, thus was formed the Beta Chapter of the Phi Epsilon Pi Fraternity at American University.

450

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

Throughout the fraternity’s existence, Professor Said was the only faculty advisor we ever had. He gave his time and energy to us whenever it was needed. He touched all our lives in many positive ways and when called upon, used his power of persuasion to get a brother or two out of a jam. Professor has not only been my mentor and fraternity brother, but also my dear friend for over 50 years. Professor served as a peace educator since 1957 at American University. He has been a pillar of support to me, to our fraternity, and to countless others whose life he has touched.

11.15 Testimonial by Oussama Safa Oussama Safa is the Chief of the Social Justice Section at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), based in Beirut. Prior to that he was the Director of the Beirut-based public policy think tank, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.

It’d been six months since I left the American University of Beirut to seek graduate work in Washington, D.C., when I met Prof. Said. A young AUB graduate, full of idealism and oversized expectations, I was looking for a program that taught peacebuilding and post-war recovery and that would help me to support my native Lebanon in its efforts to build back following a fifteen-year war. A common friend had set up a meeting with the Professor and had made a phone introduction. As I walked into his office at the old School of International Service’s building on AU’s campus, I was struck by how many people were waiting to see him and ask for his counsel. The office, I would later experience, was forever as busy as a beehive with so many students, teachers, colleagues and friends always there sharing ideas, asking questions and above all, drinking from the fountain of wisdom and good advice that Prof. Said so generously offered. His broad smile and deep listening made me – the nervous, unsure student – feel at home and comfortable. He listened carefully and reflectively to what I had to say, the kind of program that I was looking for and my needs and expectations. I had wondered if AU would have what I was looking for. “Yes, Baba!” was his immediate response, “AU is the place for you.” Our first meeting was the start of a lifelong friendship and mentorship the lessons of which will forever accompany me. It is difficult to capture in words the influence that Professor Said had on my thinking and the subsequent transformation that he triggered in me. His vision and commitment to expanding the study of peace in all its facets was contagious and it led me – as it did many other students with me – to expand my comfort zone and go beyond classical thinking on peacebuilding and conflict resolution. What was constantly impressive with Prof. Said is that he always had time for me and my queries, no matter how busy he was. He saw in me – and so many of his students – an ambassador of peace who would grow the field wherever he went. His approach was always simple, yet very attractive. With nothing to prove, he pushed the boundaries of amalgamating peace studies with religion, particularly highlighting

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

451

the tenets of peace in Islam at a time when debates of Islamic extremism took center stage. Effortlessly and confidently, he would always counter the prevailing discourse and promulgate the message that Islam, peace and spirituality are in unison. Studying and working with Prof. Said transformed me, my attitude and my thinking. With his encouragement, I published my first article in a refereed journal and sought a second graduate degree and a research fellowship on peace and development – a topic that did not exist at SIS. It was Prof. Said who encouraged me to petition the Graduate Studies Council to accept to integrate the topic in its coursework, and it worked. Following my return to Lebanon, we kept in touch sporadically and I would visit him every time I returned to D.C. His wise counsel and encouragement were as generous as always. I will always cherish my time with the Professor and will continue to remember his boundless mentorship and counsel. His landmark “Yes, Baba!”, a reflection of his solution-oriented thinking, shall forever be etched in my memory.

11.16 Testimonial by Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand Dr. Satha-Anand is a retired Professor of Political Science at Thammasat University in Bangkok. He is the author of several books published in Thailand and abroad including Nonviolence and Islamic Imperatives (2017).

I first met Prof. Abdul Aziz Said in November 1986 at an international conference on nonviolent political struggle, perhaps the very first one of its kind in the Middle East, organized by the Amman Arab Thought Forum under the leadership of the then Crown Prince Abdullah of Jordan. The Forum was attended by world-renowned scholars such as Johan Galtung (the father of modern peace research), the late Gene Sharp (arguably the most prominent 20th century theorist of nonviolent struggle in the world), Hasan Hanafi (the critical Egyptian philosopher), Saad Eddin Ibrahim (a most prominent Arab public intellectual), and Prof. Abdul Aziz Said from the American University, among others. Somehow two things about the eminent Syrian professor from American University have made an indelible impression in my memory about him all these thirty years. First was his eloquence in proposing a profound paradigmatic change in appreciating global politics. Second, and this is perhaps more personal, in a heated exchange on how knowledge from “outsiders” could contribute to the lessening of violence in the Middle East during the three-day conference, Prof. Said had this phrase in his response: “…but my eyes were raised in the desert.” In the years since, I have oftentimes reflected on his poetic response and asked myself: what has the one whose eyes were raised in the desert seen? I am sure there are those who see the desert as a barren landscape with deadly dangers lurking but for the black gold beneath. But then I believe Prof. Said’s eyes are like those of the legendary desert fathers who could appreciate its mysterious beauty. Those with such eyes could look at a grain of sand and see the majestic

452

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

enchantment of the cosmos created by the Creator reflected in it. I believe that my reading of his words is closer to the truth of how the man sees the world. For he has never failed to recognize the merit of a person’s contribution to global peace no matter where he/she has come from, be it the center of learning or the far end of the periphery. I myself have benefited from his kindness throughout the years, with the generous time he has given me whenever I visited the U.S. capital as well as scholarly attention he has shown this Thai academic from nowhere by including me in conferences, publications or simply seeing me privately during such visits. In most of our private meetings in D.C., I remember I have always brought up two things. First was about how I was impressed with him when we met at the Amman conference. Second, I told him that the 1986 Amman trip was in fact my second trip to Jordan. The first one took place when I was 9 years old when I spent months touring the Middle East with my mom and dad, mostly visiting Sufi shrines and historical sites. And that “my father’s name, who passed away two years after that memorable trip, was Haji Abdul Aziz.” With a tender smile, he would look back at me with profound kindness in his deep thoughtful eyes and I think I know what he meant when he once said that “…my eyes were raised in the desert.”

11.17 Testimonial by Dr. Sallama Shaker Dr. Shaker is Full Clinical Professor of Middle East and International Studies in the Department of International Studies, part of the Division of Politics and Economics at Claremont Graduate University. She was also Ambassador of Egypt to Canada from 2000 to 2004.

In tribute to the legacy of my Mualem, my mentor, Professor Abdul Aziz Said. It was a lovely day in June 1989 when I walked into the inspirational office of Professor Abdul Aziz Said, Professor of International Relations at American University’s School of International Service, to seek his advice as a doctoral candidate. As I walked up the stairs, I could hear my heartbeat because I knew that this particular meeting would make a marked difference in my life and my career as an Egyptian diplomat at the Embassy in Washington, D.C. who was dreaming to understand the complex nature of the Middle East region and to be trained as an effective negotiator. The question was: will the prominent Professor welcome a career diplomat who has a full-time job and agree to navigate with her through the turbulent waters of academia and diplomacy? I still remember how excited I was to get this wonderful opportunity of meeting Professor Said face-to-face, since I always read his articles and saw his picture which resembled our famous Egyptian movie star, Omar Sharif. As I was ushered into his office by his wonderful assistant, I was enchanted by the oriental Persian carpet, the oldest map of the Middle East and Levant, and the gorgeous inscriptions of old Farsi and Arabic Sufi poems. The office was a symbol of cultural diversity and interfaith dialogue which gave me a feeling of tranquility and self-confidence.

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

453

I recall how Professor Said greeted me warmly with his charming smile and distinguished word, “Salaam,” and assured me that the fact that my full name, Sallama Shaker, means “Thank you for peace” is in itself a statement which should entitle me to become a peace activist. Indeed, this statement was a prophecy and inspiration throughout my career as a diplomat and an educator, following the path of my teacher and inspirational mentor Professor Said, who taught me how to become a global citizen. I learned my first lesson when I heard him say in our first meeting that “within the growing milieu of crisis, our perception of the world grows increasingly intertwined in social values and political factors which necessitates the understanding of the complex nature of cultural diversity and the skills of building bridges between East and West through the culture of peace and denouncing violence and ‘othering.” With a nod of his head, my professor concluded that he would be proud to mentor an Egyptian diplomat who is a woman pioneer in the “field less traveled,” i.e. diplomacy with a human face. His inspirational words are still ringing in my ears. My professor assured me that obtaining my doctoral degree at American University would be most rewarding for both the school and me; it would be a “win-win situation.” I was thrilled because he trusted my abilities, and he effectively empowered me while promising to “walk with me the extra mile” to achieve my career dreams. Taking the courses of Professor Said was most enriching. He had a unique style of teaching because he practically fulfilled the description of “The Teacher” in Kahlil Gibran’s The Prophet (1931): “The teacher does not bid you to enter the house of his wisdom, but rather leads you to the threshold of your own mind” (p. 17). Professor Said taught us the importance of listening because each person has a story to tell. So let me share with you my story. I recall when Professor Said invited my husband, Ghaleb Abdul-Rahman, and me to his lovely home in Washington, D.C. Both of us felt honored and excited to have dinner with him and dear, charming Elena. They welcomed us with open arms, and over a dinner by candlelight, my Professor said, “Let us set our agenda for our evening. So the first item on our agenda will be on the significance of your names – Sallama and Abdul-Rahman – in Arab history and culture, and why Islam is being politicized.” I will never forget how we shared the story of love between the famous singer, Sallama, and the heroic fighter, AbdulRahman Al Qass, who fought for the Umayyad caliph, Marwan ibn Abdulaziz, and sacrificed his life to free Sallama from slavery and won her heart and her freedom. Professor Said and Elena were so touched by the story and said that Ghaleb would be sacrificing for me throughout the challenging times to support me to earn my doctoral degree and would be my “rock” and “lighthouse.” My spiritual mentor emphasized that since my name means “peace” and Ghaleb’s name means the “conqueror” and Abdul-Rahman means “the servant of Compassion,” then together we will navigate and overcome life challenges. Indeed, it was like he had a crystal ball with a prophecy of a success story. We were enchanted when my Professor ushered us into his special quarters of seclusion which was a shrine filled with Sufi paintings and Qur’anic verses on peace and calligraphic inscriptions from Cordoba in Andalusia, medieval Spain, where for more than seven centuries Muslims, Jews, and Christians lived together in an atmosphere of tolerance, compassion, and flourishing literature, sciences and arts.

