A World of Paper: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State 9780773592148

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A W o r l d of Paper

Torcy in the vestments of the Order of the Holy Spirit, with a portrait of his father, Croissy. Painting by Robert Le Vrac Tournières (1701), Musée de Versailles et de Trianon. Photograph by John C. Rule.

A World of Paper Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State

J o h n C . R u l e a n d B en S. Trotter

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2014 ISBN 978-0-7735-4370-6 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-7735-9214-8 (ePDF) ISBN 978-0-7735-9215-5 (ePUB) Legal deposit third quarter 2014 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Rule, John C., author   A world of paper : Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the rise of the information state / John C. Rule and Ben S. Trotter. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-0-7735-4370-6 (bound). – ISBN 978-0-7735-9214-8 (ePDF). – ISBN 978-0-7735-9215-5 (ePUB)   1. France – History – Louis XIV, 1643–1715. 2. Bureaucracy – France – History – 17th century. 3. Bureaucracy – France – History – 18th century. 4. Government information – France – Management – History – 17th century. 5. Government information – France – Management – History – 18th century. 6. Torcy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de, 1665–1746. 7. Louis XIV, King of France, 1638–1715. 8. France. Ministère des affaires étrangères – Management – History. 9. France. Ministère des affaires étrangères – Officials and employees – History. 10. France – Foreign relations administration – History. I. Trotter, Ben S., 1949–, author II. Title. DC126.R84 2014   944'.033   C2014-900879-1 C2014-900880-5 Typeset by Jay Tee Graphics Ltd. in 10.5/13 Sabon

Contents

Tables vii Figures ix Preface xiii Introduction 3 1  Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 14 2  Torcy’s Preparation for and Rise to Power  44 3 Mentorship and Testing 94 4  The Department of Secretary of State Torcy  138 5  The Department’s Structures and Personnel  170 6  The Triumph of the Commis 225 7  Finances and Rewards  282 8  Preserving, Deploying, and Controlling Information  320 9  Ambassadors in Paris and Abroad  354 10  Information and the Formulation of Foreign Policy  371 11 Domestic Administration 435 Conclusion 460 Abbreviations 473 Notes 475 Bibliography 717 Index 773

Tables

1.1

Patrimonial and bureaucratic systems  22

4.1

Report of sent items countersigned by Torcy, March–May 1710 167

5.1 Premiers commis and premiers secrétaires under Torcy, 1696–1715 176 5.2

French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, 1698–1715 184

5.3

Sampling of domestic correspondence sent out by gouvernement 208

6.1

Venal offices, honours, and other positions held by the department’s clerks  227

7.1

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1697  288

7.2

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1698  288

7.3

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1701  289

7.4

Payments for the official mourning for Louis XIV, 1715  290

7.5

Payments to Fremont, chargé des affaires at Venice, 1710–1718 293

7.6

Summary of payment orders issued by category, 1714  294

7.7

Pensions to Rome, 1715  297

viii Tables

7.8

Payments to department personnel drawn on post office funds (Ferme général des Postes), 1712–1715  306

7.9

Department personnel in 1715  311

7.10

Recipients of acquits patents, 1691–1714  312

7.11

Remuneration of the treasurers and controllers of ambassadors, 1709 and 1714  316

11.1

Archbishops and bishops supervised by Torcy, 1711  447

Figures

1.1

Organizational structures in organic and bureaucratic theory. Source: Adapted from figure 1.3 in Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 25.   29

2.1

Genealogical chart: the Colberts. Source: Adapted from Etienne Pattou, “Famille Colbert” (2010). http://racineshistoire. free.fr/LGN. 46

2.2

Torcy as a youth. Photograph by John C. Rule.  49

4.1

Map of the généralités supervised by Torcy and major postal routes 146

4.2

Royal dispatches sent out by the first political bureau per month, 1711–1713. Source: aae md 309, fols 111–34v, “Registre des despeches du Roy,” from 1 Jan. 1711 through 9 Nov. 1713.  164

4.3

Number of folios of domestic expeditions per year, 1681–1715. Source: France, Inventaire des archives des affaires étrangères. Mémoires et documents: vols 957, 958, 961, 963, 964, 966, 969, 971, 973–6, 979–83, 987–9, 993–5, 997–9, 1004–6, 1011–13, 1016, 1017, 1020, 1022, 1026, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1040–3, 1046, 1048–54, 1057–62, 1070–7, 1084–92, 1096, 1097, 1099–105, 1109–13, 1116, 1117, 1121–8, 1132–6, 1141–4, 1146, 1149–52, 1156–9, 1161, 1163–5, 1169–72, 1175, 1177–80, 1184, 1185, 1188, 1189, 1191–4, 1197, 1198, 1200, 1203–5, 1210.  165

x Figures

5.1

List of foreign ministry personnel, 1658–1715. Source: See the information relating to each individual in chapters 5 and 6.   172

5.2

Number of foreign ministry bureaucratic personnel per year, 1658–1715. Source: A summary of figure 5.1, which is based on notes for each individual in chapters 5 and 6.  174

5.3

Map of French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, c. 1700. Source: Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.  186

5.4

Department organization under the Briennes, 1661–1663. Sources: Brienne, Mémoires, 2:277n9; Picavet, “Commis,” 104–6; and Piccioni, Commis, 19–20, 103–43.  188

5.5

Department organization under Lionne, 1663–1671. Sources: Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85 (Abbé Gaudon was an advisor, not a commis); Picavet, “Commis,” 103–20; Piccioni, Commis, 147–53; and Cras, “Lionne,” 68.  189

5.6

Department organization under Pomponne, 1671–1679. Sources: Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85; Picavet, “Commis,” 110–12; and Piccioni, Commis, 147–56.  191

5.7

Department organization under Croissy, 1680–1696. Sources: Piccioni, Commis, 160–88; Picavet, “Commis,” 115, 119n2; Pagès, Grand Électeur, 436, 550n, 555n; Smithies, Chaumont and Choisy, 187–9; aae md 302, fol. 122v (late 1686 or early 1687); ibid., 1004, fol. 157v (1690); ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 349 (8 Dec. 1693) and fols 420r–v (9 Mar.? 1694), show that Mignon’s bureau dealt with Denmark; bn mf 8833, fol. 143v, 14 June 1689; and ibid., 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696.  195

5.8

Department organization under Torcy, 1696–1715. Source: See notes in “The Department Reorganized” section in chapter 5. 196

5.9

Number of French diplomatic missions, 1692–1715. Source: Based on an analysis of the lists of French diplomats serving between 1692 and 1715 compiled in Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:207–45.  197



Figures xi

5.10

Comparison: numbers of volumes of correspondance politique produced per state by the first and second political bureaus, 1696–1715. Source: Based on list of volumes of correspondance politique in France, État numérique correspondance politique (there is no list available for Florence/Tuscany). 198

5.11

Torcy in ceremonial garb of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Source: From a manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale of France. Photograph by John C. Rule.  215

6.1

Genealogical chart: the Mignons. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  229

6.2

Charles Mignon at the 1678 signing of the Treaty of Nijmegen. Detail from the painting by Henri Gascar (1635–1701), The Signing of the Peace Treaty between France and Spain in Nijmegen on September 17, 1678. Museum Het Valkhof, Nijmegen. 236

6.3

Genealogical chart: the Noblets. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  239

6.4

Genealogical chart: the Blondels. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  244

7.1

Number of payment orders issued per month, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnances Expediées pendant l’année 1714.”  284

7.2

Percentage of monthly payment orders issued on the first day of the month, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnaces Expediées pendant l’année 1714.” 285

7.3

Expenditures on embassies, 1699–1709. Source: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. There is no data for 1706.  291

7.4

Expenditures for secret affairs, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662 (which uses the category “Subsidies” for “Affaires secretes”).  295

xii Figures

7.5

Expenditures on the Swiss Leagues, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. There is no data for 1706.  302

7.6

Payment order amounts issued by category, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnaces Expediées pendant l’année 1714.”  304

7.7

Expenditures for travel, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. “Voyages” for 1708 and 1709 also include “Dons.” Neither category is present for 1706 or 1707.  305

Preface

Sadly, after some years of illness, John C. Rule passed away on 12 January 2013. Happily, however, he knew that the book upon which he had long laboured was to be published by McGill-Queen’s University Press. During his final months, he drew great comfort from the knowledge that illness would not prevent the fulfilment of his life’s work and its presentation to the scholarly community and the wider public. Since John C. Rule retired from the Ohio State University as a full professor of history in 1995, it is appropriate to remind a younger generation of his contributions to the field of early modern history and especially to the study of the reign of Louis XIV. For a number of years while in Paris working in various archives, John stayed on the left bank in the Hôtel des Deux Continents, aptly named in that it reflected the range of his scholarly inquiries and collaboration. John’s research also drew him to archival holdings in London and The Hague, as well as to several collections of papers housed in the United States. The publications that resulted are highly regarded by European scholars as well as by scholars on this side of the Atlantic. John’s association from the late 1950s with a group of Anglo-American diplomatic historians that included Mark A. Thomson, Ragnhild Hatton, and Andrew Lossky placed him among those who offered important revisions to the standard scholarly consensus of the neglected final decades of Louis XIV’s reign as dismal and unproductive. A 1964 conference on the reign of Louis XIV held at Ohio State produced papers that, along with additional complementary articles, were published in 1969 as Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, edited by John, who also provided a lengthy introduction to and an extensive annotated bibliography of the reign. This volume of articles by noted scholars of the reign remains a much-cited

xiv Preface

standard work among international scholars of the Sun King’s reign. John also published important articles that examine, for instance, government reform in the reign’s final decades, the functioning of the king’s councils, the enduring Franco-Spanish rivalry from 1492 to 1700, the colonial policies of the Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain family of navy secretaries of state, and treaty-making on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession. In particular, John’s influential publications on Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, Louis XIV’s last secretary of state for foreign affairs, have illuminated important aspects of French diplomatic and administrative history during these final decades. From the 1960s, John’s archival work has brought into sharp focus Torcy’s bureaucratic collaborators, the pen-wielding clerks, who animated the Sun King’s diplomacy in the bureaus at the centre as it radiated out to embassies across Europe and beyond. This book marks the culmination of John’s over four decades of research and writing on this exceptional administrative apparatus and the individuals who made it function. When John’s illness slowed his progress on his book manuscript, he invited me to complete the project. I had been his doctoral student at Ohio State in the 1970s and 1990s, researching Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban and the development of France’s fortifications bureaucracy. My work had led me to joke with John that, as far as I was concerned, Louis XIV’s reign ended in 1707, the year Vauban died. In taking up this new project, I was led into the even more intricate and densely layered world of Colbert de Torcy. With typical graciousness, John insisted from the outset that I act as his co-author. I initially balked at what I considered an excess of generosity, but I came to appreciate what John meant by it. He was entrusting to me not the editing of a largely finished product, but the completing of a manuscript that needed to be taken beyond where his illness would leave it. As I assembled, reorganized, supplemented, and rewrote his drafts in a manner faithful to his original vision for the study of this dynamic bureaucracy, we regularly “talked Torcy” – our shorthand for these conversations that aided my labour as they raised his spirits. John oriented me to the world of Louisquatorzian diplomacy and administration that he knew so well and initially guided me in my own reading and research. I also came to draw heavily from the abundant archival notes and microfilms he had collected over the decades. These have proven invaluable for my own understanding of the administrative structures, practices, and personnel of Torcy’s department and for supplying a wealth of archival material to complete and extend the narrative and analysis John had originally outlined. ­Fortunately,



Preface xv

my own archival research, including at the Archives des Affaires étrangères in Paris, helped me navigate through and make good use of John’s extensive and meticulous research, including the many documents he had microfilmed. Through the generosity of archivists and scholars in France, I have been able to access additional archival material that has proved particularly helpful. The Internet also pointed me to a wealth of printed material largely inaccessible when John was doing his research. Search engines turned up references to Torcy’s clerks in books and journals where no one would have thought to look, even if they had access to them. Indeed, I can hardly imagine having completed the book without access to the Internet and its information web. If this book is perhaps longer than it ought to be, it is not as long as it might have been. John’s unfinished manuscript was originally intended to recount and analyse the content of Torcy’s diplomacy, especially during the War of the Spanish Succession. While this analysis would have given the book a wider scope, bringing that part of the manuscript to completion would have made it much too lengthy. On the topics of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and management of information alone, John had much to say and I have had much to add. As I grew more comfortable in my role as co-author, I shared with John the changes and additions I made; he offered thoughtful feedback and enthusiastically endorsed the new directions in which I had taken the manuscript in light of my further research and reading of new works in the field. His scholarly integrity and natural graciousness were obvious even when my changes revised some of his earlier conclusions. However, recent social science research in the areas of governance and organizational theory has largely confirmed John’s pioneering insights into administrative history and allowed me to extend his insights in new directions. Likewise, the central theme of information – its collection, management, and use – that emerged as I moved beyond John’s original outline was already present in embryonic form. As John foresaw from the beginning, this book would be a collaborative effort, and I never doubted his abiding confidence in me even when I doubted myself. Upon the sad news of John’s passing, my wife, Ann, remarked that as long as I worked on the manuscript I would continue to “talk Torcy” with him. Fortunately, the manuscript has profited from other eyes. At an early date, Marsha Frey and Linda Frey read the entire manuscript and offered comments that ultimately helped to refocus and refine it. The two anonymous readers for McGill-Queen’s University Press provided helpful suggestions, welcome encouragement, and references to

xvi Preface

several recent works whose content and conclusions have substantially strengthened the book’s argument and taken it in some fresh directions. Jamel Ostwald generously read through what eventually became ­chapter 10, and his probing questions helped me to strengthen this chapter. Gary McCollim did the same for chapter 7, saving me from several errors. Antony McKenna’s helpful suggestions for the section on Daniel Larroque in chapter 6 greatly improved it. To all of these readers I offer heartfelt thanks. From the outset and until its completion, John Burnham facilitated my work, encouraged me in my writing, and steered this manuscript toward publication. He could not have done better in piloting the manuscript to McGill-Queen’s University Press, where friendly professionalism and high standards reign. Working with my editor Kyla Madden has been a constant delight. I value her early and genuine enthusiasm for this book and her subsequent affable honesty in aiding its improvement. The book’s copy editor, Judith Turnbull, used her experienced and careful eye to rescue it from errors and vague wording. All of these individuals have earned my gratitude. There were others whose contributions cannot go unmentioned. Hamish Scott offered encouragement while John worked on the manuscript and then later when I took it up. Others who contributed to John’s research are Douglas Clark Baxter and many of John’s former students, including Harold P. Anderson, Linda Frey, Marsha Frey, Gary M ­ cCollim, Jamel Ostwald, Thomas Schaeper, John Stapleton, and Andrew Szarka. Without being able to reconstruct the long list of all those who have aided John’s research since the 1960s, I can only offer his and my sincere gratitude to the many who are not listed above. Proving that the Republic of Letters thrives in the age of the Internet, several scholars, librarians, and archivists shared valuable primary and secondary sources as well as answered my many queries via email, including Peter ­Barber, ­Alexandre Cojannot, Robert J. Fulton, Jr, Nora Gaedeke, AnneMadeleine ­Goulet, Antony McKenna, Rémi Mathis, Maïlys ­Mouginot, Laurence Pope, ­Patricia Ranum, Niels van Tol, and Richard Waller. Others who answered my email queries along the way include R ­ ebekah Ahrendt, Joseph ­Bergin, Ngaire Bushell, Sara Chapman, Lex D ­ onaldson, Jerald Hage, Albert Hamscher, Mette Harder, Jeremy Hayhoe, Ben ­ Kafka, David Onnekink, Jotham Parsons, Brian Porter-SzÜcs, Orest Ranum, Guy Rowlands, ­Victoria Sanger, Paul Sonnino, Giora ­Sternberg, Brian Strayer, Leslie ­Tuttle, and Christophe Villecroix. H-France and the H-Network in general are marvelous places for connecting with an international community of scholars eager to help one another’s research!



Preface xvii

Maggie Montanaro and Judy Montanaro assisted with French translations and in transferring funds to France, a task more difficult than one would imagine in the digital age. Those presently or formerly in the Department of History of Ohio State who offered assistance include Chris Burton and Gail Summerhill. Marie Mazon typed the chapters that John originally drafted, while my wife, Ann Trotter, did some additional typing when I first took over the project. My thanks as well to the staff of the Ohio State University Library, especially to David Lincove and Anthony Maniaci, and to the staff of the Columbus State Community College Library, especially Julie Zaveloff. Technological assistance was generously provided by M.J. Willow at Columbus State Community College and by Lorraine Hilton. Ron Moore skilfully created the maps and the genealogical charts. Leonard Burnham carefully copy-edited the manuscript. I extend my apologies and gratitude to anyone whom I may have forgotten to mention. Finally, I must thank my family – my wife, Ann; my daughter, Chloe Grace; and my son, Benjamin Jacob – for putting up for some years now with the countless hours I spent in my study surrounded by stacks of books and photocopies, pecking away at my computer, preoccupied with Torcy. In our collaboration, John Rule was responsible for the initial incomplete manuscript and I am responsible for the reorganization, revisions, and further writing that have given shape to the present book. Ultimately, I alone am responsible for the book’s final form, content, and presentation, and I also assume responsibility for any faults and errors. Although they are inevitable, my hope is that they are few. This book is about memory and legacy. Therefore, I would like to dedicate it to the memory of those departed ones who smiled upon and encouraged my love of history and my scholarly pursuits. Each left behind her or his own memories and legacies: my mother, Jo-Ann ­Trotter; my father, John Sooloft Trotter II; my father-in-law, Dominic Joseph DeLaurentis; my brother, John Sooloft Trotter III; and my mentor and friend, John C. Rule. Note: Dates are generally given in the New Style, but when both are given, the New Style date comes first and is separated by a slash (/) from the Old Style date. In some cases, accent marks have been added to the French from archival sources that originally lacked them.

A W o r l d of Paper

Introduction

Love it, hate it, or merely tolerate it, bureaucracy, which for better or for worse is indeed “a structure of domination,”1 is nevertheless ubiquitous in today’s world and unlikely to disappear.2 For generations, historians and social scientists, whatever their feelings about it, have identified bureaucracy as the foundation of the modern state and have focused on the reign of Louis XIV of France as a model both then and later for developing a bureaucracy. In this book, the administrative department presided over by the Sun King’s last foreign secretary, Jean-­Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, is examined in detail. In recreating the details of the structure and operation of the bureaucratic process and examining the individuals who made it function, it is possible to show how Louis’s bureaucracy evolved in the interplay of policy, the cultivation of loyal personnel, and growing governmental power. What also comes into sharper focus is the importance of information and especially its collection and control for purposes of state decision-making (and managing the flow of information to decision-makers), policy implementation, and even winning over what has come to be known as “public opinion.” This book also provides an opportunity to demystify bureaucracy, primarily as to how it functioned under Torcy, but also as to how it functions in our own world. Recent historians have observed that the major political contribution of the reign of Louis XIV of France was not a system of governance called “absolutism,” but rather the modern state itself, an institution that transcends the usual stale caricatures of monarchical despotism. Today, one might discuss and then dismiss the (largely idealized) theory and practice of absolutism, but the same cannot be done with the powerful bureaucratic mechanisms that embody and project the power of the modern state, whether controlled by a dictator, a

4

A World of Paper

narrow oligarchy, or a ­multi-party and highly participatory democracy. Traditionally, early modernists focused on political theory, but the modern state itself – its origins, its articulation, and its operation – has come to be regarded as equally worthy of study. The institutional arrangements and processes of early modern France are seen to have more in common with the equivalent of our own time than might be assumed. This is especially the case given political scientists’ recent re-evaluations of Weberian models of the state and its bureaucracy that have found these models to be too idealized in their conception and in the way they are assumed to operate. In adopting these critical approaches, we offer a fresh look at the structure, development, operation, and personnel of the Department of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, especially during the nearly twenty-year (1696–1715) tenure of Torcy, widely regarded as “one of the most brilliant foreign ministers of the ancien régime”3 and as a reformer who led the foreign office during diplomacy’s Golden Age.4 This book is thus not primarily a history of diplomacy, but instead an examination of bureaucratic processes. Building on the work of earlier French administrators and especially that of his father, Charles Colbert de Croissy, foreign secretary from 1680 to 1696, Torcy employed a highly skilled team of collaborators to manage complex issues of war and peace during the turbulent and troubled final decades of the reign. It was a rather small staff of men, young and old, often of relatively humble social origins yet rising in royal service as clerks.5 They formed the often-neglected lower clerical and administrative levels that the upper elite layers could not function without.6 If Torcy’s contributions to diplomatic culture are widely acknowledged, his department’s administrative operations and personnel remain shadowy, explored in just a few prior works, two of which date from the 1920s. The first, a relatively short article covering Louis XIV’s personal reign, was published by Camille Picavet in 1926. Although its four pages on the Torcy era offer a fairly comprehensive list of the department’s clerks, its treatment of structure and operating procedures is understandably cursory. Nevertheless, Picavet remains foundational.7 Camille Piccioni’s book is a continuation and completion of research begun by diplomatic historian and former ambassador to Norway Louis Delavaud. Published in 1928, it deals with the commis (clerks) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It remains useful, but is dated, omits too much, makes significant errors, and focuses on individuals, only somewhat bringing the department itself into focus.8 More recent and generally more factually reliable is Jean-Pierre



Introduction 5

Samoyault’s study (1971) of the foreign office bureaus under Louis XV, which, because of its focus on the post-Torcy era, necessarily presents a constricted and incomplete picture of Torcy’s department and personnel.9 Finally, the French foreign office’s official and collectively written two-volume administrative history appeared in 1984. Its well-organized focus on structures adds to our understanding of the department before 1789, but details of the Torcy era are often inadequate and sometimes mistaken.10 Our book offers a more up-to-date, detailed, and yet coherent focus on the Department of Foreign Affairs during the final decades of Louis XIV’s long reign. It is anchored in archival sources in France and elsewhere and is framed by current scholarship, including some key theoretical and empirical studies by non-historians. We explore the department’s organizational structure and the way it actually operated. The lack of contemporary formal regulations outlining these structures turns out to be an advantage, since it compels a more empirical approach.11 Although this does not always yield as full or certain a picture as we might desire, it means that our sketch is grounded in the quotidian realities experienced in the bureaus and beyond rather than in precise but idealized organizational regulations. Our depiction of Torcy’s department is thus not as the central bureaucracy as it might have appeared “on paper,” but rather as it emerged dynamically through the streams of paper that flowed in, within, and out of its bureaus and connected them with provincial administrators and French diplomats abroad.12 This fits Michel Foucault’s notion of “power … analysed as something which circulates … which only functions in the form of a chain.”13 As will become clear, this power regularly circulated in the form of written information, creating a “world of paper” whose management was crucial and often the source of interdepartmental friction. Traditional accounts dwell on the rivalry and conflict among Louis XIV’s secretaries of state, then as now an undeniable part of the workscape, when turf wars can set the state’s agents against one another. Nevertheless, essential elements of cooperation and information-sharing had to exist for the bureaucracy to function as well as it did given the constraints of technology, time, and distance under which it operated. We explore the important formal and informal links with other departments and their personnel as we trace the workings of the foreign ministry’s bureaucracy within this wider administrative apparatus. Since the exact outlines of the structures of Torcy’s department are not always clear, we pay particular attention to the individuals who inhabited

6

A World of Paper

and animated this organization, serving as the minister’s “vehicles of power.”14 Traditional depictions of the department’s small group of commis, premiers commis (chief clerks), and secretaries focus largely on their service within the bureaus; the outside offices they held or any other extra-department connections they had are largely seen as resulting from their department service. Our study, on the other hand and as much as the sources allow, takes these individuals before they entered the department as our point of departure to ascertain why they attached themselves to the foreign office and what they brought to it. It turns out that for many individuals service in the foreign ministry was a further step in a family strategy of social and professional advancement that was already under way. This meant that staff members’ earlier, independent contacts were typically maintained after they entered the department, and these contacts were usually further cultivated and extended through marriages within and outside it. Not only did this serve the needs of these individuals and their kinship groups, it also benefited the foreign secretary, as it allowed him to profit from their information networks and enlarge his staff’s scope of action within the bureaus of Versailles, in the provinces, and abroad, including in the Republic of Letters, which linked the learned of Europe. Where permitted by the scanty sources, our prosopographical study of the clerks of the department approaches them not anachronistically as lone individuals but rather as persons embedded within kinship and client groups – both essential dimensions of life in early modern France. Again, with an eye to the way states actually operate in much of the world today, not excepting the democracies, it should be obvious that attention to such networks is not without present significance. If Torcy knew the Chinese proverb that the palest ink is better than the best memory, he would have heartily agreed. Yet he would also have concurred with Samuel Johnson, who noted that “[k]nowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information upon it.”15 It is only in the past few decades that scholars have begun to explore the idea of information historically and in particular to examine the ways in which information’s acquisition, organization, preservation, and retrieval enhanced and shaped state power, creating what is termed the “information state.” Jacob Soll, for example, offers a pioneering look at the Louisquatorzian information state created by his minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert.16 Daniel R. Headrick notes that Europe’s late seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century information advances came from new information systems rather than from information-handling



Introduction 7

machines and marked the real beginnings of an information revolution.17 James W. Cortada likewise points to “‘information ages’ before the one we live in now.”18 His recent agenda and strategies for the emerging field of “information history”19 are consistent with the approach taken in our book. Moving beyond the technology of information, Cortada urges the researcher to seek out the “vessels [that] were used to collect and store information,” which include “schools, universities, libraries, industrial research centers, publishers, scholarly communities (tangible and virtual), and government agencies.”20 This requires examining particular professions or groupings to determine what information they collected, acted upon, and shared, as well as tracing “the patterns of adoption and the use of information over time.”21 In particular, this means following the flow of written and verbal information within established “communities of practice” with shared interests, knowledge, and modes of collecting and processing that information.22 Cortada regards states’ diplomatic activity as especially fertile ground for studying the collection, management, and use of information, as this work has historically left “one of the richest, most detailed paper trails of any profession.”23 Moreover, since diplomatic personnel were required to be literate, and their daily activities centred on reading, writing, analysis, and documentation, examining their milieu offers insight into the early professionalization of what are now commonly called “knowledge workers.”24 The foreign office under Torcy was one of many bureaucratic communities of practice within the Louisquatorzian state. It functioned as a vessel for collecting and storing the domestic and international information necessary to its function and was deployed to shape the opinions and actions of decision-makers at the centre and the king’s operatives in the provinces and abroad. Begun under Croissy, this preservation of foreign office institutional memory was part of a broader initiative, extended under Torcy, to utilize the department’s informational heritage in diplomacy’s daily work, which consequently required new ways of organizing and digesting it for faster and easier access. This can be seen, for example, in Torcy’s aggressive exploitation of his department’s increasingly organized information stores for producing propaganda. This innovation through technique rather than technology is also apparent in the individual studies and group seminars involving the students in his pioneering Académie politique for the training of embassy personnel. The developments we have uncovered under Torcy are similar to those found by Cortada in what he describes as the “information ecosystem” of Spain’s foreign ministry between 1815 and 1936. Although his study

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focuses on a later period, Cortada acknowledges that “the informationalization of work evident today was well under way before … 1789.”25 Indeed, his study identifies in the diplomatic ecosystem of nineteenthcentury Spain many features that can be observed in Torcy’s own department. One was a growing professionalization linked to an “information superstructure” that displayed a “remarkable resilience and ability to thrive,”26 allowing it to weather regime changes such as the French foreign office experienced in 1715 when it was reorganized under the Regency. Stressing information-gathering rather than negotiating as the most common diplomatic occupation, Cortada points to the foreign ministry in the capital as “the gear box, the engine” that kept the channels of the diplomatic ecosystem functioning,27 which is an apt metaphor for Torcy’s foreign office at Versailles.28 Any study of the foreign secretary’s department cannot dwell exclusively on diplomacy, since each of the four secretaries of state also administered a portion of the kingdom’s provinces. Yet the administrative functions of the department have been regularly treated hastily and superficially,29 perhaps disdained as an irrational and burdensome distraction from what modern eyes see as the true function of a foreign office. In contrast, we seek to explain why these domestic duties were more than just a leftover from the past and how they actually advanced the department’s work, including in diplomacy. A sizable amount of the ministry’s human and time resources were devoted to these domestic administrative tasks, which resulted increasingly in collecting information on the king’s subjects. These tasks became more significant as the conciliar way of government of the early reign gave way to a routine of bureaucratic administration handled by a new breed of state servants who, in training, way of work, and outlook, were unlike the judicial, ecclesiastical, and military elites who had traditionally served as the state’s primary agents. This book begins with theories about bureaucracy and modernity, but then moves outward to the person of Torcy, to his wider circle of collaborators, and to the institutional context within which they operated. We begin by exploring the traditional concepts of bureaucracy and the modern state by which the administration of France under the Sun King are typically measured and found wanting. Recent empirical studies of the state and its administrative operations during the past two centuries, however, have led to a reformulation of these concepts and to the pruning of those idealized elements of what modern bureaucracy is in both theory and practice that obscure the resemblance and developmental



Introduction 9

debt of the present to the Louisquatorzian state. These insights allow us to trace the intertwined development of the court and bureaucracy of Louis XIV, the consummate roi-bureaucrate, and the space within which they operated, especially at Versailles. This book is not a biography of Torcy.30 Nevertheless, his preparation for high office through careful education, extensive travel, and practical experience within his father’s bureaus was an essential part of who he was and what he did, as were the family members who surrounded, supported, served, and sometimes quarreled with him. A bureaucracy is not a machine but an organization animated by people, and as the person at the foreign office helm, Torcy was crucial to how it operated and how its shape changed over time. With this is mind, we explore his transition from “survivancier” (designated legal successor) to his father’s office in 1689, to secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1696, and to minister of state in 1699.31 With his father’s death in 1696, Torcy took on greater leadership within the ­Colbert clan, assuming responsibility for the advancement of the family and its many clients. The days of the great Colbert and Le Tellier ministerial clientages had passed, but Torcy was nonetheless well placed to serve those close to him. Yet even after succeeding to his father’s powerful position at the king’s side, the young Torcy underwent several years of grueling and perilous testing that would reveal whether he was fit for the high office he held. Fortunately, he was guided in this by his mentor and father-in-law, former foreign secretary ­(1671–79) Simon Arnauld, the marquis de Pomponne. They negotiated an end to the Nine Years War32 and then sought to avert a new war over the Spanish succession through a broad diplomatic initiative centred on a bold partition scheme that won the collaboration of England and the United Provinces, France’s enemies in the late war. While the two treaties that resulted ultimately failed to prevent another ruinous conflict, it was not because the young secretary disappointed the king’s expectations. Certainly, Torcy was not without critics at court or among the foreign diplomatic corps, but tested as an administrator, advisor, and negotiator, Torcy had earned Louis XIV’s confidence. This book focuses on Torcy’s department, a group of personnel attached to his office of secretary of state, the secretaryship particularly responsible for foreign affairs. After exploring the department’s development, powers, and responsibilities prior to Torcy’s time, we then move ahead to the point at which he lost his office upon the king’s death in 1715. There, in the transition to and during the opening years of regency on behalf of the infant Louis XV, we gain greater insight into how the

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f­oreign office bureaucracy operated under Torcy. We then examine and map out the temporal and spatial contexts within which the foreign office functioned during Torcy’s tenure in office. This is followed by an analysis of the all-important personnel who animated the department, including its several premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, and support staff of domestics who saw to the creature comforts of the foreign secretary and his clerks and who sometimes performed diplomatic tasks as well. We also trace the administrative structures and procedures under Torcy’s predecessors as foreign secretary in order to establish a baseline against which any change and continuity under him must be understood. To gain a fuller sense of the department’s operational resources, we include those persons and administrative entities outside its “official structure” that nonetheless contributed significantly to its successful functioning. Among these were post office personnel attached to the court who managed the vital mails, secretaries in the king’s Cabinet who wielded their pens at his side and on his behalf, household officers who orchestrated diplomatic ceremony and royal audiences, household couriers who carried dispatches throughout Europe, and genealogists who delved into dusty parchments on behalf of the chivalric “Ordres du Roi” (Royal Orders). Especially important was the informal “brain trust” of experts, scholars, and literary figures, many of whom were well-­connected members of the Republic of Letters who assisted the secretary and his staff in a variety of vital tasks. In our prosopographical study of the premiers commis and secretaries, we discuss them in their kinship and clientage groups when the sources allow. This brings out the relationships and alliances among them and the links and sources of information and favours they maintained outside the department. These included their connections with the varied worlds of noble estate management, municipal office, and bourgeois trades serving the court, and their possession of the costly chancellery and fiscal venal offices that raised a family’s social status. Represented as well is the interconnected milieu of finance that fed and fed off the kingdom’s military-industrial complex and the complicated fiscal system that struggled to keep the ship of state afloat. This myriad of connections contributed to the value and growing power of the upper rank of clerks, affording them a measure of independence from the secretary of state and stability of position as prized experts serving the king. Of course, all aspects of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and its work required funding, so we examine how that money was spent and the financial arrangements for paying the bills at home and channeling funds abroad for diplomacy and clandestine



Introduction 11

operations. We also explore how department personnel were remunerated, and consider the other rewards reaped by the ministry’s faithful. Information, already a recurring theme in several contexts, is examined from additional angles. Part of the preservation and utilization of the ministry’s institutional memory included gathering public papers in private hands and adding them to the archives that Torcy’s father had begun to assemble at his Paris residence and at Versailles. Croissy had them organized into volumes that were in essence easily retrievable files. Torcy built on, refined, and extended these efforts, which culminated in the establishment of a separate archive and a connected diplomatic training academy in Paris, a city increasingly known for its libraries and concentrations of ministerial archives. Another opportunity for managing and tapping into the information stream was afforded by Torcy’s management of the French mails, which he had to keep secure and flowing despite the vicissitudes of weather, war, and incompetent or dishonest postal officials. Yet he and his staff also worked to manage the flow of information by policing the book trade and monitoring what was published in France and abroad, censoring it when necessary and possible. And in a web that extended from the foreign office bureaus at Versailles to France’s embassies abroad and then to ports, palaces, frontiers, and other listening points throughout Europe and beyond, Torcy and his staff created, coordinated, and paid networks of spies and other secret agents wherever French interests were at stake. Because diplomats and their staffs serving abroad were essential components in the gathering and dissemination of information, we look into the world of ambassadors and embassies, both those Torcy sent abroad as well as those sent by foreign states to Paris. This was the context of perhaps one of Torcy’s most remarkable initiatives: the Académie politique. This bold venture, closely linked with the establishment of an archive in Paris and prefiguring the schools of public administration established only much later, was a concrete measure promoting Torcy’s vision for the increased professionalization of diplomacy. All states rely on information in order to govern, but as B. Guy Peters observes, the differences in how they do so rests on “the extent to which information drives decisions or is only a part of a decision process that also involves a number of more deliberative and politicized elements. That is, in some versions of governance the reactions to information are preprogrammed, while in others the responses are indeterminate and involve greater judgment by the actors involved.”33 A considerable proportion of the decisions made in response to the information received in

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the foreign office was made by its clerks, especially the premiers commis and secretaries who straightforwardly resolved matters that required no or low levels of judgment because they were routine or relatively clearcut, with few, or only insignificantly different, alternatives. As the complexity, unfamiliarity, and potential consequences of a decision increased, the process reached up the hierarchy to the foreign secretary himself or even outside the department to the king and his closest advisors. Relations with foreign powers, ultimately concerning issues of war and peace, were among the principal concerns of the Louisquatorzian state. Foreign policy was therefore formulated and decided by the king and his two-to-seven-member “Conseil” (council), not infrequently after difficult deliberations that left opinions divided and required the monarch to make a judgment among two or more passionately held and cogently articulated alternatives. The foreign secretary controlled the information that the Conseil’s members received as well as the information those on the outside received of the Conseil’s resolutions, which placed him in a powerful position to shape both. As this was a collective decision-­ making process, however, Torcy formulated foreign policy neither alone nor simply in collaboration with the king. Nevertheless, he held in his hand powerful cards that excited the envy of Mme de M ­ aintenon, the king’s morganatic wife, and some fellow secretaries of state. The obvious way to counter the foreign secretary’s strong hand was with cards of one’s own in the form of independently obtained and controlled information. We examine the resulting clashes that at times troubled Torcy’s management of diplomacy, especially during delicate negotiations. Dispatches, another royal council, formulated domestic policy and coordinated its implementation, so information played a vital role in its deliberations and in the king’s decisions. In Dispatches, however, no one played a role comparable to that of Torcy on the Conseil, since the provincial information flow was less concentrated and its control more evenly shared. Each secretary of state supervised his own group of provinces and had to work in Dispatches with the powerful controller general of finances and the not-insignificant chancellor, who had independent information networks of their own that covered all the provinces. Like his fellow secretaries of state, Torcy increasingly managed the everyday administration of those provinces under his care through his clerks, who worked in cooperation, if not always comfortably or successfully, with intendants, governors, bishops, sovereign court magistrates, and other provincial officials. It is particularly in domestic administration that we often encounter the routine decisions that



Introduction 13

Peters characterizes as preprogrammed responses to information, often taken as one of the hallmarks of modern administrative organizations. Paris, the kingdom’s capital and the centre and crossroads of much diplomatic activity, was of particular concern to the foreign office. There we encounter Torcy’s agents working with the police to monitor resident and transient foreigners, especially those in embassies, and anyone who gravitated toward them, including those Parisians who interacted with them either too sympathetically or too antagonistically. Anyone who ran afoul of this system or any of the other strictures resulting from the foreign secretary’s policing responsibilities could find themselves in prison. Torcy and his staff took a keen interest in those who entered, remained, and were released from the prison system, as well as in the many interrogations to which they were subjected. It should come as no surprise that controlling information was a key concern here as it was in much of the department’s activity. The assurance of “good order” in both domestic and international affairs seemed to require such measures, and they were pursued with vigour, at times leavened with humanity. The range of the Department of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was clearly wider than one might initially suppose. Under Torcy, the bureaucracy that managed this growing workload was expanded, reorganized, articulated, stabilized, and routinized. Yet when Louis XIV died on 1 September 1715 and his long reign ended, so did Torcy’s career as foreign secretary. Within twenty days he resigned his charge, which the new Regency government stripped of its department and most of its duties, seemingly ending the reign of the mighty secretaries of state as France embarked upon an experiment with conciliar government. The various councils established by the regent, however, largely inherited and perpetuated the bureaucratic structures, procedures, and personnel that Torcy and his collaborators had shaped during diplomacy’s Golden Age. This was a legacy forged in the continuing evolution of the modern administrative state as it marshaled and organized information for the tasks of governing. It imprinted a lasting mark on diplomatic and bureaucratic practices in France and throughout Europe in the eighteenth century and to the present.

1 Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate

The intertwined issues of war and peace and the concomitant necessity of finding the funds to pursue both remained the most important concerns of early modern Europe’s dynastically minded monarchs1 as they moved from traditional ways of governing to means often identified with the “modern state.” War and diplomacy were both managed increasingly in what is classically described as a bureaucratic fashion, and France’s roi-bureaucrate Louis XIV presided over an administration that became the model for much of Europe. While past historians often examined his government for antiquarian or propagandistic purposes (the rise of France as a unified nation is an especially important example of the latter), others did so to understand the nature of power, and especially a royal power said to be “absolute,” centralized, and bureaucratic. Recent historical research, however, challenges these accepted narratives, disputing the Louisquatorzian state as an exemplar of the modern state, especially as classically defined as unwaveringly centralized and bureaucratic. Meanwhile, scholars from fields such as political science and public administration illuminate and raise serious doubts about the model of the modern state itself, the standard by which Louis’s state is measured. New research and fresh thinking dispute prevailing assumptions about the modern state’s nature and functioning, even in paradigmatic France. Significantly, these challenges are based on empirical studies that move beyond Weberian models to explore the realities of everyday public administration as it operates in a wider context that includes non-public (i.e., non-governmental) actors.2 In addition, recent theories empirically developed in the social sciences provide fresh ways of conceptualizing and exploring the structure and functioning of organizations that may be applied to early modern administrations. These new perspectives also



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 15

shape a clearer view of how the court, Versailles, the royal household, and the king’s Cabinet served as context and factors in administrative developments under the roi-bureaucrate.

T he S ig n if ic a n c e o f T o rcy and Hi s Department As secretary of state, Torcy managed a “département” (department), defined in Furetière’s contemporary dictionary as a division among several persons of functions or duties in order to avoid confusion.3 It embraced foreign affairs as well as elements of domestic administration, including the supervision of several provinces. The usual difficulties of provincial administration (and foreign relations) were compounded during his tenure by the lingering and bitter legacy of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the deadly effects of bad weather and relentless war on the people and economy. During this same period, international conditions were much altered from those of the first half of the reign by the shock of what James Collins calls the “Great War (1683–1721),” especially after it reached serious levels on the western frontiers in 1688, challenging not only French hegemony but eventually France’s survival as a great power.4 It was under these circumstances that Torcy finalized negotiations to end one war by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) and sought to unravel the knot of the looming Spanish succession with two peaceful partition agreements. After the disasters of the War of the Spanish Succession, he achieved at Utrecht (1713) a better peace settlement than most expected. That these were not easy tasks was due in part to the transitional nature of these years, during which a European system of great powers to be kept in balance gained ground even as traditional dynastic concerns remained potent.5 Arguably as significant, Torcy and his team of clerks and outside “consultants” played a central role in the articulation and standardization of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and political culture that profoundly shaped practices in France and the rest of Europe.6 Even as they struggled to negotiate an end to Louis XIV’s final war, Torcy and his collaborators implemented a pioneering vision for the training of public administrative experts with the innovative Académie politique (Political Academy). Torcy’s tenure as foreign secretary (28 July 1696–23 September 1715) covered nineteen years of Louis XIV’s long reign, two years longer than the nearly seventeen-year (November 1679–26 July 1696) tenure of his father, Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy. Before Croissy, Simon Arnauld, marquis de Pomponne, had served for nearly eight

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years ­(October 1671–September 1679), and his predecessor Hugues de Lionne, marquis de Fresne, officially served eight years (3 April 1663–1 September 1671) or roughly ten years if one counts the time from 1661 when Henri-Auguste de Lomenie, comte de Brienne, still held the secretary of state’s office while Lionne largely exercised its functions. Torcy was thus the longest serving of Louis’s foreign secretaries, at just over one-third of the personal reign’s fifty-five years. He and his father, with whom he trained but from whom he differed in important respects, controlled the foreign office for nearly thirty-six years, just short of twothirds of Louis XIV’s personal reign. Compared with the next two reigns, this is remarkable stability, as the foreign secretaries of the rest of the eighteenth century typically served for less than five years.7 This basic constancy permitted procedures to be tested and adjusted and then to develop roots that allowed them to transcend the tenures of Croissy and Torcy and shape the foreign office thereafter. This stability also rested on the continuity of several commis whose careers stretched as far back as Mazarin. Through them, Torcy drew on the administrative practices and wisdom of his predecessors. Between 1715 and 1750, seven foreign secretaries served Louis XV, including Chauvelin for nearly ten of these years, in contrast to the two Colberts, who served his predecessor for nearly the same time span. Yet a striking bureaucratic stability characterized the department itself. While Torcy was out of office in 1715 and his administrative legacy appeared further attenuated when Cardinal Dubois terminated his Académie politique in 1721, the administrative structures developed and the diplomatic personnel acculturated during Torcy’s era constituted a remarkable organizational, procedural, and cultural continuity long into Louis XV’s reign.8 Of the five premiers commis who served between 1715 and 1745, all but one (the son of one of them) had entered service and received training during Torcy’s tenure. At least one of the Torcy-trained clerks headed one of the important political bureaus until 1749, when NicolasLouis Le Dran was transferred to the departmental archives as its head. At his retirement in 1762, Le Dran was the last living direct link with Torcy’s remarkable team of clerks, the illustrious Torcy himself having died on 2 September 1746.9 The eighteenth century was dominated, as Hamish Scott points out, by a distinctive and novel diplomatic culture. It became cohesive and homogeneous as it spread, imparting considerable unity to the conduct of international relations. This culture became a distinctive code or language that helped to unify the world of eighteenth-century diplomacy.10



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 17

The new subculture increasingly drew diplomatic personnel from the higher nobility. This social orientation was reinforced when ambassadors interacted with one another in the aristocratic milieu of Europe’s royal courts, where matters of protocol and etiquette loomed large and “their ‘art of negotiation’ [was modeled] on the psychological art of the courtier to manage men, control passions and (where necessary) dissemble.”11 Linguistically, this culture originated and was articulated in the French of Torcy and his collaborators. Foreign diplomats communicated with one another in French, and many even did so with officials at home.12 This linguistic unity facilitated and reinforced the domination of French ideas and practices through widely read diplomatic treatises such as those by François de Callières and Antoine Pecquet fils, both experienced members of France’s foreign office. Collections of treaties, including those assembled by Torcy’s department, were likewise in French, as increasingly were the treaties themselves. The longestablished system of resident diplomacy spread further as Louis XIV contended with the coalitions raised up against him. French power, prestige, and wide-ranging diplomacy ensured that others emulated France’s model. That model was readily observable by other states’ diplomats whether posted in Paris, at courts where French diplomats served, or at the peace congresses that assembled to end the era’s many wars and at which France was prominent.13 Far from being disconnected and airy theoretical reflections on diplomacy, the post-Westphalian proliferation of “treatises on the ‘ideal ambassador’” according to the important recent research of Heidrun R.I. Kugeler, “constituted the core of an early diplomatic theory that sought to define the diplomat’s task as the pivotal agents [sic] within the increasingly complex field of international relations in the formative phase of the European states-system.”14 This was the context in which Torcy operated and to which he contributed significantly through his leadership in the foreign ministry as it pursued its three major purposes: gathering information, representing the king, and negotiating.15 His tenure was the longest of any B ­ ourbon foreign minister and was arguably the most influential. Building on his predecessors’ work and especially that of his father, Torcy directed structural and cultural innovations in the administration of diplomacy, the preservation and utilization of records, and the training of diplomats. This largely set the trajectory for France’s diplomatic apparatus for the rest of the century, drawing much of a willing Europe along with it. Scott dates the emergence of this French-inspired diplomatic culture from the 1680s, which is when Torcy commenced his apprenticeship at

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his father’s side, while the crucial years were those when Torcy fashioned and directed policy and practice. It is no coincidence that the influential works of Callières and Pecquet fils drew on their own and others’ experiences of Torcy’s time as minister.16 Of course, it would be misleading to imply that Torcy stood alone at the helm of France’s diplomatic apparatus, since in theory and practice its personnel acted at the command and on behalf of the king. Louis XIV was an active participant in the “métier” (craft) of kingship, and this included setting policy and shaping the new diplomatic culture.17 For all his posturing and pursuit of personal gloire, for all his sense of “proprietary dynasticism” (his ownership of public power),18 for all his eminence as a builder of palaces and other monuments to monarchy, Louis XIV may best be remembered as a bureaucrat, a methodical and dedicated administrator. For over fifty-four years, Louis immersed himself in his state’s administrative details, met his councils weekly, and closeted himself with ministers in long working sessions. This regimen has earned him the epithet le roi-bureaucrate or the king-bureaucrat.19 While Louis was also a master of ceremony, managing and enhancing the rich ritual symbolism inherited from his predecessors, it was still as a bureaucrat and head of a central administration that he marshaled this cultural power to attempt to make his will known and felt throughout his kingdom and internationally. This entailed managing symbols as well as gathering and processing information by means of a carefully controlled central administration increasingly adapted to these purposes and able to project royal power even where his person was absent.20 In diplomacy in particular, seemingly trivial and petty matters of ceremonial served such purposes as “the necessary language and code” of an international society of princes by “enacting and symbolizing” power relations to the public and offering “ample opportunities to exchange information, advance the negotiations and to ascertain the common social and cultural background of the corps diplomatique” necessary to the art of negotiation.21 Louis XIV’s active participation in the creation of a distinctive diplomatic culture and in the work of diplomacy itself stands out as well because it was not continued during the next reign. His greatgrandson Louis XV reigned first as a minor under the Regency and then with Cardinal Fleury as surrogate monarch until the latter’s death in 1743. Thereafter, Louis XV provided little leadership, leaving foreign affairs to ever-shifting factions and a rapid succession of foreign secretaries or engaging in a problematic personal diplomacy.22 ­Nevertheless,



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 19

the bureaucratic structure created in the collaboration between Louis XIV, Croissy, and then Torcy maintained much of this legacy. Indeed, French historians from the Third Republic and after claim an element of fundamental administrative continuity from Louis XIV, through Napoleon, and into their own time, a view enshrined at the beginning of the twentieth century in Ernest Lavisse’s magisterial and still influential synthesis. Downplaying but not abandoning the older, superficial paradigm of Louisquatorzian despotism, Lavisse focuses on centralization and bureaucratization, which he links with the creation and eventual realization of national unity. This and the scope and success of his diplomacy nonetheless earned the arch “absolutist” an honoured place in the republican-nationalist pantheon.23 This narrative is now challenged as teleological,24 too linear and tidy, too premeditated, and divorced from contingencies of events and personalities.25 Even so, significant administrative change took place under Louis XIV.26 These changes were brought about as the state drew selectively on a pluralistic past that it then rationally adapted, often to the point of making outright innovations, even if not usually portrayed as such.27 The results represented a legacy of continuity and change that offered those monarchs and ministers after 1715 an altered menu of feasible choices for future change even as it in other ways constrained them.28 Joël Cornette sees a transforming modernity in the state’s administrative and executive functioning under Louis XIV that placed royal power at the centre of significant transformations of cultural and political practices. The state was the primary agent of this change whereby the traditional and contractual forms uniting subjects and sovereign gradually gave way to an impersonal culture of state service. The nobility rather than the ever-rising middle class served as precocious participants in this metamorphosis because they embodied an ideal of individual merit that privileged (in more than one sense) the display of personal aptitude and skill and its recognition and reward by the monarch. Just as significantly, service to the king subjected the traditional aristocratic norms of generosity, sacrifice, and courage usually connected with personal service to a set of impersonal norms that included obedience, discipline, and work to create limits on aristocratic behaviour.29 The early ministers Colbert and Louvois usually dominate the reign’s narratives, even though the former died in 1683 and the latter in 1691. Institutions of power, however, continued to evolve and in the crucible of the near-constant warfare, financial disintegration, subsistence crises,30

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and high-stakes diplomacy that marked the reign’s final decades. James B. Collins contends that the “great period of reform and change under Louis XIV came not early in the reign … but at its end.”31 This bold but considered claim reflects the historiographical advances of the past several decades.32 Nevertheless, the end of the reign, while no longer as neglected as it once was, remains understudied.33 In a review of the historiography of “the absolutism of Louis XIV as social collaboration,” William Beik proposes that future research undertake a “more intensive examination of the functioning of Louis XIV’s government after 1690, especially the civilian government.”34 Along similar lines, Thierry Sarmant observes that despite all the work of the past decades on Louis XIV’s monarchy, historians still know little about the exercise of political power, its practices and everyday realities. Sarmant notes the paradox that while there are myriad studies of royal agents acting locally, the same is not true for the top of the central administration. We remain insufficiently informed as to the work of the king and his ministers, the activity of departments and ministerial offices, and the relationship between ministers and their departments. He urges historians to remedy this but adds that a response is already under way,35 pointing to studies of Navy and Household Secretary Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Seignelay, of Controller General Claude Le Peletier, of Louis and Jérôme Phélypeaux, comtes de Pontchartrain, a father and son who between them served as controller general, navy and household secretary, and chancellor, and of war secretaries Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier, marquis de Barbezieux, and Michel Chamillart.36 Yet important omissions remain, perhaps the most striking being that of Torcy.37 Recent studies of diplomacy during the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign, especially those by the incomparable Lucien Bély,38 add a depth, breadth, and richness to our knowledge of significant aspects of diplomatic practice under Torcy, but there is still no volume dedicated to his department’s functioning as a bureaucracy. We are cautioned on the one hand not to regard Louis’s state as “the failed prototype of the Weberian modern state”39 and on the other not to “exaggerate the efficiency of [this] burgeoning administrative machine; to say the least, it deviated considerably from Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, in structure and in performance.”40 Yet, as we take care not to mystify government efficiency under Louis XIV, it often goes unnoticed that we must also guard against exaggerating the efficiency of modern bureaucracies.41 It makes no sense to denigrate the organization and efficiency of so-called pre-modern administrative arrangements for



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 21

failing to live up to a Weberian ideal that is itself increasingly open to question.42 Recent studies undermine both its theoretical underpinnings and its relationship to reality.43 Often a monolithically imagined “modernity” is invested with an aura of inevitability.44 One cannot, however, ignore the profound changes of the past decades that have appreciably undermined France’s inherited statist mentalities and practices.45 The Accademia in Florence houses sobering antidotes to this mystification of modernity. On the way to Michelangelo’s colossal David, the visitor passes four smaller, unfinished figures of slaves originally intended for Pope Julius II’s tomb. Looking at each, one could almost allow Michelangelo’s claim that his chisel and hammer merely liberated the figure imprisoned in the marble rather than created it from an inanimate block of stone. What constitutes great art has been long debated, but a persistent consensus attributes to it the capacity to foster such illusions of artlessness and inevitability – the artist as midwife rather than parent of the art “birthed.” The so-called modern state, centralized and bureaucratic, with its characteristic conceptual framework, mechanisms of control, and modes of operation, all allegedly based on the rule of reason, has during the past two centuries likewise been regarded as encased, like Michelangelo’s figures, but in this instance in ossified layers of tradition and irrationality. In this view, the modern state, yearning to be free, to be born, like Michelangelo’s figures of slaves or the nationalists’ “nation,” likewise rests immobilized until liberated by the bearers of progress, unleashed by the eighteenth century’s Enlightenment and revolutions wielding the hammers and chisels of Reason and History. It has been a powerful and even alluring myth, and it remains potent into the twenty-first century, but it is, nonetheless, a myth.46 Another myth is the oft-quoted but apocryphal aphorism “L’État c’est moi” (I am the state) by which Louis XIV is said to have claimed to embody the state, although if properly understood in the context of the time, it would have been a reasonable and meaningful claim had he made it.47 More revealing, however, are his actual words as he lay dying: upbraiding those weeping at his bedside, he insisted, “I’m going, but the state will always remain.”48 As did much of the machinery of state, witnessed by the remarkable and often overlooked continuity of Louisquatorzian administrative procedures and personnel during the conciliar experiment of the Regency’s Polysynod and after.49 Ronald Asch aptly observes, “[T]he consolidation of a bureaucratic administrative apparatus … [was] without a doubt among the hallmarks of the modern state.”50

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Table 1.1 Patrimonial and bureaucratic systems Patrimonial System

Bureaucratic System

1.  undefined area of jurisdiction 2.  informal hierarchy 3.  informal training and testing 4.  part-time officials 5.  oral commands

1.  fixed areas 2.  formal hierarchy 3.  formal training and testing 4.  full-time officials 5.  written orders

Source: Burke, History and Social Theory, 30.

T he o r ie s o f B u r e au c r acy, Moderni ty, and C e n t r a l izati on Like absolutism, the term bureaucracy was coined after the fact. It emerged in print in the second half of the eighteenth century to ridicule the state apparatus as a political system in which power rests with mere clerks rather than with those whose instruments they were meant to be.51 This storm of opprobrium was not seriously countered until late in the nineteenth century when German sociologist Max Weber rescued the term from the trash heap of historical misunderstanding and misuse.52 For Weber, “capitalism and bureaucratization were, in his opinion, the main promoters of the secular process of rationalization” radically altering the traditional world and are thus inextricably intertwined with concepts of modernity and the modern state.53 Although Weber recognized the negatives of bureaucratization, such as numbing routinization, central control, and threats to individual liberty, he nonetheless saw it as superior to non-rational and non-bureaucratic administrative systems and as the direction in which society was moving, seemingly irresistibly and perhaps irreversibly. He saw bureaucratization as a reality to be lamented but not ignored and as something that must therefore be analysed as a core constituent of modernity.54 Although negative stereotypes of bureaucracy persist,55 historians still deploy it as a standard against which to measure the administrative apparatuses and practices of the early modern era, most often to find them lamentably wanting. Weber provides a litmus test of bureaucracy by juxtaposing the attributes of what he describes as an older “patrimonial” system of administration with those of the “more mature” bureaucracies of his own times, which Peter Burke helpfully summarizes (table 1.1). In patrimonial authority, which often grew out of patriarchalism or charismatic



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domination, tradition governed a ruler who saw public administration as a personal instrument and with little difference between the public and private spheres. Patrimonial systems were characterized by jurisdictional imprecision, casual chains of command, preparation for service through apprenticeship, part-time personnel, and verbal rather than written orders. In contrast, Weber’s model of bureaucracy posits jurisdictional precision, formal chains of command, selection based on testing after formal education, full-time personnel, written orders,56 and administrative personnel who follow “general rules that are stable and can be learned.”57 One synthesis of studies comparing Weber’s ideal features with those of actual administrative systems, however, argues for bureaucracy as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. The question then is degrees of bureaucratization rather than its presence or absence, since each element is present in varying levels that are neither especially correlated with one another nor correlated with the organization’s age and, particularly, its size. Hierarchy of authority appears to be an especially critical attribute, whereas technical competence and merit are not. Another study demonstrates that key and interrelated features of hierarchical authority, a stable system of communication and record-keeping (files), and continuity within an organization emerge from a “continuity of work load” that renders routinization and standardization of official tasks economical.58 Burke reminds us that since models need not be rigid but may incorporate the possibility of change, we might “focus not on bureaucracy but on the process of bureaucratization.”59 If the early modern period was a transitional phase between patrimonial and bureaucratic systems, then which end of the continuum was most characteristic of the foreign office bureaucracy under Torcy? Examining each of the six contrasting characteristics of Weber’s analysis outlined above suggests an answer. First, jurisdictional areas within the state were being defined more closely, especially in the period of the great wars of the 1690s and 1700s. Torcy and his colleagues clashed over what each regarded as interference in his area of responsibility, leading to the king’s intervention to resolve them. Rather than a lack of boundaries, such disputes demonstrate that even “precisely” defined jurisdictional parameters may be subject to nitpicking exactly because the boundaries are, on the surface of it, quite clear. Boundary disputes may result from a clash of interests as well as from imprecision.60 Slipshod definitions may be widely accepted or even desired and prove quite workable until challenged on grounds other than ambiguity.61 Moreover, bureaus battling over jurisdictional boundaries

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are hardly “non-bureaucratic” or “pre-modern,” since such combat can occupy so-called modern bureaucracies as well.62 The notion of “fixed areas” of jurisdiction implies a static situation, whereas the reality is typically administrative institutions in motion. They collide in their daily operation or as parts (by desire or default) take on new tasks or “clients” under changing circumstances. Bureaucrats may seek clear boundaries, but these are seldom drawn without friction, the need for outside mediation, or periodic revision. To characterize as patrimonialism Louis XIV’s power-grasping secretaries of state accumulating attributes and interfering in one another’s departments is to overlook the administrative empire-building, cronyism, and nepotism found in today’s bureaucracies. Weber himself expected that a bureaucracy would be under a “supreme chief” who held “his position of authority by virtue of appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession,” which by no means negated the fact that he presided over a bureaucracy.63 Despite the assumption of an unambiguous distinction between the public and private in modern bureaucracy, the everyday reality is otherwise, even in those bureaucracies where corruption is not rampant. One might ask, for instance, if functionaries are always scrupulous in abstaining from doing personal business on public time or with public property such as automobiles, telephones, and computers.64 Moreover, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the “New Public Management” in the English-speaking world aims at largely eliminating public bureaucracies and transferring their functions to private sector corporate bureaucracies explicitly focused on corporate profitability. Rather than delivering services, the remaining government agencies largely become “contract administrators” dealing with for-profit private interests delivering public services.65 While under Torcy the line between service to the foreign secretary in his bureaus and service in his household was not always crisp, and personnel in each could function on both sides of it, the two were nonetheless seen as distinct, albeit related, entities. Second, a clearer hierarchy of clerks emerged during Louis’s reign, ranging from young apprentices to senior clerks and secretaries. Hierarchy performed the vital function of creating a system of accountability.66 Even the way department clerks were paid suggested and reinforced both hierarchy and accountability. Third, the training of clerks was informal and largely on-the-job. Many were apprenticed from youth, often by a father, father-in-law, brother, uncle, or cousin, to take their place in the department. While this was seemingly at odds with the ­classic Weberian model, Weber himself noted that “‘examination for expertise’ … [is not]



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 25

an indispensable accompaniment of bureaucratization” and that even modern bureaucracies long used “in-service training and performance in party organizations as a substitute.”67 Outsiders entering the foreign ministry’s bureaus at its hierarchy’s upper levels had already acquired training and proven themselves elsewhere, as we shall see when we examine individual careers. Fourth, clerks served full time and most of their lives in the department, unlike household officials, most of whom served only part of a year. The payment of pensions to retired clerks and their surviving dependents was also consistent with a careerist outlook.68 Fifth, while some commands were given orally, they were increasingly in written form, with the secretary of state or another official annotating and correcting drafts or scribbling briefs note on documents for further action.69 In fact, the volume, organization, and preservation of paperwork increased markedly under Croissy and Torcy.70 Sixth and last, Torcy’s bureaus operated according to a stable set of general rules that the clerks learned and generally followed. While some of these were in written form, many were not, and precisely because of the stability of their application. On the basis of these characteristics of bureaucracy and the caveats about the reality of modern bureaucracy we have noted, we conclude that the foreign office under Torcy was closer to Weber’s bureaucratic model than to his patrimonial one.71 The growth of the infrastructure of the early modern state likewise preoccupies Michel Foucault, who borrows eclectically from sociologists, archaeologists, and historians to depict the state’s emergence from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in political terms as well as in its broader cultural context. His thesis is that centralized government energy was increasingly diverted to the problems of a growing and diverse urbanized population. In France this helped break the mould of an older jurisprudential conception of state sovereignty. The final decades of Louis XIV’s reign were convulsed by the challenges of three European/world wars and the attendant problems of health and population dislocation, steeply rising taxes, an increase in violence in the aftermath of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the divisive clash over the anti-Jansenist papal bull Unigenitus. Torcy’s department, given its additional domestic responsibilities, experienced them all. In Foucauldian terminology, the state’s “administrative apparatuses” responded to these challenges – albeit often inadequately – by demanding of its agents different “elements, dimensions and factors of the state’s power” that when considered together, “formed the major components of a new political rationality.”72 Foucault labels state centralization and its intrusion into

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areas of provincial and local government as “gouvernementalité,” inadequately translated into English as “governmentality.” The origin of the term is more helpful: “The semantic linking of governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them.”73 Governmentality expresses “a tacit renunciation of the view that [so-called] absolutism marks a more or less sharp transition to modern forms of power.”74 Rather than a break or sharp transition, there is an “expansion in the range and scope of governmental institutions.”75 In many ways governmentality seems to ­Foucault a more accurate and satisfying term than the largely obsolete and misleading jumble of concepts termed absolutism because “it offers a view on power beyond a perspective that centers either on consensus or on violence.”76 Scholars of public administration now label governmentality “governance,” a term increasingly nudging aside the label “public administration,” seen by many as too narrow in its focus. The emphasis now is on the “study of inter-jurisdictional relations and thirdparty policy implementation in public administration … [and] the study of the influence or power of non-state and non-­jurisdictional public collectives.”77 As far as the sources permit, we will place the functioning of Torcy’s bureaucracy in this wider context. This expansion of the state’s “range and scope” increased the circulation of paper between the centre and the farthest corners of the state and beyond. Louis XIV attempted to balance delegation of authority with careful control over his collaborators by establishing modes of working with councils and individual ministers so that the administration functioned efficiently and submissively while he also performed his indispensable ceremonial, social, and familial functions.78 The system that resulted allowed a remarkable continuity of command that survived the French Revolution.79 This continuity should not be exaggerated or construed in an overly linear manner, but it should not be ignored. Longevity in office by the king and his ministers was crucial to this stability.80 Once Louis XIV had come to trust his ministers, he tended to retain them in office, often for a lifetime. By far the longest-serving bureaucrat was Louis XIV himself, who held office for over fifty-four years. As Pomponne observed to a friend, the king understood the affairs of state better than any of his ministers.81 This longevity in office and continuity of service were hard to match in many states and created what ­Wolfgang J. Mommsen calls “a self-propelling process in time.”82 ­Continuity was also increasingly the norm among the clerks who staffed the ­departments



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of state, not so much because entrenched ministerial dynasties protected their clients but because ministers of whatever family or faction recognized the need for knowledgeable and skilled bureaucrats to project a department’s power.83 Charles Frostin has added much to our understanding of the administrative arrangements of the reign’s final decades, including Navy and Household Secretary Jérôme de Pontchartrain’s interference in his colleagues’ departments and attempts to extend the scope of his own “cumul” (accumulation) of functions. Frostin calls it premature to speak of bureaucracy under Louis XIV because the organization of central power remained fluid and imprecise, ministerial departments were illdefined, personnel were few, the lines of transmission were so insufficient and tangled that the result was “des approximations, des tâtonnements et des contradictions dans les ordres donnés” (approximations, guesswork and contradictions in the orders given), leaving considerable initiative to those charged with executing the centre’s commands.84 Such an evaluation, however, holds Louis XIV’s government to an unrealistic standard of bureaucracy and overlooks other approaches to the issue of state power.85 It ignores the fact that “Weber, of course, was constructing an ideal type, and we should expect bureaucracy to vary from the ideal type simply because the demands of actually operating an organization are likely to generate some unique problems that need to be solved.”86 Obviously, the context within which the Louisquatorzian system operated differed from that of Weber’s time. Yet even as a reflection of public administration in modern states during the past two centuries Weber’s model is of dubious validity if we lose sight of its idealized nature. Our notions of “modernity” and the “modern state” require a deeper look. Modernity is a temporal and a qualitative concept. In its temporal sense, it is more precise and yet in constant motion, limiting its explanatory value because the “modern” is continually outdated and updated with the passing of time. To ascribe to the past forces of modernization that are in the process of moving things toward the “modern” (i.e., the way they are now) not only decontextualizes the past but underestimates the present’s fluidity and complexity. Since we cannot assume we comprehend the present merely because we live in it, we must examine it carefully to assess the accuracy of our notion of it if we intend to use it to measure the past. As a qualitative concept, modernity (ironically) has a long pedigree but is regularly an omnibus term freighted with linear assumptions and teleological implications. The modern state has meant many things over the past two centuries and its meaning

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continues to change.87 What, for instance, has the breakup of so many states since 1989 or the devolution of power to regional governments (in France, for example, the very model of a modern centralized state) done to former assumptions about the meaning or inevitability of the modern centralized state? What of the international organizations and the non-­governmental organizations (ngos) that increasingly impose limits on state sovereignty and action? The European Union’s further political integration (or at least the shape it will take) is no longer as confidently assumed as it once was. Globally it appears that the forces of state disintegration and de-centralization are stronger than many analysts have heretofore supposed.88 A serious challenge to the Weberian concept of bureaucracy comes from organizational case studies that empirically test Weber’s conclusions with a qualitative methodology only to reveal bureaucracy’s “dysfunctions, such as rigidity, low output, and even subversion of organizational goals.” Yet later studies employing a quantitative methodology to whole organizations and their overall performance demonstrate that the positive effects of bureaucracy outweigh the negatives.89 How are these contradictory results to be reconciled? Contingency theory, developed since the 1960s, offers a notionally satisfying and empirically backed explanation. This paradigm contends that “organizational effectiveness results from fitting characteristics of the organization, such as its structure, to contingencies that reflect the situation of the organization.”90 It accordingly breaks with traditional, universalistic theories like that of Weber, which prescribes maximizing specialization (“tight job definition”) and formalization (“rules”) to achieve maximum organizational effectiveness.91 Instead, contingency theory “sees maximum performance as resulting from adopting, not the maximum, but rather the appropriate level of the structural variable that fits the contingency.”92 Contingency theory permits us to step back from the Weberian concept of bureaucracy to focus instead on the broader and more supple concept of organizational structure and then to imbed the concept of bureaucracy into it in a more flexible manner. Organizational structure has centred around two competing yet ultimately synthesizable structural models called “organic theory” and “bureaucracy theory” (figure 1.1). Organic theory posits two poles between which organizational structures run. At one pole, mechanistic structure is highly centralized, with decisions made at the top and those below performing tasks that are highly specified, reliant on documentary forms, and bound by rules from above. Mechanistic structures typically maximize specialization and formalization. At the

Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 29

Centralization of decision-making



High

SIMPLE

MECHANISTIC

bureaucratic theory

organic theory

Centralized decisionmaking + Low specializationformalization of jobs

Centralized decisionmaking + High specializationformalization of jobs

Best fit: small size

Best fit: task certainty

ORGANIC organic theory

Low

Decentralized decision-making + Low specializationformalization of jobs Best fit: task uncertainty Low 

BUREAUCRATIC bureaucratic theory Decentralized decision-making + High specializationformalization of jobs Best fit: large size High 

Specialization-formalization of jobs Figure 1.1 Organizational structures in organic and bureaucratic theory

opposite end of the organic theory continuum is organic structure, with little functional specialization and formalization and with decentralized decision-making. This is the best fit for an unstable environment because those in the middle and at the bottom of an organic structure possess the expertise that allows them greater initiative in dealing with this task uncertainty. According to organic theory, when the tasks to be performed are fairly regular (low task uncertainty) organizations trend toward the mechanistic pole, whereas high task uncertainty, requiring flexibility and innovation by experienced and knowledgeable subordinates, works best with an organic structure. Bureaucracy theory posits two different poles:

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bureaucratic structure at one end and simple/unbureaucratic structure at the other. Organic theory often focuses on environmental contingencies such as technological change that affect task uncertainty, whereas the operative contingency for bureaucratic theory is size, defined as the number of an organization’s employees. Bureaucratic structure, which is typically the best fit for larger organizations, shares with organic theory’s mechanistic structure both high specialization and formalization but not centralization; instead, bureaucratic structures control their personnel indirectly by embodying decisions made at the top in specialized jobs and formalized procedures. Simple structure is a better fit for smaller organizations because it permits the centralization of decision-making and thus requires low levels of specialization and formalization.93 Contingency theory allows a nuanced classification of organizational structures according to how well they fit the contingencies within which they function, especially size and task uncertainty. Therefore, after approximating the foreign office’s organizational structure along the two continuums proposed by organic and bureaucracy theories, we must address additional issues. At any given moment, what contingencies likely account for the department’s organizational structure and is that structure the best fit with those contingencies? Any changes in structure may also be interrogated with reference to possible adjustments to changing circumstances. This should permit a more fluid and realistic determination and assessment of the organizational structure of a foreign affairs department than allowed by the standard bureaucratic-ornot dichotomy or even a more sophisticated continuum of degrees of bureaucratization. This will require that we address the questions of the location of decision-making within the foreign office and the degree of job specialization and formalization between 1661 and 1715 to see if there was a noticeable shift, especially under Torcy. With the framework of contingency theory and these questions in mind, we will later propose some answers. It appears, then, that far from being an end toward which government necessarily evolves,94 the so-called modern bureaucratic and centralized state is one of many possible institutional outcomes and itself a shifting entity and concept.95 Moreover, we must ask if the implicit model of the modern state typically assumed is a reflection of modern reality or of an ideal.96 Scholars may reasonably and productively inquire about state change under Louis XIV and collaborators such as Torcy, but it is unhelpful to subject the results to an index of modernity that owes more to rationalistic theories than to historical and present practice.97



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Consider the following description of France’s governance. Locally, the central government’s resident representative and the local elite constitute a “dual elite” that excludes other local participants, including many economic interests, and cooperates “to adapt national regulations to local circumstances.” The local notables tend to accumulate offices that provide “access to higher levels of authority and [consolidate] local power bases.”98 A series of administrative reforms creates a situation where “in practice, the various sub-national authorities have overlapping territorial jurisdictions and loosely defined spheres of competence.” To make matters worse, “there is no formal hierarchy between them. No single authority can impose its will on any other, or prevent a rival authority from adopting policies in competition with its own.”99 Attempts at reform fail, even though there are those who argue that France has “too many layers of sub-national government.” This “complex and confusing structure” persists and worsens because “each reform adds a new layer, but is incapable of dispensing with the old.”100 It has been “a process of incremental accretion … New structures have been added to existing ones, without a fundamental overhaul of the territorial system as a whole.”101 In addition, the state “has usually accommodated interests, [such as those] framed in terms of maintaining social equilibrium,”102 while “the boundary between what is public and what is private is porous.”103 This description captures basic aspects and problems of government under the Sun King,104 but it is in fact a description of the functioning of public administration in much of France under the Third Republic and the Fifth Republic’s decentralization reforms under way since the 1980s. Administrative confusion, overlap, and lack of precision are familiar to early modern historians, but not as characteristics of French administration since 1789, usually regarded as “the model of the unitary state”105 owing to its long-assumed “bureaucratic” (i.e., hierarchical and rational) mode of operation. This raises an obvious question: are the workings of the foreign affairs department and the other parts of Louis XIV’s bureaucracy as unlike the bureaucracies of our own time as is usually assumed?106 Bent Flyvbjerg’s analysis of recent urban planning in the Danish town of Aalborg uncovers the ways in which planning, politics, and administration interact with the realities of power in a modern democratic state. He contends that the “project of modernity,” both among its theorists and those who attempt to implement it, “emphasize[s] the ideals of modernity but do[es] not examine modernity as it is actually e­ xperienced.

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­ odernity’s elevation of rationality as an ideal seems to result in, or M at least coexist with, an ignorance of the real rationalities at work in everyday politics, administration, and planning.” Flyvbjerg invokes ­Machiavelli’s warning that “a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way of self-destruction.” Focusing less on an idealized rationality and more on the actual workings of power is more illuminating because it “blurs the dividing line between rationality and rationalization” and allows us to see, following Kant’s pronouncement, the ways in which “the possession of power unavoidably spoils the free use of reason.”107 Thus, we should be wary of the uncritical invocation of “modern” and “rational,” terms that lead us to misjudge and misunderstand the early modern’s administrative arrangements as well as blind us to the realities of state-functioning today.108 As Kenneth J. Meier and Gregory C. Hill observe, “Bureaucracies are forged in the smithy of politics. The decisions to create such structures and maintain them, whether conscious or not, are made by political actors involved in the process of governance.”109 The most useful studies, then, are those that descend from helpful theoretical heights to test and ground their ideas in the contemporary context. Sharon Kettering’s work on clientelism’s positive contributions to state centralization also notes their persistence in our own world.110 Post-Napoleonic public administration professed a unitary and territorial model, yet its imperfect implementation created parallel and overlapping state networks that allowed the Third Republic’s local elites to negotiate with local and national political and administrative actors over the allocation of financial resources, exceptions to regulations, and other concessions from the centre that rendered the system flexible even if state-centric. Local political actors accumulated elective offices to strengthen their electoral base and to enhance their standing in Paris.111 This mania for office would not have surprised their nonelected early modern counterparts. It was a passion that administrators like Torcy sought to gratify for the good of the treasury as well as the central administration and provincial governance. As Richard Bonney aptly observes, at a certain level, “the history of the origins of the modern state is the history of patronage; it is not the history of institutions in itself.”112 John A. Rohr, in a comparative study of late twentieth-century French and American approaches to ethical issues, contends that “administrative systems cannot be divorced from national histories and administrative ethical standards are necessarily grounded in these specific



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a­ dministrative systems.” Compared with their American counterparts, he says, the “French rely much more heavily on tradition, respect for public service as a noble calling, and, quite literally, on an esprit de corps. The traditional respect for the public service in France is inextricably linked to the French tradition of ‘the state.’”113 To make sense of Torcy’s department requires that we contextualize it in the world in which it operated, including the social arrangements and assumptions that governed that society as well as its monarch.114 Louis XIV and Torcy acted locally through collaboration, but also sought to centralize power and reshape traditional institutions for greater efficiency and reliability. These goals were in “basic contradiction,”115 but such is the case in all but idealized governments. Real governments are by nature teeming with tensions and riddled with contradiction that must be explored rather than ignored.116 Modernity is hardly monolithic.117 Even when the foreign secretary’s department operated in a “bureaucratic” fashion, it could make use of practices seemingly antithetical to modern bureaucratic rationality such as venality of office.118 No less a critic of tradition than the British utilitarian Jeremy Bentham defended venality, arguing that better officials would come from families with the monetary means to purchase offices than from those gaining office due merely to birth or family connections.119 In the past one hundred years, powerful public employee unions, for instance, with a strong sense of public service yet also intent upon protecting their members, have provided salubrious job security but have at times resisted central direction and innovation, although not always without good cause or with negative consequences. While these powerful actors in current French government are not part of the state, they are sanctioned and empowered by it, as they and the bureaucracy are networked with one another and are but one example where, as in Torcy’s world, the private and the public are not sharply separated. In truth, today’s French state, like that of the ancien régime, functions within a network of complex interrelationships with non-public actors who share more in the exercise of state power than classic models of modernity and bureaucracy allow.120 Similarly, the idea of centralization needs to be reformulated in a less rigid, top-down manner, as historians are beginning to do for early modern England. Too often, as Edward Higgs notes, “local government is ignored, or seen as merely a limitation on proper state formation.”121 He argues that early modern England’s decentralized form of power nonetheless empowered the central state to act with vigour and decisively.122 Local government played a crucial role in gathering information, either

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for the central government or for its own purposes.123 Higgs suggests that we “see the state as power relations stretching out from the centre but incorporating local power elites … [A]s a dispersed network of power relations, rather than as a ‘thing.’”124 Perhaps rather than a set of relationships the state is a “set of processes whereby power and authority is exercised and reproduced. The actors in these processes can be varied and linked in changing constellations, and the ‘state’ is merely the term that certain actors call themselves when participating in such activities.”125 Steve Hindle, likewise from the context of early modern England, argues that governance expanded not from a one-sided initiative from the centre but from a dynamic dialogue between centre and localities based on particular and mutual needs.126 Since the 1990s, although its roots may be found some decades earlier, the concept of “governance” has emerged in the social sciences to shape what David Levi-Faur describes as “a research agenda that looked beyond the constitutional arrangements and formal aspects of the polity, politics and policy.”127 Instead, governance explores “new processes of governing,” “changed conditions of ordered rule,” and “new methods by which society is governed.”128 The thrust of governance theory and research is apparently on new responses to changes since the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to apply many of its insights to the early modern period and to Louisquatorzian France in particular.129 Governance theory’s notion that “authority is institutionalized, or at least can be institutionalized in different spheres, and by implication these arenas can compete, bargain, or coordinate among themselves or ignore each other” reflects what early modern scholars have discovered of the interactions of the royal government at Versailles with local entities and officials throughout the realm. Likewise, governance focuses on shifts “downward (to the local, regional, and the metropolitan), and horizontally (to private and civil spheres of authority).”130 Claus Offe, reflecting a “state-centred governance” perspective, observes that one finds the notion that governance can increase the intervention capacity of the state by bringing non-state actors into the making and implementation of public policy, thus making the latter more efficient and less fallible … The catchphrase of this doctrine is that the state should confine itself to steering and leave the rowing to other actors. One could also speak of auxiliary forces within civil society who, through appropriate means and according to their specific competences and resources, are being recruited



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for ­cooperation in the fulfillment of public tasks, become subject to regulatory oversight and economic incentives, and are thus licensed to privately exercise (previously exclusively) public functions.131 Offe goes on to say that for governance the “core intuition is that of a state-organized unburdening of the state” in order to achieve “a ‘leaner’ and at the same time more ‘capable’ state.” This description of developments during the past several decades might also be applied to an earlier period such that, perhaps Janus-like, governance’s development can be seen not only as something toward which states today are moving, but also as something away from which states moved after the early modern era and during their change into the forms they are retreating from today. In other words, governance conceivably is not so much something entirely new as it is a return to some of the structures, processes, and strategies employed by the early modern state. The metaphor of steering is particularly useful. Alistair Cole describes how France’s central government since the late twentieth century has employed it to deal with the increasing burden of governing. He connects steering with decentralization and the centre’s use of new agencies or local governments to carry out its will. While delegating these responsibilities and even assigning locals control of the allocation of the necessary financial resources, the central state nonetheless guides the final result by carefully defining and regulating it.132 This metaphor also usefully describes how Torcy and the other secretaries of state administered their provinces: a relatively small bureaucracy guided the collaboration of royal and local officials in carrying out the monarch’s will in constant dialogue with local interests.133 Thus, the ministerial departments at Versailles worked out a largely non-coercive method of getting a significant segment of provincial officials to cooperate with them134 and even adopt some of the centre’s administrative values, as when provincial governments, imitating the king and his ministers, patronized mapmakers for local administrative purposes.135 Moreover, as contingency theory demonstrates, not all parts of early modern administration had to be “bureaucratic” in the same way or to the same degree as one another, especially when comparing organizational structures at the centre with those in the provinces.136 In truth, the administration that Louis XIV “forged in the smithy of politics,” seemingly so deficient in administrative power when compared with its post-1789 counterpart actually functioned remarkably well in many of its endeavors.137 As Karl Deutsch suggested in his 1963 classic The Nerves of Government, “it might be

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profitable to look upon government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering.”138

T h e C o u rt at V e rsa il les : A Space for G ov e r n a nce In a religious paean to absolutism, Bishop Bossuet located Louis XIV not only in the lofty and divinely ordained celestial-terrestrial hierarchy, but also in mundane human space. “Consider the prince in his cabinet,” he proposed. “From thence flow the commands which coordinate the efforts of magistrates and captains, of citizens and soldiers, of provinces and armies … It is the image of God, who directs all nature from his throne in the highest heaven.”139 From the more profane medical viewpoint emerging during the seventeenth century, the king’s physical body, its health, and its location in space were also increasingly significant given the extreme personalization of power that resulted from Louis XIV’s decision to make all the major decisions and to live almost constantly in the public eye.140 Both perspectives point toward two enduring aspects of Louis’s kingship: the translation of many of the crown’s government offices to the palace and town of Versailles along with the royal court, and the redefinition of the role of the king’s household and especially his Cabinet in the affairs of state. One can hardly imagine Louis XIV without the setting of his palace and court. Far from being isolated, Louis XIV found himself in a court that was open to courtiers, officials, and visitors alike.141 He converted the chateau of Versailles from a country house to the seat of government. Later dedicated by King Louis-Philippe as a museum “to all the glories of France,” Versailles became a shrine to kingship long before the Sun King’s death in 1715. It was nonetheless a “working” shrine. Historians of the reign seldom describe the bureaucrats’ offices crowded into the detached wings in front of the palace, in the Hôtel de la Surintendance, or in alcoves and garrets of the palace proper. Yet a visitor to Versailles in the late seventeenth century would most likely pass through the outer court’s gates and enter what was known as the ministerial court, bounded on either side by detached ministerial wings known as the right wing and the left wing. They originally consisted of four separated pavilions of four storeys, topped by massive Mansard roofs, with each pavilion housing the official household and department of one of the four secretaries of state. Constructed from the beginning of the 1670s as the king and his entourage came increasingly to Versailles, in 1678 the two



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pavilions on each side were joined and dubbed a wing. The secretaries eventually moved from the more cramped rooms of the pavilions to the more spacious chambers in between. The foreign secretary had his residence and offices in the right wing.142 Basements and sub-basements for offices and for storage were possible because the wings were built on a surface that sloped down from the palace, and under the pavilions closest to the chateau were kitchens. The ground level housed, among other offices, the antechamber and the “cabinet” (office) of the secretary, while the first floor above the ground floor (i.e., the second floor) was occupied by his wife and contained official reception and dining rooms for the bountiful “table ouverte” (open table) secretaries typically hosted. On the floor above were more rooms for the family, but usually of a more private nature, since family might include more than children, such as Torcy’s sister Mme de Bouzols. Additional space for clerks and domestics was in the attics, lighted by skylights.143 Other space within the palace proper served as a stage for diplomatic activities. The Hall of Ambassadors was where the introducer of ambassadors received foreign representatives and then guided them across the courtyard and up the so-called Ambassadors’ Staircase to the royal apartments.144 This centralization of decision-making and administration is often equated with the term “absolutism.”145 Without entering into the seemingly endless although not completely unproductive debate over absolutism,146 one can be certain that the physical centralization of the king, court, councils, and departments of government meant that informed decisions could be made and implemented as quickly as early modern communication allowed.147 Jacob Soll rightly dubs the Great Colbert “the information master” because of his genius in adapting inherited techniques of gathering, processing, filing, and retrieving knowledge into a finely honed administrative tool.148 This clearly had a spatial dimension. As Hélène Himmelfarb observes, “By gathering all the reins of government around himself all year long, Louis XIV turned Versailles into much more than a residence; it was also an enormous administrative center, where a crowd of people came every day to the offices and agencies it housed with a thousand different requests.”149 Of course, ministers could attend to the king’s business from anywhere in the kingdom and even beyond its frontiers, as when Torcy journeyed to The Hague for peace negotiations in 1709. They could even do business while traveling, dictating to a secretary or annotating dispatches and other paperwork in a carriage as it bumped along the highway. Accompanied by a secretary and/or a premier commis, they could

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go to one royal palace or another and find there a place to stay and bureaus for work, as at Fontainebleau where the court resided for approximately six weeks each autumn.150 Almost a mile away from Versailles, the small Trianon Palace had a spacious room set aside for the king’s councils. At the palace-hermitage of Marly, almost four and a half miles from Versailles, several buildings just behind the main pavilion housed clerks of the secretaries of state. In 1698 yet another wing was added to the offices of the ministerial courtyards at Marly. Mme de Maintenon quipped that there was so much building going on that Marly would soon become another Versailles.151 Versailles with its permanently established bureaus, however, remained the fulcrum of activity. Another result of the establishment of a permanent, largely year-round residence at Versailles was the appearance of nearby palaces and minicourts created by various members of the royal family and princes of the blood. An observer called them princely planets revolving about the royal sun.152 The king’s ministers also constructed or renovated chateaus within the orbit of Versailles, as if they too rotated around the sun.153 Croissy and his son Torcy inherited the estate of Croissy from Torcy’s grandfather and added gardens designed by Le Notre. Not only architects, painters, sculptors, gardeners, and men of letters enjoyed their patronage, but cartographers did as well. It was especially during the reign’s last three wars that reduced royal largesse to map-­makers was supplemented by royal princes, especially the Orléans family, and by royal ministers such as Seignelay and the Pontchartrains.154 The central­ ization of power in the hands of departments, bureaus, councils, and cabinets was enhanced by their permanency and proximity to the prince, marking the end of “itinerant power” that was more medieval than modern.155 Another legacy of the centralizing process was the minute management of time made increasingly possible by the advances in timekeeping promoted by Louis XIV. From the king to the lowliest servant, all followed a timetable. The duc de Saint-Simon perceived this as tyranny and commented that when he was away from Versailles, he had only to look at his watch to know what the king and his court were doing. Louis scheduled and orchestrated daily life at Versailles, seasonal sojourns to other palaces, and great public events such as promotions into the Royal Orders of chivalry, elevations to the rank of the Marshal of France, and receptions of ambassadors. All was to be ordered and magnificent at Versailles to reflect its creator and his kingdom and to be the envy of the world.156



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Louis XIV’s magnificent court was celebrated in the latter half of the twentieth century by art and architecture historians as well as sociologists. Norbert Elias’s epoch-making work on The Court Society, written in the late 1920s and early 1930s, made its impact only a few decades ago. Jeroen Duindam, however, questions Elias’s “visionary image of humanity’s progress towards a world less hampered by eruptions of irrational drives and impulses” and the “cliché of tamed nobles at court [as] the ideal illustration of this process.”157 Recent research demonstrates that “nobles at court were far from caged and impotent,” and that the seductive accounts of Saint-Simon – so voluminous, so insistent, and seemingly so authoritative – must be used with care and only in conjunction with other sources. Indeed, the little duke’s popular “myth of Versailles,” perpetuated by many historians and adopted by Elias, posits a monarchical manipulation of his courtiers that rests on a few anecdotes. It is upon closer examination implausible because it reduces the courtiers to mere puppets and elevates the king to a level seemingly beyond human needs and limitations.158 Hillay Zmora calls the court “an arena for the development and representation of aristocratic as well as royal power, and therefore also for the balancing of aristocratic and royal interests.”159 The elites at the court of France often became power brokers interceding with the monarch and his ministers for the benefit of their provincial clientele. While there were risks in this dependence, the rewards nonetheless allowed them to tap into the growing state’s resources.160 David Parker correctly perceives that Versailles “was much more than a product of the king’s ego … most of the 3,000 or so nobles who were presented at court each year and the select few who secured lodging there did so because they wished to be there.”161 As Mme de Motteville quipped, “Versailles has become a great market place.”162 There the elites jockeyed for the privileges, offices, and other rewards distributed by the king and his ministers.163 The court was also an important marriage mart.164 Members of the great ministerial dynasties have been appropriately dubbed “mandarins-bureaucrats,”165 and it was to their public receptions and private audiences that Parisian and provincial favour-seekers hastened. Sharon Kettering grasps the essence of mandarin-bureaucrat clientelism when she argues, “[I]n a more integrated state with a stronger central government, such as late seventeenth-century France … a new, more impersonal basis for administrative relationships had to be found. The result was an emerging corps of public officials, a new royal bureaucracy.”166 Built paradoxically using clientelism, it tended to undermine

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the older great noble clientelism, although such exalted lay and clerical patronage never disappeared during the old regime.167 Moreover, there was already in place during Louis XIV’s reign a group of royal officials that made up the king’s household, both civil and military, directly linked to the mandarin system. The offices of the household permanently attached to the court by the fifteenth century were closely related in personnel and often overlapping in duties with the ministerial departments, but the next century witnessed the separation from the household of independent government departments.168 At the risk of provoking the Weberian purist intent upon seeing only patrimonialism in this period, this gradual divergence should not be pushed too far or too quickly. Duindam cautions that we “cannot easily separate the early modern court from the state; for most purposes this conglomerate of persons, institutions, and interests was the major theatre where the ‘state’ took form … The court was a steady point of contact for the major players of the realm … Power, at court and elsewhere, was a process reflecting changing balances among groups and persons, never a fixed outcome or an artefact.”169 The household and government shared a common workspace, often overlapping personnel, and above all, the same master. As Orest Ranum observes, “Direct relationship with the king in a clerk’s capacity might well describe their position, and it was from this humble beginning that the secretaries of state developed.”170 In terms of numbers of personnel and share of the royal budget, the central bureaucracy remained below the inner household, especially when the other royal households and all the services connected to the court are included.171 While the administration outside the household grew, so did the household itself, both in size and greater administrative efficiency through increased routinization and paperwork.172 The monarch spent his days and nights largely surrounded by household officials and servants, especially in the suite of royal apartments that was the particular domain of the “valets de la chambre” (valets of the chamber). In between court ceremonies, religious services, council meetings, formal audiences, entertainments, and other activities was what was called “the time of the valets” when the monarch was alone with these familiar and trusted figures with whom he could behave and converse more informally. The long-serving first valet Alexandre ­Bontemps for one was quite influential. While Louis XIV limited the size of the civil household,173 in the manner of the roi-bureaucrate he extensively reorganized certain household offices, including his Cabinet and the “Grande Écurie” (Great Stable).174 Louis also revived the award of



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the chivalric Order of the Holy Spirit and further increased its prestige by naming his ministers and secretaries of state as its officers, displaying a mature sense of the value of honorific titles and offices.175 By the end of his reign, the more fully articulated civil household embraced more than twenty-two great offices and departments.176 Withal it numbered over two thousand domestic officiers not counting the many servants who aided them, and at its most extended also included the households of the royal family. Many of the high officials were housed in the vast Grand Commons apartment complex at Versailles located immediately behind the ministerial wing of south wing.177 Most served only part of the year, or even every other year, but the rewards of office were as much about prestige as they were about pecuniary gain.178 Such practices violating Weberian principles persisted in one form or another well past the French Revolution.179 The royal household, both civil and military,180 was “the main theatre” of the changing administrative arrangements during this era.181 The household’s administrative departments became more articulated, stable (in part due to the practice of granting survivance to office), routinized, and animated by clerks armed with pens, paper, registers, and files. The household was also an important source of patronage, especially for the higher nobility, who were not generally attracted to administrative positions. Household officials, especially at the senior levels, typically accumulated military and provincial offices as well.182 The secretaries of state enjoyed offices in the household hierarchy and were well placed to suggest family and clients to fill vacancies. Croissy and Torcy, as will be seen below, placed important foreign office personnel in key positions enjoying the king’s presence. Much has been made since the nineteenth century of Louis XIV’s bed and bedchamber as the centre of the palace and the centre of the absolutist state. It was only in 1701 and without symbolic intent, however, that the king’s bedroom came to be in that location which previously served as the Grand Cabinet, with its three double doors opening to the Grand Gallery (the Hall of Mirrors), which was the monarch’s true “place of work, the site of royal audiences, and a center of government.”183 ­Himmelfarb brands this bed fixation “pure fantasy” and argues instead that the king’s “bedroom … played a secondary role compared to the Grand Cabinet.”184 While symbol-rich, colourful, and magnificent rituals at court, in the provinces, and at embassies abroad were critical elements of governance, it was nonetheless the mundane work of scriveners to translate these trappings of power into reality.

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The Cabinet (“Grand Cabinet” or “Cabinet du roi” and later “Cabinet du Conseil”) was in many ways the nerve centre of a bureaucratic web.185 In the royal apartments, whose extent and configuration changed over the reign, the king’s bedchamber was next to this Cabinet, and it was there that Louis met with his various councils. Although access to this space was carefully controlled,186 it was also where other important public events took place: audiences, state and dynastic ceremonies and announcements, and meetings of such august bodies as the Royal Orders. The Cabinet was connected by a door to the king’s private apartments, which in Louis XIV’s day comprised an extensive suite of nine small- to medium-size rooms that housed his various collections, including gems, coins, rare books, bronzes, and paintings.187 Unlike some of his princely contemporaries, Louis worked in his Cabinet nearly every day, reading documents and often consulting his valuable book collection. The art of map-making, which was fast becoming a Paris-centred science, fascinated him. An alcove in the Cabinet included a selection of recent maps of the world, Europe, and especially France, Paris, and its environs.188 The Cabinet was also the workshop of his four private cabinet secretaries (“secrétaires du Cabinet”), who held a privileged position within the bureaucratic hierarchy and served as liaison with the various ministerial departments and with the royal councils, especially the Conseil, the king’s closest advisors on the great matters of state. They set schedules, monitored the king’s calendar, coordinated his itineraries, and took the king’s dictation and drafted some of his letters. The most senior of these was the secretary of the hand (“secrétaire de la main”), said to have “la plume” (the pen) because of his ability to imitate the monarch’s handwriting in order to expedite paperwork. He served all year and resided at Versailles, while his colleagues served quarterly. The other cabinet secretaries could write a royal letter in their own hand or, for greater effect, imitate the king’s hand. Frequently, Louis XIV employed these secretaries to write letters that he deemed either “privileged” or too routine (such as New Year’s greetings) to be brought to his councils, although his secret message to Queen Anne during the negotiations that preceded Utrecht was in his own hand.189 The four secretaries of state, who continued to be named within the household as secretaries of the king’s chamber (“secrétaires de la chambre du roi”), also shared this privilege, which is a warning against drawing too fine a line between the administration of the king’s state and his household.190 The Cabinet was the setting for royal tête-à-têtes with members of the royal family, individual administrators, household officials, and a small



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group of close confidants.191 A frequent visitor was the lieutenant-­general of police, who carried news of the capital both scandalous and seditious. Invested with ever-widening powers, he carried out Louis XIV’s attack on sin in Paris and at court.192 The Cabinet was also where Louis happily received the retired minister Claude Le Peletier, who would come to Versailles from his estate at Villeneuve expressly for a discreet and private chat, slipping in and out of the palace so as to avoid the evercurious courtiers.193 Those who hoped to see the king typically waited outside its door.194 The vast and sprawling palace complex nevertheless facilitated swift communication between the king’s Cabinet and his courtiers and ministers. The king could send a message by means of a corps of pages on duty in rooms nestled next to the apartment’s small staircase. The chief valets “entered the king’s private apartments [Cabinet] at all hours and always by the back offices. Through [their] hands [passed] secret orders and messages, the private audiences, the sealed letters to and from the king.”195 Letters for Paris, the provinces, or points abroad if not posted by the regular mail were entrusted to cabinet couriers whose horses were in the “Small Stable” or the foreign ministry’s cellar.196 Even though only a small group performed its work, the Cabinet’s reach was wide and far. The palace-office complex of Versailles was the physical “centre” of the Sun King’s centralization efforts, and Torcy and his staff were a part of it. This hub embraced other nearby palaces and Paris to form the setting in which Torcy was born, educated, trained, and raised to great power, and in which, in conjunction with the roi-bureaucrate and the clerks of his own department, he shaped the conduct, institutions, and practices of diplomacy and administration. But like Greco-Roman statuary analysed from a misleadingly austere and abstract monochromatic perspective because time has denuded it of its original garish paint and non-stone accoutrements, buildings as well as administrative structures considered apart from the individuals who inhabited them lack colour as well as authenticity. Palaces without people are not even museums, for museums are filled with people, albeit now in quite different roles, and bureaucratic institutions without people become perfectly abstracted machines that never existed and never will. It is thus appropriate that we turn from brick and mortar edifices and organizational systems to examine the career of the individual who animated and led the foreign office during Louis XIV’s final two decades.

2 Torcy’s Preparation for and Rise to Power

The life of Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy (14 September 1665–2 September 1746) reveals not only an efficient administrator, distinguished diplomat, and celebrated statesman, but a man of wit, probity, and humanity, qualities that served him well in the early years of the Enlightenment. These traits were the fruit of a carefully prepared and guided education in which his family played a significant part. As well as being immersed in both the Greek and Roman classics, he formally studied law and experienced a thorough-going schooling in aesthetics. With access to the incomparable libraries amassed by members of the Colbert circle, he read widely and knew many respected contemporary scholars. Torcy grew up during a period of significant change in the crown’s attitude toward and management of information that would shape his own attitudes and actions and mark diplomatic practice throughout Europe. His travels abroad on the king’s behalf added breadth, depth, and sophistication to this education and gained him the diplomatic experience, knowledge of foreign languages and courts, and contacts that Louis XIV regarded as necessary for his foreign secretary.1 Torcy rounded out this careful preparation for royal service with years of experience labouring in the bureaus of his father, the marquis de Croissy, among the documents and alongside the clerks who were the heart of this bureaucracy. One of Croissy’s significant accomplishments as foreign minister had been to gain a monopoly of the contact that foreign diplomats had with the king’s ministers. Previously, diplomats had approached any minister with whom they had a good rapport or to whose department they thought their business best related. That minister would then report the matter to the Conseil. Croissy, with his brother Colbert’s backing, however, insisted that henceforth all diplomatic contact with the Conseil



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pass through him. The king agreed and even Louvois was fairly scrupulous in complying with this, although the latter nonetheless retained an informal network of informants for his own use.2 Croissy was diligent in holding regular audiences for the foreign diplomats and then, probably after speaking with the king, forwarded to his colleagues anything that concerned their departments or, if the matter warranted, reported it to the Conseil for discussion.3 This, coupled with reading incoming diplomatic dispatches and drafts of replies, made him the Conseil’s reporter on all foreign affairs and afforded him significant control over the flow of diplomatic information to the king and his ministers, a theme to which we will return. Yet when Croissy died in 1696, the minister who replaced him as reporter was not his son and survivancier Torcy, but Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, whose disgrace as foreign secretary in 1679 had made possible Croissy’s appointment to that office.4 ­Pomponne, recalled to the Conseil in 1691, regained neither the secretary of state’s office nor control over the foreign office’s administration in 1696, which both fell to Torcy, so the two had to work together. What could have been a tense association, however, was instead a happy and productive mentoring relationship between the two, and it was sealed by a marriage alliance. While less than half Pomponne’s age, Torcy was his co-worker, and he was appreciated and pushed forward by his mentor until the king invited him into the Conseil as a minister who would help formulate policy. As Torcy rose in royal service he saw to it that his family (figure 2.1) and that of his wife, the Pomponnes, shared in these opportunities for positions, advancement, honours, and wealth. The benefit was mutual, as these kin in turn aided and supported Torcy and his department in their diplomatic work. Indeed, to consider early modern political figures apart from their relationships misses too much of their context and story. Yet it would be a mistake to push family solidarity too far by confounding cohesion on defending common interests with constituting an ideological bloc.

Y o u t h a n d Educati on Torcy was born to Françoise and Charles Colbert de Croissy on 14 September 1665 at the Paris home of his maternal grandfather, councillor of state Joachim Béraud, sieur de Croissy-en-Brie. At the Colbert’s parish church of Saint-Eustache on 23 September, Torcy’s famous uncle, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, held his nephew, godson, and namesake at the baptismal font while the Colbert clan, clients, and friends looked on.

Figure 2.1a Genealogical chart: the Colberts

Figure 2.1b Genealogical chart (continued): the Colberts

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From Torcy’s very first days he was nurtured, and he lived much of his life within the context of family that embraces all one’s kin.5 His father, known in the 1660s as President Colbert, ranked among the state’s administrative elite and had recently purchased two prestigious offices: “maitre des requêtes” (master of requests, handling requests and complaints made to the king) and “président à mortier” (a senior judge) in the Metz parlement (soon exchanged for a presidency in the Paris parlement). Since the late 1650s he had served as a “commissaire” (commissioner) on leave from the Council of State, representing the king first in Alsace, then in the central provinces of Touraine, Poitou, Maine, and Anjou, and, as of 1663, in distant Brittany. Croissy’s career was made possible in large part by his brother Jean-Baptiste Colbert, minister of state, household and navy secretary of state, controller general of finances, and superintendent of royal buildings. Torcy’s maternal grandfather, Joachim Béraud, was one of the Chancellery’s four grand audienciers de France (first officers who received letters to be sealed). Françoise Béraud, Torcy’s mother and Joachim’s only daughter, brought to her marriage an impressive dowry of 276,000 livres and the promise of inheriting her father’s estates. In anticipation of this inheritance, President Colbert began styling himself as Colbert de Croissy and his eldest son took his title, chevalier de Torcy, from one of his grandfather’s estates.6 Croissy’s rise in royal service meant that he was often absent from his children in the provinces or abroad. Therefore, the earliest sustained influence in the life of Torcy (figure 2.2) and his brother Charles-­ Joachim, born in June 1667, was that of grandfather Béraud, in whose house they lived and with whom they studied and traveled until Torcy was seven and his brother five. Béraud was an enlightened state servant not only experienced in matters of business but also widely read in the Latin classics, modern literature, and ancient and modern philosophies. He had lavished his love of literature and the arts on Françoise, who in turn did the same with her children. Although Mme de Croissy possessed a sound business sense, she was very much the aristocratic grande dame of admirable good taste. While in England as ambassador’s wife, she was a valuable support to her husband in his many duties.7 Croissy later possessed a fine library, but unlike the traditional library of the humanist-educated gentleman, Croissy’s reflected the influence of his brother Jean-Baptiste and the “evolution toward technical libraries for state administrators … [that] was a direct product of his technical training and positions in state administration and diplomacy.”8 Thus the



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Figure 2.2 Torcy as a youth

roughly 10 per cent of his collection devoted to religion and the classics was far outweighed by the 50 per cent focused on history and the 30 per cent comprised of legal and political texts. By 1680 he had gathered the nucleus of a law library, which he bequeathed to Torcy, who had begun his own study of law.9 Croissy did not neglect modern languages. It was while in the German-speaking Alsace as intendant that he acknowledged to his brother a growing sense that he needed to learn the language.10 He became so proficient in German and knowledgeable of German law, that the king’s Conseil recognized him as an expert on German affairs, which served him well at the Congress of Nijmegen. Following his father’s example, Torcy hired a tutor in German who accompanied him on his own visits to Brandenburg, Denmark, and Sweden.11 He likewise followed his father’s lead in religion and was punctilious in the observance

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of his religious duties, but he was a staunch Gallican – like Croissy – who, though trained by Jesuits, mistrusted them. Colbert’s duties as uncle and godfather assured Torcy a favoured place among his cousins. As head of a powerful ministerial family, C ­ olbert became perforce a power broker, an indispensable link to a patronage network that extended beyond Paris to remote centres of provincial power.12 He granted his nephew access to his private library on rue ­Vivienne, one of the most extensive in Europe, and to the Royal Library under his control located a block away. Both formed the core of the empire of information collection and management he constructed to free Louis XIV’s central administration from dependence on the parlements and other traditional bodies for knowledge of the kingdom.13 With access to the library went the ability to consult Colbert’s distinguished librarian and legal expert Étienne Baluze, whose correspondence gives us a glimpse of library privileges. Colbert, for example, instructed Baluze to search the library for a portfolio containing several English treaties with his notes on them that he had loaned Croissy when he was ambassador to England.14 These treaties dealt with tariffs that were under consideration at Nijmegen and so were invaluable references for Ambassador Croissy. When the Treaty of Nijmegen was finally brought before the Paris parlement in 1679, Colbert wrote Baluze on his brother’s behalf inquiring as to the exact title Louis XIV should use in saluting such crowned heads as the queens of Spain and England.15 In December 1681 Colbert requested that Baluze send him any volumes he could find on Morocco’s history so that Torcy might compile a brief survey from it, but if he failed to find relevant materials in the library, he might inquire of the royal historian François Eudes, sieur de Mézeray, if his notes to the histories of France contained information on North Africa. In July 1682 Croissy wrote Baluze on his son’s behalf about the history of the principality of Orange, then under blockade by French troops.16 Baluze’s many kindnesses were not forgotten when Torcy years later defended the librarian’s loyalty before the king in the Conseil and had him recalled from years of exile for scholarly work done for the disgraced Cardinal de Bouillon.17 More than being a kindly uncle sharing books, Colbert trained his brother and nephew in his methodology of government based on amassing, arranging, storing, retrieving, and marshaling information. Croissy’s apprenticeship as a provincial intendant ensured his initiation into the Colbertian role of “bureaucratic informer.”18 Indeed, the foreign office’s official archives that Croissy and later his son developed owed much to the powerful



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and innovative library/archival system created by the Great Colbert before his death in 1683.19 In 1680 Torcy completed a thesis for a master’s degree in philosophy whereupon his father took him to Versailles to present a printed copy to Louis XIV, who was pleased with the flattering frontispiece depicting the king crowned by Immortality.20 When Croissy’s household moved to a recently purchased large residence on rue Vivienne, Torcy commenced cataloguing the books and manuscripts that Croissy had acquired in England and the Netherlands. He also undertook a short course in aesthetics, reading works on architecture and art that would lead him to amass a celebrated collection of paintings, tapestries, and sculpture.21 His concurrent study of the law led to a degree in September 1683, after which he took his oath as an “avocat” (attorney).22 The time for practical immersion in the world and work of diplomacy and administration had arrived.

T r av e l a n d A pprenti ceshi p Carefully and broadly educated, Torcy now entered a period of travel and apprenticeship. The need to travel while young was critical. The Venetian ambassador, wanting to take his leave of the foreign secretary, wrote Croissy to see if he was coming to Paris, but Croissy replied that since being a minister of state meant that he must always be where the king was, the ambassador was obliged to visit him at Versailles.23 Croissy, who had gained much from his years abroad, saw to it that Torcy had an opportunity to travel before such peregrinations became largely impossible.24 Torcy’s travels began early. When he was eight, he joined his father in England, and at age seventeen, he and his parents accompanied Louis XIV on a four-month tour through Bourgogne to Franche-Comté and Alsace.25 A trip to Germany by way of Montbelliard, down the Rhine to Mainz, and then to Heidelberg was likely projected for Torcy sometime thereafter but never took place.26 In January 1684, no doubt at Croissy’s suggestion, Louis XIV commissioned Torcy, his extraordinary envoy, to carry condolences and felicitations to Pedro II, former regent of Portugal, on his accession to the throne after his brother Afonso VI’s death. Torcy was also to seek an audience with the ailing queen, Marie Françoise of Savoy-Nemours, and the unmarried Infanta Isabel Luísa, Pedro’s only heir. After he departed Versailles, however, Torcy’s mission grew when word arrived of the queen’s death the previous month, requiring additional condolences.27 More than forty gentlemen and domestics accompanied Torcy, including

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two particularly valuable companions: Étienne-Jachet du Pré, who knew Iberia well, having served in Madrid as secretary and chargé d’affaires; and Guillard, a foreign office propagandist and intelligence agent. Croissy urged his son to confer with them daily to learn what they had gathered from their own observations and reflections.28 Torcy traveled to Rochefort, where he was welcomed by navy intendant and Colbert client Pierre Arnoul, who ordered a frigate to carry the party to Lisbon; they crossed the stormy Bay of Biscay in record time, docking in the Tagus on 16 March 1684. Torcy remained in Portugal for ten months, the longest stay of his Grand Tour.29 The young visitor was welcomed by the veteran diplomat, septuagenarian Melchior de Harod de ­Senevas, baron then marquis de Saint-Romain, of a noble Lyonnais family, a friend of grandfather Béraud and Croissy’s associate. Saint-Romain’s 1683–85 posting to Portugal was his second, the first having been in 1666–71. Regarded as a friend of the House of Braganza, Saint-Romain stood in Louis XIV’s stead as godfather to Pedro’s daughter.30 Under his aegis, Torcy was granted a private audience with Pedro two days after his arrival that proved most auspicious. Pedro, often blunt and irascible, seems to have taken an instant liking to Torcy. He was also well received by the Infanta, whose possible marriage was of continuing interest to the French court.31 Torcy impressed all he met at court, including the Count of Tarouca, who would one day represent Portuguese interests at Utrecht.32 Under Saint-Romain’s guidance, Torcy wrote his first dispatches to Louis XIV and Croissy. Before his departure, his father wrote a set of personal directives for the fledgling envoy, barely eighteen years old. He began with a reminder that zeal for the master’s reputation had to be tempered with prudence so that the reasonable desire for personal distinction did not lead him to naïveté or folly. Croissy contended that unlike soldiers who could merit royal esteem by risking their lives, diplomats could do so only by speaking and writing well. Thus, Torcy’s dispatches were to be full of detail and local colour, yet written in clear and precise terms. Style was to be correct yet natural and easy, avoiding metaphor and allegory, since the king preferred a conversational style to insipid praises and favoured robust and detailed description to fulsome flattery.33 What Croissy might have added was that Louis XIV, unable to travel abroad except to the battlefront, lived vicariously through descriptions sent him by his envoys and agents.34 Torcy likewise received detailed instructions on what the king expected in diplomatic reports.35 The envoy should describe the character, the



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inclinations and “la génie” (the spirit) of the prince, his diplomatic alliances, and the reasons for his dynasty’s friendships and enmities. He should observe closely all the ceremonies that followed Pedro’s coronation. Precise details were required concerning principal fortresses, army and navy size, crown revenues, and royal favours awarded. The king wanted an assessment of the strategic and economic value of the colonies Portugal still possessed, especially those in Africa, the East Indies, and Brazil. Finally, he should examine the nature of Portugal’s Cortes and judicial system. The instructions finally insisted broadly that there was nothing about Portugal unworthy of reporting to the king.36 This was a daunting list, even with Saint-Romain’s help. However, Torcy’s initial dispatch seems to have satisfied Louis and his foreign secretary, although Croissy felt compelled to add that he found the letter rather short and dry.37 Torcy laboured on the next round of reports to give more detail, such as the pedigrees and intermarriages of the great noble houses. Croissy’s reply was positive, noting the greater accuracy and detail than in the earlier account. However, he reproved Torcy for using the formal “vous” for its modesty or his desire to please that also led him to take a place lower than was his right at the Portuguese court, something prejudicial to the king’s dignity given that any honour he was shown in Lisbon was due to his being Louis XIV’s envoy.38 Indeed, Torcy would learn the following year just how punctilious his master could be in matters of protocol. In a later dispatch, Croissy reiterated that the king only regarded an individual’s merit, virtue, and ability and that the services of fathers and relatives were not substitutes.39 These parental admonitions came at a crucial moment when the young diplomat was far from home, family, and his usual trusted advisors. Croissy, anxious that he perform his duties with distinction so that the king would speak well of him on his return, at times sounded shrill and his advice seemed ponderous, yet whether it was because Torcy was a better pupil or because Croissy was a gentler taskmaster, Torcy’s tutelage under his father seems to have been less excruciating than it was for other survivanciers.40 Argoud, Seignelay’s agent in Lisbon, kept him informed of his cousin’s activities with a steady stream of letters about his travel plans, Croissy’s compliments to Saint-Romain, and Torcy’s companions. Argoud also carried out several errands on Torcy’s behalf, hoping to be rewarded when they were reported to Croissy but unsure that Torcy, who he regarded as timid, would press his case with his more forceful father.41 By October 1685 Argoud was at Versailles, preceding Torcy by some months and seeking Croissy’s favour by means of Seignelay’s good offices. The

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­ olbert librarian Pierre Clairambault helped him acquire a room near C his bureau and put him to work, while Croissy’s premier commis JeanLouis Bergeret offered his good offices, assuring him that his service to Torcy in Lisbon would enhance his standing with the minister. In addition, Clairambault put him in contact with Callières, whose recommendation would carry further weight.42 As Argoud’s letters reveal, Torcy was already imbedded in the patronage system that animated the ­Colbert administrative apparatus as well as the foreign office. In April 1685 Croissy wrote Torcy that his return plans were still undecided, awaiting the outcome of a possible peace settlement between France and Spain and her allies. If the war continued, Torcy was to return home by sea in the same vessel that had borne him to Lisbon, but if peace came, he would return by land through Spain.43 When Luxembourg surrendered on 4 June to French besiegers, prospects for peace increased and Croissy instructed Torcy to have his farewell audience right away so as to be ready to depart for Madrid upon word from Versailles.44 By the middle of June prospects for peace matured, as did the secretary’s plans for his son’s travels, with all of Italy now added to the itinerary.45 By late August, with no general truce yet concluded, Torcy was instructed to remain in Lisbon but assured that the Madrid visit was to proceed and given more detailed instructions about his conveyance, lodgings, and a hoped-for audience with Carlos II and his French queen, Marie-Louise.46 Although a wait for Spanish passports brought further delay, Croissy wryly wrote on 10 September that since the truce contained nothing about an exchange of prisoners, his son should be careful not to add to their number by departing without the necessary documents.47 Twelve days later Croissy reported that ratifications had been exchanged for the Truce of Ratisbon (signed 15 August 1684) and Torcy could therefore depart, but now Louis XIV desired that his visit be “incognito,” that is, in an unofficial, private capacity, in order to forego the usual protocol and ceremonial formalities.48 On the eve of Torcy’s departure, Saint-Romain, shrewd politician and wise mentor, wrote to Croissy summing up his visit. Admiring the discretion and prudent conduct of one his age in dealing with Portugal’s king, the ambassador astutely observed that Croissy’s son was “capable de gouverner les gouverneurs memes” (capable of governing the governers themselves).49 Pedro II and the Infanta were so impressed with the young envoy that at his farewell audience they presented him with a more considerable gift than normally given to foreign envoys.50 Torcy departed in late November or early December and was received with honours and



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by royal order allowed to tour the arsenals and fortresses he passed in Portugal, arriving in Madrid on 21 December 1685.51 Torcy shortly received an audience with Queen Marie-Louise, daughter of Louis XIV’s brother Philippe d’Orléans, who was overjoyed to talk with a countryman and a young one at that, fresh from the court at Lisbon and, more importantly, from that at Versailles. She invited him to several court entertainments where he mixed easily, facilitated by his knowledge of Spanish and his unofficial status; she lent him carriages to visit nearby royal palaces; but most importantly, she interceded on his behalf for an audience with Carlos II.52 Symbolically, the Spanish monarch’s meeting with a French diplomat, even one traveling incognito, was of great importance to the French court. Spain and France had been at war intermittently for over a decade, so few French envoys had resided in Madrid, let alone been afforded a glimpse of the reclusive Carlos. Torcy knew that Louis XIV would read his description of Carlos and his court with great interest. It was a testing time. Carlos was standing by his desk when Torcy arrived for his audience. Torcy described him as small of stature, with flowing blond hair, a high forehead, blue eyes, a long pinched nose, large mouth, exaggerated lower lip, and a chin that showed a hint of a blond goatee. Turning to the king’s character and innate disposition, Torcy reported that Carlos was known to be scrupulously devout and in conversation often brusque and easily roused to anger. He enjoyed hunting, even in the most inclement weather. Toward his wife, Marie-Louise, he displayed loving tenderness, and she in turn watched over him with an almost maternal concern. Torcy believed the queen wielded considerable political power, an assessment that wiser heads at Versailles probably discounted. Likely most startling to both Louis XIV and Croissy was the realization that Carlos was certainly not the imbecile or invalid that some agents had reported. Indeed, he was seemingly in good health and might live for many more years (fifteen, as it happened).53 Torcy sketched portraits of all the members of the king’s council, knowing the value of such information for those formulating policy at Versailles. It would also form the foundation of his own knowledge of the Spanish court that would one day influence his thinking about whether or not to accept the testament of Carlos II. He completed his Spanish interlude with a courtesy visit to the king’s mother, Marianna of Austria, widow of Philip IV, sister of ­Leopold I of Austria, and a former regent who was still politically powerful.54 Delighted to hear Torcy speak Spanish, in a moment of cordiality she ordered her rooms in the Buen Retiro, like

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the Escorial a storehouse of Spanish art treasures, opened to the young Frenchman.55 In mid-December Torcy still projected a trip to Italy by land via Lyon rather than by sea routes via Bayonne or Barcelona, but by February his father wrote urging him to say his adieus and return to Versailles as quickly as possible.56 Louis and Croissy were so pleased with his Iberian sojourn that the secretary had had his dispatches from Portugal transcribed and bound in a volume for the king’s future consultation.57 Torcy’s daughter, having later found nothing in his papers to explain his sudden recall, speculated that perhaps Croissy had given in to his son’s desire for further travel or had already himself another mission in mind.58 In any event, Torcy hastened to obey, arriving at Versailles on 25 March, where five days later Louis XIV received him with favour, according to the Gazette de France, and was especially pleased with his account of Spain.59 Basking in the warmth of the Sun King’s praise, Croissy gained permission to send Torcy on a new mission as extraordinary envoy to Denmark with letters of condolence on the death of King Christian V’s mother, and on 13 April 1685 the Gazette de France announced this new appointment.60 Barely a month after his return from over a year in sunny Iberia, Torcy departed Versailles on 3 May 1685 and Paris eleven days later for the mists and cold of Scandinavia and the Baltic.61 As he traveled, a letter from France’s ambassador in Copenhagen, Antoine, marquis de Villars, reached Versailles with news of changes in protocol at the Danish court that threatened to disrupt the mission. Imitating an innovation at the English court, Christian V decided to receive foreign envoys while seated and wearing his hat rather than standing and hatless as he had done in the past. Other foreign envoys in Copenhagen joined Villars in resisting this change as prejudicial to the dignity of their masters, but not wanting a break with Denmark, they engineered various clever face-saving but nonetheless trying ways around it. Torcy received orders to wait in Hamburg while diplomats in Copenhagen and at Versailles worked toward a resolution.62 Traveling again with du Pré, an écuyer, a secretary, and several servants, Torcy passed through The Hague, where he conferred with one of France’s most astute ambassadors, Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux, who was balanced in his judgments, patient in negotiation, and proficient in the art of language. Like Saint-Romain, d’Avaux was impressed with Torcy, especially with his knowledge of the Dutch government.63 Journeying through northern Germany, Torcy lingered five



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days at the Hanoverian court of Brunswick-Lüneberg at Bruckhausen, a hunting lodge near Celle where he was well received by the Duke of Celle, George William, and his duchess. He wrote home that it was hard to believe he was in Germany, since they spoke only French and most of the officers were French.64 After a journey of a day and a night, he arrived in Hamburg on 15 June, staying with the local French resident, another veteran diplomat, Abbé Étienne Bidal d’Asfeld, and awaiting word to proceed.65 More difficulties delayed and then threatened to abort Torcy’s Danish mission unless perhaps he was received by Christian V in the Duchy of Holstein or in Norway, away from the court at Copenhagen and with the full honours formerly accorded French envoys. Meanwhile, a contingency plan developed in early June to send him to the Brandenburger and Saxon courts and then to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.66 Perhaps while in Hamburg Torcy conceived of extending his Danish trip to Sweden. Croissy consented, but only if Torcy made it clear to the suspicious Danes that he went only out of personal curiosity.67 Even when the Danish visit was again on track, plans for an extended visit encompassing German courts persisted and soon included a trip to Sweden, a Baltic crossing to Danzig, and even a journey south to Warsaw to see Polish king John III Sobieski. It was an ambitious itinerary but one that promised the valued first-hand observations relished by the king and Croissy and that would secure the contacts, information, and experience essential to a young man expected one day to serve as foreign secretary. By 9 August, however, the advancing season led Croissy to urge against such an extended itinerary. Torcy nonetheless still hoped to complete a voyage that promised rich rewards.68 Following a compromise and according to its terms, Torcy finally sailed from Hamburg on 9 July for the port of Larvik on Norway’s south coast just west of the Oslofijord, where far from court protocol he could be presented to King Christian in a manner that conformed to previous practice. Few other foreigners, let alone Frenchmen, had visited the rugged coastal towns of Norway, well guarded by natural forces of submerged rocks, fierce winds, and booming surf.69 Christian and Torcy developed such an easy rapport that when the king’s party returned to Copenhagen, the king himself conducted Torcy on a visit through the arsenal and harbour fortresses, inviting him to inspect the map depot and even permitting him to purchase maps for the French foreign archives. During his sojourn in Copenhagen, Torcy displayed a flicker of independence when his wish to visit Sweden persisted despite

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Croissy’s misgivings. France and Sweden, Croissy explained, were diplomatically on the coolest of terms, but he finally assented with the provision that Torcy travel unofficially. As it happened, Charles XI’s reception of the young diplomat was nearly as frigid as the weather in Stockholm. Nevertheless, Torcy charmed yet another queen mother, Hedvig-Elenora, Charles X’s widow.70 Torcy next visited Berlin, where he was well received by the “Great Elector” Frederick William, who presented him with a rich gift. Informed of this, Croissy wrote Torcy that he understood why he had accepted this token of esteem in light of his earlier reticence about accepting princely gifts, but cautioned him that he was not to accept any future presents because he was not traveling in an official capacity. Croissy blamed himself for not explaining this diplomatic subtlety earlier. In the event, however, the king desired the gift returned, and Torcy was to do so through France’s Berlin ambassador with all necessary diplomatic finesse. In this same letter, Croissy noted approvingly the cancellation of a side trip to Cologne, urging his son to hasten to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.71 Passing through Dresden, Torcy arrived in Ratisbon on 30 November 1685, where he lingered for three months under the tutelage of Ambassador Louis de Verjus, comte de Crécy, an experienced diplomat, pamphleteer, and art connoisseur. Torcy observed at first hand Crécy’s delicate negotiations concerning the Palatine succession and the rights of the king’s sister-in-law. He also experienced at first hand the enduring diplomatic importance of Latin: although Germans had no problem with oral communication in French, each document presented to the Imperial Diet had to be in Latin.72 One Englishman at Ratisbon claimed that the presence of “Torsie” enlivened Carnival because of the balls and masquerades given in his honour.73 Torcy sent Croissy character sketches of the ministers he encountered, lastingly useful in negotiations with the Imperial Diet in the coming years. He then descended the Danube by boat to Vienna at the end of February 1686, was feared lost when high winds wrecked several boats, but arrived safely on 7 March, remaining in Vienna for two and a half weeks to draw perceptive portraits of Leopold I and his court.74 Journeying on to Munich, he met with Elector Max Emmanuel, with whom he would work closely in the future, presenting him with a letter of recommendation from the elector’s sister, the wife of Dauphin Louis de France (known also as “le Grand D ­ auphin” and “Monseigneur). Lingering in Bavaria only a few days, Torcy then hastened to cross the Alps for a short stay in Venice, but not before reporting to his father that he had seen the elector’s



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palace, whose rooms he considered the most beautiful he had seen in Germany.75 In Venice Torcy’s visit created more of a stir than he had hoped. The French ambassador, to preserve diplomatic honour locally, insisted Torcy stay with him rather than in rented lodgings, while the Republic planned to shower him with parting gifts. This led him to slip out of the city under cover earlier than planned.76 Clearly, he had taken to heart his father’s instructions about accepting gifts! Journeying south led him through Mantua, where he was well received by the duke.77 Most of his time in Italy, however, was spent in Rome, where he arrived at the end of May and remained for five months, except for a short journey to Naples. He lodged at the Farnese palace with his hosts the French envoys, César, the cardinal d’Estrées, and his brother, François-Annibal, duc d’Estrées.78 The cardinal introduced Torcy into Roman society and especially to the salon of Louise-Angélique La Trémoille, Princess Lanti, and her sister Marie-Anne de Trémoille, duchesse de Bracciano and later the princesse des Ursins, with whom he would later be in close contact in his dealings with Bourbon Spain. Both ladies from the great French family of Trémoille had married into the powerful Roman Orsini family and supported a French party in the heart of Rome. Bracciano opened her palace, country villa, and acquaintanceship of several Roman ladies to the French voyager.79 After receiving news that Torcy had left Vienna for Munich, Croissy had sent him instructions for his Italian journey, especially for the important visit to Rome. He urged him to follow the d’Estrées brothers’ counsel in his relations with the cardinals and the Holy Father and to observe whenever possible the talents, character, interests, and inclinations of each of the cardinals, particularly those who could one day be elected pope.80 Perhaps betraying some mild frustration, Torcy informed his father that the cardinal d’Estrées had limited his visits with the other cardinals, even though many had asked to visit him, because d’Estrées said that his experience with past visitors to Rome taught him that otherwise he would end up wasting valuable time. Possibly d’Estrées was anxious as well to limit this potential rival source of first-hand information to the foreign secretary by subtle management of Torcy’s contacts in Rome. Besides limiting the young man’s access to Their Eminences, he kept him busy with the Eternal City’s sights.81 This accorded with Croissy’s earlier urgings that Torcy examine Rome’s antiquities and learn good taste in painting, architecture, and sculpture, all of which should not be neglected at his age, since it would be of use one day.82 As one who hoped

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to serve a monarch who considered himself a connoisseur, Torcy likely appreciated this sage paternal advice. Torcy was pleased to report that he witnessed a cardinal receive his hat in a ceremony that had not taken place in five years and he thought not likely to do so again anytime soon. He was also cordially received by Innocent XI, which pleased Croissy because that pope was no friend of France. On 23 September Torcy departed Rome for the long journey home, scheduling a stop in Modena, whose ruler had offered warnings of and protection against the dangers of bad mountain roads.83 Traveling first through Florence, he stayed with Grand Duke Cosimo III de’ Medici, who was married to Marguerite Louise d’Orléans, daughter of Louis XIV’s uncle Gaston. The marriage, an unhappy one that resulted in a separation and Marguerite’s return to France in 1674, nonetheless produced three children. The Grand Duke hoped to wed his youngest son, Gian Gastone, to Isabel Luísa of Portugal, whom Torcy had met in Lisbon the previous year. Cosimo spoke to Torcy several times of these plans and hoped that he would help him gain Louis XIV’s support. When the Grand Duke named those in the Portuguese royal council opposed to the match, Torcy shared what he knew of these individuals, but already a cautious diplomat, he assured his father that he shared only a part of what he had learned in Lisbon. After passing along C ­ osimo’s effusive praises of the king and avowals of friendship for Croissy, Torcy wryly added that he had answered as he thought such politeness merited without committing his father or France to anything.84 He traveled next to Modena and then to Genoa, arriving on 17 October. Taking the land route, he reached Turin, where he was delayed by the autumn rains, and finally reached Versailles on 23 November 1696, again to a favourable reception.85 After his return, Torcy settled down to regular labour in the department to learn all the aspects of its operation and handled correspondence, for example, with Rome and the other Italian states. According to Torcy’s daughter, Croissy continued his training by having him study old dispatches and even prepare responses to some of the king’s envoys abroad.86 Torcy’s inked annotations begin to appear on documents during this period, and there are indications that he went to the king’s Cabinet with orders prepared for the monarch’s signature but always subject to revision at the royal behest.87 There are also increasing numbers of letters to provincial officials from his pen.88 In addition, he read and sorted the cartons and bundles of diplomatic papers accumulated since 1660 that his father was having classified and prepared for binding.89



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Before a year had passed, he was off to England. At the end of August 1687, Torcy carried the king’s condolences to James II upon the death of his mother-in-law, along with some confidential dispatches. He was permitted an additional six to eight weeks in England to gather the extensive array of information outlined in his second set of instructions. Ambassador Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, marquis de Branges, who followed the Stuart court on its peregrinations, wrote from Bath that James would receive Torcy at Oxford and suggested that Torcy stay with him in London, but Croissy, not wanting to inconvenience the ambassador, directed his son to rent lodgings yet dine at the embassy. At Oxford James received him graciously, after which Torcy viewed the local sights.90 In a dispatch home, he detailed his reception by James and recounted the freer conversation he had had with him for nearly half an hour afterwards. He also reported that Barillon would leave in the morning for Bath and that he would follow, hoping to have an audience with the queen.91 By the end of October Torcy left London, esteemed, according to Barillon, by the entire court.92 Back home Torcy assisted his father with correspondence with Italian ecclesiastics and drafting letters in the king’s name, especially since Croissy’s arthritis made it difficult for him personally to draft instructions as he had often done in the past.93 When word reached Versailles on 23 August 1689 that the ailing Innocent XI had died, Torcy managed the important flow of letters to those cardinals through whom Louis XIV hoped to influence the papal election94 and drafted the instructions for the new French envoy to Rome, Charles Albert d’Ailly, duc de Chaulnes.95 Following Crécy’s suggestion three years earlier, Croissy sent Torcy along with his brother Abbé Croissy to accompany Chaulnes. They left Versailles on 27 August, were joined in Lyon by three cardinals, embarked from Toulon on royal galleys on 10 September, and arrived at Rome on 23 September.96 Torcy’s letter of 27 September describing the growing tensions in the conclave, the factional manoeuvring, and the cardinals’ political posturing was a model of its kind: detailed, balanced in its judgments, and punctuated with gossipy tidbits fit for royal delectation.97 More than an observer, Torcy took part in all French discussions and negotiations, acquitting himself admirably, as Chaulnes assured the king.98 As Crécy had wisely foreseen, experiencing a papal conclave and the intrigue that engulfed it would serve Torcy well in future dealings with the Holy See and with the papal nuncios sent to France. Shortly after Alexander VIII’s election on 6 October 1689, a special messenger arrived in Rome carrying the news that Torcy was to return

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to France at once to assume officially the duties of secretary of state as his father’s designated successor, an honour granted Croissy by the king at the same time that Louis Pontchartrain replaced Claude Le ­Peletier as controller general.99 Meeting the new pope, who complimented and embraced him during a half-hour audience, Torcy told him that he was leaving Rome ahead of the rest of the French delegation in order to thank the king at Versailles for the honour he had just received. On the night of the 11th, Torcy departed Rome for Civitavecchia, where a galley carried him home to a new status and new responsibilities.100

The

s u rv i va n c i e r

at Work

Upon his return to Versailles on 6 November 1689, Torcy’s positive report on the recent French-engineered election of Venetian cardinal Pietro Ottoboni as Pope Alexander VIII raised hopes for better relations with Rome. On the 8th, amidst the acclaim for his successful mission, Torcy took the oath of secretary of state as his father’s survivancier.101 This practice is particularly foreign if not repugnant to modern meritocratic sensibilities (although, to be sure, not to modern practice). However, our own preferences are also subject to criticism. François Monnier and Guy Thuillier observe that theoretical formulations risk distorting the administrative trainee’s outlook by implying a rationally necessary fit between ends and means. They defend the success and rationality of the French tradition of on-the-job training practised in the professions, business management, and ministerial cabinets, contending that it remains unproven that one can “learn” administering other than in actual offices and in the professions.102 Granting a survivance was in fact a workable system if we seek the “order underlying what often looks … like disorder, on the rules of the game and the pressures on all the actors.”103 Indeed, the intergenerational transfer within the same family of occupation and profession occurred at all social levels and was an old practice that continued throughout the early modern era, being regarded as “a guarantee of qualification, cohesion, and loyalty towards an individual’s own social group and his superiors.”104 A survivance gave the king and an office-holder control over the successor’s training because it took place largely within their immediate circle and surroundings and was thus an on-the-job training unavailable to outsiders. The department’s personnel could initiate the apprentice into its administrative procedures and practices as well as into ministerial politics. Moreover, Louis XIV was a creature of habit



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in the way he worked and if possible with whom he worked.105 He was supportive of his secretaries of state, but exacting in his expectations, requiring them to be well informed and precise in their one-on-one consultations and conciliar reports and discussions. A survivancier had the opportunity to become a familiar face to the king, acquainted with his routine and preferences. When he finally succeeded to the office, a procedural continuity was in place to soften the monarch’s loss of a familiar and trusted collaborator and to smooth the transition to his new but not unfamiliar replacement. In addition, the survivancier could draw on a legion of kinsmen and clients who, optimally, were known, tested, and faithful assistants. Examples of bright and qualified “outsiders” who stumbled during a transition for lack of the “insider’s” experience and perspective were not unknown then and now, and the system of survivance meant to prevent this in many instances did so admirably.106 The element of merit was hardly absent from this system, since the survivancier had no security of succession and the king sincerely believed that “loftiness of rank is never more solid than when it is sustained by uniqueness of merit.”107 If he lacked the king’s confidence because of inability or age, he was only guaranteed that a replacement would have to indemnify him for his office. Louis XIV liked to believe that, starting with Louvois, he himself had formed many of the administrators who succeeded those he had inherited from Mazarin. The father of a survivancier was often as demanding of his son as was the king and perhaps more so because the family’s fate rested on the youth-in-training’s performance. Louvois, his father’s survivancier in 1655 and his co-secretary in 1664 until succeeding him fully in 1677, sought to continue the Le Tellier hold on the war department in 1681 by obtaining the survivance for his eldest son, Michel François Le Tellier, marquis de C ­ ourtanvaux, but after four years of frustrating and failed training, Louvois had ­Courtanvaux resign and the survivance assigned to his third son, the marquis de Barbezieux. Michel Chamillart’s twenty-year-old son and survivancier (since 1707), Michel II Chamillart, marquis de Cany, fell with his father in 1709 and had to surrender the war secretaryship to Daniel Voysin, who then paid him for it.108 Since the survivancier did not merely stand aside until death visited his father and the king called, his could be a grueling regimen. Travel was often part of his formation and typically came early in his apprenticeship, as we saw with Torcy. Under his father’s guidance, Louvois toured the provinces from which future wars were likely to be launched if not fought, while Seignelay and Jérôme Pontchartrain made circuits of the

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Atlantic and Mediterranean ports and naval hubs. These arduous journeys were wearing even on young men, but they were invaluable for the intelligence gathered from observations and conversations to be shared later with a monarch and ministers avid for information. Furthermore, the survivancier became acquainted with the officials and clients away from the capital who made a department’s operations a reality, which in Torcy’s case meant diplomats and embassy personnel in major European capitals. Torcy also garnered first-hand knowledge of and acquaintance with many of the rulers and their ministers with whom he would later interact as secretary.109 A pedigree of steadfast service to the crown was highly prized among the elite and especially by the monarch. Individuals functioned and gained such honour (or dishonour) in the context of an extended kinship group. This was an era when no formal schools for training administrators existed, although Torcy later made an innovative attempt to remedy this. University studies, in addition to ignoring public administration, were typically of short duration and of mediocre quality.110 In this context, the system of survivanciers filled a gap. Even as his training proceeded, growing competence would allow the survivancier to shoulder some of his father’s burden of office. When Chamillart’s son was granted the survivance, the court memorialist Philippe de Courcillon, marquis de Dangeau, remarked that his right to sign official documents would save his father three or four hours daily. This also permitted the son to become a specialist in certain aspects of his father’s cumul of functions while still under supervision. Louis himself enjoyed working with these young men, but his role in their formation was greater perhaps in his imagination than in reality, since their fathers’ tutelage reigned supreme. They were kept busy with various tasks to widen their experience and test their abilities, including service on the Council of Dispatches and attending upon the king in tandem or alone.111 Louis XIV could be intimidating as he probed the survivancier’s knowledge, weighed his judgment, and evaluated his temperament. Yet prevailing in these tasks and trials was a critical part of honing one’s skills and enjoying someday a successful succession.112 In addition, the transfer of administrative papers and books from father to son provided critical administrative continuity in the period before ministerial archives were established.113 Croissy was always careful to brief the king on the contents of incoming dispatches in a timely fashion, either in private or in the Conseil, and even when indisposed with gout, he saw to it that premier commis Bergeret did so on his behalf.114 Torcy as survivancier increasingly



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assumed this responsibility, which also afforded him greater knowledge of the department and closer contact with the king. His range of correspondence increased with each passing year as he wrote in his father’s name or on his behalf but in his own name, as when Croissy was absent from court.115 He could also write in his own name on the king’s behalf to as important a personage as Cardinal Étienne Le Camus, thanking him for his services in the last conclave and promising to let him know about his request to come to court as soon as the king made his intentions known, for the cardinal was not in favour at that time.116 Rome had proven fruitful in friendships and acquaintances that would serve Torcy well as he navigated the often-treacherous waters of papal diplomacy. In 1691 he penned a letter to the Auditor de Rota Cavallerini recalling their meeting in Rome in 1689. The next year Cavallerini was named papal nuncio to France and received the cardinal’s red hat in 1695 before returning to Rome in 1696.117 Torcy was also involved with police affairs, in 1691 countersigning his father’s orders for the arrest and later release of the English Quaker William Bromfield and writing officials at the Bastille to take care with where they lodged him, since James II was concerned about the prisoner’s poor health.118 The table of contents for a volume of Croissy’s domestic “expéditions” (outgoing items) for 1692, for instance, gives some sense of Torcy’s activities during this period, recording 121 letters sent out from Torcy, not including all the official documents he helped draft.119 On 8 June 1690, as survivancier Torcy accompanied the controller general and two state councillors of the Council of Finances to present the customary “don gratuit” (free gift) request to the Assembly of the Clergy meeting at Saint-Germain. This was not normally a foreign office function, but Torcy went on behalf of his ailing cousin Seignelay, responsible for the affairs of the clergy, and because the king’s deputies were there to press for a larger “free gift” than usual to fight the war. The records of the Assembly suggest that Torcy played an important role in briefing the delegates on the international situation.120 Torcy’s credit with the king continued to rise, and by 1 October 1690 he could sign orders as secretary of state.121 When Seignelay died suddenly in November 1690, rumours circulated that Torcy would act on behalf of his seven-year-old nephew Marie-Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Seignelay, marquis de Lonré, as household secretary until he was of age to succeed his father, but in fact, Louis Pontchartrain received both charges.122 It is nevertheless telling that Torcy’s credit was such that it could sustain such speculations; if they proved false, it was because of his young cousin’s age.

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During the campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands between 1691 and 1693, Croissy, Torcy, and other administrators accompanied Louis XIV to the battlefront.123 The royal entourage left Versailles on 17 March 1691 to join the army already on the move toward the strategic and well-defended city of Mons, but so early in the campaigning season that it surprised the Allies, still wrangling over plans for the coming spring. The royal cortege reached the trenches before Mons on 21 March.124 Because there was always government business to transact and continuity was essential, Torcy’s reports from the royal camp sound a mundane, unruffled tone, and the king held all the usual councils and gave orders concerning all state business as if he were at Versailles.125 Among Torcy’s first dispatches were instructions to Chaulnes, with a duplicate for a commis in Croissy’s bureau, ordering writs calling for the Estates of Brittany’s biennial meeting. Torcy, with an eye on the papal conclave assembling after the death of Alexander VIII, dispatched letters to Rome on behalf of the king and his father.126 While sappers dug trenches and gunners placed their artillery, the foreign office, too, advanced the monarch’s war plans. Torcy greeted a messenger from Benoît Bidal, baron d’Asfeld, the accomplished envoy negotiating with Sweden’s king, ­ Hanover’s duke, and an array of lesser northern German princes to create a “third party” to deny the emperor support and pressure him to turn the 1684 Truce of Ratisbon into a permanent settlement. Bidal’s messenger carried the welcome news that a rapprochement had been reached with the Duke of Saxe-Gotha.127 Meantime, engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban’s siege was successful, Mons surrendered on 9 April, and five days later Louis and his entourage were back at Versailles. In spring 1692 the king again went to the battlefront, this time down the Meuse to besiege the mighty fortress-city of Namur, but even in the midst of these momentous military operations, the work of government continued apace. Ministers Croissy, Pomponne, and Paul de SaintAignan, duc de Beauvillier, accompanied the king so that the Conseil could continue to meet. Secretary of State Balthazar Phélypeaux, marquis de Châteauneuf, had also come, as had War Secretary Barbezieux, anxious to see the results of his months of careful preparation even as he kept in touch with the other war theatres. Torcy was there to second his father, issuing letters to the provinces even as he made his way to the French camp.128 On 28 May 1692, while the siege was under way and the king rode about to watch the action, Torcy issued a circular letter to all bishops to see what they could do out of compassion for the families of the troops defeated in Ireland the previous year. To Controller General



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Pontchartrain, who had remained in Paris, Torcy fired off various missives. One informed him that the king’s envoy to Münster, Jean-Casimir Frischmann, had arrived at the camp to report on his conferences with the bishop as part of Croissy’s “third party” initiative. Another requested that he send two thousand pistolles at once to diplomat Michel Amelot in Switzerland for secret expenses. He also asked that money be sent to Iberville, French resident in Geneva, although by what means he was not sure.129 The movement of money was not the only logistical aspect of diplomacy to occupy Torcy: he wrote to the Marseilles naval intendant about important packets to be delivered, one into the hands of Joseph Fabre, still in Provence.130 As the siege progressed, Torcy met with Louis to read and judge requests from petitioners (the “rolle des placets” or “jugement des placets”).131 After Namur’s final capitulation on 30 June 1692, Torcy wrote to his Amsterdam agent Pierre Daguerre that while the king believed that the Dutch provinces most strongly for war were also the most republican, the taking of Namur might now hasten peace.132 That year and the following Torcy took on a growing portion of his father’s administrative workload. In a volume of Croissy’s domestic expéditions for 1692, Torcy had either written or dictated 120 of the 285 letters sent.133 He also took over much of the correspondence with the erudite Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, publisher of the Gazette de France, the semi-official compendium of court and foreign news and a source of foreign intelligence, especially from England.134 Torcy informed ­Renaudot (January 1693) that he had read to the king what he had written to Croissy and added that he needed his advice or that of other experts he might consult on a legal matter concerning a confiscation of goods so that he could present his findings at the next Dispatches meeting, implying that his father would be unable to attend. He wrote Renaudot often for enlightenment on various matters.135 Croissy’s health had been deteriorating since at least 1690.136 On 13 March 1693, in his father’s absence, Torcy reported to the king on foreign dispatches.137 That May the king embarked upon what was to be his last appearance at the front heading his army. Torcy again accompanied him, but with his position noticeably enhanced, for Louis now asked for his input into the growing discussion of peace among his advisors.138 In November, as the terrible shortage of grain continued, the king wrote to Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, concerning aid for the provincial poor. Torcy attached his own note instructing the bishop to notify him of any measures he took in his diocese so that

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he could inform the king. In this domestic crisis, Torcy was shouldering even the most important burdens and reporting directly to the king.139 Meanwhile, as a sign of the king’s esteem, he was invited to the monarch’s Marly retreat in September 1694.140 Croissy was so ill in April 1695 that he was unable to accompany the king, his ministers, and the court to Compiegne, fueling a growing anxiety among his family, friends, and colleagues.141 In May ambassador to Denmark ­François d’Usson de ­Bonrepaus, kept informed of Croissy’s physical decline, wrote to Croissy’s secretary François Blondel that he was gratified that the king was pleased with Torcy. He also thought Torcy quite capable and hoped that when Croissy recovered he would nonetheless share his functions with his son.142 While Croissy remained the department’s master, working with the king and his Conseil to formulate policy, Torcy was increasingly fulfilling many routine administrative functions and it appeared that his apprenticeship might soon end. These years of training were important for Torcy’s language skills and outlook, as he sharpened his pen by pruning the verbiage of official language.143 As he later advised his brother-in-law, Abbé Pomponne, when one writes to the king, who grows weary of ponderous sentences, one should be succinct. Torcy was thus creating a language for eighteenthcentury diplomatic culture: discreet but understandable.144 Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu observes that “official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that … conditions are created … for … a unified linguistic market, dominated by an official language.” The official language that Torcy himself adopted developed in the cultivated circles of Paris and at Versailles among those whom Bourdieu calls “authorized persons”: high officials and great state servants, whom one may call mandarins, who spoke and wrote formal “legitimate … authorized authoritative language.”145 At his father’s side and under Louis XIV’s direct guidance, Torcy developed an authorial, official voice that he learned to use with consummate skill.146

S e c r e ta ry a n d M ini s ter of S tate After a long illness, Croissy died at Versailles on 28 July 1696, and Dangeau noted the next day that shortly Torcy would marry Mlle ­ Catherine-­Félicité Pomponne.147 On the 30th Pomponne went to Paris to work on the marriage papers for a match that would considerably augment Torcy’s fortune, and the king himself signed the marriage ­contract



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on 2 August.148 The marriage took place on the morning of 13 August at Saint-Eustache and was celebrated that evening at ­Pomponne’s Paris residence.149 This was not, however, as some have assumed, a marriage long blocked because Croissy, bitter toward Pomponne, was set against it.150 To the contrary, the marriage was under discussion well before Croissy’s final illness.151 With an eye to the future as Croissy’s health deteriorated, Louis intended to join Pomponne and Torcy, in Saint-Simon’s terms, as “bon maître” (good master) and “jeune” (young) survivancier.152 The delay was likely due in part to the foreign secretary’s chronic poor health,153 his daughter’s marriage to the marquis de Bouzols in May, and the ongoing negotiations in the United Provinces and Savoy during June and July.154 When Croissy became so ill on 21 July that he was confined to his bed at Versailles with no one expecting him to survive, there was loud talk of the Torcy-Pomponne union and since the king’s desire for the marriage was clear, no one doubted that it would be concluded soon.155 Moreover, it is unlikely that the loyal Croissy would have opposed a marriage that would maintain his son in high office, even if under Pomponne’s tutelage.156 Françoise-Félicité ­Colbert, marquise d’Ancezune, Torcy’s daughter and the granddaughter of Pomponne and Croissy, wrote that when Pomponne was restored to the Conseil his unexpected courtesy call on Croissy to assure him of his lack of bitterness, his sincere desire for friendship, and his hope to work in harmony was well received and prepared the way for the future marital alliance between their families. She also noted that Croissy did not live to have the pleasure of seeing the marriage concluded, although he had much desired it.157 Louis André’s claim that, at the death of Croissy, Pomponne once again took up the direction of foreign affairs cannot be credited, but clearly Torcy did not experience a complete succession to his father’s position.158 When the king learned at the Trianon that Croissy had died, he had already considered the disposition of his responsibilities, and on Sunday, 29 July, summoned Torcy’s kinsman Beauvillier to announce the new arrangements.159 Torcy was to direct the department in receiving, decoding, and otherwise processing the correspondence that would be placed in the dossiers that Pomponne would take to the Conseil. There, as minister of state, Pomponne would read the dispatches and note on their margins what was resolved concerning them. Torcy and his commis would then generate outgoing correspondence to embody these decisions. One week after this arrangement was announced, Pomponne read Torcy’s dispatches for the first time in the Conseil’s regular morning

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meeting.160 The following day, Torcy left Marly, where he likely had conferred with the king, to join Pomponne at his Paris home to receive the foreign ambassadors.161 Torcy took his oath as secretary of state from the king on 12 August 1696.162 On 19 August the king asked the ­Pomponnes to stay at Versailles and share Croissy’s former apartments with the ­Torcys, which added a spatial symbol of the unity expected even as it physically facilitated their work together.163 Torcy paid a visit on 25 August to the papal nuncio at his Paris residence, where that high-ranking member of the diplomatic corps was the first to “luy donna la main” (give him his hand). This seemingly simple gesture struck the knowledgeable observer because Torcy was only a secretary of state and not a minister of state, whereas the extension of an ambassador’s hand was by court protocol reserved only for ministers.164 This raises the question of why Torcy was denied the immediate entry to the high council granted his predecessors.165 Although never an intendant, which had been the training ground for his two immediate predecessors, he was undoubtedly qualified and well informed by his education, travel, and long immersion in the department’s paperwork. Equally important were his frequent work sessions with the king individually and in Dispatches, permitting him to anticipate the direction of Louis’s thoughts. Yet a secretary of state’s administrative duties did not require attendance at the Conseil, as was true of the other non-­ minister secretaries such as Barbezieux and later Jérôme Pontchartrain, and domestic matters were tended to in Dispatches where all four secretaries sat. Nevertheless, it was in the Conseil that foreign affairs were largely discussed and decided, and Torcy was not among its members.166 The department was not without a voice on the Conseil, but it was now only that of Pomponne, whom Croissy had replaced as secretary and minister in 1679. During Louvois’s ascendancy of the 1680s, rumours circulated of Croissy’s impending replacement, but his skill, his connections, and the king’s support allowed him to weather any storms.167 On Louvois’s death in July 1691, the king immediately recalled ­Pomponne to the Conseil and put him in apartments at Versailles right next to Croissy’s in the ministerial wing to signal a policy shift and to facilitate their communication.168 As secretary of state, Croissy still issued and received all instructions and correspondence in the king’s name or in his own.169 Pomponne’s return, however, as described by Rémi Mathis, was not just a significant policy shift from war to diplomacy but a diplomacy of negotiation rather than one of confrontation.170 Pomponne’s temperate voice surely carried more authority with the king than that



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of Croissy, long linked with the brutal and disastrous policies espoused by Louvois and Seignelay. Perhaps equally important in moderating the Conseil’s tone was the growing role of Pomponne’s friend and Croissy’s kinsman Beauvillier, named minister the same day Pomponne was recalled.171 This left Croissy further isolated in the Conseil, since Le ­Pelletier, closely linked with Pomponne and Beauvillier, also favoured moderation and peace.172 In reporting the universal joy at Louvois’s demise and the advent of Beauvillier and Pomponne, Marie le Bailleul, marquise d’Huxelles, exulted that the spirit of the ministry had altered and that Louvois would soon be forgotten.173 Andrew Lossky contends that Pomponne’s return made him “the real director of French foreign policy,” relegating Croissy to “a competent chief clerk and legal expert.”174 Although fellow minister Claude Le Peletier, a Le Tellier kinsman and client, credited Croissy with having some sense, he claimed that because he never applied himself and was too narrow, he lacked credit, resulting in a poorly conducted foreign policy.175 However, Thierry Sarmant and Mathieu Stoll call Croissy a brilliant second to Pomponne and a great clerk rather than a great minister, but even though he never enjoyed the preponderance of his brother or Louvois, he was nonetheless master of his own department and an important minister to whom the king listened, even if his credit with the king was eclipsed by that of the bellicose war minister.176 The marquise d’Huxelles, a well-connected observer and Pomponne’s friend and conduit of information, lauded his 1691 return, claiming that she had heard that Torcy desired it and that foreigners had great confidence in Pomponne. In her view, Croissy had now become quite “caduc” (obsolete).177 Yet Croissy still had a seat on the Conseil, and any eclipse he may have suffered as a minister did not make Pomponne the administrative master of foreign affairs, as the king made clear to the nuncio and other diplomats.178 Even Louvois, who had nibbled around the edges of the foreign minister’s prerogative to name diplomats and supervise diplomatic correspondence, had avoided any direct interference in the operations of his colleague’s department.179 Despite Pomponne’s kinship with some diplomats and friendship with others, neither they nor he sought to bypass Croissy through separate correspondence.180 Croissy’s kinsman Beauvillier, with whom he often disagreed on policy, had contacts in the department’s bureaus and played a role in foreign affairs from 1691. When Louis took Croissy, Pomponne, and Beauvillier with him to the front, it was presumably because all three played roles in foreign policy.181 When Croissy was too ill to attend the

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Conseil in May 1695, Beauvillier and not Pomponne acted as reporter. Although Pomponne was certainly consulted as well, the king also conferred with and chose Beauvillier to announce the details of Torcy’s duties upon Croissy’s death. Torcy’s marginalia on letters concerning Poland suggest that Beauvillier may also have overseen his direction of some diplomatic business in 1696.182 However, even Beauvillier did not meddle in the actual administration of foreign affairs.183 Although during his years of tutelage Torcy usually trod along ­Pomponne’s and Beauvillier’s more conciliatory policy path, in administrative matters he plainly followed in his father’s footsteps.184 The king had made it clear that Torcy, not Beauvillier or even Pomponne, his designated mentor and liaison with the Conseil, would run the department. Pomponne lacked the orderly and powerful work drive of the Colberts, whereas Torcy had clearly inherited it.185 If Louis had been unhappy with the way Croissy ran his department, he could have replaced him in 1691 with Pomponne, but instead, while he moved away from Croissy’s tone, style, and policy preferences, he retained his admittedly admirable and effective administrative organization.186 In his study of the Polysynod, Alexandre Dupilet offers a useful distinction between two types of secretary of state: those who were “secrétairesconseillers politiques” (administrators as well as political advisors) and those who were essentially “secrétaires-commis” (chief clerks) or administrators directing routine matters but not helping formulate policy. As examples of the latter he points to all the secretaries of state for the rpr (Religion préntendue réformée or the Reformed Church), to the war secretaries after ­Louvois, and to Torcy at the beginning of his tenure.187 Mathieu Stoll, in approaching the matter from the opposite direction, notes the rise of ministers without portfolio from Le Peletier’s resignation in 1689 as controller general. He contends that for a decade Louis XIV largely separated bureaucratic management from policy formulation. From the death of Louvois in 1691, three of the five ministers (not counting the Dauphin) – Le Peletier, Pomponne, and Beauvillier – were not secretaries of state, and when Croissy died in 1696, only one minister ­(Pontchartrain) was a secretary of state until Torcy officially joined the Conseil in 1699.188 The last time the foreign office had been clearly divided between a secrétaire conseiller politique and a secrétaire commis was during the first three years of Louis XIV’s personal reign.189 Lionne, Mazarin’s candidate and the king’s preference for foreign secretary, sat in the Conseil from March 1661 while Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne,



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remained secretary of state (from 1643), assisted by his son and (since 1651) survivancier, a division of labour that proved most unsatisfactory. Even before Mazarin’s death, French diplomats and the department’s provincial officials were burdened with a double correspondence with both Brienne and Lionne. Brienne’s bureau routinely received and decoded dispatches and then passed them on to Lionne, who read, discussed, and reacted to them in tête-à-têtes with the king and in the Conseil, but some went directly to Lionne to decode, bypassing the secretary altogether.190 Yet in 1661 Louis-Henri (called “Brienne the Younger”) was a plausible survivancier. Born in 1636, he was two years older than the king. His education and extensive travel were international and extended over several years, and a marital alliance with the daughter of his father’s predecessor as foreign secretary, the still-influential Léon Bouthillier de Chavigny, augured well for him. Although Mazarin increasingly sidestepped his father, on 22 May 1658 Brienne the Younger was granted the right to sign orders and exercise the secretaryship during the court’s travels. Mazarin’s power, personality, and worldly tastes drew him into the cardinal’s orbit, and the two got on well, but this did nothing to halt Lionne’s ascent and Mazarin’s plans for him to replace both Briennes. Louis XIV thought Brienne too old and conceited and lacking in good advice and his son, while eager to serve, too young and inexperienced to manage the foreign office let alone offer wise counsel. When it had become painfully clear that neither Brienne was acceptable to the king, they reluctantly sold the office to Lionne on 19 April 1663.191 The parallels of Brienne the Younger with Torcy thirty-five years later are obvious – each was well educated, well traveled, and well connected, including being married to the daughter of his father’s predecessor – but the differences were decisive. Neither Croissy nor Torcy was an object of royal disfavour, nor had either been pushed aside in the department’s management. Unlike the Briennes, who would have neither dreamed of nor consented to a marital alliance with Lionne, the Colberts supported Torcy’s marriage to Pomponne’s daughter. In addition, Torcy and not Pomponne had increasingly managed the department’s daily business during Croissy’s many illnesses.192 It was Pomponne and not Torcy who was unfamiliar to many foreign office personnel in 1696.193 Nevertheless, this arrangement marked a departure from conditions under Croissy’s secretaryship and at least superficially recalled the Briennes’ tenure. Was Torcy to be merely a secrétaire-commis? This was apparently no more Louis XIV’s intention than it was to recreate Pomponne as

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a secrétaire-conseiller politique. While Pomponne would have no hand in running the department, he and Torcy would conduct and supervise negotiations together and what Pomponne took to the Conseil was prepared in conjunction with the secretary. They already had good working and personal relations, and these would continue as mentor and pupil and father- and son-in-law. The king intended by this arrangement not an affront to Torcy but a mark of his confidence in Pomponne.194 Would adding Torcy have further unbalanced the Colbert and Le ­Tellier ratio on the Conseil? Pomponne, although allied with Torcy, was hardly a Colbert, and the pro-Jesuit Beauvillier was often at odds with the staunchly Gallican Torcy.195 While once willing and even anxious to hear rival voices grouped in two fractious factions competing for his ear at the council table, an older Louis changed course. In 1689 he introduced a third family, the Pontchartrains (although they were initially closely associated with the Le Tellier clan), into the Conseil and from 1691 appointed more moderate individuals, eliminating the need to balance factions, and increasingly worked with specialists outside the Conseil.196 Sarmant, however, rejects what he sees as an recent over-emphasis on factions and their balancing, even for the earlier part of the reign, objecting that the hoary Colbert/Le Tellier dichotomy ignores the frequent service the clients of one rendered the other and, worse, often inflates the alleged factional dichotomy into an ideological one. He helpfully points instead to differences of ministerial style resulting from the career starting position of each: Colbert was a clan founder, whereas Louvois was a clan inheritor.197 For his part, Frostin traces the close ties between the Phélypeaux and the Le Telliers to question the “third family” interpretation of Louis Pontchartrain’s rise and emphasizes the role Le Tellier kinsman and client Claude Le Peletier played in ­Pontchartrain’s selection to succeed him as controller general. It was a choice welcomed by Louvois, suggesting that the Pontchartrains were only in a strict sense an autonomous clan.198 A better explanation for Torcy’s initial status as secrétaire-commis centres on age and seniority. A secretary in service longer than another was likely jealous when a colleague advanced ahead of him to become a secrétaire-conseiller politique. If Torcy had been raised to the Conseil at age thirty-one, might there have been pressure for Barbezieux, war secretary at twenty-eight, to receive the same prestige and access to the heart of decision-making?199 Torcy was kept off the Conseil given considerations of age, experience, and continuity. The king preferred familiar faces at his side, and this worked in Pomponne’s favour in the small



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group that was the Conseil.200 In 1696 Louis XIV was past his midfifties, and his ministers were all over fifty years old save Beauvillier, who was close at forty-eight. Pontchartrain was fifty-three, Le Peletier sixty-six, and Pomponne seventy-eight (Croissy had been almost sixtyeight when he died), whereas Torcy was not quite thirty-one.201 Yet Louis had no aversion to youth: in 1691 Barbezieux became secretary of war at barely twenty-three years of age, and in 1696 Jérôme Pontchartrain was designated his father’s successor for the navy and household at age twenty-two. When Torcy finally fully joined the Conseil early in 1699, he was not yet thirty-four, whereas the next youngest member, ­Chamillart, was forty-seven (Beauvillier was fifty and Pontchartrain fifty-six). On the other hand, if we look at the age of entry into the Conseil of the ministers from 1661 through 1699, we find that all save two were in their forties or fifties. The two exceptions, who like Torcy had apprenticed alongside their father, were Louvois at thirty-one and Seignelay at thirty-eight.202 Perhaps it was this parallel that gave the king pause and also accounts for the relatively older group he assembled to advise him after Louvois’s passing. Although Torcy’s administrative star had shown brightly at Croissy’s side, it was not yet entirely clear that he was not his father’s duplicate in temperament and attitude.203 Perhaps Louis blamed the relative youth of Seignelay and Louvois, who each had the royal ear from their thirties, for the reckless and failed policies of the past decade, now preferring instead the more considered counsel of older men. In any event, if in 1696 Torcy had the king’s full confidence as an administrator, he apparently did not yet have it as a councillor. That he was eventually expected to attain it, however, is suggested by court memorialist Louis François de Bouschet, marquis de Sourches’s note that Pomponne reported on foreign affairs to the Conseil until it pleased the king to have Torcy do so.204 Given Pomponne’s advanced age and bouts of illness, it was likely that all concerned expected that sooner than later Torcy would become a secrétaire-conseiller politique.205 A secretary of state under tutelage was not unprecedented. Barbezieux, who worked alongside his father from age eighteen, became secretary shortly after turning twenty-three, but given his age and the fact that the kingdom was at war, the king placed him under the mentorship of two older and more experienced men, his kinsman Gilbert Colbert de Saint-Pouange, an old hand in the war department, and Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay, the king’s unofficial war secrétaire-conseiller politique. Although his department and powers were reduced from what they had been under his father, Barbezieux had successes as an administrator, but

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the carefree habits of youth, especially after he lost his wife in 1694, led him to pursue pleasure and neglect his duties. Complaints from the generals earned him a royal reprimand and chastisement for the brutal manner that he had gotten whether by nature or nurture from his father. Sobered, Barbezieux laboured to earn back the king’s confidence, while Maintenon and her supporters hoped for his elevation to minister, but he died suddenly in 1701.206 Given the manner in which Louis XIV personally formulated and directed war strategy in conjunction with military advisors such as Chamlay, Vauban, and his generals,207 the king was perhaps content with Barbezieux remaining a secrétaire-commis. Torcy, however, was expected to become a secrétaire-conseiller politique. Barbezieux’s tutelage is instructive for understanding Torcy’s five years later. The king’s original expectations for Barbezieux were disappointed, as seen in his blunt but pained memoir of 29 October 1695 to Barbezieux’s uncle Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims. After detailing the secretary’s dissolute ways and neglect of duties, including delayed dispatches, Louis intimated that some blamed him for the young man’s actions, since he had permitted a twenty-three-year-old to serve as war minister, “especially at a time like this, when the greatest and most important affairs are in his hands.”208 If the king secondguessed his own wisdom in advancing a young survivancier in the midst of war, he likely sought to avoid the same mistake less than a year later with serious peace negotiations under way. That both survivanciers were sons of ministers associated with now-regretted brutal and aggressive policies must also have weighed upon Louis. It is no coincidence that in Torcy’s case the king also looked to a senior family member, Torcy’s older cousin Beauvillier, as he considered how to manage the young man’s transition from successor to secretary. Given his own reservations about Croissy and his son, Beauvillier may have proposed Torcy’s marital alliance with and tutelage under Pomponne, his old friend and fellow moderate, but if not the plan’s instigator, Beauvillier surely welcomed and supported it as prudent. Prudence was indeed essential as peace negotiations finally moved forward after years of starts and stalls. Callières was in the United Provinces between May and late October 1697 conducting talks with the Dutch, and it was during Croissy’s final days that the thorny question of yielding Strasbourg was on the table.209 Despite his travels to the most important courts of Europe, however, Torcy had never actually conducted a negotiation,210 so the essential continuity in the conduct of negotiations came from Pomponne’s remaining on the Conseil and becoming



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reporter and from Torcy’s remaining with the administrative apparatus, now as its only head. The transition must have seemed natural to most. When Ambassador Bonrepaus wrote to Torcy in 1697 upon word of his own eminent transfer from Copenhagen to The Hague, he discussed its details with the young secretary and even took the opportunity to suggest an appointment to Brussels for his brother, but ­Bonrepaus only consulted Pomponne concerning Dutch ceremonial, which he knew from his previous ambassadorship.211 Perhaps recalling the earlier unhappy circumstances under the Briennes and Lionne, an outsider like Saint-Simon misconstrued these arrangements, opining that Pomponne directed foreign affairs while Torcy only had the nominal charge.212 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, general commissioner of fortifications, had a keener sense of this arrangement. Writing to Torcy on 16 September 1696 with several pages of reasons why France should never surrender frontier fortifications such as Strasbourg (e.g., it would give the Rhine to her enemies), Vauban concluded by saying that if Torcy did not believe his arguments he should speak to Pomponne, who, if he had the power, should dissuade the king from such sacrifices.213 If Torcy’s role was merely nominal and with no influence on foreign affairs, Vauban would likely not have wasted ink attempting to influence his thinking. When the emperor finally agreed to the mediation of Sweden’s Charles XI in January 1697 and it was agreed to open a peace congress at ­Ryswick in the coming months, Torcy drafted instructions for the three plenipotentiaries (dated 25 February 1697), who then departed for the United Provinces at the beginning of March.214 By then it was becoming obvious just how difficult it was to implement the previous year’s division of labour.215 On 3 March Pomponne drafted a memoir to persuade Louis to permit Torcy to enter the Conseil in order to enhance his ability to draft the dispatches steering the upcoming intricate negotiations.216 In July when talks stalled and entered a more critical stage in secret conversations between Louis François, duc de Boufflers, and Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, events pushed Louis to yield in part to Pomponne’s request and summon Torcy four times in a two-week period to meet with the Conseil.217 He was thus present during what was called “the reading” of dispatches, which took up the bulk of the typical meeting, but remained standing and was apparently excused during debates and when the ministers voted their advice to the king.218 As Torcy later related to Saint-Simon, sometime during September 1697 he entered the Conseil carrying the foreign dispatches but still without having a seat (literally) at the table or a voice in debates. Cardinal Toussaint Forbin-

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Janson having recently left Rome for France, the king remarked on the decline in the quality of the dispatches now coming from the embassy there, adding that it was a true misfortune that he could not make the worthy Forbin-Janson a minister of state. Torcy opined loudly enough to be heard that he saw no one more capable than the cardinal and that if the king considered Forbin-Janson capable of serving on the Conseil, then he saw nothing that should prevent him from doing so. The king, who heard these remarks, did not upbraid him for his impetuosity, Torcy reported, but rather instructed him in his maxim of state since Mazarin’s death never to admit an ecclesiastic and in particular a cardinal into his Conseil.219 Such unofficial entries into the council chamber afforded Louis an opportunity to take Torcy’s measure and eventually to invite him to remain and be seated. Saint-Simon suggests that the nearly eighty-year-old Pomponne, who included Torcy in all aspects of diplomatic policy, facilitated this familiarity by having Torcy carry his dispatch portfolio into the council chamber for him.220 On 13 December 1698 Sourches recorded that an important royal official was in worse health than usual, but he referred to the thirtyyear-old Barbezieux rather than to the octogenarian Pomponne. Nevertheless, in the same sentence he recorded the death of Pomponne’s older brother, by definition the “extremely old” Abbé Antoine Arnauld.221 Faltering health and a desire to pursue personal piety made Pomponne eager to retire from public life, but he had not done so for family reasons,222 which presumably included seeing his son-in-law in the full exercise of his charge as foreign secretary and thereby assuring the future of Pomponne’s daughter and grandchildren. As early as August 1697 Torcy shouldered some of Pomponne’s post office tasks.223 Torcy’s position on the Conseil had solidified such that the 1698 État de la France listed him without qualification among its members.224 The next year began with further signs of his ascent. On 13 February 1699 the king backed his foreign secretary’s refusal to accede to the pretensions of Louis Grimaldi, prince de Monaco and France’s new envoy to Rome, to be addressed by the secretary as “Monseigneur.”225 Three days later when the Moroccan ambassador, after months of fruitless discussions at Brest, came to Versailles for direct peace talks, he negotiated only with Torcy, seconded by Jérôme Pontchartrain representing the navy.226 By then it was also clear that Pomponne’s advanced age required a transition, that Torcy’s proven abilities permitted one, and that it should take place before Pomponne’s health or death disrupted the work of diplomacy. When an envoy from Brussels arrived at Versailles on ­Tuesday 17



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February 1699 with official word of the death of the Bavarian e­ lectoral prince on 6 February,227 the need to renegotiate the partition treaty apparently was the catalyst. Sourches wrote on 4 March that although rumours held that Torcy had been made a minister and first sat (literally) in the Conseil fifteen days earlier (Wednesday, 18 February, the Conseil’s regular meeting), neither he nor his family would verify them.228 ­Dangeau confirmed the gossip on 9 March. He observed that although the foreign secretary was usually a minister, the king’s grace to Torcy was all the more considerable given that he was only thirty-three years old.229 His entry for Thursday, 10 September 1699, gives a peek into the council chamber at Fontainebleau: after describing where the king, the Dauphin, and the other ministers sat, he observed that Torcy alone was at the end of the table opposite the king reading the ambassadors’ dispatches and the responses resolved upon at the previous council.230 In other words, Pomponne had ceded to Torcy his reporter’s role. Pomponne continued attending council meetings until the very end, but after having seemed in perfect health at Fontainebleau on the evening of 22 September 1699, the next morning at Mass he was so weak that the king sent him word to absent himself from the Conseil.231 Torcy was concerned enough to suspend routine diplomatic business.232 ­Pomponne seemed to rally, then grew worse, and died on 26 September 1699, according to Sourches universally regretted and a great loss for the king, the state, and all decent people.233 Pomponne’s “death caused no sharp break in French foreign policy.”234 In many ways Torcy’s approach was closer to that of his father-in-law than to that of his late father, but it should not be assumed that their frequent and intimate collaboration meant they were identical. During the 1660s, for example, Colbert attempted to address European public opinion through pamphlets generated by the literary figures he gathered around him, whereas the ministers of the following two decades, including his brother Croissy, largely looked instead to buying off princes with subsidies or intimidating them with military muscle. Even the relatively moderate Pomponne had little use for royally sponsored pamphlets, regarding them as unlikely to change many minds. Louvois, Barbezieux, and Croissy sponsored a trickle of such writings during the Nine Years War, but it was under Torcy that the winds shifted decisively in favour of cultivating foreign public opinion. In the aftermath of Ryswick and especially with the acceptance of the Spanish inheritance, Torcy set several writers to work wielding their pens to defend and promote French interests abroad.235 Still, such a resort to reasoned persuasion and the power

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of the pen was closer to the outlook of Pomponne that it was to the more belligerent approach of Croissy. Yet the fact that Torcy and Pomponne resided together meant that they could easily converse about affairs and did not often need to correspond, which leaves historians without much of a paper trail revealing their interactions with one another.

T h e F a m ily Network Family relationships during the “kinship-dominated” early modern era were sources of cohesiveness as well as conflict, especially for the upper classes for which such ties were vital.236 It is telling that in the État de la France’s annual roll of state positions and their occupants, the section on the four secretaries of state listed not only their spouses but also their children, siblings and their spouses, and other important kin.237 Contrast this with the spare official personnel directories of today and the distance between our outlook and theirs on the ideal (if not always the actual) connection between family and government office is striking. As minister since 1679, Croissy was the Colbert clan’s senior member from the time of his brother’s death in 1683, and he favoured a few of his kinsmen, including nephew Nicolas Desmaretz, an eminent authority on state fiscal policy, and uncle Henri Pussort, a renowned jurist and dean of the Conseil d’État privé, a part of the larger King’s Council that heard appeals for non-financial cases. Harmony, however, did not rule the ranks of the Colberts in the late 1680s and 1690s. Croissy not only quarreled with his nephews by marriage, “the dukes” (Beauvillier and Charles-Honoré d’Albert, duc de Chevreuse), but fell out with his nephew Seignelay, whom he admonished for leading what he regarded as a dissolute life bordering on scandal that threatened to bankrupt his immediate family.238 When Croissy died in the summer of 1696, he left his own family financially secure but not affluent. Among the immediate tasks Torcy faced as the new head of the family was fortifying its fortune by investment, offices, and marriage.239 Croissy had made investments largely in four areas: personal possessions (jewels, tapestries, works of art, a library, etc.), real property (a large townhouse on rue Vivienne, the Château de Croissy and adjacent lands, and a house on the Place Royal), “rentes” (interest payment on a loan given as an annuity) that included nearly 160,000 livres loaned to Brittany’s estates, and venal offices. All told, Croissy’s fortune was estimated at around 1,700,000 livres.240 Torcy and his business-minded mother adapted the past investment pattern to the



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family’s immediate needs by diversifying their holdings with rentes in the Paris Hôtel de Ville, establishing a firm foundation in government securities and one on which they could borrow for current expenses. Torcy received an augmentation by brevet en rentes of the secretary of state’s office, which in the later days of Louis XIV’s reign was worth nearly 750,000 livres. In 1701 he sold his office of grand treasurer of the Royal Orders for 430,000 livres, recently augmented by a royal gift of 200,000 livres, and moved up to the offices of commander-chancellor, guard of the seals, and superintendent, valued at 350,000 livres, which he sold in 1716 for over 600,000 livres. He also purchased as an investment the office of secretary of the king (for 100,000 livres). After ­Pomponne’s death, he was named head of the postal system, worth 400,000 livres. By 1715 Torcy held offices worth nearly 1,900,000 livres, rivaling his father’s entire fortune of 1696.241 Nevertheless, it was in the category of real property that Torcy expanded his holdings by purchasing, after long negotiations, the lands of Sablé and Bois-Dauphin near Le Mans for 450,000 livres in January 1711. Within the year the king raised these holdings to a marquisate and by 1715 Torcy had invested 100,000 livres in improvements to his château.242 In 1714 he and his wife began negotiations for the purchase of a new townhouse located on Paris’s right bank, facing the Seine, near the Palais Bourbon, which at Torcy’s death in 1746 was valued at 370,000 livres.243 In his lifetime Torcy amassed a fortune of nearly 7,000,000 livres, but in the years immediately after his father’s death, he struggled to borrow money for his and his sisters’ marriages and his brothers’ appointments to office. The negotiations to strengthen the family’s financial and social position began before Croissy’s death with the May 1696 marriage of Torcy’s sister Marie-Françoise Colbert de Croissy, then twenty-five, to army brigadier Joachim de Montaigu, marquis de Bouzols. Befitting a royal minister’s daughter, her dowry was handsome: 260,000 livres, with 200,000 livres paid immediately and the rest later, including 32,000 in rentes from the Brittany estates. This strained Croissy’s purse, but the alliance brought an infusion of the old noble blood so valued by the rising ministerial families.244 Bouzols, a distinguished soldier who rose to marshal of camp in 1704 and lieutenant-general in 1710, also served on several diplomatic missions, including to Savoy in June 1696 as part of the hostage exchange sealing the secret treaty with Victor Amadeus. Torcy sent him to Lorraine in 1698 to render civilities on behalf of Louis XIV to its duke, newly returned to his duchy after twenty-seven years

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of French occupation, and to inspect several fortresses along the border on his way home. When war came, Bouzols fed Torcy valuable information on troop movements and disagreements within the general staff. In late autumn 1714 when French ambassadors were being named with the return of peace, Matthew Prior reported to London that Bouzols was rumoured for Switzerland with comte du Luc’s likely transfer to Vienna (the Swiss post, however, remained vacant until 1716).245 Bouzols’s wife, described by Saint-Simon as “hideous,” was her husband’s opposite: fiery, outspoken, and amusing. A member of a powerful court clique that included Louis Antoine de Gondrin de Pardallan, duc d’Antin, legitimate son of Françoise Athénaïs de Rochechouart de Mortemart, marquise de  Montespan, Louis XIV’s former mistress, and Louise Françoise de Bourbon (known as Madame la Duchesse), Montespan’s eldest daughter by the king, Mme Bouzols nevertheless acted as go-between for the rival cabals of the Duke of Burgundy and the Dauphin.246 Torcy looked to her for court gossip. The next to wed was Torcy, whose marriage brought a large dowry and proved to be one of the great strengths of his career. Catherine-­ Félicité de Pomponne would be the mother of their four children and in time one of the most accomplished hostesses of her day. A strongly religious Jansenist, she was known as a woman of virtue and charity. In the parish of Croissy, she helped found the Sisters of Charity’s hospice; at Sablé she endowed the Hôtel Dieu with a legacy of 20,000 livres; and she and Torcy were the benefactors of several churches near Sablé. While Saint-Simon and other observers at court claimed that Catherine influenced many of her husband’s decisions, this cannot be verified one way or the other.247 When Montpellier’s bishop died in 1696, Torcy promptly solicited the diocese for his younger brother Charles-Joachim, Abbé Croissy, his boyhood companion and confidant.248 As secretary of state, Torcy had access to the rolle of ecclesiastical benefices, a privilege that frequently profited the Colberts.249 Charles-Joachim had accompanied Torcy to the 1689 conclave in Rome, but whereas Torcy rushed home by galley to take up his succession, his brother traveled by land, only to be arrested by the Spanish in Milan and eventually traded for a prisoner held by France. He received his doctorate in 1692 and was named grand-vicar of the abbey of Pontoise and, soon thereafter, abbot of wealthy ­Froidmont in Beauvais. He became one of the agents general of the Assembly of the Clergy, represented the archdiocese of Rouen at the 1695 Assembly, and was elevated to bishop of Montpellier the following year.250 Charles-­



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Joachim, who died in 1738, was a moral and political advisor to his brother. Suspected of being a Jansenist, he was at the very least exacting in his spirituality and had a strong Gallican sense of independence from the papacy.251 Only nineteen at the time of Torcy’s marriage, younger brother LouisFrançois-Henri Colbert, chevalier de Croissy, was already a battlefield veteran, having served since 1692 in the Flanders campaigns.252 Chevalier of the Order of Malta at the age of eleven, he became an infantry brigadier in 1702 and a Chevalier of the Order of St Louis in 1705. Torcy sent him to Lorraine in 1704 to congratulate the duke on the birth of a son.253 A brave if reckless soldier, he was twice captured by Allied troops and twice ransomed by his brother.254 Croissy became a lieutenant-general in March 1710 and in 1714, through his brother’s intercession, lieutenant du roi for the city and diocese of Nantes.255 He became the comte de Croissy in 1711 and married Marie Brunet de Rancy, daughter of a rich farmer general of finances and secretary of the king who was married to a Colbert de Villacerf.256 Named ambassador to Sweden in 1715, he remained there until recalled in 1718. His appointment made an impression on Matthew Prior, who reported to Secretary Townshend, “Your lordship will easily judge that the King of France endeavours to be very well with the King of Sweden when you remember that this minister is brother to secretary Torcy.”257 On first meeting Croissy, Charles XII, newly returned from Turkey, was unimpressed with the slight, elegant courtier, but he later commended Croissy for bravery under fire and they became close friends. Dazzled by the charismatic warrior, Croissy assured Torcy that Charles was as much a philosopher as he was a king.258 Croissy’s mission to keep the Prussians and Swedes from going to war with one another was perhaps doomed by circumstances from the outset, but the inexperienced ambassador’s abrupt manner with the Prussians and his clumsy attempt at mediation, which even his brother criticized, did not help.259 Nevertheless, Croissy maintained warm relations with Torcy, once forwarding to him a letter from a woman said to be crazy but who struck him as sensible and moderate in the recitation of her tale of woe. Moved to compassion, he clearly expected the same reaction from his brother.260 In the years 1700 to 1701, Torcy negotiated the marriage of his sister Marie (known as Marguerite)-Thérèse, born in 1682. Louis de Clermont d’Amboise, chevalier marquis de Renel, came from an old noble family and was already a lieutenant-general and governor and grand bailly of Chaumont.261 The marriage lasted but a brief time, as Renel died of

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smallpox during the siege of Liege in 1702, leading Torcy to write to Noblet that he had been occupied that week with the sad business of his brother-in-law’s funeral.262 Marguerite-Thérèse, one of the great court beauties, was not a widow for long, remarrying on 5 January 1704 a grandee of Spain of Genoese extraction, Francesco-Maria Spinola, duc de Saint-Pierre and prince de Sabionetta, twenty-three years her senior and, at least on paper, a very wealthy man. The duke was struck by her beauty and the hope that her brother might assist in recovering his family lands in northern Italy and Naples, confiscated by the emperor because he had declared for Philip V.263 With France’s 1707 withdrawal from the peninsula, Saint-Pierre’s hopes waned when the Austrians occupied his remaining estates and confiscated their revenues. He and the duchess lived precariously in Paris near Torcy from the summer of 1706, but returned to Italy the following summer to fight for their rights, living in near solitude at Savona in neutral Genoa. To ease his fears that France might abandon him at the peace table and French fears that he might rally to the archduke to regain his lands, both Louis XIV and Torcy wrote to Saint-Pierre in February and March 1708 to assure him that he would receive restitution at the war’s end and to offer him the position of head of the household of Carlos II’s widow, Maria-Anna of Neuburg, Dowager Queen of Spain, in exile at Bayonne. Saint-Pierre accepted in April.264 Even though a May decree finalized the confiscation of their Neapolitan fiefs and revenues, the Saint-Pierres lingered in ­Savona. In mid-June 1708, they were greeted at Savona’s harbour entrance by a British squadron under the command of Sir John Leake. The duke naively wrote Torcy with some pride that Sir John had invited them to dine aboard his flagship, but Torcy, clearly appalled, fired back that they should avoid further contact with the Allied commander and leave Italy as soon as possible. They did so under cover of darkness by French galleys to Toulon and then journeyed across southern France, arriving at Bayonne on 31 October. For the next four years Torcy’s sister assumed the double role of the Dowager Queen’s chief lady-in-waiting and warder, while the duke tried to bring order to her household.265 Torcy and the king were especially wary of Maria-Anna’s intrigues to regain power in Spain, fearing that she might want to marry Philip V, ally herself with the duc d’Orléans (who visited her twice), or return to her earlier Austrian alliance. Torcy, who in 1706 had contemplated bringing her to Paris,266 was delighted instead to have his sister act as his first line of defence at Bayonne and to send him regular reports about the busy port and its governor, Antoine Charles



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IV, duc de Gramont. For her part, the dowager hoped that the p ­ owerful minister’s charming sister would advance her cause at Versailles, but both Saint-Pierres eventually tired of the court-in-exile’s petty intrigues. When Torcy, true to his promise to support the restitution of the duke’s Italian possessions, suggested they journey to Utrecht to pursue personally their cause, they gladly quit Bayonne at the beginning of 1712. During the Utrecht negotiations, Charles Talbot, 1st Duke of Shrewsbury, reminded English secretary Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, “[Y]ou know the share the Colbert family takes in this affair, so doubt not what is proper … consideration of Madame de Croissy and Monsieur de Torcy.”267 Torcy also gratified Mme de Pomponne’s desire that he protect her financial interests and promote her children’s futures.268 In 1699 Torcy sent his brother-in-law Nicolas-Simon Arnauld, chevalier then marquis de Pomponne, to Brussels on a short but sensitive ceremonial visit to its Governor General Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, to offer condolences upon the death of his son and to reassure him that despite this loss, Louis still desired that the elector receive some substantial compensation from the Spanish inheritance that would now elude his dynasty. ­Pomponne stayed only a few days so as not to compromise Max in the eyes of his Spanish masters and then gave a full report at Versailles of all he observed. Pomponne was reappointed lieutenant-general of the Isle [sic] de France (March 1697), his patent of office citing his valour in battle at Stafford, Steenkerke, and Neerwinden, and during the tense famine years of 1708–09 he rode with troops guarding shipments of grain and other supplies for the capital. He also lent his brother-in-law troops to guard the couriers carrying the posts to the northern frontier.269 Henri-Charles Arnauld, Pomponne’s youngest son, became like a brother to Torcy. At the age of fourteen he was awarded the revenue of an abbey in Poitou and then ten years later exchanged it for the richly endowed abbey of Saint-Medard-en-Soisson. Newly consecrated a priest and with his father’s and Torcy’s sponsorship, the abbé became the Duke of Burgundy’s almoner in 1698 and accompanied him to the Rhine front in 1702 and 1703. Pomponne’s earlier traveling in Italy led Torcy in 1705 to promote him as ambassador to Venice, where he proved an adept diplomat, monitoring a spy network encompassing northern Italy, Vienna, and Hungary, aiding the Rákóczi uprising in Hungary, improving communication between Rome and Versailles (both in the postal and diplomatic sense), and challenging Imperial propaganda with a plethora of pro-French pamphlets often printed in Venice.270 Although

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for a time Pomponne flirted with the idea of requesting the plum Swiss ­ambassadorship, Torcy dissuaded him.271 On his return to Versailles, he was appointed one of the three ecclesiastical councillors of state and in 1716 succeeded Torcy as commander-chancellor of the Royal Orders. He was a cultivated man, knowledgeable in Italian and Spanish literature, a connoisseur of architecture and the arts generally, a prominent member of several academies, and one of Torcy’s most valuable confidants throughout their long lives.272 The Colbert clan’s elder and Nestor was Henri Pussort, Torcy’s greatuncle, eighty years old in 1696 and regarded as a man of integrity and capability even by his enemies.273 Pussort served as dean of the Conseil d’État privé and chair of several important royal commissions. Acknowledged as one of the great legal minds of the day, he helped draft the civil Code Louis. A bureaucrat par excellence, he turned his large residence on the Neuve-Saint-Honoré into a government bureau, with a dozen commis working in downstairs rooms. A champion of royal power, he wrote that “if all the old laws would be contrary to the new ordinances that the king proposes, that is no reason to prevent its execution … because a prince has no need of antiquity to compose new laws for his state” – a maxim Torcy espoused early in his career.274 The ­Croissys looked to Pussort for political guidance as well as financial assistance. Early in the 1690s Croissy borrowed over 110,000 livres, and in 1696 Pussort advanced 15,000 livres to Charles-Joachim, just nominated to Montpellier. When Torcy married, Pussort pledged 100,000 livres to him to be paid at Pussort’s death, and during his lifetime, he aided other members of the Colbert clan, including a loan of 110,000 livres to his great-nephew Desmaretz. All told, from 1690 to 1697 the Colbert clan received over 210,000 livres in loans and gifts, or almost a quarter of Pussort’s declared fortune.275 However, Pussort was also a family peacemaker. The relationship between Seignelay and Croissy had become strained after Colbert’s death in 1683, but quarrels did not boil over into public until 1686 when, as the English ambassador reported, a courier arrived at Versailles from Rome carrying a patent for permitting revenues from the Abbey of St Denis to be used for Mme de Maintenon’s new convent at St Cyr. Being the first to bring the king important news increased one’s prestige at court and demonstrated the bearer’s competency and efficiency, so Seignelay waylaid the courier and “took ye Pacquet opened it, and carried ye news to ye King. Monsr Croissy takes this as a great Invasion of his Province, complaines highly of it, and has caused him



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to expresse great Resentments against Mr. De Seignelay.”276 Pussort and Beauvillier reconciled the two,277 but this squabble was not an isolated event. Uncle and nephew quarreled over relations with the papacy, preparations for war in 1688–89, and d’Avaux’s mission to Ireland. When Seignelay died suddenly, Croissy, knowing that his nephew was seriously in debt, sent his premier commis Bergeret to the Hôtel Colbert along with the family lawyer Pierre du Boc and several bailiffs armed with lettres de cachet to impound and seal all the objects and treasure belonging to the grand treasurer of the Royal Orders for fear that Seignelay’s creditors or his widow might rifle through the king’s property.278 Torcy later proved a protector and mentor to the Seignelay children. Perhaps prodded by his mother and certainly by Pussort, Torcy brought the eldest, Marie-Jean Baptiste, to court, presented him to the king, placed him in the honour guard welcoming the English ambassador, and helped him purchase an infantry colonelcy. A valiant soldier, he died in February 1712 in one of the war’s last battles. Torcy continued his protection of the Seignelays by securing two “arrêts du conseil” (council judgments) in 22 October 1712 and March 1714 reducing the family debts. He also invested in the building of the Hôtel Seignelay, next to his own hotel on the right bank of the Seine.279 Two other sons of the Great Colbert became valuable political allies. Jules-Armand Colbert, marquis de Blainville, his father’s survivancier as superintendent of buildings since 1674, saw that charge pass to Louvois with the breakup of Colbert’s empire in 1683, so Blainville purchased the office of grand master of ceremonies in 1685.280 Not yet twenty years old, he soon tired of serving as a court functionary, preferring the military career he had begun in 1682. Moreover, his subordinate Nicolas II Sainctot was experienced and accustomed to acting independently, so the two quarreled and Sainctot was forced out in 1691.281 Under Torcy, Blainville often co-hosted receptions for visiting dignitaries, such as the Earl of Portland, the Earl of Manchester, and the papal nuncio, and played a prominent role at the wedding of Marie-Adelaide of Savoy to the Duke of Burgundy. From 1690 Blainville sought to resell his charge but was unable to do so until 1701.282 With the outbreak of war, he returned to the army as a “maréchal de camp” (brigadier), distinguished himself in the 1702 and 1703 Rhine campaigns, but died in August 1704 of severe wounds received at Blenheim. While with the army of the Rhine, Blainville was a valuable informant. He wrote Torcy from Kaisersworth hoping that his news of the siege reached the foreign secretary more quickly than what Boufflers was sending to War

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S­ ecretary Chamillart and urging his cousin to send him dispatches by special messenger, circumventing the usual military couriers.283 His death was not only a personal loss but cost Torcy one of his best sources of military intelligence. Colbert’s son Jacques-Nicolas served as coadjutor (from 1680) and then as archbishop (from 1691) of Rouen and occupied one wing of the Hôtel Colbert when in Paris as de facto overseer of the Colbert library. As a gesture of friendship and family alliance he opened the library to his uncle Croissy and cousin Torcy, allowing them to send their commis to examine its diplomatic documents and treaty collections and to consult with Colbert librarian Baluze, as they did later when editing state papers for the foreign affairs archives.284 Jacques-Nicolas, who disliked the Jesuits and advocated moderate measures in dealing with post-Revocation “New Converts” (ncs) was one of his like-minded cousin’s most trusted advisors on church affairs.285 It was with genuine regret that Torcy informed his friend the abbé Melchior de Polignac in 1707 of the death of one whose passing, he contended, would be mourned by all with any connection to him.286 As ecclesiastical allies, this left among the Colbert prelates Torcy’s brother at Montpellier, who increasingly sympathized with the Jansenists, his cousin Vincent-François Desmaretz, bishop of Saint-Malo, closely allied with the archbishop of Paris, C ­ ardinal Noailles, and Vincent-François’s older brother Jacques Desmaretz, bishop of Riez and then Auch, but whose tenure was unremarkable.287 Another kinsman in Torcy’s circle of friends and collaborators was René-Mans de Froulay, comte de Tessé, Marshal of France since 1703, an experienced diplomat, and related by marriage through Seignelay. His correspondence with Torcy ranged from peace negotiations to personal matters. Tessé was attentive to Torcy’s ongoing interest in acquiring Sablé and Bois-Dauphin, which he had tried to purchase in 1708 from the heirs of Abel Servien but had been blocked by legal problems with Servien’s debts, especially those owed to Villars. He sent Torcy information about these coveted lands and recommended someone to help plan their rehabilitation after long neglect. Tessé knew that his war-weary friend hoped that Sablé would one day be a place of repose, so with negotiations weighing heavily upon Torcy’s shoulders, Tessé declared that he would write only of the wolves, boars, and independent life he knew Torcy longed for.288 A distant cousin, Michel d’Ancel, sieur Desgranges, had served under Colbert, Seignelay, and Louis de Pontchartrain as a navy premier commis, but through Croissy’s intercession, he became a master of c­ eremonies



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under Blainville’s nominal direction in May 1691. In December 1700, Torcy and Blainville selected Desgranges to accompany Philip V to Spain in that same capacity. While traveling, Desgranges sent Torcy accounts of the new king and his brothers. When he returned to Versailles, he remained as a master of ceremonies until the Regency.289 Colbert’s godson, Jean-Baptiste Louis Picon d’Andrézel, son of one of his premiers commis, was in the 1690s treated like a member of Croissy’s family. An ordinary commissioner of war and then sub-delegate general of Alsace in 1701, in 1705 he became a “maître de hôtel ordinaire du roi” (butler to the king) and later secretary of the chamber in the king’s Cabinet, where he assisted Torcy on occasion at private audiences with foreign diplomats or served as liaison with various embassies in Paris. After the Utrecht peace settlement, he was promoted to lieutenant du roi in Roussillon and in the next reign ambassador to Constantinople.290 Perhaps the most important member of the Colbert clan to receive Torcy’s protection was his first cousin Nicolas Desmaretz.291 Desmaretz had been a favourite of Croissy, who was highly selective of those of the Colbert clan to whom he extended his patronage and confidence. Born in 1648 to Croissy’s sister Marie Colbert and Jean Desmaretz, treasurer of the Soissons bureau of Finance, the young Desmaretz entered Colbert’s bureaus at the age of fifteen. Colbert later arranged his advantageous marriage to Madeleine de Béchameil, whose sister was to marry the duc de Cossé-Brissac. Desmaretz rose rapidly in the financial bureaucracy, but after his uncle’s death in 1683 he was dismissed by the new controller general Claude Le Peletier and was among those attacked by the Le Tellier clan. Accused but never convicted of financial manipulation of state funds and of malfeasance in office, he was nonetheless exiled to his Maillebois estate with his reputation seemingly shattered. Yet he continued to advise Seignelay and Croissy on financial affairs and, more surprisingly, served as a secret advisor to Le Peletier and increasingly to subsequent controllers general. Slowly he re-entered Parisian society in the 1680s, occupying a townhouse on rue Vivienne next to the Hôtel Croissy and becoming Torcy’s close friend. Fears that the return of war would strain the royal treasury not yet recovered from the havoc of the Nine Years War caused Controller General Chamillart to consult the knowledgeable Desmaretz from 1699, and it is likely from then that he began keeping his cousin Torcy apprised of the kingdom’s financial health. In April 1701 there was a request from Madrid that Desmaretz be sent there to manage finances, but Jean Orry went instead and Desmaretz remained privately at ­Chamillart’s

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side.292 As it became apparent that Chamillart was inadequate to the double burden of controller general and war secretary, D ­ esmaretz’s kinsmen Torcy, Chevreuse, and Beauvillier, Maintenon, and possibly former controller general Pontchartrain called for his readmission to public service.293 In September 1703 Louis XIV finally received D ­ esmaretz in public audience, and he was appointed soon thereafter one of the two directors of finance, with a crucial administrative role. In 1708 ­Chamillart’s broken health finally persuaded the king to allow him to resign as controller general and replace him with Desmaretz, who in eight months also joined the Conseil. Torcy assured the duc de Gramont that the king had the highest opinion of him because of his experience and application to duty.294 Desmaretz supplied his cousin with pertinent reports on finance and channeled some of his office’s numerous patronage possibilities to Torcy’s clients.295 A degree of stability returned to France’s fractured finances as Desmaretz augmented and reorganized his department. He also tipped the balance in the Conseil in favour of Torcy and other néo-politiques (pragmatists who put the interests of the state first) during the Utrecht peace negotiations. Matthew Prior, who became Torcy’s friend and ally in peacemaking, worried privately to Bolingbroke in 1712 that “Monsieur de Torcy … is really a good deal concerned, and, faith! with reason; he has more enemies than I thought, and has reason to apprehend any shock in our affairs.”296 Among those critical of Torcy’s foreign policy and religious beliefs were his uncles by marriage to Colbert’s daughters, Chevreuse to Jeanne-Marie in 1667 and Beauvillier to Henrietta-Louise in 1671. ­Beauvillier became chief of the Council of Finances in 1685 and governor of the household of the Grandchildren of France and minister in 1691. His importance during the War of the Spanish Succession was such that along with Torcy and Chamillart, he received Jean Orry’s reform memoirs written from Spain and briefings when Orry came to Versailles.297 Named governor of Guyenne in 1696, Chevreuse remained a more private person, and although it was recurrently rumoured at court that he would be called to the Conseil, he never was.298 Yet Chevreuse consulted privately with the king and also sent his thoughts to the Conseil through Beauvillier.299 Religion would drive a wedge between these Colbert kinsmen. ­François de Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon, the politically ambitious descendant of an old and devoutly Catholic noble family, tutor of the Duke of Burgundy from 1689, and archbishop of Cambrai from 1695, had espoused a type of mysticism that he called “Pure Love,” an intense



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r­eligiosity mixed with aristocratic charm that fascinated Maintenon and her circle, which included the dukes and their wives. Unfortunately for them, ­Fénelon welcomed into their sphere his kinswoman Mme de Guyon, whose brand of mysticism called “Quietism” eventually alarmed Bossuet and the king and earned official condemnation.300 From 1693 ­Maintenon distanced herself from Fénelon, but the dukes remained loyal. Croissy and Torcy believed that the dukes had compromised not only their own reputations but those of the Colbert clan. Personally Torcy looked on Fénelon as a counterfeit prude, while Beauvillier believed that Torcy secretly supported the Jansenists, regarded by the duke as only slightly less detestable and dangerous than the despised Reformed faith. Torcy also differed with his uncles on Gallicanism, doggedly defending the rights of the crown and the Gallican church’s freedoms, whereas the dukes promoted ultramontanism and the Jesuits.301 Shortly after Pomponne’s death, Fénelon advised Beauvillier to remain friendly with Torcy for the sake of council business, but not to push his confidence too far. Fénelon suspected Torcy of membership in a proJansenist cabal that included his brother the bishop of Montpellier and Renaudot.302 When rumours circulated in April 1710 that the pope was ill, Fénelon informed Chevreuse that he feared a conclave, since he doubted that Torcy and France’s worldly cardinals were interested in the election of a theologian and courageous champion of right doctrine.303 Earlier that month Torcy had reported to the Conseil the nuncio’s accusation that parlement’s arrêt disallowing papal condemnation of several works by the bishop of Saint Pons was due to a Jansenist cabal that had misled the king.304 Torcy not only rejected the charge as false, but countered that the real problem was the Holy See’s assault on Gallican liberties. As the dispute with Rome dragged on, Beauvillier made his standard insinuation that Torcy was a Jansenist partisan.305 His estrangement from Torcy extended to Torcy’s wife, whom the duke strongly disliked for her alleged “strong influence over [Torcy’s] mind, reaching it by way of his heart.” Although, Saint-Simon continued, Beauvillier believed that she “had an excellent brain and was well-informed,” he nonetheless viewed her as “a kind of heretic who perverted her husband” into accepting the Arnaulds’ deeply rooted Jansenism.306 Yet family solidarity was resilient, as demonstrated in May 1710 when Beauvillier stood at the baptismal font with Torcy’s new daughter, Constance.307 The mistrust between uncle and nephew spilled over into council debates. Torcy noted in his journal in 1710 a small quarrel that erupted when Beauvillier opposed sending the papacy several propositions that

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Torcy had prepared for the Curia’s review, complaining that he had not had enough time to study them. The king, intervening in the squabble, reminded Beauvillier that he would never veer from the Gallican maxims, while Torcy added that the duke’s fears were groundless, since these propositions had been seen in council before. The Conseil supported Torcy’s motion.308 In 1711 Torcy read a dispatch from Constantinople reporting that the sultan had sent a large army against Russia and urged support for the Turks, since war in the Balkans would distract Austria from war in the west. Burgundy and Beauvillier objected to any such dealings with the infidel. In his private journal, Torcy mocked such pure consciences.309 In April of that same year, however, he apparently caught the pious Beauvillier acting hypocritically. During a Conseil session shortly after the Grand Dauphin’s death, Torcy found the monarch and the other ministers so moved to tears that they had difficulty expressing their opinions during discussion. He, however, possessing in his own words more firmness, was able to proceed, but he reproached himself immediately afterward for hard-heartedness. On leaving the council chamber, however, he found the other ministers laughing among themselves and so ceased reproving himself.310 Historians who use kinship to place Torcy with his uncles in a clanbased political alliance are mistaken.311 A more nuanced approach notes the decline of clan groupings in the reign’s later years, although they do not disappear altogether, and focuses instead on looser cabals. Yet Saint-Simon grouped Torcy, Desmaretz, and the dukes into a “cabal of ministers” because they were the predominant voices among those who exercised power and promoted the interests of their Colbert kin and clients, such as Desmaretz’s political rehabilitation.312 They were often ideologically at odds, however, especially on church matters, as Torcy considered the dukes and their pupil Burgundy parts of a neo-dévot cabal. Despite these differences, as Saint-Simon observed, “they all being wise and moderate men, [they] preserved the decencies.” 313 The exiled Fénelon, confined to Cambrai since 1697, continued to stir up the dukes against Torcy and his approach to diplomacy. Chevreuse, however, wrote Fénelon favourably of the foreign secretary in an April 1709 letter, calling him a very good secretary and knowledgeable of the princes’ (Louis’s heirs) interests and “ours” (le nôtre), meaning the Burgundy circle, and praising his kinsman’s character, devotion to duty, and diplomatic skills.314 But Fénelon and likely Beauvillier as well remained unconvinced. As preparations advanced to send envoys for peace talks at Gertruydenberg, Fénelon urged Chevreuse to persuade Beauvillier to



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lobby the king to replace the once-disgraced Polignac with someone of reputation, even Beauvillier himself if asked. The aristocratic archbishop sniffed that Torcy preferred a professional diplomat dependent upon him, what Fénelon disparaged as a professional negotiator who applied all the rules of the art.315 Of course, this was the very calibre of diplomat Torcy hoped to form in the academy he later established! Despite the fact that outsiders often thought the Colbert clan members on the Conseil were like-minded on policy, Fénelon knew that Beauvillier and Torcy, while usually united in promoting Colbert clan interests, were often divided on the means and ends of diplomacy.316 Bureaucracies are organizational structures that can appear as machines, but in truth they are at most only machine-like and are always made up of humans. Any analysis of a bureaucracy must factor in the humans who inhabited it and those on the outside who facilitated its functioning. The relationships between Torcy and his kin illustrate this human dimension of the foreign office’s operation and the significance of the individual who led it when seen within his family context. These relationships also demonstrate the significance of family working together for their advancement not as isolated individuals but as members of a kinship network. Granted, family could be at times quarrelsome or even a limiting factor, as when the fall of the fortunes or reputation of one member tainted the others. Nevertheless, ties of kinship and marriage were ever present in the outlook of the early modern French as they viewed themselves and others. Calculations for maintaining or advancing one’s place in society, for marital alliances, for career options, and for a wide spectrum of life’s choices always included kinship as a weighty factor, even when it was on occasion rejected. For Torcy, it was family that placed him in the position to hope one day to accede to the charge of foreign secretary, that saw to his apprenticeship in the family “business,” and that assisted and mentored him as he undertook that weighty responsibility. In addition, family supplied several of his collaborators in domestic administration and diplomacy, whether as ambassadors or as bishops assisting in provincial management or in the informal but nonetheless vital roles in court life played by his sisters. Indeed, family was his mainstay of advice and support during the first few years of his secretaryship, and it was from his new family by marriage that he would gain a mentor for the years of testing that came at the outset of his tenure as foreign secretary.

3 Mentorship and Testing

Before Torcy could place his personal stamp on his department’s personnel, administrative policies, and organization he first had to step into what was a foreign secretary’s chief and most perilous role: guiding the negotiations that could either end or prolong a war. This could only be accomplished through continuing collaboration with the diplomatic organization and personnel both at home and abroad inherited from his father. Even so, his personal leadership of that department was crucial to its effective operation. Moreover, the policy decisions Torcy and Pomponne persuaded the king and his Conseil to adopt and the negotiations he guided or personally conducted in tandem with his father-inlaw clearly demonstrate that there was more to the foreign office than its system of organization. Torcy and Pomponne would need to balance losses and gains in a manner satisfactory to the king’s honour and his desire for a defensible northeastern frontier on the one hand and his yearning for respite from a ruinous war on the other.1 After peace was re-established at Ryswick, embassies were sent out to resume full diplomatic relations with France’s former enemies, but because the war had lasted nearly a decade, many former representatives had moved on to other royal service, leaving the French diplomatic corps depleted and in need of an infusion of talent and expertise. Filling these posts would require immediate attention yet careful consideration. At the same time, Torcy and Pomponne tackled the looming Spanish succession, the most critical foreign policy issue of the reign. Any solution had to preserve the peace by satisfying the fears of the kingdom’s former foes while serving French interests and Bourbon dynasticism. Louis XIV’s commitment to attain these ends through negotiation was genuine. He, Pomponne, and Torcy pursued an audacious partition scheme in which the king not



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only sacrificed his progeny’s legal rights to the Spanish throne, but also achieved this compromise in concert with his old foe, William III of England. If the efforts of the new secretary and his mentor ultimately failed to maintain peace, it would not be for lack of skilled and patient effort, which the king had the wisdom to recognize and reward. As the relatively young Torcy emerged from his father’s shadow to guide the foreign office during an especially perilous period, he attracted criticism at court and among the diplomatic community. Criticism eventually diminished as Torcy proved himself to the king and even to some of his harshest critics, but understandably for someone so intimately involved at the centre of the state, it never completely disappeared.

C o n c l u d in g t h e T r eaty of Ryswi ck: A P e r il o us Debut For a few years the Nine Years War had been fought with fervour, but war weariness set in as the economic and fiscal costs of continuous war on land and sea weighed increasingly on all the participants.2 Louvois’s death in July 1691 and Pomponne’s return to the Conseil were symbolic as well as substantive in signaling a new French policy orientation toward moderation.3 Louis XIV was also looking beyond the present war to the long-expected death of Spain’s childless Carlos II and the contest over the succession to his throne and empire. Exploratory peace talks began in the summer of 1691, but without result as war dragged on. Yet the pressure for peace continued to mount as France experienced bad harvests in 1692 and 1693 and the harsh winter of 1693–94. Savoy was the target of serious French peace feelers from 1692, resulting in the 29 June 1696 Treaty of Turin neutralizing Savoy and then Italy.4 This first split in the anti-French coalition encouraged the other members also to look to their own interests. The Amsterdam burgomasters made overtures to France, facing not only failing finances from the mounting costs of war but a debilitating disruption of commerce and convinced that the Stadtholder William of Orange and his inner circle were wedded to war. Croissy in turn indirectly approached William, but to no avail.5 From the winter of 1693–94, an important collaboration was established between the French diplomat Callières and Francisco Mollo, a wealthy Amsterdam merchant well-connected in republican circles and resident of the Polish king. Their fruitful contacts were not without their missteps and misunderstandings, but they were the channel through which began the serious talks that led to peace at Ryswick in

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1697.6 Informal contacts continued intermittently, including a generous French proposal with a secret article countenancing the recognition of William as England’s king, but when the Dutch pressed for more concessions and Louis XIV obliged them, they insisted on more. Negotiations were suspended in September 1695.7 Winter passed without further talks as France planned a spring invasion to link up with the Jacobites and knock England out of the war or at least distract her, but when this was foiled, Louis offered new concessions that led to a tentative agreement for a peace congress at Utrecht.8 William and the Dutch wanted to include the emperor, so Dominik Andreas, Count Kaunitz, Imperial ambassador to The Hague, sought instructions from Leopold I. When they finally arrived, they included a demand for the restitution of Strasbourg, which, coupled with the Anglo-Dutch insistence on French recognition of William as English king, prevented further progress. It was at this point that Croissy died (28 July 1696). Although ill on and off for some years, Croissy had nonetheless directed negotiations to the end. Pomponne participated in policy discussions in the Conseil, whereas Torcy as his father’s chief assistant was only aware – but not a part – of them.9 In fact, his primary task had been to lighten his father’s load by largely shouldering provincial administration and some diplomatic tasks, while the all-important drafting of instructions remained Croissy’s preserve, whatever input Torcy may have had. There is, nonetheless, a tantalizing hint of a wider role for Torcy as royal advisor before Croissy’s passing. During the 1693 campaign, Louis had young Torcy draft some propositions for peace. Torcy blamed the Prince of Orange, whom he called Holland’s absolute master for stifling any thoughts of peace in the war-weary Republic and for inspiring the League of Augsburg to fight on. With his emerging diplomat’s eye and deft pen, Torcy observed that the king’s arms and conditions for peace must march along with one another, an outlook reflected in his later craving for battlefront news and his support for projects like a Jacobite descent on Scotland to hasten the war’s end.10 He defended his father’s reunions, conceding at most that perhaps Venice might arbitrate the decisions of the Metz Chamber of Reunion, but insisted that Strasbourg’s seizure was consistent with the Treaty of Westphalia and its retention the key to preventing a German invasion of France. The emperor might be compensated by French-held places, and Imperial princes would have captured places returned, but with the fortifications of most demolished.11 In its particulars Torcy’s memoir largely echoed what Louis had offered his opponents in his 24 September 1688



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manifesto cum ultimatum. It also anticipated what Torcy would write in instructions for the final year of negotiations and was close as well to what was finally agreed upon at Ryswick.12 Beauvillier also drafted a proposal, as did Pomponne after Louis’s return from the front, and all three were examined by the Conseil on 29 June when all the ministers could be present.13 Upon being officially announced as foreign secretary on 29 July 1696 at court and to the diplomatic community, Torcy was at once confronted with the fate of Strasbourg. The emperor insisted that only its unconditional cession would assure peace, but Louis resisted until Callières’s 30 July letter drove home the intensity of Imperial intransigence. Louis accepted cession with some conditions, but the Dutch were unmoved; and on 27 August Louis finally agreed to cede Strasbourg unconditionally.14 Although not yet in the Conseil, Torcy helped Pomponne prepare for its meetings, likely joined him in conferences with Louis, and met with the monarch on his own.15 All incoming and outgoing diplomatic correspondence passed through Torcy,16 who now drafted the negotiators’ instructions. His long familiarity with the department’s personnel and procedures expedited and eased this transition. When the new secretary sent Callières among others the requisite letter announcing his father’s death, he assured him that he had the same esteem for him his father had, while Callières had the same day written Torcy assurances of his continuing service to the king but now in accordance with his orders.17 A letter from Vauban suggests Torcy’s new role in formulating policy. Hearing rumours of concessions on Strasbourg circulating at court and in the capital when he returned to Paris in September, Torcy dashed off a letter to his friend the playwright and royal historian Jean Racine expressing incredulity that there were those in the Conseil so uninformed as to diminish France’s reputation and power by such a show of weakness.18 A few days later Vauban sent a letter to the new secretary urging him to stand firm on Strasbourg and warning of the consequences of handing over the Rhine to France’s enemies. The architect of much of this frontier clearly meant to lobby both Torcy and Pomponne as a way of influencing the king.19 Torcy and Pomponne were part of another development that signaled a policy shift. The brutal bombardments by sea and land promoted by Louvois and Seignelay from the 1680s with the king’s approbation had, predictably, provoked Allied retaliation in kind along the French coast in the 1690s. When Louis finally found the damage and psychological disruption wreaked upon his ports and their populations intolerable,

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he at first responded with escalation if they did not cease, threatening and then carrying out the bombardment of Brussels in August 1695. After Croissy’s death, Torcy, the more pacific Pomponne, and the latter’s like-minded friend Callières won Louis to a new approach to end this reciprocal destruction. An unsigned mutual moratorium with the Allies of October 1697 led the king to order coastal batteries disarmed and coastal defenders sent elsewhere. Louis appreciated the wisdom of hastening the Dutch toward peace through a return to normal commerce, but he also now had less trust in the efficacy of ruthlessness and Torcy and Pomponne did everything to encourage such moderate policies.20 Among the new secretary’s pressing tasks was the execution of the Treaty of Turin’s provisions (ratified 7 September). The first article called for two hostages, Henri-François, duc de Foix, and Auguste, duc de ­Choiseul, to be sent to Turin until this was accomplished. Torcy wrote instructions for the two peers on 8 September, telling them to work closely with Tessé, who had brokered this peace, and to insist that the honours they received at the Savoyard court were modeled on those rendered the Spanish governor of Milan and former viceroy of Catalonia.21 Torcy also orchestrated the treaty’s celebration with Te Deums for maximum public effect.22 A related mission concerned the article linking the Houses of Bourbon and Savoy by marriage. Henri de Lorraine, comte de Brionne, grand écuyer of France and a chevalier of the Royal Orders, was selected to set off immediately for the frontier to receive eleven-year-old MarieAdelaide of Savoy, the betrothed of the fourteen-year-old Duke of Burgundy, to be educated at the French court until her marriage. Ceremony was particularly important in Brionne’s instructions (10 September 1696) because, although she was not yet Duchess of Burgundy, Louis wanted to woo Marie-Adelaide and her father by bestowing honours that clearly distinguished her from other princesses of her rank. Torcy enlisted his kinsman, Master of Ceremonies ­Desgranges, to instruct Brionne and the party of ladies-in-waiting as well as the dignitaries awaiting the princess in Lyon on the proper protocol for receiving a royal bride-to-be.23 Although neutralized militarily, Italy still reverberated with diplomatic speculation and activity, as Victor-Amadeus seethed with ambition. Tessé wrote Torcy of the need to appoint an ambassador and reminded him that Turin was a difficult post for foreign envoys, unwelcoming and suspicious like its ruler, and recommended against placing an ecclesiastic in such a menacing environment.24 Meanwhile, Leopold’s obstinate foot-dragging, while winning further French concessions, drove the Dutch to despair. The States-General voted



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on 3 September to commence talks with France for a general treaty. While the Maritime Powers suggested invoking the Swedish king’s mediation as provided for at Westphalia and Nijmegen, Leopold dithered. Callières concluded that this was a ploy to wheedle from Louis and his son a renunciation of the Spanish inheritance. With the royal blessing, Callières refused to negotiate anything not a part of past treaties, from Westphalia to Nijmegen, which had excluded any discussion of such a renunciation. Yet during that winter Callières continued his encounters with Dutch diplomats, working out many of the details of what would eventually be accepted at Ryswick. Louis was intent on avoiding any Imperial trap to force him into renouncing the Spanish prize, but he had Torcy instruct Callières to sound out the Dutch separately and secretly on what they hoped and feared when Carlos died. Callières reported that they were resolute that neither the Spanish Netherlands nor the Spanish monarchy be joined to either France or Austria, but were open to possibilities of inheritance by princes of either or both dynasties so long as they remained cadet branches that were forever separate from the main branches. This was valuable information, especially when, after peace was achieved, Torcy could focus on this matter.25 By the end of October 1696 a general peace conference was finally in the planning stages, with the hope that Charles XI of Sweden would serve as mediator and that the talks would take place in the Dutch Republic. Louis regarded this as a token of his confidence in the Dutch desire for peace, since the emperor held out for Switzerland or another location closer to his centre of power.26 But a last-minute and unauthorized manoeuvre by Callières over Luxembourg nearly derailed the talks. While the Dutch cried foul, Louis expressed displeasure with Callières for exceeding his instructions and failing to reverse himself immediately upon command to do so. The royal displeasure was given teeth when Callières, Torcy’s and the king’s chief collaborator in getting these talks under way, was reduced to a supporting role at the side of two higher-level negotiators: Nicolas-Auguste de Harlay de Bonneuil and the experienced septuagenarian diplomat Honoré Courtin.27 On 10 November 1696 Courtin wrote to Callières to inform him that he and Harlay-Bonneuil had been selected to serve with him and that to expedite matters the king wanted them to follow the simplest of ceremonials.28 Two weeks later Courtin wrote Callières that Torcy and Harlay-Bonneuil would send him a small memoir and noted that he and Harlay-Bonneuil would require three different passports: for going, for returning with horses and carriages, and for baggage. Additionally, they would bring two camp beds and a staff

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of ten to twelve persons and would require chambers, since they would not be meeting at Delft, the location of the French embassy, and would thus need to return home at a reasonable time after each workday. In a postscript suggesting that he spoke with Torcy in the presence of his mother, Courtin added that Mme de Croissy, recalling her days with her husband at the Nijmegen congress, complained that they had been miserably lodged there and so preferred Utrecht for the conferences, with the Allied negotiators remaining in The Hague and the French in Delft.29 As the French negotiators prepared to depart in late February 1697, the emperor still withheld his consent, so those powers attending agreed that the French would stay at Delft and the Allies at The Hague and that they would meet daily at a point nearby and in between, the Prince of Orange’s country house at Ryswick.30 French preparations continued apace, with War Secretary Barbezieux enlisted to facilitate passage through the war zone and the vital communications link back to Torcy’s Versailles bureaus. A problem arose when royal physicians determined that Holland’s air was too humid for Courtin’s sensitive eyes, so Louis Verjus de Crécy, another distinguished and experienced ambassador, was appointed in his place. The selection of Crécy, like Courtin a septuagenarian, was perhaps related to the three months the young Torcy had spent under his mentorship at Ratisbon in 1686. Crécy was already ill when summoned to Versailles, and the voyage there only made his “rhume” (cold) worse.31 Harlay-Bonneuil likewise fell ill but was able in February to announce that his health was restored and that, in any event, everything must give way before “le service” (the service).32 During that winter Torcy and Pomponne continued to monitor diplomatic movements, military plans, and any other development that might hasten or hinder that spring’s peacemaking process. Everyone wondered if Parliament would approve William’s request for funds for yet another year of war (they finally did), and William worried that the Austrians might settle separately with France, since the two Catholic powers, each with a stake in the Spanish succession, might arrange it to their mutual advantage and exclude the Protestant powers. Meanwhile, Callières heard from Navy Secretary and Controller General Pontchartrain, exercising his right to instruct ambassadors on commercial and colonial matters, which would loom large at Ryswick, especially for the Maritime Powers, although not yet to the degree they would later at Utrecht.33 Barbezieux was not happy with Callières and shared doubts about his loyalty with Torcy, complaining on 5 December 1696 not of the content



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of Callières’s memoir forwarded by Torcy, but of the diplomat’s failure to write to him as he assumed they had arranged.34 It is unlikely that this gained Callières a reprimand from Torcy, who may have welcomed or even suggested this epistolatory silence to deny the war secretary direct access to those conducting the upcoming negotiations and forestall any meddling. However, the king and Croissy had earlier also shared doubts about Callières, leading them in 1694 to pair him with Harlay-­ Bonneuil, who received fuller and more forthright instructions even though this was through Callières’s contact Mollo. Harlay-Bonneuil was even told not to share his instructions with Callières, perhaps because of the king’s recollection of Callières’s role in the 1670s in the quixotic and unauthorized attempt by Charles-Paris d’Orléans, duc de Longueville, to be elected king of Poland and Callières’s subsequent diplomatic service with the Duke of Savoy. Whatever the reason for it, this secrecy soon proved so cumbersome and counterproductive that Louis and Croissy gave way to Harlay-Bonneuil’s pleas for an equal partnership, although the mission proved unsuccessful. Further missions to the Republic in 1695 and 1696 by Callières as sole envoy likewise failed and earned him a rebuke from the king during the second for allegedly exceeding his instructions and implying unintended commitments. Croissy, however, responded more positively, while Callières boldly defended himself to the king, who, once satisfied, graciously endorsed all his envoy had done thus far. Croissy’s earlier suspicion of Callières may have been related to the latter’s close ties with Beauvillier and Chevreuse, with whom Croissy and later his son often disagreed over policy. Nevertheless, father and son concluded that although Callières moved in circles critical of them, he was loyal, and Callières would remain Torcy’s close collaborator to the end of the reign.35 Wooed by both sides during the war, Sweden’s Charles XI temporized and avoided committing himself, but yielded to entreaties to serve as mediator and issued invitations to convene a conference at Ryswick on 9 May 1697. These plans were nearly frustrated by his death on 5 April, but it was soon agreed that Sweden’s ambassador Count Nils L ­ illierooth (Lillieroot) would mediate, confirming French agent Daguerre’s prediction to Torcy that Sweden would remain committed. Daguerre also insisted that public opinion would force William to continue negotiating. The discussions at Ryswick, however, would prove to be merely a front for negotiations taking place behind the scenes.36 As the delegates’ departure approached, Torcy drafted their instructions, dated 25 February 1697. These were not the first but were ­certainly

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the most extensive and significant instructions he drafted as the new secretary. Louis André and Émile Bourgeois describe them as so clear and detailed that they fixed the parameters of the future negotiation precisely and definitively.37 The prologue bristles with what one might be tempted to dismiss as Gallic bluster: continuing the war would hurt the Allies more than it would France because she could sustain a long conflict; moreover, even if the Allies had the necessary forces, it would take them many years to capture the very forts the French king had offered them in his peace overtures.38 At the end of 1696, however, the fiscal and military position of the anti-France alliance was deteriorating and the coalition unraveling. Since the defection of Savoy, the remaining Allies suspected one another of seeking separate agreements with France. In particular, William III suspected that Vienna’s diplomatic dallying was in hopes that if Carlos II died before peace was achieved, then the Grand Alliance, committed by treaty to obtaining the whole of his inheritance for the House of Austria, would help him realize his dynastic aspiration.39 Even so, a realistic assessment of what the Allies could and could not do on the battlefield or at sea led Torcy to instruct the plenipotentiaries that since the king wanted peace but a solid one, he would selectively sacrifice some past gains in order to keep others.40 After a brief overview of past negotiations and a recounting of Imperial delays and obstruction, Torcy guided the plenipotentiaries by means of seven articles outlining the king’s political, commercial, and dynastic objectives. He also assured them that his clerks would supply them with copies of relevant correspondence from earlier negotiations to help prepare them for the work ahead.41 The two new plenipotentiaries finally departed the court at the beginning of March and journeyed more or less openly (i.e., not incognito as Callières had earlier traveled) by land and canal to join their colleague at Delft on the 19th. Before leaving Paris, Harlay-Bonneuil had one last conversation with Abbé Renaudot, the foreign ministry’s “spymaster,” who briefed him on the latest news from England. Current and full reports on events and public opinion, especially in London, were so vital that even as the delegation made its way to the frontier, HarlayBonneuil took time at Lille to write Callières that some further information Renaudot had forgotten would be sent along to Delft.42 Meanwhile, Daguerre, a naturalized citizen of the Republic and an Amsterdam burgher who had kept the foreign ministry current on public opinion there since 1678, had received a memoir on commerce from Harlay-Bonneuil and would speak with the plenipotentiaries about Amsterdam’s trade shortly after their arrival in Delft.43



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At the same time, Torcy looked south to preserve the peace previously made with Savoy. He announced on 8 February the choice of the valiant soldier Gabriel, comte de Briord, first equerry in the household of Monsieur, the king’s brother, as ambassador to Savoy, and issued his instructions on 23 March 1697. He did not hide from Briord that he was being sent to an ambitious, anxious, dissimulating prince jealous of his authority and careful to take advantage of any opportunity for expansion, but said that the king had selected him because he knew how to make his master’s intentions known gently but with all the firmness necessary. Tessé introduced Briord at the Savoyard court, including to the duke’s mother, Marie-Jeanne-Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours, known as “Madama Real,” a descendant of Henri IV born in France and favourable to French interests. He did the same with his other pro-French contacts and secret agents in the region, but Briord was cautioned not to compromise any of them, especially Madama Real. Because Tessé was not an official ambassador and had negotiated in secret, he could offer Briord only limited advice on ceremony. To rectify this, Torcy sent further instructions with guidelines as to entries, extension of the hand, visits, and seating at dinner.44 There was another facet of closer relations with Savoy. Briord had been in Turin only a few months when on 29 June he received a letter from former controller general Le Peletier, still a minister and postal superintendent. Le Peletier had been asking for permission to retire from his offices and court since the promise of peace grew stronger in the autumn of 1696, but Louis delayed an answer. Le Peletier was nevertheless confident enough of the king’s eventual consent to mention it to Briord while informing him that a postal official would travel to the Lyon postal bureau and then on to Chambery in Savoy to arrange the reopening of vital routes to Turin and beyond. This would be important groundwork for the expansion of diplomatic missions that usually followed the end of a war.45 At Ryswick, where the peace congress formally opened 9 May 1697, talks droned on formally but fruitlessly.46 Daguerre kept Torcy informed of Spanish and Austrian delays and of the comings and goings of war vessels assembling to keep Jean Bart and his corsairs in Dunkirk and to intercept Bernard Desjean, baron de Pointis, and his fleet of privateers returning from the profitable capture of Cartagena (2 May 1697). The Anglo-Dutch fleets succeeded in keeping Bart bottled up the whole summer, but failed to intercept Pointis, whose return to Brest raised French morale, discouraged her foes, and enriched the French treasury at a

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time when her foes’ funds were running low.47 The attitude of Amsterdam’s merchants and magistrates was crucial to making peace or continuing the war. As William III admitted to Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland in mid-September, “If I had followed my own inclinations, I should be firm and make no concessions; but you will learn from the [Grand] Pensionary [of Holland Anthonie Heinsius] the declaration which the citizens of Amsterdam have caused me to make. Thus I cannot discover any means of continuing the war, and without that, you know, our firmness would avail us nothing.”48 Torcy, anxious to monitor Amsterdam’s resolve, looked to multiple sources of intelligence: Ambassador ­Bonrepaus in Denmark, Daguerre in Delft, and, of course, Mollo.49 In addition, these informants peppered him and his delegates at ­Ryswick with memoirs on commerce to help with negotiations. This gave rise to jealousy among the foreign office’s agents, with Daguerre complaining that the plenipotentiaries listened more to Mollo than to him because Callières was partial to Mollo. Accustomed to rivalry among agents anxious to please and to reap rewards, Torcy reassured Daguerre and encouraged him to continue sending news from the conference. This independent source also enabled Torcy to keep an eye on France’s plenipotentiaries and better assess the reports they sent him.50 While Savoy continued to occupy Torcy, a new situation, albeit of a minor nature, drew his attention to the Spanish border where three hundred soldiers had apparently occupied a traditionally French valley. Although France and Spain were still at war, Torcy wanted first to explore his options before responding to a provocation that might expand the war.51 It was in the Baltic, however, that the threat of a new war was greatest because the death of Sweden’s king, who was succeeded by his fourteen-year-old son, Charles XII, opened an opportunity for her old enemies in Denmark, Brandenburg, Poland, and Russia. Torcy did his best to keep up with events in these states and to promote tranquility when possible. Poland was holding an election for a new king after John III Sobieski died in 1696, so Torcy kept the Ryswick plenipotentiaries abreast of events there and shared his fear that the nomination of Elector Augustus I (“the Strong”) of Saxony (eventually elected as Augustus II of Poland-Lithuania) would comfort France’s enemies and diminish the chances of the Prince de Conti, Louis XIV’s candidate.52 From Copenhagen, Bonrepaus sent a long memoir on Holstein, always a flashpoint between Denmark and Sweden, while Torcy and the king wrote back with hopes that these two crowns and several of the German princes could be kept at peace by a treaty of neutrality. From Holland, also an



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important listening post to the north, Daguerre sent Baltic news and an encouraging report that Amsterdam’s burgomasters were embarrassed by Tsar Peter I’s bellicose visit and his threat to send a Russian army to Poland to aid the beleaguered Elector of Saxony.53 William III, growing impatient with the lethargic proceedings at Utrecht,54 initiated an approach to France that would eventually provide the stalled congress a face-saving peace agreement, although reached elsewhere. He sent his friend and close collaborator the Earl of Portland to talk with an old acquaintance, Marshal Louis François, duc de ­Boufflers.55 Their several meetings between 2 July and 11 September, often in an orchard on the edge of a village near Brussels, were crucial to establishing trust between the two negotiators and their masters. Torcy and Louis closely monitored their content and direction. In a clear example of the ongoing interplay between negotiations and war, news of the French capture of Cartagena and its New World treasure and of the capitulation of Barcelona increased Anglo-Dutch concern that Louis might be tempted away from his earlier concessions, especially if France’s position improved any further. The Ryswick congress worked to put into final form the peace largely crafted by Portland and Boufflers, but the Austrians and Spaniards appeared unlikely to sign. In mid-August Torcy received intelligence from Daguerre of a Brussels meeting to discuss whether Spain should accept French terms between the Spanish diplomat Don Bernardo de Quiros, from whose secretary Daguerre gleaned this intelligence, and Bavarian Elector Max Emmanuel, governor general of the Spanish Netherlands. A month later, Daguerre reported that the capture of Barcelona had greatly contributed to the case for peace and that Quiros was now pressing it on a reluctant Madrid.56 When France and the Maritime Powers did sign a treaty on 20 September 1697, Spain joined them, but Austria did so only on 30 October. By mid-November Torcy reported to the plenipotentiaries that the treaty ratifications had been received from all the signatories except the Empire, but these finally arrived nearly a month later.57 Halfway into his second year as secretary, Torcy had led France’s foreign office in the liquidation of a ruinous war that had lasted for nearly a decade. Opinion at court and among the populace, unaccustomed to seeing the Louisquatorzian juggernaut knocked off course, was critical of the sacrifices made.58 Yet given the array of foes France had faced, the domestic troubles brought on by fighting and financing such an extensive war, and the climatological disasters that led to famine, Ryswick could have been a disaster. While the Sun King “stumbled in 1688 into a general war for

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which France was completely unprepared,”59 Andrew Lossky astutely observes that contemporaries and later historians should focus on the territory France retained rather than on that from which her troops withdrew. The bloated conquests since Nijmegen and the extensive reunions after 1 August 1691 were restored to the Empire and France lost her posts on the Rhine’s right bank. Luxembourg was likewise lost, ­Lorraine restored to its duke, and Catalonia evacuated. Flanders reverted to Spanish rule, although the Dutch were permitted to garrison several towns as a barrier against future French aggression. The Dutch largely regained their former trading privileges, and England gained recognition of ­William III as its lawful monarch. What, then, did France achieve? French diplomacy managed to retain Strasbourg, vital to the control of Alsace, and Louis was now Alsace’s de jure ruler. Strategic fortifications such as those at Sarrelouis and Longwy were retained. Indeed, it has been argued that Louis had finally come round to ­Vauban’s vision of a more defensible, linear frontier. While French conquests overseas were mostly returned, Louis did manage to gain legal title to the Caribbean islands of Tortuga and Santo Domingo (the western half, now Haiti).60 Throughout this process the new foreign secretary was fully immersed in the administration of foreign affairs as well as in the policy formulation that guided it. Pomponne alone appeared in the Conseil on the foreign office’s behalf, but he carried with him the results of Torcy’s and his staff’s labours in the form of summaries and drafts. The reading and planning of responses to Boufflers’s letters and those from the three plenipotentiaries (mostly drafted by Callières) involved the king and his Conseil, with Pomponne as “rapporteur” (reporter), but although both Pomponne and Torcy wrote to the plenipotentiaries, it was primarily Torcy who drafted the king’s replies and instructions that were discussed in council.61 The final negotiations at Ryswick tested Torcy’s diplomatic voice and found it properly tuned for that vital and delicate task. When the breathing space of peace finally arrived, it became clear to many and eventually to the king that it would be more efficient to hear that voice directly and fully within the Conseil itself.

T h e N e w D ip l o m at s after Ryswi ck With peace concluded, Louis XIV and his foreign ministers embarked upon an audacious diplomatic initiative to maintain peace while increasing France’s territory without recourse to arms. This was in marked contrast to the confident aggressiveness of the past wars, planned, prepared



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for, and conducted by the bellicose Louvois, Seignelay, and Croissy.62 The inescapable event that threatened Europe with turmoil was the long-expected death of Carlos II of Spain, whose lack of an heir placed in question the fate of the still extensive and resource-rich Spanish monarchy. To head off the scramble for the spoils that threatened another debilitating conflict, Louis, Pomponne, and Torcy resolved to temper dynastic interests with rationality and a quest for peace.63 Following Ryswick, former and would-be French diplomats flocked to Paris or Versailles seeking audience with Torcy. Their visits were often preceded by letters declaring fidelity to him as secretary of state and to the Colbert family. One of the first came from the interim envoy to The Hague and newly appointed resident in Geneva, Pierre Cadiot de La Closure, who in thanking Torcy for his protection and benevolence proffered his zeal and loyalty.64 Abbé Polignac wrote from Poland asking for Torcy’s assistance and protection.65 Less formulaic was a note from the consummate diplomat Bonrepaus, who wrote that his most vivid memory of his recent visit to the Hôtel Croissy was the goodwill of Mme de Torcy, who as a hostess was rivaled only by Mme de Croissy herself.66 This flurry of activity occurred because peace meant the re-establishment of the diplomatic ties that had been among the war’s early casualties. This included sending ambassadors to the four great powers formerly allied against France: England, Spain, the United Provinces, and the emperor. These “Great Embassies” will be treated in greater detail further on, but it is important to note that France launched an expansive diplomatic effort toward lesser courts as well. Torcy received a memoir in March 1698 from Ulrich Obrecht in Germany urging him to appoint envoys to the assemblies of the Imperial Circles because ­Leopold I planned to pursue Imperial military reform through them rather than through the Diet.67 Nicolas du Blé, marquis d’Huxelles, commanding in Alsace, also urged the wooing of the Rhineland princes.68 Louis XIV, however, was chary of wasting money and diplomatic energy on them, since they had followed Hanover – bought off by being raised to an electorate – in rallying to the emperor during the last war and Torcy initially resisted treating them as responsible sovereigns or recipients of French subsidies, but the reluctance of both would melt as the partitioning enterprise heated up.69 These initiatives augmented the number of diplomats required, but ten years of war had diminished the ranks of available diplomats, as few pursued it as a full-time career.70 With the king’s consent, Torcy drew many initial appointees from his circle of friends, clients, and relatives. While some appointments were under

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c­ onsideration even before the ink had dried on the new treaties, others would not materialize until as late as 1701, when circumstances required them (see figure 5.9 below). Louis Rousseau de Chamoy received the important appointment to the German Diet at Ratisbon in March 1698 and was at his post on the last day of April. His father had served Louis XIII’s brother, ­Gaston, duc d’Orléans, which likely explains Rousseau’s connections with the Arnaulds, who were close to Gaston. Rousseau’s career commenced in 1665 when Pomponne took him to Sweden as his secretary and where he remained first as chargé d’affaires and then as resident during ­Pomponne’s absence (1668–71). He later undertook missions to German courts on behalf of Foreign Secretary Pomponne, earning plaudits for his prudence and his knowledge of Germany and the north, but when Croissy replaced his patron, he received no further postings after finishing as extraordinary envoy to the Elector of Saxony in 1683. Having purchased the office of ordinary gentleman of the king, Rousseau was not without means and in early 1691 made a favourable match that was witnessed by Pomponne, who in a matter of months would be recalled to the Conseil. Perhaps to position himself to be among the new envoys sent out once peace returned, Rousseau presented Pomponne with a treatise he claimed was modeled on the minister, entitled L’idée du parfait ambassadeur, in September 1697. This was followed in January by a memoir on the requirements of the post of envoy to Ratisbon, the issues to be addressed, and suggestions for winning over the Diet’s deputies. Whether Torcy solicited this, his annotations indicate that he read it, and shortly thereafter Rousseau returned to diplomatic service.71 While in Ratisbon, Rousseau monitored Imperial propaganda72 and was later commissioned by Torcy to write a series of pamphlets directed against Emperor Leopold, who, according to a letter from the king, “is profiting … from the weakness of the German princes by establishing his absolute authority in the Empire.”73 Torcy hoped at the very least that the pamphlets Rousseau and other agents generated would persuade the German princes and states to seek the middle ground and declare their neutrality in the likelihood of war over Spain’s succession.74 These efforts bore little fruit, and in June 1703, before war had been declared, the deputies stood by while the emperor illegally ordered Rousseau to depart Ratisbon in five days, leaving behind his wife, who was on the verge of giving birth. This was his final diplomatic mission and he died in 1711.75 Charles François de la Bonde d’Iberville was also sent into the Empire.76 A former foreign office commis77 and one of Torcy’s tutors in



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the 1680s, he was recalled in February 1698 after ten years in Geneva as resident and sent at the end of the year as extraordinary envoy to the Rhineland princes, including Mainz, Hesse-Cassel, and Trier.78 On his return to Paris in 1700 he resided in Torcy’s household, advising him and helping with his personal correspondence. In 1703 he held a series of discussions with the Russian ambassador on Torcy’s behalf.79 He also helped Torcy manage part of the Italian correspondence.80 After briefly serving as envoy to Spain (November 1709 to January 1710), he returned to Paris until appointed extraordinary envoy to Great Britain after Utrecht.81 Jean-Louis d’Usson, marquis de Bonnac, nephew of Torcy’s friend and confidant Bonrepaus, became his uncle’s secretary in Denmark and then the United Provinces when he was forced to give up soldiering.82 When Bonrepaus retired in 1699, Bonnac replaced him as chargé d’affaires in The Hague until 1700, when he was sent as envoy to the court of Duke Anton Ulrich of Wolfenbüttel of the senior branch of the House of Brunswick. In 1701 another of Bonnac’s uncles, Lieutenant-General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac, joined him as military advisor to Anton Ulrich, magnet for those princes resentful of Hanover’s elevation to the ninth electorate. Together uncle and nephew supplied Torcy with secret reports detailing the military strength of Wolfenbüttel and neighbouring Hanover, whose Duke George (the future George I of Great Britain) was Anton Ulrich’s relative and rival. Unfortunately, George, fearing an attack, launched a pre-emptive strike in 1702 and forced Anton Ulrich into exile along with both d’Ussons. Bonnac was not held responsible for the Wolfenbüttel fiasco, and Torcy had him appointed extraordinary envoy to Sweden in 1701 and extraordinary envoy to the court of August II of Saxony-Poland in 1707 (until 1710). On the eve of the congress of Utrecht in 1711, Bonnac, by then a seasoned diplomat and worthy successor of his uncle, was named ambassador to Spain to convince Philip V to go along with the terms of his grandfather’s peacemaking. Leaving that demanding post in 1713, Bonnac held several ambassadorial appointments during the next reign until his retirement in 1736.83 There were other councillors on German affairs. Jean-Casimir ­Frischmann de Ranconnières was a German who had rallied to France by becoming a Catholic and marrying a French woman. He had previously met Torcy at the siege of Namur in 1692. Until 1695 and again in 1698, Frischmann acted as envoy and paymaster to the Prince-Bishop of ­Münster, who, like many German princes, often played a double game, milking both sides for subsidies. When Frischmann returned to Paris

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in 1702, he became one of Torcy’s most valuable advisors on German affairs.84 During the Nine Years War, Croissy recruited a royal guards brigadier, Pierre Puchot, comte de Clinchamp and marquis Des Alleurs (known by the latter title), for a temporary assignment as military observer and negotiator for prisoner release, but a financial setback and the war’s end forced Des Alleurs to seek a diplomatic post as an honourable peacetime occupation. Torcy sent him to Brandenburg ­(1698–1701), Liege (1701), Electoral Palatinate (1701), and then Cologne (1701–02), where he became an expert on German affairs and was aided by his charming wife, but with the outbreak of war he asked to be re-employed in the army, where he was promoted to maréchal de camp. When ­Ferenc II Rákóczi of Hungary, leading an insurrection against the Habsburgs, asked Louis XIV in 1703 for an officer to train his troops, Torcy suggested Des Alleurs as the ideal choice and he was promoted to lieutenant-general. From 1704 he remained in Hungary as extraordinary envoy and military advisor to Rákóczi, but as the insurrection limped toward failure, he was transferred to Constantinople to replace Ambassador Charles de Ferriol, baron d’Argental, who had gone mad. Soon disillusioned with this new post, Des Alleurs asked to be recalled. His entreaties to the Porte (the Ottoman court) on behalf of Sweden’s exiled Charles XII had not only annoyed the Turks but had made it appear that he was neglecting his duties on behalf of French commerce, so his request was granted at the end of 1713. Bonnac replaced him, but empty state coffers and the transition surrounding the passing of Louis XIV delayed Bonnac’s departure until June 1716. Des Alleurs, ill, discouraged, and anxious to return to France, braved a perilous winter voyage to hasten his return home. He died in 1725.85 As Sweden grew wary of the dynastic union between the Maritime ­Powers that commenced in 1688, French diplomats sought to re-­establish the former close relationship with Stockholm. The new ambassador, Louis de Guiscard, comte de Bourlie and marquis de Magny (known as the comte de Guiscard), had the task of negotiating with young Charles XII, who Versailles already realized would drive a hard bargain. ­Guiscard was a soldier who had impressed Louis XIV during the late war enough to earn a diplomatic post, but he was also allied with the Colberts, having through Croissy’s patronage received the governorship of the chateau, city, and gouvernement of Sedan, a fortress-city supervised directly by the foreign office.86 As with the German princes, Torcy was wary of wasting pensions on the Swedish ministers, preferring instead to dangle before them secret gratifications contingent upon



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the signing of a treaty with teeth. Guiscard’s courtly manners and careful balancing of alternatives proved a perfect foil to Charles XII’s bluntness and lack of tact, but even though the ambassador crisscrossed the Baltic in the peripatetic warrior-king’s train, he ultimately failed to bend Charles toward French goals.87 Skepticism about Sweden inclined the French increasingly toward Denmark.88 Torcy nominated François Bouton, comte de Chamilly, as ambassador to Copenhagen in May 1698 and Chamilly cooperated with Guiscard, who visited him several times in Copenhagen. A brigadier of infantry, Chamilly had headed several missions to the Italian states when Croissy was minister. He was not formally received by the Danish monarch until early 1700 owing to the latter’s illness and a protocol dispute that led to Chamilly’s recall in 1702, with no exchange of ambassadors between the two powers again until 1726. French interests were not left unrepresented, however, since Jean-Baptiste Poussin, who had handled English affairs upon Ambassador Camille d’Hostun, comte de Tallard’s departure from London, was transferred as embassy secretary to Copenhagen, where he remained until 1726 and served as paymaster for a spy network that extended from Sweden into Poland, Russia, and northern Germany.89 When Abbé Jean d’Estrées, ambassador to Portugal, requested leave in May 1697 to return to Paris, Torcy selected as his replacement Pomponne’s kinsman Pierre Du Coudray Rouillé, baron de Marbeuf, a career administrator without diplomatic experience. After departing Portugal in 1703 because his efforts to tie Pedro II to France were being frustrated by French mistakes and the skilful manoeuvres of the Grand Alliance, Rouillé served next as special envoy to the Elector of Bavaria, then to Heinsius, and finally as a peace negotiator from 1709.90 His replacement in Lisbon was Pierre-Antoine de Castagnéry, marquis de Châteauneuf, who after a decade as ambassador to the Ottoman court returned home under a cloud in 1700 for offending French traditionalists in Turkey and at home by sometimes wearing Turkish garb. A Savoyard by birth, ­Châteauneuf migrated to France and in 1675 purchased a councillor’s charge in the Paris parlement. In 1679 he accompanied Marie-Louise d’Orléans to Madrid, where she was to marry Carlos II, but Croissy did not employ him again until 1689 when he appointed him ambassador to the Porte, due in part to the friendship his learned and witty brother François de Castagnéry, Abbé Châteauneuf, had formed with Torcy. When the winds of war had dispersed the cloud over the marquis de Châteauneuf, Torcy sent him to Portugal to replace Rouillé,

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where he faced the nearly impossible mission of preventing Pedro II from turning neutral or, worse, defecting to the Allies. In 1704 the marquis replaced Abbé d’Estrées as ambassador in Madrid because the latter’s ongoing battles with the princesse des Ursins had undermined his effectiveness with Philip V and his queen. Ursins’s victory was pyrrhic, however, since Châteauneuf had to inform her that an irritated Louis XIV had recalled her to France. After a subsequent mission to Savoy, he was named ambassador to the United Provinces, serving there from 1713 to 1718 and helping Spain and Portugal finally make peace early in 1715. Articulate, precise, and a master of detail, Châteauneuf was an ideal negotiator. However, the diplomatic debut in 1697 of his brother, Abbé Châteauneuf, to carry money and messages to Abbé Polignac, then deeply enmeshed in Polish electoral politics, resulted in the recall and exile from court of both abbés. While Polignac’s career would later resume spectacularly, Abbé Châteauneuf was happy to return to the literary world and would be best remembered as godfather to the aspiring young poet and playwright François-Marie Arouet, a.k.a Voltaire.91 Roger Brulart de Sillery, marquis de Puyzieulx, received the important Swiss embassy, which, like Constantinople, was one of the most desirable assignments because the low cost of living there allowed an ambassador to live well without great personal outlays, unlike other posts.92 An army officer whose career had been cut short by the enmity of ­Louvois, Puyzieulx was rescued from political limbo by his cousin François VII, prince de Marcillac and duc de La Rochefoucauld, a first gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, who felt that his kinsman had been shabbily treated. Louis XIV agreed and the Colberts were happy to advance a victim of Louvois’s ill will, especially since Puyzieulx’s forebears had been secretaries of state themselves. In early December 1697, Puyzieulx, newly promoted to lieutenant-general and reaffirmed as governor of Huningue on the Rhine, was confirmed as ambassador to the Swiss. To the surprise of many court skeptics, he proved a capable minister, ably seconded by his first secretary, Sainte-Colombe, who served as Torcy’s spymaster throughout the next war.93 The most important appointment to Italy in 1697 was Gabriel, comte de Briord, as ambassador to Savoy, a diplomatic rank granted as a special favour to the duke for abandoning his coalition partners. Turin had always been a difficult post and the current duke was not easy to work with, but Briord wisely preferred subtle suggestion to strong-arm tactics in keeping Victor-Amadeus on France’s side. Briord, an old ­Frondeur in the household of the princes of Condé until the death of Louis II de



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­ ourbon, prince de Condé, in 1686, saw his military career rehabiliB tated with that of Condé at the outset of the Dutch War. During the Nine Years War he served in Germany supplying the army battling the emperor. Despite his lack of diplomatic experience, his friendship with Torcy led to his recommendation for the Turin post, where he remained until December 1699, when he was recalled to replace Bonrepaus at The Hague.94 Roland Jachiet, sieur Dupré, who had been posted earlier to Cologne, Strasbourg, Geneva, and Mantua, remained as extraordinary envoy to Florence, where he had been since 1694. Upon his death in 1709, Torcy described him as a zealous and virtuous royal servant.95 Cardinal Forbin-Janson, chargé d’affaires in Rome from 1690 to 1697, was followed by Emmanuel Théodose de La Tour d’Auvergne, Cardinal Bouillon, but his connections with Fénelon did nothing to endear him to Louis XIV and so Bouillon urged that with the impending death of Carlos II a sword nobleman represent the king at the papal court. Louis Grimaldi, prince de Monaco, whose instructions are dated 28 January 1699, was sent as ambassador, but he quarreled with Torcy before leaving France and proved quarrelsome in Rome as well. When he died suddenly 3 January 1701 in Rome, Cardinal Forbin-Janson, in Rome already for the 1700 papal election, served again as chargé d’affaires.96 Torcy thought highly of Forbin-Janson, who was a kinsman of ­Pomponne and former employer and protector of Charles-François Noblet, who joined Torcy’s department as a commis in 1698. One of Torcy’s immediate concerns in 1698 was Lorraine’s neutrality. Reinstated at Ryswick, Duke Leopold maintained a precarious neutrality during the next war. From 1698 to early 1702, Torcy sent three representatives to the duke’s temporary capital at Lunéville: his brotherin-law Bouzols (1698), Callières (1700), and, as permanent resident, Jean ­Baptiste d’Audiffret (1702), who remained until 1715. D’Audiffret, son of a prominent Marseille municipal leader, published his three-­volume Histoire et géographie ancienne et moderne in Paris in ­1694–95 and served as envoy to Mantua, Parma, and ­Modena from 1698 until 1702. His reports to Torcy from Lorraine were an invaluable source of information on the eastern borderlands.97 Torcy appreciated that some diplomatic appointments could be unrewarding or even dangerous. Charles François de Carades, marquis du Héron, faithfully represented France at the Rhenish courts before the Nine Years War and after Ryswick at the court of Augustus II of Saxony to continue Des Alleurs’s work. On returning from a military review he was kidnapped, perhaps at the instigation of Augustus himself. Torcy,

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a stickler for diplomatic immunity, complained to the elector, but once Héron was freed, Augustus expelled him from Saxony. The next year Héron lost his life from wounds suffered in a skirmish in Hungary.98 More fortunate, Polignac nonetheless nearly lost his career.99 Scion of an old noble family of the southwest, Polignac studied at the colleges of Harcourt and Clermont in Paris where Torcy was also a student, but he only met him formally in 1689 in Rome. Torcy’s brother Charles Joachim then encountered Polignac when both served as conclavists at the 1691 election of Innocent XII. As Torcy recounted later, he and his brother admired Polignac for his facility with languages, his ready wit, and the ease with which he moved in court circles. Perhaps on Torcy’s suggestion, Croissy nominated the thirty-three-year-old abbé as ambassador to Poland in 1693. The suave, handsome, and articulate representative of French culture and political acumen was warmly welcomed into noble houses, where he sought the friendship of members of the powerful Lithuanian Sapieha clan that, with its vast estates and private army, constituted a state within a state. Polignac also became a favourite of Michael, Cardinal Radziojowski, who as a youth had attended school in France, but Polignac failed to win over King John III Sobieski, “Saviour of Vienna” from the besieging Turks, who nurtured a deep distrust of France, its king, and all things French because Louis XIV had encouraged the Porte against the Habsburgs. But Sobieski’s malevolence came to an abrupt end in June 1696 when he suffered a seizure and died. In the ensuing political crisis, Polignac, confident of his Polish friends, espoused the candidacy of Louis XIV’s cousin Prince François Louis de Bourbon, prince de Conti, and employed the substantial funds he had brought to brazenly bribe electors in the Polish Diet to vote for Conti. He promised the Sapieha 178,000 livres and Radziojowski nearly 185,000 livres, and spent over 2,400,000 livres, promised or distributed. News of Sobieski’s death and of Conti’s nomination reached Versailles on 3 July 1696, just as Croissy lay dying. Although Beauvillier was nominal spokesman for foreign affairs during Croissy’s last illness, the dayto-day supervision of the diplomatic correspondence still fell to Torcy, who was uncertain what to do about Conti’s candidacy. Louis XIV’s relations with his cousin were strained, since at one time the king had favoured Max Emanuel of Bavaria for the Polish throne. Torcy’s uncertainty is reflected in the notes he scribbled in the margins of the draft instructions he was preparing for Polignac, asking Beauvillier to find out if the king wanted the instructions communicated to Conti and, if so, to



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ask the monarch to make any changes he judged apropos. Elsewhere in the draft instructions, Torcy’s marginalia questioned whether Beauvillier had reviewed the amount of the pensions to be sent to Polignac, amounting to over 100,000 livres.100 Torcy was right to be cautious. Although Conti was twice to be declared king of Poland, he had no army, very little money at hand, and his support from the Polish landed nobility melted like the snows of spring. In the late summer of 1697, just as the peace of Ryswick was being signed, Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, claimed the Polish throne, converted to Catholicism, and invaded Poland. With no army, Polignac fled Warsaw for the free port of Danzig where, pursued by Saxon troops, he was fortunate to escape to a French frigate in the harbour, abandoning his household goods, jewels, and monies to the Danzig mob. On Polignac’s return to France, Louis XIV refused to see him, furious over the loss of gloire and funds, and exiled him to his abbey of B ­ onfort.101 When Louis XIV accepted the Spanish crown for the duc d’Anjou in 1700, Polignac immediately wrote with congratulations and in his accompanying letter to Torcy candidly confessed that this was the best news a man in disgrace could receive. With the aid of the king’s confessor, Père La Chaise, Torcy finally persuaded Louis to pardon Polignac, but he felt it prudent for Polignac to serve in Rome as a judge in the Court of the Rota. Torcy’s confidence in his friend was later rewarded when Polignac displayed his considerable talents as a negotiator at the peace conferences at ­Gertruydenberg and Utrecht.102 It took Torcy three years to assemble this corps of diplomats, which by any reckoning was one of the most important achievements of the early years of his ministry, even though the coming crisis that eventually led to war exposed the inadequacies in the training of many of them.103 The selection of envoys represented a delicate balancing of young and old, experienced and novice, civilian and military, friends and potential rivals, those with powerful patrons and those solely dependent on the Colberts. Perhaps most importantly, he had to find those willing to serve often in unfamiliar and even difficult locations and usually with little financial reward.104 Out of a group of thirty or so envoys, Torcy came to rely especially on the opinions of an inner circle of advisors and itinerant envoys that included Rouillé, Iberville, Châteauneuf, his brother the abbé, Bonrepaus, and his nephew Bonnac.105 Torcy discovered serendipitously an important diplomatic ally and friend outside his usual circle in Philippe Antoine Gualterio, newly named nuncio to France in 1700 and with whom he had corresponded

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from 1696 while Gualterio was vice-legate in Avignon. Relations with the papal authorities at Avignon under Croissy had at best been strained, in part because of the commercial rivalry between the Avignon-Comtat and the nearby French farmers and wine merchants, but Torcy was more moderate in his approach and sought accommodation rather than confrontation. When Gualterio arrived at Versailles in early August 1700, he was at once invited to a private meeting with Torcy. Both were prudent men, moderates in matters of church doctrine, who along with the future pope Clement XI (Albani) wished to continue the Franco-Papal détente begun under Innocent XII. Like Torcy, Gualterio was a man of learning, a patron of the arts, and a renowned collector of paintings and books. Born into a noble family of Orvieto, the future cardinal was educated in Rome, where he took not only holy orders but also a law degree. Like Torcy he, too, feared that the Imperial invasions of northern Italy during the Nine Years War presaged aggressions that not only threatened the independence of the northern Italian states but of the Papal States themselves.106 The patron of Gualterio’s youth was his uncle, the cardinal archbishop of Ancona, who recommended his precocious nephew to the French representative in Rome, Cardinal d’Estrées. So quickly did the future nuncio become proficient in French and an advocate of French culture that François de Neufville, duc de Villeroy, exclaimed that at heart Gualterio was very French, and in time Gualterio became a naturalized Frenchman, an advocate of French policies both in Rome and abroad, and, in all but name, a member of the French foreign office. Indeed, during the latter stages of War of the Spanish Succession, Ursins recommended to Torcy that Gualterio, by then a cardinal and one of her confidants, be sent as French ambassador to Spain.107 When his nunciate to France ended in 1706 upon his elevation to the Sacred College, Torcy expressed his sense of loss to Pomponne in Venice, aware of the likely difference between Gualterio and his replacement, Agustino Cusani, then nuncio to Venice.108 Torcy’s circle of advisors was only just beginning to emerge in January 1698 when he was faced with the formidable assignment of greeting, entertaining, and, ultimately, negotiating with England’s ambassador and William III’s personal envoy, Lord Portland. The question of the Spanish succession, impending since 1665, once again moved centre stage, threatening to undo the hard-won peace achieved at Ryswick. How to untangle this dynastic knot and prevent war would occupy Torcy and his department personnel in the bureaus and abroad over the next few years.



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E mbas s ie s a n d P a rt it io n Treati es : Resolvi ng the S pa n is h S ucces si on Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, arrived in France during a January ice storm. His carriages and wagons were frozen to the piers, and boats could not moor because the Seine was iced over, so ­Marshal Boufflers lent him his coach for his first visit to Versailles. On 4 February 1698, punctually at 9 a.m., Torcy led Portland by way of the queen’s stairway to Louis XIV’s Cabinet. Portland later wrote William III that he was received “with kind words, urging that past enmities be forgotten.”109 He was then feted at a state dinner hosted by Torcy in his apartments; Torcy, rather than his aged father-in-law, was present at this and the other formal and public events connected with this major embassy. He had witnessed other ambassadorial arrivals before at his father’s side, but this was the first time he joined the king and the arriving diplomat at centre stage. The guest list for this state dinner, carefully culled with the help of his cousin, Grand Master of Ceremonies Blainville, included the duc de Gramont, a family friend; Boufflers, Portland’s fellow negotiator at Ryswick; Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims, Barbezieux’s uncle and a powerful churchman; and Tallard, newly named ambassador to England.110 The visit of William III’s favourite would mark the beginning of Louis’s efforts to win his former enemy to a peaceful resolution of the Spanish succession.111 William, with his army having been largely disbanded by Parliament after Ryswick, was also inclined to this approach and had backed away from his earlier support for Austria as the sole recipient.112 This was a remarkable turn of events. According to Wout Troost, ­William had long regarded Louis as a threat to the liberties of all of Europe – one of his ways of expressing the notion of a balance of power – while Louis saw William as a warmonger intent on preserving his power over the Republic.113 Portland’s embassy was also a practical test of one of the most delicate provisions of Ryswick: the establishment of diplomatic relations with the formerly anathematized Prince of Orange, now recognized as England’s king. The harmony of ­Portland’s first audience, however, was shattered at his next visit when he sighted in the Hall of Mirrors one of the most important Jacobite leaders, James Fitz James ­Stuart, Duke of Berwick, James II’s natural son by Arabella Churchill (sister of John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough). Berwick, who had entered French service in 1691, exclaimed at full volume that it was an affront to a true Englishman to find such an ­“assassin” at

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France’s court. Torcy directly sought out Portland and explained that Louis XIV, bound by princely hospitality, had opened his palace at St Germain-en-Laye to his unfortunate “cousin and brother” and would never change his mind about James’s residence. Saint-Simon reported prematurely, “Louis XIV thoroughly approved Torcy for having silenced Lord Portland.”114 Portland, however, repeated his discomforting complaint, even to Louis himself, but the French were firm in their refusals.115 Although a disgruntled Portland reminded William that he had never expected much from the French in upholding the peace, William urged patience and confessed, “I dread refusals more than anything whatever.”116 His weakness at home as Parliament dismantled England’s military might and the anticipated death of Carlos II left it up to the French, he acknowledged, to address his concerns about James II and the Jacobites. For now, Portland was instructed to drop the matter.117 He dutifully changed his tone and made well-received amends with Torcy, Pomponne, and Louis XIV.118 Preparations for his formal Paris entry in early March and a dispute over the order of carriages with Introducer of Ambassadors Michel Chabenat de Bonneuil led Portland to threaten to cancel it, but Torcy cleverly resolved it in the ambassador’s favour without creating a precedent for future entries.119 The entry took place 9 March to the acclaim of the crowds that thronged to see the magnificent display, but at the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs another ceremonial battle of wills broke out. When receiving Louis Marie Victor, duc d’Aumont, peer of the realm and first gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, Portland punctiliously followed the dictates of diplomatic courtesy: he met the duke on the stairs, gave him his hand, conducted him to an armchair, and, when d’Aumont left, descended the stairs and saw him into his coach. Soon thereafter there arrived someone Portland believed to be a “lesser personage,” Édouard Colbert, marquis de Villacerf, who expected the same honours. Portland refused to meet him beyond the door of his antechamber, and there ensued a standoff as Villacerf refused to ascend further than halfway up the stairs and the ambassador refused to descend. This led to a public clash between the outraged Portland and the equally irritated Bonneuil, who was conducting the visits. Bonneuil retaliated by refusing the scheduled supper with Portland, who later protested to Pomponne and Torcy. Although Torcy’s initial response did not satisfy the earl, it was clear that the introducer’s subsequent visit to Portland to humbly accept his berating was under Torcy’s orders.120 Thereafter, relations between Portland and Torcy eased perceptibly, and the earl became a popular figure at



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court, even being invited to hold the candle at Louis XIV’s coucher, the royal going-to-bed ceremony to which ambassadors were not normally invited.121 While William was delighted, Portland remained suspicious of French intentions.122 The French, however, were in earnest about establishing a new relationship with their former foe. Torcy later observed that though William III had been the “oracle” of the former league against France, he was skilled and informed and so could not ignore the dangers posed by Carlos II’s imminent death.123 When the death of the Queen Mother Marianna in 1696 left the decidedly pro-Austrian Queen Maria-Anna ascendant in Madrid and the January 1698 Ottoman suit for peace secured the emperor’s eastern frontier, any understanding between France and Austria seemed unlikely. The Maritime Powers appeared the more likely partners for an accommodation. Torcy, Pomponne, and the king were confident that William had sent his favourite, not to discuss Jacobites, but to confer on the more pressing issue of Spain. By the end of February, however, Portland’s silence on this led them to doubt that he had any such orders.124 Torcy had prepared for this possibility so as not to lose the opportunity of sounding out William.125 He and Pomponne approached Portland on 14 March, proposing to discuss the fate of Spain and emphasizing the need to forestall another war and the dangers of Austrian hegemony in Italy and the Empire. What ensued was a diplomatic dance in which each side sought to draw out the other on specifics. Portland finally took the lead and suggested that Bavaria’s electoral prince inherit the Spanish monarchy, insisting that this was merely his own suggestion, although it was actually William’s preference.126 The French ministers responded noncommittally that Philip IV’s testament was null, but they were secretly pleased with Portland’s suggestion, even if they preferred a son of France on the Spanish throne, convinced that any move away from the Austrian claimant must begin with a tilt toward the Bavarian one.127 This French overture so heartened William that he dispatched a copy of Portland’s report to Heinsius, begging him to forward his thoughts to the earl, and then wrote Portland to urge him to pursue these talks and a more concrete French proposal.128 However, secret intelligence of C ­ arlos’s deteriorating health led William to explore other options should Carlos expire in the midst of these negotiations, suggesting to Heinsius the possibility of resurrecting the anti-French alliance.129 David Onnekink has shown that the fluctuating state of Carlos’s health, ­Austrian ­victories

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over the Turks that permitted transferring her military might to the west, the woeful state of English finances, and Parliament’s postwar army reductions all factored in to the calculations of these negotiators long accustomed to mutual suspicions.130 What was nonetheless remarkable was Louis’s willingness to sacrifice what he believed to be his legitimate claims to the entire Spanish succession so that he could enjoy at least part of it in peace while depriving Austria of the whole. William and Heinsius were slow to trust the French, but Louis and his ministers genuinely believed that they could strike a deal and even build a future alliance with their former nemesis.131 Discussions in France slowly inched toward greater specificity on both sides.132 The earliest explicit French partition proposals, worked out by Louis XIV, Pomponne, and Torcy, offered William his choice of two partitioning alternatives. The first, to include only those parties with a claim, awarded Naples, Sicily, and the Duchy of Luxembourg to the Dauphin; Milan to Leopold’s son; and the balance to the electoral prince. The second proposed Spain and the overseas empire for one of Louis XIV’s grandsons and the Spanish states in Italy (except Milan, suggested for the Duke of Savoy as a counterbalance to Imperial power) for the archduke. The Maritime Powers would receive new treaties assuring their trade within the Spanish monarchy and a few places on the African coast to protect their Mediterranean trade. This was an opening gambit in a chess game with high stakes. Nonetheless, William expressed his surprise to Heinsius and Portland that the French were so open and had initially yielded so much. Ironically, the second alternative resembled what was later agreed to at Utrecht: a French prince inheriting Spain and the Empire; the Austrians predominant in Italy (Savoy initially received Sicily); and the British gaining the asiento (the monopoly on supplying Spain’s New World colonies with slaves), Gibraltar and Minorca to protect their Mediterranean trade, and territories carved out of lands claimed by New France.133 In April it appeared that the bargaining would take place in London between William and newly arrived French ambassador Tallard.134 Yet conversations in both capitals persisted, with Portland still a major voice, even though it was becoming clearer that this time-consuming process needed to be limited to one city or the other. Louis, who had always suspected that direct talks with William would progress further than indirect ones through the more suspicious Portland, instructed Tallard to accompany William to the United Provinces at the close of Parliament.135 Portland, who remained on good terms with Pomponne



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and Torcy, planned his departure after the requisite lengthy diplomatic leave-taking.136 Before that, however, he indulged in one last flurry of purchases of French luxury goods that included mirrors, textiles, guns, furniture, clothing, wigs, paintings, and, of course, wine.137 His final audience with Louis took place in mid-June in the Cabinet, with just the two of them present. Portland’s request to visit the famed Dunkirk fortifications on his return journey was readily granted. Indeed, the king arranged for him to inspect other places along the way and to be received by cannon salutes, honour guards, and engineers to guide his visits, all presumably to impress him with French defences.138 ­Portland was later presented with a costly gift of the king’s portrait in a box studded with diamonds.139 When he arrived in London, William awaited him, pleased with these still mostly secret negotiations. The English public, however, judged his embassy largely on its outer appearance: some saw a dazzling success, but most could see only a tremendous waste of scarce royal funds to feed the ambitions of a royal favourite whose fortunes appeared to be flagging.140 The commencement of Portland’s lengthy stay in France roughly coincided with the launching of four post-Ryswick missions we might dub the “Great Embassies.” In November 1698 Tallard, was named to London while Bonrepaus was transferred from Copenhagen to The Hague. Less than two weeks later Henri I de Beuvron, marquis d’Harcourt, was designated for Madrid. In mid-December Claude Louis Hector, marquis (in 1705, duc) de Villars, was selected for Vienna.141 These emissaries were to serve in four of Europe’s most important capitals, but each was also part of the foreign office’s two-pronged plan for a proactive resolution of the Spanish succession. The first prong resumed prewar efforts to beat the emperor at gaining recognition of a candidate as Carlos II’s rightful heir. Harcourt would defend the Bourbon claim but aim primarily at frustrating those of the Austrian archduke and Bavaria’s electoral prince. Given the uncertainties in Madrid and the improbability of a Bourbon swallowing the whole Spanish monarchy unmolested, the second prong was the chief negotiation. Tallard would seek an accommodation with William III permitting a peaceful partition and thereby forestalling Austria’s grab for the whole while satisfying French interests and Bourbon claims. The other two Great Embassies would play supporting roles by gathering vital information and thwarting any disruption of the efforts in London and Madrid.142 Louis XIV and his foreign ministers were embarking upon an audacious and complex process of what Sir George Clark calls “secret and

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hypothetical diplomacy.”143 First, the object of the negotiations was the disposition of a monarchy and its subject territories that belonged to neither of the participants in the talks.144 Louis XIV was a claimant, as were Austria’s Archduke Charles and Bavaria’s electoral prince, but ­William III was not.145 Second, the current ruler of Spain was neither a part of the negotiations nor open to any division of his holdings, yet being childless could complicate or wreck negotiations by bestowing domestic and international legitimacy on one claimant. Partitioning the Spanish monarchy was not without precedent, as Louis XIV and Leopold I had done so in 1668 when the infant Carlos was not expected to live.146 They had justified their presumption as heirs who only wanted a mutually beneficial and peaceful allotment of their expected inheritance. In 1698, however, Louis XIV and William were not fellow claimants, leading to a third complication concerning legitimacy. Louis was not motivated by a willingness to go halves with William, who in any case was not asserting any rights of his own. Instead, both sought to put to one side – or at least from centre stage – particular dynastic and state interests for the higher good of European peace, regardless of legal rights to Spain.147 Dynasticism was unquestionably a vital element in their calculations, determining who was eligible and who was not for a share of the spoils, but preserving the peace and maintaining the balance of power were the two central criteria for assigning or denying portions to particular heirs.148 In fact, so essential were these two ends that negotiations included the possibility of a share of the spoils for the Maritime Powers, a clear violation of dynasticism. In contrast, the 1668 treaty had “maintained a balance of power between France and the House of Habsburg … [and] rested on dynastic traditions which could justify transfers of sovereignty.”149 That Louis considered gratifying William’s desire for Mediterranean and Caribbean ports to protect Anglo-Dutch commerce even without dynastically legitimate claims signaled an important shift.150 Again, state and dynastic self-interest were hardly absent, but rationality and realism seemed now to be at the fore. Answering William’s scruples over partitioning while Carlos yet lived, Louis pointed out that those wanting a share of the spoils would pounce the day Carlos died, pre-empting negotiations and plunging Europe into war. Therefore, they had to act pragmatically and peremptorily to avert such a tragedy for the sake of their own peoples and all of Europe.151 A fourth complication arose from the nature and number of the participants, at first glance only two and both monarchs. Having battled bitterly for decades, William and Louis were unaccustomed to w ­ orking



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together and trusting one another. William was highly suspicious,152 whereas the policy-makers at Versailles were anxious to put aside past differences and shape their negotiations according to the frank assessments made by their ambassador on the spot in London.153 Drawing on the intelligence assets bequeathed to him by his father, Torcy often had a good sense of the treacherous political waters of the three kingdoms in which William navigated, especially in Parliament. As William wrote Heinsius in exasperation, “They are but too well informed of everything that passes here.”154 The grand pensionary was essential (although not sufficient) to William for keeping the States-General in tow, and he relied on him not just to voice Dutch interests but also for feedback on French proposals and his responses to them.155 At Versailles the process was not simple but it was more manageable. Pomponne and Torcy were apparently like-minded in policy and worked closely with the king, while the Conseil, in which policy matters were discussed, supported their conciliatory approach.156 Torcy and Pomponne often went to Portland or received him together, but there were other times when Portland and Torcy met alone. Protocol and scheduling audiences were handled by Torcy as secretary of state, who also usually attended Portland’s private royal audiences and was more likely than his aging father-in-law to encounter Portland at the royal levee and ceremonial occasions.157 In the spring of 1698, France’s new ambassador to London was relatively unknown to Torcy and his department. Tallard had enjoyed a distinguished military career, rising to lieutenant-general in 1693, and was fortunate in having as patron his mother’s uncle, the duc de Villeroy, who recognized in him a possible candidate for higher administrative or army office. Described by Saint-Simon, who knew him well, as driven by avarice and ambition, Tallard was nevertheless an officer trained in the military ethic and thus an inspired choice to deal with William III.158 He arrived in London on 29 March, but it was nearly two weeks before private talks began in earnest. The plan to focus serious negotiations on direct discussions in London between Tallard and William was frustrated by the return of Portland (29 June), who with Heinsius won ­William to their cautious mistrust of the French. Negotiations grew sluggish even as Tallard followed William and his favourite for his usual summer visit to the Republic.159 Still intent upon peace, Louis instructed Tallard to make further concessions, despite word from Madrid that the people and grandees wanted a Bourbon on the throne and French troops were poised on the Spanish frontier to prevent the emperor from intervening. Louis was convinced that even these favourable factors would result in

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war and he wanted nothing of it.160 The diplomatic dance accelerated thereafter as the partners drew closer and closer to a partition agreement, finally reached on 8 September 1698 at Utrecht and signed on 24 September and 11 October 1698.161 The First Partition Treaty, hammered out by former foes, was a remarkable diplomatic feat.162 While Tallard and William III were dividing the Spanish monarchy, Harcourt was busy in Madrid.163 A handsome, ebullient war hero, he was backed by Maintenon, who it was rumoured was grooming him for a high post in the government, perhaps even that of foreign secretary.164 After a month’s arduous journey, Harcourt arrived in Madrid on 24 February 1698. He was joined later by his wealthy and politically adept wife, and they became the centre of social life, opening their house and purse to the greater nobility and clergy and giving life to a proFrench party.165 The politically motivated possessiveness of his German wife and his fragile health kept Carlos sequestered in his palaces, but as Torcy witnessed in 1685, he was neither dim-witted nor uninformed of outside events.166 Archbishop of Toledo and cardinal Luis Manuel ­Fernández de ­Portocarrero, leader of the pro-French party, regularly visited the king’s chambers, and after several months of waiting, Harcourt received an audience, the first of several.167 Carlos made it clear that he deeply resented any talk of partition. Thus, negotiations were kept secret for fear that if Carlos got wind of them, he might, as a pre-emptive measure, make the archduke his heir and bring him to Madrid, even though he said he hated the rude and uncouth “Germans.”168 Torcy’s first instructions advised Harcourt to act as a bystander and, instead of participating, gather information from the political elite and foreign diplomats, especially Austria’s ambassador Ferdinand Bonaventura, Count Harrach, who had a formidable reputation among the French. Treating Maintenon’s protégé with caution, Torcy nonetheless cautioned Harcourt to be wary of Carlos’s wife. Harcourt, however, plunged energetically into the political fray, even approaching the queen with gifts from Paris and gossip from Versailles.169 After the publication of the First Partition Treaty and given the need to reassure France’s new allies, it was no longer considered politic to maintain a high-ranking diplomat in Madrid, and so Harcourt was recalled.170 Villars in Vienna was also well qualified for his mission. The son of a soldier-diplomat who had represented the king in Spain, Turin, and Denmark, Villars was acquainted with the intricacies of diplomacy and enjoyed a distinguished military career, first as aide to Condé in the Dutch War and then while envoy to Bavaria as a volunteer with Max



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Emanuel at the decisive victory over the Turks at Mohács (1687). ­Villars remained in Munich until the Nine Years War led to a new military command.171 Though initially failing to enlist Max on the French side, he kept in touch with him and encouraged his defection from the Grand Alliance in 1696–97. The bluster and bravado of the soldier only lightly hid a lover of classical literature, a patron of the arts, and an accomplished courtier. Villars’s relations with Torcy, whom he had known since before the war, were ambivalent and uneasy.172 While he was in Vienna in 1699, a verbal clash with the Prince Adam von Lichtenstein stung Villars so deeply that he asked Torcy for permission to challenge the prince to a duel, but a horrified Torcy reminded him of the king’s severe disapproval of dueling.173 The two masked their subsequent unease behind a jocular manner, often wrapped in classical allusion. When Torcy remarked that Villars held in his hand Psyche’s box (a reference to a box that the mortal girl Psyche was given by Venus and later furtively opened to find not the beauty she desired but an infernal sleep), Villars replied with an assurance that the box of diplomatic secrets would not be opened by his impatience or indiscretion.174 A month later Torcy complimented him on his wisdom, jokingly addressing him as “Votre Sagesse” (Your Wisdom).175 Yet in his Mémoires Villars laments that at the end of his embassy, unlike the magnificently recompensed and better-connected (with Torcy) Tallard and (with Barbezieux) Harcourt, he received merely empty words of thanks.176 Nevertheless, he could also play the suppliant. Seeing that he might be assigned to the army of Italy in 1701, where he foresaw a clash between the Duke of Savoy and Marshal Nicolas de Catinat, he urged Torcy to do all he could to get him posted instead to the army in Flanders.177 Unlike the missions to Madrid and London, that to Vienna was pursued with neither hope nor haste.178 Villars was kept in ignorance of the negotiation and signing of the First Partition Treaty. The Austrians, aware of their waning fortunes in Madrid, speculated that Villars had been sent to explore a new partition with the emperor. They initiated several indirect and unofficial probes, but on instruction from Torcy, the ambassador deftly sidestepped them. Yet Villars himself began to wonder why he was left languishing on the Danube.179 Despite the lack of negotiations, he was kept busy establishing a spy network that survived most of the next war. An accomplished courtier, he moved easily in the Viennese salons and established contact with the “ministerial party” opposed to a Franco-Austrian war and favouring the partitioning option.180 As he reported to Torcy, however, these internecine court

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rivalries paled before the bitter antipathy toward France of the Habsburg heir apparent Joseph, whose chief military advisor, Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy-Carignan (known as Prince Eugene), shared these feelings.181 Although auguring ill for Austrian adherence to any partition treaty, this information was essential to Torcy’s ability to offer the king good counsel. Bonrepaus, heading the fourth Great Embassy, was already well known to Torcy as ambassador to Denmark since 1693. While not from the sword nobility, he claimed to be a gentleman in his native Foix, was wealthy and well respected, and moved in the highest court circles. The often-snobbish Saint-Simon, who could find fault only with Bonrepaus’s short, plump figure and his disagreeable accent, praised him for his character, speech, good sense, and diplomatic skills. Trusted by Colbert and Seignelay, Bonrepaus attracted Croissy’s attention and from 1685 became familiar with both England and the United Provinces while working in both on naval and commercial agreements.182 This and his knowledge of Baltic affairs made him a wise choice for The Hague, where burghers and ardent republicans were unimpressed by sword nobility. Bonrepaus’s assignment was to thwart a Dutch-Imperial alliance by pointing out the costs to commerce of a war to enforce Austria’s designs on the whole Spanish succession. Frustrated by his exclusion from the talks across the Channel, Heinsius tried to engage Bonrepaus in more concrete discussions; however, the wily ambassador refused to be drawn in. When negotiations moved to the United Provinces, Bonrepaus asked to join Tallard, but Louis would agree only to inform him of what had been discussed so far.183 Torcy could feel pleased with the accomplishments of the four embassies whose efforts he directed and coordinated; the Spanish monarchy could now be peacefully and profitably partitioned for the sake of Europe and France. This feat of negotiation at the expense of Austrian ambitions was especially impressive because it was accomplished with the Maritime Powers, Austria’s erstwhile allies. In addition to cutting the Spanish knot with bold diplomacy, Torcy’s team overcame an old and bitter enmity with William III. Because the peaceful partition scheme ultimately gave way under the weight of subsequent events, it is easy to overlook the daring diplomatic revolution of 1698 that might have rivaled the famous one of 1756 reconciling France and Austria. This reversal of alignments foreshadowed the Anglo-French entente that bloomed briefly to make peace at Utrecht and then re-emerged in 1718 to guarantee that the peace last longer and function effectively. From



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1698, Torcy and other French policy-makers were motivated by a realistic assessment of what endangered peace and what it would take to preserve it, even if that entailed allying with the former fulcrum of antiFrench coalitions.184 Charles II, allied with or at least largely friendly toward Louis XIV, was usually a secret and subsidized French client, but William III made England the head of an anti-French coalition of Catholics and Protestants. Thus, the wooing of William to an alliance with his former adversary would be quite different from the courting of Charles II. At times Louis inclined toward the methods used with the Stuarts, but Tallard carefully steered him in another direction.185 Evidently the French hinted first that a triple alliance might maintain the newly won peace, but it was William who observed to ­Tallard that a partition policy would end his former alliance with Austria and move him toward one with France.186 Louis’s reaction was positive, and as ­Portland reported, Louis told him that if he and William “perfectly understand each other, the rest of Europe will follow our sentiments.”187 What gave this triple alliance talk substance was the concerted effort required to implement the partitioning scheme in the likely face of opposition. Louis was anxious for military aid in Italy, where he expected opposition from Venice and Savoy should the Dauphin receive Milan, although he raised this point in part to show William that placing a son of the D ­ auphin on the Spanish throne instead would be less costly. While William and Heinsius were adamant that France not have Milan, ­William nonetheless envisioned a triple “offensive and defensive alliance” to enforce the treaty and a league of the “crowns of the north” and several Imperial princes to ensure peaceful compliance.188 Louis heartily endorsed both, concluding that Leopold could not refuse to comply with such a powerful combination of forces.189 As this realignment grew closer to reality, William spoke openly of France as his ally and of their common interest in preventing Austria’s aggrandizement; he even astonished the French by suggesting that Milan be withheld from the emperor until he agreed to the division.190 Had events not intervened, could this radical international realignment have lasted? There were those in England’s government who, when finally made aware of the treaty when it was all but signed, were willing to go along with partitioning, but not with an alliance to enforce it.191 Yet the post-Utrecht French alliance, unpopular in Britain as it was in France, nevertheless functioned longer than many imagined.192 Louis XIV and William III may have fashioned a bold plan to resolve the Spanish succession through a revolutionary realignment of alliances,

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but there was still much that could go wrong.193 Although the new allies hoped to keep the treaty’s details secret until they officially notified the emperor in 1699, word of it was soon noised about Europe. A furious Carlos made a new will in favour of the electoral prince, while Vienna’s envoys manoeuvred to subvert the new alliance.194 Despite this, the triple alliance held and Torcy remained optimistic that faced with this formidable association of former foes, the emperor would yield.195 On 5 February 1699, however, the ground shifted dangerously with the electoral prince’s unexpected death. Many Spaniards, including Carlos, took comfort in this frustration of the partition scheme. Heinsius received the news as a further shock, having that same day learned of the Peace of Carlowitz, which increased Leopold’s options in the west. William III was equally disconcerted and wrote to Heinsius that “we are in no small labyrinth, and may it please God to help us out of it!”196 As we have seen, it was this crisis that provoked Torcy’s entry into the Conseil, which directed Tallard to sound William out about salvaging the partitioning option. Both sides again danced about, waiting for the other to make the first move, but to avoid feeding William’s suspicions, Louis made an offer: the archduke would receive the late prince’s portion and the Dauphin’s would be augmented only by Milan.197 Though startled by Louis’s modest claims, William nonetheless balked at Milan or any increase to France’s award. The Anglo-Dutch contention that the treaty’s secret article making Max his son’s heir now came into force soon fell before Louis’s counter that Max could only inherit what was possessed rather than promised. Fresh negotiations soon began, and the rumour at Versailles was that the king had made a “ligue” with England and the Dutch prejudicial to the emperor’s projects.198 William wanted to include the emperor, but Leopold disregarded Dutch overtures and Louis insisted upon an agreement with his new allies first. Meanwhile, Parliament reduced the army’s size, diminishing William’s influence at home and abroad; the city of Amsterdam initially refused to approve a new treaty; Portland begged to withdraw from all public affairs; and William feared that Heinsius might step down as grand pensionary. David Onnekink rightly sees these long, drawn-out negotiations as largely reflecting William’s troubles with Parliament over the army rather than his deteriorating relations with France.199 Torcy raised the stakes by hinting that without a new treaty France would be forced to respond positively to pro-French proposals emanating from Madrid.200 Heinsius feared that France might be driven to a separate agreement with Austria if the Maritime Powers delayed further,



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even though Louis seemed set on a closer and continuing alliance with ­William.201 Yet as Onnekink notes, William’s deteriorating power meant that “Louis began to doubt the usefulness” of this alliance.202 Despite Leopold’s delays and final refusal to countenance a revised partition, all three allies nonetheless sensed that the way out of the labyrinth lay through Vienna. Louis initially hoped to win Leopold with a generous offer, but if he refused, he was content to pressure his partners to reach a new agreement as soon as possible and leave it to them to compel him to sign.203 William hoped that the Austrians would see that without an agreement, French forces on Spain’s frontiers would pounce at the news of Carlos’ death. When the Dutch ambassador found the expectation in Vienna that the Maritime Powers would secure the succession for them as specified in their previous agreement, William hastened to disabuse them of that notion.204 Yet even as the First Partition Treaty had neared finalization and Louis had pressed William to commit to a common war effort if required to enforce the treaty, he had balked and pinned his hopes on a powerful league to draw the emperor in.205 By mid-June 1699 Tallard and Portland had hammered out the outline of a new treaty, but the Maritime Powers held off signing in hopes of a positive Austrian response. Tallard hinted that his master would have to take other measures to secure his interests, and a month later Torcy told the English ambassador Manchester that the delay had led Louis to consider pinning his hopes on developments in Madrid. He also played on Anglo-Dutch fears of a secret Franco-Austrian agreement.206 Torcy kept up the pressure, prompting Charles Montagu, 4th Earl of Manchester to report home, “I never see M. de Torcy but he speaks to me of the great affair.”207 To secret French satisfaction and Anglo-Dutch chagrin, Austrian adamancy finally forced a separate signing of a Second Partition Treaty in London (21 February 1699/3 March 1700) and in The Hague (25 March 1700).208 From the moment the emperor was informed of the treaty, he would have three months to sign or see the three signatories allocate the archduke’s share to another yet-to-be-specified prince. Imperial Ambassador Philip Louis, Count von ­Sinzendorf, fearing that Spain would declare for a French heir, urged Vienna to sign, but his entreaties went unheeded.209 Torcy hastened to assuage English anxiety by insisting that leaked news of the Second Partition Treaty was unlikely to favourably dispose Spain toward France and that Louis intended to adhere strictly to his treaty obligations. Within the week Torcy again assured Manchester that Louis intended to act only in concert with ­William.210 The labyrinth of which William

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had earlier despaired appeared to have been escaped without his going through Vienna. Despite bumps and delays along the way, the triple alliance of 1698 had survived and was seemingly on its way toward realizing its goals with regard to the Spanish succession, the maintenance of peace, and a diplomatic revolution. Torcy now escalated the campaign to draw in Austria and convince other states to pressure Vienna. Callières journeyed to Lorraine to win its duke to the Milan exchange, France’s ambassadors in London and The Hague proposed further concrete measures for the treaty’s execution, the Swiss were urged to block the passage of Imperial troops intent upon thwarting the partition, and Sweden was informed that a commercial treaty would be contingent upon adherence to the partition treaty.211 Torcy informed Manchester that Sinzendorf had instructions to break up the triple alliance by offering France the Indies in lieu of Italian lands, but he assured Manchester that he had found these Austrian offers unworthy of sharing with Louis XIV, who, in any event, would never entertain alterations to the treaty apart from his allies.212 Remarkably, the news from Spain that all but one of the Royal Council’s members had urged Carlos to designate a French prince as his heir did not derail the new alliance. William insisted to Heinsius that this was neither surprising nor unanticipated and it would “make the Emperor resolve the sooner to join the treaty.”213 At the end of July William was still at work constructing what he termed “the grand alliance with regard to the Spanish succession.”214 Even the emperor’s final refusal in August to sign led the English envoy in Vienna to shake his head at Leopold’s unrealistic expectations of support in Spain and his rejection of the partition.215 For his part, Torcy resisted Spanish entreaties to abandon the treaty, continued to pressure Austria, and notified the Maritime Powers that France intended to counter Austria’s troop movements in Italy by placing troops near Catalonia’s frontier, ready to march in and secure French claims.216 Yet all was not harmonious in the triple alliance. The French were anxious to forestall Imperial moves to circumvent the treaty, but found the perceived Dutch indifference to these dangers disturbing. Their fears were not imaginary. William confided to Heinsius his reluctance to go to war for a treaty he had hoped would remove the need for war, caustically observing that the “French are a hasty people, and like to do everything with hauteur [haughtiness]; but that is not our way.”217 Hence, he and Heinsius refrained from committing to the Franco-Portuguese alliance under negotiation. William also feared that few would join a



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­ ro-treaty league without the triple alliance first naming the prince to p inherit the archduke’s share should Austria fail to sign. A month later he had concluded that the Elector of Brandenburg was too intent upon a crown to cross the emperor and that the most to be hoped for from the German princes was neutrality.218 Even so, work on tying up the treaty’s loose ends continued as alliance members clung to the fading conviction that the emperor would eventually be compelled to comply. Yet Leopold, who had concluded with the signing of the Second Partition Treaty that Anglo-Dutch help would not be forthcoming, was nonetheless determined to resist a partition. His advisors came around that summer to the idea of granting the Hohenzollerns their coveted royal crown in Prussia as the price for Brandenburger troops.219 Perhaps the triple alliance could have prevailed against Austria’s obstinacy, but C ­ arlos’s attempt to pre-empt partitioning with a new will presented an even greater challenge. When Carlos II expired on 1 November 1700, his new will was made public, revealing that the entire prize was to go to Louis XIV’s grandson or, if he refused it, to the archduke. It was an offer that would have been difficult for Louis XIV to refuse even though it eventually led to war.220 Whether any partition treaty had any hope of success is a matter of conjecture. Sir George Clark says of the First Partition Treaty, “It is hard to imagine a scheme of partition better suited to the requirements of the time,” since it satisfied Dutch and Bavarian aspirations and was a “just partition” that gave the Habsburgs and Bourbons territories that would not cause undue friction between them. Its major stumbling blocks were Leopold’s refusal to partition and the uncertainty of the partitioners’ resolve to stand firm against him.221 Yet especially in light of Carlos’s new will in favour of the electoral prince, it might well have held had Carlos expired at that point.222 The Second Partition Treaty was “not as ingenious as the first,” according to Clark, but “the problem lay not in the terms of the treaty but in its reception.”223 William Roosen argues, however, that because of the international system itself, the competing interests and attitudes of the major powers after Ryswick made war over the Spanish succession highly likely and the electoral prince’s death made it inevitable.224 David Onnekink, while arguing that the partition treaties were not, as often assumed, “one of the greatest non-events in diplomatic history,” nonetheless terms the second treaty “a rather unfortunate settlement that satisfied no one and could easily result in renewed conflict.”225 He rejects the traditional nationalistic and deterministic Whig/Orangeist claim that an aggressive Louis XIV made

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the War of the S­ panish S­ uccession inevitable, but also denies that this war resulted from “a sequence of misunderstandings, mutual distrust and war propaganda that made it impossible for each side to judge correctly the other’s essentially peaceful motives.”226 Although both warweary monarchs negotiated warily but in basic good faith, he disagrees with Wout Troost’s thesis of mutual misunderstanding. He argues that what ultimately undid their efforts was Louis’s and his advisors’ reasonable calculus when presented with Carlos II’s pro-Bourbon testament that William III, hobbled by a Parliament opposed to standing armies and their costs, had lost his value as an ally and a partner in peacemaking through partitioning.227 In a recent look at the failure of the partition treaties, Troost apparently agrees with this assessment and adds ­William’s unwillingness to pressure Leopold I to accept a partition.228 The two partition treaties have nonetheless been rightly called ­Pomponne’s “greatest achievement in diplomacy.”229 Torcy could be proud of the astonishing diplomatic reversal he and his father-in-law achieved by means of audacious yet cautious negotiation. Pomponne, however, who died three months after France and England signed the Second Partition Treaty and six months before the Dutch officially signed it, would miss its unraveling in November 1700. The English ambassador at Versailles, expressing regret at Pomponne’s passing, explained to the secretary of state in London that his lament was also because “it will make the other [Torcy] much higher than ever.”230 Apparently, Torcy was already regarded as more difficult to manipulate than the mild-­mannered Pomponne. Although Torcy had been groomed from youth, was traveled and trained, had been eased into office by degrees, was mentored by his father, his father-in-law, and even the king, there was still no guarantee that Torcy could successfully pilot policy formation and the bureaucratic mechanism he had inherited in the increasingly turbulent waters of European affairs. As he scrambled to keep afloat the partition scheme and triple alliance, he laboured without his father-in-law at his side. Yet Pomponne’s lessons in subtlety, flexibility, and the pursuit of peace had prepared Torcy well, and complemented the more technical but nevertheless significant administrative training he had received from Croissy. Both legacies would serve him well as he stood with Louis XIV at the helm of French diplomacy during the most dangerous and daunting days of the long reign, and they would be essential components of his own legacy to European diplomacy. Both legacies would also allow him to deflect the criticisms that came at him from various critics at court.



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C r it ic s at Court The denizens of Louis XIV’s court were often said either to possess or to lack génie, defined as the refinement and perfection of one’s talents through an education that pushed one’s nature to its limits.231 In later years Torcy offered his own definition of génie for the guidance of the apprentice diplomats in his newly founded academy. He advised each to nurture his génie by demonstrating a supple, prudent, and penetrating mind. The essence of his advice was that in dealing with diplomats and humans generally, one must display great sense and solid judgment and conduct one’s affairs wisely.232 Torcy’s own génie, as his critics noted, developed slowly, masked at first by traces of his father’s abrasiveness, irritability, and quick temper and his mother’s caution and protectiveness. Others, however, saw beyond these distractions. Abbé Claude Bernou, writing to Renaudot from Rome in 1685 just after Torcy’s arrival there, said that he appeared to him to be very wise, quite modest, and well informed.233 Callières, who had observed Torcy at work and had seen the fruits of his labours, assured a confidant that the late Croissy’s son was wise, a good writer, and showed great promise.234 Still others, however, were less keen or less careful in their evaluations. Saint-Simon, without knowing Torcy personally, judged him vain because of what he took as a stiff, irresolute, and timid exterior.235 Villars later noted William III’s astonishment that Louis XIV had such young ministers, clearly a reference to Barbezieux and Torcy, each not yet thirty.236 Claude Le Peletier, minister and former controller general, in evaluating French diplomacy in the wake of the Treaty of Ryswick, claimed that Torcy, although a harder worker than his father, lacked the credit and force for managing such an important “machine” at the outset of the Spanish succession crisis.237 England’s Paris embassy secretary Matthew Prior displayed his usual caustic wit to sum up what he claimed was the consensus of the foreign diplomatic corps not long after Ryswick. Torcy, he opined, did not possess “génie” and his only merit “was to be born a Colbert and to have wed the daughter of Pomponne,” reputed to be an “honnête homme” and regarded as the “premier minister” after Maintenon. As evidence Prior related that Maintenon had easily overturned the young secretary’s award of a minor post to a friend simply because he had not first cleared it with her.238 Such timidity proved fleeting. During the late 1690s, another aspect of Torcy’s character began to emerge that was perhaps less agreeable in tone and more direct in manner and sparked no doubt by his stressful

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encounters with foreign envoys and critics at court. The Austrian diplomat Franz Melchior, Baron von Wiser, detected the shift and in a letter to Ulrich, Count von Kinsky, in Vienna complained that Torcy, although under the tutelage of Pomponne, was nevertheless so easily irritated that all the diplomatic community complained. For example, if a minister newly arrived at court went first to Pomponne before presenting himself to Torcy, he would incur the sting of the latter’s wrath. Wiser closed his letter with the assertion that while Torcy was neither as violent nor as quick tempered as Croissy, his still surface rendered him equally dangerous.239 In enlisting Desmaretz to lobby his cousin on altering his position on relations with Spain, Maintenon later remarked that when the foreign secretary wanted something, he really wanted it. Although not intended as such, Torcy took this as a compliment.240 Torcy’s backlash also caught Prior with its sting. By the end of the 1690s the English secretary’s letters no longer mentioned timidity or lack of génie, but complained instead “that I think Torcy’s way of giving his answer peremptory enough.”241 Prior further grumbled that “denying us this request is injust [sic]” and “what I urge to the contrary had little weight.”242 At another time, in a moment of frustration, Prior added, “I will do what I can … but I shall scarcely get an opportunity to speak to the great Torcy.”243 Evidently, the once belittled Torcy had become a political force to conjure with, whose génie was no longer hidden but had begun to shine. Thereafter, Prior’s opinion took on a more balanced, less strident tone, as in July 1699 when he informed the secretary of state in London that “to say the truth out, if he [Torcy] determines everything as quick as he did some points yesterday, he may soon finish all.”244 Later he confided that “I got matters so ordered as that his Excellence [Lord Manchester] paid him [Torcy] his first visit, without the usual falderal.”245 Jacques Le Quien de La Neufville, a member of the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres who published an Histoire des Postes in 1708 and dedicated it to Torcy, mentioned these earlier doubts about Torcy in his dedicatory remarks, but made it clear that the king’s confidence in Torcy had been vindicated. From Torcy’s youth, he declared, the king discerned his natural talents and good education. While some judged premature the monarch’s selection of one so young, Le Quien de La Neufville’s encomium contended that Torcy’s wise conduct in office had justified the king’s foresight as well as his choice.246 Some criticism was blunted by Torcy’s growing influence with the king and in his councils. This surfaced mid-1699 in a letter to Pomponne from Cardinal Le Camus, bishop of Grenoble. As noted above, scarcely



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two years earlier, Vauban had asked Torcy to intercede with his fatherin-law, but by 1698 it would seem that the roles were reversed. Reporting the need to establish more parishes in and around the city, Le Camus hoped that Pomponne would persuade Torcy to share this with the king, knowing that Torcy handled such domestic matters and that it would be a mistake to ask him to bypass his son-in-law and present his petition directly to Louis.247 Likewise, Torcy’s uncle by marriage, Chevreuse, advised one of his agents to seek Torcy’s support, for without it his proposal would go nowhere.248 Other criticism fell before the facts. Torcy’s former critic Saint-Simon made an astonishing volte-face. Looking back later on Torcy’s tenure, he admitted that at the outset of the Regency he had wanted Torcy out of the government. He recognized, however, that the regent retained Torcy as a key advisor because he knew the state’s most intimate secrets.249 The duke also admitted that Torcy “was exceedingly well informed, a man of wit, honor, integrity, and learning; he spoke quietly, with restraint, almost modestly, saying only what was required, but saying it well because he had a gift for both oratory and writing. Most often reason was on his side.”250 Saint-Simon confessed having been blinded earlier by passion and ignorance, which he attributed to the influence of his friends ­Beauvillier and Chevreuse, who had taken Seignelay’s side in his quarrels with the Croissys and who suspected Torcy of Jansenism, even though both dukes had been friends with Pomponne.251 In 1702 the Portuguese envoy José de Cunha Brochado complained to Lisbon, perhaps self-servingly, that Torcy had neither the experience nor the authority to direct the multiple negotiations then under way.252 By the time the worries of the War of the Spanish Succession had engulfed Torcy’s department, however, most critics acknowledged his mastery of diplomacy. In 1703 there appeared a French translation of an anonymous English commentary (or perhaps one from a French writer wishing to deceive the authorities) on the royal family, court, and government. The author, apparently a close observer of the court and Parisian diplomatic circles, offered harsh evaluations: the Duke of Burgundy, with a violent temperament, seemed grave, sombre, and arbitrary; Villeroy appeared of little value; the brutal and hedonistic Barbezieux understood the basics of matters, but his commis did his work for him while he committed terrible acts in doing his job; and Chancellor Louis ­Pontchartrain had stolen so many offices that he was unable to fully exercise any. In contrast, he commended Torcy’s experience, culture, and education, adding that wise beyond his years, he would one day be a great minister. The

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anonymous author insisted that although Torcy’s greatest desire was to serve his prince, foreign ambassadors were nonetheless pleased with the way he conducted negotiations.253 Herman van Petkum, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s resident at The Hague (1703–14), decided to make contact with Torcy in 1706 to attempt to mediate peace even though he did not know him. In his later recollection of the beginning of these secret negotiations, Petkum related that Johan Palmquist, Swedish ambassador to France (1689–1703) and then to the United Provinces (1703–15), recommended Torcy to him as a man of honour and integrity.254 Of course, some criticism would never go away. The royal family harboured a particularly persistent, vituperative, and possibly dangerous critic in Élisabeth Charlotte of Bavaria, duchesse d’Orléans, German wife of Louis XIV’s brother, Philippe, and known as “Madame” at court and as “Liselotte” to her cronies and family. Madame was formidable in every sense and deeply resented having her private correspondence with her German relatives opened by that little “toad” (crapaud) Torcy.255 She expressed her views quite openly in her letters and was especially candid in her comments on the royal family, including her brother-in-law the king and his detested secret wife Maintenon. Madame enjoyed twitting Louis and his foreign minister. In 1716 she recalled that years before she had passed along to the king word from a French refugee in Holland that William of Orange was going to England. She claimed the king thanked her but in the evening laughingly told her, “My ministers insist that you are ill-informed,” to which she replied that time would tell. Sometime later, after Madame had been proven correct, she recalled, “Torcy came to see me and said that I ought to inform him of the news I received. I replied: ‘[Y]ou have assured the king that I received false news,’” explaining that she had therefore discouraged her sources for fear of spreading rumours. Torcy, she continued, “laughed, as he usually did, and said: ‘Your news is always very good.’ To which I answered: ‘A great and able minister must have surer news than I, for he knows all things.’ That evening the king said to me: ‘You have been ridiculing my ministers.’ I replied: ‘I only returned them what they gave me.’”256 Such skirmishes, however, reflected Torcy’s deeper concern that Madame’s imprudent disclosures and falsehoods as well as her epistolatory panting for peace were harmful to French interests. Also worrying was her network of correspondents aimed at promoting her son ­Philippe’s interests in Spain, which appeared to threaten Philip V’s position as king. These included figures in Madrid as well as the German dowager queen of Spain Maria-Anna and Gramont, former ambassador



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to Spain, both in Bayonne.257 She later called Cardinal Dubois and Torcy “stinking eggs and rotten butter, we would be better off if they were on the gallows rather than at the court.”258 However, Madame herself was not unaware that Torcy might reveal stories about her that could be harmful, even while her son Philip was regent. Writing from the Orléans country seat at Saint-Cloud, she confessed that “Torcy is by no means my friend; if he could find something to harm me, he would be sure to use it. But this is one thing I do not have to worry about, my son knows me too well and realizes that I love him dearly.”259 Yet the shadow of doubt remained. Torcy debuted as foreign secretary and progressed into the Conseil at a time that would have tested even the most seasoned statesman. Yet carefully prepared by travel abroad and service alongside the foreign office clerks, he also inherited his father’s administrative apparatus that was more extensive and rationally organized than that of his successors.260 Pomponne’s tutelage in moderate policy ends and means was apparently accomplished with a light touch and in a collaborative manner. It helped Torcy fashion his own diplomatic style, which mirrored neither that of his “hardbitten” father nor that of his “easy-going” father-in-law,261 but was instead a synthesis of the best of both men. It was this synthesis that ultimately pleased Louis XIV and served him well during the darkest days the kingdom experienced under his personal rule.

4 The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

From humble beginnings as domestic clerks in the royal household writing for their master and trusted with any secrets he put to paper, the four secretaries of state were by the end of the sixteenth century among the most powerful and intimate members of the monarch’s administrative apparatus.1 Their powers and responsibilities ranged far and wide over collections of provinces and specialized tasks that shifted over time, often depending on who held the secretaryship, but eventually stabilized somewhat around core specialties such as war, foreign affairs, and the royal household. Although a secretary of state charged with foreign affairs had emerged well before Louis XIV’s reign, his office, like those of his fellow secretaries, remained immersed in domestic responsibilities, including provincial administration. The duties and powers of the secretary of state for foreign affairs and his colleagues become clearer only when seen in the light of this long evolution. Curiously, on the other side of Louis XIV’s reign, the Polysynod of conciliar government that followed upon his death in 1715 also opens a window to understanding the foreign office as it had further developed by the end of Torcy’s secretaryship, terminated by the Regency’s councils. However, as recent research reveals, what followed in 1715 was less the break with Louisquatorzian bureaucratic arrangements that historians have long assumed and more an affirmation of them. Perhaps paradoxically, studying the innovations of 1715 has become critical to our understanding of the previous reign’s bureaucracy and in a radically new way. A small but nonetheless significant assortment of notes penned by Torcy’s clerks that uncharacteristically survived the vicissitudes of time also opens a window into the foreign office’s inner workings, but in a more intimate manner and largely telescoped in time and space. As couriers gallop between the Paris



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region’s palaces and bureaus, messengers await replies (sometimes overnight), and agents and clerks impatiently watch calendar and clock for the arrival of packets from far and near, we gain a greater sense of the tyranny of time and space that constrained Torcy’s bureaucracy and how it attempted to manage both. Such considerations even lead us to examine the paper, ink, sealing wax, and other mundane matters that were all essential components of a functioning bureaucracy.

T h e O f f ic e o f S e c retary of S tate In the early 1690s Pierre Clairambault, genealogist and crown servant, composed a history of and guide to the duties of a secretary of state for Torcy, returned from Rome in October 1689 to assume his secretaryship en survivance. Drawing on a treatise written in the 1670s for Torcy’s cousin Seignelay and on documents in the king’s library, Clairambault adumbrated a secretary’s titles, privileges, and duties.2 These titles were not a litany of empty honors, but reflected duties, privileges, and powers that had been acquired after intense administrative struggles over the past century and a half. It is important that we understand these titles as they were used during Louis XIV’s reign. Clairambault speaks of the secretary of state as a “greffier” (court clerk), “notaire” (notary), and “secrétaire” (secretary), three clerical and rather lowly functions that reflect the office’s humble origins in the late thirteenth century.3 As a greffier, Torcy had become at once a recorder, preserver, and sealer of documents of a judicial nature.4 As a notaire he authenticated all royal orders by drawing them up in proper form, recording them, and sending them to their recipients. These included a plethora of royal favours as well as appointments to benefices and the great crown and household offices. A secrétaire drew up and witnessed marriages for the royal family, princes of the blood, and members of the upper nobility.5 His primary function was writing. He drafted, recorded, and transmitted the monarch’s correspondence and saw to it that decisions of the royal councils were properly drawn up, recorded, and communicated to the proper parties.6 In this latter role he served as a private secretary for the central government’s official business (“secrétaire des commandements”).7 The four secretaries of state wielded great power through these rather mundane clerical tasks because they were the conduit of the king’s will to most of his other officials and in turn the compulsory channel of their communication with him, since, formally at least, most other officials

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were not permitted to write directly to the monarch.8 This quartet of secretaries and their staffs generated and managed a good portion of the vast multidirectional flow of writing whose circulation gave life to a centralized government that Bernard Barbiche calls a “government by writing.”9 Like governments today, Louis XIV’s was not exclusively based on the written word, since much transpired orally in encounters at court, council meetings, individual work sessions with the king, talks between two secretaries of state, conversations between their clerks, and audiences with foreign representatives or supplicants from the provinces, much of which never made their way directly or fully to paper. As the monarch’s surrogate voice, a secretary of state’s words carried weight and power, whether spoken or written out.10 In addition to these clerical duties, a secretary of state also served as a “minister” (minister), “conseiller d’État” (state councillor), and reporter, all loftier roles formerly reserved to members of the first two estates. The term ministre is confusing if applied loosely. The title “ministre d’État” (minister of state) designated those chosen by the prince to direct and to deliberate together on the principle affairs of state.11 Note the administrative function as well as the corporate advisory one. Many held this status by tradition, but in 1661 Louis XIV limited it to those explicitly summoned by the royal ushers to sit in the Conseil and take on the formal title of minister.12 While not all secretaries of state were ministers, each secretary was nonetheless a source of information for the king and his administration because so much passed through his hands and under his eyes, especially as he opened, read, and summarized most incoming dispatches. In addition, each secretary held a brevet as councillor of state giving him entry to all royal councils save the highest. While secretaries served in the councils of government (all in Dispatches and some in the Conseil, the Council of Finances, and later the Council of Commerce), they rarely attended the councils of justice and administration (the Conseil d’État privé, finances et direction composed of the Conseil privée or Conseil des parties, the Conseil d’État et des finances, the Grande Direction, and the Petite Direction).13 In Dispatches each served as reporter on matters pertaining to his domestic specialties and provinces, rendering a full and trustworthy narrative or account14 to his colleagues of what he had gleaned from his incoming correspondence. The foreign secretary served as reporter in the Conseil, where foreign policy was discussed.15 Unlike the chancellor and the controller general of finances, the secretaries of state had charges that were by law semi-venal offices and as such were heritable property, transferable for generations. Dynasties,



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such as the Le Telliers, the Colberts, and the Phélypeaux, formed because sons could follow their fathers in office. Although the chancellor headed the hierarchy of royal venal office-holders and received their oaths, the secretaries of state delivered their oaths directly to the sovereign, which made them part of an august group that included the great crown and household officers, archbishops and bishops, certain members of the Royal Orders, and provincial governors and lieutenants.16 The secretaries of state, close by the monarch’s side, realized much of their potential for power from the increasing “tendency of the Crown to establish direct relationships with all levels of royal government.”17 They were the primary link between the king and his councils in the centre and his officials in the provinces. He could also, using the king’s seal, order the arrest or the release of any person in the kingdom. The scope of a secretary’s competence was such that he was truly, in C ­ lairambault’s words, “omnia homo” (a man for all seasons) and an “homme universel” (universal man).18 The foreign secretary’s administrative role, unlike that of the modern French foreign minister, was as important as his political role.19 Chancellor Pontchartrain, writing to an official of the Aix parlement, reminded him that since the secretary of state controlled his province’s ordinary administration and justice, it was for him to regulate affairs, commanding in the king’s name what must be done.20 By the end of Louis XIV’s reign, a secretary of state, in fact if not in name, combined in his person two of the attributes of a Roman magistrate: that of one who had the right of giving written opinions under the seal of office (publice respondi); and that of one who modified, supplemented, tempered, and explained the ruler’s will (jus honorarium).21 In a very active and real sense, the secretaries of state animated the king’s will in the same way that the king animated the law. They were much more than mere recorders or receptacles of the law and in fact brought it to life throughout the kingdom and beyond through their functional specializations, such as war and foreign affairs, and their responsibility for particular provinces.22 The tragic yet institutionally innovative (or at least institution-­ codifying) reign of the last Valois, Henri III, witnessed on 1 January 1589 the creation of a secretary of state charged exclusively with conducting foreign affairs. Louis Revol, who had been a commis under an earlier secretary, was assigned foreign affairs. Relations with other states remained in just one secretary’s care until 1624, when Pierre Brulart de Puyzieulx’s fall led to their distribution among the remaining three secretaries. Each was now responsible for particular states and coordination

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took place in the council. By 1626, especially as the pace of negotiations accelerated as war with the Habsburgs loomed, the disadvantages of this system brought the return to a single foreign secretary. Yet department boundaries and attributions remained highly unstable among the four secretaries under the first two Bourbons. Appointments were typically a matter of adapting a department to a particular individual rather than of assigning someone to head an unchanging administrative entity. Under the two cardinal-ministers, the secretaries functioned more as ministerial agents and less as the department heads they would increasingly become under Louis XIV.23 Any issue relating to a foreign power, including those that might otherwise seem domestic in nature, typically fell to the foreign secretary. When a foreign prince took an interest in former subjects now under French control, he dealt with the foreign secretary.24 The foreign office dealt with religious matters when a foreign power was involved,25 as it did with foreign clergy active in the French Church, especially during wartime.26 When the Scotsman Thomas Burnett of Kemeny, one of Electress Sophie of Hanover’s courtiers and one of philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s correspondents, was in Paris in 1702 to see philosopher Nicolas Malebranche, he ended up in the Bastille accused of being a spy because, some thought, he was related to the antiJacobite historian and theologian Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury. Sophie had Leibniz write a memoir to Torcy for Thomas B ­ urnett’s release to which the foreign minister responded favourably when he discovered that it was a matter of misunderstanding.27 In addition, Torcy monitored and facilitated the famous dialogue aimed at Christian reunification that took place between Bishop Bossuet and Leibniz, advisor and librarian to Hanover’s House of Brunswick.28 Each increasingly specialized secretary of state’s continuing involvement in domestic administration may appear irrational, owing more to tradition than to functionality.29 Yet if “tradition” was a pointless and immutable burden from the past, then Louisquatorzian government was hardly its prisoner. Tradition resulted from long development and remained amenable to adjustment according to the state’s perceived needs.30 It had been customary, for example, for the royal family, princes of the blood, and high-ranking churchmen to serve as the monarch’s closest advisors, but Louis XIV decisively broke with that tradition in 1661. Furthermore, to understand the functionality of past institutions requires us to enter into the rationality that contemporaries perceived in inherited structures. The work of the secretaries of state was originally



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divided on a geographic basis, and only under the last Valois kings did they begin to specialize according to function as monarchs experimented with managing their fractious state through royal servants in capacities of their choosing. Redistributing responsibilities, whether to trusted and loyal individuals or according to function or geography, was one way to accomplish this. In fact, far from being prisoners of the past, the last Valois monarchs and their three Bourbon successors escaped tradition when it suited them by breaking with it or, more frequently, by carefully and selectively manipulating it.31 The actual distribution of generalities by secretary was itself far from illogical or immutable. From the Middle Ages, France continued to add new territories in which feudal enclaves persisted, and so domestic administration and foreign affairs often merged as newly conquered areas maintained varying degrees of legal, ecclesiastical, and cultural ties with outside states.32 This was certainly the case along the frontier with the Empire, but equally so elsewhere because boundaries were not yet defined in linear fashion.33 In 1567 and 1570, for example, departments were composed roughly of areas of France in proximity to those foreign powers for which each secretary was responsible. For example, the secretary charged with Italy and the Levant supervised Piedmont, ­Dauphiné, Provence, Languedoc, the Auvergne, and Lyon, whereas the secretary who oversaw Normandy, Brittany, the Île-de-France, Orléans, and Maine also handled relations with England, Scotland, and Denmark. Although the sovereign could reassign attributes and territories at will, this grew less frequent, either to minimize disruption or perhaps from inertia.34 The death of a powerful secretary such as a Colbert (1683), Seignelay (1690), or Louvois (1691) could occasion political change, but provinces were also swapped among secretaries for practical reasons. The war department concentrated increasingly on administering frontier areas in war zones. In August 1673 Louvois traded Limousin, Saintonge, and Angoumois in the west for foreign secretary Pomponne’s generalities of Lorraine and Alsace. Likewise, the threat of Allied invasion through Savoy’s mountain passes led in March 1708 to Dauphiné’s transfer to the war department while the more secure Lyon went to the foreign office.35 There were several advantages to having specialists such as the war and foreign secretaries involved in domestic administration. As seen in the twentieth century, an interior ministry could be a critical locus for gaining and maintaining control of a state, especially a centralized one. Louis XIV’s experience under the tutelage of a cardinal-minister made

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him averse to a chief minister because his power or even that of an interior minister threatened the direct control he had sought from 1661 and perhaps only really established after Louvois’s death.36 Jacob Soll argues that it was this fear of a rival to his personal power that led the king to break up Colbert’s “grand ministry” of centralized information collection and storage upon his death in 1683, even though he continued to encourage the system on a departmental level.37 This lack of a single interior ministry under Louis XIV after Colbert benefited the secretaries of state.38 The patron and client system obliged patrons to grant their clients rewards in return for loyal service. This symbiosis required that clients and rewards remain in rough balance so that a secretary could fill all positions with reliable men, especially those positions where immediate supervision was not possible, while satisfying his clients’ craving for state service and honours.39 Kin and clients were not always qualified or docile collaborators, but the personal relationships embedded in family and patron-client ties could result in competent public administration, since they facilitated the preparation by apprenticeship that predominated before the era of public administration schools. Such a system presupposed a fund of patronage resources, but the diplomatic functions of the foreign office generated only a few positions in the capital, while the bulk of the others were outside the kingdom and typically financially burdensome to the recipient. Moreover, since most royal officials lived and operated in the countryside and urban centres of the realm, it was largely there and not in Paris that patronage resources such as grants of lands, feudal rights, and venal offices were to be found and distributed. Administering a collection of provinces thus added to one’s rewards reservoir. There were non-material benefits from domestic administration as well. The conduct of foreign policy requires a realistic appreciation of the political, military, economic, human, and psychological capital a state can deploy in pursuit of its international goals. A focus only on foreign affairs certainly yielded valuable information about the rest of the international community, but not profound knowledge about one’s own state. It is likely that Torcy approached the issues of war and peace more soberly than he might have because he was directly aware of war’s fiscal weight on the provinces. He grasped the breadth and depth of suffering brought on by the 1692–94 subsistence crises because of his work with intendants to assure local grain supplies and provide poor relief. The harsh winter of 1708–09 and his direct knowledge of its devastations surely weighed upon Torcy as he sought peace personally at The



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Hague and in later negotiations.40 He did not merely hear about provincial woes, he worked with local officials to address them. While not an advantage easily measured or calculated, this nonetheless suggests that we should think of the foreign secretary’s domestic responsibilities not as a distraction but rather as a check upon what might otherwise have been abstract and disembodied international gamesmanship. The oversight of his father’s provinces was among the most urgent, demanding, and frustrating tasks facing Torcy in his early years as designated successor, especially with Croissy occupied with negotiations for prosecuting and later ending the war. The 1685 Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had multiplied domestic as well as diplomatic difficulties. Croissy’s department supervised administrative units scattered across France and not necessarily contiguous (figure 4.1). According to a 10 January 1688 broadsheet listing the secretaries of states’ departments, Croissy generalities (“generalitez”) included Brittany; Provence; Berry; Champagne and Brie; Dauphiné; Limousin, Angoumois, and Saintonge; Navarre, Béarn, Bigorre, and Nébouzan; and the Sovereignty of Sedan, a former principality that included the fortress-city and its dependency of seventeen villages.41 This list would change thereafter: in 1694, with the creation of the generality of La Rochelle, and in 1708, when Torcy returned Dauphiné, traded by Louvois to Croissy for the Trois Evêches in 1681, in exchange for Lyon.42 Each secretary also supervised his generalities’ parlements and other sovereign courts. The foreign secretary oversaw the parlements of Aix (Provence), Grenoble (Dauphiné), Rennes (Brittany), and Pau (Béarn and Navarre), but since the parlements’ jurisdictions did not coincide with the generalities’ boundaries, some areas under Torcy looked to courts supervised by other secretaries of state.43 Even though the provincial petites chancelleries, where official documents were sealed and registered, were emanations of the Grand Chancellery in Paris, they were attached to the local parlements, sovereign courts, and présidiaux, and therefore under Torcy’s supervision, as suggested by his rather long letter to a local official outlining the means of ending the procedural abuses that had crept in over time.44 If there were diplomacy-related documents that needed to be registered in other sovereign courts, Torcy would send his colleagues copies to forward with instructions to the courts under their jurisdiction. Such was the case in 1713 with the Utrecht-mandated renunciations of the Spanish crown made by Charles, duc de Berry, and Philippe, duc d’Orléans, and the renunciation of that of France by Philip V.45 The secretary also handled remonstrances over royal legislation

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Figure 4.1 Map of the généralités supervised by Torcy and major postal routes. In 1708 Torcy traded Dauphiné for the Lyonnais with the war secretary.

issued by the superior courts, often with royal encouragement. Torcy would read them in the Conseil if they concerned provincial administration, whereas the chancellor read those concerned with justice and the controller general those related to finance. A provincial incident typically sparked these remonstrances, which sought not the effacement of royal power but rather royal intervention. The parlements, touchy about their prerogatives, their standing among other corporate bodies, and the



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status of corporate bodies such as the Church in their jurisdiction, were quick to seek redress from the king when they felt these were threatened by their rivals. The Conseil took these remonstrances seriously and on occasion even offered reasons for their decision. In addition, these courts could seek to influence decisions at Versailles by appeals or visits to Torcy or his premier commis.46 The secretaries’ power increased markedly during Louis XIV’s last two wars as their direct collaboration with the monarch skyrocketed. They continued to correspond with the provinces on a regular basis, using Dispatches as their debating society. Pressed by the volume of provincial affairs, they increased the size of their staffs and their working space at Versailles. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, the secretaries of state had surpassed in importance the governors of most provinces and shared their authority largely only with the controller general. Little wonder that Chancellor Pontchartrain instructed those with concerns about everyday administration, such as the appointment of officials, building of hospitals, disciplining of clergy, enforcement of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and repair of highways, to write to the appropriate secretary and not to him.47

T h e F o r e ig n O f f ic e Vi ewed from 1715 In 1698, before the resumption of diplomatic relations with her former enemies, France counted seventeen diplomatic missions abroad. In 1702, even after French representatives had withdrawn from Britain, the United Provinces, and Austria with the resumption of war, there were still twenty-three, although the number would slip to eleven by 1708.48 Each strand of this extensive diplomatic web, larger than any other in Europe, served and represented the French monarch and his diplomacy as “exterior organs of execution.” The “specialized central organ of command and control,”49 conveying the royal will to and through each strand and coordinating the projection with suitable splendour of Louis XIV’s diplomatic face abroad, consisted of the foreign secretary and his staff. How was this department constituted, how did it function, and who were its personnel? These are not easy questions to answer because explicit documentation is meagre, but occasional glimpses of the department’s inner workings appear in a letter from or to a clerk, in a note of instruction scribbled on a document, or in lists of personnel payments. Likewise, changes in organization or personnel can be revealing. Incongruously

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perhaps, the loss of a high-ranking official is typically less disruptive to an organization’s operation than the loss of a key clerk because the latter is normally the repository of the details of the organization’s daily functioning. These procedures characteristically evolve organically and reside in group memory rather than in writing.50 Even today, when detailed operational manuals and handbooks abound, there remains a plethora of unwritten administrative particulars whose neglect can bring an organization to its knees. Such particulars largely remain unrecorded until a staff or structural change requires their commitment to paper either to ensure continuity or to clarify what is being altered or replaced.51 The war department under three generations of Le Telliers and the foreign affairs department under Croissy and Torcy for over thirty-five years each experienced continuity of control at the top and generations of fathers, sons, uncles, and nephews who served as clerks and passed on their lore through apprenticeship, obviating the need for written administrative procedures. Ironically, the stability other departments of state lost through more frequent leadership changes has been the historian’s gain from fuller written organizational and operational details.52 The Regency’s council-based Polysynod (1715–18) is usually derided as disorderly and inefficient and dismissed as a reactionary aristocratic aberration in French political life. Fortunately, a study of the Polysynod has appeared that moves beyond what the memorialists said to what the archives reveal. Alexandre Dupilet’s meticulous work has in fact uncovered a system that was quite functional and displayed a fundamental continuity with Louisquatorzian administrative methods, despite many Polysynodists’ pretence of a radical break with the Sun King’s governing mechanism. Even the conciliar system’s collegial underpinning was an idea under discussion within the government itself long before Louis was in his grave. It was nonetheless striking to contemporaries that soon after Louis XIV’s 1 September 1715 death the regent dismantled the departments of the four secretaries of state and redistributed the parts to six specialized councils, including a “Conseil des affaires étrangères” (Council of Foreign Affairs – hereafter cae) composed of a president, three councillors, and a secretary (15 September 1715). One week later, no longer with a department, Torcy resigned as secretary of state, although he did serve on the Regency Council.53 This change affords the historian rare and explicit information about his department’s organization and operation. A memoir dated 18 September drafted for the regent and his advisors by Antoine Pecquet, premier commis and department veteran appointed secretary of the new cae,



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addressed the problem of how exactly to implement the new councils, since the laws establishing them offered little guidance.54 With one eye on what had worked in the past and the other on the unknown future, he raised a series of specific issues and suggested how to guarantee continuity under what in theory was essentially a plural department executive. The most pressing concern was communication between the new government and its envoys abroad.55 If the war department was primarily about directing troops and the navy about the deployment of war vessels, then the foreign ministry’s front-line assets were its diplomatic personnel deployed abroad. These diplomats not only shaped the initial context within which the military operated, they also worked throughout a war to maximize successes and minimize failures on the battlefield and at sea during ongoing negotiations to wring the utmost advantage from an amalgam of circumstances and interests to fashion a peace pleasing to their master. Pecquet noted that previously ambassadorial dispatches had been addressed to the king, while replies were sent out in his name, signed in his name, and countersigned by Torcy. Since past regencies had followed this practice because they acted in the name of the monarch, he saw no reason for change. He did recommend, however, that the cae’s secretary (that is, himself) be granted a dispensation to draw up, sign, and seal royal orders until he could acquire the requisite charge of secretary of the king and that a circular letter be sent abroad without delay to inform envoys and other correspondents of these changes and the proper letter formats.56 The memoir betrays an insider’s viewpoint when it lists the matters the cae would discuss prior to President Huxelles’s reporting its deliberations to the larger Regency Council. Since the business of diplomacy often did not produce issues for discussion, such as those concerning alliances or the ways of avoiding commitments, he recommended that the cae meet only three times per week to read dispatches and to formulate responses to those not referred up to the Regency Council.57 At this point the wily bureaucrat did not yet draw the obvious implication: routine matters, which accounted for the bulk of the department’s work, would be managed without the cae by the department’s clerks – a policy that undoubtedly reflected the practice under Torcy, where most matters rarely went before the Conseil. After obtaining a decision from the regent or Regency Council concerning an incoming dispatch, Pecquet suggested that Huxelles or a clerk draft a response to be read at the next cae meeting, recorded in its register, and finally sent out. Because

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c­ ertain responses could not remain unsent until these meetings, however, Pecquet urged that Huxelles be permitted to send them out and then read a copy at the next cae meeting, thus allowing the president, and by implication his staff, latitude similar to that enjoyed by Torcy vis-àvis the Conseil through his direct work (la liasse – literally the bundle of papers a minister carried) with Louis XIV. Also, surely in imitation of Louisquatorzian practice, Huxelles could work directly with the regent, bypassing the cae and merely informing it of any decisions based on secret advice while withholding the advice itself or at least its source.58 While not as costly as waging war, projecting power through diplomacy nonetheless required ready cash or credit that was often disbursed in secret. Pecquet was anxious to maintain a liquid fund and establish procedures to sustain the financial flow for the department’s work, especially the continued use of “ordonnances au porteur” (orders to pay to the bearer) issued to unnamed recipients.59 The next two sections of the memoir offer a revealing contrast between what Pecquet termed the “ordre” (procedures) of council meetings and those of the department’s “ordre du travail intérieur” (inner working). Since councils were the organizing principle and governing bodies of the Regency, he naturally began with the cae’s meetings. Although he deferentially noted that it was for the aristocratic councillors to arrange the sessions according to their schedules, he did specify that sessions be scheduled so that there would be at least twenty-four hours before the next meeting of the Regency Council. This was so that the cae’s decisions and reasoning could be rendered into proper written form by the department’s staff. It was in this daily “inner working” that the department’s technical and vital toil transpired, and this was clearly the realm of the clerks. Incoming dispatches, he insisted, even though addressed to the king or his cae, must be opened upon arrival each morning and afternoon for any necessary decoding and translating before extracts could be made of their contents. Since opening correspondence could not wait for the thrice weekly cae sessions, the specialists, either alongside the president or in his stead, had to assume this fundamental role, initially sorting diplomatic business into what was routine and what had to go before the cae.60 Torcy, of course, had closely supervised this, as he was the sole secretary and continuously involved in department work with a staff that served at his sufferance. Huxelles, however, while council president, was nonetheless somewhat distanced from his clerks because they served under the regent-appointed council secretary. In any event, he ended up leaving it to Pecquet to open the dispatches.61



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Pecquet identified other important functions exercised directly by Torcy. As secretary of state and head of the post office, Torcy initially sorted through anonymous letters to the king, deciding which merited being forwarded to which minister and which anonymous denunciations of alleged abuses of power warranted investigation. With Torcy retaining the post office, would the cae now have to take on this task if other provisions were not made? As to the bimonthly audiences with foreign envoys, the cae had to arrange to hear the Parisian diplomatic community’s frequent complaints and requests, especially so that those requiring further clarification or redress outside the department could, after the clerks prepared proper documentation, be forwarded to the appropriate council. Pecquet particularly cautioned against responding to foreign envoys in writing, a greater peril now, he noted archly, due to the increased numbers at the department’s helm. Foreign diplomats had long advocated this practice, but Pecquet insisted that since political maxims were subject to frequent change, there was no need to hand foreign diplomats a written record of them as a weapon against future French interests.62 Pecquet ended his reflections on the numerous and daunting tasks before the new councillors by finally stating what he had thus far only implied. Accomplishing these numerous technical tasks in a timely manner so that the cae could satisfy the regent and Regency Council, he warned, would require a rather large number of commis.63 Those unfamiliar with this administrative work – by implication the aristocratic councillors themselves – were insufficient to the task. In the unsettling transition from Louisquatorzian rule to that of a nephew long critical of his uncle’s system, Pecquet was likely uncertain of how far the regent’s administrative housecleaning would reach, but taking his own retention as a positive sign of his respect for trained technicians, he stressed that Torcy had formed a skilled and honest corps of bureaucrats. Pushing his point further, he asserted that the difficult times ahead required their conservation for reasons of efficiency and the security of state secrets.64 If not motivated at least in part by loyalty to his departmental colleagues, Pecquet undoubtedly knew that his own survival as the cae’s secretary depended on salvaging as much of the procedures and personnel of Torcy’s efficient department as possible even as he adapted it to the new conciliar system. The Pecquet memoir of 26 September 1715 shifts from rehearsing the reasons for continuing or adapting particular measures to spelling them out. He claimed that all of the new council’s “mechanique” ­(mechanism) could be reduced to five functions: weekly diplomatic audiences, the

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manner of writing to French envoys and receiving their letters, the secure deposit of departmental papers for ready access by the cae, the safekeeping of codes, and the choice of commis.65 While these five functions are useful pointers to at least some of the primary tasks of the foreign office’s executive, they still fail to give a full sense of the work Torcy had performed,66 the inner workings, and the internal organization of the department under Torcy. The importance of Pecquet, his fellow commis, and the organizational and procedural principles he outlined in these memoirs to the preservation of Torcy’s administrative legacy is underlined by the fact that the foreign office not only lost its secretary of state, it was physically displaced as well. When the court and government abandoned Versailles for Paris, the departments of state did likewise, vacating quarters they had occupied for nearly a half century. The cae met in the Louvre on Monday and Friday mornings, and its bureaus relocated to Pecquet’s residence on rue Neuve des Petits-Champs, not far from Torcy’s former residence.67 This only served to strengthen the function of premier commis as the chief “bonding agent,” one that held the department together as a bundle of bureaucratic attitudes and practices even as its spatial dimensions were in flux.