454

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

He explained to us the significance of the 99 names of God, emphasizing al-Rahman, which means the Compassionate, the Merciful, and how al-rahma is an essential leadership quality and important factor in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. That evening, my professor shared with us his favorite poem from the Sufi poet Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi (1165–1240), who was born in Andalusia and traveled all over North Africa and the Middle East spreading the values of humility, love and the power of embracing others, which Professor Said explained, represent the fulfillment of the Islamic universal peace message as expressed in these lines: My heart has become capable of every form. It is a pasture of gazelles and a convent for Christian Monks, and a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Ka‘ba and the tablets of the Torah and the Book of the Qur’an. I follow the religion of love, whatever way love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith. (Ibn al-‘Arabi/Nicholson 1978)

He asked us to reflect on these lines and link it with “cultural pluralism,” which can achieve broader human involvement that can trigger a vision which involves the heart and the soul. Our agenda was always set to follow current political events in the Arab world and the United States with specific questions on how to bridge the gap between East and West – which Professor Said referred to as being dominated by “civilizational identities” where the West seems to feel threatened by Islam, based on Samuel Huntington’s theory about the “clash of civilizations.” He explained to us how the road to build better understanding will require intellectuals like us since we are stakeholders of global stability to build dialogues based on facts about Islamic civilization and the paradigm of peace in Islam, and to take an enlightened approach which can highlight that the problems between the West and the Middle East are shared problems and that much can be gained from efforts to showcase common grounds. We discussed the dire need to open dialogues with our American friends to recognize Islam as a system with social values and its relevance to peacemaking. One particular dinner stands out: when my dear Professor Said and Elena invited us to their charming home in May 1993 to celebrate my graduation. As always, he set the agenda, and his first question addressed to me with pride and joy was: “What’s next and when will you be writing your first book and wear your two hats, the ‘academic hat’ and your ‘diplomatic hat’?” Indeed, that was the moment of inspiration and promises to be fulfilled. All the intellectual and spiritual guidance of my professor inspired me as a scholar to write my first book, State, Society, and Privatization in Turkey, 1979–1990, which was published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press in 1995. This was my fulfilled promise to my Mualem who always emphasized to us in his classes “the need to share knowledge because education is empowerment.” The broader, insightful thinking of Professor Said was instrumental in enhancing my career as a scholar and a diplomat. Upon my return to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was awarded the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Americas, which was for the first time in the history of the Ministry to be held by an Egyptian woman diplomat. Indeed, my dear professor, you said it correctly: “Quality education is empowerment.”

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

455

Being a career diplomat who is interested in the art of negotiations and conflict resolution in the Middle East region, I had the great opportunity to take classes with Professor Said, in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program which he successfully initiated at American University’s School of International Service. I learned the skills of diplomacy and negotiations, wearing “the velvet gloves” and the importance of “humanizing your enemy” and the phrase which my teacher repeated frequently: If we look at peace as a transformative process, it should be perceived as a love triangle transcending self-centered egos in order to build trust and humanity, understanding and becoming companions on the journey for peace with compassion rather than “othering” and blaming. Humility is required and reconciliation is built on trust.

When I became the Ambassador of Egypt to Canada from 2000 to 2004, all these valuable lessons resonated with me and I was able to apply them effectively to practice when I was negotiating to help release children who were used as child soldiers in the conflict between Uganda and Sudan. When we were able to announce the release of these kidnapped children to be returned to their villages in their countries, I called Professor Said in Washington, D.C. to share with him this “success story” which I was able to accomplish by applying his guidelines and advice and all the lessons that I learned from him about constructive dialogue and trust-building, negotiating with a human touch, the art of “whirling together,” and the importance of understanding the complex human nature of your counterparts at the negotiating table. There is always a “story to be shared” so we all need to be “good listeners.” When I embarked on my academic career as a visiting professor at Yale University in July 2008 to 2013, I sought the advice of Professor Said, who sincerely encouraged me to follow his path and share my knowledge as a practitioner and scholar on peacebuilding and conflict resolution. He was proud of me as his dedicated student and he humbled me by welcoming my invitation to address my Yale students on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in view of all of his concerted efforts in his visits to the Middle East region and the occupied territories. My dear Professor Said traveled all the way from Washington, D.C. to New Haven, Connecticut in October of 2009 to discuss with my students the root causes of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, sharing his experience from the field and how, many times, he heard one party in the conflict say about the other: “We hate them for making us do what we do, because they bring out the beast in us.” Explaining how peace will only be maintained by a just and comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in fulfillment of the United Nations resolutions and the Saudi Initiative of 2002, was instrumental in opening the students’ understanding that this conflict is not an interreligious feud but is over the land. A new story can be built if both sides can restore confidence and resort to peacebuilding through equity to transcend hatred and revenge. There need be no illusion about the challenges facing the negotiators on both sides because of all the wounds inflicted by the conflict and the human losses and loss of confidence; however, let us look together on all world wars which ended with treaties that are sustained – embedded in the dynamic force of saving lives and acknowledging the wholeness of human life which is sacred in all religions. My Professor shared with

456

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

my class the Qur’anic verse (8:61), which conveys this principle: “But if your enemy inclines towards peace, do thou incline towards peace – and trust in God, for he hears and knows all things.” On his second visit to Yale University upon the invitation of the Library of Alexandria of Egypt and Yale Divinity School in 2010, Professor Said gave a presentation at the conference on “Building Bridges between West and East” in which he emphasized the need for new thinking and constructing bridges by recognizing that the whole world needs the whole world. In his presentation, there was great emphasis on how structural changes need to happen in many societies in the Arab world to support democratic changes and human rights, and on how Western countries need to realize that change has to come from within in Muslim lands where radicalization of young Muslim men is happening. Supporting internal developments demands addressing the needs of the peoples. Leaders have to inspire their people to act toward proper ends to achieve the common public good. Leadership demands vision, with mercy and loyalty to the public interest. Clearly, my mentor, Professor Said, was able – with his enlightened “spiritual antenna” and insightful understanding of the nuances of the Middle East region – to foresee the Uprisings of January 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. He said, the “writing was on the wall but no one wanted to listen to the genuine cry of the people.” I remember how many phone discussions we had about Syria, and he was always adamant about reassuring me that “as long as Damascus holds, Syria will remain intact and the regime will survive because the outside opposition does not have a strategy and they are involved in power struggle.” His insightful comments that “peace in Syria will be peace of the Exhausted NOT peace of the Brave” is indeed what is looming on the horizon. Professor Said emphasized the need for a vision that acknowledges a local culture and a dialogue to provide a mechanism for the values of diverse groups, to ensure the integrity of the country while satisfying the local diversity and cultural needs. He underscored the need to encourage a Syrian voice in all conferences, to protect the minorities in Syria, to develop a sense of citizenship and responsibility as citizens, and to engage in reconciliation. His message is clear: “STOP DEHUMANIZING and DEMONIZING EACH OTHER.” This is the recipe of reaching peace which I taught at Yale University between 2008 and 2013 and have been teaching in my classes at Claremont Graduate University since 2014: the power of peace and healing, the need for new thinking and building bridges, and the renunciation of anger. Together, these elements fulfill the teachings of Sufism as I learned it from Professor Said: “When you see the face of anger, look behind it and you will see the face of pride. Bring anger and pride under your feet, turn them into a ladder and climb higher. There is no peace until you become their master.” When I was invited with my husband, Ghaleb, to pay tribute to Professor Said at the International Conference held in Washington, D.C. on March 19th, 2015, I had the honor to be the Keynote speaker as one of the dedicated students, “SAIDINS,” who were there manifesting their love and admiration for “the legacy of a professor who shows no signs of slowing down.”

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

457

On the second day of the conference, Professor Said invited us to a wonderful brunch with Elena, who was sparkling as usual. We had an agenda with his vision, speculating on how the future of the Middle East will be after the major transformative changes which happened in the region. Professor Said was thrilled to know that I am following his steps and encouraging students to understand the puzzles of the Middle East region as a land with people and cultures and civilizations. It was most gratifying for me to see him smile when I was telling him about my students’ reaction when I quoted his famous statement about Universality of Islam from his opening speech at the Library of Alexandria in Egypt, October 4–5, 2003: Islam is likened to “a river” rather than a “lake”; like a river Islam has sometimes picked up sediments that are not particularly Islamic, yet the soils over which Islam has flowed have sometimes enriched Islam by providing new, culturally diverse ways for universalism of the tradition to manifest.

When we were having our dessert, we exchanged notes on our families and he encouraged me to write a book on the Middle East; this is another promise which I will fulfill. This is the legacy of my dear Professor Said, who enriched our lives with his inspiration; an icon of peace, love and compassion with a clear message: “But all humans who experience inner peace spread to others. This is a possibility for all of us. Peace is the doorway to compassion and nonviolence is the first step to love.”

11.18 Testimonial by Srimati Karuna Srimati Karuna is the full-time Minister of the Self-Revelation Church of Absolute Monism, which follows the spiritual tradition of Advaita Vedanta with a totally nonsectarian philosophy. She is also the Director of the Gandhi Memorial Center, which shares the message of Mahatma Gandhi and the cultural and spiritual heritage that nourished him.

As an undergraduate student of American University in the 90s, I remember the day a friend told me about the new master’s program in International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). Immediately it drew my interest before I even learned anything about it. I soon decided to apply to the joint BA/MA IPCR program. It was clear to me after reading the program philosophy that it was the right program for me. As an interdisciplinary program, it addressed peace and conflict resolution on multiple levels – starting with conflict and peace building within the individual, moving between individuals, between groups, between states and globally. I later came to better understand that the nature of the program was also inherent in the character of the man who founded it, Professor Abdul Aziz Said. Eventually, when it came time to sign up for classes I, like most students, wanted to take a class with Professor Said. But by no surprise, his classes were full. The one I really wanted to take was entitled: “Islamic Sources of Peace and Conflict Resolution.” I asked the program coordinator to help me sign up but she said he would only give a blue card for an over-subscribed class if it was really a subject that I was interested to study, not just because he was teaching it! I explained to her my

458

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

interest in world religions and philosophy, and permission was granted. I was let into the world of Professor Said and it provided me with life-long direction. This class was, in fact, the first class offered under the Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace Studies, of which Professor Said was the first occupant. After getting to know Professor Said as a teacher, I wanted to find a way to help him with his work so I began volunteering with his newly established Center for Global Peace. In fact, the first program I was asked to plan led me to the Gandhi Memorial Center, where I have now been the Director for the last 14 years. At that time, in January 1998, I hoped to arrange a program on Gandhi and King. After visiting the Gandhi Memorial Center, I had set out on a path to a much wider vocation. It not only brought me to the Gandhi Center but also to the Self-Revelation Church of Absolute Monism, both founded by Swami Premananda of India. I later became the full-time Minster of this Church. After graduating with my B.A./M.A. I worked for a year helping with a book project on international human rights advocates (including a number of Nobel Peace Prize recipients) and remained in touch with Prof. Said and the program at American University. I remember learning how Professor Said was almost always ahead of his time academically. He was always on the cutting edge—bridging human rights, development and peace building with the field of international relations. The impact of this forward thinking was evident over the decades as other universities, scholars and practitioners evolved in their thinking. After assisting with that book project, I returned to American University to work with Professor Said as the coordinator of the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program. I worked closely with him for six years, helping to increase enrollment in the various master’s programs offered under the auspices of IPCR, as well as the peace studies concentrations at the B.A. and Ph.D. levels. It was a time of tremendous growth in the academic program, in terms of student enrollment, faculty, staff and alumni… so much so that it became the largest program in the School of International Service. The program was beginning to have an outstanding footprint on the American University campus and around the globe. There were many up-hill challenges but also many successes in the work. Professor Said was not just the founder and the director of the program. He was a symbol of it. It became the most collaborative team on campus. Professor Said led cooperatively, always involving the community of professors, staff, students and alumni in every aspect of the decision-making process. There was also the element of service (notably, the program is part of the School of International Service.) The combination of theory and practice, domestic and global policy, personal and social growth and unfoldment, involvement of a broad spectrum of disciplines and, over time, a more experienced cohort of students, all shaped not only the future of the program but its impact on the world. What is more, everyone could see that IPCR wasn’t a program—it was a family. It is true that this man from the desert of Syria brought with him the ability to unite many tribes under one flag – what greater testimony to a man of peace.