“I n n e r W o r k in g ” : C o n t e xts of Ti me and Space The Polysynod is unique among ancien régime government institutions because throughout its three years of existence its daily operations are revealed in the minutes of all its councils, with the exception of the cae, for which none were kept for secrecy’s sake.68 We are thus otherwise largely dependent for such information on personal journals and memoirs, both of which are open to criticism and may be used only with care. Torcy’s richly detailed and reliable secret Journal has proven indispensable for understanding the inner workings of Louis XIV’s Conseil because it situates its sessions in time and space, reports debates, and provides context, but it covers only a year and a half (6 November 1709 through 29 May 1711)69 and is mostly silent on the administrative routine of his bureaus. For that, a clerk’s journal or memoir would likely provide a richer yield, but alas, none has surfaced.70 The foreign ministry’s archives for Torcy’s tenure consist mainly of official papers or private papers of personages loftier than clerks, although clerks make occasional appearances.71 Sometimes a more sustained correspondence is preserved when a diplomat, his staff member, or some other i­ndividual



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friendly to France wrote regularly to the premier commis who supervised communications with the country where he was.72 Ambassadors might also have had a personal and private correspondence with clerks in the central bureaus who were their particular friends, but if we have any of these letters, they are typically in private collections. Perhaps the clerk was loath to include them in the official correspondence because diplomats often opened up to them more than they would to the minister and especially to the king.73 Such personal missives may also be found in the papers of those outside the bureaus who interacted professionally and personally with foreign office clerks.74 Colonel N ­ athaniel Hooke, Irishman, Catholic convert from Protestantism, and Jacobite from 1688, became a French national and acquired a colonel’s commission with Torcy’s help in 1703. Hooke was a skilled soldier and, as he called himself, an “officer-negotiator,” as well as on occasion a secret agent. Largely dependent on Torcy as his patron, he offered the secretary a valuable set of eyes at the battle front, although this did not win him the war minister’s affection. His papers preserve a precious sampling of his correspondence with two of Torcy’s commis. While attention is typically given only to letters to and from Torcy, other French ministers, and an array of important Jacobites, Hooke’s correspondence with the commis provides a glimpse of the department’s inner working between 1704 and 1707.75 On a presumably cold morning in early January 1704, Hooke’s lackey set out from the Stuart court at Saint-Germain bearing Torcy a letter and Pecquet a note of transmission, but he was uncertain as to where he would find them. He was to go first to Marly, the most likely location and only two and one-half miles away, but if they were not there, then he was to proceed to Versailles, approximately five miles further.76 Although both were in fact with the king at Marly, Hooke received a response only four days later with Pecquet’s apology that it would have come earlier had he had an opportunity.77 In another informal note later that spring, Hooke asked that Pecquet allow him to call him his very dear friend and then begged him in that capacity to reply immediately to the attached letter to Torcy while his lackey waited.78 Pecquet wrote back without delay the surely unwelcome report that Torcy had read the letters from Hooke and James Drummond, 1st Duke of Perth, that had arrived as he was departing for Paris and thus had instructed Pecquet to write that he would make no reply. Pecquet complied but, after effusive thanks for Hooke’s offer of friendship, insisted that he had done his best to secure the desired replies and added further that Torcy had not indicated when or even if he might respond.79

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The early summer of 1705 was a busy one for Hooke as he prepared for a secret mission to the Scottish Jacobites about a possible invasion the following year.80 Chevreuse, who was close to Louis XIV, a Jacobite champion, and one of Hooke’s patrons, wrote to him at Saint-Germain from Versailles on 19 June that all the necessary documents for his mission were now ready. If his health permitted, he urged him to go to Paris that day after dinner and seek out premier commis Clair Adam, who was coordinating the paperwork and had copies for him. Chevreuse helpfully added that while in the capital Adam might lodge at the Hôtel Croissy or at least nearby and that in any case the Hôtel Croissy’s staff could point him in the right direction. If he needed to see Torcy directly, the minister would return from Paris the following morning, whereas Adam would remain in the capital for some days. Hooke replied immediately, probably by the same messenger, that he was leaving for Paris right away, but since he doubted that he would see Torcy there, he asked the duke to deliver the enclosed letter from Charles Middleton, 2nd Earl of Middleton, to the minister the next day. In addition, Hooke asked Chevreuse to request that Torcy apply to the Sunday session of the Conseil for three blank passports for Scottish vessels to be used for his return, any agent he might send, or his dispatches.81 Yet obtaining these passports proved difficult. A note from Adam on 5 July informed Hooke of a new snag. Rather than explaining it himself, Adam sent along letters he had just received from Pecquet, but he assured the anxious agent that the passports should be ready that evening and advised him to send his lackey back again the next morning. Adam also gave Hooke’s messenger a packet freshly arrived from Antwerp addressed to Torcy, but then added a postscript explaining that after opening it, he was returning it to the sender because the letters of exchange it contained were flawed. Unable to conceal his impatience with this delay, Hooke nonetheless expressed his pleasure at hearing that Adam’s ailing son was better and thanked him for sparing him an embarrassment by his wise handling of the Antwerp packet. He also returned to his earlier passport proposition intended to facilitate his mission, still regarding it as neither extraordinary nor unreasonable. Nonetheless, he offered to drop it if Adam thought it out of line and closed with further solicitation on behalf of young Adam’s health and with compliments to Mme Adam.82 Both the foreign office and the war department had contributed to this frustrating delay. Pecquet’s forwarded note explained that the requested passport modification permitting Hooke to bring into France the same goods as allowed during peacetime was not only without precedent and



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inappropriate, but would by its very latitude give away Hooke’s mission. Pecquet warned Hooke not to insist upon such passports, but closed with more than perfunctory assurances of friendship and good wishes for his mission.83 Adam also forwarded Pecquet’s note to him saying that the passports were enclosed, along with an explanatory note for Hooke, which Pecquet left to Adam’s discretion whether to share with the colonel or not. Pecquet also assured Adam that he would always defer to him as the master on this as on other occasions. Following words of concern for his son’s health, Pecquet reminded his senior colleague to fill in the names on the passports, assuring him that only his current state of worry about his son accounted for what might otherwise be taken as a slight against Adam’s usual precision. Just as he was about to send this packet to Adam at Versailles, Pecquet was interrupted by the arrival of a messenger from navy department premier commis Joseph de La Touche informing him that he also needed to examine and approve Hooke’s passports. Frustrated by this new holdup, Pecquet rerouted the passports to La Touche, urging him to process them quickly, so that they could then be forwarded to the war office for further action, and left it to Adam either to send back the messenger boy (“garçon”) who awaited the passports or keep him there.84 As the long day of exchanged notes, notices of further delays, and denied requests drew to a close, Hooke replied to Pecquet’s notes to Adam and to himself by assuring Pecquet that while unconvinced that his earlier passport requests were unwise, he bowed to Pecquet’s judgment. Anxious to lay his hands on the documents first thing the next morning for a Monday departure, Hooke requested that his messenger remain the night at Versailles.85 The passports were forthcoming the next morning, along with another note from Adam updating Hooke on his son’s health and sharing the frank fatherly confession that this greatly afflicted him. Adam added that rather than repeating the reasons advanced against Hooke’s passport proposition, he would only say that since the objections applied just to Dunkirk, he was enclosing two of the desired passports with exemptions for Calais, two for Nantes, and two for La Rochelle. He closed with mutual compliments between their wives and wishes for a good trip and return as Hooke embarked on his dangerous mission.86 With the passport difficulties resolved, Hooke hurried on Tuesday to Dunkirk, where he found the ship ready and in the harbour with a favourable wind, but no news from Antwerp of his letters of exchange. Disappointed at this new hindrance, he ventured from the lodgings where he was hiding for fear of being recognized to speak with the local

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maitre de poste. When the evening mail produced nothing, he wrote Torcy and Adam separately to share his concerns and await new orders. He also begged the premier commis to speak to Torcy on his behalf. That same day, using a pseudonym, Hooke wrote to the Antwerp postmaster for his help in expediting the desired packet, referring to the orders the postmaster must have received from Torcy and Adam.87 Two days later the bills of exchange for 12,000 livres finally arrived, but not without a new predicament: both were endorsed by the Paris banker who had obtained them for him, whereas he had not wanted them to be traceable to France. Rather than further delay his departure, he decided to send them back from Scotland if they needed to be redone.88 He finally landed in Scotland on 8 August for secret negotiations with various Jacobites and returned to France on 18 September. Torcy read his findings to the Conseil on 19 October where they fed hopes for a possible Scottish landing during next year’s campaign. Thereafter, Pecquet coordinated an elaborate clandestine communications link between Hooke and his cross-Channel contacts by means of Antwerp postmaster Le Fevre. The ever-helpful premier commis also arranged lodgings for Hooke nearby, presumably in the city of Versailles, so that Hooke could stay close to the ongoing planning. Hopes for an expedition, however, grew increasingly forlorn in the following months, as no emissaries from Scotland appeared in France, and so invasion plans were eventually shelved.89 André Holenstein has observed that state-building and “intensifying communication” fed off one another and resulted in the “introduction of new administrative procedures and techniques and the emergence of new media and channels of communication between centres and localities.”90 Thus, the notes exchanged among those below the ministerial level offer insights into the operations that oiled and turned the machinery of diplomacy at the centre and as it reached abroad. Although the king and the state apparatus were located at Versailles, monarch, ministers, and select staff relocated frequently to the nearby Trianon or to Marly, annually to Fontainebleau (approximately six weeks every autumn), and occasionally but briefly to other locations. Paris and particularly the Hôtel Croissy was the other hub of diplomatic business. It was there that Torcy received the foreign diplomatic community once or more per month. The Hôtel des Ambassadeurs, a residence provided by the king for visiting dignitaries, and the dwellings of resident diplomats were also there. Postal routes converged on Paris and its central post office. The ­premier commis often had a Paris residence. A secretary and commis might work with the minister from Paris for a day or so at



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a time, and Adam, who was also intendant of Torcy’s household, frequently had business that detained him there after Torcy’s departure. As Chevreuse informed Hooke, the Hôtel Croissy’s staff – most likely the Suisse – would know the whereabouts of any department personnel who happened to be in the capital.91 Ministers, clerks, and messengers frequently traversed the VersaillesMarly-Paris communication triangle. The two palaces, not quite four and one-half miles apart (all these distances are as the crow flies), were each almost eleven miles from Torcy’s Paris residence in the western suburbs. When the court resided at Fontainebleau, two sides of this triangle lengthened to almost forty miles. For Jacobite affairs, one of Torcy’s responsibilities, the basic triangle stretched to include Saint-Germain, a little over two miles further along the road from Marly, not quite seven miles from Versailles and some eleven miles from Paris (since the ­Stuarts accompanied the court to Fontainebleau, this trip actually increased their proximity to the king). The five notes that passed among Hooke, Adam, and Pecquet on 4 July 1705 spanned that whole day, a Saturday, and moved along this triangle as lackeys hastened between Hooke at Saint-Germain, Adam at Versailles, and the Trianon, where Torcy and Pecquet were in attendance upon the king.92 These notes and all the others that must have gone out that day for other business required numerous lackeys to carry them and to wait for replies, as well as plentiful horses at the ready to bear them along these well-traveled highways. When a personage of importance, including a premier commis, made the journey in person, he traveled by horse-drawn vehicle, which required additional horses and personnel.93 Moreover, delays and crossed communications were multiplied by the fact that someone at any one of the triangle’s corners could not always be certain at which other corner the party he sought might be at any given moment.94 The same is seen in a February 1697 Saturday morning note from Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil, who had yet to depart for Ryswick. Adam, who Torcy had working on the plenipotentiaries’ lengthy instructions, had been told to show them to Harlay-Bonneuil before his Sunday audience with the king. The busy commis wrote that rather than taking the chance of calling on him and not finding him at home, he hoped Harlay-Bonneuil would set a time for their meeting. Better still, if he happened to be in the neighbourhood and dropped by, Adam would gladly receive him, since it would spare him the loss of valuable time.95 This old practice of clerks often ­working from their residences added yet another extension to the communication triangle.96

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As Hooke demonstrated, one made use of whatever means were available to get messages delivered in a timely manner. Sending a letter to Torcy by way of Chevreuse, who would see the minister at Versailles, was a way to elevate its importance. Even before transportation and communication accelerated to speeds more familiar today, Hooke’s wait on a single day for needed documents drove him to despair. In addition, as witnessed that day, the flow of communications was ongoing. Adam amended his note to Hooke after he opened the Antwerp packet. ­Pecquet’s earlier note to Adam, meant to accompany the passports, was sent without them but with a postscript explaining their rerouting to the war department. Even the morning note that P ­ ecquet penned for Hooke had the addition of an afternoon afterthought explaining the delay of his lackey. What emerges from this perhaps not untypical day is an amount of flux that might not fit our preconceived notions of the more leisurely pace of early modern affairs. The geographic separation of bureaucratic actors at the centre, even if as slight as the mile between Versailles and the Trianon or the space between one desk and another in the same room, multiplied the production and flow of “lower level” pieces of paper. By means of writing, members of the same bureaucracy shaped and transmitted the “higher level” documents that most typically survive in the archives. Even short distances such as from one’s bureau to a council chamber within the same palace complex required notes to prompt one’s memory for a presentation or for its recollection as a basis for the more formal writing that usually resulted, such as a “cleaner” summary or a letter.97 Time went hand in glove with distance in a more obvious manner in the era before instantaneous communication and therefore contributed to the need for note-taking. When hurried, Torcy used the back of the letters he was carrying to scribble unrelated notes from unplanned and informal conversations he had had with individual diplomats. Or he might write random thoughts or reminders to himself.98 Such notes that were part of the production process of a bureau, especially if on separate paper rather than scrawled on drafts or incoming letters, were mostly discarded along the way99 or were weeded out when the higher-level end products – correspondence, copies of documents, and the like – were later assembled for preservation. The surviving stray notes from premier commis Charles Mignon’s archives betray their ephemeral nature by the way they were dated: “Thursday morning,” “Saturday evening,” and “this 15th.” This suggests that this was sufficient for their intended short existence.100 Official correspondence intended for preservation was usually more



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c­ arefully dated. Even though the type of intra- or inter-office writing seen in Hooke’s and Mignon’s papers rarely makes it into the historical record, it nonetheless played an essential role in producing, revising, assembling, transmitting, receiving, processing, and storing those writings that did. Scholars like Robert Darnton have “employed the notion of ‘information society’ … as a way of moving away from the history of the book to the history of communication.”101 Likewise, Filippo de Vivo moves the study of state communication beyond formal documents to embrace the fuller range of surviving oral, manuscript, and printed communication.102 Thus, the state archives today may largely contain the formal but nonetheless incomplete record of department communication.103 As with Hooke’s passports, inter-ministerial cooperation could further complicate coordination and multiply the requisite writing, lackeys, and horses. The additional complexity of Paris bankers arranging letters of exchange from Antwerp and their intended recipient relocating from the Paris region to Dunkirk in hiding under an assumed name to collect his mail suggests the sophisticated planning and organization required of the foreign office staff. That Torcy also headed the post office clearly extended the grasp of these planners at the centre, as witnessed by the ongoing collaboration with postmasters at Dunkirk and Antwerp.104 The notes exchanged that July day say something as well about specialization within the department and relationships among its clerks. Pecquet handled the passports, perhaps because as head of the first political bureau he had charge of English affairs or because he was the premier commis at Torcy’s side at that moment. Yet Pecquet apparently acted largely on his own in denying Hooke’s passport exception. In neither his note to Hooke nor this note to Adam did Pecquet invoke Torcy to justify or add authority to his refusal, and when the colonel grudgingly submitted, he acknowledged that it was to Pecquet’s judgment that he did so, without any mention of Torcy. A premier commis was empowered to open the minister’s sensitive mail and redirect it. He also enjoyed much latitude in making decisions and thereby insulating the minister from unnecessary work.105 When Hooke later asked Pecquet to deliver a letter to Torcy, the premier commis replied four days later in an amiable letter containing friendly banter about family that “le Seigneur” (the lord, i.e., Torcy) was working but that he would give the missive to him when he was able.106 This door-keeping by the minister’s senior staff was a significant consideration for any would-be supplicant. While we need not doubt the sincerity of Hooke’s sentiments for Adam’s family, Hooke was prudent to cultivate a person who controlled access

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to the ­powerful minister. When someone wrote to a minister, he was wise to write as well to his premier commis, as Hooke did, entreating Adam to add his voice to his letter alerting Torcy to the seriousness of the missing letters of exchange.107 While Adam’s specialty appears to have been letters of exchange and codes,108 his position was enhanced by other factors. A department veteran before Croissy became minister, Adam served as Torcy’s household intendant. In 1705 he was probably in his mid-­fifties or mid-sixties and thus Pecquet’s senior in age as well as experience. This explains Pecquet’s deference to Adam in the matter of passports even though Hooke’s mission fell under Pecquet’s bureau. The dynamics were imprecise. Perhaps Adam backed his younger colleague’s decision for form’s sake and collegial solidarity. Yet he gave Hooke the desired passports for other ports and, with the collusion of Dunkirk’s intendant, circumvented Pecquet’s ruling. While evidence is lacking, it is possible that Adam even arranged or encouraged the intendant’s wink and nod at the rules.109 That Saturday of 4 July was stressful because Hooke not only saw the days passing, he heard the clock ticking. Although one might suppose the clock-dominated office to be a creation of the Industrial Revolution, the daily schedule of the foreign office was in fact fairly tightly bound to exact measurements of time. Louis XIV promoted advances in timekeeping technology in the 1670s that made clocks more accurate and allowed them to be miniaturized to a personal and portable scale as watches.110 Those who could afford watches would experience time not “as a continuous movement” but as “an experience of discontinuity.”111 Time for this steadily growing minority would henceforth be marked in minutes, as experienced at Louis XIV’s court where time was highly structured.112 That relentless ticking also structured the activities of the foreign office clerks as they worked toward an unending succession of deadlines.113 The rhythm of council meetings required that they prepare beforehand the dispatches (by deciphering them), drafts of letters, memoirs, and other papers Torcy would bundle into a portfolio (liasse) to carry with him into meetings with the ever-punctual monarch.114 Pecquet’s 1715 memoir specified at least one day if possible to move letters and memoirs from draft to final form before the clock chimed for their presentation to the Regency Council.115 Louis XIV’s Conseil, where foreign policy and other great matters of state were discussed, normally met twice per week on Sunday and Wednesday mornings in sessions usually lasting from 9:45 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. It might reconvene once more during the week on a Monday, Thursday, or Friday morning if needed, as was sometimes



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the case during a time of intense negotiations.116 Discussions of domestic matters and the disposition of petitions took place in Dispatches, which by Torcy’s day had ceased meeting twice per week, instead convening on Monday mornings every other week or once monthly.117 While the clerks could generally count on a fairly steady Sunday-Monday-Wednesday timetable, the possibility of further sessions to complete unfinished business or deal with a courier galloping in with pressing news kept them ever alert and ready to scramble.118 Of course, there was little to discuss at some meetings because the couriers were delayed.119 Then there were deadlines for inserting items in or reading over the contents of the Gazette prior to its printing on Fridays and into the night before its Paris distribution on Saturday mornings.120 Clearly, newspapers and pocket watches played crucial roles “in the development of the modern sense of time … as regular, linear, and predictable.”121 As Kenneth J. Banks has ably demonstrated for the navy ministry’s Atlantic colonies, the “infrastructure and coordination required to send the king’s word overseas could be extraordinarily complicated.”122 The foreign office faced a similar challenge but with its own distinct issues.123 Whereas great distances and local climate limited (although not as much as formerly imagined) the frequency of contact between the navy ministry and its New World colonies, the scale of communications in Europe was by comparison much smaller and the land connections more developed. This both allowed, indeed required, more-frequent contact between the foreign office and its embassies. While Quebec was inaccessible by water for at least six months owing to ice, the Baltic Sea only rarely froze completely (1703 and 1708 saw ice in the Danish Straits). Although France’s links to her Atlantic colonies began with land transport in Europe and involved some land transport in the Americas as well, these links were nonetheless mostly by water. The foreign office’s links to other countries, however, were much more dependent upon land routes. Of the water routes, Constantinople required the longest voyage,124 whereas crossing the English Channel, while not always easy or fast, still took less time. Scandinavia, although optimally more quickly reached by sea, was still accessible largely by land. Mountainous regions like the Alps at times proved treacherous, and places like Poland and Spain seemed endlessly distant.125 Yet Rome, for example, could be reached by ship from Marseille to Leghorn or by overland routes through Savoy. Such multiple combinations of land and sea routes to most destinations permitted sending several messages by diverse paths.126 Managing such widely dispersed communication networks required current information on local

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conditions along their various strands and careful planning, coordination, and an eye constantly on the calendar and clock. The department apparently maintained a day-by-day list of the arrival and departure of couriers as well as a listing of foreign cities whose couriers departed and arrived on a regular schedule.127 The minister and his clerks had handy, in memory or on paper, logistical data such as average travel times for regular couriers on various circuits, always subject, of course, to a variety of mishaps.128 Not all ordinary couriers shared the same arrival-­departure timetable: some were scheduled for several times per week, while others for only once per week.129 Ambassadors might also, at greater risk, send dispatches with the diplomatic couriers of other states.130 In addition, postal couriers had a regular schedule between Paris, the court, and the satellite ministerial residences surrounding Paris.131 Unquestionably, the foreign office’s clerks had “an existence structured in time by the activities of receiving and sending mail.”132 Rather than a linear, chronological sequence of letters and their replies, segments of correspondence often crossed or even vanished through the vicissitudes of travel.133 Replies from the centre often awaited information or decisions from other locations before being formulated and dispatched. Even before the telegraph and later technology hyper-­accelerated the pace of communication, Torcy’s bureau had to function in a timely and precise fashion to process and coordinate all the correspondence from its embassies.134 During the interwar partition treaty negotiations, London-Paris-Madrid was the crucial axis, but ­Portugal, Savoy, and Rome were also significant information sources and part of French calculations, as were more distant points such as ­Venice, Europe’s ear to the Levant, and Constantinople, a listening post with an even greater range. Synchronization was particularly critical when both ­Tallard in London and Portland in Paris transmitted talking points between Louis XIV and William III. To ensure that the same propositions were being advanced in both locations, Torcy’s clerks compared what Tallard wrote from London with what the French ministers heard at Versailles to see if they conveyed the same sense of William’s negotiating position.135 Shortened communication times could present a different set of problems for a negotiation. William III’s move across the Channel to his continental residence at Loo reduced courier travel time to Versailles, but also put him in closer contact with Heinsius in The Hague, affording the latter’s suspicions of France greater influence.136 To o ­ ptimize the communication flow, Torcy’s clerks drew on diplomatic personnel abroad or returned home for details of the events on each court’s calendar that might complicate the ebb



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and flow of diplomatic business, including holidays, the prince’s seasonal movements (for instance, to hunting retreats), and meetings of important bodies, such as the Dutch States-General or Britain’s Parliament.137 Torcy and his staff heard the clock ticking as they deciphered incoming dispatches, read and digested them, and shared them with the king and his Conseil.138 Next they formulated, drafted, and presented responses embodying a multiplicity of shifting factors, including council discussions and royal decisions. Then they revised drafts, put them in final form (which might involve encoding them) for Torcy to read to the king in the evening for final approval, and then, if no further revisions were required, they sent them off in the morning.139 Of course, any finished dispatch before being whisked away was still subject to last-minute amendment, revision, or suppression depending upon the arrival of fresh information or a sudden change of policy.140 As they shuffled all these papers, Torcy and his staff tried to maintain an accurate sense of the place of these letters and their contents in time and space.141 For instance, any received dispatch was already outdated, providing a sense of the situation at its point of origin while it might well have become somewhat or radically altered by the time it was read. Responses were always formulated on the basis of news they knew to be out of date, or if from as far away as the Levant, downright stale. Likewise, the responses and orders emanating from the centre often arrived at their destination being outdated due to changing circumstances both there and in France.142 Yet except for situations where decision-makers met face to face and had no need to consult others at a distance – which often created its own set of problems, such as a lack of “time for reflection and consultation”143 – this ever-present time lag was a fact of life factored into diplomatic calculations. Although instantaneous communication with the department’s embassies was not possible, those at the centre nonetheless knew that delays could make the difference between success and failure. Diplomats abroad were likewise aware of the element of time, as when an envoy wrote apologetically to Torcy that he was scandalized because his new secretary had overlooked a letter from the king, delaying his reply.144 Worse than delays, which were inevitable, was the element of unpredictability: one never really knew when messages would arrive or be received.145 Those rulers who personally took to the battlefield added further increments of time and space, but when, like the mercurial Charles XII of Sweden, they did not ­typically permit diplomats to accompany them, the complications grew.146 The foreign office thus operated under circumstances where messages moved relatively slowly but

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55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 1711 1712 1713

Jan. 20 15 26

Feb. 18 55 22

Mar. 15 36 27

Apr. 31 24 32

May 17 27 26

June 18 24 23

July 22 26 17

Aug. 9 24 21

Sept. 12 29 27

Oct. 14 22 22

Nov. 16 24 7

Dec. 14 26

Figure 4.2 Royal dispatches sent out by the first political bureau per month, 1711–1713. The first political bureau had responsibility for England, Holland, Spain, Portugal, the Swiss, and Italy.

where initiating that movement nevertheless required swift action. The leisurely part, if it can be called that, was not in making the response but in awaiting its result, which surely demanded great patience. The foreign office was organized into a number of bureaus to deal with diplomatic and domestic administration, and each processed a flow of incoming and outgoing paperwork that could be steady and substantial or could come at intervals, but all requiring timely processing. Foreign correspondence was roughly divided between two political bureaus (Spain, Portugal, Britain, Holland, the Swiss Cantons, and Italy were in the first, while Lorraine, the Holy Roman Empire, its member states, Scandinavia, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire were in the second). During the years 1711–13 the first political bureau expedited on average one dispatch from the king every day or every other day (figure 4.2).147 ­During the ten years Iberville was Geneva resident, for example, he sent Torcy and his father 524 letters – an average of one per week – and received 389 from them.148 But these figures understate the actual volume of ­correspondence. Rémi



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Figure 4.3 Number of folios of domestic expeditions per year, 1681–1715 (with trend line)

Mathis differentiates four types of outgoing correspondence: the king’s dispatches, the secretary’s dispatches, the secretary’s personal letters, and various commis’ letters. Only those dispatches from the king and secretary, he notes, are in the foreign archives.149 This was also largely true under Torcy. Further, any paperwork entering and exiting the bureaus deemed worthy of leaving a formal paper trail was painstakingly organized, copied, entered, or preserved in draft form into various specialized registries. For example, the most basic series for domestic administration were the volumes of “expéditions” (outgoing items) that joined the separate “minutes” (drafts) of every paper sent out by the department.150 A year’s expéditions could be divided among two to nine volumes, with the average number during Croissy’s tenure nearly doubling under Torcy. Either before or after binding, each volume received an alphabetical table of contents.151 Some sense of the annual volume of domestic paperwork comes from the crude measure of the total number of folios contained in these ­volumes (figure 4.3). The major rise during the second half of the

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1680s is likely connected with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, while the increases from1698 reflect the shift of focus to domestic matters after Ryswick. The decline after 1702 may be due to the widening of the war that had begun the previous year, affording less time for d ­ omestic matters, but the reason for the 1704 spike is unclear. Despite annual fluctuations, the trend is plain: Torcy’s bureaus were normally producing almost double the amount of paperwork Croissy’s had. From these volumes of annual expéditions the foreign ministry’s clerks created a variety of lists. As humble as mere lists may appear among the products of the pen, they were likely at the very origin of writing and have always functioned as powerful instruments of administration because they “do not communicate, they control transfer operations … The individual items are not put down in writing for the sake of memorizing spoken words, but in order to regulate goods, things, or people. Lists sort and engender circulation.”152 For example, among the lists the foreign office compiled were those for payment orders, in effect controlling to whom, where, and for what purposes department funds went.153 Another list records merely the date and addressee of dispatches and letters from the king, certainly of all the papers issuing from Torcy’s bureaus those most intent upon and likely to regulate the behaviour of their recipients!154 When the king met with Dispatches, each secretary of state had to present him with a listing of the outgoing items countersigned (“Mémoire des expéditions contresignées”) in his department since the last session. Each department had designated for this task at least one premier commis who was also a secretary of the king. The memoirs from Torcy’s department were chronological listings of type (e.g., brevet, dépêche du Roy), recipient, and date (table 4.1), whereas those from Pontchartrain and Voysin did not list specific dates.155 Boislisle claims that while this system kept the king informed of what was signed in his name, each secretary of state remained in ignorance of what the others were authorizing.156 However, each secretary apparently also received copies of the lists presented to the king, and in Torcy’s case he had these bound together in separate volumes so that he had a running account of everything sent out by his colleagues.157 Thus, if the frequency of Dispatches meetings declined over time, the council nonetheless maintained its coordinating role for domestic administration. It would assemble in the king’s presence when difficult issues had to be sorted out, but even when not meeting frequently, its members kept abreast of one another’s activities through the periodic distribution of the lists of outgoing items

Table 4.1 Report of sent items countersigned by Torcy, March–May 1710 Type of Item Sent Acquit patent Arrêt Brevet Commission Confirmation de noblesse Confirmation des statuts Congé Déclaration Dépêche du Roy Dispense d’âge Dispense de grade Dispense de parenté Édit Expéditions pour la tenue des États Gouvernement héréditaire [Provisions de] Lettre de cachet Lettre du Roy Lettres d’attache Lettres d’état Lettres d’intermediat3 Lettres de réhabilitation Lettres patentes Naturalité [Lettres de] Ordonnance Ordonnance [de payement] Ordonnance de vacations Ordonnance de voyage Ordre Passeport Permission4 Ratification Relief de noblesse Rémission Renouvellement de pouvoir Total Items Sent

17 March–28 April1

28 April–19 May2

5 5 7 14 0 0 2 4 28 4 1 1 2 0 1 0 3 2 2 1 1 2 5 1 68 1 6 5 208 2 1 1 1 0 384

0 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 14 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 2 0 66 2 0 0 0 2 140

Source: aae md 1168, fols 109–30 and 169–77v, “Mémoire des expéditions contresignées par Mr de Torcy,” March–May 1710.

1 The beginning and ending dates for these lists are the dates of Monday meetings of the Council of Dispatches. Dangeau, Journal, 13:126, 148, 161. 2 These two periods are not equal in number of days, since the first covers six weeks and the second three weeks. 3 “Lettres d’intermediat, Qui sont des lettres que le Roy accorde pour joüir des gages d’un office depuis la mort du titulaire jusques à ce que le successeur soit pourvû.” daf, s.v. “Lettres d’intermediat.” 4 aae md 1062, fol. 16, is an example of a permission from 9 July 1699, granting the president of the Parlement of Dauphiné permission to travel to Rome for a year.

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c­ ountersigned. If these reports raised any questions, a secretary could easily contact his colleague. Indeed, even though the ministries were in fairly close proximity to one another at Versailles, papers streamed back and forth among the various departments of state as items or extracts from each were forwarded to or inquiries made of the other departments.158 Depending on the form a piece of paperwork was to take, clerks had to factor in the steps involved in producing it when preparing to meet deadlines.159 Letters and other documents bearing the monarch’s and minister’s signature required particular attention to such details as the size and weight of the paper used, even in routine foreign and domestic correspondence. This was because in the minds of Europe’s educated classes “there was no divide between words and the actions they referred to,” which meant that political meanings – concerning, for instance, power relationships – were coded into writing in forms of politeness that were fairly clear to the recipient.160 Little was left to chance. Salutations and formal closings based on the sender’s and recipient’s status were carefully spelled out.161 Woe to the naive or careless commis who disregarded the rules of protocol, for both the king and his minister were strict taskmasters! The premier commis created model letters for particular occasions to guide the copyists who put missives in their final form. In 1707, for example, when instructions went out for Te Deums to celebrate the birth of the Duke of Burgundy’s son, the 2nd Duke of Brittany, there were five separate models with appropriate alternate wording and blanks, each letter progressively shorter, for the following groups and in the necessary quantities: thirteen governors or commandants; fortysix bishops and archbishops; seven parlements; seven procurers general; and seven first presidents of the parlements. Appended were lists of governors and commandants by name and prelates by see.162 Such so-called circular letters were a commonplace of administration, with recipients varying according to subject.163 The royal government had long used printing to disseminate laws.164 Preprinted forms extended printing’s power to other tasks and were indicative of the routinization of department business. As early as 1714 the foreign office began using printed passports with blank spaces for specifics and signatures in order to standardize and expedite their issuance. The same printer’s order included forms for payment authorizations. In this as in other areas the foreign office was innovative.165 This labour-saving measure was also employed by ambassadors abroad and was especially helpful to them with their often limited staffs. Pomponne



The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

169

in Venice, for instance, in 1706 used a general form printed with his family arms and his name and titles at the top, and at the bottom in Italian, “Par Son Excelence,” with space above for his secretary to affix the abbé’s signature and his own below.166 The post office, also headed by Torcy, produced forms as well, such as one to inform maitres de poste along a particular route of the required horses and vehicles for official travelers.167 With what tools did these “pencil-pushers” (or in Britain, “pen-­ pushers”) accomplish their work? We are fortunate to have a list of office supplies ordered in Torcy’s name for delivery to the Louvre archive.168 Paper, the bureaus’ primary raw material and finished product, dominates the list: six “rames” (reams, here defined as 480 sheets each) of large and strong “papier de compte” (writing paper); six reams of “à la Telliere” (foolscap); one ream of “papier à lettres” (letter paper); two hundred large, strong quill pens; six small “canifs” (knives) for trimming the quill pens; four pieces of “ruban de fil” (tape) for binding documents together; a piece of “nonpareille” (very narrow ribbon), perhaps for the same purpose; a bushel of “poudre de buy” (boxwood sawdust) to sprinkle on ink to prevent fading; two pints of shiny ink; and two pounds of “cire d’Espagne” (Spanish wax), a composition of gum and other material used to seal letters. This order did not include the pencils whose traces are found on papers throughout the archives, usually for corrections, annotations, and routing and filing instructions. Although we know that furniture was ordered, we have no descriptions of the writing desks, tables, chairs, lamps, shelves, and storage cabinets that must have filled the bureaus at the Louvre and Versailles.169 We know little of the layout or decoration of the bureaus, although we may assume that the domestic and the two political bureaus were in separate chambers.170 The department’s Versailles library had a fireplace of green marble from the Pyrenean Campan valley.171 Perhaps there were portraits of Louis XIV and Torcy on the walls, as in the bureau of Paris maître de poste Gabriel Pigeon, who served under Torcy.172 In greater number, however, were likely utilitarian items such as maps of Europe, particular states and regions, and postal routes, as well as lists displaying summaries of information, such as postal timetables to remind the clerks of the crucial deadlines that structured their workdays.173 Who filled these bureaus and pushed their quills across the reams of paper consumed by the foreign office each year? How were these individuals and their work structured? It is to these important issues that we turn next.

5 The Department’s Structures and Personnel

Structural charts of organization are often misleading because they provide a paper image of how things are supposed to work that typically falls short of how they actually operate, a gap the modern world has thus far been unable to transcend. Charting the early modern state’s structures, however, is even more daunting. Although we have drawn up organizational charts that attempt to portray the foreign office’s structure under Louis XIV’s foreign secretaries, we do so fully aware of their limitations and perils. In the first place, they are not literal representations of formally designed and prescribed outlines of responsibilities and lines of authority, since royal legislation prescribing them was usually lacking. In truth, much of our evidence is scattered, indirect, imprecise, and incomplete, so what we propose is subject to revision in the face of new evidence and keener insights. These charts are snapshots at best: reasonably sharp in places, but fuzzy in others; uncertain as to what has been left out or cut off; ambiguous as to the moment(s) in departmental development they depict; and tentative as to typicality. This leads to a second caveat: structure remained malleable, even during Torcy’s tenure. It altered with each change of secretary, as clerks departed and were replaced or as the flow of business increased. The department was much more a matter of people to be deployed than of pigeonholes to be filled, particularly since the number of personnel remained small. Finally, those who did the department’s work and served its needs included household officers, postal personnel, and the assortment of savants, scholars, and literary figures who served as Torcy’s “brain trust,” all vital adjuncts to the department’s clerks. This diverse group constituted the VersaillesParis core that helped the foreign secretary carry out his diplomatic and administrative responsibilities.



The Department’s Structures and Personnel

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P e rs o n n e l and Bureaus The foreign secretary relied primarily on two loosely connected yet interdependent bodies for the conduct of business at the centre: his bureaucracy and his household staff that supported it. Both were located permanently at Versailles with extensions at Torcy’s Paris residence or wherever else he might be. Strictly speaking, the “département” (department)1 consisted of the clerical staff, “garçons de bureau” (office boys), and regular consultants who served in its bureaus or at their homes, while the household embraced Torcy’s domestics, but like the royal government and royal household, Torcy’s bureaus and household functioned side by side and with some personnel holding positions and performing duties in both. Together they constituted the department in its wider sense.2 To this must be added the personnel employed in the other charges held by Torcy, such as the Royal Orders and the post office, as well as in parts of the royal household closely linked with the foreign office, such as the introducers of ambassadors, because of the essential and related services they provided. There was an essential fluidity in the department’s administrative structures, since assignment of responsibilities and supervision shifted with the arrival and departure of individuals possessing particular skills and knowledge. Likewise, the department’s focus adjusted to accommodate the changing kaleidoscope of issues, states, and other diplomatic players, as with the striking transformation in 1700 of Spain from enemy to ally, eventually necessitating a third political bureau. Even seemingly stable arrangements required ongoing revision and adjustment to accommodate altering circumstances.3 Before examining the department’s organization, however, we must first introduce its personnel. Clerks, both commis and secretaries, were the department’s foundation. Rather than specifying particular duties, the title commis emphasized one’s accountability to a superior for the charge or employment with which one had been commissioned or entrusted.4 This fits with the Weberian notion of accountability through hierarchy. A commis’s labours ranged from low-skilled copying (perhaps “the quintessentially bureaucratic act”),5 filing, more meticulous yet tedious encoding and decoding, to highly skilled translating and drafting of documents. Exact numbers for clerks are difficult to determine for lack of precise definitions and clear records, but their ranks certainly increased under Louis XIV.6 Based on a list (figure 5.1) of fifty-two full-time foreign office personnel – premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, and ­specialists (translators,

 

Foreign Secretaries Briennes

Lionne

Louvois (Interim)

1660–63 1663–71 1671

Pomponne

Colbert (Interim)

Croissy

Torcy

1671–79

1679–80 1680–96 1696–1715

Employees

Tenure

Ariste, Pierre

1658–63

P

 

 

 

 

 

 

Parayre, Jean

1658–80

x

P

P

P

P

 

 

Dalencé, Joachim

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dautiège, Jacques

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Azemart

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Boulleau, Nicolas

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Barthe

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mareiz (Marest)

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Du Fresne, Léonard de Mousseaux

1659–63

P

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pachau, Louis

1663–80

 

P

P

P

P

 

 

Moncheny, Louis de

1663–69

 

P

 

 

 

 

 

Luc de Rives

1663–71

 

P

 

 

 

 

 

Gaudon, Abbé Sylvain

1663–71

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Bigorre, Abbé

1663–65

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

La Pause, Louis

1663–64

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Adam, Clair

1667–1715

 

x

x

x

x

x/P

P

Morel, Abbé Jean

1670–71

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Aubert

1671–1705

 

x

x

x

x

x

x/P

Tourmont, Pierre de

1671–80

 

 

 

P

P

 

 

Lebeau, Edme

1671–80 | 1698–1705

 

 

 

x

x

 

x

Rouillé du Coudray, Hilaire

1673–78

 

 

 

P

 

 

 

Iberville, Charles François de la Bonde d’

1678–88

 

 

 

x

x

x

 

Mignon, Charles

1680–97

 

 

 

 

 

P

P

Bergeret, Jean-Louis

1680–93

 

 

 

 

 

P

 

Blondel, François

1680–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Fournier, Michel

1680–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x/P

Le Melle(s)

1681–92

 

 

 

 

 

x

 

Saint-Prest, Jean-Yves de

1682–1714

 

 

 

 

 

*

*

Maugin

1691–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Montreuil

1691–92

 

 

 

 

 

x

 

Marolot, Louis-Bénigne de

1693–1711

 

 

 

 

 

x

x/P

Lullier, Marc-Antoine

1694–1703

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Noblet, Charles-François

1698–1705

 

 

 

 

 

 

x/P

Pecquet, Antoine

1700–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

P

Brameret, Bénigne

1700

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Larroque, Daniel

1700–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Ligny, Victor Goulu, Sr de

1702–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Bernage, Jean-Nicolas de, Sr de Saint-Illiers

1704–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Le Grand, Abbé Joachim

1705–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Fournier, Charles

1706–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Martin

1706

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Beauchamp, Antoine Faucard, Sr de

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Prévost, Jean de

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Odeau, Pierre

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Du Theil, Jean-Gabriel de La Porte

1708–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Adam, Jean-Baptiste

1709–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Mignon, Pierre

1710–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Le Dran, Nicolas-Louis

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Du Parc

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Sermenté, Michel, Sr de Montalais

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Dupuisse, Philippe-Céleste

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Delisle de La Drevetière, Louis François

?

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

8–9

5–7

4

6–8

7

7–10

9–21

Range of Number of Employees in Department under Each Secretary Key Premier commis

P

Secretary, commis or sous commis

x

Other personnel

*

Figure 5.1 List of foreign ministry personnel, 1658–1715. Note: The list includes those premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, translators, writers, archivists, and fiscal personnel (treasurers of ambassadors) who have been identified as regularly employed (in terms of relatively regular remuneration) in the bureaucracy, but it does not necessarily include everyone, perhaps leaving out unidentified commis and copyists. Also, no names of office boys are known. Years of service are those established in the sources and in secondary works, but precise beginning and ending dates are not known for some individuals. See the information for each individual in chapters 5 and 6. Although the elder Brienne’s tenure as secretary of state began in 1643, due to the availability of data, this list includes personnel only from 1658.

writers, and archivists) – identified as having served 1 ­ 658–1715 and their individual terms of service (in several cases only approximate), tentative numbers emerge (figure 5.2).7 The Briennes usually had nine staff members (during 1658–63, excluding the earlier years of Brienne’s secretaryship). Numbers fell under Lionne, who typically employed six clerks (with a range from five to seven), but they increased under Pomponne to an average of seven (with a range from six to eight). Croissy’s tenure witnessed another augmentation, to an average of nine staff members (with a range from seven to ten). Torcy began with nine clerks, but numbers rose fairly steadily from 1698 (ten) to peak in 1711 (twenty-one) and declined slightly thereafter to nineteen at the reign’s end. Given the small numbers involved and uncertainties about individuals and dates of service, caution is in order, but it seems that the trend is clear and fits with anecdotal accounts of a growing staff.8 Distinctions in function and rank arose over time.9 A commis might enter the department as an office boy and through apprenticeship graduate to “commis simple” (simple clerk) or, with a title indicating a more specialized function and a superior status, to “secrétaire” (secretary).10 In time, he might even aspire to “chef du bureau” (bureau chief) or receive the official title of “principal” or “premier commis” or “premier secrétaire” (chief secretary). The numbers of premiers commis at any one time increased over time: the

Figure 5.2 Number of foreign ministry bureaucratic personnel per year, 1658–1715. Note: The graph includes those premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, translators, writers, archivists, and fiscal personnel (treasurers of ambassadors) who have been identified as regularly employed (in terms of relatively regular remuneration) in the bureaucracy, but it does not necessarily include everyone, perhaps leaving out unidentified commis and copyists. Also, no names of office boys are known. Years of service are those established in the sources and in secondary works, but precise beginning and ending dates are not known for some individuals.



The Department’s Structures and Personnel

175

Briennes had one in 1658 and two thereafter; Lionne had three through 1669, then two; Pomponne had three until a fourth was added in 1673; Croissy had only two premiers commis; and Torcy, who began with two, added a third in 1700, a fourth from 1701, and from 1712 was back down to three (based on figure 5.1).11 The premiers commis, with a status well above the simple commis, were the “souls” who animated the department, whereas those below them generally had to see only to their own work and execute orders from their superiors.12 Premiers commis were “the equivalent of an Under-­ Secretary”13 and were the royal officials “who came most to resemble modern bureaucrats.”14 They enjoyed direct access to the foreign secretary, who relied on them for the everyday business of summarizing dispatches and memoirs, making coherent extracts,15 drafting replies, and even greeting important visitors on his behalf.16 Many also exercised supervisory roles within the bureaus. Most served long years, often training family members to work at their side and to remain as part of their legacy to the department. In an era before formal credentialing for public service existed, acquisition and recognition of expertise typically came through experience.17 Indeed, this longevity led to stability, enhancing the department’s success and allowing the premiers commis influence over routine decision-making that is glimpsed only occasionally. Jean Meyer has included them in the “‘brain-trusts’ de ‘spécialistes’” (brain trusts of experts) that surrounded great ministers.18 Unlike most of their noble “betters,” these clerks enjoyed access to the state secrets contained in the foreign office’s papers and archives.19 Their knowledge of department business and standing was such that they were unafraid of making candid comments to socially superior diplomats concerning negotiations under way. During the Ryswick conference, for instance, premier commis Mignon penned a note to plenipotentiary Harlay-­Bonneuil, still in Paris, to accompany documents he was sending him from Callières, already in Holland. Mignon remarked that while C ­ allières was confident that, based on the preliminaries he had sent, a treaty would soon result, he believed that he was greatly mistaken because there would be much wrangling over each of its articles and other issues were yet to be resolved.20 Torcy’s premiers commis (table 5.1) included Charles Mignon, Aubert, Clair Adam, Michel Fournier, and Antoine Pecquet; it seems that CharlesFrançois Noblet and Louis-Bénigne de Marolot were among them as well.21 Despite sharing the same title, they were not all of equal status within the department. Aubert served under another premier ­commis

1661 ?

1668 ?

Senlis in Picardy ?

Picardy ?

1656

c. 1645 1655? ?

c. 1640–50

Born

Paris

Montereau-fault-Yonne in Île-de-France (French Gâtinais) Bourges in Berry Paris? ?

Sources: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.

Premier Secrétaire François Blondel Victor Goulou de Ligny

Charles-François Noblet Antoine Pecquet Louis-Bénigne de Marolot?

Charles Mignon Michel Fournier Aubert

Premier Commis Clair Adam

Region of Origin

Table 5.1 Premiers commis and premiers secrétaires under Torcy, 1696–1715

1680 1702

1700 1693?

1680 1680? Before 1671 1698

1667

Entered Dept.

1680 1702

1700 1706?

1700?

1680 1698? By 1701

1698?

Began as Premier Commis

1715 After 1718

1725 1710?

1705

1698 1723 1705

1715

Ended as Premier Commis

Left with Torcy ?

Retirement Death?

Death

Death Retirement Retirement

Secretary to new Conseil des dedans

Reason for Leaving

1725 1723

1728 1710– 13?

1705

1698 1730 1714

1725

Died



The Department’s Structures and Personnel

177

but was apparently also a bureau chief.22 Contemporaries outside the department might use the title premier commis and secretary interchangeably, but François Blondel and Victor Goulou de Ligny were in fact premier secrétaires.23 Unlike the king and some other ministers who rarely took up a pen, preferring instead to dictate to others,24 Torcy annotated and corrected the papers he received, wrote drafts for the king, and penned some of his own more personal or secret correspondence.25 Nevertheless, the volume was simply too much for one scribbler, as noted by a premier commis twenty-five years before Torcy became secretary.26 While Torcy personally drafted or wrote many letters, he was often limited to adding a postscript to those written by his staff.27 The secretary of state’s secrétaires were those clerks most intimately associated with his daily work, which increased their status and influence. The classic description of the department lists a premier secrétaire who took dictation, dispatched passports and payment orders, kept the second copy of all codes, and sent out the secret letters reserved for the minister’s eyes only, assisted by a second secretary who filled in during absences and had the additional responsibility of drawing up extracts from departmental correspondence of negotiations since Ryswick.28 At least one secretary accompanied the minister as he moved from one corner to another of the communication triangles at the realm’s centre. More difficult to classify in the hierarchy are the various specialists who served the department on a full-time basis. These included translators, archivists, and writers, although staff clearly classifiable as clerks might also perform these functions. They ranked above the simple commis and might even be on a par with and mistaken for a premier commis, as was the case of Jean-Yves de Saint-Prest, head of the emerging archival bureau. The simple commis acted daily as copyists, decipherers, clerks-inordinary, translators, issuers of passports, editors of diplomatic reports, and jacks-of-all-clerical-trades. Sons and nephews of premiers commis were not infrequent, and this nepotism provided on-the-job training for future personnel, assured continuity of viewpoint and administrative tradition, and offered security for state secrets.29 Unlike clerks in the typical venal office, department clerks served full-time yet at the pleasure of the department chief. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, a type of tenure-in-office was unofficially recognized and most of a clerk’s life was spent in a department and in close proximity to its head.30 Assisting the commis were unknown numbers of office boys

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A World of Paper

who served as copyists, porters, messengers, and in any other needed capacity.31 Clerks owed their patron a profound personal allegiance, but received tangible rewards for their loyalty. Even though separated by social rank and privilege, the secretary of state and his clerks were nevertheless inextricably bound together in a patron-client relationship. Many clerks were educated with the children of the secretary of state, supped at his table, lived in rooms in his home, married in his presence, and in some cases died at his residence.32 Yet while both Croissy and Torcy managed their department through the clientage system, this arrangement was not the sum of a clerk’s position within the state, nor could the state resist the growing (and really long-present) importance of specialized skills and experience in the hiring and retention of bureaucratic personnel.33 By far the largest group at the centre, although easily overlooked, was comprised of those who served the quotidian needs of the clerks and the minister’s household at Versailles, in Paris, or on the road.34 The household comprised the persons who cleaned, hauled wood and water, lit fires, attended to the stables, served food, and performed the other menial tasks required by the foreign secretary’s family, resident entourage, and clerks. Sizable staffs were necessary to run the large residences that sprouted throughout Paris, as the household of someone of Torcy’s stature could employ as many as forty, all of whom were resident. At the top of the hierarchy was the intendant (business manager), almoner (chaplain), secretary (the intendant’s chief collaborator who kept the accounts), “écuyer” (equerry), and “maître d’hôtel” (supervisor of the kitchen staff), each normally provided with a valet. They supervised and saw to the needs, including spiritual instruction, of those below them. The staff within the house itself also included “valets de chamber” (footmen), ushers and “huissiers” (introducers), a “Suisse” (porter) who controlled the entry and exit of goods and people, and various pages, lackeys, and other underlings.35 The écuyers were important because they supervised the liveried servants, including lackeys, pages, and stable personnel, and oversaw the sending out of couriers who might include a valet de chambre or even the écuyer himself.36 The écuyer might also undertake special missions at court or in Paris for the secretary, indicating that he enjoyed a certain social standing and familiarity with protocol.37 The first of Torcy’s écuyers, appointed by Croissy in 1690, was Joseph Drouin de Maugin, while the second was Jean Pré de Seigle des Presle, once a major in the town and citadel of Montelimart and a former captain in the regiment



The Department’s Structures and Personnel

179

of Normandy. Des Presle was also Mme de Torcy’s écuyer and carried messages to Rome so often that he befriended Charles-François Poerson, director of Rome’s French Academy.38 Maugin rode with Torcy at royal hunts and oversaw entertainments for visiting dignitaries.39 Four “cavaliers de la Poste” (mounted postal guards) commanded by the sieur de la Tournelle were paid from postal funds, lodged variously at Paris or Versailles, and served the secretary as diplomatic couriers. In a practice dating from Louvois’s superintendence, one of them departed from Paris or from the court each day at noon to ensure a regular flow of essential mail.40 De la Tournelle was especially busy carrying messages between Versailles, Paris, and wherever the court resided.41 He also undertook special missions, as in 1715 when he journeyed with a guard and a valet to the French embassy in Soleure to deliver gold chains and medals as gifts for the king’s Swiss clients.42 In 1930 the great diplomatic historian Camille Picavet posed two questions: first, did the department have bureaus before 1714, and second, were they already differentiated from one another? Apparently not, he concluded, and others have more or less concurred.43 However, Samoyault saw that there were two political bureaus based on geography throughout Louis XIV’s reign, even though their attributions might have changed over time.44 Like his colleagues, from early in the Sun King’s personal reign, the foreign secretary channeled the efforts of his department’s clerical core through an evolving array of specialized bureaus.45 The label “vostre bureau” (your bureau) or its variations occurs in department correspondence.46 Financial accounts provide another indicator through collective payments authorized for the unnamed commis of a premier commis or bureau chief.47 Dating the emergence of bureaus and determining their number have been hampered by the tendency to tie both to the number of premiers commis at any given time, which limits the search for bureaus to formal, separate, permanent, and hierarchical structures on the assumption that only such a Weberian bureau would require a premier commis at its head. If you have a premier commis, then you have such a bureau; the corollary is no premier commis, no bureau.48 While evidence for specialized ministerial bureaus can come indirectly from the proliferation of premiers commis, since this higher status might imply a further division of responsibilities,49 this did not always result in a bureau or at least one fitting Weber’s ideal. There were elements of continuity and experimentation in this bureau-­ formation process that afforded a measure of stability, yet the results rarely appeared as formal regulations, or if they did, they reflected

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A World of Paper

­ ractices already in place for some time. Rather than seeking from conp temporaries the elusive formal organizational directive or chart, we should look for (multi)task-oriented teams. Indeed, the evolution of the French language itself reflects these new bureaucratic realities. By 1694 the term bureau had broadened beyond its earlier designation as a desk or table upon which to count money or place papers to encompass as well the site where an organization’s members gathered to work.50 During the coming decades the term also came to include those who worked in a bureau.51 With this in mind, the search for bureaus should aim at detecting groupings, even if temporary and shifting, of tasks and teams of commis directed by a premier commis or bureau chief. As contingency theory suggests, rather than forcing all business and personnel into fixed, narrow compartments, the department’s bureaus emerged as fluid and pragmatic arrangements matching available individuals to the tasks at hand.52 This was a particularly rational approach, since the number of staff in the foreign office remained smaller by at least half and grew more slowly than those of the controller general and the other secretaries of state, save that charged with overseeing the rpf or “Religion prétendu reformée” (so-called Reformed Religion, the Protestants).53 The economists’ concept of diseconomy of scale elucidates some unintended consequences for an organization with a large workforce. Coordinating larger staffs means multiplying the layers of management, but this increases the possibility of garbled communication and complications from “office politics.” This can result in “communication distortion due to bounded rationality,” according to studies from the business world, since “a single manager has cognitive limits and cannot understand every aspect of a complex organization.” The resulting information distortion “reduces the ability of high-level executives to make decisions based on facts and negatively impacts their ability to strategize and respond directly to [situations].”54 To regard the absence of increased specialization, numerous bureaus, and fixed responsibilities in a bureaucracy as a failure to achieve the achievable and the desirable is to ignore the complexity of both administrative theory and reality.55 Until a structure reaches a particular size, it is not only unnecessary but also counterproductive to adopt patterns of organization better suited to larger ones. In small organizations, the person at the very top is by necessity apt to perform more jobs, even of a clerical nature, than his counterpart in a larger one. Other reasons for this can include security considerations, lack of confidence in the abilities of particular personnel, fear of organizational failure to perform



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properly, or an inability to delegate. Staff members in a small organization also frequently fill in for an absent, ill, or overwhelmed colleague.56 Specialization of function and personnel into separate bureaus makes little sense when a task is unable to occupy fully one staff member or when it requires periodic rather than ongoing attention. A more rational and efficient alternative would be to assign a bureau chief a specific but intermittent task to monitor continuously. Then, as needed, he could draw together a short-term workforce of clerks, including other bureau chiefs, to process the increased workload.57 This is apparently what happened in the foreign office. With these considerations in mind, we can identify the following bureaus under Torcy: a secretariat; two political bureaus for foreign correspondence; a code service; a domestic administration bureau; a political or modern archive, with a related but not necessarily separate ancient or historic archive;58 a bureau of the “trésoriers des ambassadeurs” (treasurers of ambassadors); and an Académie politique. Each of these bureaus, whose existence, attributions, and personnel remained flexible to fit shifting needs and personnel qualifications, was typically headed by a bureau chief who might be a premier commis or a secretary. We cannot always attach individuals to particular bureaus with any certainty and likewise cannot determine exactly when a bureau emerged as a working entity since what might seem new may in fact be an earlier practice now regularized or made explicit. The standard accounts, for instance, deny the appearance of a domestic bureau before 1723, but as will be seen below, one existed long before.59 What follows suggests outlines and tentative answers that may serve as markers for further research, but always with the understanding that the evidence is usually elusive and even nonexistent. In this section, we examine the secretariat and the two political bureaus, and in the following section the code service, but the archives, the treasurers of ambassadors, and the Académie politique are treated in later chapters. The secretariat emerged as the department’s gatekeeper.60 Although François Blondel served both father and son as secretary from 1680 until 1715, Bergeret long acted as Croissy’s personal scribe and it was only in the 1690s that Blondel appears more prominently as his secretary and, even before Croissy’s passing, as Torcy’s.61 It was apparently under Torcy that the gate-keeping role became more focused, with a secretariat of premiers secrétaires and “sous-secrétaires” (second or under secretaries). He retained Blondel, who was joined in 1702 by Ligny. Later, second secretaries were engaged: Blondel’s nephew Jean-Gabriel de La

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Porte du Theil in 1708 and Blondel’s son Louis-Augustin during the last year or two of the reign.62 This clearly exceeds the two-secretary model usually assumed. What it means for the exact distribution of titles is unclear. Perhaps Blondel and Ligny were each a premier secrétaire, since each was also called premier commis. In addition to taking the minister’s dictation and attending to his personal and most secret correspondence, his secretaries oversaw the entry and departure of much of the department’s paperwork. As couriers brought in dispatches, the secretariat assisted the minister in opening them, writing the name of the sender on the center-top of the first page and often the date received as well, and then directing them to the appropriate political bureau.63 Once dispatches and other documents were ready to be sent out, the secretaries prepared them for the appropriate courier.64 They also accommodated French prelates and the nearby Jacobite court by including their letters in packets sent to Rome by official courier (the espionage opportunities this courtesy afforded are obvious).65 The Versailles secretariat apparently tried to serve as the transmission and reception point for letters among diplomats abroad, but the latter often found ways to route them so as to avoid the capital, likely for time considerations and perhaps also for fear that the letters might be opened.66 The first secretary guarded the department’s deepest secrets, including the particulars about undercover agents and other rulers’ officials in French pay. A seventeen-folio document marked as secret business (“Secret Affaires”) contains a running account of payments from late 1701 through 1708, carefully noting the recipient, alias, location, name and place of any letter drops, codes employed, date and amount of payments, and the means of payment, such as the name of the banker or person delivering the sum. Sometimes there are later annotations. An agent under suspicion in Vienna was arrested and another had his “appointements” (remuneration) increased. Sometimes an agent is crossed out, such as one who failed to travel to Holland as promised even though he pocketed the advance paid. The manuscript is in one hand only, suggesting that Blondel kept it for his and the minister’s eyes only.67 It also lists those agents’ addresses that were shared with others, such as the navy secretary, to allow them direct contact with the agents. This was done presumably to alert Torcy’s colleagues to any changes and allow any indiscretion compromising an agent to be traced back to its source.68 A separate note listed the names and addresses of those in Paris and the provinces available for clandestine mail drops of letters from the plenipotentiaries at Ryswick and had instructions for masking



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secret ­correspondence by folding and sealing the letter in the manner of merchants and having the envelope addressed by a hand unknown to outsiders.69 Each premier commis under Croissy may have handled accounts.70 Although there was no official, separate accounting bureau until 1725, Samoyault says that Ligny had this duty under the Regency.71 We will see later that this was likely the continuation of Torcy’s practice with regard to subsidies. The post-Ryswick diplomatic scramble to avoid war or to go into it with adequate allies nearly overwhelmed the foreign office with the endless and insistent demands for subsidies. While a lack of funds became the nagging issue once war commenced, on its eve the urgent need was another paymaster. When Torcy’s client and friend Grenoble intendant Étienne-Jean Bouchu recommended Ligny to him early in 1702, he replied at once that he had a post for such a man of finance.72 As for payments to ambassadors, Adam apparently handled these from at least 1699, as he would later when he purchased the office of treasurer of ambassadors.73 Foreign correspondence passed through two political bureaus. The first dealt with Spain, Portugal, Britain, Holland, the Swiss Cantons, and Italy, while the second handled Germany, Lorraine, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, Asia, and Africa (table 5.2 and figure 5.3).74 However sensible these groupings might appear or actually were, they were not inevitable. Geography played a role, but so did volume of correspondence and such personnel considerations as linguistic skill and previous experience.75 These bureaus, each with a chief typically assisted by three commis, did any necessary decoding, translating, summarizing (in the margins, sometimes paragraph by paragraph, or in a separate document), and excerpting from these often lengthy dispatches.76 Based on the foreign secretary’s verbal or written instructions, the chief drafted replies for him to correct and amend, and he did the same when a dispatch’s contents required communication with other departments of state. In this manner, the chief demonstrated his compositional skills, knowledge of the affairs of his bureau’s states, and grasp and ability to anticipate the secretary’s and king’s intentions. He might even draft the all-important instructions for departing diplomats. A bureau head, increasingly from a non-legal background, relied instead on his general education, which along with proper breeding in politeness equipped him with the requisite rhetorical skills.77 The simple commis served primarily as a copyist during this drafting process but was more active in preparing the final document, including encoding it, before it was forwarded to the secretariat

– Du Pré Iberville Louciennes – – Rouillé La Trémoille Briole – Amelot De la Haye 8 – – Châteauneuf Bonrepaus – – – – – – Polignac –

1st Political Bureau England Florence Geneva Genoa Holland Mantua Portugal Rome, Auditor of the Rota Savoy Spain Swiss Cantons Venice Total in Bureau

2nd Political Bureau Bavaria, Electorate of Cologne, Archbishopric-Electorate of Constantinople Denmark Empire (Ratisbon) Frankfurt-am-Main (Imperial Free City) Hamburg Lorraine Mainz, Trier, and Landgrave of Hesse Münster, Bishopric of Poland Stuttgart (Duchy of Württemberg)

16982

Table 5.2 French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, 1698–17151

Ricous Des Alleurs Ferriol Chamilly Rousseau de Chamoy Obrecht Bidal – Iberville Frischmann Héron Gergy

– Du Pré De la Closure Louciennes – Audiffret Rouillé La Trémoille Phélypeaux Marcin Puyzieux Hennequin 10

17023

– – Ferriol –10 – – – Audiffret – – – –

– Du Pré De la Closure Louciennes – Bergy – Polignac – Amelot Puyzieux Pomponne 8

17084

– – Des Alleurs *Poussin – – – Audiffret – – Baluze –

– Gergy De la Closure Anneville – – – La Trémoille – Bonnac Du Luc – 6

17135

– – Bonnac Poussin – – – Audiffret – – Baluze –

– La Trémoille De Prie7 *Pachau8 Du Luc *Fremont 10

Iberville Gergy De la Closure Anneville Châteauneuf

17156

D’Avaux – 4

Bonnac [Not named]11 12

Bonnac – 3

Bezenwald – 5

Bezenwald – 5

  1 This chart reflects the printed lists in État de la France and Almanach Royal, which are not fully inclusive or completely accurate; they do, however, offer a rough approximation of the embassies under each bureau. Grouping by bureau is based on Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.  2 État de la France (1698), 3:443–6.   3 Ibid. (1702), 3:449–53.   4 Ibid. (1708), 3:450–3.  5 Almanach Royal (1713), 219.   6 Ibid. (1715), 53.   7 The Duke of Savoy is listed in the source by his new royal title, “Roy de Sicile.”   8 Those serving as chargé d’affaires are marked with an asterisk (*).   9 Although not named in any lists for the two political bureaus, Russia was likely under the second. 10 No ambassador to Denmark is listed, probably because Bonrepaus, whose embassy there ended 21 November 1697, had not yet been replaced by Chamilly, whose instructions are dated 17 May 1698. France, Recueil, 13:73, 83–4. 11 The envoy to Wolfenbüttel had returned home that year.

Sources: État de la France (1698, 1702, and 1708); Almanach Royal (1713 and 1715); and Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.

Sweden Wolfenbüttel (Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg) Total in Bureau

Figure 5.3 Map of French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, c. 1700



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for sending out. In addition, clerks examined the assorted papers that typically accompanied arriving dispatches, including memoirs, newsletters, reports from secret agents, and printed materials such as official pronouncements, pamphlets, and newsletters. They also generated a steady stream of summaries, tables, dossiers, and any other compilation, digest, or analysis that might aid them or their superiors in their labours.78

C h a n g in g S t ru c t u r es and Procedures b e f o r e Torcy Rather than coming only at the end of Louis XIV’s reign, as often assumed, a distribution of foreign office responsibilities developed long before with bureaus forming around premiers commis entrusted with particular tasks. Any understanding of Torcy’s department requires that we examine it under his predecessors. Since those years are beyond the primary scope of this book, we must rely largely on secondary rather than archival sources, but an interesting picture emerges nonetheless. Even before 1661, the foreign office under the Briennes79 had a division of labour based on function and perhaps geography as well, although the details are sketchy (figure 5.4).80 Two premiers commis, Léonard de Mousseaux du Fresne (from 1659) and Pierre Ariste (from at least 1658), handled external as well as colonial and Atlantic naval affairs. Du Fresne, an intelligent and seasoned secretary to ambassadors to Sweden and several German princes, went to Germany for the Briennes on several diplomatic missions and returned home in 1658 as the elector of Mainz’s resident at the French court. When Brienne fils engaged him the following year as premier commis, he worked with Spanish, Danish, and German (including Mainz and Cologne) correspondence, specialized in commercial and colonial matters, and was his closest and most trusted collaborator.81 Ariste, who resided with Lionne, had also served on missions to Germany, but the only traces of his handwriting on the foreign correspondence of that era are classification instructions scribbled on their backs. He also worked with ceremonial and managed consulates, then a part of the foreign office.82 Commis Jean Parayre (Paraire) entered the department in 1655 and managed domestic administration.83 Those who assisted them included Joachim Dalencé, son of a royal surgeon, who after the Briennes’ fall undertook diplomatic missions to Germany (1664) and England (1668). Brienne called his former secretary, the hard-working Jacques Dautiège, his second commis, while

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

* Léonard de Mousseau, Sr du FRESNE (1659–63) External affairs (specialist on Germany and later, colonial and maritime affairs)

* Pierre ARISTE (1658?–63) External affairs (specialist on Germany, ceremony, and colonial and maritime affairs)

Jean PARAYRE (1655–63) Provinces and external affairs

Figure 5.4 Department organization under the Briennes, 1661–1663. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. This chart represents the department only at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign (1661), even though Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne, began as foreign secretary in 1643. His son Louis-Henri, survivancier from 1651, increasingly collaborated in the department’s work. From 1626 the foreign secretary was the transmission agent for the paperwork of the “Marine du Ponant” (Atlantic navy), while the war secretary did the same for the “Marine du Levant” (Mediterranean navy). Richelieu held the real power over both and the colonies as “grand-maître de la navigation” (grand master of navigation). After his death, the two navies were united under the foreign secretary in 1644, but shortly thereafter the former division with the war department was re-established, giving both secretaries of state greater influence over naval affairs. Following Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, naval administration was increasingly under Colbert in practice but not in law. According to a regulation of 11 May 1667, Colbert generated all royal orders and official acts concerning the navy, read them to the king, but then sent them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be drawn up officially and sent out. The foreign ministry was relieved of all navy business when Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669. Taillemite, ­Colbert, 11–21.

Azemart served as Brienne’s secretary. Other long-serving commis were Nicolas Boulleau, Marest, who copied treaties, and Barthe, who assisted Du Fresne and worked with codes.84 Lionne’s close diplomatic collaboration with Mazarin and the king since the time of Richelieu’s death left the Briennes with little to do of substance, and in 1663 Lionne officially assumed control of the department upon becoming secretary of state.85 Judging the Briennes’ staff to have been negligent, he dismissed all but Parayre, whom he promoted to premier commis supervising domestic administration.86 Lionne always drafted his own dispatches.87 His friend Pomponne, who succeeded him in 1671, claimed that his predecessor had only three commis, one of whom was largely unoccupied because Lionne himself did so much. The premier commis Lionne kept busy was Louis Pachau, a close and trusted collaborator who managed external affairs and their funding and,



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Abbé Silvain GAUDON (1663–71) Placets, benefices, and ecclesiastical affairs * Louis PACHAU (1663–71) Most external affairs, Provence, and codes (since 1669?)

* Jean PARAYRE (1663–71) Most provinces

* Luc de RIVES (1663–71) Expedition of acts and correspondence * Louis de MONCHENY (1663?–d. 1669?) Codes

Figure 5.5 Department organization under Lionne, 1663–1671. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Gaudon and Luc de Rives acted as a secretariat and premiers commis Pachau, Parayre, and Moncheny each headed a bureau. Piccioni, Commis, 35, credits Moncheny with being the first chief of a code service, creating, distributing, and securing code tables with the assistance of two commis. Abbé Gaudon, in an 18 September 1671 letter to Pomponne, referred to a “Mouchérier” – likely Moncheny – who worked with the codes but who was now dead (Delavaud, “Changement,” 384). He also noted that Pachau had been handling codes for the past two years (ibid., 383), suggesting that Moncheny died in 1669 or earlier. Cras, “Lionne,” 53, 55, lists Lionne’s uncle Luc de Rives, a cleric from the diocese of Lyon much involved in Lionne’s political and financial affairs, as a “premier commis ad honorem” (honorary). Picavet, “Commis,” 107, and Piccioni, Commis, 152, note Rives’s honorary title, but credit him with no real role in the department. Piccioni (152n2), however, observes that Rives served as Lionne’s secretary, which is supported by documents in Lionne, Lettres, 41, 129; and Peyron, Documents des Hôpitaux de Paris, 4:243–4, 257–9, 261, 264, 266, 275–6. Moncheny was a cleric of the Paris diocese. Contemporary registries show that Rives shared with the other three premiers commis in sending out correspondence and the important and lucrative expedition of the department’s official acts. Cras, “Lionne,” 68.

exceptionally, domestic matters for Provence (figure 5.5).88 Pomponne’s remark, however, only scratches the surface. Lionne raised his secretary Louis de Moncheny to premier commis dealing chiefly with codes and from the beginning of 1667 assisted by Clair Adam. When Moncheny died around 1669, codes passed to Pachau, whose weak eyesight required that Abbé Jean Morel join Adam.89 Lyon cleric and maître ordinaire in the Paris Chambre des Comptes Luc de Rives, uncle of Lionne’s wife and his long-time political and financial agent, while named premier commis ad honorem (honorary), acted as Lionne’s secretary and assisted with the lucrative expédition of the department’s official documents.90 We know others in the department by chance and not always happy ones. Abbé Bigorre, a commis assembling an annual registry of all dispatches from the king and Lionne to French envoys, in September 1663 engaged Louis La Pause, a young copyist who worked from his

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attic room but sold ­copies of drafts to foreign diplomats. The following March, before much damage was done, Lionne discovered his treachery and sent him to the Bastille, to be hanged on 16 April. Although absolved of treason, ­Bigorre’s negligence was not forgiven by the king as Lionne had hoped, so in 1665 he went to England as embassy secretary with Gaston Henri de Bourbon, duc de Verneuil.91 Abbé Silvain Gaudon, neither a commis nor in the department’s pay, resided with Lionne and assisted quarterly with the critical domestic task of responding to petitions, distributing benefices, and managing ecclesiastical affairs.92 Then there were the more humble personnel glimpsed only occasionally.93 Upon the death of his friend and patron Lionne in 1671, Pomponne was summoned from Stockholm to take his place. As his father, ­Robert Arnauld d’Andilly, observed, he would not lack for staff as an infinite number of men were soliciting posts, especially the prestigious one of premier commis.94 Pomponne considered reappointing Du Fresne, in Paris since 1670 as the elector of Mainz’s envoy, as premier commis, but as Du Fresne would suffer thereby a loss of status, nothing came of it. Instead, Pomponne retained Pachau and Parayre along with their subordinates Adam and Aubert. The existing distribution of tasks between domestic administration and external affairs continued (figure 5.6) and was tightened, with Parayre gaining Provence. Rives departed to attend to Lionne’s family business, and Gaudon was not re-engaged.95 Pierre de Tourmont, Pomponne’s valued secretary abroad and trusted agent until the marquis’s death, joined the department as premier commis to supervise external relations with the north while Pachau supervised those with the south.96 Pomponne’s kinsman Hilaire Rouillé du ­Coudray was named premier commis in 1673, but with what responsibilities is unclear.97 Edme Lebeau served as a commis and in 1678 was joined by Charles François de la Bonde d’Iberville, who worked particularly with the Genevan correspondence and in 1688 became resident in that city.98 It has been recently argued that the foreign office’s transition from a geographical to a functional division of labour came quite late, lagging behind the other departments of state. However, this equates the division between domestic and external correspondence with the one based on geography (as in north and south),99 whereas the former was grounded in function, not geography. Indeed, the two types of bureau dealt with different subject matter (domestic affairs versus international relations), required specialized background knowledge (of provincial versus foreign authority and power structures, customs, history, and current conditions), and involved having to deal with significantly different groups



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs * Pierre de TOURMONT (1671–79) Continued as Pomponne’s secretary and “Directeur des affaires du Nord”

* Louis PACHAU (1671–80) External affairs and codes

* Jean PARAYRE (1671–80) Provinces (now including Provence)

Figure 5.6 Department organization under Pomponne, 1671–1679. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Tourmont served as Pomponne’s secretary and premier commis of the bureau handling “the affairs of the North,” while premiers commis Pachau and Parayre each headed a bureau. Both Pachau and Parayre served under interim foreign secretary Louvois after the 1 September 1671 death of Lionne until ­Pomponne arrived from Sweden on 14 January 1672. Not mentioned by Delavaud, Picavet, or Piccioni was Pomponne’s kinsman Hilaire Rouillé du Coudray, named premier commis in 1673 according to Saint-Simon, ss-Boislisle, 9:18n7, and Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, but neither work indicates what role Rouillé du Coudray played. Sarmant and Stoll also claim that Rouillé du Coudray was “remplacé vers 1678 par le jeune fils du ministre ­[Pomponne]” (replaced around 1678 by the minister’s young son) but without naming the son. Since ­Pomponne’s oldest son was born in 1662, with the others following in 1664 and 1669, this is rather puzzling.

(a wider social range in France as opposed to a narrower one abroad) and individuals (a variety of provincial elites and officials in contrast to sovereign princes and a small, largely urban court elite).100 As the king understood, in contrast with the “affairs of war … the administration of a state constantly requires cares of a different nature.”101 Much of the domestic bureau’s work involved greater task certainty, whereas diplomatic business typically engendered greater task uncertainty, which according to contingency theory’s analysis of organizational structure tended to make the domestic side rather mechanistic in structure. By contrast, the two political bureaus’ diplomatic work required greater expertise and offered the clerks who drafted documents more independence. In terms of governance theory, it seems that in generating much domestic paperwork the “reactions to information [were] preprogrammed,” whereas in replying to diplomatic correspondence, it was more likely

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that “the responses [were] indeterminate and involve[d] greater judgment by the actors involved.”102 Domestic documents were often in the form of royal orders or legal papers directed at subjects, whereas diplomatic documents, in addressing foreign rulers, differed not only in format but in tone. Instructions for departing diplomats were sustained compositions in a freer and more literary style that provided parameters and explored contingencies more often than they gave simple orders. In contrast, instructions to provincial officials were often relatively short letters, since the time-distance differential between foreign and domestic communication generally made the latter faster and more frequent. Certainly, there were overlapping and similar functions, and when merely copying papers, a clerk could float as needed from one function to the other. Yet expertise in processing these two categories of files counted for something, as demonstrated by Parayre’s continuity in managing domestic affairs under three secretaries and by Pachau’s with external affairs under two. While acknowledging that war department paperwork was quite detailed, Brienne contended that it required more diligence than wit, whereas diplomatic writings were not the same thing, since sudden and unforeseeable matters arose daily. He granted that while war department clerks might draft good standard legal documents with prescribed formats, they would do poorly with foreign dispatches or ambassadorial instructions.103 Long before Torcy, foreign ministers and their clerks developed an exalted sense of the compositional skills necessary to their work, skills that stood in sharp contrast to those required for the lesser “chancery compositions” churned out in domestic or war administration.104 The foreign office entered a new era with Pomponne’s disgrace on 18 November 1679 and replacement by Croissy on 20 January 1680. Alongside the obvious shift toward a more belligerent foreign policy already under way, seemingly ratified by Croissy’s appointment, there was the conquest of the foreign office itself by the ambitious Colbert clan.105 Lionne, like Colbert and Le Tellier, was one of Mazarin’s creatures bequeathed to Louis XIV, whereas Pomponne was not. Although not part of any ministerial grouping, he was nonetheless protected and promoted by his friends Lionne, Le Tellier, and the latter’s first cousin, Claude Le Peletier, all of whom the Colberts regarded as rivals for favour and advancement. It was thus no surprise that Pomponne’s premiers commis were soon cashiered.106 Tourmont transferred to the war department, while Parayre and Pachau both retired, although as was customary with former premier commis, they occasionally served Croissy.107



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Like his predecessors, Croissy looked to his own circle for replacements. François Faille, his secretary and commis since 1654, now served chiefly as his household intendant.108 Charles Mignon, his secretary since at least 1663, took Tourmont’s place without, like him, having served first as a commis.109 Pachau’s replacement, in place by December, was Jean-Louis Bergeret, a Parisian of Alsatian ancestry and since 1672 a general counsel in the Metz parlement, eventual hub of the reunion activities along the eastern frontier. Just one month before Pomponne’s dismissal, the first Chambre de réunion at Metz was authorized (23 October 1679). Croissy himself had broached with the king this judicial alternative to conquest as early as 1664, and from 1670 the Metz parlement began sifting through old parchments to ascertain the crown’s seigneurial rights in its jurisdiction.110 Ezéchiel Spanheim, B ­ randenburg’s envoy to France, later speculated that this probably accounted for ­Bergeret’s appointment, since he and Croissy had worked together on what was the foremost foreign policy initiative during his early ministry.111 Yet Bergeret was likely a Colbert client before Metz, as Colbert selected royal appointees to parlements from within his family and client network, especially for Metz. Moreover, Bergeret was a kinsman of the rising master of requests Louis Boucherat, named chancellor in 1685.112 Bergeret is perhaps the best known of the premier commis if only because he entered the Académie française (2 January 1685) following a controversial election. Many literati, who resented Bergeret’s selection over a “more worthy” candidate because he was not a published writer, attributed it to intense lobbying by the Colbert clan to satisfy a client’s vanity. His elevation, however, was approved by the king and was not without its defenders both then and later. Racine praised Bergeret’s acquaintance with history and good books in general, but especially his deep knowledge of events at foreign courts, of treaties and alliances, and of the important negotiations of their royal patron’s reign.113 Indeed, elevating an expert to an academy was one means of recruiting and rewarding expertise while legitimizing and credentialing it.114 There is some disagreement as to Bergeret’s responsibilities. Abbé François Timoléon de Choisy, a former friend appalled by his election, said that he was a vain mere scribe who hardly deserved his rich premier commis salary. Choisy wrote this in the context of praising Croissy’s dispatch-writing abilities, which he considered underappreciated owing to the minister’s coarse and brutal manner. Georges Pagès’s study of Croissy’s correspondence confirms that he dictated his drafts to Bergeret and later corrected them himself to reflect changes made during Conseil

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discussions.115 Yet a premier commis did more than draft dispatches, as noted by the perceptive Spanheim. In light of the pretext that precipitated Pomponne’s disgrace, Croissy was scrupulous about keeping the king informed daily of all significant diplomatic business, but during his frequent illnesses, it was Bergeret who kept Louis up to date, a duty Torcy later assumed as survivancier. Aware of the practical advantage of a foreign office clerk also holding a royal household office, Spanheim noted that being a secretary of the Cabinet facilitated Bergeret’s access to the king. Bergeret was so valued and trusted by Croissy that he received important briefings on his behalf.116 He also helped his master smooth ruffled feathers in the foreign community.117 On at least one occasion he participated in the recruitment process by repeatedly encouraging a prominent parliamentarian to consider diplomatic service.118 Did Croissy continue Pomponne’s tripartite division of two political and one domestic bureau? Camille Piccioni claims that Bergeret was the sole premier commis until he was joined by Aubert and Mignon in 1688, but in fact Mignon entered the department with that rank in 1680 and Aubert achieved it only under Torcy.119 The evidence indicates that both Mignon and Bergeret handled domestic matters, especially the former because as a secretary of the king of the Grand Chancellery he drew up, signed, and sealed the royal orders that made up a large part of domestic paperwork.120 It is impossible to state with greater certainty how domestic affairs were supervised under Croissy without thoroughly sifting through his correspondence, a task beyond the scope of the present work. The division of foreign affairs is less opaque. Mignon’s bureau included ­Denmark and Sweden,121 while Bergeret’s encompassed ­England, Italy, Germany, Geneva, and Siam.122 This suggests that Croissy discontinued or at least modified the earlier division by “north” and “south.” With seemingly fewer foreign missions to supervise, Mignon likely took on more of the domestic responsibilities, and as will be discussed below, a domestic bureau only re-emerged sometime between 1698 and 1700 (figure 5.7).123 Additional personnel under Croissy included the veteran Adam, two who arrived with Croissy, Mignon’s nephew Michel Fournier and François Blondel, and, later, Le Melle – or Le Melles – (from 1681 to at least 1692), Montreuil (from 1691 to 1692), and Louis-Bénigne de Marolot (added by 1693).124 The structure under Torcy by 1700 is somewhat clearer (figure 5.8): a first political bureau headed by Pecquet and a second political bureau headed by Fournier, whether as a simple commis as bureau chief or, more likely, as premier commis.125 Pecquet’s bureau included Italy (e.g., ­Venice



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maison François FAILLE (1680–96) Intendant and commis

* Jean-Louis BERGERET (1680–94) Croissy’s personal scribe External affairs and provinces

Secretariat François BLONDEL (1680–96) Finances and codes

* Charles MIGNON (1680–96) External affairs and provinces

Archives (from 1680) Jean-Yves de SAINT-PREST (c. 1682–96)

Figure 5.7 Department organization under Croissy, 1680–1696. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. The division of states and provinces between the two premiers commis is uncertain, but the following give some indications: ­Bergeret assisted with England and Mantua (Picavet); Bergeret helped Croissy with Brandenburg (Pagès); Bergeret approached Choisy on behalf of Croissy concerning Siam (Smithies); secretary of the king Mignon countersigned the “Arrest du Conseil d’Estat du Roy” (aae md 302 and 1004 and bn mf 8833, which contradict Piccioni’s contention [162] that Bergeret’s administrative existence terminated quietly in 1688); Mignon’s bureau dealt with Denmark (aae cp Danemark 47); and Mignon dealt with the affairs of Marseilles at Torcy’s request (bn mf 8858).

and Rome), Spain, Portugal, the Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces, and Britain.126 The workload if not the importance of these two political bureaus was unequal. Comparing listings of French diplomats abroad drawn from État de la France for 1698, 1702, and 1708 and from the 1713 and 1715 Almanach Royal shows that Pecquet’s bureau oversaw more diplomats – usually double the number – than did Fournier’s (table 5.2). Only in the great post-Ryswick re-establishment of French missions abroad did the second bureau’s numbers match those of the first (figure 5.9).127 Comparing the number of volumes of political correspondence generated by each bureau during Torcy’s tenure reveals that Pecquet’s bureau handled more than double the volume of ­Fournier’s bureau (figure 5.10), which is congruent with the list of states for which each was responsible. Missions to the papacy, Spain, the Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces, and Great Britain, all in Pecquet’s bureau, far surpassed all the others in volume and as a group accounted for just over half the total. Altogether the first bureau accounted for approximately

Figure 5.8 Department organization under Torcy, 1696–1715. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Bold dates in parentheses indicate when a separate bureau was formed (dates may be approximate).

Figure 5.9 Number of French diplomatic missions, 1692–1715. Note: The figures are not exact and could be further refined, but likely without seriously altering the overall trend.

Figure 5.10 Comparison: numbers of volumes of correspondance politique produced per state by the first and second political bureaus, 1696–1715. Note: Numbers are approximate and meant only to be suggestive. Figures from “Supplemental” volumes are not included, since they are usually small and often cover a wide range of years.



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70 per cent of the total volume and the second bureau roughly 30 per cent of it.128 This imbalance was probably unintentional. The widening war ruptured diplomatic relations with Austria, the United Provinces, and ­England, as was the case during most of Torcy’s tenure. By contrast, missions remained throughout this period in Rome, Copenhagen, ­Stockholm, Constantinople, and Switzerland. Yet factors beyond ongoing diplomatic relations must have been at play, since correspondence with the Scandinavians and Ottomans fell far short not only of the volume with the papacy and the Swiss but also with that of the Dutch and English. The quantity of correspondence was also influenced by the extent, level, and length of peace negotiations, since communications with plenipotentiaries were assigned to the bureau responsible for the place where the congress met. Thus, the drawn-out and critical negotiations at Ryswick and Utrecht added to the United Provinces’ volumes, while those at Baden augmented the Swiss tomes. Likewise, the quantity of correspondence concerning the disputed succession to the diminutive Swiss territory of Neuchâtel on France’s border was nearly twice that for Russia during this period. The evidence suggests that the intended balance between the two bureaus was not in the volume of correspondence generated, but in the number of missions to be supervised post-Ryswick. Thus, the 1702 levels (table 5.2), before the overall numbers of missions fell almost to the levels seen during the Nine Years War, probably reflected the anticipated division of labour. The matter of codes illustrates the difficulty in determining when or even if other specialized functions resulted in the creation of bureaus. Codes, or ciphers, served to secure communication between the centre and its agents abroad. Given the nature and purposes of codes, it is not surprising that exact information about them is often vague or lacking.129 The foreign office changed codebooks often, followed strict procedures, and employed codes with some novel features. This led to a certain smugness among French diplomats as to the inviolability of their codes, which were nonetheless cracked by the Allies during the War of the Spanish Succession.130 Charles Mignon’s personal papers contain instructions for a special code used with the plenipotentiaries at ­Ryswick. The encoder was cautioned not to mix unencrypted words or lines among those in code and to take the time to mix into the code the null ciphers (“caractères nuls”), which he would find at the bottom of the key. Fear of interception led to each missive being encoded with two different keys in an alternating pattern of five lines encoded with one key

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and the sixth with the other. To signal to the decipherer which code was being used for which set of lines, the number of the appropriate code was inserted as the first character of the dispatch to indicate whether the repeating line pattern throughout was five then one or one then five.131 An envoy often received an ordinary code and a more difficult one for those secrets that had to remain impenetrable.132 These instructions indicate just how painstaking and time-consuming encoding and decoding could be, although not all codes were this complex. Under Lionne a premier commis and two office boys specialized in codes and formed an identifiable code service (“service du chiffre”). It generated, distributed, and safeguarded tables of codes, but because code specialists performed other departmental tasks, they functioned more as a task-oriented team than a completely separate bureau. The earliest entirely separate and official code bureau came in 1749 but lasted only six years, likely because encoding and decoding traditionally and logically took place within the political bureaus themselves.133 Torcy encoded his most secret and delicate letters, as did his premier commis.134 Moreover, encoding and decoding entailed a tension between the desire for absolute accuracy and security and the need for haste in sending out and making use of information while fresh. Thus, even the use of a code or the centralization of its operations for security’s sake frequently clashed with efficiency and timeliness, not only in the department’s bureaus, but in its embassies as well.135 Billard, secretary to Jules de Gravel, marquis de Marly, extraordinary envoy to Brandenburg, reacted defensively to criticism that he had badly encoded a dispatch, insisting that it was the first complaint he had ever received. Adam responded soothingly that in his own twenty-one years serving Lionne, Pomponne, and Croissy, he had found that what pleased one minister did not necessarily please the others.136 France produced two master cryptologists, the legendary Antoine Rossignol (d. 1682) and his son Bonaventure-Charles Rossignol (d. 1705). Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louvois employed them, and Louis XIV, who had rewarded each richly, regretted the passing of both. The king made certain that the latter’s children, although too young to carry on the family tradition, were provided for financially. Neither Rossignol appears to have worked directly for the foreign office, yet it no doubt benefited from the efforts of both. Moreover, Antoine had married a cousin of Pomponne’s wife.137 Expert knowledge and skill had to be kept under the state’s control and denied to its enemies, so the department’s solicitude for these potential experts who might have access to secret



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family knowledge of codes made sense.138 Others worked with codes under Torcy.139 Marc-Antoine Lullier began in the Le Telliers’ department and may have apprenticed under or worked alongside Antoine Rossignol. He joined Croissy sometime in 1694–96 and retired after 1701 and before 1706, perhaps in 1703. He was said to be a decoder without using a key (“déchiffreur sans clé”), which suggests expertise.140 Since most clerks would need to decode and encode dispatches on a daily basis, that activity was not easily separated from the political bureaus. Instead, the code service specialized in distributing codebooks as well as generating new code tables, since security was served by a plethora of ciphers or the more drastic replacement of a code.141 The increased complexity required for greater security, however, could slow or even rupture the communication process.142 Under Croissy and Torcy the sending out of a new code might fall to secretary Blondel or a political bureau’s premier commis, but Adam, who began in the code service, played a leading role in creating codes. He apparently introduced departing diplomats and agents to their codes, personally entrusting them with keys to the ciphers they carried. At Versailles, codebooks were in the care of Torcy’s premier secrétaire and premier commis, who kept them under lock and key in the minister’s bureaus.143 Spies frequently required mobility to do their snooping. Movement could be fairly localized, as when tampering with the mail in a post office or monitoring objects and people of interest around a port, near a military facility, along a vital highway, or in a royal residence’s corridors, but when it required the ability to travel more widely and through one or more sovereignties, passports were one of the weapons used to control the movement of information and the people gathering and carrying it, especially during wartime.144 Issuing passports was among the foreign office’s duties, but this was not its exclusive province, since the other secretaries of state as well as governors, intendants, and magistrates in coastal or frontier cities could issue them for their jurisdiction. For security reasons, however, passports for the court and for Paris, whether requested by foreigners for a visit or by French subjects resident in either to go abroad, came from the foreign secretary. French subjects received passports not only for protection while abroad and, in particular, for safe conduct in enemy territory and war zones, but also to permit the foreign office to monitor those whose foreign travels for commercial, religious, or other reasons might have hidden purposes.145 Of course, like others, France used passports to cover its own agents’ espionage. Obtaining a passport through the foreign office normally required

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a court or government connection, especially in the foreign ministry, perhaps with a clerk or even a domestic in the secretary’s household, and it was this sponsor who delivered the passport to its recipient.146 A flurry of passports issued proclaimed the approach of peace talks.147 In 1697 the number of passports issued by Torcy’s bureaus increased dramatically. After ten years of war Europeans welcomed the opportunity to go abroad unmolested by contending armies. Torcy’s clerks issued nearly five hundred passports between 1 January and 1 June 1697. Several registers of passport requests, beginning with one for 1 June 1697, list information about the traveler, accompanying family and servants, and goods and specie that might be transported. Two registry columns were left blank: one for listing the person who recommended the applicant; and the other for Torcy’s penciled queries or instructions to his commis. The minister might, for instance, want to apprise someone at court of the proposed journey, ask about an applicant’s religious status (a Huguenot refugee or a New Convert?), or refer the request to the police lieutenant and his agents for further scrutiny.148 When the next war began to end in piecemeal fashion, the floodgates were again opened. For the year 1712 over 2,080 passports were issued and nearly 3,000 for the following year.149 Bély believes that the 1712 list suggests that prior to this list there was little order in the department’s passport records,150 but that is contradicted by the earlier lists kept. Rather than disorder’s remedy, the 1712 list was likely a further refinement of the order already in place. Religion now seemed to be less of an issue. The names of bankers, merchants, gentlemen on tour, actors and musicians, and servants top the list, followed by churchmen, soldiers, and officials. The names of sponsors included Mme de Croissy, Abbé Polignac, ­Chancellor JohannFriedrich-Ignaz Karg of Cologne, Cardinal G ­ ualterio, Abbé Pomponne, Louis-Léon Pajot, and department clerks Adam, Pecquet, Mignon, Blondel, and Fournier.151 It is not completely clear how passports were issued, but a penciled annotation on Torcy’s notes from the 28 April 1701 diplomatic audiences indicates that passport requests were to go to Aubert, which may have been connected with his elevation as premier commis around this time.152 His was likely a coordinating role. Given their varying volume, passports did not occupy him full-time, so perhaps what Aubert headed was what we suggested earlier was a bureau defined as a task-oriented and temporary team led by a premier commis or bureau chief whose ongoing responsibility for the task provided its essential organization, coordination, and continuity. Ligny, who joined Torcy’s secretariat in 1702, may have assisted Aubert in his work, but



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when Aubert retired in 1705, passports were apparently absorbed into the secretariat and supervised by Ligny.153 Even resident foreign nationals holding passports made Torcy and his department uneasy, especially during hostilities. They might be potential or actual spies, dealers in illegal goods or peddlers of forged documents, purveyors of seditious libels, and so on. If they planned to stay in Paris for an extended time or settle there, they were tracked by the commissioners of their quarter, having been required to register with them or their innkeeper.154 The transition from peace to war, however, created confusing grey zones, and overzealous police spies were prone to mistakes. In 1702 a Scotsman from the court of Hanover was arrested as a spy because he lacked a passport and appeared to be writing coded letters. When Torcy looked into the case, he found not a spy, but a scholar who had been in France before war was declared and who interspersed Greek in his correspondence.155 Foreign envoys also monitored the activities of their own nationals. The English diplomat Matthew Prior, for instance, did not trust a Mark Lynch, reporting home that he had let Torcy “know where he is, that he may keep an eye upon him.”156 The Jacobite court at St-Germain-en-Laye was a constant and continual source of information and irritation. On the basis of a letter from Lord Middleton concerning three Englishmen who had also proved cooperative with French authorities, Torcy instructed d’Argenson to allow them to continue their medical studies.157

T h e D e pa rt m e nt Reorgani zed As we have seen, a domestic bureau had long existed before Croissy either consolidated it with one of the political bureaus or split its duties between them. A separate domestic bureau had re-emerged by 1700, but when exactly, in what circumstances, and under whose supervision? Louis Delavaud says that Adam was made premier commis in 1694 and charged with domestic affairs.158 Delavaud draws no connection between Adam’s promotion and Bergeret’s death on 9 October of that year, but surely Adam was elevated as Bergeret’s replacement.159 Adam’s situation was apparently changing even before Bergeret’s passing. Writing Adam from Denmark at the end of 1693, Bonrepaus referred to his new “emploi” (employment), apprehensive that it would distract Adam from his work in the bureau. The ambassador complained of carelessly encoded dispatches received from the bureau supervised by Mignon and responsible for Denmark and Sweden.160 To what new

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employment was Bonrepaus referring? It is unlikely he meant the code service, since any such responsibility had likely come at Pachau’s departure in 1680 and in any case would neither fully occupy nor distract him from his duties under Mignon.161 Perhaps too much should not be read into the use of the word emploi here, as it can refer to a function and not necessarily a commission or rank.162 As Croissy’s health worsened and Torcy assumed additional responsibilities, including following the king to the front during the 1693 campaign, Adam probably accompanied the heir and increasingly worked at his side. Perhaps it was this closer working relationship that Bonrepaus had in mind.163 Did Adam’s 1694 promotion mark an end to the dualism that had reigned in Croissy’s bureaus for the last fourteen years and a return to the tripartite scheme of two foreign and one domestic bureau? In 1694 and 1695, however, there were only two premiers commis, Mignon and Adam.164 Besides, what would have been the impetus for this, especially during time of war? One of the two premiers commis had died, but he could be replaced. Moreover, Torcy’s growing responsibilities as Croissy’s health deteriorated included domestic correspondence.165 At this point in the war the number of French embassies was at a low level (figure 5.9), with no sign of increasing in the foreseeable future. In 1695 Adam replaced Mignon’s nephew Fournier in carrying the summons for the estates to Brittany. The explanation does not require a revived domestic bureau, but it cannot rest merely on Adam’s new status, since Fournier had gone earlier as a simple commis.166 Fournier’s harried uncle likely needed his help once Adam was no longer assisting him, so reassigning the biennial journey to Brittany to Adam made sense within the existing administrative framework. More significantly, who replaced Bergeret in foreign affairs? If Mignon took on the supervision of all embassies, which was perhaps manageable at this point in the war owing to low numbers, it nonetheless might have been considered an arrangement too disruptive to work patterns and habits for all involved, at Versailles as well as abroad. A simpler solution, especially given the sudden and unexpected nature of the vacancy, was to fill it as it existed without delay with an experienced commis and avoid the upheaval of realigning personnel and responsibilities. Until a thorough study is made of Croissy’s bureaucracy, it appears most likely that Adam stepped into Bergeret’s bureau at its head in 1694 with no reorganization at that time. As Croissy’s bouts of illness worsened early in 1696, Mignon wrote to Provence’s intendant at Torcy’s request and remarked on the heavy burden placed on the harried survivancier by his father’s infirmity.167



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When Croissy died on 25 August, Mignon remained in place, but throughout 1697 Bonrepaus complained to Blondel about the inefficiency of Mignon’s bureau, although he wrote apologetically to the weary clerk himself for any trouble he might have caused his office (“vostre bureau”) and in November even addressed Mignon’s poor health.168 By February 1698 Adam was handling business with Provence, informing its intendant that he had taken charge of Mignon’s bureau until his health improved.169 Unfortunately, chronic illness forced Mignon’s retirement at the beginning of April and by the beginning of June he was dead.170 The passing of this long-serving premier commis did not necessitate any restructuring, but it may have made it possible, as the end of the war six months earlier certainly had. Indeed, the return of peace required that embassies be sent to former enemies, making expansion and restructuring essential. The number jumped from approximately fifteen missions in 1697 to thirty-five the following year (figure 5.9). Perhaps, in the midst of this expansion and the increased volume of paperwork it generated, the division of labour prior to Bergeret’s death continued, with Fournier assuming his uncle’s bureau as Adam had Bergeret’s.171 By June 1698 Charles-François Noblet had joined the department, but if he was named a premier commis, it was likely not until the end of 1700 and even then his service was not the sedentary kind required of a political bureau’s chief.172 A more plausible sign of restructuring was Antoine Pecquet’s arrival as a premier commis in 1700.173 This appears to be the year during which Torcy reinstated the pre-Croissy tripartite division: two political bureaus for foreign affairs, headed by Pecquet and Fournier, and one bureau handling domestic matters, led by Adam, an arrangement that remained until the end of the reign.174 It seems unlikely that these changes had to await Pomponne’s passing, as he had found this same format serviceable when he was secretary.175 Perpetual negotiating during the War of the Spanish Succession placed a heavy burden on Torcy’s bureaus and increased the number of clerks.176 Yet growth and restructuring began earlier, during the postwar restoration of diplomatic relations and the whirlwind of activity aimed at forestalling another war through partitioning schemes. This occurred between the final months of 1697 and into 1700, as seen in the jump in the number of diplomatic missions sent out (figure 5.9). The pressure this placed on the old system was probably soon evident, but the delicate negotiations for the partition treaties, the second not signed by France and England until June 1699, probably precluded whatever restructuring Torcy and Pomponne might have desired. Moreover, the

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experienced Fournier, having taken over Mignon’s bureau, likely eased the strain somewhat. By 1701, however, when war no longer seemed avoidable and the coalition-building diplomatic preparation for it accelerated, the basic reorganization was complete. Thus, it was during the interwar crucible of 1699 and 1700, not the ensuing war, that a reorganized and expanded department was forged. The war years were hectic for the foreign office clerks and required additional personnel, but the prior labours of peace altered the bureaucracy’s structure and initially grew its numbers (figure 5.2). Adam’s domestic bureau had several commis each assigned a group of provinces. They read and summarized whatever was received from it, including official correspondence, individual or group complaints and requests, and any written or printed materials that an official, especially the intendant, thought might be of interest.177 In addition to serving as copyists, they assisted in drafting replies to provincial correspondence. Adam was already quite busy with other matters as Torcy’s household intendant and, from the end of 1706, as a treasurer of ambassadors. A sampling of lists of outgoing letters to the provinces reveals that they went mostly to major civil, military, ecclesiastical, judicial, and municipal officials (table 5.3).178 Each list records the names of important officials, even if they received only a single letter during the cycle; recipients not specified (“others”) were presumably not officials. Intendants were especially frequent correspondents, but depending on the issue, local power structure, and personalities involved, others could assume importance. In the pays d’état Brittany and Provence, the lieutenant-general who stood in for the absentee governor was a recurrent correspondent, as frequent as the intendant in the case of Grignan in Provence. During the 1708 subsistence crisis, Louis Ravat, elected that year as Lyon’s provost of merchants, received in the sample more communications from the minister than did the intendant.179 Letters to “others” were more common in the pays d’état and for Brittany were close to half of those sent out. Provence received the most correspondence in each sample not only by volume, but also in the number and variety of recipients, including many judicial and municipal officials. Berry and Limoges, both pays d’élection, apparently required less attention than the more self-governing pays d’état of Provence, Brittany, and Béarn and Navarre. Nevertheless, Champagne-Brie’s intendant, André de Harouys ­ (1702–11), was as frequent a contact as all but the intendant of Provence, perhaps because of his province’s proximity to the exposed eastern frontier. The total volume of these dispatches sent out was on average at least one per



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day. This may seem insignificant until one considers all the preliminary paperwork and discussions typically required to produce a single final draft.180 This kept the bureau’s commis busy but still able to assist with other department tasks such as helping Aubert with passports. The domestic bureau specialized in preparing and sending out the various actes en commandement or documents sent on the monarch’s personal order.181 Issued and countersigned by the secretary in the king’s name (table 4.1), they included “brevets” (letters patent used to convey a favour, usually without cost to the king), commissions, dispensations from age requirements (for example, for holding an office), edicts, grants of leave, “ordres du roi” (orders of the king), payment authorizations (such as ordonnances or acquits patents),182 and “lettres de naturalité” (naturalization letters).183 Although the later eighteenth century may have seen an expanded secretariat assume responsibility for issuing and registering legal documents before sending them out,184 under Torcy this was done in the domestic bureau.185 Several department registries of expéditions indicate that particular individuals, including premiers commis, had a hand in the task of registration, including Adam, Fournier, Aubert, Marolot, Noblet, and Lullier. Adam apparently coordinated the schedule so that no one was responsible for expediting documents more than two days consecutively and for no more than eight days in a month.186 Of course, one might be unfortunate enough to draw duty during the first or last days of the month (figure 7.2 below), which were often the busiest, yet the stream of paperwork, even with ebbs and flows for seasonal or other reasons, was fairly steady.187 Additional work resulted when Adam and his team took on special tasks, such as resolving the administrative fate of Barcelonnette. It had been detached from Provence by Savoy in 1388, and its loss was contested until its return in 1713 at Utrecht. While Provence expected it back, Dauphiné lobbied to annex it. Letters from Grignan in Provence were sent directly or routed to Adam, as were other missives from the Aix and Grenoble parlements and other interested parties, which Adam and his commis summarized for Torcy’s perusal.188 Adam also assisted Torcy with the original reading of the rolle, which fit well with domestic affairs and was a source of rewards for those in and outside the department.189 His hand was also in the policing of Paris and managing the prisoners the ministry sent to the Bastille.190 Adam’s activities reached to Brittany, where Croissy had served twice (1663 and 1665) as royal commissioner general to its estates. As foreign secretary, Croissy convoked these biennial gatherings and issued orders to those selected as royal

Table 5.3 Sampling of domestic correspondence sent out by gouvernement Recipients of Domestic Correspondence Classified by Gouvernement1

Jan.– June 1697

Oct.– Dec. 1706

July– Sept. 1708

Oct.– Dec. 1708

Apr.– June 1709

totals

Berry *Dey de Séraucourt (intendant 1673–99) *Quarré (Carré) de Montgeron (intendant 1705–08) *Foullé de Martangis (intendant 1708–20) Archbishop of Bourges

3 3

1 –

2 –

1 –

1 –

8 3

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

1

2

Bretagne (pays d’état) Count de Châteaurenault (lieutenant-general) *Béchameil de Nointel (intendant 1691–1705) *Ferrand (intendant 1705–16) Bishop of Brieux Meannd (?) of Nantes M. de la Fontaine Duc de Rohan (president of the nobility in the estates) Bishop of Nantes Others2

13 –

15 3

20 3

13 2

12 1

73 9

5

–

–

–

–

5

–

6

8

4

6

24

– – – –

1 1 1 1

– – – –

– – – –

– – – –

1 1 1 1

1 7

– 4

– 9

3 4

– 5

4 29

Champagne-Brie Prince de Soubize (governor) *Harouys (intendant 1702–11) Phélypeaux (intendant of Paris) Archbishop of Reims Bishop of Meaux Comte de Grandpré (lieutenant-general at Reims) Abbé de Cestaux Archbishop of Sens Bishop of Troyes Bishop of Langres Penart (lieutenant-general at Sedan) Others

1 – –

18 1 9

13 – 7

20 – 11

4 – 4

56 1 31

–

–

1

2

–

3

– – –

1 1 1

– – –

– – –

– – –

1 1 1

– – – – 1

– – – – –

1 – – – –

– 1 1 1 –

– – – – –

1 1 1 1 1

–

5

4

1

–

10

Dauphiné (until March 1708)3 Duc de la Feuillade (governor) *Bauyn d’Angervilliers (intendant 1705–15) Others

–

17

–

–

–

17

–

1

–

–

–

1

–

12

–

–

–

12

–

4

–

–

–

4

4

sent

% of Total Sent  1.7%

15.8%

12.1%

 3.7%

Table 5.3 continued –

3

7

105

2

22

–

2

4

–

–

6

–

–

–

8

1

9

– – 1 –

1 –

– 1

– 1

– 1

–

2

1

–

1 3 1 3

Lyonnais (from March 1708)6 *Trudaine (intendant 1704–10) Duc de Villeroy (governor) Rochebonne (commandant) Archbishop of Lyon Ravat (provost of merchants of Lyon) Others

–

–

18

7

6

31

–

–

2

–

2

4

– – – –

– – – –

1 1 3 8

1 – – 4

1 – 1 2

3 1 4 14

–

–

3

2

1

6

Navarre et Béarn (pays d’état) Duc de Gramont (governor and lieutenant-general) *Pinon de Quincy (intendant 1694–99) *Macary (acting intendant)7 Bishop of Oléron Bishop of Tarbes Bishop of Bayonne Others

11

11

14

12

9

57

–

2

2

–

–

4

5

–

–

–

–

5

– 3 – – 3

5 2 1 – 1

7 1 1 1 2

6 1 – 1 4

5 – – – 4

23 7 2 2 14

Provence (pays d’état) Comte de Grignan (lieutenant-general) *Pierre-Cardin Lebret (intendant 1687–1704) *Cardin Lebret (intendant 1704–34) Pierre-Cardin Lebret (premier président Parlement of Aix, 1690–1710) Marquis de Buoren (in absence of Grignan) Duc de Vendôme (governor) Archbishop of Aix (presid.) Bishop of Fréjus Chalmazel (military commandant Toulon) Bishop of Marseilles Archbishop of Avignon Ancien échevins of Marseilles

14 –

52 11

47 14

44 9

19 1

176 35

6

–

–

–

–

6

–

15

13

9

1

38

–

5

–

–

1

6

1

–

–

–

–

1

– – – –

– 2 2 3

– 1 – 4

1 1 – 4

– 1 – 1

1 5 2 12

– – 1

1 7 1

– – –

– – –

– – –

1 7 2

Limousin et Angoumois (Limoges) *Rouillé de Fontaine-Guerin (intendant 1702–08) *Quarré de Montgeron (intendant 1708–10) Marlot-Vigen Bishop of Limoges Bishop of Angoulême Others

 4.8%

 6.7%

12.3%

38%

Table 5.3 continued Echevins (aldermen) of Marseilles Procureur généraux Parlement Procureur généraux Cour de Comptes Bishop of Vence Bishop of Apt Bishop of Sisteron Marie et conseillers de Toulon Vauvré (intendant of the Marine Toulon) Bishop of Toulon Blondel de Gouvernement8 Archbishop of Arles M. de la Gardie Others Saintonge (part of Limoges and of La Rochelle)9 *Bernage (intendant 1694–1702) *Begon (marine and provincial intendant) Bishop of Saintes Others Total Sent

–

1

–

–

–

1

–

3

–

–

–

3

–

1

–

–

–

1

– – – –

1 – – –

1 1 1 1

– – 1 –

1 – – –

3 1 2 1

–

–

1

3

–

4

– – – – 6

– – – – 4

1 – – – 9

– – – 2 14

1 1 1 – 10

2 1 1 2 43

710

2

6

4

3

22

4

–

–

–

–

4

–

2

4

4

3

13

1 1 49

– – 119

2 – 127

– – 111

– – 56

3 1 462

 4.8%

–

Sources: aae md 1041, fols 3–11, for Jan.–June 1697 (6 months); ibid., 1144, for Oct.–Dec. 1706 (3 months); ibid., 1158, fols 33, 63, 68, 103, 233, and 351, for July–Sept. 1708 (3 months); ibid., 1159, fols 8–12, for Oct.– Dec. 1708 (3 months); and ibid., 1163, fols 5–9, for Apr.–June 1709 (3 months).

1 Intendants are marked with an asterisk (*). 2 The category “Others” throughout this table is used in each of the sources. 3 Dauphiné was under Louvois until 1681, when he traded it to Croissy for the Trois Evêches; in March 1708, however, Dauphiné returned to the war department, while the foreign office received Lyon. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. 4 Nothing is listed for Dauphiné in this volume. 5 Data for Limousin only. 6 See note 3 above. 7 Antoine-François Méliand, intendant 1704 to 1710, also served as army intendant in Spain. Almanach Royal (1706), 56. 8 Charles-François Blondel de Jouvancourt, from 1704 commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille and commissaire général de la marine in Provence. The appellation “de Gouvernement” was used to distinguish him from his brother François Blondel de Sissonne, Torcy’s secretary. 9 In April 1694 La Rochelle was raised to an intendancy by joining the marine intendancy of the port city with territories taken from the surrounding generalities of Poitiers, Limoges, and Bordeaux; until 1717, the marine intendant at Rochefort also served as provincial intendant. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1346. The Angoumois remained with Limousin, while Saintonge was largely transferred to La Rochelle (in 1695, according to Smedley-Weil, Intendants, 40), although enough of Saintonge was left with the Angoumois for it to remain linked with Limousin on the list of generalities under the foreign secretary in 1715. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. 10 Saintonge is listed in this volume, while Limousin and the Angoumois are not, but the letter to the bishop of Angoulême is nonetheless classified under this heading.



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commissioners, including the governor and from 1689 the intendant. Beginning with the 1695 session, Adam delivered these documents and informed the commissioners precisely of the king’s desires, which were usually a financial contribution. Accompanied by a valet, he stayed long enough to see the preparations under way, but did not linger, since the meetings could last for months.191 These responsibilities made Adam a powerful figure in domestic affairs and fostered his professional and personal relationships with some of the provincial elite.192 Torcy’s secretary Blondel, Marseille’s lobbyist in Paris and at court from 1697 to 1712, made certain that from 1701 (which further supports the idea of the re-emergence of a domestic bureau just prior to that date) an annual pension of 1,500 livres went to Adam, who gratefully favoured the port’s interests.193 In 1704 the Paris agent of the consuls of Tulette in Dauphiné approached Controller General ­Chamillart about protecting their historic tax exemptions, but disappointing bargaining over the fee for his help led the agent to turn to Torcy’s more accommodating premier commis. With the intervention of the minister’s sister, Mme de Bouzols, and 1,000 livres to various persons to ease it along its way, the case was finally resolved in Tulette’s favour in 1706 at a cost of the 12,000 livres, with 1,500 livres going to the intendant of the Hôtel Croissy, premier commis Adam.194

T h e D e pa rt m e n t ’ s “ N etwork of Actors” As with Louis XIV’s other ministers, Torcy enjoyed a cumul de charges (accumulation of charges), which permitted him to accumulate additional posts, whether related or not. This privilege was often profitable in terms of power, patronage, and riches, but could wreck a ministerial career if too burdensome, as was clearly the case for Chamillart. Torcy, however, was fortunate because his cumul complemented his primary responsibilities and supplied vital services without being onerous. The same was true of some components of the royal household that were formally and informally subject to him.195 Other parts of the royal administration not under Torcy’s control also collaborated closely with the foreign office. One trend in recent public administration scholarship argues that the work of public bureaucracies “often takes place via networks of actors rather than solely within the confines of a single, hierarchical bureaucracy.”196 Much of this research focuses on the late twentieth century,197 yet early modern historians have turned increasingly to this network analysis.198 This approach certainly illuminates relationships among the

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parts of Torcy’s cumul as well as the foreign office’s interactions with parts of the royal household, with Renaudot’s Gazette, and with certain provincial groupings of power elites. Such networks consist of informal links between individuals in other parts of the government or entities outside of it that afford the “collaboration and coordination” needed to handle matters beyond the means of their individual constituents. Those at the top of the government might set up or encourage these networks, or they might arise from separate entities that commonly work together. Far from being antithetical to bureaucracy because of their informal nature or lack of a specified hierarchy, such networks are commonly found working alongside and in tandem with bureaucracies.199 The foreign office relied on many such networks. Some, discussed in this section and in later chapters, such as Marseille’s Gleise cabal (chapter 6), are more easily detected than those only glimpsed in the social activities – salons, dinners, “coffees,” and weddings – in which Torcy and members of his staff participated individually or together. Like our world, theirs was not one of all business and no play. Indeed, the two often overlapped. Much business was accomplished in the course of socializing, which was true of these bureaucrats as it was more obviously so of the ambassadors whose work was wrapped in rounds of public and private social events. As “surintendant general des postes et relais” (superintendent of posts and relay stations) from 1699 to 1721, Torcy managed the communication network essential to the efficient and effective functioning of all the departments and indeed to the very existence of a modern state. With the king remaining increasingly “centred” at Versailles and the Paris region, his words and those of the faithful servants at his side had to radiate forth in a timely and regular fashion by means of a reliable communication infrastructure. Special couriers were always an option, but they were a great expense to be avoided if possible. Instead, the heart of the communication network was the postal system that circulated information and correspondence between the centre and the periphery on a fairly consistent schedule. Its functioning was critical to the small central administration’s collaboration with the numerous royal and local officials required to govern the realm, as witnessed by the radial network of postal routes centred on Paris and largely in place by the beginning of the eighteenth century.200 Control of the post office also facilitated intelligence gathering because it afforded access to private correspondence by means of the infamous Cabinet noir in Paris’s main post office where letters to and from “suspected persons” were opened and ­copied. By profession, diplomats fit this description. The superintendence also offered



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Torcy further opportunities for one-on-one sessions with the king to regulate postal affairs and to share intelligence gleaned from the mails.201 The foreign ministry’s commis worked with postal officials on a daily basis, as we have already seen with de la Tournelle and his four mounted postal guards. Although Torcy was head of both departments, there was no other formal hierarchical linkage between them. Torcy employed a separate premier commis for postal matters, but this did not prevent the two entities from collaborating informally concerning couriers and mail surveillance. The post office is discussed in chapter 8, but for now it is noteworthy that the two controllers general of posts and relay stations who oversaw the whole system on behalf of the superintendent were also directly responsible for the mails of the court and Paris. The commis Louis Hainfray managed the “bureau des postes à la suite de la cour” (court postal bureau) at Versailles or wherever else the king might be.202 In addition, Guyot, “M[aît]re de la poste aux chevaux à la suite de la cour” (court postmaster for horses), was responsible for the many horses required for couriers and royal transportation.203 The superintendent’s responsibility encompassed the “Postes” (post office) handling the mail and the “Relais” (relay stations) transporting them. Relay stations were strung along the main highways radiating from Paris. Each was under a “maître de poste” (relay postmaster) who did not handle the mails, but provided the numerous fresh horses kept on hand for postal couriers, cabinet couriers, movements of the royal family, and for hire to other government departments and private travelers. The annual removal of the court to Fontainebleau, for example, in 1701 cost just over 17,832 livres for postilions, for horses used, crippled, or dead, and for the expenses of the three “visiteurs des postes” (postal inspectors) who coordinated it along the route.204 The Duke of Burgundy used postal horses in April 1702 to travel to Brussels to assume command of the Flanders front. Arrangements were undertaken by Torcy’s postal secretariat at a total cost of 8,373 livres: 6,423 for postilions and post horses, 600 for five relay postmasters along the route for dead or lamed horses, and 1,350 for the cost of gathering fresh horses. Burgundy again looked to Torcy after the successful siege of Brisach for horses for his return to Versailles.205 Gabriel Pigeon, “M[aît]re de la poste aux chevaux de la ville de Paris” (Paris postmaster for horses), escorted foreign couriers arriving in the capital to Versailles, Marly, or Fontainebleau. Upon entering France, they were required to check in with the relay postmasters along their route and obtain a passport from the superintendent once they reached Paris to avoid be taken for spies.206

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The royal household’s “courriers du cabinet” (cabinet couriers) were nominated to this venal office by the “grand écuyer” (grand equerry) and carried urgent or top-secret official dispatches.207 Five were assigned to the king and queen, one to each of the four secretaries of state (Grégoire Raisin was assigned to Torcy), one to the controller general, and one to the grand equerry, always at the ready to ride forth. The secretaries of state used riders other than the cabinet couriers, presumably when they were unavailable so that the rider could engage horses at the same reduced rate (governors could do the same).208 Since state business depended on these dispatches reaching provincial towns or foreign capitals expeditiously, messengers had access to fresh horses at all royal postal stations at a lower rate than that for private persons hiring horses. Depending on the weather, Torcy’s cabinet courier could ride hard from Versailles to The Hague in three or four days, Madrid in eight, Vienna in nine to ten, Turin in five, Venice in ten to twelve, and Rome in ten to eleven. The courier Bonfond exhibited a feat of strength and endurance by riding from Rome the day Pope Innocent XII died (27 September 1700) and reaching Versailles on the morning of 6 October. This allowed Louis XIV to order his cardinals to leave at once for Rome, where they arrived in time to enter the conclave and help elect ­Cardinal Albani as Clement XI, the first pontiff in a half-century friendly to France.209 Swift couriers proved invaluable in the competition to have the latest news. Torcy was stung in 1700 when the war secretary’s courier arrived at Fontainebleau with word of Carlos II’s death, but he had subsequent revenge. His courier outdistanced the war minister’s rider to reach Versailles in a record time of four days to allow Torcy to be the one to announce the December 1710 victory in Spain at Villa Viciosa to ­Maintenon and then to the king.210 Torcy also stood at the summit of a network of honours, the “Ordre de Saint-Esprit” (Order of the Holy Spirit) created by Henri III and the kingdom’s highest chivalric order. Foreign as well as French notables aspired to become a part of the order and its magnificent ceremonial, which were more than mere adornments. Chivalric orders were important “instrument[s] of state building” in that they encouraged and generously rewarded service to the monarch.211 On 12 August 1696, the day before his wedding, Torcy went to the king to take his oath as the grand treasurer of the Royal Orders, a charge inherited from his father.212 He sold it in 1701 when the king appointed him to succeed the late Barbezieux as the chancellor of the order (figure 5.11).213 Such was the prestige of this position that when Louis XIV presented his grandson

Figure 5.11 Torcy in ceremonial garb of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Torcy is wearing the eight-pointed cross (also seen at the top of the frame) suspended from a blue ribbon (cordon bleu) and robes of the Order of the Holy Spirit. His long mantle is of velvet and embroidered with gold and red flames to symbolize the tongues of fire at Pentecost. His ceremonial black hat with its white plume is on the table. The “H” with royal crowns above it and at its sides in the upper corners of the frame stands for Henri III, who founded the order in 1578.

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Berry and nephew Orléans with collars of the Order of the Golden Fleece from the new Bourbon king of Spain, Torcy stood in as chancellor of the Golden Fleece in the magnificent ceremony.214 The order’s four officers were lucrative and prestigious positions,215 but also entailed actual work and of a potentially contentious nature. Collaborating closely with the king on the selection of members provided Torcy with patronage possibilities at home as well as a means of rewarding the faithful French and foreigners who aided diplomacy. Establishing the requisite proofs of nobility could be touchy, as could the ever-contentious matter of ceremony. Adam managed much of the paperwork related to this charge and was well compensated for it.216 If Maintenon’s chamber, where the aging Louis XIV often met with his ministers, was the most important unofficial physical location of royal power, then the “Cabinet du roi” (king’s Cabinet) was its primary official centre, as was also the royal bedchamber. The Cabinet was where the monarch received important visitors such as ambassadors, met with his councillors, closeted with individual administrators and advisors, and worked privately with his Cabinet staff. The “huissier du cabinet du roi” (cabinet usher), of which there were two serving by semester, acted as doorkeeper to this the most restricted of public royal spaces, where entry was by invitation only. He summoned ministers to the Cabinet for meetings of the Conseil and then watched at the door to keep out the uninvited. Each usher received 660 livres annual gages and 600 livres of other compensation from the royal treasury in addition to food and lodging at court. Department accounts show that usher MichelNicolas Vassal also received an annual 600-livre pension from the foreign office.217 While no reason is given, it was perhaps a reward for his assistance with the diplomatic audiences that took place in the Cabinet. In any event, he was part of the network of actors outside the formal department needed to fulfil its many responsibilities. The foreign office benefited from the placement of other department personnel at the king’s side in his Cabinet. As a “secrétaire du Cabinet” (cabinet secretary), Bergeret enhanced his ability to brief the king on the minister’s behalf, which explains Bonrepaus’s hope that his friend and Croissy’s secretary Blondel might succeed to that office.218 As it happened, it was left vacant until 1698, when Louis XIV conferred it on Callières as a reward for his work at Ryswick, no doubt at Torcy’s suggestion or at least with his approval, for he and Callières worked closely and amicably. At the beginning of 1701, upon the passing of the venerable President Toussaint Rose, principal cabinet secretary since 1657,



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Callières was awarded his post, again with Torcy’s likely endorsement. This placed him daily at the king’s side assisting in drafting and writing his correspondence and creating an intimate working relationship that rivaled or exceeded that of any minister.219 Had an intimate or client of Torcy’s rivals Chamillart or Jérôme Pontchartrain laboured so close to the king’s side and to his ear, the results might have caused Torcy no end of trouble. There was another set of household offices important to diplomacy, especially when its ritual was played out in the theatre that was the court. Royal audiences typically took place in public in the royal bedchamber in the morning. The ushers and the first gentleman of the chamber had parts in these performances, but the real directors of the formalities were the introducers of ambassadors, venal royal household officers subject directly to the king. The introducers were essential moulders of the milieu of protocol that enveloped most diplomacy, and they worked in close collaboration and cooperation with Torcy and his staff on diplomatic visits and audiences.220 The palace and its grounds were the settings for the many formal and informal social occasions not ostensibly dedicated to negotiation. Yet they allowed Torcy and his master to seek to impress and take the measure of diplomats and visiting princes. Tours of the exquisite gardens of Versailles demonstrated the affluence and taste of a monarch who commanded men of genius to subject nature with such pleasing effect; with their hydraulic wonders, the gardens formed an integral part of the welcome given to important foreigners new to the wonders wrought by the Sun King. It is no surprise that Torcy, who like his master had a highly developed aesthetic sense, took part in such occasions.221 Clearly, neither the work of the foreign office nor its clerks were confined to the bureaus flanking the front of Versailles, but instead ranged throughout that vast complex in frequent and often intimate collaboration with others of its denizens, including postal staff and members of the royal household.

T h e In f o r m a l “Brai n Trust” In May 1709 Torcy walked a diplomatic tightrope as direct peace negotiations opened with Grand Pensionary Heinsius, the Duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene. Such high-level talks could result in triumph, disaster, or something in between for both France and the foreign secretary. He later reflected in his memoirs that while negotiating alone in The Hague, he realized that “in an affair of such importance he stood

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in need of assistance” and so summoned the veteran diplomat Rouillé to his side. Only a person with “very little experience,” he mused, could imagine “his own knowledge sufficient.” Such a one would likely “see his presumption punished by mistakes, which he could have avoided, had he taken prudent counsel.” Torcy knew that his plans could only benefit from discussion with an informed colleague willing to offer needed criticism, observing that the “mind is enlightened by contradictions when these arise from a mutual desire of seeking and discovering the truth.”222 This desire for frank and expert advice was characteristic of Torcy, who in the great Colbertian tradition sought it from outside his department as well. The foreign ministry’s bureaus were also linked to an informal and loosely structured “brain trust of specialists” comprised of a variety of experts.223 Those few regularly employed by the foreign office served in capacities that set them apart from the clerks. These intellectuals and scholars, with a wide range of interests and occupations, typically resided in Paris or nearby, but were linked with the learned throughout France and Europe, receiving and sharing scholarly as well as political and court news.224 From his uncle and his father Torcy inherited the services of Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, the well-connected scholar and spymaster, and Pierre Clairambault, librarian and genealogist. Both worked for other ministers as well. Torcy engaged the services of Abbé JeanBaptiste Dubos, a well-traveled intellectual, writer, and notable figure of the early Enlightenment, in frequent correspondence with the critic and philosopher Pierre Bayle from the 1690s until the latter’s death in 1706. Dubos contributed to and defended Bayle’s learned and provocatively heterodox Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1687) and drew others into contributing to Bayle’s widely read publication, including members of Torcy’s brain trust, such as Nicolas Clément, head of the royal library.225 Using his contacts in the Republic of Letters for purchasing books abroad, Dubos received copies from London of the works of the English political arithmetician Charles Davenant from none other than John Locke, which the abbé then used for French propaganda purposes.226 Another of Bayle’s long-time co-labourers in the Republic of Letters, Daniel Larroque, had interacted with many of these savants since the early 1680s and continued to do so when he entered Torcy’s service as a translator. Antony McKenna, in his introduction to a volume of Bayle’s correspondence, lists Dubos and Larroque among the “secretaries” of the Republic of Letters, each with his own “réseau” (network) of correspondents.227



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Like his father, Torcy was careful to cultivate and even protect the librarians of important collections. A case in point is the affair of Jean Aymon, former French priest and now a married Calvinist minister, who arrived in Paris to sell a collection to the royal library and attracted the interest of Clément, Pontchartrain, and Cardinal-Archbishop Noailles by feigning a desire to reconvert and help with anti-Huguenot propaganda. Clément allowed him access to the library, but when Aymon disappeared with several ancient manuscripts of potential value to the Protestant cause, it touched off a crisis in the Republic of Letters. While many Protestants rejoiced over Aymon’s acquisitions, Clément appealed through Renier Leers to the higher values of scholarship over sectarian loyalties and the chevalier de Croissy enlisted the covert assistance of moderate Protestant pastor Jacques Basnage and his brother journalist Henri Basnage de Beauval to recover the stolen items. Apprised of the theft, the king had Torcy intervene, which he did initially through the Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin, but given the state of war between France and the Dutch, it was only in 1709 that the StatesGeneral saw to it that Aymon returned the most important stolen manuscript to the chevalier de Croissy, who traveled to The Hague to receive it.228 Clairambault, another Colbert librarian, assisted Torcy from 1698 as genealogist of the Royal Orders, an essential post given the proof of four degrees of hereditary nobility required for membership.229 After 1700 Clairambault and his friend and fellow scholar Abbé Joachim Le Grand paged through many an arcane genealogical text or dusty document on Torcy’s behalf to resolve the sensitive issue of aligning French chivalric orders with those of newly Bourbon Spain.230 At his behest, Clairambault also researched the rights of the marc d’or, a tax on the registration of the provisions for venal offices that paid the gages of the officers of the Order of the Holy Spirit.231 The Oratorian Joachim Le Grand was a widely traveled master of many languages, avid researcher, and prolific author of historical works who educated Pomponne’s nephew and the young Victor Marie, comte then duc d’Estrées in the early 1680s. A series of disputes over Reformation history with Anglican bishop Gilbert Burnet from 1685 to 1691 led him to frequent the royal library, where he joined the learned circle of Melschisidec Thévenot, Clément, Baluze, Renaudot, and Clairambault.232 In 1692 Abbé d’Estrées, named ambassador to Portugal, engaged Le Grand as his secretary. When he returned to Paris around August of 1697, Le Grand had mastered Portuguese and gathered source materials he later used to write on Portuguese history. His plans for a study on Louis XI

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took him, with Louis Pontchartrain’s authorization, on several provincial journeys in search of manuscripts. His busy authorial activities were interrupted in 1702 when he went as secretary with Cardinal d’Estrées and his nephew the abbé, this time to Spain. Le Grand remained as secretary when Abbé d’Estrées replaced his uncle as ambassador in 1703 and accompanied d’Estrées and Philip V to the Portuguese frontier in 1704. He also undertook favours for friends and patrons, such as copying designs of the royal Spanish insignia and forms of address for Clairam­ bault.233 He resided with Clairambault when he returned home in 1704 and was summoned by Torcy in 1705 to assist in organizing, summarizing, and creating tables for diplomatic papers with the help of six assistants, serving the foreign office thereafter on a permanent basis.234 Other experts included Abbé René Aubert de Vertôt, historian and associate of the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres who served the foreign office as a writer.235 Jean de La Chapelle, a financial official, aspiring dramatist, and member of the Académie française, penned propaganda for the ministry. Like the others, both were men of some standing in literary circles at court and throughout Europe, valued and respected for their knowledge and intellectual abilities. All these experts were widely agreed to possess “specialized practical or productive knowledge” based in part on their own experience and in part on information gathered by others from which they drew useful abstractions for royal service.236 Such knowledge was a valued commodity in early modern Europe and was exchanged and diffused by means of a vast network of thousands of correspondents who managed to permeate barriers to the free flow of information posed by confessional differences and war. This flow included new and used books, copies from manuscripts and rare books, research queries and answers, corrections to published works, and recommendations that created new personal or epistolatory links among scholars. Personal and political news was an important part of this as well.237 Torcy valued these experts and the precious commodity of information and networks of informants they offered. He consulted them on historical and legal questions238 and on countries to which they had traveled. He also engaged them for research and writing projects relating to his administrative tasks and for the production of propaganda. Several of them, as will be seen, contributed significantly to the genesis and implementation of Torcy’s academy for the training of diplomats. Indeed, discussions and exchanges through the networks of the Republic of Letters helped spread ideas and models for diplomatic professionalism beyond France.239



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The Republic of Letters was also a rich source of information for Torcy on the movement of ideas outside of France. The Huguenot refugee and moderate pastor Jacques Basnage, the chevalier de Croissy’s friend, encountered Torcy in May 1709 when the foreign secretary journeyed to The Hague for secret peace talks. During the 1710 Gertruydenberg peace talks, Basnage likely advised Dutch negotiators Willem Buys and Bruno Van der Dussen on the hopes of the French Huguenot refugees. In April 1711 the pastor sent Torcy condolences on the death of the Dauphin, and they remained in contact thereafter. With the full knowledge of his protector Heinsius, Basnage supplied Torcy with pertinent pamphlets and news about international events and the state of public opinion in the United Provinces and England, and the foreign secretary pumped him for information about Buys, the Dutch negotiator. Basnage also helped the French delegation with passports and housing at the Utrecht peace conference. In turn, Torcy did what he could to assure that Basnage’s sister, who had returned to France and converted, inherited their late mother’s large Normandy estate, since he could not.240 Although not actually a member of Torcy’s brain trust, Basnage nonetheless made it clear that Torcy was open to sources of useful information no matter where he might find it. Torcy’s circle of specialists also embraced envoys and other embassy personnel home from duty abroad, retired diplomats, former commis, and royal household officials. Some, such as Polignac, he had known from his youth. Likewise, Iberville, a Pomponne commis from 1678 retained by Croissy, became treasurer of France at Caen in 1687 and then joined Normandy’s Chambre des comptes. Appointed resident in Geneva in 1688, he remained at that vital listening post until 1698, served thereafter as extraordinary envoy to Mainz, Genoa, and Spain, and crowned his career with a posting to London from 1713 to 1717. Iberville was cultivated and politically pragmatic, a friend of literary figures such as Fontenelle, Renaudot, and Clément, and generally well regarded, especially by Torcy.241 Callières and Rousseau de Chamoy were active diplomats. From 1683, Callières actively participated in a group of Colbert clients that included Renaudot, Thévenot, premier commis Bergeret, and others with expertise or interest in non-European languages and locations, particularly in the east. They were especially connected with navy secretary Seignelay, the location of whose department bureaus led some to dub them the “Society of the rue des Victoires.”242 When negotiating at Ryswick in 1697, Callières was among those of the French delegation who journeyed to Rotterdam to pay their homage to Bayle.243 A former

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jeune de langues and current interpreter at the Constantinople embassy, Benjamin Brue, was in Paris in 1709–10 on behalf of the French Levant community to report to Torcy on the erratic and violent behaviour of Ambassador Ferriol. While in France, he interacted with other orientalists and numismatists and drafted a number of memoirs at Torcy’s request on Ottoman affairs and Ferriol’s comportment. Interestingly, the ambassador’s sister Mme de Ferriol, said to be Torcy’s mistress, facilitated Brue’s presentation to Torcy of an agate he had brought from the Levant. Torcy was delighted.244 François Pidou de Saint-Olon, another close associate, became a “gentilhomme ordinaire” (ordinary gentleman) in the king’s household in the late 1680s through his father’s connection with Colbert. Although of a relatively poor noble family, he received a good education, traveled widely, and was polite, easy of manner, and polished of speech. He often read to the king, carried royal messages, conducted guests on palace tours, and sometimes served as an unofficial master of ceremonies.245 His youthful travels to Morocco and along the Barbary Coast to Cairo, Aleppo, Smyrna, Constantinople, and back through the Adriatic, studying Arabic along the way, later led Croissy to have him instruct Torcy about North Africa and the Ottoman Empire. In 1682, as extraordinary envoy to Genoa, he gathered intelligence on the city’s finances and port facilities, and he subsequently advised Croissy on Mediterranean and Italian affairs. During the struggle between Innocent XI and Louis XIV in 1687 and 1688, he was Croissy’s personal representative guarding the nuncio Angelo Maria Ranuzzi being held under house arrest.246 Before Torcy’s 1689 departure for Rome, Saint-Olon briefed him on his conversations with Ranuzzi. Later, Torcy and Louis XIV had him carry gifts and greetings to the Sultan of Morocco, who had requested that a man of quality be sent to his court. When he returned to Paris in 1694, he described his adventures in a book beautifully illustrated by an artist in his entourage. His successful mission led Sultan Moulay Isma’il to respond to Louis XIV’s invitation by sending an embassy of his own to Versailles in 1698.247 Carried by a French fleet, the Moroccans reached Brest at the end of November to be met by Saint-Olon and his friend and associate François Petit de la Croix, the Collège royal’s professor of Arabic. Saint-Olon was present at the Moroccans’ day-long conference with Jérôme Pontchartrain and Torcy and when the latter presented them to the king. He cautioned Torcy that the sultan’s greed, vanity, and ambition were limitless, but tempered this gloomy observation by noting that even if a treaty were not signed at once, at least a Moroccan



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sovereign had begun diplomatic relations with the king and accepted the king’s gifts.248 In 1715 he assisted in the Persian embassy’s reception, meeting it at Marseilles and accompanying it to Versailles.249 When Torcy needed expert advice, he was adept at recruiting specialists from other departments as well. The engineer Vauban, long associated with the Le Telliers, gravitated after Louvois’s death to Jérôme Pontchartrain. Although he had intensely disliked Torcy’s uncle, he had nonetheless worked with him on fortifications.250 Vauban frequented the salons of Torcy’s sister, duchesse de Saint-Pierre, and his purported mistress, Marie-Angélique de Tencin, comtesse de Ferriol, where he encountered the minister, ambassadors, and savants such as Antoine Furetière, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, and Abbé Dubos, who may have introduced him to Davenant’s political arithmetic. Vauban collaborated with Torcy on common concerns that included propaganda.251 In need of expert advice on Spanish trade, Torcy sought out Nicolas Mesnager from the newly established Council of Commerce. Mesnager knew global commerce, grasped the intricacies of the Spanish asiento agreement, and had written a widely acclaimed book on Spanish trade. Torcy sent him to Holland several times for commercial negotiations. Valuing Mesnager’s expertise and modesty, he nominated him a plenipotentiary to the Utrecht Congress in 1712 and instructed his clerks to supply him with whatever data he needed.252 The ability to have swift consultation among individuals in this shifting assortment of experts largely depended on who was not away from Paris, absent from court, on assignment abroad, or preoccupied with another project. This brain trust shows again that there is more to a bureaucracy than what appears on the typical organizational chart (including those in the present work!). Torcy and his commis sought and received expert advice of all kinds based on the studies, travels, contacts, life experiences, and reflections of a network outside the bureaus, comprised of savants and diplomats that stretched throughout Europe. Important parts of the foreign ministry’s work, including propaganda, would have languished without the research and writing they did. Departing diplomats would have received less-satisfactory briefing for lack of the cosmopolitan contribution of these experts. Commercial negotiations would have suffered from the lack of precise data and analysis by those familiar with the intricacies of manufacturing, agriculture, and trade. Of course, Torcy, his fellow ministers, and especially the king had the final say in the formulation of policy, but although we cannot calculate precisely the value of the expert advice they received, we

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must not underestimate it. It has been observed, “We shall generally find that the triangular person has got into the square hole, the oblong into the triangular, and a square person has squeezed himself into the round hole. The officer and the office, the doer and the thing done, seldom fit so exactly that we can say they were almost made for each other.”253 This reality requires that we look beyond formal structures to complementary networks of actors if we wish to understand bureaucratic organizations. Prescribed organizational structures and the personnel who populate them impose constraints upon one another; contingency theory demonstrates that it is out of their daily dialectic that organizational reality emerges.254 Although we have already mentioned several of Torcy’s clerks, we now turn to a more detailed examination of these individuals and the groups to which the belonged in order to perceive the foreign office’s organizational reality.

6 The Triumph of the Commis

Clerks of all stripes, targets of growing anti-bureaucratic invective during the eighteenth century, nonetheless gave life to the evolving organization of the foreign ministry and were major contributors to its glory then and later. As Louis XIV himself noted in regard to himself, “Not all the reputation of great men is formed by great actions. Since the most menial ones are performed the most often, it is on them that our true inclinations are judged.”1 This was equally true of Torcy’s clerks as seen in the tasks they performed within the ministry’s bureaus and in the personal networks they drew on beyond its walls. In this chapter we reconstruct some careers that illustrate the fundamental personal interconnections that underlay this bureaucracy’s functioning. The clerk’s world was at first glance a small one of bureaucrats toiling in the rather artificial administrative city of Versailles.2 There or in Paris, they laboured and lived typically in close proximity to the minister and to one another.3 Many owed their position to a father or uncle, and the kinship network extended further because several department families were connected by marriage, both prior to and after entry into the foreign office. Most of Croissy’s and Torcy’s clerks entered the department because of links with the Colbert client network or, after Torcy’s marriage, with that of Pomponne. It would be misleading, however, to portray the careers, especially of the premiers commis, as circumscribed by the foreign office, the royal palace, or the capital. A premier commis typically owned property outside the capital, often a country seat with feudal appurtenances that signaled his arrival and further ascent in society and included a role in local life.4 Clerks were attached to roots, whether of long standing or of recent planting, that typically intertwined with those of the local elite families and their interests. Marriage alliances outside the department

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could enhance a premier commis’s influence and standing. He usually held significant outside offices that provided him with nobility, prestige, and sometimes significant revenues (table 6.1). Documents identifying a premier commis usually listed the titles of these offices first. Indeed, he might not even identify himself as a premier commis, preferring only his more socially significant titles.5 Such offices also allowed a premier commis to acquire contacts, relationships, information, and influence6 outside the department, lessening his complete dependence on the minister and linking him to other powerful patrons. In a system where the monarch could make or break a minister at will, it behooved those in his entourage to avoid “placing all their bets on one horse.” If a minister died, was passed over, or fell, his clients, including his clerks, had to have other patrons to turn to or some other means of retaining ministerial or royal favour.7 When the great accumulations of posts held by the Colberts and Le Telliers before 1691 gave way to a greater number of separate departments and a wider dispersion of ministerial power, the scope and sway of the past’s extensive ministerial clienteles also declined. A new patronage system more directly dependent on the monarch and more related to the staff member’s knowledge and skill meant more independence from the current minister and greater staff stability when he left office. Ministerial favour and connections still mattered in obtaining positions and advancement within a department’s bureaucracy, but professionalism played an increasing role.8 These fluid circumstances made venal offices a wise investment for family survival and advancement.9 The office of secretary of the king, for example, even elevated its holder into the same corporate body to which all secretaries of state were still required to belong.10 Yet the minister and the department’s work also profited from the links of his clerks and their kin with other parts of the administration and with influential families at court, throughout France, and abroad. For this reason, our discussion of clerks will as much as possible consider them as groups, especially based on kinship and marriage, and explore the family and clientage networks outside the department within which they were embedded. Since many of these bonds were forged long before Torcy’s time, we are drawn to the early seventeenth century, which is fitting since early modern people saw themselves not as isolated individuals but as embedded in a continuum reaching back and forward in time. The notion of the “self-made man” was foreign to their thinking, whereas clans and lineages were not.11 Individuals belonged to kinship and clientage networks through which they both expressed and restrained their individuality.12

Table 6.1 Venal offices, honours, and other positions held by the department’s clerks

Clerk Clair Adam Charles Mignon

Year Entered Dept. 1667 1680

• 1691–1723

•

• 1706–16

•

•

c. 1675

• 1683–98

François Blondel

1680

• 1694–96 • 1697–98 • 1697–1712 • 1699–1711 • 1704–24

Michel Fournier

1680

• ? • 1673–? • 1698–

1730? Charles-François Noblet

1698

• 1685 • 1691 • 1697 • 1702 • 1702

Antoine Pecquet

1700

• 1705–13 • 1713–20 • 1715 • 1717–28

Victor Goulu de Ligny Antoine-François Faucard de Beauchamp

Venal Offices, Honours, and Other Positions

Years Held

1702

• Before

1707

• 1713

1702– ?

Secretary of the king 1 Treasurer of the ambassadors • Receiver of tailles at Péronne in Picardy • Secretary of the king • Treasurer of France at Caen • Secretary of the king • Agent for city and chamber of Marseille in Paris • Intendant and alternate authorizing officer in the king’s buildings department • Secretary of the king • Alternate receiver general of tailles at Péronne in Picardy • Treasurer of France at Caen • Treasurer of France at Rouen • Secretary of the king • Garde des Minutes (custodian of the minutes) of the Grand Chancellery • Chevalier of the Order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem and of Notre-Dame de Mont-Carmel • Greffier en chef (chief registrar) of the Chambre des comptes • Secretary des commandements (of commandments) of the Duke of Burgundy • Auditor in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany • Treasurer of France general of finances in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany • Granted letters of nobility • Secretary of the king • Commis of the Extraordinary of War for the Army of Italy • Maître (master) in the Chambre des Comptes of Brittany

Sources: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.

1 There is no indication of any offices held by premiers commis Aubert and Marolot, but neither of them was a secretary of the king. 2 The office of secretary of the king is noted in small capitals because it was such an important path for advancement into the nobility and was also necessary so that this office-holder could countersign royal acts.

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While service to the minister and increasingly to the king motivated a clerk in his work, an equal or even greater incentive was the proximity it afforded him to information concerning royal favours to be granted and to those empowered to award them. Unquestionably, the minister was served by staff intent upon enhancing the position and wealth of themselves and the other members of their kinship network.13

T he M ig n o n s : M u n ic ipa l Offi ce, Bourgeoi s T r a d e s , a n d Fi nance Croissy’s death brought no immediate personnel changes to the department since the new secretary was no outsider, but a co-worker among men with whom he had grown up and learned his craft. Charles Mignon,14 who remained premier commis, was from a provincial family of new men emerging in the decades before the Colbert ascendancy at court (figure 6.1).15 Even before Mignon entered Colbert service, one brother became a “gen du roi” (one who represented the king in a parlement), another became a secretary of the king, and his sisters made promising marriages into well-connected and ascending provincial and Parisian families in the judiciary, finance, and booming bourgeois trades. Like that of the other premiers commis, Mignon’s employment with Croissy and Torcy was not the beginning or even the cause of his ascent, but signaled how far his family had already risen outside the department. It was emblematic as well of the decline of noble clienteles in the face of growing ministerial clienteles.16 Service to the Colberts certainly enhanced Mignon’s status and provided him and his kin further opportunities, but it was only one, although increasingly the most significant, of many ladders in a strategy of family ascent. From a family of lawyers in Berry, Charles Mignon’s father, René I Mignon,17 served as intendant of the Pot de Rhodes family: first, for Marguerite d’Aubray, widow of François Pot de Rhodes, grand master of ceremonies of France, who died in 1622, and then for their son Claude, who succeeded to his father’s office, dying in 1642.18 From as early as 1623, however, René was also attached to the urbane Charles de l’Aubespine, sieur de Châteauneuf and Abbé Préaux, like his father a respected diplomat and member of parlement.19 René resided with him in Paris as his intendant and secretary.20 Named “garde des sceaux” (guard of the seals) in 1630, Châteauneuf saw his seigneury raised to a barony and then to a marquisate. His soaring ambition resulted in twenty years of fruitless conniving to displace Richelieu and then ­Mazarin as head of

Figure 6.1 Genealogical chart: the Mignons. The birth order of the Mignon siblings is an approximation based on the available information.

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the royal council. Although he was close to Anne of Austria, his incessant intrigues eventually alienated the king and Richelieu, resulting in 1633 in his disgrace and ten-year imprisonment. His trusted agent René was also arrested and closely questioned, especially about his master’s papers, and then put in the Bastille. He was soon released, however, and back attending to Châteauneuf’s business, such as overseeing additions to his chateau at Montrouge just south of Paris in collaboration with the architect François Mansart and the master stonemason Michel Villedo. Châteauneuf’s fortunes improved with Richelieu’s death, but he was unable to replace the new cardinal in the queen regent’s confidence, even though he regained the seals in 1650 when the Fronde forced her to seek an ally. Aged seventy-two and still not reconciled to Mazarin’s hegemony, Châteauneuf lost his office again the next year, but still schemed and was briefly recalled until Mazarin’s triumphant return from exile in 1652 ended all his hopes and led to his own exile in Berry.21 As he lay dying, Mazarin, ever anxious to win over former opponents even if not affording them his full trust, smoothed the way for Châteauneuf’s heirs to succeed to their inheritance.22 René administered Châteauneuf’s provision for the construction of a family tomb in a chapel in Bourges Cathedral (completed in about 1659). Acting as agent for Châteauneuf’s brother and heir, he again worked with Mansart and also with the sculptor Philippe de Buyster.23 Like Châteauneuf, René I Mignon was a man of Paris as well as of Bourges. The business of his imprisoned or exiled master drew him often to the capital. In 1648, at the outset of the Fronde, the courtier F ­ rançois de Rochechouart, sieur de Jars, Châteauneuf’s friend and fellow conspirator against both cardinals, commissioned Mansart to build a townhouse for him in the trendy new quarter on (ironically) rue Richelieu. Since Jars borrowed from Châteauneuf for the project and likely from Mignon as well, Mignon handled the finances and was presumably otherwise involved, especially since the master stonemason at the site, Michel Villedo fils, had married Mignon’s daughter Anne three years earlier.24 Joseph Bergin warns that “the vocabulary of service conceals as much as it reveals about seventeenth-century realities.”25 Thus, secretaries and valets who served noble households, despite such seemingly humble labels, could actually do so with pride as they basked in their masters’ reflected status and power, much like those with similar positions in the royal household. Early modern grandees were not isolated i­ndividuals, but rose and fell because of the family (of blood as well as of ­marriage),



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friends, patrons, clients, and servants surrounding them, literally from cradle to grave. As elite fortunes waxed and waned, so often did those of persons connected with them, including servants. What domestics lacked in birth and initial status they made up for in daily direct or written contact with their “betters” and the intimate knowledge they possessed of their fortune and most private affairs. The typically scattered property holdings and financial assets (and liabilities) of the upper nobility required an extensive management network of assistants with legal and administrative skills. At a time when the overlapping or even blending of the private and public was both accepted and pushed to its limits, the ranks of experienced household servants provided public officials loyal as well as talented recruits. Like his master did when serving the king, a noble’s servant mixed the advancement of his own kin and clients with his master’s business. As long as this did not violate his interests, the master both approved and aided this with rewards and preferments, which curiously often resulted in a financial symbiosis wherein the rewarded servant personally loaned money to his noble employer, who, like most noblemen, was forever short of money.26 This is the context of René I Mignon’s service to Châteauneuf and his own strategy of family advancement. The alliance with the Villedos was just one of the promising matches arranged for his numerous children from among his master’s and his own connections in Berry and Paris. René I’s own bride was Gertrude La Houst, an Antwerp native who received a naturalization letter on 25 February 1623 and married Mignon three months later.27 She also appears in a 1654 agreement concluded between the churchwardens at Montrouge and the Mignons, and is listed as heir of the late Pierre Fouquet, controller of the household of the late prior of Condé.28 Like her husband, her kin, too, served as agents of the nobility. The Mignons established themselves at Montrouge and enjoyed a privileged position in local society. The five Mignon daughters were all married by 1658. Charlotte married Jean Marpon, seigneur d’Oislon and de Chezeau, commissioner general of marine artillery, king’s councillor, and president treasurer general for the king in Berry.29 As already noted, Anne wed Michel Villedo fils.30 Jeanne married Claude Bécuau, sieur de Coulombe and des Réaux, king’s councillor for the bailliage of Berry and the présidial of B ­ ourges, 31 and mayor of Bourges (1678–82), while Marguerite wed Nicolas Fournier, perhaps from a family of stone masons and royal architects.32 Finally, Gertrude (died 1700) married Charles Noblet de Morgard (died c. 1686), secretary to François-Marie l’Hospital, duc de Vitry, and

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a ­secretary of the king from 1653 to 1685.33 Each of these marriages involved a husband either in or eventually drawn into Colbert’s service. Yet three husbands were from family circles originally opposed to the cardinals or to Colbert and were therefore under some shadow when Louis XIV’s personal reign began. Like his father-in-law, Jean Marpon served the l’Aubespine family as procureur for François de l’Aubespine, seigneur d’Hauterive, brother and heir of the garde des sceaux, although his older brother, Richard Marpon, had served Richelieu. As one of the two commissioners general of marine artillery and a member of the bureau of finances for Berry, Jean Marpon (if he lived that long) may have eventually migrated into Colbert’s clientage as the fortunes of the l’Aubespines waned.34 The second duc de Vitry, whom Charles Noblet served, was a son of Nicolas de l’Hospital, marshal and first duc de Vitry, acclaimed assassin of the hated royal favourite Concino Concini and from 1637 imprisoned at Richelieu’s instigation, though he was released at the cardinal’s death. Disgruntled with Anne’s regency, the second duke was a Frondeur supporting Cardinal Jean-François de Gondi, cardinal de Retz and garde des sceaux Châteauneuf. Memory of his father’s past service to the crown, however, won him rehabilitation, and Vitry eventually added diplomacy to his military service to the crown. He married (1646) the daughter of Grand Master of Ceremonies Claude Pot de Rhodes, whose family René I Mignon had served as intendant.35 This may explain the marriage to Gertrude Mignon of Vitry’s secretary Charles Noblet, son of Michel Noblet, avocat in the Paris parlement, and newly minted nobleman by the purchase of the office of secretary of the king in 1651. Noblet was also connected to Pomponne, to whom he loaned money and sold property in Paris for building an orangerie. During the first half of the 1660s Pomponne was also under a shadow, doubly damned in the king’s eye by his family’s Jansenism and his own links with Nicolas Fouquet, which may have tainted Noblet as well.36 However, Villedo fils, Louis Le Vau’s entrepreneur at the fallen minister’s Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte, like the other talented builders and artists who had served Fouquet, was drawn into the king’s and Colbert’s service.37 The other matches were with men clearly in both cardinals’ camps. Although in the 1660s Claude Bécuau earned low marks in the intendant’s report to Colbert as a judge in the Bourges présidial, he was from a line of Bourges municipal officials who had remained loyal to the king during the Fronde and was therefore a valued client.38 While mayor of Bourges, he negotiated the city’s 1682 acquisition of the Hôtel Jacques



The Triumph of the Commis 233

Coeur and the Hôtel Limoges from Colbert, marquis de Châteauneuf since 1679, to the minister’s financial advantage. Subsequent municipal officials complained not about the 33,000 livres cost, but about what they regarded as the humiliating and onerous additional requirement: every four years on the feast of Saint Jean-Baptiste (!) they were as a group to present to the marquis in person a gold medal with his arms on one side and those of Bourges and its current mayor on the other. They groused at the unseemliness of the magistrates of the proud former capital of Gaul leaving their city unprotected while they trudged off to a small town to render homage. Bécuau may also have delayed the next municipal election to allow Secretary of State Croissy to push through a list of candidates favoured by the king.39 The Mignon’s second son, Jacques, was wed on 29 January 1658 to Louise Le Vau, the not-yet-sixteen-year-old daughter of the famous architect with whom René I had earlier worked. This wedding took place two days after that of Louise’s older sister Jeanne Le Vau, who married Henry Guichard, who like his father served in the Orléans household. Each of Louis Le Vau’s daughters received a dowry of 60,000 livres and, even better, a Paris house built by her father on the fashionable Île Saint-Louis. Jacques Mignon was later involved with his brother-inlaw ­Guichard’s bitter quarrel with the musician Jean-Baptiste Lully.40 Le Vau, son of a master mason, himself had eschewed the normal selection of a mate from among other mason families and did so for his daughters as well, part of a strategy of social advancement that led to his appointment as royal architect in 1655.41 Jacques Mignon’s own ascent was apparent when he joined (2 May 1656) the Metz parlement as second avocat général. As one of the gens du roi he participated in several of the parlement’s clashes with the city officials and royal governor of Toul, where it reluctantly sat, and in 1658 he was physically attacked by the governor’s agents. Although by 1661 Jacques had left that post, he remained a councillor secretary of the king and apparently became linked with Colbert.42 After Louis Le Vau’s death as a bankrupt in 1670, Jacques Mignon and his brother-in-law Guichard joined the other creditors in their legal assaults, including charges of embezzlement, on Le Vau’s estate. Although his widow appealed to Colbert for protection from her sons-in-law, he stood aside during this assault on the former royal architect’s reputation.43 Jacques’s older brother René II did not marry until 1675, when he wed Marguerite, daughter of Claude I Robert, a distinguished avocat au ­Parlement of Paris, originally from Chartres. Her oldest brother, Claude II

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Robert, was a financier who became royal prosecutor in the New Châtelet that Colbert created in 1674 and served as the Colbert family’s legal advisor. Interestingly, Claude II’s Châtelet assignment included assisting in its Chambre des bâtiments, where matters relating to building were regulated and adjudicated, including disputes between entrepreneurs and their suppliers and workers. Three general masters sat alternatively in Paris or at Versailles to settle disputes and control entrance into the ranks of master masons. In 1674 François Villedo, brother of Claude II’s sister’s brother-in-law, Michel Villedo fils, was one of them. M ­ arguerite’s youngest brother, François-Roger Robert, would likewise join Colbert’s clientage as a navy officer of the pen in 1682, ending his fifty-four years of service as intendant of Brest.44 In 1658 René II Mignon became a secretary of the king upon the resignation of brother-in-law Jean ­Marpon’s brother Richard, who had spent the requisite twenty years in office to acquire nobility but had no children of his own. René II benefited from the custom whereby a family ennobled its members by rotating this office among them.45 Like his father and his brother-in-law, young René II entered the l’Aubespines’ service as intendant for François de l’Aubespine, marquis de Châteauneuf, the garde des sceaux’s brother and heir.46 After his own father’s death (René I died some time before May 1665), René II remained with the l’Aubespines, even when François died and his son Charles became marquis in 1670. Sometime after his own 1675 marriage into the Colbert clientage, however, René II entered Colbert’s service as his intendant and confidential agent. Colbert, who had long desired a holding in Berry, jumped at the opportunity to acquire Châteauneuf and other seigneuries from the l’Aubespines when they lost them in a 1679 court judgment. Their former intendant took charge of this rich mixture of urban and rural lands and rights on Colbert’s behalf, facilitating the transition. In May 1681 the Châteauneuf barony was erected into a marquisate held directly from the king.47 René II worked with his new master to improve the productivity of the farms, to introduce cloth manufacturing to relieve rural poverty, and to acquire further noble lands. For his efforts he was awarded the contract (“traité”) for the general receipts of Bourges in 1680.48 It was likely René II Mignon who arranged with his brother-in-law, Bourges mayor Claude Bécuau, the municipality’s purchase of Jacques Coeur’s properties that flattered Colbert’s ego and irked the other city fathers. This is the milieu into which Charles Mignon, another of René I’s sons, began his association with the Colberts.49 Yet the chronology of



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the family’s migration into the Colbert clientage suggests that Charles Mignon was in fact the first to enter it during summer 1663, when he joined Croissy as secretary on his journey to the Estates of Brittany as commissioner general. Mignon followed Croissy later that year to an intendancy in Tours and Poitiers (until 1665) and to one in Amiens and Soissons in 1666. During the War of Devolution in 1667, Croissy served as intendant of the Army of Flanders. The following year he was named a state councillor and the first intendant of newly conquered Flanders, presumably still assisted by Mignon. In 1668, with Mignon as his secretary, Croissy traveled as extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary to the peace congress at Aix-la-Chapelle and then to England as ambassador until January 1674.50 In London, Mignon became friends with the great diarist Samuel Pepys, clerk of the acts of the Navy Board, who visited Mignon when he and Mrs Pepys journeyed to Paris in September and October 1669.51 Croissy was designated one of the plenipotentiaries to the Nijmegen peace congress in June 1675, but it was only a year later that the French delegation, with Mignon as secretary, received passports from the Spanish. It required two more years of tough talking to bring the Dutch and then the Spanish to terms. A grateful Louis XIV presented Mignon with a medal depicting Louis XIII, which became a valued family heirloom.52 Six months after the signing but while the negotiators were still in Nijmegen, the king commissioned a commemorative painting of it in which a standing Mignon is shown handing a pen to Godefroy, comte d’Estrades, with Croissy seated to his left ­(figure 6.2).53 He was likely with Croissy in Bavaria in 1679, where he was extraordinary envoy to the elector until named to replace Pomponne on 20 November. When he took office two months later, Mignon served as one of his two premiers commis, with great influence in Croissy’s department, in other parts of the royal administration, and in the provinces.54 One year after returning from London, Mignon married (contract signed 24 February 1675). He joined himself not just to a wife but, in the manner of early modern marriages, to a web woven from the threads of kinship and clientage. Catherine Lefouin (Le Fouin) was the daughter of Paris wine merchant Michel Lefouin, son of Nicolas Lefouin, one of the twelve privileged wine merchants supplying the court. Michel had died in poverty the previous autumn, but it was his sister’s husband (and a Lefouin cousin), François Lefouin, already guardian of Michel’s four children, who arranged the match. François, a notary since 1650, served Mazarin and then Colbert, had close ties to the world of finance, and was elected a Paris alderman in 1665. In 1670 Lefouin sold his notary

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Figure 6.2 Charles Mignon at the 1678 signing of the Treaty of Nijmegen. The French delegation (from left to right): a page (Michel Fournier?); Embassy Secretary Charles Mignon (handing the ambassador a quill pen); Marshal Godefroy d’Éstrades; Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy; and Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux

practice, Colbert having appointed him the previous year secretary general of the navy and greffier of the admiralty’s Council of Prizes, engaged in the lucrative adjudication of naval prizes. The admirals were minors during his tenure (until his death in1688), so real power rested with ­Colbert and then Seignelay, whose grip on the admiralty was assured by the faithful client Lefouin.55 In 1669 while on leave in Paris, Mignon introduced Lefouin to his counterpart in England’s navy, Samuel Pepys, then visiting Paris. They talked about naval affairs and then Lefouin invited him to his bureau for further conversation. Pepys was a valuable



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contact owing to the negotiations then in progress for an Anglo-French anti-Dutch alliance, which Croissy secretly signed at Dover the following May.56 The Mignon-Lefouin marital alliance benefited both families. By joining his niece with a prominent member of the entourage of Colbert’s brother, a rising star in administrative and diplomatic circles, Lefouin provided her a better match than could have been expected given her late father’s situation, while Mignon benefited from the connection with a powerful Colbert client and used the 60,000 livres ­Catherine brought to the marriage to purchase the office of receiver of tailles at Péronne in Picardy.57 When Charles Mignon died in 1698, his children were still minors. His testament named his brother-in-law Nicolas-Dominique Lefouin, a Paris bourgeois, as guardian. Lefouin sought to preserve Mignon’s rather considerable fortune, but its recovery and maintenance was complicated, requiring journeys to Brittany and Lorraine and a sustained legal battle in Rouen. The workload was so great that he persuaded the other relatives to approve naming on 12 November 1698 another guardian to assist him, Mignon’s nephew, Michel Fournier. In his testament Mignon expressed the hope that his oldest son would become an ordinary gentleman of the king, an honorific office in the civil household, but Charles Mignon fils joined the King’s Musketeers in 1703 and, ten years later, spent much of his inheritance on a costly and onerous commission of lieutenant of the guards of the king’s gate only to have to resign it when the household was downsized in 1716. Mignon’s younger son, François-­ Marie, rather than acquiring a royal household controller’s office as his father had wished, followed his older brother into the more aristocratic military household and with the same result. Their father had wisely foreseen that instead of judicial offices that would only distance them from the court, civil household offices offered a surer path for advancement and financial security. Charles Mignon’s position as a premier commis was in theory an easily revocable commission, but he had experienced a remarkably stable tenure, while proximity to the king and his ministers made a variety of rich rewards more accessible. His sons, however, missed these opportunities and after 1716 lived off dwindling assets.58 Neither of Mignon’s sons followed him into the foreign office, but four nephews did.59 His brother Michel, about whom we know nothing, had a son, Pierre Mignon, who was a commis from 1710 to 1740, beginning in Pecquet’s bureau. Another brother, Pascal, had a son, Henry Mignon, who probably commenced service after Torcy’s time, retiring before 1731. Both brothers may be obscure because they remained rooted in the

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bourgeoisie, unlike the rest of the family.60 The sons of Charles Mignon’s sisters, however, served Torcy more significantly as premiers commis and left their mark in the department. Michel Fournier, likely born c. 1660 to Mignon’s sister Marguerite and to Nicolas Fournier, began his career in Colbert’s navy ministry. In 1678, however, he accompanied his uncle to Nijmegen with Croissy and likely followed both into the foreign office in 1680, labouring alongside his uncle until the latter’s 1698 retirement.61 Fournier worked with passports and acquired an expert knowledge of German and northern affairs before moving on to head a bureau with his uncle’s retirement.62 He, too, held offices outside the department and was clearly ascending socially before joining it. Like Mignon, Fournier served as alternative receiver of tailles at Péronne, and in 1673 he became treasurer of France at Caen and in 1698 treasurer of France at Rouen. He had been ennobled by 1711.63 He also established a dynasty of foreign office Fourniers, although none rose higher than commis. Charles joined his father in 1705 but died in 1715, while François entered the department after his father’s 1723 retirement (Michel Fournier died in 1730) and remained until discharged in 1767. Finally, grandson Gabriel-­ François served into the French Revolution.64 Fournier used his connections to establish his son, priest Michel-­Georges, as councillor in the Clergy of Soissons’ Sovereign Chamber and as canon in its cathedral. In 1719 Michel-Georges became abbé commendataire (enjoying the revenue without authority) of the Royal Abbey of Notre-Dame de Grandchamp in the diocese of Chartres, where he served with distinction until his death in 1751, perhaps tellingly, at Versailles.65

N o b l e t : R is in g a nd Wanderi ng A d m in is t r ati ve Star Of Mignon’s nephews, his sister Gertrude’s son Charles-François Noblet was among Torcy’s closest confidants.66 He brought valuable and wideranging family and patronage connections to the foreign office and to the Mignon clan. His father, Charles Noblet de Morgard (figure 6.3), became a secretary of the king in 1651 or 1653, was elected a “syndic” (officer) of that corporative body in 1678, and resigned in favour of his son Charles-François’s survivance in 1685.67 Given his father’s longstanding ties with Pomponne, it comes as no surprise that when CharlesFrançois commenced his diplomatic service in 1680, it was as secretary to Pomponne kinsman Toussaint Forbin-Janson, bishop of Beauvais, returning to Poland briefly as extraordinary ambassador. When Forbin-

Figure 6.3 Genealogical chart: the Noblets. The birth order of the Noblet siblings is an approximation based on the available information.

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Janson returned to France in the autumn of 1681, Noblet stayed with the new ambassador, Nicolas-Louis l’Hospital, marquis de Vitry, younger brother of the late duc de Vitry, who, as we have seen, Noblet’s father had served as secretary. Noblet served as one of the marquis’s two secretaries and was in charge of codes until returning home in 1683.68 Back in France, Noblet attended to establishing himself in life, succeeding his father as secretary of the king (1685) and marrying in that year or the next, befitting his rising status, Marie-Anne Contenot, daughter of an auditor in the Chambre des comptes. The daughter she bore c. 1687 was given her name, but was left motherless soon thereafter.69 Noblet remarried in 1689 to Marguerite Navarre, daughter of Thomas Navarre, treasurer general at Metz’s bureau of finance, sister of JeanBaptiste Navarre, president à mortier of the Metz parlement, and herself the recent widow of Secretary of the King Antoine-Adrien de Croisy [sic].70 The Noblet’s son Toussaint was baptized the day after Christmas 1689 near Beauvais with his namesake, Forbin-Janson, as godfather.71 On 29 March 1691 Noblet purchased one of the four charges of “garde des minutes” (keeper of the minutes) of the Grand Chancellery.72 Forbin-Janson, raised to cardinal in February 1690 and sent to the pope in June to resolve the nagging affair of the régale (the king’s right to collect a vacant bishopric’s revenues), remained in Rome as chargé d’affaires, again with Noblet as his secretary. When the Duke of Mantua asked Louis XIV to send him a confidential agent to hear his complaints about the French envoy to his court, Forbin-Janson selected Noblet, whom he described to the king as wise, faithful, capable, and fluent in Italian.73 Noblet conducted these delicate talks and the other tasks the cardinal assigned with great skill, for which he was named a chevalier of the Order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem and of Notre-Dame of Mount Carmel.74 When five new cardinals, including a French one, were created on 22 July 1697, Forbin-Janson dispatched Noblet to inform Louis XIV, which he did in an audience nine days later. He also met with ­Pontchartrain on the cardinal’s behalf and updated Bossuet at length on business at the Holy See.75 Replaced in Rome by Cardinal B ­ ouillon, Forbin-­Janson himself returned to Versailles that September and asked his kinsman Pomponne to intervene with Torcy to obtain Noblet a diplomatic post in Germany or Mantua, but nothing materialized 76 In August 1698 the princesse des Ursins, whose famous salon gathered the French and friends of France in Rome and was likely frequented by Noblet, wrote Torcy that she was pleased at the news that he had taken into his bureau such a man of merit still loved and regretted in the Eternal City.77



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In fact, when Ursins’s sister Princess Lanti, was in Paris dying of cancer, she wrote to her husband in Rome that while she had seen Torcy only once and without being able to speak with him on an important family matter, she had nonetheless made known to him through Noblet that she hoped to do so soon. Noblet, whom she had known in Rome, had been back in France hardly a year, yet already had enough influence with Torcy and in his department to serve as her intermediary.78 His knowledge of Italian, Italy, and especially Rome, with its French ecclesiastical, diplomatic, artistic, and intellectual community and the non-French drawn to it, made him a valuable asset, especially given the increasing attention to Italy’s future as diplomats contemplated the Spanish empire’s fate after Carlos II. By June 1698, for these reasons and probably Mignon’s April retirement as well, Noblet had joined Torcy’s staff. It was not, however, a foregone conclusion that Noblet would enter Torcy’s service. Like Pomponne, who counted Michel Le Tellier and Claude Le Peletier among his friends at court, the Noblets were in the Le Tellier rather than the Colbert orbit.79 From as early as 1677, Noblet’s financier brother, René-Charles Noblet, sieur d’Ozonville, ­ acted as ­Louvois’s agent and household intendant.80 Receiver general of finances of the generality of Bourges (1683–88) and a supplier of food to the army, he was named a director of the third Senegal Company in 1696.81 His marriage to Louise-Françoise d’Arbon, like that of his sister ­Marguerite to a commis in the war office, embedded the Noblets more firmly within the Le Tellier clientage. His bride’s brother was war department commis François d’Arbon de Bellou, like the Noblets from a Parisian robe family.82 The later Pomponne-Colbert alliance through Torcy’s marriage, however, did not preclude d’Ozonville from seeking favours from his father’s old friend Pomponne, even before his brother had entered the foreign office.83 Philip d’Anjou’s succession to the Spanish throne at the end of 1700 drew Noblet into intimate contact with the royal family and advanced his career appreciably. Torcy urgently needed someone to accompany the young king. Such a person had to know the foreign office’s workings, be an experienced private secretary, hold the office of secretary of the king (being familiar with and authorized to countersign and seal royal documents), have traveled in southern Europe, and be fluent in Spanish and Italian. Noblet fit the bill exactly.84 Although contemporaries were often imprecise with such labels, Noblet was likely raised to premier commis at the end of 1700 due to the importance of this mission.85 The task, however, was formidable, requiring him to set up a secretariat that

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traveled by day and wrote dispatches in the early evening, to be signed and sent off by courier early the next morning. The new court required revised protocol, recast modes of address, and new seals, although in the meantime Torcy lent Noblet one of his own private royal seals. Noblet quickly learned to imitate the young king’s hand for official documents. The post office’s Louis-Léon Pajot accompanied Philip V’s entourage to establish special courier routes and horse relays. Noblet acquitted himself well but nevertheless frequently consulted the new monarch’s former tutor Beauvillier, ever sensitive to issues of rank. When Pajot was not invited to dine at the table with other members of the secretariat, Noblet complained to Beauvillier, who at once rectified the slight.86 Torcy also entrusted Noblet with the transfer of jewels and art treasures from Louis XIV’s household to that of his grandson, including a recent portrait of Louis by Hyacinthe Rigaud, copied by the artist onto a half-dozen canvases as gifts for distinguished visitors.87 Once they reached the frontier, Noblet rode with the young king, only two days into his new kingdom. Returning to France, he narrated the journey to the anxious grandfather, including the tearful parting of the royal brothers at the Pyrenees.88 This absence from the foreign minister’s bureaus was meant to be an exceptional one and of relatively short duration, but Noblet’s clearly rising star soon became a wandering one as well. He had ridden several months in the company of the Duke of Burgundy on his younger brother’s triumphal progress toward Spain. Much to Burgundy’s pleasure, in April 1702 Noblet was appointed his secretary to accompany him to the Spanish Netherlands.89 At the same time, Noblet served Torcy by collecting information (e.g., interrogating prisoners and collecting pamphlets), hiring agents to continue this work after his departure, and conducting diplomatic negotiations within the Empire.90 He also kept him apprised of events and personalities on this critical front where the Dauphin’s son hoped to win military glory.91 Meantime, Noblet’s old patron Forbin-Janson, back in Rome as chargé d’affaires, was not forgotten. From the battlefront Noblet penned propagandistic letters in Italian that, along with the cardinal’s letter to him, elicited lively rejoinders from the emperor’s Italian partisans when published in Rome.92 Home with Burgundy from the German front in 1703, Noblet returned to the foreign office, helping supervise Italian and Swiss correspondence. His knowledge of the spy network in the southern German, Swiss, and northern Italian corridor proved invaluable to Torcy in grooming Pomponne to become ambassador to Venice, the latter requesting that Noblet serve as his decipherer and general liaison officer at Versailles.93



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His star was poised to ascend still further, especially given his close and happy ties with Burgundy, second in line to the throne. It was thus with acute sadness that Torcy wrote Forbin-Janson at the end of 1705 of Noblet’s sudden death.94 Both men had lost a friend, and the department an able servant. Unlike Mignon and Fournier, Noblet was not followed by family into the department. His son Toussaint, not quite sixteen years old when Noblet died, had worked alongside his father in Torcy’s bureau for a time but did not continue thereafter.95 Yet like these kinsmen, Noblet contributed skills, knowledge, experience, and connections that added to the effectiveness and efficiency of the foreign secretary’s administrative apparatus.

T h e B l o n d e l s : T h e F i scal-Fi nanci al and M il ita ry- In du s tri al Complexes The kinship group composed of François Blondel and his siblings reveals the scope and strength of the links that a great functionary could forge within the foreign office, with the wider Colbert clientele, and with powerful interests in other departments, throughout the kingdom, and abroad. By any test of wealth, family connections, and loyalty to the ­Colberts – especially to Torcy – Blondel and his kin ranked primi inter pares among the clans of clerks. The matriarch, Elisabeth Clopet, was only a master linen dressmaker, although her brother, Guillaume Clopet, rose to become “président au grenier à sel” (president of the salt attic) at Brie-Comte-Robert. Her husband, Louis Blondel, sieur d’Azincourt in Picardy, was perhaps a parlement avocat (figure 6.4). Their four sons, however, would amass wealth that exceeded the nobility they inherited, and they would rise in the ranks of the king’s servants. Three brothers – Paul Blondel, sieur d’Azincourt; Joseph Blondel, sieur de Gagny; and Charles-François Blondel, sieur de Jouvancourt – would all serve the navy as administrators, while Gagny and Jouvancourt would also serve the navy as consular officials. Gagny, joined by his brother ­François Blondel, sieur de Vaucresson and de Cueilly and later comte de S­ issonne (referred to hereafter as Blondel), would serve in the royal building administration. Blondel, perhaps professionally the best situated of the siblings, served both Croissy and Torcy as secretary from 1680 to 1715. The brothers had two sisters, Catherine-Charlotte and Marie, who would marry well and have sons who entered the diplomatic world.96 It is not known what the initial family connection with the C ­ olberts was, but Blondel began his apprenticeship with Croissy in 1680, ­residing

Figure 6.4 Genealogical chart: the Blondels. The birth order of the Blondel siblings is an approximation based on the available information.



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in the minister’s townhouse on rue Vivienne.97 Signaling his rapid advancement, in 1685 Blondel’s dazzling wedding reception was hosted by Croissy and attended by Colbert’s widow and others of that clan, including Seignelay, Pussort, Jacques-Nicolas Colbert (future archbishop of Rouen), and Louis Victor de Rochechouart, duc de Mortemort (married to Colbert’s daughter Marie Anne), as well as neighbour Anne Jules, duc de Noailles. Blondel’s widowed mother, his brother Gagny, his sister Marie, and her spouse Gabriel de La Porte, sieur du Theil, brigadier of the Royal Guards, also attended. The bride, Jeanne-Marie Marin, daughter of Vincent Marin, the late Colbert’s household intendant and an ordinary secretary of the queen, was the recent widow of another Colbert client, Antoine Faucard, sieur de Beauchamp. She brought ­ Blondel a young stepson, Antoine-François.98 Blondel, not yet twentyfive years old but well matched, could expect further advancement in the service of the still-powerful Colberts. Although his service began with Croissy, at nineteen Blondel grew close to the fifteen-year-old Torcy while living in the minister’s household, and from at least 1693 he served as Torcy’s commis.99 Early the next year he acquired his first outside office as treasurer of France at Caen by means of a royal gratification, prompting Bonrepaus to congratulate him from Copenhagen on this mark of favour.100 That same year, hearing of Bergeret’s death, Bonrepaus, himself a king’s reader, hoped that Blondel might succeed Bergeret as cabinet secretary.101 Although he did not, such speculation attests to Blondel’s rise outside the department, where he actively promoted his family’s fortunes, especially those of his three brothers. The careers of Blondel and his siblings demonstrate the permeability of the barriers between the various departments of state below the ministerial level. When fixated on department heads, historians fashion misleading narratives that imply unrelenting rivalry and conflict. Reality, however, was more complicated and nuanced, particularly with regard to department staff. Informal yet close ties, for instance, existed between the foreign office and the navy, the latter of which the former had in part supervised from 1629 until 1669. The spatial distance between the two was itself minimal, since from 1683 Seignelay and the navy bureaus were housed at Versailles in the same ministerial building as the foreign office, although in a separate pavilion.102 Administrators and their bureaus nonetheless remained jealous of their powers and prerogatives. Even kin such as Croissy and his nephew Seignelay clashed on occasion. The Blondel brothers served as bridges between these two

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a­ dministrative units, facilitating greater cooperation. Like many royal officials, the brothers were involved in finance, shuffling about royal and private monies to fund the work of royal government in France and abroad. Service overseas, in French ports, and in the bureaus of Versailles afforded each brother access to people and information beneficial to the rest of the family as well as to those they served. Blondel, living and labouring at the epicentre of royal administration and patronage, saw to it that his kin advanced in the worlds of diplomacy and the navy. His ability to do so in the latter is noteworthy in that much of it was accomplished when the navy was no longer a Colbert preserve but instead was under the rival Pontchartrain family. The connections between the foreign secretary and naval administration were many, complex, and historic, requiring that we delve at some length again into the early seventeenth century. The navy department was a rather late creation. Responsibility for naval matters long belonged to various admiralties. Henri IV’s endeavour to transcend them and build a specialized war fleet languished after his assassination but was revived by Richelieu. Named grand master of navigation in 1626, he steadily supplanted the admiralties, established his own clients as port officials, and gathered a cluster of capable collaborators at the centre.103 That same year, two secretaries of state were assigned to prepare and transmit official naval paperwork, but without decision-­making power or administrative control. War Secretary Charles Le Beauclerc continued supervising Provence, its galleys, and the Mediterranean fleet ­(Marine du Levant) first assigned to him in 1619, as would his successors until 1669. The Atlantic fleet (Marine du Ponant) fell to Secretary of State Nicolas Potier d’Ocquerre and upon his death in 1628 to his successor, Claude Bouthillier. In 1629, when Foreign Secretary Raymond P ­ ­hélypeaux d’Herbault died, his secretaryship passed to his son Louis II Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, but his responsibility for foreign affairs shifted to Bouthillier and would remain combined with the Atlantic fleet until 1669.104 It has been suggested that after Richelieu the two navy departments were joined for a time under Foreign Secretary ­Brienne, but this is doubtful.105 In any event, Mazarin’s efforts to sustain the navy foundered after the Fronde for lack of funds, and navy paperwork consequently diminished.106 After Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, however, Colbert, hoping to realize Richelieu’s maritime vision, increasingly but informally managed both parts of the navy. An 11 May 1667 ­regulation empowered him to generate all navy orders, present them to the king, and then forward them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be officially drawn up and sent out. When



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Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669, the foreign affairs and war departments were officially relieved of all navy business.107 Colbert also acquired from Lionne the right to appoint France’s consuls abroad. From the final years of the sixteenth century, monarchs had left to the foreign secretary their selection as well as the lucrative issuance of their letters of provision. A consulate was often a costly acquisition, commonly purchased by a group of investors who engaged a commis to perform its duties for most of the year. Foreign Secretary Brienne earned a tidy sum from this traffic and added the Alexandria consulate to his family’s patrimony while awarding his wife the Cairo consulate to lease out for 11,000 livres. Under the Colberts, however, consuls increasingly became royal instruments promoting the crown’s naval and commercial ambitions. Seignelay finally converted consuls from offices into commissions, although still held on the basis of a lease that accrued to the navy secretary’s profit. The consul recouped his costs through assorted exactions on local merchants, a practice not ended until Pontchartrain granted consuls a fixed salary in 1691. Despite these changes, the separation of the consular service from the foreign secretary was neither complete nor final.108 In parts of the world, a consul was France’s only official representative, requiring that he work with the foreign as well as the navy secretary. One commentator ranked consuls with ambassadors, since they were authorized representatives of the king who not only kept him informed, but carried out his diplomatic will. Furthermore, the foreign office’s ambassador in Constantinople acted there as consul and was entitled to name many consuls and sub-consuls in the Aegean and Black seas.109 Other consuls might frequently correspond with the foreign secretary, as did Michel-Ange de La Chausse, an erudite antiquarian in Rome and consul from 1705 until his death in 1724. Because Rome was upriver from two busy vice-consulates on the coast, he had little navy business to perform, so was primarily a purveyor of news and gossip from the papal court.110 The individuals who populate an organization are as important if not more so than its structure. Shifting surface structure might mask a deeper continuity of personnel who execute if not make policy, as demonstrated in the creation of Colbert’s navy department. Between 1661 and 1669, Colbert dominated the nascent department by controlling its finances through a revived “Conseil de Marine” (navy council) populated with clients and family, including his brother Croissy, who as ambassador to London from 1668 to 1674 kept a close eye on English naval affairs. When Croissy became foreign secretary at the end of 1679, the foreign

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office again drew closer to the navy by entering the Colbert orbit.111 Blondel and his brothers continued, as well as strengthened, the links between the two departments. It was perhaps following his marriage that Blondel, nimbly ascending the Colbert clientage ladder, introduced his three brothers into its ranks. Gagny, who had attended the 1685 wedding, departed for Constantinople in November of that year as secretary and chancellor to the new ambassador, Pierre Girardin de Vauvré, brother of Toulon’s navy intendant, Jean-Louis Girardin de Vauvré, a Colbert kinsman and client. Ambassador Vauvré dispatched Gagny in July 1688 to replace Smyrna’s consul killed in an earthquake. The following January, on the ambassador’s recommendation, Seignelay formally appointed Gagny to this the most lucrative of the Levantine consulates.112 This was not a transfer from the foreign office to the navy, since Gagny was already under the latter as chancellor to the ambassador cum consul at Constantinople. In fact, it was only a partial and simple transfer within the Colbertian administrative empire. The situation of a Levantine consul, however, was not so uncomplicated. Consuls were “the key power-brokers in the Levant,” and that of cosmopolitan Smyrna was particularly powerful. He lived like a prince in a small palace and was accompanied by liveried footmen and “janissaries holding six-foot-long staves ivory-knobbed staves with which they beat the ground.”113 As the king’s local agent, he represented royal interests, even to the extent of purchasing and shipping such exotic products as horses, leather, antiquities, and manuscripts to satisfy royal desires. He assisted and policed French commercial and naval vessels visiting his port, extended aid to French travelers, and defended the rights of the “nation,” defined as the local and largely mercantile French community. He immersed himself in all commercial matters, facilitating trade by resolving disputes among quarrelsome French traders and mediating their differences with local merchants and officials, and exercised police, judicial, and notarial powers over the “nation.” This heavy regulatory hand was resented when Colbert and his son converted consuls from employees of the local merchant community into servants of the state. It also led to conflict with the Marseille Chamber of Commerce, which dominated and soon monopolized Levantine trade. This powerful interest group particularly resented any interference from ambassadors and consuls.114 Gagny’s predecessor at Smyrna represented Colbert’s privileged trading companies, a further complication in Levantine trade. In 1685 the defunct Company of the Levant run by Parisian financiers was replaced



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by the new Company of the Mediterranean, this time composed of experienced Marseille merchants and local royal (mostly naval) officials. The company’s monopoly included the farm of consular posts, many of which were soon filled by family and friends of Joseph Fabre, “trésorier de la Marine” (navy treasurer) at Marseille and the new company’s moving spirit. This irked directors like naval intendant Vauvré, who already complained that the Fabres ran the company for their own benefit, and provoked the Marseille Chamber of Commerce and Levant merchants, who resented the new and aggressive consuls, whom they accused of only promoting royal, company, and personal interests. Even though he had replaced the late and much detested Louis Fabre at Smyrna, Gagny was nonetheless treated with coldness, insolence, and a torrent of complaints to the Marseille Chamber of Commerce. To make matters worse, he was still chancellor to an ambassador accused by the chamber of favouring consuls over merchants and whose brother was a company director.115 The situation deteriorated with Pierre Girardin de Vauvré’s sudden death in January 1689 and the May appointment of Pierre-Antoine de Castagnéry, marquis de Châteauneuf, as his replacement, with instructions from Seignelay to defer to the Marseille chamber and give way to the “nation” in its disputes with the consul. This conciliatory policy was even more pronounced when the milder Louis Pontchartrain became secretary in 1690.116 Gagny’s continuing quarrels with the Smyrna nation led to protests to Châteauneuf and growing tension between the ambassador and the consul. A new consul was appointed for Smyrna in August 1691, and by the year’s end Gagny had departed for France.117 Yet this circumstance and the Colberts’ loss of the navy with the death of ­Seignelay (1690) did not end Gagny’s navy service. Apparently, even before his ship docked in Marseille, Pontchartrain appointed him navy commissioner for forests at Lyon, responsible for procuring the wood essential for the ships and weapons constructed at the Mediterranean naval arsenals.118 His fortunes were further enhanced when near Lyon on 8 March 1693 he married Marie-Madeleine de Ferriol, sister of Augustin de Ferriol, sieur de Pont-Vesle en Bresse, receiver general of finances of Dauphiné, who in 1701, following his brother Constant and his father, would become a councillor in the Metz parlement. Another brother, Charles de Ferriol, baron d’Argental, was then serving as a chargé de mission under the ambassador to Constantinople.119 Both brothers and their connections would figure prominently in the futures of the Blondels as well as that of Torcy.

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Another important association for the Blondels would be that with Bonrepaus. He personally embodied a number of the characteristics that marked the Blondels, such as navy service, foreign office service, and loyalty to the Colbert clan. Like them, he was also a participant in the “fiscal-financial system” and “military-industrial complex” assembled by the Great Colbert.120 A close collaborator of Colbert’s and then ­Seignelay’s, Bonrepaus was disappointed when Louis Pontchartrain was preferred to him as Seignelay’s successor. Having lost his previous zest for navy business, he lingered for a while under Pontchartrain but departed some months after the disastrous defeat at La Hogue (June 1692). Croissy procured for him the ambassadorship to Copenhagen. Enjoying Torcy’s confidence as well, he transferred to The Hague in 1698.121 Bonrepaus’s connection with the Blondel family may have begun when Gagny entered the navy administration upon his return from Smyrna. In any event, once Bonrepaus reached Copenhagen in February 1693, Blondel not only conducted department business with him, but served as one of his financial agents in France.122 That same year, Blondel negotiated with Bonrepaus on behalf of one of his brothers for the possible purchase of his charge of navy commissioner general. The ambassador assured him that Pontchartrain was unlikely to suppress such a charge, but that if he did, it was out of both their hands. Nevertheless, he urged Blondel to take the contract to the minister. What happened next is unclear, but Bonrepaus still owed money on the charge and, for whatever reason, no sale took place.123 Blondel and his brothers Gagny and Azincourt all acted as Bonrepaus’s bankers during his second ambassadorship at The Hague (April–December 1699).124 The bond between Blondel and Bonrepaus went beyond business to include a circle of prominent friends at court. Bonrepaus sent greetings through Blondel to the influential first valet of the royal chamber, ­ Alexandre Bontemps, confidant of the king, and to his secret wife M ­ arguerite Bosc du Bois, widow of de la Roche, premier commis of the royal treasury. Bonrepaus also had a close friendship with the brilliant royal favourite and “grand maréchal des logis de la maison du roi” (grand quartermaster for the king, court, and household troops) Louis d’Oger, marquis de Cavoye, who had also been an intimate of ­Seignelay’s. He was especially close to Cavoye’s friend the playwright and royal historian Racine and was particularly active as a link between Racine and their mutual friend in Copenhagen.125 On one occasion, when ­Bonrepaus was anxious to counter rumours at court that he had requested but would be denied a particular favour, he penned



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a letter to Croissy, to be read to the king, denying any interest in the favour. At the same time, he wrote Blondel that he hoped he would be the one to decode this letter to Croissy when it arrived and asked that he share it with Racine so as to inform him of his situation. Even if this favour had already been granted when the letter arrived at Versailles, ­Bonrepaus asked Blondel to see that it still made its way to the king.126 The following year, complaining that the Danish climate was ruining his health, Bonrepaus hoped that the king might allow him to return home. Lamenting that it was useless to write of it to any of his other friends, he assured Blondel of his confidence in him and wondered if Blondel might approach Beauvillier or even Chevreuse on his behalf.127 While it is unlikely that Croissy would have appreciated any such attempt to bypass him or that Blondel would have lightly risked angering a minister of Croissy’s temperament, it is nonetheless apparent that Bonrepaus, who had a keen eye for such things, had a high estimation of Blondel’s connections and credit at court. Jean Racine was also well-connected with the foreign office and the Colbert clan. At Colbert’s instigation, he was elected to the French Academy in 1673 and appointed royal historian in 1677. Racine even named his first-born son Jean-Baptiste in 1678 to honour his patron. Chevreuse, married to Colbert’s daughter in 1667, had been Racine’s friend at school. Racine remained close to the younger Colberts. ­Seignelay protected and promoted him, and he was on intimate enough terms with Torcy to discuss the hazardous topic of Jansenism.128 As early as the first performance of his tragedy Andromaque in 1667, the great playwright had explored the tensions between an emerging bureaucratic and professional diplomacy and a traditional diplomacy based on noble lineage as the only means of representation.129 His son Jean-­Baptiste entered the foreign ministry in 1695 or 1696 to learn diplomacy under Torcy, and he became intimate with Blondel and premier commis Mignon, to whose bureau he was assigned. This confluence of connections led to his selection in 1698 to accompany Bonrepaus to The Hague as his secretary. Until his death in April 1699, Racine encouraged Jean-Baptiste to do all he could to conserve and enhance the good will and opinion of ­Bonrepaus, Torcy, and their circle, hinting hopefully that Beauvillier or the duc de Noailles might one day employ him.130 From 1698, envisioning a future posting for young Racine to Frankfurt, Torcy, ­Bonrepaus, and Jean-­Baptiste’s parents urged him to go to Strasbourg to learn ­German with Ulrich Obrecht, a scholar and trusted foreign office operative, but after his father’s death, Jean-Baptiste preferred the security of

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r­ emaining with Bonrepaus, f­earing the costs of going to Germany and having little desire to learn German. His hope, he confided to Renaudot, was to be sent to Italy. With the abbé’s support, Torcy was persuaded to permit him to accept Cardinal d’Estrées’s invitation to follow him to Rome as his secretary.131 In the meantime, Gagny and Blondel’s older brother, Paul Blondel d’Azincourt was establishing himself in the navy. After marrying ­Catherine Mabille, the daughter of a Paris merchant butcher in 1688, he went to Dunkirk as “trésorier de la Marine, directeur des vivres de la Marine” (navy treasurer, director of navy provisions) for Flanders and Picardy, and “trésorier général des vivres des armées du Roi sur terre” (treasurer general of provisions for royal land forces) for the Flanders coast. There Azincourt’s wife gave birth to a son in March 1691, but she died soon after.132 As directeur des vivres, he and his “écrivains” (clerks) were to verify the quantity and quality of all food supplies and other provisions entering or leaving the naval arsenal for consumption there or on warships. This entailed constant vigilance through inspections, samplings, meticulous record-keeping, and reports to the port intendant on the honesty of the various “munitionnaires” (purveyors) who had contracted to furnish these supplies.133 Azincourt swiftly settled into Dunkirk, on 17 June 1692 marrying the daughter of a local corsair (his second marriage) whose brother-in-law, the famous fellow corsair Jean Bart, signed the marriage contract.134 Azincourt and his second wife became fixtures of local society, dining frequently at the home of bookseller and “imprimeur de l’Amirauté” (admiralty printer) Antoine Van Ursel. Other dinner regulars included municipal officials as well as “commissaire ordonnateur de la Marine” (navy commissary) Jacques Vergier, who had served with Bart at sea. Vergier was popular with local merchants, a poet appreciated by Jérôme Pontchartrain, and Azincourt’s close friend.135 Azincourt was apparently involved in finance. On 17 January 1693 the comte d’Avaux, in Dunkirk on his way to Sweden as ambassador, wrote Croissy of his lack of money and his financial rescue by Blondel’s brother.136 ­Bonrepaus may have connected the two. On his way to Denmark as ambassador, he too was in Dunkirk with d’Avaux awaiting favourable weather to sail aboard a ship commanded by none other than Azincourt’s kinsman Jean Bart.137 Azincourt later carried a letter of exchange to Provence on ­Bonrepaus’s behalf and served his banking needs in other ways.138 He died at his Dunkirk post on 18 July 1701.139 Azincourt was not the only Blondel concerned with navy supplies. From 1694 until 1699 Gagny was a member of the companies of



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­ munitionnaires de la marine et des galères” (purveyors of the navy and “ galleys) that supplied the whole fleet with food, drink, and anything needed to store and distribute it, and whose operations Azincourt monitored at Dunkirk. Numbering only forty-eight during the whole reign, these purveyors were not businessmen but financiers. They were mostly ­Colbert kin and clients drawn largely from the ranks of office-holders and naval administrators to form companies to bid on the annual commissary contract. They included some of the most important financiers of the reign, such as Cyr Monmerqué and Pierre Pellard, as well as Louis de Lubert’s brother-in-law Jacques André du Pille, who, as receiver general of finances at Lyon and a munitionnaire since 1682, may have been responsible for enlisting Gagny. Bonrepaus, who had originally set up this system for Colbert, was himself a munitionnaire from 1673 to 1678.140 Gagny was the brother most involved in the world of finance and as a munitionnaire was enmeshed in the Colbertian fiscal-financial system and military-industrial complex.141 Further marking his ascent, Gagny purchased a charge of secretary of the king in 1696, although the office was suppressed the following year.142 While Gagny was ensconcing himself in the world of finance and Azincourt in the navy at Dunkirk, the youngest brother turned south to the great arsenal at Toulon. Charles-François Blondel de Jouvancourt appeared as Toulon’s écrivain principal in 1695 while in his early thirties.143 Unlike their friend Bonrepaus, the Blondels easily balanced serving both Pontchartrain navy secretaries while remaining Colbert loyalists. Louis Pontchartrain, even as he advanced his own clients, wisely eschewed a purge of department veterans. Instead, he cultivated them, winning some into his clientage, yet still collaborating with and indeed promoting cooperative Colbertians such as the Blondels.144 Like his brother a decade before, Jouvancourt was drawn east to the Levant. Since the mid-1670s dragoon colonel Charles de Ferriol had been in eastern Europe, eventually commanding two regiments of Count Imre Thököly’s troops in the Hungarians’ anti-Habsburg revolt and leaving with Thököly to join the Turks in seven campaigns against the common Imperial foe. This experience led to Ferriol’s selection as chargé de mission to Constantinople from 1692 to 1695, first to assist Ambassador Châteauneuf in efforts to draw the Turks into the Nine Years War and then to go to Transylvania to offer the rebels French encouragement as well as gold.145 When Ferriol returned to Constantinople in March 1696, Jouvancourt accompanied him as secretary, probably owing to the influence of Blondel at the foreign ministry and of Gagny, Ferriol’s brother-

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in-law and former embassy chancellor at Constantinople and Smyrna consul.146 Jouvancourt may have returned to France a year earlier than Ferriol, since he was commissioned as Dunkirk’s écrivain principal in the summer of 1697 to serve with Azincourt. By the end of the next year, however, he was in Toulon as écrivain principal.147 If we trust the history penned by Bonrepaus’s nephew Bonnac, an experienced diplomat and ambassador to the Porte from 1716 to 1724, the year 1699 offers a particularly striking demonstration of Blondel’s influence in the foreign ministry. Bonnac writes that not long after ­Ferriol’s first diplomatic appointment to Constantinople, which he owed to friends in France, he set his eye on replacing Ambassador Châteauneuf.148 The marriage of Blondel’s brother to Ferriol’s sister in 1693 made his ambition possible. Ferriol won the favour of Blondel and Croissy’s formidable widow, who had great influence with her son Torcy. Ferriol and his friend the dragoman Joachim Fonton, whom Châteauneuf had recalled from Turkish army headquarters in Hungary owing to jealousy of his close contacts with Ferriol, engineered the ambassador’s dismissal by sewing suspicion at court that his recent adoption of Turkish dress portended a conversion to Islam. Bonnac, who clearly respected Châteauneuf and thought him ill-used, claims that Torcy was won over to this intrigue because of his weakness for the former Marie-Angélique de Tencin, the young, cultivated, and striking wife of Ferriol’s brother Augustin de Ferriol.149 Popular songs alleged a liaison between the two, but if there was one, it likely would have existed between 1705 and 1710,150 long after Ferriol’s 1699 selection for Constantinople. Moreover, prior to that appointment, Ferriol received a life pension of 3,000 livres for his twenty-seven years of service and for having carried out secret orders in 1692, 1693, and 1694.151 The new ambassador’s 1699 instructions stressed the value of his frequent and recent sojourns in Turkey and especially his knowledge of the sultan’s government. The instructions made it clear that with the return of peace after Ryswick and with the partition process still advancing despite the recent death of the electoral prince, Louis had decided on a harder line with the Porte. Safeguarding commerce remained a priority, but the king insisted that the erosion of Catholic rights tolerated by Châteauneuf cease and that the Turks allow Catholic missionaries a freer hand throughout their empire. Ferriol was further instructed to see to it that neither the Porte nor the Imperial ambassador did anything to diminish the ceremonial honours due the French monarch and his envoy.152 If Ferriol ultimately proved too inflexible and a poor choice for the post, his knowledge and



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e­xperience were hardly negligible and his temperament matched the monarch’s mood when he was appointed.153 There is little doubt that the Blondels, with reason to want Châteauneuf replaced and by Ferriol, had the influence to accomplish both goals. Gagny surely resented Châteauneuf for backing the Smyrna “nation” against him as consul and later helping engineer his recall to France. The Blondels could thus avenge an affront to a brother as they promoted his brother-in-law. Mme de Croissy’s part in the scheme is not difficult to discern. Blondel was like family, having lived in her home, grown up with her son, and married into the Colbert clientele. As a further benefit, the third Blondel brother, Jouvancourt, would once again accompany Ferriol, but now as ambassador’s secretary and consular chancellor. As war grew more likely in the west, French diplomacy sought to turn the Porte’s plans away from war with Venice or the Crimean Tartars and toward one against the emperor. In January 1703 military preparations against the Tartars were proceeding apace at the military headquarters of Adrianople. When dragoman Fonton’s mission failed to change Turkish policy, Ferriol dispatched Jouvancourt to press France’s case with the new Grand Vizier, known to be less keen on war than his predecessor, and to negotiate a resolution to the nagging “incident of the audience.” This contretemps dated back to January 1700 when Ferriol, newly arrived and against all advice, refused to leave his sword behind for his first audience with the sultan. In the ensuing standoff, the ambassador was never officially received. Bearing a letter and rich gifts of cloth and clocks, Jouvancourt entered Adrianople to negotiate with the Phanariote Alexander Maurocordato (Mavrocordato), councillor of state, Grand Dragoman, and a negotiator at Carlowitz. These talks were eventually productive enough for Ferriol to send Jouvancourt to France with a proposed settlement and further commercial and religious concessions. At Versailles the king approved Jouvancourt’s suggestion for a pension for Maurocordato, who had shown himself favourable to French interests.154 In addition to his post as embassy secretary, Jouvancourt was chancellor of the Constantinople consulate, serving as its secretary and archivist for the official documents it generated. The navy paid his appointements for his consular post.155 Any of France’s permanent diplomats abroad might receive supplementary instructions regarding commerce from the navy secretary, but nowhere was an ambassador expected to be in as close contact with him as in Constantinople, where he served concurrently as local consul and corresponded frequently with the other Levantine consuls.156 Ferriol’s private correspondence with his brother Augustin and

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with the Blondels is peppered with complaints against ­Pontchartrain, with whom he clashed. Torcy, however, is lauded for coming to the latter’s defence, especially in 1709 when a Turkish official representing Constantinople’s captain-pasha and perhaps the Grand Vizier as well, arrived at Versailles to press Pontchartrain for Ferriol’s recall, which was almost granted.157 Jouvancourt relayed news from the Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Balkan frontier, the Crimea, and Poland to Torcy and Pontchartrain. Reports flowed from his pen of the retrieval in the Dardanelles of an anchor lost decades earlier by Abraham Duquesne’s fleet, of the English abandonment of their scheme to initiate trade up the Danube, of the launch of a Turkish war vessel of 138 guns, of the arrival in Adrianople of the severed head of the former pasha of Diyarbakir on the Tigris, and of Turkish surprise that the English would recognize a woman (Queen Anne) as their ruler. Jouvancourt also sent Pontchartrain a project for establishing a trading company and toiled at obtaining naval stores such as tallow and Black Sea tar and hemp for the royal arsenals.158 In Paris, Blondel, like his brother, worked well with Pontchartrain and especially with his premier commis Charles d’Irumberry de Salaberry, a former Colbert client favoured by both Pontchartrains. Even Ferriol on occasion availed himself of what he called the secretary’s “credit” with Jérôme Pontchartrain.159 Jean-Baptiste Estelle, later famous as Marseille’s chief alderman during the city’s 1720 plague outbreak, was son of a French consul in Morocco and himself consul at Salé on Morocco’s Atlantic coast from 1689 to 1698. Back in France, Estelle became Blondel’s brother-in-law by marrying Elisabeth de Bonnaud de Roquebrune, step-sister through her mother of Blondel’s wife Marie née Marin. This connection was a major factor in Estelle’s landing the plum position of consul at Sidon (Seyde) in Syria, one of the principal Levant ports, where he served from 1702 to 1711.160 Blondel’s sister CatherineCharlotte married (c. 1687) Joseph Richard, sieur de Tussac and procureur in the sénéchaussée of Montmorillon in Poitou. They too benefited from Blondel’s access to Pontchartrain’s ear when their oldest son, Joseph-Jean Richard, was sent to the Capuchin school by the French embassy in Pera, the European district across the Golden Horn from Constantinople. From 1699 to 1706 he was an enfant de langues (language student) learning Oriental languages in preparation of becoming a secrétaire interprète du roi (royal interpreting secretary) in Turkish and Arabic. His younger brother, André-François Richard d’Abenour, studied there from 1707 to 1713, remaining in the Levantine consular service until his death.161 These positions, much sought after, since they provided



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an education at the expense of the Marseille Chamber of Commerce and promised a brilliant career in the Levant, were given out by the king on the advice of the navy minister with the advice of the ambassador to the Porte and those who had their ears.162 Thus Guillaume Maugin, son of Torcy’s écuyer, received one of these positions, but he was sent home after four years under close guard for attempting to convert to Islam.163 France’s primary link to the Levant was Marseille, the great commercial port and base for France’s galley fleet through which flowed a vast variety of goods as well as news and official correspondence between the kingdom and much of the Mediterranean world, including the exotic Ottoman east, the Barbary and Spanish west, and nearby Italy. There was another source in Marseille of the Blondels’ power and great worth to the foreign secretary. Since 1696 its municipal government was in the hands of a corrupt cabal dominated by the mercantile Gleise (Gleize) family.164 How the Blondels first connected with them is unknown, but it was likely through Gagny and his earlier ties to Marseille as Smyrna consul and his later activities as a munitionnaire.165 As part of Provence, Marseille was in Torcy’s department and thus long familiar to Blondel. The Gleises manoeuvred in order to eliminate all local officials hostile to their interests, including Joseph Villeneuve, Paris agent of the Marseille municipality and Chamber of Commerce. Three years earlier Torcy had backed Villeneuve against efforts to oust him, but with the ascendance of the Gleises, Torcy allowed them to force his retirement on 28 December 1697. Torcy’s price was Blondel’s appointment as Marseille’s new Paris agent, made official on 30 January 1698. Given Blondel’s prominent position in the foreign office and his credit with and easy access to other ministers, the Gleises and their coterie gladly paid the price.166 Modern social science network research finds “strong interactions between actors in specific policy domains.”167 This seems to apply to the relationship between the foreign office and the network that embraced Torcy, Blondel, the Gleises, and others in Marseille. At the end of the twentieth century, networks in Britain “were characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery, responsibility and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public … They have a high degree of vertical interdependence and limited ­horizontal articulation. They are highly integrated.”168 Likewise, those outside the Gleise faction were excluded from Marseille’s city government and Chamber of Commerce. From 1697 until 1712, Blondel served both the city government and its Chamber of Commerce as lobbyist,

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providing stability and smoothing the way for the requests and representatives of each through the foreign office and the other Versailles bureaus, especially the navy’s and the controller general’s bureaus. A denizen of this administrative milieu for over fifteen years, Blondel possessed an intimate knowledge of the people and procedures required to expedite business, including the timely distribution of pensions and Levantine products paid for by the municipal and chamber funds he managed for that purpose. The recipients ranged from Torcy at the top and premiers commis Adam and Salaberry, who reaped rich pensions, down to the ministers’ commis and household domestics, who like those higher up eagerly received gifts of fine food, drink, textiles, and other Levantine luxuries. Blondel, who grew wealthy from the gifts of the grateful Gleise faction, his annual 1,500-livre pension, and the flow of further funds under the table, saw to it that his Marseille connections hired his kinsmen and friends whenever possible.169 The idea of Blondel becoming Marseille’s new lobbyist apparently came from Torcy rather than from the city and the chamber, although they easily grasped its advantages.170 The Fabre clan, a part of the Gleise cabal, had been the target of intendant Lebret’s complaints to ­Seignelay the previous decade, but that minister had likewise taken their part against the intendant.171 Perhaps Torcy similarly decided it was in the end better for commerce, provincial peace, and foreign office business to side with the present masters of Marseille rather than with the intendant in Aix and to co-opt them to serve his purposes.172 Moreover, Anfossy, the powerful secretary of Provence’s lieutenant du roi Grignan, was part of the network, as was the notary Pierre Sossin, who served Charles-Gaspard Vintimille du Luc, bishop of Marseille (­1692–1708) and of Aix (1708–29), and his brother Charles-François Vintimille, comte du Luc, soldier, galley captain, diplomat, and Torcy client and friend.173 The members of the network had common interests and the financial and political resources to promote them, and they knew the rules of the network, such as whom to work through and reward, that made it work for its members, but kept it a “closed sector network” for non-members.174 It has been suggested that Blondel’s selection as Marseille’s agent resulted in part from his marital ties with the city’s elite. These marriages, however, came after his 1697 appointment.175 In September 1703, when Jouvancourt was in France reporting on his Adrianople negotiations, he wed Magdelaine Gleise, daughter of Jean and brother of Pierre, who brought with her a 40,000-livre dowry.176 Early the next



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year, probably using these new resources, Jouvancourt purchased one of the one ­hundred venal charges of commissaire de la Marine (naval commissioner) created in March 1702.177 This marriage integrated the network even further. When rumours reached the port that a cash-strapped crown might resurrect the sale of Levantine consulates, Jouvancourt, now a part of Marseille’s ruling establishment, fired off a letter to his brother in Paris. Well aware of his influence in the navy ministry, he informed Blondel that the Marseille chamber would prefer that consulates be placed under their control, as in the past, and sent Pont­chartrain a seven-page memoir making the same point.178 Jouvancourt’s naval post, however, was more than a cover for serving the cabal, and he would advance far in its civil hierarchy, serving under Louis XV as Martinique’s intendant and then as Marseille’s intendant-général des galères (intendant general of galleys), in which city he died 29 March 1729.179 He kept navy secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain (and likely his own brother at the foreign ministry) informed on a surprising variety of matters, including movements of enemy troops and vessels, grain and munitions shipments, corsair and bandit attacks, and the actions of the Royal Galley Fleet itself. During the war he kept a close eye on events in the Papal States and Naples, passing along intelligence of revolts, of negotiations with the Imperials, of ecclesiastical appointments, and even of the Roman Carnival, a festival potentially rife with subversion.180 He was also kept busy with the affairs of the Marseille galley arsenal.181 Despite remaining in France as a naval bureaucrat, Jouvancourt did not sever ties with Ferriol, acting from Marseille as the ambassador’s financial agent, while Ferriol’s brother Augustin did so in Paris. ­Ferriol’s letters to both of these agents are crammed with details of the bills of exchange that Jouvancourt, Samuel Bernard, and other bankers issued for the needs of his embassy and for him to pass on to Rákóczi in Hungary.182 Given Ferriol’s later madness, which made him a liability to Torcy, and the prolonged and ignominious process by which he was replaced by Des Alleurs from April 1710 to April 1711, Jouvancourt was fortunate to have been long removed from Constantinople.183 He journeyed to Paris often to enjoy its pleasures and visit family, who were mostly in its vicinity. In addition to mingling with the influential at court and in the capital, Jouvancourt served them from Marseilles when possible. In the summer of 1712, for example, he reported to Torcy and Louis-Antoine, duc d’Antin, director general of the king’s buildings since 1708, the transshipment up the Rhône from Marseille of crates of art for the king and his ministers from the newly arrived papal nuncio.184

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As was typical with the Blondel brothers, this connection of one brother with the transport of art reflected the wider family enterprise. In 1699, the same year Jouvancourt left for the Levant, his middle brothers purchased offices in the king’s buildings department headed by JulesHardouin Mansart. Mansart was named superintendent in January after Colbert de Villacerf resigned the post when his premier commis’s embezzlement was uncovered, leading to an administrative housecleaning.185 Blondel became “conseiller du roy en ses Conseils, intendant et ordonnateur alternative” (king’s councillor in his councils, alternate intendant and authorizing officer),186 while Gagny became a treasurer general.187 In that department’s hierarchy, these were prestigious and lucrative offices. The three intendants were second to the director in status and remuneration, while the three treasurers ranked fourth, after the three controllers general. Daily administration rested mostly upon the director, his premier commis, and their commis.188 Unlike Villacerf, however, ­Mansart did not feel threatened by the venal officers and gave them an active administrative role as his subordinates in matters of contracts and, in a “conseil des Bâtiments” (Buildings Council, which from 1702 met every Tuesday at Versailles), in verifying memoirs from entrepreneurs.189 The treasurer also enjoyed a position that was potentially more profitable yet perilous. During his year of service he was free to use department funds drawn from the royal treasury for his own financial speculations. At its end, however, if expenditures exceeded these funds, he had to wait until the following year to be reimbursed for the advance he made to cover the shortfall. Also, Gagny loaned the king 50,000 livres to meet department expenses for 1702. While Blondel’s office carried greater prestige, its gages were 6,000 livres annually, whereas Gagny’s, with its more fluid possibilities, could yield 30,000 livres per year, which explains why the treasurers were part of the closed circle of approximately five hundred of the regime’s financiers who enriched themselves from such public charges.190 When new offices of secretary of the king were created in 1704 to raise war funds, Gagny again purchased one. His further financial dealings, however, are not known. His financier brother-in-law, Augustin Ferriol, prospered, especially under Desmaretz, so it is likely that Gagny was also caught up in the schemes aimed at extracting money from financiers while offering them the hope of turning a tidy profit. That prospect, however, dimmed as the war dragged on.191 Gagny sold his charge of treasurer in 1714 and that of secretary of the king in 1720. Having grown rich from his many endeavours in royal service and finance, his fortune ultimately foundered, a victim p ­ erhaps of



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the Regency’s ­Chamber of Justice, which pursued the previous regime’s financiers, or of the more destructive Mississippi Bubble. While his only remaining brother, Jouvancourt, was in Martinique, the totally ruined widower Gagny died ignominiously in a ground-floor apartment off the gateway of a Paris townhouse on 14 March 1726.192 Like his brother, Blondel purchased one of the offices of secretary of the king created in 1704, holding it until his death. He was a particular friend of the important banker Samuel Bernard,193 perhaps largely because of his financial duties on behalf of the foreign office rather than any heavy personal involvement in finance. As it was, he was growing rich from lobbying for Marseille. In 1703 he began the purchase of the domain of Sissonne, roughly twenty kilometres east of Laon, from François-­César, comte de Roucy. Completing the sale and rendering homage for it in 1706, the new comte de Sissonne and his wife began rebuilding the chateau and surrounding it with a grand park pierced with handsome avenues.194 Their four daughters made good matches during this same period. In 1701 Jeanne-Elisabeth married Pierre-­François-Hyacinthe de Vintimille, comte de Marseille and baron d’Oullioules, of an old Provencal family related to the Vintimille du Lucs. In 1704 Thérèse married Bernard Daspe, baron de Meilhan, who had a fortune of 150,000 livres and would succeed his father as président à mortier of the Toulouse parlement. The same year MarieFrançoise married Gérard-Marie Berthelier, sieur de Lespervière (or ­Lespinasse), secretary of the king. When widowed, in 1709 she married Joseph-Marie de Barral, président à mortier of the Grenoble parlement and later marquis de la Bastie d’Arvillard. Finally, in 1711 Marie-Anne wed Joseph-Hector de Montaut, marquis de Montbérault and vicomte de Saumont, of ancient lineage and syndic of the Armagnac nobility. The Vintimille du Luc connection was the most brilliant of the matches, as a later genealogist made apparent by listing Marie-Anne Blondel as soeur germaine (sister from the same father and mother) of the comtesse de Vintimille du Luc. When the rising magistrate Daspe wed Thérèse, it was observed that this was made possible by his large fortune, since she brought him a rich dowry of 50,000 livres and the honour of seeing the king and royal family assist at the marriage. The other daughters appear to have been equally well provided for.195 Blondel sold his office in the buildings department in 1711, and his position as Marseille’s Paris agent ended in 1712 as part of cost-cutting by the municipality and its merchants.196 Unlike that of his brother Gagny, however, Blondel’s fortune, grounded primarily in the rewards of bureaucratic

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service, weathered the economic storms of the war years. Blondel died in 1725.197 As Croissy’s secretary and then Torcy’s and as head of the department’s secretariat from at least 1697 until 1715, Blondel was well placed to advance his kin, including his stepson, Antoine-François F ­ aucard de Beauchamp, already from a distinguished lineage of Colbert clients. Beauchamp’s mother, Jeanne-Marie, was the daughter of Colbert’s intendant Vincent Marin. His father, Antoine Faucard de Beauchamp, who had died relatively young (by July 1684), was the son of two old Colbert family servants who in 1663, as a favour to the minister, secretly took in the illegitimate son of Louis XIV and Louise Françoise, duchesse de La Vallière to care for.198 In 1707 Antoine-François Beauchamp, at least twenty-three years old, made his first appearance in department records and was listed regularly from 1710 in its accounts. He seems to have worked with domestic administration as a simple commis.199 Following a strategy more typical of a rising premier commis, he purchased an office of “maître” (magistrate) in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany in 1713.200 At some point he married Madeline Berthellier, perhaps from the same family as his half-sister Marie-Françoise’s first husband. The Beauchamps’ son, François, later served the department under an uncle and a cousin, Jean Gabriel de La Porte du Theil, and their daughter, Jeanne-Benjamine-Angelique, married that same cousin in 1737.201 Antoine-François Faucard de Beauchamp left the department with Torcy in 1715 and became an important postal official. When he died is unknown, but his widow died in 1754.202 Born to Gabriel de La Porte, sieur du Theil, and to Marie Blondel in 1683, Jean-Gabriel de la Porte du Theil began his diplomatic career early, thanks to his uncle François Blondel. From 1701 he served in Spain as secretary to ambassadors Ferdinand, comte de Marsin (­Marcin), ­Cardinal d’Estrées, and Abbé d’Estrées, and received a commission from Philip V in 1702 as a Spanish cavalry lieutenant. Tessé, Torcy’s kinsman and close friend then commanding in Spain, engaged him as secretary in 1705. Tessé and Blondel saw to it that Philip V made du Theil a “commissaire des guerres” (war commissioner) in the Spanish army. When Tessé left Spain after an unsuccessful campaign in 1705, Orry wanted du Theil to remain as his secretary, but instead he accompanied Tessé home.203 In 1708 he joined Torcy’s secretariat,204 where he helped copy out parts of the Treaty of Ryswick and subsequent agreements for Torcy to carry with him for negotiations in The Hague in May 1709. Du Theil also assisted Ligny in sending out subsidies to allies and recording



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Torcy’s dictation, and made frequent use of his knowledge of Spanish and Italian.205 In 1712, at just twenty-nine, Torcy sent him as a secretary to the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht. It was an apt choice, since du Theil knew conditions in Spain at first-hand, had intimate knowledge of the Treaty of Ryswick, was experienced at taking dictation and composing minutes, and had acquired under Ligny’s tutelage expertise with codes. Perhaps more crucially, he got along famously with the diverse group of envoys at Utrecht. At the conclusion of peace in 1713, Torcy appointed him embassy secretary and chargé d’affaires at The Hague.206 He was there only briefly, however, since a secretary-in-chief was needed at the peace congress meeting at the small Swiss town of Baden. Again, du Theil’s acquaintance with the department and with congress protocol landed him the job. While praising du Theil to Torcy, the ambassador to Switzerland du Luc acknowledged that the young man was under Torcy’s and Blondel’s protection – a powerful combination indeed.207 In 1715 du Theil returned to the secretariat, becoming one of its most powerful members, perhaps being named second secretary. Close ties with Pecquet and Marshal Huxelles led to his promotion to premier commis under the Regency in September 1715. He immediately took as his special assistant his cousin and Blondel’s nephew, Louis Richard de Tussac, who also knew Spanish and Italian and whose brothers had been enfants de langues through their uncle’s influence. He promoted the career of his future brother-in-law François Faucard de Beauchamp in the department’s archives and eventually secured for him posts of ambassadorial secretary and chargé d’affaires in Portugal and resident in Liege. Du Theil also took François as his secretary to Vienna (1736–37) and to the negotiations at Breda (1747). In 1737 at the age of fifty-five, du Theil drew the blood and stepfamily of Blondel together when he took a young bride, Jeanne-Benjamine-Angelique, daughter of Blondel’s stepson Beauchamp. He died eighteen years later after a long and distinguished career.208 François Faucard de Beauchamp’s diplomatic career was helped along by another kinsman who began his career under Torcy. This was his uncle Louis-Augustin Blondel, who was François Blondel’s son and thus his own father’s half-brother as well as du Theil’s cousin. After studying law, Louis-Augustin entered Torcy’s Académie politique in 1713 and then the department secretariat. Like du Theil, he apprenticed as an ambassadorial secretary in Madrid (1717–18). He served as a ­diplomat in Turin, various German courts, and Vienna until his retirement in 1751. Like du Theil, he would also employ nephew François Faucard as a secretary.209

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The Blondels, their kin, and their marital alliances are emblematic of the way in which finance weaved its way through the administrative fabric of the French state, even in departments seemingly far removed from such considerations. Venal offices in finance did more than supplement a bureaucrat’s income. They also marked his social ascent and made him attractive to a minister for service in a more professional capacity.

Ada m : D e pa rt m e n t V e t eran and Fai thful C o l b e rt Cli ent Clair Adam, who began his service in the foreign ministry before Mignon and Blondel, was born sometime between 1640 and 1650 in Montereaufault-­Yonne into a family of royal officials and clerics who had lived for centuries in the French Gâtinais east of Fontainebleau. In 1667 he entered Lionne’s department as a code apprentice under premier commis Pachau, a fellow Gâtinais who was likely his sponsor and patron. When Pomponne was disgraced, Pachau interceded with Croissy on Adam’s behalf and the latter was retained, although Pachau himself was not. Adam traveled to Berlin early in 1680, reporting back to premier commis Tourmont, himself uncertain of his own future under the new minister. Adam found a lack of order and economy in the household of François de Pas, comte de Rébenac, who had been appointed extraordinary envoy to the Brandenburg court late the previous year. Back in Paris, Adam continued as a code clerk and a copyist. Now Croissy’s client, Adam prospered in his service and, like him, invested in the annuities of the Estates of Brittany. In 1684 he purchased a residence near the Hôtel Croissy at the southwest corner of rue Richelieu and rue Neuve-des-­ Petits-Champs, and in 1686 he married Michelle du Rosoir (or Rozoir). But Adam’s closest connection was increasingly with Torcy, who stood as godfather to his son, born the following year, and whom Adam accompanied to Rome as private secretary in 1689. His fortune grew and he invested in 1690 with former department colleague Parayre, the royal architect Robert de Cotte, and others in a society formed to build a canal between Paris and Saint-Maur. Adam took a critical step in his social and professional ascent when in 1691 he purchased the expensive nobility-granting office of secretary of the king, which also allowed him to draw up, sign, and seal royal orders. Interestingly, one of the two witnesses (who could not be related by blood or marriage) to provide one of the required attestations to his good morals was Ferriol, future ambassador to Constantinople. Perhaps the Blondels’ connection with Ferriol



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began through Adam. Even though he had already been using them to seal his personal documents, he registered his arms in 1696.210 In order to be close to the bureau, Adam built a villa on the outskirts of Versailles northeast of the palace known as Glatigny.211 Early in his ascent, however, Adam experienced a misadventure that might have ended it. In December 1690 Croissy selected Adam as a “person of confidence” to accompany Foy de La Neuville, gentleman of the chamber of the king of Poland, to Hamburg carrying ratifications for a secret convention with Hanover that was a strand in a web of negotiations aiming to draw other German princes and the Scandinavians closer to France. The fear of enemy agents laying their hands on its particulars led to an ingenious precaution: a Swiss officer disguised as a merchant would carry a duplicate of the papers to the cantons and from there to Hamburg; and La Neuville, who made frequent trips between Warsaw and Paris, would reach Hamburg by way of the United Provinces and northern Germany. In addition, only the first and last pages of the signed ratification were sent; the particulars would be added once the document reached Hamburg. Adam, masquerading as La Neuville’s secretary, would fill in the blanks of the document he had begun at Versailles. During their journey, unfortunately, Neuville’s servant loaded the valise containing the document on a wagon that was to follow them some days later but which fell into Dutch hands instead and was forwarded to Heinsius, who could not, however, learn anything specific from it. The French agents discovered their loss only once in Hamburg on 10 January 1691, but the Swiss courier had made it through safely and Adam was able to complete his task. Benoît Bidal, baron d’Asfeld, the diplomat responsible for these negotiations, was not pleased that Dutch suspicions had been raised and was anxious to be rid of Adam, who ended up returning home by way of Denmark and Norway to avoid Dutch agents. Adam blamed La Neuville for the errant valise but nonetheless earned a reprimand from Croissy, who insisted that he was “unable to stomach such a ridiculous blunder,” for a courier should never lose sight of his luggage.212 Although his travels abroad were ended, Adam apparently did not fall out of favour and received a generous gratification of 3,000 livres in 1691. After Croissy’s death in July 1696 he was appointed intendant of Torcy’s household and “tuteur bon des Enfants mineurs” of the new secretary’s minor siblings (legal guardian of their persons and property).213 Along with Torcy’s mother, his brother, and Renaudot, Adam loaned his patron the funds he needed at his marriage.214 His closeness with the family was clearly indicated in 1701 when Adam was one of only two

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non-family members who signed the marriage contract of Torcy’s sister Thérèse when she wed the marquis de Renel.215 So powerful did Adam grow in Torcy’s service that provincial intendants came to pay their respects when they “made their court” at Versailles. Even the police chief of Paris courted Adam to have him show a particular document to the absent secretary of state.216 When Torcy was in The Hague secretly negotiating for peace in 1709, Adam was entrusted with sending out and opening the foreign secretary’s correspondence.217 Adam had other protectors outside the department, such as Maintenon’s niece Françoise Charlotte Amble d’Aubigné, duchesse de Noailles.218 He also undertook delicate missions for Torcy and the king, as in March 1715 when the princesse des Ursins, expelled from Spain, coldly received at Versailles, and denied lodging at the palace, was taken in by Adam and his wife and spent a night at Glatigny.219 Clearly, the Adams moved in lofty circles. Although perhaps not the most brilliant of Torcy’s clerks, Adam was certainly among the most trustworthy, devotedly loyal, and steadfast.220 This did not, however, prevent the regent from making use of his skills by installing him in 1715 as one of the principal commis of the new domestic affairs council.221 Adam recruited his own family into Torcy’s service. His brother Nicolas became a visiteur des postes. His son-in-law Jean de Prévost, former captain of the gardes du corps of Marshal Boufflers and in 1705 a Toulouse “capitoul” (alderman, which granted him noble status), joined his father-in-law in 1706 in purchasing one of the new offices of treasurers of ambassadors. Adam’s son Jean-Baptiste, born in 1687 and with bright prospects as Torcy’s godson, became a commis by at least 1709 but was so debauched and disliked that his colleagues dubbed him “Cain.” Other contemporaries must also have thought him untrustworthy because once his father and Torcy exited the department, young Adam was heard of no more. For all his years and faithful service in the department, stretching from almost the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign to his death, Adam was unable to launch a dynasty to carry on his legacy.222

P e cq u e t : T h e P in n ac l e o f Professi onali sm Ironically, Torcy’s premier commis Antoine Pecquet may be best known for the role he played during the Regency, even though it was based on the skills and knowledge he had acquired and deployed prior to 1715. He has been characterized as “un de ces laborieux qui travaillent autant



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par goût que par devoir avec le sentiment d’être utiles et la joie d’être ignorés” (one of those hard workers who labour as much from taste as from duty with the sense of being useful and the joy of being ignored).223 He remained a premier commis until he retired owing to apoplexy in 1725 and died in 1728.224 He was succeeded by (and is often confused with) his more famous son, Antoine Pecquet fils, who penned the famous treatise Discours sur l’art de négocier, sometimes misattributed to his father.225 Pecquet’s father, Michel, was a merchant in Senlis (where Antoine was born in 1668) and later an engineer, probably in Louvois’s fortifications department.226 There is some confusion about Antoine’s early career. From 1682 he worked on royal fortifications, although in what capacity is unclear; aged fourteen, he was likely his father’s apprentice, but in four years his work on fortifications ended.227 In 1686 someone recommended him to intendant of finance Michel Le Peletier de Souzy, former intendant of Flanders, to work for his brother, Controller General Le Peletier, as inspector and director of public works in Ypres.228 Pecquet was in Claude Le Peletier’s service for fourteen years, remaining after the latter gave up the controller general’s office (1689)229 and left the Conseil (1697).230 He made use of his engineering skills and experience supervising the 1696–97 reconstruction work on Le Peletier’s Paris residence.231 Pecquet entered the foreign office in 1700 as a premier commis.232 He was perhaps recommended to Torcy by his late father-in-law’s old friend Claude Le Peletier, now largely retired from public life.233 Pecquet was a prodigious worker. Nicolas Mesnager drew on his ability to read English and knowledge of commercial matters during negotiations in 1711.234 Pecquet took dictation from Torcy on the delicate matter of Matthew Prior’s secret visit to Fontainebleau in July 1711 to present the British peace preliminaries.235 An expert on European court etiquette and protocol, it was to him that Ambassador du Luc in Vienna wrote in 1715 when he encountered difficulties with the nuncio.236 Pecquet could facilitate an unofficial diplomatic visit to the king, as the irrepressible Prior reported to Whitehall: “Monsieur Torcy having delivered me the answer to the mémoire … M. Pecquet came to me [3 August 1711] in the morning and told me the king would see me at six in the evening in his closet. Accordingly at that time M. Pecquet went privately with me through the lodging, and Monsieur Torcy came out from the king’s cabinet, and introduced me (to the king).”237 With some relish, Viscount Bolingbroke later wrote: “But I am forced to make Monsieur Pecquet come to me … twice this day, while Monsieur Torcy stays [in Paris].”238 Like the other

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foreign office clerks, Pecquet formed friendships with French agents abroad that surface occasionally in official correspondence.239 In 1689, before entering Torcy’s service, Pecquet married the daughter of Martin Cadart, seigneur de Beauregard, “maître des fontaines” (master of the fountains) of the Duke of Brunswick. Their daughter married Charles-Arnould Nolin de la Tournelle, who succeeded to his father-inlaw’s office of secretary of the king in 1728 and four years later became “secrétaire a la conduit des ambassadeurs” (secretary to conduct ambassadors).240 Antoine fils, like his father a diligent and knowledgeable worker, was premier commis under Louis XV, and thus father and son helped lead the foreign office bureaucracy during the first four decades of the eighteenth century. Pecquet père accumulated financial offices in Brittany, long a source of rewards for Colbert clients. Unlike his foreign office colleagues of the earlier generation, however, Pecquet began this process after his entry into the foreign office: in 1705 he became an auditor in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes and in 1713 a “trésorier de France généraux de finances” (treasurer of France general of finance) in the same body.241 He was granted letters of nobility in July 1715 and only became a secretary of the king under the Regency.242 Like Adam’s, Pecquet’s career was largely fashioned within the department and by his work in the field in foreign policy. There can be little doubt that both the training and experience he provided his son Antoine fils, as well as his own conduct and role as guardian of the department’s traditions, contributed to the treatise the younger Pecquet would publish in 1737. The elder Pecquet’s professionalism and proficiency – and his connections with key figures in the new regime, of course – allowed him to preserve the department’s Colbert legacy during the Polysynod and afterwards under the resurgent system of secretaries of state. Moreover, when Torcy left the foreign office, Pecquet remained and even faithfully served Huxelles and later Cardinal Dubois, who was consumed with jealousy and hatred for Torcy.243 Perhaps at one level Pecquet was, in Weber’s words, a clerk “devoted to [the] impersonal and functional purposes” of the foreign office rather than to any particular person, which resembles not patrimonialism but Weber’s “pure type” of bureaucracy.244 At another level, however, he was, like all bureaucrats, a complex individual rather than a simple abstraction. Thus, he exhibited attitudes that were carried over from the Torcy era, as indeed did all the foreign office’s personnel.245 When in 1718 the British diplomats distributed gifts to Dubois and Pecquet for their work on the alliance just signed, Pecquet’s refusal to accept the 500 livres proffered puzzled and even somewhat



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offended them. Pecquet was motivated perhaps by patriotic sentiment against the Hanoverians or by institutional reticence toward outside gifts. He did accept, though, a gratification from the regent.246 In 1718, as the British tried to push France toward vigorous measures against Spain, Pecquet supported Dubois in resisting this pressure. The following year, however, Pecquet, like Torcy, was critical of Dubois’s weakness when faced with British pressure over Spain and the treaty London made with Sweden behind his back.247 What seems likely is that Pecquet was in closer communication with his former employer than Dubois suspected or would have countenanced.248

L ar ro q u e : A L in k to t he Republi c of Letters Nearly a century ago André Le Glay observed that the letters exchanged between intelligent and curious individuals constituted the true mode of staying informed of court news and gossip, foreign events, the lives of the nobility, and the latest ideas circulating in the salons.249 Such linkage through letters was especially true of the world of early modern scholars. This self-acknowledged Republic of Letters, although often riven by personal rancour and controversies of an intra- (and therefore all the more bitter) rather than an inter-denominational nature, was nonetheless held together by “an ideal of mutual support and assistance in the furthering of knowledge that completely transcended all differences of religion and political affiliations.”250 Especially in the decades after 1650, European scholars, treading a path similar to that of scientists (these should not be seen as easily distinguishable categories), increasingly approached subjects such as history and (more cautiously) theology with a critical, rational, and secular mindset and methodology. Jonathan Israel insists that it is only within the context of this era of intellectual ferment, characterized by Paul Hazard as the “crisis of the European mind,” that the Enlightenment may be understood.251 As we have already seen, many members of Torcy’s brain trust, such as Dubos and Le Grand, were active and important members of the international scholarly networks. ­Daniel Larroque was likewise an important epistolatory link in the Republic of Letters and perhaps the clerk with the most striking and checkered background.252 Like his father Mathieu, one of the greatest Reformed theologians in France, Daniel (born c. 1660) was a Protestant minister in Rouen and a pugnacious apologist. During his 1674 Rouen sojourn, Pierre Bayle came to know both Larroques. The young Daniel made such a favourable impression that when he sent Bayle a manuscript d ­ uring the

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winter of 1683–84, Bayle forwarded it to his Rotterdam editor Renier Leers. Le Prosélyte abusé, published anonymously in 1684, was a reply to a book by a recent Protestant convert to Catholicism. Still in his early twenties, Larroque critiqued the author with “delicacy and sarcasm.”253 By June 1684 he was in Paris as preceptor to a young nobleman (perhaps a German), immersed in the savant world and forwarding news and books to Bayle in Rotterdam. Larroque complained that the Republic of Letters in Paris was in the doldrums owing to the many bad devotional books being published. If this continued, he jested, it would have to be re-founded as a separate republic of piety!254 As pressure mounted on France’s Huguenots, Larroque left Paris for Holland on 10 February 1685.255 He spent some months with Bayle in Rotterdam writing and published that year Les véritables motifs de la conversion de l’abbé de la Trappe, a critique of Abbé Armand Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé, a former dissolute cleric turned Trappist reformer.256 By the end of November, Larroque was in London learning English and making contacts. He served a congregation in London, but his great love was Oxford, to which he went whenever he could, calling it a land of science and the place where Greek and oriental languages most flourished. Extracts from English books as well as books themselves crossed the North Sea to Rotterdam along with news of and introductions to members of the Huguenot diaspora and the English scholarly and scientific community.257 Bayle’s illness, which delayed and truncated the February 1687 issue of his monthly innovative journal of literary criticism, the News of the Republic of Letters, likely led Larroque to return to Rotterdam. He edited the March issue alone and the next five in collaboration with Jean Le Clerc, as well as doing further polemical writing and publishing of his own.258 From late 1689 he spent approximately nine months as secretary to Sir William Dutton Colt, England’s envoy to Hanover, but did not meet Leibniz, who was away in Italy during his stay. By the time Leibniz returned in June 1690, Larroque had left Colt’s service to travel to Rotterdam to see Bayle and then went to Denmark.259 If Larroque was not already known to the foreign ministry, he certainly was after the French ambassador’s confessor in Copenhagen, perhaps in August or September1690, heard his startling repudiation of Protestantism in favour of Catholicism. By October, with a 300-livre économat pension for New Converts, Larroque was in Paris.260 Why did he convert and at this time? Likely homesick for the intellectual delights of Paris and tiring of the pettiness and poverty of life as a Huguenot exile, he may have been enticed by an offer from Paul Pellisson, hopes



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of recovering the confiscated property of family members who had fled in 1685, a growing discomfort with William III’s anti-French crusade, witnessed first-hand during his diplomatic mission to Hanover, or any combination of these factors.261 Given his striking success in Hanover,262 an important hub of the Republic of Letters, and with the recent outbreak of war, which always increased the hunger for news, Larroque may have considered that his literary patron Bayle, the great L ­ eibniz, and the erudite community in general might be better served from France than from England or Germany. Given his connections, he would be better placed to help diffuse news and books from the vital French intellectual centre and also remedy the shortage of German and English works making their way into French libraries and critical journals.263 Whatever his likely complex motives, he headed to Rotterdam when he left Colt’s service and then, perhaps with Bayle’s blessing, journeyed to Copenhagen, away from any obvious linkage with his patron that might raise French suspicions as to the sincerity of his conversion yet to a neutral port that would allow a quick return to France. As for the genuineness of Larroque’s conversion, whether or not he was a deist, he was certainly critical of dogmatism.264 Outward Catholic conformity coupled with a skeptical intellectual life fell easily within the bounds of Bayle’s sense of toleration. Indeed, Bayle defended him against the fiery pastor Pierre ­Jurieu, saying that God and no man was the judge of Larroque’s actions.265 In Paris, although under a kind of supervision by the Jesuit Père Antoine Verjus, brother of the diplomat Verjus de Crécy, Larroque resumed his role as one of Bayle’s chief French contacts.266 He quickly reconnected with sundry orientalists and literary figures, including Abbé Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’Olivet, learned grammarian, poet Nicolas ­Boileau’s friend, and Voltaire’s teacher; Père Leonard de SainteCatherine, librarian and bibliophile; Daniel Huet, bishop of Avranches, academician, Latinist, and Hellenist; and François Roger Gaignières, antiquarian and collector.267 He was also now in correspondence with Leibniz, sending him books and news from Paris and facilitating his contact with Malebranche.268 The great German erudite envied Larroque’s position in Paris, which he called “la source des connoissances” (source of knowledge), assuring him that he was no mere inhabitant, but “un des members principaux du senat des scavans” (one of the principal members of the senate of savants).269 Of course, Leibniz said this in the context of requesting help with some historical research – the French, he insisted, knew the history of other nations better than did their own natives – but it was true that Paris was rich in libraries and savants. L ­ eibniz also

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maintained that contemporary France was as superior in the sciences as it was in public affairs, which often went hand in hand, as in the ages of Augustus and the Arab Caliphate.270 Though living in Dutch exile, Bayle was French by birth, language (he never learned Dutch), and culture, and he likewise saw Paris, with its many libraries open to scholars and bookshops filled with old books, as the centre of the intellectual world. Correspondents such as Larroque and Dubos kept him in close contact with that world.271 Yet the dazzling and vibrant intellectual life of Paris also depended on foreign contacts to assure the circulation of the often-illicit books that scholars were anxious to hear about or read. In particular, most of Bayle’s works were banned in France. However, official censorship could be haphazard, inefficient, and even indulgent when it came to certain titles, but it still posed an ever-present threat.272 In mid-April 1690 there appeared in the United Provinces a controversial work, Avis aux réfugiés sur leur prochain retour en France … par Monsieur C.L.A.A.P.D.P., said by its publisher to be the work of an old friend, a Catholic avocat in the Paris parlement. The book, critical of Protestants and the Glorious Revolution, defended Louis XIV’s right to expel religious minorities who took up the pen or arms against their lawful sovereign to foment anarchy and civil war. It urged a Huguenot refugee return to France by means of royal clemency rather than the Protestant crusade William III was raising and advised the returnees to submit to their rightful king. Although well received by Bossuet and others in France, the book was bitterly denounced by the Huguenot diaspora. Speculation flew as to its author. By the spring of 1691 the pastor Jurieu attributed it to Bayle and a pro-French cabal in Holland opposed to William III. Despite Bayle’s continuous denial of authorship, his close friends and most of the rest of the Republic of Letters did not believe him. Bayle even encouraged the suggestion that Larroque (by then safely out of reach of Dutch authorities and whom Jurieu numbered to be among Bayle’s cabal that Jurieu blamed for the Avis) was perhaps the author. Some contemporaries said that Larroque himself claimed authorship, a supposition that gained subsequent scholarly credence, but as Gianluca Mori has convincingly demonstrated in the introduction to his critical edition of this work, Bayle alone wrote it, which was perfectly consistent with his subtle notions of toleration and politics.273 Larroque’s previously bright prospects dimmed considerably when a compromising paper in his handwriting turned up during police ­lieutenant Gabriel Nicolas de La Reynie’s sweep of Rouen and Lyon booksellers that were producing libelous and Protestant works. Accord-



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ing to a ­February 1700 report on his case, the half-sheet contained a project for a preface to an edition of Bernhard de Fontenelle’s Dialogues des morts that contained things whose application was deemed contrary to royal service. This and the accusation of trading in forbidden books (a common activity in the Republic of Letters) led to Larroque’s arrest on 25 November 1694, along with his friend the orientalist Antoine Galland, with him at that moment and assumed to be an accomplice but released within a week. Found among Larroque’s papers were what Pontchartrain later (20 May 1696) termed “bad manuscripts” deserving greater punishment than the imprisonment he actually received.274 Bayle read of the arrest in a Dutch gazette, but doubted Larroque’s guilt and wrote their mutual friend, François Pinsson de Riolles, avocat in the Paris parlement, for news and to offer his support. Leibniz, likewise informed of Larroque’s travails, hoped for his release.275 After nearly a year in Paris’s Petit Châtelet prison, where during the final seven or eight months his friends could visit him, Larroque was transferred to Angers, at first heavily restricted by Pontchartrain as a man who had gotten mixed up with writing “des libelles diffamatoires” (defamatory libelous writings).276 Bayle maintained contact through those who visited the prisoner, especially the Jesuit mathematician, philologist, and numismatist Edouard de Vitry, Larroque’s close friend.277 Early in 1696 Larroque was transferred from Angers to Saumur, still under surveillance to prevent the production of further “mauvais écrits” (bad writings) or meetings with other converts from Catholicism, but apparently good behaviour and royal mercy led to his release in December 1698, although he was still confined to the town of Saumur.278 Early in 1699 the Châtelet’s royal prosecutor, Colbert family legal advisor and Mignon kinsman-by-marriage Claude II Robert, approached ­Pontchartrain on Larroque’s behalf. Whether he did so on Torcy’s behalf is not known, but all the Colbert connections that helped obtain Larroque’s release certainly render this a strong possibility. In any event, when Pontchartrain took the matter to the king, he was instructed to seek the advice of Bossuet, who had known Larroque since 1691, which he did on 24 March.279 Based on the bishop’s testimony and that of others as to his mental abilities (“capacité”) and Pontchartrain’s conclusion that Larroque’s guilt, while real, was based on necessity rather than any other (political?) motive, he was finally released on probation on 13 January 1700 and forbidden to leave France.280 A report ­annotated by police lieutenant d’Argenson on 24 February 1700 summarized Larroque’s case and indicated that he had arrived in Paris only

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eight days before. His request that his personal and scholarly papers seized at his arrest be returned elicited the comment to d’Argenson from police greffier Gaudion (11 March) that his colleague Tauxier, who had Larroque’s papers, had remarked that he was lucky to have been arrested only after the earlier execution of two others convicted “pour libelles énormes” (for excessive libels). In any event, Pontchartrain wrote d’Argenson (28 July 1700) that he was to see that Larroque’s restored économats pension was paid.281 From his arrival in Paris, he was back among his old literary friends, sharing a letter he had recently received from Bayle.282 Another of Larroque’s champions was Marie-Madelaine de Rochechouart, abbess of Fontevrault, the sister of former royal mistress Mme de Montespan and the third duc de Mortemart, married to the Great ­Colbert’s daughter Marie-Anne. Called the “Queen of Abbesses,” she was an influential member of many literary circles and the king’s correspondent. She commended Larroque to Montespan, Gaignières, and the Noailles family, and helped him obtain a place with her kinsman Torcy as an English and Dutch translator.283 Hardly settled into his new employment, the former prisoner was, astonishingly, assigned, along with premier commis Noblet and master of ceremonies Desgranges, to accompany the young dukes of Burgundy and Berry as they hurriedly escorted their brother Philip to his new Spanish throne. Larroque was apparently assigned to the suite of Burgundy and the duc de Noailles. The December 1700 through April 1701 journey began in haste, but ended in a more leisurely way with a circuitous return through the south, up the Rhône, and back to Paris, which Torcy carefully orchestrated to build support for the monarchy as international tensions heightened. Putting his pen to good use, Larroque chronicled the incessant round of receptions the princes endured at almost every stop, but he was also able to visit historical sites along the way, including the tombs of Louis XI and Montaigne. He also sent a running account of this long journey to his friend Gaignières.284 Both Bayle and Leibniz were informed of Larroque’s release and change of fortune.285 Larroque and Bayle continued to correspond, and before the latter’s death on 28 December 1706, Larroque enlisted Louis XIV’s personal physician Fagon to prepare a “consultation” on Bayle’s illness, unfortunately dated the day before his demise.286 Contact with Leibniz was more intermittent, but Larroque’s Hanover connections served him well while working for Torcy. For instance, the Grand Duke of Tuscany’s extraordinary envoy to France from 1695 until his death in



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1707 was none other than Averardo Salviati, marquis of Montiéri, who had earned Leibniz’s gratitude for introducing him to Larroque.287 Although his clerical, translating, and writing duties as a foreign office staff member required that he normally reside at Versailles, when staying in Paris Larroque entertained friends with the latest court news in rooms provided to him by the rich duchesse de Lesdiguières in her splendid hotel. One habitual visitor was his friend the orientalist and archaeologist Antoine Galland, the first European to translate Les mille et une nuits (The Thousand and One Nights or The Arabian Nights), who shared his translations with Larroque as he finished them. When Larroque was in Paris, especially for festival days, Galland was in the habit of visiting with him at his rooms to drink coffee, share verses and songs, and discuss literary matters.288 In February 1709 Pontchartrain wanted to appoint ­Galland professor of Arabic in the Royal College, but a jurisdictional dispute with Torcy delayed the announcement until 8 June. Yet the day after, Galland dined at Versailles with Torcy, Larroque, and Le Grand, another of his friends.289 It is not clear what work if any Galland performed for the foreign office, but on 27 December 1710 Larroque shared with him an account of Vendôme’s victories over the Allies in Spain at Brihuega and Villa Viciosa (8 and 10 December) written in Torcy’s bureau to be printed for propaganda purposes. This suggests that Larroque was the author of the account, but in any event, it shows how quickly the ministry’s propaganda machine could deploy its products.290 In his youth, premier commis under Louis XV Le Dran worked alongside Larroque, who, like Abbé Le Grand, collaborated with JeanYves de Saint-Prest at the Louvre. Le Dran described them as “bons généraux d’armée qui n’avoient des troupes” (good army generals who had no troops) for the erudition they deployed to defend French foreign policy.291 Indeed, Larroque used his skills in 1709 to offer a quasi-­ official response to a Dutch edition of the papers and letters of the comte d’Estrades, a former ambassador to the United Provinces, that its publishers touted as revealing the secrets of French diplomatic perfidy. In addition to noting the copyist, editorial, and printer errors that mutilated the originals, Larroque accused those who issued the five volumes of seeking but failing to obscure past French glory, their insults to France merely highlighting England’s divided and poor government and Dutch ingratitude.292 Larroque and Le Grand laboured among the diplomatic papers, ­inventorying them for easier access, and from 1712 served as adjunct teachers in the Académie politique connected with the archive and directed by Saint-Prest.293

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Under the Regency, the duc d’Antin, the abbess of Fontevrault’s nephew, requested that Larroque join him on the Polysynod’s Conseil du dedans, which consolidated all domestic administration. He was its chief premier commis, joining the two other premiers commis who headed its three bureaus, who included Adam, reprising his duties under Torcy.294 When in September 1718 the regent abolished this and other councils, re-dividing domestic administration among four re-empowered secretaries of state, Larroque retired with a pension to pursue his writing and publishing on religion and history until his death in 1731.295 Larroque was perhaps a deist of the radical Enlightenment, close to both the suspected radical yet enigmatic Bayle and the anti-radical and moderate Enlightenment champion Leibniz, and served the more conventionally pious Torcy, who personally gravitated at most toward the edge of the moderate Early Enlightenment mainstream.296 Torcy could not have been unaware of Larroque’s ideas and the intellectual company he kept, but his desire to deploy the best minds and sharpest pens in the service of his king’s foreign policy led him to embrace a pragmatic latitudinarianism.

C l ie n t s a n d D e pa rt ment Veterans The foreign office under Torcy included clerks who had entered it long before he did and others who were added in the final years of the War of the Spanish Succession. Some clerks served only a short time, leaving because of death, another career opportunity, or perhaps because they did not like the work. We know only a little about some of them, almost nothing about others, and we do not even know of the existence of others. It is not surprising that many from the department’s lower levels are obscure, but it is curious that we know little even about some of the premiers commis. One of these is Aubert, who served under Lionne, Pomponne, Croissy, and Torcy until his retirement in 1705.297 When he became a premier commis is uncertain, but it was at least by 1701.298 Details concerning Aubert are sketchy, but a building contract in the foreign archives perhaps offers some possibilities. The contract is with Jean Richard, architect and master mason, for some construction on the grounds of the Abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Pres in Paris on behalf of Jacques Aubert, royal councillor, “contrôleur des guerres” (controller of war), and treasurer general to Cardinal Furstenberg, abbot of Saint-Germain, who was developing part of its grounds to pay his many expenses.299 Piccioni cites this contract to corroborate his hypothesis that Aubert, whom he believes to be this Jacques Aubert, disappeared from



The Triumph of the Commis 277

department records after 1694.300 However, service in the foreign office hardly precluded holding a household post with an important personage. Indeed, the foreign secretary might recommend one of his clerks for such a post as a reward and a means of keeping an eye on someone of interest. As already noted, it was common for a premier commis to omit that title while preferring more socially exalted ones in public documents. Moreover, building a fine Parisian townhouse and speculating in real estate were hardly at odds with a clerk’s position. In any event, other evidence shows that Aubert did not leave the department. Even more shadowy is Louis Bénigne de Marolot, who first appears in the 1693 accounts and by 1706 was a premier commis.301 With the reorganization after Mignon’s retirement, Marolot seems primarily to have assisted Adam with domestic correspondence, perhaps with responsibility for southern provinces, although like Noblet and Ligny he often served as Torcy’s copyist, as with a draft treaty sent out in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession.302 The last notice of him in department accounts comes in 1710, after which he apparently disappeared, whether due to death or retirement is unknown.303 Victor Goulu (or Goullet), sieur de Ligny, who generated a good deal of correspondence during his years in the department, is less obscure. A “sieur de Ligny” sold Croissy a house and land adjoining his estate at Croissy in 1687, and in 1691 letters of nobility were expedited by the foreign office for presumably the same person.304 Victor Goulu de Ligny served Pomponne as a personal secretary, was on the staff of Pomponne’s kinsman Antoine, marquis de Feuquières, French com­ mander at ­Pignerol during the Nine Years War, and was a commis of the Extraordinary of War for the Army of Italy as of 1702 under the Colbert client Bouchu, intendant of Dauphiné and the Army of Italy. From June 1701 the Extraordinary of War, the principal military treasury under the war department’s jurisdiction, was struck with major bankruptcies from top to bottom, likely affecting Ligny and forcing Bouchu to look to his own resources and resourcefulness for credit to keep the army fed and supplied. The hard-pressed intendant nonetheless found time to write Torcy (18 March 1702) on Ligny’s behalf. His letter arrived at Versailles most opportunely, for Torcy, scrambling to keep pace with disbursements for the diplomacy of the widening war, immediately offered Ligny his protection and employment.305 In the final months of 1702 Ligny was among those minor agents Torcy dispatched to sound out members of the Dutch peace party, traveling to Frankfurt under the assumed name of “Seeblat.”306 By late November he was in the foreign office as Torcy’s

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secretary, issuing orders for payments, including gratifications to diplomats abroad, processing passports, taking dictation, handling the minister’s correspondence, dispensing subsidies to French allies, and working on postal matters.307 One of Ligny’s early assignments was to correspond with Noblet, who was traveling with the Army of Germany in Alsace. Noblet, in reporting to Torcy on the activities of Abbé Pomponne, who was traveling in the Duke of Burgundy’s train, made a joke about Ligny “vous présentant un cardon qu’il chiffré” (presenting you with a thistle he encrypted).308 Apparently in response to a request from Noblet for a gratification for a nun he encountered at the front, Torcy scribbled at the top of the letter that Ligny had sent it.309 In other business, Torcy noted that he had spoken to Ligny about Noblet to say that he accepted his proposition about gathering news through the Strasbourg postmaster.310 The former army treasurer was soon paymaster to France’s allies abroad, assisting Blondel in sending out the secret subsidies, which often required Ligny to accompany Torcy when he followed the king to Marly and to Fontainebleau. He developed a close correspondence with Ambassador Pomponne in Venice and from 1705 to 1709 sent him by a circuitous route more than 150,000 livres to be smuggled from Venice to the Hungarian insurgents. Ligny maintained a registry for Hungarian subsidies and sent letters and ordonnances signed in his own name to ­Bonnac, ambassador to Sweden and the Polish Commonwealth, who had promoted the Hungarian diversion.311 He also supplied monies to ­Poussin in Denmark and to the bankers of the two Wittelsbach electors.312 Ambassador Ferriol, another of Ligny’s regular correspondents, wrote to him upon his return from Constantinople in March 1711 to explain and justify his expenditures for the Hungarian adventure. The department had begun to demand a more exact accounting of expenditures when a mission was completed. That same year du Theil, Blondel’s nephew, joined the secretariat to assist Ligny with the growing work.313 Despite the system of treasurers of ambassadors, the plenipotentiaries to Utrecht still wrote Ligny directly for payment of their gratifications. Mesnager, for example, importuned Ligny for immediate payment to be delivered to his man of affairs in Paris, Philippe Masson, and two weeks later Masson wrote to Ligny about funds for Polignac, also requesting passports, presumably for delivering the monies.314 Given his financial skills and duties, it is little wonder that Ligny was retained during the Regency.315 Another wartime recommendation came from Louis de Bernage, provincial intendant of Franche-Comté and then Flanders. His cousin Jean-



The Triumph of the Commis 279

Nicolas de Bernage, sieur de Saint-Illiers, entered the department in 1704 and worked under Pecquet.316 In 1712 the Colberts arranged a marriage between Bernage and the daughter of the controller general of the company of the Swiss Guard. Torcy and his wife attended the wedding, as did Mme de Croissy, Torcy’s brothers Henri and Charles-Joachim, and all of the department’s premiers commis. Later (1719) the Fourniers stood godparents for Bernage’s son.317 Bernage was regarded as a man of probity who possessed “une belle main propre sous dictation” (a beautiful clean hand under dictation).318 Under the Regency he was specially charged with sending out passports and legal documents.319 Nicolas-Louis Le Dran was born in 1687 in Paris, son of maitre surgeon, Henri Le Dran, who had served the Colbert family and became surgeon-major of the Gardes françaises du Roi. While his older brother Henri-François Le Dran became a famous Paris surgeon and his younger brother François-Antoine served in Martinique as a royal physician, Nicolas entered Torcy’s service as a translator in October 1711 on the recommendation of his brother, Charles-Joachim Colbert, Montpellier’s bishop. François-Aimé Pouget, one of Charles-Joachim’s closest advisors, had been in a seminary with Le Dran and spoke enthusiastically of him as an excellent Latin translator who also knew German, Spanish, and Italian. Le Dran could also read and translate from English, a talent increasingly prized in the early eighteenth century as relations with Great Britain grew closer.320 When Saint-Prest left Versailles for the Louvre with the department’s archives in 1710, Le Dran stayed behind to classify the remaining documents and those that continued to accumulate, but joined him in 1711 as “gardien des Archives anciennes” (guardian of the old archives). After 1715 he served as chief of the archives and undertook various stints as premier commis, retiring in 1762 and dying twelve years later. The solitary and unmarried Le Dran loved books, music, and history, and produced invaluable historical studies of the foreign office. Michel Sermenté, sieur de Montalais, son of a receiver and payer of rentes of the Hôtel de Ville, joined the department in 1711. Trained as an avocat in the Paris parlement, Sermenté proved a valuable assistant to Adam drafting legal documents sent to the provinces and parlements. In 1711 he wed the daughter of the regiment of the Swiss Guards’ ­“maréchal des logis” (quartermaster), and his colleague du Theil later stood as his daughter’s godfather. Under the Regency, Sermenté attached himself to Joseph Fleuriau d’Armenonville, who purchased Torcy’s office of secretary of state on 3 February 1716. He served as his p ­ remier

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commis even though the new secretary had no department and duties reduced to signing expéditions. Sermenté returned to the department as premier commis when Fleuriau d’Armenonville’s son, Charles-Jean-­ Baptiste comte de Fleuriau Morville, became foreign secretary in 1723 upon Cardinal Dubois’s death, but when Fleuriau Morville fell in 1727, Sermenté retired. He was, however, able to introduce his son Marie-­ Gabriel and a nephew into the department as commis, while another son, Louis, would hold the same position in the navy.321 Inevitably, there are other commis who leave only brief or puzzling traces in department records. Sieur de Maugin, brother of Torcy’s écuyer, first appeared on a December 1691 commis list.322 His duties are not clear, but a letter from Noblet to Torcy from the camp at Brisach in 1703 mentioned him.323 Some clerks were apparently part of the augmented staff required to cope with the post-Ryswick expansion of missions. Edme Lebeau, who rejoined the department, had worked with Parayre on domestic administration under Pomponne and remained with the disgraced Pomponne as his valet de chambre.324 In 1698 he reappeared in the department’s payroll records, vanishing in 1706.325 PhilippeCéleste Dupuisse (also Dupuize or Dupuise) married in 1695, but we know nothing of him until he became Saint-Prest’s secretary in 1711 at the Louvre archive and the Académie politique established there later. He was installed in a first-floor apartment of four rooms as “garde des registre des Archives des Affaires Estrangères” (guardian of the register of the foreign affairs archives), a post he held until his death in 1741.326 Duparc (or Du Parc), who had entered the bureaus by 1711, worked with Pecquet during Torcy’s final years, signing the register for ­Bernage’s 1713 marriage. He apparently followed Torcy to the post office in 1715.327 We have already met Marc-Antoine Lullier, who worked with codes and retired around 1703. A Martin, said to have been a premier commis in 1706, has left only one tantalizing trace in records outside the department.328 Likewise not appearing in foreign office records is Louis François Delisle de La Drevetière, said to have been one of Torcy’s commis and who came to Paris to study law but abandoned it to write plays during the Regency.329 Another such individual was a simple commis, Bénigne Brameret, son of a bourgeois of Thenissey in Burgundy and himself a former maître de postes at Dijon, which already connected him to Torcy’s clientage. His new direct association with the great minister in Paris apparently made him an even more attractive match for the daughter of Jean Fabarel, honorary councillor at Dijon’s présidial and later an official of the Burgundian Chambre des comptes. They were wed in



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1700.330 Although he did not belong to the higher levels of the department and society inhabited by the premiers commis and the minister’s secretaries, Brameret nonetheless shared some of their central attributes. As a member of a kinship group he maintained ties with the local elites in his native province, even while working in Paris, and parlayed his position in the royal bureaucracy to marry well so as to advance from his bourgeois roots into a judicial family and enjoy for himself, his offspring, and his kin all the opportunities that this made possible. As with any administration, it is typically those “in the trenches” who perform the organization’s quotidian, but essential, tasks. Yet they are often unknown to and unappreciated by those distant from them in both experience and time. However, to anyone dealing with a bureaucracy, it is often these subordinate personnel rather than the person at the top who is the organization’s “face” because it is with them that they interact first and most frequently. Such, for example, was the typical experience of the foreign ministry’s secret agents, lower-level embassy personnel abroad, individuals applying for passports, clerks in the other state administrative units, and provincial petitioners in Paris seeking something from the minister. The wielders of pen and paper – or today’s more sophisticated electronic devices – give a bureaucratic structure life. They, not the structure within which they operate, project the department’s power. Weber likened “modern bureaucracy” to a machine, yet the staff of Torcy’s foreign office were more than cogs in a mechanism. The premiers commis especially were men of some standing in their own right, embedded in family and client systems within and outside the department and connected with other powerful and influential groups and individuals by networks that radiated out from each. It was this remarkable group of increasingly skilled and professionalized scribblers and managers of information that allowed the triumph of the modern bureaucratic state. Whether envisioned as a machine or in more human terms, bureaucracy is inextricably entwined with money matters. Not only are funds required to feed its functioning, a bureaucracy typically dispenses funds to others that render them dependent upon it for their livelihood and for accomplishing their work. Both aspects are explored in the next chapter.

7 Finances and Rewards

Louis XIV knew well that it was “finances [that] move and activate the whole great body of the monarchy.”1 Cicero maintained that “the sinews of War are infinite money,”2 but he might have added that the same was true of diplomacy, although it was always outdistanced by war in its funding. By its very nature, diplomacy is an expensive business requiring the maintenance of a variety of representatives and agents abroad. For those who acted in public, there were the costs of staffing an embassy and the obligatory opulence entailed in advertising the wealth and power of the ruler they represented. For those who laboured covertly, the costs of clandestine operations, including travel, bribes, and sending secret messages, could be quite high, but the tradeoff for all the cash expended was potentially valuable information. There were as well subsidies paid to particular princes for their alliance or neutrality.3 There were the costs at home of maintaining the minister’s bureaucrats, including their remuneration and other rewards, as well as outlays for items such as furniture and writing supplies. The department was also responsible for paying out a variety of pensions, including to New Converts, retired department personnel or their survivors, and those serving the foreign office in the provinces and abroad. This required that Torcy and his staff work closely with the state treasury and with bankers in Paris and abroad to keep the flow of money safe and uninterrupted.4

T h e F u n d s o f t h e Department In terms of the royal budget, the foreign office’s share never exceeded 5 per cent, whereas the war department could consume from 34.5 per cent



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of the total during peace and more than 60 per cent during war.5 Seeing that these massive amounts reached the troops along the frontiers in a sufficient and timely fashion was no small feat, yet the lesser but still significant funds for diplomacy presented their own problems. Some of the foreign office’s funds were disbursed in the provinces under its control and in the vicinity of Paris, but the bulk of them went abroad to pay diplomats, their staffs, and couriers, and, with greater concealment, to be disbursed locally as subsidies to foreign rulers, their advisors, and a wide array of clandestine agents, informants, and spies.6 Foreign expenditures frequently required payments in the local currency, obliging Torcy’s staff to apply current conversion rates when changing French money to that of the rest of Europe.7 Moving such funds in safety and secrecy through often hostile territory required great effort and ingenuity. Although the department’s bookkeeping division was small compared with that of the controller general and the war ministry, it elaborated a shifting structure to meet these fiscal responsibilities, incorporating networks of agents outside the kingdom, including foreign bankers, among whom were Jews and Protestants. From Croissy’s time, finances were apparently coordinated by his secretariat, with Blondel playing a leading role that continued throughout Torcy’s tenure. Blondel was joined by Ligny and later du Theil. The secretariat saw to the disbursement of most funds, including (until 1706) orders to the guards of the royal treasury for payments to diplomats serving abroad, but Adam often countersigned payment orders during Croissy’s final illness and continued to do so for those related to domestic administration as premiers commis for the domestic bureau.8 By the time the War of the Spanish Succession erupted, Adam, Blondel, Ligny, and Fournier could countersign financial ordonnances. In December 1706, ostensibly for greater efficiency but more likely as means of raising revenue for the war, the king created nine new venal offices: three “trésoriers des appointements des ambassadeurs” (treasurers for the remuneration of ambassadors), three principal commis, and three controllers general. The edict then proceeded to reduce the total to six by splitting the third (the triennial) of each set of offices and joining each half to the remaining two (the ancien and the alternatif), and further providing that one person could own and exercise the remaining two offices. Clair Adam, along with his son-in-law Jean de Prévost, each purchased an office of treasurer, while Parisian banker and Adam’s relative Pierre Odeau bought both controller offices.9 The two treasurers served alternately, with Adam taking the even years.10 Whether the three

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Figure 7.1 Number of payment orders issued per month, 1714

offices of principal commis were purchased is not indicated but it seems unlikely, since no gages payments are reported for them.11 In any event, Torcy’s secretariat continued to work with these accounts, which are included with all the others in an annual registry of the department’s payment orders.12 Adam and Prévost had responsibility for and signed these accounts, but it is likely that the foreign ministry’s secretaries and commis did most of the work involved.13 An analysis of the dates that the department’s payment orders were issued in 1714 (figure 7.1) reveals that the last and first month of the year were the busiest, while February was the least busy, followed by November, which reflects annual payments scheduled either for the beginning or the end of the year. Likewise, the months with the largest volume of payments on the first of the month (figure 7.2) are January and July, reflecting sums issued in increments of one year or six months; quarterly disbursements are reflected in rises in numbers during April and October. Not surprisingly, December has the fewest issued on the first of the month. Clearly, many payments were routine and fairly stable.



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Figure 7.2 Percentage of monthly payment orders issued on the first day of the month, 1714. Note: On 31 December, 27% of the month’s total was issued.

How much did the foreign ministry expend each year? Picavet offers totals for 1700 (over 4,000,000 livres) and 1707 (4,458,000 livres). He breaks this down to 606,000 livres for personnel in 1700, rising to 924,000 livres in 1707, and says that the total for 1700 included subsidies of 1,560,000 livres for Bavaria, 1,271,000 livres for Cologne, and 600,000 livres for Hungary, at total for subsidies in 1700 of 3,431,000 livres, which he says was about the same in 1707.14 Although these sums embrace two of the department’s major expenditure categories, they neglect others, so we turn to another set of figures coming from budgets drawn up during Chamillart’s tenure as controller general: two detailed lists of expenses to be paid before and after 6 September 1699, the date he assumed the position; and tables of government expenses covering the periods 1700–05 (with no data for 1704), 1706 (very limited data), 1707, and 1708–09.15 Like all such official financial data from the period, these figures must be treated with caution, but they are nonetheless suggestive. The categories of expenditure are not by department, so there were no separate department budgets. The “chapitres” (categories)

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Chamillart listed are often specific to a particular ministry, especially in the case of war and the navy, but only three funds appear to have been the foreign office’s preserve: “Ambassades” (embassies), “Affaires secretes” (secret affairs, including foreign subsidies), and the “Ligues suisses” (Swiss Leagues). The remaining departmental expenses were scattered among a number of other categories, including Acquits patents, Gages du Conseil, Pensions, and Pensions et gratifications ordinaries, and Gratifications par comptant et autres dépenses, for remunerating bureau personnel, the secretary of state, and diplomats;16 “Garnisons ordinaries” (ordinary garrisons) for remunerating governors, lieutenants du roi, and garrison commanders in foreign ministry–supervised provinces;17 La Bastille for the costs of pursuing, transporting, and feeding prisoners who had run afoul of the department for domestic or diplomatic reasons;18 Pensions for annual “pensions” (allowances) to foreign adherents of the king who cooperated with the foreign ministry;19 Voyages for regular and special postal couriers as well as traveling expenses via post for department staff;20 and probably Écuries for the horses used by cabinet couriers carrying diplomatic dispatches. Sometimes the department’s accounts make clear what fund a payment came from – for example, a payment of acquits patents, an ordonnance de voyage, or a pension – but other times it must be inferred, as in the case of ordinary garrisons.21 In some instances, a definitive inference is not possible: Were funds for garrison chapels and chaplains drawn from ordinary garrisons, Pensions, or Dons (gifts)? And what about the pensions and gratifications paid to “nouveaux convertis” (New Converts or ncs)? Did they come from the royal treasury, perhaps from “Offrandes et aumônes” (offerings and alms) or from the “Caisse des conversions” (conversion fund), administered by the Assembly of the Clergy but funded by the “régale” (the king’s right to one-third of a vacant episcopal see’s temporal revenues)?22 There is no category clearly marked out for the department’s regular non-personnel expenses, such as paper, quills, ink, and binding. The only annual estimate we have, 30,000 livres, is from Saint-Simon for late in the reign.23 Despite these difficulties, the three categories of funds clearly under the foreign secretary’s control reveal interesting trends between 1699 and 1709. The increased numbers of diplomats sent out after Ryswick pushed up expenditures for embassies until 1702, when the onset of war saw them drop by 40 per cent (figure 7.3).24 They fell further the next year and would remain flat for the rest of this period. A rise came only after Utrecht with the re-establishment of diplomatic r­ elations with



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­former enemies.25 More detail comes from the “Estats des Ambassadeurs” (lists of ambassadors) that, prior to the appearance of the treasurers of ambassadors, were issued to the royal treasurer authorizing payment of their appointements.26 The list for 1697 (table 7.1) of diplomats on active duty reflects a department in transition. The three plenipotentiaries to the Ryswick Congress are still listed, along with ambassadors largely holding posts in neutral countries like Venice, Switzerland, and Sweden, and residents and secretaries serving mostly in the Italian states. Continuing change marks the 1698 list (table 7.2).27 The Ryswick plenipotentiaries had returned home but not to ambassadorial positions, while extraordinary ambassadors were sent to former enemies England and Spain and representatives went out to other posts. The restoration of prewar diplomatic relations and the shift in assignments that began in 1698 were largely codified by 1701 (table 7.3), the high point both for number of missions (figure 5.9) and expenditures on embassies (figure 7.3).28 It is also clear that by September 1715, the Colbert family, clients, and creatures had become the dominant force in the diplomatic corps (table 7.4).29 A late addition to the department was the comte du Luc, a distinguished soldier and former lieutenant du roi in Provence, brother of Marseille’s bishop and a close friend of Torcy’s known for his generosity and fidelity. His political support in that province helped earn him the Swiss embassy in 1708, a place as plenipotentiary at Baden in 1714, and the next year the ambassadorship to Vienna.30 Jean-Baptiste de Johanne de la Carre, comte de Saumery, a relative of Mme de Colbert, was sent to Bavaria.31 Chevalier Rossi, an Italian nobleman who had served as Torcy’s agent at the papal court, filled the newly created residency at Brussels. Another foreigner who had rallied to France and to Torcy was Bailiff Lorenzi, Cardinal Francesco Maria de’ Medici’s gentleman of the chamber who married the daughter of Roland Jachiet Dupré, the Florentine-born career diplomat posted to Florence as French resident from 1694 until he died there in 1709. Lorenzi had Torcy’s full trust, serving as chargé d’affaires until the new resident arrived, and did so again when the resident departed in 1715.32 These diplomats joined the faithful Frischmann, d’Audiffret, Poussin, La Closure, Jacques-Vincent Languet, comte de Gergy, and others who had long served Torcy and even his father.33 Torcy’s ascendancy was apparent in the appointment of his “crony” Iberville as envoy to Great Britain, quite an accomplishment for someone who had entered the department as a simple commis. The same may be said of the nomination of his brother, comte de Croissy, as ambassador to the court of Charles XII of Sweden. By the time of the

Table 7.1 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1697 (for 6 months) Name

Annually (in livres)

Post

Harlay Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Count de Crecy Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Callières Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Castagnières Ottoman Empire D’Avaux Sweden Polignac Poland Briord Savoy De La Haye Venice Amelot de Gourney Switzerland Abbé d’Estrées Portugal Du Pré Florence Louciennes Genoa Ferriol Ottoman Empire (just appointed) Abbé Noirmoutier Rome, court of the Rota Iberville Geneva Heirs of the late M. La Resident in Sweden who died 6 June 1697 Piquetière (his annual payment was 8,000) Canderstein Secretary in Germany Baluze Poland Le Blond Italian Secretary in Venice 6-Month Total Annual Total [projected from these figures and with the adjustment for the resident in Sweden]

18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 11,500 12,000 12,000 12,000 6,000 6,000 18,000 3,000 3,600 3,466 3,000 1,500 500 200,566 410,200

Source: aae md 1043, fol. 37, “Estats … des Ambassadeurs,” 1697. 1 That is, their appointements. Table 7.2 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1698 Name

Post

Prince de Monaco Tallard Harcourt D’Avaux Bonrepaus Castagnières Chamilly Briord De La Haye Puyzieulx Polignac Annual Total

Rome England Spain Sweden Holland Ottoman Empire Denmark Savoy Venice Switzerland Poland

Annually (in livres) 72,000 48,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 24,000 24,000 36,000 420,000

Source: aae Finance du Ministère 1661–1767, vol. 1, fol. 9, “Estat … des Ambassadeurs,” 1698. This lists only the major posts and is therefore incomplete.

1 That is, their appointements.

Table 7.3 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1701 Name

Title

Post

Prince de Monaco Tallard

Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador [Extraordinary] ambassador2 [Extraordinary] ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Ambassador Ambassador

Rome (deceased; to his heirs for Jan.) England (for Jan.– May) Spain

Ambassador Ambassador Envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Harcourt Marsin Guiscard Briord D’Avaux Ferriol Chamilly Phélypeaux De la Haye Hennequin de Charmont Puyzieulx Rouillé Villars Blecourt Chamoy Ricousse Desalleurs Heron Bonnac

Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Usson

Extraordinary envoy

Obrecht

Extraordinary envoy

Iberville Gergy Frischmann Dupré Louciennes D’Audiffret Abbé Bidal Abbé Noirmoustier De la Closure

Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Auditor Resident

Per Month (in livres)

Annually (in livres)

6,000

6,000

4,000

20,000

3,000

36,000

Spain (since June)

3,000

21,000

Sweden

3,000

36,000

United Provinces (Jan.–July) United Provinces (Jan.–Sept.) Ottoman Empire

3,000

21,000

3,000

27,000

3,000

36,000

Denmark

3,000

36,000

Savoy

2,500

30,000

Venice Venice (Apr.–Dec.)

2,000 2,000

24,000 18,000

Switzerland Portugal Austria (Jan.–Aug.) Spain Imperial Diet Bavaria (Mar.–Dec.) Cologne and earlier Brandenburg Poland Sweden and earlier Wolfenbüttel Wolfenbüttel (July– Dec.) Frankfurt (deceased 6 Aug.; to his heirs) Mainz Swabia Münster Florence Genoa Mantua Germany Rota in Rome

2,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500

24,000 24,000 12,000 18,000 18,000 15,000 18,000

1,500 1,500

18,000 18,000

1,500

9,000

1,500

10,800

1,250 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 500

15,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 6,000

500

7,200

Geneva (plus 1,200 for his chapel)

Table 7.3 continued Baluze

–

D’Alibert Italian secretary Le Blond Italian secretary Reignier Almoner Annual Total

“serving the King abroad” Rome Venice Sweden

250

3,000

166 83 –

2,000 1,000 800 602,800

Source: aae md 306, fols 65–72r (31 Dec. 1701), “Estats … des Ambassadeurs,” 1701.

1  That is, their appointements. 2  Although this “Estat” lists Harcourt and Marsin as ambassadors, they were both extraordinary ambassadors. France, Recueil, 11:449–51; and ibid., 12:1. Table 7.4 Payments for the official mourning for Louis XIV, 17151 Name

Title

Post

Cardinal Trémoille De Pyre St Aigan Abbé Mornay Châteauneuf Du Luc Croissy Des Alleurs Saumery D’Audiffret Rossi Iberville Frischmann De Rottembourg Poussin De Besenval De Campredon Lorenzi, [Balli] Coulet Fremont De La Closure De La Martinière La Feuillade Alègre2 D’Avary Bonnac Gergy Danneville Graville De la Faye Total

Chargé d’affaires Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Chargé d’affaires Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Chargé d’affaires Envoy Extraordinary envoy Resident Chargé d’affaires Chargé d’affaires Chargé d’affaires Resident Chargé d’affaires Extraordinary ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Rome Sicily Spain Portugal Holland Austria Sweden Ottoman Empire Bavaria Lorraine Brussels Great Britain Cologne Prussia The German princes Poland Sweden Florence Genoa Venice Geneva Switzerland Rome Great Britain Switzerland Ottoman Empire Imperial Diet Mainz Florence Genoa

Amount (in livres) 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 * * * * * * * * 57,000

Source: aae md 310, fols 296–7v, “Estat des ordonnances à expédier aux Ministres du Roy et autres personnes sans caractère qui servent Sa Maj.té dans les Pays Etrangers, pour le Deüil du feu Roy, conformément à l’usage pratiqué dans touts les occasions de Deüil,” 1715.

1 Payments for “le deüil” were for the costs of the official mourning observed at each French embassy when a member of the royal family died. An asterisk (*) denotes those “Ministres nommez qui sont encore a Paris” (appointed ministers who are still in Paris). 2 Actually, Iberville was in London as extraordinary envoy, 1713–17. France, Recueil, ­25-2:158–60



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Figure 7.3 Expenditures on embassies, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

Sun King’s death, Torcy had assembled a most distinguished and loyal, if somewhat inbred, team of diplomats that was the model for all Europe. The compensation of diplomats, though often in arrears throughout the reign, is revealing with respect to its structure.34 The appointements for 1701 (table 7.3) expose the dramatic difference between the extremes of the diplomatic hierarchy: the ambassador to Rome earned 72,000 livres, whereas the secretary who translated for him received less than 1.5 per cent of that amount. Even so, there was an element of standardization within the various compensation levels as appointements correlated strongly with diplomatic title and a sense of what it took to live abroad in a manner worthy of that title and the monarch it represented. Extraordinary ambassadors received between 72,000 and 30,000 livres annually, but if the extremes of Rome and England at the top and Savoy at the bottom of the group are set aside, the other five ambassadors each earned 36,000 livres. The four representatives with the rank of ambassador each drew 24,000 livres (extrapolating ­Hennequin de Charmont’s pay to a full year), while the sixteen envoys (all extraordinary envoys

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save one) drew between 18,000 and 12,000 livres, with those posted to the minor German and Italian courts occupying the lower range. The one resident earned half what an envoy did. These gradations reflect a common attitude at that time and one still present, as any public sector employee knows. A public servant was only doing his duty, goes this thinking, and therefore neither was out to nor needed to make his living through his position.35 Service to the monarch was an honourable calling that made a man a gentleman whether he was compensated in a manner commensurate with that standing or not. Those at the hierarchy’s top received pensions from a grateful monarch, allowances for the expenses of that service, or, for venal offices, interest on the money they had loaned the king (gages), rather than demeaning pay. Those at the bottom, though perhaps more dependent on this income for their economic well-being, shared a similar outlook, giving great weight to the presumption of social standing their public service implied even if the economic reality fell short.36 The department defrayed diplomacy’s other expenses as well, as seen in the variety of payments made to Fremont, chargé d’affaires at Venice, in the separate list kept of how much he received (table 7.5). A new appointee also received an allowance for furnishing his residence. In 1714, for instance, plenipotentiaries du Luc and Dominique-Claude Barberie de Saint-Contest each received 16,000 livres for his residence at the peace congress of Baden, as did the newly appointed ambassadors to London and Madrid. Bonnac, on his way to Constantinople, was granted 15,000 livres, and Torcy’s brother Croissy was allowed 12,000 livres for his Swedish embassy. The new envoy to Bavaria received 6,000 livres; Poussin, newly appointed to Germany, received 4,000 livres; and comte du Luc, who had received 16,000 livres in April, received the same sum in December when posted to Vienna.37 The same year the marquis de Châteauneuf, the new ambassador to the Dutch, was reimbursed 15,736 livres for the construction and operation of a Catholic chapel at his embassy, while Iberville in London received 6,000 livres for the upkeep of his chapel. With the passing of a foreign prince or his consort, France’s ambassador, as representative of Louis XIV, observed official mourning. Louis, marquis de Brancas in Spain, was granted 4,000 livres for the February death of Maria Louisa of Savoy, queen of Spain, and in August chargé d’affaires Jacques de Campredon in Stockholm and Gergy in Florence received 1,500 and 2,000 livres respectively for the death of Queen Anne of Great Britain. When a French prince of the blood died, all French embassies observed public mourning, as they did

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293

Table 7.5 Payments to Fremont, chargé des affaires at Venice, 1710–1718 Date

Type

Dec. 1710 May 1711 June 1711

Appointements Deüil1 for Monseigneur Gratification to the secretary of the nuncio in Venice Appointements Deüil for the Dauphin and Dauphine Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Deüil for the duc de Berry Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Deüil feu Roy (Louis XIV) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months)

Dec. 1711 Mar. 1712 June 1712 Dec. 1712 June 1713 Dec. 1713 May 1714 June 1714 Dec. 1714 June 1715 Dec. 1715 Feb. 1716 June 1716 Dec. 1716 July 1717 Dec. 1717 June 1718

Amount (in livres)

Annual Total (in livres)

6,000 1,500 300 100 6,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000

6,000

7,900

7,500 6,000

7,500 6,000

7,500 6,000

Source: aae cp Venise 160, fol. 278r–v.

1 Expenses for the official mourning observed at French embassies.

in May of that same deadly year with the passing of the duc de Berry, at a cost totaling 43,500 livres.38 In addition, the department reimbursed travel expenses for an ambassador’s secretary and couriers.39 Of course, embassies were expected to keep track of their expenses and send an annual report to the department.40 When we total the costs of the ninetyfive ordonnances (13 per cent of the total sent) expedited by the treasurers of ambassadors for 1714 that do not include travel (“voyages”), they come to 691,886 livres, only 13.3 per cent of total expenditures, yet the largest category whose recipients are identified (table 7.6). The second category of foreign ministry expenses in Chamillart’s summary tables is secret affairs, used for subsidies and gratifications to encourage and enable foreign princes and their entourages to favour French interests (figure 7.4).41 These expenditures jumped from just over 1.1 million livres in 1700 to 10.2 million the next year as Torcy’s newly deployed diplomats, seeking to avert or prepare for war, sought to buy

Au porteur

6

5

6.5%

47

1.6%

Royal Orders – 

– 

3

1.4%

72,900

Local Govt Officers  7

 3.5%

26

1.2%

64,220

Travel 3

13.6%

99

0.8%

44,000

New Converts 2

14.5%

106

0.6%

33,600

Foreign Missions – 

1.0% 

7

0.5%

27,000

Retirement Pensions –

 1.6%

12

0.5%

26,700

–

1.2% 

9

0.2%

11,409

Prisoners –

 1.6%

12

0.1%

7,294

–

–

1

0.1%

6,000

–

1.1% 

8

0.1%

2,800

1 The percentages do not total 100% due to rounding and because percentages below 1% are not indicated.

determine, for instance, the type of pension based on the recipient’s status.

ated by the author based on labels on each item in the accounts themselves, although this required further investigation in some cases to

ISSUED

TOTAL PAYMENT ORDERS

(in livres)

 –

6.3%

46

4.7%

Gratifications 80,570

Postal Guards TOTAL EXPENDITURES

4

– 

2

7.7%

245,300

Académie Politique

tion the amount to be paid. The same lack of specified amounts applies to vacations and most “crime investigations.” Categories were cre-

1

Misc.

383,333

Clergy (misc.)

Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302. The total for the travel column is only partial, since most of the ordonnances de voyages do not men-

Issued

Total Number

Rank among

Issued1

Total Number

95

13.0%

229

31.1%

13.3%

691,886

Percentage of

67.2%

3,486,464

Treasurers of Ambassadors

Number Issued

ditures

Total Expen-

Percentage of

livres)

Expenditure (in

categories

order

payment

Pensions

Table 7.6 Summary of payment orders issued by category, 1714

Chapels –

 1.9%

14

0.0%

1,804

Crime Investigations 730

11

– 

 –

 –

1.5% 

5,186,043

 –

 –

3

– 

763

Vacations



Finances and Rewards

295

Figure 7.4 Expenditures for secret affairs, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

alliances or neutrality, especially among the German princes.42 The figure would oscillate between 5 and 8 million livres for the war years covered by figure 7.4, but as Boislisle’s 1707 table reveals, almost 70 per cent of the subsidies for that year went to two Wittelsbach allies, Elector Max Emmanuel of Bavaria and his younger brother, Joseph ­Clemens, electorarchbishop of Cologne.43 Torcy worked frequently with the Piedmontese Ferdinand-Augustin de Solar, comte de Monasterol, Max’s envoy to the French court from 1701, who in 1708 married a French widow linked with Maintenon.44 Another Italian, Jean-Paul Bombarda, Max’s treasurer and a Brussels banker, received a 10 per cent commission on all the subsidies he managed. Given the sorry state of French finances and fortunes on the Flanders battlefields, it comes as no surprise that a steady stream of complaints flowed from the Bavarian court about delayed and irregular subsidy payments.45 One of the most difficult of France’s allies, both politically and geographically, was the kingdom of Hungary, led in revolt against the ­Habsburgs by Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi.46 The routes into Hungary were

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all circuitous and militarily dangerous.47 If the geography proved daunting, the nobles of Hungary were even more so. Yet Torcy strongly supported the Hungarian revolt and with Louis XIV’s consent drew sizable subsidies from Secret Affairs. Ligny saw to their oversight, while Des Alleurs was Torcy’s chief agent with Rákóczi.48 In 1708 Des Alleurs lamented that his silver sustained so many individuals that he was driven into debt and forced to have his wife send him a letter of exchange.49 In early June 1708 Torcy reassured him that his appointements had not been diminished even though the lowered exchange rate made it appear so. He promised that if Des Alleurs preferred, he would send the money by way of the Danzig bankers.50 In June 1709 Ligny wrote to Bonnac, ambassador to Poland, indicating that the payment order for 150,000 livres he had just sent through him to Hungary was meant to cover three months.51 Considering all the ports of entry, perhaps as much as 4,000,000 to 4,500,000 livres reached Rákóczi and helped keep the revolt alive until 1710. While Rákóczi lived in Paris in exile, the department provided him with a hefty annual pension of 100,000 livres, paid quarterly.52 Torcy zealously guarded his privileged connection with the Holy See: it meant, as it had for his father and his father-in-law, an excellent listening post, where clerics and lay representatives of the Catholic world mingled freely, exchanging the gossip of Europe’s princely courts. Torcy employed his envoys and personal representatives to distribute patronage wherever it might advance French interests, as seen by the subsidies awarded to select cardinals, prelates, and laymen in 1715 (table 7.7). The list reveals the influence of the kin, secretaries, and household officials of those who wore the red hats and who aspired to the papal tiara. French clerics who went to Rome could also benefit from the minister’s generosity, as did Père Ange de Cambolas, a Toulousian elected procurergeneral of the Carmelites in 1704.53 Again, because many pensions and gratifications were paid “au porteur” (to the bearer), recipients are known only if clearly identified in the annual registry of payment orders or in another perhaps secret list.54 A sampling from 171455 reveals payments to a surprising range of foreigners and French subjects. Payments to Antonio Caffaro (8,000 livres), a pro-French Sicilian senator who was among those notables who fled with their families to France at the end of the island’s French occupation in 1678,56 and to Pierre-Bénigne Languet, baron de Montigny (800 livres), the Bavarian elector’s lieutenant-colonel of the Cuirassiers and adjutant,57 demonstrate Louis’s continuing loyalty to those committed



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Table 7.7 Pensions to Rome, 1715 Recipient Cardinal Ottoboni Cardinal Pico (della Mirandolla) Cardinal Gualterio Nuncio Cornelio Bentiviglio Alessandro Albani, nephew of Pope Clement XI1 Archbishop of Cirene (Cyrene) Raymond Gallani, archbishop d’Ancire and patriarchal vicar of Constantinople Count Juliani2 Count Carminati, “Romain”3 Marquis de Maldachin, “Romain”4 Sieur Lucci, secretary to Cardinal Gualterio Count Fiumé, chamberlain of Cardinal Trémoille Chevalier Chappe5 Abbé Albicini6 Total

Annually (in livres) 30,000 12,000 20,000 20,000 12,000 600 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 105,600

Source: aae md 310, fols 238–41v and 301–4.

1 Clement XI (1700–1721) made Albani, an officer in the pontifical army, a cardinal in 1721. A worldly collector of antiquities, unlike his uncle he was pro-Austrian and favoured the Hanoverians over the Stuarts. France, Recueil, 17:557n1. 2 Juliani was a client of Cardinal Joseph-Emmanuel de La Trémoille, chargé d’affaires in Rome (1706–1720). He and Carminati were later suspected of spying for the ultramontane party. Dorsanne, Anecdotes Unigenitus, 3:67, 96, 98, 101. 3 Carminati, a long-time French pensioner, was made a French count in 1700 and formally received French protection in 1713. He had also been long in the confidence of Cardinal Albani. In 1727 Carminati became Italian secretary of the embassy in Rome. Recueil, 20:118, 118n4, 144. 4 André Maidalchini was the nephew of Cardinal Maidalchini (1621–1700) and influential at the Holy See. Targe, Maison de Bourbon d’Espagne, 129 ; and France, Recueil, 20:144, 144n3. In 1714 he accompanied Elisabeth Farnese to Spain to become the new queen. Courcy, Espagne après Utrecht, 248, 292, 319, 326n2, 328n1, 334. He sent Torcy news of the Spanish court. 5 Chappe was Cardinal Ottoboni’s secretary. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 3:168. 6 Albicini had entry to many cardinals and was a long-time French pensioner and source of information. France, Recueil, 20:143, 143n2, 144.

to his cause. The same is true of Jean II de Beausobre (600 livres), a captain in the Swiss Regiment of Stoppa who defied the emperor’s “invitation” to switch to his service or lose his family lands in the cantons,58 and of Christian II, Count Palatine of Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld (6,000 livres pension and 6,000 livres gratification), who served in the French army until retiring in 1696.59 The case of the erudite student of antique

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­ edals, the marquis de Saint-Ferréol-Montauban (2,000 livres for him m and his wife), gentleman of the bedchamber of the late Charles II, E ­ lector Palatine (d. 1685) and brother of Madame, whom the marquis was currently assisting with her collection, is a reminder that motivations could be many. As Torcy kept faith with the servant of an allied house, he also performed a service for Madame (even though she despised him for opening her mail), curried favour with the duc d’Orléans, the likely regent when Louis XIV died, and even pleased the king, like his sisterin-law an avid collector of medals, as well.60 French commercial interests meshed with the king’s desire to spread Catholicism, as when Jacob Abensur (1,000 livres), a Jew, Hamburg merchant, and the Polish king’s resident there, left Danish service and in 1706 moved to France where he converted and took the baptismal name of “Louis” in honour of his royal godfather.61 Humanitarianism inspired several pensions. Barbara Chiffinch ­Villiers, Countess of Jersey (12,000 livres), widow of Edward Villiers, 1st Earl of Jersey, former ambassador to France and Tory secretary of state for the Southern Department, was an inveterate Jacobite intriguer who fled to France in 1713 with her ten-year-old son in order to raise him a ­Catholic.62 Another pensioned widow was Damiana de Cueva (200 livres), whose husband, Spanish captain and explorer Francisco de Seixas y Lovera, claimed to be knowledgeable of the Indies and the Pacific. Failing to interest the Spanish government in his schemes, he received a more favourable reception in France.63 In the aftermath of a devastating fire in Prague in 1689, rumor held that the French had recruited deserters from the Austrian army to set it. Several of the accused were tortured, including Maximillien Septier of Prague (500 livres), who repeatedly denied the charges. If he was innocent, then the king on whose behalf he had suffered did not forget this humble Bohemian, but if he was indeed an arsonist, his services did not go unrewarded.64 Even humbler individuals received consideration, such as Pierre Milson in Champagne, about whom we know only that he was a poor blind man. Others made the list because of their connections. The former abbess of Notre-Dame de Meaux, Madelene de Mornay (800 livres), was the daughter of the late Henry de Mornay, marquis de Montchevreuil, an old friend of Maintenon’s and a great favourite of the king. One of the few who witnessed Louis’s secret morganatic marriage to Maintenon, Mornay was governor of two of the royal bastards, Louis, comte de Vermandois, and Louis Auguste de Bourbon, duc du Maine. Moreover, his son, the retired abbess’s brother, was Abbé René de Mornay-­



Finances and Rewards

299

Montchevreuil, whose Champagne benefices were in the foreign ministry’s provinces and who was appointed ambassador to Portugal in 1713.65 The Lutzelbourg (or Lutzbourg) family, an ancient noble house of Lorraine near the fortress at Phalsbourg, the strategic link between the duchy and Alsace, provided Louis XIV’s armies with several officers. It probably helped Comte Antoine-Michel, comte de Lutzelbourg, a cavalry colonel who received a pension of 1,500 livres, that his daughter was married to the diplomat Des Alleurs.66 Christophe Brosseau (600 livres), an avocat in the Paris parlement and the Hanseatic League’s agent to Versailles (1698–1717), owed the latter position to his friendship with Crécy, former envoy to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon and Torcy’s mentor on his visit there.67 Assisting with the department’s domestic chores also merited a pension. Nicolas Foy de Saint-Maurice, a president in the Lyon Cour des monnaies, received 1,500 livres after an extraordinary mission to Provence to spread terror among counterfeiters of royal coins.68 Pragmatism could lead the king to overlook a recipient’s past sins. Dominique Amonio (3,000 livres), a naturalized French subject (1680), retained property and important contacts in the Papal States. Appointed household ordinary physician to Louis XIV in 1681, by 1690 he was drawn into finance. Amonio used his Italian contacts to have a remarkable antique bust of Caesar, said to bear an astonishing resemblance to the king, displayed in the galleries of Versailles. He then advanced the king the money to purchase it, but when some years later it was found to be a fake made in France at Amonio’s behest, he fled the kingdom. As the War of the Spanish Succession unfolded, he resurfaced in Paris now fully devoted to finance and with all forgiven. Amonio proved useful enough to win a foreign office pension, became rich enough to be a target of the Regency’s Chamber of Justice, and retained connections enough to end up paying little.69 Forgiveness and reconciliation also accounted for the pensions and gratifications awarded to former Protestants. Some went directly to individuals, while others were paid to the convents and other institutions aimed at re-educating converted youth, in some cases for Catholic religious vocations.70 In 1714 these accounted for nearly 15 per cent of the department’s ordonnances and represented the second largest category, although they amounted to much less than 1 per cent of the total listed expenditures. Most were for amounts below 500 livres, while those above, such as the largest  – 2,000 livres to Christophe Vangangelt of a family of bankers of Dutch origin – went to socially prominent converts. Recipients included foreigners who had converted as well as royal

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s­ ubjects in the department’s provinces. Foreign missions received some ministry support (27,000 livres), channeled primarily to Irish missions but also to Ottoman and Crimean endeavours. Public diplomatic gifts (as opposed to outright bribes that were kept secret) are another cost of conducting diplomacy that is difficult to trace in the budget. These included those presented on Louis XIV’s behalf to fellow heads of state and the more numerous gifts dispensed at Versailles to their representatives, usually at their departure. Early in the reign these gifts served to familiarize foreign courts with the French king’s face or to celebrate his martial triumphs, especially with engravings and medals. Diplomatic gifts were once quickly appraised for their monetary value so that this could be made known when they were publicly displayed and reciprocal gifts of matching worth might be assembled, but Louis XIV began a trend of selecting gifts to showcase French taste and luxury manufacturing.71 Louis, who loved diamonds, supplied them from his precious stones collection for such items as the highly crafted boîte à portrait (portrait box), his favourite gift to foreign diplomats. Actually a medallion rather than a box, it was the king’s likeness in a diamond-studded silver or gold setting whose value varied according to its diamond content. These portraits, originally hand-painted enamel miniatures, gave way by the reign’s end to enamel relief portraits resembling cameos. Although less luxurious, this new process was faster and less costly.72 Torcy participated in the selection of appropriate gifts73 as well as in organizing the department’s records of past gifts given, crucial to a selection process dependent on precedent and carefully calibrated reciprocity. It was likely Clairambault who from 1669 gathered the data. One of Torcy’s secretaries (the hand resembles that of du Theil) then began a register running through 1714 with blank pages for additional entries. Arranged by state or sovereign city, it was a chronological list of recipient, occasion (if applicable), gift, and its cost, with an alphabetical index at the volume’s end.74 Since the goal of such gifts was to project the kingdom’s artistic creativity and the monarch’s power and wealth, Torcy sometimes displayed gifts to visitors to show that Louis XIV’s treasures were still intact despite war and economic crisis. In November 1709 he showed a beautiful cape to be presented to Elector Max Emmanuel to Heinsius’s agent Petkum, who marveled that it was embossed with seven large diamonds.75 In July 1713 Torcy personally consulted Claude Ballin, the king’s jeweler, concerning the design of twenty-four silver boxes to house the ratification seals of the Utrecht treaties.76 Neutral powers also received gifts. In 1697



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301

the recently appointed ambassador to Constantinople left carrying three cases filled with items carefully selected to display French ingenuity and craftsmanship, including linen cloths and handkerchiefs, eyeglasses, candelabras, small bejeweled pagodas, and boxes with gold and silver inlay.77 Gift-giving was expensive and not without difficulties, as when Torcy asked Desmaretz’s help because a keeper of medals refused to furnish those the king wished to present to foreign ambassadors unless he first received money of the same value for their replacement.78 Two other major budget categories attracted Torcy’s attention. As liaison with the Jacobite court at Saint-Germain-en-Laye,79 Torcy likely took an interest in the approximately 600,000 livres annually allotted and how this sum was spent even though the accounts did not pass through his office.80 A few Jacobites received assistance from the ministry.81 The connection with the account of the Swiss Leagues was more direct. Its two controllers general and two treasurers general were Parisbased venal officers who relocated to Switzerland during their semester of service. Their accounts, however, had to be signed by the ambassador and submitted to Torcy, who authorized payments into and from this treasury. In addition to subsidies and gifts, the account covered embassy expenses at Soleure, including staff gratifications and pensions (secretaries-­interpreters, first secretary, and other secretaries), the furnishing allowance allowed each new ambassador, and the Geneva resident’s expenses.82 This treasury’s disbursements rose from just below 174,000 livres before the war to over 550,000 in 1708–09 (figure 7.5). Swiss subsidies were considered vital to keeping the cantons neutral during a war.83 We gain another sense of department expenses when we examine them in terms of the payment orders issued by Torcy’s clerks in a single year, as seen in the summary of payment orders issued in 1714 (table 7.6).84 Of the itemized expenditures, embassies ranked first (691,886 livres), but this category consisted of payments made by the treasurers of ambassadors for remunerating embassy personnel (appointements and pensions, accounting for 63 per cent of the total), furniture allowances (117,000 livres), diplomatic gifts (30,000 livres for Bonnac to distribute to the Porte’s ministers), two embassy chapels (21,736 livres), and the expenses of the Persian ambassador’s visit (18,000 livres). Two miscellaneous items accounted for nearly 8 per cent of the itemized payment orders: 233,333 livres to the Prince of Nassau-Dietz as the third and final indemnity payment for the cession of the Principality of Orange to France; and 150,000 of the 250,000 livres owed to William

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Figure 7.5 Expenditures on the Swiss Leagues, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

­ erbert, 2nd Marquis of Powis (2nd Duke of Powis in the Jacobite peerH age) for fire damage to his London residence while occupied by Ambassador d’Aumont. Only three pensions accounted for the 72,900 livres disbursed on behalf of the Royal Orders, an example of the jumbled accounting of the era. New Converts and those who cared for them and their re-education as Catholics received various sums totaling 33,600 livres for 106 payment orders. A payment register for Dauphiné for January to April 1708 included payments to local New Converts, suggesting that Adam and his domestic bureau kept a similar, but separate account of expéditions for each province under their care.85 The foreign ministry remunerated a portion of its provincial governors, lieutenants du roi, and governors, commandants, majors, and aide-majors of cities and fortified places. The total listed for 1714 of 64,220 livres was surely not the whole of what went to these officials, especially since only one payment is labeled “appointements” while all the rest are marked either “supplement appointements,” “en lieu [in place of] appointements,” or a “gratification” of some sort. The same is suggested by the lack of



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i­nclusiveness: for example, only Berry’s governor is listed. How or by whom the other payments were made, however, is not clear. The ministry also paid appointements, gratifications, and supplements (for lighting the chapels) to the chaplains of the military posts in its provinces.86 Given the widespread use of the ordonnance written au porteur, the controller general felt the same frustration today’s historians experience in tracking the foreign ministry’s expenditures. Over two-thirds of expenditures and almost one-third of all ordonnances expedited by the department during 1714 were issued in this anonymous manner (figure 7.6 and table 7.6). The same is largely true for the 99 ordonnances de voyage issued during the same period. The only 3 ordonnances de voyage listing an amount totaled 44,000 livres, which is perhaps suggestive of the amounts of the other 96, especially since we know that total travel expenditures rose with the coming of war (figure 7.7). There are 11 additional unspecified entries marked vacations, the often hourly supplementary fees paid to judicial officials and their police auxiliaries (table 7.6).87 For example, the ministry paid for food, lodging, and the return to Paris of sieur Bazin, lieutenant of the Company of the Criminal Lieutenant of the Short Robe of the Paris Châtelet, and the four guards and six horses he employed to conduct a prisoner from Charenton to near Valenciennes.88 As with the other vacations, the amount was not listed, making it impossible to calculate exactly how much was spent on what. During the difficult war years everyone struggled to find funds for their departments, including Torcy, even though the controller general was his cousin. Fortunately, he faced necessity with suppleness and inventiveness. Although postal superintendent, Torcy could not draw at will from its revenues, especially because expenses grew with the wartime imperative of maintaining and extending vital postal routes.89 In 1712, out of desperation, he assigned a series of outstanding ordonnances from as far back as December 1710 to be paid from postal funds (table 7.8). He used this expedient three more times that year for a total of 43,484 livres. The following year the total jumped to 195,603 livres, but it fell subsequently. All told, the department drew over 400,000 livres from the post office during the reign’s final four years.90 Torcy was assisted in finding and funneling funds by a circle of financiers from his family and the banking community itself. One of his closest consultants was the Colbert client Paul-Etienne Brunet, seigneur de Rancy.91 In 1677 he entered royal service as treasurer general of the royal household, a post of immense responsibility and power, and in 1683 assumed the extremely profitable receiver generalship for the ­conquered

Figure 7.6 Payment order amounts issued by category, 1714. Note: Amounts are in livres.



Finances and Rewards

305

Figure 7.7 Expenditures for travel, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

province of Flanders. His oldest brother, Jean-Baptiste Brunet, baron de Chailly and de Cercey, became a keeper of the royal treasury. PaulEtienne married Torcy’s cousin Geneviève Michaela Colbert de ­Villacerf, and Torcy negotiated one of the marital coups of Louis XIV’s last years by marrying his brother the comte de Croissy to Paul-Etienne’s daughter Marie in 1711, thereby joining ministerial power with banking riches. The Brunets were a useful link between the treasury and the department’s commis. A commis armed with an ordonnance au porteur or an acquit patent and alerted to the arrival of a shipment of gold and/or silver at the royal treasury could hurry to collect that great rarity in wartime, coin of the realm. With diplomats, agents, and interests scattered across Europe and beyond, the foreign office relied on bankers to transfer and disburse the funds that fed diplomacy.92 Iberville, former resident in Geneva, acted as liaison with Lyon’s and Geneva’s financiers. Early in the new war he presented a friend, the Genevan banker Jean-Claude Tourton, head of his family’s Paris branch, to Torcy at one of the minister’s weekly gatherings,

Table 7.8 Payments to department personnel drawn on post office funds (Ferme général des Postes), 1712–1715 Amount (in livres)

List for …

Dated

To

For

2 Jan. 1713

1 Nov. 1712

Larroque

1,200

1 Nov. 1712

Du Theil

16 Oct. 1712

Ligny

16 Oct. 1712 18 Feb. 24 Mar. 1 May 1 May 27 June 31 July 8 Aug. 1 Oct. 1 Oct. 30 Oct. 30 Oct. 1 Nov. 1 Nov. 2 Nov. 2 Nov. 26 Nov.

Commis de M. Fournier Pecquet Commis Pecquet Larroque Du Theil Élèves du Louvre Du Theil Pecquet Saint-Prest Du Theil Fournier Ligny Larroque Maugin Du Theil Du Theil Pecquet

6-month appointements 6-month appointements gratification extraordinaire gratification extraordinaire gratification au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification ordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

Jan. 10 Feb. 16 Feb. 16 Feb. * Apr.2 * Apr. * May * May * May * May June 12 June 1 July 1 July 10 July

Pecquet Commis Pecquet La Tournelle Commis Fournier Du Theil Élèves du Louvre Larroque Du Theil Maugin Pecquet Maugin Du Theil Du Theil Pecquet Saint-Prest

1,500 1,500 1,600 1,200 5,000 6,000 1,200 1,000 300 600 800 500 500 1,500 2,000

1 Aug. 5 Aug. * Sept. * Oct. * Nov. * Nov. * Nov. * Nov.

Du Theil Ligny Du Theil Saint-Prest Larroque Du Theil Maugin Fournier

au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification extraordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification ordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

28 Mar. 1713 20 June 1713 1 Aug. 1713 10 Oct. 1713

2 Dec. 1713

29 Jan. 1714 4 Apr. 1714

18 Sept. 1714

18 Dec 1714

500 1,000 900 1,500 1,200 1,200 500 6,000 2,000 1,500 4,000 2,000 1,500 1,000 1,200 300 4,000 1,000 1,200

500 1,000 500 4,000 1,200 1,000 300 1,500

Table 7.8 continued

14 Feb. 1715

16 Apr. 1715 9 July 1715

* Nov.

Du Theil

au porteur

1,000

1 Jan. 9 Jan. 12 Jan. 25 Nov. 1714 1 Jan. 1713 1 Mar. 1713 1 Jan. 20 Apr. 1 May 1 May 1 May 5 May 30 May 30 May 1 July

Pecquet Commis Pecquet Commis Fournier Du Theil Abbé Le Grand Abbé Le Grand Abbé Le Grand Élèves du Louvre Larroque Du Theil Maugin Pecquet Commis Adam Ligny Pecquet

au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

1,500 1,500 1,500 3,000 500 500 500 6,000 1,200 1,000 300 600 2,400 1,000 1,500

Sources: aae md 1192, fols 419–22r; ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v; and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10.

1 Entries clearly marked “rembt porteur” (reimbursement to the bearer) are not included in this chart. 2 An asterisk (*) indicates a date for which the day is not completely readable on the microfilm copy of this material.

which led to their frequent collaboration. Tourton recommended to him the Rotterdam merchant-banker Jacques Senserf, who in May 1709 met Torcy’s coach outside of Rotterdam as he traveled secretly to The Hague and then conducted him and several other Dutch banker associates on a promenade around the central park. Years later Senserf acted as gobetween in Torcy’s negotiations with Petkum.93 Perhaps no Louisquatorzian banker is better known today than ­Samuel Bernard. Early in 1697 he sent Torcy 3 million livres in the form of ten letters of exchange, beginning a long if not always amicable association.94 Bernard converted to Catholicism in 1685 and was ennobled in 1699. Abbé Pomponne did not like or trust Bernard and wrote bitterly from Venice to point out that Bernard had the Sacerdoti brothers, Jewish bankers in Genoa, search Italy for the sum of 5 or 6 million livres, whereas if he had been consulted he could have found the money through those same bankers without Bernard making his usual immense profits.95 Bernard could be irritating, as when in the midst of a crisis in which he owed millions he wrote to Torcy complaining that having for years paid the postage for ordonnances sent to Torcy’s office, he now claimed a reimbursement of 2,500 livres.96 Torcy was equally dogged in defending the royal purse. Informing an ambassador that he had withdrawn a note payable to the bearer originally paid by Bernard, he

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explained that such procedures had to be simplified so that scarce royal funds were not put into bankers’ hands sooner than necessary.97 Yet the system needed more than simplification, it needed an entire overhaul. English observers were quick to see France’s financial w ­ eaknesses. Richard Hill, envoy to Savoy, reported to Whitehall in 1705 that Louis XIV’s treasury was beginning to fail him: “He is already bankrupt for 25 million [in sterling] … do continue to best Mr. Chamillard [on the battle field], a year or two more … and leave the rest to Marlborough.”98 The 1709 banking crisis of confidence involved a number of banks from Genoa to Amsterdam, but crucial was Bernard’s immense indebtedness secured by French government bank bills. When banks were besieged by creditors in Paris, Lyon, Geneva, and elsewhere demanding payment in coin, Bernard defaulted. Yet the banker was a man of many talents, not the least being survival.99 In a few years, having paid off his creditors, Bernard rebuilt his empire on a smaller scale and with Amsterdam as his operational base. Payments to Torcy’s department began appearing regularly again in 1711 when he forwarded Blondel 4,700 livres to help purchase the celebrated Gaignières library. Other smaller assignations continued well beyond Louis XIV’s death.100 The banking house of Antoine and Pierre Crozat was a rising star in the financial firmament.101 But there were moments of tension, as when Torcy wrote to Pierre on 11 August 1715 to complain that an improperly phrased letter of exchange drawn on a Dutch bank for the rather considerable amount of 30,000 écus would have to be rewritten. He pointedly reminded Crozat that it was destined for his brother Croissy, ambassador to Sweden.102 Despite such difficulties and friction, without bankers, their funds, credit, and contacts, the foreign office could never have financially fueled its extensive diplomatic and espionage apparatus.

T h e F a it h f u l Rewarded Louvois once stopped one of his commis in a Versailles corridor and asked about his personal income, ever eager to solicit further royal rewards for his staff to bind “their hearts and tongues with chains of gold.” When the harried clerk could only respond vaguely, the minister questioned his lack of precision, to which the commis replied that the minister gave him no time to spend much of it. Louvois, who drove himself as hard as he drove others, laughed it off by informing the frustrated commis that he would be able to rest when he grew old. The clerk’s



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r­ eaction is not reported.103 The clerks who served the secretaries of state sprang largely from the upper bourgeoisie and the lesser robe and pen nobility,104 but they rarely began as nonentities utterly dependent on their bureaucratic service for status and wealth. They were mostly men on the move with a nose for what would solidify and increase the financial base they were assembling for their families. Fidelity might bind them in part to a paternalistic system, but tangible rewards underlay the system’s continued survival and growth. Part of the allure and thus one of the imperatives of public service was the ability to achieve and maintain a social standing commensurate with royal service.105 Evidence of payments is scattered among the department’s financial records and even among general correspondence, but when pulled together, a pattern of rewards emerges.106 Terminology for these rewards was imprecise, but we can nonetheless make some distinctions. The remuneration of the commis must be distinguished from that of the venal “officier” (office-holder), whose fixed and regular (even if often in arrears) gages was actually interest paid on the price of the office the officier had “loaned” the king for its possession and use (or usufruct). The officier supplemented his gages with service fees: a judicial officier collected obligatory “épices” (gifts) and “vacations” (supplements for time spent on a complex matter), while a financial officier enjoyed taxation, a percentage of monies passing through his hands.107 By contrast, commis, pre-functionaries like the ancien régime’s inspectors and engineers,108 were commissaires whose positions were theoretically revocable, but were in fact remarkably stable. Their appointements (remuneration) was defined as the wage or pension a great lord dispensed to retain respectable men in his service, but unlike the wage of venal office-­ holders, these were pensions or annual gratifications granted by brevet for an undetermined time and drawn on the royal treasury.109 In Torcy’s department, the precise elements of the appointements for commis and secretaries included ordinary gratifications,110 extraordinary gratifications, acquits patents, pensions, and ordonnances de voyages (travel reimbursements).111 Torcy was also able to reward the faithful through the rolle.112 In addition, the premiers commis in particular supplemented their income with additional commissions and offices either held prior to their entry into the department or gained as a result of the secretary of state’s influence (table 6.1).113 It would seem that the “revenue de base fixe” (fixed base revenue)114 of a clerk’s appointements was the ordinary gratification. Although annual, these were issued and recorded au porteur and thus not spelled out in

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department accounts. Fortunately, three lists of such payments drawn on the funds of the Farmers-General of the Posts between 1713 and 1715 are, perhaps for that reason, more specific (table 7.8).115 They show that simple commis were paid in the name of and by the premiers commis under whom they served: 1,200 livres for “commis Pecquet” in 1713 and 1,500 in 1714 and 1715; 1,200 for “commis Fournier” in 1714 and 1,500 in 1715;116 and 2,400 for “commis Adam” in 1715.117 The meaning of these figures is clarified by the regent’s payment authorization for annual appointements and supplements to Torcy’s commis still in the department after the creation of the Council for Foreign Affairs on 1 October 1715 (table 7.9): Pecquet received 3,000 livres, while Fournier, also a premier commis, received 1,500 livres, and Ligny, a secretary, received 1,000. Du Theil, who had returned to the secretariat after serving as secretary at Utrecht and then Baden and in between as chargé d’affaires in The Hague, received 2,000 livres. The commis Maugin received 600 livres, and the three unnamed commis of Pecquet’s bureau each received 500 livres.118 This is confirmed in the 1713–15 accounts of ordinary gratifications drawn on postal funds: Pecquet received 3,000 livres each year; Fournier received 1,500 in 1713 and 1714;119 Ligny drew 1,000 each year; Maugin received 300 in 1713, two 300livre payments and one of 800 livres in 1714, and 300 livres in 1715;120 and Du Theil, whose annual appointements for 1712 was 1,000 livres, had clearly moved up to 2,000 livres from 1713 on.121 The hierarchy of ordinary gratifications is apparent: at the top are the premiers commis, at 3,000 to 1,500 livres; next are the secretaries, at 2,000 to 1,000 livres; and clearly at the bottom are the simple commis, at 600–500 livres.122 As for extraordinary gratifications, they were also issued au porteur, but again some drawn on postal funds in 1713 provide greater specificity than usual: 1,000 livres to Ligny and 900 livres to the “commis de M. Fournier” (for 1712).123 This was likely in recognition of outstanding effort during the ongoing treaty negotiations, but other occasions for such extraordinary payments might be based on individual professional accomplishments or a milestone such as a marriage.124 Another element in the pay of certain commis were acquits patents awarded each year by the king in consideration of services rendered.125 As a royal grace, however, they were not regularly scheduled but issued for the services of the previous year as early as the following January or as late as the summer. The department had 15,000 livres annually to issue in increments of 3,000. From at least 1691 Torcy received 3,000 livres annually, with an additional 12,000 livres reserved for his commis.

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311

Table 7.9 Department personnel in 17151 Premiers Commis

Secretaries

Simple Commis

Office Boys

Others2

Adam3 * Fournier, Michel * Pecquet

Blondel4 * Ligny * Du Theil

Adam fils5 Beauchamp6 Sermenté7 Mignon, Pierre8 Fournier, Charles9 * Maugin * Bernage10 * Du Parc11 * Le Dran

Unknown

* Larroque * Abbé Le Grand Saint-Prest12

Source: aae md 310, fols 292–3, 1715.

1 Those explicitly listed as “commis de M. Le M.is de Torcy” in aae md 310, fols 292–3, are marked with an asterisk (*). 2 Larroque and Le Grand were not normally listed or paid in the same manner as commis. 3 Adam left the department to become a secretary in the Polysynod’s Conseil des dedans. 4 Blondel apparently retired. 5 Adam fils likely left the department when his father did. 6 Beauchamp remained with Torcy, but now as secretary of the postal superintendant. 7 Sermenté served Joseph Fleuriau d’Armenonville, who purchased Torcy’s office of secretary of state 3 February 1716. 8 It is not clear why Pierre Mignon is not on this list, since he apparently remained in the department until 1740. 9 Charles Fournier died on 24 September 1715. 10 According to Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, Bernage, Du Parc, and Le Dran served in ­Pecquet’s bureau, so they are likely the commis referred to in aae md 310, fol. 292v, as “trios commis du bureau du Sr Pecquet.” Samoyault, Bureaux, 300, claims that Pierre Mignon also served under Pecquet until 1740 (ibid., 300), but given that Mignon’s cousin Michel Fournier served as a premier commis until 1 November 1723 (ibid., 286), Pierre may have served under Fournier until 1723 and then with Pecquet thereafter. 11 Du Parc may have gone to the Post Office, which is perhaps when Pierre Mignon’s inclusion among Pecquet’s three commis began. 12 As garde de dépôt des archives de Vieux-Louvre and director of the Académie politique, Saint-Prest was never paid along with or in the same manner as the commis. Piccioni, Commis, 32, is mistaken in calling him a premier commis before he headed the archives. See Thuillier, “Première école,”22–4.

Croissy and Torcy did not follow the practice of subsequent reigns126 of reserving acquits patents for the premiers commis (table 7.10). In 1691 and 1692 two individuals received 3,000 livres each: the premiers commis Bergeret and Mignon. Thereafter, apparently, only one premier ­commis received the full sum (from 1698, Adam), while the other awards of 3,000 livres might be shared by two individuals, ­including premiers

Table 7.10 Recipients of acquits patents,1 1691–17142 Year

Acquit Patent of 3,000 Livres3

1691 1692 16934 1694 1695 1698

Bergeret and Mignon Bergeret and Mignon Bergeret Mignon and Adam Mignon and Adam Adam

1700

Adam

1705

Adam

1709 1710 1711

Adam Adam Adam

1712

Adam

1713

Adam

17147

Adam

Acquit Patent of 1,500 Livres Aubert, Les Melles, Montreuil, Fournier Aubert, Les Melles, Montreuil, Fournier Mignon, Aubert, Adam, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Noblet, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [Maria]5 Aubert, Noblet, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [retired] Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [retired] Blondel, Fournier, Marolot, Pecquet,6 Ligny, Adam fils Blondel, Fournier, Marolot, Pecquet, Ligny, Beauchamp Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Du Parc Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils

Sources: aae md 1011, fol. 170; ibid., 1013, fol. 293 (1691); ibid., 1017, fol. 162 (1692); ibid., 1029, fol. 202 (1693); ibid., 1021, fol. 202r–v (1693); ibid., 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid. 1074, fol. 66 (1700); ibid., 1134, fol. 26r–v (1705); ibid., 1170, fols 441–2r (1710); ibid., 1180, fol. 2 (1711); ibid., 1186, fols 361–2r (1712); ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v (1713); ibid., 1197, fol. 16 (1714); and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53 (1694 and 1695).

1 An acquit patent, a royal brevet sealed with the grand seal, authorized a monetary gratification to an individual and served as a receipt and legal discharge to the entity making the payment. 2 The foreign secretary received 12,000 livres annually in acquits patents for his commis. Since sums awarded as an acquit patent were in increments of 3,000 livres, those who received 1,500 livres were listed with another individual as the recipient of the 3,000-livre award. 3 Torcy was also awarded a separate acquit patent of 3,000 livres for each of these years. 4 Why one 1,500-livre share was not awarded this year is not indicated. 5 It is not clear why Parayre was included at this late date. He had served Pomponne, but was let go by Croissy. Perhaps Torcy was making amends for what he and father-in-law Pomponne may have seen as an injustice to Parayre. 6 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n61, says that Pecquet first appeared in this acquits patents list, but does not indicate for what amount. 7 In 1714 La Chapelle also received an acquit patent of 3,000 livres. aae md 1197, fol. 15.



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commis, simple commis, and even a retired premier commis. Adam’s award likely reflected both his position as premier commis and his close ties to Torcy as his household intendant, but it is unclear why after 1710 simple commis like Bernage, Maugin, Beauchamp, and ­Sermenté received awards while high functionaries like Pecquet, Ligny, and Blondel received nothing. Perhaps it was because the latter group had greater access to other revenue sources. Certain department personnel were remunerated in a manner that set them apart. Even before heading the Louvre archive, Saint-Prest, who was never called a commis, received an annual lump sum gratification, raised in 1699 from 3,000 livres to 4,000. He apparently received no augmentation when he took charge of the archive (1710) or when he was made director of the Académie politique (1711), although like other department personnel, he received a 2,000-livre extraordinary gratification in 1714.127 Le Grand, employed in documentary research in concert with Saint-Prest, received annual appointements of 3,000 livres, usually paid in two-month increments.128 Larroque’s annual appointements of 2,400 livres were disbursed twice per year.129 The two were listed as commis only in the 1715 list prepared for the regent130 and had always been remunerated apart from and at a higher level than Torcy’s commis, perhaps owing to their literary skills and scholarly status. Clairambault, clearly an outside consultant, received a 2,000-livre pension in 1691.131 Neither Dubos nor Renaudot, two other outside consultants, appears on the department’s payroll, although in 1691 the latter’s commis Bardon received a 400-livre gratification.132 The propagandist La Chapelle, also part of the “brain trust” of outside experts, received a 2,000-livre annual gratification. After his last diplomatic mission, Colonel Hooke received an annual pension of 1,500 livres.133 Further monetary rewards included pensions of two kinds: those to a commis on active service and those to a retired commis or his widow and/ or minor children.134 While on active duty from 1701 to 1715 P ­ ecquet received an annual pension of 600 livres,135 but from what the records specify, his case appears to have been unique among the clerks. More common were retirement pensions (paid annually or semi-­annually), but since our modern idea of retirement was unfamiliar to aged yet healthy early modern people, most clerks died in service.136 Premier commis Aubert, who retired at the end of 1705, received 2,500 livres, while the cryptologist and simple commis Lullier, who retired at about the same time, received 1,500 livres augmented annually by 500 livres. Parayre, premier commis under Brienne, Lionne, and Pomponne, died in 1707,

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but his widow received 600 livres. The two minor children of master cryptologist Charles-Bonaventure Rossignol (son of Antoine, of even greater reputation), who died in 1705 but had never served directly in the foreign office, were nonetheless awarded 5,000 livres in the expectation that they would one day follow in their father’s footsteps. Pensions were also awarded to the widow and children of certain embassy personnel, as in the case of Joachim Fonton, first secretary-interpreter (dragoman) to France’s Levantine ambassadors.137 Only a few retired ambassadors received pensions: Ferriol, once at Constantinople, received 3,000 livres; de la Haye, formerly in Venice, received 6,000 livres; and Frischmann, once in Münster, received 7,000 livres, although as ordinary and extraordinary gratifications rather than as a pension.138 All told, such benefits for former department personnel represented only a bit over 1.5 per cent of department expenditures, a small price for the loyalty likely engendered (table 7.6). If a commis or secretary traveled on royal business, he was reimbursed with an ordonnance de voyage.139 Such travel could be lucrative, as is clear from the few specific amounts listed in the accounts.140 Noblet’s income was liberally increased by reimbursements, although they were not always quick in coming and the constant traveling could be wearing.141 Accompanied by a valet, Adam traveled biennially to assist at the opening session of Brittany’s estates. Clerks undertook other trips whose itinerary but not purpose was recorded in the accounts.142 This is likely because voyages were paid from a separate budget category and were calculated according to a variety of formulae that depended on such factors as distance, time, and one’s status in the state hierarchy.143 There were more subtle means of rewarding a clerk or ministerial advisor, prominent among them being by a favourable judgment in the reading of the rolle.144 This practice clearly displays the vigour with which Louis XIV and his advisors turned a time-honoured regalian right into an instrument of power politics and patronage.145 It derived from delegated rights that had never left the bosom of the Conseil du Roi. Invoking the rights of the dominant seigneur, the king and the designated secretary of state, who served monthly terms on a rotating basis, reviewed claims derived from a hodgepodge of feudal-seigneurial franchises and privileges. As the realm’s dispenser of justice, the king might grant a favour in the form of permissions, privileges, gifts, or awards.146 Written petitions followed a formula, one that identified the petitioner as a faithful and deserving subject, specified the request, such as a type of feudal-seigneurial privilege in a certain place or for particular lands, and



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appealed to royal honour and generosity.147 These were collected in the king’s antechamber on Mondays at approximately half past noon after the meeting of Dispatches. An armchair set before a green velvet–draped table symbolized the royal presence. To its left stood the war secretary, who until 1714 was responsible for collecting and initially processing the petitions placed respectfully on the table, gathered up by a commis, later to be sorted and abstracted. Petitions were then scrutinized by a master of requests. If the request was unusual or difficult, it was referred at once to the secretary of state. Sometime during the last week of the month, usually following a meeting of the Conseil or Dispatches, the king met with at least one master of requests, a secretary from the king’s chamber, the designated secretary of state, and one of the secretary’s premier commis, the latter serving as reporter.148 As placets were increasingly answered by bureaucrats within the ministries, petitioners phrased their placets accordingly and sometimes sent duplicates directly to the secretaries of state. Clientage played a role in all this, as reflected in the placets of courtiers and central government personnel, who only felt the need to submit short, almost perfunctory requests.149 On many occasions news of an impending case reached Torcy’s bureaus before it became generally known, affording the bureaucrats time to frame a plea and present it before an avaricious courtier got wind of it. In times of economic distress and war, this process could supplement a crown servant’s income by granting him the right to enforce the king’s rolle judgment. The rights and privileges conferred were confirmed by a brevet replete with repeated phrases about fidelity and constancy or confidence and honour  – sentiments that cemented the patron-client relationship.150 Department personnel frequently received favourable judgments of their petitions, along with renewals (typically for five years) of rights previously granted, such as those to Aubert, Maugin, Blondel, and Adam in 1695. Occasionally petitions intersected. In the summer of 1693 Le Peletier de Souzy petitioned for the right of aubaine in a property that had already been granted to Maugin; although Souzy was the director of fortifications and an intendant of finance, he had to give way to Maugin’s prior claim.151 Withal, the records reveal that the king gave his assent to forty-six of the petitions from foreign office staff from 1690 to 1694, and forty-three from 1699 to 1701, and during the same periods cast an outright denial only ten times. The most insistent of the department’s petitioners from 1690 to 1694 were Maugin, with ten petitions; Blondel, with seven; Iberville, with three; and Adam, Marolot, Mignon, and Fournier, with two each. Among those renewing

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Table 7.11 Remuneration of the treasurers and controllers of ambassadors, 17091 and 17142

Treasurer (during his year of service) Treasurer (during his year not in service) Controller

Gages (in livres)3

Taxations fixes (in livres)4

Epices, façons et frais de reddition du compte à rendre en la Chambre des comptes de l’année de son exercice (in livres)5

7,500

9,0006

(2,000)

16,500

–

7,500

–

4,500

7,500

3,000

1,500

Annual Total (in livres)

Sources: aae md 309, fols 12v–14r (1709); and ibid., 310, fols 282v–4v (1714).

1 Both documents are accounts prepared for submission to the Chambre des comptes, the second (for 1714) dated 30 January 1716. The first document, dated 18 January 1711, indicates in two places that it is for the year “mil sept cent huit,” but one of these indications has the “huit” crossed out and replaced with “neuf,” which fits with the document’s note that Prévost was treasurer that year. 2 All amounts are in livres. 3 Gages were the annual payments to an office-holder in return for the sum of money he had “loaned” the king for the right to exercise the office. 4 Taxations were given to officials who handled money either as a fixed percentage or, as in this instance, as a fixed rate. 5 These were the fees for submitting these accounts to the Chambre des comptes for audit. 6 In 1714 Adam’s taxations were 9,500 livres, either because this was the sum attached to his particular office of ancien et mi-triennal treasurer of ambassadors or because of an augmentation for both treasurers, perhaps because of the increased number of diplomatic missions sent out after the return of peace.

their rights, Blondel led the pack with sixteen renewals for the period 1699 to 1701.152 Other rewards included venal or appointive offices, although in the case of venal offices it was usually the opportunity to purchase the office that was the favour, not the office itself. The expensive office of s­ ecretary of the king in the Grand Chancellery of Paris  – 55,000–70,00 livres in the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign  – granted the holder gages, tax exemptions, and, best of all, nobility. It was a must for a premier commis who drew up, signed, and sealed the royal acts that were an important component of domestic paperwork.153 The venal offices of treasurers of ambassadors, created in 1706 and purchased by Adam and his son-in-law Jean de Prévost, were particularly lucrative. Pierre Odeau, a banker and close associate of Adam, purchased the office of controller of the treasurers of ambassadors. The treasurers received annual gages of



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7,500 livres and taxations fixes of 9,000 or 9,500 livres during the years they exercised their office; the controller received gages of 3,000 livres and taxations fixes of 1,500 livres (table 7.11).154 The foreign secretary also awarded the privilege of printing treaties and other diplomatic agreements, which apparently fetched a fixed 1,200 livres annually from printers’ fees.155 Even before entering the department, Mignon and Noblet each had kin holding an office of secretary of the king that would eventually come to them,156 whereas their colleagues Adam, Blondel, and Pecquet clearly owed the same office to service within the department (table 6.1). This office offered the quickest ascent into the nobility and was within the financial reach of a premier commis or secretary, but as the case of Fournier and Ligny make clear, not all of them could afford it. A direct connection between a gratification secured by Torcy from the king and the subsequent purchase of an office is not always explicit, as it was in 1694 when Blondel purchased that of treasurer of France at Caen.157 He sold it in 1696 in order to become a secretary of the king the following year, but when that office was suppressed in 1697, he used the proceeds two years later to purchase Mansart’s office of intendant and alternate authorizing officer of the king’s buildings for more than 100,000 livres. When a new office of secretary of the king was created in 1704, Blondel purchased it while retaining the other post.158 We may assume the same process was at work when Pecquet purchased the office of auditor in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes in 1705 and then eight years later sold it to acquire one as a treasurer of France. From the latter Pecquet received annual gages of 2,431 livres and a 2,000-livre gratification at the Breton estates’ biennial meeting. Prior to the 1713 meeting, Torcy wrote a polite note to the president of the Chambre des comptes explaining that owing to his responsibilities at court Pecquet would have to be formally installed in office in absentia. The secretary of state, however, would provide money for a substitute to represent Pecquet.159 Fournier160 and Blondel each purchased a treasurer of France office in the 1690s, the former in Caen and the latter in Rouen. At the time of Fournier’s installation, Torcy wrote notes on his behalf to his first cousins the archbishop of Rouen and the provincial intendant.161 The 1695 capitation was not a tax on one’s wealth, but rather a head tax based on one’s social status or that of one’s offices. Perhaps less of a precise indication of the era’s social hierarchy than some have claimed, its twenty-two tariff groupings nevertheless suggest a relative sense of the social status of the department personnel. The premiers commis of the

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secretaries of state and controller general were in the eighth class along with, among others, maréchaux des camps of the army, naval squadron chiefs, counselors of the Parisian superior courts, masters of the Paris Chambre des comptes, grand masters of waters and forests, ­secretaries of the king of the Grand Chancellery, and presidents and treasurers of France of Paris, all assessed 200 livres based on their alleged status. The simple commis of the secretaries of state were in the eleventh rank, assessed at 100 livres, along with war and naval commissioners, controllers general of the ordinary and extraordinary of war, lieutenants general of the parlements, and mayors of cities with a parlement or other superior court. With the exception of the principal commis of the extraordinary of war, food, and stages, who were in the seventh class, the premiers commis of the secretaries of state and the controller general ranked above all the other various kinds of commis. Yet even the simple clerks of these departments were far from the bottom of the commis category.162 But again, this perceived social status was not the same as an accurate estimate of wealth.163 Reconstructing the income of a premier commis is not easy, as seen in the case of Clair Adam. In the final years of the reign he received the following annually: as premier commis, an acquit patent of 3,000 livres; as a treasurer of ambassadors, 16,500 livres; and for work on the Royal Orders’ behalf, 1,200 livres.164 This base of 20,700 livres does not include proceeds from the lucrative monopoly for granting permission to print official treaties, service as Torcy’s household intendant, pensions and gifts from Marseilles, ordonnances de voyages, and any ordinary or extraordinary gratification received au porteur. Adam probably drew the largest sum from the crown of all the department’s clerks, which perhaps accounts for his estate at Glatigny.165 The other premiers commis present a similar picture: some income from the department, but not all of it specified. Whatever the exact totals, it is clear that these were men in a position to accumulate enough wealth to acquire property, the heart’s desire of most of their contemporaries. A further example of the inadequacy of our attempt at income reconstruction comes from considering the other opportunities the commis had for generating wealth. During the Nine Years War clerks and ministers alike invested in privateering ventures against English and Dutch shipping. Family and government connections offered advanced knowledge of these expeditions. In a 1696 expedition, the list of investors included Saint-Prest at 1,000 livres, Mignon at 1,500 livres, and Mme de Croissy.166 That many clerks were also men of finance by reason of the venal offices they held suggests further investments of a



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public and private nature. This is a reminder that the clerk-administrators of the department’s upper echelons, despite their ink-stained fingers, were men who sought the wealth necessary to a lifestyle like that of the nobles who wielded the sword or donned judicial robes. It is perhaps appropriate that this chapter concludes by climbing down from these loftier financial heights to the inadequately known but undoubtedly inferior rewards received by those lower in the hierarchy. As we have seen, simple commis were for the most part listed in groups paid by the premiers commis under whom they worked. We also know what they received from acquits patents. The writing done by a clerk often required digesting, summarizing, drafting, compiling, and other sophisticated skills in addition to tedious copying, but what about the simple copyists who undoubtedly lightened their load? And what of the office boys and porters who moved correspondence, files, drafts, and supplies within the bureaus, and who carried messages within the Versailles complex to locales within the capital’s vicinity? Of them, either as groups or as individuals, the department’s accounts are silent. Although they are largely anonymous in the foreign office’s written institutional memory, they nonetheless played an essential part in the preservation, control, and utilization of information and diplomatic memory that was to constitute perhaps the greatest legacy of the two Colbert foreign secretaries.

8 Preserving, Deploying, and Controlling Information

Cicero’s apt use of a bodily image in his assertion that “the sinews of war are infinite money” could be extended to other of the state’s limbs and rephrased to assert that the sinews of war as well as diplomacy are infinite information. Similarly, Weber claims that “[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge.”1 One of the hallmarks of the organizational and technical expertise of the clerks of the foreign office was their control over specialized, valuable knowledge and their ability to process and then place it in the king’s hands to be acted upon.2 The ability of the state to use that knowledge to project its diplomatic power abroad no doubt enhanced the expert status of the small foreign office staff who achieved this result even in places where royal armies could never dream of marching.3 Although it is commonly assumed that the computer launched the “Information Age,” the amount of information, written and printed, was very much an issue for the growing states of the seventeenth century.4 These included valuable state papers the royal government wished to preserve and others it sought to suppress. The police, especially in the capital, helped the foreign office secure the documents of deceased royal servants that constituted the paper trail of France’s foreign policy. But the paper passion of the foreign office was more than a desire merely to possess the letters, pamphlets, and books of others. It aimed at providing diplomats at home and abroad with a historical perspective on international relations and negotiations. While censorship and the pursuit of illegal written and visual materials were part of the foreign office’s strategy for dealing with France’s critics, Torcy pushed royal propagandists to draw on the rich trove of official papers his department was assembling. Another part of his effort to control information focused on the mail that flowed along



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the water and land routes of a Europe-wide web of post offices by means of regularly scheduled service as well as special couriers.5 Torcy’s control of the kingdom’s post office was crucial to managing and to peeking into the flow of information that coursed among the capitals and cities of Europe and the wider world.