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

459

11.19 Testimonial by Dr. Joshua N. Weiss Dr. Weiss is a Co-Founder of the Global Negotiation Initiative at the Harvard Negotiation Project and Director of the MS in Leadership and Negotiation at Bay Path University.

The sun streamed brightly into a classroom on the second floor of the old School of International Service building on the campus of American University. It was 8:30 a.m. on a very warm D.C. morning in late August of 1993. This was to be my first graduate class. As I plopped my books down on my desk I glanced out the window, wondering what type of journey I was about to embark upon. Then, the door opened, and a man with bushy eyebrows, a luminous twinkle in his eye, and the biggest smile I had ever seen sauntered in wearing a tweed jacket and an ascot. He put his briefcase on the desk and simply said, “Welcome my dears, to Peace Paradigms. I am your Professor – Professor Abdul Aziz Said. I want to begin with a story…” And with that simple and warm welcome my life would never be the same. To that point in my existence I had not really done much of note. However, that all changed thanks primarily to Professor Said and the Peace and Conflict Resolution (PCR) program. As I settled into the graduate program I noticed my energy level and passion for the subject grew exponentially with every passing day. Every step of the way Prof. Said was there to encourage me and, perhaps more importantly, challenge me. He sought to assist me in growing in ways I did not know I was capable of. I remember frequently sitting in his office. Every time I would come in he would say, “Yes, yes my dear come in. How can I help you?” With those words, whatever problems or issues I was having seemed much more manageable. I recall once early on in the degree program I was speaking to my mother and was trying to describe Prof. Said. I remember vividly telling her “When I sit down to speak with him it is as if I am the only person in the world and his attention is completely focused on me.” That is an unusual feeling, but what made it even more memorable was that it was, without question, genuine and sincere. It was simply who he was. From early on in the program I could feel Prof. Said subtly challenging me to be more – to reach higher than I had ever reached before. As but one example, I was not the best writer when I entered the program (which is being kind). One day Prof. Said called me into his office and asked me about my writing process. Honestly, to that point I am not really certain I had a writing process. I provided him with what could only have been a very feeble response. He encouraged me to try something new – to sit down, start writing, and to just see what would happen. He cautioned me that whatever I would produce would need many revisions but getting something down on paper was an essential first step. I recall trying this approach. At first, I struggled, but then I got the hang of it and found myself just writing…and then writing some more. After a few papers the process felt very liberating. While my writing was still not up to graduate level standards, I was beginning to develop a new, more comfortable, way to approach this task. I recall one assignment on which I felt I had done a very solid job. I was proud of the work I had put in and was eager to get Prof. Said’s feedback. The following week he called me into his office and explained that what I had done was certainly an improvement, but he knew I could do

460

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

better. The key to writing, as he explained thoughtfully and carefully, was revisions, revisions, and more revisions. I left his office a bit dejected, but begrudgingly took his point. Eventually I became a better writer, but to this day I still go through numerous revisions in whatever work I am creating. At times I think back to Prof. Said’s face and hear his voice uttering, “Is this really the best you can do?” So I sit back down and do another draft. Now, as time wore on, I also had the opportunity to become the Graduate Student Council President while I was in the PCR program. At that time the PCR program was still a concentration under the broader rubric of International Politics. Prof. Said had been working tirelessly to get the PCR program to be its own Master’s Degree. Of course, when he and I would meet we would discuss this at great length and how we, as students, could assist in this effort. Like any challenge of this type there were frustrations along the way and Prof. Said expressed them to me. However, having learned from the greats, such as Gandhi and King, he knew he had to stay focused on his goal WHILE also being true to the process. The means always had to justify the ends. I distinctly remember the day that the PCR program was approved as its own Master’s Degree. Prof. Said gave me a big hug and thanked me for all my efforts. The only reply I could muster, as I choked back the tears, was “No Professor, thank you.” Many years later when I brought two of my daughters to Washington, D.C. we had to pay a visit to meet my dear Professor. When we got to his office the same familiar “Yes Joshua, come in, come in” rang out. But then he saw my daughters and his eyes gleamed with the pride often reserved for a grandfather. Initially my girls were a little hesitant given they were four- and two-years-old respectively. However, Prof. Said’s warmth won them over and before I knew it they were sitting on his lap and playing with the many artifacts on his desk. Of course, he was telling them stories… One of the most valuable things I learned from Professor Said that has guided my career was that peace, and dealing with conflict productively, was not some abstract notion. It was something that had to be practiced every day, which came in the form of how we dealt with people and the way we approached problems. I noticed that he did not always succeed in this pursuit. After all, he was human. But he always tried. I recall one time where he became frustrated in a meeting related the PCR program becoming its own master’s degree and he lost his temper. As the meeting was ending, he gently rose and apologized for his behavior… admitting that his emotions had overwhelmed him. As he sat back down it was clear people forgave him and the table was set for the next time we would all sit together. Put differently, Prof. Said strove to live the principles he taught and sought to embed them deeply in his students. This has lived on in me. As I look back at my own career, I notice that I have gravitated to people in the field with that same way of thinking and it has served me well. To conclude, Professor Said was, without question, a brilliant scholar and practitioner. I learned so very much from him from that perspective. However, the things that really stay with me have to do with his character. He was as generous in heart, mind, and soul as anyone I have ever met. Simply knowing he was in the world was

11 Reflections from Colleagues, Practitioners, and Former Students

461

a source of comfort for me and many others. That is quite a gift to bestow upon the world… and it is a gift that keeps on giving.

11.20 Testimonial by Barbara Wien Barbara Wien has edited and written 27 books and articles, led eight non-profits, and taught at six universities. Recognized for her leadership and “moral courage” four times by foundations and academic societies, Barbara was named “Peace Educator of the Year” in 2018 by the Peace & Justice Studies Association (PJSA). She was featured in Amy Goodman’s book Exceptions to the Rulers (2003) and the Progressive magazine for opposing the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as a U.S. government official. Her interviews include The Washington Post, NBC Nightly News, Defense One, National Public Radio, Australian Broadcasting, Nuclear Times, and broadcasts in India, Uganda, Zambia, Palestine-Israel, and Australia.

It was the fall of 1978 at American University. I was 19 years old and intimidated in my International Relations courses by my male classmates from Iran, the U.S., and various Middle Eastern countries. I felt I lacked their intellectual prowess. Thankfully, my professor was gentle and inclusive. He insured the few females in the class had opportunities to speak. He turned to us to share our thoughts and ideas. Under his facilitation, our discussions were rich, textured, inclusive, and robust. I found my voice. Abdul Aziz Said rocked my world. At first I was struck by his mustache and eyebrows, which were very bushy. He was regal and elegant in his comportment, and his wisdom stretched back many centuries. I recognized I was in the presence of a hugely consequential figure. His class was the first time I had studied human rights as a body of scholarship. He challenged my conventional notions of international relations and my worldview, yet I was unafraid. He helped me shine even when I felt I lacked expertise. Abdul Aziz Said humanized Palestinians for me for the first time, and offered students a different narrative on the wars in the Middle East. We could transform these conflicts. We did not need to live with bloodshed. He shared Palestinian scholarship and stories, such as Samih al-Qasim’s poem, “Enemy of the Sun.” I still have these wonderful gifts from Dr. Said to this day. Abdul Aziz Said was my professor, mentor, and spiritual guide from 1977 to 1981 and for many decades after. He helped me become a passionate advocate for social justice and nonviolence. It is due to his patience, deep sense of history, and life of personal integrity that my peacebuilding work has been sustained over the last 40 years. He helped build the field of Peace Studies at American University, which has graduated tens of thousands of young people working to improve the human condition and end the institution of war today. After graduation, I realized how Dr. Said had given me the most profound gift of all: The power of HOPE. I had newfound courage for the future. I came to the

462

N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk

realization that the human race has a choice: Abdul taught me that we are not destined to live in a pessimistic world. We can adopt new norms and values in the international system. We can build a new global infrastructure to protect human rights and resolve conflicts – a new global peace system. This is his most enduring legacy. He offers humanity a new grand narrative. We are the agents of change and of our own future. We hold in our hands the ability to end violence and war. I found my calling in the field of peace education because of Abdul, and I have never looked back. Thank you, Dr. Said!

References Gibran, K. (1931). The prophet. New York: Knopf. Havel, V. (1995, June 8). Civilization’s thin veneer. Commencement Address at Harvard University. Ibn al-‘Arabi, M., & Nicholson, R. A. (1978). The tarjuman al-ashwaq: A collection of mystical odes by Muhyi‘ddin Ibn al-‘Arabi. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House Ltd. Rogers, C. (1989). The rust workshop. In H. Kirschenbaum & V. Land Henderson (Eds.), The Carl Rogers reader (pp. 457–477). New York: Houghton Mifflin. Said, A. A., & Lerche, C. O. III (2006). Peace as a human right: Toward an integrated understanding. In J. Mertus & J. W. Helsing (Eds.), Human rights and conflict: Exploring the links between rights, law, and peacebuilding (pp. 129–149). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O. III, & Funk, N. C. (2006). For the need for new thinking. International Journal of Peace Studies, 11(2), 105–120. Said, A. A., Lerche, C. O., Jr., & Lerche, C. O. III (1995). Concepts of international politics in global perspective (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Shaker, S. (1995). State, society, and privatization in Turkey, 1979–1990. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

On American University

American University is an independent, coeducational university, chartered by an Act of Congress in 1893 as a Methodist Church–related institution. Our cosmopolitan, multicultural campus enrolls approximately 13,000 students in undergraduate, master’s, doctoral, and professional degree and certificate programs. The university attracts students from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the territories, and 130 countries. American University offers a wide range of undergraduate and graduate programs through its seven major divisions: College of Arts and Sciences, Kogod School of Business, School of Communication, School of International Service, School of Public Affairs, Washington College of Law, and School of Professional and Extended Studies. The College of Arts and Sciences comprises 21 teaching units, including the School of Education, Teaching, and Health. Each semester approximately 400 students from 200 colleges worldwide participate in programs through AU’s School of Professional and Extended Studies, AU Abroad, and Abroad at AU. Academic offerings of the university include 68 bachelor’s degrees; 69 master’s degrees; 10 doctoral degrees; JD, LLM, and SJD degrees; and certificate programs. University leaders have assembled a nationally and internationally acclaimed faculty committed to excellence in teaching and scholarship—real wonks in their field—along with a diverse and talented student body. American University’s

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

463

464

On American University

academic programs are grounded in the arts and sciences and connected to the extraordinary cultural, public affairs, legal, business, international, and communication resources of Washington, DC. AU will continue to build on these strengths to create a distinctively American, globally oriented university dedicated to academic excellence in preparing students for leadership in a complex international society. Website: American University, http://www.american.edu/about/index.cfm. Website: AU, School of International Service (SIS), https://www.american.edu/sis/ index.cfm.

On the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at Conrad Grebel University College and the University of Waterloo

Conrad Grebel University College (Grebel) was established on the campus of the University of Waterloo in 1963, as a college affiliated with the Mennonite Anabaptist peace church tradition. By 1970, as Grebel grew and interest in its academic offerings increased, the College began offering courses related to peace studies. The interest that these courses generated led Grebel to initiate the first Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) program in Canada in 1977 as an interdisciplinary minor, implemented in a cooperative arrangement with various partner departments within the University of Waterloo’s Faculty of Arts. Nearly three decades later, in Fall 2005, a Bachelor of Arts major was added to the PACS program, followed by a Master of Peace and Conflict Studies (MPACS) degree in 2012. As PACS academic programs have grown, so too has departmental support for a number of non-degree continuing education study options and co-curricular activities. Since 1998, the PACS Department has offered a professional development Certificate Program in Conflict Management. Co-curricular activities and events associated with the College add to the vibrancy of the peace studies experience, including those associated with the Kindred Credit Union Centre for Peace Advancement (CPA), which serves as a space at the College for innovative peace-related activities distinguished by collaboration, interdisciplinarity, and multi-sector engagement. In aspiring to promote innovative and expansively defined peace practices in local as well as global contexts, the CPA hosts established institutional partners as

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

465

466

On the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at Conrad Grebel …

well as individuals and groups seeking to launch peace “start-ups” within the CPA’s interactive incubator space. Since its birth in 1977, the PACS Department at Grebel has grown into a dynamic locus for academic research, undergraduate- and graduate-level study, and community engagement. All of these activities are underpinned by a commitment not just to deeply understand roots of conflict and violence, but also to identify effective bases for advancing peace and justice in everyday social relationships as well as in the larger world. Website: Conrad Grebel University College, https://uwaterloo.ca/grebel/. Website: Peace and Conflict Studies Department, https://uwaterloo.ca/peace-con flict-studies/. Website: University of Waterloo, https://uwaterloo.ca/.

On Wilfrid Laurier University and the Department of Religion and Culture

Wilfrid Laurier University is a leading Canadian university that excels at academic excellence. Its holistic approach to learning integrates innovative programming with hands-on experience outside the classroom. Students gain both the knowledge and skills needed to succeed in the future and the inspiration to make their mark. Laurier consistently ranks high in student satisfaction thanks to its unique community-centred culture. From day one, students feel welcomed and find their place in the many faculties, clubs, teams and associations Laurier has to offer. Students build supportive and collaborative relationships with faculty and staff as well as lasting connections in the communities they live, learn and work in, and in the global community. After graduation, thousands of engaged alumni carry the Laurier legacy throughout the world. Through its community of researchers, leaders and educators, Laurier has built a reputation as a world-class institution known for its academic excellence – knowledge that serves society, creates connections and has a lasting impact. Laurier specializes in arts and social sciences, business and economics, music, science, social work, education and theology. The university has campuses in Waterloo and Brantford and locations in Kitchener and Chongqing, China, a research office in Yellowknife, and a future location in Milton, Ontario. Laurier was established as the Evangelical

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

467

468

On Wilfrid Laurier University and the Department of Religion and Culture

Lutheran Seminary of Canada in 1911 and remains the home of the affiliated Martin Luther University College (formerly Waterloo Lutheran Seminary). The Department of Religion and Culture at Laurier is situated within the Faculty of Arts, and offers BA as well as MA and PhD programs. Religion and Culture students explore the rich diversity of world faith traditions and examine how religion interacts with contemporary culture. In addition to investigating sacred texts, oral narratives, expressive arts, and spirituality in the world’s religions, the curriculum also engages issues relating to human rights, religious rights and freedoms, the status of women, identity and belonging, inter-group conflict and coexistence in a multicultural society. Website: Department of Religion and Culture, https://students.wlu.ca/programs/arts/ religion-and-culture/index.html. Website: Wilfrid Laurier University, https://www.wlu.ca/.

On Abdul Aziz Said

Dr. Abdul Aziz Said was a visionary in the field of international affairs. During his six-decade career at American University (AU) in Washington, D.C., Dr. Said continually sought to break new ground through innovative research, curriculum development, and practice. He was on the leading edge of efforts not just to reconceptualize international politics from a global perspective, but also to advance human rights, foreground the significance of culture and ethnicity, highlight the role of faith and religion, promote peacemaking through dialogue, and address root causes of conflict such as social inequity and injustice. As the longest serving professor at American University, Dr. Said was an iconic presence: Director Emeritus and founder of AU’s Center for Global Peace; Mohamed Said Farsi Chair Emeritus of Islamic Peace; and founder and first director of the AU School of International Service’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program – a program that included a Master of Arts degree and four dual or joint degree options, as well as concentrations at the doctoral and undergraduate levels. Dr. Said is considered a pioneer in the development of the field of International Peace and Conflict Resolution and his interdisciplinary approach to the subject area has influenced academics and practitioners worldwide. The authoritative Washington Post characterized him as a “singular institution promoting peace.” © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

469

470

On Abdul Aziz Said

Dr. Said founded over a dozen other centers and research programs and authored or co-authored over 25 books and 100 publications. In addition to serving as a teacher and mentor to thousands of students, and receiving more than 20 faculty awards, Abdul Aziz Said was a frequent lecturer and participant in national and international conferences. He was also dedicated to public service that included consulting to the U.S. Department of State, the Defense Department, the U.S. Information Agency, the National Security Council, and the White House. He served on over 20 boards of various non-governmental organizations, including the National Peace Foundation, The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, and Global Education Associates. He was the recipient of over 30 awards, including the International Studies Association’s “Distinguished Scholar of Peace Studies,” The Inter-American Defense College’s “Diploma Honoris Causa,” and the El-Hibri “Peace Education Prize” (first recipient). Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.american.edu/sis/rememberingabdul-aziz-said.cfm; https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20210215-a-tri bute-to-abdul-aziz-said.cfm; https://www.american.edu/news/abdul_aziz_said_ obituary.cfm; https://abdulazizsaidamericanu.org/; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Aziz_Said.

Nathan C. Funk

Nathan C. Funk (Ph.D., American University, 2000) is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, the University of Waterloo. A frequent collaborator with Abdul Aziz Said, his publications include Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (2009), Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West (2004), Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam (2001), “Localizing Peace: An Agenda for Sustainable Peacebuilding (Peace and Conflict Studies, 2010), “Constructing Civic Space: Civil Resistance, Sustainable Citizen Empowerment, and Transitional Justice as Pathways of Change in Contemporary Arab Politics” (in Arab Spring: Modernity, Identity and Change, 2019), “Religion and Peaceful Relations: Negotiating the Sacred” (in The Routledge Companion to the Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2019), and the Conclusion to Middle Power in the Middle East: Canada’s Foreign and Defence Policies in a Changing Region (2022). He has served on the boards of several Canadian peace organizations, including the Peace and Conflict Studies Association of Canada. Address: Conrad Grebel University College, 140 Westmount Road North, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6, Canada. Email: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

471

472

Nathan C. Funk

Website: https://uwaterloo.ca/grebel/people-profiles/ nathan-funk. Undergraduate Peace and Conflict Studies Program: uwaterloo.ca/pacs. Graduate Peace and Conflict Studies Program (MPACS): uwaterloo.ca/mpacs.

Meena Sharify-Funk

Meena Sharify-Funk (Ph.D., American University, 2005) is Associate Professor of Religion and Culture at Wilfrid Laurier University. Her research and writing address topics related to women and Islam, Islamic and Sufi hermeneutics, and the role of cultural and religious factors in peacemaking. She is author of two books, Muslim Women in Contemporary North America: Controversies, Clichés, and Conversations (2023) and Encountering the Transnational: Women, Islam and the Politics of Interpretation (2008). She has also co-authored two books, Contemporary Sufism: Piety, Politics, and Popular Culture (2018) and Unveiling Sufism: From Manhattan to Mecca (2017), and has co-edited two books, Cultural Diversity and Islam (2003) and Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, Not Static (2006). She has authored numerous journal articles and book chapters, and was guest editor of a special issue of the journal Religions on “Contemporary Muslim Thought and Identity” (April 2022). Address: Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5, Canada. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.wlu.ca/academics/faculties/fac ulty-of-arts/faculty-profiles/meena-sharify-funk/index. html. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

473

Index

A Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, 32, 35, 75, 81, 119, 121, 361 Active listening, 385, 396, 397, 448 Adawiyya, Rabia al, 412 Affirmation, 38, 39, 177, 180, 324, 328, 329, 331, 336, 339, 341, 349, 353, 361, 384, 391 Afghanistan, 30, 117, 214, 293, 461 Africa, 19, 59, 65, 103, 110, 144, 164–169, 184, 195, 204, 292, 296, 365, 445, 446 Agricultural revolution, 186, 253 Akgonenc, Oya, 444 Aleppo, 7–9, 51, 267 Algeria, 24, 59, 181, 182, 252, 268, 273, 274, 287, 293, 297, 298, 305 Alliances, 161, 171, 174, 195, 272, 299 America, 12–14, 17, 19, 20, 26, 36, 40, 65, 68, 105, 111, 116, 120, 121, 149, 171, 172, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 193, 197, 199, 214, 215, 232, 241–243, 247, 268, 305, 347, 348, 351, 359, 362, 363, 388, 404, 417, 443 American University in Washington (AU), 432, 435, 439, 449 American University of Beirut, 11, 53, 450 American University of Cairo, 11 Amuda, 4–6, 9, 10, 13, 50, 267 Anti-colonialism, 165–167, 234, 270 Anticommunism, 172, 183 Arab-American, 12, 13, 29, 30, 105, 440 Arab, Arab world, 13, 36, 116, 121, 267, 268, 270–274, 276, 277, 288, 296, 299, 365, 418

Arab Gulf states, 26, 33, 294, 296, 297, 301 Arabic, 5, 7, 19, 22, 51, 270, 298, 334, 353, 452 Arab-Israeli conflict, 65, 117, 274, 278, 302, 349 Arab-Israeli war, 11, 273 Arab nationalism/nationalists, 6, 30, 269, 270, 272, 276 Arab revolt of 1916, 269 Aramaic language, 5 Armenian Genocide, 4 Armenians, 4 Aron, Raymond, 148, 203, 207 Assimilation/assimilate, 208, 212, 250, 282, 285, 286, 294, 295, 340, 349, 355, 359 Assyrians, 4 Awad, Mubarak, 26, 68, 81, 423