P re s e rv in g a n d U s in g I nsti tuti onal Memory An administrative department’s papers are palpable elements of its quotidian functioning as well as potent symbols of its power. It was thus both practically and symbolically appropriate that when Torcy resigned as secretary of state and his department was dismantled at the outset of the Regency in 1715, Philippe II, duc d’Orléans, instructed him to turn over all domestic paperwork to the head of the new department now charged with provincial administration.6 We have already described the careful attention paid to the production of the department’s paperwork, a sensible consideration given that “diplomacy takes its name from the diploma (folded letter) of the Greeks.”7 We now turn to the parallel and growing attention given to the preservation of these masses of papers as elements of institutional memory. Papers from the past were no longer primarily documents, proof to be produced when verifying a right or claim, but instead were records of past negotiations to be ransacked for information and precedents to be woven into arguments to drive and shape current negotiations.8 This approach was hindered, however, by the custom of a diplomat leaving his post or a foreign secretary leaving office with his papers remaining in his or his heirs’ possession.9 There were sporadic efforts to retain them for the state, especially under Louis XIII, but what was kept or recovered by purchase or donation went to the royal library rather than to the foreign office. When Lionne died in 1671, however, the king ordered his papers to be placed under Colbert’s care until turned over to his successor. Pomponne, disgraced on 18 November 1679, left Lionne’s papers as well as his own for his successor.10 While Croissy was on his way home from Bavaria, his brother Colbert acted as foreign secretary (18 November 1679 to 12 February 1680), which again placed these papers under his care. They were likely next removed to Croissy’s residence near his brother’s on rue Vivienne, where the bundles were subjected to a quick and preliminary inventory, probably by the Colbert client and librarian Clément.11 This was a significant step and one that Weber connects with “the emergence of genuinely modern administration,” since placing public papers formerly in private

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hands into an archive “goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management.”12 With the embryonic archives safely ensconced in the Hôtel Croissy13 and with the preliminary inventory in hand, it was obvious to the new foreign secretary that what he now possessed was largely a jumble of unsorted papers in bundles. Rather than a real archive, it was more aptly “nothing but a depot with no access facilities.”14 Not that Croissy’s predecessors had operated in a disorderly manner. Their records, however, were organized for current use, and “as soon as they fell into disuse, they also fell back into infinite disorder, for unlike documents, they were defined solely by usage.”15 Under Croissy, the department now embarked on the systematic selection and preservation of its accumulating documentation, to which Croissy added the rich record of his own past negotiations. It is hardly surprising that he took this course, being the brother and protégé of the Great Colbert, aptly dubbed the “information master.”16 Yet Croissy’s own success with historical research in provincial libraries as his part in the reunions must not be overlooked.17 It is fair to say that both Colbert brothers were driven by the “info-lust” that had infected the learned of Europe since the Renaissance.18 Torcy’s later achievement in information preservation clearly followed in their wake. Croissy retained Clément and gave him an organizational scheme to sort the papers geographically by foreign power and then collate the hitherto separate incoming dispatches with the “minutes” (drafts) of outgoing dispatches, letters, and reports for each particular envoy or royal agent into a chronological series.19 This permitted one to “read” a negotiation as a contextualized narrative embracing its chief correspondents. A researcher seeking an even wider context could also consult the relevant narratives constructed for other individuals, locations, or negotiations. This marked a radical departure from the “monological” registries of outgoing correspondence normally kept. Cornelia Vismann maintains that “a more dialogic form of governance arises only when retention of drafts is complemented by preservation of incoming missives. Only then can we speak of files in the modern sense of the word.”20 The chronological integrity of these files, essential to their purpose, was assured by binding them together. Assisting Clément in this effort was Le Melle and an unnamed copyist assigned to make a clean copy of Croissy’s ­Nijmegen negotiations, vital to current reunion diplomacy. Original copies of treaties with attached official seals could not be bound but were inventoried and stored in the drawers of a specially constructed walnut cabinet.21 This treatment of treaties also reflected their status as



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­ ocuments, set aside and guarded, unlike records that were assembled d into a file for optimum circulation and use.22 Croissy, not content merely to organize diplomatic paperwork, insisted that this content become “operative knowledge,”23 readily accessible to departmental personnel in search of vital diplomatic information. As Callières later remarked, the written instructions accompanying ambassadors leaving Paris for their posts abroad were “frequently altered in many articles, by daily dispatches which [he] receives, and which are to be looked upon as so many new instructions founded upon the advices which he has sent from the country where he is, and upon the events which change the situation of affairs.”24 This suggests an unending dialogue between the evolving desires and knowledge of the king and his ministers on the one hand and the arrival of information and perspectives from the king’s representatives abroad on the other. Underlying this conversation and intended to prevent it from becoming cacophonous and confused was an organized chronological series largely comprising letters received and drafts of those sent out. This clarifying contextualization allowed the foreign secretary and his clerks, reflecting the will of the king and his Conseil, to make the continuing and orderly alteration of instructions that ­Callières had in mind. Even though this operative knowledge required additional labour and greater skill to produce, each volume commenced with a table of abbreviated extracts from each item to indicate what each was about. This required a skilful balance of comprehensiveness and brevity so that nothing essential was lost in these summaries. Although the documented diplomatic memory being assembled dated back to the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign, this was not enough for Croissy, whose legal mind desired depth and breadth in this database. He was anxious as well to please his royal master by glorifying his earlier years. At the start of 1681 Croissy tasked Clément with tracking down diplomatic documents from the Brienne era. Although several of their former staff members were interviewed, nothing came of it. This initiative, however, paid off later in further acquisitions and was pursued with equal vigour under Torcy.25 Turning his attention back to the documents already in hand, in July Clément engaged de Bost to assist with creating tables for volumes and making extracts of correspondence and then engaged a trusted but unnamed friend to second him. For security’s sake, they wielded their pens in Clément’s chamber. Even Croissy and Bergeret joined the effort, assisting in particular with Portuguese papers. When sets of negotiations were ready to be bound, the work was done by select binders who set up shop in the Hôtel Croissy, again to preserve

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state secrets.26 Torcy’s later archival accomplishments clearly rested on those of his father, a fact that counters and rebalances Saint-Simon’s influential but skewed account assigning Torcy most of the credit.27 Croissy’s organizational achievement reached beyond the paperwork of the past. During the course of 1680 as Clément’s team brought order to his two predecessors’ papers, Croissy was so pleased with the results – individual files of diplomatic dialogue grouped geographically and arranged chronologically by diplomatic agent – he decided to organize current correspondence in the same manner.28 This had several advantages. It insured that these documents were largely bindery-ready at the end of the year or early in the next without requiring additional time and labour to reorganize them and making them unavailable for consultation. It also made correspondence more easily and logically read in context even before binding. Creating abbreviated extracts was likely now intended as an ongoing process, not only expediting the annual binding process,29 but allowing the minister and his staff to re-access their contents quickly and efficiently in their daily work. There was a further gain in efficiency: the mode of reading through “current” correspondence was now the same as that required for rummaging through the records of earlier negotiations. No mental shift was necessary to transition swiftly yet accurately from one to the other, since both were based on the same geographical and chronological format. There is no clear indication of how exactly current materials were stored in this “filing” system prior to binding: were they held in portfolios, pigeonholed, placed in trays, or joined together with ribbon?30 In any event, Croissy’s archival initiative went beyond the reorganization of the bundles inherited from his predecessors to create a new system of ongoing organization meant to eliminate altogether such accumulated confusion.31 Tucked away among Clément’s accounts for 1687 is an allocation of 12 livres for a large sheet of vellum to be glued to a piece of wood and upon which was written an abbreviated table of all the bound volumes of negotiations.32 What better demonstrates that this innovative schema had become an integral part of the department’s work routine than posting it as a sign – or “menu” – presumably to guide anyone wanting to lay hands quickly on a particular negotiation series? Although provision at Versailles for housing ministers and their staffs accompanying the still peripatetic monarch had begun in 1670, it was only in 1683 that Louis XIV definitively moved the court and government to his new palace. While most royal officials continued to maintain a Paris residence and some bureaus remained largely in the capital,



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in 1685 the foreign office made the move to the Versailles pavilion that would house the foreign secretary, his family, and his bureaus for the reminder of the reign. Over the course of two days a hired wagon drawn by four horses transported the department’s bound manuscripts from rue Vivienne to Versailles.33 This collection now incorporated other volumes besides those chronicling negotiations. In the first half of 1681 Clément’s accounts reveal that thirty-six volumes of drafts, financial statements, and other papers also went to the bindery. Financial documents and perhaps drafts of domestic correspondence were, however, not encased in red Moroccan leather, but in a less expensive marbled paper over cardboard. Likewise, three volumes of drafts of arrêts for 1680–83, two volumes of drafts of items sent out, and two volumes of formularies for letters to heads of state were bound in a less expensive parchment.34 In a final entry in his accounts, Clément recorded that on 13 October 1687 he hired a carriage to transport recently bound volumes to Versailles, after which his service in the foreign office apparently ended, likely because in 1688 he began work on a second catalogue of printed materials in the Royal Library.35 Jean-Yves de Saint-Prest, who entered the department sometime around 1682, acted as its unofficial historiographer, but was neither a premier commis nor a commis.36 He possessed an invaluable array of abilities as a lawyer, amateur historian, collector of rare manuscripts, and self-trained librarian-archivist. A savant connected with other men of letters, he took a passionate interest in religious issues, especially from a Jansenist viewpoint.37 He was related to robe and sword nobility through the Séguier and Bouillon families, while his father, Pierre, from near Chartres, was a payer of rentes of the Paris Hôtel de Ville, a costly office and one probably purchased with the fruits of finance. In 1667, aged twenty-seven, Saint-Prest became a councillor of the king in the Grand Conseil, and in 1670 he wed Anne Chomel, whose father had been in the Paris parlement and whose mother was a Séguier. They had two daughters, but their marriage ended in separation in 1717.38 SaintPrest’s erudition, especially his knowledge of German diplomatic history, earned him a role in the education of the young duc de Chartres, future duc d’Orléans and regent, for whom he compiled accounts to ensure that he knew his mother’s beloved German homeland. A grateful Madame later made Saint-Prest her secretary.39 Saint-Prest strongly advocated the study of past and present treaties for the contextual background information they supplied for current negotiations. He also recommended reading any series of treaties for the

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wisdom to be gained through reflecting upon international relations.40 The accounts of past negotiations he produced were based on official correspondence as well as on supplementary materials, creating full and authoritative narratives as background for use in the minister’s bureau and for diplomats preparing for missions.41 Saint-Prest also composed numerous reports for Croissy and later Torcy on legal aspects of international relations and apparently did the same for the other secretaries of state.42 Additional research and writing assignments included a report for Tallard’s instruction on the ceremonial employed by past French ambassadors to England and one to help Torcy in 1711 as he planned for a future peace congress by detailing what French plenipotentiaries had been paid at previous ones.43 At Torcy’s behest, Saint-Prest assembled two treaty series in ten volumes of folio manuscript, complete with background material and other information: the first from 1598 (Vervins) to 1678 (Nijmegen) and the second from 1678 to 1693.44 Torcy’s instructions for departing envoys demonstrate his strong sense of history.45 The author of an incomplete manuscript on contemporary diplomatic history claims further that Torcy had advanced beyond traditional methodology. The author may have been Saint-Prest, but Abbé Vertôt seems more likely, so we will assume that the work was his.46 Vertôt claimed to employ a new genre of historical writing that was beyond the abilities of an individual limited to his own enlightenment because it drew on the actual instructions issued to ambassadors and the correspondence they exchanged with the king and his foreign secretary.47 Vertôt claimed that his history was intended for those whose heavy public functions kept them from reading the many volumes of political correspondence assembled in Torcy’s ministry.48 He credited the idea for such an approach to history to Croissy, who entrusted the task to a man who was familiar with public affairs, was wise and hard-working, and who pushed the work far along. Although he did not name him, it could only have been Saint-Prest.49 Vertôt contended, however, that this earlier effort was marred by what he claimed Torcy later determined to be an excess of respect for the original documents. The result was an abridgement into an account that while solid was nonetheless dry. What Torcy sought instead, according to Vertôt, were works that put forth an argument, that posed and attempted to answer questions, and that drew parallels. Vertôt hoped to accomplish the same ends in his own history. He also specified that his sources would be noted in the margins – letters with their dates and locations, including page numbers, in the volumes of political correspondence, as well as references from printed histories.50



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Organization and accessibility remained a concern for Torcy and his collaborators. Even today a book with an index is more user-friendly than one without, but all indexes are not of the same scope and reliability: they might include only proper names or only the most important people; the categories might be too broad, narrow, or incomplete; and the indexer might be less than careful in gathering, sorting, and noting page references. As the bound volumes of diplomatic papers continued to multiply and private collections of public documents were acquired, improving indexes became imperative. Proposals for the Académie politique’s organization from abbés Le Grand and Renaudot stressed the importance of “tables,” and Le Grand recounted an anecdote about his own inability to locate a particular diplomatic document. He also urged the minister to gather tables from the rich libraries of Paris and elsewhere so that department staff and associated researchers and writers would know what was available where.51 Memory’s preservation and organization raises the question of the purposes for which memory is to be used, since preservation as its own end usually results in bundles of documents accessed only with difficulty, whereas more purpose-driven conservation aims to arrange what is preserved in a way that best serves the extrinsic rationale for doing so. In truth, however, the result of Croissy’s effort to reconstruct the record of past negotiations was largely for internal department use.52 The Fronde had made ministers wary of subjecting monarchy to history’s critical methodology for fear of feeding discontent by stripping away its aura of mystery.53 Torcy, however, “attempted to adjust the practice of absolute monarchy to newly emergent patterns of political culture” by reaching out to audiences beyond the ministry bureaus. The foreign office engaged in a war of words with France’s detractors, especially on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession, and Torcy personally coordinated that effort.54 The initiative to create and preserve diplomatic memory in an organized and easily accessible manner would thus gain an additional and pressing purpose. Joseph Klaits, in his groundbreaking study of Torcy’s propaganda initiatives, observes that the “habitual use of documentary materials in the propaganda works [that Torcy] commissioned points to the foreign minister’s conviction that the historical record could serve as an effective response to the accusations lodged against Louis XIV by his foreign enemies and domestic critics.” Among the authors whose efforts the minister coordinated for varying lengths of service were Le Grand (on the payroll since 1705); Dubos (freelancing from 1701); Louis P ­ ouyvet de

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La Blinières, avocat in the Paris parlement who joined Dubos in 1710 as a secretary to the Gertruydenberg delegation; Hooke; and La C ­ hapelle (employed from 1702).55 Klaits underlines “the close relationship … between scholarly history and French war propaganda” and credits Dubos with creating and practising a way of writing history that would approach that of the eighteenth century.56 Torcy shared this outlook, seeing the propagandistic publications sponsored by his department not as French lies to counter Allied lies, but instead, in Klaits’s words, as “a means of enlightenment by which men’s true interests were made known to them.”57 Saint-Prest was not, as some claim, the overseer of this bold venture – in reality it was supervised by Torcy58 – but he nonetheless facilitated it. Deeply familiar with the full range of the department’s rich documentation, he knew where to locate needed documents among the plethora of papers he oversaw. As a part of the capital’s company of learned men, he knew to whom or where to go for written materials not at the foreign ministry. His role as archivist was formalized when he became caretaker of the department’s records when they were deposited in the Louvre. Along with filling the Louvre’s attics with an organized archive numbering nearly two thousand manuscript volumes by the time Torcy left office in 1715, Saint-Prest advised Torcy on the design of the Académie politique, indicating that it and the archives were largely conceived as functioning together. He was its first and only director, and when he died in 1720, it soon closed. From 1712 until then, however, he worked often and closely with Torcy to professionalize and advance diplomacy through the proper utilization of the information in its archives.59

P a r is : T h e In f o r mati on Capi tal Paris, then northern Europe’s greatest metropolis, was linked with nearby Versailles in a geographic, political, and cultural symbiosis. Little more than ten miles apart, a constant traffic of couriers and coaches traveled the three hours between the palace and the capital’s administrative, religious, and cultural centres.60 As one observer noted in 1661, Louis XIV wanted to make of Paris what Augustus had made of Rome, which he indeed did with numerous monumental buildings. Paris was also home to royal academies established to promote Renaissance ideals and serve as “both paragons of taste and the fount of normative rules.”61 Those established between 1661 and 1671 – to organize and support the sciences, music, dance, inscriptions and belles-lettres, and ­architecture –



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added to the two founded by Richelieu and Mazarin, the Académie française and an academy for sculpture and painting. All located in the capital, from 1692 many were housed in the Louvre. Torcy, who had spent a good deal of his life in Paris and received ambassadors at his residence there, also took pride in the capital.62 When creating the foreign affairs archive and later the Académie politique for which it served as a “workshop,” Torcy and his advisors looked to Paris and particularly space in the Louvre as a worthy setting for this latest royal academy. Had the archive been intended merely to relieve overcrowding in the departmental offices at Versailles, other space at the palace (though always at a premium) or in the surrounding town might have been secured for convenience sake. The move to Paris also marked the diplomatic papers’ division into two working collections: those from Ryswick and after, to remain at Versailles for quick access by the minister and his staff; and those prior to Ryswick, to go to the Louvre, eventually to be used by the students of the academy.63 The establishment of an “archives office” and its mission of putting to use files no longer in normal circulation clearly mark the Louvre as more than a simple depository. Storage and accessibility were meant to work hand in hand.64 The king agreed on 22 December 1709 to Torcy’s request to place his archive in the Louvre.65 Work soon began to subdivide the three rooms the archive was to occupy and refit them and the adjoining “grand salon” with furniture and the simple wooden shelves to hold the bound volumes. One room housed a bindery so that the highly secret diplomatic documents would not have to go off premises. When the move came in the spring of 1710, it required six wagon trips from Versailles and was supervised by Pecquet, who kept careful track as the porters climbed the 116 steps with the records of their monarch’s diplomatic deeds.66 Paris abounded with important libraries. The Louvre itself housed the Cabinet des Livres or Bibliothèque du Louvre, the legal library of deposit for everything printed in the kingdom with royal privilege since 1658.67 The Louvois family’s library and art collection, presided over by Torcy’s friend, the scholarly Camille Le Tellier, abbé de Louvois, and the fine library of rare books of Jean-Jacques Charron, marquis de Ménars, ­Colbert’s wealthy brother-in-law, were near Torcy’s residence.68 In an apartment located on the neighbouring Place des Victoires, the ­Clairambaults, uncle and nephew, collated and analysed state papers for the navy and the foreign office, including the Gaignières collection.69 On rue Vivienne was the celebrated Royal Library, described by Dr ­Martin Lister in 1698 as “commodiously disposed”70 in twenty-two rooms and

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housing over 50,000 printed works and 15,000 manuscripts. Lister also described the nearby collection of the late Jean-Baptiste Colbert: “I saw the Library of the late Monsieur Colbert, that great Patron of Learning … At the upper-end [of the library] is a fair Room, wherein the Papers of State are kept; particularly those of the Administration of Cardinal Mazarin, and his own Accounts, when he was in Employment. These make up many hundred Folios, finely bound in Red Maroquin and Gilt.”71 The same Moroccan red binding, with gilt edges and the Colberts’ serpentine emblem, was used by the foreign ministry. In the last years of Louis XIV’s reign, this part of Paris constituted one of the largest concentrations of libraries and archives in the Western world, a cornucopia of memory and learning mostly open to Torcy and his staff and, it was hoped, to the Académie politique’s students as well.72 Even before he became secretary, Torcy sought to preserve other state archival resources. In February 1696 as Croissy’s health declined, Torcy’s staff, while searching for the titles to the seigneurie of Torcy, found the Chambre des comptes’ archives in disarray, prompting him to complain to one of its chief judges.73 Several years later his friend and former tutor Rousseau de Chamoy offered to bring some order to these same archives, a task begun in earnest in February 1703 when Dispatches gave its authorization. During his research, Rousseau uncovered numerous chancellery records that ranged from 1421 to 1672. Torcy was likewise instrumental in opening Brittany’s “Trésor des chartes” (treasury of charters) in Rennes and in organizing the archives of Nantes. During the wars at the end of the seventeenth century, the House of Lorraine’s records were transferred to Metz. Torcy ordered them copied, and after Ryswick, as a good will gesture, the originals were returned to Nancy.74 Torcy shared with Paris’s police and parlement the right to seal and then review personal papers of anyone dying in the capital, especially those that touched state interests in any way. Priority was placed, however, on retrieving state papers from former French agents.75 Saint-Prest often hastened to the deceased’s dwelling to search a sealed desk or room for such documents. When Ariste, the Briennes’ premier commis, died in 1697, Saint-Prest and Commissioner Delamare of the Châtelet were sent to seal his residence and forbid his heirs entrance until Saint-Prest extracted those letters concerning foreign affairs.76 In 1702 d’Argenson informed Torcy that he had sealed the papers of Forval, former French resident to the Grisons and agent in Poland. These included the key to his code, letters from Poland (including a number of formal ones written in Latin to the Polish chancery), books, and an extensive collection



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of rare pamphlets.77 Not all of Richelieu’s papers were in the collection that he left to his niece, Marie Madeleine de Vignerot du Pont de Courlay, first duchesse d’Aiguillon, but it was nonetheless a large one. The second duchess, who inherited it in 1675, was a less careful guardian than the first, so papers began to disappear. When she died in October 1704, leaving her possessions to her disgraced and disgraceful nephew, Torcy obtained the king’s authorization to remove the cardinal’s papers from the estate, but it was only on 2 March 1705 that Adam received an order to seize them. Where they were taken is not known, but by the end of 1710 they were in the Louvre’s new archive where, following Torcy’s instructions, Le Grand organized and inventoried the papers, arranging them geographically.78 Another major acquisition was the papers of former foreign secretary of state Brienne, inspected by Adam.79 Even the papers of a member of the Pajot postal dynasty attracted the minister’s ever-vigilant eye.80 Papers of foreigners were also of interest. In 1711 the effects of “M. Krock [Scroff],” Paris resident of Tsar Peter I, were sealed. The inventory sent to Torcy listed code books, letters from the French court, letters from the tsar and tsarina, and memoirs on trade with Russia and Russia’s relations with Sweden.81 It was widely known that Torcy was acquiring anything that might enhance the foreign ministry’s diplomatic record. In early 1699 Abbé Louis Thésut, brother of Baron Jean de Thésut, secrétaire des commandements to Monsieur, the king’s brother, was attending to the never-­ending wrangling over Madame’s claim to her father’s (d. 1690) Palatinate electorate. Another Orléans official, Jean-Paul du Hautoy de Rossicourt, had been sent to Germany earlier to gather the documentation needed to press Madame’s case with her recalcitrant brother, but when he was suspected of being in league with her brother’s officials, he fled with the papers. Abbé Thésut journeyed to Strasbourg to enlist the magistrate and scholar Ulrich Obrecht in helping him track them. Tracing the twisted path that the two large chests of papers were said to have traveled, in early 1700 Thésut, having already spoken with Torcy, informed Obrecht that the last time Hautoy was in Paris he had approached Saint-Prest about giving the ministry’s archives fourteen or fifteen volumes that included the late elector’s negotiations. The hapless Hautoy de ­Rossicourt ended up in the Bastille but was soon released when the papers were recovered. It is not clear, however, whether or not any of them ever made their way to Torcy’s archive.82 Pierre Clairambault was an obliging collaborator in this document dragnet. From his vantage point on Place des Victoires, he knew most of

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the great collectors and their collections. In April 1699, for instance, he wrote to Adam informing him of a fugitive compilation of Seignelay’s papers. His greatest triumph, however, came in snagging the Gaignières collection. The independently wealthy François Roger de Gaignières, governor of the town and principality of Joinville, had assembled one of Europe’s great amateur collections of manuscripts, maps, prints, medals, plans, and portraits. Its historical value attracted the attention of Louis XIV, who inquired through Torcy of its disposition. The principle that papers produced by or sent to public servants belonged by right to the state dated from at least the previous century, but only Louis XIV and his ministers, especially those of the reign’s second half, were able to implement it with some consistency. The interest in Gaignières’s collection, however, testified to a growing sense that the state’s right extended as well to papers that related to it or served the public interest.83 For over twenty years Gaignières’s neighbour, Ambassador Puyzieulx, periodically reported to Torcy on the collector’s and collection’s health. Many others, including England’s William III, had hoped to acquire the collection, but in February 1711 Torcy concluded an agreement whereby in return for financial considerations for himself and his heirs, it went to the king upon the death of Gaignières. He and the collection, whose use he still enjoyed, were soon placed under close scrutiny when Torcy acted on Clairambault’s doubts about Gaignières’s sincerity and fears of theft by some of the collector’s associates. When Gaignières died in March 1715, Torcy sent d’Argenson and his brother-in-law, Privy Councillor Louis Urbain Lefevre de Caumartin, to inspect the cache. Wisely, they brought along a portrait painter to evaluate the art works. In May, Torcy wrote to Clairambault outlining the disposition of the materials based on the latter’s carefully compiled inventories: any papers relating to foreign affairs since the 1598 Treaty of Vervins would go to the Louvre archives, as would any books needed for the work of those who laboured there; everything else either went to the Royal Library or, if already in a royal collection, was to be sold.84 In summary, Torcy sought to get his own information house in order and increase its supply of useful historical knowledge by acquiring materials pertinent to diplomacy that had escaped the foreign ministry’s control. All this information aided department insiders who sought a fuller and more precise understanding of past French diplomacy and served broader purposes that projected the fruits of that knowledge outside the ministry. Information and power typically march together, especially in diplomacy where much of the work of negotiation relies



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on deploying informed words in order to shape perceptions. The foreign office’s mania for old documents under two Colberts reflects a keen appreciation for the power of what was written on paper, as illustrated by Croissy’s own rummaging about in provincial libraries for parchments to manipulate into a case for acquiring border territories. If Torcy’s goals were less aggressive than those of his father, he nonetheless appreciated the potency of documents in creating the propaganda he sent abroad to justify French policy. The intended audience for the mustered documentation was also different: Croissy had others of legal training in mind, whereas Torcy looked to a wider public opinion.85 This “info-lust” was part of Torcy’s legacy to the foreign office. Not all of the subsequent foreign secretaries pursued papers with his doggedness, but the torch was continuously carried by such men as Le Dran, trained under Torcy. With the acquisition of Mazarin’s papers in 1732, Le Dran proudly announced to foreign secretary Chauvelin, who shared this passion, that the archives now had a complete run of correspondence from almost every French ambassador back to 1624.86

C e n s o rs h ip a n d Propaganda Another aspect of information management aimed not at its preservation, but at its elimination by various means of censorship or its countering through propaganda. These two activities were not easily separated and indeed fed upon one another, since both had the same goal of stopping domestic and enemy subversive publications. Combating the diffusion of hostile printed materials was Torcy’s never-ending headache. Early in the War of the Spanish Succession he was frustrated by his inability to stem the torrent of books, pamphlets, newsletters, broadsides, and gazettes “à la main” (hand-copied gazettes) inundating the Parisian marketplaces, cafes, parks, and even postal bureaus. In league with d’Argenson’s police, Torcy moved quickly to monitor the arrival of contraband publications and arrest the worst offenders, but at times he despaired over the gazettes from Holland flooding the capital.87 Many of these materials had not far to travel, as they were printed or hand-copied in Parisian cellars or provincial towns such as Lyon and Rouen. As well, a steady stream of contraband publications coursed across the eastern frontier.88 In combating the influx of enemy propaganda, the best defence was an early warning system in the leading neutral cities and diplomatic centres. Four were particularly important: Geneva and Soleure in Switzer­ land and the Venice-Rome axis in Italy. Soleure, home of the French

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a­ mbassador and situated halfway between Basel and Berne, proved an ideal listening post. The two ambassadors who served there during the war were both Torcy’s friends and clients: Roger Brulart de Sillery, marquis de Puyzieulx89 (assisted by the first-class diplomat and master spy Saint-Colombe), and the comte du Luc upon Puyzieulx’s 1708 retirement. Both maintained a large staff that included propagandists such as La Chapelle and Jean-Baptiste Rousseau.90 As the war moved into its opening phase in 1702, Puyzieulx and Sainte-Colombe were already establishing lines of communication with Rousseau de Chamoy in Ratisbon, from which he reported on the Imperial Diet, with Rudolph ­Christian, Baron Imhof in Vienna, a German diplomat who supplied the ambassadors with a weekly newsletter and pamphlets, and with Obrecht in Strasbourg, who wrote a series of tracts on the Spanish succession. La Closure, resident in Geneva, and d’Audiffret, extraordinary envoy to Lorraine, relayed information concerning the book trade.91 News about enemy propaganda often flowed along the same networks that provided the information used in French writings meant to counter it. In October 1701, just as Imperial troops advanced into the plains of northern Italy, Habsburg agents headed by Franz Ehrenreich, Count von Trautsmandorff, infiltrated some of the chief Swiss cities, including Basel. Answering a worried letter from Puyzieulx, Torcy urged him to warn Basel’s magistrates to pay more attention to what was printed in their city. If they lacked the authority to ban such works, the magistrates could at least threaten their authors with what Torcy termed the punishment their insolence deserved.92 He feared that the emperor’s agents had already suborned many Swiss publishers and booksellers. Berne proved more difficult to deal with than Basel because the Fischer family of postmasters and burgomasters were overtly anti-French. The French embassy bribed several municipal agents who supplied local gossip and the occasional pamphlet, but neither the ambassadors nor their agents could curb the Fischers’ influence.93 During the crucial period of peacemaking in 1713–14, du Luc translated timely articles from the Zurich journals to send to Paris along with German publications from Innsbruck.94 Geneva was a particularly well-placed listening post for gathering news and printed works from French-speaking Switzerland, Savoy, and northern Italy for the foreign office clerks to comb through.95 The French residents were Torcy’s confidant Iberville in the 1690s and thereafter La Closure. The latter had served Verjus de Crécy at Ratisbon, his own uncle Roland Jachiet Dupré in Florence, and Verjus de Crécy again at Ryswick, where he remained as chargé until the arrival of Ambassador



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Bonrepaus.96 On his arrival in Geneva in 1698 La Closure reported that many in the book dealers’ guild, which he dubbed “a Republic within a Republic,” were either suspicious of or outright hostile toward France. Slowly, however, his agents infiltrated the Genevan book market and by the middle of the war were able to warn French customs in Lyon of incoming contraband. Through a network of Swiss merchants and banking houses friendly with Samuel Bernard, La Closure purchased scurrilous books and pamphlets in the Netherlands to be sent directly to Paris.97 In June 1707, for example, a large parcel of books was delivered to a Parisian merchant banker, Salomon, who carried them at once to the nearby Hôtel Croissy. La Closure also supplied Torcy’s clerks with an important Swiss publication, Nouvelles d’Italie (News of Italy), as well as a clandestine publication in Italian printed in Milan and subsidized by Prince Eugene and the Habsburg Archduke Charles.98 In early 1707 La Closure enclosed a pamphlet in a sealed packet as if it were a plague bacillus and entrusted it to a special courier bound for Versailles. The first two letters it contained, written in a flat, noninflammatory, conversational tone, observed that France’s government and especially Torcy must be aware that the kingdom was exhausted and could no longer think of maintaining a Bourbon in Madrid. Inevitably, it continued, Austria will occupy Naples and Sicily and then the pope will recognize the archduke as rightful king. The letters made specific demands: that Strasbourg be returned to the emperor and Lille included in any Dutch barrier.99 Few examples of this pamphlet exist, perhaps testimony to Torcy’s vigorous pursuit of any copies that might have reached Parisian bookstalls. Neutral northern Italy was likewise a worry. During the war’s first years Torcy sought to secure French interests there against Imperial troops and propaganda by appointing an extraordinary ambassador to Venice with political clout and loyal to him. That person was Abbé Pomponne, Torcy’s brother-in-law. Nominated late in 1704, Pomponne arrived in Venice via Rome in early 1705 and at once gathered a circle of informants.100 Venice was a well-placed listening post.101 From its ports Pomponne’s agents possessed an untrammeled view of the Adriatic and beyond to the Dalmatian ports, including Ragusa, from whence they gathered news of and tracts from the revolt in Hungary. From the Venetian mainland his agents accessed the mountain passes into the land of the Grisons and beyond to the Austrian heartland and the Swiss valley routes to France.102 Pomponne purchased the services of newsmongers and copyists to edit a newsletter of local and Italian

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events. These were carried over the Alps, on foot, if necessary, in bad weather. Pomponne also employed French galleys visiting the ports of Civita ­Vecchio, L ­ eghorn, and Savona to convey the mail home to the Toulon naval base.103 A lynchpin of Torcy’s early warning system on the eastern frontier was Jean-Baptiste d’Audiffret, a Provencal and former special envoy to ­Mantua. From 1702 French resident in Lorraine, d’Audiffret monitored the mails that passed from Switzerland and the Germanys through the Burgundian corridor into France, hired agents to detect scandalous books entering the kingdom, and even secreted agents into the ducal household. Traveling to Versailles from time to time, in February 1708 he carried recent newsletters and pamphlets from Frankfurt’s book fair and Mainz’s book market. He also passed on duplicates of news gathered in Germany to Rouillé, envoy to Elector Max in Brussels. During the spring months of 1711 d’Audiffret reported that he had learned from his agents in the duke’s household that Marlborough was not only under attack by the High Tories, but by moderate public opinion as well in both Britain and the United Provinces. He continued through the summer to forward anti-Marlborough sentiment from the (London) Examiner and other pro-Tory publications.104 The news of attacks on Marlborough’s character and generalship could not have arrived at Versailles at a more propitious time, since Torcy had just opened peace negotiations with the Tory leadership and welcomed any news of dissention among the Allies. In the fall of 1711 Torcy received what the Tory press termed “an excellent and unanswerable Piece” by Jonathan Swift entitled The Conduct of the Allies, whose attack on Marlborough and the Whigs dripped with vitriol. Torcy ordered d’Argenson to have the tract translated into French at once, and within the week it appeared in the bookstalls.105 In the writing of the history of early modern media, notes Joad ­Raymond, “we create a map where oral, manuscript and print transmission coexist, where commerce and politics need to be understood side by side, where social and intellectual networks are mutually explanatory. The themes of networks, the means of exploiting and controlling news media, and the intersection between public and private shape much of this map.”106 This was the milieu in which the foreign office experienced and interacted with the media. Throughout the war Torcy received tracts of all kinds, printed and copied by hand, from booksellers across Europe, neutral, allied, or hostile. Booksellers often published as well as sold books. The foreign office most frequently patronized the p ­ ublishing houses of Caspart Fritsch, de Bohm, and Renier Leers in Rotterdam;



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Isaac Wallant in London; and Pierre Matteau in Cologne. In France, ­Alibert, a merchant-librarian in Besançon, dealt with Swiss publications. In Paris, Henriques, on rue Bourbon, supplied the foreign minister with Iberian and Italian publications. An independent agent working out of Amsterdam, Jean-Louis de Lorme, was a frequent visitor to Paris. While Torcy was in The Hague in May 1709, he received a visit from a representative of the publishing house of Moet Jing. Renier Leers, chief bookseller of the Rotterdam book trade, like many of his compatriots dealt with anyone who had money. Between 1694 and 1696 Leers had traveled often to Paris to negotiate agreements for the entry of foreign books, including Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire, and thus when war came again, Leers and other Dutch dealers supplied the foreign office with a galaxy of Dutch gazettes and books.107 To ingratiate himself with both the Allies and the French, Leers played informant and at one time tried his hand at brokering peace negotiations. In 1711, just as serious peace parleys were emerging from the cabinets at Versailles and Whitehall, Leers wrote to the Tory cleric Dr Edward Stratford, canon of Christchurch, Oxford, saying that if he desired, he would serve as liaison between the Tory leader and the French foreign minister, but adding that Stratford must be wary, as Torcy was educated in “Popish, tyrannical, and arbitrary principals.”108 Torcy nonetheless found him useful. State surveillance of the book trade required cooperation with Jérôme Pontchartrain. He often consulted Torcy, as when he received a copy of the works of the Spanish Jesuit and historian Juan de Mariana being sold in Paris bookstalls. Alarmed because of that author’s espousal of regicide and recalling that Mariana’s De rege et regis institutione (1598) had been condemned to be burned by the parlement, Pontchartrain requested that Torcy ask the Spanish ambassador to alert the Spanish court and post office to the dangers of Mariana’s works.109 On another occasion Jérôme wrote to Torcy and the editors of the Jesuit journal Mémoires de Trévoux for help in suppressing a printing of an edition of Pierre Richelet’s Dictionnaire made by the Oratorian Père Fabre. Claude Brossette, a lawyer and Jesuit, objected to the Jansenist elements it incorporated and presented a petition to Torcy requesting its condemnation. Jérôme informed the editors that Torcy had expedited the lettre de cachet (see chapter 11) and had, at his urging, instructed intendant Charles Trudaine in Lyon to seize Fabre’s papers. Trudaine confiscated the book’s profits, amounting to 350 livres, and Torcy informed Jérôme and royal confessor Père Michel Tellier that he had distributed the monies to the police and the poor.110

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Domestic pre-censorship was also used to filter out undesirable works. In an acknowledgment of the rules of the game in 1703, d’Argenson assured Torcy that he would not grant permission to publish without the minister’s agreement and would therefore await his decision on the manuscript he was sending him, but Torcy replied that he saw no reason to forbid its publication.111 Torcy cooperated with Chancellor ­Pontchartrain as well in their common battle against undesirable books. Between 1699 and 1704 the chancellor established two committees to act as readers, advisors, and ultimately censors of books that were to be published with the crown’s imprimatur or at least its tacit consent. Many of the fifty-six royal censors were members of Torcy’s brain trust, including Clairambault, Renaudot, and Vertôt. Torcy never became an official censor, but he collected many of the reviewed editions. Even men of the church knew of Torcy’s penchant for clandestine literature. Before he died, Bishop Bossuet gave Torcy the collected works of Swiss reformer Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s successor.112 The final decades of the reign witnessed “a demand for information” from a public sphere wider than suspected by earlier scholars. There was as well an increased interest in and respect for public opinion and in the ability of writers to shape it.113 Torcy and his department thus acted proactively to win over the reading public. Gilles Feyel has pointed to France’s “double information market” under Louis XIV. The Gazette, playing a crucial role in centralizing France, was the government’s official mouthpiece for royal events, detailed noble genealogies, and foreign news, yet it was careful to reflect royal views on diplomacy and war. Reprinted in the provinces for wider distribution, it was free from advertisements, personal and commercial notices (“classifieds”), domestic news, and independent commentary. Alongside the Gazette were the foreign journals printed in French, often in the Dutch Republic, and allowed to circulate freely within France. They offered French readers both domestic news and freewheeling, frequently critical commentary on France’s internal and external affairs. From the 1670s these two sources of news permitted the emergence in France of an informed, critical, and steadily growing public who, as readers, created a synthesis based on both sources.114 According to Brendan Dooley, “Printed news permitted the comparison of accounts in a way never possible before,” and this allowed serious readers to overcome the radical skepticism of the age toward information from authority, whether religious, philosophical, or political.115 Jeremy Popkin reminds us not to mistake a lack of participation in government for a lack of interest in its activities and other



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political news. War touched most lives outside the actual combat zone. Noble families who supplied the officers were concerned with mobilizations and news from the fronts. War finance mobilized wealth from new as well as old nobles, while feeding Mars involved merchants and could affect markets throughout France. Paradoxically, Popkin observes, the small number of decision-makers in monarchical states actually encouraged the reading public to follow the lead of policy-makers in attempting a “rational political calculation” based on knowledge of rulers, ministers, and resources.116 News of the king’s health was also a matter of concern internally and abroad. This information was controlled and carefully packaged for maximum effect and was of great concern to the foreign office, since out-of-commission or dead monarchs disrupted international calculations.117 While the Gazette represented the king’s viewpoint on diplomacy and war, it was not devoid of useful information. Popkin stresses that even in the seventeenth century western Europe was “unique in the pre-modern world” because it “permitted the development of a system that made so much political information available to ordinary citizens, regardless of their social status, at a relatively modest cost.”118 The Gazette, carefully read by Louis XIV’s subjects and by foreigners, was therefore promoted and closely supervised by royal ministers who also contributed to its contents. By Torcy’s time it had become an annex of the foreign office, with Renaudot and Torcy working in close collaboration. The minister fed the Gazette privileged information, while the abbé shared the latest news with him. In addition, Torcy’s clerks censored the journal’s contents. Its re-impression in a growing number of provincial centres gave the propaganda of the foreign office a wider scope and was facilitated by close cooperation between the Gazette and the postal and courier service directed by Torcy.119 Diplomats were among those hungry for political and war news. The foreign office collected complete runs of the Gazette (from 1632) and the Mercure de France (from 1672), but even these were assembled and paginated only with difficulty, given irregularities of delivery and missing instalments. Foreign journals were more difficult to gather in complete series, but from 1691 the ministry kept a full run of the authoritative Gazette d’Amsterdam as a reference tool. Each year was manually and continuously paginated and a subject table prepared of its contents. While tables were mostly focused on foreign affairs, from 1714 and the crisis over Unigenitus, domestic matters increasingly garnered attention. Given the expense and labour required to assemble and

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render a complete collection usable, only this foreign journal received such comprehensive treatment. Still, French diplomats abroad sent the ministry all kinds of other printed material of a political nature, including the occasional journal as well as speeches, proclamations, and laws. These, along with the historical documentation being arranged for easier access, provided a wealth of material for the department’s commis and associated savants and writers.120 The war of words among Europe’s powers intensified during the opening years of the War of the Spanish Succession. To buttress the censorial cordon sanitaire that he was building on the French frontiers, Torcy went on the offensive, unleashing his own propaganda. Editing and production would be demanding, requiring a reliable printer-publisher who could be trusted not to leak information to the gazetteers or agents of foreign envoys and who would undertake the distribution of the tracts in neutral and Allied cities. Torcy sought a writer whose style was even, graceful, and dignified, with the edge of elegance expected by the king and the critical acumen expected by the minister. Since Louis XIV did not wish his ministers of state or his envoys abroad to engage openly in polemical squabbles, considering it demeaning and undignified for a servant of the king, the foreign office fought the propaganda wars covertly. In 1702, with his agent-propagandist not yet chosen and his printers unreliable, Torcy’s first venture into the propaganda wars was a bit amateurish. He complained to d’Argenson of errors in the proof copy, prodded him to recommend a new publisher, and charged him personally with monitoring the changeover to a new press.121 Meantime, following the suggestion of his sister, Madame Bouzols, and the recommendation of the prince de Conti, Torcy selected Jean de La Chapelle, an aspiring diplomat, playwright, and member of the French Academy as his propagandist. Nourished by Torcy’s memoranda and summaries of diplomatic documents, La Chapelle undertook a series of forty-eight anonymous letters entitled Lettres d’un Suisse à un François.122 As wartime responsibilities crowded d’Argenson’s agenda, he informed Torcy that “if you decided that the arguments … [presented in the Swiss Lettres] should prevail, I consider myself obligated to inform you that the inspection of each issue can only be carried out in your office and under your supervision, because only there can one judge what can be said and what must be suppressed.”123 Torcy, along with several of his commis, assumed the supervision of La Chapelle’s work.124 The Swiss Lettres reflected and reiterated familiar themes such as the spectre of Habsburg domination not only of central Europe and



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the Germanys but of Italy.125 They played upon English party and religious divisions, Dutch economic fears that Britain was seeking hegemony in world trade, and Swiss suspicions that, as the birthplace of the Habsburg dynasty, Austria wanted the cantons to return to their former liege lord.126 These pamphlets proved immensely popular in France and annoyingly provocative in Allied weekly gazettes. Queen Anne, who received the English version by penny post, was “much impressed.”127 Torcy also deployed select state documents against the Allies. In a “prologue” to France’s publication of her 4 December 1703 declaration of war on Savoy, Duke Victor Amadeus’s well-known perfidy was held up to scorn. Immediately following this, Torcy arranged the publication of a royal missive to Pope Clement XI warning of Savoy’s treachery and the likelihood that northern Italy’s balance of power would be upset and the Papal States endangered by a dual Savoyard-Imperial incursion  – a prophecy soon fulfilled. Both publications reflected Torcy’s concern for careful documentation, rich elaboration, and persuasive argument.128 These traits were part of what Klaits terms “Torcy’s modernization of the crown’s traditional use of official historiography,” which had been underused for propaganda purposes earlier in the reign.129 These traits reappeared in the composition of the foreign minister’s greatest propaganda coup, which like a phoenix arose from France’s dark hour of military and diplomatic defeat in the summer of 1709. The Allied powers negotiating with Torcy in The Hague demanded such harsh terms that some on that side expected their rejection and rumours circulated that Torcy had been sent to the Bastille.130 Many in France and abroad expected a written response. In London Horatio Walpole wrote to a friend that “a manifesto is preparing to be published through the provinces aggravating ye hard terms ye allies would impose upon the French monarch.”131 After the king and his Conseil rejected the Allied peace offer on 1 June 1709, Torcy put aside his usual preference for private diplomacy, which normally left the French public to speculate on the progress of peace negotiations, even though he always had an ear cocked to hear what “le public” was saying.132 He originally proposed a public manifesto with a full account of the negotiations, but it was reduced to two letters from the king, one to the governors and the other to the bishops, but each for wider circulation. In Torcy’s draft of the governors’ letter, the king offered the public not only a frank report, but a stirring appeal for their support as well. Petitfils contends that the emphasis on ceremony and power at Louis XIV’s court has led historians to overlook this expression of power through information and words. Indeed, Torcy

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took traditional symbols of kingship but redeployed them to portray the king as defender not of his own reputation but of that of his people. This dignified yet emotionally charged letter rejected the Allied demand that Louis join them in driving his grandson off the Spanish throne, declaring such a request shocking to humanity. Torcy had Louis conclude by exhorting his people to even greater efforts, since his extensive concessions had failed to end the war. The separate letter to the episcopal hierarchy, to be read from every pulpit in France, was a direct, personal appeal that accused the Allies of attacking the Catholic faith.133 What made the letter to the governors a departure from the past was its carefully orchestrated and extensive dissemination. The clerks of the foreign office saw to its printing and expedition to the governors in the usual manner of a circular letter, while the governors in turn distributed it widely throughout the provinces. Torcy’s strategy produced a profound and positive reaction as common soldiers, courtiers, and provincials rallied to the king. As one agent reported to the Allies, “I cannot express to you the wrath of this nation against the Allies at the news of their stiff demands and the general joy at the king’s resolve to sustain his grandson, the king of Spain.”134 Yet Torcy’s bold propaganda initiative made some on the Conseil uncomfortable. When the Gertruydenberg peace talks failed the following year, there was resistance to another public appeal and none was made. Even so, the foreign office had shown itself adept at deploying words, diplomacy’s customary tools, to shape and direct public opinion in the civil societies emerging outside and within the kingdom.135

T h e P ow e r o f t h e Post Offi ce Upon Claude Le Peletier’s retirement in 1697, his friend Pomponne succeeded him as postal superintendent. At Pomponne’s death two years later, the commission passed to Torcy, Pomponne’s designated successor. Both Le Peletier and Pomponne had allowed the post office to run largely on its own.136 Torcy, however, like Louvois, who created the Louisquatorzian postal system, took a keen interest in it.137 The post office was essential to the regular flow of official (not to mention private) documents to and from the provinces and abroad, but Torcy was particularly keen on its intelligence possibilities through monitoring international news.138 Although he lost the foreign ministry in 1715, he nonetheless advised the regent on foreign affairs and remained a force in government circles in part because he retained the post office until 1721.139



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Under Louvois’s tenure (1663–91) the system came under royal control and from 1672 was leased out to the “ferme général des Postes” (postal leaseholders) for nine years for an annual fixed payment. The leaseholders then sublet large and small portions to “sous-fermiers” (sublessees) who then sublet smaller parts.140 The Rouillé and Pajot families, prime movers behind the postal leaseholders, held it until 1738 and grew quite rich.141 Under Torcy, however, directors of postal bureaus were appointed by and answered to the postal leaseholders who also served Torcy as “contrôleurs généraux des postes et relais” (controllers general of the postal system and relay stations). From 1695, when death created a vacancy among their number, the remaining controllers, Antoine Rouillé, who with his son Louis Rollin-Rouillé held one position, and Léon II Pajot, who held the other, paid the royal treasury for the right to partition the third office of controllers’ functions to avoid sharing the power they had achieved under Le Peletier’s distant superintendence. Nevertheless, Torcy was in overall charge and assisted by a premier commis for postal affairs, Claude de Prailly, Pomponne’s former household intendant and then guardian of his oldest son and heir, Nicolas-Simon Arnauld de Pomponne.142 There were 770 “bureaux de poste” (postal bureaus) throughout the kingdom in 1700 when the system of subleasing was replaced by one where the postal leaseholders selected the director of each bureau. “Directions simples” (simple bureaus) were in the homes of their directors, who largely worked alone. In the few larger “directions composes” (compound bureaus), like those in Paris and Lyon, a variety of underlings assisted the directors.143 Upon payment of the proper fee (based on distance and weight),144 the bureau sent out deposited letters in packets. A bureau also received the arriving “melons” (packets of letters) for sorting before they were picked up at its window by the addressees. Regional directors supervised groupings of local postal bureaus.145 Postal couriers, nominated to their venal offices by the superintendent and subject to his control and discipline, were supervised by the Rouillé controllers. In 1694 only six postal couriers rode from Paris to the east, so their small numbers were supplemented by “entrepreneurs de dépêches” (outside providers) under contract to the post office.146 Originally a separate service, relay stations (“relais”) provided the indispensable horses. Each relay station was under a maître de postes, sometimes misleadingly translated as “postmaster,” a venal officer until 1692 but thereafter appointed by the superintendent by simple commission. His staff cared for its horses and wheeled vehicles and furnished

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the postilions, who rode the left horse of the team pulling a vehicle. Typically located at the entries and exits of towns, relay stations were costly assemblages of land, buildings, personnel, and horses.147 So vital was this system to the state’s functioning that there was little toleration for dishonesty and inefficiency. The maîtres were closely watched by inspectors who reported directly to the superintendent and were among his most important eyes in the provinces. In addition to their supervision from the centre, provincial postal officials and their establishments were also under the provinc­ial intendants.148 As important as monetary remuneration were the privileges and prerequisites that postal officials enjoyed, including exemption from the taille (the crown’s main direct tax) on the first one hundred arpents of land and from quartering troops or paying for their lodging elsewhere. Most profitable perhaps was the right of maîtres to sell wine and foodstuffs in their relay stations, known to be among the kingdom’s best inns. This hospitality role made maîtres and their wives valued informants for officials locally and at the centre.149 During wartime, Torcy often defended their highly prized rights and privileges from encroachments by other administrators  – for instance, reminding an intendant that the exclusion of the sons and postilions of maîtres de postes also applied to militia service.150 Writing to Rouen’s royal prosecutor, Torcy reported that he had asked Desmaretz to order an end to the prosecution of Rouen’s postal bureau director for not having paid the capitation.151 In March 1711 he requested that Desmaretz exempt the maîtres de postes from paying the new dixième tax, but the controller general wrote in the margin of Torcy’s letter that no one had the right to such an exemption.152 Following Ryswick, Pomponne and Torcy continued and extended the reforms begun by the Pajot-Rouillé clans by ordering the reorganization and extension of the messenger service in the north of France. The central gathering place for couriers was the hamlet of Le Bourget just north of Paris. Here barracks were repaired or rebuilt and a timetable recorded for the arrivals and departures of coaches and couriers traveling south to Paris and north to Amiens, the channel ports and Calais, where packet boats left several times a week for England. In wartime a crucial artery flowed from Le Bourget to Soissons, Rheims, Cambrai, and Valenciennes, then to Brussels, The Hague, and Amsterdam. From Amsterdam a courier could follow a road to Deventer, Münster, Bremen, and on to Hamburg.153 For access to Germany, Torcy reorganized the messenger service that followed the road to Verdun and Metz, known



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as the “Metz alley,” then to Nancy in the Duchy of Lorraine and on to Strasbourg, which after its occupation in 1681 became one of the main portals to Germany.154 Lyon had long served as the central postal bureau for Italian mail. Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, other stations were added to facilitate military communications.155 Torcy and French envoys throughout Italy struggled to keep lines of communication open between Versailles and Rome, a Herculean task that, except for the years 1707 and 1708, they largely accomplished.156 Louis-Léon Pajot served Torcy as the system’s energetic co-­ administrator. Son of Louis II Pajot, one of its two controllers since 1686, he proved to be an ideal collaborator and confidant. When his education by the Jesuits was interrupted by an eye malady that threatened blindness, his tutor read to him from Descartes’s mechanistic philosophy, which affected him deeply. Once his sight was restored, he traveled to Holland where the cabinet of curiosities of the famous botanist and anatomist Frederik Ruysch inspired him to create his own collection, one focused especially on mechanical marvels, which he began upon his return to France in 1698. His collection, visited by such rulers as Peter the Great, earned him an honorary membership in the Académie royal des sciences in 1716. When designated his fifty-year-old father’s successor, he began an apprenticeship that lasted until his father’s death in 1708.157 Although not yet thirty, Pajot, the new comte d’Onsenbray, quickly earned the king’s confidence. Louis entrusted him with several secret and delicate matters independent of the ministers, including helping hide his secret will during his last illness before it was deposited with the Paris parlement.158 In 1698 Pajot remained in Paris rather than move to Versailles, establishing himself in his father’s townhouse near the central post office on rue des Déchargeurs near Les Halles.159 With the aid of his brothers Christophe-Alexandre Pajot, marquis de Villers, and Jean-Baptiste Pajot, seigneur de Dampierre and abbé de Saint-Loup, he reorganized the notorious bureau known to posterity as the “Cabinet noir” (darkened chamber). As superintendent, Torcy kept the list of those whose correspondence was to be monitored, but another minister could request additions by submitting his request through the royal household secretary. Most provincial correspondence passed through Paris for what the leaseholders claimed were financial reasons, facilitating centralized surveillance, although provincial post offices could be enlisted if needed. The Cabinet noir, in an annex to the central post office, was extensive and well organized and quickly gained notoriety for secrecy and subterfuge.

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­ etters were opened, copied, deciphered, resealed, and sent on their way, L which could cause noticeable delays.160 Matthew Prior warned the Earl of ­Portland: “I wrote no plainer, because I take it for granted that all my letters are broke open; it is for this reason that I do not send you word of two or three other things of this kind of which I write to Mr. Secretary.”161 Madame complained to her German cousins that just because “letters are properly sealed does not mean anything; they have a material made of mercury and other stuff that can be pressed onto a seal, where it takes on the shape of the seal … After they have read and copied the letters, they neatly reseal them and no one can see that they have been opened.”162 In the hands a supple, perceptive, well-informed foreign minister such as Torcy, the Cabinet noir became a formidable weapon and was extremely active during his tenure. To divine the designs of foreign powers or those in contact with them, Torcy largely confined his surveillance to political correspondence originating in, entering, or traversing France. Marlborough confided to his wife: “I dare not write anything by the post what I must expect may be seen by the French.”163 Dubois, Torcy’s successor, however, began to pry systematically into the personal and private affairs of the great of the court and capital in order to share juicy gossip with the regent.164 As chief of the Cabinet noir, Pajot was de facto head of a part of the foreign office’s intelligence service.165 In addition, Philip V awarded him the mail contract for the Spanish Netherlands, taking it from the Prince of Thurn und Taxis charged with the Imperial postal system.166 The Dutch observers were probably not surprised to learn that Pajot had accompanied Torcy on his negotiating mission to The Hague in May 1709.167 While Torcy engaged the Allied leaders in peace talks, his diplomatic doppelganger interviewed French and Dutch postal agents and traveled to Amsterdam to meet with friendly bankers and merchants. Godolphin reported indignantly that “the State [of the Netherlands] would not stop the intercourse of letters between the bankers in Amsterdam and those in Paris.”168 On his return from The Hague, Pajot became more deeply involved in facilitating the peace negotiations. Having met the Dutch agent Petkum in The Hague, Pajot offered him his townhouse and hospitality when he was in Paris, which on one occasion was so lavish that it upset Petkum’s health!169 Pestilences of all kinds might impede the flow of mail. When Torcy got word that a “contagion” was ravaging Vienna, he instructed Pajot to alert the maîtres de postes on the Imperial frontier to take precautions to prevent its spread into France.170 He labeled as despicable the armed



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robbery of the mails that increased during war and hard times.171 The north of France, especially near the front, was a breeding ground for robbers. When a postilion from Verdun’s relay station was arrested for theft, Torcy instructed the intendant to hold him until a postal chaise could be sent to transport him to Paris.172 In 1711 Torcy reported to d’Argenson that a contretemps had broken out in the central post office’s chamber where letters were weighed. Insolent words were exchanged, an ink bottle was thrown, an official was accosted, and the post office temporarily closed. Torcy was angry enough to order the miscreants imprisoned in the Bastille.173 In June 1715 a shocking slaying occurred on the route from Paris to Dijon, a route once deemed safe. The prince de C­ondé’s valet, traveling in an official carriage, was stabbed and his servant killed. Although mounted guards were sent from the Versailles garrison, the assassins were never found.174 The minister’s letters could be biting when local officials failed to react promptly to troubles. In his own hand, Torcy reminded Dondell, lieutenant de roi and president of the Vannes présidial, that having corresponded with him repeatedly regarding the murder of two couriers, he expected immediate action. He marked out the traditional closing of “your affectionate servant” on the draft, suggesting that the exasperated minister was no longer either “affectionate” or Dondell’s “servant.”175 During the war Torcy established or refurbished postal bureaus and relay stations, but after Utrecht the reconstruction process accelerated. It was directed both at the postal infrastructure of roads, bridges, postal bureaus, and relay stations, and at the international postal system, for which new postal treaties were negotiated. With one eye on the recent wartime battle against illicit publications oozing across the borders and the other on the current leaking of specie out of France, Torcy proposed (without success) the appointment of ten postal inspectors to serve in the postal bureaus of key frontier cities. They would inspect all outgoing and incoming letters and packages for anything against the interests of the king and state.176 Administrative change did come in September 1715, however, when the regent abolished the post office’s central administration commissions and resurrected them as venal offices. The two controllers, for example, became general intendants and, in the spirit of the Polysynod, joined with the superintendent (now also called “grand master”) in a postal council.177 The grand master’s new secretary, who assisted him by preparing the minutes of meetings and expediting and countersigning his orders, was former foreign office clerk B ­ eauchamp, who maintained contacts with his former colleagues, especially with his

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step-cousin and future son-in-law du Theil. Beauchamp was relieved of his duties in October 1721 when Cardinal Dubois engineered Torcy’s dismissal and assumed his post, but the experienced secretary was reinstated after the cardinal’s death in August 1723.178 Etienne Vincent, “caissier de la Poste” (postal cashier), became the new treasurer in 1715.179 Le Quien de La Neufville’s 1708 description of the postal hierarchy shows that all of the positions named in the 1715 edict were already present and functioning at that earlier date. Indeed, the edict itself implied as much by claiming that its purpose was to take a structure of simple commissions and transform it into one of “charges.” Only then, it continued, would postal administrators have the necessary authority to remedy the abuses and disorder the original commissioners had been tasked with up to 1692.180 Although the move to venality served the government’s pressing need for cash, the edict nonetheless suggests that the postal administration inherited, maintained, and extended by Torcy was worthy of retention and consolidation.

E s p io n ag e : T h e W o r l d of Purloi ned In f o r m ati on In the aftermath of the apparent failure of the Gertruydenberg peace talks, Louis XIV met with his Conseil on 16 July 1710 to decide how to proceed. In his private journal Torcy summarized the assessment of the Allies’ situation: while militarily their position seemed ideal, outnumbering France’s armies and poised on her Flanders frontier, their interior affairs were less favourable because the Maritime Powers were each increasingly short of money and Britain especially was plagued with political infighting and Scottish unrest.181 What permitted such a comprehensive assessment? In a word, what goes today by the name of “intelligence.” How it was assembled takes us to the sprawling topic of spies, informers, adventurers, intelligence gatherers, and propagandists that summons a colourful parade of errant agents, ranging from Protestant preachers to French abbés, Italian counts, Jewish bankers, and papal secretaries, to sexual adventurers, venal journalists, and informers hidden for decades in government bureaus or in a palace entourage or military establishment.182 Although the archival sources yield graphic and often amusing accounts that frequently read more like fiction than fact, these clandestine gleanings were nonetheless considered crucial to the functioning of French diplomacy and kept the foreign office clerks busy sifting and summarizing the countless reports that came in. Writing to



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Bolingbroke in England, Torcy warned of the adventurers across Europe who sold information or misinformation to warring governments hungry for news.183 Intelligence gatherers may conveniently be divided into roughly seven non-exhaustive and overlapping categories: those in the immediate war zone; agents secreted at or near strategic sites; spies on missions; gadflies living at court or in major urban centres; deep-seated spies (or moles); diplomats recruited by a foreign power; and spymasters directing field operations. Agents located in the immediate war zone surveyed troop movements and typically reported to the local military commander. They might be officers suborned by the opposing force, scouts detached from their own headquarters, area natives selling information, or spies specially trained and attached to the military commander’s private corps and paid from his secret purse.184 Agents in the second category, who watched strategic sites such as a port, citadel, mountain pass, river crossing, or narrows leading from one body of water to another, were often amateurs in the present-day sense of the word: shipyard clerks who watched vessels loading and unloading; and postal officials who observed important messengers passing through relay stations, troops moving to or from the front, or mysterious coaches stopping for a fresh relay of horses. The governor of France’s citadel of Sospel in the mountains above the Mediterranean sent agents to observe the passage of Allied troops through the Alpine passes on their way to invade Provence in the summer of 1707.185 Itinerant informers, the third category, often traveled from one country to another and were permanent agents or sold their services by the mission. Nathaniel Hooke undertook missions on the continent and to the British Isles, translating, writing reports and propaganda, and gleaning information for the ministry.186 Toby Bourke traveled about and reported from Spain.187 A mysterious “Sr Printemps” was especially mobile and specialized in military espionage: munitions crossing the Adriatic to Italy from Trieste; Prince Eugene’s baggage and eighty gunpowder-laden wagons gathering at Augsburg, bound for Italy; details from Frankfurt of German troops earmarked for service on the Po; and assorted news from the centre of Allied joint planning at The Hague.188 The fourth category embraced court chroniclers, gossips, snoops, and even outright thieves selling their wares, often with an anecdote or two added to titillate their readers. Daniel de Martine (Martini), a diplomat in Paris, made frequent trips to Versailles to gather tidbits of court gossip for his newsletter read at the courts of Brandenburg, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel, and at Marlborough’s headquarters.189 Abbé Nicolas

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Lenglet du Fresnoy, once employed by Torcy as a book collector and cataloguer, absconded with some manuscripts. Although he was apprehended and the manuscripts returned, Torcy confided to his Journal that a savant and connoisseur he had trusted had ended up a bad character who had turned to espionage and fraud.190 It was, however, the fifth category’s deep-seated agents whom contemporaries regarded as the true spies. It is difficult to uncover their true identities, masked as they were by noms de guerre, ciphered messages, and letter drops. Among those in French service were Zorn in Basel, ­Pastor in Vienna, Vaux in Berlin, and Meyer in Basel and Berne.191 Perhaps the best known of these moles was Abbé François Gaultier in London, who began his career with Tallard in 1698 as embassy chaplain and then remained after his departure, eventually serving the Earl of Jersey and his Catholic wife. Gaultier smuggled information out of London during the war’s middle years and in the summer of 1711 accompanied Matthew Prior to Fontainebleau for secret conversations with Torcy and other ministers.192 Such agents led double or triple lives constantly at risk and played vital roles in the peace process.193 Similar to these but of loftier rank is a sixth category of diplomats recruited from another sovereign power’s service and typically paid subsidies. They and their families might eventually seek French protection or asylum, as did Cardinal Gualterio, recruited by Torcy while in Paris as nuncio; Jan van Brouchoven, Count of Bergeyck, the Spanish Netherlands’ superintendent of finances and a Spanish and French agent; and Baron Karg, the archbishop of Cologne’s chancellor. One of the most celebrated envoys-for-sale was Herman van Petkum, who represented several tiny German principalities at The Hague and whose services were open to the highest bidder, which was usually the Dutch, but later the French. He became an important liaison with Louis XIV’s court during the preliminary talks of 1709 and 1710.194 Those in the last category, the master spies who served spy networks as overseers and paymasters, were typically French diplomats or their secretaries. Openly, they acted as “honourable spies,” uncovering court secrets, but clandestinely they wove extensive intelligence-gathering webs.195 Secretary Jean-Baptiste Poussin, who served in London and then in Copenhagen during the War of the Spanish Succession, procured agents in the Baltic and northern Germany. On several occasions he journeyed as far afield as Leipzig and Berlin to extend his reach.196 During his prewar embassy to Vienna, Villars received over 100,000 livres to hire agents from as far away as Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and



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northern Germany. Bankers in the port of Danzig served as p ­ aymasters for agents in the Baltic-Polish area. During the first years of the war, Villars’s secretary Angelo Piatoni remained the chief French correspondent in Vienna and cooperated with the spy network established in Copenhagen by ­Bonrepaus before he left in 1697 and continued under Poussin.197 ­Bonrepaus reported that he had found a man to whom he could write regularly, code-named “d’Orgemont” and a frequent traveler between Basel and Vienna. Other agents included Jacob Hauser, a merchant in Berlin, and the Imhof brothers, officials in Wolfenbüttel’s court.198 France’s enemies sought to emulate this intelligence system, which was regarded by diplomatic theorists as “superior to any other state in this period.”199 Pierre Rossignol d’Anneville, Torcy’s close friend and frequent correspondent, was an intelligence gatherer whose activities are difficult to classify precisely.200 Born in 1661 into a family of rising Norman lawyers and office-holders, d’Anneville became attached to the C ­ olberts and may have served in the bureaus of the foreign office sometime before 1688, when Iberville was still a commis, which may account for their later close relationship. When Iberville went to Genoa in 1706 as envoy, d’Anneville accompanied him and remained for a year, but then embarked upon further travels to Florence, Venice, and Rome, and visits with Abbé ­Pomponne and cardinals Ottoboni and Gualterio. Lacking credentials or an official mission, but more than a tourist, he gathered information useful to Torcy, the military, and those administrators in provinces potentially affected by Italian events. Unable to proceed to Naples, he nonetheless made valuable contacts, including a papal audience, before returning to Genoa in 1709 to fill in unofficially for Iberville, who had returned home. There he began secret but ultimately stillborn talks with Raphael Sacerdoti, a local Jewish banker who approached him unofficially on behalf of the Duke of Savoy to intimate that he might abandon his allies if France paid his price.201 D’Anneville kept Pontchartrain apprised of maritime matters, recruited spies to go to Rome or Vienna, and did his own spying by hiding in a fisherman’s hut in 1711 to observe the Archduke Charles’s secret landing near Genoa while returning from Spain to Vienna to claim the Imperial crown. Returning to France in early 1710, Pomponne stayed with d’Anneville and reported to Torcy the Genoese’s high regard for him. Although d’Anneville was named chargé d’affaires the following year and upgraded to envoy extraordinary in 1712, his chronic ill health forced the king to permit his return home in January 1713. This Paris sojourn ended in August 1714, but

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on d’Anneville’s way back to his Genoese post, Torcy had him detour to Baden to assist at the peace conference. Once the t­reaties were signed, d’Anneville resumed his leisurely progress to Genoa, but now with the agreeable knowledge that Torcy intended to send him to Mainz as extraordinary envoy. His instructions, however, issued just days before Louis XIV’s death and Torcy’s removal from office, were for naught, and so d’Anneville’s diplomatic career was over. His multiple roles as unofficial and official envoy, tourist, spy, and recruiter of spies demonstrate the permeability of categories related to espionage. Intelligence agents were attached to the foreign ministry and to the war and navy ministries, where they operated at two levels. Armies and fleets approaching one another or armies besieging fortresses required a steady flow of intelligence related to the position, size, composition, supplies, health, and morale of opposing forces as well as the physical contexts in which they might engage one another. Such “micro-espionage” was as old as war itself. At the “macro-espionage” level military spies watched for strategic indicators, such as movements of armies or ships that might signal political-military decisions, such as an impending first strike or the opening of a new front.202 It was especially at this macro level that the foreign ministry’s espionage efforts and those of the war ministry overlapped, sometimes colliding in redundancy and rivalry, but often colluding by sharing information.203 All kinds of information flowed in and out of and circulated within the kingdom. Spies were certainly contributors to this stream, but a good deal of it flowed naturally through the post office, making it in some ways easier for the foreign ministry to manage. The Cabinet noir, affording a window into the content of the mails, helped Torcy and his clerks detect espionage and intercept seditious materials. Regular postal service as well as special cabinet couriers linked the administrative cities of Versailles and Paris with provincial officialdom and embassies abroad. The propaganda machine that developed under Torcy’s leadership also depended upon the mails. Drafts and instructions traveled back and forth between his bureaus and operatives outside the kingdom, and postal bureaus throughout Europe distributed the finished products. All were components in a calculated effort to preserve, arrange, and digest information for the department’s evolving research purposes, to manage its flow abroad, and to block, confiscate, and counter the propaganda and intelligence produced by the pens of publicists and spies employed by France’s enemies. Ambassadors and their staffs abroad were essential components of this information scheme, providing much of its raw



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material and disseminating much of its production throughout Europe. In the following chapter we examine these diplomats with whom the department’s clerks at the centre interacted and upon whose behalf they laboured. We look as well at the diplomatic corps resident in Paris and their interactions with the king and the foreign ministry.

9 Ambassadors in Paris and Abroad

The growing field dubbed the “New Diplomatic History” has challenged and moved beyond the traditional nationalistic teleology and chronology centred on narrating the march toward a modern system of permanent diplomatic representation. Instead, this new approach ranges across disciplines and seeks to embed diplomatic history in the wider cultural histories of which it was a significant and inseparable part.1 Lucien Bély’s work, which offers “an intricate and sensitive blending of social and international history with the history of ideas,” represents this fresh approach at its best.2 This wider perspective shows that diplomacy was only “a privileged aspect of general systems of information-gathering, of representation, and of negotiation” that may be seen as its chief purposes and activities.3 Predictably, gathering, processing, and disseminating information were at diplomacy’s core, since all of its personnel, from the loftiest ambassador to the lowliest clerk and the meanest spy, fed into and off of this complex and extensive circulatory system that nourished the conduct of foreign affairs. The information sent from embassies, however, was quite varied and ranged well beyond chronicling negotiations to include such items as court gossip, factional intrigues, descriptions of public ceremonies, vital events of great families, military preparations, epidemics, weather, food shortages, commerce, and outbreaks of animal and plant diseases.4 Drawing on and adding to this information flow, Louis XIV, like his fellow rulers and states today, represented and projected his power by manipulating symbols and perceptions, as when employing “ceremonial and protocol … as a means of asserting and defending status and interests.”5 Such public occasions were closely observed for what they might reveal about relationships among rulers and states, and indeed were meant to be reported home by diplomats as



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part of the information craved by all foreign ministries. Louis XIV, with Torcy typically at his side, customarily received foreign diplomats in the symbolic splendour of his various palaces, whereas Torcy met them more informally in the same settings, in regular audiences at his Paris home, or in his Versailles bureau and residence to receive and impart information. Meanwhile, outside the kingdom, French diplomats of varying rank, assisted by a variety of secretaries and domestic staff, busied themselves in Europe’s capitals and courts, sometimes with negotiations, but more often with representing their monarch and gathering information and carrying out instructions emanating from his foreign office. The atmosphere abroad could be tense, with locals often suspicious of embassies and their personnel and resentful of their privileges, pretensions, and snooping. Clashes with local authorities were common, and embassies in Paris experienced similar problems that required Torcy’s frequent intervention. Strikingly, even while immersed in wartime diplomacy and tortuous tentative moves toward peace, Torcy and his collaborators acted on their growing interest in producing a more professional diplomatic corps. A significant part of Torcy’s legacy was his short-lived, but nonetheless radical, effort to alter the formation of diplomatic personnel and to better prepare them for their complex vocation.

D ip l o m at ic Audi ences In 1712 Nuncio Cornelio Bentivoglio carried a sealed papal letter for Louis XIV. When he approached Torcy to arrange an audience to convey the letter, the secretary would not allow it, explaining that letters, sealed or unsealed, could not be given directly to the monarch, but had to be read by him first, in the original or in a copy. After opening and reading the letter, Torcy found it satisfactory in certain respects, but when the nuncio once more asked to present it to the king, Torcy again demurred, saying that it first had to be discussed in the Conseil.6 As liaison between visiting and resident ambassadors and the king through whom requests for audiences were made and arranged, it was Torcy’s function to spare his master surprises.7 This door-keeping aimed at shielding the king from foreign ambassadors’ pressure and manipulation and served to keep the foreign secretary apprised of their interactions. As well, Torcy was typically present during a diplomat’s audience with the king. Louis, long wary of diplomats who tried to draw him into inadvertently uttering unintended commitments or revealing secrets, tended to listen more often than talk.8

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Saint-Simon distinguished two types of morning audiences at the king’s bedside between prayers and his attendance at Mass. “Audiences secretes” (secret audiences) were ceremonial and for ambassadors, with Torcy present, whereas “audiences particulières” (particular audiences) were without ceremony and granted to anyone the king wanted to talk to at that moment.9 The Journal of Nicolas de Sainctot (or Sainctôt), introducer of ambassadors from 1691 to 1709, however, reveals a more complex schema.10 Some days or weeks before an envoy first met the king he had an “audience incognito” (incognito audience, so-called because he was still without official standing at court) with the foreign secretary in the Hall of Ambassadors. His “première audience” (first audience) with the king was not a work session, but a public occasion that took place after the royal levee and in the Cabinet where he formally presented the official letters already submitted to Torcy for inspection.11 Upon arriving by coach, the ambassador was accompanied by Torcy and the introducer from the Hall of Ambassadors to the Hall of Mirrors and announced to the king, who, seated or standing behind his table in his Cabinet, sent for his foreign secretary. After they conferred, the introducer accompanied the ambassador into the royal presence and then withdrew. At the end of the audience, Torcy touched the door with the head of his sword to summon the usher to recall the introducer to escort the ambassador out. This process was repeated depending on what other envoys the king received that day.12 Thereafter a resident diplomat was integrated into the court’s social and ceremonial life, dining regularly on Tuesday’s at the grand chamberlain’s table.13 Subsequent audiences in the Cabinet were particular audiences. Louis also granted particular audiences before leaving his bedchamber to attend Mass. They took place at the bedside and within the balustrade that separated the bed from the rest of the chamber. The envoy, again accompanied by the introducer, approached the seated monarch, making three bows, and, after speaking with him in the presence of those household officials and princes permitted to range themselves behind and beside the royal chair, exited with three bows.14 These public occasions, with Torcy typically present, could nonetheless witness frank discussions of diplomatic business.15 What Sainctot terms secret audiences differ from Saint-Simon’s definition. Sainctot’s example is from 1692 when Croissy, without an introducer present, brought the Duke of ­Hanover’s agent-secretary to the king to take his leave and receive a royal gift, whereas the usual “audience de congé” (farewell audience) took place in public and was well attended.16 Not all audiences, however, fit neatly



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into a category. Sainctot describes an audience of complaint given to the Venetian ambassador who came to protest the treatment of his lackeys. Perhaps to show a certain disdain, Louis stood by the window while the envoy spoke.17 Visiting royalty traveling unofficially received a type of secret audience, as when Bonneuil conducted the Prince of Denmark into the royal presence with notables, including Beauvillier and other dukes, as well as the prince’s suite in attendance. While these were not exactly clandestine meetings, the fiction of secrecy allowed a relaxation of ceremony and avoided the distraction of protocol quarrels.18 Less frequent but even more splendid were extraordinary audiences. These were for the extraordinary envoy on a special mission from a state already represented at Versailles or from one with whom France did not normally have diplomatic relations. These took place in the sumptuous Salon of Apollo where the royal throne, placed on a dais, was approached from the Hall of Mirrors by way of the Salon of War. Those few especially magnificent occasions, when the throne was set up at the opposite end of the Hall of Mirrors just outside the Salon of Peace, required the dignitary to traverse the gallery’s entire length to approach the king, as was the case for ambassadors from Morocco, Muscovy, Siam, and Persia. Extraordinary embassies were complicated and costly affairs. Designated notables, usually with the requisite linguistic skills or accompanied by a royal translator, met the visitor at the frontier or the gates of Paris. After residing a few days in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, the ambassador rode in his coach, accompanied by an introducer and a prince of the blood or marshal of France, and followed by the coaches of other dignitaries, including the rest of the princes and princesses of the blood, the foreign minister, and the foreign diplomatic community, to make his official entry before the wide-eyed, cheering Parisians. The envoy and his entourage proceeded to the luxuriously appointed Hôtel des Ambassadeurs on rue Tournon near the Luxembourg Palace. A few more days of preparation passed in this new residence before he was presented to the king in a further display of royal pomp and power. The envoy’s next and last formal audience was also lavish, followed by dinner with high royal officials (but not with the king), a round of informal farewells in the chambers of the royal family, and his departure from Versailles for Paris and his journey home.19 These interactions were governed by varying levels of formality and ceremony with implications for the status and honour of rulers and their representatives, and they frequently resulted in friction, fights, and even the withdrawal of envoys.20 Louis XIV’s court and diplomats were taken

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as models by many, and the volume of works produced by French diplomatic theorists and writers on ceremonial deepened and widened this influence. Yet France had no monopoly on such concerns, as other states also produced models for emulation.21 All of Europe’s courts regarded etiquette and ceremony as ways of ordering the world and making clear its power and honour hierarchies. Far from being rigid, these “rules” were such that each state sought to raise its position in the international hierarchy by exploiting every ambiguity and latching on to any favourable precedent that presented itself while at the same time trying to foil the same manoeuvres by those equal to or below it in strength and influence.22 The grand master of ceremonies and the master of ceremonies23 attended an extraordinary ambassador’s first and farewell audiences, receiving him at the bottom of the magnificent Ambassadors’ Staircase and guiding him to the Cabinet, but otherwise it was the two introducers, like modern diplomatic chiefs of protocol, who on every occasion presented a diplomat to the king.24 The two introducers owned their offices, served by semester, and were part of the royal household, although the household secretary controlled only their remuneration. The king gave them their orders by way of the foreign secretary, with whom they worked in concert.25 Sainctot, who served from 1691 to 1709 during the July–December semester, had a close relationship with Torcy that had begun under Croissy.26 While the minutiae of court ritual were of concern to the foreign secretary, he was too busy to make it his primary focus. Because ceremony and particularly diplomatic observance were grounded in tradition and precedent, Sainctot was keen on chronicling these. In 1698 he wrote Torcy that because he feared that when he died this knowledge would die with him, he hoped to leave an account of his experiences, which he eventually did.27 In November 1698 Louis Nicolas, baron de Breteuil, former envoy to Mantua, purchased the second office of introducer and served the first semester beginning on 1 January 1699 until the end of the reign. When in doubt about some facet of ceremony, he looked to the king, whose memory of such matters was legendary. His predecessor’s jealous widow denied Breteuil his papers, and his colleague Sainctot offered only grudging assistance. This led Breteuil to write a detailed journal from the outset of his service to spare future incumbents a similar predicament.28 Later, Torcy’s clerks consulted and made extracts from it.29 Breteuil’s work began almost immediately with the reception of Jersey’s extraordinary embassy and was followed by the even more complicated and delicate ceremony for the Moroccan ambassador. As his memoirs



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indicate, Breteuil and the foreign secretary collaborated on routine and extraordinary matters alike to assure that all ran in the smooth and precise manner expected by their exacting master.30 An adept introducer could help avert a diplomatic crisis by circumspectly managing an angry envoy, as Breteuil did when the Moroccan ambassador refused to ride in the same carriage with a French official,31 but Torcy and the king might overrule the introducers, as in their 1708 protocol dispute with ­Nuncio Cusani. Torcy claimed that the ruling was based on the records consulted, but given his remark to the envoy in Rome that it would please the pope, threatened as he was by his Imperial enemies, politics likely also played a role.32 Although Torcy met with foreign diplomats individually as needed or, for the nuncio at least, on a regular basis,33 he also inherited his father’s challenging and time-consuming task of receiving foreign diplomats in his Paris townhouse on rue Vivienne. These receptions occurred weekly or even more often, but might also have taken place only once or twice per month.34 In the still-busy period after Utrecht but before the work at Baden was completed, Matthew Prior testily observed that “Torcy come[s] only once a week to Paris to give audience to us fforianers [sic].”35 Accredited envoys once officially received at court needed no formal invitation other than a note announcing that the minister would be “at home.” Other invited guests included French diplomats home from an assignment or preparing for one, senior officials preparing for a foreign tour, and the occasional young foreign prince traveling incognito. When in Paris Minister Pomponne attended these receptions, as did Torcy’s mother, who in the waning years of Croissy’s life had served both as hostess and advisor to the foreign envoys on the practicalities of Parisian life. The Earl of Jersey, who desired a mirror, received a note from Prior that he was with Mme de Croissy, who “promises to take care of the Glace [mirror], the design, and to embark it so … that you have nothing more to do.”36 On selected Sundays she received the wives of the diplomatic corps and on occasion gentlemen like Matthew Prior, a favourite with the ladies.37 However welcoming the foreign secretary and his mother seemed, Torcy, like his father, was careful to screen those claiming membership in the diplomatic corps before admitting them. Shortly before William III’s death in 1701 a Scotsman named ­Alexander Cunningham claimed that he had been sent by the British government “to secure justice … for Scottish subjects of France.” A suspicious Torcy demanded verification of his claim, but when none was forthcoming, Cunningham was no longer welcome in Torcy’s home or at court.38

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These afternoon audiences exuded an atmosphere of relaxed etiquette. Torcy, unlike his father, moved easily among his guests, chatting and relating the latest diplomatic gossip.39 As Prior informed B ­ olingbroke, Torcy was not above confiding to those present that particular matters were “a bit confused.”40 Prior also admitted to his English friends that “I carried my notes [which] I had taken to enable me to speak more particularly” to Torcy.41 Despite relaxed appearances, Torcy or an attendant secretary kept summary notes of the conversations with individual envoys, a practice begun predictably by his information-­collecting father.42 The issues raised ranged widely: Denmark’s ambassador complained that in prize judgments the Swedish king’s recommendations received greater consideration than those from his master; Poland’s envoy demanded a response concerning a confiscated vessel; Tuscany’s envoy again asked for letters of naturalization for the grand duke’s kinsman; Zell’s envoy requested his farewell audience; the nuncio delivered a memoir concerning Avignon; Venice’s ambassador expressed concerns about protocol at the Duchess of Burgundy’s audiences; Spanheim of Brandenburg raised a question about Article 4 of the Treaty of Ryswick; Trier’s envoy requested a royal audience to discuss the church at Speyer; the United Provinces’ ambassador asked about liberty for prisoners of war; Portugal’s ambassador requested a passport; Denmark’s ambassador sought payment of some promised subsidies.43 Sometimes the notes on a particular request stretched to a dozen or so lines, but others were as brief as a few words when the request was routine. These notes were re-­copied into a cleaner and more formal summary record on sheets that were later joined together, the original notes likely discarded. These summaries, despite their formulaic layout, have a rushed quality to them that betokens working lists to remind the minister what issues had to be addressed and when they had been raised rather than formal records for outsiders or posterity. These reminders were especially useful when policy might require that the pacing of replies to queries be as prolonged as possible.44 Perhaps Torcy and his secretary relished most those times when they could record that a reception produced nothing of importance45 to add to their already weighty workload. During his first sixteen months as secretary of state, Torcy received foreign envoys on twenty-four afternoons, usually on Tuesdays. The longest hiatus was between 13 August and 1 October 1697 when the court resided at Fontainebleau. Torcy deemed the distance to Paris too far for him to travel there and return in the same day. Moreover, the minister and the diplomatic community cherished this autumn vacation.46



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A m bas sa d o rs and Embassi es For most Europeans, the most visible of Louis XIV’s foreign ministry personnel were the representatives who served in their capitals, ranging from the glittering extraordinary ambassador to the more mundane resident.47 Although they were accredited to the states’ rulers and were honoured members of their courts, French diplomats also sought to enhance Louis’s reputation and that of his kingdom in the opinion of a wider public that they carefully monitored and reported on back home.48 In addition to offering displays of French power, they accomplished this with a residence sumptuously appointed with the latest French luxuries, lavish entertaining, and levels of tasteful consumption that impressed locals, as it depleted the ambassador’s personal purse.49 In 1698 France had thirteen ambassadors serving in England, Holland, the Empire, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Rome, Venice, Savoy, the Swiss Confederation, and Constantinople, an extraordinary envoy each in Tuscany and Genoa, and a resident in Geneva. As a group, these representatives stood at the summit of the hierarchy of the personnel of the department.50 Although of varying social rank and background, they had in common that they shared the king’s confidence. This was based on a flexible set of criteria that allowed Louis XIV and his foreign secretary to seek the best match of an individual to the circumstances of each post and mission.51 They may be separated into three layers. At the very top, typically serving as ambassadors, the highest diplomatic rank, were those whom contemporaries called les grands or les importants.52 Most often they were from the old sword nobility or the highest military rank.53 This allowed them to wield influence independent of the foreign secretary. They possessed the requisite wealth and prestige to adorn the premier diplomatic posts and represent the person of the king, and most were polished in manner and adroit in conversation as required by diplomatic service at a royal court.54 These dukes, counts, cardinals, and marshals, who boasted ties with the monarch himself or with the great noble court families or the newly arrived, wealthy, urban nobility, contributed many eminent ambassadors.55 Their skill as courtiers, so significant to their diplomatic task of representation, neither guaranteed nor precluded the ability to negotiate, which in any event was the skill typically employed less often than representation and information-­gathering.56 During the War of the Spanish Succession, it was from among these noblemen that Torcy often recruited ministers plenipotentiary for peace congresses and ambassadors for special missions.57 This group included

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high-born foreigners such as the Chevalier Rossi, from an illustrious Perugian family, whom Torcy sent on missions to The Hague and to Rome.58 While jarring to a nationalist outlook, their service is a reminder that diplomats were royal servants who represented a person rather than an abstract state.59 Torcy was better able to place department veterans, Colbert clients, and his own friends in some posts than others. His favourites among les importants included du Luc, a close friend, and Polignac, a boyhood companion, who was recalled from Rome in 1709 to counsel him on the peace negotiations under way in the United Provinces. Although all diplomatic appointments formally passed through the foreign secretary’s hands,60 candidates were suggested and promoted by the king’s entourage, including other ministers, courtiers, and especially Maintenon. The final choice, however, rested with the king. Names of those to be offered an appointment were apparently first announced to the Conseil, either as a formality or to see if there were any strong objections. Torcy then made formal offers, which might be declined for health or other reasons.61 Ambassadorships to Europe’s most important courts, especially when a great name was required or important negotiations were planned, typically offered the secretary less opportunity to place candidates of his own choosing or even liking. The king’s penchant for noblemen, especially military ones, as worthy representatives of his royal dignity and for those in whom he had personal confidence at times required Torcy to work with someone he hardly knew or in whom he had little confidence. Such appointees might also feel beholden to Maintenon, another minister, or a prominent courtier. Torcy mistrusted Harcourt, who had insistently sought a place on the Conseil, and feared marshals Huxelles, Tallard, and Villars because of their close ties with the rival Le Telliers and with Maintenon.62 Yet he kept his likes and dislikes in check so as not to impede the king’s service. A second social layer of diplomats traced their origins to the lesser sword nobility, the robe nobility, and even the upper bourgeoisie, and represented an emerging bureaucratic nobility that often purchased offices such as secretary of the king to enable their ascent.63 Though less exalted in the court hierarchy than les importants, they typically served in the second rank of diplomats as envoys and residents. Under Torcy, they were increasingly named ambassador or extraordinary envoy, or served as special ministerial advisor.64 Among those thus favoured were Rouillé, Callières, Mesnager, and Michel Amelot, councillor of the Paris parlement and ambassador to Spain (1705–09).65 The d’Ussons, an old



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robe family, included the uncle, Bonrepaus, who served on missions to the English, Danes, Dutch, and Baltic Hansa, and his nephew Bonnac, posted to various northern German princely courts (1700–04), Prussia (1705), and, on Torcy’s express nomination, Spain (1711). The Colberts and Torcy’s in-laws, from this and the social layer above it, served France abroad and were Torcy’s valuable informants and close confidants, tied to him by bonds of family, fortune, and loyalty.66 Persons of less exalted social origins made up the third layer of French diplomatic personnel. Their careful selection was critical to the success of a mission according to the consummate diplomat Callières.67 Some posts were permanent, appointed and maintained by the ministry in Paris, such as the royal interpreting secretaries found in embassies in the Levant, Venice, and Switzerland. Although not formally diplomats, they occasionally undertook such missions for the ambassador or even acted on his behalf during his absence.68 There were also chaplains for missions in non-Catholic states such as Britain, the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.69 Secretaries, typically selected and paid by the envoy himself, were not permanent embassy personnel, but tied to the envoy to whom they owed their primary loyalty. These invaluable secretaries managed the copious correspondence that moved across their master’s desk: they opened dispatches from Paris, decoded and encoded letters, and copied outgoing correspondence. They also performed chancellery functions such as delivering passports and other official certificates. On occasion they delivered dispatches to neighbouring courts or to Paris, filled in for their master during an absence or illness, and managed embassy business officially or unofficially as chargés d’affaires upon his death or departure. Peace congress plenipotentiaries, overwhelmed by the volume of clerical work, pooled their secretarial staffs to cope with it.70 Even before leaving France for a mission, an ambassador’s secretaries busily made copies of mémoires to be used on the mission.71 During vital negotiations or when critical news, such as a royal death, had to travel fast, an embassy had its own courier or used other staff as messengers for these expensive land or sea voyages paid for by the department.72 An ambassador’s train included, as well, an assortment of servants, guards, and hangers-on.73 Torcy insisted that all diplomatic personnel perform according to his high expectations, and when they did not, he told them so. His letter to Amelot, former ambassador to the Swiss and ambassador to Spain since 1705, is a model of the gentle, but firm, rebuke. He began by confessing that having since his father’s time admired Amelot’s dispatches, he was

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now profoundly surprised that those now coming from Spain did not match this previous level of factual knowledge. He insisted that Amelot fully inform the king of the state of mind in Madrid, said to be entirely rebellious, since he was in the best position to let the king know the truth of matters there. Moving from this rebuke toward his closing, Torcy added reminders of the ambassador’s long experience and the useful lessons even he had learned from his past negotiations, concluding that he had no need to instruct Amelot in what Amelot knew infinitely better than Torcy himself did.74 In 1709, when France seemingly abandoned Spain for purposes of obtaining peace, Amelot asked to be recalled, but once further harsh Allied demands were rejected and the two Bourbon crowns were again to make war together, Torcy nonetheless resisted the Spanish court’s entreaties for his return. Amelot’s diligence and efficient reforms had stirred up anti-French sentiments in Spain, but perhaps more damning in Torcy’s calculations were the princesse des Ursins’s appeals for his return, motivated, as he confided to his journal, by selfinterest: she wanted an ambassador to serve as her valet rather than to monitor and shed light on her conduct.75 As in the other capitals, diplomats were coveted guests in Paris, where society gathered to converse, offering the curious a slice of the foreign and on occasion the exotic, sharing information drawn from their homeland and from the courts they had visited about events, customs, sights, and people.76 It was this easy and frequent contact with the residents of the capital that caused the foreign minister and the Paris police to take an interest in foreign envoys and their residences. In the first two months of 1701, for example, Jérôme Pontchartrain passed on to Torcy complaints about a charlatan physician harboured in the ­ Mantuan envoy’s house, a street disturbance whose culprits sought refuge in the house of Savoy’s ambassador, and a street closure at the Comédie by the Venetian ambassador’s entourage.77 Such misconduct faded, however, when set beside that of Prince Rákóczi, exiled in Paris. Resident foreign princes presented awkward legal and diplomatic difficulties, but Louis XIV, who had subsidized his revolt against the emperor, had no choice but to receive him and continue his princely pension of 100,000 livres paid quarterly. Not content with this, the prince turned his appropriately named Hôtel de Transylvanie into a gambling den. Although Louis XIV allowed some gambling at Versailles, he did not approve of it in Paris, where prostitution flourished and nobles might gamble away pensions awarded them by the king to help pay their debts. Neighbours complained that the prince opened his household to undesirables. The



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prince’s unbounded ego and unquenchable greed were not easily contained, but the not-so-veiled threats of cutting his pension cooled his interest in gambling considerably.78 No envoy, however, was watched with as much consistency and assiduity as the papal nuncio. In the late 1680s Torcy read intercepted correspondence between Nuncio Ranuzzi in Paris and the papal secretary of state in Rome in which the latter likened Croissy’s harsh remarks to Ranuzzi to those of a brutal African Moor.79 Since the nuncio’s letters had been opened, this observation was likely meant to be read by Croissy personally. Ranuzzi left Paris on 11 August 1689, and in September Torcy, who was in Rome, wrote to his father with the news that during a harrowing journey over the Alps Ranuzzi and his entourage were attacked by bandits and their baggage stolen. It was reported that Ranuzzi feared that his correspondence would be sold to the Allies and published in the Netherlands, but he died shortly thereafter and his correspondence was never found.80 The Ranuzzi affair had marked the nadir in Louis XIV’s relations with the papacy and tensions eased in the later 1690s, but nuncios continued to be watched until the nunciate of Gualterio witnessed a genuine and extended détente.81

T he Ac a d é m ie p o l it iq u e : The Professi onali zati on o f D ip lomacy A diplomatic post, despite its monetary disadvantages, could serve a great noble as a stepping-stone to greater honours.82 Yet from the late seventeenth century, even as diplomats became increasingly aristocratic in their social origins and outlook, statesmen, savants, and diplomats themselves across Europe focused increasingly on the professional training of diplomats in order to equip them with the specialized knowledge and skills required in the increasingly complex international order. To be sure, university training, especially in law, was useful to the future diplomat, but universities were not aimed primarily at training a wide variety of professionals. One would be more likely to acquire such technical training on the job as an apprentice or eventually in elite, specialized academies.83 This was a Europe-wide development,84 but Heidrun R.I. Kugeler’s recent work emphasizes the role of France’s extensive diplomatic apparatus as pioneer and model.85 Talk of the deficiencies of France’s diplomats had become common within foreign ministry circles around the time of Ryswick as the need for men to serve abroad increased. It focused on the training of embassy secretaries, who would

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then be poised to advance in the ranks. Rousseau de Chamoy and ­Callières were active diplomats and part of the foreign office’s brain trust, while Antoine Pecquet fils, son of Antoine Pecquet père, premier commis under Torcy and during the Regency, began as a commis under his father in 1723, succeeded him as premier commis in 1725, and served until 1740. Each composed a manual of conduct for diplomats.86 In September 1697 Rousseau de Chamoy dedicated his L’Idée du Parfait Ambassadeur to Pomponne, who had launched his diplomatic career in 1665 when he took him to Sweden as his ambassadorial secretary. Not much employed by Croissy, Rousseau de Chamoy was appointed plenipotentiary to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon by Torcy in early 1698. He wrote his treatise while serving as a gentleman of the royal chamber, which afforded him plenty of time for reflection. From 1697 it circulated in manuscript form among French diplomats, and it was published only in 1912.87 Callières’s De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains was first printed in 1716, but it may have been written as early as 1697 after the Ryswick negotiations and may also have circulated in manuscript form.88 Pecquet fils may have begun Discours sur l’Art de Négocier as early as 1710, but it was first printed in Paris in 1737, in The Hague the following year, and thereafter in further editions.89 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Noblet and Pecquet père also proposed creating a corps of trained embassy secretaries.90 Like their British counterparts, the French emphasized knowledge of geography, history, comparative government, and language (Latin and modern) in the training of diplomats. Callières adds that “before entering the profession of diplomacy the young man should have traveled to the principal courts of Europe … [I]n certain cases they should accompany the king’s ambassadors and envoys as traveling companions [and] … it is highly desirable that such novices on diplomacy should learn foreign languages.”91 Like most “self-made men,” Callières was both proud of and a bit touchy about his accomplishments, which had exceeded the expectations of his humble birth. He favoured ambassadors who were more like himself rather than those favoured merely by birth, but ever the realist, he settled for measures directed at the professional formation of those advantaged by birth. What Nature may have done in part – for Callières was not ignorant of the positive profits of good birth – nurture would complete and even enhance. He saw that the gap between birth and ability could also be filled by pairing a man of accomplishment and proper formation with a nobleman appointed to a post requiring his high birth and aura of magnificence.92 Ellen McClure argues that



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­ allières, in offering a new version of the monarch and the ambassador C as human actors, envisioned ambassadors who assumed more independence and therefore needed more skill than required in their traditional role as “military heralds, who do not arrive in a foreign court to negotiate but rather to impose their masters’ authority.”93 This traditional view was reflected in the aristocratic Fénelon’s disdain for the professionalism that Callières had in mind and that Torcy, though constrained by the king’s preferences, sought to promote.94 In another passage of his treatise, Callières notes that it would be a happy circumstance if envoys passed through an apprenticeship to demonstrate the “capacity to profit by study and travel.”95 Torcy, who had experienced such an apprenticeship, felt that a school for young diplomats, beginning with those who would serve abroad as ambassadors’ secretaries, would be advantageous to the state. Although reform ideas had been brewing for some time, even before the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Torcy was prepared to seek their realization.96 In 1712, with Louis XIV’s support, he established the Académie politique, which operated in close association with the foreign ministry archives recently established in the Louvre. Without our going into the details of the academy’s genesis, which have been treated elsewhere, it is nonetheless significant that the idea for it emerged and took shape within Torcy’s circle in 1711. Discussions and exchanges of memoirs apparently included premier commis Pecquet père; archivist Saint-Prest; the “braintrusters” Le Grand, Renaudot, and Clairambault; and the diplomat ­Callières (and perhaps Rousseau de Chamoy).97 Six “élèves du Louvre” (students of the Louvre) were trained in the language and documents of diplomacy and housed in the Louvre near the diplomatic archives, the academy’s “laboratory.”98 From that moment, the idea of a school for diplomats has tickled the fancy, admiration, and curiosity of many. Contemporary Joseph Addison delighted in ridiculing the idea, speculating that the school would hire “six wise masters” to teach the pupils the art of “state legerdemain,” that is, “how to take off the impression of a seal … split a wafer … open a letter” without the receiver knowing the missive had been opened; they would also hire a language master to instruct them in “how to distinguish between the spirit and the letter, and likewise demonstrate how the same form of words may lay an obligation upon any prince of Europe, different from that which lays upon” the king of France.99 Despite the Addisonian irony, Torcy’s scheme for the education of diplomats embodied the thinking of a new generation of foreign ministers, diplomatic theorists, and savants across Europe.100

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The negotiations Marshal Villars conducted at Rastadt in 1713 exemplify several of the defects Torcy sought to remedy through professional training. The emperor and his German allies continued to hold out after Utrecht for better terms, hoping that fears for the British and French successions would render Louis XIV more pliable. Prince Eugene advanced to the Rhine, forcing Louis to field an army with Villars in command and empowered to negotiate should this force compel the Imperials to seek peace. Torcy and the king appreciated that the improving though still-volatile military situation could be transformed by a French battlefield or siege victory and were anxious to act quickly if a negotiating window opened. While Villars would ultimately require instruction from Versailles based on the current overall situation – for instance, the extent of any French victory and gains along the Rhine – he was to be prepared to talk concretely with an accredited Imperial envoy at a moment’s notice. This occurred after Landau’s fall and Freiburg’s capture in October 1713.101 Both then and in his later Mémoires, Villars blamed the foreign minister for delaying the signing of the tentative peace settlement that he had worked out at Rastadt with Eugene. Villars claimed that Torcy was jealous of War Secretary Voysin, the marshal’s official liaison with the king, and implied that the pursuit of the Italian interests of the duc de Saint-Pierre, Torcy’s brother-in-law, were “bagatelles” impeding the conclusion of a general peace, as were Max Emmanuel’s pretensions, which he dismissed as mad and unjust.102 Voysin, however, did his best to explain the king’s negotiating stance, to urge Villars to look to Torcy’s bureaus for a draft treaty, and to advise wariness of Eugene during the talks.103 Villars, however, feared that if he did not conclude a treaty quickly, he would be replaced by a professional diplomat, and he suspected that this was Torcy’s design.104 It was not that he lacked diplomatic experience in information-gathering and representation, which were important and constant diplomatic tasks,105 but it may be argued that for negotiations, which if successful won public acclaim and royal rewards, he lacked the necessary patience and subtlety. Meanwhile, the Imperials had discerned the marshal’s faults as a negotiator, starting with his garrulousness. His war weariness and gullibility with regard to Eugene’s bluffs led him unwisely to discard the threat of war’s renewal, reflecting his own inclinations rather than those of the king and his ministers. The Imperials easily grasped Villars’s palpable and inflated ambition to crown his military triumphs with that of peacemaking. Yet especially telling was Eugene’s observation that Villars’s profound unfamiliarity with previous negotiations rendered him timid



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and ­hesitant for fear of criticism by Torcy and the other ministers.106 This was a clear example of why Torcy and Saint-Prest insisted upon the historical dimension of the academy’s curriculum. While the Académie politique was once dismissed or passed over lightly as a curious footnote to a reign that was in its final days Guy Thuillier places it in a wider chronological and institutional context that goes beyond the issue of diplomatic training. He insists that it was something unusual, subversive, and quasi-revolutionary. Likewise, Bruno Neveu, in his introduction to Thuillier’s book, contends that Torcy’s initiative attempted the first true revolution in administrative mores.107 Why such exalted claims for an endeavour that survived the foreign minister by only four years? Thuillier argues that Torcy’s academy was France’s first school of public administration, prefiguring the ena, or National School of Administration (École nationale d’administration) created by Charles de Gaulle in 1945. The idea of a school to train diplomats and even all public servants, while shocking to those who considered birth a sufficient qualification for service, had been raised several times in the previous century. Nevertheless, it was Torcy’s foreign office and its brain trust that brought the idea down to the ground and put it in place. The academy would have been unable to function had it not been for the minister’s active support and even participation in its meetings.108 This institutionalization of the training process for diplomats served to legitimize and enhance their status as experts or possessors of specialized skills and knowledge.109 The academy was pioneering in its idea of careers open to talent and in its pedagogy of instruction through the ancestor of the modern “conférence de méthode,” a kind of seminar used to train administrators in written and oral expression as well as in thinking skills.110 Perhaps the program was too challenging to prevailing notions of birth and decentralized education as paths to state service to survive Torcy’s fall and Saint-Prest’s death. It seems, too, that many students rebelled against the rigours of its training and that concerns for secrecy emerged as well. Ever jealous of Torcy, Dubois dissolved the academy in 1721.111 Yet even after its demise, Torcy’s innovative academy remained a tantalizing model of new possibilities. Nick Childs contends that the club known as the Entresol “carried on the work of the Académie politique, but at a different level,” by mixing older, experienced, and even retired statesmen with younger ones already moving up within the administrative ranks. Torcy and Abbé Pomponne were among its participants. Although not an official organization, the Entresol, meeting in Paris from about 1724, united men interested in political

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discussions ranging from domestic affairs to diplomacy, the most frequent topic. The government closed it down in 1731, mistakenly fearing that it was a centre of opposition.112 Torcy’s Académie politique nevertheless remains a tangible tribute to the administrative ferment, innovation, and accomplishment that marked the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign.113 The professionalization of the diplomatic corps was paralleled by the professionalization of diplomatic administration across Europe, where the French foreign office was often a model but hardly exclusively so.114 From the perspective of those processing the flow of correspondence and memoirs between the court and its scattered embassies, the abilities or the deficiencies of those serving abroad were pleasantly or painfully obvious. Torcy’s clerks likely winced when they opened and read Villars’s letters naively describing how well he and Eugene were getting on at Rastadt. Although not normally themselves diplomats, these clerks had read and heard enough to appreciate what was good and bad practice. In addition, the growing expertise and specialization within the bureaus provided a model of professionalism, as clerks characteristically spent years at their tasks. Secretaries and premiers commis were knowledgeable of multiple facets of the business of diplomacy and the skills it required. At the very least, it was the work of Saint-Prest and his assistants in the archives, along with that of the other clerks, who created the series of negotiations, the summaries, and the archival sources and tools that made the academy’s system of professional training possible. Yet lest we see the foreign office as a self-contained entity that was professionalizing as it directed the kingdom’s international relations, we must recall the realities of Louisquatorzian governance. Although the maturing bureaucracy that had developed during Louis’s long reign handled the business of foreign relations at the routine level, policy was debated and set in a royal council by an active monarch jealous of his prerogative and willing to step outside the normative management structures of diplomacy when it suited his purposes. Predictably, information – perhaps the lifeblood of diplomacy – and its control were often at the heart of Torcy’s defence of his role in foreign affairs and might pit him against his administrative colleagues, the monarch’s secret wife, or even the king himself. We turn next to examine the control of information and the role it played in the formulation and management of ­foreign policy.

10 Information and the Formulation of Foreign Policy

Even as the health of the nearly seventy-seven-year-old Louis XIV steadily deteriorated during June and especially August, ending in his death on 1 September 1715, he nonetheless valiantly attempted to show himself to his court and maintain the regal routines that marked his long reign. Thus, while in pain but still lucid, he met with his Conseil until he no longer could, as August and his own life steadily waned. This was in part a symbolic display of the monarch still taking counsel, as he personally presided over the affairs of state, but for Louis, who from 1661 had decided to forego a first minister and himself rule as well as reign, it was even more a matter of fulfilling his self-chosen role as the state’s chief decision-maker.1 It was remarked at court that the king knew state business better than any of his ministers.2 As he noted in the Mémoires written for his son nearly half a century earlier, through knowledge of his own affairs and contact with his major officials, he wished to signal that “he is actually governing them instead of being governed by them.”3 Setting policy with his councillors at his side characterized how Louis conducted all important state business, but none more so and in greater frequency and detail than war and peace, the twin aspects of the craft of the warrior-king.4 The final decision in foreign policy belonged to the king, but its formulation was the collective responsibility of the Conseil deliberating with the king. It was the foreign secretary’s monopoly neither in theory nor in practice. Yet Torcy was not without his resources in playing a major, if not always decisive, role in this process. The most important arrow in his quiver was control over the information concerning foreign affairs that flowed through his bureaus and, after receiving the ministrations of both Torcy and his clerks, flowed on to the king and his other ministers.5 Louis XIV had long acknowledged his need “of

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keeping an eye on the whole earth” by means of intelligence from the provinces and abroad, especially from the courts of foreign princes  – in short, “of being informed of an infinite number of things.”6 Indeed, Torcy’s skill in gathering and weighing information, typically a diplomat’s most constant and significant activity, was tested more often than his ability to negotiate.7 In this chapter we will explore this significant power source, its extent, its limits, and how it was deployed. Potentially troubling for this arrangement, however, were independent information streams to the king and his council. While many had or claimed to have potentially valuable information on a variety of matters, three individuals stand out as the most serious threats to Torcy’s dominant role regarding foreign affairs information. Mme de M ­ aintenon’s intimate relationship with her secret spouse was all the more significant for being the subject of speculation that frequently overinflated it. Not only was she often present when the king worked individually with a secretary of state, she could share her opinions with Louis in private, she could serve as a valuable and direct conduit to him for others, sometimes seconding what was received officially from his ministers and at other times contradicting it. Although there were limits to her influence, she was nonetheless a force to be reckoned with. Chamillart, a royal favourite, controller general, and then war minister, saw himself endowed with and later burdened by responsibilities that had once been divided between his powerful predecessors Colbert and Louvois. Hard pressed to direct an increasingly unsuccessful war with ever-diminishing resources, he in frustration joined the search for peace. He sent out his own agents and peace feelers without Torcy’s or the Conseil’s knowledge, and opened, with the king’s approval, a potentially important channel of information independent of the foreign minister’s control.8 When this secret du roi of covert royal negotiations outside official channels became known, it was widely regarded as counterproductive and a hindrance to the beginning of serious negotiations. It fed the long-standing picture of Louis XIV alternately practising diplomatic duplicity in order to disrupt enemy alliances and presiding over divided councillors who offered him poor advice. It also planted seeds of doubt as to whether Torcy was the diplomatic voice speaking on behalf of the king and his Conseil, thus unnecessarily complicating his job of seeking peace and conducting peace talks. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, Jérôme Pontchartrain, secretary of state for the navy and household, did not interfere in negotiations and largely left it to Torcy to coordinate them at Utrecht. His interference was in a sphere heretofore largely, although not entirely, the foreign



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s­ ecretary’s preserve: gathering information from abroad and reporting it to the king.9 This and Pontchartrain’s ambition to serve as the king’s secretary general of the administrative monarchy led to clashes with Torcy.10 Despite challenges from these three, particularly since they had the king’s explicit or tacit blessing, in the end Torcy remained the information master for foreign affairs. Yet the struggles along the way were nonetheless irksome and dangerous to the exercise of his duties.

T he D e c is io n - M a k e rs : T h e Ki ng and Hi s Consei l Although serving as the Conseil’s reporter had been largely the foreign minister’s monopoly from Croissy’s tenure, policy-making was a collective enterprise with each minister invited to express his opinion and even debate with his colleagues before the king made the final decision, all done in secret.11 Military commanders and close yet unofficial advisors such as Chevreuse could also influence foreign policy, but the royal ministers, in counseling the king, enjoyed the advantage of knowing most state secrets. These included undisclosed treaties, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence reports, policy papers specially prepared for their eyes only, and detailed accounts of negotiations in progress. All other royal advisors, whatever their influence or credit with the king, operated with the disadvantage of not automatically sharing in this extensive and complex database that typically gave the king and his small Conseil informational cohesiveness even as their interpretations of it and their policy priorities sharply differed.12 Yet even this group, including the foreign minister, could be denied full access to diplomatic information by the king, who remained, in Picavet’s phrase, the chief and centre of diplomatic activity.13 The control of information was likewise at the heart of the formulation of military strategy. Historians once focused on the extent of the 1691 dismemberment of Louvois’s former accumulation of charges to assess the new position of the war secretary. Recent studies, however, concentrate on the altered mode of decision-making signaled by the king’s enhanced personal management of the flow of military information. Louvois had stood between the king and his generals by controlling their correspondence, but Louis XIV decided that henceforth he and his generals would write directly to one another. He also co-opted Louvois’s former collaborators Chamlay and Vauban as his clients and worked directly with them without a minister as a filter to elaborate strategy. As war secretary but never as a minister, Louvois’s son Barbezieux

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dealt mostly with administrative and logistical matters and with his department’s domestic administrative duties. This diminished control over information and relegation to a secondary level of decision-making meant that strategy largely escaped Barbezieux’s influence in all but a supporting role. Retaining his former full access to all of the war department’s information database but now through the king rather than the war secretary, Chamlay played a greater role in strategy formation, as he continued to generate prodigious numbers of memoirs to help the king and his generals each winter as they planned for the coming campaign season.14 If at the level of strategy Chamlay had become the king’s unofficial secrétaire-conseiller politique, then Barbezieux was clearly a secrétaire-commis. Was the situation the same for the foreign secretary? Some argue that after the demise of the “grands vizirs” Colbert and Louvois, the king was mostly served by competent secretaries of state who were nevertheless mere “grands commis.”15 In other words, the secretaries of state, having no role in formulating policy, merely carried it out. But this begs the question of where and how policy was formulated. Military strategy was fashioned by the king in conjunction with Chamlay, his generals, and whomever else he chose to consult. The king, of course, always had the final say, but it was not the case that he ceased involving others in making policy. Jean-Christian Petitfils contends that after 1691 the liasse, or individual work sessions each secretary of state had with the king, no longer served as preparation for business that went before the Conseil, but instead became the place where decisions were made by the king with individual secretaries. He also claims that Conseil meetings became mere formalities, since decisions, with the notable exception of the acceptance of Carlos II’s testament, had already been made outside these sessions.16 This interpretation, however, presents a number of difficulties. It had never been the case that the Conseil, while in theory omnicompetent, acted so in practice, since it was only one of several councils. As we have seen, war strategy was set in informal war councils, domestic matters were typically decided in Dispatches, and fiscal policy was fashioned by the Royal Council of Finances. The Conseil was always a small group of two to five ministers (at most seven with invited royal heirs) who advised the king behind closed doors on the most important and secret affairs of state, which largely meant foreign relations and ecclesiastical matters because they related to Rome.17 This kept them busy enough. Scrutiny of Torcy’s journal reveals that despite whatever preparation and manoeuvring preceded these sessions, it was king in his



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Conseil who still largely formulated foreign policy. Saint-Simon’s 1712 anonymous letter to the king acknowledged this as well, observing that unlike the specialties of the other secretaries of state, foreign affairs were set in the Conseil rather than in the foreign secretary’s tête-à-têtes with the king.18 It also seems contradictory to claim that the secretaries of state after 1691 were mere chief clerks and yet made policy decisions in private and individual conferences with the king. While such one-on-one sessions certainly occurred more frequently in the reign’s final decades as the administration became increasingly bureaucratized, routine or minor decisions had always been made outside the chambers of all councils.19 Moreover, if from 1691 even the major policy decisions were being made by individual secretaries of state acting alone with the king, this would seem to elevate them above mere chief clerks. Indeed, rather than being the more tame secrétaires-commis, they would be the very secrétairesconseillers politiques of whom Saint-Simon and others complained and whom they hoped to eliminate. Although never as powerful as Colbert and Louvois had been, later secretaries of state were hardly impotent in policy formulation. A secretary of state or controller general who also served as a minister had an added advantage in monitoring and advising on any of his department’s business that came before the Conseil, especially the chief foreign policy matters of war and peace, which weighed heavily on all departments of state. A voice at this table could thus count for much.20 After 1691 those so privileged, although not always immediately, were Foreign Secretary Croissy, Controller General and Navy and Household Secretary Louis Pontchartrain, Foreign Secretary Torcy, Controller General and War Secretary Chamillart, Controller General Desmaretz, and War Secretary Voysin, whereas all the secretaries of state for the Religion prétendue réformée, War Secretary Barbezieux, and Navy and Household Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain were never called to the Conseil. Louis XIV was determined never again to have a Colbert or Louvois, but that did not mean that all of his later secretaries of state were simple chief clerks or never aspired to a greater role. For the foreign secretary, as with the other chief administrators, it was his control over information rather than any exclusive decision-making capacity that gave him his greatest leverage in the formulation of policy. Torcy and his staff selected, excerpted, and summarized from the flood of incoming paper and together served as chief conduit of diplomatic data to the royal decision-maker and the ministers who advised him. As Filippo de Vivo demonstrates for early modern Venice, the “control

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over information secured influence and defined power hierarchies” and precluded others from formulating alternate policies,21 which is why the foreign secretary jealously guarded his control over the inflow and outflow of diplomatic information, ostensibly his department’s monopoly since 1626. There were limits to what Torcy could withhold. From the outset of his personal reign Louis was determined that no over-mighty minister would hold all the cards, and so he shared major matters – generally, no matter how secret – with his ministers in order to gain their considered counsel.22 Although he later came to rely largely on just two ministers – Colbert and Louvois – after the latter’s death in 1691 Louis returned to his earlier practice with even greater determination. Perhaps chastened by his unpleasant experience with a secret du roi during the 1706 search for peace, he later claimed not to relish the prospect of these trusted advisors learning from the public things he had kept hidden from them.23 Nevertheless, Torcy and his staff necessarily shaped what the king and his Conseil read and heard by the manner in which they packaged and presented what they had selected, excerpted, and synthesized from the data flow. Moreover, Torcy could come to Conseil sessions with drafts in hand of replies to the materials the rest of the ministers had yet to see or hear him read.24 It also meant that there were some matters the king shared with him but not with his other ministers.25 Yet one would be mistaken to imagine that Torcy sought to keep from his fellow ministers whatever he possibly could; he knew that policy was decided collectively and indeed he welcomed other perspectives for resolving complicated and difficult questions. In January 1711, for example, after gaining only limited clarity by spending the three days since the last Conseil session turning over in his head the pros and cons of responding to secret peace overtures from Britain, he sought out his fellow ministers individually for their thoughts before the next day’s meeting.26 Conflicts with fellow department heads were inevitable, since war, the navy, colonies, commerce, and state finance each had significant international components that drew those charged with them into foreign affairs. This was especially the case with department heads who had the capacity to deploy their own agents abroad or to tap into existing structures to gather information for presentation to the king and his Conseil. A secretary of state with an extensive department who was also a minister was thus the most likely potential threat to the foreign secretary’s hypothetical diplomatic data monopoly. Even ministers without portfolio such as Le Peletier and Beauvillier had their ­networks of ­informants, while the war secretary and minister Louvois



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drew ­intelligence from a number of correspondents in war zones and abroad. But these sources nonetheless failed to match the extensive formal and informal networks controlled and created by the foreign secretary for the purpose of gathering international intelligence. For the most part, even Louvois lacked an organized information service, relying instead on existing structures of military, diplomatic, and other informants who were tied to him personally as clients or who hoped to win his patronage.27 Negotiations were fertile ground for rival information networks. Contact with or control of agents negotiating or seeking such talks allowed a minister to manage what the king and his Conseil knew of the matter in question, since in addition to the letters written to the king and shared with his ministers, there were the private letters that were typically not shared.28 It also afforded the minister a role outside the council chamber in communicating the royal will to that agent and through him to other states. This meant that the foreign secretary did not possess or control the full database upon which policy decisions were formulated, since another held at least a piece of it. Of course, the foreign secretary’s information monopoly was never theoretically or practically achievable, as we shall see, but the issue instead was a matter of scope and scale: how much of the potential diplomatic database escaped the foreign minister’s grasp and just how significant was this information outside his control to his ability to shape diplomacy? The king could also create difficulties for his ministers. In December 1709, as hostilities wore on and peace negotiations sputtered, Louis XIV lashed out at his councillors for the concessions they were recommending to gain peace. Torcy attributed the king’s atypical mistrust of his advisors to the influence of courtiers hoping to replace them and depression over his kingdom’s sad state. Even though he often disagreed with Beauvillier’s stand on negotiations, Torcy nonetheless lauded him in his journal for his courage to tell the king the painful truths Louis needed to hear for his state’s well-being, believing that the king normally appreciated and desired such frankness.29 The following January, after again harshly reproaching Beauvillier, Louis did not spare Torcy, sarcastically commending his speed in the current negotiations when he was normally the slowest of negotiators. Torcy recorded in his journal that he understood neither the reason for this reproach nor why he should deserve it, since he never delayed and in fact usually anticipated the king’s orders, but he stoically observed that since masters never believed themselves to be wrong, he would hold his tongue and try to profit

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from this and the other mortifications to which he said he was subjected.30 When Polignac and Huxelles returned from the failed peace talks at Gertruydenberg that July, tongues wagged at Marly when the king graciously received and spoke with the plenipotentiaries for half an hour without including Torcy. Once more Torcy recorded that he was long accustomed to such treatment from the king, whether it was intended to show Louis’s superiority, keep his foreign minister humble, or take out his anger on him (presumably because of his more even temper) for his weariness with having to woo (“faire la cour”) his other ministers. While a happy retirement might seem preferable, Torcy mused, wisdom and prudence recommended service with patient submission. Perhaps regretting this ill treatment, the king, at the council meeting that followed, proposed Torcy’s brother-in-law Abbé Pomponne as the new ambassador to Spain – according to Torcy in order to please him.31 Fortunately for Torcy, such royal outbursts, if not rare, were at least not the norm and did not seem to threaten his position as foreign minister. The king’s attitude was likely better reflected by the way he spoke to Torcy one day when Torcy came to Maintenon’s chamber to read dispatches to the king. Louis cheerfully exclaimed that he was very happy to have his services and wondered what he would have done had Torcy’s character been other than what it was.32 If Torcy was deliberate in giving counsel and negotiating, it definitely accorded with the king’s normal aversion to “impatience and haste.”33 When Torcy fully entered the Conseil’s charmed circle early in 1699, he received an armless and backless “pliant” (folding stool) that literally granted him a seat at the decision-making table; he no longer had to stand as he had when he had merely been an occasional and largely silent attendee. His role as reporter structured much of his schedule and that of his staff.34 Whether at Versailles, Marly, or Fontainebleau, he rose at about 7 a.m. and consulted his clerks about dispatches that might have arrived in the night, although his instructions were to be awakened for news of great importance so that he could personally supervise its deciphering for immediate delivery to the king. These dispatches were then summarized by the appropriate commis for Torcy to read, mark, and later share with the king and then his Conseil.35 Unlike his fellow administrators, Torcy did not have a regular meeting time with the king; instead, each day he sent word to the king to find out when he wanted to talk with him.36 On meeting days he attended the monarch’s levee at about 8:15 a.m. Either then or immediately after Mass at around 9:15 a.m., he waited upon the king to receive his instructions or to share the



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latest news. Torcy also consulted with the king, who made the final decision on each Conseil session’s agenda, a key means of managing foreign policy discussions.37 Neither the mass of information that arrived and departed daily from the foreign office bureaus nor the Conseil’s limited time, even though it met several times per week, made it possible or necessary for its gathered members to scrutinize all diplomatic information and make collective decisions about it. This was thus a key moment in Torcy’s management of the diplomatic information flow, as he could influence the king as to which issues or aspects of them they could resolve between the two of them and which needed to go on to the assembled ministers. The Conseil typically discussed and charted a general course for all important negotiations, but it was Torcy who was at the wheel steering distant talks as well as those he conducted personally. He informed the king of their progress almost daily and with him made course adjustments as necessary.38 Torcy provided the Conseil with summary reports of relevant diplomatic business at their meetings, but went into greater detail only when larger adjustments and difficult decisions were required. During the king’s individual sessions with Torcy, he might assign a matter to the Conseil for consideration, judging that he and Torcy could not or should not resolve it on their own. In June 1710, for example, after he and Torcy spoke about the Paris parlement’s legal proceedings against Cardinal Bouillon, the king decided that such an important affair should be discussed in the next day’s Conseil meeting.39 Once Louis and Torcy entered the Versailles Cabinet chamber, precedence and protocol ruled the seating pattern. The king sat at the head of the table in a “fauteuil” (armchair) facing the windows.40 On the side to his right sat the Dauphin, with a vacant pliant separating his “tabouret-­ pliant” (square stool without arms or back) from Beauvillier’s pliant, and next to the duke sat Chamillart. On the side to the king’s left Chancellor Pontchartrain sat on a pliant to emphasize that his council rank was not as chancellor, entitled to a smaller fauteuil or tabouret, but as minister. Next to him sat Torcy. When Burgundy entered the Conseil in 1703, he bumped Pontchartrain and Torcy down a place. When later Desmaretz joined as controller general and Voysin as war secretary, the former sat next to Torcy and the latter took Chamillart’s place. The usual pattern of meetings was described briefly by Louis de Courcillon, abbé de Dangeau, Saint-Simon, and at length Torcy, in his journal. The abbé noted that sessions most often opened with Torcy reading from current dispatches and advising the king on how best to answer them. In routine matters the king voiced his approval if he shared

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Torcy’s opinion, but in important matters he sought the advice of the others, with the Dauphin, when he spoke, doing so first. The other ministers read over Torcy’s draft replies to earlier letters to verify that they reflected the resolutions taken in the previous meeting. Torcy recorded these for reference at the next meeting.41 Saint-Simon observed that Torcy “spoke quietly, with restraint, almost modestly, saying only what was required, but saying it well because he had a gift of both oratory and writing. Most often reason was on his side.”42 This format, simply called “the reading,” accounted for at least 80 per cent of the council’s time, but the king himself might report on discussions he had had with ambassadors or other princes.43 In an extraordinary council meeting at the chancellor’s residence without the king in attendance, five ministers decided a matter and the king ratified it in the next day’s session.44 Abbé Dangeau further noted that the Conseil usually met on Sundays, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays when the king returned from Mass until about one o’clock, when he dined.45 Torcy’s journal entries offer a more detailed and precise account of meeting times that corrects this version. The Conseil was convened at most three times a week: Sunday mornings (known as the Sunday or morning council), Wednesday mornings, and an additional meeting on Monday mornings or Thursdays during the war. Over the nineteen months that Torcy kept a journal (6 November 1709 to 31 May 1711), he made an entry for 312 days out of a possible 490 days, recording 113 Conseil meetings and 12 Dispatches meetings.46 His entries reveal that the Sunday–Wednesday axis seems to have obtained throughout these nineteen months, while Tuesday sessions were rare, since Torcy typically held his Paris audience for foreign envoys on that day. When an extraordinary Conseil meeting disturbed the Sunday–Wednesday axis, Torcy took care to note the reason, such as a holiday, the failure to complete the previous session’s business, or the press of diplomatic business. On Thursday 27 February 1710, for example, a special session reviewed instructions for the Gertruydenberg plenipotentiaries. On Monday 14 April 1710, Louis XIV convoked the Conseil to hear the dispatches from Gertruydenberg, but since the king and Torcy had already prepared a response, the deliberation was brief and replies went out the next morning. On Monday 21 April 1710, the council met because Louis XIV deemed it essential to inform the public about the peace negotiations.47 A meeting on Monday 30 June 1710 continued Sunday’s discussion, but because Monday’s meeting of Dispatches also had unfinished business, Secretary of State La Vrillière appeared before that council to report on his provinces and then, because he was



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not a minister, departed so that without being reconvened the Conseil could emerge from the chrysalis of Dispatches.48 Months like those of February and August 1710 appear to be atypical. In February 1710 Torcy noted that he had not written in his journal for several days.49 Then in August he wrote that because the court moved from Marly to Versailles and then back to Marly, the ministers had spent some time in Paris or at their country estates. Another such opportunity came in October.50 The heavy responsibilities of the early stages of peace negotiations in April and May 1711 interrupted Torcy’s entries, causing him to abandon keeping his journal altogether.51 By projecting and making allowances for the days Torcy made no entry, we can estimate that the Conseil assembled at least eight times a month, excepting certain holidays and days that the court was in the country. Croissy had once set forth as a maxim the idea that being a minister meant always being where the king was, which meant that ministers could rarely move far from the royal presence.52 The foreign secretary in particular was in almost constant attendance upon the king.53 Louis XIV insisted on hearing open discussion of difficult policy decisions. To recall the main issues of the debate and the opinions expressed, Torcy recorded particulars in his private and secret journal. It indicates that though he could be petulant, hesitant, aggressive, withdrawn, and even tearful, Louis listened to his council, was usually swayed by majority opinion, but did not invariably follow it. Debate could become heated and at times acrimonious. Certainly factions and partisanship played important roles in council meetings. In the latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, Torcy forged an alliance with his cousin ­Desmaretz that he believed strengthened the Conseil and brought solidity to its affairs. To secure his cousin’s good will and support, Torcy frequently sought his advice.54 When Petkum arrived from The Hague in 1709 with the latest Allied peace overtures, Torcy asked Desmaretz to join him and Polignac in impressing upon the envoy that while France was eager for peace, she was ready to continue the war if necessary.55 Desmaretz was even able to change Torcy’s mind on their negotiating strategy, whereas the other ministers had only confirmed his initial position.56 Above all, Torcy followed Desmaretz’s advice to pursue peace negotiations with Great Britain. Together the cousins formed a néo-politique, pragmatic faction that served as a middle way between the extremes of war or peace, Jansenist or Jesuit, and ultra-Gallican or ultramontane. Moreover, as a result of council discussions, Torcy proved willing to change his mind even concerning his own proposals.57

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As we have seen, in matters of policy, the Colbertian alliance did not automatically extend to the cousin-by-marriage Beauvillier, who annoyed Torcy with his “purer-than-thou” attitude on religion and his foreign policy inconsistencies. Torcy confided to his journal that consciences as pure as those of Beauvillier and his protégé Burgundy were easily wounded.58 Chancellor Pontchartrain, usually allied with the néo-politiques, also favoured moderate Gallicanism, realistic peace overtures, spirited defence of the royal prerogative, and cautious but progressive legal reform. His disagreements with the Colberts were usually over patronage matters.59 Voysin, too, in his early years on the council often supported the néo-politiques. He was an excellent administrator but a neophyte in foreign policy matters and so tended to move with caution. War strategy was not directly a topic of discussion in the Conseil,60 but ecclesiastical matters were, since the kingdom’s Catholicism ipso facto had an international dimension. The Conseil was especially concerned with the defence of right doctrine and the important Assembly of the Clergy meetings. Papal relations had implications for both foreign and domestic policy and were almost certain to elicit a comment, often heated, from the largely anti-Gallican Beauvillier or Burgundy as Torcy jealously guarded his right as foreign secretary to correspond with Rome.61 Louis XIV, playing the role of arbiter, reminded his ministers that he wanted good relations with the pope.62 Cardinal B ­ ouillon, an already troublesome and pretentious prelate, consorted with the enemy in 1710 and then wrote Louis XIV an insulting letter resigning his posts. The government’s reaction revealed an instructive conciliar division of labour. Upon learning that the parlement was initiating judicial action against Bouillon, the monarch had the Conseil take up the affair. The more mundane disposition of Bouillon’s rich benefices, however, was handled in Dispatches, although not without a lively clash between Beauvillier and Chancellor Pontchartrain.63 The foreign secretary’s interest in the Conseil’s discussion of ecclesiastical matters also derived from the fact that the pope, while claiming to lead Christianity and governing the Catholic Church, was also a head of state. As a foreign prince, he possessed two separate enclaves within French borders, the Comtat Venaissin and Avignon.64 Both could harbour French refugees or serve as pawns to be occupied and then returned in the diplomatic game with Rome. Since both were also bordered on three sides by provinces under Torcy’s supervision (Provence and, until 1708, Dauphiné), he had an additional interest in them.



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The papal nuncio was a diplomatic representative and the apostolic delegate to the Kingdom of France through whom all requests for and grants of indults, dispensations, benefice bulls, absolutions, and other papal favours flowed to and from Rome. He also received appeals to the Holy Father from France’s clergy and faithful.65 When the resolution of the Franco-papal crisis of the 1680s permitted the resumption of normal procedures for obtaining papal provisions for benefices, it was Torcy who wrote to all episcopal candidates to inform them that their bankers had not yet come up with the funds to be sent to Rome to complete the necessary administrative processes.66 When a clergyman was raised to the cardinalate, the pope notified him through Torcy.67 Questions about the inspection of religious houses in Paris were Torcy’s concern as well. Based on a request sent by Cardinal Forbin-Janson, chargé d’affaires in Rome, for example, Torcy ordered Achille III de H ­ arlay, first president of the Paris parlement, to select a commission of three judges to visit a Carmelite convent.68 He also worked with Rome on disputes over the naming of bishops to French sees under Allied occupation during wartime.69 Oversight of monies sent to the Roman Curia required that Torcy additionally serve as banker and paymaster. He reminded newly named prelates that they owed money payments to the Roman court for their office. His responsibilities for these matters became a topic for council discussion when Clement XI augmented the papal currency, leading to confusion as to what payments were due and ultimately to their suspension. The king ordered Torcy to assemble the Parisian bankers who dealt with such matters. On 29 November 1709 two of the leading Parisian lawyers and four bankers met in the Hôtel Croissy with Torcy and ­Polignac, newly returned from Rome. Torcy’s personal lawyer, Nouet, and the bankers worked out a compromise by which the French delegations paid the augmentations, though they insisted on a promise that these would be the last.70 Another issue arose in council the following year over the nuncio’s desire to augment the traditional payments made to his servants for benefices granted. The rest of the Conseil, including the normally pro-papal Beauvillier, voted with the king’s assent to instruct the bankers who handled these payments to Rome to refuse to send them. The Gallican Torcy, however, only supported refusing to send the augmentations, arguing that the political fallout from taking on this relatively minor issue made it the wiser course to overlook what he agreed was an abuse by papal agents.71 Nuncios arriving in Paris paid Torcy a courtesy visit even before he was secretary of state. Once in office he met them weekly on Tuesdays.72

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They might discuss issues of war and peace, such as how to limit hostilities in Italy or the pope’s 1708 appeal for French military assistance against Imperial threats. Their most frequent conversations, however, were over contentious religious topics like Jansenism and Gallican liberties, which found their echo in Conseil debates.73 Meetings of the Assembly of the Clergy were particularly worrying to Rome because they might take actions detrimental to the Holy See’s authority. Gathering every five years and with small assemblies meeting in between, these sessions traditionally began on 25 May and typically lasted an entire year. Fiscal matters were their primary concern, including the so-called free gift they always voted the king, but debates in the Assembly on other matters, particularly on Jansenism and the papal bulls aimed at it, could stir up Gallican currents, for which the nuncio was always on the watch.74 Despite his Gallican sympathies, Torcy’s duties required that he take an active role in the intricate and perilous negotiations with the papacy concerning the divisive bull Unigenitus.75 The secretaries of state were members of the greater Conseil du roi and thus served on extraordinary commissions, with Torcy typically on those created to deal with foreign sovereignties or foreigners within France.76 In 1698, for instance, he sat on the commission charged with registering the marriage contract between Elisabeth Charlotte d’Orléans, daughter of Louis XIV’s brother Philippe, and Leopold, son of the Duke of Lorraine. When the duke’s two commissioners arrived at Versailles in late August, Torcy greeted them and led them to Chancellor B ­ oucherat’s chambers. Following formal greetings, the chancellor was seated at the head of the table, while commissioners Torcy and Louis Pontchartrain sat opposite the two Lorrainers. As both reporter and notary, Torcy read the particulars of the contract from the commission’s official journal, presented it to the chancellor, and had foreign office clerks make copies for all the participants to sign.77 That same year Torcy served on Boucherat’s commission to adjust and end the difficulties between Louis XIV and William III over the latter’s rights to Orange. To craft the 1699 agreement, Torcy served alongside Pomponne, Beauvillier, and ­Pontchartrain, assisted by the masters of requests Jean-Baptiste Pomereu, a Colbert client and future intendant of Champagne, and Henri d’Aguesseau, councillor of state on the Royal Council of Finances and Pontchartrain’s kinsman and close collaborator.78 The commission’s solution was ultimately shipwrecked by the Protestant refugee problem, a leitmotif in Torcy’s correspondence with royal officials in neighbouring Provence.79 When the situation worsened with the onset of war, Louis



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used William III’s death in 1702 as a pretext to order the Aix parlement to seize Orange by feudal right because the principality’s authorities had not offered the faith and homage due him as Provence’s count. In a manner reminiscent of the reunions under his father, Torcy and his associates made clever use of the king’s feudal rights to eliminate a worrisome enclave.80 Other ad hoc commissions resolved thorny international disagreements, especially after Ryswick re-established a peace framework. There was, for example, a dispute between the archbishop of Basel and a foreigner in French service. Even though he was not on the commission, Torcy exercised influence through two French ambassadors who were. Christian II, Prince of Birkenfeld, began serving Louis XIV in 1667 after ten years in Swedish and Imperial armies. Obtaining the German infantry regiment of Alsace, he fought with distinction in Franche-Comté and retired in 1696 with the rank of lieutenant-general. Two lines of Palatinate Wittelsbachs had diverged in the mid-sixteenth century: the Birkenfelds were the younger line, while the Neuburgs, who inherited the Palatine Electorate in 1685, the elder. The Birkenfelds were among those Rhenish princes who traditionally looked to France to counter the emperor. In the 1680s Birkenfeld played an important role in France’s dispute with Sweden over the reunion of Deux-Ponts, the personal inheritance of Sweden’s monarch. Louis XIV never forgot Birkenfeld’s support, devotion, and service.81 Extraordinary commissions thus served a variety of ends: to peacefully resolve international conflicts; to advance French interests without war; and to protect and reward faithful foreign clients. All was accomplished with legality and deliberation, or at least the appearance of it. As a member of such commissions or through his men on them, Torcy not only helped shape the decisions they made but also controlled the flow of information from them to the king and his assembled Conseil.

Mada m e d e M a in t e n o n : “Partner, Matri arch, a n d M in i ster” 82 In explaining to Archbishop Noailles why she was mysterious about certain policy matters, Mme de Maintenon noted that the king had imposed silence on his Conseil members.83 To be sure, Louis XIV’s secret morganatic wife was never named a minister and did not usually join in Conseil policy debates, even when they took place within her chambers. Yet her influence with the king, even if difficult to determine with exactness,

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was nonetheless considerable and likely appeared even greater to many because of its uncertain dimensions and its exercise in intimate conversations largely behind closed doors. What gave Maintenon’s influence particular potency, even when it remained potential rather than actual, was her easy access to the king that allowed her to present him with oral and written information in addition to what he received from his chief officials. While not necessarily always working independently, secretly, and at cross purposes with the king’s advisors and department heads, she certainly did so often enough to arouse fears of her influence and interference. Torcy was particularly concerned with any independent, covert actors who might through malevolence, disagreement, or ineptitude disrupt the delicate business of diplomacy. In Paris in 1705 a ditty circulated lampooning the king’s generals. Since it ended up in the foreign archives, Torcy likely saw it, but we can only speculate as to his reaction. Was it amusement at the satirizing of Maintenon and her creatures? Perhaps he felt some satisfaction that his was not among the names linked in the lyrics with hers and assigning her blame for all of France’s ills, but he certainly was not pleased with the circulation of such libelles as the war effort floundered. Tallard and Tessé were ridiculed as Maintenon’s heroes, while the Pontchartrains, ­Chamillart, and Beauvillier were included with the sycophants, false “dévots” (devout Catholics), hypocrites, and flatterers like the Jesuits who were all “à la Maintenon.” The same refrain, the song continued, explained all of France’s disorders, abuses, edicts, taxes, and expenditures, to which the king only lent his name.84 Most writers immediately after the Sun King’s demise endorsed this popular analysis of ­Maintenon’s political role, and historians long echoed it until they moved in the opposite direction, portraying her as without influence and power. Recent research, however, reveals a more nuanced picture of limited but nonetheless great influence, especially in ecclesiastical patronage and in foreign and military policy.85 Torcy thus had cause to step carefully. Interactions between Torcy and Maintenon were characterized by correctness without cordiality in part because of the Fénelon affair. In 1697 Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai and the Duke of Burgundy’s tutor, courted controversy with his adherence to the teachings of Mme Guyon, suspected of sharing some beliefs with Quietism, recently condemned by the Church as heresy. When later that year Guyon’s ideas were formally condemned, the king dismissed Fénelon as tutor and confined him to his diocese. Although the controversy raged on ­publicly until



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1699, when Fénelon finally submitted to her condemnation, ­apparently without f­urther consequence, the publication that same year of his Télémaque criticizing Louis XIV and his rule rendered his exile permanent. M ­ aintenon, Beauvillier, and Chevreuse had all followed Fénelon and Guyon, but Maintenon, unlike the dukes, distanced herself once the king’s strong disapproval of Guyon’s teachings became clear. Yet for a woman of keen intelligence, political astuteness, and consummate knowledge of the court, even Maintenon’s initial involvement in the controversy was inexplicable to Torcy, who distanced himself from her, a traditional ally of the Colberts, and his ducal relatives. But preferring to avoid confrontations, he reluctantly succumbed to Maintenon’s effort to moderate the king’s campaign against Fénelon at the Holy See by reading the king drafts of letters to Rome in her presence.86 Throughout his relationship with Maintenon, Torcy usually sought when possible not to read such correspondence in her hearing.87 Nevertheless, it was correspondence and especially that with Rome that prompted her criticism of Torcy. Maintenon’s insatiable interest in religious and ecclesiastical affairs was driven by genuine piety and the politics of religious patronage. She never tired of advancing the fortunes of her family and those she favoured and often knew in advance about the distribution of bishoprics, superior posts in cathedrals and monasteries, and pensions and livings that were the king’s to give.88 Torcy, too, was interested in these for the sake of the Colberts, his clients (especially those in his department), and foreign prelates in French service. Late in October 1701 Maintenon told Anne de Rohan-Chabot, princesse de Soubise, of her suspicion that Torcy had become increasingly vigilant in his inspection of correspondence with the Holy See. She assured the princess that she had forwarded the petitions supporting her son’s elevation to Strasbourg’s coadjutorship, but cautioned that it would be best if she also cultivated Torcy. Maintenon admitted that although she had sent her recommendation to Rome, she had no idea how Torcy would react or whether he might detain the mail in order to add his own instructions. It was, she advised, prudent for the princess to write to thank him for his assistance.89 Maintenon’s influence could extend to diplomatic appointments, as it had in 1698 in the selection of the prince de Monaco to serve in Rome, and while here too it had its limits with the king and while Torcy was not without resources to frustrate it, Torcy was nonetheless determined to keep an eye on her activities.90 What provoked Maintenon as much as the realization that Torcy had become the watchdog of Roman affairs

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was the knowledge that he was opening her correspondence and doing so with the king’s authority and acquiescence. Torcy kept a list of “suspected persons” whose mail was routinely opened, including not only Maintenon and her close friends, but members of the royal family as well as some in Torcy’s family.91 The correspondence that Maintenon most prized, other than that with the royal family, was that with her old friend Ursins, who at her suggestion to the king had become head of the young Spanish queen’s household and through whom Maintenon imagined she could influence Spanish policy. Official letters to and from Spain, including those between Louis XIV and his grandson, all ambassadorial correspondence, and even that concerning finance and war had to be issued by or at least pass through Torcy, since Spain remained nonetheless a foreign ally.92 However, Maintenon and others in the royal family were permitted to correspond directly with Philip V, Ursins, and others in Spain who might then send, through them, any concerns and complaints, even for the king’s ear, that they preferred not be filtered by Torcy or shared with the other ministers in the Conseil.93 As was well known, any of these letters that went by post or official courier were subject to Torcy’s covert inspection. Maintenon complained to Torcy of this, warned Ursins, wrote rude notes in her letters that he was likely to read, and even sent letters by special messenger. Despite these protests and precautions, Torcy quite often read her letters before they reached Madrid.94 He was nonetheless unable to block Maintenon from knowing and influencing Spanish affairs, for she did so at the king’s connivance, who shared everything with her, even the most secret information, which came from Madrid and from Torcy’s bureau.95 The year 1708 was one of military disasters: the March failure of the Scottish invasion, the 11 July defeat of Burgundy and Vendôme at Oudenarde, and the December loss of Lille and Ghent. Following on the previous year’s relative successes, these reversals destroyed any renewed confidence that the Allies might be forced to accept French terms. The 1708 campaigning season had commenced with another rotation of generals among the theatres, perhaps because “Louis XIV was still searching for the right combination [of generals].”96 By the beginning of 1709 Maintenon was soliciting several generals individually for a wide range of military information and for ideas that would end the string of defeats. She actively promoted Villars as a replacement for ­Vendôme and rejoiced when he was appointed commander in Flanders in March and the detested Vendôme was left in disgrace for most of the next campaign season. Torcy, wary of Maintenon’s interference with



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­ iplomacy, was equally chary of her intrusion into the conduct of the d war. ­Throughout the war he too had sought to build up a winning general who could bring it to a satisfactory conclusion, and he had long supported ­Vendôme, among others, against Maintenon’s favourite Villars.97 Vendôme, no longer in disgrace from the autumn of 1709 and given a command in Spain, acquitted himself well at the Battle of Villa Viciosa (10 December 1710). Torcy celebrated that battle as a turning point in Spain and in the war in general, assuring Vendôme that he attributed the first Allied dispositions toward peace to that victory.98 Later, in addition to the military and diplomatic news he normally passed along, Torcy promised to send Vendôme the horses he needed and, if possible, mules, donkeys, sheep, and grain.99 The Noailles family connection drew Torcy and the king’s wife together in other ways. The old marshal, Anne-Jules, duc de Noailles, who died in 1708, and his wife were the Croissys’ long-time friends and political allies. The new duc de Noailles, Adrien Maurice, Maintenon’s nephew by marriage, was Torcy’s close friend.100 Their correspondence spanned forty years and constituted a running commentary on public affairs and their families. Noailles strongly supported Torcy’s membership on the Regency Council in 1716. In the last days of Louis XIV’s reign, when the clergy were deeply divided over Unigenitus, the ­Colbert bishops, led by Louis Antoine de Noailles, cardinal-archbishop of Paris and the young duke’s uncle, were united against its acceptance.101 ­Maintenon touted Noailles’s generalship, supported his military promotions, and celebrated his ducal honours.102 Partly because of Noailles’s military career, Maintenon followed the progress of military campaigns with the enthusiasm of an ardent amateur. She also looked to him for news from Spain.103 Torcy, however, had a poor view of his friend’s battlefield abilities. Commenting to Vendôme on the contents of a letter from Noailles, Torcy acidly observed that he would find a huge difference between reality and statements on paper.104 Maintenon also championed favourites from her household government, such as Michel Chamillart and Daniel-François Voysin. When first appointed controller general in September 1699, Chamillart was viewed by the other ministers and corporate financiers as an experienced administrator and a moderate reformer. Chamillart became a master of requests in 1686 and in 1689 intendant of Rouen, where he befriended Croissy’s nephew and Torcy’s cousin Jacques-Nicolas ­ Colbert, archbishop of Rouen. Chamillart purchased the office of intendant of finance in 1690, became controller of Maintenon’s household in 1695, and was asked by

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her to submit a general analysis of royal finances, which impressed the king.105 In 1699, when Pontchartrain was raised to the chancellorship, Chamillart succeeded him as controller general.106 On 3 December 1700 Maintenon conveyed to Harcourt the good news that C ­ hamillart had been called to the Conseil. Although she knew H ­ arcourt would share her disappointment that Barbezieux, whose hoped-for membership would further augment her influence, had not also been summoned, she urged patience, seeing it as only a matter of time.107 Fate dealt a different hand when, a month later, Barbezieux died suddenly, but fate relented somewhat when the post of war secretary went to Chamillart.108 Personally, Torcy was and remained on amicable terms with ­Chamillart and his family, but when the war minister started to interfere in peace negotiations, the two ministers began a struggle that ended only in C ­ hamillart’s 1709 dismissal.109 Torcy had foreseen Voysin’s rise, noting in his Mémoires110 that during the 1692 siege of Namur, Voysin and his wife had the good fortune and artfulness to please the visiting M ­ aintenon. Voysin, provincial intendant in the area, and his wife prepared lodgings for Maintenon that quite pleased her. She later rewarded their attentiveness by appointing Voysin her household controller. In 1709 he followed Chamillart as war secretary and in 1714 succeeded Pontchartrain as chancellor.111 Maintenon became fond of the clever, handsome Harcourt, ambassador to Spain just before Carlos II’s death. When he returned to court, Maintenon intrigued to have him made a minister. Louis XIV often consulted him on Spanish affairs, even inviting him in 1702 to make an extraordinary appearance at a session of the normally closed Conseil to debate the pros and cons of Philip V making a tour of his Italian possessions. Unfortunately for Maintenon her creature overplayed his hand in 1709 with a bungled attempt to supplant Beauvillier.112 Although Torcy opposed Harcourt entering the Conseil, he took care not to exaggerate or exacerbate differences between himself and Harcourt’s patroness. Neither Torcy nor Maintenon wished to quarrel openly, since Louis XIV imposed a consistent standard of rectitude on his family and political advisors. He sanctioned competitiveness, discussion, and debate, but not to the point of disturbing his sleep. He expected public decorum. Therefore, ­Maintenon and Torcy muted their comments and even at times joined forces against potential rivals, such as the Jesuits, whom Torcy opposed as enemies of Gallicanism and Maintenon disliked for their support of Fénelon and opposition to Noailles’s 1696 appointment as archbishop of Paris. She felt as well that the king’s Jesuit confessor Père



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La Chaise had misguided his penitent by being altogether too gentle and too forgiving.113 During the worst days of the war and its attendant disasters, ­Maintenon and Torcy shared a passionate desire for peace. Both were appalled by the loss of life among the families they knew. Blainville, Torcy’s cousin and close friend, died in 1704 of wounds inflicted at the battle of Blenheim (Höchstadt), and his brother Croissy, wounded and taken prisoner at the same battle, was again captured in 1710 and later exchanged. ­Seignelay’s son, for whom Torcy served as an unofficial guardian, died in battle in 1712.114 Death crept into Versailles itself. In one terrible week (1705) Beauvillier lost two sons to an epidemic of smallpox.115 The royal family lost two heirs apparent (1711) and one heir presumptive (1712) to that dread disease. In 1709, at the height of the war, Louis and the ministers working with him could hear M ­ aintenon cry out from her bed that France must have peace.116 But while sharing Maintenon’s sentiments, Torcy deftly deflected a suggestion made in January 1710 by Florisson, a Leiden merchant the king had permitted to go to The Hague for talks with Heinsius. The grand pensionary had pressed Florisson to seek out Maintenon when he reported back to Versailles. Heinsius knew that she wanted peace and believed that she had opposed the setting aside of the Second Partition Treaty in 1700. Florisson pressed Torcy for a letter from Maintenon to Heinsius, but as Torcy confided to his journal, he convinced Florisson only with considerable difficulty that Maintenon would not write such a letter.117 Whether he said this after first consulting Maintenon seems unlikely whatever her actual thoughts about writing to the pensionary, but certainly Torcy had no desire to involve her in the negotiating process and could rest content that the king concurred. As the year progressed and possibilities of peace faltered, the king in his Conseil resolved in early August to back Spain militarily. The ministers debated the contours of the renewed relationship with Madrid, with Torcy arguing against leaving it indeterminate and for negotiating a treaty should the Spanish request one. Maintenon complained to many, including to Desmaretz, that Torcy was the head of a pro-Spanish cabal that advocated a Franco-Spanish treaty that would block peace and that he was bickering with Ursins because he had not forgiven her for forcing the Abbé d’Estrées out of Spain in 1703. Miffed with the falsehoods that he said that court cabals were circulating, Torcy had nevertheless resolved not to waste his time confronting them, but when the noise grew to a level that he believed threatened him and, more importantly, the king’s interests, he resolved to act. He wrote to Maintenon for an

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audience, but when a reply was not forthcoming, he went to the king and spoke strongly to him. Three days later, meeting with Maintenon, he repeated what he had said to the king, stressing how public discussion of matters that must remain secret would be harmful to the king’s interests, and it appeared that he won her over.118 Thereafter, his journal reports no further confrontations between Torcy and Maintenon. In fact, in the aftermath of the victory of Vendôme’s Franco-­Spanish army at Brihuega on 8 December 1710, the king, the Dauphin, and Torcy rejoiced, while those who saw Spain as an obstacle to peace were uncertain whether to despair or celebrate. Torcy recorded with likely satisfaction that ­Maintenon, increasingly frustrated by Allied inflexibility, had decided to embrace a French victory no matter where it occurred and was thus indignant when Ursins’s envoy to Versailles voiced her complaint that France was holding back on financial and other support for Spain.119 Yet whether or not Maintenon’s policy views agreed with Torcy’s, she always remained a potential threat to his position because of her proximity to the king and her role as an information link between the French and Spanish courts. In an 8 February 1711 Conseil session, Torcy read a letter from Philip V concerning peace negotiations, but two days later when he saw the king to report on another matter, Louis shared with him confidential pleas from the Spanish king sent in a letter by way of Maintenon. Instructing Torcy to share its contents with no one, the king revealingly asked that he return the letter to him for burning, but only after writing a reply on his behalf.120 Even though Philip sent his missive by way of Maintenon, surely to Torcy’s satisfaction the king made it clear that the more important task of answering it belonged to his foreign minister.

Ch a m il l a rt a n d t h e S earch for Peace In 1684 Charles Le Brun finished painting the vast vaulted ceiling of the Hall of Mirrors, a long gallery linking the Salon of War at one end with the Salon of Peace at the other. With iconography representing the two sides of the coin of foreign relations, two-thirds of these paintings touted the military and diplomatic triumphs of the reign up to that date.121 Yet, as even the flow of these paintings suggests, foreign relations is not a coin with two distinct sides. There is no clear, crisp division between war and diplomacy, nor could there be, since, as Clausewitz famously remarked, “war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”122 Louis



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XIV showed an appreciation of this Clausewitzian connection when referring to the 1661 bloody confrontation in L ­ ondon over ­precedence between his ambassador’s retainers and those of Spain, observing that the latter “believed they had already defeated my armies by this miserable advantage.”123 This was because “a reputation can often do more by itself than the most powerful armies,” but as a “most fragile” possession, it had to be tended to constantly.124 Willing to capitalize on this asset to gain what he wanted peacefully, Louis recognized as well that to succeed, a genuine willingness to negotiate required a matching resolve to go to war if necessary.125 Along with valour, he included “ability in negotiations” among the qualities of a great king.126 Indeed, the Mémoires that Louis prepared for his heir are in part a running account of his triumphant assertion of Bourbon/French interests and reputation, proudly and equally trumpeted whether achieved by force of arms or dint of diplomacy. Rather than seek abstract boundaries between war and diplomacy, we will examine some of the everyday interactions among those who directed these related pursuits, ranging from complete cooperation to opposition and even outright subversion, but more often something in between. ­William Roosen suggests that it was not until the Treaty of Utrecht at the end of Louis’s reign, if even then, that diplomacy became “a substitute for warfare” rather than “simply the handmaiden which prepared the way for war’s arrival, its course, and its departure.”127 As argued in chapter 3, however, even though the two partition treaties negotiated after Ryswick ultimately did not hold, they were nonetheless clearly aimed at using diplomacy to prevent another war. But Roosen is correct in recognizing that war and diplomacy are intimately linked, and even if we cannot disambiguate in practice (and not always in theory) the boundaries between the pursuit of peace and the prosecution of war, each – then as now – was typically the responsibility of a separate government department with functional specialties. Some of these might have been exercised independently and without conflict, while others were carried out in an evolving and complex interplay of dispute and cooperation. A general in the field entering into negotiations, even as he retained command of his troops, was required to keep the king informed directly through the foreign secretary rather than through the war minister.128 This offered an opportunity for administrative border crossing, as had often been the case while Louvois lived but not under his less-­ powerful son who was also not a minister. Barbezieux was kept abreast of the Treaty of Turin’s negotiations in 1696 and worked alongside

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Torcy on some of Ryswick’s particulars the following year.129 He also had his own agents who fed him information and permitted him to make quasi-­diplomatic moves independent of the foreign office. Days before his death and hoping to tie up Imperial forces on the Hungarian plain and make the emperor think twice about war in the west, he sidestepped both Torcy and Ambassador Villars in Vienna to make direct contact with Rákóczi.130 But this was as far as Barbezieux went or was in a position to go. Moreover, just as the conduct of negotiations required knowledge of the war situation, so the management of war entailed monitoring peace talks in order to know what military pressure to exert, withhold, threaten, or prepare for, resulting in a complex and ongoing dialectic between the making of war and the making of peace.131 No matter which secretary sent them, the king’s official instructions to negotiators were first discussed in the Conseil. As we saw in chapter 2, it is necessary to clarify the actual role played by department heads in state business: do they formulate and execute policy or do they primarily carry it out? This section of the current chapter focuses on foreign policy formulation and the conduct of negotiations from the perspective of the participants who controlled the information flow to decision-makers. Competition among those informing and advising the king was part of playing the power game. When Carlos II died on 1 November 1700, chargé d’affaires in Madrid Jean-Denis, marquis de Blécourt, dispatched by express courier an unofficial report to Versailles and the news that Anjou was his heir.132 Having in his haste passed the Spanish Junta’s courier carrying the same news, Blécourt’s fatigued rider fell ill at Bayonne on the French frontier. Harcourt, commanding the troops there who were preparing to occupy France’s treaty spoils upon news of Carlos’s death, had instructions to read official dispatches from Madrid before sending them on to enable him to act swiftly if necessary without awaiting orders. While a new courier made ready to carry ­Blécourt’s packet to Fontainebleau, Harcourt scribbled some quick lines to War Secretary Barbezieux and asked him to share them with Controller General Chamillart. Harcourt urged both to lobby for the will’s acceptance, even though, like Blécourt, at that moment he supposed it to be conditional on an Austrian marital alliance. He reiterated his earlier requests for more troops and asked Barbezieux to deliver Blécourt’s packet to Torcy, since proper procedure required the military messenger to deliver everything to the war secretary first. 133 Harcourt might have acted as he did to expedite military preparations or, if Saint-Simon is correct, to allow Barbezieux to be the first to inform the king.134



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When Harcourt’s courier arrived at Fontainebleau on 9 November 1700, he went first to Barbezieux, who then forwarded the diplomatic pouch to Torcy. Armed with Harcourt’s note, however, Barbezieux went straight away to the king, then meeting with the Council of Finances, to share the momentous news and cheat Torcy of the honour. Barbezieux’s gambit goes unmentioned in Torcy’s later Mémoires, although perhaps pointedly, he highlighted his own adherence to proper procedures. Nevertheless, the ploy provoked a quarrel between the two that did not escape the ever-watchful court.135 Yet Torcy could hardly pause to focus on this slight, although in the future he sought to preclude its repetition.136 In any event, the foreign minister’s rival in information flows died suddenly on 5 January 1701 as the dogs of war were straining to slip their bonds and unleash the havoc of Louis XIV’s mostly costly and dangerous conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–14). It took just over a year and a half after Louis XIV accepted Carlos II’s testament in November 1700 for the English, Dutch, and Austrians to coalesce and finally declare war on the Bourbons, but once war finally came, on 15 May 1702, it initially “shook confidence in French military preeminence.”137 Peace feelers were not entirely absent during the first few years of fighting, but as hostilities dragged on and France’s fortunes and friends seemed to fade away, an increasingly weary monarch, from 1705 to 1706, more earnestly sought to negotiate peace on the best terms possible.138 The ebb and flow – and mostly ebb – of his armies’ battlefield fortunes largely determined how much Louis was willing to concede, but France’s deteriorating position only emboldened the Allies to demand more than the king felt he could sacrifice.139 When it seemed that France could fight no longer, Torcy himself journeyed to The Hague in 1709 (April–May) bearing extensive concessions, to which the Allies, regarding Louis as exhausted and desperate for peace, added provisions requiring him to help them drive his grandson out of Spain and to do so in two months or the proposed truce would expire. After lengthy deliberation, the king and his Conseil, including Torcy, rejected The Hague preliminaries as beyond what France could reasonably yield.140 With resolve rebounding against such arrogance, the weary kingdom put forth fresh efforts to defeat or dismember the Allied coalition, which paid dividends with Britain’s 1711 open defection from the Grand Alliance. Looking back in his later Mémoires on the long years of negotiations that had finally led to the opening of the Utrecht Congress in 1712, Torcy piously reflected: “Who could have foreseen at that time that the prosperities of an alliance so formidable to France and Spain were at an end; that the

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Supreme being who fixes the boundaries of the ocean, and calms, whenever he pleases, the impetuous fury of its waves, should immediately stem the torrent of so many [Allied] victories; that before two years were expired, those victors, so proud, and so intoxicated with success, should be confounded in their devices.”141 To the kingdom’s friends and foes alike, including Torcy, another factor, whether providential or not, was the fall of War Minister ­Chamillart in June 1709, ending his interference in the peace process.142 While it is beyond the scope of this book to narrate and analyse all the negotiations that brought this ruinous war to an end, we will explore those peace initiatives from 1705 through 1709 in which Chamillart intruded into Torcy’s control of diplomacy and the flow of diplomatic information to the decision-makers of Versailles. We will examine the war minister’s motivations and mode of operation as well as Torcy’s responses and methodology. Clear differences will emerge in how they conducted diplomacy. The foreign minister employed multiple but coordinated channels of contacts and “pourparlers” (talks), eventually narrowing them to a peace-producing negotiation, whereas the war minister undertook negotiation initiatives that, because they took place outside the normal management system of diplomacy, were uncoordinated with those of the foreign ministry. Torcy’s own agents were already jealous of one another’s access to his ear or to assignments to carry proposals to the enemy, but he largely kept them under control through the apt soothing word or stern reprimand. Chamillart’s agents, however, were both outside the foreign secretary’s control and encouraged by the war minister and his assistants to oppose or even subvert Torcy’s operatives, referred to as “vos compétiteurs” (your competitors).143 Agents thus worked knowingly or unwittingly at cross purposes, which generated confusion at home and uncertainty and mistrust abroad. Those operating outside the system were deprived of its experiential and informational base and thus were limited in their own perspective. At the same time, they robbed the rest of the diplomatic system of insight into their piece of the kingdom’s foreign policy. Consequently, both parties operated in partial darkness, which led inevitably to missteps and stumbles and damaged the work and morale of the foreign minister, his staff, and diplomatic personnel abroad. The foreign office’s coordinating role was a critical aspect of “diplomacy as a bureaucratic system,” comprised of the complementary elements of “permanent or semi-permanent embassies, but also a directing office enjoying institutional continuity.”144 Such extrasystem diplomacy, because it compromised the work of the “directing



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office,” was harmful enough when pursued without the king’s knowledge, but when permitted or even authorized by the monarch, it could prove toxic to the conduct of foreign policy and the monarch’s reputation abroad, no matter what short-term gains it might yield. Did the king know of Chamillart’s initiatives? And if he knew of or even authorized them as personal diplomacy, then when and for how long? Why did he pursue such a risky course? Although it would be anachronistic to brand the king’s actions interference, since as sovereign he was free to negotiate through whomever he pleased, bypassing the normal structure was nonetheless fraught with danger.145 When Controller General Chamillart, a minister since the previous November, was named (8 January 1701) to replace the late Barbezieux, Torcy was intent on avoiding skirmishes over turf. In a project drafted that summer for a diplomatic and military mission to the German principality of Wolfenbüttel, Torcy specified that the head of troops write to Chamillart only about matters that concerned war and address all other letters to him. Optimistically but tellingly, he added that thus far the two secretaries had not wanted to usurp one another’s functions, unlike those who had preceded them.146 The ensuing months of coalition-­building for the looming war intensified Torcy’s collaboration with the king.147 ­Callières believed that a small number of capable and carefully placed diplomats could “with a small expense do frequently as much service as standing armies … because they know how to employ the forces of the country where they reside, in favour of the interests of the Prince whom they serve.”148 Without a war and with lingering hopes that one might be avoided, Chamillart was initially preoccupied with planning and preparation, but once war came, coordinating it on multiple fronts opened a wider space for him through daily interactions with the king as the minister responsible for both war and finance. When military means failed, ambition and this double burden drove him to seek peace through diplomatic initiatives apart from and even in competition with the foreign minister. Even prior to his search for peace, Chamillart clashed with Torcy over Spain.149 Louis XIV wrote his grandson frequent letters and significantly influenced Spanish affairs, but it was Torcy who drafted them and who read and consulted with Louis on those from his grandson. Given their quantity and varying degrees of importance or controversy, Louis could not have seen all or every part of the letters written in his name.150 Of course, Torcy could not venture far from what he knew the royal will to be, but he still enjoyed latitude in many details and in

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r­ elatively minor matters. This correspondence ranged beyond diplomacy to address domestic and military affairs in Spain and its ­possessions. French ­ambassadors in Madrid were in constant contact with Torcy and through him with the king and others in his government. Representing an Allied state as well as the head of the Bourbon dynasty, their extensive domestic intervention frequently irked the independent-minded princesse des Ursins and fed Spanish resentment against French influence.151 The king instructed Chamillart to channel his contacts with Spain through the foreign office, which the war minister found irksome. Chamillart’s client, the financial reformer Jean Orry, had to send his proposals through the ambassador to Torcy, who read them to the king and shared them with Chamillart and then relayed their responses back to Spain.152 Chamillart acknowledged this arrangement, albeit with undisguised irritation, in a 6 September 1703 confidential memoir to Torcy, but as war on the Iberian peninsula seemed more likely with Portugal’s defection to the Grand Alliance (16 May), Chamillart pressed for an adjustment to permit Orry, the French ambassador, and the Spanish war minister to correspond directly with him on war matters. He argued that an ambassador writing directly to the war minister on matters of war was analogous to the established practice of generals at the front corresponding directly with the foreign secretary when conducting negotiations. Labeling it novel and quite singular that Philip V needed to be led in governing his monarchy, he was even more troubled by foreign office control of the information flow to and from Spain, no matter what ministry it concerned.153 Torcy’s shorter response of the same day reiterated what he had apparently said in their discussion the previous day: he was not opposed to Orry or Spain’s war minister writing directly to ­Chamillart concerning war and reminded him that he had himself written Orry only when the war minister had asked him to. He insisted, however, that during his and his father’s twenty-four years in the foreign office the king had always ordered his ambassadors to report on all matters directly to the foreign secretary and to him alone. He did not believe that it was his intention to change this, but invited his colleague to talk to the king if he thought otherwise.154 Information, particularly understood in its context, is a critical asset in administrative turf battles. Unlike Torcy, who had traveled widely, including in Spain, Chamillart was untraveled and lacked personal knowledge of foreign courts. Moreover, as described by Paul Sharp, he did not share the diplomat’s outlook: “For most people, international relations involve the parties they are between and the issues they are about.



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How they see and order these shapes their ways of seeing international relations. For diplomats, in contrast, it is the conditions of ­separateness that provide the distinctive site or space from which diplomats see the world, and from which a diplomatic tradition of international thought emerges to make its own distinctive sense of the resulting relations.”155 Chamillart shared the disdain of Spain’s culture, institutions, and people common at court and among Frenchmen in Spain, but which Torcy cautioned against.156 To gain his own supply of Spanish news, the frustrated war minister increasingly cultivated his own informants.157 He often relied on French commanders for intelligence, but since they were also nominally part of Spain’s military, as “foreigners” they wrote to Torcy as well.158 Other informants briefed both ministers. The Irishman Colonel Toby Bourke, a keen observer in Madrid from 1705 ostensibly as James III’s representative but in French pay, wrote both regularly.159 From strategic posts on the sea or frontier, Torcy received general news as well as detailed reports on the flow of men and matériel to Spain that helped him grasp the wider strategic picture as he sought to influence Chamillart, the king, and the Conseil in policy formulation.160 He wrote Gramont, former ambassador to Spain, to ask him to help persuade Chamillart to maintain French military ascendancy in Spain, since nothing, he insisted, would drive the Allies toward peace more than Spanish loyalty to France.161 Under Chamillart’s successor, Voysin, war secretary from 10 June 1709 and minister two days later, Torcy continued his active role in Spanish affairs. Vendôme, sent to Spain to command the army in 1710, was instructed to write to the king through Torcy, who acted as reporter when the Conseil discussed such strategic matters as his proposal to besiege Barcelona in 1711.162 The foreign secretary was also in active communication with the other French commanders in Spain when they acted in a diplomatic capacity and shared in the Conseil their reports of military operations when they came through him.163 In his analysis of Heinsius’s military role during Louis XIV’s last two wars, John M. Stapleton, Jr, employs a useful model also applicable to Torcy’s involvement in military matters. The model posits four levels of military activity: the political or policy level, encompassing war aims as “influenced by the state’s understanding of the war’s causes, its conduct, conclusion, as well as its consequences”; the strategic level, focused on “the deployment of the state’s military resources to achieve those ends”; and the operational and tactical levels, which “encompass military decision-­making on the theater or even unit level.”164 Considering these distinctions, it appears that Torcy operated at the levels

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a­ ppropriate to a foreign secretary. In discussions and debates in the Conseil, he assisted the king in formulating war aims and strategies to realize them and then adapting both to the fluctuating circumstances of war, finance, ­diplomacy, and contingency (for example, the unexpected death of key dynastic figures, such as the Grand Dauphin and Emperor Joseph I in April 1711 and the Duke of Burgundy the following February). The ministers promoted and questioned campaign strategies, proposals for troop allocation among the fronts, and diplomatic schemes for moving the enemy to the peace table and signing a settlement.165 Yet most military matters were outside the Conseil’s control. Not only did the king have the final word, but the constraints imposed by distance, time, changing circumstances, and chance meant that field commanders were never mere executors of plans crafted at court. Rowlands notes with reference to the king and his military advisors at the centre – specialists ­Chamlay and Vauban and marshals and officers at court – that if there was a “Cabinet strategy,” it was more “a system of coordination than one of domination.”166 Field commanders used suggestion and other subtle means to bring the king to their viewpoint. Such military voices increasingly carried more weight than the war minister’s in strategic discussions.167 Although the Conseil was kept current on developments at the fronts, its members were even more removed from the operational and tactical work of the war and navy secretaries, since once policy and strategic decisions were made, it was inappropriate for ministers to interfere in their implementation. The 1708 Franco-Jacobite expedition to invade Britain illustrates the complex interplay of diplomacy and war and shows no evidence that Torcy interfered in operational and tactical matters; indeed, he left them to the experts. Although English diplomats generally assumed that Louis and his ministers were unswervingly devoted to the Jacobite cause, relations fluctuated because neither partner really trusted the other. From the early 1690s Louis’s ministers grew increasingly disenchanted with and even hostile to the Jacobites, faulting their intelligence reports, reliability as allies, and value to French interests. Torcy especially feared leaks from the Jacobite court. The French populace revered the Stuarts as Catholic martyrs, and Louis XIV felt a kingly kinship with James II and his dynasty. Yet while Louis favoured a Jacobite restoration and was often more willing to aid their cause than his ministers advised, it was not usually at the price of French interests.168 Callières had inherited from his friend Renaudot responsibility for Jacobite affairs, advising and assisting Torcy from 1702 to 1708. Earlier attempts to win support



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for a joint operation to restore the Stuarts and/or drive the British to the bargaining table had failed, but in January 1705 the idea attracted renewed interest as a means of taking pressure off the Moselle front. Callières and his friends Nathaniel Hooke and Chevreuse lobbied on behalf of an expedition, and Hooke went to Scotland to gauge local support; but more pressing matters in Flanders sidelined the project. In 1706, seconded by the nuncio Gualterio, they again lobbied Torcy and the other ministers, but after France’s defeat at Ramillies, with no hope of success. Early in 1707 Hooke again returned to Scotland to test sentiment for a rising, and upon his return, he, Callières, and Chevreuse drafted a proposal that both advocated for an invasion and planned it out in detail in hopes of winning over a skeptical war minister. After discussions in the Conseil, the king’s reluctance was overcome only in December 1707 when Chevreuse enlisted the duc de Noailles to persuade Maintenon to intervene. With strategy set, Navy Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain, excluded earlier from Conseil discussions for reasons of secrecy, joined the operational planning. Though Torcy was actively involved at the level of policy and strategy, his participation receded once the invasion was decided upon and operational and tactical planning was taken up by the war and navy secretaries. Unfortunately for French and Jacobite hopes, the expedition that finally sailed from Dunkirk on 6 March 1708 ended in failure.169 But let us return to the time before the War of the Spanish Succession formally erupted. Prior to Torcy’s Wolfenbüttel mission draft proposal, offered in August, Mars was already on the march. Imperial troops invaded Italy in June 1701, and negotiations at The Hague, turning from peace to war, fashioned a new Grand Alliance (signed 7 September 1701) of the Dutch, England, and Austria, even though anemic efforts toward peace sputtered on up to and even after the formal Allied declaration of war in May 1702. The end of the 1703 campaign saw vague and unsuccessful approaches to Heinsius.170 By then, however, most diplomacy was directed at securing additional allies or neutralizing the aloof.171 The first serious peace talks began in 1704 and would sputter on for nearly seven years. The Allies, vindicating their tentative assault on Spain, captured Gibraltar (5 August). In Germany they defeated the French at Blenheim (13 August), ending the threat to Vienna and forcing Bavaria’s evacuation. Louis XIV was now at least open to hearing proposals from Dutch peace advocates, who were long anxious to restore their commerce and apprehensive of their domineering English ally and

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commercial rival. In October 1704 Mollo outlined their fundamental conditions to his old contact Callières: satisfy the royal ­ambitions of Archduke Charles, assign the Spanish Netherlands to a prince friendly to the Republic, and guarantee Dutch commerce.172 Eventually receptive to Callières’ urgings, Torcy had lieutenant-general Yves, marquis d’Alègre, operating at the end of February 1705 under Villars in the Moselle valley, call on Duke Leopold of Lorraine to request “that he would use his interest with the Allyes to get there [sic] consent that he might be allowed as mediator.”173 Upon the recommendation of his trusted friend Iberville, France’s resident in Geneva, Torcy tapped Louis Du Puy Saint-Gervais, a Huguenot avocat in exile in Switzerland with ties to the Republic, for a secret mission.174 In The Hague from March 1705, Du Puy’s only mission was to approach the different factions and gain agreement on the means of conducting future talks, but after individual discussions with Heinsius and Godard Willem van Welland (Weyland), Utrecht’s pro-peace deputy, Du Puy was finally put on notice that the Dutch felt bound by treaty to procure the whole Spanish monarchy for the archduke. With neither side willing to make the first offer, discussions stalled, but on the eve of Du Puy’s departure in early April, Welland assured him privately that after conferring with twenty of the Republic’s principal cities, the consensus was that the Spanish succession had to be partitioned along the lines of the Second Partition Treaty. Marlborough later (4 May) confided to his close colleague Lord Treasurer Sidney Godolphin that Du Puy’s presence had been unsettling because many Dutch provinces were in such financial straits that even war supporters despaired of fighting on and he feared the growing peace party eager for French proposals. Well into the summer, while Marlborough fretted, Du Puy wrote Heinsius in hopes of reigniting talks.175 Anxious to reprise his role in promoting the pourparlers that had eventually ended the last war, Mollo wrote to Callières that the peace party was open to a partition and suggested (28 May) Naples and Sicily for the archduke and the Spanish Netherlands for the Bavarian elector or the Duke of Lorraine (if the latter, France would receive his duchy). Intrigued, Callières included these proposals in a May mémoire urging an approach through the Dutch, who he believed could be satisfied with their former West Indian trading privileges, a friendly prince to the south, and a kingdom for the archduke. He and his friend Saint-Simon promoted this proposal with the peace party, Beauvillier and Chevreuse, and with Chancellor Pontchartrain and Chamillart, although the last two saw partition as unlikely. Undeterred, Callières resisted negotiat-



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ing with Mollo by post and suggested face-to-face talks. Mollo agreed (22 July) but indicated that any decision must await the States-General’s approval, which by 13 August was given.176 Even before the Dutch agreed to talk, Louis XIV’s Conseil discussed the hoped-for secret negotiations, and it was likely that Chamillart recommended at that time the Dutch-born physician Adrian ­ Engleburt ­Helvétius for the mission. The Leiden-trained Helvétius was a distinguished man, a naturalized French subject who lived in Paris, and a physician to the Orléans family. In 1701 he had saved Beauvillier’s life when Chevreuse rushed him to his bedside after Guy-Crescent Fagon, the king’s first physician, had given up hope. Helvétius had also attended to ­Chamillart, to whom he had sent a long mémoire the previous year urging that French interests not be sacrificed for Spain. In addition, ­Helvétius had the credible cover of an annual pass to the United Provinces to tend to patients, including his father. Whatever reservations Torcy may have had about employing the war minister’s close associate, it seems unlikely that he could have raised them given Helvétius’s obvious plausibility. Moreover, his mission was not to negotiate but to test Dutch sentiments and convince them to send someone to Versailles or elsewhere for secret talks to be based on the terms of the Grand Alliance’s 1701 treaty: guarantees for Dutch commerce, a barrier in the southern Netherlands, and satisfaction for the other Allies that would require some partitioning of the Spanish monarchy.177 Helvétius arrived in The Hague on 20 or 21 September,178 but after disappointing covert conversations with Gouda pensionary Bruno Van der Dussen, his intermediary with Heinsius and Amsterdam pensionary Willem Buys, H ­ elvétius sent Chamillart a copy of his 2 October 1705 report to Torcy. Normally the war minister’s discussion of diplomacy took place with the king and Torcy in the Conseil with the other ministers, so when Dangeau noted that for the evening of 2 October Chamillart worked in Maintenon’s quarters with the king and was joined twice by Torcy (and this prior to the arrival of Helvétius’s letter), it struck him as unusual, though he was unaware of the atypical involvement of both ministers in this mission.179 Helvétius wrote that the Dutch were suspicious of his lack of a commission to discuss specifics and of the other French agents who had been talking peace with Dutch citizens during the past year, including after he had received his passport to leave France. They suspected that these initiatives were meant only to sow discord and exploit divisions in the Republic. Hoping to be France’s only agent to work with the Dutch, Helvétius proceeded to disparage Mollo, his contacts, and all other channels allegedly emanating

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from the foreign office.180 Torcy’s reply ten days later contained soothing expressions of confidence but was unyielding to the physician’s reiterated requests for further instructions and official negotiating p ­ owers.181 Frustrated, he complained to Chamillart (23 October) that he felt little support from Torcy.182 Three days later he informed Torcy of the angry refusal of Heinsius and his colleagues to talk further until Louis XIV sent a fully empowered emissary. Torcy replied on 5 November that the king would accede to this Dutch demand. Helvétius lingered in Holland, hoping to be named that negotiator, but finally left before Christmas when the Dutch made it clear that he should go.183 Marlborough thought that peace talks were premature.184 Fears of furtive negotiations for a separate peace circulated among the other Allied diplomats, leading the Imperial envoy to plot a nocturnal raid on Helvétius’s rooms in the residence of Willem Nieupoort, his friend and long-time correspondent, to seize his papers, but the Dutch authorities uncovered and halted it.185 Was there any substance to these charges of multiple and contradictory initiatives emanating from the foreign office?186 On 6 November 1705 Dreux-Louis Dugué de Bagnols informed Torcy of a warning from The Hague that the Dutch were complaining of hearing from too many apparently discordant would-be negotiators.187 Torcy’s archivist SaintPrest subsequently made a lengthy summary and analysis of correspondence extracts concerning the United Provinces from 1700 through March 1706 for internal use and acknowledged that there had been a “foule” (crowd) of French negotiators.188 But did they originate from the foreign office? To answer, we must examine each in turn. On 21 June, Marlborough shared suspicions with Godolphin that the purpose of the visit of Brussels papal internuncio Giovanni Bussi to The Hague was to deliver peace proposals. His peace mission, however, was to the United Province’s Protestant majority on behalf of its Catholic minority, who were suspected of overeagerness for peace with France, while his negotiations with the Republic concerned his unpopular measures backing the Jesuits against the Jansenists in the Dutch Catholic Church.189 As part of another alleged foreign office initiative, Helvétius named LieutenantGeneral Alègre, captured on 18 July. Alègre, a prominent courtier whose daughter had been married (unhappily) to Barbezieux, was known to the Dutch for his spirited but unsuccessful defence of besieged Bonn in 1703. Granted leave by Marlborough in early August to return home, he departed only some weeks later after discussing peace with Dutchmen who then commissioned him to sound out Louis XIV on terms.190 Yet these discussions were originally communicated to Chamillart, owed



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nothing to foreign office directives, and originated in the R ­ epublic at the initiative of war-weary burghers.191 Helvétius reported that ­Dussen claimed that another such approach came in September from Abbé SaintRemy, former tutor to the son of Briord, French ambassador to The Hague (1700–01). However, the abbé’s initiative more likely resulted directly or indirectly from Chamillart’s actions rather than Torcy’s instructions.192 Although it was perceived that these initiatives all originated with Torcy and were part of his negotiating strategy, this was not the case.193 In Helvétius’s 5 August instructions Torcy himself acknowledged that individuals, either with the king’s tacit consent or merely acting on their own, had approached the Dutch. Two months later Alègre’s instructions repeated this, adding that none of them had received from the king instructions or authority to make proposals. While Helvétius swallowed the Dutch spin on this as French dirty tricks aimed at dividing the Allies, Torcy knew that the Grand Alliance was already deeply divided. He was more concerned that such uncoordinated multiple approaches only prolonged the war by making France appear desperate for peace. He understood that fear of French might and yet the expectation that “fragile France” was about to fall united the Dutch peace and war “parties” behind the necessity of “no peace without England,” as J.G. Stork-­ Penning has phrased it, since even those most anxious for peace were willing to prolong the war rather than break with the ally they felt they could not do without. As Torcy instructed Helvétius, his goal was not to dissolve the Alliance, but rather to encourage one of its members to take the first step toward a peace that would realize the goals of its 1701 treaty. He sought not to divide the Dutch but to unite them in recognizing the dangers posed by growing Austrian and especially British aspirations. As Torcy presciently observed, if Britain found it to her advantage, she would be the first to talk peace with France.194 Although open to almost any avenue that might end the war, he cautioned Helvétius that the prospect of winning peace attracted all sorts of would-be negotiators, and suggested that without careful coordination these would create damaging impressions abroad.195 Torcy’s disavowal of responsibility for the “crowd” of negotiators was consistent with his preferred manner of operating. But was this true of the initiative that overlapped with Helvétius’s mission? On 27 July 1705 Governor General Max Emmanuel signed the ratification for the “Articles and Conditions” that would regulate the contributions (a kind of protection money) exacted from Spanish

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Flanders by Allied troops raiding across the frontier. The lead negotiator was Flemish nobleman Louis van Haveskercke, Baron van L ­ ichtervelde, alderman and former mayor of Bruges, and deputy of the Flanders Estates, who met with Dussen in the second week of July. Bagnols, intendant of Flanders and the Spanish Netherlands, and ­Rouillé, French envoy to Elector Max in Brussels, who had sent Haveskercke, also instructed him to raise the issue of peace. Bagnols had written Torcy about the proposal Haveskercke would carry to The Hague, and the baron apparently had with him a letter from Torcy referring to what Bagnols had sent him. Haveskercke had also been briefed on the correspondence between Mollo and Callières, which suggests that even if this was not a mission authorized by the foreign office, Torcy was nonetheless careful that it not conflict with his other initiatives. Heinsius was apprised of the proposals when he met with Dussen and Haveskercke on 29 July. Utrecht deputy Welland also talked with the baron and thought that while he had support from France, he had no official authorization, although Haveskercke assured him that Torcy would sign one. The terms Heinsius passed along to Marlborough on 15 August for comment were the following: a Dutch-garrisoned barrier in a Dutch-­protected southern Netherlands republic, paid for by the south; a rollback of French trading rights in the West Indies to pre-1700; Naples and Sicily for the archduke; Milan to the Duke of Lorraine (his current duchy to France); recognition of Anne as queen of England; and satisfaction for Portugal and Savoy.196 Whereas Marlborough and Godolphin, to whom he forwarded a copy, both repeated the English mantra of “no peace without Spain” for the archduke and rejected any partitioning, Heinsius raised the possibility of satisfying the archduke by adding Milan to Naples and Sicily, albeit without optimism for its likelihood.197 Exchanges between Buys and Heinsius indicate that they and other leaders had favourably received the baron and hoped to introduce him to ­Marlborough. Since Haveskercke had gone back to Brussels, Heinsius and others were anxious to have him return for further discussions.198 Although ­Marlborough assured Godolphin on 2 September that despite appearances Heinsius was “intierly [sic] in the intirest [sic] of England,” he nonetheless proposed to disrupt any movements toward peace in concert with “our friends” in The Hague.199 At the beginning of September the Haveskercke channel went dry, not because of English obstruction, but because of mutual agreement in Paris and The Hague to parley directly through an agent from Versailles, which again shows Torcy’s preference for synchronized approaches.200 Haveskercke’s mission and instructions



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had originated in Brussels, but while Versailles was informed beforehand and had, as Torcy phrased it, given tacit consent, Louis XIV and Torcy nevertheless retained a degree of deniability because it was not officially authorized.201 When Helvétius’s instructions were issued on 5 August, the Brussels initiative was still active, but as far as Torcy was concerned, Haveskercke’s role had ended before the Dutch sent Helvétius’s passport on 7 September and he arrived on the 20th in The Hague.202 Peace feelers might be many, but Torcy’s preference was for actively negotiating through one channel at a time – and one firmly under his control.203 Since Helvétius’s mission was to see if official talks were possible and Torcy would not appoint him to conduct them for fear that negotiations and information about them would escape his control, he needed an emissary who reported only to him. He found this person in the chevalier de Croissy’s friend Alègre, whom he had previously sent secretly to Lorraine and who was presently in France on a sixty-day leave with a mission from the Dutch peace party. Dangeau recorded the curiosity that on 10 September 1705 Alègre was the only “courtier” invited to Marly, unaware that he was there to confer with the king and Torcy on the Dutch peace feelers and was soon invested with full powers to carry proposals to Heinsius and, if possible, Marlborough. Although initially a paroled officer dealing with Chamillart, Alègre was now clearly part of Torcy’s team and, unlike Helvétius, coordinated his efforts with those of the foreign office’s contact Mollo while in The Hague.204 Torcy’s proposal (6 October 1705), the first since the onset of war to officially countenance a partition, offered the following: to Archduke Charles, Bavaria; to Max Emanuel, the Two Sicilies; to the Dutch, a strong barrier and sovereignty over Upper Guelders and Limburg; to Britain, guaranteed trade with Spain and her colonies; and to Philip V, retention of Spain, her overseas empire, and Milan. Alègre was also to probe Marlborough’s peace sentiments delicately and, if positive, promise him a royal “gift” of two million livres for playing peacemaker.205 Whereas Helvétius had been unable to see Heinsius directly, once Alègre finally reached The Hague on 28 November, he soon met with Heinsius, Buys, Dussen, and others, and did so often.206 Unfortunately, his proposals and alternatives pleased no one. Torcy reminded him that he was dealing with difficult people and authorized additional concessions, but to no avail. Rejecting these offers as insufficient, especially for Archduke Charles, the Dutch nevertheless declined to make counteroffers.207 Discussions, in trouble from late December, largely ended when the Dutch accused Versailles of deceitfulness in conducting s­ imultaneous

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peace talks, citing as evidence a January letter from Helvétius to ­Nieupoort.208 While it is unlikely that Torcy had re-authorized the physician as his agent, the Dutch were under pressure, Marlborough having urged Heinsius from London to hasten Alègre’s departure for confinement in England, “for his stay at The Hague makes a noyse [sic].” Here he was referring to Parliament’s discomfort at rumours of secret negotiations. While some in the United Provinces were ready to talk peace, most there and in England were not.209 At Torcy’s behest Du Puy returned to The Hague from Geneva in April 1706 to follow up on Alègre’s mission. Sicco van Goslinga, Frisian deputy to the States-General and field deputy to the army, had long known Du Puy. From their conversations, Goslinga believed that France was sincere about wanting a reasonable peace, but he thought that Allied demands were excessive and doubted that Marlborough, whom he called ambitious and greedy, wanted peace. Although others in the government agreed with him, most leaned toward the self-serving English position that all French talk of peace aimed only at splitting the Alliance.210 While disappointed, Torcy looked to Tessé’s substantial army and naval expedition that was assembling to recapture Barcelona, consoling Alègre with the hope that its success would decide more than all the propositions they could make.211 Unfortunately, the siege failed and the road opened for an Allied advance on Madrid. Matters worsened after battles at Ramillies (23 May) and Turin (7 September), when France lost the Spanish Netherlands and then northern Italy. These accumulating woes gave rise in 1706 to what Bély describes as four networks and channels of negotiations, two emanating from the Spanish Netherlands and two from France. Count Bergeyck, Philip V’s administrator of the Spanish Netherlands, extended peace feelers on his own to Dussen well before Ramillies. Torcy learned of them after the battle from Rouillé, and Bergeyck subsequently consulted him on alternative proposals, but by summer’s end this channel was dry.212 Torcy also had to deal with the semi-­independent diplomacy of the Bavarian elector in Brussels. Feeling increasingly sidelined, Max opened a channel to Marlborough in mid-July to address his own interests at the expense of France. Rouillé was drawn reluctantly into conversations with Max, who pretended that his peace proposal actually came from Marlborough. By September this path had proven unproductive, but Torcy and the king kept it open as they waited to see how things developed with parallel proposals under direct discussion with the Dutch.213



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Adding to Torcy’s chagrin, of the two channels directly connected to Versailles, only one flowed through the foreign office. Managed by Callières, this channel was in response to word from Mollo that Dutch republicans remained anxious for peace on the basis of the Second Partition Treaty, which would remove Philip V from Spain but leave him with Naples and Sicily. It bore no immediate fruit and earned Callières and Mollo a strong word of caution from Torcy owing to intelligence that their enthusiasm for it was making it seem a firmer offer than it was.214 The other channel originated with Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux, a former ambassador to the Dutch (1678–88 and 1701) with long-established ties with anti-Orange republicans. Disparaging approaches to Marlborough and the English, he convinced Chamillart that the path to peace lay through the Province of Holland’s republicans. The previous winter d’Avaux had introduced Chamillart to Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin, who was in Paris on business. In early July they entrusted the Dutchman with a message for Heinsius, first cousin of Hennequin’s brother-in-law.215 With Hennequin’s first report at the end of July, d’Avaux enthused to Chamillart that this channel looked quite promising.216 Heinsius shared with Marlborough and Holland’s deputies Hennequin’s revealing account from Paris, assuming that Chamillart’s eagerness for peace likely reflected Louis’s sentiments. The terms proposed offered much more than Alègre’s final offer: Philip V retained only Guiposcoa, Navarre, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia in Spain and Milan; the archduke received the rest of Spain and its territories; the Republic received the Spanish Netherlands; and the Dutch gained commercial concessions, including a reversion to the 1664 tariff.217 The Dutch found the partition of Spain itself strange and objected to Bourbon control of Milan.218 Hennequin later clarified the earlier offer by dropping the division of Spain and augmenting Philip V’s portion with Naples and Sicily.219 D’Avaux and Chamillart, who believed that a treaty could be achieved in eight days, grew increasingly impatient for a positive Dutch response, anxious that once word of their negotiations was out, the war minister would lose his control over them. As August wore on, Chamillart lamented that he would never have begun these negotiations had Hennequin not frequently assured him of the Republic’s pacific desires and pressed for a positive response by month’s end.220 Fearing counter-moves from Torcy, Chamillart wanted a quick triumph to blunt any recriminations and threatened to turn the negotiations over to Torcy if the Dutch did not reply clearly and promptly.221 Aware that Torcy would not be pleased with his clandestine c­ ollaboration with C ­ hamillart,

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d’Avaux began to worry when the anticipated swift success failed to materialize. In late August he notified Hennequin that ­Marlborough had sought to short-circuit their talks with his own approach to Max in Brussels and Torcy had heard about it from Rouillé. To forestall these rival pourparlers, d’Avaux said that he was now obliged to share with Torcy a part of Hennequin’s interactions with Chamillart, but asked that his own previous knowledge of them go unmentioned in any subsequent letters.222 Clearly, negotiations through Hennequin had been undertaken without the foreign minister’s knowledge. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous Helvétius was back in The Hague, snooping into mail passing through, sending Chamillart what news he gathered, and talking with Hennequin about his negotiations.223 Paul Sharp observes that the realist tradition’s metaphor of diplomacy as a game “suggests that the game … can be more or less well played.” Thus, “good diplomacy and good diplomats can be seen, not just as elements of power and instruments of policy, but as somehow capable of finessing both.”224 Chamillart was a poor negotiator. Worse than his impatience was his guilelessness, which compromised Torcy’s endeavour to play his master’s bad hand to the best advantage. Hennequin was Dutch, Heinsius’s kinsman, a magistrate, and a merchant, so when Chamillart insisted that he was unable to haggle (“marchander”) and spoke only truthfully and sincerely, it must have been clear in the Republic that they were dealing with someone who knew nothing of the haggling between states called “diplomacy.” Astonishingly, he confessed that France was no longer able to defend herself without self-harm and that maintaining Philip V’s entire holdings would ruin an already exhausted France.225 To be sure, Allied intelligence reports and the English and Dutch press had for some time embraced what Jamel Ostwald calls the “fragile France” model: “either a quick battle and invasion or a year or two of blockade would be enough to bring France to its knees – and throughout the war this French weakness was used as an argument to continue the war to force France to even better terms, not sign a premature peace that Louis would later renege on.”226 All the same, an explicit confirmation from France’s chief war and fiscal administrator was significant and suggested that a desperate Louis XIV had himself authorized this abject appeal.227 Disclosing the despondency expressed by the king and his ministers in camera contradicted the more positive face the foreign secretary wore in negotiations and suggested division among the king’s advisors, violating one of the reasons for keeping council discussions secret.228 If those trying to anticipate French moves supposed that Louis and his m ­ inisters



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were turning a blind eye to a hopeless reality, that was one thing, but it was something quite different if they knew that the French leadership saw clearly how impossible their ­situation was. The desperate might always “hope till Hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates,” and it is not without reason that a later French leader observed that “a leader is a dealer in hope.”229 This raises the question of the king’s role in Chamillart’s initiative.230 After an account of Rouillé’s 1709 mission to the Republic, Saint-Simon added what he described as two relevant but largely unknown anecdotes that he said took place not long before. Although writing at least twenty years later, he claimed that his account was based on what he learned from Chamillart and Beauvillier, his friends at the time, and from Torcy, his friend only later.231 According to the duke, Chamillart sought to remove peace negotiations from Torcy and, with the king’s knowledge, sent agents abroad to seek contacts and intimated that the foreign minister’s operatives were straw men through whom nothing would be accomplished. Torcy instructed his agents to return the favour, thus creating abroad the spectacle of royal ministers with opposing interests. The only examples of the parallel diplomacy that Saint-Simon cited, however, were Helvétius’s two missions to Holland.232 In one sentence he speculated on the jesting at home and abroad that resulted from a doctor serving as a diplomat and then pictured Torcy and Chamillart reporting separately to a king who permitted this embarrasment. Torcy recognized the harm this did to diplomacy and his own position, but Saint-Simon said that he stood powerless before Chamillart’s royal favour and could only protest ineffectually to the war minister through Beauvillier. Thus, what Saint-Simon alleged took place through Helvétius was a parallel diplomacy sanctioned by and acknowledged to his ministers by the king. This is vintage Saint-Simon: dramatic and detailed, but not without difficulties. Which two missions served as his examples of parallel diplomacy? In 1705 both ministers reported to the king on Helvétius’s mission, but as we have seen, although this was unusual they did this together. Although the doctor was Chamillart’s protégé, the mission was authorized in the Conseil and Torcy wrote his instructions. ­Helvétius’s December 1707–February 1708 mission served as cover for Mesnager’s negotiations on the West Indies trade. Even though Torcy wrote Mesnager’s instructions, both ministers were involved, since commerce was Chamillart’s concern. As for the March–April 1708 mission, it is unclear what it was, but it does not appear to have taken place without Torcy’s knowledge and participation.233 Whatever Torcy’s ­distaste for

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having to share the management of a mission with his colleague, none of those undertaken by Helvétius really fit Saint-Simon’s description of a parallel diplomacy: he neither negotiated nor traveled as Chamillart’s emissary without Torcy’s knowledge. Yet Saint-Simon says nothing of the Hennequin negotiations that for a time were an example of parallel diplomacy. Perhaps after misconstruing Helvétius’s missions and confounding them with Hennequin’s negotiations, he painted Chamillart’s covert diplomacy with broad strokes to imply a picture of the royally sanctioned divided diplomacy known to all the king’s ministers.234 Again, this account was written after the reign on the basis of information gathered later, and Saint-Simon’s antipathy to Louis XIV certainly disposed him to place his actions in a bad light. Yet it is curious that the duke’s 1712 anonymous and critical letter to the king made no mention of any of this and instead portrayed the foreign minister as firmly in control of the flow of diplomatic information to the king and his Conseil.235 Like his contemporaries, Saint-Simon knew of Chamillart’s general fishing in foreign policy waters and the involvement of both ministers in ­Helvétius’s 1705 mission, but it was apparently only long after 1712 that, when composing his memoirs, he interpreted it in the context of what he came to see as Louis XIV’s complicity in an ongoing and openly divided diplomacy. Supplementing Saint-Simon’s account with other sources suggests no less a complicated picture of Louis XIV’s conduct of diplomacy in 1706. One of Chamillart’s letters to Hennequin began with the admission that “[i]l n’a sûrement pas plus couté au Roy de prendre sa résolution sur les propositions, que je vous ay faites, qu’à moy de m’en charger” (it surely did not cost the king more to decide on the propositions that I have made to you than it did for me to take charge of them). He then pointed to the secrecy necessary “pour que cette négociation fût restée entre mes mains” (in order for that negotiation to remain in my hands) and declared his unwillingness to “en demeurer chargé avantage” (remain charged with it anymore) without terms preserving Bourbon honour.236 It is unlikely that he was talking about keeping secrets from the king, as that would have been too risky.237 In later acknowledging that Louis’s support for this approach eventually wavered owing to lack of results, Saint-Simon noted that Torcy successfully threatened Chamillart with going to the king, not to inform him of the war minister’s negotiations but to have him decide which of them was to direct diplomacy.238 Thus, what Saint-Simon took for a royally blessed system of competitive and parallel diplomacy undertaken with his ministers’ knowledge was in



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reality a secret du roi “which bypassed the secretary of state for foreign affairs and official channels.”239 Louis had authorized the war minister to negotiate with Hennequin without the knowledge of his foreign secretary and other ministers. At the very end of July, Antoine Sersanders, president of the Council of Flanders (now under Allied occupation), approached Max, his former master, on behalf of a mysterious friend of peace, whom he later revealed to be Marlborough, to initiate talks on the basis of Mollo’s last proposal, the Second Partition Treaty. When informed of this by ­Rouillé, Louis and Torcy agreed to pursue this channel.240 It was apparently at this point that the king had to let Torcy in on what had been passing between Chamillart and Hennequin, for d’Avaux announced to the latter on 27 August that he had to share a part of it with Torcy.241 On 2 September he further informed the merchant that things had occurred obliging him and Chamillart to inform Beauvillier and Torcy of the full negotiations and share with them the Dutchman’s letters. While reassuring him that these ministers were quite satisfied and thought well of him, he expressed doubt that either understood as well as he did the difficulties Hennequin faced in steering their proposals through the Republic’s slow-moving political machinery.242 Meanwhile, Chamillart’s mounting disappointment turned bitter. He regarded Marlborough’s initiative as a ruse to paralyze French and Spanish forces in Italy. Writing H ­ ennequin on 20 September to update him on the details of the Marlborough negotiations, Chamillart argued that Dutch and English interests were not the same and urged Hennequin to come to France as quickly as possible to conclude a negotiation he over-optimistically characterized as on the eve of conclusion. He claimed sullenly that the assurances he had given the king of the nearing success of their negotiations prevented him from sending troops to Italy, which would have prevented the ignominious Turin defeat on 7 September 1706. He reproached Hennequin for fostering these false hopes and self-servingly complained that his good faith had cost France dearly.243 Although he later, perhaps grudgingly, absolved Hennequin of collusion with Marlborough, Chamillart despaired of peace, vowing to leave to others the cares of dealing with the Dutch when peace finally became possible and declaring that he had told d’Avaux that he would renounce any role in what followed. Framing the matter in terms of rivalry with the foreign minister, which supports Saint-Simon’s sense of Chamillart’s motives, he complained that ­Callières and Mollo (who both served Torcy) would greatly benefit from all this. Spitefully, he let drop that Mollo had some time ago ­predicted

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failure, saying that Heinsius lacked the confidence in H ­ ennequin required to conclude peace through him.244 Marlborough, anticipating more concessions, wrote Heinsius that the “blow in Pie[d]mont must creat [sic] great trouble at the court of France, so that I do not doubt but you will have new proposals from M. ­Chamillard [sic],” but none were forthcoming.245 D’Avaux reassured Hennequin that although he was sure that Torcy would be quite happy should the initiative pass to him, he surmised that this would not happen so long as Hennequin’s negotiations continued. A week later, while still hoping for success, d’Avaux repeated Chamillart’s earlier threat of abandoning negotiations if their failure threatened him with reproach.246 Meanwhile, d’Avaux and the war minister heaped opprobrium on Mollo and Callières, alleging that they were attempting to disrupt and discredit Hennequin’s negotiations out of jealousy.247 In contrast, Torcy had d’Avaux write to Hennequin that his mission had failed owing to lack of support from the States-General and that with negotiations with Marlborough now appearing to move forward, his restraint in proposing nothing directly that might derail them was commendable. To further limit damage, Torcy wrote the merchant personally (22 November 1706) that Chamillart had shared his letters and that d’Avaux would remain involved but would now be working through the foreign office. Unlike Chamillart, however, Torcy stressed not French weakness, but war weariness among all the combatants and the need not to leave to Louis XIV alone the merit of re-establishing peace. In carefully calculated terms, he assured Hennequin that he and Chamillart had the same wish for the success of these negotiations and were united in their replies. But the subtext was that the king had given up on his secret du roi and turned over these negotiations to Torcy to direct and coordinate with the others.248 Chastened, Louis XIV had indeed decided in early October 1706 to abandon secret talks through individuals not authorized to negotiate and henceforth to employ only duly designated agents, since the informal multi-channel approach had only fed fears of French machinations. Rouillé was tasked with proposing the public peace conference Callières had suggested at the Flanders front, but in a personal letter, Torcy expressed skepticism about what he admitted was presently their sole hope for solid negotiations. Rouillé, likewise dubious, correctly predicted that far from lowering Allied anxieties, this new French initiative would raise further suspicion. By the end of November Max informed Louis XIV that the Maritime Powers declined a conference. The die was



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cast, and in December Torcy instructed Hennequin to inform the StatesGeneral that henceforth France would negotiate only through and with fully empowered envoys.249 We will discuss later what motivated Chamillart and the king to pursue this secret du roi, but for now it is instructive to contrast the­­different ways that Torcy and Chamillart managed the aftermath of these failed talks. Torcy protested to Hennequin that he did not seek to divide the Allies and had orders not do so, but would argue simply on the basis of England’s outlook in contrast to Dutch interests. He acknowledged defeat at Turin, but playing to the Maritime Powers’ growing mistrust of the emperor and the Duke of Savoy, he emphasized that it gave the emperor control of Milan. He did the same with Bourbon losses in Spain, assuring Hennequin that the archduke could only replace Philip V on his throne and in the Spanish people’s hearts at the cost of much Dutch blood and bullion. Indeed, such were the positive changes (as he presented them) in French fortunes that, as Torcy made it clear, the terms rejected by the Maritime Powers were no longer on the table. Any new talks would start from scratch. He expressed the king’s willingness to have secret talks either at Versailles or in the Republic, concluding positively if not over-optimistically that when one does not want to finish negotiations, matters are difficult, but when one’s intentions are good, difficulties are removed.250 By contrast, while chagrined by his diplomatic disappointment, Chamillart had only dimly seen the error of his ways. After confessing to ­Hennequin in December 1706 his inaptitude for diplomacy, he added that his ardent desire for peace would not prevent him from finding the necessary resources to continue the war to thwart the harsh terms the Allies had previously hoped to impose. He repudiated his earlier actions, repented of having advised the king to offer such outrageous concessions, thanked God that since rejected by the Allies they were now off the table, and expressed the hope that he might find sufficient “forces,” which could mean either strength or troops, to sustain the great task he was now obliged to take up again. In whatever portion his regret was heart-felt or merely what he was required to write as damage control, his hope that he would find sufficient “forces” still sounded less confident than Torcy likely desired.251 D’Avaux reiterated to Hennequin on 3 January 1707 that the king had made it clear that Torcy alone was to direct negotiations and serve as the sole recipient of his communications; any effort to bypass him would incur royal displeasure and impair negotiations. Hennequin’s letters were to speak to Torcy of diplomacy and only

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offer Chamillart personal greetings.252 But being without result, contact ended as hostilities resumed at the end of May 1707.253 Unfortunately, Louis’s secret du roi had raised lingering questions as to the identity of his diplomatic point man. William Gregg (or Greg), a former secretary to his uncle on a diplomatic mission to Denmark and ­presently an impecunious clerk in Secretary of State Robert ­Harley’s office, sought to retail diplomatic secrets in October 1707 by contacting Chamillart and sending him copies of confidential papers. His treason was soon uncovered by continental postal agents in British pay and he was hanged.254 Following the ratification of the treaty recognizing the loss of Milan, Ambassador Amelot, apparently under the impression that the war minister was again engaged in covert talks, wrote ­Chamillart from Madrid in July 1707 to urge him to inform Spain’s king and queen of the treaty unless it was the king’s wish otherwise. Amelot also asked that Chamillart at least keep him informed so that he could guard French interests. Chamillart assured Amelot that there were no negotiations under way, but rather than referring him to Torcy, he told him what a lack of funds had forced the king to consider conceding in future talks and authorized Amelot to impart these secrets to Ursins if he saw fit.255 At the beginning of November 1707 Bagnols in Brussels forwarded the States-General’s feelers to Chamillart, but either chastened by the Hennequin fiasco or because he thought little of this lead, he apparently deferred to Torcy, who immediately prepared instructions (dated 6 November 1707) for limited negotiations so that Bagnols could test Dutch sincerity. Torcy patiently probed and pushed the Dutch until this channel ran dry.256 Torcy’s antipathy toward Chamillart’s amateur diplomacy was apparently driven by policy rather than pride. No matter who took them or how numerous they were, France’s steps toward talks would trip over one another unless carefully coordinated. To mix metaphors, without harmonization, multiple channels produced a cacophony of proposals easily misconstrued as ploys to foster division, as that tactic had been used during the last war.257 Torcy did not permit disdain for his colleague’s impatient intrusion into his craft to blind him to the useful opportunities and operatives that were its by-product. When an associate of Heinsius sent for Helvétius in November 1707, allegedly for a medical consultation but also for a passport valid for five persons, Torcy and the king saw an opportunity to address Dutch commercial concerns. The author of the February 1706 exclusion of the Dutch from the Spanish Indies was Rouen official Nicolas Mesnager, member of the French



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Council of Commerce and Chamillart’s trade representative in Spain from December 1704 to April 1706. Chamillart first noticed Mesnager while serving in Normandy as intendant. Mesnager also had a close working relationship with Navy Secretary Jérôme ­Pontchartrain, also interested in overseas commerce.258 Torcy saw him as the perfect agent to accompany Helvétius in December 1707 to scratch the Dutch burghers’ commercial itch.259 Mesnager’s secret economic mission quickly accomplished, the Dutch tried to move him beyond his instructions to discuss territorial matters. With the limited expectations for his mission accomplished, however, a satisfied Torcy summoned him home the following February,260 but had him continue corresponding with the Dutch.261 Mesnager’s return to court coincided with Chamillart’s resignation as controller general on 20 February because of his health and the weight of work, as Torcy graciously announced to Abbé Pomponne. Clearly happy with this change and Chamillart’s replacement by his cousin ­Desmaretz, Torcy tellingly added that France herself had great resources even when they were badly managed.262 Mesnager’s negotiations are a reminder that interdepartmental rivalry over commerce was triangular because it concerned the controller general and the navy and foreign secretaries.263 A roughly contemporary bureaucratic boundary dispute led Torcy to rebuke Pomponne for following the navy secretary’s instructions to discuss with the Venetians a list of merchandise for possible trade with France. Protecting his own turf and that of his cousin, Torcy insisted that this was a matter for the controller general, not the navy secretary, and admonished the ambassador to be more careful in the future and remember that it was not for Jérôme P ­ ontchartrain to propose treaties.264 The abbé replied that formerly it had scarcely mattered to him whether trade was under ­Pontchartrain or Chamillart, but now that such matters were under Torcy’s and D ­ esmaretz’s direction, they were joined in the same hands.265 His concern was for unity of policy and voice in commercial negotiations. Given the numerous competing lobbies and networks, it was natural for Pomponne to envision Torcy as more likely to be in harmony with his kinsmen Desmaretz than with the rival Pontchartrain clan or the upstart Chamillart.266 Torcy’s differences with Chamillart related as well to the role of diplomacy during Louis XIV’s wars, which differed from what it has been since Napoleon. John A. Lynn usefully distinguishes between the dominant modern paradigm of “war-as-event” and the pre-Napoleonic paradigm of “war-as-process” characteristic of Louis XIV’s era. Whereas the

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modern war-as-event is seen as a crisis to be resolved quickly by means of a battlefield knockout blow, war-as-process reflects “the indecisive character of battle and siege, the slow tempo of operations, the strong resolve to make war feed war, the powerful influence of attrition, and the considerable emphasis given to ongoing diplomatic negotiations.”267 This had several consequences for how Torcy played his role as foreign secretary. Like diplomats in modern wars, those of Louis XIV’s era were occupied during hostilities with shoring up alliances, seeking new ones, and scheming to detach members from the coalition of their foes.268 In modern conflicts, peace negotiations typically begin only toward the end when matters have been largely determined on the battlefield and diplomacy is “little more than [a] mop-up operation,” while in Torcy’s time, combatants began negotiations early. The difference between war-asevent and war-as-process meant that “Napoleon dictated” after decisive battles, whereas “Louis XIV negotiated.”269 Cardinal Richelieu confessed that it took him several years of experience managing France’s foreign affairs to realize that “it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, whether openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits are reaped and still more in those for which no future prospects as yet seem likely … He who negotiates continuously will finally find the right instant to attain his ends, and even if this does not come about, at least it can be said he has lost nothing while keeping abreast of the events of the world.”270 His reference to the diplomat as news gatherer is a reminder of this important function separate from yet preliminary to his work at the negotiating table. Louisquatorzian battles were not without importance, but rather than being decisive and ending a war in a relatively unambiguous manner, they shared significance with two other factors. One was the ability of a state or coalition to muster and sustain the financial resources that allowed Mars to be fed in order to fight. Guy Rowlands notes that Chamillart’s “financial policies from mid-1709 onwards were placing Louis XIV in a race between utter bankruptcy and a tolerable diplomatic solution to the conflict.”271 The other was what Lynn calls “diplomatic finesse,” or the skill with which one played one’s financial cards along with those won or lost through sieges, pitched battle, and other military events.272 As Jeremy Black notes, “Diplomacy was intended to ensure profit from the use of force, just as force was seen as the way to pursue diplomatic goals.”273 In 1708 in Madrid, Louis XIV and Torcy instructed Amelot to make it clear to Philip V that talking peace was not a bad



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thing and that it was impossible to manage one’s interests without talking, especially in order that, after such a long and unfortunate war, force would not be permitted to decide the peace terms.274 Callières contended that “there is in the art of negotiating a certain dexterity, which consists in knowing how to take things by the proper handle.”275 As diplomats talked, armies took to the field and fleets sailed, hoping to avoid defeat or gain a victory to be parlayed into a more favourable settlement at the negotiating table.276 Callières reminded a Dutch agent in 1694 that the events of war necessarily change circumstances and minds, giving fresh hopes and new views to both parties.277 Torcy similarly noted in 1711 that the best way to advance peace was to prepare well for war, and the following year he labeled the loss of Le Quesnoy an evident setback to negotiations then under way at Utrecht.278 Even as plenipotentiaries negotiated, they were eager to know their foe’s financial health but anxious to conceal their own treasury’s true state, all the while making a show of their master’s ability to continue the war. Since years of victory or defeat could be undone by the defection of an ally, faltering finances, or military successes in the final round of a war of attrition, the foreign secretary had to have a finger on the financial and political pulse of all the belligerents as well as an eye on the war on land and sea.279 This was another reason Desmaretz’s rise to controller general in 1708 benefited his cousin, likewise avid for war information by way of the war minister or his own informants scattered at the fronts, along the frontiers, and throughout Europe.280 From 1709, for example, Torcy and Villars stayed in close contact so that they could coordinate negotiations and warfare to achieve the best peace possible, writing candidly and sharing the most secret information. When Prior and Gaultier arrived at Versailles in July 1711 with Queen Anne’s authorization for secret negotiations, Torcy wrote Villars that the army’s ability to carry on the war would determine his capacity to resist British demands and gain better terms. No one could better make the former crucial determination, he readily confessed, than the army’s commander.281 The legacy of Louis XIV’s secret diplomacy of 1706 lay heavily upon future contacts. Petkum, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s diplomatic resident at The Hague and Heinsius’s friend and agent, sought to mediate a settlement. He contacted Torcy, was invited to Versailles for lengthy discussions in late December 1707, and corresponded with him after his January departure to report to Heinsius.282 Autumn rumours of ­Helvétius’s return to The Hague, however, had nearly aborted P ­ etkum’s Versailles trip. Although, as we have seen, Helvétius traveled as cover for Mesnager,

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who had a mandate limited to commercial matters, the Dutch were suspicious, and Petkum, accusing Torcy of double-dealing, protested that he was being shoved aside while peace proposals were being brought daily to Heinsius by someone the pensionary disliked.283 Alluding to 1706, he was “convinced that the conduct of those who were employed last year hindered, instead of helping to, peace by giving the Allies a lower idea of France’s strength.”284 Unlike Chamillart, Torcy sparred with Petkum without revealing French weakness, but when he complained of Allied obduracy, Petkum replied that their mistrust resulted from France’s shifting propositions through different channels. Although he insisted that the king was sincere and that Heinsius should ignore those who claimed to represent him, Torcy could not so easily escape the legacy of 1706.285 When Petkum discovered that news of his contacts with Torcy on Heinsius’s behalf had leaked out, he wrote the foreign minister that he suspected Du Puy, whom he believed to be Chamillart’s agent and making his own peace overtures. However, Torcy defended Du Puy, who was in Amsterdam on his behalf and unaware of Petkum’s mission.286 He also assured Petkum that he was France’s preferred channel and that Du Puy, no longer a French agent, had no mandate and would not be a part of future talks without ­Petkum’s approval.287 French defeat at Oudenarde (11 July 1708) provoked Chamillart to new intrusions into diplomacy during the siege that led to the loss of Lille (13 August to 8 December). The Duke of Berwick, in Flanders from the Rhine front to support Lille, was in private communication with his uncle Marlborough, whose forces covered Eugene’s besieging army. When Marlborough wrote in late August that he could best foster peace talks if France first sent a proposal to the States-General, Berwick, after consulting with Torcy, replied that any such initiative would have to come from the Dutch. Chamillart, at the front to mediate between the quarreling Burgundy and Vendôme, remained skeptical of ­Marlborough’s motives, but Torcy was willing to work this opening with due caution.288 When Berwick received another encouraging letter from Marlborough on 30 October, Burgundy suggested that he forward it to the foreign minister and that Chamillart write to Torcy as well for the king’s instructions as to a reply. Torcy and his commis quickly prepared memoirs to advise the king, who then sent various guidelines to Burgundy, Chamillart, and ­Berwick on crafting a careful but positive reply. Torcy’s accompanying letter to Chamillart showed cautious optimism. The war minister reported to Torcy that he had worked with ­Berwick on a reply that he hoped would conform to the instructions, but



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a­ ccording to Berwick, Chamillart, “through excess of policy, had taken it into his head that this proposal of Marlborough’s proceeded only from the bad situation the allied army was in,” a conclusion he called “beyond my penetration.”289 Berwick believed that Marlborough, like the rest of ­Europe, wanted peace, and rather than to confess Allied doubts, he wrote to him proposing that they open a negotiations channel. When ­Chamillart dictated the reply (5 November 1708), Berwick found it so bizarre that he wrote it down in French so that his uncle would know it was not his. As he suspected, the duke “was indeed so much offended at it, that no use could be made of this opening to bring about a peace.” In Berwick’s opinion, this was the main reason Marlborough soured on the peace process.290 Torcy, put out by the rudeness of the reply, at first chided Berwick. Burgundy as well regretted the reply, and before the end of the month Berwick – doubtless contentedly – was back in Germany and no longer part of these intrigues.291 In his defence of Utrecht, Bolingbroke later wrote: “I know most certainly, that France lost, two years before [1708], by the little skill and address of her principal1 [at the bottom of the page: ‘1 Chamillard [sic]’] minister, in answering overtures made during the siege of Lisle by a principal person among the allies,2 [at the bottom of the page: ‘2 ­Marlborough’] such an opportunity, and such a correspondence, as would have removed some of the obstacles that lay now in her way, have prevented others, and have procured her peace.”292 Although we cannot know with certainty how damaging Chamillart’s actions were to real possibilities of peace at any given moment, it would be a mistake to discount the role of skilful diplomacy or its lack in the timing and shape of any peace settlement, since negotiations accomplish more than the ratification of outcomes determined by military and domestic considerations. As informal written and face-to-face discussions sputtered on during 1708 and Torcy had to float further concessions, Chamillart’s diplomatic activities continued.293 The harsh winter of 1708–09 began “a crisis of unprecedented breadth as France faced military disaster, financial ruin, and mass starvation. The king responded with the most remarkable two years of his reign, surmounting all challenges in a way that astonished his contemporaries, especially his enemies.”294 As his administrators scrambled to scrape together resources to feed the people and maintain the army in its Flanders frontier holding action, his diplomats proffered olive branches without rushing to give up too much at the peace table. Torcy pursued two channels in early 1709.295 One was by way of ­Flanders intendant Maignart de Bernières and his ­counterpart

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in the Allied-­occupied Spanish Netherlands, the States-­General’s deputy Nicolas de Pesters, in frequent contact through administrating a common frontier. Marlborough knew both and favoured this channel, but Pesters, recalling the divided diplomacy of 1706, informed Bernières that the duke was pleased that Torcy and Chamillart were working together to authorize his mission.296 The other channel ran from Heinsius through Dussen to Flanders administrator Bergeyck, from whom D ­ ussen had received French peace proposals in 1706. During Christmas 1708 ­Dussen secretly contacted his old acquaintance for talks. Bergeyck immediately informed his friend Chamillart and kept him apprised of all they discussed. On the basis of the terms he had offered Dussen on the king’s behalf at the end of 1706 and on fresh news from Madrid indicating that he could offer the Dutch unspecified commercial advantages in the West Indies trade, Bergeyck sent Dussen a peace proposal. By the end of January 1709, convinced that the Dutch were serious about negotiating, ­Bergeyck arranged a secret meeting with Chamillart at his estate, hoping to avoid questions by avoiding Versailles. It is not clear why B ­ ergeyck’s plan to work only through Chamillart failed. From the outset he had chosen to share his secret news from Madrid and The Hague only with the war minister. His Dutch contacts were clearly jealous of the other French agents at work on Torcy’s behalf, hoping that C ­ hamillart would be given sole direction of the negotiations.297 His visit turned out to be more than a clandestine meeting with Chamillart, triggering speculation at court. On 1 February Dangeau noted with curiosity Bergeyck’s three days of royal audiences with only Chamillart present, while ­Sourches recorded on 4 February his long meeting with the king, work with Torcy, and visit to Chamillart at his estate, from whence he returned to Flanders.298 Had a chastened Chamillart decided to share this promising channel with the foreign secretary or had Torcy found out about it, perhaps at some point during Bergeyck’s visit?299 In any event, the king had now charged Torcy with managing this channel. In announcing this new direction to ­Boufflers on 15 February, Torcy explained that while Marlborough thought that the Bernières-Pesters conferences were useful, Heinsius disagreed. M ­ arlborough did not approve of talks through Dussen, bu­t Bergeyck believed that this would be the sure path to peace and had so convinced the king. Although the Bernières-­ Pesters channel was now closed, Torcy noted to Boufflers that the terms ­Dussen had offered Bergeyck were unfortunately too much like those Pesters had demanded.300 The foreign secretary thus saw a fruitful lead under his care superseded by one that offered nothing better and had th­e



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­ isadvantage of running through Chamillart’s friend, exposing it to the d war minister’s meddling. The difference between the two ministers was again manifest in how each handled this channel. Chamillart wrote Bergeyck that he was impatient to have a fuller account of these clandestine contacts, adding that if they had been undertaken in good faith, Bergeyck would soon notice.301 Torcy, however, reacted with his customary mix of subtlety and patience.302 Advising a straightforward response, to which the king and Bergeyck agreed, Torcy wrote Dussen a polite, but concise, non-­ combative reply that agreed to negotiate on the proposed conditions, announced the king’s choice of councillor of state Daniel Voysin as negotiator, and requested passports for Voysin and Bergeyck.303 Although a conference had thus been settled on, the details had not, but these were clearly now in Torcy’s hands and Dussen informed Bergeyck that for security’s sake and the matter’s importance and utility, since he would negotiate only with France’s designated representative, they could no longer correspond.304 Despite Torcy’s entreaties, Voysin declined the appointment, apparently regarding it as too risky to his career; ­Rouillé, named in his place, received instructions from Torcy on 3 March 1709.305 At long last, peace talks were apparently to begin in earnest. Leaving to one side for the moment the king’s role in all of this, what beyond France’s deteriorating military and financial position accounts for Chamillart’s incursions into diplomacy? Again, the line between war and diplomacy is never crisp, and this was true in 1703, even though Chamillart had naively insisted to Torcy that the war secretary’s functions had nothing in common with those of the foreign secretary.306 Saint-Simon, however, offered a more specific explanation when he claimed that his friend Chamillart was struck by being the heir of the two great ministers Colbert and Louvois. Impressed and inspired by the latter’s forays into diplomacy, he had transcriptions prepared from ministry archives of Louvois’s numerous negotiations.307 Indeed, Chamillart reminded Hennequin in 1706 that as war secretary and controller general he not only conducted a multi-front war, but had to be concerned with tariffs, commercial treaties, and any Dutch fortress that might face France.308 He likely saw himself as the minister best placed to judge France’s ability to push the war or press for peace. As the intimate of Louis and his consort, he held the king’s ear and favour. As a minister of state, he was privy to and participant in the Conseil’s secret discussions of foreign policy. He even earned the appellation of “principal minister” from as astute a participant in the peace negotiations as Bolingbroke.309

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As one might suspect, there are no records of the war minister’s many conversations with the king. Nevertheless, it seems likely that C ­ hamillart approached the king with promises of a channel certain to produce peace quickly, but only if kept in absolute secrecy from the other ministers, including the foreign secretary, who already had agents pursuing other paths, apparently without success. D’Avaux introduced ­Chamillart and Hennequin and served as their intermediary and as the war minister’s counselor in guiding these talks. The former ambassador to the Dutch was certain that his republican friends could be brought to terms if France made enough concessions. Perhaps his wide diplomatic experience and his service at the Nijmegen peace congress as a negotiator with Croissy, father of the youngish (almost a quarter century his junior) current foreign minister, may have led d’Avaux to see himself as more skilled and knowledgeable in such matters. Moreover, d’Avaux had been a member of Louvois’s clientele and was one of his chief informants, even though he served under Croissy as an ambassador.310 Obtaining peace in such short order would surely have crowned his long and distinguished career. There is likely an element of redemption and revenge in this as well. D’Avaux probably had not forgiven Callières and Mollo for developing the negotiating channel during the Nine Years War that eventually superseded the official one he was pursuing and led to Ryswick.311 Yet even with the king’s blessing, sending out agents to initiate peace talks and keeping Torcy and the rest of the Conseil in the dark until they could be presented with a peace treaty constituted a risky trespass on his colleagues’ prerogatives. Chamillart’s and d’Avaux’s insistence on concealment suggests that they understood this but thought that a stunning success would sweep any objections aside.312 Louis, shaken by the evacuation of Flanders, likewise must have thought the same. For all his ambitions, Chamillart’s writing style nonetheless betrayed an overstated sensitivity, a lack of self-confidence, and a penchant for lamentation.313 In contrast to Torcy, neither Chamillart’s training nor his temperament afforded him the patience required to bring delicate negotiations to fruition.314 Some months following his failed attempt to broker peace, he candidly confessed to Hennequin that he had abandoned their negotiations because they had not gone well enough to give him a taste for a profession in which he was inexperienced and had been counterproductive.315 Perhaps he had an inkling of what others saw in him. Some years later Chevreuse offered Fénelon, a fellow member of the peace party, an appraisal of the Conseil’s members. While filled with praises for Torcy’s conduct of diplomacy, Chevreuse gave a startling,



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terse, and candid evaluation of his friend Chamillart: he was always useless for the important affairs (“inutiles pour les grandes affaires”).316 At the end of that year, Torcy wrote in his journal of the setbacks that resulted from Chamillart’s secret negotiations and that cost France what little good opinion the enemy still had of her forces and her affairs. He found it insupportable that the minister entrusted with war and finances would inform the enemy that an absolutely exhausted France was on the brink and that it was not in the interest of the Dutch to let her slip over it.317 Torcy’s negative assessment, shared by contemporaries and historians alike, seems justified.318 Yet Torcy omitted here anything about the king, who at least in 1706 permitted and facilitated ­Chamillart’s initiative and turned it into a secret du roi. Balancing a realistic assessment of Chamillart’s abilities and inadequacies with recognition of the double burden he bore, Emmanuel Pénicaut nonetheless characterizes his peace initiatives as somewhat maladroit.319 Still, he endeavours to place C ­ hamillart’s actions in a better light by emphasizing the network of acquaintances he had on both sides of the Spanish Netherlands frontier that, in 1709, yielded a more productive negotiating channel than Torcy’s did. He twice refers to the channel through Bergeyck as a path opened by Chamillart.320 But this is misleading on a number of grounds. It was Dussen, not Chamillart, who initiated the channel and did so through Bergeyck, and it was the latter who apparently chose not to share it immediately with Torcy. Dussen’s encouraging letters to Mesnager indicating his favourable disposition toward peace as well as his role in late December in obtaining the release of the chevalier de Croissy, Torcy’s recently captured brother, all suggest that Dussen was out to woo rather than bypass and alienate the foreign minister.321 Pénicaut also relies on Arsène Legrelle, who misleadingly cites ­Dangeau’s report of Bergeyck huddling with the king and Chamillart, but ignores Sourches’s report a few days later of the Flemish administrator also meeting with Torcy.322 Thus, Chamillart is portrayed as having successfully challenged Torcy on his own turf by opening the channel that actually resulted in peace talks. When the king restored matters to their proper order, Pénicaut continues, he thanked the Flemish administrator and turned over to Torcy the channel opened by Chamillart, who was left only with the advantage of having nourished the first contacts. This is all portrayed as an example of the normal competition among ministers that was desired and managed by the king, although as we have seen, recent research argues against this traditional competitive model, especially for the end of the reign.323 Building on Lucien

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Bély’s ­characterization of this as a division of labour and his contention that diplomacy is careful to explore every avenue of negotiation, Pénicaut says that Torcy’s role was to carry out the preliminary negotiations resulting from the war secretary’s contact.324 Bely’s discussion, however, hardly suggests that he regards this so-called division of labour as normal or healthy.325 Furthermore, working multiple channels neither requires nor functions best in the divided and competitive system that Pénicaut posits as the norm. Moreover, Torcy honoured the principle Bély cited by making the best of Chamillart’s channels when they came his way. As for the war minister having nourished Bergeyck’s contact, as we have seen, Legrelle makes it clear that Chamillart treated this contact with impatience and mistrust, whereas the king and Torcy were the ones who patiently pursued D ­ ussen’s enigmatic overtures.326 If ­Chamillart deserves any credit here, it is for standing aside and letting the foreign minister do his job, but it is not at all clear that the war minister stood aside for that reason and indeed he may have been forced to do so. While Rouillé met with Buys and Dussen in a southern Dutch village, talk of peace, as Dangeau noted on 14 March 1709, was accompanied by the understanding that envoys must report to Torcy alone, not to Chamillart, and that this returned matters to their proper order, since such negotiations belonged to the foreign secretary.327 Torcy and the other ministers, including his kinsman Beauvillier, had long resented Chamillart’s meddling in diplomacy. Saint-Simon’s account of this, as noted earlier, is not chronologically precise, but may fit here: B ­ eauvillier confronted the war minister and threatened to take the matter to the king if he did not agree to keep to his own department. Surely aware of his declining favour and record of failed diplomatic dealings, Chamillart decided that accepting Beauvillier’s terms was better than enduring their humiliating imposition by the king, which suggests that Louis XIV had already abandoned his secret du roi even if he still tolerated Chamillart’s information-gathering and diplomatic dabbling on the edges. Torcy, however, having seen Chamillart break his word in past agreements, required Chamillart’s acceptance in writing, which Beauvillier obligingly witnessed and forwarded to him. According to Saint-Simon, this ended Chamillart’s interference in foreign affairs as well as his conflict with Torcy for the remaining months of his tenure as war secretary.328 The war minister, however, continued to correspond with Hennequin, who sent him pessimistic assessments of the negotiations from which they both were excluded.329 Yet after Chamillart was forced out as war minister on 9 June 1709, the symbolism did not go unnoticed at court that



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during Bergeyck’s next trip to Versailles (7 July), it was Torcy who presented him to the king, after which the three worked together.330 If 1709 did not represent a return to the divided diplomacy of the past, we must still account for the secret du roi pursued by Louis through Chamillart in 1706. In May 1706, with his already exhausted kingdom sagging under the burden of this new war, the king boldly launched a Flanders offensive to force the Allies to the peace table, but with the stunning defeat at Ramillies (23 May) and the rapid loss of much of the Spanish Netherlands, he saw the enemy move closer to France’s frontier and the road to Paris. The strategic enormity of this disaster, the vast amounts of territory lost, and the rapidity with which it was happening made Louis desperate for peace.331 Moreover, the aging monarch was himself hardly immune to the popular notion that the kingdom’s miseries could be relieved and the golden past restored if only he – as king the only disinterested individual in the realm – governed directly and on his own, without the injurious influence of self-seeking ministers, mistresses, and courtiers, who always had personal ambitions and clients to promote.332 He was thus willing to exercise his royal prerogative to employ a secret du roi when approached by the experienced diplomat d’Avaux, who knew the Dutch well, and the trusted Chamillart, who promised peace in a matter of weeks. Claude Le Peletier believed that in general the king had become the victim of his own impatience for peace.333 As we have seen, however, when the swift results did not appear as promised and the king realized the mischief such divided diplomacy caused the pursuit of peace, he abandoned that strategy and apparently did not return to it again.334 Saint-Simon claimed that his account of ­Chamillart’s final agreement to stay out of negotiations was based on what he had gathered from his friends, the three individuals involved, and indicated that Beauvillier, not the king, had orchestrated it.335 Furthermore, Chamillart’s acquiescence implies that although Louis, weary of war and weighed down by the burdens of kingship and age, had long since abandoned the secret du roi of 1706, he had finally recognized (in 1709?) that even his favourite’s continued dabbling in diplomacy endangered prospects for peace, especially with the beginning of serious talks.336 Louis appreciated loyalty and was faithful to his friends, but Chamillart’s actions aroused growing discontent at court and with the wider public.337 Although increasingly isolated from the court and its gossip, Louis nonetheless heard the complaints of the royal family and his generals, especially Boufflers, Harcourt, and Villars, the respected voices that counted in such matters. Saint-Simon recites a ­series of other

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incidents that he believed finally forced the king to give way to opinion and dismiss his favourite, but Pénicaut prudently drops those incidents imagined by the memorialist and discounts the others to focus on Torcy’s return, on 1 June 1709, from his negotiations in The Hague bearing the terms that would decide the fate of peace and of Chamillart as well. When Louis and his Conseil rejected them, Chamillart’s fall was certain. A renewed war effort required a new war secretary to regain the confidence of the army and its commanders and to demonstrate to the Allies the will to fight on.338 Torcy recognized that France desperately needed peace, but he knew better than to say so while negotiating. Good diplomacy thrives on multiple openings and options that must be properly coordinated and managed if they are to end in success rather than in self-inflicted failure and frustration. Torcy, who had the patience to make the most of 1709’s openings, had not achieved what he had hoped for when he returned from The Hague, but at least future negotiations would be directed by the king and his Conseil working together, if not always in agreement, and controlled and synchronized by the foreign secretary, to and through whom communications to foreign and French diplomats would flow. In the New Year he wistfully confided to his journal cautious hope for a new era. With Chamillart’s disgrace, he reflected, the Conseil had been strengthened and there was more solidity to the way it handled business than before. He felt that Voysin spoke with good sense and without passion, and that such judiciousness made up for any lack of experience.339 Experience, judgment, good sense, and controlled passion rather than a desperate desire for peace would fortify the Conseil in the unrelenting and arduous pursuit of peace.

Jé rôm e P o n t c h a rt r a in , “ Mi ni ster of the Navy, C o u rt, a n d Pari s ” 340 Rivalry between the Colberts and the Pontchartrains for the control of patronage began in Brittany in 1677 when Louis Pontchartrain was appointed premier president of Brittany’s parlement, reducing the near monopoly the Colberts had long enjoyed.341 When Jérôme Pontchartrain succeeded his father in 1699 as navy and household secretary of state, including responsibility for Paris, this rivalry intensified. The new secretary had a habit of interfering in the affairs of other departments, including those of his father’s chancellery.342 The elder Pontchartrain, however, had been more scrupulous about honouring departmental boundaries,



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even as chancellor.343 Nonetheless, Saint-Simon, who detested Jérôme, was likely correct in observing that the new secretary was extremely jealous of Torcy.344 Jérôme’s personality was shaped by his appearance – smallpox had heavily marked his face and cost him an eye whose w ­ eeping glass replacement was said to be alarming – and by being the only surviving son of parents who invested in him all the family hopes. While his mother fussed over his health and future plans, his father lectured him harshly to ensure his preparation for office, which made him behave as if he always had something to prove.345 Even as a fledgling secretary of state in 1699, he wrote fearlessly to more established and powerful colleagues in an abrupt and aggressive manner sure to irritate.346 Jérôme Pontchartrain’s efforts to increase the efficiency and productivity of his department through greater specialization in more clearly delineated bureaus were also intended to block any rival ministries from poaching its functions. Likewise, prior to officially relinquishing his secretaryship to his son, Louis Pontchartrain sought to discourage poachers by securing clearer interdepartmental boundaries.347 In a 1698 memoir to the king, Pontchartrain complained that questions over departmental boundaries dating back to the Lionne era had been ignored by Croissy and Torcy and yet the latter now wanted to appropriate naval functions by labeling them usurpations on the part of the naval administration.348 To spare the king such useless and fatiguing conflict,349 Pontchartrain pointed to Torcy’s already full plate of functions. These included tending to the Rome correspondence, sending certain matters to the Paris parlement, publishing the recent Treaty of Ryswick, drawing up marriage articles for Mademoiselle, and performing a thousand other similar functions, whereas he – he claimed disingenuously – only had to follow the fortunes of a vessel.350 In October 1698 the king issued a regulation resolving these conflicts.351 Although letters to ambassadors in the king’s name had to be countersigned by the foreign secretary, the navy secretary could write to them on his own behalf when he needed to inform them of the royal will concerning commerce and the navy. The only exception was that he could address direct instructions on commercial and naval matters to the ambassadors to Constantinople, Venice, Madrid, and Lisbon, which the foreign secretary would refer to in his general instructions. Negotiations with sovereign powers for commercial treaties had to pass through the Conseil and then be drafted or approved by the foreign secretary. The navy secretary, however, could present treaties with Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to the king and countersign them, as well as present

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their envoys to him.352 This system, which largely preserved the principle of the centralization of diplomatic negotiations,353 was tested the following year when Tallard was in London negotiating with William III. The ambassador apparently resisted Pontchartrain’s request for details of the talks, but Torcy, while acknowledging the confused situation the envoy believed he was in, instructed him to write to the navy secretary, since the good of the service was the first rule.354 An additional note prescribed, however, that Torcy would receive a copy of all letters to the navy secretary so that he could manage the overall negotiations without confusing or fatiguing the king.355 As for the consular service once under the foreign office, it was a source of friction especially from 1699 when Jérôme Pontchartrain expanded its range beyond the Mediterranean to northern European ports from London to Danzig and altered its primary mission to information-gathering. The geographic range and sheer quantity of information accumulated, including commercial, naval, political, and military intelligence, allowed Pontchartrain to construct a parallel information network to rival that of the foreign ministry. Much to the annoyance of Torcy and the other secretaries of state, Pontchartrain reveled in sharing international as well as domestic gleanings with the king in their frequent sessions together.356 The Council of Commerce, created in 1700 and dominated by Pontchartrain clients, also expanded the range of his interests and influence and often put him at odds with the foreign secretary, the controller general, and the secretary of the Council of Commerce.357 The Pontchartrains were especially keen on colonial development. The Spanish succession seemingly opened a wide door to French interests. In 1702 Jérôme sent François-Ambroise Daubenton, nephew of Philip V’s confessor, to Spain as a naval and commercial agent upon the recommendation of Daubenton’s kinsman Jean Orry, the Spanish monarch’s French financial advisor. Daubenton’s conduct in promoting French commercial interests in Spain and its colonial markets was too much like that of an ambassador for Torcy’s liking. Pontchartrain regarded Spain and its empire as his preserve, since France’s navy secured its links with America. He was not above going behind Torcy’s back in negotiations with Bourbon Madrid, as he did in securing for France the asiento, or slave trade monopoly, and in delimiting the boundary between the French and Spanish portions of Hispaniola as required by the Treaty of Ryswick.358 He did the same with colonial border disputes with Portugal and England, again writing directly to France’s ambassadors at those courts and bypassing the foreign office.359



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Torcy was particularly wary of unwarranted interference in France’s relations with Rome and the affairs of the Gallican Church. In 1711, for instance, Pontchartrain asked Torcy to assist in resolving a dispute in his province of Paris that had simmered since 1708, when the Augustinians had elected Père Rast, allegedly openly protected by France’s enemies, as the order’s provincial general.360 Torcy’s reply – repeated to Cardinal de La Trémoille, French representative in Rome, and to France’s Augustinian provincials – declined to intervene directly because of the king’s fear of schism. Yet he cunningly noted that he was powerless to prevent a new election. Prior Jean Le Tort of the Grand Augustins in Paris conferred with Pontchartrain at Fontainebleau, but while preparing for a meeting with Torcy in Paris and hoping to avoid unnecessary jealousies, he cautioned a colleague not to mention to Torcy Pontchartrain’s continuing involvement.361 Pontchartrain’s contribution presumably included letters to his friend La Trémoille in Rome, which undoubtedly would have irked Torcy. The prior corresponded further with and finally met Torcy, and it appears that an approach was also made to Rome for a new election.362 However, neither the king nor Torcy were pleased with the Augustinians because of the original election. The secretary was further displeased with Le Tort’s manoeuvres behind his back. It was no coincidence that the royal commission investigating Augustinian convents found that three, including the Grand Augustins of Paris, did not have royally authorized constitutions and would now have to seek them humbly and on the king’s terms.363 As foreign secretary, Torcy was interested in the activities in Paris of foreigners, particularly those connected with the embassies, but he shared responsibility for them with Pontchartrain, whose supervision of the Paris region made him de facto minister of police. Like that of the Paris parlement, Pontchartrain’s jurisdiction over the capital could extend to the realm’s frontiers, especially as he cast his net to catch wartime spies. At times better informed than Torcy on the activities of resident and visiting foreigners, he relished being the first to report them to the king and then to pass along to his colleague the resulting royal orders.364 His extended network of consuls amplified his anti-espionage efforts, and he raised Torcy’s ire by addressing French embassies directly for information to aid his investigations and prosecutions.365 Torcy’s sarcasm is in full display in a letter to the French envoy in Lorraine. He assured him that Pontchartrain’s curiosity was quite laudable and that nothing was more worthy of a great minister than to turn his sights toward all the places that might interest the king’s service.

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­ evertheless, he continued, the job of a royal envoy abroad was not N that of a journalist. More pointedly, he reminded the envoy that it was contrary to royal intentions and orders to send news to others rather than to the king. Switching to a reassuring tone, Torcy advised him to go on with ­business as usual with the firm knowledge that Pontchartrain’s letter had not been authorized by the king.366 Torcy generally avoided needlessly encroaching on his colleague’s turf367 and would even intervene with the king on his behalf when asked.368 Pontchartrain was also capable of cooperation, lending his colleague the translating services of a navy commis or forwarding intelligence of an enemy agent in Amsterdam opening French mail.369 When he needed a letter intercepted as part of his surveillance activities, Pontchartrain had to make his request to Torcy.370 When peace negotiations began in earnest, Pontchartrain’s colonial and international commercial ambitions as well as his control over and advocacy of French fishing rights understandably made him anxious. Mesnager had worked well with Pontchartrain’s man ­Daubenton in Spain and had won his praise, but at Utrecht he proved to be Torcy’s man, provoking Pontchartrain’s anger by communicating with him less than the navy secretary desired, despite a special code provided for that purpose.371 Nevertheless, even though the overall direction and day-to-day management of the negotiations were in Torcy’s hands, ­Pontchartrain was a key player in colonial and trade matters, drafting memoirs approved by the king and Torcy as guidelines for France’s plenipotentiaries.372 ­Desmaretz did the same, also in conjunction with Torcy.373 Pontchartrain resisted colonial and commercial concessions as much as possible, complaining that the French envoys were not firm enough, but he knew that France’s desperate situation offered them few options.374 It is not true, however, that Pontchartrain tried to sabotage the Anglo-French trade treaty that had been a part of the London preliminaries that framed the Utrecht negotiations.375 Pontchartrain had already launched his program of re-­establishing French colonial power even before the Utrecht Treaty was signed. In his eyes, Britain had become France’s major overseas competitor.376 This hardly put him on a collision course with Torcy and his policy of rapprochement with Britain, as both hoped for more trade across the Channel but were unwilling to pay too high a price for it. Moreover, the impact of the crushing Whig electoral victory at the beginning of 1715 must not be overlooked. While Torcy hoped for continued cooperation with the Bolingbroke ministry, it was unlikely with the Whigs.377



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After the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, Pontchartrain pushed for closer commercial and political ties with Peter the Great’s Russia, whereas Torcy preferred the traditional alliance with Sweden, though now reoriented toward new goals.378 Religion provided new sources of tension.379 Louis Pontchartrain and Torcy together defended the ­liberties of the Gallican Church,380 but Louis XIV’s turn toward Rome left the Gallicans on the Conseil increasingly beleaguered. The papal bull Unigenitus finally led to the chancellor’s resignation (1 July 1714) after years of decreasing influence due to his dogged opposition to ultramontane influence.381 Far from weakening young Pontchartrain’s position in the government, the king’s shift in religious policy only strengthened it, since Jérôme, who was pro-Jesuit, counted on the society’s continuing cooperation as missionaries in his colonial expansion schemes.382 His vision of a colonially resurgent France had the old king’s backing, even when parts of it were clearly at odds with the spirit if not the letter of Utrecht.383 He also collaborated closely with Souzy, director general of fortifications, and Claude Le Blanc, intendant of Maritime Flanders and Jérôme’s kinsman, as they slyly sought to evade the mandated destruction of Dunkirk by aggrandizing nearby Mardick.384 Prior, writing to Bolingbroke as Britain and France attempted to implement their Utrecht settlement, quipped in code that for “Pontchartrain’s opinion I would give no more than [I would] for his word.”385 Although Jérôme Pontchartrain was a difficult colleague to work with, at least Torcy’s experience with him was shared by his fellow administrators. Despite Pontchartrain’s power from his cumul and especially from his role as a sort of interior minister,386 he never joined the Conseil and his relations with his father were such that the chancellor was hardly his passive mouthpiece in its sessions. The snappish navy secretary could be prying and meddlesome, but he never mounted an assault on Torcy’s direction of foreign policy as Chamillart had, especially when it was coupled with the king’s personal diplomacy. Louis XIV had the final word in setting foreign policy, but its formulation was open to the direct and indirect influence of a variety of actors in addition to the foreign minister: administrative colleagues, generals, courtiers, family, and especially Maintenon. In the Conseil itself, by design a place for other voices to debate and dispute policy, however, Torcy’s voice was strong because of his reporter’s role, the king’s confidence in his judgment, and the asymmetry of information afforded by his control of the foreign office. Despite challenges to that control by some of his colleagues, the normal bureaucratic procedure was that once policy was set, it remained

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Torcy’s task, with the assistance of his able staff, to see that it was implemented, although it would always be subject to further revision in conjunction with the king alone or with his Conseil. Curiously, the area in which the foreign secretary’s efforts were less subject to such interference was in domestic administration, to which we now turn.

11 Domestic Administration

Dangeau recorded in his journal for 16 November 1699 that Mme de Torcy had come down with smallpox. It was not her devoted husband, however, who stayed by her bedside until she recovered, but her brother, Abbé Pomponne. Indicative of his strong sense of duty to his royal master rather than of any disregard for his wife, Torcy did not visit his infected wife and thus was able to continue attending council meetings.1 From 1661 the highest levels of policy formulation and application took place in three royal councils. As we have seen, the Conseil focused on foreign policy and other great matters of state, while the Council of Finances managed fiscal and economic matters. Dispatches specialized in domestic administration. All three made decisions not in their own name, but always in that of the king, who varyingly attended their sessions, where decisions were either made or ratified. The four secretaries of state, the chancellor, and the controller general each headed departments with special attributes and specialized personnel, and each often worked with the king individually. Nonetheless, formulating policy and coordinating its application required working in concert. Some of this happened through letters and in meetings between individuals and in council meetings, but as the reign lengthened, the Conseil continued its frequent meetings, whereas Dispatches and the Council of Finances met less frequently. Even for matters dealt with in a council, individual ministers increasingly met with the king to regulate such business beforehand.2 Routine affairs were handled in a bureaucratic manner within departments by their heads and administrative staff.3 Courtiers, officials lower in the hierarchy, provincial officials and elites, and other suppliants all sought the favour of these ministers, who in turn sought the king’s favour. However, the path to such favour often ran through the

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administrative bureaus. The influence these clerks wielded, while impossible to measure, makes occasional yet tantalizing appearances in the official records.4

T h e C o u n c il o f Di spatches Another royal council presided over by Louis XIV and attended by all four secretaries of state was Dispatches; it was the council responsible for coordinating domestic affairs. Despite fewer meetings, Dispatches continued to play an important role during Louis XIV’s last years as the conciliar watchdog, guardian of public security, arbiter of disagreements among crown officials, occasional broker of royal patronage, and channel through which the central government was warned of provincial unrest or of conflicts that could conjure it.5 The whole state edifice was built and animated by money, so it is no surprise that the controller general’s department was the royal administration’s largest in scope and personnel. The controller general himself sat on Dispatches (and on the Conseil as a minister), headed the Council of Finances, and frequently worked individually with the king.6 His power over provincial administration was immense, in part because he named most of the intendants (excluding those in ports, dependent on the navy secretary, and those in conquered provinces or with armies, dependent on the war secretary).7 Surveys of the reign’s administrative correspondence reveal how frequently he communicated with the intendants and how widely the topics ranged, as finance and economics touched so many other matters. The intendants also had frequent and important dealings with the four secretaries of state and the chancellor. Although loath to have them intrude on what he regarded as his turf,8 Chamillart struggled to direct the war as well as finance it. When he received a letter from his client the bishop of Nantes about a squabble with soldiers over hunting encroachments, his testy marginal note pointed out that he had already told the bishop to address himself to Torcy, whose province it was, insisting that only war matters were his concern.9 When Berry’s intendant, reporting on the costs and problems connected with prosecuting a province-wide arson epidemic, asked the controller general if he might also write the chancellor and the province’s secretary of state, Chamillart heartily assented. When informed of a proposed establishment in Grenoble for the education of young ladies destined for domestic service, Chamillart’s marginalia indicated that this was Torcy’s affair.10



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Increasingly, the secretaries of state also became arbiters of Protestant affairs. Secretary of State Balthazar Phélypeaux, marquis de Châteauneuf, responsible for Protestant affairs from 1676 until his death in 1700, often consulted with the king until the 1685 Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which Saint-Simon claimed rendered his secretaryship almost nil.11 Ongoing problems with Huguenots and New Converts, however, continued to generate a steady volume of provincial administrative activity, so that Châteauneuf and his son and successor Louis IV Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, still attended to Protestant matters but now as a secretary of state in his assigned provinces.12 Although the lack of a specialty did reduce Châteauneuf’s workload and influence, he remained responsible for the usual flow of business to and from the rather considerable number of provinces and the four parlements in his charge,13 especially since controllers general following Colbert left more and more provincial matters to the secretaries of state. While stressing Châteauneuf’s dependence on his fellow secretaries because he was not a minister, Sourches nonetheless remarked upon his wit, admirable ability to report on matters in Dispatches, and expertise in Protestant affairs, which still counted for something.14 His particular grouping of provinces, based on their religious composition at the time his charge was created in 1598, contained many Huguenots. Later, La Vrillière helped suppress the Camisard Revolt, even though it brought him into conflict with the powerful war department.15 Documents issued by Dispatches included legislative acts such as various types of “lettres patentes” (letters patent) signed by the king and a secretary of state. Some were sealed with the chancellor’s grand seal, but increasingly they were sealed by a secretary with a smaller seal or not sealed at all. “Arrêts du Conseil” (conciliar decisions) were of various types and had the advantage of not requiring registration by a superior court. The secretaries of state and their clerks attached to Dispatches translated the council’s decisions into the language of an arrêt en commandement (a decision made in the king’s presence), which opened significantly by announcing that “the king being in his council …” and concluding with an endorsement by a secretary of state, signing his family name (“Colbert” or “Phélypeaux,” for example), bypassing the chancellor. Those executive directives were among the chief weapons in Dispatches’ legal armory.16 This council was an excellent training ground in domestic administration. Both Louis XIV and Louis XV used it to prepare royal heirs before calling them to the Conseil.17 The Grand Dauphin entered Dispatches in

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1688, and his son, the heir presumptive Burgundy, entered in 1699. On 6 December 1712, Berry, Louis’s grandson and heir (after Burgundy’s death), entered Dispatches and attended with his grandfather, marking the council’s persistent significance in the reign’s final years.18 Secretaries of state who were not yet – or never became – ministers worked in Dispatches with the king and other high officials on important domestic matters.19 The only detailed account of what actually transpired in Dispatches can be found in a 1710 report in Torcy’s journal and concerned the archbishop of Aix-en-Provence Charles-Gaspard-Guillaume de ­Vintimille’s request that the king confirm his right to control admission to and expulsion from the Aix seminary, to which the seminary’s priests objected. Fearing the caprice and bad temper of this archbishop or his successors, Torcy proposed what he termed a moderate and conciliatory solution: the archbishop could control entry, but not exclusively control expulsion. Torcy assessed his support: Chancellor Pontchartrain and La Vrillière agreed with him, whereas Jérôme Pontchartrain, as often happened, proposed something odd and Voysin, Beauvillier, and Burgundy supported the archbishop’s request. The archbishop’s insinuations had painted the seminary priests as Jansenists and overt rebels against both church and state, which naturally incensed Burgundy and Beauvillier. Moreover, even before he began his report, Torcy saw by the king’s gestures and few words that he had already decided in favour of the archbishop and was thus not likely to be pleased with his proposal. Louis portrayed the seminarians as motivated only by unruliness, and Torcy confided to his journal, perhaps with irony, that one must presume that the king’s understanding was superior to that of his dissenting councillors.20 As in the Conseil, debate in Dispatches often split along the lines of the néo-politiques Torcy and Desmaretz and the dévots Beauvillier and Burgundy. The swing votes included Jérôme Pontchartrain, who was so moody and unpredictable that Torcy wrote him off as a dependable ally, and Voysin, war secretary from 1709, who at first voted with the moderates but later turned against them. While much is made of interdepartmental quarrels and jealousies in Saint-Simon’s waspish memoirs, it is clear that it was the frequent need to work together and the reality of actually doing so that occasioned these clashes. Interdepartmental cooperation was a part of the routine of government.21 For example, in writing to intendant Lebret of a disputed matter on Torcy’s behalf, Blondel referenced further letters to him from Torcy and Controller General Pontchartrain and previewed Dispatches’ likely decision, ­stressing



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its desire to accommodate the losing side as well. Blondel shared that he had spoken with Pontchartrain’s commis about the details and would also consult with Clair Adam about the discussion of the matter in Dispatches. He promised that when all was resolved, Torcy would send the requested order. Although the dispute grew convoluted and dragged on, interdepartmental cooperation continued. When the king finally imposed a resolution, Pontchartrain informed Lebret, adding that Torcy would soon send him the details.22 Louis Pontchartrain remained a strong advocate of cooperation when he became chancellor on 3 September 1699. While he brought new energy to and increased the power of an office in decline since the beginning of the reign, he nonetheless streamlined it, insisting that the chancellery need not be burdened by cases that should be heard by the secretaries of state. This was clearly due in part to the shift from an older judicial-based style of administration to a more bureaucratic approach animated less by men of judicial background, but increasingly, especially at the bureau level, by functionaries trained in administrative procedures and tied to the head of a department or the king rather than to a judicial body. Pontchartrain insisted that officials looking to him for assistance, even if they were his judicial clients, follow regular channels in dealing with central or provincial administrative hierarchies.23 Thus, he wrote to the advocate general of Aix’s parlement that matters of ordinary jurisdiction were Torcy’s preserve and instructed the first president of Brittany’s parlement to submit his request to the king by way of Torcy.24 In answering a Rennes official’s letter about a financial conflict with the bishop of Nantes, he replied that such matters went through Torcy as the province’s secretary of state and were decided according to his report to the king and his council.25 As Louis XIV’s reign lengthened and greater stability and routine set in, department heads working individually with the monarch  – under Louis XIV known as the liasse (literally, a bundle of papers) – conducted an increasing volume of state business.26 This practice likely increased during Louvois’s ministry, as he preferred private work sessions. He was less of an orator than the Colberts, and individual encounters with the king better served his penchant for insinuating himself into the affairs of other departments.27 Individual consultations still met the ideal of the king “taking counsel” because decisions in the form of arrêts en commandement still required his assent and opened with the requisite reference to the king being in his council, but this prevents historians from differentiating arrêts decided in council sessions from those that were

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not. Like council meetings, the liasse tended to take place according to a flexible schedule. While some administrators had a regular time slot for meetings with the king, Torcy did not, since he frequently came to the king with the latest dispatches. Typically, a department head arrived at the Cabinet, leaving at the door the assistant who had carried his bag of papers, entered, and then sat in an armless folding chair opposite the king, seated in a large armchair behind a cloth-covered table furnished by the Cabinet staff with paper, pens, and ink. They set to work reading dispatches and jointly drafting replies or correcting those the official brought (often drafted by his clerks), with the monarch’s verbal directives written up later by the official or his staff. Throughout the session, problems and their possible resolution were turned over in a relatively informal and conversational manner, offering the administrator opportune moments to try to influence policy and secure appointments and other favours for family, friends, and clients, despite the stiff competition from other ministers and courtiers. These one-on-one sessions afforded administrators rare glimpses of their master’s personal side, but more regularly they allowed the king to monitor the state’s administrative departments.28 Although the role of Dispatches continued throughout the reign, the secretary, bearing his sheaf of papers and closeted with the king, handled an increasing portion of routine and non-contentious administrative work.29

T he R o u t in e o f P rov in ci al Admi ni strati on The relatively tiny group of ministers, officials, and clerks centred in Versailles and Paris relied on local aristocratic elites, venal office-­ holders, and the clergy to project royal power into the provinces. As we have seen, some recent scholarship focuses on a shift from a traditional state-centred concept of government to a broader process called “governance.” Governance consists of “steering” by state officials at the centre and “rowing” by local officials and non-state actors such that the state’s power is exerted horizontally and not just hierarchically.30 Steering by state actors is typically accomplished through “information-­ gathering, rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement,”31 and Torcy and his clerks employed all of these means. In the local village it was the parish priest who typically spoke the printed words written on behalf of the distant king. His vigilance and cooperation were indispensable, particularly since from 1690 the royal government’s intrusion into local affairs through regulation and monitoring was on the rise.32 Local



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office-­holders were not the passive tools of the central administration, but acted as mediators between the centre and the periphery or asked the king to referee among conflicting local interests.33 The foreign secretary kept busy granting audiences to provincial individuals and delegations.34 Torcy corresponded with thirty-nine archbishops and bishops; fourteen provincial governors, lieutenants-general, and military commandants; eight intendants; seven sovereign or superior courts (three parlements, two Chambres des comptes, and two Cours des monnaies); and three provincial estates.35 His network of provincial correspondents included above all the intendants, the trained, loyal representatives who formed a corps of information-collectors and informants,36 as well as lesser officials, Parisian officials on mission, itinerant agents, relatives, and friends. Informants on the spot facilitated the centre’s preparation of reports and recommendations to the king and his councils. Depending on the issue and an individual’s position in the hierarchy, Torcy might solicit further information37 or advice on solutions.38 This informationgathering was essential to those at Versailles who performed the four fundamental tasks of governance.39 First, based on input from state and non-state actors, they set state goals ranging from broad policy orientations to operational ends. Second, especially with the king in a council or individually, they prioritized, reconciled, and coordinated the plethora of goals that often conflicted with one another or with the state’s basic capacities, such as finances. Implementation, the third task, might also involve both state and non-state actors. The fourth task consisted of gathering and processing the feedback required to improve all governance tasks. We will catch glimpses of each of these tasks being performed in the examples that follow. Preserving public security ranked high among the monarchy’s goals. Writing to Michel V Bégon, intendant of the newly formed (April 1694) La Rochelle generality, Torcy deplored the disorders in Pons, a town south of the chief market centre of Saintes, but assured Bégon that the king was pleased to hear of the suppression of a nearby peasant uprising. To prevent a recurrence, Torcy sent him a packet of lettres des cachets with blanks for filling in names. Bégon, Torcy’s kinsman, worked closely with him, sending him lists of local landlords and establishing or reorganizing présidiaux (special appeals courts).40 This judicial reorganization prompted letters of complaint from the lieutenant-general and the court’s assessor, but Torcy replied reprovingly that before he took any report of dissatisfaction to Dispatches, it had to be written with clarity.41 Frustrated, the assessor wrote again, requesting that if the secretary

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appointed an investigator, it be anyone other than Bégon. From these letters come two observations. First, the central government depended on the royal courts and their magistrates along with a royal representative (intendant, sub-delegate, local commander, or town governor) to cooperate in order to give Dispatches early warning of trouble. Second, municipal magistrates and royal intendants served as checks and balances on one another’s authority.42 Marked by memories of the Fronde, Louis XIV abhorred public disorder. Torcy informed Lebret that the king had learned of disorders in Marseille brought on by weakness and negligence. Such a large city could ill afford such threats to what he termed safety and public liberty.43 He ordered him to coordinate with local judiciary and other provincial officials to punish the troublemakers promptly. Most citizens shared this concern for law and order, craving safety for themselves, their families, and their possessions, regarding its provision as the prerequisite to the free exercise of their rights and privileges and an essential duty of monarchy.44 The state was aware of this “public opinion” as well as of the wide range of other concerns, rumours, and mutterings expressed by and circulating among all social groups. The police and officials in the capital and provinces monitored oral as well as written expression in the kingdom’s noisy streets and other public places.45 The secretary also concerned himself with individual lawlessness. A 1706 circular letter to intendants listed items stolen from a Lyon merchant on his way home from Limoges and provided physical descriptions of the culprits and their horses, down to the colour of the harnesses.46 In another case, Sisteron’s lieutenant du roi reported intervening in a row among the local bourgeoisie involving two men who tried to force a merchant to sell them glass at a price lower than agreed on when the order was placed. When the merchant refused, the two went on a rampage, mistreating all who opposed them, including a pregnant woman, and pursuing them into a church. Because a lieutenant du roi was involved, Torcy informed the Provence parlement that the matter was for him to judge, not them.47 However, royal intervention locally was not automatic. Informing Champagne’s intendant of a request from a man claiming to have been robbed on the highway, Torcy asked if there was any problem with those already examining the case that required royal intervention to assure justice, adding that he awaited this clarification.48 Conflicts and criminal activity were best avoided through the enforcement of existing laws, as he reminded Provence’s intendant in referencing a 1691 arrêt condemning certain games of chance, including “Barsette”



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and “Pharaon.” Of course, the reminder suggests that these games were still being played despite the ban.49 Along with criminals of the lower sort, Torcy confronted upper-class miscreants. Nobles were expected to abstain from duels or be dealt with harshly, and Torcy averred that this stricture grew everyday more inflexible.50 Yet when a count fleeing his creditors sought refuge with his companions in an Augustinian convent, Torcy informed local authorities to arrest the companions but set the nobleman free, a clear example of the privilege of rank. Writing an official at the chateau of Nantes concerning a nobleman’s imprisonment, Torcy mentioned that he had also written intendant Ferrand for clarification. Two weeks later he again wrote Ferrand, this time seeking information in a case where a widow’s kin requested a lettre de cachet to imprison her for scandalous living. In cooperation with d’Argenson, who was required to report annually to the secretaries on the prisoners they had ordered detained, Torcy’s department monitored these inmates and the frequent transfers that took place.51 Mercy had its place in this scheme as well. As a thoughtful wielder of police power, Torcy sought to achieve the proper balance between gentleness and the fear of punishment in eliciting suitable behaviour.52 In 1691 he sent his intendants a circular letter listing the name and rank of malefactors who had fled, been imprisoned, or exiled. Each was to annotate his list indicating what royal grace he would advise the king to grant.53 In this as in so many matters, Torcy knew that those on the spot were often the best informed, and he did not regard it as incompatible with centralized decision-making to solicit their feedback. Indeed, civil administration could only benefit from better-educated provincial officials, which is why the king promoted legal studies in Provence to equip future bureaucrats to administer justice.54 Beyond their diplomatic implications, national security matters occupied the foreign secretary at the local level. With the king at the war front, Torcy coordinated the prosecution of someone in Champagne accused of seditious speech.55 In 1705 d’Argenson wrote him about a chevalier de Rozet in the Bastille, who had everyone there in an uproar because of his ravings about an alleged conspiracy to assassinate the king. He dismissed him as mad but promised to keep Torcy informed.56 The book trade was always monitored, especially during wartime. Furious at some anonymous pamphlets and letters he received in 1707, Torcy urged greater vigilance in tracking down and punishing purveyors of illegal books and pamphlets.57

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Foreign office clerks drew up and sent out commissions and orders for the auxiliaries of the department’s provincial governors, ­including lieutenants-­general, more localized venal lieutenants du roi (created in 1692), and commandants en chef, who were primarily military commanders.58 Lieutenants general and commandants were like vice-­governors, acting for governors normally absent at court or checking on any who were overly ambitious.59 The secretary intervened in disputes between governors and their subordinates, although he regularly backed all of them against any locals who flouted their authority.60 Appointed governor of Provence, Villars was dismayed to learn that Torcy wrote directly to his four lieutenants general. He had assumed that they were his subordinates, but none felt obliged to share the minister’s orders with him.61 In 1692, as survivancier, Torcy wrote to Henri Charles de Beaumanoir, marquis de Lavardin, lieutenant-general in Brittany, to share intelligence from soldiers and sailors saved from the Isle of Jersey and from a person in La Rochelle of a possible English coastal descent, urging him to investigate. Torcy also wrote Bordeaux intendant Louis Bazin de Bezons about a Protestant subject in Bayonne who regularly sent news to someone in Amsterdam. He was to watch the man to discover his sources, arrest him, and send word to Paris. In 1708 an official in Brest forwarded Torcy information extracted from an arrested spy. Pleased that the man had finally come clean, he eagerly requested further confessions.62 A governor might also assist Torcy with diplomatic business. ­Dangeau recorded the stir at court when word arrived on 20 June 1696 that ­Pamplona’s governor had sent the duc de Gramont, governor of Navarre and Béarn, letters from Spain’s king addressed to Louis XIV and members of his family announcing the death of the pro-Austrian queen mother.63 Her passing was important news at a Versailles closely monitoring the effect of the delicate balance of influences on the feeble ­Carlos II. Later, Gramont helped Torcy translate letters into Spanish, earning Louis XIV’s praise for his skills when the minister showed them to him.64 From 1704 to 1705 Gramont again deployed these skills when sent as ambassador to Louis XIV’s grandson Philip V. Upon his return to his governorship, Gramont remained one of Torcy’s close advisors on Spanish affairs.65 Military affairs underlined the need for interdepartmental cooperation in provincial administration. During the Camisard Revolt, La ­Vrillière sent Torcy intelligence of enemy communication with the rebels. Although already aware of this, Torcy assured his colleague that he had again passed this information on to the commandants in ­Provence and



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Dauphiné. A few months later Torcy forwarded intelligence to C ­ hamillart of Protestant movements in the Alpine valleys of Dauphiné. Fearing that they might link up with Languedoc’s rebels, Torcy urged him to provide troops to prevent it.66 Dauphiné’s intendant Bouchu kept him apprised of the Duke of Savoy’s war preparations and collaborated with him on the more mundane matter of funding Fort Barraux’s chapel. The post, recently renovated by Vauban, protected the approach to Grenoble from Savoy. The secretary assured Bouchu that this small expense would be charged to the treasurers of the extraordinary of war.67 Problems with New Converts, or as Torcy sometimes labeled them, the “mal convertis” (poorly converted),68 increased from 1685, giving the central administration and its provincial agents even greater reason for local interference.69 The monitoring of attendance at Mass and the taking of the Sacrament involved the intendant and his associates in an almost perpetual inquest requiring constant travel and the questioning of local officials. Croissy’s earlier calls for prompt and vigorous action had fallen off as war with Europe raged, but after Ryswick Torcy peppered his intendants with requests for information on local Protestant holdouts and New Converts as well as for advice on how to deal with them. Instructions to the intendants in 1699 stated unambiguously that occasional efforts no longer sufficed.70 What was required of the intendants now was long-term and constant attention, with eyes always open to anything occurring in their jurisdiction regarding religion, which they were to regard as their principal and most important undertaking.71 The municipalities of Provence were later informed that only good subjects, defined as good Catholics, could be elected to local office (subject to the intendant’s advice). Torcy promised to issue the orders necessary to assure compliance.72 Like his colleagues, Torcy worked ceaselessly to steer local officials toward the rigorous application of the regulations implementing the Revocation, on occasion quoting from them in his letters to the intendants. He wanted this accomplished, however, without causing public scandal, a phrase he employed more than once in urging that zeal be tempered with prudence.73 In a circular letter to five of his intendants, Torcy reported that the Conseil had heard from Languedoc’s Basville of the arrest of a man acting as an agent for another in reconverting New Converts. He appended a description and ordered the man’s arrest on sight.74 During the Camisard Revolt, Torcy had no qualms about treating rebels harshly. He informed Basville of a party of two refugee ministers and eight former French officers traveling to the Cevennes from Holland

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via Germany, Switzerland, and Savoy carrying letters of exchange for 25,000 to 30,000 florins drawn on banks in Lyon and a letter of introduction to the Duke of Savoy from his envoy in The Hague. The intendant was to do all he could to apprehend this dangerous group.75 As Torcy indicated to Lebret, the king wanted a list of New Converts imprisoned in Provence, with names, ranks, and dates of imprisonment, the official who had authorized their incarceration, and an account of their prison behaviour. The inquiry was intended to determine who, through sincere conversion and good conduct, might be released. While the regime dealt harshly with religious dissent, it had no desire to keep New Converts imprisoned longer than necessary.76 At one level Torcy had no pity for those who failed at their religious duties or who wanted to flee France, observing that seizing their goods should be an effective punishment.77 Yet he was not rigidly iron-fisted. While characterizing some formerly Protestant women as obstinate and opinionated, he nonetheless urged the intendant to avoid making extreme threats he could not carry out.78 He desired results with minimal disorder, urging subordinates to be firm yet flexible and pragmatic. Acknowledging that some conversions involved much more disorder than others, he nonetheless thought it better to punish a few of the most opinionated in order to hold on to the others.79 He also warmly welcomed genuine converts.80 Yet in 1692 he intervened on behalf of English Quaker William Bromfield and his wife, neither of whom was a convert. To spare them persecution by their Catholic neighbours in Pontoise, Torcy instructed the Paris police chief to permit them to live in the capital and to help them find quarters. This unexpected leniency was because a number of Quakers had remained loyal to James II and moved in Jacobite circles, incurring both Whig and Tory wrath. Bromfield was also a Jacobite agent and a merchant employed by Renaudot, the navy’s and foreign office’s “spymaster.”81 In addition to their usual religious duties and help with New Converts, Catholic clergy, especially the episcopal hierarchy, were vital components of the state’s administrative machinery, as they controlled property and personnel that afforded them influence. In 1711 the foreign office supervised 6 of the kingdom’s 16 archbishops and 28 of its 97 bishops, for a total of 34 of its 113 archdioceses and dioceses or 30 per cent of the total (table 11.1). Torcy’s share of archbishops, at nearly 31 per cent, was higher than that of his three colleagues, a legacy of the historic spread of dioceses in his provinces rather than the result of a conscious distribution. While this added to the workload of his bureaus, it also

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Table 11.1 Archbishops and bishops supervised by Torcy, 17111 Provinces2 Bordeaux

Arles Tours

Auch

Aix Lyon4 Bourges Reims

Sens Paris

Archdiocese and Dioceses Bordeaux Condom Luçon Arles Tours Vannes Tréguier Auch Lectoure Dax Aix Sisteron Lyon Mâcon Bourges St Flour Reims Noyon Beauvais Sens Paris

Angoulême Poitiers Périgueux Marseille Nantes St Malo St Pol-de-Léon Tarbes Aire Bazas Apt Gap Langres

Saintes La Rochelle

Sarlat Agen

Toulon St Brieux Cornouailles3 Le Mans Bayonne Comminges Lescar Riez

St Paul Dol Rennes Angers Oléron Couserans

Chalon sur-Saône

Autun

Tulles Le Puy Châlons-en-Champagne Boulogne

Limoges

Clermont

Laon Senlis

Amiens Soissons

Troyes Meaux

Nevers Chartres

Auxerre Orléans

Fréjus

Sources: bn mf 20756, fols 247–9, listing all the dioceses and archdioceses of the kingdom; supplemented by Bergin, Crown, Church, x (Map 1), 17 (Map 2); and aae md 1180, fol. 130r–v, 25 Apr. 1711, for those supervised by the foreign secretary.

1 Those in italics were under the foreign secretary’s supervision. aae md 1180, fol. 130r–v, 25 Apr. 1711 (a circulation list for a circular letter of that date). The foreign secretary supervised 6 of the kingdom’s 16 archdioceses and 34 of its 113 dioceses. 2 This list does not include archdioceses and dioceses added by Louis XIV’s conquests (i.e., the archdioceses of Cambrai and Besançon, the diocese of Perpignan, and the Principality of Orange) and the not yet fully integrated “Three Bishoprics” (Metz, Toul, and Verdun), still tied to the Holy Roman Empire. See Bergin, Crown, Church, 18–36, on the special status and problems of these areas. 3 Quimper. 4 In March 1708 the foreign secretary exchanged Dauphiné for Lyon with the war secretary.

increased patronage possibilities. A secretary of state officially worked with such an ecclesiastical appointment only once the choice of who was to fill it had been made by processing the paperwork for it and the full range of other benefices,82 but prior to that he had ample opportunity to promote his candidates with the king, the royal confessor, or anyone else with influence.83 Torcy worked diligently on behalf of kin, clients, clerks, and foreign prelates and diplomats loyal to France. In 1710 he

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informed his friend Cardinal Gualterio, former nuncio and French client, that the king had named him abbot of the immensely wealthy St Rémy monastery of Rheims.84 But not all division of ecclesiastical spoils was amicable. Torcy tartly advised Oléron’s bishop that he had no right to appoint a curate in the town of Vacqué, since it was not in his diocese and belonged to its patron, the king.85 When Cardinal Bouillon fled to France’s enemies in 1710, Pontchartrain and Beauvillier were at loggerheads in Dispatches over the distribution of Cluny and Bouillon’s other abbeys.86 In this highly hierarchical society, central and local officials often clashed with the clergy, as all jockeyed to protect their privileges from encroachment. Sometimes the intendant mediated, as when Torcy instructed Bouchu to resolve differences between a cathedral chapter and Dauphiné’s general hospital, but at other times those at the centre had to intervene to reconcile and coordinate conflicting goals at the local level and align them with those set by the central state. In 1691 Torcy wrote Provence’s intendant about the quarrel of Arles’s archbishop and cathedral canons with officers of the sénéchaussée (a lower court such as a présidial) over the latter’s demand for admission to the cathedral’s higher choir stalls. Having obtained further details, Torcy reported that the king, following Torcy’s advice, had ruled that the officers were not entitled to the alleged right they had wrongly exercised for some time.87 Torcy forwarded to a later archbishop of Arles a letter of complaint to the king from his diocese and cautioned him that bad treatment only exacerbated discontent, adding more soothingly yet pointedly that he would leave it to his prudence to do what he thought best.88 He reminded the bishop of Nantes, locked in a struggle with the Chambre des comptes over a chapel and its funding, of the virtue of tranquility in promoting the king’s service and public edification. He apparently took the hint, and Torcy notified the intendant of the matter’s resolution.89 Some years later, however, the same bishop attempted to bypass the secretary by writing directly to the king to complain that Torcy was frustrating his legitimate request for another chapel. The king, however, had royal confessor Père Tellier forward the letter to Torcy so that he could inform the king on the appropriateness of the bishop’s request.90 The Wisdom of Solomon was required time and again to head off a potential clash between church and state. Entirely in his own hand, Torcy replied to the intendant of Dauphiné’s report of Vienne’s disputed mayoral election and its archbishop’s reasons for his opposition. Torcy wrote reassuringly that because the intendant’s account presented all



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parties’ reasons in a clear and orderly fashion, the king easily decided the matter in accordance with the intendant’s recommendation that the election stand. He added, however, that the king did not issue an arrêt on this occasion so as not to offend a generally cooperative prelate or discourage his generosity toward the local general hospital and that the king left aside any determination of rights. In a letter making this assertion of royal power more palatable, Torcy instructed the archbishop to reach a face-saving accommodation.91 Louis XIV, believing that “in order to maintain public discipline [kings] must lend vigorous aid to those who administer their authority,” eagerly defended the rights, prominence, and dignity of those who exercised authority in his name in the provinces.92 To investigate complaints from Brittany’s governor, the duc de Chaulnes, that he had been denied due honour during a Te Deum sung in his presence in the cathedral, Torcy asked the intendant about the practice in other cathedrals. With that information in hand and the decision made, Torcy relayed to the bishop and canons the king’s strong displeasure with their lack of respect and shared with the bishop his own anger over this behaviour, signaling the severity of the rebuke by enshrining the governor’s rights in an arrêt.93 Torcy also disapproved of parish priests encroaching on civil authority, even for desirable ends, such as when a priest overstepped his rights by disciplining a couple living in concubinage. Rather than withholding the sacraments, the normal first step within his power, the priest had appealed to the ordinary judges to punish and imprison the culprits.94 More shocking was the behaviour of two nuns, already convicted of immorality and indecency, who tried to poison another nun. Torcy obligingly sent Bishop Bossuet the necessary lettres de cachet.95 Even seemingly trivial challenges or acts of disrespect to an intendant elicited a strong reaction. Torcy wrote the lieutenant de roi of Navarrins about a sentinel who had delayed the intendant at the city gate with words and actions entirely lacking in the respect owed someone entrusted with the king’s business, but insisted that the fault rested with the lieutenant’s orders to the sentry. Branding the officer’s conduct entirely contrary to royal service, Torcy informed him that he would have to justify himself to the king.96 While Torcy and the king had no patience for clerical interference in civil affairs, this administrative protocol was not reciprocal. Intendants were the king’s provincial representatives as well as his eyes and ears. Louis XIV had Torcy discreetly seek the advice of the intendant in Béarn and Navarre, François Feydeau du Plessis, on a petition from one of the

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bishop of Lescar’s priests. When Breton bishops clashed over interference in one another’s dioceses, Torcy ordered them to submit themselves to the intendant Louis Béchameil de Nointel, who acted in the king’s name. Similarly, he employed the intendant on the spot to intervene between a bishop and his chapter over honours the latter complained they were denied. Even a bishop’s word was subject to the intendant’s verification, as Torcy wrote Lebret concerning conflicting counter-­charges exchanged between the bishop of Toulouse and the canons of the church of Cuers. The canons complained of the doctrines of two curates, the bishop imputed the canons’ morals, and Torcy assured Lebret that while the king did not want to doubt the bishop, he wanted to determine what exactly was going on.97 Not all church business involved conflict resolution. Seminaries were established, as in the diocese of Oléron in 1708, or the secretary advised a chapter or a bishop’s vicar general during a vacancy. The department also authorized expenditures on behalf of clergy, including monies from goods seized from Protestant churches and redirected to priests involved in conversions. Clerks issued letters enjoining the clergy to mark public occasions such as victory with Te Deums and prayers at times of national mourning.98 Torcy also saw to it that only crown-authorized clerical establishments continued to exist and that these were well regulated through authorized inspections.99 Louis XIV required the ecclesiastical hierarchy to deal decisively with faulty doctrine, and Torcy assured and documented their compliance. In 1700 he informed Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims, that the king wanted to know if he had made it clear to his bishops that they were to publish as widely as possible the papal constitution of 12 March 1699 condemning one of Fénelon’s works. Requiring more than assent, he requested two copies of the printed order the archbishop had sent throughout his province, which foreign office clerks filed with the request’s minute when they were received. The intendants were enlisted to prevent reprints of Cornelius Jansen’s works and stop sales of copies of subversive Dutch sermons.100 A number of letters concerning New Converts and their property touch on other royal concerns, including public welfare, charity, and education. Torcy reminded Lebret that a worthy clergyman’s request was nonetheless directly contrary to standing royal orders that material taken from dismantled Protestant temples be used in building or repairing the local general hospital.101 Indeed, the theme of building or repairing c­ haritable institutions pervades Torcy’s correspondence. The



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general hospital, regarded as a municipal rather than a religious establishment, was envisioned as a panacea for the problems of the poor.102 In exchange for funds for schools, including those to indoctrinate New Converts, the king required details of how they were to be run. Anxious that teaching take place in a proper manner, Torcy directed intendants to regulate what went on in classrooms more closely.103 In the tradition of his uncle Colbert, Torcy directed the intendants in the assembling of “a massive bank of information that the crown could use not only for reform and state-building, but also for strengthening its own power in the long struggle against the independent power of traditional nobles and the parlements.”104 Knowledge of provincial affairs aided foreign ministry bureaucrats as they steered the politics and policies of the provincial estates. While some estates assisted with local administration, their most important role was in voting, levying, and collecting taxes suggested by the crown, even though the vote itself was increasingly a formality. Estates also provided feedback by channeling provincial concerns and grievances to the king through “cahiers des doléances” (notebooks of grievances), shepherded through discussion in Dispatches by the province’s secretary of state, who then drew up a point-by-point reply.105 Brittany and Provence were among the four grands pays d’états, while Béarn, Bigorre, and Nébouzan were smaller estates along the Pyrenees frontier dependent on the Crown of Navarre. Béarn-Navarre’s various estates continued to gather but were often so disorganized that Torcy finally asked that they send a delegation of deputies to Versailles to discuss their grievances. Provence’s Assembly of Communities (which replaced the estates in 1639), presided over by the archbishop of Aix, was given to internecine squabbling, but with a mixture of promises and prodding they usually followed the leadership of Lieutenant-General Grignan and intendants Pierre Cardin Lebret (until 1704) and his son Cardin Lebret. Deputies from the towns of D ­ auphiné met in assemblies that the intendant labeled clandestine because since 1628 they had been forbidden to meet without royal permission, which was never granted during Louis XIV’s reign.106 Brittany’s estates occasionally displayed some of their former vigour, but Torcy’s department steered them with great care. Every biennium from 1695, Adam carried lists to Rennes of town deputies to be summoned, while annotations on lists of nobles noted recent deaths, derogations, and those away with the military. Adam sought out the governor, whether at court, in Paris, at the front, or at his country estate, to propose the agenda and a projected subsidy to steer the deputies in the desired

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direction.107 When the comte de Toulouse, Louis XIV’s legitimated son, became governor in 1695, Torcy tried to instruct him in his privileges and arcane duties. He later confided to his journal that when a Breton deputation arrived at Versailles for a royal audience, Toulouse vacated his place as governor and moved to the ranks of the royal princes, but as the lowest-ranking of the royal princes, this was a less favoured place than had he remained with the Breton delegation. Torcy concluded that he believed him to have been badly advised.108 After the Fronde the royal government kept a tighter rein on the often fractious municipalities, but local elites still had room for manoeuvre and clashes were common among officials within and outside city boundaries. Municipal elections were frequent flashpoints and could turn unruly when local cabals collided, as they did in Marseille in 1693.109 Before Louis XIV’s reign these disputes were typically resolved through long, drawn-out, and complicated lawsuits as part of an overall negotiating strategy, but now they were increasingly settled administratively rather than judicially by deft steering from Versailles.110 Torcy aimed to maintain public order and assure responsible local governance while defending royal rights. Louis XIV’s obsession with order extended to ceremony, no triviality since hierarchy often manifests itself in people’s arrangement in space, including proximity to a person, a position in a procession, or precedence of entry or exit into or from a place.111 More mundane jurisdictional disputes could also elicit royal intervention to maintain peace while underscoring the king’s role as arbiter of public affairs.112 Royal officials who abused their power were viewed as subverting proper order and subject to royal rebuke, as the major of Navarrins in Béarn discovered when the king received complaints of his violence toward the locals. Outraged, Louis ordered the town’s governor to investigate and if the charges were confirmed to express his displeasure with the abuse of an authority given for his subjects’ relief rather than their continual harassment.113 Likewise, complaints of scandal elicited inquiries and possible intervention, as when Torcy instructed the intendant to investigate allegations of impropriety against the bishop of Digne.114 The state sought information to better extract resources from the kingdom, especially money, men, and matériel for war, but there was also a genuine concern for the welfare of its inhabitants and for provincial improvements. After the terrible winter of 1708–09, for instance, Torcy was anxious that grain reach the hungry in Provence. He relayed to a local official the king’s and Desmaretz’s pleasure that he had adopted



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the best means possible for dealing with disorders among the local butchers and the interruption of grain boats up the Rhône. Torcy also worked with the controller general on grain shortages already surfacing in ­Toulon.115 Public health emergencies caught his attention as well. In 1691 he responded to concerns about the possible arrival of plague in Provence by interdicting commerce with its source, the Kingdom of Naples, and with the Papal States, should it spread there. He would not, however, stop the courier service to Toulon and Marseille,116 likely to maintain communications with Catinat’s army poised to attack Nice when the 1691 campaign opened. Torcy was also proactive, as when he instructed Provence’s intendant to provide public fountains for clean water and repair local canals.117 A secretary of state’s capacity for dispensing the fruits of patronage was enormous, but it is not always possible to determine precisely who influenced or made such decisions. In theory and often in practice the king had the final say.118 Nevertheless, secretaries oversaw and influenced appointments in their own bureaucracies and even more in their provinces, and they had other resources for rewarding family, friends, clients, and supplicants favoured by power brokers.119 Access to and control of the information flow between these provinces and the court frequently offered decisive leverage, even as others jockeyed to influence these appointments. In 1691 Torcy wrote an informant in his own hand that the king wanted to know the precise state of health of the lieutenant-­ general of Saintonge and Angoumois. The informant was to gather this information secretly and send it to Torcy so that he could relay it to the king.120 Both dispatch and discretion were necessary to assure Torcy’s influence in naming a replacement upon news of the lieutenant-­general’s death. News of deaths traveled quickly and set off a scramble for honours left behind, as when Tallard wrote Torcy from his London embassy about an office whose holder he heard had died.121 The routine of renewing or appointing a governor, lieutenant, or major in a town began by drawing up an authorizing document that was then sent out to the local sovereign court as petites lettres patentes under a yellow seal, with the appointment, usually to run for three years. Occasionally, however, a contretemps arose. In 1710, when Pierre du Cambout, duc de Coislin, died, his younger brother and sole heir, Henri-Charles du Cambout, bishop of Metz, claimed his title, but Louis XIV denied it, declaring that it was a military title. Although the case remained in the courts for years, the late duke’s royal offices were expeditiously divided among “worthy” courtiers, including Torcy’s younger

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brother Croissy, made governor of Crécy-en-Brie. On another occasion, when the governor of Nantes was heard to be in extremis, the post’s monetary value was immediately assessed. Miraculously, the governor survived for another five years, but when he did die, Torcy already had an assessment of his office’s revenues, and within a month that post, too, went to Croissy.122 Secretaries of state, with access to the king and any others who could influence appointments, including members of the civil, military, and ecclesiastical hierarchies and members of the royal family and court, were well placed to serve their own clients.123 Torcy helped his friend the comte de Guiscard succeed to his father’s governorships of the city, fortress, and sovereignty of Sedan and helped Lebret fils succeed his father as Provence’s intendant. At the time of the Ryswick negotiations, Torcy wrote a lettre du roi to Bayonne’s magistrates requesting that his agent and spy Daguerre, busy in Amsterdam and elsewhere, be permitted to enjoy Bayonne’s privileges even though he was presently absent.124 Torcy also obtained a mail courier’s post in Bayonne for a domestic of its governor, Gramont. Gratifying the clients of others allowed him to earn future consideration from other powerful patrons or to repay them for past ones. In extending his protection to the Duchess of Burgundy’s valet, Torcy ingratiated himself with the favoured royal heir’s wife. He instructed his own client, Champagne intendant André de Harouys, to write on behalf of the valet’s nephew, enabling Harouys to serve Torcy through his own provincial patronage network.125 A collateral part of this patronage correspondence included the letters flowing among clients, patrons, and brokers offering thanks for current favours and keeping channels open for future ones. Such compliments were often sincerely meant and a normal part of obtaining favours. Torcy received many such pleasantries, as when Vauvré, Toulon’s naval intendant, congratulated him upon Desmaretz being named minister. He offered compliments as well, thanking a priest for the concern shown his aunt, Claire Colbert, abbess of Saint Claire of Rheims. To a letter of appreciation from Achille III de Harlay, the Paris parlement’s first president, Torcy replied graciously that while always happy to do him a favour, the present one was too trifling to deserve thanks.126

T h e P o l ic in g of Pari s On 22 July 1714 Torcy received a letter from d’Argenson relating that, in accordance with his earlier instruction, his men had searched Paris for



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a Scotsman named Law, said to be a professional gambler and British spy, but alas, they could not find him. At the top of this missive Torcy scribbled that since Law was not suspected of anything, he could be left in peace; Torcy then left it to a commis to draft a fuller rely.127 This letter and other evidence counter the myth that John Law, later the regent’s financial wizard, was a professional gambler,128 but the letter is significant for an additional reason. It reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that the foreign secretary and his department played a role in the policing of Paris and its vicinity. The early modern use of the word “police” was ambiguous, serving as an omnibus term for both a jurisdictional right and an obligation to act. It has been suggested that the closest simplified modern equivalent is “administration.”129 Jurisdiction was over a given area, corporate body, or category of individuals, while “policing” was undertaken to ensure order and safety within the civil (and often civic) body. Civility was inherent in the definitions of the police in such works as Delamare’s Traité de la police or the Dictionnaire de Trévoux, which equated the policing of a state with civilization’s progress.130 The household secretary and, under him, the capital’s lieutenant of police were the two officials most responsible for policing Paris. From the tenure of Colbert, the household secretary enjoyed the significant privilege of bypassing the chancellor and reporting directly to the king.131 He was the chief conduit of Parisian news to the king and his councils. In an average year the lieutenant of police wrote him over three hundred letters, answering specific questions, commenting on the day’s news and gossip, and speculating on future developments. Court wags whispered that Jérôme Pontchartrain distilled smut from Parisian refuse to whet Louis’s prurient curiosity, but a more likely motive was Louis’s obsession with knowing the details of the lives of his court’s great families. Whether their failings or achievements, their misadventures or accomplishments, it did not matter. What mattered was that information be promptly reported to ensure that royal largesse and appointments were properly directed. The king also worried that urban riots might become uprisings. He complained to his Conseil that he saw too many beggars in the streets and that royal couriers and foreign envoys were afraid to ride abroad at night without an armed band of torch men and fusiliers.132 The first lieutenant of police in Paris, Gabriel Nicolas de La Reynie, undertook the Herculean task of serving as liaison between the central administration and the complex municipal hierarchy of magistrates, commissioners, and inspectors collectively known as the Châtelet.

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Torcy treated La Reynie as a valuable guide, and they conversed when he ­visited Versailles, so it was a severe blow when under the lash of Louis Pontchartrain’s criticism, La Reynie retired in 1697.133 His successor, Marc-René de Voyer de Paulmy d’Argenson, from an important old sword family, a Pontchartrain client, and a master politician, worked with Torcy and his bureaus on a regular basis, particularly on any matter involving a foreigner.134 The struggle of France and her few allies against the great coalition that opposed them centred on Paris and the complex of palaces surrounding it, the heart of intelligence-gathering and decision-making. This relatively small but densely packed area was awash in information and overflowing with those anxious to gain hold of it. Some sought merely to impress others with the juicy morsel they had overheard or were privy to, while others looked to turn a profit by selling privileged information to news-hawkers. Enemy agents sought intelligence, while others, if not themselves spies, were willing or anxious to pass along what they knew, whether for profit, spite, or other motive.135 The Paris post office was an especially irksome source of leaks in Torcy’s information system.136 Some postal clerks abused their position to sell what they gleaned from the letters flowing through their bureaus.137 Parisian and provincial postal clerks were frequently under police surveillance.138 The many foreigners in the capital and its vicinity attracted even greater attention during wartime.139 These included merchants, clergy, students, embassy personnel, and refugees. Considered potentially dangerous, they were monitored closely and a weekly report forwarded to the foreign office.140 Torcy’s formal relationship with the police derived largely from his judicial power as a secretary of state to arrest, interrogate, incarcerate, and release suspects by means of a lettre de cachet, a private expression of the royal will in the form of a sealed order whose object was a particular person or group. Outside the regular judicial system, a lettre de cachet did not specify a charge and the person detained was not technically a criminal until further measures were taken, which might be never.141 Like his fellow administrators who looked to the Châtelet to watch suspects and if necessary arrest and transport them to prison, Torcy engaged its Compagnie du lieutenant criminel de robe-courte. This paramilitary group, whose short military robes distinguished them from colleagues whose function was primarily judicial, had an excellent reputation and often accepted special assignments for extra income.142 Lieutenant Le Roux received a gratification of 600 livres for spying on



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foreign visitors. In 1707 Lieutenant Pommereuil and his archers spent 159 days pursuing suspects and were paid for their time, their food, and a carriage to transport the prisoners to Paris, while in 1713 another of the company’s officers brought prisoners from distant Bordeaux.143 A checklist sent to Torcy at the end of 1697 reveals the pattern of arrests and releases for that year. Of the fifty-seven imprisoned or exiled, over one-third went to one of the general hospital establishments in Paris, a dumping ground for the lower classes. “For [sic] l’Évêque”144 and the Châtelet were holding houses that received seven detainees, while the Abbaye, which housed military prisoners within the walls of Saint-Germain-des Pres, received one. Of those remaining, nine went to unspecified destinations, four were exiled from Paris, and the remaining few were confined in the provinces.145 An additional eight young men went not to a prison per se but to the convent of Saint Lazare, reserved for so-called men of quality who were feeble-minded, insane, or libertine. As we now know, the infamous lettre de cachet was often requested by families to prevent a member from bringing shame upon or injury to them all.146 Several of Saint Lazare’s inhabitants were sons of important officials, such as the chancellor’s premier commis, a police lieutenant, and an intendant’s sub-delegate. At the bottom of a page of notes, Torcy had penned the pious hope that its inmates were there for the correction of their lives and morals.147 Five prisoners went to the Bastille and Vincennes, reserved for more socially elevated state prisoners such as nobles, royal officials who had gone astray, and important foreigners.148 Prior, reporting home on one of his agents whom he called a cheat and Torcy regarded as a cross between a knave and a madman, gave assurances that his punishment would not exceed lodgings in what he playfully called “the little house.”149 Some of those incarcerated had an aura of mystery about them. Torcy entrusted the “prisonnier sans nom” (prisoner without a name) to d’Argenson to hold incommunicado in the Bastille and repeatedly question about a supposed plot to poison Philip V. The Spanish court took this threat seriously, sending Ursins’s nephew, Louis de Talleyrand, prince de Chalais, to consult with Torcy and seek a royal audience. Torcy and the king were particularly concerned with any possible link between the prisoner and the duc d’Orléans, accused a few years earlier of plotting to take Philip’s throne. The accusations against the prisoner were not proven, but so secret were the proceedings that d’Argenson, not entrusting the interrogation accounts to writing, traveled to Versailles where, on Torcy’s advice, he delivered them verbally.150

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The foreigners in the capital sometimes experienced police action as part of diplomacy’s choreography. In 1703 Imperial officials in Hamburg arrested former Danish ambassador to France Meyercroon on what the French regarded as a pretext for punishing him for having spoken out at Ratisbon against the proposal that the Empire declare war on France. As it happened, a French fleet that attacked a Dutch convoy returning from Lisbon rescued from a sinking Dutch ship the Imperial ambassador to Portugal and the Elector of Mainz’s envoy to Spain. Torcy made it clear to both and to their home governments that their treatment would mirror that given Meyercroon. Torcy and Jérôme ­Pontchartrain cooperated on these two cases, but the lead police official, who the following year shared information with Torcy first, earned Pontchartrain’s testy reminder that police matters concerning the Bastille were under his department.151 When the Duke of Savoy suddenly abandoned France in 1703 to join the Allies and had all French subjects in Savoy arrested, Torcy retaliated with Pontchartrain’s hearty endorsement and had all Savoyards in Paris detained save the ambassador and his suite.152 Worried about foreign envoys and their staffs, the department relied on the police to monitor their comings and goings, especially (since 1685) those from Protestant states. Torcy repeatedly complained to the latter about New Converts illegally frequenting their chapels or chaplains making secret forays outside embassy grounds to conduct services. “Heretical” books channeled through embassies were subject to seizure, as were embassy personnel considered to have gone too far in their relations with New Converts.153 Given French sensibilities about Gallican liberties as well as the papal role in international politics, the nuncio’s Paris residence was also under observation, with visitors and mail passing in and out carefully noted.154 The foreign office also monitored trouble in Parisian streets involving embassy staff, such as an almoner under the protection of Malta’s envoy being caught up in a violent clash.155 Whether it was an issue of Mantua’s representative being suspected of sheltering a medical charlatan, street fights breaking out involving the Savoyard ambassador’s staff, or the Venetian ambassador’s entourage infuriating locals by blocking a street, Torcy acted with the police.156 Not all interactions between embassies and the Parisians were negative, since ambassadors and their entourages were consumers of daily supplies as well as of luxury goods to furnish their residences, take home with them, or purchase on behalf of patrons and friends at home. They also typically employed locals for lower domestic positions to cut costs and because they knew French and local customs.157



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Watched as well were the several thousands of the Jacobite community in Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Spies were a concern, as were the seedy or criminal hangers-on typically attracted by an exiled population to prey upon countrymen and hosts alike. Violence was a particular problem within the community and in its relations with the surrounding French. Torcy worked with d’Argenson and even with Jacobite secretary of state Lord Middleton to monitor this often mobile and turbulent population. Numerous Jacobites served France as distinguished and loyal soldiers and agents, but their presence offered Britain an easy means of inserting agents into the French capital.158 Traditional images of isolated scriveners scribbling away in bureaus removed from daily realities to the contrary, it is fitting that our exploration of the foreign office’s workings ends in the streets amid crowds of Parisians jostling and brawling with the often pugnacious lackeys of foreign representatives to Louis XIV’s court. Leaving to one side the perhaps too easy parallel between these altercations and those on a grander and deadlier scale among these states as they jostled for precedence, profit, and power in Europe and overseas, there is another aspect worth noting. Even as Torcy and his staff directed the diplomatic apparatus of Europe’s most powerful state, sending out finely and precisely worded instructions to diplomats in far-flung embassies to shape the course of international relations, they also dealt with an abundance of mundane domestic business, whether related to diplomacy or not. Papers concerning a wide range and mixture of matters and containing a profusion of information passed between the ink-stained fingers of this small group of clerks often but not exclusively bent over writing desks in bureaus at Versailles and its environs. It is this potent encounter of ink and paper that rendered data into writing and then organized this recorded information into files that empowered these bureaucrats within the administration of perhaps Europe’s most dazzling and powerful state.

Conclusion

Louis XIV played many roles as monarch – the soldier-king, the royal builder, the kingly collector of art and curiosities, the master of court ceremonial – but perhaps his most influential was that of roi-­bureaucrate, supervising a bureaucratic apparatus of remarkable sophistication and reach. Not only did he preside over this expanding system of government bureaucracy and public administration – an emerging “world of paper”  – but he was intimately involved in its creation and articulation. Historians have been loath to portray Louisquatorzian bureaucracy as fitting too closely the Weberian ideal type of “modern” bureaucracy, wisely choosing not to ignore the importance, for example, of clientage and patronage in early modern organizations. The dilemma resolves itself in part with a more realistic depiction of modern bureaucracy. One helpful approach is to see bureaucracy as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Thus, Weber himself wrote of an older “patrimonial” system of administration that contrasted with the “more mature” bureaucracies of his own times. But in recent decades others have gone on to critique both Weber’s model and his/our sense of just what modern bureaucracy looks like in practice. Modern bureaucracies have been weighed on the Weberian scale and found wanting. The ways in which administrative organizations in the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first operate internally and interact with outsiders are much less tidy than the Weberian model suggests, and yet these organizations are usually able to adjust their structure to their circumstances to accomplish the particular tasks set for them. Contingency theory helps explain how this adaptation operates through altering functional specialization, formalization, and centralization to fit an organization’s changing circumstances and especially its size. This f­ lexible and ­multi-faceted vision



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of administrative organization permits a better understanding of organizations and how they change. The result is that while modern bureaucracy looks and operates less like the idealization drawn by many of Weber’s interpreters, early modern bureaucracy looks more like the modern reality of public administration than formerly assumed. Torcy, who had been carefully groomed for office within the C ­ olbert clan by formal education, travel, and apprenticeship in his father’s bureaus, plunged into the routine and work of the administrative department from as early as 1689 when he officially became Croissy’s survivancier. Nurtured within and aided throughout his career by an extensive family network that included two foreign ministers of France – his father and his father-in-law – he was hardly unprepared to assume the helm of the foreign office in 1696. However, with his appointment coming at the beginning of delicate and contentious negotiations to end a devastating war, it was a time of testing for the still-young secretary of state. In collaboration with Pomponne, Torcy and his department successfully managed the mechanics of concluding peace and then launched a series of embassies and diplomatic initiatives aimed at a peaceful resolution of the impending Spanish succession. He had critics among the capital’s resident diplomats and the powerful at court, including the king’s secret wife, but Torcy was not without influential backers and allies. For the most part he deflected the barbs and won over many former detractors, but above all he largely stood firm in Louis XIV’s confidence. Even the poaching in the foreign ministry’s diplomatic domain and domestic functions by the powerful fellow secretaries of state Chamillart and Jérôme Pontchartrain ultimately proved ineffective. Although the king decided policy with the advice of his Conseil, in which Torcy’s was but one voice, Torcy held firm as coordinator of French diplomacy and diplomatic information and master of the foreign office. A greater challenge to his control over negotiations and the flow of information relating to them came in 1706 when the despairing king briefly sought peace through secret diplomacy in collaboration with the war minister and without the knowledge of Torcy or the rest of the Conseil. Chamillart’s inept negotiations, however, further damaged France’s credibility with her enemies, unnecessarily complicating and prolonging the already tortuous peace process. Desperate to end the war, Chamillart could not refrain from further intrusions around the edges of the quest for peace, but he never again did so in collaboration with the king. Torcy’s department, as we have shown, did more than coordinate the diplomatic web woven throughout Europe and beyond on behalf

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of Louis XIV. As secretary of state, Torcy administered a portion of the realm’s provinces and was what we would call today a “hands-on” administrator, closely involved in the details of his duties. Nevertheless, he had only two hands. A hands-on approach to management at its best requires knowledge and first-hand experience of administrative processes as well as ongoing monitoring of an organization’s personnel and functioning. This certainly characterized Torcy’s tenure as foreign secretary. An administrative head who keeps all the decision-making power in his or her own hands – which in its less-glamorous reality is difficult and time-consuming decision-making work – risks any number of perils, including exhaustion and ill-informed decisions. The organization experiences bottlenecks and eventually organizational paralysis, and in the ranks there is a sense of a lack of trust from those higher up and even an unwillingness or inability to make relatively simple decisions. Unlike Philip II of Spain,1 his own uncle Colbert, and perhaps his father Croissy,2 Torcy knew how to delegate authority to his clerks, which he did increasingly as the weight of wartime duties and negotiations pressed more heavily upon him. Torcy had grown up within the Colbertian information state. The architect of this administrative edifice and the intellectual force that drove it was Colbert, ably served by his younger brother and disciple Croissy. They were the pioneers of the early days of Louis XIV’s personal reign, when its structures were assembled, its agents trained and sent out, and its libraries and archives gathered and organized to project royal power within France and abroad. Croissy, after long years in the provinces and at foreign courts, applied his sibling’s vision and methods to the foreign office by creating an archive and reshaping the way daily business was conducted so that organized, easily accessible files would result. What accounted for this difference in approach and temperament between Torcy on the one hand and his father and uncle on the other? In part, it was due to the fact that Torcy began his apprenticeship when the Colbertian information state was already in place and functioning. Thus, while Torcy gave the foreign ministry’s archives a home in the Louvre, expanded and improved its contents and organization, and utilized it in innovative ways, especially for purposes of propaganda and the training of future diplomats, it was Croissy and not his son who created the department’s archive. Unlike his father and his uncle, Torcy began his work life essentially as a commis or premier commis in the organization that he would one day lead.



Conclusion 463

Despite his humble beginnings in the bureaus of others and his utilization of elements of France’s rich administrative past, in many respects Colbert assembled, created, and shaped the bureaucracy he headed under Louis XIV. Croissy came into the foreign office as its head having previously interacted with it as an ambassador, but without having ever been a part of its central administration. In fact, as secretary he broke with its past in a number of ways, including by purging top administrative personnel and apparently altering the former bureau structure of specialized bureaus for foreign and domestic tasks. Torcy, however, who from the age of fifteen had grown up within the department’s bosom, upon his father’s death emerged as secretary of a department that, following the king’s intention, had already become the “family business” of the Colbert de Croissys. Torcy’s training was in part at the feet of his father, father-in-law, and the king, but it was also at the side of the department’s clerks, whom he saw regularly not only in the bureaus at Versailles but at the Hôtel Croissy, where many resided and were intimates of the Colberts. Such intimacy especially affected Torcy during his youth when the social distance between him and the clerks was less pronounced. This, of course, did not guarantee that he would grow up to trust and delegate authority to these clerks and those who later joined them, but it did mean that when the department became his as secretary in 1696, he belonged to the department by training, sentiment, experience, and personal relationships. One of the reasons historians frequently write accounts of events and organizations from a “great man” perspective is that this is the perspective implied by what has been preserved or by the way documents are written, despite what common sense might suggest. When narrating or analysing the foreign ministry’s activities and actions, it is easy to write in terms of “Torcy wrote” this, “Torcy ordered” that, or “Torcy instructed” this one or that one. The reality, however, was often that one of his senior clerks wrote a draft, perhaps from the minister’s annotations on the document to which he was responding, perhaps based on oral instructions, or perhaps based on what he knew or thought he knew of the minister’s or department’s usual reply to such correspondence. In some cases Torcy heavily revised the draft, but in others he revised only lightly or not at all.3 At other times a premier commis wrote a letter or note on his own behalf, often known to us only from the recipient’s surviving papers. Any order or instruction emanating from his bureaus had Torcy’s tacit if not explicit approval; otherwise the offending clerk was, at the very least, set straight on the matter. It is not possible, however,

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that all of the department’s writings originated from his pen or were seen by him personally. Indeed, his peregrinations among the three points of the Paris “communication triangle” (Versailles, Marly, and Paris), not to mention Fontainebleau, other palaces, or trips to the battle front, meant that while some decisions could be made only after awaiting his return or sending a lackey to track him down, others proceeded apace without him. By its very nature, this behind-the-scenes process appears only occasionally in the record. Even today it largely eludes the observer, leading to a fiction, whether explicit or implicit, that it was the organization itself that was acting rather than its personnel. Our account of Torcy’s bureaucracy depicts specifics when the evidence permits, but nevertheless must often rest content with merely tracing its activities or areas of responsibility and then from this inferring its clerks’ activities. The emerging picture is complex and goes beyond the usual sense of the proper work of diplomacy. From the beginning of the personal reign, a tripartite division of departmental labour was the norm, even if not always embodied in three unmistakably separate and identifiable bureaus. Two premier commis divided diplomatic business on a geographic basis, while a third supervised domestic administration. If Croissy in fact deviated from this arrangement as the evidence suggests, Torcy returned to it when he reorganized the department after Ryswick and Mignon’s death. Contrary to what is often claimed, the fundamental division of department business was based not on geography but on function. The two political bureaus typically processed long letters of news or queries for guidance from French diplomats and their staffs that often required decoding before being acted upon. These clerks additionally read through a variety of spy reports and printed materials that in some cases needed to be translated before being summarized. Likewise, out-going materials were often lengthy because distance and the vicissitudes of foreign postal services precluded frequent and rapid exchanges between an embassy and the court. Much correspondence had to be encoded before being sent out, and sometimes translation from French was required if a document was for the eyes of a foreign power that could or would not accept French text. If legal knowledge was necessary for this work, it was of international law or the “constitution” of a particular state or region, such as the composite and parliamentary English monarchy or the Holy Roman Empire when dealing with German princelings. Indeed, while the clerks of the department mostly remained in France, their minds had to range beyond its frontiers to gain and maintain knowledge of the history, customs, climate, geography, current



Conclusion 465

events, and key players in a number of foreign states and courts. Their primary contacts were with the king’s representatives and their staffs abroad, since they were the ones the clerks at Versailles worked with and often served in maintaining while abroad their private interests at home. The domestic bureau, however, received a different type of paperwork  – for example, petitions, shorter letters (due to shorter distances as well as the well-developed French postal system) from provincial administrators, and judicial documents. Neither decoding, encoding, nor translating was normally required, but a thorough knowledge of the formularies for drafting a variety of royal legal documents was. And if the minds of the clerks at Versailles handling domestic correspondence did not normally have to venture beyond the kingdom’s frontiers for this work, they nonetheless needed to know the variety of customs, histories, institutions, legal systems, and personnel of each of the provinces and areas within them supervised by the foreign office. Rule from Versailles more often meant steering locals (not always successfully) toward goals set at the centre than it did imposing the royal will. Since this was done best through the careful coordination of royal officials, local officials at varying levels of governance, and local elites in the provinces, such steering required a keen awareness of highway conditions. The differences between a pays d’élections and a province with estates, for instance, could be significant, since each required a different kind of steering; moreover, even the two pays d’état of Provence and Brittany were hardly identical. In the domestic bureau as well as the political bureaus, there were great advantages to be had from a stable staff steeped in department procedures for managing the paperwork that flowed in and out of the bureaus. Prior to the First World War, myths of modernity served to make sense of (or perhaps to exaggerate) the distance between the institutions and practices of the “Age of Progress” and those of the early modern, but even before 1914 and particularly since, they have been increasingly questioned. One of our goals has been to demystify bureaucracy, which in the modern world, we must reiterate, looks and works less like the mechanistic Weberian model than is often assumed, and is consequently in the early modern surprisingly closer to what exists today. The foreign office under Torcy was clearly bureaucratic: it had professional, full-time personnel for specified tasks who were arranged hierarchically; skill and merit played a role in their selection either from within the department in which they had undergone an apprenticeship or from the outside where they had acquired training and proven their ability for the work of the

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foreign office. Promotion within the department was largely based on technical merit. Clerks were paid something similar to a salary, although there were other rewards to be had. For the most part, these clerks were guided in their work by set procedures that in some cases were in writing and in others were enshrined in unwritten office custom. And their actions were recorded in the written records they helped create and later stored in files for future reference. Furthermore, as we have shown, early modern practices that were often derided or dismissed as irrational during the past two centuries now make more sense when evaluated in the context and light of the time. For example, with no schools of public administration, the system of survivancier offered a young man an invaluable apprenticeship as secretary of state without binding the king to his eventual promotion. Likewise, nepotism and apprenticeship often worked hand in hand to provide the department with skilled and dedicated clerks. Merit apparently played a role in this. For example, Adam remained with domestic administration rather than becoming head of a political bureau, perhaps because he did not know Latin. Torcy was not averse to bringing in skilled and tested outsiders for specialized tasks and leadership roles: for example, Ligny’s experience with war finance led to important accounting responsibilities, while Noblet and Pecquet had proven abilities that allowed them to become premier commis with little or no experience within the department. Even tasking the foreign secretary with a portion of domestic administration served Louis XIV’s desire not to have an all-powerful “interior minister” at the same time that provincial administration provided the secretary of state with a reservoir of patronage possibilities and kept him grounded in the kingdom’s economic and social realities, which formed the unavoidable context within which diplomacy played out. As royal councils increasingly concentrated on high-level decisionmaking and controversial issues, the daily administration of France increasingly fell to the experienced bureaucrats of the relatively small yet efficient central administration who coerced, cajoled, coddled, and cooperated with provincial officials and elites.4 Those searching for bureaus within the department often overlook them because they expect formal structures and fail to appreciate the ways in which a small organization is best ordered. Bureaus within the foreign ministry existed as ongoing entities under a particular premier commis or as temporary, task-oriented groups under a chef de bureau. With a bureau’s relatively small staff, it was highly rational for clerks to fill in for colleagues as the



Conclusion 467

workload or absences required, which could be a virtue rather than a vice when the goal was a quick turnaround of department documents. Torcy’s clerks were more than mere creatures of the minister or extensions of his department. The premier commis and especially the secretaries were typically rising men in possession of the standing, skills, and networks that had made them attractive to Croissy and Torcy. Indeed, those at the top of the foreign office’s administrative staff ended up extending the department’s influence and augmenting its information sources through their family connections and ties with other powerful patrons. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Blondel, who linked the department with the fiscal-financial and military-industrial complexes that provided the Louisquatorzian regime with much of its money and material muscle. The venal offices and honours that these clerks held outside the department were not always a result of their service in the foreign ministry. Before entering Croissy’s service, Mignon was already in line to be a secretary of the king, succeeding his brother René II who several years earlier had followed the childless brother of his brotherin-law. Noblet was already a secretary of the king, having succeeded his father long before he joined the department. Nevertheless, the Colberts regularly saw to it that their associates were properly rewarded for their skills and loyalty, although the exact parameters of these are not always easy to trace in the department accounts. Yet, even the payroll records we have reveal a hierarchy of remuneration that reflected the department’s organizational hierarchy that placed the premiers commis and secretaries clearly at the top, with simple commis well below them and sous-commis and office boys not even explicitly mentioned. In many ways the story of the foreign office bureaucracy under Torcy revolves around the management of information. Indeed, much of his and his staff’s administrative achievement related to the acquisition of information, its more efficient processing, its storage for future use, and the simplification of its retrieval in an organized archive. Not just bureau personnel participated in these tasks. A “brain trust” of diplomatic personnel and erudite and linguistic experts supplemented their work, drawing on the rich intellectual resources of Paris as well as those of learned friends and correspondents in France and throughout Europe. Spy-catching and censorship were reactive measures meant to control the flow of information in and out of the kingdom, but more proactive measures included the issuance of passports, sponsorship of propaganda, and management of France’s postal system. While passports were among the normal tools of the foreign office, it was Torcy and his staff

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who integrated propaganda into the ministry’s effort to preserve institutional memory. They also used the post office to support departmental purposes, such as monitoring correspondence, including that of royal family members, courtiers, and suspected or potential spies, and assuring regular and reliable courier service to embassies as well as to the active theatres of war and negotiation. As Louis XIV lay dying at Versailles, Torcy made sure that he kept French diplomats abroad updated on his health and the fact that the doctors still held out hope.5 Even so, he must have sensed that the end of the reign was near. The days ahead would be perilous for him and others who represented a monarch and administrative system that many had grown weary of and wanted to modify or replace. Although Torcy and his department superficially appeared to have been eliminated by the Polysynod in 1715, both in fact survived, albeit in different forms and in different ways. The only administrative position Torcy maintained was his considerable power over the post office, which gave him continuing access to other people’s mail. He also served on the Regency Council and was influential as the duc d’Orléans’s foreign affairs advisor until November 1721. So great was his credit with the regent that Dubois lived in constant fear of being eclipsed.6 Dubois’s English supporters shared this apprehension. Ambassador John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair, wrote home at the beginning of 1719 that Torcy was consulted so frequently and his advice followed that all he lacked was the title of foreign secretary.7 Such fears were justified. From the beginning of the Regency, Torcy acted secretly on Orléans’s behalf by making use of his wide network of international connections to write to foreigners within and outside of France for news. To protect the contents of these missives and their writers’ identity, Torcy regularly burned the letters after recording without attribution any valuable information they contained. Five volumes, beginning in 1715 and running through 1718, number 1,238 folios. Torcy’s explanatory note at the front of the first volume is revealing: despite the regent’s major administrative changes, Orléans nonetheless considered it essential to continue the late king’s secret correspondence with foreign informants and therefore entrusted it to Torcy as the minister who had long managed it.8 In the wake of rival and financier John Law’s fall in 1720, Dubois negotiated a Franco-Spanish defensive alliance (27 March 1721), cemented it with a dynastic marriage, and turned it into a triple alliance with Britain (13 June 1721). As a newly minted cardinal (promotion on 16 July 1721), Dubois brokered the Treaty of Nystad (September



Conclusion 469

1721) that ended the Great Northern War. These multiple successes convinced the regent to grant Dubois’s request to take the post office from Torcy and require him to retire to his estate at Sablé. That Dubois finally persuaded Orléans to let Torcy go, however, likely had less to do with the cardinal’s ascendancy over his rival and more to do with the fact that Torcy had served his purpose in the regent’s diplomatic manoeuvring. Dubois’s overreliance on the alliance with Britain’s Hanoverians had unfortunately served Austrian interests all too well. When Dubois finally rallied to Torcy’s middle policy between this extreme and that of the anglophobic and pro-Spanish “old court” party, Orléans could afford to allow his old tutor to indulge his personal animosity and purge his rival.9 In terms of policy, after all, Torcy was the victor. Now reconciled with her traditional foe across the Channel and her Bourbon kin over the Pyrenees, France could keep Austria in check in a manner less dependent on the unreliable Whigs. Although France continued her pragmatic cooperation with Britain to maintain peace and Europe’s balance of power, under Cardinal Fleury she emerged from Albion’s shadow to pursue her own interests more independently. This was accomplished largely through a flexible and deft diplomacy reminiscent of that pursued by Louis XIV and Torcy to end the War of the Spanish Succession with treaties better than could be expected given the kingdom’s wartime disasters. Once peace was achieved at Utrecht, Torcy and the diplomatic apparatus he directed sought to preserve it by forestalling any resurrection of the Grand Alliance and rebuilding French prestige through diplomacy rather than war. There were those in Paris and other capitals who would have welcomed war, but the direction of French foreign policy in the quarter century after Torcy’s departure largely moved along the paths he and Louis XIV had laid out.10 Although Torcy’s Regency activities lie beyond the scope of the present work, we have already seen that they offer a useful coda not only for understanding Torcy’s policy legacy, but for understanding his administrative one as well. When Stair tried to pry the regent away from his reliance on Torcy’s counsel in 1719, he suggested that the only way for Orléans to assure that he remained in power once Louis XV reached majority was “by making himself entirely master of foreign affairs, so that nobody but himself should have any perfect knowledge of the state of them.” The regent’s only rival, Stair continued, was Torcy, the “one man in the kingdom that could have it in his power to hurt, by the knowledge of that matter.” The only way to end this threat, Stair concluded, was to “break the chain” of Torcy’s information on foreign affairs.11

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Dubois himself had earlier complained to Stair that he feared for his position because “there were many things which were hid from him.”12 The power that came from access to and control of information was clear. Torcy had worked for nearly three decades at building, utilizing, improving, and maintaining information networks at home and abroad. As historians have increasingly emphasized, information encompasses much more than printed words. It includes handwritten and spoken words as well as symbols and ceremonies, but above all it is about networks of people who communicate information in a myriad of ways, locations, and circumstances. Thus, in addition to but intimately connected with Torcy’s policy legacy was the diplomatic institution he left behind in 1715. Building on the achievements of his predecessors in office and especially those of his father and father-in-law, Torcy fashioned an effective and exemplary bureaucracy and corps of envoys that set the European standard. The department, largely intact and continuing under Pecquet’s able leadership, served the regent and the specialized foreign affairs council, while its domestic section, still led by Adam and now joined by Larroque, merged with those of the other secretaries of state under the new domestic administration council. Thus, the foreign ministry’s increasingly professional and skilled personnel and its administrative procedures largely survived Torcy’s dismissal as foreign secretary to influence French diplomatic practice in the eighteenth century and that of Europe as well. Many contributed to this legacy, including the hard-working Louis XIV and the earlier foreign secretaries of his reign, but in many ways this bureaucratic apparatus was primarily the result of the efforts of the two Colberts, Croissy and Torcy, and especially of the latter’s innovative and productive collaboration with the professional, knowledgeable, and hard-working clerks of his department. The routinization of work is one of the important characteristics of any administrative organization. While diplomacy has its predictable and routine elements, it also has to deal with much that cannot be foreseen. It has been suggested that the structures and practices of diplomacy have “evolved over many centuries precisely to absorb quickly what might otherwise be considered exogenous events and circumstances at work, such as wars and sudden changes in government.”13 If the smooth operation of the daily grind of diplomatic business was one test of an organization’s efficiency, then managing the unexpected in a timely and effective manner (and possibly exploiting it for gain) was quite another. Torcy’s achievement was to reorganize and expand the king’s diplomatic



Conclusion 471

apparatus at home and abroad at a time when the stakes were especially high due to the complex issues relating to resolving the Spanish succession. Innovative yet risky partition schemes, fighting a war in which France was abandoned by most of her allies, and negotiating a peace after an acrimonious conflict and a string of French defeats sorely tested the department and its diplomats, but the final result was better than could have been expected. Studies of modern bureaucracy suggest that the foreign ministry at the end of Louis XIV’s reign was more “modern” than we think. Or, looking at the matter from the other direction, perhaps we should say that bureaucracy during what is usually labeled the “modern era” bears a closer resemblance to early modern administrations than is often assumed. Increasing informationalization and professionalization are undoubtedly hallmarks of administrative organizations over the past two centuries, but the process was well under way before 1789.

Abbreviations

A rc h iv e s a nd Li brari es aae aae ae aae cp aae md aae ppsr aae pvr

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris aae, Acquisitions extraordinaires aae, Correspondance Politique aae, Mémoires et Documents aae, Personnel – Première série reliée aae, Service du personnel, Édits, lois et ordonnances, arrêtés et décrets, “Volumes relies” an Archives Nationales, Paris ban Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale, Paris bl British Library, London bl am BL, Additional Manuscripts bn Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris bn ag bn, Armorial Général de France bn Cab. H. bn, Cabinet des Titres, Cabinet d’Hozier bn Car. H. bn, Cabinet des Titres, Carrés d’Hozier bn db bn, Cabinet des Titres, Dossiers bleus bn mf bn, Manuscrits français, Fonds français bn naf bn, Manuscrits français, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises bn po bn, Cabinet des Titres, Pièces originales pro sp Public Record Office, State Papers, London

474 Abbreviations

P r in t e d W o r k s and Journals Archives hg France. Ministère des relations extérieures. Les archives du Ministère des relations extérieures depuis les origines: Histoire et guide suivis d’une étude des sources de l’histoire des affaires étrangères dans les dépôts parisiens et départementaux. 2 vols. Paris: Impr. nationale 1984–85 daf Académie Française. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française. 1st ed. 2 vols. Paris: Coignard 1694. Dictionnaires d’autrefois, artfl, at http://artfl-project. uchicago.edu/ gbhmc Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission ss -Boislisle Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de. Mémoires de Saint-Simon. Edited by Arthur M. de Boislisle. 41 vols. Paris: Hachette et cie 1879–1928 ss -Coirault Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de. Mémoires. Additions au Journal de Dangeau/Saint-Simon. Edited by Yves Coirault. 8 vols. Paris: Gallimard 1983–88

Notes

Introduction 1 Max Weber quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. 2 “Bureaucracy as an organizational form is nothing if not persistent. To the degree that it does not meet the governance needs of societies, we would expect that bureaucracy would be replaced with other organizational forms.” Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 66. They go on to conclude that “bureaucracy will continue to flourish in the twenty-first century for many of the same reasons that it has flourished in the last century, it facilitates the governance process in ways other organizational forms do not” (ibid., 67). 3 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 327. Although terms such as “foreign minister,” “foreign secretary,” “foreign ministry,” and “foreign office” are anachronistic and are not translations of the French terms used then, they will be employed for the sake of brevity throughout the book for the secretary of state for foreign affairs and for his department. McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 209, for example, refer to the foreign office under Torcy. Picavet, Diplomatie, 68, however, says that Torcy, a “fonctionnaire honorable et prudent … ne vaut pas Lionne” (honourable and prudent functionary … was not the equal of Lionne), the first foreign minister of Louis XIV’s personal reign. 4 André, Louis XIV, 41; and Frey and Frey, Diplomatic Immunity, 215. 5 There was not always a crisp differentiation among the department’s various types of clerical personnel, so we will often employ “clerks” or even “commis” (clerk) to embrace them all, including secretaries. 6 Church, Red Tape, 4–5. 7 Picavet, “Commis,” 103–20. Baschet, Dépôt, published in 1875, although focused on the department’s archives, details general information as well. 8 Piccioni, Commis. He cites Picavet, “Commis,” on only two pages (ibid., 167–8) and for only Brienne’s department.

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Notes to pages 5–7

9 Samoyault, Bureaux. While Picavet’s 1926 article is listed among the sources, it was often ignored in the writing. 10 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1. Piccioni’s value and limitations are noted (ibid., 268) in this work’s bibliography, but oddly, Picavet’s 1926 article is ignored even though his others are cited. This, unfortunately, leads to several omissions and errors. 11 Michel Foucault urged the “expulsion of law” from the study of modern society thusly: “We must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.” Quoted in Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 56. Stollberg-Rilinger, “Communication Theory,” 314–15, discusses the dangers such texts presented to classical constitutional history. 12 Weber’s short description of bureaucracy: “The combination of written documents and a continuous operation by officials constitutes the ‘office’ (Bureau) which is the central focus of all types of modern organized action.” Quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. 13 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 98. Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 106, summarizes the chief legacy of Foucault’s analysis of power thus: “Power is always an exercise, never simply an attribute.” 14 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 98. 15 Quoted in Blair, Too Much to Know, 263. 16 Weller, “Introduction.” See Soll, “The Antiquary and the Information State”; Soll, “How to Manage an Information State”; and Soll, Information Master. See also Vivo, Information, on political communication in Venice in the early seventeenth century. Higgs, Information State, vii, offers a more restrictive definition of the information state as one “involved in the collection and manipulation of information on private citizens,” which suggests a largely domestic focus. Yet, more expansively, Higgs seeks “to examine the generalised and structured collection of information which is so typical of modern administration – the creation of routine administrative records, and of databases, paper and electronic, rather than the ad hoc activities of informers and ‘spooks.’ It is the ubiquity of contemporary state data gathering, and the way in which it collects information in a standardised form for ease of analysis and retrieval, that is so significant.” This seems to point toward the broader sense of the information state seen in Soll’s work and which we adopt here. 17 Headrick, When Information Came of Age, 8. 18 Cortada, “Shaping Information History,” 122. See also Cortada, “Do We Live in the Information Age?” Although I became aware of Cortada’s recent and important work only as this book was about to go to press, my thanks go to Robert J. Fulton, Jr, for introducing me to it.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28

29

30

Notes to pages 7–9

477

Cortada, “Shaping Information History.” Ibid., 129. Ibid., 130, 132. Ibid., 135–6. Cortada, “Information Ecosystems,” 223. Ibid., 222. Ibid., 224. Cortada defines an ecosystem as “a body of information [that] circulates within some institution or group of individuals who communicate frequently with each other – in our case, diplomats and those with whom they worked – and their employers – in our example, diplomatic ministries. This ecosystem consists of documents and publications that circulate within a community, but it also includes shared knowledge, worldviews, and the values its members have accumulated through experience and education” (ibid., 225). Ibid., 224. Ibid., 229. “Workers in all fields,” Cortada observes, “organize data, or information, in ways relevant to their work,” as reflected in the “typology, or data map” applied to Spanish diplomatic papers (ibid., 238). Croissy, Torcy, and their clerks did the same. The parallels between practices in Madrid and those in Torcy’s bureaus are striking. Clerks distributed to the appropriate colleagues incoming materials for processing, including a variety of printed materials such as news clippings, pamphlets, and maps received from agents abroad (ibid., 230–3). Both central administrations had internal sources of information for ready access (a library, an archive of current materials, and office files in current use by various clerks) and an archive of older materials still accessible for department use (ibid., 234–8). Each ministry sought legal and other expert advice from the academic community, and published treaty anthologies, and prepared historical studies and document collections primarily for internal use (ibid., 240–4). In terms of methodology, as we have done with the bound volumes the French foreign office produced, Cortada counts bundles of records in the diplomatic archive to calculate the volume of diplomatic information (ibid., 231). Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:60–1, 95, for example, devotes to provincial administration the equivalent of one page and one paragraph out of nearly ninety pages on the central administration under the ancien régime, even though it describes it as a rather heavy burden (95). Perhaps the best published biographical overview of Torcy’s kin, career, fortune, and children is Roth, “Torcy.” Although brief, it is densely packed with useful information from and references to secondary as well as primary sources, including family papers in the Archive du château de BoisDauphin.

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Notes to pages 9–15

31 “Minister” is a term used loosely for those at the pinnacle of administrative power, even though technically it included only those called to the Conseil or “Conseil d’en haut” (literally, the council from on high), the latter a designation dating to the time of Mazarin. It refers not to the council’s place in the hierarchy of state but to its meeting on the premier étage (the first floor above the ground floor) of royal residences where the royal chambers were rather than on the ground floor. Barbiche, Institutions, 286. We will refer to it hereafter as simply the Conseil. 32 Also called the War of the League of Augsburg. While both labels have their advantages and adherents, we adopt the shorter of the two. See the note in the chronology in Hatton, Louis XIV and Europe, 297. 33 Peters, “Information and Governing,” 113.

Chapter One 1 Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 217n1, observes that referring to “international” relations is technically anachronistic and misleading given that diplomats represented dynasties rather than nations. See also Black, Diplomacy, 26, 48, 104. 2 As in Bell, Lawyers. 3 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, 1: s.v. “département.” His examples include the secretaries of state and their departments of the navy, Normandy, and Protestant affairs. Similarly, the 1694 first edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (hereafter daf) notes that département is used for the different provinces of the kingdom, the different affairs of state directed by the secretaries of state, intendants of finance, and intendants of justice. This is clearly the sense used in the listings of the “Departemens [sic] de Messieurs les Secretaires d’Etat” (Departments of the Secretaries of State) found in the Almanach royal and the État de la France, annual publications that included information on the state and its personnel. Both publications must be used with caution, however, because care was not always taken in updating and revising lists of officials. Esmonin, Études, 233–7; and Boucher, “Évolution de la maison du roi,” 360–1. 4 Collins, State, 150–1, observes that the great material advantages of the early reign had dwindled by the 1690s and France after 1688 faced a more united enemy led by William III. Opposing armies had also matched many of the measures that had once given France the military edge. 5 Ibid., 154. Torcy was among the creators of “the modern European Great Power system” (ibid., 191). Black, British Diplomats, 2, warns against neglecting dynastic concerns in early modern diplomacy. 6 For Utrecht as an early turning point toward stabilized diplomatic practice, see Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 154–5.



Notes to pages 16–18

479

7 Only three managed to serve much beyond that average: Charles-­Gravier, comte de Vergennes (1774–87), almost thirteen years; Germain-Louis de Chauvelin (1727–37), nearly nine and one half years; and Amelot de ­Chaillou (1737–44), just over seven years. These statistics are based on the chart in Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:788–9. See Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, for the biography, career, and sources on each foreign minister. 8 Piccioni, Commis, 270–2. 9 Based on data in Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, 293–4, 296, 301. 10 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 59. See Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, on the influence of French culture and consumption on European diplomacy and diplomats. 11 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 78–9. See also Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 59–64, which notes the persistence of court politics in modern diplomacy. 12 Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 243–59, 796–7, demonstrates Latin’s persistence and argues that the diplomats’ eighteenth-century switch from Latin to French was due to the latter’s wide cultural use and was not the wedge of a bid for linguistic hegemony. Diplomatic language lagged behind in other areas of use due to conservatism and a tradition of Latin as a neutral language of compromise. See Rouillé to Louis XIV, 21 Nov. 1704, on letters in Latin from Poland. bn naf 22996, fol. 8r–v; and bl am 31138, fol. 108v, Bristol to Bolingbroke, 17 Mar. 1713, on the Latin instruments at Utrecht. 13 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 60–80. See Bély, Espions, 373–548, for the Utrecht peace congress. 14 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 265. 15 Black, Diplomacy, 12–14. 16 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 61–3, 70, 74, 82, for his chronology. Bély, Art de la paix, 557–79, profiles Callières, who served under Torcy. Pecquet fils drew on his father’s service under Torcy and after as well as his own. See also Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 93. 17 Zmora, Monarchy, 90–1, stresses the role Louis XIV played personally in his monarchy’s success. Black, Diplomacy, 46, 79, argues that the king’s role in diplomacy was central. Cole, Governing, 190–2, shows the continuing importance of the predilections of individuals by underling the fact that “institutional variables do not dictate behavior” and that under President Nicolas Sarkozy, “strengthening the Élysée as the centre of operations has been a core preoccupation” (190). 18 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 9–15, uses and endorses the idea of “proprietary dynasticism” from Rowen, King’s State. 19 Rule, “Roi-Bureaucrate.” Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 284, conclude that behind the facade of “roi de guerre” (war king), Louis XIV was a “roi de cabinet” (staff king) in the manner of Spain’s Philip II. Manal, “Comment t­ ravaillait un roi,” calls Louis XIV administrator and “grand commis” of the state.

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Notes to pages 18–19

20 Duindam, Courts, discusses court ceremony under Louis XIV without divorcing it from the work of government or casting it in the typical Saint-­ Simonian characterization as mere manipulation. 21 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 153–4. 22 Jones, Great Nation, 124, 128, 234. Collins, State, xiii–xiv, also contrasts Louis XIV with Louis XV. See Black, Diplomacy, 107, on Louis XV’s personal diplomacy. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, especially 86, ­787–9, stress the importance of individuals and their personalities. See also Blockmans et al., “Origines,” 10; and Genet, “État moderne,” 268–9. 23 See discussions in Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 137–8; Church, Louis XIV in Historical Thought, 21–54; and Carbonell, “Origines,” ­296–312. Cole, Governing, 28–9, describes the Jacobin view of the state and those similar elements that made the Louisquatorzian state so appealing to historians such as Lavisse. See also Nora, “Lavisse’s Histoire,” ­329–90. Bonney, “Absolutism,” 94, argues that “centralization,” a neologism first employed under the Terror in 1794, “is best avoided by the historian of early modern France … Instead, [sixteenth- and seventeenth-century people] stressed the distinction between the king’s delegated and his retained justice.” 24 Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 137. Blockmans, “Origines,” 2–6, offer examples from various national historiographical traditions. 25 Recent criticisms and warnings are found in Duindam, Courts, 318; ­Rowlands, Dynastic State; Smith, Merit, 6; Runciman, “Origins,” 47; and Genet, “État modern,” 278–9. 26 Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 204n27, notes “the undeniable bureaucratic development of the central state.” 27 Collins, State, 26, demonstrates that the seemingly complex and confusing layers of judicial power were in fact rational and adapted to contemporary realities. Dubost and Sahlins, Louis XIV, les immigrés, 17–21, analyse the 1697 tax imposed on immigrants. The royal declaration of the tax and the Council of Finances’s arrêt issued a week later together demonstrate the ambiguity of old regime politics. The declaration reflects an archaic form, whereas the decree, representing modernity, addresses the measure’s practical and administrative aspects and political implications. In a memoir for the regent on the late king’s councils, administrator Louis Fagon, son of the famous royal physician, candidly noted that Louis XIV had established councils in a form that differed from what they had been previously. aae md 1206, fol. 245. 28 Zmora, Monarchy, 6, 75–94, argues that the real work of “absolutism” and its greatest practitioner, Louis XIV, was primarily “renovative” (75) or “restorative” (90), returning the state and nobility to an earlier mode of close cooperation and mutual benefit. Beik, Absolutism, 339, argues that “absolute monarchs and their ministers did improve the state apparatus in



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s­ ignificant ways, but their modernity has been overemphasized by historians.” He urges a close examination of the “traditional social climate” in which these improvements occurred. His book seeks to discover “why [absolutism] worked first so badly and then so well” under Louis XIV (4). Tilly, “State Formation,” 137 (italics in original), marks “the analysis of ordered paths” by which states were transformed by following “a continuous field of possibilities, a field itself produced by multiple combinations of the same fundamental variables.” He observes that “within each path of state formation, earlier steps constrained later ones” (143). Cornette, “Nouveau ‘Siècle de Louis XIV,’” 602–3. Schaeper, Economy of France, offers a less bleak overall assessment, even though real difficulties nonetheless remained. Collins, State, 196–7. Even at the beginning of the process of re-evaluation of the second half of the reign it was possible to argue that it was in reality “the Second Period of Reform (following on that of Colbert), or the Second Renewal.” Rule, “Royal Ministers,” 1. Church, Red Tape, 16, claims on thin evidence that “there were few initiatives in government at the end of the reign,” and thereby misses the period’s important bureaucratic advances. Collins, State, especially chap. 5; Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” 29–42; Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 206; Church, Louis XIV in Historical Thought, 58, 73, 77, 90–2; and Rule, “Royal Ministers.” This is not to say, however, that the earlier period is as well understood as is often assumed. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, 8–13. For recent works on financial developments during the reign’s final decades, see Potter, Corps and Clienteles; and McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege. Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 223. In a more theory-driven observation, Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 2–3, says, “Whereas the focus of modernity is on ‘what should be done,’ I suggest a reorientation toward ‘what is actually done.’ In this way we obtain a better grasp – less idealistic, more grounded.” Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” 29. Ranum, Richelieu, 46, warns against history “written from the legislative bones of the ancien régime; descriptions from règlements, without a thorough study of the personalities holding the office, are not only inaccurate but sterile.” Bonney, “Absolutism,” 115–17, also argues for new approaches to the study of the state. Dingli, Seignelay; Mazel, Le Peletier; Frostin, Les Pontchartrain; ­Chapman, Private Ambition; Rowlands, Dynastic State; and Pénicaut, Chamillart (which understandably leaves aside his other post as controller general). Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” notes Mathieu Stoll’s unpublished work on Claude Le Peletier, which has subsequently (2011) appeared as Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil. Sarmant also laments the lack of studies on departments such as the prp, household, and fortifications (created in 1691 and headed by Claude’s brother Michel Le Peletier de Souzy) and of full-scale studies of

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Notes to pages 20–1 Colbert de Croissy, Arnauld de Pomponne, and Daniel Voysin. Studies subsequent to Sarmant’s comments include McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, on Controller General Nicolas Desmaretz; and Cénat, Chamlay, on Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay, Louvois’s and Louis XIV’s chief military collaborator. Especially Bély, Espions; and Bély, Art de la paix. See also Bély, “Torcy.” Collins, State, ixn1. Krygier, “State and Bureaucracy,” 4. Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 205–7, quotes and uses Clausewitz’s sobering observations on the realities of “friction” – his omnibus term for all those “factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” – and “chance” in the great affairs of state. Church, Red Tape, 11–21, despite a caveat about the limitations of the Weberian “ideal type,” appears to deny bureaucratic status to any administrative structure that was poorly planned or failed to maintain crisp Weberian parameters in the face of the inevitable kaleidoscope of changing technology, governmental purposes, bureaucratic “neighbours,” and internal and external contingencies. Likewise, in this view a department that fails to live up to the promise of its structure is denied bureaucratic status; apparently, a failed bureaucracy is no bureaucracy. Weber himself, however, did not look at the quality of administrative structures alone, noting that the “first such basis of bureaucratization has been the quantitative extension of administrative tasks.” Weber, Economy and Society, 2:969. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, especially 43–4, 48, offer a trenchant examination of modern bureaucracy’s theory and practice. Higgs, Information State, 9, notes that the British state after 1914 “did not always prove itself to be the sort of rational, Weberian state that some sociologists would have us believe.” Higgs also observes that the “modern central state is merely a particular form of polity, not the ideal type” (32). Criticisms of Weber, of course, have been around since his work first appeared. A still perceptive reading is Friedrich, “Observations,” 27–33. He faults Weber’s lack of empiricism, use of “ideal types,” smuggling of value judgments into his model, and thinly disguised preference for a Prussian-style military organization as his model’s inspiration, but nonetheless credits Weber with having “opened important lines of inquiry” (33). Runciman, “Origins,” 47, argues against such assumptions. Cole, Governing. This legacy, however, is mixed. For example, “France has a particularly costly and inefficient system of tax collection,” and this was bequeathed by Napoleon (ibid., 179). Hindle, State, ix, urges that English “state formation” be seen “less as a linear process than as a sedimentary one, in which successive waves of social, cultural and institutional development subtly reshaped the contours of the political landscape.”