B Ba‘ath Party, 271, 274 Balance of power, 148, 172, 196, 208, 223, 260, 282 Bangura, Abdul Karim, 35, 121 Barth, Fredrik, 209, 210 Barzani, Masrur, 31, 77 Basque, 190, 203, 213 Bateson, Gregory, 335, 373, 387 Beers, Charlotte, 31 Beirut, 11, 13, 53, 117, 268, 272, 280, 284 Belgium, 203, 210, 252 Belief system(s), 165, 253, 254, 260, 302, 308, 336, 358, 384, 395 Berbers, 293 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 374

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. C. Funk and M. Sharify-Funk (eds.), Abdul Aziz Said: A Pioneer in Peace, Intercultural Dialogue, and Cooperative Global Politics, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice 26, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13905-5

475

476 Boulding, Elise, 26 Boulding, Kenneth, 148 Bradshaw, Mary Eloise, 14 Brazil, 19, 26, 193, 200, 252 Burke, Edmund, 194, 223, 224

C Cairo, 11, 12, 53, 268 Calvinism, 305, 357 Canada, 200, 204, 206, 455 Capitalist so¬cieties/systems, 225, 234, 242 Carstarphen, Nike, 27, 425 Carter, Jimmy, 22, 25, 65, 117, 230, 409 Cavafy, Constantine, 33 Center for Global Peace, 29, 72, 75, 324, 432, 433, 458 Change, social, 39, 63, 67, 106, 110, 111, 114, 116, 120, 154, 155, 188, 190, 260, 284, 294, 312, 362, 399, 400 China, Chinese, 172, 181, 182, 184, 188, 190, 192, 195, 204, 213, 228, 241, 249, 372, 406 Christendom, 132 Christian, 4–6, 11, 24–26, 30, 34, 48, 49, 122, 132, 136, 176, 179, 203, 269, 271, 280, 281, 291, 294, 296, 304, 321, 336, 341, 346, 348, 350, 351, 353, 431 Christian Arabs, 270 Christianity, 30, 177, 269, 280, 286, 312, 338, 350, 353, 411 Church, the, 179, 194, 212, 248 Civil and political rights, 110, 221, 230, 233, 240, 241, 244, 315, 365 Civil society, 29, 244, 246, 307, 364 Civil war, 9, 117, 207, 210, 213, 252, 297, 417, 445 Class (social), 211, 301, 322 Coexistence, 145, 203, 208, 260, 291, 313, 319, 326, 361, 366, 392, 393, 396, 401–403 Cold War, 14, 28, 29, 36, 68, 107–111, 114, 115, 144, 154, 182, 185, 191, 195, 240, 242, 244, 245, 252, 254, 321, 347, 348 Colonialism, 7, 19, 52, 153, 157, 159, 198, 292, 313, 351, 357 Communalism, 120, 211, 260, 284, 291, 293 Communication, 5, 17, 21, 27, 28, 32, 34, 37, 57, 113, 114, 146, 148, 152, 159,

Index 162, 174, 191, 202, 204, 208–210, 215, 228, 234–236, 238, 239, 244, 268, 280, 290, 294, 312, 326, 360, 384–387, 393, 396, 397, 405, 408, 423, 432, 433 Communism, 14, 55, 108, 143, 150, 160, 172, 175, 177, 182, 225, 226, 229, 348 Comte, Auguste, 323, 324 Conflict, 3, 8, 11, 23, 27–29, 33, 34, 105, 113, 116–118, 121, 126, 127, 133, 135, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 158, 183, 188, 193, 195, 196, 198, 203, 205–210, 212, 216, 229, 231, 240, 244, 250, 262, 263, 278, 282, 292, 294–298, 301, 304, 308, 309, 313, 315, 318–320, 324, 337, 340, 344–349, 352–354, 356, 357, 359–362, 364, 374, 379, 381, 383–387, 391, 393, 395, 396, 398, 401, 404, 405, 409–418, 423–425, 427, 428, 437, 440, 442, 444, 445, 447, 449, 455, 457, 460–462 Conflict resolution, 9, 22, 26, 28–31, 40, 41, 72, 114, 119, 121, 262, 264, 309, 312, 313, 315, 318, 319, 324–326, 381, 383–387, 410, 414, 415, 418, 426, 428–432, 435, 438, 440, 443, 444, 447, 450, 454, 455, 457 Consensus, 38, 107, 115, 127, 132–136, 142, 158, 185, 188, 191, 206, 224, 251, 256, 257, 260, 307, 374, 429 Consumerism, 199, 241, 318, 337 Consumption, consumption ethic, 179, 187, 217, 234, 251, 255, 285 Containment, 172, 196, 308 Cooperation, 27, 35, 38, 39, 106, 107, 113, 126, 148, 154, 155, 193, 208, 209, 235, 250, 257–259, 294, 304, 320, 344, 349, 353, 359, 361, 375, 384, 392, 394, 396, 412 Cooperative global politics, 4, 28, 36, 38, 104, 115, 122, 251 Coptic, 294 Corporatist (system), 228 Cotton, Tom, 27 Counterrevolution, 190, 229 Coup(s) d’état, 272, 273, 275, 276 Creative imagination, 6, 39, 335, 376, 377 Croatia, 203 Crow, Karim, 30, 333 Cultural community, 235, 239, 264, 291, 327, 337, 398

Index Cultural creativity, 235, 236, 239 Cultural diversity, 30, 37, 75, 119, 122, 331, 336, 341, 342, 361, 392, 393, 401, 452, 453 Cultural empathy, 37 Cultural imperialism, 114, 196, 291 Cultural triumphalism, 38, 303, 304, 308 Culture as a resource, 393 D Damascus, 6, 7, 11, 22, 51, 267, 268, 270, 272, 334, 456 Decision-maker, 147, 208 Decision-making, 107, 113, 133, 148–150, 152, 193, 197, 198, 210, 292, 315, 363, 364, 429, 458 Decolonization, 14, 59, 103, 110, 112, 252 Democracy, 31, 38, 107, 114, 115, 127, 150, 157, 159, 160, 162, 171, 226, 240–246, 248, 249, 251, 275, 303, 305, 306, 322, 340, 342, 349, 352, 357, 358, 361, 362, 364, 365, 411 Detente, 228 Deutsch, Karl W., 62, 109, 149, 151, 155 Development, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, 35, 37–39, 41, 65, 68, 104–106, 109, 110, 112, 114–118, 120–122, 130, 132, 136, 139, 143, 147, 154–157, 159–161, 166, 167, 186–189, 192, 194, 199–203, 206, 208, 211, 212, 216, 217, 222, 227–231, 233–236, 238, 240, 245–248, 255, 257, 259, 264, 274, 282, 283, 285–289, 291, 294, 300, 301, 306, 307, 313, 315, 316, 324, 332, 337, 340, 345, 354, 355, 360, 362, 365, 372, 393, 394, 398, 400, 402, 437, 439, 447, 451, 458 Dialogue, 26, 27, 30, 35, 37, 38, 69, 114, 119, 120, 247, 249, 262, 263, 279, 308, 313, 323, 324, 339, 348, 352, 354, 359, 360, 366, 384–387, 390, 391, 395–397, 399, 404, 405, 423, 429, 436, 442, 454–456 Dignity, see human dignity Diplomacy, 20, 31, 34, 40, 113, 115, 117, 138, 141, 214, 247, 260, 261, 308, 453, 455 Diversity, 18, 24, 37, 47, 106, 155, 189, 203, 221, 247, 251, 260, 264, 272, 291, 312, 325, 327, 330, 336, 341, 351, 375, 390–392, 394, 398, 400, 406, 429, 431, 438, 441, 456

477 Domestic politics, 128, 129, 232 Drugs, 20, 111, 113, 191, 214

E East/Eastern, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21–23, 26, 30, 32, 85, 116, 118, 157, 163, 188, 199, 204, 226, 254, 274, 280, 285, 287, 288, 292, 296, 297, 304, 307, 327, 346, 347, 351, 353, 388, 390, 391, 401, 408, 411, 424, 431, 453, 454, 456 Ecological balance, 38, 260, 291, 313, 315, 336, 393, 429 Ecological crisis, 185 Economic, social, and cultural rights, 221, 230, 240, 244 Ego involvement, 120, 374 Egypt, 12, 25, 26, 32, 34, 50, 66, 117, 119, 210, 268–270, 273–275, 287, 288, 294, 296, 298, 339, 379, 455–457 Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 14, 430, 431 Electronic revolution, 243 Elliott, William Yandell, 224 Ellul, Jacques, 212 Empathy as a tool of analysis, 386 Enlightenment, 145, 146, 180, 241, 288, 350, 355 Era of rights, 240, 241 Ethics, 28, 131, 136, 154, 207, 235, 253, 258, 259, 269, 328, 334, 343, 398, 401 Ethiopia, 14, 55, 252, 300 Ethnic conflict, 21, 203, 205–214, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300 Ethnic disassociation, 202, 208 Ethnic identity/identities, 113, 206, 209, 253, 295 Ethnicity/ethnic, 5, 21, 31, 36, 111, 113, 114, 118, 193, 202–211, 215, 216, 252, 286, 292–299, 301, 329, 350, 351, 438, 444 Ethnonationalism/ethnonationalist, 113 Europe, 16, 26, 127, 132, 149, 158, 166, 172, 174, 195, 199, 206, 212, 215, 223, 226, 240–243, 245, 248, 252, 254, 280, 282, 286, 292, 297, 341, 347, 351, 353 Exceptionalism and Islam, 119, 321 local exceptionalisms, 265

478 F Fairness, 115, 237, 258, 259, 385 Faith, 11, 111, 112, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 207, 211, 212, 269, 284, 287, 290, 305, 311, 312, 316, 318, 322, 327–330, 333, 335, 336, 339, 343, 359, 361, 390, 399–401, 406, 434, 454 Falasifah(philosophers), 314 Farsi, Hani, 29, 74, 431 Farsi, Mohamed Said, 29, 74, 119, 431, 432, 458 Fatah, 269, 277 Fathy, Hassan, 34, 264 Fear, 9, 18, 34, 161, 172–174, 182, 197, 203, 226, 249, 278, 280, 299, 305, 316, 330, 336, 345, 351, 352, 354, 360–362, 390, 395–397, 405, 407, 411, 412 Fertile Crescent, 4, 271, 296, 340 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 223 Fisher, Ronald J., 28, 319 Fitrah (human constitution), 317, 332 Foreign policy, 14–16, 26, 65, 106, 107, 112, 114, 118, 127–130, 132, 134, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 154, 163, 171, 172, 181, 183, 184, 189, 191, 193–196, 200, 213, 214, 217, 222, 230, 232, 233, 299, 303, 320, 347, 360, 364, 440 Forgiveness, 318, 319, 331, 402 France, 19, 172, 187, 192, 213, 223, 249, 252, 299 Freedom, 22, 24, 115, 121, 129, 131, 137, 143, 164, 168, 172, 178, 181, 203, 221, 223–226, 233–238, 244, 246, 249, 256, 261, 276, 289, 290, 298, 300, 317, 327, 330, 334, 335, 352, 361, 375, 388, 391, 398, 405 French, 6–9, 12, 19, 46, 51, 53, 117, 180, 195, 203, 204, 213, 241, 249, 267 French Mandate, 3–5, 36, 48, 51, 52, 109, 116 French Revolution, 132, 180, 194, 223, 226, 244, 245, 249 Fundamentalism, 253, 281, 288, 289, 304, 305, 307, 309, 350, 355–359, 384, 406 Funk, Nathan, 3, 30, 72, 87, 103, 115, 118, 119, 121, 423, 441, 445 G Geertz, Clifford, 211, 294

Index Geopolitics, 112, 118, 192, 195, 196, 198, 202, 216, 355 Germany, 7, 20, 187, 198–200, 252, 392 Ghareeb, Edmund, 77 Gibran, Kahlil, 13, 453 Global citizens, 393, 394, 401, 425, 428 Global civilization, 115, 122, 254, 283, 372, 441 Globalization, 28, 37, 103, 254, 306, 362, 388, 392, 394 Global South, 104, 240, 245, 250, 251, 253–255 God, 21, 136, 141, 172, 286, 287, 289, 290, 312, 314, 317, 318, 327–338, 341, 351, 372, 375, 399, 404, 412, 435, 436, 443, 446, 454, 456 Goodman, Louis, 334, 428, 461 Gordon, Milton, 210, 211 Government, 17, 19, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 59, 80, 105, 126–131, 133, 135, 138, 140, 143, 151, 158, 160, 173, 180, 190, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 213–215, 222, 225–227, 236, 243, 298–301, 305, 308, 338, 349, 356, 409, 424, 433, 443, 446 Great powers, 173, 174, 197 Greek(s), 224, 316, 416 association/organization (fraternities), 18, 82 thought, philosophers, learning, 332, 340, 353 Greeley, Andrew, 208, 211, 215 Gregorian, Hrach, 360 Griffith, Ernest Stacey, 14, 15, 58, 430, 431 Gross National Product (GNP), 115, 156, 187, 189, 198–200, 217, 232, 255, 301 Gulf War (1991), 118, 297–300, 348 H Hadi, Shaykh Daham al-, 6 Hardy, G. H., 377 Harman, Willis, 27, 255 Hasakah, al-, 6 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 223, 224 Hegemony, 30, 245, 256, 289, 291, 304, 313, 348, 349, 362, 406, 407 Henderson, Loy W., 15 Hibri, Fuad El-, 34, 35, 40, 81, 434 Hobbes, Thomas, 180, 212, 223, 316 Human dignity, 21, 25, 35, 36, 104, 106, 114, 116, 221, 225, 226, 233, 260, 265, 286, 307, 308, 311–313, 320,

Index 326, 327, 330, 337, 353, 361, 363, 365, 385, 386, 390–393, 438 Humanism/humanist, 25, 225, 226, 228, 235, 236, 239, 245, 261, 279, 283, 286, 288, 289, 292 Human rights, 21, 23, 25, 26, 37, 65, 68, 114, 115, 205, 213, 221, 222, 224, 226–232, 240, 242, 245–247, 250, 251, 260, 292, 295, 299, 300, 307, 315, 355, 403, 429, 437, 442, 456, 458, 462 Huntington, Samuel, 29, 304, 320, 321, 348, 431, 454 Hussein, Saddam, 116, 360 I Ibn al-‘Arabi (or Ibn ‘Arabi), 6, 11, 314, 337, 378, 419, 438, 454 Ibn Khaldun, 23, 73, 314, 353 Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, 23, 73 Identity, 21, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, 52, 105, 110, 113–115, 129, 145, 150, 160, 161, 167, 178, 194, 197, 200, 206, 211, 215, 221, 223, 224, 260, 263, 268, 272, 293, 294, 308, 319, 324, 337, 343–346, 349, 350, 356–358, 362, 372, 384, 393–396, 400, 401, 406, 438, 440, 441, 454 Ideology/ideologies, 29, 30, 109, 111, 112, 117, 128, 132, 135, 149, 150, 168, 172, 178–182, 187, 191, 194, 195, 197, 210, 215, 216, 224, 240, 252, 259, 273, 274, 276, 289, 297, 303, 336, 348, 355, 399, 406 Imperial powers, imperialism, 14, 55, 150, 151, 156, 175, 186, 187, 194, 195, 245, 281, 283, 286, 313, 442 India, 19, 70, 144, 195, 199, 204, 208, 211, 356, 458 Individualism, 180, 181, 235, 319, 352, 361, 386 Industrial Revolution, 127, 146, 199, 223, 227, 240–243, 253, 357 In-group (and out-group), 259, 345, 349, 358 Intercultural dialogue, 4, 36, 37, 104, 106, 120–122, 265, 366, 392, 429 Interdependence, 139, 145, 149, 167, 168, 201, 207, 209, 215, 250, 256, 260, 283, 300, 333, 392, 394, 407, 413 International law, 13, 14, 108, 136–139, 181, 222, 307, 365

479 International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, 435, 458 International politics, 16, 28, 38, 58, 63, 67, 106–109, 111, 112, 120, 125, 127–132, 134, 135, 137–144, 153, 159, 164, 174, 176, 189, 192, 194, 196, 206–208, 217, 440, 460 International Relations (IR) – (discipline), 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 28, 35–37, 61, 62, 72, 87, 96, 103, 105, 106, 108–110, 112, 113, 116, 122, 125, 127, 140, 147–153, 158, 164, 173, 191, 192, 194–200, 202, 205–208, 253, 292, 315, 321, 324, 373, 382, 393, 398, 406, 407, 409, 429, 430, 439, 440, 442, 444, 452, 458, 461 International relations (relations among states), 136 International Studies Association (ISA), 35, 40, 62, 84, 105 International system, 14, 20, 110, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 147, 149, 160, 162–165, 167–169, 172–175, 181, 182, 184, 188, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201, 205, 206, 245, 292, 300, 349, 406, 462 Investment, 116, 142, 184, 187, 192, 197–201, 255 Iran/Iranian, 15, 25, 117, 280, 281, 287, 293, 295–300, 305, 307, 308, 349, 461 Iranian Revolution, 65, 117, 321, 324, 347, 349 Iraq, 30, 31, 34, 40, 78, 206, 213, 268, 270, 271, 273, 274, 280, 287, 293, 295–300, 308, 349, 362, 438, 461 Irish, Marian, 14, 416 Ishak, Bassam Said, 49, 50 Ishaq, Said, 4–7, 10, 48–50 Islam, 23, 25, 30, 32, 74, 75, 103, 106, 107, 117, 119, 120, 177, 268–270, 277, 279, 280, 283–291, 296, 303, 305–308, 311–314, 316–318, 320–353, 356, 357, 359–366, 398, 409, 411, 431, 433, 451, 453, 454, 457 Islam, and peace, 23, 30, 74, 119, 312, 313, 322, 324, 325, 431 Islamic revivalism/revival, revivalists, 23, 29, 117, 118, 279, 283, 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, 322–324, 341, 355–357, 364

480 Israel, 68, 116, 268, 273, 280, 295, 297, 298, 302–304, 307, 309, 356, 379, 408, 409, 418 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 295, 302, 303, 307, 308, 455 Ithaka (poem), 33

J Japan, 187, 188, 192, 198–200, 244, 245, 252, 253, 305, 356 Jazira (region in Syria), 4–6, 24, 47, 49, 77 Jew/Jewish, 5, 11, 18, 66, 82, 122, 191, 203, 205, 271, 279, 280, 304, 321, 339–341, 346, 351, 424, 431, 432, 436, 438, 449, 453 Jihad (striving), 317, 330 Jordan, 26, 116, 268, 271–273, 278, 287, 296, 297, 451, 452 Judeo-Christian, 131, 133, 222, 231, 282, 285, 289, 340 Justice, 26, 63, 111, 116, 119, 120, 129, 137, 139, 176, 234, 242, 247–249, 260, 261, 276, 305, 314, 316, 317, 326, 327, 331, 332, 365, 374, 393, 402, 404, 414, 419, 429, 436

K Kadayifici, Ayse, xvi Kant, Immanuel, 149, 223, 224, 315 Kariel, Henry, 151, 224 Kaufmann, Sister Adrienne, 27, 69, 425 Kelly, Petra, 25, 63 Kenya, 204 Khacho, Shamsa, 5, 47 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 117, 281, 286, 288 King Hussein bin Talal, 278 King Jr, Martin Luther, 17, 248, 250, 373, 412 Kunkle, Lynn, 436 Kurdish studies, 29, 31, 77 Kurds/Kurdish, 5, 6, 31, 49, 77, 211, 293, 295–300

L Leadership, 3, 7, 10, 26, 34, 104, 114, 115, 132, 144, 166, 167, 189, 225, 232, 242, 259, 270, 273–275, 284, 291, 294, 298, 303, 308, 316, 352, 362, 417, 429, 433, 437, 438, 451, 454, 456 League of Nations, 14, 135, 181

Index Lebanon, 7, 12, 25, 65, 117, 208, 268–273, 278, 280, 293, 295–298, 301, 302, 305, 307, 309, 450, 451 Lederach, John Paul, 105, 263, 319, 385 Lerche III, Charles O., 17, 28, 58, 115 Lerche, Jr., Charles O., 15, 21, 58, 104, 107, 439 Less Developed Countries (LDCs), 196–198, 201, 228, 229, 231, 232 Liberalism, 146, 151, 229, 235, 290, 312 Library of Alexandria, 32, 119, 339, 456, 457 Libya, 59, 268, 287, 297, 456 Lichtheim, George, 194, 195 Lindsay, A. D., 148, 241, 246, 248, 249 Local, 5, 7, 15, 36, 114, 116, 157, 160, 190, 204, 216, 262–264, 293, 297, 306, 307, 365, 400, 426, 441, 456 Localizing/localization, 37, 264, 392, 394 Localizing peace, 34, 115, 263 Locke, John, 180, 223, 316 Love, 9, 24, 312, 318, 330, 331, 334–337, 394, 407, 409, 412–415, 418, 428, 435, 436, 439, 445, 449, 453–457