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46 Bell, Cult of the Nation, 5–6, argues that much the same has been done with regard to the “nation.” He notes nationalism’s paradoxical nature in its “claims which take the nation’s existence wholly for granted, yet it proposes programs which treat the nation as something yet unbuilt” (5). Jones, Great Nation, xviii–xx, observes that due to “non-historiographical but intensely historical events since 1989 … [m]any of the old teleological certainties have been exploded, and in a post-Marxist, post-Revisionist, and maybe even post-modern world, we can explore the political culture of the eighteenth century as a whole and its diverse political projects with less of a sense that 1789 was inevitable, or linked past and future in unilinear fashion, or even that it necessarily formed part of one of the founding grand narratives of Western modernity” (xix). Burke, History and Social Theory, 147, describes teleological thinking as based on “the assumption that change is essentially internal to a social system, the development of potential, the growth of a branching tree.” For where this kind of thinking has often led, see Scott, Seeing Like a State. 47 Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 18–19. 48 Quoted in Collins, State, xxiv, who notes that Fritz Hartung demonstrated long ago that this classic phrase was apocryphal. 49 The Polysynod was not the complete break with Louisquatorzian administrative structures and procedures once assumed, but rather a rearrangement of personnel at the very top and not as radical as often supposed. Administrative structures, procedures, and personnel below this level exhibited a striking continuity. Collins, State, 223–6; Petitfils, Régent, 319–25; and the very recent full-scale study by Dupilet, Régence absolue. 50 Asch and Birke, Princes, Patronage, 16–17. 51 Krygier, “State and Bureaucracy,” 21–5; and Kafka, “Hunting,” 119–26. 52 Mommsen, Weber, especially chap. 7. 53 Ibid., 109. 54 Ibid., 109–20. Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 143–8, 152–3, discusses bureaucracy’s adaptability and the advantages and disadvantages of task routinization, but also examines those negative and self-serving aspects that promote internal turf wars, mediocre personnel, and resistance to change. 55 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 52. 56 Burke, History and Social Theory, 30–1; and Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19, 195–6. 57 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 52. 58 Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 136–41 (quotation, 140). Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 23, also sees a continuum. 59 Burke, History and Social Theory, 30. He also observes that both systems “have their benefits, but also their costs.” Adams, “Rule,” 237–66, suggests modifications to Weber’s classic formulation of patrimonialism, noting that

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Notes to pages 23–5 “grand dichotomies,” while useful, can become “quick and dirty substitutes for more flexible concepts that can register diachronic change in relationships or systems.” Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:254–9, for example, shows that while in 1700 the king had made a relatively clear division of commercial responsibilities between the controller general and the navy secretary, Chamillart later requested a change because he considered the division unworkable. Routine and standards are not to be confused with clarity, which in turn should not necessarily be regarded as inimical to bureaucratic growth. Riley, Virtue, 3, shows how the police used the “permeable and imprecise language used to define ‘crime’ and ‘sin’” to their advantage to cast their jurisdictional net more widely. While they served a monarch set upon extirpating immorality, definitions and interpretations were left to them. Dimock, “Expanding Jurisdictions,” 282–91; and Hoover Commission, “Duplication of Functions,” 291–7. Ferlie, Lynn, and Pollitt, “Afterword,” 723, report that “it has become a commonplace that the boundaries between the public sector, the private sector, and civil society are becoming less clearcut and more ambiguous.” Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 21, 23. Collins, State, 66, points to the “profoundly personal nature of rulership” in both the early modern and our own times, requiring that strong personal bonds remain important, even in a bureaucratized state. One could multiply the examples and also take them in the other direction. What about educators who use their own funds for classroom supplies and who spend weekends and holidays at home working on their public service jobs? Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 55–7. Ibid., 65. Weber, Economy and Society, 2:999. Perhaps more clearly than Burke, Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 65, formulate this factor as “occupation of offices based on expertise and training” without specifying formal education and testing. Ash, “Expertise,” 6, notes that “an important aspect of expertise is the ability to learn on the job, and especially to cope with the surprises and unexpected setbacks one is virtually certain to encounter in the course of one’s career.” Azimi, “Pensions,” 77–8, demonstrates that the administrative customs of the various ministries with regard to these pensions only later gave rise to written law. Torcy, Journal, 303, records an example of the dangers of oral communication. Louis Pontchartrain misinformed him about the sending of some important orders because he had misunderstood what the king had said.



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70 Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 138, notes “Weber’s view that bureaucratization is encouraged by the need to deal with large continuous flows of administrative jobs.” 71 Collins, State, 208, 208n24, argues that while the bureaucracies created in France and England between the 1680s and 1720s differed from later ones “in fundamental ways (such as levels of routinization, real salaries, and size),” it does not mean that they were not bureaucracies. He notes that Brewer’s argument in his Sinews of Power that a fiscal-military bureaucracy arose in England during this period is now the historical consensus. 72 Rabinow, Foucault Reader, 16. Jones, Great Nation, xxi, 18–25, 219, is a recent acknowledgment of the royal government’s often creative and humanitarian attempts from the 1690s to respond to these challenges. 73 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality,” 2. 74 “Governmentality” is discussed at length in Burchell et al., Foucault Effect, especially 1–51. Also, Miller, Passion of Foucault, 299–301; and Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 24–31, 52–6. 75 Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 53. Riley, Virtue, 2, notes that “Louis XIV’s efforts to discipline France and attack sin were sustained by a voracious curiosity about moral conduct, a most rudimentary religious understanding, and, for the first time, a royal bureaucracy capable of providing detailed and precise information on sin.” Louis loved detail. Collins, State, 254, says that the “transition from to the modern state, in terms of the actual activities of the state, took firm root in the second quarter of the eighteenth century … The three main attributes of the old state (military, financial, and judicial) still dominated government thinking and expenditure but new concerns grew in importance … the police, poor relief, education, and sanitation and public works.” 76 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality,” 3. See also Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 91–3. 77 Frederickson, “Public Administration?,” 282–304 (quotation on 283). ­Hindle, State, 1–2, 23, adopts the idea of governance, but argues that Foucault’s influence has led many scholars to focus on “corridors of power” upheld by force, rather than on “circuits of authority” based on “some degree of reciprocity in that it implies the acceptance of the governed of the legitimacy of their superiors’ rule” (236; italics in original). This has resulted in too much focus on central bureaucracy rather on local administration. 78 Duindam, Courts, 228–30. 79 Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 172, 180. 80 Dee, Expansion and Crisis, 175, points out that ministerial stability contributed to Louis XIV’s “constant tone of firm authority.” Whereas his two successors weakened their authority by “sudden ministerial changes and radical

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Notes to pages 26–8 alterations in policy,” Louis XIV remained loyal to a servant like Chamillart long after his inability was patent to most. By doing so, however, the king denied the discontented, especially during the troubled final decades of the reign, a scapegoat to serve as a focus for opponents of the regime. Delavaud, Pomponne, 95. Mommsen, Weber, 112. Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 26, said that “[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational.” Former controller general Claude Le Peletier, although a member of the Le Tellier ministerial faction at court, observed that the king kept ­Louvois’s son and survivancier Barbezieux as war secretary for the sake of continuity and because of his late father’s bureaus, clerks, and the order that they provided. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 155. Frostin, “Organisation,” 202. Apropos to the aggrandizing activities of young Pontchartrain, it is worth noting that Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 143, says that a “genuinely centralized bureaucracy is not only self-maintaining but self-­ developing. Its organizational design rewards bureaucrats who extend the scope of their power by maximizing their organization’s size or wealth or budget.” Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 4–9. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 64. They also point out that “Weber … defined bureaucracy in formal, structural terms” (52). Burke, History and Social Theory, 142–51, offers a trenchant exploration and critique of the concept of modernity and modernization theories. See also Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 24, 107–30. Carbonell, “Origines,” 297n1, contends that although absurd, the historic tradition in France calls the sixteenth through the end of the eighteenth century “modern”; the period from 1789 to the ever-distant present is labeled “contemporaine,” and yet “état moderne” is often used for the state from 1789, even though many now see its origins in the Middle Ages. The state and the nation are related concepts but are frequently confounded even in scholarly discussion. Blockmans, “Origines,” 1–6, 12. For recent French administrative and political decentralization, see Cole, Governing, who highlights administrative realities often at odds with seemingly rational and precise government structures. He demonstrates how the traditional model of the unitary Napoleonic state never reflected the actual relationship between the centre and the periphery, compromised as it was by the persistence of local centres of power and by overlapping layers of central power. Cole also discusses the challenges and opportunities Europeanization poses for French public administration (87–113). See also Pollitt, ­“Decentralization,” 371–97, and various essays in Levi-Faur, Oxford Handbook of Governance.

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Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 76. Ibid., 1. This definition is further elaborated and terms defined in ibid., 5–6. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 3–4 (quotation on 4). Ibid., 1–30. Guéry, “State,” 21–2, seems to imply this when he says that in the ancien régime, “[b]ureaucracy existed only in embryonic form.” Pollitt, “Decentralization,” 373–7, which also includes a concept map of the variety of forms “decentralization” can take on. See also Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 6–9; and Reinhard, “No Statebuilding.” Cole, Governing, 53, after tracing the outlines of the “paradigm of the unitary state” and the “Napoleonic model,” observes: “In practice, centre-­ periphery relations were much more flexible than the Napoleonic model implied, as uncovered in [various] empirical studies.” He notes “the gap between discourse and behavior” (161) in the republican citizenship model and the state. Portrayed as strictly separated, public and private spheres in reality negotiated rule exceptions to adapt to local circumstances or the needs of particular groups. The 1901 law on associations, still very much in play, “conveniently blurs the boundaries between what is public and what is private. It has become a cover to enable public funds to be directed to organizations serving private interests” (162). Black, Diplomacy, 117, in noting the complexity of concepts of modernity and modernization in the history of diplomatic practice and culture, warns against teleological assumptions. Ibid., 54. Ibid., 56. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 62. Ibid., 138. Ibid., 142. As in Mettam, Power and Faction, 38. Cole, Governing, 52–3. Rowlands, Financial Decline, as his subtitle indicates, deals with “war, influence, and money,” was “conceived and written as the western world entered a prolonged period of financial crisis,” and bears enough similarity with practices under Louis XIV as to lead him to express his concern for the damage done by “the recent profligacy and fecklessness of western politicians, bankers, and borrowers” (vii). Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 2. See also Stollberg-Rilinger, “Communication Theory.” Scott, Seeing Like a State, is an exploration of how a highly abstract rationality at the centre can create disasters when it ignores local realities.

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108 Cole, Governing, 178: “Sociological institutionalism thus frames institutions in terms of the belief systems of actors, considered as members of a profession, corps or grade, rather than as utility-maximizing individuals, as in rational choice theory. Its underlying assumption is that individuals within organizations are conservative, fearful of change and resolute in defense of their interests.” 109 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 53. 110 Kettering, Patrons, especially chap. 6. Burke, History and Social Theory, 73, observes that “[s]ome degree of patronage exists in every society, however ‘modern.’” Peters, Politics of Bureaucracy, 90–1, observes that even today value-free bureaucrats do not exist. A spoils system could select bureaucrats both on the basis of commitment to a program and an ability to bring it about, which he labels “responsive competence.” The latter might be more important to success than “neutral competence.” Flinders, “Governance and Patronage,” 268–71, argues for an examination of the use of patronage by modern states that moves beyond its usual equation with corruption, noting that patronage “offers a form of linkage at three levels: between politicians and the state, between the state and society, and between society and politicians” (268). Claiming that “modernization” has undermined “traditional patron-client relationships,” which he terms “closed patronage,” he therefore discusses the positive role of modern “open patronage” in the guise of “party patronage” (270). Perhaps, however, he underplays the ability of traditional patron-client relationships in accomplishing what he credits to “open patronage”: “a form of social or organizational glue through which to establish low-cost high-trust relationships” (268). 111 Cole, Governing, 54. He also observes that the “bureaucracy sometimes ­functions efficiently only because rules are not enforced, but maintaining the fiction of rule-based treatment for everybody is a core belief” (178). 112 Quoted in Zmora, Monarchy, 79. Zmora’s chapter 5 characterizes absolutism as the “cohabitation” of monarchy and nobility centred on the court. It was Louis XIV’s masterful control of patronage that made him “more proficient in the craft of kingship than his colleagues” (91). 113 Rohr, “Ethical Issues,” 294. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, 9, likewise observe that administrative science is not universal but national. ­Kettering, Patrons, 192–206, shows how what was regarded as corruption in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries differs from the twentieth-­ century view. Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 131–6, discuss efforts to uncover the context-based rationality of venal offices. Argyriades, “Need for Comparative Studies,” 359–61, observes that modern bureaucratic elites are “deeply rooted in the political culture and historical experience of the different countries” (359) and urges the biographical study of bureaucrats.



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114 Cole, Governing, 183, urges the same for studies of today’s French administration. Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 235, emphasizes attention to “social context and history” in gauging an institution’s effectiveness, while Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 167, 195, 198, warns against judgments that ignore context. Collins, State, 26, contends that the old regime’s financial system, “seemingly so complex and illogical, actually provided a very rational adaptation to the practical realities of the early modern state,” as demonstrated in McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege. 115 Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 222. 116 Cole, Governing, 53, 60–2, highlights the contradictions and tensions within France’s administrative and political decentralization, where even efforts to clarify and rationalize arrangements often fail or make matters worse. ­Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 234–6, discusses the limits of constitution writing and administrative reform. 117 Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 129, observes: “One way of dealing with the complexity of modernity, adopted by some historians and theorists, is to pluralize it … so it is possible to speak of many ‘modernities.’” 118 Collins, State, 8n10, warns against applying current standards of consistency to the ancien régime and reminds us of our own society’s contradictions. Smith, Merit, 11–56, strikes this proper balance in discussing changing seventeenth-­century views of merit. 119 Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 175. Cassan, “État ‘moderne,’” 469, demonstrates that even without venality the new professional administrators at the end of the eighteenth century used professionalization to create administrative dynasties based on mastery of technical knowledge, possession of intangible knowledge of internalized social codes, and career opportunities facilitated by kinship and professional connections. Collins, State, 191–2, cites Pierre Bourdieu’s provocative contention that academic titles today operate in similar ways to create a state-sanctioned hereditary elite serving the state. 120 Cole, Governing, 138–43. Bell, Lawyers, shows the same mixed motivations of self and public service among barristers. Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 20, tries unconvincingly to reconcile this reality with his model as follows: “Where ‘rights’ to an office exist, as in the cases of judges, and recently of an increasing portion of officials and even workers, they do not normally serve the purpose of appropriation by the official, but of securing the purely objective and independent character of the conduct of the office so that it is oriented only to the relevant norms.” Yet Weber also argues contradictorily that the “relatively great security of the official’s income, as well as the rewards of social esteem, make the office a sought-after position.” Weber, From Max Weber, 203. Compare this with Sharp, “Historical Changes in Recruitment,” 299–300, a 1931 study claiming that “the dominant

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Notes to pages 33–6 urge that led most young Frenchmen to seek careers in government offices before the [Great] war was a desire for a calm bourgeois security they seemed to offer.” After the war, recruitment moved down the social scale as aristocrats and bourgeoisie sought more lucrative private sector careers and the draw of state service became “more strongly than ever a desire for security and steady, but not too strenuous, work” (303). Higgs, Information State, 25. Ibid., 35. Ibid., 25–6, 30–44. Ibid., 26. This is in line with what Beik and others have suggested for France. Ibid. Hindle, State, 15–24. His introduction (1–36) is aimed at reuniting “social, economic and cultural developments” into what he sees as a traditionally fragmented historiography of governance. Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 6. R.A.W. Rhodes, quoted in ibid., 7 (italics in original). See, for example, Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions.” Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 6. Quoted in ibid., 12 (italics in original). Cole, Governing, 12, 67–8, 122–3. Research on French education, welfare, and job training has “uncovered evidence of ‘layering,’ of creating new institutions, agencies and programmes on top of old ones, adding to complexity and uncertainty without improving the central state’s steering capacity” (ibid., 167). Klijn, “Networks,” 257–81, explores this area of growing scholarly attention. As in, for example, Beik, Absolutism, 303–28. Collins, State, 93–4. Petto, Cartography, 8, 35–40, 60–8. Beik, “Social Interpretation,” 160, who notes that the “government of Louis XIV perfected new advances in state management,” also says that “[d]ecentralized rule by local and regional lords was replaced by semi-centralized government run by a graduated hierarchy of venal officeholders and nobles.” Bély, Dictionnaire, 29, after describing the many obstacles faced and the resources possessed by Louis XIV’s administration, labels it more a miracle than a malfunction and asks if, given the same conditions, today’s administrations could claim to do better. Quoted in Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 3. Quoted in translation in Breen, Law, 155. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 19, 127, 129, 474, 477, 481. For the negative health aspects of the location of Versailles, see ibid., 266–316. Duindam, Courts, 82–3, contrasts the openness of the French court with the more secluded one of the Austrian Habsburgs. However, Da Vinha, Valets,



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27–8, calls the alleged accessibility of the French monarch a “facade” and stresses instead its limitations. Newton, Espace du roi, 470–1 (ibid., 34–7, has detailed diagrams of the ministerial wings). Although each pavilion had originally been assigned to a secretary of state, this neat scheme was violated from 1682. For example, a secretary’s accumulation of offices might place him elsewhere in the palace. In 1699, as a special royal favour, Louis Pontchartrain kept his rooms in the right wing rather than move to the Chancellery (ibid., 422). A secretary might prefer another space for residence and offices, as did Louvois. Sarmant, Demeures, 47–50. Newton, Espace du roi, 17, 415–16. He marks who occupied which space in the ministerial wings and the former building superintendent’s quarters (ibid., 418–90). See also Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 284. Newton, Espace du roi, 95–6; and Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 287. Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, explores this debate. Chapter 2 especially addresses the interconnections between absolutism and centralization. Bonney, “Absolutism,” 93–117; and Collins, State, xiv–xxv, survey the varieties of absolutism’s meaning among recent scholars. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, however, offers a productive and provocative reexamination, as does Potter, Corps and Clienteles. Collins, State, 173–4, says that one reason Louis sought to attract the great aristocrats, noble officials, and financiers to Versailles and Paris was to have them close by for debates over policy, since implementation of policy required their cooperation. Soll, Information Master. Scott, Seeing Like a State, discusses how the state’s quest for information as it sought resources, especially for war, promoted centralization and standardization in order to make the vast variety of local societies “legible” to those at the centre. See Parker, Global Crisis, 625–9, for the link between this quest for “legibility” and global climate change and revolutions during the seventeenth century. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 278. Samoyault, Bureaux, 220, calls Versailles a somewhat artificial administrative city where people transplanted from diverse backgrounds became administration employees. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 272–4. Hooke, a foreign office operative, reported that at Fontainebleau on 7 October 1707 he made a copy of a draft letter Torcy had personally written to be sent eventually to Scotland and did so “in M. Pecquet’s bureau.” Hooke, Correspondence, 2:487. Sourches, Mémoires, 11:328 (3 May 1709), reported the rumour that Torcy had gone to The Hague despite his precaution of leaving his secretary and one of his principal ­commis at Marly. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 254, observed in the 1660s while away from Paris and at Saint-Germain that “there is less time for paperwork in the country.”

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Notes to pages 38–9

151 Dunlop, Royal Palaces, 159. 152 For several of the satellite courts, see Hazlehurst, Gardens of Illusion. 153 Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 286–92, urges caution in applying the solar symbolism of Versailles to the whole reign. She even suggests that the appellation “Sun King” (le Roi-Soleil) is arguably apocryphal and should be allowed to expire (292). Perhaps so, but like the term “Renaissance,” it is likely here to stay. Nevertheless, we use it with due caution. Collins, State, 104, says that the most common image of Louis in the medals struck during his reign was Mars, not Apollo. 154 Petto, Cartography, 22, 33–5, 178. 155 Nordmann, Frontières, 157–61. Symcox, “From Commune to Capital: Turin,” 242–69, traces the similar effect on the Savoyard capital of a sedentary court and a growing bureaucracy. 156 Racevskis, Time, 25–89. For a narrative of the king’s day, see État de la France (1698), 1:250–84; and Saule, Journée. Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, ­223–302, provides rich descriptions and discusses the origins and evolution of these public occasions. Duindam, Courts, 131–80, demonstrates that practices were not as rigid as Saint-Simon claimed. Collins, State, 148–50, talks of the “new civility, a new structure of manners” (149) created by this ordering of time. 157 Duindam, Courts, 295. See also ibid., 7–9; Duindam, Myths; and Zmora, Monarchy, 76–94. 158 Duindam, Courts, 295. On Saint-Simon, see ibid., 8, 13, 214–15, 261, 310. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” especially 294, discusses the myth of “Versailles as a grandiose but malevolent palace governed by Louis XIV with an iron fist ready to quash any individual will.” Zmora, Monarchy, 78, offers this succinct evaluation: “Elias’ methodologically jejune thesis, resting on the account given by one disgruntled and surreptitiously tendentious noble, is misleadingly reductionist.” Duindam, Courts, 311, mentions in passing the “impact of permanent diplomacy, itself driven by the competition among European courts” as one of the more likely factors leading to the “‘ceremonialisation’ of the court.” 159 Zmora, Monarchy, 83. Duindam, Courts, 234–42, discusses the risks of proximity to the monarch and favour. 160 Zmora, Monarchy, 7, argues that, “[r]ather than the instrument with which the monarchy shattered the might of the nobility, the state turns out to have been the instrument which the monarchy was forced to allow nobles (and other powerful people) to wield in their interest as well as in its own.” 161 Parker, Class and State, 193. Duindam, Courts, 279–87, helpfully explores what he calls “enticements and manipulations.” 162 Quoted in Duindam, Myths, 93n39. See also Levron, Vie quotidienne, especially 83–4.

163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173

174 175 176 177 178

179

180

Notes to pages 39–41

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Duindam, Myths, 93n37. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 161–97. Duindam, Myths, 140. Kettering, Patrons, 237. Rowlands, Dynastic State, 354–61, discusses this with regard to the army. Guéry, “State,” 1–52. Duindam, Courts, 260–1; see also ibid., 48. Ranum, Richelieu, 48. Duindam, Courts, 63, 303. Ibid., 224. Da Vinha, Valets, xiv, 19–28. Louis XIII and Richelieu successfully reduced the swollen ranks of household officials, but Anne of Austria’s regency witnessed an explosion of new household offices and exemptions. Louis XIV decreased and stabilized their numbers, yet “consolidated their status by confirming their privileges and protecting their offices against creditors.” He allowed the numbers of administrators running the “day-to-day machinery of the court” to fluctuate according to the needs of the services provided. However, their social status languished behind that of the upper echelons of household officers. Duindam, Courts, 55. Da Vinha, Valets, 30–2, discusses the reduced numbers of domestics by the end of the reign. Smith, Merit, 151. Duindam, Courts, 189–91. Barbiche, Institutions, 38–41; and Bély, Dictionnaire, 777–82. Walton, Louis XIV’s Versailles, 17, 128. For numbers under Louis XIV, see Duindam, Courts, 54–61. Asch and Birke, Princes, Patronage, 78. Da Vinha, Valets, 20–1, ­107–19, ­indicates that this was also the rule among them. See also Duindam, Courts, 49–50, 287, although his remarks on p. 123 appear a bit con­ tradictory as to the clarity of distinctions. État de la France (1698): 1: passim, lists household officials by name and semester served whenever possible. Similarly, for most of the nineteenth century, many posts in the French state administration were “honorary” appointments, valued not for their monetary remuneration but for the social prestige public service conferred; the aristocrats and bourgeoisie who occupied these posts usually had enough other income to ignore the low pay and still live comfortably. Sharp, “Historical Changes in Recruitment,” 300–3. The military household played a similar role, although Louis XIV also “treated household units as something of a military school.” Lynn, Giant, 519. See also Rowlands, Dynastic State, 180–1. The king, with the advice of the war secretary, rewarded his clients and those of his ministerial collaborators with honours, appointments, missions, advancements in rank,

494

181 182 183

184

185 186 187 188 189

190

Notes to pages 41–2 e­ nnoblements, even governorships and lieutenancies of towns and cities, especially in new acquisitions (ibid., 349–62). Duindam, Courts, 312; see also 48, 260–1. Ibid., 98; and Rowlands, Dynastic State, 42–6. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297–8. Blanning, Culture of Power, 29–36, disagrees with Himmelfarb on the centrality of the bedchamber and the sun motif, but acknowledges the late date of the move of the bedchamber to the centre. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297. Da Vinha, Valets, 333–6, who describes the solemn surveillance of the royal bed even during the king’s absence and contends that the 1701 move was intentional, nevertheless notes that these measures were also meant to secure the king’s effects, including important state papers. Da Vinha does agree that when the court settled at Versailles, its status changed from that of a private residence to a state residence (33) and thus highlights the valets’ role in preparing the royal chamber for council meetings and in attending to the king’s needs for work in his Cabinet (36, 50–1). On the royal apartments, see Newton, Espace du roi, 124–7; and ­Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297. Da Vinha, Valets, 50–1. Castelluccio, Collections royales, 94–119. See Petto, Cartography. Bély, Art de la paix, 101–4; Duindam, Courts, 101–2; and Mousnier, Institutions, 2:115. Boislisle’s study of Rose in ss-Boislisle, 8:407–20, remains indispensable. bn mf 6658, fol. 37, records that cabinet secretaries received 16,000 livres per annum. See Barbiche, Institutions, 134, 174, 185, for royal letters. He notes that the secretaries of state also had “la plume,” but unlike the cabinet secretaries, they could also affix the royal signature with their counter-signature. Most of the letters destined for foreign courts were drafted by the foreign secretary (ibid., 415), but in aae cp Espagne 244, fol. 253, Torcy wrote Cabinet Secretary Callières on 1 April 1715 to write a letter from the king to the Spanish king and queen on the occasion of a new ambassador’s appointment. Torcy, Journal, 323 (26 Dec. 1710), relates that the king wanted to write ­Vendôme in his own hand. When Torcy showed him the draft he had written out imitating the royal handwriting, the king questioned a phrase and had it changed. aae md 1080, fols 141 and 142, are two letters of Louis XIV to M. Le Prince (Henri Jules, prince de Condé), 21 June 1700. Ibid., 1197, fol. 270 (1714), is an example of an ordonnance “sans adresse ni sceau” that began with “De par le Roy” and spoke the king’s will in the third person. Widely used by the royal bureaucracy, the original of this ordonnance was valid if it had the king’s signature and a secretary of state’s counter-signature.



191 192 193 194 195 196

Notes to pages 43–9

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Barbiche, Institutions, 68–9, 188. An example in aae md 1197, fol. 270, has a good imitation of “Louis” at the bottom and extensive revisions in Torcy’s hand. Is this perhaps because by that date a premier commis who was also a secretary of the king could sign these with an imitation of the king’s signature? The drafts of these short letters are marked in the foreign office’s registries with the notation “de la main de Louis 14” (in the hand of Louis XIV). Torcy, Journal, 233, 321, 334–5, 366, 381. Riley, Virtue. Mazel, Le Peletier, 128–9, notes three such visits recorded by Sourches. See also Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 232–3. Torcy, Journal, 265. Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 1:146–7. See also Da Vinha, Valets. État de la France (1698), 1:209–10.

Chapter Two 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 34. 2 Spanheim, Relation, 350–3. In his notes to this edition, Bourgeois says that Louvois, whose incursions into foreign affairs administration this measure was meant to prevent, generally respected it. If he did retain a secret agent in Savoy, he nonetheless made it clear that their contact remain sub rosa and burned all the letters he received (352n1). For Louvois’s network, see Brousse, “Réseaux d’informations de Louvois.” 3 Spanheim, Relation, 351, 368. 4 Major works on Pomponne are Delavaud, Pomponne; Pomponne, “Relation”; Rowen, “Pomponne”; Sedgwick, Travails, especially chaps 10 and 12; and Petitfils, “Pomponne.” 5 Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 154–84. Much of what follows on Torcy’s education is drawn from this article and from Rule, “Career,” 967–96. 6 There is no book-length biography of Croissy, but see Bérenger, “Croissy”; Bérenger, “Marquis de Croissy”; Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy”; and Duffo, Torcy, which draws heavily on the account left by Torcy’s daughter, the marquise d’Ancezune, published in Marchand, “Vie Torcy.” Spanheim, Relation, 350–77, offers the best contemporary portrait. See bn Cab. H., no. 9734; and bn db 203, fols 148–73, for a family genealogy. 7 Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 54–60 (on diplomats’ wives), 130 (Mme de Croissy in England). 8 Soll, Information Master, 111. 9 bn Clairambault 519, fols 327–8. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 73–5, demonstrates the growing importance of law among the specialized knowledge to be connected with diplomacy. 10 Bérenger, “Croissy,” 158.

496

Notes to pages 49–51

11 Knowledge of German among the non-Alsatian French was rare at this time. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 289n218, 432n135. 12 This network of Colbert cousins, clients, and créatures has been labeled a “lobby.” Dessert and Journet, “Lobby Colbert,” 303–36. See also Kettering, Patrons, 174. 13 Soll, Information Master, 111, 121–2, 143–52. Baluze, administrator of ­Colbert’s library, played a significant role in this. 14 bn Baluze 362, fol. 219, Colbert to Baluze, 10 Sept. 1677. 15 Ibid., fol. 234, Colbert to Baluze, 1 Sept. 1679. 16 Ibid., fol. 249, Colbert to Baluze, 28 Dec. 1681. Baluze replied that the treaties with Morocco were renewed in 1635; the articles and their history are in 78 volumes. For Orange, see ibid., fol. 261, Colbert to Baluze, 8 July 1682. Mézeray (1610–1683) was said to be in disfavour in the early 1680s, but this note would seem to question that assertion. 17 bn Clairambault 1198, fol. 144, Baluze to Torcy, 16 June 1711. For discussion of the case, see Torcy, Journal, 216, 216n2. 18 Soll, Information Master, 67–83, describes the training and work of Colbert’s intendants. 19 Ibid., 155–9. 20 Jouin, Charles Le Brun, 233; and Torcy, Journal, ix. 21 Roth, “Torcy,” 186–7; and Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 190–1. 22 Torcy, Journal, ixn2; see also Bell, Lawyers, chap. 2. 23 bn mf 6679, fol. 49r, from the journal of introducer of ambassadors Nicolas II Sainctot. 24 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 334. Croissy traveled in Germany, Poland, Austria, Italy, England, and the United Provinces. Spanheim, Relation, 354–7. Croissy’s predecessors had also traveled abroad or served as ambassadors before assuming the direction of foreign affairs. Poumarède, “Brienne”; Cras, “Lionne”; and Petitfils, “Pomponne.” The narrative of Torcy’s travels is in two manuscript volumes in the Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale (cited hereafter as ban), ms 253, ba 14–16 and E 404, portions of which are published in Delavaud, “Éducation”; Marchand, Mission Torcy; and Marchand, “Vie Torcy.” 25 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:324n2. For the 1683 royal itinerary, see Cornette, Chronique, 310. 26 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 362, cryptically assigned Croissy’s undated instructions for this trip to April 1685 because of the events concerned. Presumably, Delavaud meant Torcy’s projected trip through Germany to Denmark, announced in mid-April (see Marchand, Mission Torcy, 18, for the 13 April notice in the Gazette de France). It seems, however, that these instructions predated the Danish mission. Bearing condolences to the king of Denmark suggests that the envoy made his way to Copenhagen quickly rather than



27

28 29

30 31 32 33

34

35 36

Notes to pages 51–3

497

after numerous stops along the way and by a less direct route. While stops in Germany (although not in Mainz or Heidelberg) were projected after the Danish mission, the proposed itinerary Delavaud published begins in ­Montbelliard. Moreover, disparaging his son’s normal manner, Croissy urged him to write in a small journal every night. The letter’s content and tone sound more like observations made in the wake of the 1683 trip rather than after the later Iberian voyage, whose results pleased Torcy’s exacting father. This fits with the account from Torcy’s daughter (Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:324), who claim that her father received on the 1663 journey the parental correction and niggling otherwise usual for a boy of his age and prospects. For Torcy’s instructions, see France, Recueil, 3:163–9. Queen Maria ­Francisca Isabel, as she was known in Portugal, was the sister of Marie-Jeanne-­Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours, who was Victor Amadeus II’s mother and Savoy’s regent. The queen had been unhappily married to Afonso until Pedro became regent after a palace coup in 1667 and her husband after her unconsummated first marriage was annulled. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325n5; and Delavaud, “Éducation,” 340–2, 344, 357, 359–60. See Croissy to Torcy, 4 Feb. 1684 (ibid., 350). Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325; and Delavaud, “Éducation,” 341. The introduction to Torcy’s instructions in France, Recueil, 3:164, gives an arrival date of 21 March, but without a source. For Saint-Romain’s career and his instructions, see France, Recueil, 3:87–119, 147–62. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325–8. Greater detail is in Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 175–8. Delavaud, “Scènes,” 265. Croissy to Torcy, 4 Feb. 1684, in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 346–50. In a 10 March letter, Croissy urged him not to be overly cautious and hold back on expressing his thoughts. Better some minor faults in his letters, he tartly observed, than the great sterility that so often appeared (ibid., 351). In 1695 Louis would criticize War Secretary Barbezieux as one who “speaks and writes crudely.” Rule, Louis XIV, 50. In later life Torcy was able to indulge his preference for a more literary style in written exchanges with such friends as Tessé and Gramont (Dubet, Orry, 46), but he also instructed his clerks on missions abroad as to his and the king’s preference for letters that were neither too long nor too dry. aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 161, Torcy to Noblet, 17 Dec. 1700. Cénat, Chamlay, 28, observes that his detailed and descriptive dispatches were what drew the king and Louvois to the otherwise obscure marshal general of logistics. France, Recueil, 3:164–9, 25 Jan. 1684. Ibid., 168.

498 37 38 39 40

41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53

54 55 56

57 58 59 60

61 62

Notes to pages 53–6 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 352. Ibid., 355. Ibid., 360. For Colbert’s son Seignelay, see Soll, Information Master, 84–93; and for Jérôme, son of Louis Pontchartrain, see Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 273–322. The letters of Argoud to Seignelay or someone in his bureau are in bn ­Clairambault 501, fol. 559 (4 July 1684), fol. 569 (13 Aug. 1684), fol. 607 (29 Aug. 1684), fol. 609 (26 Sept. 1684), fol. 612 (7 Oct. 1684), fol. 620 (23 Oct. 1684), fols 651–2 (13 Feb. 1685; the quotation is from this letter), and fol. 661 (13 Mar. 1685). Ibid., fol. 707, Argoud to ?, 1 Oct. 1685. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 352. Ibid., 353. Ibid., 354. Ibid., 355–7. Ibid., 358. The passports are in aae cp Espagne 69, fols 247ff. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 358–9. The phrase “gouverner les gouverneurs” refers to those charged with the education of children. aae cp Portugal 22, fol. 15, also quoted in Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:328n3. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 328. Ibid., 330. Ibid., 330–2. ban ms 253, ba, fols 177ff, and as recounted in Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:331–4. Modern scholars have concurred with Torcy’s assessment of ­Carlos. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 572. ban ms 253, E 404, fols 175–6. For Marianna, her regency, and her continuing influence, see Kamen, Spain Later Seventeenth Century, 328–43, 384–6. Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 178–80. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 360–1. The Italian trip was to have been made with a smaller retinue of only those necessary, since Torcy would travel with no official status and thus at Croissy’s personal expense (ibid., 359). Ibid., 361. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:335. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 343. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:335n3, quotes from the Gazette. Marchand, Mission Torcy, 18–19. Although Geffroy mentioned Torcy’s mission in France, Recueil, 13:217, he did not publish his instructions, which are in Marchand, Mission Torcy, 20–3. See Marchand, Mission Torcy, 19, 32, for the dates of departure. Ibid., 19, 23–6.



Notes to pages 56–9

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63 D’Avaux to Croissy, 24 May 1685, in ibid., 34. Further praises were sent in a letter of 31 May 1685 (ibid., 37). 64 Ibid., 49. 65 Ibid. 66 Croissy to Torcy, 7 June 1685, ibid., 41, and again 18 June, although Saxony is no longer mentioned (ibid., 45). 67 Croissy to Torcy, 4 July 1685, ibid., 56. For Danish and Swedish relations during this period, see Upton, Charles XI, chap. 6. 68 Marchand, Mission Torcy, 41, 45, 51–2, 56, 58, 61, 65, 89, traces the evolving itinerary. 69 ban ms 253, ba, fols 48–50. Marchand, Mission Torcy, 52–4, 65–91, describes the final protocol arrangements and the visit. The protocol compromise set a precedent that the English consciously mimicked the following year. Sir Gabriel Sylvius to Sir William Trumbull, 3 Apr. 1686, Copenhagen, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 145. Delavaud, “France et Danemark,” 470, 470n1, reports that Torcy was lodged in Larvik with Count Guldenlöwe, who twenty-two years earlier was entertained by Louis XIV when he had accompanied Christian V to France. Delavaud, France’s first ambassador to an independent Norway, had a commemorative bust of Torcy placed in the Christiania legation in 1908. 70 Marchand, Mission Torcy, 95–112; and Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 182–4. 71 ban ms 253, ba fols 92–3, Croissy to Torcy, 15 Nov. 1685. See also ­Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:56–7, where Torcy’s daughter says that the elector refused to comply and Torcy had to keep the gift. On changing attitudes about gifts during this era, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 49–51. 72 Verjus had been in Germany since 1670 and at Ratisbon since 1679. ­Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 371–7 (for a biographical note). For the negotiations at the time Torcy was at Ratisbon, see ibid., 441–52. See also Auerbach, France et le Saint empire, 193–215, 263, who notes that ­Pomponne and Verjus did not like one another and that the latter welcomed and courted the favour of Croissy (ibid., 1987–88). Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 257, 274–5, 284, observes that the French likewise insisted that documents presented to them be in Latin rather than German. 73 Sir George Etherege to Sir William Trumbull, 25 Feb. 1685/4 Mar. 1686, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 124. 74 See Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 4:57–71, where Torcy’s daughter quotes extensively from these notes. See ban ms 253, ba fols 94–9v, for Torcy’s notes, and fols 135–44v for the final copy. Also, Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 184–8. 75 ban ms 253, ba, 134v, Torcy to Croissy, 5 Apr. 1686, Munich. See also Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 185–6; and Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:71–7. He arrived in Venice on 24 April 1686 after a journey of eleven days from Munich. 76 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:72.

500

Notes to pages 59–60

77 aae cp Rome 301, fol. 208–9r, Torcy to Croissy, 27 Aug. 1686. 78 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:73–4. Torcy’s daughter refers with regret to lost memoirs her father had written while in Rome. There is extensive correspondence between Torcy, du Pré, the d’Éstrées brothers, and Croissy from January to October 1686 in aae cp Rome 301. 79 In a letter of 18 April 1686, quoted in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 366, Croissy urged Torcy to visit Bracciano. See Torcy to Croissy, 30 July 1686, bn mf 20148, fol. 165v, on his good relations with the duchess. For Torcy’s visit, see Cermakian, Ursins, 158–9, 173–4; and for the salon, Goulet, “Cercle Ursins à Rome,” 60–71. 80 Croissy to Torcy, 18 Apr. 1686, quoted in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 366. For more on Torcy’s Roman sojourn, see Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 186–9. 81 bn mf 20148, fol. 161, Torcy to Croissy, 5 June 1686. On 16 July 1686 (ibid., fol. 164), Torcy informed Croissy that d’Estrées’s insights into the papal court supplied him with much to reflect upon when the summer heat kept him from going about the city. On 30 July 1686 (ibid., fol. ­165r–v), Torcy again wrote glowingly of the instruction and favour he received from the cardinal. Perhaps whatever mistrust initially distanced them had dissipated. 82 Croissy to Torcy, 18 Apr. 1686, in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 368. 83 bn mf 20148, fol. 163, Torcy to Croissy, 16 July 1686. For Modena, see aae cp Rome 301, fol. 285v, Torcy to Croissy, 1 Oct. 1686, Florence. For reactions to Torcy’s audience with the pope, see Neveu, Correspondence Ranuzzi, 1:747, 759. 84 aae cp Rome 301, fols 283 and 287, Torcy to Croissy, 1 Oct. 1686 (italics added in the quotation). See Sourches, Mémoires, 6:34 (20 May 1698), for the dinner Torcy had at Versailles for the second son of the grand duke, who had come to France apparently without taking leave of his father and family. 85 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:74n2, quoting the Gazette de France. 86 Ibid., 74. 87 aae md 302, fol. 194v, 1 Apr. 1687. Ibid., 1004, fol. 435, Torcy to bishop of Oléron, 9 Nov. 1690, reveals Torcy reporting directly to and receiving orders from the king; for other examples, see ibid., 1006, fol. 110r–v (29 Sept. 1690) and fol. 145 (14 Nov. 1690), showing the revisions Torcy made as the king instructed him in the form of these letters. 88 For instance, bn mf 8834, fol. 74, Torcy to Lebret, 29 Apr. 1689, on new converts; and aae md 1004, fols 180–2, 408 (in Torcy’s hand), 409–13, and 509–10. 89 Pencil marks in Torcy’s hand – such as “Provence 1682” in aae md 1730, fols 18ff – testify to his classification work in his father’s archives, perhaps during this period. Interestingly, he organized many of his own letters for later archiving: for example, aae cp Rome 301, fol. 102–3bis, where in a



90

91

92 93 94

95

96

97 98

99

Notes to pages 61–2

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1 July 1686 letter to his father from Rome he wrote, “Rome 1686” as a filing guide. Baschet, Dépôt, 59–61, publishes the royal order of 9 February 1688 authorizing payment for the binding work, which would be done in red Moroccan and with the Colbert arms. aae cp Angleterre 162, fols 157–8. The queen’s mother, the Duchess of Modena, was also Mazarin’s niece. For this and the mission to England in general, see Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:74–6. France, Recueil, 25-2:386–95, has further information, including Torcy’s original instructions, dated (probably) 21 August 1687, and additions dated 12 September and sent to him in London. For Croissy’s 19 September 1687 letter about lodgings, see ban ms 253, ba fol. 154r–v. aae cp Angleterre 162, fols 159–60v, Torcy to Louis XIV, 14 Sept. 1687, and fols 157–8r, to Croissy. He also mentioned that he was accompanied by “Mr Bontems” and that when they arrived in London on the 10th, Barillon wanted them to stay with him. Torcy’s farewell audiences are discussed in ibid., fols 173–5r, Barillon to Louis XIV, 23 Sept. 1687; and ibid., fols ­231–5v, 27 Oct. 1687. Ibid., fol. 242, Barillon to Louis XIV, 30 Oct. 1687. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 83. From the end of the 1680s, Spanheim, Relation, 173, refers to Croissy’s gout and worsening health. Examples of Torcy’s letters concerning papal affairs are aae cp Rome 317 and 318 (for 1688); and ibid., 326, fols 80r–v, 112, 192, 282, and (for 1689) 283. Ibid., fol. 328v, has a guide in table form to the cardinals and the factions among them. France, Recueil, 17:25. Chaulnes’s instructions, printed in ibid., 17:30–57, do not indicate that Torcy prepared them, but it is clear from the original in aae cp Rome 323, fols 12ff. For Crécy’s advice, see Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:189n4. According to ­Sourches, Mémoires, 3:140–1 (21 Aug. 1689), the king cancelled the permission originally granted to the young court abbés eager to go to Rome save that given to Abbé Croissy, who was to accompany his brother. Louis feared any of them dying in Rome, since the pope had the right to fill such vacancies. aae cp Rome 323, fol. 290, Chaulnes to Louis XIV, 5 Nov. 1689, describes Abbé Croissy carrying a letter to and being received by the pope. Torcy’s daughter quoted extensively from this and four other letters from Torcy to Croissy from Rome. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:190–203. aae cp Rome 323, fol. 115, Chaulnes to Louis XIV, 2 Oct. 1689. Ibid., fol. 195r–v, Chaulnes to Croissy, 9 Oct. 1689, reported that he and Torcy had conferred on the elevation of the bishop of Beauvais. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:155, 155n2, 156 (13 Sept. 1689), says that the king used the survivance to persuade Croissy to sell his office of président à mortier in the Paris parlement to facilitate other changes in that court. The

502

100 101

102 103

04 1 105

106

107 108 109

110

111

112

Notes to pages 62–4 ­ olbert family, anxious to secure Torcy’s future as secretary of state, perC suaded Croissy to let go of an office he had held on to in order to serve in it and provide for his family should he suffer the fate of previous foreign secretaries cashiered by the king (ibid., 155n2). aae cp Rome 327, fol. 72 (15 Oct. 1689), fol. 108 (11 Oct. 1689), Abbé Herault to Croissy. Also Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:200–3. Dangeau, Journal, 3:18–19; and Sourches, Mémoires, 3:172. Sourches reported (16 Nov. 1689) that it was approximately then that Torcy took his oath of office as secretary from the king’s hands and began signing outgoing dispatches to relieve his father, much burdened by chronic and painful gout (176). Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, 26–7. Burke, History and Social Theory, 75; his discussion of the difficulties in defining “corruption” (73–6) is brief but instructive. See also Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 195–7, and his reminder of Acton’s dictum about the corrupting nature of power, which ironically may have rendered the powerful bureaucracies of the past two centuries even more susceptible to malfeasance than those of the early modern era. Ridder-Symoens, “Training and Professionalization,” 170. He preferred to select his chief collaborators from among “those already in office or whom birth and inclination have attached to our personal service.” Louis XIV, Mémoires, 32. This and the following paragraphs are drawn from Frostin, Les ­Pontchartrain, 324–32, a useful discussion of the advantages of this system. After Barbezieux’s death in 1701, among the ministers and secretaries who worked closely with the king, only Torcy and Jérôme Pontchartrain had been trained as survivanciers (ibid., 324). Louis XIV, Mémoires, 144. Poumarède, “Brienne,” 62; Rowlands, Dynastic State, 37–8 (the Le Telliers); and Pénicaut, “Chamillart,” 303, 311. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:439, Renaudot to Croissy, 16 Jan. 1694, notes that Charles Fanshaw, apparently now a Jacobite, was known to Torcy from his visit to Portugal when Fanshaw was ambassador there. Bély, Dictionnaire, 451–3. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 73–5, points out the relatively small pool from which diplomatic personnel could be drawn, noting that even many of those who qualified by birth and breeding still lacked the requisite experience or training. aae md 1026, fol. 49, Croissy to Cardinal Bouillon, 8 Feb. 1694, reporting from Versailles that Torcy had read Forbin-Janson’s dispatches to the king that morning. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 17, 273–365, 372, discusses Jérôme ­Pontchartrain’s travels and formation and the smooth transition to his



113 114

115

116 117

118 119 120 121 122 123

124

Notes to pages 64–6

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f­ ather’s secretaryship. Luçay, Origines, 116n1, notes that survivanciers were members by right of Dispatches. See also Dangeau, Journal, 11:276 (3 Jan. 1707). Ranum, Richelieu, 51–2. Spanheim, Relation, 173. Sir William Trumbull, English ambassador to France, reported two occasions in February 1686 when he was forced to conduct business with Croissy, bedridden due to gout, through “commis” who, after conferring with their master, returned to relay his wishes. Clark, Trumbull, 188–9. See, for instance, aae md 1005, fol. 72, Torcy to Bishop Bossuet, 9 Mar. 1690; ibid., fol. 116, Croissy [Torcy] to President Rose, 21 Aug. 1690; and ibid., fol. 138, Torcy/Croissy to père de la Chaize, 3 May 1690 (two letters). Ibid., 1004, fol. 182r, Croissy [Torcy] to Bouville, 27 Apr. 1690, used a trope common to father and son: I must know what goes on because I give an exact account to the king. Torcy reported on his own to the king and perhaps occasionally filled in for his ailing father at Dispatches. Letters sent out in Croissy’s name were typically marked “Mgr,” while those in Torcy’s name were marked “Mgr Torcy,” as in ibid., fol. 413, 31 Oct. 1690. aae md 1004, fol. 96, Torcy to Le Camus, 28 Sept. 1691. Ibid., fol. 213, Torcy to Cavallerini, 10 Feb. 1691. In 1696 Cavallerini and Sebastiano Tanara, nuncio to Austria, were part of a secret effort to resolve the impending Spanish succession. aae cp Autriche 68, fols 153–7v (with Torcy’s additions). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:327, 327n2; see also ibid., 182 (for 1694). aae md 1016. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:245, 245n1; and Recueil des actes du clergé, 9:752. Dangeau, Journal, 3:230. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:323–4. Dangeau, Journal, 3:303 (18 Mar. 1691), 4:58 (8 Apr. 1692), 4:78 (19 May 1692), 4:259 (5 Apr. 1693). In 1691, along with the war secretary, Croissy went to the front, while in 1692 and 1693 he was joined by fellow ministers Pomponne and Beauvillier. Pontchartrain and Le Peletier remained in Paris. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:369–70, mentions that secretary of state Châteauneuf was also in attendance and relates that on 21 March 1691 at Le Quesnoy, he and Croissy, who had not brought tents, were ceded monastic cells in the abbey by officers who had residences nearby. All the other courtiers, however, had to be satisfied with whatever lodgings they could manage. A map of these three trips based on Dangeau is in Boutier, Atlas, 35. In mid-March 1694 while the king slept several days at Chantilly, Croissy, Pomponne, and Beauvillier slept nearby at Compiegne, where the king met with them after leaving Chantilly. Dangeau, Journal, 4:462, 464. Lynn, Wars, 216–18; and Sourches, Mémoires, 4:74 (19 June 1691).

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125 Dangeau, Journal, 3:312. On the evening of Louis’s first day at Mons, even after he had inspected the lines for six hours and made other dispositions for the siege, his work did not cease. After acting as a general giving orders, ­Dangeau noted, he worked as a king at state business without neglecting the least of it (306). 126 aae cp Rome 344, fols 67–84r, 9 Apr. 1691; and Sourches, Mémoires, 3:407–8. 127 For this 12 April 1691 neutrality treaty and a similar one signed 25 March with the Prince-Bishop of Münster, see aae md 1010, fol. 158ff. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:410 (19 Apr. 1691), says that this news arrived as the royal party returned to Versailles. This effort to end France’s diplomatic isolation is discussed in Fayard, “‘Third Party,’” 213–40. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:409 (18 Apr. 1691), records the arrival of news of Baltic diplomatic developments. 128 aae md 1016, fols 179ff. Torcy was assisted by at least four secretaries. Ibid., fol. 179, Torcy to lieutenant du roi at Dauphiné, 13 May 1692. 129 Ibid., fol. 189, Circular Letter, 28 May 1692; ibid., fol. 198, Torcy to ­Pontchartrain, 20 June 1692; ibid., fol. 202, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 25 June 1692; and ibid., fol. 205, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 4 July 1692. For ­Frischmann and his activities, see Fayard, “‘Third Party,’” 213–40; and ­Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 523, 531–2, 547, 560, 586, 636–9. 130 aae md 1016, fol. 204, Torcy to Montmort, 30 June 1692. 131 Ibid., 1019 fol. 55, June 1692. The rolle is discussed below on pages 314–16. 132 Ibid., 1016, fol. 266, Torcy to Daguerre, 6 July 1692, Mariembourg. 133 Ibid. 134 Villien, Renaudot; and especially Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37. 135 bn naf 7492, fol. 379, Torcy to Renaudot, 24 or 29 Jan. 1693 (?). For Torcy’s annotations on Renaudot’s letters to Croissy, see 1 Mar. 1693 (ibid., fol. 292), 19 Sept. 1693 (ibid., fol. 300), and 7 Dec. 1693 (ibid., 7487, fol. 267). See also Torcy to Renaudot, 16 Mar. 1693 (ibid., fol. 210), and 3 Mar. 1694 (ibid., fol. 321r). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:450, records Torcy’s work with Renaudot on Jacobite affairs in early 1694. 136 Spanheim, Relation, 173. 137 Dangeau, Journal, 4:246. 138 Ibid., 289–313 (18 May–26 June 1693), recounts the royal progress to and from the frontier. aae md 1022, fols 76ff, has traces of Torcy’s correspondence from the front. Ibid., cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693, is Torcy’s peace proposal. 139 Bossuet, Correspondance, 6:76n3, Torcy to Bossuet, 20 Nov. 1693. ­Pontchartrain asked Bossuet (25 Nov. 1692) to reply to the letter Torcy had sent the bishop concerning converts from his diocese arrested in Croissy’s department of Sedan as they fled France (ibid., 5:267). Torcy reported to ­Bossuet (16 Dec. 1693) that he had read his letter to the king (ibid.,



140 141

142 43 1 144 145 146

147 148 149 150

151

Notes to pages 68–9

505

­ :100–1), and later (30 Dec. 1693) wrote Bossuet about the arrest of those 6 fleeing the kingdom because of famine (ibid., 112). In 1695 both Torcy and Croissy requested and received a memoir from Bossuet on ecclesiastical matters (ibid., 14:311–12). Dangeau, Journal, 5:72 (2 Sept. 1694). Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 86. His health was of ongoing concern at France’s embassies. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 445, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 18 May 1684; and ibid., fol. 457, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 8 June 1694. aae cp Danemark, 47, fols 556–7, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 10 May 1695; and ibid., 57, fol. 22, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 11 Dec. 1696. See Rule, “Career,” 988–96, for a fuller treatment. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture.” Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 46, 69. Torcy later developed a voice that allowed him to differ subtly with the king’s greater optimism during peace negotiations. For example, while Louis was sanguine about the progress Philip V was making in Spain, Torcy was more guarded, as can be seen by comparing the letter he drafted on behalf of the king for the Utrecht plenipotentiaries on 10 January 1712, in aae cp ­Hollande 22, fol. 31r–v, and his own letter to them the same day (ibid., 32r). Dangeau, Journal, 5:443–4. Also Sourches, Mémoires, 5:168–9. Sourches, Mémoires, 5:169; and Dangeau, Journal, 5:445, 448. Roth, “Torcy,” 184–5, discusses the marriage contract. Dangeau, Journal, 5:453. This claim apparently originated with Rowen, “Pomponne,” 547, who repeated it in Rowen, Ambassador Prepares, 16. It is repeated in Rule, “King and Minister,” 218, 218n29; and in Sedgwick, Travails, 241. Rowen, ­“Pomponne,” 547n102, cites ss-Boislisle, 6:349, but that passage only implies that because Louis and Pomponne feared that Croissy might become jealous at Pomponne’s return, Pomponne sought to win him over by personally announcing the news and asking for his friendship. Saint-Simon reports Croissy’s great surprise, but says noting of a rebuff, while Boislisle (ibid., 349n2) notes that Pomponne’s memoirs record no resentment against Croissy and even laud his diplomatic accomplishments. Torcy’s daughter offers a similar account. Mathis, “Vie de Simon Arnauld,” 5. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 165, may imply lingering discomfort between the two families in saying that the marriage was intended to “reconcile” them, but indicates no opposition from Croissy and characterizes the union as in some way Croissy’s posthumous masterpiece. Sedgwick, Travails, 229–30, says that the king’s generosity to Pomponne in his disgrace meant that Pomponne “accepted his dismissal from office with far greater equanimity than he had his earlier setbacks.” Other possible brides for Torcy mentioned in the first half of the 1690s were Mlle d’Estrées (Sévigné, Lettres, 9:459), Mlle Dangeau, and Mlle

506

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155 156

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Notes to page 69 d’Hocquincourt (Delavaud, Pomponne, 98–9). From 20 September 1695 a match with Mlle Pomponne was expected, with the king’s favour and his and Pomponne’s monetary contributions already specified (Dangeau, Journal, 5:281). On the 28th, however, the marquise d’Huxelles wrote Antoine Escalins d’Adhemar, marquis de la Garde, that there was no longer talk of it (Delavaud, Pomponne, 102). No reason was given, but it is an unwarranted assumption that it was due to Croissy’s opposition. Secretary of State ­Châteauneuf was also bidding for Mlle Pomponne’s hand for his son, the marquis de La Vrillière, but Pomponne would not agree unless La Vrillière received his father’s survivance, which the king would not grant (Dangeau, Journal, 5:299). See also the excerpt from vol. 1, pt 2, chap. 3, sections 2 and 3 of Mathis, “Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, secrétaire d’État des Affaires étrangères de Louis XIV (1618–1699),” 2 vols., thèse, l’École nationale des chartes, 2007 (graciously provided by the author, this excerpt is cited hereafter as “Mathis, Thèse Excerpt” because it has its own pagination and footnote numbers that do not correspond to the two sections as they appear in the original document). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 10–11. ss -Coirault, 1:303. Sourches, Mémoires, 4:446 (20 Apr. 1695), mentions one such long bout and recovery, but a relapse on 1 May kept him away from the Conseil (448). He was ill again on 4 October (5:61–2). Dangeau, Journal, 5:406, 410–11, 422, 437–9. Negotiations of marriage contract terms, a complex and time-consuming process that would bind together the fortunes of both families into the future, could also generate delays as each side sought the maximum benefit. After all, both fathers were diplomats! A further delaying factor may have been the fact that the children of secretaries of state, including their designated heirs to office, tended to marry upward into the old nobility. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 173, 196–7; ­Bluche, “Social Origins,” 94; Dingli, Seignelay, 52–7; and Frostin, Les ­Pontchartrain, 241–2, 246, 251–2. In January 1696, Barbezieux had made a brilliant match and had a wedding “worthy of a prince of the blood” (Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 219). If Croissy had any qualms about marrying his son to Pomponne’s daughter, it seems more likely they resulted from the Arnauld’s lack of lofty lineage than from any lingering bitterness (besides, it was Croissy who had replaced Pomponne, not the other way around). Dangeau, Journal, 5:441. Ibid., 447 (Saint-Simon’s “Additions”). Bossuet, in a letter to his nephew in Rome on the day after Croissy’s death, confirmed this. Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:15–16. Kettering, French Society, 4, 6–9, discusses family duty and marriage strategies. Delavaud, Pomponne, 16. The full text is in Mathis, “Vie de Simon Arnauld,” 1–6.



Notes to pages 69–70

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158 André, Louis XIV, 40. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 11, reports that many contemporaries assumed the same. 159 Dangeau, Journal, 5:444. Beauvillier had married one of the Great Colbert’s daughters. 160 Ibid., 449 (5 Aug. 1696). 161 Ibid., 451 (8 Aug. 1696). Papal Nuncio Delfini’s audience took place with both Pomponne and Torcy, having been rescheduled because of the latter’s wedding. Torcy was also present when the nuncio was presented to the ­Dauphin later that day. A few days later, the nuncio visited first Pomponne and then Torcy separately. bn mf 6679, fol. 164; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:472 (19 Aug. 1696). 162 Henri III’s 1588–89 règlement specifying that a secretary of state had to be at least thirty-five years old was not strictly followed. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:86. For oaths administered directly by the king rather than the chancellor and a list of those entitled to this privilege, see État de la France (1698), 1:274–8. 163 Croissy’s widow was assigned the Pomponnes’ vacated premises. An example of this proximity of apartments at play is gbhmc, Prior Papers, 359, Prior to Jersey, 24 June 1699. He shared a report from an English officer who was at Versailles with Matthew Wall, an English agent who had been pretending for some years to be a Jacobite activist. Prior’s agent reported “that Wall did there speak with … Torcy above stairs in his own apartment, by the same token that Mons. De Heemskirk [a Dutch diplomat] dined that day with … Torcy, and that … Torcy spoke with Wall just as he rose from dinner, that Wall spoke with … Pomponne that same day in the apartment below.” 164 bn mf 6679, fol. 166. 165 Lionne was a minister nearly four years before becoming foreign secretary, Pomponne entered the Conseil the day after his arrival in Paris, and Croissy became a minister the same day he became secretary of state. Bluche, Louis XIV, 576. 166 For the Conseil’s importance for foreign affairs and Torcy’s later ministerial role, see Neveu, “Conseil d’État.” 167 In 1685 they spoke in Rome of Louvois’s hopes to replace Croissy with his own creature, and in 1689 word circulated at court of a possible disgrace. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 92, 95. 168 Newton, Espace du roi, 424. It was the ground floor of the original pavilion at the end of the ministerial wing closest to the palace. Pomponne and his wife also leased a residence in the city of Versailles. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 4n12. 169 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 4, 4n10, did not find Pomponne in any of the Correspondance Politique, 1691–96. 170 Ibid., 3; and Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–50. Lossky, Louis XIV, 170, 173, 175, 232–5, 310n30, describes a rather toxic collaboration

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171 172 73 1 174 175 176

177 178

Notes to page 71 between Louis XIV, Louvois, and Croissy during the 1680s. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 868–8, include him with Louvois and Seignelay as the “durs” (harsh ones) of the Conseil and generally endorse Spanheim’s assessment of him, as does Sarmant, Demeures, 68–9, 83. Drawing on Spanheim, however, Bourgeois sees Croissy as less bellicose than Louvois. Spanheim, Relation, 365–7. He was also less severe with Huguenots than his nephew Seignelay (ibid., 388n1, 391n2, 407–8). Spanheim reported that he had heard Seignelay’s commis complain to Croissy’s that they trembled when Seignelay spoke to them, suggesting that Croissy’s commis had a better relationship with their master (ibid., 394). Dangeau, Journal, 3:370–1. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 133–4. They kept each other informed of what went on at Conseil meetings they missed (265). Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 25 July 1691, in Delavaud, Pomponne, 96. Lossky, Louis XIV, 247. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 140, 146, 152. His Le Tellier partisanship also led to a poor opinion of Lionne. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 86, 88. Others suggest an even lesser role in policy matters and throughout his ministry. Rousset, Louvois, 2:573–4; and Boislisle in ss-Boislisle, 6:346n3. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 162–3, while stressing Croissy’s skills, nonetheless concludes that he remained a technician and did not inspire overall royal policy, although he did not oppose it. Yet Croissy bore part of the responsibility for the reunion policy and the general resort to force and bullying during the 1680s. Cénat, Roi stratège, 127, 160; and ­Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 330–2. As a Conseil member with often like-minded ministers such as Louvois and Seignelay, it seems unlikely that the forceful Croissy refrained from helping formulate such policy until deprived of his last ally in 1691. Torcy “voulait le recherché” (wanted him sought out). Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 22 Aug. 1691, in Delavaud, Pomponne, 97. Sainctot noted that because Croissy and Pomponne differed over how the French clergy were to conduct business with Rome, a royal order of 2 October 1692 specified that the nuncio and other envoys were to address themselves to Croissy and not to other ministers. bn mf 6679, fol. 26. ­Pomponne returned the Venetian ambassador’s February 1695 visit and created a protocol problem through an excess of civility that Introducer Bonneuil had to resolve, but rather than violating the 1692 royal order, it appears that ­Pomponne was stepping in for the ailing Croissy (ibid., 84v–85), whose health issues disrupted other visits or prevented him from returning them (ibid., fols 89–90). Sourches, Mémoires, 4:446 (20 Apr. 1695), reported that Croissy was better after a particularly bad gout attack, which may have been related to Pomponne’s substitution for him that February.



Notes to pages 71–2

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179 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 263. Spanheim claimed that while Louvois had interfered in foreign office business under Pomponne, he mostly did not under Croissy. Spanheim, Relation, 336, 351–3. In his notes on the text, Bourgeois (ibid., 339n1) says that even though the war minister’s was the predominant voice in formulating policy, Louvois biographer Camille R ­ ousset’s claim that Louvois directed foreign affairs from 1680 is an exaggeration. 180 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 6–8. 181 Dangeau, Journal, 4:58 (8 Apr. 1692), noting that Beauvillier and ­Pomponne had followed the king to Flanders, tellingly observed that Croissy “suit toujours” (always follows). The initial receipt, decoding, and reading of dispatches and the expedition of paperwork required the secretary’s constant presence. It usually sufficed to summon the other royal councillors for the deliberative process of making policy. This explains Croissy’s and later Torcy’s presence with the king at Marly even when the other ministers were absent or came only for council meetings (as in ibid., 3:352, 392, 429; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:114n12). Spanheim, Relation, 165, observes that under Croissy the former practice of ambassadors promiscuously meeting with other ministers ended. It was agreed that only the foreign secretary would receive foreign envoys, render an account to the king and Conseil, arrange royal audiences for ambassadors if informed beforehand of their subjects, and remain during these audiences. 182 France, Recueil, 4:229n1, 230n5, on Poland. For Beauvillier’s role in the policy that led to Ryswick and his close connections with Callières, one of its negotiators, see Lizerand, Beauvillier, 170–6; and Pope, Callières, 85, 87, 127–8. 183 Lizerand, Beauvillier, 168, concedes that Beauvillier’s foreign policy role did not equal Torcy’s, but he then claims that foreign policy from Pomponne’s death until 1714 was especially the work of the king, Torcy, and Beauvillier. Lizerand credits this to Torcy’s deference to his kinsman, elder, and friend and to Torcy’s youth, timidity, conciliatory nature, and lack of the king’s full confidence. These propositions (ibid., 168–76) are weakly supported by thin evidence and are all dubious, as any reading of Torcy’s Journal confirms. The evidence merely supports Beauvillier’s significant foreign policy role as one of several ministers. 184 Petitfils, “Pomponne,” 80, says that Torcy was one of the best of the old regime’s foreign ministers because he knew how to join the skill (habileté) of Pomponne with the firmness (fermeté) of Croissy. For the contrast between Croissy and Pomponne, see also Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 322, 330–6. Lossky also associates Torcy with Pomponne’s “restrained opportunism.” 185 Lossky, “‘Maxims,” 291–3. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 5–6, sees Pomponne as a better councillor than administrator.

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186 If Croissy appears more like a secrétaire-commis from 1691, it is likely because either his voice as a secrétaire-conseiller politique was drowned out by those of the king’s more conciliatory councillors or he had changed his tune to harmonize with them. 187 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 351–3. While Saint-Simon envisioned the replacement of the detested “all-powerful ministers” with councils to advise the regent, Dupilet argues that the Polysynod councils actually functioned as administrative rather than as policy-making bodies, which accorded with the regent’s desire for centralized decision-making. 188 Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 214, 218–20. Stoll says that Torcy became a minister in 1697, but as will be seen below, his official entry into the Conseil came only in early 1699, before Pomponne’s death. 189 Cras, “Charge de secrétaire,” 115–27. 190 Poumarède, “Brienne,” 61; and Cras, “Lionne,” 67. Nothing along these lines occurred under Croissy, even though Louvois interfered in the departments of all of his colleagues, according to Spanheim, Relation, 164–76, 188–9. As acting foreign secretary from Lionne’s death in September 1671 to the arrival of Pomponne from Sweden in February 1672, Louvois made connections with France’s ambassadors that he later utilized as surintendant des bâtiments during Croissy’s secretaryship, bypassing the secretary apparently without objection and writing directly to ambassadors to acquire paintings, sculpture, antiquities, books, objets d’art, and even plants. Sarmant, Demeures, 227–32. 191 Poumarède, “Brienne,” 57–60, 62; and Louis XIV, Mémoires, 35. 192 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 114–15. Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 4 Oct. 1691, reported that the royal physician Fagon believed that Croissy also suffered from kidney stones. Delavaud, Pomponne, 98. 193 In a letter to Iberville in Geneva following Croissy’s death, Pomponne noted Torcy’s esteem for the resident and his own hope to have the same for him. Although Iberville had been at this post since 1689, Pomponne apparently had no official contact with department personnel abroad while Croissy was secretary. aae cp Genève 16, fol. 161, Pomponne to Iberville, 10 Sept. 1696. Pomponne did know bureau personnel such as Adam who had served under him. 194 Rule, “King and Minister,” 218; and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 10–12. 195 Bérenger, “Croissy,” 164, 173 (table), claims that with Pomponne and ­Beauvillier on the Conseil there were three Colberts ranged against one Le Tellier. This is misleading because the three hardly constituted a voting bloc, especially on religious issues. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 146–8, 208, while acknowledging these religious differences, nonetheless links Torcy later with Beauvillier and the Burgundy faction. 196 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 217–47, 514–20. See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 5–6.



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197 Sarmant, Demeures, 328–9, takes issue with the recent work of Jean-­ Christian Petitfils, Joël Cornette, and Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie. Collins, State, 198, likewise cautions against making too much of these two factions and points to ties among their members. Although hardly decisive, the king’s clear disapproval of encouraging such divisiveness as expressed in Louis XIV, Mémoires, 192–3, is nonetheless worth consideration. 198 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 119–26. 199 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 63–4, argues that age, not lack of ability, kept Barbezieux off the Conseil, speculating plausibly that eventually the royal summons would have come had he not died in his thirty-second year. Nevertheless, in the context of Barbezieux’s ten years as secretary but not minister, Rowlands suggests that he likely found it “galling” that Torcy, who became secretary five years after he did, joined the Conseil in 1699 at the age of thirty-four, a jealousy based on seniority rather than factional balancing. Rowlands also observes that Seignelay, secretary since 1683, became a minister in 1689, a month before turning thirty-eight. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 293–4, note that Barbezieux was humiliated when ­Chamillart, only one year after being named controller general, was made a minister. They agree that an early death prevented Barbezieux from becoming a great secretary of war but that, along with intelligence, mastery of the written word, and capacity for work, he suffered from the defects of a young courtier. 200 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 2–3. 201 Baluze, aged sixty-six, shared with a kinsman the news that Torcy had succeeded his father, but observed that at age thirty-one he was too young and would not soon enter the council. Fage, Lettres Baluze, 119. 202 According to a 1716 reminiscence of Madame, when the noted aphorist and précieuse Anne Bigot de Cornule visited Versailles in 1690, she noted ­Seignelay’s entry into the Conseil and Torcy’s authorization to sign orders as a secretary of state, remarking that they were both quite young. Upon her return to Paris she was asked what she had seen. According to Madame, she quipped that she had seen some very curious and unexpected things, including some “ministers in the cradle.” Maintenon, Lettres, 3:476. 203 Beauvillier and Chevreuse had a poor opinion of Croissy and his son, largely based on personal and policy differences. ss-Coirault, 3:524, 5:332. 204 Sourches, Mémoires, 5:169 (28–9 July 1696). 205 Pomponne was ill with a fever that lasted over five months (July to December 1694). Delavaud, Pomponne, 100–1, notes that the marquise d’Huxelles sadly reported to La Garde 16 September 1694 that she believed Pomponne would retire from public life. Pomponne rallied enough to attend the Conseil on 29 September 1694, but according to Dangeau, Journal, 5:86, he had been unable to attend the past two months. His fevers remained intermittent

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216 217 218

219

Notes to pages 76–8 at least until the following January (Delavaud, Pomponne, 100n6). See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 8. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 290–3; Cénat, Roi stratège, 175–85; and Rowlands, Dynastic State, 64–71. Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 312, note that in his mid-sixties Voysin’s tutelage under Boufflers was shorter than Barbezieux’s. Chamillart was not under tutelage, perhaps because he already was controller general and minister and had a close personal relationship with the king. Also, his largely administrative role as war minister and his other duties, according to Cénat, Roi stratège, 218, left Chamillart without time or desire to exceed these functions and interfere with strategy. Cénat, Roi stratège, 178–95, 217–21. From the letter’s translation in Rule, Louis XIV, 50–1. For the memoir and its history, see Saint-Simon, Mémoires complets, 8:457–8. France, Recueil, 21:475–8, 478n1–2 (on Strasbourg). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 12. aae cp Danemark 58, fols 478–80v, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 26 Nov. 1697. ss -Coirault, 1:423, in remarks on the September 1697 retirement of ­Pomponne’s friend and fellow minister Claude Le Peletier. The comtesse de Grignan, Mme de Sévigné’s daughter, made a similar mistake. She wrote Pomponne on 7 August 1696 that she had found the king and Torcy quite happy, the one for having Pomponne as secretary of state and the other for having him as father in place of Croissy. Sévigné, Lettres, 10:405. aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 412–20. Vauban’s 13 September 1696 letter to his friend Racine related his arrival in Paris to rumours of a peace made by the foreign ministers on dishonourable conditions. Vauban, Ses écrits, 2:446. Vauban saw, even at that early date, that Pomponne and Torcy operated in tandem, albeit with different roles. France, Recueil, 21:505–37. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 14. Mathis’s claim, however, that nothing changed until Pomponne’s death (ibid., 15) was not the case, as shown below. SaintSimon aptly pointed to the impossibility of a non-minister foreign secretary unless teamed with a father or father-in-law, since his handling of foreign dispatches and audiences with foreign envoys required reports to the Conseil, into which only ministers entered. ss-Coirault, 1:601. aae md 305, fols 81–2; and aae ppsr 66, fols 308–21v, 3 Mar. 1697. Dangeau, Journal, 6:158 (23 July 1697). Rule, “King in His Council,” 231–41, describes council procedures. See Vivo, Information, 31, on how the physical location of speakers in government debates reinforced the sense of hierarchy. ss -Coirault, 1:424–5, which he dates as having taken place a few days after Pomponne received the post office when Le Peletier resigned from it and left court on 18 September 1697. Forbin-Janson left Rome 27 July 1697 (France,



20 2 221 222 223 224 225 226

227 228

229

230 231 232 233 234 235

236 237 238 39 2 240 241

Notes to pages 78–81

513

Recueil, 17:93) and was formally received at court on 8 or 14 September 1697. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:627. ss -Coirault, 1:601. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:100. Dangeau, Journal, 7:157; and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 8. aae md 1046, fols 86–7. État de la France (1698), 3:6. Dangeau, Journal, 7:25–6 (13 Feb. 1699); and Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 48. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:124–9. Negotiations began on 26 February 1699 (ibid., 134). See aae md 1056, fol. 39, “Pouvoir à Mrs de Torci et de Maurepas pour traiter avec l’amb. de Maroc.” Dangeau, Journal, 7:28. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:136. Dangeau, Journal, 7:41 (4 Mar. 1699), reports that the same day Torcy and Beauvillier were named commissioners to serve with two others from England to implement Ryswick’s provisions concerning the Principality of Orange. Dangeau, Journal, 7:43, claimed that the appointment had been kept secret for six weeks. However, Sourches, Mémoires, 6:138, recorded 14 March that the rumours had grown louder and Torcy still declined to confirm them. This uncertainty likely explains Dangeau’s speculation that Torcy’s entry took place “six weeks” before 4 March, but Sourches’s “fifteen days” fits better with circumstances. bn Cab. H. 343, no. 9734 (Colberts), p. 8, notes that Torcy was declared minister in March 1699. Dangeau, Journal, 7:148. Ibid., 156. Grimblot, Letters, 2:366n, Manchester to Jersey, 30 Sept. 1699. Dangeau, Journal, 7:157; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:187–8. Lossky, Louis XIV, 259. Klaits, Propaganda, especially 86–102. In the memoir Torcy gave the ­English ambassador to justify Louis XIV’s acceptance of Carlos II’s testament, he spoke of the influence of Spanish public opinion. aae cp Angleterre 189, fol. 353v. Kettering, French Society, 18; and Adams, “Rule,” 243–4. État de la France (1698), 3:22–7. For the Conseil d’État privé and for Pussort, see McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 51–5, 238. Dangeau, Journal, 1:357 (4 July 1686), mentions a quarrel mediated by Beauvillier and Pussort. See also Clark, Trumbull, 130. Braun, “Staying on Top,” 248–9. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 171–2. Roth, “Torcy,” 188–90. Also aae md 1093, fols 17r–18, 1 Jan. 1701; and ibid., 1135, fols 236–41v.

514

Notes to pages 81–3

242 Torcy, Journal, 345n4. 243 Neuman, Robert de Cotte, 132–5. De Cotte drew plans for the Hôtel Torcy, but the actual final planning and construction were done by his rival ­Germain Boffrand. Strandberg, “Dessins et documents,” 130–46. 244 bn Clairambault 1170, fol. 117, says that the future bridegroom was well off because he had the Régiment piedmont royal, purchased for more than 80,000 francs with the Colberts’ help. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 167, details the marriage settlement. See also ss-Coirault, 1:270. 245 For Bouzols, see Bély, Espions, 306; ss-Boislisle, 3:35n1; and Courcelles, Dictionnaire historique, 7:457–8. For his Lorraine mission, see his instructions in France, Recueil, 7:97–100; and ss-Coirault, 1:483. aae cp Autriche 81, fol. 78, Torcy to Noblet, 22 July 1702, shows that the minister stayed in contact with his brother-in-law and received news of him from his agents in the field. Prior’s letter to Townsend of 16 November 1714 is in pro sp France 78/159/ pt 2, fol. 262r. 246 Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 149. 247 Ibid., 205, 246; and Sedgwick, Travails, 241–2. For Catherine’s role in politics, see Meyer, Colbert, 346–7. For the motivations for increased elite support of local general hospitals, see Hickey, Local Hospitals, 115–32. 248 Bergin, Crown, Church, 402. 249 aae md 1030, fol. 157, 2 Nov. 1696, refers to the death of Charles de Prades, bishop of Montpellier. 250 Ibid., 1006, fols 42–3, has letters of 20 July 1690 from Croissy to Nicolas de Lamignon de Basville, to the duc de Noailles, to the marquis de Laganez (Leganés), and to the viceroy of Catalonia and of Milan, concerning the exchange of a Don Juan de Marimont for the abbé’s freedom. See Dangeau, Journal, 3:60 (28 Jan. 1690), on his arrest; and ibid., 4:177 (23 July 1690); and ibid., 212 (4 Sept. 1690), for his release. 251 Charles-Joachim to Cardinal de Noailles, 26 Nov. 1711, bn mf 23217, fols 21–5. 252 Courcelles, Dictionnaire historique, 4:366–7. 253 Dangeau, Journal, 9:425. He received a gratification of 6,000 livres. aae md 1120, fol. 60. 254 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:588n4, on Croissy’s possible exchange. bl am 15284, fol. 90, Torcy to Abbé Pomponne, 4 Oct. 1705, mentions a royal pension for Croissy. 255 aae md 1197, fol. 18, 9 Jan. 1714, with 40,000 livres revenue. 256 In writing to Ursins, Maintenon confided that Croissy was to wed one of the wealthiest heiresses in Paris. Maintenon, Lettres inédites Maintenon et Ursins, 2:250, Ursins to Maintenon, 28 Dec. 1711. See Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:298–9, for Paul-Étienne Brunet de Rancy. When Rancy became a



257 258

59 2 260 261 262 263

264

265

266 267

268

Notes to pages 83–5

515

secretary of the king in 1701, one of his references was fellow secrétaire and Torcy’s premier commis Noblet. pro sp France 78/159/pt 2, fol. 298, Prior to Townshend, 14 Dec. 1714. Hatton, Charles XII, 379, 394, 401, 408 (quotes Croissy to Torcy, 27 May 1715), 410, 416. France, Recueil, 2:47–76, has his instructions. aae cp Suède 134, fol. 75, is the 14 Apr. 1715 letter to Charles XII introducing Croissy, while ibid., 133, fols 6, 8–9, 20r–v, 44, are July–Aug. 1715 letters between Versailles and Croissy in Straslund. Schnakenbourg, “Politique française Nord,” 251–74. aae md 1517, fol. 371, Croissy to Torcy, 8 July 1715. Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 95, 105. aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 295, Torcy to Noblet, 23 June 1702. For the Saint-Pierres, see Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 105–15; and ss-Coirault, 2:223, 223n4, 404, 404nn2–8; 3:1005; 8:123–4. In 1704, when FrancoSpanish prospects were still bright in northern Italy, Torcy instructed France’s ambassador to Spain to speak to Philip V on Saint-Pierre’s behalf. bn naf 23187, fol. 239r–v, Torcy to Gramont, 23 Nov. 1704. Sabionetta, near Mantua and Cremona, had been purchased from the king of Spain in 1693. ­Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 106–7. aae cp Milanais 18, fols 120–4v, in which the duke enumerates his losses. For the assurances of restitution, see aae cp Milanais 18, fol. 129, Louis XIV to Saint-Pierre, 8 Mar. 1708; and Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109. Torcy also pressured Madrid to pay out the pension promised the duke the previous year. aae cp Milanais 18, fols 125–83, letters from Saint-Pierre to Torcy and vice versa, covering the period February through July 1708; for example, ibid., fol. 152r, Saint-Pierre to Torcy, 21 Apr. 1708, on his money problems and request for a new residence in Bayonne. See aae md 1159, fol. 73, Torcy to the intendant of Languedoc Basville, 22 Oct. 1708, apprising him that since the duchess would be passing through Montpellier, he was to provide her with anything she needed, including an escort. See also Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109. bn naf 23187, fols 333–4, Torcy to Gramont, 6 Sept. 1706; ibid., fol. ­365r–v, 9 Oct. 1706; and ibid., fol. 347, 10 Oct. 1706. Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:369. See also Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109–15. Saint-Pierre’s hopes for Sabionetta were not realized, however, because the emperor refused to return it. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, xvii, xxi. Torcy drafted a letter (26 June 1711) for her to Controller General ­Desmaretz requesting financial relief and invoking Torcy’s support. Delavaud, Pomponne, 251, 251n5, 252. The chambers in Torcy’s Versailles apartment that she had lived in with her husband were given up to Torcy’s mother, who

516

269

270

271

272 273 74 2 275 276 277 278

279

280

Notes to pages 85–7 had relinquished her former apartments to make room for others. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:191. bn Clairambault 668, fol. 313, containing the brevet retenu; also fol. 317. For his mission and instructions, see aae md 1063, fols 72ff (fol. 115 authorizes 6,000 livres for his trip); and France, Recueil, 7:97–100. See also ­Sedgwick, Travails, 244; and the following letters: aae cp Bavière 42, fols 477–84, marquis de Pomponne to Louis XIV, 14 Mar. 1699; and ibid., fol. 488, Max to Louis XIV, 27 Mar. 1699. For his embassy and instructions, see France, Recueil, 26:xiv, 127–56. The extended correspondence between Pomponne and Torcy is housed in volumes of aae cp Venise 142 through 162. See also aae md 1210, fol. 224. Torcy explained that he had consulted with Pomponne’s mother and sister, Torcy’s wife, and that they all agreed that going to Switzerland was not in Pomponne’s best interests. aae cp Venise 151, fol. 261r–v, Torcy to ­Pomponne, 15 Dec. 1707. On 18 February 1708 Pomponne wrote to Puyzieulx that Torcy had changed his mind about sending him to the Swiss cantons as his replacement, claiming that he was content with his destiny (ibid., 156, fol. 40). However, not long after (ibid., 130v, Pomponne to Puyzieulx, 28 Apr. 1708), he noted that while others were reluctant to go to Switzerland, judging it too troublesome, he, who had passionately desired to go, foresaw tranquility re-established there soon. Not yet aware of the failure of the Franco-Jacobite invasion of Scotland launched in March with such great expectations, Pomponne speculated that perhaps Torcy had another appointment in mind for him, hinting perhaps at the Jacobite court to be established in Britain. Sedgwick, Travails, 246–51, seems unnecessarily harsh in his judgment of the abbé. ss -Coirault, 1:357. See Pillorget, “Pussort,” 255–74. Hamscher, Parlement of Paris, 142, 156, 163–4, 175–8, 188 (quotation on 177). Pillorget, “Pussort,” 273; and Roth, “Torcy,” 184. Clark, Trumbull, 129–30. Dangeau, Journal, 1:357 (4 July 1686). bn Clairambault 1193, fol. 35: “Inventaire des Titres” listing the “Treasure” given “into the hands of Monseigneur de Croissy,” including 250,000 Louis d’or, a parchment signed by King Henri III establishing the Order of SaintEsprit, and many other documents. Ibid., 1170, fols 93, 103–4; and ibid., fols 210r–11. See also bn Cab. H. 343, fol. 10; ss-Coirault, 3:68, 4:466–7; and Karg von Bebenburg, Correspondance, 1:317. For his career, see Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 47–9; ­ss-Coirault, 1:452, 787; 2:213, 215, 247, 475, 483, 703; and Courcelles, ­Dictionnaire historique, 3:362–3.



Notes to pages 87–90

517

281 Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 24–7, says they quarreled especially over precedence, leading the king to issue a règlement in 1690 to clarify matters. 282 bn mf 6679, fols 198r–v, 222v, 266, 317v, 341v. Blainville’s successor, Thomas II de Dreux, marquis de Dreux-Brézé, also a soldier and Chamillart’s brother-in-law, obtained the office with his help and held it until his death in 1749. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 50–5. 283 aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 178, Blainville to Torcy, 19 May 1702. 284 Murat, Colbert, 224–5; and Péronnet, Évêques, 1:450–1. bn Baluze 218 passim contains papers revealing Baluze’s role as the archbishop’s technical expert. See also Saunders, “Library Colbert,” 283–300. 285 Bergin, Crown, Church, 402. 286 aae cp Rome 474, fols 119–20v, Torcy to Polignac, 19 Dec. 1707. 287 Bergin, Crown, Church, 404–5. Intendant Ferrand wrote in 1707 that the bishop of Saint-Malo, presiding over the Estates of Brittany, had won their esteem and confidence and that he had never seen them so tranquil. Le Moyne de La Borderie and Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne, 5: 555. With ­Brittany in Torcy’s department, this was surely welcome news. 288 bn naf 20274, fol. 83v, Tessé to Torcy, 25 Oct. 1711. See ibid., fols 33–7v, Tessé to Torcy, 20 Sept. 1710, on peace and on obtaining a royal audience for him; ibid., fol. 41r, Tessé to Torcy, 29 Oct. 1710, attaching a memoir on Sablé; and ibid., fol. 120r–v, Tessé to Torcy, 12 Oct. 1712, on passing near Sablé. For Sablé, see Roth, “Torcy,” 185–6. Not surprisingly, while in Provence Tessé looked to Torcy in patronage matters, as in bn naf 2027, fols 13–31, Tessé to Torcy, 11 Oct. 1713. 289 See Torcy, Journal, 217, 217n3, for an example of his assistance to Torcy and a brief biographical sketch. For examples of his ceremonial duties, see bn mf 6679, fols 146v, 222v, 341v. See aae md 1093, fol. 5, 6 Jan. 1701, for his orders; and ibid., fols 57–9, 27 Feb. 1701, for his account of how the princes were ceremonially received along the way, with Torcy’s comments in the margin. 290 Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 204–5. 291 What follows on Desmaretz’s life, family, and policies is based on McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, especially chap. 3. 292 Dubet, Orry, 38–41. 293 See also the discussion of his rehabilitation in Meyer, Colbert, 343–5. 294 bn naf 23187, fol. 401, Torcy to Gramont, 12 Mar. 1708. 295 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 106, 129. 296 Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:60, Prior to Bolingbroke, 13 Sept. 1712. The French had hoped that if Bolingbroke dared, Prior would be named a delegate to Utrecht, but he did not. Louis XIV to Plenipotentiaries, 21 Jan. 1712, in aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 55v. Torcy regularly entertained Prior. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 200.

518

Notes to pages 90–1

297 Dubet, Orry, 97, 121, 184. 298 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 520. ss-Coirault, 3:88, says that Maintenon and ­Harcourt among others opposed his membership. 299 Torcy, Journal, 177. 300 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 530–43; and Van Kley, Religious Origins of the French Revolution, 56–7. 301 Lizerand, Beauvillier; 109–11. Torcy, Journal, 172, noted that Beauvillier censured the maxims of the Gallican Church but did not dare condemn them. In Torcy’s opinion, Beauvillier saw them as an extravagant and childish retaliation against the wise advice of a father and a step that could lead to heresy. Torcy also criticized those who were quick to see Jansenists everywhere and served as the Jesuits’ “valets” (ibid., 213). 302 Fénelon, Correspondance, 10:27 (notes in 11:27–8), Fénelon to Beauvillier, 5 Oct. [1699]. 303 Ibid., 14:230, Fénelon to Chevreuse, 24 Apr. 1710. In ibid., 233, Fénelon complained to Chevreuse (3 May 1710) that the liberties of the Gallican Church were real encumbrances. Admitting that Rome’s pretentions were too great, he nonetheless feared the power of the laity more than a schism. He was also afraid that Torcy and the French cardinals would prevent the election of Cardinal Carlo Agostino Fabroni as pope. Fabroni, later one of the authors of the anti-Gallican bull Unigenitus, was never elected pope. In ibid., 366 (29 Apr. 1711), Fénelon sent Chevreuse a list of points to discuss with Père Tellier concerning the condemnation of a theological work suspected of Jansenism. He thought it would be better to discuss this with Rome directly through the nuncio rather than through the highly suspicious channel through Torcy. On 23 October 1711, in a coded letter, the Jesuit Guillaume Daubenton wrote Fénelon from Rome that the reluctant pope had given way to Louis XIV’s insistence on Cardinal Cornelio Bentivoglio as the next nuncio to France. Daubenton complained that the new nuncio was no theologian, had no understanding of Jansenism, was closely linked to Pomponne, Torcy’s brother-in-law, and therefore only wanted what Torcy wanted (ibid., 455; notes in 15:356–7). 304 Torcy, Journal, 162 (8 Apr. 1710); and ibid, 159–61, for the original incident. For Pierre-Jean Percin de Montgaillard, bishop of Pons, who was “widely suspected of Jansenism” because of his correspondence with several leading members of the group and whose case touched off the anti-Jansenist persecution that eventually led to Unigenitus, see Bergin, Crown, Church, 222, 292, 307, 462–3. 305 Torcy, Journal, 171 (30 Apr. 1710). 306 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. 307 Torcy, Journal, 182.



Notes to pages 92–5

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08 3 309 310 311

Ibid., 211 (25 June 1710). Ibid., 359 (25 Jan. 1711). Ibid., 424–5. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 164, 173; and Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173, do this. Meyer, Bossuet, 257–8, goes so far as to cast the conflict over Quietism as in part a clash between the Le Telliers and the Colberts, referring to the dukes as the whole Colbert clan without mention of Torcy. 312 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 619–25. 313 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. 314 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:136, Chevreuse to Fénelon, 9 Apr. 1709. 315 Bély, Art de la paix, 452–3. For the letter, see Fénelon, Correspondance, 14: 167 (notes in 15:119–22), Fénelon to Chevreuse, 18 Nov. 1709. The duke kept the archbishop informed of secret negotiations, as seen in ibid., 14:172–6 (notes in 15:128–32), Chevreuse to Fénelon, 1 and 2 Dec. 1709; in his 9 Apr. 1709 letter (ibid., 14:138), Chevreuse asked Fénelon to burn his letter after reading it for fear that others might see it. In April 1710 Fénelon also sent Beauvillier and Chevreuse a secret peace memoir (ibid., 229–30, 233, notes in 15:175, 177). 316 Torcy, Journal, 67, reported the rumour that he and Desmaretz had joined ­Beauvillier in pressing for peace at any price. Torcy and Beauvillier also ­ disagreed over how to approach negotiations with Savoy in 1710 (ibid., 128–9).

Chapter Three 1 Troost, William III, 146, argues that after the Treaty of Nijmegen (1678), “although Louis XIV’s policy of strengthening his north-eastern frontier was defensive in nature and led to only limited territorial expansion, the aggressive way in which it was implemented sent the wrong signals” that he was still aiming at what his foes feared was “universal monarchy.” See also ibid., 96–9, 296. 2 For negotiations leading up to Ryswick, see Thomson, “Louis XIV and ­William III,” 24–48; and France, Recueil, 21:405–537. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:423–515, can be supplemented by Legrelle, Ryswick. The six-volume second edition of Diplomatie is cited below unless indicated otherwise. It contains much of Ryswick word for word, but some important documents were either omitted or abbreviated. Thanks to Mr Niels van Tol of the Bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix in The Hague for providing a copy of this work. The war is recounted in Lynn, Wars, 191–265, while Lossky, Louis XIV, 233–56, weaves together war, diplomacy, and internal events. See also S­ tapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 87–106. This and the following paragraphs about negotiations before Torcy succeeded his father are based on these sources.

520

Notes to pages 95–7

3 Vauban greeted Pomponne’s return to the Conseil and his moderate policies with enthusiasm. He wrote to François Mollo, Dutch merchant, Polish resident, and diplomatic dabbler, on 12 February 1694 that the war resulted from the whim of certain powerful and ambitious individuals (Louvois and Seignelay?) who believed that to maintain their power they had to embroil the king in wars. This malign influence was now gone, he insisted, and the present Conseil was composed of men of pleasing qualities guided by serving the good of the state and their master. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 3:74 (John Rule originally consulted the letters cited from Heinsius, Briefwisseling, throughout this work in the originals at the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, but decided that for the reader’s convenience references to them would be from this authoritative edition). Writing to Mollo, 10 May 1694, Callières blamed Louvois alone for squandering his reputation with the Dutch in commercial conflicts over salted fish and woolens and claimed that Croissy had always opposed these policies. Such behaviour was no longer to be feared because the Conseil was now quite united (ibid., 82). 4 Legrelle, Ryswick, 23–43. 5 Jongste, “The 1690s,” 73; and France, Recueil, 21:417–31. 6 Mollo, variously identified as a Spanish or Portuguese convert to Christianity, a Swiss, or an Italian, lived in Amsterdam for over thirty years and married a regent’s daughter. French visitors often lodged with him, and he created a weekly newsletter for Torcy describing the current political-economic scene there and throughout the United Provinces. Pope, Callières, 71–111, is a rich and important account of these negotiations and Callières’s and Mollo’s collaboration. On Mollo, see also Keens-Soper and Schweitzer’s introduction to Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 7–8, 44n45; and France, Recueil, 21:442–3, 448, 454, 465, 471–6. 7 France, Recueil, 21:442–71; and Legrelle, Ryswick, 44–52. 8 Nordmann, “Louis XIV and the Jacobites,” 88–9. 9 Haussonville, Duchesse de Bourgogne, 1:120, quotes from Torcy’s letter to Tessé, 26 July 1696, showing this from at least Croissy’s final illness. 10 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693; Gibson, Scottish Card, 14, 18, 21, 36–8, 97–8; and Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 90–1, notes Louis XIV’s “insistence on using force to support his diplomatic initiatives.” 11 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693. 12 For 1688 and Ryswick, see Lossky, Louis XIV, 231, 255. The instructions, 25 February 1697, are in France, Recueil, 21:509–37. 13 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 189–90v, for the meeting. See ibid., fols 174–85, for the “Mémoire sur la paix,” and fols 191–204 for Pomponne’s “Mémoire pour la paix.” It was in this memoir that Pomponne proposed William’s eventual recognition as king. Louis agreed to this, but intended to make William pay dearly for it. Nordmann, “Louis XIV and the Jacobites,” 86–7.



Notes to pages 97–9

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14 France, Recueil, 21:477, 478, 478n1. Troost, William III, 250, calls this “the real breakthrough in the negotiations.” 15 Dangeau, Journal, 6:187, 420, reports that Torcy and Pontchartrain were in long discussions with the king in Maintenon’s chambers. 16 Ibid., 184, 328, 396, 434, all mention the arrival of a courier whose dispatches Torcy took to the king. 17 Callières, Letters, 57, 57n162. The marquise d’Huxelles apparently assured Callières that he was held in esteem by both Pomponne and Torcy, and he assured her that he felt the same toward them (ibid., 57–8, 62). 18 Vauban, Ses écrits, 2:445–7, Vauban to Racine, 13 Sept. 1696. 19 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 412–20, Vauban to Torcy, 16 Sept. 1696. 20 Delavaud, “Arrangement international,” 698–705. 21 France, Recueil, 14:179–82. 22 bn naf 23187, fol. 234, Torcy to Gramont, 14 Sept. 1696. He sent the duke, who was governor of Navarre, a copy of the treaty along with a lettre de cachet on how the news was to be sung. See Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information, on the political uses of Te Deum masses. 23 France, Recueil, 14:183–7. 24 Handen, “Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II,” 253–5. See France, Recueil, 14:189, Tessé to Louis XIV, 1 July 1696. aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 10, Tessé to Torcy, 12 Jan. 1697, suggests the exchange of Montserrat for Cremona and, because the liberty of Italy was at stake, keeping a “porte” (door) open to help the Marquis of Mantua and to prevent the fall of an isolated Milan to the Austrians. Storrs, Rise of Savoy, moving beyond the traditional “perfidious Piedmont” view of Victor-Amadeus’s diplomatic volte-faces, interprets them as responses to what the duke saw as real or potential disloyalty on the part of his current allies. He intended to exploit the opportunities Great Power rivalries offered to realize his goals of enhanced security, territory, and status. Ibid., 135–8, confirms and explains much of what Tessé said about diplomatic conditions in Turin. 25 France, Recueil, 21:477–8; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:470–6. 26 Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 235–8. For the offer of Danish mediation, see Thomson, “Louis XIV and William III,” 30. The Austrians, after agreeing to Italy’s neutralization in October 1696, for a time promoted Victor-Amadeus as mediator. Storrs, Rise of Savoy, 2. 27 Pope, Callières, 93–5, 99–103. According to Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 35, “[s]overeigns might seek to impart general direction to their representatives, but it was the latter who were directly and creatively engaged in on-going negotiations.” 28 bn naf 3298, fol. 102r–v, Courtin to Callières, 10 Nov. 1696. Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 240, says that William had the same desire for ­informality, whereas Austria and the Empire’s princes insisted upon traditional forms.

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29

30 31

32 33 34

35

36

Notes to pages 100–1 See France, Recueil, 21:443–4, for Callières and Harlay-­Bonneuil; and ss-­ Coirault, 2:405–8. For Harlay-Bonneuil’s earlier ­negotiations with the Empire, see Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 402–6, 412–18. bn naf 3298, fols 106–7v, Courtin to Callières, 24 Nov. 1696. In a letter Leibniz wrote from Ryswick between May and September 1697, he contrasted the Imperial delegate’s furnishings, food, and suite with the more modest establishment of the French delegates at Delft, noting as well the contrast with former French practice. He said that this reflected the current spirit at Versailles, where all had seemingly become “small collar” (“petit collet”), but warned against measuring the value of the very capable French delegation by the livery of their pages. Leibniz, Briefe, Vierte Reihe, Sechster Band, 270. France, Recueil, 21:512–13. bn naf 3298, fol. 114, Barbezieux to Courtin and Harlay-Bonneuil; ibid., 115r–v, Courtin to Callières, 6 Dec. 1696; and ibid., fols 124–5, Crécy to Callières, 30 Dec. 1696. This last letter indicates that in February, even though no longer going to Holland as an envoy, Courtin had written a memoir for the use of those who were. Crécy had been involved in the 1694 negotiations in Switzerland with the Imperials concerning the Spanish succession, described in Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:407–18. bn naf 3298, fols 130–1, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 17 Feb. 1697. Ibid., fol. 126, Pontchartrain to Callières, 17 Jan. 1697; and Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 235–8. Callières, Letters, 25. Ibid., 75–6, Callières to marquise d’Huxelles, 4 Oct. 1696, is about criticism at court. Pope, Callières, 89–90, says that he was a scapegoat for what was actually the king’s willingness to consider sacrificing Luxembourg and/or Strasbourg for peace. Callières, Letters, 9–11, 14–16, 21–4; and especially Pope, Callières, 71–98, 128. These missions are detailed in France, Recueil, 21:442–504; for the king’s real intentions being kept from Callières according to the instructions of 15 October 1694, see ibid., 444–5, 456–69. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 22, observes that “[d]iplomats are conventionally not trusted by those they represent. Do they serve their Princes, themselves, or intricate and secret schemes of their collective concocting that they dignify with terms like stability, order and peace?” On Swedish mediation, see Upton, Charles XI, 201–11. On the evolution of mediation, see Katorska, “Méditations françaises,” 225–34. aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 14, Daguerre to Torcy, 2 May 1697. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:476–7, calls the proceedings at Ryswick a chimerical congress and quotes the French ambassador to Venice, Denis de la Haye de Vantelay, as writing to the king on 1 June 1697 that everyone was persuaded that the Dutch had made a separate peace with France the previous October.



Notes to page 102

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37 France, Recueil, 21:505. aae cp Hollande 172, fols 12–58, shows Torcy’s corrections and additions throughout the manuscript; it also has other comments in pencil marked out (perhaps Pomponne’s). 38 France, Recueil, 21:505. 39 Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 104; Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 232–41; and Troost, William III, 245–51. 40 France, Recueil, 21:510. 41 Ibid., 509–37; and ibid., 517n1. Pontchartrain sent the plenipotentiaries a memoir on commerce in March, as did Daguerre. 42 Ibid., 507. bn naf 3298, fol. 132, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 3 Mar. 1697, Paris; and ibid., fols 140–1, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 8 Mar. 1697, Lille. Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37, reproduces four of Renaudot’s reports: two to Croissy in 1696 and two to Torcy, dated 8 October 1696 and 2 January 1698. The first three contain the political, military, and financial information and analysis that shaped perceptions at Versailles of William’s ability to sustain the war (e.g., ibid., 133, from 8 Oct. 1696). Callières was the abbé’s friend and collaborator. Callières, Letters, 11–13. bn naf 3298, fol. 144, Crécy to Callières, 10 Mar. 1697, spoke of the desire for receiving news when they stopped at Ghent. 43 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 10, Daguerre to Torcy, 25 Mar. 1697, Delft; also ibid., fol. 13, Torcy to Daguerre, 1 Apr. 1697, saying that he hoped he would continue to supply advice to the plenipotentiaries. His activities on behalf of his homeland cost him a part of his fortune, while the outbreak of the Nine Years War forced him and his wife to return to France in 1689. In Jan. 1693, however, he returned to the Republic, ostensibly to see to his interests there but in reality to spy and in July received instructions for secret exploratory peace talks with Dutch agents in Brussels. These lasted until October and then gave way to the mission of Abbé Morel, who traveled incognito to Brussels as Daguerre’s merchant kinsman for further talks that lasted until Jan. 1694. Daguerre remained at his side to assist him, his knowledge of Dutch being of particular value. France, Recueil, 21:380, 380n3, 381, 413–31. From February 1697 he held a brevet as king’s agent, receiving 1,500 livres every three months. He was granted permission after Ryswick to remain in Amsterdam to continue trading. Ibid., 22:1n3. Daguerre continued to report to Torcy from Bayonne. aae cp Espagne 231, fols 65, 77, Daguerre to Torcy, 25 and 29 Aug. 1714. Daguerre was also in frequent communication with the ambassador to the United Provinces, Bonrepaus, about commerce, tariffs, and French shipping according to an inventory of a part of Bonrepaus’s outgoing correspondence covering 6 April–15 December 1699. Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 5, 6, 9, 14, 21, 41. I am grateful to Antony McKenna, who upon acquiring this inventory immediately sent me a copy so that I might use it for this book.

524

Notes to pages 103–5

44 For Briord’s mission and instructions, see France, Recueil, 14:189–201. aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 39, is Briord’s “Lettre d’Estat” to smooth his way through France, and ibid., fol. 55, is his “Lettre de créance” (both dated 29 March 1697). 45 aae cp Sardaigne 103, fols 63–4, Le Peletier to Briord, 29 June 1697. See Mazel, Le Peletier, 116. 46 Legrelle, Ryswick, 77. For English frustrations, see Legg, Prior, 53–64. 47 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 27, Daguerre to Torcy, 7 June 1697; ibid., fols 16–18, 9 May 1697; ibid., fol. 19v, 20 May 1697; ibid., fols 30, 36r–v, 13 June 1697 (two letters); and ibid., fols 68–9, July 1697. In his first letter of 13 June, Daguerre complained that he had not been paid in three months and his constant surveillance efforts were costing him dearly, and in his second, he reported that the Spanish were pressing for the Anglo-Dutch fleet’s departure. For Bart and Pointis that year, see Symcox, Crisis Sea Power, 218–19. 48 Grimblot, Letters, 1:122–3. 49 aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 188v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 2 July 1697; and ibid., Hollande 174, fol. 59, Daguerre to Torcy, 1 July 1697. 50 aae cp Hollande 174, fols 49–50, Daguerre to Torcy, 24 June 1697, about a memoir he gave to Harlay-Bonneuil; ibid., fol. 63, Daguerre to Torcy, 4 July 1697; and ibid., fol. 71, Torcy to Daguerre, 15 July 1697. Daguerre’s attempts to discredit his rival continued. On 12 October 1697 (ibid., fol. 134v) he told Torcy that Quiros’s secretary had shared with him that he had intercepted several letters from Mollo to Portland and that Mollo had accepted gratifications totaling 12,000 écus. 51 aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 65, Torcy to Briord, 13 July 1697; and aae md 1043, fol. 68, Torcy to Pinon, 28 July 1697. 52 bn naf 3298, fol. 156, Torcy to plenipotentiaries, 10 July 1697, is on Polish affairs. Callières, Letters, 9–11, 29–30, attests to Callières’s enduring interest in Polish affairs. 53 aae cp Danemark 56, fols 30–50, Bonrepaus to Louis XIV, 13 Aug. 1697; ibid., fol. 57v, Louis XIV to Bonrepaus, 29 Aug. 1697; ibid., Hollande 174, fol. 114, Torcy to Daguerre, 19 Sept. 1697; and ibid., fols 118–20v, Daguerre to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1697. 54 His impatience is especially clear in his letter to Heinsius, 11 July 1697, in Grimblot, Letters, 1:17–18. Although Callières did not share any secret information, his letters from Holland to the marquise d’Huxelles add insight into the milieu of the slow-paced negotiations as well as into the negotiator himself. Largely unpublished until now, the letters, with an informative introduction and helpful notes by Laurence Pope, are in Callières, Letters, and must now be counted among the important published letter collections pertaining to Ryswick.



Notes to pages 105–7

525

55 These negotiations in Grimblot, Letters, 1:1–125, make lively reading. ­Legrelle, Ryswick, 77–130, includes fuller versions of the French letters. Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” offers useful analysis. 56 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 96, Daguerre to Torcy, 15 Aug. 1697; and ibid., fols 118–20v, Daguerre to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1697. Daguerre also informed Torcy on 3 October 1697 (ibid., fol. 126r) that Quiros’s secretary shared that he believed that a French prince might well be chosen to succeed ­Carlos II and that France should send a known figure as the new ambassador. Daguerre also sent Torcy talk from The Hague about the chances of ­getting the emperor to sign the treaty while France held on to Strasbourg (ibid., fol. 112, 12 Sept. 1697). In a letter a few days later (ibid., fol. 116, 16 Sept. 1697) he was hearing hopes that an equivalent for Strasbourg might make a difference. 57 bn naf 3298, fol. 178, Torcy to plenipotentiaries, 15 Nov. 1697; aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 158, Daguerre to Torcy, 12 Dec. 1697; and ibid., fol. 168, Torcy to La Closure, 23 Dec. 1697. For ratifications of treaties, see Constant, “Traités,” 240–2. 58 Pope, Callières, 111–13. 59 Lossky, Louis XIV, 235. 60 Ibid., 255–6. For similar positive assessments of Ryswick, see Bély, Relations, 371–2; Pujo, Vauban, 220–1, on the frontier; and Rule, “Roi-Bureaucrate,” 79–81, especially on the colonies. Pope, Callières, 72n4, 111, takes issue with Legrelle’s view of Ryswick as a success. For a variety of other views, see Troost, William III, 252n91. 61 Examples are Callières to Pomponne, 12 Aug. 1697, in Legrelle, Ryswick, 122–3; and plenipotentiaries to Torcy, 29 Mar. 1697, in aae cp Hollande 172, fols 73–4r. Torcy’s drafting shows up, for instance, in Legrelle, Ryswick, 113n1; bn naf 3298, fol. 148, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries, 13 May 1697; ibid., fol. 162, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries, 6 Aug. 1697; and aae cp Hollande 171, fols 16rff, Louis XIV to plenipotentiaries, 7 Nov. 1697. 62 Lossky, Louis XIV, 149–81, 212–49, discusses the foreign policy confusion and crisis that led to a radical reorientation, especially after Louvois’s death. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 327, traces the ossification of Louis XIV’s thought and its transition from the 1690s toward greater flexibility and pragmatism. 63 Bély, Art de la paix, 380, calls this an attempt to construct a rational European order. 64 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 176, La Closure to Torcy, 24 Dec. 1697, Delft. 65 Paul, Polignac, 80. 66 aae cp Danemark 57, fol. 22, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 11 Dec. 1696. 67 Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 162–3, 517–18. The Alsatian Obrecht (1646–1701) converted to Catholicism after France’s occupation of

526

68 69 70

71

72 73 74 75 76

77 78

Notes to pages 107–9 S­ trasbourg. He had earlier negotiated on Louis XIV’s behalf with the ­Palatinate’s prince-elector, written a memoir at his request on sovereign rights, and been an unofficial but influential foreign ministry advisor on Germany. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 479–501. See also France, Recueil, 28:113. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 174. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 58, notes that “diplomacy puts people in touch with power. It does so, however, in a complex and paradoxical way. For people who actually expect to hold power and wield power, all diplomatic missions are hardship postings where reputations can always be damaged but rarely strengthened … For those living with less great expectations, however, diplomacy promises its own attractions and the possibility of acquiring power and influence within its admittedly more modest terms of reference … [through] the symbolic role conferred upon diplomats; the opportunities provided by interactions with colleagues; and the advantages conferred by positions as expert advisors to those with real power, their political masters.” For his career, see Delavaud’s preface to Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur; and France, Recueil, 18:71–82. See also the entry in bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 128. aae cp Allemagne 330, fols 210–25, Jan. 1698, is his “Mémoire concernant l’Employ de Ratisbon,” while ibid., fols 244–9, 19 Mar. 1698, are his instructions as plenipotentiary to Ratisbon. See also ibid., fols 306–7, Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 1 Aug. 1698. In a 19 April 1698 letter to Torcy from Strasbourg, Rousseau made it clear that he owed his position to Torcy’s “protection.” Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur, 51. The treatise’s original has not been found, but a copy is among ­Tallard’s papers, likely given to him by Pomponne or Torcy as he prepared for his English embassy, his first diplomatic mission (ibid., 1–3). Rousseau’s work was not published until 1912 (ibid., 9). bn naf 7488, fols 97–8v, Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 7 July 1701, with a translation of the emperor’s latest comments on the Mantuan affair. Louis XIV to Rousseau de Chamoy, 13 Apr. 1702, quoted in Klaits, Propaganda, 99. Ibid., 98–105, 300–5. Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur, 7–8. Iberville, Correspondance, is a rich new resource. For an insight into his work in Geneva, see aae cp Genève 16, fol. 103, Louis de Pontchartrain to Iberville, 14 Dec. 1696. See also France, Recueil, 28:113–28. For his later career, see aae cp Gênes 40, fol. 319r–v, Iberville to Torcy, 16 Jan. 1709, Genoa. France, Recueil, 28:114n1, says he served from 1678 to 1688. This was a potentially fruitful field for French diplomacy because the emperor had promoted Habsburg dynastic interests at the expense of



79

80

81 82 83

84

85

86

87 88 89

90

Notes to pages 109–11

527

I­ mperial ones at Ryswick. Iberville exploited subsequent wrangling between Vienna and the princes over Ryswick’s implications. Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 497–509, 512–38, 546–7, 566–7, 572, 588. The deputy of Geneva’s governing council reported back on 12 May 1688 that he had heard from various sources that Iberville, Croissy’s “troisième commis” (third clerk), a man of spirit and quality, had been named the new resident to ­Geneva. Dupré, Correspondance, 340n1. For instance, see aae cp Russie 3, fols 21–5, Iberville to Torcy, 17 Nov. 1703; and ibid., fols 27ff, for Iberville’s advice to Torcy on Muscovite ceremonial and on trade. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 55, 56, Torcy to Anneville, 13 and 17 June 1709. In bl am 20351, fol. 134, Iberville to Gualterio, 19 May 1710, he mentioned working in Paris and at Versailles. France, Recueil, 25-2:135–74. For Bonnac, see France, Recueil, 12:187; Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 44; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 52–3. aae cp Brunswick-Hanovre 42, Bonnac to Torcy, 30 Aug. 1701, fol. 240r–v. For the situation in Wolfenbüttel, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:502–11, ­5:53–7. Aubert de La Chesnaye-des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 19:318–22, has entries on both Bonnac and Bezac. Wentzcke, Frischmann; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 174. aae md 1016, fol. 198, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 20 June 1692, camp before Namur. In aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 300–3v, 18 Apr. 1709, Frischmann recommended himself to Torcy as French representative to the elector of Cologne. His career is recounted by his successor at Constantinople. Bonnac, Mémoire, 57–65. See also France, Recueil, 16:236, 255–6; and Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 532–3, 545–6, 567–9. For his importance as military advisor to Rákóczi, see Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 31, who also points out the contribution of the marquis du Héron (ibid., 40–7). See Frey and Frey, Societies in Upheaval, especially chapter 3, for background. aae md 1017, fol. 220, 5 May 1692, records Guiscard’s Sedan appointments. See France, Recueil, 2:188–203, for his 18 April 1699 instructions; and ­Hatton, Charles XII, 85–6, for the negotiations. bn mf 10703, fol. 97, Torcy to Guiscard, 22 July 1700; and Hatton, Charles XII, 118, 130, 143–56. See also ss-Coirault, 7:721–2. Hatton, “Charles XII and Great Northern War,” 651. aae cp Danemark 65, fol. 132, Chamilly to Torcy (no date); France, Recueil, 13:83–102; and ss-Coirault, 1:425, 2:283–4. For Chamilly in Italy, see France, Recueil, 15:327–31. Bély, Espions, 93–4, 170, 264, discusses Poussin’s spy network. Notices and instructions are in France, Recueil, 3:211–23; and ibid., ­22:178–223. See also Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 388–9. See Mathis, Thèse

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92 93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102

03 1 104 105 106

107 108

Notes to pages 112–16 Excerpt, 18, for his kinship with Pomponne. He was also part of the circle of Beauvillier and Chevreuse. ss-Coirault, 2:532. In aae cp Portugal 35, fol. 151, Torcy to Rouillé, 29 Nov. 1700, Torcy jested with Rouillé that he had picked up the warlike spirit of the Portuguese. For the marquis, see Bonnac, Mémoire, 42–4; France, Recueil, 22:324; ibid., 3:226n1; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 82. For the abbé, see ss-Coirault, 1:387, 387n5, 399, 401, 405–7; and ibid., 2:499. Boles, Huguenots, 48. France, Recueil, 30:145–6; and Boislisle, Suisse et Puyzieulx, who notes Sainte-Colombe’s importance. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 62–3. For a notice and his instructions, see France, Recueil, 14:189–201 (for Savoy); and ibid., 22:35–94 (for Holland). France, Recueil, 15:315n1; ibid., 19:61–73; and Flournoy, Journal, 47n21. See Dupré, Correspondance, for his eight years as resident to Geneva. France, Recueil, 17:85–297. Ibid., 15:333n1, for a brief biographical note. See also Aubert de La ­Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 1:529; and Parisse, Histoire ­Lorraine, 315–8. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 8–9v, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 14 Jan. 1708, is an example of the information he collected. See Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 355–7, for his geographical work on Germany. Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 477–83, 488, 592. Paul, Polignac, 23–85. France, Recueil, 4:209–46 (229n1, 230n5, for Torcy’s marginalia). Paul, Polignac, 23–85. Ibid., 88–94, 129–231. aae cp Espagne 85, fol. 416, Polignac to Torcy, 19 Nov. 1700. Polignac received the cardinal’s hat at the end of 1712 at the request of the Stuart James III, who exercised his rights in the so-called Promotion of Kings. Gregg, “Monarchs without a Crown,” 403. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 170. Ibid., 157–66. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 65–8, on diplomats both far and near serving as expert advisors. Torcy, Journal, 200n1; and France, Recueil, 27:143–4n4, for a brief biography (see 299–345, for a questionnaire he submitted to Torcy). See also Blet, Nonces, 215–40. For his correspondence with Torcy, see bl am 20319, vol. 2. aae md 310, fol. 239v, which records the royal pension of 20,000 livres he received in 1715. Cermakian, Ursins, 432, 454. bl am 15284, fol. 264, Torcy to Pomponne, 20 Aug. 1706. Torcy had harsh words for Cardinal Francesco Barberini, elevated in 1690, and grandnephew of the Cardinal Francesco Barberini who had served as nuncio to France in 1625 and whose family Mazarin had promoted and protected.



Notes to pages 117–18

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109 For his journey and first audience, see Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 207–17; and Grimblot, Letters, 1:159–63. Portland’s formal instructions are brief and say nothing directly of his real mission of ascertaining Louis’s intentions toward the Spanish succession. Legg, British Diplomatic Instructions, 2:2–3. 110 bn mf 6679, fols 222vff. Saint-Simon described Tallard as a person whom no one trusted but whose company everyone enjoyed. ss-Boislisle, 11:51–2. 111 On 24 December 1697 William III wrote Heinsius: “What the French ambassadors have said to you, that something must be done by the Republic, France, and me, towards maintaining the peace, surprises me much,” but he assured the grand pensionary that Portland “will readily be able to get to the bottom of this affair in France,” and thus William was anxious for his embassy to begin soon. Grimblot, Letters, 1:144. William, however, was not very sanguine as to a “general guarantee for the peace” from the French, as he informed Heinsius 28 January 1698 (ibid., 153). 112 Troost, William III, 253. After the peace, he and Heinsius refused to renew the Grand Alliance if it included its original article supporting Austria’s claim to Spain. 113 Ibid., 95–9, 296–7. 114 Saint-Simon, Saint-Simon at Versailles, 44. For a view of these difficulties from the viewpoint of James II’s court, see Callow, King in Exile, 345–55. James frustrated Portland’s visits to various members of the court and attendance at particular occasions merely through his own presence, knowing full well that William’s envoy could not abide it. 115 Grimblot, Letters, 1:168–74, Portland to William III, 17 Feb. 1698. Despite French hospitality, Portland’s staff was watched: aae cp Angleterre 173, fol. 218, Torcy to La Reynie, d’Argenson, and Renaudot, all 6 Jan. 1698. In March this almost led to the arrest of Portland’s chaplain for allegedly administering the sacraments to a Frenchman. Although the accusation was later withdrawn, Portland was not satisfied with the apology he received from a police underling rather than from its head, Marc René de Voyer, marquis d’Argenson. Grimblot, Letters, 1:198–201. 116 Grimblot, Letters, 1:172–3 (Portland to William III, 18 Feb. 1698); and ibid., 175 (William III to Portland, 8/18 Feb. 1698). Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 166, shows that Portland’s doubts were largely rooted in lack of parliamentary support for such an initiative. 117 Grimblot, Letters, 1:181–3, William III to Portland, 13/23 Feb. 1698; and Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 167–8. 118 Grimblot, Letters, 1:185–96, 198–204, Portland to William III, 1 and 7 Mar. 1698. 119 Ibid., 205–10. For Bonneuil, see Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 50. 120 Grimblot, Letters, 1:205–10, 220–5.

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Notes to pages 119–20

121 Described in État de la France (1698), 1:270–1. 122 ss-Coirault, 1:464; Grimblot, Letters, 1:174–5, William III to Portland, 8/18 Feb. 1698; ibid., 211, 218, William III to Heinsius, 25 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1698; and ibid., 217–18, 227, Portland to William III, 8 and 13 Mar. 1698. 123 Torcy, Mémoires, 1:38–9. 124 Tallard’s instructions of 2 March 1698, quoted in translation in Grimblot, Letters, 1:264, 267–8. An undated “Memorandum” penned by Torcy before Portland’s arrival expressed the same confidence that he had come primarily to talk of Spain (ibid., 286–7). On Austria, see Spielman, Leopold I, 169–72. 125 Torcy’s “Memorandum,” in Grimblot, Letters, 1:287–9. 126 For Portland’s account to William III, 15 Mar. 1698, see ibid., 290–4; and for Torcy and Pomponne’s account to Louis XIV, see ibid., 294–304. See also Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 210–12. Troost, William III, 253–4, notes that William’s knowledge of Carlos II’s 1696 secret will in favour of the electoral prince also inclined him toward this solution. While in Paris, Portland visited the aged Jean Hérault de Gourville, a once-disgraced financier who had undertaken diplomatic missions for the French crown, including in the United Provinces, where he established a good relationship with William III. Gourville later wrote that when Portland asked his opinion on the best way to resolve the Spanish impasse, he replied that the electoral prince should take the Spanish throne, to which Portland responded that William was of the same opinion. Gourville, Mémoires, 2:142–3. 127 Grimblot, Letters, 1:273, 303. 128 Ibid., 304–5 (William III to Heinsius, 8/18 Mar. 1698); and ibid., 306–8 ­(William III to Portland, 9/19 Mar. 1698). 129 Ibid., 311 (William III to Portland, 14/24 Mar. 1698); and ibid., 312–13 (William III to Heinsius, 15/25 Mar. 1698). 130 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 213. 131 Grimblot, Letters, 1:461 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698); ibid., 476–7, 485 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 16 May 1698); ibid., 494 (Portland to William III, 17 May 1698); and Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 216. 132 William had Portland make it clear that he wanted the return of Dunkirk, an enhanced barrier, ports in the Mediterranean and West Indies, and the emperor placed in possession of Spanish Italy. Grimblot, Letters, 1:344–5 (William III to Portland, 28 Mar./7 Apr. 1698). Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 381–2, details the weaknesses of the informal barrier already in place. Pomponne and Torcy emphasized that although Spain belonged by right to the Bourbons, Louis XIV promised that the two crowns would never be joined and that the Spanish could choose between the Dauphin’s sons Berry and Anjou for an heir to be raised in Spain without French attendants. They also spoke of ceding the Spanish Netherlands to its governor, Max E ­ mmanuel



133

134 135

36 1 137 138

139 140 141

142

143

144 145

Notes to pages 120–2

531

of Bavaria, and of new commercial treaties with England and the Dutch. Grimblot, Letters, 1:328 (Portland to William III, 2 Apr. 1698). Grimblot, Letters, 1:385–92 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 17 Apr. 1698); ibid., 411 (William III to Heinsius, 13/23 Apr. 1698); and ibid., 415 (William III to Portland, 14/24 Apr. 1698). Ibid., 362 (William III to Portland, 1/11 Apr. 1698); ibid., 392 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 17 Apr. 1698); and ibid., 396 (Portland to William III, 20 Apr. 1698). For instance, as in ibid., 411 (William III to Heinsius, 13/23 Apr. 1698). See ibid., 428–9 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Apr. 1698), for the suggestion that as “the matter begins to assume a more definite form,” it should be discussed in either London or Paris; and ibid., 450, 452 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 May 1698), for the former’s preference for talks with William, whether in London or in Holland. Ibid., 495 (Portland to William III, 17 May 1698). Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 53, 104–6, 190–1. Dangeau, Journal, 6:370. Portland reported that their conversation “was too private and too long” for a letter but was of such importance that he would relate it to William personally. Grimblot, Letters, 2:36–7 (Portland to William III, 17 June 1698). Unfortunately, no record of Portland’s relation to William of this conversation with Louis XIV has been found. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 216. Dangeau, Journal, 6:370. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 217. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:629, 631. Tallard’s embassy had begun even before he reached London when he and Portland exchanged pleasantries in France. On 27 February 1698, the king ordered Tallard’s immediate departure for London. Dangeau, Journal, 16:301. His final audience with the king was on 11 March, the day of Portland’s first public royal audience (ibid., 309). For Torcy’s instructions for each ambassador, see, for Harcourt, France, Recueil, 11:449–81 (23 Dec. 1697); for Bonrepaus, ibid., 22:1–29 (13 Jan. 1698); for Tallard, ibid., 25-2:1–23 (2 Mar. 1698); and for Villars, ibid., 1:125–50 (16 June 1698). Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 387. See also Bély, Art de la paix, 460, on partitioning; and ibid., 577, where he says that the negotiations for the partition treaties heralded a new era. Roosen, Diplomacy, 26. The claims (there were others but these were the most plausible) were based on descent through female lines (valid in Spanish law) but complicated by renunciations of rights made upon marriage that were often disputed on various legal grounds. Also disputed was a monarch’s testamentary power: could he bind his heir, as some claimed Philip IV had done to his son Carlos II?

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49 1 150

151 152

153

154

Notes to pages 122–3 A childless monarch’s testamentary rights, however, were not generally disputed. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 385–6, 391, is a lucid account of these claims. See also Bély, Relations, 375–7; and Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 383–6. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 328, stresses Louis’s belief that the Dauphin’s claim rested on heredity and Spain’s fundamental laws and not on Spain’s failure to pay his wife’s dowry or Carlos II’s will. Bérenger, “Attempted Rapprochement,” 133–52. William III admitted to Portland (14/24 Apr. 1698) that in weighing the two French alternatives, giving Spain to the electoral prince was “the most advantageous to all Europe in general.” Unfortunately, he continued, that would deprive the Maritime Powers of gaining the ports in the Mediterranean or Caribbean that might result from a Bourbon receiving Spain. Grimblot, Letters, 1:415. Tallard reported to Louis XIV on 11 April 1698 (ibid., 365) that William insisted that the Spanish succession was not an issue that lawyers would decide, but one to be resolved either by their efforts on behalf of European peace or by recourse to a war in which each fought for his own national interests. Ibid., 421, Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Apr. 1698, on maintaining the balance of power in Italy by assigning Milan to the Duke of Savoy. See Thompson, “Balancing Europe,” on the varieties of meaning of this term and how it was used especially in early eighteenth century Britain. Bérenger, “Attempted Rapprochement,” 146. Grimblot, Letters, 2:100 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698), indicated his willingness, even at that late date, to give the Maritime Powers Ceuta and Oran in North Africa and Santo Domingo in the West Indies in exchange for a Bourbon Spain. Ibid., 1:459 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698); and ibid., 481 (Louis to ­Tallard, 16 May 1698). Their rapprochement began during the talks to end the war. Thomson, “Louis XIV and William III,” 24–48. Claydon, “William’s War Propaganda,” ­125–42, explains William’s bitterness toward France. See also Troost, ­William III, 95–9. Even though Louis had asked Tallard to see if William would agree to revisit the idea of assigning Spain to the Dauphin’s son, the ambassador forthrightly expressed his doubts. Grimblot, Letters, 2:48 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 3 July 1698). Ibid., 1:147 (William III to Heinsius, 11/21 Jan. 1698). Information came from Renaudot and his network of informants (ibid., 228–42) and from ­Tallard, who also sent Torcy a journal of events in Parliament (ibid., 466–71, 495). Tallard wrote Louis that William would not respond to his proposals until he knew how much money Parliament would vote for troops (4 July



155

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157

158 159 160 161

162

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Notes to pages 123–4

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1698, ibid., 2:48–9). For William’s difficulties, especially after Ryswick, see Thomson, “Parliament and Foreign Policy,” 130–2; Groenveld, “William III Stadholder,” 17–38; and Speck, “William III and Three Kingdoms,” 39–52. Of what he took to be a French ultimatum, William III wrote Heinsius, 14/24 March 1699, “I should be glad to have your sentiments thereon immediately.” Grimblot, Letters, 2:308–9. Tallard informed Louis XIV, 3 July 1698 (ibid., 48), that the Dutch had made William “resolute” on keeping a French prince off the Spanish throne. Tallard later wrote Torcy that he found Heinsius’s objections to the First Partition Treaty draft, submitted to him by Portland, to be mostly reasonable (ibid., 135, 1 Sept. 1698). For William and Heinsius, see Veenendaal, “Who Is in Charge?,” 11–12; and Onnekink, “Anglo-Dutch Diplomatic Cooperation,” 48–50. Portland reported to William III, 4 May 1698, regarding a reply to English counter-proposals, that Torcy and Pomponne informed him that “the letters [from Tallard] having just arrived, and the matter being of such importance, it would be necessary to make a report to the king in council, which would not be held till Sunday.” Grimblot, Letters, 1:442. Examples are ibid., 161–3, 168, 177ff, 185, 188, 199n, 200–10, 222–3, ­226–32, 375, 378, 395, 397, 440, 442, 445, 454–5, 492; and ibid., 2:18–19. See ibid., 1:210, however, for an occasion where Portland complained to Pomponne about protocol issues, although it was with Torcy that he resolved them. Tallard’s sense on one occasion that he needed to justify himself to the secretary of state in particular suggests the extent of Torcy’s influence (ibid., 435–6 [Tallard to Torcy, 30 Apr. 1698]). ss -Coirault, 2:308–9; and France, Recueil, 25-2:13–14. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 218. Grimblot, Letters, 2:93–5 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698). Ibid., 104 (William III to Heinsius, 10 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 147–8, 167 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 and 16 Sept. 1698). See ibid., 105–46; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:246–305, 369–428, for the steps by which final agreement was reached. France, Recueil, 25-2:35–9. In his son’s name, Louis relinquished Spain and its overseas empire to Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria. The Dauphin’s share encompassed Naples, Sicily, the Stato dei Presidi off Tuscany, the port of Finale west of Genoa, and the Spanish province of Guiposcoa on the Bay of Biscay, while the archduke received Milan. According to a secret article, if the electoral prince once king died heirless, then his father Max would inherit his portion. See Grimblot, Letters, 2:483–95, for the text of the treaty. On Harcourt in Spain, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:123–82, 306–68, 465–99; and Maquart, Espagne de Charles II, 129–31. Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, remains essential. ss -Coirault, 2:158–67, 3:383–7.

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Notes to pages 124–7

165 Stanhope, Spain under Charles Second, 125, 133, 139, 147, 150, marks the rise and fall of the Harcourts in the Spanish public’s favour. 166 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 572, agrees. 167 Harcourt was instructed that his primary mission was to uncover the true dispositions of the principal grandees and report how they felt about the succession (France, Recueil, 11:453). See also aae cp Espagne 78, fols 34–41, 42–4, 50–1. 168 Grimblot, Letters, 1:481, Louis XIV to Tallard, 16 May 1698; ibid., 2:7–8, Louis XIV to Tallard, 29 May 1698; and Torcy, Mémoires, 1:48. 169 France, Recueil, 11:465–8, 474; and ss-Coirault, 1:720. 170 France, Recueil, 11:450; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:342–5. 171 Sturgill, Villars, 14–15. 172 Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 47n31, notes that Villars, who addressed war secretaries as “Monseigneur” until he was made a marshal in 1702, nonetheless used “Monsieur” with Secretary of State Torcy in the late 1690s. 173 Villars, Mémoires, 1:220n1. He later promised Torcy in verse that he would guard his tongue on the matter (ibid., 459–60). 174 aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 135, Torcy to Villars, 15 July 1699. 175 Ibid., Torcy to Villars, fol. 183, 31 Aug. 1699. 176 Villars, Mémoires, 1:350. 177 Ibid., 331; and ibid., 6:253n1. 178 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:429–40. 179 Villars, Mémoires, 1:303. Villars was later convinced that had he been given a free hand, he could have negotiated a partition treaty with the Austrians better than the one signed with the Maritime Powers (ibid., 2:253). Vogüé, however, cites Austrian documents that show that Torcy and the king were justified in doubting the sincerity of these Austrian overtures (ibid., 254). See also Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:440–61; and Spielman, Leopold I, 173–4, on Austria’s partition overtures. 180 Villars, Mémoires, 1:348n1, on the spy network. See Frey and Frey, Question of Empire, 15, 34–41, for the Imperial court’s factions. See also Spielman, Leopold I, 175, 179–81. 181 Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis, 31–3. 182 ss-Coirault, 1:425–6. See also France, Recueil, 22:1–2. 183 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:373–85, 419–27. Bonrepaus’s efforts to insinuate himself into the negotiations for the Second Partition Treaty were likewise rebuffed, and Tallard was confirmed as the sole negotiator. With nothing further to do and perhaps rather disappointed, Bonrepaus took leave of The Hague at the start of December for some rest in France. Grimblot, Letters, 2:338, 350, 372–4, 377–8. 184 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 110, call the post-Utrecht Anglo-French entente “as revolutionary as the later Austro-French Diplomatic ­Revolution



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of the 1750s, and … completely foreign to the normal pattern of AngloFrench relations from 1689 to 1815.” For the Quadruple Alliance, see ibid., 111–24; and Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–35. After Torcy’s hope for guaranteeing Utrecht in partnership with the Bolingbroke ministry ended when the Whigs came to power, he looked to a “family compact” with Spain, but Philip V’s bellicosity and designs on Italy led him to support the regent’s return to accommodation with Britain. Petitfils, Régent, 433, 439, 441, 480, 578–9; and Shennan, Philippe, Duke of Orléans, 68–9. Orléans’s tutor, Abbé Guillaume Dubois, later architect of the Quadruple Alliance and a cardinal, accompanied Tallard to London in 1698 (ibid., 52), but when Tallard complained to Versailles that Dubois was secretly carrying on parallel negotiations on behalf of Orléans, Torcy recalled him. Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 1:255. Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–2. Claydon, William III, especially 121–58, argues that Louis misread William’s relationship with Parliament and still relied upon his experiences with the last two Stuarts. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 170–1, however, says that despite Tallard’s warning against equating William with the last two Stuarts, Louis correctly perceived his weakness vis-à-vis Parliament. Louis XIV wrote Tallard, 26 May 1698, that the “more [William’s] power is limited by Parliament, the greater is it his interest to unite closely with me,” hinting that whereas the emperor would require subsidies from William rather than providing them, he would be “always ready” to offer assistance, presumably in the form of subsidies. Grimblot, Letters, 1:511–12. On 2 June 1698 Tallard reminded the king that unlike the late ­Stuarts, William was “supported by Holland, of which he has the absolute control,” and concluded that William’s interest in a French alliance rested on international rather than domestic considerations (ibid., 2:13). Louis, however, persisted in thinking that William might feel more secure if he could be certain of French backing should England have one of its frequent revolutions, although he also suspected that William might use the pretext of war with France over Spain to strengthen his hand against Parliament (ibid., 29–31 [Louis XIV to Tallard, 12 June 1698]). Grimblot, Letters, 1:144 (William III to Heinsius, 24 Dec. 1697/3 Jan. 1698); and ibid., 460–1, 463 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698). Louis XIV wrote to Tallard, 16 May 1698, that France allied with England would end support for the Jacobites and prevent James II in France from plotting against ­William (ibid., 476–7, 485–6). This suggests that Louis intended this partitioning partnership to endure beyond Carlos’s death and extend to other international issues. Ibid., 494 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 17 May 1698). Ibid., 2:98–9 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 105–7 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 15 Aug. 1698).

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Notes to pages 127–9

189 Ibid., 112 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 18 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 118–19 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 19 Aug. 1698). 190 Ibid., 126–8 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Aug. 1698). 191 Ibid., 155 (Vernon to Portland, 30 Aug./10 Sept. 1698). See also Thomson, “Parliament and Foreign Policy,” 131–3. 192 Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–35; and Onnekink, “Partition Treaties.” 193 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:5–176, 193–324. 194 Ibid., 2:488–99, 500–2. 195 Ibid., 533–42. See France, Recueil, 17:157–64, for Torcy’s instructions of 28 January 1699 to the prince de Monaco, France’s new envoy to Rome, with whom he shared the treaty’s contents. On Imperial policy and the Spanish succession, see Spielman, Leopold I, 169–73. 196 Grimblot, Letters, 2:255 (William III to Heinsius, 31Jan./10 Feb. 1699). Torcy, d’Argenson, and others exchanged letters from late 1702 through early 1703 concerning the possible involvement of a certain Gonzel in the alleged poisoning of the electoral prince. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:453–60. 197 Tallard also floated, among other possibilities, two exchange schemes: France to exchange, first, Milan for Lorraine and, second, her earlier awards in southern Italy to the Duke of Savoy for his current possessions. Both aimed to consolidate France’s frontiers and avoid far-flung holdings difficult and expensive to defend. Grimblot, Letters, 2:260–70 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 13 Feb. 1699). Louis informed Tallard that he knew “how much Europe would be alarmed at seeing my power raised above that of the House of Austria,” but he was convinced that if the emperor’s power, already augmented by the German princes’ submission and peace with the Turks, increased further due to a revised partition, then “it is for the general interest, that … mine shall always be able to counterbalance it” (ibid., 262). William, however, wrote Heinsius that he suspected that Louis planned to annex the Dauphin’s share to France (ibid., 338 [18 July 1699]). 198 Letters in ibid., 273–89; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:154 (13 May 1699). 199 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 219–23. William persuaded Portland to finish the talks with Tallard, even though the earl was increasingly doubtful that partitioning would succeed given the lack of domestic support. Grimblot, Letters, 2:290–332, 361–2, 375. William urged Heinsius to remain to continue backing his efforts on behalf of the Dutch (ibid., 2:306–7 ­[William III to Heinsius, 28 Feb./10 Mar. 1699]). 200 Grimblot, Letters, 2:325–6 (William III to Portland, 28 Apr./7 May 1699); and repeated in late December (ibid., 385). 201 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 220. Louis XIV raised this possibility with Tallard even though he preferred working with William. Grimblot, Letters, 2:268–9 (13 Feb. 1699). See also ibid., 299 (Louis to Tallard, 3 Mar. 1699).



Notes to pages 129–30

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202 Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 170. See ibid., 171–2, on growing English weakness. 203 William clearly recognized this. Grimblot, Letters, 2:343 (William III to ­Portland, 21 Aug. 1699); and ibid., 347–9 (William III to Heinsius, 15 and 19 Sept. 1699). See also Spielman, Leopold I, 174–5. 204 Grimblot, Letters, 2:330–1 (William III to Heinsius, 12/22 and 16/26 May 1699). By 16 August 1699 (ibid., 341), however, he confided to the grand pensionary that it now appeared that the Austrians would have to be forced to comply, “which to me is an incomprehensible policy, and will embarrass us much.” Portland was the butt of French and Imperial suspicions, blamed variously for delaying an agreement or for wanting to force it down the emperor’s throat. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 222–3. 205 See Grimblot, Letters, 2:335 (William III to Heinsius, 26 June 1699), on forcing Sweden to join such a league. See Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:444–81, on negotiations in Scandinavia. 206 Grimblot, Letters, 2:380–1 (William III to Heinsius, 24 Nov./4 Dec. 1699); and ibid., 385–7 (Manchester to Jersey, 23 Dec. 1699). See also ibid., 392 (William III to Heinsius, 5/15 Jan. 1700). 207 Ibid., 388 (William III to Heinsius, 19/29 Dec.); and ibid., 389 (Manchester to Jersey, 31 Dec. 1699). 208 This new agreement assigned Archduke Charles Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the overseas empire, but with the provision that these territories could never be inherited by one who wore the Imperial crown. The Dauphin would receive Naples, Sicily, the presidial ports, Finale on the coast west of Genoa, and Guiposcoa. Finally, France would exchange Milan for Lorraine. Ibid., 495–507, contains the English text of the treaty. For Austrian and Dutch resistance and the decision of the latter to sign the treaty, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:92–263. 209 Grimblot, Letters, 2:403–6 (Manchester to Jersey, 19 May 1700); and ibid., 406–7 (Jersey to Manchester, 13/24 May 1700). 210 Ibid., 411, 413–14 (Manchester to Jersey, 2 and 9 June 1700). 211 See the various letters in ibid., 412–21. For allied diplomatic efforts in ­Lorraine, Savoy, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:400–568. See bn mf 10703, fols 102v–3r, Louis XIV to Guiscard, 12 Aug. 1700. 212 Grimblot, Letters, 2:418–19 (Manchester to Jersey, 26 June 1700). 213 Seemingly undisturbed, he went on in this letter to discuss other issues of implementation (ibid., 421–2 [William III to Heinsius, 18/29 June 1700]). His opinion was shared by English diplomats in Vienna and France, as in ibid., 423–4 (Manchester to Sutton, 9 July 1700). 214 Ibid., 427 (William III to Heinsius, 30 July 1700). 215 Ibid., 430–1 (Sutton to Manchester, 18 Aug. 1700). Francis Schonenberg, envoy extraordinary to Spain, reported to Manchester that while the ­Spanish

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17 2 218 219 220

21 2 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229

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Notes to pages 130–3 Council of State favoured Anjou, the “King and Queen are absolutely for the Imperial court” (ibid., 439 [23 Sept. 1700]). For details on negotiations in Vienna and Austria’s diplomatic efforts to secure the whole succession, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:263–336. Grimblot, Letters, 2:431–2 (Manchester to Blathwayt, 20 Aug. 1700); and ibid., 434 (Manchester to Jersey, 27 Aug. 1700), with Torcy’s complaint about the Dutch. Ibid., 435–8 (William III to Heinsius, 21 Aug. and 21 Sept. 1700). Ibid., 435–6 (William III to Heinsius, 12 Sept. 1700). Spielman, Leopold I, 181–2. The influential chapter by Jean Bérenger in Bély et al., Guerre et paix, ­1:403–27, interprets the dynamics of the French acceptance of the will largely in light of Saint-Simon’s account, but the duke’s narrative is problematic and must be carefully balanced with other sources. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” offers more broadly based reasons why Louis XIV accepted the testament. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 393–4 (quotation on 393). Roosen, “Origins,” 160; and Spielman, Leopold I, 173. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 395–6. Roosen, “Origins,” 151–75, includes a provocative systems analysis. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 161, 173. Ibid., 163. Ibid., 166–77. Troost, “William III’s ideas,” 299, apparently written before Onnekink’s article appeared. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 336. The Conseil was not, however, unanimous in its support of the partitioning initiative, as indicated by Pomponne’s friend and fellow peace advocate Claude Le Peletier, who wrote to the king arguing against it as the worst manoeuvre one could have made because it only served the interests of William III. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 158. Grimblot, Letters, 2:366n (Manchester to Jersey, 30 Sept. 1699). See also ibid., 365–6 (Manchester to Jersey, 6 Nov. 1699), for his annoyance with Torcy because he insisted upon knowing the subject of any requested audience. Manchester told Jersey (ibid., 366) that he would try to keep this information from Torcy, although it would “not be very easy, considering his temper,” by which he meant his natural disposition. Torcy also held the line at disturbing Louis’s time away at Marly with diplomatic audiences. Génie, from the Latin ingenium, was often used to describe a person who made every effort to refine and perfect his natural talents. Stanton, Aristocrat as Art, 212. It signified the inclination, natural disposition, or talent of individuals. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (hereafter daf), s.v.



Notes to pages 133–5

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“Génie.” It was often used in the negative sense: the bad “genius” (mauvais génie) of Louvois, quoted in Cordelier, Maintenon, 306. Berwick remarked that ­Chamillart “meant very well, but had so little genius” that it was hard to fathom how the king could choose or maintain him as minister for so long. Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:68. The original French uses génie. Berwick, Mémoires, 2:73. 232 bn Clairambault 519 (Mélanges 668), fol. 336. 233 bn naf 7497, Bernou to Renaudot, 15 May 1685. Thanks to Laurence Pope for the copy of this letter. 234 Callières to marquise d’Huxelles, 6 Aug. 1696, in Callières, Letters, 57. 235 ss-Coirault, 5:332. Ursins, who had met Torcy when he visited Rome in 1686, confided to Marshal Anne Jules, duc de Noailles’s wife, that Philip V’s timidity reminded her of an earlier Torcy (but clearly, not the present one!). Cermakian, Ursins, 159n124, 12 Dec. 1701. In aae cp Espagne 94, fols 93, 12 Nov. 1701, Ursins made the same observation to Torcy. Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 67, sees this “timidity” as excessive prudence on Torcy’s part. Yet a letter from Ursins to Maintenon, 20 June 1714, shows her anxious that a misunderstanding caused by Philip V’s timidity would not earn for her own nephew Torcy’s “displeasure.” Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 3:416–17. 236 Villars, Mémoires, 1:145. 237 André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 161–3. He also considered Croissy’s génie to be limited (ibid., 140). 238 Legg, Prior, 69 (Prior to Albemarle, c. 19 Mar. 1697 – 1698 New Style). 239 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:438 (Wiser to Kinsky, 30 June 1698). 240 Torcy, Journal, 241 (3 Aug. 1710). 241 Legg, Prior, 317 (Prior to Jersey, 6 Nov. 1699). 242 Ibid., 293, 306 (Prior to Jersey, 17 June and 5 Aug. 1699). 243 Ibid., 301 (Prior to Jersey, 8/18 July 1699). 244 Ibid., 304 (Prior to Jersey, 19/29 July 1699). 245 Ibid., 308 (Prior to Jersey, 8 Aug. 1699). During the next round of peacemaking, Prior would write home of “our friend Monsieur Torcy’s particular courage and prudence.” pro sp France 78/158, fol. 21, 20/31 Jan. 1714. 246 Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, p. 5 of the unnumbered dedicatory Epistre. 247 Le Camus, Lettres, 2:343. 248 Joly, Converti de Bossuet, 413. 249 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:456–5; and ibid., 3:22. 250 Ibid., 2:162. At the beginning of his research into Louis XIV’s reign, Voltaire expressed doubts about Torcy’s veracity because of his position as a royal minister. Voltaire, Œuvres complètes, 52:317–18. After reading Torcy’s Mémoires, still in manuscript form, however, the skeptic reversed himself, writing in his book that Torcy had been one of the most virtuous men in

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254 255

256 257

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Notes to pages 135–9 ­ urope and in a position where politics often trumped morality. Voltaire, E Siècle de Louis XIV, 1:280n. In fact, after a careful rereading of Torcy’s Memoires once published (his reading of the manuscript had apparently been cursory), Voltaire made many corrections to his own book. Brumfitt, ­Voltaire, Historian, 131, 135. In a 1767 letter he also characterized Torcy as completely candid. Voltaire, Lettres inédites, 182. ss -Coirault, 5:332. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Torre do Tombo, vol. 570; Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon, bn Fundo General, vol. 253, Dec. 1702; and Peres, A diplomacia Portuguesa, 153n2. “Caractère de la Famille Royale de France, des Ministres d’État, et des principales Personnes de la Cour en 1703 (Traduit de l’Anglois à Villefranche chez Pinceau),” bn Clairambault 228, fols 64, 72, and (on Torcy) 86, 87. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 317. See Torcy, Journal, 190n2, for Palmquist. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 157; she even complained that the hated Louvois had at least punctually delivered her letters after opening them and that Torcy distorted what she wrote when he reported to the king (ibid., 146–7). She also wrote that Maintenon, the “wicked trollop,” was behind the opening of her letters (ibid., 174). Wormeley, Correspondence of Madame, 92–3. Bély, Princes, 105. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 168: Madame to Electress Sophie of Hanover, 5 Apr. 1708, said that the court “still did not know what happened to our young King of England [James III],” which Torcy perhaps saw as a tip-off to Sophie that James was up to something, which he indeed was, having embarked with a French fleet for an attempted invasion of Scotland. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 271. Madame’s recriminations continued throughout the Regency (ibid., 206–7, 255–6, 266), and she accused Torcy of wrecking the postal service through his “avarice and greed” (ibid., 271). Ibid., 208. Cruysse, Madame Palatine, 477, called Torcy her favourite “bête noire.” Even so, Torcy worked at obtaining satisfaction regarding Madame’s claims to the Palatinate, as he wrote to Gualterio. bl am 20318, fol. 36, 14 Dec. 1701; and ibid., fol. 40, 10 Mar. 1702. Roosen, Diplomacy, 38. Ibid., for the adjectives describing each.

Chapter Four 1 Bély, Princes, 98. 2 bn mf 21564, fol. 73. Another succinct description is in the April 1700 provisions of office for Louis IV Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, at the time he was granted his charge as secretary en survivance to his father. It said that the secretary must read and sign all documents leaving his office, such as



Notes to pages 139–41

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payment orders, confirmation of commissions and titles, powers to act in the king’s name, and all of his department’s dispatches. bn Clairambault 664, fol. 536. 3 Barbiche, Institutions, 173–6. The secrétaire label first appeared in the sixteenth century. Luçay, Origines, 3–4, 12; and Michaud, Grande Chancellerie, especially 126–54. 4 A greffe was the place where the registers were kept, where in a jurisdiction judges issued sentences and decrees. daf, s.v. “greffe.” A greffier was an officer who ran such a registry. 5 Barbiche, Institutions, 181. Dangeau, Journal, 6:439, noted that when a marriage involved a foreign prince, it was Torcy who read the contract aloud and handed the king the pen at the formal signing ceremony. 6 A secretary was defined as one whose job was to write and draw up letters and dispatches for his master. daf, s.v. “secrétaire.” 7 Barbiche, Institutions, 185–91, summarizes the types of “actes en comman­de­ ment” issued by secretaries of state. 8 Ibid., 192. 9 Ibid., 184. The controller general’s vast department accounted for a large portion of this. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 113–16. Even a Parisian chronicler who on the eve of the Revolution remarked upon “bureaucracy” as a “word recently coined to indicate … the overgrown power possessed by simple clerks” nonetheless, under the Directory, called it a “mania for the quill, which dates to Monsieur Colbert.” Quoted in Kafka, “Hunting,” 113, 115. 10 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 283. 11 daf, s.v. “ministre d’État.” 12 Barbiche, Institutions, 291–2. 13 Ibid., 282–3, 291–300; the charts on pages 287 and 294 are especially helpful. Luçay, Origines, 120, drawing on Dangeau, recounts that Torcy attended the Conseil des parties to see the swearing-in of his brother-in-law, Abbé Pomponne, but then requested permission to withdraw before any business was conducted, even though he was entitled to attend. 14 daf, s.v. “Rapport.” 15 Barbiche, Institutions, 184. Antoine, Conseil du Roi, 124, says that he was the principal reporter, but when the war and navy secretaries were also ministers, they reported on these matters. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 65, points to a discussion on trade where Desmaretz served as reporter. 16 Barbiche, Institutions, 173–93. See also Mousnier, Institutions, 2:143–6; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:53–92. Luçay, Origines, 156, reports that in his final years Louis XIV granted to those secretaries who were not ministers the same 20,000 livres annual pension as those who were. See also Bély, Dictionnaire, 159–60, 451–3.

542

Notes to pages 141–2

17 Ranum, Richelieu, 52. 18 bn mf 21564, fol. 83. 19 Outrey, “Administration,” 306–8. He observes that while the secretary was a royal minister, he was also the first and the best of the king’s clerks (ibid., 308). 20 bn mf 21123, fol. 351v, Pontchartrain to Gaufredy de Trels, July 1704. 21 Justinian, Digest, 13, 23, 28. On 7 January 1711 Torcy wrote to LouisJoseph, duc de Vendôme, commanding Spanish and French troops in Spain, of the importance of the Hungarian revolt for the Bourbon cause. At the end of the letter he suggested that Vendôme speak to Philip V about helping France subsidize the Hungarians, remarking that although he added this without having first run it by the king, he doubted that his master would disapprove. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 55. 22 On the lex animate, see Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 127–43. 23 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:53–60. For the pre-1661 foreign secretaries, see the entries in Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, 3–63. Luçay, Origines, 582–93, has tables of attributions from the various règlements up to 1661. Outrey, “Administration,” 304–5, argues that making Louis Revol the first foreign secretary had more to do with creating order by entrusting foreign correspondence to a loyal servant than with promoting a specialization agenda. 24 aae md 1043, fol. 336, Torcy to Barbezieux, 4 Dec. 1697, relaying the Swedish resident’s request that the frontier intendants treat the inhabitants of the Duchy of Deux Ponts (Zweibrücken) favourably. The Treaty of ­Ryswick restored it to Sweden’s monarch after French occupation during the reunions. Ibid., 1073, fol. 8, Torcy to bishop of Metz, 7 July 1700, apparently again addressed the issue. See bn mf 17435, fols 74ff, for Torcy’s letters to Achille III de Harlay in 1699 concerning French subjects with lands in Lorraine and the jurisdictional questions raised by the duchy’s return to its duke at Ryswick. aae md 1189, fol. 142, Torcy to intendant of Champagne, 27 Aug. 1713, requested information concerning the bishop of Liege’s lands, the inhabitants of the Ardennes village of Montcornet, and the elector of Cologne. 25 Torcy directed the bishop of Metz to speak to the Swedish resident concerning Lutherans in his jurisdiction. aae md 1077, fol. 8, Torcy to bishop of Metz, 7 July 1700. 26 When a Liege Carmelite was elected provincial of the order’s French province, Torcy was concerned that it would allow a foreigner access to the “heart of the kingdom” as he visited convents. Torcy consoled Ange de Cambolas, general of the Carmelites, that the king had likewise opposed the election. He instructed him to name a French provincial vicar to govern and visit these convents. bn mf 15772, fol. 141, Torcy to Cambolas, 24 Sept. 1706.



Notes to pages 142–3

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27 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Einundzwanzigster Band: 82, 113–14, 117–18, are letters between Leibniz and Sophie, Oct.–Nov. 1702. Leibniz’s 3 Dec. 1703 letter to Burnett explained the whole affair (ibid., Zweiundzwanzigster Band: 705–7), while that of 12 May 1704 urged him to thank those French and Danish diplomats who had served his cause (ibid., Dreiundzwanzigster Band: 362). For the two Burnet[t]s, who spelled their names differently, see Leibniz, Controversies, 457–8. 28 Leibniz to Anton Ulrich, 23 April 1699. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Einundzwanzigster Band: 4. Leibniz to Bossuet, 14 May 1700 (ibid., Achtzehnter Band: 630), and Leibniz to Anton Ulrich, 21 June 1701 (ibid., Zwangister Band: 7). Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:190, 4 July 1701, says that Bossuet dined at Torcy’s to discuss German Lutheranism with the Duke of Saxe-Gotha’s envoy and was there again the next two evenings. Le Dieu (ibid., 196, 250, ­252–3) suggests that Torcy was apprised of Bossuet’s correspondence with ­Leibniz and that the letters and other writings were actually exchanged through Torcy. When Bossuet composed a treatise on the conciliation of Germany, he provided copies to Torcy and the pope, sending the latter through the nuncio (ibid., 247, 250, 255, 257). For this dialogue, see Hazard, European Mind, 217–36. 29 Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 74, 76, 78, strongly suggests that modernity implies a separation between internal and external functions of government. Hamilton and Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy, 72–3, seemingly imply the same. 30 In the related areas of public finance, venality of office, and provincial governance, for example, Potter, Corps and Clienteles, 22, argues that “absolutism under Louis XIV was neither ossified nor in crisis, but rather dynamic and flexible.” 31 Barbiche, Institutions, 176–81. See also Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 51–64. Ranum, Richelieu, 49, suggests that the geographic organization of the departments was originally and reasonably a function of the courier services. He also points favourably to the flexibility and adaptability of administrative arrangements under Louis XIII (ibid., 50–2, 59, 63). Cosandey and ­Descimon, Absolutisme, 149–62, also stress the flexibility and pragmatism that typically led to innovations being introduced with the trappings of tradition; this has blinded later historians to their true nature, although many contemporaries clearly saw through this disguise. Chaline, Année des quatre dauphins, 194–6, discusses how this could be accomplished even in royal mourning ceremonial. 32 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:60–1. 33 On early modern frontiers, see Black, Maps and Politics, 121–30; and ­Nordmann, Frontières. The eighteenth century would see a move toward greater linearity.

544

Notes to pages 143–5

34 Luçay, Origines, 582–3. Functional specialization was also subject to experimentation. A 1626 règlement in bn Clairambault 664, fol. 133, noted that each secretary of state was in charge of the fortifications within his department, but from 1661 onward fortifications were consolidated under Colbert’s and Louvois’s departments, under Louvois upon Seignelay’s death in 1690, and upon Louvois’s death in 1691 under a new department not held by a secretary of state but under Director General of Fortifications Michel Le ­Peletier de Souzy. Trotter, “Vauban and Administration.” Torcy had occasion to deal with fortifications, although usually in conjunction with Souzy. He also solicited from his intendants a listing of fortifications in their intendancies. aae md 1012, fol. 100, Torcy to the intendants of Provence, Béarn, Brittany, Berry, and Limousin, 15 Aug. 1691. Sedan’s engineer sent Torcy information on its fortifications (ibid., 1057, fol. 95v) that Torcy later shared with Souzy (ibid., fol. 15, June 1699). In bn mf 8874, fol. 183, Souzy to Lebret, 29 Sept. 1702, Souzy informed the intendant that he had not received clarifications from Chamillart’s and Torcy’s bureaus on property damage resulting from the building of some fortifications. 35 Luçay, Origines, 581–3, 596–7. Lyon was a frontier city until Henri IV conquered Bresse from Savoy. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 235–6. 36 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 67–8, 99, 103–4. 37 Soll, Information Master, 154–9. 38 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 214–20, offer a reminder not to confound the controller general’s department, commonly regarded as the heart of the state, with its head. It took an accumulation of other functions to create Colbert’s exalted status, something not usually enjoyed by his successors. 39 Engrand, “Clients du roi,” 90. 40 For these crises, see Lachiver, Années de misère. James Dayrolle, British resident at The Hague, reported home to Secretary of State Henry Boyle on 3/14 June 1709 that “strong reports that marquis de Torcy had secretly contracted with merchants at Amsterdam” for eighteen shiploads of Baltic grain, paid for in silver. bl am 15876, fol. 253r. 41 bn Clairambault 664, fol. 247. The broadsheet confusingly calls these units “generalities,” whereas the names listed are actually those used for provinces and for gouvernements, which were territorial units under governors. Generalities were late-Valois fiscal units named for the cities where their bureaus of finance were located. The practice of listing a secretary of state’s provinces as generalities is attested to in État de la France (1661), 371–3, 338ff, 409ff, and editions for subsequent years. An intendance was a late-seventeenth century term for an administrative unit under an intendant. The complex term province had connotations that were political, ethnic, cultural, and in certain cases solely administrative. A province should not be confused with a gouvernement or a généralité. In the pays d’élections, which had no



42

43 44 45

46

47 48 49

50

51

Notes to pages 145–8

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­ rovincial estates, an intendancy was equivalent to a generality, whereas in p the pays d’état, which had estates, they were equivalent to a province. These definitions are from Barbiche, Institutions, 313–19; and Bély, Dictionnaire, 601. There appears to have been a department of the intendancy of Sedan that included Rocroi, Chateauregnault, Meziers, Maubertfontaine, Aubigny, ­Launybogny, Ligny le petit, Signy l’abbaye, Domery, Launoy, Donchery, Charleville, Sedan, and Raucourt under Sr Melesieu. On 27 August 1692 it was joined to the Champagne intendancy under Michel Larcher. aae md 304, fol. 13v. The foreign secretary appointed Sedan’s governor, lieutenant du roi, and sergeant major. Ibid., 1011, fol. 106, 4 Mar. 1691. In April 1694 La Rochelle became an intendancy when the port city’s navy intendancy was joined with territories taken from the surrounding generalities of Poitiers, Limoges, and Bordeaux. Until 1717 Rochefort’s navy intendant also served as provincial intendant. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1346. The Angoumois remained with Limousin, while Saintonge was largely transferred to La Rochelle in 1695. Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 40. There was enough of Saintonge left with the Angoumois for it to remain linked with Limousin on the list of the foreign secretary’s generalities in 1715. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. Almanach royal (1706), 42. For provinces and their parlements, see Mousnier, Institutions, 2:255–7. aae md 1080, fols 73–8, 18 May 1701. Ibid., 1191, fols 154–5v, 5 Apr. 1713, Torcy to Jérôme Pontchartrain, Voysin, and La Vrillière. See also ibid., fol. 119r–v, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 10 Mar. 1713. Antoine, “Remonstrances,” 87–122. He appends a remonstrance from the Chambre des comptes of Nantes sent through Torcy and gives an example of Torcy digging deeper into the complaints of the parlement of Aix against its lieutenant-general, François Adhémar de Monteil, comte de Grignan. Depping, Correspondance, 1:932–4, 950. The origins of Dispatches are explored in Barbiche, Institutions, 286–8, 293; and Luçay, Origines, 36–8. État de la France (1698), 3:443–6; ibid. (1702), 3:449–53; and ibid. (1708), 3:450–2. The distinction and terminology – “organes extérieures d’exécution” and “organe central de commandement et de contrôle spécialisé” – are from ­Outrey, “Administration,” 300–2. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 287–8, differentiate between the “culture of service” (culture de service) and the “culture of the service” (culture du ­service) that developed in each ministry with the rise of a new type of man, the administrator. Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 37, notes that “[r]everse-engineering of cultural artefacts must be complemented by evidence of ‘insider’ perceptions. But such evidence is especially hard to find, because for insiders cultural

546

52

53 54

55

56 57 58

59

Notes to pages 148–50 practices are normally too self-evident for comment. The explicit discussions generated during moments of crisis … are extremely useful.” Pénicaut, “Commis,” 78–9, demonstrates this for the advent of Chamillart as war secretary in 1701. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 307, call the commis the living memory of their department. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 7–25, 54–78, 129, 137, 148–9, 219, 243, 284–5, 307. aae md 1206, fol. 211. Piccioni, Commis, 181, says that Pecquet was selected because of his erudition and his editorial skills, but Bély, Espions, 348, suggests that it was also due in part to the favour he had gained through his correspondence with the Utrecht negotiators, including Huxelles. This could also account for Saint-Simon’s report that in the Regency Council, of which he was a member, Huxelles said little and was closeted nearly every morning with Pecquet for “his lesson.” ss-Boislisle, 11:427. On the other hand, since Huxelles was among those of his enemies the regent hoped to mollify and monitor by inclusion within his government (Dupilet, Régence absolue, 129–30), it seems unlikely that Huxelles’s was the decisive recommendation. Pecquet had already served many years as head of the foreign office’s key bureau (ibid., 220–1) and surely had Torcy’s endorsement. In any event, most of the council secretaries had been premiers commis in the old departments (ibid., 146), although Pecquet had the distinction of being the only one named in a preliminary list of council secretaries and members dated 19 September 1715 (ibid., 159). This was more than merely a matter of the mechanics of protocol. La ­Closure, resident in Geneva, had received no official notification of Louis XIV’s death as late as 7 October 1715, although the news had been known in Geneva for a month. He lamely apologized to the Republic’s rulers that although he had written Torcy many times for orders, it was likely that a reply had gotten lost amid all the disruption at court. Brandli, Résidence, 80. aae md 1206, fols 212, 215. According to Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054, Pecquet had become a secretary of the king by 1717. aae md 1206, fol. 212r–v. Ibid., fols 212v–13v. This was, in fact the way foreign affairs were largely carried out under the Polysynod. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 260. Pecquet had also handled Torcy’s secret correspondence (ibid., 220). The regent also made wide use of la liasse to expedite the work of the other councils, even though this was in violation of what Saint-Simon and others had envisioned as one of the essential breaks with Louisquatorzian practice (ibid., 244, 259, 284). aae md 1206, fols 213v–214. For ordonnances au porteur, see Barbiche, Institutions, 190; examples in the accounts under Torcy are in aae md 1201, fol. 274 (for 1 Mar. 1714), and ibid., 310, fol. 346 (for 1 Jan. 1715). See



60 61

62

63 64

65

66

67 68 69 70

Notes to pages 150–2

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ibid., 1137, fol. 13, where in 1705 Torcy noted that some particular funds were spent for secret department business that he could not mention. aae md 1206, fols 214–15. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221–2, notes that Pecquet worked closely with Huxelles in preparing reports to be delivered in the cae and Regency Council and even served as reporter to the cae on particular matters. aae md 1206, fols 215–16v. Utrecht having been a rare exception, its written negotiations between France and Britain are thus “a boon to historians.” Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 481. aae md 1206, fols 216v–17. Attached to aae md 1206, fols 216v–17, was a memoir listing these personnel; unfortunately, it is missing. His fears proved unfounded, since three of the four cae members were experienced diplomats. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 138. Ash, “Expertise,” 17, notes: “Well realizing the nature and extent of their importance, some early modern experts worked to establish themselves as indispensable tools of effective governance and traded on their status as vital intermediaries to advance their own positions.” aae md 1260, fols 232–4, which begins “Toute la Mechanique du Conseil,” is labeled and dated by a different hand as regulations for the cae, 26 Sept. 1715. Comments – mostly “good” – and one alteration are written in another hand, perhaps that of the regent or Huxelles (ibid., fols 220–2, is the corrected copy). A third draft (ibid., fols 218–19v), with “Depar Le Roy” as a heading, is a draft of an ordonnance defining the cae’s functioning and is based on the first four articles of the “Toute la Mechanique …” documents. It is also labeled by the same hand that labeled the 26 September manuscript as a project from 20 September 1715 for the establishment of a cae and ends with the phrase “given at Vincennes” and blanks for the day and month. However, unlike all the other councils of government except the Regency Council itself, there was no ordonnance issued for the cae for reasons of secrecy, according to Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 524. Picavet, Diplomatie, 27, 68, calls the ministry’s bureaucracy a “machine.” While cae members helped draft letters to France’s diplomats, Huxelles alone signed them. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 273. He also reprised Torcy’s role as reporter on foreign affairs to the Regency Council, where Torcy now sat (ibid., 260). Almanach Royal (1716), 55. Torcy had moved to the rue Bourbon in the ­Faubourg Saint-Germain (ibid., 54). Dupilet, Régence absolue, 154. Rule, “King in His Council,” 216–41, especially figures 4 and 5. aae ae, Cote 8–22, from the archives of Charles Mignon, however, contains a few commis notes among papers labeled as letters and notes of the Ryswick plenipotentiaries. There are also fragments of premier commis Du

548

71

72

73

74

75

76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Notes to pages 152–5 Fresne’s journal covering 1659 to 1672, in Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 385–97. Archives hg, 2:25. An example of this is seen in Armand Baschet’s list of all the correspondence in the aae cp exchanged between the foreign office and France’s embassies and agents in England, 1698–1714, in gbhmc, ThirtyNinth Annual Report Public Records, 772–826. There are roughly fifty to seventy items listed on each page, but in all there are only thirteen notes or letters to or from Pecquet, the premier commis responsible for Britain. Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 94, 114–15, 119, 156, 162, quotes letters (from aae cp Suède 110) to Pecquet from Groffey, a French agent serving as secretary to Count Sapiéha, the grand treasurer of Lithuania, traveling with Charles XII at the same time as Jean Victor, baron de Besenval, French ambassador to Sweden (ibid., 15, 52–3). gbhmc, Thirty-Ninth Annual Report Public Records, 772–826. Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 64–6, 67n2, 130–1, 140–1, 148–50, are minutes of Besenval’s letters to Pecquet from Leipzig and Danzig in 1707, all drawn from the Besenval family papers. Besenval called Pecquet (spelled “Peuquet” by Syveton) his friend and wrote to him quite candidly. Blondel was another friend who received similar letters (ibid., 247–9). English diplomat Matthew Prior’s letters are another source. Prior to Jersey, 27 June 1699, also enclosed a note from “Mr Adams” concerning the arrest of a person accused of murdering a certain Captain Mansell. Legg, Prior, 293 Hooke, Correspondence. For his career, see Pope, “Mucking about in ­Germany”; Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke”; and Byrne, “Hooke and Saxony,” 409–28. For the instructions for his 1711 mission to Saxon King Augustus II of Poland, see France, Recueil, 4:266. Hooke, Correspondence, 1:42, Hooke to Pecquet, 4 Jan. 1704. Ibid., 162, Hooke to Adam, 15 Mar. 1704, is an even shorter note asking him personally to give Torcy the accompanying letter. Ibid., Pecquet to Hooke, 8 Jan. 1704 (the printed edition says “1764,” which is clearly a misprint). Ibid., 186, Pecquet to Hooke, 28 May 1705. Ibid., 187, Pecquet to Hooke, 28 May 1705. Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke,” 306–11; and Pope, Callières, 167–76, on the 1705 Scottish mission. Hooke, Correspondence, 1:214 (Chevreuse to Hooke, 19 June 1705); and ibid., 215 (Hooke to Chevreuse, 19 June 1705). Ibid., 231–2 (Adam to Hooke and Hooke to Adam, both 4 July 1705). Ibid., 233–4 (Pecquet to Hooke, 4 July 1705). Ibid., 232–3 (Pecquet to Adam, 4 July 1705). Pecquet’s earlier letter to Hooke had indicated that it was he who had retained Hooke’s lackey despite his



85 86 87

88 89 90 91

92 93

94

95

96

Notes to pages 155–7

549

orders to return at eleven (ibid., 234). Ibid., 231 (Adam to Hooke, 4 July 1705), indicated that the admiralty as well as the war office had made difficulties with the passports. Ibid., 234 (Hooke to Pecquet, 4 July 1705). Ibid., 234–5 (Adam to Hooke, 5 July 1705). Ibid., 2383–9 (Hooke to Torcy, to Adam, and to Le Fevre, all 10 July 1705). Le Fevre wrote Hooke from Antwerp (12 and 13 July 1705) of his efforts to see what had caused the delay, which included writing to the postmaster at Dunkirk (ibid., 244–5). Ibid., 244 (Hooke to Torcy, 12 July 1705). Ibid., 459–60 (Pecquet to Hooke, 28 Nov. 1705). Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 18. Austrian ambassador Sinzendorf addressed a letter to Torcy from Paris, 25 August 1699, explaining that he was writing to ask a question, since he had not seen him recently. Sinzendorf related that he had been told at Torcy’s Paris residence that the minister, who was at Marly, where the diplomatic corps was not permitted, would return home only in eight days. aae cp Autriche 70, fols 179–80. Dangeau, Journal, 10:360–1. If both premiers commis were at Versailles, it seems unlikely that they would have needed to write one another. Hooke, Correspondence, 2:169 (Adam to Hooke, 11 Mar. 1707), informed him that he had codes for him at his estate of Glatigny on the northern outskirts of the city of Versailles. Since he would not be at the palace, where Hooke was staying, until the next day, Adam sent his note by carriage so that the colonel could avail himself of it should he come to Glatigny. Ibid., 2: 423–24 (Hooke to Moray, 1 July 1707), instructed a colleague whose horses had been seized at Meaux to seek help from Torcy and ­Pontchartrain. Hooke, at Versailles, sent messages to both secretaries of state but found that they were out of town. He assured Captain John Moray (or Murray), who was in Paris, that he would approach Pontchartrain when he returned but urged him to go see Torcy personally in the rue Vivienne as soon as he received his note. Two days later Moray wrote Hooke that his note reached him only on 2 July and that when he rushed to Torcy’s residence he discovered that he had left for Versailles on the previous night. Hooke replied on the 4th that he had seen Torcy at Versailles on Saturday the 2nd and was promised the needed letter, which was written – presumably by a commis – that night, but given that Torcy “being very busy,” it was not signed until the evening of the 4th even though Hooke sent for it often (ibid., 2: 426). aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 104r–v, Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil. The only date Adam supplied was “a jeudy matin,” but the reference to the Sunday audience allows us to date the letter 21 Feb. 1697. Dangeau, Journal, 6:77. Piccioni, Commis, 108.

550

Notes to pages 158–60

97 As with the aide-mémoire or agenda (for the Conseil?) Torcy wrote on the back of a letter relating to Sweden in late August 1715. aae cp Suède 133, fol. 51v. Torcy also used the back of a letter of Christmas greetings he had received. Torcy, Journal, 104–5. 98 For examples of letters with disparate notes on them, see aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 74v, 25 Dec. 1698, letter from Cardinal Guillaume-Egon von ­Fürstenberg; ibid., Brunswick-Hanovre 42, fol. 14v, 1 Mar. 1701 (which one must turn upside down to read Torcy’s notes); ibid., Denmark 65, fol. 114, 31 Oct. 1702; ibid., md 1119 (although numbered inside as 1118), fol. 50, 6 Feb. 1704, letter from Chamillart; ibid., fols 221v and 362v, 1704 letters from Jérôme Pontchartrain. 99 Soll, “From Note-Taking,” 355–75, reflects on this whole process. Adam’s 4 July note to Hooke also enclosed Pecquet’s notes for Adam and for Hooke, but apparently Pecquet or Adam chose not to include the note Pecquet received from La Touche in the navy department. aae md 1102, fol. 190 (1702), is a letter with a note from Torcy scrawled across its top instructing a commis to see if he had responded to a letter. Ibid., 1197, fol. 337v (1714) appears to be some notes about an edict concerning notary acts and the date it was sent in the department. A note at the bottom asks commis AntoineFrançois Faucard de Beauchamp not to shred or tear it up when he finished with it; this apparently would have been its fate otherwise had it not been deemed worth retaining. Torcy, Journal, 42, in recording the king’s request that he retrieve some documents for him, remarked that his request was written on a slip or scrap of paper. It is unlikely that he saved this or other such notes. 100 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fols 104v, 107, 110v. 101 Vivo, Information, 12n63. 102 Ibid., 12–16. 103 Favier, Archives, 36, 53, notes that as archives seek to preserve papers, they must nonetheless destroy the portion of them deemed of no or less value to avoid overwhelming mountains of paper. Even if the archives retained every scrap of paper produced around an event, Vismann, Files, 8–11, reminds us of the problems with the Rankean assumption and hope that records can yield a full picture of the past. 104 Vaillé, Postes, 5:372–8, on Louis-Léon Pajot’s lease of the postal system in the Spanish Netherlands from 1701. The Antwerp postmaster was French. 105 Peters, Politics of Bureaucracy, 89, emphasizes that “public administrators, even those at relatively low levels in the organizational hierarchy, are decision makers.” 106 Hooke, Correspondence, 1:460 (Pecquet to Hooke, 28 Nov. 1705). 107 Ibid., 238–9 (Hooke to Torcy and to Adam, 10 July 1705). 108 Ibid., 2:168–9 (Adam to Hooke, 11 and 14 Mar. 1707).



Notes to pages 160–1

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109 The naval intendant at Dunkirk, Henry-Jules Du Guay, proved cooperative in this and other matters, allowing Hooke to place a mark on the passports he had so he could use them at Dunkirk as if it were the authorized port. Ibid., 242 (Hooke to Perth, 12 July 1705). 110 Racevskis, Time, 25–44. See Landes, Revolution in Time, 87–8, 98–103, on miniaturization. 111 Racevskis, Time, 13. 112 Ibid., 54–6, 68–70. 113 When the Académie politique was established, a pendulum clock costing 250 livres was purchased for the “Cabinet du Louvre.” aae md 1192, fol. 423 (1713). 114 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 165, note that while the departments of all the secretaries marched to the rhythm of Dispatches, the foreign office also marched to that of the Conseil and the department of the controller general to that of the Council of Finances. 115 aae md 1206, fols 214–15. 116 Rule, “King in His Council,” 219–23. 117 Boislisle, Conseils, 90–108. Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 310, argues for “several stages of development” during the reign as opposed to the traditional notion of “a steady decline in power and influence.” 118 When long encoded letters arrived during a session, the king ordered his ministers to reassemble that evening in Maintenon’s chambers so as to give the foreign office clerks time to decode them. Torcy, Journal, 152. 119 Ibid., 291, 380. 120 Feyel, Annonce, 475. 121 Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 20, 21–3. 122 Banks, Chasing Empire, 45. 123 Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” studies France’s northern diplomatic networks at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Ellis, “British Communication and Diplomacy,” 160–3, is a useful comparison for the whole century. See also Black, Diplomacy, 49–50, 95–8. 124 Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 661, shows that a letter could reach Constantinople from Marseilles in a little over a month in 1707, whereas in a 4 December 1707 letter to his brother in Paris, Amabassador Ferriol indicated that only three days earlier he had finally received by way of Venice his letters dated 20 April and 20 July (ibid., 705). 125 See Bély, Art de la paix, 438, 453–6, on information and relative isolation both at court and at postings abroad. 126 aae cp Venise 148, fol. 231, Pomponne to Torcy, 19 Nov. 1706, related that all the September and October mail to Venice had come via Genoa. bl am 15284, fol. 320, Torcy to Pomponne, 22 Nov. 1706, concerned the further precaution of reducing the paper size of Paris dispatches to make them easier

552

127 128

129

130

131

132 133 134

135 136 137 138

Notes to pages 162–3 to hide. Torcy to Pomponne, 4 Dec. 1706, announced that they would also be sent in triplicate (ibid., fol. 325). aae md 1175, fols 207–37 (1703). From 1707 Torcy made postal routes and schedules public in the semi-­ official, annual Almanach Royal and in the separate, periodically revised Liste Generale des Postes de France. Its title page notes that Torcy had it drawn up for the king’s service and the public’s convenience. Fordham, Routes de France, 11–15, 20, 54–5, and plates I and II. Le Quien de La ­Neufville, Origine des postes, 74, notes that Torcy had an exact map drawn up of all the postal routes of the kingdom, also for official and public use. État de la France (1706), 117–32, gives the following schedule for the departure of postal couriers from Paris: for the United Provinces, Mondays and Fridays at 8 a.m.; for southern Germany and Austria, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays at noon; for Spain and Portugal, Sundays at midnight; for Rome and other Italian cities, Monday evenings; for Soleure in the Swiss Cantons, Mondays at noon; and for the British Isles, Wednesdays and Saturdays at 8 a.m. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 583 (Ferriol to Louis XIV, 4 Apr. 1700), reported from Constantinople that the precipitous departure of the Imperial ambassador’s courier prevented him from writing as long a letter as he desired. He wrote Pontchartrain (28 Apr. 1700) that as no French boat had departed Constantinople for France during February, he had been unable to send him news earlier (ibid., 586). État de la France (1706), 132, says that postal couriers going to the court, whether in Versailles, Marly, Saint Germain-en-Laye, or Fontainebleau, left Paris daily at 8 p.m. Service from Paris to ministerial country residences was as follows: to Torcy, every evening at 6 p.m.; to Pontchartrain, Wednesdays and Saturdays, at 8 p.m.; to Beauvillier, daily at noon; and to Villacerf, daily at noon (ibid., 118, 124, 130). Racevskis, Time, 91. Arblaster, “Posts, Newsletters, Newspapers,” 29, on the unreliability of sea links. Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 292, with a map (ibid., 299) showing the diffusion of news of the 1709 Russian victory over Sweden at Poltava. Grimblot, Letters, 2:18–19 (Portland to William III, 4 June 1698). Ibid., 109 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 16 Aug. 1698), remarked that five to six days was the normal time for a courier to travel from Loo to Versailles and back. Duindam, Courts, 140–7, on the Habsburg schedule. Torcy, Journal, 222, recorded that when a dispatch from Huxelles at ­Gertruydenberg arrived during a morning meeting, it was deciphered for Torcy to share before the Conseil adjourned.



Notes to pages 163–6

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39 Ibid., 209, 215. 1 140 aae md 1118, fol. 146, 9 Sept. 1703, is a note from Torcy to his clerk Charles-François Noblet instructing him to burn a letter he had sent earlier for the Duke of Burgundy, since it was now outdated by later news. 141 Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 309–10, discusses how space affects the “horizon d’efficacité” (horizon of effectiveness) for any state’s diplomacy. 142 Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 128–36, describes the dilemma of France’s ambassador to Sweden Besenval upon receiving orders from Torcy in 1707 that he take a bold approach to the Austrian ambassador about the possibility of peace talks. Subsequent to sending Torcy the letter that had prompted this order in light of what had then seemed a reasonable risk, Besenval had new information that now made such an initiative dangerous to any hopes of a Swedish alliance. At pains not to appear insubordinate, he was eventually congratulated by Torcy and the king on his prudence and initiative. Ambassador Isaac de Feuquières grumbled to Secretary of State Pomponne from Sweden in 1673 that he recognized the danger of being as far away as he was, with only himself for counsel. Given that it could be six or seven weeks before he received a response to his letters home, he could easily make major blunders, especially when diplomatic decisions in Sweden were pressing. Mathis, “Ambassadeur du Roi Soleil,” 33. 143 Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 47–8. 144 aae cp Lorraine 73, fols 208–9, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 10 Mar. 1710. 145 Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 52. 146 Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 48. When Charles made an exception for diplomats while campaigning in Saxony in 1707, this required Besenval and his Versailles contacts to improvise a whole new communication system. 147 This list suggests that each political bureau kept its own ongoing or summary list of dispatches expedited. 148 Iberville, Correspondance, 1:xin4. 149 Mathis, “Pomponne,” bases this analysis on Pomponne’s ministry. A dispatch was a letter concerning public business. daf, s.v. “Depesche.” 150 Barbiche, “Diplomatics,” 426, notes that “the form of the documents provides invaluable evidence regarding the decision processes and activities of an administrative body.” He also notes that “diplomatics for the modern era is still a young field” owing to the historic focus on pre-modern documents and the explosion of sealed documents from the fifteenth century with the decentralization of the royal chancery to provincial “lesser chanceries” and increased sealing in the bureaus of the secretaries of state (ibid., 423). 151 For 1711, for example, see aae md 1177 through 1180. Archives hg, 1: 118, notes that these volumes contain only outgoing items. 152 Vismann, Files, 6.

554

Notes to pages 166–8

153 aae md 307, fols 39–47, for example, is a short list covering 16 September 1705 until the end of that year, whereas ibid., 309, fols 60–70, is a list for all of 1711. 154 For example, ibid., 309, fols 111ff (1711). 155 Dangeau, Journal, 10:504 (1705), mentions this practice. For examples, see aae md 1168, fols 109–30, 169–77v. They are listed as covering 17 March– 28 April and 28 April–19 May 1710, to coincide with meetings of Dispatches on those three days (Dangeau, Journal, 13:126, 148, 161). Each list begins on the initial date of its period of inclusion but ends (24 April and 14 May) some days before the closing date. According to aae md 1044 (1697), Mignon signed the council decrees (“arrest du cons”). bn mf 8833, fol. 143v (1689), has Mignon’s signature at the end of the list of arrêts. Mignon and later Adam signed because they were secretaries of the king, whereas Pecquet was not until the Regency. 156 Boislisle, Conseils, 105. 157 For example, aae md 1168 (1710), contains those countersigned by ­Pontchartrain, Voysin, La Vrillière, and Torcy arranged in chronological order. These separate volumes, which first appeared beginning in late March 1667 (ibid., 922), constitute an unbroken series until the end of the reign and stand out because their coverage typically begins with a year but ends on a specific date early the following year, which appears to be the date of the first meeting of Dispatches for the new year. These volumes are normally in excess of 500 folios. Examples are ibid., 1168 (1710–27 Jan. 1711); and ibid., 1176 (1711–9 Feb. 1712), as confirmed by meeting dates recorded in Dangeau, Journal, 13:329, 14:82. The correlation cannot be confirmed for many of the volumes, since Dangeau does not always note Dispatches meetings. 158 aae md 1083, 1108, 1115, 1119, 1131, covering the years 1701–05, were each entitled “Letters of the Secretaries of State to M. de Torcy.” The number of folios in each was as follows, in order: 235, 569, 217, 377, and 209. This experimental series was not continued and ministerial correspondence was again mixed in with other letters received, perhaps because it had not been really possible to keep it completely separate. Samoyault, Bureaux, 65n11, relates that the letters exchanged between Torcy and his fellow secretaries of state were drafted by his premier commis. 159 aae md 950, covering the period 1679–1701, contains formulas for the department’s typical expéditions. 160 Vismann, Files, 103. 161 aae md 1181, fol. 141 (1711). Ibid., 1044, fols 214–29 (1697), is a “Formulaire pour le Cabinet du Roy 1663 (avec des notes qui finis en 1696),” while ibid., fols 230ff, has “Observations” by Rose. Ibid., 309, fols 258–66v, is a complete “Protocole pour les lettres du Roy seulement 1712” dated 31 Dec. 1712; and ibid., 310, fols 161–3, is a heavily corrected draft ­“Formulaire



162

163

164 165

166 167

168

Notes to pages 168–9

555

du cabinet du Roy pour les lettres de la main de sa Mte,” 31 Dec. 1714, that was eventually sent to the marquis de Saint-Thomas, minister of Victor-­ Amadeus, king of Sardinia, presumably to instruct him in such matters for the new monarch. aae cp Russie 3, fols 27–32, Iberville to Torcy, 22 Nov. 1703, includes details of Russian court epistolary ceremonial. For salutations, closings, and the “hierarchy of material, space and graphics,” see Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 33–88. See also Archives hg, 2:27–8, 30–1. aae md 1149, fols 37–9, 10 Jan. 1707. Ibid., 1169, fols 207–10, 20 Feb. 1710, is the same for the birth of the duc d’Anjou, but using “fresh” model letters. Ibid., 1081, fols 301–2v (1700), is a model relating to Sedan, complete with explanatory notes in the left-hand column. aae md 1057, fol. 29, 7 Jan. 1699, is a model letter from the king to the archbishops and bishops of Champagne, listing the five sees in the left-hand margin. It is preceded (ibid., fols 16–28v) by the king’s memoir for all provincial intendants and has a notation on its first page instructing the commis to send it to the intendants and bishops along with the king’s letter of 7 Jan. 1699. Ibid., 1064, fol. 3, is another such memoir dated 31 Jan. 1699. A notation at the top indicates that an original has been sent to the intendants and a copy to each bishop. Esmonin, Études, 179–80. aae md 1201, fol. 253r–v (1714), requests 500 blank passports, 1,000 payment authorizations, 125 treaties of peace and commerce, and 200 “Constitutions du Pape” (Unigenitus), all at a cost of 1,509 livres. Adam’s monopoly for printing treaties thus included other departmental printing. Although Archives hg, 2:27, says that there were no printed headers on department stationary before the Revolution, the question of preprinted forms clearly deserves further research. Denis, Histoire identité, 19–31, 69, dates the model for the printed passport to 1716 and the war department’s form for granting leave to soldiers. Utilizing front and back, the latter was compact and printed on a material sturdier than ordinary paper to facilitate and withstand frequent handling by officials. While it is not surprising that we have not uncovered any of the foreign office’s printed passports, they clearly predated the army’s forms by two years and were likely similar. aae cp Venise 149, fol. 242. The secretary also appears to have numbered these as issued (this one is “num.o Trente six,” or number thirty-six). aae md 1206, fol. 182r. This form, although not filled out, had already been signed by Torcy and his postal secretary Claude de Prailly, probably to expedite their issuance by the court postal clerks. It uses what appears to be a carved cursive typeface below the Colbert arms (a serpent). Ibid., 1186, fol. 277 (12 May 1712). The total cost was 147 livres 15 sou. Archives hg, 2:26–7, addresses paper only briefly.

556

Notes to pages 169–73

169 aae md 1192, fol. 423 (Dec. 1713), for 250 livres for a clock; and ibid., fol. 423v, concerning furniture. 170 Barber, Diplomacy, 444–5. 171 Baschet, Dépôt, 63. 172 Marchand, Maître de poste, 288. 173 Baschet, Dépôt, 79, mentions an order for a large sheet of vellum to be glued to a piece of wood and upon which was written an abbreviated table listing all the bound volumes of negotiations.

Chapter Five 1 Devos, Inventaire Guerre, 2n5, prefers the term “département” to the anachronistic terms “ministère” and “secrétariat,” because, in its earliest sense, it embraces the attributions of the secretary of state as well as, later, the administrative organs under his direction charged with these attributions. 2 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100. The absence of a bright line between household and departmental personnel is demonstrated in Furetière, Dictionnaire, 3: s.v. “Secrétaire,” which includes one marking them as domestics of great lords or men of the robe. 3 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:979–8, on the third bureau added after Torcy. Devos et al., Inventaire Guerre, 4–5, contrasts the war department’s more flexible structure with the controllor general’s more hierarchical one. Like the foreign office, the war department’s central bureaucracy responded to war and peace with fluctuations in numbers and organization. 4 daf, s.v. “Commis.” Nicot, Thresor de la langue francoyse, notes that the term had expanded beyond its original connection with secret matters. 5 Vismann, Files, 60, based on Jack Goody. 6 Samoyault, Bureaux, 36, says that Le Dran’s notes specify that there were two or three premiers commis at any one time during Louis XIV’s reign and nine simple commis in 1715. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:124, say there were a total of fourteen commis and secretaries in 1727, thirty-seven commis and a few secretaries in 1766, and thirty-eight commis in 1774. These figures are approximate and those for earlier periods are even more so. Devos, Inventaire Guerre, 4n13, notes that even in the highly structured department of the controllor general, determining the number of commis serving under a premier commis is difficult. 7 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 323, offer an estimate of foreign ministry personnel (excluding diplomatic personnel abroad): seventy-one recorded between 1661 and 1715, approximately fifteen in service c. 1691, and approximately twenty c. 1715. They define a department’s “effectifs” (numbers) in a restrictive sense as those employed by the central administration in Versailles or



8

9

10

11 12 13 14 15

Notes to pages 173–5

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Paris, but unfortunately do not specify which positions and individuals they classified among them. Other than saying generally that they utilized ministry and notary archives, they do not list the sources for their estimates, which exceed those we have established. Although their greater numbers may well be correct, it is not possible to verify them. Given the uncertainties about the years of service of Torcy’s commis, Bénigne Brameret, Martin, and Delisle de La Drevetière, the numbers during his tenure are likely understated (see chapter 6 below for these three individuals). In 1588 each secretary of state was to be assisted by a commis and six clerks of his choosing but approved by the monarch. Two of these clerks specialized in summarizing all incoming dispatches for the king and copying all incoming and outgoing correspondence. A commis was paid by the piece of paper produced. In 1599, apparently, clerks became commis, while the original commis was elevated to principal commis, drafting letters and acting as a bureau chief. By the mid-seventeenth century pay per piece gave way to regular salaries as the number of premiers commis increased, varying from two to three. Outrey, “Administration,” 309–12. In 1694 a premier commis was defined as “le premier Commis d’un Secrétaire d’Estat” (head clerk of a secretary of state) who has “plusieurs Commis sous luy” (many clerks under him). Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “premier commis”; and Furetière, ­Dictionnaire, 2d ed., 1: s.v. “premier commis.” Furetière, Dictionnaire, 3: s.v. “Secretaire,” makes a distinction between the high-status officer who by order of his master “expédie” (sends out) ­various documents, rendering them authentic by his signature (e.g., secretaries of state) and the humbler domestics of great lords or men of the robe who serve them by writing their dispatches, conducting their affairs, making extracts of materials upon which they must report, and offering useful information to help them get at the facts of a case. These latter, he notes, were called the “clercs” (clerks) of various judicial officials. Piccioni, Commis, 158, also points to the domestic nature of commis and especially secretaries as men of the household. While all secretaries were commis, not all commis were secretaries. Samoyault, Bureaux, 192, calls the secretaries an intermediate category between the premier commis and the commis. See also Antoine, “Entourage,” 15. Again, caveats about the years of service of Aubert and Marolot make these numbers tentative (see chapter 6 below). Piccioni, Commis, 48. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 63. Parker, Class and State, 178. For pencil marks by Torcy or a commis on a long letter indicating the important parts, see aae cp Rome 540, fols 8v–15r, La Trémoille to Louis XIV, 13 Nov. 1714.

558

Notes to pages 175–7

16 As when Petkum came to Versailles in 1706 for secret peace talks. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 318. 17 Ash, “Expertise,” 3, 5–6. 18 Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81 (for the quotation), 85, 88. 19 The same had been the case in Venice. Vivo, Information, 50–1. 20 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 108. The note, dated “at Versailles Saturday evening,” does not name the addressee, but it was clearly Harlay-Bonneuil. Mignon mentioned having missed the recipient at the Chancellery (ibid., fol. 107), then the residence of Chancellor Louis Boucherat whose daughter was married to Harlay de Bonneuil. Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:586. Tornézy, Bergeret et Fragonard, 2, notes that Mignon’s late colleague ­Bergeret was Boucherat’s kinsman, which may explain Mignon’s inclusion in this circle. 21 The lists in the secondary sources do not always match. Picavet, “Commis,” 116–18; Piccioni, Commis, 163–83; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 159, 217, 301, all attest to Adam, Pecquet, and Mignon. Piccioni, Commis, 162–3, 270, adds Aubert, while Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100, list all four. ­Piccioni, Commis, 190, says that Fournier only attained that rank in 1715, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, suggests that it was in 1698 (Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100, do not list him either before or after 1715). Picavet, “Commis,” 116, includes Noblet, but Piccioni says he was only a commis and Baschet, Samoyault, and Baillou ignore him altogether. See chapter 6 for Noblet and Marolot. 22 Pénicaut, “Commis,” 83–5, notes the same arrangement in the war department. However, Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221n7, is correct to point out that between Pecquet and Fournier, each the head of a political bureau, the relationship was not hierarchical. 23 Baschet, Dépôt, 275, calls Blondel a premier commis, as did d’Argenson, head of the Paris police, writing to Chamillart (1 Dec. 1703), in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:133. He is called this as well as Torcy’s secretary in bn po 371, fol. 33, Dec. 1711. As for Ligny, he is labeled Torcy’s premier commis by Danish ambassador Henning Meyer, comte de Meyercroon, writing to d’Argenson (16 Dec. 1703), in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:64. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 175n4, 350; and Baschet, Dépôt, 523, also give Ligny both labels, but Piccioni, Commis, 157–8, says Ligny was a simple commis and Pomponne’s secretary, while Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30, 290 (where he calls him “Goullet”), says only that he was Torcy’s premier secrétaire. 24 aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 114, Louis XIV to plenipotentiaries, 20 Mar. 1712, is an instance of the king adding a note in his own hand. On Louvois’s preference for dictation, see Sarmant and Stoll, “Style de Louvois,” 60. 25 For example, Torcy wrote Gualterio, 20 September 1709, to express his and Mme de Torcy’s regrets at a death in the cardinal’s family. bl am 20319, fol.



26

27

28 29 30

31

32

33

34

Notes to pages 177–8

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31r–v. For letters in Torcy’s hand to Gualterio during 1702, see ibid., 20318, fols 36–207. Léonard de Mousseau Du Fresne served until 1663 and assured Pomponne in a 1671 memoir on department organization that attending council meetings, reading dispatches, and spending at least five hours each day in just the ordinary audiences would leave him little time to draft dispatches and instructions. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378. Examples in letters to Abbé Pomponne are bl am 15285, fol. 164, 16 Aug. 1708, on Mme de Pomponne’s health; and ibid., fol. 300, 12 Apr. 1709, expressing hope that the frank and open advice Pomponne wrote to Ferriol in Constantinople would not fall into enemy hands. Piccioni, Commis, 28–9, 188–9; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:92–6. Barbiche, Institutions, 182. Ibid., 85–7. According to Luçay, Origines, 152–3, four venal offices of commis of the secretaries of state were created in 1694, but soon suppressed. Although Luçay does not say so, they were probably created as fiscal expedients. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:132, note that there were seven in 1788. The number under Croissy and Torcy is unknown. daf, s.v. “Garçon,” indicates that the term was also used for a valet. Thus, an office boy was not necessarily a youth since daf, s.v. “Valet,” defines him as a domestic who serves in “bas employs” (low jobs). Controller General Claude Le Peletier also had his commis at his table to hear their concerns. Mazel, Le Peletier, 121. Samoyault, Bureaux, 231, says that most clerks rented modest rooms or houses in Versailles but when on duty would often sleep at the bureau when distant from their own residences. Antoine, “Entourage,” 18–20, points to the growing gap between ministers and their staffs as the former allied with the great court nobility and premier commis could no longer aspire to ministerial status as they had earlier in the century. Ministers were increasingly dynastic, while outsiders who became ministers after the Fronde were drawn largely from the ranks of the provincial intendants. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 475–8. There is little written on his household, but see Piccioni, Commis, 46–7; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:133–5. Bély, Espions, 642, mentions du Pré, a “laquais” (young valet in livery), Petit, Mme de Torcy’s valet de chambre, and Lestre, one of Torcy’s coachmen. Duhard, Torcy’s cook, had a reputation for fine cuisine that attracted many at court to the minister’s table and even drew a student from Lille to study with him (ibid., 651). ss-Boislisle, 17:347, notes the fame of Torcy’s table. Courier runs to Rome and Spain in 1714 by du Pré and Petit are recorded in aae md 1201, fols 275v, 276v, 290, and 300.

560

Notes to pages 178–9

35 Gutton, Domestiques, 17–67, on households. The wife and children of great personages required additional personnel or their own households. A Mme Belin was governess of Torcy’s oldest son, Jean-Baptiste, born 25 January 1703. She was a relative of Jacques Belin, curé of Blainville, who had begun his career as tutor to Torcy and his brother. Galland, Journal, 1:381, 381n552. He served as tutor only to 1680. Allix, “Protégé de Colbert,” 8. 36 Abbé Louis Bossuet in Rome indicates that Torcy’s valets de chambre served as couriers between Paris and Rome. For examples, see Bossuet, Correspondance, 10:118, 146, 160–1; and ibid., 14:333. aae md 1192, fol. 432v, is a 3 February 1713 authorization for payment to du Pré for carrying dispatches to Rome; and ibid., fol. 442v, 10 June 1713, is to Petit for riding to Madrid. 37 Blet, Nonces, 242, relates that Torcy sent his écuyer to Nuncio Cusani with a reply to his request for a royal audience. Dangeau, Journal, 4:239 (22 Feb. 1693), reports that Croissy’s écuyer delivered royal parting gifts to the visiting Prince of Denmark. bn mf 6679, fol. 260r–v (1698), records Torcy’s écuyer explaining a matter of protocol to the complaining Dutch ambassador. Ibid., fol. 326 (1700), reveals Charles Emmanuel des Balbis, comte de Vernon, Savoy’s ambassador, taking advantage of Torcy’s absence to place his carriage ahead of the minister’s, occupied by his écuyer as his representative. 38 For Maugin, see bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 125; for Presle, see ibid., fol. 96; Chaix d’Est-Ange, Dictionnaire des familles, 7:296; and letters in Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 3:201, 203–4, 299. Bély, ­Espions, 651, mentions that a certain Bonnet may also have served Torcy as écuyer. 39 For Torcy hunting, see Duindam, Courts, 148n66; and Haile, Mary of ­Modena, 433. Torcy, Journal, 441, reports hunting with the king at Marly. 40 Vailleé, Postes, 5:231, 231n5. aae md 1192, fols 19–21, 7 July 1713, is a request for reimbursement from de la Tournelle and a detailed list of the cloth, buttons, and other materials he purchased for the tailor, who made four uniforms. See ibid., fols 429 and 437v, for examples of monthly payment orders for lodging for Maugin de la Tournelle and his four mounted postal guards in Paris. Ibid., 1201, fols 269–302 passim, 1714’s annual accounts, show an average of 608 livres authorized the first of every month for their food and lodging expenses of the previous month. 41 aae md 1192, fols. 269–302, accounts for 1714, for example, show that he was issued twenty-three travel reimbursements that year, each typically for multiple trips. The royal household’s couriers du cabinet (discussed below) also carried department dispatches. 42 Ibid., 310, fol. 364v. 43 Picavet, Diplomatie, 40. According to Piccioni, Commis, 20, it was only in 1714 that two bureaus with clearly distinct functions were created. In 1970 Roth, “Torcy,” 192, said the same. Interestingly, in 1926 Picavet, “Commis,”



44

45 46

47

48

49

50

51

Notes to pages 179–80

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117–19, speculated that there must have been a “bureau du chiffre” (code bureau) and an “office de traduction” (translation office). Samoyault, Bureaux, 35–6. Apparently returning to Piccioni’s thesis, Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, claim (without indicating when) that Torcy first divided the department into two bureaus. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 311–25, 354–5, offer a perceptive discussion of this evolution. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 375, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Dec. 1693; ibid., fol. 350v, Bonrepaus to Adam, 15 Dec. 1693; bn mf 8863, fol. 141, Adam to Lebret, 10 Feb. 1698; and aae md 310, fol. 293, listing a payment in 1715 for the three commis of Pecquet’s “bureau.” As in 1713 for the “commis de” (clerks of) Fournier and of Pecquet, and in 1715 for those of Pecquet, of Fournier, and of Adam. aae md 1192, fol. 419r–v (2 Jan. 1713); and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10 (1715). The term chef de bureau, while not a contemporary one, is suggested by Pénicaut, “Commis,” 83. Outrey, “Administration,” 312, says that each political bureau typically included three to six commis in addition to its chief. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, faults Piccioni for claiming that there were four political bureaus from 1715 to 1723 because he counted four premiers commis during that period. Samoyault says that Piccioni misinterpreted the classic description of Torcy’s bureau, penned in 1751 by Le Dran and now in aae, Organisation et Règlement du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ­1547–1801, vol. 1, fols 47–8. Samoyault, Bureaux, 32n2, says that Le Dran’s count of premier commis was four rather than the actual three because he confounded Mignon and his nephew Fournier. Although Piccioni, Commis, 193, does repeat Le Dran’s miscount, he actually rejects the notion of a fourth bureau and labels Fournier as “hors cadres” (outside the normal hierarchy), without any discernible specific function. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 312. Antoine Pecquet fils, son of Torcy’s premier commis and later himself to hold that position (1723–37), penned Pensées diverses sur l’homme (1738), in which he observed that “[a] premier commis des affaires étrangères held the highest position in the Secretariat of State and was outranked only by the Secretary of State himself.” Quoted in Pecquet, Discourse Art of Negotiation, 89. daf , s.v. “Bureau.” For examples of this extension of meaning, see Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:489–90, Adam to Saint-Mars, 17 Jan. 1706, explaining that a letter he wanted could be found in the bureaus; and aae cp Venise 147, fol. 187, Abbé Pomponne to Torcy, 26 June 1706, concerning letters feared lost in the late Noblet’s bureau. Académie Française, Nouveau dictionnaire, 1:194, listed the clerks who worked in the offices of the secretaries of state as an example of a bureau also meaning the people who worked in it.

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52 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100. 53 Even as it grew during the eighteenth century, the foreign office remained a relatively small group of men and in daily interaction with the secretary and with one another. Masson, Département des affaires étrangères, 11. ­Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 323, provide the following approximate estimates of the growth in numbers of commis in the following ministerial departments from 1691 to 1715: finances, from 80 to 100–20; war, from 40 to 50–60; household and navy, from 25 to 50; foreign affairs, from 15 to 29; and rpr, remaining unchanged with 10. Outrey, “Administration,” 318, observes that the old regime appears to have attached less importance to the form of institutions than it did to the choice of the men and their abilities who occupied them. 54 Canbäck et al., “Diseconomies of Scale” 33–4. This research is suggestive but does not consider early modern bureaucracy either theoretically or empirically. 55 For example, Piccioni, Commis, 35–6, describes the duties of the premier commis who headed the code service as creating, distributing, and maintaining tables of codes. With two assistants for these tasks this could hardly have fully occupied him or them. Yet because the premier commis Moncheny received a foreign envoy and assisted the minister in collating a treaty, ­Piccioni sees this as evidence of premiers commis having attributions that were “ne sont guères fixes” (hardly fixed) until Torcy. His first example, however, rests on a misreading of Vendegies, “Biographie Vuoerden,” 543, a journal entry from 22 February 1661 where Michel-Ange, baron de ­Vuorden recorded that when he went to Lionne’s to inquire about his health, Moncheny, whom Vuorden calls Lionne’s secretary, replied that Lionne was too ill to receive him. Before departing, Vuorden commented that this delayed their work together on a matter entrusted to him. Yet at this point, prior to Mazarin’s death on 3 March 1661, Lionne was not the secretary of state and neither was Moncheny his premier commis. 56 Mathis, “Pomponne,” shows that premiers commis frequently decoded dispatches and that many commis might communicate with the same envoy abroad. His conclusion that this indicates that there were not yet specialized bureaus within the department, however, is debatable. He also concludes from his statistical study of the department’s document output that it was not yet the work of an organized and modern administration because nearly half of the documents sent out were highly personalized, being drafted or dictated by Pomponne himself. Again, this hardly disqualifies the department from consideration as organized or modern given its small (compared with later in the reign) size and volume of work. Pomponne’s preference for personally creating most first drafts is understandable, since he was the one answerable to the king. His predecessor Lionne, who regarded his charge as quite



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Notes to pages 181–2

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l­aborious, nonetheless personally drafted all of the king’s foreign dispatches rather than delegating them to his commis, he said, out of a desire to perform his duty. Although he noted that the crush of correspondence with the provinces demanded his constant attention, he did not claim to generate those drafts. Luçay, Origines, 58–9. Picavet, “Commis,” 119, notes that bureaucratic roles varied depending on the secretary and that Lionne allowed his clerks less initiative than did Pomponne. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 324, observe that the relatively small size of the central administration implies radically different social relationships from those that prevail in large, anonymous administrations. It was a bureaucratic chain of command of only a few links. Organizational fluidity and intramural interaction remained common, they insist, because the first specialized bureaus had yet to establish themselves as watertight compartments or bureaucratic strongholds. The king might know most of his domestics by sight, but his department heads (except for the controller general) knew those who served in their bureaus better, even if those at the lowest level they knew only by sight. Samoyault, Bureaux, 216–17, notes that neither the presence of the minister nor that of his four premiers commis at the 1713 wedding of Jean-Nicolas de Bernage, a simple commis, was repeated thereafter, observing that in Torcy’s time relations between upper and lower ranks, while respectful, were quite amicable. aae md 1208, fol. 57, Clairambault to Torcy, 25 May 1715, referred to the archives as Torcy’s Louvre bureau. Samoyault, Bureaux, 155, mentions such a bureau in the foreign office only as early as 1723, after the demise (1718) of the Regency’s fleeting consolidation of domestic administration. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:95, imply that evidence for the first separate domestic bureau comes only in 1727. Antoine, “Entourage,” 20, notes the emergence of this layer of intimate ministerial collaborators who could then link him with the increasingly specialized and numerous bureaus. He cites Torcy’s two secretaries as examples. Samoyault, Bureaux, 33–4, makes the same observation for Louis XV’s era. Blondel apparently coordinated ciphers, according to Bonrepaus’s letters from Copenhagen to Blondel in aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 375 (1 Dec. 1693); fols 416–17 (2 Mar. 1694); fol. 419 (9 Mar. 1694); and ibid., 57, fol. 26r (18 Jan. 1697). Blondel is called Croissy’s secretary in aae md 1004, fol. 264 (20 July 1690); ibid., 1017, fol. 169 (1692); and ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 354 (1693). He is called Torcy’s commis in aae md 1019, fol. 235 (1693). Piccioni, Commis, 28–9, 188–9, says that Torcy originated the secretariat as a separate service and had only two secretaries during his tenure: first secretary Blondel and a second he never identifies. Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30,

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65

66

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Notes to page 182 claims that at the end of the reign Torcy had only two secretaries: Ligny, the first secretary, and de la Porte du Theil, the second. Samoyault says little of Blondel, identifying him (ibid., 159) as Torcy’s secretary and (ibid., 294) as Croissy’s secretary, but never specifying his exact role. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:92–6, offer a useful overview of the functions of the secretariat, but most of his examples are after 1715. He mentions du Theil, but not Blondel and mistakes the engineer, diplomat, and mathematics professor François Blondel (1618–86), who was unrelated, as the father of premier commis Blondel’s son, the future diplomat Louis-Augustin Blondel (ibid., 229). See Roman d’Amat, “François Blondel,” 699–700 (the engineer), and “Louis-Augustin Blondel,” 702–3. Archives hg, 2:29. Bonrepaus wrote Jean-Baptiste Henri de Valincour that Blondel sent out the (ordinary) post for Denmark from Paris on Mondays and Wednesdays before noon. aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 216v–17, 19 July 1697. He wrote ­Iberville, French resident in Geneva, that his letters reached him by way of Lyon, whereas those from Provence and Italy come by way of Blondel in Paris (ibid., 47, fol. 308, 23 May 1693). Ibid., Angleterre 237, fol. 20, is a note for Blondel in Torcy’s hand instructing him to mail the letter in Paris on Wednesday, 20 January 1712. On a 15 August. 1708 letter from d’Argenson Torcy scrawled at the top a few words in answer with instructions that it was to go to his secretary Ligny, who would draft a reply (ibid., md 1160, fol. 128). Joseph Stafford, Mary of Modena’s secretary, wrote Gualterio, 20 March 1712, that he had complained to Torcy’s commis about delays, observing that even though few mail pouches had been lost in the past five or six years, more attention was paid to security than to speed. bl am 31258, fol. 50r–v. The letters and packages Abbé Bossuet sent to his uncle Bishop Bossuet from Rome went through Blondel’s bureau. Bossuet, Correspondance, 9:387–9. See also Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:166–7. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 308, Bonrepaus in Copenhagen to Iberville in Geneva, 23 May 1693, urged his colleague to send news directly through a contact in Lyon rather than via Paris. aae md 307, fols 137–53v. Ibid., 310, fols 301–4, lists pensions and ordinary gratifications sent abroad by Torcy. It is in the same hand, reflects the last full year of the reign, and was likely prepared for the regent by Blondel. Ibid., fols 311–12, deals with payments 1713–15 and is also in Blondel’s hand. See Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 48–50, for a letter from Ambassador Besenval to Pecquet via a M. Pandry, cloth merchant, rue de l’Arbre Sec, Paris, apparently one such letter drop. aae md 307, fol. 149r–v. Blondel likely kept this registry and not Ligny, since for Poussin in Denmark there is no address listed, but merely a note that Ligny would be able to supply it.



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69 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 144r–v, unsigned and undated. Petkum recalled that in his winter 1706–07 meeting with Torcy they formulated means for concealing their future correspondence, since as the agent of an Imperial prince he was forbidden contact with the enemy. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 319. 70 Bonrepaus wrote to Mignon, 15 Dec. 1693, asking that he send his gratification payment of 6,000 livres to Blondel, who would give it to M. de Lubert. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 350. Louis de Lubert, presumably ­Bonrepaus’s banker, was treasurer general of the marine and a financier close to the ­Colberts. Dessert, Argent, 638. Blondel acted as Bonrepaus’s personal agent. See letters from Bonrepaus to Blondel in 1697 in aae cp Danemark 58, fols 45v–7r (26 Mar.), fol. 153 (9 June), fol. 188v (2 July), fol. 203r (9 July); and (to Mme Blondel in her husband’s absence), fol. 398 (15 Oct.). 71 Samoyault, Bureaux, 114. Landosle, “Congrès de Bade,” 322n1, says that Blondel appears to have been specifically charged with keeping these accounts. 72 aae md 1102, fol. 192r, Torcy to Bouchu, 18 Mar. 1702. 73 Bonrepaus complained to Adam 10 August 1699 about the losses he suffered from the exchange rate between France and Holland and on 17 September 1699 requested reimbursement for money advanced to Protestant refugees returning to France. Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 22–3, 32. 74 Samoyault, Bureaux, 37. This is the distribution of countries between the two political bureaus in 1715 under Torcy. Pecquet created a third bureau under the Regency to handle the growing correspondence with Iberia and Italy. 75 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, note Du Fresne’s 1671 advice to Pomponne, who was contemplating how to organize his new charge. Relative to the Electorate of Mainz, of which he was resident in Paris, he faulted the department’s division of its affairs between two commis, one for the electorate itself and the other for its dealings with the Imperial Diet in Ratisbon. Baillou concludes from this that the division of these responsibilities was not yet done in a very rational fashion, but this is misleading for several reasons. Du Fresne was not referencing arrangements under Lionne but under Brienne when he and Ariste, both experts on Germany, divided its courts between them. In addition, his quarrel was not with division per se, even that of Germany, which he said was workable, but with that for Mainz’s affairs. Yet that arrangement was not without merit, since the paper flow was to two locations, Mainz and Ratisbon, with the differing dynamics of a prince’s court versus the Imperial Diet, especially given the latter’s reliance on Latin. In any event, we should be open to a variety of rational alternatives when trying to understand the past (and the present, for that matter!). 76 Archives hg, 2:30. aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fols 49ff, “Extraits de Despeches de M. du Heron et des Mémoires concernant la Hongrie,” is an

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Notes to pages 183–7 example from 1701. Ibid., md 1146, fol. 170, has brief extracts from the king’s and Torcy’s letters (30 Dec. 1706) about Hungarian subsidies. Vismann, Files, 103–4. Handbooks of form letters took the place of the detailed knowledge necessary to the chancellery clerks of the past. Samoyault, Bureaux, 65–76; and Archives hg, 2:23–5. aae cp Angleterre 224, fols 15ff, has extracts from the London gazettes from 25 December 1707 to 1 January 1708 about such news as movement of naval vessels, Baltic shipping, and losses to the French. These papers were typically separated in the foreign archives from the Correspondance politique and placed in the Mémoires et documents. Archives hg, 2:24–5. Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne, was foreign secretary from 1643. His son Louis-Henri became his survivancier in 1651 and increasingly his collaborator. The foreign secretary served as “agent de transmission” (transmission agent) for paperwork for the Marine du Ponant (Atlantic fleet). After Nicolas Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, the actual administration of both parts of the navy increasingly fell to Colbert, who, by a regulation of 11 May 1667, generated all navy orders and read them to the king but sent them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be prepared for sending out. The foreign office was finally relieved of all navy business when Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669. Taillemite, Colbert, 11–21. That same year, Lionne traded with Colbert responsibility for commerce for supervision of Berry, Navarre, Béarn, and Bigorre. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 220–1. Picavet, “Commis,” 104–6; and Piccioni, Commis, 19–20. Piccioni, Commis, 107–27. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:197–8, had nothing but praise for Du Fresne: his dispatches were exemplary and he prepared drafts of letters from the king. See also Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” ­385–97. Livet, Intendance d’Alsace, 190, notes his knowledge of German affairs. Lists of all the departments’ diplomats and their appointements from 1658 to 1661 among Du Fresne’s papers suggest that they were all within his competence. Boislisle, “Addition aux Mémoriaux,” 275–80. Piccioni, Commis, 127–43 (Ariste died in 1697). Picavet, “Commis,” 107, says that from 1662 Colbert employed Ariste on navy business, although he still may also have served Brienne. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:200, wrote that the inability of the highly skilled Ariste to come up with ideas easily was offset by his devotion and the quality of his work. For Ariste and consular affairs, upon which he wrote a treatise, see Poumarède, “Naissance d’une institution,” 68n18, 77, 83, 88. Piccioni, Commis, 103–7. Piccioni calls Parayre a premier commis, apparently following Baschet, Dépôt, 86, who cites a 1707 inventory of the late Parayre’s papers that uses that label, but the inventory’s creator also believed that one of Lionne’s principal commis was Le Roy, who actually served ­Louvois. Brienne, however, divided his first commission (the premier commis



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post) between Du Fresne and Ariste (Brienne, Mémoires, 3:200), and each time he mentions them it is as his premier commis (ibid., 2:58, 3:57, 154, 197). Parayre’s name, however, is mentioned without further label between two others labeled as commis (ibid., 199–200), the latter of which, Dautiège, he calls elsewhere his “second commis” (ibid., 2:17). Piccioni, Commis, 136, dismisses Brienne’s evidence, but without explanation. Brienne found ­Parayre proficient, but he could not adapt (“m’accommodais”) himself to Parayre as much as he could to Dautiège (ibid., 279). Parayre’s influential uncle was the anti-Jansenist Jesuit Père François Annat, Louis XIV’s confessor from 1654 to 1670. Bluche, Louis XIV, 390. The Jansenist Abbé Silvain Gaudon, linked with Pomponne’s uncle, Henri Arnauld, bishop of Angers, wrote ­Pomponne in 1671 that the capable Parayre had been reluctantly retained by Lionne for his connection to Annat and ecclesiastical appointments, despite ­Brienne’s warning that he was divisive and malevolent in his ambitions. ­Delavaud, “Changement,” 383–4. Gaudon and his brother Jean were among the first recluses at Port-Royal, but Sylvain later renounced Jansenism. Rapin, Mémoires, 1:126, 566. 84 Baschet, Dépôt, 63; and Picavet, “Commis,” 146 (for “Maretz”). Ibid., 104–7 (for Du Fresne, Ariste, Dalencé, Dautiège, Parayre, and Azemart); and ­Piccioni, Commis, 103–46 (for these plus Boulleau). Dalencé (or d’Alencé) served Chancellor Pierre Séguier as secretary (1663–72) and then entered Louvois’s service as a purchasing agent for books, medals, and other curiosities in the United Provinces and Germany. He also reported back economic, political, and military intelligence. Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois”; and Sarmant, Demeures, 228–9. Dalencé also expedited books for Bayle and his network. Bayle, Correspondance, 7:184–5, 372. Dautiège later served controversially in Sicily as secretary to Marshal Louis Victor de Rochechouart, duc de Vivonne, commander of the French naval force occupying the island. Laloy, Révolte de Messine, 2:13–14, 212, 351, 474. 85 See Cras, “Charge de secrétaire”; Poumarède, “Brienne”; and Cras, “Lionne.” 86 In 1671 Gaudon noted to incoming secretary Pomponne that the foreign ministry had a provincial department or bureau (“département des provinces”). Delavaud, “Changement,” 382. He also referred to Pomponne continuing Pachau and Parayre in their “commissions,” a shorthand for the position of premier commis (ibid., 381). Pomponne also implied that ­Parayre was one of his predecessor’s premier commis (ibid., 374–5). Du Fresne nonetheless continued to serve Lionne intermittently and assisted Colbert as a trusted consultant on navy and colonial matters. When he took formal charge of the navy and colonies in 1669, Colbert considered Du Fresne for his premier commis, which garnered him anticipatory letters of congratulation from Pomponne in The Hague and Croissy and his secretary Charles Mignon in London. Nothing came of it, however, likely because Du Fresne

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89

90

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93 94 95

Notes to pages 188–90 was already occupied on diplomatic missions in Germany. Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 387–95. Pagès, Contributions, 64. Picavet, “Commis,” 106–10; Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85; and Piccioni, Commis, 147–53 (Pachau). Pachau had responsibility for correspondence with the papal nuncio. Dainville-Barbiche, Correspondance Spada, 22n131, 644n2. While Lionne remained bedridden in Paris, Pachau traveled with Berny, Lionne’s son and survivancier, to the front with the king in 1667 during the War of Devolution. Picavet, “Organisation,” 206–12. Piccioni, Commis, 35, calls Moncheny the first chief of a code service. ­Gaudon, in an 18 September 1671 letter to Pomponne, referred to a ­“Mouchérier” – likely Moncheny – who worked with codes but who was now dead (Delavaud, “Changement,” 384). Since Gaudon noted that Pachau had been handling codes for two years (ibid., 383), it is likely that Moncheny died in 1669 or earlier. See Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. Morel later had a distinguished career as an envoy until his death in 1719. France, Recueil, 21:417–20. Delavaud, “Changement de ministre,” 382; Cras, “Hugues de Lionne,” 53, 55; and Cras, “Lionne,” 68. This is supported by documents in Lionne, Lettres, 41, 129, 136, 141, 165, 203, 219; and Peyron, Documents des Hôpitaux de Paris, 4:243–4, 257–9, 261, 264, 266, 275–6. Picavet, “Commis,” 107; and Piccioni, Commis, 152, note Luc de Rives’s honorary title, but Picavet sees him as inactive and Piccioni assumes he remained only Lionne’s secretary. Documents for this affair are in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 3:445–9. ­Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:127, say that La Pause was born around 1639. See Lionne’s comments to his uncle (21 Mar. 1664) in Lionne, Lettres, 200–1; and those to d’Estrades (20 Mar. 1664) in Mignet, Négociations, 1:277–8, 285. For Bigorre in England, see Jusserand, French Ambassador, 147. See also Piccioni, Commis, 158–9. Delavaud, “Changement,” 376, 381. Gaudon published Latin verses separately celebrating Mazarin and Lionne after the 1659 Peace of the Pyrenees. His older brother Jean Gaudon was Lionne’s advisor. Loskoutoff, Rome des Césars, 276–7, 435, 455. Le Tellier wrote Lionne (4 Nov. 1667) to acknowledge receiving dispatches from his lackey. Picavet, “Organisation,” 215. Delavaud, “Changement,” 375. Ibid., 368–85. Parayre sought support from the new minister’s father. Mme de Grignan, acting for her husband, lieutenant du roi in Provence, and her mother, Marie Rabutin-Chantal, marquise de Sévigné (known as Mme de Sévigné), also lobbied on his behalf (ibid., 395). Despite his anti-Jansenist uncle Annat, Parayre was also recommended by the bishop of Angers, Pomponne’s uncle (ibid., 374). Gaudon tried to poison Pomponne’s mind



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101 102 103

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against Parayre by labeling him a Jesuit spy and disloyal partisan of Pierre de Bonsi, archbishop of Toulouse (ibid., 383–5), an experienced diplomat mentioned as Lionne’s successor. Bergin, Crown, Church, 208. See also the summary by Mathis, “Pomponne”; and Picavet, “Commis,” 110–12. Both Pachau and Parayre served Louvois during the interim between Lionne’s death on 1 September 1671 and Pomponne’s arrival on 14 January 1672. For Tourmont, see Piccioni, Commis, 154–6; Delavaud, Pomponne, 54, 60, 63, 72, 75, 76, 124, 128, 169, 311; Pénicaut, “Commis,” 128–9; and Pagès, Contributions, 64, who says that Tourmont’s hand appears most often in Pomponne’s drafts. ss -Boislisle, 9:18n7. He goes unmentioned by Delavaud, Picavet, and Piccioni. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, add that he was replaced around 1678 by the minister’s young son (“le jeune fils du ministre”) but without naming him. Since Pomponne’s oldest son was born in 1662, with the others following in 1664 and 1669, this is a puzzling claim. Piccioni, Commis, 156–7, says that Lebeau (or Le Beau), who served under Parayre, shared with him the treaty-printing privilege granted in 1678, but his source, Baschet, Dépôt, 285, provides no citation. However, according to the privilege printed in Traité de paix entre le Roy et Suède et Zell, it was granted 31 May 1673 to Pachau, Parayre, and Tourmont. On 25 June 1678 the same three ceded the printing monopoly to Frederic Leonard for twenty years. Leonard, Recueil des traitez, vols 3 and 6 (no consecutive page numbers). Iberville, Correspondance, 1:lxxxviii–lxxxix. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 313; and Mathis, “Pomponne.” Du Fresne’s 1671 memoir to Pomponne on department organization stressed that the man supervising provinces needed to understand them and what related to them and to be accurate and honest in his paperwork, since it concerned governors, magistrates, the people, communities, individuals, and justice. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 155. Peters, “Information and Governing,” 113. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:196–7. The vituperative Abbé Gaudon, who also regarded skills for drafting diplomatic papers as superior to those for ­domestic and other paperwork, was perhaps unfairly dismissive of the latter. ­Delavaud, “Changement,” 381–3. Vismann, Files, 102–4, who calls them “Baroque secretaries” in contrast to legally trained chancellery clerks. Antoine, marquis de Pas wrote (8 Mar. 1680) his father, Isaac de Pas, marquis de Feuquières, ambassador to Sweden, that when he approached Croissy on his behalf for an office he was purchasing, he was greeted with the remarkable coolness (“prodigieux froid”) that, like his brother, he had adopted upon becoming a minister. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:100.

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Notes to pages 192–3

106 Tourmont wrote Feuquières (late Nov. 1679) of the misfortune of ­Pomponne’s disgrace, adding that he had been ordered to remain in his post (ibid., 4–5). On 29 December he wrote that he would learn his fate only when Croissy arrived (ibid., 31). In mid-February he was growing hopeful (ibid., 103), but on 15 April 1680, he reported that dismissals were issued on the 13th and pensions awarded (Pachau 3,000 livres, Tourmont 2,000 livres, and Parayre 1,000 livres). With fulsome praise, Croissy assured ­Tourmont that the king would employ him in a foreign country (ibid., 127). Rébenac wrote Feuquières from Berlin (26 Apr. 1680) that he had learned of ­Tourmont’s disgrace and the order for the others to retire, but that all were nonetheless happy that, knowing all that they knew, they had not been arrested. He attributed the dismissals to the little love Croissy had for his predecessor’s creatures (ibid., 137). In June Tourmont wrote Feuquières of his satisfaction with his new position in Louvois’s bureau (ibid., 165). 107 In 1680 Pachau compiled a list of former Brienne clerks who might have official papers for the archive Croissy was assembling. Parayre paid a visit to Strasbourg on the king’s behalf, perhaps in preparation for its occupation in September 1681. Piccioni, Commis, 106–7, 153, 160. Parayre was wealthy enough to become a secretary of the king in 1680, an office he held until his death in 1707. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1036–7. Torcy may have employed him, as he is listed among his commis granted an acquit patent. aae md 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid., 1074, fol. 66 (1700); and ibid., 1134, fol. 60r–v (1705). His widow received a pension of 600 livres (e.g., ibid., 1160, fol. 162, for 1708; and ibid., 308, fol. 36v, for 1709). 108 Traces of his activities are in Colbert, Lettres, 1:439 and vol. 2, pt 2: 533; and ibid., 7:49, 49n3, 342, 352. Faille, who knew German, was the sovereign council of Alsace’s greffier (1658–61) when Croissy was its president. Livet and Wilsdorf, Conseil Souverain d’Alsace, 146, 171, 186, 806. Livet, Intendance d’Alsace, 195, 200–2, 206, reveals that Faille, a Provencal, had served Croissy since the latter’s 1654 stint there as intendant des armées. Villain, Fortune Colbert, 136, relates that when Colbert added to his Paris holdings, Croissy and his secretary Faille became tenants by judicial lease of an acquisition next to his rue Neuve-des-Petits-Champs residence. The Croissy household resided there in the 1660s. Neymarck, Colbert, 2:501, notes that Faille was Croissy’s legal representative (“mandataire”) and a treasurer of France at Caen in 1673. When Croissy became minister, Faille was still serving, delivering a gratification to Nicolas Clément in 1681. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 368. The 1682 record of Faille’s acquisition of a substantial house at the entrance of the park at Vincennes indicated that he resided at the Hôtel Croissy on rue Vivienne in Paris. France, État des communes: Joinville-lePont, 9.



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109 Tourmont confirmed to Feuquières on 24 June 1680 that Mignon was his successor. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:165. On 26 April 1680, Rébenac had written Feuquières of Mignon’s entry into the department (ibid., 137), and he wrote on 28 August 1681 to ridicule what he termed Mignon’s gross stupidities in a matter of purchasing horses from Brandenburg (ibid., 249–50). The two diplomats were relatives and Pomponne’s clients (ibid., xiv, 10), while Tourmont was a client of Rébenac’s family (e.g., ibid., 27, 29–30, 37, 88–92, 107). 110 Chaix d’Est-Ange, Dictionnaire des familles, 3:391–2; Prévost, “Bergeret,” 1525; and Michel, Biographie Parlement de Metz, 25, for his service there, 1672–86. See Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–50, for background. Mignon is listed with Bergeret as one of two “principal commis” in the 1692 payroll list in aae md 1017, fol. 162. 111 Spanheim, Rélation, 360, 360n2. Bourgeois’s note indicates that he was asked to become premier commis in December 1680. Rébenac wrote Feuquières from Berlin on 26 April 1680 (Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:137) that Mignon was known to be a new premier commis, but the other had not yet been named. Livet, Histoire de l’Académie française, 2:296n1, agrees that it was likely from Metz that Croissy knew Bergeret. 112 Mousnier, Institutions, 2:257. Tornézy, Bergeret et Fragonard, 2, mentions the Boucherat connection. See also Labatut, “Boucherat,” 87–101. When Boucherat was named chancellor, Bergeret was part of the Académie française’s select congratulatory delegation. Mercure galant (Dec. 1685), 99–101. The Metz parlement’s president asked Colbert (3 Feb. 1675) to order its councillors then in Paris – especially that term’s general counsel Bergeret – to take up their charges and not abuse the favour of receiving their gages without having yet served. Depping, Correspondance, 2:199–200. Antoine ­Barillon de Morangis, intendant at Metz, wrote Colbert (18 Mar. 1676) that he awaited Bergeret’s arrival for help evaluating the Cathedral chapter of Metz’s manuscripts to determine which merited transfer to Colbert’s library. Delisle, Cabinet des manuscrits, 1:450. Colbert instructed Baluze to send Bergeret all material concerning the Metz chapter so that he could draft the necessary letter. bn Baluze 362, fol. 217, 29 June 1676. 113 Dangeau, Journal, 1:77, 103, 105. Olivet, Histoire de l’Académie Françoise, 215–16, is wholly negative, whereas notes in the work’s critical edition offer a more balanced view, citing praise from members Racine, Abbé Saint-Pierre, and Jean de La Chapelle. Livet, Histoire de l’Académie française, 2:294–6, 497. Gilles Ménage, passed over in preference to Bergeret, later charged that Bergeret’s friend, royal confessor Père de La Chaise, strongly promoted his selection as did the whole Colbert clan, specifying Seignelay, Croissy, the coadjutor of Rheims (Colbert’s second son), the duc de Saint-Aignan and his

572

114

115

116

117 118

119

120

Notes to pages 193–4 son the duc de Beauvillier (Colbert’s son-in-law), and many great ladies at court. Ménage and de La Monnoye, Anti-Baillet, vol. 7, pt 1: 278–80. This supports the proposition that Bergeret was a long-time Colbert client. Ash, “Expertise,” 8–11, 18. Blair, Too Much to Know, 85–7, marks the respect among early modern scholars for note-takers on a variety of subjects, including those whose results did not lead to publication, since their notes might be useful to those friends and correspondents permitted to consult them. Choisy, Mémoires, 1:113–14; and Pagès, Contributions, 64n3, 65. Someone named Cottereau, sent by James II to Paris to acquire plants and wine (and likely also to spy), spoke of “Bergère, one of … Croissy’s clerks, a boasting fellow, on whom de Croissy much relies.” Cottereau to Sir William Trumbull, 5 Aug. 1686, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 203. Spanheim, Rélation, 370. He recalled that a navy intendant from Brest once reported to Bergeret in his presence on the level of the fleet’s preparedness, unaware that he was a foreign envoy (ibid., 558). Bourgeois (ibid., 360n2) mistakenly thought that Bergeret purchased the secrétaire du cabinet office from the marquis de Crécy in 1682, but Dangeau, Journal, 1:6–7 (10 and 16 Apr. 1684), noted that he secretly purchased it from Jean Talon, former intendant of New France, and finally took his oath and possession of his right to enter the king’s presence on 7 November 1684 (ibid., 68). His term was April through June. État de la France (1692), 204. gbhmc, Seventh Report, 285, a 1683 contretemps over an alleged attempt to pressure a dying coachman into converting to Catholicism. Petit, Souvenirs, 81. Antoine Joly, marquis de Blaisy, was an intimate of ­Harlay de Bonneuil and his father-in-law, Chancellor Boucherat, Bergeret’s kinsman (ibid., 54–62). Piccioni, Commis, 162, says that the earliest document indicating that Aubert was a premier commis is from 1688, but does not identify or cite it. Yet Aubert was not named a premier commis in the 1694 and 1695 lists of acquits patents. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. The first time he appears as one is in May 1701. aae md 1069, fol. 264. Piccioni, Commis, 163, 165, mistakenly asserts that Mignon became a premier commis only in 1688. Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 354, lists letters from Mignon and Blondel to the Chamber in 1690 and 1691. The papers of Pierre-Cardin Lebret, intendant of Provence, has printed copies of a May 1689 “Arrest du Conseil,” all with Mignon’s name signed on the last page just below the printing. bn mf 8833, fols 115v, 117v, 119v, and 143v. aae md 1004, fol. 157v, expéditions for 1690, was signed by Mignon to indicate that a law had been registered. In ibid., fol. 122v (late 1686 or early 1687), Mignon signed that he read through the arrêts of the Conseil d’État. Mignon was embroiled in an administrative dispute with Breton clergy in 1688. Flavien de Blois, Capucins, 54–6. Letters between Croissy and the bishop of Gap, who requested



121

122

123

124

Notes to page 194

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modifications to an earlier royal regulation concerning celebratory bonfires, show that ­Bergeret was part of this process and was well known to the bishop and his brother, also his Parisian agent. Guillaume, Inventaire HautesAlpes, ­4:205–6. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 8:246–7, recounts a 1683 case involving the procurer general of the Metz parlement who falsified a lettre de cachet to avoid his creditors and confessed to sending Bergeret a letter, presumably because of his Metz connection and foreign office responsibilities. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 349, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 8 Dec. 1693; and ibid., fol. 375, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Dec. 1693, complaining about delayed letters and even more egregious negligence by Mignon’s bureau. See also ibid., fol. 515, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 15 Feb. 1694; ibid., 58, fol. 44, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 26 Mar. 1697, apologizing for the trouble he caused his bureau; and ibid., fol. 90v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 23 Apr. 1697, again with complaints about Mignon’s bureau. Bély, Espions, 141, mentions Mignon corresponding with embassy personnel in Denmark, Saxony, Sweden, and Brunswick. Ambassador d’Avaux wrote to Croissy (20 May 1693) from Sweden of obtaining a copy of a code from Mignon. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212. However, a 1685 letter in Marchand, Mission Torcy, 61, shows Bergeret involved with Scandinavia or at least Torcy’s visit there. Picavet, “Commis,” 115, 119n2 (England and Mantua); and Pagès, Grand Électeur, 436, 550n, 555n (Brandenburg). In 1680 the Council of Geneva, seeking the favourable resolution of a matter with Croissy, sent Bergeret a gift. Flournoy, Journal, 85n60, 91n12. Bergeret approached Choisy on Croissy’s behalf concerning Siam, although he also admitted that because of the need for naval participation the mission depended entirely on Seignelay. Smithies, Chaumont and Choisy, 187–9. Records of payments to Bergeret as “principal commis” include aae md 1011, fol. 170r–v (1691); ibid., 1013, fol. 292 (1691); ibid., 1017, fol. 162 (1692); and ibid. 1021, fol. 202r–v (1693), contradicting the contention of Piccioni, Commis, 162, that Bergeret’s administrative existence ended in 1688. When Mignon handled Spanheim’s request for a passport in Paris in 1681, it was likely in a domestic capacity. Joret, “Formont,” 110. Mignon’s 21/31 May 1686 letter to Spanheim announcing a proposed settlement over a disputed ship likely reflected an issue raised in Croissy’s audiences for foreign diplomats. Joret, “Voyageur Tavernier,” 272. Acquits patents for 1694 and 1695. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. For Le Melle, see Baschet, Dépôt, 78, 79n1; and aae md 1017, fol. 162, a 1692 payroll list. Montreuil appears in an 8 May 1691 list for acquits patents for commis (ibid., 1011, fol. 170; and ibid.,1013, fol. 293), and one for 1692 (ibid.,1017, fol. 162) but disappears thereafter. Marolot appears on the 27 April 1693 acquits patents list (ibid., 1021, fol. 202r–v).

574

Notes to pages 194–9

125 Piccioni, Commis, 20–1, 270 (chart). He mistakenly places Mignon, who died in 1698, at the head of the second bureau until 1715, ignoring Fournier, who he says became a premier commis only in 1715 (ibid., 193). However, aae md 1192, fol. 419, 16 Dec. 1712, lists a gratification for the “commis de M. Fournier,” and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10r, 1 Jan. 1715, lists a payment for the “commis de Fournier.” This lends weight to Samoyault, Bureaux, 7, 35n2, 36, 286, who contends that Fournier was a premier commis in succession to his uncle Mignon. He notes that Fournier joined Adam, Ligny, and Pecquet as premier commis signing commis Jean-Nicolas Bernage’s marriage contract in 1713 (ibid., 217). The second bureau’s areas are listed as Germany and the countries of the north and the Levant (ibid., 37). 126 aae cp Venise 148, fol. 144, Fremont to Pecquet, 2 Oct. 1706; ibid., fol. 217, Fremont to Pecquet, 13 Nov. 1706; ibid., Espagne 191, fol. 95, Amelot to Pecquet, 20 May 1709; ibid., Rome 502, fol. 58, Abbé Rioux (secretary to Polignac, auditor of the Rota) to one of Torcy’s commis, mentioning Pecquet and enclosing a letter for him; ibid., Espagne 203, fol. 434, Bonnac to ­Pecquet, 2 Nov. 1710; and ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 114, du Luc to Torcy, 29 Dec. 1713. Prior, History, 392, records his interactions with Pecquet in September 1713. aae md 309, fols 111–34, which is a partial registry of “Depeches du Roy” for 1711–13 listing these same recipients plus Portugal and the United Provinces, is surely a registry for Pecquet’s bureau. 127 While neither fully inclusive nor completely accurate, these tables are nonetheless suggestive. A 1701 list would likely have included missions still in England and the United Provinces, balancing the count between the two bureaus. The years 1698–1700 marked a rapid expansion of French diplomatic missions abroad, which more than doubled from the Nine Years War levels. Figure 5.9 is based on an analysis and summary of lists of French diplomats serving between 1692 and 1715 compiled by Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:207–45. Here, too, figures are not exact and could be further refined, but likely without seriously altering the overall trend shown in the table. 128 The data is based on the lists of volumes (dates and very brief description of contents) of political correspondence from individual states in France, État numérique correspondance politique. The inclusion of volumes was based on dates of coverage; those covering multiple years were usually not counted when they also covered years outside the 1696–1715 time frame. When months of coverage are specified, volumes from before August 1696, when Torcy became secretary, and after 1 September 1715, when Louis XIV died, were not included in totals. Information in the supplemental cp series for the various states was also excluded because its volumes mostly cover long periods of time and their inclusion would have only minimally altered the counts. This is a crude and rough measurement because the volumes, as well as the letters in them, are not of uniform length. Also, not all i­ncoming ­written and



129 130 131

132 133

134

135

36 1 137

38 1 139 140

Notes to pages 199–201

575

printed materials were kept and what was not included in aae cp ended up in aae md. For the composition of the two series, see Archives hg, 1:113–16; and France, Inventaire sommaire: Correspondance politique, 1:v–x. Kahn, Codebreakers, especially chap. 5. Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 141, 145–6. aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 146r–v, undated and unsigned, but in Mignon’s hand. Null ciphers are so called because “in any given cryptogram the greater portion of the letters are null, a certain few being significant, and perhaps a few others being significant only in that they are indicators for finding truly significant letters.” Gaines, Cryptanalysis, 4. France, Recueil, 13:72, instructions for the extraordinary ambassador to Denmark, 22 Oct. 1688. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35–6, 68–73, 128–30; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:106–8. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 220, agrees that code work took place in each political bureau. Bély, Espions, 154–7, for codes and decoding under Torcy. aae cp Venise 148, fol. 239, a 1706 letter of whose contents the king will be informed, has a note on it saying that it is to be deciphered by Pecquet. Ambassadors might also decipher their own correspondence, as Ferriol indicated from Constantinople to Jouvancourt, 16 October 1708, in Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 803. Even Philip V personally encoded part of a letter to his grandfather. Torcy, Journal, 280. aae cp Rome 502, fol. 16, Polignac to Torcy, 12 Jan. 1709, apologized for writing without code (“en clair”), since time did not permit him to encode his letter. Charles Auguste d’Allonville, marquis de Louville, writing to Torcy from Spain (ibid., Espagne 114, fols 298–304, 18 July 1703), contended that while it was always dangerous to write without code, even more dangerous were code clerks with loose lips. Adam to Billard, 13 May 1688, in Piccioni, Commis, 168–9. For the Rossignols, see ss-Boislisle, 13:149–50, 525; Piccioni, Commis, 96–7, who suggests that one of Brienne’s code clerks was Antoine’s student and subordinate; Arvencas, “Rossignol,” 511–16; and Kahn, Codebreakers, ­157–63. See Delavaud, Pomponne, 140n1, for the family connection. An example of the annual 5,000 livres to the Rossignol children is aae md 1192, fol. 11v (4 Oct. 1713). Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 133, notes the intergenerational nature of much cryptographic knowledge. Ash, “Expertise,” 5, 14–15. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212, d’Avaux to Croissy, 20 May 1693, shows Mignon working with codes for Sweden. Piccioni, Commis, 187, says that Lullier served continuously under Croissy and Torcy, but a note in ss-Boislisle, 13:150n1, says that, along with ­Rossignol, Lullier served Louvois as code clerk. Financial records list ­Lullier

576

Notes to page 201

as Barbezieux’s commis in 1692 (aae md 1019, fol. 59v) and 1693 (ibid., 1029, fol. 61; and ibid., 1009, fol. 144), but by 1699 show him with Torcy (ibid., 1068, fol. 179). He was still active in 1701 (ibid., 1082, fol. 287, gratification for 1,500 livres), but on the retired pension roll by at least 1706 (ibid., 1145, fol. 6; and ibid., 1192, fol. 429v, for 1713). Boislisle ­(ss-Boislisle, 13:150n1) notes that according to Mercure Galant (Nov. 1703) Lullier was one of Louvois’s decipherers. Although he does not say, the Mercure reference was to Lullier’s retirement (since this particular issue is not available online, this could not be verified). Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, say that he worked for Croissy as a code clerk, which means that he left Barbezieux before or during 1696. In 1723–24 Lullier was still alive and, based on his forty-five years under different ministers as decipherer without key, advanced age, and neediness, requesting pensions for his three daughters, which were granted. aae md 313, fol. 232 (Alexandre Cojannot graciously provided a copy of this document). If he retired sometime after 1701 and before 1706, then he began serving c. 1660, plausibly putting him in his eighties when he requested these pensions. 141 Bonrepaus complained to Blondel, about a possible breach of the code and the need for its replacement. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 419, 9 Mar. 1694. On the same day (ibid., fol. 420r–v) he requested that Mignon send a new code via Dunkirk on the first ship to the Baltic. Torcy wrote to Pomponne in Venice that since his letters had apparently been intercepted and deciphered, he would send him two new codes: a larger one for regular dispatches and a smaller one for extraordinary occasions. bl am 15284, fol. 309v, 29 Oct. 1706. 42 Villars urged Puyzieulx to employ codes upon codes (“faire chiffres sur les 1 chiffres”) for security’s sake. aae cp Allemagne 350, fol. 17, 21 Jan. 1708. When Cardinal Joseph-Emmanuel de La Trémoille complained from Rome that he could not make sense of the code used in Villars’s letters, Torcy responded that he would write to Villars about it (ibid., Rome 540, fol. 229v, 25 Dec. 1714). 143 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443, reports that in 1691 Adam claimed to know several codes by heart. Writing to Adam, Bonrepaus claimed that the code he employed was unbreakable and the best ever made. He suggested that Adam experiment by having the Paris code clerks attempt to decode a letter written in one of his best codes. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 461r–v, 15 June 1694. Adam asked Hooke to see him to confer on the words and names to be used in his codes (ibid., Angleterre 221, fol. 267, 11 Mar. 1707). Although ill, Hooke was set on departing for his mission as soon as he recovered and asked Adam to send the codebooks to him (ibid., fol. 267v, 14 Mar. 1707). That day Adam sent him two codes of a different type from which one could not derive tables for decoding (ibid., fol. 268). Villars reported to Puyzieulx, having received a code from Bernage, who apparently worked under Adam



144 145

146

147 148

149 150 151

152

Notes to pages 201–2

577

(ibid., Allemagne 350, fol. 14, 20 Jan. 1708). Bonrepaus forwarded a copy of a code from Croissy to Frischmann in Münster (ibid., Danemark 47, fol. 101, 1693). See ibid., Gênes 52, fol. 187, for an example of a code table with explanation, presumably for agents in Italy. Bély, Espions, 610–11. Samoyault, Bureaux, 124. Bély, Espions, 610–53, analyses passport issuance and recipients. Pontchartrain to Bignon, 26 Jan. 1700, is an example of another secretary of state issuing a passport. Depping, Correspondance, 4:615. Regarded as foreigners, Jewish residents of Paris required passports. Although welcomed earlier in the reign, governmental hostility increased after 1685. Benbassa, Jews of France, 50–1, 59, 70–2. Although Jews were not legally permitted to reside in Paris, Torcy was not averse to granting exceptions. aae md 1040, fol. 16, Torcy to La Reynie, 6 Jan. 1696, a passport for Abraham Mosés Vallich (renewed on 19 Jan. 1705, ibid., 1137, fol. 15). A list of numbers of Jewish families and individuals in French cities in 1701 shows four families (of sixteen persons) and 150 “others” residing in Paris (ibid., 1093, fols 119–21). For Jews in diplomacy, see Bély, Espions, 171–4. Bély, Espions, 623–4, 642. aae md 1103, fol. 62v, 5 Sept. 1702, notes passports delivered to Blondel and another to Adam; and ibid., 1118, fol. 271v, 1703, notes one delivered to Noblet in Paris for a man traveling to Venice and Rome. Bély, Espions, 618–19. aae md 1044, fols 1–8, for the count; ibid., fols 90–3v, for the 1 June 1697 “Estat”; ibid., fols 97ff, for “Estats” for 13 and 19 June and for 13 Aug. 1697. In 1711 Torcy scandalized many in the Republic of Letters by denying the passport request of Pierre Coste, a savant and translator of John Locke, because he was a Huguenot refugee and minister. In 1713, however, Coste was permitted into France and in the following year Torcy’s brother, ­Montpellier’s bishop, entertained him and opened his library to him. Goldgar, Impolite Learning, 187. Bély, Espions, 621–53, is a detailed analysis of the 1712 passport list. For the lists for 1713 and related documents, see aae md 1196, fols 57–164. Bély, Espions, 611. aae md 1196, fols 129–45. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 132–3, says that the Mainz apothecary Speslas, highly regarded by Torcy, sponsored many passport-­seekers desiring to visit France during the War of the Spanish Succession. See also Bély, Espions, 632 (as Spitzlay); and Bouvet and Dauphin, “Successeurs,” 29–30 (as Spitzley). aae md 306, fol. 9r. Aubert was a premier commis by at least May 1701 (ibid., 1069, fol. 264). Mignon and Adam may have coordinated passports earlier (ibid., 1044, fols 97 and 118v, 1697).

578

Notes to pages 203–4

153 Samoyault, Bureaux, 30, mentions Ligny’s later work with passports. ­Meyercroon wrote d’Argenson that Ligny would send the necessary passport allowing a Dane to prolong his stay in France. Ravaisson, Archives ­Bastille, 11:64, 16 Dec. 1703. Paris bankers applied to Ligny for passports for ­Polignac in Utrecht. aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 53, 10 Mar. 1712. 154 aae md 1596, fols 227–30, 31 Jan. 1713, lists foreigners in Paris, noting their nationality, business, and a description of their passport. 155 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Zweiundzwanzigster Band: 706–7. A report for d’Argenson’s office (from 1714?) refers to a prisoner claiming that when war broke out he applied for a passport to leave France, but Torcy’s commis assured him that nothing had been resolved yet on that subject. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:473. 156 Legg, Prior, 292, Matthew Prior to Earl of Jersey, 17 June 1699. 157 aae md 1124, fol. 71, Torcy to d’Argenson, 14 Jan. 1704, concerning a letter from Lord Middleton. For Torcy and the police who dealt with suspected spies, see Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 12:22, 27, 44–6. 158 Delavaud, “Adam,” 445. Piccioni, Commis, 166, 175, repeats this date, but goes on to claim that Bergeret, who he mistakenly claims left the department in 1688, was replaced by Aubert, who he wrongly claims was let go in 1694 upon Adam’s promotion (ibid., 162). Piccioni’s own chronological chart of premiers commis (ibid., 270), however, contradicts this by dating Aubert’s service as 1685 to 1705. 159 Acquits patents for 1694 and 1695 name Mignon and Adam as premiers commis. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. aae pvr, 1, fol. 173v, says that Adam was Torcy’s intendant and his commis for the administration of his department’s provinces. Dangeau, Journal, 5:90, says Bergeret died unexpectedly after two days of illness (confirmed by Sourches, Mémoires, 4:393, 10 Oct. 1694). Department historian Le Dran, writing in 1724, placed Adam’s promotion in 1696 when Torcy became secretary of state, but his dates are not always correct. Piccioni, Commis, 169–70. The duties that Le Dran listed for Adam are those of a household intendant, a charge Adam did in fact officially assume when Torcy succeeded his father and established his own household in August 1696. 160 aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 350v, Bonrepaus to Adam, 15 Dec. 1693. D’Avaux mentioned to Croissy (20 May 1693) that he had obtained a copy of a code from Mignon. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212. 161 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443, notes that codes never fully occupied Adam’s time. Two letters from Bonrepaus to Adam in aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 414, 23 Feb. 1694, and fol. 461r–v, 15 June 1694, may imply Adam’s involvement with a code service, but do not specify whether it was done while he continued in Mignon’s bureau or in another capacity.

Notes to pages 204–5

162 163

64 1 165

166

167 168

169

170

daf ,

579

s.v. “Employ,” also means the occupation or function of the person employed. aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 352, Bonrepaus to Adam, 30 June 1693, acknowledging receipt of Adam’s “Journal du voyage du Roy.” According to Le Dran, Adam accompanied Torcy on his travels throughout Europe between 1685 and 1687. Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. However, Piccioni, Commis, ­170–1, disagrees, arguing that Le Dran could only have meant Torcy’s 1689 trip to Rome, since individuals other than Adam accompanied him on his earlier travels. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. bn mf 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696, on affairs in Marseilles. Even shortly after Croissy’s death (25 Aug. 1696), Baluze wrote to his niece’s husband that he had sent copies of his letter about a local matter to the ministers Beauvillier, Pomponne, and Le Pelletier and to Mignon as well. Fage, Lettres Baluze, 121. aae md 1012, fol. 101, 19 Aug. 1691, Fournier’s reimbursement for travel to Brest by way of Nantes. Adam received one to go to the camp d’Andernech (?) near Brussels to carry the convocation of the Estates of Brittany to Louis Alexandre de Bourbon, comte de Toulouse (ibid., 1032, fol. 418, 21 Sept. 1695). Delavaud, “Adam,” 445, says that Adam traveled to Brittany by virtue of being premier commis. Adam was also interested in the Breton estates as an investor in their annuities. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-etVilaine, 2:350. Provincial estates were important proxies for the crown in raising credit. Rowlands, Financial Decline, 79–80. bn mf 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696. aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 45v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 26 Mar. 1697; ibid., fol. 90v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 23 Apr. 1697; ibid., fol. 44, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 26 Mar. 1697; and ibid., fols 491–4, Bonrepaus to Mignon, Nov. 1697. bn mf 8863, fol. 141, Adam to Lebret, 10 Feb. 1698. In ibid., fols ­112–15v, Blondel earlier wrote Lebret on 29 January 1698, apparently to explain Adam’s involvement in working with Torcy on a tangled dispute in Marseilles. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, 99, 100, 102, repeat Piccioni, Commis, 163, who claims, based on Le Dran, that Mignon served until 1725. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, however, shows that Le Dran confounded Mignon with his nephew Michel Fournier. Samoyault cites Dangeau, Journal, 6:323 (2 Apr. 1698), on Mignon’s retirement and royal pension and the 7 July 1698 provisions in Mignon’s dossier as secretary of the king indicating his death. Racine wrote to his son Jean-Baptiste on 5 June 1698 of Mignon’s death, referring to the obligation the youth owed him for mentoring him at

580

171

72 1 173

174

175 176 177

Notes to pages 205–6 the foreign office. Racine, Œeuvres, 7:249. Mignon’s testament is dated 12 March, and his “inventory after death” 9 June 1698. Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 481n23, 479n16. Legg, Prior, 307 (Prior to Jersey, 5 Aug. 1699), reports that Adam, among others at court, shared with him speculation as to what the coming session of Parliament would do to limit William III and his “wise reflexions [sic] of our Kingdom’s being le païs des revolutions [the land of revolutions].” Adam’s dealings with Prior the past June had concerned what was apparently a domestic matter (ibid., 293). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 16n56, claims that Adam was the sole premier commis after Mignon’s death until apparently 1706. Although the reasons for this conclusion are unclear, if as his note suggests he is basing this on acquits patents lists from 1698 in which Adam was the only clerk listed at the 3,000 livres rate, then it is unwarranted. A premier commis did not always receive the higher rate and might be listed with simple commis and secretaries at the lower rate (see table 7.11 below, e.g., Mignon in 1693 and Pecquet in 1709 and 1710). He also implies that ­Pecquet was a premier commis only after 1706 (ibid., 17n61). See chapter 7 below. Piccioni, Commis, 181, says incorrectly that he served under Croissy as a commis. The correct year derives from provisions (10 Sept. 1713) for his office of treasurer of France in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes, which mention his thirteen years as Torcy’s premier commis. bn po 2220, fols 2–3r. His letters of nobility (ibid., fols 8–9r, July 1715) mention fifteen years at that post. The earliest notice of him in department records called him premier commis and noted that he received 600 livres. aae md 1093, fol. 153 (May? 1701). Although Adam had experience with foreign and domestic business, he did not become head of one of the political bureaus. This may have been his preference or related to Le Dran’s remark that Adam never learned Latin. ­Piccioni, Commis, 169. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 187–291, demonstrates that Latin was still much used in diplomacy, especially with the Empire. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17, notes that Torcy’s changes did not call into question his father-in-law’s organization or working methods. Picavet, “Commis,” 118. aae md 1205, fol. 110, 1 May 1715, authorized 2,400 livres for Adam’s clerks. An unknown sender wrote Adam (ibid., 1517, fols 103–4v, 20 May 1707) about a matter in Nantes that he then forwarded to Torcy the same day (ibid., fols 105r–v). A note in Torcy’s hand concerning the archbishop of Rheims (Champagne) and his need for a papal bull for a particular abbey has Adam’s name written at the top (ibid., 1191, fol. 21, 13 Jan. 1713). Several expéditions for Dauphiné (9 and 14 Apr. 1705) were in the hand of Aubert,



178 79 1 180

181

182

183

Notes to pages 206–7

581

who apparently served under Adam (ibid., 1553, fols 394r–5). In May 1703 Abbé Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:422, noted dealing with Torcy’s commis in charge of the affairs of the department of Champagne. Four lists cover three-month periods and one covers six months. For gouvernements and their officials, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 604–8. For Louis Ravat, see Monahan, Year of Sorrows, 56–7. The types of dispatches sent out in our samples are not specified, but they likely included only those sent out by the secretary, since those from the king – at least when sent out by the political bureaus – were normally listed in a separate registry, such as aae md 309, fols 111–34v. For the variety of these and the specifications for their preparation, see ­Barbiche, Institutions, 185–91. Additional typical tables of contents are in aae md 1026 and 1040 (for 1694 and 1696, under Croissy); ibid., 1042 (for 1697); and ibid., 1180 (for Apr.–June 1711). Adam signed the 28 February 1710 paperwork raising the Duchy of Harcourt to the peerage. ­Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, 2:535. After their presentation to the parlement, ­Villars instructed Lebret to return his credentials as Provence’s new governor to Adam (who had likely issued them) as the surest way to reach him at court. Villars, Mémoires, 6:36. A royal brevet sealed with the grand seal authorizing an individual’s monetary gratification. An acquit served as a receipt and legal discharge to the entity making the payment. Académie Française, Dictionnaire historique, 1:736. See also Barbiche, Institutions, 169, 189. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:95, claim that passports and naturalization letters were the foreign office’s preserve, which is incorrect as we have already seen for passports. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 77–8, 330, says that naturalization letters were sealed and issued by the Grand Chancellery, but sent out by the secretary of state for the household (ibid., 77, 366–7). The draft of the letter, accompanied by a request submitted to the household secretary, had to be written by a secretary of the king (actually, the household secretary’s commis), who was paid roughly 70 livres by the applicant. Sahlins, who says nothing of how the other secretaries of state fit into this system, uses only the department archives of the household secretary for the database he readily describes as incomplete and random (ibid., 329–33). Yet naturalization letters are among the foreign office’s expéditions. aae md 1041 (1696), ibid., 1074 (1700); ibid., 1158 (1708); and ibid., 1182, fol. 297 (1 July 1711), for Cardinal Gualterio. The entry for a sent naturalization ­letter notes that it was sealed (ibid., 1148, fol. 364v, 1707). Perhaps applicants could approach the foreign office and have their letters drafted (probably still for a fee) by a premier commis or secretary who was a secretary of the king (Mignon, Adam, Blondel, or Noblet) and could thus countersign the king’s name.

582

Notes to page 207

184 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:93, suggest this, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–34, says nothing of it in his description of the secretariat. 185 Former premier commis Du Fresne cautioned Pomponne at the beginning of his ministry that provincial administration required a trustworthy man because issuing legal documents afforded so many opportunities for bribery. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378–9. Gaudon advised Pomponne that the provincial department (“département des provinces”) prepared arrêts for which a commis needed only a bit of style and sharpness of mind to draft with adequate detail and give the reasons for their issuance (ibid., 382). Along with recording letters sent out, registration served short- and long-term institutional memory and centralized records of authentication. Vismann, Files, 77–8. daf, s.v. “Enregistrer,” defines it as putting something in a registry containing public acts in order to make it more authentic and give it force. 186 aae md 1068, passim (1699), indicates that Adam took turns with Marolot, Noblet, Fournier, and, later in the year, Lullier. Ibid., 1129, fols 277–94 (1704), shows that Adam served alone all of December, while Aubert, who equaled him in days, served the previous two months, followed by Marolot and, on many fewer days, by Fournier, likely because he headed a political bureau, albeit the one with less work than Pecquet’s. 187 Ibid., 1010, for instance, contains a listing of countersigned expéditions showing that Croissy’s department sent out 351 expéditions for 12 March–7 May 1691, 101 for 18 June–2 July 1691, and 131 for 16 July–27 August 1691. Ibid., 1075, shows 579 expéditions for September–December 1700, while ibid., 1199, shows 445 for the same period in 1714. 188 Ibid., 1554, fols 35, 36, 43, and 87, are examples of letters or routing notes; and ibid., fols 214–24, is a summary for Torcy. Villars wrote Lebret from the front that Torcy’s support was essential for retaining the valley for Provence, of which he was the new governor. Villars also wrote Torcy on behalf of Provence to enlist his natural eloquence (“eloquence naturelle”). ­Villars, Mémoires, 6:56, 58–9. The king decided in Provence’s favour, since the inhabitants still saw themselves as Provencals. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 161. 189 aae md 1069, fols 134–5, is an example from the turn of the century. D’Argenson wrote Adam about aubaine and a Lille banker (ibid., 1060, fols 27–31v, 25 Mar. 1708). The droit d’aubaine was “the king’s right of escheat [forfeiture to the state] to the property of an unexempted foreigner” who died in France, since such individuals were not permitted to make a valid will. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 35–6. 190 aae md 1160, fol. 21, is a 1708 memoir to Adam concerning Paris. The following relate to police matters: Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:489–90, Adam to Saint-Mars, 17 Jan. 1706; ibid., 13:27–6, Le Quien de La ­Neufville to Adam, 20 Feb. 1713; and ibid., 60, Adam to d’Argenson, 30 July 1713. Yet aae md 1553, fol. 441, 27 June 1709, records a petition addressed to



191

192

193

194 195

96 1 197 198 199

Notes to pages 211–12

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Pecquet that a certain prisoner be liberated from the château of Grenoble and Voysin’s request to Torcy that it be granted; Torcy mentioned having made the same request to Pecquet, to whom he would send two further letters (ibid., fol. 443, 29 June 1709). Pecquet also handled some orders for incarcerations in the Bastille and the citadel of Amiens in 1713 (ibid., 1196, fols 26v–7r). Since Pecquet’s bureau handled Italian and Dutch relations, perhaps these instances were connected with diplomatic affairs and, in the case of Amiens, especially with negotiations under way in Utrecht. Adam’s bureau may have specialized in prisoners in the Paris region. Also, we should not discount such factors as temporary absences or illnesses that required senior clerks to fill in for one another. In any event, these examples demonstrate that boundaries within the department were permeable. Kerhervé, Bretagne en 1665, 24–5, 30n. For the workings of the estates, see Rebillon, États Bretagne, 164–76, 183–4. Records of Adam’s trips include the following orders for related travel reimbursement: aae md 1032, fol. 418, 21 Sept. 1695, to the camp at d’Andernech near Brussels to Brittany’s governor, the comte de Toulouse; ibid., 1056, fol. 212, to Brest, 15 Oct. 1699; ibid., 1190, fol. 406v, 20 Oct. 1703; ibid., 307, fol. 43v, to Brest, Oct. 1705; ibid., 1176, fol. 423 (1711); ibid., 1182, fol. 167 (1711); and ibid., 1190, fol. 406v, 20 Oct. 1713. Adam likely profited from these trips, since among the estates’ 1702 gratifications was 2,000 livres for Torcy’s two commis. Letaconnoux, Relations, 93n2. For the estates’ strategy of gaining influence and protection through widely distributed pensions, see Collins, Classes, Estates, ­195–6. Adam, who owned rentes issued by the Breton estates, received arrears of 6,618 livres and 3 sous in 1685. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-etVilaine, 2:350. Along with a letter concerning provincial business, Adam sent Lebret a letter of sympathy for the loss of his third wife. bn mf 8895, fol. 265, 6 Apr. 1711. Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 547, 547n54. Torcy’s domestics received New Year’s gifts (ibid., 545). Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:385, also notes Blondel’s and Adam’s connections with the group running Marseille. Lacroix and Faure, Inventaire Drôme, 254; and Lacroix, Montélimar, 8:205–7. The foreign ministry and post office fit together so well that Dubois continuously lobbied the regent to take the post office from Torcy and award it to him as foreign minister, which he did in 1721 when forced to choose between the two. Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 126–7. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61. Klijn, “Networks,” 259. Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 14–16. Ibid., 260–7; and Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61–2.

584

Notes to pages 212–14

200 Marchand, Maître de poste, 184–9, traces the creation of this network. To extend its reach, Torcy sought to push postal routes deeper into Brittany. 201 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 240–1; Vaillé, Postes, 5:8–19; and Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 113. 202 aae md 1017, fols 7v and 16, lists several travel reimbursements to ­Hainfray during 1692. Ibid., 1069, fol. 243, is a Dec. 1701 request (granted) for a grace from the rolle for Hainfray, and ibid., 1148 fol. 454v, is a reimbursement for following the court from Versailles to Metz and back in 1707. According to Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:127, Hainfray also received an annual gratification of 100 livres from the superintendent of the king’s buildings in consideration of the care taken with that department’s letters and packages, paid from 1691 through 1715 (ibid., 3:636; and ibid., 5:927). Vaillé, Postes, 5:217 and note 6, lists Louis Hainfray among those postal commis Torcy ordered arrested and sent to the Bastille for leaking information gleaned from the mails to gazetteers, but this was in fact Louis ­Hainfray fils, as noted in Torcy’s letter to d’Argenson, 23 December 1709, in ­Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:431. Despite this, the father retained his post. aae md 1192, fol. 430, for 1713. 203 In 1713 Guyot was reimbursed for twenty trips from Versailles to Paris. aae md 1192, fol. 430v. The annual Fontainebleau sojourn of 1713 cost 9,481 livres paid to postal personnel, including money for lamed or dead horses and 300 livres for a visit to Rambouillet. A detailed breakdown is in ibid., fols 426–8v. 204 Ibid., 1093, fols 238–9 (1701). Marchand, Maître de poste, 247–86, describes these major economic enterprises. 205 aae md 1106, fols 64–5, 25 Apr. 1702, is a summary for Burgundy’s trips. It notes 600 livres reimbursed to five different relay postmasters for dead or crippled horses and other damaged equipment, while a listing for relays includes costs for postilions, another 8,373 livres, 16 sous. Ibid., 1108, fol. 56, Pajot to Torcy, 23 Apr. 1702, expressed his near despair at finding enough horses for Burgundy’s journey. See also the two letters in Louis and ­Beauvillier, Lettres, 219, 335–6. 206 Brillet, De la Voirie, 580. Brillet, royal prosecutor at the Admiralty, helped the aging Nicolas Delamare produce the fourth and final volume of his famous Traité de police. On 1 January 1713, Pigeon was reimbursed for thirty-seven such trips. aae md 1192, fol. 430v. Pigeon served from at least 1695 until his death in 1716. Marchand, Maître de poste, 287–8. There was also a maître de poste at Fontainebleau. aae md 307, fol. 41, 15 Oct. 1705. 207 Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–31; and Brillet, De la Voirie, 564, 574–80. On cabinet couriers and Louvois’s unsuccessful bid to appoint them, see Vaillé, Postes, 4:135–41. The king’s valet de chambre Louis Blouin also served as a diplomatic courier. Couriers might serve as Torcy’s eyes and ears. ­British ­resident



208

209 210 211

212

213 214 215

Notes to pages 214–16

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James Dayrolle dourly reported from The Hague that “Maison Neuve,” who had arrived 26 January/4 February 1710 with the reply to the latest Allied peace terms, was still there on 1/11 February, “walking and talking and examining how matters are disposed.” He added that “the arrival of the ­[cabinet] courrier causes a great ferment of joy here upon the hopes of a sudden peace.” bl am 15876, fol. 285v. Dangeau, Journal, 12:423–6 (May 1709), shows that couriers were likewise watched for and eagerly awaited in France. For a cross-Channel comparison, see Cady, English Royal Messengers. Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–31. For urgent occasions, such as Torcy’s 1709 negotiations at The Hague, Louis’s personal courier Claude Guichon rode back and forth. bl am 15876, fol. 246v. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 73, written for and dedicated to Torcy, noted that cabinet couriers wore a distinguishing medallion bearing the arms of France. They received a fixedrate reimbursement based on the number of postal stops on their journey. Vaillé, Postes, 4:140. Raisin and Guichon were paid for several trips between the court and Utrecht in 1712. aae md France 1183, fols 271 and ­370v–2. In 1714 La Vrillière’s cabinet courier Étienne Coiffier de Beaulieu also served Torcy (ibid., 1201, fols 270v–1, 272, and 281). For a list of couriers, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–8; and État de la France (1712), 1:210, which also reports that cabinet couriers received 225 livres in gages. France, Recueil, 17:153, 153n1. Maintenon, Maintenon d’après sa correspondance, 2:263–4. Zmora, Monarchy, 32. For the chivalric orders, see Ducourtial, Ordres, 31–5; Barbiche, Institutions, 42–3, which notes that because membership in the older Order of Saint-Michel was required for entry into the Holy Spirit, members of the latter came to be known as chevaliers of the Royal Orders; and Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 74–84, for their social significance. Dangeau, Journal, 5:452 (12 Aug. 1696). On 29 July 1696, the day after Torcy’s father’s death, the king granted Torcy a brevet de retenue for the grand treasurer’s post of 350,000 livres, augmented to 500,000 livres on account of Croissy’s long illness (ibid., 442–3). A brevet de retenue fixed the sum that the holder of a non-venal, non-transferable charge was to be given by his successor. Barbiche, Institutions, 82, 191. Sourches, Mémoires, 7:3 (8 Jan. 1701). ss -Coirault, 2:31. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1384–8, discusses its ceremonies and includes a list of all the chevaliers. See also Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, 285–93. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:119, notes that on 2 February 1699, alongside the king, Torcy performed the ceremonial duties of the absent provost. Such ceremonial work continued even as war spread. Dangeau, Journal, 8:397 (24 Apr. 1702). Torcy also received 10,000 livres to hire two commis.

586

Notes to pages 216–17

216 Clairambault wrote Adam, 5 April 1699, concerning a recipient of the Order of Saint-Michael. aae md 1064, fol. 26. Torcy had to arbitrate among conflicting requests of members (ibid., 1137, fols 2–12, 10 Jan. 1705). Payments for the order’s officers went through the foreign ministry (ibid., 1055, fols 89 and 266; and ibid., 1056, fols 89 and 103r–v, both for 1698), Adam signed the treasurer’s accounts for 1699, for which he received 1,200 livres, and he received another 400 livres for other work for the various orders (ibid., 1064, fols 229–44). Bontemps signed a receipt for a collar of the Order of the Holy Spirit received from Adam, listed as Torcy’s intendant and premier commis (ibid., fol. 245). 217 See État de la France (1698), 1:207–8, 277–83, for the office and its functions. If a council meeting took place in the royal chamber, then these duties fell to the huissier de chambre (usher of the chamber). It was also the duty of the first valet of the chamber to stand by the entrance of any chamber in which a council met (ibid., 279, 283). According to Newton, Petite Cour, 89–92, the two cabinet ushers served at the same time, but this may have been an eighteenth-century practice. A member of the Vassal family had served in this office since at least 1661. Mémoires Rambouillet, 19:191; and État de la France (1661), 103. Vassal’s colleague, Baudoüin Chauvin, apparently did not receive a pension from Torcy. For payments to Vassal, see aae md 1055, fol. 8v (1698); ibid., 308, fol. 34v (1 Jan. 1710); and ibid., 309, fol. 65v (1 July 1711). In 1714 he was paid 600 livres for the last six months of 1713 and 600 for the first six months of 1714 (ibid., 1201, fols 269v and 285), with 600 every six months thereafter (ibid., 310, fols 346v and 363v; and ibid., 1207, fol. 179v). 218 aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 488v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 12 Oct. 1694. Earlier, in ibid., fol. 431r, 19 Apr. 1694, Bonrepaus had congratulated Blondel on his purchase of the office of treasurer of France with a gratification the king had given him to do so, calling it a mark of the monarch’s satisfaction with his service. This made Bonrepaus’s speculation plausible even though it proved not to be the outcome. 219 Callières’s close ties with Beauvillier and Chevreuse perhaps also afforded him “a power base of sorts of his own.” Nevertheless, he and Torcy continued to labour cooperatively and apparently without rivalry. Pope, ­Callières, ­116–17, 127–8 (quotation 128). He was Louis XIV’s second and last principal cabinet secretary, although he may have spent less time at his side as Louis’s health and activity waned (ibid., 191). Cabinet secretaries enjoyed lodgings at Versailles. Newton, Petite Cour, 92–4. The two venal posts of lecteur du roi (reader to the king) also offered access to the king and possible career advancement without requiring actual reading (ibid., 95–6). They enjoyed la première entrée (the first entry) to the king while he was still in his bed. Saule, Journée, 25–8. The influential and ambitious diplomat ­Bonrepaus,



220

221 222 223 224 225

226 227

228

229

Notes to pages 217–19

587

reader to the king 1685–1719, was often posted abroad. Newton, Petite Cour, 96n3. The other reader, Nicolas-Guillaume de Bautru de Vaubrun, Abbé Cormery, purchased his charge in 1696 but was in exile in Anjou from 1700 to 1710. ss-Boislisle, 5:342n3. Past secretaries and readers retained first entry even when no longer holding the office. État de la France (1698), 1:259. Although they received their gages through the household, they also received extraordinary gratifications from the foreign office. Master of Ceremonies Desgranges and his son, his “ayde des ceremonies” (aide for ceremonies), received 8,000 livres for their part in the trip through the south of France by the new Spanish queen on her way to Spain, including for travel expenses for themselves and a valet. aae md 310, fol. 350r–v. See Berger and Hedin, Diplomatic Tours, especially 66–7, for the May 1704 tour given to the Duke of Mantua and Torcy’s part in it. Quotations from Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:256. Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81, uses and develops this concept. See Ash, “Expertise,” on the role of such experts. Vittu, “Instruments,” 163. Baschet, Dépôt, 102–9; and Klaits, Propaganda, passim. For Renaudot, see Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37; and Niceron and Hardion, Mémoires, ­12:25–41. For Dubos, see Lombard, Du Bos; and for his interactions with Bayle, Lieshout, Making of Bayle’s Dictionnaire, passim. See ibid., 89, 214, 277, for Clément’s contributions. Renaudot had originally condemned the Dictionnaire on religious grounds, but he and Bayle later tried, at least on the surface, to reconcile (ibid., 36–7, 39–41, 43). For Bayle, “the single most widely read and influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment,” see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 331–41. Klaits, Propaganda, 177. Torcy had earlier tried to engage Davenant’s services for French propaganda (ibid., 107–12). Bayle, Correspondance, 9:xv. For Larroque, see chapter 6 below. Two letters from Dubos to Bayle, one from 1695 and another from 1696, are filled with literary news (ibid., 519–30, 577–89; the editorial notes are invaluable). Goldgar, Impolite Learning, 174–83; and Hauréau, Singularités historiques et littéraires, 286–324. Croissy’s friendship dated to his 1704 passage through Rotterdam on his return from England as a prisoner of war. Cerny, Theology, Politics, and Letters, 132–3. Lauer, Catalogue Clairambault, v–ix, discusses Pierre’s life and the history of the Order of the Holy Spirit he would eventually compile. ­Clairambault wrote Torcy, 26 June 1701, about the statutes of the Order of the Holy Spirit. aae md 1093, fols 264–5. He also wrote the minister about his research on the order’s profession of faith (ibid., 1175, fol. 193, 3 Dec. 1703). Torcy wrote Chamillart, 15 December 1706, to authorize 1,200 livres

588

230

231

232

233 234

35 2 236 237 238

Notes to pages 219–20 to ­Clairambault for research, registers, and writings, and 90 livres for the binding of eight volumes relating to the order (ibid., 1144, fol. 326). They exchanged other letters on research, ceremonies, and abuses of the order’s rituals and its ceremonial cordonne bleu (sky-blue ribbon) (ibid., 1160, fol. 116, Clairambault to Torcy, 15 Aug. 1709 [sic – in a volume for 1708]; and ibid., fol. 119, Torcy to Clairambault, 16 Aug. 1708). Torcy again wrote C ­ hamillart to authorize 1,200 livres to Clairambault for research and ­writing and 300 livres for the Sieur Le Clerc, who made designs for the order’s ceremonies, both drawn on marc d’or funds (ibid., 1169, fols 57–9, 13 Jan. 1710). Clairambault objected to Torcy that Cardinal Forbin-Janson’s desire to appeal to the pope about the rights of the Chevaliers of Malta and the Order of the Holy Spirit violated royal sovereignty. aae md 1106, fols 93–4, 18 July 1702. Clairambault reported to Torcy, 6 May 1703, that he had received a memoir printed in Spain on the incompatibility of French chivalric orders with those of Spain. bn Clairambault 452, fol. 41. On 12 May 1703, Le Grand sent Clairambault from Madrid three notebooks about the Spanish nobility (ibid., fol. 44). Someone wrote Torcy, 8 February 1704, reporting that Clairambault had visited him on the minister’s behalf concerning the rights of the marc d’or. bn naf 22940, fol. 2. The marc d’or was separate from the Royal Orders. ­Bluche, Dictionnaire, 962. Adam examined the accounts of one of the treasurers of the marc d’or on behalf of order grand treasurer Gilbert Colbert, marquis de Saint-Pouange. aae md 1193, fol. 93, Adam to Saint-Pouange, 27 Jan. 1704. This and the following paragraph are largely based on Niceron and Hardion, Mémoires, 26:123–50; Baschet, Dépôt, 102–5; Klaits, Propaganda, 246–66; Thuillier, Première école, 15–16, 32–53, 57–8, 63–74; and Delavaud, Pomponne, 280n1. Concurrent with his work for Torcy, Le Grand made extensive use of primary sources for a manuscript on Louis XI that he left unpublished. Bakos, Images of Kingship, 9, 59, 78, 117–21. bn Clairambault 452, fol. 44, Le Grand to Clairambault, 12 May 1703, Madrid. Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 452–3 (based on a note on Le Grand in bn mf 22585, pp. 85–8). Le Grand appeared at the Regency’s outset among the department’s personnel. aae md 310, fols 292–3. Michaud et al., Biographie Universelle, 48:293–9. Ash, “Expertise,” 4–11, 17n on the definition of experts. Maber, “Knowledge as Commodity.” For Bayle’s Paris networks, see McKenna, “Conclusion.” Black, Diplomacy, 55–6, 89, underlines the importance of legal matters in diplomacy because of questions over protocol, sovereignty, and dynastic rights.

39 2 240 241 242 243 244

245 246

247 248

249 250 251

252

53 2 254

Notes to pages 220–5

589

Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 249. Cerny, Theology, Politics, and Letters, 128–38. Iberville, Correspondance, 1:lxxxviii–cvi. Pope, Callières, 49–52; and Schweizer, “Callières,” 621–2. Lieshout, “Retouches au portrait Bayle,” 57. Galland, Journal, 1: 500–1, 503, 505, 508, 520, 525–8. Brue sent his friend the orientalist Antoine Galland the design of an intaglio seal that belonged to the “chevalier de Torsy” to see what he thought of it. The editorial note identifies the chevalier as Torcy’s second son, Charles, who it says died in 1708 as a navy captain (ibid., 526, 526n1091). Charles, however, died as an infant in 1707, so it is likely that Galland meant his son Jean-Baptiste, who was not yet seven years old. bn mf 6679, fol. 100, 5 Jan. 1696, relates that he substituted for the ailing Introducer Bonneuil. See France, Recueil, 14:163n1 (for biographical data), 163–5, on his mission in Savoy; on Genoa, ibid., 19:181–200; and on guarding Ranuzzi, Blet, ­Nonces, 159–63. This embassy and Saint-Olon’s role in its reception are described in Breteuil, Mémoires, 47–84. Cossé Brissac et al., Sources du Maroc, 5:10. See aae md 1056, fol. 36r–v, 8 June 1699, for Saint-Olon’s travel reimbursement and gratification payment. Grenet, “Their Masters’ Voices?,” 10–12, discusses the elements of etiquette and control in such missions. See Hossain, “Employment and Training,” for Petit de la Croix and royal interpreters. Breteuil, Mémoires, 100–54. For these relationships, especially before 1691, see Trotter, “Vauban and Administration.” Virol, Vauban, 287, 293–4, 333–5, 373. Torcy thanked Vauban for sending a memoir from a former member of Besançon’s parlement concerning the king’s rights to the County of Montbelliard. aae md 1146, fol. 68, 20 May 1706. Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 40–1, 54–6, 223–35; and Torcy, Mémoires, 1:111, 112. aae md 1186, fol. 352, is an “État et estimation des Merchan­ disses faite à Bordeaux qui M. de Menager a demandé par sa lettre du 26 juillet 1712.” The author added a note that if Mesnager wanted any other such compilations he need only inform him. Sydney Smith, quoted in Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 505. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61; and Donaldson, Contingency Theory.

Chapter Six 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 125. 2 These are the descriptions of Samoyault, Bureaux, 220.

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Notes to pages 225–8

3 Torcy’s residence was on rue Vivienne. Adam lived on the nearby rue Neuve des Petits-Champs. Almanach Royal (1706), 168; and ibid. (1712), 86. Blondel lived on the same street (ibid.), as did Pecquet, at least by 1716 (ibid. [1716], 55). 4 Piccioni, Commis, 132, notes that most of them emerged from the lesser nobility or were soon ennobled by the king. 5 The title of commis was not one that offered great prestige when one reached a certain social level, which is why premiers commis were typically identified by the titles of the offices they held or at least they listed them first. See ­Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 294. For an example, see aae md 1197, fols ­16v–17r, a list of acquits patents for Jan. 1714, where Clair Adam is described as “[s]ecrétaire maison couronne de France et de nos finances, Trésorier général de nos Ambassadeurs et Ministre dans les Cours Étrangères et premier commis.” 6 Antoine, “Entourage,” 19. 7 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 445, uses this racing analogy. See Braun, “Staying on Top,” 258, on the need to be adaptable. 8 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 520–5. The chart in ibid., 525, exaggerates these changes by disconnecting commis from ministers in the period after 1691. See also Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 467–78. However, they overlook Torcy’s control of the post office (ibid., 476) and thus do not include him with Pontchartrain as an exception to the fact that the other great state servants no longer possessed accumulations of offices. 9 Unlike the position of premier commis based in part on skill, a venal office could be passed on to sons regardless of their ability. This fit nicely with a family strategy aimed at maintaining achieved status. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 141–3. Even outside of court offices, there was an “all-­ pervasiveness of dynastic thinking” (ibid., 166). On strategies of “socio-­ cultural reproduction” and the need for adaptability, see Braun, “Staying on Top.” 10 Antoine, “Entourage,” 19. 11 Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 13–14. 12 Mettam, Power and Faction, 45–54, especially 58; Smith, Merit, 57–91 (chap. 2, “Family and the Personal Modality”); and Braun, “Staying on Top,” 246, who observes that “intergenerational transfer of ‘property rights’ [which he says includes economic, social, and cultural capital (ibid., 233)] requires family planning in the broadest sense of the word” and “a degree of selfdenial on the part of all individual family members” (ibid., 247). 13 Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 125–75, especially 137. Although focused on the upper levels of offices/charges in the king’s household, this article offers insights that apply to the more humble premiers commis. See also Braun, “Staying on Top,” 255–6.



Notes to pages 228–30

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14 For Mignon, also a secretary of the king, see bn po 1963, fol. 63; aae md 1017, fol. 35; and ibid., 302, fols 122–4, 194. See also Piccioni, Commis, 163–5; Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, 159, 167; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:967. 15 As will be explained below, parts of the family tree remain uncertain. 16 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 152. 17 Numbers (I and II) have been added to the name René Mignon for the sake of clarity. 18 For the Pot de Rhodes connection, see Cher, Inventaire Cher, 2: (série D) 131–2, 137. Several entries make it clear that Mignon loaned money to various members of the family and their spouses. For the Pot de Rhodes family and the household, see Duindam, Courts, 189–90; and Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 41–7. 19 Babelon, “Mansart et Châteauneuf,” 81–96, a useful overview of ­Châteauneuf’s career, mentions René I Mignon’s work on various building projects. 20 The earliest record of him in l’Aubespine’s service is on 21 May 1623 in an entry in the Registres des insinuations (registers of donations) involving his wife Gertrude La Houst and a house. It names him his secretary and guard of the small seal of justice, and dwelling at l’Aubespine’s residence on rue Grenelle (St Eustache parish). This summary in an y 163, fol. 492v, as well as other helpful information about the Mignons and their connections, was generously provided by Patricia M. Ranum (communication to the author of 7 Jan. 2011). 21 Mignon’s arrest is discussed in a letter from Laffemas to Séguier in ­Depping, Études Jars, 61–2; in Richelieu, Lettres, 4:428n1; in Cousin, Chevreuse, 403–4 (he was interrogated by Claude de Boullion and Claude and Léon Bouthillier); and in Bassompierre, Journal, 4:152–3. 22 Mazarin, Lettres, 6:48–9, Mazarin to Abbé Fouquet, 19 Sept. 1653, informs him that the king approved the proposal for Châteauneuf’s heirs made by the new first president of the Paris parlement, Pomponne II de Bellièvre, who himself had acted equivocally during the Fronde (ibid., 759–60). Chosen by Châteauneuf as his sole executor, he in turn gave “full executionary powers” (3 Oct. 1653) to Mignon. Olson, Poussin, 82, 261n75. 23 For his role in seeing to Châteauneuf’s funeral and tomb, see Jongleux, Chroniques, 1545–5; Chaleix, Buyster, 142–4; and, for Mignon as agent, Chauleur and Louis, Mansart, 369. See also Babelon and Mignot, Mansart, 123–5 (Montrouge), 222–3 (the tomb). 24 Babelon and Mignot, Mansart, 193, 198nn8–9. It is worth recalling that the Colberts of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were masons, entrepreneurs, and architects. Murat, Colbert, 1–2. 25 Bergin, Richelieu, 44.

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Notes to page 231

26 Ibid., 41–4, 68, 140. Bergin’s study of the cardinal’s fortune offers insight into this often hidden or ignored milieu of wealth management. One need only recall the position, albeit an extreme example, of Colbert in Mazarin’s service to see how this could rebound to the servant’s advantage. Taking on such a seemingly servile occupation hardly constituted a loss of status for someone on the rise. For Colbert in this regard, see Dessert, Royaume Colbert, especially chap. 2. 27 Her name comes from the marriage contract of Charles Noblet and Gertrude Mignon on 5 June 1644 in an mc/et/lix/101 (graciously provided by ­Alexandre Cojannot, conservator at the Archives des Affaires étrangères). Gertrude La Houst’s origins are noted in Paris, Inventaire-sommaire HôtelDieu, 1:92, which indicates that she was born in 1601. Her naturalization letter is in Archives ap-hp, Hôtel-Dieu 1522. A 1639 extract from the 21 May 1623 marriage contract notes that her uncle Pierre Fouquet, who apparently died in 1639, had given her a sum at her marriage and subsequently made her his heir (ibid., 1523). Maïlys Mouginot, archivist at the Service des Archives de l’ap-hp in Paris graciously provided copies of both these documents, and Alexandre Cojannot kindly transcribed and commented on them. 28 Seine, Montrouge, 11 (dated 21 Aug. 1654). Montrouge is just outside and to the south of Paris’s encircling peripheral boulevards. The agreement provided that should the church ever be rebuilt, the churchwardens would place the Mignons’ pew in the most eminent place in the church, as it was presently, and do the same for their tomb and epitaph if they were deceased. It listed them as “sieur et demoiselle Mignon” (Mr and Mrs Mignon). Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “demoiselle,” says it was an old term for the wife or daughter of a gentleman of noble extraction, whereas now (in 1690) madame was preferred and demoiselle was reserved for an unmarried daughter of merchants and their social betters. See Braun, “Staying on Top,” 257, on church pews as insignia of rank. 29 Magny, Nobiliaire universel, 6:166. Their eldest son, Robert-Richard ­Marpon, was fifty-three years old when he died in 1691. Perrot, Journal, 132. Thus, Jean and Charlotte likely wed before 1638, although if born legitimate, Charlotte must have been quite young, since her parents wed in 1622. 30 In 1662 he was called “écuyer, conseiller-secrétaire du roi, maison & couronne de France, & de ses finances” in papers for their daughter Marguerite-­Aimée’s wedding to Antoine-Hercule Picon, sieur de Pousilhac, king’s councillor. Pièces fugitives, vol. 1, pt 2: 308. Picon, Colbert’s premier commis, decoded his secret correspondence. Colbert, Lettres, 4:314n1. Michel fils was son of the famous master stonemason Michel Villedo and related to the architect Libéral Bruant. Grouchy, “Artistes français,” 88, 88n2. Bauchal, Dictionnaire architectes, 568–9, 589, either ignores Michel Villedo



31

32

33

34

Notes to pages 231–2

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fils or confuses him with his father, as does Fournier, Énigmes, 179–92, and Moulin, Maçons, 15, 130, 145 (she suggests that he was born c. 1580 and died in 1650 or c. 1670). Letters of provision were issued in 1652, however, to Michel Villedo and Michel Villedo fils, master stonemasons of the king, bridges, and highways of France. Robillard de Beaurepaire, Inventaire Seine-inférieure, 2:40. Tessereau, Histoire Chancelerie, 1:552, notes for March 1668 the succession of a new secretary of the king to the office held by the late Michel Villedo, likely Michel père. Francastel, Architectes, 2:264, notes that Michel fils frequently served as entrepreneur for the architect Louis Le Vau. He also collaborated with his brothers in creating new streets and houses in Paris. Fournier, Butte des Moulins, 79–86 (again, he mistakes Michel fils for his father). According to Ballon, Le Vau, 99, Michel fils died in 1685. Jeanne Mignon was Claude Bécuau’s widow. Boyer et al., Inventaire Cher, 73. Jeanne died in 1701. They had four sons: two cathedral canons; a priest who served Cardinal La Trémoille; and a captain in the Regiment of ­Piedmont. Guère, “Mémoires Gassot,” 246. A bailliage was a royal court of appeal from seigneurial courts or first instance for other cases, while a présidial was a special appeals court above it, but below a parlement. These are the parents of Charles Mignon’s nephew, Michel Fournier. Nothing is known of the father’s background, but there were a number of Fourniers who were master stonemasons and royal architects at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries such as Isaïe Fournier, an architect who served Henri IV and Louis XIII. Bauchal, Dictionnaire architectes, 225–7. For an earlier Nicolas Fournier, master mason in 1607, see Berty and Legrand, Topographie historique, 76–7. Ballon, Le Vau, 94, notes that mason families typically intermarried. Given her sister Anne’s marriage to Villedo fils, it is plausible that the Nicolas Fournier that Marguerite Mignon wed was descended from this earlier Nicolas and also a mason. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. For Charles Noblet’s death, see an y 5330, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 230, 24 Jan 1687, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres /zoom.php?idcollection=101&page=230. For Gertrude’s death, see an y 4090, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 266, 7 Oct. 1700, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=1327&page=266. See Lainé, Dictionnaire véridique, 2:276, on Charles Noblet and his son, Charles-François, later Torcy’s commis. For Charles’s service with Vitry since at least 1648, see Lhuillier, “Recherches L’hospital-Vitry,” 114. Thanks to Alexandre Cojannot for pointing out the Noblet-Vitry connection. Boyer et al., Inventaire Cher, 4:298. It is not clear when Marpon served as artillery commissioner. Jean was not a part of the naval appointments ­Colbert made in the 1680s. Since he was born in 1609, he may have held the

594

35 36

37

38

39

40

Notes to pages 232–3 post during the Richelieu era, possibly owing to the influence of his kinsman Richard. For Richard Marpon, see Tessereau, Histoire grande Chancelerie, 1:359 (he became a secretary of the king in 1634); and Bergin, Richelieu, 130, where he acted on Richelieu’s behalf in a land sale. For the family, see Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 8:100–3; and Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 49:325–9. Lainé, Dictionnaire véridique, 2:276, calls him the family’s “author.” For loans to and connections with Pomponne from at least the beginning of the 1660s, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 137, 163, 168, 245, 328, 334. Favre-­ Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:15–18, shows that during this period the Grand Chancellery was a businessmen’s club facilitating the rise of the legion of fiscal capitalists who served the royal treasury. Sedgwick, Travails, 195–202, discusses Pomponne during this period. His marriage to the daughter of Nicolas Foucquet’s wealthy cousin had become a political and fiscal liability, forcing him to borrow to renovate his family estate. The Arnaulds were suspected as Frondeurs (ibid., 140–62). Chatelain, Foucquet, 362, 495, discusses Villedo fils at Vau, while Tiberghien, Versailles, 94–5, 335, does so for Versailles. Colbert, Lettres, 5:447 (Louis Le Vau to Colbert, 11 Apr. 1663), describes his work at Saint-Germain with the architect and gardener Le Notre (ibid., 447n2, says that Villedo fils had been master of masonry works of the king’s buildings since 1654). See also LaCaille, “Partage du palais Mazarin,” 331–2. Colbert could be difficult for Villedo to please. Laprade et al., Orbay, 120. For his brothers François and Guillaume Villedo, who also served Colbert, see Fournier, Énigmes, 187–92; and Tiberghien, Versailles, 320. Pallet, Histoire du Berry, 5:46, says he was from a family of mayors and aldermen. Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, nouv. éd., 447–53, details the manoeuvrings by Claude’s brother Pierre while the princes were in ­Bourges in 1651. Intendant Auguste Robert de Pomereu observed to Colbert that Bécuau, while financially comfortable, was as a judge too influenced by friends. Pomereu included him among the many judges lacking in capability, knowledge, and devotion to duty. Michaud, “Basoche provinciale,” 180, 183–4. Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, nouv. éd., 483–92; and Marsy, “Médailles,” 156–7. Under his leadership and with the help of the intendant Mathias ­Poncet de la Rivière, Bourges received part of the augmentation of a local wine tax they requested for local needs. Toureau de Maisonneuve, “Vin vendu Bourges,” 235–7. Bourdel, “Nouveaux documents,” 216–19. The houses were lost in the early 1670s to Louis Le Vau’s creditors. Ranum, “Lully Plays Deaf,” 18–20, notes that René I Mignon, guardian of the bride of Marc-Antoine Charpentier’s cousin, had connections to a circle of Orléanist servants and clients that



41 42

43

44

Notes to pages 233–4

595

included the Lullys. For the quarrel with Lully, see ibid., 15–31; and Livet, Intrigues de Molière, 239. Ballon, Le Vau, 92–4. Michel, Biographie parlement Metz, 368–9; and Michel, Histoire parlement Metz, 125–33. An infantry captain was ordered imprisoned on 12 May 1661 after assaulting an avocat général of the parlement, identified in Boislisle’s notes as Jacques Mignon. Boislisle, “Mémoriaux Conseil 1661,” 1:285, 288. Advielle, Histoire de Sceaux, 220, lists him among the notables and servants of great personages, mostly dwelling in Paris, who appear in the parish records of Colbert’s estate outside Paris. René had given the house and land at Montrouge, less than four miles north of Sceaux, to Jacques and his brother René II in 1662. Meuvret, Problème des subsistances, 167. The legal minimum age for serving as an avocat general was thirty, but this was often gotten around by obtaining a dispensation, so that many entered the parlement in their mid-twenties. Hamscher, Parlement of Paris, 25–6. If Jacques Mignon was around twenty-five years old when he entered the parlement in 1656, this suggests that he was born c. 1631 and was thus the oldest son (if René II, born c.1638, was the oldest son, then Jacques would have been seventeen or so when he entered parlement, which seems unlikely). Jacques, who apparently led a dissolute life, lost his fortune before dying c. 1695 and left his widow dependent on charity for her lodgings. Bourdel, “Nouveaux documents,” 215–18, 234. Ballon, Le Vau, 108–26, convincingly accounts for Colbert’s actions in the context of his anger and disappointment over Le Vau’s “approach to architecture” (ibid., 7) and his failure to meet the exacting minister’s many expectations. Self-interest and a desire not to defend a dead father-in-law against a living patron likely account for Jacques Mignon’s actions, as did his own bad reputation (ibid., 216n78). Goy, “Journal Deffens,” 305, 305n2, records that Marguerite died in 1714 and René II in 1716. They married in 1675, but had no children (editor’s note says that he was seventy-eight years old, which would mean that he was born c. 1638). Mercure de France (May 1736), 1034, has François-Roger’s (1658–1736) obituary (Claude I was married in 1633 and died in 1685; the obituary mistakes his grandparents for his parents). Dessert, “Marine royale,” 83n30, discusses Robert’s career, but mistakes René II for Charles Mignon, Croissy’s premier commis. Révérend, Titres, 6:101, discusses Claude I but notes only two children. Rey, Château de la Chevrette, 29n1, says that Claude Robert, avocat au parlement, and his son, royal prosecutor at the Châtelet, owned Chevrette in 1663. Boislisle, Mémoires des intendants, 201, notes Claude II’s 1674 appointment and his death in 1719 at age eighty-six (born c. 1633), while Neymarck, Colbert, 2:468, marks Claude II’s presence during the drawing up of Colbert’s “inventory after death” as representative of his absent daughter, Marie-Anne Colbert, and her husband, Louis de

596

45 46

47

48 49

50

Notes to pages 234–5 Rochechouart, duc de Mortemart. The État de la France (1683), 2:507, notes his judicial connection with Villedo fils. Bély, Dictionnaire, 775–6, explains the Chambre des bâtiments. Tessereau, Histoire Grande Chancelerie, 1:467. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:47–8, discusses the practice of “rotation.” Meuvret, Production des céréales, vol. 2, pt 2: 167. François de l’Aubespine was a lieutenant general in the army and governor of Breda. Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:560. Fosseyeux, Hôtel-Dieu, 367, reports that on 20 May 1665 Jacques and René II, domiciled together on rue de l’Université, parish of Saint-Sulpice, sold two houses in Paris to the Hôtel-Dieu of Paris for 35,500 livres in order to pay the creditors of their father’s estate. See also Paris, Inventaire-sommaire Hôtel-Dieu, 92, 151. For Charles de l’Aubespine, see Moréri et al., Grand dictionnaire, 1:483–4. Villain, Fortune Colbert, 261, refers to René II in 1679 as l’Aubespine’s former secretary. From 1679 he was Colbert’s legal representative in various financial matters (ibid., 261–2, 266, 271). Colbert, Lettres, 7:90–1, 1313–12; ibid.,vol. 2, pt 2: 77; and ibid., 5:426. See also Loriquet, “Papiers Colbert récemment acquis,” 231–2. Connecting the various Mignons has been difficult. Samoyault, Bureaux, 208, 286, 299–300, for instance, mentions only some of Charles Mignon’s siblings: Marguerite, who married Fournier; and two other brothers, Michel and Pascal, who are known only insofar as each had a son, Pierre and Henry respectively, whom their uncle Charles brought into the department as commis. How can these Mignons be connected with the offspring of René I Mignon? Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006, notes that Gertrude Mignon, wife of Charles Noblet, was Charles Mignon’s sister, while Patricia Ranum (email message to author,7 Jan. 2011) expands upon and corrects Ranum, “Lully Plays Deaf,” 19n10, and cites the 1673 marriage contract from an mc/et/lxxv/164, 7 Feb. 1673, for René-Charles Noblet d’Ozonville, son of Gertrude and Charles Noblet, where René Mignon is listed as the groom’s maternal uncle. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 19–28. For his intendancies, see Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 44. Mignon received 400 livres from the Estates of Brittany in 1663. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:226. He countersigned documents issued by Croissy. One, dated 29 November 1663, is in Imbert, “Registre,” 69, while another, dated 18 August 1666 at Amiens, is in Huguet, Grand maréchal, ivn5 and appendix 3. Devèze, Admirable réforme, 119n43, mentions Croissy carrying out forestry reforms in Picardy on 30 July 1666 with Mignon as greffier. Mignon was likely with Croissy when he returned to Brittany in 1665 for the estates’ meeting and then inspected the coasts in September and October before returning to Tours.



Notes to pages 235–8

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51 Baschet, Dépôt, 63, notes Mignon’s time in England, but Piccioni, Commis, 163–4, based on his error in dating Mignon’s death in 1725 rather than in 1698, denies that letters from a “Mignon” in London in 1668 and 1669 to Du Fresne are from Charles Mignon. bl am 65138, fols 155 and 158–60, are accounts that Mignon kept in London of French subsidies paid to a ­ W. Chiffinch from 1670 to 1672. For Mignon and Pepys, see Holmes, Pepys in Paris, 10–11; Pepys, Further Correspondence, 280; and Pepys, Letters and Family Circle, 104, 118. 52 For Mignon at Nijmegen, see Doppler, “Journal du chanoine,” 177, 181–3. See also Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 480–1. Two further medals with the likeness of the king of Sweden were likely awarded Mignon by that monarch in conjunction with the 1679 signing of the Treaty of Saint-Germain between France and Brandenburg, restoring Swedish holdings on the Baltic. 53 Henri Gascard (1635–1701), “The Signing of the Peace between France and Spain” (oil on canvas, 161 x 274.5 cm), is now in the Valkhof Museum in Nijmegen. A black and white copy with an explanation is in Barber, Diplomacy, 111–12. 54 The comic actor and playwright Raymond Poisson had retired to Nantes in Brittany. On 15 September 1685, he wrote his friend Lagrange, ordinary comedian of the king at Fontainebleau, about the finances of an office he was requesting, ostensibly for himself, but actually for his son. Poisson asked Lagrange to go to controller general Le Pelletier with his request, but if he could not, then he was to approach Mignon, whom Poisson called obliging and the greatest of his friends. Lagrange was to persuade Mignon to speak on Poisson’s behalf and present the controller with his request. Poisson also mentioned that an M. Reval (?) of Nantes, a local notable who backed his request, was Mignon’s intimate friend. Curtis, Crispin Ier, 63–4. 55 Limon, Notaires au Châtelet, 170–2, 286, 371–2; and Dumas, “Conseil des prises,” 348–50, 367–9. 56 These visits are recounted in Holmes, Pepys in Paris, 10–11. Although he does not name the “Greffier of the Paris Naval Office,” it can only have been Lefouin. 57 Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 388, 394, 429, 436–7. For this family connection, see also Surun, Marchands de vin, 377–8. 58 After ten years as tutor, these cares ruined Lefouin and he lost all his furniture in a judgment of 1709. Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 431–3. 59 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:967, mistakes Mignon’s nephews for his sons. 60 Samoyault, Bureaux, 299–300. Pierre Mignon, who died childless (ibid., 223), had three sisters: one married a “voiturier” (carrier of goods), another a “charpentier” (carpenter), and a third a “maçon” (mason) (ibid., 208n25). Piccioni, Commis, 165, mistakenly calls Pierre one of Charles Mignon’s two sons.

598

Notes to pages 238–40

61 Piccioni, Commis, 190–3, says Fournier left the navy in 1678, whereas Samoyault, Bureaux, 37, 167, 286, says it was in 1683. Yet Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, note that Charles [sic] Fournier went to Nijmegen with his uncle Charles Mignon in 1678 and later became a commis. Fournier’s birth date is unknown, but Piccioni notes a 1774 statement by his grandson that his aged and ill grandfather retired in 1723 after forty-five years’ service. Since he went to Nijmegen as a youth, he was likely born c. 1660. Piccioni, Commis, 192. aae md 1017, fol. 63r–v, 6 Feb. 1691, calls Fournier Croissy’s commis, as did a 1692 payroll list (ibid., fol. 162). 62 Piccioni, Commis, 193; and Bély, Espions, 629. 63 Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, notes Péronne but without a date. For his treasurer’s offices, see Frondeville, “Registres-mémoriaux,” 208, 224. bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 35, says Fournier was king’s councillor, treasurer of France at Rouen, and Torcy’s commis. Traces of his financial activities surface in his 1691 loan of 14,000 livres to Paris mercers and a 1712 purchase of rentes from the Breton estates for 3,000 livres. Saint-Joanny, Registre marchands merciers, 178; and Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:356. Samoyault, Bureaux, 175, says that Louis XIV ennobled Fournier, whereas Piccioni, Commis, 191, thought this took place after his 1723 retirement; however, bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 35, indicates that he was ennobled by Louis XIV at least by 1711. 64 Piccioni, Commis, 192; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 285–6. 65 Gautier, “Histoire Grandchamp,” 240–1, 247–8. He says that Michel ­Fournier’s wife was “Mme Marie-Anne Guerreau,” although he is unsure of her surname’s transcription. Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, says they had eight children and that she died in 1741. The grant of Grandchamp is recorded in aae md 1210, fol. 120v. Fournier purchased an important cartulary for his son’s abbey in 1720. Michel-Georges was interred in the abbey church as were his two maiden sisters, in 1784 and 1786. 66 For biographical notes, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 168n1, 334 (a correction and addition); Piccioni, Commis, 186–7; Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1005–6. 67 For the elder Noblets, see Lainé, Dictionnaire, 2:276; Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1005–6. Lainé and ­Bluche say the father received his office in 1653, but Favre-Lejeune says it was in1651. For officers of the corporate “collège” of the secretaries of the king, see Olivier-Martin, Organisation corporative, 301–10. Sévigné, Lettres, 3:507–8, recounts a 1675 anecdote concerning Mme Noblet of the Hôtel Vitry, who was playing a Venetian card game with Monsieur. 68 France, Recueil, 4:151–60, details the mission. Forbin-Janson’s return is noted in Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 1:429. Traces of Noblet’s activities in Poland occur incidentally in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 8:129,



69

70

71 72 73 74

75

76 77

Notes to page 240

599

as part of the judicial process against one of Vitry’s staff who sold codes after Noblet’s departure. For Forbin-Janson and Pomponne, see Dainville-­ Barbiche, Correspondance Spada, 47. For Marie-Anne Contenot, see an y 5309, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 227, 21 July 1687, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=137&page=227. Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2; and Chazaud, Inventaire Allier, 429, lists her as his wife, but without indication that she was his first. Her father, Claude Contenot, became an auditor in 1650 and her brother of the same name became one in 1680. État de la France (1674), 2:330; and ibid. (1683), 2:463. Marie-Anne, daughter of Noblet and Marie-Anne Contenot, in 1706 wed Pierre-François Maissat, honorary councillor in the Grand Chamber of the Paris parlement. Mercure de France (Nov. 1741), 2547 (her obituary). For her guardianship, see an y 4023a, Registres de tutelles, fol. 476, 15 May 1691, http://doc.geneanet.org/ registres/zoom.php?idcollection=4396&page=746 Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006, mention his second wife, but not his first. Favre-Lejeune mistakes Toussaint’s step-sister Anne-Marie for a daughter of Marguerite Navarre, as does the entry for Toussaint Noblet in “Nobiliaire et armorial Grand collège,” 293–4. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. Toussaint was later secretary to d’Argenson, garde des sceaux during the Regency. ss -Boislisle, 7:344n3. See Marion, Dictionnaire, 84, for this office. France, Recueil, 15:312–14. He received it from Cardinal Forbin-Janson in Rome on 2 April 1697. Marsy, Liste des chevaliers, 40. Diplomats were often rewarded with membership in this order. Ducourtial, Ordres, 36. The audience was noted in the Gazette. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:626. See ss-Boislisle, 4:246n2, for Forbin-Janson to Pontchartrain, 22 July 1697; and Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314, Bossuet to Abbé ­Bossuet (in Rome), 5 Aug. 1697, on his meeting with Noblet. Abbé Bossuet, the bishop’s nephew, regularly sent him news from Rome. On 20 October 1698 (ibid., 10:261–2) he asked his uncle to praise Poussin, secretary to the new envoy to Rome, in the hearing of Noblet (his predecessor as secretary), Torcy, and Pomponne. On 17 November, Bossuet reported that he had sung ­Poussin’s praises before both ministers and would continue to do so, also promising not to neglect Noblet (ibid., 293). In 1699 Bossuet appealed to Torcy on his nephew’s behalf in his dispute with the irascible Cardinal Bouillon (ibid., 12:47–51, 54–8). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 16n57. ss -Boislisle, 4: 246–7. On 19 August 1697 (ibid., 7:344n3a) Ursins had written Pomponne from Rome that Noblet was good to her in a thousand ways (“m’était bon à mille choses”). For her salon, see Goulet, “Cercle Ursins à

600

78

79

80

81 82

83

84 85

Notes to page 241 Rome.” It is almost certain that someone like Noblet attended this salon while in Rome. Anne-Madeleine Goulet, email message to author, 7 and 12 July 2012. Princess Lanti to Prince Lanti, 30 June 1698. A transcription of his letter from the fonds Lante of the Archivo di Stato in Rome was kindly provided by Anne-Madeleine Goulet. Piccioni, Commis, 186–7, says Noblet entered Torcy’s department in August, but Lanti’s letter suggests that it happened a bit earlier. For Pomponne and the Le Telliers, see Sedgwick, Travails, 147, 195, 198, 218. Pomponne, however, had poor relations with Louvois, who considered him a rival minister and later joined with Colbert to engineer his fall. Denis, Archives Cogner, 70, shows him arranging leases in 1677. A 12 August 1680 document calls him Louvois’s intendant. Loizeau de ­Grandmaison, Inventaire Indre-et-Loire, 377. Dessert, Argent, 513, 659. Pénicaut, “Commis,” 92, 92n34, says that d’Ozonville’s marriage was in 1688, but this is contradicted by the marriage contract in an, Minutier central, Étude LXXV, 164, 7 Feb. 1673 (from Patricia Ranum, email message to author, 7 Jan. 2011). Marguerite married (6 July 1684) Georges-Hélie Gardien, nephew of Hélie du Fresnoy (d. 1698), Louvois’s and Barbezieux’s premier commis, who, probably on his uncle’s recommendation, served from c. 1696 to 1715 (ibid., 111). There were two other sisters. Anne Noblet married Philippe de Bonnet de Thou, councillor in the Bourges présidial. Guère, “Mémoires Gassot,” 231, 235; and Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, 57. An unnamed sister wed Charles Belet, secretary of the queen, farmer of the large and small duties of the Breton estates, farmer general of salt of Lyon, Provence, and Dauphiné, receiver general of finances at Rouen, and a secretary of the king, 1676–89. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:185. Martin, Catalogue Arsenal, 6:29, records that sometime during 1697–99 an unspecified “Noblet” approached Pomponne about acquiring a charge of secretary of the king. It was probably Charles-René d’Ozonville, as his brother already held one. Dangeau, Journal, 7:449, 8:25–6; Lizerand, Beauvillier, 199, 415–16, ­419–22, 431–2, 435, 447–8; and Louis and Beauvillier, Lettres, 406. Dangeau, Journal, 7:449 (5 Dec. 1700), initially labeled Noblet Torcy’s commis but later his premier commis (ibid., 8:394, 20 Apr. 1702). Saint-Simon (ss-Boislisle, 7:344), only calls him a premier commis, but Boislisle’s notes say that Noblet was listed as a simple commis in 1700 acquits patents (ibid., 344n3). Sourches, Mémoires, 7:11, 9:434, called him a commis in 1701 and 1705. Piccioni, Commis, 186–7, says that he remained a simple commis. However, an editor’s note in Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2, says



86

87

88 89

90

91

Notes to page 242

601

that Noblet became a premier commis upon his return from serving Forbin-­ Janson in Rome and before going to Spain at the end of 1700. Bourgogne and Beauvillier, Lettres, 114, 414 (on Pajot); aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 28, Torcy to Noblet, 5 Dec. 1700 (on Pajot); ibid., fol. 47, Noblet to Torcy, 8 Dec. 1700 (on his lodgings); ibid., fol. 37, Torcy to Noblet, 7 Dec. 1700 (on sending a Spanish formulary for Philip V’s letters); ibid., fol. 156, Noblet to Torcy, 9 Dec. 1700 (detailing his translation work); ibid., fol. 161, Torcy to Noblet, 17 Dec. 1700 (entrusting him with the composition of letters because he knows it will be done well, but nonetheless urging him to work quickly and to write letters that are neither too long nor too dry); and ibid., fol. 337, Noblet to Torcy, 18 Dec. 1700 (explaining how he is using Torcy’s formulary to devise forms of address). See also Beauvillier’s request (9 Dec. 1700) and Louis XIV’s marginal notations the next day about sending formularies to Noblet. Bourgogne and Beauvillier, Lettres, 406. When in 1710 the ailing Spanish queen wanted to take the waters at Bagnères-deLuchon across the border in France, Torcy made the protocol arrangements. Torcy, Journal, 311. aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 253r, Torcy to Noblet, 26 Dec. 1700, about a diamond in his care. For the portraits, see ibid., fol. 200, Desgranges to Torcy, 12 Dec. 1700. Not surprisingly, Torcy signed the wedding contract when Rigaud married in 1703. Guiffrey, “Contrat de marriage,” 58, 61. ss -Boislisle, 8:64; Sourches, Mémoires, 7:11; and Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:676. Dangeau, Journal, 8:394, 436; and Lizerand, Beauvillier, 527–8, B ­ eauvillier to Noblet, 2 July 1703. After Noblet’s death, Sourches, Mémoires, 9:434, observed that while there was no appointements attached to the post, it was a coveted one. Noblet, temporarily employed in the royal household, counted Beauvillier among his protectors, reporting that the duke would intercede to obtain him lodging at Fontainebleau during his return to court. Noblet to Torcy, 11 Sept. 1703 (aae cp Autriche 84, fol. 56). For negotiations: aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 144, Torcy to Noblet, 9 May 1702; ibid., fol. 145r, Noblet to Torcy, 9 May 1702; and ibid., fol. 207, Torcy to Noblet, 30(?) May 1702. For news-gathering: ibid., fols 157–8v, May 1702 (Noblet sent pamphlets in German); ibid., 81, fol. 200, Noblet to Torcy, Aug. 1702 (questioned prisoners); ibid., fol. 223, Noblet to Torcy, 30 Aug. 1702 (news from Brandenburg); ibid., 83, fol. 32r–v, an intercepted letter of 8 July 1703 from Prince Louis of Baden to Zinzendorf; ibid., fols 77ff, intercepted letters of Zinzendorf to the Emperor, 16 July 1703; and ibid., fol. 215v, Torcy to Noblet, 15 Aug. 1703 (news-gathering through the Strasbourg post office). aae cp Autriche 83, fol. 69 (an order of battle for the 1703 Rhine campaign); ibid., fol. 164, Noblet to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1703 (on Vauban and ­Tallard);

602

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93 94

95 96

97

Notes to pages 242–5 and ibid., fol. 268, Noblet to Torcy, 27 Aug. 1703 (on conflicts between ­Vauban and various officers over siege technique). British Museum, Catalogue of additions, 225, 228. At the bottom of a letter to Gualterio in Paris, Forbin-Janson added a note asking the nuncio to deliver a letter enclosed for Noblet. bl am 20356, fol. 65r, 4 July 1705. aae cp Venise 145, fol. 205, Pomponne to Torcy, 21 Nov. 1705. Ibid., Rome 462, fol. 288, Torcy to Forbin-Janson, 8 Nov. 1705. Favre-­ Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:49, says that Noblet resigned his office in 1720; and ibid., 2:1005, says he died in 1732, while Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329, says he died around 1729. His 1705 death, however, is recorded by Dangeau, Journal, 10:490 (11 Dec.); and Sourches, Mémoires, 9:434 (7 Dec.), who says he died of an inflammation of the lungs. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, 60–2, 102; and Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:252–4. Louis and Elisabeth had nine children. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, ­1:227–8, with entries for Joseph and François, says that both were born in 1661. Joseph, however, was likely the older of the two, since along with being sieur de Gagny he inherited the Azincourt title after the death of Paul in 1701 (Paul, forty-seven when he died, was the eldest son, born in about 1654). Favre-Lejeune is the only source for Louis Blondel’s alleged connection with a parlement and apparently the source for its repetition in Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:252. As an avocat en parlement, Louis Blondel may have been a titular barrister, that is, one with legal training but not actually practising before a parlement. See Bell, Lawyers, 27–8, on barrister titles. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253, says that Charles-François was born “9 février 1693,” but this is clearly a misprint, perhaps for 1663, a date more in line with those of his siblings. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 102, confuses Marie with Catherine-Charlotte, who is not listed among the nine children. The remaining siblings had religious vocations. For the sake of clarity, Paul will be referred to as Azincourt, Joseph as Gagny, François as Blondel, and Charles-François as Jouvancourt. Piccioni, Commis, 188, bases this date on aae md 314, fol. 61, a 1725 order from Louis XV based on the petition of that year from Blondel’s widow the day following Blondel’s death. It spoke of his thirty-five years as Croissy’s and Torcy’s secretary (he left the department with Torcy in 1715). See also bn Car. H. 99, fols 310–11. The title of his position varies among commentators. Sahuc, Archives Saint-Pons, 1:1909–2, calls him Croissy’s commis in descriptions of legal papers for grants made in 1689–92. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228, calls him principal commis under father and son. Rott, Inventaire, 4:479, lists Blondel as Torcy’s secretary in 1698 and as a commis in 1699 (ibid., 343). Baschet, Dépôt, 275, says he was both a secretary and a premier commis, whereas Piccioni, Commis, 188–9, says that Baschet was mistaken in calling him a premier commis. The primary sources also use these labels



98

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100

101 102 03 1 104

105

06 1 107

Notes to pages 245–7

603

inconsistently and interchangeably. bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 2 (Nov. 1711), calls him Torcy’s secretary, while bnpo 371, fol. 33 (Dec. 1711), lists him as Torcy’s secretary and premier commis. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61. For Blondel’s marriage contract, see bn, Car. H. 99, fols 310–11v. For Marin, see Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228; and Villain, Fortune Colbert, 145, 147n9, 167–9, 183, 186, 213–14, 220, 261, where Marin is also called Colbert’s commis and secretary. For Marin’s office in the queen’s household, see État de la France (1665), 2: n.p. aae md 1009, fol. 144 (Mar. 1693); and ibid, 1019, fol. 235 (June 1693). Bonrepaus still called him Croissy’s commis in a letter of that year (ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 354). aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 431r, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 19 Apr. 1694. As a further sign of Blondel’s enhanced position, Bonrepaus solicited his help in obtaining a pension for his brother, Lieutenant General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac. Frondeville, “Registres-mémoriaux,” 221–2, reports that Rouen’s Chambre des comptes received a royal order that Blondel receive the office’s gages in 1696, the same year he sold it. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 488v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 12 Oct. 1694. Samoyault, Bureaux, 219–20; he lists several such interdepartmental friendships, albeit from after 1715. Meyer, “Marine française,” 488–9, 506–8; and Bergin, Richelieu, 94–118. Taillemite, Colbert, 16; Luçay, Origines, 588–92; Ranum, Richelieu, 34–5, 72n1, 98–9; Sarmant, Ministres guerre, 84, 205; Bluche, Dictionnaire, 41; and Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, 31–3, 36. Luçay, Origines, 49, 593, says they were reunited in 1644 but only briefly, and Taillemite, Colbert, 16, concurs. Barbiche, Institutions, 178, 212, says they were united from 1642 until 1661. Dessert, La Royale, 22, says the navy was entrusted to Foreign Secretary Brienne when Mazarin assumed power and then Louis XIV gave the Levant to Le Tellier in 1661. Why this confusion? When Michel Le Tellier was named secretary of state for war on 13 April 1643, he exercised his duties only by commission. Secretary François Sublet de Noyers refused to relinquish the office, so Le Tellier lacked full legal standing as secretary until 20 October 1645 with Sublet’s death. André, Michel Le Tellier, 93–101, 665–6; and Sarmant, Ministres guerre, 238. Thus, it is likely that Brienne handled Le Tellier’s official paperwork for the Mediterranean fleet from 1643 to 1645. Brienne also filled in for Le Tellier as head of the war department when he was in exile during the Fronde (ibid.). In any event, the documents generated on behalf of the diminished Mediterranean fleet paled in volume and importance beside those of the new war secretary’s military responsibilities. Meyer, “Marine française,” 512–13. Taillemite, Colbert, 17–21; and Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 180–1.

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Notes to pages 247–9

108 Consulates returned to the foreign ministry briefly from 1762 to 1764 and then definitively in 1793. 109 The règlement of 7 March 1669 is in Colbert, Lettres, vol. 3, pt 1: 104–5. See also Poumarède, “Naissance d’une institution,” 65–128; Mézin, ­Consuls, 3–4, 9–11, 16–17, 20–3; Barbiche, Institutions, 220–2; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 201–11. Mansel, Levant, 1–15, offers a quick introduction to the Levant and describes Pera, a suburb outside the walls of Constan­ tinople by the Christian district of Galata, where the embassies were located. 110 See Mézin, Consuls, 362–3, on La Chausse. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 4:32–3, La Chausse to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1711, reported on the magnificent decorations for the memorial service for the late Grand Dauphin and the complaints of a cardinal of the Austrian faction. He sent the minister a copy of the relation of the service he had written and published in Italian for propaganda purposes. He also assisted Torcy with his own art purchases (ibid., 100). In 1712 there was a flurry of letters about an incident in which Roman constables accosted a liveried porter of the French Academy of Painting and Sculpture while he bathed in the Tiber (ibid., 116–17, 123, 135, 138, 148). When the affair was finally resolved to the satisfaction of Louis XIV’s honour, La Chausse wrote Torcy (10 Sept. 1712) implying that Cardinal La Trémoille, the French envoy, had lacked force in defending French honour (ibid., 146). He also worked with Torcy to purchase on behalf of Philippe d’Orléans the art collection of the late Queen Christiana of Sweden from her indebted heirs. Ancel, “Tableaux Christine,” 223–7. 111 Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 179. See Colbert, Lettres, vol. 3, pt 1: passim, for his letters to Croissy in London on naval matters. 112 Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 128. For Smyrna, see Paris, Histoire du commerce, 437–5; and Mansel, Levant, 16–35, who notes that the city of 100,000 was known as the “eye of Asia” and the “pearl of Asia.” 113 Mansel, Levant, 27. 114 Mézin, Consuls, 29–44, on the “nation” and consular functions. On these tensions, see Masson, Histoire du commerce, 2404–3; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:3–34, 231–6. 115 Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5: 44–64; and Masson, Histoire du commerce, 193–7, 242–7. Bonrepaus, who later formed a close relationship with the Blondel brothers, was sent by Seignelay to Provence to mediate differences among the company directors. Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 117–18, has summaries of Gagny’s letters. 116 Masson, Histoire du commerce, 243–4, 258–68; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:67–71. 117 The letters from Châteauneuf to the navy secretary and others are summarized in Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 121–31 (the



118

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120 121

122

123

124

125

Notes to pages 249–50

605

index mistakenly credits all of its Blondel references to Charles Blondel de ­Jouvancourt, Joseph’s brother). Neuville, État Archives marine, 32; Peter, Manufactures Marine, 184–6; and Taillemite, Archives marine Série B Tables, 269, which says that Gagny retired from this post in 1695. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 33. The date and location are from Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253. Marie-Madeline’s obituary is in Le Mercure (1723), 621–2. ­Dessert, Argent, 586, notes Augustin Ferriol’s role as a financier. See Asse, “Président de Ferriol,” 129–40, 161–71, for fuller biographical information. For the Ferriol family, see Michel, Biographie Parlement de Metz, 159–60. For Charles Ferriol, see France, Recueil, 29:150–1. As aptly named and described by Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 19; and Dessert, La Royale, 74–7. Dessert, Argent, 699–700; and Boislisle, “Bonrepaus,” 88–91, 105–11, ­153–9, 166–75, 181–92, 196–203, provide biographical details. Bonrepaus served as a galley officer, commissioner general of the marine en Ponant, intendant general of the navy, and inspector of the classes, undertaking missions to England and Denmark for the foreign secretary. He was also a tax farmer and businessman involved in various Colbert royal companies and furnishing the navy with food supplies. Dessert, La Royale, 58–9. cp Danemark 47, fol. 350, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 15 Dec. 1693, instructed him to send his 6,000 livres gratification to Blondel, who would give it to his banker Lubert. On 27 July 1694 Bonrepaus wrote Blondel about funds owed to him. Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 323. cp Danemark 47, fols 365–8, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Oct. 1693. Ibid., fol. 368v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 8 Dec. 1693, said that he wanted 18,000 livres for the commissaire, but would ask 14,000, and that he had already drawn 1,500 écus from his banker Lubert. For the sale of such commissions, see Barbiche, Institutions, 82, 191. An inventory of Bonrepaus’s outgoing correspondence (other than official dispatches to the king and the foreign secretary) for 6 April–15 December 1699, the period of his second ambassadorship in The Hague, mentions all three acting on his behalf: for Blondel, Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 9, 18, 25, 27, 30–2, 35–8, 40; for Gagny, ibid., 13, 32, 37, 40; and for Azincourt, ibid., 25. Mensonides, however, misidentified (ibid., 13) “Blondel” as the recipient of a letter congratulating him upon becoming a treasurer of the king’s buildings, which was clearly intended for his brother Gagny, identified elsewhere in the inventory as “Blondel, trésorier des bâtiments.” This suggests that other letters in the inventory marked as to Blondel were in fact to Gagny, who was a large-scale financier. Bonrepaus’s letters to Blondel, 1693–99, are excerpted in Picard, ­Corpus Racinianum, 300, 314, 323–6, 343, 348–50. See also Picard, “Racine

606

126

127 128 29 1 130

131

132

133

134

135 136

Notes to pages 251–2 courtisan,” 726–43. For Cavoye, see ss-Coirault, 1:137, 275–7, 610 (his friendship with Racine). For the Bontemps, see ibid., 808–10. Mme B ­ ontemps promoted her son in the household. He accompanied Philip V to Spain as first valet of the wardrobe and confidant (ibid., 7:855–6). Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 324–5, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 10 Aug. 1694. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 171, 171n122, stresses that absent ambassadors needed friendly forces at court to watch out for their interests. Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 343, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 5 Feb. 1695. Ranum, Artisans of Glory, 292–6, 310, 316, 316n97; and Picard, “Racine courtisan,” 728–9. Hampton, “Tragedy of Delegation.” Biographical details for Jean-Baptiste are in Racine, Oeuvres, 1:120–2, ­164–7. Ibid., 7:139n2, 159–60, 193, 193n2–195, 198–202, 226–8, 249, 256, 258–60, 265, 272–4, 280–2, are relevant letters between Racine family members. Ibid., 226; and Turgeon, “Letters Racine to Renaudot,” 172–83. For the positive assessment of young Racine that Torcy gave to his father, see Picard, “Racine courtisan,” 742. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 125. For his titles, see Hozier and Tupigny, Armorial Paris, 1:55. For her death, see an y 5331, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 307, 19 June 1692. http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=100&page=307 These duties are described in Ordonnance de Louis XIV, 209–14. ­Azincourt’s position as a treasurer is unclear. Ibid., 403–34, describes the accounting procedures and the role of the two general treasurers of the navy (one for the Atlantic and one for the Mediterranean) and their commis at each port. See also Legohérel, Trésoriers généraux. The Atlantic general treasurer from 1678 to 1705 was not Azincourt but Lubert (ibid., 67), Bonrepaus’s banker. Perhaps Azincourt was Lubert’s commis at Dunkirk, but his title of trésorier confuses matters. The marriage was to Ludwine-Charlotte-Louise Van der Mersch ­(Vandermeersch) and produced four children. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 125. Her father, François Van der Mersch, was the “utérin-frère” (half-brother on his mother’s side) of Bart’s second wife, Marie-Jacqueline Tugghe. ­Mancel, “Famille de Jean Bart,” 333–4, 435; and Van der Mersch, Révolution ­Belgique, 46, 49. Van der Mersch was a volunteer with Bart from 1688 and entered the navy in 1703, continuing as a corsair with a royal vessel and advancing in the fleet. Malo, Corsaires, 2:430–1. Lesmaires, “Imprimeries,” 225–6. Jal, Dictionnaire, 1252–4, has an entry on Vergier. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:22 (although the editor could not identify the brother, Azincourt seems likely).



Notes to pages 252–3

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137 Dangeau, Journal, 4:211 (20 Dec. 1692), on their departure from court; and ibid., 247 (16 Mar. 1693), on Bart’s safe return to Dunkirk. 138 Writing from Denmark, Bonrepaus mentioned to Blondel that his brother was traveling on his behalf to Provence with a letter of exchange. Writing to Blondel’s brother the same day with further instructions, Bonrepaus addressed him as councillor and secretary of the king and “général des vivres de la Marine” (commissary general of the navy). aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 45v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 26 Mar. 1697; and ibid., fols 47r–48, ­Bonrepaus to Azincourt, 26 Mar. 1697. Not long after, Blondel received a letter from Bonrepaus’s brother, Lieutenant General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac, assuring him that the ambassador owed his brother a great deal (ibid., fol. 108). See also ibid., fol. 203r, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 9 July 1697. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 393, observes that the label councillor and secretary of the king was given so widely as to be almost meaningless. However, in aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 399, Bonrepaus wrote Blondel on 15 October 1697 that because he had not received a response from Torcy to his letters, his ordonnances were in the hands of “Mr Blondel [d’Azincourt] général des vivres.” 139 Azincourt was among the notables, including navy intendant Claude Cébéret and Jean Bart buried in choir of Saint-Eloi in Dunkirk. Lemaire, “Peut-on espérer retrouver les restes de Jean Bart?,” 296. After his death his widow, who apparently moved to Paris to be near her powerful Blondel kinsmen, was in possession of a good library. On 29 May 1710 Iberville wrote ­Gualterio that the books he wanted were kept chez Mme d’Azincourt, widow of Blondel’s brother. He would find a way of sending them to London. bl am 20351, fol. 138. 140 Dessert, La Royale, 62–5, describes this system, while ibid., 290–3, lists the members of the companies. On Lubert and du Pille, see ibid., 66. Dessert, Argent, has brief biographies of many of the two companies’ financiers, but his only mention of Joseph Blondel de Gagny (ibid., 586) mistakes him for his brother the général des vivres. 141 Both labels are from Dessert, La Royale, 74–7. For discussion of these groups, especially in connection with Chamillart, see Rowlands, Financial Decline. 142 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:227. 143 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, dates his appointment 1 September, whereas Deschard, Organisation, 105, dates it 1 November. 144 Chapman, Private Ambition, 117–29. 145 Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 77, on Ferriol’s military career in the east. For his early missions and instructions, see France, Recueil, 29:149–62. ­Bonnac, Mémoire, 48–9, claims that Ferriol originally fled to Poland because of a liaison with the daughter of a great family. When a quarrel with a Polish

608

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148 149

150

151 152

153

154

Notes to pages 254–5 magnate over a gambling debt threatened to turn violent, the French ambassador to Warsaw sent Ferriol to Hungary to join the rebels. France, Recueil, 29:150–1. For Jouvancourt, see Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41; and Deschard, Organisation, 105. Deschard, Organisation, 105. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, mistakenly says Toulouse rather than Toulon. The duties of the various écrivains are outlined in the 1689 Ordonnance de marine, 182–3, 267–72. Bonnac, Mémoire, 49. Ibid. For Fonton, see Testa and Gautier, Drogmans, 48–50, 163–4. ­Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 775 (Ferriol to Augustin Ferriol, 26 May 1708), relates the outrage that his surgeon Duchin had received the bastinado from the Turks for being caught on a horse in Constantinople, even though he was rushing to the side of a seriously ill patient. He added that Mme de Croissy would be greatly vexed when she heard of this, suggesting that the surgeon was perhaps her client. Sareil, Les Tencin, 18–19; and Vaillot, Madame de Tencin, 40–1. In a 1 August 1707 letter to Torcy, Ferriol called the minister his protector. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 683. aae md 1040, fol. 69, 15 Feb. 1696. France, Recueil, 29:163–74, instructions dated 28 May 1699. See Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:91–2, on relations with Turkey from 1697 to 1715. Rousseau, Relations Turquie, 1:64–94, notes that persuading the Turks to attack the emperor in Hungary took on greater urgency as war in Europe looked increasingly likely. This underlined Ferriol’s experience in Hungary and his value as ambassador. Bonnac, Mémoire, 113–33, is Ferriol’s 10 August 1711 account for the king of his mission in which he defends his actions, beginning in Hungary in 1676. Topin, Homme masque de fer, chaps 11–14, counters the mid-eighteenth-­ century speculation that Armenian Patriarch Avedick was the mysterious “man in the iron mask.” Topin shows how Ferriol worked in concert with Versailles to promote missions and had cover from the king, Pontchartrain, and Torcy for kidnapping Avedick on his way into exile and secretly diverting him to France to be imprisoned at Mont Saint-Michel and then the Bastille. Topin is harshly critical of Ferriol. A more favourable assessment of him as a diplomat is Asse, “Ferriol et Aïssé,” 1–48, 97–144, 169–210, which includes biographical details. Asse, “Ferriol et Aïssé,” 74–94, is an account of Jouvancourt’s 1703 mission. For Maurocordato (1641–1709), see Somel, Historical dictionary, 176. Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 184, indicate that Ferriol had also sent Jouvancourt to court with Turkish responses to his demands in the late summer of 1701. Ferriol to Blondel, 8 Nov. 1707, extols the continuing value of the pension to Maurocordato. Varenbergh, ­“Correspondance



155

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58 1 159

160 161

162

163

164

Notes to pages 255–7

609

Ferriol,” 695. Bonnac, Mémoire, 50–1, reports that he had it from ­Jouvancourt that if Ferriol had been more moderate and worn only a ceremonial “short” sword rather than insisting upon a long dueling sword the incident could have been avoided. Jouvancourt kept the sword as a curiosity. Mézin, Consuls, 44–6; and Masson, Histoire du commerce, 262–7. From 1691 the king took responsibility for the appointment and pay of chancellors. Mézin, Consuls, 10–11, 22–3. This was true even after he had largely lost the right to appoint them. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 655–7, 679, 685, 691, 717, 726, 817–18, 838. On 4 January 1709, Ferriol wrote his brother’s wife that Pontchartrain would answer to God for the injustice he had done him (ibid., 820). Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 189–97. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 696–7 (Ferriol to Blondel, 8 Nov. 1707), with a list of suggested candidates to fill consular openings. On 2 February 1708 Ferriol wrote Jouvancourt requesting that he ask Blondel and Salaberry to intervene with Pontchartrain for approval of the two positions of enfant de langue he had requested long ago (ibid., 735–6). Kroell, ­“Billon de Cancerille,” 133, is another example of their combined influence in obtaining appointments. Salaberry was premier commis of the bureau of the Levant from 1688 to 1709. Vergé-Franceschi, Marine française, 206. Carrière et al., Marseille, ville morte, 241–2; and Hozier and Tupigny, Armorial général, 495–7. For the Richard family, see Mézin, Consuls, 519–20; “Tablettes généalogiques et nobiliaires,” 254–5; and Rédit and Richard, Inventaire Vienne, 1:101. A curious journal kept by Charles Demaillasson, avocat du roi in Montmorillon, records the marriage of Joseph Richard and Catherine Blondel, the birth of their children, and various trips to Paris. Bardet, “Journal de Demaillasson [vol. 2],” 71, 74, 83, 92, 103, 105, 112. Bardet’s notes show that the Blondel siblings remained close: in 1713, when the chambermaid of Marie Blondel, widow of Gabriel de la Porte du Theil, married a Montmorillon merchant, the bride assembled her own dowry from 900 livres owed to her by Gagny and 500 livres owed by Blondel (ibid., 395n1). For the enfants [or jeunes] de langues, see Dupont-Ferrier, Du Collège de Clermont, 3:349–63, 418–21 (listing the enfants under Louis XIV); and Hossain, “Training of Interpreters.” Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 96 (Ferriol’s letter to the chamber of 29 Aug. 1700); and Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 180 (Ferriol’s letter to Pontchartrain of 24 Aug. 1700). For the Gleises, see Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 539–40, ­552–4; Marchand, Intendant, 132–42; and Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:384–5, ­Harlay to Desmaretz, 6 July 1711.