M Malraux, André, 372 Mardin (city), 4 Mardin, Serif, ¸ 23, 73 Marxism/Marxist(s), 225, 226, 288 Marx, Karl, 151, 224, 225, 322, 323 Matson, Floyd, 211 Mazrui, Ali, 204 McCarthy, Colman, 442 McCarthy, Senator Joseph, 14, 17, 55 Means and ends, 150, 337, 386 Mesopotamia, 4, 186 Messianism, 195, 197, 269, 291 Method/methodology, 19, 21, 109, 111, 121, 132, 138, 142, 143, 145, 149, 152, 153, 155–158, 161, 174, 177, 194, 196, 202, 210, 226, 260, 263, 276, 326, 375, 376, 378–381, 385, 411, 424, 442, 443 Middle class, 241, 243, 244, 249, 275 Middle East, 18, 19, 22, 23, 30, 34, 35, 66, 68, 103, 106, 115–118, 184, 197, 253, 278, 285, 288, 289, 292, 294–297, 300–305, 308, 322, 346–348, 351, 352, 354, 355, 357, 362, 365, 424, 433, 443, 451, 452, 454–457, 461

Index Military conflict, 198, 206, 229 power, 142, 196, 198, 242, 256, 299, 300 spending, 199, 307 Millennialism, 194, 195 Modern democratic state, 240–243, 249 Modernization, 110, 115, 118, 153–157, 159–162, 166–168, 186, 187, 204, 211, 212, 215, 227, 228, 231, 234, 255, 271, 275, 294, 295, 301, 303, 305, 321, 322, 324, 337, 340, 357 Mohamed Said Farsi Chair of Islamic Peace, 75 Morality, 58, 107, 108, 131–136, 149, 183, 232, 257–259, 347, 357, 407 Morgenthau, Hans, 16, 62, 109, 148, 149 Morocco, 24, 268, 287, 293, 297, 298 Mualim (teacher), 35, 121 Mughisuddin, Mohammed, 444 Muhaiyaddeen, M. R. Bawa, xvi Muhammad, Prophet, 269, 278, 290, 329 Multiculturalism, 247, 248 Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 20, 21, 35, 111, 113, 192, 194, 199–201, 213, 229 Mulunda-Nyanga, Rev. Daniel Ngoy, 445 Muslim, 5, 11, 24, 29–31, 49, 75, 117, 118, 120, 279–286, 288, 290, 291, 295, 356–365, 431, 438, 453, 456 Mutakalimun (theologians), 314 Mutasawwifa (Sufis), 314 Myth, 111, 180, 183, 270, 275, 289, 427

N Narcotics, 214 Narratives conflict-saturated, 344 of compatibility, 120, 353–355, 357, 359, 360 of complementarit, 120 of confrontation, 263, 340, 353, 355, 360 of defined, 344 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 22, 146, 268, 273 Nation, 127, 129, 132, 144, 159, 172, 184, 191, 194, 197, 201–203, 205–207, 210, 211, 213, 223, 224, 238, 244, 246–249, 254, 257, 258, 274–276, 293, 300, 315, 321, 398, 404, 406, 407

481 National interest, 111, 113, 114, 129, 130, 133, 174, 175, 196, 207, 230, 232, 260, 261, 282, 308, 402, 417 Nationalism, 110, 115, 127, 132, 134, 135, 141, 143, 145, 149, 150, 155, 159, 165–167, 177, 180, 181, 190, 194–196, 204, 206, 213, 215, 240, 251, 252, 269, 271, 282, 297, 354, 356, 358 National sovereignty, 300, 301 Nation-state, 112, 113, 143, 159, 161, 186, 190–197, 199–202, 206–208, 212, 214–217, 226–228, 247, 261, 282, 285, 286, 292, 293, 296, 301, 315, 402 Natural law, 136, 137, 231, 398 Neo-corporatism, 242, 243, 245 Neoethnic, 113, 205, 214–216 Neo-liberalism, 242, 243, 245 Neo-Marxists/neo-Marxism, 225, 226 Neutralism, 110, 145, 167 Nineteenth century, 134, 166, 194, 196, 199, 207, 215, 223, 224, 241, 270, 287, 288 Nisbet, Robert, 212, 216, 217 Nixon, Richard, 191, 196, 214 Nominalism, 222, 223 Non-alignment, 145, 167 Non-Western/non-West, 37, 105, 108–112, 144, 145, 153–161, 163–165, 168, 180, 181, 250, 262, 289, 303, 313, 316, 319, 351, 355, 358 Nonviolence, 9, 26, 28, 30, 68, 260, 318, 324, 326, 327, 331, 347, 412, 419, 423, 424, 438, 442, 451, 457, 461 Nonviolence International, 26, 34, 41, 68, 324, 423 North Africa, 19, 116, 118, 274, 292, 298, 347, 454 Northern Ireland, 210 Nuclear, 27, 36, 104, 107, 108, 111, 133, 140, 143, 144, 172, 173, 186, 197, 198, 201, 202, 205, 208, 217, 251 Nuclear war, 141 Nuclear weaponry, 197 Nyanga, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, 72, 445

O Organicism, 222–224 Other,” the Islam as “other” to the West, 306, 350 West as “other” to Muslims, The, 338

482 and self, 346, 357, 359, 404 Ottoman Empire, 4, 270 P Pakistan, 204, 205, 208, 210, 212, 281 Palestine, 68, 270–273, 275, 276, 305, 362, 423, 424 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 297 Palestinians, 23, 26, 29, 68, 118, 191, 272, 273, 276–279, 294, 296–298, 302, 309, 348, 355, 408, 423, 436, 455, 461 Pan-Arabism, 269–271 Peace as absence (of war or violence), 115, 261, 313, 315, 325, 326, 330, 402, 403 as presence, 36, 393 in Islam, 317, 330, 331, 451, 454 inner peace, 408, 410–414, 434, 457 in Western understandings, 314 limited conceptions of, 403 total peace, 34, 36, 122, 392–395, 398–400, 402–404 Peace and conflict resolution studies, 312, 313, 425, 427, 435, 439, 440 Peace studies, 26, 29, 30, 35, 36, 40, 69, 84, 105, 119, 312, 322, 417, 424, 426, 427, 429–432, 434, 441, 443, 444, 450, 458, 461 Pedagogy, 383–387 People of the Book, 317, 331, 351 Phi Epsilon Pi, 18, 40, 82, 449 Plato, 315, 353, 386, 399 Platonists, 222 Pluralism, 4, 21, 31, 36, 75, 133, 174, 224, 235, 236, 260, 291, 295, 297, 308, 313, 318, 324, 328, 329, 331, 341, 361, 363, 392, 393, 398, 401, 454 Policy, 17, 20–23, 29, 31, 105, 107, 109, 111, 114, 117–119, 122, 127–131, 133, 134, 136, 142, 149, 167, 171–176, 183–185, 188–192, 196, 199, 208, 231, 232, 254–257, 270, 274, 284, 299–301, 307, 308, 315, 342, 348, 349, 354, 355, 359, 362, 438, 444, 458 Policy-maker/-making, 128–130, 133, 136, 138, 155, 183, 197, 321, 340 Political development, 20, 110, 112, 116, 145, 155–158, 161, 271, 294, 398 Political scientists, 14, 29, 35, 110, 113, 122, 153–158, 173, 177, 183–185,

Index 187, 202, 205, 206, 212, 267, 338, 348 Politics (definition…; ascriptive…), 126, 222, 251 Positivism, positivist science, 19, 35, 121, 207, 217, 372, 375, 378–381 Post-Cold War, 28–30, 36, 103, 115, 240, 242, 245 Postmodernism, 113 Post-positivists/post-positivism, 103, 378 Potter, Pitman Benjamin, 14, 22, 55, 149 Poverty, 19, 172, 179, 227, 229, 232, 241, 247, 249, 253, 303, 307, 394, 395 Power power, military, 142, 196, 198, 242, 256, 299, 300 Power imbalances, 109, 118, 385, 418 Power politics, 16, 27, 28, 63, 107, 119, 196, 198, 204, 283, 312, 314, 315, 325, 326, 362, 403, 405, 425 Praxeological styles, 304, 312, 325 Private goods, 257, 315 Public diplomacy, 19, 23, 59, 70, 105, 117 Public goods, 38, 115, 120, 122, 126, 151, 257, 258, 315, 400, 456 Q Qadhafi, 117, 286 Qaeda, al-, 30 Qal‘at Mar‘a, 4 Qualitative research, 379, 380 Quantitative research, 379, 381 Quebec, 190, 204 Qur’an, 5, 290, 312, 314, 316–318, 327–334, 336, 341, 343, 454 R Rabin, Yit¬zhak, 116, 279 Race, racism (including Black, White), 20, 151, 187, 235, 241, 243, 245, 291 Rationalism, 211, 212, 269, 270, 291, 315 Realpolitik, 16, 109, 315, 426, 440 Reconciliation, 29, 130, 132, 145, 228, 263, 277, 293, 307, 309, 313, 319, 324, 326, 328, 337, 361, 364, 366, 383, 385, 387, 392, 403, 416, 417, 445, 455, 456 Red Scare, 14, 17, 55 Religion, 10, 11, 24, 34, 40, 113, 120, 186, 210–212, 252, 255, 280, 285, 289, 293, 304, 306, 308, 311, 313, 317, 318, 321, 323–325, 329, 331, 336,

Index 339, 350, 352, 354, 358, 364, 365, 372, 373, 387, 399, 404, 407, 409, 411, 431, 449, 450, 454, 458 Renaissance, 146, 202, 225, 286, 340, 353 Revivalism, Islamic, 23, 29, 117, 118, 305, 307, 309, 322, 324, 341, 356, 357 Revolutionism, 20, 111, 177–183, 185, 433 Revolution, revolutionary movements, 20, 22, 37, 63, 65, 103, 109–112, 116, 121, 139, 154, 159, 175–187, 190, 191, 208, 223, 226, 235, 240–242, 244, 245, 267–269, 274–277, 366, 392 Rights and duties, 137, 138, 222, 224, 231 Rihani, Ameen F., 6, 13, 30, 31, 388–392 Rihani, May, 448 Robinson, Edgar, 14, 407 Rogers, Carl, 26, 417, 423, 424, 429 Roman Empire, 254, 411 Rosenberg, Keith, 82, 449 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 149, 223, 224 Rumi, Jalal ad-Din, 6, 24, 373, 401, 418, 419 Russia, 181, 187, 197, 226, 244, 251, 252, 277 Russian Revolution, 180, 389

S Sadat, 117, 286, 379, 380 Safa, Oussama, 450 Said, Abdul Aziz, 3–5, 7, 10–12, 23, 33, 35, 38–40, 45–48, 51–76, 78–85, 103, 106, 108, 109, 115, 119, 121, 122, 279, 423, 425, 428, 430–432, 435, 436, 439, 442, 444, 448, 451, 452, 457, 459, 461 Said, Jawdat, xvi Satha-Anand, Chaiwat, 75, 319, 451 Saudi Arabia, 12, 74, 76, 268, 287, 296, 297, 305, 431 Schmoller, Gustav, 195 School of International Service (SIS), 14–17, 21, 23, 24, 26–29, 32, 34, 40, 58, 62, 69, 72–74, 77, 79, 107, 114, 116, 121, 424–432, 434, 436, 439, 443, 445, 447–452, 455, 458, 459 Search for Common Ground, 29, 34, 41, 68, 425, 435 Secession, 202, 206, 207, 210, 213, 295, 446 Second World War, 8, 153 Sectarianism, 292, 293, 295, 296, 298