610

Notes to pages 257–8

165 A Gleise had served as consul at Salonika from 1685 to 1688. Saint-Yves, “Consulats,” 276. Another was involved in 1658 with another Marseille family for the consulate of Cairo. Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:207–8. 166 Marchand, Intendant, 132–3; and Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 16–21. 167 Klijn, “Networks,” 262. 168 R.A.W. Rhodes, quoted in ibid. 169 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21–3; and especially Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 538–9, 544–51, detail Marseille’s lobbying efforts. See also Kettering, “Brokerage,” 81–2. Rambert, Histoire du commerce, 42–5, offers a case study of Blondel’s involvement. bn mf 18979, fol. 104v, lists payments Blondel received for distribution; and ibid., 8867, fols 9ff, describes his fortune. When the parish church of his lordship of Vaucresson was repaired, he contributed to the design and supervised the project’s contractor. He also petitioned Mme de Maintenon for funds for the work, to which he also contributed. Ferté, Vie religieuse, 91–3, 97. The Saint-Cyr convent of which Maintenon was the protector had the right to appoint Vaucresson’s priest. Hurtaut and Magny, Dictionnaire, 772. 170 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21. 171 Ibid., 38–63, on the Fabres. Joseph Fabre was deputy to the Council of Commerce 1700–03, and his younger brother Mathieu served 1703–14. bn mf 8867, fols 9ff, is a list in chart form maintained by Lebret from 1699 to 1709. It includes all of Marseille’s municipal posts and those who held them, noting time of service, personal characteristics, and connections. Many were marked as family or followers of the Gleise. 172 Kettering, French Society, 56. Takeda, “Absolutism, Marseillais Civic Humanism,” 722–34, argues that from at least 1700 the crown made use of traditional municipal language of public good to promote absolutist goals. Joseph Fabre played an important role in this as the city’s deputy to the Council of Commerce. 173 See Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:385, Harlay to Desmaretz, 6 July 1711, for Anfossy and Sossin. Babeau, Villars, gouverneur de Provence, 102–3, cites a 1713 letter from Lebret to Villars informing him “en secret” that Grignan was one of the causes of Marseille’s disorders because he was the long-time protector of the cabal that ran it. Under the Regency, Villars headed the commission that investigated the cabal’s affairs and led to a new municipal regulation in March 1717 (ibid., 107–11). 174 Klijn, “Networks,” 263–4. The realities of policy implementation make it likely that such networks existed in other sectors of the government as well. 175 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21, says that Blondel was not without his own links to Marseille, citing his brother-in-law, Jean-Baptiste Estelle. However, that marriage did not take place until 1699. Carrière et al., Marseille, ville morte, 242. Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 540, mentions



176

177

178 179

180

181

182

Notes to pages 258–9

611

J­ ouvancourt’s marriage to a Gleise and his position as Marseille controller of the galleys as two of the reasons Blondel remained as lobbyist even after Marseille was represented in Paris from 1700 in the new Council of Commerce. That marriage, however, was on 26 September 1703. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3. As for Jouvancourt’s galley position, it began in 1704. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3, on the marriage. Among their children were Roseline, who became a nun (Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3), and a son who died as commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille 7 July 1746 (Deschard, Organisation, 105n2). When his father-in-law purchased one of the charges of secretary of the king created in 1704, Mathieu Fabre and Gagny were among his references (“témoins”). Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:631–2. Deschard, Organisation, 24–6, 105. His particular office was Marseille’s “commissaire des galères en charge et contrôleur” (commissioner of galleys in charge and controller). Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 204–5, Jouvancourt to “son frère à la cour,” 21 Jan. 1705. Deschard, Organisation, 105: 15 Jan. 1714, commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille; 30 Apr. 1716, commissaire General des galères at Marseille; 1 Apr. 1722, intendant des Iles du Vent (the Lesser Antilles and Martinique); and intendant des galères at Marseille. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1: 253n3, gives his death date. ­ 12–13, Taillemite, Inventaire archives marine B7, 1:29, 51, 72, 79, 100, 110, 1 117, 119, 122, 137, 141–2, 144, 155, 157, 159, 162, 164, 172, 174, 180, 195, 199, 201, 204, 206, 211, 216, for the years 1709–11. Plantet, Correspondance Deys d’Alger, 2:71, Bekir-Reis (Algerian ambassador) to Pontchartrain, Mar. 1711, lists Jouvancourt among those amassing naval supplies requested for his return voyage. In Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 647–865, most letters are to ­Jouvancourt or Augustin Ferriol. Gagny makes an appearance in these financial matters (ibid., 648, 764), as does Michel Gleise (ibid., 674, 755, 773), who traded in Constantinople and was one of the two deputies of the “nation” with whom Ferriol worked as Constantinople’s consul. On 5 January 1709 Ferriol wrote Blondel (ibid., 822) to thank him for taking his part against those who were smearing his name. He cast about for who might have complained about him, lighting on Michel Gleise, Jouvancourt’s kinsman by marriage, whom Ferriol accused of being a scandalous libertine whom he had nonetheless favoured and raised above his rank. Nothing apparently came of this wild accusation. Thereafter, Ferriol’s ire was reserved for Pontchartrain and the Turkish agent who visited Versailles to request his recall (ibid., 828, 836). Jouvancourt’s role as a financier is also signaled by

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187

188

89 1 190

91 1 192 193

Notes to pages 259–61 his office of treasurer of France in Auch from 1719 to 1729. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41. Among other places, this is recounted in Maulde-La-Clavière, Mille et une nuits, 197–204. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 4:112, 134, for letters to d’Antin and Torcy, 7 July and 7 Aug. 1712. Ringot and Sarmant, “Surintendance des Bâtiments,” 64–5. Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:570, 5:571. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:139 (21 Mar. 1699), says Blondel purchased the office of intendant des bâtiments from Mansart for himself or one of his brothers. Dangeau, Journal, 7:49 (16 Mar. 1699), also mentions the purchase. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61, says it was in 1700, but that was actually his first full year of service. État de la France (1708), 1:329, lists Blondel, Torcy’s secretary, as alternatif among three Intendants & Ordonnateurs des Bâtiments serving by year. Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:306, 5:840, 930. According to État de la France (1702), 322, Gagny served in 1701, while his fellow treasurer was to serve in 1702. Ibid., (1708), 1:329, lists Blondel [de Gagny], secretary of the king, as one of the two who owned the three offices of treasurers. Sarmant, Demeures, 89–95, 111. The intendants and treasurers served triennially. In a 6 August 1708 letter to Jouvancourt, Ferriol wrote from Constantinople that he thought that “M. Blondel” will be happier with d’Antin as head of Bâtiments than he had been with Mansart since the duke will deal with matters more nobly (“traittera les choses plus noblement”). It is likely he meant Gagny, since he typically referred to Blondel as either “M. de ­Vaucresson” or your brother (“monsieur votre frère”) (e.g., in Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 711, 716). Ringot and Sarmant, “Surintendance des Bâtiments,” 65–7. Tiberghien, Versailles, 504 (54 for the quotation and 54n1 for Joseph Blondel [de Gagny]). Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:953, notes that Gagny was paid 2,312 livres on 1 August 1703 (9 per cent interest for six months on 50,000 livres) and the same on 12 September. Asse, “President Ferriol,” 136–8. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:254, 254n1; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1: 227. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 714 (Ferriol to Blondel, 4 Dec. 1707). Two days later Ferriol shared with Jouvancourt that he hoped Blondel would be able to sort out a thorny matter with Bernard on his behalf (ibid., 716). On 1 December 1703 d’Argenson wrote Chamillart that Blondel, one of Torcy’s premiers commis, was intimate friends with Bernard. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:133. aae md 1186, fol. 246r–v, a 6 May 1712 letter to Bernard about transfers of funds and written on Torcy’s behalf appears to be from Blondel.



Notes to pages 261–2

613

194 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61. Melleville, Dictionnaire de l’Aisne, 2:204, notes the 27 June 1706 contract in Paris for the acquisition with his wife of the domain of Sissonne, for which he rendered homage on 16 July. 195 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61–2. For Vintimille, see Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 482–3; for Daspe, see Couaix, “Monographie d’un village,” 521–2; and for Berthelier, see Tessereau, Histoire Grande Chancelerie, 2:514. Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 22, reports that in 1704 Blondel’s daughter received from the Marseille Chamber of Commerce a wedding gift of rich fabrics. Hyrvoix de Landosle, “Congrès de Bade,” 322, notes du Luc’s close marital and professional ties with Blondel. 196 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 23. 197 an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 28, 19 Dec. 1725, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=28 198 Colbert wrote of this in a secret journal. In December 1663 he arranged for the boy to be cared for by Gury Focard (Focart) de Beauchamps and his wife Clémence Pré, who lived on rue aux Ours, informing them that the child belonged to one of his brothers and a woman of quality. Thinking they were saving his sibling’s honour, they accepted the infant when he was secretly given to them at 6 a.m. on a street near the Hôtel Colbert and had him baptized at their parish church. A M. de Lincour and demoiselle ­Elisabeth du Beux were listed as parents and the Beauchamps as godparents. Père Anselme, the genealogist, said that the child, who would have been known as Louis de Bourbon, died unlegitimated on 15 July 1666 and was buried at Saint-Eustache. A later marginal note on Anselme’s manuscript adds that Beauchamp was the father of Torcy’s secretary Beauchamp, believed to have married Marin’s daughter. Colbert, Lettres, 6:462–4. Anselme skips a generation, however, since Torcy’s secretary was Gury’s grandson. A 1653 contract shows Guy [sic] Focart de Beauchamp leasing a house on rue aux Ours and the corner of rue Salle-au-Comte, while a 10 February 1667 contract shows him in possession as owner. A 13 July 1684 record, however, lists Jeanne Marie Marin, widow of M. Antoine Faucart de Beauchamp, and M. Fiacre Dufour as joint guardians of “Antoine François Faucart de Beauchamp,” son and sole heir of his late father and owner of the rue aux Ours house. Brièle, Supplément inventaire hospitalières, 148. This means that Antoine died and Antoine-François was born sometime before mid-July 1684. 199 Curiously, Samoyault, Bureaux, 294, says nothing of Beauchamp’s time in the foreign office when tracing his career, but adds concerning his daughter (ibid., 211n32) that her father had been Torcy’s secretary in his youth. Baschet, Dépôt, 284, also says nothing of his foreign office service. Beauchamp receives no mention in either Piccioni or Baillou. aae md 1517, fol. 109, is a 20 May 1707 note from Beauchamp, apparently to Torcy, informing him that with Fournier’s help he had found the requested clarification and

614

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201 202 203

204

205

206

207

208 209

Notes to pages 262–3 was sending the copy he made of a document along with extracts he had taken from some others. See accounts in ibid., 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v; ibid., 1186, fols 361–2r; and ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v. Potier de Courcy, Nobiliaire Bretagne, 3:72. Fourmont, Histoire Chambre des comptes, 343, says that he was received 8 July 1713, having purchased one of two offices created in October 1711. At one point he was authorized by the chamber to borrow 100,000 livres in its name. France, Inventairesommaire Loire-Inférieure, 1:181. Samoyault, Bureaux, 211n32, 285, 294. For Marie-Françoise’s marriage, see p. 261. Affiches, annonces, et avis divers (1754), 263. For his career, see aae ppsr 66, fols 147–9 and 173; Baschet, Dépôt, 275–91 (along with some extracts from letters, including a 1705 letter from Spain from du Theil to Blondel); La Porte des Vaulx, Histoire généalogique, 304–9, 337 (a list of documentation), 345–7 (for dates); Piccioni, Commis, 194–206; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 38, 159, 293–4. La Porte des Vaulx, however, mistakes François Blondel for the engineer and mathematician of the same name (Histoire généalogique, 304). Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 2d ed., 12: 141–3, is also useful, but mistakenly calls Marie Blondel, Torcy’s secretary’s sister, his daughter. His father died in 1689. an y 5310, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 11, 10 Dec. 1689, http://doc.geneanet. org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=138&page=11 aae ppsr 66, fol. 148. Baschet, Dépôt, 278, says the end of 1705; and ­Piccioni, Commis, 197, says 1706; but Samoyault, Bureaux, 294, and La Porte des Vaulx, Histoire généalogique, 305, have the correct date. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 96, Juan de Herrara to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1709, Madrid, is an example of his knowledge of Spain being put to use. The letter has a note on it saying that du Theil will make an extract of it. Samoyault, Bureaux, 165, mentions his knowledge of Italian. aae ppsr 66, fol. 148. Baschet, Dépôt, 279, excerpts the king’s 29 May 1713 letter appointing him, while his 3 November 1713 letter of provision is in aae md 1190, fol. 480v. aae cp Suisse 254, fol. 69, du Luc to Torcy, 20 Aug. 1714. Writing from Baden, he offered an honest assessment of du Theil, insisting that it was not based on the fact that he was Blondel’s nephew, to whom the ambassador was obligated. He found du Theil to be worthy of the minister’s protection and esteem because of his composed yet lively and quick mind. The ambassador also praised his fidelity in preparing dispatches, neither adding to nor subtracting from their necessary content. For Richard de Tussac, see Samoyault, Bureaux, 165, 3040–5. For François Faucard and his career, see ibid., 285; and France, Recueil, 31: 233ff. Fould, Diplomate; and Roman d’Amat, “Blondel (Louis-Augustin),” 702–3.



Notes to pages 265–6

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210 Adam died in November 1724, having retired from public office in 1718. See aae pvr, 1, fols 173–5; bn db 3, pièces 66 and 67, listing the ­Chalons connection; bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 2–3; and an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 36, 25 Feb. 1725, http://doc.geneanet. org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=36. See also ­Boislisle’s notes in ss-Boislisle, 26:182–3, 523; Piccioni, Commis, 166–79 (who says he was born c. 1650); Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:40, on témoins (witnesses) for secretaries of the king; and ibid., 123, on Adam (which says he was born c. 1645). The fullest and most authoritative biography, Delavaud, “Adam,” 443–7, says he was born between 1640 and 1650. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:350, notes the Breton annuities. Tourmont to Rébenac, 12 Apr. 1680, in Feuquières, Lettres, 5:126, mentions the Berlin trip. For the Paris residence he owned until 1721, see Vitu, Maison mortuaire Molière, 120, 351. In 1671 Pachau was said to have had two “garcons” since 1669 to do the actual code work because of his poor eyesight. Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. 211 aae cp Angleterre 221, fol. 267, Adam to Hooke, 11 Mar. 1707, Glatigny. Piccioni, Commis, 178, unaware of Adam’s earlier Parisian residence, notes his purchase of a house on rue de la Sourdière in 1720, mistakenly claiming that he lived only at Versailles until then. For this purchase, see bnpo 8, fol. 24. 212 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443–5, gives a fuller account of this diplomatic errand than does Piccioni. On the rather shady La Neuville, see Madariaga, “Foy de La Neuville,” 21–30. For the canal project, see Marcel, Inventaire papiers de Cotte, 12. 213 For his gratification, see aae md 1012, fol. 59. See also Delavaud, “Adam,” 443; and Piccioni, Commis, 169–70. aae md 1044, fol. 8 (28 Jan. 1697), is a payment for his role with tutors. For tutelage in law, see Chéruel, Dictionnaire historique, 2:1232. 214 Roth, “Torcy,” 188. 215 Piccioni, Commis, 176. 216 aae md 1160, fol. 21 (1708). 217 Piccioni, Commis, 176. It was Beauvillier, however, who acted as reporter in the Conseil. Lizerand, Beauvillier, 169. A similar situation occurred when Louvois’s premier commis Saint-Pouange opened letters during his absence and reported their contents to the king. Saint-Pouange became a trusted advisor to both king and minister. Baxter, Servants of the Sword, 204. 218 bn mf 6944, fol. 245, Torcy to duchesse de Noailles, 6 Sept. 1710, refers to papers he gave to Adam, who had the honour of her protection and was zealous in her service. 219 Dangeau, Journal, 15:390; ss-Boislisle, 26:182–3, 523; and Cermakian, Ursins, 537–8.

616

Notes to pages 266–7

220 Piccioni, Commis, 169–70, quotes Le Dran’s low opinion of Adam, but Baschet, Dépôt, 85, calls him Torcy’s “commis de confiance” (confidential clerk). 221 Piccioni, Commis, 178, reports that Adam headed one of the three bureaus of the Polysynod’s “Conseil des affaires du dedans” (Council of Interior Affairs), which is confirmed by the Almanach Royal (1716), 60–1. See aae md 1212, fols 3, 9–10, and 24–5, for some of his work on the regent’s behalf in 1715. Ibid., 1095, fol. 54, 4 July 1718, is a petition concerning a benefice addressed to Adam at his home. 222 For Adam fils, see Piccioni, Commis, 169, 172–3, 188. He appears consistently in payroll accounts from 1709 until 1715. See, for example, aae md1163, fol. 292v; ibid., 1196, fol. 150v; ibid., 1197, fols, 16–17; and ibid., 1208, fol. 23. For Nicolas Adam, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:289; and aae md 1148, fol. 175v, for a reimbursement for a trip to Spain in 1707. For Prévost, see Piccioni, Commis, 186; and aae md 307, fols 82–8, Dec. 1706. ­Dupilet, Régence absolue, 211, mistakenly says that he served his father-in-law as a commis. Adam’s other daughter, Charlotte Michelle, married Jacques Le Diacre, écuyer, sieur Daingreville, and king’s councillor and royal avocat in the Paris Bureau of Finances and Chamber of the Domain. an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 36, 25 Feb. 1725, http:// doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=36 223 Leclercq, Histoire, 1:149 224 bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2; bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 2–10; ibid., pièce 74, fols 178r–80; aae md 1204, fol. 87ff; and ibid., 1207, fol. 176r, for references to his letters of nobility. For biographical details, see Delavaud, “Éducation,” 336n3; “Nobiliaire et armorial (dixième article),” 337; Piccioni, Commis, 179–83; Samoyault, Bureaux, 301–2; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054–5. Most secondary accounts place Pecquet’s retirement due to illness in 1725, but Marais, Journal, 2:632, has a 16 March 1723 entry noting ­Pecquet’s illness and Cardinal Dubois’s sorrow over losing such a good “second.” Pecquet’s son joined him that same year, so perhaps though largely sidelined by health the father nonetheless officially remained as premier commis until his son could succeed him in 1725. 225 Antoine fils entered the foreign office as a commis in 1723, succeeded Antoine père as premier commis in 1725, wrote the Discours sur l’Art de Négocier (published in 1737), and was disgraced and imprisoned in 1740 for having too close an association with foreign secretary and garde des sceaux Germain Louis de Chauvelin, who had fallen three years earlier. Pecquet, Discourse sur l’Art of Negotiation, xiii–xv. The editors provide some information on the father but unfortunately confuse father and son when discussing the latter’s service upon his father’s recommendation as secretary to SaintSimon during his embassy to Spain (1721–22). Saint-Simon to Dubois, 13 Jan. 1722, in Saint-Simon, Siècles et jours, 228.



Notes to page 267

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226 Michel Pecquet was employed on fortifications from 1675 until his death in 1688. See bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2r–v; and bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8. Lequoy, Maisons Senlis, 1:169–70, 174, records property acquisitions in Senlis of “Michel Pecquet marchand et Madeleine Desvoies sa femme.” Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, mistakenly calls Michel a Paris merchant. 227 bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8, notes that from 1682 Antoine served in the “fortifications de … places, et qu’il a continue de faire, tant dans nos bastiments et ouvrages publics.” See also bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2r–v. 228 Chotard, Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban, 273, quotes from and summarizes Souzy’s 30 January 1686 letter to his collaborator over the years Chazerat, director of fortifications at Ypres, requesting “des renseignements sur les mœurs, la capacité et la fidélité du sieur Péquet, ingénieur, qu’on lui propose pour l’inspection et la direction des ouvrages publics que le roi fait faire, et qui a travaillé à Ypres.” Although Antoine at this date was just eighteen years old, Souzy’s letter likely concerns him rather than his father, since bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8, and bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2 and 2v, make it clear that the senior Pecquet was employed with fortifications, whereas Antoine also worked on “bastiments et ouvrages publics.” See ­Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1466, for Souzy. Chotard mistakenly thought that Souzy was a high functionary in the war department (although he later supervised fortifications as a separate department upon Louvois’s death). Souzy left Flanders in 1683 and the following year became an intendant of finances under his brother Claude Le Peletier (although Souzy spelled the family name “Pelletier,” we use the common modern spelling here). Both were Le Tellier clients. Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, claims that Antoine worked on “fortifications” under “Le Peletier” from 1682 to 1696, likely mistaking Claude for Souzy. 229 Baschet, Dépôt, 163, notes that Pecquet had previously served the controller general Le Peletier, which Piccioni, Commis, 181, interprets to mean that Pecquet was a “commis aux finances” and claims that this was from 1683 to 1689. Samoyault, Bureaux, 167, says the same, but then ignores it in his summary of Pecquet’s service (ibid., 301). Even if Pecquet served the controller general as a commis, it could have been only for three years at most. 230 bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8. 231 Pecquet’s supervision of construction at the Hôtel d’Effiat is discussed in Gady, “Grande demeure disparue,” 150–1, 154. Gady calls Pecquet Le ­Peletier’s “homme de confiance” who with care and forcefulness directed the work and consulted knowledgeably with architects and other experts, which is not surprising considering his background. Mazel, Le Peletier, 168, also mentions Pecquet’s 1696–97 supervisory role. Le Peletier’s long-time intendant died in November 1694, so it is perhaps then that Pecquet became his intendant (ibid., 117).

618

Notes to pages 267–8

232 Pecquet and Adam witnessed the signing of Bossuet’s will at Versailles on 27 August 1703, but Pecquet was listed as a commis, while Adam was listed as premier commis. Bossuet, Correspondance, 14:255. aae md 1553, fol. 439, contains a 27 June 1709 letter from Paris with an envelope addressed to “Monsieur Pecquet premier commis de Monsrg Torcy. En cour.” As already noted, however, the listing of exact titles was far from consistent. Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, dates Pecquet’s entry to 1700, as do Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 655, and earlier, Baschet, Dépôt, 163, and Bourgeois, Diplomatie secrète, 1:175. Piccioni, Commis, 179, 181, however, speculates that since Pecquet was a premier commis from 1696, he must have entered the foreign office as a simple commis in 1689, when Le Peletier left office. Favre-­Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054, adopts this incorrect chronology, as does ­Dupilet, Régence absolue, 393 (speculating that he joined the department in the 1690s as a commis). 233 When Le Peletier retired in September 1697 the post office went to ­Pomponne. Mazel, Le Peletier, 166–7. 234 Bély, Espions, 231, 588. 235 Legg, “Torcy’s Account,” 525. Its multiple folios are entirely in Pecquet’s hand. 236 Mercier, Vie d’Ambassadeur, 191. aae md 1191, fol. 22, Torcy to Karg, 26 Feb. 1712, indicates that Pecquet was coordinating embassy ceremonial mourning following the Dauphin’s death. 237 Legg, Prior, 158–9. 238 Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:140–1. In aae md 1135, fol. 269, 5 Sept. 1705, Torcy described Pecquet as one of his principal commis, and for that reason requested that the Nantes Chambre des comptes afford him a prompt reception audience because his need for him for the king’s service did not permit a lengthy absence. 239 For example, aae md France 1208, fol. 30r–v, Puyzieulx to Pecquet, 23 Feb. 1715, where the former ambassador mentions their long-time friendship and Pecquet’s affection for him. 240 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1008, 1054; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:243. 241 Meyer, Noblesse Bretonne, 1:216–17. The first cost more than 30,000 livres and the second 45,000 livres; with the 100,000 livres required to become a secretary of the king in 1716, Meyer concludes that this shows that Pecquet was quite rich. While the treasurer’s office required no real work, it yielded profit and prestige (ibid., 226). His auditor’s office entailed enough effort that on 25 January 1711 the king requested that the Chambre admit the man who Pecquet wanted to commission to fulfil his duties even though he was three months short of the age requirement. The request noted that Pecquet was unable to be there to perform his functions because he was attached to royal service at Torcy’s side. aae md 1177, fols 69–70.



Notes to pages 268–9

619

242 bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 8–10. 243 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054. Wiesener, Regent, Dubois, 2:217, says that during negotiations for the 1718 alliance with Britain, Pecquet loaned his eloquence to Huxelles. On Dubois’s jealousy and struggle with Torcy, see P ­ etitfils, Régent, 578–9, 605; and Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:270, and 3: 138–43, 240–3, 253, 277–8. In 1723 Dubois referred to Torcy as “notre ennemi ­mortel” (our mortal enemy) in conversation with the British (ibid., 470). 244 Weber, Economy and Society, 2:959. 245 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 112, for instance, remark that in 1716 “the secretariat of the French council of foreign affairs and their diplomats abroad were hostile to the new direction of French policies under the Regent and were sympathetic to Philip V.” 246 Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:217–19; and Leclercq, Histoire, 2:22–3. 247 Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:282. Stair wrote to London from Paris (1 Sept. 1719) that Pecquet remarked to one of his undersecretaries that it was clear to him that Stair was a skilful minister who did with Dubois as he pleased. Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, 2:592. 248 Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 330, means to criticize Pecquet when he says that he “had suffered no pangs of conscience in the move from serving Torcy to serving” Dubois, but this is to miss the growing professionalism of the time. It also rests on the unwarranted assumption that Pecquet had cut his ties with Torcy and served Dubois with full confidence in him. Another source of information from the new foreign affairs council was member Abbé d’Estrées (Dupilet, Régence absolue, 382), who was as we have seen close to Torcy. 249 Tessé, Lettres, vii. 250 Maber, “Texts, Travel,” 231. Especially helpful on the Republic of Letters’ workings during the era of Torcy’s ministry is Goldgar, Impolite Learning. 251 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 3–22. 252 For biographical details in this and the following paragraph, see Labrousse, Inventaire Bayle, 371–4; Labrousse, Bayle, 1:54n1, 182n56, 218–21, 266; Briggs, “Larroque Author”; Briggs, “Larroque”; Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre 287n2, 434n15, 481n2, 567 (Larroque to Bayle, May 1686), 587n1; and, for much that we know about Larroque, a work by Abbé Olivet and Jesuit Pierre Desfontaines’s 1739 pseudonymous polemic rebuttal, both of which must be used with caution in light of the detailed editorial notes on them in Bayle, Correspondence, 8:87–135. For Bayle in Rouen, see Bost, Bayle, 83–91. Larroque is not mentioned in the standard works on the foreign office such as Baschet, Picavet, Piccioni, and Samoyault, and is mentioned only briefly in Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:223, as SaintPrest’s adjunct. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 338, who says more about him, does not mention his ties to the Republic of Letters.

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Notes to pages 270–1

253 Lennon, Reading Bayle, 126–32 (quotation 126). 254 These letters of Larroque to Bayle are from the modern critical edition, Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre: 287, 10 June 1684; 299, 6 July 1686; 304, midJuly 1684; 307, 28 July 1684; 327, Aug.–Sept. 1684; and 357, 27 Nov. 1684. The ample editorial notes are especially helpful. Unfortunately, we have few of Bayle’s letters to Larroque because he burned them, numbering more than two hundred. Bayle, Correspondence, 9:3n10. Only two have turned up (ibid., 8:530n18). In 1692, in the context of sharing that someone had made public a deceased individual’s private letters, Leibniz wrote Larroque that letters between friends must be a sacred thing, to which Larroque largely agreed. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 547, 579. 255 Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre 387, Bayle to Jean Rou, 17 Feb. 1685 (date corrected from earlier editions). 256 Ibid., Lettre 434, Rondel to Bayle, Apr.–June 1685; and Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1300–1, on Rancé. 257 Larroque to Bayle in Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre: 481, 9–20 Nov. 1685; 546, Mar.–Apr. 1686; 567, May 1686; 568, May–June 1686; and 587, June–July 1686. Also Larroque to Bayle in Bayle, Correspondence, 7:33–9, 12/22 1686; and ibid., 170–83, Sept.–Oct. 1686. 258 Bayle, Correspondence, 8:132n50. 259 Colt was there from 1689 until 1692. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 238, 587. Larroque knew Leibniz’s reputation through their mutual friends, the English scientist Robert Boyle and the Huguenot librarian Henri Justel. Larroque to Averardo Salviati, 30 March 1691, ibid., 424, and Larroque to Leibniz, 25 May 1691, ibid., 498. Bayle wrote David Constant on 24 October 1690 that it had been four or five months since Larroque had left him to return to France (“nous quittez depuis 4o ou 5 mois pour s’en retourner en France”). Bayle, Correspondance, 8:179. This would have been June or July 1690, which given Leibniz’s June 1690 return from Italy, means that Larroque likely left Hanover in May or earlier. 260 Leibniz briefly mentioned Larroque’s Copenhagen conversion to Hessen-­ Rheinfels, 10(?) January 1691 and 20/30 July 1691. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 155, 238–9. He also noted it to Henri Justel 13/23 January 1691 (ibid., 355). According to Bayle’s 23 November 1690 letter to Gilles Ménage, Larroque had given fellow scholar Abbé Claude Nicaise in Paris a letter dated 19 October to include in his packet to Bayle. Bayle, Correspondence, 8:206. His pension is noted in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258n1, although Briggs, “Larroque,” 210, puts it at 400 livres. 261 Briggs, “Larroque,” 215, 219–20. Briggs speculates that he may even have carried secrets from Colt’s Hanover mission to bargain with in Paris. ­Jurieu claimed that Larroque returned to France as agent of Holland’s “French cabal” (ibid., 214).



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262 In a 9 April 1691 letter Leibniz offered effusive thanks to his Tuscan friend Averardo Salviati, marquis of Montiéri, for introducing him to Larroque. His friends, including Gerhard Wolter Molanus, a Lutheran theologian and his collaborator in irenic initiatives, spoke so highly of Larroque that ­Leibniz said that it increased his regret at not having met a man of such “force” (penetration and ability) as was rarely encountered in Wolfenbüttel or even larger cities. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 456. Leibniz wrote Larroque on 21/31 July 1691 that the duke, duchess, and others at court recalled with pleasure his merit and praised his deep knowledge (ibid., 587). For Molanus, see Leibniz, Controversies, 465. 263 Larroque wrote Leibniz on 25 May 1691 that the current war would likely prevent him from seeing in Hanover some recent books published in Paris. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 497. Vittu, “Instruments of Political Power,” 170, on news hunger. He also offered to procure a Parisian printer for some of Leibniz’s works, affirming that as a “good fellow countryman” (“bon compatriote”), presumably of the Republic of Letters, he would be delighted to see some “German enlightenment” (“les lumières de l’Allemagne”) transported to France (ibid., 498). Although Paris was renowned for its libraries as a centre of research, they contained few German and English books. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 123–6, 138, 149. Anglophone libraries also had few German books (ibid., 137–8). 264 Lennon, Reading Bayle, 132, says that he showed clear signs of an “incipient deism.” In a 10 July 1692 letter to Leibniz, Larroque asserted that Catholic conduct frequently quenched morality while inflaming a dogmatism that contributed nothing to the sanctification of children. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 325–6. 265 For Bayle’s inclusive idea of toleration and his alleged deism, see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 152, 331–41; and Tinsley, Bayle’s Reformation, 5–26. See Lennon, Reading Bayle, 127n57, for Bayle’s defence of Larroque. 266 Briggs, “Larroque,” 216, mentions this supervision. Letters between Larroque and Bayle through December 1692 are in Bayle, Correspondence, 8: letters 772, 791, 796, 806, 862; and ibid., 9: letters 987, 994, which does not include Bayle’s letters to others that mention Larroque. 267 Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 466. See also Dew, Orientalism, 84n11, 126n143, 239; and of course, the various letters in volumes 8, 9, and 10 of Bayle, Correspondence. For his friendship with Huet, see Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, ­Sechster Band: 425, 472, 587. 268 Larroque to Leibniz, 19 Dec. 1692. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 579. Leibniz informed Pellisson (19 Nov. 1691) that he had been in regular communication with Larroque on a historical question for the past six months (ibid., Zweite Reihe, Zweiter Band: 466). See also Leibniz to Enst von HessenRheinfels, 7/17 June 1691 (ibid., Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 215–16).

622 69 2 270 271 272 273 274

275

276

277

278

279

80 2 281

282

Notes to pages 271–4 Leibniz to Larroque, 21/31 1691 (ibid., 588). Ibid., 590–1. Lieshout, “Retouches au portrait Bayle,” 38–41, 47. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 97–103, 331. Bayle, Avis, 7–49. Mori raises questions about Briggs, “Bayle ou Larroque?,” a recent incarnation of the thesis that Larroque authored the Avis. The brief account of Larroque’s arrest, imprisonment, and eventual release found in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258–9, which appeared in 1920, was given wider currency in Labrousse, Inventaire Bayle, 2727–3, but unfortunately it ignored the fuller documentation published in 1879 in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:23–41, and used here. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 92–3, briefly synthesizes all three accounts. For a recent critique of earlier notions about the pamphlet’s identity, see McKenna’s note in Bayle, Correspondence, 8:133n56. Bayle to Pinsson des Riolles, 6 Dec. 1694, in Bayle, Correspondence, ­9:381–83 (see also ibid., 469–71); and Leibniz, Briefe, Zweite Reihe, Dritter Band: 7783, 7800, 7808, 7830. François Janiçon to Bayle, 14 Nov. 1695, in Bayle, Correspondence, 9:503. See also the 14 December 1695 letter to Bayle from Mathieu de Larroque fils, Daniel’s half-brother and captain in the Piedmont Regiment (ibid., 513–14). Mathieu, also a pastor, abjured in 1685 and entered the army (ibid., 506n12). Ibid., 514, 622. For the period April 1696–July 1697, see ibid., 10:5–6, 72–5, 82, 93–4, 116, 139, 182–3, 210, 322, 378, 538, 563, 604 (Antony McKenna generously shared these references prior to volume 10’s publication for inclusion here). For Vitry, see Albertan, “VITRY.” Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:37–8. Informed by a friend of this news, ­Galland hoped for Larroque’s complete freedom soon. Abdel-Halim, “Correspondance Galland,” 245–6. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:39, Pontchartrain to Bossuet, 24 Mar. 1699 (a slightly different version is in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258–9). ­Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 497, is Larroque’s 25 May 1691 letter to Leibniz passing along Bossuet’s favourable public remarks about him; and ibid., ­588–9, is Leibniz’s delighted reply (21/31 July 1691). Pontchartrain to de Rey, 13 Jan. 1700, in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:39. Ibid., 39–41. Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:259n4, quotes (without dating it) Pontchartrain’s 28 July 1700 letter to d’Argenson, but mistakes Daguesseau for its recipient. Galland to Nicaise, 12 Feb. 1700. Abdel-Halim, “Correspondance Galland,” 283. Larroque’s two letters to Galland (14 and 22 July 1700, the second written from Caen) contain literary news and philosophical reflections, but say nothing of a new position in the foreign office (ibid., 323–26 and ­328–30), suggesting that he had not yet entered Torcy’s service.



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283 Clément, Abbesse de Fontevrault, 205n3, 213, 216–18, 244, 248–9, 255, 258–9, 348n1, also highlights Larroque’s connections with her and ­Gaignières. Saint-Léger, “Éditions,” 94, remarks on his linguistic skills, to which must be added Latin and Greek thanks to his classical education. It does not appear that his primary duties were in the domestic bureau, as speculated by Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221. 284 Coirault, “Tour de France,” 17–20; and Bottineau, Art cour de Philippe V, 137, 137n165. 285 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achtzehnter Band: 466, Pinsson des Riolles to Leibniz, 19 March 1700. 286 Bayle to Pinsson de Riolles, 24 Feb. 1705, mentioned receiving a 16 February letter from Larroque, and in his 12 April 1705 letter to Pinsson des Riolles, Bayle referenced receiving one dated 3 March. Gerig and van Roosbroeck, “Letters Bayle,” 21–4. Bayle to Larroque, 22 Nov. 1706; and Fagon’s “Consultation,” 27 Dec. 1706, in Bayle, Oeuvres diverses, 192–4. The favour of such a consultation reflects the esteem the king had for Bayle and Larroque. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 186, 189, 191–2, 194. 287 Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:535. 288 For the years 1708–09, see Galland, Journal, 1:216, 216n136, 217, 260, 525, 528. Thanks to Richard Waller for sharing invaluable references to meetings between Galland and Larroque in Galland, Journal, vol. 2 (forthcoming), for 1710–11. Galland, who was with Larroque at the moment of his arrest, was arrested as well, but soon released. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 92–3. 289 For the disputed appointment, see Galland, Journal, 1:256n256, 267–8, 268n287, 277–8. For the 9 June 1709 dinner, see ibid., 381. Galland and Le Grand were friends. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 177–8. He and Dubos were old friends but had a heated scholarly quarrel during the 1690s (ibid., 89, 91, 94, 95, 106, 234, 344, 360–80). Galland was a member of Caen’s royal academy along with Larroque’s friend Vitry and Abbé Belin, its perpetual secretary and Torcy’s old tutor (ibid., 100–3). Torcy and Galland also encountered one another at the salon of Marie Anne de la Vergne de Guilleragues, marquise d’O. (ibid., 122). 290 Galland, Journal, vol. 2 (27 Dec. 1710). 291 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:223, quoting from aae pvr, 1, fol. 95. The two had been in contact since at least 1697 when Le Grand visited with Larroque while confined in Saumur. Larroque to Bayle, 8 Dec. 1697 (text graciously communicated by Antony McKenna). 292 Saint-Léger, “Éditions,” 93–9. 293 Thuillier, Première école, 94n7. 294 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 228–9, 388. His suggestion that Larroque’s move to this council with Adam might indicate that he, too, worked with domestic affairs under Torcy (ibid., 221) seems unlikely, since he was primarily a

624

295

296 297

298

299

300

Notes to pages 276–7 t­ ranslator and writer. Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:259n4, lists an annual pension of 4,000 livres. Moréri et al., Dictionnaire, 6:164–5, detail his literary output, which includes a life of the royal historiographer and libertine François Eudes de Mézeray (or Mézerai). See Ranum, Artisans of Glory, 197–232, on Mézerai. A letter from Bouhier to Marais, 17 Apr. 1725, says that after his retirement Larroque complained of his misfortune “ayant tout perdu au papier” (having lost all to paper), an allusion to the Mississippi Bubble of John Law that burst in 1720. Duranton, Correspondance Bouhier, 8:139. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 502, 509, on Leibniz. See ibid., 11–12, for the moderate/radical distinction. Picavet, “Commis,” 110, 110n1, based on Aubert’s 16 September 1705 titre de pension, verifies his long service as a commis beginning under Lionne, but says nothing of his becoming a premier commis. Alexandre Cojannot kindly attempted to locate this document in the aae but could not because Picavet’s citation is incorrect. Sourches, Mémoires, 9:365 (21 Sept. 1705), noted that Aubert, Torcy’s premier commis, retired with a pension of 2,500 livres. aae md 1168, fol. 397 (1710), notes a pension of 2,500 livres with a 500-livre augmentation for Aubert, formerly one of the principal commis. Aubert appears in the following department documents: ibid., 1012, fol. 63, 31 July 1691, awarded a confiscation from the rolle; ibid., 1017, fol. 162, received a gratification for 1692 (Bergeret and Mignon are listed as premiers commis and paid accordingly, but Aubert is listed with the other commis who receive half the amount); ibid., 1069, fol. 204, Aubert is specified as Torcy’s premier commis (May 1701); and ibid., 1129, fols 277–94 (1704), expedited documents. Baschet, Dépôt, 63, 523, says that Aubert was a premier commis in 1688 and earlier under Lionne and Pomponne, but without citing evidence. Piccioni, Commis, 161–3, makes the same claim and refers to unspecified documents from 1688 and 1694; Piccioni’s chart (ibid., 270) says that Aubert was premier commis from 1685 until 1705. aae md 1080, fols 306–11, 4 Nov. 1700. Fischer, “Conseil,” 53–4, mentions a sieur Aubert who was Furstenberg’s treasurer. Furstenberg began his Parisian exile in December 1689. His contacts with the foreign ministry could easily have facilitated Aubert’s appointment when Furstenberg was named abbot in 1690. O’Connor, Negotiator, 188–97. Lefeuve, Histoire de Paris, 1:21, notes that in 1723 several houses were seized by court order from an Aubert. Piccioni, Commis, 162–3. This is the only source that provides a first name for Aubert if indeed this is the same individual. Perhaps Piccioni ran across commis Aubert’s first name elsewhere or assumed, not implausibly, that the contract’s presence in the foreign archives suggests that the two Auberts are one and the same.



Notes to page 277

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301 aae md 1021, fol. 202r–v, acquits patents for 27 Apr. 1693. He is not mentioned in the standard accounts by Baschet, Picavet, Piccioni, Samoyault, or Baillou, but Rott, Inventaire, 4:133, lists a letter from Marolot, “commis de Msgr de Croissy,” to Ambassador Amelot transmitting a letter from Le ­Peletier, 18 Feb. 1694. aae md 1033, fol. 292, Nov. 1698, is a request for lods et vents from “Marolot, commis de M. de Torcy.” Gallet-Guerne and Baulez, Versailles. Dessins d’architecture, 465, notes grants of land to him in the city of Versailles; he is still listed there in 1709 (ibid., 471). Two contemporary sources call him a premier commis: Bourde de la Rogerie, “Inventaire Kériolet (Finistère),” 382, 24 Oct. 1706, recording a royal gift to him of lots for building in the Parc-aux-Cerfs, rues Saint-Louis and Saint-Antoine at Versailles; and bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 81 (Nov. 1711). “Armorial de Versailles (1697–1701),” 5, suggests that his title of nobility was registered by at least 1701. He was married to Louise Madeleine Desrousseaux, and they had a son, Jean Baptiste, c. 1700, according to the record at GeneaNet, http:// gw3.geneanet.org/pyl?lang=en&p=louis+benigne&n=marolot 302 According to aae md 1068, fols 146–7, he was among the commis expediting the department’s paperwork in 1699. That same year he accompanied Adam in late September on an unspecified mission that took them to Compiegne, passing by Chantilly (ibid., 1056, fol. 164). At the top of a letter from Chamillart to Torcy, 26 Jan. 1702, about “chicanes continuelles” at the government of Nice is written the routing instruction “M. Marolot” (ibid., 1108, fol. 14). Ibid., cp Autriche 80, fol. 144, Torcy to Noblet, 9 May 1702, says Marolot copied out the project for a treaty he was sending him. 303 aae md 1170, fols 441–2r (1710). He makes no appearance in the subsequent lists of pensions. Samoyault, Bureaux, 217, does not list him among the four premiers commis who signed the marriage contract of commis ­Bernage in 1713. Marolot is also not on a 1715 list of Torcy’s commis prepared for the regent. aae md 310, fols 292–3 (other current personnel are also absent, but the reasons for each can be accounted for). 304 aae md 1010, fol. 81, letters of nobility for “le Sr Ligny.” Croissy’s purchase was on 30 September 1687 for 3,478 livres. See Bérenger, “Croissy,” 170. Although in Rule, “Commis,” 74, Ligny is referred to as “comte de Ligny,” it now appears doubtful that he used that title, since it is found nowhere in the archival materials consulted for this book or in the few printed sources concerning Ligny. Of all those discussing the commis, including Baschet, Picavet, Delavaud, Piccioni, and Baillou, only Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30, 114, calls him “comte,” but even Samoyault in his main entry for him (ibid., 290) lists him only as “Sr de Ligny.” 305 Pomponne’s will listed 550 livres for the remaining gages of “sieur Deligny,” his secretary. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 175n4, 350. See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n62. Feuquières, Lettres, 5:367–8n, has a copy of a ­passport

626

306 307

308

309 10 3 311

312

Notes to pages 277–8 issued to the Savoyards by Feuquières on 15 May 1691; a note says that it was signed on his behalf by “de Ligny.” aae md 1102, fol. 192r, Torcy to Bouchu, 18 Mar. 1702, replied to the intendant’s request on behalf of “trésorier des armées” Ligny. For the Extraordinary of Wars, its treasurers or commis, and the 1701 collapse, see Rowlands, Dynastic State, 112–43; and Rowlands, Financial Decline. For Bouchu, see Rey, Intendant de province, 10–12, 74–85. France, Recueil, 22:116n2. aae md 1103, fol. 178, 30 Nov. 1702. See also Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:123. Ligny was involved with passports for Henri Bernard fils, falconer to the Danish king, and Christian Iogems, a falconer wanting to transport birds from Holland. Charliat, “Documents inédits,” 190–2, provides no date but says the letter is from aae cp Danemark 65, which covers 1701–03. aae md, 1106, fol. 164v, notes Bernard’s passport (20 Apr. 1702); ibid., fol. 174, records a gratification for him upon his return from Denmark (7 Dec. 1702). Danish diplomat Meyercroon’s letter to d’Argenson on 16 December 1703 referred to “M. de Ligny, premier commis de M. de Torcy,” to whom he will send a passport to extend the stay of a Danish subject in France. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:64. Both of these call Ligny a premier commis. A copy of a receipt for subsidies received by the Bavarians in August 1712 in aae cp Bavière 64, fol. 237, called him “Monsieur de Ligny, premier commis.” On a 1708 letter from d’Argenson to Torcy dealing with postal affairs, Ligny’s name is written at the top. Ibid., md 1160, fol. 33. Another letter from d’Argenson (ibid., fol. 117, 15 Aug. 1708) informed Torcy that postal commis were still leaking news despite the minister’s warnings. Torcy scrawled at the top of page that the guilty should be arrested and questioned, and referred the matter to Ligny. D’Argenson also helped Torcy coordinate secret diplomacy. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 48. aae cp Autriche 82, fol. 266v, Noblet to Torcy, 28 June 1703. Reference to an encoded thistle was perhaps an elaborate joke that both Ligny and Torcy would enjoy. “M. de Ligny expedié ordce le 200 [livres] 26 aoust.” aae cp Autriche 83, fol. 199, Noblet to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1703. Ibid., fol. 215v, 15 Aug. 1703. Ibid., Hongrie-Transylvanie 15, fol. 66, 17 June 1709. See ibid., Venise 150, fol. 53v, 12 Feb. 1707, for Ligny working with Samuel Bernard and ­Pomponne on letters of exchange for Italy; and ibid., 156, fol. 331v, for letters of exchange sent by Ligny to Pomponne in 1707 and 1708. Ligny continued sending funds to Venice after Pomponne’s 1710 departure, channeling them through consul Le Blond (ibid., 160, fols 307–8, Le Blond to Torcy, 21 Mar. 1711). aae md 1175, fol. 27, Jan. 1710.



Notes to pages 278–80

627

313 Ibid., cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 16, fol. 14, Ferriol to Ligny, 3 Mar. 1711, Paris. In Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 792, Ferriol wrote his brother Augustin Ferriol, 12 September 1708, acknowledging his report that the ambassador’s memoir on his annual extraordinary expenses had been accepted and that Ligny had been ordered to send him his payment for it. See Samoyault, Bureaux, 30, for du Theil. 314 aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 52v, Mesnager to Ligny, 27 Feb. 1712; and ibid., fol. 55, Masson to Ligny, 10 Mar. 1712. 315 Fonck, “Huxelles,” 107. 316 Samoyault, Bureaux, 275–6; and Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221. Villars wrote Puyzieulx, 20 January 1708, that he had received a code from Bernage. aae cp Allemagne 350, fol. 14. A volume of “Mémoires des expéditions” from 1712 through 10 January 1713 indicates that it was done by Bernage (ibid., md 1183). He shows up in payroll records, for instance, in ibid., 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v. 317 Samoyault, Bureaux, 213, 216–18. 318 aae Organisation et Règlement, 1: fols 49–50r. 319 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:96. He appears in the acquits patents for 1711 (aae md 1180, fol. 2) and other payroll records for that year (ibid., fols 526–7v). 320 Samoyault, Bureaux, 40, 160–1, 164–5, 167, 175–6, 205, 218–19, 296; Piccioni, Commis, 214–19; and Baschet, Dépôt, 117, 173, 184–201, 275, 292–319 (he mistakenly calls Charles-Joachim Torcy’s uncle, ibid., 184). aae Organisation et Règlement, 1, fols 49–50r, calls him talented and wise. Archives hg, 1: passim, attests to the importance of his work as departmental historian. His younger brother Pierre Le Dran, who had begun as a treasurer of the king’s troops, became his assistant at the Louvre under Louis XV. Baschet, Dépôt, 184. For the three physicians in the family, see Dechambre, Dictionnaire médicales, 134–6. 321 Samoyault, Bureaux, 216, 306, does not list a date for the beginning of his service under Torcy but lists the wedding date. Sermenté first appeared in the accounts in 1711 on the acquits patents list and through 1714. aae md 1180, fol. 2; ibid., 1186, fols 361–61r; ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v; and ibid., 1197, fol. 16. For Armenonville and his office, see Antoine, Conseil du Roi, 81. See Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 103–4, on Fleuriau Armenonville and Fleuriau Morville. Secretary of State La Vrillière still handled most of the expéditions, however. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 388. 322 Separating the brothers in the accounts is not always simple, but the following clearly identify a commis Maugin: aae md 1011, fol. 170 (acquits patents for a group of commis, 1691); ibid., 1145, fol. 123 (“commis de Torcy,” 1706); ibid., 1181, fol. 527v (“commis,” 1711); ibid., 1186, fol. 362 (listed with commis, 1712); ibid., 1197, fol. 17v (“commis,” 1714); and ibid., 310,

628

323 324

325

326 327

328

329

330

Notes to pages 280–2 fol. 293 (“Supple. d’appointemens au Commis de M. Le Mis de Torcy,” 1715). aae cp Autriche 84, fols 56ff, 11 Sept. 1703. Piccioni, Commis, 151, 156–7; and Delavaud, Pomponne, 175–6. Lebeau’s wife was charged with care for the daily expenses of Mme de Pomponne and her household (ibid., 176) and was left 300 livres in rentes when Mme de Pomponne died in 1712 (ibid., 261). Acquit patents lists in aae md 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid., 1074, fol. 66, (1700); ibid., 1134, fol. 26r–v (1705); and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n60. Piccioni, Commis, 187–8; Samoyault, Bureaux, 91, 169n14, 187, 209, 231, 241, 283; and Thuillier, Première école, 94n7, 96n2. Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, 348 (where he adds “Larrechef” to his name). He appears in department accounts in aae md 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v (1711). A Du Parc is mentioned in the post office in 1715 and after. Vaillé, Postes, 5:30–1, 30n3. Gallet-Guerne and Baulez, Versailles. Dessins d’architecture, 2:233, indicates that in 1706 a “Sieur Martin, premier commis de M. de Torcy” had built a residence in the Parc-au-cerfs quarter in 1706. With only this one reference, he has not been counted among the premiers commis. Marais, Journal, 2:472, 472n4. Spada, “‘Arlequin sauvage,’” 96n2, notes that there is no trace of him in the archives, including the aae. He was born in 1682 and died in 1756. His L’Arlequin sauvage (1721) was of the “noble savage” genre used to criticize contemporary French society. Anticipating ideas he would later develop, it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s favourite play. Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 2d ed., 11:7–8. Had he served (briefly?) as a sous-commis or copyist, he was likely to have remained unnamed in the records. Garnier, Inventaire Côte-d’Or, 1:552. Hozier and Bouchot, Généralité de Bourgogne, 203, has Fabarel’s coat of arms. France, Catalogue général des manuscrits, 5:239, lists a memoir of receipts and expenses made on behalf of Brameret and his wife from 1 September 1703 by Fabarel, corrector of Burgundy’s Chambre des comptes.

Chapter Seven 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 24. 2 Quoted in Brewer, Sinews of Power, v. 3 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 136, justified subsidies by observing that “meager sums spent with judgment often save states from infinitely greater losses.” 4 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 69–76, clearly and succinctly explains the controller general’s functions. He observes that even though



Notes to page 283

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Louis XIV “regulated expenditures with each secretary of state and left it to the controller general to find the funds to pay them,” the latter nonetheless exercised some restraint on spending (ibid., 72). However, Rowlands, Financial Decline, 33–4, 134, stresses that in practice there was little oversight. 5 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 206, 231. 6 aae md 307, fols 138–53v (1701–08). On the difficulties of determining exchange rates, see Rowlands, Financial Decline, 96–100. Rowlands details the financial strain on France from funding the many armies it required because of its overstretched commitments during the War of the Spanish Succession (ibid., 23–30). Although they involved much smaller sums, the extensive missions, subsidies, and other diplomatic expenses of that conflict also strained the foreign office’s finances. Torcy, Journal, 230–1, lamented this lack of funds and its consequences for diplomacy. 7 aae md 305, fols 226–7v, has tables from 11 October 1699 for navigating the complexities of French money and that of England, Holland, Germany, Cologne, Strasbourg, Flanders, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Ibid., cp Brunswick-­Hanovre 38, fol. 114, is a draft treaty with the bishop of Münster and the dukes of Wolfenbüttel from 1701. It specifies subsidies, a portion calculated in French money but payable in Hamburg presumably in local coin, and another portion payable in French coin. 8 Piccioni, Commis, 37–8; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:122. See aae md 1030, fol. 204, “Etats des appointements des Ministres Étrangères pour les six premiers. Mois de 1697,” 10 July 1697, to be paid by guard of the royal treasury Pierre Gruyn; and ibid., 306, fols 65–72, 31 Dec. 1701, for an order to Gruyn to pay the appointements of French diplomats abroad for 1701. For examples of these secretaries’ work on finances, see ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 350, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 15 Dec. 1693, concerning his gratification ordinaire; ibid., 58, fol. 153, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 9 June 1697, concerning his delayed gratification and giving directions as to where to send his ordonnance de deuil (for mourning); ibid., md 1103, fol. 178, a 30 Nov. 1702 receipt to Ligny for an ordonnance au porteur for 4,000 livres; ibid., cp Venise 156, fol. 331v, listing letters of exchange sent by Ligny in 1707 and 1708; and ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 130, du Luc to Jérôme Pontchartrain, 28 Mar. 1714, informing him that he has written to Blondel to make remonstrances to Pontchartrain concerning some pensions. See bn naf 22940, fol. 7, Adam to Lebret fils, 6 Jan. 1704, advising him that he will be sending the 420-livre pension Torcy authorized for a resident of an Ursuline convent in Pau. 9 aae md 307, fols 82–5, “Édit du Roy, portant création de trois ­Trésoriers des Appointements des Ambassadeurs, & de trois Offices de principaux Commis y joint,” Dec. 1706. See Piccioni, Commis, 39, 177–8, 186. Adam paid 150,000 livres for his office.

630

Notes to pages 283–6

10 aae md 1148, fols 78, 114v, 176r–v, 230, and 451r–v, show that Prévost served in 1707, while ibid., fol. 435v, which begins with January 1708’s accounts, indicates that Adam served in 1708. Each treasurer was responsible for clearing up his accounts when he could, even if during his colleague’s year: ibid., 1168, fol. 122, for instance, shows that Adam disbursed appointments to Abbé Pomponne for the first three months of 1710 (3,000 livres), while Prevost disbursed the 24,000 livres owed him for the previous year (1709). Ibid., fol. 123, represents the same situation for Bonnac in Poland. 11 Piccioni, Commis, 38, says Prevost had three commis, but the accounts suggest otherwise. aae md 309, fols 12v–13, is the end of the treasurers’ accounts signed by Torcy on18 January 1711. It specifies the following: ­Prévost, trésorier général alternative, received gages of 7,500 livres and 9,500 livres for les taxations fixes for the present year, as well as 2,000 livres for the costs of filing the accounts with the Chambre des comptes; Adam, trésorier général ancien, received 7,500 livres gages for the present year; Pierre Odeau, contrôleur général ancien, received 3,000 livres gages and 1,500 livres “pour ses taxations” for the present year; and the sum of 345,200 livres was to be used by Prévost for his part of 1708 to pay diplomats (for the year 1709, “8” was crossed out and “9” was added). Taxations were the percentages of the sums they managed to which financial officers were entitled as part of their remuneration. Barbiche, Institutions, 83. 12 “Estats générales des Ordonnances.” For example, see aae md 1201, fols 269–302, the “Estat” for 1714. 13 aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 52, 27 Feb. 1712, where Mesnager thanked Ligny for expediting his ordonnance de gratification; and ibid., fol. 55, 10 Mar. 1712, Paris bankers to Ligny about funds for Polignac. 14 Picavet, Diplomatie, 39–40. 15 Boislisle, “Documents relatifs finances,” 175–223, for 1699; Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:600, 604; and ibid., 3:662, for the other years. For a brief but enlightening look at budgets, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 180–2. Reconciling these totals with those that Picavet published would require more information than either set provides. 16 For examples from 1699, which provides detailed lists, see Boislisle, “Documents relatifs finances,” 202–4, 218, 220. 17 Ibid., 189, 215. 18 Ibid., 195. 19 Ibid., 196–9. 20 Ibid., 220, describes this category as for journeys by postal conveyance within and outside France and for fees for officers (“vacations d’officiers”). 21 Ibid., 215, notes a global sum for ordinary garrisons, for appointements and food for governors and lieutenants general, and for governors of strongholds within France and the pay of their guard companies.



Notes to pages 286–92

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22 Ibid., 211, for Offrandes et aumônes. For the régale, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 1063–5. 23 Picavet, Diplomatie, 40. 24 Ibid., 39–40, gives other and overlapping figures for annual expenditures for ambassadors’ appointements (in livres): 810,000 (1680); 675,000 (1688); 836,000 (1699); 606,000 (1700); 924,000 (1707); and 1,000,000 (1715). 25 aae md 1201, fols 268–302, “Estat général des Ordonnances … 1714,” shows that the treasurers of ambassadors authorized 630,686 livres that year. A similar rise in the giving of diplomatic gifts of volumes of engravings after Ryswick and then a falling off with the return of war are seen in Richefort, “Présents diplomatiques,” 273–4. 26 aae md 1043, fol. 37, reads “Estat pour les ministres estrangers [i.e., French envoys]” for half the year, 1697. 27 aae Service de la comptabilité, Comptabilité “Volumes reliés,” Finance du Ministère 1661–1767, vol. 1, fol. 9 for the year 1698. 28 Not all diplomats were necessarily recorded in these lists. For example, that for 1701 (table 7.3) did not list Jean Lanfranc des Hayes, baron de ­Forval, who was sent under the name of “comte de Brosses” to the Grisons in Switzerland in July 1700 to secure the Valtelline Pass from being used by Imperial troops during any crisis involving the Spanish succession. His mission ended in December 1700. See France, Recueil, vol. 30, pt 2: 703–10, for his mission and instructions. In aae cp Grisons 13, fol. 305, 25 Aug. 1701, Torcy informed Forval that since he traveled secretly and without a formal authorization of title, he had not been included in the previous year’s register of ambassadors. Nevertheless, Torcy assured him, he would receive his appointements at the same time as the others as well as 2,000 livres for official mourning for Monsieur. 29 aae md 310, fols 296–7v. 30 Mercier, Vie d’ambassadeur, 19–21. 31 Sourches, Mémoires, 3:287. 32 France, Recueil, 19:xlvi, liii, 61, 67, 70, 78, 83–6, 125–6. Although he and his children were naturalized in 1716, neither the bailiff nor his son comte Lorenzi, likewise French chargé from 1735 to 1741, was named French resident (ibid., 17:555n1). 33 For Gergy, see Auerbach, France et le Saint empire, 264–72. 34 Picavet, Diplomatie, 82, 87. The same was true in more financially advanced Britain. Black, British Diplomats, 109–14; and Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 11–13. 35 Polignac wrote Torcy in December 1712 from Utrecht on Pecquet’s behalf saying that the latter’s “poverty” might force him to leave Torcy’s service. Reminding the minister of the critical role his premier commis played in the

632

36 37 38

39 40 41

42

43 44

45

46

Notes to pages 292–5 current negotiations, Polignac suggested that a pension might bind Pecquet to Torcy’s service. Torcy, while acknowledging that Pecquet’s merit had not been matched by his luck, nonetheless insisted that “la pauvreté dans nos employs est honourable” (poverty in our occupations is honourable). Quoted in Bély, Espions, 347. Azimi, “Traitements,” 433–6. aae md 1201, fols 277v, 283v, 292, and 299r–v. Ibid., fols 278, 279v–80, and 293v. See Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, ­165–70, on court mourning practices at Versailles. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 22–6, discusses the costs of official mourning and the outfitting of chapels at late Stuart embassies. aae md 1201, fols 269–302, shows at least thirty-five of such ordonnances de voyages in 1714. Ibid., cp Venise 147, fol. 157, 12 June 1706. An authorization for 62,500 au porteur issued at the camp at the siege of Le Quesnoy on 30 May 1693 adds that it was to be employed in secret affairs for the king’s service. Ibid., md 1020, fol. 260. Other references to “Affaires Secrettes” or “Dépense Secrettes” are in ibid., 1016, fol. 202, 25 June 1692, Torcy to Pontchartrain; ibid., 1026, fol. 75, 2 Apr. 1694, ordonnance au porteur for 21,600 livres signed by Torcy; and ibid., 1135, fol. 260, 1 Sept. 1705, for 50,000 livres for “affaires secrètes” to be paid to the bearer for a letter of exchange for the same amount issued by Samuel Bernard for Madrid. A pioneering article is Hatton, “Gratifications,” 68–94. aae md 1201, fols 269–302 (1714), records gratifications, for instance, for the entourage of the Prince-Bishop of Liege, including one for Liege’s Paris resident, Jean-Baptiste Valdor under the pseudonym of “Dorwalde.” See France, Recueil, 30:xlviii, 172. Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:604. Torcy, Journal, 4n2. A big spender, he was pursued for his debts in 1710. When in 1718 Max asked for an accounting of the subsidies received from France, Monasterol committed suicide. For Bombarda and the administration of the Wittelsbach subsidies, see Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:263–74; and Hartmann, “De la musique à la finance,” 322–36. At the time of his death in late 1712, Bombarda’s commis was Gaspard-­Hyacinthe Caze, a kinsman of Mme de Croissy who became treasurer of the post office, couriers, and relays under Torcy in 1715. Hartmann, “De la musique à la finance,” 332. Caze was protected by Torcy and from 1721 to 1750 was a farmer general in the General Tax Farm. Durand, Les fermiers généraux, 96. An excellent, brief summary of the revolt is Frey and Frey, Societies in Upheaval, 61–81. See also Ingrao, Quest and Crisis, 123–60; and Bély, Art de la paix, 525–31.



Notes to pages 296–99

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47 One led from Danzig to Lublin, Cracow, and then across the Carpathians. The second began in Constantinople, continued to Nish, Belgrade, and into the Hungarian plain. The third and fourth both began in Venice, either across the Adriatic to a port like Ragusa and across Bosnia to Hungary, or across land to Laibach (Ljubljana) and then down into the plains. 48 Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, details Des Alleurs’s role. 49 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 13, fol. 126, Des Alleurs to Torcy, 17 May 1708. 50 Ibid., 13, fol. 131, Torcy to Des Alleurs, 28 June 1708. 51 Ibid., 15, fol. 66, Ligny (for Torcy) to Bonnac, 17 May 1709. See ibid., Suède 119, fols 43 and 241, for payments to Rákóczi made through Bonnac in 1708. 52 Ibid., md 1201, fol. 282v, brevet of 20 June 1714. The Hungarian Baron Georges Ráttky, colonel of Hussars, received 4,620 livres annually (ibid., fol. 269). He had campaigned with Rákóczi before entering French service in 1707 and being naturalized in 1715. A further 40,000 livres went annually to the Hungarian lords who had accompanied the prince in exile (ibid., 310, fol. 238). For Ráttky, see Choppin, Cavalerie française, 100. 53 aae md 1201, fol. 286; and Table Gazette de France, 1:291. 54 Two such lists were drawn up after Torcy left the department, apparently for Huxelle’s and the regent’s instruction. aae md 310, fols 237–41v and 301–4. 55 Ibid., 1201, fols 269–302. 56 For Caffaro, see Sue, Jean Bart, 226, 234, 242, 265, 296. A member of a related Sicilian family, the Cigala, also received a pension of 400 livres and is mentioned in ibid., 221, 223, 233–5. aae md 1062, fol. 14, is the draft of the ordonnance for his quarterly payment for 8 July 1699. 57 Sourches, Mémoires, 8:299, 299n1, says that he was originally from Burgundy and was the brother of French diplomat comte de Gergy. 58 Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 4:658–9. 59 See chapter 10, note 80, below. 60 Broglie, Société Saint-Germain des Prés, 161–3; and Moréri, Dictionnaire, 10:475. 61 Dangeau, Journal, 11:265, 265n1. Dangeau and his wife stood in for the king and the Duchess of Burgundy as godparents. 62 Gregg, Queen Anne, 375–6. 63 Dahlgren, Relations commerciales, 89n2. A French translation of his Théâtre naval hydrographique … (Paris: Gissey 1704) was dedicated to the comte de Toulouse. 64 Denis, Bohême, 1:390–1. 65 Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:286; and Recueil des actes du clergé, 9:750, 1105. As vicar general for Cardinal Forbin-Janson in 1701, Mornay likely knew Noblet, perhaps leading Torcy to take notice of the abbé.

634

Notes to pages 299–301

66 Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 9:220–1. 67 Pelus-Kaplan, “Gallica aux archives de Lübeck,” 197–8. 68 Espitalier, Évêques de Fréjus, 475–8. Both Lyon and Provence were in Torcy’s department. 69 Le Paulmier, “Amonio,” 33–50. One of his uncles was a master of the chamber for Innocent XI (1676–89). O’Connor, Negotiator, 144, 150–1, 226n34, discusses his work for Ranuzzi as liaison with the French court. 70 Strayer, Huguenots and Camisards, 335–52, describes the workings of what was described by some as “fraternal charity” and by others as “bribery.” 71 Walton, “Era of Louis XIV,” 199–213; and Richefort, “Présents diplomatiques,” 263–79. aae md 1016, fols 256–9r, 15 Sept. 1692, is a register of “stones and jewels” listing 225 luxurious gift items. In reporting Louis XIV’s gift of a ring to Bolingbroke, it was noted that it had been the Dauphin’s and was valued at 50,000 livres. bl am 33273, fol. 180r, Sutton to Watkins, 2 Sept. 1712. Diplomats’ wives also received gifts from Louis XIV. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 60. 72 Bimbenet-Privat, “Pierreries de Louis XIV,” 81–96. 73 Torcy asked a Swedish diplomat what kind of gift his colleague might prefer (ibid., 92–3). 74 Thépaut-Cabasset, “Présents du Roi,” 4–18. 75 Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 9: 450 (Petkum to Heinsius, 22 Nov. 1709). 76 Of 56 marks in weight, each displayed the royal arms. aae md 1192, fol. 446, 9 July 1713. See also ibid., 1205, fol. 369, an order for two silver boxes for seals for delivery to Pecquet; ibid., 310, fol. 288, 450 livres to Ballin for two silver boxes for the ratification seals for an alliance with the Catholic Swiss cantons; and ibid., 1148, fol. 290v, 12 Sept. 1707, authorizing Ballin to make a gift of approximately 130 marcs of silver for Nuncio Cusani. 77 aae md 1041, fol. 197v, 16 July 1697. In 1714 Bonnac received 30,000 livres for the customary gifts from a newly arrived ambassador to the Porte’s ministers. Ibid., 1201, fol. 284. 78 Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:279 (Torcy to Desmaretz, 18 Mar. 1710). 79 Haile, Mary of Modena, 368–73, 381, 387, 400–1, 445, 454. 80 Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:600. 81 In addition to the widow of Jersey already mentioned, there was also ­Elisabeth Bryerley, probably related to Joseph Bryerley, the Duke of Berwick’s equerry, and Abbé Butler, a doctor of the Sorbonne and kinsman of James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormonde. Of course, secret agents were listed elsewhere. Toby Bourke (“Bourg”), officially listed as serving the English king in Spain, received two gratifications of 3,000 livres. 82 Boislisle, Suisses et Puyzieulx, xxvi–xxvi. For examples, see aae md 301, fol. 301 (31 Dec. 1714); and Rott, Inventaire, 4:488–90, 503–13. See also ­Mercier, Vie d’ambassadeur, 167–78.



Notes to pages 301–5

635

83 Boislisle, Suisse et Puyzieulx, i–xxxviii. The Swiss subsidies were so important that in 1694 Croissy sent Louis Pontchartrain an urgent, indeed peremptory, note reminding him to remit funds to the League treasurers. aae md 1026, fol. 51, Croissy to Pontchartrain, 5 Mar. 1694. In 1709, when word reached Pomponne in Venice that the French princes were contributing their silver to pay for an autumn offensive, he wrote Torcy a plaintive letter underlining the importance of these subsidies and suggesting that he be sent the crown’s jewels to pawn to Venice’s Christian or Jewish bankers. He claimed he could raise enough to pay the annual Swiss pensions or subsidize a revolt in Naples. aae cp Venise 158, fol. 113r–v, Pomponne to Torcy 29 June 1709. 84 Based on aae md 1201, fols 269–302. 85 Ibid., 1553, fols 427–8r. Since 1702, John William Friso, Prince of NassauDietz, was locked with King Frederick I of Prussia and another prince in a succession dispute over the inheritance of William III as Prince of Orange. Although Friso died in a drowning accident in 1711, he left a posthumous son, William Charles Henry Friso (later known as William IV, Prince of Orange), as his heir. Rowen, Princes of Orange, 148–51. The Nassau-Dietz claims were recognized at Utrecht in article 10 of the treaty signed 11 April 1713 between France and Prussia. Frederick I, who died on 25 February before the formal signing, ceded the Principality of Orange to France and agreed to indemnify the young prince. Vast, Traités de Louis XIV, 3:125–6. In fact, however, it was Louis XIV, anxious for better relations with Prussia, who paid the one million–livre indemnity to Nassau-Dietz on Prussia’s behalf. France, Recueil, 16:288–9. 86 There are several sums given for reimbursements for the care and conduct of prisoners, but these are not listed as vacations and seem to involve officers in Torcy’s provinces (e.g., aae md 1201, fols 285v and 288). 87 Barbiche, Institutions, 83; and Marion, Dictionnaire, 549. 88 aae md 1201, fol. 278. 89 Ibid., cp Liège 18, fols 11ff, show the mail service’s increasing disruption through that state with the onset of war from early 1702. Eventually the French developed a new route to Liege that avoided Spanish postal tariffs (ibid., fol. 196). 90 aae md 1186, fols 218–19v (1712); ibid., 1192, fols 419–22r (1713); ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v (1714); and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10 (1715). Torcy’s letter to Pajot, 3 Feb. 1712 (ibid., fol. 68), announced that Desmaretz had assigned 2,650 livres 10 sous to be paid from postal funds and that he was sending a register of the ordonnances so that Vincent could make the payments. 91 Dessert, Argent, 102–3, 131, 136, 144, 231, 259, 270, 323, 332–3, 549–50; and Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 56, for the Brunet family. 92 La Closure, Iberville’s successor in Geneva, in 1704 wrote to Torcy about Jean-Henri Huguetan, Bernard’s Amsterdam associate and grandson of a

636

93 94

95 96 97 98 99

100

101 102 103 104 105

106

107

Notes to pages 307–9 Lyon Protestant refugee, declaring that never did a man know so well how to put money in motion. Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:150–1. Lévy, Capitalistes, 38, 73, 76, 77, 205, 349–51; and Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:78–9, 83. aae md 1041, fol. 124, Bernard to Torcy, 6 Mar. 1697. At the top of the letter is written “M. Bernard banquier.” See Lüthy, Banque protestante, especially 1:74–5, 121–5; Levy, Capitalistes, 49–50; and Dessert, Argent, ­192–202, 532. aae cp Venise 158, fol. 124, Pomponne to Torcy, 6 July 1709. Ibid., md 1181, fol. 49v, Bernard to Torcy, 7 Mar. 1711. Ibid., 1042, fol. 22, Torcy to d’Avaux, 10 Jan. 1697. Quoted in Dickson and Sperling, “War, Finance,” 284. There is no comprehensive work on the financial crisis (crises) of 1709, but see Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:188–230; and Monahan, Year of Sorrows, 81–6. aae md 1181, fol. 49, Bernard to Torcy, 7 Mar. 1711. See also ibid., fols 29, 51, 99, and 128 (1711); ibid., fol. 101, Torcy to Bernard, 19 May 1711, acknowledging that Pecquet had received four letters of exchange; and ibid., 1186, fol. 285 (1712). Dessert, Argent, 565–6; and Lévy, Capitalistes, passim. Antoine financed the plenipotentiaries’ journey to Utrecht (ibid., 151). aae cp Suède 133, fol. 40, Torcy to Crozat, 11 Aug. 1715. Memoires histoire de Louvois, 159–60. Samoyault, Bureaux, 157–65 203–23. Azimi, “Traitements,” 429–31, discusses the tension between the ideal of public service and financial reality. There are few traces of rewards to Torcy’s household, but Bély, Espions, 642, has uncovered some. For instance, the payment orders in the general registry for 1710 (aae md 308, fols 29–39), 1711 (ibid., 309, fols 60–70), and 1713 (ibid., 1192, fols 3–13v) are all brief summaries, listing (from left to right) only amount, type of payment (e.g., gratification, pension, au porteur), and term (e.g., three or six months), name of recipient, and date. Those for 1714 (ibid., 1201, fols 269–302) and 1715 (ibid., 310, fols 346–68), however, include details about the recipient (e.g., if a diplomat, where stationed; convert to Catholicism; nationality; actual services performed, such as the particulars of an investigation), and in a format (from left to right): date, amount, recipient, details about the recipient and reasons for payment, and type and terms of payment. Barbiche, Institutions, 78, 83; and Azimi, “Traitements,” 432. These forms of remuneration applied to any premier commis also holding a venal office. Samoyault, Bureaux, 179–202, must be used on this topic with care, since it is based largely on the period after Torcy and reaches conclusions often at odds with the practices of that earlier period. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:127–32, also deals largely with the post-Torcy department.

108 109 110 111

12 1 113

114 115

116

117

118

Notes to pages 309–10

637

Barbiche, Institutions, 84–7; and Azimi, “Traitements.” Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “appointements.” A gift or gratuity given to someone. daf, s.v. “gratification.” A pension was what a king, prince, or great lord gave annually as a gratuity, recompense for services, or to induce someone to favour their interests. Ibid., s.v. “pension.” See above, pp. 314–16. Pierre Clairambault recorded the revenues drawn from the fiscal patchwork of the “Appointments.” They included partial reimbursements and gratifications to departmental commis, secretaries, messengers, translators, and ushers, as well as payment for brief trips and even books, pens, ink, and notebooks for the Académie politique’s students. Torcy’s own pensions from the Appointments reached over 40,000 livres. Around 1700 his total income from this source reached over 120,000 livres; Barbezieux drew nearly 140,000 livres; Jérôme Pontchartrain, 144,000 livres; and ­Châteauneuf, 75,000 to 80,000 livres. bn Clairambault 664, fols 615–16. See also ­McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 76–8. Azimi, “Traitements,” 441. aae md 1192, fols 419–22r (1713), ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v, and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10, 114r, 158r, and 188r (1715). The only specified gratification for Adam is from 1691 and for 3,000 livres, but it is not clear whether it was ordinary or extraordinary, since it coincided with his mission abroad (1690–91) and his purchase of an office of secretary of the king (1691). The increase and decrease in the sums for Pecquet’s and Fournier’s bureaus may be due to the addition of a new staff member or an internal transfer from another bureau. This figure could represent both a 900-livre extraordinary gratification like that for Fournier’s commis in 1712 and 1,500 for their ordinary gratifications, explaining the 2,400-livre total. aae md 310, fols 292–3. Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, says that Bernage, Du Parc, and Le Dran were in Pecquet’s bureau, and (ibid., 300) adds Pierre Mignon to this group, although he may actually have begun in his uncle Fournier’s bureau in 1710 and after the latter’s retirement in 1723 (ibid., 286) served under Pecquet from 1723 to 1740. This leaves Adam fils, ­Sermenté, Beauchamp, Charles Fournier, Maugin, and perhaps Pierre Mignon for the bureaus of Adam and Fournier prior to September 1715. This is a total of nine simple commis, which conforms to the later count by department historian Le Dran, cited in Samoyault, Bureaux, 36. Indicative of the imprecision of terminology at the time, two others listed by the regent as commis are Larroque (2,400 livres) and Abbé Le Grand (3,000 livres). Again, Adam had gone to the new domestic council, Beauchamp had moved to the post office, and Blondel probably retired when Torcy left office.

638

Notes to pages 310–13

119 The absence of an amount for Fournier in 1715 may be due to the fact that these accounts were apparently interrupted by Louis XIV’s death on 1 September. 120 The 300-livre increments clearly represent six-month payments but the 800 livres in 1714 may have been an extraordinary gratification. 121 It is not clear what the other sums au porteur paid Du Theil in those three years were for, but it is not likely that they were all gratifications, since the totals were 10,000, 10,000, and 4,000 livres respectively. 122 Samoyault, Bureaux, 188, misreads aae md 310, fol. 292v as 1,500 for ­Pecquet’s three commis for half a year, whereas it clearly specifies “par an” (per year). Azimi, “Traitements,” 435, notes that such disparities in remuneration were ubiquitous in the ancien régime. 123 aae md 1192, fols 419–21v (1713). The figure for Pecquet is labeled a gratification, whereas the figures for his commis are au porteur, but since it is not the same as their annual sum, it can be assumed that it too is extraordinary. Later sums for Pecquet that are listed au porteur appear to be ordinary gratifications, although as indicated above some au porteur payments were likely extraordinary gratifications even though not marked as such. 124 Azimi, “Traitements,” 453–8. 125 aae md 1197, fol. 16. 126 Samoyault, Bureaux, 185. 127 aae md 1062, fol. 56, is the 20 August 1699 ordonnance for his 3,000-livre gratification for the previous year. Ibid., 1077, fol. 68 (1700), records the raise. Ibid., 1192, fol. 240 (1713), for example, records the usual 4,000 livres. The extraordinary gratification is in ibid., 1201, fol. 250v (1714). 128 Ibid., 1145, fol. 16 (1706), authorized “500 au porteur” for two months of appointements for documentary research. The rate was fixed at 250 livres per month (ibid., 308, fol. 29v, 1 Jan. 1710), but could include supplements, such as the 600 livres paid that same year (ibid., fol. 31v). Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 453, says that Torcy paid Le Grand a 1,000 écus (3,000 livres) pension every October. 129 aae md 309, fols 64 and 69 (1711). 130 Ibid., 310, fols 292–3. 131 The secretary of state’s recommendation could help secure positions outside the department. In 1698 Pierre Clairambault, with the support of Torcy, the Royal Orders’ treasurer, outbid his rival Charles d’Hozier for the office of the chivalric orders’ genealogist, a venal post for which he paid 40,000 livres. Within the year he designated his nephew Nicolas-Paschal Clairambault as his survivancier. Lauer, Catalogue Clairambault, 1:v–viii. 132 aae md 1013, fol. 188. Klaits, Propaganda, 182–3, on Dubos’s meagre rewards.



Notes to pages 313–14

639

133 aae md 308, fol. 38v (1710). On 15 January 1700 La Chapelle also received an acquit patent of 3,000 livres in consideration of his services in the past year. For Hooke, see Pope, “Mucking about in Germany.” 134 Azimi, “Pensions,” 92, discusses “pension” as an omnibus term under the monarchy. 135 aae md 1093, fol. 153 (1701); ibid., 308, fol. 33 (1710); ibid., 309, fol. 64v (1711); ibid., 1192, fol. 7 (1713); ibid., 1201, fol. 250 (1714); and ibid., 1205, fol. 110 (1715). 136 Azimi, “Pensions,” 85–6. 137 aae md 307, fol. 39 (Aubert); ibid., 1145, fols 6 and 203 (Lullier); ibid., 1160, fol. 162 (1708, “veuve Parayre”); ibid., 1201, fol. 293 (1714, ­Rossignol); and ibid., fol. 280v (1714, Fonton). For the Rossignol pension, see also ss-Boislisle, 13:149–50. Samoyault, Bureaux, 186, mentions that certain retired commis also received pensions from their original departments. 138 aae md 1201, fols 273, 280v, 281v, and 295 (1714). 139 For a rare example and not for a commis, see ibid., 1056, fol. 36, for SaintOlon, a secretary, and a valet to journey between Versailles and Brest twice to accompany the Moroccan ambassador in 1698 and 1699. 140 Ibid., 1066, fol. 11 (1699), says that Adam received 2,000 livres for voyages, while ibid., 1094, fol. 13r (1701), specifies 2,100 livres paid to Aubert. 141 aae cp Autriche 81, fol. 129–30, Torcy to Noblet, 2 Aug. 1702, assuring him that he had again pressed Pontchartrain for his payment, but that for ­Noblet it was far more important that he please the Duke of Burgundy, for which the king would see him well rewarded. As Burgundy’s secrétaire des commandements, Noblet was paid through the royal household. Noblet thanked ­Pontchartrain, 21 August 1702, for sending the payment (ibid., fol. 196). 142 For examples of Adam’s trips to Brittany, see aae md 307, fol. 43v (1705); ibid., 1182, fol. 167v (1711); and ibid., 1190, fol. 406v (1713). Ibid., 1056, fol. 164 (1699), shows Adam and Marolot traveling to Compiegne via Chantilly the night (25 Sept.) that Pomponne lay dying at Fontainebleau. Ibid., 1187, fol. 81, records an unspecified ordonnance de voyage for Adam, while ibid., 310, fol. 294, reports payments to Fournier for four round trips between Calais and London in 1715. 143 Vaillé, Postes, 4:140, notes that under Louvois cabinet couriers were paid at a rate of 100 sols per relay station to their destinations. The numbers of relay stations to some important destinations were 40 to The Hague, 50 to London, 130 to Rome, and 150 each to Madrid and Warsaw. Until 1716 postal inspectors were paid 8 livres per relay station visited and 12 livres per day during the visit (horses were gratis) (ibid., 5:290). 144 For details, see Rule, “Rolle,” 84–92, from which this and the following paragraphs are largely drawn. The king and secretary of state literally read

640

145

46 1 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155

56 1 157

158

Notes to pages 314–17 down the list of names, writing assent, denial, and other comments as they read. Records of this are in aae md 1011 (1691); ibid., 1012 (1692); ibid., 1019 (a summary of the years 1692–94); ibid., 1033 (1695–98); ibid., 1069 ­(1699–1701); ibid., 1118 (1703); ibid., 1129 (1704); ibid., 1160 (1708); ibid., 1181 (1711); ibid., 1194 (1713); and ibid., 1208 (1715). Antoine, Conseil du roi, 286–7. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 45–64, describes how the aubaine was used in contradictory ways for “absolutist” state-­ building and fiscal expediencies. For these domain rights, see Barbiche, Institutions, 371. For placets and their “language,” see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 117–21. État de la France (1698), 1:284–5; and, briefly, Barbiche, Institutions, 181. Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 118, 120–1. aae md 1011, fol. 62, 30 Nov. 1691. Ibid., 1012, fol. 364. Ibid., 1069, fols 3–23, covering 1699 to 1701, is the fullest account discovered. Bély, Dictionnaire, 1144–6; and Barbiche, Institutions, 163–4. According to ibid., 310, fols 283v–4, Odeau received for each half of 1714 gages of 1,500 livres and taxations fixes of 750 livres; see ibid., 309, fol. 13 for 1711.  aae cp Angleterre 173, fol. 186v; and, ibid., md 1064, fols 112–13 (10 Sept. 1699). Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 309–36, 372, discusses the published treaty series that indicated a growing audience for such reading matter outside diplomatic circles. See also Black, Diplomacy, 80. Mignon and Bergeret together were granted this privilege for ten years on 7 July 1684 (Leonard, Recueil des traitez, vols 3 and 4 [no consecutive page numbers]), but when it expired in 1694, Bergeret was dead and there were no public treaties to print. With the July 1696 peace treaty with Savoy, Mignon was granted the privilege on 10 October 1696 (aae md 1064, fols ­112v–14v), as noted in the privilege’s extract printed in 1697 in Traité de paix entre la France et la Savoye. A 1697 grant of permission to print the Treaty of ­Ryswick names him as sole privilege-holder (ibid., cp Angleterre 173, fol. 186v). The late 1700 printed edition of Testament de Charles II, however, refers to the late Mignon in the 10 September 1699 grant of the privilege to Adam (see also aae md 1064, fols 112v–14v). Adam’s grant was renewed for twelve years on 1 September 1712, as noted at the end of Traité de suspension d’armes entre la France et l’Angleterre, 12–14. Mignon’s brother, René II, and Noblet’s father. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 431r, 19 Apr. 1694, Bonrepaus to Blondel, offering his congratulations on the gratification the king had provided for the office’s purchase as a mark of satisfaction with his service. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:139, noted on 21 March 1699 Blondel’s purchase of Mansart’s charge.



Notes to pages 317–21

641

159 See aae md 1194, fol. 178 (1713), for a “Lettre de Compatibilité” in favour of Pecquet. 160 bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fols 35–6. 161 aae md 1129, fol. 286. 162 Bluche and Solnon, Véritable hiérarchie, 103–4, 118–19, 130–1. See Kwass, Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité, 69–70, for a critique of Bluche and Solnon’s assertion that the tax mirrored social hierarchy. 163 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 1–2, 37–42. 164 aae md 1056, fol. 103r–v; and ibid., 1064, fol. 238bis r. bn Clairambault 1193, fol. 93 (1704), shows Adam working for Saint Pouange, the Royal Orders’ grand treasurer, apparently examining the accounts of Louis-­ François Moufle de Champigny, one of the treasurers of the marc d’or. Champigny received the office from his father-in-law, Nicolas Chuppin, and served with Nicolas’s brother Jean Chuppin. Du Chesne and Haudicquer de Blancourt, Recherches ordre du Saint Esprit, 2:451–4. Champigny and the Chuppins were Colbert kin and close to Croissy. Nagle, Droit de marc d’or, 50. Receipts for marc d’or payments are found in aae md, 1064, fols 1–2r. Adam’s work for the Orders may have begun as early as 1690 when Croissy was grand treasurer and likely lasted through 1700, at which point Torcy was promoted to chancellor, a position he held until 1716. The accounts for 1698 and 1699 show the chancellor’s secretary receiving 400 livres annually. Adam likely served in this capacity. 165 aae cp Angleterre 221, documents dated 11 Mar. 1707, written from Glatigny. 166 Symcox, Crisis Sea Power, 241–3.

Chapter Eight 1 Quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. See also the illuminating chapter on “Diplomats and the Information Society” in Black, British Diplomats, 118–45. 2 Ash, “Expertise,” 14–15. 3 Ibid., 16, on “action at a distance.” 4 Blair, Too Much to Know; and Headrick, When Information. For a general discussion of models of state information-gathering and the extent of early modern data collection in England, see Higgs, Information State, especially 10–27. 5 Allen, Post and Courier Service. 6 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 171–2 (22 Sept.). 7 Black, Diplomacy, 20. 8 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:110. On the distinction between documents and records, see Vismann, Files, 71–72. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-

642

Notes to pages 321–2

Empire, 255–78, details how French and Imperial delegations appealed to tradition concerning the use of Latin and French in past negotiations to play for time during negotiations. Venice pioneered in “the collection and systematic storing of information.” Vivo, Information, 49–50. 9 Vismann, Files, 58, says that archives re-purpose records as reminders of a state’s past. This first took place under the Romans. Favier, Archives, 20–2, explains that in France until the eighteenth century all “public” papers were regarded as private, even those of the monarch himself. Public servants were personally responsible for their activities on behalf of the king, so their papers, as evidence of their work, were regarded as a surety for their heirs to use to defend both the late crown servant’s reputation and their own fortunes. Even Venice was plagued by this confounding of public with private documents. Vivo, Information, 54–7. 10 Baschet, Dépôt, 4–67. On 1 September 1671, the day Lionne died, Colbert went to his Paris residence with a royal order to seal his papers, assisted by Lionne’s son Berny and Luc de Rives. Louvois, acting foreign secretary until Pomponne arrived from Sweden, received those papers needed for daily business, but the others remained under seal with Colbert (ibid., 64–6), probably at his residence. They were eventually transferred to Pomponne’s new residence at Place des Victoires, purchased 1 July 1672. For Pomponne’s Paris residences, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 109–12, 221. There is no clear indication where these papers were stored in the interim, but given Louis XIV’s animus toward the Arnauld family, it is unlikely that it would have been at the ancient Arnauld residence in the Hôtel Pomponne on rue de la Verre­ rie, where until 1672 Pomponne resided when in Paris. They more likely remained at the Hôtel Colbert until Pomponne’s return. 11 See Clément’s 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers …” of the foreign secretary in Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 361–2. 12 Vismann, Files, 58–9. 13 According to Marchand, Dictionnaire, 223, Jacques Tubeuf, a president of the Chambre des comptes, had three residences constructed by the architect Le Muet. Mazarin purchased two and incorporated them into his palace. The one Croissy acquired was constructed between 1648 and 1655. A 5 June 1688 purchase contract with Tubeuf’s heirs leads Bérenger to conclude that Croissy owned what came to be known as the Hôtel Croissy at 16 rue ­Vivienne, only from 1688. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 170, 170n1. However, ­Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 99, notes that Croissy, who rented a house on rue Vivienne, only realized his dream of purchasing one on that street in 1670 when he purchased the Hôtel Tubeuf upon Tubeuf’s death. A 27 January 1681 legal document signed by Croissy apparently supports Delavaud by indicating that the Croissys resided in their rue Vivienne townhouse from at least the beginning of the 1680s. Loriquet, “Papiers Colbert,” 256. Croissy



14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25

26

27

28 29

Notes to pages 322–4

643

wanted to be close to his brother, who in 1665 purchased the Hôtel Beautru (later Hôtel Colbert) at the corner of rue Vivienne and rue Neuve-des-PetitsChamps. Neymarck, Colbert, 2:495. Mazarin, Colbert’s master, had resided on rue Vivienne since 1643. Vismann, Files, 98–9. Ibid., 98. Soll, Information Master. Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–9. Blair, Too Much to Know, 6. Baschet, Dépôt, 73–8; and Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 360, 362 (for ­Clément’s own words in his 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers” of the foreign secretary). The original bundles are described in Archives hg, 1:214. The geographic classification scheme remains to this day, although in 1896 the chronological arrangement of materials within this framework was replaced by one based on subject matter. It remains controversial (ibid., ­113–15; and 2:65–6). See Duplessis, “Nicolas Clément,” 94–100. Vismann, Files, 95. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 433–5, 479, ­discusses how such correspondence was used by foreign office commis to write policy memoirs to guide French interpretations of German law and treaties. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 362–8. Le Melle (or Le Melles) was still on the department’s payroll in 1692. aae md 1017, fol. 162. Vismann, Files, 98. Ash, “Expertise,” 20–2, on the emergence of “operative knowledge.” Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 132. Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 396, 396n3, relates that when Du Fresne died, Clément had Parayre examine the papers, and Bergeret assumed the same task some months later. For reasons unknown, however, these valuable papers escaped the department’s grip until a 1910 purchase. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 356–9. Baschet, Dépôt, 74–82, made use of Delisle’s material before it was published and printed selections from it (and, in some instances, selections that Delisle did not publish), but apparently mixed up some of the details. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 356–9. Although Delisle faults Baschet for downplaying Croissy’s contribution in an earlier work, by 1875 Baschet had reversed himself. Baschet, Dépôt, 75. Clément’s 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers” of the foreign secretary, in Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372. The yearly binding began at the end of 1680 with twenty-five volumes for that year, then thirty volumes for 1683–84, twenty-seven volumes for 1685 (perhaps early in 1686, with six volumes for 1685 having been bound in November of that year), and thirty-three for 1686–87 (ibid., 362, 370–2).

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Notes to pages 324–5

30 Perhaps we catch a glimpse of a filing system in the Moroccan leather portfolios with ribbons that Croissy took with him to Nijmegen (ibid., 368). Le Dran later referred to liasses, which were packets of many papers joined together in the centre fold by means of ribbons or strings, but papers were damaged by their frequent removal and replacement in these packets. Archives hg, 1:213–14. 31 See Vismann, Files, 100–1, on the importance of this “planning ahead” as a step beyond “archival cleanup.” 32 Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372. Baschet, Dépôt, 79, mentions it without further comment. Not surprisingly, this object has apparently not survived, probably because of its size and eventual obsolescence. It was most likely a chart that listed volumes, the years they covered, and the agent involved, all grouped under the appropriate geographic rubric and presumably with space for adding volumes as they were bound. If this was the case, one wonders if once the original was filled up a new one replaced it. Ellis, “British Communication and Diplomacy,” 163, relates that the British foreign office pasted large printed copies of ciphers on boards to facilitate code work. 33 Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372, lists the move’s costs. Baschet, Dépôt, 79, misquotes this as “quatre charriots” and fails to include the further information that only one wagon and one man to drive it were hired. Counting the 540 volumes of correspondence through 1679 and the volumes generated by Croissy’s department by 1685, the move may have comprised over six hundred volumes. It is not clear, however, how many volumes remained at the Hôtel Croissy in Paris, but Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:88, 109, suggest that it may have been substantial, whereas Baschet, Dépôt, 116–17, insists that in 1710 all volumes for 1660 to 1698 were at Versailles before being transported to the Louvre. 34 Leather binding cost 3–4 livres per volume, whereas parchment cost only 30 sous (there were 20 sous per livre) and marbled paper over cardboard only 25 sous per volume. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 370–2. The cost differential likely reflected the pride of place diplomacy held as a kingly craft and the practical consideration that negotiation narratives were the most likely of these papers to be consulted again and again. For the royal bindery and for the difficulties obtaining the expensive red Moroccan leather, leading to the substitution of vellum early in the next reign, see Archives hg, 1:214–15. 35 Baschet, Dépôt, 79. For Clément’s cataloguing 1688 work, see Balayé, “Bibliothèque du Roi,” 210–11. A 25 November 1698 payment authorization by Torcy suggests that the volumes of negotiations between 1688 until Croissy’s death in 1696 were not bound until 1698. Baschet, Dépôt, 83–4. This interruption to the annual binding of political correspondence coincided with the outbreak of war in 1688 and the return of peace in 1697. Perhaps the press of affairs or, more likely, binding costs delayed this final step in



36 37

38

39

Notes to page 325

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the ­preservation process. The payment authorization’s cryptic reference to 11,692 livres for binding and to the additional cost of clerks suggests that Croissy’s system broke down further during these war years; perhaps political correspondence was either partially sorted or not at all, requiring extensive preparation before later binding under Torcy. Baschet (ibid., 87–8) mentions (without citing or quoting) a document that he reads as suggesting that Torcy did not get around to having his own papers bound until August 1706. Archives hg, 1:214, notes that in 1706 the foreign ministry gave the binder Dubois such a large and lucrative work order that he was harassed by the community of binders. During the next war, volumes were again apparently not bound immediately. When the king asked Torcy in 1709 for a 1707 report, he retrieved it the next day, but the king said not to bother having it copied, since he would return it shortly, which he did some weeks later. Torcy, Journal, 16, 18, 42. Had these papers been from a bound volume, a copy would have been necessary. Torcy sent Chamillart two documents from the 1690s and asked for their return when he had looked at them. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:26. Thuillier, “Première école,” 22–4. Piccioni, Commis, 32, is mistaken in calling him a premier commis. When he died, he had a library of 1,434 volumes worth 1,678 livres and composed of numerous religious books, including the Bible in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, many Jansenist works, books of other confessions, and Arab and Persian works. He had an extensive legal library of civil, canon, and customary law, as well as works on astronomy, astrology, and chronology. His collection included paintings and prints of religious subjects, small landscapes, birds and flowers, and a portrait of the king. Samoyault, Bureaux, 242–5, 258–9. See Thuillier, Première école, 56, 56n6, for Bruno Neveu’s comments on his Jansenism. Saint-Prest’s friend Abbé François de Camps was a numismatist and legal scholar who had Jansenist connections. Bergin, Crown, Church, 259–60. The separation may have been connected to debts that forced Saint-Prest in 1715 to sell two hotels inherited from his mother. For these details, see especially Thuillier, Première école, 55–7; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 166, 205, 207, 210, 220–1, 233, 309. Piccioni, Commis, 183–6, relies largely on Baschet, Dépôt, passim (but especially chaps 2, 3, and 4). For Anne Chomel, see Popoff, Prosopographie, 439. Their affairs were also the subject of correspondence between the police lieutenant and the household secretary. D’Argenson, Rapports inédits, 387. Petitfils, Regent, 29. Thuillier, Première école, 56, says he served Madame from 1670 to 1718, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 309, dates it from 1692, as does Baschet, Dépôt, 143. Available issues of État de la France (1678, 1684, 1686, 1698), however, list someone else as Madame’s secrétaire des

646

40 41

42

43 44

45 46

47

48

Notes to page 326 ­commandements during those years, whereas Saint-Prest appears first in 1702, the next available issue (ibid., 2:156), Several of the inventories he made for her have survived and at least two were signed by Blondel as crown auditor. bn po 2774, fol. 21. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 524–5, notes Saint-Prest’s writings on the Palatinate question. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 525–33. Delavaud, Pomponne, xxviii–xix, 302–3; and Baschet, Dépôt, 83–4. For example, France, Inventaire des mémoires et documents: Fonds France et fonds divers, Rome, 2–4, lists Saint-Prest’s histories of negotiations between France and the pope at Pisa (1664) and between France’s envoys at Rome and the popes (1661–91, in six volumes, and over 750 folios in two volumes of the memoirs of French ambassadors in Rome (1675–93); ibid., Hollande, 2–6, shows negotiations with the United Provinces; and ibid., Venise, 2, is a 1704 account of relations with Venice since 1701, prepared presumably for Pomponne, who was appointed ambassador the following year. Thuillier, Première école, 56; and Piccioni, Commis, 185. Rott, Inventaire, 4:491, notes a 24 November 1688 memoir penned by Saint-Prest on the thorny question of international law relating to Swiss troops employed for and against Austria and the Empire. aae cp Angleterre 173, fols 256–274 (1697); and ibid., Hollande 231, fol. 248r–v. France, Archives du ministère des relations extérieures, 1:152–4. The first series appeared in a two-volume pirated edition in Amsterdam in 1725. SaintSimon possessed a manuscript copy of the second series. Lombard, Du Bos, 392. “Histoire du roy Louis XIV, depuis la paix des Pirénées jusqu’à celle d’Aixla-Chapelle, par les négotiations de ses ministres dans les cours étrangères, écrite sur les Mémoires du bureau de M. le Mis de Torcy, ministre et secrétaire d’État.” bn naf 3064 (235 pages) and aae md 412 (126 folios). It goes only as far as 1663. The aae catalogue lists Saint-Prest as author, but with a question mark. The bn copy has penciled corrections on it, including some in Torcy’s hand (e.g., fol. 21). What makes the case for Vertôt’s authorship compelling is a 1708 letter from Vertôt to Jean-Antoine de Mesmes of the Paris parlement in the same hand as that of the bn manuscript. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 213–34. bn naf 3064, fol. 3. Delavaud, Pomponne, xviii, xviiin6, attributes the work to “Saint-Prez,” but in his “Additions et Corrections” (ibid., 302–3), along with quoting from the manuscript, he notes that Jean de Boislisle, the only other historian who had utilized this source, attributed it to the students of either Saint-Prest or Legrand, presumably as part of the Académie politique. bn naf 3064, fol. 5. Because this particular work was not for the general public, the abbé offered candid analyses of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louvois. His view of the latter was especially negative (ibid., fol. 202).



Notes to pages 326–8

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49 This was likely Vertôt’s generous description of his colleague rather than Saint-Prest’s flattering self-portrait, which is another point in favour of the former’s authorship. 50 Ibid., fol. 5. Among the outside sources he employed were Jean du Tillet’s 1550 La Chronique des Roys de France (fol. 17); Antoine Aubery’s 1695 L’Histoire du cardinal Mazarin (fol. 93); Charles Bernard’s 1646 Histoire de Louis XIII (fol. 96); and Samuel Puffendorf’s historical works (fols 97 and 99). 51 Thuillier, Première école, 46–8, 61–2, 70, 82–3, 85. Some tables had already been gathered, such as aae md 1080, fols 39–41v, 17 Apr. 1700, of Chambre des comptes accounts in the chancellery from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (ibid., fol. 42, is the transmission letter and explanation). Archives hg, 1:238, indicates that Torcy envisioned alphabetic directories and analytical tables for the bound volumes later known as Mémoires et Documents. 52 Torcy, Journal, 197, reported that in 1710 when preparing a request for a dispensation from Rome for the duc de Berry’s marriage, he searched for a precedent and found one from 1692. 53 Klaits, Propaganda, 191–2. 54 Ibid., 295. 55 Ibid., 113–70 (La Chapelle), 171–93 (Dubos), 246–66 (Le Grand). La ­Blinières is discussed in ibid., 223–7, 237, 240, 270; and Bély, Espions, 348. Saint-Prest, however, does not appear in Klait’s account. For Dubos at ­Gertruydenberg, see Torcy, Journal, 128n1. 56 Dubos was a Parisian man of letters from the 1690s. He began writing for Torcy in 1701 after much travel through England, the Low Countries, and Italy. He became fluent in English, corresponded with Bayle from 1695, and visited him while in Holland. He not only used Torcy’s archives to write his works but also drew on English sources unavailable to the minister. Klaits, Propaganda, 172–3, 175–6. 57 Ibid., 190. Kaiser, “Rhetoric in Service of King,” 182–99, offers insights into Dubos’s aesthetic principles and his Lockean view of public judgment. On Dubos’s views of public opinion and its importance, see also Gunn, Opinion, 106–11. 58 Picconi, Premiers commis, 184–5, seems to be responsible for the claim, repeated by Thuillier, “Première école,” 23n10, that Saint-Prest headed a “bureau de presse” (press office) that attempted to use the archive to influence contemporary news writers. While Piccioni implies that his major source on Saint-Prest is Baschet, Dépôt, nothing in it supports the press bureau claim. Delavaud, Pomponne, 303, speaks of Saint-Prest’s archival work and quotes Jean de Boislisle about the historical work executed at the reign’s end by Saint-Prest’s “special services” collaborators. A little further on ­Delavaud says that the king’s foreign ministry had a true press bureau like that in a modern foreign office and that Torcy himself took up the pen for its work,

648

59

60

61 62

63

64 65

Notes to pages 328–9 implying that Torcy rather than Saint-Prest coordinated this initiative. Since Piccioni used Delavaud’s notes for his book (Piccioni, Commis, 9), he may have misinterpreted the latter’s thoughts on this matter. Thuillier, Première école; and Archives hg, 1:16–23. From 1663 to 1715, exactly 1,843 volumes were bound with the Colbert arms (ibid., 67–8), revising the earlier estimate in Baschet, Dépôt, 161, of just over 2,000 volumes. Williams, Police, is excellent on the police under Louis XIV. Ranum, Paris, is elegantly written and thought-provoking. Jones, Paris, chap. 5, is a recent and expansive account. Jones, Paris, 157–60 (quotation on 160). During the Utrecht negotiations, Torcy received a prospectus from Dom Michael Féliben for a new multi-volume history of Paris, including what was of special interest to Louis XIV, a collection of medals, coins, jetons, seals, and inscriptions. Torcy, who knew Féliben’s work, granted him a royal subsidy. aae md 1195, fols 182ff. For the Louvre’s other occupants, see France, Archives du ministère des relations extérieures, 1:177. Baschet, Dépôt, 142, speculates that Torcy’s one reservation about this otherwise desirable location was being relegated to the top floor. He details the division of holdings (ibid., 116). Volumes remaining at Versailles presumably occupied the same shelves that once held the whole collection in the department’s library (ibid., 63). Vismann, Files, 99. Torcy, Journal, 76. Torcy’s journal was discovered and published by ­Masson in 1884, after Baschet’s volume appeared. Nevertheless, Masson notes (ibid., 76n1) that Baschet, Dépôt, 115–16, quoting Dangeau’s entry for 9 March 1710, misreads it, incorrectly assigning Torcy’s request for space in the Louvre to that date. In fact, the entry for 9 March 1710 (Dangeau, ­Journal, 13:119) notes that both Torcy’s request and the king’s assent had come some months earlier and that work on the rooms was in progress (“Le roi a accordé depuis quelques mois à M. de Torcy ce qu’il lui demandoit; l’on travaille pour cela”). Baschet, Dépôt, 116, misassigns the move to the end of 1710 or the beginning of 1711, whereas it took place in the spring of 1710. ss -Boislisle, 19:362, 362n4, likewise misreading Dangeau, dates the order from March 1710. Saint-Simon also claims that Torcy had previously established a public depot in a detached pavilion of the Petits-Pères near Place des Victoires and accessible from the Hôtel Torcy’s garden on rue Vivienne. Both Boislisle (ibid., 363n4, 364n3) and Baschet, Dépôt, 116–17, show that Saint-Simon was mistaken, since it was the household and navy archives that Jérôme Pontchartrain established at that location in 1699. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:88, suggest that this error may have arisen from the fact that Torcy of necessity kept many papers at his Paris residence for work or storage.



Notes to pages 329–31

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66 Archives hg, 1:175–9, 213–16. From 1680 until shortly after Torcy left office, the volumes were bound in expensive calfskin and Moroccan leather imported from the Levant and then stamped with the Colbert coat of arms. Thereafter they were marked with the royal arms. England’s foreign office trailed France in this area, as seen in Higgs, Information State, 54. aae md 1186, fols 218v and 277, lists payments in 1712 to porters and to a merchant for paper, pens, and other supplies. 67 Rathery, “Notice cabinet du roi,” 1013–22. aae md 1064, fol. 114, 10 Sept. 1699, specifies that copies of treaties and anything else printed by permission of Adam’s monopoly be placed in the Royal Library, in the Louvre’s Cabinet des Livres, and with the chancellor. 68 ss-Coirault, 6:636, 1363. 69 Boislisle, “Place des Victoires,” 264; and Grandmaison, Gaignières, 77–9. 70 Lister, Journey to Paris, 108. 71 Ibid., 128–30. Torcy acquired books for it through his contacts abroad. aae cp Rome 510, fol. 18, Torcy to Gualterio, 20 Feb. 1710, inquiring about books being sent from Rome. 72 This is the context of Le Grand’s proposal for “tables” from each of them. He listed several of these libraries, their collections, and the disorder found in many of them. Thuillier, Première école, 46–7. 73 aae md 1040, fol. 52, Torcy to Nicolay, 2 Feb. 1696; and ibid., fol. 100, Torcy to de la Tour, 28 Jan. 1696. 74 Ibid., 1080, fols 39–42. Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 7 Apr. 1700. Ibid., 1169, fol. 45r–v, 9 Jan. 1710, ordered the opening of the Nantes archives. Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 3. 75 In 1713 Blondel received an order concerning the late Cardinal Forbin-­ Janson’s papers. Baschet, Dépôt, 159n. 76 bn mf 21591, fol. 245, Torcy to Delamare, 6 Feb. 1697; and ibid., fol. 246, 6 Mar. 1697, Saint-Prest’s order. See accounts in Thuillier, Première école, 56n1; and Baschet, Dépôt, 85–6. The same happened when Parayre died in 1707 (ibid., 86; for the inventory, see ibid., 86–8). aae md 1041, fol. 156, is a 1696 note relating that Delamare turned over to Saint-Prest the papers of a “Sr Drift [?].” 77 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fol. 77, d’Argenson to Torcy, 24 Aug. 1702. 78 Richelieu, Papiers, 1:21–30. 79 aae md 1135, fol. 278r, 7 Sept. 1705. 80 Younger brother of Pajot, Henri Pajot-des-Marches, sieur du Boucher, secretary of the king, had an interest in the ferme des postes. Aubert de la Chesnaye-­Desbois and Badier, Dictionnaire de la noblesse, 11:154. When he died on 4 October 1713, his papers were ordered sealed and retrieved. aae md 1194, fol. 260; and ibid., 1190, fol. 348, both 7 Oct. 1713.

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Notes to pages 331–4

81 aae cp Russie 3, fols 124ff, for an inventory of Krock’s papers submitted to Torcy and the items themselves (he died in Paris in April 1711). The Russian code (ibid., fol. 155) is especially interesting because it used symbols for its notations. France, Recueil, 8:119–20, has a brief note on Krock and prints a letter to him from Torcy. Notations of gratifications paid to Krock in aae md 1011, fol. 242, 27 June 1691; and ibid., 1017, fol. 194, 23 Apr. 1692, show that he had long been on the French payroll. Ibid., cp Russie 3, fol. 117, Krock to Torcy, 24 June 1710 (from Villars’s camp at Remy), concerned the tsar’s offer to mediate a peace. 82 Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:311–22. 83 Favier, Archives, 7, 22–5. 84 aae md 1208, fol. 26, Torcy to Puyzieulx, 20 Feb. 1715, discussed ­Gaignières’s cabinet; and ibid., fol. 52, 12 Apr. 1715, had an account of ­Gaignières’s death and the disposition of his treasures. Concerning the division of the spoils, see ibid., 57r–9, Clairambault to Torcy, 25 May 1715; and ibid., 1205, fols 289–92v, Torcy to Clairambault, 27 May 1715. For ­Gaignières and his collection, see also Delisle, Cabinet des manuscrits, ­335–56; ­Grandmaison, Gaignières, especially 72–8, 81–2, on Torcy’s role in its acquisition; and Ranum, Portraits around Charpentier, 475–84. 85 For example, aae md 445, fol. 57r–v, Burgundy to Forbin-Janson, 27 Sept. 1703, was ostensibly a personal letter from the duke justifying the length of the siege of Brisach and “spinning” the siege itself as a means of pushing the Allies to talk peace. He referred to the false stories circulating in Rome and his hope that the pope would hear the truth. A note on the draft indicated that it was written for the cardinal to make public in Rome. 86 Baschet, Dépôt, 232. 87 aae md 1187, fol. 14r, Torcy to d’Argenson, 2 Aug. 1712. On the “culture of news” monitored by police spies, see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 112–14. 88 From Cologne’s electoral court-in-exile in Valenciennes and Lille, Baron Karg regularly supplied Torcy with copies of the Gazette de Leyde and the Nouvelles Publiques of Liège. Karg de Bebenbourg, Correspondance, 1:36–532. 89 France, Recueil, 30:145–67. Also, Boislisle, Suisses et Puyzieulx. 90 Klaits, Propaganda, 116–21; and France, Recueil, 30:184–6. 91 aae md 1080, fol., 231, 27 July 1700, indicates that La Closure was on a secret mission for Torcy; ibid., cp Lorraine 73, fols 6ff, consists of pamphlets and decrees of the Lorraine government sent to Torcy by d’Audiffret; and ibid., md 449, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 24 Apr. 1711, includes gossip from the Duke of Lorraine’s household concerning Marlborough. 92 aae cp Suisse 132, Torcy to Puyzieulx, 10 Oct. 1701. 93 Ibid., Venise 151, fol. 89, Pomponne to Torcy, 13 Aug. 1707, spoke of difficulties with the Fischer brothers (see also ibid., fol. 120); however, in



94 95 96 97 98 99 00 1

101 102

103

104

05 1 106 107

Notes to pages 334–7

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ibid., 153, fol. 28, 28 Jan. 1708, Pomponne told Torcy that he would rather deal with the Fischers than trust sending the post through Milan. See ibid., 156, fol. 20, Torcy to Pomponne, 9 Feb. 1708, on the Fischers as Imperial servants. Ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 8v, du Luc to Torcy, 20 Jan. 1713. As made clear in Vial-Bergon’s introduction to Iberville, Correspondance, xiv–xxi. Brandli, Résidence, 78–9, for La Closure’s career. Torcy made his acquaintance in Ratisbon in 1685. Lévy, Capitalistes, 54–5, 198–214. aae cp Milanais 18, fol. 75, Nouvelles d’Italie, dated 15 June 1707; and ibid., fols 76–7v, a report on the state of Imperial troops. Ibid., fols 78–86. In a 5 April 1707 letter to Pomponne, Cardinal Gualterio said of Torcy that “absolument il ne vous aime pas moins que si vous estiez son propre frère.” bl am 20340, fol. 32. Pomponne was chosen before the end of 1704. aae cp Venise 141, fol. 67, Torcy to Santa Buono (Spanish ambassador to Venice), 29 Dec. 1704. The important Pisani and Delphini families were among his informants. For the Pisani, see bl am 20338, fol. 163r, Pomponne to ­Gualterio, 7 Jan. 1708; and aae cp Venise 153, fol. 183, Pomponne to Louis XIV, 8 Apr. 1708. For the Delphini, see ibid., 148, fols 231 and 239, ­Pomponne Torcy, Oct., 1706; ibid., 156, fols 61ff, Pomponne to Delphini, 14 Apr. 1708; ibid., 157, fol. 73, Pomponne to Torcy, 2 Feb. 1709; and bl am 15285, fol. 259, Torcy to Pomponne, 14 Feb. 1709. Vivo, Information, 5, 70–1, 75. aae cp Venise 160, fol. 50v, Jérôme Pontchartrain to Torcy, 3 Apr. 1709, containing memoirs from Pomponne; ibid., 149, fols 104–6v, Pomponne to Torcy, 17 Apr. 1706; ibid., 157, fol. 38v; and ibid., Grisons 13, fol. 223, “Mémoire” sent to Torcy, 10 Apr. 1701, and fol. 433. bl am 15285, fol. 230r–v; ibid., fol. 343, Torcy to Pomponne, 1 Aug. 1709, on the Duke of Lorraine’s intercepted letters and papers Pomponne was sending him. aae cp Gênes 30, fol. 7, Iberville to Torcy, 17 Feb. 1709, reported on papers from Naples and packets from Pomponne and Gualterio. aae cp Lorraine 77, fol. 318, Torcy to d’Audiffret, 28 Apr. 1712. Torcy asked that a copy of a book on the origins of the House of Lorraine be sent to him at once, before the formal opening of the congress at Utrecht. Ibid., Angleterre 237, fols 52–63, d’Argenson to Torcy, 8 Feb. 1712. Raymond, “Introduction,” 16. Lankhorst, Renier Leers. aae md 1195, fol. 122, d’Argenson to Torcy, 13 Nov. 1713, about an anonymous letter that alerted the police that sieur de Lorme was bringing forbidden books from Holland and would have to be followed to determine the accusation’s truth. See also Bots, “Recueil des

652

108 109

110

111 112 113

114 115 116 117 18 1 119

20 1 121

122

Notes to pages 337–40 informations,” 55–6. Martin, Livre, pouvoirs et société, 752, discusses Renier Leers in Paris, 1694–96. gbhmc, Manuscripts Portland, 4:678, Leers to Stratford, 25Apr./5 May 1711, although Leers was willing to withhold judgment. Depping, Correspondence, 4:638, 18 June 1705 (Depping says the letter is to “De Torex,” but this is likely a misprint, since the context almost certainly points to Torcy as its recipient). Ibid., 644–5. aae md 1168, fol. 171, Torcy to Trudaine, 12 Feb. 1710; ibid., 1169, fol. 48, Torcy to Trudaine, 9 Jan. 1710; ibid., fol. 152, Torcy to Tellier, 4 Feb. 1710; and ibid., 1170, fol. 49, Torcy to Du Gas de Rigoley, 10 Apr. 1710 (ibid., fol. 50, a copy to Tellier). See Bray, César-Pierre Richelet, 103–4. aae md 1118, fol. 202, d’Argenson to Torcy, 22 Dec. 1703, and Torcy’s undated reply (ibid., fol. 205). Martin, Livre, pouvoir et société, 759–65. Vittu, “Instruments of Political Power,” 160 (quotation). Gunn, Opinion, 97, 105, 116. This pushes Habermas’s beginning date for the concept back from 1750 and widens it to include court politics (ibid., 122–5). Parker, Global Crisis, 570–7, dates the emergence of a public sphere in Europe to even earlier in the seventeenth century. Several postal clerks were arrested for opening letters and selling the information in them to commercial news hawkers. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:429–31. Feyel, L’Annonce, 1–6, 435–7, 486. Dooley, “News and doubt,” 275–83, 287 (quotation on 279). Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 16–18. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 315, 320–2, 324–6, 344, 363, 367, 374–8, 380, 477, 479. Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 16. Feyel, L’Annonce, 436, 442, 456–503. Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 4–7, 26, stresses state support for the press and downplays Habermas’s overly oppositional model. Enaux and Rétat, “‘Gazette d’Amsterdam.’” Klaits, Propaganda, 46, 145, 145n68. Raymond, “Introduction,” 7–9, observes that propaganda did not operate on a passive audience and that print especially created a dialogue between the public and the state that was not so easy to control once unleashed. Klaits, Propaganda, 113–70. La Chapelle’s association with the House of Conti-Bourbon and friendship with the Colberts, especially with Torcy, aroused the suspicions of Chamillart, who blocked La Chapelle’s advancement in the government. Torcy wrote to La Chapelle: “[Y]ou would have to be an angel to avoid suspicions … [of those] who blame the impartial for all the difficulties they are encountering” (ibid., 120). See also Boles, Huguenots, 47–67.



Notes to pages 340–2

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123 Klaits, Propaganda, 81. 124 Ibid., 145n66, mentions the assistance of Blondel and La Chapelle’s wife. 125 Anti-Habsburg polemics drew in other members of Torcy’s brain trust. In 1708 d’Avaux passed on to Torcy a prospectus from Vertôt for a book on the negotiations of the Treaty of Münster that would show that the treaty was founded on Habsburg ambitions. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 213–34. 126 Coombs, Conduct of the Dutch, 43: “The Whole City of Amsterdam … declare very openly against prohibiting Commerce with France.” As French sources reveal, bills of exchange from France helped finance the purchase of supplies from Dutch suppliers for the French army. 127 Klaits, Propaganda, 147. 128 an k 1327, no. 22, p. 4. Torcy described the Duke of Savoy as a man of “la plus grande dextérité”; also, ibid., no. 23, p. 5. Klaits, Propaganda, 198–9. 129 Klaits, Propaganda, 191, 192–3. 130 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 435, Marlborough to Heinsius, 11 June 1709, relayed Prince Eugene’s doubts that Louis would comply. René Saunière de l’Hermitage, French Huguenot and London correspondent of Heinsius and the States-General, reported these rumours to Heinsius (11 June 1709) but did not credit them. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 8:592. 131 pro sp Holland 84/233/pt 1, fol. 113r, Walpole to Tilson, 14 June 1709. 132 Torcy, Journal, 193. 133 The letter to the governors is in Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 1:404–7 (full text in aae md Hollande 57, fols 163–8). Torcy later claimed to have proposed going to The Hague to seek peace or at the very least to ascertain the Allies’ “real intentions” and “of making the king’s real sentiments known, as well in France as in foreign countries.” Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:242. For penetrating analysis of this episode, see Klaits, Propaganda, 207–20 (ibid., 218n54, is the letter to the prelates); and Petitfils, Louis XIV, 635–9. Saunière de l’Hermitage wrote Heinsius, 25 June 1709, of the singularity of the letter’s circulation and appeal. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 8:646. Rameix, “Justifying War,” 186–7, explores the preaching of sermons to spread royal wartime propaganda during the Nine Years War. 134 Churchill, Marlborough, 2:559. 135 Klaits, Propaganda, 221–45. Villars, Mémoires, 3:281, Villars to Torcy, 20 July 1710, raised the possibility of another manifesto. Breen, Law, 25–8, 151–2, 204–6, agrees with Lucien Karpik, David A. Bell, and Sarah Maza that Habermas’s eighteenth-century emergence of a “bourgeois public sphere” of rational discussion of public affairs actually began among avocats, but unlike them, he places it in the seventeenth century. 136 Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 220–4, discusses Le Peletier’s tenure. Matthew Prior informed London of his summer of 1699 complaints to Pomponne about problems with the mails. Prior appears to suggest that Pajot (presumably

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139 140 141 142

143

144 145 146 147 148

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Notes to pages 342–4 Léon II) was the real force to be reckoned with in resolving these matters. Legg, Prior, 299, 301, 303, 310–11. For its organization, see Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 72–6; Brillet, De la Voirie, 564, 574–80; Vaillé, Postes, 5:25–9, 288–9; Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 92–107; Bély, Dictionnaire, 1002, 1006–8, 1237–9, 1320; and Marchand, Maître de poste. Vaillé, Postes, 5:1–11, 98–9. Postal couriers were obligated to carry the letters and packets of governors and other superior officers in the provinces. See also Brillet, De la Voirie, 564; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 223. See Arblaster, “Posts,” 22, 26, 30. Vaillé, Postes, 5:12, 12n6. Ibid., vol. 4. Ibid., 5:25–7, 33–72, 94–106; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 103. Delavaud, Pomponne, 119, 136, 143, 151, 162, 163, 171, 175, 260, 3 ­ 44–5. Babelon, Nouveaux hommages, 1:89, reflects his guardianship. Prailly provided Le Quien de La Neufville information for his treatise on the post office’s origins. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, Foreword. Marchand, Maître de poste, 110–12. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 75, says that there were 900, counting those bureaus that followed the armies. Brillet, De la Voirie, 584–96, discusses the December 1703 list of rates and rate hike, the first since 1676 and brought on by rising costs and war needs. Vaillé, Postes, 5:47–8, says that these were created in 1704. Ibid., 4:105–14; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 161–83. Marchand, Maître de poste, 233, 247–86. Vaillé, Postes, 5:288–91. Bély, Espions, 152, relates that a postal inspector in 1712 reported to Adam and Torcy. Inspectors were Nicolas Adam, brother of Clair Adam, and Nicolas Cottebrune. Until 1716 they were paid 8 livres per relay station visited and 12 livres per day during the visit (horses were gratis) (ibid., 290). aae md 1148, fol. 175v, records a 1707 payment to N. Adam and Cottebrune for a trip to Spain to improve its postal connections with France. Cottebrune, formerly Pomponne’s valet de chambre, had carried his dispatches from Saint-Germain to Nijmegen and Hamburg in 1678. Upon Pomponne’s death, Cottebrune entered Torcy’s service. Mme de ­Pomponne left him a bequest of 300 in rentes when she died in 1712. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 261, 335. aae md 1093, fol. 238v, indicates that there were at least three postal inspectors in 1701, including a Sieur Simonnot. See bn mf 8862, fol. 276, Pomponne to Lebret, 4 Oct. 1697, about a visit by postal inspectors. Vaillé, Postes, 5:233–91; and Brillet, De la Voirie, 552–637. Allen, Post and Courier, 70–1, says the stations and their inns were generally considered good and well regulated.



Notes to pages 344–6

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150 Marchand, Maître de poste, 241 (ibid., 239–46, on their many privileges). 151 aae md 1175, fol. 155, Torcy to Richebourg, June 1710. 152 Vaillé, Postes, 5:276. See also McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 199. 153 Vaillé, Postes, 5:249. In 1702 the postal inspectors reported to Torcy that Le Bourget was provisioned with twenty-seven horses, Soissons and Metz with twenty, Lyon and Limoges with seventeen, Meaux with thirteen, Orléans with eleven, and Fontainebleau with ten. 154 “Allée de Metz” occurs in aae cp Autriche 82, fol. 213, in a note of 23 June 1703. Noblet, while on the frontier with the Duke of Burgundy and his army, inspected postal routes and set up new ones. Ibid., 84, fol. 56, ­Noblet to Torcy, 11 Sept. 1703. Noblet also described the Tyrolean postal route and routes through Lorraine (ibid., 82, fols 103 and 108). See also ibid., md 1177, fol. 189, Torcy to Saint Contest (provincial intendant at Metz), 23 Feb. 1711, on courier service in the Metz-Nancy area. 155 aae md 1108, fol. 56, Pajot to Torcy, 23 Apr. 1702, reported that he had forwarded Rouillé Chamillart’s request for service to Bonn. 156 Italian routes are discussed in aae cp Gênes 40, fol. 10r–v, Torcy to Iberville, 22 Nov. 1706; ibid., Rome 501, fol. 264, La Trémoille to Pomponne, 13 July 1709; and ibid., md 1160, fol. 69, Torcy to Pajot, 21 May 1708. Vaillé, Postes, 5:312–24, treats the wartime postal routes. 157 Vaillé, Postes, 5:94–106. For the Pajots, see Viton de Saint Allais, Nobiliaire universel, 6:218–21. 158 “Éloge de M. d’Onsenbray,” in Grandjean de Fouchy, Histoire Académie des sciences, 143–54. Onsenbray, of which there are various spellings, including Ons-en-Bray, Onz-en-bray, and Onzenbray, was raised to a comté (county) in 1702. 159 Marchand, Maître de poste, 104–5, is a lively description of that post office’s operation. 160 Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 106–37. Although Torcy might open letters, delay the departure of the post, or otherwise interfere with its normal operations for reason of state, he was adamant that others not appropriate that regal right. In 1706, after the director of the Rennes postal bureau complained to Torcy that the agent of Hercule Mériadec, duc de Rohan, had arrested a postal courier who was on his way from Paris to Rennes for the purpose of removing several letters, the minister informed Brittany’s intendant that he had written to Rohan to express his displeasure. aae md 1144, fol. 226, Torcy to Ferrand, 23 Nov. 1706. Torcy ran little risk in pressing this peer, as he was one of the king’s least-liked people in the realm. ss-Coirault, 1:433. 161 gbhmc, Prior Papers, 276, Prior to Portland, 17 Oct. 1698. 162 Orléans, Woman’s Life, 208. 163 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 2:1126–7.

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Notes to pages 346–7

164 Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 127. 165 Villars complained to Torcy, 27 July 1709, that his mail was being opened and delayed, denying the accusation that his couriers were carrying too many of his personal letters. Villars, Mémoires, 3:258–9. Torcy replied (ibid., 259, 2 Aug. 1709) that he had written Pajot to echo his outrage and instruct him to spare Villars this nuisance, occupied as he was with the most important affairs of state. 166 This disrupted the Allied system of mail intercepts, led to the creation of a Dutch Black Chamber, and facilitated Allied interception of mail from the Bavarian court-in-exile at Namur. The Dutch also intercepted French diplomatic correspondence with the north in Amsterdam’s post office. Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 141–53. Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 304, discusses the convergence of postal and spy networks in northern Germany. In 1703 Leibniz wrote to a Polish officer that when he was next in Hanover he would share with him an intercepted French diplomatic letter commenting on Poland’s primate, Cardinal Radziojowski. The letter was decoded in ­England. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Zweiundzwanzigster Band, 165. 167 bl am 15876, fol. 246v, Dayrolle to Boyle, 29 Apr./10 May 1709: “There is no body of any distinction with marquis de Torcy, only Monsr Pajot, Director General of the Post Office.” See also aae cp Hollande 200, fols 4r–10v, “Mémoire sur l’État présent des affaires de l’Europe.” 168 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 3:1211. 169 Torcy, Journal, 47. 170 aae md 1191, fol. 265, Torcy to Pajot, 13 May 1713. Letters from the Empire arriving in their bureaus were to be “parfumer exactemnt” (fumigated) in line with the miasmatic theory of disease. Bad air was to be dispelled by burning something that produced a strong odor, such as gunpowder or sulfur. daf, s.v. “parfumer.” For an example of the same practice in Florence in 1630, see Parker, Global Crisis, 630. 171 aae md 1172, fol. 299, Torcy to Basville, 13 Dec. 1710. Also an g7 302, ­Basville to (Torcy), 31 Jan. 1694, reporting on the disappearance of a courier. 172 aae md 1102, fol. 32, Torcy to Saint Contest, 17 Jan. 1702. 173 Ibid., 1181, Torcy to d’Argenson, 30 Sept. 1711. 174 Nougaret, Histoire de la Poste Bourgogne, 32, 43. 175 aae md 1200, fol. 217, Torcy to Dondell (1711). Ibid., 1191, Torcy to d’Argenson, 19 June 1713, passed on information from Pajot about individuals in Paris suspected of complicity in the Lyon courier’s murder. 176 Ibid., 1209, fols 117–23, “Mémoire concernant les Postes,” 31 Dec. 1713. 177 Vaillé, Postes, 5:29–32. The September 1715 document codifying changes under Torcy and governing his successors is in aae md 1206, fols 247–8v (also in Brillet, De la Voirie, 561–3).



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178 Vaillé, Postes, 5:31, 31n1. A 17 December 1720 report from d’Argenson’s bureau recorded that a prisoner claimed to have applied to the foreign office for a passport with a recommendation from Torcy’s commis ­Beauchamp, to whom he had first applied. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 13:320. ­Prudhomme, Inventaire l’hôpital Grenoble, 153, notes a 13 September 1723 letter from Pajot announcing that Beauchamp was resuming his post. 179 He or his brother André, later a commis à la recette des Postes, served the Army of Italy early in the 1690s as its postal clerk. For the Vincents, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:49, 72, 301–2; and aae md 1186, fols 246 and 294 for 1712 (in which Vincent is called “postal cashier”). 180 aae md 1206, fol. 247; and Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 73–6. 181 Torcy, Journal, 223–6. 182 Bély, Espions, a rich and indispensable study of this topic, is reviewed by Rule, “Gathering Intelligence.” 183 Bély, Espions, 56. Roosen, Diplomacy, 129–61; and McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 208–9, question the value of much of the intelligence gained. A Béarn priest wrote Cardinal Noailles in Paris of letters from Marlborough inciting the locals to revolt and offering a leader and tax exemptions. Although highly skeptical, Torcy ordered Gramont to investigate. bn naf 23187, fol. 363, 28 Nov. 1706. See Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 121–3, on police fears of plots against the king and the psychology behind the fabrication and denunciation of false plots. 184 Bély, Espions, 91. 185 Ibid., 223–5. 186 Klaits, Propaganda, 270, 272. 187 Bély, Espions, 293; and Kamen, War of Succession, 86n7. 188 aae cp Venise 141, fols 162–3, Champigny to Torcy, 21 Feb. 1705; ibid., fol. 167r–v, Champigny to Torcy, 28 Feb. 1705; ibid., fol. 184, Torcy to ­Champigny, 30 Mar. 1705; ibid., fol. 196, Torcy to Champigny, 12 Apr. 1705; ibid., fol. 203, copy of a letter from Printemps, 6 Mar. 1705, Augsburg; ibid., fol. 205, Torcy to Champigny, 19 Apr. 1705; ibid., fol. 213, Torcy to ­Champigny, 24 Apr. 1705; and ibid., fol. 251, Champigny to Torcy, 2 May 1705. 189 Bély, Espions, 91, 234. The Martine newsletters in the Blenheim archives are “almost totally ignored, but undeservedly so.” Snyder, Marlborough-­ Godolphin Correspondence, 2:993n1. 190 Torcy, Journal, 231–2. 191 Bély, Espions, 93. See Klaits, Propaganda, especially 45–7, for Basel’s importance as a centre for disseminating French propaganda. 192 Bély, Dictionnaire, 177–80. See also Bély, Espions, passim. In April 1713 Torcy wrote Gaultier to congratulate him on receiving from the king the

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195 196 197 198 99 1 200

201

02 2 203

Notes to pages 350–4 Abbey of Savigny’s income and to remind him that he would also receive a pension from Philip V, a silver bowl and 6,000 pounds from Queen Anne, and an apartment at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Sèze, “Louis XIV a perdu ­Tournai,” 523. bn naf 20274, fol. 116, Tessé wrote Ursins, 14 Aug. 1712, upon ­Bolingbroke’s arrival in France for direct negotiations with Torcy, with Prior and Gaultier in tow, that the latter two were two little junior genies of the great peace machine (“petits génies subalternes … la grande machine de la paix”). See Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 42–3, 194, 227–9, 342–3; and Bély, Espions, passim. Coirault, Manuscrits de Saint-Simon, 140–3, discusses the TorcyGualterio correspondence. Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 80, famously applied this label to ambassadors. Torcy, Journal, 9. See Bély, “Poussin,” 423–42, for his career. Bély, Espions, 93–4; and Villars, Mémoires, 1:348, 348n1. aae cp Danemark 58, fols 44–5, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 5 Feb. 1697; and ibid., fol. 399, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 15 Oct. 1697. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 248. This and the following paragraph are based on Rostand, “Voyages et Négociations,” 3–133 (which incorrectly gives his birth date as 1671); France, Recueil, 19:xxxi, 238n3, on Genoa; and France, Recueil, 28:129n1, 130–6, on Mainz. Lüthy, Banque protestante, 154, 177, on the Sacerdoti brothers’ bank. For these negotiations, see France, Recueil, 19:xxix–xxxvi, 238; and Torcy, Journal, 58–9, 227–8. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 50, Anneville to Desmaretz, 25 May 1709, indicates that Sacerdoti was secretly arranging grain shipments to France. This useful distinction is from Bély, “Secret et espionnage militaire,” 28–39. Intelligence from the foreign office was factored into the war department’s strategic planning. Cénat, Roi stratège, 185. Torcy ordered the extraordinary envoy to the Grisons to inform Villars, who was bringing substantial numbers of troops into Italy, of any movement in the crucial Valtelline Pass route from Germany to Lombardy. aae cp Grisons 13, fol. 299, Torcy to Forval, 17 Aug. 1701. Pomponne in Venice shared intelligence with the war ministry, although cooperation locally between diplomats and soldiers could earn the latter Chamillart’s reproaches. Bély, Art de la paix, 422–5.

C h a p t e r Ni ne 1 Watkins, “New Diplomatic History.” 2 Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,” 732. 3 Black, Diplomacy, 12.



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4 Lindemann, “Diplomatic Archive,” discusses these rich yet underutilized resources that have much to offer many disciplines in addition to diplomatic history. 5 Black, Diplomacy, 77 (and 35). 6 Blet, Nonces, 265–6. Grimblot, Letters, 1:168, 445, 454; and ibid., 2:189n, 365–6, offer further examples. 7 Austria’s ambassador wrote Torcy on 30 April 1699 expressing hope for an audience between the time the king returned from Marly and departed for Fontainebleau. aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 181. 8 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 200–1. 9 ss-Boislisle, 28:341–2. He says they are called “secret” merely to distinguish them from those given without ceremony to anyone. 10 In 1655 Sainctot inherited the master of ceremonies charge held by his uncle and father, but conflicts with Blainville led him to sell the office to Michel Desgranges in 1691 and purchase the semester as introducer held by Michel Chabente de Bonneuil. Contemporaries regarded Sainctot as authoritative in protocol matters. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 67–8. 11 bn ff 6679, “Journal de Sainctot,” fols 21–2, includes an August 1692 description of the nuncio’s first visits. 12 Ibid., fol. 23v. These envoys might be there to offer the king compliments for a royal birth, victory, or other notable event. Torcy was typically the only officer of state in attendance. For a description, see also Saule, Journée, 29, 33–9, and the even more detailed description of the Venetian ambassador’s audiences in Breteuil, Mémoires, 85–96. 13 Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, 293–4. 14 État de la France (1698), 1:272–3. See also ss-Boislisle, 28: 342; and Saule, Journée, 30–2. 15 Grimblot, Letters, 2:18–20 (Portland to William III, 4 June 1698). He and Louis spoke of proposals for a partition treaty. Given the secrecy of these negotiations, precautions were likely taken so that they would not be overheard. According to État de la France (1698), 1:264, talking among those witnessing a levee was permitted so long as it was not too loud. This background noise may have permitted greater privacy on the other side of the balustrade. Torcy, present at Portland’s audience, had the right of entry to the king’s levee (ibid., 261). Blet, Nonces, 206, 213, 226, 285, indicates Torcy’s presence during the nuncio’s royal audiences. 16 bn mf 6679, fols 23v–4. 17 Ibid., fol. 26r–v (1692). 18 Ibid., fols 26–32 (1692). Bély, Princes, 469–509, discusses the purposes and operations of princely visits incognito and notes their further relevance to Torcy for such long-term visitors as James III, Elector Max Emmanuel, and Rákóczi.

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Notes to pages 357–8

19 Bély, Princes, 294–9; État de la France (1698), 1:274; Breteuil, Mémoires, 47–84, 97–154; and Berger, Versailles, 59–63. The sixteenth-century Hôtel du Nivernais became the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs extraordinaire in 1630 under the control of the grand écuyer. Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 12–13. It is now the Tournon Caserne of the Garde Républicaine. aae md 1201, fols 295v and 300, notes 6,000 and 12,000 livres paid out for the expenses of the Persian ambassador and his entourage. See Grenet, “Their Masters’ Voices?,” 13–17, on changing approaches to these royal interpreters’ function. For this experience from the perspective of English ambassadors, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 37–40. 20 In 1698 when the doorkeepers at Versailles prevented their pages from accompanying them into the royal apartments, the diplomatic corps complained that their honour had been compromised. Torcy responded that the aim was to exclude all non-authorized pages, including those of the king, from his crowded apartments. aae md 305, fol. 146. Breteuil, Mémoires, 243–6, in later years lamented that the decline of public ceremonies where ranks were clearly delineated had resulted in people no longer staying in their “natural” rank. Roosen, “Diplomatic Ceremonial,” 452–76, analyses the purpose and operation of the often-ridiculed diplomatic ceremonial. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 134–56, is a recent analysis of diplomatic ceremonial. 21 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 253–7. 22 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 347–51, 434–8; and Black, British Diplomats, 100–1. The organization and development of ceremonial was more pragmatic than doctrinaire. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 137. Diplomats abroad also had to be familiar with foreign protocol. Rousseau de Chamoy, newly posted to Ratisbon, wrote Torcy, 3 May 1698, for a copy of the protocol followed in the Colleges of the Electors and of the Princes. Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait Ambassadeur, 52. Louis XIV regulated a dispute among resident diplomats over precedence in taking leave and presenting condolences. Dangeau, Journal, 10:334. 23 Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies.” The grand master of ceremonies had to be present for diplomatic events involving the military household (ibid., 88). His department also managed visits by foreign sovereigns, though in conjunction with the foreign secretary (ibid., 116–18). The registers of ceremonies that the grand masters were obliged to keep became research sources for past practices and for resolving disputes over court, diplomatic, and other types of protocol (ibid., 79–82, 119–35). 24 The staircase, completed in 1680 and demolished in 1752, is described in Berger, Versailles, 29–39. Its two staircases accessed the premier étage in what were to become the Venus Salon and the Diana Salon. One proceeded from there to the Hall of Mirrors through a series of rooms that included the Throne Chamber and the Salon of War. For these offices, see Nguyen,



25

26

27

28

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“Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 85–8. Duindam, Courts, 188–93, argues that the increasing significance of diplomacy and its protocol helped push the introducers’ position above that of the masters of ceremony. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 86; they also took their oaths before the grand master of ceremonies. See also État de la France (1698), 1:627–32; and Breteuil, Mémoires, 29. It was to Torcy that Claude Labbé, sieur de Villeras, ordinary secretary for the conducting of ambassadors, turned in May 1700 with his petition requesting the same exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the household’s other commensaux. Torcy presented his request to the king and wrote Jérôme Pontchartrain to see to its implementation when granted, likely to his testy colleague’s annoyance. aae md 305, fols 258–60, 19 May 1700. This secretary served all year. État de la France (1702), 1:641. bn mf 6679, fols 138v–9v, 19 Feb. 1696, has notes exchanged between Torcy and Sainctot. See Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 50–3, for brief notices on those under Louis XIV. Continuity of practice came largely through the journals they kept. René Girault served with distinction for sixty-seven years (ibid., 29–30). When he died in March 1697, Dangeau, Journal, 6:91 (who called him “sous-introducteur”), records that Sainctot and his colleague ­Bonneuil disputed with Torcy over who had the right to fill the vacancy. The king, however, reserved the right for himself. In 1713 the introducers persuaded the king to clarify their status as being above that of the ordinary secretary so that their brevet could now read that he served près (near) rather than avec (with) them. Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 30. bn mf 6679, fol. 260r, note Sainctot to Torcy, 21 Aug. 1698. Ibid., 260v, Torcy to Sainctot, 22 Aug. 1698, dealt with the Dutch ambassador’s concern over the distance between his and the foreign minister’s coach and its implications for rank. Torcy, claiming indifference to this detail, nonetheless recommended the model followed by the English and other ambassadors. He dealt with a similar dispute in January 1700 (Dangeau, Journal, 7:233). On 31 December 1698 Prior shared with Portland concerns about the order of carriages for the Earl of Jersey’s formal Paris entry and alleged that “these people are playing their old tricks over again” (gbhmc, Prior Papers, 306–7). On coaches as luxurious symbols of power, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 29–36, 108–11. bl am 15285, fol. 75r–v, Torcy to Pomponne, 9 Apr. 1708, discusses questions of precedence and protocol for the Venetian ambassador’s Versailles audience. aae cp Venise 146, fol. 210, Torcy to Pomponne, 23 Mar. 1706, shows the secretary’s concern even for the way the ambassador referred to the Doge in his dispatches home. See also Duindam, Courts, ­188–93; and Loomie, “Conducteur des ambassadeurs,” 333–56. Breteuil, Mémoires, 20–31. This volume contains several letters between Torcy and Breteuil. His predecessor was Bonneuil, with whom Torcy clashed

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33 34

35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43 44 45

Notes to pages 358–60 during the Portland embassy. For Bonneuil and Breteuil, see ss-Coirault, 1:569–70, 1444. See aae md 1106, fol. 36, 18 Mar. 1702, for extracts from Breteuil’s registers for that year that concerned the ceremonial between introducers and nuncios. Breteuil, Mémoires, 72–3, is an example of his reliance on the king and close work with Torcy. Ibid., 47–84, recounts the Moroccan ambassador’s visit. Ibid., 79–81. aae cp Rome 491, fol. 124, Torcy to Gualterio, 18 July 1708. Torcy, Journal, 138–9, also describes a February 1710 contretemps with the two nuncios then at court. Calling the incident unnecessary and ridiculous, he blamed ­Breteuil for provoking it. They met weekly on Tuesdays. Blet, Nonces, 198, 225. Torcy also held scheduled and unscheduled meetings with individual ambassadors, some with public knowledge and others meant to be secret. bl am 20318, fol. 74r, Torcy to Gualterio, 22 June 1703, arranged a seemingly secret meeting with the pro-French nuncio at a house rented by his secretary Blondel. Picavet, Diplomatie, 36, argues that these regular audiences were less important under Torcy than they had been under Croissy. pro sp France 78/157, fols 35–7r, 11 Nov. 1713. Legg, Prior, 313. See also Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 108, 197. Breteuil, Mémoires, 217–20, reports that ambassadors’ wives were not entitled to any special consideration at court. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 9. According to Sainctot, Pomponne and Torcy dropped Croissy’s distinction between envoys and residents whereby he had not given his hand to residents or allowed them to be seated. bn mf 6679, fols 209–10. pro sp France 78/158, fols 1123–5, Apr. 1714, Paris. Legg, Prior, 240–1. An example of a log is aae md 304, fols 302–29v, audiences for 7 July; 14, 21, and 28 Aug.; 14 Sept.; 3 and 10 Oct.; 19 and 27 Nov.; and 10 and 17 Dec. 1696. After noting the date, the secretary listed the diplomat either by title – “M. le Nonce” or “L’Envoyé de Portugal” – or by name – “M. ­Mayercron” (Denmark) or “Le sr Palmquist” (Sweden), and followed that with a summary of the issues raised. Bourgeois reports in Spanheim, Relation, 352n1, that the foreign office’s series of registries of these audiences began with Croissy in 1680. aae md 1108, fol. 150, is an example of Torcy’s penciled notes from 1702 on three folds of a sheet of paper folded four times. aae md 304, fols 308, 314, and 319 (for 1696); and ibid., 305, fols 121, 124v, 128v, 140v, 142, 143, 192, 202, and 211 (for 1698 and 1699). For example, ibid., fol. 199. See Torcy, Journal, 300, for Torcy’s conclusion regarding the audience of 6 November 1710.



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46 Records of audiences are scattered for this period throughout volumes in aae md 304, 305, 306, 307, and 308; and ibid., 304, fol. 308, 21 Aug. 1696, for example, shows the corrections and annotations made in Torcy’s hand. 47 For the hierarchy of diplomatic ranks, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 82–4; and Roosen, Diplomacy, 59–64. For the function and “character” of residents, see Brandli, Résidence, 27–83, on Geneva. This work, despite the dates in its title, has much to say about developments under Louis XIV. 48 Gunn, Opinion, 148, 151. Roosen, Diplomacy, 5–6, reminds us that, despite usage then and now, diplomats represented rulers, not nations or peoples. 49 Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 48, 53–4, 228. 50 État de la France (1698), 3:443–6. On the evolving diplomatic hierarchy, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 82–4; and Bély, Art de la paix, 483–501. 51 Côté, “What Did It Mean,” 235–50, is a useful study of the selection criteria, but the attempt to compare the results of a case study of approximately fifty ambassadors to Rome, London, and Vienna with the ideal of the “perfect ambassador” reflected in the treatises of the time falls flat. Côté correctly concludes that Abraham de Wicquefort and Callières were not “utopian idealists” (236) in the standards they prescribed, but fails to adequately explain why. Côté gives only perfunctory attention to the backgrounds of the two theorists drawn upon the most: Callières is merely a “French diplomat” and Wicquefort a “diplomat” (242). Their “new concern with political content” (239) is mentioned but not accounted for. Côté speculates that although Louis XIV “might never have read authors such as [Pedro de] Vera or Wicquefort, his selection of diplomats seems to suggest that he shared some of the theorists’ ideas” (250). But why? Any explanation of Wicquefort’s and Callières’s realism must recognize that both were diplomats experienced in the practices of France’s foreign office. 52 Roosen, Diplomacy, chap. 3. According to État de la France (1698), 3:445, ambassadors to Rome, the Empire, Spain, and Britain were always drawn from the great lords, while those to Venice, the United Provinces, and the Swiss were from the robe nobility. Ambassadors to Savoy and Constantinople could be either, although for the latter post a robe noble had to be raised to the sword. Residents, envoys, and agents sent to Italy’s and Germany’s princes and republics could be drawn from either stratum. However, Picavet, “‘Carrière’ diplomatique,” 389, demonstrates that this was often violated in practice. For the social origins of diplomats, see also Bély, Espions, 291–5, 297–300. See also Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,” 743–7. 53 Soldiers serving as diplomats became more common on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession. Bély, Art de la paix, 487; and Sarmant and Waksman, “King and Generals,” 164–65. The English journalist ­Addison, in a 1712 satirical article in the Spectator on the establishment of Torcy’s Académie politique, unfavourably contrasted Louis XIV’s current generals as

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Notes to pages 361–2 potential diplomats with those of the previous war, who he said had served well in both roles. Thuillier, Première école, 89. Black, British Diplomats, 44, notes that military men as diplomats was also common in Britain due to “the absence of notions of specialization and technical training in diplomacy, and their already-demonstrated willingness to serve the Crown and availability in peacetime, but also the sense that such envoys were especially appropriate for particular courts.” See also Black, Diplomacy, 72. Black, Diplomacy, 26, 48–9, 68, 73, 116; and Craveri, Age of Conversation, 290. Picavet, “‘Carrière’ diplomatique,” an admittedly tentative and partial comparative study based on the data available at the time, is nonetheless valuable on recruitment and social origins. Picavet concludes that there was not yet a diplomatic career in the modern sense of training for, and advancement in the context of, steady and exclusive employment. Black, Diplomacy, 102–3. Revealingly, Torcy wrote early in 1706 to Forbin-Janson, recalled from Rome owing to ill health, of his difficulty finding a good replacement during wartime. aae cp Rome 462, fol. 348. Torcy, Journal, 243n4, 315–17. aae md 1192, fol. 458 (1713), is a payment to Rossi. Black, Diplomacy, 100. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 137n26. Dangeau, Journal, 15:278 (14 Nov. 1714), notes that at that morning’s Conseil several suggestions were made for embassies to Vienna, Madrid, and London. Torcy approached two candidates after the meeting, giving each twentyfour hours to respond. Both accepted and Torcy presented them to the king the next day (ibid., 279). For other rumours of possible choices, see ibid., 7:177, in 1699, and 9:204, in 1703. Rule, “King and Minister,” 221, 231n100. ss-Coirault, 2:562, claims that in 1705 Harcourt drew close to both Pontchartrains even though Maintenon was distant from them. Maintenon remarked to Ursins in a 3 January 1712 letter that even though Huxelles, on the Utrecht negotiating team, was “said to be jealous of the friendship that subsists between M. de Torcy and the Abbé Polignac,” she was optimistic that the work toward peace would overcome such feelings. Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 1:357. Dubet, Orry, 41, relates that Harcourt had opposed sending Desmaretz to Spain in 1701, which did not likely endear him to Torcy. Kettering, French Society, 64–80. Roosen, Diplomacy, 87–91. Roosen’s work remains invaluable on diplomatic practice and the workings of embassies. For Michel Amelot, marquis de Gournay, see Torcy, Journal, 48n4; and Kamen, War of Succession, 48, who concludes that “the years of his ­ambassadorship were not therefore simply the high point of French influence



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in this period: they were also the most active years of change and development during the war, and the most favorably remembered.” Rule, “King and Minister,” 213–14, 218. Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 135–6. See Poisson, “Secrétaires-interprètes”; Bély, Espions, 349–50; and aae md 1192, fol. 456. Chaplains were usually under the authority of the grand almoner of France, although the chaplain at Geneva was under the bishop of Annecy. They were subject to the foreign minister’s approval and sometimes acted for an absent resident. Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 231. Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:194–5, 204–14; Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 229–30; and Roosen, Diplomacy, 91–102, 141–3. Roosen notes that all but a few of the French secretaries were ambassadorial secretaries rather than embassy secretaries, a situation Torcy tried to remedy with his Académie politique. aae cp Suisse 254, fol. 78, plenipotentiaries to Louis XIV, 7 June 1714, informed him that they would combine their secretarial staffs as they had done at Rastadt. For disbursements for the Stockholm chapel, see ibid., fols 3, 5v, and 8 (1713). Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:205, notes that personal servants and cooks might also accompany an ambassador, while other servants were recruited locally. aae cp Portugal 44, fol. 13, Châteauneuf to Torcy, 14 Mar. 1704, however, shows that the ambassador had a suite of twenty-four French domestics, which helps explain his pleas for more funds. Black, British Diplomats, 56–7, notes that secretaries likewise supplemented the missing linguistic skills of British diplomats. aae, ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 104r, Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil. aae md 1192, fols 432v, 433v, 435r–v, 436, and 438v, are examples of payments to couriers during 1713, a busy time for negotiations at Utrecht and elsewhere. At Gertruydenberg in 1710 Polignac used his valet de chambre as a courier. bl am 15876, fols 305v and 306r. aae cp Hollande 230, fol. 259, lists the following as Mesnager’s household at Utrecht: four friends, one secretary, one gentleman, one almoner, one écuyer, four pages, one “maître d’hôtel” (butler), three valets de chambre, one officer, two aides to the officer, one cook, two aides to the cook, one “patissier” (pastry cook), two “rotisseurs” (broilers), one “garçon pour le Me d.” (butler’s boy), four “valets de pied” (footmen), two coachmen, two postilions, one Suisse, four valets, fourteen carriage horses, six saddle horses, two ceremonial coaches, one coach for the staff, and one “chaise de poste” (a light vehicle for one person and rapid travel). And Mesnager was not even a nobleman! In Stockholm in 1671, Pomponne had three secretaries, a chaplain, three pages, seven lackeys, two carriages, and eight horses. Delavaud, “Changement,” 371–2. For a comparison with the households of later Stuart diplomats, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 54–64. aae cp Espagne 189, fol. 100, 11 Feb. 1709.

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75 Torcy, Journal, 251. 76 Craveri, Age of Conversation, 289–92. On the influence of late Stuart diplomats on culture and consumption when they returned from abroad, see ­Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, especially 1–8. 77 bn mf 6658, fol. 50v (27 Jan. 1701), 98 (18 Feb. 1701), and 102v (19 Feb. 1701). 78 aae md 1202, fols 46–8 (1714) and 211. See also Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 315–16. 79 Neveu, Correspondence Ranuzzi, 1:36, 56. 80 aae cp Rome 323, fol. 92, Torcy to Croissy, Rome, 27 Sept. 1689. 81 Blet, Nonces, 215–40. 82 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 162, 240. 83 Ridder-Symoens, “Training and Professionalization,” 159, 161. 84 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 123–43, but cf. Black, British Diplomats, 32–4. Black also rightly insists on the importance of social skills, noting that inexperienced aristocratic diplomats were not necessarily mediocre (ibid., 2, 7–8). For this as part of wider changes during the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign, see Bély, Art de la paix, 576–7, and Rule, “Royal Revisions,” 50–5. On the fin du règne and Callières, see Pope’s introduction to Callières, Letters, 32–5. 85 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice.” 86 Pecquet, Discourse on the Art of Negotiation, xii–xxvii. For this group of negotiators, see also Colson, “Ambassador between Light and Shade,” ­179–95. At least 176 diplomat manuals appeared in print between 1625 and 1700 (ibid., 181). These authors reflected the “abstraction or distillation of theory from practice” that was a hallmark of expertise. Ash, “Expertise,” 7. 87 Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur. See the comments of Bély, Espions, 335–6. 88 François de Callières, De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains (Paris, 1716). For its writing and publication history, including on the Internet, see Waquet in Callières, Art de négocier, 9–37, 75–105, 176–7. For an English translation, see Callières, Art of Diplomacy. 89 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 38n123, observes that Pecquet fils may have begun his treatise as early as 1710 under his father’s influence. A recent English translation is Pecquet, Discourse on the Art of Negotiation. 90 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 173. 91 Translation from Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 123–4. 92 Bély, Art de la paix, 575–6; and Pope, Callières, 4–5. 93 McClure, Sunspots and Sun King, 253–60 (quotation on 256). 94 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:167 (notes in 15:19–22), Fénelon to Chevreuse, 18 Nov. 1709.



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95 Quoted in Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 124. aae cp Venise 147, fol. 189v, Pomponne to Torcy, 26 June 1706, requests a secretary, referring to a young man at Ryswick with Callières as a possible candidate. Ibid., fol. 196, Torcy to Pomponne, 16 July 1706, remarks that such men were hard to find but nonetheless promised to speak with Callières. 96 In his introduction to Thuillier, L’E.N.A., 10–13, Pierre Chaunu emphasizes that this bold initiative of establishing an academy likely emerged because of rather than despite the period of tension, crisis, and painful introspection that followed the hard-won yet unsatisfactory peace of Ryswick. 97 See Klaits, “Men of Letters”; Keens-Soper, “French Political Academy”; Thuillier, “Première école”; Thuillier, Première école; and Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 170–9. Callières’ participation, once merely suspected, has been confirmed by the discovery of new documents. Schweizer, “Callières,” 621–22. On the creation and evolution of the foreign archives, see Nathan, “Archives anciennes,” 193–204. 98 aae md 1192, fol. 423r–v, lists expenses for the “Élèves du Louvre” and includes student names as well as funds for a clock and furniture. 99 Quoted in Keens-Soper, “French Political Academy,” 323–4. 100 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 179–241. 101 Lynn, Wars, 356–7. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 279–88, dismantles the myth of French linguistic imperialism against the Empire at Rastadt by demonstrating that French rather than the usual Latin was used for this treaty owing to the parties’ haste to conclude an agreement. It was Eugene who proposed signing the French draft so that he would not have to consult with Vienna over the meaning of certain technical Latin terms. Furthermore, the Treaty of Baden that grew out of the Rastadt accord was in the traditional Latin. 102 Villars, Mémoires, 4:12–16. Villars also blamed the defence of Ursins’s interests if war returned, and claimed that by requiring him to send his letters through the war minister, Voysin and the king had made Torcy his mortal enemy. Villars to Voysin, 28 Jan. 1714 (ibid., 379). Vogüé, Villars, 2:46–130, recounts these negotiations. Ever the diplomat, Torcy personally replied to Villars’s attack on his professionalism. Vogüé (82) says that it would be difficult to find a more tastefully and courteously delivered lesson. Sturgill, Villars, 147–8, likewise shows Torcy attempting to “salve Villars’ ruffled ego” despite the king’s annoyance with the marshal. 103 Villars, Mémoires, 4:369–71, Voysin to Villars, 22 Dec. 1713. 104 Vogüé, Villars, 2:60. 105 Black, Diplomacy, 73–4. 106 Villars, Mémoires, 4:365 (Eugene to Charles VI, 6 Dec. 1713). Villars admitted to the king that he had not imagined that being a negotiator required so much finesse. Vogüé, Villars, 2:76.

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107 Thuillier, Première école, xvi, 1. 108 Thuillier, L’E.N.A., 17–21, 28; and Thuillier, Première école, 3–25. 109 Ash, “Expertise,” 18. Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 218, argues for an understanding of diplomatic practice as a cross-cultural experience of understanding and operating within a context of different political cultures. For success, diplomats had to understand the ideologies that informed the beliefs and principles that influenced their fellow diplomats and those who directed their efforts. Along the same lines, see Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 75–92. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, cxvi, cites a Hamburg pastor who feared the “open outlook of persons – courtiers, diplomats, soldiers, and ‘men of the world – who traveled widely, continually mixing in different cultural and religious contexts.” 110 Thuillier, L’E.N.A., chap. 1. 111 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 178–9; Chaunu, introduction to Thuillier, L’E.N.A.; and Thuillier, Première école. 112 Childs, Entresol, 8 (quotation), 67, 134–5, 156–7. 113 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 54–62, also stresses that a variety of reform ideas were emerging and circulating within central government circles during Louis XIV’s final decades. 114 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 246–8.

Chapter Ten 1 Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 148–65, 474, 477. 2 André, Louis XIV, 40. 3 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 239. 4 Roosen, Diplomacy, 34; and Bély, Art de la paix, 393–4. Torcy, Journal, 202, records Torcy’s 1710 discussion with the Bavarian elector in which he assured Max that he only spoke on his own behalf and could say nothing decisive until he reported back to the king. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 663, remarks on the king’s intense supervision of the Utrecht negotiations that matched his practice since 1661. 5 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 47, refers to the “information scarcity that is traditionally associated with diplomacy and diplomats.” Control of information was likewise key to the controller general’s power. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 62–4. 6 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 30. See also ibid., 215–16, 238–9. 7 Black, Diplomacy, 14, 73–4, 82, 103. 8 Of the three primary tasks of diplomacy – representation, information-­ gathering, and negotiation – the last has been most under the control of diplomats, although rulers, favourites, and ministers outside the foreign office can diminish it (ibid., 14–15).



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9 “Information-gathering has tended to be least under the control of the formal diplomatic process” (ibid., 14). 10 “Secrétaire général de la monarchie administrative,” from Frostin, “Organ­ isation,” 201, who also says that he acted as a sort of “secrétaire de direction” (executive secretary), transmitting royal orders to his colleagues (ibid., 210). 11 Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 83–4; and Antoine, Conseil du roi, 303. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 22, acknowledges that kings “owe … a public accounting of all their actions … and yet cannot render it to any of their contemporaries without disclosing the secrets of their conduct and neglecting their greatest interests.” 12 Bély, Art de la paix, 514–15. 13 Picavet, Diplomatie, chap. 3, “Le Roi, chef et centre de l’action diplomatique.” 14 Cénat, Roi stratège, 178–95, summarizes and contributes to recent research on this. Barbezieux eventually gained more independence, but his influence over strategy remained limited and often negative, which led to conflicts with various generals. 15 Ibid., 178–9; and Petitfils, Louis XIV, 515. 16 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 519. 17 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 32–3, acknowledges that “it is wise to listen to everyone, and not to believe entirely those around us,” but nonetheless he saw it best “for the important interests of the state and for secret affairs” to rely on a small group of advisors who could devote to them “more time and concentration than all the others.” See also ibid., 74, 162–3, 173, 228, 238–9, 254–5. 18 Saint-Simon, Écrits inédites, 4:55. 19 “We obviously cannot do everything, but we must provide for everything to be done well, and this depends primarily on whom we choose [as our agents].” Louis XIV, Mémoires, 255. See also ibid., 82, 188, on balancing the need to delegate and its dangers. 20 Apropos of an otherwise unspecified complaint raised by the controller general concerning Navy Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain, Torcy reminded Chamillart (8 June 1705) that when memoirs prepared by the navy secretary had previously gone before the Conseil, it was because the elder ­Pontchartrain, while navy secretary and controller general, also served on the Conseil. Torcy informed Chamillart that he was mistaken in believing that Louis ­Pontchartrain had done so because he was then controller general. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:25–6. 21 Vivo, Information, 7 (quotation), 32–9. See also Cornette, Roi de guerre, 260–1. 22 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 238–40.

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Notes to pages 376–9

23 As the king wrote secretly to Philip V, 26 July 1709. Baudrillart, “Intrigues,” 252. 24 Torcy, Journal, 411; and Picavet, Diplomatie, 25, 63–5. 25 Torcy, Journal, 294, 372, 383. 26 Ibid., 356–8. 27 Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois,” 77. Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 217–18, 223–4, mentions Le Peletier’s network of informants but offers no evidence that it was as extensive as that of the foreign secretary, although his control of the post office and its Cabinet noir certainly extended its reach. Stoll also notes Beauvillier’s network, but his reference to Lizerand, Beauvillier, 412–13, reveals nothing of an extensive nature. 28 Torcy, Journal, 183, reported that, after the Conseil meeting, he shared with the king the letter Polignac addressed to him from Gertruydenberg concerning his relationship with his fellow plenipotentiary Huxelles. The king instructed Torcy to keep it a secret. 29 Ibid., 68–70. On another occasion Torcy was careful to exonerate ­Beauvillier as the source of rumours that the foreign secretary wanted peace at any price, observing that those actually responsible for this misinformation were even more the duke’s enemies than his. Among their mutual enemies Torcy included Maintenon (ibid., 241). See Louis XIV, Mémoires, 228, for his recognition of the value of frank advisors. 30 Torcy, Journal, 125. 31 Ibid., 234–5. Pomponne was ambassador to Venice at that time. Torcy labeled the appointment a “piège” (trap) that God mercifully helped him avoid. Earlier that month Torcy recorded that the king used a tone with him in rejecting his advice concerning the Duke of Savoy that, had he used it with someone else, would suggest the king suspected that individual of having a secret understanding with the duke (ibid., 229). 32 Ibid., xvii–xviii. 33 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 182. 34 The following is adapted from Rule, “King in His Council,” 216–24; Rule, “Emergent Bureaucracy,” 277–8; and Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 320. See also Mousnier, Institutions, 2:130–46; and Antoine, Conseil du roi, 43–79. 35 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fol. 49, extracts of Héron’s dispatches and memoirs concerning Hungary, 16 Nov. 1701, shows Torcy’s pencil markings, as does ibid., fol. 60, Héron to Torcy (?), 30 Jan. 1702. 36 Sourches, Mémoires, 11:324 (27 Apr. 1709). 37 Picavet, Diplomatie, 55–6. 38 Torcy, Journal, 314. 39 Ibid., 204. For other examples, see ibid., 238, 276, 298, 307, 332, 356. On one occasion, however, Torcy believed that the king had referred to the Conseil his advice to send someone to compliment Philip V on the victory at



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­ rihuega because he no longer supported the idea and wanted to delay havB ing to make a decision (ibid., 323). From a sketch by Charles Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre, dated 3 July 1702. an r4 825, 3 July 1702. Thanks to Gary McCollim for this reference. See Rule, “King in His Council,” 233, fig. 6 (based on it). Perkins, “Councils,” 395–7. Perkins discovered from another source that the letter from which the extract was taken was from Abbé Dangeau, brother of the memorialist. Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. Torcy, Journal, 75, 112, 147, 383, 438. Ibid., 57. Perkins, “Councils,” 92–3; and Torcy, Journal, 211–12. Rule, “King in His Council,” 223, fig. 5. Torcy, Journal, 39, 90–1, 134–5, 140–1, 165–7, 200, 322. On Monday 6 April 1711, a letter from Gaultier opening the prospect of peace negotiations with Great Britain required an immediate reply (ibid., 420). Similarly, on Monday 25 May 1711, a letter from Philip V of Spain to Austria’s Archduke Charles necessitated an immediate response (ibid., 434). Ibid., 215. Ibid., 134. See Rule, “King in His Council,” 221. pro sp France 78/159, fol. 216, Prior to Stanhope, 12/23 Oct. 1714: “Monsr de Torcy is gone for 2 or 3 days to an Estate of his own, and this is a sort of Holy day-week for all the Ministers: there will be no counsel [sic] ’till the beginning of the next – he will return to Versailles Saturday.” On 17 July 1710 (Torcy, Journal, 227) Torcy noted that he was going to Croissy until the evening of the 19th, since the Gertruydenberg plenipotentiaries’ courier had been sent. Torcy, Journal, 425. bn mf 6679, fol. 49, c. Apr. 1694. Picavet, Diplomatie, 56–7. On the debates, divisions, and discouragements among the king and his ministers from September 1709 to March 1710, see Rule, “Preliminaries.” Torcy, Journal, 231, which relates that he spoke to Desmaretz of the usefulness of the northern alliances. Torcy, Journal, 33. Ibid., 356–8. Ibid., 176. Ibid., 359. Chapman, Private Ambition. Cénat, Roi stratège, 40. For such discussions, see Torcy, Journal, 158, 159–60, 163, 197–204, 218–19. For conflicts with Beauvillier, see ibid., 170–3, 187–8, 211–13.

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62 Ibid., 212. 63 See ibid., 204 (for the king’s decision), 220 (for the meeting of ­Dispatches). For Boullion, see Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 107–8; and ­ss-Coirault, 3:951–70. 64 For both, see Bluche, Dictionnaire, 146–7, 374–5. Avignon, with a population of about 24,000, had dual sovereigns: the pope (since 1348) and the king of France (since 1535). Louis XIV occupied it and the Comtat twice, in 1662–64 and 1688–89. The Comtat, papal property since 1229 and with a population of approximately 100,000, was governed by a resident rector from its capital, Carpentras. Embedded in the main portion of the Comtat’s territories since 1544 was the smaller Principality of Orange of the House of Orange-Nassau. Occupied during Louis XIV’s wars with William III, it was restored to the latter at Ryswick, reoccupied by France in 1702, and then ceded to France in 1713 at Utrecht (ibid., 1119–20). Boutier, Atlas, 26–7, shows these enclaves. 65 Blet, “Nonce en France,” 223–35, 257–8; and Blet, Nonces, 7–12. 66 aae md 1016, fols 48ff, Torcy to archbishop of Auch and bishops of Montauban, Tréguier, Tarbes, Alét, and Die, 23 Jan. 1692. See Bergin, Crown, Church, 256 and chap. 5, for the crisis. 67 In 1713 Torcy sent such a message by courier to Henri-Pons Thyard de Bissy, bishop of Meaux. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 4:405. 68 bn mf 17431, fol. 76, Torcy to President Harlay, 25 Oct. 1696. Also aae md 1041, fol. 168, Torcy to Père Garden, 7 Apr. 1697. 69 Bergin, Crown, Church, 36–41. 70 Torcy, Journal, 42–7. 71 Ibid., 187–8. 72 Blet, Nonces, 167, 177, 197–291. 73 Ibid., chaps 10–13, passim. See, for example, aae cp Rome 430, fol. 301, Torcy to J. Pontchartrain, 13 Dec. 1702, about the nuncio’s complaints of ships attacked and a fortress shelled in the Gulf of Venice. 74 Bély, Dictionnaire, 123–5; and Bergin, Crown, Church. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 221–2, explain that the household secretary of state’s role, although formally charged with the affairs of the clergy, was largely confined to paperwork and was of secondary importance among his attributes. Torcy’s extensive role in clerical affairs is detailed in Blet, Clergé de France. 75 Le Roy, Gallicanisme, details Torcy’s role. 76 For such commissions, see Bluche, Dictionnaire, 368–9. 77 bn mf 6679, fols 254–5, Aug. 1698. Harsany, Cour de Léopold de Lorraine, 45–8, describes these marriage negotiations as recorded in aae cp Lorraine 46. The other commissioners were Beauvillier and Pomponne (ibid., fol. 102, 4 Aug. 1698). Dangeau, Journal, 6:439 (12 Oct. 1698), specified that Torcy read the contract to the king and handed him the pen to sign it because it



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entailed a marriage with a foreign prince. Thanks to Douglas Clark Baxter for sharing information about this wedding. aae md 1067, fol. 21, lists the commissioners, as does Dangeau, Journal, 6:467 (29 Nov. 1698). See bn mf 8863, fol. 450, Torcy to Lebret, 17 Apr. 1698, concerning William III’s request for monies owed him by Orange’s clergy. See also Dangeau, Journal, 7:41 (4 Mar. 1691). The convention’s ratification, dated 26 August 1699, is in aae md 1064, fols 109–10v. Marchand, Intendant, 290, 293–5. bn mf 8873, fol. 39, Chamillart to Lebret, 5 May 1702. See Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 317–20. With Orange in French hands, Torcy informed Grignan (aae md 1144, fol. 64, Louis XIV to Grignan, 13 Oct. 1706) that the king had authorized the opening of Orange’s archives to the marquis de Mailly concerning his rights in the principality. aae md 1144, fol. 398v. For Birkenfeld and his son, see Courcelles, Dictionnaire des généraux, 1:425–6. See also Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 73–80; and ss-Coirault, 6:343–4. Borrowed from the title of Bryant, “Partner.” Maintenon, Lettres, 5:391, 22 Oct. 1698. aae md 1137, fols 161–3. For such songs, see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 108–12. Le Peletier claimed that Maintenon and Louis Pontchartrain often cooperated to set policy. He also seemingly implied that Chamillart’s foray into peace negotiations developed out of his meetings with the king and Maintenon. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 157, 160, 168. Bryant, “Partner,” 77–106. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:402. Picavet, Diplomatie, 50. For her role and that of the Colberts in ecclesiastical patronage, see Bergin, Crown, Church, 264–76; and Bryant, “Partner,” 93–4. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:509. Bryant, “Partner,” 89. She wrote to Archbishop Noailles of Paris, 29 May 1698, that her choice for an ambassadorial post was receiving consideration. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:347–8. In a 14 November 1704 letter to Noailles, however, Maintenon claimed that she had no influence over Puyzieulx’s possible ambassadorship to the Swiss and that any lobbying on his behalf should target Torcy. She assured the cardinal that the king did not want her even to appear to enter into such matters and that if she passed on to the king a memoir on Puyzieulx’s behalf, he would only forward it to Torcy. Maintenon, Lettres à Noailles, 4:245–6. In 1714 she influenced the appointment of Abbé Mornay as ambassador to Portugal. His parents were her old friends. Bryant, “Partner,” 97. Vaillé, Postes, 5:22–7, 69–70, 92–3, 312–25; and Vaillé, Cabinet noir. See also Bély, Espions, especially 56–150; and Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,”

674

92 93

94

95

96 97

Notes to pages 388–9 732–52, a review of Bély. Fénelon, Correspondance, 17:199n1, indicates that Torcy kept an eye on letters between Beauvillier and Fénelon. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 174; and Bély, Art de la paix, 392. Philip V, for example, sent two letters dated 13 April 1709 through ­Maintenon to Louis requesting that the duc d’Orléans not be returned to Spain. The bitter and accusatory letter detailing his reasons was for the king alone, whereas the shorter and more-reserved one could be shared with the Conseil and even Orléans. Baudrillart, “Intrigues,” 29–30, 246. Torcy, Journal, 372, discussed a February 1711 secret letter from Philip V to his grandfather that also arrived through Maintenon. See Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:101–5, Amelot to Maintenon, 7 Dec. 1708, sending her his reflections on peace proposals involving Spain. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:564ff; and ibid., 509, 515; and to Ursins she wrote that the mails to Spain passed through Torcy’s hands (ibid., 195). On another occasion she complained to Ursins that if she had not heard from her, it was because Torcy controlled the couriers. Maintenon, Lettres à d’Aubigné et Ursins, 144. Bryant, “Partner,” 89–91. For examples, see Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 1:31–4 (29 Aug. 1706); ibid., 63–4 (5 Sept. 1706); ibid., 100 (1 May 1707); ibid., 430 (12 June 1713); and ibid., 2:97 (28 Jan. 1715). For Ursins’s letters to Maintenon: ibid., 166–8 (6 Nov. 1707); and ibid., 299, 318 (3 Nov. 1706 and 7 Feb. 1707), where she complained that Torcy had not been writing her very often. By the end of the year, according to letters of 18 September and 25 December 1707 (ibid., 3:96, 159), she apparently saw herself on better terms with Torcy. Lynn, Wars, 317. For the losses of 1708, see ibid., 316–25. Ibid., 329; and Bryant, “Partner,” 92–3. For Torcy’s support of Vendôme, see his letter to him in aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 39, 15 Dec. 1710. Torcy thanked Vendôme in a letter of 9 February 1711 (ibid., fols 68–9) for protecting a kinsman and helping him become a colonel sooner than expected. Vendôme was governor of Provence, under Torcy’s supervision (see ibid., fol. 120, Torcy to Vendôme, 22 June 1711, in which he sends to Spain materials on the marshal’s gouvernement). Ironically, in 1712 Vendôme was succeeded at his death by Villars. Torcy, Journal, 65, is a 12 December 1709 entry expressing his hope that Villars had not won over Maintenon to the Scottish invasion plan he was then promoting. In 1715 when Villars succeeded the deceased Grignan as lieutenant-general of Provence, he immediately put in for the 10,000 to 12,000 livres he claimed Grignan had received annually from Arles and Marseilles. Torcy instructed the intendant to look into this right away, which Lebret did with great thoroughness, finding no basis for Villars’s claim. Given his difficulties with Villars, it perhaps pleased the foreign secretary to pass on these negative findings in such detail. bn naf 22940, fols ­270–1r,



98 99

100

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111

112

Notes to pages 389–90

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Torcy to Lebret, 14 Jan. 1715, and fols 272r–5r, Torcy to Villars, 27 Jan. 1715. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 141, Torcy to Vendôme, 30 Nov. 1711. Ibid., fol. 58v, Torcy to Vendôme, 18 Jan. 1711. Torcy’s letters to Vendôme while he was commanding in Spain are peppered with English and Dutch political news and with Torcy’s view of peace prospects. One letter reported on Hungary and a possible Russo-Turkish war (ibid., fol. 55, Torcy to ­Vendôme, 7 Jan. 1711). Torcy discussed the Noailles family in bl am 20320, fol. 133, 12 May 1714. In aae md 449, fol. 22, 29 May 1706, Torcy sent Noailles “felicitations” on his promotion to lieutenant-general and related that he had personally taken the news to the Noailles family. Noailles sent Torcy news of the Spanish campaign and congratulations on Bouzols’s promotion in ibid., fol. 45, 8 July 1708. In Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:373, 388, Prior informed Bolingbroke that he and the Colberts dined “very splendidly” with the Noailles on several occasions. In aae md 1175, fol. 32, 12 Nov. 1706, Torcy wrote Noailles that, according to a tip from Ambassador Ferriol in Constantinople, Noailles should warn his personal physician not to invest with a bankrupt merchant established in Pera. Durand, Jansénisme et Joachim Colbert, 22–40. Cermakian, Ursins, 191, 191n150; and Bryant, “Partner,” 88. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:547, 551. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 7, Torcy to Vendôme, 22 Sept. 1710. Chamillart, Correspondance, 1:7–11. Pénicaut, Chamillart; and Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:v, vii, viii. See also bl am 46357, fols 344–5. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:530. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 141. Maintenon, who had loathed Louvois, had good relations with his son. Chamillart, Correspondence, 2:323n1. In January 1708, Chamillart’s son, the marquis de Cany, married Marie-Françoise de Rochechouart, daughter of Torcy’s aunt, Marie-Anne Colbert, who had married Louis de Rochechouart, duc de Mortemart. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:117. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 633, calls him a hard-working but political nonentity whose appointment allowed Maintenon to retain a creature on the council even with Chamillart’s departure (see also ibid., 649, 677–8, 682). FalqueCador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 307–17, however, argue that Voysin, although primarily an administrator, eventually gained enough credibility with the king and his generals, who decided strategic matters, to be able to offer his opinion. ss -Coirault, 2:158–62; and 3:228–9, 231, 383–9.

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Notes to pages 391–4

113 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 1:72–3, 77, 89, 102. Torcy, Journal, 43, discusses the “liberties” of the Gallican Church. For her conflicts with La Chaise, see Langlois, Maintenon, 175, 183–4, 249. 114 aae md 1173, fol. 178 (1712). 115 Lizerand, Beauvillier, 305–15. 116 Maintenon, Maintenon d’après sa correspondance, 2:238; and Torcy, Journal, 125–6. 117 Torcy, Journal, 122. 118 Ibid., 240–3. 119 Ibid., 319–20. 120 Ibid., 372. 121 Cornette, Roi de guerre, 244–7. 122 The war and foreign portfolios were held jointly by several ministers from 1594 to 1624. Bély, “Origines sociales,” 552–6; and Clausewitz, On War, 99. 123 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 72. 124 Ibid., 225. 125 Ibid., 77, 249. 126 Ibid., 96, 169. 127 Roosen, Diplomacy, 1. 128 aae md 306, fol. 243, Memoir, Chamillart to Torcy, 6 Sept. 1703. Examples of such negotiations include Catinat and Tessé with Savoy (1691–96), Boufflers with Portland (1697), Berwick with Marlborough (1708), and ­Villars with Prince Eugene (1713–14). According to Haussonville, Duchesse de Bourgogne, 1:121, during his negotiations Tessé wrote daily to the king, Barbezieux, and (after Croissy’s death) Torcy. For this mixture of the military and diplomatic, see Tessé, Mémoires et lettres, 1:16–78; Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 87–106 (on Boufflers); Legrelle, Négociation inconnue; and Sturgill, Villars, 137–49. 129 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 70. 130 Ibid. 131 Chamillart informed Torcy, presumably so that he could make the necessary protests, that Venice had furnished the emperor with 4,000 horses and forage. aae md 1108, fol. 40, 20 Mar. 1702. This dialectic as well as the lack of clear boundaries, is demonstrated in the military and diplomatic activities and thought of Chamlay. Cénat, Chamlay, 41, 63–5, 72–4, 75–82, 112–14, 127–31, 138. 132 Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, 2:291–3 (Blécourt to Louis XIV, 1 Nov. 1700). 133 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:145–7. Antonio de Ubilla, secretary of the Despacho Universal, reported that Blécourt arranged for the Junta’s courier to be stopped so that his would arrive first (ss-Boislisle, 7:293n1), but this appears unlikely and corroborating evidence is lacking. Torcy, Mémoires,



134

135

136

137 138 139

140 141

Notes to pages 394–6

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1:83, reports that Harcourt had never trusted the Maritime Powers as partners. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:148–9, Harcourt to Barbezieux, 7 Nov. 1700, is a longer letter outlining his reasons against the treaty (the high cost of enforcement) and for the testament. Replying to Harcourt’s earlier letters, Barbezieux (8 Nov. 1700, ibid., 149–50) indicated that he preferred the treaty because it added to France’s borders through exchanges with Savoy and ­Lorraine, hopefully without the expense of war, but he agreed that the testament was preferable to a costly fight to enforce the treaty. However, reluctant to enter into political discussions, Barbezieux downplayed his own sentiments and expressed willingness to leave this matter in the hands of those tasked with disentangling it. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:145, says that as an officer Harcourt was motivated by a scrupulous observance of proper channels, but this is less likely than the military expediency indicated in his letter, perhaps combined with Saint-Simon’s suggestion in ss-Boislisle, 7:293. aae cp Espagne 85, fol. 355, ­Harcourt to Torcy, 5 Nov. 1700, informed him of the exhausted courier and that his packet would arrive by way of Barbezieux. This was wise, since Torcy had his own agents at the frontier monitoring couriers. Ibid., fol. 305, Gibaudière, lieutenant du roi at Bayonne, to Torcy, 24 Oct. 1700. Dangeau, Journal, 7:411–12; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:300. Rowlands notes that Saint-Simon relates a similar incident with couriers and a colleague in 1692 that garnered Barbezieux a royal reprimand, as such unseemly undermining of a colleague annoyed the decorum-obsessed monarch and may have postponed his admission to the Conseil. Rowlands, Dynastic State, 70–1. Harcourt may thus have unintentionally sabotaged Barbezieux’s advancement. aae cp Autriche 92, fol. 231r–v, Torcy to Villars, 24 Aug. 1713, is a reply to his request for instructions as to whom to address correspondence concerning negotiations. The king ordered that his couriers could still go to the war office first but were then immediately to take any dispatches concerning negotiations to Torcy. Villars was not to share copies of these letters, since that would preclude Torcy replying to Allied offers in secret. In negotiations, Torcy reminded him, it was essential that such information not pass through multiple hands. Foreign office replies to Villars would come by the marshal’s returning courier or those from the war office. Lynn, Wars, 274. McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 62. By 1708, while the Grand Alliance had realized most of its original objectives of 1701–02, new objectives had been subsequently added, especially regarding Iberia, making peace more difficult to achieve. Ibid., 60–2. Dangeau, Journal, 12:429. Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:98.

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Notes to pages 396–8

142 What is at issue here is not the war secretary’s information-gathering – a perfectly legitimate activity necessary to his responsibilities – but his efforts to initiate and conduct peace talks with the enemy. 143 Vreede, Correspondance, 260 (D’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Oct. 1706). D’Avaux, managing this negotiation on Chamillart’s behalf, urged ­Hennequin to consider sharing with the Dutch negotiators the negative comments written about them by two of Torcy’s agents, Mollo and Callières (ibid., 140–2 [4 Oct. 1706]). Black, Diplomacy, 16, 47, underlines the importance of unaccredited agents in any state’s diplomacy. 144 Black, Diplomacy, 46, 79, 104–5. Summit diplomacy, a kind of personal diplomacy, was used during and after the Second World War (ibid., 209–10). 145 Ibid., 29. 146 aae cp Brunswick-Hanovre 38, fol. 182v (7 Aug. 1701). “Anticiper” sometimes meant “to usurp.” daf, s.v. “anticiper.” 147 Black, Diplomacy, 12, 52, emphasizes this often-neglected role of diplomacy. 148 Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 73. 149 A cryptic reference to a controversy between the two is in Torcy’s 8 June 1705 letter to Chamillart apparently centred on the controller general’s prerogatives. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:26. 150 Bély, Art de la paix, 392. This includes even letters ostensibly in the monarch’s own hand. The sheer volume of the Spanish correspondence in part accounts for increases in the number of foreign office personnel during these years. 151 Bély, Art de la paix, 391–406; and Kamen, War of Succession, 42–56. ­Baudrillart, Philippe V, discusses Spain’s tangled and shifting politics and often troubled relationship with France. Requests for advice from Spain’s Council of State passed through Torcy’s hands for Louis’s consideration (ibid., 120). Torcy also helped the king fill posts in the Spanish government (ibid., 122). He secured patronage as far afield as Naples through Ursins, as he wrote to Gramont, 16 Nov. 1704. bn na 23187, fol. 258. Torcy was disgusted with the infighting among the French in Madrid, which he said was more harmful “than all the plotting of the disaffected.” Kamen, Philip V, 36. For a sense of the matters that passed through Torcy’s hands as he drafted the king’s letters to Spain and made his replies, see the two volumes of Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot. 152 For Orry’s relationship with the ministers, see Dubet, Orry, especially 23, 38–41, 93–7, 169–72, 184. Interestingly, Orry’s three French and one or two Spanish commis were paid 6,400 livres annually by the foreign office (101). After the failed Franco-Spanish siege of Barcelona, Louis held audiences in his Cabinet on 22 and 23 November 1705 with Spain’s ambassador and other Spaniards. Only Torcy joined him even though Chamillart was at Versailles. Dangeau, Journal, 10:476.



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153 aae md 306, fols 240–4 (also an appendix to ss-Boislisle, 12:538–40). Following his signature, Chamillart added that he retained neither draft nor copy of this letter. Earlier letters from Spain urgently requesting French troops and commanders to prevent an invasion via Portugal are Louville to Torcy, 12 July 1703; Louville to Beauvillier, 28 July 1703; and Ursins to Torcy, 17 Oct. 1703 (ibid., 534–7). See Chamillart to Torcy, 17 Jan. 1702, asking that he write to Ambassador Marcin in Spain to ask Philip V to supply the funds Charles-Henri de Lorraine, prince de Vaudémont, requested to defend Milan. aae md 1108, fol. 56. 154 aae md 306, fols 245–6 (also in ss-Boislisle, 12:540). 155 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 81. He goes on to examine the diplomat’s double sense of being regarded as and feeling like a stranger that leads to distinctive attitudes and ways of dealing with others (99–109). 156 Pénicault, Chamillart, 174n53. Ilie, “Exomorphism,” cites the anti-Spanish cultural bias, for instance, of Louville, Gramont, and Tessé, and underlines its negative effect on French efforts in Spain, but notes Torcy’s more accommodating attitude (379, 384n28). Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 150, warned against such prejudice. See also Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 36, on diplomatic corps as “epistemic communities with their own way of seeing the world and their own solutions to problems.” See also ibid., 71. 157 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173–4. 158 Kamen, War of Succession, 19. Berwick, Mémoires, 1:227, notes that when he arrived in Spain in 1704, Philip V formally appointed him captain-general of his armies. See Petrie, Berwick, 166–7, on the ambiguities of this position. This arrangement explains Torcy’s letters sent to Vendôme in Spain in 1710 after the French withdrawal to satisfy the Allies during negotiations. For example, in aae cp Espagne 203, fols 332–3v, 5 Sept. 1710, Torcy reported that he read the king Vendôme’s letter requesting troops and was now sending the royal reply. 159 Walsh, “Toby Bourke,” 143–53. He was also Ursins’s client. 160 From Toulon, for instance, an official sent him news that a battalion of royal artillery and a company of cannoneers had embarked for Spain. aae md 1144, fol. 97, for Torcy’s 23 Oct. 1706 letter of thanks; and ibid., 1158, fol. 99, 23 Aug. 1708, for another. 161 bn naf 23187, fol. 365, 5 Dec 1706; and ibid., fol. 360, 17 Nov 1706. Torcy also thanked Gramont, in Bayonne, for Spanish news (ibid., fol. 327, 1 Aug. 1706). 162 Torcy, Journal, 243, 324–7. 163 Ibid., 259, 269, 291, 317. 164 Stapleton, “Grand Pensionary at War,” 203, draws on a model typically used with later periods, such as the First World War, but argues convincingly for its earlier application.

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Notes to pages 400–1

165 For example, since 1708 Torcy had favoured and urged on the Conseil the opening of a second front in Germany to relieve pressure on Flanders. When this was finally done in 1711, it was quite successful. Klaits, Propaganda, 274. Torcy also held discussions with Max Emmanuel in November 1709 about a possible German campaign. Torcy, Journal, 5–13. 166 Rowlands, “Stratégie de cabinet,” 25–34 (quotation on 34). See also ­Drévillon, Impôt de sang, 30–9; Cénat, Chamlay; and the correspondence analysis in Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals,” 156–74. Louis XIV was “an officer-king more than a soldier-king … chief of a general staff rather than a warlord” (ibid., 174). 167 Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals”; and Rowlands, “Stratégie de cabinet.” See also Petitfils, Louis XIV, 594–6, 632–3. 168 Pamphleteer Peter Samson wrote Horatio Walpole in 1716 affirming Torcy’s devotion to James II on the basis of assurances from the Dutch diplomat Buys, who referenced his conversations with Torcy and his brother Croissy. Walpole, Honest Diplomat, 174–5. Despite fulsome praise from Queen Mary of Modena and her son, Torcy doubted they fully trusted him, and he felt the same about them, relying instead on his own operatives and increasingly on James III’s half-brother, the Duke of Berwick, who placed French interests ahead of Jacobite dreams. Gregg, Protestant Succession, 100–2. Torcy often had to balance carrying out royal Jacobite policy with which he disagreed with playing his best diplomatic hand. Corp, Court in Exile, 11–179, especially 55. See also Bennett, “Jacobitism,” 142–9; and Nordmann, “Louis XIV and Jacobites,” 82–111. Thomson, “Origins,” 153–7, discusses the background and reasons for Louis XIV’s controversial recognition of James II’s son as James III in September 1701. Although Torcy and the other ministers were opposed, Thomson argues that Louis’s decision was likely “in accordance with principle and expediency alike” (ibid., 154). 169 Gibson, Scottish Card, is a detailed account of the expedition and its origins. See also Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke”; Pope, Callières, 103–85; and Corp, Court in Exile, 164, 164n32. Although many, including the king, also blamed the failure on the lack of coordination between Chamillart and ­Pontchartrain, Torcy was generous to his rivals and absolved them both, pointing instead to the delay caused by James III’s illness and to British naval superiority. Torcy, Journal, 63. Against the advice of some of his ministers, during the 1709–10 campaign intermission Louis again considered an invasion to get negotiations moving. Corp, Court in Exile, 164–5. For Torcy’s on and off enthusiasm for these 1709–10 plans, see Rule, “Preliminaries,” 100–2. 170 France, Recueil, 22:113–15; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:13–14. These approaches were through Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin and



171 172 173

174

175

176 177

178

179

180 181 182

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Holstein-Gottorp’s resident in The Hague, Herman van Petkum. Hennequin was in Paris early in 1703. See also ibid., 5:231; and aae cp Hollande 200, fol. 17, d’Argenson to Torcy, 20 Jan. 1703. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:34–110. A memoir dated c. January 1704 mentioned possible Swedish mediation. aae cp Hollande 200, fols 5–11v. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:232–4. Marlborough wrote Godolphin on 4 May 1705 that he had learned this from Leopold’s minister. Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:424–5 (since our topic is a continental one, to avoid confusion only New Style dates are given from this collection). France, Recueil, 22:116n2. Torcy, Journal, 415–20, remarked on Du Puy’s contacts with Orangeist circles. He was former deputy governor of the young Johan Willem Friso, Prince of Nassau-Dietz (1687–1711), a relative of ­William III and his chosen heir for all the holdings of the House of Orange. Israel, Dutch Republic, 959–68. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:235. Du Puy’s 9 April 1705 memoir is in aae cp ­Hollande 202, fols 55–6. Letters are in Vreede, Correspondance, 224–6 (Du Puy to Heinsius, 17 Apr. 1705, Paris); Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:423–4 (Marlborough to Godolphin, 4 May 1705), 450 (Du Puy to Heinsius, 20 May 1705, reference only), 452 (Marlborough to ­Godolphin, 6 July 1705); and Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 187 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 26 June 1705). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:236–37; Pope, Callières, 138–40; and ibid., 209–14 (Callières’s memoir in translation). ss -Boislisle, 8:91–6. France, Recueil, 22:117–26, has his instructions. ­Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:552, says that he was also connected with M ­ aintenon and Pontchartrain. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:237–44; and Bély, Espions, 33, 788nn47–9, discuss his negotiations. Saint-Simon respected him as a physician and person, but criticized his lack of diplomatic skills and said that the choice of a physician for diplomacy was ridiculed in France and abroad. ­ss-Boislisle, 17:181–4. His son was the philosopher Claude Adrien Helvétius. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:240. He was to reside with and be guided by Willem Nieupoort, the Rotterdam customs farmer. See France, Recueil, 22:123n1, 124; and Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:35–51. Dangeau, Journal, 10:436. For Heinsius’s close collaboration on foreign policy with Dussen and especially Buys, see Stork-Penning, “Ordeal,” 110–12. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:35–51 (Helvétius to Torcy, 2 Oct. 1705; ibid., 122n2, notes Helvétius’s authorship). aae cp Hollande 202, fols 214–15, Torcy to Helvétius, 12 Oct. 1705. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:240–1 (Helvétius to Chamillart, 23 Oct. 1705).

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Notes to pages 404–5

183 aae Hollande 202, fols 238–43, Helvétius to Torcy, 2 Oct. 1705; and ibid., 203, fol. 103, 15 Oct. 1705 (reporting that he has been issued his passport). See also France, Recueil, 22:119–20. 184 Marlborough shared with Godolphin on 27 August his sense that the French could not “offer even what they have a mind to give” for fear of alienating Spain, while the Dutch, whose yearnings for peace worried him, were afraid to “disoblige their allyes [sic].” Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:477. 185 It was also alleged that Rouillé was there masquerading as the doctor’s secretary. Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:551–4. Rouillé, representing France to Max Emmanuel in Brussels, had sent the elector’s cabinet secretary Richard ­Reichard on a secret mission to see if Heinsius was open to talks. Reichard received a 3,000-livre annual French pension. bn na 22996, fols 22–3, ­Rouillé to Louis XIV, 1 Dec. 1704. 186 Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:550–1, mentioned anonymous feelers said to have emanated from Elector Max, speculation about Venetian diplomats coming and going from London, and suspicions about former Spanish ambassador to The Hague Don Bernardo de Quiros and Antonin Nompar de Caumont, duc de Lauzun at Aix-la-Chapelle. 187 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:241 (Bagnols to Torcy, 6 Nov. 1705). 188 France, Recueil, 22:115. He thought this unfortunate because it fed Allied perceptions of a weak France. 189 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:446. Marlborough also wrote Godolphin (1 July 1705) that Du Puy’s letter to Heinsius of 10 June 1705 mentioned that the internuncio was “zealous for peace” (ibid., 450, 450n1). Yet holding this widespread sentiment hardly proved that Bussi, on instructions from France, sought to initiate peace talks. Neither France, Recueil (vol. 22), Legrelle, nor Stork-Penning mention such a mission ­(Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 446n1). Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:721–31. Israel, Dutch Republic, 1034–5, explains this internal Catholic conflict. 190 Marlborough wrote Heinsius of Alègre’s request for a pass and his “very good reputation.” Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 199 (2 Aug. 1705). The same day he wrote Alègre granting his request. Marlborough, Letters and Dispatches, 2:195–6. 191 France, Recueil, 22:127n2, 135n4. 192 Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:41. Heinsius informed Marlborough (20 Sept. 1705) of two letters from Aix-la-Chapelle from someone formerly employed by Briord offering his services as a peace emissary. ­Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 213. However, Torcy neither trusted nor currently employed Abbé Saint-Remy (Bély, Espions, 185) and assured ­Helvétius ­(Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:242n1 [12 Oct. 1705]) that he had never heard of him. Legrelle suspects otherwise, since Torcy’s later (6 Nov.



193

194

195

196

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1707) ­instructions for intendant Bagnols observed of Saint-Remy that the moment his first negotiation began, its secret was public (ibid.). But this reading of Torcy as claiming responsibility for Saint-Remy’s first mission is unwarranted; he merely noted it. In reporting Lauzun’s departure for Aixla-Chapelle on 12 September 1705 and the suspicions it aroused in Paris, ­Dangeau dismissed the latter by claiming that it was a health-related visit to the waters (Dangeau, Journal, 10:417). But Saint-Simon, married to ­Lauzun’s wife’s sister, and with whom Lauzun often shared episodes from his life, claimed that the illness was feigned and the journey was yet another of ­Lauzun’s attempts to regain favour. Lauzun hoped to meet important foreigners so that he could capitalize on the widespread desire for peace by poking his nose into what he apparently knew were the first tentative steps in that direction (Saint-Simon’s additions in ibid.). Saint-Simon’s longer account claimed that Lauzun did not linger, since he met no one there of sufficient importance. ss-Coirault, 2:615–17. The required passport had to have come from the foreign office. However, Saint-Simon noted that part of Lauzun’s rehabilitation strategy was his promotion of the 1702 marriage of their mutual brother-in-law, the duc de Lorges’s son, to Chamillart’s daughter (ibid., 615). Chamillart borrowed nearly two-thirds of the price of Barbezieux’s secretaryship from Lauzun. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 125–6, 324n45. Dangeau, Journal, 10: passim, usually attuned to leaks from Conseil meetings, is silent about rumours of peace feelers from the beginning of May through the end of the year. Even if not actually Chamillart’s agent, Lauzun nonetheless likely learned from the war minister that tentative steps toward peace were afoot. If Lauzun acted independently on what he had (over)heard, so might Saint-Remy have acted on what he (over)heard at Aix-la-Chapelle. Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance,” 193–4, acknowledges that despite Dutch perceptions, many who approached the Dutch with peace proposals in these years were not authorized by Louis. France, Recueil, 22:120–6, 134–5; and Stork-Penning, “Ordeal,” 114 (quotation). Although suspicious of French sincerity, Stork-Penning nonetheless concedes that England was willing and able to make peace without her Dutch ally and eventually did so (ibid., 116, 119–20). France, Recueil, 22:122. Torcy, Journal, 8, 260, has similar observations, but in 1711 he followed up on an anonymous letter from England (ibid., 399). Other than at peace conferences, Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 180, warned that having more than one diplomat in a given country would only lead to quarrels and disrupt the carrying out of their duties. Haveskercke’s mission is recounted in Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 21–36. The “Articulen ende Conditien,” whose spelling of the baron’s name is adopted here, were printed in Ghent in 1705 (alternate spellings are “Haverskerke,” “Haveskerke,” and “Haveskerckes”). It is not clear whether

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Notes to pages 406–7 Heinsius received a copy of Torcy’s letter or was merely allowed to read the baron’s copy, but in any event he did not forward a copy to Marlborough. ­Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 202–3. Marlborough also called for Dutch garrisons in Antwerp, Namur, and Luxemburg, and something “for the advantage of Protestants” and for Savoy. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 203 (19 Aug. 1705). ­Godolphin’s 18 August 1705 response (ibid., 209) was requested by Marlborough to make English opposition to Haveskercke’s proposals clear to Heinsius. Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:478–9. Heinsius’s reply (Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 205 [21 Aug 1705]) also mentioned greater protection for trade with the West Indies and more control over the southern Netherlands garrisons, but added that none of this was possible if the archduke must have Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands, which the French were currently unwilling to yield. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:309 (Buys to Heinsius, 25 Aug. 1705); and ibid., 4:312 (Heinsius to Buys, 26 Aug. 1705). Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:482–3. See also ­Marlborough to Godolphin, 7 Sept. 1705, on the same subject (ibid., ­1:484–5). For other examples of Marlborough’s July–September efforts to frustrate any Dutch moves toward peace talks, shared, of course, with ­Godolphin or the Duchess of Marlborough, but not with Heinsius, see ibid., 1:452–3, 461, 481–5, 491–3, 498. See Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 35; Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:327 ­(Dussen to Heinsius, 4 Sept. 1705); and ibid., 4:331–2 (Heinsius to Buys, 7 Sept. 1705). Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 202. With Louis’s permission, Max had sent his agent Witkmann to sound out Heinsius about peace and in particular the possibility of an exchange of Bavaria for Sicily and Naples. Witkmann’s March–April sojourn in The Hague elicited nothing specific from Heinsius, but it did lead to rumours. France, Recueil, 12:138–9. There is a likely reference to this in Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:550. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:332 (Heinsius to Buys, 7 Sept. 1705). Heinsius would later report to Marlborough that Haveskercke was quite jealous of Alègre’s talks with the Dutch burghers. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 220 (24 Oct. 1705). Berridge et al., Diplomatic Theory, 77, says that “[i]t was Richelieu’s view that negotiations would never be effective unless they were directed from home by a single mind … aware that continuous negotiation made this even more essential, as it multiplied the possibilities of contradiction and inconsistency … Though often more honored in the breach than in the observance.” Alègre and Mollo coordinated their efforts. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:251; aae cp Hollande 203, fol. 88, Alègre to Torcy, 8 Dec. 1705; ibid., fol. 116, Alègre



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to Louis XIV, 18 Dec. 1705; ibid., 205, fol. 45, Alègre to Louis XIV, 12 Jan. 1706; and ibid., fol. 106, Alègre to Torcy, 5 Feb. 1706. For Callières’s hand in this, see Pope, Callières, 141. For Alègre and his 6 October 1705 instructions, see France, Recueil, ­22:127–51; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:244–56. See also Dangeau, Journal, 10:15. The exchange of Bavaria for Naples and Sicily had already been proposed to the Dutch by Max through his emissary Witkmann in March and April 1705. France, Recueil, 22:138–9. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:40–1, notes that since 1701 Louis XIV and Torcy had considered reintegrating into France the domains of the counts of Flanders, perhaps with an exchange for Roussillon. He suggests that these secret plans prepared Louis for his later willingness to dismember the Spanish monarchy after his 1702–04 military defeats – not to aggrandize France but to maintain her intact. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1st ed., 4:351. The proposals Torcy sent Alègre were similar to those that Callières, influenced by what he was hearing from Mollo, had floated to him in May 1705. Pope, Callières, 138–40. aae cp Hollande 202, fol. 238, Helvétius to Torcy, 26 Oct. 1705; and ibid., 203, fols 72–6, Alègre to Torcy, 1 Dec. 1705. France, Recueil, 22:131 (Torcy to Alègre, 10 Jan. 1706). For the negotiations, see ibid., 128–31; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:248–54. As early as 1 November 1705, Marlborough wrote Heinsius that he did not think that “any conversation of [Alègre’s] would much forward the inclination for peace.” Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 220. On 12 February 1706 Marlborough indicated that it was time for the prisoner of war to come to England (ibid., 225). On 13 February 1706 Mollo reported to Callières that the talks were pretty much played out. aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 134. Torcy related to Alègre (5 Nov. 1705), perhaps because it was not his preference, that the king had decided to entrust the doctor with any unfinished negotiations when the time came for him to go to England as a prisoner of war. ­Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:241n5. Torcy advised Alègre to consult Helvétius about his health before leaving for England. aae cp Hollande 204, fol. 280, 19 Nov. 1705. aae cp Hollande 203, fol. 123, Alègre to Torcy, 22 Dec. 1705; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:254. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 225 (19 Feb. 1706). On 26 February 1706 he repeated that “[p]eople here are very impatient to have M. d’Allègre [sic] in England” (ibid., 226), and in a letter the same day from Heinsius, the grand pensionary said that people in the United Provinces had long been anxious for his departure (ibid.). aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 52, Alègre to Louis XIV, 19 Jan. 1706, stressed Dutch security fears lingering from 1672. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:255–6; and Goslinga, Mémoires, 7, 13–15, 29, 41–4.

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211 aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 154, Torcy to Alègre, 1 Mar. 1706. 212 Bély, Espions, 107–10. See ibid., 108, for a chart that traces the connections between the various participants in these negotiations. On Bergeyck’s initiative, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:258–60. 213 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:273–84; and Gaeddert, “Franco-Bavarian Alliance,” 139–201. See also Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 248–9, 251, 254–5, 262–4, 269, 279–80. 214 Pope, Callières, 142–3; and see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:260–2, for Mollo’s proposal. 215 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:13n5, 261–76. Roosen, Diplomacy, 68–71, summarizes d’Avaux’s career. His conviction that the way to peace was through the Province of Holland is seen in his letter to Hennequin, 8 Nov. 1706, in Vreede, Correspondance, 177–8. 216 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:264 (d’Avaux to Chamillart, 30 July 1706). 217 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 253 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 3 Aug. 1706). For the commercial terms, see Chamillart to Hennequin, 2 Aug. 1706, in Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:265. 218 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 255 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 7 Aug. 1706). Chamillart likely got the idea of two kings in Spain from a 1704 proposal from Helvétius. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:237–8 (especially 237n5). 219 Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, 258 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 18 Aug 1706); and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:271 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 22 Aug. 1706). 220 Vreede, Correspondance, 245–52. 221 D’Avaux wrote Hennequin (13 Aug. 1706) that if Chamillart did not hear from the States-General soon he would withdraw his proposals and leave the matter with those charged with negotiations, that is, with Torcy. Vreede, Correspondance, 249. Chamillart worried to Hennequin (19 Aug. 1706) that word of his efforts was leaking out, making a quick resolution imperative (ibid., 251), and d’Avaux warned (27 Aug. 1706) of negotiations afoot between Max and Marlborough (ibid., 252–3). Marlborough and Heinsius corresponded during September about (false) rumours that Callières was in Holland, which Heinsius dismissed but said were fueled by French peace proposals whispered about by a public anxious for details. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 267–8. 222 Vreede, Correspondance, 252–3 (27 Aug. 1706). 223 Helvétius to Chamillart, 26 Aug. 1706. Chamillart, Correspondance, ­2:122–9. This would-be negotiator mystified the British. Marlborough’s quartermaster general, William Cadogan, answering an inquiry in early 1708 from Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby and 3rd Earl of Strafford, extra­ordinary ambassador in Berlin, reported that “[Helvétius] passed by this place [Brussels] attended



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with a secretary and a Valet de Chambre, what an odd equipage for a Dutch Quack.” He later averred that “those Proposals of Peace you mentioned to have been shown at Berlin are purely Chimerical. I may say that … further overtures from Helvétius have rather prejudiced than advanced the matter [of peace].” bl am 22196, fol. 130, Cadogan to S­ trafford, 19 Jan. 1708, and fol. 133, Cadogan to Strafford, 30 Jan. 1708. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 55, 56–7. Vreede, Correspondance, 250 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 19 Aug. 1706). Jamel Ostwald, email message to author, 15 Dec. 2012. Bergeyck told Torcy on 12 February 1711 that the Dutch believed that France was open to them and they had only to penetrate her frontiers. See also Torcy, Journal, 377. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 253 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 3 Aug. 1706). See Colson, “Ambassador between Light and Shade,” 185–7, on such a breach of secrecy during negotiations. Vivo, Information, 41–5. After the failure of the 1710 talks at Gertruydenberg, Torcy also went through a period of despair and uncertainty. Torcy, Journal, 206–8; and Bély, Art de la Paix, 432–5. He was careful, however, not to express this outside the council chamber or his journal. Percy Bysshe Shelly’s Demogorgon in Prometheus Unbound, quoted in Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 497; and Napoleon, quoted in Peter ­Tsouras, The Book of Military Quotations (St Paul, mn: Zenith Press, 2005), 247. Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance,” 194, says that Louis “did not leave the conduct of all negotiations in the hands of his able foreign minister, Torcy,” whereas Roosen, Diplomacy, 36–7, mentions interference in diplomacy by other secretaries, but says that Louis tried to prevent it. ss -Boislisle, 17:179–86. Ibid., 181n7. Although he mentions Helvétius’s other journeys, Boislisle identifies the two in question as those of December 1707 and March–April 1708, but without explanation as to why these rather than the others. After quoting Saint-Simon’s description of this divided diplomacy, Chamillart’s parallel network of agents, and Helvétius’s missions, Bély, Espions, 107–9, says that the secret negotiations of 1706 are sufficient to illustrate the parallel network. He does not, however, offer here or elsewhere evidence of Chamillart having been engaged in rival negotiations other than in 1706 through Hennequin. Sourches, Mémoires, 11:56, mentions in the same sentence that despite illness Chamillart had gone to Torcy’s and was two hours in his Cabinet with the physician, who then departed for Flanders with Chamlay and other military men on a trip whose purpose was not known. Boislisle’s note concerning Chamillart’s Brussels agents (ibid., 180n4) refers to correspondence with Hennequin, Mollo, and Mesnager and to Abbé Lenglet du Fresnoy’s service to him. Yet of these four, only Hennequin is known to have negotiated secretly with or on behalf of Chamillart behind Torcy’s back.

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Notes to pages 412–14 In 1705 Torcy sent Lenglet du Fresnoy as secretary for French and Latin languages to the Elector of Cologne’s Lille court-in-exile to watch his ministers Karg and Carlo, Baron Siméoni, for any anti-French activities. From the 1708 fall of Lille, the abbé established relations with Prince Eugene and continued a foreign correspondence that facilitated his spying. Michault, Vie Lenglet du Fresnoy, 28–32. He also spied for Flanders intendant Bernières, Boufflers, and then Chamillart. Bély, Espions, 187–8. In July 1710 Torcy thought him a scoundrel – as did Boufflers – and ordered his arrest over some purloined atlases, but he had left for Tournai ahead of the police. Torcy, Journal, 232. Saint-Simon, Écrits inédites, 4:55–6. Vreede, Correspondance, 250–1, Chamillart to Hennequin, 19 Aug. 1706. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:265, mentions Chamillart’s long individual work sessions with the king during this period. When in 1709 Torcy referred in his Journal, 85, to the 1706 negotiations with Hennequin that Chamillart wanted to conduct secretly (“secrètement conduire”), he surely meant those that were kept secret from the Conseil and not from the king. ss -Boislisle, 17:184–5. This is the description of the secret du roi under the regent and Louis XV in McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 181. See also Black, Diplomacy, 107–9. Monnier, “Secret du roi,” 236, observes that “classic” secret diplomacy, while in the shadows and often leaving no documentary trace, differs from Louis XV’s secret du roi, which was conducted in opposition to official diplomacy. Whether Torcy appreciated the irony or not, after 1715 he helped the regent pursue his own secret personal diplomacy. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 399. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:275–83. See Louis XIV to Rouillé, 14 Aug. 1706 (ibid., 278–81). There was suspicion then and since that Max was floating his own proposal and pretending that it originated with Marlborough (ibid., 276). Vreede, Correspondance, 252–3 (27 Aug. 1706). Ibid., 254–5 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 2 Sept. 1706). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:285, 285n6, Chamillart to Hennequin, 20 Sept. 1706, and a quotation from the king’s 6 September 1706 letter to Orléans confirming Chamillart’s self-criticism. D’Avaux informed Hennequin (1 Oct. 1706) that he had defended him against false reports that had temporarily cost him Chamillart’s faith in him. Vreede, Correspondance, 258–61. Vreede, Correspondance, 138–9 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 3 Oct. 1706). D’Avaux also wrote Hennequin pointed complaints about Mollo’s alleged intrigues (ibid., 258, 1 Oct. 1706). Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 269 (23 Sept. 1706). Vreede, Correspondance, 260–1 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Oct. 1706); and ibid., 148, 150 (8 Oct. 1706). Fulminating against Mollo’s alleged attempts



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to discredit Hennequin, d’Avaux suggested that he return the favour by going to Heinsius to destroy Mollo’s credibility (ibid., 140–2 [4 Oct. 1706]) and later sent news of Rouillé’s negotiations and further anti-Mollo barbs (ibid., 152–3 [11 Oct. 1706]). Pope, Callières, 144–7, notes that Mollo’s and ­Callières’s concerns about the channels through Max and Hennequin earned them Torcy’s and Chamillart’s wrath. Vreede, Correspondance, 138–42, 258–61. Ibid., 175 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Nov. 1706); ibid., 176 (5 Nov. 1706); and ibid., 178–9. Chamillart also wrote to Hennequin of the new arrangements (ibid., 178–9, 21 Nov. 1706). For Torcy to Hennequin, 22 Nov. 1706, see ibid., 179–81. As Torcy later wrote to a like-minded Villars (26 Aug. 1710), the Allies would not see reason while they believed that France’s situation was so desperate that all they had to do was hold firm to gain all they demanded. Villars, Mémoires, 3:284. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:287–94. Vreede, Correspondance, 171–2 ­(Marlborough to Heinsius, 23 Oct. 1706), shows the former’s suspicions. Writing to Hennequin on 8 November 1706 (ibid., 177–8), d’Avaux shared that he and Chamillart did not trust Marlborough. D’Avaux claimed to differ with those in charge of the French negotiations and vented his distrust of and disdain for Mollo. For Callières’s peace proposal, see Pope, Callières, 147. Vreede, Correspondance, 182–5 (Torcy to Hennequin, 5 Dec. 1706). Torcy repeated his condition that the talks be secret and between fully empowered envoys (ibid., 194–6 [23 Dec. 1706]; and ibid., 204 [30 Dec. 1706]). Torcy added that Du Puy, returning to Geneva, would no longer be able to write Hennequin as he had earlier proposed (ibid., 208 [6 Jan. 1707]). See ibid., xviii–xix (Heinsius to Marlborough, 7 Dec. 1706), expressing the very fears of Vienna’s intentions toward Milan raised by Torcy. Ibid., 189–90 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 16 Dec. 1706). For this double meaning, s.v. “des forces,” Académie Française, Dictionnaire, 4th ed. Vreede, Correspondance, 206–8 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 3 Jan. 1707). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:295–9. Callières’s involvement in these negotiations ended, likely because he had become too identified by Torcy and the king with the Chevreuse-Beauvillier faction and its willingness to accede to any Allied demand for peace. Pope, Callières, 152. The Whigs made much of this incident not only against Harley, but also against the network of French agents Torcy had in Britain, with whom the Whigs falsely believed Gregg was linked. Alsop, “Gregg, William”; and Bély, Espions, 348. Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:218–20 (Amelot to Chamillart, 11 July 1707, and Chamillart’s 25 July 1707 reply). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:299–301; and France, Recueil, 22:151–9.

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Notes to pages 416–18

257 It did, however, later succeed in prying the English away from their allies. Pope, Callières, 149–52, offers perceptive reflections on these negotiations. 258 Dahlgren, Relations commerciales, 481–95, describes the Franco-Spanish negotiations that unsettled the Dutch. For Mesnager and his mission, see Bély, Espions, 576–81; ss-Boislisle, 22:157–8; ibid., 24:284–5; Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 34–41, 233–4; France, Recueil, 22:159–77; and Torcy, Memoirs, 1:118–19. This English translation, likely by Prior’s secretary Adrian Drift, follows the French edition precisely; for that reason we use it for all translations of Torcy’s Mémoires. 259 Helvétius wrote Torcy hoping to serve as a secret channel to Dussen. aae cp Hollande 212, fol. 170, 19 Sept. 1707. 260 His journal and letters during these negotiations are in aae cp Hollande 211. Ibid., 214, fols 11–88, is his correspondence with Torcy. Also related is ibid., Espagne 188, fols 35–47. 261 Examples are aae cp Hollande 215, fol. 50r–v, Dussen to Mesnager, 31 Aug. 1708; and ibid., fols 124r–5v, “Mémoire au Roi,” 30 Sept. 1708. 262 bl am 15285, fol. 27r, Torcy to Pomponne, 26 Mar. 1708. 263 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176–84, shows that these clashes could be quite bitter (although he cautions against ignoring the background of ongoing cooperation) and were exacerbated by rivalry for the king’s ear on domestic as well as commercial matters. The Pontchartrains also regarded Chamillart as an upstart. On Franco-Spanish colonial trade and Chamillart, see Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 225–6; and Kamen, War of Succession, 140–51. 264 bl am 15285, fol. 52r, Torcy to Pomponne, 26 Mar. 1708. 265 aae cp Venise 153, fol. 221, Pomponne to Torcy, 21 Apr. 1708. 266 See Rowlands, Financial Decline, 40–3, on Chamillart’s circle. 267 Lynn, Wars, 367. Bély, Art de la paix, 498–9, likewise cautions against anachronism in discussing past diplomacy. Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 216n3, notes that Louis XIV did revert to a war-as-event approach in 1693 and 1706 as the fighting dragged on at great cost and with little to show for it. In both campaigns, however, this change failed to produce the desired breakthrough, “forcing the Sun King to continue the wars of attrition” ­(italics in original). 268 For other parallels, such as using propaganda, subversion, and “diplomacy by conference” (direct consultations on intergovernmental relations among allied leaders), see Hamilton and Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy, 140–6. 269 Lynn, Wars, 375. 270 Richelieu, Political Testament, 94–5. 271 Rowlands, Financial Decline, 230. This was in addition to the chronic financial problems with which France began the war, which Rowlands analyses with clarity.



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272 Lynn, Wars, 373–4. Henry Kissinger observes “that the way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first, and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the issues.” Quoted in Roosen, “Origins,” 173n36 (italics in original). 273 Black, Diplomacy, 53. 274 Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:90. 275 Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 146, based on a quotation from Epictetus. 276 Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals,” 172. On vain hopes for a decisive battle during Louis’s last war, see Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 17–19, 304–5; and Ostwald, “‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies,” 649–78. See also Lynn, Battle, particularly chap. 6. 277 Heinsius, Het archief raadpensionaris, 3:80 (Callières to Mollo, 12 Apr. 1694). Torcy assured Villars that his military efforts had appreciably improved France’s negotiating position. Villars, Mémoires, 3:257 (29 June 1709), a point Torcy repeated on 3 August 1711 (ibid., 305). Polignac wrote Villars (1 June 1710) from the floundering Gertruydenberg talks that only his battlefield action would bring the talks to a successful conclusion (ibid., 276), a sentiment Torcy repeated to Villars a few days later (ibid., 280). 278 bl am 20139, fol. 151v, Torcy to Gualterio, 23 Jan. 1711. He earlier expressed the same to Villars. Villars, Mémoires, 3:284 (Torcy to Villars, 26 Aug. 1710). For Le Quesnoy, see aae cp Allemagne 352, fol. 70v, Torcy to Harcourt, 8 July 1712. At Ryswick in 1697 Leibniz recalled hearing Croissy respond years earlier to those who complimented him on the significance of his being named to negotiate at Nijmegen: do not expect anything from him because it is the king’s armies that make matters (“fassent les affaires”). It was likewise at Ryswick, Leibniz added, that highly skilled diplomats had real weight given to their words by Louis XIV’s well-maintained and deployed army. Leibniz, Briefe, Vierte Reihe, Sechster Band, 270. 279 Lynn, Wars, 374. See also Bély, Art de la paix, 490–5; and Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 17, 21. 280 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 102, 106. aae cp Autriche 80 and 81, passim, contain Noblet’s letters to Torcy from the Rhine front in 1702; ibid., 82, 83, 84, passim, are letters from 1703. See ibid., 80, fols 178ff, for letters to Torcy from his cousin Blainville, an officer at the front. In one (ibid., fol. 178, 19 May 1702), Blainville sent news from Kaiserworth, telling Torcy that he would receive it even sooner than Chamillart. Noblet kept a journal of Burgundy’s campaign that he sent to Torcy (ibid., fols 174–7). On 23 May 1702 (ibid., fol. 189), Noblet informed Torcy that his brother Croissy had earned glory by being wounded. Torcy’s brother-in-law Bouzols also sent useful news from Germany (ibid., 81, fol. 78, Torcy to Noblet, 22 July 1702).

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Notes to pages 419–21

281 Villars, Mémoires, 3:302 (Torcy to Villars, 24 July 1711). See also ibid., 42, 44–7, 185, 246–50, 292–3, 296–7, 305–7. 282 Bély, Dictionnaire, 342–3; and Bély, Espions, 94, 464. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:425–30, says that Torcy never really trusted Petkum, who received French gold but was Heinsius’s man. For Petkum’s correspondence with Torcy, see gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 317–66. 283 gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 325–6. There were also rumours that Max was seeking negotiations again, although Torcy denied them (ibid., 324–6). 284 Ibid., 324 (1 Dec. 1707). 285 Ibid., 325–6, 328. 286 Ibid., 328 (Petkum to Torcy, 16 Aug. 1708, and Torcy to Petkum, 23 Aug. 1708). Torcy’s contention is confirmed in Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 396 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 11 Aug. 1708). 287 gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 328–30 (quotation 330, Petkum to Torcy, 13 Sept. 1708). Petkum’s concerns about Du Puy are confirmed in Marlborough to Heinsius, 16 Aug. 1708, and Heinsius to Marlborough, 18 and 22 Aug. 1708. The latter relates that, at the duke’s behest, Heinsius sent an associate to dissuade Du Puy from going to see Marlborough. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 396–8. Du Puy continued to send Torcy memoirs over the years, as in 1709, aae cp Hollande 212, fols 19–26. 288 Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 20–1. For Chamillart at the front, see Pénicaut, Chamillart, 198–9. Torcy wrote Petkum several times (4 and 25 Oct. 1708) that discussion sometimes smoothed over difficulties. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 330, 332. 289 Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:48. For this episode see Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 5–6, 16–44. Berwick had little respect for Chamillart, whom he blamed for the failure of the 1708 Scottish invasion by passing him over as its leader. Instead, Chamillart selected the ineffective Charles Auguste de Goyon de Matignon, comte de Gacé, the brother of a friend, and for the expedition had him created Marshal Matignon. Gibson, Scottish Card, 109, 126. 290 Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:49. 291 Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 38–40. Torcy later approved another (unsuccessful) attempt to nudge Marlborough toward actively pushing peace talks. A Portuguese Jew named Henriquez hoped to use to this end the officer Arnold Joost van Keppel, 1st Earl of Albemarle, and his wife, both particularly esteemed by the duke (ibid., 44–8). 292 Bolingbroke, Defence of Utrecht, 109. The siege of Lille began 13 August 1708, the city capitulated on 22 October, and the citadel on 8 December. Its length was particularly nerve-wracking and frustrating for the Allies. ­Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 204, 232. 293 Torcy denied to Petkum rumours that Helvétius was on his way to Holland (15 Nov. 1708). gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 334. He had to do the same



294 295

296 297

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301 302

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Notes to pages 421–3

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with rumours concerning Chamillart writing to Heinsius for talks or traveling to Flanders with peace offers. Ibid., 337; and aae cp Hollande 217, fol. 5r–v, Petkum to Torcy, 1 Jan. 1709. Collins, State, 180 (quotation), 185–6. Hennequin had renewed his correspondence with Chamillart, while Mollo was again actively writing to Callières. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 69. Torcy later characterized Chamillart’s 1708 use of Hennequin as aimed at making peace abruptly. Torcy, Journal, 53. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 52–67. See ibid., 67, for Pesters to Bernières, 2 Feb. 1709. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:431–40. The agents from Dussen to Bergeyck who insisted on going through Chamillart rather than Torcy were intriguers probing French sentiments for peace and were increasingly disavowed as the prospect of talks became a reality (ibid., 341). Dangeau, Journal, 12:321; and Sourches, Mémoires, 11:266. See also ­Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 54–9, 69–80. See Dangeau, Journal, 12:130, for Chamillart and Bergeyck’s close friendship. For Bergeyck, see Kamen, War of Succession, 50–3. Torcy, Journal, 85, said that he was instructed by the king to write a reply to either Heinsius or Dussen at Bergeyck’s suggestion. Torcy does not, however, specify what led the Flemish administrator to do so. Bergeyck’s 11 February 1709 letter to Chamillart, however, suggests that like the war minister he had come to have doubts about this channel. Bergeyck thought that the king had decided to have Torcy respond to Dussen in order to force Heinsius to declare his true intentions and stop wasting time with the other channel. ­Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:442. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 55. Writing to Chamillart, Bergeyck revealed that his channel was definitely in competition with that of Pesters and suggested that there was some information-sharing going on behind the foreign minister’s back. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:439 (21 Jan. 1709). Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 80 (22 Jan. 1709). Torcy, Journal, 125, recorded that the king chided him for being the slowest of all men in his negotiations. aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 30, Jan. 1712, Torcy wrote the Utrecht plenipotentiaries on the king’s behalf that they must be prepared to show patience and moderation. In his own letter to them, Torcy reiterated the importance and necessity of not becoming impatient. The advantage in negotiations as in war is to the one who endures more, he observed (ibid., fol. 84r). Torcy and the king again urged patience, since the pressure of the need for peace would eventually make the Allies more reasonable (ibid., fol. 208, 21 Feb. 1712). See Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 81, for Torcy’s 3 February 1709 letter. Bergeyck wrote to Chamillart (11 Feb. 1709), endorsing the plan (ibid., 82).

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Notes to pages 423–5

04 See ibid., 85, for Dussen to Bergeyck, 19 Feb. 1709. 3 305 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:445–6; and Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 310. France, Recueil, 22:178, notes that the king had thought of naming ­Alègre prior to appointing Voysin. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:116–17, notes with barely disguised scorn that Voysin turned to Maintenon to head off any ill will from the king resulting from his refusal to take what the foreign minister considered an honourable appointment. 306 aae md 306, fol. 240. 307 ss-Boislisle, 17:179–80. For these transcriptions, Louvois’s negotiations, and Chamillart’s use in 1709 of Adrien Cazier, one of Louvois’s principal agents in the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands, see ibid., 179n3. 308 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:264–5, Chamillart to Hennequin, 2 Aug. 1706. Even when Torcy instructed an envoy, Chamillart had input regarding the king’s wishes for the article concerning the barrier, as in the 6 November 1707 instructions for Dugué de Bagnols, France, Recueil, 22:158. 309 Bolingbroke, Defence of Utrecht, 327. 310 Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois,” 62, 69–70, 73. 311 See Pope, Callières, 75, on this rivalry. 312 [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 1:389–96, relates the strange case of René de Renneville, a French spy employed by Chamillart but suspected of turning double-agent. Torcy had him arrested in 1702. From his Bastille cell he protested his innocence, writing flattering verses to win over the king and Torcy. Kept incommunicado, he wrote a letter to his wife that was never sent, begging her to tell Torcy and Pecquet that his papers contained signed orders from Chamillart. If this was true, perhaps Torcy, with or without the king’s full knowledge, sought to spare Chamillart potential embarrassment. 313 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 203–4. Rowlands, Financial Decline, 36–40, 163–6, sees the overburdened minister as lacking the skills and temperament for his many functions. 314 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173, says that for these reasons Chamillart felt no need to bother with the files of negotiations entrusted to Torcy. Cénat, Chamlay, 114, notes that Chamlay’s diplomacy was also hobbled by a lack of patience. 315 Vreede, Correspondance, 189 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 16 Dec. 1706). 316 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:136 (Chevreuse to Fénelon, 9 Apr. 1709). He said the same of Chancellor Pontchartrain. 317 Torcy, Journal, 85. For further remarks on the war minister’s meddling, see Rule, “King and Minister,” 223–4; Chamillart, Correspondance, 1:42ff; ibid., 2:5ff; Bély, Espions, 110; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:305–6. 318 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:305–6, referring to years of multiple and confused negotiations and a lack of unity in French peace efforts, singles out ­Chamillart’s diplomatic missteps. Le Peletier’s memoir on the king’s affairs



319 320 321 322 323

324 325

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329 330 331 332 333 334

Notes to pages 425–7

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(finished March–April1707) noted the imprudence of Chamillart’s admission of weakness to France’s foes. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 169. Pénicaut, “Temps difficiles.” Pénicaut, Chamillart, 175. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:430–1. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 175; and Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 80. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:440, also ignores Sourches. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176. Claiming to be in line with Bély, Pénicaut contends that if this division of labour resulted in competition, it was because the king was convinced that good diplomacy leaves no channel unexplored. Yet Bély, Espions, 109, makes clear that if there was a division of labour, it was not the norm, but only emerged once Torcy learned of Hennequin’s negotiations and was drawn into them. Bély, Espions, 109; and Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176. Bély, Espions, 110, due to the fact that it is good diplomatic practice to explore every avenue of negotiation, raises the question of whether this competition was desired. Without offering an explicit answer, he implies one in depicting Chamillart’s failures and frustration with the Hennequin mission and the king’s subsequent decision to renounce multiple secret channels (ibid., 110). Other than gathering information and poking his nose into Torcy’s initiatives, there are no further examples of Chamillart pursuing separate and secret negotiations in Bély’s massive volume. Moreover, the remarks of Saint-Simon that Bély quotes clearly indicate that whatever the extent of this royally sanctioned divided diplomacy, the duke meant to condemn rather than commend the monarch for it. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:440–1. Dangeau, Journal, 12:357. ss -Boislisle, 17:179–86. During Torcy’s delicate negotiations at The Hague, his letters to the king were addressed through Beauvillier, who read them to the Conseil. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:212. Le Peletier had privately warned the king against appointing Chamillart war secretary, citing his (commendable) preoccupation with finances and his lack of knowledge of military administration. Mazel, Le Peletier, 125. See also André, Deux mémoires de Le ­Peletier, 168–9, for his low opinion of Chamillart’s negotiating skills. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:461, 467–8. Dangeau, Journal, 12:463. See Lynn, Wars, 303–11, for what he calls the annus horribilis of the war. Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 114–17. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 169. Picavet, Diplomatie, 66–7, discusses Louis XIV’s diplomatic secrets that sometimes excluded his Conseil, the foreign secretary, and certain ambassadors, but concludes that they were for the most part related to small or

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Notes to pages 427–9 family matters and were too sporadic to represent the “politique personnelle du roi” (king’s personal politics) or what we have characterized as a secret du roi. ss -Boislisle, 17:185. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 252, observe that when vital state interests were at stake, as in 1709–14, it was imperative that France speak with one voice, which favoured the foreign secretary. As one popular song intoned, for peace negotiations the king turns to his physician, while for war plans he looks to his apothecary. ss-Boislisle, 17:184n1. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 151–9; and McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 125. Torcy, Journal, 107 (12 Jan. 1710). According to Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 315, Voysin did not seek to interfere in the departmental operations of the other secretaries of state. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 125, notes that Desmaretz and Voysin began by cooperating, but in 1709 they clashed over the treatment of receivers general of finance and the quartering of troops. They were able, though, to work through these differences. This characterization of his triple ministry is in Frostin, “Organisation,” 212. Chapman, Private Ambition, 36, 52–3. The Pontchartrains became serious rivals to the Colberts and Le Telliers after Louis Pontchartrain’s appointment as controller general and entry into the Conseil in 1689 (ibid., 57–9). Le Moyne de La Borderie and Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne, 5:536, report that in 1677 the Breton estates awarded Colbert, Seignelay, Croissy, and Torcy gratifications totaling 41,000 livres. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 276–7. Chapman, Private Ambition, 145–64, details the increased vigour Pontchartrain brought to his office and his insistence that judicial officials follow “proper channels” in their work. Antoine, “Remonstrances,” 97, offers an example: the Aix parlement’s procurer general sent a remonstrance to Pontchartrain, who upbraided him for sending Torcy only an extract. Torcy needed the entire document, Pontchartrain insisted, since such remonstrances had to go through him as that province’s secretary of state. ss -Coirault, 2:562. This was in part because Torcy was a minister and he was not. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 301, 302. See ibid., 285, 298–9, on his relationship with his mother, and ibid., 285, 296–8, 318, on that with his father. He later served as intermediary between his parents, whose own relationship was tense (ibid., 317–20). Ibid., 368, 385. Ibid., 353–4, 360.



Notes to pages 429–31

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348 The règlement printed in Luçay, Origines, 130n1, is from a manuscript in the navy library and dates from the end of the 1690s. Another copy is bn ­Clairambault 664, fols 487r–9. Ibid., fols 290v–1, is a matter-of-fact “[m]émoire sur les fonctions des charges des Secrétaires d’État de la Marine et des affaires Étrangères,” tracing this history, but without reaching any conclusion. Ibid., fols 293ff is an extract from the naval registers of the king’s dispatches to foreign countries from 1669 to 1698. A memoir along the same lines on the king’s letters from1680 to 1698 (ibid., fols 321–464) may also have been part of research done for Torcy that raised his apprehension about navy encroachments on his turf. 349 Ibid., fol. 488. 350 Ibid., fol. 490. 351 Roosen, “True Ambassador,” 323, says this was largely a lengthier recapitulation of parameters established between Lionne and Colbert in 1667. 352 bn Clairambault 664, fols 499–500, “Règlement fait par le Roy, entre Mr de Pontchartrain et de M. de Torcy sur les fonctions de leurs charges,” Oct. 1698. Torcy forwarded to Pontchartrain a petition he had received from an Algerian prisoner in the Châtelet that, upon its translation, seemed to belong under Pontchartrain’s jurisdiction. aae md 1189, fol. 80, Torcy to ­Pontchartrain, 18 Sept. 1712. 353 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 232, call it the foreign secretary’s first mission. 354 bn Clairambault 664, fol. 505, Torcy to Tallard, 13 Mar. 1699. 355 Ibid., fol. 507. 356 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 342–4. For examples of clashes between Torcy and the Pontchartrains over Venice and Constantinople, see ibid., 140–1. See also Frostin, “Organisation,” 212–23. On consulates, see Mézin, Consuls, 16–17. For a sampling of the information Pontchartrain gathered from his foreign contacts, see bn Clairambault 297, fols 239ff, on Genoa, Sardinia, Florence and Siena, Vienna (including the latest opera lyrics sent by Ambassador du Luc in 1713, ibid., fols 301–8), Italy (the latest pamphlets), and Spain (from Toby Bourke). 357 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 345–50; Meyer, Colbert, 346; and Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 226. 358 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 356–7, 398–400. Daubenton left Spain in 1709. 359 Ibid., 401–3. 360 bn mf 15772, fols 268–9, Torcy to Jérôme Pontchartrain, 18 Aug. 1711. 361 Ibid., Le Tort to another priest, 13 Sept. 1711. See ibid., fol. 280, Le Tort to Rast, 14 Sept. 1711; and ibid., fols 284–5, Le Tort to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1711. 362 Ibid., fol. 290. 363 Ibid., fol. 312. Torcy, Journal, 262–6 (Sept. 1710), concerns a dispute with the nuncio over royal efforts to re-establish discipline in several houses of “Augustins déchaussés” (bare-footed), also called the Petits-Pères. The pope

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Notes to pages 431–2 contended that Louis could hold monks to their rules, but he could not make the rules. Both the Conseil and Dispatches discussed this matter. While some wanted to take it to the parlement, Torcy and the king prevailed in their desire to offer the Gallican Church and the nuncio a face-saving way to avoid a crisis at a time when France desperately needed papal diplomatic support. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 392–3. For example, see bn mf 6658, fol. 20v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 21 Jan. 1701, for cabaret violence by men wearing the English ambassador’s livery. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 394–6. In contrast, although perhaps because they did not have a network of independent agents abroad, the comte de ­Toulouse, admiral of France, asked Torcy to perform a favour for him if it was not too burdensome. He wanted French diplomats to gather foreign regulations from the last war concerning privateering and prizes so that he could create an exact compendium of them for admiralty use. He also offered to pay any expenses involved. aae md 1205, fol. 189–90, Toulouse to Torcy, 25 Apr. 1715. aae CP Lorraine 77, fol. 288, Torcy to d’Audiffret, 28 Jan. 1712. Ibid., md 1118, fol. 37, Torcy to d’Argenson, 21 Jan. 1703, informed him that because the report he had sent him of a New Convert who merited chastisement really belonged to Pontchartrain’s department, he had forwarded it to him, although perhaps in a bit of turnabout, after having first read it to the king. See Torcy, Journal, 274, for a matter of pay for navy department commis. Torcy thanked him for Joseph Pellerin’s help in reading important coded letters seized in 1706 from a Spanish frigate before it delivered the Austrian archduke to Genoa. Mascart, Vie Borda, 193–4n5. See aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 173r–v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 23 Dec. 1711, on Amsterdam. Ibid., md 1108, fol. 64, 17 May 1707, Pontchartrain passed on to Torcy intelligence from consuls in Italy. Frostin, “Organisation,” 218, accuses Pontchartrain of not respecting Torcy’s prerogatives as post office head when he requested that Etampes’s prévôt de la maréchaussée (a sort of locally based royal mobile police force) write him of the outcome of an incident involving the mistreatment of postilions by a naval captain. The letter Frostin quotes, however, acknowledged that it was for Torcy to order a punishment. Pontchartrain’s request for a full report may also be interpreted as a reasonable desire to see that his department personnel receive justice. bn mf 6658, fol. 260v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 25 Apr. 1701; and Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:450–2. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 351–3, 403–6. Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 464–78; and Miquelon “Envisioning the French Empire,” 653–77, especially 656n18.



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373 For instance, aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 125r, plenipotentiaries to Torcy, 1 Feb. 1712. Ibid., 236, fol. 24, Mesnager to Torcy, 4 July 1712; Mesnager told Torcy that he had written Desmaretz about the Castile trade. 374 aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 14r, Torcy to Huxelles, 20 Mar. 1712, reports that while Pontchartrain feared that the delegates had not done enough, the foreign secretary had defended them. On Pontchartrain’s willingness to sacrifice colonies in order to preserve the state and the gains from earlier in the reign, see Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 400. Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 478, argues that Pontchartrain’s “great failing was not his policy but his neglecting to offer guidance for the Utrecht plenipotentiaries and the king … Pleas for information from Utrecht were answered with terse, unhelpful lectures on boundaries and mercantilism. The plenipotentiaries were left to infer much.” At one point Torcy vented his frustration during negotiations to his English friend Prior, showing him a “very confused letter to himself from Monsieur Pontchartrain relating to Newfoundland and comparing the Dates of Several Letters upon which Monsieur Pontchartrain has grounded new fears and apprehensions that some Mistakes may arise upon the Orders given in that Affair.” pro sp France 78/157, fol. 373, Prior to Bolingbroke, 29 Nov. 1713. 375 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 407–10, makes this claim. It is refuted convincingly, however, in Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire,” 660, 671; and Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 459–86. Schaeper, “French and English Trade,” 1–18, discusses the depth and breadth of French disgruntlement with the commercial treaty, a dissatisfaction shared by Torcy despite his strong desire for close relations with the Tory government. ­Schnakenbourg, “Commerce et diplomatie,” 349–65, shows that in 1713 the French accepted an unfavourable trade treaty in order to gain peace, but in subsequent discussions of those parts left for negotiation once peace returned, they made their objections clear. When Parliament refused to ratify the commercial treaty, French negotiators made a show of continuing to talk for a variety of political reasons, letting the blame for failure fall on the British. The French wanted a trade treaty but not this particular version. Frostin, Les Pont­ chartrain, 408, apparently mistakes Pontchartrain’s foot-dragging for a rogue effort to sabotage the treaty, whereas it was in fact part of a coordinated French negotiating strategy. 376 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 407–10. 377 From early 1715 French Baltic policy became focused on limiting British and Hanoverian influence. Schnakenbourg, “Politique française Nord,” 272. See Petitfils, Regent, 221, on the Whig victory. Campbell, Power and Politics, 53, says that Torcy “had been partly excluded since 1713” from the formation of foreign policy “because of his anglophobia” and that although Torcy “was still a councillor for foreign affairs … his opinions were not always

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Notes to pages 433–6 respected” (54). Given his collaboration with the Tories in bringing about the Utrecht treaty, attributing Torcy’s policy stance to anglophobia is implausible. Moreover, his role of advising the regent was significant. Petitfils contends that the regent only gratified Dubois’s desire to be rid of his rival when he was sure that Dubois had finally come around to Torcy’s more flexible and balanced view of foreign policy. Petitfils, Regent, 322, 324, 341, 433–6, 439, 441, 468, 478, 480, 578–9, 599. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 457. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 109–10. For Louis Pontchartrain’s loss of influence and resignation, see ibid., 411–25. Ibid., 424. See ibid., 428–53, for Jérôme’s post-Utrecht colonial initiatives. Finances for his plans also led to some friction with Desmaretz (ibid., 442), with whom Louis Pontchartrain, but not Jérôme, got along (ibid., 171). ­Desmaretz apparently took a strong hand in commercial matters concerning Marseilles, which was sure to provoke Jérôme’s anger. See, for example, ­Desmaretz’s letters to Lebret in bn naf 22940, fols 301r–v (10 Aug. 1708), 308 (2 Apr. 1710), and 314 (5 June 1713). Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 426–8. The king and his navy secretary saw Utrecht as a “truce of recuperation” before France could once again challenge Britain colonially and commercially (456), which Frostin links to du Luc’s mission to Vienna to sound out Austria on a possible rapprochement. Bély, Dictionnaire, 139–47, 266–70. pro sp France 78/157, fol. 287, 22 Sept. 1713. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176n62, contends that Frostin’s emphasis on the extent of Pontchartrain’s administrative empire is perhaps excessive when compared to Chamillart’s.

Chapter Eleven 1 Dangeau, Journal, 7:190. 2 Torcy, Journal, 294 (1 Nov. 1710), reported that the king gave him a memoir to read and comment upon without divulging to anyone the proposition it contained. 3 Breen, Law, 205–12, shows that routinization also extended to Dijon’s municipal government. 4 Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81–97. For Marseille’s Gleise faction and their connections within the foreign office, see chapter 6 above. 5 For Dispatches’ role, see Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 309–20; but cf. Collins, State, 111. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 203–4, empirically establishes that the Regency’s domestic council continued Dispatches’ specialization in contentious matters and administrative conflicts.



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6 See McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, for the controller general and his department. 7 Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 24–6, 35–6, 88, 96, 108, 120, 155. Intendants were not removed or switched around just because a new controller or secretary of state took office. While ministers sought to influence postings, the decision was the king’s, based often on provincial circumstances (ibid., 84–5). 8 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 87–8 (especially 87n165); ibid., 176–84, traces ­Chamillart’s conflicts with both Pontchartrains, including in his role as war secretary (Pénicaut also emphasizes that cooperation took place), although Chamillart and his successor as controller general, Torcy’s cousin Desmaretz, got on fairly well (ibid., 184–7). 9 Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:366 (30 Nov. 1706). 10 See ibid., 323, 329, for Chamillart’s marginal notes on letters of 2 and 28 May 1706. Of course, the controller general continued to confer with his colleagues individually as necessary. For example, bn mf 8867, fol. 400, Torcy to Lebret, 12 Mar. 1700, in discussing the various memoirs submitted by the nobility’s syndics on a variety of subjects, noted that Torcy reported to the king after having communicated with Chamillart. 11 ss-Boislisle, 4:254. Bourgeon, “Balthazar Phélypeaux,” 145, largely follows Saint-Simon in his evaluation of his post-Revocation role. 12 As Boislisle observes in a note in ss-Boislisle, 4:255. 13 Luçay, Origines, 131. 14 Sourches, Mémoires, 1:17. For a list of what was in his department, see État de la France (1698), 3:27–8. Evidence of Châteauneuf’s administrative role, both for the Religion prétendue réformée before 1685 and for the general administration of his provinces, can be found in France, Correspondance des intendants, passim. 15 Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 3:213n23, 214n27, shows that La Vrillière was among those receiving copies of military dispatches from Nicolas Auguste de la Baume, marquis de Montrevel, commander of the royal troops in Languedoc, a province in La Vrillière’s department, as well as from that province’s intendant Basville (ibid., 375). While La Vrillière was among those Villars originally consulted when he replaced Montrevel in March 1704 (ibid., 366), Chamillart granted him a dispensation from writing to La Vrillière, leaving the secretary to rely on the regular correspondence from Basville for military news. Chamillart wrote dismissively of what he labeled the little minister’s effort to be somebody, maintaining that Villars’s waiver was only granted because this was an extraordinary war (ibid., 392n12). See ibid., 657–60, 682nn13–14, for a clash between La Vrillière and Villars. Although Villars came out largely the winner in this, it is telling that he was worried enough about what La Vrillière was saying at court and to the king that he

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23 24 25

26

Notes to pages 437–9 sought and received Chamillart’s intervention on his behalf with Louis and Maintenon. bn mf 8863, fol. 645, Adam to archbishop of Aix, 1 June 1698, informed him that an arrêt was being sent as a result of the memoir Torcy carried to the council that morning. For Dispatches and actes en commandement, see Barbiche, Institutions, 167, 184–93, 293, 294 (a helpful chart of the composition of all the councils), 301, 304–8; and Luçay, Origines, 116–19, 134–47. Blanquie and Cornette, Institutions, 49. Burgundy was invited to attend from 25 October 1699, but at first only to listen and learn. By the following year, however, he had a deliberative voice. ss -Coirault, 1:663, 751. For Berry, see Dangeau, Journal, 14:276. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 290, relate that in November 1685 only eighteen-year-old Barbezieux received the survivance and right to sign as ­secretary of state. On 31 March 1687 he entered Dispatches alongside his father. Torcy, Journal, 209–11. aae md 1146, fol. 102r–v, Torcy to Chamillart, 30 July 1706; Torcy enlisted Chamillart’s help arranging a prisoner exchange for France’s envoy to ­Wolfenbüttel, his wife, and his servant, captured by the Allies. Torcy informed Iberville, resident at Genoa, that Pontchartrain would recommend using his department’s galleys to help transport the mails (ibid., cp Gênes 40, fol. 87v, to, 6 June 1707). Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, chap. 7, on tension and collaboration among ministers, is a balanced treatment. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 179, argues that Regency councils continued the Louisquatorzian tradition of interdepartmental cooperation. bn mf 8863, fols 112–16, Blondel to Lebret, 29 Jan. 1698; ibid., fol. 101, Pontchartrain to Lebret, 22 Jan. 1698; and ibid., fol. 110, Torcy to Lebret, 24 Jan. 1698. Bély, Dictionnaire, 28–31, is a perceptive overview. For Pontchartrain’s insistence on regular channels, see Chapman, Private Ambition, 146–50, 157–64. bn mf 21123, fol. 351v, Pontchartrain to Gaufredy de Trels, July 1704; and ibid., fol. 379v–80r, Pontchartrain to Brilhac, 2 July 1704. Ibid., fol. 612v, Pontchartrain to La Monneraye, 6 Oct. 1704. Other examples of such letters from Pontchartrain are Depping, Correspondance, 1:933, to Toulouse’s Academy of Floral Games, 14 Jan. 1709 (Desmaretz); ibid., 934, to Agen’s présidial officers, 5 Feb. 1709 (La Vrillière); ibid., 932, to Gimont’s mayor and consuls, 2 Oct. 1707 (La Vrillière); and ibid., 950 (to Toulon’s mayor and consuls, 2 Nov. 1712 [Torcy]). See also Hamscher, Conseil privé, 118n21. Torcy, with similar sensitivity to proper channels, instructed the bishop of Chalons to rewrite and send to Pontchartrain what was clearly a financial matter. aae md 1022, fol. 158, 31 Aug. 1693. Barbiche, Institutions, 133.



Notes to pages 439–42

703

27 Sarmant, Demeures, 276–77. Louvois’s work as superintendent of buildings especially lent itself to this way of work. 28 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 177–83. 29 Hamscher, Conseil privé, 7, 108–12 (see especially 111n6). See also ­McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, especially chap. 2. 30 Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 5, 9, 12, 14–15. 31 Ibid., 14. 32 Collins, State, 6, 12, 115, 228–9. 33 Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 19–31. 34 Spanheim, Relation, 406. 35 According to a list in aae md 1186, fols 111–12r (1712). In March 1708 Dauphiné was traded to the war secretary for the Lyonnais. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. Torcy no longer supervised Grenoble’s parlement. 36 Soll, Information Master, 68 (his chapter 5 develops this theme). Intendants looked to Torcy to pay their sub-delegates’ gages. bn mf 8879, fol. 298 (1704). 37 aae md 1186, fol. 205, Torcy to Jean-Charles Doujat (Hainault’s intendant), 16 Apr. 1712. 38 For example, ibid., 1144, fol. 105, Torcy to intendant André de Harouys (Champagne), 25 Oct. 1706, concerning a conflict between a town’s governor and its aldermen over control of prisoners; bn mf 8839, fol. 233, Torcy to intendant Pierre-Cardin Lebret (Provence), 28 Feb. 1692, instructing him to investigate the case of a Marseilles woman who complained to the king that because her husband has gone to America by royal order she had to close her shop; and aae md 1144, fol. 59, Torcy to de Miane, 12 Oct. 1706, about a nobleman imprisoned in the Château de Nantes, mentioned that he has also written intendant François-Antoine Ferrand for clarification. 39 As outlined in Peters, “Governance,” 22. 40 aae md 1032, fol. 380r, Torcy to Bégon, 23 Aug. 1695; also ibid., 1477, fol. 431, Bégon to Torcy, 14 June 1701. 41 Ibid., 1477, fols 385ff, for letters between Torcy and the authorities at Saintes. 42 See also ibid., 1031, fols 189–90v. Torcy to Bouchu, 15 Jan. 1691. ­Parker, Global Crisis, 511–12, shows that local officials and elites carefully monitored the popular mood and tried when possible to derail any ­movement along the continuum of resistance that might eventually lead to open rebellion. 43 bn mf 8867, fol. 197, Torcy to Lebret, 31 Jan. 1700. 44 Breen, Law, 161–3. 45 Gunn, Opinion, 128–34. 46 aae md 1144, fol. 225, 23 Nov. 1706. 47 Ibid., 1159, fol. 127, Torcy to De la Garde, 4 Nov. 1708.

704

Notes to pages 442–4

48 Ibid., fol. 318, Torcy to Harouys, 18 Dec. 1708. 49 bn mf 8856, fol. 382, Torcy to Lebret, 23 Dec. 1695. See Riley, Virtue, for Louis XIV’s attitudes toward sin/crime and his important but unsuccessful efforts to stamp it out. 50 bn naf 5096, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries at Ryswick, 4 Nov. 1697. 51 aae md 1159, fols 25 and 26, Torcy to d’Argenson and intendant Jean Phélypeaux, 5 Oct. 1708; ibid., 1144 fol. 59, Torcy to de Miane, 12 Oct. 1706; ibid., 1137, fols 43–6, 26 Mar. 1705, listed prisoners Torcy had ordered to the Bastille since 1701; ibid., fols 47–8, d’Argenson asked Torcy the next day to check the list; and ibid., 1144, fol. 335, Torcy to Jérôme Bignon, 22 Dec. 1706, discussed a prisoner transfer from the Amiens citadel to Vincennes. 52 bn naf 3517, fol. 43, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Nov. 1702. 53 aae md 1012 fol. 195, 8 Oct. 1691. bn mf 8858, fol. 156, Torcy to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696, ordered an individual’s exile ended. 54 aae md 1159, fols 210–215, Nov. 1708. 55 Ibid., 1022, fol. 111, Torcy to Procureur General, 16 June 1693. 56 Ibid., 1137, fol. 95, d’Argenson to Torcy, 7 July 1705. Ibid., cp Autriche 80, fol. 167r–v, d’Argenson to Torcy, 7 June 1702, concerned the surveillance of a man writing to Vienna who had known and perhaps served Imperial Ambassador Zinzendorf during the Nine Years War. 57 Ibid., 1731, fol. 38r–v, Torcy to Lebret, 3 Apr. 1707; and ibid., 1016, fol. 101, Torcy to Michel Larcher (Champagne), 29 Feb. 1692, ordered a bookseller arrested for printing books prejudicial to the king. bn mf 8842, fol. 39, Torcy to Lebret, 2 Jan. 1692, is an example of such regulation under less stressful circumstances. 58 Barbiche, Institutions, 328–31. aae md 1514, fol. 178, 6 July 1701; and ibid., fol. 257, July 1703, are commissions for lieutenants-general. Ibid., 1553, fol. 361, concerns officer commissions in a bourgeois militia in 1703. Torcy resolved a dispute between Béarn’s parlement and local syndics and militias (bn naf 23187, fol. 315r, Torcy to Gramont, 6 June 1706), and between the bourgeois militia and Sisteron’s garrison (ibid., 22940, fol. 276, Torcy to Lebret, 13 July 1715). aae md 1148, fol. 172, May 1707, ordered the Chambre des comptes to suppress the office of intendant of fortifications for Champagne. 59 aae md 1553, fol. 358, Louis XIV to Tessé, 18 Oct. 1703, appointed him commandant because of the absence of its governor, Louis d’Abusson, duc de La Feuillade. Ibid., 1020, fol. 239, Torcy to Béchameil de Nointel, 16 Mar. 1693, explained that although the honours of lieutenant de roi and governor of Rennes had hitherto been joined, the king had separated them. 60 Ibid., 1514, fols 201ff, 20 Oct. 1702, concerning the conduct of Mme de Sévigné’s son, Charles de Sévigné, and coastal defence at Nantes, where he



61 62

63 64

65

66

67 68 69

70 71 72 73

Notes to pages 444–5

705

was lieutenant du roi. Governor d’Estrées intervened and put his men in Nantes, and when Sévigné reacted, d’Estrées threatened a severe and exact justice. Torcy wrote Pucelle, commandant in Provence, about his dispute with Marvellin’s new mayor (ibid., 1022, fol. 123, 14 July 1693). Babeau, Villars, gouverneur, 40–1. aae md 1514, fol. 368, Torcy to Lavardin, 2 Oct. 1692; ibid., 1012 fol. 189, Torcy to Bezons, 1 Oct. 1691; and ibid., 1159, fol. 211, Torcy to de la ­Fontaine, 11 Dec. 1708. Ibid., 1032, fol. 187, Torcy to Lavardin, 10 Apr. 1695, informed him that the duc de Choiseul was to be lieutenant-general under him and Vauban was to supervise coastal defences. He urged them all to work together in concert. Ibid., fol. 239, Torcy to Vauban, 5 June 1695, discussed difficulties over ranks and promotions. Dangeau, Journal, 5:428. bn naf 23187, fols 230–1, Torcy to Gramont, 25 Aug. 1696. Ibid., fol. 219, Torcy to Gramont, 8 Aug. 1696, asked the governor to assist the Bavarian elector’s courier to Madrid who carried the news of the birth of the elector’s daughter. France was seeking Max’s support for the Spanish succession. See France, Recueil, 12:89–132, for his lengthy instructions and short mission. Their discussions on Spain, Gramont’s management of the provincial estates, and Torcy’s favours to his followers are reflected in Torcy’s 1706 letters to Gramont in bn naf 23187 (fol. 319, 4 July; fol. 321, 18 July; fol. 327, 1 Aug.; fols 329–30, 15 Aug.; and fols 333–4, 6 Sept.). aae md 1553, fol. 345, Torcy to La Vrillière, 9 Jan. 1703; and ibid., fol. 355, Torcy to Chamillart, 12 Apr. 1703. See also ibid., 1517, fol. 12v, for Torcy’s agenda of c. 1705/06, labeled as a memoir of things he had to talk to ­Chamillart about concerning Brittany, such as troops and their movements. Ibid., 1108, fol. 64, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 17 May 1702, passed along news from Italy, including information from the navy’s consul in Sardinia. aae md 1553, fol. 357, Torcy to Bouchu, 14 Oct. 1703; and ibid., fol. ­359r–v, Bouchu to Torcy, 30 Dec. 1703. bn naf 22940, fol. 253, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 486. See bn mf 8845, fol. 37, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Nov. 1692, for earlier concerns about New Converts possessing munitions of war in their houses. Marchand, Intendant, 289–98. Quoted in ibid., 291. bn naf 22940, fol. 257, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. For examples of Torcy’s letters to Lebret urging enforcement, see bn mf 8848, fol. 62, 20 July 1693; ibid., 8850, fol. 76 (the order follows in fol. 78), 26 Jan. 1694; and ibid., fol. 139, 12 Feb. 1694. aae md 1186, fols 261–2, Torcy to Antoine-François Méliand, Lyon’s intendant, 9 May 1712, did the same. For words of caution, see ibid., 1017, fol. 93, Torcy to Béarn ­intendant

706

74 75 76 77

78

79 80

81

82

83

Notes to pages 445–7 François du Feydeau Plessis, 12 Feb. 1692; and ibid., 1163, fol. 38, Torcy to Berthier, 11 Apr. 1709. Intendants shared their thoughts on how to handle New Converts, as in bn mf 7487, fols 486–503, Bégon to Torcy, 4 May 1698. aae md 1149, fol. 147, 17 Feb. 1707, is a letter expressing the king’s concern with the bad example set by graveside ceremonies of relapsed New Converts who had refused last rites. The clerk who drafted it focused on the scandal caused by New Converts, whereas Torcy’s revisions insisted on proceeding prudently so as to avoid the false accusations that only created scandal. Torcy was sensitive to public opinion in France and abroad. aae md 1041, 21 June 1696. Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 3:282–3, 287n36. bn naf 3517, fol. 126, Torcy to Lebret, 2 Mar. 1704. aae md 1011, fol. 15, Croissy (in Torcy’s hand) to the bishop of Oléron, 2 Jan. 1691 (a clerical error due to the change of year marks it “1690”). Torcy, who had little patience for fraud, years later informed d’Argenson of a young woman who went about Paris acting scandalously and claiming to be from the comte du Hamel’s family. His inquiries to the intendant of Champagne, where part of that family still resided, showed her to be an imposter. She was consigned to the general hospital (ibid., 1191, fol. 156, 5 Apr. 1713). Hamel, a Protestant who had fled to Holland in 1685, left behind two daughters who were educated as Catholics at royal expense. See also Hérelle, Documents inédites sur le Protestantisme, 2:260n2. bn naf 22940, fol. 256, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 1:28, notes that Torcy reflected the royal opinion that force should be avoided if at all possible in getting New Converts to Mass. bn naf 22940, fol. 253, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. aae md 1144, fol. 211, Torcy to Dauphiné intendant Nicolas Prosper Bauyn d’Angervilliers, 17 Nov. 1706; and ibid., fol. 48, 10 Oct. and 22 Dec. 1706, concerning Johnston, a Scot and former Protestant pastor. Ibid., 1016, fol. 56, Torcy to La Reynie, 29 Jan. 1692. For Bromfield, see Monod, Jacobitism and English People, 105n40, 156, 156n41; and Burger, “Spymaster,” 114–15. aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 163, d’Argenson to Torcy, 31 May 1702, reported that Bromfield had been arrested, had been taken to the Bastille, and had had his rooms searched. From Croissy’s time, separate volumes recorded expéditions of awards of benefices (meaning anything with money attached) and other clergy matters. aae md 1030 (1694–1701); and ibid., 1174 (1710), are examples. Bergin, Crown, Church, 171–9, 262–3, on ministerial patronage. aae md 1186, fols 161–4, lists benefices awarded 26 March 1712 and pensions drawn on benefices. The benefice list, numbered 2 through 45, tells what is given to whom and has in the left-hand margin annotations such as “to soand-so.” What these annotations signify is unclear, but they suggest that if



84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91 92

Notes to pages 448–9

707

those listed, including foreign office personnel (Pecquet, Fournier, Du Theil, and de Presle), Abbé Pajot, and Cholet, Maintenon’s footman, did not receive something directly in these grants, the recipients were likely their clients. Ibid., 1210, fols 119–21, of abbeys granted since the Regency, lists only the abbey and (presumably) its recipient (including Pecquet and Fournier). Ibid., fols 18–19 (1715), lists vacant benefices and the revenues of each. Ibid., fols 20ff, lists requests for benefices, noting the reasons and letter(s) of recommendation received. Bossuet, Correspondence, 12:84–5, Torcy to Bossuet, 23 July 1699, sought his opinion on instructions from the king concerning a disputed appointment. The bishop of Nantes, thanking Chamillart for supporting his request for an abbey, asked permission to solicit Torcy’s support as well. Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:305 (16 Feb. 1706). bl am 20324, fol. 3, Pressiat (expeditor of bulls at Rome) to Gualterio, 30 July 1710. aae md 1004, fol. 435, Torcy to bishop of Oléron, 9 Nov. 1690. Torcy, Journal, 220. aae md 1005, fol. 79, Torcy to Bouchu, 17 Mar. 1690. For Bouchu as intendant, see Bouchu, Intendance Dauphiné 1698, lxxxix, xcii–xciii. Disputes between local elites and the clergy over hospitals are discussed in Hickey, Local Hospitals, 114, 130. For Provence, see aae md 1012, fol. 207, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Oct. (indicating that the matter had been raised in Dispatches); and ibid., fol. 268, 20 Nov. 1691. In November 1706 Bossuet complained to Torcy that Meaux’s municipal officials had denied him the required Easter visit and compliments. The mayor responded to Torcy’s inquiry by traveling to court to defend (unsuccessfully) his conduct. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 4:39–40. Torcy wrote Rheims’s archbishop and présidial to resolve their dispute over who should kneel when the prelate gave his benediction. aae md 1191, fols 41–2v, 16 Jan. 1713. aae md 1075, fol. 357, Torcy to archbishop of Arles, 14 Dec. 1700. Ibid., 1159, fol. 279, Torcy to bishop of Nantes, 9 Dec. 1708; and ibid., fol. 323, Torcy to Ferrand, 19 Dec. 1708. See also ibid., fol. 53, for this dispute. Ibid., 1517, fol. 225, Tellier to Torcy, 29 Sept. 1710; and ibid., fols 223–4, for the bishop’s letter of 20 September 1710. Bypassing the secretary and going directly to the king was not permitted, but one could ask a patron to intervene with the secretary. For example, bn mf 8839, fol. 244, Torcy to Lebret, 28 Feb. 1691, informed him that royal confessor Père de La Chaise had sent Torcy a letter of complaint from convent clergy in conflict with local officials. Torcy told him to see to the matter and write to both the convent and La Chaise. aae md 1013, fol. 189r–v, Torcy to Bouchu, 15 Jan. 1691; and ibid., fol. 191r–v, Torcy to the archbishop of Vienne, 15 Jan. 1691. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 188.

708

Notes to pages 449–51

93 aae md, 1020, fol. 288, Torcy to bishop of Saint-Malo, 28 July 1693; bn mf 8839 fol. 289, Torcy to Béchameil de Nointel, 28 July 1693; and aae md 1020, fols 454 and 455, Torcy to bishop of Saint-Malo and to the canons, 20 Oct. 1693. See ibid., 1043, fol. 57r, Torcy to Grignan, 23 July 1697, informing Grignan that the king approved his resolution of the conflict between the governor and the consuls of Arles at the time of the Te Deum for the taking of Ath. In fact, the king would turn Grignan’s solution into a general regulation. 94 bn naf 22940, fol. 261, Torcy to Lebret, 11 July 1701. 95 Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:454 (15 July 1703). 96 aae md 1043, fol. 144, Torcy to Pertu, 19 Aug. 1697. 97 Ibid., 1004, fol. 180, Torcy to Feydeau du Plessis, 27 Apr. 1690; ibid., 1020, fol. 350, Torcy to bishop of St Pol-de-Léon, 26 Aug. 1693; ibid., fol. 76, Torcy to Bouchu, 29 Apr. 1693; bn mf 8863, fol. 673, Torcy to Lebret, 5 June 1698; and ibid., fols 674–6, for letters the previous day informing the bishop and canons that Lebret would investigate. 98 aae md 1159, fol. 238, Nov. 1708, a “Déclaration du Roy”; ibid., 1144, fol. 99, Torcy to Marloz, vicar general of Bishopric of Limoges, 24 Oct. 1706; bn naf 22940, fol. 252, Torcy to Lebret, 26 June 1702; aae md 1004, fol. 251r–v, a 1690 circular letter list for a Te Deum; and ibid., 1180, fol. 128, 25 Apr. 1711, prayers for the late Dauphin. Ibid., 1041, fol. 33, 5 Sept. 1696, is a circular letter announcing the king’s improving health. On the Te Deum as royal spectacle, see Petitfils, Louis XIV, 424–5; and Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information. 99 aae md 1012, fol. 145, Torcy to Feydeau du Plessis, 6 Sept. 1691, ordering closure of an unauthorized convent; and bn mf 17431, fol. 76, Torcy to Achille III de Harlay, 15 Oct. 1696, for a visit to a Carmelite house. 100 bn mf 20756, fol. 135, Torcy to Archbishop Le Tellier, 5 Aug. 1700; and ibid., fol. 136r, Le Tellier’s circular letter, with a copy of Torcy’s letter he sent along with it. For intendants, see ibid., 8867, fol. 303, Torcy to Lebret, 1 Mar. 1700. 101 bn naf 22940, fol. 252, Torcy to Lebret, 26 June 1702. 102 aae md 1011, fols 201–7, May 1691, detailed orders for a general hospital in Brest; ibid., 1180, fol. 323, Aug. 1711, on a hospital in Brest; bn mf 8839, fol. 296, Jan. 1691, a memoir to Torcy; ibid., 8842, fol. 118, Torcy to Lebret, 17 Jan. 1692, reconfirming the Aix hospital’s director; and ibid., fol. 122, Torcy to Lebret, 18 Jan. 1692, directing him to speak to Tarascon’s consuls about establishing a hospital there. For general hospitals, especially in smaller cities and towns, see Hickey, Local Hospitals, xvi, 54–5, 109–12. 103 aae md 1004, fol. 409, Torcy to Lebret, 23 Oct. 1690, concerning schools that should have been established in Orange to instruct New Converts; ibid., fol. 509, Torcy to Lebret, 20 Dec. 1690, on the administration of the ­Collège d’Orange; and ibid., 1022, fol. 48, Torcy to Larcher, 4 Mar. 1693, about



104

105

106

107 108

109 110 111

112

Notes to pages 451–2

709

instruction in schools. Ibid., 1191, fols 333–4, 16 June 1713, two letters from Torcy about religious instruction for Lyon silk workers not yet converted. Soll, Information Master, 73. Torcy requested general provincial information from his intendants in 1691. aae md 1012, fol. 100; and ibid., 1013, fol. 57. He received other such reports, including those for the Duke of Burgundy at the end of the 1690s. Ibid., 1753, fols 200–64v, for Bourges, drawn up by Louis-François Dey de Séraucourt (1698); ibid., fols 60ff, for La Rochelle; and ibid., fols 180–99, for Béarn and Basse Navarre. For provincial estates, see Barbiche, Institutions, 98–102; and Mousnier, Institutions, 1:610–11. aae md 1517, fols 28–9v, is the 1703 cahiers of Brittany’s estates. The royal response in ibid., fols 31–2, is to the 1705 remonstrances. aae md 1144, fol. 107, Torcy to bishop of Tarbes, 25 Oct. 1706, thanking him for a report on Bigorre’s estates over which he presided. Cardin Lebret, Intendance de Provence, 132–6, 345–7, discusses the estates and civil and military government (ibid., 213–18, 337–45). aae md 1190, fol. 406, 20 Oct. 1713. Torcy, Journal, 362–3. Rebillon, États Bretagne, 184, says that Toulouse never visited the province. Breen, Law, 93–6, 131–2, 207–8, however, shows that even absentee governors, such as the Condés in Burgundy, could wield considerable power locally. aae md 1020, fol. 349, Torcy to Lebret, 26 Aug. 1693. For a later Marseille election, see ibid., 1144, fol. 196, Torcy to Lebret fils, 15 Nov. 1706. Breen, Law, 131–2. Ibid., 81. aae md 1144, fol. 95, Torcy to archbishop of Aix, 23 Oct. 1706; ibid., fol. 197, on the entry of the mayor and aldermen into Marseille; ibid., 1163, fol. 33, Torcy to the officers of Marseille’s sénéchaussée, 11 Apr. 1709; and ibid., fols 44–5r, Torcy to Lebret and de la Garde (of Provence’s parlement), 13 Apr. 1709, asserting that the king, not the parlement, resolved public ceremony issues. Ibid., 1020, fols 308 and 309, are Torcy’s letters to Angoumois’s lieutenant du roi and the sub-delegate of the maréchaussée, 4 Aug. 1693, supporting the former in his dispute with the latter over honours due him and instructing both to look to Limoges intendant Michel-André Jubert de Bouville for a resolution. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:385–6, 399–402, 422, discusses a 1702 conflict between judicial officers and monks in Meaux over the former’s absence from Te Deums. Torcy instructed the local intendant to investigate. Although Bossuet eventually successfully interceded with Torcy on behalf of the chapter, the conflict dragged on. bn naf 22940, fol. 276r–v, Torcy to Lebret, 13 July 1715, resolved a conflict between the lieutenant du roi and a mayor, consuls, and lieutenants of police over the use of citadel troops to restore order. aae md 1144, fol. 105, Torcy to Harouys, 25 Oct. 1706, asked for details of a conflict between a town’s

710

113 114 115

116 117 118

119

120 121

122 123

Notes to pages 452–4 governor and aldermen over the control of some prisoners so that the king could resolve it. aae md 1017, fol. 431, Torcy to governor of Navarrins, 19 Nov. 1692. bn mf 8874, fol. 249, Torcy to Lebret, 4 Nov. 1704. aae md 1163, fol. 30, Torcy to Ravat, 9 Apr. 1709; and ibid., 1159, fol. 195, Torcy to Chalmazel and Toulon’s mayor, consuls, and lieutenants du roi, 30 Nov. 1708. Torcy and Desmaretz clashed over grain when the latter resisted Torcy’s requests for passports for grain exports to Spain. Desmaretz feared the effect on public opinion but proposed a means of arranging shipments discreetly. Ibid., cp Espagne 203, fol. 389, Desmaretz to Torcy, 18 Oct. 1710; and ibid., fol. 402, Desmaretz to Torcy, 3 Nov. 1710. Torcy enlisted the episcopal hierarchy to help feed the poor during bad harvests. Ibid., md 1020, fol. 79, 15 Feb. 1693, circulars to bishops and archbishops. According to Parker, Global Crisis, 589, climate change between 1691 and 1701 and the Great Winter of 1709 killed well over one and a half million of the approximately twenty million French. He also notes that by 1700 states had become somewhat more responsive to the needs of their people – especially for food – because of the earlier global crisis (ibid., 322–3, 611–41). aae md 1011, fol. 107, Torcy to Grignan, 5 Jan. 1691. Ibid., 1144, fol. 46, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Oct. 1706. Ibid., 1012, fol. 238, 5 Nov. 1691, on François de Rohan, prince de Soubise’s replacement as Berry’s governor. The letter of provision originally read comte d’Aubigné, Maintenon’s brother, but his name was marked out and replaced by that of Emmanuel II Crusso, duc d’Uzès. However, Aubigné did become Berry’s governor, while Uzès was appointed the governor of Saintonge. See also ss-Coirault, 1:57, 428–9. For examples of appointments under Torcy’s care, see aae md 1017, fol. 492; and ibid., 1144, fols 170–1. Dauphiné’s military government, for instance, comprised a governor, a lieutenant-governor, four lieutenants de roi particuliers (created during the Nine Years War), and nineteen gouverneurs particuliers of towns and fortresses. Bouchu, Intendance Dauphiné 1698, 66–7. aae md 1011, fols 114 and 119, 6 and 13 Mar. 1691 (addressee not noted). Ibid., cp Angleterre 178, fol. 45, Tallard to Torcy, 23 Mar. 1698. Ibid., md 1043, fol. 133, 14 Aug. 1697; Torcy informed François Henri be Montmorency-­Bouteville, duc de Luxembourg, that he had recommended his second son, Pierre-Henri de Montmorency-Luxembourg, known as Abbé de Luxembourg, for a post and urged that the abbé get to Paris quickly. Torcy, Journal, 184; aae md 1171, fol. 254, 1 Sept. 1710, concerning Crécyen-Brie; and ibid., 1197, fol. 18, 9 Jan. 1714, concerning Nantes. aae md 1032, fol. 271, Torcy to La Chaise, 1695, about a vacant abbey; and ibid., 1144, fol. 213, Torcy to Chamillart, 17 Nov. 1706, on a pension for a member of the Taras chapter.



Notes to pages 454–6

711

124 Ibid., 1017, fol. 220, 5 May 1692, for Guiscard’s appointments; ibid., 1731, fol. 4, Torcy to Lebret fils, extended his protection; and ibid., 1055, fol. 349v, lettre du roi to Bayonne, 1698. Ibid., 1016, fol. 147, Torcy to Le Camus, 15 Apr. 1692, on behalf of a man employed in Italy by Ambassador Rébenac and now in Paris in extremity, needing money and other help. 125 Ibid., 1175, fol. 201, Torcy to Pajot, 16 Dec. 1703, noted that Gramont was pushing hard for the post currently held by a former courier who did not actually serve. Ibid., 1144, fol. 80, Torcy to Harouys, 17 Oct. 1706. bn mf 8874, fol. 322, Torcy to Lebret, 24 Oct. 1702, noted that Burgundy supported a Marseille merchant’s request to be the exclusive supplier for a game known as mail or pale-mail, a mixture of boules and croquet. 126 aae md 1159, fol. 327, Torcy to Vauvré, 19 Dec. 1708; ibid., 1144, fol. 224, Torcy to Père Lescaut, 23 Nov. 1706; and bn mf 17431, fol. 73, Torcy to Harlay, 15 Jan. 1696. 127 aae cp Angleterre 262, fol. 287, d’Argenson to Torcy, 22 July 1714. 128 Hamilton, “John Law.” 129 Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1216–17. For a different approach, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 993–5. 130 Williams, Police, 9–10, 20–1. aae md 1170, fol. 103, Torcy to Delamare, 16 Apr. 1710, thanked him for a copy of the second volume of his treatise. 131 For the household secretaryship, see Barbiche, Institutions, 239–51. 132 Anderson, “Police of Paris,” 218 (quoting Jérôme Pontchartrain to d’Argenson, 22 Nov. 1700). 133 Examples of Torcy’s letters to La Reynie are aae md 1012, fol. 137, 4 Sept. 1691, involving a widow, letters in her possession, and a lettre de cachet to place her in the Bastille; and ibid., 1016, fol. 321, 17 Nov. 1692, on the arrest of a suspected spy. Pontchartrain’s opposition to La Reynie is explained in Chapman, Private Ambition, 74. 134 D’Argenson, Rapports inédits, 9, 63–7, 89–90, 195–6, 342. 135 On learning of d’Argenson’s suspicion of a provincial priest, Torcy thought he recalled that the same priest had visited him at Versailles claiming to have intelligence for the king about Austrian activities in Franche-Comté. Torcy ordered his arrest and interrogation (28 Sept. 1702). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:438–46. [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 2:24, lists a penniless wanderer arrested by Torcy in 1703 who first claimed to be a Protestant but then asked to convert. He was regarded as an enemy spy sent to stir the New Converts to rebellion. In aae cp Venise 152, fol. 173r–v, however, Torcy told d’Argenson he was convinced that the man the police chief identified as a spy was not one. 136 Torcy denounced (unauthorized) leaks but was apparently not above allowing them for his own purposes, if Lamberty is correct in tracing the

712

137 138

139

140 141 142 143

144

145 146 147 148

Notes to pages 456–7 source of a scurrilous gazette report about Carlos II’s wife in 1700 to one of Torcy’s commis. Lamberty, Mémoires, 1:114. Ravisson, Archives Bastille, 11:429–31. aae md 1137, fol. 20, Torcy to d’Argenson, 22 Jan. 1705, alerted him about Bellevaux, son of the Dinan maître de poste who aroused suspicion by his presence and conversations in Paris and the letters he received from Germany. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:228–36, adds that he was in Paris so often meeting with postal clerks that he was eventually arrested and put in the Bastille, despite his claim that Torcy would protect him. aae md 1187, fols 80ff, is the transcript of the interrogation of a Marseilles postal courier arrested 24 September 1712. A January 1699 incident shows that foreigners attracted suspicion even during peacetime. An Italian count who appeared at Versailles, although clearly a man of quality, nonetheless horrified those who heard him speak loquaciously about his scandalous life. He mingled with courtiers in the king’s apartments, but Louis, offended that he had not been formally presented and that his clothes and mustaches were “foreign,” ordered his arrest. He was caught near Torcy’s apartments, allegedly seeking his favour. Although he was himself unarmed, the large arms cache and papers found in his lodgings caused further alarm. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:176–9. Williams, Police, 41. aae md 1175, fol. 14, Torcy to d’Argenson, 3 Sept. 1703, requests surveillance of a Hamburg merchant. Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 1–9. Funck-Brentano, Lettres de cachet, passim, lists the prisoners sent by Torcy. See also Cottret, Bastille à prendre, 35–50. See Williams, Police, 84–6, for the Robe courte (short robe), created in 1526. aae md 1186, fol. 63, 1 Feb. 1712. Further listings of his missions are in ibid., 1148, fol. 177, 19 June 1707; and ibid., 1187, fols 142–4, d’Argenson to Torcy, Nov. 1712. See also ibid., 1192, fols 118v–119, d’Argenson to Torcy, 23 Aug. 1713. Ibid., 1016, fol. 321, Torcy to La Reynie, 17 Nov. 1692, orders that a likely spy at the Jacobite court who stole letters from an Irish priest be taken there immediately. bn Clairambault 668, fol. 1687. See Williams, Police, 233–5; and Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 43–57, on these places of confinement. Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 11–30; and ibid., xi–xxxiii, discusses these myths. bn Clairambault 986, fols 6, 12–13, 32, 51, 70, 122, 134, 161, and passim to fol. 473. aae md 1118, fol. 284v, records that in 1703 the chevalier de Rosset was sent to the Bastille for having contact with Cevennes rebels. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:478–96, tells of the prince de la Riccia, a pro-Austrian Neapolitan noble arrested and transported to France in 1702 and imprisoned at Vincennes. Despite years of papal pleas, Riccia was released in 1713 only



149 150 151

152 153 154 155 156 157 158

Notes to pages 457–66

713

to please Queen Anne during the peace negotiations. Torcy kept a careful eye on his activities and mail during his incarceration. A Genoese serving the Duke of Lorraine went there in 1711 on suspicion of espionage but hanged himself after his first interrogation, which d’Argenson took as confirmation of their suspicions (ibid., 12:45–6). Another occupant, labeled a young libertine, was a banker’s Milanese kinsman and clerk who robbed him of a considerable sum [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 2:130. Legg, Prior, 290 (Prior to Jersey, 10 June 1699). Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 59–115, discusses myth and reality in both prisons. Kamen, Philip V, 61–2. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:94–117 (116 for Pontchartrain’s letter). The Imperial ambassador was only released at the end of 1703 and sent back to Portugal when Villeroy, captured earlier that year at Cremona, was released. Ibid., 105–6. Douen, Révocation à Paris, 2:540–50. Williams, Police, 41. For such a list, see aae cp Rome 326, fols 25–7 (Feb. 1689). aae md 1108, fol. 60, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 6 May 1702. bn mf 6658, fols 50v, 98, and 102v, letters of Pontchartrain to Torcy, early 1701. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 31, 47, 61–2. Genet-Rouffiac, “Jacobites in Paris,” 15–38.

Conclusion 1 Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, especially chap. 1 and pp. 72–5. 2 Tourmont noted that Mignon, who replaced him as premier commis, was expressly forbidden to write to any of the king’s diplomats abroad. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:165. Illness, however, forced Croissy to delegate increasingly to his clerks and his son. 3 aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 214r–v, for example, is a 1699 draft letter to a foreign ambassador that Torcy completely rewrote; and ibid., 74, fols 41–51, is a 6 May 1700 letter from the king to Villars that he extensively corrected and revised. 4 Hurt, Louis XIV Parlements, insists upon the “authoritarian core” of Louis XIV’s rule that he contends has been underestimated by those who emphasized the elements of conciliation and cooperation with provincial authorities. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, offers a balanced revision to “revisionism,” suggesting that while Louis XIV’s “willingness to collaborate and compromise” with provincial elites helps account for the success of his rule, he did so as “the dominant partner in this relationship” (178). Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 60, observe that “although bureaucratic relationships contain

714

Notes to pages 468–9

more than coercion … at the end of the day bureaucracies are an ordering of power.” Breen, Law, 135–7, 148–50, demonstrates that from 1668 Dijon’s avocats became less active participants in municipal government and were instead “reduced to little more than local agents of the expanding administrative monarchy, responsible primarily for putting into effect decisions made” by the royal council, the intendant, and the governor. Additionally, “mid-level notables” lost a voice in municipal governance as the local political elite narrowed. At the same time, local elites were increasingly squeezed financially to replenish a royal treasury increasingly drained by war. 5 aae cp Suède 133, fol. 68r–v, 26 Aug. 1715, circular letter from Torcy to ambassadors. 6 Just months before his death, the ailing cardinal shared with the English that he was working to ensure that the regent did not choose Torcy as his successor. Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 3:470. 7 Ibid., 2:311, 314. 8 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 346–7. 9 Petitfils, Régent, 578, 599. Cf., Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:319–20, who says that the regent won Torcy over to his policy of war on Spain in 1719. Wiesener sees as surprising and disingenuous Torcy’s defence of the regent’s policy as an extension of the Sun King’s post-Utrecht balancing diplomacy aimed at maintaining the peace. He also notes the striking similarity between Torcy’s discourse in the Regency Council and the public defence of the unpopular policy written on Dubois’s behalf by Fontenelle, whose pen Dubois frequently employed. He then asks who inspired whom (ibid., 320). Wiesener too narrowly identifies Torcy with the old court faction and fails to appreciate his pragmatism and moderation. Leclercq, Histoire, 1:519, does the same and with Pecquet as well, based on what Dubois was hearing from his nephew (ibid.; and ibid., 2:1, which is at odds, however, with Pecquet’s behaviour, as in ibid., 8). Dupilet, Régence absolue, 143, however, calls Torcy a neutral among the Regency’s factions who only appeared to be of the old court because of his former function and his family ties. For international relations during 1720–21, see McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 110–11, ­117–23. In September 1719 Stair met with the regent, secretly on Dubois’s behalf, to urge him to dismiss Torcy as a threat to his control of foreign affairs, but to no avail (ibid., 3:140–3). Stair recounted the meeting to James Craggs the Younger, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in a letter of 23 September 1719. Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, ­2:594–6. See ss-Coirault, 7:863–5, for Saint-Simon’s description of the manner of Torcy’s dismissal – unsavoury on the part of Dubois, but generous on that of the regent – and his own refusal to help Dubois implement it. 10 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 97–8, 101, 105–6, 126, 132–3, 137–9, 142, 145, 148, 150–4.



Notes to pages 469–70

715

11 Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, 2:595 (italics added; Stair to Craggs, 23 Sept. 1719). 12 Ibid., 590 (Stair to Craggs, 9 Sept. 1719). 13 Cortada, “Information Ecosystems,” 247.

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Index

Note: The letter f following a page number indicates a figure, the letter n a note, and the letter t a table. absolutism: debate over, 3–4, 37; and Louis XIV, 20–2, 25–7, 36–7, 480– 1n28, 543n30, 543n31; as social collaboration, 20, 488n112, 610n172 Académie: française, 193, 220, 329, 571n112, 571–2n113; des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 134, 220; royal des sciences, 345 Académie politique, 7, 11, 181, 196f5.8, 280, 663–4n53; and conférence de méthode, 369; creation of, 327–9, 367, 667n97; curriculum of, 330, 367, 369–70; expenses of, 294t7.6, 311t7.9, 313, 551n113, 637n113; legacy of, 15–16, 369–70; and professionalization of diplomacy, 365–70; students and faculty of, 263, 275, 646n47 accumulation (cumul): of ministerial attributes/functions, 24, 27, 64, 211– 12, 226, 373, 433, 491n142, 544n38, 590n8; of offices by foreign office personnel, 31–2, 41, 268, 316–17 acquits, 581n182; as department expense, 286, 305; and ­domestic

­ ureau, 167t4.1, 207; to foreign b office personnel, 305, 309–13, 312t7.10, 318–19; lists of, 570n107, 572n119, 573n124, 578n159, 580n171, 590n5, 600–1n85, 627n319, 627n321, 627–8n322, 628n325; patents, 639n133 Adam, Clair, 194, 200, 202, ­264–6, 268, 310, 510n193, 574n125, 615n210, 615n218, 649n67; connections of, 211, 258, 264, 266, 318, 583n192, 583n193; and daughter Charlotte Michelle (m. Jacques Le Diacre), 616n222; duties of, ­154–60, 172f5.1, 183, 189–90, 196f5.8, 201, 203–7, 211, 216, 264–6, 277, 279, 283–4, 302, 314, 331–2, 439, 451, 466, 548n74, 550n99, 554n155, 565n73, 576–7n143, 577n146, 577n152, 578n159, 578n161, 579n163, 579n166, 579n169, 580n171, 580n174, 580–1n177, 581n181, 581n183, 582n186, 582n189, 582–3n190, 583n190, 616n220, 625n302, 629n8,

774 Index 639n142, 654n148, 702n16; family of, 154–5, 159, 264, 266, 283, 316; marc d’or, 588n231; offices and honours of, 176t5.1, 227t6.1, 283–4, 317, 590n5; as premier commis, 175, 176t5.1, 203–5, 311t7.9, 558n21, 578n158, 578n159, 580n171, 590n5, 618n232; and Regency, 276, 311t7.9, 470, 615n210, 616n221, 623–4n294, 637n118; residences of, 264–6, 318, 549n93, 590n3, 615n210, 615n211; rewards to, 258, 264–5, 307t7.8, 311, 312t7.10, ­313–15, 316, 316t7.11, 318, 555n165, 579n166, 580n171, 583n191, 629n9, 630n11, 637n115, 639n140, 639n142, 640n155, 641n164; and Royal Orders, 586n216, 641n164; as treasurer of ambassadors, 196f5.8, 266, 316–17, 629n10 Adam, Jean-Baptiste, 172f5.1, 266, 311t7.9, 312t7.10, 637n118 Adam, Nicolas, 616n222, 654n148 Aguesseau, Henri d’, 384, 622n281 Alègre, Yves, marquis d’, 290t7.4, 402, 404–5, 407–9, 682n190, 684n202, 684–5n204, 685n205, 685n207, 694n305 Alexander VIII (pope), 61–2, 66 ambassadors. See diplomats Amelot, Michel, marquis de Gournay, 67, 184t5.2, 288t7.1, 362–4, 416, 418, 664–5n65 Amonio, Dominique, 299, 634n69 Ancezune, Françoise-Félicité Colbert, marquise d’, 56, 60, 69, 496–7n26, 499n71, 500n78, 505n150 ancien régime (old regime), 4, 40, 152, 480n27, 481n35, 487n94, 489n114, 562n53, 638n122; affinities of modern state with, 33, 489n118 André, Louis, 69, 102

Annat, Père François, 567n83, 568–9n95 Anne, Queen (of Great Britain), 42, 256, 292, 341, 419, 658n192, 713n148 Anneville, Pierre Rossignol d’, 184t5.2, 290t7.4, 351–2 Antin, Louis Antoine de Gondrin de Pardallan, duc d’, 82, 259, 276, 612n188 appointements (remuneration), 601n89; to agents, 182; to central administration personnel, 306t7.8, ­309–10, 313, 638n128; to consuls, 255; to diplomats, 283, 287, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289–90t7.3, 291, 293t7.5, 296, 301, 566n81, 629n8, 631n24, 631n28; to embassy personnel, 301; to provincial officials, 302–3, 630n21 apprenticeship (also tutelage), 23, 144, 148, 243, 345, 466; of clerk, 173, 263, 465–6; of Croissy, 50; of diplomats, 367; of Torcy, 17–18, 51–69, 72–7, 93, 134, 137, 367, 461–2, 496–7n26, 497n33, 498n56, 500n79, 503n115; of Voysin, 512n206 Arabic, 222, 256, 275 archduke. See Charles, Archduke of Austria archives, foreign office, 169, 181; access to, 175; additions to, 323, 330– 3, 570n107; and Baluze, 88; and ­Clément, 321–4; and Colbert, 51, 321–2, 462; contents of, 152–3, 158– 9, 165, 321–5, 386, 553n151; and Correspondance politique (aae cp), 566n78, 574–5n128; Croissy’s creation of, 11, 50, 322–7, 462, 643n27; and destruction of papers, 550n103; and Mémoires et Documents (aae md), 566n78, 574–5n128, 647n51; in minister’s Paris residence, 321–4, 644n33, 649n65; move to Louvre



Index 775

of, 279, 644n33, 648n63, 649n65; organization of, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 279, 322–4, 566n78, 574–5n128, 643n19, 644n30, 644n32, 644n34, 644–5n35, 647n51, 648n59, 649n66; personnel of, 16, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 263, 279–80, 311t7.9; purposes and uses of, 367–8, 642n9, 647n52, 647n58, 659n4; and Torcy, ­326–30, 462, 467, 477n28, 500–1n89, 563n58, 647n51, 649n65; Torcy purchases maps for, 57; at Versailles, 324–5, 648n63. See also Académie politique; files; paperwork; propaganda; Saint-Prest archives, ministerial, 11, 64; household and navy, 648n65; of Nantes, 649n74; of Orange, 673n80; and Regency, 148; of war, 423 Argenson, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’, 529n115, 536n196, 599n71; and censorship, 333, 338, 651–2n107; and foreign office staff, 273–4, 582n189, 612n193, 626n307, 645n38, 657n178; and papers and collections, 330, 332; and post office, 347, 584n202, 626n307, 656n175, 712n138; and prisons and prisoners, 443, 457, 578n155, 704n51, ­712–13n148; and propaganda, 336, 340; and work with Torcy policing Paris, 203, 455–6, 459, 578n157, 698n367, 704n56, 706n77, 706n81, 711n135, 712n140 Ariste, Pierre, 172f5.1, 187, 188f5.4, 330, 565n75, 566n82, 567n83, 567n84 aristocracy. See nobility Arnauld family, 78, 91, 108, 190, 506n154, 566–7n83; and Louis XIV, 594n36, 642n10

arrêt, 87, 442–3, 449, 480n27, 702n16; and clerks, 167t4.1, 325, 437–40, 554n155, 572–3n120, 582n185 Asfeld, Abbé Étienne Bidal d’, 57, 289t7.3 asiento, 120, 223, 430 aubaine, droit d’, 315, 582n189, 640n145 Aubert (premier commis), 227t6.1, 276–7; as bureau chief, 177, 202; in domestic bureau, 580–1n177, 582n186; as “Jacques” Aubert, 276– 7, 624n299, 624n300; and passports, 202–3, 207, 276; as premier commis, 172f5.1, 175, 176t5.1, 190, 194, 202, 558n21, 572n119, 577n152, 578n158, 624n297, 624n298; rewards to, 312t7.10, 313, 315, 624n298, 639n140 Aubespine, l’. See Châteauneuf audiences, 40, 90, 355–60, 457; in Cabinet, 41–3, 116, 356, 678n152; Croissy and control of, 509n181; extraordinary, 357; farewell (de congé), 121, 360; and foreign office personnel with king, 240; foreign secretary and domestic, 441, 452; of foreign secretary for diplomats, 45, 89, 107, 151, 355, 359–60, 380, 512n215, 559n26, 573n123, 662n34; foreign secretary’s notes on, 202, 360, 662n42, 663n46; and French diplomatic personnel abroad, 124, 255, 351, 531n141; of French diplomats with king, 157; incognito, 356–7; ministerial, 39, 140; for nuncios, 507n161, 560n37, 659n15; particulières (particular audiences), 356; première (first), 117, 356, 531n141; protocol and, 10, 357–8, 661n27; records of royal, 358–9, 659n12; in royal bedchamber, 217, 356, 659n15;

776 Index and royal display, 354–5; secretes (secret), 356; Torcy and royal, 123, 355, 422, 517n288, 538n230, 659n7; Torcy’s while abroad, 51–62, 500n83 Audiffret, Jean Baptiste d’, 113, 184t5.2, 287, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 334, 336, 528n97, 650n91, 651n104 Augustus I, elector of Saxony, and Augustus II, king of Poland-Lithuania (“the Strong”) (also August II of Saxony-Poland), 104, 113–15 Aumont, Louis Marie Victor, duc d’, 118, 302 Austria: ambassadors to France of, 134, 549n91, 659n7; diplomacy after Rastadt of, 469, 700n383; and espionage, 85, 182, 259, 334–5, 350–1, 697n356, 704n56, 711n135; French diplomats in, 82, 121, 124– 6, 147, 263, 267, 287, 292, 394, 663n51, 664n61, 700n383; imperial court of, 490–1n141, 534n180; and Nine Years War and peace negotiations, 77, 94–106, 114, 521n24, 521n26, 521–2n28, 525n56; and partition negotiations, 107, 117– 32, 394, 444, 522n31, 529n112, 530–1n132, 534n179, 535n185, 536n197, 537n204, 537n208, 537– 8n215, 631n28; and Swiss troops, 297, 646n42; Torcy in, 58–9; and War of the Spanish Succession, 84–5, 92, 110, 199, 242, 255, 335, 401, 604n110, 676n131, 698n369, 712– 13n148; and War of the Spanish Succession peace negotiations, 341, 368–9, 392–428, 515n267, 534n179, 553n142. See also German states; Holy Roman Empire Austria, Anne of (queen of France), 230, 493n173

Avaux, Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’: and the Blondels, 252, 606n136; and Chamillart’s negotiations, 409–10, 413–16, 424–7, 678n143, 686n215, 686n221, 688n243, 688n244, 688–9n246, 689n249; and codes, 573n121, 575n139, 578n160; mission to Ireland of, 87; mission to Sweden of, 185t5.2; at Nijmegen, 236f6.2; and propaganda, 653n125; rewards to, 185t5.2, 288t7.1, 288t7.2; and Torcy’s travels, 56  avocat, 232–3, 243, 272–3, 279, 299, 328, 402, 595–6n44, 602n96, 653n135, 714n4; avocat du roi, 609n161, 616n222; avocat général, 233, 595n42 Azemart (secretary), 172f5.1, 188 Baden, Treaty of, 199, 263, 287, 292, 310, 352, 359, 614n207, 667n101 Bagnols, Dreux-Louis Dugué de, 404, 406, 416, 682–3n192, 694n308 Ballin, Claude, 300, 634n76 Baluze, Étienne (librarian), 50, 88, 219, 496n13, 496n16, 511n201, 517n284, 571n112, 579n165 Baluze, Jean Casimir (diplomat), 184t5.2, 288t7.1, 290t7.3 bankers, 487n106, 712–13n148; and clandestine activities and espionage, 156, 159, 182, 335, 348, 351, 446, 658n201; and connections with foreign office personnel, 250, 252, 259, 283, 316, 565n70, 605n122, 605n123; and embassies, 259, 296, 630n13; and foreign office, 261, 278, 282–3, 299, 306–8, 346, 582n189, 635n83; and passports, 202, 578n153; and Rome, 383; and subsidies, 278, 295; and Torcy, 303, 305–8, 383. See also finance



Index 777

Barbezieux, Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier de, 20; apprenticeship of, 66, 75–6, 512n206; and C ­ allières, ­100–1; clerks of, 575–6n140, 600n82; and facilitating diplomacy, 100; family of, 117 (uncle), 404, 506n154 (wife); and generals, 669n14; and ­Harcourt, 125, 677n134, 677n135; health of, 78; and negotiations, 393–4, 676n128, 676–7n133; nonminister status of, 70, 74, 375, 390, 511n199; opinions of, 133, 135, 486n83, 497n33; and propaganda, 79; rewards to, 637n113; rivalry with Torcy of, 3 ­ 94–5, 397; and Royal Orders, 214; as secrétaire-commis, 373–4; as ­survivancier, 63, 502n106, 702n19 Barillon d’Amoncourt, Paul, marquis de Branges, 61, 501n91 Bart, Jean, 103, 252, 606n134, 607n137, 607n139 Barthe (commis), 172f5.1, 188 Basnage, Jacques, 219, 221 Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand, electoral prince of, 79, 119–22, 128, 131, 254, 530n126, 532n147, 533n162, 536n196 Bayle, Pierre, 588n237; and Callières, 221; and Dalencé, 567n84; and Dubos, 218, 647n56; and Larroque, 218, 269–76, 620n254, 620n259, 620n260, 621n265, 622n274; and Leers, 337; and Renaudot, 587n225 Beauchamp, Antoine Faucard, sieur de, 245, 262. See also Marin, Jeanne-Marie Beauchamp, Antoine-François Faucard, sieur de, 172f5.1, 227t6.1, 245, 262, 311t7.9, 312t7.10, 313, ­347–8, 550n99, 613n198, 613–14n199,

637n118, 657n178; and wife ­Madeline Berthellier, 262 Beauchamp, François Faucard de, 262–3 Beauchamp, Jeanne-Benjamine-­ Angélique Faucard de (m. Jean ­Gabriel de La Porte du Theil), 262–3 Beauchamps, Gury Focard (Focart) de, 613n198; wife Clémence Pré, 613n198 Beauvillier, Paul, duc de Saint-Aignan and duc de: and Blondel, 251; and Chamillart, 411, 413, 426–7; and Chevreuse, 90, 403, 527–8n90, 586–7n219; and council meetings, 379–80, 382–4, 438, 448, 695n328; and differences with Croissy, 71, 80, 101, 135, 511n203; and differences with Torcy, 74, 90–3, 135, 382–4, 438, 510n195, 518n301, 673–4n91; and foreign office, 71–2; informants of, 376; lampoon of, 386; and loss of sons, 391; and Maintenon, 387, 390; marriage to Colbert’s daughter of, 90; as minister, 66, 71, 75, 90, 503n123, 509n181, 552n131, 579n165, 615n217; in Nine Years War peace faction, 71–2, 97, 509n182; and Noblet, 242, 601n86, 601n89; and Racine, 251; reconciles Croissy and Seignelay, 87; supports Desmaretz, 90; Torcy defends, 377, 670n29; and Torcy’s transition to secretary of state, 69, 71–2, 76, 114– 15, 509n183; and visiting princes, 357; in War of the Spanish Succession peace faction, 402, 519n315, 519n316, 689n253 Béchameil de Nointel, Louis, 208t5.3, 450, 704n59 Bécuau, Claude, sieur de Coulombe and des Réaux, 231–4, 593n31, 594n38

778 Index bedchamber, royal, 216; and audiences, 217, 356; and coucher, 119; debate over centrality of, 41–2, 494n183, 494n184; entrée, la première (the first entry) into, 586–7n219; household personnel of, 112, 118, 217, 494n184; and levee, 123, 356, 659n15 Bégon, Michel V, 210t5.3, 441–2 Beik, William, 20, 480–1n28, 490n124, 490n136 Belin, Abbé Jacques, 560n35, 623n289 Bély, Lucien, 20, 202, 354, 408, 426 Béraud, Françoise. See Croissy, Françoise Béraud, marquise de Béraud, Joachim de Croissy-en-Brie, 45, 48, 52 Bergeret, Jean-Louis: in Académie française, 193, 571–2n113; as cabinet secretary, 194, 216, 572n116; changes upon death of, 203–5, 245, 578n159; as Colbert client, 193; as expert, 221; family of, 193, 558n20, 572n118; in navy administration Metz parlement, 193, 571n112; and papers, 87, 643n25; as premier commis, 54, 64, 172f5.1, 194, 195f5.7, 571n110, 572–3n120, 573n121, 573n122, 578n158; rewards to, 311, 312t7.10, 624n298, 640n155; work with Croissy of, 181, 193–4, 323 Bergeyck, Jan van Brouchoven, Count of, 350; and Chamillart’s negotiations, 422–3, 425–7, 693n297, 693n298, 693n299, 693n300; on Dutch assessment of French defences, 687n226; in navy administration peace negotiations, 408, 422 Bernage, Jean-Nicolas, sieur de SaintIlliers, 172f5.1, 278–80, 311t7.9; in navy administration codes, 576– 7n143, 627n316; in Pecquet’s

bureau, 279, 311t7.9, 637n118; rewards to, 312t7.10, 313; wedding of, 279–80, 563n57, 574n125, 625n303 Bernard, Samuel, 259, 261, 307–8, 335, 612n193, 626n311, 632n41, 635–6n92 Bernières, Maignart de, 421–2, 687–8n234 Berry, Charles, duc de, 145, 216, 274, 293, 293t7.5, 438, 530–1n132, 647n52 Berwick, James Fitz James Stuart, Duke of: and Chamillart, 420–1, 538– 9n231, 692n289; and Marlborough, 420–1; and Portand, 117–18; in Spain, 679n158; and Torcy, 420–1, 634n81, 680n168 Besenval, Jean Victor, baron de, 290t7.4, 548n72, 548n73, 553n142, 553n146 Bidal, Benoît, baron d’Asfeld, 66, 265 Bigorre, Abbé, 172f5.1, 189–90 Birkenfeld (Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld), Chrétien de Bavière II, Count ­Palatine and Prince of, 297, 385 Blainville, Jules-Armand Colbert, marquis de, 87–9, 117, 391, 517n282, 659n10, 691n280 Blécourt, Jean-Denis, marquis de, 289t7.3, 394, 676–7n133 Blenheim (Höchstadt), battle of, 87, 391, 401 Blondel, Catherine-Charlotte (m. Joseph Richard), 243, 256, 602n96, 609n161 Blondel, François (mathematics professor), 563–4n62, 614n203 Blondel, Louis, sieur d’Azincourt, 243, 602n96; wife Elisabeth Clopet, 243, 245 Blondel, Louis-Augustin, 182, 263, 563–4n62



Index 779

Blondel, Marie (m. Gabriel de La Porte du Theil), 245, 262, 609n161, 614n203 Blondel, Paul, sieur d’Azincourt, 602n96, 607n140; and Bonrepaus, 250, 605n124, 607n138; and finance, 243, 252, 606n136; in navy administration, 252–4, 606n133, 607n138, 607n139; in navy administration wife (first) Catherine Mabille, 252; widow of, 607n139; and wife (second), Ludwine-Charlotte-Louise Van Der Mersch, 252, 606n134 Blondel de Gagny, Joseph, 243, 245, 602n96, 611n176; and Bâtiments, 260, 605n124, 612n187, 612n188, 612n190; and Bonrepaus, 250, 604n115; as consul and ambassadorial secretary, 248–50, 255, 257; and Ferriols, 253–4, 611n182; and finance, 253, 260–1, 605n124, 607n140, 609n161, 611n182; as munitionnaire, 252–3, 257; in navy administration, 250, 252, 605n118; and wife Marie-Madeleine de ­Ferriol, 249 Blondel de Jouvancourt, Charles-­ François, 243, 602n96, 604–5n117; children of, 611n176; as Ferriol’s agent in France, 259, 609n159, ­611–12n182, 612n193; as ­Ferriol’s secretary and consular chancellor, 253–6, 258, 260; and finance, 612n188; and marriage connection with Gleise family, 610–11n175, 611–12n182; in navy administration, 210t5.3, 253–4, 259, 261, 608–9n154, 610–11n175, 611n181; and wife Magdelaine Gleise, 258, 611n175 Blondel de Vaucresson, François, sieur de Cueilly and later comte de

S­ issonne, 172f5.1, 176t5.1, 194, 210t5.3, 243, 261–2, 602n96, 609n161, 612n188, 637n118; and bankers, 612n193; and Bâtiments, 260, 317, 612n186; and ­Bonrepaus, 68, 205, 216, 245, 250– 1, 565n70, 573n121, 576n141, 586n218, 603n100, 605n122, 605n123, 605n124, 607n138, 629n8, 640n157; children of, 261, 613n195; and codes, 201, 563n61, 576n141; and connections with navy, 245–6, 248, 253–6, 258– 9, 438–9, 609n159; and Croissy family, 243–5, 254–5; as crown auditor, 645–6n39; and department finances, 182, 278, 283, 308, 564n67, 564n68, 565n71; and diplomatic papers, 649n75; and favours to kin and clients, 181–2, 256, 262–3, 278, 614n207; and ­Ferriols, 249, 254–7, 264–5, 609n159, 611– 12n182; and friends among ambassadors, 548n73; as link to fiscalfinancial and military-­industrial complexes, 467; as Marseille’s lobbyist, 211, 257–9, 610n169, 610– 11n175; offices, 216, 227t6.1, 245, 260–1, 312t7.10, 317, 581n183, 586n218, 603n100, 640n157; and passports, 202, 577n146; as premier secrétaire, 177, 181–2, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 262, 311t7.9, 558n23, 563n61, 563–4n62, 564n64, 564n65, 572–3n120, 579n169, 602–3n97, 662n34; and propaganda, 653n124; and relationship with Torcy, 245; residences of, 261, 590n3, 610n169, 613n194; rewards to, 261, 312t7.10, 313, 315–16, 586n218, 603n100, 640n157; and wife Jeanne-Marie Marin (m. first to Antoine Faucart de

780 Index Beauchamp), 245, 256, 262, 565n70, 602–3n97, 603n98, 613n194, 613n198 Blondel family, 243–64 Bolingbroke, Henry St John, 1st Viscount, 85, 90, 267, 349, 360, 421, 423, 432–3, 517n296, 535n184, 634n71, 658n193, 675n100 Bombarda, Jean-Paul, 295, 632n45 Bonnac, Jean-Louis d’Usson, marquis de, 109–10, 184–5t5.2, 363; history of ambassadors to Constantinople of, 254, 608–9n154; rewards to, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 630n10; subsidies and gifts through, 278, 296, 301, 633n51, 634n76; as Torcy’s advisor, 115 Bonneuil, Michel Chabenate de, 118, 357, 508n178, 589n245, 659n10, 661n26, 661–2n28 Bonrepaus, François d’Usson de, 362–3, 605n121; and Adam, 203– 4, 565n73; and the Blondels, 126, 216, 245, 250–3, 564n64, 565n70, 586n218, 603n100, 604n115, 605n122, 605n123, 605n124, 606n133, 607n138, 629n8, 640n157; and codes, 576n141, ­576–7n143; complains about Mignon’s bureau, 203–5, 573n121; and J-B Racine, 251–2; mission to Denmark of, 104, 184–5t5.2, 351, 564n66; mission to United Provinces of, 113, 121, 334–5, 523n43, 534n183; as reader to the king, ­586–7n219; rewards to, 288t7.2, 565n70; and Torcy, 68, 77, 107, 109, 115 Bontemps, Alexandre, 40, 250, 586n216, 606n125 Bossuet, Abbé Louis, 506n118, 560n36, 564n65, 599n75

Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne (bishop of Meaux): and absolutism, 36; and Fénelon, 91; and foreign office staff, 240, 273, 564n65, 599n75, 618n232, 622n279, 706–7n83, 707n87; and Leibniz, 142, 543n28, 622n279; and Protestants, 142, 272, 504–5n139, 543n28; and Torcy, 67–8, 142, 338, 449, 504–5n139, 543n28, 599n75, 709n111 Boucherat, Louis, 193, 384, 558n20, 571n112, 572n118 Bouchu, Étienne-Jean, 183, 277, 445, 448 Boufflers, Louis François, duc de: and Chamillart, 427; and military couriers, 87–8; and Portland embassy, 117; and Prévost, 266; and Ryswick negotiations, 77, 105–6; and Torcy, 422, 687–8n234; Voysin’s tutelage under, 512n206 Bouillon, Emmanuel Théodose de La Tour d’Auvergne (cardinal), 50, 113, 240, 325, 379, 382, 448, 599n75 Boulleau, Nicolas, 172f5.1, 188 bourgeoisie, 442, 490n120, 493n179, 653n135, 704n58; clerks from, 280– 1, 309; diplomats from, 362; trades of, 10, 228, 237–8 Bourke, Toby, 349, 399, 634n81, 679n159, 697n356 Bouzols, Joachim de Montaigu, marquis de, 69, 81–2, 113, 514n245, 675n100, 691n280 Bouzols, Mme de. See Croissy, MarieFrançoise Colbert de, marquise de Bouzols Bracciano, Marie-Anne de La Trémoille, Duchess of. See Ursins, princesse d’ brain trust. See Torcy Brameret, Bénigne, 172f5.1, 280–1, 628n330



Index 781

Breteuil, Louis Nicolas, baron de, 358– 9, 660n20, 662n32 Brienne, Henri-Auguste Lomenie, comte de: and consuls, 246; department of, 323, 330–1, 570n107; diplomatic papers from and Lionne, 16, 72–3, 77, 566n79; and Michel Le Tellier, 603n105; and navy and colonial affairs, 188f5.4, 246–7, 566n79, 603n105; organization of, 187–8, 188f5.4, 565n75, 566n79, 566–7n83; personnel of, 172–3f5.1, ­173–5, 187–8, 313, 566–7n83, 575n137 Brienne, Louis-Henri Lomenie, comte de (Brienne the Younger), 73, 187, 192, 566n79, 566n81, 566n82, 566–7n83 Brihuega, battle of, 275, 392, 671n39 Briord, Gabriel, comte de, 103, 112– 13, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 405, 524n44, 682–3n192 Bromfield, William, 65, 446, 706n81 Brunet, Paul-Etienne, seigneur de Rancy, 303, 305, 514–15n256 bureaucracy, 1–13, 50, 89, 483n54, 485n71, 541n9, 713–14n4; and clerks, 43–4, 268, 281; and court, 492n155, 494n184; and delegating, 180–1; and diplomacy, 396; future of, 475n2; and geography, 158, 162, 352; and hierarchy, 22t1.1, 23–5, 31, 42, 141, 171, 177–8, 212, 260, 435, 452, 550n105; and information, 476n12, 476n16, 485n75, 486n83; of Louis XIV, 18–43, 72, 315, 375, 435–6, 439–40, 460–1, 470–1; and modernity, 8, 465–6, 488n110, 502n103; and networks, 211–12, 217, 225; and professionalism, 226, 251, 370, 489n119; routinization, 22–3, 40, 168, 470, 483n54, 484n61,

485n71, 700n3; and theory, 14, 21–36, 223–4, 281, 482n42, 482n43, 484n61, 488n111; Torcy and, 15–16, 19, 35, 93, 132, 138–9, 151–2, 433– 4, 459 bureaus: additional political, 171, 561n48, 565n74; and bureau chief, 173, 177, 180–1, 202, 466, 557n9, 561n47; and centralization, 38–40, 42, 465–6, 486n84; changing meanings of, 180; Croissy’s division of, 194, 203–4, 463–4; debate over division into, 179–81, 187–8, 189f5.5, 190–1, 211, 560–1n43, 561n44, 561n48, 562–3n56, 563n57, 563n59; domestic, 164, 181, 187–8, 206–11, 465, 567–8n86; location of Torcy’s, 169, 171, 245, 265, 324–5; and restructuring under Torcy, 194–201, 203–11, 464–7; routinization in, 72–3, 149–50, 168, 175, 324, 360, 370, 375, 435, 438–54; two political, 16, 159, 164, 169, 179, 181–7, 191–6, 198–201, 203, 205–6, 464–6, 553n147, 558n22, 561n47, 574n125, 581n180, 582n186, 583n190 Burgundy, Duke of, 135; cabal of, 82, 92, 510n195; and Conseil, 92, 379, 382, 438; death of, 293t7.5, 400, 438; difficulties as commander, 388, 420, 650n85; and Dispatches, 438, 702n18; and Fénelon, 90, 92, 386; intendants’ reports for, 709n104; intercession with Torcy of, 711n125; and Marlborough-Berwick negotiations, 420–1; and post office horses, 213, 584n205; son of, 168; and Torcy’s family, 85, 278; and Torcy’s staff, 227t6.1, 242–3, 274, 278, 553n140, 639n141, 655n154, 691n280. See also Burgundy, MarieAdelaide of Savoy, Duchess of

782 Index Burgundy, Marie-Adelaide of Savoy, Duchess of, 293t7.5, 633n61; audiences of, 360; journey to France, 98; marriage of, 87, 98; and Torcy, 454 Burnet, Gilbert (bishop of Salisbury), 142, 219 Bussi, Giovanni, 404, 682n189 Buys, Willem, negotiator, 221, 426; negotiation work with Heinsius of, 403–4, 406–7; on Torcy’s Jacobitism, 680n168 cabals, 82, 91–2, 272; Bayle’s alleged pro-French, 391, 452, 620n261; Gleise, 212, 257–9, 451, 610n173, 610n175. See also Conseil; courts, royal Cabinet du roi (king’s Cabinet), 15, 36–8, 40–3, 60, 216, 245; audiences in, 117, 121, 267, 356–8, 678n152, 687n233; Conseil meetings in, 379; huissiers de la chambre (ushers of the chamber) of, 216, 586n217; individual work with king in, 440; valets in, 494n184 Cabinet noir, 212, 345–6, 352, 655n160, 670n27 cabinet secretaries (secrétaires du Cabinet), 10, 42, 89, 194, 216–17, 494n189, 494n190, 586–7n219; and formularies, 554–5n161; la plume, 42, 494n190; secrétaire de la main, 42; Torcy’s clerks as, 572n116 “Cabinet strategy,” 400, 479n19, 680n166 cae. See Council of Foreign Affairs Callières, François de: and Académie politique, 667n97; and ­Beauvillier and Chevreuse, 509n182, 586– 7n219, 689n253; as cabinet secretary, 216–17, 494–5n190; and Croissy, 54; diplomatic treatise by,

17–18, 366–7, 663n51; on diplomats and diplomacy, 323, 363, 366– 8, 679n156, 683n195; disparaged by Chamillart’s negotiators, 413–14, 424, 678n143; as expert, 221, 366; and Jacobites, 400–1; on Louvois, 520n5; and marquise d’Huxelles, 521n17, 524n54; mission to Lorraine of, 113, 130; and negotiations to end Nine Years War, 76, 95–106, 175, 522n34, 522n35; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 402–3, 406, 409, 413–14, 419, 424, 685n205, 685n207, 686n221, 688–9n246, 689n249, 693n295; and patronage, 54; and Poland, 524n52; and Renaudot, 523n42; rewards to, 288t7.1; and Torcy, 133, 362, 667n95, 688–9n246. See also Mollo, Francisco Cambolas, Ange de, 296, 542n26 Campredon, Jacques de, 290t7.4, 292 Cany, Michel II Chamillart, marquis de, 63, 675n109 capitation, 317–18, 344 Carlos II, king of Spain, 444; diplomatic missions to, 113; Louis XIV’s acceptance of testament of, 55, 131–2, 374, 395, 513n235, 538n220; negotiations to partition succession of, 85, 99, 107, 117–32, 241, 525n56; news of his death, 214, 394–5; other testaments of, 530n126, 531–2n145; Torcy’s audience with, 54–5. See also Maria-Anna of Neuburg, dowager queen of Spain; Marie-Louise d’Orléans, Queen (of Spain); succession, Spanish Carlowitz, Peace of, 128, 255 Catinat, Nicolas de, 125, 453, 676n128 censorship, 11, 272, 320, 333–40, 443, 467



Index 783

centralization, 480n23; and absolutism, 14, 19, 37; and codes, 200; and Louis XIV, 33, 37–8, 43, 140, ­143–4, 338, 443, 490n136; and modern state, 21–36, 29f1.1, 460–1, 486n84, 491n148; and post office, 345 ceremonial. See diplomatic ceremonial; courts, royal ceremonies: grand master of, 87, 117, 228, 232, 358, 660n23, 661n25; master of, 88–9, 98, 274, 358, 587n220, 650n10 Chamber of Justice, 261, 299 Chambre des comptes, 318, 642–3n13, 704n58; archives of, 330, 647n51; audits by, 316t7.11, 630n11; and domestic administration, 448, 545n46; foreign office personnel and, 189, 221, 227t6.1, 240, 262, 268, 280, 317, 580n173, 603n100, 614n200, 618n238, 628n330 Chamillart, Michel, 20, 394; on Conseil, 75, 375, 379, 390; as controller general, 89–90, 211, 418; cumul of, 90, 211, 372, 423, 436; and deference to secretaries of state in many domestic matters, 436; and Dussen-Bergeyck negotiations, 421–7; and fall from power, 63–4, 396, 417, 426–8; and Helvétius’s negotiations, 402–8, 411– 12, 416–17; and intelligence from Torcy, 445; and list of expenditures, 285–6, 293; and ­Maintenon, 386, 389–90; as negotiator, 398–9, 410– 11, 415–16, 420, 423–6; and rivalry with Torcy, 217, 372 390, 396–9, 413, 417, 433, 461; and secret negotiations of 1706, 396–7, 409–16, 419–20, 422, 424–7; and 1708 Berwick-­Marlborough negotiation, 420–1; and Spain, 90, 396–9; survivancier of, 63; as war secretary, 88, 90

Chamilly, François Bouton, comte de, 111, 184–5t5.2, 288t7.2, 289t7.3 Chamlay, Jules-Louis Bolé de: and Chamillart, 687n233; and diplomacy, 676n131, 694n314; as royal advisor, 75–6, 373–4, 400 Chamoy, Louis Rousseau de: in brain trust, 221, 366–7; L’Idée du Parfait Ambassadeur of, 366, 526n71; mission to Ratisbon of, 108, 184t5.2, 334, 366, 660n22; and Pomponne, 366; rewards to, 289t7.3; as Torcy’s tutor, 330 chancellor: on Conseil, 379–80; in Dispatches, 146; duties and powers of, 12, 141, 147, 338, 435–7, 439, 455, 507n162, 649n67; office of, 140. See also Grand Chancellery chapels and chaplains (almoners), 448; at French embassy, 289t7.3, 290t7.3, 292, 301, 350, 363, 458, 529n115, 632n38, 665n69, 665n70, 665n73; at garrisons, 286, 294t7.6, 303, 445; in households, 85, 178 Charles, Archduke of Austria (later Emperor Charles VI), 84; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 402, 406–9, 415, 537n208, 684n197; and partition negotiations, 120–4, 128–31, 533n162, 537n208; and propaganda, 335; return from Spain of, 351, 698n369 Charles XI, King (of Sweden), 58, 77, 99, 101 Charles XII, King (of Sweden), 83, 104, 110–11, 163; Besneval’s mission to, 548n72, 553n142, 553n146; embassy of comte de Croissy to, 287 Chartres, duc de. See Orléans Châteauneuf, Balthazar Phélypeaux, marquis de, 437, 505–6n151;

784 Index rewards to, 637n113; at war front, 66, 503n123 Châteauneuf, Charles de l’Aubespine, sieur, baron, and marquis de, 228– 32, 234; heirs, 591n22 Châteauneuf, Abbé François de Castagnéry: and friendship with Torcy, 111, 115; mission to Poland of, 112 Châteauneuf, Pierre-Antoine de ­Castagnéry, marquis de: diplomatic missions of, 111–12, 184t5.2, 249, 253–5; domestics of, 665n70; as part of Torcy’s inner circle, 115; rewards to, 290t7.4, 292 Châtelet. See Paris Chaulnes, Charles Albert d’Ailly, duc de, 61, 66, 449, 501n98 Chauvelin, Germain Louis de, 16, 333, 479n7, 616n225 Chevreuse, Charles-Honoré d’Albert, duc de: and Beauvillier, 403; and Blondel, 251; and criticism of ­Chamillart, 425; and Desmaretz, 90; and disagreement with Croissy and Torcy, 80, 101, 511n203; and Fénelon, 91–3, 387, 424, 518n303, 519n315; and Hooke, 154, 157– 8, 401; and marriage to Colbert’s daughter, 90; and opinion of Torcy, 92, 135, 424, 511n203; and peace party, 402, 586–7n219, 689n253; and Racine, 251; as unofficial royal advisor, 90, 373 chivalric orders. See Royal Orders Choiseul, Auguste, duc de, 98, 705n62 Choisy, Abbé François Timoléon de, 193, 195f5.7 Christian V, King (of Denmark), 56–7, 499n69 church and clergy: and appointments to, 259, 383, 447–8, 580–1n177, 665n69; and Assembly of the Clergy,

65, 82, 286, 382, 384; in conquests and during wartime, 142–3, 360, 383, 404, 431, 456, 542n24, 542n25, 657n183, 711n135, 712n144; and criminals, 442–3, 457; danger to clergy as diplomats, 98; and doctrinal disputes, 116, 386–7, 389, 450, 518n304; and ecclesiastics as royal officials, 8, 86, 141; and family of foreign office personnel in, 238, 593n31; foreign office domestic supervision of, 12, 16, 66–7, 134–5, 146–7, 168, 189f5.5, 190, 206, 208– 10t5.3, 294t7.6, 374, 383, 436, 438– 9, 442, 446–52, 447t11.1, 501n98, 504–5n139, 517n287, 555n163, 566–7n83, 572–3n120, 702n16, 702n25, 707n87, 707n90, 708n93, 708n97, 709n106, 709n111, 710n115; and foreign office measures dealing with monastics, 278, 383, 431, 449, 542n26, 629n8, 697– 8n363, 707n90, 708n99; and household secretary, 672n74; and Jesuits, 50, 74, 88, 91, 271, 273, 337, 345, 381, 386, 390, 404, 433, 518n301, 518n303, 566–7n83, 568–9n95, 619–20n252; and local governance, 93, 440–1, 446; Maintenon’s patronage of, 86, 386–7, 390, 610n169; and parish priests, 440, 449; and passports, 202; as patrons of foreign office personnel, 238, 273, 279, 317; regale, 240, 286; and royal councils, 92, 374, 382–4, 438–9; and royal propaganda, 341, 653n133; secretaries of state and patronage of, 82, 88, 139, 189f5.5, 190, 299, 382–3, ­446–8, 453–4, 616n221, 706n82, 706–7n83, 709n111; Torcy’s advisors on, 88, 91, 599n75. See also ­Gallicanism; Jansenism; ­nuncios;



Index 785

papacy; Protestants; Quietism; Unigenitus ciphers. See codes circular letters, 168; to clergy, 66, 168, 447t11.1, 708n98, 708n100, 710n115; to diplomats abroad, 149, 714n5; to provincial officials, 168, 342, 442–3, 445, 708n98 Clairambault, Nicolas-Paschal, 329, 638n131 Clairambault, Pierre, 54, 563n58, 637n113; in brain trust, 338, 367; as genealogist of Royal Orders, 219– 20, 586n216, 587–8n229, 588n230, 588n231, 638n131; rewards to, 313, 587–8n229; on secretary of state’s duties, 139–41; work for Torcy of, 218, 300, 329, 331–2 Clark, Sir George, 121–2, 131 Clausewitz, Carl von, 392–3, 482n41 Clément, Nicolas: in brain trust, 218– 19, 221; and Croissy’s diplomatic papers for, 321–5, 643n25; rewards to, 570n108 Clement XI (pope), 116, 214, 297t7.7, 341, 383 clientelism and patronage: advantages for administration of, 144, 153–4, 226, 228, 230–1, 446–7, 453–4, 460, 488n110, 517n288, 707n90; and centralization, 32–5, 39–41, 488n110; and Colbert clan, 9, 45, 50, 52, 54, 89–90, 92, 108, 110, 193, 221, 225, 303, 608n149; and foreign office staff, 6, 10, 26–7, 41, 74, 178, 183, 217, 226, 232–8, 240–81, 314–15, 387, 467, 706–7n83; and Louis XIV, 226, 314–15, 373–4, 448, 453, 466, 488n112; and nepotism, 24, 177, 466; and other ministers, 377, 382, 398, 424, 428–30, 436, 439, 456, 571n109, 617n228;

and patrons and patronage, 38, 123, 125, 190, 211, 220, 230–1, 251, 386–90, 427, 440, 446–8, 453–4, 458, 466–7, 488n113, 595n43, 706– 7n83; princely, 594–5n40; rewards for foreign, 216, 296–7, 385, 447–8, 678n151; and rolle, 315; and survivanciers, 63–4; Torcy fills diplomatic posts using, 107–16, 287–91, 334, 362 clocks, 160–1, 255 codes: clerks working with, 73, 160, 163, 177, 182, 188, 189f5.5, 189, 242, 251, 263–4, 280, 330, 464, 549n93, 551n118, 552n138, 573n121, 575n134, 575n137, 575n139, 575–6n140, 578n160, 615n210, 627n316; deciphered in Cabinet noir, 346; at embassies, 240, 350, 598–9n68; foreign, 330–1, 644n32, 650n81, 656n166; organization of work with, 181, 189f5.5, 189, 191f5.6, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 199–201, 203–4, 363, 560– 1n43, 562n55, 562–3n56, 563n61, 568n89, 575n133, 578n161; and other departments, 432, 592–3n30, 698n369; princes, ministers, and ambassadors working with, 200, 378, 575n134, 575n135; security of, 152, 199–201, 203, 575n131, 575n135, 576n141, 576n142, 576–7n143 Colbert, Gilbert, marquis de SaintPouange. See Saint-Pouange, Gilbert Colbert de Colbert, Jacques-Nicolas (archbishop of Rouen), 88, 245, 389, 571–2n113 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 192, 329, 463, 592n26, 696n341; children of, 86–90; as clan founder, 74; clients and, 9, 44–5, 50, 52, 54, 126, 193,

786 Index 219, 222, 225, 228, 232–8, 241, 243, 245, 250–1, 253, 262, 321, 571n112, 594n37, 595n42, 595n43, ­595–6n44, 596n47, 603n98, 605n121, 613n198; and consuls, 247–8; and Croissy, 44, 48, 50, 247, 321–2, 462; and foreign office, 44, 192, 321, 642n10; and information, 6, 37, 50–1, 144, 321–2, 330, 451, 462, 541n9; library of, 44, 50, 88, 330; “lobby” of, 496n12; ministry of, 19, 143, 226, 250, 372, 374–6, 423, 437, 544n34, 544n38; and navy, 188f5.4, 236, 246–8, 566n79, ­567–8n86; propaganda, 79; property of, 233–4, 570n108; and royal household, 455; and Torcy, 45, 50 Colbert, Marie Anne (m. Louis Victor de Rochechouart), 245, 274, 595– 6n44, 675n109 Colbert de Villacerf. See Villacerf, Édouard Colbert, marquis de Colberts: arms of, 330, 501n89, 555n167, 648n59, 649n66; clan/ family of, 9, 45, 80, 85–6, 88–9, 141, 192–3, 245, 248, 279, 287, 305, 363, 389, 502n99, 571–2n113, 591n24, 641n164, 675n100; clients of, 45, 82, 107, 110, 115, 218–19, 221–2, 225, 243, 246, 248, 250–1, 253, 255–6, 262, 264, 268, 273–4, 277, 279, 287, 303, 321, 351, 362, 384, 387, 467, 565n70, 571–2n113, 652n122; as Conseil faction, 74, 92–3, 382, 510n195; family discord among, 74, 80, 86, 90–3, 382; and financiers, 253; and Maintenon, 387; and Pomponnes, 73, 133, 192, 225, 241, 363; and Pontchartrain, 74, 246, 253, 382, 428, 696n341; and rivalry with Le Telliers, 9, 74, 112, 192, 226, 241, 519n311, 600n79;

work style of, 50–1, 72, 74, 218, 322, 439, 461–4 Collins, James B., 15, 20 colonies, 53, 700n382, 700n383; communication with, 161; diplomatic instructions and, 100; and foreign office, 187, 188f5.4, 376, 430, 567–8n86; of Martinique, 259, 261, 279, 611n179; in negotiations, 106, 120, 407, 432–3, 525n60, 532n150, 699n374 Colt, Sir William Dutton, 270–1, 620n259, 620n261 commandants (commandants en chef), 168, 302, 441, 444 commis (clerks), 6, 10–12, 171, 172– 3f5.1, 281, 557n10; as bureau chief, 173, 177, 179–81, 194, 202, 466, 557n9, 561n47; as commis simple (simple clerk), 10, 171, 173, 175, 177–8, 183, 187, 194, 204, 262, 280, 287, 310, 311t7.9, 313, 318–19, 467, 558n23, 580n171, 600–1n85, 618n232; definition of, 171; as department’s “living memory,” 546n52; hierarchy of, 173, 175–9, 557n10, 561n49, 563n57, 580n171; numbers of, 171–5, 172– 3f5.1, 174f5.2, 206, 556n3, 556n6, 556–7n7, 557n8, 557n9, 561n48, 580n171, 637–8n118, 561n48, 562n53; as sous-commis, 467, 628n329. See also bureaus; premier commis; secretary communication triangle, VersaillesMarly-Paris, 157, 177, 464 Condé, Louis II de Bourbon, prince de, 113, 124 Conseil: agenda of, 379, 382, 670– 1n39; as Conseil d’en haut, 478n31; control of information to, 12, 44–5, 348–52, 371–8, 385, 394, 399, 412,



Index 787

461, 674n93; debates of, 12, 91–2, 381, 384, 390, 512n218; decisionmaking in, 12, 371, 373–6, 379, 394, 399–401, 429, 435, 461; delay of Torcy serving on, 70–80, 511n201; and diplomatic appointments, 362, 664n61; ecclesiastics barred from, 78, 142; factions in, 70–1, 74, 90, 92–3, 95, 381–2, 433, 507–8n170, 508n176, 510n195, 520n3, 675n111, 696n341; meetings of, 42, 152, 378– 83, 509n181, 586n217; membership of ministers on, 74–5, 140, 375, 379, 390, 428, 436, 507n165, 511n199, 677n135, 669n20; and propaganda, 341–2; and remonstrances over royal legislation, 145–7; reporter in, 44–5, 64, 69–70, 72, 74, 76–7, 106, 140, 373, 379, 433, 541n15, 615n217, 695n328; rewards for members of, 286; schedule of, 160–3, 380–1, 435, 533n156; seating in, 79, 378–9; secrecy of, 373, 385, 392, 410–11, 423, 682–3n192, 687n228; secrets kept from, 424–8, 461, 670n28, 674n93, 688n237, 695–6n334; size of, 374; structure before 1661, 230; support personnel for meetings of, 216, 323, 494n184; at war front, 66, 96–7 councillor, state (conseiller d’État): meaning of label, 607n138; secretary of state as, 140 consuls, 187, 243, 610n165, 626n311; control of, 247, 604n108, 609n115; and information-gathering for ­ J.­ Pontchartrain, 430–1, 698n369, 705n66; Levantine, 248–9, 254–9 Conti, François Louis de Bourbon, prince de, 104, 114, 340 contingency theory, 28–30, 35, 180–1, 191–2, 224, 460–1

controller general, 20, 214, 303, 423, 668n5; bureaus and clerks of, 283, 317–18, 541n9, 544n38, 551n114, 556n6, 559n32, 563n57, 617n229; on Conseil, 375, 436, 669n20; in Dispatches, 12, 146, 436, 438–9; and foreign office, 258; and secretaries of state, 140, 147, 180, 417, 430, 435–6, 484n60, 628–9n4, 669n20; and Torcy, 65, 438–9, 453, 678n149. See also Colbert, Jean-­Baptiste; ­Chamillart, Michel; ­Desmaretz, Nicolas; Le Peletier, Claude; ­Pontchartrain, Louis Phélypeaux de Cotte, Robert de, 264, 514n243 Cottebrune, Nicolas, 654n148 Council (Conseil): of Commerce, 140, 223, 417, 430, 610n171, 610n172, 610–11n175; Conseil privée or Conseil des parties, 541n13; d’État privé, 80, 86, 140; of Finance, 65, 90, 140, 374, 395, 480n27, 551n114; of Prizes, 236; du Roi, 80, 314; of State (d’État), 48, 572–3n120 Council of Dispatches: factions in, 438; meetings of, 166–8, 435–6, 438– 40; royal heirs in, 437–8; secretaries of state in, 70, 140, 437; and survivanciers, 64. See also domestic administration Council of Foreign Affairs (Conseil des affaires étrangères), 148–52, 310, 547n61, 547n64, 547n65, 547n66; hostile to regent’s diplomacy, 619n245, 619n248; Torcy’s sources on, 269, 619n248 councils, 12–13, 140, 158, 441, 455, 466, 551n114, 559n26, 713–14n4; centralization of, 37–8, 42; and Louis XIV, 8, 18, 26, 40, 42, 63, 140, 148, 371, 382, 436, 480n27; of Portugal, 60; of Regency’s Polysynod, 13,

788 Index 21, 138, 148–52, 266, 276, 470, 510n187, 546n54, 546n58, 547n65, 616n221, 700n5, 702n21; secretaries of state and royal, 139–42, 384; of Spain, 55, 130, 537–8n215, 678n151; Torcy’s influence in, 1 ­ 34–5. See also Conseil; council of ...; Polysynod couriers, 10, 88, 161–2, 182, 286, 328, 455, 656n165, 677n134, 677n135, 677n136; cabinet (courriers du cabinet), 43, 85, 214, 286, 352, 585n208, 639n143; postal, 212–13, 321, 343–7, 352, 654n138, 674n94; schedules of, 552n129, 552n131; of Torcy, 138, 178–9, 283, 293, 560n36, 584–5n207, 665n72 court, royal: cabals/factions at French, 82, 241, 391–2, 486n83; ceremonial of, 70, 98, 103, 118–19, 178, 267, 341, 355–60, 460, 480n20, 492n156, 492n158, 554–5n161, 632n38, 660n23, 660–1n24, 661n27, 662n32, 662n37, 662n39; courtiers of, 36, 39, 43, 315, 342, 362, 377, 427, 433, 435, 440, 453, 468, 511n199, 712n139; diplomats at foreign, 17, 44, 125–6, 222, 240, 247, 354–5, 361–4, 370–2, 663– 4n53, 668n109; of France, 9–10, 15, 36–43, 86, 133–7, 201–2, 226, 237, 490–1n141, 492n159, 551n125; news and gossip from French, 43, 67, 218, 269, 275, 349, 453–4, 540n157; of new Spanish Bourbon monarchy, 242; and nobility, 488n112, 492n158, 492n160; openness of French, 36; opinion at French, 105, 112, 118, 254, 342, 395, 426– 8, 444, 455, 522n34, 652n113; rumours at French, 90, 97, 250–1, 422, 507n167, 580n171; schedule at

French, 160–3, 492n156; and Torcy, 82, 93, 95, 132–7, 461; Torcy at foreign, 52–62, 76. See also audiences; Jacobites; Marly; Trianon; Versailles Courtin, Honoré, 99–100, 522n31 courts, judicial, 12, 145–7, 318, 437, 441–2, 448, 453, 480n27, 593n31; bailliage, 231, 593n31; sénéchaussée, 256, 448. See also parlements; Parlement of Crécy, Louis de Verjus, marquis de, 271, 499n72; as plenipotentairy to Ryswick, 100, 288t7.1, 334, 522n31; and Torcy, 58, 61, 100, 299 Croissy, Charles Colbert, marquis de: administrative dynasty of, 148; and archives, 7, 11, 25, 49–50, 321– 7, 333, 462, 570n107, 643n27, 644n33, 644–5n35; and audiences, 356, 573n123, 662n34, 662n39, 662n42; characterizations and evaluations of, 71, 134, 193, 365, 507– 8n170, 508n176, 512n212, 520n3, 539n237, 569n105, 691n278; clients of, 41, 53–4, 108, 110–11, 114, 126, 178, 192–3, 225, 233, 250–1, 264– 5, 499n72, 570n106, 571–2n113, 573n122, 641n164; and codes, 201, 573n121, 575–6n140, 576– 7n143, 578n160; and Colbert, 44, 48–50, 247–8, 321–2, 462; on Conseil, 70–2, 75, 373, 375, 507n165, 508n176, 510n186; and delegating, 462, 713n2; department organization of, 183, 194, 195f5.7, 203–5, 283, 464, 526–7n78; department personnel of, 160, 172–3f5.1, 173, 175, 178, 181, 193–4, 201, 221–2, 228, 243, 262, 264, 266, 467, 526– 7n78, 559n31, 560n37, 563n61, 563–4n62, 570n108, 598n61, 602– 3n97, 603n99, 625n301; early career



Index 789

of, 48–51, 207, 235–8, 424, 496n24, 567–8n86, 570n108, 571n111, 596n50; as foreign secretary, 15–16, 44–5, 51, 69–73, 76, 79–80, 96, 116, 192–4, 207, 429, 462–3, 509n181, 510n186, 510n190, 635n83; generalities of, 145; health of, 67–9, 71–3, 114, 204, 283, 330, 501n93, 503n114, 505n141, 508n178, 510n192, 520n9, 585n212, 713n2; and Huguenots, 507–8n170; kin of, 45–8, 80–9, 91, 135, 245, 265, 389, 511n203; legacy of, 4, 16, 19, 132, 470; and Louis XIV, 64, 66, 72–3, 106–7, 192, 194, 381, 501–2n99, 503n123, 507–8n170, 509n181; and Louvois, 70–1, 507n167, 507–8n170, 508n176, 509n179, 510n190; and New Converts, 445; and Nine Years War negotiations, 95–6, 101, 523n42; and paperwork, 165f4.3, 165–6, 581n181, 582n187, 644n30, 706n82; and Pomponne, 69–72, 366, 505n150, 505–6n151, 506n154, 508n178, 509n184, 510n193; relationship with clerks of, 200, 244–5, 311, 507–8n170; and religion, 49–50, 91, 504–5n139; residences of, 38, 51, 80, 264, 277, 570n108, 642–3n13; and reunions, 96, 193, 507–8n170, 508n176; and Torcy’s marriage, 69, 505n150, 505– 6n151, 506n154; wealth of, 48, 80–1, 696n341 Croissy, Charles-Joachim Colbert, abbé de (bishop of Montpellier), 48, 61, 82–3, 86, 279, 501n96, 514n250, 627n320 Croissy, Françoise Béraud, marquise de, 48, 80–1, 85, 265, 318, 507n163; clients of, 107, 202, 254–5, 279, 608n149, 632n45; and diplomatic

audiences, 359; as diplomat’s wife, 100, 495n7; and Noailles family, 389 Croissy, Louis-François-Henri Colbert, chevalier and later comte de, 83, 407; and Jacques Basnage, 219, 221, 587n228; marriage of, 83, 305, 514– 15n256; mission to Charles XII of Sweden, 83, 287; offices of, 453–4; rewards to, 290t7.4, 292, 308; and Torcy, 83, 680n168; and wife Marie Brunet de Rancy, 83; as wounded prisoner of war, 83, 391, 425, 514n254, 587n228, 691n280 Croissy, Madame. See Croissy, Françoise Béraud, marquise de Croissy, Marie-Françoise Colbert de, marquise de Bouzols, 37, 69, 81–2, 211, 340 Croissy, Marie (Marguerite)-Thérèse Colbert de: and dowager queen of Spain, 84–5, 515n265; as duchesse de Saint-Pierre (second marriage), 84; and first marriage as marquise de Renel, 83–4, 266; salon of, 223; and Utrecht negotiations, 85 cumul (de charges). See accumulation Cusani, Agustino (nuncio), 116, 359, 560n37, 634n76 Daguerre, Pierre, 67, 101–5, 454, 523n41, 523n43, 524n47, 524n50, 525n56 Dalencé, Joachim, 172f5.1, 187, 567n84 Dangeau, Louis de Courcillon, abbé de, 379–80 Dangeau, Philippe de Courcillon, marquis de, 64, 68, 79, 403, 407, 422, 425–6, 435, 444 Daubenton, François-Ambroise, 430, 432, 697n358; and brother ­Guillaume Daubenton, 518n303

790 Index Dauphin. See Louis de France Dautiège, Jacques, 172f5.1, 187, 567n83, 567n84 Davenant, Charles, 218, 223, 587n226 decentralization, 28–9, 29f1.1, 31, 33–6, 486n88, 487n95, 489n116, 490n136, 553n150; of royal chancery, 553n150 decision-making. See Conseil De la Haye de Vantelay, Denis, 184t5.2, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 314, 522n36 Delamare, Nicolas, 330, 455, 584n206, 649n76, 711n130 Delavaud, Louis, 4, 203, 499n69, 648n58 Delisle de La Drevetière, Louis F ­ rançois, 173f5.1, 280, 628n329 Denmark: diplomats from, 360, 662n42; embassy chapel in, 363; and foreign office bureaus, 143, 183, 184–5t5.2, 194, 195f5.7, 203, 564n64, 573n121; French diplomats to, 68, 104, 109, 111, 124, 126, 143, 199, 250, 252, 278, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 357, 361, 416, 496n26, 564n68, 575n132, 605n121; Larroque in, 270–1, 620n260; spy network in, 350–1; Torcy’s visit to, 49, 56–7, 496–7n26; visit to ­Versailles of Prince of, 357, 560n37 departments (départements): boundaries and conflicts among, 5, 23–4, 142, 245–6, 376–7, 393–434, ­436–7, 483n54, 676n131, 697n348, 698n369, 701n8; definition of, 15, 171, 478n3, 556n1 Des Alleurs, Pierre Puchot, comte de Clinchamp and marquis, 110, 113, 184t5.2, 259, 299; rewards to, 290t7.4, 296 

Desgranges, Michel d’Ancel, sieur, 88–9, 98, 274, 587n220, 659n10 Desmaretz, Nicolas, 86, 88–90, 260, 635n90, 699n373; on Conseil, 90, 92, 375, 379, 381–2, 438, 519n316, 541n15; and Croissy, 80, 89; and fellow secretaries of state, 696n339, 700n382, 701n8; and Maintenon, 134, 391; and Torcy, 89–90, 92, 301, 344, 381, 417, 419, 432, 452– 4, 515–16n268, 664n62, 671n54, 710n115 dévots (neo-dévots), 92, 386, 438 diplomatic ceremonial and protocol, 37–8, 70, 103, 117–19, 216–17, 267, 326, 354–60, 393, 508n178, 509n181, 549n91, 560n37, 618n236, 620n22, 620n23, 639n139, 659n12, 660n19, 660n20, 660n22, 660n23, 660–1n24, 661n27, 662n29, 662n32, 662n39; and Ambassadors’ Staircase, 37, 358; and coaches, 117–18, 307, 328, 356–7, 661n27, 665n73; and Hall of Ambassadors, 37, 356; and struggles over precedence, 393, 452, 459, 517n281, 660n22, 661n27 diplomats: as ambassadors, 289– 90t7.3, 290t7.4; as career, 107, 369, 664n55; as chargé d’affaires, 52, 108, 109, 113, 185t5.2, 240, 242, 263, 287, 290t7–4, 292, 297t7.7, 310, 351, 383, 394; costs to, 112, 252, 292, 361, 365, 606n126; courtiers as, 17, 83, 125, 361, 404, 407, 668n109; and embassies, 361–5; as envoys (and extraordinary envoys), 289–90t7.3, 290t7.4, 291–2, 362, 662n39, 663n52; as extraordinary ambassadors, 235, 238, 287, 289– 90t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 335, 358, 361; French employment of foreign, 350, 362, 399; and information, 17, 52–3,



Index 791

323, 352–5, 363–4, 398–9, 464–5; and negotiating, 17, 354–5, 361; outlook of, 16–17, 398–9, 668n109; primary tasks of, 17, 354, 368, 668n8; professionalization of, 7–8, 11, 93, 220, 251, 328, 355, 365–70, 666n86; rank/hierarchy among, 112, 124, 247, 291–2; recruiting and appointing of, 77, 83, 86, 93, 98, 100, 106– 16, 194, 242, 250, 254–5, 287–91, 308, 334–5, 361–3, 366–7, 407, 423, 525n56, 663n51, 663n52, 664n61, 673n90, 694n305; as representing rulers, 17, 147, 251, 282, 291–2, 354–5, 361–2, 418–19, 421, 424– 6, 478n1, 522n35, 663n48; as residents, 288t7.1, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 361–2, 662n39, 663n52, 665n69; rewards to, 287, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 290t7.4, 291–3, 293t7.5, 294t7.6, 301, 304f7.6, 314, 629n8, 630n10, 631n24, 631n25, 631n28; skills and temperament required of, 17, 52, 83, 151, 361, 365–70, 372, 398–9, 424, 444, 666n84, 667n106, 681n177, 691n278, 694n313, 695n328; social origins of, 251, 361–3, 365–7, 369, 663n52, 664n55, 666n84; soldiers as, 83, 124–5, 153, 393–4, 398, 663–4n53; staff of, 282, 301, 314, 363, 365, 665n70, 665n73, 667n95; status abroad of, 355, 364; surveillance in Paris of, 13, 364–5, 458; Torcy monitors French, 104; treatises and manuals on, 17, 108, 267–8, 365–7, 526n71, 663n51, 666n86, 666n89; wives of, 48, 108, 110, 124, 296, 359, 495n7, 634n71, 662n37, 702n21. See also chapels and chaplains (almoners); couriers; domestics Dispatches. See Council of Dispatches

domestic administration: and cahiers des doléances (notebooks of grievances), 451, 709n105; and Dispatches, 12, 70, 140, 161, 166, 168, 435–9; and domestic bureau, 164, 181, 187–92, 194, 203–11, 465, 567–8n86; and expéditions, 65, 67, 165–8, 302; by foreign office, 7, 12–13, 15, 25–6, 31–6, 50, 93, 135, 138–47, 190, 211–12, 214, 257–9, 281, 299, 435–59; and grain supply, 67–8, 144, 452–3, 544n40, 710n115; paperwork of, 190–2, 194, 206–7, 316, 325, 437, 465, 569n103, 582n185; and pays d’élections, 465, 544–5n41; and pays d’état, 206, 451, 465, 544–5n41; and Polysynod, 266, 276, 321, 470, 700n5; rationale for foreign office responsibility for, 8, 142–5, 453, 466; and Torcy under Croissy, 60, 65–8, 96, 145 domestics, 231, 262, 559n31, 594– 5n40, 595n42; of diplomat, 355, 363, 458, 665n70; passport requests for, 202; of royal household, 40–1, 231; “Suisse” (porter) as, 157, 178; of Torcy’s household, 10, 37, 171, 178, 258, 560n36, 583n193; traveling with Torcy, 51. See also valets Dubois, Guillaume (abbé then cardinal); and Académie politique, 16; as foreign secretary, 280; and jealousy of Torcy, 268, 369, 468–9, 619n243, 699–700n377, 714n6, 714n9; as Orléans’s tutor and agent, 534–5n184; and Pecquet, 268– 9, 616n224, 619n247, 619n248, 714n9; and post office, 137, 346, 348, 583n195; and regent, 468–70, 699–700n377, 714n9 Dubos, Jean-Baptiste (abbé): and Bayle, 218, 272, 647n56; in brain trust,

792 Index 218, 223, 269; and propaganda, 327–8, 647n56; and public opinion, 647n57; and Republic of Letters, 218, 269, 623; rewards to, 313, 638n132 Du Fresne, Léonard de Mousseaux, 172f5.1, 187–8, 188f5.4, 190, 566n81, 567n83, 567–8n86, 597n51, 643n25; on department organization, 559n26, 565n75, 569n100, 582n185; diplomatic missions of, 187, 190, 567–8n86 Du Luc, Charles-François Vintimille, comte, 82, 184t5.2, 258, 261, 263, 267, 287, 290t7.4, 292, 334, 362, 697n356, 700n383; ties to Blondel of, 613n195, 614n207, 629n8 Du Luc, Charles-Gaspard Vintimille (bishop of Marseille), 258, 261 Duparc (or Du Parc) (commis), 173f5.1, 280, 311t7.9, 312t7.10, 628n327, 637n118 Dupilet, Alexandre, 72, 148 Du Pré (laquais), 559n34, 560n36 du Pré, Étienne-Jachet, 52, 56, 500n78 Dupré (or Du Pré or Du Pres), Roland Jachiet, sieur, 113, 184t5.2, 287, 288t7.1, 289t7.3, 334 Dupuisse, Philippe-Céleste, 173f5.1, 280 Du Puy Saint-Gervais, Louis, 402, 408, 420, 681n174, 682n189, 689n250, 692n287 Dussen, Bruno Van der, 221; collaborates with Heinsius, 681n179; and 1705–06 negotiations, 403–8, 422, 690n259; and 1708–09 negotiations, 422–3, 425–6, 693n297, 693n299 Dutch. See United Provinces dynasticism: ceremonies of, 42; of office-holders, 559n33, 590n9, 590n12; proprietary, 18, 479n18;

royal, 14–15, 94–5, 102, 107, 110, 116, 122, 400, 468, 478n5, 526–7n78, 588n238. See also survivanciers economy: and consuls, 248–9, 254– 7, 110; and Dutch fears for trade, 341, 401–3, 653n126; information on, 53, 144, 223, 256, 331, 354, 376, 429–30, 466, 520n6, 523n43, 527n79, 555n165, 567n84; and post office, 584n204; problems of, 15, 95, 262, 300, 315, 481n30; and slave trade, 120, 430; of Spain, 223, 41–7, 699n373; and state administration, 254–8, 435–6, 453, 541n15, 566n79, 690n263; and tariffs, 50, 409, 423, 523n43; and trade in negotiations, 95, 98, 102, 104, 120, 122, 126, 254, 407, 411, 416–17, 422, 430, 432, 523n41, 589n252, 684n197, 699n375 écuyer (equerry), 103, 592–3n30, 616n222, 665n73, 634n81; grand écuyer of France, 98, 214, 660n19; of Torcy, 56, 178–9, 257, 280, 560n37, 560n38 Edict of Nantes, Revocation of, 88; diplomatic implications, 145, 166; and more work for foreign office, 15, 25, 145, 147, 166, 437, 445–6, 450–1, 458; and secretary of state for rpr, 180, 437. See also New Converts; Protestants education, 133, 222, 490n132; of ­Brienne the Younger, 73; of clerks, 183, 477n25, 484n67, 623n283; of diplomats, 361–70, 477n25; for domestics, 436; in foreign languages, 256–7, 263; of princes and nobles, 325, 345, 369; (re-) of Protestants, 299, 302, 450–1; state concern for,



Index 793

485n75; of Torcy, 9, 23, 44–51, 70, 134–5, 461. See also Académie politique; apprenticeship; profession élèves du Louvre, 306t7.8, 307t7.8, 367, 667n98 Elias, Norbert, 39, 492n158 “Embassies, Great,” 107, 117–32 emperor. See Austria; Holy Roman Empire Enlightenment, 21, 44; and Torcy’s “brain trust,” 218, 269, 276 Entresol Club, 369–70 épices, 309, 316t7.11 equerry. See écuyer espionage, 348–54; accusations of, 142, 203, 455, 657n183, 706n81, 711n133, 711n135; and foreign office clerks, 182–3, 373, 464; and French agents abroad, 52, 104–5, 297t7.7, 409, 454, 523n43, 567n84, 687–8n234, 694n312; via French post office, 212–13, 342, 345–7; and French spy networks, 11, 85, 111, 123, 125, 242, 259, 283, 350– 1, 371–2, 376–7, 527n89, 698n369; interrogations of, 444, 712–13n148; and military intelligence, 87–8, 399– 400, 430, 444–5, 658n203; by other states, 119, 410, 456, 572n115, 712n144; by Paris police, 203, 431, 456–9, 650n87; and postal networks abroad, 432, 656n166; and ­Renaudot, 67, 102, 218, 446, 523n42; and Sainte-Columbe, 112, 334; and spy-catching in France, 201, 212–13, 467–8 estates, provincial, 544–5n41, 579n166; of Brittany, 66, 80–1, 204, 314, 317, 451–2, 517n287, 579n166, 583n191, 596n50, 600n82, 709n105; and Croissy, 80–1, 207–9, 264, 596n50, 696n341; foreign office personnel

and finances of, 264, 317, 579n166, 583n191, 596n50, 598n63; foreign office supervision of, 204, 314, 317, 441, 451–2, 465; and Torcy, 66, 441, 451–2, 696n341, 705n65, 709n106 Estelle, Jean-Baptiste, 256, 610–11n175 Estrades, Godefroy, comte d’, 235, 236f6.2, 275 Estrées, César d’ (cardinal), 59–60, 116, 220, 252, 262 Estrées, François-Annibal, duc d’, 59, 705n60 Estrées, Jean d’ (abbé), 111–12, 219– 20, 262, 288t7.1, 391, 619n248 État de la France, 78, 80, 195, 478n3 Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy-­ Carignan (Prince Eugene), 126, 217, 335, 349, 368, 653n130, 676n128, 688n234 experts: clerks as, 10, 24–5, 29, 175, 191–3, 201, 238, 263, 267, 320, 370, 467; diplomats as, 369, 526n70, 528n105; and expertise, 437, 484n67, 517n284, 547n64, 572n114, 588n236, 617n231, 643n23, 666n86; on Germany, 49, 110, 238, 565n75; on law, 49–50, 67, 71; and state, 200–1, 320, 565n75, 587n223, 588n236, 617n231; and Torcy, 10, 15, 218–24, 313, 400, 467, 477n28 Extraordinary of War, 227t6.1, 277, 318, 445, 625–6n305 Fabarel, Jean, 280, 628n330 Fabre, Joseph, 67, 249, 610n171, 610n172; clan of, 258 Fabre, Mathieu, 610n171, 611n176 Fagon, Guy-Crescent (royal physician), 274, 403, 510n192 Faille, François, 193, 195f5.7, 570n108 Fénelon, François de Salignac de La Mothe (archbishop of Cam-

794 Index brai), 90, 113, 450; and Beauvillier and Chevreuse, 91–3, 387, 518n303, 519n315; as critic of Louis Pont­chartrain, 694n316; as critic of Torcy, 91–3, 367, 518n303; and Duke of Burgundy, 386; and ­Maintenon, 91, 386–7, 390; and peace party, 424; and Quietism, 91, 386–7; and Torcy, 91, 390, 450, 673–4n91 Ferriol, Augustin de, sieur de Pont-Vesle en Bresse, 249, 254; as agent for his brother, 255, 259; as financier, 260, 605n19; and wife Marie-Angélique de Tencin, comtesse de Ferriol, 222– 3, 254 Ferriol, Charles de, baron d’Argental: and Adam, 264; and advice from Abbé Pomponne, 559n27; as ambassador to the Ottomans, 184t5.2, 255–6, 573n134; and the Blondels, 249, 253–6, 259–60, 264, 608– 9n154, 609n159, 611–12n182, 612n188, 612n193; and Catholic missions, 608n153; as chargé de mission in Constantinople, 249, 253– 4, 607–8n145, 608n152, 627n313; and Hungarian subsidies, 259, 278; and Jérôme Pontchartrain, 609n157, 611–12n182; and plans to replace Ambassador Châteauneuf, 254–5; reports to Torcy on, 222; rewards to, 254, 289t7.3, 314; Torcy and, 254–5, 259, 608n150, 675n100 Feuquières, Antoine, marquis de Pas, then marquis de, 277, 571n109 Feuquières, Isaac de Pas, marquis de, 553n142, 569n105 files: and bureaucracy, 23, 41; and Croissy, 11; and organization, 192, 322, 324, 329, 459, 462, 466, 477n28. See also paperwork

finance: and exchange rates, 283, 296, 565n73, 629n6; and financiers, 234, 241, 248, 253, 260–1, 303–8, 389, 468, 491n147, 530n126; and “fiscalfinancial system,” 250, 253; and foreign office personnel, 228–68, 318– 19, 325, 565n70, 605n119, 605n124, 611–12n182; and Mississippi Bubble, 261, 624n295. See also banks Fleuriau d’Armenonville, Joseph, 279– 80, 311t7.9 Fleury, André-Hercule de (cardinal), 18, 469 Fontainebleau, 264, 431, 597n54, 659n7; and annual court visit, 38, 156–7, 213, 360, 639n142; Conseil at, 79, 394–5; foreign office work at, 37–8, 157, 214, 278, 378, 464, 491n150, 601n89; post office and, 213, 552n131, 584n203, 584n206, 655n153; visits of diplomats to, 267, 350 Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de, 221, 223, 273, 714n9  Fontevrault, Marie-Madelaine de Rochechouart, Abbess of, 274, 276 Fonton, Joachim, 254–5, 314 Forbin-Janson, Toussaint (cardinal), 77–8, 113, 238, 240, 242, 383, 502n111, 512–13n219, 588n230, 649n75, 650n85, 664n57; and Charles-François Noblet, 113, 238, 240, 242–3, 598–9n68, 599n74, 601n85, 602n92, 633n65 foreign office under Torcy: as bureaucracy, 23–5, 27, 93, 281; daily operation of, 146f4.1, 147–69, 167t4.1, 208t5.3; expenditures of, 40, 216, 282–319, 284f7.1, 285f7.2, 290t7.4, 291f7.3, 294t7.6, 295f7.4, 297t7.7, 302f7.5, 304f7.6, 305f7.7, 450, 560n40, 560n41, 629n6,



Index 795

631n24; managing accounts of, 179, 182–3, 278, 283–4, 301–2, 309– 10, 466, 565n71, 628–9n4, 629n8; organization of, 171–87, 184– 5t5.2, 186f5.3, 194–203, 196f5.8, 198f5.10; personnel of, 170–9, 172– 3f5.1, 174f5.2, 311t7.9; reorganization of, 205–11; rewards to diplomats of, 286–94, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 293t7.5; rewards to personnel of, 227t6.1, 307t7.8, 308– 19, 312t7.10, 467; routinization of, 8, 12–13, 152, 284, 483n54. See also acquit; appointements; bureaus; bureaucracy; finance; gages; secretariat fortifications, 121, 617n226, 617n227, 617n228; administration of, 223, 267, 315, 481n37, 544n34, 617n228, 704n58; in diplomacy, 77, 96, 106, 433 Forval, Jean Lanfranc des Hayes, baron de (“comte de Brosses”), 330–1, 631n28 Foucault, Michel, 5, 25–6, 232, 476n11, 485n77 Fouquet, Abbé, 591n22 Fouquet, Nicolas, 188f5.4, 232, 246, 566n79 Fouquet, Pierre, 231, 592n27 Fournier, Charles, 172f5.1, 238, 311t7.9, 637n118 Fournier, François, 238 Fournier, Gabriel-François, 238 Fournier, Michel, 202, 236f6.2, 279, 613–14n199; bureau of, 195, 196f5.8, 205–6, 558n22, 582n186, 613n116; as commis, 172f5.1, 194, 204; commis of, 306–7t7.8, 310, 637n117, 637n118; family of, 593n32, 598n65; and foreign office finances, 283; and Mignon, 237–8,

243, 598n61; offices of, 227t6.1, 238, 317, 598n63; as premier commis, 172f5.1, 175, 176t5.1, 194, 207, 311t7.9, 558n21, 561n48, 574n125; rewards to, 306t7.8, 310, 312t7.10, 315, 317, 579n166, 638n119, 639n142, 707n83 Fournier, Michel-Georges, 238, 598n65 Fournier, Nicolas, 231, 238 Fremont (diplomat in Venice), 184t5.2, 290t7.4, 292, 293t7.5 French language in diplomacy, 17, 479n12, 667n101 French Revolution, 26, 41, 238 Fresnoy, Abbé Nicolas Lenglet du, 349– 50, 687–8n234 Frischmann de Ranconnières, JeanCasimir, 67, 109–10, 184, 287, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 314 Friso, Johan Willem, Prince of NassauDietz, 635n85, 681n174 Fronde, 230, 232, 246, 327, 442, 452, 559n33, 591n22, 603n105; and Frondeurs, 112, 232, 594n36 Frostin, Charles, 27, 74 Furetière, Antoine, 15, 223 Fürstenberg, Guillaume-Egon von (cardinal), 276–7, 624n299 gages: 167t4.1, 260, 316t7.11, 571n112, 585n208, 587n220, 603n100, 625–6n305; definition of, 292, 309, 316t7.11; as department expense, 216, 284, 286, 316t7.11, 316–17, 630n11, 640n154, 703n36; and marc d’or, 219 Gaignières, François Roger, 271, 274, 308, 329, 332, 623n283, 650n84 Gallicanism, 83; of Croissy, 50; of Louis XIV, 92, 433, 698n363; of neo-politiques, 381–2, 433; opponents of, 91, 382, 390, 458, 518n301, 518n303;

796 Index of Torcy, 50, 74, 91, 381, 383–4, 390, 431, 676n113, 698n363 garçons de bureau. See office boys Gaston, duc d’Orléans, 60, 108 Gaudon, Silvain (abbé), 172f5.1, 189f5.5, 190, 567n83, 567–8n86, 568n89, 568n92, 568–9n95, 569n103, 582n185 Gaultier, François (abbé), 350, 419, 657–8n192, 658n193, 671n47 Gazette (de France), 56, 67, 161, 212, 338–9 gazettes, 341, 566n78, 650n88, 712n136; Dutch, 273, 333, 337–9; and gazetteers, 340, 584n202; à la main (hand-copied), 333 general hospitals, 147, 448–51, 457, 514n247, 706n77, 708n102 generalities, 544–5n41; distribution among secretaries, 143, 210t5.3, 545n42; duties for, 145–7; of foreign office, 145, 146f4.1, 545n42 generals: lampoon of, 386; and Louis XIV, 76, 373–4, 388–9, 427–8, 433; and Maintenon, 388–9; and negotiating at the front, 393, 398; and Torcy, 389, 398–400 génie, la, 53, 133–4, 538n231, 539n237, 658n193 Gergy, Jacques-Vincent Languet, comte de, 184t5.2, 287, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 633n57 German (language), 49, 57–8, 251–2, 271, 279, 334, 496n11, 499n72, 570n108, 601n90, 621n263 German states: Bavaria, Duchy and Electorate of: French diplomats to, 111, 184t5.2, 235, 287, 289t7.3, 290t7.4; Torcy visits, 58–9 Birkenfeld, County of, 297, 385, 673n81

Brandenburg, Prince-Electorate of, 104, 131, 349, 571n109; diplomats from, 193–4, 360; French diplomats in, 110, 195f5.7, 200, 264, 289t7.3; French spies in, 350–1; and Mignon, 573n122, 597n52; news from, 601n90; Torcy’s visit to, 49, 57–8 Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Duchy of: court of, 109, 351, 621n262; French diplomats in, 109, 184t5.2, 289t7.3, 397, 401, 702n21; subsidies to dukes of, 629n7 Cologne, Electorate of, 58, 110, 113, 184t5.2, 187, 202, 285, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 295, 337, 350, 527n84, 542n24, 629n7, 650n88, 688n234 Frankfurt (-am-Main), Imperial City of, 184t5.2, 251, 336, 349 Hamburg, Imperial City of, 56–7, 184t5.2, 265, 298, 344, 458, 629n7, 654n148, 668n109, 712n140 Hanover, Duchy then Electorate of: 57, 66, 107, 109, 142, 203, 265, 270–1, 274, 297t7.7, 349, 356, 469, 656n166, 699–700n377; Duke George (later King George I of Great Britain) raised to elector, 107, 109 Hesse-Cassel, Landgraviate of, 109, 349 Holstein-Gottorp, Duchy of, 136, 419, 681n170 Liege, Prince-Bishopric of, 84, 542n26, 650n88; French diplomats to, 110, 263; postal route, 635n89; Prince-Bishop of, 542n24, 632n42 Lorraine, Duchy of: Duke Leopold of, 106, 113, 330, 402, 542n24, 651n103, 651n104, 712–13n148;



Index 797

French diplomats in, 81, 83, 113, 164, 183, 184t5.2, 196f5.8, 290t7.4, 334, 336, 407, 431–2, 528n97, 650n91; French marital alliance with, 384, 672–3n77; and possible territorial exchanges, 130, 402, 406, 536n197, 537n208, 676–7n133; and postal routes, 345, 655n154 Luxembourg, Duchy and city of, 99, 106, 120, 522n34 Mainz, Electorate of, 51, 336, 565n75; elector of, 109, 184t5.2, 187, 190, 458; French diplomats in, 221, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 352 Münster, Prince-Bishopric of, 109, 504n127, 629n7; French diplomats in, 67, 109, 184t5.2, 289t7.3, 314; and postal routes, 344 Palatinate, Electorate of, 110, 331, 385, 525–6n67, 540n259, 645–6n39 Saxony, Electorate of, 104–5, 115; French diplomats in, 108–9, 113– 14, 548n75, 553n146, 573n121 See also Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria; Empire Gertruydenberg, peace talks at, 92, 221, 342, 348, 378, 687n228; Conseil and, 380, 552n138, 670n28, 671n50; Polignac at, 115, 691n277; selection of envoys to, 92–3; staff of French delegation to, 328, 665n72 gifts: and diplomacy, 121, 124, 179, 222–3, 255, 268–9, 300–1, 356, 407, 631n25, 634n71, 634n77; to foreign office staff, 258, 318, 573n122, 583n193, 613n195, 625n301; of Louis XIV to Torcy, 54, 58–9, 81; to officiers, 309; royal, 314; to Spain, 242; and Torcy, 300–1, 634n73, 634n76

Gleise cabal, 212, 257–8, 610n171 Gleise family, 258, 610n165, 611n176, 611–12n182 Godolphin, Sidney, 1st Earl of, 346, 402, 404, 406, 684n197, 684n199 gouvernementalité (governmentality). See governance governance, 11, 26; and experts, 547n64; and files, 322; fundamental tasks of, 441; and patronage, 488n110; and responses to information, 11–12, 191–2; and ritual, 41, 452; and “rowing,” 34, 440; and “steering,” 34–6, 440, 452, 465, 490n132; theory of, 31–6, 440–1, 485n77 governors (of provinces, towns, and citadels), 147, 713–14n4; absentee, 206, 444, 704n59, 709n108; appointment of, 110, 444, 453–4, 493–4n180, 544–5n41, 581n181, 674–5n97, 710n118; and couriers, 214, 654n138, 705n64; and foreign office supervision, 12, 168, 208– 9t5.3, 441–2, 569n100, 582n188; and gouvernements, 444, 544–5n41, 710n119; and information, 341–2, 349, 521n22; in local conflicts, 444, 449, 703n38, 704–5n60, 708n93, 709–10n112; and passports, 201; and provincial estates, 211, 451–2, 583n191; rewards to, 286, 302–3, 630n21 Gramont, Antoine Charles IV, duc de, 90, 117; at Bayonne, 84–5, 137, 454, 679n161, 705n64; as diplomat, 136, 399, 444, 679n156; as governor, 209t5.3, 444, 521n22, 657n183, 705n65; and Torcy, 444, 497n33, 705n65, 711n125 Grand Alliance, 102, 111, 125, 130, 395, 398, 401, 403, 405, 469,

798 Index 529n112, 677n139, 683n193, 687n230 Grand Chancellery, 145, 194, 240, 316, 318, 581n183, 594n36; petites chancelleries of, 145, 553n150 grand écuyer (grand equerry), 98, 214, 660n19 gratifications, 278, 524n50, 584n202; and acquit patent, 312t7.10, 581n182; as category of foreign office expenses, 286, 294t7.6, 296, 636n106; definition of, 309, 637n110; to domestic officials, 302– 3, 456, 583n191; to embassy personnel, 301; extraordinary, 309–10, 318, 587n220, 637n117, 638n120, 638n123, 638n127; to foreigners, 110, 293t7.5, 293, 297, 564n67, 626n307, 632n42, 634n81, 650n81; to foreign office personnel, 245, 265, 269, 306t7.8, 313, 317, 574n125, 575–6n140, 586n218, 624n298, 637n113, 637n115, 637n117, 638n120, 638n121, 638n123, 638n127, 640n157; to French diplomats, 278, 314, 514n253, 565n70, 605n122, 629n8, 630n13; to New Converts, 286, 299; ordinary, 286, 309–10, 318, 564n67, 637n117, 638n123; to personnel outside the foreign office, 313, 570n108, 587n220, 589n248; from provincial estates, 317, 583n191, 696n341 Great Britain, 644n32: alliance with France, 127, 147, 268–9, 279, 468– 9, 534–5n184, 619n243, 619n247, 699–700n377; colonies and trade of, 256, 341, 430, 432–3, 699n375, 700n383; development of early modern state in, 33–4, 482n45, 485n71; diplomats of, 56, 58, 270, 308, 366, 661n27, 663–4n53, 665n70;

­ iplomats in France of, 82, 86–7, d 116, 129, 133–4, 203, 360, 400, 503n114, 513n235, 653–4n136, 698n364, 699n374; embassy chapel in, 292, 350, 363; and espionage, 65, 67, 136, 350, 359, 416, 430, 446, 455, 459, 507n163, 656n166, 689n254; French diplomats in, 48, 50–1, 107, 109, 111, 120, 143, 164, 183, 184t5.2, 187, 190, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 199, 221, 235, 247, 287, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 291–2, 302, 326, 361, 526n71, 605n101, 663n52, 664n61; French plans to invade, 349, 400–1, 516n271, 680n168; information on, 102, 126, 135, 218, 221, 336–7, 348, 444, 566n78, 675n99; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 85, 267, 341, 349, 368, 376, 381, 395, 401, 405–28, 457n62, 584–5n207, 671n47, 682n186, 683n194, 684n197; Parliament of, 100, 117–18, 120, 123, 128, 132, 163, 194, 408, 464, 529n116, 532–3n154, 535n185, 580n171, 699n375; and partition negotiations, 9, 87, 95, 116–23, 127–32, 162, 346, 430, 529n109, 529n111, 529n114, 529n115, 529n116, 530n124, 530n126, 530–1n132, 531n135, 531n138, 531n141, 532n147, 533n155, 533n156, 533n157, 535n185, 535n186, 536n199, 537n204, 659n15, 661n27, 661– 2n28; and Ryswick negotiations, 77, 104–5, 95–106, 524n50; Torcy’s visit to, 61, 501n91 Great Colbert. See Colbert, Jean-Baptiste Great Powers, 15, 107 greffier, 139, 227t6.1, 236, 274, 541n4, 570n108, 596n50, 597n56



Index 799

Gregg (or Greg), William, 416, 689n254 Grignan, comtesse (Mme) de, 512n212, 568–9n95 Grignan, François Adhémar de Monteil, comte de, 206–7, 209t5.3, 258, 451, 545n46, 610n173, 673n80, 674– 5n97, 708n93 Gualterio, Philippe Antoine (cardinal), 115–16, 202, 297t7.7, 350–1, 365, 401, 448, 558–9n25, 581n183, 602n92, 651n100, 651n103, 662n34; and books, 607n139, 649n71 Guiscard, Louis de, comte de ­Bourlie and marquis de Magny (known as comte de Guiscard), 110–11, 289t7.3, 454 Guyon, Mme de, 91, 386–7 Guyot (court postmaster for horses), 196f5.8, 213, 584n203 Habsburg monarchy. See Austria; Hungary Hainfray, Louis, 196f5.8, 213, 584n202; son Louis fils, 584n202 Harcourt, Henri I de Beuvron, marquis then duc d’, 427, 581n181, 677n133, 677n135; and Maintenon, 390, 518n298, 664n62; mission to Spain of, 121, 124–5, 288t7.2, 289t7.3; and Torcy, 362, 390, 394–5, 677n134 Harlay, Achille III de, 383, 454 Harlay de Bonneuil, Nicolas-Auguste de, 99–102, 157, 175, 522n28, 558n20, 572n118 Harley, Robert, 416, 689n254 Harouys, André de, 206, 208t5.3, 454, 709–10n112 Hauterive, François de l’Aubespine, seigneur d’. See Châteauneuf, François de l’Aubespine, seigneur d’Hauterive, marquis de

Haveskercke, Louis van, Baron van Lichtervelde, 406–7, 684n202 Heinsius, Anthonie, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 104, 111; and Dussen and Buys, 681n179; his agents, 300, 391, 653n130, 692n282, 692n287; military role, 399; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 217, 221, 391, 401–10, 414, 416, 419–20, 422, 682n185, 683–4n196, 684n197, 684n199, 684n201, 684n202, 685n209, 686n221, 688– 9n246, 692–3n293, 693n299; and Neuville and Adam mission, 265; and partition negotiations, 119– 20, 123, 126–30, 162, 529n112, 533n155 Helvétius, Adrian Engleburt, 403– 5, 407–8, 410–12, 416–17, 419, 682n183, 682–3n192, 685n207, 686n218, 686–7n223, 687n232, 690n259, 692–3n293; son, 681 Hennequin, Gualterus, 219, 409–16, 423–4, 426, 678n143, 680–1n170, 687n232, 687n234, 693n295 Henri III, King (of France), 141, 214, 215f5.11, 507n162, 516n278 Henri IV, King (of France), 103, 246, 544n35, 593n32 Héron, Charles François de Carades, marquis du, 113–14, 184t5.2, 289t7.3, 527n85 Higgs, Edward, 33–4, 476n16 Himmelfarb, Hélène, 37, 41 history: and archives, 181; Colbert clan interest in, 49–50; and composition for administrative use, 139, 279, 587–8n229, 697n348; clerks’ knowledge of, 190, 193, 464–5; early modern writing of, 269, 271–6; foreign office connections with writers of, 219–20, 250–1, 539–40n250,

800 Index 621n268, 624n295, 648n62; and propaganda, 7, 327–8, 333, 340–2, 462; and use for diplomacy, 320– 3, 325–8, 332–3, 340–2, 366–9, 477n28, 646n41, 647n50, 647–8n58 Holland. See United Provinces Holy Roman Empire: and emperor’s ambitions, 108, 116, 119, ­340–1, 384, 415, 526–7n78, 536n197, 653n125; French knowledge of, 464, 528n97, 643n20, 646n42; French diplomats to Imperial Diet of, 57–8, 108, 164, 184t5.2, 299, 334, 366, 499n72, 526n71, 565n75, 651n96, 660n22, 663n52; French diplomats in states of, 242, 361; Imperial Circles of, 107; Imperial Diet of, 57–8, 100, 107, 458, 565n75; Imperial diplomats from, 521–2n28, 522n29, 641–2n8; postal system of, 346, 650– 1n93; “Third Party” in, 66–7, 385, 504n127. See also Austria; German states; Latin Hooke, Colonel Nathaniel: and propaganda, 328, 349; rewards to, 313; Scottish expedition, 401; and Torcy’s staff, 153–60, 491n150, 549n93, 549n94, 551n109, 576–7n143 Hôtel: des Ambassadeurs (du ­Nivernais), 118, 156, 357, 660n19; Beautru, 642–3n13; Colbert, 87–8, 613n198, 642n10, 642–3n13; Croissy, 89, 107, 154, 156–7, 211, 264, 322–3, 335, 383, 463, 570n108, 642–3n13, 644n33; d’Effiat, 617n231; Jacques Cœur and Limoges, 232–3; de Pomponne, 642n10; ­Seignelay, 87; de la Surintendance, 36; Torcy, 87, 514n243, 648n65; de Transylvanie, 364; Tubeuf, 642–3n13; de Vitry, 598n67

Hôtel de Ville, rentes of, 81, 279, 325 household. See Louis XIV; Torcy, JeanBaptiste Colbert de household, secretary of state for the, 65, 345, 358, 455, 581n183, 645n38; and affairs of clergy, 672n74. See also navy House of Austria. See Habsburgs Huet, Daniel (bishop of Avranches), 271, 621n267 Huguenots. See Protestants Hungary, 350, 633n47; French diplomats in, 114, 670n35; pensions to exiled rebel officers of, 633n52; rebellion in, 85, 110, 253–4, 295– 6, 335, 394, 542n21, 607–8n145, 608n152, 675n99, 676n99; subsidies to, 259, 278, 285, 296, 555–6n76. See also Rákóczi, Prince Ferenc II Huxelles, Marie le Bailleul, marquise d’: and Callières, 521n17, 524n54; on ministers, 71, 511–12n205; on Torcy’s marriage, 505–6n151 Huxelles, Nicolas du Blé, marquis d’: and Council of Foreign Affairs, 148– 50, 547n65; on German princes, 107; at Gertruydenberg, 378, 670n28; and Pecquet, 150, 263, 268, 546n54, 547n61, 619n243; and Regency Council, 547n65; and Torcy, 363, 664n62 Iberville, Charles François de la Bonde d’, 108–9, 221, 289t7.3, 315, 564n66, 607n139; as commis, 108, 172f5.1, 190, 221, 287, 351, 527n78; as envoy to England, 184t5.2, 287, 290t7.4, 292; as Geneva resident, 67, 164, 288t7.1; and Torcy, 108–9, 115, 287, 305, 334, 402 Imhof, Rudolph Christian, Baron, 334, 351



Index 801

incognito, 102, 356, 359, 659n18; Torcy traveling, 54–5. See also audiences information: access for kin and clients, 228, 246; and censorship, 333–40; centralization of, 37, 144, 328–33; to Conseil and its control, 371–85; control of diplomatic, 44–5, ­370–434, 461, 469–70, 670n27, 677n136, 678n142, 693n300, 695n325, 697n356; control of domestic, 50, 144–7, 440–59; and control of strategy, 373–4; and experts, 217–24; as field in history, 7; and foreign office clerks’ networks, 226, 246, 467; gathering of diplomatic, 17–19, 50–64, 99, 113, 121, 124–6, 242, 282, 348–53, 354–5, 360–1, 364, 368, 532–3n154, 669n9; gathering of domestic, 33–4, 144–7, 440–59, 485n75, 709n104; informal sources of, 71, 82; as information age or society of, 7, 159, 320; and information ecosystem, 7–8, 477n25; and information state, 6, 462, 476n16, 482n43; and Jérôme Pontchartrain, 428–34; and listening posts, 11, 104– 5, 162, 221, 296, 333–5; and Maintenon, 385–92; management of, 44, 161–2, 281, 319, 321, 352–3, 370, 459, 467; for negotiations, 102, 320– 8, 332–3, 668n5, 699n374; and post office, 212, 320–1, 342–8, 584n202, 652n113, 656n166; power of, 341– 2; preservation and storage of, 6–7, 11, 17, 25, 50, 139, 152–3, 158–9, 165, 319, 320–30, 333, 352, 463, 467–8, 550n103, 641–2n8, 644– 5n35, 648n65; and propaganda, 341–2; of public on state, 478n3; and secretaries of state, 12, 45, 140; and spies, 348–53, 456–9, 656n166; and state, 3–13, 338–9, 491n148;

and time and space, 138–9, 152–69, 553n141, 553n142; Torcy and, 55, 57, 462 Innocent XI (pope), 60–1, 222, 634n69 Innocent XII (pope), 114, 116, 214 intendant, household: of Colbert, 234, 245, 262; of Croissy, 193, 195f5.7; foreign office clerks’ connections with, 228, 232, 234, 241, 262; of Le Peletier, 617n231; of Louvois, 241; of Pomponne, 343; of Torcy, 157, 160, 178, 196f5.8, 206, 211, 265, 313, 318, 578n159 intendants, provincial, 713–14n4; appointment of, 436, 701n7; as apprenticeship for secretaries of state, 70, 559n33; and foreign office, 12, 144, 208–10t5.3, 211, 258, 266, 436, 441–54, 545n42, 555n163, 705– 6n73; as informant, 50, 206, 441–54, 496n18, 542n24, 544n34, 709n104; and passports, 201; and post office, 344; sub-delegates of, 89, 442, 457, 703n36, 709n111; and term “intendance,” 544–5n41 introducer of ambassadors, 37, 589n245, 659n10, 660–1n24; and ambassadorial audiences, 356–9, 508n178; and ambassadorial entries, 118; foreign office relations with, 171, 217, 661n26, 662n30 Ireland, 66, 87, 300, 712n144 Isabel Luísa, Infanta (of Portugal), 51–2, 54, 60 Italian states: Florence, Grand Duchy of, 21, 351, 656n170, 697n356; French diplomats to, 113, 184t5.2, 287, 288t7.1, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 334; Torcy in, 60 Genoa, Republic of, 60, 84, 351, 533n162, 537n208, 697n356;

802 Index archduke in, 351, 698n369; bankers of, 307–8; French diplomats to, 184t5.2, 221–2, 288t7.1, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 351–2, 361; and mails, 551–2n126, 702n21 Mantua, Duchy of: diplomats in France of, 364, 458; duke of, 59, 240, 587n221; French diplomats to, 113, 184t5.2, 195f5.7, 289t7.3, 336, 358 Milan, Duchy of, 82, 98; defence of, 679n153; in negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 406–7, 409, 415–16, 689n250; in partition negotiations, 120, 127– 30, 532n148, 533n162, 536n197, 537n208; and postal routes, 650– 1n93; and propaganda, 335; in Ryswick negotiations, 521n24 Modena, Duchy of, 60, 113 Naples, Kingdom of, 678n151; information on, 259, 351, 651n103; in negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 335, 684n201, 685n205; in partition negotiations, 120, 402, 406, 409, 533n162, 537n208; and plague, 453; Torcy’s visit to, 59 Savoy, Duchy of, 143, 161–2, 207, 308, 334, 492n2, 519n316, 537n211, 544n35 Venice, Republic of: and Ambassador Pomponne and foreign office staff, 242, 278, 561n50, 626n311, 629n8, 646n41, 667n95; bankers of, 635n83; and diplomats in France, 360, 661n27; French diplomats to, 85, 168–9, 184t5.2, 194, 287, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289– 90t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 293t7.5, 335, 361, 522n36, 663n52; French opposition to Ottoman war with,

255; and information management, 375, 641–2n8, 642n9; and interpreting secretary, 288t7.1, 363; as listening post, 162, 333, 335, 351, 651n100, 658n203; and mail, 214, 551n124, 551–2n126, 576n141, 633n47, 650–1n93; navy secretary and French diplomat to, 429, 697n356; nuncio to, 116; and partition negotiations, 127; as possible arbitrator of reunions, 96; Torcy protests to, 676n131; Torcy’s visit to, 58–9, 499n75 See also papacy; Savoy, Duke of Jacobites, 142; and court at Saint-­ Germain-en-Laye, 153–4, 157, 182, 203, 301, 400, 459, 657–8n192, 712n144; in France, 298, 446, 459; in French service, 153, 446, 459, 680n168; and Louis XIV, 400–1, 680n168; and Portland and partition negotiations, 117–19, 535n186; and royal advisors, 154, 400–1, 680n168; and Scottish invasion plans, 96, 154–7, 400–1, 516n271; and Torcy, 157, 298, 301–2, 400–1, 502n109, 504n135, 507n163, 680n168 James II, King (of England), 65, 117, 446, 572n115; Louis XIV and, 400, 680n168; Portland mission and, 118; Torcy and, 61 James III, King, 399, 528n102, 540n257, 659n18, 680n168, 680n169 Jansenism, 404; and Conseil, 438; and foreign office staff, 325, 567n83, 568–9n95, 645n37; and Mme Torcy, 82, 91; and nuncio, 384, 518n303; opposition to, 25, 91, 518n304; Pomponne and, 232; Torcy and, 91, 135, 251, 337, 381, 518n301,



Index 803

518n303; and Torcy’s brother, 83, 88, 91 Jersey, Barbara Chiffinch Villiers, Countess of, 298, 350, 634n81 Jersey, Edward Villiers, 1st Earl of, 298, 350, 358–9, 661n27 Jesuits, 50, 345, 386, 404; and ­Beauvillier and Chevreuse, 74, 91; and Croissy, 50; and J. Pontchartrain, 433; and Torcy, 50, 390, 518n301 jewels, 80, 115; in diplomacy, 300–1, 634n71; of Louis XIV, 242, 635n83 Jews: as bankers, 283, 307, 348, 351, 635n83; in diplomacy, 692n291; as merchants, 298; in Paris, 577 John III Sobieski, King (of Poland), 57, 104, 114 Joseph Ferdinand, Electoral Prince of Bavaria, 79, 119–22, 128, 131, 254 Jurieu, Pierre, 271–2, 620n261 Justel, Henri, 620n259, 620n260 Karg von Bebenburg, Johann-­FriedrichIgnaz, Baron, 202, 350, 650n88, 688n234 Kettering, Sharon, 32, 39 kinship: and apprenticeship, 64; and bureaucracy, 93, 144, 489n119; and clientage networks, 6, 10, 144, 225–8, 231, 235, 243, 246, 253, 258, 263–4, 281; network of Torcy, 45, 80–93, 98, 262, 274, 417, 441, 632n45, 674–5n97; and survivanciers, 63–4, 75–6 Krock (Paris resident of Tsar Peter I), 331, 650n81 Kugeler, Heidrun R.I., 17, 365 La Chaise, Père de, 115, 390–1, 571– 2n113, 676n113, 707n90, 710n123 La Chapelle, Jean de, 220, 312t7.10, 313, 328, 334, 571–2n113; and

friendship with Torcy, 652n122; remuneration of, 639n133; and Swiss Lettres, 340–1, 653n124 La Chausse, Michel-Ange de, 247, 604n110 La Closure, Pierre Cadiot de, 107, 184t5.2, 287, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 334–5, 546n55, 635–6n92, 650n91, 651n96 La Neuville, Foy de, 265, 615n212 Lanti, Louise-Angélique de La Trémoille, Princess, 59, 241, 600n78 La Pause, Louis, 172f5.1, 189–90, 568n91 La Reynie, Gabriel Nicolas de, 272, 455–6, 711n133 Larroque, Daniel, 172f5.1; and Bayle, 269–76, 620n254; brother of, 622n276; conversion of, 271–6, 621n264; and Dubos, 623n289; entry into foreign office of, 622n282; father of, 269; and Le Grand, 623n291; and Leibniz, 620n259, 621n262, 621n263, 621n268; and Regency, 470; and Republic of Letters, 218, 269–76, 311t7.9, 619n252; rewards to, 306–7t7.8, 311t7.9, 313, 620n260, 623–4n294, 624n295, 637n118; as translator, 623n283, 623–4n294 Latin, 271, 366, 623n283; in diplomacy, 58, 279, 330, 466, 479n12, 499n72, 565n75, 580n174, 642n8, 667n101 La Touche, Joseph de, 155, 550n99 La Trémoille, Joseph-Emmanuel de (cardinal), 184t5.2, 297t7.7, 431, 576n142, 593n31, 604n110 Lauzun, Antonin Nompar de Caumont, duc de, 682n186, 683n192 Lavisse, Ernest, 19, 480n23

804 Index La Vrillière, Louis IV Phélypeaux, marquis de, 380, 437–8, 444, 505–6n151, 540–1n2, 627n321, 701–2n15 Law, John, 455, 468, 624n295 Lebeau, Edme, 172f5.1, 190, 280, 569n98, 628n324 Lebret (fils), Cardin, 209t5.3, 451, 454, 581n181, 582n188, 583n192, 610n173, 629n8, 674–5n97, 711n124 Lebret, Pierre-Cardin, 209t5.3, 258, 438–9, 442, 446, 450–1, 544n34, 572–3n120, 579n169, 610n171, 673n78, 703n38, 707n90, 708n97, 708n102 Le Camus, Cardinal Étienne, 65, 134, 711n124 Le Dran, Nicolas-Louis, 172f5.1, 275, 279, 311t7.9; brothers of, 279, 627n320; on foreign office organization and personnel, 556n6, 561n48, 578n159, 579n163, 579–80n170, 580n174, 616n220, 637n118, 644n30; and Torcy’s administrative legacy, 16, 333 Leers, Renier, 219, 270, 336–7, 651– 2n107, 652n108 Le Fevre (Antwerp postmaster), 156, 549n87 Lefouin, François, 235–7, 597n56 Lefouin, Nicolas-Dominique, 237, 597n58 Le Grand, Joachim (abbé), 172f5.1, 219–20, 311t7.9, 588n234; and archives, 275, 327, 331, 649n72; in brain trust, 269, 367; and Galland, 275, 623n289; and history, 588n232; and Larroque, 275, 623n291; rewards to, 307t7.8, 313, 637n118, 638n128; and Royal Orders, 219, 588n230

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 522n29, 543n27, 578n155, 656n166, 691n278; and Bossuet, 142, 543n28; and Larroque, 270–1, 273– 6, 620n254, 620n259, 620n260, 621n262, 621n263, 621n264, 621n268, 622n269, 622n279; and Torcy, 142 Le Melle (commis), 172f5.1, 194, 322, 643n21 Leopold I (emperor), 55, 58, 96, 107, 122, 132 Le Peletier, Claude: Chamillart, 673n84, 694–5n318, 695n328; as controller general, 20, 62, 74, 267, 559n32, 617n228; and Croissy, 71, 133, 539n237; and Desmaretz, 89; and the Le Telliers, 71, 74, 192, 241, 486n83, 508n175; on Louis XIV and peace, 427; on Maintenon and Louis Pontchartrain, 673n84; as minister, 43, 72, 75, 376, 503n123; opposition to partition treaty of, 538n229; and Pecquet, 617n229, 617n231, 618n232; and Pomponne, 241, 512n212; and post office, 103, 342– 3, 670n27; and Torcy, 133, 267 Le Peletier de Souzy, Michel, 267, 315, 433, 481–2n37, 617n228; and Torcy, 544n34 Le Quien de La Neufville, Jacques, 134, 348, 552n128, 585n208, 654n142 les importants. See nobility Le Tellier, Charles-Maurice (archbishop of Rheims), 76, 117, 450 Le Tellier, Michel, 192, 241, 603n105 Le Tellier clan: and accumulation of posts, 226; clients and kinsmen of, 9, 71, 201, 223, 241, 362, 508n175, 617n228; as dynasty of war secretaries, 63, 141, 148, 486n83; and the Pontchartrains, 74, 696n341; rivalry



Index 805

with Colberts of, 74, 89, 192, 362, 510n195, 519n311 letters (bills) of exchange: diplomats’ personal, 252, 259, 607n138, 636n100; and foreign office, 154– 6, 159–60, 296, 307–8, 626n311, 629n8, 632n41, 653n126; Huguenots carrying, 445–6 lettres patentes, 167t4.1, 437, 453 Le Vau, Louis, 232–3, 593n30, 594n37, 594–5n40, 595n43 liasse, la: definition and description of, 150, 644n30; and Louis XIV, 150, 160, 374–5, 439–40; and Regency, 546n58 library: of Colbert, 44, 50–1, 88, 219, 496n13, 517n284, 571n112; of Croissy, 48–50, 80; of foreign office at Versailles, 169, 648n63; of ­Gaignières, 308, 332; as information source for foreign office, 7, 322, 327, 333, 462, 477n28, 571n112, 649n72; of navy, 697n348; Paris as centre of, 11, 271–2, 327, 329–30, 607n139, 621n263, 648n63, 649n72; provincial, 322, 333; and Republic of Letters, 271–2, 577n148; royal, 139, 218–19, 321, 325, 329, 332, 477n28, 649n67; of Saint-Prest, 645n37 lieutenant du roi, 83, 89, 258, 287, 442, 504n128, 545n41, 568n95, 677n134, 704–5n60, 709n111, 709n112 lieutenant-general: of police, 43; provincial, 206, 208–9t5.3, 441, 444, 451, 453, 454n46, 674–5n97 Ligny, Victor Goulou de: and accounts, 183, 262, 277–8, 283, 296, 466, 626n311, 627n313, 629n8, 630n13; alleged nobility of, 625n304; and codes, 196f5.8, 263; and Extraordinary of War, 227t6.1, 277; and passports, 202–3, 578n153, ­625–6n305,

626n307; and Pomponne, 277, 625– 6n305; and post office, 626n307; rewards to, 306–7t7.8, 310, 312t7.10, 313, 317; as secretary, 172f5.1, 176t5.1, 177, 181–3, 277, 311t7.9, 563–4n62, 564n64, 564n68 Lionne, Hugues de: foreign office structure of, 189f5.5, 200, 429, 565n75; and Mazarin, 72–3, 188, 562n55; as minister, 507n165; and navy and consuls, 246–7, 566n79; opinions of, 475n3, 508n175; personnel of, 172f5.1, 173–5, 187–90, 189f5.5, 264, 276, 313, 566–7n83, 567– 8n86, 568n90, 568n92, 568n93; and ­Pomponne, 188, 190, 192; public papers of, 321, 642n10; as secretary of state, 16, 72–3, 77, 568–9n95; and his survivancier, 568n88; work habits of, 562–3n56 lobbies and lobbying, 211, 257–9, 261, 496n12, 610n169, 610–11n175 Lorenzi, Bailiff, 287, 290t7.4, 631n32 Lorme, Jean-Louis de, 337, 651–2n107 Lossky, Andrew, 71, 106 Louis de France, Dauphin (also known as the Grand Dauphin and Monseigneur), 58, 392; and audiences, 507n161; cabal of, 82; in Conseil, 72, 79, 379–80; death of, 92, 221, 293t7.5, 400, 604n110, 618n236, 708n98; in Dispatches, 437–8; and his ring as diplomatic gift, 634n71; share in partition treaties of, 120, 127–8, 530–1n132, 531–2n145, 532n153, 533n162, 536n197, 537n208 Louis XIII, King (of France), 108, 235, 321, 493n173, 543n31, 593n32 Louis XIV, King (of France): and absolutism, 3–4, 20–2, 25–7, 36–7, 480–1n28, 543n30, 543n31; and

806 Index ­ ureaucracy, 14–15, 18–43, 72, 315, b 375, 435–6, 439–40, 460–71; and his court, 36–43, 315; death of, 9, 13, 138, 371, 546n55, 638n119; and decorum, 390, 677n135; and delegating, 26, 35, 669n19; and direct work with administrators, 146, 150, 372, 439–40; domestic success of, 713– 14n4; and foreign policy formation, 18, 371–85; foreign policy of, 105– 7, 117–32, 519n1; and gloire/reputation, 18, 115, 225, 342, 361, 393, 397; as “grand commis,” 479n19; health of, 36, 339, 345, 371, 468, 586–7n219, 708n98; household of, 10, 15, 36, 40–3, 214–17, 237, 242, 356–8, 493n173, 493n178, 493– 4n180, 556n2, 557n10, 587n220; and loyalty, 427; and no more first minister, 143–4, 371, 466; and public opinion, 341–2, 669n11; as roi bureaucrate, 9, 14–43, 460; and routine, 42, 62–3; style of reports to, 52, 68 Louis XV, King (of France), 259, 469, 602–3n97; compared with Louis XIV, 18, 437, 480n22, 688n239; foreign office under, 5, 9, 16, 18–19, 268, 275, 563n60, 627n320; secret diplomacy of, 18, 480n22, 688n239 Louvois, François-Michel le Tellier, marquis de: and accumulation of offices, 87, 144, 372–6, 423, 544n34; as clan inheritor, 74; clerks of, 308–9, 565– 6n76, 570n106, 575–6n140, 600n82, 615n217; clients of, 223, 241, 373, 424, 497n34, 600n80; foreign policy of, 71, 75, 95, 97, 107, 507n167, 507–8n170, 508n176, 520n3, 538– 9n231; informants and agents of, 45, 376–7, 567n84, 694n307; and interference in diplomacy, 393,

423, 495n2, 509n179, 510n190; as interim foreign secretary, 172f5.1, 191f5.6, 568–9n95, 642n10; and liasse, 439, 703n27; library of, 329; and Louis XIV, 63, 144, 373, 507– 8n170, 525n62; and ­Maintenon, 675n108; as minister, 19, 70–1, 75, 372–6, 423, 646n48; and ­Pomponne, 600n79; and the Pontchartrains, 74; and post office, 179, 342–3, 540n255, 584–5n207, 639n143; preference for dictation of, 558n24; and propaganda, 79; and rivalry with Colberts, 112; and strategy, 373; as survivancier, 63; survivanciers of, 63, 486n83; as war secretary, 143, 145, 200, 267, 491n142, 544n34 Louvre, 152; Académie politique in, 329, 367, 551n113; academies in, 329, 367, 648n63; archives in, 169, 275, 279–80, 311t7.9, 313, 328–32, 367, 462, 563n58, 627n320, 644n33, 648n63, 648n65, 649n67; and élèves du Louvre, 306–7t7.8, 367, 667n98 Lubert, Louis de, 253, 565n70, 605n122, 605n123, 606n133; and brother-in-law Jacques André du Pille, 253 Luc de Rives, 172f5.1, 189f5.5, 189, 568n90, 642n10 Lullier, Marc-Antoine, 172f5.1, 201, 207, 280, 575–6n140; rewards to, 313, 575–6n140 Lully, Jean-Baptiste, 233, 595n40 Luxembourg, François Henri be Montmorency-­Bouteville, duc de, 54, 710n121 Madame. See Orléans, Élisabeth Charlotte of Bavaria, duchesse d’ Maintenon, Françoise d’Aubigné, marquise de (known as Mme de



Index 807

­ aintenon): and Barbezieux, 76, M 390, 675n108; and Beauvillier and Chevreuse, 91, 390, 401, 664n62; chamber of, 216, 378, 403, 521n15, 551n118; and Chamillart, 389–90, 673n84, 701–2n15; clients of, 295, 386–90, 681n177, 706–7n83; and Desmaretz, 90, 134, 391; and diplomatic appointments, 362, 387, 673n90; and dislike of Jesuits, 390– 1; family of, 389, 710n118; and Fénelon, 91, 386–7, 390; and generals, 388–9; and Harcourt, 124, 390, 518n298, 664n62; and Huxelles, 362, 664n62; influence with king, 372, 385–6, 392, 401, 433, 673n84, 674n93, 701–2n15; and Madame, 136, 540n255, 674n94; on Marly, 38; and the Noailles, 266, 389–90, 401; and peace, 391–2, 674n93; and the Pontchartrains, 664n62, 673n84; as “premier minister,” 133; and SaintCyr convent, 610n169; and secret marriage to Louis XIV, 298; and Tallard, 124; and Torcy, 12, 133–4, 214, 385–92, 433, 664n62; and Villars, 362, 388, 674–5n97, 701–2n15; and Voysin, 389–90, 675n111, 694n305 Malebranche, Nicolas, 142, 271 Manchester, Charles Montagu, 4th Earl of, 87, 129–30, 134, 537–8n215, 538n230 mandarins-bureaucrats, 39–40, 68 Mansart, François, 230 Mansart, Jules-Hardouin, 260, 370, 612n186, 612n188, 640n158 marc d’or, 219, 588n229, 588n231, 641n164 Marest (commis), 172f5.1, 188 Maria-Anna of Neuburg, ­dowager queen of Spain, 84, 119, 136, 711–12n136

Maria Louisa of Savoy, Queen (of Spain), 292, 388, 601n86 Marie-Louise d’Orléans, Queen (of Spain), 54–5, 111 Marin, Jeanne-Marie (m. Antoine ­Faucart de Beauchamp and then François Blondel de Vaucresson), 245, 256, 262, 613n198 Marin, Vincent, 245, 262, 603n98, 613n198 Marine. See navy Marly, 38, 381; communication with, 157, 213, 464, 552n131; department clerks at, 153, 156, 278, 378, 491n150; and diplomats, 538n230, 549n91, 659n7; Torcy at, 68, 70, 378, 407, 509n181, 560n39 Marolot, Louis-Bénigne de, 172f5.1, 175, 176t5.1, 194, 207, 227t6.1, 277, 582n186, 625n301, 625n302, 625n303, 639n142; family of, 625n301; wealth and remuneration of, 312t7.10, 315, 573n124, 625n301 Marpon, Jean, seigneur d’Oislon and de Chezeau, 231–2, 234, 593–4n34 Marseille, 223, 318; aldermen of, 210t5.3, 256, 709n111; bishop of, 209t5.3, 258, 287, 447t11.1; Chamber of Commerce of, 248–9, 257, 610n175, 613n195; and domestic administration, 195f5.7, 209–10t5.3, 259, 579n169, 583n193, 703n38, 709n109, 712n138; factions in, 258; and Gleise cabal, 212, 452, 610n165, 610n171, 610n173, 700n4; lobbyist of, 211, 227t6.1, 257–9, 261, 610n169; and navy, 67, 259; and trade, 249, 257, 700n382, 711n125 Marsin (Marcin), Ferdinand, comte de, 262, 289t7.3 Martin (commis), 172f5.1, 280, 628n328

808 Index Martine (Martini), Daniel de, 349, 657n189 Mary of Modena, Queen (of England), 564n65, 680n168 Mathis, Rémi, 70, 164–5 Maugin, Guillaume, 257 Maugin, Joseph Drouin de, 178–9, 280 Maugin, sieur de (commis), 172f5.1, 280, 306–7t7.8, 310, 311t7.9, 312t7.10, 313, 315, 627–8n322, 637n118 Maurocordato (Mavrocordato), ­Alexander, 255, 608–9n154 Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria: in France, 659n18; French diplomats to, 85, 336, 682n185; gift to, 300; as governor general of Spanish Netherlands, 85, 405–6; and Namur courtin-exile, 656n166; and partition treaties, 105, 119–22, 128, 530–1n132, 533n162, 705n64; and peace negotiations, 368, 402, 407–10, 413–14, 668n4, 682n186, 684n201, 685n205, 686n221, 688n240, 688–9n246, 692n283; as possible candidate for Polish throne, 114; subsidies to, 295, 632n44; and Torcy, 58, 296, 668n4, 680n165; and Villars, 124–5. See also German states Mazarin, Jules (cardinal), 73, 78, 188, 228, 230, 246, 329, 478n31, 501n90, 528n108, 603n105, 646n48; creatures of, 16, 63, 72, 192, 200, 235, 562n55, 568n92, 592n26; papers of, 330, 333; property of, 642–3n13 medals: collectors of, 298, 332, 567n84, 648n62; as diplomatic gifts, 179, 300–1, 597n52; as propaganda, 492n153 memory: of bureaucratic procedures, 147–8, 162, 546n52; preserving

i­nstitutional, 6–7, 11, 158–9, 319, 321–8, 468, 582n185 Ménage, Gilles, 571–2n113, 620n260 Mesmes, Jean-Antoine de, 56, 236f6.2, 409, 646n46 Mesnager, Nicolas, 267, 362, 416–17, 425, 432, 687–8n234; trade negotiations 1707–08 of, 411, 417, 419–20; at Utrecht, 223, 278, 432, 589n252, 630n13, 665n73, 699n373 Mézeray, François Eudes, sieur de, 50, 496n16, 624n295 Middleton, Charles Middleton, 2nd Earl of, 154, 203, 459 Mignon, Anne (m. Michel Villedo fils), 230–2 Mignon, Charles, 228–38, 241, 243, 277, 464, 596n49; children of, 597n59, 597n60; clients of, 597n54; and codes, 199, 203–4, 573n121, 575n139, 576n141, 578n161; connections of, 558n20; criticism of, 203–4, 571n109, 573n121; as Croissy’s secretary, 193, 596n50, 567–8n86, 597n51, 597n52; and J-B Racine, 251; kin of, 228–38, 273; and notes as source, ­158–9, 175; offices of, 227t6.1, 317, 467, 554n155; and passports, 202, 573n123, 577n152; as premier commis, 172f5.1, 175, 176t5.1, 193–4, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 204–6, 561n48, 571n110, 571n111, 572n119, 572–3n120, 574n125, 579n165, 579–80n170, 581n183, 624n298; privateering investment of, 318; rewards to, 311, 312t7.10, 315, 596n50, 640n155; and wife ­Catherine Lefouin, 235. See also Fournier, Michel (nephew) Mignon, Charlotte (m. Jean Marpon), 231–2, 592n29 Mignon, François-Marie, 237



Index 809

Mignon, Gertrude (m. Charles Noblet de Morgard), 231–2, 238, 592n27, 593n33, 596n49 Mignon, Henry, 237–8 Mignon, Jacques, 233, 595n42, 595n43, 596n47, 596n49; Louise Le Vau, 233 Mignon, Jeanne (m. Claude Bécuau), 231–2, 593n31 Mignon, Marguerite (m. Nicolas Fournier), 231–2, 238, 593n32, 596n49 Mignon, Michel, 237, 596n49 Mignon, Pascal, 237–8, 596n49 Mignon, Pierre, 172f5.1, 237, 311t7.9, 597n60, 637n118 Mignon, René I, 228–34, 591n17, 591n18, 591n20, 591n21, 592n28, 594–5n40, 596n49; and wife ­Gertrude La Houst, 231, 591n20, 592n27 Mignon, René II, 233–4, 467, 591n17, 595n42, 595–6n44, 596n47, 640n156; and wife Marguerite ­Robert, 233–4, 595–6n44 Mignon fils, Charles, 237 “military-industrial complex,” 10, 243, 250, 253, 467 ministers: archives, 11, 64; clientages of, 9, 27, 39–40, 144, 226, 228, 324, 493–4n180, 563n60, 706– 7n83; cooperation among, 5, 159, 217, 245–6, 253, 337–8, 352, 393, 432, 438–9, 444–5, 458, 551n109, 554n158, 658n203, 690n263, 696n339, 701n8, 702n21; country residences of, 38, 162, 552n131; departments of, 20, 27, 35–6, 40, 42, 62, 142, 156, 179, 562n53; dynasties of, 27, 39–40, 50, 81, 148, 485– 6n80, 506n154, 559n33; locations at Versailles of, 36–8, 41, 70, 491n142, 507n168; as narrowly defined, 140;

rivalries among, 5, 31, 62, 74, 82, 192, 217, 245, 352, 362, 376–7, 392–434, 486n83, 600n79, 680n169, 690n263, 696n341, 701n8 ministre d’État (minister of state). See Conseil minutes (drafts). See paperwork modern, 480n27, 481–2n28; critique of concepts and reality of modernity, 8–9, 21, 27–32, 62, 465, 471, 481n34, 483n46, 486n87, 487n97, 489n117, 543n29, 562–3n56; idea of retirement, 313; paradigm of war, 417–18; sense of time, 161; state, 3–4, 8, 13–14, 19–36, 212, 281, 482n43, 484n63, 485n75, 488n110 Mollo, Francisco, 520n6; and Callières during Nine Years War, 95, 101, 104, 520n3, 524n50; and Callières during War of the Spanish Succession negotiations, 402–9, 413–14, 684–5n204, 685n205, 685n207, 687–8n234, 693n295; disparaged by ­Chamillart’s negotiators, 403, 413–14, 424, 678n143, 688n244, 689n249; and Vauban, 520n3 Monaco, Louis Grimaldi, prince de, 78, 113, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 387 Monasterol, Ferdinand-Augustin de Solar, comte de, 295, 632n44 Moncheny, Louis de, 172f5.1, 189f5.5, 189, 562n55, 568n89 Montespan, Françoise Athénaïs de Rochechouart de Mortemart, marquise de, 82, 274 Montreuil (commis), 172f5.1, 194, 312t7.10 Morel, Jean (abbé), 172f5.1, 189, 523n43, 568n89 Mornay, René Mornay-Montchevreuil, abbé de, 290t7.4, 298–9, 633n65, 673n90

810 Index Morocco: diplomatic relations with, 50, 222–3, 256, 357, 429, 496n16 mourning (le deuil): and ceremonial and innovation, 543n31; and embassy ceremonial, 618n236; embassy expenses for, 290t7.4, 292– 3, 293t7.5, 629n8, 631n28, 632n38; and instructions for national, 450 municipalities: and censorship, 334; and charity, 451; and conflict, 233, 448– 9, 452, 704–5n60, 707n87, 708n93, 709n111, 709–10n112; and corruption, 257–8, 334, 610n173; and elections, 233, 445, 448, 452; and foreign office clerks, 569n100; and governance, 452; and intendants, 442, 610n171; and maintenance of order, 442; officials of, 10, 113, 206, 231– 4, 252, 318, 455, 594n38; and passports, 201; privileges of, 454; routinization in government of, 700n3; and royal power, 211, 610n172, 708n102, 713–14n4 munitionnaires (purveyors), 252–3 Napoleon, Emperor, 19, 32, 411, 417–18, 482n45, 486n88, 487n96, 687n229 naturalization letters (lettres de naturalité), 167t4.1, 207, 231, 360, 581n183, 592n27 navy (Marine): administrative personnel of, 52, 88, 210t5.3, 249, 258, 545n42, 562n53, 566n82, 567– 8n86, 572n116, 605n121, 606n133; archives of, 329, 648n65; and colonies, 161; Council of (Conseil de), 247; and espionage, 352, 376, 446; and experts, 221; and foreign navies, 53; and foreign office clerks cooperating with, 155, 182, 257–9, 432, 550n99, 609n159, 705n66; navy

personnel’s ties with foreign office clerks, 231–2, 234–8, 243, 245–59, 280, 565n70, 595–6n44, 598n61, 605n118, 605n121, 606n133, 606n134, 607n138, 607n139; pre1669 foreign office supervision of, 188f5.4, 246–7, 566n79, 603n155; secretary of household and of, 20, 27, 48, 75, 375, 400–1, 428–34, 436, 484n60, 541n15, 669n20, 697n348; secretary’s role in diplomacy, 78, 100, 255–7, 372–3, 417, 429–30, 432–3, 700n383  neo-dévot, 92 neo-politiques, 90, 381–2, 438 networks: of clients and patrons, 50, 193, 226–8, 454; and communication, 161–2, 470; and family, 80–93, 226–8, 259, 461; of foreign office, 26, 211–24, 257–9, 283; of foreign office clerks, 6, 225–6, 269, 281, 467; information and domestic, 12, 441, 470; information and foreign, 45, 334–40, 376–7, 417, 430– 2, 468, 470, 532–3n154, 670n27, 698n365; and negotiations, 408–9, 425, 687n232; of Republic of Letters, 218–21, 269, 588n237; social science research on, 257–8, 610n174; of spies, 11, 85, 111, 125, 242, 350– 2, 656n166, 689n254; of state with non-state actors, 26, 33–6, 211–12, 257–9, 440–1 Neveu, Bruno, 369, 645n37 New Converts, 270–1; and économat pensions, 270, 274; and foreign embassies, 458; foreign office concerns with, 202, 450–1, 705n69, 706n80, 708–9n103, 711n135; foreign office pensions for, 282, 286, 299, 294t7.6, 302; Torcy’s attitude toward, 88, 445–6, 705–6n73,



Index 811

706n78; working for or with Torcy, 153, 219, 221, 274, 402 Nieupoort, Willem, 404, 408, 681n178 Nijmegen, Congress of, 99, 654n148; Croissy at, 49–50, 100, 235, 424, 644n30, 691n278; documents from, 322; and Mignon and Fournier at, 235, 238, 597n52, 598n61 Nijmegen, Treaty of, 50, 99, 235, 326; Louis XIV’s policy after, 106, 519n1 Nine Years War, 116, 125, 277, 523n43, 710n119; and Croissy’s diplomats, 110, 113, 199, 253, 574n127; economic costs of, 89; negotiations of, 9, 424; and privateering investments, 318; and propaganda, 79, 653n133; and spies, 704n56; and Torcy and negotiations ending, 94–106; and War of the League of Augsburg label, 478n32 Noailles, Adrien Maurice, duc de, 251, 274, 389, 401 Noailles, Anne Jules, duc de, 245, 389, 539n235, 675n100 Noailles, Françoise Charlotte Amble d’Aubigné, duchesse de, 266, 389, 615n218 Noailles, Louis Antoine de (cardinalarchbishop of Paris), 88, 219, 385, 389–90, 657n183, 675n90 nobility, 139, 175, 228, 338, 364, 443, 592n28; acquisition by foreign office personnel of, 226, 227t6.1, 238, 240, 243, 261, 264, 268, 277, 317, 319, 580n173, 590n4, 598n63, 616n224, 625n301, 625n304; clerks from clienteles of, 10, 228–32; as diplomats, 17, 92–3, 113–14, 126, 222, 251, 287, 361, 365–7, 666n84; les importants as, 361–2; and Louis XIV’s court, 36–43, 315, 491n147, 492n158; ministers intermarry with

older, 81, 83, 506n154, 559n33; and Polysynod, 148–51; in prison, 457, 703n38, 712–13n148; of the robe, 126, 241, 309, 325, 362–3, 663n52; and royal patronage, 41, 216, 219, 488n112; and royal power, 39, 440, 451, 480–1n28, 490n136, 492n160; and state service, 19, 33, 237, 299, 307, 339, 493–4n180; strategies for acquiring of, 232, 234, 264, 266, 316–17; of the sword, 113, 126, 319, 325, 361–2, 456, 663n52 Noblet, Charles-François, 238–43; and Beauvillier, 601n89; and daughter Marie-Anne Noblet, 240, 599n69; death of, 243, 601n89, 602n94; and Duke of Burgundy, 242–3, 274, 278, 280, 553n140, 601n89, 639n141, 655n154, 691n280; and Forbin-Janson, 113, 238–40, 242–3, 633n65; in foreign office, 113, 172f5.1, 176t5.1, 207, 241–3, 277–8, 561n50, 582n186, 600n78, 601–2n90; offices of, 227t6.1, 317, 467; and passports, 577n146; in Poland, 239–40, 598– 9n68; and post office, 278, 601n90, 655n154; as premier commis, 175, 205, 241, 274, 466, 514–15n256, 558n21, 581n183, 600–1n85; proposes training embassy secretaries, 366; rewards to, 312t7.10, 314, 601n89, 639n141; in Rome, 240–1, 599n75, 599–600n77; and sisters, 600n82; and son Toussaint Noblet, 240, 243, 599n70, 599n71; in Spain, 241–2, 274, 601n86, 601n87; and Torcy, 84, 238, 553n140, 599n75, 639n141; and Ursins, 240–1, 599– 600n77; and wife (first) Marie-Anne Contenot, 240, 599n69, 599n70; and wife (second) Marguerite Navarre, 240, 599n70 

812 Index Noblet, René-Charles, sieur d’Ozonville, 241, 596n49, 600n82, 600n83; and wife Louise-Françoise d’Arbon, 241 Noblet de Morgard, Charles, 231–2, 238, 240, 593n33, 598n67, 640n156; and wife Gertrude Mignon, 592n27, 596n49 nuncios, papal: and Conseil, 91, 383, 697–8n363; to France, 65, 87, 115– 16, 222, 259, 297t7.7, 365, 383, 458, 518n303, 528n108, 543n28, 568n88, 602n92; as internuncio to Spanish Netherlands, 404, 682n189; and other ministers, 71, 508n178, 518n303, 672n73; to other states, 293t7.5, 503n117; and protocol, 65, 70, 267, 359, 662n29, 662n32; royal gift to, 634n76; and Torcy, 61, 70, 115–16, 350, 355, 359–60, 365, 383–4, 401, 448, 507n161, 560n37, 659n15, 662n34 Obrecht, Ulrich, 107, 184t5.2, 251, 289t7.3, 331, 334, 525–6n67 Odeau, Pierre, 172f5.1, 196f5.8, 283, 316, 630n11, 640n154 office boys, 171, 173f5.1, 174f5.2, 177– 8, 200, 311t7.9, 319, 467, 615n210 Olivet, Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’ (abbé), 271, 571n113, 619n252 Onnekink, David, 119, 128–9, 131 Orange, principality of, 50, 301–2, 384–5, 447t11.1, 513n228, 635n85, 672n64, 673n78, 673n80 Orange, William of. See William III orders, chivalric. See Royal Orders ordonnance, 167t4.1, 207, 278, 283, 293, 294t7.6, 299, 303, 304f7.6, 306–7t7.8, 307; au porteur, 150, 294t7.6, 296, 303, 304f7.6, 305, 306–7t7.8, 309–10, 318, 546–7n59,

629n8, 632n41, 636n106, 638n121, 638n123, 638n128; de deuil, 290t7.4, 293t7.5, 629n8; de voyage, 167t4.1, 286, 294t7.6, 303, 305f7.7, 309, 314, 318, 632n39, 639n142 organic theory, 28–30 Orléans, Élisabeth Charlotte of Bavaria, duchesse d’ (known as Madame and Liselotte), 511n202; as collector of medals, 298; and Palatinate claim, 331, 540n259; and Saint-Prest, 325, 645–6n39; and Torcy, 136–7, 298, 346, 540n255, 540n257, 540n258, 540n259 Orléans, Gaston, 60, 108 Orléans, Philippe I, duc d’ (Monsieur), 55, 103, 331, 598n67, 631n28; daughter’s marriage to Duke of Lorraine, 384 Orléans, Philippe II, duc d’ (duc de Chartres and later regent): and Dubois, 346, 468–70, 534–5n184, 583n195, 699–700n377, 714n6, 714n9; as duc de Chartres, 325; and Order of the Golden Fleece, 216; and Philip V, 457, 619n245, 674n93; as regent, 113, 148–51, 266, 269, 276, 310, 313, 321, 347, 455, 480n27, 510n187, 546n54, 546n58, 547n65, 564n67, 616n221, 619n245, 633n54; renunciations of, 145–6; and secret as regent, 688n239; in Spain, 84; and Torcy, 135, 137, 298, 342, 468–70, 534–5n184, 604n110, 688n239, 699–700n377, 714n6, 714n9. See also Dubois, Guillaume (abbé then cardinal) Orléans family: clients of, 233, 403; and mapmakers, 38 Orry, Jean, 89–90, 262, 398, 430, 678n152 Ottoboni, Pietro. See Alexander VIII



Index 813

Ottoman Empire: Catholic Church and, 297t7.7, 300; communications with, 161, 551n124, 552n130, 633n47; consuls in, 222, 247–50, 254–5, 257, 259, 611–12n182; dragoman in, 254–5, 314; enfant de langues in, 256–7, 263; French diplomats to, 89, 110–12, 164, 183, 184t5.2, 196f5.8, 199, 253–7, 278, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 361, 575n134, 608n149, 608–9n154, 611–12n182, 663n52; foreign relations of, 92, 114, 119–20, 125, 255, 536n197, 608n152, 675n99; gifts to officials of, 301, 634n77; information on, 162, 222, 256–7, 559n27; navy secretary and French diplomats to, 429, 697n356; residences of diplomats in, 604n109 Oudenarde, battle of, 388, 420 Pachau, Louis, 172f5.1; diplomatic missions of, 184t5.2; as premier commis, 188–92, 204, 264, 568n88, 568n89, 568–9n95, 615n210; rewards to, 570n106; and treaty-printing monopoly, 569n98; and work for Croissy, 192–3, 570n107 Pajot, Christophe-Alexandre, marquis de Villers, 345 Pajot, Jean-Baptiste, seigneur de ­Dampierre and abbé de Saint-Loup, 345, 707n83 Pajot, Léon II, comte d’Onsenbray, 343, 345, 653–4n136 Pajot, Louis-Léon, comte d’Onsenbray, 202, 242, 345–6, 656n165, 656n167, 656n175, 657n178 Pajot-Rouillé clan, 344 papacy: and Avignon, 116, 360, 382, 672n64; and Curia, 92, 383; and ecclesiastical appointments, 86, 259,

383, 387–8, 501n96; elections to, 59, 61–2, 65–6, 82, 91, 113–14, 214, 518n303; French diplomats to, 61, 78, 113, 116, 195, 199, 240–2, 247, 252, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289– 90t7.3, 290t7.4, 291, 296, 361–2, 512–13n219, 536n195, 600–1n85, 663n51, 664n57; French relations with, 60–2, 85, 87, 240, 335, 341, 359, 365, 374, 382–4, 387–8, 431, 508n178, 518n303, 543n28, 646n41, 647n52, 650n85; and Gallicanism, 83, 91–2, 433, 588n230, 697–8n363; and papal states, 116, 259, 299, 341, 382, 453; and Rome, 161–2, 179, 182, 214, 241, 345, 599n75, 599– 600n77; and Rota, 115, 184t5.2; and subsidies to papal court, 296, 297t7.7; Torcy visits to, 59–62, 65, 222, 264, 500n78, 500n83, 501n94, 501n96, 539n235. See also nuncios, papal paperwork, 138–9, 152–3, 158–9, 321, 373, 463–4, 491n150, 550n99, 569n100; and apprenticeship, 70; and diplomacy, 7; and documents vs records, 321; of domestic administration, 65, 67, 165–6, 207, 280, 302, 706n82; and drafts (minutes), 25, 45, 106, 158, 160, 163 165, 177, 190, 193–4, 263, 319, 322–3, 325, 352, 376, 387, 495, 562–3n56, 566n81; and expéditions (outgoing items), 65, 67, 165–8, 302; and forms of address, 168; and formularies, 325, 465, 566n77, 601n86; increase in, 25, 40, 165–6, 205, 375, 460; and lists, 166–8; managing foreign office, 5, 37–8, 60, 152, 154, 159–69, 177–8, 180–7, 205–11, 216, 220, 265, 275, 281, 447, 459, 465, 477n28, 509n181, 557n9, 565n75;

814 Index of navy, 246–7, 566n79; and paper trails (or lack of), 7, 80, 40, 148, 165, 320; as preprinted forms, 168– 9, 555n165, 555n167; in private hands, 11, 64, 275, 321–3, 327, 330– 3, 358, 566–7n83, 570n107, 642n9, 642n10, 643n25, 649n75, 649n76, 649n80, 650n81; and registries, 165–6, 167t4.1, 189, 202, 207, 278, 284, 296, 322, 494–5n190, 564n68, 574n126, 581n180, 582n185, 627n316, 636n106, 662n42; and royal household, 41–2; writing supplies for, 168–9, 286, 551–2n126, 555n165, 649n66. See also archives; files Parayre (Paraire), Jean, 172f5.1, 566–7n83, 567–8n86, 568–9n95, 570n107; and clerks’ papers, 643n25, 649n76; and domestic administration, 187–92, 280; as fellow investor with Adam, 264; rewards to, 312t7.10, 313–14, 570n106, 570n107; and treaty-­ printing monopoly, 569n98 Paris: Châtelet of, 234, 273, 303, 330, 455–7, 595–6n44; as information centre, 328–33; policing of, 454–9 Parlement: of Béarn (Pau), 704n58; of Brittany (Rennes), 428, 439; of ­Dauphiné (Grenoble), 207, 261, 703n35; of Franche-Comté ­(Besançon), 589n25; of ­Languedoc (Toulouse), 261; of Metz, 48, 193, 233, 240, 249, 571n112, 572–3n120, 595n42; of Paris, 48, 50, 91, 111, 232–3, 272–3, 279, 299, 325, 328, 330, 337, 345, 362, 379, 382–3, 429, 431, 454, 591n22, 599n69, 646n46; of Provence (Aix), 141, 207, 209–10t5.3, 385, 439, 442, 545n46, 581n181, 696n343, 709n111

parlements: gens du roi in, 228, 233; and Louis XIV, 50, 451, 697–8n363, 709n111, 713–14n4; personnel of, 48, 240, 261, 318; and registration of legislation and remonstrances, 145– 7, 437; supervised by foreign office, 145–6, 168, 279, 441; supervised by other secretaries of state, 437 partition treaty, 9, 15 94–5, 107–28, 131–2, 162, 205, 254, 393, 471, 531n143, 535n186, 538n229, 659n15; with Austria, 122, 534n179; as basis for negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 402–13; First, 79, 117–29, 131, 529n116, 533n155, 536n199; Second, 128–31, 391, 534n183, 536n197 passports: foreign office processing of, 154–5, 158–60, 177, 201–3, 207, 238, 278–9, 281, 467, 577n146, 577n152, 578n153, 581n183, 626n307; French diplomats, agents, and, 54, 154, 221, 235, 423; French embassies and, 363; other government agencies issuing, 201, 548– 9n84, 551n109, 581n183, 710n115; and Jews, 577n145; and pre-printed, 168, 555n165 patrimonialism, 24–5, 40, 268, 483–4n59 patronage. See clientelism Pecquet, Michel, 267, 617n226 Pecquet fils, Antoine, 268, 561n49, 616n224, 616n225; and Discours sur l’art de négocier, 17–18, 267, 366, 479n16, 666n89 Pecquet père, Antoine, 266–9, 617n227, 618n239; and Académie politique, 366–7; and archives, 329; bureau of, 194–9, 491n150, 558n22, 561n46, 561n47, 582–3n190, 637n116; and Claude Le Pelletier, 617n228,



Index 815

617n229, 617n231, 618n232; and deciphering letters, 575n134; and Dubois, 268–9, 616n224, 619n247, 619n248, 714n9; and fortifications, 617n227, 617n228; and his commis, 237, 269, 280, 306–7t7.8, 310, 311t7.9, 561n46, 561n47, 637n118, 638n122; and Hooke mission, 153– 60, 550n99; and Marshal Huxelles, 546n54, 547n61, 619n243; offices of, 227t6.1, 317, 546n56, 554n155, 618n238, 618n241; as passport sponsor, 202; as premier commis, 172f5.1, 176t5.1, 205, 267, 311t7.9, 366, 466, 548n71, 548n73, 574n125, 574n126, 618n232, 618n235, 618n236, 694n312; residence of, 590n3; rewards to, 268–9, 306– 7t7.8, 310, 312t7.10, 313, 580n171, 618n241, 631–2n35, 638n123, 706– 7n83; as secretary to Council of Foreign Affairs, 148–53, 263, 470, 546n58, 565n74 Pedro II, King (of Portugal), 51–4, 111– 12, 497n27 Pénicaut, Emmanuel, 425–6, 428, 695n323 pensions: to cabinet ushers, 216, 596n217; to clergy, 387, 706–7n83, 710n123; definition of, 637n111, 639n134; as department expense, 286, 294t7.6, 301–2, 629n8, 636n106; to embassy personnel, 301; to foreign office personnel, 211, 309, 313–14, 484n68, 570n106, 570n107, 631–2n35, 638n128; to foreign princes and officials, 110, 115, 255, 282, 286, 296–8, 297t7.7, 364–5, 528n106, 564n67, 608– 9n154, 633n56, 635n83, 682n185; to French diplomats, 657–8n192; and hierarchy, 292; and humanitar-

ian motives, 298; from lobbyists, 258, 318; to New Converts, 270, 274, 282, 286, 294t7.6, 299, 620n260; from provincial estates, 583n191; to retired diplomats, 254, 314; to retired foreign office personnel, 25, 276, 282, 294t7.6, 313–14, 575–6n140, 579–80n170, 623–4n294, 624n297, 624n298, 639n137; to secretaries of state and ministers, 541n16, 637n113; to those with connections, 298–9, 514n254, 515n264, 603n100 Pepys, Samuel, 235–6 Peter I the Great, Tsar (of Russia), 105, 331, 345, 433 Petitfils, Jean-Christian, 341, 374 Petkum, Herman van: as mediator and negotiator, 300, 307, 350, 680– 1n170; as not trusted by Torcy, 692n282; and Pajot, 346; and 1706–07 negotiations, 136, 419– 20, 565n69; and 1708 contact with Torcy, 692n287, 692n288, 692– 3n293; and 1709–10 negotiations, 350, 381 Philip II, King (of Spain), 462, 479n19 Philip IV, King (of Spain), 55, 119, 531n145 Philip V, King (of Spain) (Philippe, duc d’Anjou), 84, 390, 430, 575n134, 605–6n125; and acceptance of Spanish crown as duc d’Anjou, 115, 394– 6; as duc d’Anjou, 555n162; and duc d’Orléans, 136–7, 457, 534–5n184, 619n245, 674n93; French diplomats to, 109, 112, 418, 444; and French generals, 679n158; and French post office, 242, 346; journey to Spain of, 89, 241–2; Maintenon’s correspondence with, 388, 674n93; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 407–10, 415, 418–19,

816 Index 671n47; and partition negotiations, 531–2n132; renunciations of French crown of, 145; and Torcy, 388, 392, 398, 457, 505n146, 516n263, 539n235, 542n21, 670–1n39, 679n153; and Torcy’s staff, 220, 241–2, 262, 601n86, 657–8n192, 678n151 Picavet, Camille, 4, 179, 285, 373 Pigeon, Gabriel, 169, 196f5.8, 213, 584n206 Place des Victoires, 329, 331, 642n10, 648n65 plume, la (the pen). See cabinet secretaries Poland, 72, 101, 104–5, 109, 111, 161, 164, 256, 330, 350, 361, 479n12, 496n24, 548n75, 598n68, 607n145, 631n10; and Danzig, 57, 115, 296, 351, 430, 548n73, 633n47; French diplomats in, 107, 114, 184t5.2, 238, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 296, 360, 656n166; royal elections in, 104, 115, 265 Political Academy. See Académie politique Polysynod, 72; and conciliar government, 138, 148–52, 347, 510n187, 546n58; and continuity with Louisquatorzian practices, 21, 148– 52, 268, 468, 483n49; and Torcy’s staff serving, 276, 311t7.9, 616n221 Pomereu, Auguste Robert de, 594n38 Pomereu, Jean-Baptiste, 384 Pomponne, Catherine-Félicité de. See Torcy, Catherine-Félicité de Pomponne, marquise de Pomponne, Henri-Charles Arnauld (abbé), 68, 85–6, 116; as ambassador to Venice, 184t5.2, 242, 278, 335–6, 351, 626n311, 646n41, 658n203, 665n73; and bankers, 307, 635n83;

as candidate for other postings, 378, 516n271; and Entresol, 369; and Mme de Torcy, 435; and passports, 202; and pre-printed forms, 168–9; rewards to, 630n10; and Torcy, 417, 518n303, 541n13, 559n27, 576n141, 651n100, 661n27, 667n95 Pomponne, Nicolas-Simon Arnauld, chevalier then marquis de, 85, 343 Pomponne, Simon Arnauld, marquis de: and Beauvillier, 71, 76, 135; on Conseil, 45, 66, 70–5, 77–9, 95–7, 106, 503n123, 507n165, 509n181, 510n193, 510n195, 511–12n205, 520n3, 579n165, 672–3n77; and Croissy, 69–72, 366, 505n150, 505– 6n151, 506n154, 508n178, 509n184, 510n193; and daughter’s marriage to Torcy, 68–9, 73, 76, 505n150, 505–6n151, 506n154; disgrace of, 45, 192, 194, 505n150, 570n106, 571n109; foreign office under, 143, 172f5.1, 173–5, 188–94, 191f5.6, 205, 567–8n86, 569n97; foreign policy of, 70–2, 79–80, 94–8, 106–7, 509n184, 520n13; and kin and former personnel in Torcy’s service, 108, 111, 113, 200, 219, 221, 225, 232, 238–41, 264, 276–7, 280, 312t7.10, 313–14, 343, 366, 499n72, 594n36, 625–6n305, 654n148; legacy of, 9, 95, 132, 461; and Le Pelletier, 71, 512n212, 538n229; Le Telliers, 600n79; on Louis XIV’s understanding of state affairs, 26; and mentorship of Torcy, 9, 45, 69–80, 94–8, 100, 106, 132–7, 359, 384, 507n161, 509n184, 512n212, 512n213, 512n215; papers of, 321, 642n10; as post office superintendent, 78, 342, 344, 512–13n219, 653–4n136; residences of, 507n168, 642n10; as



Index 817

s­ ecretary of state, 15–16, 559n26; and Torcy negotiating partition treaties, 118–32, 530–1n132, 533n157; and wife Catherine ­Ladvocat Arnauld, marquise de Pomponne, 85, 559n27, 628n324, 654n148; work style of, 72, 509n185, 562–3n56, 569n96 Pontchartrain, Jérôme Phélypeaux de: and cartographers, 38; and ­Chamillart, 690n263, 701n8; clients of, 252–3, 664n62; and ­Desmaretz, 700n382; and foreign office personnel, 246, 256, 609n159, 629n8; informants of, 351, 697n356; interference by, 27, 372–3, 461, 486n84, 698n369, 699n375; as navy and household secretary, 20, 256, 259, 417, 428–34, 552n130, 554n157, 577n145, 590n8, 609n157, 611–12n182, 637n113, 648n65, 661n25, 700n383, 700n386; as nonminister secretary, 70, 375, 401; and policing of Paris, 455–8, 698n364, 698n367; and relations with parents, 696n345; as survivancier, 63–4, 75, 502n106, 502–3n112; and Torcy, 78, 217, 222, 275, 337, 364, 372–3, 428–34, 549n94, 608n153, 639n141, 669n20, 672n73, 680n169, 697n356, 698n369, 699n374, 699n375, 702n21, 705n66; and Vauban, 223 Pontchartrain, Louis Phélypeaux de: and cartographers, 38; and censorship, 273–4; and ­Chamillart, 690n263, 701n8; as ­chancellor, 135, 141, 147, 338, 390, 491n142, 696n343, 700n381, 702n23, 702n25; clients of, 253, 428, 664n62, 696n341; on Conseil, 72, 74–5, 375, 379, 382, 384, 402, 503n123, 669n20; and consuls, 247;

as ­controller general, 62, 635n83; and Desmaretz, 90, 700n382; on Dispatches, 438–9, 448; and ­foreign office personnel, 246; lampoon of, 386; and Le Telliers, 74; and ­Maintenon, 673n84, 681n177; as navy and household secretary, 20, 249–50, 256, 417, 429–30, 456, 523n41, 711n133; relations with son, 696n345; and religious matters, 219, 240, 504–5n139; and scholars, 220; and Torcy, 433, 438–9, 484– 5n69, 521n15, 697n352 Porte. See Ottoman Empire Portland, Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of: partition negotiations, 87, 116–23, 127–9, 162, 346, 529n109, 529n111, 529n114, 529n115, 529n116, 530n124, 530n126, 530– 1n132, 531n138, 531n141, 532n147, 533n155, 533n156, 533n157, 536n199, 537n204, 659n15, 661n27, 661–2n28; Ryswick negotiations, 77, 104–5, 524n50 Portugal: defection to Grand Alliance, 398, 679n153; diplomats in France, 135, 360; and foreign office bureaus, 164, 183, 574n126; French diplomats to, 111–12, 184t5.2, 195, 219, 263, 299, 361, 673n90; negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 406; and partition negotiations, 162; J. Pontchartrain and French diplomat to, 429–30; Torcy, J. Pontchartrain, and Imperial diplomat to, 458, 713n151; Torcy visits, 51–6, 60 post office (Postes), 342–8, 465: controllers general of, 213, 343; court postal bureau of, 196f5.8, 213, 555n167; dishonest personnel of, 11, 456, 584n202, 626n307, 652n113; earlier superintendents of, 103,

818 Index 342–3, 512–13n219, 670n27; and Farmers-General of the Posts (ferme général), 10, 306t7.8, 310, 343, 649n80; and foreign post offices, 321, 334, 337, 346–7, 352, 416, 550n104, 650–1n93, 656n166; funds of, 179, 303, 306t7.8, 307t7.7, 310, 635n90; inspectors (visiteurs des postes) of, 213, 266, 639n143, 654n148, 655n153; and mail, 43, 162; and maitre de poste (relay postmaster) and relay stations, 156, 159, 169, 213–14, 278, 280, 343–4, 346, 584n205, 584n206, 639n143, 654n149, 655n153, 712n138; organization of, 212–13, 343–4, 347– 8; Paris postmaster for horses of, 196f5.8, 213; and postal bureaus (bureaux de poste), 103, 333, 343–7, 352, 654n142, 655n160; and postal council, 347; and postal guards, 179, 196f5.8, 213, 294t7.6, 306t7.8, 560n40; and rate hikes, 654n144; routes of, 85, 103, 146f4.1, 156, 169, 242, 303, 344–5, 552n128, 584n200, 635n89, 654n148; schedules of, 552n128, 552n129, 552n131, 564n64; spies and, 201, 349, 352, 656n166, 712n138; Torcy and, 78, 81, 151, 159, 169–71, 196f5.8, 217, 278, 321, 339, 342–8, 467–9, 540n258, 552n128, 655n160. See also Cabinet noir; couriers; Pajot, Louis-Léon, comte d’Onsenbray  Pot de Rhodes family, 591; Claude, 228, 232; François, 228; Marguerite d’Aubray, 228 Poussin, Jean-Baptiste, 111, 287; in Denmark, 184t5.2, 278, 564n68; in Germany, 290t7.4, 292; in Rome, 599n75; and spies, 111, 350–1, 527n89

power: balance of, 117, 120, 122, 341, 469, 532n148, 536n197; clerks and, 6–7, 10, 22, 25–7, 159–60, 230, 243, 257–8, 266, 281, 443, 459, 467, 486n84, 541n9; and information, 5–7, 12, 228, 320–55, 371–434, 451, 462, 469–70, 668n5; Louis XIV and, 18–20, 26, 33, 35–43, 216, 314, 357–8, 449, 452; and reason, 32; and state, 34. See also gifts Prailly, Claude de, 343, 555n167, 654n142 premier or principal commis (first or principal clerk): after 1715, 16, 546n54; functions and powers of, 12, 152–60, 166–8, 173–207, 211, 225– 6, 228, 315, 370, 463–7, 554n158, 557n9, 557n10, 561n49, 562n55, 562–3n56, 566–7n83, 567–8n86, 581n183, 582n185, 631–2n35; status and rewards to, 225–7, 237, 262, 277, 309–19, 467, 559n33, 580n171, 590n5, 590n9, 631–2n35, 636n107; of Torcy, 172–3f5.1, 175– 7, 176t5.1, 227t6.1, 237, 241–2, 276, 279, 281, 283, 581n183, 602–3n97. See also commis (clerks) premier secrétaire (chief secretary): duties of, 177, 181–3, 201; title of, 173, 557n10; Torcy’s, 176t5.1, 182–3, 558n23. See also secretariat, foreign office Presle, Jean Pré de Seigle des, 178–9, 707n83 Prévost, Jean de, 172f5.1, 196f5.8, 266, 283–4, 316t7.11, 316, 616n222, 630n10, 630n11 Prior, Matthew, 457, 661n27, 690n258; on J. Pontchartrain, 433, 699n374; and mail, 346, 653–4n136; and negotiations, 267, 350, 419, 517n296, 658n193; and Torcy, 90, 133–4, 203, 359–60, 507n163, 517n296,



Index 819

539n245, 671n50, 699n374; and Torcy’s family, 82–3, 359, 675n100; and Torcy’s staff, 267, 548n74, 574n126, 580n171 prisons and prisoners, 446, 456–7, 703n38; and Abbaye, 457; and Amiens, 583n190, 704n51; and Angers, 273; and Bastille, 65, 142, 190, 207, 230, 331, 341, 347, 443, 457–8, 573n120, 578n155, 582– 3n190, 584n202, 608n153, 657n178, 694n312, 704n51, 706n81, 711n133, 712n138, 712–13n148; foreign office and, 13, 65, 207, 242, 286, 294t7.6, 303, 443, 446, 456–7; and For [sic] l’Évêque, 457; and Nantes, 443; and Petit Châtelet, 273, 697n352; and Saint Lazare convent, 457; and ­Saumur, 273, 623n291; and Vincennes, 457, 704n51, 712–13n148 professions: conservatism of, 488n108; and ena, or National School of Administration (École nationale d’administration), 369; and information, 7–8; professional advancement in, 6, 264, 310; and professionalization and professionalism, 7–8, 11, 93, 220, 226, 251, 266–9, 281, 328, 355, 365–70, 424, 465, 470–1, 489n119, 619n248, 667n102; training for, 62. See also apprenticeship propaganda, 79–80, 132, 272, 652n121; archival documents and, 7, 327–8, 333, 462; and bureau de presse (press office), 647–8n58; Croissy and, 79–80, 333; sermons as, 653n133; Torcy and, 85, 108, 218–20, 223, 275, 333–42, 349, 352, 467–8, 604n110, 657n191 Protestants: as bankers, 283, 299, 635– 6n92; and diplomacy, 100, 127, 221, 404, 684n197; and espionage, 348,

444, 653n130, 711n135; in France, 269–70, 437, 445–6, 450; and propaganda, 219, 272; as refugees, 202, 221, 270–2, 384, 565n73, 577n148, 706n77; and treatment by Croissy, 507–8n170 protocol. See ceremonial public administration. See governance public opinion, 3, 79, 101, 105, 338, 342, 428, 442, 513n235; Dubos on, 647n57; Torcy kept informed of, 102, 221, 336, 361, 705–6n73, 710n115 public sphere, 338–9, 652n113, 653n135 publishers, 621n263; collaboration with, 67, 340, 640n155; monitoring of, 67, 334, 338; purchases abroad through, 336–7 Pussort, Henri, 80, 86–7, 245, 513n238 Puyzieulx, Roger Brulart de Sillery, marquis de, 112, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 332, 334, 516n271, 576n142, 576–7n143, 627n316, 673n90; and Torcy’s staff, 618n239 Quietism, 91, 386, 519n311 Quiros, Don Bernardo de, 105, 524n50, 525n56, 682n186 Racine, Jean, 97, 193, 250–1, 512n213, 571–2n113, 579–80n170, 606n125, 606n131 Racine, Jean-Baptiste, 251–2, 579– 8n170, 606n131 Radziojowski, Michael (cardinal), 114, 656n166 Raisin, Grégoire, 214, 585n208 Rákóczi, Prince Ferenc II: in exile, 296, 364–5, 633n52, 659n18; uprising, 85, 110, 259, 295–6, 394, 633n51, 633n52

820 Index Ramillies, battle of, 401, 408, 427 Ranuzzi, Angelo Maria (nuncio), 222, 365, 589n246, 634n69 Rastadt, Treaty of, 368–70, 665n70, 667n101 Ratisbon, Truce of, 54, 66 Ravat, Louis, 206, 209t5.3 Rébenac, François de Pas, comte de, 264, 570n106, 571n109, 571n111, 711n124 Regency. See Dubois, Guillaume (abbé then cardinal); Polysynod; Orléans, Philippe II, duc d’ Relais. See post office Religion prétendu reformée (so-called Reformed Religion, the Protestants). See Protestants; New Converts remuneration. See acquits; appointements; gages; gratifications; pensions Renaudot, Eusèbe (abbé): and Académie politique, 327, 367; and espionage, 102, 446, 502n109, 523n42, 532–3n154; and foreign office, 313, 338–9; and Gazette, 67, 212, 339; as literary figure, 219, 221, 587n225; and Torcy, 67, 91, 133, 212, 218, 252, 265, 339, 400, 504n135 Renel, Louis de Clermont d’Amboise, chevalier marquis de, 83–4, 266 Republic of Letters: and brain trust, 10, 219–20; Torcy and, 219, 221, 577n148; and Torcy’s staff, 6, 218, 269–76, 619n252, 621n263 Richard, Joseph, sieur de Tussac, 256, 609n161 Richard, Joseph-Jean, 256 Richard d’Abenour, André-François, 256 Richard de Tussac, Louis, 263 Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis de (cardinal), 188, 228, 230, 329, 493n173, 594n34, 646n48; clients

of, 200, 232; and navy, 188f5.4, 246; on negotiations, 418, 684n203; papers of, 331 Rigaud, Hyacinthe, 242, 601n87 Robert, Claude I, 233, 595–6n44 Robert, Claude II, 233–4, 273, 595–6n44 Rohan, Hercule Mériadec, duc de, 208t5.3, 655n160 rolle, the (Rolle des placets), 82, 207, 309, 314–16, 584n202, 624n298 Roosen, William, 131, 393 Rose, Toussaint, 216–17, 554–5n161 Rossi, Chevalier, 287, 362 Rossignol, Antoine, 200–1, 314; and son Bonaventure-Charles, 200, 314, 575n137, 575–6n140, 639n137 Rouillé, Antoine, 343–4, 655n155 Rouillé, Pierre Du Coudray, baron de Marbeuf, 111–12, 184t5.2, 289t7.3, 528n90; as envoy to Max Emmanuel, 336, 406, 408, 410–11, 413–14, 682n185, 689n246; and 1709 peace negotiations, 218, 423, 426; and Torcy, 115, 218, 362 Rouillé du Coudray, Hilaire, 172f5.1, 190, 191f5.6 Rowlands, Guy, 400, 418 Royal Orders: and Adam, 318, 586n216, 588n231, 641n164; ceremonies of, 38, 42; chevaliers of, 98, 585n211; and Order of the Golden Fleece, 216; and Order of the Holy Spirit, 41–2, 214–15, 215f5.11, 219, 585n211, 587–8n229, 588n230; and Order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem and of Notre-Dame of Mount Carmel, 227t6.1, 240; and Order of Saint-Michel, 585n211; and state building, 214; Torcy as officer of, 81, 86, 196f5.8, 214–15, 641n164; Torcy and work of, 10, 171, 219, 294t7.6,



Index 821

302, 586n216, 588n230, 588n231. See also marc d’or Russia, 92, 104–5, 109, 111, 185t5.2, 199, 331, 363, 433, 552n134, 555n161, 650n81 Ryswick, Treaty of: aftermath of, 79, 94–5, 117, 131, 133, 166, 177, 183, 199, 216, 254, 262–3, 329–30, 344, 360, 366, 385, 429–30, 445, 522– 3n154, 542n24, 631n25, 640n155, 667n96; foreign office reorganization after, 464; French diplomatic expansion after, 106–16, 121, 195, 280, 286–7, 365; negotiation of, 15, 77, 94–107, 157, 175, 182, 199, 221, 288t7.1, 334, 394, 424, 454, 509n182, 522n29, 522n36, 525n60, 525–6n78, 667n95, 672n64; and Orange, 513n228 Sacerdoti, Raphael (and his brother), 307, 351, 658n201 Sainctot, Nicolas II: and audiences, 356–8, 508, 659n11; as introducer of ambassadors, 356–8; journal of, 356; as master of ceremonies, 87, 659n10; and protocol, 508n178, 659n10, 661n27, 662n39; and Torcy, 358, 661n26 Sainte-Colombe (embassy secretary), 112, 334 Saint-Olon, François Pidou de, 222–3, 589n248 Saint-Pierre, Charles Irénée Castel (abbé), 571–2n113 Saint-Pierre, duchesse de. See Croissy, Marie (Marguerite)-Thérèse ­Colbert de Saint-Pierre, François-Marie Spinola, prince de Sabionetta and duc de, 84–5; and dowager queen of Spain, 515n263, 515n264, 515n265; and

Utrecht negotiations, 85, 368, 515n267 Saint-Pouange, Gilbert Colbert de, 75, 588n231, 615n217 Saint-Prest, Jean-Yves de, 172f5.1, 177, 311t7.9, 325–8, 645n37, 647n49; and Académie politique, 275, 313, 328, 367, 369–70; and collaborators at archive, 275, 280, 619n252; family of, 325, 645n38; library of, 645n37; and Louvre archive, 177, 195f5.7, 196f5.8, 279, 325–8, 330– 1, 367, 369–70, 647–8n58, 649n76; and Orléans family, 325, 645–6n39; rewards to, 306t7.8, 311t7.9, 313, 318; writings of, 325–6, 370, 404, 646n41, 646n42, 646n46, 646n47 Saint-Remy (abbé), 405, 682–3n192 Saint-Romain, Melchior de Harod de Senevas de, 52–4, 56 Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de, 286, 646n44; on the acceptance of Carlos II’s testament, 538n220; as ambassador to Spain, 616n225; on audiences, 356; on Barbezieux, 677n135; on Bonrepaus, 126; on the Colberts, 82, 92; on the Conseil, 375, 379–80; on court cabals, 92; on Croissy and Pomponne, 505n150; and dislike of secretaries of state, 375, 510n187; on Harcourt, 677n134; on Huxelles, 546n54; and information from Torcy, 77, 427; on Jérôme Pontchartrain, 429; on Lauzun, 682–3n192; on Louis XIV, 38–9, 412, 480n20, 492n156, 546n58; on ministerial rivalry, 394, 438; on Mme de Torcy, 82, 91; on parallel/divided diplomacy, 411–13, 423, 426–8, 681n177, 687n232, 695n325; and peace party, 402; on secretary of state for the rpr, 437;

822 Index on Tallard, 123, 529n110; on Torcy, 118, 133, 135, 324, 380, 648n65, 714n9; on Torcy’s mentorship, 69, 77–8, 512n215 Salaberry, Charles d’Irumberry de, 256, 258, 609n159 salons, 269; of duchesse de Saint-Pierre, 223; Torcy and, 59, 212, 623n289; of Ursins in Rome, 59, 240, 599– 600n77; in Vienna, 125 Salviati, Averardo, marquis of Montiéri, 275, 621n262 Samoyault, Jean-Pierre, 4–5, 179, 183 Sarmant, Thierry, 20, 71, 74 Saumery, Jean-Baptiste de Johanne de la Carre, comte de, 287, 290t7.4 Scotland. See Jacobite secrétaire, definition of, 557n10 secrétaire à la conduit des ambassadeurs (secretary to conduct ambassadors), 268 secrétaires-commis. See secretaries of state secrétaires-conseillers politiques. See secretaries of state secrétaire des commandements, 139, 331, 639n141 secretariat, foreign office: after 1715, 561n49, 563–4n62, 619n245; before Torcy, 189f5.5, 195f5.7, 283, 563– 4n62; definition of, 556n1; under Torcy, 181–3, 187, 196f5.8, 202–3, 262–3, 278, 283–4, 310, 563–4n62. See also premier secrétaire secretaries of state, 13, 138–47, 384; and domestic administration, 8, 12, 35, 315, 435–59, 494n190, 541n7, 553n150, 554n158; family of, 80; issuing passports, 201; and ­naturalization, 581n183; power and prestige of, 40–2, 138, 226; and Regency, 13, 148, 268, 276; rivalry

among, 5, 12, 24, 430, 696n339; as secrétaires-commis, 72–6, 76, 374–5, 510n186; as secrétaires-conseillers politiques, 72–6, 374–5, 510n186; as secretaries of the king’s chamber (secrétaires de la chambre du roi), 42; specialization of, 28–30, 138, 141–4, 147, 375, 393, 542n23, 544n34; staff of, 180–1, 309, 318, 559n30, 561n51; wealth of, 318; and work with king, 63. See also couriers; departments; Dispatches; dynasties; liasse, la secretary of the king (secrétaire du roi), 83; confers nobility, 232, 234, 316; as corporate body, 226, 238, 240; duties and powers of, 149, 166, 194, 241, 316, 494–5n190; foreign office staff as, 149, 166, 194, 195f5.7, 227t6.1, 240–1, 260, 264, 268, 316– 17, 467, 546n56, 570n107, 581n183, 637n115; and naturalization letters, 581n183; price of office of, 81, 316, 618n241; secretaries of state as, 81, 226; and strategy of family ascent, 226, 228, 232–4, 238, 253, 260–1, 268, 362, 467, 514–15n256, 592– 3n30, 593–4n34, 600n82, 600n83, 607n138, 611n176 secret du roi: under Louis XIV, 372, 376, 412–16, 425–7, 688n239, 696n334; under Louis XV, 688n239 Seignelay, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de, 20, 143, 544n34, 573n122, 696n341; and admiralty, 236; agents of, 53; and Bonrepaus, 126, 250, 604n115; children of, 65, 87, 391; on Conseil, 75, 508n176, 511n199, 511n202; and consuls, 247–9; and experts, 221; kin and clients of, 88–9, 126, 245, 250–1, 258, 571–2n113; and mapmakers, 38; papers of, 332;



Index 823

policies of, 71, 75, 97, 107, 507– 8n170, 520n3; and quarrels with Croissy, 80, 86–7, 135, 245; as survivancier, 63–4, 139; and Torcy, 65, 87–8 Sermenté, Michel, sieur de Montalais, 173f5.1, 279–80, 311t7.9, 637n118; rewards to, 312t7.10, 313 servants. See domestics Sévigné, Charles de, 704–5n60 Sévigné, Marie Rabutin-Chantal, marquise de (known as “Mme de S­évigné”), 568n95, 704–5n60 Sharp, Paul, 398, 410 Sinzendorf, Philip Louis, Count von, 129–30, 549n91 Soll, Jacob, 6, 37, 144 Sophie, Electress (of Hanover), 142, 540n257 Sourches, Louis François de Bouschet, marquis de, 75, 78–9, 422, 425, 437 Souzy. See Le Peletier de Souzy, Michel Spain: and Barcelona, 56, 105, 399, 408, 678n152; Council of State of, 537–8n215, 678n151; diplomats from, 109; and duc d’Orléans, 136, 145, 674n93; foreign ministry of (1815–1936), 7–8, 477n28; French diplomats to, 116, 164, 171, 183, 184t5.2, 187, 195, 196f5.8, 220–1, 262–3, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 361–4, 534n165, 616n225, 663n52; French post office and, 388, 654n148, 674n94; and Gibraltar, 120, 401; intelligence on, 349, 399, 634n81, 697n356; and Nijmegen negotiations, 635; and Nine Years War and peace negotiations, 103–6; post–1715 relations of, 269, 468–9, 714n9; and Torcy’s role in, under Philip V, 84, 90, 216, 219, 223, 388– 92, 397–9, 430, 575n135, 588n230,

664n62, 678n151, 678n152, 679n153, 679n156, 679n158; Torcy’s visit to, 54–6. See also Carlos II, king of Spain; Philip V, King (of Spain) (Philippe, duc d’Anjou); Spanish succession Spanheim, Ezéchiel, 360, 573n123; on Bergeret, 193–4, 572n116; on Croissy, 508n170, 509n179, 509n181 Spanish Netherlands, 66, 99, 105, 242, 346, 350, 402, 406, 408–9, 422, 425, 427, 530–1n132, 537n208, 550n104, 685n205, 694n307; and Antwerp, 154–6, 159, 231, 550n104, 684n197; and Brussels, 77, 78, 85, 98, 105, 213, 287, 290t7.4, 295, 336, 344, 404, 406–8, 410, 416, 523n43, 579n166, 583n191, 682n185, 686n223, 687n234; Max Emmanuel of Bavaria governor general of, 85, 105, 405 Spanish succession: negotiating a settlement to avoid war over, 9, 15, 85, 94–5, 99–100, 107–8, 116–34, 361, 366–7, 381, 392–428, 444, 461, 471, 503n117, 522n31, 529n109, 529n112, 530n124, 530–1n132, 532n147, 532n150, 532n153, 533n162, 534–5n184, 535n185, 537n208, 631n28, 705n64; War of the, 132, 135, 147, 199, 205, 275– 7, 283, 299, 327, 333–4, 340, 342, 345, 350, 361, 366–7, 381, 391–6, 399, 401–28, 430–2, 469, 505n146, 577n151, 629n6, 682n184, 684n197, 686n218 Spanish West Indies: Dutch trade with, 416, 422, 530–1n132, 684n197; French trade with, 406, 411, 416–17; in negotiations, 130, 532n150 Spies. See espionage

824 Index Stair, John Dalrymple, Earl of, 468–70, 619n247, 714n9 steering. See governance strategy. See generals; Louis XIV Stuarts. See Jacobites subsidies: to Bavarian Wittelsbachs, 285, 626n307, 632n44, 632n45; to Cologne Wittelsbachs, 285; to England, 535n185, 597n51; to foreign diplomats, 350; to foreign princes, 79, 107, 109, 183, 282–3, 360; to Hungary, 285, 295–6; in local currency, 283, 629n7; Louis XIV on value of, 628n3; management of, 183, 262–3, 278; to Rome, 296; shortage of funds for, 629n6; to Swiss, 301, 635n83; totals of, 285–6, 293–6 superintendent of buildings, 510n190, 703n27 superior court. See parlements surintendant général des postes et relais (superintendent of posts and relay stations). See post office survivanciers, 73, 87, 238, 540– 1n2, 638n131; in royal household, 41; secretaries of state as, 62–4, 76, 466, 486n83, 502n106, 502–3n112, ­505–6n151, 566n79, 568n88, 702n19; Torcy as, 9, 45, 53, 62–9, 76, 139, 194, 204, 444, 461, 501–2n99 Sweden: diplomats from, 662n42; dispute with France over Deux-Ponts, 385, 542n24; embassy chapel in, 363, 665n70; embassy personnel in, 573n121; French diplomats in, 66, 83, 108–10, 163, 183, 185t5.2, 187, 194, 203, 252, 278, 287, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289–90t7.3, 290t7.4, 292, 361, 548n72, 553n142, 569n105; mediation at Ryswick, 77, 99, 101;

Mignon’s medal from king of, 597n52; and partition treaties, 130, 537n205; relations with other states, 104, 110–11, 269, 331, 433; Torcy’s visit to, 49, 57–8 Swiss Cantons: Abbé Pomponne considered for posting to, 86, 516n271; Basel, 334, 350–1, 385, 657n191; diplomacy in, 522n31, 537n211, 631n28; and foreign office clerks, 164, 183, 195, 196f5.8, 199, 242; French diplomats to, 67, 82, 112, 184t5.2, 199, 263, 287, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 361, 363, 663n52, 673n90; and French propaganda, 340–1; gifts to French clients in, 179, 634n76; the Grisons, 330, 335, 631n28, 658n203; and partition treaties, 130, 334; as peace congress site, 99, 263; publications and news, 333–7; Soleure, 179, 301, 333–4, 552n129; subsidies to, 301, 635n83; Swiss Leagues, 286, 301, 302f7.5; troops in French pay, 265, 279, 297, 646n42 Tallard, Camille d’Hostun, comte de, 529n110; and Dubois, 534–5n184; on English monarchs, 535n185; and Maintenon, 362, 386; mission to England, 111, 117, 326, 350, 531n141; on Parliament, 532–3n154; and partition negotiations, 120–9, 162, 532n147, 532n148, 532n153, 533n155, 533n156, 534n183, 536n197, 536n199; rewards to, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 453; and Rousseau de Chamoy’s Parfait ambassadeur, 526n71; and Torcy, 362, 430, 533n157 taxation, 309, 316t7.11, 317, 630n11, 640n154



Index 825

Te Deum(s), 98, 168, 449–50, 708n93, 709n111 Tencin, Marie-Angélique de (m. Augustin de Ferriol), 222–3, 254 Tessé, René-Mans de Froulay, comte de: anti-Spanish cultural bias of, 679n156; as commandant in Provence, 704n59; diplomats to France unofficial mission to Savoy, 98, 103, 521n24, 676n128; and du Theil, 262; friendship with Torcy, 88, 497n33, 517n288; lampooned, 386; on Prior and Gaultier, 658n193; in Spain, 262, 408 Testament of Carlos II. See Carlos II Theil, Gabriel de La Porte, sieur du, 245, 262, 609n161 Theil, Jean-Gabriel de La Porte du: as godfather to colleague’s daughter, 279; and languages, 263, 614n205; recording gifts sent, 300; rewards to, 306–7t7.8, 310, 638n121, 706–7n83; in secretariat, 172f5.1, 181–2, 262–3, 278, 283, 311t7.9, 563–4n62; serving abroad, 262–3, 310, 614n207; serving with kin, 262–3, 348 Thévenot, Melschisidec, 219, 221 Thuillier, Guy, 62, 369 Torcy, Catherine-Félicité de Pomponne, marquise de, 68–9, 82, 91, 107, 179, 435, 516n271, 558–9n25, 559n34 Torcy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert de: apprenticeship under Croissy, 51–68, 96, 461–3, 496–7n26, 497n33, 498n56, 500n79, 503n115; apprenticeship under Louis XIV, 62–9; assembles corps of diplomats, 106– 16; becomes minister, 77–9, 128; becomes secretary of state, 68–77, 97; brain trust of, 10, 15, 170, 175, ­217–24, 269, 313, 318, 338, 366, 369, 467, 653n125; charac-

ter and ­temperament of, 13, 44, 133–6, 298, 538n230; criticisms of, 91–3, 133–7, 367, 518n303; and delegating, 462–3; education of, 44–51, 330; evaluations of, 4, 133–7, 509n184; family of, 47–51, 80–93; genie of, 133–4; household of, 10, 24, 37, 56, 160, 171, 178–9, 206, 257–8, 265–6, 280, 313, 318, 559n34, 560n36, 560n37, 560n38, 578n159, 583n193, 636n105; journal of, 152, 380–1, 438, 648n65; legacy of, 4–21, 132, 152, 268, 319, 332–3, 355, 461–71; and Louis XIV, 134–7, 377–8, 397–8, 461, 500n87, 693n302; and ­Maintenon, 12, 133, 385–92; and Marie-Angélique de Tencin, comtesse de Ferriol, 222–3, 254; marriage of, 69, 82, 86, 133, 505n150, 505–6n151, 506n154; memoirs of, 539–40n250, 690n258; mentorship by Pomponne, 94–106; ­negotiating skills of, 76, 94–5, 117– 32, 396–7, 406–7, 410–11, 414–19, 420–8, 680n168; as officer of Royal Orders, 81, 86, 196f5.8, 214–16, 219, 641n164; offices held, 81; and policing of Paris, 203, 431, 454–9, 578n157, 698n367, 704n56, 706n77, 706n81, 711n135, 712n140; and relations with staff, 238, 245, 265–6, 275; residences of, 81–2, 87–8, 469, 514n243, 517n288, 648n65; rewards to, 81, 310, 585n212; and subjects’ health and welfare, 452–3; travels of, 51–62, 395, 398–9, 500n83; tutors of, 330, 560n35, 623n289; wealth of, 81, 86. See also Conseil; Royal Orders; Torcy, Catherine-Félicité de ­Pomponne, marquise de Tories, 298, 336–7, 446, 699n375, 699–700n377

826 Index Toulouse, Louis Alexandre de Bourbon, comte de, 452, 579n166, 583n191, 633n63, 698n365, 709n108 Tourmont, Pierre de, 172f5.1; dismissal of, 192–3, 264, 570n106, 571n109; joins war department, 192, 570n106; as Pomponne’s secretary and premier commis, 190–3, 569n96, 569n98, 570n106; on successor Mignon, 571n109, 713n2 Tournelle, sieur de la, 179, 196f5.8, 213, 306t7.8, 560n40 Tourton, Jean-Claude, 305, 307 translators, 171, 177, 218, 274, 279, 357  treasurers of ambassadors, 181, 183, 196f5.8, 206, 283–4, 287; and controller of, 196f5.8, 316–17; offices of principal commis to, 283–4; payments by, 278, 284, 293, 294t7.6, 301, 630n10, 631n25; rewards to, 316–18, 316t7.11, 630n11; venal offices of, 227t6.1, 266, 283–4, 316t7.11, 316–17 treasurers of France, 318, 611– 12n182; foreign office personnel as, 211, 227t6.1, 238, 245, 268, 317, 570n108, 580n173, 586n218, 598n63 treaties: collections of, 17, 50, 88, 325, 646n44; privilege of printing, 317– 18, 555n165, 569n98, 640n155, 649n67 Trianon Palace, 38, 69, 156–8 Troost, Wout, 117, 132 Trudaine, Charles, 209t5.3, 337 Turin, Treaty of, 95, 98, 393 tutelage, legal concept of, 597n58, 615n213 Unigenitus, 25, 339, 384, 389, 433, 518n304, 555n165

United Provinces: and barrier, 106, 335, 403, 406–7, 530–1n132, 694n308; Croissy’s travels to, 235, 496; diplomats to France of, 360, 507n163, 560n37, 661n127; embassy chapel in, 292, 363; and espionage, 265, 432, 444, 656n166; French diplomats in, 77, 109, 110, 112, 126, 147, 164, 183, 184t5.2, 199, 195–9, 196f5.8, 223, 275, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 290t7.4, 361, 409, 530n126, 663n52, 665n73; French refugees in, 270, 272, 445–6, 706n77; Holland (province of), 100, 104, 409; intelligence on, 67, 102, 104–5, 136, 182, 221, 336–7, 339–40, 520n6, 523n43, 524n47, 567n84, 675n99, 694n307; and negotiations to end War of the Spanish Succession, 362, 395, 401– 27, 678n143, 683n193, 683n194, 684n197, 684n199, 685n209, 686n221, 687n226, 690n258; and partition negotiations, 9, 99, 107, 117–32, 530–1n132, 531n135, 533n155, 535n185, 536n199, 537n208, 552n31; peace party in, 95, 97, 104, 277, 401–4, 405, 409, 424, 682n184, 684n202; post office and, 344, 346, 552n129; and Ryswick negotiations, 69, 76–7, 95–106, 175, 522n29, 522n36, 524n54, 525n56; States-General of, 98–9, 123, 163, 219, 403, 408, 414–16, 420, 422, 653n130, 686n221; Torcy’s travels to, 56, 307, 653n133 Ursins, Marie-Anne de La Trémoille, duchesse de Bracciano and then princesse des: and Bourke, 679n159; and French diplomats in Spain, 112, 116, 364, 391, 398, 416; and Maintenon, 388, 391–2, 514–15n256, 664n62, 674n94, 674n95; in Rome, 59,



Index 827

240; and Torcy, 59, 240, 266, 364, 388, 391, 457, 500n79, 539n235, 667n102, 674n95, 678n151; and Torcy’s clerks, 240–1, 266, 599–600n77 Usson, Jean d’, marquis de Bezac, 109, 289t7.3, 603n100, 607n138 Utrecht, Treaty of, 120, 145, 207, 300, 368, 393, 432–3, 635n85, 672n64, 700n383; assessments of, 15, 421, 469; congress for, 85, 109, 115, 221, 233, 263, 310, 517n296, 636n101, 665n73; negotiations for, 90, 100, 199, 310, 359, 372, 395–6, 419, 432, 505n146, 546n54, 547n61, 651n104, 664n62, 668n4, 693n302, 699n374, 699–700n377 vacations, 167t4.1, 294t7.6, 303, 309, 630n20, 635n86 valets, 230–1; ambassadors’, 665n73; king’s, 40, 43, 494n184; Torcy’s, 178, 560n36. See also domestics Vassal, Michel-Nicolas, 216, 586n217 Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de, 66, 445; on Pomponne, 512n213, 520n3; as royal military advisor, 76, 106, 373, 400; and Torcy, 77, 97, 135, 223, 512n213, 589n251, 601–2n91, 705n62 Vauvré, Jean-Louis Girardin de, 210t5.3, 248–9, 454 venality of office: rationale for, 33, 348, 489n119, 543n30 Vendôme, Louis-Joseph, duc de: and disgrace after Oudenarde, 388; and duke of Burgundy, 388, 420; as governor of Provence, 209t5.3, 674–5n97; in Spain, 275, 389, 392, 399; and Torcy, 389, 392, 399, 494– 5n190, 542n21, 674–5n97, 675n99, 679n158

Versailles, 494n184; abandoned during Regency, 152; archive at, 11, 279, 325, 644n33; as communication hub, 85, 100, 153, 156–8, 162, 182, 212–14, 328, 345, 352, 552n131, 552n136, 553n146, 584n202, 584n203; and court at nearby royal palaces, 156, 381, 464; foreign office bureaus at, 6, 8, 147, 169–71, 178–9, 201, 225, 245–6, 329, 355, 378–9, 463, 549n92, 648n63; foreign office staff reside at, 275, 324, 559n32, 615n211; gardens and diplomacy, 217; ministerial apartments at, 70, 515–16n268; residences of princes and officials in city or vicinity of, 38, 265, 507n168, 549n93, 625n301, 628n328, 671n50; as space for governance, 9, 15, 36–43, 51, 168, 217, 245–6, 258, 319, 324–5, 440–1, 459, 491n147, 491n149, 492n158, 556– 7n7; as unhealthy location, 490n140. See also audiences; bedchamber, royal; court, royal Vertôt, René Aubert de (abbé): in brain trust, 220, 338, 653n125; and manuscript on diplomatic history, 326, 646n46, 647n49 Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy then king of Sardinia, 125, 521n26; diplomats serving, 101, 446, 364, 458, 560n37; French diplomats to, 103, 112, 184t5.2, 288t7.1, 288t7.2, 289t7.3, 291, 361, 663n52; as king of Sardinia, 554–5n161; and partition negotiations, 120, 127, 532n148, 536n197, 676–7n133; political character of, 341, 521n24, 653n128; as “Roy de Sicile,” 185t5.2; 1696 treaty with, 69, 81, 95, 98, 102–4; Torcy’s advice concerning, 670n31; and War of the

828 Index S­ panish Succession, 351, 406, 415, 445–6, 458, 684n197 Villacerf, Édouard Colbert, marquis de, 83, 118, 260 Villars, Claude Louis Hector, marquis then duc de, 88, 402, 427, 581n181, 610n173, 701–2n1; and codes, 576n142, 576–7n143, 627n316; and Maintenon, 362, 388–9, 674–5n97; as negotiator, 368–70, 534n179, 667n106; and spies, 351–2; and Torcy, 125, 133, 362, 368–9, 419, 444, 534n172, 582n188, 656n165, 667n102, 674–5n97, 677n136, 689n248, 691n277; to Vienna, 121, 124–6, 289t7.3, 394 Villa Viciosa, battle of, 214, 275, 289 Villedo, Michel fils, 230–2, 234, 592– 3n30, 593n32, 594n37 Villeroy, François de Neufville, duc de, 116, 123, 135, 209t5.3, 713n151 Vincent, Etienne, 348, 635n90; and brother André, 657n179 Vintimille, Charles-Gaspard-Guillaume de (archbishop of Aix-en-Provence), 258, 438 Vintimille, Pierre-François-Hyacinthe de, comte de Marseille and baron d’Oullioules, 261 Vitry, Edouard de, 273, 623n289 Vitry, François-Marie l’Hospital, 2nd duc de, 231–2, 240, 593n33, 598n67 Vitry, Nicolas-Louis l’Hospital, marquis de, 240, 598–9n68 Vivo, Filippo de, 159, 375 Voltaire, 112, 271, 539–40n250 Voysin, Daniel-François: on Conseil, 375, 379, 382, 428, 438; and Dispatches, 166; and Maintenon, 389–90, 694n305; and Torcy, 368, 382, 390, 399, 423, 428, 582– 3n190, 694n305; as war secretary,

63, 512n206, 667n102, 675n111, 696n339  war: and bombardments, 97–8; and “decisive battles,” 125, 418–19, 691n276; and diplomacy, 392–4, 408, 417–20, 423; and “war-asevent,” 417–18, 690n267; and “waras-process,” 417–18 war, secretary of state for: administrative personnel of, 617n228; and changes after Louvois, 373–4; continuity of, 148, 486n83; and domestic administration, 143, 436, 493– 4n180; and foreign office personnel, 192, 241; and information, 374; and intelligence, 352, 658n203, 678n142; and navy administration, 188f5.4, 246–7; organization of, 283, 556n3; paperwork of, 192, 603n105; and printed forms, 555n165; and the rolle, 315; share of expenditures of, 282–3. See also Barbezieux, Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier de; ­Chamillart, Michel; Le Tellier, Michel; Louvois, FrançoisMichel le Tellier, marquis de; Voysin, Daniel-François War of the League of Augsburg. See Nine Years War War of the Spanish Succession. See Spanish succession watches. See clocks Weber, Max: and bureaucracy, 22–5, 41, 171, 268, 281, 320–1, 460, 482n42, 485n70; critique of, 21, 27–8, 179, 460–1, 465, 482n43, 483–4n59, 489–90n120; and model of state and bureaucracy, 4, 14, 20; and patrimonialism, 22, 40, 268, 460 Welland (Weyland), Godard Willem van, 402, 406

Westphalia, Treaty of, 17, 96, 99 Whigs, 336, 432, 469, 535n184, 689n254 William III, King (of England/Great Britain) and Prince (of Orange): Huguenot critique of, 271–2; interest in Gagnières collection, 332; and Jean Hérault de Gourville, 530n126; on Louis XIV’s young ministers, 133; and Nine Years War and negotiations, 95–106, 117, 136, 162, 478n4, 520n13, 523n42; and

Index 829 ­ artition ­negotiations, 95, 116–32, p 430, 529n111, 529n112, 530–1n132, 531n135, 531n138, 532n147, 532n153, 532–3n154, 533n155, 535n186, 536n197, 536n199, 536n201, 537n204, 537n205, 537n213, 538n229, 580n171; and Principality of Orange, 301–2, 384– 5, 635n85, 672n64, 673n78 will of Carlos II. See Carlos II, Louis XIV’s acceptance of testament of and other testaments of

A W o r l d of Paper

Torcy in the vestments of the Order of the Holy Spirit, with a portrait of his father, Croissy. Painting by Robert Le Vrac Tournières (1701), Musée de Versailles et de Trianon. Photograph by John C. Rule.

A World of Paper Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State

J o h n C . R u l e a n d B en S. Trotter

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2014 ISBN 978-0-7735-4370-6 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-7735-9214-8 (ePDF) ISBN 978-0-7735-9215-5 (ePUB) Legal deposit third quarter 2014 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Rule, John C., author   A world of paper : Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the rise of the information state / John C. Rule and Ben S. Trotter. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-0-7735-4370-6 (bound). – ISBN 978-0-7735-9214-8 (ePDF). – ISBN 978-0-7735-9215-5 (ePUB)   1. France – History – Louis XIV, 1643–1715. 2. Bureaucracy – France – History – 17th century. 3. Bureaucracy – France – History – 18th century. 4. Government information – France – Management – History – 17th century. 5. Government information – France – Management – History – 18th century. 6. Torcy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de, 1665–1746. 7. Louis XIV, King of France, 1638–1715. 8. France. Ministère des affaires étrangères – Management – History. 9. France. Ministère des affaires étrangères – Officials and employees – History. 10. France – Foreign relations administration – History. I. Trotter, Ben S., 1949–, author II. Title. DC126.R84 2014   944'.033   C2014-900879-1 C2014-900880-5 Typeset by Jay Tee Graphics Ltd. in 10.5/13 Sabon

Contents

Tables vii Figures ix Preface xiii Introduction 3 1  Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 14 2  Torcy’s Preparation for and Rise to Power  44 3 Mentorship and Testing 94 4  The Department of Secretary of State Torcy  138 5  The Department’s Structures and Personnel  170 6  The Triumph of the Commis 225 7  Finances and Rewards  282 8  Preserving, Deploying, and Controlling Information  320 9  Ambassadors in Paris and Abroad  354 10  Information and the Formulation of Foreign Policy  371 11 Domestic Administration 435 Conclusion 460 Abbreviations 473 Notes 475 Bibliography 717 Index 773

Tables

1.1

Patrimonial and bureaucratic systems  22

4.1

Report of sent items countersigned by Torcy, March–May 1710 167

5.1 Premiers commis and premiers secrétaires under Torcy, 1696–1715 176 5.2

French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, 1698–1715 184

5.3

Sampling of domestic correspondence sent out by gouvernement 208

6.1

Venal offices, honours, and other positions held by the department’s clerks  227

7.1

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1697  288

7.2

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1698  288

7.3

List of ambassadors and their pay, 1701  289

7.4

Payments for the official mourning for Louis XIV, 1715  290

7.5

Payments to Fremont, chargé des affaires at Venice, 1710–1718 293

7.6

Summary of payment orders issued by category, 1714  294

7.7

Pensions to Rome, 1715  297

viii Tables

7.8

Payments to department personnel drawn on post office funds (Ferme général des Postes), 1712–1715  306

7.9

Department personnel in 1715  311

7.10

Recipients of acquits patents, 1691–1714  312

7.11

Remuneration of the treasurers and controllers of ambassadors, 1709 and 1714  316

11.1

Archbishops and bishops supervised by Torcy, 1711  447

Figures

1.1

Organizational structures in organic and bureaucratic theory. Source: Adapted from figure 1.3 in Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 25.   29

2.1

Genealogical chart: the Colberts. Source: Adapted from Etienne Pattou, “Famille Colbert” (2010). http://racineshistoire. free.fr/LGN. 46

2.2

Torcy as a youth. Photograph by John C. Rule.  49

4.1

Map of the généralités supervised by Torcy and major postal routes 146

4.2

Royal dispatches sent out by the first political bureau per month, 1711–1713. Source: aae md 309, fols 111–34v, “Registre des despeches du Roy,” from 1 Jan. 1711 through 9 Nov. 1713.  164

4.3

Number of folios of domestic expeditions per year, 1681–1715. Source: France, Inventaire des archives des affaires étrangères. Mémoires et documents: vols 957, 958, 961, 963, 964, 966, 969, 971, 973–6, 979–83, 987–9, 993–5, 997–9, 1004–6, 1011–13, 1016, 1017, 1020, 1022, 1026, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1040–3, 1046, 1048–54, 1057–62, 1070–7, 1084–92, 1096, 1097, 1099–105, 1109–13, 1116, 1117, 1121–8, 1132–6, 1141–4, 1146, 1149–52, 1156–9, 1161, 1163–5, 1169–72, 1175, 1177–80, 1184, 1185, 1188, 1189, 1191–4, 1197, 1198, 1200, 1203–5, 1210.  165

x Figures

5.1

List of foreign ministry personnel, 1658–1715. Source: See the information relating to each individual in chapters 5 and 6.   172

5.2

Number of foreign ministry bureaucratic personnel per year, 1658–1715. Source: A summary of figure 5.1, which is based on notes for each individual in chapters 5 and 6.  174

5.3

Map of French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, c. 1700. Source: Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.  186

5.4

Department organization under the Briennes, 1661–1663. Sources: Brienne, Mémoires, 2:277n9; Picavet, “Commis,” 104–6; and Piccioni, Commis, 19–20, 103–43.  188

5.5

Department organization under Lionne, 1663–1671. Sources: Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85 (Abbé Gaudon was an advisor, not a commis); Picavet, “Commis,” 103–20; Piccioni, Commis, 147–53; and Cras, “Lionne,” 68.  189

5.6

Department organization under Pomponne, 1671–1679. Sources: Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85; Picavet, “Commis,” 110–12; and Piccioni, Commis, 147–56.  191

5.7

Department organization under Croissy, 1680–1696. Sources: Piccioni, Commis, 160–88; Picavet, “Commis,” 115, 119n2; Pagès, Grand Électeur, 436, 550n, 555n; Smithies, Chaumont and Choisy, 187–9; aae md 302, fol. 122v (late 1686 or early 1687); ibid., 1004, fol. 157v (1690); ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 349 (8 Dec. 1693) and fols 420r–v (9 Mar.? 1694), show that Mignon’s bureau dealt with Denmark; bn mf 8833, fol. 143v, 14 June 1689; and ibid., 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696.  195

5.8

Department organization under Torcy, 1696–1715. Source: See notes in “The Department Reorganized” section in chapter 5. 196

5.9

Number of French diplomatic missions, 1692–1715. Source: Based on an analysis of the lists of French diplomats serving between 1692 and 1715 compiled in Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:207–45.  197



Figures xi

5.10

Comparison: numbers of volumes of correspondance politique produced per state by the first and second political bureaus, 1696–1715. Source: Based on list of volumes of correspondance politique in France, État numérique correspondance politique (there is no list available for Florence/Tuscany). 198

5.11

Torcy in ceremonial garb of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Source: From a manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale of France. Photograph by John C. Rule.  215

6.1

Genealogical chart: the Mignons. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  229

6.2

Charles Mignon at the 1678 signing of the Treaty of Nijmegen. Detail from the painting by Henri Gascar (1635–1701), The Signing of the Peace Treaty between France and Spain in Nijmegen on September 17, 1678. Museum Het Valkhof, Nijmegen. 236

6.3

Genealogical chart: the Noblets. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  239

6.4

Genealogical chart: the Blondels. Source: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.  244

7.1

Number of payment orders issued per month, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnances Expediées pendant l’année 1714.”  284

7.2

Percentage of monthly payment orders issued on the first day of the month, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnaces Expediées pendant l’année 1714.” 285

7.3

Expenditures on embassies, 1699–1709. Source: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. There is no data for 1706.  291

7.4

Expenditures for secret affairs, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662 (which uses the category “Subsidies” for “Affaires secretes”).  295

xii Figures

7.5

Expenditures on the Swiss Leagues, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. There is no data for 1706.  302

7.6

Payment order amounts issued by category, 1714. Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302, “Estats General des Ordonnaces Expediées pendant l’année 1714.”  304

7.7

Expenditures for travel, 1699–1709. Sources: Figures for 1700–07 are from Boislisle, ed., Correspondance, 2:600, 604, and those for 1708 and 1709 from ibid., 3:662. “Voyages” for 1708 and 1709 also include “Dons.” Neither category is present for 1706 or 1707.  305

Preface

Sadly, after some years of illness, John C. Rule passed away on 12 January 2013. Happily, however, he knew that the book upon which he had long laboured was to be published by McGill-Queen’s University Press. During his final months, he drew great comfort from the knowledge that illness would not prevent the fulfilment of his life’s work and its presentation to the scholarly community and the wider public. Since John C. Rule retired from the Ohio State University as a full professor of history in 1995, it is appropriate to remind a younger generation of his contributions to the field of early modern history and especially to the study of the reign of Louis XIV. For a number of years while in Paris working in various archives, John stayed on the left bank in the Hôtel des Deux Continents, aptly named in that it reflected the range of his scholarly inquiries and collaboration. John’s research also drew him to archival holdings in London and The Hague, as well as to several collections of papers housed in the United States. The publications that resulted are highly regarded by European scholars as well as by scholars on this side of the Atlantic. John’s association from the late 1950s with a group of Anglo-American diplomatic historians that included Mark A. Thomson, Ragnhild Hatton, and Andrew Lossky placed him among those who offered important revisions to the standard scholarly consensus of the neglected final decades of Louis XIV’s reign as dismal and unproductive. A 1964 conference on the reign of Louis XIV held at Ohio State produced papers that, along with additional complementary articles, were published in 1969 as Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, edited by John, who also provided a lengthy introduction to and an extensive annotated bibliography of the reign. This volume of articles by noted scholars of the reign remains a much-cited

xiv Preface

standard work among international scholars of the Sun King’s reign. John also published important articles that examine, for instance, government reform in the reign’s final decades, the functioning of the king’s councils, the enduring Franco-Spanish rivalry from 1492 to 1700, the colonial policies of the Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain family of navy secretaries of state, and treaty-making on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession. In particular, John’s influential publications on Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, Louis XIV’s last secretary of state for foreign affairs, have illuminated important aspects of French diplomatic and administrative history during these final decades. From the 1960s, John’s archival work has brought into sharp focus Torcy’s bureaucratic collaborators, the pen-wielding clerks, who animated the Sun King’s diplomacy in the bureaus at the centre as it radiated out to embassies across Europe and beyond. This book marks the culmination of John’s over four decades of research and writing on this exceptional administrative apparatus and the individuals who made it function. When John’s illness slowed his progress on his book manuscript, he invited me to complete the project. I had been his doctoral student at Ohio State in the 1970s and 1990s, researching Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban and the development of France’s fortifications bureaucracy. My work had led me to joke with John that, as far as I was concerned, Louis XIV’s reign ended in 1707, the year Vauban died. In taking up this new project, I was led into the even more intricate and densely layered world of Colbert de Torcy. With typical graciousness, John insisted from the outset that I act as his co-author. I initially balked at what I considered an excess of generosity, but I came to appreciate what John meant by it. He was entrusting to me not the editing of a largely finished product, but the completing of a manuscript that needed to be taken beyond where his illness would leave it. As I assembled, reorganized, supplemented, and rewrote his drafts in a manner faithful to his original vision for the study of this dynamic bureaucracy, we regularly “talked Torcy” – our shorthand for these conversations that aided my labour as they raised his spirits. John oriented me to the world of Louisquatorzian diplomacy and administration that he knew so well and initially guided me in my own reading and research. I also came to draw heavily from the abundant archival notes and microfilms he had collected over the decades. These have proven invaluable for my own understanding of the administrative structures, practices, and personnel of Torcy’s department and for supplying a wealth of archival material to complete and extend the narrative and analysis John had originally outlined. ­Fortunately,



Preface xv

my own archival research, including at the Archives des Affaires étrangères in Paris, helped me navigate through and make good use of John’s extensive and meticulous research, including the many documents he had microfilmed. Through the generosity of archivists and scholars in France, I have been able to access additional archival material that has proved particularly helpful. The Internet also pointed me to a wealth of printed material largely inaccessible when John was doing his research. Search engines turned up references to Torcy’s clerks in books and journals where no one would have thought to look, even if they had access to them. Indeed, I can hardly imagine having completed the book without access to the Internet and its information web. If this book is perhaps longer than it ought to be, it is not as long as it might have been. John’s unfinished manuscript was originally intended to recount and analyse the content of Torcy’s diplomacy, especially during the War of the Spanish Succession. While this analysis would have given the book a wider scope, bringing that part of the manuscript to completion would have made it much too lengthy. On the topics of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and management of information alone, John had much to say and I have had much to add. As I grew more comfortable in my role as co-author, I shared with John the changes and additions I made; he offered thoughtful feedback and enthusiastically endorsed the new directions in which I had taken the manuscript in light of my further research and reading of new works in the field. His scholarly integrity and natural graciousness were obvious even when my changes revised some of his earlier conclusions. However, recent social science research in the areas of governance and organizational theory has largely confirmed John’s pioneering insights into administrative history and allowed me to extend his insights in new directions. Likewise, the central theme of information – its collection, management, and use – that emerged as I moved beyond John’s original outline was already present in embryonic form. As John foresaw from the beginning, this book would be a collaborative effort, and I never doubted his abiding confidence in me even when I doubted myself. Upon the sad news of John’s passing, my wife, Ann, remarked that as long as I worked on the manuscript I would continue to “talk Torcy” with him. Fortunately, the manuscript has profited from other eyes. At an early date, Marsha Frey and Linda Frey read the entire manuscript and offered comments that ultimately helped to refocus and refine it. The two anonymous readers for McGill-Queen’s University Press provided helpful suggestions, welcome encouragement, and references to

xvi Preface

several recent works whose content and conclusions have substantially strengthened the book’s argument and taken it in some fresh directions. Jamel Ostwald generously read through what eventually became ­chapter 10, and his probing questions helped me to strengthen this chapter. Gary McCollim did the same for chapter 7, saving me from several errors. Antony McKenna’s helpful suggestions for the section on Daniel Larroque in chapter 6 greatly improved it. To all of these readers I offer heartfelt thanks. From the outset and until its completion, John Burnham facilitated my work, encouraged me in my writing, and steered this manuscript toward publication. He could not have done better in piloting the manuscript to McGill-Queen’s University Press, where friendly professionalism and high standards reign. Working with my editor Kyla Madden has been a constant delight. I value her early and genuine enthusiasm for this book and her subsequent affable honesty in aiding its improvement. The book’s copy editor, Judith Turnbull, used her experienced and careful eye to rescue it from errors and vague wording. All of these individuals have earned my gratitude. There were others whose contributions cannot go unmentioned. Hamish Scott offered encouragement while John worked on the manuscript and then later when I took it up. Others who contributed to John’s research are Douglas Clark Baxter and many of John’s former students, including Harold P. Anderson, Linda Frey, Marsha Frey, Gary M ­ cCollim, Jamel Ostwald, Thomas Schaeper, John Stapleton, and Andrew Szarka. Without being able to reconstruct the long list of all those who have aided John’s research since the 1960s, I can only offer his and my sincere gratitude to the many who are not listed above. Proving that the Republic of Letters thrives in the age of the Internet, several scholars, librarians, and archivists shared valuable primary and secondary sources as well as answered my many queries via email, including Peter ­Barber, ­Alexandre Cojannot, Robert J. Fulton, Jr, Nora Gaedeke, AnneMadeleine ­Goulet, Antony McKenna, Rémi Mathis, Maïlys ­Mouginot, Laurence Pope, ­Patricia Ranum, Niels van Tol, and Richard Waller. Others who answered my email queries along the way include R ­ ebekah Ahrendt, Joseph ­Bergin, Ngaire Bushell, Sara Chapman, Lex D ­ onaldson, Jerald Hage, Albert Hamscher, Mette Harder, Jeremy Hayhoe, Ben ­ Kafka, David Onnekink, Jotham Parsons, Brian Porter-SzÜcs, Orest Ranum, Guy Rowlands, ­Victoria Sanger, Paul Sonnino, Giora ­Sternberg, Brian Strayer, Leslie ­Tuttle, and Christophe Villecroix. H-France and the H-Network in general are marvelous places for connecting with an international community of scholars eager to help one another’s research!



Preface xvii

Maggie Montanaro and Judy Montanaro assisted with French translations and in transferring funds to France, a task more difficult than one would imagine in the digital age. Those presently or formerly in the Department of History of Ohio State who offered assistance include Chris Burton and Gail Summerhill. Marie Mazon typed the chapters that John originally drafted, while my wife, Ann Trotter, did some additional typing when I first took over the project. My thanks as well to the staff of the Ohio State University Library, especially to David Lincove and Anthony Maniaci, and to the staff of the Columbus State Community College Library, especially Julie Zaveloff. Technological assistance was generously provided by M.J. Willow at Columbus State Community College and by Lorraine Hilton. Ron Moore skilfully created the maps and the genealogical charts. Leonard Burnham carefully copy-edited the manuscript. I extend my apologies and gratitude to anyone whom I may have forgotten to mention. Finally, I must thank my family – my wife, Ann; my daughter, Chloe Grace; and my son, Benjamin Jacob – for putting up for some years now with the countless hours I spent in my study surrounded by stacks of books and photocopies, pecking away at my computer, preoccupied with Torcy. In our collaboration, John Rule was responsible for the initial incomplete manuscript and I am responsible for the reorganization, revisions, and further writing that have given shape to the present book. Ultimately, I alone am responsible for the book’s final form, content, and presentation, and I also assume responsibility for any faults and errors. Although they are inevitable, my hope is that they are few. This book is about memory and legacy. Therefore, I would like to dedicate it to the memory of those departed ones who smiled upon and encouraged my love of history and my scholarly pursuits. Each left behind her or his own memories and legacies: my mother, Jo-Ann ­Trotter; my father, John Sooloft Trotter II; my father-in-law, Dominic Joseph DeLaurentis; my brother, John Sooloft Trotter III; and my mentor and friend, John C. Rule. Note: Dates are generally given in the New Style, but when both are given, the New Style date comes first and is separated by a slash (/) from the Old Style date. In some cases, accent marks have been added to the French from archival sources that originally lacked them.

Introduction

Love it, hate it, or merely tolerate it, bureaucracy, which for better or for worse is indeed “a structure of domination,”1 is nevertheless ubiquitous in today’s world and unlikely to disappear.2 For generations, historians and social scientists, whatever their feelings about it, have identified bureaucracy as the foundation of the modern state and have focused on the reign of Louis XIV of France as a model both then and later for developing a bureaucracy. In this book, the administrative department presided over by the Sun King’s last foreign secretary, Jean-­Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, is examined in detail. In recreating the details of the structure and operation of the bureaucratic process and examining the individuals who made it function, it is possible to show how Louis’s bureaucracy evolved in the interplay of policy, the cultivation of loyal personnel, and growing governmental power. What also comes into sharper focus is the importance of information and especially its collection and control for purposes of state decision-making (and managing the flow of information to decision-makers), policy implementation, and even winning over what has come to be known as “public opinion.” This book also provides an opportunity to demystify bureaucracy, primarily as to how it functioned under Torcy, but also as to how it functions in our own world. Recent historians have observed that the major political contribution of the reign of Louis XIV of France was not a system of governance called “absolutism,” but rather the modern state itself, an institution that transcends the usual stale caricatures of monarchical despotism. Today, one might discuss and then dismiss the (largely idealized) theory and practice of absolutism, but the same cannot be done with the powerful bureaucratic mechanisms that embody and project the power of the modern state, whether controlled by a dictator, a

4

A World of Paper

narrow oligarchy, or a ­multi-party and highly participatory democracy. Traditionally, early modernists focused on political theory, but the modern state itself – its origins, its articulation, and its operation – has come to be regarded as equally worthy of study. The institutional arrangements and processes of early modern France are seen to have more in common with the equivalent of our own time than might be assumed. This is especially the case given political scientists’ recent re-evaluations of Weberian models of the state and its bureaucracy that have found these models to be too idealized in their conception and in the way they are assumed to operate. In adopting these critical approaches, we offer a fresh look at the structure, development, operation, and personnel of the Department of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, especially during the nearly twenty-year (1696–1715) tenure of Torcy, widely regarded as “one of the most brilliant foreign ministers of the ancien régime”3 and as a reformer who led the foreign office during diplomacy’s Golden Age.4 This book is thus not primarily a history of diplomacy, but instead an examination of bureaucratic processes. Building on the work of earlier French administrators and especially that of his father, Charles Colbert de Croissy, foreign secretary from 1680 to 1696, Torcy employed a highly skilled team of collaborators to manage complex issues of war and peace during the turbulent and troubled final decades of the reign. It was a rather small staff of men, young and old, often of relatively humble social origins yet rising in royal service as clerks.5 They formed the often-neglected lower clerical and administrative levels that the upper elite layers could not function without.6 If Torcy’s contributions to diplomatic culture are widely acknowledged, his department’s administrative operations and personnel remain shadowy, explored in just a few prior works, two of which date from the 1920s. The first, a relatively short article covering Louis XIV’s personal reign, was published by Camille Picavet in 1926. Although its four pages on the Torcy era offer a fairly comprehensive list of the department’s clerks, its treatment of structure and operating procedures is understandably cursory. Nevertheless, Picavet remains foundational.7 Camille Piccioni’s book is a continuation and completion of research begun by diplomatic historian and former ambassador to Norway Louis Delavaud. Published in 1928, it deals with the commis (clerks) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It remains useful, but is dated, omits too much, makes significant errors, and focuses on individuals, only somewhat bringing the department itself into focus.8 More recent and generally more factually reliable is Jean-Pierre



Introduction 5

Samoyault’s study (1971) of the foreign office bureaus under Louis XV, which, because of its focus on the post-Torcy era, necessarily presents a constricted and incomplete picture of Torcy’s department and personnel.9 Finally, the French foreign office’s official and collectively written two-volume administrative history appeared in 1984. Its well-organized focus on structures adds to our understanding of the department before 1789, but details of the Torcy era are often inadequate and sometimes mistaken.10 Our book offers a more up-to-date, detailed, and yet coherent focus on the Department of Foreign Affairs during the final decades of Louis XIV’s long reign. It is anchored in archival sources in France and elsewhere and is framed by current scholarship, including some key theoretical and empirical studies by non-historians. We explore the department’s organizational structure and the way it actually operated. The lack of contemporary formal regulations outlining these structures turns out to be an advantage, since it compels a more empirical approach.11 Although this does not always yield as full or certain a picture as we might desire, it means that our sketch is grounded in the quotidian realities experienced in the bureaus and beyond rather than in precise but idealized organizational regulations. Our depiction of Torcy’s department is thus not as the central bureaucracy as it might have appeared “on paper,” but rather as it emerged dynamically through the streams of paper that flowed in, within, and out of its bureaus and connected them with provincial administrators and French diplomats abroad.12 This fits Michel Foucault’s notion of “power … analysed as something which circulates … which only functions in the form of a chain.”13 As will become clear, this power regularly circulated in the form of written information, creating a “world of paper” whose management was crucial and often the source of interdepartmental friction. Traditional accounts dwell on the rivalry and conflict among Louis XIV’s secretaries of state, then as now an undeniable part of the workscape, when turf wars can set the state’s agents against one another. Nevertheless, essential elements of cooperation and information-sharing had to exist for the bureaucracy to function as well as it did given the constraints of technology, time, and distance under which it operated. We explore the important formal and informal links with other departments and their personnel as we trace the workings of the foreign ministry’s bureaucracy within this wider administrative apparatus. Since the exact outlines of the structures of Torcy’s department are not always clear, we pay particular attention to the individuals who inhabited

6

A World of Paper

and animated this organization, serving as the minister’s “vehicles of power.”14 Traditional depictions of the department’s small group of commis, premiers commis (chief clerks), and secretaries focus largely on their service within the bureaus; the outside offices they held or any other extra-department connections they had are largely seen as resulting from their department service. Our study, on the other hand and as much as the sources allow, takes these individuals before they entered the department as our point of departure to ascertain why they attached themselves to the foreign office and what they brought to it. It turns out that for many individuals service in the foreign ministry was a further step in a family strategy of social and professional advancement that was already under way. This meant that staff members’ earlier, independent contacts were typically maintained after they entered the department, and these contacts were usually further cultivated and extended through marriages within and outside it. Not only did this serve the needs of these individuals and their kinship groups, it also benefited the foreign secretary, as it allowed him to profit from their information networks and enlarge his staff’s scope of action within the bureaus of Versailles, in the provinces, and abroad, including in the Republic of Letters, which linked the learned of Europe. Where permitted by the scanty sources, our prosopographical study of the clerks of the department approaches them not anachronistically as lone individuals but rather as persons embedded within kinship and client groups – both essential dimensions of life in early modern France. Again, with an eye to the way states actually operate in much of the world today, not excepting the democracies, it should be obvious that attention to such networks is not without present significance. If Torcy knew the Chinese proverb that the palest ink is better than the best memory, he would have heartily agreed. Yet he would also have concurred with Samuel Johnson, who noted that “[k]nowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information upon it.”15 It is only in the past few decades that scholars have begun to explore the idea of information historically and in particular to examine the ways in which information’s acquisition, organization, preservation, and retrieval enhanced and shaped state power, creating what is termed the “information state.” Jacob Soll, for example, offers a pioneering look at the Louisquatorzian information state created by his minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert.16 Daniel R. Headrick notes that Europe’s late seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century information advances came from new information systems rather than from information-handling



Introduction 7

machines and marked the real beginnings of an information revolution.17 James W. Cortada likewise points to “‘information ages’ before the one we live in now.”18 His recent agenda and strategies for the emerging field of “information history”19 are consistent with the approach taken in our book. Moving beyond the technology of information, Cortada urges the researcher to seek out the “vessels [that] were used to collect and store information,” which include “schools, universities, libraries, industrial research centers, publishers, scholarly communities (tangible and virtual), and government agencies.”20 This requires examining particular professions or groupings to determine what information they collected, acted upon, and shared, as well as tracing “the patterns of adoption and the use of information over time.”21 In particular, this means following the flow of written and verbal information within established “communities of practice” with shared interests, knowledge, and modes of collecting and processing that information.22 Cortada regards states’ diplomatic activity as especially fertile ground for studying the collection, management, and use of information, as this work has historically left “one of the richest, most detailed paper trails of any profession.”23 Moreover, since diplomatic personnel were required to be literate, and their daily activities centred on reading, writing, analysis, and documentation, examining their milieu offers insight into the early professionalization of what are now commonly called “knowledge workers.”24 The foreign office under Torcy was one of many bureaucratic communities of practice within the Louisquatorzian state. It functioned as a vessel for collecting and storing the domestic and international information necessary to its function and was deployed to shape the opinions and actions of decision-makers at the centre and the king’s operatives in the provinces and abroad. Begun under Croissy, this preservation of foreign office institutional memory was part of a broader initiative, extended under Torcy, to utilize the department’s informational heritage in diplomacy’s daily work, which consequently required new ways of organizing and digesting it for faster and easier access. This can be seen, for example, in Torcy’s aggressive exploitation of his department’s increasingly organized information stores for producing propaganda. This innovation through technique rather than technology is also apparent in the individual studies and group seminars involving the students in his pioneering Académie politique for the training of embassy personnel. The developments we have uncovered under Torcy are similar to those found by Cortada in what he describes as the “information ecosystem” of Spain’s foreign ministry between 1815 and 1936. Although his study

8

A World of Paper

focuses on a later period, Cortada acknowledges that “the informationalization of work evident today was well under way before … 1789.”25 Indeed, his study identifies in the diplomatic ecosystem of nineteenthcentury Spain many features that can be observed in Torcy’s own department. One was a growing professionalization linked to an “information superstructure” that displayed a “remarkable resilience and ability to thrive,”26 allowing it to weather regime changes such as the French foreign office experienced in 1715 when it was reorganized under the Regency. Stressing information-gathering rather than negotiating as the most common diplomatic occupation, Cortada points to the foreign ministry in the capital as “the gear box, the engine” that kept the channels of the diplomatic ecosystem functioning,27 which is an apt metaphor for Torcy’s foreign office at Versailles.28 Any study of the foreign secretary’s department cannot dwell exclusively on diplomacy, since each of the four secretaries of state also administered a portion of the kingdom’s provinces. Yet the administrative functions of the department have been regularly treated hastily and superficially,29 perhaps disdained as an irrational and burdensome distraction from what modern eyes see as the true function of a foreign office. In contrast, we seek to explain why these domestic duties were more than just a leftover from the past and how they actually advanced the department’s work, including in diplomacy. A sizable amount of the ministry’s human and time resources were devoted to these domestic administrative tasks, which resulted increasingly in collecting information on the king’s subjects. These tasks became more significant as the conciliar way of government of the early reign gave way to a routine of bureaucratic administration handled by a new breed of state servants who, in training, way of work, and outlook, were unlike the judicial, ecclesiastical, and military elites who had traditionally served as the state’s primary agents. This book begins with theories about bureaucracy and modernity, but then moves outward to the person of Torcy, to his wider circle of collaborators, and to the institutional context within which they operated. We begin by exploring the traditional concepts of bureaucracy and the modern state by which the administration of France under the Sun King are typically measured and found wanting. Recent empirical studies of the state and its administrative operations during the past two centuries, however, have led to a reformulation of these concepts and to the pruning of those idealized elements of what modern bureaucracy is in both theory and practice that obscure the resemblance and developmental



Introduction 9

debt of the present to the Louisquatorzian state. These insights allow us to trace the intertwined development of the court and bureaucracy of Louis XIV, the consummate roi-bureaucrate, and the space within which they operated, especially at Versailles. This book is not a biography of Torcy.30 Nevertheless, his preparation for high office through careful education, extensive travel, and practical experience within his father’s bureaus was an essential part of who he was and what he did, as were the family members who surrounded, supported, served, and sometimes quarreled with him. A bureaucracy is not a machine but an organization animated by people, and as the person at the foreign office helm, Torcy was crucial to how it operated and how its shape changed over time. With this is mind, we explore his transition from “survivancier” (designated legal successor) to his father’s office in 1689, to secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1696, and to minister of state in 1699.31 With his father’s death in 1696, Torcy took on greater leadership within the ­Colbert clan, assuming responsibility for the advancement of the family and its many clients. The days of the great Colbert and Le Tellier ministerial clientages had passed, but Torcy was nonetheless well placed to serve those close to him. Yet even after succeeding to his father’s powerful position at the king’s side, the young Torcy underwent several years of grueling and perilous testing that would reveal whether he was fit for the high office he held. Fortunately, he was guided in this by his mentor and father-in-law, former foreign secretary ­(1671–79) Simon Arnauld, the marquis de Pomponne. They negotiated an end to the Nine Years War32 and then sought to avert a new war over the Spanish succession through a broad diplomatic initiative centred on a bold partition scheme that won the collaboration of England and the United Provinces, France’s enemies in the late war. While the two treaties that resulted ultimately failed to prevent another ruinous conflict, it was not because the young secretary disappointed the king’s expectations. Certainly, Torcy was not without critics at court or among the foreign diplomatic corps, but tested as an administrator, advisor, and negotiator, Torcy had earned Louis XIV’s confidence. This book focuses on Torcy’s department, a group of personnel attached to his office of secretary of state, the secretaryship particularly responsible for foreign affairs. After exploring the department’s development, powers, and responsibilities prior to Torcy’s time, we then move ahead to the point at which he lost his office upon the king’s death in 1715. There, in the transition to and during the opening years of regency on behalf of the infant Louis XV, we gain greater insight into how the

10

A World of Paper

f­oreign office bureaucracy operated under Torcy. We then examine and map out the temporal and spatial contexts within which the foreign office functioned during Torcy’s tenure in office. This is followed by an analysis of the all-important personnel who animated the department, including its several premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, and support staff of domestics who saw to the creature comforts of the foreign secretary and his clerks and who sometimes performed diplomatic tasks as well. We also trace the administrative structures and procedures under Torcy’s predecessors as foreign secretary in order to establish a baseline against which any change and continuity under him must be understood. To gain a fuller sense of the department’s operational resources, we include those persons and administrative entities outside its “official structure” that nonetheless contributed significantly to its successful functioning. Among these were post office personnel attached to the court who managed the vital mails, secretaries in the king’s Cabinet who wielded their pens at his side and on his behalf, household officers who orchestrated diplomatic ceremony and royal audiences, household couriers who carried dispatches throughout Europe, and genealogists who delved into dusty parchments on behalf of the chivalric “Ordres du Roi” (Royal Orders). Especially important was the informal “brain trust” of experts, scholars, and literary figures, many of whom were well-­connected members of the Republic of Letters who assisted the secretary and his staff in a variety of vital tasks. In our prosopographical study of the premiers commis and secretaries, we discuss them in their kinship and clientage groups when the sources allow. This brings out the relationships and alliances among them and the links and sources of information and favours they maintained outside the department. These included their connections with the varied worlds of noble estate management, municipal office, and bourgeois trades serving the court, and their possession of the costly chancellery and fiscal venal offices that raised a family’s social status. Represented as well is the interconnected milieu of finance that fed and fed off the kingdom’s military-industrial complex and the complicated fiscal system that struggled to keep the ship of state afloat. This myriad of connections contributed to the value and growing power of the upper rank of clerks, affording them a measure of independence from the secretary of state and stability of position as prized experts serving the king. Of course, all aspects of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and its work required funding, so we examine how that money was spent and the financial arrangements for paying the bills at home and channeling funds abroad for diplomacy and clandestine



Introduction 11

operations. We also explore how department personnel were remunerated, and consider the other rewards reaped by the ministry’s faithful. Information, already a recurring theme in several contexts, is examined from additional angles. Part of the preservation and utilization of the ministry’s institutional memory included gathering public papers in private hands and adding them to the archives that Torcy’s father had begun to assemble at his Paris residence and at Versailles. Croissy had them organized into volumes that were in essence easily retrievable files. Torcy built on, refined, and extended these efforts, which culminated in the establishment of a separate archive and a connected diplomatic training academy in Paris, a city increasingly known for its libraries and concentrations of ministerial archives. Another opportunity for managing and tapping into the information stream was afforded by Torcy’s management of the French mails, which he had to keep secure and flowing despite the vicissitudes of weather, war, and incompetent or dishonest postal officials. Yet he and his staff also worked to manage the flow of information by policing the book trade and monitoring what was published in France and abroad, censoring it when necessary and possible. And in a web that extended from the foreign office bureaus at Versailles to France’s embassies abroad and then to ports, palaces, frontiers, and other listening points throughout Europe and beyond, Torcy and his staff created, coordinated, and paid networks of spies and other secret agents wherever French interests were at stake. Because diplomats and their staffs serving abroad were essential components in the gathering and dissemination of information, we look into the world of ambassadors and embassies, both those Torcy sent abroad as well as those sent by foreign states to Paris. This was the context of perhaps one of Torcy’s most remarkable initiatives: the Académie politique. This bold venture, closely linked with the establishment of an archive in Paris and prefiguring the schools of public administration established only much later, was a concrete measure promoting Torcy’s vision for the increased professionalization of diplomacy. All states rely on information in order to govern, but as B. Guy Peters observes, the differences in how they do so rests on “the extent to which information drives decisions or is only a part of a decision process that also involves a number of more deliberative and politicized elements. That is, in some versions of governance the reactions to information are preprogrammed, while in others the responses are indeterminate and involve greater judgment by the actors involved.”33 A considerable proportion of the decisions made in response to the information received in

12

A World of Paper

the foreign office was made by its clerks, especially the premiers commis and secretaries who straightforwardly resolved matters that required no or low levels of judgment because they were routine or relatively clearcut, with few, or only insignificantly different, alternatives. As the complexity, unfamiliarity, and potential consequences of a decision increased, the process reached up the hierarchy to the foreign secretary himself or even outside the department to the king and his closest advisors. Relations with foreign powers, ultimately concerning issues of war and peace, were among the principal concerns of the Louisquatorzian state. Foreign policy was therefore formulated and decided by the king and his two-to-seven-member “Conseil” (council), not infrequently after difficult deliberations that left opinions divided and required the monarch to make a judgment among two or more passionately held and cogently articulated alternatives. The foreign secretary controlled the information that the Conseil’s members received as well as the information those on the outside received of the Conseil’s resolutions, which placed him in a powerful position to shape both. As this was a collective decision-­ making process, however, Torcy formulated foreign policy neither alone nor simply in collaboration with the king. Nevertheless, he held in his hand powerful cards that excited the envy of Mme de M ­ aintenon, the king’s morganatic wife, and some fellow secretaries of state. The obvious way to counter the foreign secretary’s strong hand was with cards of one’s own in the form of independently obtained and controlled information. We examine the resulting clashes that at times troubled Torcy’s management of diplomacy, especially during delicate negotiations. Dispatches, another royal council, formulated domestic policy and coordinated its implementation, so information played a vital role in its deliberations and in the king’s decisions. In Dispatches, however, no one played a role comparable to that of Torcy on the Conseil, since the provincial information flow was less concentrated and its control more evenly shared. Each secretary of state supervised his own group of provinces and had to work in Dispatches with the powerful controller general of finances and the not-insignificant chancellor, who had independent information networks of their own that covered all the provinces. Like his fellow secretaries of state, Torcy increasingly managed the everyday administration of those provinces under his care through his clerks, who worked in cooperation, if not always comfortably or successfully, with intendants, governors, bishops, sovereign court magistrates, and other provincial officials. It is particularly in domestic administration that we often encounter the routine decisions that



Introduction 13

Peters characterizes as preprogrammed responses to information, often taken as one of the hallmarks of modern administrative organizations. Paris, the kingdom’s capital and the centre and crossroads of much diplomatic activity, was of particular concern to the foreign office. There we encounter Torcy’s agents working with the police to monitor resident and transient foreigners, especially those in embassies, and anyone who gravitated toward them, including those Parisians who interacted with them either too sympathetically or too antagonistically. Anyone who ran afoul of this system or any of the other strictures resulting from the foreign secretary’s policing responsibilities could find themselves in prison. Torcy and his staff took a keen interest in those who entered, remained, and were released from the prison system, as well as in the many interrogations to which they were subjected. It should come as no surprise that controlling information was a key concern here as it was in much of the department’s activity. The assurance of “good order” in both domestic and international affairs seemed to require such measures, and they were pursued with vigour, at times leavened with humanity. The range of the Department of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was clearly wider than one might initially suppose. Under Torcy, the bureaucracy that managed this growing workload was expanded, reorganized, articulated, stabilized, and routinized. Yet when Louis XIV died on 1 September 1715 and his long reign ended, so did Torcy’s career as foreign secretary. Within twenty days he resigned his charge, which the new Regency government stripped of its department and most of its duties, seemingly ending the reign of the mighty secretaries of state as France embarked upon an experiment with conciliar government. The various councils established by the regent, however, largely inherited and perpetuated the bureaucratic structures, procedures, and personnel that Torcy and his collaborators had shaped during diplomacy’s Golden Age. This was a legacy forged in the continuing evolution of the modern administrative state as it marshaled and organized information for the tasks of governing. It imprinted a lasting mark on diplomatic and bureaucratic practices in France and throughout Europe in the eighteenth century and to the present.

1 Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate

The intertwined issues of war and peace and the concomitant necessity of finding the funds to pursue both remained the most important concerns of early modern Europe’s dynastically minded monarchs1 as they moved from traditional ways of governing to means often identified with the “modern state.” War and diplomacy were both managed increasingly in what is classically described as a bureaucratic fashion, and France’s roi-bureaucrate Louis XIV presided over an administration that became the model for much of Europe. While past historians often examined his government for antiquarian or propagandistic purposes (the rise of France as a unified nation is an especially important example of the latter), others did so to understand the nature of power, and especially a royal power said to be “absolute,” centralized, and bureaucratic. Recent historical research, however, challenges these accepted narratives, disputing the Louisquatorzian state as an exemplar of the modern state, especially as classically defined as unwaveringly centralized and bureaucratic. Meanwhile, scholars from fields such as political science and public administration illuminate and raise serious doubts about the model of the modern state itself, the standard by which Louis’s state is measured. New research and fresh thinking dispute prevailing assumptions about the modern state’s nature and functioning, even in paradigmatic France. Significantly, these challenges are based on empirical studies that move beyond Weberian models to explore the realities of everyday public administration as it operates in a wider context that includes non-public (i.e., non-governmental) actors.2 In addition, recent theories empirically developed in the social sciences provide fresh ways of conceptualizing and exploring the structure and functioning of organizations that may be applied to early modern administrations. These new perspectives also



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 15

shape a clearer view of how the court, Versailles, the royal household, and the king’s Cabinet served as context and factors in administrative developments under the roi-bureaucrate.

T he S ig n if ic a n c e o f T o rcy and Hi s Department As secretary of state, Torcy managed a “département” (department), defined in Furetière’s contemporary dictionary as a division among several persons of functions or duties in order to avoid confusion.3 It embraced foreign affairs as well as elements of domestic administration, including the supervision of several provinces. The usual difficulties of provincial administration (and foreign relations) were compounded during his tenure by the lingering and bitter legacy of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the deadly effects of bad weather and relentless war on the people and economy. During this same period, international conditions were much altered from those of the first half of the reign by the shock of what James Collins calls the “Great War (1683–1721),” especially after it reached serious levels on the western frontiers in 1688, challenging not only French hegemony but eventually France’s survival as a great power.4 It was under these circumstances that Torcy finalized negotiations to end one war by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) and sought to unravel the knot of the looming Spanish succession with two peaceful partition agreements. After the disasters of the War of the Spanish Succession, he achieved at Utrecht (1713) a better peace settlement than most expected. That these were not easy tasks was due in part to the transitional nature of these years, during which a European system of great powers to be kept in balance gained ground even as traditional dynastic concerns remained potent.5 Arguably as significant, Torcy and his team of clerks and outside “consultants” played a central role in the articulation and standardization of the foreign office’s bureaucracy and political culture that profoundly shaped practices in France and the rest of Europe.6 Even as they struggled to negotiate an end to Louis XIV’s final war, Torcy and his collaborators implemented a pioneering vision for the training of public administrative experts with the innovative Académie politique (Political Academy). Torcy’s tenure as foreign secretary (28 July 1696–23 September 1715) covered nineteen years of Louis XIV’s long reign, two years longer than the nearly seventeen-year (November 1679–26 July 1696) tenure of his father, Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy. Before Croissy, Simon Arnauld, marquis de Pomponne, had served for nearly eight

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years ­(October 1671–September 1679), and his predecessor Hugues de Lionne, marquis de Fresne, officially served eight years (3 April 1663–1 September 1671) or roughly ten years if one counts the time from 1661 when Henri-Auguste de Lomenie, comte de Brienne, still held the secretary of state’s office while Lionne largely exercised its functions. Torcy was thus the longest serving of Louis’s foreign secretaries, at just over one-third of the personal reign’s fifty-five years. He and his father, with whom he trained but from whom he differed in important respects, controlled the foreign office for nearly thirty-six years, just short of twothirds of Louis XIV’s personal reign. Compared with the next two reigns, this is remarkable stability, as the foreign secretaries of the rest of the eighteenth century typically served for less than five years.7 This basic constancy permitted procedures to be tested and adjusted and then to develop roots that allowed them to transcend the tenures of Croissy and Torcy and shape the foreign office thereafter. This stability also rested on the continuity of several commis whose careers stretched as far back as Mazarin. Through them, Torcy drew on the administrative practices and wisdom of his predecessors. Between 1715 and 1750, seven foreign secretaries served Louis XV, including Chauvelin for nearly ten of these years, in contrast to the two Colberts, who served his predecessor for nearly the same time span. Yet a striking bureaucratic stability characterized the department itself. While Torcy was out of office in 1715 and his administrative legacy appeared further attenuated when Cardinal Dubois terminated his Académie politique in 1721, the administrative structures developed and the diplomatic personnel acculturated during Torcy’s era constituted a remarkable organizational, procedural, and cultural continuity long into Louis XV’s reign.8 Of the five premiers commis who served between 1715 and 1745, all but one (the son of one of them) had entered service and received training during Torcy’s tenure. At least one of the Torcy-trained clerks headed one of the important political bureaus until 1749, when NicolasLouis Le Dran was transferred to the departmental archives as its head. At his retirement in 1762, Le Dran was the last living direct link with Torcy’s remarkable team of clerks, the illustrious Torcy himself having died on 2 September 1746.9 The eighteenth century was dominated, as Hamish Scott points out, by a distinctive and novel diplomatic culture. It became cohesive and homogeneous as it spread, imparting considerable unity to the conduct of international relations. This culture became a distinctive code or language that helped to unify the world of eighteenth-century diplomacy.10



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 17

The new subculture increasingly drew diplomatic personnel from the higher nobility. This social orientation was reinforced when ambassadors interacted with one another in the aristocratic milieu of Europe’s royal courts, where matters of protocol and etiquette loomed large and “their ‘art of negotiation’ [was modeled] on the psychological art of the courtier to manage men, control passions and (where necessary) dissemble.”11 Linguistically, this culture originated and was articulated in the French of Torcy and his collaborators. Foreign diplomats communicated with one another in French, and many even did so with officials at home.12 This linguistic unity facilitated and reinforced the domination of French ideas and practices through widely read diplomatic treatises such as those by François de Callières and Antoine Pecquet fils, both experienced members of France’s foreign office. Collections of treaties, including those assembled by Torcy’s department, were likewise in French, as increasingly were the treaties themselves. The longestablished system of resident diplomacy spread further as Louis XIV contended with the coalitions raised up against him. French power, prestige, and wide-ranging diplomacy ensured that others emulated France’s model. That model was readily observable by other states’ diplomats whether posted in Paris, at courts where French diplomats served, or at the peace congresses that assembled to end the era’s many wars and at which France was prominent.13 Far from being disconnected and airy theoretical reflections on diplomacy, the post-Westphalian proliferation of “treatises on the ‘ideal ambassador’” according to the important recent research of Heidrun R.I. Kugeler, “constituted the core of an early diplomatic theory that sought to define the diplomat’s task as the pivotal agents [sic] within the increasingly complex field of international relations in the formative phase of the European states-system.”14 This was the context in which Torcy operated and to which he contributed significantly through his leadership in the foreign ministry as it pursued its three major purposes: gathering information, representing the king, and negotiating.15 His tenure was the longest of any B ­ ourbon foreign minister and was arguably the most influential. Building on his predecessors’ work and especially that of his father, Torcy directed structural and cultural innovations in the administration of diplomacy, the preservation and utilization of records, and the training of diplomats. This largely set the trajectory for France’s diplomatic apparatus for the rest of the century, drawing much of a willing Europe along with it. Scott dates the emergence of this French-inspired diplomatic culture from the 1680s, which is when Torcy commenced his apprenticeship at

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his father’s side, while the crucial years were those when Torcy fashioned and directed policy and practice. It is no coincidence that the influential works of Callières and Pecquet fils drew on their own and others’ experiences of Torcy’s time as minister.16 Of course, it would be misleading to imply that Torcy stood alone at the helm of France’s diplomatic apparatus, since in theory and practice its personnel acted at the command and on behalf of the king. Louis XIV was an active participant in the “métier” (craft) of kingship, and this included setting policy and shaping the new diplomatic culture.17 For all his posturing and pursuit of personal gloire, for all his sense of “proprietary dynasticism” (his ownership of public power),18 for all his eminence as a builder of palaces and other monuments to monarchy, Louis XIV may best be remembered as a bureaucrat, a methodical and dedicated administrator. For over fifty-four years, Louis immersed himself in his state’s administrative details, met his councils weekly, and closeted himself with ministers in long working sessions. This regimen has earned him the epithet le roi-bureaucrate or the king-bureaucrat.19 While Louis was also a master of ceremony, managing and enhancing the rich ritual symbolism inherited from his predecessors, it was still as a bureaucrat and head of a central administration that he marshaled this cultural power to attempt to make his will known and felt throughout his kingdom and internationally. This entailed managing symbols as well as gathering and processing information by means of a carefully controlled central administration increasingly adapted to these purposes and able to project royal power even where his person was absent.20 In diplomacy in particular, seemingly trivial and petty matters of ceremonial served such purposes as “the necessary language and code” of an international society of princes by “enacting and symbolizing” power relations to the public and offering “ample opportunities to exchange information, advance the negotiations and to ascertain the common social and cultural background of the corps diplomatique” necessary to the art of negotiation.21 Louis XIV’s active participation in the creation of a distinctive diplomatic culture and in the work of diplomacy itself stands out as well because it was not continued during the next reign. His greatgrandson Louis XV reigned first as a minor under the Regency and then with Cardinal Fleury as surrogate monarch until the latter’s death in 1743. Thereafter, Louis XV provided little leadership, leaving foreign affairs to ever-shifting factions and a rapid succession of foreign secretaries or engaging in a problematic personal diplomacy.22 ­Nevertheless,



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 19

the bureaucratic structure created in the collaboration between Louis XIV, Croissy, and then Torcy maintained much of this legacy. Indeed, French historians from the Third Republic and after claim an element of fundamental administrative continuity from Louis XIV, through Napoleon, and into their own time, a view enshrined at the beginning of the twentieth century in Ernest Lavisse’s magisterial and still influential synthesis. Downplaying but not abandoning the older, superficial paradigm of Louisquatorzian despotism, Lavisse focuses on centralization and bureaucratization, which he links with the creation and eventual realization of national unity. This and the scope and success of his diplomacy nonetheless earned the arch “absolutist” an honoured place in the republican-nationalist pantheon.23 This narrative is now challenged as teleological,24 too linear and tidy, too premeditated, and divorced from contingencies of events and personalities.25 Even so, significant administrative change took place under Louis XIV.26 These changes were brought about as the state drew selectively on a pluralistic past that it then rationally adapted, often to the point of making outright innovations, even if not usually portrayed as such.27 The results represented a legacy of continuity and change that offered those monarchs and ministers after 1715 an altered menu of feasible choices for future change even as it in other ways constrained them.28 Joël Cornette sees a transforming modernity in the state’s administrative and executive functioning under Louis XIV that placed royal power at the centre of significant transformations of cultural and political practices. The state was the primary agent of this change whereby the traditional and contractual forms uniting subjects and sovereign gradually gave way to an impersonal culture of state service. The nobility rather than the ever-rising middle class served as precocious participants in this metamorphosis because they embodied an ideal of individual merit that privileged (in more than one sense) the display of personal aptitude and skill and its recognition and reward by the monarch. Just as significantly, service to the king subjected the traditional aristocratic norms of generosity, sacrifice, and courage usually connected with personal service to a set of impersonal norms that included obedience, discipline, and work to create limits on aristocratic behaviour.29 The early ministers Colbert and Louvois usually dominate the reign’s narratives, even though the former died in 1683 and the latter in 1691. Institutions of power, however, continued to evolve and in the crucible of the near-constant warfare, financial disintegration, subsistence crises,30

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and high-stakes diplomacy that marked the reign’s final decades. James B. Collins contends that the “great period of reform and change under Louis XIV came not early in the reign … but at its end.”31 This bold but considered claim reflects the historiographical advances of the past several decades.32 Nevertheless, the end of the reign, while no longer as neglected as it once was, remains understudied.33 In a review of the historiography of “the absolutism of Louis XIV as social collaboration,” William Beik proposes that future research undertake a “more intensive examination of the functioning of Louis XIV’s government after 1690, especially the civilian government.”34 Along similar lines, Thierry Sarmant observes that despite all the work of the past decades on Louis XIV’s monarchy, historians still know little about the exercise of political power, its practices and everyday realities. Sarmant notes the paradox that while there are myriad studies of royal agents acting locally, the same is not true for the top of the central administration. We remain insufficiently informed as to the work of the king and his ministers, the activity of departments and ministerial offices, and the relationship between ministers and their departments. He urges historians to remedy this but adds that a response is already under way,35 pointing to studies of Navy and Household Secretary Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Seignelay, of Controller General Claude Le Peletier, of Louis and Jérôme Phélypeaux, comtes de Pontchartrain, a father and son who between them served as controller general, navy and household secretary, and chancellor, and of war secretaries Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier, marquis de Barbezieux, and Michel Chamillart.36 Yet important omissions remain, perhaps the most striking being that of Torcy.37 Recent studies of diplomacy during the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign, especially those by the incomparable Lucien Bély,38 add a depth, breadth, and richness to our knowledge of significant aspects of diplomatic practice under Torcy, but there is still no volume dedicated to his department’s functioning as a bureaucracy. We are cautioned on the one hand not to regard Louis’s state as “the failed prototype of the Weberian modern state”39 and on the other not to “exaggerate the efficiency of [this] burgeoning administrative machine; to say the least, it deviated considerably from Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, in structure and in performance.”40 Yet, as we take care not to mystify government efficiency under Louis XIV, it often goes unnoticed that we must also guard against exaggerating the efficiency of modern bureaucracies.41 It makes no sense to denigrate the organization and efficiency of so-called pre-modern administrative arrangements for



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 21

failing to live up to a Weberian ideal that is itself increasingly open to question.42 Recent studies undermine both its theoretical underpinnings and its relationship to reality.43 Often a monolithically imagined “modernity” is invested with an aura of inevitability.44 One cannot, however, ignore the profound changes of the past decades that have appreciably undermined France’s inherited statist mentalities and practices.45 The Accademia in Florence houses sobering antidotes to this mystification of modernity. On the way to Michelangelo’s colossal David, the visitor passes four smaller, unfinished figures of slaves originally intended for Pope Julius II’s tomb. Looking at each, one could almost allow Michelangelo’s claim that his chisel and hammer merely liberated the figure imprisoned in the marble rather than created it from an inanimate block of stone. What constitutes great art has been long debated, but a persistent consensus attributes to it the capacity to foster such illusions of artlessness and inevitability – the artist as midwife rather than parent of the art “birthed.” The so-called modern state, centralized and bureaucratic, with its characteristic conceptual framework, mechanisms of control, and modes of operation, all allegedly based on the rule of reason, has during the past two centuries likewise been regarded as encased, like Michelangelo’s figures, but in this instance in ossified layers of tradition and irrationality. In this view, the modern state, yearning to be free, to be born, like Michelangelo’s figures of slaves or the nationalists’ “nation,” likewise rests immobilized until liberated by the bearers of progress, unleashed by the eighteenth century’s Enlightenment and revolutions wielding the hammers and chisels of Reason and History. It has been a powerful and even alluring myth, and it remains potent into the twenty-first century, but it is, nonetheless, a myth.46 Another myth is the oft-quoted but apocryphal aphorism “L’État c’est moi” (I am the state) by which Louis XIV is said to have claimed to embody the state, although if properly understood in the context of the time, it would have been a reasonable and meaningful claim had he made it.47 More revealing, however, are his actual words as he lay dying: upbraiding those weeping at his bedside, he insisted, “I’m going, but the state will always remain.”48 As did much of the machinery of state, witnessed by the remarkable and often overlooked continuity of Louisquatorzian administrative procedures and personnel during the conciliar experiment of the Regency’s Polysynod and after.49 Ronald Asch aptly observes, “[T]he consolidation of a bureaucratic administrative apparatus … [was] without a doubt among the hallmarks of the modern state.”50

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Table 1.1 Patrimonial and bureaucratic systems Patrimonial System

Bureaucratic System

1.  undefined area of jurisdiction 2.  informal hierarchy 3.  informal training and testing 4.  part-time officials 5.  oral commands

1.  fixed areas 2.  formal hierarchy 3.  formal training and testing 4.  full-time officials 5.  written orders

Source: Burke, History and Social Theory, 30.

T he o r ie s o f B u r e au c r acy, Moderni ty, and C e n t r a l izati on Like absolutism, the term bureaucracy was coined after the fact. It emerged in print in the second half of the eighteenth century to ridicule the state apparatus as a political system in which power rests with mere clerks rather than with those whose instruments they were meant to be.51 This storm of opprobrium was not seriously countered until late in the nineteenth century when German sociologist Max Weber rescued the term from the trash heap of historical misunderstanding and misuse.52 For Weber, “capitalism and bureaucratization were, in his opinion, the main promoters of the secular process of rationalization” radically altering the traditional world and are thus inextricably intertwined with concepts of modernity and the modern state.53 Although Weber recognized the negatives of bureaucratization, such as numbing routinization, central control, and threats to individual liberty, he nonetheless saw it as superior to non-rational and non-bureaucratic administrative systems and as the direction in which society was moving, seemingly irresistibly and perhaps irreversibly. He saw bureaucratization as a reality to be lamented but not ignored and as something that must therefore be analysed as a core constituent of modernity.54 Although negative stereotypes of bureaucracy persist,55 historians still deploy it as a standard against which to measure the administrative apparatuses and practices of the early modern era, most often to find them lamentably wanting. Weber provides a litmus test of bureaucracy by juxtaposing the attributes of what he describes as an older “patrimonial” system of administration with those of the “more mature” bureaucracies of his own times, which Peter Burke helpfully summarizes (table 1.1). In patrimonial authority, which often grew out of patriarchalism or charismatic



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 23

domination, tradition governed a ruler who saw public administration as a personal instrument and with little difference between the public and private spheres. Patrimonial systems were characterized by jurisdictional imprecision, casual chains of command, preparation for service through apprenticeship, part-time personnel, and verbal rather than written orders. In contrast, Weber’s model of bureaucracy posits jurisdictional precision, formal chains of command, selection based on testing after formal education, full-time personnel, written orders,56 and administrative personnel who follow “general rules that are stable and can be learned.”57 One synthesis of studies comparing Weber’s ideal features with those of actual administrative systems, however, argues for bureaucracy as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. The question then is degrees of bureaucratization rather than its presence or absence, since each element is present in varying levels that are neither especially correlated with one another nor correlated with the organization’s age and, particularly, its size. Hierarchy of authority appears to be an especially critical attribute, whereas technical competence and merit are not. Another study demonstrates that key and interrelated features of hierarchical authority, a stable system of communication and record-keeping (files), and continuity within an organization emerge from a “continuity of work load” that renders routinization and standardization of official tasks economical.58 Burke reminds us that since models need not be rigid but may incorporate the possibility of change, we might “focus not on bureaucracy but on the process of bureaucratization.”59 If the early modern period was a transitional phase between patrimonial and bureaucratic systems, then which end of the continuum was most characteristic of the foreign office bureaucracy under Torcy? Examining each of the six contrasting characteristics of Weber’s analysis outlined above suggests an answer. First, jurisdictional areas within the state were being defined more closely, especially in the period of the great wars of the 1690s and 1700s. Torcy and his colleagues clashed over what each regarded as interference in his area of responsibility, leading to the king’s intervention to resolve them. Rather than a lack of boundaries, such disputes demonstrate that even “precisely” defined jurisdictional parameters may be subject to nitpicking exactly because the boundaries are, on the surface of it, quite clear. Boundary disputes may result from a clash of interests as well as from imprecision.60 Slipshod definitions may be widely accepted or even desired and prove quite workable until challenged on grounds other than ambiguity.61 Moreover, bureaus battling over jurisdictional boundaries

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are hardly “non-bureaucratic” or “pre-modern,” since such combat can occupy so-called modern bureaucracies as well.62 The notion of “fixed areas” of jurisdiction implies a static situation, whereas the reality is typically administrative institutions in motion. They collide in their daily operation or as parts (by desire or default) take on new tasks or “clients” under changing circumstances. Bureaucrats may seek clear boundaries, but these are seldom drawn without friction, the need for outside mediation, or periodic revision. To characterize as patrimonialism Louis XIV’s power-grasping secretaries of state accumulating attributes and interfering in one another’s departments is to overlook the administrative empire-building, cronyism, and nepotism found in today’s bureaucracies. Weber himself expected that a bureaucracy would be under a “supreme chief” who held “his position of authority by virtue of appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession,” which by no means negated the fact that he presided over a bureaucracy.63 Despite the assumption of an unambiguous distinction between the public and private in modern bureaucracy, the everyday reality is otherwise, even in those bureaucracies where corruption is not rampant. One might ask, for instance, if functionaries are always scrupulous in abstaining from doing personal business on public time or with public property such as automobiles, telephones, and computers.64 Moreover, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the “New Public Management” in the English-speaking world aims at largely eliminating public bureaucracies and transferring their functions to private sector corporate bureaucracies explicitly focused on corporate profitability. Rather than delivering services, the remaining government agencies largely become “contract administrators” dealing with for-profit private interests delivering public services.65 While under Torcy the line between service to the foreign secretary in his bureaus and service in his household was not always crisp, and personnel in each could function on both sides of it, the two were nonetheless seen as distinct, albeit related, entities. Second, a clearer hierarchy of clerks emerged during Louis’s reign, ranging from young apprentices to senior clerks and secretaries. Hierarchy performed the vital function of creating a system of accountability.66 Even the way department clerks were paid suggested and reinforced both hierarchy and accountability. Third, the training of clerks was informal and largely on-the-job. Many were apprenticed from youth, often by a father, father-in-law, brother, uncle, or cousin, to take their place in the department. While this was seemingly at odds with the ­classic Weberian model, Weber himself noted that “‘examination for expertise’ … [is not]



Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 25

an indispensable accompaniment of bureaucratization” and that even modern bureaucracies long used “in-service training and performance in party organizations as a substitute.”67 Outsiders entering the foreign ministry’s bureaus at its hierarchy’s upper levels had already acquired training and proven themselves elsewhere, as we shall see when we examine individual careers. Fourth, clerks served full time and most of their lives in the department, unlike household officials, most of whom served only part of a year. The payment of pensions to retired clerks and their surviving dependents was also consistent with a careerist outlook.68 Fifth, while some commands were given orally, they were increasingly in written form, with the secretary of state or another official annotating and correcting drafts or scribbling briefs note on documents for further action.69 In fact, the volume, organization, and preservation of paperwork increased markedly under Croissy and Torcy.70 Sixth and last, Torcy’s bureaus operated according to a stable set of general rules that the clerks learned and generally followed. While some of these were in written form, many were not, and precisely because of the stability of their application. On the basis of these characteristics of bureaucracy and the caveats about the reality of modern bureaucracy we have noted, we conclude that the foreign office under Torcy was closer to Weber’s bureaucratic model than to his patrimonial one.71 The growth of the infrastructure of the early modern state likewise preoccupies Michel Foucault, who borrows eclectically from sociologists, archaeologists, and historians to depict the state’s emergence from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in political terms as well as in its broader cultural context. His thesis is that centralized government energy was increasingly diverted to the problems of a growing and diverse urbanized population. In France this helped break the mould of an older jurisprudential conception of state sovereignty. The final decades of Louis XIV’s reign were convulsed by the challenges of three European/world wars and the attendant problems of health and population dislocation, steeply rising taxes, an increase in violence in the aftermath of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the divisive clash over the anti-Jansenist papal bull Unigenitus. Torcy’s department, given its additional domestic responsibilities, experienced them all. In Foucauldian terminology, the state’s “administrative apparatuses” responded to these challenges – albeit often inadequately – by demanding of its agents different “elements, dimensions and factors of the state’s power” that when considered together, “formed the major components of a new political rationality.”72 Foucault labels state centralization and its intrusion into

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areas of provincial and local government as “gouvernementalité,” inadequately translated into English as “governmentality.” The origin of the term is more helpful: “The semantic linking of governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them.”73 Governmentality expresses “a tacit renunciation of the view that [so-called] absolutism marks a more or less sharp transition to modern forms of power.”74 Rather than a break or sharp transition, there is an “expansion in the range and scope of governmental institutions.”75 In many ways governmentality seems to ­Foucault a more accurate and satisfying term than the largely obsolete and misleading jumble of concepts termed absolutism because “it offers a view on power beyond a perspective that centers either on consensus or on violence.”76 Scholars of public administration now label governmentality “governance,” a term increasingly nudging aside the label “public administration,” seen by many as too narrow in its focus. The emphasis now is on the “study of inter-jurisdictional relations and thirdparty policy implementation in public administration … [and] the study of the influence or power of non-state and non-­jurisdictional public collectives.”77 As far as the sources permit, we will place the functioning of Torcy’s bureaucracy in this wider context. This expansion of the state’s “range and scope” increased the circulation of paper between the centre and the farthest corners of the state and beyond. Louis XIV attempted to balance delegation of authority with careful control over his collaborators by establishing modes of working with councils and individual ministers so that the administration functioned efficiently and submissively while he also performed his indispensable ceremonial, social, and familial functions.78 The system that resulted allowed a remarkable continuity of command that survived the French Revolution.79 This continuity should not be exaggerated or construed in an overly linear manner, but it should not be ignored. Longevity in office by the king and his ministers was crucial to this stability.80 Once Louis XIV had come to trust his ministers, he tended to retain them in office, often for a lifetime. By far the longest-serving bureaucrat was Louis XIV himself, who held office for over fifty-four years. As Pomponne observed to a friend, the king understood the affairs of state better than any of his ministers.81 This longevity in office and continuity of service were hard to match in many states and created what ­Wolfgang J. Mommsen calls “a self-propelling process in time.”82 ­Continuity was also increasingly the norm among the clerks who staffed the ­departments



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of state, not so much because entrenched ministerial dynasties protected their clients but because ministers of whatever family or faction recognized the need for knowledgeable and skilled bureaucrats to project a department’s power.83 Charles Frostin has added much to our understanding of the administrative arrangements of the reign’s final decades, including Navy and Household Secretary Jérôme de Pontchartrain’s interference in his colleagues’ departments and attempts to extend the scope of his own “cumul” (accumulation) of functions. Frostin calls it premature to speak of bureaucracy under Louis XIV because the organization of central power remained fluid and imprecise, ministerial departments were illdefined, personnel were few, the lines of transmission were so insufficient and tangled that the result was “des approximations, des tâtonnements et des contradictions dans les ordres donnés” (approximations, guesswork and contradictions in the orders given), leaving considerable initiative to those charged with executing the centre’s commands.84 Such an evaluation, however, holds Louis XIV’s government to an unrealistic standard of bureaucracy and overlooks other approaches to the issue of state power.85 It ignores the fact that “Weber, of course, was constructing an ideal type, and we should expect bureaucracy to vary from the ideal type simply because the demands of actually operating an organization are likely to generate some unique problems that need to be solved.”86 Obviously, the context within which the Louisquatorzian system operated differed from that of Weber’s time. Yet even as a reflection of public administration in modern states during the past two centuries Weber’s model is of dubious validity if we lose sight of its idealized nature. Our notions of “modernity” and the “modern state” require a deeper look. Modernity is a temporal and a qualitative concept. In its temporal sense, it is more precise and yet in constant motion, limiting its explanatory value because the “modern” is continually outdated and updated with the passing of time. To ascribe to the past forces of modernization that are in the process of moving things toward the “modern” (i.e., the way they are now) not only decontextualizes the past but underestimates the present’s fluidity and complexity. Since we cannot assume we comprehend the present merely because we live in it, we must examine it carefully to assess the accuracy of our notion of it if we intend to use it to measure the past. As a qualitative concept, modernity (ironically) has a long pedigree but is regularly an omnibus term freighted with linear assumptions and teleological implications. The modern state has meant many things over the past two centuries and its meaning

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continues to change.87 What, for instance, has the breakup of so many states since 1989 or the devolution of power to regional governments (in France, for example, the very model of a modern centralized state) done to former assumptions about the meaning or inevitability of the modern centralized state? What of the international organizations and the non-­governmental organizations (ngos) that increasingly impose limits on state sovereignty and action? The European Union’s further political integration (or at least the shape it will take) is no longer as confidently assumed as it once was. Globally it appears that the forces of state disintegration and de-centralization are stronger than many analysts have heretofore supposed.88 A serious challenge to the Weberian concept of bureaucracy comes from organizational case studies that empirically test Weber’s conclusions with a qualitative methodology only to reveal bureaucracy’s “dysfunctions, such as rigidity, low output, and even subversion of organizational goals.” Yet later studies employing a quantitative methodology to whole organizations and their overall performance demonstrate that the positive effects of bureaucracy outweigh the negatives.89 How are these contradictory results to be reconciled? Contingency theory, developed since the 1960s, offers a notionally satisfying and empirically backed explanation. This paradigm contends that “organizational effectiveness results from fitting characteristics of the organization, such as its structure, to contingencies that reflect the situation of the organization.”90 It accordingly breaks with traditional, universalistic theories like that of Weber, which prescribes maximizing specialization (“tight job definition”) and formalization (“rules”) to achieve maximum organizational effectiveness.91 Instead, contingency theory “sees maximum performance as resulting from adopting, not the maximum, but rather the appropriate level of the structural variable that fits the contingency.”92 Contingency theory permits us to step back from the Weberian concept of bureaucracy to focus instead on the broader and more supple concept of organizational structure and then to imbed the concept of bureaucracy into it in a more flexible manner. Organizational structure has centred around two competing yet ultimately synthesizable structural models called “organic theory” and “bureaucracy theory” (figure 1.1). Organic theory posits two poles between which organizational structures run. At one pole, mechanistic structure is highly centralized, with decisions made at the top and those below performing tasks that are highly specified, reliant on documentary forms, and bound by rules from above. Mechanistic structures typically maximize specialization and formalization. At the

Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate 29

Centralization of decision-making



High

SIMPLE

MECHANISTIC

bureaucratic theory

organic theory

Centralized decisionmaking + Low specializationformalization of jobs

Centralized decisionmaking + High specializationformalization of jobs

Best fit: small size

Best fit: task certainty

ORGANIC organic theory

Low

Decentralized decision-making + Low specializationformalization of jobs Best fit: task uncertainty Low 

BUREAUCRATIC bureaucratic theory Decentralized decision-making + High specializationformalization of jobs Best fit: large size High 

Specialization-formalization of jobs Figure 1.1 Organizational structures in organic and bureaucratic theory

opposite end of the organic theory continuum is organic structure, with little functional specialization and formalization and with decentralized decision-making. This is the best fit for an unstable environment because those in the middle and at the bottom of an organic structure possess the expertise that allows them greater initiative in dealing with this task uncertainty. According to organic theory, when the tasks to be performed are fairly regular (low task uncertainty) organizations trend toward the mechanistic pole, whereas high task uncertainty, requiring flexibility and innovation by experienced and knowledgeable subordinates, works best with an organic structure. Bureaucracy theory posits two different poles:

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bureaucratic structure at one end and simple/unbureaucratic structure at the other. Organic theory often focuses on environmental contingencies such as technological change that affect task uncertainty, whereas the operative contingency for bureaucratic theory is size, defined as the number of an organization’s employees. Bureaucratic structure, which is typically the best fit for larger organizations, shares with organic theory’s mechanistic structure both high specialization and formalization but not centralization; instead, bureaucratic structures control their personnel indirectly by embodying decisions made at the top in specialized jobs and formalized procedures. Simple structure is a better fit for smaller organizations because it permits the centralization of decision-making and thus requires low levels of specialization and formalization.93 Contingency theory allows a nuanced classification of organizational structures according to how well they fit the contingencies within which they function, especially size and task uncertainty. Therefore, after approximating the foreign office’s organizational structure along the two continuums proposed by organic and bureaucracy theories, we must address additional issues. At any given moment, what contingencies likely account for the department’s organizational structure and is that structure the best fit with those contingencies? Any changes in structure may also be interrogated with reference to possible adjustments to changing circumstances. This should permit a more fluid and realistic determination and assessment of the organizational structure of a foreign affairs department than allowed by the standard bureaucratic-ornot dichotomy or even a more sophisticated continuum of degrees of bureaucratization. This will require that we address the questions of the location of decision-making within the foreign office and the degree of job specialization and formalization between 1661 and 1715 to see if there was a noticeable shift, especially under Torcy. With the framework of contingency theory and these questions in mind, we will later propose some answers. It appears, then, that far from being an end toward which government necessarily evolves,94 the so-called modern bureaucratic and centralized state is one of many possible institutional outcomes and itself a shifting entity and concept.95 Moreover, we must ask if the implicit model of the modern state typically assumed is a reflection of modern reality or of an ideal.96 Scholars may reasonably and productively inquire about state change under Louis XIV and collaborators such as Torcy, but it is unhelpful to subject the results to an index of modernity that owes more to rationalistic theories than to historical and present practice.97



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Consider the following description of France’s governance. Locally, the central government’s resident representative and the local elite constitute a “dual elite” that excludes other local participants, including many economic interests, and cooperates “to adapt national regulations to local circumstances.” The local notables tend to accumulate offices that provide “access to higher levels of authority and [consolidate] local power bases.”98 A series of administrative reforms creates a situation where “in practice, the various sub-national authorities have overlapping territorial jurisdictions and loosely defined spheres of competence.” To make matters worse, “there is no formal hierarchy between them. No single authority can impose its will on any other, or prevent a rival authority from adopting policies in competition with its own.”99 Attempts at reform fail, even though there are those who argue that France has “too many layers of sub-national government.” This “complex and confusing structure” persists and worsens because “each reform adds a new layer, but is incapable of dispensing with the old.”100 It has been “a process of incremental accretion … New structures have been added to existing ones, without a fundamental overhaul of the territorial system as a whole.”101 In addition, the state “has usually accommodated interests, [such as those] framed in terms of maintaining social equilibrium,”102 while “the boundary between what is public and what is private is porous.”103 This description captures basic aspects and problems of government under the Sun King,104 but it is in fact a description of the functioning of public administration in much of France under the Third Republic and the Fifth Republic’s decentralization reforms under way since the 1980s. Administrative confusion, overlap, and lack of precision are familiar to early modern historians, but not as characteristics of French administration since 1789, usually regarded as “the model of the unitary state”105 owing to its long-assumed “bureaucratic” (i.e., hierarchical and rational) mode of operation. This raises an obvious question: are the workings of the foreign affairs department and the other parts of Louis XIV’s bureaucracy as unlike the bureaucracies of our own time as is usually assumed?106 Bent Flyvbjerg’s analysis of recent urban planning in the Danish town of Aalborg uncovers the ways in which planning, politics, and administration interact with the realities of power in a modern democratic state. He contends that the “project of modernity,” both among its theorists and those who attempt to implement it, “emphasize[s] the ideals of modernity but do[es] not examine modernity as it is actually e­ xperienced.

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­ odernity’s elevation of rationality as an ideal seems to result in, or M at least coexist with, an ignorance of the real rationalities at work in everyday politics, administration, and planning.” Flyvbjerg invokes ­Machiavelli’s warning that “a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way of self-destruction.” Focusing less on an idealized rationality and more on the actual workings of power is more illuminating because it “blurs the dividing line between rationality and rationalization” and allows us to see, following Kant’s pronouncement, the ways in which “the possession of power unavoidably spoils the free use of reason.”107 Thus, we should be wary of the uncritical invocation of “modern” and “rational,” terms that lead us to misjudge and misunderstand the early modern’s administrative arrangements as well as blind us to the realities of state-functioning today.108 As Kenneth J. Meier and Gregory C. Hill observe, “Bureaucracies are forged in the smithy of politics. The decisions to create such structures and maintain them, whether conscious or not, are made by political actors involved in the process of governance.”109 The most useful studies, then, are those that descend from helpful theoretical heights to test and ground their ideas in the contemporary context. Sharon Kettering’s work on clientelism’s positive contributions to state centralization also notes their persistence in our own world.110 Post-Napoleonic public administration professed a unitary and territorial model, yet its imperfect implementation created parallel and overlapping state networks that allowed the Third Republic’s local elites to negotiate with local and national political and administrative actors over the allocation of financial resources, exceptions to regulations, and other concessions from the centre that rendered the system flexible even if state-centric. Local political actors accumulated elective offices to strengthen their electoral base and to enhance their standing in Paris.111 This mania for office would not have surprised their nonelected early modern counterparts. It was a passion that administrators like Torcy sought to gratify for the good of the treasury as well as the central administration and provincial governance. As Richard Bonney aptly observes, at a certain level, “the history of the origins of the modern state is the history of patronage; it is not the history of institutions in itself.”112 John A. Rohr, in a comparative study of late twentieth-century French and American approaches to ethical issues, contends that “administrative systems cannot be divorced from national histories and administrative ethical standards are necessarily grounded in these specific



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a­ dministrative systems.” Compared with their American counterparts, he says, the “French rely much more heavily on tradition, respect for public service as a noble calling, and, quite literally, on an esprit de corps. The traditional respect for the public service in France is inextricably linked to the French tradition of ‘the state.’”113 To make sense of Torcy’s department requires that we contextualize it in the world in which it operated, including the social arrangements and assumptions that governed that society as well as its monarch.114 Louis XIV and Torcy acted locally through collaboration, but also sought to centralize power and reshape traditional institutions for greater efficiency and reliability. These goals were in “basic contradiction,”115 but such is the case in all but idealized governments. Real governments are by nature teeming with tensions and riddled with contradiction that must be explored rather than ignored.116 Modernity is hardly monolithic.117 Even when the foreign secretary’s department operated in a “bureaucratic” fashion, it could make use of practices seemingly antithetical to modern bureaucratic rationality such as venality of office.118 No less a critic of tradition than the British utilitarian Jeremy Bentham defended venality, arguing that better officials would come from families with the monetary means to purchase offices than from those gaining office due merely to birth or family connections.119 In the past one hundred years, powerful public employee unions, for instance, with a strong sense of public service yet also intent upon protecting their members, have provided salubrious job security but have at times resisted central direction and innovation, although not always without good cause or with negative consequences. While these powerful actors in current French government are not part of the state, they are sanctioned and empowered by it, as they and the bureaucracy are networked with one another and are but one example where, as in Torcy’s world, the private and the public are not sharply separated. In truth, today’s French state, like that of the ancien régime, functions within a network of complex interrelationships with non-public actors who share more in the exercise of state power than classic models of modernity and bureaucracy allow.120 Similarly, the idea of centralization needs to be reformulated in a less rigid, top-down manner, as historians are beginning to do for early modern England. Too often, as Edward Higgs notes, “local government is ignored, or seen as merely a limitation on proper state formation.”121 He argues that early modern England’s decentralized form of power nonetheless empowered the central state to act with vigour and decisively.122 Local government played a crucial role in gathering information, either

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for the central government or for its own purposes.123 Higgs suggests that we “see the state as power relations stretching out from the centre but incorporating local power elites … [A]s a dispersed network of power relations, rather than as a ‘thing.’”124 Perhaps rather than a set of relationships the state is a “set of processes whereby power and authority is exercised and reproduced. The actors in these processes can be varied and linked in changing constellations, and the ‘state’ is merely the term that certain actors call themselves when participating in such activities.”125 Steve Hindle, likewise from the context of early modern England, argues that governance expanded not from a one-sided initiative from the centre but from a dynamic dialogue between centre and localities based on particular and mutual needs.126 Since the 1990s, although its roots may be found some decades earlier, the concept of “governance” has emerged in the social sciences to shape what David Levi-Faur describes as “a research agenda that looked beyond the constitutional arrangements and formal aspects of the polity, politics and policy.”127 Instead, governance explores “new processes of governing,” “changed conditions of ordered rule,” and “new methods by which society is governed.”128 The thrust of governance theory and research is apparently on new responses to changes since the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to apply many of its insights to the early modern period and to Louisquatorzian France in particular.129 Governance theory’s notion that “authority is institutionalized, or at least can be institutionalized in different spheres, and by implication these arenas can compete, bargain, or coordinate among themselves or ignore each other” reflects what early modern scholars have discovered of the interactions of the royal government at Versailles with local entities and officials throughout the realm. Likewise, governance focuses on shifts “downward (to the local, regional, and the metropolitan), and horizontally (to private and civil spheres of authority).”130 Claus Offe, reflecting a “state-centred governance” perspective, observes that one finds the notion that governance can increase the intervention capacity of the state by bringing non-state actors into the making and implementation of public policy, thus making the latter more efficient and less fallible … The catchphrase of this doctrine is that the state should confine itself to steering and leave the rowing to other actors. One could also speak of auxiliary forces within civil society who, through appropriate means and according to their specific competences and resources, are being recruited



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for ­cooperation in the fulfillment of public tasks, become subject to regulatory oversight and economic incentives, and are thus licensed to privately exercise (previously exclusively) public functions.131 Offe goes on to say that for governance the “core intuition is that of a state-organized unburdening of the state” in order to achieve “a ‘leaner’ and at the same time more ‘capable’ state.” This description of developments during the past several decades might also be applied to an earlier period such that, perhaps Janus-like, governance’s development can be seen not only as something toward which states today are moving, but also as something away from which states moved after the early modern era and during their change into the forms they are retreating from today. In other words, governance conceivably is not so much something entirely new as it is a return to some of the structures, processes, and strategies employed by the early modern state. The metaphor of steering is particularly useful. Alistair Cole describes how France’s central government since the late twentieth century has employed it to deal with the increasing burden of governing. He connects steering with decentralization and the centre’s use of new agencies or local governments to carry out its will. While delegating these responsibilities and even assigning locals control of the allocation of the necessary financial resources, the central state nonetheless guides the final result by carefully defining and regulating it.132 This metaphor also usefully describes how Torcy and the other secretaries of state administered their provinces: a relatively small bureaucracy guided the collaboration of royal and local officials in carrying out the monarch’s will in constant dialogue with local interests.133 Thus, the ministerial departments at Versailles worked out a largely non-coercive method of getting a significant segment of provincial officials to cooperate with them134 and even adopt some of the centre’s administrative values, as when provincial governments, imitating the king and his ministers, patronized mapmakers for local administrative purposes.135 Moreover, as contingency theory demonstrates, not all parts of early modern administration had to be “bureaucratic” in the same way or to the same degree as one another, especially when comparing organizational structures at the centre with those in the provinces.136 In truth, the administration that Louis XIV “forged in the smithy of politics,” seemingly so deficient in administrative power when compared with its post-1789 counterpart actually functioned remarkably well in many of its endeavors.137 As Karl Deutsch suggested in his 1963 classic The Nerves of Government, “it might be

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profitable to look upon government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering.”138

T h e C o u rt at V e rsa il les : A Space for G ov e r n a nce In a religious paean to absolutism, Bishop Bossuet located Louis XIV not only in the lofty and divinely ordained celestial-terrestrial hierarchy, but also in mundane human space. “Consider the prince in his cabinet,” he proposed. “From thence flow the commands which coordinate the efforts of magistrates and captains, of citizens and soldiers, of provinces and armies … It is the image of God, who directs all nature from his throne in the highest heaven.”139 From the more profane medical viewpoint emerging during the seventeenth century, the king’s physical body, its health, and its location in space were also increasingly significant given the extreme personalization of power that resulted from Louis XIV’s decision to make all the major decisions and to live almost constantly in the public eye.140 Both perspectives point toward two enduring aspects of Louis’s kingship: the translation of many of the crown’s government offices to the palace and town of Versailles along with the royal court, and the redefinition of the role of the king’s household and especially his Cabinet in the affairs of state. One can hardly imagine Louis XIV without the setting of his palace and court. Far from being isolated, Louis XIV found himself in a court that was open to courtiers, officials, and visitors alike.141 He converted the chateau of Versailles from a country house to the seat of government. Later dedicated by King Louis-Philippe as a museum “to all the glories of France,” Versailles became a shrine to kingship long before the Sun King’s death in 1715. It was nonetheless a “working” shrine. Historians of the reign seldom describe the bureaucrats’ offices crowded into the detached wings in front of the palace, in the Hôtel de la Surintendance, or in alcoves and garrets of the palace proper. Yet a visitor to Versailles in the late seventeenth century would most likely pass through the outer court’s gates and enter what was known as the ministerial court, bounded on either side by detached ministerial wings known as the right wing and the left wing. They originally consisted of four separated pavilions of four storeys, topped by massive Mansard roofs, with each pavilion housing the official household and department of one of the four secretaries of state. Constructed from the beginning of the 1670s as the king and his entourage came increasingly to Versailles, in 1678 the two



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pavilions on each side were joined and dubbed a wing. The secretaries eventually moved from the more cramped rooms of the pavilions to the more spacious chambers in between. The foreign secretary had his residence and offices in the right wing.142 Basements and sub-basements for offices and for storage were possible because the wings were built on a surface that sloped down from the palace, and under the pavilions closest to the chateau were kitchens. The ground level housed, among other offices, the antechamber and the “cabinet” (office) of the secretary, while the first floor above the ground floor (i.e., the second floor) was occupied by his wife and contained official reception and dining rooms for the bountiful “table ouverte” (open table) secretaries typically hosted. On the floor above were more rooms for the family, but usually of a more private nature, since family might include more than children, such as Torcy’s sister Mme de Bouzols. Additional space for clerks and domestics was in the attics, lighted by skylights.143 Other space within the palace proper served as a stage for diplomatic activities. The Hall of Ambassadors was where the introducer of ambassadors received foreign representatives and then guided them across the courtyard and up the so-called Ambassadors’ Staircase to the royal apartments.144 This centralization of decision-making and administration is often equated with the term “absolutism.”145 Without entering into the seemingly endless although not completely unproductive debate over absolutism,146 one can be certain that the physical centralization of the king, court, councils, and departments of government meant that informed decisions could be made and implemented as quickly as early modern communication allowed.147 Jacob Soll rightly dubs the Great Colbert “the information master” because of his genius in adapting inherited techniques of gathering, processing, filing, and retrieving knowledge into a finely honed administrative tool.148 This clearly had a spatial dimension. As Hélène Himmelfarb observes, “By gathering all the reins of government around himself all year long, Louis XIV turned Versailles into much more than a residence; it was also an enormous administrative center, where a crowd of people came every day to the offices and agencies it housed with a thousand different requests.”149 Of course, ministers could attend to the king’s business from anywhere in the kingdom and even beyond its frontiers, as when Torcy journeyed to The Hague for peace negotiations in 1709. They could even do business while traveling, dictating to a secretary or annotating dispatches and other paperwork in a carriage as it bumped along the highway. Accompanied by a secretary and/or a premier commis, they could

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go to one royal palace or another and find there a place to stay and bureaus for work, as at Fontainebleau where the court resided for approximately six weeks each autumn.150 Almost a mile away from Versailles, the small Trianon Palace had a spacious room set aside for the king’s councils. At the palace-hermitage of Marly, almost four and a half miles from Versailles, several buildings just behind the main pavilion housed clerks of the secretaries of state. In 1698 yet another wing was added to the offices of the ministerial courtyards at Marly. Mme de Maintenon quipped that there was so much building going on that Marly would soon become another Versailles.151 Versailles with its permanently established bureaus, however, remained the fulcrum of activity. Another result of the establishment of a permanent, largely year-round residence at Versailles was the appearance of nearby palaces and minicourts created by various members of the royal family and princes of the blood. An observer called them princely planets revolving about the royal sun.152 The king’s ministers also constructed or renovated chateaus within the orbit of Versailles, as if they too rotated around the sun.153 Croissy and his son Torcy inherited the estate of Croissy from Torcy’s grandfather and added gardens designed by Le Notre. Not only architects, painters, sculptors, gardeners, and men of letters enjoyed their patronage, but cartographers did as well. It was especially during the reign’s last three wars that reduced royal largesse to map-­makers was supplemented by royal princes, especially the Orléans family, and by royal ministers such as Seignelay and the Pontchartrains.154 The central­ ization of power in the hands of departments, bureaus, councils, and cabinets was enhanced by their permanency and proximity to the prince, marking the end of “itinerant power” that was more medieval than modern.155 Another legacy of the centralizing process was the minute management of time made increasingly possible by the advances in timekeeping promoted by Louis XIV. From the king to the lowliest servant, all followed a timetable. The duc de Saint-Simon perceived this as tyranny and commented that when he was away from Versailles, he had only to look at his watch to know what the king and his court were doing. Louis scheduled and orchestrated daily life at Versailles, seasonal sojourns to other palaces, and great public events such as promotions into the Royal Orders of chivalry, elevations to the rank of the Marshal of France, and receptions of ambassadors. All was to be ordered and magnificent at Versailles to reflect its creator and his kingdom and to be the envy of the world.156



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Louis XIV’s magnificent court was celebrated in the latter half of the twentieth century by art and architecture historians as well as sociologists. Norbert Elias’s epoch-making work on The Court Society, written in the late 1920s and early 1930s, made its impact only a few decades ago. Jeroen Duindam, however, questions Elias’s “visionary image of humanity’s progress towards a world less hampered by eruptions of irrational drives and impulses” and the “cliché of tamed nobles at court [as] the ideal illustration of this process.”157 Recent research demonstrates that “nobles at court were far from caged and impotent,” and that the seductive accounts of Saint-Simon – so voluminous, so insistent, and seemingly so authoritative – must be used with care and only in conjunction with other sources. Indeed, the little duke’s popular “myth of Versailles,” perpetuated by many historians and adopted by Elias, posits a monarchical manipulation of his courtiers that rests on a few anecdotes. It is upon closer examination implausible because it reduces the courtiers to mere puppets and elevates the king to a level seemingly beyond human needs and limitations.158 Hillay Zmora calls the court “an arena for the development and representation of aristocratic as well as royal power, and therefore also for the balancing of aristocratic and royal interests.”159 The elites at the court of France often became power brokers interceding with the monarch and his ministers for the benefit of their provincial clientele. While there were risks in this dependence, the rewards nonetheless allowed them to tap into the growing state’s resources.160 David Parker correctly perceives that Versailles “was much more than a product of the king’s ego … most of the 3,000 or so nobles who were presented at court each year and the select few who secured lodging there did so because they wished to be there.”161 As Mme de Motteville quipped, “Versailles has become a great market place.”162 There the elites jockeyed for the privileges, offices, and other rewards distributed by the king and his ministers.163 The court was also an important marriage mart.164 Members of the great ministerial dynasties have been appropriately dubbed “mandarins-bureaucrats,”165 and it was to their public receptions and private audiences that Parisian and provincial favour-seekers hastened. Sharon Kettering grasps the essence of mandarin-bureaucrat clientelism when she argues, “[I]n a more integrated state with a stronger central government, such as late seventeenth-century France … a new, more impersonal basis for administrative relationships had to be found. The result was an emerging corps of public officials, a new royal bureaucracy.”166 Built paradoxically using clientelism, it tended to undermine

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the older great noble clientelism, although such exalted lay and clerical patronage never disappeared during the old regime.167 Moreover, there was already in place during Louis XIV’s reign a group of royal officials that made up the king’s household, both civil and military, directly linked to the mandarin system. The offices of the household permanently attached to the court by the fifteenth century were closely related in personnel and often overlapping in duties with the ministerial departments, but the next century witnessed the separation from the household of independent government departments.168 At the risk of provoking the Weberian purist intent upon seeing only patrimonialism in this period, this gradual divergence should not be pushed too far or too quickly. Duindam cautions that we “cannot easily separate the early modern court from the state; for most purposes this conglomerate of persons, institutions, and interests was the major theatre where the ‘state’ took form … The court was a steady point of contact for the major players of the realm … Power, at court and elsewhere, was a process reflecting changing balances among groups and persons, never a fixed outcome or an artefact.”169 The household and government shared a common workspace, often overlapping personnel, and above all, the same master. As Orest Ranum observes, “Direct relationship with the king in a clerk’s capacity might well describe their position, and it was from this humble beginning that the secretaries of state developed.”170 In terms of numbers of personnel and share of the royal budget, the central bureaucracy remained below the inner household, especially when the other royal households and all the services connected to the court are included.171 While the administration outside the household grew, so did the household itself, both in size and greater administrative efficiency through increased routinization and paperwork.172 The monarch spent his days and nights largely surrounded by household officials and servants, especially in the suite of royal apartments that was the particular domain of the “valets de la chambre” (valets of the chamber). In between court ceremonies, religious services, council meetings, formal audiences, entertainments, and other activities was what was called “the time of the valets” when the monarch was alone with these familiar and trusted figures with whom he could behave and converse more informally. The long-serving first valet Alexandre ­Bontemps for one was quite influential. While Louis XIV limited the size of the civil household,173 in the manner of the roi-bureaucrate he extensively reorganized certain household offices, including his Cabinet and the “Grande Écurie” (Great Stable).174 Louis also revived the award of



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the chivalric Order of the Holy Spirit and further increased its prestige by naming his ministers and secretaries of state as its officers, displaying a mature sense of the value of honorific titles and offices.175 By the end of his reign, the more fully articulated civil household embraced more than twenty-two great offices and departments.176 Withal it numbered over two thousand domestic officiers not counting the many servants who aided them, and at its most extended also included the households of the royal family. Many of the high officials were housed in the vast Grand Commons apartment complex at Versailles located immediately behind the ministerial wing of south wing.177 Most served only part of the year, or even every other year, but the rewards of office were as much about prestige as they were about pecuniary gain.178 Such practices violating Weberian principles persisted in one form or another well past the French Revolution.179 The royal household, both civil and military,180 was “the main theatre” of the changing administrative arrangements during this era.181 The household’s administrative departments became more articulated, stable (in part due to the practice of granting survivance to office), routinized, and animated by clerks armed with pens, paper, registers, and files. The household was also an important source of patronage, especially for the higher nobility, who were not generally attracted to administrative positions. Household officials, especially at the senior levels, typically accumulated military and provincial offices as well.182 The secretaries of state enjoyed offices in the household hierarchy and were well placed to suggest family and clients to fill vacancies. Croissy and Torcy, as will be seen below, placed important foreign office personnel in key positions enjoying the king’s presence. Much has been made since the nineteenth century of Louis XIV’s bed and bedchamber as the centre of the palace and the centre of the absolutist state. It was only in 1701 and without symbolic intent, however, that the king’s bedroom came to be in that location which previously served as the Grand Cabinet, with its three double doors opening to the Grand Gallery (the Hall of Mirrors), which was the monarch’s true “place of work, the site of royal audiences, and a center of government.”183 ­Himmelfarb brands this bed fixation “pure fantasy” and argues instead that the king’s “bedroom … played a secondary role compared to the Grand Cabinet.”184 While symbol-rich, colourful, and magnificent rituals at court, in the provinces, and at embassies abroad were critical elements of governance, it was nonetheless the mundane work of scriveners to translate these trappings of power into reality.

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The Cabinet (“Grand Cabinet” or “Cabinet du roi” and later “Cabinet du Conseil”) was in many ways the nerve centre of a bureaucratic web.185 In the royal apartments, whose extent and configuration changed over the reign, the king’s bedchamber was next to this Cabinet, and it was there that Louis met with his various councils. Although access to this space was carefully controlled,186 it was also where other important public events took place: audiences, state and dynastic ceremonies and announcements, and meetings of such august bodies as the Royal Orders. The Cabinet was connected by a door to the king’s private apartments, which in Louis XIV’s day comprised an extensive suite of nine small- to medium-size rooms that housed his various collections, including gems, coins, rare books, bronzes, and paintings.187 Unlike some of his princely contemporaries, Louis worked in his Cabinet nearly every day, reading documents and often consulting his valuable book collection. The art of map-making, which was fast becoming a Paris-centred science, fascinated him. An alcove in the Cabinet included a selection of recent maps of the world, Europe, and especially France, Paris, and its environs.188 The Cabinet was also the workshop of his four private cabinet secretaries (“secrétaires du Cabinet”), who held a privileged position within the bureaucratic hierarchy and served as liaison with the various ministerial departments and with the royal councils, especially the Conseil, the king’s closest advisors on the great matters of state. They set schedules, monitored the king’s calendar, coordinated his itineraries, and took the king’s dictation and drafted some of his letters. The most senior of these was the secretary of the hand (“secrétaire de la main”), said to have “la plume” (the pen) because of his ability to imitate the monarch’s handwriting in order to expedite paperwork. He served all year and resided at Versailles, while his colleagues served quarterly. The other cabinet secretaries could write a royal letter in their own hand or, for greater effect, imitate the king’s hand. Frequently, Louis XIV employed these secretaries to write letters that he deemed either “privileged” or too routine (such as New Year’s greetings) to be brought to his councils, although his secret message to Queen Anne during the negotiations that preceded Utrecht was in his own hand.189 The four secretaries of state, who continued to be named within the household as secretaries of the king’s chamber (“secrétaires de la chambre du roi”), also shared this privilege, which is a warning against drawing too fine a line between the administration of the king’s state and his household.190 The Cabinet was the setting for royal tête-à-têtes with members of the royal family, individual administrators, household officials, and a small



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group of close confidants.191 A frequent visitor was the lieutenant-­general of police, who carried news of the capital both scandalous and seditious. Invested with ever-widening powers, he carried out Louis XIV’s attack on sin in Paris and at court.192 The Cabinet was also where Louis happily received the retired minister Claude Le Peletier, who would come to Versailles from his estate at Villeneuve expressly for a discreet and private chat, slipping in and out of the palace so as to avoid the evercurious courtiers.193 Those who hoped to see the king typically waited outside its door.194 The vast and sprawling palace complex nevertheless facilitated swift communication between the king’s Cabinet and his courtiers and ministers. The king could send a message by means of a corps of pages on duty in rooms nestled next to the apartment’s small staircase. The chief valets “entered the king’s private apartments [Cabinet] at all hours and always by the back offices. Through [their] hands [passed] secret orders and messages, the private audiences, the sealed letters to and from the king.”195 Letters for Paris, the provinces, or points abroad if not posted by the regular mail were entrusted to cabinet couriers whose horses were in the “Small Stable” or the foreign ministry’s cellar.196 Even though only a small group performed its work, the Cabinet’s reach was wide and far. The palace-office complex of Versailles was the physical “centre” of the Sun King’s centralization efforts, and Torcy and his staff were a part of it. This hub embraced other nearby palaces and Paris to form the setting in which Torcy was born, educated, trained, and raised to great power, and in which, in conjunction with the roi-bureaucrate and the clerks of his own department, he shaped the conduct, institutions, and practices of diplomacy and administration. But like Greco-Roman statuary analysed from a misleadingly austere and abstract monochromatic perspective because time has denuded it of its original garish paint and non-stone accoutrements, buildings as well as administrative structures considered apart from the individuals who inhabited them lack colour as well as authenticity. Palaces without people are not even museums, for museums are filled with people, albeit now in quite different roles, and bureaucratic institutions without people become perfectly abstracted machines that never existed and never will. It is thus appropriate that we turn from brick and mortar edifices and organizational systems to examine the career of the individual who animated and led the foreign office during Louis XIV’s final two decades.

2 Torcy’s Preparation for and Rise to Power

The life of Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy (14 September 1665–2 September 1746) reveals not only an efficient administrator, distinguished diplomat, and celebrated statesman, but a man of wit, probity, and humanity, qualities that served him well in the early years of the Enlightenment. These traits were the fruit of a carefully prepared and guided education in which his family played a significant part. As well as being immersed in both the Greek and Roman classics, he formally studied law and experienced a thorough-going schooling in aesthetics. With access to the incomparable libraries amassed by members of the Colbert circle, he read widely and knew many respected contemporary scholars. Torcy grew up during a period of significant change in the crown’s attitude toward and management of information that would shape his own attitudes and actions and mark diplomatic practice throughout Europe. His travels abroad on the king’s behalf added breadth, depth, and sophistication to this education and gained him the diplomatic experience, knowledge of foreign languages and courts, and contacts that Louis XIV regarded as necessary for his foreign secretary.1 Torcy rounded out this careful preparation for royal service with years of experience labouring in the bureaus of his father, the marquis de Croissy, among the documents and alongside the clerks who were the heart of this bureaucracy. One of Croissy’s significant accomplishments as foreign minister had been to gain a monopoly of the contact that foreign diplomats had with the king’s ministers. Previously, diplomats had approached any minister with whom they had a good rapport or to whose department they thought their business best related. That minister would then report the matter to the Conseil. Croissy, with his brother Colbert’s backing, however, insisted that henceforth all diplomatic contact with the Conseil



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pass through him. The king agreed and even Louvois was fairly scrupulous in complying with this, although the latter nonetheless retained an informal network of informants for his own use.2 Croissy was diligent in holding regular audiences for the foreign diplomats and then, probably after speaking with the king, forwarded to his colleagues anything that concerned their departments or, if the matter warranted, reported it to the Conseil for discussion.3 This, coupled with reading incoming diplomatic dispatches and drafts of replies, made him the Conseil’s reporter on all foreign affairs and afforded him significant control over the flow of diplomatic information to the king and his ministers, a theme to which we will return. Yet when Croissy died in 1696, the minister who replaced him as reporter was not his son and survivancier Torcy, but Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, whose disgrace as foreign secretary in 1679 had made possible Croissy’s appointment to that office.4 ­Pomponne, recalled to the Conseil in 1691, regained neither the secretary of state’s office nor control over the foreign office’s administration in 1696, which both fell to Torcy, so the two had to work together. What could have been a tense association, however, was instead a happy and productive mentoring relationship between the two, and it was sealed by a marriage alliance. While less than half Pomponne’s age, Torcy was his co-worker, and he was appreciated and pushed forward by his mentor until the king invited him into the Conseil as a minister who would help formulate policy. As Torcy rose in royal service he saw to it that his family (figure 2.1) and that of his wife, the Pomponnes, shared in these opportunities for positions, advancement, honours, and wealth. The benefit was mutual, as these kin in turn aided and supported Torcy and his department in their diplomatic work. Indeed, to consider early modern political figures apart from their relationships misses too much of their context and story. Yet it would be a mistake to push family solidarity too far by confounding cohesion on defending common interests with constituting an ideological bloc.

Y o u t h a n d Educati on Torcy was born to Françoise and Charles Colbert de Croissy on 14 September 1665 at the Paris home of his maternal grandfather, councillor of state Joachim Béraud, sieur de Croissy-en-Brie. At the Colbert’s parish church of Saint-Eustache on 23 September, Torcy’s famous uncle, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, held his nephew, godson, and namesake at the baptismal font while the Colbert clan, clients, and friends looked on.

Figure 2.1a Genealogical chart: the Colberts

Figure 2.1b Genealogical chart (continued): the Colberts

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From Torcy’s very first days he was nurtured, and he lived much of his life within the context of family that embraces all one’s kin.5 His father, known in the 1660s as President Colbert, ranked among the state’s administrative elite and had recently purchased two prestigious offices: “maitre des requêtes” (master of requests, handling requests and complaints made to the king) and “président à mortier” (a senior judge) in the Metz parlement (soon exchanged for a presidency in the Paris parlement). Since the late 1650s he had served as a “commissaire” (commissioner) on leave from the Council of State, representing the king first in Alsace, then in the central provinces of Touraine, Poitou, Maine, and Anjou, and, as of 1663, in distant Brittany. Croissy’s career was made possible in large part by his brother Jean-Baptiste Colbert, minister of state, household and navy secretary of state, controller general of finances, and superintendent of royal buildings. Torcy’s maternal grandfather, Joachim Béraud, was one of the Chancellery’s four grand audienciers de France (first officers who received letters to be sealed). Françoise Béraud, Torcy’s mother and Joachim’s only daughter, brought to her marriage an impressive dowry of 276,000 livres and the promise of inheriting her father’s estates. In anticipation of this inheritance, President Colbert began styling himself as Colbert de Croissy and his eldest son took his title, chevalier de Torcy, from one of his grandfather’s estates.6 Croissy’s rise in royal service meant that he was often absent from his children in the provinces or abroad. Therefore, the earliest sustained influence in the life of Torcy (figure 2.2) and his brother Charles-­ Joachim, born in June 1667, was that of grandfather Béraud, in whose house they lived and with whom they studied and traveled until Torcy was seven and his brother five. Béraud was an enlightened state servant not only experienced in matters of business but also widely read in the Latin classics, modern literature, and ancient and modern philosophies. He had lavished his love of literature and the arts on Françoise, who in turn did the same with her children. Although Mme de Croissy possessed a sound business sense, she was very much the aristocratic grande dame of admirable good taste. While in England as ambassador’s wife, she was a valuable support to her husband in his many duties.7 Croissy later possessed a fine library, but unlike the traditional library of the humanist-educated gentleman, Croissy’s reflected the influence of his brother Jean-Baptiste and the “evolution toward technical libraries for state administrators … [that] was a direct product of his technical training and positions in state administration and diplomacy.”8 Thus the



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Figure 2.2 Torcy as a youth

roughly 10 per cent of his collection devoted to religion and the classics was far outweighed by the 50 per cent focused on history and the 30 per cent comprised of legal and political texts. By 1680 he had gathered the nucleus of a law library, which he bequeathed to Torcy, who had begun his own study of law.9 Croissy did not neglect modern languages. It was while in the German-speaking Alsace as intendant that he acknowledged to his brother a growing sense that he needed to learn the language.10 He became so proficient in German and knowledgeable of German law, that the king’s Conseil recognized him as an expert on German affairs, which served him well at the Congress of Nijmegen. Following his father’s example, Torcy hired a tutor in German who accompanied him on his own visits to Brandenburg, Denmark, and Sweden.11 He likewise followed his father’s lead in religion and was punctilious in the observance

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of his religious duties, but he was a staunch Gallican – like Croissy – who, though trained by Jesuits, mistrusted them. Colbert’s duties as uncle and godfather assured Torcy a favoured place among his cousins. As head of a powerful ministerial family, C ­ olbert became perforce a power broker, an indispensable link to a patronage network that extended beyond Paris to remote centres of provincial power.12 He granted his nephew access to his private library on rue ­Vivienne, one of the most extensive in Europe, and to the Royal Library under his control located a block away. Both formed the core of the empire of information collection and management he constructed to free Louis XIV’s central administration from dependence on the parlements and other traditional bodies for knowledge of the kingdom.13 With access to the library went the ability to consult Colbert’s distinguished librarian and legal expert Étienne Baluze, whose correspondence gives us a glimpse of library privileges. Colbert, for example, instructed Baluze to search the library for a portfolio containing several English treaties with his notes on them that he had loaned Croissy when he was ambassador to England.14 These treaties dealt with tariffs that were under consideration at Nijmegen and so were invaluable references for Ambassador Croissy. When the Treaty of Nijmegen was finally brought before the Paris parlement in 1679, Colbert wrote Baluze on his brother’s behalf inquiring as to the exact title Louis XIV should use in saluting such crowned heads as the queens of Spain and England.15 In December 1681 Colbert requested that Baluze send him any volumes he could find on Morocco’s history so that Torcy might compile a brief survey from it, but if he failed to find relevant materials in the library, he might inquire of the royal historian François Eudes, sieur de Mézeray, if his notes to the histories of France contained information on North Africa. In July 1682 Croissy wrote Baluze on his son’s behalf about the history of the principality of Orange, then under blockade by French troops.16 Baluze’s many kindnesses were not forgotten when Torcy years later defended the librarian’s loyalty before the king in the Conseil and had him recalled from years of exile for scholarly work done for the disgraced Cardinal de Bouillon.17 More than being a kindly uncle sharing books, Colbert trained his brother and nephew in his methodology of government based on amassing, arranging, storing, retrieving, and marshaling information. Croissy’s apprenticeship as a provincial intendant ensured his initiation into the Colbertian role of “bureaucratic informer.”18 Indeed, the foreign office’s official archives that Croissy and later his son developed owed much to the powerful



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and innovative library/archival system created by the Great Colbert before his death in 1683.19 In 1680 Torcy completed a thesis for a master’s degree in philosophy whereupon his father took him to Versailles to present a printed copy to Louis XIV, who was pleased with the flattering frontispiece depicting the king crowned by Immortality.20 When Croissy’s household moved to a recently purchased large residence on rue Vivienne, Torcy commenced cataloguing the books and manuscripts that Croissy had acquired in England and the Netherlands. He also undertook a short course in aesthetics, reading works on architecture and art that would lead him to amass a celebrated collection of paintings, tapestries, and sculpture.21 His concurrent study of the law led to a degree in September 1683, after which he took his oath as an “avocat” (attorney).22 The time for practical immersion in the world and work of diplomacy and administration had arrived.

T r av e l a n d A pprenti ceshi p Carefully and broadly educated, Torcy now entered a period of travel and apprenticeship. The need to travel while young was critical. The Venetian ambassador, wanting to take his leave of the foreign secretary, wrote Croissy to see if he was coming to Paris, but Croissy replied that since being a minister of state meant that he must always be where the king was, the ambassador was obliged to visit him at Versailles.23 Croissy, who had gained much from his years abroad, saw to it that Torcy had an opportunity to travel before such peregrinations became largely impossible.24 Torcy’s travels began early. When he was eight, he joined his father in England, and at age seventeen, he and his parents accompanied Louis XIV on a four-month tour through Bourgogne to Franche-Comté and Alsace.25 A trip to Germany by way of Montbelliard, down the Rhine to Mainz, and then to Heidelberg was likely projected for Torcy sometime thereafter but never took place.26 In January 1684, no doubt at Croissy’s suggestion, Louis XIV commissioned Torcy, his extraordinary envoy, to carry condolences and felicitations to Pedro II, former regent of Portugal, on his accession to the throne after his brother Afonso VI’s death. Torcy was also to seek an audience with the ailing queen, Marie Françoise of Savoy-Nemours, and the unmarried Infanta Isabel Luísa, Pedro’s only heir. After he departed Versailles, however, Torcy’s mission grew when word arrived of the queen’s death the previous month, requiring additional condolences.27 More than forty gentlemen and domestics accompanied Torcy, including

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two particularly valuable companions: Étienne-Jachet du Pré, who knew Iberia well, having served in Madrid as secretary and chargé d’affaires; and Guillard, a foreign office propagandist and intelligence agent. Croissy urged his son to confer with them daily to learn what they had gathered from their own observations and reflections.28 Torcy traveled to Rochefort, where he was welcomed by navy intendant and Colbert client Pierre Arnoul, who ordered a frigate to carry the party to Lisbon; they crossed the stormy Bay of Biscay in record time, docking in the Tagus on 16 March 1684. Torcy remained in Portugal for ten months, the longest stay of his Grand Tour.29 The young visitor was welcomed by the veteran diplomat, septuagenarian Melchior de Harod de ­Senevas, baron then marquis de Saint-Romain, of a noble Lyonnais family, a friend of grandfather Béraud and Croissy’s associate. Saint-Romain’s 1683–85 posting to Portugal was his second, the first having been in 1666–71. Regarded as a friend of the House of Braganza, Saint-Romain stood in Louis XIV’s stead as godfather to Pedro’s daughter.30 Under his aegis, Torcy was granted a private audience with Pedro two days after his arrival that proved most auspicious. Pedro, often blunt and irascible, seems to have taken an instant liking to Torcy. He was also well received by the Infanta, whose possible marriage was of continuing interest to the French court.31 Torcy impressed all he met at court, including the Count of Tarouca, who would one day represent Portuguese interests at Utrecht.32 Under Saint-Romain’s guidance, Torcy wrote his first dispatches to Louis XIV and Croissy. Before his departure, his father wrote a set of personal directives for the fledgling envoy, barely eighteen years old. He began with a reminder that zeal for the master’s reputation had to be tempered with prudence so that the reasonable desire for personal distinction did not lead him to naïveté or folly. Croissy contended that unlike soldiers who could merit royal esteem by risking their lives, diplomats could do so only by speaking and writing well. Thus, Torcy’s dispatches were to be full of detail and local colour, yet written in clear and precise terms. Style was to be correct yet natural and easy, avoiding metaphor and allegory, since the king preferred a conversational style to insipid praises and favoured robust and detailed description to fulsome flattery.33 What Croissy might have added was that Louis XIV, unable to travel abroad except to the battlefront, lived vicariously through descriptions sent him by his envoys and agents.34 Torcy likewise received detailed instructions on what the king expected in diplomatic reports.35 The envoy should describe the character, the



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inclinations and “la génie” (the spirit) of the prince, his diplomatic alliances, and the reasons for his dynasty’s friendships and enmities. He should observe closely all the ceremonies that followed Pedro’s coronation. Precise details were required concerning principal fortresses, army and navy size, crown revenues, and royal favours awarded. The king wanted an assessment of the strategic and economic value of the colonies Portugal still possessed, especially those in Africa, the East Indies, and Brazil. Finally, he should examine the nature of Portugal’s Cortes and judicial system. The instructions finally insisted broadly that there was nothing about Portugal unworthy of reporting to the king.36 This was a daunting list, even with Saint-Romain’s help. However, Torcy’s initial dispatch seems to have satisfied Louis and his foreign secretary, although Croissy felt compelled to add that he found the letter rather short and dry.37 Torcy laboured on the next round of reports to give more detail, such as the pedigrees and intermarriages of the great noble houses. Croissy’s reply was positive, noting the greater accuracy and detail than in the earlier account. However, he reproved Torcy for using the formal “vous” for its modesty or his desire to please that also led him to take a place lower than was his right at the Portuguese court, something prejudicial to the king’s dignity given that any honour he was shown in Lisbon was due to his being Louis XIV’s envoy.38 Indeed, Torcy would learn the following year just how punctilious his master could be in matters of protocol. In a later dispatch, Croissy reiterated that the king only regarded an individual’s merit, virtue, and ability and that the services of fathers and relatives were not substitutes.39 These parental admonitions came at a crucial moment when the young diplomat was far from home, family, and his usual trusted advisors. Croissy, anxious that he perform his duties with distinction so that the king would speak well of him on his return, at times sounded shrill and his advice seemed ponderous, yet whether it was because Torcy was a better pupil or because Croissy was a gentler taskmaster, Torcy’s tutelage under his father seems to have been less excruciating than it was for other survivanciers.40 Argoud, Seignelay’s agent in Lisbon, kept him informed of his cousin’s activities with a steady stream of letters about his travel plans, Croissy’s compliments to Saint-Romain, and Torcy’s companions. Argoud also carried out several errands on Torcy’s behalf, hoping to be rewarded when they were reported to Croissy but unsure that Torcy, who he regarded as timid, would press his case with his more forceful father.41 By October 1685 Argoud was at Versailles, preceding Torcy by some months and seeking Croissy’s favour by means of Seignelay’s good offices. The

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­ olbert librarian Pierre Clairambault helped him acquire a room near C his bureau and put him to work, while Croissy’s premier commis JeanLouis Bergeret offered his good offices, assuring him that his service to Torcy in Lisbon would enhance his standing with the minister. In addition, Clairambault put him in contact with Callières, whose recommendation would carry further weight.42 As Argoud’s letters reveal, Torcy was already imbedded in the patronage system that animated the ­Colbert administrative apparatus as well as the foreign office. In April 1685 Croissy wrote Torcy that his return plans were still undecided, awaiting the outcome of a possible peace settlement between France and Spain and her allies. If the war continued, Torcy was to return home by sea in the same vessel that had borne him to Lisbon, but if peace came, he would return by land through Spain.43 When Luxembourg surrendered on 4 June to French besiegers, prospects for peace increased and Croissy instructed Torcy to have his farewell audience right away so as to be ready to depart for Madrid upon word from Versailles.44 By the middle of June prospects for peace matured, as did the secretary’s plans for his son’s travels, with all of Italy now added to the itinerary.45 By late August, with no general truce yet concluded, Torcy was instructed to remain in Lisbon but assured that the Madrid visit was to proceed and given more detailed instructions about his conveyance, lodgings, and a hoped-for audience with Carlos II and his French queen, Marie-Louise.46 Although a wait for Spanish passports brought further delay, Croissy wryly wrote on 10 September that since the truce contained nothing about an exchange of prisoners, his son should be careful not to add to their number by departing without the necessary documents.47 Twelve days later Croissy reported that ratifications had been exchanged for the Truce of Ratisbon (signed 15 August 1684) and Torcy could therefore depart, but now Louis XIV desired that his visit be “incognito,” that is, in an unofficial, private capacity, in order to forego the usual protocol and ceremonial formalities.48 On the eve of Torcy’s departure, Saint-Romain, shrewd politician and wise mentor, wrote to Croissy summing up his visit. Admiring the discretion and prudent conduct of one his age in dealing with Portugal’s king, the ambassador astutely observed that Croissy’s son was “capable de gouverner les gouverneurs memes” (capable of governing the governers themselves).49 Pedro II and the Infanta were so impressed with the young envoy that at his farewell audience they presented him with a more considerable gift than normally given to foreign envoys.50 Torcy departed in late November or early December and was received with honours and



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by royal order allowed to tour the arsenals and fortresses he passed in Portugal, arriving in Madrid on 21 December 1685.51 Torcy shortly received an audience with Queen Marie-Louise, daughter of Louis XIV’s brother Philippe d’Orléans, who was overjoyed to talk with a countryman and a young one at that, fresh from the court at Lisbon and, more importantly, from that at Versailles. She invited him to several court entertainments where he mixed easily, facilitated by his knowledge of Spanish and his unofficial status; she lent him carriages to visit nearby royal palaces; but most importantly, she interceded on his behalf for an audience with Carlos II.52 Symbolically, the Spanish monarch’s meeting with a French diplomat, even one traveling incognito, was of great importance to the French court. Spain and France had been at war intermittently for over a decade, so few French envoys had resided in Madrid, let alone been afforded a glimpse of the reclusive Carlos. Torcy knew that Louis XIV would read his description of Carlos and his court with great interest. It was a testing time. Carlos was standing by his desk when Torcy arrived for his audience. Torcy described him as small of stature, with flowing blond hair, a high forehead, blue eyes, a long pinched nose, large mouth, exaggerated lower lip, and a chin that showed a hint of a blond goatee. Turning to the king’s character and innate disposition, Torcy reported that Carlos was known to be scrupulously devout and in conversation often brusque and easily roused to anger. He enjoyed hunting, even in the most inclement weather. Toward his wife, Marie-Louise, he displayed loving tenderness, and she in turn watched over him with an almost maternal concern. Torcy believed the queen wielded considerable political power, an assessment that wiser heads at Versailles probably discounted. Likely most startling to both Louis XIV and Croissy was the realization that Carlos was certainly not the imbecile or invalid that some agents had reported. Indeed, he was seemingly in good health and might live for many more years (fifteen, as it happened).53 Torcy sketched portraits of all the members of the king’s council, knowing the value of such information for those formulating policy at Versailles. It would also form the foundation of his own knowledge of the Spanish court that would one day influence his thinking about whether or not to accept the testament of Carlos II. He completed his Spanish interlude with a courtesy visit to the king’s mother, Marianna of Austria, widow of Philip IV, sister of ­Leopold I of Austria, and a former regent who was still politically powerful.54 Delighted to hear Torcy speak Spanish, in a moment of cordiality she ordered her rooms in the Buen Retiro, like

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the Escorial a storehouse of Spanish art treasures, opened to the young Frenchman.55 In mid-December Torcy still projected a trip to Italy by land via Lyon rather than by sea routes via Bayonne or Barcelona, but by February his father wrote urging him to say his adieus and return to Versailles as quickly as possible.56 Louis and Croissy were so pleased with his Iberian sojourn that the secretary had had his dispatches from Portugal transcribed and bound in a volume for the king’s future consultation.57 Torcy’s daughter, having later found nothing in his papers to explain his sudden recall, speculated that perhaps Croissy had given in to his son’s desire for further travel or had already himself another mission in mind.58 In any event, Torcy hastened to obey, arriving at Versailles on 25 March, where five days later Louis XIV received him with favour, according to the Gazette de France, and was especially pleased with his account of Spain.59 Basking in the warmth of the Sun King’s praise, Croissy gained permission to send Torcy on a new mission as extraordinary envoy to Denmark with letters of condolence on the death of King Christian V’s mother, and on 13 April 1685 the Gazette de France announced this new appointment.60 Barely a month after his return from over a year in sunny Iberia, Torcy departed Versailles on 3 May 1685 and Paris eleven days later for the mists and cold of Scandinavia and the Baltic.61 As he traveled, a letter from France’s ambassador in Copenhagen, Antoine, marquis de Villars, reached Versailles with news of changes in protocol at the Danish court that threatened to disrupt the mission. Imitating an innovation at the English court, Christian V decided to receive foreign envoys while seated and wearing his hat rather than standing and hatless as he had done in the past. Other foreign envoys in Copenhagen joined Villars in resisting this change as prejudicial to the dignity of their masters, but not wanting a break with Denmark, they engineered various clever face-saving but nonetheless trying ways around it. Torcy received orders to wait in Hamburg while diplomats in Copenhagen and at Versailles worked toward a resolution.62 Traveling again with du Pré, an écuyer, a secretary, and several servants, Torcy passed through The Hague, where he conferred with one of France’s most astute ambassadors, Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux, who was balanced in his judgments, patient in negotiation, and proficient in the art of language. Like Saint-Romain, d’Avaux was impressed with Torcy, especially with his knowledge of the Dutch government.63 Journeying through northern Germany, Torcy lingered five



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days at the Hanoverian court of Brunswick-Lüneberg at Bruckhausen, a hunting lodge near Celle where he was well received by the Duke of Celle, George William, and his duchess. He wrote home that it was hard to believe he was in Germany, since they spoke only French and most of the officers were French.64 After a journey of a day and a night, he arrived in Hamburg on 15 June, staying with the local French resident, another veteran diplomat, Abbé Étienne Bidal d’Asfeld, and awaiting word to proceed.65 More difficulties delayed and then threatened to abort Torcy’s Danish mission unless perhaps he was received by Christian V in the Duchy of Holstein or in Norway, away from the court at Copenhagen and with the full honours formerly accorded French envoys. Meanwhile, a contingency plan developed in early June to send him to the Brandenburger and Saxon courts and then to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.66 Perhaps while in Hamburg Torcy conceived of extending his Danish trip to Sweden. Croissy consented, but only if Torcy made it clear to the suspicious Danes that he went only out of personal curiosity.67 Even when the Danish visit was again on track, plans for an extended visit encompassing German courts persisted and soon included a trip to Sweden, a Baltic crossing to Danzig, and even a journey south to Warsaw to see Polish king John III Sobieski. It was an ambitious itinerary but one that promised the valued first-hand observations relished by the king and Croissy and that would secure the contacts, information, and experience essential to a young man expected one day to serve as foreign secretary. By 9 August, however, the advancing season led Croissy to urge against such an extended itinerary. Torcy nonetheless still hoped to complete a voyage that promised rich rewards.68 Following a compromise and according to its terms, Torcy finally sailed from Hamburg on 9 July for the port of Larvik on Norway’s south coast just west of the Oslofijord, where far from court protocol he could be presented to King Christian in a manner that conformed to previous practice. Few other foreigners, let alone Frenchmen, had visited the rugged coastal towns of Norway, well guarded by natural forces of submerged rocks, fierce winds, and booming surf.69 Christian and Torcy developed such an easy rapport that when the king’s party returned to Copenhagen, the king himself conducted Torcy on a visit through the arsenal and harbour fortresses, inviting him to inspect the map depot and even permitting him to purchase maps for the French foreign archives. During his sojourn in Copenhagen, Torcy displayed a flicker of independence when his wish to visit Sweden persisted despite

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Croissy’s misgivings. France and Sweden, Croissy explained, were diplomatically on the coolest of terms, but he finally assented with the provision that Torcy travel unofficially. As it happened, Charles XI’s reception of the young diplomat was nearly as frigid as the weather in Stockholm. Nevertheless, Torcy charmed yet another queen mother, Hedvig-Elenora, Charles X’s widow.70 Torcy next visited Berlin, where he was well received by the “Great Elector” Frederick William, who presented him with a rich gift. Informed of this, Croissy wrote Torcy that he understood why he had accepted this token of esteem in light of his earlier reticence about accepting princely gifts, but cautioned him that he was not to accept any future presents because he was not traveling in an official capacity. Croissy blamed himself for not explaining this diplomatic subtlety earlier. In the event, however, the king desired the gift returned, and Torcy was to do so through France’s Berlin ambassador with all necessary diplomatic finesse. In this same letter, Croissy noted approvingly the cancellation of a side trip to Cologne, urging his son to hasten to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon.71 Passing through Dresden, Torcy arrived in Ratisbon on 30 November 1685, where he lingered for three months under the tutelage of Ambassador Louis de Verjus, comte de Crécy, an experienced diplomat, pamphleteer, and art connoisseur. Torcy observed at first hand Crécy’s delicate negotiations concerning the Palatine succession and the rights of the king’s sister-in-law. He also experienced at first hand the enduring diplomatic importance of Latin: although Germans had no problem with oral communication in French, each document presented to the Imperial Diet had to be in Latin.72 One Englishman at Ratisbon claimed that the presence of “Torsie” enlivened Carnival because of the balls and masquerades given in his honour.73 Torcy sent Croissy character sketches of the ministers he encountered, lastingly useful in negotiations with the Imperial Diet in the coming years. He then descended the Danube by boat to Vienna at the end of February 1686, was feared lost when high winds wrecked several boats, but arrived safely on 7 March, remaining in Vienna for two and a half weeks to draw perceptive portraits of Leopold I and his court.74 Journeying on to Munich, he met with Elector Max Emmanuel, with whom he would work closely in the future, presenting him with a letter of recommendation from the elector’s sister, the wife of Dauphin Louis de France (known also as “le Grand D ­ auphin” and “Monseigneur). Lingering in Bavaria only a few days, Torcy then hastened to cross the Alps for a short stay in Venice, but not before reporting to his father that he had seen the elector’s



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palace, whose rooms he considered the most beautiful he had seen in Germany.75 In Venice Torcy’s visit created more of a stir than he had hoped. The French ambassador, to preserve diplomatic honour locally, insisted Torcy stay with him rather than in rented lodgings, while the Republic planned to shower him with parting gifts. This led him to slip out of the city under cover earlier than planned.76 Clearly, he had taken to heart his father’s instructions about accepting gifts! Journeying south led him through Mantua, where he was well received by the duke.77 Most of his time in Italy, however, was spent in Rome, where he arrived at the end of May and remained for five months, except for a short journey to Naples. He lodged at the Farnese palace with his hosts the French envoys, César, the cardinal d’Estrées, and his brother, François-Annibal, duc d’Estrées.78 The cardinal introduced Torcy into Roman society and especially to the salon of Louise-Angélique La Trémoille, Princess Lanti, and her sister Marie-Anne de Trémoille, duchesse de Bracciano and later the princesse des Ursins, with whom he would later be in close contact in his dealings with Bourbon Spain. Both ladies from the great French family of Trémoille had married into the powerful Roman Orsini family and supported a French party in the heart of Rome. Bracciano opened her palace, country villa, and acquaintanceship of several Roman ladies to the French voyager.79 After receiving news that Torcy had left Vienna for Munich, Croissy had sent him instructions for his Italian journey, especially for the important visit to Rome. He urged him to follow the d’Estrées brothers’ counsel in his relations with the cardinals and the Holy Father and to observe whenever possible the talents, character, interests, and inclinations of each of the cardinals, particularly those who could one day be elected pope.80 Perhaps betraying some mild frustration, Torcy informed his father that the cardinal d’Estrées had limited his visits with the other cardinals, even though many had asked to visit him, because d’Estrées said that his experience with past visitors to Rome taught him that otherwise he would end up wasting valuable time. Possibly d’Estrées was anxious as well to limit this potential rival source of first-hand information to the foreign secretary by subtle management of Torcy’s contacts in Rome. Besides limiting the young man’s access to Their Eminences, he kept him busy with the Eternal City’s sights.81 This accorded with Croissy’s earlier urgings that Torcy examine Rome’s antiquities and learn good taste in painting, architecture, and sculpture, all of which should not be neglected at his age, since it would be of use one day.82 As one who hoped

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to serve a monarch who considered himself a connoisseur, Torcy likely appreciated this sage paternal advice. Torcy was pleased to report that he witnessed a cardinal receive his hat in a ceremony that had not taken place in five years and he thought not likely to do so again anytime soon. He was also cordially received by Innocent XI, which pleased Croissy because that pope was no friend of France. On 23 September Torcy departed Rome for the long journey home, scheduling a stop in Modena, whose ruler had offered warnings of and protection against the dangers of bad mountain roads.83 Traveling first through Florence, he stayed with Grand Duke Cosimo III de’ Medici, who was married to Marguerite Louise d’Orléans, daughter of Louis XIV’s uncle Gaston. The marriage, an unhappy one that resulted in a separation and Marguerite’s return to France in 1674, nonetheless produced three children. The Grand Duke hoped to wed his youngest son, Gian Gastone, to Isabel Luísa of Portugal, whom Torcy had met in Lisbon the previous year. Cosimo spoke to Torcy several times of these plans and hoped that he would help him gain Louis XIV’s support. When the Grand Duke named those in the Portuguese royal council opposed to the match, Torcy shared what he knew of these individuals, but already a cautious diplomat, he assured his father that he shared only a part of what he had learned in Lisbon. After passing along C ­ osimo’s effusive praises of the king and avowals of friendship for Croissy, Torcy wryly added that he had answered as he thought such politeness merited without committing his father or France to anything.84 He traveled next to Modena and then to Genoa, arriving on 17 October. Taking the land route, he reached Turin, where he was delayed by the autumn rains, and finally reached Versailles on 23 November 1696, again to a favourable reception.85 After his return, Torcy settled down to regular labour in the department to learn all the aspects of its operation and handled correspondence, for example, with Rome and the other Italian states. According to Torcy’s daughter, Croissy continued his training by having him study old dispatches and even prepare responses to some of the king’s envoys abroad.86 Torcy’s inked annotations begin to appear on documents during this period, and there are indications that he went to the king’s Cabinet with orders prepared for the monarch’s signature but always subject to revision at the royal behest.87 There are also increasing numbers of letters to provincial officials from his pen.88 In addition, he read and sorted the cartons and bundles of diplomatic papers accumulated since 1660 that his father was having classified and prepared for binding.89



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Before a year had passed, he was off to England. At the end of August 1687, Torcy carried the king’s condolences to James II upon the death of his mother-in-law, along with some confidential dispatches. He was permitted an additional six to eight weeks in England to gather the extensive array of information outlined in his second set of instructions. Ambassador Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, marquis de Branges, who followed the Stuart court on its peregrinations, wrote from Bath that James would receive Torcy at Oxford and suggested that Torcy stay with him in London, but Croissy, not wanting to inconvenience the ambassador, directed his son to rent lodgings yet dine at the embassy. At Oxford James received him graciously, after which Torcy viewed the local sights.90 In a dispatch home, he detailed his reception by James and recounted the freer conversation he had had with him for nearly half an hour afterwards. He also reported that Barillon would leave in the morning for Bath and that he would follow, hoping to have an audience with the queen.91 By the end of October Torcy left London, esteemed, according to Barillon, by the entire court.92 Back home Torcy assisted his father with correspondence with Italian ecclesiastics and drafting letters in the king’s name, especially since Croissy’s arthritis made it difficult for him personally to draft instructions as he had often done in the past.93 When word reached Versailles on 23 August 1689 that the ailing Innocent XI had died, Torcy managed the important flow of letters to those cardinals through whom Louis XIV hoped to influence the papal election94 and drafted the instructions for the new French envoy to Rome, Charles Albert d’Ailly, duc de Chaulnes.95 Following Crécy’s suggestion three years earlier, Croissy sent Torcy along with his brother Abbé Croissy to accompany Chaulnes. They left Versailles on 27 August, were joined in Lyon by three cardinals, embarked from Toulon on royal galleys on 10 September, and arrived at Rome on 23 September.96 Torcy’s letter of 27 September describing the growing tensions in the conclave, the factional manoeuvring, and the cardinals’ political posturing was a model of its kind: detailed, balanced in its judgments, and punctuated with gossipy tidbits fit for royal delectation.97 More than an observer, Torcy took part in all French discussions and negotiations, acquitting himself admirably, as Chaulnes assured the king.98 As Crécy had wisely foreseen, experiencing a papal conclave and the intrigue that engulfed it would serve Torcy well in future dealings with the Holy See and with the papal nuncios sent to France. Shortly after Alexander VIII’s election on 6 October 1689, a special messenger arrived in Rome carrying the news that Torcy was to return

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to France at once to assume officially the duties of secretary of state as his father’s designated successor, an honour granted Croissy by the king at the same time that Louis Pontchartrain replaced Claude Le ­Peletier as controller general.99 Meeting the new pope, who complimented and embraced him during a half-hour audience, Torcy told him that he was leaving Rome ahead of the rest of the French delegation in order to thank the king at Versailles for the honour he had just received. On the night of the 11th, Torcy departed Rome for Civitavecchia, where a galley carried him home to a new status and new responsibilities.100

The

s u rv i va n c i e r

at Work

Upon his return to Versailles on 6 November 1689, Torcy’s positive report on the recent French-engineered election of Venetian cardinal Pietro Ottoboni as Pope Alexander VIII raised hopes for better relations with Rome. On the 8th, amidst the acclaim for his successful mission, Torcy took the oath of secretary of state as his father’s survivancier.101 This practice is particularly foreign if not repugnant to modern meritocratic sensibilities (although, to be sure, not to modern practice). However, our own preferences are also subject to criticism. François Monnier and Guy Thuillier observe that theoretical formulations risk distorting the administrative trainee’s outlook by implying a rationally necessary fit between ends and means. They defend the success and rationality of the French tradition of on-the-job training practised in the professions, business management, and ministerial cabinets, contending that it remains unproven that one can “learn” administering other than in actual offices and in the professions.102 Granting a survivance was in fact a workable system if we seek the “order underlying what often looks … like disorder, on the rules of the game and the pressures on all the actors.”103 Indeed, the intergenerational transfer within the same family of occupation and profession occurred at all social levels and was an old practice that continued throughout the early modern era, being regarded as “a guarantee of qualification, cohesion, and loyalty towards an individual’s own social group and his superiors.”104 A survivance gave the king and an office-holder control over the successor’s training because it took place largely within their immediate circle and surroundings and was thus an on-the-job training unavailable to outsiders. The department’s personnel could initiate the apprentice into its administrative procedures and practices as well as into ministerial politics. Moreover, Louis XIV was a creature of habit



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in the way he worked and if possible with whom he worked.105 He was supportive of his secretaries of state, but exacting in his expectations, requiring them to be well informed and precise in their one-on-one consultations and conciliar reports and discussions. A survivancier had the opportunity to become a familiar face to the king, acquainted with his routine and preferences. When he finally succeeded to the office, a procedural continuity was in place to soften the monarch’s loss of a familiar and trusted collaborator and to smooth the transition to his new but not unfamiliar replacement. In addition, the survivancier could draw on a legion of kinsmen and clients who, optimally, were known, tested, and faithful assistants. Examples of bright and qualified “outsiders” who stumbled during a transition for lack of the “insider’s” experience and perspective were not unknown then and now, and the system of survivance meant to prevent this in many instances did so admirably.106 The element of merit was hardly absent from this system, since the survivancier had no security of succession and the king sincerely believed that “loftiness of rank is never more solid than when it is sustained by uniqueness of merit.”107 If he lacked the king’s confidence because of inability or age, he was only guaranteed that a replacement would have to indemnify him for his office. Louis XIV liked to believe that, starting with Louvois, he himself had formed many of the administrators who succeeded those he had inherited from Mazarin. The father of a survivancier was often as demanding of his son as was the king and perhaps more so because the family’s fate rested on the youth-in-training’s performance. Louvois, his father’s survivancier in 1655 and his co-secretary in 1664 until succeeding him fully in 1677, sought to continue the Le Tellier hold on the war department in 1681 by obtaining the survivance for his eldest son, Michel François Le Tellier, marquis de C ­ ourtanvaux, but after four years of frustrating and failed training, Louvois had ­Courtanvaux resign and the survivance assigned to his third son, the marquis de Barbezieux. Michel Chamillart’s twenty-year-old son and survivancier (since 1707), Michel II Chamillart, marquis de Cany, fell with his father in 1709 and had to surrender the war secretaryship to Daniel Voysin, who then paid him for it.108 Since the survivancier did not merely stand aside until death visited his father and the king called, his could be a grueling regimen. Travel was often part of his formation and typically came early in his apprenticeship, as we saw with Torcy. Under his father’s guidance, Louvois toured the provinces from which future wars were likely to be launched if not fought, while Seignelay and Jérôme Pontchartrain made circuits of the

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Atlantic and Mediterranean ports and naval hubs. These arduous journeys were wearing even on young men, but they were invaluable for the intelligence gathered from observations and conversations to be shared later with a monarch and ministers avid for information. Furthermore, the survivancier became acquainted with the officials and clients away from the capital who made a department’s operations a reality, which in Torcy’s case meant diplomats and embassy personnel in major European capitals. Torcy also garnered first-hand knowledge of and acquaintance with many of the rulers and their ministers with whom he would later interact as secretary.109 A pedigree of steadfast service to the crown was highly prized among the elite and especially by the monarch. Individuals functioned and gained such honour (or dishonour) in the context of an extended kinship group. This was an era when no formal schools for training administrators existed, although Torcy later made an innovative attempt to remedy this. University studies, in addition to ignoring public administration, were typically of short duration and of mediocre quality.110 In this context, the system of survivanciers filled a gap. Even as his training proceeded, growing competence would allow the survivancier to shoulder some of his father’s burden of office. When Chamillart’s son was granted the survivance, the court memorialist Philippe de Courcillon, marquis de Dangeau, remarked that his right to sign official documents would save his father three or four hours daily. This also permitted the son to become a specialist in certain aspects of his father’s cumul of functions while still under supervision. Louis himself enjoyed working with these young men, but his role in their formation was greater perhaps in his imagination than in reality, since their fathers’ tutelage reigned supreme. They were kept busy with various tasks to widen their experience and test their abilities, including service on the Council of Dispatches and attending upon the king in tandem or alone.111 Louis XIV could be intimidating as he probed the survivancier’s knowledge, weighed his judgment, and evaluated his temperament. Yet prevailing in these tasks and trials was a critical part of honing one’s skills and enjoying someday a successful succession.112 In addition, the transfer of administrative papers and books from father to son provided critical administrative continuity in the period before ministerial archives were established.113 Croissy was always careful to brief the king on the contents of incoming dispatches in a timely fashion, either in private or in the Conseil, and even when indisposed with gout, he saw to it that premier commis Bergeret did so on his behalf.114 Torcy as survivancier increasingly



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assumed this responsibility, which also afforded him greater knowledge of the department and closer contact with the king. His range of correspondence increased with each passing year as he wrote in his father’s name or on his behalf but in his own name, as when Croissy was absent from court.115 He could also write in his own name on the king’s behalf to as important a personage as Cardinal Étienne Le Camus, thanking him for his services in the last conclave and promising to let him know about his request to come to court as soon as the king made his intentions known, for the cardinal was not in favour at that time.116 Rome had proven fruitful in friendships and acquaintances that would serve Torcy well as he navigated the often-treacherous waters of papal diplomacy. In 1691 he penned a letter to the Auditor de Rota Cavallerini recalling their meeting in Rome in 1689. The next year Cavallerini was named papal nuncio to France and received the cardinal’s red hat in 1695 before returning to Rome in 1696.117 Torcy was also involved with police affairs, in 1691 countersigning his father’s orders for the arrest and later release of the English Quaker William Bromfield and writing officials at the Bastille to take care with where they lodged him, since James II was concerned about the prisoner’s poor health.118 The table of contents for a volume of Croissy’s domestic “expéditions” (outgoing items) for 1692, for instance, gives some sense of Torcy’s activities during this period, recording 121 letters sent out from Torcy, not including all the official documents he helped draft.119 On 8 June 1690, as survivancier Torcy accompanied the controller general and two state councillors of the Council of Finances to present the customary “don gratuit” (free gift) request to the Assembly of the Clergy meeting at Saint-Germain. This was not normally a foreign office function, but Torcy went on behalf of his ailing cousin Seignelay, responsible for the affairs of the clergy, and because the king’s deputies were there to press for a larger “free gift” than usual to fight the war. The records of the Assembly suggest that Torcy played an important role in briefing the delegates on the international situation.120 Torcy’s credit with the king continued to rise, and by 1 October 1690 he could sign orders as secretary of state.121 When Seignelay died suddenly in November 1690, rumours circulated that Torcy would act on behalf of his seven-year-old nephew Marie-Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Seignelay, marquis de Lonré, as household secretary until he was of age to succeed his father, but in fact, Louis Pontchartrain received both charges.122 It is nevertheless telling that Torcy’s credit was such that it could sustain such speculations; if they proved false, it was because of his young cousin’s age.

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During the campaigns in the Spanish Netherlands between 1691 and 1693, Croissy, Torcy, and other administrators accompanied Louis XIV to the battlefront.123 The royal entourage left Versailles on 17 March 1691 to join the army already on the move toward the strategic and well-defended city of Mons, but so early in the campaigning season that it surprised the Allies, still wrangling over plans for the coming spring. The royal cortege reached the trenches before Mons on 21 March.124 Because there was always government business to transact and continuity was essential, Torcy’s reports from the royal camp sound a mundane, unruffled tone, and the king held all the usual councils and gave orders concerning all state business as if he were at Versailles.125 Among Torcy’s first dispatches were instructions to Chaulnes, with a duplicate for a commis in Croissy’s bureau, ordering writs calling for the Estates of Brittany’s biennial meeting. Torcy, with an eye on the papal conclave assembling after the death of Alexander VIII, dispatched letters to Rome on behalf of the king and his father.126 While sappers dug trenches and gunners placed their artillery, the foreign office, too, advanced the monarch’s war plans. Torcy greeted a messenger from Benoît Bidal, baron d’Asfeld, the accomplished envoy negotiating with Sweden’s king, ­ Hanover’s duke, and an array of lesser northern German princes to create a “third party” to deny the emperor support and pressure him to turn the 1684 Truce of Ratisbon into a permanent settlement. Bidal’s messenger carried the welcome news that a rapprochement had been reached with the Duke of Saxe-Gotha.127 Meantime, engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban’s siege was successful, Mons surrendered on 9 April, and five days later Louis and his entourage were back at Versailles. In spring 1692 the king again went to the battlefront, this time down the Meuse to besiege the mighty fortress-city of Namur, but even in the midst of these momentous military operations, the work of government continued apace. Ministers Croissy, Pomponne, and Paul de SaintAignan, duc de Beauvillier, accompanied the king so that the Conseil could continue to meet. Secretary of State Balthazar Phélypeaux, marquis de Châteauneuf, had also come, as had War Secretary Barbezieux, anxious to see the results of his months of careful preparation even as he kept in touch with the other war theatres. Torcy was there to second his father, issuing letters to the provinces even as he made his way to the French camp.128 On 28 May 1692, while the siege was under way and the king rode about to watch the action, Torcy issued a circular letter to all bishops to see what they could do out of compassion for the families of the troops defeated in Ireland the previous year. To Controller General



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Pontchartrain, who had remained in Paris, Torcy fired off various missives. One informed him that the king’s envoy to Münster, Jean-Casimir Frischmann, had arrived at the camp to report on his conferences with the bishop as part of Croissy’s “third party” initiative. Another requested that he send two thousand pistolles at once to diplomat Michel Amelot in Switzerland for secret expenses. He also asked that money be sent to Iberville, French resident in Geneva, although by what means he was not sure.129 The movement of money was not the only logistical aspect of diplomacy to occupy Torcy: he wrote to the Marseilles naval intendant about important packets to be delivered, one into the hands of Joseph Fabre, still in Provence.130 As the siege progressed, Torcy met with Louis to read and judge requests from petitioners (the “rolle des placets” or “jugement des placets”).131 After Namur’s final capitulation on 30 June 1692, Torcy wrote to his Amsterdam agent Pierre Daguerre that while the king believed that the Dutch provinces most strongly for war were also the most republican, the taking of Namur might now hasten peace.132 That year and the following Torcy took on a growing portion of his father’s administrative workload. In a volume of Croissy’s domestic expéditions for 1692, Torcy had either written or dictated 120 of the 285 letters sent.133 He also took over much of the correspondence with the erudite Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, publisher of the Gazette de France, the semi-official compendium of court and foreign news and a source of foreign intelligence, especially from England.134 Torcy informed ­Renaudot (January 1693) that he had read to the king what he had written to Croissy and added that he needed his advice or that of other experts he might consult on a legal matter concerning a confiscation of goods so that he could present his findings at the next Dispatches meeting, implying that his father would be unable to attend. He wrote Renaudot often for enlightenment on various matters.135 Croissy’s health had been deteriorating since at least 1690.136 On 13 March 1693, in his father’s absence, Torcy reported to the king on foreign dispatches.137 That May the king embarked upon what was to be his last appearance at the front heading his army. Torcy again accompanied him, but with his position noticeably enhanced, for Louis now asked for his input into the growing discussion of peace among his advisors.138 In November, as the terrible shortage of grain continued, the king wrote to Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, concerning aid for the provincial poor. Torcy attached his own note instructing the bishop to notify him of any measures he took in his diocese so that

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he could inform the king. In this domestic crisis, Torcy was shouldering even the most important burdens and reporting directly to the king.139 Meanwhile, as a sign of the king’s esteem, he was invited to the monarch’s Marly retreat in September 1694.140 Croissy was so ill in April 1695 that he was unable to accompany the king, his ministers, and the court to Compiegne, fueling a growing anxiety among his family, friends, and colleagues.141 In May ambassador to Denmark ­François d’Usson de ­Bonrepaus, kept informed of Croissy’s physical decline, wrote to Croissy’s secretary François Blondel that he was gratified that the king was pleased with Torcy. He also thought Torcy quite capable and hoped that when Croissy recovered he would nonetheless share his functions with his son.142 While Croissy remained the department’s master, working with the king and his Conseil to formulate policy, Torcy was increasingly fulfilling many routine administrative functions and it appeared that his apprenticeship might soon end. These years of training were important for Torcy’s language skills and outlook, as he sharpened his pen by pruning the verbiage of official language.143 As he later advised his brother-in-law, Abbé Pomponne, when one writes to the king, who grows weary of ponderous sentences, one should be succinct. Torcy was thus creating a language for eighteenthcentury diplomatic culture: discreet but understandable.144 Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu observes that “official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that … conditions are created … for … a unified linguistic market, dominated by an official language.” The official language that Torcy himself adopted developed in the cultivated circles of Paris and at Versailles among those whom Bourdieu calls “authorized persons”: high officials and great state servants, whom one may call mandarins, who spoke and wrote formal “legitimate … authorized authoritative language.”145 At his father’s side and under Louis XIV’s direct guidance, Torcy developed an authorial, official voice that he learned to use with consummate skill.146

S e c r e ta ry a n d M ini s ter of S tate After a long illness, Croissy died at Versailles on 28 July 1696, and Dangeau noted the next day that shortly Torcy would marry Mlle ­ Catherine-­Félicité Pomponne.147 On the 30th Pomponne went to Paris to work on the marriage papers for a match that would considerably augment Torcy’s fortune, and the king himself signed the marriage ­contract



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on 2 August.148 The marriage took place on the morning of 13 August at Saint-Eustache and was celebrated that evening at ­Pomponne’s Paris residence.149 This was not, however, as some have assumed, a marriage long blocked because Croissy, bitter toward Pomponne, was set against it.150 To the contrary, the marriage was under discussion well before Croissy’s final illness.151 With an eye to the future as Croissy’s health deteriorated, Louis intended to join Pomponne and Torcy, in Saint-Simon’s terms, as “bon maître” (good master) and “jeune” (young) survivancier.152 The delay was likely due in part to the foreign secretary’s chronic poor health,153 his daughter’s marriage to the marquis de Bouzols in May, and the ongoing negotiations in the United Provinces and Savoy during June and July.154 When Croissy became so ill on 21 July that he was confined to his bed at Versailles with no one expecting him to survive, there was loud talk of the Torcy-Pomponne union and since the king’s desire for the marriage was clear, no one doubted that it would be concluded soon.155 Moreover, it is unlikely that the loyal Croissy would have opposed a marriage that would maintain his son in high office, even if under Pomponne’s tutelage.156 Françoise-Félicité ­Colbert, marquise d’Ancezune, Torcy’s daughter and the granddaughter of Pomponne and Croissy, wrote that when Pomponne was restored to the Conseil his unexpected courtesy call on Croissy to assure him of his lack of bitterness, his sincere desire for friendship, and his hope to work in harmony was well received and prepared the way for the future marital alliance between their families. She also noted that Croissy did not live to have the pleasure of seeing the marriage concluded, although he had much desired it.157 Louis André’s claim that, at the death of Croissy, Pomponne once again took up the direction of foreign affairs cannot be credited, but clearly Torcy did not experience a complete succession to his father’s position.158 When the king learned at the Trianon that Croissy had died, he had already considered the disposition of his responsibilities, and on Sunday, 29 July, summoned Torcy’s kinsman Beauvillier to announce the new arrangements.159 Torcy was to direct the department in receiving, decoding, and otherwise processing the correspondence that would be placed in the dossiers that Pomponne would take to the Conseil. There, as minister of state, Pomponne would read the dispatches and note on their margins what was resolved concerning them. Torcy and his commis would then generate outgoing correspondence to embody these decisions. One week after this arrangement was announced, Pomponne read Torcy’s dispatches for the first time in the Conseil’s regular morning

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meeting.160 The following day, Torcy left Marly, where he likely had conferred with the king, to join Pomponne at his Paris home to receive the foreign ambassadors.161 Torcy took his oath as secretary of state from the king on 12 August 1696.162 On 19 August the king asked the ­Pomponnes to stay at Versailles and share Croissy’s former apartments with the ­Torcys, which added a spatial symbol of the unity expected even as it physically facilitated their work together.163 Torcy paid a visit on 25 August to the papal nuncio at his Paris residence, where that high-ranking member of the diplomatic corps was the first to “luy donna la main” (give him his hand). This seemingly simple gesture struck the knowledgeable observer because Torcy was only a secretary of state and not a minister of state, whereas the extension of an ambassador’s hand was by court protocol reserved only for ministers.164 This raises the question of why Torcy was denied the immediate entry to the high council granted his predecessors.165 Although never an intendant, which had been the training ground for his two immediate predecessors, he was undoubtedly qualified and well informed by his education, travel, and long immersion in the department’s paperwork. Equally important were his frequent work sessions with the king individually and in Dispatches, permitting him to anticipate the direction of Louis’s thoughts. Yet a secretary of state’s administrative duties did not require attendance at the Conseil, as was true of the other non-­ minister secretaries such as Barbezieux and later Jérôme Pontchartrain, and domestic matters were tended to in Dispatches where all four secretaries sat. Nevertheless, it was in the Conseil that foreign affairs were largely discussed and decided, and Torcy was not among its members.166 The department was not without a voice on the Conseil, but it was now only that of Pomponne, whom Croissy had replaced as secretary and minister in 1679. During Louvois’s ascendancy of the 1680s, rumours circulated of Croissy’s impending replacement, but his skill, his connections, and the king’s support allowed him to weather any storms.167 On Louvois’s death in July 1691, the king immediately recalled ­Pomponne to the Conseil and put him in apartments at Versailles right next to Croissy’s in the ministerial wing to signal a policy shift and to facilitate their communication.168 As secretary of state, Croissy still issued and received all instructions and correspondence in the king’s name or in his own.169 Pomponne’s return, however, as described by Rémi Mathis, was not just a significant policy shift from war to diplomacy but a diplomacy of negotiation rather than one of confrontation.170 Pomponne’s temperate voice surely carried more authority with the king than that



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of Croissy, long linked with the brutal and disastrous policies espoused by Louvois and Seignelay. Perhaps equally important in moderating the Conseil’s tone was the growing role of Pomponne’s friend and Croissy’s kinsman Beauvillier, named minister the same day Pomponne was recalled.171 This left Croissy further isolated in the Conseil, since Le ­Pelletier, closely linked with Pomponne and Beauvillier, also favoured moderation and peace.172 In reporting the universal joy at Louvois’s demise and the advent of Beauvillier and Pomponne, Marie le Bailleul, marquise d’Huxelles, exulted that the spirit of the ministry had altered and that Louvois would soon be forgotten.173 Andrew Lossky contends that Pomponne’s return made him “the real director of French foreign policy,” relegating Croissy to “a competent chief clerk and legal expert.”174 Although fellow minister Claude Le Peletier, a Le Tellier kinsman and client, credited Croissy with having some sense, he claimed that because he never applied himself and was too narrow, he lacked credit, resulting in a poorly conducted foreign policy.175 However, Thierry Sarmant and Mathieu Stoll call Croissy a brilliant second to Pomponne and a great clerk rather than a great minister, but even though he never enjoyed the preponderance of his brother or Louvois, he was nonetheless master of his own department and an important minister to whom the king listened, even if his credit with the king was eclipsed by that of the bellicose war minister.176 The marquise d’Huxelles, a well-connected observer and Pomponne’s friend and conduit of information, lauded his 1691 return, claiming that she had heard that Torcy desired it and that foreigners had great confidence in Pomponne. In her view, Croissy had now become quite “caduc” (obsolete).177 Yet Croissy still had a seat on the Conseil, and any eclipse he may have suffered as a minister did not make Pomponne the administrative master of foreign affairs, as the king made clear to the nuncio and other diplomats.178 Even Louvois, who had nibbled around the edges of the foreign minister’s prerogative to name diplomats and supervise diplomatic correspondence, had avoided any direct interference in the operations of his colleague’s department.179 Despite Pomponne’s kinship with some diplomats and friendship with others, neither they nor he sought to bypass Croissy through separate correspondence.180 Croissy’s kinsman Beauvillier, with whom he often disagreed on policy, had contacts in the department’s bureaus and played a role in foreign affairs from 1691. When Louis took Croissy, Pomponne, and Beauvillier with him to the front, it was presumably because all three played roles in foreign policy.181 When Croissy was too ill to attend the

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Conseil in May 1695, Beauvillier and not Pomponne acted as reporter. Although Pomponne was certainly consulted as well, the king also conferred with and chose Beauvillier to announce the details of Torcy’s duties upon Croissy’s death. Torcy’s marginalia on letters concerning Poland suggest that Beauvillier may also have overseen his direction of some diplomatic business in 1696.182 However, even Beauvillier did not meddle in the actual administration of foreign affairs.183 Although during his years of tutelage Torcy usually trod along ­Pomponne’s and Beauvillier’s more conciliatory policy path, in administrative matters he plainly followed in his father’s footsteps.184 The king had made it clear that Torcy, not Beauvillier or even Pomponne, his designated mentor and liaison with the Conseil, would run the department. Pomponne lacked the orderly and powerful work drive of the Colberts, whereas Torcy had clearly inherited it.185 If Louis had been unhappy with the way Croissy ran his department, he could have replaced him in 1691 with Pomponne, but instead, while he moved away from Croissy’s tone, style, and policy preferences, he retained his admittedly admirable and effective administrative organization.186 In his study of the Polysynod, Alexandre Dupilet offers a useful distinction between two types of secretary of state: those who were “secrétairesconseillers politiques” (administrators as well as political advisors) and those who were essentially “secrétaires-commis” (chief clerks) or administrators directing routine matters but not helping formulate policy. As examples of the latter he points to all the secretaries of state for the rpr (Religion préntendue réformée or the Reformed Church), to the war secretaries after ­Louvois, and to Torcy at the beginning of his tenure.187 Mathieu Stoll, in approaching the matter from the opposite direction, notes the rise of ministers without portfolio from Le Peletier’s resignation in 1689 as controller general. He contends that for a decade Louis XIV largely separated bureaucratic management from policy formulation. From the death of Louvois in 1691, three of the five ministers (not counting the Dauphin) – Le Peletier, Pomponne, and Beauvillier – were not secretaries of state, and when Croissy died in 1696, only one minister ­(Pontchartrain) was a secretary of state until Torcy officially joined the Conseil in 1699.188 The last time the foreign office had been clearly divided between a secrétaire conseiller politique and a secrétaire commis was during the first three years of Louis XIV’s personal reign.189 Lionne, Mazarin’s candidate and the king’s preference for foreign secretary, sat in the Conseil from March 1661 while Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne,



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remained secretary of state (from 1643), assisted by his son and (since 1651) survivancier, a division of labour that proved most unsatisfactory. Even before Mazarin’s death, French diplomats and the department’s provincial officials were burdened with a double correspondence with both Brienne and Lionne. Brienne’s bureau routinely received and decoded dispatches and then passed them on to Lionne, who read, discussed, and reacted to them in tête-à-têtes with the king and in the Conseil, but some went directly to Lionne to decode, bypassing the secretary altogether.190 Yet in 1661 Louis-Henri (called “Brienne the Younger”) was a plausible survivancier. Born in 1636, he was two years older than the king. His education and extensive travel were international and extended over several years, and a marital alliance with the daughter of his father’s predecessor as foreign secretary, the still-influential Léon Bouthillier de Chavigny, augured well for him. Although Mazarin increasingly sidestepped his father, on 22 May 1658 Brienne the Younger was granted the right to sign orders and exercise the secretaryship during the court’s travels. Mazarin’s power, personality, and worldly tastes drew him into the cardinal’s orbit, and the two got on well, but this did nothing to halt Lionne’s ascent and Mazarin’s plans for him to replace both Briennes. Louis XIV thought Brienne too old and conceited and lacking in good advice and his son, while eager to serve, too young and inexperienced to manage the foreign office let alone offer wise counsel. When it had become painfully clear that neither Brienne was acceptable to the king, they reluctantly sold the office to Lionne on 19 April 1663.191 The parallels of Brienne the Younger with Torcy thirty-five years later are obvious – each was well educated, well traveled, and well connected, including being married to the daughter of his father’s predecessor – but the differences were decisive. Neither Croissy nor Torcy was an object of royal disfavour, nor had either been pushed aside in the department’s management. Unlike the Briennes, who would have neither dreamed of nor consented to a marital alliance with Lionne, the Colberts supported Torcy’s marriage to Pomponne’s daughter. In addition, Torcy and not Pomponne had increasingly managed the department’s daily business during Croissy’s many illnesses.192 It was Pomponne and not Torcy who was unfamiliar to many foreign office personnel in 1696.193 Nevertheless, this arrangement marked a departure from conditions under Croissy’s secretaryship and at least superficially recalled the Briennes’ tenure. Was Torcy to be merely a secrétaire-commis? This was apparently no more Louis XIV’s intention than it was to recreate Pomponne as

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a secrétaire-conseiller politique. While Pomponne would have no hand in running the department, he and Torcy would conduct and supervise negotiations together and what Pomponne took to the Conseil was prepared in conjunction with the secretary. They already had good working and personal relations, and these would continue as mentor and pupil and father- and son-in-law. The king intended by this arrangement not an affront to Torcy but a mark of his confidence in Pomponne.194 Would adding Torcy have further unbalanced the Colbert and Le ­Tellier ratio on the Conseil? Pomponne, although allied with Torcy, was hardly a Colbert, and the pro-Jesuit Beauvillier was often at odds with the staunchly Gallican Torcy.195 While once willing and even anxious to hear rival voices grouped in two fractious factions competing for his ear at the council table, an older Louis changed course. In 1689 he introduced a third family, the Pontchartrains (although they were initially closely associated with the Le Tellier clan), into the Conseil and from 1691 appointed more moderate individuals, eliminating the need to balance factions, and increasingly worked with specialists outside the Conseil.196 Sarmant, however, rejects what he sees as an recent over-emphasis on factions and their balancing, even for the earlier part of the reign, objecting that the hoary Colbert/Le Tellier dichotomy ignores the frequent service the clients of one rendered the other and, worse, often inflates the alleged factional dichotomy into an ideological one. He helpfully points instead to differences of ministerial style resulting from the career starting position of each: Colbert was a clan founder, whereas Louvois was a clan inheritor.197 For his part, Frostin traces the close ties between the Phélypeaux and the Le Telliers to question the “third family” interpretation of Louis Pontchartrain’s rise and emphasizes the role Le Tellier kinsman and client Claude Le Peletier played in ­Pontchartrain’s selection to succeed him as controller general. It was a choice welcomed by Louvois, suggesting that the Pontchartrains were only in a strict sense an autonomous clan.198 A better explanation for Torcy’s initial status as secrétaire-commis centres on age and seniority. A secretary in service longer than another was likely jealous when a colleague advanced ahead of him to become a secrétaire-conseiller politique. If Torcy had been raised to the Conseil at age thirty-one, might there have been pressure for Barbezieux, war secretary at twenty-eight, to receive the same prestige and access to the heart of decision-making?199 Torcy was kept off the Conseil given considerations of age, experience, and continuity. The king preferred familiar faces at his side, and this worked in Pomponne’s favour in the small



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group that was the Conseil.200 In 1696 Louis XIV was past his midfifties, and his ministers were all over fifty years old save Beauvillier, who was close at forty-eight. Pontchartrain was fifty-three, Le Peletier sixty-six, and Pomponne seventy-eight (Croissy had been almost sixtyeight when he died), whereas Torcy was not quite thirty-one.201 Yet Louis had no aversion to youth: in 1691 Barbezieux became secretary of war at barely twenty-three years of age, and in 1696 Jérôme Pontchartrain was designated his father’s successor for the navy and household at age twenty-two. When Torcy finally fully joined the Conseil early in 1699, he was not yet thirty-four, whereas the next youngest member, ­Chamillart, was forty-seven (Beauvillier was fifty and Pontchartrain fifty-six). On the other hand, if we look at the age of entry into the Conseil of the ministers from 1661 through 1699, we find that all save two were in their forties or fifties. The two exceptions, who like Torcy had apprenticed alongside their father, were Louvois at thirty-one and Seignelay at thirty-eight.202 Perhaps it was this parallel that gave the king pause and also accounts for the relatively older group he assembled to advise him after Louvois’s passing. Although Torcy’s administrative star had shown brightly at Croissy’s side, it was not yet entirely clear that he was not his father’s duplicate in temperament and attitude.203 Perhaps Louis blamed the relative youth of Seignelay and Louvois, who each had the royal ear from their thirties, for the reckless and failed policies of the past decade, now preferring instead the more considered counsel of older men. In any event, if in 1696 Torcy had the king’s full confidence as an administrator, he apparently did not yet have it as a councillor. That he was eventually expected to attain it, however, is suggested by court memorialist Louis François de Bouschet, marquis de Sourches’s note that Pomponne reported on foreign affairs to the Conseil until it pleased the king to have Torcy do so.204 Given Pomponne’s advanced age and bouts of illness, it was likely that all concerned expected that sooner than later Torcy would become a secrétaire-conseiller politique.205 A secretary of state under tutelage was not unprecedented. Barbezieux, who worked alongside his father from age eighteen, became secretary shortly after turning twenty-three, but given his age and the fact that the kingdom was at war, the king placed him under the mentorship of two older and more experienced men, his kinsman Gilbert Colbert de Saint-Pouange, an old hand in the war department, and Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay, the king’s unofficial war secrétaire-conseiller politique. Although his department and powers were reduced from what they had been under his father, Barbezieux had successes as an administrator, but

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the carefree habits of youth, especially after he lost his wife in 1694, led him to pursue pleasure and neglect his duties. Complaints from the generals earned him a royal reprimand and chastisement for the brutal manner that he had gotten whether by nature or nurture from his father. Sobered, Barbezieux laboured to earn back the king’s confidence, while Maintenon and her supporters hoped for his elevation to minister, but he died suddenly in 1701.206 Given the manner in which Louis XIV personally formulated and directed war strategy in conjunction with military advisors such as Chamlay, Vauban, and his generals,207 the king was perhaps content with Barbezieux remaining a secrétaire-commis. Torcy, however, was expected to become a secrétaire-conseiller politique. Barbezieux’s tutelage is instructive for understanding Torcy’s five years later. The king’s original expectations for Barbezieux were disappointed, as seen in his blunt but pained memoir of 29 October 1695 to Barbezieux’s uncle Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims. After detailing the secretary’s dissolute ways and neglect of duties, including delayed dispatches, Louis intimated that some blamed him for the young man’s actions, since he had permitted a twenty-three-year-old to serve as war minister, “especially at a time like this, when the greatest and most important affairs are in his hands.”208 If the king secondguessed his own wisdom in advancing a young survivancier in the midst of war, he likely sought to avoid the same mistake less than a year later with serious peace negotiations under way. That both survivanciers were sons of ministers associated with now-regretted brutal and aggressive policies must also have weighed upon Louis. It is no coincidence that in Torcy’s case the king also looked to a senior family member, Torcy’s older cousin Beauvillier, as he considered how to manage the young man’s transition from successor to secretary. Given his own reservations about Croissy and his son, Beauvillier may have proposed Torcy’s marital alliance with and tutelage under Pomponne, his old friend and fellow moderate, but if not the plan’s instigator, Beauvillier surely welcomed and supported it as prudent. Prudence was indeed essential as peace negotiations finally moved forward after years of starts and stalls. Callières was in the United Provinces between May and late October 1697 conducting talks with the Dutch, and it was during Croissy’s final days that the thorny question of yielding Strasbourg was on the table.209 Despite his travels to the most important courts of Europe, however, Torcy had never actually conducted a negotiation,210 so the essential continuity in the conduct of negotiations came from Pomponne’s remaining on the Conseil and becoming



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reporter and from Torcy’s remaining with the administrative apparatus, now as its only head. The transition must have seemed natural to most. When Ambassador Bonrepaus wrote to Torcy in 1697 upon word of his own eminent transfer from Copenhagen to The Hague, he discussed its details with the young secretary and even took the opportunity to suggest an appointment to Brussels for his brother, but ­Bonrepaus only consulted Pomponne concerning Dutch ceremonial, which he knew from his previous ambassadorship.211 Perhaps recalling the earlier unhappy circumstances under the Briennes and Lionne, an outsider like Saint-Simon misconstrued these arrangements, opining that Pomponne directed foreign affairs while Torcy only had the nominal charge.212 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, general commissioner of fortifications, had a keener sense of this arrangement. Writing to Torcy on 16 September 1696 with several pages of reasons why France should never surrender frontier fortifications such as Strasbourg (e.g., it would give the Rhine to her enemies), Vauban concluded by saying that if Torcy did not believe his arguments he should speak to Pomponne, who, if he had the power, should dissuade the king from such sacrifices.213 If Torcy’s role was merely nominal and with no influence on foreign affairs, Vauban would likely not have wasted ink attempting to influence his thinking. When the emperor finally agreed to the mediation of Sweden’s Charles XI in January 1697 and it was agreed to open a peace congress at ­Ryswick in the coming months, Torcy drafted instructions for the three plenipotentiaries (dated 25 February 1697), who then departed for the United Provinces at the beginning of March.214 By then it was becoming obvious just how difficult it was to implement the previous year’s division of labour.215 On 3 March Pomponne drafted a memoir to persuade Louis to permit Torcy to enter the Conseil in order to enhance his ability to draft the dispatches steering the upcoming intricate negotiations.216 In July when talks stalled and entered a more critical stage in secret conversations between Louis François, duc de Boufflers, and Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, events pushed Louis to yield in part to Pomponne’s request and summon Torcy four times in a two-week period to meet with the Conseil.217 He was thus present during what was called “the reading” of dispatches, which took up the bulk of the typical meeting, but remained standing and was apparently excused during debates and when the ministers voted their advice to the king.218 As Torcy later related to Saint-Simon, sometime during September 1697 he entered the Conseil carrying the foreign dispatches but still without having a seat (literally) at the table or a voice in debates. Cardinal Toussaint Forbin-

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Janson having recently left Rome for France, the king remarked on the decline in the quality of the dispatches now coming from the embassy there, adding that it was a true misfortune that he could not make the worthy Forbin-Janson a minister of state. Torcy opined loudly enough to be heard that he saw no one more capable than the cardinal and that if the king considered Forbin-Janson capable of serving on the Conseil, then he saw nothing that should prevent him from doing so. The king, who heard these remarks, did not upbraid him for his impetuosity, Torcy reported, but rather instructed him in his maxim of state since Mazarin’s death never to admit an ecclesiastic and in particular a cardinal into his Conseil.219 Such unofficial entries into the council chamber afforded Louis an opportunity to take Torcy’s measure and eventually to invite him to remain and be seated. Saint-Simon suggests that the nearly eighty-year-old Pomponne, who included Torcy in all aspects of diplomatic policy, facilitated this familiarity by having Torcy carry his dispatch portfolio into the council chamber for him.220 On 13 December 1698 Sourches recorded that an important royal official was in worse health than usual, but he referred to the thirtyyear-old Barbezieux rather than to the octogenarian Pomponne. Nevertheless, in the same sentence he recorded the death of Pomponne’s older brother, by definition the “extremely old” Abbé Antoine Arnauld.221 Faltering health and a desire to pursue personal piety made Pomponne eager to retire from public life, but he had not done so for family reasons,222 which presumably included seeing his son-in-law in the full exercise of his charge as foreign secretary and thereby assuring the future of Pomponne’s daughter and grandchildren. As early as August 1697 Torcy shouldered some of Pomponne’s post office tasks.223 Torcy’s position on the Conseil had solidified such that the 1698 État de la France listed him without qualification among its members.224 The next year began with further signs of his ascent. On 13 February 1699 the king backed his foreign secretary’s refusal to accede to the pretensions of Louis Grimaldi, prince de Monaco and France’s new envoy to Rome, to be addressed by the secretary as “Monseigneur.”225 Three days later when the Moroccan ambassador, after months of fruitless discussions at Brest, came to Versailles for direct peace talks, he negotiated only with Torcy, seconded by Jérôme Pontchartrain representing the navy.226 By then it was also clear that Pomponne’s advanced age required a transition, that Torcy’s proven abilities permitted one, and that it should take place before Pomponne’s health or death disrupted the work of diplomacy. When an envoy from Brussels arrived at Versailles on ­Tuesday 17



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February 1699 with official word of the death of the Bavarian e­ lectoral prince on 6 February,227 the need to renegotiate the partition treaty apparently was the catalyst. Sourches wrote on 4 March that although rumours held that Torcy had been made a minister and first sat (literally) in the Conseil fifteen days earlier (Wednesday, 18 February, the Conseil’s regular meeting), neither he nor his family would verify them.228 ­Dangeau confirmed the gossip on 9 March. He observed that although the foreign secretary was usually a minister, the king’s grace to Torcy was all the more considerable given that he was only thirty-three years old.229 His entry for Thursday, 10 September 1699, gives a peek into the council chamber at Fontainebleau: after describing where the king, the Dauphin, and the other ministers sat, he observed that Torcy alone was at the end of the table opposite the king reading the ambassadors’ dispatches and the responses resolved upon at the previous council.230 In other words, Pomponne had ceded to Torcy his reporter’s role. Pomponne continued attending council meetings until the very end, but after having seemed in perfect health at Fontainebleau on the evening of 22 September 1699, the next morning at Mass he was so weak that the king sent him word to absent himself from the Conseil.231 Torcy was concerned enough to suspend routine diplomatic business.232 ­Pomponne seemed to rally, then grew worse, and died on 26 September 1699, according to Sourches universally regretted and a great loss for the king, the state, and all decent people.233 Pomponne’s “death caused no sharp break in French foreign policy.”234 In many ways Torcy’s approach was closer to that of his father-in-law than to that of his late father, but it should not be assumed that their frequent and intimate collaboration meant they were identical. During the 1660s, for example, Colbert attempted to address European public opinion through pamphlets generated by the literary figures he gathered around him, whereas the ministers of the following two decades, including his brother Croissy, largely looked instead to buying off princes with subsidies or intimidating them with military muscle. Even the relatively moderate Pomponne had little use for royally sponsored pamphlets, regarding them as unlikely to change many minds. Louvois, Barbezieux, and Croissy sponsored a trickle of such writings during the Nine Years War, but it was under Torcy that the winds shifted decisively in favour of cultivating foreign public opinion. In the aftermath of Ryswick and especially with the acceptance of the Spanish inheritance, Torcy set several writers to work wielding their pens to defend and promote French interests abroad.235 Still, such a resort to reasoned persuasion and the power

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of the pen was closer to the outlook of Pomponne that it was to the more belligerent approach of Croissy. Yet the fact that Torcy and Pomponne resided together meant that they could easily converse about affairs and did not often need to correspond, which leaves historians without much of a paper trail revealing their interactions with one another.

T h e F a m ily Network Family relationships during the “kinship-dominated” early modern era were sources of cohesiveness as well as conflict, especially for the upper classes for which such ties were vital.236 It is telling that in the État de la France’s annual roll of state positions and their occupants, the section on the four secretaries of state listed not only their spouses but also their children, siblings and their spouses, and other important kin.237 Contrast this with the spare official personnel directories of today and the distance between our outlook and theirs on the ideal (if not always the actual) connection between family and government office is striking. As minister since 1679, Croissy was the Colbert clan’s senior member from the time of his brother’s death in 1683, and he favoured a few of his kinsmen, including nephew Nicolas Desmaretz, an eminent authority on state fiscal policy, and uncle Henri Pussort, a renowned jurist and dean of the Conseil d’État privé, a part of the larger King’s Council that heard appeals for non-financial cases. Harmony, however, did not rule the ranks of the Colberts in the late 1680s and 1690s. Croissy not only quarreled with his nephews by marriage, “the dukes” (Beauvillier and Charles-Honoré d’Albert, duc de Chevreuse), but fell out with his nephew Seignelay, whom he admonished for leading what he regarded as a dissolute life bordering on scandal that threatened to bankrupt his immediate family.238 When Croissy died in the summer of 1696, he left his own family financially secure but not affluent. Among the immediate tasks Torcy faced as the new head of the family was fortifying its fortune by investment, offices, and marriage.239 Croissy had made investments largely in four areas: personal possessions (jewels, tapestries, works of art, a library, etc.), real property (a large townhouse on rue Vivienne, the Château de Croissy and adjacent lands, and a house on the Place Royal), “rentes” (interest payment on a loan given as an annuity) that included nearly 160,000 livres loaned to Brittany’s estates, and venal offices. All told, Croissy’s fortune was estimated at around 1,700,000 livres.240 Torcy and his business-minded mother adapted the past investment pattern to the



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family’s immediate needs by diversifying their holdings with rentes in the Paris Hôtel de Ville, establishing a firm foundation in government securities and one on which they could borrow for current expenses. Torcy received an augmentation by brevet en rentes of the secretary of state’s office, which in the later days of Louis XIV’s reign was worth nearly 750,000 livres. In 1701 he sold his office of grand treasurer of the Royal Orders for 430,000 livres, recently augmented by a royal gift of 200,000 livres, and moved up to the offices of commander-chancellor, guard of the seals, and superintendent, valued at 350,000 livres, which he sold in 1716 for over 600,000 livres. He also purchased as an investment the office of secretary of the king (for 100,000 livres). After ­Pomponne’s death, he was named head of the postal system, worth 400,000 livres. By 1715 Torcy held offices worth nearly 1,900,000 livres, rivaling his father’s entire fortune of 1696.241 Nevertheless, it was in the category of real property that Torcy expanded his holdings by purchasing, after long negotiations, the lands of Sablé and Bois-Dauphin near Le Mans for 450,000 livres in January 1711. Within the year the king raised these holdings to a marquisate and by 1715 Torcy had invested 100,000 livres in improvements to his château.242 In 1714 he and his wife began negotiations for the purchase of a new townhouse located on Paris’s right bank, facing the Seine, near the Palais Bourbon, which at Torcy’s death in 1746 was valued at 370,000 livres.243 In his lifetime Torcy amassed a fortune of nearly 7,000,000 livres, but in the years immediately after his father’s death, he struggled to borrow money for his and his sisters’ marriages and his brothers’ appointments to office. The negotiations to strengthen the family’s financial and social position began before Croissy’s death with the May 1696 marriage of Torcy’s sister Marie-Françoise Colbert de Croissy, then twenty-five, to army brigadier Joachim de Montaigu, marquis de Bouzols. Befitting a royal minister’s daughter, her dowry was handsome: 260,000 livres, with 200,000 livres paid immediately and the rest later, including 32,000 in rentes from the Brittany estates. This strained Croissy’s purse, but the alliance brought an infusion of the old noble blood so valued by the rising ministerial families.244 Bouzols, a distinguished soldier who rose to marshal of camp in 1704 and lieutenant-general in 1710, also served on several diplomatic missions, including to Savoy in June 1696 as part of the hostage exchange sealing the secret treaty with Victor Amadeus. Torcy sent him to Lorraine in 1698 to render civilities on behalf of Louis XIV to its duke, newly returned to his duchy after twenty-seven years

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of French occupation, and to inspect several fortresses along the border on his way home. When war came, Bouzols fed Torcy valuable information on troop movements and disagreements within the general staff. In late autumn 1714 when French ambassadors were being named with the return of peace, Matthew Prior reported to London that Bouzols was rumoured for Switzerland with comte du Luc’s likely transfer to Vienna (the Swiss post, however, remained vacant until 1716).245 Bouzols’s wife, described by Saint-Simon as “hideous,” was her husband’s opposite: fiery, outspoken, and amusing. A member of a powerful court clique that included Louis Antoine de Gondrin de Pardallan, duc d’Antin, legitimate son of Françoise Athénaïs de Rochechouart de Mortemart, marquise de  Montespan, Louis XIV’s former mistress, and Louise Françoise de Bourbon (known as Madame la Duchesse), Montespan’s eldest daughter by the king, Mme Bouzols nevertheless acted as go-between for the rival cabals of the Duke of Burgundy and the Dauphin.246 Torcy looked to her for court gossip. The next to wed was Torcy, whose marriage brought a large dowry and proved to be one of the great strengths of his career. Catherine-­ Félicité de Pomponne would be the mother of their four children and in time one of the most accomplished hostesses of her day. A strongly religious Jansenist, she was known as a woman of virtue and charity. In the parish of Croissy, she helped found the Sisters of Charity’s hospice; at Sablé she endowed the Hôtel Dieu with a legacy of 20,000 livres; and she and Torcy were the benefactors of several churches near Sablé. While Saint-Simon and other observers at court claimed that Catherine influenced many of her husband’s decisions, this cannot be verified one way or the other.247 When Montpellier’s bishop died in 1696, Torcy promptly solicited the diocese for his younger brother Charles-Joachim, Abbé Croissy, his boyhood companion and confidant.248 As secretary of state, Torcy had access to the rolle of ecclesiastical benefices, a privilege that frequently profited the Colberts.249 Charles-Joachim had accompanied Torcy to the 1689 conclave in Rome, but whereas Torcy rushed home by galley to take up his succession, his brother traveled by land, only to be arrested by the Spanish in Milan and eventually traded for a prisoner held by France. He received his doctorate in 1692 and was named grand-vicar of the abbey of Pontoise and, soon thereafter, abbot of wealthy ­Froidmont in Beauvais. He became one of the agents general of the Assembly of the Clergy, represented the archdiocese of Rouen at the 1695 Assembly, and was elevated to bishop of Montpellier the following year.250 Charles-­



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Joachim, who died in 1738, was a moral and political advisor to his brother. Suspected of being a Jansenist, he was at the very least exacting in his spirituality and had a strong Gallican sense of independence from the papacy.251 Only nineteen at the time of Torcy’s marriage, younger brother LouisFrançois-Henri Colbert, chevalier de Croissy, was already a battlefield veteran, having served since 1692 in the Flanders campaigns.252 Chevalier of the Order of Malta at the age of eleven, he became an infantry brigadier in 1702 and a Chevalier of the Order of St Louis in 1705. Torcy sent him to Lorraine in 1704 to congratulate the duke on the birth of a son.253 A brave if reckless soldier, he was twice captured by Allied troops and twice ransomed by his brother.254 Croissy became a lieutenant-general in March 1710 and in 1714, through his brother’s intercession, lieutenant du roi for the city and diocese of Nantes.255 He became the comte de Croissy in 1711 and married Marie Brunet de Rancy, daughter of a rich farmer general of finances and secretary of the king who was married to a Colbert de Villacerf.256 Named ambassador to Sweden in 1715, he remained there until recalled in 1718. His appointment made an impression on Matthew Prior, who reported to Secretary Townshend, “Your lordship will easily judge that the King of France endeavours to be very well with the King of Sweden when you remember that this minister is brother to secretary Torcy.”257 On first meeting Croissy, Charles XII, newly returned from Turkey, was unimpressed with the slight, elegant courtier, but he later commended Croissy for bravery under fire and they became close friends. Dazzled by the charismatic warrior, Croissy assured Torcy that Charles was as much a philosopher as he was a king.258 Croissy’s mission to keep the Prussians and Swedes from going to war with one another was perhaps doomed by circumstances from the outset, but the inexperienced ambassador’s abrupt manner with the Prussians and his clumsy attempt at mediation, which even his brother criticized, did not help.259 Nevertheless, Croissy maintained warm relations with Torcy, once forwarding to him a letter from a woman said to be crazy but who struck him as sensible and moderate in the recitation of her tale of woe. Moved to compassion, he clearly expected the same reaction from his brother.260 In the years 1700 to 1701, Torcy negotiated the marriage of his sister Marie (known as Marguerite)-Thérèse, born in 1682. Louis de Clermont d’Amboise, chevalier marquis de Renel, came from an old noble family and was already a lieutenant-general and governor and grand bailly of Chaumont.261 The marriage lasted but a brief time, as Renel died of

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smallpox during the siege of Liege in 1702, leading Torcy to write to Noblet that he had been occupied that week with the sad business of his brother-in-law’s funeral.262 Marguerite-Thérèse, one of the great court beauties, was not a widow for long, remarrying on 5 January 1704 a grandee of Spain of Genoese extraction, Francesco-Maria Spinola, duc de Saint-Pierre and prince de Sabionetta, twenty-three years her senior and, at least on paper, a very wealthy man. The duke was struck by her beauty and the hope that her brother might assist in recovering his family lands in northern Italy and Naples, confiscated by the emperor because he had declared for Philip V.263 With France’s 1707 withdrawal from the peninsula, Saint-Pierre’s hopes waned when the Austrians occupied his remaining estates and confiscated their revenues. He and the duchess lived precariously in Paris near Torcy from the summer of 1706, but returned to Italy the following summer to fight for their rights, living in near solitude at Savona in neutral Genoa. To ease his fears that France might abandon him at the peace table and French fears that he might rally to the archduke to regain his lands, both Louis XIV and Torcy wrote to Saint-Pierre in February and March 1708 to assure him that he would receive restitution at the war’s end and to offer him the position of head of the household of Carlos II’s widow, Maria-Anna of Neuburg, Dowager Queen of Spain, in exile at Bayonne. Saint-Pierre accepted in April.264 Even though a May decree finalized the confiscation of their Neapolitan fiefs and revenues, the Saint-Pierres lingered in ­Savona. In mid-June 1708, they were greeted at Savona’s harbour entrance by a British squadron under the command of Sir John Leake. The duke naively wrote Torcy with some pride that Sir John had invited them to dine aboard his flagship, but Torcy, clearly appalled, fired back that they should avoid further contact with the Allied commander and leave Italy as soon as possible. They did so under cover of darkness by French galleys to Toulon and then journeyed across southern France, arriving at Bayonne on 31 October. For the next four years Torcy’s sister assumed the double role of the Dowager Queen’s chief lady-in-waiting and warder, while the duke tried to bring order to her household.265 Torcy and the king were especially wary of Maria-Anna’s intrigues to regain power in Spain, fearing that she might want to marry Philip V, ally herself with the duc d’Orléans (who visited her twice), or return to her earlier Austrian alliance. Torcy, who in 1706 had contemplated bringing her to Paris,266 was delighted instead to have his sister act as his first line of defence at Bayonne and to send him regular reports about the busy port and its governor, Antoine Charles



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IV, duc de Gramont. For her part, the dowager hoped that the p ­ owerful minister’s charming sister would advance her cause at Versailles, but both Saint-Pierres eventually tired of the court-in-exile’s petty intrigues. When Torcy, true to his promise to support the restitution of the duke’s Italian possessions, suggested they journey to Utrecht to pursue personally their cause, they gladly quit Bayonne at the beginning of 1712. During the Utrecht negotiations, Charles Talbot, 1st Duke of Shrewsbury, reminded English secretary Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, “[Y]ou know the share the Colbert family takes in this affair, so doubt not what is proper … consideration of Madame de Croissy and Monsieur de Torcy.”267 Torcy also gratified Mme de Pomponne’s desire that he protect her financial interests and promote her children’s futures.268 In 1699 Torcy sent his brother-in-law Nicolas-Simon Arnauld, chevalier then marquis de Pomponne, to Brussels on a short but sensitive ceremonial visit to its Governor General Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, to offer condolences upon the death of his son and to reassure him that despite this loss, Louis still desired that the elector receive some substantial compensation from the Spanish inheritance that would now elude his dynasty. ­Pomponne stayed only a few days so as not to compromise Max in the eyes of his Spanish masters and then gave a full report at Versailles of all he observed. Pomponne was reappointed lieutenant-general of the Isle [sic] de France (March 1697), his patent of office citing his valour in battle at Stafford, Steenkerke, and Neerwinden, and during the tense famine years of 1708–09 he rode with troops guarding shipments of grain and other supplies for the capital. He also lent his brother-in-law troops to guard the couriers carrying the posts to the northern frontier.269 Henri-Charles Arnauld, Pomponne’s youngest son, became like a brother to Torcy. At the age of fourteen he was awarded the revenue of an abbey in Poitou and then ten years later exchanged it for the richly endowed abbey of Saint-Medard-en-Soisson. Newly consecrated a priest and with his father’s and Torcy’s sponsorship, the abbé became the Duke of Burgundy’s almoner in 1698 and accompanied him to the Rhine front in 1702 and 1703. Pomponne’s earlier traveling in Italy led Torcy in 1705 to promote him as ambassador to Venice, where he proved an adept diplomat, monitoring a spy network encompassing northern Italy, Vienna, and Hungary, aiding the Rákóczi uprising in Hungary, improving communication between Rome and Versailles (both in the postal and diplomatic sense), and challenging Imperial propaganda with a plethora of pro-French pamphlets often printed in Venice.270 Although

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for a time Pomponne flirted with the idea of requesting the plum Swiss ­ambassadorship, Torcy dissuaded him.271 On his return to Versailles, he was appointed one of the three ecclesiastical councillors of state and in 1716 succeeded Torcy as commander-chancellor of the Royal Orders. He was a cultivated man, knowledgeable in Italian and Spanish literature, a connoisseur of architecture and the arts generally, a prominent member of several academies, and one of Torcy’s most valuable confidants throughout their long lives.272 The Colbert clan’s elder and Nestor was Henri Pussort, Torcy’s greatuncle, eighty years old in 1696 and regarded as a man of integrity and capability even by his enemies.273 Pussort served as dean of the Conseil d’État privé and chair of several important royal commissions. Acknowledged as one of the great legal minds of the day, he helped draft the civil Code Louis. A bureaucrat par excellence, he turned his large residence on the Neuve-Saint-Honoré into a government bureau, with a dozen commis working in downstairs rooms. A champion of royal power, he wrote that “if all the old laws would be contrary to the new ordinances that the king proposes, that is no reason to prevent its execution … because a prince has no need of antiquity to compose new laws for his state” – a maxim Torcy espoused early in his career.274 The ­Croissys looked to Pussort for political guidance as well as financial assistance. Early in the 1690s Croissy borrowed over 110,000 livres, and in 1696 Pussort advanced 15,000 livres to Charles-Joachim, just nominated to Montpellier. When Torcy married, Pussort pledged 100,000 livres to him to be paid at Pussort’s death, and during his lifetime, he aided other members of the Colbert clan, including a loan of 110,000 livres to his great-nephew Desmaretz. All told, from 1690 to 1697 the Colbert clan received over 210,000 livres in loans and gifts, or almost a quarter of Pussort’s declared fortune.275 However, Pussort was also a family peacemaker. The relationship between Seignelay and Croissy had become strained after Colbert’s death in 1683, but quarrels did not boil over into public until 1686 when, as the English ambassador reported, a courier arrived at Versailles from Rome carrying a patent for permitting revenues from the Abbey of St Denis to be used for Mme de Maintenon’s new convent at St Cyr. Being the first to bring the king important news increased one’s prestige at court and demonstrated the bearer’s competency and efficiency, so Seignelay waylaid the courier and “took ye Pacquet opened it, and carried ye news to ye King. Monsr Croissy takes this as a great Invasion of his Province, complaines highly of it, and has caused him



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to expresse great Resentments against Mr. De Seignelay.”276 Pussort and Beauvillier reconciled the two,277 but this squabble was not an isolated event. Uncle and nephew quarreled over relations with the papacy, preparations for war in 1688–89, and d’Avaux’s mission to Ireland. When Seignelay died suddenly, Croissy, knowing that his nephew was seriously in debt, sent his premier commis Bergeret to the Hôtel Colbert along with the family lawyer Pierre du Boc and several bailiffs armed with lettres de cachet to impound and seal all the objects and treasure belonging to the grand treasurer of the Royal Orders for fear that Seignelay’s creditors or his widow might rifle through the king’s property.278 Torcy later proved a protector and mentor to the Seignelay children. Perhaps prodded by his mother and certainly by Pussort, Torcy brought the eldest, Marie-Jean Baptiste, to court, presented him to the king, placed him in the honour guard welcoming the English ambassador, and helped him purchase an infantry colonelcy. A valiant soldier, he died in February 1712 in one of the war’s last battles. Torcy continued his protection of the Seignelays by securing two “arrêts du conseil” (council judgments) in 22 October 1712 and March 1714 reducing the family debts. He also invested in the building of the Hôtel Seignelay, next to his own hotel on the right bank of the Seine.279 Two other sons of the Great Colbert became valuable political allies. Jules-Armand Colbert, marquis de Blainville, his father’s survivancier as superintendent of buildings since 1674, saw that charge pass to Louvois with the breakup of Colbert’s empire in 1683, so Blainville purchased the office of grand master of ceremonies in 1685.280 Not yet twenty years old, he soon tired of serving as a court functionary, preferring the military career he had begun in 1682. Moreover, his subordinate Nicolas II Sainctot was experienced and accustomed to acting independently, so the two quarreled and Sainctot was forced out in 1691.281 Under Torcy, Blainville often co-hosted receptions for visiting dignitaries, such as the Earl of Portland, the Earl of Manchester, and the papal nuncio, and played a prominent role at the wedding of Marie-Adelaide of Savoy to the Duke of Burgundy. From 1690 Blainville sought to resell his charge but was unable to do so until 1701.282 With the outbreak of war, he returned to the army as a “maréchal de camp” (brigadier), distinguished himself in the 1702 and 1703 Rhine campaigns, but died in August 1704 of severe wounds received at Blenheim. While with the army of the Rhine, Blainville was a valuable informant. He wrote Torcy from Kaisersworth hoping that his news of the siege reached the foreign secretary more quickly than what Boufflers was sending to War

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S­ ecretary Chamillart and urging his cousin to send him dispatches by special messenger, circumventing the usual military couriers.283 His death was not only a personal loss but cost Torcy one of his best sources of military intelligence. Colbert’s son Jacques-Nicolas served as coadjutor (from 1680) and then as archbishop (from 1691) of Rouen and occupied one wing of the Hôtel Colbert when in Paris as de facto overseer of the Colbert library. As a gesture of friendship and family alliance he opened the library to his uncle Croissy and cousin Torcy, allowing them to send their commis to examine its diplomatic documents and treaty collections and to consult with Colbert librarian Baluze, as they did later when editing state papers for the foreign affairs archives.284 Jacques-Nicolas, who disliked the Jesuits and advocated moderate measures in dealing with post-Revocation “New Converts” (ncs) was one of his like-minded cousin’s most trusted advisors on church affairs.285 It was with genuine regret that Torcy informed his friend the abbé Melchior de Polignac in 1707 of the death of one whose passing, he contended, would be mourned by all with any connection to him.286 As ecclesiastical allies, this left among the Colbert prelates Torcy’s brother at Montpellier, who increasingly sympathized with the Jansenists, his cousin Vincent-François Desmaretz, bishop of Saint-Malo, closely allied with the archbishop of Paris, C ­ ardinal Noailles, and Vincent-François’s older brother Jacques Desmaretz, bishop of Riez and then Auch, but whose tenure was unremarkable.287 Another kinsman in Torcy’s circle of friends and collaborators was René-Mans de Froulay, comte de Tessé, Marshal of France since 1703, an experienced diplomat, and related by marriage through Seignelay. His correspondence with Torcy ranged from peace negotiations to personal matters. Tessé was attentive to Torcy’s ongoing interest in acquiring Sablé and Bois-Dauphin, which he had tried to purchase in 1708 from the heirs of Abel Servien but had been blocked by legal problems with Servien’s debts, especially those owed to Villars. He sent Torcy information about these coveted lands and recommended someone to help plan their rehabilitation after long neglect. Tessé knew that his war-weary friend hoped that Sablé would one day be a place of repose, so with negotiations weighing heavily upon Torcy’s shoulders, Tessé declared that he would write only of the wolves, boars, and independent life he knew Torcy longed for.288 A distant cousin, Michel d’Ancel, sieur Desgranges, had served under Colbert, Seignelay, and Louis de Pontchartrain as a navy premier commis, but through Croissy’s intercession, he became a master of c­ eremonies



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under Blainville’s nominal direction in May 1691. In December 1700, Torcy and Blainville selected Desgranges to accompany Philip V to Spain in that same capacity. While traveling, Desgranges sent Torcy accounts of the new king and his brothers. When he returned to Versailles, he remained as a master of ceremonies until the Regency.289 Colbert’s godson, Jean-Baptiste Louis Picon d’Andrézel, son of one of his premiers commis, was in the 1690s treated like a member of Croissy’s family. An ordinary commissioner of war and then sub-delegate general of Alsace in 1701, in 1705 he became a “maître de hôtel ordinaire du roi” (butler to the king) and later secretary of the chamber in the king’s Cabinet, where he assisted Torcy on occasion at private audiences with foreign diplomats or served as liaison with various embassies in Paris. After the Utrecht peace settlement, he was promoted to lieutenant du roi in Roussillon and in the next reign ambassador to Constantinople.290 Perhaps the most important member of the Colbert clan to receive Torcy’s protection was his first cousin Nicolas Desmaretz.291 Desmaretz had been a favourite of Croissy, who was highly selective of those of the Colbert clan to whom he extended his patronage and confidence. Born in 1648 to Croissy’s sister Marie Colbert and Jean Desmaretz, treasurer of the Soissons bureau of Finance, the young Desmaretz entered Colbert’s bureaus at the age of fifteen. Colbert later arranged his advantageous marriage to Madeleine de Béchameil, whose sister was to marry the duc de Cossé-Brissac. Desmaretz rose rapidly in the financial bureaucracy, but after his uncle’s death in 1683 he was dismissed by the new controller general Claude Le Peletier and was among those attacked by the Le Tellier clan. Accused but never convicted of financial manipulation of state funds and of malfeasance in office, he was nonetheless exiled to his Maillebois estate with his reputation seemingly shattered. Yet he continued to advise Seignelay and Croissy on financial affairs and, more surprisingly, served as a secret advisor to Le Peletier and increasingly to subsequent controllers general. Slowly he re-entered Parisian society in the 1680s, occupying a townhouse on rue Vivienne next to the Hôtel Croissy and becoming Torcy’s close friend. Fears that the return of war would strain the royal treasury not yet recovered from the havoc of the Nine Years War caused Controller General Chamillart to consult the knowledgeable Desmaretz from 1699, and it is likely from then that he began keeping his cousin Torcy apprised of the kingdom’s financial health. In April 1701 there was a request from Madrid that Desmaretz be sent there to manage finances, but Jean Orry went instead and Desmaretz remained privately at ­Chamillart’s

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side.292 As it became apparent that Chamillart was inadequate to the double burden of controller general and war secretary, D ­ esmaretz’s kinsmen Torcy, Chevreuse, and Beauvillier, Maintenon, and possibly former controller general Pontchartrain called for his readmission to public service.293 In September 1703 Louis XIV finally received D ­ esmaretz in public audience, and he was appointed soon thereafter one of the two directors of finance, with a crucial administrative role. In 1708 ­Chamillart’s broken health finally persuaded the king to allow him to resign as controller general and replace him with Desmaretz, who in eight months also joined the Conseil. Torcy assured the duc de Gramont that the king had the highest opinion of him because of his experience and application to duty.294 Desmaretz supplied his cousin with pertinent reports on finance and channeled some of his office’s numerous patronage possibilities to Torcy’s clients.295 A degree of stability returned to France’s fractured finances as Desmaretz augmented and reorganized his department. He also tipped the balance in the Conseil in favour of Torcy and other néo-politiques (pragmatists who put the interests of the state first) during the Utrecht peace negotiations. Matthew Prior, who became Torcy’s friend and ally in peacemaking, worried privately to Bolingbroke in 1712 that “Monsieur de Torcy … is really a good deal concerned, and, faith! with reason; he has more enemies than I thought, and has reason to apprehend any shock in our affairs.”296 Among those critical of Torcy’s foreign policy and religious beliefs were his uncles by marriage to Colbert’s daughters, Chevreuse to Jeanne-Marie in 1667 and Beauvillier to Henrietta-Louise in 1671. ­Beauvillier became chief of the Council of Finances in 1685 and governor of the household of the Grandchildren of France and minister in 1691. His importance during the War of the Spanish Succession was such that along with Torcy and Chamillart, he received Jean Orry’s reform memoirs written from Spain and briefings when Orry came to Versailles.297 Named governor of Guyenne in 1696, Chevreuse remained a more private person, and although it was recurrently rumoured at court that he would be called to the Conseil, he never was.298 Yet Chevreuse consulted privately with the king and also sent his thoughts to the Conseil through Beauvillier.299 Religion would drive a wedge between these Colbert kinsmen. ­François de Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon, the politically ambitious descendant of an old and devoutly Catholic noble family, tutor of the Duke of Burgundy from 1689, and archbishop of Cambrai from 1695, had espoused a type of mysticism that he called “Pure Love,” an intense



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r­eligiosity mixed with aristocratic charm that fascinated Maintenon and her circle, which included the dukes and their wives. Unfortunately for them, ­Fénelon welcomed into their sphere his kinswoman Mme de Guyon, whose brand of mysticism called “Quietism” eventually alarmed Bossuet and the king and earned official condemnation.300 From 1693 ­Maintenon distanced herself from Fénelon, but the dukes remained loyal. Croissy and Torcy believed that the dukes had compromised not only their own reputations but those of the Colbert clan. Personally Torcy looked on Fénelon as a counterfeit prude, while Beauvillier believed that Torcy secretly supported the Jansenists, regarded by the duke as only slightly less detestable and dangerous than the despised Reformed faith. Torcy also differed with his uncles on Gallicanism, doggedly defending the rights of the crown and the Gallican church’s freedoms, whereas the dukes promoted ultramontanism and the Jesuits.301 Shortly after Pomponne’s death, Fénelon advised Beauvillier to remain friendly with Torcy for the sake of council business, but not to push his confidence too far. Fénelon suspected Torcy of membership in a proJansenist cabal that included his brother the bishop of Montpellier and Renaudot.302 When rumours circulated in April 1710 that the pope was ill, Fénelon informed Chevreuse that he feared a conclave, since he doubted that Torcy and France’s worldly cardinals were interested in the election of a theologian and courageous champion of right doctrine.303 Earlier that month Torcy had reported to the Conseil the nuncio’s accusation that parlement’s arrêt disallowing papal condemnation of several works by the bishop of Saint Pons was due to a Jansenist cabal that had misled the king.304 Torcy not only rejected the charge as false, but countered that the real problem was the Holy See’s assault on Gallican liberties. As the dispute with Rome dragged on, Beauvillier made his standard insinuation that Torcy was a Jansenist partisan.305 His estrangement from Torcy extended to Torcy’s wife, whom the duke strongly disliked for her alleged “strong influence over [Torcy’s] mind, reaching it by way of his heart.” Although, Saint-Simon continued, Beauvillier believed that she “had an excellent brain and was well-informed,” he nonetheless viewed her as “a kind of heretic who perverted her husband” into accepting the Arnaulds’ deeply rooted Jansenism.306 Yet family solidarity was resilient, as demonstrated in May 1710 when Beauvillier stood at the baptismal font with Torcy’s new daughter, Constance.307 The mistrust between uncle and nephew spilled over into council debates. Torcy noted in his journal in 1710 a small quarrel that erupted when Beauvillier opposed sending the papacy several propositions that

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Torcy had prepared for the Curia’s review, complaining that he had not had enough time to study them. The king, intervening in the squabble, reminded Beauvillier that he would never veer from the Gallican maxims, while Torcy added that the duke’s fears were groundless, since these propositions had been seen in council before. The Conseil supported Torcy’s motion.308 In 1711 Torcy read a dispatch from Constantinople reporting that the sultan had sent a large army against Russia and urged support for the Turks, since war in the Balkans would distract Austria from war in the west. Burgundy and Beauvillier objected to any such dealings with the infidel. In his private journal, Torcy mocked such pure consciences.309 In April of that same year, however, he apparently caught the pious Beauvillier acting hypocritically. During a Conseil session shortly after the Grand Dauphin’s death, Torcy found the monarch and the other ministers so moved to tears that they had difficulty expressing their opinions during discussion. He, however, possessing in his own words more firmness, was able to proceed, but he reproached himself immediately afterward for hard-heartedness. On leaving the council chamber, however, he found the other ministers laughing among themselves and so ceased reproving himself.310 Historians who use kinship to place Torcy with his uncles in a clanbased political alliance are mistaken.311 A more nuanced approach notes the decline of clan groupings in the reign’s later years, although they do not disappear altogether, and focuses instead on looser cabals. Yet Saint-Simon grouped Torcy, Desmaretz, and the dukes into a “cabal of ministers” because they were the predominant voices among those who exercised power and promoted the interests of their Colbert kin and clients, such as Desmaretz’s political rehabilitation.312 They were often ideologically at odds, however, especially on church matters, as Torcy considered the dukes and their pupil Burgundy parts of a neo-dévot cabal. Despite these differences, as Saint-Simon observed, “they all being wise and moderate men, [they] preserved the decencies.” 313 The exiled Fénelon, confined to Cambrai since 1697, continued to stir up the dukes against Torcy and his approach to diplomacy. Chevreuse, however, wrote Fénelon favourably of the foreign secretary in an April 1709 letter, calling him a very good secretary and knowledgeable of the princes’ (Louis’s heirs) interests and “ours” (le nôtre), meaning the Burgundy circle, and praising his kinsman’s character, devotion to duty, and diplomatic skills.314 But Fénelon and likely Beauvillier as well remained unconvinced. As preparations advanced to send envoys for peace talks at Gertruydenberg, Fénelon urged Chevreuse to persuade Beauvillier to



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lobby the king to replace the once-disgraced Polignac with someone of reputation, even Beauvillier himself if asked. The aristocratic archbishop sniffed that Torcy preferred a professional diplomat dependent upon him, what Fénelon disparaged as a professional negotiator who applied all the rules of the art.315 Of course, this was the very calibre of diplomat Torcy hoped to form in the academy he later established! Despite the fact that outsiders often thought the Colbert clan members on the Conseil were like-minded on policy, Fénelon knew that Beauvillier and Torcy, while usually united in promoting Colbert clan interests, were often divided on the means and ends of diplomacy.316 Bureaucracies are organizational structures that can appear as machines, but in truth they are at most only machine-like and are always made up of humans. Any analysis of a bureaucracy must factor in the humans who inhabited it and those on the outside who facilitated its functioning. The relationships between Torcy and his kin illustrate this human dimension of the foreign office’s operation and the significance of the individual who led it when seen within his family context. These relationships also demonstrate the significance of family working together for their advancement not as isolated individuals but as members of a kinship network. Granted, family could be at times quarrelsome or even a limiting factor, as when the fall of the fortunes or reputation of one member tainted the others. Nevertheless, ties of kinship and marriage were ever present in the outlook of the early modern French as they viewed themselves and others. Calculations for maintaining or advancing one’s place in society, for marital alliances, for career options, and for a wide spectrum of life’s choices always included kinship as a weighty factor, even when it was on occasion rejected. For Torcy, it was family that placed him in the position to hope one day to accede to the charge of foreign secretary, that saw to his apprenticeship in the family “business,” and that assisted and mentored him as he undertook that weighty responsibility. In addition, family supplied several of his collaborators in domestic administration and diplomacy, whether as ambassadors or as bishops assisting in provincial management or in the informal but nonetheless vital roles in court life played by his sisters. Indeed, family was his mainstay of advice and support during the first few years of his secretaryship, and it was from his new family by marriage that he would gain a mentor for the years of testing that came at the outset of his tenure as foreign secretary.