483 Secularism/secular, 122, 159, 177, 269–271, 277, 286, 289, 296–298, 303, 305, 306, 313, 320, 322, 323, 349, 352, 356, 365, 389, 406 Security, 20, 29, 30, 38, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, 105, 110, 111, 113, 128, 146, 160, 171, 173–176, 182, 184, 192, 194–198, 201, 202, 216, 217, 228, 230, 232, 233, 235–237, 244, 246, 249, 256, 259, 262, 264, 284, 290, 295, 297–302, 304, 311, 315, 317, 321, 342, 348, 351, 352, 358, 361–365, 393, 403–407, 417, 429, 448 Self-determination, 37, 104, 205, 212, 213, 270, 272, 293, 295, 296, 300, 318 September 11 (9/11), 30 Shah, 117, 281, 286 Shaker, Sallama, 452, 453 Shammar tribe, 5, 6, 31, 78 Shariah (Islamic Laws), 281, 286, 287, 298, 316, 317, 326 Sharify-Funk, Meena, 30 Sharp, Samuel L., 14, 17, 55 Shiites, 293, 295–299, 301 Shishakli, Colonel Adib, 10, 49 Simmons, Luiz (Lou), 20, 21, 80, 112, 113, 192, 194, 202, 205 Sitka, Betty, 29, 31, 72, 388, 447 Socialism, 225, 226, 242, 252, 260, 268, 274, 283, 287, 358 Socialist revolutions, 241 Social justice, 25, 221, 258, 261, 281, 284, 286, 290, 296, 306, 318, 326, 331, 335, 336, 356, 363, 365, 391–393, 443, 450, 461 Social values (in politics), 20, 58, 107, 126–129, 133, 286, 363, 373, 453, 454 Solidarity, 38, 74, 108, 160, 232, 236, 239, 245, 259, 261, 265, 289–291, 312, 317, 318, 327, 328, 349, 351, 359, 373, 407, 437, 438 Somalia, 59, 293 Sophists, 223 Sovereignty, 131, 137–139, 143, 148, 149, 160, 202, 207, 212, 214, 224, 252, 260, 293, 296, 299, 300 Soviet Union, 27, 103, 111, 162, 165, 172, 187, 196, 197, 199, 204, 225, 246, 252, 293, 294 Spain, 20, 199, 200, 203, 213, 252, 340, 350, 351, 425, 453

484 Spirituality and conflict resolution, 387 and education, 398 and pedagogy, 121, 383, 387 and religion, 389 definition, 372 spiritual values, 115, 120, 254, 313, 337, 372, 374, 383, 392 Srimati Karuna, 457 Stability, 104, 112, 143, 151, 156, 161, 162, 171, 174, 175, 182–184, 187, 197, 228, 240, 252, 254, 257, 262, 284, 290, 293, 299, 301–303, 306, 315, 319, 320, 326, 330, 335, 365, 381, 407, 454 State Department, 15, 19, 22, 31, 32, 34, 59, 60, 70, 438 Structural violence, 261, 397, 401, 414 Subculture, 20, 111, 112, 116, 184, 185, 187–192, 205, 206, 213, 215, 216, 250, 272, 289 Sudan, 59, 205, 213, 268, 287, 293, 295, 297, 298, 300, 455 Sufi/Sufism, 7, 24, 66, 67, 119, 120, 122, 306, 322, 327–330, 332–337, 374, 398, 409, 413, 431, 433–435, 440, 452–454, 456 Sunnah, 290, 314, 317 Sunni (Arabs, Muslims), 5, 6, 288, 295–297, 299 Superpowers, 27, 111, 228, 229, 245, 256, 300, 354 Supranationalism, 202, 206 Suqiyat, 4 Syria, 4–6, 8–13, 22, 24–26, 34, 49–53, 56, 78, 103, 109, 116, 122, 267–269, 271–275, 287, 293, 296–298, 300, 306, 349, 408, 418, 423, 424, 431, 433, 456, 458 Syriac/Syriac Orthodox, 4, 5 Syrian civil war (2011-), 9, 34 Syrian Parliament, 5 Syrian Republic, 10, 49

T Tasawwuf (Sufism), 322, 327, 328, 336, 337 Tawhid (unity), 337 Techniculture, 186, 187 Technology, 6, 27, 34, 52, 107, 108, 135, 136, 139, 174, 179, 186, 200, 202, 204, 208, 213, 216, 228, 229, 233,

Index 234, 242, 243, 249–251, 253, 254, 260, 264, 282, 283, 285, 323, 331, 337, 355, 382, 393, 433 Terrorism, terrorist, 30, 117, 198, 203, 213, 252, 279, 282, 284, 297, 298, 302, 305, 307, 313, 320, 338, 341, 346, 350, 352, 356, 360 Theory/theories, 19–21, 28, 36, 62, 109, 112, 121, 130, 136–138, 140, 147–164, 173, 185, 189, 192, 194, 199, 201–203, 206, 211, 212, 215, 216, 222, 228, 241–246, 248, 261, 303, 312–314, 318, 321, 324, 342, 353, 364, 375, 376, 380, 381, 383, 385, 386, 407, 429, 433, 436, 454, 458 Third World, 21, 111, 114, 184, 191, 198, 201, 222, 226–229, 231–233, 289, 292 Track-two diplomacy, 26, 27, 29, 70 Tradition/traditional, 7, 17, 24, 26, 28, 34–37, 51, 52, 58, 63, 66, 67, 74, 108, 110–117, 119, 120, 132, 133, 136, 139, 141–143, 145, 148–150, 152–154, 157–160, 162–164, 166, 172, 174, 178, 180, 185, 186, 188, 190, 198, 204, 208, 214, 215, 221, 222, 224–227, 229, 233, 235, 251, 259, 263, 264, 268, 275–277, 280, 282, 284–287, 289–292, 295, 296, 300, 301, 303, 304, 307, 308, 312, 313, 316–319, 322–328, 330–336, 338, 341–343, 347, 350, 351, 353, 358, 359, 361–365, 372–374, 382, 384, 392–394, 399, 400, 403, 404, 406, 447, 457 Transition, age of, 110, 184 Triumphalism, see cultural triumphalism Tunisia, 24, 268, 271, 274, 287, 296, 298, 456 Turkey, 4, 29, 214, 252, 253, 287, 293, 295, 296, 299, 300, 306, 454 Turner, Elena, 5, 11, 17, 31, 32, 34, 45, 71, 72, 117, 279 Twentieth century, 139, 151, 159, 179, 181, 195, 207, 212, 224, 230, 252, 269, 270, 295, 309, 323, 355, 389, 403 Twenty-first century, 3, 187, 198, 212, 215, 295, 312, 372, 373, 388 Tyson, Brady, 26, 28, 68, 114, 115, 228, 229, 240

Index U Uganda, 205, 206, 212, 213, 447, 455, 461 Ulama, 314 Ulam, Adam, 195 Underdevelopment/underdeveloped, 146, 153, 155, 156, 158, 163, 165, 227, 229, 280 United Arab Republic, 10, 50, 181 United Nations, 14, 71, 110, 135, 136, 142, 229, 230, 233, 244–246, 248, 249, 262, 284, 293, 300, 409, 424, 455 United States, 12, 27, 29, 74, 111, 112, 118, 134, 158, 162, 164, 166, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178, 181–184, 187–189, 191–193, 197–199, 206, 211, 214, 215, 228, 230, 232, 240–244, 246–249, 252, 253, 284, 294, 297, 299–302, 305–309, 316, 354, 356, 360, 362, 404, 406, 408, 424, 431, 436, 454 United States Information Agency (USIA), 19, 26 United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 26, 428, 432 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 221, 229, 233, 244, 246, 249, 250 Universalism/universalist, 37, 114, 119, 133, 281, 286, 291, 317, 328, 329, 331, 336, 457 University Senate, 18, 32, 39, 64 U.S.S.R., 154, 187, 188, 192, 228, 249 V Value-free analysis, 152, 173 Values, 16, 18, 27, 32, 35, 36, 38, 74, 104, 105, 107, 109–112, 114, 115, 118, 121, 126–130, 132, 134, 141, 145, 149–152, 154, 156–159, 162, 164, 165, 167, 173, 175, 176, 182–186, 188, 189, 208–210, 217, 222–225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 238, 239, 245, 247, 249–251, 253, 254, 260, 262–264, 274, 276, 279–281, 283, 285–288, 290, 292, 295, 299, 303, 306, 307, 309, 312, 313, 316, 318–320, 322, 326, 330, 333, 338–340, 342, 345–348, 352, 353, 356, 358, 359, 361–363, 365, 371–373, 375, 380, 383–386, 390–398, 404–406, 408, 429, 435, 442, 446, 454, 456, 462 Vance, Cyrus, 230

485 Vichy, 8, 9 Vietnam, 173, 181, 183, 193, 213, 419, 444 Vietnam war, 16, 171, 183, 216

W War nuclear war, 141 total war, 34, 36, 108, 122, 140, 141, 403 war on terror, 30 Washington, D.C., 3, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 29, 30, 53, 54, 57, 61, 63, 76, 105, 116, 118, 248, 300, 324, 355, 424, 427, 432, 436, 440, 443, 446, 449, 450, 452, 453, 455, 456, 460 Weaver, Richard M., 224 Weber, Max, 322, 323, 357 Weiss, Joshua N., 459 West, 6, 13, 19, 20, 30, 61, 63, 66, 85, 112, 116, 117, 120, 121, 144–146, 157–163, 165–168, 174, 179–181, 187, 188, 195, 203, 222, 224, 226, 231, 235, 250, 254, 255, 270, 279–288, 291, 303–306, 314, 320–323, 338, 340, 344–355, 357, 359–361, 366, 384, 388, 390, 392, 404, 408, 454, 456 Westernization/Westernizing, 110, 166–168, 270, 285, 289 Western liberalism, 228, 275, 288, 290, 315 Western (societies, cultures, values), 119, 133, 156, 180, 181, 222, 283, 313, 321, 340, 347, 352, 354, 355, 357, 361 Wien, Barbara, 461 World order, 21, 25, 28, 29, 36, 69, 104, 112, 114, 115, 119, 149, 221, 228, 232, 240, 243, 247, 251–253, 256, 259–262, 285, 289, 291, 292, 312, 314, 320, 325, 326, 398, 402, 403, 429, 430, 433 World War I, 4, 296 World War II, 5, 7, 8, 11, 16, 46, 140, 142, 153, 182, 208, 229, 234, 267, 270, 282, 296, 348

Y Yawer, Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-, 78 Yazidis, 5 Yugoslavia, 203, 226, 252, 293, 428