3 Mentorship and Testing

Before Torcy could place his personal stamp on his department’s personnel, administrative policies, and organization he first had to step into what was a foreign secretary’s chief and most perilous role: guiding the negotiations that could either end or prolong a war. This could only be accomplished through continuing collaboration with the diplomatic organization and personnel both at home and abroad inherited from his father. Even so, his personal leadership of that department was crucial to its effective operation. Moreover, the policy decisions Torcy and Pomponne persuaded the king and his Conseil to adopt and the negotiations he guided or personally conducted in tandem with his father-inlaw clearly demonstrate that there was more to the foreign office than its system of organization. Torcy and Pomponne would need to balance losses and gains in a manner satisfactory to the king’s honour and his desire for a defensible northeastern frontier on the one hand and his yearning for respite from a ruinous war on the other.1 After peace was re-established at Ryswick, embassies were sent out to resume full diplomatic relations with France’s former enemies, but because the war had lasted nearly a decade, many former representatives had moved on to other royal service, leaving the French diplomatic corps depleted and in need of an infusion of talent and expertise. Filling these posts would require immediate attention yet careful consideration. At the same time, Torcy and Pomponne tackled the looming Spanish succession, the most critical foreign policy issue of the reign. Any solution had to preserve the peace by satisfying the fears of the kingdom’s former foes while serving French interests and Bourbon dynasticism. Louis XIV’s commitment to attain these ends through negotiation was genuine. He, Pomponne, and Torcy pursued an audacious partition scheme in which the king not



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only sacrificed his progeny’s legal rights to the Spanish throne, but also achieved this compromise in concert with his old foe, William III of England. If the efforts of the new secretary and his mentor ultimately failed to maintain peace, it would not be for lack of skilled and patient effort, which the king had the wisdom to recognize and reward. As the relatively young Torcy emerged from his father’s shadow to guide the foreign office during an especially perilous period, he attracted criticism at court and among the diplomatic community. Criticism eventually diminished as Torcy proved himself to the king and even to some of his harshest critics, but understandably for someone so intimately involved at the centre of the state, it never completely disappeared.

C o n c l u d in g t h e T r eaty of Ryswi ck: A P e r il o us Debut For a few years the Nine Years War had been fought with fervour, but war weariness set in as the economic and fiscal costs of continuous war on land and sea weighed increasingly on all the participants.2 Louvois’s death in July 1691 and Pomponne’s return to the Conseil were symbolic as well as substantive in signaling a new French policy orientation toward moderation.3 Louis XIV was also looking beyond the present war to the long-expected death of Spain’s childless Carlos II and the contest over the succession to his throne and empire. Exploratory peace talks began in the summer of 1691, but without result as war dragged on. Yet the pressure for peace continued to mount as France experienced bad harvests in 1692 and 1693 and the harsh winter of 1693–94. Savoy was the target of serious French peace feelers from 1692, resulting in the 29 June 1696 Treaty of Turin neutralizing Savoy and then Italy.4 This first split in the anti-French coalition encouraged the other members also to look to their own interests. The Amsterdam burgomasters made overtures to France, facing not only failing finances from the mounting costs of war but a debilitating disruption of commerce and convinced that the Stadtholder William of Orange and his inner circle were wedded to war. Croissy in turn indirectly approached William, but to no avail.5 From the winter of 1693–94, an important collaboration was established between the French diplomat Callières and Francisco Mollo, a wealthy Amsterdam merchant well-connected in republican circles and resident of the Polish king. Their fruitful contacts were not without their missteps and misunderstandings, but they were the channel through which began the serious talks that led to peace at Ryswick in

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1697.6 Informal contacts continued intermittently, including a generous French proposal with a secret article countenancing the recognition of William as England’s king, but when the Dutch pressed for more concessions and Louis XIV obliged them, they insisted on more. Negotiations were suspended in September 1695.7 Winter passed without further talks as France planned a spring invasion to link up with the Jacobites and knock England out of the war or at least distract her, but when this was foiled, Louis offered new concessions that led to a tentative agreement for a peace congress at Utrecht.8 William and the Dutch wanted to include the emperor, so Dominik Andreas, Count Kaunitz, Imperial ambassador to The Hague, sought instructions from Leopold I. When they finally arrived, they included a demand for the restitution of Strasbourg, which, coupled with the Anglo-Dutch insistence on French recognition of William as English king, prevented further progress. It was at this point that Croissy died (28 July 1696). Although ill on and off for some years, Croissy had nonetheless directed negotiations to the end. Pomponne participated in policy discussions in the Conseil, whereas Torcy as his father’s chief assistant was only aware – but not a part – of them.9 In fact, his primary task had been to lighten his father’s load by largely shouldering provincial administration and some diplomatic tasks, while the all-important drafting of instructions remained Croissy’s preserve, whatever input Torcy may have had. There is, nonetheless, a tantalizing hint of a wider role for Torcy as royal advisor before Croissy’s passing. During the 1693 campaign, Louis had young Torcy draft some propositions for peace. Torcy blamed the Prince of Orange, whom he called Holland’s absolute master for stifling any thoughts of peace in the war-weary Republic and for inspiring the League of Augsburg to fight on. With his emerging diplomat’s eye and deft pen, Torcy observed that the king’s arms and conditions for peace must march along with one another, an outlook reflected in his later craving for battlefront news and his support for projects like a Jacobite descent on Scotland to hasten the war’s end.10 He defended his father’s reunions, conceding at most that perhaps Venice might arbitrate the decisions of the Metz Chamber of Reunion, but insisted that Strasbourg’s seizure was consistent with the Treaty of Westphalia and its retention the key to preventing a German invasion of France. The emperor might be compensated by French-held places, and Imperial princes would have captured places returned, but with the fortifications of most demolished.11 In its particulars Torcy’s memoir largely echoed what Louis had offered his opponents in his 24 September 1688



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manifesto cum ultimatum. It also anticipated what Torcy would write in instructions for the final year of negotiations and was close as well to what was finally agreed upon at Ryswick.12 Beauvillier also drafted a proposal, as did Pomponne after Louis’s return from the front, and all three were examined by the Conseil on 29 June when all the ministers could be present.13 Upon being officially announced as foreign secretary on 29 July 1696 at court and to the diplomatic community, Torcy was at once confronted with the fate of Strasbourg. The emperor insisted that only its unconditional cession would assure peace, but Louis resisted until Callières’s 30 July letter drove home the intensity of Imperial intransigence. Louis accepted cession with some conditions, but the Dutch were unmoved; and on 27 August Louis finally agreed to cede Strasbourg unconditionally.14 Although not yet in the Conseil, Torcy helped Pomponne prepare for its meetings, likely joined him in conferences with Louis, and met with the monarch on his own.15 All incoming and outgoing diplomatic correspondence passed through Torcy,16 who now drafted the negotiators’ instructions. His long familiarity with the department’s personnel and procedures expedited and eased this transition. When the new secretary sent Callières among others the requisite letter announcing his father’s death, he assured him that he had the same esteem for him his father had, while Callières had the same day written Torcy assurances of his continuing service to the king but now in accordance with his orders.17 A letter from Vauban suggests Torcy’s new role in formulating policy. Hearing rumours of concessions on Strasbourg circulating at court and in the capital when he returned to Paris in September, Torcy dashed off a letter to his friend the playwright and royal historian Jean Racine expressing incredulity that there were those in the Conseil so uninformed as to diminish France’s reputation and power by such a show of weakness.18 A few days later Vauban sent a letter to the new secretary urging him to stand firm on Strasbourg and warning of the consequences of handing over the Rhine to France’s enemies. The architect of much of this frontier clearly meant to lobby both Torcy and Pomponne as a way of influencing the king.19 Torcy and Pomponne were part of another development that signaled a policy shift. The brutal bombardments by sea and land promoted by Louvois and Seignelay from the 1680s with the king’s approbation had, predictably, provoked Allied retaliation in kind along the French coast in the 1690s. When Louis finally found the damage and psychological disruption wreaked upon his ports and their populations intolerable,

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he at first responded with escalation if they did not cease, threatening and then carrying out the bombardment of Brussels in August 1695. After Croissy’s death, Torcy, the more pacific Pomponne, and the latter’s like-minded friend Callières won Louis to a new approach to end this reciprocal destruction. An unsigned mutual moratorium with the Allies of October 1697 led the king to order coastal batteries disarmed and coastal defenders sent elsewhere. Louis appreciated the wisdom of hastening the Dutch toward peace through a return to normal commerce, but he also now had less trust in the efficacy of ruthlessness and Torcy and Pomponne did everything to encourage such moderate policies.20 Among the new secretary’s pressing tasks was the execution of the Treaty of Turin’s provisions (ratified 7 September). The first article called for two hostages, Henri-François, duc de Foix, and Auguste, duc de ­Choiseul, to be sent to Turin until this was accomplished. Torcy wrote instructions for the two peers on 8 September, telling them to work closely with Tessé, who had brokered this peace, and to insist that the honours they received at the Savoyard court were modeled on those rendered the Spanish governor of Milan and former viceroy of Catalonia.21 Torcy also orchestrated the treaty’s celebration with Te Deums for maximum public effect.22 A related mission concerned the article linking the Houses of Bourbon and Savoy by marriage. Henri de Lorraine, comte de Brionne, grand écuyer of France and a chevalier of the Royal Orders, was selected to set off immediately for the frontier to receive eleven-year-old MarieAdelaide of Savoy, the betrothed of the fourteen-year-old Duke of Burgundy, to be educated at the French court until her marriage. Ceremony was particularly important in Brionne’s instructions (10 September 1696) because, although she was not yet Duchess of Burgundy, Louis wanted to woo Marie-Adelaide and her father by bestowing honours that clearly distinguished her from other princesses of her rank. Torcy enlisted his kinsman, Master of Ceremonies ­Desgranges, to instruct Brionne and the party of ladies-in-waiting as well as the dignitaries awaiting the princess in Lyon on the proper protocol for receiving a royal bride-to-be.23 Although neutralized militarily, Italy still reverberated with diplomatic speculation and activity, as Victor-Amadeus seethed with ambition. Tessé wrote Torcy of the need to appoint an ambassador and reminded him that Turin was a difficult post for foreign envoys, unwelcoming and suspicious like its ruler, and recommended against placing an ecclesiastic in such a menacing environment.24 Meanwhile, Leopold’s obstinate foot-dragging, while winning further French concessions, drove the Dutch to despair. The States-General voted



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on 3 September to commence talks with France for a general treaty. While the Maritime Powers suggested invoking the Swedish king’s mediation as provided for at Westphalia and Nijmegen, Leopold dithered. Callières concluded that this was a ploy to wheedle from Louis and his son a renunciation of the Spanish inheritance. With the royal blessing, Callières refused to negotiate anything not a part of past treaties, from Westphalia to Nijmegen, which had excluded any discussion of such a renunciation. Yet during that winter Callières continued his encounters with Dutch diplomats, working out many of the details of what would eventually be accepted at Ryswick. Louis was intent on avoiding any Imperial trap to force him into renouncing the Spanish prize, but he had Torcy instruct Callières to sound out the Dutch separately and secretly on what they hoped and feared when Carlos died. Callières reported that they were resolute that neither the Spanish Netherlands nor the Spanish monarchy be joined to either France or Austria, but were open to possibilities of inheritance by princes of either or both dynasties so long as they remained cadet branches that were forever separate from the main branches. This was valuable information, especially when, after peace was achieved, Torcy could focus on this matter.25 By the end of October 1696 a general peace conference was finally in the planning stages, with the hope that Charles XI of Sweden would serve as mediator and that the talks would take place in the Dutch Republic. Louis regarded this as a token of his confidence in the Dutch desire for peace, since the emperor held out for Switzerland or another location closer to his centre of power.26 But a last-minute and unauthorized manoeuvre by Callières over Luxembourg nearly derailed the talks. While the Dutch cried foul, Louis expressed displeasure with Callières for exceeding his instructions and failing to reverse himself immediately upon command to do so. The royal displeasure was given teeth when Callières, Torcy’s and the king’s chief collaborator in getting these talks under way, was reduced to a supporting role at the side of two higher-level negotiators: Nicolas-Auguste de Harlay de Bonneuil and the experienced septuagenarian diplomat Honoré Courtin.27 On 10 November 1696 Courtin wrote to Callières to inform him that he and Harlay-Bonneuil had been selected to serve with him and that to expedite matters the king wanted them to follow the simplest of ceremonials.28 Two weeks later Courtin wrote Callières that Torcy and Harlay-Bonneuil would send him a small memoir and noted that he and Harlay-Bonneuil would require three different passports: for going, for returning with horses and carriages, and for baggage. Additionally, they would bring two camp beds and a staff

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of ten to twelve persons and would require chambers, since they would not be meeting at Delft, the location of the French embassy, and would thus need to return home at a reasonable time after each workday. In a postscript suggesting that he spoke with Torcy in the presence of his mother, Courtin added that Mme de Croissy, recalling her days with her husband at the Nijmegen congress, complained that they had been miserably lodged there and so preferred Utrecht for the conferences, with the Allied negotiators remaining in The Hague and the French in Delft.29 As the French negotiators prepared to depart in late February 1697, the emperor still withheld his consent, so those powers attending agreed that the French would stay at Delft and the Allies at The Hague and that they would meet daily at a point nearby and in between, the Prince of Orange’s country house at Ryswick.30 French preparations continued apace, with War Secretary Barbezieux enlisted to facilitate passage through the war zone and the vital communications link back to Torcy’s Versailles bureaus. A problem arose when royal physicians determined that Holland’s air was too humid for Courtin’s sensitive eyes, so Louis Verjus de Crécy, another distinguished and experienced ambassador, was appointed in his place. The selection of Crécy, like Courtin a septuagenarian, was perhaps related to the three months the young Torcy had spent under his mentorship at Ratisbon in 1686. Crécy was already ill when summoned to Versailles, and the voyage there only made his “rhume” (cold) worse.31 Harlay-Bonneuil likewise fell ill but was able in February to announce that his health was restored and that, in any event, everything must give way before “le service” (the service).32 During that winter Torcy and Pomponne continued to monitor diplomatic movements, military plans, and any other development that might hasten or hinder that spring’s peacemaking process. Everyone wondered if Parliament would approve William’s request for funds for yet another year of war (they finally did), and William worried that the Austrians might settle separately with France, since the two Catholic powers, each with a stake in the Spanish succession, might arrange it to their mutual advantage and exclude the Protestant powers. Meanwhile, Callières heard from Navy Secretary and Controller General Pontchartrain, exercising his right to instruct ambassadors on commercial and colonial matters, which would loom large at Ryswick, especially for the Maritime Powers, although not yet to the degree they would later at Utrecht.33 Barbezieux was not happy with Callières and shared doubts about his loyalty with Torcy, complaining on 5 December 1696 not of the content



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of Callières’s memoir forwarded by Torcy, but of the diplomat’s failure to write to him as he assumed they had arranged.34 It is unlikely that this gained Callières a reprimand from Torcy, who may have welcomed or even suggested this epistolatory silence to deny the war secretary direct access to those conducting the upcoming negotiations and forestall any meddling. However, the king and Croissy had earlier also shared doubts about Callières, leading them in 1694 to pair him with Harlay-­ Bonneuil, who received fuller and more forthright instructions even though this was through Callières’s contact Mollo. Harlay-Bonneuil was even told not to share his instructions with Callières, perhaps because of the king’s recollection of Callières’s role in the 1670s in the quixotic and unauthorized attempt by Charles-Paris d’Orléans, duc de Longueville, to be elected king of Poland and Callières’s subsequent diplomatic service with the Duke of Savoy. Whatever the reason for it, this secrecy soon proved so cumbersome and counterproductive that Louis and Croissy gave way to Harlay-Bonneuil’s pleas for an equal partnership, although the mission proved unsuccessful. Further missions to the Republic in 1695 and 1696 by Callières as sole envoy likewise failed and earned him a rebuke from the king during the second for allegedly exceeding his instructions and implying unintended commitments. Croissy, however, responded more positively, while Callières boldly defended himself to the king, who, once satisfied, graciously endorsed all his envoy had done thus far. Croissy’s earlier suspicion of Callières may have been related to the latter’s close ties with Beauvillier and Chevreuse, with whom Croissy and later his son often disagreed over policy. Nevertheless, father and son concluded that although Callières moved in circles critical of them, he was loyal, and Callières would remain Torcy’s close collaborator to the end of the reign.35 Wooed by both sides during the war, Sweden’s Charles XI temporized and avoided committing himself, but yielded to entreaties to serve as mediator and issued invitations to convene a conference at Ryswick on 9 May 1697. These plans were nearly frustrated by his death on 5 April, but it was soon agreed that Sweden’s ambassador Count Nils L ­ illierooth (Lillieroot) would mediate, confirming French agent Daguerre’s prediction to Torcy that Sweden would remain committed. Daguerre also insisted that public opinion would force William to continue negotiating. The discussions at Ryswick, however, would prove to be merely a front for negotiations taking place behind the scenes.36 As the delegates’ departure approached, Torcy drafted their instructions, dated 25 February 1697. These were not the first but were ­certainly

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the most extensive and significant instructions he drafted as the new secretary. Louis André and Émile Bourgeois describe them as so clear and detailed that they fixed the parameters of the future negotiation precisely and definitively.37 The prologue bristles with what one might be tempted to dismiss as Gallic bluster: continuing the war would hurt the Allies more than it would France because she could sustain a long conflict; moreover, even if the Allies had the necessary forces, it would take them many years to capture the very forts the French king had offered them in his peace overtures.38 At the end of 1696, however, the fiscal and military position of the anti-France alliance was deteriorating and the coalition unraveling. Since the defection of Savoy, the remaining Allies suspected one another of seeking separate agreements with France. In particular, William III suspected that Vienna’s diplomatic dallying was in hopes that if Carlos II died before peace was achieved, then the Grand Alliance, committed by treaty to obtaining the whole of his inheritance for the House of Austria, would help him realize his dynastic aspiration.39 Even so, a realistic assessment of what the Allies could and could not do on the battlefield or at sea led Torcy to instruct the plenipotentiaries that since the king wanted peace but a solid one, he would selectively sacrifice some past gains in order to keep others.40 After a brief overview of past negotiations and a recounting of Imperial delays and obstruction, Torcy guided the plenipotentiaries by means of seven articles outlining the king’s political, commercial, and dynastic objectives. He also assured them that his clerks would supply them with copies of relevant correspondence from earlier negotiations to help prepare them for the work ahead.41 The two new plenipotentiaries finally departed the court at the beginning of March and journeyed more or less openly (i.e., not incognito as Callières had earlier traveled) by land and canal to join their colleague at Delft on the 19th. Before leaving Paris, Harlay-Bonneuil had one last conversation with Abbé Renaudot, the foreign ministry’s “spymaster,” who briefed him on the latest news from England. Current and full reports on events and public opinion, especially in London, were so vital that even as the delegation made its way to the frontier, HarlayBonneuil took time at Lille to write Callières that some further information Renaudot had forgotten would be sent along to Delft.42 Meanwhile, Daguerre, a naturalized citizen of the Republic and an Amsterdam burgher who had kept the foreign ministry current on public opinion there since 1678, had received a memoir on commerce from Harlay-Bonneuil and would speak with the plenipotentiaries about Amsterdam’s trade shortly after their arrival in Delft.43



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At the same time, Torcy looked south to preserve the peace previously made with Savoy. He announced on 8 February the choice of the valiant soldier Gabriel, comte de Briord, first equerry in the household of Monsieur, the king’s brother, as ambassador to Savoy, and issued his instructions on 23 March 1697. He did not hide from Briord that he was being sent to an ambitious, anxious, dissimulating prince jealous of his authority and careful to take advantage of any opportunity for expansion, but said that the king had selected him because he knew how to make his master’s intentions known gently but with all the firmness necessary. Tessé introduced Briord at the Savoyard court, including to the duke’s mother, Marie-Jeanne-Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours, known as “Madama Real,” a descendant of Henri IV born in France and favourable to French interests. He did the same with his other pro-French contacts and secret agents in the region, but Briord was cautioned not to compromise any of them, especially Madama Real. Because Tessé was not an official ambassador and had negotiated in secret, he could offer Briord only limited advice on ceremony. To rectify this, Torcy sent further instructions with guidelines as to entries, extension of the hand, visits, and seating at dinner.44 There was another facet of closer relations with Savoy. Briord had been in Turin only a few months when on 29 June he received a letter from former controller general Le Peletier, still a minister and postal superintendent. Le Peletier had been asking for permission to retire from his offices and court since the promise of peace grew stronger in the autumn of 1696, but Louis delayed an answer. Le Peletier was nevertheless confident enough of the king’s eventual consent to mention it to Briord while informing him that a postal official would travel to the Lyon postal bureau and then on to Chambery in Savoy to arrange the reopening of vital routes to Turin and beyond. This would be important groundwork for the expansion of diplomatic missions that usually followed the end of a war.45 At Ryswick, where the peace congress formally opened 9 May 1697, talks droned on formally but fruitlessly.46 Daguerre kept Torcy informed of Spanish and Austrian delays and of the comings and goings of war vessels assembling to keep Jean Bart and his corsairs in Dunkirk and to intercept Bernard Desjean, baron de Pointis, and his fleet of privateers returning from the profitable capture of Cartagena (2 May 1697). The Anglo-Dutch fleets succeeded in keeping Bart bottled up the whole summer, but failed to intercept Pointis, whose return to Brest raised French morale, discouraged her foes, and enriched the French treasury at a

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time when her foes’ funds were running low.47 The attitude of Amsterdam’s merchants and magistrates was crucial to making peace or continuing the war. As William III admitted to Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland in mid-September, “If I had followed my own inclinations, I should be firm and make no concessions; but you will learn from the [Grand] Pensionary [of Holland Anthonie Heinsius] the declaration which the citizens of Amsterdam have caused me to make. Thus I cannot discover any means of continuing the war, and without that, you know, our firmness would avail us nothing.”48 Torcy, anxious to monitor Amsterdam’s resolve, looked to multiple sources of intelligence: Ambassador ­Bonrepaus in Denmark, Daguerre in Delft, and, of course, Mollo.49 In addition, these informants peppered him and his delegates at ­Ryswick with memoirs on commerce to help with negotiations. This gave rise to jealousy among the foreign office’s agents, with Daguerre complaining that the plenipotentiaries listened more to Mollo than to him because Callières was partial to Mollo. Accustomed to rivalry among agents anxious to please and to reap rewards, Torcy reassured Daguerre and encouraged him to continue sending news from the conference. This independent source also enabled Torcy to keep an eye on France’s plenipotentiaries and better assess the reports they sent him.50 While Savoy continued to occupy Torcy, a new situation, albeit of a minor nature, drew his attention to the Spanish border where three hundred soldiers had apparently occupied a traditionally French valley. Although France and Spain were still at war, Torcy wanted first to explore his options before responding to a provocation that might expand the war.51 It was in the Baltic, however, that the threat of a new war was greatest because the death of Sweden’s king, who was succeeded by his fourteen-year-old son, Charles XII, opened an opportunity for her old enemies in Denmark, Brandenburg, Poland, and Russia. Torcy did his best to keep up with events in these states and to promote tranquility when possible. Poland was holding an election for a new king after John III Sobieski died in 1696, so Torcy kept the Ryswick plenipotentiaries abreast of events there and shared his fear that the nomination of Elector Augustus I (“the Strong”) of Saxony (eventually elected as Augustus II of Poland-Lithuania) would comfort France’s enemies and diminish the chances of the Prince de Conti, Louis XIV’s candidate.52 From Copenhagen, Bonrepaus sent a long memoir on Holstein, always a flashpoint between Denmark and Sweden, while Torcy and the king wrote back with hopes that these two crowns and several of the German princes could be kept at peace by a treaty of neutrality. From Holland, also an



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important listening post to the north, Daguerre sent Baltic news and an encouraging report that Amsterdam’s burgomasters were embarrassed by Tsar Peter I’s bellicose visit and his threat to send a Russian army to Poland to aid the beleaguered Elector of Saxony.53 William III, growing impatient with the lethargic proceedings at Utrecht,54 initiated an approach to France that would eventually provide the stalled congress a face-saving peace agreement, although reached elsewhere. He sent his friend and close collaborator the Earl of Portland to talk with an old acquaintance, Marshal Louis François, duc de ­Boufflers.55 Their several meetings between 2 July and 11 September, often in an orchard on the edge of a village near Brussels, were crucial to establishing trust between the two negotiators and their masters. Torcy and Louis closely monitored their content and direction. In a clear example of the ongoing interplay between negotiations and war, news of the French capture of Cartagena and its New World treasure and of the capitulation of Barcelona increased Anglo-Dutch concern that Louis might be tempted away from his earlier concessions, especially if France’s position improved any further. The Ryswick congress worked to put into final form the peace largely crafted by Portland and Boufflers, but the Austrians and Spaniards appeared unlikely to sign. In mid-August Torcy received intelligence from Daguerre of a Brussels meeting to discuss whether Spain should accept French terms between the Spanish diplomat Don Bernardo de Quiros, from whose secretary Daguerre gleaned this intelligence, and Bavarian Elector Max Emmanuel, governor general of the Spanish Netherlands. A month later, Daguerre reported that the capture of Barcelona had greatly contributed to the case for peace and that Quiros was now pressing it on a reluctant Madrid.56 When France and the Maritime Powers did sign a treaty on 20 September 1697, Spain joined them, but Austria did so only on 30 October. By mid-November Torcy reported to the plenipotentiaries that the treaty ratifications had been received from all the signatories except the Empire, but these finally arrived nearly a month later.57 Halfway into his second year as secretary, Torcy had led France’s foreign office in the liquidation of a ruinous war that had lasted for nearly a decade. Opinion at court and among the populace, unaccustomed to seeing the Louisquatorzian juggernaut knocked off course, was critical of the sacrifices made.58 Yet given the array of foes France had faced, the domestic troubles brought on by fighting and financing such an extensive war, and the climatological disasters that led to famine, Ryswick could have been a disaster. While the Sun King “stumbled in 1688 into a general war for

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which France was completely unprepared,”59 Andrew Lossky astutely observes that contemporaries and later historians should focus on the territory France retained rather than on that from which her troops withdrew. The bloated conquests since Nijmegen and the extensive reunions after 1 August 1691 were restored to the Empire and France lost her posts on the Rhine’s right bank. Luxembourg was likewise lost, ­Lorraine restored to its duke, and Catalonia evacuated. Flanders reverted to Spanish rule, although the Dutch were permitted to garrison several towns as a barrier against future French aggression. The Dutch largely regained their former trading privileges, and England gained recognition of ­William III as its lawful monarch. What, then, did France achieve? French diplomacy managed to retain Strasbourg, vital to the control of Alsace, and Louis was now Alsace’s de jure ruler. Strategic fortifications such as those at Sarrelouis and Longwy were retained. Indeed, it has been argued that Louis had finally come round to ­Vauban’s vision of a more defensible, linear frontier. While French conquests overseas were mostly returned, Louis did manage to gain legal title to the Caribbean islands of Tortuga and Santo Domingo (the western half, now Haiti).60 Throughout this process the new foreign secretary was fully immersed in the administration of foreign affairs as well as in the policy formulation that guided it. Pomponne alone appeared in the Conseil on the foreign office’s behalf, but he carried with him the results of Torcy’s and his staff’s labours in the form of summaries and drafts. The reading and planning of responses to Boufflers’s letters and those from the three plenipotentiaries (mostly drafted by Callières) involved the king and his Conseil, with Pomponne as “rapporteur” (reporter), but although both Pomponne and Torcy wrote to the plenipotentiaries, it was primarily Torcy who drafted the king’s replies and instructions that were discussed in council.61 The final negotiations at Ryswick tested Torcy’s diplomatic voice and found it properly tuned for that vital and delicate task. When the breathing space of peace finally arrived, it became clear to many and eventually to the king that it would be more efficient to hear that voice directly and fully within the Conseil itself.

T h e N e w D ip l o m at s after Ryswi ck With peace concluded, Louis XIV and his foreign ministers embarked upon an audacious diplomatic initiative to maintain peace while increasing France’s territory without recourse to arms. This was in marked contrast to the confident aggressiveness of the past wars, planned, prepared



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for, and conducted by the bellicose Louvois, Seignelay, and Croissy.62 The inescapable event that threatened Europe with turmoil was the long-expected death of Carlos II of Spain, whose lack of an heir placed in question the fate of the still extensive and resource-rich Spanish monarchy. To head off the scramble for the spoils that threatened another debilitating conflict, Louis, Pomponne, and Torcy resolved to temper dynastic interests with rationality and a quest for peace.63 Following Ryswick, former and would-be French diplomats flocked to Paris or Versailles seeking audience with Torcy. Their visits were often preceded by letters declaring fidelity to him as secretary of state and to the Colbert family. One of the first came from the interim envoy to The Hague and newly appointed resident in Geneva, Pierre Cadiot de La Closure, who in thanking Torcy for his protection and benevolence proffered his zeal and loyalty.64 Abbé Polignac wrote from Poland asking for Torcy’s assistance and protection.65 Less formulaic was a note from the consummate diplomat Bonrepaus, who wrote that his most vivid memory of his recent visit to the Hôtel Croissy was the goodwill of Mme de Torcy, who as a hostess was rivaled only by Mme de Croissy herself.66 This flurry of activity occurred because peace meant the re-establishment of the diplomatic ties that had been among the war’s early casualties. This included sending ambassadors to the four great powers formerly allied against France: England, Spain, the United Provinces, and the emperor. These “Great Embassies” will be treated in greater detail further on, but it is important to note that France launched an expansive diplomatic effort toward lesser courts as well. Torcy received a memoir in March 1698 from Ulrich Obrecht in Germany urging him to appoint envoys to the assemblies of the Imperial Circles because ­Leopold I planned to pursue Imperial military reform through them rather than through the Diet.67 Nicolas du Blé, marquis d’Huxelles, commanding in Alsace, also urged the wooing of the Rhineland princes.68 Louis XIV, however, was chary of wasting money and diplomatic energy on them, since they had followed Hanover – bought off by being raised to an electorate – in rallying to the emperor during the last war and Torcy initially resisted treating them as responsible sovereigns or recipients of French subsidies, but the reluctance of both would melt as the partitioning enterprise heated up.69 These initiatives augmented the number of diplomats required, but ten years of war had diminished the ranks of available diplomats, as few pursued it as a full-time career.70 With the king’s consent, Torcy drew many initial appointees from his circle of friends, clients, and relatives. While some appointments were under

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c­ onsideration even before the ink had dried on the new treaties, others would not materialize until as late as 1701, when circumstances required them (see figure 5.9 below). Louis Rousseau de Chamoy received the important appointment to the German Diet at Ratisbon in March 1698 and was at his post on the last day of April. His father had served Louis XIII’s brother, ­Gaston, duc d’Orléans, which likely explains Rousseau’s connections with the Arnaulds, who were close to Gaston. Rousseau’s career commenced in 1665 when Pomponne took him to Sweden as his secretary and where he remained first as chargé d’affaires and then as resident during ­Pomponne’s absence (1668–71). He later undertook missions to German courts on behalf of Foreign Secretary Pomponne, earning plaudits for his prudence and his knowledge of Germany and the north, but when Croissy replaced his patron, he received no further postings after finishing as extraordinary envoy to the Elector of Saxony in 1683. Having purchased the office of ordinary gentleman of the king, Rousseau was not without means and in early 1691 made a favourable match that was witnessed by Pomponne, who in a matter of months would be recalled to the Conseil. Perhaps to position himself to be among the new envoys sent out once peace returned, Rousseau presented Pomponne with a treatise he claimed was modeled on the minister, entitled L’idée du parfait ambassadeur, in September 1697. This was followed in January by a memoir on the requirements of the post of envoy to Ratisbon, the issues to be addressed, and suggestions for winning over the Diet’s deputies. Whether Torcy solicited this, his annotations indicate that he read it, and shortly thereafter Rousseau returned to diplomatic service.71 While in Ratisbon, Rousseau monitored Imperial propaganda72 and was later commissioned by Torcy to write a series of pamphlets directed against Emperor Leopold, who, according to a letter from the king, “is profiting … from the weakness of the German princes by establishing his absolute authority in the Empire.”73 Torcy hoped at the very least that the pamphlets Rousseau and other agents generated would persuade the German princes and states to seek the middle ground and declare their neutrality in the likelihood of war over Spain’s succession.74 These efforts bore little fruit, and in June 1703, before war had been declared, the deputies stood by while the emperor illegally ordered Rousseau to depart Ratisbon in five days, leaving behind his wife, who was on the verge of giving birth. This was his final diplomatic mission and he died in 1711.75 Charles François de la Bonde d’Iberville was also sent into the Empire.76 A former foreign office commis77 and one of Torcy’s tutors in



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the 1680s, he was recalled in February 1698 after ten years in Geneva as resident and sent at the end of the year as extraordinary envoy to the Rhineland princes, including Mainz, Hesse-Cassel, and Trier.78 On his return to Paris in 1700 he resided in Torcy’s household, advising him and helping with his personal correspondence. In 1703 he held a series of discussions with the Russian ambassador on Torcy’s behalf.79 He also helped Torcy manage part of the Italian correspondence.80 After briefly serving as envoy to Spain (November 1709 to January 1710), he returned to Paris until appointed extraordinary envoy to Great Britain after Utrecht.81 Jean-Louis d’Usson, marquis de Bonnac, nephew of Torcy’s friend and confidant Bonrepaus, became his uncle’s secretary in Denmark and then the United Provinces when he was forced to give up soldiering.82 When Bonrepaus retired in 1699, Bonnac replaced him as chargé d’affaires in The Hague until 1700, when he was sent as envoy to the court of Duke Anton Ulrich of Wolfenbüttel of the senior branch of the House of Brunswick. In 1701 another of Bonnac’s uncles, Lieutenant-General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac, joined him as military advisor to Anton Ulrich, magnet for those princes resentful of Hanover’s elevation to the ninth electorate. Together uncle and nephew supplied Torcy with secret reports detailing the military strength of Wolfenbüttel and neighbouring Hanover, whose Duke George (the future George I of Great Britain) was Anton Ulrich’s relative and rival. Unfortunately, George, fearing an attack, launched a pre-emptive strike in 1702 and forced Anton Ulrich into exile along with both d’Ussons. Bonnac was not held responsible for the Wolfenbüttel fiasco, and Torcy had him appointed extraordinary envoy to Sweden in 1701 and extraordinary envoy to the court of August II of Saxony-Poland in 1707 (until 1710). On the eve of the congress of Utrecht in 1711, Bonnac, by then a seasoned diplomat and worthy successor of his uncle, was named ambassador to Spain to convince Philip V to go along with the terms of his grandfather’s peacemaking. Leaving that demanding post in 1713, Bonnac held several ambassadorial appointments during the next reign until his retirement in 1736.83 There were other councillors on German affairs. Jean-Casimir ­Frischmann de Ranconnières was a German who had rallied to France by becoming a Catholic and marrying a French woman. He had previously met Torcy at the siege of Namur in 1692. Until 1695 and again in 1698, Frischmann acted as envoy and paymaster to the Prince-Bishop of ­Münster, who, like many German princes, often played a double game, milking both sides for subsidies. When Frischmann returned to Paris

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in 1702, he became one of Torcy’s most valuable advisors on German affairs.84 During the Nine Years War, Croissy recruited a royal guards brigadier, Pierre Puchot, comte de Clinchamp and marquis Des Alleurs (known by the latter title), for a temporary assignment as military observer and negotiator for prisoner release, but a financial setback and the war’s end forced Des Alleurs to seek a diplomatic post as an honourable peacetime occupation. Torcy sent him to Brandenburg ­(1698–1701), Liege (1701), Electoral Palatinate (1701), and then Cologne (1701–02), where he became an expert on German affairs and was aided by his charming wife, but with the outbreak of war he asked to be re-employed in the army, where he was promoted to maréchal de camp. When ­Ferenc II Rákóczi of Hungary, leading an insurrection against the Habsburgs, asked Louis XIV in 1703 for an officer to train his troops, Torcy suggested Des Alleurs as the ideal choice and he was promoted to lieutenant-general. From 1704 he remained in Hungary as extraordinary envoy and military advisor to Rákóczi, but as the insurrection limped toward failure, he was transferred to Constantinople to replace Ambassador Charles de Ferriol, baron d’Argental, who had gone mad. Soon disillusioned with this new post, Des Alleurs asked to be recalled. His entreaties to the Porte (the Ottoman court) on behalf of Sweden’s exiled Charles XII had not only annoyed the Turks but had made it appear that he was neglecting his duties on behalf of French commerce, so his request was granted at the end of 1713. Bonnac replaced him, but empty state coffers and the transition surrounding the passing of Louis XIV delayed Bonnac’s departure until June 1716. Des Alleurs, ill, discouraged, and anxious to return to France, braved a perilous winter voyage to hasten his return home. He died in 1725.85 As Sweden grew wary of the dynastic union between the Maritime ­Powers that commenced in 1688, French diplomats sought to re-­establish the former close relationship with Stockholm. The new ambassador, Louis de Guiscard, comte de Bourlie and marquis de Magny (known as the comte de Guiscard), had the task of negotiating with young Charles XII, who Versailles already realized would drive a hard bargain. ­Guiscard was a soldier who had impressed Louis XIV during the late war enough to earn a diplomatic post, but he was also allied with the Colberts, having through Croissy’s patronage received the governorship of the chateau, city, and gouvernement of Sedan, a fortress-city supervised directly by the foreign office.86 As with the German princes, Torcy was wary of wasting pensions on the Swedish ministers, preferring instead to dangle before them secret gratifications contingent upon



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the signing of a treaty with teeth. Guiscard’s courtly manners and careful balancing of alternatives proved a perfect foil to Charles XII’s bluntness and lack of tact, but even though the ambassador crisscrossed the Baltic in the peripatetic warrior-king’s train, he ultimately failed to bend Charles toward French goals.87 Skepticism about Sweden inclined the French increasingly toward Denmark.88 Torcy nominated François Bouton, comte de Chamilly, as ambassador to Copenhagen in May 1698 and Chamilly cooperated with Guiscard, who visited him several times in Copenhagen. A brigadier of infantry, Chamilly had headed several missions to the Italian states when Croissy was minister. He was not formally received by the Danish monarch until early 1700 owing to the latter’s illness and a protocol dispute that led to Chamilly’s recall in 1702, with no exchange of ambassadors between the two powers again until 1726. French interests were not left unrepresented, however, since Jean-Baptiste Poussin, who had handled English affairs upon Ambassador Camille d’Hostun, comte de Tallard’s departure from London, was transferred as embassy secretary to Copenhagen, where he remained until 1726 and served as paymaster for a spy network that extended from Sweden into Poland, Russia, and northern Germany.89 When Abbé Jean d’Estrées, ambassador to Portugal, requested leave in May 1697 to return to Paris, Torcy selected as his replacement Pomponne’s kinsman Pierre Du Coudray Rouillé, baron de Marbeuf, a career administrator without diplomatic experience. After departing Portugal in 1703 because his efforts to tie Pedro II to France were being frustrated by French mistakes and the skilful manoeuvres of the Grand Alliance, Rouillé served next as special envoy to the Elector of Bavaria, then to Heinsius, and finally as a peace negotiator from 1709.90 His replacement in Lisbon was Pierre-Antoine de Castagnéry, marquis de Châteauneuf, who after a decade as ambassador to the Ottoman court returned home under a cloud in 1700 for offending French traditionalists in Turkey and at home by sometimes wearing Turkish garb. A Savoyard by birth, ­Châteauneuf migrated to France and in 1675 purchased a councillor’s charge in the Paris parlement. In 1679 he accompanied Marie-Louise d’Orléans to Madrid, where she was to marry Carlos II, but Croissy did not employ him again until 1689 when he appointed him ambassador to the Porte, due in part to the friendship his learned and witty brother François de Castagnéry, Abbé Châteauneuf, had formed with Torcy. When the winds of war had dispersed the cloud over the marquis de Châteauneuf, Torcy sent him to Portugal to replace Rouillé,

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where he faced the nearly impossible mission of preventing Pedro II from turning neutral or, worse, defecting to the Allies. In 1704 the marquis replaced Abbé d’Estrées as ambassador in Madrid because the latter’s ongoing battles with the princesse des Ursins had undermined his effectiveness with Philip V and his queen. Ursins’s victory was pyrrhic, however, since Châteauneuf had to inform her that an irritated Louis XIV had recalled her to France. After a subsequent mission to Savoy, he was named ambassador to the United Provinces, serving there from 1713 to 1718 and helping Spain and Portugal finally make peace early in 1715. Articulate, precise, and a master of detail, Châteauneuf was an ideal negotiator. However, the diplomatic debut in 1697 of his brother, Abbé Châteauneuf, to carry money and messages to Abbé Polignac, then deeply enmeshed in Polish electoral politics, resulted in the recall and exile from court of both abbés. While Polignac’s career would later resume spectacularly, Abbé Châteauneuf was happy to return to the literary world and would be best remembered as godfather to the aspiring young poet and playwright François-Marie Arouet, a.k.a Voltaire.91 Roger Brulart de Sillery, marquis de Puyzieulx, received the important Swiss embassy, which, like Constantinople, was one of the most desirable assignments because the low cost of living there allowed an ambassador to live well without great personal outlays, unlike other posts.92 An army officer whose career had been cut short by the enmity of ­Louvois, Puyzieulx was rescued from political limbo by his cousin François VII, prince de Marcillac and duc de La Rochefoucauld, a first gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, who felt that his kinsman had been shabbily treated. Louis XIV agreed and the Colberts were happy to advance a victim of Louvois’s ill will, especially since Puyzieulx’s forebears had been secretaries of state themselves. In early December 1697, Puyzieulx, newly promoted to lieutenant-general and reaffirmed as governor of Huningue on the Rhine, was confirmed as ambassador to the Swiss. To the surprise of many court skeptics, he proved a capable minister, ably seconded by his first secretary, Sainte-Colombe, who served as Torcy’s spymaster throughout the next war.93 The most important appointment to Italy in 1697 was Gabriel, comte de Briord, as ambassador to Savoy, a diplomatic rank granted as a special favour to the duke for abandoning his coalition partners. Turin had always been a difficult post and the current duke was not easy to work with, but Briord wisely preferred subtle suggestion to strong-arm tactics in keeping Victor-Amadeus on France’s side. Briord, an old ­Frondeur in the household of the princes of Condé until the death of Louis II de



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­ ourbon, prince de Condé, in 1686, saw his military career rehabiliB tated with that of Condé at the outset of the Dutch War. During the Nine Years War he served in Germany supplying the army battling the emperor. Despite his lack of diplomatic experience, his friendship with Torcy led to his recommendation for the Turin post, where he remained until December 1699, when he was recalled to replace Bonrepaus at The Hague.94 Roland Jachiet, sieur Dupré, who had been posted earlier to Cologne, Strasbourg, Geneva, and Mantua, remained as extraordinary envoy to Florence, where he had been since 1694. Upon his death in 1709, Torcy described him as a zealous and virtuous royal servant.95 Cardinal Forbin-Janson, chargé d’affaires in Rome from 1690 to 1697, was followed by Emmanuel Théodose de La Tour d’Auvergne, Cardinal Bouillon, but his connections with Fénelon did nothing to endear him to Louis XIV and so Bouillon urged that with the impending death of Carlos II a sword nobleman represent the king at the papal court. Louis Grimaldi, prince de Monaco, whose instructions are dated 28 January 1699, was sent as ambassador, but he quarreled with Torcy before leaving France and proved quarrelsome in Rome as well. When he died suddenly 3 January 1701 in Rome, Cardinal Forbin-Janson, in Rome already for the 1700 papal election, served again as chargé d’affaires.96 Torcy thought highly of Forbin-Janson, who was a kinsman of ­Pomponne and former employer and protector of Charles-François Noblet, who joined Torcy’s department as a commis in 1698. One of Torcy’s immediate concerns in 1698 was Lorraine’s neutrality. Reinstated at Ryswick, Duke Leopold maintained a precarious neutrality during the next war. From 1698 to early 1702, Torcy sent three representatives to the duke’s temporary capital at Lunéville: his brotherin-law Bouzols (1698), Callières (1700), and, as permanent resident, Jean ­Baptiste d’Audiffret (1702), who remained until 1715. D’Audiffret, son of a prominent Marseille municipal leader, published his three-­volume Histoire et géographie ancienne et moderne in Paris in ­1694–95 and served as envoy to Mantua, Parma, and ­Modena from 1698 until 1702. His reports to Torcy from Lorraine were an invaluable source of information on the eastern borderlands.97 Torcy appreciated that some diplomatic appointments could be unrewarding or even dangerous. Charles François de Carades, marquis du Héron, faithfully represented France at the Rhenish courts before the Nine Years War and after Ryswick at the court of Augustus II of Saxony to continue Des Alleurs’s work. On returning from a military review he was kidnapped, perhaps at the instigation of Augustus himself. Torcy,

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a stickler for diplomatic immunity, complained to the elector, but once Héron was freed, Augustus expelled him from Saxony. The next year Héron lost his life from wounds suffered in a skirmish in Hungary.98 More fortunate, Polignac nonetheless nearly lost his career.99 Scion of an old noble family of the southwest, Polignac studied at the colleges of Harcourt and Clermont in Paris where Torcy was also a student, but he only met him formally in 1689 in Rome. Torcy’s brother Charles Joachim then encountered Polignac when both served as conclavists at the 1691 election of Innocent XII. As Torcy recounted later, he and his brother admired Polignac for his facility with languages, his ready wit, and the ease with which he moved in court circles. Perhaps on Torcy’s suggestion, Croissy nominated the thirty-three-year-old abbé as ambassador to Poland in 1693. The suave, handsome, and articulate representative of French culture and political acumen was warmly welcomed into noble houses, where he sought the friendship of members of the powerful Lithuanian Sapieha clan that, with its vast estates and private army, constituted a state within a state. Polignac also became a favourite of Michael, Cardinal Radziojowski, who as a youth had attended school in France, but Polignac failed to win over King John III Sobieski, “Saviour of Vienna” from the besieging Turks, who nurtured a deep distrust of France, its king, and all things French because Louis XIV had encouraged the Porte against the Habsburgs. But Sobieski’s malevolence came to an abrupt end in June 1696 when he suffered a seizure and died. In the ensuing political crisis, Polignac, confident of his Polish friends, espoused the candidacy of Louis XIV’s cousin Prince François Louis de Bourbon, prince de Conti, and employed the substantial funds he had brought to brazenly bribe electors in the Polish Diet to vote for Conti. He promised the Sapieha 178,000 livres and Radziojowski nearly 185,000 livres, and spent over 2,400,000 livres, promised or distributed. News of Sobieski’s death and of Conti’s nomination reached Versailles on 3 July 1696, just as Croissy lay dying. Although Beauvillier was nominal spokesman for foreign affairs during Croissy’s last illness, the dayto-day supervision of the diplomatic correspondence still fell to Torcy, who was uncertain what to do about Conti’s candidacy. Louis XIV’s relations with his cousin were strained, since at one time the king had favoured Max Emanuel of Bavaria for the Polish throne. Torcy’s uncertainty is reflected in the notes he scribbled in the margins of the draft instructions he was preparing for Polignac, asking Beauvillier to find out if the king wanted the instructions communicated to Conti and, if so, to



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ask the monarch to make any changes he judged apropos. Elsewhere in the draft instructions, Torcy’s marginalia questioned whether Beauvillier had reviewed the amount of the pensions to be sent to Polignac, amounting to over 100,000 livres.100 Torcy was right to be cautious. Although Conti was twice to be declared king of Poland, he had no army, very little money at hand, and his support from the Polish landed nobility melted like the snows of spring. In the late summer of 1697, just as the peace of Ryswick was being signed, Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, claimed the Polish throne, converted to Catholicism, and invaded Poland. With no army, Polignac fled Warsaw for the free port of Danzig where, pursued by Saxon troops, he was fortunate to escape to a French frigate in the harbour, abandoning his household goods, jewels, and monies to the Danzig mob. On Polignac’s return to France, Louis XIV refused to see him, furious over the loss of gloire and funds, and exiled him to his abbey of B ­ onfort.101 When Louis XIV accepted the Spanish crown for the duc d’Anjou in 1700, Polignac immediately wrote with congratulations and in his accompanying letter to Torcy candidly confessed that this was the best news a man in disgrace could receive. With the aid of the king’s confessor, Père La Chaise, Torcy finally persuaded Louis to pardon Polignac, but he felt it prudent for Polignac to serve in Rome as a judge in the Court of the Rota. Torcy’s confidence in his friend was later rewarded when Polignac displayed his considerable talents as a negotiator at the peace conferences at ­Gertruydenberg and Utrecht.102 It took Torcy three years to assemble this corps of diplomats, which by any reckoning was one of the most important achievements of the early years of his ministry, even though the coming crisis that eventually led to war exposed the inadequacies in the training of many of them.103 The selection of envoys represented a delicate balancing of young and old, experienced and novice, civilian and military, friends and potential rivals, those with powerful patrons and those solely dependent on the Colberts. Perhaps most importantly, he had to find those willing to serve often in unfamiliar and even difficult locations and usually with little financial reward.104 Out of a group of thirty or so envoys, Torcy came to rely especially on the opinions of an inner circle of advisors and itinerant envoys that included Rouillé, Iberville, Châteauneuf, his brother the abbé, Bonrepaus, and his nephew Bonnac.105 Torcy discovered serendipitously an important diplomatic ally and friend outside his usual circle in Philippe Antoine Gualterio, newly named nuncio to France in 1700 and with whom he had corresponded

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from 1696 while Gualterio was vice-legate in Avignon. Relations with the papal authorities at Avignon under Croissy had at best been strained, in part because of the commercial rivalry between the Avignon-Comtat and the nearby French farmers and wine merchants, but Torcy was more moderate in his approach and sought accommodation rather than confrontation. When Gualterio arrived at Versailles in early August 1700, he was at once invited to a private meeting with Torcy. Both were prudent men, moderates in matters of church doctrine, who along with the future pope Clement XI (Albani) wished to continue the Franco-Papal détente begun under Innocent XII. Like Torcy, Gualterio was a man of learning, a patron of the arts, and a renowned collector of paintings and books. Born into a noble family of Orvieto, the future cardinal was educated in Rome, where he took not only holy orders but also a law degree. Like Torcy he, too, feared that the Imperial invasions of northern Italy during the Nine Years War presaged aggressions that not only threatened the independence of the northern Italian states but of the Papal States themselves.106 The patron of Gualterio’s youth was his uncle, the cardinal archbishop of Ancona, who recommended his precocious nephew to the French representative in Rome, Cardinal d’Estrées. So quickly did the future nuncio become proficient in French and an advocate of French culture that François de Neufville, duc de Villeroy, exclaimed that at heart Gualterio was very French, and in time Gualterio became a naturalized Frenchman, an advocate of French policies both in Rome and abroad, and, in all but name, a member of the French foreign office. Indeed, during the latter stages of War of the Spanish Succession, Ursins recommended to Torcy that Gualterio, by then a cardinal and one of her confidants, be sent as French ambassador to Spain.107 When his nunciate to France ended in 1706 upon his elevation to the Sacred College, Torcy expressed his sense of loss to Pomponne in Venice, aware of the likely difference between Gualterio and his replacement, Agustino Cusani, then nuncio to Venice.108 Torcy’s circle of advisors was only just beginning to emerge in January 1698 when he was faced with the formidable assignment of greeting, entertaining, and, ultimately, negotiating with England’s ambassador and William III’s personal envoy, Lord Portland. The question of the Spanish succession, impending since 1665, once again moved centre stage, threatening to undo the hard-won peace achieved at Ryswick. How to untangle this dynastic knot and prevent war would occupy Torcy and his department personnel in the bureaus and abroad over the next few years.



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E mbas s ie s a n d P a rt it io n Treati es : Resolvi ng the S pa n is h S ucces si on Hans William Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, arrived in France during a January ice storm. His carriages and wagons were frozen to the piers, and boats could not moor because the Seine was iced over, so ­Marshal Boufflers lent him his coach for his first visit to Versailles. On 4 February 1698, punctually at 9 a.m., Torcy led Portland by way of the queen’s stairway to Louis XIV’s Cabinet. Portland later wrote William III that he was received “with kind words, urging that past enmities be forgotten.”109 He was then feted at a state dinner hosted by Torcy in his apartments; Torcy, rather than his aged father-in-law, was present at this and the other formal and public events connected with this major embassy. He had witnessed other ambassadorial arrivals before at his father’s side, but this was the first time he joined the king and the arriving diplomat at centre stage. The guest list for this state dinner, carefully culled with the help of his cousin, Grand Master of Ceremonies Blainville, included the duc de Gramont, a family friend; Boufflers, Portland’s fellow negotiator at Ryswick; Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims, Barbezieux’s uncle and a powerful churchman; and Tallard, newly named ambassador to England.110 The visit of William III’s favourite would mark the beginning of Louis’s efforts to win his former enemy to a peaceful resolution of the Spanish succession.111 William, with his army having been largely disbanded by Parliament after Ryswick, was also inclined to this approach and had backed away from his earlier support for Austria as the sole recipient.112 This was a remarkable turn of events. According to Wout Troost, ­William had long regarded Louis as a threat to the liberties of all of Europe – one of his ways of expressing the notion of a balance of power – while Louis saw William as a warmonger intent on preserving his power over the Republic.113 Portland’s embassy was also a practical test of one of the most delicate provisions of Ryswick: the establishment of diplomatic relations with the formerly anathematized Prince of Orange, now recognized as England’s king. The harmony of ­Portland’s first audience, however, was shattered at his next visit when he sighted in the Hall of Mirrors one of the most important Jacobite leaders, James Fitz James ­Stuart, Duke of Berwick, James II’s natural son by Arabella Churchill (sister of John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough). Berwick, who had entered French service in 1691, exclaimed at full volume that it was an affront to a true Englishman to find such an ­“assassin” at

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France’s court. Torcy directly sought out Portland and explained that Louis XIV, bound by princely hospitality, had opened his palace at St Germain-en-Laye to his unfortunate “cousin and brother” and would never change his mind about James’s residence. Saint-Simon reported prematurely, “Louis XIV thoroughly approved Torcy for having silenced Lord Portland.”114 Portland, however, repeated his discomforting complaint, even to Louis himself, but the French were firm in their refusals.115 Although a disgruntled Portland reminded William that he had never expected much from the French in upholding the peace, William urged patience and confessed, “I dread refusals more than anything whatever.”116 His weakness at home as Parliament dismantled England’s military might and the anticipated death of Carlos II left it up to the French, he acknowledged, to address his concerns about James II and the Jacobites. For now, Portland was instructed to drop the matter.117 He dutifully changed his tone and made well-received amends with Torcy, Pomponne, and Louis XIV.118 Preparations for his formal Paris entry in early March and a dispute over the order of carriages with Introducer of Ambassadors Michel Chabenat de Bonneuil led Portland to threaten to cancel it, but Torcy cleverly resolved it in the ambassador’s favour without creating a precedent for future entries.119 The entry took place 9 March to the acclaim of the crowds that thronged to see the magnificent display, but at the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs another ceremonial battle of wills broke out. When receiving Louis Marie Victor, duc d’Aumont, peer of the realm and first gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, Portland punctiliously followed the dictates of diplomatic courtesy: he met the duke on the stairs, gave him his hand, conducted him to an armchair, and, when d’Aumont left, descended the stairs and saw him into his coach. Soon thereafter there arrived someone Portland believed to be a “lesser personage,” Édouard Colbert, marquis de Villacerf, who expected the same honours. Portland refused to meet him beyond the door of his antechamber, and there ensued a standoff as Villacerf refused to ascend further than halfway up the stairs and the ambassador refused to descend. This led to a public clash between the outraged Portland and the equally irritated Bonneuil, who was conducting the visits. Bonneuil retaliated by refusing the scheduled supper with Portland, who later protested to Pomponne and Torcy. Although Torcy’s initial response did not satisfy the earl, it was clear that the introducer’s subsequent visit to Portland to humbly accept his berating was under Torcy’s orders.120 Thereafter, relations between Portland and Torcy eased perceptibly, and the earl became a popular figure at



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court, even being invited to hold the candle at Louis XIV’s coucher, the royal going-to-bed ceremony to which ambassadors were not normally invited.121 While William was delighted, Portland remained suspicious of French intentions.122 The French, however, were in earnest about establishing a new relationship with their former foe. Torcy later observed that though William III had been the “oracle” of the former league against France, he was skilled and informed and so could not ignore the dangers posed by Carlos II’s imminent death.123 When the death of the Queen Mother Marianna in 1696 left the decidedly pro-Austrian Queen Maria-Anna ascendant in Madrid and the January 1698 Ottoman suit for peace secured the emperor’s eastern frontier, any understanding between France and Austria seemed unlikely. The Maritime Powers appeared the more likely partners for an accommodation. Torcy, Pomponne, and the king were confident that William had sent his favourite, not to discuss Jacobites, but to confer on the more pressing issue of Spain. By the end of February, however, Portland’s silence on this led them to doubt that he had any such orders.124 Torcy had prepared for this possibility so as not to lose the opportunity of sounding out William.125 He and Pomponne approached Portland on 14 March, proposing to discuss the fate of Spain and emphasizing the need to forestall another war and the dangers of Austrian hegemony in Italy and the Empire. What ensued was a diplomatic dance in which each side sought to draw out the other on specifics. Portland finally took the lead and suggested that Bavaria’s electoral prince inherit the Spanish monarchy, insisting that this was merely his own suggestion, although it was actually William’s preference.126 The French ministers responded noncommittally that Philip IV’s testament was null, but they were secretly pleased with Portland’s suggestion, even if they preferred a son of France on the Spanish throne, convinced that any move away from the Austrian claimant must begin with a tilt toward the Bavarian one.127 This French overture so heartened William that he dispatched a copy of Portland’s report to Heinsius, begging him to forward his thoughts to the earl, and then wrote Portland to urge him to pursue these talks and a more concrete French proposal.128 However, secret intelligence of C ­ arlos’s deteriorating health led William to explore other options should Carlos expire in the midst of these negotiations, suggesting to Heinsius the possibility of resurrecting the anti-French alliance.129 David Onnekink has shown that the fluctuating state of Carlos’s health, ­Austrian ­victories

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over the Turks that permitted transferring her military might to the west, the woeful state of English finances, and Parliament’s postwar army reductions all factored in to the calculations of these negotiators long accustomed to mutual suspicions.130 What was nonetheless remarkable was Louis’s willingness to sacrifice what he believed to be his legitimate claims to the entire Spanish succession so that he could enjoy at least part of it in peace while depriving Austria of the whole. William and Heinsius were slow to trust the French, but Louis and his ministers genuinely believed that they could strike a deal and even build a future alliance with their former nemesis.131 Discussions in France slowly inched toward greater specificity on both sides.132 The earliest explicit French partition proposals, worked out by Louis XIV, Pomponne, and Torcy, offered William his choice of two partitioning alternatives. The first, to include only those parties with a claim, awarded Naples, Sicily, and the Duchy of Luxembourg to the Dauphin; Milan to Leopold’s son; and the balance to the electoral prince. The second proposed Spain and the overseas empire for one of Louis XIV’s grandsons and the Spanish states in Italy (except Milan, suggested for the Duke of Savoy as a counterbalance to Imperial power) for the archduke. The Maritime Powers would receive new treaties assuring their trade within the Spanish monarchy and a few places on the African coast to protect their Mediterranean trade. This was an opening gambit in a chess game with high stakes. Nonetheless, William expressed his surprise to Heinsius and Portland that the French were so open and had initially yielded so much. Ironically, the second alternative resembled what was later agreed to at Utrecht: a French prince inheriting Spain and the Empire; the Austrians predominant in Italy (Savoy initially received Sicily); and the British gaining the asiento (the monopoly on supplying Spain’s New World colonies with slaves), Gibraltar and Minorca to protect their Mediterranean trade, and territories carved out of lands claimed by New France.133 In April it appeared that the bargaining would take place in London between William and newly arrived French ambassador Tallard.134 Yet conversations in both capitals persisted, with Portland still a major voice, even though it was becoming clearer that this time-consuming process needed to be limited to one city or the other. Louis, who had always suspected that direct talks with William would progress further than indirect ones through the more suspicious Portland, instructed Tallard to accompany William to the United Provinces at the close of Parliament.135 Portland, who remained on good terms with Pomponne



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and Torcy, planned his departure after the requisite lengthy diplomatic leave-taking.136 Before that, however, he indulged in one last flurry of purchases of French luxury goods that included mirrors, textiles, guns, furniture, clothing, wigs, paintings, and, of course, wine.137 His final audience with Louis took place in mid-June in the Cabinet, with just the two of them present. Portland’s request to visit the famed Dunkirk fortifications on his return journey was readily granted. Indeed, the king arranged for him to inspect other places along the way and to be received by cannon salutes, honour guards, and engineers to guide his visits, all presumably to impress him with French defences.138 ­Portland was later presented with a costly gift of the king’s portrait in a box studded with diamonds.139 When he arrived in London, William awaited him, pleased with these still mostly secret negotiations. The English public, however, judged his embassy largely on its outer appearance: some saw a dazzling success, but most could see only a tremendous waste of scarce royal funds to feed the ambitions of a royal favourite whose fortunes appeared to be flagging.140 The commencement of Portland’s lengthy stay in France roughly coincided with the launching of four post-Ryswick missions we might dub the “Great Embassies.” In November 1698 Tallard, was named to London while Bonrepaus was transferred from Copenhagen to The Hague. Less than two weeks later Henri I de Beuvron, marquis d’Harcourt, was designated for Madrid. In mid-December Claude Louis Hector, marquis (in 1705, duc) de Villars, was selected for Vienna.141 These emissaries were to serve in four of Europe’s most important capitals, but each was also part of the foreign office’s two-pronged plan for a proactive resolution of the Spanish succession. The first prong resumed prewar efforts to beat the emperor at gaining recognition of a candidate as Carlos II’s rightful heir. Harcourt would defend the Bourbon claim but aim primarily at frustrating those of the Austrian archduke and Bavaria’s electoral prince. Given the uncertainties in Madrid and the improbability of a Bourbon swallowing the whole Spanish monarchy unmolested, the second prong was the chief negotiation. Tallard would seek an accommodation with William III permitting a peaceful partition and thereby forestalling Austria’s grab for the whole while satisfying French interests and Bourbon claims. The other two Great Embassies would play supporting roles by gathering vital information and thwarting any disruption of the efforts in London and Madrid.142 Louis XIV and his foreign ministers were embarking upon an audacious and complex process of what Sir George Clark calls “secret and

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hypothetical diplomacy.”143 First, the object of the negotiations was the disposition of a monarchy and its subject territories that belonged to neither of the participants in the talks.144 Louis XIV was a claimant, as were Austria’s Archduke Charles and Bavaria’s electoral prince, but ­William III was not.145 Second, the current ruler of Spain was neither a part of the negotiations nor open to any division of his holdings, yet being childless could complicate or wreck negotiations by bestowing domestic and international legitimacy on one claimant. Partitioning the Spanish monarchy was not without precedent, as Louis XIV and Leopold I had done so in 1668 when the infant Carlos was not expected to live.146 They had justified their presumption as heirs who only wanted a mutually beneficial and peaceful allotment of their expected inheritance. In 1698, however, Louis XIV and William were not fellow claimants, leading to a third complication concerning legitimacy. Louis was not motivated by a willingness to go halves with William, who in any case was not asserting any rights of his own. Instead, both sought to put to one side – or at least from centre stage – particular dynastic and state interests for the higher good of European peace, regardless of legal rights to Spain.147 Dynasticism was unquestionably a vital element in their calculations, determining who was eligible and who was not for a share of the spoils, but preserving the peace and maintaining the balance of power were the two central criteria for assigning or denying portions to particular heirs.148 In fact, so essential were these two ends that negotiations included the possibility of a share of the spoils for the Maritime Powers, a clear violation of dynasticism. In contrast, the 1668 treaty had “maintained a balance of power between France and the House of Habsburg … [and] rested on dynastic traditions which could justify transfers of sovereignty.”149 That Louis considered gratifying William’s desire for Mediterranean and Caribbean ports to protect Anglo-Dutch commerce even without dynastically legitimate claims signaled an important shift.150 Again, state and dynastic self-interest were hardly absent, but rationality and realism seemed now to be at the fore. Answering William’s scruples over partitioning while Carlos yet lived, Louis pointed out that those wanting a share of the spoils would pounce the day Carlos died, pre-empting negotiations and plunging Europe into war. Therefore, they had to act pragmatically and peremptorily to avert such a tragedy for the sake of their own peoples and all of Europe.151 A fourth complication arose from the nature and number of the participants, at first glance only two and both monarchs. Having battled bitterly for decades, William and Louis were unaccustomed to w ­ orking



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together and trusting one another. William was highly suspicious,152 whereas the policy-makers at Versailles were anxious to put aside past differences and shape their negotiations according to the frank assessments made by their ambassador on the spot in London.153 Drawing on the intelligence assets bequeathed to him by his father, Torcy often had a good sense of the treacherous political waters of the three kingdoms in which William navigated, especially in Parliament. As William wrote Heinsius in exasperation, “They are but too well informed of everything that passes here.”154 The grand pensionary was essential (although not sufficient) to William for keeping the States-General in tow, and he relied on him not just to voice Dutch interests but also for feedback on French proposals and his responses to them.155 At Versailles the process was not simple but it was more manageable. Pomponne and Torcy were apparently like-minded in policy and worked closely with the king, while the Conseil, in which policy matters were discussed, supported their conciliatory approach.156 Torcy and Pomponne often went to Portland or received him together, but there were other times when Portland and Torcy met alone. Protocol and scheduling audiences were handled by Torcy as secretary of state, who also usually attended Portland’s private royal audiences and was more likely than his aging father-in-law to encounter Portland at the royal levee and ceremonial occasions.157 In the spring of 1698, France’s new ambassador to London was relatively unknown to Torcy and his department. Tallard had enjoyed a distinguished military career, rising to lieutenant-general in 1693, and was fortunate in having as patron his mother’s uncle, the duc de Villeroy, who recognized in him a possible candidate for higher administrative or army office. Described by Saint-Simon, who knew him well, as driven by avarice and ambition, Tallard was nevertheless an officer trained in the military ethic and thus an inspired choice to deal with William III.158 He arrived in London on 29 March, but it was nearly two weeks before private talks began in earnest. The plan to focus serious negotiations on direct discussions in London between Tallard and William was frustrated by the return of Portland (29 June), who with Heinsius won ­William to their cautious mistrust of the French. Negotiations grew sluggish even as Tallard followed William and his favourite for his usual summer visit to the Republic.159 Still intent upon peace, Louis instructed Tallard to make further concessions, despite word from Madrid that the people and grandees wanted a Bourbon on the throne and French troops were poised on the Spanish frontier to prevent the emperor from intervening. Louis was convinced that even these favourable factors would result in

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war and he wanted nothing of it.160 The diplomatic dance accelerated thereafter as the partners drew closer and closer to a partition agreement, finally reached on 8 September 1698 at Utrecht and signed on 24 September and 11 October 1698.161 The First Partition Treaty, hammered out by former foes, was a remarkable diplomatic feat.162 While Tallard and William III were dividing the Spanish monarchy, Harcourt was busy in Madrid.163 A handsome, ebullient war hero, he was backed by Maintenon, who it was rumoured was grooming him for a high post in the government, perhaps even that of foreign secretary.164 After a month’s arduous journey, Harcourt arrived in Madrid on 24 February 1698. He was joined later by his wealthy and politically adept wife, and they became the centre of social life, opening their house and purse to the greater nobility and clergy and giving life to a proFrench party.165 The politically motivated possessiveness of his German wife and his fragile health kept Carlos sequestered in his palaces, but as Torcy witnessed in 1685, he was neither dim-witted nor uninformed of outside events.166 Archbishop of Toledo and cardinal Luis Manuel ­Fernández de ­Portocarrero, leader of the pro-French party, regularly visited the king’s chambers, and after several months of waiting, Harcourt received an audience, the first of several.167 Carlos made it clear that he deeply resented any talk of partition. Thus, negotiations were kept secret for fear that if Carlos got wind of them, he might, as a pre-emptive measure, make the archduke his heir and bring him to Madrid, even though he said he hated the rude and uncouth “Germans.”168 Torcy’s first instructions advised Harcourt to act as a bystander and, instead of participating, gather information from the political elite and foreign diplomats, especially Austria’s ambassador Ferdinand Bonaventura, Count Harrach, who had a formidable reputation among the French. Treating Maintenon’s protégé with caution, Torcy nonetheless cautioned Harcourt to be wary of Carlos’s wife. Harcourt, however, plunged energetically into the political fray, even approaching the queen with gifts from Paris and gossip from Versailles.169 After the publication of the First Partition Treaty and given the need to reassure France’s new allies, it was no longer considered politic to maintain a high-ranking diplomat in Madrid, and so Harcourt was recalled.170 Villars in Vienna was also well qualified for his mission. The son of a soldier-diplomat who had represented the king in Spain, Turin, and Denmark, Villars was acquainted with the intricacies of diplomacy and enjoyed a distinguished military career, first as aide to Condé in the Dutch War and then while envoy to Bavaria as a volunteer with Max



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Emanuel at the decisive victory over the Turks at Mohács (1687). ­Villars remained in Munich until the Nine Years War led to a new military command.171 Though initially failing to enlist Max on the French side, he kept in touch with him and encouraged his defection from the Grand Alliance in 1696–97. The bluster and bravado of the soldier only lightly hid a lover of classical literature, a patron of the arts, and an accomplished courtier. Villars’s relations with Torcy, whom he had known since before the war, were ambivalent and uneasy.172 While he was in Vienna in 1699, a verbal clash with the Prince Adam von Lichtenstein stung Villars so deeply that he asked Torcy for permission to challenge the prince to a duel, but a horrified Torcy reminded him of the king’s severe disapproval of dueling.173 The two masked their subsequent unease behind a jocular manner, often wrapped in classical allusion. When Torcy remarked that Villars held in his hand Psyche’s box (a reference to a box that the mortal girl Psyche was given by Venus and later furtively opened to find not the beauty she desired but an infernal sleep), Villars replied with an assurance that the box of diplomatic secrets would not be opened by his impatience or indiscretion.174 A month later Torcy complimented him on his wisdom, jokingly addressing him as “Votre Sagesse” (Your Wisdom).175 Yet in his Mémoires Villars laments that at the end of his embassy, unlike the magnificently recompensed and better-connected (with Torcy) Tallard and (with Barbezieux) Harcourt, he received merely empty words of thanks.176 Nevertheless, he could also play the suppliant. Seeing that he might be assigned to the army of Italy in 1701, where he foresaw a clash between the Duke of Savoy and Marshal Nicolas de Catinat, he urged Torcy to do all he could to get him posted instead to the army in Flanders.177 Unlike the missions to Madrid and London, that to Vienna was pursued with neither hope nor haste.178 Villars was kept in ignorance of the negotiation and signing of the First Partition Treaty. The Austrians, aware of their waning fortunes in Madrid, speculated that Villars had been sent to explore a new partition with the emperor. They initiated several indirect and unofficial probes, but on instruction from Torcy, the ambassador deftly sidestepped them. Yet Villars himself began to wonder why he was left languishing on the Danube.179 Despite the lack of negotiations, he was kept busy establishing a spy network that survived most of the next war. An accomplished courtier, he moved easily in the Viennese salons and established contact with the “ministerial party” opposed to a Franco-Austrian war and favouring the partitioning option.180 As he reported to Torcy, however, these internecine court

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rivalries paled before the bitter antipathy toward France of the Habsburg heir apparent Joseph, whose chief military advisor, Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy-Carignan (known as Prince Eugene), shared these feelings.181 Although auguring ill for Austrian adherence to any partition treaty, this information was essential to Torcy’s ability to offer the king good counsel. Bonrepaus, heading the fourth Great Embassy, was already well known to Torcy as ambassador to Denmark since 1693. While not from the sword nobility, he claimed to be a gentleman in his native Foix, was wealthy and well respected, and moved in the highest court circles. The often-snobbish Saint-Simon, who could find fault only with Bonrepaus’s short, plump figure and his disagreeable accent, praised him for his character, speech, good sense, and diplomatic skills. Trusted by Colbert and Seignelay, Bonrepaus attracted Croissy’s attention and from 1685 became familiar with both England and the United Provinces while working in both on naval and commercial agreements.182 This and his knowledge of Baltic affairs made him a wise choice for The Hague, where burghers and ardent republicans were unimpressed by sword nobility. Bonrepaus’s assignment was to thwart a Dutch-Imperial alliance by pointing out the costs to commerce of a war to enforce Austria’s designs on the whole Spanish succession. Frustrated by his exclusion from the talks across the Channel, Heinsius tried to engage Bonrepaus in more concrete discussions; however, the wily ambassador refused to be drawn in. When negotiations moved to the United Provinces, Bonrepaus asked to join Tallard, but Louis would agree only to inform him of what had been discussed so far.183 Torcy could feel pleased with the accomplishments of the four embassies whose efforts he directed and coordinated; the Spanish monarchy could now be peacefully and profitably partitioned for the sake of Europe and France. This feat of negotiation at the expense of Austrian ambitions was especially impressive because it was accomplished with the Maritime Powers, Austria’s erstwhile allies. In addition to cutting the Spanish knot with bold diplomacy, Torcy’s team overcame an old and bitter enmity with William III. Because the peaceful partition scheme ultimately gave way under the weight of subsequent events, it is easy to overlook the daring diplomatic revolution of 1698 that might have rivaled the famous one of 1756 reconciling France and Austria. This reversal of alignments foreshadowed the Anglo-French entente that bloomed briefly to make peace at Utrecht and then re-emerged in 1718 to guarantee that the peace last longer and function effectively. From



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1698, Torcy and other French policy-makers were motivated by a realistic assessment of what endangered peace and what it would take to preserve it, even if that entailed allying with the former fulcrum of antiFrench coalitions.184 Charles II, allied with or at least largely friendly toward Louis XIV, was usually a secret and subsidized French client, but William III made England the head of an anti-French coalition of Catholics and Protestants. Thus, the wooing of William to an alliance with his former adversary would be quite different from the courting of Charles II. At times Louis inclined toward the methods used with the Stuarts, but Tallard carefully steered him in another direction.185 Evidently the French hinted first that a triple alliance might maintain the newly won peace, but it was William who observed to ­Tallard that a partition policy would end his former alliance with Austria and move him toward one with France.186 Louis’s reaction was positive, and as ­Portland reported, Louis told him that if he and William “perfectly understand each other, the rest of Europe will follow our sentiments.”187 What gave this triple alliance talk substance was the concerted effort required to implement the partitioning scheme in the likely face of opposition. Louis was anxious for military aid in Italy, where he expected opposition from Venice and Savoy should the Dauphin receive Milan, although he raised this point in part to show William that placing a son of the D ­ auphin on the Spanish throne instead would be less costly. While William and Heinsius were adamant that France not have Milan, ­William nonetheless envisioned a triple “offensive and defensive alliance” to enforce the treaty and a league of the “crowns of the north” and several Imperial princes to ensure peaceful compliance.188 Louis heartily endorsed both, concluding that Leopold could not refuse to comply with such a powerful combination of forces.189 As this realignment grew closer to reality, William spoke openly of France as his ally and of their common interest in preventing Austria’s aggrandizement; he even astonished the French by suggesting that Milan be withheld from the emperor until he agreed to the division.190 Had events not intervened, could this radical international realignment have lasted? There were those in England’s government who, when finally made aware of the treaty when it was all but signed, were willing to go along with partitioning, but not with an alliance to enforce it.191 Yet the post-Utrecht French alliance, unpopular in Britain as it was in France, nevertheless functioned longer than many imagined.192 Louis XIV and William III may have fashioned a bold plan to resolve the Spanish succession through a revolutionary realignment of alliances,

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but there was still much that could go wrong.193 Although the new allies hoped to keep the treaty’s details secret until they officially notified the emperor in 1699, word of it was soon noised about Europe. A furious Carlos made a new will in favour of the electoral prince, while Vienna’s envoys manoeuvred to subvert the new alliance.194 Despite this, the triple alliance held and Torcy remained optimistic that faced with this formidable association of former foes, the emperor would yield.195 On 5 February 1699, however, the ground shifted dangerously with the electoral prince’s unexpected death. Many Spaniards, including Carlos, took comfort in this frustration of the partition scheme. Heinsius received the news as a further shock, having that same day learned of the Peace of Carlowitz, which increased Leopold’s options in the west. William III was equally disconcerted and wrote to Heinsius that “we are in no small labyrinth, and may it please God to help us out of it!”196 As we have seen, it was this crisis that provoked Torcy’s entry into the Conseil, which directed Tallard to sound William out about salvaging the partitioning option. Both sides again danced about, waiting for the other to make the first move, but to avoid feeding William’s suspicions, Louis made an offer: the archduke would receive the late prince’s portion and the Dauphin’s would be augmented only by Milan.197 Though startled by Louis’s modest claims, William nonetheless balked at Milan or any increase to France’s award. The Anglo-Dutch contention that the treaty’s secret article making Max his son’s heir now came into force soon fell before Louis’s counter that Max could only inherit what was possessed rather than promised. Fresh negotiations soon began, and the rumour at Versailles was that the king had made a “ligue” with England and the Dutch prejudicial to the emperor’s projects.198 William wanted to include the emperor, but Leopold disregarded Dutch overtures and Louis insisted upon an agreement with his new allies first. Meanwhile, Parliament reduced the army’s size, diminishing William’s influence at home and abroad; the city of Amsterdam initially refused to approve a new treaty; Portland begged to withdraw from all public affairs; and William feared that Heinsius might step down as grand pensionary. David Onnekink rightly sees these long, drawn-out negotiations as largely reflecting William’s troubles with Parliament over the army rather than his deteriorating relations with France.199 Torcy raised the stakes by hinting that without a new treaty France would be forced to respond positively to pro-French proposals emanating from Madrid.200 Heinsius feared that France might be driven to a separate agreement with Austria if the Maritime Powers delayed further,



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even though Louis seemed set on a closer and continuing alliance with ­William.201 Yet as Onnekink notes, William’s deteriorating power meant that “Louis began to doubt the usefulness” of this alliance.202 Despite Leopold’s delays and final refusal to countenance a revised partition, all three allies nonetheless sensed that the way out of the labyrinth lay through Vienna. Louis initially hoped to win Leopold with a generous offer, but if he refused, he was content to pressure his partners to reach a new agreement as soon as possible and leave it to them to compel him to sign.203 William hoped that the Austrians would see that without an agreement, French forces on Spain’s frontiers would pounce at the news of Carlos’ death. When the Dutch ambassador found the expectation in Vienna that the Maritime Powers would secure the succession for them as specified in their previous agreement, William hastened to disabuse them of that notion.204 Yet even as the First Partition Treaty had neared finalization and Louis had pressed William to commit to a common war effort if required to enforce the treaty, he had balked and pinned his hopes on a powerful league to draw the emperor in.205 By mid-June 1699 Tallard and Portland had hammered out the outline of a new treaty, but the Maritime Powers held off signing in hopes of a positive Austrian response. Tallard hinted that his master would have to take other measures to secure his interests, and a month later Torcy told the English ambassador Manchester that the delay had led Louis to consider pinning his hopes on developments in Madrid. He also played on Anglo-Dutch fears of a secret Franco-Austrian agreement.206 Torcy kept up the pressure, prompting Charles Montagu, 4th Earl of Manchester to report home, “I never see M. de Torcy but he speaks to me of the great affair.”207 To secret French satisfaction and Anglo-Dutch chagrin, Austrian adamancy finally forced a separate signing of a Second Partition Treaty in London (21 February 1699/3 March 1700) and in The Hague (25 March 1700).208 From the moment the emperor was informed of the treaty, he would have three months to sign or see the three signatories allocate the archduke’s share to another yet-to-be-specified prince. Imperial Ambassador Philip Louis, Count von ­Sinzendorf, fearing that Spain would declare for a French heir, urged Vienna to sign, but his entreaties went unheeded.209 Torcy hastened to assuage English anxiety by insisting that leaked news of the Second Partition Treaty was unlikely to favourably dispose Spain toward France and that Louis intended to adhere strictly to his treaty obligations. Within the week Torcy again assured Manchester that Louis intended to act only in concert with ­William.210 The labyrinth of which William

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had earlier despaired appeared to have been escaped without his going through Vienna. Despite bumps and delays along the way, the triple alliance of 1698 had survived and was seemingly on its way toward realizing its goals with regard to the Spanish succession, the maintenance of peace, and a diplomatic revolution. Torcy now escalated the campaign to draw in Austria and convince other states to pressure Vienna. Callières journeyed to Lorraine to win its duke to the Milan exchange, France’s ambassadors in London and The Hague proposed further concrete measures for the treaty’s execution, the Swiss were urged to block the passage of Imperial troops intent upon thwarting the partition, and Sweden was informed that a commercial treaty would be contingent upon adherence to the partition treaty.211 Torcy informed Manchester that Sinzendorf had instructions to break up the triple alliance by offering France the Indies in lieu of Italian lands, but he assured Manchester that he had found these Austrian offers unworthy of sharing with Louis XIV, who, in any event, would never entertain alterations to the treaty apart from his allies.212 Remarkably, the news from Spain that all but one of the Royal Council’s members had urged Carlos to designate a French prince as his heir did not derail the new alliance. William insisted to Heinsius that this was neither surprising nor unanticipated and it would “make the Emperor resolve the sooner to join the treaty.”213 At the end of July William was still at work constructing what he termed “the grand alliance with regard to the Spanish succession.”214 Even the emperor’s final refusal in August to sign led the English envoy in Vienna to shake his head at Leopold’s unrealistic expectations of support in Spain and his rejection of the partition.215 For his part, Torcy resisted Spanish entreaties to abandon the treaty, continued to pressure Austria, and notified the Maritime Powers that France intended to counter Austria’s troop movements in Italy by placing troops near Catalonia’s frontier, ready to march in and secure French claims.216 Yet all was not harmonious in the triple alliance. The French were anxious to forestall Imperial moves to circumvent the treaty, but found the perceived Dutch indifference to these dangers disturbing. Their fears were not imaginary. William confided to Heinsius his reluctance to go to war for a treaty he had hoped would remove the need for war, caustically observing that the “French are a hasty people, and like to do everything with hauteur [haughtiness]; but that is not our way.”217 Hence, he and Heinsius refrained from committing to the Franco-Portuguese alliance under negotiation. William also feared that few would join a



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­ ro-treaty league without the triple alliance first naming the prince to p inherit the archduke’s share should Austria fail to sign. A month later he had concluded that the Elector of Brandenburg was too intent upon a crown to cross the emperor and that the most to be hoped for from the German princes was neutrality.218 Even so, work on tying up the treaty’s loose ends continued as alliance members clung to the fading conviction that the emperor would eventually be compelled to comply. Yet Leopold, who had concluded with the signing of the Second Partition Treaty that Anglo-Dutch help would not be forthcoming, was nonetheless determined to resist a partition. His advisors came around that summer to the idea of granting the Hohenzollerns their coveted royal crown in Prussia as the price for Brandenburger troops.219 Perhaps the triple alliance could have prevailed against Austria’s obstinacy, but C ­ arlos’s attempt to pre-empt partitioning with a new will presented an even greater challenge. When Carlos II expired on 1 November 1700, his new will was made public, revealing that the entire prize was to go to Louis XIV’s grandson or, if he refused it, to the archduke. It was an offer that would have been difficult for Louis XIV to refuse even though it eventually led to war.220 Whether any partition treaty had any hope of success is a matter of conjecture. Sir George Clark says of the First Partition Treaty, “It is hard to imagine a scheme of partition better suited to the requirements of the time,” since it satisfied Dutch and Bavarian aspirations and was a “just partition” that gave the Habsburgs and Bourbons territories that would not cause undue friction between them. Its major stumbling blocks were Leopold’s refusal to partition and the uncertainty of the partitioners’ resolve to stand firm against him.221 Yet especially in light of Carlos’s new will in favour of the electoral prince, it might well have held had Carlos expired at that point.222 The Second Partition Treaty was “not as ingenious as the first,” according to Clark, but “the problem lay not in the terms of the treaty but in its reception.”223 William Roosen argues, however, that because of the international system itself, the competing interests and attitudes of the major powers after Ryswick made war over the Spanish succession highly likely and the electoral prince’s death made it inevitable.224 David Onnekink, while arguing that the partition treaties were not, as often assumed, “one of the greatest non-events in diplomatic history,” nonetheless terms the second treaty “a rather unfortunate settlement that satisfied no one and could easily result in renewed conflict.”225 He rejects the traditional nationalistic and deterministic Whig/Orangeist claim that an aggressive Louis XIV made

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the War of the S­ panish S­ uccession inevitable, but also denies that this war resulted from “a sequence of misunderstandings, mutual distrust and war propaganda that made it impossible for each side to judge correctly the other’s essentially peaceful motives.”226 Although both warweary monarchs negotiated warily but in basic good faith, he disagrees with Wout Troost’s thesis of mutual misunderstanding. He argues that what ultimately undid their efforts was Louis’s and his advisors’ reasonable calculus when presented with Carlos II’s pro-Bourbon testament that William III, hobbled by a Parliament opposed to standing armies and their costs, had lost his value as an ally and a partner in peacemaking through partitioning.227 In a recent look at the failure of the partition treaties, Troost apparently agrees with this assessment and adds ­William’s unwillingness to pressure Leopold I to accept a partition.228 The two partition treaties have nonetheless been rightly called ­Pomponne’s “greatest achievement in diplomacy.”229 Torcy could be proud of the astonishing diplomatic reversal he and his father-in-law achieved by means of audacious yet cautious negotiation. Pomponne, however, who died three months after France and England signed the Second Partition Treaty and six months before the Dutch officially signed it, would miss its unraveling in November 1700. The English ambassador at Versailles, expressing regret at Pomponne’s passing, explained to the secretary of state in London that his lament was also because “it will make the other [Torcy] much higher than ever.”230 Apparently, Torcy was already regarded as more difficult to manipulate than the mild-­mannered Pomponne. Although Torcy had been groomed from youth, was traveled and trained, had been eased into office by degrees, was mentored by his father, his father-in-law, and even the king, there was still no guarantee that Torcy could successfully pilot policy formation and the bureaucratic mechanism he had inherited in the increasingly turbulent waters of European affairs. As he scrambled to keep afloat the partition scheme and triple alliance, he laboured without his father-in-law at his side. Yet Pomponne’s lessons in subtlety, flexibility, and the pursuit of peace had prepared Torcy well, and complemented the more technical but nevertheless significant administrative training he had received from Croissy. Both legacies would serve him well as he stood with Louis XIV at the helm of French diplomacy during the most dangerous and daunting days of the long reign, and they would be essential components of his own legacy to European diplomacy. Both legacies would also allow him to deflect the criticisms that came at him from various critics at court.



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C r it ic s at Court The denizens of Louis XIV’s court were often said either to possess or to lack génie, defined as the refinement and perfection of one’s talents through an education that pushed one’s nature to its limits.231 In later years Torcy offered his own definition of génie for the guidance of the apprentice diplomats in his newly founded academy. He advised each to nurture his génie by demonstrating a supple, prudent, and penetrating mind. The essence of his advice was that in dealing with diplomats and humans generally, one must display great sense and solid judgment and conduct one’s affairs wisely.232 Torcy’s own génie, as his critics noted, developed slowly, masked at first by traces of his father’s abrasiveness, irritability, and quick temper and his mother’s caution and protectiveness. Others, however, saw beyond these distractions. Abbé Claude Bernou, writing to Renaudot from Rome in 1685 just after Torcy’s arrival there, said that he appeared to him to be very wise, quite modest, and well informed.233 Callières, who had observed Torcy at work and had seen the fruits of his labours, assured a confidant that the late Croissy’s son was wise, a good writer, and showed great promise.234 Still others, however, were less keen or less careful in their evaluations. Saint-Simon, without knowing Torcy personally, judged him vain because of what he took as a stiff, irresolute, and timid exterior.235 Villars later noted William III’s astonishment that Louis XIV had such young ministers, clearly a reference to Barbezieux and Torcy, each not yet thirty.236 Claude Le Peletier, minister and former controller general, in evaluating French diplomacy in the wake of the Treaty of Ryswick, claimed that Torcy, although a harder worker than his father, lacked the credit and force for managing such an important “machine” at the outset of the Spanish succession crisis.237 England’s Paris embassy secretary Matthew Prior displayed his usual caustic wit to sum up what he claimed was the consensus of the foreign diplomatic corps not long after Ryswick. Torcy, he opined, did not possess “génie” and his only merit “was to be born a Colbert and to have wed the daughter of Pomponne,” reputed to be an “honnête homme” and regarded as the “premier minister” after Maintenon. As evidence Prior related that Maintenon had easily overturned the young secretary’s award of a minor post to a friend simply because he had not first cleared it with her.238 Such timidity proved fleeting. During the late 1690s, another aspect of Torcy’s character began to emerge that was perhaps less agreeable in tone and more direct in manner and sparked no doubt by his stressful

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encounters with foreign envoys and critics at court. The Austrian diplomat Franz Melchior, Baron von Wiser, detected the shift and in a letter to Ulrich, Count von Kinsky, in Vienna complained that Torcy, although under the tutelage of Pomponne, was nevertheless so easily irritated that all the diplomatic community complained. For example, if a minister newly arrived at court went first to Pomponne before presenting himself to Torcy, he would incur the sting of the latter’s wrath. Wiser closed his letter with the assertion that while Torcy was neither as violent nor as quick tempered as Croissy, his still surface rendered him equally dangerous.239 In enlisting Desmaretz to lobby his cousin on altering his position on relations with Spain, Maintenon later remarked that when the foreign secretary wanted something, he really wanted it. Although not intended as such, Torcy took this as a compliment.240 Torcy’s backlash also caught Prior with its sting. By the end of the 1690s the English secretary’s letters no longer mentioned timidity or lack of génie, but complained instead “that I think Torcy’s way of giving his answer peremptory enough.”241 Prior further grumbled that “denying us this request is injust [sic]” and “what I urge to the contrary had little weight.”242 At another time, in a moment of frustration, Prior added, “I will do what I can … but I shall scarcely get an opportunity to speak to the great Torcy.”243 Evidently, the once belittled Torcy had become a political force to conjure with, whose génie was no longer hidden but had begun to shine. Thereafter, Prior’s opinion took on a more balanced, less strident tone, as in July 1699 when he informed the secretary of state in London that “to say the truth out, if he [Torcy] determines everything as quick as he did some points yesterday, he may soon finish all.”244 Later he confided that “I got matters so ordered as that his Excellence [Lord Manchester] paid him [Torcy] his first visit, without the usual falderal.”245 Jacques Le Quien de La Neufville, a member of the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres who published an Histoire des Postes in 1708 and dedicated it to Torcy, mentioned these earlier doubts about Torcy in his dedicatory remarks, but made it clear that the king’s confidence in Torcy had been vindicated. From Torcy’s youth, he declared, the king discerned his natural talents and good education. While some judged premature the monarch’s selection of one so young, Le Quien de La Neufville’s encomium contended that Torcy’s wise conduct in office had justified the king’s foresight as well as his choice.246 Some criticism was blunted by Torcy’s growing influence with the king and in his councils. This surfaced mid-1699 in a letter to Pomponne from Cardinal Le Camus, bishop of Grenoble. As noted above, scarcely



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two years earlier, Vauban had asked Torcy to intercede with his fatherin-law, but by 1698 it would seem that the roles were reversed. Reporting the need to establish more parishes in and around the city, Le Camus hoped that Pomponne would persuade Torcy to share this with the king, knowing that Torcy handled such domestic matters and that it would be a mistake to ask him to bypass his son-in-law and present his petition directly to Louis.247 Likewise, Torcy’s uncle by marriage, Chevreuse, advised one of his agents to seek Torcy’s support, for without it his proposal would go nowhere.248 Other criticism fell before the facts. Torcy’s former critic Saint-Simon made an astonishing volte-face. Looking back later on Torcy’s tenure, he admitted that at the outset of the Regency he had wanted Torcy out of the government. He recognized, however, that the regent retained Torcy as a key advisor because he knew the state’s most intimate secrets.249 The duke also admitted that Torcy “was exceedingly well informed, a man of wit, honor, integrity, and learning; he spoke quietly, with restraint, almost modestly, saying only what was required, but saying it well because he had a gift for both oratory and writing. Most often reason was on his side.”250 Saint-Simon confessed having been blinded earlier by passion and ignorance, which he attributed to the influence of his friends ­Beauvillier and Chevreuse, who had taken Seignelay’s side in his quarrels with the Croissys and who suspected Torcy of Jansenism, even though both dukes had been friends with Pomponne.251 In 1702 the Portuguese envoy José de Cunha Brochado complained to Lisbon, perhaps self-servingly, that Torcy had neither the experience nor the authority to direct the multiple negotiations then under way.252 By the time the worries of the War of the Spanish Succession had engulfed Torcy’s department, however, most critics acknowledged his mastery of diplomacy. In 1703 there appeared a French translation of an anonymous English commentary (or perhaps one from a French writer wishing to deceive the authorities) on the royal family, court, and government. The author, apparently a close observer of the court and Parisian diplomatic circles, offered harsh evaluations: the Duke of Burgundy, with a violent temperament, seemed grave, sombre, and arbitrary; Villeroy appeared of little value; the brutal and hedonistic Barbezieux understood the basics of matters, but his commis did his work for him while he committed terrible acts in doing his job; and Chancellor Louis ­Pontchartrain had stolen so many offices that he was unable to fully exercise any. In contrast, he commended Torcy’s experience, culture, and education, adding that wise beyond his years, he would one day be a great minister. The

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anonymous author insisted that although Torcy’s greatest desire was to serve his prince, foreign ambassadors were nonetheless pleased with the way he conducted negotiations.253 Herman van Petkum, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s resident at The Hague (1703–14), decided to make contact with Torcy in 1706 to attempt to mediate peace even though he did not know him. In his later recollection of the beginning of these secret negotiations, Petkum related that Johan Palmquist, Swedish ambassador to France (1689–1703) and then to the United Provinces (1703–15), recommended Torcy to him as a man of honour and integrity.254 Of course, some criticism would never go away. The royal family harboured a particularly persistent, vituperative, and possibly dangerous critic in Élisabeth Charlotte of Bavaria, duchesse d’Orléans, German wife of Louis XIV’s brother, Philippe, and known as “Madame” at court and as “Liselotte” to her cronies and family. Madame was formidable in every sense and deeply resented having her private correspondence with her German relatives opened by that little “toad” (crapaud) Torcy.255 She expressed her views quite openly in her letters and was especially candid in her comments on the royal family, including her brother-in-law the king and his detested secret wife Maintenon. Madame enjoyed twitting Louis and his foreign minister. In 1716 she recalled that years before she had passed along to the king word from a French refugee in Holland that William of Orange was going to England. She claimed the king thanked her but in the evening laughingly told her, “My ministers insist that you are ill-informed,” to which she replied that time would tell. Sometime later, after Madame had been proven correct, she recalled, “Torcy came to see me and said that I ought to inform him of the news I received. I replied: ‘[Y]ou have assured the king that I received false news,’” explaining that she had therefore discouraged her sources for fear of spreading rumours. Torcy, she continued, “laughed, as he usually did, and said: ‘Your news is always very good.’ To which I answered: ‘A great and able minister must have surer news than I, for he knows all things.’ That evening the king said to me: ‘You have been ridiculing my ministers.’ I replied: ‘I only returned them what they gave me.’”256 Such skirmishes, however, reflected Torcy’s deeper concern that Madame’s imprudent disclosures and falsehoods as well as her epistolatory panting for peace were harmful to French interests. Also worrying was her network of correspondents aimed at promoting her son ­Philippe’s interests in Spain, which appeared to threaten Philip V’s position as king. These included figures in Madrid as well as the German dowager queen of Spain Maria-Anna and Gramont, former ambassador



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to Spain, both in Bayonne.257 She later called Cardinal Dubois and Torcy “stinking eggs and rotten butter, we would be better off if they were on the gallows rather than at the court.”258 However, Madame herself was not unaware that Torcy might reveal stories about her that could be harmful, even while her son Philip was regent. Writing from the Orléans country seat at Saint-Cloud, she confessed that “Torcy is by no means my friend; if he could find something to harm me, he would be sure to use it. But this is one thing I do not have to worry about, my son knows me too well and realizes that I love him dearly.”259 Yet the shadow of doubt remained. Torcy debuted as foreign secretary and progressed into the Conseil at a time that would have tested even the most seasoned statesman. Yet carefully prepared by travel abroad and service alongside the foreign office clerks, he also inherited his father’s administrative apparatus that was more extensive and rationally organized than that of his successors.260 Pomponne’s tutelage in moderate policy ends and means was apparently accomplished with a light touch and in a collaborative manner. It helped Torcy fashion his own diplomatic style, which mirrored neither that of his “hardbitten” father nor that of his “easy-going” father-in-law,261 but was instead a synthesis of the best of both men. It was this synthesis that ultimately pleased Louis XIV and served him well during the darkest days the kingdom experienced under his personal rule.

4 The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

From humble beginnings as domestic clerks in the royal household writing for their master and trusted with any secrets he put to paper, the four secretaries of state were by the end of the sixteenth century among the most powerful and intimate members of the monarch’s administrative apparatus.1 Their powers and responsibilities ranged far and wide over collections of provinces and specialized tasks that shifted over time, often depending on who held the secretaryship, but eventually stabilized somewhat around core specialties such as war, foreign affairs, and the royal household. Although a secretary of state charged with foreign affairs had emerged well before Louis XIV’s reign, his office, like those of his fellow secretaries, remained immersed in domestic responsibilities, including provincial administration. The duties and powers of the secretary of state for foreign affairs and his colleagues become clearer only when seen in the light of this long evolution. Curiously, on the other side of Louis XIV’s reign, the Polysynod of conciliar government that followed upon his death in 1715 also opens a window to understanding the foreign office as it had further developed by the end of Torcy’s secretaryship, terminated by the Regency’s councils. However, as recent research reveals, what followed in 1715 was less the break with Louisquatorzian bureaucratic arrangements that historians have long assumed and more an affirmation of them. Perhaps paradoxically, studying the innovations of 1715 has become critical to our understanding of the previous reign’s bureaucracy and in a radically new way. A small but nonetheless significant assortment of notes penned by Torcy’s clerks that uncharacteristically survived the vicissitudes of time also opens a window into the foreign office’s inner workings, but in a more intimate manner and largely telescoped in time and space. As couriers gallop between the Paris



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region’s palaces and bureaus, messengers await replies (sometimes overnight), and agents and clerks impatiently watch calendar and clock for the arrival of packets from far and near, we gain a greater sense of the tyranny of time and space that constrained Torcy’s bureaucracy and how it attempted to manage both. Such considerations even lead us to examine the paper, ink, sealing wax, and other mundane matters that were all essential components of a functioning bureaucracy.

T h e O f f ic e o f S e c retary of S tate In the early 1690s Pierre Clairambault, genealogist and crown servant, composed a history of and guide to the duties of a secretary of state for Torcy, returned from Rome in October 1689 to assume his secretaryship en survivance. Drawing on a treatise written in the 1670s for Torcy’s cousin Seignelay and on documents in the king’s library, Clairambault adumbrated a secretary’s titles, privileges, and duties.2 These titles were not a litany of empty honors, but reflected duties, privileges, and powers that had been acquired after intense administrative struggles over the past century and a half. It is important that we understand these titles as they were used during Louis XIV’s reign. Clairambault speaks of the secretary of state as a “greffier” (court clerk), “notaire” (notary), and “secrétaire” (secretary), three clerical and rather lowly functions that reflect the office’s humble origins in the late thirteenth century.3 As a greffier, Torcy had become at once a recorder, preserver, and sealer of documents of a judicial nature.4 As a notaire he authenticated all royal orders by drawing them up in proper form, recording them, and sending them to their recipients. These included a plethora of royal favours as well as appointments to benefices and the great crown and household offices. A secrétaire drew up and witnessed marriages for the royal family, princes of the blood, and members of the upper nobility.5 His primary function was writing. He drafted, recorded, and transmitted the monarch’s correspondence and saw to it that decisions of the royal councils were properly drawn up, recorded, and communicated to the proper parties.6 In this latter role he served as a private secretary for the central government’s official business (“secrétaire des commandements”).7 The four secretaries of state wielded great power through these rather mundane clerical tasks because they were the conduit of the king’s will to most of his other officials and in turn the compulsory channel of their communication with him, since, formally at least, most other officials

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were not permitted to write directly to the monarch.8 This quartet of secretaries and their staffs generated and managed a good portion of the vast multidirectional flow of writing whose circulation gave life to a centralized government that Bernard Barbiche calls a “government by writing.”9 Like governments today, Louis XIV’s was not exclusively based on the written word, since much transpired orally in encounters at court, council meetings, individual work sessions with the king, talks between two secretaries of state, conversations between their clerks, and audiences with foreign representatives or supplicants from the provinces, much of which never made their way directly or fully to paper. As the monarch’s surrogate voice, a secretary of state’s words carried weight and power, whether spoken or written out.10 In addition to these clerical duties, a secretary of state also served as a “minister” (minister), “conseiller d’État” (state councillor), and reporter, all loftier roles formerly reserved to members of the first two estates. The term ministre is confusing if applied loosely. The title “ministre d’État” (minister of state) designated those chosen by the prince to direct and to deliberate together on the principle affairs of state.11 Note the administrative function as well as the corporate advisory one. Many held this status by tradition, but in 1661 Louis XIV limited it to those explicitly summoned by the royal ushers to sit in the Conseil and take on the formal title of minister.12 While not all secretaries of state were ministers, each secretary was nonetheless a source of information for the king and his administration because so much passed through his hands and under his eyes, especially as he opened, read, and summarized most incoming dispatches. In addition, each secretary held a brevet as councillor of state giving him entry to all royal councils save the highest. While secretaries served in the councils of government (all in Dispatches and some in the Conseil, the Council of Finances, and later the Council of Commerce), they rarely attended the councils of justice and administration (the Conseil d’État privé, finances et direction composed of the Conseil privée or Conseil des parties, the Conseil d’État et des finances, the Grande Direction, and the Petite Direction).13 In Dispatches each served as reporter on matters pertaining to his domestic specialties and provinces, rendering a full and trustworthy narrative or account14 to his colleagues of what he had gleaned from his incoming correspondence. The foreign secretary served as reporter in the Conseil, where foreign policy was discussed.15 Unlike the chancellor and the controller general of finances, the secretaries of state had charges that were by law semi-venal offices and as such were heritable property, transferable for generations. Dynasties,



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such as the Le Telliers, the Colberts, and the Phélypeaux, formed because sons could follow their fathers in office. Although the chancellor headed the hierarchy of royal venal office-holders and received their oaths, the secretaries of state delivered their oaths directly to the sovereign, which made them part of an august group that included the great crown and household officers, archbishops and bishops, certain members of the Royal Orders, and provincial governors and lieutenants.16 The secretaries of state, close by the monarch’s side, realized much of their potential for power from the increasing “tendency of the Crown to establish direct relationships with all levels of royal government.”17 They were the primary link between the king and his councils in the centre and his officials in the provinces. He could also, using the king’s seal, order the arrest or the release of any person in the kingdom. The scope of a secretary’s competence was such that he was truly, in C ­ lairambault’s words, “omnia homo” (a man for all seasons) and an “homme universel” (universal man).18 The foreign secretary’s administrative role, unlike that of the modern French foreign minister, was as important as his political role.19 Chancellor Pontchartrain, writing to an official of the Aix parlement, reminded him that since the secretary of state controlled his province’s ordinary administration and justice, it was for him to regulate affairs, commanding in the king’s name what must be done.20 By the end of Louis XIV’s reign, a secretary of state, in fact if not in name, combined in his person two of the attributes of a Roman magistrate: that of one who had the right of giving written opinions under the seal of office (publice respondi); and that of one who modified, supplemented, tempered, and explained the ruler’s will (jus honorarium).21 In a very active and real sense, the secretaries of state animated the king’s will in the same way that the king animated the law. They were much more than mere recorders or receptacles of the law and in fact brought it to life throughout the kingdom and beyond through their functional specializations, such as war and foreign affairs, and their responsibility for particular provinces.22 The tragic yet institutionally innovative (or at least institution-­ codifying) reign of the last Valois, Henri III, witnessed on 1 January 1589 the creation of a secretary of state charged exclusively with conducting foreign affairs. Louis Revol, who had been a commis under an earlier secretary, was assigned foreign affairs. Relations with other states remained in just one secretary’s care until 1624, when Pierre Brulart de Puyzieulx’s fall led to their distribution among the remaining three secretaries. Each was now responsible for particular states and coordination

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took place in the council. By 1626, especially as the pace of negotiations accelerated as war with the Habsburgs loomed, the disadvantages of this system brought the return to a single foreign secretary. Yet department boundaries and attributions remained highly unstable among the four secretaries under the first two Bourbons. Appointments were typically a matter of adapting a department to a particular individual rather than of assigning someone to head an unchanging administrative entity. Under the two cardinal-ministers, the secretaries functioned more as ministerial agents and less as the department heads they would increasingly become under Louis XIV.23 Any issue relating to a foreign power, including those that might otherwise seem domestic in nature, typically fell to the foreign secretary. When a foreign prince took an interest in former subjects now under French control, he dealt with the foreign secretary.24 The foreign office dealt with religious matters when a foreign power was involved,25 as it did with foreign clergy active in the French Church, especially during wartime.26 When the Scotsman Thomas Burnett of Kemeny, one of Electress Sophie of Hanover’s courtiers and one of philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s correspondents, was in Paris in 1702 to see philosopher Nicolas Malebranche, he ended up in the Bastille accused of being a spy because, some thought, he was related to the antiJacobite historian and theologian Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury. Sophie had Leibniz write a memoir to Torcy for Thomas B ­ urnett’s release to which the foreign minister responded favourably when he discovered that it was a matter of misunderstanding.27 In addition, Torcy monitored and facilitated the famous dialogue aimed at Christian reunification that took place between Bishop Bossuet and Leibniz, advisor and librarian to Hanover’s House of Brunswick.28 Each increasingly specialized secretary of state’s continuing involvement in domestic administration may appear irrational, owing more to tradition than to functionality.29 Yet if “tradition” was a pointless and immutable burden from the past, then Louisquatorzian government was hardly its prisoner. Tradition resulted from long development and remained amenable to adjustment according to the state’s perceived needs.30 It had been customary, for example, for the royal family, princes of the blood, and high-ranking churchmen to serve as the monarch’s closest advisors, but Louis XIV decisively broke with that tradition in 1661. Furthermore, to understand the functionality of past institutions requires us to enter into the rationality that contemporaries perceived in inherited structures. The work of the secretaries of state was originally



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divided on a geographic basis, and only under the last Valois kings did they begin to specialize according to function as monarchs experimented with managing their fractious state through royal servants in capacities of their choosing. Redistributing responsibilities, whether to trusted and loyal individuals or according to function or geography, was one way to accomplish this. In fact, far from being prisoners of the past, the last Valois monarchs and their three Bourbon successors escaped tradition when it suited them by breaking with it or, more frequently, by carefully and selectively manipulating it.31 The actual distribution of generalities by secretary was itself far from illogical or immutable. From the Middle Ages, France continued to add new territories in which feudal enclaves persisted, and so domestic administration and foreign affairs often merged as newly conquered areas maintained varying degrees of legal, ecclesiastical, and cultural ties with outside states.32 This was certainly the case along the frontier with the Empire, but equally so elsewhere because boundaries were not yet defined in linear fashion.33 In 1567 and 1570, for example, departments were composed roughly of areas of France in proximity to those foreign powers for which each secretary was responsible. For example, the secretary charged with Italy and the Levant supervised Piedmont, ­Dauphiné, Provence, Languedoc, the Auvergne, and Lyon, whereas the secretary who oversaw Normandy, Brittany, the Île-de-France, Orléans, and Maine also handled relations with England, Scotland, and Denmark. Although the sovereign could reassign attributes and territories at will, this grew less frequent, either to minimize disruption or perhaps from inertia.34 The death of a powerful secretary such as a Colbert (1683), Seignelay (1690), or Louvois (1691) could occasion political change, but provinces were also swapped among secretaries for practical reasons. The war department concentrated increasingly on administering frontier areas in war zones. In August 1673 Louvois traded Limousin, Saintonge, and Angoumois in the west for foreign secretary Pomponne’s generalities of Lorraine and Alsace. Likewise, the threat of Allied invasion through Savoy’s mountain passes led in March 1708 to Dauphiné’s transfer to the war department while the more secure Lyon went to the foreign office.35 There were several advantages to having specialists such as the war and foreign secretaries involved in domestic administration. As seen in the twentieth century, an interior ministry could be a critical locus for gaining and maintaining control of a state, especially a centralized one. Louis XIV’s experience under the tutelage of a cardinal-minister made

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him averse to a chief minister because his power or even that of an interior minister threatened the direct control he had sought from 1661 and perhaps only really established after Louvois’s death.36 Jacob Soll argues that it was this fear of a rival to his personal power that led the king to break up Colbert’s “grand ministry” of centralized information collection and storage upon his death in 1683, even though he continued to encourage the system on a departmental level.37 This lack of a single interior ministry under Louis XIV after Colbert benefited the secretaries of state.38 The patron and client system obliged patrons to grant their clients rewards in return for loyal service. This symbiosis required that clients and rewards remain in rough balance so that a secretary could fill all positions with reliable men, especially those positions where immediate supervision was not possible, while satisfying his clients’ craving for state service and honours.39 Kin and clients were not always qualified or docile collaborators, but the personal relationships embedded in family and patron-client ties could result in competent public administration, since they facilitated the preparation by apprenticeship that predominated before the era of public administration schools. Such a system presupposed a fund of patronage resources, but the diplomatic functions of the foreign office generated only a few positions in the capital, while the bulk of the others were outside the kingdom and typically financially burdensome to the recipient. Moreover, since most royal officials lived and operated in the countryside and urban centres of the realm, it was largely there and not in Paris that patronage resources such as grants of lands, feudal rights, and venal offices were to be found and distributed. Administering a collection of provinces thus added to one’s rewards reservoir. There were non-material benefits from domestic administration as well. The conduct of foreign policy requires a realistic appreciation of the political, military, economic, human, and psychological capital a state can deploy in pursuit of its international goals. A focus only on foreign affairs certainly yielded valuable information about the rest of the international community, but not profound knowledge about one’s own state. It is likely that Torcy approached the issues of war and peace more soberly than he might have because he was directly aware of war’s fiscal weight on the provinces. He grasped the breadth and depth of suffering brought on by the 1692–94 subsistence crises because of his work with intendants to assure local grain supplies and provide poor relief. The harsh winter of 1708–09 and his direct knowledge of its devastations surely weighed upon Torcy as he sought peace personally at The



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Hague and in later negotiations.40 He did not merely hear about provincial woes, he worked with local officials to address them. While not an advantage easily measured or calculated, this nonetheless suggests that we should think of the foreign secretary’s domestic responsibilities not as a distraction but rather as a check upon what might otherwise have been abstract and disembodied international gamesmanship. The oversight of his father’s provinces was among the most urgent, demanding, and frustrating tasks facing Torcy in his early years as designated successor, especially with Croissy occupied with negotiations for prosecuting and later ending the war. The 1685 Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had multiplied domestic as well as diplomatic difficulties. Croissy’s department supervised administrative units scattered across France and not necessarily contiguous (figure 4.1). According to a 10 January 1688 broadsheet listing the secretaries of states’ departments, Croissy generalities (“generalitez”) included Brittany; Provence; Berry; Champagne and Brie; Dauphiné; Limousin, Angoumois, and Saintonge; Navarre, Béarn, Bigorre, and Nébouzan; and the Sovereignty of Sedan, a former principality that included the fortress-city and its dependency of seventeen villages.41 This list would change thereafter: in 1694, with the creation of the generality of La Rochelle, and in 1708, when Torcy returned Dauphiné, traded by Louvois to Croissy for the Trois Evêches in 1681, in exchange for Lyon.42 Each secretary also supervised his generalities’ parlements and other sovereign courts. The foreign secretary oversaw the parlements of Aix (Provence), Grenoble (Dauphiné), Rennes (Brittany), and Pau (Béarn and Navarre), but since the parlements’ jurisdictions did not coincide with the generalities’ boundaries, some areas under Torcy looked to courts supervised by other secretaries of state.43 Even though the provincial petites chancelleries, where official documents were sealed and registered, were emanations of the Grand Chancellery in Paris, they were attached to the local parlements, sovereign courts, and présidiaux, and therefore under Torcy’s supervision, as suggested by his rather long letter to a local official outlining the means of ending the procedural abuses that had crept in over time.44 If there were diplomacy-related documents that needed to be registered in other sovereign courts, Torcy would send his colleagues copies to forward with instructions to the courts under their jurisdiction. Such was the case in 1713 with the Utrecht-mandated renunciations of the Spanish crown made by Charles, duc de Berry, and Philippe, duc d’Orléans, and the renunciation of that of France by Philip V.45 The secretary also handled remonstrances over royal legislation

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Figure 4.1 Map of the généralités supervised by Torcy and major postal routes. In 1708 Torcy traded Dauphiné for the Lyonnais with the war secretary.

issued by the superior courts, often with royal encouragement. Torcy would read them in the Conseil if they concerned provincial administration, whereas the chancellor read those concerned with justice and the controller general those related to finance. A provincial incident typically sparked these remonstrances, which sought not the effacement of royal power but rather royal intervention. The parlements, touchy about their prerogatives, their standing among other corporate bodies, and the



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status of corporate bodies such as the Church in their jurisdiction, were quick to seek redress from the king when they felt these were threatened by their rivals. The Conseil took these remonstrances seriously and on occasion even offered reasons for their decision. In addition, these courts could seek to influence decisions at Versailles by appeals or visits to Torcy or his premier commis.46 The secretaries’ power increased markedly during Louis XIV’s last two wars as their direct collaboration with the monarch skyrocketed. They continued to correspond with the provinces on a regular basis, using Dispatches as their debating society. Pressed by the volume of provincial affairs, they increased the size of their staffs and their working space at Versailles. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, the secretaries of state had surpassed in importance the governors of most provinces and shared their authority largely only with the controller general. Little wonder that Chancellor Pontchartrain instructed those with concerns about everyday administration, such as the appointment of officials, building of hospitals, disciplining of clergy, enforcement of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and repair of highways, to write to the appropriate secretary and not to him.47

T h e F o r e ig n O f f ic e Vi ewed from 1715 In 1698, before the resumption of diplomatic relations with her former enemies, France counted seventeen diplomatic missions abroad. In 1702, even after French representatives had withdrawn from Britain, the United Provinces, and Austria with the resumption of war, there were still twenty-three, although the number would slip to eleven by 1708.48 Each strand of this extensive diplomatic web, larger than any other in Europe, served and represented the French monarch and his diplomacy as “exterior organs of execution.” The “specialized central organ of command and control,”49 conveying the royal will to and through each strand and coordinating the projection with suitable splendour of Louis XIV’s diplomatic face abroad, consisted of the foreign secretary and his staff. How was this department constituted, how did it function, and who were its personnel? These are not easy questions to answer because explicit documentation is meagre, but occasional glimpses of the department’s inner workings appear in a letter from or to a clerk, in a note of instruction scribbled on a document, or in lists of personnel payments. Likewise, changes in organization or personnel can be revealing. Incongruously

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perhaps, the loss of a high-ranking official is typically less disruptive to an organization’s operation than the loss of a key clerk because the latter is normally the repository of the details of the organization’s daily functioning. These procedures characteristically evolve organically and reside in group memory rather than in writing.50 Even today, when detailed operational manuals and handbooks abound, there remains a plethora of unwritten administrative particulars whose neglect can bring an organization to its knees. Such particulars largely remain unrecorded until a staff or structural change requires their commitment to paper either to ensure continuity or to clarify what is being altered or replaced.51 The war department under three generations of Le Telliers and the foreign affairs department under Croissy and Torcy for over thirty-five years each experienced continuity of control at the top and generations of fathers, sons, uncles, and nephews who served as clerks and passed on their lore through apprenticeship, obviating the need for written administrative procedures. Ironically, the stability other departments of state lost through more frequent leadership changes has been the historian’s gain from fuller written organizational and operational details.52 The Regency’s council-based Polysynod (1715–18) is usually derided as disorderly and inefficient and dismissed as a reactionary aristocratic aberration in French political life. Fortunately, a study of the Polysynod has appeared that moves beyond what the memorialists said to what the archives reveal. Alexandre Dupilet’s meticulous work has in fact uncovered a system that was quite functional and displayed a fundamental continuity with Louisquatorzian administrative methods, despite many Polysynodists’ pretence of a radical break with the Sun King’s governing mechanism. Even the conciliar system’s collegial underpinning was an idea under discussion within the government itself long before Louis was in his grave. It was nonetheless striking to contemporaries that soon after Louis XIV’s 1 September 1715 death the regent dismantled the departments of the four secretaries of state and redistributed the parts to six specialized councils, including a “Conseil des affaires étrangères” (Council of Foreign Affairs – hereafter cae) composed of a president, three councillors, and a secretary (15 September 1715). One week later, no longer with a department, Torcy resigned as secretary of state, although he did serve on the Regency Council.53 This change affords the historian rare and explicit information about his department’s organization and operation. A memoir dated 18 September drafted for the regent and his advisors by Antoine Pecquet, premier commis and department veteran appointed secretary of the new cae,



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addressed the problem of how exactly to implement the new councils, since the laws establishing them offered little guidance.54 With one eye on what had worked in the past and the other on the unknown future, he raised a series of specific issues and suggested how to guarantee continuity under what in theory was essentially a plural department executive. The most pressing concern was communication between the new government and its envoys abroad.55 If the war department was primarily about directing troops and the navy about the deployment of war vessels, then the foreign ministry’s front-line assets were its diplomatic personnel deployed abroad. These diplomats not only shaped the initial context within which the military operated, they also worked throughout a war to maximize successes and minimize failures on the battlefield and at sea during ongoing negotiations to wring the utmost advantage from an amalgam of circumstances and interests to fashion a peace pleasing to their master. Pecquet noted that previously ambassadorial dispatches had been addressed to the king, while replies were sent out in his name, signed in his name, and countersigned by Torcy. Since past regencies had followed this practice because they acted in the name of the monarch, he saw no reason for change. He did recommend, however, that the cae’s secretary (that is, himself) be granted a dispensation to draw up, sign, and seal royal orders until he could acquire the requisite charge of secretary of the king and that a circular letter be sent abroad without delay to inform envoys and other correspondents of these changes and the proper letter formats.56 The memoir betrays an insider’s viewpoint when it lists the matters the cae would discuss prior to President Huxelles’s reporting its deliberations to the larger Regency Council. Since the business of diplomacy often did not produce issues for discussion, such as those concerning alliances or the ways of avoiding commitments, he recommended that the cae meet only three times per week to read dispatches and to formulate responses to those not referred up to the Regency Council.57 At this point the wily bureaucrat did not yet draw the obvious implication: routine matters, which accounted for the bulk of the department’s work, would be managed without the cae by the department’s clerks – a policy that undoubtedly reflected the practice under Torcy, where most matters rarely went before the Conseil. After obtaining a decision from the regent or Regency Council concerning an incoming dispatch, Pecquet suggested that Huxelles or a clerk draft a response to be read at the next cae meeting, recorded in its register, and finally sent out. Because

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c­ ertain responses could not remain unsent until these meetings, however, Pecquet urged that Huxelles be permitted to send them out and then read a copy at the next cae meeting, thus allowing the president, and by implication his staff, latitude similar to that enjoyed by Torcy vis-àvis the Conseil through his direct work (la liasse – literally the bundle of papers a minister carried) with Louis XIV. Also, surely in imitation of Louisquatorzian practice, Huxelles could work directly with the regent, bypassing the cae and merely informing it of any decisions based on secret advice while withholding the advice itself or at least its source.58 While not as costly as waging war, projecting power through diplomacy nonetheless required ready cash or credit that was often disbursed in secret. Pecquet was anxious to maintain a liquid fund and establish procedures to sustain the financial flow for the department’s work, especially the continued use of “ordonnances au porteur” (orders to pay to the bearer) issued to unnamed recipients.59 The next two sections of the memoir offer a revealing contrast between what Pecquet termed the “ordre” (procedures) of council meetings and those of the department’s “ordre du travail intérieur” (inner working). Since councils were the organizing principle and governing bodies of the Regency, he naturally began with the cae’s meetings. Although he deferentially noted that it was for the aristocratic councillors to arrange the sessions according to their schedules, he did specify that sessions be scheduled so that there would be at least twenty-four hours before the next meeting of the Regency Council. This was so that the cae’s decisions and reasoning could be rendered into proper written form by the department’s staff. It was in this daily “inner working” that the department’s technical and vital toil transpired, and this was clearly the realm of the clerks. Incoming dispatches, he insisted, even though addressed to the king or his cae, must be opened upon arrival each morning and afternoon for any necessary decoding and translating before extracts could be made of their contents. Since opening correspondence could not wait for the thrice weekly cae sessions, the specialists, either alongside the president or in his stead, had to assume this fundamental role, initially sorting diplomatic business into what was routine and what had to go before the cae.60 Torcy, of course, had closely supervised this, as he was the sole secretary and continuously involved in department work with a staff that served at his sufferance. Huxelles, however, while council president, was nonetheless somewhat distanced from his clerks because they served under the regent-appointed council secretary. In any event, he ended up leaving it to Pecquet to open the dispatches.61



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Pecquet identified other important functions exercised directly by Torcy. As secretary of state and head of the post office, Torcy initially sorted through anonymous letters to the king, deciding which merited being forwarded to which minister and which anonymous denunciations of alleged abuses of power warranted investigation. With Torcy retaining the post office, would the cae now have to take on this task if other provisions were not made? As to the bimonthly audiences with foreign envoys, the cae had to arrange to hear the Parisian diplomatic community’s frequent complaints and requests, especially so that those requiring further clarification or redress outside the department could, after the clerks prepared proper documentation, be forwarded to the appropriate council. Pecquet particularly cautioned against responding to foreign envoys in writing, a greater peril now, he noted archly, due to the increased numbers at the department’s helm. Foreign diplomats had long advocated this practice, but Pecquet insisted that since political maxims were subject to frequent change, there was no need to hand foreign diplomats a written record of them as a weapon against future French interests.62 Pecquet ended his reflections on the numerous and daunting tasks before the new councillors by finally stating what he had thus far only implied. Accomplishing these numerous technical tasks in a timely manner so that the cae could satisfy the regent and Regency Council, he warned, would require a rather large number of commis.63 Those unfamiliar with this administrative work – by implication the aristocratic councillors themselves – were insufficient to the task. In the unsettling transition from Louisquatorzian rule to that of a nephew long critical of his uncle’s system, Pecquet was likely uncertain of how far the regent’s administrative housecleaning would reach, but taking his own retention as a positive sign of his respect for trained technicians, he stressed that Torcy had formed a skilled and honest corps of bureaucrats. Pushing his point further, he asserted that the difficult times ahead required their conservation for reasons of efficiency and the security of state secrets.64 If not motivated at least in part by loyalty to his departmental colleagues, Pecquet undoubtedly knew that his own survival as the cae’s secretary depended on salvaging as much of the procedures and personnel of Torcy’s efficient department as possible even as he adapted it to the new conciliar system. The Pecquet memoir of 26 September 1715 shifts from rehearsing the reasons for continuing or adapting particular measures to spelling them out. He claimed that all of the new council’s “mechanique” ­(mechanism) could be reduced to five functions: weekly diplomatic audiences, the

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manner of writing to French envoys and receiving their letters, the secure deposit of departmental papers for ready access by the cae, the safekeeping of codes, and the choice of commis.65 While these five functions are useful pointers to at least some of the primary tasks of the foreign office’s executive, they still fail to give a full sense of the work Torcy had performed,66 the inner workings, and the internal organization of the department under Torcy. The importance of Pecquet, his fellow commis, and the organizational and procedural principles he outlined in these memoirs to the preservation of Torcy’s administrative legacy is underlined by the fact that the foreign office not only lost its secretary of state, it was physically displaced as well. When the court and government abandoned Versailles for Paris, the departments of state did likewise, vacating quarters they had occupied for nearly a half century. The cae met in the Louvre on Monday and Friday mornings, and its bureaus relocated to Pecquet’s residence on rue Neuve des Petits-Champs, not far from Torcy’s former residence.67 This only served to strengthen the function of premier commis as the chief “bonding agent,” one that held the department together as a bundle of bureaucratic attitudes and practices even as its spatial dimensions were in flux.

“I n n e r W o r k in g ” : C o n t e xts of Ti me and Space The Polysynod is unique among ancien régime government institutions because throughout its three years of existence its daily operations are revealed in the minutes of all its councils, with the exception of the cae, for which none were kept for secrecy’s sake.68 We are thus otherwise largely dependent for such information on personal journals and memoirs, both of which are open to criticism and may be used only with care. Torcy’s richly detailed and reliable secret Journal has proven indispensable for understanding the inner workings of Louis XIV’s Conseil because it situates its sessions in time and space, reports debates, and provides context, but it covers only a year and a half (6 November 1709 through 29 May 1711)69 and is mostly silent on the administrative routine of his bureaus. For that, a clerk’s journal or memoir would likely provide a richer yield, but alas, none has surfaced.70 The foreign ministry’s archives for Torcy’s tenure consist mainly of official papers or private papers of personages loftier than clerks, although clerks make occasional appearances.71 Sometimes a more sustained correspondence is preserved when a diplomat, his staff member, or some other i­ndividual



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friendly to France wrote regularly to the premier commis who supervised communications with the country where he was.72 Ambassadors might also have had a personal and private correspondence with clerks in the central bureaus who were their particular friends, but if we have any of these letters, they are typically in private collections. Perhaps the clerk was loath to include them in the official correspondence because diplomats often opened up to them more than they would to the minister and especially to the king.73 Such personal missives may also be found in the papers of those outside the bureaus who interacted professionally and personally with foreign office clerks.74 Colonel N ­ athaniel Hooke, Irishman, Catholic convert from Protestantism, and Jacobite from 1688, became a French national and acquired a colonel’s commission with Torcy’s help in 1703. Hooke was a skilled soldier and, as he called himself, an “officer-negotiator,” as well as on occasion a secret agent. Largely dependent on Torcy as his patron, he offered the secretary a valuable set of eyes at the battle front, although this did not win him the war minister’s affection. His papers preserve a precious sampling of his correspondence with two of Torcy’s commis. While attention is typically given only to letters to and from Torcy, other French ministers, and an array of important Jacobites, Hooke’s correspondence with the commis provides a glimpse of the department’s inner working between 1704 and 1707.75 On a presumably cold morning in early January 1704, Hooke’s lackey set out from the Stuart court at Saint-Germain bearing Torcy a letter and Pecquet a note of transmission, but he was uncertain as to where he would find them. He was to go first to Marly, the most likely location and only two and one-half miles away, but if they were not there, then he was to proceed to Versailles, approximately five miles further.76 Although both were in fact with the king at Marly, Hooke received a response only four days later with Pecquet’s apology that it would have come earlier had he had an opportunity.77 In another informal note later that spring, Hooke asked that Pecquet allow him to call him his very dear friend and then begged him in that capacity to reply immediately to the attached letter to Torcy while his lackey waited.78 Pecquet wrote back without delay the surely unwelcome report that Torcy had read the letters from Hooke and James Drummond, 1st Duke of Perth, that had arrived as he was departing for Paris and thus had instructed Pecquet to write that he would make no reply. Pecquet complied but, after effusive thanks for Hooke’s offer of friendship, insisted that he had done his best to secure the desired replies and added further that Torcy had not indicated when or even if he might respond.79

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The early summer of 1705 was a busy one for Hooke as he prepared for a secret mission to the Scottish Jacobites about a possible invasion the following year.80 Chevreuse, who was close to Louis XIV, a Jacobite champion, and one of Hooke’s patrons, wrote to him at Saint-Germain from Versailles on 19 June that all the necessary documents for his mission were now ready. If his health permitted, he urged him to go to Paris that day after dinner and seek out premier commis Clair Adam, who was coordinating the paperwork and had copies for him. Chevreuse helpfully added that while in the capital Adam might lodge at the Hôtel Croissy or at least nearby and that in any case the Hôtel Croissy’s staff could point him in the right direction. If he needed to see Torcy directly, the minister would return from Paris the following morning, whereas Adam would remain in the capital for some days. Hooke replied immediately, probably by the same messenger, that he was leaving for Paris right away, but since he doubted that he would see Torcy there, he asked the duke to deliver the enclosed letter from Charles Middleton, 2nd Earl of Middleton, to the minister the next day. In addition, Hooke asked Chevreuse to request that Torcy apply to the Sunday session of the Conseil for three blank passports for Scottish vessels to be used for his return, any agent he might send, or his dispatches.81 Yet obtaining these passports proved difficult. A note from Adam on 5 July informed Hooke of a new snag. Rather than explaining it himself, Adam sent along letters he had just received from Pecquet, but he assured the anxious agent that the passports should be ready that evening and advised him to send his lackey back again the next morning. Adam also gave Hooke’s messenger a packet freshly arrived from Antwerp addressed to Torcy, but then added a postscript explaining that after opening it, he was returning it to the sender because the letters of exchange it contained were flawed. Unable to conceal his impatience with this delay, Hooke nonetheless expressed his pleasure at hearing that Adam’s ailing son was better and thanked him for sparing him an embarrassment by his wise handling of the Antwerp packet. He also returned to his earlier passport proposition intended to facilitate his mission, still regarding it as neither extraordinary nor unreasonable. Nonetheless, he offered to drop it if Adam thought it out of line and closed with further solicitation on behalf of young Adam’s health and with compliments to Mme Adam.82 Both the foreign office and the war department had contributed to this frustrating delay. Pecquet’s forwarded note explained that the requested passport modification permitting Hooke to bring into France the same goods as allowed during peacetime was not only without precedent and



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inappropriate, but would by its very latitude give away Hooke’s mission. Pecquet warned Hooke not to insist upon such passports, but closed with more than perfunctory assurances of friendship and good wishes for his mission.83 Adam also forwarded Pecquet’s note to him saying that the passports were enclosed, along with an explanatory note for Hooke, which Pecquet left to Adam’s discretion whether to share with the colonel or not. Pecquet also assured Adam that he would always defer to him as the master on this as on other occasions. Following words of concern for his son’s health, Pecquet reminded his senior colleague to fill in the names on the passports, assuring him that only his current state of worry about his son accounted for what might otherwise be taken as a slight against Adam’s usual precision. Just as he was about to send this packet to Adam at Versailles, Pecquet was interrupted by the arrival of a messenger from navy department premier commis Joseph de La Touche informing him that he also needed to examine and approve Hooke’s passports. Frustrated by this new holdup, Pecquet rerouted the passports to La Touche, urging him to process them quickly, so that they could then be forwarded to the war office for further action, and left it to Adam either to send back the messenger boy (“garçon”) who awaited the passports or keep him there.84 As the long day of exchanged notes, notices of further delays, and denied requests drew to a close, Hooke replied to Pecquet’s notes to Adam and to himself by assuring Pecquet that while unconvinced that his earlier passport requests were unwise, he bowed to Pecquet’s judgment. Anxious to lay his hands on the documents first thing the next morning for a Monday departure, Hooke requested that his messenger remain the night at Versailles.85 The passports were forthcoming the next morning, along with another note from Adam updating Hooke on his son’s health and sharing the frank fatherly confession that this greatly afflicted him. Adam added that rather than repeating the reasons advanced against Hooke’s passport proposition, he would only say that since the objections applied just to Dunkirk, he was enclosing two of the desired passports with exemptions for Calais, two for Nantes, and two for La Rochelle. He closed with mutual compliments between their wives and wishes for a good trip and return as Hooke embarked on his dangerous mission.86 With the passport difficulties resolved, Hooke hurried on Tuesday to Dunkirk, where he found the ship ready and in the harbour with a favourable wind, but no news from Antwerp of his letters of exchange. Disappointed at this new hindrance, he ventured from the lodgings where he was hiding for fear of being recognized to speak with the local

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maitre de poste. When the evening mail produced nothing, he wrote Torcy and Adam separately to share his concerns and await new orders. He also begged the premier commis to speak to Torcy on his behalf. That same day, using a pseudonym, Hooke wrote to the Antwerp postmaster for his help in expediting the desired packet, referring to the orders the postmaster must have received from Torcy and Adam.87 Two days later the bills of exchange for 12,000 livres finally arrived, but not without a new predicament: both were endorsed by the Paris banker who had obtained them for him, whereas he had not wanted them to be traceable to France. Rather than further delay his departure, he decided to send them back from Scotland if they needed to be redone.88 He finally landed in Scotland on 8 August for secret negotiations with various Jacobites and returned to France on 18 September. Torcy read his findings to the Conseil on 19 October where they fed hopes for a possible Scottish landing during next year’s campaign. Thereafter, Pecquet coordinated an elaborate clandestine communications link between Hooke and his cross-Channel contacts by means of Antwerp postmaster Le Fevre. The ever-helpful premier commis also arranged lodgings for Hooke nearby, presumably in the city of Versailles, so that Hooke could stay close to the ongoing planning. Hopes for an expedition, however, grew increasingly forlorn in the following months, as no emissaries from Scotland appeared in France, and so invasion plans were eventually shelved.89 André Holenstein has observed that state-building and “intensifying communication” fed off one another and resulted in the “introduction of new administrative procedures and techniques and the emergence of new media and channels of communication between centres and localities.”90 Thus, the notes exchanged among those below the ministerial level offer insights into the operations that oiled and turned the machinery of diplomacy at the centre and as it reached abroad. Although the king and the state apparatus were located at Versailles, monarch, ministers, and select staff relocated frequently to the nearby Trianon or to Marly, annually to Fontainebleau (approximately six weeks every autumn), and occasionally but briefly to other locations. Paris and particularly the Hôtel Croissy was the other hub of diplomatic business. It was there that Torcy received the foreign diplomatic community once or more per month. The Hôtel des Ambassadeurs, a residence provided by the king for visiting dignitaries, and the dwellings of resident diplomats were also there. Postal routes converged on Paris and its central post office. The ­premier commis often had a Paris residence. A secretary and commis might work with the minister from Paris for a day or so at



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a time, and Adam, who was also intendant of Torcy’s household, frequently had business that detained him there after Torcy’s departure. As Chevreuse informed Hooke, the Hôtel Croissy’s staff – most likely the Suisse – would know the whereabouts of any department personnel who happened to be in the capital.91 Ministers, clerks, and messengers frequently traversed the VersaillesMarly-Paris communication triangle. The two palaces, not quite four and one-half miles apart (all these distances are as the crow flies), were each almost eleven miles from Torcy’s Paris residence in the western suburbs. When the court resided at Fontainebleau, two sides of this triangle lengthened to almost forty miles. For Jacobite affairs, one of Torcy’s responsibilities, the basic triangle stretched to include Saint-Germain, a little over two miles further along the road from Marly, not quite seven miles from Versailles and some eleven miles from Paris (since the ­Stuarts accompanied the court to Fontainebleau, this trip actually increased their proximity to the king). The five notes that passed among Hooke, Adam, and Pecquet on 4 July 1705 spanned that whole day, a Saturday, and moved along this triangle as lackeys hastened between Hooke at Saint-Germain, Adam at Versailles, and the Trianon, where Torcy and Pecquet were in attendance upon the king.92 These notes and all the others that must have gone out that day for other business required numerous lackeys to carry them and to wait for replies, as well as plentiful horses at the ready to bear them along these well-traveled highways. When a personage of importance, including a premier commis, made the journey in person, he traveled by horse-drawn vehicle, which required additional horses and personnel.93 Moreover, delays and crossed communications were multiplied by the fact that someone at any one of the triangle’s corners could not always be certain at which other corner the party he sought might be at any given moment.94 The same is seen in a February 1697 Saturday morning note from Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil, who had yet to depart for Ryswick. Adam, who Torcy had working on the plenipotentiaries’ lengthy instructions, had been told to show them to Harlay-Bonneuil before his Sunday audience with the king. The busy commis wrote that rather than taking the chance of calling on him and not finding him at home, he hoped Harlay-Bonneuil would set a time for their meeting. Better still, if he happened to be in the neighbourhood and dropped by, Adam would gladly receive him, since it would spare him the loss of valuable time.95 This old practice of clerks often ­working from their residences added yet another extension to the communication triangle.96

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As Hooke demonstrated, one made use of whatever means were available to get messages delivered in a timely manner. Sending a letter to Torcy by way of Chevreuse, who would see the minister at Versailles, was a way to elevate its importance. Even before transportation and communication accelerated to speeds more familiar today, Hooke’s wait on a single day for needed documents drove him to despair. In addition, as witnessed that day, the flow of communications was ongoing. Adam amended his note to Hooke after he opened the Antwerp packet. ­Pecquet’s earlier note to Adam, meant to accompany the passports, was sent without them but with a postscript explaining their rerouting to the war department. Even the morning note that P ­ ecquet penned for Hooke had the addition of an afternoon afterthought explaining the delay of his lackey. What emerges from this perhaps not untypical day is an amount of flux that might not fit our preconceived notions of the more leisurely pace of early modern affairs. The geographic separation of bureaucratic actors at the centre, even if as slight as the mile between Versailles and the Trianon or the space between one desk and another in the same room, multiplied the production and flow of “lower level” pieces of paper. By means of writing, members of the same bureaucracy shaped and transmitted the “higher level” documents that most typically survive in the archives. Even short distances such as from one’s bureau to a council chamber within the same palace complex required notes to prompt one’s memory for a presentation or for its recollection as a basis for the more formal writing that usually resulted, such as a “cleaner” summary or a letter.97 Time went hand in glove with distance in a more obvious manner in the era before instantaneous communication and therefore contributed to the need for note-taking. When hurried, Torcy used the back of the letters he was carrying to scribble unrelated notes from unplanned and informal conversations he had had with individual diplomats. Or he might write random thoughts or reminders to himself.98 Such notes that were part of the production process of a bureau, especially if on separate paper rather than scrawled on drafts or incoming letters, were mostly discarded along the way99 or were weeded out when the higher-level end products – correspondence, copies of documents, and the like – were later assembled for preservation. The surviving stray notes from premier commis Charles Mignon’s archives betray their ephemeral nature by the way they were dated: “Thursday morning,” “Saturday evening,” and “this 15th.” This suggests that this was sufficient for their intended short existence.100 Official correspondence intended for preservation was usually more



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c­ arefully dated. Even though the type of intra- or inter-office writing seen in Hooke’s and Mignon’s papers rarely makes it into the historical record, it nonetheless played an essential role in producing, revising, assembling, transmitting, receiving, processing, and storing those writings that did. Scholars like Robert Darnton have “employed the notion of ‘information society’ … as a way of moving away from the history of the book to the history of communication.”101 Likewise, Filippo de Vivo moves the study of state communication beyond formal documents to embrace the fuller range of surviving oral, manuscript, and printed communication.102 Thus, the state archives today may largely contain the formal but nonetheless incomplete record of department communication.103 As with Hooke’s passports, inter-ministerial cooperation could further complicate coordination and multiply the requisite writing, lackeys, and horses. The additional complexity of Paris bankers arranging letters of exchange from Antwerp and their intended recipient relocating from the Paris region to Dunkirk in hiding under an assumed name to collect his mail suggests the sophisticated planning and organization required of the foreign office staff. That Torcy also headed the post office clearly extended the grasp of these planners at the centre, as witnessed by the ongoing collaboration with postmasters at Dunkirk and Antwerp.104 The notes exchanged that July day say something as well about specialization within the department and relationships among its clerks. Pecquet handled the passports, perhaps because as head of the first political bureau he had charge of English affairs or because he was the premier commis at Torcy’s side at that moment. Yet Pecquet apparently acted largely on his own in denying Hooke’s passport exception. In neither his note to Hooke nor this note to Adam did Pecquet invoke Torcy to justify or add authority to his refusal, and when the colonel grudgingly submitted, he acknowledged that it was to Pecquet’s judgment that he did so, without any mention of Torcy. A premier commis was empowered to open the minister’s sensitive mail and redirect it. He also enjoyed much latitude in making decisions and thereby insulating the minister from unnecessary work.105 When Hooke later asked Pecquet to deliver a letter to Torcy, the premier commis replied four days later in an amiable letter containing friendly banter about family that “le Seigneur” (the lord, i.e., Torcy) was working but that he would give the missive to him when he was able.106 This door-keeping by the minister’s senior staff was a significant consideration for any would-be supplicant. While we need not doubt the sincerity of Hooke’s sentiments for Adam’s family, Hooke was prudent to cultivate a person who controlled access

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to the ­powerful minister. When someone wrote to a minister, he was wise to write as well to his premier commis, as Hooke did, entreating Adam to add his voice to his letter alerting Torcy to the seriousness of the missing letters of exchange.107 While Adam’s specialty appears to have been letters of exchange and codes,108 his position was enhanced by other factors. A department veteran before Croissy became minister, Adam served as Torcy’s household intendant. In 1705 he was probably in his mid-­fifties or mid-sixties and thus Pecquet’s senior in age as well as experience. This explains Pecquet’s deference to Adam in the matter of passports even though Hooke’s mission fell under Pecquet’s bureau. The dynamics were imprecise. Perhaps Adam backed his younger colleague’s decision for form’s sake and collegial solidarity. Yet he gave Hooke the desired passports for other ports and, with the collusion of Dunkirk’s intendant, circumvented Pecquet’s ruling. While evidence is lacking, it is possible that Adam even arranged or encouraged the intendant’s wink and nod at the rules.109 That Saturday of 4 July was stressful because Hooke not only saw the days passing, he heard the clock ticking. Although one might suppose the clock-dominated office to be a creation of the Industrial Revolution, the daily schedule of the foreign office was in fact fairly tightly bound to exact measurements of time. Louis XIV promoted advances in timekeeping technology in the 1670s that made clocks more accurate and allowed them to be miniaturized to a personal and portable scale as watches.110 Those who could afford watches would experience time not “as a continuous movement” but as “an experience of discontinuity.”111 Time for this steadily growing minority would henceforth be marked in minutes, as experienced at Louis XIV’s court where time was highly structured.112 That relentless ticking also structured the activities of the foreign office clerks as they worked toward an unending succession of deadlines.113 The rhythm of council meetings required that they prepare beforehand the dispatches (by deciphering them), drafts of letters, memoirs, and other papers Torcy would bundle into a portfolio (liasse) to carry with him into meetings with the ever-punctual monarch.114 Pecquet’s 1715 memoir specified at least one day if possible to move letters and memoirs from draft to final form before the clock chimed for their presentation to the Regency Council.115 Louis XIV’s Conseil, where foreign policy and other great matters of state were discussed, normally met twice per week on Sunday and Wednesday mornings in sessions usually lasting from 9:45 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. It might reconvene once more during the week on a Monday, Thursday, or Friday morning if needed, as was sometimes



The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

161

the case during a time of intense negotiations.116 Discussions of domestic matters and the disposition of petitions took place in Dispatches, which by Torcy’s day had ceased meeting twice per week, instead convening on Monday mornings every other week or once monthly.117 While the clerks could generally count on a fairly steady Sunday-Monday-Wednesday timetable, the possibility of further sessions to complete unfinished business or deal with a courier galloping in with pressing news kept them ever alert and ready to scramble.118 Of course, there was little to discuss at some meetings because the couriers were delayed.119 Then there were deadlines for inserting items in or reading over the contents of the Gazette prior to its printing on Fridays and into the night before its Paris distribution on Saturday mornings.120 Clearly, newspapers and pocket watches played crucial roles “in the development of the modern sense of time … as regular, linear, and predictable.”121 As Kenneth J. Banks has ably demonstrated for the navy ministry’s Atlantic colonies, the “infrastructure and coordination required to send the king’s word overseas could be extraordinarily complicated.”122 The foreign office faced a similar challenge but with its own distinct issues.123 Whereas great distances and local climate limited (although not as much as formerly imagined) the frequency of contact between the navy ministry and its New World colonies, the scale of communications in Europe was by comparison much smaller and the land connections more developed. This both allowed, indeed required, more-frequent contact between the foreign office and its embassies. While Quebec was inaccessible by water for at least six months owing to ice, the Baltic Sea only rarely froze completely (1703 and 1708 saw ice in the Danish Straits). Although France’s links to her Atlantic colonies began with land transport in Europe and involved some land transport in the Americas as well, these links were nonetheless mostly by water. The foreign office’s links to other countries, however, were much more dependent upon land routes. Of the water routes, Constantinople required the longest voyage,124 whereas crossing the English Channel, while not always easy or fast, still took less time. Scandinavia, although optimally more quickly reached by sea, was still accessible largely by land. Mountainous regions like the Alps at times proved treacherous, and places like Poland and Spain seemed endlessly distant.125 Yet Rome, for example, could be reached by ship from Marseille to Leghorn or by overland routes through Savoy. Such multiple combinations of land and sea routes to most destinations permitted sending several messages by diverse paths.126 Managing such widely dispersed communication networks required current information on local

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conditions along their various strands and careful planning, coordination, and an eye constantly on the calendar and clock. The department apparently maintained a day-by-day list of the arrival and departure of couriers as well as a listing of foreign cities whose couriers departed and arrived on a regular schedule.127 The minister and his clerks had handy, in memory or on paper, logistical data such as average travel times for regular couriers on various circuits, always subject, of course, to a variety of mishaps.128 Not all ordinary couriers shared the same arrival-­departure timetable: some were scheduled for several times per week, while others for only once per week.129 Ambassadors might also, at greater risk, send dispatches with the diplomatic couriers of other states.130 In addition, postal couriers had a regular schedule between Paris, the court, and the satellite ministerial residences surrounding Paris.131 Unquestionably, the foreign office’s clerks had “an existence structured in time by the activities of receiving and sending mail.”132 Rather than a linear, chronological sequence of letters and their replies, segments of correspondence often crossed or even vanished through the vicissitudes of travel.133 Replies from the centre often awaited information or decisions from other locations before being formulated and dispatched. Even before the telegraph and later technology hyper-­accelerated the pace of communication, Torcy’s bureau had to function in a timely and precise fashion to process and coordinate all the correspondence from its embassies.134 During the interwar partition treaty negotiations, London-Paris-Madrid was the crucial axis, but ­Portugal, Savoy, and Rome were also significant information sources and part of French calculations, as were more distant points such as ­Venice, Europe’s ear to the Levant, and Constantinople, a listening post with an even greater range. Synchronization was particularly critical when both ­Tallard in London and Portland in Paris transmitted talking points between Louis XIV and William III. To ensure that the same propositions were being advanced in both locations, Torcy’s clerks compared what Tallard wrote from London with what the French ministers heard at Versailles to see if they conveyed the same sense of William’s negotiating position.135 Shortened communication times could present a different set of problems for a negotiation. William III’s move across the Channel to his continental residence at Loo reduced courier travel time to Versailles, but also put him in closer contact with Heinsius in The Hague, affording the latter’s suspicions of France greater influence.136 To o ­ ptimize the communication flow, Torcy’s clerks drew on diplomatic personnel abroad or returned home for details of the events on each court’s calendar that might complicate the ebb



The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

163

and flow of diplomatic business, including holidays, the prince’s seasonal movements (for instance, to hunting retreats), and meetings of important bodies, such as the Dutch States-General or Britain’s Parliament.137 Torcy and his staff heard the clock ticking as they deciphered incoming dispatches, read and digested them, and shared them with the king and his Conseil.138 Next they formulated, drafted, and presented responses embodying a multiplicity of shifting factors, including council discussions and royal decisions. Then they revised drafts, put them in final form (which might involve encoding them) for Torcy to read to the king in the evening for final approval, and then, if no further revisions were required, they sent them off in the morning.139 Of course, any finished dispatch before being whisked away was still subject to last-minute amendment, revision, or suppression depending upon the arrival of fresh information or a sudden change of policy.140 As they shuffled all these papers, Torcy and his staff tried to maintain an accurate sense of the place of these letters and their contents in time and space.141 For instance, any received dispatch was already outdated, providing a sense of the situation at its point of origin while it might well have become somewhat or radically altered by the time it was read. Responses were always formulated on the basis of news they knew to be out of date, or if from as far away as the Levant, downright stale. Likewise, the responses and orders emanating from the centre often arrived at their destination being outdated due to changing circumstances both there and in France.142 Yet except for situations where decision-makers met face to face and had no need to consult others at a distance – which often created its own set of problems, such as a lack of “time for reflection and consultation”143 – this ever-present time lag was a fact of life factored into diplomatic calculations. Although instantaneous communication with the department’s embassies was not possible, those at the centre nonetheless knew that delays could make the difference between success and failure. Diplomats abroad were likewise aware of the element of time, as when an envoy wrote apologetically to Torcy that he was scandalized because his new secretary had overlooked a letter from the king, delaying his reply.144 Worse than delays, which were inevitable, was the element of unpredictability: one never really knew when messages would arrive or be received.145 Those rulers who personally took to the battlefield added further increments of time and space, but when, like the mercurial Charles XII of Sweden, they did not ­typically permit diplomats to accompany them, the complications grew.146 The foreign office thus operated under circumstances where messages moved relatively slowly but

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55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 1711 1712 1713

Jan. 20 15 26

Feb. 18 55 22

Mar. 15 36 27

Apr. 31 24 32

May 17 27 26

June 18 24 23

July 22 26 17

Aug. 9 24 21

Sept. 12 29 27

Oct. 14 22 22

Nov. 16 24 7

Dec. 14 26

Figure 4.2 Royal dispatches sent out by the first political bureau per month, 1711–1713. The first political bureau had responsibility for England, Holland, Spain, Portugal, the Swiss, and Italy.

where initiating that movement nevertheless required swift action. The leisurely part, if it can be called that, was not in making the response but in awaiting its result, which surely demanded great patience. The foreign office was organized into a number of bureaus to deal with diplomatic and domestic administration, and each processed a flow of incoming and outgoing paperwork that could be steady and substantial or could come at intervals, but all requiring timely processing. Foreign correspondence was roughly divided between two political bureaus (Spain, Portugal, Britain, Holland, the Swiss Cantons, and Italy were in the first, while Lorraine, the Holy Roman Empire, its member states, Scandinavia, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire were in the second). During the years 1711–13 the first political bureau expedited on average one dispatch from the king every day or every other day (figure 4.2).147 ­During the ten years Iberville was Geneva resident, for example, he sent Torcy and his father 524 letters – an average of one per week – and received 389 from them.148 But these figures understate the actual volume of ­correspondence. Rémi



The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

165

Figure 4.3 Number of folios of domestic expeditions per year, 1681–1715 (with trend line)

Mathis differentiates four types of outgoing correspondence: the king’s dispatches, the secretary’s dispatches, the secretary’s personal letters, and various commis’ letters. Only those dispatches from the king and secretary, he notes, are in the foreign archives.149 This was also largely true under Torcy. Further, any paperwork entering and exiting the bureaus deemed worthy of leaving a formal paper trail was painstakingly organized, copied, entered, or preserved in draft form into various specialized registries. For example, the most basic series for domestic administration were the volumes of “expéditions” (outgoing items) that joined the separate “minutes” (drafts) of every paper sent out by the department.150 A year’s expéditions could be divided among two to nine volumes, with the average number during Croissy’s tenure nearly doubling under Torcy. Either before or after binding, each volume received an alphabetical table of contents.151 Some sense of the annual volume of domestic paperwork comes from the crude measure of the total number of folios contained in these ­volumes (figure 4.3). The major rise during the second half of the

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1680s is likely connected with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, while the increases from1698 reflect the shift of focus to domestic matters after Ryswick. The decline after 1702 may be due to the widening of the war that had begun the previous year, affording less time for d ­ omestic matters, but the reason for the 1704 spike is unclear. Despite annual fluctuations, the trend is plain: Torcy’s bureaus were normally producing almost double the amount of paperwork Croissy’s had. From these volumes of annual expéditions the foreign ministry’s clerks created a variety of lists. As humble as mere lists may appear among the products of the pen, they were likely at the very origin of writing and have always functioned as powerful instruments of administration because they “do not communicate, they control transfer operations … The individual items are not put down in writing for the sake of memorizing spoken words, but in order to regulate goods, things, or people. Lists sort and engender circulation.”152 For example, among the lists the foreign office compiled were those for payment orders, in effect controlling to whom, where, and for what purposes department funds went.153 Another list records merely the date and addressee of dispatches and letters from the king, certainly of all the papers issuing from Torcy’s bureaus those most intent upon and likely to regulate the behaviour of their recipients!154 When the king met with Dispatches, each secretary of state had to present him with a listing of the outgoing items countersigned (“Mémoire des expéditions contresignées”) in his department since the last session. Each department had designated for this task at least one premier commis who was also a secretary of the king. The memoirs from Torcy’s department were chronological listings of type (e.g., brevet, dépêche du Roy), recipient, and date (table 4.1), whereas those from Pontchartrain and Voysin did not list specific dates.155 Boislisle claims that while this system kept the king informed of what was signed in his name, each secretary of state remained in ignorance of what the others were authorizing.156 However, each secretary apparently also received copies of the lists presented to the king, and in Torcy’s case he had these bound together in separate volumes so that he had a running account of everything sent out by his colleagues.157 Thus, if the frequency of Dispatches meetings declined over time, the council nonetheless maintained its coordinating role for domestic administration. It would assemble in the king’s presence when difficult issues had to be sorted out, but even when not meeting frequently, its members kept abreast of one another’s activities through the periodic distribution of the lists of outgoing items

Table 4.1 Report of sent items countersigned by Torcy, March–May 1710 Type of Item Sent Acquit patent Arrêt Brevet Commission Confirmation de noblesse Confirmation des statuts Congé Déclaration Dépêche du Roy Dispense d’âge Dispense de grade Dispense de parenté Édit Expéditions pour la tenue des États Gouvernement héréditaire [Provisions de] Lettre de cachet Lettre du Roy Lettres d’attache Lettres d’état Lettres d’intermediat3 Lettres de réhabilitation Lettres patentes Naturalité [Lettres de] Ordonnance Ordonnance [de payement] Ordonnance de vacations Ordonnance de voyage Ordre Passeport Permission4 Ratification Relief de noblesse Rémission Renouvellement de pouvoir Total Items Sent

17 March–28 April1

28 April–19 May2

5 5 7 14 0 0 2 4 28 4 1 1 2 0 1 0 3 2 2 1 1 2 5 1 68 1 6 5 208 2 1 1 1 0 384

0 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 14 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 2 0 66 2 0 0 0 2 140

Source: aae md 1168, fols 109–30 and 169–77v, “Mémoire des expéditions contresignées par Mr de Torcy,” March–May 1710.

1 The beginning and ending dates for these lists are the dates of Monday meetings of the Council of Dispatches. Dangeau, Journal, 13:126, 148, 161. 2 These two periods are not equal in number of days, since the first covers six weeks and the second three weeks. 3 “Lettres d’intermediat, Qui sont des lettres que le Roy accorde pour joüir des gages d’un office depuis la mort du titulaire jusques à ce que le successeur soit pourvû.” daf, s.v. “Lettres d’intermediat.” 4 aae md 1062, fol. 16, is an example of a permission from 9 July 1699, granting the president of the Parlement of Dauphiné permission to travel to Rome for a year.

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c­ ountersigned. If these reports raised any questions, a secretary could easily contact his colleague. Indeed, even though the ministries were in fairly close proximity to one another at Versailles, papers streamed back and forth among the various departments of state as items or extracts from each were forwarded to or inquiries made of the other departments.158 Depending on the form a piece of paperwork was to take, clerks had to factor in the steps involved in producing it when preparing to meet deadlines.159 Letters and other documents bearing the monarch’s and minister’s signature required particular attention to such details as the size and weight of the paper used, even in routine foreign and domestic correspondence. This was because in the minds of Europe’s educated classes “there was no divide between words and the actions they referred to,” which meant that political meanings – concerning, for instance, power relationships – were coded into writing in forms of politeness that were fairly clear to the recipient.160 Little was left to chance. Salutations and formal closings based on the sender’s and recipient’s status were carefully spelled out.161 Woe to the naive or careless commis who disregarded the rules of protocol, for both the king and his minister were strict taskmasters! The premier commis created model letters for particular occasions to guide the copyists who put missives in their final form. In 1707, for example, when instructions went out for Te Deums to celebrate the birth of the Duke of Burgundy’s son, the 2nd Duke of Brittany, there were five separate models with appropriate alternate wording and blanks, each letter progressively shorter, for the following groups and in the necessary quantities: thirteen governors or commandants; fortysix bishops and archbishops; seven parlements; seven procurers general; and seven first presidents of the parlements. Appended were lists of governors and commandants by name and prelates by see.162 Such so-called circular letters were a commonplace of administration, with recipients varying according to subject.163 The royal government had long used printing to disseminate laws.164 Preprinted forms extended printing’s power to other tasks and were indicative of the routinization of department business. As early as 1714 the foreign office began using printed passports with blank spaces for specifics and signatures in order to standardize and expedite their issuance. The same printer’s order included forms for payment authorizations. In this as in other areas the foreign office was innovative.165 This labour-saving measure was also employed by ambassadors abroad and was especially helpful to them with their often limited staffs. Pomponne



The Department of Secretary of State Torcy

169

in Venice, for instance, in 1706 used a general form printed with his family arms and his name and titles at the top, and at the bottom in Italian, “Par Son Excelence,” with space above for his secretary to affix the abbé’s signature and his own below.166 The post office, also headed by Torcy, produced forms as well, such as one to inform maitres de poste along a particular route of the required horses and vehicles for official travelers.167 With what tools did these “pencil-pushers” (or in Britain, “pen-­ pushers”) accomplish their work? We are fortunate to have a list of office supplies ordered in Torcy’s name for delivery to the Louvre archive.168 Paper, the bureaus’ primary raw material and finished product, dominates the list: six “rames” (reams, here defined as 480 sheets each) of large and strong “papier de compte” (writing paper); six reams of “à la Telliere” (foolscap); one ream of “papier à lettres” (letter paper); two hundred large, strong quill pens; six small “canifs” (knives) for trimming the quill pens; four pieces of “ruban de fil” (tape) for binding documents together; a piece of “nonpareille” (very narrow ribbon), perhaps for the same purpose; a bushel of “poudre de buy” (boxwood sawdust) to sprinkle on ink to prevent fading; two pints of shiny ink; and two pounds of “cire d’Espagne” (Spanish wax), a composition of gum and other material used to seal letters. This order did not include the pencils whose traces are found on papers throughout the archives, usually for corrections, annotations, and routing and filing instructions. Although we know that furniture was ordered, we have no descriptions of the writing desks, tables, chairs, lamps, shelves, and storage cabinets that must have filled the bureaus at the Louvre and Versailles.169 We know little of the layout or decoration of the bureaus, although we may assume that the domestic and the two political bureaus were in separate chambers.170 The department’s Versailles library had a fireplace of green marble from the Pyrenean Campan valley.171 Perhaps there were portraits of Louis XIV and Torcy on the walls, as in the bureau of Paris maître de poste Gabriel Pigeon, who served under Torcy.172 In greater number, however, were likely utilitarian items such as maps of Europe, particular states and regions, and postal routes, as well as lists displaying summaries of information, such as postal timetables to remind the clerks of the crucial deadlines that structured their workdays.173 Who filled these bureaus and pushed their quills across the reams of paper consumed by the foreign office each year? How were these individuals and their work structured? It is to these important issues that we turn next.

5 The Department’s Structures and Personnel

Structural charts of organization are often misleading because they provide a paper image of how things are supposed to work that typically falls short of how they actually operate, a gap the modern world has thus far been unable to transcend. Charting the early modern state’s structures, however, is even more daunting. Although we have drawn up organizational charts that attempt to portray the foreign office’s structure under Louis XIV’s foreign secretaries, we do so fully aware of their limitations and perils. In the first place, they are not literal representations of formally designed and prescribed outlines of responsibilities and lines of authority, since royal legislation prescribing them was usually lacking. In truth, much of our evidence is scattered, indirect, imprecise, and incomplete, so what we propose is subject to revision in the face of new evidence and keener insights. These charts are snapshots at best: reasonably sharp in places, but fuzzy in others; uncertain as to what has been left out or cut off; ambiguous as to the moment(s) in departmental development they depict; and tentative as to typicality. This leads to a second caveat: structure remained malleable, even during Torcy’s tenure. It altered with each change of secretary, as clerks departed and were replaced or as the flow of business increased. The department was much more a matter of people to be deployed than of pigeonholes to be filled, particularly since the number of personnel remained small. Finally, those who did the department’s work and served its needs included household officers, postal personnel, and the assortment of savants, scholars, and literary figures who served as Torcy’s “brain trust,” all vital adjuncts to the department’s clerks. This diverse group constituted the VersaillesParis core that helped the foreign secretary carry out his diplomatic and administrative responsibilities.



The Department’s Structures and Personnel

171

P e rs o n n e l and Bureaus The foreign secretary relied primarily on two loosely connected yet interdependent bodies for the conduct of business at the centre: his bureaucracy and his household staff that supported it. Both were located permanently at Versailles with extensions at Torcy’s Paris residence or wherever else he might be. Strictly speaking, the “département” (department)1 consisted of the clerical staff, “garçons de bureau” (office boys), and regular consultants who served in its bureaus or at their homes, while the household embraced Torcy’s domestics, but like the royal government and royal household, Torcy’s bureaus and household functioned side by side and with some personnel holding positions and performing duties in both. Together they constituted the department in its wider sense.2 To this must be added the personnel employed in the other charges held by Torcy, such as the Royal Orders and the post office, as well as in parts of the royal household closely linked with the foreign office, such as the introducers of ambassadors, because of the essential and related services they provided. There was an essential fluidity in the department’s administrative structures, since assignment of responsibilities and supervision shifted with the arrival and departure of individuals possessing particular skills and knowledge. Likewise, the department’s focus adjusted to accommodate the changing kaleidoscope of issues, states, and other diplomatic players, as with the striking transformation in 1700 of Spain from enemy to ally, eventually necessitating a third political bureau. Even seemingly stable arrangements required ongoing revision and adjustment to accommodate altering circumstances.3 Before examining the department’s organization, however, we must first introduce its personnel. Clerks, both commis and secretaries, were the department’s foundation. Rather than specifying particular duties, the title commis emphasized one’s accountability to a superior for the charge or employment with which one had been commissioned or entrusted.4 This fits with the Weberian notion of accountability through hierarchy. A commis’s labours ranged from low-skilled copying (perhaps “the quintessentially bureaucratic act”),5 filing, more meticulous yet tedious encoding and decoding, to highly skilled translating and drafting of documents. Exact numbers for clerks are difficult to determine for lack of precise definitions and clear records, but their ranks certainly increased under Louis XIV.6 Based on a list (figure 5.1) of fifty-two full-time foreign office personnel – premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, and ­specialists (translators,

 

Foreign Secretaries Briennes

Lionne

Louvois (Interim)

1660–63 1663–71 1671

Pomponne

Colbert (Interim)

Croissy

Torcy

1671–79

1679–80 1680–96 1696–1715

Employees

Tenure

Ariste, Pierre

1658–63

P

 

 

 

 

 

 

Parayre, Jean

1658–80

x

P

P

P

P

 

 

Dalencé, Joachim

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dautiège, Jacques

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Azemart

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Boulleau, Nicolas

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Barthe

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mareiz (Marest)

1658–63

x

 

 

 

 

 

 

Du Fresne, Léonard de Mousseaux

1659–63

P

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pachau, Louis

1663–80

 

P

P

P

P

 

 

Moncheny, Louis de

1663–69

 

P

 

 

 

 

 

Luc de Rives

1663–71

 

P

 

 

 

 

 

Gaudon, Abbé Sylvain

1663–71

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Bigorre, Abbé

1663–65

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

La Pause, Louis

1663–64

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Adam, Clair

1667–1715

 

x

x

x

x

x/P

P

Morel, Abbé Jean

1670–71

 

x

 

 

 

 

 

Aubert

1671–1705

 

x

x

x

x

x

x/P

Tourmont, Pierre de

1671–80

 

 

 

P

P

 

 

Lebeau, Edme

1671–80 | 1698–1705

 

 

 

x

x

 

x

Rouillé du Coudray, Hilaire

1673–78

 

 

 

P

 

 

 

Iberville, Charles François de la Bonde d’

1678–88

 

 

 

x

x

x

 

Mignon, Charles

1680–97

 

 

 

 

 

P

P

Bergeret, Jean-Louis

1680–93

 

 

 

 

 

P

 

Blondel, François

1680–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Fournier, Michel

1680–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x/P

Le Melle(s)

1681–92

 

 

 

 

 

x

 

Saint-Prest, Jean-Yves de

1682–1714

 

 

 

 

 

*

*

Maugin

1691–1715

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Montreuil

1691–92

 

 

 

 

 

x

 

Marolot, Louis-Bénigne de

1693–1711

 

 

 

 

 

x

x/P

Lullier, Marc-Antoine

1694–1703

 

 

 

 

 

x

x

Noblet, Charles-François

1698–1705

 

 

 

 

 

 

x/P

Pecquet, Antoine

1700–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

P

Brameret, Bénigne

1700

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Larroque, Daniel

1700–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Ligny, Victor Goulu, Sr de

1702–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Bernage, Jean-Nicolas de, Sr de Saint-Illiers

1704–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Le Grand, Abbé Joachim

1705–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Fournier, Charles

1706–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Martin

1706

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Beauchamp, Antoine Faucard, Sr de

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Prévost, Jean de

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Odeau, Pierre

1707–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Du Theil, Jean-Gabriel de La Porte

1708–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Adam, Jean-Baptiste

1709–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Mignon, Pierre

1710–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Le Dran, Nicolas-Louis

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Du Parc

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Sermenté, Michel, Sr de Montalais

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Dupuisse, Philippe-Céleste

1711–15

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Delisle de La Drevetière, Louis François

?

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

8–9

5–7

4

6–8

7

7–10

9–21

Range of Number of Employees in Department under Each Secretary Key Premier commis

P

Secretary, commis or sous commis

x

Other personnel

*

Figure 5.1 List of foreign ministry personnel, 1658–1715. Note: The list includes those premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, translators, writers, archivists, and fiscal personnel (treasurers of ambassadors) who have been identified as regularly employed (in terms of relatively regular remuneration) in the bureaucracy, but it does not necessarily include everyone, perhaps leaving out unidentified commis and copyists. Also, no names of office boys are known. Years of service are those established in the sources and in secondary works, but precise beginning and ending dates are not known for some individuals. See the information for each individual in chapters 5 and 6. Although the elder Brienne’s tenure as secretary of state began in 1643, due to the availability of data, this list includes personnel only from 1658.

writers, and archivists) – identified as having served 1 ­ 658–1715 and their individual terms of service (in several cases only approximate), tentative numbers emerge (figure 5.2).7 The Briennes usually had nine staff members (during 1658–63, excluding the earlier years of Brienne’s secretaryship). Numbers fell under Lionne, who typically employed six clerks (with a range from five to seven), but they increased under Pomponne to an average of seven (with a range from six to eight). Croissy’s tenure witnessed another augmentation, to an average of nine staff members (with a range from seven to ten). Torcy began with nine clerks, but numbers rose fairly steadily from 1698 (ten) to peak in 1711 (twenty-one) and declined slightly thereafter to nineteen at the reign’s end. Given the small numbers involved and uncertainties about individuals and dates of service, caution is in order, but it seems that the trend is clear and fits with anecdotal accounts of a growing staff.8 Distinctions in function and rank arose over time.9 A commis might enter the department as an office boy and through apprenticeship graduate to “commis simple” (simple clerk) or, with a title indicating a more specialized function and a superior status, to “secrétaire” (secretary).10 In time, he might even aspire to “chef du bureau” (bureau chief) or receive the official title of “principal” or “premier commis” or “premier secrétaire” (chief secretary). The numbers of premiers commis at any one time increased over time: the

Figure 5.2 Number of foreign ministry bureaucratic personnel per year, 1658–1715. Note: The graph includes those premiers commis, secretaries, simple commis, translators, writers, archivists, and fiscal personnel (treasurers of ambassadors) who have been identified as regularly employed (in terms of relatively regular remuneration) in the bureaucracy, but it does not necessarily include everyone, perhaps leaving out unidentified commis and copyists. Also, no names of office boys are known. Years of service are those established in the sources and in secondary works, but precise beginning and ending dates are not known for some individuals.



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Briennes had one in 1658 and two thereafter; Lionne had three through 1669, then two; Pomponne had three until a fourth was added in 1673; Croissy had only two premiers commis; and Torcy, who began with two, added a third in 1700, a fourth from 1701, and from 1712 was back down to three (based on figure 5.1).11 The premiers commis, with a status well above the simple commis, were the “souls” who animated the department, whereas those below them generally had to see only to their own work and execute orders from their superiors.12 Premiers commis were “the equivalent of an Under-­ Secretary”13 and were the royal officials “who came most to resemble modern bureaucrats.”14 They enjoyed direct access to the foreign secretary, who relied on them for the everyday business of summarizing dispatches and memoirs, making coherent extracts,15 drafting replies, and even greeting important visitors on his behalf.16 Many also exercised supervisory roles within the bureaus. Most served long years, often training family members to work at their side and to remain as part of their legacy to the department. In an era before formal credentialing for public service existed, acquisition and recognition of expertise typically came through experience.17 Indeed, this longevity led to stability, enhancing the department’s success and allowing the premiers commis influence over routine decision-making that is glimpsed only occasionally. Jean Meyer has included them in the “‘brain-trusts’ de ‘spécialistes’” (brain trusts of experts) that surrounded great ministers.18 Unlike most of their noble “betters,” these clerks enjoyed access to the state secrets contained in the foreign office’s papers and archives.19 Their knowledge of department business and standing was such that they were unafraid of making candid comments to socially superior diplomats concerning negotiations under way. During the Ryswick conference, for instance, premier commis Mignon penned a note to plenipotentiary Harlay-­Bonneuil, still in Paris, to accompany documents he was sending him from Callières, already in Holland. Mignon remarked that while C ­ allières was confident that, based on the preliminaries he had sent, a treaty would soon result, he believed that he was greatly mistaken because there would be much wrangling over each of its articles and other issues were yet to be resolved.20 Torcy’s premiers commis (table 5.1) included Charles Mignon, Aubert, Clair Adam, Michel Fournier, and Antoine Pecquet; it seems that CharlesFrançois Noblet and Louis-Bénigne de Marolot were among them as well.21 Despite sharing the same title, they were not all of equal status within the department. Aubert served under another premier ­commis

1661 ?

1668 ?

Senlis in Picardy ?

Picardy ?

1656

c. 1645 1655? ?

c. 1640–50

Born

Paris

Montereau-fault-Yonne in Île-de-France (French Gâtinais) Bourges in Berry Paris? ?

Sources: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.

Premier Secrétaire François Blondel Victor Goulou de Ligny

Charles-François Noblet Antoine Pecquet Louis-Bénigne de Marolot?

Charles Mignon Michel Fournier Aubert

Premier Commis Clair Adam

Region of Origin

Table 5.1 Premiers commis and premiers secrétaires under Torcy, 1696–1715

1680 1702

1700 1693?

1680 1680? Before 1671 1698

1667

Entered Dept.

1680 1702

1700 1706?

1700?

1680 1698? By 1701

1698?

Began as Premier Commis

1715 After 1718

1725 1710?

1705

1698 1723 1705

1715

Ended as Premier Commis

Left with Torcy ?

Retirement Death?

Death

Death Retirement Retirement

Secretary to new Conseil des dedans

Reason for Leaving

1725 1723

1728 1710– 13?

1705

1698 1730 1714

1725

Died



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but was apparently also a bureau chief.22 Contemporaries outside the department might use the title premier commis and secretary interchangeably, but François Blondel and Victor Goulou de Ligny were in fact premier secrétaires.23 Unlike the king and some other ministers who rarely took up a pen, preferring instead to dictate to others,24 Torcy annotated and corrected the papers he received, wrote drafts for the king, and penned some of his own more personal or secret correspondence.25 Nevertheless, the volume was simply too much for one scribbler, as noted by a premier commis twenty-five years before Torcy became secretary.26 While Torcy personally drafted or wrote many letters, he was often limited to adding a postscript to those written by his staff.27 The secretary of state’s secrétaires were those clerks most intimately associated with his daily work, which increased their status and influence. The classic description of the department lists a premier secrétaire who took dictation, dispatched passports and payment orders, kept the second copy of all codes, and sent out the secret letters reserved for the minister’s eyes only, assisted by a second secretary who filled in during absences and had the additional responsibility of drawing up extracts from departmental correspondence of negotiations since Ryswick.28 At least one secretary accompanied the minister as he moved from one corner to another of the communication triangles at the realm’s centre. More difficult to classify in the hierarchy are the various specialists who served the department on a full-time basis. These included translators, archivists, and writers, although staff clearly classifiable as clerks might also perform these functions. They ranked above the simple commis and might even be on a par with and mistaken for a premier commis, as was the case of Jean-Yves de Saint-Prest, head of the emerging archival bureau. The simple commis acted daily as copyists, decipherers, clerks-inordinary, translators, issuers of passports, editors of diplomatic reports, and jacks-of-all-clerical-trades. Sons and nephews of premiers commis were not infrequent, and this nepotism provided on-the-job training for future personnel, assured continuity of viewpoint and administrative tradition, and offered security for state secrets.29 Unlike clerks in the typical venal office, department clerks served full-time yet at the pleasure of the department chief. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, a type of tenure-in-office was unofficially recognized and most of a clerk’s life was spent in a department and in close proximity to its head.30 Assisting the commis were unknown numbers of office boys

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who served as copyists, porters, messengers, and in any other needed capacity.31 Clerks owed their patron a profound personal allegiance, but received tangible rewards for their loyalty. Even though separated by social rank and privilege, the secretary of state and his clerks were nevertheless inextricably bound together in a patron-client relationship. Many clerks were educated with the children of the secretary of state, supped at his table, lived in rooms in his home, married in his presence, and in some cases died at his residence.32 Yet while both Croissy and Torcy managed their department through the clientage system, this arrangement was not the sum of a clerk’s position within the state, nor could the state resist the growing (and really long-present) importance of specialized skills and experience in the hiring and retention of bureaucratic personnel.33 By far the largest group at the centre, although easily overlooked, was comprised of those who served the quotidian needs of the clerks and the minister’s household at Versailles, in Paris, or on the road.34 The household comprised the persons who cleaned, hauled wood and water, lit fires, attended to the stables, served food, and performed the other menial tasks required by the foreign secretary’s family, resident entourage, and clerks. Sizable staffs were necessary to run the large residences that sprouted throughout Paris, as the household of someone of Torcy’s stature could employ as many as forty, all of whom were resident. At the top of the hierarchy was the intendant (business manager), almoner (chaplain), secretary (the intendant’s chief collaborator who kept the accounts), “écuyer” (equerry), and “maître d’hôtel” (supervisor of the kitchen staff), each normally provided with a valet. They supervised and saw to the needs, including spiritual instruction, of those below them. The staff within the house itself also included “valets de chamber” (footmen), ushers and “huissiers” (introducers), a “Suisse” (porter) who controlled the entry and exit of goods and people, and various pages, lackeys, and other underlings.35 The écuyers were important because they supervised the liveried servants, including lackeys, pages, and stable personnel, and oversaw the sending out of couriers who might include a valet de chambre or even the écuyer himself.36 The écuyer might also undertake special missions at court or in Paris for the secretary, indicating that he enjoyed a certain social standing and familiarity with protocol.37 The first of Torcy’s écuyers, appointed by Croissy in 1690, was Joseph Drouin de Maugin, while the second was Jean Pré de Seigle des Presle, once a major in the town and citadel of Montelimart and a former captain in the regiment



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of Normandy. Des Presle was also Mme de Torcy’s écuyer and carried messages to Rome so often that he befriended Charles-François Poerson, director of Rome’s French Academy.38 Maugin rode with Torcy at royal hunts and oversaw entertainments for visiting dignitaries.39 Four “cavaliers de la Poste” (mounted postal guards) commanded by the sieur de la Tournelle were paid from postal funds, lodged variously at Paris or Versailles, and served the secretary as diplomatic couriers. In a practice dating from Louvois’s superintendence, one of them departed from Paris or from the court each day at noon to ensure a regular flow of essential mail.40 De la Tournelle was especially busy carrying messages between Versailles, Paris, and wherever the court resided.41 He also undertook special missions, as in 1715 when he journeyed with a guard and a valet to the French embassy in Soleure to deliver gold chains and medals as gifts for the king’s Swiss clients.42 In 1930 the great diplomatic historian Camille Picavet posed two questions: first, did the department have bureaus before 1714, and second, were they already differentiated from one another? Apparently not, he concluded, and others have more or less concurred.43 However, Samoyault saw that there were two political bureaus based on geography throughout Louis XIV’s reign, even though their attributions might have changed over time.44 Like his colleagues, from early in the Sun King’s personal reign, the foreign secretary channeled the efforts of his department’s clerical core through an evolving array of specialized bureaus.45 The label “vostre bureau” (your bureau) or its variations occurs in department correspondence.46 Financial accounts provide another indicator through collective payments authorized for the unnamed commis of a premier commis or bureau chief.47 Dating the emergence of bureaus and determining their number have been hampered by the tendency to tie both to the number of premiers commis at any given time, which limits the search for bureaus to formal, separate, permanent, and hierarchical structures on the assumption that only such a Weberian bureau would require a premier commis at its head. If you have a premier commis, then you have such a bureau; the corollary is no premier commis, no bureau.48 While evidence for specialized ministerial bureaus can come indirectly from the proliferation of premiers commis, since this higher status might imply a further division of responsibilities,49 this did not always result in a bureau or at least one fitting Weber’s ideal. There were elements of continuity and experimentation in this bureau-­ formation process that afforded a measure of stability, yet the results rarely appeared as formal regulations, or if they did, they reflected

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­ ractices already in place for some time. Rather than seeking from conp temporaries the elusive formal organizational directive or chart, we should look for (multi)task-oriented teams. Indeed, the evolution of the French language itself reflects these new bureaucratic realities. By 1694 the term bureau had broadened beyond its earlier designation as a desk or table upon which to count money or place papers to encompass as well the site where an organization’s members gathered to work.50 During the coming decades the term also came to include those who worked in a bureau.51 With this in mind, the search for bureaus should aim at detecting groupings, even if temporary and shifting, of tasks and teams of commis directed by a premier commis or bureau chief. As contingency theory suggests, rather than forcing all business and personnel into fixed, narrow compartments, the department’s bureaus emerged as fluid and pragmatic arrangements matching available individuals to the tasks at hand.52 This was a particularly rational approach, since the number of staff in the foreign office remained smaller by at least half and grew more slowly than those of the controller general and the other secretaries of state, save that charged with overseeing the rpf or “Religion prétendu reformée” (so-called Reformed Religion, the Protestants).53 The economists’ concept of diseconomy of scale elucidates some unintended consequences for an organization with a large workforce. Coordinating larger staffs means multiplying the layers of management, but this increases the possibility of garbled communication and complications from “office politics.” This can result in “communication distortion due to bounded rationality,” according to studies from the business world, since “a single manager has cognitive limits and cannot understand every aspect of a complex organization.” The resulting information distortion “reduces the ability of high-level executives to make decisions based on facts and negatively impacts their ability to strategize and respond directly to [situations].”54 To regard the absence of increased specialization, numerous bureaus, and fixed responsibilities in a bureaucracy as a failure to achieve the achievable and the desirable is to ignore the complexity of both administrative theory and reality.55 Until a structure reaches a particular size, it is not only unnecessary but also counterproductive to adopt patterns of organization better suited to larger ones. In small organizations, the person at the very top is by necessity apt to perform more jobs, even of a clerical nature, than his counterpart in a larger one. Other reasons for this can include security considerations, lack of confidence in the abilities of particular personnel, fear of organizational failure to perform



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properly, or an inability to delegate. Staff members in a small organization also frequently fill in for an absent, ill, or overwhelmed colleague.56 Specialization of function and personnel into separate bureaus makes little sense when a task is unable to occupy fully one staff member or when it requires periodic rather than ongoing attention. A more rational and efficient alternative would be to assign a bureau chief a specific but intermittent task to monitor continuously. Then, as needed, he could draw together a short-term workforce of clerks, including other bureau chiefs, to process the increased workload.57 This is apparently what happened in the foreign office. With these considerations in mind, we can identify the following bureaus under Torcy: a secretariat; two political bureaus for foreign correspondence; a code service; a domestic administration bureau; a political or modern archive, with a related but not necessarily separate ancient or historic archive;58 a bureau of the “trésoriers des ambassadeurs” (treasurers of ambassadors); and an Académie politique. Each of these bureaus, whose existence, attributions, and personnel remained flexible to fit shifting needs and personnel qualifications, was typically headed by a bureau chief who might be a premier commis or a secretary. We cannot always attach individuals to particular bureaus with any certainty and likewise cannot determine exactly when a bureau emerged as a working entity since what might seem new may in fact be an earlier practice now regularized or made explicit. The standard accounts, for instance, deny the appearance of a domestic bureau before 1723, but as will be seen below, one existed long before.59 What follows suggests outlines and tentative answers that may serve as markers for further research, but always with the understanding that the evidence is usually elusive and even nonexistent. In this section, we examine the secretariat and the two political bureaus, and in the following section the code service, but the archives, the treasurers of ambassadors, and the Académie politique are treated in later chapters. The secretariat emerged as the department’s gatekeeper.60 Although François Blondel served both father and son as secretary from 1680 until 1715, Bergeret long acted as Croissy’s personal scribe and it was only in the 1690s that Blondel appears more prominently as his secretary and, even before Croissy’s passing, as Torcy’s.61 It was apparently under Torcy that the gate-keeping role became more focused, with a secretariat of premiers secrétaires and “sous-secrétaires” (second or under secretaries). He retained Blondel, who was joined in 1702 by Ligny. Later, second secretaries were engaged: Blondel’s nephew Jean-Gabriel de La

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Porte du Theil in 1708 and Blondel’s son Louis-Augustin during the last year or two of the reign.62 This clearly exceeds the two-secretary model usually assumed. What it means for the exact distribution of titles is unclear. Perhaps Blondel and Ligny were each a premier secrétaire, since each was also called premier commis. In addition to taking the minister’s dictation and attending to his personal and most secret correspondence, his secretaries oversaw the entry and departure of much of the department’s paperwork. As couriers brought in dispatches, the secretariat assisted the minister in opening them, writing the name of the sender on the center-top of the first page and often the date received as well, and then directing them to the appropriate political bureau.63 Once dispatches and other documents were ready to be sent out, the secretaries prepared them for the appropriate courier.64 They also accommodated French prelates and the nearby Jacobite court by including their letters in packets sent to Rome by official courier (the espionage opportunities this courtesy afforded are obvious).65 The Versailles secretariat apparently tried to serve as the transmission and reception point for letters among diplomats abroad, but the latter often found ways to route them so as to avoid the capital, likely for time considerations and perhaps also for fear that the letters might be opened.66 The first secretary guarded the department’s deepest secrets, including the particulars about undercover agents and other rulers’ officials in French pay. A seventeen-folio document marked as secret business (“Secret Affaires”) contains a running account of payments from late 1701 through 1708, carefully noting the recipient, alias, location, name and place of any letter drops, codes employed, date and amount of payments, and the means of payment, such as the name of the banker or person delivering the sum. Sometimes there are later annotations. An agent under suspicion in Vienna was arrested and another had his “appointements” (remuneration) increased. Sometimes an agent is crossed out, such as one who failed to travel to Holland as promised even though he pocketed the advance paid. The manuscript is in one hand only, suggesting that Blondel kept it for his and the minister’s eyes only.67 It also lists those agents’ addresses that were shared with others, such as the navy secretary, to allow them direct contact with the agents. This was done presumably to alert Torcy’s colleagues to any changes and allow any indiscretion compromising an agent to be traced back to its source.68 A separate note listed the names and addresses of those in Paris and the provinces available for clandestine mail drops of letters from the plenipotentiaries at Ryswick and had instructions for masking



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secret ­correspondence by folding and sealing the letter in the manner of merchants and having the envelope addressed by a hand unknown to outsiders.69 Each premier commis under Croissy may have handled accounts.70 Although there was no official, separate accounting bureau until 1725, Samoyault says that Ligny had this duty under the Regency.71 We will see later that this was likely the continuation of Torcy’s practice with regard to subsidies. The post-Ryswick diplomatic scramble to avoid war or to go into it with adequate allies nearly overwhelmed the foreign office with the endless and insistent demands for subsidies. While a lack of funds became the nagging issue once war commenced, on its eve the urgent need was another paymaster. When Torcy’s client and friend Grenoble intendant Étienne-Jean Bouchu recommended Ligny to him early in 1702, he replied at once that he had a post for such a man of finance.72 As for payments to ambassadors, Adam apparently handled these from at least 1699, as he would later when he purchased the office of treasurer of ambassadors.73 Foreign correspondence passed through two political bureaus. The first dealt with Spain, Portugal, Britain, Holland, the Swiss Cantons, and Italy, while the second handled Germany, Lorraine, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, Asia, and Africa (table 5.2 and figure 5.3).74 However sensible these groupings might appear or actually were, they were not inevitable. Geography played a role, but so did volume of correspondence and such personnel considerations as linguistic skill and previous experience.75 These bureaus, each with a chief typically assisted by three commis, did any necessary decoding, translating, summarizing (in the margins, sometimes paragraph by paragraph, or in a separate document), and excerpting from these often lengthy dispatches.76 Based on the foreign secretary’s verbal or written instructions, the chief drafted replies for him to correct and amend, and he did the same when a dispatch’s contents required communication with other departments of state. In this manner, the chief demonstrated his compositional skills, knowledge of the affairs of his bureau’s states, and grasp and ability to anticipate the secretary’s and king’s intentions. He might even draft the all-important instructions for departing diplomats. A bureau head, increasingly from a non-legal background, relied instead on his general education, which along with proper breeding in politeness equipped him with the requisite rhetorical skills.77 The simple commis served primarily as a copyist during this drafting process but was more active in preparing the final document, including encoding it, before it was forwarded to the secretariat

– Du Pré Iberville Louciennes – – Rouillé La Trémoille Briole – Amelot De la Haye 8 – – Châteauneuf Bonrepaus – – – – – – Polignac –

1st Political Bureau England Florence Geneva Genoa Holland Mantua Portugal Rome, Auditor of the Rota Savoy Spain Swiss Cantons Venice Total in Bureau

2nd Political Bureau Bavaria, Electorate of Cologne, Archbishopric-Electorate of Constantinople Denmark Empire (Ratisbon) Frankfurt-am-Main (Imperial Free City) Hamburg Lorraine Mainz, Trier, and Landgrave of Hesse Münster, Bishopric of Poland Stuttgart (Duchy of Württemberg)

16982

Table 5.2 French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, 1698–17151

Ricous Des Alleurs Ferriol Chamilly Rousseau de Chamoy Obrecht Bidal – Iberville Frischmann Héron Gergy

– Du Pré De la Closure Louciennes – Audiffret Rouillé La Trémoille Phélypeaux Marcin Puyzieux Hennequin 10

17023

– – Ferriol –10 – – – Audiffret – – – –

– Du Pré De la Closure Louciennes – Bergy – Polignac – Amelot Puyzieux Pomponne 8

17084

– – Des Alleurs *Poussin – – – Audiffret – – Baluze –

– Gergy De la Closure Anneville – – – La Trémoille – Bonnac Du Luc – 6

17135

– – Bonnac Poussin – – – Audiffret – – Baluze –

– La Trémoille De Prie7 *Pachau8 Du Luc *Fremont 10

Iberville Gergy De la Closure Anneville Châteauneuf

17156

D’Avaux – 4

Bonnac [Not named]11 12

Bonnac – 3

Bezenwald – 5

Bezenwald – 5

  1 This chart reflects the printed lists in État de la France and Almanach Royal, which are not fully inclusive or completely accurate; they do, however, offer a rough approximation of the embassies under each bureau. Grouping by bureau is based on Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.  2 État de la France (1698), 3:443–6.   3 Ibid. (1702), 3:449–53.   4 Ibid. (1708), 3:450–3.  5 Almanach Royal (1713), 219.   6 Ibid. (1715), 53.   7 The Duke of Savoy is listed in the source by his new royal title, “Roy de Sicile.”   8 Those serving as chargé d’affaires are marked with an asterisk (*).   9 Although not named in any lists for the two political bureaus, Russia was likely under the second. 10 No ambassador to Denmark is listed, probably because Bonrepaus, whose embassy there ended 21 November 1697, had not yet been replaced by Chamilly, whose instructions are dated 17 May 1698. France, Recueil, 13:73, 83–4. 11 The envoy to Wolfenbüttel had returned home that year.

Sources: État de la France (1698, 1702, and 1708); Almanach Royal (1713 and 1715); and Samoyault, Bureaux, 37.

Sweden Wolfenbüttel (Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg) Total in Bureau

Figure 5.3 Map of French diplomatic missions grouped by political bureau, c. 1700



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for sending out. In addition, clerks examined the assorted papers that typically accompanied arriving dispatches, including memoirs, newsletters, reports from secret agents, and printed materials such as official pronouncements, pamphlets, and newsletters. They also generated a steady stream of summaries, tables, dossiers, and any other compilation, digest, or analysis that might aid them or their superiors in their labours.78

C h a n g in g S t ru c t u r es and Procedures b e f o r e Torcy Rather than coming only at the end of Louis XIV’s reign, as often assumed, a distribution of foreign office responsibilities developed long before with bureaus forming around premiers commis entrusted with particular tasks. Any understanding of Torcy’s department requires that we examine it under his predecessors. Since those years are beyond the primary scope of this book, we must rely largely on secondary rather than archival sources, but an interesting picture emerges nonetheless. Even before 1661, the foreign office under the Briennes79 had a division of labour based on function and perhaps geography as well, although the details are sketchy (figure 5.4).80 Two premiers commis, Léonard de Mousseaux du Fresne (from 1659) and Pierre Ariste (from at least 1658), handled external as well as colonial and Atlantic naval affairs. Du Fresne, an intelligent and seasoned secretary to ambassadors to Sweden and several German princes, went to Germany for the Briennes on several diplomatic missions and returned home in 1658 as the elector of Mainz’s resident at the French court. When Brienne fils engaged him the following year as premier commis, he worked with Spanish, Danish, and German (including Mainz and Cologne) correspondence, specialized in commercial and colonial matters, and was his closest and most trusted collaborator.81 Ariste, who resided with Lionne, had also served on missions to Germany, but the only traces of his handwriting on the foreign correspondence of that era are classification instructions scribbled on their backs. He also worked with ceremonial and managed consulates, then a part of the foreign office.82 Commis Jean Parayre (Paraire) entered the department in 1655 and managed domestic administration.83 Those who assisted them included Joachim Dalencé, son of a royal surgeon, who after the Briennes’ fall undertook diplomatic missions to Germany (1664) and England (1668). Brienne called his former secretary, the hard-working Jacques Dautiège, his second commis, while

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

* Léonard de Mousseau, Sr du FRESNE (1659–63) External affairs (specialist on Germany and later, colonial and maritime affairs)

* Pierre ARISTE (1658?–63) External affairs (specialist on Germany, ceremony, and colonial and maritime affairs)

Jean PARAYRE (1655–63) Provinces and external affairs

Figure 5.4 Department organization under the Briennes, 1661–1663. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. This chart represents the department only at the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign (1661), even though Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne, began as foreign secretary in 1643. His son Louis-Henri, survivancier from 1651, increasingly collaborated in the department’s work. From 1626 the foreign secretary was the transmission agent for the paperwork of the “Marine du Ponant” (Atlantic navy), while the war secretary did the same for the “Marine du Levant” (Mediterranean navy). Richelieu held the real power over both and the colonies as “grand-maître de la navigation” (grand master of navigation). After his death, the two navies were united under the foreign secretary in 1644, but shortly thereafter the former division with the war department was re-established, giving both secretaries of state greater influence over naval affairs. Following Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, naval administration was increasingly under Colbert in practice but not in law. According to a regulation of 11 May 1667, Colbert generated all royal orders and official acts concerning the navy, read them to the king, but then sent them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be drawn up officially and sent out. The foreign ministry was relieved of all navy business when Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669. Taillemite, ­Colbert, 11–21.

Azemart served as Brienne’s secretary. Other long-serving commis were Nicolas Boulleau, Marest, who copied treaties, and Barthe, who assisted Du Fresne and worked with codes.84 Lionne’s close diplomatic collaboration with Mazarin and the king since the time of Richelieu’s death left the Briennes with little to do of substance, and in 1663 Lionne officially assumed control of the department upon becoming secretary of state.85 Judging the Briennes’ staff to have been negligent, he dismissed all but Parayre, whom he promoted to premier commis supervising domestic administration.86 Lionne always drafted his own dispatches.87 His friend Pomponne, who succeeded him in 1671, claimed that his predecessor had only three commis, one of whom was largely unoccupied because Lionne himself did so much. The premier commis Lionne kept busy was Louis Pachau, a close and trusted collaborator who managed external affairs and their funding and,



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Abbé Silvain GAUDON (1663–71) Placets, benefices, and ecclesiastical affairs * Louis PACHAU (1663–71) Most external affairs, Provence, and codes (since 1669?)

* Jean PARAYRE (1663–71) Most provinces

* Luc de RIVES (1663–71) Expedition of acts and correspondence * Louis de MONCHENY (1663?–d. 1669?) Codes

Figure 5.5 Department organization under Lionne, 1663–1671. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Gaudon and Luc de Rives acted as a secretariat and premiers commis Pachau, Parayre, and Moncheny each headed a bureau. Piccioni, Commis, 35, credits Moncheny with being the first chief of a code service, creating, distributing, and securing code tables with the assistance of two commis. Abbé Gaudon, in an 18 September 1671 letter to Pomponne, referred to a “Mouchérier” – likely Moncheny – who worked with the codes but who was now dead (Delavaud, “Changement,” 384). He also noted that Pachau had been handling codes for the past two years (ibid., 383), suggesting that Moncheny died in 1669 or earlier. Cras, “Lionne,” 53, 55, lists Lionne’s uncle Luc de Rives, a cleric from the diocese of Lyon much involved in Lionne’s political and financial affairs, as a “premier commis ad honorem” (honorary). Picavet, “Commis,” 107, and Piccioni, Commis, 152, note Rives’s honorary title, but credit him with no real role in the department. Piccioni (152n2), however, observes that Rives served as Lionne’s secretary, which is supported by documents in Lionne, Lettres, 41, 129; and Peyron, Documents des Hôpitaux de Paris, 4:243–4, 257–9, 261, 264, 266, 275–6. Moncheny was a cleric of the Paris diocese. Contemporary registries show that Rives shared with the other three premiers commis in sending out correspondence and the important and lucrative expedition of the department’s official acts. Cras, “Lionne,” 68.

exceptionally, domestic matters for Provence (figure 5.5).88 Pomponne’s remark, however, only scratches the surface. Lionne raised his secretary Louis de Moncheny to premier commis dealing chiefly with codes and from the beginning of 1667 assisted by Clair Adam. When Moncheny died around 1669, codes passed to Pachau, whose weak eyesight required that Abbé Jean Morel join Adam.89 Lyon cleric and maître ordinaire in the Paris Chambre des Comptes Luc de Rives, uncle of Lionne’s wife and his long-time political and financial agent, while named premier commis ad honorem (honorary), acted as Lionne’s secretary and assisted with the lucrative expédition of the department’s official documents.90 We know others in the department by chance and not always happy ones. Abbé Bigorre, a commis assembling an annual registry of all dispatches from the king and Lionne to French envoys, in September 1663 engaged Louis La Pause, a young copyist who worked from his

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attic room but sold ­copies of drafts to foreign diplomats. The following March, before much damage was done, Lionne discovered his treachery and sent him to the Bastille, to be hanged on 16 April. Although absolved of treason, ­Bigorre’s negligence was not forgiven by the king as Lionne had hoped, so in 1665 he went to England as embassy secretary with Gaston Henri de Bourbon, duc de Verneuil.91 Abbé Silvain Gaudon, neither a commis nor in the department’s pay, resided with Lionne and assisted quarterly with the critical domestic task of responding to petitions, distributing benefices, and managing ecclesiastical affairs.92 Then there were the more humble personnel glimpsed only occasionally.93 Upon the death of his friend and patron Lionne in 1671, Pomponne was summoned from Stockholm to take his place. As his father, ­Robert Arnauld d’Andilly, observed, he would not lack for staff as an infinite number of men were soliciting posts, especially the prestigious one of premier commis.94 Pomponne considered reappointing Du Fresne, in Paris since 1670 as the elector of Mainz’s envoy, as premier commis, but as Du Fresne would suffer thereby a loss of status, nothing came of it. Instead, Pomponne retained Pachau and Parayre along with their subordinates Adam and Aubert. The existing distribution of tasks between domestic administration and external affairs continued (figure 5.6) and was tightened, with Parayre gaining Provence. Rives departed to attend to Lionne’s family business, and Gaudon was not re-engaged.95 Pierre de Tourmont, Pomponne’s valued secretary abroad and trusted agent until the marquis’s death, joined the department as premier commis to supervise external relations with the north while Pachau supervised those with the south.96 Pomponne’s kinsman Hilaire Rouillé du ­Coudray was named premier commis in 1673, but with what responsibilities is unclear.97 Edme Lebeau served as a commis and in 1678 was joined by Charles François de la Bonde d’Iberville, who worked particularly with the Genevan correspondence and in 1688 became resident in that city.98 It has been recently argued that the foreign office’s transition from a geographical to a functional division of labour came quite late, lagging behind the other departments of state. However, this equates the division between domestic and external correspondence with the one based on geography (as in north and south),99 whereas the former was grounded in function, not geography. Indeed, the two types of bureau dealt with different subject matter (domestic affairs versus international relations), required specialized background knowledge (of provincial versus foreign authority and power structures, customs, history, and current conditions), and involved having to deal with significantly different groups



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs * Pierre de TOURMONT (1671–79) Continued as Pomponne’s secretary and “Directeur des affaires du Nord”

* Louis PACHAU (1671–80) External affairs and codes

* Jean PARAYRE (1671–80) Provinces (now including Provence)

Figure 5.6 Department organization under Pomponne, 1671–1679. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Tourmont served as Pomponne’s secretary and premier commis of the bureau handling “the affairs of the North,” while premiers commis Pachau and Parayre each headed a bureau. Both Pachau and Parayre served under interim foreign secretary Louvois after the 1 September 1671 death of Lionne until ­Pomponne arrived from Sweden on 14 January 1672. Not mentioned by Delavaud, Picavet, or Piccioni was Pomponne’s kinsman Hilaire Rouillé du Coudray, named premier commis in 1673 according to Saint-Simon, ss-Boislisle, 9:18n7, and Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, but neither work indicates what role Rouillé du Coudray played. Sarmant and Stoll also claim that Rouillé du Coudray was “remplacé vers 1678 par le jeune fils du ministre ­[Pomponne]” (replaced around 1678 by the minister’s young son) but without naming the son. Since ­Pomponne’s oldest son was born in 1662, with the others following in 1664 and 1669, this is rather puzzling.

(a wider social range in France as opposed to a narrower one abroad) and individuals (a variety of provincial elites and officials in contrast to sovereign princes and a small, largely urban court elite).100 As the king understood, in contrast with the “affairs of war … the administration of a state constantly requires cares of a different nature.”101 Much of the domestic bureau’s work involved greater task certainty, whereas diplomatic business typically engendered greater task uncertainty, which according to contingency theory’s analysis of organizational structure tended to make the domestic side rather mechanistic in structure. By contrast, the two political bureaus’ diplomatic work required greater expertise and offered the clerks who drafted documents more independence. In terms of governance theory, it seems that in generating much domestic paperwork the “reactions to information [were] preprogrammed,” whereas in replying to diplomatic correspondence, it was more likely

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that “the responses [were] indeterminate and involve[d] greater judgment by the actors involved.”102 Domestic documents were often in the form of royal orders or legal papers directed at subjects, whereas diplomatic documents, in addressing foreign rulers, differed not only in format but in tone. Instructions for departing diplomats were sustained compositions in a freer and more literary style that provided parameters and explored contingencies more often than they gave simple orders. In contrast, instructions to provincial officials were often relatively short letters, since the time-distance differential between foreign and domestic communication generally made the latter faster and more frequent. Certainly, there were overlapping and similar functions, and when merely copying papers, a clerk could float as needed from one function to the other. Yet expertise in processing these two categories of files counted for something, as demonstrated by Parayre’s continuity in managing domestic affairs under three secretaries and by Pachau’s with external affairs under two. While acknowledging that war department paperwork was quite detailed, Brienne contended that it required more diligence than wit, whereas diplomatic writings were not the same thing, since sudden and unforeseeable matters arose daily. He granted that while war department clerks might draft good standard legal documents with prescribed formats, they would do poorly with foreign dispatches or ambassadorial instructions.103 Long before Torcy, foreign ministers and their clerks developed an exalted sense of the compositional skills necessary to their work, skills that stood in sharp contrast to those required for the lesser “chancery compositions” churned out in domestic or war administration.104 The foreign office entered a new era with Pomponne’s disgrace on 18 November 1679 and replacement by Croissy on 20 January 1680. Alongside the obvious shift toward a more belligerent foreign policy already under way, seemingly ratified by Croissy’s appointment, there was the conquest of the foreign office itself by the ambitious Colbert clan.105 Lionne, like Colbert and Le Tellier, was one of Mazarin’s creatures bequeathed to Louis XIV, whereas Pomponne was not. Although not part of any ministerial grouping, he was nonetheless protected and promoted by his friends Lionne, Le Tellier, and the latter’s first cousin, Claude Le Peletier, all of whom the Colberts regarded as rivals for favour and advancement. It was thus no surprise that Pomponne’s premiers commis were soon cashiered.106 Tourmont transferred to the war department, while Parayre and Pachau both retired, although as was customary with former premier commis, they occasionally served Croissy.107



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Like his predecessors, Croissy looked to his own circle for replacements. François Faille, his secretary and commis since 1654, now served chiefly as his household intendant.108 Charles Mignon, his secretary since at least 1663, took Tourmont’s place without, like him, having served first as a commis.109 Pachau’s replacement, in place by December, was Jean-Louis Bergeret, a Parisian of Alsatian ancestry and since 1672 a general counsel in the Metz parlement, eventual hub of the reunion activities along the eastern frontier. Just one month before Pomponne’s dismissal, the first Chambre de réunion at Metz was authorized (23 October 1679). Croissy himself had broached with the king this judicial alternative to conquest as early as 1664, and from 1670 the Metz parlement began sifting through old parchments to ascertain the crown’s seigneurial rights in its jurisdiction.110 Ezéchiel Spanheim, B ­ randenburg’s envoy to France, later speculated that this probably accounted for ­Bergeret’s appointment, since he and Croissy had worked together on what was the foremost foreign policy initiative during his early ministry.111 Yet Bergeret was likely a Colbert client before Metz, as Colbert selected royal appointees to parlements from within his family and client network, especially for Metz. Moreover, Bergeret was a kinsman of the rising master of requests Louis Boucherat, named chancellor in 1685.112 Bergeret is perhaps the best known of the premier commis if only because he entered the Académie française (2 January 1685) following a controversial election. Many literati, who resented Bergeret’s selection over a “more worthy” candidate because he was not a published writer, attributed it to intense lobbying by the Colbert clan to satisfy a client’s vanity. His elevation, however, was approved by the king and was not without its defenders both then and later. Racine praised Bergeret’s acquaintance with history and good books in general, but especially his deep knowledge of events at foreign courts, of treaties and alliances, and of the important negotiations of their royal patron’s reign.113 Indeed, elevating an expert to an academy was one means of recruiting and rewarding expertise while legitimizing and credentialing it.114 There is some disagreement as to Bergeret’s responsibilities. Abbé François Timoléon de Choisy, a former friend appalled by his election, said that he was a vain mere scribe who hardly deserved his rich premier commis salary. Choisy wrote this in the context of praising Croissy’s dispatch-writing abilities, which he considered underappreciated owing to the minister’s coarse and brutal manner. Georges Pagès’s study of Croissy’s correspondence confirms that he dictated his drafts to Bergeret and later corrected them himself to reflect changes made during Conseil

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discussions.115 Yet a premier commis did more than draft dispatches, as noted by the perceptive Spanheim. In light of the pretext that precipitated Pomponne’s disgrace, Croissy was scrupulous about keeping the king informed daily of all significant diplomatic business, but during his frequent illnesses, it was Bergeret who kept Louis up to date, a duty Torcy later assumed as survivancier. Aware of the practical advantage of a foreign office clerk also holding a royal household office, Spanheim noted that being a secretary of the Cabinet facilitated Bergeret’s access to the king. Bergeret was so valued and trusted by Croissy that he received important briefings on his behalf.116 He also helped his master smooth ruffled feathers in the foreign community.117 On at least one occasion he participated in the recruitment process by repeatedly encouraging a prominent parliamentarian to consider diplomatic service.118 Did Croissy continue Pomponne’s tripartite division of two political and one domestic bureau? Camille Piccioni claims that Bergeret was the sole premier commis until he was joined by Aubert and Mignon in 1688, but in fact Mignon entered the department with that rank in 1680 and Aubert achieved it only under Torcy.119 The evidence indicates that both Mignon and Bergeret handled domestic matters, especially the former because as a secretary of the king of the Grand Chancellery he drew up, signed, and sealed the royal orders that made up a large part of domestic paperwork.120 It is impossible to state with greater certainty how domestic affairs were supervised under Croissy without thoroughly sifting through his correspondence, a task beyond the scope of the present work. The division of foreign affairs is less opaque. Mignon’s bureau included ­Denmark and Sweden,121 while Bergeret’s encompassed ­England, Italy, Germany, Geneva, and Siam.122 This suggests that Croissy discontinued or at least modified the earlier division by “north” and “south.” With seemingly fewer foreign missions to supervise, Mignon likely took on more of the domestic responsibilities, and as will be discussed below, a domestic bureau only re-emerged sometime between 1698 and 1700 (figure 5.7).123 Additional personnel under Croissy included the veteran Adam, two who arrived with Croissy, Mignon’s nephew Michel Fournier and François Blondel, and, later, Le Melle – or Le Melles – (from 1681 to at least 1692), Montreuil (from 1691 to 1692), and Louis-Bénigne de Marolot (added by 1693).124 The structure under Torcy by 1700 is somewhat clearer (figure 5.8): a first political bureau headed by Pecquet and a second political bureau headed by Fournier, whether as a simple commis as bureau chief or, more likely, as premier commis.125 Pecquet’s bureau included Italy (e.g., ­Venice



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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Maison François FAILLE (1680–96) Intendant and commis

* Jean-Louis BERGERET (1680–94) Croissy’s personal scribe External affairs and provinces

Secretariat François BLONDEL (1680–96) Finances and codes

* Charles MIGNON (1680–96) External affairs and provinces

Archives (from 1680) Jean-Yves de SAINT-PREST (c. 1682–96)

Figure 5.7 Department organization under Croissy, 1680–1696. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. The division of states and provinces between the two premiers commis is uncertain, but the following give some indications: ­Bergeret assisted with England and Mantua (Picavet); Bergeret helped Croissy with Brandenburg (Pagès); Bergeret approached Choisy on behalf of Croissy concerning Siam (Smithies); secretary of the king Mignon countersigned the “Arrest du Conseil d’Estat du Roy” (aae md 302 and 1004 and bn mf 8833, which contradict Piccioni’s contention [162] that Bergeret’s administrative existence terminated quietly in 1688); Mignon’s bureau dealt with Denmark (aae cp Danemark 47); and Mignon dealt with the affairs of Marseilles at Torcy’s request (bn mf 8858).

and Rome), Spain, Portugal, the Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces, and Britain.126 The workload if not the importance of these two political bureaus was unequal. Comparing listings of French diplomats abroad drawn from État de la France for 1698, 1702, and 1708 and from the 1713 and 1715 Almanach Royal shows that Pecquet’s bureau oversaw more diplomats – usually double the number – than did Fournier’s (table 5.2). Only in the great post-Ryswick re-establishment of French missions abroad did the second bureau’s numbers match those of the first (figure 5.9).127 Comparing the number of volumes of political correspondence generated by each bureau during Torcy’s tenure reveals that Pecquet’s bureau handled more than double the volume of ­Fournier’s bureau (figure 5.10), which is congruent with the list of states for which each was responsible. Missions to the papacy, Spain, the Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces, and Great Britain, all in Pecquet’s bureau, far surpassed all the others in volume and as a group accounted for just over half the total. Altogether the first bureau accounted for approximately

Figure 5.8 Department organization under Torcy, 1696–1715. Note: Premiers commis are marked with an asterisk. Bold dates in parentheses indicate when a separate bureau was formed (dates may be approximate).

Figure 5.9 Number of French diplomatic missions, 1692–1715. Note: The figures are not exact and could be further refined, but likely without seriously altering the overall trend.

Figure 5.10 Comparison: numbers of volumes of correspondance politique produced per state by the first and second political bureaus, 1696–1715. Note: Numbers are approximate and meant only to be suggestive. Figures from “Supplemental” volumes are not included, since they are usually small and often cover a wide range of years.



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70 per cent of the total volume and the second bureau roughly 30 per cent of it.128 This imbalance was probably unintentional. The widening war ruptured diplomatic relations with Austria, the United Provinces, and ­England, as was the case during most of Torcy’s tenure. By contrast, missions remained throughout this period in Rome, Copenhagen, ­Stockholm, Constantinople, and Switzerland. Yet factors beyond ongoing diplomatic relations must have been at play, since correspondence with the Scandinavians and Ottomans fell far short not only of the volume with the papacy and the Swiss but also with that of the Dutch and English. The quantity of correspondence was also influenced by the extent, level, and length of peace negotiations, since communications with plenipotentiaries were assigned to the bureau responsible for the place where the congress met. Thus, the drawn-out and critical negotiations at Ryswick and Utrecht added to the United Provinces’ volumes, while those at Baden augmented the Swiss tomes. Likewise, the quantity of correspondence concerning the disputed succession to the diminutive Swiss territory of Neuchâtel on France’s border was nearly twice that for Russia during this period. The evidence suggests that the intended balance between the two bureaus was not in the volume of correspondence generated, but in the number of missions to be supervised post-Ryswick. Thus, the 1702 levels (table 5.2), before the overall numbers of missions fell almost to the levels seen during the Nine Years War, probably reflected the anticipated division of labour. The matter of codes illustrates the difficulty in determining when or even if other specialized functions resulted in the creation of bureaus. Codes, or ciphers, served to secure communication between the centre and its agents abroad. Given the nature and purposes of codes, it is not surprising that exact information about them is often vague or lacking.129 The foreign office changed codebooks often, followed strict procedures, and employed codes with some novel features. This led to a certain smugness among French diplomats as to the inviolability of their codes, which were nonetheless cracked by the Allies during the War of the Spanish Succession.130 Charles Mignon’s personal papers contain instructions for a special code used with the plenipotentiaries at ­Ryswick. The encoder was cautioned not to mix unencrypted words or lines among those in code and to take the time to mix into the code the null ciphers (“caractères nuls”), which he would find at the bottom of the key. Fear of interception led to each missive being encoded with two different keys in an alternating pattern of five lines encoded with one key

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and the sixth with the other. To signal to the decipherer which code was being used for which set of lines, the number of the appropriate code was inserted as the first character of the dispatch to indicate whether the repeating line pattern throughout was five then one or one then five.131 An envoy often received an ordinary code and a more difficult one for those secrets that had to remain impenetrable.132 These instructions indicate just how painstaking and time-consuming encoding and decoding could be, although not all codes were this complex. Under Lionne a premier commis and two office boys specialized in codes and formed an identifiable code service (“service du chiffre”). It generated, distributed, and safeguarded tables of codes, but because code specialists performed other departmental tasks, they functioned more as a task-oriented team than a completely separate bureau. The earliest entirely separate and official code bureau came in 1749 but lasted only six years, likely because encoding and decoding traditionally and logically took place within the political bureaus themselves.133 Torcy encoded his most secret and delicate letters, as did his premier commis.134 Moreover, encoding and decoding entailed a tension between the desire for absolute accuracy and security and the need for haste in sending out and making use of information while fresh. Thus, even the use of a code or the centralization of its operations for security’s sake frequently clashed with efficiency and timeliness, not only in the department’s bureaus, but in its embassies as well.135 Billard, secretary to Jules de Gravel, marquis de Marly, extraordinary envoy to Brandenburg, reacted defensively to criticism that he had badly encoded a dispatch, insisting that it was the first complaint he had ever received. Adam responded soothingly that in his own twenty-one years serving Lionne, Pomponne, and Croissy, he had found that what pleased one minister did not necessarily please the others.136 France produced two master cryptologists, the legendary Antoine Rossignol (d. 1682) and his son Bonaventure-Charles Rossignol (d. 1705). Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louvois employed them, and Louis XIV, who had rewarded each richly, regretted the passing of both. The king made certain that the latter’s children, although too young to carry on the family tradition, were provided for financially. Neither Rossignol appears to have worked directly for the foreign office, yet it no doubt benefited from the efforts of both. Moreover, Antoine had married a cousin of Pomponne’s wife.137 Expert knowledge and skill had to be kept under the state’s control and denied to its enemies, so the department’s solicitude for these potential experts who might have access to secret



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family knowledge of codes made sense.138 Others worked with codes under Torcy.139 Marc-Antoine Lullier began in the Le Telliers’ department and may have apprenticed under or worked alongside Antoine Rossignol. He joined Croissy sometime in 1694–96 and retired after 1701 and before 1706, perhaps in 1703. He was said to be a decoder without using a key (“déchiffreur sans clé”), which suggests expertise.140 Since most clerks would need to decode and encode dispatches on a daily basis, that activity was not easily separated from the political bureaus. Instead, the code service specialized in distributing codebooks as well as generating new code tables, since security was served by a plethora of ciphers or the more drastic replacement of a code.141 The increased complexity required for greater security, however, could slow or even rupture the communication process.142 Under Croissy and Torcy the sending out of a new code might fall to secretary Blondel or a political bureau’s premier commis, but Adam, who began in the code service, played a leading role in creating codes. He apparently introduced departing diplomats and agents to their codes, personally entrusting them with keys to the ciphers they carried. At Versailles, codebooks were in the care of Torcy’s premier secrétaire and premier commis, who kept them under lock and key in the minister’s bureaus.143 Spies frequently required mobility to do their snooping. Movement could be fairly localized, as when tampering with the mail in a post office or monitoring objects and people of interest around a port, near a military facility, along a vital highway, or in a royal residence’s corridors, but when it required the ability to travel more widely and through one or more sovereignties, passports were one of the weapons used to control the movement of information and the people gathering and carrying it, especially during wartime.144 Issuing passports was among the foreign office’s duties, but this was not its exclusive province, since the other secretaries of state as well as governors, intendants, and magistrates in coastal or frontier cities could issue them for their jurisdiction. For security reasons, however, passports for the court and for Paris, whether requested by foreigners for a visit or by French subjects resident in either to go abroad, came from the foreign secretary. French subjects received passports not only for protection while abroad and, in particular, for safe conduct in enemy territory and war zones, but also to permit the foreign office to monitor those whose foreign travels for commercial, religious, or other reasons might have hidden purposes.145 Of course, like others, France used passports to cover its own agents’ espionage. Obtaining a passport through the foreign office normally required

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a court or government connection, especially in the foreign ministry, perhaps with a clerk or even a domestic in the secretary’s household, and it was this sponsor who delivered the passport to its recipient.146 A flurry of passports issued proclaimed the approach of peace talks.147 In 1697 the number of passports issued by Torcy’s bureaus increased dramatically. After ten years of war Europeans welcomed the opportunity to go abroad unmolested by contending armies. Torcy’s clerks issued nearly five hundred passports between 1 January and 1 June 1697. Several registers of passport requests, beginning with one for 1 June 1697, list information about the traveler, accompanying family and servants, and goods and specie that might be transported. Two registry columns were left blank: one for listing the person who recommended the applicant; and the other for Torcy’s penciled queries or instructions to his commis. The minister might, for instance, want to apprise someone at court of the proposed journey, ask about an applicant’s religious status (a Huguenot refugee or a New Convert?), or refer the request to the police lieutenant and his agents for further scrutiny.148 When the next war began to end in piecemeal fashion, the floodgates were again opened. For the year 1712 over 2,080 passports were issued and nearly 3,000 for the following year.149 Bély believes that the 1712 list suggests that prior to this list there was little order in the department’s passport records,150 but that is contradicted by the earlier lists kept. Rather than disorder’s remedy, the 1712 list was likely a further refinement of the order already in place. Religion now seemed to be less of an issue. The names of bankers, merchants, gentlemen on tour, actors and musicians, and servants top the list, followed by churchmen, soldiers, and officials. The names of sponsors included Mme de Croissy, Abbé Polignac, ­Chancellor JohannFriedrich-Ignaz Karg of Cologne, Cardinal G ­ ualterio, Abbé Pomponne, Louis-Léon Pajot, and department clerks Adam, Pecquet, Mignon, Blondel, and Fournier.151 It is not completely clear how passports were issued, but a penciled annotation on Torcy’s notes from the 28 April 1701 diplomatic audiences indicates that passport requests were to go to Aubert, which may have been connected with his elevation as premier commis around this time.152 His was likely a coordinating role. Given their varying volume, passports did not occupy him full-time, so perhaps what Aubert headed was what we suggested earlier was a bureau defined as a task-oriented and temporary team led by a premier commis or bureau chief whose ongoing responsibility for the task provided its essential organization, coordination, and continuity. Ligny, who joined Torcy’s secretariat in 1702, may have assisted Aubert in his work, but



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when Aubert retired in 1705, passports were apparently absorbed into the secretariat and supervised by Ligny.153 Even resident foreign nationals holding passports made Torcy and his department uneasy, especially during hostilities. They might be potential or actual spies, dealers in illegal goods or peddlers of forged documents, purveyors of seditious libels, and so on. If they planned to stay in Paris for an extended time or settle there, they were tracked by the commissioners of their quarter, having been required to register with them or their innkeeper.154 The transition from peace to war, however, created confusing grey zones, and overzealous police spies were prone to mistakes. In 1702 a Scotsman from the court of Hanover was arrested as a spy because he lacked a passport and appeared to be writing coded letters. When Torcy looked into the case, he found not a spy, but a scholar who had been in France before war was declared and who interspersed Greek in his correspondence.155 Foreign envoys also monitored the activities of their own nationals. The English diplomat Matthew Prior, for instance, did not trust a Mark Lynch, reporting home that he had let Torcy “know where he is, that he may keep an eye upon him.”156 The Jacobite court at St-Germain-en-Laye was a constant and continual source of information and irritation. On the basis of a letter from Lord Middleton concerning three Englishmen who had also proved cooperative with French authorities, Torcy instructed d’Argenson to allow them to continue their medical studies.157

T h e D e pa rt m e nt Reorgani zed As we have seen, a domestic bureau had long existed before Croissy either consolidated it with one of the political bureaus or split its duties between them. A separate domestic bureau had re-emerged by 1700, but when exactly, in what circumstances, and under whose supervision? Louis Delavaud says that Adam was made premier commis in 1694 and charged with domestic affairs.158 Delavaud draws no connection between Adam’s promotion and Bergeret’s death on 9 October of that year, but surely Adam was elevated as Bergeret’s replacement.159 Adam’s situation was apparently changing even before Bergeret’s passing. Writing Adam from Denmark at the end of 1693, Bonrepaus referred to his new “emploi” (employment), apprehensive that it would distract Adam from his work in the bureau. The ambassador complained of carelessly encoded dispatches received from the bureau supervised by Mignon and responsible for Denmark and Sweden.160 To what new

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employment was Bonrepaus referring? It is unlikely he meant the code service, since any such responsibility had likely come at Pachau’s departure in 1680 and in any case would neither fully occupy nor distract him from his duties under Mignon.161 Perhaps too much should not be read into the use of the word emploi here, as it can refer to a function and not necessarily a commission or rank.162 As Croissy’s health worsened and Torcy assumed additional responsibilities, including following the king to the front during the 1693 campaign, Adam probably accompanied the heir and increasingly worked at his side. Perhaps it was this closer working relationship that Bonrepaus had in mind.163 Did Adam’s 1694 promotion mark an end to the dualism that had reigned in Croissy’s bureaus for the last fourteen years and a return to the tripartite scheme of two foreign and one domestic bureau? In 1694 and 1695, however, there were only two premiers commis, Mignon and Adam.164 Besides, what would have been the impetus for this, especially during time of war? One of the two premiers commis had died, but he could be replaced. Moreover, Torcy’s growing responsibilities as Croissy’s health deteriorated included domestic correspondence.165 At this point in the war the number of French embassies was at a low level (figure 5.9), with no sign of increasing in the foreseeable future. In 1695 Adam replaced Mignon’s nephew Fournier in carrying the summons for the estates to Brittany. The explanation does not require a revived domestic bureau, but it cannot rest merely on Adam’s new status, since Fournier had gone earlier as a simple commis.166 Fournier’s harried uncle likely needed his help once Adam was no longer assisting him, so reassigning the biennial journey to Brittany to Adam made sense within the existing administrative framework. More significantly, who replaced Bergeret in foreign affairs? If Mignon took on the supervision of all embassies, which was perhaps manageable at this point in the war owing to low numbers, it nonetheless might have been considered an arrangement too disruptive to work patterns and habits for all involved, at Versailles as well as abroad. A simpler solution, especially given the sudden and unexpected nature of the vacancy, was to fill it as it existed without delay with an experienced commis and avoid the upheaval of realigning personnel and responsibilities. Until a thorough study is made of Croissy’s bureaucracy, it appears most likely that Adam stepped into Bergeret’s bureau at its head in 1694 with no reorganization at that time. As Croissy’s bouts of illness worsened early in 1696, Mignon wrote to Provence’s intendant at Torcy’s request and remarked on the heavy burden placed on the harried survivancier by his father’s infirmity.167



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When Croissy died on 25 August, Mignon remained in place, but throughout 1697 Bonrepaus complained to Blondel about the inefficiency of Mignon’s bureau, although he wrote apologetically to the weary clerk himself for any trouble he might have caused his office (“vostre bureau”) and in November even addressed Mignon’s poor health.168 By February 1698 Adam was handling business with Provence, informing its intendant that he had taken charge of Mignon’s bureau until his health improved.169 Unfortunately, chronic illness forced Mignon’s retirement at the beginning of April and by the beginning of June he was dead.170 The passing of this long-serving premier commis did not necessitate any restructuring, but it may have made it possible, as the end of the war six months earlier certainly had. Indeed, the return of peace required that embassies be sent to former enemies, making expansion and restructuring essential. The number jumped from approximately fifteen missions in 1697 to thirty-five the following year (figure 5.9). Perhaps, in the midst of this expansion and the increased volume of paperwork it generated, the division of labour prior to Bergeret’s death continued, with Fournier assuming his uncle’s bureau as Adam had Bergeret’s.171 By June 1698 Charles-François Noblet had joined the department, but if he was named a premier commis, it was likely not until the end of 1700 and even then his service was not the sedentary kind required of a political bureau’s chief.172 A more plausible sign of restructuring was Antoine Pecquet’s arrival as a premier commis in 1700.173 This appears to be the year during which Torcy reinstated the pre-Croissy tripartite division: two political bureaus for foreign affairs, headed by Pecquet and Fournier, and one bureau handling domestic matters, led by Adam, an arrangement that remained until the end of the reign.174 It seems unlikely that these changes had to await Pomponne’s passing, as he had found this same format serviceable when he was secretary.175 Perpetual negotiating during the War of the Spanish Succession placed a heavy burden on Torcy’s bureaus and increased the number of clerks.176 Yet growth and restructuring began earlier, during the postwar restoration of diplomatic relations and the whirlwind of activity aimed at forestalling another war through partitioning schemes. This occurred between the final months of 1697 and into 1700, as seen in the jump in the number of diplomatic missions sent out (figure 5.9). The pressure this placed on the old system was probably soon evident, but the delicate negotiations for the partition treaties, the second not signed by France and England until June 1699, probably precluded whatever restructuring Torcy and Pomponne might have desired. Moreover, the

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experienced Fournier, having taken over Mignon’s bureau, likely eased the strain somewhat. By 1701, however, when war no longer seemed avoidable and the coalition-building diplomatic preparation for it accelerated, the basic reorganization was complete. Thus, it was during the interwar crucible of 1699 and 1700, not the ensuing war, that a reorganized and expanded department was forged. The war years were hectic for the foreign office clerks and required additional personnel, but the prior labours of peace altered the bureaucracy’s structure and initially grew its numbers (figure 5.2). Adam’s domestic bureau had several commis each assigned a group of provinces. They read and summarized whatever was received from it, including official correspondence, individual or group complaints and requests, and any written or printed materials that an official, especially the intendant, thought might be of interest.177 In addition to serving as copyists, they assisted in drafting replies to provincial correspondence. Adam was already quite busy with other matters as Torcy’s household intendant and, from the end of 1706, as a treasurer of ambassadors. A sampling of lists of outgoing letters to the provinces reveals that they went mostly to major civil, military, ecclesiastical, judicial, and municipal officials (table 5.3).178 Each list records the names of important officials, even if they received only a single letter during the cycle; recipients not specified (“others”) were presumably not officials. Intendants were especially frequent correspondents, but depending on the issue, local power structure, and personalities involved, others could assume importance. In the pays d’état Brittany and Provence, the lieutenant-general who stood in for the absentee governor was a recurrent correspondent, as frequent as the intendant in the case of Grignan in Provence. During the 1708 subsistence crisis, Louis Ravat, elected that year as Lyon’s provost of merchants, received in the sample more communications from the minister than did the intendant.179 Letters to “others” were more common in the pays d’état and for Brittany were close to half of those sent out. Provence received the most correspondence in each sample not only by volume, but also in the number and variety of recipients, including many judicial and municipal officials. Berry and Limoges, both pays d’élection, apparently required less attention than the more self-governing pays d’état of Provence, Brittany, and Béarn and Navarre. Nevertheless, Champagne-Brie’s intendant, André de Harouys ­ (1702–11), was as frequent a contact as all but the intendant of Provence, perhaps because of his province’s proximity to the exposed eastern frontier. The total volume of these dispatches sent out was on average at least one per



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day. This may seem insignificant until one considers all the preliminary paperwork and discussions typically required to produce a single final draft.180 This kept the bureau’s commis busy but still able to assist with other department tasks such as helping Aubert with passports. The domestic bureau specialized in preparing and sending out the various actes en commandement or documents sent on the monarch’s personal order.181 Issued and countersigned by the secretary in the king’s name (table 4.1), they included “brevets” (letters patent used to convey a favour, usually without cost to the king), commissions, dispensations from age requirements (for example, for holding an office), edicts, grants of leave, “ordres du roi” (orders of the king), payment authorizations (such as ordonnances or acquits patents),182 and “lettres de naturalité” (naturalization letters).183 Although the later eighteenth century may have seen an expanded secretariat assume responsibility for issuing and registering legal documents before sending them out,184 under Torcy this was done in the domestic bureau.185 Several department registries of expéditions indicate that particular individuals, including premiers commis, had a hand in the task of registration, including Adam, Fournier, Aubert, Marolot, Noblet, and Lullier. Adam apparently coordinated the schedule so that no one was responsible for expediting documents more than two days consecutively and for no more than eight days in a month.186 Of course, one might be unfortunate enough to draw duty during the first or last days of the month (figure 7.2 below), which were often the busiest, yet the stream of paperwork, even with ebbs and flows for seasonal or other reasons, was fairly steady.187 Additional work resulted when Adam and his team took on special tasks, such as resolving the administrative fate of Barcelonnette. It had been detached from Provence by Savoy in 1388, and its loss was contested until its return in 1713 at Utrecht. While Provence expected it back, Dauphiné lobbied to annex it. Letters from Grignan in Provence were sent directly or routed to Adam, as were other missives from the Aix and Grenoble parlements and other interested parties, which Adam and his commis summarized for Torcy’s perusal.188 Adam also assisted Torcy with the original reading of the rolle, which fit well with domestic affairs and was a source of rewards for those in and outside the department.189 His hand was also in the policing of Paris and managing the prisoners the ministry sent to the Bastille.190 Adam’s activities reached to Brittany, where Croissy had served twice (1663 and 1665) as royal commissioner general to its estates. As foreign secretary, Croissy convoked these biennial gatherings and issued orders to those selected as royal

Table 5.3 Sampling of domestic correspondence sent out by gouvernement Recipients of Domestic Correspondence Classified by Gouvernement1

Jan.– June 1697

Oct.– Dec. 1706

July– Sept. 1708

Oct.– Dec. 1708

Apr.– June 1709

totals

Berry *Dey de Séraucourt (intendant 1673–99) *Quarré (Carré) de Montgeron (intendant 1705–08) *Foullé de Martangis (intendant 1708–20) Archbishop of Bourges

3 3

1 –

2 –

1 –

1 –

8 3

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

–

1

–

1

2

Bretagne (pays d’état) Count de Châteaurenault (lieutenant-general) *Béchameil de Nointel (intendant 1691–1705) *Ferrand (intendant 1705–16) Bishop of Brieux Meannd (?) of Nantes M. de la Fontaine Duc de Rohan (president of the nobility in the estates) Bishop of Nantes Others2

13 –

15 3

20 3

13 2

12 1

73 9

5

–

–

–

–

5

–

6

8

4

6

24

– – – –

1 1 1 1

– – – –

– – – –

– – – –

1 1 1 1

1 7

– 4

– 9

3 4

– 5

4 29

Champagne-Brie Prince de Soubize (governor) *Harouys (intendant 1702–11) Phélypeaux (intendant of Paris) Archbishop of Reims Bishop of Meaux Comte de Grandpré (lieutenant-general at Reims) Abbé de Cestaux Archbishop of Sens Bishop of Troyes Bishop of Langres Penart (lieutenant-general at Sedan) Others

1 – –

18 1 9

13 – 7

20 – 11

4 – 4

56 1 31

–

–

1

2

–

3

– – –

1 1 1

– – –

– – –

– – –

1 1 1

– – – – 1

– – – – –

1 – – – –

– 1 1 1 –

– – – – –

1 1 1 1 1

–

5

4

1

–

10

Dauphiné (until March 1708)3 Duc de la Feuillade (governor) *Bauyn d’Angervilliers (intendant 1705–15) Others

–

17

–

–

–

17

–

1

–

–

–

1

–

12

–

–

–

12

–

4

–

–

–

4

4

sent

% of Total Sent  1.7%

15.8%

12.1%

 3.7%

Table 5.3 continued –

3

7

105

2

22

–

2

4

–

–

6

–

–

–

8

1

9

– – 1 –

1 –

– 1

– 1

– 1

–

2

1

–

1 3 1 3

Lyonnais (from March 1708)6 *Trudaine (intendant 1704–10) Duc de Villeroy (governor) Rochebonne (commandant) Archbishop of Lyon Ravat (provost of merchants of Lyon) Others

–

–

18

7

6

31

–

–

2

–

2

4

– – – –

– – – –

1 1 3 8

1 – – 4

1 – 1 2

3 1 4 14

–

–

3

2

1

6

Navarre et Béarn (pays d’état) Duc de Gramont (governor and lieutenant-general) *Pinon de Quincy (intendant 1694–99) *Macary (acting intendant)7 Bishop of Oléron Bishop of Tarbes Bishop of Bayonne Others

11

11

14

12

9

57

–

2

2

–

–

4

5

–

–

–

–

5

– 3 – – 3

5 2 1 – 1

7 1 1 1 2

6 1 – 1 4

5 – – – 4

23 7 2 2 14

Provence (pays d’état) Comte de Grignan (lieutenant-general) *Pierre-Cardin Lebret (intendant 1687–1704) *Cardin Lebret (intendant 1704–34) Pierre-Cardin Lebret (premier président Parlement of Aix, 1690–1710) Marquis de Buoren (in absence of Grignan) Duc de Vendôme (governor) Archbishop of Aix (presid.) Bishop of Fréjus Chalmazel (military commandant Toulon) Bishop of Marseilles Archbishop of Avignon Ancien échevins of Marseilles

14 –

52 11

47 14

44 9

19 1

176 35

6

–

–

–

–

6

–

15

13

9

1

38

–

5

–

–

1

6

1

–

–

–

–

1

– – – –

– 2 2 3

– 1 – 4

1 1 – 4

– 1 – 1

1 5 2 12

– – 1

1 7 1

– – –

– – –

– – –

1 7 2

Limousin et Angoumois (Limoges) *Rouillé de Fontaine-Guerin (intendant 1702–08) *Quarré de Montgeron (intendant 1708–10) Marlot-Vigen Bishop of Limoges Bishop of Angoulême Others

 4.8%

 6.7%

12.3%

38%

Table 5.3 continued Echevins (aldermen) of Marseilles Procureur généraux Parlement Procureur généraux Cour de Comptes Bishop of Vence Bishop of Apt Bishop of Sisteron Marie et conseillers de Toulon Vauvré (intendant of the Marine Toulon) Bishop of Toulon Blondel de Gouvernement8 Archbishop of Arles M. de la Gardie Others Saintonge (part of Limoges and of La Rochelle)9 *Bernage (intendant 1694–1702) *Begon (marine and provincial intendant) Bishop of Saintes Others Total Sent

–

1

–

–

–

1

–

3

–

–

–

3

–

1

–

–

–

1

– – – –

1 – – –

1 1 1 1

– – 1 –

1 – – –

3 1 2 1

–

–

1

3

–

4

– – – – 6

– – – – 4

1 – – – 9

– – – 2 14

1 1 1 – 10

2 1 1 2 43

710

2

6

4

3

22

4

–

–

–

–

4

–

2

4

4

3

13

1 1 49

– – 119

2 – 127

– – 111

– – 56

3 1 462

 4.8%

–

Sources: aae md 1041, fols 3–11, for Jan.–June 1697 (6 months); ibid., 1144, for Oct.–Dec. 1706 (3 months); ibid., 1158, fols 33, 63, 68, 103, 233, and 351, for July–Sept. 1708 (3 months); ibid., 1159, fols 8–12, for Oct.– Dec. 1708 (3 months); and ibid., 1163, fols 5–9, for Apr.–June 1709 (3 months).

1 Intendants are marked with an asterisk (*). 2 The category “Others” throughout this table is used in each of the sources. 3 Dauphiné was under Louvois until 1681, when he traded it to Croissy for the Trois Evêches; in March 1708, however, Dauphiné returned to the war department, while the foreign office received Lyon. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. 4 Nothing is listed for Dauphiné in this volume. 5 Data for Limousin only. 6 See note 3 above. 7 Antoine-François Méliand, intendant 1704 to 1710, also served as army intendant in Spain. Almanach Royal (1706), 56. 8 Charles-François Blondel de Jouvancourt, from 1704 commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille and commissaire général de la marine in Provence. The appellation “de Gouvernement” was used to distinguish him from his brother François Blondel de Sissonne, Torcy’s secretary. 9 In April 1694 La Rochelle was raised to an intendancy by joining the marine intendancy of the port city with territories taken from the surrounding generalities of Poitiers, Limoges, and Bordeaux; until 1717, the marine intendant at Rochefort also served as provincial intendant. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1346. The Angoumois remained with Limousin, while Saintonge was largely transferred to La Rochelle (in 1695, according to Smedley-Weil, Intendants, 40), although enough of Saintonge was left with the Angoumois for it to remain linked with Limousin on the list of generalities under the foreign secretary in 1715. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. 10 Saintonge is listed in this volume, while Limousin and the Angoumois are not, but the letter to the bishop of Angoulême is nonetheless classified under this heading.



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commissioners, including the governor and from 1689 the intendant. Beginning with the 1695 session, Adam delivered these documents and informed the commissioners precisely of the king’s desires, which were usually a financial contribution. Accompanied by a valet, he stayed long enough to see the preparations under way, but did not linger, since the meetings could last for months.191 These responsibilities made Adam a powerful figure in domestic affairs and fostered his professional and personal relationships with some of the provincial elite.192 Torcy’s secretary Blondel, Marseille’s lobbyist in Paris and at court from 1697 to 1712, made certain that from 1701 (which further supports the idea of the re-emergence of a domestic bureau just prior to that date) an annual pension of 1,500 livres went to Adam, who gratefully favoured the port’s interests.193 In 1704 the Paris agent of the consuls of Tulette in Dauphiné approached Controller General ­Chamillart about protecting their historic tax exemptions, but disappointing bargaining over the fee for his help led the agent to turn to Torcy’s more accommodating premier commis. With the intervention of the minister’s sister, Mme de Bouzols, and 1,000 livres to various persons to ease it along its way, the case was finally resolved in Tulette’s favour in 1706 at a cost of the 12,000 livres, with 1,500 livres going to the intendant of the Hôtel Croissy, premier commis Adam.194

T h e D e pa rt m e n t ’ s “ N etwork of Actors” As with Louis XIV’s other ministers, Torcy enjoyed a cumul de charges (accumulation of charges), which permitted him to accumulate additional posts, whether related or not. This privilege was often profitable in terms of power, patronage, and riches, but could wreck a ministerial career if too burdensome, as was clearly the case for Chamillart. Torcy, however, was fortunate because his cumul complemented his primary responsibilities and supplied vital services without being onerous. The same was true of some components of the royal household that were formally and informally subject to him.195 Other parts of the royal administration not under Torcy’s control also collaborated closely with the foreign office. One trend in recent public administration scholarship argues that the work of public bureaucracies “often takes place via networks of actors rather than solely within the confines of a single, hierarchical bureaucracy.”196 Much of this research focuses on the late twentieth century,197 yet early modern historians have turned increasingly to this network analysis.198 This approach certainly illuminates relationships among the

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parts of Torcy’s cumul as well as the foreign office’s interactions with parts of the royal household, with Renaudot’s Gazette, and with certain provincial groupings of power elites. Such networks consist of informal links between individuals in other parts of the government or entities outside of it that afford the “collaboration and coordination” needed to handle matters beyond the means of their individual constituents. Those at the top of the government might set up or encourage these networks, or they might arise from separate entities that commonly work together. Far from being antithetical to bureaucracy because of their informal nature or lack of a specified hierarchy, such networks are commonly found working alongside and in tandem with bureaucracies.199 The foreign office relied on many such networks. Some, discussed in this section and in later chapters, such as Marseille’s Gleise cabal (chapter 6), are more easily detected than those only glimpsed in the social activities – salons, dinners, “coffees,” and weddings – in which Torcy and members of his staff participated individually or together. Like our world, theirs was not one of all business and no play. Indeed, the two often overlapped. Much business was accomplished in the course of socializing, which was true of these bureaucrats as it was more obviously so of the ambassadors whose work was wrapped in rounds of public and private social events. As “surintendant general des postes et relais” (superintendent of posts and relay stations) from 1699 to 1721, Torcy managed the communication network essential to the efficient and effective functioning of all the departments and indeed to the very existence of a modern state. With the king remaining increasingly “centred” at Versailles and the Paris region, his words and those of the faithful servants at his side had to radiate forth in a timely and regular fashion by means of a reliable communication infrastructure. Special couriers were always an option, but they were a great expense to be avoided if possible. Instead, the heart of the communication network was the postal system that circulated information and correspondence between the centre and the periphery on a fairly consistent schedule. Its functioning was critical to the small central administration’s collaboration with the numerous royal and local officials required to govern the realm, as witnessed by the radial network of postal routes centred on Paris and largely in place by the beginning of the eighteenth century.200 Control of the post office also facilitated intelligence gathering because it afforded access to private correspondence by means of the infamous Cabinet noir in Paris’s main post office where letters to and from “suspected persons” were opened and ­copied. By profession, diplomats fit this description. The superintendence also offered



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Torcy further opportunities for one-on-one sessions with the king to regulate postal affairs and to share intelligence gleaned from the mails.201 The foreign ministry’s commis worked with postal officials on a daily basis, as we have already seen with de la Tournelle and his four mounted postal guards. Although Torcy was head of both departments, there was no other formal hierarchical linkage between them. Torcy employed a separate premier commis for postal matters, but this did not prevent the two entities from collaborating informally concerning couriers and mail surveillance. The post office is discussed in chapter 8, but for now it is noteworthy that the two controllers general of posts and relay stations who oversaw the whole system on behalf of the superintendent were also directly responsible for the mails of the court and Paris. The commis Louis Hainfray managed the “bureau des postes à la suite de la cour” (court postal bureau) at Versailles or wherever else the king might be.202 In addition, Guyot, “M[aît]re de la poste aux chevaux à la suite de la cour” (court postmaster for horses), was responsible for the many horses required for couriers and royal transportation.203 The superintendent’s responsibility encompassed the “Postes” (post office) handling the mail and the “Relais” (relay stations) transporting them. Relay stations were strung along the main highways radiating from Paris. Each was under a “maître de poste” (relay postmaster) who did not handle the mails, but provided the numerous fresh horses kept on hand for postal couriers, cabinet couriers, movements of the royal family, and for hire to other government departments and private travelers. The annual removal of the court to Fontainebleau, for example, in 1701 cost just over 17,832 livres for postilions, for horses used, crippled, or dead, and for the expenses of the three “visiteurs des postes” (postal inspectors) who coordinated it along the route.204 The Duke of Burgundy used postal horses in April 1702 to travel to Brussels to assume command of the Flanders front. Arrangements were undertaken by Torcy’s postal secretariat at a total cost of 8,373 livres: 6,423 for postilions and post horses, 600 for five relay postmasters along the route for dead or lamed horses, and 1,350 for the cost of gathering fresh horses. Burgundy again looked to Torcy after the successful siege of Brisach for horses for his return to Versailles.205 Gabriel Pigeon, “M[aît]re de la poste aux chevaux de la ville de Paris” (Paris postmaster for horses), escorted foreign couriers arriving in the capital to Versailles, Marly, or Fontainebleau. Upon entering France, they were required to check in with the relay postmasters along their route and obtain a passport from the superintendent once they reached Paris to avoid be taken for spies.206

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The royal household’s “courriers du cabinet” (cabinet couriers) were nominated to this venal office by the “grand écuyer” (grand equerry) and carried urgent or top-secret official dispatches.207 Five were assigned to the king and queen, one to each of the four secretaries of state (Grégoire Raisin was assigned to Torcy), one to the controller general, and one to the grand equerry, always at the ready to ride forth. The secretaries of state used riders other than the cabinet couriers, presumably when they were unavailable so that the rider could engage horses at the same reduced rate (governors could do the same).208 Since state business depended on these dispatches reaching provincial towns or foreign capitals expeditiously, messengers had access to fresh horses at all royal postal stations at a lower rate than that for private persons hiring horses. Depending on the weather, Torcy’s cabinet courier could ride hard from Versailles to The Hague in three or four days, Madrid in eight, Vienna in nine to ten, Turin in five, Venice in ten to twelve, and Rome in ten to eleven. The courier Bonfond exhibited a feat of strength and endurance by riding from Rome the day Pope Innocent XII died (27 September 1700) and reaching Versailles on the morning of 6 October. This allowed Louis XIV to order his cardinals to leave at once for Rome, where they arrived in time to enter the conclave and help elect ­Cardinal Albani as Clement XI, the first pontiff in a half-century friendly to France.209 Swift couriers proved invaluable in the competition to have the latest news. Torcy was stung in 1700 when the war secretary’s courier arrived at Fontainebleau with word of Carlos II’s death, but he had subsequent revenge. His courier outdistanced the war minister’s rider to reach Versailles in a record time of four days to allow Torcy to be the one to announce the December 1710 victory in Spain at Villa Viciosa to ­Maintenon and then to the king.210 Torcy also stood at the summit of a network of honours, the “Ordre de Saint-Esprit” (Order of the Holy Spirit) created by Henri III and the kingdom’s highest chivalric order. Foreign as well as French notables aspired to become a part of the order and its magnificent ceremonial, which were more than mere adornments. Chivalric orders were important “instrument[s] of state building” in that they encouraged and generously rewarded service to the monarch.211 On 12 August 1696, the day before his wedding, Torcy went to the king to take his oath as the grand treasurer of the Royal Orders, a charge inherited from his father.212 He sold it in 1701 when the king appointed him to succeed the late Barbezieux as the chancellor of the order (figure 5.11).213 Such was the prestige of this position that when Louis XIV presented his grandson

Figure 5.11 Torcy in ceremonial garb of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Torcy is wearing the eight-pointed cross (also seen at the top of the frame) suspended from a blue ribbon (cordon bleu) and robes of the Order of the Holy Spirit. His long mantle is of velvet and embroidered with gold and red flames to symbolize the tongues of fire at Pentecost. His ceremonial black hat with its white plume is on the table. The “H” with royal crowns above it and at its sides in the upper corners of the frame stands for Henri III, who founded the order in 1578.

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Berry and nephew Orléans with collars of the Order of the Golden Fleece from the new Bourbon king of Spain, Torcy stood in as chancellor of the Golden Fleece in the magnificent ceremony.214 The order’s four officers were lucrative and prestigious positions,215 but also entailed actual work and of a potentially contentious nature. Collaborating closely with the king on the selection of members provided Torcy with patronage possibilities at home as well as a means of rewarding the faithful French and foreigners who aided diplomacy. Establishing the requisite proofs of nobility could be touchy, as could the ever-contentious matter of ceremony. Adam managed much of the paperwork related to this charge and was well compensated for it.216 If Maintenon’s chamber, where the aging Louis XIV often met with his ministers, was the most important unofficial physical location of royal power, then the “Cabinet du roi” (king’s Cabinet) was its primary official centre, as was also the royal bedchamber. The Cabinet was where the monarch received important visitors such as ambassadors, met with his councillors, closeted with individual administrators and advisors, and worked privately with his Cabinet staff. The “huissier du cabinet du roi” (cabinet usher), of which there were two serving by semester, acted as doorkeeper to this the most restricted of public royal spaces, where entry was by invitation only. He summoned ministers to the Cabinet for meetings of the Conseil and then watched at the door to keep out the uninvited. Each usher received 660 livres annual gages and 600 livres of other compensation from the royal treasury in addition to food and lodging at court. Department accounts show that usher MichelNicolas Vassal also received an annual 600-livre pension from the foreign office.217 While no reason is given, it was perhaps a reward for his assistance with the diplomatic audiences that took place in the Cabinet. In any event, he was part of the network of actors outside the formal department needed to fulfil its many responsibilities. The foreign office benefited from the placement of other department personnel at the king’s side in his Cabinet. As a “secrétaire du Cabinet” (cabinet secretary), Bergeret enhanced his ability to brief the king on the minister’s behalf, which explains Bonrepaus’s hope that his friend and Croissy’s secretary Blondel might succeed to that office.218 As it happened, it was left vacant until 1698, when Louis XIV conferred it on Callières as a reward for his work at Ryswick, no doubt at Torcy’s suggestion or at least with his approval, for he and Callières worked closely and amicably. At the beginning of 1701, upon the passing of the venerable President Toussaint Rose, principal cabinet secretary since 1657,



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Callières was awarded his post, again with Torcy’s likely endorsement. This placed him daily at the king’s side assisting in drafting and writing his correspondence and creating an intimate working relationship that rivaled or exceeded that of any minister.219 Had an intimate or client of Torcy’s rivals Chamillart or Jérôme Pontchartrain laboured so close to the king’s side and to his ear, the results might have caused Torcy no end of trouble. There was another set of household offices important to diplomacy, especially when its ritual was played out in the theatre that was the court. Royal audiences typically took place in public in the royal bedchamber in the morning. The ushers and the first gentleman of the chamber had parts in these performances, but the real directors of the formalities were the introducers of ambassadors, venal royal household officers subject directly to the king. The introducers were essential moulders of the milieu of protocol that enveloped most diplomacy, and they worked in close collaboration and cooperation with Torcy and his staff on diplomatic visits and audiences.220 The palace and its grounds were the settings for the many formal and informal social occasions not ostensibly dedicated to negotiation. Yet they allowed Torcy and his master to seek to impress and take the measure of diplomats and visiting princes. Tours of the exquisite gardens of Versailles demonstrated the affluence and taste of a monarch who commanded men of genius to subject nature with such pleasing effect; with their hydraulic wonders, the gardens formed an integral part of the welcome given to important foreigners new to the wonders wrought by the Sun King. It is no surprise that Torcy, who like his master had a highly developed aesthetic sense, took part in such occasions.221 Clearly, neither the work of the foreign office nor its clerks were confined to the bureaus flanking the front of Versailles, but instead ranged throughout that vast complex in frequent and often intimate collaboration with others of its denizens, including postal staff and members of the royal household.

T h e In f o r m a l “Brai n Trust” In May 1709 Torcy walked a diplomatic tightrope as direct peace negotiations opened with Grand Pensionary Heinsius, the Duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene. Such high-level talks could result in triumph, disaster, or something in between for both France and the foreign secretary. He later reflected in his memoirs that while negotiating alone in The Hague, he realized that “in an affair of such importance he stood

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in need of assistance” and so summoned the veteran diplomat Rouillé to his side. Only a person with “very little experience,” he mused, could imagine “his own knowledge sufficient.” Such a one would likely “see his presumption punished by mistakes, which he could have avoided, had he taken prudent counsel.” Torcy knew that his plans could only benefit from discussion with an informed colleague willing to offer needed criticism, observing that the “mind is enlightened by contradictions when these arise from a mutual desire of seeking and discovering the truth.”222 This desire for frank and expert advice was characteristic of Torcy, who in the great Colbertian tradition sought it from outside his department as well. The foreign ministry’s bureaus were also linked to an informal and loosely structured “brain trust of specialists” comprised of a variety of experts.223 Those few regularly employed by the foreign office served in capacities that set them apart from the clerks. These intellectuals and scholars, with a wide range of interests and occupations, typically resided in Paris or nearby, but were linked with the learned throughout France and Europe, receiving and sharing scholarly as well as political and court news.224 From his uncle and his father Torcy inherited the services of Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, the well-connected scholar and spymaster, and Pierre Clairambault, librarian and genealogist. Both worked for other ministers as well. Torcy engaged the services of Abbé JeanBaptiste Dubos, a well-traveled intellectual, writer, and notable figure of the early Enlightenment, in frequent correspondence with the critic and philosopher Pierre Bayle from the 1690s until the latter’s death in 1706. Dubos contributed to and defended Bayle’s learned and provocatively heterodox Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1687) and drew others into contributing to Bayle’s widely read publication, including members of Torcy’s brain trust, such as Nicolas Clément, head of the royal library.225 Using his contacts in the Republic of Letters for purchasing books abroad, Dubos received copies from London of the works of the English political arithmetician Charles Davenant from none other than John Locke, which the abbé then used for French propaganda purposes.226 Another of Bayle’s long-time co-labourers in the Republic of Letters, Daniel Larroque, had interacted with many of these savants since the early 1680s and continued to do so when he entered Torcy’s service as a translator. Antony McKenna, in his introduction to a volume of Bayle’s correspondence, lists Dubos and Larroque among the “secretaries” of the Republic of Letters, each with his own “réseau” (network) of correspondents.227



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Like his father, Torcy was careful to cultivate and even protect the librarians of important collections. A case in point is the affair of Jean Aymon, former French priest and now a married Calvinist minister, who arrived in Paris to sell a collection to the royal library and attracted the interest of Clément, Pontchartrain, and Cardinal-Archbishop Noailles by feigning a desire to reconvert and help with anti-Huguenot propaganda. Clément allowed him access to the library, but when Aymon disappeared with several ancient manuscripts of potential value to the Protestant cause, it touched off a crisis in the Republic of Letters. While many Protestants rejoiced over Aymon’s acquisitions, Clément appealed through Renier Leers to the higher values of scholarship over sectarian loyalties and the chevalier de Croissy enlisted the covert assistance of moderate Protestant pastor Jacques Basnage and his brother journalist Henri Basnage de Beauval to recover the stolen items. Apprised of the theft, the king had Torcy intervene, which he did initially through the Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin, but given the state of war between France and the Dutch, it was only in 1709 that the StatesGeneral saw to it that Aymon returned the most important stolen manuscript to the chevalier de Croissy, who traveled to The Hague to receive it.228 Clairambault, another Colbert librarian, assisted Torcy from 1698 as genealogist of the Royal Orders, an essential post given the proof of four degrees of hereditary nobility required for membership.229 After 1700 Clairambault and his friend and fellow scholar Abbé Joachim Le Grand paged through many an arcane genealogical text or dusty document on Torcy’s behalf to resolve the sensitive issue of aligning French chivalric orders with those of newly Bourbon Spain.230 At his behest, Clairambault also researched the rights of the marc d’or, a tax on the registration of the provisions for venal offices that paid the gages of the officers of the Order of the Holy Spirit.231 The Oratorian Joachim Le Grand was a widely traveled master of many languages, avid researcher, and prolific author of historical works who educated Pomponne’s nephew and the young Victor Marie, comte then duc d’Estrées in the early 1680s. A series of disputes over Reformation history with Anglican bishop Gilbert Burnet from 1685 to 1691 led him to frequent the royal library, where he joined the learned circle of Melschisidec Thévenot, Clément, Baluze, Renaudot, and Clairambault.232 In 1692 Abbé d’Estrées, named ambassador to Portugal, engaged Le Grand as his secretary. When he returned to Paris around August of 1697, Le Grand had mastered Portuguese and gathered source materials he later used to write on Portuguese history. His plans for a study on Louis XI

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took him, with Louis Pontchartrain’s authorization, on several provincial journeys in search of manuscripts. His busy authorial activities were interrupted in 1702 when he went as secretary with Cardinal d’Estrées and his nephew the abbé, this time to Spain. Le Grand remained as secretary when Abbé d’Estrées replaced his uncle as ambassador in 1703 and accompanied d’Estrées and Philip V to the Portuguese frontier in 1704. He also undertook favours for friends and patrons, such as copying designs of the royal Spanish insignia and forms of address for Clairam­ bault.233 He resided with Clairambault when he returned home in 1704 and was summoned by Torcy in 1705 to assist in organizing, summarizing, and creating tables for diplomatic papers with the help of six assistants, serving the foreign office thereafter on a permanent basis.234 Other experts included Abbé René Aubert de Vertôt, historian and associate of the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres who served the foreign office as a writer.235 Jean de La Chapelle, a financial official, aspiring dramatist, and member of the Académie française, penned propaganda for the ministry. Like the others, both were men of some standing in literary circles at court and throughout Europe, valued and respected for their knowledge and intellectual abilities. All these experts were widely agreed to possess “specialized practical or productive knowledge” based in part on their own experience and in part on information gathered by others from which they drew useful abstractions for royal service.236 Such knowledge was a valued commodity in early modern Europe and was exchanged and diffused by means of a vast network of thousands of correspondents who managed to permeate barriers to the free flow of information posed by confessional differences and war. This flow included new and used books, copies from manuscripts and rare books, research queries and answers, corrections to published works, and recommendations that created new personal or epistolatory links among scholars. Personal and political news was an important part of this as well.237 Torcy valued these experts and the precious commodity of information and networks of informants they offered. He consulted them on historical and legal questions238 and on countries to which they had traveled. He also engaged them for research and writing projects relating to his administrative tasks and for the production of propaganda. Several of them, as will be seen, contributed significantly to the genesis and implementation of Torcy’s academy for the training of diplomats. Indeed, discussions and exchanges through the networks of the Republic of Letters helped spread ideas and models for diplomatic professionalism beyond France.239



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The Republic of Letters was also a rich source of information for Torcy on the movement of ideas outside of France. The Huguenot refugee and moderate pastor Jacques Basnage, the chevalier de Croissy’s friend, encountered Torcy in May 1709 when the foreign secretary journeyed to The Hague for secret peace talks. During the 1710 Gertruydenberg peace talks, Basnage likely advised Dutch negotiators Willem Buys and Bruno Van der Dussen on the hopes of the French Huguenot refugees. In April 1711 the pastor sent Torcy condolences on the death of the Dauphin, and they remained in contact thereafter. With the full knowledge of his protector Heinsius, Basnage supplied Torcy with pertinent pamphlets and news about international events and the state of public opinion in the United Provinces and England, and the foreign secretary pumped him for information about Buys, the Dutch negotiator. Basnage also helped the French delegation with passports and housing at the Utrecht peace conference. In turn, Torcy did what he could to assure that Basnage’s sister, who had returned to France and converted, inherited their late mother’s large Normandy estate, since he could not.240 Although not actually a member of Torcy’s brain trust, Basnage nonetheless made it clear that Torcy was open to sources of useful information no matter where he might find it. Torcy’s circle of specialists also embraced envoys and other embassy personnel home from duty abroad, retired diplomats, former commis, and royal household officials. Some, such as Polignac, he had known from his youth. Likewise, Iberville, a Pomponne commis from 1678 retained by Croissy, became treasurer of France at Caen in 1687 and then joined Normandy’s Chambre des comptes. Appointed resident in Geneva in 1688, he remained at that vital listening post until 1698, served thereafter as extraordinary envoy to Mainz, Genoa, and Spain, and crowned his career with a posting to London from 1713 to 1717. Iberville was cultivated and politically pragmatic, a friend of literary figures such as Fontenelle, Renaudot, and Clément, and generally well regarded, especially by Torcy.241 Callières and Rousseau de Chamoy were active diplomats. From 1683, Callières actively participated in a group of Colbert clients that included Renaudot, Thévenot, premier commis Bergeret, and others with expertise or interest in non-European languages and locations, particularly in the east. They were especially connected with navy secretary Seignelay, the location of whose department bureaus led some to dub them the “Society of the rue des Victoires.”242 When negotiating at Ryswick in 1697, Callières was among those of the French delegation who journeyed to Rotterdam to pay their homage to Bayle.243 A former

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jeune de langues and current interpreter at the Constantinople embassy, Benjamin Brue, was in Paris in 1709–10 on behalf of the French Levant community to report to Torcy on the erratic and violent behaviour of Ambassador Ferriol. While in France, he interacted with other orientalists and numismatists and drafted a number of memoirs at Torcy’s request on Ottoman affairs and Ferriol’s comportment. Interestingly, the ambassador’s sister Mme de Ferriol, said to be Torcy’s mistress, facilitated Brue’s presentation to Torcy of an agate he had brought from the Levant. Torcy was delighted.244 François Pidou de Saint-Olon, another close associate, became a “gentilhomme ordinaire” (ordinary gentleman) in the king’s household in the late 1680s through his father’s connection with Colbert. Although of a relatively poor noble family, he received a good education, traveled widely, and was polite, easy of manner, and polished of speech. He often read to the king, carried royal messages, conducted guests on palace tours, and sometimes served as an unofficial master of ceremonies.245 His youthful travels to Morocco and along the Barbary Coast to Cairo, Aleppo, Smyrna, Constantinople, and back through the Adriatic, studying Arabic along the way, later led Croissy to have him instruct Torcy about North Africa and the Ottoman Empire. In 1682, as extraordinary envoy to Genoa, he gathered intelligence on the city’s finances and port facilities, and he subsequently advised Croissy on Mediterranean and Italian affairs. During the struggle between Innocent XI and Louis XIV in 1687 and 1688, he was Croissy’s personal representative guarding the nuncio Angelo Maria Ranuzzi being held under house arrest.246 Before Torcy’s 1689 departure for Rome, Saint-Olon briefed him on his conversations with Ranuzzi. Later, Torcy and Louis XIV had him carry gifts and greetings to the Sultan of Morocco, who had requested that a man of quality be sent to his court. When he returned to Paris in 1694, he described his adventures in a book beautifully illustrated by an artist in his entourage. His successful mission led Sultan Moulay Isma’il to respond to Louis XIV’s invitation by sending an embassy of his own to Versailles in 1698.247 Carried by a French fleet, the Moroccans reached Brest at the end of November to be met by Saint-Olon and his friend and associate François Petit de la Croix, the Collège royal’s professor of Arabic. Saint-Olon was present at the Moroccans’ day-long conference with Jérôme Pontchartrain and Torcy and when the latter presented them to the king. He cautioned Torcy that the sultan’s greed, vanity, and ambition were limitless, but tempered this gloomy observation by noting that even if a treaty were not signed at once, at least a Moroccan



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sovereign had begun diplomatic relations with the king and accepted the king’s gifts.248 In 1715 he assisted in the Persian embassy’s reception, meeting it at Marseilles and accompanying it to Versailles.249 When Torcy needed expert advice, he was adept at recruiting specialists from other departments as well. The engineer Vauban, long associated with the Le Telliers, gravitated after Louvois’s death to Jérôme Pontchartrain. Although he had intensely disliked Torcy’s uncle, he had nonetheless worked with him on fortifications.250 Vauban frequented the salons of Torcy’s sister, duchesse de Saint-Pierre, and his purported mistress, Marie-Angélique de Tencin, comtesse de Ferriol, where he encountered the minister, ambassadors, and savants such as Antoine Furetière, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, and Abbé Dubos, who may have introduced him to Davenant’s political arithmetic. Vauban collaborated with Torcy on common concerns that included propaganda.251 In need of expert advice on Spanish trade, Torcy sought out Nicolas Mesnager from the newly established Council of Commerce. Mesnager knew global commerce, grasped the intricacies of the Spanish asiento agreement, and had written a widely acclaimed book on Spanish trade. Torcy sent him to Holland several times for commercial negotiations. Valuing Mesnager’s expertise and modesty, he nominated him a plenipotentiary to the Utrecht Congress in 1712 and instructed his clerks to supply him with whatever data he needed.252 The ability to have swift consultation among individuals in this shifting assortment of experts largely depended on who was not away from Paris, absent from court, on assignment abroad, or preoccupied with another project. This brain trust shows again that there is more to a bureaucracy than what appears on the typical organizational chart (including those in the present work!). Torcy and his commis sought and received expert advice of all kinds based on the studies, travels, contacts, life experiences, and reflections of a network outside the bureaus, comprised of savants and diplomats that stretched throughout Europe. Important parts of the foreign ministry’s work, including propaganda, would have languished without the research and writing they did. Departing diplomats would have received less-satisfactory briefing for lack of the cosmopolitan contribution of these experts. Commercial negotiations would have suffered from the lack of precise data and analysis by those familiar with the intricacies of manufacturing, agriculture, and trade. Of course, Torcy, his fellow ministers, and especially the king had the final say in the formulation of policy, but although we cannot calculate precisely the value of the expert advice they received, we

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must not underestimate it. It has been observed, “We shall generally find that the triangular person has got into the square hole, the oblong into the triangular, and a square person has squeezed himself into the round hole. The officer and the office, the doer and the thing done, seldom fit so exactly that we can say they were almost made for each other.”253 This reality requires that we look beyond formal structures to complementary networks of actors if we wish to understand bureaucratic organizations. Prescribed organizational structures and the personnel who populate them impose constraints upon one another; contingency theory demonstrates that it is out of their daily dialectic that organizational reality emerges.254 Although we have already mentioned several of Torcy’s clerks, we now turn to a more detailed examination of these individuals and the groups to which the belonged in order to perceive the foreign office’s organizational reality.

6 The Triumph of the Commis

Clerks of all stripes, targets of growing anti-bureaucratic invective during the eighteenth century, nonetheless gave life to the evolving organization of the foreign ministry and were major contributors to its glory then and later. As Louis XIV himself noted in regard to himself, “Not all the reputation of great men is formed by great actions. Since the most menial ones are performed the most often, it is on them that our true inclinations are judged.”1 This was equally true of Torcy’s clerks as seen in the tasks they performed within the ministry’s bureaus and in the personal networks they drew on beyond its walls. In this chapter we reconstruct some careers that illustrate the fundamental personal interconnections that underlay this bureaucracy’s functioning. The clerk’s world was at first glance a small one of bureaucrats toiling in the rather artificial administrative city of Versailles.2 There or in Paris, they laboured and lived typically in close proximity to the minister and to one another.3 Many owed their position to a father or uncle, and the kinship network extended further because several department families were connected by marriage, both prior to and after entry into the foreign office. Most of Croissy’s and Torcy’s clerks entered the department because of links with the Colbert client network or, after Torcy’s marriage, with that of Pomponne. It would be misleading, however, to portray the careers, especially of the premiers commis, as circumscribed by the foreign office, the royal palace, or the capital. A premier commis typically owned property outside the capital, often a country seat with feudal appurtenances that signaled his arrival and further ascent in society and included a role in local life.4 Clerks were attached to roots, whether of long standing or of recent planting, that typically intertwined with those of the local elite families and their interests. Marriage alliances outside the department

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could enhance a premier commis’s influence and standing. He usually held significant outside offices that provided him with nobility, prestige, and sometimes significant revenues (table 6.1). Documents identifying a premier commis usually listed the titles of these offices first. Indeed, he might not even identify himself as a premier commis, preferring only his more socially significant titles.5 Such offices also allowed a premier commis to acquire contacts, relationships, information, and influence6 outside the department, lessening his complete dependence on the minister and linking him to other powerful patrons. In a system where the monarch could make or break a minister at will, it behooved those in his entourage to avoid “placing all their bets on one horse.” If a minister died, was passed over, or fell, his clients, including his clerks, had to have other patrons to turn to or some other means of retaining ministerial or royal favour.7 When the great accumulations of posts held by the Colberts and Le Telliers before 1691 gave way to a greater number of separate departments and a wider dispersion of ministerial power, the scope and sway of the past’s extensive ministerial clienteles also declined. A new patronage system more directly dependent on the monarch and more related to the staff member’s knowledge and skill meant more independence from the current minister and greater staff stability when he left office. Ministerial favour and connections still mattered in obtaining positions and advancement within a department’s bureaucracy, but professionalism played an increasing role.8 These fluid circumstances made venal offices a wise investment for family survival and advancement.9 The office of secretary of the king, for example, even elevated its holder into the same corporate body to which all secretaries of state were still required to belong.10 Yet the minister and the department’s work also profited from the links of his clerks and their kin with other parts of the administration and with influential families at court, throughout France, and abroad. For this reason, our discussion of clerks will as much as possible consider them as groups, especially based on kinship and marriage, and explore the family and clientage networks outside the department within which they were embedded. Since many of these bonds were forged long before Torcy’s time, we are drawn to the early seventeenth century, which is fitting since early modern people saw themselves not as isolated individuals but as embedded in a continuum reaching back and forward in time. The notion of the “self-made man” was foreign to their thinking, whereas clans and lineages were not.11 Individuals belonged to kinship and clientage networks through which they both expressed and restrained their individuality.12

Table 6.1 Venal offices, honours, and other positions held by the department’s clerks

Clerk Clair Adam Charles Mignon

Year Entered Dept. 1667 1680

• 1691–1723

•

• 1706–16

•

•

c. 1675

• 1683–98

François Blondel

1680

• 1694–96 • 1697–98 • 1697–1712 • 1699–1711 • 1704–24

Michel Fournier

1680

• ? • 1673–? • 1698–

1730? Charles-François Noblet

1698

• 1685 • 1691 • 1697 • 1702 • 1702

Antoine Pecquet

1700

• 1705–13 • 1713–20 • 1715 • 1717–28

Victor Goulu de Ligny Antoine-François Faucard de Beauchamp

Venal Offices, Honours, and Other Positions

Years Held

1702

• Before

1707

• 1713

1702– ?

Secretary of the king 1 Treasurer of the ambassadors • Receiver of tailles at Péronne in Picardy • Secretary of the king • Treasurer of France at Caen • Secretary of the king • Agent for city and chamber of Marseille in Paris • Intendant and alternate authorizing officer in the king’s buildings department • Secretary of the king • Alternate receiver general of tailles at Péronne in Picardy • Treasurer of France at Caen • Treasurer of France at Rouen • Secretary of the king • Garde des Minutes (custodian of the minutes) of the Grand Chancellery • Chevalier of the Order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem and of Notre-Dame de Mont-Carmel • Greffier en chef (chief registrar) of the Chambre des comptes • Secretary des commandements (of commandments) of the Duke of Burgundy • Auditor in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany • Treasurer of France general of finances in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany • Granted letters of nobility • Secretary of the king • Commis of the Extraordinary of War for the Army of Italy • Maître (master) in the Chambre des Comptes of Brittany

Sources: See the notes relating to each individual in chapter 6.

1 There is no indication of any offices held by premiers commis Aubert and Marolot, but neither of them was a secretary of the king. 2 The office of secretary of the king is noted in small capitals because it was such an important path for advancement into the nobility and was also necessary so that this office-holder could countersign royal acts.

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While service to the minister and increasingly to the king motivated a clerk in his work, an equal or even greater incentive was the proximity it afforded him to information concerning royal favours to be granted and to those empowered to award them. Unquestionably, the minister was served by staff intent upon enhancing the position and wealth of themselves and the other members of their kinship network.13

T he M ig n o n s : M u n ic ipa l Offi ce, Bourgeoi s T r a d e s , a n d Fi nance Croissy’s death brought no immediate personnel changes to the department since the new secretary was no outsider, but a co-worker among men with whom he had grown up and learned his craft. Charles Mignon,14 who remained premier commis, was from a provincial family of new men emerging in the decades before the Colbert ascendancy at court (figure 6.1).15 Even before Mignon entered Colbert service, one brother became a “gen du roi” (one who represented the king in a parlement), another became a secretary of the king, and his sisters made promising marriages into well-connected and ascending provincial and Parisian families in the judiciary, finance, and booming bourgeois trades. Like that of the other premiers commis, Mignon’s employment with Croissy and Torcy was not the beginning or even the cause of his ascent, but signaled how far his family had already risen outside the department. It was emblematic as well of the decline of noble clienteles in the face of growing ministerial clienteles.16 Service to the Colberts certainly enhanced Mignon’s status and provided him and his kin further opportunities, but it was only one, although increasingly the most significant, of many ladders in a strategy of family ascent. From a family of lawyers in Berry, Charles Mignon’s father, René I Mignon,17 served as intendant of the Pot de Rhodes family: first, for Marguerite d’Aubray, widow of François Pot de Rhodes, grand master of ceremonies of France, who died in 1622, and then for their son Claude, who succeeded to his father’s office, dying in 1642.18 From as early as 1623, however, René was also attached to the urbane Charles de l’Aubespine, sieur de Châteauneuf and Abbé Préaux, like his father a respected diplomat and member of parlement.19 René resided with him in Paris as his intendant and secretary.20 Named “garde des sceaux” (guard of the seals) in 1630, Châteauneuf saw his seigneury raised to a barony and then to a marquisate. His soaring ambition resulted in twenty years of fruitless conniving to displace Richelieu and then ­Mazarin as head of

Figure 6.1 Genealogical chart: the Mignons. The birth order of the Mignon siblings is an approximation based on the available information.

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the royal council. Although he was close to Anne of Austria, his incessant intrigues eventually alienated the king and Richelieu, resulting in 1633 in his disgrace and ten-year imprisonment. His trusted agent René was also arrested and closely questioned, especially about his master’s papers, and then put in the Bastille. He was soon released, however, and back attending to Châteauneuf’s business, such as overseeing additions to his chateau at Montrouge just south of Paris in collaboration with the architect François Mansart and the master stonemason Michel Villedo. Châteauneuf’s fortunes improved with Richelieu’s death, but he was unable to replace the new cardinal in the queen regent’s confidence, even though he regained the seals in 1650 when the Fronde forced her to seek an ally. Aged seventy-two and still not reconciled to Mazarin’s hegemony, Châteauneuf lost his office again the next year, but still schemed and was briefly recalled until Mazarin’s triumphant return from exile in 1652 ended all his hopes and led to his own exile in Berry.21 As he lay dying, Mazarin, ever anxious to win over former opponents even if not affording them his full trust, smoothed the way for Châteauneuf’s heirs to succeed to their inheritance.22 René administered Châteauneuf’s provision for the construction of a family tomb in a chapel in Bourges Cathedral (completed in about 1659). Acting as agent for Châteauneuf’s brother and heir, he again worked with Mansart and also with the sculptor Philippe de Buyster.23 Like Châteauneuf, René I Mignon was a man of Paris as well as of Bourges. The business of his imprisoned or exiled master drew him often to the capital. In 1648, at the outset of the Fronde, the courtier F ­ rançois de Rochechouart, sieur de Jars, Châteauneuf’s friend and fellow conspirator against both cardinals, commissioned Mansart to build a townhouse for him in the trendy new quarter on (ironically) rue Richelieu. Since Jars borrowed from Châteauneuf for the project and likely from Mignon as well, Mignon handled the finances and was presumably otherwise involved, especially since the master stonemason at the site, Michel Villedo fils, had married Mignon’s daughter Anne three years earlier.24 Joseph Bergin warns that “the vocabulary of service conceals as much as it reveals about seventeenth-century realities.”25 Thus, secretaries and valets who served noble households, despite such seemingly humble labels, could actually do so with pride as they basked in their masters’ reflected status and power, much like those with similar positions in the royal household. Early modern grandees were not isolated i­ndividuals, but rose and fell because of the family (of blood as well as of ­marriage),



The Triumph of the Commis 231

friends, patrons, clients, and servants surrounding them, literally from cradle to grave. As elite fortunes waxed and waned, so often did those of persons connected with them, including servants. What domestics lacked in birth and initial status they made up for in daily direct or written contact with their “betters” and the intimate knowledge they possessed of their fortune and most private affairs. The typically scattered property holdings and financial assets (and liabilities) of the upper nobility required an extensive management network of assistants with legal and administrative skills. At a time when the overlapping or even blending of the private and public was both accepted and pushed to its limits, the ranks of experienced household servants provided public officials loyal as well as talented recruits. Like his master did when serving the king, a noble’s servant mixed the advancement of his own kin and clients with his master’s business. As long as this did not violate his interests, the master both approved and aided this with rewards and preferments, which curiously often resulted in a financial symbiosis wherein the rewarded servant personally loaned money to his noble employer, who, like most noblemen, was forever short of money.26 This is the context of René I Mignon’s service to Châteauneuf and his own strategy of family advancement. The alliance with the Villedos was just one of the promising matches arranged for his numerous children from among his master’s and his own connections in Berry and Paris. René I’s own bride was Gertrude La Houst, an Antwerp native who received a naturalization letter on 25 February 1623 and married Mignon three months later.27 She also appears in a 1654 agreement concluded between the churchwardens at Montrouge and the Mignons, and is listed as heir of the late Pierre Fouquet, controller of the household of the late prior of Condé.28 Like her husband, her kin, too, served as agents of the nobility. The Mignons established themselves at Montrouge and enjoyed a privileged position in local society. The five Mignon daughters were all married by 1658. Charlotte married Jean Marpon, seigneur d’Oislon and de Chezeau, commissioner general of marine artillery, king’s councillor, and president treasurer general for the king in Berry.29 As already noted, Anne wed Michel Villedo fils.30 Jeanne married Claude Bécuau, sieur de Coulombe and des Réaux, king’s councillor for the bailliage of Berry and the présidial of B ­ ourges, 31 and mayor of Bourges (1678–82), while Marguerite wed Nicolas Fournier, perhaps from a family of stone masons and royal architects.32 Finally, Gertrude (died 1700) married Charles Noblet de Morgard (died c. 1686), secretary to François-Marie l’Hospital, duc de Vitry, and

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a ­secretary of the king from 1653 to 1685.33 Each of these marriages involved a husband either in or eventually drawn into Colbert’s service. Yet three husbands were from family circles originally opposed to the cardinals or to Colbert and were therefore under some shadow when Louis XIV’s personal reign began. Like his father-in-law, Jean Marpon served the l’Aubespine family as procureur for François de l’Aubespine, seigneur d’Hauterive, brother and heir of the garde des sceaux, although his older brother, Richard Marpon, had served Richelieu. As one of the two commissioners general of marine artillery and a member of the bureau of finances for Berry, Jean Marpon (if he lived that long) may have eventually migrated into Colbert’s clientage as the fortunes of the l’Aubespines waned.34 The second duc de Vitry, whom Charles Noblet served, was a son of Nicolas de l’Hospital, marshal and first duc de Vitry, acclaimed assassin of the hated royal favourite Concino Concini and from 1637 imprisoned at Richelieu’s instigation, though he was released at the cardinal’s death. Disgruntled with Anne’s regency, the second duke was a Frondeur supporting Cardinal Jean-François de Gondi, cardinal de Retz and garde des sceaux Châteauneuf. Memory of his father’s past service to the crown, however, won him rehabilitation, and Vitry eventually added diplomacy to his military service to the crown. He married (1646) the daughter of Grand Master of Ceremonies Claude Pot de Rhodes, whose family René I Mignon had served as intendant.35 This may explain the marriage to Gertrude Mignon of Vitry’s secretary Charles Noblet, son of Michel Noblet, avocat in the Paris parlement, and newly minted nobleman by the purchase of the office of secretary of the king in 1651. Noblet was also connected to Pomponne, to whom he loaned money and sold property in Paris for building an orangerie. During the first half of the 1660s Pomponne was also under a shadow, doubly damned in the king’s eye by his family’s Jansenism and his own links with Nicolas Fouquet, which may have tainted Noblet as well.36 However, Villedo fils, Louis Le Vau’s entrepreneur at the fallen minister’s Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte, like the other talented builders and artists who had served Fouquet, was drawn into the king’s and Colbert’s service.37 The other matches were with men clearly in both cardinals’ camps. Although in the 1660s Claude Bécuau earned low marks in the intendant’s report to Colbert as a judge in the Bourges présidial, he was from a line of Bourges municipal officials who had remained loyal to the king during the Fronde and was therefore a valued client.38 While mayor of Bourges, he negotiated the city’s 1682 acquisition of the Hôtel Jacques



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Coeur and the Hôtel Limoges from Colbert, marquis de Châteauneuf since 1679, to the minister’s financial advantage. Subsequent municipal officials complained not about the 33,000 livres cost, but about what they regarded as the humiliating and onerous additional requirement: every four years on the feast of Saint Jean-Baptiste (!) they were as a group to present to the marquis in person a gold medal with his arms on one side and those of Bourges and its current mayor on the other. They groused at the unseemliness of the magistrates of the proud former capital of Gaul leaving their city unprotected while they trudged off to a small town to render homage. Bécuau may also have delayed the next municipal election to allow Secretary of State Croissy to push through a list of candidates favoured by the king.39 The Mignon’s second son, Jacques, was wed on 29 January 1658 to Louise Le Vau, the not-yet-sixteen-year-old daughter of the famous architect with whom René I had earlier worked. This wedding took place two days after that of Louise’s older sister Jeanne Le Vau, who married Henry Guichard, who like his father served in the Orléans household. Each of Louis Le Vau’s daughters received a dowry of 60,000 livres and, even better, a Paris house built by her father on the fashionable Île Saint-Louis. Jacques Mignon was later involved with his brother-inlaw ­Guichard’s bitter quarrel with the musician Jean-Baptiste Lully.40 Le Vau, son of a master mason, himself had eschewed the normal selection of a mate from among other mason families and did so for his daughters as well, part of a strategy of social advancement that led to his appointment as royal architect in 1655.41 Jacques Mignon’s own ascent was apparent when he joined (2 May 1656) the Metz parlement as second avocat général. As one of the gens du roi he participated in several of the parlement’s clashes with the city officials and royal governor of Toul, where it reluctantly sat, and in 1658 he was physically attacked by the governor’s agents. Although by 1661 Jacques had left that post, he remained a councillor secretary of the king and apparently became linked with Colbert.42 After Louis Le Vau’s death as a bankrupt in 1670, Jacques Mignon and his brother-in-law Guichard joined the other creditors in their legal assaults, including charges of embezzlement, on Le Vau’s estate. Although his widow appealed to Colbert for protection from her sons-in-law, he stood aside during this assault on the former royal architect’s reputation.43 Jacques’s older brother René II did not marry until 1675, when he wed Marguerite, daughter of Claude I Robert, a distinguished avocat au ­Parlement of Paris, originally from Chartres. Her oldest brother, Claude II

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Robert, was a financier who became royal prosecutor in the New Châtelet that Colbert created in 1674 and served as the Colbert family’s legal advisor. Interestingly, Claude II’s Châtelet assignment included assisting in its Chambre des bâtiments, where matters relating to building were regulated and adjudicated, including disputes between entrepreneurs and their suppliers and workers. Three general masters sat alternatively in Paris or at Versailles to settle disputes and control entrance into the ranks of master masons. In 1674 François Villedo, brother of Claude II’s sister’s brother-in-law, Michel Villedo fils, was one of them. M ­ arguerite’s youngest brother, François-Roger Robert, would likewise join Colbert’s clientage as a navy officer of the pen in 1682, ending his fifty-four years of service as intendant of Brest.44 In 1658 René II Mignon became a secretary of the king upon the resignation of brother-in-law Jean ­Marpon’s brother Richard, who had spent the requisite twenty years in office to acquire nobility but had no children of his own. René II benefited from the custom whereby a family ennobled its members by rotating this office among them.45 Like his father and his brother-in-law, young René II entered the l’Aubespines’ service as intendant for François de l’Aubespine, marquis de Châteauneuf, the garde des sceaux’s brother and heir.46 After his own father’s death (René I died some time before May 1665), René II remained with the l’Aubespines, even when François died and his son Charles became marquis in 1670. Sometime after his own 1675 marriage into the Colbert clientage, however, René II entered Colbert’s service as his intendant and confidential agent. Colbert, who had long desired a holding in Berry, jumped at the opportunity to acquire Châteauneuf and other seigneuries from the l’Aubespines when they lost them in a 1679 court judgment. Their former intendant took charge of this rich mixture of urban and rural lands and rights on Colbert’s behalf, facilitating the transition. In May 1681 the Châteauneuf barony was erected into a marquisate held directly from the king.47 René II worked with his new master to improve the productivity of the farms, to introduce cloth manufacturing to relieve rural poverty, and to acquire further noble lands. For his efforts he was awarded the contract (“traité”) for the general receipts of Bourges in 1680.48 It was likely René II Mignon who arranged with his brother-in-law, Bourges mayor Claude Bécuau, the municipality’s purchase of Jacques Coeur’s properties that flattered Colbert’s ego and irked the other city fathers. This is the milieu into which Charles Mignon, another of René I’s sons, began his association with the Colberts.49 Yet the chronology of



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the family’s migration into the Colbert clientage suggests that Charles Mignon was in fact the first to enter it during summer 1663, when he joined Croissy as secretary on his journey to the Estates of Brittany as commissioner general. Mignon followed Croissy later that year to an intendancy in Tours and Poitiers (until 1665) and to one in Amiens and Soissons in 1666. During the War of Devolution in 1667, Croissy served as intendant of the Army of Flanders. The following year he was named a state councillor and the first intendant of newly conquered Flanders, presumably still assisted by Mignon. In 1668, with Mignon as his secretary, Croissy traveled as extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary to the peace congress at Aix-la-Chapelle and then to England as ambassador until January 1674.50 In London, Mignon became friends with the great diarist Samuel Pepys, clerk of the acts of the Navy Board, who visited Mignon when he and Mrs Pepys journeyed to Paris in September and October 1669.51 Croissy was designated one of the plenipotentiaries to the Nijmegen peace congress in June 1675, but it was only a year later that the French delegation, with Mignon as secretary, received passports from the Spanish. It required two more years of tough talking to bring the Dutch and then the Spanish to terms. A grateful Louis XIV presented Mignon with a medal depicting Louis XIII, which became a valued family heirloom.52 Six months after the signing but while the negotiators were still in Nijmegen, the king commissioned a commemorative painting of it in which a standing Mignon is shown handing a pen to Godefroy, comte d’Estrades, with Croissy seated to his left ­(figure 6.2).53 He was likely with Croissy in Bavaria in 1679, where he was extraordinary envoy to the elector until named to replace Pomponne on 20 November. When he took office two months later, Mignon served as one of his two premiers commis, with great influence in Croissy’s department, in other parts of the royal administration, and in the provinces.54 One year after returning from London, Mignon married (contract signed 24 February 1675). He joined himself not just to a wife but, in the manner of early modern marriages, to a web woven from the threads of kinship and clientage. Catherine Lefouin (Le Fouin) was the daughter of Paris wine merchant Michel Lefouin, son of Nicolas Lefouin, one of the twelve privileged wine merchants supplying the court. Michel had died in poverty the previous autumn, but it was his sister’s husband (and a Lefouin cousin), François Lefouin, already guardian of Michel’s four children, who arranged the match. François, a notary since 1650, served Mazarin and then Colbert, had close ties to the world of finance, and was elected a Paris alderman in 1665. In 1670 Lefouin sold his notary

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Figure 6.2 Charles Mignon at the 1678 signing of the Treaty of Nijmegen. The French delegation (from left to right): a page (Michel Fournier?); Embassy Secretary Charles Mignon (handing the ambassador a quill pen); Marshal Godefroy d’Éstrades; Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy; and Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux

practice, Colbert having appointed him the previous year secretary general of the navy and greffier of the admiralty’s Council of Prizes, engaged in the lucrative adjudication of naval prizes. The admirals were minors during his tenure (until his death in1688), so real power rested with ­Colbert and then Seignelay, whose grip on the admiralty was assured by the faithful client Lefouin.55 In 1669 while on leave in Paris, Mignon introduced Lefouin to his counterpart in England’s navy, Samuel Pepys, then visiting Paris. They talked about naval affairs and then Lefouin invited him to his bureau for further conversation. Pepys was a valuable



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contact owing to the negotiations then in progress for an Anglo-French anti-Dutch alliance, which Croissy secretly signed at Dover the following May.56 The Mignon-Lefouin marital alliance benefited both families. By joining his niece with a prominent member of the entourage of Colbert’s brother, a rising star in administrative and diplomatic circles, Lefouin provided her a better match than could have been expected given her late father’s situation, while Mignon benefited from the connection with a powerful Colbert client and used the 60,000 livres ­Catherine brought to the marriage to purchase the office of receiver of tailles at Péronne in Picardy.57 When Charles Mignon died in 1698, his children were still minors. His testament named his brother-in-law Nicolas-Dominique Lefouin, a Paris bourgeois, as guardian. Lefouin sought to preserve Mignon’s rather considerable fortune, but its recovery and maintenance was complicated, requiring journeys to Brittany and Lorraine and a sustained legal battle in Rouen. The workload was so great that he persuaded the other relatives to approve naming on 12 November 1698 another guardian to assist him, Mignon’s nephew, Michel Fournier. In his testament Mignon expressed the hope that his oldest son would become an ordinary gentleman of the king, an honorific office in the civil household, but Charles Mignon fils joined the King’s Musketeers in 1703 and, ten years later, spent much of his inheritance on a costly and onerous commission of lieutenant of the guards of the king’s gate only to have to resign it when the household was downsized in 1716. Mignon’s younger son, François-­ Marie, rather than acquiring a royal household controller’s office as his father had wished, followed his older brother into the more aristocratic military household and with the same result. Their father had wisely foreseen that instead of judicial offices that would only distance them from the court, civil household offices offered a surer path for advancement and financial security. Charles Mignon’s position as a premier commis was in theory an easily revocable commission, but he had experienced a remarkably stable tenure, while proximity to the king and his ministers made a variety of rich rewards more accessible. His sons, however, missed these opportunities and after 1716 lived off dwindling assets.58 Neither of Mignon’s sons followed him into the foreign office, but four nephews did.59 His brother Michel, about whom we know nothing, had a son, Pierre Mignon, who was a commis from 1710 to 1740, beginning in Pecquet’s bureau. Another brother, Pascal, had a son, Henry Mignon, who probably commenced service after Torcy’s time, retiring before 1731. Both brothers may be obscure because they remained rooted in the

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bourgeoisie, unlike the rest of the family.60 The sons of Charles Mignon’s sisters, however, served Torcy more significantly as premiers commis and left their mark in the department. Michel Fournier, likely born c. 1660 to Mignon’s sister Marguerite and to Nicolas Fournier, began his career in Colbert’s navy ministry. In 1678, however, he accompanied his uncle to Nijmegen with Croissy and likely followed both into the foreign office in 1680, labouring alongside his uncle until the latter’s 1698 retirement.61 Fournier worked with passports and acquired an expert knowledge of German and northern affairs before moving on to head a bureau with his uncle’s retirement.62 He, too, held offices outside the department and was clearly ascending socially before joining it. Like Mignon, Fournier served as alternative receiver of tailles at Péronne, and in 1673 he became treasurer of France at Caen and in 1698 treasurer of France at Rouen. He had been ennobled by 1711.63 He also established a dynasty of foreign office Fourniers, although none rose higher than commis. Charles joined his father in 1705 but died in 1715, while François entered the department after his father’s 1723 retirement (Michel Fournier died in 1730) and remained until discharged in 1767. Finally, grandson Gabriel-­ François served into the French Revolution.64 Fournier used his connections to establish his son, priest Michel-­Georges, as councillor in the Clergy of Soissons’ Sovereign Chamber and as canon in its cathedral. In 1719 Michel-Georges became abbé commendataire (enjoying the revenue without authority) of the Royal Abbey of Notre-Dame de Grandchamp in the diocese of Chartres, where he served with distinction until his death in 1751, perhaps tellingly, at Versailles.65

N o b l e t : R is in g a nd Wanderi ng A d m in is t r ati ve Star Of Mignon’s nephews, his sister Gertrude’s son Charles-François Noblet was among Torcy’s closest confidants.66 He brought valuable and wideranging family and patronage connections to the foreign office and to the Mignon clan. His father, Charles Noblet de Morgard (figure 6.3), became a secretary of the king in 1651 or 1653, was elected a “syndic” (officer) of that corporative body in 1678, and resigned in favour of his son Charles-François’s survivance in 1685.67 Given his father’s longstanding ties with Pomponne, it comes as no surprise that when CharlesFrançois commenced his diplomatic service in 1680, it was as secretary to Pomponne kinsman Toussaint Forbin-Janson, bishop of Beauvais, returning to Poland briefly as extraordinary ambassador. When Forbin-

Figure 6.3 Genealogical chart: the Noblets. The birth order of the Noblet siblings is an approximation based on the available information.

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Janson returned to France in the autumn of 1681, Noblet stayed with the new ambassador, Nicolas-Louis l’Hospital, marquis de Vitry, younger brother of the late duc de Vitry, who, as we have seen, Noblet’s father had served as secretary. Noblet served as one of the marquis’s two secretaries and was in charge of codes until returning home in 1683.68 Back in France, Noblet attended to establishing himself in life, succeeding his father as secretary of the king (1685) and marrying in that year or the next, befitting his rising status, Marie-Anne Contenot, daughter of an auditor in the Chambre des comptes. The daughter she bore c. 1687 was given her name, but was left motherless soon thereafter.69 Noblet remarried in 1689 to Marguerite Navarre, daughter of Thomas Navarre, treasurer general at Metz’s bureau of finance, sister of JeanBaptiste Navarre, president à mortier of the Metz parlement, and herself the recent widow of Secretary of the King Antoine-Adrien de Croisy [sic].70 The Noblet’s son Toussaint was baptized the day after Christmas 1689 near Beauvais with his namesake, Forbin-Janson, as godfather.71 On 29 March 1691 Noblet purchased one of the four charges of “garde des minutes” (keeper of the minutes) of the Grand Chancellery.72 Forbin-Janson, raised to cardinal in February 1690 and sent to the pope in June to resolve the nagging affair of the régale (the king’s right to collect a vacant bishopric’s revenues), remained in Rome as chargé d’affaires, again with Noblet as his secretary. When the Duke of Mantua asked Louis XIV to send him a confidential agent to hear his complaints about the French envoy to his court, Forbin-Janson selected Noblet, whom he described to the king as wise, faithful, capable, and fluent in Italian.73 Noblet conducted these delicate talks and the other tasks the cardinal assigned with great skill, for which he was named a chevalier of the Order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem and of Notre-Dame of Mount Carmel.74 When five new cardinals, including a French one, were created on 22 July 1697, Forbin-Janson dispatched Noblet to inform Louis XIV, which he did in an audience nine days later. He also met with ­Pontchartrain on the cardinal’s behalf and updated Bossuet at length on business at the Holy See.75 Replaced in Rome by Cardinal B ­ ouillon, Forbin-­Janson himself returned to Versailles that September and asked his kinsman Pomponne to intervene with Torcy to obtain Noblet a diplomatic post in Germany or Mantua, but nothing materialized 76 In August 1698 the princesse des Ursins, whose famous salon gathered the French and friends of France in Rome and was likely frequented by Noblet, wrote Torcy that she was pleased at the news that he had taken into his bureau such a man of merit still loved and regretted in the Eternal City.77



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In fact, when Ursins’s sister Princess Lanti, was in Paris dying of cancer, she wrote to her husband in Rome that while she had seen Torcy only once and without being able to speak with him on an important family matter, she had nonetheless made known to him through Noblet that she hoped to do so soon. Noblet, whom she had known in Rome, had been back in France hardly a year, yet already had enough influence with Torcy and in his department to serve as her intermediary.78 His knowledge of Italian, Italy, and especially Rome, with its French ecclesiastical, diplomatic, artistic, and intellectual community and the non-French drawn to it, made him a valuable asset, especially given the increasing attention to Italy’s future as diplomats contemplated the Spanish empire’s fate after Carlos II. By June 1698, for these reasons and probably Mignon’s April retirement as well, Noblet had joined Torcy’s staff. It was not, however, a foregone conclusion that Noblet would enter Torcy’s service. Like Pomponne, who counted Michel Le Tellier and Claude Le Peletier among his friends at court, the Noblets were in the Le Tellier rather than the Colbert orbit.79 From as early as 1677, Noblet’s financier brother, René-Charles Noblet, sieur d’Ozonville, ­ acted as ­Louvois’s agent and household intendant.80 Receiver general of finances of the generality of Bourges (1683–88) and a supplier of food to the army, he was named a director of the third Senegal Company in 1696.81 His marriage to Louise-Françoise d’Arbon, like that of his sister ­Marguerite to a commis in the war office, embedded the Noblets more firmly within the Le Tellier clientage. His bride’s brother was war department commis François d’Arbon de Bellou, like the Noblets from a Parisian robe family.82 The later Pomponne-Colbert alliance through Torcy’s marriage, however, did not preclude d’Ozonville from seeking favours from his father’s old friend Pomponne, even before his brother had entered the foreign office.83 Philip d’Anjou’s succession to the Spanish throne at the end of 1700 drew Noblet into intimate contact with the royal family and advanced his career appreciably. Torcy urgently needed someone to accompany the young king. Such a person had to know the foreign office’s workings, be an experienced private secretary, hold the office of secretary of the king (being familiar with and authorized to countersign and seal royal documents), have traveled in southern Europe, and be fluent in Spanish and Italian. Noblet fit the bill exactly.84 Although contemporaries were often imprecise with such labels, Noblet was likely raised to premier commis at the end of 1700 due to the importance of this mission.85 The task, however, was formidable, requiring him to set up a secretariat that

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traveled by day and wrote dispatches in the early evening, to be signed and sent off by courier early the next morning. The new court required revised protocol, recast modes of address, and new seals, although in the meantime Torcy lent Noblet one of his own private royal seals. Noblet quickly learned to imitate the young king’s hand for official documents. The post office’s Louis-Léon Pajot accompanied Philip V’s entourage to establish special courier routes and horse relays. Noblet acquitted himself well but nevertheless frequently consulted the new monarch’s former tutor Beauvillier, ever sensitive to issues of rank. When Pajot was not invited to dine at the table with other members of the secretariat, Noblet complained to Beauvillier, who at once rectified the slight.86 Torcy also entrusted Noblet with the transfer of jewels and art treasures from Louis XIV’s household to that of his grandson, including a recent portrait of Louis by Hyacinthe Rigaud, copied by the artist onto a half-dozen canvases as gifts for distinguished visitors.87 Once they reached the frontier, Noblet rode with the young king, only two days into his new kingdom. Returning to France, he narrated the journey to the anxious grandfather, including the tearful parting of the royal brothers at the Pyrenees.88 This absence from the foreign minister’s bureaus was meant to be an exceptional one and of relatively short duration, but Noblet’s clearly rising star soon became a wandering one as well. He had ridden several months in the company of the Duke of Burgundy on his younger brother’s triumphal progress toward Spain. Much to Burgundy’s pleasure, in April 1702 Noblet was appointed his secretary to accompany him to the Spanish Netherlands.89 At the same time, Noblet served Torcy by collecting information (e.g., interrogating prisoners and collecting pamphlets), hiring agents to continue this work after his departure, and conducting diplomatic negotiations within the Empire.90 He also kept him apprised of events and personalities on this critical front where the Dauphin’s son hoped to win military glory.91 Meantime, Noblet’s old patron Forbin-Janson, back in Rome as chargé d’affaires, was not forgotten. From the battlefront Noblet penned propagandistic letters in Italian that, along with the cardinal’s letter to him, elicited lively rejoinders from the emperor’s Italian partisans when published in Rome.92 Home with Burgundy from the German front in 1703, Noblet returned to the foreign office, helping supervise Italian and Swiss correspondence. His knowledge of the spy network in the southern German, Swiss, and northern Italian corridor proved invaluable to Torcy in grooming Pomponne to become ambassador to Venice, the latter requesting that Noblet serve as his decipherer and general liaison officer at Versailles.93



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His star was poised to ascend still further, especially given his close and happy ties with Burgundy, second in line to the throne. It was thus with acute sadness that Torcy wrote Forbin-Janson at the end of 1705 of Noblet’s sudden death.94 Both men had lost a friend, and the department an able servant. Unlike Mignon and Fournier, Noblet was not followed by family into the department. His son Toussaint, not quite sixteen years old when Noblet died, had worked alongside his father in Torcy’s bureau for a time but did not continue thereafter.95 Yet like these kinsmen, Noblet contributed skills, knowledge, experience, and connections that added to the effectiveness and efficiency of the foreign secretary’s administrative apparatus.

T h e B l o n d e l s : T h e F i scal-Fi nanci al and M il ita ry- In du s tri al Complexes The kinship group composed of François Blondel and his siblings reveals the scope and strength of the links that a great functionary could forge within the foreign office, with the wider Colbert clientele, and with powerful interests in other departments, throughout the kingdom, and abroad. By any test of wealth, family connections, and loyalty to the ­Colberts – especially to Torcy – Blondel and his kin ranked primi inter pares among the clans of clerks. The matriarch, Elisabeth Clopet, was only a master linen dressmaker, although her brother, Guillaume Clopet, rose to become “président au grenier à sel” (president of the salt attic) at Brie-Comte-Robert. Her husband, Louis Blondel, sieur d’Azincourt in Picardy, was perhaps a parlement avocat (figure 6.4). Their four sons, however, would amass wealth that exceeded the nobility they inherited, and they would rise in the ranks of the king’s servants. Three brothers – Paul Blondel, sieur d’Azincourt; Joseph Blondel, sieur de Gagny; and Charles-François Blondel, sieur de Jouvancourt – would all serve the navy as administrators, while Gagny and Jouvancourt would also serve the navy as consular officials. Gagny, joined by his brother ­François Blondel, sieur de Vaucresson and de Cueilly and later comte de S­ issonne (referred to hereafter as Blondel), would serve in the royal building administration. Blondel, perhaps professionally the best situated of the siblings, served both Croissy and Torcy as secretary from 1680 to 1715. The brothers had two sisters, Catherine-Charlotte and Marie, who would marry well and have sons who entered the diplomatic world.96 It is not known what the initial family connection with the C ­ olberts was, but Blondel began his apprenticeship with Croissy in 1680, ­residing

Figure 6.4 Genealogical chart: the Blondels. The birth order of the Blondel siblings is an approximation based on the available information.



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in the minister’s townhouse on rue Vivienne.97 Signaling his rapid advancement, in 1685 Blondel’s dazzling wedding reception was hosted by Croissy and attended by Colbert’s widow and others of that clan, including Seignelay, Pussort, Jacques-Nicolas Colbert (future archbishop of Rouen), and Louis Victor de Rochechouart, duc de Mortemort (married to Colbert’s daughter Marie Anne), as well as neighbour Anne Jules, duc de Noailles. Blondel’s widowed mother, his brother Gagny, his sister Marie, and her spouse Gabriel de La Porte, sieur du Theil, brigadier of the Royal Guards, also attended. The bride, Jeanne-Marie Marin, daughter of Vincent Marin, the late Colbert’s household intendant and an ordinary secretary of the queen, was the recent widow of another Colbert client, Antoine Faucard, sieur de Beauchamp. She brought ­ Blondel a young stepson, Antoine-François.98 Blondel, not yet twentyfive years old but well matched, could expect further advancement in the service of the still-powerful Colberts. Although his service began with Croissy, at nineteen Blondel grew close to the fifteen-year-old Torcy while living in the minister’s household, and from at least 1693 he served as Torcy’s commis.99 Early the next year he acquired his first outside office as treasurer of France at Caen by means of a royal gratification, prompting Bonrepaus to congratulate him from Copenhagen on this mark of favour.100 That same year, hearing of Bergeret’s death, Bonrepaus, himself a king’s reader, hoped that Blondel might succeed Bergeret as cabinet secretary.101 Although he did not, such speculation attests to Blondel’s rise outside the department, where he actively promoted his family’s fortunes, especially those of his three brothers. The careers of Blondel and his siblings demonstrate the permeability of the barriers between the various departments of state below the ministerial level. When fixated on department heads, historians fashion misleading narratives that imply unrelenting rivalry and conflict. Reality, however, was more complicated and nuanced, particularly with regard to department staff. Informal yet close ties, for instance, existed between the foreign office and the navy, the latter of which the former had in part supervised from 1629 until 1669. The spatial distance between the two was itself minimal, since from 1683 Seignelay and the navy bureaus were housed at Versailles in the same ministerial building as the foreign office, although in a separate pavilion.102 Administrators and their bureaus nonetheless remained jealous of their powers and prerogatives. Even kin such as Croissy and his nephew Seignelay clashed on occasion. The Blondel brothers served as bridges between these two

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a­ dministrative units, facilitating greater cooperation. Like many royal officials, the brothers were involved in finance, shuffling about royal and private monies to fund the work of royal government in France and abroad. Service overseas, in French ports, and in the bureaus of Versailles afforded each brother access to people and information beneficial to the rest of the family as well as to those they served. Blondel, living and labouring at the epicentre of royal administration and patronage, saw to it that his kin advanced in the worlds of diplomacy and the navy. His ability to do so in the latter is noteworthy in that much of it was accomplished when the navy was no longer a Colbert preserve but instead was under the rival Pontchartrain family. The connections between the foreign secretary and naval administration were many, complex, and historic, requiring that we delve at some length again into the early seventeenth century. The navy department was a rather late creation. Responsibility for naval matters long belonged to various admiralties. Henri IV’s endeavour to transcend them and build a specialized war fleet languished after his assassination but was revived by Richelieu. Named grand master of navigation in 1626, he steadily supplanted the admiralties, established his own clients as port officials, and gathered a cluster of capable collaborators at the centre.103 That same year, two secretaries of state were assigned to prepare and transmit official naval paperwork, but without decision-­making power or administrative control. War Secretary Charles Le Beauclerc continued supervising Provence, its galleys, and the Mediterranean fleet ­(Marine du Levant) first assigned to him in 1619, as would his successors until 1669. The Atlantic fleet (Marine du Ponant) fell to Secretary of State Nicolas Potier d’Ocquerre and upon his death in 1628 to his successor, Claude Bouthillier. In 1629, when Foreign Secretary Raymond P ­ ­hélypeaux d’Herbault died, his secretaryship passed to his son Louis II Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, but his responsibility for foreign affairs shifted to Bouthillier and would remain combined with the Atlantic fleet until 1669.104 It has been suggested that after Richelieu the two navy departments were joined for a time under Foreign Secretary ­Brienne, but this is doubtful.105 In any event, Mazarin’s efforts to sustain the navy foundered after the Fronde for lack of funds, and navy paperwork consequently diminished.106 After Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, however, Colbert, hoping to realize Richelieu’s maritime vision, increasingly but informally managed both parts of the navy. An 11 May 1667 ­regulation empowered him to generate all navy orders, present them to the king, and then forward them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be officially drawn up and sent out. When



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Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669, the foreign affairs and war departments were officially relieved of all navy business.107 Colbert also acquired from Lionne the right to appoint France’s consuls abroad. From the final years of the sixteenth century, monarchs had left to the foreign secretary their selection as well as the lucrative issuance of their letters of provision. A consulate was often a costly acquisition, commonly purchased by a group of investors who engaged a commis to perform its duties for most of the year. Foreign Secretary Brienne earned a tidy sum from this traffic and added the Alexandria consulate to his family’s patrimony while awarding his wife the Cairo consulate to lease out for 11,000 livres. Under the Colberts, however, consuls increasingly became royal instruments promoting the crown’s naval and commercial ambitions. Seignelay finally converted consuls from offices into commissions, although still held on the basis of a lease that accrued to the navy secretary’s profit. The consul recouped his costs through assorted exactions on local merchants, a practice not ended until Pontchartrain granted consuls a fixed salary in 1691. Despite these changes, the separation of the consular service from the foreign secretary was neither complete nor final.108 In parts of the world, a consul was France’s only official representative, requiring that he work with the foreign as well as the navy secretary. One commentator ranked consuls with ambassadors, since they were authorized representatives of the king who not only kept him informed, but carried out his diplomatic will. Furthermore, the foreign office’s ambassador in Constantinople acted there as consul and was entitled to name many consuls and sub-consuls in the Aegean and Black seas.109 Other consuls might frequently correspond with the foreign secretary, as did Michel-Ange de La Chausse, an erudite antiquarian in Rome and consul from 1705 until his death in 1724. Because Rome was upriver from two busy vice-consulates on the coast, he had little navy business to perform, so was primarily a purveyor of news and gossip from the papal court.110 The individuals who populate an organization are as important if not more so than its structure. Shifting surface structure might mask a deeper continuity of personnel who execute if not make policy, as demonstrated in the creation of Colbert’s navy department. Between 1661 and 1669, Colbert dominated the nascent department by controlling its finances through a revived “Conseil de Marine” (navy council) populated with clients and family, including his brother Croissy, who as ambassador to London from 1668 to 1674 kept a close eye on English naval affairs. When Croissy became foreign secretary at the end of 1679, the foreign

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office again drew closer to the navy by entering the Colbert orbit.111 Blondel and his brothers continued, as well as strengthened, the links between the two departments. It was perhaps following his marriage that Blondel, nimbly ascending the Colbert clientage ladder, introduced his three brothers into its ranks. Gagny, who had attended the 1685 wedding, departed for Constantinople in November of that year as secretary and chancellor to the new ambassador, Pierre Girardin de Vauvré, brother of Toulon’s navy intendant, Jean-Louis Girardin de Vauvré, a Colbert kinsman and client. Ambassador Vauvré dispatched Gagny in July 1688 to replace Smyrna’s consul killed in an earthquake. The following January, on the ambassador’s recommendation, Seignelay formally appointed Gagny to this the most lucrative of the Levantine consulates.112 This was not a transfer from the foreign office to the navy, since Gagny was already under the latter as chancellor to the ambassador cum consul at Constantinople. In fact, it was only a partial and simple transfer within the Colbertian administrative empire. The situation of a Levantine consul, however, was not so uncomplicated. Consuls were “the key power-brokers in the Levant,” and that of cosmopolitan Smyrna was particularly powerful. He lived like a prince in a small palace and was accompanied by liveried footmen and “janissaries holding six-foot-long staves ivory-knobbed staves with which they beat the ground.”113 As the king’s local agent, he represented royal interests, even to the extent of purchasing and shipping such exotic products as horses, leather, antiquities, and manuscripts to satisfy royal desires. He assisted and policed French commercial and naval vessels visiting his port, extended aid to French travelers, and defended the rights of the “nation,” defined as the local and largely mercantile French community. He immersed himself in all commercial matters, facilitating trade by resolving disputes among quarrelsome French traders and mediating their differences with local merchants and officials, and exercised police, judicial, and notarial powers over the “nation.” This heavy regulatory hand was resented when Colbert and his son converted consuls from employees of the local merchant community into servants of the state. It also led to conflict with the Marseille Chamber of Commerce, which dominated and soon monopolized Levantine trade. This powerful interest group particularly resented any interference from ambassadors and consuls.114 Gagny’s predecessor at Smyrna represented Colbert’s privileged trading companies, a further complication in Levantine trade. In 1685 the defunct Company of the Levant run by Parisian financiers was replaced



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by the new Company of the Mediterranean, this time composed of experienced Marseille merchants and local royal (mostly naval) officials. The company’s monopoly included the farm of consular posts, many of which were soon filled by family and friends of Joseph Fabre, “trésorier de la Marine” (navy treasurer) at Marseille and the new company’s moving spirit. This irked directors like naval intendant Vauvré, who already complained that the Fabres ran the company for their own benefit, and provoked the Marseille Chamber of Commerce and Levant merchants, who resented the new and aggressive consuls, whom they accused of only promoting royal, company, and personal interests. Even though he had replaced the late and much detested Louis Fabre at Smyrna, Gagny was nonetheless treated with coldness, insolence, and a torrent of complaints to the Marseille Chamber of Commerce. To make matters worse, he was still chancellor to an ambassador accused by the chamber of favouring consuls over merchants and whose brother was a company director.115 The situation deteriorated with Pierre Girardin de Vauvré’s sudden death in January 1689 and the May appointment of Pierre-Antoine de Castagnéry, marquis de Châteauneuf, as his replacement, with instructions from Seignelay to defer to the Marseille chamber and give way to the “nation” in its disputes with the consul. This conciliatory policy was even more pronounced when the milder Louis Pontchartrain became secretary in 1690.116 Gagny’s continuing quarrels with the Smyrna nation led to protests to Châteauneuf and growing tension between the ambassador and the consul. A new consul was appointed for Smyrna in August 1691, and by the year’s end Gagny had departed for France.117 Yet this circumstance and the Colberts’ loss of the navy with the death of ­Seignelay (1690) did not end Gagny’s navy service. Apparently, even before his ship docked in Marseille, Pontchartrain appointed him navy commissioner for forests at Lyon, responsible for procuring the wood essential for the ships and weapons constructed at the Mediterranean naval arsenals.118 His fortunes were further enhanced when near Lyon on 8 March 1693 he married Marie-Madeleine de Ferriol, sister of Augustin de Ferriol, sieur de Pont-Vesle en Bresse, receiver general of finances of Dauphiné, who in 1701, following his brother Constant and his father, would become a councillor in the Metz parlement. Another brother, Charles de Ferriol, baron d’Argental, was then serving as a chargé de mission under the ambassador to Constantinople.119 Both brothers and their connections would figure prominently in the futures of the Blondels as well as that of Torcy.

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Another important association for the Blondels would be that with Bonrepaus. He personally embodied a number of the characteristics that marked the Blondels, such as navy service, foreign office service, and loyalty to the Colbert clan. Like them, he was also a participant in the “fiscal-financial system” and “military-industrial complex” assembled by the Great Colbert.120 A close collaborator of Colbert’s and then ­Seignelay’s, Bonrepaus was disappointed when Louis Pontchartrain was preferred to him as Seignelay’s successor. Having lost his previous zest for navy business, he lingered for a while under Pontchartrain but departed some months after the disastrous defeat at La Hogue (June 1692). Croissy procured for him the ambassadorship to Copenhagen. Enjoying Torcy’s confidence as well, he transferred to The Hague in 1698.121 Bonrepaus’s connection with the Blondel family may have begun when Gagny entered the navy administration upon his return from Smyrna. In any event, once Bonrepaus reached Copenhagen in February 1693, Blondel not only conducted department business with him, but served as one of his financial agents in France.122 That same year, Blondel negotiated with Bonrepaus on behalf of one of his brothers for the possible purchase of his charge of navy commissioner general. The ambassador assured him that Pontchartrain was unlikely to suppress such a charge, but that if he did, it was out of both their hands. Nevertheless, he urged Blondel to take the contract to the minister. What happened next is unclear, but Bonrepaus still owed money on the charge and, for whatever reason, no sale took place.123 Blondel and his brothers Gagny and Azincourt all acted as Bonrepaus’s bankers during his second ambassadorship at The Hague (April–December 1699).124 The bond between Blondel and Bonrepaus went beyond business to include a circle of prominent friends at court. Bonrepaus sent greetings through Blondel to the influential first valet of the royal chamber, ­ Alexandre Bontemps, confidant of the king, and to his secret wife M ­ arguerite Bosc du Bois, widow of de la Roche, premier commis of the royal treasury. Bonrepaus also had a close friendship with the brilliant royal favourite and “grand maréchal des logis de la maison du roi” (grand quartermaster for the king, court, and household troops) Louis d’Oger, marquis de Cavoye, who had also been an intimate of ­Seignelay’s. He was especially close to Cavoye’s friend the playwright and royal historian Racine and was particularly active as a link between Racine and their mutual friend in Copenhagen.125 On one occasion, when ­Bonrepaus was anxious to counter rumours at court that he had requested but would be denied a particular favour, he penned



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a letter to Croissy, to be read to the king, denying any interest in the favour. At the same time, he wrote Blondel that he hoped he would be the one to decode this letter to Croissy when it arrived and asked that he share it with Racine so as to inform him of his situation. Even if this favour had already been granted when the letter arrived at Versailles, ­Bonrepaus asked Blondel to see that it still made its way to the king.126 The following year, complaining that the Danish climate was ruining his health, Bonrepaus hoped that the king might allow him to return home. Lamenting that it was useless to write of it to any of his other friends, he assured Blondel of his confidence in him and wondered if Blondel might approach Beauvillier or even Chevreuse on his behalf.127 While it is unlikely that Croissy would have appreciated any such attempt to bypass him or that Blondel would have lightly risked angering a minister of Croissy’s temperament, it is nonetheless apparent that Bonrepaus, who had a keen eye for such things, had a high estimation of Blondel’s connections and credit at court. Jean Racine was also well-connected with the foreign office and the Colbert clan. At Colbert’s instigation, he was elected to the French Academy in 1673 and appointed royal historian in 1677. Racine even named his first-born son Jean-Baptiste in 1678 to honour his patron. Chevreuse, married to Colbert’s daughter in 1667, had been Racine’s friend at school. Racine remained close to the younger Colberts. ­Seignelay protected and promoted him, and he was on intimate enough terms with Torcy to discuss the hazardous topic of Jansenism.128 As early as the first performance of his tragedy Andromaque in 1667, the great playwright had explored the tensions between an emerging bureaucratic and professional diplomacy and a traditional diplomacy based on noble lineage as the only means of representation.129 His son Jean-­Baptiste entered the foreign ministry in 1695 or 1696 to learn diplomacy under Torcy, and he became intimate with Blondel and premier commis Mignon, to whose bureau he was assigned. This confluence of connections led to his selection in 1698 to accompany Bonrepaus to The Hague as his secretary. Until his death in April 1699, Racine encouraged Jean-Baptiste to do all he could to conserve and enhance the good will and opinion of ­Bonrepaus, Torcy, and their circle, hinting hopefully that Beauvillier or the duc de Noailles might one day employ him.130 From 1698, envisioning a future posting for young Racine to Frankfurt, Torcy, ­Bonrepaus, and Jean-­Baptiste’s parents urged him to go to Strasbourg to learn ­German with Ulrich Obrecht, a scholar and trusted foreign office operative, but after his father’s death, Jean-Baptiste preferred the security of

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r­ emaining with Bonrepaus, f­earing the costs of going to Germany and having little desire to learn German. His hope, he confided to Renaudot, was to be sent to Italy. With the abbé’s support, Torcy was persuaded to permit him to accept Cardinal d’Estrées’s invitation to follow him to Rome as his secretary.131 In the meantime, Gagny and Blondel’s older brother, Paul Blondel d’Azincourt was establishing himself in the navy. After marrying ­Catherine Mabille, the daughter of a Paris merchant butcher in 1688, he went to Dunkirk as “trésorier de la Marine, directeur des vivres de la Marine” (navy treasurer, director of navy provisions) for Flanders and Picardy, and “trésorier général des vivres des armées du Roi sur terre” (treasurer general of provisions for royal land forces) for the Flanders coast. There Azincourt’s wife gave birth to a son in March 1691, but she died soon after.132 As directeur des vivres, he and his “écrivains” (clerks) were to verify the quantity and quality of all food supplies and other provisions entering or leaving the naval arsenal for consumption there or on warships. This entailed constant vigilance through inspections, samplings, meticulous record-keeping, and reports to the port intendant on the honesty of the various “munitionnaires” (purveyors) who had contracted to furnish these supplies.133 Azincourt swiftly settled into Dunkirk, on 17 June 1692 marrying the daughter of a local corsair (his second marriage) whose brother-in-law, the famous fellow corsair Jean Bart, signed the marriage contract.134 Azincourt and his second wife became fixtures of local society, dining frequently at the home of bookseller and “imprimeur de l’Amirauté” (admiralty printer) Antoine Van Ursel. Other dinner regulars included municipal officials as well as “commissaire ordonnateur de la Marine” (navy commissary) Jacques Vergier, who had served with Bart at sea. Vergier was popular with local merchants, a poet appreciated by Jérôme Pontchartrain, and Azincourt’s close friend.135 Azincourt was apparently involved in finance. On 17 January 1693 the comte d’Avaux, in Dunkirk on his way to Sweden as ambassador, wrote Croissy of his lack of money and his financial rescue by Blondel’s brother.136 ­Bonrepaus may have connected the two. On his way to Denmark as ambassador, he too was in Dunkirk with d’Avaux awaiting favourable weather to sail aboard a ship commanded by none other than Azincourt’s kinsman Jean Bart.137 Azincourt later carried a letter of exchange to Provence on ­Bonrepaus’s behalf and served his banking needs in other ways.138 He died at his Dunkirk post on 18 July 1701.139 Azincourt was not the only Blondel concerned with navy supplies. From 1694 until 1699 Gagny was a member of the companies of



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­ munitionnaires de la marine et des galères” (purveyors of the navy and “ galleys) that supplied the whole fleet with food, drink, and anything needed to store and distribute it, and whose operations Azincourt monitored at Dunkirk. Numbering only forty-eight during the whole reign, these purveyors were not businessmen but financiers. They were mostly ­Colbert kin and clients drawn largely from the ranks of office-holders and naval administrators to form companies to bid on the annual commissary contract. They included some of the most important financiers of the reign, such as Cyr Monmerqué and Pierre Pellard, as well as Louis de Lubert’s brother-in-law Jacques André du Pille, who, as receiver general of finances at Lyon and a munitionnaire since 1682, may have been responsible for enlisting Gagny. Bonrepaus, who had originally set up this system for Colbert, was himself a munitionnaire from 1673 to 1678.140 Gagny was the brother most involved in the world of finance and as a munitionnaire was enmeshed in the Colbertian fiscal-financial system and military-industrial complex.141 Further marking his ascent, Gagny purchased a charge of secretary of the king in 1696, although the office was suppressed the following year.142 While Gagny was ensconcing himself in the world of finance and Azincourt in the navy at Dunkirk, the youngest brother turned south to the great arsenal at Toulon. Charles-François Blondel de Jouvancourt appeared as Toulon’s écrivain principal in 1695 while in his early thirties.143 Unlike their friend Bonrepaus, the Blondels easily balanced serving both Pontchartrain navy secretaries while remaining Colbert loyalists. Louis Pontchartrain, even as he advanced his own clients, wisely eschewed a purge of department veterans. Instead, he cultivated them, winning some into his clientage, yet still collaborating with and indeed promoting cooperative Colbertians such as the Blondels.144 Like his brother a decade before, Jouvancourt was drawn east to the Levant. Since the mid-1670s dragoon colonel Charles de Ferriol had been in eastern Europe, eventually commanding two regiments of Count Imre Thököly’s troops in the Hungarians’ anti-Habsburg revolt and leaving with Thököly to join the Turks in seven campaigns against the common Imperial foe. This experience led to Ferriol’s selection as chargé de mission to Constantinople from 1692 to 1695, first to assist Ambassador Châteauneuf in efforts to draw the Turks into the Nine Years War and then to go to Transylvania to offer the rebels French encouragement as well as gold.145 When Ferriol returned to Constantinople in March 1696, Jouvancourt accompanied him as secretary, probably owing to the influence of Blondel at the foreign ministry and of Gagny, Ferriol’s brother-

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in-law and former embassy chancellor at Constantinople and Smyrna consul.146 Jouvancourt may have returned to France a year earlier than Ferriol, since he was commissioned as Dunkirk’s écrivain principal in the summer of 1697 to serve with Azincourt. By the end of the next year, however, he was in Toulon as écrivain principal.147 If we trust the history penned by Bonrepaus’s nephew Bonnac, an experienced diplomat and ambassador to the Porte from 1716 to 1724, the year 1699 offers a particularly striking demonstration of Blondel’s influence in the foreign ministry. Bonnac writes that not long after ­Ferriol’s first diplomatic appointment to Constantinople, which he owed to friends in France, he set his eye on replacing Ambassador Châteauneuf.148 The marriage of Blondel’s brother to Ferriol’s sister in 1693 made his ambition possible. Ferriol won the favour of Blondel and Croissy’s formidable widow, who had great influence with her son Torcy. Ferriol and his friend the dragoman Joachim Fonton, whom Châteauneuf had recalled from Turkish army headquarters in Hungary owing to jealousy of his close contacts with Ferriol, engineered the ambassador’s dismissal by sewing suspicion at court that his recent adoption of Turkish dress portended a conversion to Islam. Bonnac, who clearly respected Châteauneuf and thought him ill-used, claims that Torcy was won over to this intrigue because of his weakness for the former Marie-Angélique de Tencin, the young, cultivated, and striking wife of Ferriol’s brother Augustin de Ferriol.149 Popular songs alleged a liaison between the two, but if there was one, it likely would have existed between 1705 and 1710,150 long after Ferriol’s 1699 selection for Constantinople. Moreover, prior to that appointment, Ferriol received a life pension of 3,000 livres for his twenty-seven years of service and for having carried out secret orders in 1692, 1693, and 1694.151 The new ambassador’s 1699 instructions stressed the value of his frequent and recent sojourns in Turkey and especially his knowledge of the sultan’s government. The instructions made it clear that with the return of peace after Ryswick and with the partition process still advancing despite the recent death of the electoral prince, Louis had decided on a harder line with the Porte. Safeguarding commerce remained a priority, but the king insisted that the erosion of Catholic rights tolerated by Châteauneuf cease and that the Turks allow Catholic missionaries a freer hand throughout their empire. Ferriol was further instructed to see to it that neither the Porte nor the Imperial ambassador did anything to diminish the ceremonial honours due the French monarch and his envoy.152 If Ferriol ultimately proved too inflexible and a poor choice for the post, his knowledge and



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e­xperience were hardly negligible and his temperament matched the monarch’s mood when he was appointed.153 There is little doubt that the Blondels, with reason to want Châteauneuf replaced and by Ferriol, had the influence to accomplish both goals. Gagny surely resented Châteauneuf for backing the Smyrna “nation” against him as consul and later helping engineer his recall to France. The Blondels could thus avenge an affront to a brother as they promoted his brother-in-law. Mme de Croissy’s part in the scheme is not difficult to discern. Blondel was like family, having lived in her home, grown up with her son, and married into the Colbert clientele. As a further benefit, the third Blondel brother, Jouvancourt, would once again accompany Ferriol, but now as ambassador’s secretary and consular chancellor. As war grew more likely in the west, French diplomacy sought to turn the Porte’s plans away from war with Venice or the Crimean Tartars and toward one against the emperor. In January 1703 military preparations against the Tartars were proceeding apace at the military headquarters of Adrianople. When dragoman Fonton’s mission failed to change Turkish policy, Ferriol dispatched Jouvancourt to press France’s case with the new Grand Vizier, known to be less keen on war than his predecessor, and to negotiate a resolution to the nagging “incident of the audience.” This contretemps dated back to January 1700 when Ferriol, newly arrived and against all advice, refused to leave his sword behind for his first audience with the sultan. In the ensuing standoff, the ambassador was never officially received. Bearing a letter and rich gifts of cloth and clocks, Jouvancourt entered Adrianople to negotiate with the Phanariote Alexander Maurocordato (Mavrocordato), councillor of state, Grand Dragoman, and a negotiator at Carlowitz. These talks were eventually productive enough for Ferriol to send Jouvancourt to France with a proposed settlement and further commercial and religious concessions. At Versailles the king approved Jouvancourt’s suggestion for a pension for Maurocordato, who had shown himself favourable to French interests.154 In addition to his post as embassy secretary, Jouvancourt was chancellor of the Constantinople consulate, serving as its secretary and archivist for the official documents it generated. The navy paid his appointements for his consular post.155 Any of France’s permanent diplomats abroad might receive supplementary instructions regarding commerce from the navy secretary, but nowhere was an ambassador expected to be in as close contact with him as in Constantinople, where he served concurrently as local consul and corresponded frequently with the other Levantine consuls.156 Ferriol’s private correspondence with his brother Augustin and

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with the Blondels is peppered with complaints against ­Pontchartrain, with whom he clashed. Torcy, however, is lauded for coming to the latter’s defence, especially in 1709 when a Turkish official representing Constantinople’s captain-pasha and perhaps the Grand Vizier as well, arrived at Versailles to press Pontchartrain for Ferriol’s recall, which was almost granted.157 Jouvancourt relayed news from the Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Balkan frontier, the Crimea, and Poland to Torcy and Pontchartrain. Reports flowed from his pen of the retrieval in the Dardanelles of an anchor lost decades earlier by Abraham Duquesne’s fleet, of the English abandonment of their scheme to initiate trade up the Danube, of the launch of a Turkish war vessel of 138 guns, of the arrival in Adrianople of the severed head of the former pasha of Diyarbakir on the Tigris, and of Turkish surprise that the English would recognize a woman (Queen Anne) as their ruler. Jouvancourt also sent Pontchartrain a project for establishing a trading company and toiled at obtaining naval stores such as tallow and Black Sea tar and hemp for the royal arsenals.158 In Paris, Blondel, like his brother, worked well with Pontchartrain and especially with his premier commis Charles d’Irumberry de Salaberry, a former Colbert client favoured by both Pontchartrains. Even Ferriol on occasion availed himself of what he called the secretary’s “credit” with Jérôme Pontchartrain.159 Jean-Baptiste Estelle, later famous as Marseille’s chief alderman during the city’s 1720 plague outbreak, was son of a French consul in Morocco and himself consul at Salé on Morocco’s Atlantic coast from 1689 to 1698. Back in France, Estelle became Blondel’s brother-in-law by marrying Elisabeth de Bonnaud de Roquebrune, step-sister through her mother of Blondel’s wife Marie née Marin. This connection was a major factor in Estelle’s landing the plum position of consul at Sidon (Seyde) in Syria, one of the principal Levant ports, where he served from 1702 to 1711.160 Blondel’s sister CatherineCharlotte married (c. 1687) Joseph Richard, sieur de Tussac and procureur in the sénéchaussée of Montmorillon in Poitou. They too benefited from Blondel’s access to Pontchartrain’s ear when their oldest son, Joseph-Jean Richard, was sent to the Capuchin school by the French embassy in Pera, the European district across the Golden Horn from Constantinople. From 1699 to 1706 he was an enfant de langues (language student) learning Oriental languages in preparation of becoming a secrétaire interprète du roi (royal interpreting secretary) in Turkish and Arabic. His younger brother, André-François Richard d’Abenour, studied there from 1707 to 1713, remaining in the Levantine consular service until his death.161 These positions, much sought after, since they provided



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an education at the expense of the Marseille Chamber of Commerce and promised a brilliant career in the Levant, were given out by the king on the advice of the navy minister with the advice of the ambassador to the Porte and those who had their ears.162 Thus Guillaume Maugin, son of Torcy’s écuyer, received one of these positions, but he was sent home after four years under close guard for attempting to convert to Islam.163 France’s primary link to the Levant was Marseille, the great commercial port and base for France’s galley fleet through which flowed a vast variety of goods as well as news and official correspondence between the kingdom and much of the Mediterranean world, including the exotic Ottoman east, the Barbary and Spanish west, and nearby Italy. There was another source in Marseille of the Blondels’ power and great worth to the foreign secretary. Since 1696 its municipal government was in the hands of a corrupt cabal dominated by the mercantile Gleise (Gleize) family.164 How the Blondels first connected with them is unknown, but it was likely through Gagny and his earlier ties to Marseille as Smyrna consul and his later activities as a munitionnaire.165 As part of Provence, Marseille was in Torcy’s department and thus long familiar to Blondel. The Gleises manoeuvred in order to eliminate all local officials hostile to their interests, including Joseph Villeneuve, Paris agent of the Marseille municipality and Chamber of Commerce. Three years earlier Torcy had backed Villeneuve against efforts to oust him, but with the ascendance of the Gleises, Torcy allowed them to force his retirement on 28 December 1697. Torcy’s price was Blondel’s appointment as Marseille’s new Paris agent, made official on 30 January 1698. Given Blondel’s prominent position in the foreign office and his credit with and easy access to other ministers, the Gleises and their coterie gladly paid the price.166 Modern social science network research finds “strong interactions between actors in specific policy domains.”167 This seems to apply to the relationship between the foreign office and the network that embraced Torcy, Blondel, the Gleises, and others in Marseille. At the end of the twentieth century, networks in Britain “were characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery, responsibility and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public … They have a high degree of vertical interdependence and limited ­horizontal articulation. They are highly integrated.”168 Likewise, those outside the Gleise faction were excluded from Marseille’s city government and Chamber of Commerce. From 1697 until 1712, Blondel served both the city government and its Chamber of Commerce as lobbyist,

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providing stability and smoothing the way for the requests and representatives of each through the foreign office and the other Versailles bureaus, especially the navy’s and the controller general’s bureaus. A denizen of this administrative milieu for over fifteen years, Blondel possessed an intimate knowledge of the people and procedures required to expedite business, including the timely distribution of pensions and Levantine products paid for by the municipal and chamber funds he managed for that purpose. The recipients ranged from Torcy at the top and premiers commis Adam and Salaberry, who reaped rich pensions, down to the ministers’ commis and household domestics, who like those higher up eagerly received gifts of fine food, drink, textiles, and other Levantine luxuries. Blondel, who grew wealthy from the gifts of the grateful Gleise faction, his annual 1,500-livre pension, and the flow of further funds under the table, saw to it that his Marseille connections hired his kinsmen and friends whenever possible.169 The idea of Blondel becoming Marseille’s new lobbyist apparently came from Torcy rather than from the city and the chamber, although they easily grasped its advantages.170 The Fabre clan, a part of the Gleise cabal, had been the target of intendant Lebret’s complaints to ­Seignelay the previous decade, but that minister had likewise taken their part against the intendant.171 Perhaps Torcy similarly decided it was in the end better for commerce, provincial peace, and foreign office business to side with the present masters of Marseille rather than with the intendant in Aix and to co-opt them to serve his purposes.172 Moreover, Anfossy, the powerful secretary of Provence’s lieutenant du roi Grignan, was part of the network, as was the notary Pierre Sossin, who served Charles-Gaspard Vintimille du Luc, bishop of Marseille (­1692–1708) and of Aix (1708–29), and his brother Charles-François Vintimille, comte du Luc, soldier, galley captain, diplomat, and Torcy client and friend.173 The members of the network had common interests and the financial and political resources to promote them, and they knew the rules of the network, such as whom to work through and reward, that made it work for its members, but kept it a “closed sector network” for non-members.174 It has been suggested that Blondel’s selection as Marseille’s agent resulted in part from his marital ties with the city’s elite. These marriages, however, came after his 1697 appointment.175 In September 1703, when Jouvancourt was in France reporting on his Adrianople negotiations, he wed Magdelaine Gleise, daughter of Jean and brother of Pierre, who brought with her a 40,000-livre dowry.176 Early the next



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year, probably using these new resources, Jouvancourt purchased one of the one ­hundred venal charges of commissaire de la Marine (naval commissioner) created in March 1702.177 This marriage integrated the network even further. When rumours reached the port that a cash-strapped crown might resurrect the sale of Levantine consulates, Jouvancourt, now a part of Marseille’s ruling establishment, fired off a letter to his brother in Paris. Well aware of his influence in the navy ministry, he informed Blondel that the Marseille chamber would prefer that consulates be placed under their control, as in the past, and sent Pont­chartrain a seven-page memoir making the same point.178 Jouvancourt’s naval post, however, was more than a cover for serving the cabal, and he would advance far in its civil hierarchy, serving under Louis XV as Martinique’s intendant and then as Marseille’s intendant-général des galères (intendant general of galleys), in which city he died 29 March 1729.179 He kept navy secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain (and likely his own brother at the foreign ministry) informed on a surprising variety of matters, including movements of enemy troops and vessels, grain and munitions shipments, corsair and bandit attacks, and the actions of the Royal Galley Fleet itself. During the war he kept a close eye on events in the Papal States and Naples, passing along intelligence of revolts, of negotiations with the Imperials, of ecclesiastical appointments, and even of the Roman Carnival, a festival potentially rife with subversion.180 He was also kept busy with the affairs of the Marseille galley arsenal.181 Despite remaining in France as a naval bureaucrat, Jouvancourt did not sever ties with Ferriol, acting from Marseille as the ambassador’s financial agent, while Ferriol’s brother Augustin did so in Paris. ­Ferriol’s letters to both of these agents are crammed with details of the bills of exchange that Jouvancourt, Samuel Bernard, and other bankers issued for the needs of his embassy and for him to pass on to Rákóczi in Hungary.182 Given Ferriol’s later madness, which made him a liability to Torcy, and the prolonged and ignominious process by which he was replaced by Des Alleurs from April 1710 to April 1711, Jouvancourt was fortunate to have been long removed from Constantinople.183 He journeyed to Paris often to enjoy its pleasures and visit family, who were mostly in its vicinity. In addition to mingling with the influential at court and in the capital, Jouvancourt served them from Marseilles when possible. In the summer of 1712, for example, he reported to Torcy and Louis-Antoine, duc d’Antin, director general of the king’s buildings since 1708, the transshipment up the Rhône from Marseille of crates of art for the king and his ministers from the newly arrived papal nuncio.184

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As was typical with the Blondel brothers, this connection of one brother with the transport of art reflected the wider family enterprise. In 1699, the same year Jouvancourt left for the Levant, his middle brothers purchased offices in the king’s buildings department headed by JulesHardouin Mansart. Mansart was named superintendent in January after Colbert de Villacerf resigned the post when his premier commis’s embezzlement was uncovered, leading to an administrative housecleaning.185 Blondel became “conseiller du roy en ses Conseils, intendant et ordonnateur alternative” (king’s councillor in his councils, alternate intendant and authorizing officer),186 while Gagny became a treasurer general.187 In that department’s hierarchy, these were prestigious and lucrative offices. The three intendants were second to the director in status and remuneration, while the three treasurers ranked fourth, after the three controllers general. Daily administration rested mostly upon the director, his premier commis, and their commis.188 Unlike Villacerf, however, ­Mansart did not feel threatened by the venal officers and gave them an active administrative role as his subordinates in matters of contracts and, in a “conseil des Bâtiments” (Buildings Council, which from 1702 met every Tuesday at Versailles), in verifying memoirs from entrepreneurs.189 The treasurer also enjoyed a position that was potentially more profitable yet perilous. During his year of service he was free to use department funds drawn from the royal treasury for his own financial speculations. At its end, however, if expenditures exceeded these funds, he had to wait until the following year to be reimbursed for the advance he made to cover the shortfall. Also, Gagny loaned the king 50,000 livres to meet department expenses for 1702. While Blondel’s office carried greater prestige, its gages were 6,000 livres annually, whereas Gagny’s, with its more fluid possibilities, could yield 30,000 livres per year, which explains why the treasurers were part of the closed circle of approximately five hundred of the regime’s financiers who enriched themselves from such public charges.190 When new offices of secretary of the king were created in 1704 to raise war funds, Gagny again purchased one. His further financial dealings, however, are not known. His financier brother-in-law, Augustin Ferriol, prospered, especially under Desmaretz, so it is likely that Gagny was also caught up in the schemes aimed at extracting money from financiers while offering them the hope of turning a tidy profit. That prospect, however, dimmed as the war dragged on.191 Gagny sold his charge of treasurer in 1714 and that of secretary of the king in 1720. Having grown rich from his many endeavours in royal service and finance, his fortune ultimately foundered, a victim p ­ erhaps of



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the Regency’s ­Chamber of Justice, which pursued the previous regime’s financiers, or of the more destructive Mississippi Bubble. While his only remaining brother, Jouvancourt, was in Martinique, the totally ruined widower Gagny died ignominiously in a ground-floor apartment off the gateway of a Paris townhouse on 14 March 1726.192 Like his brother, Blondel purchased one of the offices of secretary of the king created in 1704, holding it until his death. He was a particular friend of the important banker Samuel Bernard,193 perhaps largely because of his financial duties on behalf of the foreign office rather than any heavy personal involvement in finance. As it was, he was growing rich from lobbying for Marseille. In 1703 he began the purchase of the domain of Sissonne, roughly twenty kilometres east of Laon, from François-­César, comte de Roucy. Completing the sale and rendering homage for it in 1706, the new comte de Sissonne and his wife began rebuilding the chateau and surrounding it with a grand park pierced with handsome avenues.194 Their four daughters made good matches during this same period. In 1701 Jeanne-Elisabeth married Pierre-­François-Hyacinthe de Vintimille, comte de Marseille and baron d’Oullioules, of an old Provencal family related to the Vintimille du Lucs. In 1704 Thérèse married Bernard Daspe, baron de Meilhan, who had a fortune of 150,000 livres and would succeed his father as président à mortier of the Toulouse parlement. The same year MarieFrançoise married Gérard-Marie Berthelier, sieur de Lespervière (or ­Lespinasse), secretary of the king. When widowed, in 1709 she married Joseph-Marie de Barral, président à mortier of the Grenoble parlement and later marquis de la Bastie d’Arvillard. Finally, in 1711 Marie-Anne wed Joseph-Hector de Montaut, marquis de Montbérault and vicomte de Saumont, of ancient lineage and syndic of the Armagnac nobility. The Vintimille du Luc connection was the most brilliant of the matches, as a later genealogist made apparent by listing Marie-Anne Blondel as soeur germaine (sister from the same father and mother) of the comtesse de Vintimille du Luc. When the rising magistrate Daspe wed Thérèse, it was observed that this was made possible by his large fortune, since she brought him a rich dowry of 50,000 livres and the honour of seeing the king and royal family assist at the marriage. The other daughters appear to have been equally well provided for.195 Blondel sold his office in the buildings department in 1711, and his position as Marseille’s Paris agent ended in 1712 as part of cost-cutting by the municipality and its merchants.196 Unlike that of his brother Gagny, however, Blondel’s fortune, grounded primarily in the rewards of bureaucratic

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service, weathered the economic storms of the war years. Blondel died in 1725.197 As Croissy’s secretary and then Torcy’s and as head of the department’s secretariat from at least 1697 until 1715, Blondel was well placed to advance his kin, including his stepson, Antoine-François F ­ aucard de Beauchamp, already from a distinguished lineage of Colbert clients. Beauchamp’s mother, Jeanne-Marie, was the daughter of Colbert’s intendant Vincent Marin. His father, Antoine Faucard de Beauchamp, who had died relatively young (by July 1684), was the son of two old Colbert family servants who in 1663, as a favour to the minister, secretly took in the illegitimate son of Louis XIV and Louise Françoise, duchesse de La Vallière to care for.198 In 1707 Antoine-François Beauchamp, at least twenty-three years old, made his first appearance in department records and was listed regularly from 1710 in its accounts. He seems to have worked with domestic administration as a simple commis.199 Following a strategy more typical of a rising premier commis, he purchased an office of “maître” (magistrate) in the Chambre des comptes of Brittany in 1713.200 At some point he married Madeline Berthellier, perhaps from the same family as his half-sister Marie-Françoise’s first husband. The Beauchamps’ son, François, later served the department under an uncle and a cousin, Jean Gabriel de La Porte du Theil, and their daughter, Jeanne-Benjamine-Angelique, married that same cousin in 1737.201 Antoine-François Faucard de Beauchamp left the department with Torcy in 1715 and became an important postal official. When he died is unknown, but his widow died in 1754.202 Born to Gabriel de La Porte, sieur du Theil, and to Marie Blondel in 1683, Jean-Gabriel de la Porte du Theil began his diplomatic career early, thanks to his uncle François Blondel. From 1701 he served in Spain as secretary to ambassadors Ferdinand, comte de Marsin (­Marcin), ­Cardinal d’Estrées, and Abbé d’Estrées, and received a commission from Philip V in 1702 as a Spanish cavalry lieutenant. Tessé, Torcy’s kinsman and close friend then commanding in Spain, engaged him as secretary in 1705. Tessé and Blondel saw to it that Philip V made du Theil a “commissaire des guerres” (war commissioner) in the Spanish army. When Tessé left Spain after an unsuccessful campaign in 1705, Orry wanted du Theil to remain as his secretary, but instead he accompanied Tessé home.203 In 1708 he joined Torcy’s secretariat,204 where he helped copy out parts of the Treaty of Ryswick and subsequent agreements for Torcy to carry with him for negotiations in The Hague in May 1709. Du Theil also assisted Ligny in sending out subsidies to allies and recording



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Torcy’s dictation, and made frequent use of his knowledge of Spanish and Italian.205 In 1712, at just twenty-nine, Torcy sent him as a secretary to the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht. It was an apt choice, since du Theil knew conditions in Spain at first-hand, had intimate knowledge of the Treaty of Ryswick, was experienced at taking dictation and composing minutes, and had acquired under Ligny’s tutelage expertise with codes. Perhaps more crucially, he got along famously with the diverse group of envoys at Utrecht. At the conclusion of peace in 1713, Torcy appointed him embassy secretary and chargé d’affaires at The Hague.206 He was there only briefly, however, since a secretary-in-chief was needed at the peace congress meeting at the small Swiss town of Baden. Again, du Theil’s acquaintance with the department and with congress protocol landed him the job. While praising du Theil to Torcy, the ambassador to Switzerland du Luc acknowledged that the young man was under Torcy’s and Blondel’s protection – a powerful combination indeed.207 In 1715 du Theil returned to the secretariat, becoming one of its most powerful members, perhaps being named second secretary. Close ties with Pecquet and Marshal Huxelles led to his promotion to premier commis under the Regency in September 1715. He immediately took as his special assistant his cousin and Blondel’s nephew, Louis Richard de Tussac, who also knew Spanish and Italian and whose brothers had been enfants de langues through their uncle’s influence. He promoted the career of his future brother-in-law François Faucard de Beauchamp in the department’s archives and eventually secured for him posts of ambassadorial secretary and chargé d’affaires in Portugal and resident in Liege. Du Theil also took François as his secretary to Vienna (1736–37) and to the negotiations at Breda (1747). In 1737 at the age of fifty-five, du Theil drew the blood and stepfamily of Blondel together when he took a young bride, Jeanne-Benjamine-Angelique, daughter of Blondel’s stepson Beauchamp. He died eighteen years later after a long and distinguished career.208 François Faucard de Beauchamp’s diplomatic career was helped along by another kinsman who began his career under Torcy. This was his uncle Louis-Augustin Blondel, who was François Blondel’s son and thus his own father’s half-brother as well as du Theil’s cousin. After studying law, Louis-Augustin entered Torcy’s Académie politique in 1713 and then the department secretariat. Like du Theil, he apprenticed as an ambassadorial secretary in Madrid (1717–18). He served as a ­diplomat in Turin, various German courts, and Vienna until his retirement in 1751. Like du Theil, he would also employ nephew François Faucard as a secretary.209

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The Blondels, their kin, and their marital alliances are emblematic of the way in which finance weaved its way through the administrative fabric of the French state, even in departments seemingly far removed from such considerations. Venal offices in finance did more than supplement a bureaucrat’s income. They also marked his social ascent and made him attractive to a minister for service in a more professional capacity.

Ada m : D e pa rt m e n t V e t eran and Fai thful C o l b e rt Cli ent Clair Adam, who began his service in the foreign ministry before Mignon and Blondel, was born sometime between 1640 and 1650 in Montereaufault-­Yonne into a family of royal officials and clerics who had lived for centuries in the French Gâtinais east of Fontainebleau. In 1667 he entered Lionne’s department as a code apprentice under premier commis Pachau, a fellow Gâtinais who was likely his sponsor and patron. When Pomponne was disgraced, Pachau interceded with Croissy on Adam’s behalf and the latter was retained, although Pachau himself was not. Adam traveled to Berlin early in 1680, reporting back to premier commis Tourmont, himself uncertain of his own future under the new minister. Adam found a lack of order and economy in the household of François de Pas, comte de Rébenac, who had been appointed extraordinary envoy to the Brandenburg court late the previous year. Back in Paris, Adam continued as a code clerk and a copyist. Now Croissy’s client, Adam prospered in his service and, like him, invested in the annuities of the Estates of Brittany. In 1684 he purchased a residence near the Hôtel Croissy at the southwest corner of rue Richelieu and rue Neuve-des-­ Petits-Champs, and in 1686 he married Michelle du Rosoir (or Rozoir). But Adam’s closest connection was increasingly with Torcy, who stood as godfather to his son, born the following year, and whom Adam accompanied to Rome as private secretary in 1689. His fortune grew and he invested in 1690 with former department colleague Parayre, the royal architect Robert de Cotte, and others in a society formed to build a canal between Paris and Saint-Maur. Adam took a critical step in his social and professional ascent when in 1691 he purchased the expensive nobility-granting office of secretary of the king, which also allowed him to draw up, sign, and seal royal orders. Interestingly, one of the two witnesses (who could not be related by blood or marriage) to provide one of the required attestations to his good morals was Ferriol, future ambassador to Constantinople. Perhaps the Blondels’ connection with Ferriol



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began through Adam. Even though he had already been using them to seal his personal documents, he registered his arms in 1696.210 In order to be close to the bureau, Adam built a villa on the outskirts of Versailles northeast of the palace known as Glatigny.211 Early in his ascent, however, Adam experienced a misadventure that might have ended it. In December 1690 Croissy selected Adam as a “person of confidence” to accompany Foy de La Neuville, gentleman of the chamber of the king of Poland, to Hamburg carrying ratifications for a secret convention with Hanover that was a strand in a web of negotiations aiming to draw other German princes and the Scandinavians closer to France. The fear of enemy agents laying their hands on its particulars led to an ingenious precaution: a Swiss officer disguised as a merchant would carry a duplicate of the papers to the cantons and from there to Hamburg; and La Neuville, who made frequent trips between Warsaw and Paris, would reach Hamburg by way of the United Provinces and northern Germany. In addition, only the first and last pages of the signed ratification were sent; the particulars would be added once the document reached Hamburg. Adam, masquerading as La Neuville’s secretary, would fill in the blanks of the document he had begun at Versailles. During their journey, unfortunately, Neuville’s servant loaded the valise containing the document on a wagon that was to follow them some days later but which fell into Dutch hands instead and was forwarded to Heinsius, who could not, however, learn anything specific from it. The French agents discovered their loss only once in Hamburg on 10 January 1691, but the Swiss courier had made it through safely and Adam was able to complete his task. Benoît Bidal, baron d’Asfeld, the diplomat responsible for these negotiations, was not pleased that Dutch suspicions had been raised and was anxious to be rid of Adam, who ended up returning home by way of Denmark and Norway to avoid Dutch agents. Adam blamed La Neuville for the errant valise but nonetheless earned a reprimand from Croissy, who insisted that he was “unable to stomach such a ridiculous blunder,” for a courier should never lose sight of his luggage.212 Although his travels abroad were ended, Adam apparently did not fall out of favour and received a generous gratification of 3,000 livres in 1691. After Croissy’s death in July 1696 he was appointed intendant of Torcy’s household and “tuteur bon des Enfants mineurs” of the new secretary’s minor siblings (legal guardian of their persons and property).213 Along with Torcy’s mother, his brother, and Renaudot, Adam loaned his patron the funds he needed at his marriage.214 His closeness with the family was clearly indicated in 1701 when Adam was one of only two

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non-family members who signed the marriage contract of Torcy’s sister Thérèse when she wed the marquis de Renel.215 So powerful did Adam grow in Torcy’s service that provincial intendants came to pay their respects when they “made their court” at Versailles. Even the police chief of Paris courted Adam to have him show a particular document to the absent secretary of state.216 When Torcy was in The Hague secretly negotiating for peace in 1709, Adam was entrusted with sending out and opening the foreign secretary’s correspondence.217 Adam had other protectors outside the department, such as Maintenon’s niece Françoise Charlotte Amble d’Aubigné, duchesse de Noailles.218 He also undertook delicate missions for Torcy and the king, as in March 1715 when the princesse des Ursins, expelled from Spain, coldly received at Versailles, and denied lodging at the palace, was taken in by Adam and his wife and spent a night at Glatigny.219 Clearly, the Adams moved in lofty circles. Although perhaps not the most brilliant of Torcy’s clerks, Adam was certainly among the most trustworthy, devotedly loyal, and steadfast.220 This did not, however, prevent the regent from making use of his skills by installing him in 1715 as one of the principal commis of the new domestic affairs council.221 Adam recruited his own family into Torcy’s service. His brother Nicolas became a visiteur des postes. His son-in-law Jean de Prévost, former captain of the gardes du corps of Marshal Boufflers and in 1705 a Toulouse “capitoul” (alderman, which granted him noble status), joined his father-in-law in 1706 in purchasing one of the new offices of treasurers of ambassadors. Adam’s son Jean-Baptiste, born in 1687 and with bright prospects as Torcy’s godson, became a commis by at least 1709 but was so debauched and disliked that his colleagues dubbed him “Cain.” Other contemporaries must also have thought him untrustworthy because once his father and Torcy exited the department, young Adam was heard of no more. For all his years and faithful service in the department, stretching from almost the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign to his death, Adam was unable to launch a dynasty to carry on his legacy.222

P e cq u e t : T h e P in n ac l e o f Professi onali sm Ironically, Torcy’s premier commis Antoine Pecquet may be best known for the role he played during the Regency, even though it was based on the skills and knowledge he had acquired and deployed prior to 1715. He has been characterized as “un de ces laborieux qui travaillent autant



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par goût que par devoir avec le sentiment d’être utiles et la joie d’être ignorés” (one of those hard workers who labour as much from taste as from duty with the sense of being useful and the joy of being ignored).223 He remained a premier commis until he retired owing to apoplexy in 1725 and died in 1728.224 He was succeeded by (and is often confused with) his more famous son, Antoine Pecquet fils, who penned the famous treatise Discours sur l’art de négocier, sometimes misattributed to his father.225 Pecquet’s father, Michel, was a merchant in Senlis (where Antoine was born in 1668) and later an engineer, probably in Louvois’s fortifications department.226 There is some confusion about Antoine’s early career. From 1682 he worked on royal fortifications, although in what capacity is unclear; aged fourteen, he was likely his father’s apprentice, but in four years his work on fortifications ended.227 In 1686 someone recommended him to intendant of finance Michel Le Peletier de Souzy, former intendant of Flanders, to work for his brother, Controller General Le Peletier, as inspector and director of public works in Ypres.228 Pecquet was in Claude Le Peletier’s service for fourteen years, remaining after the latter gave up the controller general’s office (1689)229 and left the Conseil (1697).230 He made use of his engineering skills and experience supervising the 1696–97 reconstruction work on Le Peletier’s Paris residence.231 Pecquet entered the foreign office in 1700 as a premier commis.232 He was perhaps recommended to Torcy by his late father-in-law’s old friend Claude Le Peletier, now largely retired from public life.233 Pecquet was a prodigious worker. Nicolas Mesnager drew on his ability to read English and knowledge of commercial matters during negotiations in 1711.234 Pecquet took dictation from Torcy on the delicate matter of Matthew Prior’s secret visit to Fontainebleau in July 1711 to present the British peace preliminaries.235 An expert on European court etiquette and protocol, it was to him that Ambassador du Luc in Vienna wrote in 1715 when he encountered difficulties with the nuncio.236 Pecquet could facilitate an unofficial diplomatic visit to the king, as the irrepressible Prior reported to Whitehall: “Monsieur Torcy having delivered me the answer to the mémoire … M. Pecquet came to me [3 August 1711] in the morning and told me the king would see me at six in the evening in his closet. Accordingly at that time M. Pecquet went privately with me through the lodging, and Monsieur Torcy came out from the king’s cabinet, and introduced me (to the king).”237 With some relish, Viscount Bolingbroke later wrote: “But I am forced to make Monsieur Pecquet come to me … twice this day, while Monsieur Torcy stays [in Paris].”238 Like the other

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foreign office clerks, Pecquet formed friendships with French agents abroad that surface occasionally in official correspondence.239 In 1689, before entering Torcy’s service, Pecquet married the daughter of Martin Cadart, seigneur de Beauregard, “maître des fontaines” (master of the fountains) of the Duke of Brunswick. Their daughter married Charles-Arnould Nolin de la Tournelle, who succeeded to his father-inlaw’s office of secretary of the king in 1728 and four years later became “secrétaire a la conduit des ambassadeurs” (secretary to conduct ambassadors).240 Antoine fils, like his father a diligent and knowledgeable worker, was premier commis under Louis XV, and thus father and son helped lead the foreign office bureaucracy during the first four decades of the eighteenth century. Pecquet père accumulated financial offices in Brittany, long a source of rewards for Colbert clients. Unlike his foreign office colleagues of the earlier generation, however, Pecquet began this process after his entry into the foreign office: in 1705 he became an auditor in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes and in 1713 a “trésorier de France généraux de finances” (treasurer of France general of finance) in the same body.241 He was granted letters of nobility in July 1715 and only became a secretary of the king under the Regency.242 Like Adam’s, Pecquet’s career was largely fashioned within the department and by his work in the field in foreign policy. There can be little doubt that both the training and experience he provided his son Antoine fils, as well as his own conduct and role as guardian of the department’s traditions, contributed to the treatise the younger Pecquet would publish in 1737. The elder Pecquet’s professionalism and proficiency – and his connections with key figures in the new regime, of course – allowed him to preserve the department’s Colbert legacy during the Polysynod and afterwards under the resurgent system of secretaries of state. Moreover, when Torcy left the foreign office, Pecquet remained and even faithfully served Huxelles and later Cardinal Dubois, who was consumed with jealousy and hatred for Torcy.243 Perhaps at one level Pecquet was, in Weber’s words, a clerk “devoted to [the] impersonal and functional purposes” of the foreign office rather than to any particular person, which resembles not patrimonialism but Weber’s “pure type” of bureaucracy.244 At another level, however, he was, like all bureaucrats, a complex individual rather than a simple abstraction. Thus, he exhibited attitudes that were carried over from the Torcy era, as indeed did all the foreign office’s personnel.245 When in 1718 the British diplomats distributed gifts to Dubois and Pecquet for their work on the alliance just signed, Pecquet’s refusal to accept the 500 livres proffered puzzled and even somewhat



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offended them. Pecquet was motivated perhaps by patriotic sentiment against the Hanoverians or by institutional reticence toward outside gifts. He did accept, though, a gratification from the regent.246 In 1718, as the British tried to push France toward vigorous measures against Spain, Pecquet supported Dubois in resisting this pressure. The following year, however, Pecquet, like Torcy, was critical of Dubois’s weakness when faced with British pressure over Spain and the treaty London made with Sweden behind his back.247 What seems likely is that Pecquet was in closer communication with his former employer than Dubois suspected or would have countenanced.248

L ar ro q u e : A L in k to t he Republi c of Letters Nearly a century ago André Le Glay observed that the letters exchanged between intelligent and curious individuals constituted the true mode of staying informed of court news and gossip, foreign events, the lives of the nobility, and the latest ideas circulating in the salons.249 Such linkage through letters was especially true of the world of early modern scholars. This self-acknowledged Republic of Letters, although often riven by personal rancour and controversies of an intra- (and therefore all the more bitter) rather than an inter-denominational nature, was nonetheless held together by “an ideal of mutual support and assistance in the furthering of knowledge that completely transcended all differences of religion and political affiliations.”250 Especially in the decades after 1650, European scholars, treading a path similar to that of scientists (these should not be seen as easily distinguishable categories), increasingly approached subjects such as history and (more cautiously) theology with a critical, rational, and secular mindset and methodology. Jonathan Israel insists that it is only within the context of this era of intellectual ferment, characterized by Paul Hazard as the “crisis of the European mind,” that the Enlightenment may be understood.251 As we have already seen, many members of Torcy’s brain trust, such as Dubos and Le Grand, were active and important members of the international scholarly networks. ­Daniel Larroque was likewise an important epistolatory link in the Republic of Letters and perhaps the clerk with the most striking and checkered background.252 Like his father Mathieu, one of the greatest Reformed theologians in France, Daniel (born c. 1660) was a Protestant minister in Rouen and a pugnacious apologist. During his 1674 Rouen sojourn, Pierre Bayle came to know both Larroques. The young Daniel made such a favourable impression that when he sent Bayle a manuscript d ­ uring the

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winter of 1683–84, Bayle forwarded it to his Rotterdam editor Renier Leers. Le Prosélyte abusé, published anonymously in 1684, was a reply to a book by a recent Protestant convert to Catholicism. Still in his early twenties, Larroque critiqued the author with “delicacy and sarcasm.”253 By June 1684 he was in Paris as preceptor to a young nobleman (perhaps a German), immersed in the savant world and forwarding news and books to Bayle in Rotterdam. Larroque complained that the Republic of Letters in Paris was in the doldrums owing to the many bad devotional books being published. If this continued, he jested, it would have to be re-founded as a separate republic of piety!254 As pressure mounted on France’s Huguenots, Larroque left Paris for Holland on 10 February 1685.255 He spent some months with Bayle in Rotterdam writing and published that year Les véritables motifs de la conversion de l’abbé de la Trappe, a critique of Abbé Armand Jean le Bouthillier de Rancé, a former dissolute cleric turned Trappist reformer.256 By the end of November, Larroque was in London learning English and making contacts. He served a congregation in London, but his great love was Oxford, to which he went whenever he could, calling it a land of science and the place where Greek and oriental languages most flourished. Extracts from English books as well as books themselves crossed the North Sea to Rotterdam along with news of and introductions to members of the Huguenot diaspora and the English scholarly and scientific community.257 Bayle’s illness, which delayed and truncated the February 1687 issue of his monthly innovative journal of literary criticism, the News of the Republic of Letters, likely led Larroque to return to Rotterdam. He edited the March issue alone and the next five in collaboration with Jean Le Clerc, as well as doing further polemical writing and publishing of his own.258 From late 1689 he spent approximately nine months as secretary to Sir William Dutton Colt, England’s envoy to Hanover, but did not meet Leibniz, who was away in Italy during his stay. By the time Leibniz returned in June 1690, Larroque had left Colt’s service to travel to Rotterdam to see Bayle and then went to Denmark.259 If Larroque was not already known to the foreign ministry, he certainly was after the French ambassador’s confessor in Copenhagen, perhaps in August or September1690, heard his startling repudiation of Protestantism in favour of Catholicism. By October, with a 300-livre économat pension for New Converts, Larroque was in Paris.260 Why did he convert and at this time? Likely homesick for the intellectual delights of Paris and tiring of the pettiness and poverty of life as a Huguenot exile, he may have been enticed by an offer from Paul Pellisson, hopes



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of recovering the confiscated property of family members who had fled in 1685, a growing discomfort with William III’s anti-French crusade, witnessed first-hand during his diplomatic mission to Hanover, or any combination of these factors.261 Given his striking success in Hanover,262 an important hub of the Republic of Letters, and with the recent outbreak of war, which always increased the hunger for news, Larroque may have considered that his literary patron Bayle, the great L ­ eibniz, and the erudite community in general might be better served from France than from England or Germany. Given his connections, he would be better placed to help diffuse news and books from the vital French intellectual centre and also remedy the shortage of German and English works making their way into French libraries and critical journals.263 Whatever his likely complex motives, he headed to Rotterdam when he left Colt’s service and then, perhaps with Bayle’s blessing, journeyed to Copenhagen, away from any obvious linkage with his patron that might raise French suspicions as to the sincerity of his conversion yet to a neutral port that would allow a quick return to France. As for the genuineness of Larroque’s conversion, whether or not he was a deist, he was certainly critical of dogmatism.264 Outward Catholic conformity coupled with a skeptical intellectual life fell easily within the bounds of Bayle’s sense of toleration. Indeed, Bayle defended him against the fiery pastor Pierre ­Jurieu, saying that God and no man was the judge of Larroque’s actions.265 In Paris, although under a kind of supervision by the Jesuit Père Antoine Verjus, brother of the diplomat Verjus de Crécy, Larroque resumed his role as one of Bayle’s chief French contacts.266 He quickly reconnected with sundry orientalists and literary figures, including Abbé Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’Olivet, learned grammarian, poet Nicolas ­Boileau’s friend, and Voltaire’s teacher; Père Leonard de SainteCatherine, librarian and bibliophile; Daniel Huet, bishop of Avranches, academician, Latinist, and Hellenist; and François Roger Gaignières, antiquarian and collector.267 He was also now in correspondence with Leibniz, sending him books and news from Paris and facilitating his contact with Malebranche.268 The great German erudite envied Larroque’s position in Paris, which he called “la source des connoissances” (source of knowledge), assuring him that he was no mere inhabitant, but “un des members principaux du senat des scavans” (one of the principal members of the senate of savants).269 Of course, Leibniz said this in the context of requesting help with some historical research – the French, he insisted, knew the history of other nations better than did their own natives – but it was true that Paris was rich in libraries and savants. L ­ eibniz also

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maintained that contemporary France was as superior in the sciences as it was in public affairs, which often went hand in hand, as in the ages of Augustus and the Arab Caliphate.270 Though living in Dutch exile, Bayle was French by birth, language (he never learned Dutch), and culture, and he likewise saw Paris, with its many libraries open to scholars and bookshops filled with old books, as the centre of the intellectual world. Correspondents such as Larroque and Dubos kept him in close contact with that world.271 Yet the dazzling and vibrant intellectual life of Paris also depended on foreign contacts to assure the circulation of the often-illicit books that scholars were anxious to hear about or read. In particular, most of Bayle’s works were banned in France. However, official censorship could be haphazard, inefficient, and even indulgent when it came to certain titles, but it still posed an ever-present threat.272 In mid-April 1690 there appeared in the United Provinces a controversial work, Avis aux réfugiés sur leur prochain retour en France … par Monsieur C.L.A.A.P.D.P., said by its publisher to be the work of an old friend, a Catholic avocat in the Paris parlement. The book, critical of Protestants and the Glorious Revolution, defended Louis XIV’s right to expel religious minorities who took up the pen or arms against their lawful sovereign to foment anarchy and civil war. It urged a Huguenot refugee return to France by means of royal clemency rather than the Protestant crusade William III was raising and advised the returnees to submit to their rightful king. Although well received by Bossuet and others in France, the book was bitterly denounced by the Huguenot diaspora. Speculation flew as to its author. By the spring of 1691 the pastor Jurieu attributed it to Bayle and a pro-French cabal in Holland opposed to William III. Despite Bayle’s continuous denial of authorship, his close friends and most of the rest of the Republic of Letters did not believe him. Bayle even encouraged the suggestion that Larroque (by then safely out of reach of Dutch authorities and whom Jurieu numbered to be among Bayle’s cabal that Jurieu blamed for the Avis) was perhaps the author. Some contemporaries said that Larroque himself claimed authorship, a supposition that gained subsequent scholarly credence, but as Gianluca Mori has convincingly demonstrated in the introduction to his critical edition of this work, Bayle alone wrote it, which was perfectly consistent with his subtle notions of toleration and politics.273 Larroque’s previously bright prospects dimmed considerably when a compromising paper in his handwriting turned up during police ­lieutenant Gabriel Nicolas de La Reynie’s sweep of Rouen and Lyon booksellers that were producing libelous and Protestant works. Accord-



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ing to a ­February 1700 report on his case, the half-sheet contained a project for a preface to an edition of Bernhard de Fontenelle’s Dialogues des morts that contained things whose application was deemed contrary to royal service. This and the accusation of trading in forbidden books (a common activity in the Republic of Letters) led to Larroque’s arrest on 25 November 1694, along with his friend the orientalist Antoine Galland, with him at that moment and assumed to be an accomplice but released within a week. Found among Larroque’s papers were what Pontchartrain later (20 May 1696) termed “bad manuscripts” deserving greater punishment than the imprisonment he actually received.274 Bayle read of the arrest in a Dutch gazette, but doubted Larroque’s guilt and wrote their mutual friend, François Pinsson de Riolles, avocat in the Paris parlement, for news and to offer his support. Leibniz, likewise informed of Larroque’s travails, hoped for his release.275 After nearly a year in Paris’s Petit Châtelet prison, where during the final seven or eight months his friends could visit him, Larroque was transferred to Angers, at first heavily restricted by Pontchartrain as a man who had gotten mixed up with writing “des libelles diffamatoires” (defamatory libelous writings).276 Bayle maintained contact through those who visited the prisoner, especially the Jesuit mathematician, philologist, and numismatist Edouard de Vitry, Larroque’s close friend.277 Early in 1696 Larroque was transferred from Angers to Saumur, still under surveillance to prevent the production of further “mauvais écrits” (bad writings) or meetings with other converts from Catholicism, but apparently good behaviour and royal mercy led to his release in December 1698, although he was still confined to the town of Saumur.278 Early in 1699 the Châtelet’s royal prosecutor, Colbert family legal advisor and Mignon kinsman-by-marriage Claude II Robert, approached ­Pontchartrain on Larroque’s behalf. Whether he did so on Torcy’s behalf is not known, but all the Colbert connections that helped obtain Larroque’s release certainly render this a strong possibility. In any event, when Pontchartrain took the matter to the king, he was instructed to seek the advice of Bossuet, who had known Larroque since 1691, which he did on 24 March.279 Based on the bishop’s testimony and that of others as to his mental abilities (“capacité”) and Pontchartrain’s conclusion that Larroque’s guilt, while real, was based on necessity rather than any other (political?) motive, he was finally released on probation on 13 January 1700 and forbidden to leave France.280 A report ­annotated by police lieutenant d’Argenson on 24 February 1700 summarized Larroque’s case and indicated that he had arrived in Paris only

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eight days before. His request that his personal and scholarly papers seized at his arrest be returned elicited the comment to d’Argenson from police greffier Gaudion (11 March) that his colleague Tauxier, who had Larroque’s papers, had remarked that he was lucky to have been arrested only after the earlier execution of two others convicted “pour libelles énormes” (for excessive libels). In any event, Pontchartrain wrote d’Argenson (28 July 1700) that he was to see that Larroque’s restored économats pension was paid.281 From his arrival in Paris, he was back among his old literary friends, sharing a letter he had recently received from Bayle.282 Another of Larroque’s champions was Marie-Madelaine de Rochechouart, abbess of Fontevrault, the sister of former royal mistress Mme de Montespan and the third duc de Mortemart, married to the Great ­Colbert’s daughter Marie-Anne. Called the “Queen of Abbesses,” she was an influential member of many literary circles and the king’s correspondent. She commended Larroque to Montespan, Gaignières, and the Noailles family, and helped him obtain a place with her kinsman Torcy as an English and Dutch translator.283 Hardly settled into his new employment, the former prisoner was, astonishingly, assigned, along with premier commis Noblet and master of ceremonies Desgranges, to accompany the young dukes of Burgundy and Berry as they hurriedly escorted their brother Philip to his new Spanish throne. Larroque was apparently assigned to the suite of Burgundy and the duc de Noailles. The December 1700 through April 1701 journey began in haste, but ended in a more leisurely way with a circuitous return through the south, up the Rhône, and back to Paris, which Torcy carefully orchestrated to build support for the monarchy as international tensions heightened. Putting his pen to good use, Larroque chronicled the incessant round of receptions the princes endured at almost every stop, but he was also able to visit historical sites along the way, including the tombs of Louis XI and Montaigne. He also sent a running account of this long journey to his friend Gaignières.284 Both Bayle and Leibniz were informed of Larroque’s release and change of fortune.285 Larroque and Bayle continued to correspond, and before the latter’s death on 28 December 1706, Larroque enlisted Louis XIV’s personal physician Fagon to prepare a “consultation” on Bayle’s illness, unfortunately dated the day before his demise.286 Contact with Leibniz was more intermittent, but Larroque’s Hanover connections served him well while working for Torcy. For instance, the Grand Duke of Tuscany’s extraordinary envoy to France from 1695 until his death in



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1707 was none other than Averardo Salviati, marquis of Montiéri, who had earned Leibniz’s gratitude for introducing him to Larroque.287 Although his clerical, translating, and writing duties as a foreign office staff member required that he normally reside at Versailles, when staying in Paris Larroque entertained friends with the latest court news in rooms provided to him by the rich duchesse de Lesdiguières in her splendid hotel. One habitual visitor was his friend the orientalist and archaeologist Antoine Galland, the first European to translate Les mille et une nuits (The Thousand and One Nights or The Arabian Nights), who shared his translations with Larroque as he finished them. When Larroque was in Paris, especially for festival days, Galland was in the habit of visiting with him at his rooms to drink coffee, share verses and songs, and discuss literary matters.288 In February 1709 Pontchartrain wanted to appoint ­Galland professor of Arabic in the Royal College, but a jurisdictional dispute with Torcy delayed the announcement until 8 June. Yet the day after, Galland dined at Versailles with Torcy, Larroque, and Le Grand, another of his friends.289 It is not clear what work if any Galland performed for the foreign office, but on 27 December 1710 Larroque shared with him an account of Vendôme’s victories over the Allies in Spain at Brihuega and Villa Viciosa (8 and 10 December) written in Torcy’s bureau to be printed for propaganda purposes. This suggests that Larroque was the author of the account, but in any event, it shows how quickly the ministry’s propaganda machine could deploy its products.290 In his youth, premier commis under Louis XV Le Dran worked alongside Larroque, who, like Abbé Le Grand, collaborated with JeanYves de Saint-Prest at the Louvre. Le Dran described them as “bons généraux d’armée qui n’avoient des troupes” (good army generals who had no troops) for the erudition they deployed to defend French foreign policy.291 Indeed, Larroque used his skills in 1709 to offer a quasi-­ official response to a Dutch edition of the papers and letters of the comte d’Estrades, a former ambassador to the United Provinces, that its publishers touted as revealing the secrets of French diplomatic perfidy. In addition to noting the copyist, editorial, and printer errors that mutilated the originals, Larroque accused those who issued the five volumes of seeking but failing to obscure past French glory, their insults to France merely highlighting England’s divided and poor government and Dutch ingratitude.292 Larroque and Le Grand laboured among the diplomatic papers, ­inventorying them for easier access, and from 1712 served as adjunct teachers in the Académie politique connected with the archive and directed by Saint-Prest.293

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Under the Regency, the duc d’Antin, the abbess of Fontevrault’s nephew, requested that Larroque join him on the Polysynod’s Conseil du dedans, which consolidated all domestic administration. He was its chief premier commis, joining the two other premiers commis who headed its three bureaus, who included Adam, reprising his duties under Torcy.294 When in September 1718 the regent abolished this and other councils, re-dividing domestic administration among four re-empowered secretaries of state, Larroque retired with a pension to pursue his writing and publishing on religion and history until his death in 1731.295 Larroque was perhaps a deist of the radical Enlightenment, close to both the suspected radical yet enigmatic Bayle and the anti-radical and moderate Enlightenment champion Leibniz, and served the more conventionally pious Torcy, who personally gravitated at most toward the edge of the moderate Early Enlightenment mainstream.296 Torcy could not have been unaware of Larroque’s ideas and the intellectual company he kept, but his desire to deploy the best minds and sharpest pens in the service of his king’s foreign policy led him to embrace a pragmatic latitudinarianism.

C l ie n t s a n d D e pa rt ment Veterans The foreign office under Torcy included clerks who had entered it long before he did and others who were added in the final years of the War of the Spanish Succession. Some clerks served only a short time, leaving because of death, another career opportunity, or perhaps because they did not like the work. We know only a little about some of them, almost nothing about others, and we do not even know of the existence of others. It is not surprising that many from the department’s lower levels are obscure, but it is curious that we know little even about some of the premiers commis. One of these is Aubert, who served under Lionne, Pomponne, Croissy, and Torcy until his retirement in 1705.297 When he became a premier commis is uncertain, but it was at least by 1701.298 Details concerning Aubert are sketchy, but a building contract in the foreign archives perhaps offers some possibilities. The contract is with Jean Richard, architect and master mason, for some construction on the grounds of the Abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Pres in Paris on behalf of Jacques Aubert, royal councillor, “contrôleur des guerres” (controller of war), and treasurer general to Cardinal Furstenberg, abbot of Saint-Germain, who was developing part of its grounds to pay his many expenses.299 Piccioni cites this contract to corroborate his hypothesis that Aubert, whom he believes to be this Jacques Aubert, disappeared from



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department records after 1694.300 However, service in the foreign office hardly precluded holding a household post with an important personage. Indeed, the foreign secretary might recommend one of his clerks for such a post as a reward and a means of keeping an eye on someone of interest. As already noted, it was common for a premier commis to omit that title while preferring more socially exalted ones in public documents. Moreover, building a fine Parisian townhouse and speculating in real estate were hardly at odds with a clerk’s position. In any event, other evidence shows that Aubert did not leave the department. Even more shadowy is Louis Bénigne de Marolot, who first appears in the 1693 accounts and by 1706 was a premier commis.301 With the reorganization after Mignon’s retirement, Marolot seems primarily to have assisted Adam with domestic correspondence, perhaps with responsibility for southern provinces, although like Noblet and Ligny he often served as Torcy’s copyist, as with a draft treaty sent out in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession.302 The last notice of him in department accounts comes in 1710, after which he apparently disappeared, whether due to death or retirement is unknown.303 Victor Goulu (or Goullet), sieur de Ligny, who generated a good deal of correspondence during his years in the department, is less obscure. A “sieur de Ligny” sold Croissy a house and land adjoining his estate at Croissy in 1687, and in 1691 letters of nobility were expedited by the foreign office for presumably the same person.304 Victor Goulu de Ligny served Pomponne as a personal secretary, was on the staff of Pomponne’s kinsman Antoine, marquis de Feuquières, French com­ mander at ­Pignerol during the Nine Years War, and was a commis of the Extraordinary of War for the Army of Italy as of 1702 under the Colbert client Bouchu, intendant of Dauphiné and the Army of Italy. From June 1701 the Extraordinary of War, the principal military treasury under the war department’s jurisdiction, was struck with major bankruptcies from top to bottom, likely affecting Ligny and forcing Bouchu to look to his own resources and resourcefulness for credit to keep the army fed and supplied. The hard-pressed intendant nonetheless found time to write Torcy (18 March 1702) on Ligny’s behalf. His letter arrived at Versailles most opportunely, for Torcy, scrambling to keep pace with disbursements for the diplomacy of the widening war, immediately offered Ligny his protection and employment.305 In the final months of 1702 Ligny was among those minor agents Torcy dispatched to sound out members of the Dutch peace party, traveling to Frankfurt under the assumed name of “Seeblat.”306 By late November he was in the foreign office as Torcy’s

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secretary, issuing orders for payments, including gratifications to diplomats abroad, processing passports, taking dictation, handling the minister’s correspondence, dispensing subsidies to French allies, and working on postal matters.307 One of Ligny’s early assignments was to correspond with Noblet, who was traveling with the Army of Germany in Alsace. Noblet, in reporting to Torcy on the activities of Abbé Pomponne, who was traveling in the Duke of Burgundy’s train, made a joke about Ligny “vous présentant un cardon qu’il chiffré” (presenting you with a thistle he encrypted).308 Apparently in response to a request from Noblet for a gratification for a nun he encountered at the front, Torcy scribbled at the top of the letter that Ligny had sent it.309 In other business, Torcy noted that he had spoken to Ligny about Noblet to say that he accepted his proposition about gathering news through the Strasbourg postmaster.310 The former army treasurer was soon paymaster to France’s allies abroad, assisting Blondel in sending out the secret subsidies, which often required Ligny to accompany Torcy when he followed the king to Marly and to Fontainebleau. He developed a close correspondence with Ambassador Pomponne in Venice and from 1705 to 1709 sent him by a circuitous route more than 150,000 livres to be smuggled from Venice to the Hungarian insurgents. Ligny maintained a registry for Hungarian subsidies and sent letters and ordonnances signed in his own name to ­Bonnac, ambassador to Sweden and the Polish Commonwealth, who had promoted the Hungarian diversion.311 He also supplied monies to ­Poussin in Denmark and to the bankers of the two Wittelsbach electors.312 Ambassador Ferriol, another of Ligny’s regular correspondents, wrote to him upon his return from Constantinople in March 1711 to explain and justify his expenditures for the Hungarian adventure. The department had begun to demand a more exact accounting of expenditures when a mission was completed. That same year du Theil, Blondel’s nephew, joined the secretariat to assist Ligny with the growing work.313 Despite the system of treasurers of ambassadors, the plenipotentiaries to Utrecht still wrote Ligny directly for payment of their gratifications. Mesnager, for example, importuned Ligny for immediate payment to be delivered to his man of affairs in Paris, Philippe Masson, and two weeks later Masson wrote to Ligny about funds for Polignac, also requesting passports, presumably for delivering the monies.314 Given his financial skills and duties, it is little wonder that Ligny was retained during the Regency.315 Another wartime recommendation came from Louis de Bernage, provincial intendant of Franche-Comté and then Flanders. His cousin Jean-



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Nicolas de Bernage, sieur de Saint-Illiers, entered the department in 1704 and worked under Pecquet.316 In 1712 the Colberts arranged a marriage between Bernage and the daughter of the controller general of the company of the Swiss Guard. Torcy and his wife attended the wedding, as did Mme de Croissy, Torcy’s brothers Henri and Charles-Joachim, and all of the department’s premiers commis. Later (1719) the Fourniers stood godparents for Bernage’s son.317 Bernage was regarded as a man of probity who possessed “une belle main propre sous dictation” (a beautiful clean hand under dictation).318 Under the Regency he was specially charged with sending out passports and legal documents.319 Nicolas-Louis Le Dran was born in 1687 in Paris, son of maitre surgeon, Henri Le Dran, who had served the Colbert family and became surgeon-major of the Gardes françaises du Roi. While his older brother Henri-François Le Dran became a famous Paris surgeon and his younger brother François-Antoine served in Martinique as a royal physician, Nicolas entered Torcy’s service as a translator in October 1711 on the recommendation of his brother, Charles-Joachim Colbert, Montpellier’s bishop. François-Aimé Pouget, one of Charles-Joachim’s closest advisors, had been in a seminary with Le Dran and spoke enthusiastically of him as an excellent Latin translator who also knew German, Spanish, and Italian. Le Dran could also read and translate from English, a talent increasingly prized in the early eighteenth century as relations with Great Britain grew closer.320 When Saint-Prest left Versailles for the Louvre with the department’s archives in 1710, Le Dran stayed behind to classify the remaining documents and those that continued to accumulate, but joined him in 1711 as “gardien des Archives anciennes” (guardian of the old archives). After 1715 he served as chief of the archives and undertook various stints as premier commis, retiring in 1762 and dying twelve years later. The solitary and unmarried Le Dran loved books, music, and history, and produced invaluable historical studies of the foreign office. Michel Sermenté, sieur de Montalais, son of a receiver and payer of rentes of the Hôtel de Ville, joined the department in 1711. Trained as an avocat in the Paris parlement, Sermenté proved a valuable assistant to Adam drafting legal documents sent to the provinces and parlements. In 1711 he wed the daughter of the regiment of the Swiss Guards’ ­“maréchal des logis” (quartermaster), and his colleague du Theil later stood as his daughter’s godfather. Under the Regency, Sermenté attached himself to Joseph Fleuriau d’Armenonville, who purchased Torcy’s office of secretary of state on 3 February 1716. He served as his p ­ remier

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commis even though the new secretary had no department and duties reduced to signing expéditions. Sermenté returned to the department as premier commis when Fleuriau d’Armenonville’s son, Charles-Jean-­ Baptiste comte de Fleuriau Morville, became foreign secretary in 1723 upon Cardinal Dubois’s death, but when Fleuriau Morville fell in 1727, Sermenté retired. He was, however, able to introduce his son Marie-­ Gabriel and a nephew into the department as commis, while another son, Louis, would hold the same position in the navy.321 Inevitably, there are other commis who leave only brief or puzzling traces in department records. Sieur de Maugin, brother of Torcy’s écuyer, first appeared on a December 1691 commis list.322 His duties are not clear, but a letter from Noblet to Torcy from the camp at Brisach in 1703 mentioned him.323 Some clerks were apparently part of the augmented staff required to cope with the post-Ryswick expansion of missions. Edme Lebeau, who rejoined the department, had worked with Parayre on domestic administration under Pomponne and remained with the disgraced Pomponne as his valet de chambre.324 In 1698 he reappeared in the department’s payroll records, vanishing in 1706.325 PhilippeCéleste Dupuisse (also Dupuize or Dupuise) married in 1695, but we know nothing of him until he became Saint-Prest’s secretary in 1711 at the Louvre archive and the Académie politique established there later. He was installed in a first-floor apartment of four rooms as “garde des registre des Archives des Affaires Estrangères” (guardian of the register of the foreign affairs archives), a post he held until his death in 1741.326 Duparc (or Du Parc), who had entered the bureaus by 1711, worked with Pecquet during Torcy’s final years, signing the register for ­Bernage’s 1713 marriage. He apparently followed Torcy to the post office in 1715.327 We have already met Marc-Antoine Lullier, who worked with codes and retired around 1703. A Martin, said to have been a premier commis in 1706, has left only one tantalizing trace in records outside the department.328 Likewise not appearing in foreign office records is Louis François Delisle de La Drevetière, said to have been one of Torcy’s commis and who came to Paris to study law but abandoned it to write plays during the Regency.329 Another such individual was a simple commis, Bénigne Brameret, son of a bourgeois of Thenissey in Burgundy and himself a former maître de postes at Dijon, which already connected him to Torcy’s clientage. His new direct association with the great minister in Paris apparently made him an even more attractive match for the daughter of Jean Fabarel, honorary councillor at Dijon’s présidial and later an official of the Burgundian Chambre des comptes. They were wed in



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1700.330 Although he did not belong to the higher levels of the department and society inhabited by the premiers commis and the minister’s secretaries, Brameret nonetheless shared some of their central attributes. As a member of a kinship group he maintained ties with the local elites in his native province, even while working in Paris, and parlayed his position in the royal bureaucracy to marry well so as to advance from his bourgeois roots into a judicial family and enjoy for himself, his offspring, and his kin all the opportunities that this made possible. As with any administration, it is typically those “in the trenches” who perform the organization’s quotidian, but essential, tasks. Yet they are often unknown to and unappreciated by those distant from them in both experience and time. However, to anyone dealing with a bureaucracy, it is often these subordinate personnel rather than the person at the top who is the organization’s “face” because it is with them that they interact first and most frequently. Such, for example, was the typical experience of the foreign ministry’s secret agents, lower-level embassy personnel abroad, individuals applying for passports, clerks in the other state administrative units, and provincial petitioners in Paris seeking something from the minister. The wielders of pen and paper – or today’s more sophisticated electronic devices – give a bureaucratic structure life. They, not the structure within which they operate, project the department’s power. Weber likened “modern bureaucracy” to a machine, yet the staff of Torcy’s foreign office were more than cogs in a mechanism. The premiers commis especially were men of some standing in their own right, embedded in family and client systems within and outside the department and connected with other powerful and influential groups and individuals by networks that radiated out from each. It was this remarkable group of increasingly skilled and professionalized scribblers and managers of information that allowed the triumph of the modern bureaucratic state. Whether envisioned as a machine or in more human terms, bureaucracy is inextricably entwined with money matters. Not only are funds required to feed its functioning, a bureaucracy typically dispenses funds to others that render them dependent upon it for their livelihood and for accomplishing their work. Both aspects are explored in the next chapter.

7 Finances and Rewards

Louis XIV knew well that it was “finances [that] move and activate the whole great body of the monarchy.”1 Cicero maintained that “the sinews of War are infinite money,”2 but he might have added that the same was true of diplomacy, although it was always outdistanced by war in its funding. By its very nature, diplomacy is an expensive business requiring the maintenance of a variety of representatives and agents abroad. For those who acted in public, there were the costs of staffing an embassy and the obligatory opulence entailed in advertising the wealth and power of the ruler they represented. For those who laboured covertly, the costs of clandestine operations, including travel, bribes, and sending secret messages, could be quite high, but the tradeoff for all the cash expended was potentially valuable information. There were as well subsidies paid to particular princes for their alliance or neutrality.3 There were the costs at home of maintaining the minister’s bureaucrats, including their remuneration and other rewards, as well as outlays for items such as furniture and writing supplies. The department was also responsible for paying out a variety of pensions, including to New Converts, retired department personnel or their survivors, and those serving the foreign office in the provinces and abroad. This required that Torcy and his staff work closely with the state treasury and with bankers in Paris and abroad to keep the flow of money safe and uninterrupted.4

T h e F u n d s o f t h e Department In terms of the royal budget, the foreign office’s share never exceeded 5 per cent, whereas the war department could consume from 34.5 per cent



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of the total during peace and more than 60 per cent during war.5 Seeing that these massive amounts reached the troops along the frontiers in a sufficient and timely fashion was no small feat, yet the lesser but still significant funds for diplomacy presented their own problems. Some of the foreign office’s funds were disbursed in the provinces under its control and in the vicinity of Paris, but the bulk of them went abroad to pay diplomats, their staffs, and couriers, and, with greater concealment, to be disbursed locally as subsidies to foreign rulers, their advisors, and a wide array of clandestine agents, informants, and spies.6 Foreign expenditures frequently required payments in the local currency, obliging Torcy’s staff to apply current conversion rates when changing French money to that of the rest of Europe.7 Moving such funds in safety and secrecy through often hostile territory required great effort and ingenuity. Although the department’s bookkeeping division was small compared with that of the controller general and the war ministry, it elaborated a shifting structure to meet these fiscal responsibilities, incorporating networks of agents outside the kingdom, including foreign bankers, among whom were Jews and Protestants. From Croissy’s time, finances were apparently coordinated by his secretariat, with Blondel playing a leading role that continued throughout Torcy’s tenure. Blondel was joined by Ligny and later du Theil. The secretariat saw to the disbursement of most funds, including (until 1706) orders to the guards of the royal treasury for payments to diplomats serving abroad, but Adam often countersigned payment orders during Croissy’s final illness and continued to do so for those related to domestic administration as premiers commis for the domestic bureau.8 By the time the War of the Spanish Succession erupted, Adam, Blondel, Ligny, and Fournier could countersign financial ordonnances. In December 1706, ostensibly for greater efficiency but more likely as means of raising revenue for the war, the king created nine new venal offices: three “trésoriers des appointements des ambassadeurs” (treasurers for the remuneration of ambassadors), three principal commis, and three controllers general. The edict then proceeded to reduce the total to six by splitting the third (the triennial) of each set of offices and joining each half to the remaining two (the ancien and the alternatif), and further providing that one person could own and exercise the remaining two offices. Clair Adam, along with his son-in-law Jean de Prévost, each purchased an office of treasurer, while Parisian banker and Adam’s relative Pierre Odeau bought both controller offices.9 The two treasurers served alternately, with Adam taking the even years.10 Whether the three

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Figure 7.1 Number of payment orders issued per month, 1714

offices of principal commis were purchased is not indicated but it seems unlikely, since no gages payments are reported for them.11 In any event, Torcy’s secretariat continued to work with these accounts, which are included with all the others in an annual registry of the department’s payment orders.12 Adam and Prévost had responsibility for and signed these accounts, but it is likely that the foreign ministry’s secretaries and commis did most of the work involved.13 An analysis of the dates that the department’s payment orders were issued in 1714 (figure 7.1) reveals that the last and first month of the year were the busiest, while February was the least busy, followed by November, which reflects annual payments scheduled either for the beginning or the end of the year. Likewise, the months with the largest volume of payments on the first of the month (figure 7.2) are January and July, reflecting sums issued in increments of one year or six months; quarterly disbursements are reflected in rises in numbers during April and October. Not surprisingly, December has the fewest issued on the first of the month. Clearly, many payments were routine and fairly stable.



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Figure 7.2 Percentage of monthly payment orders issued on the first day of the month, 1714. Note: On 31 December, 27% of the month’s total was issued.

How much did the foreign ministry expend each year? Picavet offers totals for 1700 (over 4,000,000 livres) and 1707 (4,458,000 livres). He breaks this down to 606,000 livres for personnel in 1700, rising to 924,000 livres in 1707, and says that the total for 1700 included subsidies of 1,560,000 livres for Bavaria, 1,271,000 livres for Cologne, and 600,000 livres for Hungary, at total for subsidies in 1700 of 3,431,000 livres, which he says was about the same in 1707.14 Although these sums embrace two of the department’s major expenditure categories, they neglect others, so we turn to another set of figures coming from budgets drawn up during Chamillart’s tenure as controller general: two detailed lists of expenses to be paid before and after 6 September 1699, the date he assumed the position; and tables of government expenses covering the periods 1700–05 (with no data for 1704), 1706 (very limited data), 1707, and 1708–09.15 Like all such official financial data from the period, these figures must be treated with caution, but they are nonetheless suggestive. The categories of expenditure are not by department, so there were no separate department budgets. The “chapitres” (categories)

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Chamillart listed are often specific to a particular ministry, especially in the case of war and the navy, but only three funds appear to have been the foreign office’s preserve: “Ambassades” (embassies), “Affaires secretes” (secret affairs, including foreign subsidies), and the “Ligues suisses” (Swiss Leagues). The remaining departmental expenses were scattered among a number of other categories, including Acquits patents, Gages du Conseil, Pensions, and Pensions et gratifications ordinaries, and Gratifications par comptant et autres dépenses, for remunerating bureau personnel, the secretary of state, and diplomats;16 “Garnisons ordinaries” (ordinary garrisons) for remunerating governors, lieutenants du roi, and garrison commanders in foreign ministry–supervised provinces;17 La Bastille for the costs of pursuing, transporting, and feeding prisoners who had run afoul of the department for domestic or diplomatic reasons;18 Pensions for annual “pensions” (allowances) to foreign adherents of the king who cooperated with the foreign ministry;19 Voyages for regular and special postal couriers as well as traveling expenses via post for department staff;20 and probably Écuries for the horses used by cabinet couriers carrying diplomatic dispatches. Sometimes the department’s accounts make clear what fund a payment came from – for example, a payment of acquits patents, an ordonnance de voyage, or a pension – but other times it must be inferred, as in the case of ordinary garrisons.21 In some instances, a definitive inference is not possible: Were funds for garrison chapels and chaplains drawn from ordinary garrisons, Pensions, or Dons (gifts)? And what about the pensions and gratifications paid to “nouveaux convertis” (New Converts or ncs)? Did they come from the royal treasury, perhaps from “Offrandes et aumônes” (offerings and alms) or from the “Caisse des conversions” (conversion fund), administered by the Assembly of the Clergy but funded by the “régale” (the king’s right to one-third of a vacant episcopal see’s temporal revenues)?22 There is no category clearly marked out for the department’s regular non-personnel expenses, such as paper, quills, ink, and binding. The only annual estimate we have, 30,000 livres, is from Saint-Simon for late in the reign.23 Despite these difficulties, the three categories of funds clearly under the foreign secretary’s control reveal interesting trends between 1699 and 1709. The increased numbers of diplomats sent out after Ryswick pushed up expenditures for embassies until 1702, when the onset of war saw them drop by 40 per cent (figure 7.3).24 They fell further the next year and would remain flat for the rest of this period. A rise came only after Utrecht with the re-establishment of diplomatic r­ elations with



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­former enemies.25 More detail comes from the “Estats des Ambassadeurs” (lists of ambassadors) that, prior to the appearance of the treasurers of ambassadors, were issued to the royal treasurer authorizing payment of their appointements.26 The list for 1697 (table 7.1) of diplomats on active duty reflects a department in transition. The three plenipotentiaries to the Ryswick Congress are still listed, along with ambassadors largely holding posts in neutral countries like Venice, Switzerland, and Sweden, and residents and secretaries serving mostly in the Italian states. Continuing change marks the 1698 list (table 7.2).27 The Ryswick plenipotentiaries had returned home but not to ambassadorial positions, while extraordinary ambassadors were sent to former enemies England and Spain and representatives went out to other posts. The restoration of prewar diplomatic relations and the shift in assignments that began in 1698 were largely codified by 1701 (table 7.3), the high point both for number of missions (figure 5.9) and expenditures on embassies (figure 7.3).28 It is also clear that by September 1715, the Colbert family, clients, and creatures had become the dominant force in the diplomatic corps (table 7.4).29 A late addition to the department was the comte du Luc, a distinguished soldier and former lieutenant du roi in Provence, brother of Marseille’s bishop and a close friend of Torcy’s known for his generosity and fidelity. His political support in that province helped earn him the Swiss embassy in 1708, a place as plenipotentiary at Baden in 1714, and the next year the ambassadorship to Vienna.30 Jean-Baptiste de Johanne de la Carre, comte de Saumery, a relative of Mme de Colbert, was sent to Bavaria.31 Chevalier Rossi, an Italian nobleman who had served as Torcy’s agent at the papal court, filled the newly created residency at Brussels. Another foreigner who had rallied to France and to Torcy was Bailiff Lorenzi, Cardinal Francesco Maria de’ Medici’s gentleman of the chamber who married the daughter of Roland Jachiet Dupré, the Florentine-born career diplomat posted to Florence as French resident from 1694 until he died there in 1709. Lorenzi had Torcy’s full trust, serving as chargé d’affaires until the new resident arrived, and did so again when the resident departed in 1715.32 These diplomats joined the faithful Frischmann, d’Audiffret, Poussin, La Closure, Jacques-Vincent Languet, comte de Gergy, and others who had long served Torcy and even his father.33 Torcy’s ascendancy was apparent in the appointment of his “crony” Iberville as envoy to Great Britain, quite an accomplishment for someone who had entered the department as a simple commis. The same may be said of the nomination of his brother, comte de Croissy, as ambassador to the court of Charles XII of Sweden. By the time of the

Table 7.1 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1697 (for 6 months) Name

Annually (in livres)

Post

Harlay Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Count de Crecy Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Callières Plenipotentiary to the Ryswick Congress Castagnières Ottoman Empire D’Avaux Sweden Polignac Poland Briord Savoy De La Haye Venice Amelot de Gourney Switzerland Abbé d’Estrées Portugal Du Pré Florence Louciennes Genoa Ferriol Ottoman Empire (just appointed) Abbé Noirmoutier Rome, court of the Rota Iberville Geneva Heirs of the late M. La Resident in Sweden who died 6 June 1697 Piquetière (his annual payment was 8,000) Canderstein Secretary in Germany Baluze Poland Le Blond Italian Secretary in Venice 6-Month Total Annual Total [projected from these figures and with the adjustment for the resident in Sweden]

18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 11,500 12,000 12,000 12,000 6,000 6,000 18,000 3,000 3,600 3,466 3,000 1,500 500 200,566 410,200

Source: aae md 1043, fol. 37, “Estats … des Ambassadeurs,” 1697. 1 That is, their appointements. Table 7.2 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1698 Name

Post

Prince de Monaco Tallard Harcourt D’Avaux Bonrepaus Castagnières Chamilly Briord De La Haye Puyzieulx Polignac Annual Total

Rome England Spain Sweden Holland Ottoman Empire Denmark Savoy Venice Switzerland Poland

Annually (in livres) 72,000 48,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 24,000 24,000 36,000 420,000

Source: aae Finance du Ministère 1661–1767, vol. 1, fol. 9, “Estat … des Ambassadeurs,” 1698. This lists only the major posts and is therefore incomplete.

1 That is, their appointements.

Table 7.3 List of ambassadors and their pay,1 1701 Name

Title

Post

Prince de Monaco Tallard

Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador [Extraordinary] ambassador2 [Extraordinary] ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Extraordinary ambassador Ambassador Ambassador

Rome (deceased; to his heirs for Jan.) England (for Jan.– May) Spain

Ambassador Ambassador Envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Harcourt Marsin Guiscard Briord D’Avaux Ferriol Chamilly Phélypeaux De la Haye Hennequin de Charmont Puyzieulx Rouillé Villars Blecourt Chamoy Ricousse Desalleurs Heron Bonnac

Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Usson

Extraordinary envoy

Obrecht

Extraordinary envoy

Iberville Gergy Frischmann Dupré Louciennes D’Audiffret Abbé Bidal Abbé Noirmoustier De la Closure

Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Auditor Resident

Per Month (in livres)

Annually (in livres)

6,000

6,000

4,000

20,000

3,000

36,000

Spain (since June)

3,000

21,000

Sweden

3,000

36,000

United Provinces (Jan.–July) United Provinces (Jan.–Sept.) Ottoman Empire

3,000

21,000

3,000

27,000

3,000

36,000

Denmark

3,000

36,000

Savoy

2,500

30,000

Venice Venice (Apr.–Dec.)

2,000 2,000

24,000 18,000

Switzerland Portugal Austria (Jan.–Aug.) Spain Imperial Diet Bavaria (Mar.–Dec.) Cologne and earlier Brandenburg Poland Sweden and earlier Wolfenbüttel Wolfenbüttel (July– Dec.) Frankfurt (deceased 6 Aug.; to his heirs) Mainz Swabia Münster Florence Genoa Mantua Germany Rota in Rome

2,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500

24,000 24,000 12,000 18,000 18,000 15,000 18,000

1,500 1,500

18,000 18,000

1,500

9,000

1,500

10,800

1,250 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 500

15,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 6,000

500

7,200

Geneva (plus 1,200 for his chapel)

Table 7.3 continued Baluze

–

D’Alibert Italian secretary Le Blond Italian secretary Reignier Almoner Annual Total

“serving the King abroad” Rome Venice Sweden

250

3,000

166 83 –

2,000 1,000 800 602,800

Source: aae md 306, fols 65–72r (31 Dec. 1701), “Estats … des Ambassadeurs,” 1701.

1  That is, their appointements. 2  Although this “Estat” lists Harcourt and Marsin as ambassadors, they were both extraordinary ambassadors. France, Recueil, 11:449–51; and ibid., 12:1. Table 7.4 Payments for the official mourning for Louis XIV, 17151 Name

Title

Post

Cardinal Trémoille De Pyre St Aigan Abbé Mornay Châteauneuf Du Luc Croissy Des Alleurs Saumery D’Audiffret Rossi Iberville Frischmann De Rottembourg Poussin De Besenval De Campredon Lorenzi, [Balli] Coulet Fremont De La Closure De La Martinière La Feuillade Alègre2 D’Avary Bonnac Gergy Danneville Graville De la Faye Total

Chargé d’affaires Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Chargé d’affaires Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Chargé d’affaires Envoy Extraordinary envoy Resident Chargé d’affaires Chargé d’affaires Chargé d’affaires Resident Chargé d’affaires Extraordinary ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Ambassador Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy Extraordinary envoy

Rome Sicily Spain Portugal Holland Austria Sweden Ottoman Empire Bavaria Lorraine Brussels Great Britain Cologne Prussia The German princes Poland Sweden Florence Genoa Venice Geneva Switzerland Rome Great Britain Switzerland Ottoman Empire Imperial Diet Mainz Florence Genoa

Amount (in livres) 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 * * * * * * * * 57,000

Source: aae md 310, fols 296–7v, “Estat des ordonnances à expédier aux Ministres du Roy et autres personnes sans caractère qui servent Sa Maj.té dans les Pays Etrangers, pour le Deüil du feu Roy, conformément à l’usage pratiqué dans touts les occasions de Deüil,” 1715.

1 Payments for “le deüil” were for the costs of the official mourning observed at each French embassy when a member of the royal family died. An asterisk (*) denotes those “Ministres nommez qui sont encore a Paris” (appointed ministers who are still in Paris). 2 Actually, Iberville was in London as extraordinary envoy, 1713–17. France, Recueil, ­25-2:158–60



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Figure 7.3 Expenditures on embassies, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

Sun King’s death, Torcy had assembled a most distinguished and loyal, if somewhat inbred, team of diplomats that was the model for all Europe. The compensation of diplomats, though often in arrears throughout the reign, is revealing with respect to its structure.34 The appointements for 1701 (table 7.3) expose the dramatic difference between the extremes of the diplomatic hierarchy: the ambassador to Rome earned 72,000 livres, whereas the secretary who translated for him received less than 1.5 per cent of that amount. Even so, there was an element of standardization within the various compensation levels as appointements correlated strongly with diplomatic title and a sense of what it took to live abroad in a manner worthy of that title and the monarch it represented. Extraordinary ambassadors received between 72,000 and 30,000 livres annually, but if the extremes of Rome and England at the top and Savoy at the bottom of the group are set aside, the other five ambassadors each earned 36,000 livres. The four representatives with the rank of ambassador each drew 24,000 livres (extrapolating ­Hennequin de Charmont’s pay to a full year), while the sixteen envoys (all extraordinary envoys

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save one) drew between 18,000 and 12,000 livres, with those posted to the minor German and Italian courts occupying the lower range. The one resident earned half what an envoy did. These gradations reflect a common attitude at that time and one still present, as any public sector employee knows. A public servant was only doing his duty, goes this thinking, and therefore neither was out to nor needed to make his living through his position.35 Service to the monarch was an honourable calling that made a man a gentleman whether he was compensated in a manner commensurate with that standing or not. Those at the hierarchy’s top received pensions from a grateful monarch, allowances for the expenses of that service, or, for venal offices, interest on the money they had loaned the king (gages), rather than demeaning pay. Those at the bottom, though perhaps more dependent on this income for their economic well-being, shared a similar outlook, giving great weight to the presumption of social standing their public service implied even if the economic reality fell short.36 The department defrayed diplomacy’s other expenses as well, as seen in the variety of payments made to Fremont, chargé d’affaires at Venice, in the separate list kept of how much he received (table 7.5). A new appointee also received an allowance for furnishing his residence. In 1714, for instance, plenipotentiaries du Luc and Dominique-Claude Barberie de Saint-Contest each received 16,000 livres for his residence at the peace congress of Baden, as did the newly appointed ambassadors to London and Madrid. Bonnac, on his way to Constantinople, was granted 15,000 livres, and Torcy’s brother Croissy was allowed 12,000 livres for his Swedish embassy. The new envoy to Bavaria received 6,000 livres; Poussin, newly appointed to Germany, received 4,000 livres; and comte du Luc, who had received 16,000 livres in April, received the same sum in December when posted to Vienna.37 The same year the marquis de Châteauneuf, the new ambassador to the Dutch, was reimbursed 15,736 livres for the construction and operation of a Catholic chapel at his embassy, while Iberville in London received 6,000 livres for the upkeep of his chapel. With the passing of a foreign prince or his consort, France’s ambassador, as representative of Louis XIV, observed official mourning. Louis, marquis de Brancas in Spain, was granted 4,000 livres for the February death of Maria Louisa of Savoy, queen of Spain, and in August chargé d’affaires Jacques de Campredon in Stockholm and Gergy in Florence received 1,500 and 2,000 livres respectively for the death of Queen Anne of Great Britain. When a French prince of the blood died, all French embassies observed public mourning, as they did

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Table 7.5 Payments to Fremont, chargé des affaires at Venice, 1710–1718 Date

Type

Dec. 1710 May 1711 June 1711

Appointements Deüil1 for Monseigneur Gratification to the secretary of the nuncio in Venice Appointements Deüil for the Dauphin and Dauphine Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Deüil for the duc de Berry Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Deüil feu Roy (Louis XIV) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months) Appointements (6 months)

Dec. 1711 Mar. 1712 June 1712 Dec. 1712 June 1713 Dec. 1713 May 1714 June 1714 Dec. 1714 June 1715 Dec. 1715 Feb. 1716 June 1716 Dec. 1716 July 1717 Dec. 1717 June 1718

Amount (in livres)

Annual Total (in livres)

6,000 1,500 300 100 6,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000

6,000

7,900

7,500 6,000

7,500 6,000

7,500 6,000

Source: aae cp Venise 160, fol. 278r–v.

1 Expenses for the official mourning observed at French embassies.

in May of that same deadly year with the passing of the duc de Berry, at a cost totaling 43,500 livres.38 In addition, the department reimbursed travel expenses for an ambassador’s secretary and couriers.39 Of course, embassies were expected to keep track of their expenses and send an annual report to the department.40 When we total the costs of the ninetyfive ordonnances (13 per cent of the total sent) expedited by the treasurers of ambassadors for 1714 that do not include travel (“voyages”), they come to 691,886 livres, only 13.3 per cent of total expenditures, yet the largest category whose recipients are identified (table 7.6). The second category of foreign ministry expenses in Chamillart’s summary tables is secret affairs, used for subsidies and gratifications to encourage and enable foreign princes and their entourages to favour French interests (figure 7.4).41 These expenditures jumped from just over 1.1 million livres in 1700 to 10.2 million the next year as Torcy’s newly deployed diplomats, seeking to avert or prepare for war, sought to buy

Au porteur

6

5

6.5%

47

1.6%

Royal Orders – 

– 

3

1.4%

72,900

Local Govt Officers  7

 3.5%

26

1.2%

64,220

Travel 3

13.6%

99

0.8%

44,000

New Converts 2

14.5%

106

0.6%

33,600

Foreign Missions – 

1.0% 

7

0.5%

27,000

Retirement Pensions –

 1.6%

12

0.5%

26,700

–

1.2% 

9

0.2%

11,409

Prisoners –

 1.6%

12

0.1%

7,294

–

–

1

0.1%

6,000

–

1.1% 

8

0.1%

2,800

1 The percentages do not total 100% due to rounding and because percentages below 1% are not indicated.

determine, for instance, the type of pension based on the recipient’s status.

ated by the author based on labels on each item in the accounts themselves, although this required further investigation in some cases to

ISSUED

TOTAL PAYMENT ORDERS

(in livres)

 –

6.3%

46

4.7%

Gratifications 80,570

Postal Guards TOTAL EXPENDITURES

4

– 

2

7.7%

245,300

Académie Politique

tion the amount to be paid. The same lack of specified amounts applies to vacations and most “crime investigations.” Categories were cre-

1

Misc.

383,333

Clergy (misc.)

Source: aae md 1201, fols 269–302. The total for the travel column is only partial, since most of the ordonnances de voyages do not men-

Issued

Total Number

Rank among

Issued1

Total Number

95

13.0%

229

31.1%

13.3%

691,886

Percentage of

67.2%

3,486,464

Treasurers of Ambassadors

Number Issued

ditures

Total Expen-

Percentage of

livres)

Expenditure (in

categories

order

payment

Pensions

Table 7.6 Summary of payment orders issued by category, 1714

Chapels –

 1.9%

14

0.0%

1,804

Crime Investigations 730

11

– 

 –

 –

1.5% 

5,186,043

 –

 –

3

– 

763

Vacations



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295

Figure 7.4 Expenditures for secret affairs, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

alliances or neutrality, especially among the German princes.42 The figure would oscillate between 5 and 8 million livres for the war years covered by figure 7.4, but as Boislisle’s 1707 table reveals, almost 70 per cent of the subsidies for that year went to two Wittelsbach allies, Elector Max Emmanuel of Bavaria and his younger brother, Joseph ­Clemens, electorarchbishop of Cologne.43 Torcy worked frequently with the Piedmontese Ferdinand-Augustin de Solar, comte de Monasterol, Max’s envoy to the French court from 1701, who in 1708 married a French widow linked with Maintenon.44 Another Italian, Jean-Paul Bombarda, Max’s treasurer and a Brussels banker, received a 10 per cent commission on all the subsidies he managed. Given the sorry state of French finances and fortunes on the Flanders battlefields, it comes as no surprise that a steady stream of complaints flowed from the Bavarian court about delayed and irregular subsidy payments.45 One of the most difficult of France’s allies, both politically and geographically, was the kingdom of Hungary, led in revolt against the ­Habsburgs by Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi.46 The routes into Hungary were

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all circuitous and militarily dangerous.47 If the geography proved daunting, the nobles of Hungary were even more so. Yet Torcy strongly supported the Hungarian revolt and with Louis XIV’s consent drew sizable subsidies from Secret Affairs. Ligny saw to their oversight, while Des Alleurs was Torcy’s chief agent with Rákóczi.48 In 1708 Des Alleurs lamented that his silver sustained so many individuals that he was driven into debt and forced to have his wife send him a letter of exchange.49 In early June 1708 Torcy reassured him that his appointements had not been diminished even though the lowered exchange rate made it appear so. He promised that if Des Alleurs preferred, he would send the money by way of the Danzig bankers.50 In June 1709 Ligny wrote to Bonnac, ambassador to Poland, indicating that the payment order for 150,000 livres he had just sent through him to Hungary was meant to cover three months.51 Considering all the ports of entry, perhaps as much as 4,000,000 to 4,500,000 livres reached Rákóczi and helped keep the revolt alive until 1710. While Rákóczi lived in Paris in exile, the department provided him with a hefty annual pension of 100,000 livres, paid quarterly.52 Torcy zealously guarded his privileged connection with the Holy See: it meant, as it had for his father and his father-in-law, an excellent listening post, where clerics and lay representatives of the Catholic world mingled freely, exchanging the gossip of Europe’s princely courts. Torcy employed his envoys and personal representatives to distribute patronage wherever it might advance French interests, as seen by the subsidies awarded to select cardinals, prelates, and laymen in 1715 (table 7.7). The list reveals the influence of the kin, secretaries, and household officials of those who wore the red hats and who aspired to the papal tiara. French clerics who went to Rome could also benefit from the minister’s generosity, as did Père Ange de Cambolas, a Toulousian elected procurergeneral of the Carmelites in 1704.53 Again, because many pensions and gratifications were paid “au porteur” (to the bearer), recipients are known only if clearly identified in the annual registry of payment orders or in another perhaps secret list.54 A sampling from 171455 reveals payments to a surprising range of foreigners and French subjects. Payments to Antonio Caffaro (8,000 livres), a pro-French Sicilian senator who was among those notables who fled with their families to France at the end of the island’s French occupation in 1678,56 and to Pierre-Bénigne Languet, baron de Montigny (800 livres), the Bavarian elector’s lieutenant-colonel of the Cuirassiers and adjutant,57 demonstrate Louis’s continuing loyalty to those committed



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Table 7.7 Pensions to Rome, 1715 Recipient Cardinal Ottoboni Cardinal Pico (della Mirandolla) Cardinal Gualterio Nuncio Cornelio Bentiviglio Alessandro Albani, nephew of Pope Clement XI1 Archbishop of Cirene (Cyrene) Raymond Gallani, archbishop d’Ancire and patriarchal vicar of Constantinople Count Juliani2 Count Carminati, “Romain”3 Marquis de Maldachin, “Romain”4 Sieur Lucci, secretary to Cardinal Gualterio Count Fiumé, chamberlain of Cardinal Trémoille Chevalier Chappe5 Abbé Albicini6 Total

Annually (in livres) 30,000 12,000 20,000 20,000 12,000 600 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 105,600

Source: aae md 310, fols 238–41v and 301–4.

1 Clement XI (1700–1721) made Albani, an officer in the pontifical army, a cardinal in 1721. A worldly collector of antiquities, unlike his uncle he was pro-Austrian and favoured the Hanoverians over the Stuarts. France, Recueil, 17:557n1. 2 Juliani was a client of Cardinal Joseph-Emmanuel de La Trémoille, chargé d’affaires in Rome (1706–1720). He and Carminati were later suspected of spying for the ultramontane party. Dorsanne, Anecdotes Unigenitus, 3:67, 96, 98, 101. 3 Carminati, a long-time French pensioner, was made a French count in 1700 and formally received French protection in 1713. He had also been long in the confidence of Cardinal Albani. In 1727 Carminati became Italian secretary of the embassy in Rome. Recueil, 20:118, 118n4, 144. 4 André Maidalchini was the nephew of Cardinal Maidalchini (1621–1700) and influential at the Holy See. Targe, Maison de Bourbon d’Espagne, 129 ; and France, Recueil, 20:144, 144n3. In 1714 he accompanied Elisabeth Farnese to Spain to become the new queen. Courcy, Espagne après Utrecht, 248, 292, 319, 326n2, 328n1, 334. He sent Torcy news of the Spanish court. 5 Chappe was Cardinal Ottoboni’s secretary. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 3:168. 6 Albicini had entry to many cardinals and was a long-time French pensioner and source of information. France, Recueil, 20:143, 143n2, 144.

to his cause. The same is true of Jean II de Beausobre (600 livres), a captain in the Swiss Regiment of Stoppa who defied the emperor’s “invitation” to switch to his service or lose his family lands in the cantons,58 and of Christian II, Count Palatine of Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld (6,000 livres pension and 6,000 livres gratification), who served in the French army until retiring in 1696.59 The case of the erudite student of antique

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­ edals, the marquis de Saint-Ferréol-Montauban (2,000 livres for him m and his wife), gentleman of the bedchamber of the late Charles II, E ­ lector Palatine (d. 1685) and brother of Madame, whom the marquis was currently assisting with her collection, is a reminder that motivations could be many. As Torcy kept faith with the servant of an allied house, he also performed a service for Madame (even though she despised him for opening her mail), curried favour with the duc d’Orléans, the likely regent when Louis XIV died, and even pleased the king, like his sisterin-law an avid collector of medals, as well.60 French commercial interests meshed with the king’s desire to spread Catholicism, as when Jacob Abensur (1,000 livres), a Jew, Hamburg merchant, and the Polish king’s resident there, left Danish service and in 1706 moved to France where he converted and took the baptismal name of “Louis” in honour of his royal godfather.61 Humanitarianism inspired several pensions. Barbara Chiffinch ­Villiers, Countess of Jersey (12,000 livres), widow of Edward Villiers, 1st Earl of Jersey, former ambassador to France and Tory secretary of state for the Southern Department, was an inveterate Jacobite intriguer who fled to France in 1713 with her ten-year-old son in order to raise him a ­Catholic.62 Another pensioned widow was Damiana de Cueva (200 livres), whose husband, Spanish captain and explorer Francisco de Seixas y Lovera, claimed to be knowledgeable of the Indies and the Pacific. Failing to interest the Spanish government in his schemes, he received a more favourable reception in France.63 In the aftermath of a devastating fire in Prague in 1689, rumor held that the French had recruited deserters from the Austrian army to set it. Several of the accused were tortured, including Maximillien Septier of Prague (500 livres), who repeatedly denied the charges. If he was innocent, then the king on whose behalf he had suffered did not forget this humble Bohemian, but if he was indeed an arsonist, his services did not go unrewarded.64 Even humbler individuals received consideration, such as Pierre Milson in Champagne, about whom we know only that he was a poor blind man. Others made the list because of their connections. The former abbess of Notre-Dame de Meaux, Madelene de Mornay (800 livres), was the daughter of the late Henry de Mornay, marquis de Montchevreuil, an old friend of Maintenon’s and a great favourite of the king. One of the few who witnessed Louis’s secret morganatic marriage to Maintenon, Mornay was governor of two of the royal bastards, Louis, comte de Vermandois, and Louis Auguste de Bourbon, duc du Maine. Moreover, his son, the retired abbess’s brother, was Abbé René de Mornay-­



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Montchevreuil, whose Champagne benefices were in the foreign ministry’s provinces and who was appointed ambassador to Portugal in 1713.65 The Lutzelbourg (or Lutzbourg) family, an ancient noble house of Lorraine near the fortress at Phalsbourg, the strategic link between the duchy and Alsace, provided Louis XIV’s armies with several officers. It probably helped Comte Antoine-Michel, comte de Lutzelbourg, a cavalry colonel who received a pension of 1,500 livres, that his daughter was married to the diplomat Des Alleurs.66 Christophe Brosseau (600 livres), an avocat in the Paris parlement and the Hanseatic League’s agent to Versailles (1698–1717), owed the latter position to his friendship with Crécy, former envoy to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon and Torcy’s mentor on his visit there.67 Assisting with the department’s domestic chores also merited a pension. Nicolas Foy de Saint-Maurice, a president in the Lyon Cour des monnaies, received 1,500 livres after an extraordinary mission to Provence to spread terror among counterfeiters of royal coins.68 Pragmatism could lead the king to overlook a recipient’s past sins. Dominique Amonio (3,000 livres), a naturalized French subject (1680), retained property and important contacts in the Papal States. Appointed household ordinary physician to Louis XIV in 1681, by 1690 he was drawn into finance. Amonio used his Italian contacts to have a remarkable antique bust of Caesar, said to bear an astonishing resemblance to the king, displayed in the galleries of Versailles. He then advanced the king the money to purchase it, but when some years later it was found to be a fake made in France at Amonio’s behest, he fled the kingdom. As the War of the Spanish Succession unfolded, he resurfaced in Paris now fully devoted to finance and with all forgiven. Amonio proved useful enough to win a foreign office pension, became rich enough to be a target of the Regency’s Chamber of Justice, and retained connections enough to end up paying little.69 Forgiveness and reconciliation also accounted for the pensions and gratifications awarded to former Protestants. Some went directly to individuals, while others were paid to the convents and other institutions aimed at re-educating converted youth, in some cases for Catholic religious vocations.70 In 1714 these accounted for nearly 15 per cent of the department’s ordonnances and represented the second largest category, although they amounted to much less than 1 per cent of the total listed expenditures. Most were for amounts below 500 livres, while those above, such as the largest  – 2,000 livres to Christophe Vangangelt of a family of bankers of Dutch origin – went to socially prominent converts. Recipients included foreigners who had converted as well as royal

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s­ ubjects in the department’s provinces. Foreign missions received some ministry support (27,000 livres), channeled primarily to Irish missions but also to Ottoman and Crimean endeavours. Public diplomatic gifts (as opposed to outright bribes that were kept secret) are another cost of conducting diplomacy that is difficult to trace in the budget. These included those presented on Louis XIV’s behalf to fellow heads of state and the more numerous gifts dispensed at Versailles to their representatives, usually at their departure. Early in the reign these gifts served to familiarize foreign courts with the French king’s face or to celebrate his martial triumphs, especially with engravings and medals. Diplomatic gifts were once quickly appraised for their monetary value so that this could be made known when they were publicly displayed and reciprocal gifts of matching worth might be assembled, but Louis XIV began a trend of selecting gifts to showcase French taste and luxury manufacturing.71 Louis, who loved diamonds, supplied them from his precious stones collection for such items as the highly crafted boîte à portrait (portrait box), his favourite gift to foreign diplomats. Actually a medallion rather than a box, it was the king’s likeness in a diamond-studded silver or gold setting whose value varied according to its diamond content. These portraits, originally hand-painted enamel miniatures, gave way by the reign’s end to enamel relief portraits resembling cameos. Although less luxurious, this new process was faster and less costly.72 Torcy participated in the selection of appropriate gifts73 as well as in organizing the department’s records of past gifts given, crucial to a selection process dependent on precedent and carefully calibrated reciprocity. It was likely Clairambault who from 1669 gathered the data. One of Torcy’s secretaries (the hand resembles that of du Theil) then began a register running through 1714 with blank pages for additional entries. Arranged by state or sovereign city, it was a chronological list of recipient, occasion (if applicable), gift, and its cost, with an alphabetical index at the volume’s end.74 Since the goal of such gifts was to project the kingdom’s artistic creativity and the monarch’s power and wealth, Torcy sometimes displayed gifts to visitors to show that Louis XIV’s treasures were still intact despite war and economic crisis. In November 1709 he showed a beautiful cape to be presented to Elector Max Emmanuel to Heinsius’s agent Petkum, who marveled that it was embossed with seven large diamonds.75 In July 1713 Torcy personally consulted Claude Ballin, the king’s jeweler, concerning the design of twenty-four silver boxes to house the ratification seals of the Utrecht treaties.76 Neutral powers also received gifts. In 1697



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the recently appointed ambassador to Constantinople left carrying three cases filled with items carefully selected to display French ingenuity and craftsmanship, including linen cloths and handkerchiefs, eyeglasses, candelabras, small bejeweled pagodas, and boxes with gold and silver inlay.77 Gift-giving was expensive and not without difficulties, as when Torcy asked Desmaretz’s help because a keeper of medals refused to furnish those the king wished to present to foreign ambassadors unless he first received money of the same value for their replacement.78 Two other major budget categories attracted Torcy’s attention. As liaison with the Jacobite court at Saint-Germain-en-Laye,79 Torcy likely took an interest in the approximately 600,000 livres annually allotted and how this sum was spent even though the accounts did not pass through his office.80 A few Jacobites received assistance from the ministry.81 The connection with the account of the Swiss Leagues was more direct. Its two controllers general and two treasurers general were Parisbased venal officers who relocated to Switzerland during their semester of service. Their accounts, however, had to be signed by the ambassador and submitted to Torcy, who authorized payments into and from this treasury. In addition to subsidies and gifts, the account covered embassy expenses at Soleure, including staff gratifications and pensions (secretaries-­interpreters, first secretary, and other secretaries), the furnishing allowance allowed each new ambassador, and the Geneva resident’s expenses.82 This treasury’s disbursements rose from just below 174,000 livres before the war to over 550,000 in 1708–09 (figure 7.5). Swiss subsidies were considered vital to keeping the cantons neutral during a war.83 We gain another sense of department expenses when we examine them in terms of the payment orders issued by Torcy’s clerks in a single year, as seen in the summary of payment orders issued in 1714 (table 7.6).84 Of the itemized expenditures, embassies ranked first (691,886 livres), but this category consisted of payments made by the treasurers of ambassadors for remunerating embassy personnel (appointements and pensions, accounting for 63 per cent of the total), furniture allowances (117,000 livres), diplomatic gifts (30,000 livres for Bonnac to distribute to the Porte’s ministers), two embassy chapels (21,736 livres), and the expenses of the Persian ambassador’s visit (18,000 livres). Two miscellaneous items accounted for nearly 8 per cent of the itemized payment orders: 233,333 livres to the Prince of Nassau-Dietz as the third and final indemnity payment for the cession of the Principality of Orange to France; and 150,000 of the 250,000 livres owed to William

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Figure 7.5 Expenditures on the Swiss Leagues, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

­ erbert, 2nd Marquis of Powis (2nd Duke of Powis in the Jacobite peerH age) for fire damage to his London residence while occupied by Ambassador d’Aumont. Only three pensions accounted for the 72,900 livres disbursed on behalf of the Royal Orders, an example of the jumbled accounting of the era. New Converts and those who cared for them and their re-education as Catholics received various sums totaling 33,600 livres for 106 payment orders. A payment register for Dauphiné for January to April 1708 included payments to local New Converts, suggesting that Adam and his domestic bureau kept a similar, but separate account of expéditions for each province under their care.85 The foreign ministry remunerated a portion of its provincial governors, lieutenants du roi, and governors, commandants, majors, and aide-majors of cities and fortified places. The total listed for 1714 of 64,220 livres was surely not the whole of what went to these officials, especially since only one payment is labeled “appointements” while all the rest are marked either “supplement appointements,” “en lieu [in place of] appointements,” or a “gratification” of some sort. The same is suggested by the lack of



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i­nclusiveness: for example, only Berry’s governor is listed. How or by whom the other payments were made, however, is not clear. The ministry also paid appointements, gratifications, and supplements (for lighting the chapels) to the chaplains of the military posts in its provinces.86 Given the widespread use of the ordonnance written au porteur, the controller general felt the same frustration today’s historians experience in tracking the foreign ministry’s expenditures. Over two-thirds of expenditures and almost one-third of all ordonnances expedited by the department during 1714 were issued in this anonymous manner (figure 7.6 and table 7.6). The same is largely true for the 99 ordonnances de voyage issued during the same period. The only 3 ordonnances de voyage listing an amount totaled 44,000 livres, which is perhaps suggestive of the amounts of the other 96, especially since we know that total travel expenditures rose with the coming of war (figure 7.7). There are 11 additional unspecified entries marked vacations, the often hourly supplementary fees paid to judicial officials and their police auxiliaries (table 7.6).87 For example, the ministry paid for food, lodging, and the return to Paris of sieur Bazin, lieutenant of the Company of the Criminal Lieutenant of the Short Robe of the Paris Châtelet, and the four guards and six horses he employed to conduct a prisoner from Charenton to near Valenciennes.88 As with the other vacations, the amount was not listed, making it impossible to calculate exactly how much was spent on what. During the difficult war years everyone struggled to find funds for their departments, including Torcy, even though the controller general was his cousin. Fortunately, he faced necessity with suppleness and inventiveness. Although postal superintendent, Torcy could not draw at will from its revenues, especially because expenses grew with the wartime imperative of maintaining and extending vital postal routes.89 In 1712, out of desperation, he assigned a series of outstanding ordonnances from as far back as December 1710 to be paid from postal funds (table 7.8). He used this expedient three more times that year for a total of 43,484 livres. The following year the total jumped to 195,603 livres, but it fell subsequently. All told, the department drew over 400,000 livres from the post office during the reign’s final four years.90 Torcy was assisted in finding and funneling funds by a circle of financiers from his family and the banking community itself. One of his closest consultants was the Colbert client Paul-Etienne Brunet, seigneur de Rancy.91 In 1677 he entered royal service as treasurer general of the royal household, a post of immense responsibility and power, and in 1683 assumed the extremely profitable receiver generalship for the ­conquered

Figure 7.6 Payment order amounts issued by category, 1714. Note: Amounts are in livres.



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Figure 7.7 Expenditures for travel, 1699–1709. Note: Amounts are in livres.

province of Flanders. His oldest brother, Jean-Baptiste Brunet, baron de Chailly and de Cercey, became a keeper of the royal treasury. PaulEtienne married Torcy’s cousin Geneviève Michaela Colbert de ­Villacerf, and Torcy negotiated one of the marital coups of Louis XIV’s last years by marrying his brother the comte de Croissy to Paul-Etienne’s daughter Marie in 1711, thereby joining ministerial power with banking riches. The Brunets were a useful link between the treasury and the department’s commis. A commis armed with an ordonnance au porteur or an acquit patent and alerted to the arrival of a shipment of gold and/or silver at the royal treasury could hurry to collect that great rarity in wartime, coin of the realm. With diplomats, agents, and interests scattered across Europe and beyond, the foreign office relied on bankers to transfer and disburse the funds that fed diplomacy.92 Iberville, former resident in Geneva, acted as liaison with Lyon’s and Geneva’s financiers. Early in the new war he presented a friend, the Genevan banker Jean-Claude Tourton, head of his family’s Paris branch, to Torcy at one of the minister’s weekly gatherings,

Table 7.8 Payments to department personnel drawn on post office funds (Ferme général des Postes), 1712–1715 Amount (in livres)

List for …

Dated

To

For

2 Jan. 1713

1 Nov. 1712

Larroque

1,200

1 Nov. 1712

Du Theil

16 Oct. 1712

Ligny

16 Oct. 1712 18 Feb. 24 Mar. 1 May 1 May 27 June 31 July 8 Aug. 1 Oct. 1 Oct. 30 Oct. 30 Oct. 1 Nov. 1 Nov. 2 Nov. 2 Nov. 26 Nov.

Commis de M. Fournier Pecquet Commis Pecquet Larroque Du Theil Élèves du Louvre Du Theil Pecquet Saint-Prest Du Theil Fournier Ligny Larroque Maugin Du Theil Du Theil Pecquet

6-month appointements 6-month appointements gratification extraordinaire gratification extraordinaire gratification au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification ordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

Jan. 10 Feb. 16 Feb. 16 Feb. * Apr.2 * Apr. * May * May * May * May June 12 June 1 July 1 July 10 July

Pecquet Commis Pecquet La Tournelle Commis Fournier Du Theil Élèves du Louvre Larroque Du Theil Maugin Pecquet Maugin Du Theil Du Theil Pecquet Saint-Prest

1,500 1,500 1,600 1,200 5,000 6,000 1,200 1,000 300 600 800 500 500 1,500 2,000

1 Aug. 5 Aug. * Sept. * Oct. * Nov. * Nov. * Nov. * Nov.

Du Theil Ligny Du Theil Saint-Prest Larroque Du Theil Maugin Fournier

au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification extraordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur gratification ordinaire au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

28 Mar. 1713 20 June 1713 1 Aug. 1713 10 Oct. 1713

2 Dec. 1713

29 Jan. 1714 4 Apr. 1714

18 Sept. 1714

18 Dec 1714

500 1,000 900 1,500 1,200 1,200 500 6,000 2,000 1,500 4,000 2,000 1,500 1,000 1,200 300 4,000 1,000 1,200

500 1,000 500 4,000 1,200 1,000 300 1,500

Table 7.8 continued

14 Feb. 1715

16 Apr. 1715 9 July 1715

* Nov.

Du Theil

au porteur

1,000

1 Jan. 9 Jan. 12 Jan. 25 Nov. 1714 1 Jan. 1713 1 Mar. 1713 1 Jan. 20 Apr. 1 May 1 May 1 May 5 May 30 May 30 May 1 July

Pecquet Commis Pecquet Commis Fournier Du Theil Abbé Le Grand Abbé Le Grand Abbé Le Grand Élèves du Louvre Larroque Du Theil Maugin Pecquet Commis Adam Ligny Pecquet

au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur au porteur

1,500 1,500 1,500 3,000 500 500 500 6,000 1,200 1,000 300 600 2,400 1,000 1,500

Sources: aae md 1192, fols 419–22r; ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v; and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10.

1 Entries clearly marked “rembt porteur” (reimbursement to the bearer) are not included in this chart. 2 An asterisk (*) indicates a date for which the day is not completely readable on the microfilm copy of this material.

which led to their frequent collaboration. Tourton recommended to him the Rotterdam merchant-banker Jacques Senserf, who in May 1709 met Torcy’s coach outside of Rotterdam as he traveled secretly to The Hague and then conducted him and several other Dutch banker associates on a promenade around the central park. Years later Senserf acted as gobetween in Torcy’s negotiations with Petkum.93 Perhaps no Louisquatorzian banker is better known today than ­Samuel Bernard. Early in 1697 he sent Torcy 3 million livres in the form of ten letters of exchange, beginning a long if not always amicable association.94 Bernard converted to Catholicism in 1685 and was ennobled in 1699. Abbé Pomponne did not like or trust Bernard and wrote bitterly from Venice to point out that Bernard had the Sacerdoti brothers, Jewish bankers in Genoa, search Italy for the sum of 5 or 6 million livres, whereas if he had been consulted he could have found the money through those same bankers without Bernard making his usual immense profits.95 Bernard could be irritating, as when in the midst of a crisis in which he owed millions he wrote to Torcy complaining that having for years paid the postage for ordonnances sent to Torcy’s office, he now claimed a reimbursement of 2,500 livres.96 Torcy was equally dogged in defending the royal purse. Informing an ambassador that he had withdrawn a note payable to the bearer originally paid by Bernard, he

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explained that such procedures had to be simplified so that scarce royal funds were not put into bankers’ hands sooner than necessary.97 Yet the system needed more than simplification, it needed an entire overhaul. English observers were quick to see France’s financial w ­ eaknesses. Richard Hill, envoy to Savoy, reported to Whitehall in 1705 that Louis XIV’s treasury was beginning to fail him: “He is already bankrupt for 25 million [in sterling] … do continue to best Mr. Chamillard [on the battle field], a year or two more … and leave the rest to Marlborough.”98 The 1709 banking crisis of confidence involved a number of banks from Genoa to Amsterdam, but crucial was Bernard’s immense indebtedness secured by French government bank bills. When banks were besieged by creditors in Paris, Lyon, Geneva, and elsewhere demanding payment in coin, Bernard defaulted. Yet the banker was a man of many talents, not the least being survival.99 In a few years, having paid off his creditors, Bernard rebuilt his empire on a smaller scale and with Amsterdam as his operational base. Payments to Torcy’s department began appearing regularly again in 1711 when he forwarded Blondel 4,700 livres to help purchase the celebrated Gaignières library. Other smaller assignations continued well beyond Louis XIV’s death.100 The banking house of Antoine and Pierre Crozat was a rising star in the financial firmament.101 But there were moments of tension, as when Torcy wrote to Pierre on 11 August 1715 to complain that an improperly phrased letter of exchange drawn on a Dutch bank for the rather considerable amount of 30,000 écus would have to be rewritten. He pointedly reminded Crozat that it was destined for his brother Croissy, ambassador to Sweden.102 Despite such difficulties and friction, without bankers, their funds, credit, and contacts, the foreign office could never have financially fueled its extensive diplomatic and espionage apparatus.

T h e F a it h f u l Rewarded Louvois once stopped one of his commis in a Versailles corridor and asked about his personal income, ever eager to solicit further royal rewards for his staff to bind “their hearts and tongues with chains of gold.” When the harried clerk could only respond vaguely, the minister questioned his lack of precision, to which the commis replied that the minister gave him no time to spend much of it. Louvois, who drove himself as hard as he drove others, laughed it off by informing the frustrated commis that he would be able to rest when he grew old. The clerk’s



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r­ eaction is not reported.103 The clerks who served the secretaries of state sprang largely from the upper bourgeoisie and the lesser robe and pen nobility,104 but they rarely began as nonentities utterly dependent on their bureaucratic service for status and wealth. They were mostly men on the move with a nose for what would solidify and increase the financial base they were assembling for their families. Fidelity might bind them in part to a paternalistic system, but tangible rewards underlay the system’s continued survival and growth. Part of the allure and thus one of the imperatives of public service was the ability to achieve and maintain a social standing commensurate with royal service.105 Evidence of payments is scattered among the department’s financial records and even among general correspondence, but when pulled together, a pattern of rewards emerges.106 Terminology for these rewards was imprecise, but we can nonetheless make some distinctions. The remuneration of the commis must be distinguished from that of the venal “officier” (office-holder), whose fixed and regular (even if often in arrears) gages was actually interest paid on the price of the office the officier had “loaned” the king for its possession and use (or usufruct). The officier supplemented his gages with service fees: a judicial officier collected obligatory “épices” (gifts) and “vacations” (supplements for time spent on a complex matter), while a financial officier enjoyed taxation, a percentage of monies passing through his hands.107 By contrast, commis, pre-functionaries like the ancien régime’s inspectors and engineers,108 were commissaires whose positions were theoretically revocable, but were in fact remarkably stable. Their appointements (remuneration) was defined as the wage or pension a great lord dispensed to retain respectable men in his service, but unlike the wage of venal office-­ holders, these were pensions or annual gratifications granted by brevet for an undetermined time and drawn on the royal treasury.109 In Torcy’s department, the precise elements of the appointements for commis and secretaries included ordinary gratifications,110 extraordinary gratifications, acquits patents, pensions, and ordonnances de voyages (travel reimbursements).111 Torcy was also able to reward the faithful through the rolle.112 In addition, the premiers commis in particular supplemented their income with additional commissions and offices either held prior to their entry into the department or gained as a result of the secretary of state’s influence (table 6.1).113 It would seem that the “revenue de base fixe” (fixed base revenue)114 of a clerk’s appointements was the ordinary gratification. Although annual, these were issued and recorded au porteur and thus not spelled out in

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department accounts. Fortunately, three lists of such payments drawn on the funds of the Farmers-General of the Posts between 1713 and 1715 are, perhaps for that reason, more specific (table 7.8).115 They show that simple commis were paid in the name of and by the premiers commis under whom they served: 1,200 livres for “commis Pecquet” in 1713 and 1,500 in 1714 and 1715; 1,200 for “commis Fournier” in 1714 and 1,500 in 1715;116 and 2,400 for “commis Adam” in 1715.117 The meaning of these figures is clarified by the regent’s payment authorization for annual appointements and supplements to Torcy’s commis still in the department after the creation of the Council for Foreign Affairs on 1 October 1715 (table 7.9): Pecquet received 3,000 livres, while Fournier, also a premier commis, received 1,500 livres, and Ligny, a secretary, received 1,000. Du Theil, who had returned to the secretariat after serving as secretary at Utrecht and then Baden and in between as chargé d’affaires in The Hague, received 2,000 livres. The commis Maugin received 600 livres, and the three unnamed commis of Pecquet’s bureau each received 500 livres.118 This is confirmed in the 1713–15 accounts of ordinary gratifications drawn on postal funds: Pecquet received 3,000 livres each year; Fournier received 1,500 in 1713 and 1714;119 Ligny drew 1,000 each year; Maugin received 300 in 1713, two 300livre payments and one of 800 livres in 1714, and 300 livres in 1715;120 and Du Theil, whose annual appointements for 1712 was 1,000 livres, had clearly moved up to 2,000 livres from 1713 on.121 The hierarchy of ordinary gratifications is apparent: at the top are the premiers commis, at 3,000 to 1,500 livres; next are the secretaries, at 2,000 to 1,000 livres; and clearly at the bottom are the simple commis, at 600–500 livres.122 As for extraordinary gratifications, they were also issued au porteur, but again some drawn on postal funds in 1713 provide greater specificity than usual: 1,000 livres to Ligny and 900 livres to the “commis de M. Fournier” (for 1712).123 This was likely in recognition of outstanding effort during the ongoing treaty negotiations, but other occasions for such extraordinary payments might be based on individual professional accomplishments or a milestone such as a marriage.124 Another element in the pay of certain commis were acquits patents awarded each year by the king in consideration of services rendered.125 As a royal grace, however, they were not regularly scheduled but issued for the services of the previous year as early as the following January or as late as the summer. The department had 15,000 livres annually to issue in increments of 3,000. From at least 1691 Torcy received 3,000 livres annually, with an additional 12,000 livres reserved for his commis.

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Table 7.9 Department personnel in 17151 Premiers Commis

Secretaries

Simple Commis

Office Boys

Others2

Adam3 * Fournier, Michel * Pecquet

Blondel4 * Ligny * Du Theil

Adam fils5 Beauchamp6 Sermenté7 Mignon, Pierre8 Fournier, Charles9 * Maugin * Bernage10 * Du Parc11 * Le Dran

Unknown

* Larroque * Abbé Le Grand Saint-Prest12

Source: aae md 310, fols 292–3, 1715.

1 Those explicitly listed as “commis de M. Le M.is de Torcy” in aae md 310, fols 292–3, are marked with an asterisk (*). 2 Larroque and Le Grand were not normally listed or paid in the same manner as commis. 3 Adam left the department to become a secretary in the Polysynod’s Conseil des dedans. 4 Blondel apparently retired. 5 Adam fils likely left the department when his father did. 6 Beauchamp remained with Torcy, but now as secretary of the postal superintendant. 7 Sermenté served Joseph Fleuriau d’Armenonville, who purchased Torcy’s office of secretary of state 3 February 1716. 8 It is not clear why Pierre Mignon is not on this list, since he apparently remained in the department until 1740. 9 Charles Fournier died on 24 September 1715. 10 According to Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, Bernage, Du Parc, and Le Dran served in ­Pecquet’s bureau, so they are likely the commis referred to in aae md 310, fol. 292v, as “trios commis du bureau du Sr Pecquet.” Samoyault, Bureaux, 300, claims that Pierre Mignon also served under Pecquet until 1740 (ibid., 300), but given that Mignon’s cousin Michel Fournier served as a premier commis until 1 November 1723 (ibid., 286), Pierre may have served under Fournier until 1723 and then with Pecquet thereafter. 11 Du Parc may have gone to the Post Office, which is perhaps when Pierre Mignon’s inclusion among Pecquet’s three commis began. 12 As garde de dépôt des archives de Vieux-Louvre and director of the Académie politique, Saint-Prest was never paid along with or in the same manner as the commis. Piccioni, Commis, 32, is mistaken in calling him a premier commis before he headed the archives. See Thuillier, “Première école,”22–4.

Croissy and Torcy did not follow the practice of subsequent reigns126 of reserving acquits patents for the premiers commis (table 7.10). In 1691 and 1692 two individuals received 3,000 livres each: the premiers commis Bergeret and Mignon. Thereafter, apparently, only one premier ­commis received the full sum (from 1698, Adam), while the other awards of 3,000 livres might be shared by two individuals, ­including premiers

Table 7.10 Recipients of acquits patents,1 1691–17142 Year

Acquit Patent of 3,000 Livres3

1691 1692 16934 1694 1695 1698

Bergeret and Mignon Bergeret and Mignon Bergeret Mignon and Adam Mignon and Adam Adam

1700

Adam

1705

Adam

1709 1710 1711

Adam Adam Adam

1712

Adam

1713

Adam

17147

Adam

Acquit Patent of 1,500 Livres Aubert, Les Melles, Montreuil, Fournier Aubert, Les Melles, Montreuil, Fournier Mignon, Aubert, Adam, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot Blondel, Noblet, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [Maria]5 Aubert, Noblet, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [retired] Blondel, Aubert, Fournier, Marolot, Le Beau, Parayre [retired] Blondel, Fournier, Marolot, Pecquet,6 Ligny, Adam fils Blondel, Fournier, Marolot, Pecquet, Ligny, Beauchamp Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Du Parc Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils Fournier, Beauchamp, Sermenté, Bernage, Maugin, Adam fils

Sources: aae md 1011, fol. 170; ibid., 1013, fol. 293 (1691); ibid., 1017, fol. 162 (1692); ibid., 1029, fol. 202 (1693); ibid., 1021, fol. 202r–v (1693); ibid., 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid. 1074, fol. 66 (1700); ibid., 1134, fol. 26r–v (1705); ibid., 1170, fols 441–2r (1710); ibid., 1180, fol. 2 (1711); ibid., 1186, fols 361–2r (1712); ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v (1713); ibid., 1197, fol. 16 (1714); and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53 (1694 and 1695).

1 An acquit patent, a royal brevet sealed with the grand seal, authorized a monetary gratification to an individual and served as a receipt and legal discharge to the entity making the payment. 2 The foreign secretary received 12,000 livres annually in acquits patents for his commis. Since sums awarded as an acquit patent were in increments of 3,000 livres, those who received 1,500 livres were listed with another individual as the recipient of the 3,000-livre award. 3 Torcy was also awarded a separate acquit patent of 3,000 livres for each of these years. 4 Why one 1,500-livre share was not awarded this year is not indicated. 5 It is not clear why Parayre was included at this late date. He had served Pomponne, but was let go by Croissy. Perhaps Torcy was making amends for what he and father-in-law Pomponne may have seen as an injustice to Parayre. 6 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n61, says that Pecquet first appeared in this acquits patents list, but does not indicate for what amount. 7 In 1714 La Chapelle also received an acquit patent of 3,000 livres. aae md 1197, fol. 15.



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commis, simple commis, and even a retired premier commis. Adam’s award likely reflected both his position as premier commis and his close ties to Torcy as his household intendant, but it is unclear why after 1710 simple commis like Bernage, Maugin, Beauchamp, and ­Sermenté received awards while high functionaries like Pecquet, Ligny, and Blondel received nothing. Perhaps it was because the latter group had greater access to other revenue sources. Certain department personnel were remunerated in a manner that set them apart. Even before heading the Louvre archive, Saint-Prest, who was never called a commis, received an annual lump sum gratification, raised in 1699 from 3,000 livres to 4,000. He apparently received no augmentation when he took charge of the archive (1710) or when he was made director of the Académie politique (1711), although like other department personnel, he received a 2,000-livre extraordinary gratification in 1714.127 Le Grand, employed in documentary research in concert with Saint-Prest, received annual appointements of 3,000 livres, usually paid in two-month increments.128 Larroque’s annual appointements of 2,400 livres were disbursed twice per year.129 The two were listed as commis only in the 1715 list prepared for the regent130 and had always been remunerated apart from and at a higher level than Torcy’s commis, perhaps owing to their literary skills and scholarly status. Clairambault, clearly an outside consultant, received a 2,000-livre pension in 1691.131 Neither Dubos nor Renaudot, two other outside consultants, appears on the department’s payroll, although in 1691 the latter’s commis Bardon received a 400-livre gratification.132 The propagandist La Chapelle, also part of the “brain trust” of outside experts, received a 2,000-livre annual gratification. After his last diplomatic mission, Colonel Hooke received an annual pension of 1,500 livres.133 Further monetary rewards included pensions of two kinds: those to a commis on active service and those to a retired commis or his widow and/ or minor children.134 While on active duty from 1701 to 1715 P ­ ecquet received an annual pension of 600 livres,135 but from what the records specify, his case appears to have been unique among the clerks. More common were retirement pensions (paid annually or semi-­annually), but since our modern idea of retirement was unfamiliar to aged yet healthy early modern people, most clerks died in service.136 Premier commis Aubert, who retired at the end of 1705, received 2,500 livres, while the cryptologist and simple commis Lullier, who retired at about the same time, received 1,500 livres augmented annually by 500 livres. Parayre, premier commis under Brienne, Lionne, and Pomponne, died in 1707,

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but his widow received 600 livres. The two minor children of master cryptologist Charles-Bonaventure Rossignol (son of Antoine, of even greater reputation), who died in 1705 but had never served directly in the foreign office, were nonetheless awarded 5,000 livres in the expectation that they would one day follow in their father’s footsteps. Pensions were also awarded to the widow and children of certain embassy personnel, as in the case of Joachim Fonton, first secretary-interpreter (dragoman) to France’s Levantine ambassadors.137 Only a few retired ambassadors received pensions: Ferriol, once at Constantinople, received 3,000 livres; de la Haye, formerly in Venice, received 6,000 livres; and Frischmann, once in Münster, received 7,000 livres, although as ordinary and extraordinary gratifications rather than as a pension.138 All told, such benefits for former department personnel represented only a bit over 1.5 per cent of department expenditures, a small price for the loyalty likely engendered (table 7.6). If a commis or secretary traveled on royal business, he was reimbursed with an ordonnance de voyage.139 Such travel could be lucrative, as is clear from the few specific amounts listed in the accounts.140 Noblet’s income was liberally increased by reimbursements, although they were not always quick in coming and the constant traveling could be wearing.141 Accompanied by a valet, Adam traveled biennially to assist at the opening session of Brittany’s estates. Clerks undertook other trips whose itinerary but not purpose was recorded in the accounts.142 This is likely because voyages were paid from a separate budget category and were calculated according to a variety of formulae that depended on such factors as distance, time, and one’s status in the state hierarchy.143 There were more subtle means of rewarding a clerk or ministerial advisor, prominent among them being by a favourable judgment in the reading of the rolle.144 This practice clearly displays the vigour with which Louis XIV and his advisors turned a time-honoured regalian right into an instrument of power politics and patronage.145 It derived from delegated rights that had never left the bosom of the Conseil du Roi. Invoking the rights of the dominant seigneur, the king and the designated secretary of state, who served monthly terms on a rotating basis, reviewed claims derived from a hodgepodge of feudal-seigneurial franchises and privileges. As the realm’s dispenser of justice, the king might grant a favour in the form of permissions, privileges, gifts, or awards.146 Written petitions followed a formula, one that identified the petitioner as a faithful and deserving subject, specified the request, such as a type of feudal-seigneurial privilege in a certain place or for particular lands, and



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appealed to royal honour and generosity.147 These were collected in the king’s antechamber on Mondays at approximately half past noon after the meeting of Dispatches. An armchair set before a green velvet–draped table symbolized the royal presence. To its left stood the war secretary, who until 1714 was responsible for collecting and initially processing the petitions placed respectfully on the table, gathered up by a commis, later to be sorted and abstracted. Petitions were then scrutinized by a master of requests. If the request was unusual or difficult, it was referred at once to the secretary of state. Sometime during the last week of the month, usually following a meeting of the Conseil or Dispatches, the king met with at least one master of requests, a secretary from the king’s chamber, the designated secretary of state, and one of the secretary’s premier commis, the latter serving as reporter.148 As placets were increasingly answered by bureaucrats within the ministries, petitioners phrased their placets accordingly and sometimes sent duplicates directly to the secretaries of state. Clientage played a role in all this, as reflected in the placets of courtiers and central government personnel, who only felt the need to submit short, almost perfunctory requests.149 On many occasions news of an impending case reached Torcy’s bureaus before it became generally known, affording the bureaucrats time to frame a plea and present it before an avaricious courtier got wind of it. In times of economic distress and war, this process could supplement a crown servant’s income by granting him the right to enforce the king’s rolle judgment. The rights and privileges conferred were confirmed by a brevet replete with repeated phrases about fidelity and constancy or confidence and honour  – sentiments that cemented the patron-client relationship.150 Department personnel frequently received favourable judgments of their petitions, along with renewals (typically for five years) of rights previously granted, such as those to Aubert, Maugin, Blondel, and Adam in 1695. Occasionally petitions intersected. In the summer of 1693 Le Peletier de Souzy petitioned for the right of aubaine in a property that had already been granted to Maugin; although Souzy was the director of fortifications and an intendant of finance, he had to give way to Maugin’s prior claim.151 Withal, the records reveal that the king gave his assent to forty-six of the petitions from foreign office staff from 1690 to 1694, and forty-three from 1699 to 1701, and during the same periods cast an outright denial only ten times. The most insistent of the department’s petitioners from 1690 to 1694 were Maugin, with ten petitions; Blondel, with seven; Iberville, with three; and Adam, Marolot, Mignon, and Fournier, with two each. Among those renewing

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Table 7.11 Remuneration of the treasurers and controllers of ambassadors, 17091 and 17142

Treasurer (during his year of service) Treasurer (during his year not in service) Controller

Gages (in livres)3

Taxations fixes (in livres)4

Epices, façons et frais de reddition du compte à rendre en la Chambre des comptes de l’année de son exercice (in livres)5

7,500

9,0006

(2,000)

16,500

–

7,500

–

4,500

7,500

3,000

1,500

Annual Total (in livres)

Sources: aae md 309, fols 12v–14r (1709); and ibid., 310, fols 282v–4v (1714).

1 Both documents are accounts prepared for submission to the Chambre des comptes, the second (for 1714) dated 30 January 1716. The first document, dated 18 January 1711, indicates in two places that it is for the year “mil sept cent huit,” but one of these indications has the “huit” crossed out and replaced with “neuf,” which fits with the document’s note that Prévost was treasurer that year. 2 All amounts are in livres. 3 Gages were the annual payments to an office-holder in return for the sum of money he had “loaned” the king for the right to exercise the office. 4 Taxations were given to officials who handled money either as a fixed percentage or, as in this instance, as a fixed rate. 5 These were the fees for submitting these accounts to the Chambre des comptes for audit. 6 In 1714 Adam’s taxations were 9,500 livres, either because this was the sum attached to his particular office of ancien et mi-triennal treasurer of ambassadors or because of an augmentation for both treasurers, perhaps because of the increased number of diplomatic missions sent out after the return of peace.

their rights, Blondel led the pack with sixteen renewals for the period 1699 to 1701.152 Other rewards included venal or appointive offices, although in the case of venal offices it was usually the opportunity to purchase the office that was the favour, not the office itself. The expensive office of s­ ecretary of the king in the Grand Chancellery of Paris  – 55,000–70,00 livres in the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign  – granted the holder gages, tax exemptions, and, best of all, nobility. It was a must for a premier commis who drew up, signed, and sealed the royal acts that were an important component of domestic paperwork.153 The venal offices of treasurers of ambassadors, created in 1706 and purchased by Adam and his son-in-law Jean de Prévost, were particularly lucrative. Pierre Odeau, a banker and close associate of Adam, purchased the office of controller of the treasurers of ambassadors. The treasurers received annual gages of



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7,500 livres and taxations fixes of 9,000 or 9,500 livres during the years they exercised their office; the controller received gages of 3,000 livres and taxations fixes of 1,500 livres (table 7.11).154 The foreign secretary also awarded the privilege of printing treaties and other diplomatic agreements, which apparently fetched a fixed 1,200 livres annually from printers’ fees.155 Even before entering the department, Mignon and Noblet each had kin holding an office of secretary of the king that would eventually come to them,156 whereas their colleagues Adam, Blondel, and Pecquet clearly owed the same office to service within the department (table 6.1). This office offered the quickest ascent into the nobility and was within the financial reach of a premier commis or secretary, but as the case of Fournier and Ligny make clear, not all of them could afford it. A direct connection between a gratification secured by Torcy from the king and the subsequent purchase of an office is not always explicit, as it was in 1694 when Blondel purchased that of treasurer of France at Caen.157 He sold it in 1696 in order to become a secretary of the king the following year, but when that office was suppressed in 1697, he used the proceeds two years later to purchase Mansart’s office of intendant and alternate authorizing officer of the king’s buildings for more than 100,000 livres. When a new office of secretary of the king was created in 1704, Blondel purchased it while retaining the other post.158 We may assume the same process was at work when Pecquet purchased the office of auditor in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes in 1705 and then eight years later sold it to acquire one as a treasurer of France. From the latter Pecquet received annual gages of 2,431 livres and a 2,000-livre gratification at the Breton estates’ biennial meeting. Prior to the 1713 meeting, Torcy wrote a polite note to the president of the Chambre des comptes explaining that owing to his responsibilities at court Pecquet would have to be formally installed in office in absentia. The secretary of state, however, would provide money for a substitute to represent Pecquet.159 Fournier160 and Blondel each purchased a treasurer of France office in the 1690s, the former in Caen and the latter in Rouen. At the time of Fournier’s installation, Torcy wrote notes on his behalf to his first cousins the archbishop of Rouen and the provincial intendant.161 The 1695 capitation was not a tax on one’s wealth, but rather a head tax based on one’s social status or that of one’s offices. Perhaps less of a precise indication of the era’s social hierarchy than some have claimed, its twenty-two tariff groupings nevertheless suggest a relative sense of the social status of the department personnel. The premiers commis of the

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secretaries of state and controller general were in the eighth class along with, among others, maréchaux des camps of the army, naval squadron chiefs, counselors of the Parisian superior courts, masters of the Paris Chambre des comptes, grand masters of waters and forests, ­secretaries of the king of the Grand Chancellery, and presidents and treasurers of France of Paris, all assessed 200 livres based on their alleged status. The simple commis of the secretaries of state were in the eleventh rank, assessed at 100 livres, along with war and naval commissioners, controllers general of the ordinary and extraordinary of war, lieutenants general of the parlements, and mayors of cities with a parlement or other superior court. With the exception of the principal commis of the extraordinary of war, food, and stages, who were in the seventh class, the premiers commis of the secretaries of state and the controller general ranked above all the other various kinds of commis. Yet even the simple clerks of these departments were far from the bottom of the commis category.162 But again, this perceived social status was not the same as an accurate estimate of wealth.163 Reconstructing the income of a premier commis is not easy, as seen in the case of Clair Adam. In the final years of the reign he received the following annually: as premier commis, an acquit patent of 3,000 livres; as a treasurer of ambassadors, 16,500 livres; and for work on the Royal Orders’ behalf, 1,200 livres.164 This base of 20,700 livres does not include proceeds from the lucrative monopoly for granting permission to print official treaties, service as Torcy’s household intendant, pensions and gifts from Marseilles, ordonnances de voyages, and any ordinary or extraordinary gratification received au porteur. Adam probably drew the largest sum from the crown of all the department’s clerks, which perhaps accounts for his estate at Glatigny.165 The other premiers commis present a similar picture: some income from the department, but not all of it specified. Whatever the exact totals, it is clear that these were men in a position to accumulate enough wealth to acquire property, the heart’s desire of most of their contemporaries. A further example of the inadequacy of our attempt at income reconstruction comes from considering the other opportunities the commis had for generating wealth. During the Nine Years War clerks and ministers alike invested in privateering ventures against English and Dutch shipping. Family and government connections offered advanced knowledge of these expeditions. In a 1696 expedition, the list of investors included Saint-Prest at 1,000 livres, Mignon at 1,500 livres, and Mme de Croissy.166 That many clerks were also men of finance by reason of the venal offices they held suggests further investments of a



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public and private nature. This is a reminder that the clerk-administrators of the department’s upper echelons, despite their ink-stained fingers, were men who sought the wealth necessary to a lifestyle like that of the nobles who wielded the sword or donned judicial robes. It is perhaps appropriate that this chapter concludes by climbing down from these loftier financial heights to the inadequately known but undoubtedly inferior rewards received by those lower in the hierarchy. As we have seen, simple commis were for the most part listed in groups paid by the premiers commis under whom they worked. We also know what they received from acquits patents. The writing done by a clerk often required digesting, summarizing, drafting, compiling, and other sophisticated skills in addition to tedious copying, but what about the simple copyists who undoubtedly lightened their load? And what of the office boys and porters who moved correspondence, files, drafts, and supplies within the bureaus, and who carried messages within the Versailles complex to locales within the capital’s vicinity? Of them, either as groups or as individuals, the department’s accounts are silent. Although they are largely anonymous in the foreign office’s written institutional memory, they nonetheless played an essential part in the preservation, control, and utilization of information and diplomatic memory that was to constitute perhaps the greatest legacy of the two Colbert foreign secretaries.

8 Preserving, Deploying, and Controlling Information

Cicero’s apt use of a bodily image in his assertion that “the sinews of war are infinite money” could be extended to other of the state’s limbs and rephrased to assert that the sinews of war as well as diplomacy are infinite information. Similarly, Weber claims that “[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge.”1 One of the hallmarks of the organizational and technical expertise of the clerks of the foreign office was their control over specialized, valuable knowledge and their ability to process and then place it in the king’s hands to be acted upon.2 The ability of the state to use that knowledge to project its diplomatic power abroad no doubt enhanced the expert status of the small foreign office staff who achieved this result even in places where royal armies could never dream of marching.3 Although it is commonly assumed that the computer launched the “Information Age,” the amount of information, written and printed, was very much an issue for the growing states of the seventeenth century.4 These included valuable state papers the royal government wished to preserve and others it sought to suppress. The police, especially in the capital, helped the foreign office secure the documents of deceased royal servants that constituted the paper trail of France’s foreign policy. But the paper passion of the foreign office was more than a desire merely to possess the letters, pamphlets, and books of others. It aimed at providing diplomats at home and abroad with a historical perspective on international relations and negotiations. While censorship and the pursuit of illegal written and visual materials were part of the foreign office’s strategy for dealing with France’s critics, Torcy pushed royal propagandists to draw on the rich trove of official papers his department was assembling. Another part of his effort to control information focused on the mail that flowed along



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321

the water and land routes of a Europe-wide web of post offices by means of regularly scheduled service as well as special couriers.5 Torcy’s control of the kingdom’s post office was crucial to managing and to peeking into the flow of information that coursed among the capitals and cities of Europe and the wider world.

P re s e rv in g a n d U s in g I nsti tuti onal Memory An administrative department’s papers are palpable elements of its quotidian functioning as well as potent symbols of its power. It was thus both practically and symbolically appropriate that when Torcy resigned as secretary of state and his department was dismantled at the outset of the Regency in 1715, Philippe II, duc d’Orléans, instructed him to turn over all domestic paperwork to the head of the new department now charged with provincial administration.6 We have already described the careful attention paid to the production of the department’s paperwork, a sensible consideration given that “diplomacy takes its name from the diploma (folded letter) of the Greeks.”7 We now turn to the parallel and growing attention given to the preservation of these masses of papers as elements of institutional memory. Papers from the past were no longer primarily documents, proof to be produced when verifying a right or claim, but instead were records of past negotiations to be ransacked for information and precedents to be woven into arguments to drive and shape current negotiations.8 This approach was hindered, however, by the custom of a diplomat leaving his post or a foreign secretary leaving office with his papers remaining in his or his heirs’ possession.9 There were sporadic efforts to retain them for the state, especially under Louis XIII, but what was kept or recovered by purchase or donation went to the royal library rather than to the foreign office. When Lionne died in 1671, however, the king ordered his papers to be placed under Colbert’s care until turned over to his successor. Pomponne, disgraced on 18 November 1679, left Lionne’s papers as well as his own for his successor.10 While Croissy was on his way home from Bavaria, his brother Colbert acted as foreign secretary (18 November 1679 to 12 February 1680), which again placed these papers under his care. They were likely next removed to Croissy’s residence near his brother’s on rue Vivienne, where the bundles were subjected to a quick and preliminary inventory, probably by the Colbert client and librarian Clément.11 This was a significant step and one that Weber connects with “the emergence of genuinely modern administration,” since placing public papers formerly in private

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hands into an archive “goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management.”12 With the embryonic archives safely ensconced in the Hôtel Croissy13 and with the preliminary inventory in hand, it was obvious to the new foreign secretary that what he now possessed was largely a jumble of unsorted papers in bundles. Rather than a real archive, it was more aptly “nothing but a depot with no access facilities.”14 Not that Croissy’s predecessors had operated in a disorderly manner. Their records, however, were organized for current use, and “as soon as they fell into disuse, they also fell back into infinite disorder, for unlike documents, they were defined solely by usage.”15 Under Croissy, the department now embarked on the systematic selection and preservation of its accumulating documentation, to which Croissy added the rich record of his own past negotiations. It is hardly surprising that he took this course, being the brother and protégé of the Great Colbert, aptly dubbed the “information master.”16 Yet Croissy’s own success with historical research in provincial libraries as his part in the reunions must not be overlooked.17 It is fair to say that both Colbert brothers were driven by the “info-lust” that had infected the learned of Europe since the Renaissance.18 Torcy’s later achievement in information preservation clearly followed in their wake. Croissy retained Clément and gave him an organizational scheme to sort the papers geographically by foreign power and then collate the hitherto separate incoming dispatches with the “minutes” (drafts) of outgoing dispatches, letters, and reports for each particular envoy or royal agent into a chronological series.19 This permitted one to “read” a negotiation as a contextualized narrative embracing its chief correspondents. A researcher seeking an even wider context could also consult the relevant narratives constructed for other individuals, locations, or negotiations. This marked a radical departure from the “monological” registries of outgoing correspondence normally kept. Cornelia Vismann maintains that “a more dialogic form of governance arises only when retention of drafts is complemented by preservation of incoming missives. Only then can we speak of files in the modern sense of the word.”20 The chronological integrity of these files, essential to their purpose, was assured by binding them together. Assisting Clément in this effort was Le Melle and an unnamed copyist assigned to make a clean copy of Croissy’s ­Nijmegen negotiations, vital to current reunion diplomacy. Original copies of treaties with attached official seals could not be bound but were inventoried and stored in the drawers of a specially constructed walnut cabinet.21 This treatment of treaties also reflected their status as



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­ ocuments, set aside and guarded, unlike records that were assembled d into a file for optimum circulation and use.22 Croissy, not content merely to organize diplomatic paperwork, insisted that this content become “operative knowledge,”23 readily accessible to departmental personnel in search of vital diplomatic information. As Callières later remarked, the written instructions accompanying ambassadors leaving Paris for their posts abroad were “frequently altered in many articles, by daily dispatches which [he] receives, and which are to be looked upon as so many new instructions founded upon the advices which he has sent from the country where he is, and upon the events which change the situation of affairs.”24 This suggests an unending dialogue between the evolving desires and knowledge of the king and his ministers on the one hand and the arrival of information and perspectives from the king’s representatives abroad on the other. Underlying this conversation and intended to prevent it from becoming cacophonous and confused was an organized chronological series largely comprising letters received and drafts of those sent out. This clarifying contextualization allowed the foreign secretary and his clerks, reflecting the will of the king and his Conseil, to make the continuing and orderly alteration of instructions that ­Callières had in mind. Even though this operative knowledge required additional labour and greater skill to produce, each volume commenced with a table of abbreviated extracts from each item to indicate what each was about. This required a skilful balance of comprehensiveness and brevity so that nothing essential was lost in these summaries. Although the documented diplomatic memory being assembled dated back to the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal reign, this was not enough for Croissy, whose legal mind desired depth and breadth in this database. He was anxious as well to please his royal master by glorifying his earlier years. At the start of 1681 Croissy tasked Clément with tracking down diplomatic documents from the Brienne era. Although several of their former staff members were interviewed, nothing came of it. This initiative, however, paid off later in further acquisitions and was pursued with equal vigour under Torcy.25 Turning his attention back to the documents already in hand, in July Clément engaged de Bost to assist with creating tables for volumes and making extracts of correspondence and then engaged a trusted but unnamed friend to second him. For security’s sake, they wielded their pens in Clément’s chamber. Even Croissy and Bergeret joined the effort, assisting in particular with Portuguese papers. When sets of negotiations were ready to be bound, the work was done by select binders who set up shop in the Hôtel Croissy, again to preserve

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state secrets.26 Torcy’s later archival accomplishments clearly rested on those of his father, a fact that counters and rebalances Saint-Simon’s influential but skewed account assigning Torcy most of the credit.27 Croissy’s organizational achievement reached beyond the paperwork of the past. During the course of 1680 as Clément’s team brought order to his two predecessors’ papers, Croissy was so pleased with the results – individual files of diplomatic dialogue grouped geographically and arranged chronologically by diplomatic agent – he decided to organize current correspondence in the same manner.28 This had several advantages. It insured that these documents were largely bindery-ready at the end of the year or early in the next without requiring additional time and labour to reorganize them and making them unavailable for consultation. It also made correspondence more easily and logically read in context even before binding. Creating abbreviated extracts was likely now intended as an ongoing process, not only expediting the annual binding process,29 but allowing the minister and his staff to re-access their contents quickly and efficiently in their daily work. There was a further gain in efficiency: the mode of reading through “current” correspondence was now the same as that required for rummaging through the records of earlier negotiations. No mental shift was necessary to transition swiftly yet accurately from one to the other, since both were based on the same geographical and chronological format. There is no clear indication of how exactly current materials were stored in this “filing” system prior to binding: were they held in portfolios, pigeonholed, placed in trays, or joined together with ribbon?30 In any event, Croissy’s archival initiative went beyond the reorganization of the bundles inherited from his predecessors to create a new system of ongoing organization meant to eliminate altogether such accumulated confusion.31 Tucked away among Clément’s accounts for 1687 is an allocation of 12 livres for a large sheet of vellum to be glued to a piece of wood and upon which was written an abbreviated table of all the bound volumes of negotiations.32 What better demonstrates that this innovative schema had become an integral part of the department’s work routine than posting it as a sign – or “menu” – presumably to guide anyone wanting to lay hands quickly on a particular negotiation series? Although provision at Versailles for housing ministers and their staffs accompanying the still peripatetic monarch had begun in 1670, it was only in 1683 that Louis XIV definitively moved the court and government to his new palace. While most royal officials continued to maintain a Paris residence and some bureaus remained largely in the capital,



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in 1685 the foreign office made the move to the Versailles pavilion that would house the foreign secretary, his family, and his bureaus for the reminder of the reign. Over the course of two days a hired wagon drawn by four horses transported the department’s bound manuscripts from rue Vivienne to Versailles.33 This collection now incorporated other volumes besides those chronicling negotiations. In the first half of 1681 Clément’s accounts reveal that thirty-six volumes of drafts, financial statements, and other papers also went to the bindery. Financial documents and perhaps drafts of domestic correspondence were, however, not encased in red Moroccan leather, but in a less expensive marbled paper over cardboard. Likewise, three volumes of drafts of arrêts for 1680–83, two volumes of drafts of items sent out, and two volumes of formularies for letters to heads of state were bound in a less expensive parchment.34 In a final entry in his accounts, Clément recorded that on 13 October 1687 he hired a carriage to transport recently bound volumes to Versailles, after which his service in the foreign office apparently ended, likely because in 1688 he began work on a second catalogue of printed materials in the Royal Library.35 Jean-Yves de Saint-Prest, who entered the department sometime around 1682, acted as its unofficial historiographer, but was neither a premier commis nor a commis.36 He possessed an invaluable array of abilities as a lawyer, amateur historian, collector of rare manuscripts, and self-trained librarian-archivist. A savant connected with other men of letters, he took a passionate interest in religious issues, especially from a Jansenist viewpoint.37 He was related to robe and sword nobility through the Séguier and Bouillon families, while his father, Pierre, from near Chartres, was a payer of rentes of the Paris Hôtel de Ville, a costly office and one probably purchased with the fruits of finance. In 1667, aged twenty-seven, Saint-Prest became a councillor of the king in the Grand Conseil, and in 1670 he wed Anne Chomel, whose father had been in the Paris parlement and whose mother was a Séguier. They had two daughters, but their marriage ended in separation in 1717.38 SaintPrest’s erudition, especially his knowledge of German diplomatic history, earned him a role in the education of the young duc de Chartres, future duc d’Orléans and regent, for whom he compiled accounts to ensure that he knew his mother’s beloved German homeland. A grateful Madame later made Saint-Prest her secretary.39 Saint-Prest strongly advocated the study of past and present treaties for the contextual background information they supplied for current negotiations. He also recommended reading any series of treaties for the

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wisdom to be gained through reflecting upon international relations.40 The accounts of past negotiations he produced were based on official correspondence as well as on supplementary materials, creating full and authoritative narratives as background for use in the minister’s bureau and for diplomats preparing for missions.41 Saint-Prest also composed numerous reports for Croissy and later Torcy on legal aspects of international relations and apparently did the same for the other secretaries of state.42 Additional research and writing assignments included a report for Tallard’s instruction on the ceremonial employed by past French ambassadors to England and one to help Torcy in 1711 as he planned for a future peace congress by detailing what French plenipotentiaries had been paid at previous ones.43 At Torcy’s behest, Saint-Prest assembled two treaty series in ten volumes of folio manuscript, complete with background material and other information: the first from 1598 (Vervins) to 1678 (Nijmegen) and the second from 1678 to 1693.44 Torcy’s instructions for departing envoys demonstrate his strong sense of history.45 The author of an incomplete manuscript on contemporary diplomatic history claims further that Torcy had advanced beyond traditional methodology. The author may have been Saint-Prest, but Abbé Vertôt seems more likely, so we will assume that the work was his.46 Vertôt claimed to employ a new genre of historical writing that was beyond the abilities of an individual limited to his own enlightenment because it drew on the actual instructions issued to ambassadors and the correspondence they exchanged with the king and his foreign secretary.47 Vertôt claimed that his history was intended for those whose heavy public functions kept them from reading the many volumes of political correspondence assembled in Torcy’s ministry.48 He credited the idea for such an approach to history to Croissy, who entrusted the task to a man who was familiar with public affairs, was wise and hard-working, and who pushed the work far along. Although he did not name him, it could only have been Saint-Prest.49 Vertôt contended, however, that this earlier effort was marred by what he claimed Torcy later determined to be an excess of respect for the original documents. The result was an abridgement into an account that while solid was nonetheless dry. What Torcy sought instead, according to Vertôt, were works that put forth an argument, that posed and attempted to answer questions, and that drew parallels. Vertôt hoped to accomplish the same ends in his own history. He also specified that his sources would be noted in the margins – letters with their dates and locations, including page numbers, in the volumes of political correspondence, as well as references from printed histories.50



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Organization and accessibility remained a concern for Torcy and his collaborators. Even today a book with an index is more user-friendly than one without, but all indexes are not of the same scope and reliability: they might include only proper names or only the most important people; the categories might be too broad, narrow, or incomplete; and the indexer might be less than careful in gathering, sorting, and noting page references. As the bound volumes of diplomatic papers continued to multiply and private collections of public documents were acquired, improving indexes became imperative. Proposals for the Académie politique’s organization from abbés Le Grand and Renaudot stressed the importance of “tables,” and Le Grand recounted an anecdote about his own inability to locate a particular diplomatic document. He also urged the minister to gather tables from the rich libraries of Paris and elsewhere so that department staff and associated researchers and writers would know what was available where.51 Memory’s preservation and organization raises the question of the purposes for which memory is to be used, since preservation as its own end usually results in bundles of documents accessed only with difficulty, whereas more purpose-driven conservation aims to arrange what is preserved in a way that best serves the extrinsic rationale for doing so. In truth, however, the result of Croissy’s effort to reconstruct the record of past negotiations was largely for internal department use.52 The Fronde had made ministers wary of subjecting monarchy to history’s critical methodology for fear of feeding discontent by stripping away its aura of mystery.53 Torcy, however, “attempted to adjust the practice of absolute monarchy to newly emergent patterns of political culture” by reaching out to audiences beyond the ministry bureaus. The foreign office engaged in a war of words with France’s detractors, especially on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession, and Torcy personally coordinated that effort.54 The initiative to create and preserve diplomatic memory in an organized and easily accessible manner would thus gain an additional and pressing purpose. Joseph Klaits, in his groundbreaking study of Torcy’s propaganda initiatives, observes that the “habitual use of documentary materials in the propaganda works [that Torcy] commissioned points to the foreign minister’s conviction that the historical record could serve as an effective response to the accusations lodged against Louis XIV by his foreign enemies and domestic critics.” Among the authors whose efforts the minister coordinated for varying lengths of service were Le Grand (on the payroll since 1705); Dubos (freelancing from 1701); Louis P ­ ouyvet de

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La Blinières, avocat in the Paris parlement who joined Dubos in 1710 as a secretary to the Gertruydenberg delegation; Hooke; and La C ­ hapelle (employed from 1702).55 Klaits underlines “the close relationship … between scholarly history and French war propaganda” and credits Dubos with creating and practising a way of writing history that would approach that of the eighteenth century.56 Torcy shared this outlook, seeing the propagandistic publications sponsored by his department not as French lies to counter Allied lies, but instead, in Klaits’s words, as “a means of enlightenment by which men’s true interests were made known to them.”57 Saint-Prest was not, as some claim, the overseer of this bold venture – in reality it was supervised by Torcy58 – but he nonetheless facilitated it. Deeply familiar with the full range of the department’s rich documentation, he knew where to locate needed documents among the plethora of papers he oversaw. As a part of the capital’s company of learned men, he knew to whom or where to go for written materials not at the foreign ministry. His role as archivist was formalized when he became caretaker of the department’s records when they were deposited in the Louvre. Along with filling the Louvre’s attics with an organized archive numbering nearly two thousand manuscript volumes by the time Torcy left office in 1715, Saint-Prest advised Torcy on the design of the Académie politique, indicating that it and the archives were largely conceived as functioning together. He was its first and only director, and when he died in 1720, it soon closed. From 1712 until then, however, he worked often and closely with Torcy to professionalize and advance diplomacy through the proper utilization of the information in its archives.59

P a r is : T h e In f o r mati on Capi tal Paris, then northern Europe’s greatest metropolis, was linked with nearby Versailles in a geographic, political, and cultural symbiosis. Little more than ten miles apart, a constant traffic of couriers and coaches traveled the three hours between the palace and the capital’s administrative, religious, and cultural centres.60 As one observer noted in 1661, Louis XIV wanted to make of Paris what Augustus had made of Rome, which he indeed did with numerous monumental buildings. Paris was also home to royal academies established to promote Renaissance ideals and serve as “both paragons of taste and the fount of normative rules.”61 Those established between 1661 and 1671 – to organize and support the sciences, music, dance, inscriptions and belles-lettres, and ­architecture –



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added to the two founded by Richelieu and Mazarin, the Académie française and an academy for sculpture and painting. All located in the capital, from 1692 many were housed in the Louvre. Torcy, who had spent a good deal of his life in Paris and received ambassadors at his residence there, also took pride in the capital.62 When creating the foreign affairs archive and later the Académie politique for which it served as a “workshop,” Torcy and his advisors looked to Paris and particularly space in the Louvre as a worthy setting for this latest royal academy. Had the archive been intended merely to relieve overcrowding in the departmental offices at Versailles, other space at the palace (though always at a premium) or in the surrounding town might have been secured for convenience sake. The move to Paris also marked the diplomatic papers’ division into two working collections: those from Ryswick and after, to remain at Versailles for quick access by the minister and his staff; and those prior to Ryswick, to go to the Louvre, eventually to be used by the students of the academy.63 The establishment of an “archives office” and its mission of putting to use files no longer in normal circulation clearly mark the Louvre as more than a simple depository. Storage and accessibility were meant to work hand in hand.64 The king agreed on 22 December 1709 to Torcy’s request to place his archive in the Louvre.65 Work soon began to subdivide the three rooms the archive was to occupy and refit them and the adjoining “grand salon” with furniture and the simple wooden shelves to hold the bound volumes. One room housed a bindery so that the highly secret diplomatic documents would not have to go off premises. When the move came in the spring of 1710, it required six wagon trips from Versailles and was supervised by Pecquet, who kept careful track as the porters climbed the 116 steps with the records of their monarch’s diplomatic deeds.66 Paris abounded with important libraries. The Louvre itself housed the Cabinet des Livres or Bibliothèque du Louvre, the legal library of deposit for everything printed in the kingdom with royal privilege since 1658.67 The Louvois family’s library and art collection, presided over by Torcy’s friend, the scholarly Camille Le Tellier, abbé de Louvois, and the fine library of rare books of Jean-Jacques Charron, marquis de Ménars, ­Colbert’s wealthy brother-in-law, were near Torcy’s residence.68 In an apartment located on the neighbouring Place des Victoires, the ­Clairambaults, uncle and nephew, collated and analysed state papers for the navy and the foreign office, including the Gaignières collection.69 On rue Vivienne was the celebrated Royal Library, described by Dr ­Martin Lister in 1698 as “commodiously disposed”70 in twenty-two rooms and

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housing over 50,000 printed works and 15,000 manuscripts. Lister also described the nearby collection of the late Jean-Baptiste Colbert: “I saw the Library of the late Monsieur Colbert, that great Patron of Learning … At the upper-end [of the library] is a fair Room, wherein the Papers of State are kept; particularly those of the Administration of Cardinal Mazarin, and his own Accounts, when he was in Employment. These make up many hundred Folios, finely bound in Red Maroquin and Gilt.”71 The same Moroccan red binding, with gilt edges and the Colberts’ serpentine emblem, was used by the foreign ministry. In the last years of Louis XIV’s reign, this part of Paris constituted one of the largest concentrations of libraries and archives in the Western world, a cornucopia of memory and learning mostly open to Torcy and his staff and, it was hoped, to the Académie politique’s students as well.72 Even before he became secretary, Torcy sought to preserve other state archival resources. In February 1696 as Croissy’s health declined, Torcy’s staff, while searching for the titles to the seigneurie of Torcy, found the Chambre des comptes’ archives in disarray, prompting him to complain to one of its chief judges.73 Several years later his friend and former tutor Rousseau de Chamoy offered to bring some order to these same archives, a task begun in earnest in February 1703 when Dispatches gave its authorization. During his research, Rousseau uncovered numerous chancellery records that ranged from 1421 to 1672. Torcy was likewise instrumental in opening Brittany’s “Trésor des chartes” (treasury of charters) in Rennes and in organizing the archives of Nantes. During the wars at the end of the seventeenth century, the House of Lorraine’s records were transferred to Metz. Torcy ordered them copied, and after Ryswick, as a good will gesture, the originals were returned to Nancy.74 Torcy shared with Paris’s police and parlement the right to seal and then review personal papers of anyone dying in the capital, especially those that touched state interests in any way. Priority was placed, however, on retrieving state papers from former French agents.75 Saint-Prest often hastened to the deceased’s dwelling to search a sealed desk or room for such documents. When Ariste, the Briennes’ premier commis, died in 1697, Saint-Prest and Commissioner Delamare of the Châtelet were sent to seal his residence and forbid his heirs entrance until Saint-Prest extracted those letters concerning foreign affairs.76 In 1702 d’Argenson informed Torcy that he had sealed the papers of Forval, former French resident to the Grisons and agent in Poland. These included the key to his code, letters from Poland (including a number of formal ones written in Latin to the Polish chancery), books, and an extensive collection



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of rare pamphlets.77 Not all of Richelieu’s papers were in the collection that he left to his niece, Marie Madeleine de Vignerot du Pont de Courlay, first duchesse d’Aiguillon, but it was nonetheless a large one. The second duchess, who inherited it in 1675, was a less careful guardian than the first, so papers began to disappear. When she died in October 1704, leaving her possessions to her disgraced and disgraceful nephew, Torcy obtained the king’s authorization to remove the cardinal’s papers from the estate, but it was only on 2 March 1705 that Adam received an order to seize them. Where they were taken is not known, but by the end of 1710 they were in the Louvre’s new archive where, following Torcy’s instructions, Le Grand organized and inventoried the papers, arranging them geographically.78 Another major acquisition was the papers of former foreign secretary of state Brienne, inspected by Adam.79 Even the papers of a member of the Pajot postal dynasty attracted the minister’s ever-vigilant eye.80 Papers of foreigners were also of interest. In 1711 the effects of “M. Krock [Scroff],” Paris resident of Tsar Peter I, were sealed. The inventory sent to Torcy listed code books, letters from the French court, letters from the tsar and tsarina, and memoirs on trade with Russia and Russia’s relations with Sweden.81 It was widely known that Torcy was acquiring anything that might enhance the foreign ministry’s diplomatic record. In early 1699 Abbé Louis Thésut, brother of Baron Jean de Thésut, secrétaire des commandements to Monsieur, the king’s brother, was attending to the never-­ending wrangling over Madame’s claim to her father’s (d. 1690) Palatinate electorate. Another Orléans official, Jean-Paul du Hautoy de Rossicourt, had been sent to Germany earlier to gather the documentation needed to press Madame’s case with her recalcitrant brother, but when he was suspected of being in league with her brother’s officials, he fled with the papers. Abbé Thésut journeyed to Strasbourg to enlist the magistrate and scholar Ulrich Obrecht in helping him track them. Tracing the twisted path that the two large chests of papers were said to have traveled, in early 1700 Thésut, having already spoken with Torcy, informed Obrecht that the last time Hautoy was in Paris he had approached Saint-Prest about giving the ministry’s archives fourteen or fifteen volumes that included the late elector’s negotiations. The hapless Hautoy de ­Rossicourt ended up in the Bastille but was soon released when the papers were recovered. It is not clear, however, whether or not any of them ever made their way to Torcy’s archive.82 Pierre Clairambault was an obliging collaborator in this document dragnet. From his vantage point on Place des Victoires, he knew most of

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the great collectors and their collections. In April 1699, for instance, he wrote to Adam informing him of a fugitive compilation of Seignelay’s papers. His greatest triumph, however, came in snagging the Gaignières collection. The independently wealthy François Roger de Gaignières, governor of the town and principality of Joinville, had assembled one of Europe’s great amateur collections of manuscripts, maps, prints, medals, plans, and portraits. Its historical value attracted the attention of Louis XIV, who inquired through Torcy of its disposition. The principle that papers produced by or sent to public servants belonged by right to the state dated from at least the previous century, but only Louis XIV and his ministers, especially those of the reign’s second half, were able to implement it with some consistency. The interest in Gaignières’s collection, however, testified to a growing sense that the state’s right extended as well to papers that related to it or served the public interest.83 For over twenty years Gaignières’s neighbour, Ambassador Puyzieulx, periodically reported to Torcy on the collector’s and collection’s health. Many others, including England’s William III, had hoped to acquire the collection, but in February 1711 Torcy concluded an agreement whereby in return for financial considerations for himself and his heirs, it went to the king upon the death of Gaignières. He and the collection, whose use he still enjoyed, were soon placed under close scrutiny when Torcy acted on Clairambault’s doubts about Gaignières’s sincerity and fears of theft by some of the collector’s associates. When Gaignières died in March 1715, Torcy sent d’Argenson and his brother-in-law, Privy Councillor Louis Urbain Lefevre de Caumartin, to inspect the cache. Wisely, they brought along a portrait painter to evaluate the art works. In May, Torcy wrote to Clairambault outlining the disposition of the materials based on the latter’s carefully compiled inventories: any papers relating to foreign affairs since the 1598 Treaty of Vervins would go to the Louvre archives, as would any books needed for the work of those who laboured there; everything else either went to the Royal Library or, if already in a royal collection, was to be sold.84 In summary, Torcy sought to get his own information house in order and increase its supply of useful historical knowledge by acquiring materials pertinent to diplomacy that had escaped the foreign ministry’s control. All this information aided department insiders who sought a fuller and more precise understanding of past French diplomacy and served broader purposes that projected the fruits of that knowledge outside the ministry. Information and power typically march together, especially in diplomacy where much of the work of negotiation relies



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on deploying informed words in order to shape perceptions. The foreign office’s mania for old documents under two Colberts reflects a keen appreciation for the power of what was written on paper, as illustrated by Croissy’s own rummaging about in provincial libraries for parchments to manipulate into a case for acquiring border territories. If Torcy’s goals were less aggressive than those of his father, he nonetheless appreciated the potency of documents in creating the propaganda he sent abroad to justify French policy. The intended audience for the mustered documentation was also different: Croissy had others of legal training in mind, whereas Torcy looked to a wider public opinion.85 This “info-lust” was part of Torcy’s legacy to the foreign office. Not all of the subsequent foreign secretaries pursued papers with his doggedness, but the torch was continuously carried by such men as Le Dran, trained under Torcy. With the acquisition of Mazarin’s papers in 1732, Le Dran proudly announced to foreign secretary Chauvelin, who shared this passion, that the archives now had a complete run of correspondence from almost every French ambassador back to 1624.86

C e n s o rs h ip a n d Propaganda Another aspect of information management aimed not at its preservation, but at its elimination by various means of censorship or its countering through propaganda. These two activities were not easily separated and indeed fed upon one another, since both had the same goal of stopping domestic and enemy subversive publications. Combating the diffusion of hostile printed materials was Torcy’s never-ending headache. Early in the War of the Spanish Succession he was frustrated by his inability to stem the torrent of books, pamphlets, newsletters, broadsides, and gazettes “à la main” (hand-copied gazettes) inundating the Parisian marketplaces, cafes, parks, and even postal bureaus. In league with d’Argenson’s police, Torcy moved quickly to monitor the arrival of contraband publications and arrest the worst offenders, but at times he despaired over the gazettes from Holland flooding the capital.87 Many of these materials had not far to travel, as they were printed or hand-copied in Parisian cellars or provincial towns such as Lyon and Rouen. As well, a steady stream of contraband publications coursed across the eastern frontier.88 In combating the influx of enemy propaganda, the best defence was an early warning system in the leading neutral cities and diplomatic centres. Four were particularly important: Geneva and Soleure in Switzer­ land and the Venice-Rome axis in Italy. Soleure, home of the French

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a­ mbassador and situated halfway between Basel and Berne, proved an ideal listening post. The two ambassadors who served there during the war were both Torcy’s friends and clients: Roger Brulart de Sillery, marquis de Puyzieulx89 (assisted by the first-class diplomat and master spy Saint-Colombe), and the comte du Luc upon Puyzieulx’s 1708 retirement. Both maintained a large staff that included propagandists such as La Chapelle and Jean-Baptiste Rousseau.90 As the war moved into its opening phase in 1702, Puyzieulx and Sainte-Colombe were already establishing lines of communication with Rousseau de Chamoy in Ratisbon, from which he reported on the Imperial Diet, with Rudolph ­Christian, Baron Imhof in Vienna, a German diplomat who supplied the ambassadors with a weekly newsletter and pamphlets, and with Obrecht in Strasbourg, who wrote a series of tracts on the Spanish succession. La Closure, resident in Geneva, and d’Audiffret, extraordinary envoy to Lorraine, relayed information concerning the book trade.91 News about enemy propaganda often flowed along the same networks that provided the information used in French writings meant to counter it. In October 1701, just as Imperial troops advanced into the plains of northern Italy, Habsburg agents headed by Franz Ehrenreich, Count von Trautsmandorff, infiltrated some of the chief Swiss cities, including Basel. Answering a worried letter from Puyzieulx, Torcy urged him to warn Basel’s magistrates to pay more attention to what was printed in their city. If they lacked the authority to ban such works, the magistrates could at least threaten their authors with what Torcy termed the punishment their insolence deserved.92 He feared that the emperor’s agents had already suborned many Swiss publishers and booksellers. Berne proved more difficult to deal with than Basel because the Fischer family of postmasters and burgomasters were overtly anti-French. The French embassy bribed several municipal agents who supplied local gossip and the occasional pamphlet, but neither the ambassadors nor their agents could curb the Fischers’ influence.93 During the crucial period of peacemaking in 1713–14, du Luc translated timely articles from the Zurich journals to send to Paris along with German publications from Innsbruck.94 Geneva was a particularly well-placed listening post for gathering news and printed works from French-speaking Switzerland, Savoy, and northern Italy for the foreign office clerks to comb through.95 The French residents were Torcy’s confidant Iberville in the 1690s and thereafter La Closure. The latter had served Verjus de Crécy at Ratisbon, his own uncle Roland Jachiet Dupré in Florence, and Verjus de Crécy again at Ryswick, where he remained as chargé until the arrival of Ambassador



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Bonrepaus.96 On his arrival in Geneva in 1698 La Closure reported that many in the book dealers’ guild, which he dubbed “a Republic within a Republic,” were either suspicious of or outright hostile toward France. Slowly, however, his agents infiltrated the Genevan book market and by the middle of the war were able to warn French customs in Lyon of incoming contraband. Through a network of Swiss merchants and banking houses friendly with Samuel Bernard, La Closure purchased scurrilous books and pamphlets in the Netherlands to be sent directly to Paris.97 In June 1707, for example, a large parcel of books was delivered to a Parisian merchant banker, Salomon, who carried them at once to the nearby Hôtel Croissy. La Closure also supplied Torcy’s clerks with an important Swiss publication, Nouvelles d’Italie (News of Italy), as well as a clandestine publication in Italian printed in Milan and subsidized by Prince Eugene and the Habsburg Archduke Charles.98 In early 1707 La Closure enclosed a pamphlet in a sealed packet as if it were a plague bacillus and entrusted it to a special courier bound for Versailles. The first two letters it contained, written in a flat, noninflammatory, conversational tone, observed that France’s government and especially Torcy must be aware that the kingdom was exhausted and could no longer think of maintaining a Bourbon in Madrid. Inevitably, it continued, Austria will occupy Naples and Sicily and then the pope will recognize the archduke as rightful king. The letters made specific demands: that Strasbourg be returned to the emperor and Lille included in any Dutch barrier.99 Few examples of this pamphlet exist, perhaps testimony to Torcy’s vigorous pursuit of any copies that might have reached Parisian bookstalls. Neutral northern Italy was likewise a worry. During the war’s first years Torcy sought to secure French interests there against Imperial troops and propaganda by appointing an extraordinary ambassador to Venice with political clout and loyal to him. That person was Abbé Pomponne, Torcy’s brother-in-law. Nominated late in 1704, Pomponne arrived in Venice via Rome in early 1705 and at once gathered a circle of informants.100 Venice was a well-placed listening post.101 From its ports Pomponne’s agents possessed an untrammeled view of the Adriatic and beyond to the Dalmatian ports, including Ragusa, from whence they gathered news of and tracts from the revolt in Hungary. From the Venetian mainland his agents accessed the mountain passes into the land of the Grisons and beyond to the Austrian heartland and the Swiss valley routes to France.102 Pomponne purchased the services of newsmongers and copyists to edit a newsletter of local and Italian

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events. These were carried over the Alps, on foot, if necessary, in bad weather. Pomponne also employed French galleys visiting the ports of Civita ­Vecchio, L ­ eghorn, and Savona to convey the mail home to the Toulon naval base.103 A lynchpin of Torcy’s early warning system on the eastern frontier was Jean-Baptiste d’Audiffret, a Provencal and former special envoy to ­Mantua. From 1702 French resident in Lorraine, d’Audiffret monitored the mails that passed from Switzerland and the Germanys through the Burgundian corridor into France, hired agents to detect scandalous books entering the kingdom, and even secreted agents into the ducal household. Traveling to Versailles from time to time, in February 1708 he carried recent newsletters and pamphlets from Frankfurt’s book fair and Mainz’s book market. He also passed on duplicates of news gathered in Germany to Rouillé, envoy to Elector Max in Brussels. During the spring months of 1711 d’Audiffret reported that he had learned from his agents in the duke’s household that Marlborough was not only under attack by the High Tories, but by moderate public opinion as well in both Britain and the United Provinces. He continued through the summer to forward anti-Marlborough sentiment from the (London) Examiner and other pro-Tory publications.104 The news of attacks on Marlborough’s character and generalship could not have arrived at Versailles at a more propitious time, since Torcy had just opened peace negotiations with the Tory leadership and welcomed any news of dissention among the Allies. In the fall of 1711 Torcy received what the Tory press termed “an excellent and unanswerable Piece” by Jonathan Swift entitled The Conduct of the Allies, whose attack on Marlborough and the Whigs dripped with vitriol. Torcy ordered d’Argenson to have the tract translated into French at once, and within the week it appeared in the bookstalls.105 In the writing of the history of early modern media, notes Joad ­Raymond, “we create a map where oral, manuscript and print transmission coexist, where commerce and politics need to be understood side by side, where social and intellectual networks are mutually explanatory. The themes of networks, the means of exploiting and controlling news media, and the intersection between public and private shape much of this map.”106 This was the milieu in which the foreign office experienced and interacted with the media. Throughout the war Torcy received tracts of all kinds, printed and copied by hand, from booksellers across Europe, neutral, allied, or hostile. Booksellers often published as well as sold books. The foreign office most frequently patronized the p ­ ublishing houses of Caspart Fritsch, de Bohm, and Renier Leers in Rotterdam;



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Isaac Wallant in London; and Pierre Matteau in Cologne. In France, ­Alibert, a merchant-librarian in Besançon, dealt with Swiss publications. In Paris, Henriques, on rue Bourbon, supplied the foreign minister with Iberian and Italian publications. An independent agent working out of Amsterdam, Jean-Louis de Lorme, was a frequent visitor to Paris. While Torcy was in The Hague in May 1709, he received a visit from a representative of the publishing house of Moet Jing. Renier Leers, chief bookseller of the Rotterdam book trade, like many of his compatriots dealt with anyone who had money. Between 1694 and 1696 Leers had traveled often to Paris to negotiate agreements for the entry of foreign books, including Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire, and thus when war came again, Leers and other Dutch dealers supplied the foreign office with a galaxy of Dutch gazettes and books.107 To ingratiate himself with both the Allies and the French, Leers played informant and at one time tried his hand at brokering peace negotiations. In 1711, just as serious peace parleys were emerging from the cabinets at Versailles and Whitehall, Leers wrote to the Tory cleric Dr Edward Stratford, canon of Christchurch, Oxford, saying that if he desired, he would serve as liaison between the Tory leader and the French foreign minister, but adding that Stratford must be wary, as Torcy was educated in “Popish, tyrannical, and arbitrary principals.”108 Torcy nonetheless found him useful. State surveillance of the book trade required cooperation with Jérôme Pontchartrain. He often consulted Torcy, as when he received a copy of the works of the Spanish Jesuit and historian Juan de Mariana being sold in Paris bookstalls. Alarmed because of that author’s espousal of regicide and recalling that Mariana’s De rege et regis institutione (1598) had been condemned to be burned by the parlement, Pontchartrain requested that Torcy ask the Spanish ambassador to alert the Spanish court and post office to the dangers of Mariana’s works.109 On another occasion Jérôme wrote to Torcy and the editors of the Jesuit journal Mémoires de Trévoux for help in suppressing a printing of an edition of Pierre Richelet’s Dictionnaire made by the Oratorian Père Fabre. Claude Brossette, a lawyer and Jesuit, objected to the Jansenist elements it incorporated and presented a petition to Torcy requesting its condemnation. Jérôme informed the editors that Torcy had expedited the lettre de cachet (see chapter 11) and had, at his urging, instructed intendant Charles Trudaine in Lyon to seize Fabre’s papers. Trudaine confiscated the book’s profits, amounting to 350 livres, and Torcy informed Jérôme and royal confessor Père Michel Tellier that he had distributed the monies to the police and the poor.110

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Domestic pre-censorship was also used to filter out undesirable works. In an acknowledgment of the rules of the game in 1703, d’Argenson assured Torcy that he would not grant permission to publish without the minister’s agreement and would therefore await his decision on the manuscript he was sending him, but Torcy replied that he saw no reason to forbid its publication.111 Torcy cooperated with Chancellor ­Pontchartrain as well in their common battle against undesirable books. Between 1699 and 1704 the chancellor established two committees to act as readers, advisors, and ultimately censors of books that were to be published with the crown’s imprimatur or at least its tacit consent. Many of the fifty-six royal censors were members of Torcy’s brain trust, including Clairambault, Renaudot, and Vertôt. Torcy never became an official censor, but he collected many of the reviewed editions. Even men of the church knew of Torcy’s penchant for clandestine literature. Before he died, Bishop Bossuet gave Torcy the collected works of Swiss reformer Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s successor.112 The final decades of the reign witnessed “a demand for information” from a public sphere wider than suspected by earlier scholars. There was as well an increased interest in and respect for public opinion and in the ability of writers to shape it.113 Torcy and his department thus acted proactively to win over the reading public. Gilles Feyel has pointed to France’s “double information market” under Louis XIV. The Gazette, playing a crucial role in centralizing France, was the government’s official mouthpiece for royal events, detailed noble genealogies, and foreign news, yet it was careful to reflect royal views on diplomacy and war. Reprinted in the provinces for wider distribution, it was free from advertisements, personal and commercial notices (“classifieds”), domestic news, and independent commentary. Alongside the Gazette were the foreign journals printed in French, often in the Dutch Republic, and allowed to circulate freely within France. They offered French readers both domestic news and freewheeling, frequently critical commentary on France’s internal and external affairs. From the 1670s these two sources of news permitted the emergence in France of an informed, critical, and steadily growing public who, as readers, created a synthesis based on both sources.114 According to Brendan Dooley, “Printed news permitted the comparison of accounts in a way never possible before,” and this allowed serious readers to overcome the radical skepticism of the age toward information from authority, whether religious, philosophical, or political.115 Jeremy Popkin reminds us not to mistake a lack of participation in government for a lack of interest in its activities and other



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political news. War touched most lives outside the actual combat zone. Noble families who supplied the officers were concerned with mobilizations and news from the fronts. War finance mobilized wealth from new as well as old nobles, while feeding Mars involved merchants and could affect markets throughout France. Paradoxically, Popkin observes, the small number of decision-makers in monarchical states actually encouraged the reading public to follow the lead of policy-makers in attempting a “rational political calculation” based on knowledge of rulers, ministers, and resources.116 News of the king’s health was also a matter of concern internally and abroad. This information was controlled and carefully packaged for maximum effect and was of great concern to the foreign office, since out-of-commission or dead monarchs disrupted international calculations.117 While the Gazette represented the king’s viewpoint on diplomacy and war, it was not devoid of useful information. Popkin stresses that even in the seventeenth century western Europe was “unique in the pre-modern world” because it “permitted the development of a system that made so much political information available to ordinary citizens, regardless of their social status, at a relatively modest cost.”118 The Gazette, carefully read by Louis XIV’s subjects and by foreigners, was therefore promoted and closely supervised by royal ministers who also contributed to its contents. By Torcy’s time it had become an annex of the foreign office, with Renaudot and Torcy working in close collaboration. The minister fed the Gazette privileged information, while the abbé shared the latest news with him. In addition, Torcy’s clerks censored the journal’s contents. Its re-impression in a growing number of provincial centres gave the propaganda of the foreign office a wider scope and was facilitated by close cooperation between the Gazette and the postal and courier service directed by Torcy.119 Diplomats were among those hungry for political and war news. The foreign office collected complete runs of the Gazette (from 1632) and the Mercure de France (from 1672), but even these were assembled and paginated only with difficulty, given irregularities of delivery and missing instalments. Foreign journals were more difficult to gather in complete series, but from 1691 the ministry kept a full run of the authoritative Gazette d’Amsterdam as a reference tool. Each year was manually and continuously paginated and a subject table prepared of its contents. While tables were mostly focused on foreign affairs, from 1714 and the crisis over Unigenitus, domestic matters increasingly garnered attention. Given the expense and labour required to assemble and

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render a complete collection usable, only this foreign journal received such comprehensive treatment. Still, French diplomats abroad sent the ministry all kinds of other printed material of a political nature, including the occasional journal as well as speeches, proclamations, and laws. These, along with the historical documentation being arranged for easier access, provided a wealth of material for the department’s commis and associated savants and writers.120 The war of words among Europe’s powers intensified during the opening years of the War of the Spanish Succession. To buttress the censorial cordon sanitaire that he was building on the French frontiers, Torcy went on the offensive, unleashing his own propaganda. Editing and production would be demanding, requiring a reliable printer-publisher who could be trusted not to leak information to the gazetteers or agents of foreign envoys and who would undertake the distribution of the tracts in neutral and Allied cities. Torcy sought a writer whose style was even, graceful, and dignified, with the edge of elegance expected by the king and the critical acumen expected by the minister. Since Louis XIV did not wish his ministers of state or his envoys abroad to engage openly in polemical squabbles, considering it demeaning and undignified for a servant of the king, the foreign office fought the propaganda wars covertly. In 1702, with his agent-propagandist not yet chosen and his printers unreliable, Torcy’s first venture into the propaganda wars was a bit amateurish. He complained to d’Argenson of errors in the proof copy, prodded him to recommend a new publisher, and charged him personally with monitoring the changeover to a new press.121 Meantime, following the suggestion of his sister, Madame Bouzols, and the recommendation of the prince de Conti, Torcy selected Jean de La Chapelle, an aspiring diplomat, playwright, and member of the French Academy as his propagandist. Nourished by Torcy’s memoranda and summaries of diplomatic documents, La Chapelle undertook a series of forty-eight anonymous letters entitled Lettres d’un Suisse à un François.122 As wartime responsibilities crowded d’Argenson’s agenda, he informed Torcy that “if you decided that the arguments … [presented in the Swiss Lettres] should prevail, I consider myself obligated to inform you that the inspection of each issue can only be carried out in your office and under your supervision, because only there can one judge what can be said and what must be suppressed.”123 Torcy, along with several of his commis, assumed the supervision of La Chapelle’s work.124 The Swiss Lettres reflected and reiterated familiar themes such as the spectre of Habsburg domination not only of central Europe and



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the Germanys but of Italy.125 They played upon English party and religious divisions, Dutch economic fears that Britain was seeking hegemony in world trade, and Swiss suspicions that, as the birthplace of the Habsburg dynasty, Austria wanted the cantons to return to their former liege lord.126 These pamphlets proved immensely popular in France and annoyingly provocative in Allied weekly gazettes. Queen Anne, who received the English version by penny post, was “much impressed.”127 Torcy also deployed select state documents against the Allies. In a “prologue” to France’s publication of her 4 December 1703 declaration of war on Savoy, Duke Victor Amadeus’s well-known perfidy was held up to scorn. Immediately following this, Torcy arranged the publication of a royal missive to Pope Clement XI warning of Savoy’s treachery and the likelihood that northern Italy’s balance of power would be upset and the Papal States endangered by a dual Savoyard-Imperial incursion  – a prophecy soon fulfilled. Both publications reflected Torcy’s concern for careful documentation, rich elaboration, and persuasive argument.128 These traits were part of what Klaits terms “Torcy’s modernization of the crown’s traditional use of official historiography,” which had been underused for propaganda purposes earlier in the reign.129 These traits reappeared in the composition of the foreign minister’s greatest propaganda coup, which like a phoenix arose from France’s dark hour of military and diplomatic defeat in the summer of 1709. The Allied powers negotiating with Torcy in The Hague demanded such harsh terms that some on that side expected their rejection and rumours circulated that Torcy had been sent to the Bastille.130 Many in France and abroad expected a written response. In London Horatio Walpole wrote to a friend that “a manifesto is preparing to be published through the provinces aggravating ye hard terms ye allies would impose upon the French monarch.”131 After the king and his Conseil rejected the Allied peace offer on 1 June 1709, Torcy put aside his usual preference for private diplomacy, which normally left the French public to speculate on the progress of peace negotiations, even though he always had an ear cocked to hear what “le public” was saying.132 He originally proposed a public manifesto with a full account of the negotiations, but it was reduced to two letters from the king, one to the governors and the other to the bishops, but each for wider circulation. In Torcy’s draft of the governors’ letter, the king offered the public not only a frank report, but a stirring appeal for their support as well. Petitfils contends that the emphasis on ceremony and power at Louis XIV’s court has led historians to overlook this expression of power through information and words. Indeed, Torcy

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took traditional symbols of kingship but redeployed them to portray the king as defender not of his own reputation but of that of his people. This dignified yet emotionally charged letter rejected the Allied demand that Louis join them in driving his grandson off the Spanish throne, declaring such a request shocking to humanity. Torcy had Louis conclude by exhorting his people to even greater efforts, since his extensive concessions had failed to end the war. The separate letter to the episcopal hierarchy, to be read from every pulpit in France, was a direct, personal appeal that accused the Allies of attacking the Catholic faith.133 What made the letter to the governors a departure from the past was its carefully orchestrated and extensive dissemination. The clerks of the foreign office saw to its printing and expedition to the governors in the usual manner of a circular letter, while the governors in turn distributed it widely throughout the provinces. Torcy’s strategy produced a profound and positive reaction as common soldiers, courtiers, and provincials rallied to the king. As one agent reported to the Allies, “I cannot express to you the wrath of this nation against the Allies at the news of their stiff demands and the general joy at the king’s resolve to sustain his grandson, the king of Spain.”134 Yet Torcy’s bold propaganda initiative made some on the Conseil uncomfortable. When the Gertruydenberg peace talks failed the following year, there was resistance to another public appeal and none was made. Even so, the foreign office had shown itself adept at deploying words, diplomacy’s customary tools, to shape and direct public opinion in the civil societies emerging outside and within the kingdom.135

T h e P ow e r o f t h e Post Offi ce Upon Claude Le Peletier’s retirement in 1697, his friend Pomponne succeeded him as postal superintendent. At Pomponne’s death two years later, the commission passed to Torcy, Pomponne’s designated successor. Both Le Peletier and Pomponne had allowed the post office to run largely on its own.136 Torcy, however, like Louvois, who created the Louisquatorzian postal system, took a keen interest in it.137 The post office was essential to the regular flow of official (not to mention private) documents to and from the provinces and abroad, but Torcy was particularly keen on its intelligence possibilities through monitoring international news.138 Although he lost the foreign ministry in 1715, he nonetheless advised the regent on foreign affairs and remained a force in government circles in part because he retained the post office until 1721.139



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Under Louvois’s tenure (1663–91) the system came under royal control and from 1672 was leased out to the “ferme général des Postes” (postal leaseholders) for nine years for an annual fixed payment. The leaseholders then sublet large and small portions to “sous-fermiers” (sublessees) who then sublet smaller parts.140 The Rouillé and Pajot families, prime movers behind the postal leaseholders, held it until 1738 and grew quite rich.141 Under Torcy, however, directors of postal bureaus were appointed by and answered to the postal leaseholders who also served Torcy as “contrôleurs généraux des postes et relais” (controllers general of the postal system and relay stations). From 1695, when death created a vacancy among their number, the remaining controllers, Antoine Rouillé, who with his son Louis Rollin-Rouillé held one position, and Léon II Pajot, who held the other, paid the royal treasury for the right to partition the third office of controllers’ functions to avoid sharing the power they had achieved under Le Peletier’s distant superintendence. Nevertheless, Torcy was in overall charge and assisted by a premier commis for postal affairs, Claude de Prailly, Pomponne’s former household intendant and then guardian of his oldest son and heir, Nicolas-Simon Arnauld de Pomponne.142 There were 770 “bureaux de poste” (postal bureaus) throughout the kingdom in 1700 when the system of subleasing was replaced by one where the postal leaseholders selected the director of each bureau. “Directions simples” (simple bureaus) were in the homes of their directors, who largely worked alone. In the few larger “directions composes” (compound bureaus), like those in Paris and Lyon, a variety of underlings assisted the directors.143 Upon payment of the proper fee (based on distance and weight),144 the bureau sent out deposited letters in packets. A bureau also received the arriving “melons” (packets of letters) for sorting before they were picked up at its window by the addressees. Regional directors supervised groupings of local postal bureaus.145 Postal couriers, nominated to their venal offices by the superintendent and subject to his control and discipline, were supervised by the Rouillé controllers. In 1694 only six postal couriers rode from Paris to the east, so their small numbers were supplemented by “entrepreneurs de dépêches” (outside providers) under contract to the post office.146 Originally a separate service, relay stations (“relais”) provided the indispensable horses. Each relay station was under a maître de postes, sometimes misleadingly translated as “postmaster,” a venal officer until 1692 but thereafter appointed by the superintendent by simple commission. His staff cared for its horses and wheeled vehicles and furnished

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the postilions, who rode the left horse of the team pulling a vehicle. Typically located at the entries and exits of towns, relay stations were costly assemblages of land, buildings, personnel, and horses.147 So vital was this system to the state’s functioning that there was little toleration for dishonesty and inefficiency. The maîtres were closely watched by inspectors who reported directly to the superintendent and were among his most important eyes in the provinces. In addition to their supervision from the centre, provincial postal officials and their establishments were also under the provinc­ial intendants.148 As important as monetary remuneration were the privileges and prerequisites that postal officials enjoyed, including exemption from the taille (the crown’s main direct tax) on the first one hundred arpents of land and from quartering troops or paying for their lodging elsewhere. Most profitable perhaps was the right of maîtres to sell wine and foodstuffs in their relay stations, known to be among the kingdom’s best inns. This hospitality role made maîtres and their wives valued informants for officials locally and at the centre.149 During wartime, Torcy often defended their highly prized rights and privileges from encroachments by other administrators  – for instance, reminding an intendant that the exclusion of the sons and postilions of maîtres de postes also applied to militia service.150 Writing to Rouen’s royal prosecutor, Torcy reported that he had asked Desmaretz to order an end to the prosecution of Rouen’s postal bureau director for not having paid the capitation.151 In March 1711 he requested that Desmaretz exempt the maîtres de postes from paying the new dixième tax, but the controller general wrote in the margin of Torcy’s letter that no one had the right to such an exemption.152 Following Ryswick, Pomponne and Torcy continued and extended the reforms begun by the Pajot-Rouillé clans by ordering the reorganization and extension of the messenger service in the north of France. The central gathering place for couriers was the hamlet of Le Bourget just north of Paris. Here barracks were repaired or rebuilt and a timetable recorded for the arrivals and departures of coaches and couriers traveling south to Paris and north to Amiens, the channel ports and Calais, where packet boats left several times a week for England. In wartime a crucial artery flowed from Le Bourget to Soissons, Rheims, Cambrai, and Valenciennes, then to Brussels, The Hague, and Amsterdam. From Amsterdam a courier could follow a road to Deventer, Münster, Bremen, and on to Hamburg.153 For access to Germany, Torcy reorganized the messenger service that followed the road to Verdun and Metz, known



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as the “Metz alley,” then to Nancy in the Duchy of Lorraine and on to Strasbourg, which after its occupation in 1681 became one of the main portals to Germany.154 Lyon had long served as the central postal bureau for Italian mail. Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, other stations were added to facilitate military communications.155 Torcy and French envoys throughout Italy struggled to keep lines of communication open between Versailles and Rome, a Herculean task that, except for the years 1707 and 1708, they largely accomplished.156 Louis-Léon Pajot served Torcy as the system’s energetic co-­ administrator. Son of Louis II Pajot, one of its two controllers since 1686, he proved to be an ideal collaborator and confidant. When his education by the Jesuits was interrupted by an eye malady that threatened blindness, his tutor read to him from Descartes’s mechanistic philosophy, which affected him deeply. Once his sight was restored, he traveled to Holland where the cabinet of curiosities of the famous botanist and anatomist Frederik Ruysch inspired him to create his own collection, one focused especially on mechanical marvels, which he began upon his return to France in 1698. His collection, visited by such rulers as Peter the Great, earned him an honorary membership in the Académie royal des sciences in 1716. When designated his fifty-year-old father’s successor, he began an apprenticeship that lasted until his father’s death in 1708.157 Although not yet thirty, Pajot, the new comte d’Onsenbray, quickly earned the king’s confidence. Louis entrusted him with several secret and delicate matters independent of the ministers, including helping hide his secret will during his last illness before it was deposited with the Paris parlement.158 In 1698 Pajot remained in Paris rather than move to Versailles, establishing himself in his father’s townhouse near the central post office on rue des Déchargeurs near Les Halles.159 With the aid of his brothers Christophe-Alexandre Pajot, marquis de Villers, and Jean-Baptiste Pajot, seigneur de Dampierre and abbé de Saint-Loup, he reorganized the notorious bureau known to posterity as the “Cabinet noir” (darkened chamber). As superintendent, Torcy kept the list of those whose correspondence was to be monitored, but another minister could request additions by submitting his request through the royal household secretary. Most provincial correspondence passed through Paris for what the leaseholders claimed were financial reasons, facilitating centralized surveillance, although provincial post offices could be enlisted if needed. The Cabinet noir, in an annex to the central post office, was extensive and well organized and quickly gained notoriety for secrecy and subterfuge.

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­ etters were opened, copied, deciphered, resealed, and sent on their way, L which could cause noticeable delays.160 Matthew Prior warned the Earl of ­Portland: “I wrote no plainer, because I take it for granted that all my letters are broke open; it is for this reason that I do not send you word of two or three other things of this kind of which I write to Mr. Secretary.”161 Madame complained to her German cousins that just because “letters are properly sealed does not mean anything; they have a material made of mercury and other stuff that can be pressed onto a seal, where it takes on the shape of the seal … After they have read and copied the letters, they neatly reseal them and no one can see that they have been opened.”162 In the hands a supple, perceptive, well-informed foreign minister such as Torcy, the Cabinet noir became a formidable weapon and was extremely active during his tenure. To divine the designs of foreign powers or those in contact with them, Torcy largely confined his surveillance to political correspondence originating in, entering, or traversing France. Marlborough confided to his wife: “I dare not write anything by the post what I must expect may be seen by the French.”163 Dubois, Torcy’s successor, however, began to pry systematically into the personal and private affairs of the great of the court and capital in order to share juicy gossip with the regent.164 As chief of the Cabinet noir, Pajot was de facto head of a part of the foreign office’s intelligence service.165 In addition, Philip V awarded him the mail contract for the Spanish Netherlands, taking it from the Prince of Thurn und Taxis charged with the Imperial postal system.166 The Dutch observers were probably not surprised to learn that Pajot had accompanied Torcy on his negotiating mission to The Hague in May 1709.167 While Torcy engaged the Allied leaders in peace talks, his diplomatic doppelganger interviewed French and Dutch postal agents and traveled to Amsterdam to meet with friendly bankers and merchants. Godolphin reported indignantly that “the State [of the Netherlands] would not stop the intercourse of letters between the bankers in Amsterdam and those in Paris.”168 On his return from The Hague, Pajot became more deeply involved in facilitating the peace negotiations. Having met the Dutch agent Petkum in The Hague, Pajot offered him his townhouse and hospitality when he was in Paris, which on one occasion was so lavish that it upset Petkum’s health!169 Pestilences of all kinds might impede the flow of mail. When Torcy got word that a “contagion” was ravaging Vienna, he instructed Pajot to alert the maîtres de postes on the Imperial frontier to take precautions to prevent its spread into France.170 He labeled as despicable the armed



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robbery of the mails that increased during war and hard times.171 The north of France, especially near the front, was a breeding ground for robbers. When a postilion from Verdun’s relay station was arrested for theft, Torcy instructed the intendant to hold him until a postal chaise could be sent to transport him to Paris.172 In 1711 Torcy reported to d’Argenson that a contretemps had broken out in the central post office’s chamber where letters were weighed. Insolent words were exchanged, an ink bottle was thrown, an official was accosted, and the post office temporarily closed. Torcy was angry enough to order the miscreants imprisoned in the Bastille.173 In June 1715 a shocking slaying occurred on the route from Paris to Dijon, a route once deemed safe. The prince de C­ondé’s valet, traveling in an official carriage, was stabbed and his servant killed. Although mounted guards were sent from the Versailles garrison, the assassins were never found.174 The minister’s letters could be biting when local officials failed to react promptly to troubles. In his own hand, Torcy reminded Dondell, lieutenant de roi and president of the Vannes présidial, that having corresponded with him repeatedly regarding the murder of two couriers, he expected immediate action. He marked out the traditional closing of “your affectionate servant” on the draft, suggesting that the exasperated minister was no longer either “affectionate” or Dondell’s “servant.”175 During the war Torcy established or refurbished postal bureaus and relay stations, but after Utrecht the reconstruction process accelerated. It was directed both at the postal infrastructure of roads, bridges, postal bureaus, and relay stations, and at the international postal system, for which new postal treaties were negotiated. With one eye on the recent wartime battle against illicit publications oozing across the borders and the other on the current leaking of specie out of France, Torcy proposed (without success) the appointment of ten postal inspectors to serve in the postal bureaus of key frontier cities. They would inspect all outgoing and incoming letters and packages for anything against the interests of the king and state.176 Administrative change did come in September 1715, however, when the regent abolished the post office’s central administration commissions and resurrected them as venal offices. The two controllers, for example, became general intendants and, in the spirit of the Polysynod, joined with the superintendent (now also called “grand master”) in a postal council.177 The grand master’s new secretary, who assisted him by preparing the minutes of meetings and expediting and countersigning his orders, was former foreign office clerk B ­ eauchamp, who maintained contacts with his former colleagues, especially with his

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step-cousin and future son-in-law du Theil. Beauchamp was relieved of his duties in October 1721 when Cardinal Dubois engineered Torcy’s dismissal and assumed his post, but the experienced secretary was reinstated after the cardinal’s death in August 1723.178 Etienne Vincent, “caissier de la Poste” (postal cashier), became the new treasurer in 1715.179 Le Quien de La Neufville’s 1708 description of the postal hierarchy shows that all of the positions named in the 1715 edict were already present and functioning at that earlier date. Indeed, the edict itself implied as much by claiming that its purpose was to take a structure of simple commissions and transform it into one of “charges.” Only then, it continued, would postal administrators have the necessary authority to remedy the abuses and disorder the original commissioners had been tasked with up to 1692.180 Although the move to venality served the government’s pressing need for cash, the edict nonetheless suggests that the postal administration inherited, maintained, and extended by Torcy was worthy of retention and consolidation.

E s p io n ag e : T h e W o r l d of Purloi ned In f o r m ati on In the aftermath of the apparent failure of the Gertruydenberg peace talks, Louis XIV met with his Conseil on 16 July 1710 to decide how to proceed. In his private journal Torcy summarized the assessment of the Allies’ situation: while militarily their position seemed ideal, outnumbering France’s armies and poised on her Flanders frontier, their interior affairs were less favourable because the Maritime Powers were each increasingly short of money and Britain especially was plagued with political infighting and Scottish unrest.181 What permitted such a comprehensive assessment? In a word, what goes today by the name of “intelligence.” How it was assembled takes us to the sprawling topic of spies, informers, adventurers, intelligence gatherers, and propagandists that summons a colourful parade of errant agents, ranging from Protestant preachers to French abbés, Italian counts, Jewish bankers, and papal secretaries, to sexual adventurers, venal journalists, and informers hidden for decades in government bureaus or in a palace entourage or military establishment.182 Although the archival sources yield graphic and often amusing accounts that frequently read more like fiction than fact, these clandestine gleanings were nonetheless considered crucial to the functioning of French diplomacy and kept the foreign office clerks busy sifting and summarizing the countless reports that came in. Writing to



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Bolingbroke in England, Torcy warned of the adventurers across Europe who sold information or misinformation to warring governments hungry for news.183 Intelligence gatherers may conveniently be divided into roughly seven non-exhaustive and overlapping categories: those in the immediate war zone; agents secreted at or near strategic sites; spies on missions; gadflies living at court or in major urban centres; deep-seated spies (or moles); diplomats recruited by a foreign power; and spymasters directing field operations. Agents located in the immediate war zone surveyed troop movements and typically reported to the local military commander. They might be officers suborned by the opposing force, scouts detached from their own headquarters, area natives selling information, or spies specially trained and attached to the military commander’s private corps and paid from his secret purse.184 Agents in the second category, who watched strategic sites such as a port, citadel, mountain pass, river crossing, or narrows leading from one body of water to another, were often amateurs in the present-day sense of the word: shipyard clerks who watched vessels loading and unloading; and postal officials who observed important messengers passing through relay stations, troops moving to or from the front, or mysterious coaches stopping for a fresh relay of horses. The governor of France’s citadel of Sospel in the mountains above the Mediterranean sent agents to observe the passage of Allied troops through the Alpine passes on their way to invade Provence in the summer of 1707.185 Itinerant informers, the third category, often traveled from one country to another and were permanent agents or sold their services by the mission. Nathaniel Hooke undertook missions on the continent and to the British Isles, translating, writing reports and propaganda, and gleaning information for the ministry.186 Toby Bourke traveled about and reported from Spain.187 A mysterious “Sr Printemps” was especially mobile and specialized in military espionage: munitions crossing the Adriatic to Italy from Trieste; Prince Eugene’s baggage and eighty gunpowder-laden wagons gathering at Augsburg, bound for Italy; details from Frankfurt of German troops earmarked for service on the Po; and assorted news from the centre of Allied joint planning at The Hague.188 The fourth category embraced court chroniclers, gossips, snoops, and even outright thieves selling their wares, often with an anecdote or two added to titillate their readers. Daniel de Martine (Martini), a diplomat in Paris, made frequent trips to Versailles to gather tidbits of court gossip for his newsletter read at the courts of Brandenburg, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel, and at Marlborough’s headquarters.189 Abbé Nicolas

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Lenglet du Fresnoy, once employed by Torcy as a book collector and cataloguer, absconded with some manuscripts. Although he was apprehended and the manuscripts returned, Torcy confided to his Journal that a savant and connoisseur he had trusted had ended up a bad character who had turned to espionage and fraud.190 It was, however, the fifth category’s deep-seated agents whom contemporaries regarded as the true spies. It is difficult to uncover their true identities, masked as they were by noms de guerre, ciphered messages, and letter drops. Among those in French service were Zorn in Basel, ­Pastor in Vienna, Vaux in Berlin, and Meyer in Basel and Berne.191 Perhaps the best known of these moles was Abbé François Gaultier in London, who began his career with Tallard in 1698 as embassy chaplain and then remained after his departure, eventually serving the Earl of Jersey and his Catholic wife. Gaultier smuggled information out of London during the war’s middle years and in the summer of 1711 accompanied Matthew Prior to Fontainebleau for secret conversations with Torcy and other ministers.192 Such agents led double or triple lives constantly at risk and played vital roles in the peace process.193 Similar to these but of loftier rank is a sixth category of diplomats recruited from another sovereign power’s service and typically paid subsidies. They and their families might eventually seek French protection or asylum, as did Cardinal Gualterio, recruited by Torcy while in Paris as nuncio; Jan van Brouchoven, Count of Bergeyck, the Spanish Netherlands’ superintendent of finances and a Spanish and French agent; and Baron Karg, the archbishop of Cologne’s chancellor. One of the most celebrated envoys-for-sale was Herman van Petkum, who represented several tiny German principalities at The Hague and whose services were open to the highest bidder, which was usually the Dutch, but later the French. He became an important liaison with Louis XIV’s court during the preliminary talks of 1709 and 1710.194 Those in the last category, the master spies who served spy networks as overseers and paymasters, were typically French diplomats or their secretaries. Openly, they acted as “honourable spies,” uncovering court secrets, but clandestinely they wove extensive intelligence-gathering webs.195 Secretary Jean-Baptiste Poussin, who served in London and then in Copenhagen during the War of the Spanish Succession, procured agents in the Baltic and northern Germany. On several occasions he journeyed as far afield as Leipzig and Berlin to extend his reach.196 During his prewar embassy to Vienna, Villars received over 100,000 livres to hire agents from as far away as Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and



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northern Germany. Bankers in the port of Danzig served as p ­ aymasters for agents in the Baltic-Polish area. During the first years of the war, Villars’s secretary Angelo Piatoni remained the chief French correspondent in Vienna and cooperated with the spy network established in Copenhagen by ­Bonrepaus before he left in 1697 and continued under Poussin.197 ­Bonrepaus reported that he had found a man to whom he could write regularly, code-named “d’Orgemont” and a frequent traveler between Basel and Vienna. Other agents included Jacob Hauser, a merchant in Berlin, and the Imhof brothers, officials in Wolfenbüttel’s court.198 France’s enemies sought to emulate this intelligence system, which was regarded by diplomatic theorists as “superior to any other state in this period.”199 Pierre Rossignol d’Anneville, Torcy’s close friend and frequent correspondent, was an intelligence gatherer whose activities are difficult to classify precisely.200 Born in 1661 into a family of rising Norman lawyers and office-holders, d’Anneville became attached to the C ­ olberts and may have served in the bureaus of the foreign office sometime before 1688, when Iberville was still a commis, which may account for their later close relationship. When Iberville went to Genoa in 1706 as envoy, d’Anneville accompanied him and remained for a year, but then embarked upon further travels to Florence, Venice, and Rome, and visits with Abbé ­Pomponne and cardinals Ottoboni and Gualterio. Lacking credentials or an official mission, but more than a tourist, he gathered information useful to Torcy, the military, and those administrators in provinces potentially affected by Italian events. Unable to proceed to Naples, he nonetheless made valuable contacts, including a papal audience, before returning to Genoa in 1709 to fill in unofficially for Iberville, who had returned home. There he began secret but ultimately stillborn talks with Raphael Sacerdoti, a local Jewish banker who approached him unofficially on behalf of the Duke of Savoy to intimate that he might abandon his allies if France paid his price.201 D’Anneville kept Pontchartrain apprised of maritime matters, recruited spies to go to Rome or Vienna, and did his own spying by hiding in a fisherman’s hut in 1711 to observe the Archduke Charles’s secret landing near Genoa while returning from Spain to Vienna to claim the Imperial crown. Returning to France in early 1710, Pomponne stayed with d’Anneville and reported to Torcy the Genoese’s high regard for him. Although d’Anneville was named chargé d’affaires the following year and upgraded to envoy extraordinary in 1712, his chronic ill health forced the king to permit his return home in January 1713. This Paris sojourn ended in August 1714, but

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on d’Anneville’s way back to his Genoese post, Torcy had him detour to Baden to assist at the peace conference. Once the t­reaties were signed, d’Anneville resumed his leisurely progress to Genoa, but now with the agreeable knowledge that Torcy intended to send him to Mainz as extraordinary envoy. His instructions, however, issued just days before Louis XIV’s death and Torcy’s removal from office, were for naught, and so d’Anneville’s diplomatic career was over. His multiple roles as unofficial and official envoy, tourist, spy, and recruiter of spies demonstrate the permeability of categories related to espionage. Intelligence agents were attached to the foreign ministry and to the war and navy ministries, where they operated at two levels. Armies and fleets approaching one another or armies besieging fortresses required a steady flow of intelligence related to the position, size, composition, supplies, health, and morale of opposing forces as well as the physical contexts in which they might engage one another. Such “micro-espionage” was as old as war itself. At the “macro-espionage” level military spies watched for strategic indicators, such as movements of armies or ships that might signal political-military decisions, such as an impending first strike or the opening of a new front.202 It was especially at this macro level that the foreign ministry’s espionage efforts and those of the war ministry overlapped, sometimes colliding in redundancy and rivalry, but often colluding by sharing information.203 All kinds of information flowed in and out of and circulated within the kingdom. Spies were certainly contributors to this stream, but a good deal of it flowed naturally through the post office, making it in some ways easier for the foreign ministry to manage. The Cabinet noir, affording a window into the content of the mails, helped Torcy and his clerks detect espionage and intercept seditious materials. Regular postal service as well as special cabinet couriers linked the administrative cities of Versailles and Paris with provincial officialdom and embassies abroad. The propaganda machine that developed under Torcy’s leadership also depended upon the mails. Drafts and instructions traveled back and forth between his bureaus and operatives outside the kingdom, and postal bureaus throughout Europe distributed the finished products. All were components in a calculated effort to preserve, arrange, and digest information for the department’s evolving research purposes, to manage its flow abroad, and to block, confiscate, and counter the propaganda and intelligence produced by the pens of publicists and spies employed by France’s enemies. Ambassadors and their staffs abroad were essential components of this information scheme, providing much of its raw



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material and disseminating much of its production throughout Europe. In the following chapter we examine these diplomats with whom the department’s clerks at the centre interacted and upon whose behalf they laboured. We look as well at the diplomatic corps resident in Paris and their interactions with the king and the foreign ministry.

9 Ambassadors in Paris and Abroad

The growing field dubbed the “New Diplomatic History” has challenged and moved beyond the traditional nationalistic teleology and chronology centred on narrating the march toward a modern system of permanent diplomatic representation. Instead, this new approach ranges across disciplines and seeks to embed diplomatic history in the wider cultural histories of which it was a significant and inseparable part.1 Lucien Bély’s work, which offers “an intricate and sensitive blending of social and international history with the history of ideas,” represents this fresh approach at its best.2 This wider perspective shows that diplomacy was only “a privileged aspect of general systems of information-gathering, of representation, and of negotiation” that may be seen as its chief purposes and activities.3 Predictably, gathering, processing, and disseminating information were at diplomacy’s core, since all of its personnel, from the loftiest ambassador to the lowliest clerk and the meanest spy, fed into and off of this complex and extensive circulatory system that nourished the conduct of foreign affairs. The information sent from embassies, however, was quite varied and ranged well beyond chronicling negotiations to include such items as court gossip, factional intrigues, descriptions of public ceremonies, vital events of great families, military preparations, epidemics, weather, food shortages, commerce, and outbreaks of animal and plant diseases.4 Drawing on and adding to this information flow, Louis XIV, like his fellow rulers and states today, represented and projected his power by manipulating symbols and perceptions, as when employing “ceremonial and protocol … as a means of asserting and defending status and interests.”5 Such public occasions were closely observed for what they might reveal about relationships among rulers and states, and indeed were meant to be reported home by diplomats as



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part of the information craved by all foreign ministries. Louis XIV, with Torcy typically at his side, customarily received foreign diplomats in the symbolic splendour of his various palaces, whereas Torcy met them more informally in the same settings, in regular audiences at his Paris home, or in his Versailles bureau and residence to receive and impart information. Meanwhile, outside the kingdom, French diplomats of varying rank, assisted by a variety of secretaries and domestic staff, busied themselves in Europe’s capitals and courts, sometimes with negotiations, but more often with representing their monarch and gathering information and carrying out instructions emanating from his foreign office. The atmosphere abroad could be tense, with locals often suspicious of embassies and their personnel and resentful of their privileges, pretensions, and snooping. Clashes with local authorities were common, and embassies in Paris experienced similar problems that required Torcy’s frequent intervention. Strikingly, even while immersed in wartime diplomacy and tortuous tentative moves toward peace, Torcy and his collaborators acted on their growing interest in producing a more professional diplomatic corps. A significant part of Torcy’s legacy was his short-lived, but nonetheless radical, effort to alter the formation of diplomatic personnel and to better prepare them for their complex vocation.

D ip l o m at ic Audi ences In 1712 Nuncio Cornelio Bentivoglio carried a sealed papal letter for Louis XIV. When he approached Torcy to arrange an audience to convey the letter, the secretary would not allow it, explaining that letters, sealed or unsealed, could not be given directly to the monarch, but had to be read by him first, in the original or in a copy. After opening and reading the letter, Torcy found it satisfactory in certain respects, but when the nuncio once more asked to present it to the king, Torcy again demurred, saying that it first had to be discussed in the Conseil.6 As liaison between visiting and resident ambassadors and the king through whom requests for audiences were made and arranged, it was Torcy’s function to spare his master surprises.7 This door-keeping aimed at shielding the king from foreign ambassadors’ pressure and manipulation and served to keep the foreign secretary apprised of their interactions. As well, Torcy was typically present during a diplomat’s audience with the king. Louis, long wary of diplomats who tried to draw him into inadvertently uttering unintended commitments or revealing secrets, tended to listen more often than talk.8

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Saint-Simon distinguished two types of morning audiences at the king’s bedside between prayers and his attendance at Mass. “Audiences secretes” (secret audiences) were ceremonial and for ambassadors, with Torcy present, whereas “audiences particulières” (particular audiences) were without ceremony and granted to anyone the king wanted to talk to at that moment.9 The Journal of Nicolas de Sainctot (or Sainctôt), introducer of ambassadors from 1691 to 1709, however, reveals a more complex schema.10 Some days or weeks before an envoy first met the king he had an “audience incognito” (incognito audience, so-called because he was still without official standing at court) with the foreign secretary in the Hall of Ambassadors. His “première audience” (first audience) with the king was not a work session, but a public occasion that took place after the royal levee and in the Cabinet where he formally presented the official letters already submitted to Torcy for inspection.11 Upon arriving by coach, the ambassador was accompanied by Torcy and the introducer from the Hall of Ambassadors to the Hall of Mirrors and announced to the king, who, seated or standing behind his table in his Cabinet, sent for his foreign secretary. After they conferred, the introducer accompanied the ambassador into the royal presence and then withdrew. At the end of the audience, Torcy touched the door with the head of his sword to summon the usher to recall the introducer to escort the ambassador out. This process was repeated depending on what other envoys the king received that day.12 Thereafter a resident diplomat was integrated into the court’s social and ceremonial life, dining regularly on Tuesday’s at the grand chamberlain’s table.13 Subsequent audiences in the Cabinet were particular audiences. Louis also granted particular audiences before leaving his bedchamber to attend Mass. They took place at the bedside and within the balustrade that separated the bed from the rest of the chamber. The envoy, again accompanied by the introducer, approached the seated monarch, making three bows, and, after speaking with him in the presence of those household officials and princes permitted to range themselves behind and beside the royal chair, exited with three bows.14 These public occasions, with Torcy typically present, could nonetheless witness frank discussions of diplomatic business.15 What Sainctot terms secret audiences differ from Saint-Simon’s definition. Sainctot’s example is from 1692 when Croissy, without an introducer present, brought the Duke of ­Hanover’s agent-secretary to the king to take his leave and receive a royal gift, whereas the usual “audience de congé” (farewell audience) took place in public and was well attended.16 Not all audiences, however, fit neatly



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into a category. Sainctot describes an audience of complaint given to the Venetian ambassador who came to protest the treatment of his lackeys. Perhaps to show a certain disdain, Louis stood by the window while the envoy spoke.17 Visiting royalty traveling unofficially received a type of secret audience, as when Bonneuil conducted the Prince of Denmark into the royal presence with notables, including Beauvillier and other dukes, as well as the prince’s suite in attendance. While these were not exactly clandestine meetings, the fiction of secrecy allowed a relaxation of ceremony and avoided the distraction of protocol quarrels.18 Less frequent but even more splendid were extraordinary audiences. These were for the extraordinary envoy on a special mission from a state already represented at Versailles or from one with whom France did not normally have diplomatic relations. These took place in the sumptuous Salon of Apollo where the royal throne, placed on a dais, was approached from the Hall of Mirrors by way of the Salon of War. Those few especially magnificent occasions, when the throne was set up at the opposite end of the Hall of Mirrors just outside the Salon of Peace, required the dignitary to traverse the gallery’s entire length to approach the king, as was the case for ambassadors from Morocco, Muscovy, Siam, and Persia. Extraordinary embassies were complicated and costly affairs. Designated notables, usually with the requisite linguistic skills or accompanied by a royal translator, met the visitor at the frontier or the gates of Paris. After residing a few days in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, the ambassador rode in his coach, accompanied by an introducer and a prince of the blood or marshal of France, and followed by the coaches of other dignitaries, including the rest of the princes and princesses of the blood, the foreign minister, and the foreign diplomatic community, to make his official entry before the wide-eyed, cheering Parisians. The envoy and his entourage proceeded to the luxuriously appointed Hôtel des Ambassadeurs on rue Tournon near the Luxembourg Palace. A few more days of preparation passed in this new residence before he was presented to the king in a further display of royal pomp and power. The envoy’s next and last formal audience was also lavish, followed by dinner with high royal officials (but not with the king), a round of informal farewells in the chambers of the royal family, and his departure from Versailles for Paris and his journey home.19 These interactions were governed by varying levels of formality and ceremony with implications for the status and honour of rulers and their representatives, and they frequently resulted in friction, fights, and even the withdrawal of envoys.20 Louis XIV’s court and diplomats were taken

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as models by many, and the volume of works produced by French diplomatic theorists and writers on ceremonial deepened and widened this influence. Yet France had no monopoly on such concerns, as other states also produced models for emulation.21 All of Europe’s courts regarded etiquette and ceremony as ways of ordering the world and making clear its power and honour hierarchies. Far from being rigid, these “rules” were such that each state sought to raise its position in the international hierarchy by exploiting every ambiguity and latching on to any favourable precedent that presented itself while at the same time trying to foil the same manoeuvres by those equal to or below it in strength and influence.22 The grand master of ceremonies and the master of ceremonies23 attended an extraordinary ambassador’s first and farewell audiences, receiving him at the bottom of the magnificent Ambassadors’ Staircase and guiding him to the Cabinet, but otherwise it was the two introducers, like modern diplomatic chiefs of protocol, who on every occasion presented a diplomat to the king.24 The two introducers owned their offices, served by semester, and were part of the royal household, although the household secretary controlled only their remuneration. The king gave them their orders by way of the foreign secretary, with whom they worked in concert.25 Sainctot, who served from 1691 to 1709 during the July–December semester, had a close relationship with Torcy that had begun under Croissy.26 While the minutiae of court ritual were of concern to the foreign secretary, he was too busy to make it his primary focus. Because ceremony and particularly diplomatic observance were grounded in tradition and precedent, Sainctot was keen on chronicling these. In 1698 he wrote Torcy that because he feared that when he died this knowledge would die with him, he hoped to leave an account of his experiences, which he eventually did.27 In November 1698 Louis Nicolas, baron de Breteuil, former envoy to Mantua, purchased the second office of introducer and served the first semester beginning on 1 January 1699 until the end of the reign. When in doubt about some facet of ceremony, he looked to the king, whose memory of such matters was legendary. His predecessor’s jealous widow denied Breteuil his papers, and his colleague Sainctot offered only grudging assistance. This led Breteuil to write a detailed journal from the outset of his service to spare future incumbents a similar predicament.28 Later, Torcy’s clerks consulted and made extracts from it.29 Breteuil’s work began almost immediately with the reception of Jersey’s extraordinary embassy and was followed by the even more complicated and delicate ceremony for the Moroccan ambassador. As his memoirs



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indicate, Breteuil and the foreign secretary collaborated on routine and extraordinary matters alike to assure that all ran in the smooth and precise manner expected by their exacting master.30 An adept introducer could help avert a diplomatic crisis by circumspectly managing an angry envoy, as Breteuil did when the Moroccan ambassador refused to ride in the same carriage with a French official,31 but Torcy and the king might overrule the introducers, as in their 1708 protocol dispute with ­Nuncio Cusani. Torcy claimed that the ruling was based on the records consulted, but given his remark to the envoy in Rome that it would please the pope, threatened as he was by his Imperial enemies, politics likely also played a role.32 Although Torcy met with foreign diplomats individually as needed or, for the nuncio at least, on a regular basis,33 he also inherited his father’s challenging and time-consuming task of receiving foreign diplomats in his Paris townhouse on rue Vivienne. These receptions occurred weekly or even more often, but might also have taken place only once or twice per month.34 In the still-busy period after Utrecht but before the work at Baden was completed, Matthew Prior testily observed that “Torcy come[s] only once a week to Paris to give audience to us fforianers [sic].”35 Accredited envoys once officially received at court needed no formal invitation other than a note announcing that the minister would be “at home.” Other invited guests included French diplomats home from an assignment or preparing for one, senior officials preparing for a foreign tour, and the occasional young foreign prince traveling incognito. When in Paris Minister Pomponne attended these receptions, as did Torcy’s mother, who in the waning years of Croissy’s life had served both as hostess and advisor to the foreign envoys on the practicalities of Parisian life. The Earl of Jersey, who desired a mirror, received a note from Prior that he was with Mme de Croissy, who “promises to take care of the Glace [mirror], the design, and to embark it so … that you have nothing more to do.”36 On selected Sundays she received the wives of the diplomatic corps and on occasion gentlemen like Matthew Prior, a favourite with the ladies.37 However welcoming the foreign secretary and his mother seemed, Torcy, like his father, was careful to screen those claiming membership in the diplomatic corps before admitting them. Shortly before William III’s death in 1701 a Scotsman named ­Alexander Cunningham claimed that he had been sent by the British government “to secure justice … for Scottish subjects of France.” A suspicious Torcy demanded verification of his claim, but when none was forthcoming, Cunningham was no longer welcome in Torcy’s home or at court.38

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These afternoon audiences exuded an atmosphere of relaxed etiquette. Torcy, unlike his father, moved easily among his guests, chatting and relating the latest diplomatic gossip.39 As Prior informed B ­ olingbroke, Torcy was not above confiding to those present that particular matters were “a bit confused.”40 Prior also admitted to his English friends that “I carried my notes [which] I had taken to enable me to speak more particularly” to Torcy.41 Despite relaxed appearances, Torcy or an attendant secretary kept summary notes of the conversations with individual envoys, a practice begun predictably by his information-­collecting father.42 The issues raised ranged widely: Denmark’s ambassador complained that in prize judgments the Swedish king’s recommendations received greater consideration than those from his master; Poland’s envoy demanded a response concerning a confiscated vessel; Tuscany’s envoy again asked for letters of naturalization for the grand duke’s kinsman; Zell’s envoy requested his farewell audience; the nuncio delivered a memoir concerning Avignon; Venice’s ambassador expressed concerns about protocol at the Duchess of Burgundy’s audiences; Spanheim of Brandenburg raised a question about Article 4 of the Treaty of Ryswick; Trier’s envoy requested a royal audience to discuss the church at Speyer; the United Provinces’ ambassador asked about liberty for prisoners of war; Portugal’s ambassador requested a passport; Denmark’s ambassador sought payment of some promised subsidies.43 Sometimes the notes on a particular request stretched to a dozen or so lines, but others were as brief as a few words when the request was routine. These notes were re-­copied into a cleaner and more formal summary record on sheets that were later joined together, the original notes likely discarded. These summaries, despite their formulaic layout, have a rushed quality to them that betokens working lists to remind the minister what issues had to be addressed and when they had been raised rather than formal records for outsiders or posterity. These reminders were especially useful when policy might require that the pacing of replies to queries be as prolonged as possible.44 Perhaps Torcy and his secretary relished most those times when they could record that a reception produced nothing of importance45 to add to their already weighty workload. During his first sixteen months as secretary of state, Torcy received foreign envoys on twenty-four afternoons, usually on Tuesdays. The longest hiatus was between 13 August and 1 October 1697 when the court resided at Fontainebleau. Torcy deemed the distance to Paris too far for him to travel there and return in the same day. Moreover, the minister and the diplomatic community cherished this autumn vacation.46



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A m bas sa d o rs and Embassi es For most Europeans, the most visible of Louis XIV’s foreign ministry personnel were the representatives who served in their capitals, ranging from the glittering extraordinary ambassador to the more mundane resident.47 Although they were accredited to the states’ rulers and were honoured members of their courts, French diplomats also sought to enhance Louis’s reputation and that of his kingdom in the opinion of a wider public that they carefully monitored and reported on back home.48 In addition to offering displays of French power, they accomplished this with a residence sumptuously appointed with the latest French luxuries, lavish entertaining, and levels of tasteful consumption that impressed locals, as it depleted the ambassador’s personal purse.49 In 1698 France had thirteen ambassadors serving in England, Holland, the Empire, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Rome, Venice, Savoy, the Swiss Confederation, and Constantinople, an extraordinary envoy each in Tuscany and Genoa, and a resident in Geneva. As a group, these representatives stood at the summit of the hierarchy of the personnel of the department.50 Although of varying social rank and background, they had in common that they shared the king’s confidence. This was based on a flexible set of criteria that allowed Louis XIV and his foreign secretary to seek the best match of an individual to the circumstances of each post and mission.51 They may be separated into three layers. At the very top, typically serving as ambassadors, the highest diplomatic rank, were those whom contemporaries called les grands or les importants.52 Most often they were from the old sword nobility or the highest military rank.53 This allowed them to wield influence independent of the foreign secretary. They possessed the requisite wealth and prestige to adorn the premier diplomatic posts and represent the person of the king, and most were polished in manner and adroit in conversation as required by diplomatic service at a royal court.54 These dukes, counts, cardinals, and marshals, who boasted ties with the monarch himself or with the great noble court families or the newly arrived, wealthy, urban nobility, contributed many eminent ambassadors.55 Their skill as courtiers, so significant to their diplomatic task of representation, neither guaranteed nor precluded the ability to negotiate, which in any event was the skill typically employed less often than representation and information-­gathering.56 During the War of the Spanish Succession, it was from among these noblemen that Torcy often recruited ministers plenipotentiary for peace congresses and ambassadors for special missions.57 This group included

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high-born foreigners such as the Chevalier Rossi, from an illustrious Perugian family, whom Torcy sent on missions to The Hague and to Rome.58 While jarring to a nationalist outlook, their service is a reminder that diplomats were royal servants who represented a person rather than an abstract state.59 Torcy was better able to place department veterans, Colbert clients, and his own friends in some posts than others. His favourites among les importants included du Luc, a close friend, and Polignac, a boyhood companion, who was recalled from Rome in 1709 to counsel him on the peace negotiations under way in the United Provinces. Although all diplomatic appointments formally passed through the foreign secretary’s hands,60 candidates were suggested and promoted by the king’s entourage, including other ministers, courtiers, and especially Maintenon. The final choice, however, rested with the king. Names of those to be offered an appointment were apparently first announced to the Conseil, either as a formality or to see if there were any strong objections. Torcy then made formal offers, which might be declined for health or other reasons.61 Ambassadorships to Europe’s most important courts, especially when a great name was required or important negotiations were planned, typically offered the secretary less opportunity to place candidates of his own choosing or even liking. The king’s penchant for noblemen, especially military ones, as worthy representatives of his royal dignity and for those in whom he had personal confidence at times required Torcy to work with someone he hardly knew or in whom he had little confidence. Such appointees might also feel beholden to Maintenon, another minister, or a prominent courtier. Torcy mistrusted Harcourt, who had insistently sought a place on the Conseil, and feared marshals Huxelles, Tallard, and Villars because of their close ties with the rival Le Telliers and with Maintenon.62 Yet he kept his likes and dislikes in check so as not to impede the king’s service. A second social layer of diplomats traced their origins to the lesser sword nobility, the robe nobility, and even the upper bourgeoisie, and represented an emerging bureaucratic nobility that often purchased offices such as secretary of the king to enable their ascent.63 Though less exalted in the court hierarchy than les importants, they typically served in the second rank of diplomats as envoys and residents. Under Torcy, they were increasingly named ambassador or extraordinary envoy, or served as special ministerial advisor.64 Among those thus favoured were Rouillé, Callières, Mesnager, and Michel Amelot, councillor of the Paris parlement and ambassador to Spain (1705–09).65 The d’Ussons, an old



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robe family, included the uncle, Bonrepaus, who served on missions to the English, Danes, Dutch, and Baltic Hansa, and his nephew Bonnac, posted to various northern German princely courts (1700–04), Prussia (1705), and, on Torcy’s express nomination, Spain (1711). The Colberts and Torcy’s in-laws, from this and the social layer above it, served France abroad and were Torcy’s valuable informants and close confidants, tied to him by bonds of family, fortune, and loyalty.66 Persons of less exalted social origins made up the third layer of French diplomatic personnel. Their careful selection was critical to the success of a mission according to the consummate diplomat Callières.67 Some posts were permanent, appointed and maintained by the ministry in Paris, such as the royal interpreting secretaries found in embassies in the Levant, Venice, and Switzerland. Although not formally diplomats, they occasionally undertook such missions for the ambassador or even acted on his behalf during his absence.68 There were also chaplains for missions in non-Catholic states such as Britain, the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.69 Secretaries, typically selected and paid by the envoy himself, were not permanent embassy personnel, but tied to the envoy to whom they owed their primary loyalty. These invaluable secretaries managed the copious correspondence that moved across their master’s desk: they opened dispatches from Paris, decoded and encoded letters, and copied outgoing correspondence. They also performed chancellery functions such as delivering passports and other official certificates. On occasion they delivered dispatches to neighbouring courts or to Paris, filled in for their master during an absence or illness, and managed embassy business officially or unofficially as chargés d’affaires upon his death or departure. Peace congress plenipotentiaries, overwhelmed by the volume of clerical work, pooled their secretarial staffs to cope with it.70 Even before leaving France for a mission, an ambassador’s secretaries busily made copies of mémoires to be used on the mission.71 During vital negotiations or when critical news, such as a royal death, had to travel fast, an embassy had its own courier or used other staff as messengers for these expensive land or sea voyages paid for by the department.72 An ambassador’s train included, as well, an assortment of servants, guards, and hangers-on.73 Torcy insisted that all diplomatic personnel perform according to his high expectations, and when they did not, he told them so. His letter to Amelot, former ambassador to the Swiss and ambassador to Spain since 1705, is a model of the gentle, but firm, rebuke. He began by confessing that having since his father’s time admired Amelot’s dispatches, he was

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now profoundly surprised that those now coming from Spain did not match this previous level of factual knowledge. He insisted that Amelot fully inform the king of the state of mind in Madrid, said to be entirely rebellious, since he was in the best position to let the king know the truth of matters there. Moving from this rebuke toward his closing, Torcy added reminders of the ambassador’s long experience and the useful lessons even he had learned from his past negotiations, concluding that he had no need to instruct Amelot in what Amelot knew infinitely better than Torcy himself did.74 In 1709, when France seemingly abandoned Spain for purposes of obtaining peace, Amelot asked to be recalled, but once further harsh Allied demands were rejected and the two Bourbon crowns were again to make war together, Torcy nonetheless resisted the Spanish court’s entreaties for his return. Amelot’s diligence and efficient reforms had stirred up anti-French sentiments in Spain, but perhaps more damning in Torcy’s calculations were the princesse des Ursins’s appeals for his return, motivated, as he confided to his journal, by selfinterest: she wanted an ambassador to serve as her valet rather than to monitor and shed light on her conduct.75 As in the other capitals, diplomats were coveted guests in Paris, where society gathered to converse, offering the curious a slice of the foreign and on occasion the exotic, sharing information drawn from their homeland and from the courts they had visited about events, customs, sights, and people.76 It was this easy and frequent contact with the residents of the capital that caused the foreign minister and the Paris police to take an interest in foreign envoys and their residences. In the first two months of 1701, for example, Jérôme Pontchartrain passed on to Torcy complaints about a charlatan physician harboured in the ­ Mantuan envoy’s house, a street disturbance whose culprits sought refuge in the house of Savoy’s ambassador, and a street closure at the Comédie by the Venetian ambassador’s entourage.77 Such misconduct faded, however, when set beside that of Prince Rákóczi, exiled in Paris. Resident foreign princes presented awkward legal and diplomatic difficulties, but Louis XIV, who had subsidized his revolt against the emperor, had no choice but to receive him and continue his princely pension of 100,000 livres paid quarterly. Not content with this, the prince turned his appropriately named Hôtel de Transylvanie into a gambling den. Although Louis XIV allowed some gambling at Versailles, he did not approve of it in Paris, where prostitution flourished and nobles might gamble away pensions awarded them by the king to help pay their debts. Neighbours complained that the prince opened his household to undesirables. The



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prince’s unbounded ego and unquenchable greed were not easily contained, but the not-so-veiled threats of cutting his pension cooled his interest in gambling considerably.78 No envoy, however, was watched with as much consistency and assiduity as the papal nuncio. In the late 1680s Torcy read intercepted correspondence between Nuncio Ranuzzi in Paris and the papal secretary of state in Rome in which the latter likened Croissy’s harsh remarks to Ranuzzi to those of a brutal African Moor.79 Since the nuncio’s letters had been opened, this observation was likely meant to be read by Croissy personally. Ranuzzi left Paris on 11 August 1689, and in September Torcy, who was in Rome, wrote to his father with the news that during a harrowing journey over the Alps Ranuzzi and his entourage were attacked by bandits and their baggage stolen. It was reported that Ranuzzi feared that his correspondence would be sold to the Allies and published in the Netherlands, but he died shortly thereafter and his correspondence was never found.80 The Ranuzzi affair had marked the nadir in Louis XIV’s relations with the papacy and tensions eased in the later 1690s, but nuncios continued to be watched until the nunciate of Gualterio witnessed a genuine and extended détente.81

T he Ac a d é m ie p o l it iq u e : The Professi onali zati on o f D ip lomacy A diplomatic post, despite its monetary disadvantages, could serve a great noble as a stepping-stone to greater honours.82 Yet from the late seventeenth century, even as diplomats became increasingly aristocratic in their social origins and outlook, statesmen, savants, and diplomats themselves across Europe focused increasingly on the professional training of diplomats in order to equip them with the specialized knowledge and skills required in the increasingly complex international order. To be sure, university training, especially in law, was useful to the future diplomat, but universities were not aimed primarily at training a wide variety of professionals. One would be more likely to acquire such technical training on the job as an apprentice or eventually in elite, specialized academies.83 This was a Europe-wide development,84 but Heidrun R.I. Kugeler’s recent work emphasizes the role of France’s extensive diplomatic apparatus as pioneer and model.85 Talk of the deficiencies of France’s diplomats had become common within foreign ministry circles around the time of Ryswick as the need for men to serve abroad increased. It focused on the training of embassy secretaries, who would

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then be poised to advance in the ranks. Rousseau de Chamoy and ­Callières were active diplomats and part of the foreign office’s brain trust, while Antoine Pecquet fils, son of Antoine Pecquet père, premier commis under Torcy and during the Regency, began as a commis under his father in 1723, succeeded him as premier commis in 1725, and served until 1740. Each composed a manual of conduct for diplomats.86 In September 1697 Rousseau de Chamoy dedicated his L’Idée du Parfait Ambassadeur to Pomponne, who had launched his diplomatic career in 1665 when he took him to Sweden as his ambassadorial secretary. Not much employed by Croissy, Rousseau de Chamoy was appointed plenipotentiary to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon by Torcy in early 1698. He wrote his treatise while serving as a gentleman of the royal chamber, which afforded him plenty of time for reflection. From 1697 it circulated in manuscript form among French diplomats, and it was published only in 1912.87 Callières’s De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains was first printed in 1716, but it may have been written as early as 1697 after the Ryswick negotiations and may also have circulated in manuscript form.88 Pecquet fils may have begun Discours sur l’Art de Négocier as early as 1710, but it was first printed in Paris in 1737, in The Hague the following year, and thereafter in further editions.89 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Noblet and Pecquet père also proposed creating a corps of trained embassy secretaries.90 Like their British counterparts, the French emphasized knowledge of geography, history, comparative government, and language (Latin and modern) in the training of diplomats. Callières adds that “before entering the profession of diplomacy the young man should have traveled to the principal courts of Europe … [I]n certain cases they should accompany the king’s ambassadors and envoys as traveling companions [and] … it is highly desirable that such novices on diplomacy should learn foreign languages.”91 Like most “self-made men,” Callières was both proud of and a bit touchy about his accomplishments, which had exceeded the expectations of his humble birth. He favoured ambassadors who were more like himself rather than those favoured merely by birth, but ever the realist, he settled for measures directed at the professional formation of those advantaged by birth. What Nature may have done in part – for Callières was not ignorant of the positive profits of good birth – nurture would complete and even enhance. He saw that the gap between birth and ability could also be filled by pairing a man of accomplishment and proper formation with a nobleman appointed to a post requiring his high birth and aura of magnificence.92 Ellen McClure argues that



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­ allières, in offering a new version of the monarch and the ambassador C as human actors, envisioned ambassadors who assumed more independence and therefore needed more skill than required in their traditional role as “military heralds, who do not arrive in a foreign court to negotiate but rather to impose their masters’ authority.”93 This traditional view was reflected in the aristocratic Fénelon’s disdain for the professionalism that Callières had in mind and that Torcy, though constrained by the king’s preferences, sought to promote.94 In another passage of his treatise, Callières notes that it would be a happy circumstance if envoys passed through an apprenticeship to demonstrate the “capacity to profit by study and travel.”95 Torcy, who had experienced such an apprenticeship, felt that a school for young diplomats, beginning with those who would serve abroad as ambassadors’ secretaries, would be advantageous to the state. Although reform ideas had been brewing for some time, even before the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Torcy was prepared to seek their realization.96 In 1712, with Louis XIV’s support, he established the Académie politique, which operated in close association with the foreign ministry archives recently established in the Louvre. Without our going into the details of the academy’s genesis, which have been treated elsewhere, it is nonetheless significant that the idea for it emerged and took shape within Torcy’s circle in 1711. Discussions and exchanges of memoirs apparently included premier commis Pecquet père; archivist Saint-Prest; the “braintrusters” Le Grand, Renaudot, and Clairambault; and the diplomat ­Callières (and perhaps Rousseau de Chamoy).97 Six “élèves du Louvre” (students of the Louvre) were trained in the language and documents of diplomacy and housed in the Louvre near the diplomatic archives, the academy’s “laboratory.”98 From that moment, the idea of a school for diplomats has tickled the fancy, admiration, and curiosity of many. Contemporary Joseph Addison delighted in ridiculing the idea, speculating that the school would hire “six wise masters” to teach the pupils the art of “state legerdemain,” that is, “how to take off the impression of a seal … split a wafer … open a letter” without the receiver knowing the missive had been opened; they would also hire a language master to instruct them in “how to distinguish between the spirit and the letter, and likewise demonstrate how the same form of words may lay an obligation upon any prince of Europe, different from that which lays upon” the king of France.99 Despite the Addisonian irony, Torcy’s scheme for the education of diplomats embodied the thinking of a new generation of foreign ministers, diplomatic theorists, and savants across Europe.100

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The negotiations Marshal Villars conducted at Rastadt in 1713 exemplify several of the defects Torcy sought to remedy through professional training. The emperor and his German allies continued to hold out after Utrecht for better terms, hoping that fears for the British and French successions would render Louis XIV more pliable. Prince Eugene advanced to the Rhine, forcing Louis to field an army with Villars in command and empowered to negotiate should this force compel the Imperials to seek peace. Torcy and the king appreciated that the improving though still-volatile military situation could be transformed by a French battlefield or siege victory and were anxious to act quickly if a negotiating window opened. While Villars would ultimately require instruction from Versailles based on the current overall situation – for instance, the extent of any French victory and gains along the Rhine – he was to be prepared to talk concretely with an accredited Imperial envoy at a moment’s notice. This occurred after Landau’s fall and Freiburg’s capture in October 1713.101 Both then and in his later Mémoires, Villars blamed the foreign minister for delaying the signing of the tentative peace settlement that he had worked out at Rastadt with Eugene. Villars claimed that Torcy was jealous of War Secretary Voysin, the marshal’s official liaison with the king, and implied that the pursuit of the Italian interests of the duc de Saint-Pierre, Torcy’s brother-in-law, were “bagatelles” impeding the conclusion of a general peace, as were Max Emmanuel’s pretensions, which he dismissed as mad and unjust.102 Voysin, however, did his best to explain the king’s negotiating stance, to urge Villars to look to Torcy’s bureaus for a draft treaty, and to advise wariness of Eugene during the talks.103 Villars, however, feared that if he did not conclude a treaty quickly, he would be replaced by a professional diplomat, and he suspected that this was Torcy’s design.104 It was not that he lacked diplomatic experience in information-gathering and representation, which were important and constant diplomatic tasks,105 but it may be argued that for negotiations, which if successful won public acclaim and royal rewards, he lacked the necessary patience and subtlety. Meanwhile, the Imperials had discerned the marshal’s faults as a negotiator, starting with his garrulousness. His war weariness and gullibility with regard to Eugene’s bluffs led him unwisely to discard the threat of war’s renewal, reflecting his own inclinations rather than those of the king and his ministers. The Imperials easily grasped Villars’s palpable and inflated ambition to crown his military triumphs with that of peacemaking. Yet especially telling was Eugene’s observation that Villars’s profound unfamiliarity with previous negotiations rendered him timid



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and ­hesitant for fear of criticism by Torcy and the other ministers.106 This was a clear example of why Torcy and Saint-Prest insisted upon the historical dimension of the academy’s curriculum. While the Académie politique was once dismissed or passed over lightly as a curious footnote to a reign that was in its final days Guy Thuillier places it in a wider chronological and institutional context that goes beyond the issue of diplomatic training. He insists that it was something unusual, subversive, and quasi-revolutionary. Likewise, Bruno Neveu, in his introduction to Thuillier’s book, contends that Torcy’s initiative attempted the first true revolution in administrative mores.107 Why such exalted claims for an endeavour that survived the foreign minister by only four years? Thuillier argues that Torcy’s academy was France’s first school of public administration, prefiguring the ena, or National School of Administration (École nationale d’administration) created by Charles de Gaulle in 1945. The idea of a school to train diplomats and even all public servants, while shocking to those who considered birth a sufficient qualification for service, had been raised several times in the previous century. Nevertheless, it was Torcy’s foreign office and its brain trust that brought the idea down to the ground and put it in place. The academy would have been unable to function had it not been for the minister’s active support and even participation in its meetings.108 This institutionalization of the training process for diplomats served to legitimize and enhance their status as experts or possessors of specialized skills and knowledge.109 The academy was pioneering in its idea of careers open to talent and in its pedagogy of instruction through the ancestor of the modern “conférence de méthode,” a kind of seminar used to train administrators in written and oral expression as well as in thinking skills.110 Perhaps the program was too challenging to prevailing notions of birth and decentralized education as paths to state service to survive Torcy’s fall and Saint-Prest’s death. It seems, too, that many students rebelled against the rigours of its training and that concerns for secrecy emerged as well. Ever jealous of Torcy, Dubois dissolved the academy in 1721.111 Yet even after its demise, Torcy’s innovative academy remained a tantalizing model of new possibilities. Nick Childs contends that the club known as the Entresol “carried on the work of the Académie politique, but at a different level,” by mixing older, experienced, and even retired statesmen with younger ones already moving up within the administrative ranks. Torcy and Abbé Pomponne were among its participants. Although not an official organization, the Entresol, meeting in Paris from about 1724, united men interested in political

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discussions ranging from domestic affairs to diplomacy, the most frequent topic. The government closed it down in 1731, mistakenly fearing that it was a centre of opposition.112 Torcy’s Académie politique nevertheless remains a tangible tribute to the administrative ferment, innovation, and accomplishment that marked the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign.113 The professionalization of the diplomatic corps was paralleled by the professionalization of diplomatic administration across Europe, where the French foreign office was often a model but hardly exclusively so.114 From the perspective of those processing the flow of correspondence and memoirs between the court and its scattered embassies, the abilities or the deficiencies of those serving abroad were pleasantly or painfully obvious. Torcy’s clerks likely winced when they opened and read Villars’s letters naively describing how well he and Eugene were getting on at Rastadt. Although not normally themselves diplomats, these clerks had read and heard enough to appreciate what was good and bad practice. In addition, the growing expertise and specialization within the bureaus provided a model of professionalism, as clerks characteristically spent years at their tasks. Secretaries and premiers commis were knowledgeable of multiple facets of the business of diplomacy and the skills it required. At the very least, it was the work of Saint-Prest and his assistants in the archives, along with that of the other clerks, who created the series of negotiations, the summaries, and the archival sources and tools that made the academy’s system of professional training possible. Yet lest we see the foreign office as a self-contained entity that was professionalizing as it directed the kingdom’s international relations, we must recall the realities of Louisquatorzian governance. Although the maturing bureaucracy that had developed during Louis’s long reign handled the business of foreign relations at the routine level, policy was debated and set in a royal council by an active monarch jealous of his prerogative and willing to step outside the normative management structures of diplomacy when it suited his purposes. Predictably, information – perhaps the lifeblood of diplomacy – and its control were often at the heart of Torcy’s defence of his role in foreign affairs and might pit him against his administrative colleagues, the monarch’s secret wife, or even the king himself. We turn next to examine the control of information and the role it played in the formulation and management of ­foreign policy.

10 Information and the Formulation of Foreign Policy

Even as the health of the nearly seventy-seven-year-old Louis XIV steadily deteriorated during June and especially August, ending in his death on 1 September 1715, he nonetheless valiantly attempted to show himself to his court and maintain the regal routines that marked his long reign. Thus, while in pain but still lucid, he met with his Conseil until he no longer could, as August and his own life steadily waned. This was in part a symbolic display of the monarch still taking counsel, as he personally presided over the affairs of state, but for Louis, who from 1661 had decided to forego a first minister and himself rule as well as reign, it was even more a matter of fulfilling his self-chosen role as the state’s chief decision-maker.1 It was remarked at court that the king knew state business better than any of his ministers.2 As he noted in the Mémoires written for his son nearly half a century earlier, through knowledge of his own affairs and contact with his major officials, he wished to signal that “he is actually governing them instead of being governed by them.”3 Setting policy with his councillors at his side characterized how Louis conducted all important state business, but none more so and in greater frequency and detail than war and peace, the twin aspects of the craft of the warrior-king.4 The final decision in foreign policy belonged to the king, but its formulation was the collective responsibility of the Conseil deliberating with the king. It was the foreign secretary’s monopoly neither in theory nor in practice. Yet Torcy was not without his resources in playing a major, if not always decisive, role in this process. The most important arrow in his quiver was control over the information concerning foreign affairs that flowed through his bureaus and, after receiving the ministrations of both Torcy and his clerks, flowed on to the king and his other ministers.5 Louis XIV had long acknowledged his need “of

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keeping an eye on the whole earth” by means of intelligence from the provinces and abroad, especially from the courts of foreign princes  – in short, “of being informed of an infinite number of things.”6 Indeed, Torcy’s skill in gathering and weighing information, typically a diplomat’s most constant and significant activity, was tested more often than his ability to negotiate.7 In this chapter we will explore this significant power source, its extent, its limits, and how it was deployed. Potentially troubling for this arrangement, however, were independent information streams to the king and his council. While many had or claimed to have potentially valuable information on a variety of matters, three individuals stand out as the most serious threats to Torcy’s dominant role regarding foreign affairs information. Mme de M ­ aintenon’s intimate relationship with her secret spouse was all the more significant for being the subject of speculation that frequently overinflated it. Not only was she often present when the king worked individually with a secretary of state, she could share her opinions with Louis in private, she could serve as a valuable and direct conduit to him for others, sometimes seconding what was received officially from his ministers and at other times contradicting it. Although there were limits to her influence, she was nonetheless a force to be reckoned with. Chamillart, a royal favourite, controller general, and then war minister, saw himself endowed with and later burdened by responsibilities that had once been divided between his powerful predecessors Colbert and Louvois. Hard pressed to direct an increasingly unsuccessful war with ever-diminishing resources, he in frustration joined the search for peace. He sent out his own agents and peace feelers without Torcy’s or the Conseil’s knowledge, and opened, with the king’s approval, a potentially important channel of information independent of the foreign minister’s control.8 When this secret du roi of covert royal negotiations outside official channels became known, it was widely regarded as counterproductive and a hindrance to the beginning of serious negotiations. It fed the long-standing picture of Louis XIV alternately practising diplomatic duplicity in order to disrupt enemy alliances and presiding over divided councillors who offered him poor advice. It also planted seeds of doubt as to whether Torcy was the diplomatic voice speaking on behalf of the king and his Conseil, thus unnecessarily complicating his job of seeking peace and conducting peace talks. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, Jérôme Pontchartrain, secretary of state for the navy and household, did not interfere in negotiations and largely left it to Torcy to coordinate them at Utrecht. His interference was in a sphere heretofore largely, although not entirely, the foreign



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s­ ecretary’s preserve: gathering information from abroad and reporting it to the king.9 This and Pontchartrain’s ambition to serve as the king’s secretary general of the administrative monarchy led to clashes with Torcy.10 Despite challenges from these three, particularly since they had the king’s explicit or tacit blessing, in the end Torcy remained the information master for foreign affairs. Yet the struggles along the way were nonetheless irksome and dangerous to the exercise of his duties.

T he D e c is io n - M a k e rs : T h e Ki ng and Hi s Consei l Although serving as the Conseil’s reporter had been largely the foreign minister’s monopoly from Croissy’s tenure, policy-making was a collective enterprise with each minister invited to express his opinion and even debate with his colleagues before the king made the final decision, all done in secret.11 Military commanders and close yet unofficial advisors such as Chevreuse could also influence foreign policy, but the royal ministers, in counseling the king, enjoyed the advantage of knowing most state secrets. These included undisclosed treaties, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence reports, policy papers specially prepared for their eyes only, and detailed accounts of negotiations in progress. All other royal advisors, whatever their influence or credit with the king, operated with the disadvantage of not automatically sharing in this extensive and complex database that typically gave the king and his small Conseil informational cohesiveness even as their interpretations of it and their policy priorities sharply differed.12 Yet even this group, including the foreign minister, could be denied full access to diplomatic information by the king, who remained, in Picavet’s phrase, the chief and centre of diplomatic activity.13 The control of information was likewise at the heart of the formulation of military strategy. Historians once focused on the extent of the 1691 dismemberment of Louvois’s former accumulation of charges to assess the new position of the war secretary. Recent studies, however, concentrate on the altered mode of decision-making signaled by the king’s enhanced personal management of the flow of military information. Louvois had stood between the king and his generals by controlling their correspondence, but Louis XIV decided that henceforth he and his generals would write directly to one another. He also co-opted Louvois’s former collaborators Chamlay and Vauban as his clients and worked directly with them without a minister as a filter to elaborate strategy. As war secretary but never as a minister, Louvois’s son Barbezieux

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dealt mostly with administrative and logistical matters and with his department’s domestic administrative duties. This diminished control over information and relegation to a secondary level of decision-making meant that strategy largely escaped Barbezieux’s influence in all but a supporting role. Retaining his former full access to all of the war department’s information database but now through the king rather than the war secretary, Chamlay played a greater role in strategy formation, as he continued to generate prodigious numbers of memoirs to help the king and his generals each winter as they planned for the coming campaign season.14 If at the level of strategy Chamlay had become the king’s unofficial secrétaire-conseiller politique, then Barbezieux was clearly a secrétaire-commis. Was the situation the same for the foreign secretary? Some argue that after the demise of the “grands vizirs” Colbert and Louvois, the king was mostly served by competent secretaries of state who were nevertheless mere “grands commis.”15 In other words, the secretaries of state, having no role in formulating policy, merely carried it out. But this begs the question of where and how policy was formulated. Military strategy was fashioned by the king in conjunction with Chamlay, his generals, and whomever else he chose to consult. The king, of course, always had the final say, but it was not the case that he ceased involving others in making policy. Jean-Christian Petitfils contends that after 1691 the liasse, or individual work sessions each secretary of state had with the king, no longer served as preparation for business that went before the Conseil, but instead became the place where decisions were made by the king with individual secretaries. He also claims that Conseil meetings became mere formalities, since decisions, with the notable exception of the acceptance of Carlos II’s testament, had already been made outside these sessions.16 This interpretation, however, presents a number of difficulties. It had never been the case that the Conseil, while in theory omnicompetent, acted so in practice, since it was only one of several councils. As we have seen, war strategy was set in informal war councils, domestic matters were typically decided in Dispatches, and fiscal policy was fashioned by the Royal Council of Finances. The Conseil was always a small group of two to five ministers (at most seven with invited royal heirs) who advised the king behind closed doors on the most important and secret affairs of state, which largely meant foreign relations and ecclesiastical matters because they related to Rome.17 This kept them busy enough. Scrutiny of Torcy’s journal reveals that despite whatever preparation and manoeuvring preceded these sessions, it was king in his



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Conseil who still largely formulated foreign policy. Saint-Simon’s 1712 anonymous letter to the king acknowledged this as well, observing that unlike the specialties of the other secretaries of state, foreign affairs were set in the Conseil rather than in the foreign secretary’s tête-à-têtes with the king.18 It also seems contradictory to claim that the secretaries of state after 1691 were mere chief clerks and yet made policy decisions in private and individual conferences with the king. While such one-on-one sessions certainly occurred more frequently in the reign’s final decades as the administration became increasingly bureaucratized, routine or minor decisions had always been made outside the chambers of all councils.19 Moreover, if from 1691 even the major policy decisions were being made by individual secretaries of state acting alone with the king, this would seem to elevate them above mere chief clerks. Indeed, rather than being the more tame secrétaires-commis, they would be the very secrétairesconseillers politiques of whom Saint-Simon and others complained and whom they hoped to eliminate. Although never as powerful as Colbert and Louvois had been, later secretaries of state were hardly impotent in policy formulation. A secretary of state or controller general who also served as a minister had an added advantage in monitoring and advising on any of his department’s business that came before the Conseil, especially the chief foreign policy matters of war and peace, which weighed heavily on all departments of state. A voice at this table could thus count for much.20 After 1691 those so privileged, although not always immediately, were Foreign Secretary Croissy, Controller General and Navy and Household Secretary Louis Pontchartrain, Foreign Secretary Torcy, Controller General and War Secretary Chamillart, Controller General Desmaretz, and War Secretary Voysin, whereas all the secretaries of state for the Religion prétendue réformée, War Secretary Barbezieux, and Navy and Household Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain were never called to the Conseil. Louis XIV was determined never again to have a Colbert or Louvois, but that did not mean that all of his later secretaries of state were simple chief clerks or never aspired to a greater role. For the foreign secretary, as with the other chief administrators, it was his control over information rather than any exclusive decision-making capacity that gave him his greatest leverage in the formulation of policy. Torcy and his staff selected, excerpted, and summarized from the flood of incoming paper and together served as chief conduit of diplomatic data to the royal decision-maker and the ministers who advised him. As Filippo de Vivo demonstrates for early modern Venice, the “control

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over information secured influence and defined power hierarchies” and precluded others from formulating alternate policies,21 which is why the foreign secretary jealously guarded his control over the inflow and outflow of diplomatic information, ostensibly his department’s monopoly since 1626. There were limits to what Torcy could withhold. From the outset of his personal reign Louis was determined that no over-mighty minister would hold all the cards, and so he shared major matters – generally, no matter how secret – with his ministers in order to gain their considered counsel.22 Although he later came to rely largely on just two ministers – Colbert and Louvois – after the latter’s death in 1691 Louis returned to his earlier practice with even greater determination. Perhaps chastened by his unpleasant experience with a secret du roi during the 1706 search for peace, he later claimed not to relish the prospect of these trusted advisors learning from the public things he had kept hidden from them.23 Nevertheless, Torcy and his staff necessarily shaped what the king and his Conseil read and heard by the manner in which they packaged and presented what they had selected, excerpted, and synthesized from the data flow. Moreover, Torcy could come to Conseil sessions with drafts in hand of replies to the materials the rest of the ministers had yet to see or hear him read.24 It also meant that there were some matters the king shared with him but not with his other ministers.25 Yet one would be mistaken to imagine that Torcy sought to keep from his fellow ministers whatever he possibly could; he knew that policy was decided collectively and indeed he welcomed other perspectives for resolving complicated and difficult questions. In January 1711, for example, after gaining only limited clarity by spending the three days since the last Conseil session turning over in his head the pros and cons of responding to secret peace overtures from Britain, he sought out his fellow ministers individually for their thoughts before the next day’s meeting.26 Conflicts with fellow department heads were inevitable, since war, the navy, colonies, commerce, and state finance each had significant international components that drew those charged with them into foreign affairs. This was especially the case with department heads who had the capacity to deploy their own agents abroad or to tap into existing structures to gather information for presentation to the king and his Conseil. A secretary of state with an extensive department who was also a minister was thus the most likely potential threat to the foreign secretary’s hypothetical diplomatic data monopoly. Even ministers without portfolio such as Le Peletier and Beauvillier had their ­networks of ­informants, while the war secretary and minister Louvois



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drew ­intelligence from a number of correspondents in war zones and abroad. But these sources nonetheless failed to match the extensive formal and informal networks controlled and created by the foreign secretary for the purpose of gathering international intelligence. For the most part, even Louvois lacked an organized information service, relying instead on existing structures of military, diplomatic, and other informants who were tied to him personally as clients or who hoped to win his patronage.27 Negotiations were fertile ground for rival information networks. Contact with or control of agents negotiating or seeking such talks allowed a minister to manage what the king and his Conseil knew of the matter in question, since in addition to the letters written to the king and shared with his ministers, there were the private letters that were typically not shared.28 It also afforded the minister a role outside the council chamber in communicating the royal will to that agent and through him to other states. This meant that the foreign secretary did not possess or control the full database upon which policy decisions were formulated, since another held at least a piece of it. Of course, the foreign secretary’s information monopoly was never theoretically or practically achievable, as we shall see, but the issue instead was a matter of scope and scale: how much of the potential diplomatic database escaped the foreign minister’s grasp and just how significant was this information outside his control to his ability to shape diplomacy? The king could also create difficulties for his ministers. In December 1709, as hostilities wore on and peace negotiations sputtered, Louis XIV lashed out at his councillors for the concessions they were recommending to gain peace. Torcy attributed the king’s atypical mistrust of his advisors to the influence of courtiers hoping to replace them and depression over his kingdom’s sad state. Even though he often disagreed with Beauvillier’s stand on negotiations, Torcy nonetheless lauded him in his journal for his courage to tell the king the painful truths Louis needed to hear for his state’s well-being, believing that the king normally appreciated and desired such frankness.29 The following January, after again harshly reproaching Beauvillier, Louis did not spare Torcy, sarcastically commending his speed in the current negotiations when he was normally the slowest of negotiators. Torcy recorded in his journal that he understood neither the reason for this reproach nor why he should deserve it, since he never delayed and in fact usually anticipated the king’s orders, but he stoically observed that since masters never believed themselves to be wrong, he would hold his tongue and try to profit

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from this and the other mortifications to which he said he was subjected.30 When Polignac and Huxelles returned from the failed peace talks at Gertruydenberg that July, tongues wagged at Marly when the king graciously received and spoke with the plenipotentiaries for half an hour without including Torcy. Once more Torcy recorded that he was long accustomed to such treatment from the king, whether it was intended to show Louis’s superiority, keep his foreign minister humble, or take out his anger on him (presumably because of his more even temper) for his weariness with having to woo (“faire la cour”) his other ministers. While a happy retirement might seem preferable, Torcy mused, wisdom and prudence recommended service with patient submission. Perhaps regretting this ill treatment, the king, at the council meeting that followed, proposed Torcy’s brother-in-law Abbé Pomponne as the new ambassador to Spain – according to Torcy in order to please him.31 Fortunately for Torcy, such royal outbursts, if not rare, were at least not the norm and did not seem to threaten his position as foreign minister. The king’s attitude was likely better reflected by the way he spoke to Torcy one day when Torcy came to Maintenon’s chamber to read dispatches to the king. Louis cheerfully exclaimed that he was very happy to have his services and wondered what he would have done had Torcy’s character been other than what it was.32 If Torcy was deliberate in giving counsel and negotiating, it definitely accorded with the king’s normal aversion to “impatience and haste.”33 When Torcy fully entered the Conseil’s charmed circle early in 1699, he received an armless and backless “pliant” (folding stool) that literally granted him a seat at the decision-making table; he no longer had to stand as he had when he had merely been an occasional and largely silent attendee. His role as reporter structured much of his schedule and that of his staff.34 Whether at Versailles, Marly, or Fontainebleau, he rose at about 7 a.m. and consulted his clerks about dispatches that might have arrived in the night, although his instructions were to be awakened for news of great importance so that he could personally supervise its deciphering for immediate delivery to the king. These dispatches were then summarized by the appropriate commis for Torcy to read, mark, and later share with the king and then his Conseil.35 Unlike his fellow administrators, Torcy did not have a regular meeting time with the king; instead, each day he sent word to the king to find out when he wanted to talk with him.36 On meeting days he attended the monarch’s levee at about 8:15 a.m. Either then or immediately after Mass at around 9:15 a.m., he waited upon the king to receive his instructions or to share the



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latest news. Torcy also consulted with the king, who made the final decision on each Conseil session’s agenda, a key means of managing foreign policy discussions.37 Neither the mass of information that arrived and departed daily from the foreign office bureaus nor the Conseil’s limited time, even though it met several times per week, made it possible or necessary for its gathered members to scrutinize all diplomatic information and make collective decisions about it. This was thus a key moment in Torcy’s management of the diplomatic information flow, as he could influence the king as to which issues or aspects of them they could resolve between the two of them and which needed to go on to the assembled ministers. The Conseil typically discussed and charted a general course for all important negotiations, but it was Torcy who was at the wheel steering distant talks as well as those he conducted personally. He informed the king of their progress almost daily and with him made course adjustments as necessary.38 Torcy provided the Conseil with summary reports of relevant diplomatic business at their meetings, but went into greater detail only when larger adjustments and difficult decisions were required. During the king’s individual sessions with Torcy, he might assign a matter to the Conseil for consideration, judging that he and Torcy could not or should not resolve it on their own. In June 1710, for example, after he and Torcy spoke about the Paris parlement’s legal proceedings against Cardinal Bouillon, the king decided that such an important affair should be discussed in the next day’s Conseil meeting.39 Once Louis and Torcy entered the Versailles Cabinet chamber, precedence and protocol ruled the seating pattern. The king sat at the head of the table in a “fauteuil” (armchair) facing the windows.40 On the side to his right sat the Dauphin, with a vacant pliant separating his “tabouret-­ pliant” (square stool without arms or back) from Beauvillier’s pliant, and next to the duke sat Chamillart. On the side to the king’s left Chancellor Pontchartrain sat on a pliant to emphasize that his council rank was not as chancellor, entitled to a smaller fauteuil or tabouret, but as minister. Next to him sat Torcy. When Burgundy entered the Conseil in 1703, he bumped Pontchartrain and Torcy down a place. When later Desmaretz joined as controller general and Voysin as war secretary, the former sat next to Torcy and the latter took Chamillart’s place. The usual pattern of meetings was described briefly by Louis de Courcillon, abbé de Dangeau, Saint-Simon, and at length Torcy, in his journal. The abbé noted that sessions most often opened with Torcy reading from current dispatches and advising the king on how best to answer them. In routine matters the king voiced his approval if he shared

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Torcy’s opinion, but in important matters he sought the advice of the others, with the Dauphin, when he spoke, doing so first. The other ministers read over Torcy’s draft replies to earlier letters to verify that they reflected the resolutions taken in the previous meeting. Torcy recorded these for reference at the next meeting.41 Saint-Simon observed that Torcy “spoke quietly, with restraint, almost modestly, saying only what was required, but saying it well because he had a gift of both oratory and writing. Most often reason was on his side.”42 This format, simply called “the reading,” accounted for at least 80 per cent of the council’s time, but the king himself might report on discussions he had had with ambassadors or other princes.43 In an extraordinary council meeting at the chancellor’s residence without the king in attendance, five ministers decided a matter and the king ratified it in the next day’s session.44 Abbé Dangeau further noted that the Conseil usually met on Sundays, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays when the king returned from Mass until about one o’clock, when he dined.45 Torcy’s journal entries offer a more detailed and precise account of meeting times that corrects this version. The Conseil was convened at most three times a week: Sunday mornings (known as the Sunday or morning council), Wednesday mornings, and an additional meeting on Monday mornings or Thursdays during the war. Over the nineteen months that Torcy kept a journal (6 November 1709 to 31 May 1711), he made an entry for 312 days out of a possible 490 days, recording 113 Conseil meetings and 12 Dispatches meetings.46 His entries reveal that the Sunday–Wednesday axis seems to have obtained throughout these nineteen months, while Tuesday sessions were rare, since Torcy typically held his Paris audience for foreign envoys on that day. When an extraordinary Conseil meeting disturbed the Sunday–Wednesday axis, Torcy took care to note the reason, such as a holiday, the failure to complete the previous session’s business, or the press of diplomatic business. On Thursday 27 February 1710, for example, a special session reviewed instructions for the Gertruydenberg plenipotentiaries. On Monday 14 April 1710, Louis XIV convoked the Conseil to hear the dispatches from Gertruydenberg, but since the king and Torcy had already prepared a response, the deliberation was brief and replies went out the next morning. On Monday 21 April 1710, the council met because Louis XIV deemed it essential to inform the public about the peace negotiations.47 A meeting on Monday 30 June 1710 continued Sunday’s discussion, but because Monday’s meeting of Dispatches also had unfinished business, Secretary of State La Vrillière appeared before that council to report on his provinces and then, because he was



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not a minister, departed so that without being reconvened the Conseil could emerge from the chrysalis of Dispatches.48 Months like those of February and August 1710 appear to be atypical. In February 1710 Torcy noted that he had not written in his journal for several days.49 Then in August he wrote that because the court moved from Marly to Versailles and then back to Marly, the ministers had spent some time in Paris or at their country estates. Another such opportunity came in October.50 The heavy responsibilities of the early stages of peace negotiations in April and May 1711 interrupted Torcy’s entries, causing him to abandon keeping his journal altogether.51 By projecting and making allowances for the days Torcy made no entry, we can estimate that the Conseil assembled at least eight times a month, excepting certain holidays and days that the court was in the country. Croissy had once set forth as a maxim the idea that being a minister meant always being where the king was, which meant that ministers could rarely move far from the royal presence.52 The foreign secretary in particular was in almost constant attendance upon the king.53 Louis XIV insisted on hearing open discussion of difficult policy decisions. To recall the main issues of the debate and the opinions expressed, Torcy recorded particulars in his private and secret journal. It indicates that though he could be petulant, hesitant, aggressive, withdrawn, and even tearful, Louis listened to his council, was usually swayed by majority opinion, but did not invariably follow it. Debate could become heated and at times acrimonious. Certainly factions and partisanship played important roles in council meetings. In the latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, Torcy forged an alliance with his cousin ­Desmaretz that he believed strengthened the Conseil and brought solidity to its affairs. To secure his cousin’s good will and support, Torcy frequently sought his advice.54 When Petkum arrived from The Hague in 1709 with the latest Allied peace overtures, Torcy asked Desmaretz to join him and Polignac in impressing upon the envoy that while France was eager for peace, she was ready to continue the war if necessary.55 Desmaretz was even able to change Torcy’s mind on their negotiating strategy, whereas the other ministers had only confirmed his initial position.56 Above all, Torcy followed Desmaretz’s advice to pursue peace negotiations with Great Britain. Together the cousins formed a néo-politique, pragmatic faction that served as a middle way between the extremes of war or peace, Jansenist or Jesuit, and ultra-Gallican or ultramontane. Moreover, as a result of council discussions, Torcy proved willing to change his mind even concerning his own proposals.57

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As we have seen, in matters of policy, the Colbertian alliance did not automatically extend to the cousin-by-marriage Beauvillier, who annoyed Torcy with his “purer-than-thou” attitude on religion and his foreign policy inconsistencies. Torcy confided to his journal that consciences as pure as those of Beauvillier and his protégé Burgundy were easily wounded.58 Chancellor Pontchartrain, usually allied with the néo-politiques, also favoured moderate Gallicanism, realistic peace overtures, spirited defence of the royal prerogative, and cautious but progressive legal reform. His disagreements with the Colberts were usually over patronage matters.59 Voysin, too, in his early years on the council often supported the néo-politiques. He was an excellent administrator but a neophyte in foreign policy matters and so tended to move with caution. War strategy was not directly a topic of discussion in the Conseil,60 but ecclesiastical matters were, since the kingdom’s Catholicism ipso facto had an international dimension. The Conseil was especially concerned with the defence of right doctrine and the important Assembly of the Clergy meetings. Papal relations had implications for both foreign and domestic policy and were almost certain to elicit a comment, often heated, from the largely anti-Gallican Beauvillier or Burgundy as Torcy jealously guarded his right as foreign secretary to correspond with Rome.61 Louis XIV, playing the role of arbiter, reminded his ministers that he wanted good relations with the pope.62 Cardinal B ­ ouillon, an already troublesome and pretentious prelate, consorted with the enemy in 1710 and then wrote Louis XIV an insulting letter resigning his posts. The government’s reaction revealed an instructive conciliar division of labour. Upon learning that the parlement was initiating judicial action against Bouillon, the monarch had the Conseil take up the affair. The more mundane disposition of Bouillon’s rich benefices, however, was handled in Dispatches, although not without a lively clash between Beauvillier and Chancellor Pontchartrain.63 The foreign secretary’s interest in the Conseil’s discussion of ecclesiastical matters also derived from the fact that the pope, while claiming to lead Christianity and governing the Catholic Church, was also a head of state. As a foreign prince, he possessed two separate enclaves within French borders, the Comtat Venaissin and Avignon.64 Both could harbour French refugees or serve as pawns to be occupied and then returned in the diplomatic game with Rome. Since both were also bordered on three sides by provinces under Torcy’s supervision (Provence and, until 1708, Dauphiné), he had an additional interest in them.



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The papal nuncio was a diplomatic representative and the apostolic delegate to the Kingdom of France through whom all requests for and grants of indults, dispensations, benefice bulls, absolutions, and other papal favours flowed to and from Rome. He also received appeals to the Holy Father from France’s clergy and faithful.65 When the resolution of the Franco-papal crisis of the 1680s permitted the resumption of normal procedures for obtaining papal provisions for benefices, it was Torcy who wrote to all episcopal candidates to inform them that their bankers had not yet come up with the funds to be sent to Rome to complete the necessary administrative processes.66 When a clergyman was raised to the cardinalate, the pope notified him through Torcy.67 Questions about the inspection of religious houses in Paris were Torcy’s concern as well. Based on a request sent by Cardinal Forbin-Janson, chargé d’affaires in Rome, for example, Torcy ordered Achille III de H ­ arlay, first president of the Paris parlement, to select a commission of three judges to visit a Carmelite convent.68 He also worked with Rome on disputes over the naming of bishops to French sees under Allied occupation during wartime.69 Oversight of monies sent to the Roman Curia required that Torcy additionally serve as banker and paymaster. He reminded newly named prelates that they owed money payments to the Roman court for their office. His responsibilities for these matters became a topic for council discussion when Clement XI augmented the papal currency, leading to confusion as to what payments were due and ultimately to their suspension. The king ordered Torcy to assemble the Parisian bankers who dealt with such matters. On 29 November 1709 two of the leading Parisian lawyers and four bankers met in the Hôtel Croissy with Torcy and ­Polignac, newly returned from Rome. Torcy’s personal lawyer, Nouet, and the bankers worked out a compromise by which the French delegations paid the augmentations, though they insisted on a promise that these would be the last.70 Another issue arose in council the following year over the nuncio’s desire to augment the traditional payments made to his servants for benefices granted. The rest of the Conseil, including the normally pro-papal Beauvillier, voted with the king’s assent to instruct the bankers who handled these payments to Rome to refuse to send them. The Gallican Torcy, however, only supported refusing to send the augmentations, arguing that the political fallout from taking on this relatively minor issue made it the wiser course to overlook what he agreed was an abuse by papal agents.71 Nuncios arriving in Paris paid Torcy a courtesy visit even before he was secretary of state. Once in office he met them weekly on Tuesdays.72

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They might discuss issues of war and peace, such as how to limit hostilities in Italy or the pope’s 1708 appeal for French military assistance against Imperial threats. Their most frequent conversations, however, were over contentious religious topics like Jansenism and Gallican liberties, which found their echo in Conseil debates.73 Meetings of the Assembly of the Clergy were particularly worrying to Rome because they might take actions detrimental to the Holy See’s authority. Gathering every five years and with small assemblies meeting in between, these sessions traditionally began on 25 May and typically lasted an entire year. Fiscal matters were their primary concern, including the so-called free gift they always voted the king, but debates in the Assembly on other matters, particularly on Jansenism and the papal bulls aimed at it, could stir up Gallican currents, for which the nuncio was always on the watch.74 Despite his Gallican sympathies, Torcy’s duties required that he take an active role in the intricate and perilous negotiations with the papacy concerning the divisive bull Unigenitus.75 The secretaries of state were members of the greater Conseil du roi and thus served on extraordinary commissions, with Torcy typically on those created to deal with foreign sovereignties or foreigners within France.76 In 1698, for instance, he sat on the commission charged with registering the marriage contract between Elisabeth Charlotte d’Orléans, daughter of Louis XIV’s brother Philippe, and Leopold, son of the Duke of Lorraine. When the duke’s two commissioners arrived at Versailles in late August, Torcy greeted them and led them to Chancellor B ­ oucherat’s chambers. Following formal greetings, the chancellor was seated at the head of the table, while commissioners Torcy and Louis Pontchartrain sat opposite the two Lorrainers. As both reporter and notary, Torcy read the particulars of the contract from the commission’s official journal, presented it to the chancellor, and had foreign office clerks make copies for all the participants to sign.77 That same year Torcy served on Boucherat’s commission to adjust and end the difficulties between Louis XIV and William III over the latter’s rights to Orange. To craft the 1699 agreement, Torcy served alongside Pomponne, Beauvillier, and ­Pontchartrain, assisted by the masters of requests Jean-Baptiste Pomereu, a Colbert client and future intendant of Champagne, and Henri d’Aguesseau, councillor of state on the Royal Council of Finances and Pontchartrain’s kinsman and close collaborator.78 The commission’s solution was ultimately shipwrecked by the Protestant refugee problem, a leitmotif in Torcy’s correspondence with royal officials in neighbouring Provence.79 When the situation worsened with the onset of war, Louis



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used William III’s death in 1702 as a pretext to order the Aix parlement to seize Orange by feudal right because the principality’s authorities had not offered the faith and homage due him as Provence’s count. In a manner reminiscent of the reunions under his father, Torcy and his associates made clever use of the king’s feudal rights to eliminate a worrisome enclave.80 Other ad hoc commissions resolved thorny international disagreements, especially after Ryswick re-established a peace framework. There was, for example, a dispute between the archbishop of Basel and a foreigner in French service. Even though he was not on the commission, Torcy exercised influence through two French ambassadors who were. Christian II, Prince of Birkenfeld, began serving Louis XIV in 1667 after ten years in Swedish and Imperial armies. Obtaining the German infantry regiment of Alsace, he fought with distinction in Franche-Comté and retired in 1696 with the rank of lieutenant-general. Two lines of Palatinate Wittelsbachs had diverged in the mid-sixteenth century: the Birkenfelds were the younger line, while the Neuburgs, who inherited the Palatine Electorate in 1685, the elder. The Birkenfelds were among those Rhenish princes who traditionally looked to France to counter the emperor. In the 1680s Birkenfeld played an important role in France’s dispute with Sweden over the reunion of Deux-Ponts, the personal inheritance of Sweden’s monarch. Louis XIV never forgot Birkenfeld’s support, devotion, and service.81 Extraordinary commissions thus served a variety of ends: to peacefully resolve international conflicts; to advance French interests without war; and to protect and reward faithful foreign clients. All was accomplished with legality and deliberation, or at least the appearance of it. As a member of such commissions or through his men on them, Torcy not only helped shape the decisions they made but also controlled the flow of information from them to the king and his assembled Conseil.

Mada m e d e M a in t e n o n : “Partner, Matri arch, a n d M in i ster” 82 In explaining to Archbishop Noailles why she was mysterious about certain policy matters, Mme de Maintenon noted that the king had imposed silence on his Conseil members.83 To be sure, Louis XIV’s secret morganatic wife was never named a minister and did not usually join in Conseil policy debates, even when they took place within her chambers. Yet her influence with the king, even if difficult to determine with exactness,

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was nonetheless considerable and likely appeared even greater to many because of its uncertain dimensions and its exercise in intimate conversations largely behind closed doors. What gave Maintenon’s influence particular potency, even when it remained potential rather than actual, was her easy access to the king that allowed her to present him with oral and written information in addition to what he received from his chief officials. While not necessarily always working independently, secretly, and at cross purposes with the king’s advisors and department heads, she certainly did so often enough to arouse fears of her influence and interference. Torcy was particularly concerned with any independent, covert actors who might through malevolence, disagreement, or ineptitude disrupt the delicate business of diplomacy. In Paris in 1705 a ditty circulated lampooning the king’s generals. Since it ended up in the foreign archives, Torcy likely saw it, but we can only speculate as to his reaction. Was it amusement at the satirizing of Maintenon and her creatures? Perhaps he felt some satisfaction that his was not among the names linked in the lyrics with hers and assigning her blame for all of France’s ills, but he certainly was not pleased with the circulation of such libelles as the war effort floundered. Tallard and Tessé were ridiculed as Maintenon’s heroes, while the Pontchartrains, ­Chamillart, and Beauvillier were included with the sycophants, false “dévots” (devout Catholics), hypocrites, and flatterers like the Jesuits who were all “à la Maintenon.” The same refrain, the song continued, explained all of France’s disorders, abuses, edicts, taxes, and expenditures, to which the king only lent his name.84 Most writers immediately after the Sun King’s demise endorsed this popular analysis of ­Maintenon’s political role, and historians long echoed it until they moved in the opposite direction, portraying her as without influence and power. Recent research, however, reveals a more nuanced picture of limited but nonetheless great influence, especially in ecclesiastical patronage and in foreign and military policy.85 Torcy thus had cause to step carefully. Interactions between Torcy and Maintenon were characterized by correctness without cordiality in part because of the Fénelon affair. In 1697 Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai and the Duke of Burgundy’s tutor, courted controversy with his adherence to the teachings of Mme Guyon, suspected of sharing some beliefs with Quietism, recently condemned by the Church as heresy. When later that year Guyon’s ideas were formally condemned, the king dismissed Fénelon as tutor and confined him to his diocese. Although the controversy raged on ­publicly until



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1699, when Fénelon finally submitted to her condemnation, ­apparently without f­urther consequence, the publication that same year of his Télémaque criticizing Louis XIV and his rule rendered his exile permanent. M ­ aintenon, Beauvillier, and Chevreuse had all followed Fénelon and Guyon, but Maintenon, unlike the dukes, distanced herself once the king’s strong disapproval of Guyon’s teachings became clear. Yet for a woman of keen intelligence, political astuteness, and consummate knowledge of the court, even Maintenon’s initial involvement in the controversy was inexplicable to Torcy, who distanced himself from her, a traditional ally of the Colberts, and his ducal relatives. But preferring to avoid confrontations, he reluctantly succumbed to Maintenon’s effort to moderate the king’s campaign against Fénelon at the Holy See by reading the king drafts of letters to Rome in her presence.86 Throughout his relationship with Maintenon, Torcy usually sought when possible not to read such correspondence in her hearing.87 Nevertheless, it was correspondence and especially that with Rome that prompted her criticism of Torcy. Maintenon’s insatiable interest in religious and ecclesiastical affairs was driven by genuine piety and the politics of religious patronage. She never tired of advancing the fortunes of her family and those she favoured and often knew in advance about the distribution of bishoprics, superior posts in cathedrals and monasteries, and pensions and livings that were the king’s to give.88 Torcy, too, was interested in these for the sake of the Colberts, his clients (especially those in his department), and foreign prelates in French service. Late in October 1701 Maintenon told Anne de Rohan-Chabot, princesse de Soubise, of her suspicion that Torcy had become increasingly vigilant in his inspection of correspondence with the Holy See. She assured the princess that she had forwarded the petitions supporting her son’s elevation to Strasbourg’s coadjutorship, but cautioned that it would be best if she also cultivated Torcy. Maintenon admitted that although she had sent her recommendation to Rome, she had no idea how Torcy would react or whether he might detain the mail in order to add his own instructions. It was, she advised, prudent for the princess to write to thank him for his assistance.89 Maintenon’s influence could extend to diplomatic appointments, as it had in 1698 in the selection of the prince de Monaco to serve in Rome, and while here too it had its limits with the king and while Torcy was not without resources to frustrate it, Torcy was nonetheless determined to keep an eye on her activities.90 What provoked Maintenon as much as the realization that Torcy had become the watchdog of Roman affairs

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was the knowledge that he was opening her correspondence and doing so with the king’s authority and acquiescence. Torcy kept a list of “suspected persons” whose mail was routinely opened, including not only Maintenon and her close friends, but members of the royal family as well as some in Torcy’s family.91 The correspondence that Maintenon most prized, other than that with the royal family, was that with her old friend Ursins, who at her suggestion to the king had become head of the young Spanish queen’s household and through whom Maintenon imagined she could influence Spanish policy. Official letters to and from Spain, including those between Louis XIV and his grandson, all ambassadorial correspondence, and even that concerning finance and war had to be issued by or at least pass through Torcy, since Spain remained nonetheless a foreign ally.92 However, Maintenon and others in the royal family were permitted to correspond directly with Philip V, Ursins, and others in Spain who might then send, through them, any concerns and complaints, even for the king’s ear, that they preferred not be filtered by Torcy or shared with the other ministers in the Conseil.93 As was well known, any of these letters that went by post or official courier were subject to Torcy’s covert inspection. Maintenon complained to Torcy of this, warned Ursins, wrote rude notes in her letters that he was likely to read, and even sent letters by special messenger. Despite these protests and precautions, Torcy quite often read her letters before they reached Madrid.94 He was nonetheless unable to block Maintenon from knowing and influencing Spanish affairs, for she did so at the king’s connivance, who shared everything with her, even the most secret information, which came from Madrid and from Torcy’s bureau.95 The year 1708 was one of military disasters: the March failure of the Scottish invasion, the 11 July defeat of Burgundy and Vendôme at Oudenarde, and the December loss of Lille and Ghent. Following on the previous year’s relative successes, these reversals destroyed any renewed confidence that the Allies might be forced to accept French terms. The 1708 campaigning season had commenced with another rotation of generals among the theatres, perhaps because “Louis XIV was still searching for the right combination [of generals].”96 By the beginning of 1709 Maintenon was soliciting several generals individually for a wide range of military information and for ideas that would end the string of defeats. She actively promoted Villars as a replacement for ­Vendôme and rejoiced when he was appointed commander in Flanders in March and the detested Vendôme was left in disgrace for most of the next campaign season. Torcy, wary of Maintenon’s interference with



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­ iplomacy, was equally chary of her intrusion into the conduct of the d war. ­Throughout the war he too had sought to build up a winning general who could bring it to a satisfactory conclusion, and he had long supported ­Vendôme, among others, against Maintenon’s favourite Villars.97 Vendôme, no longer in disgrace from the autumn of 1709 and given a command in Spain, acquitted himself well at the Battle of Villa Viciosa (10 December 1710). Torcy celebrated that battle as a turning point in Spain and in the war in general, assuring Vendôme that he attributed the first Allied dispositions toward peace to that victory.98 Later, in addition to the military and diplomatic news he normally passed along, Torcy promised to send Vendôme the horses he needed and, if possible, mules, donkeys, sheep, and grain.99 The Noailles family connection drew Torcy and the king’s wife together in other ways. The old marshal, Anne-Jules, duc de Noailles, who died in 1708, and his wife were the Croissys’ long-time friends and political allies. The new duc de Noailles, Adrien Maurice, Maintenon’s nephew by marriage, was Torcy’s close friend.100 Their correspondence spanned forty years and constituted a running commentary on public affairs and their families. Noailles strongly supported Torcy’s membership on the Regency Council in 1716. In the last days of Louis XIV’s reign, when the clergy were deeply divided over Unigenitus, the ­Colbert bishops, led by Louis Antoine de Noailles, cardinal-archbishop of Paris and the young duke’s uncle, were united against its acceptance.101 ­Maintenon touted Noailles’s generalship, supported his military promotions, and celebrated his ducal honours.102 Partly because of Noailles’s military career, Maintenon followed the progress of military campaigns with the enthusiasm of an ardent amateur. She also looked to him for news from Spain.103 Torcy, however, had a poor view of his friend’s battlefield abilities. Commenting to Vendôme on the contents of a letter from Noailles, Torcy acidly observed that he would find a huge difference between reality and statements on paper.104 Maintenon also championed favourites from her household government, such as Michel Chamillart and Daniel-François Voysin. When first appointed controller general in September 1699, Chamillart was viewed by the other ministers and corporate financiers as an experienced administrator and a moderate reformer. Chamillart became a master of requests in 1686 and in 1689 intendant of Rouen, where he befriended Croissy’s nephew and Torcy’s cousin Jacques-Nicolas ­ Colbert, archbishop of Rouen. Chamillart purchased the office of intendant of finance in 1690, became controller of Maintenon’s household in 1695, and was asked by

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her to submit a general analysis of royal finances, which impressed the king.105 In 1699, when Pontchartrain was raised to the chancellorship, Chamillart succeeded him as controller general.106 On 3 December 1700 Maintenon conveyed to Harcourt the good news that C ­ hamillart had been called to the Conseil. Although she knew H ­ arcourt would share her disappointment that Barbezieux, whose hoped-for membership would further augment her influence, had not also been summoned, she urged patience, seeing it as only a matter of time.107 Fate dealt a different hand when, a month later, Barbezieux died suddenly, but fate relented somewhat when the post of war secretary went to Chamillart.108 Personally, Torcy was and remained on amicable terms with ­Chamillart and his family, but when the war minister started to interfere in peace negotiations, the two ministers began a struggle that ended only in C ­ hamillart’s 1709 dismissal.109 Torcy had foreseen Voysin’s rise, noting in his Mémoires110 that during the 1692 siege of Namur, Voysin and his wife had the good fortune and artfulness to please the visiting M ­ aintenon. Voysin, provincial intendant in the area, and his wife prepared lodgings for Maintenon that quite pleased her. She later rewarded their attentiveness by appointing Voysin her household controller. In 1709 he followed Chamillart as war secretary and in 1714 succeeded Pontchartrain as chancellor.111 Maintenon became fond of the clever, handsome Harcourt, ambassador to Spain just before Carlos II’s death. When he returned to court, Maintenon intrigued to have him made a minister. Louis XIV often consulted him on Spanish affairs, even inviting him in 1702 to make an extraordinary appearance at a session of the normally closed Conseil to debate the pros and cons of Philip V making a tour of his Italian possessions. Unfortunately for Maintenon her creature overplayed his hand in 1709 with a bungled attempt to supplant Beauvillier.112 Although Torcy opposed Harcourt entering the Conseil, he took care not to exaggerate or exacerbate differences between himself and Harcourt’s patroness. Neither Torcy nor Maintenon wished to quarrel openly, since Louis XIV imposed a consistent standard of rectitude on his family and political advisors. He sanctioned competitiveness, discussion, and debate, but not to the point of disturbing his sleep. He expected public decorum. Therefore, ­Maintenon and Torcy muted their comments and even at times joined forces against potential rivals, such as the Jesuits, whom Torcy opposed as enemies of Gallicanism and Maintenon disliked for their support of Fénelon and opposition to Noailles’s 1696 appointment as archbishop of Paris. She felt as well that the king’s Jesuit confessor Père



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La Chaise had misguided his penitent by being altogether too gentle and too forgiving.113 During the worst days of the war and its attendant disasters, ­Maintenon and Torcy shared a passionate desire for peace. Both were appalled by the loss of life among the families they knew. Blainville, Torcy’s cousin and close friend, died in 1704 of wounds inflicted at the battle of Blenheim (Höchstadt), and his brother Croissy, wounded and taken prisoner at the same battle, was again captured in 1710 and later exchanged. ­Seignelay’s son, for whom Torcy served as an unofficial guardian, died in battle in 1712.114 Death crept into Versailles itself. In one terrible week (1705) Beauvillier lost two sons to an epidemic of smallpox.115 The royal family lost two heirs apparent (1711) and one heir presumptive (1712) to that dread disease. In 1709, at the height of the war, Louis and the ministers working with him could hear M ­ aintenon cry out from her bed that France must have peace.116 But while sharing Maintenon’s sentiments, Torcy deftly deflected a suggestion made in January 1710 by Florisson, a Leiden merchant the king had permitted to go to The Hague for talks with Heinsius. The grand pensionary had pressed Florisson to seek out Maintenon when he reported back to Versailles. Heinsius knew that she wanted peace and believed that she had opposed the setting aside of the Second Partition Treaty in 1700. Florisson pressed Torcy for a letter from Maintenon to Heinsius, but as Torcy confided to his journal, he convinced Florisson only with considerable difficulty that Maintenon would not write such a letter.117 Whether he said this after first consulting Maintenon seems unlikely whatever her actual thoughts about writing to the pensionary, but certainly Torcy had no desire to involve her in the negotiating process and could rest content that the king concurred. As the year progressed and possibilities of peace faltered, the king in his Conseil resolved in early August to back Spain militarily. The ministers debated the contours of the renewed relationship with Madrid, with Torcy arguing against leaving it indeterminate and for negotiating a treaty should the Spanish request one. Maintenon complained to many, including to Desmaretz, that Torcy was the head of a pro-Spanish cabal that advocated a Franco-Spanish treaty that would block peace and that he was bickering with Ursins because he had not forgiven her for forcing the Abbé d’Estrées out of Spain in 1703. Miffed with the falsehoods that he said that court cabals were circulating, Torcy had nevertheless resolved not to waste his time confronting them, but when the noise grew to a level that he believed threatened him and, more importantly, the king’s interests, he resolved to act. He wrote to Maintenon for an

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audience, but when a reply was not forthcoming, he went to the king and spoke strongly to him. Three days later, meeting with Maintenon, he repeated what he had said to the king, stressing how public discussion of matters that must remain secret would be harmful to the king’s interests, and it appeared that he won her over.118 Thereafter, his journal reports no further confrontations between Torcy and Maintenon. In fact, in the aftermath of the victory of Vendôme’s Franco-­Spanish army at Brihuega on 8 December 1710, the king, the Dauphin, and Torcy rejoiced, while those who saw Spain as an obstacle to peace were uncertain whether to despair or celebrate. Torcy recorded with likely satisfaction that ­Maintenon, increasingly frustrated by Allied inflexibility, had decided to embrace a French victory no matter where it occurred and was thus indignant when Ursins’s envoy to Versailles voiced her complaint that France was holding back on financial and other support for Spain.119 Yet whether or not Maintenon’s policy views agreed with Torcy’s, she always remained a potential threat to his position because of her proximity to the king and her role as an information link between the French and Spanish courts. In an 8 February 1711 Conseil session, Torcy read a letter from Philip V concerning peace negotiations, but two days later when he saw the king to report on another matter, Louis shared with him confidential pleas from the Spanish king sent in a letter by way of Maintenon. Instructing Torcy to share its contents with no one, the king revealingly asked that he return the letter to him for burning, but only after writing a reply on his behalf.120 Even though Philip sent his missive by way of Maintenon, surely to Torcy’s satisfaction the king made it clear that the more important task of answering it belonged to his foreign minister.

Ch a m il l a rt a n d t h e S earch for Peace In 1684 Charles Le Brun finished painting the vast vaulted ceiling of the Hall of Mirrors, a long gallery linking the Salon of War at one end with the Salon of Peace at the other. With iconography representing the two sides of the coin of foreign relations, two-thirds of these paintings touted the military and diplomatic triumphs of the reign up to that date.121 Yet, as even the flow of these paintings suggests, foreign relations is not a coin with two distinct sides. There is no clear, crisp division between war and diplomacy, nor could there be, since, as Clausewitz famously remarked, “war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”122 Louis



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XIV showed an appreciation of this Clausewitzian connection when referring to the 1661 bloody confrontation in L ­ ondon over ­precedence between his ambassador’s retainers and those of Spain, observing that the latter “believed they had already defeated my armies by this miserable advantage.”123 This was because “a reputation can often do more by itself than the most powerful armies,” but as a “most fragile” possession, it had to be tended to constantly.124 Willing to capitalize on this asset to gain what he wanted peacefully, Louis recognized as well that to succeed, a genuine willingness to negotiate required a matching resolve to go to war if necessary.125 Along with valour, he included “ability in negotiations” among the qualities of a great king.126 Indeed, the Mémoires that Louis prepared for his heir are in part a running account of his triumphant assertion of Bourbon/French interests and reputation, proudly and equally trumpeted whether achieved by force of arms or dint of diplomacy. Rather than seek abstract boundaries between war and diplomacy, we will examine some of the everyday interactions among those who directed these related pursuits, ranging from complete cooperation to opposition and even outright subversion, but more often something in between. ­William Roosen suggests that it was not until the Treaty of Utrecht at the end of Louis’s reign, if even then, that diplomacy became “a substitute for warfare” rather than “simply the handmaiden which prepared the way for war’s arrival, its course, and its departure.”127 As argued in chapter 3, however, even though the two partition treaties negotiated after Ryswick ultimately did not hold, they were nonetheless clearly aimed at using diplomacy to prevent another war. But Roosen is correct in recognizing that war and diplomacy are intimately linked, and even if we cannot disambiguate in practice (and not always in theory) the boundaries between the pursuit of peace and the prosecution of war, each – then as now – was typically the responsibility of a separate government department with functional specialties. Some of these might have been exercised independently and without conflict, while others were carried out in an evolving and complex interplay of dispute and cooperation. A general in the field entering into negotiations, even as he retained command of his troops, was required to keep the king informed directly through the foreign secretary rather than through the war minister.128 This offered an opportunity for administrative border crossing, as had often been the case while Louvois lived but not under his less-­ powerful son who was also not a minister. Barbezieux was kept abreast of the Treaty of Turin’s negotiations in 1696 and worked alongside

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Torcy on some of Ryswick’s particulars the following year.129 He also had his own agents who fed him information and permitted him to make quasi-­diplomatic moves independent of the foreign office. Days before his death and hoping to tie up Imperial forces on the Hungarian plain and make the emperor think twice about war in the west, he sidestepped both Torcy and Ambassador Villars in Vienna to make direct contact with Rákóczi.130 But this was as far as Barbezieux went or was in a position to go. Moreover, just as the conduct of negotiations required knowledge of the war situation, so the management of war entailed monitoring peace talks in order to know what military pressure to exert, withhold, threaten, or prepare for, resulting in a complex and ongoing dialectic between the making of war and the making of peace.131 No matter which secretary sent them, the king’s official instructions to negotiators were first discussed in the Conseil. As we saw in chapter 2, it is necessary to clarify the actual role played by department heads in state business: do they formulate and execute policy or do they primarily carry it out? This section of the current chapter focuses on foreign policy formulation and the conduct of negotiations from the perspective of the participants who controlled the information flow to decision-makers. Competition among those informing and advising the king was part of playing the power game. When Carlos II died on 1 November 1700, chargé d’affaires in Madrid Jean-Denis, marquis de Blécourt, dispatched by express courier an unofficial report to Versailles and the news that Anjou was his heir.132 Having in his haste passed the Spanish Junta’s courier carrying the same news, Blécourt’s fatigued rider fell ill at Bayonne on the French frontier. Harcourt, commanding the troops there who were preparing to occupy France’s treaty spoils upon news of Carlos’s death, had instructions to read official dispatches from Madrid before sending them on to enable him to act swiftly if necessary without awaiting orders. While a new courier made ready to carry ­Blécourt’s packet to Fontainebleau, Harcourt scribbled some quick lines to War Secretary Barbezieux and asked him to share them with Controller General Chamillart. Harcourt urged both to lobby for the will’s acceptance, even though, like Blécourt, at that moment he supposed it to be conditional on an Austrian marital alliance. He reiterated his earlier requests for more troops and asked Barbezieux to deliver Blécourt’s packet to Torcy, since proper procedure required the military messenger to deliver everything to the war secretary first. 133 Harcourt might have acted as he did to expedite military preparations or, if Saint-Simon is correct, to allow Barbezieux to be the first to inform the king.134



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When Harcourt’s courier arrived at Fontainebleau on 9 November 1700, he went first to Barbezieux, who then forwarded the diplomatic pouch to Torcy. Armed with Harcourt’s note, however, Barbezieux went straight away to the king, then meeting with the Council of Finances, to share the momentous news and cheat Torcy of the honour. Barbezieux’s gambit goes unmentioned in Torcy’s later Mémoires, although perhaps pointedly, he highlighted his own adherence to proper procedures. Nevertheless, the ploy provoked a quarrel between the two that did not escape the ever-watchful court.135 Yet Torcy could hardly pause to focus on this slight, although in the future he sought to preclude its repetition.136 In any event, the foreign minister’s rival in information flows died suddenly on 5 January 1701 as the dogs of war were straining to slip their bonds and unleash the havoc of Louis XIV’s mostly costly and dangerous conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–14). It took just over a year and a half after Louis XIV accepted Carlos II’s testament in November 1700 for the English, Dutch, and Austrians to coalesce and finally declare war on the Bourbons, but once war finally came, on 15 May 1702, it initially “shook confidence in French military preeminence.”137 Peace feelers were not entirely absent during the first few years of fighting, but as hostilities dragged on and France’s fortunes and friends seemed to fade away, an increasingly weary monarch, from 1705 to 1706, more earnestly sought to negotiate peace on the best terms possible.138 The ebb and flow – and mostly ebb – of his armies’ battlefield fortunes largely determined how much Louis was willing to concede, but France’s deteriorating position only emboldened the Allies to demand more than the king felt he could sacrifice.139 When it seemed that France could fight no longer, Torcy himself journeyed to The Hague in 1709 (April–May) bearing extensive concessions, to which the Allies, regarding Louis as exhausted and desperate for peace, added provisions requiring him to help them drive his grandson out of Spain and to do so in two months or the proposed truce would expire. After lengthy deliberation, the king and his Conseil, including Torcy, rejected The Hague preliminaries as beyond what France could reasonably yield.140 With resolve rebounding against such arrogance, the weary kingdom put forth fresh efforts to defeat or dismember the Allied coalition, which paid dividends with Britain’s 1711 open defection from the Grand Alliance. Looking back in his later Mémoires on the long years of negotiations that had finally led to the opening of the Utrecht Congress in 1712, Torcy piously reflected: “Who could have foreseen at that time that the prosperities of an alliance so formidable to France and Spain were at an end; that the

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Supreme being who fixes the boundaries of the ocean, and calms, whenever he pleases, the impetuous fury of its waves, should immediately stem the torrent of so many [Allied] victories; that before two years were expired, those victors, so proud, and so intoxicated with success, should be confounded in their devices.”141 To the kingdom’s friends and foes alike, including Torcy, another factor, whether providential or not, was the fall of War Minister ­Chamillart in June 1709, ending his interference in the peace process.142 While it is beyond the scope of this book to narrate and analyse all the negotiations that brought this ruinous war to an end, we will explore those peace initiatives from 1705 through 1709 in which Chamillart intruded into Torcy’s control of diplomacy and the flow of diplomatic information to the decision-makers of Versailles. We will examine the war minister’s motivations and mode of operation as well as Torcy’s responses and methodology. Clear differences will emerge in how they conducted diplomacy. The foreign minister employed multiple but coordinated channels of contacts and “pourparlers” (talks), eventually narrowing them to a peace-producing negotiation, whereas the war minister undertook negotiation initiatives that, because they took place outside the normal management system of diplomacy, were uncoordinated with those of the foreign ministry. Torcy’s own agents were already jealous of one another’s access to his ear or to assignments to carry proposals to the enemy, but he largely kept them under control through the apt soothing word or stern reprimand. Chamillart’s agents, however, were both outside the foreign secretary’s control and encouraged by the war minister and his assistants to oppose or even subvert Torcy’s operatives, referred to as “vos compétiteurs” (your competitors).143 Agents thus worked knowingly or unwittingly at cross purposes, which generated confusion at home and uncertainty and mistrust abroad. Those operating outside the system were deprived of its experiential and informational base and thus were limited in their own perspective. At the same time, they robbed the rest of the diplomatic system of insight into their piece of the kingdom’s foreign policy. Consequently, both parties operated in partial darkness, which led inevitably to missteps and stumbles and damaged the work and morale of the foreign minister, his staff, and diplomatic personnel abroad. The foreign office’s coordinating role was a critical aspect of “diplomacy as a bureaucratic system,” comprised of the complementary elements of “permanent or semi-permanent embassies, but also a directing office enjoying institutional continuity.”144 Such extrasystem diplomacy, because it compromised the work of the “directing



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office,” was harmful enough when pursued without the king’s knowledge, but when permitted or even authorized by the monarch, it could prove toxic to the conduct of foreign policy and the monarch’s reputation abroad, no matter what short-term gains it might yield. Did the king know of Chamillart’s initiatives? And if he knew of or even authorized them as personal diplomacy, then when and for how long? Why did he pursue such a risky course? Although it would be anachronistic to brand the king’s actions interference, since as sovereign he was free to negotiate through whomever he pleased, bypassing the normal structure was nonetheless fraught with danger.145 When Controller General Chamillart, a minister since the previous November, was named (8 January 1701) to replace the late Barbezieux, Torcy was intent on avoiding skirmishes over turf. In a project drafted that summer for a diplomatic and military mission to the German principality of Wolfenbüttel, Torcy specified that the head of troops write to Chamillart only about matters that concerned war and address all other letters to him. Optimistically but tellingly, he added that thus far the two secretaries had not wanted to usurp one another’s functions, unlike those who had preceded them.146 The ensuing months of coalition-­building for the looming war intensified Torcy’s collaboration with the king.147 ­Callières believed that a small number of capable and carefully placed diplomats could “with a small expense do frequently as much service as standing armies … because they know how to employ the forces of the country where they reside, in favour of the interests of the Prince whom they serve.”148 Without a war and with lingering hopes that one might be avoided, Chamillart was initially preoccupied with planning and preparation, but once war came, coordinating it on multiple fronts opened a wider space for him through daily interactions with the king as the minister responsible for both war and finance. When military means failed, ambition and this double burden drove him to seek peace through diplomatic initiatives apart from and even in competition with the foreign minister. Even prior to his search for peace, Chamillart clashed with Torcy over Spain.149 Louis XIV wrote his grandson frequent letters and significantly influenced Spanish affairs, but it was Torcy who drafted them and who read and consulted with Louis on those from his grandson. Given their quantity and varying degrees of importance or controversy, Louis could not have seen all or every part of the letters written in his name.150 Of course, Torcy could not venture far from what he knew the royal will to be, but he still enjoyed latitude in many details and in

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r­ elatively minor matters. This correspondence ranged beyond diplomacy to address domestic and military affairs in Spain and its ­possessions. French ­ambassadors in Madrid were in constant contact with Torcy and through him with the king and others in his government. Representing an Allied state as well as the head of the Bourbon dynasty, their extensive domestic intervention frequently irked the independent-minded princesse des Ursins and fed Spanish resentment against French influence.151 The king instructed Chamillart to channel his contacts with Spain through the foreign office, which the war minister found irksome. Chamillart’s client, the financial reformer Jean Orry, had to send his proposals through the ambassador to Torcy, who read them to the king and shared them with Chamillart and then relayed their responses back to Spain.152 Chamillart acknowledged this arrangement, albeit with undisguised irritation, in a 6 September 1703 confidential memoir to Torcy, but as war on the Iberian peninsula seemed more likely with Portugal’s defection to the Grand Alliance (16 May), Chamillart pressed for an adjustment to permit Orry, the French ambassador, and the Spanish war minister to correspond directly with him on war matters. He argued that an ambassador writing directly to the war minister on matters of war was analogous to the established practice of generals at the front corresponding directly with the foreign secretary when conducting negotiations. Labeling it novel and quite singular that Philip V needed to be led in governing his monarchy, he was even more troubled by foreign office control of the information flow to and from Spain, no matter what ministry it concerned.153 Torcy’s shorter response of the same day reiterated what he had apparently said in their discussion the previous day: he was not opposed to Orry or Spain’s war minister writing directly to ­Chamillart concerning war and reminded him that he had himself written Orry only when the war minister had asked him to. He insisted, however, that during his and his father’s twenty-four years in the foreign office the king had always ordered his ambassadors to report on all matters directly to the foreign secretary and to him alone. He did not believe that it was his intention to change this, but invited his colleague to talk to the king if he thought otherwise.154 Information, particularly understood in its context, is a critical asset in administrative turf battles. Unlike Torcy, who had traveled widely, including in Spain, Chamillart was untraveled and lacked personal knowledge of foreign courts. Moreover, as described by Paul Sharp, he did not share the diplomat’s outlook: “For most people, international relations involve the parties they are between and the issues they are about.



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How they see and order these shapes their ways of seeing international relations. For diplomats, in contrast, it is the conditions of ­separateness that provide the distinctive site or space from which diplomats see the world, and from which a diplomatic tradition of international thought emerges to make its own distinctive sense of the resulting relations.”155 Chamillart shared the disdain of Spain’s culture, institutions, and people common at court and among Frenchmen in Spain, but which Torcy cautioned against.156 To gain his own supply of Spanish news, the frustrated war minister increasingly cultivated his own informants.157 He often relied on French commanders for intelligence, but since they were also nominally part of Spain’s military, as “foreigners” they wrote to Torcy as well.158 Other informants briefed both ministers. The Irishman Colonel Toby Bourke, a keen observer in Madrid from 1705 ostensibly as James III’s representative but in French pay, wrote both regularly.159 From strategic posts on the sea or frontier, Torcy received general news as well as detailed reports on the flow of men and matériel to Spain that helped him grasp the wider strategic picture as he sought to influence Chamillart, the king, and the Conseil in policy formulation.160 He wrote Gramont, former ambassador to Spain, to ask him to help persuade Chamillart to maintain French military ascendancy in Spain, since nothing, he insisted, would drive the Allies toward peace more than Spanish loyalty to France.161 Under Chamillart’s successor, Voysin, war secretary from 10 June 1709 and minister two days later, Torcy continued his active role in Spanish affairs. Vendôme, sent to Spain to command the army in 1710, was instructed to write to the king through Torcy, who acted as reporter when the Conseil discussed such strategic matters as his proposal to besiege Barcelona in 1711.162 The foreign secretary was also in active communication with the other French commanders in Spain when they acted in a diplomatic capacity and shared in the Conseil their reports of military operations when they came through him.163 In his analysis of Heinsius’s military role during Louis XIV’s last two wars, John M. Stapleton, Jr, employs a useful model also applicable to Torcy’s involvement in military matters. The model posits four levels of military activity: the political or policy level, encompassing war aims as “influenced by the state’s understanding of the war’s causes, its conduct, conclusion, as well as its consequences”; the strategic level, focused on “the deployment of the state’s military resources to achieve those ends”; and the operational and tactical levels, which “encompass military decision-­making on the theater or even unit level.”164 Considering these distinctions, it appears that Torcy operated at the levels

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a­ ppropriate to a foreign secretary. In discussions and debates in the Conseil, he assisted the king in formulating war aims and strategies to realize them and then adapting both to the fluctuating circumstances of war, finance, ­diplomacy, and contingency (for example, the unexpected death of key dynastic figures, such as the Grand Dauphin and Emperor Joseph I in April 1711 and the Duke of Burgundy the following February). The ministers promoted and questioned campaign strategies, proposals for troop allocation among the fronts, and diplomatic schemes for moving the enemy to the peace table and signing a settlement.165 Yet most military matters were outside the Conseil’s control. Not only did the king have the final word, but the constraints imposed by distance, time, changing circumstances, and chance meant that field commanders were never mere executors of plans crafted at court. Rowlands notes with reference to the king and his military advisors at the centre – specialists ­Chamlay and Vauban and marshals and officers at court – that if there was a “Cabinet strategy,” it was more “a system of coordination than one of domination.”166 Field commanders used suggestion and other subtle means to bring the king to their viewpoint. Such military voices increasingly carried more weight than the war minister’s in strategic discussions.167 Although the Conseil was kept current on developments at the fronts, its members were even more removed from the operational and tactical work of the war and navy secretaries, since once policy and strategic decisions were made, it was inappropriate for ministers to interfere in their implementation. The 1708 Franco-Jacobite expedition to invade Britain illustrates the complex interplay of diplomacy and war and shows no evidence that Torcy interfered in operational and tactical matters; indeed, he left them to the experts. Although English diplomats generally assumed that Louis and his ministers were unswervingly devoted to the Jacobite cause, relations fluctuated because neither partner really trusted the other. From the early 1690s Louis’s ministers grew increasingly disenchanted with and even hostile to the Jacobites, faulting their intelligence reports, reliability as allies, and value to French interests. Torcy especially feared leaks from the Jacobite court. The French populace revered the Stuarts as Catholic martyrs, and Louis XIV felt a kingly kinship with James II and his dynasty. Yet while Louis favoured a Jacobite restoration and was often more willing to aid their cause than his ministers advised, it was not usually at the price of French interests.168 Callières had inherited from his friend Renaudot responsibility for Jacobite affairs, advising and assisting Torcy from 1702 to 1708. Earlier attempts to win support



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for a joint operation to restore the Stuarts and/or drive the British to the bargaining table had failed, but in January 1705 the idea attracted renewed interest as a means of taking pressure off the Moselle front. Callières and his friends Nathaniel Hooke and Chevreuse lobbied on behalf of an expedition, and Hooke went to Scotland to gauge local support; but more pressing matters in Flanders sidelined the project. In 1706, seconded by the nuncio Gualterio, they again lobbied Torcy and the other ministers, but after France’s defeat at Ramillies, with no hope of success. Early in 1707 Hooke again returned to Scotland to test sentiment for a rising, and upon his return, he, Callières, and Chevreuse drafted a proposal that both advocated for an invasion and planned it out in detail in hopes of winning over a skeptical war minister. After discussions in the Conseil, the king’s reluctance was overcome only in December 1707 when Chevreuse enlisted the duc de Noailles to persuade Maintenon to intervene. With strategy set, Navy Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain, excluded earlier from Conseil discussions for reasons of secrecy, joined the operational planning. Though Torcy was actively involved at the level of policy and strategy, his participation receded once the invasion was decided upon and operational and tactical planning was taken up by the war and navy secretaries. Unfortunately for French and Jacobite hopes, the expedition that finally sailed from Dunkirk on 6 March 1708 ended in failure.169 But let us return to the time before the War of the Spanish Succession formally erupted. Prior to Torcy’s Wolfenbüttel mission draft proposal, offered in August, Mars was already on the march. Imperial troops invaded Italy in June 1701, and negotiations at The Hague, turning from peace to war, fashioned a new Grand Alliance (signed 7 September 1701) of the Dutch, England, and Austria, even though anemic efforts toward peace sputtered on up to and even after the formal Allied declaration of war in May 1702. The end of the 1703 campaign saw vague and unsuccessful approaches to Heinsius.170 By then, however, most diplomacy was directed at securing additional allies or neutralizing the aloof.171 The first serious peace talks began in 1704 and would sputter on for nearly seven years. The Allies, vindicating their tentative assault on Spain, captured Gibraltar (5 August). In Germany they defeated the French at Blenheim (13 August), ending the threat to Vienna and forcing Bavaria’s evacuation. Louis XIV was now at least open to hearing proposals from Dutch peace advocates, who were long anxious to restore their commerce and apprehensive of their domineering English ally and

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commercial rival. In October 1704 Mollo outlined their fundamental conditions to his old contact Callières: satisfy the royal ­ambitions of Archduke Charles, assign the Spanish Netherlands to a prince friendly to the Republic, and guarantee Dutch commerce.172 Eventually receptive to Callières’ urgings, Torcy had lieutenant-general Yves, marquis d’Alègre, operating at the end of February 1705 under Villars in the Moselle valley, call on Duke Leopold of Lorraine to request “that he would use his interest with the Allyes to get there [sic] consent that he might be allowed as mediator.”173 Upon the recommendation of his trusted friend Iberville, France’s resident in Geneva, Torcy tapped Louis Du Puy Saint-Gervais, a Huguenot avocat in exile in Switzerland with ties to the Republic, for a secret mission.174 In The Hague from March 1705, Du Puy’s only mission was to approach the different factions and gain agreement on the means of conducting future talks, but after individual discussions with Heinsius and Godard Willem van Welland (Weyland), Utrecht’s pro-peace deputy, Du Puy was finally put on notice that the Dutch felt bound by treaty to procure the whole Spanish monarchy for the archduke. With neither side willing to make the first offer, discussions stalled, but on the eve of Du Puy’s departure in early April, Welland assured him privately that after conferring with twenty of the Republic’s principal cities, the consensus was that the Spanish succession had to be partitioned along the lines of the Second Partition Treaty. Marlborough later (4 May) confided to his close colleague Lord Treasurer Sidney Godolphin that Du Puy’s presence had been unsettling because many Dutch provinces were in such financial straits that even war supporters despaired of fighting on and he feared the growing peace party eager for French proposals. Well into the summer, while Marlborough fretted, Du Puy wrote Heinsius in hopes of reigniting talks.175 Anxious to reprise his role in promoting the pourparlers that had eventually ended the last war, Mollo wrote to Callières that the peace party was open to a partition and suggested (28 May) Naples and Sicily for the archduke and the Spanish Netherlands for the Bavarian elector or the Duke of Lorraine (if the latter, France would receive his duchy). Intrigued, Callières included these proposals in a May mémoire urging an approach through the Dutch, who he believed could be satisfied with their former West Indian trading privileges, a friendly prince to the south, and a kingdom for the archduke. He and his friend Saint-Simon promoted this proposal with the peace party, Beauvillier and Chevreuse, and with Chancellor Pontchartrain and Chamillart, although the last two saw partition as unlikely. Undeterred, Callières resisted negotiat-



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ing with Mollo by post and suggested face-to-face talks. Mollo agreed (22 July) but indicated that any decision must await the States-General’s approval, which by 13 August was given.176 Even before the Dutch agreed to talk, Louis XIV’s Conseil discussed the hoped-for secret negotiations, and it was likely that Chamillart recommended at that time the Dutch-born physician Adrian ­ Engleburt ­Helvétius for the mission. The Leiden-trained Helvétius was a distinguished man, a naturalized French subject who lived in Paris, and a physician to the Orléans family. In 1701 he had saved Beauvillier’s life when Chevreuse rushed him to his bedside after Guy-Crescent Fagon, the king’s first physician, had given up hope. Helvétius had also attended to ­Chamillart, to whom he had sent a long mémoire the previous year urging that French interests not be sacrificed for Spain. In addition, ­Helvétius had the credible cover of an annual pass to the United Provinces to tend to patients, including his father. Whatever reservations Torcy may have had about employing the war minister’s close associate, it seems unlikely that he could have raised them given Helvétius’s obvious plausibility. Moreover, his mission was not to negotiate but to test Dutch sentiments and convince them to send someone to Versailles or elsewhere for secret talks to be based on the terms of the Grand Alliance’s 1701 treaty: guarantees for Dutch commerce, a barrier in the southern Netherlands, and satisfaction for the other Allies that would require some partitioning of the Spanish monarchy.177 Helvétius arrived in The Hague on 20 or 21 September,178 but after disappointing covert conversations with Gouda pensionary Bruno Van der Dussen, his intermediary with Heinsius and Amsterdam pensionary Willem Buys, H ­ elvétius sent Chamillart a copy of his 2 October 1705 report to Torcy. Normally the war minister’s discussion of diplomacy took place with the king and Torcy in the Conseil with the other ministers, so when Dangeau noted that for the evening of 2 October Chamillart worked in Maintenon’s quarters with the king and was joined twice by Torcy (and this prior to the arrival of Helvétius’s letter), it struck him as unusual, though he was unaware of the atypical involvement of both ministers in this mission.179 Helvétius wrote that the Dutch were suspicious of his lack of a commission to discuss specifics and of the other French agents who had been talking peace with Dutch citizens during the past year, including after he had received his passport to leave France. They suspected that these initiatives were meant only to sow discord and exploit divisions in the Republic. Hoping to be France’s only agent to work with the Dutch, Helvétius proceeded to disparage Mollo, his contacts, and all other channels allegedly emanating

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from the foreign office.180 Torcy’s reply ten days later contained soothing expressions of confidence but was unyielding to the physician’s reiterated requests for further instructions and official negotiating p ­ owers.181 Frustrated, he complained to Chamillart (23 October) that he felt little support from Torcy.182 Three days later he informed Torcy of the angry refusal of Heinsius and his colleagues to talk further until Louis XIV sent a fully empowered emissary. Torcy replied on 5 November that the king would accede to this Dutch demand. Helvétius lingered in Holland, hoping to be named that negotiator, but finally left before Christmas when the Dutch made it clear that he should go.183 Marlborough thought that peace talks were premature.184 Fears of furtive negotiations for a separate peace circulated among the other Allied diplomats, leading the Imperial envoy to plot a nocturnal raid on Helvétius’s rooms in the residence of Willem Nieupoort, his friend and long-time correspondent, to seize his papers, but the Dutch authorities uncovered and halted it.185 Was there any substance to these charges of multiple and contradictory initiatives emanating from the foreign office?186 On 6 November 1705 Dreux-Louis Dugué de Bagnols informed Torcy of a warning from The Hague that the Dutch were complaining of hearing from too many apparently discordant would-be negotiators.187 Torcy’s archivist SaintPrest subsequently made a lengthy summary and analysis of correspondence extracts concerning the United Provinces from 1700 through March 1706 for internal use and acknowledged that there had been a “foule” (crowd) of French negotiators.188 But did they originate from the foreign office? To answer, we must examine each in turn. On 21 June, Marlborough shared suspicions with Godolphin that the purpose of the visit of Brussels papal internuncio Giovanni Bussi to The Hague was to deliver peace proposals. His peace mission, however, was to the United Province’s Protestant majority on behalf of its Catholic minority, who were suspected of overeagerness for peace with France, while his negotiations with the Republic concerned his unpopular measures backing the Jesuits against the Jansenists in the Dutch Catholic Church.189 As part of another alleged foreign office initiative, Helvétius named LieutenantGeneral Alègre, captured on 18 July. Alègre, a prominent courtier whose daughter had been married (unhappily) to Barbezieux, was known to the Dutch for his spirited but unsuccessful defence of besieged Bonn in 1703. Granted leave by Marlborough in early August to return home, he departed only some weeks later after discussing peace with Dutchmen who then commissioned him to sound out Louis XIV on terms.190 Yet these discussions were originally communicated to Chamillart, owed



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nothing to foreign office directives, and originated in the R ­ epublic at the initiative of war-weary burghers.191 Helvétius reported that ­Dussen claimed that another such approach came in September from Abbé SaintRemy, former tutor to the son of Briord, French ambassador to The Hague (1700–01). However, the abbé’s initiative more likely resulted directly or indirectly from Chamillart’s actions rather than Torcy’s instructions.192 Although it was perceived that these initiatives all originated with Torcy and were part of his negotiating strategy, this was not the case.193 In Helvétius’s 5 August instructions Torcy himself acknowledged that individuals, either with the king’s tacit consent or merely acting on their own, had approached the Dutch. Two months later Alègre’s instructions repeated this, adding that none of them had received from the king instructions or authority to make proposals. While Helvétius swallowed the Dutch spin on this as French dirty tricks aimed at dividing the Allies, Torcy knew that the Grand Alliance was already deeply divided. He was more concerned that such uncoordinated multiple approaches only prolonged the war by making France appear desperate for peace. He understood that fear of French might and yet the expectation that “fragile France” was about to fall united the Dutch peace and war “parties” behind the necessity of “no peace without England,” as J.G. Stork-­ Penning has phrased it, since even those most anxious for peace were willing to prolong the war rather than break with the ally they felt they could not do without. As Torcy instructed Helvétius, his goal was not to dissolve the Alliance, but rather to encourage one of its members to take the first step toward a peace that would realize the goals of its 1701 treaty. He sought not to divide the Dutch but to unite them in recognizing the dangers posed by growing Austrian and especially British aspirations. As Torcy presciently observed, if Britain found it to her advantage, she would be the first to talk peace with France.194 Although open to almost any avenue that might end the war, he cautioned Helvétius that the prospect of winning peace attracted all sorts of would-be negotiators, and suggested that without careful coordination these would create damaging impressions abroad.195 Torcy’s disavowal of responsibility for the “crowd” of negotiators was consistent with his preferred manner of operating. But was this true of the initiative that overlapped with Helvétius’s mission? On 27 July 1705 Governor General Max Emmanuel signed the ratification for the “Articles and Conditions” that would regulate the contributions (a kind of protection money) exacted from Spanish

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Flanders by Allied troops raiding across the frontier. The lead negotiator was Flemish nobleman Louis van Haveskercke, Baron van L ­ ichtervelde, alderman and former mayor of Bruges, and deputy of the Flanders Estates, who met with Dussen in the second week of July. Bagnols, intendant of Flanders and the Spanish Netherlands, and ­Rouillé, French envoy to Elector Max in Brussels, who had sent Haveskercke, also instructed him to raise the issue of peace. Bagnols had written Torcy about the proposal Haveskercke would carry to The Hague, and the baron apparently had with him a letter from Torcy referring to what Bagnols had sent him. Haveskercke had also been briefed on the correspondence between Mollo and Callières, which suggests that even if this was not a mission authorized by the foreign office, Torcy was nonetheless careful that it not conflict with his other initiatives. Heinsius was apprised of the proposals when he met with Dussen and Haveskercke on 29 July. Utrecht deputy Welland also talked with the baron and thought that while he had support from France, he had no official authorization, although Haveskercke assured him that Torcy would sign one. The terms Heinsius passed along to Marlborough on 15 August for comment were the following: a Dutch-garrisoned barrier in a Dutch-­protected southern Netherlands republic, paid for by the south; a rollback of French trading rights in the West Indies to pre-1700; Naples and Sicily for the archduke; Milan to the Duke of Lorraine (his current duchy to France); recognition of Anne as queen of England; and satisfaction for Portugal and Savoy.196 Whereas Marlborough and Godolphin, to whom he forwarded a copy, both repeated the English mantra of “no peace without Spain” for the archduke and rejected any partitioning, Heinsius raised the possibility of satisfying the archduke by adding Milan to Naples and Sicily, albeit without optimism for its likelihood.197 Exchanges between Buys and Heinsius indicate that they and other leaders had favourably received the baron and hoped to introduce him to ­Marlborough. Since Haveskercke had gone back to Brussels, Heinsius and others were anxious to have him return for further discussions.198 Although ­Marlborough assured Godolphin on 2 September that despite appearances Heinsius was “intierly [sic] in the intirest [sic] of England,” he nonetheless proposed to disrupt any movements toward peace in concert with “our friends” in The Hague.199 At the beginning of September the Haveskercke channel went dry, not because of English obstruction, but because of mutual agreement in Paris and The Hague to parley directly through an agent from Versailles, which again shows Torcy’s preference for synchronized approaches.200 Haveskercke’s mission and instructions



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had originated in Brussels, but while Versailles was informed beforehand and had, as Torcy phrased it, given tacit consent, Louis XIV and Torcy nevertheless retained a degree of deniability because it was not officially authorized.201 When Helvétius’s instructions were issued on 5 August, the Brussels initiative was still active, but as far as Torcy was concerned, Haveskercke’s role had ended before the Dutch sent Helvétius’s passport on 7 September and he arrived on the 20th in The Hague.202 Peace feelers might be many, but Torcy’s preference was for actively negotiating through one channel at a time – and one firmly under his control.203 Since Helvétius’s mission was to see if official talks were possible and Torcy would not appoint him to conduct them for fear that negotiations and information about them would escape his control, he needed an emissary who reported only to him. He found this person in the chevalier de Croissy’s friend Alègre, whom he had previously sent secretly to Lorraine and who was presently in France on a sixty-day leave with a mission from the Dutch peace party. Dangeau recorded the curiosity that on 10 September 1705 Alègre was the only “courtier” invited to Marly, unaware that he was there to confer with the king and Torcy on the Dutch peace feelers and was soon invested with full powers to carry proposals to Heinsius and, if possible, Marlborough. Although initially a paroled officer dealing with Chamillart, Alègre was now clearly part of Torcy’s team and, unlike Helvétius, coordinated his efforts with those of the foreign office’s contact Mollo while in The Hague.204 Torcy’s proposal (6 October 1705), the first since the onset of war to officially countenance a partition, offered the following: to Archduke Charles, Bavaria; to Max Emanuel, the Two Sicilies; to the Dutch, a strong barrier and sovereignty over Upper Guelders and Limburg; to Britain, guaranteed trade with Spain and her colonies; and to Philip V, retention of Spain, her overseas empire, and Milan. Alègre was also to probe Marlborough’s peace sentiments delicately and, if positive, promise him a royal “gift” of two million livres for playing peacemaker.205 Whereas Helvétius had been unable to see Heinsius directly, once Alègre finally reached The Hague on 28 November, he soon met with Heinsius, Buys, Dussen, and others, and did so often.206 Unfortunately, his proposals and alternatives pleased no one. Torcy reminded him that he was dealing with difficult people and authorized additional concessions, but to no avail. Rejecting these offers as insufficient, especially for Archduke Charles, the Dutch nevertheless declined to make counteroffers.207 Discussions, in trouble from late December, largely ended when the Dutch accused Versailles of deceitfulness in conducting s­ imultaneous

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peace talks, citing as evidence a January letter from Helvétius to ­Nieupoort.208 While it is unlikely that Torcy had re-authorized the physician as his agent, the Dutch were under pressure, Marlborough having urged Heinsius from London to hasten Alègre’s departure for confinement in England, “for his stay at The Hague makes a noyse [sic].” Here he was referring to Parliament’s discomfort at rumours of secret negotiations. While some in the United Provinces were ready to talk peace, most there and in England were not.209 At Torcy’s behest Du Puy returned to The Hague from Geneva in April 1706 to follow up on Alègre’s mission. Sicco van Goslinga, Frisian deputy to the States-General and field deputy to the army, had long known Du Puy. From their conversations, Goslinga believed that France was sincere about wanting a reasonable peace, but he thought that Allied demands were excessive and doubted that Marlborough, whom he called ambitious and greedy, wanted peace. Although others in the government agreed with him, most leaned toward the self-serving English position that all French talk of peace aimed only at splitting the Alliance.210 While disappointed, Torcy looked to Tessé’s substantial army and naval expedition that was assembling to recapture Barcelona, consoling Alègre with the hope that its success would decide more than all the propositions they could make.211 Unfortunately, the siege failed and the road opened for an Allied advance on Madrid. Matters worsened after battles at Ramillies (23 May) and Turin (7 September), when France lost the Spanish Netherlands and then northern Italy. These accumulating woes gave rise in 1706 to what Bély describes as four networks and channels of negotiations, two emanating from the Spanish Netherlands and two from France. Count Bergeyck, Philip V’s administrator of the Spanish Netherlands, extended peace feelers on his own to Dussen well before Ramillies. Torcy learned of them after the battle from Rouillé, and Bergeyck subsequently consulted him on alternative proposals, but by summer’s end this channel was dry.212 Torcy also had to deal with the semi-­independent diplomacy of the Bavarian elector in Brussels. Feeling increasingly sidelined, Max opened a channel to Marlborough in mid-July to address his own interests at the expense of France. Rouillé was drawn reluctantly into conversations with Max, who pretended that his peace proposal actually came from Marlborough. By September this path had proven unproductive, but Torcy and the king kept it open as they waited to see how things developed with parallel proposals under direct discussion with the Dutch.213



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Adding to Torcy’s chagrin, of the two channels directly connected to Versailles, only one flowed through the foreign office. Managed by Callières, this channel was in response to word from Mollo that Dutch republicans remained anxious for peace on the basis of the Second Partition Treaty, which would remove Philip V from Spain but leave him with Naples and Sicily. It bore no immediate fruit and earned Callières and Mollo a strong word of caution from Torcy owing to intelligence that their enthusiasm for it was making it seem a firmer offer than it was.214 The other channel originated with Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux, a former ambassador to the Dutch (1678–88 and 1701) with long-established ties with anti-Orange republicans. Disparaging approaches to Marlborough and the English, he convinced Chamillart that the path to peace lay through the Province of Holland’s republicans. The previous winter d’Avaux had introduced Chamillart to Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin, who was in Paris on business. In early July they entrusted the Dutchman with a message for Heinsius, first cousin of Hennequin’s brother-in-law.215 With Hennequin’s first report at the end of July, d’Avaux enthused to Chamillart that this channel looked quite promising.216 Heinsius shared with Marlborough and Holland’s deputies Hennequin’s revealing account from Paris, assuming that Chamillart’s eagerness for peace likely reflected Louis’s sentiments. The terms proposed offered much more than Alègre’s final offer: Philip V retained only Guiposcoa, Navarre, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia in Spain and Milan; the archduke received the rest of Spain and its territories; the Republic received the Spanish Netherlands; and the Dutch gained commercial concessions, including a reversion to the 1664 tariff.217 The Dutch found the partition of Spain itself strange and objected to Bourbon control of Milan.218 Hennequin later clarified the earlier offer by dropping the division of Spain and augmenting Philip V’s portion with Naples and Sicily.219 D’Avaux and Chamillart, who believed that a treaty could be achieved in eight days, grew increasingly impatient for a positive Dutch response, anxious that once word of their negotiations was out, the war minister would lose his control over them. As August wore on, Chamillart lamented that he would never have begun these negotiations had Hennequin not frequently assured him of the Republic’s pacific desires and pressed for a positive response by month’s end.220 Fearing counter-moves from Torcy, Chamillart wanted a quick triumph to blunt any recriminations and threatened to turn the negotiations over to Torcy if the Dutch did not reply clearly and promptly.221 Aware that Torcy would not be pleased with his clandestine c­ ollaboration with C ­ hamillart,

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d’Avaux began to worry when the anticipated swift success failed to materialize. In late August he notified Hennequin that ­Marlborough had sought to short-circuit their talks with his own approach to Max in Brussels and Torcy had heard about it from Rouillé. To forestall these rival pourparlers, d’Avaux said that he was now obliged to share with Torcy a part of Hennequin’s interactions with Chamillart, but asked that his own previous knowledge of them go unmentioned in any subsequent letters.222 Clearly, negotiations through Hennequin had been undertaken without the foreign minister’s knowledge. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous Helvétius was back in The Hague, snooping into mail passing through, sending Chamillart what news he gathered, and talking with Hennequin about his negotiations.223 Paul Sharp observes that the realist tradition’s metaphor of diplomacy as a game “suggests that the game … can be more or less well played.” Thus, “good diplomacy and good diplomats can be seen, not just as elements of power and instruments of policy, but as somehow capable of finessing both.”224 Chamillart was a poor negotiator. Worse than his impatience was his guilelessness, which compromised Torcy’s endeavour to play his master’s bad hand to the best advantage. Hennequin was Dutch, Heinsius’s kinsman, a magistrate, and a merchant, so when Chamillart insisted that he was unable to haggle (“marchander”) and spoke only truthfully and sincerely, it must have been clear in the Republic that they were dealing with someone who knew nothing of the haggling between states called “diplomacy.” Astonishingly, he confessed that France was no longer able to defend herself without self-harm and that maintaining Philip V’s entire holdings would ruin an already exhausted France.225 To be sure, Allied intelligence reports and the English and Dutch press had for some time embraced what Jamel Ostwald calls the “fragile France” model: “either a quick battle and invasion or a year or two of blockade would be enough to bring France to its knees – and throughout the war this French weakness was used as an argument to continue the war to force France to even better terms, not sign a premature peace that Louis would later renege on.”226 All the same, an explicit confirmation from France’s chief war and fiscal administrator was significant and suggested that a desperate Louis XIV had himself authorized this abject appeal.227 Disclosing the despondency expressed by the king and his ministers in camera contradicted the more positive face the foreign secretary wore in negotiations and suggested division among the king’s advisors, violating one of the reasons for keeping council discussions secret.228 If those trying to anticipate French moves supposed that Louis and his m ­ inisters



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were turning a blind eye to a hopeless reality, that was one thing, but it was something quite different if they knew that the French leadership saw clearly how impossible their ­situation was. The desperate might always “hope till Hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates,” and it is not without reason that a later French leader observed that “a leader is a dealer in hope.”229 This raises the question of the king’s role in Chamillart’s initiative.230 After an account of Rouillé’s 1709 mission to the Republic, Saint-Simon added what he described as two relevant but largely unknown anecdotes that he said took place not long before. Although writing at least twenty years later, he claimed that his account was based on what he learned from Chamillart and Beauvillier, his friends at the time, and from Torcy, his friend only later.231 According to the duke, Chamillart sought to remove peace negotiations from Torcy and, with the king’s knowledge, sent agents abroad to seek contacts and intimated that the foreign minister’s operatives were straw men through whom nothing would be accomplished. Torcy instructed his agents to return the favour, thus creating abroad the spectacle of royal ministers with opposing interests. The only examples of the parallel diplomacy that Saint-Simon cited, however, were Helvétius’s two missions to Holland.232 In one sentence he speculated on the jesting at home and abroad that resulted from a doctor serving as a diplomat and then pictured Torcy and Chamillart reporting separately to a king who permitted this embarrasment. Torcy recognized the harm this did to diplomacy and his own position, but Saint-Simon said that he stood powerless before Chamillart’s royal favour and could only protest ineffectually to the war minister through Beauvillier. Thus, what Saint-Simon alleged took place through Helvétius was a parallel diplomacy sanctioned by and acknowledged to his ministers by the king. This is vintage Saint-Simon: dramatic and detailed, but not without difficulties. Which two missions served as his examples of parallel diplomacy? In 1705 both ministers reported to the king on Helvétius’s mission, but as we have seen, although this was unusual they did this together. Although the doctor was Chamillart’s protégé, the mission was authorized in the Conseil and Torcy wrote his instructions. ­Helvétius’s December 1707–February 1708 mission served as cover for Mesnager’s negotiations on the West Indies trade. Even though Torcy wrote Mesnager’s instructions, both ministers were involved, since commerce was Chamillart’s concern. As for the March–April 1708 mission, it is unclear what it was, but it does not appear to have taken place without Torcy’s knowledge and participation.233 Whatever Torcy’s ­distaste for

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having to share the management of a mission with his colleague, none of those undertaken by Helvétius really fit Saint-Simon’s description of a parallel diplomacy: he neither negotiated nor traveled as Chamillart’s emissary without Torcy’s knowledge. Yet Saint-Simon says nothing of the Hennequin negotiations that for a time were an example of parallel diplomacy. Perhaps after misconstruing Helvétius’s missions and confounding them with Hennequin’s negotiations, he painted Chamillart’s covert diplomacy with broad strokes to imply a picture of the royally sanctioned divided diplomacy known to all the king’s ministers.234 Again, this account was written after the reign on the basis of information gathered later, and Saint-Simon’s antipathy to Louis XIV certainly disposed him to place his actions in a bad light. Yet it is curious that the duke’s 1712 anonymous and critical letter to the king made no mention of any of this and instead portrayed the foreign minister as firmly in control of the flow of diplomatic information to the king and his Conseil.235 Like his contemporaries, Saint-Simon knew of Chamillart’s general fishing in foreign policy waters and the involvement of both ministers in ­Helvétius’s 1705 mission, but it was apparently only long after 1712 that, when composing his memoirs, he interpreted it in the context of what he came to see as Louis XIV’s complicity in an ongoing and openly divided diplomacy. Supplementing Saint-Simon’s account with other sources suggests no less a complicated picture of Louis XIV’s conduct of diplomacy in 1706. One of Chamillart’s letters to Hennequin began with the admission that “[i]l n’a sûrement pas plus couté au Roy de prendre sa résolution sur les propositions, que je vous ay faites, qu’à moy de m’en charger” (it surely did not cost the king more to decide on the propositions that I have made to you than it did for me to take charge of them). He then pointed to the secrecy necessary “pour que cette négociation fût restée entre mes mains” (in order for that negotiation to remain in my hands) and declared his unwillingness to “en demeurer chargé avantage” (remain charged with it anymore) without terms preserving Bourbon honour.236 It is unlikely that he was talking about keeping secrets from the king, as that would have been too risky.237 In later acknowledging that Louis’s support for this approach eventually wavered owing to lack of results, Saint-Simon noted that Torcy successfully threatened Chamillart with going to the king, not to inform him of the war minister’s negotiations but to have him decide which of them was to direct diplomacy.238 Thus, what Saint-Simon took for a royally blessed system of competitive and parallel diplomacy undertaken with his ministers’ knowledge was in



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reality a secret du roi “which bypassed the secretary of state for foreign affairs and official channels.”239 Louis had authorized the war minister to negotiate with Hennequin without the knowledge of his foreign secretary and other ministers. At the very end of July, Antoine Sersanders, president of the Council of Flanders (now under Allied occupation), approached Max, his former master, on behalf of a mysterious friend of peace, whom he later revealed to be Marlborough, to initiate talks on the basis of Mollo’s last proposal, the Second Partition Treaty. When informed of this by ­Rouillé, Louis and Torcy agreed to pursue this channel.240 It was apparently at this point that the king had to let Torcy in on what had been passing between Chamillart and Hennequin, for d’Avaux announced to the latter on 27 August that he had to share a part of it with Torcy.241 On 2 September he further informed the merchant that things had occurred obliging him and Chamillart to inform Beauvillier and Torcy of the full negotiations and share with them the Dutchman’s letters. While reassuring him that these ministers were quite satisfied and thought well of him, he expressed doubt that either understood as well as he did the difficulties Hennequin faced in steering their proposals through the Republic’s slow-moving political machinery.242 Meanwhile, Chamillart’s mounting disappointment turned bitter. He regarded Marlborough’s initiative as a ruse to paralyze French and Spanish forces in Italy. Writing H ­ ennequin on 20 September to update him on the details of the Marlborough negotiations, Chamillart argued that Dutch and English interests were not the same and urged Hennequin to come to France as quickly as possible to conclude a negotiation he over-optimistically characterized as on the eve of conclusion. He claimed sullenly that the assurances he had given the king of the nearing success of their negotiations prevented him from sending troops to Italy, which would have prevented the ignominious Turin defeat on 7 September 1706. He reproached Hennequin for fostering these false hopes and self-servingly complained that his good faith had cost France dearly.243 Although he later, perhaps grudgingly, absolved Hennequin of collusion with Marlborough, Chamillart despaired of peace, vowing to leave to others the cares of dealing with the Dutch when peace finally became possible and declaring that he had told d’Avaux that he would renounce any role in what followed. Framing the matter in terms of rivalry with the foreign minister, which supports Saint-Simon’s sense of Chamillart’s motives, he complained that ­Callières and Mollo (who both served Torcy) would greatly benefit from all this. Spitefully, he let drop that Mollo had some time ago ­predicted

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failure, saying that Heinsius lacked the confidence in H ­ ennequin required to conclude peace through him.244 Marlborough, anticipating more concessions, wrote Heinsius that the “blow in Pie[d]mont must creat [sic] great trouble at the court of France, so that I do not doubt but you will have new proposals from M. ­Chamillard [sic],” but none were forthcoming.245 D’Avaux reassured Hennequin that although he was sure that Torcy would be quite happy should the initiative pass to him, he surmised that this would not happen so long as Hennequin’s negotiations continued. A week later, while still hoping for success, d’Avaux repeated Chamillart’s earlier threat of abandoning negotiations if their failure threatened him with reproach.246 Meanwhile, d’Avaux and the war minister heaped opprobrium on Mollo and Callières, alleging that they were attempting to disrupt and discredit Hennequin’s negotiations out of jealousy.247 In contrast, Torcy had d’Avaux write to Hennequin that his mission had failed owing to lack of support from the States-General and that with negotiations with Marlborough now appearing to move forward, his restraint in proposing nothing directly that might derail them was commendable. To further limit damage, Torcy wrote the merchant personally (22 November 1706) that Chamillart had shared his letters and that d’Avaux would remain involved but would now be working through the foreign office. Unlike Chamillart, however, Torcy stressed not French weakness, but war weariness among all the combatants and the need not to leave to Louis XIV alone the merit of re-establishing peace. In carefully calculated terms, he assured Hennequin that he and Chamillart had the same wish for the success of these negotiations and were united in their replies. But the subtext was that the king had given up on his secret du roi and turned over these negotiations to Torcy to direct and coordinate with the others.248 Chastened, Louis XIV had indeed decided in early October 1706 to abandon secret talks through individuals not authorized to negotiate and henceforth to employ only duly designated agents, since the informal multi-channel approach had only fed fears of French machinations. Rouillé was tasked with proposing the public peace conference Callières had suggested at the Flanders front, but in a personal letter, Torcy expressed skepticism about what he admitted was presently their sole hope for solid negotiations. Rouillé, likewise dubious, correctly predicted that far from lowering Allied anxieties, this new French initiative would raise further suspicion. By the end of November Max informed Louis XIV that the Maritime Powers declined a conference. The die was



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cast, and in December Torcy instructed Hennequin to inform the StatesGeneral that henceforth France would negotiate only through and with fully empowered envoys.249 We will discuss later what motivated Chamillart and the king to pursue this secret du roi, but for now it is instructive to contrast the­­different ways that Torcy and Chamillart managed the aftermath of these failed talks. Torcy protested to Hennequin that he did not seek to divide the Allies and had orders not do so, but would argue simply on the basis of England’s outlook in contrast to Dutch interests. He acknowledged defeat at Turin, but playing to the Maritime Powers’ growing mistrust of the emperor and the Duke of Savoy, he emphasized that it gave the emperor control of Milan. He did the same with Bourbon losses in Spain, assuring Hennequin that the archduke could only replace Philip V on his throne and in the Spanish people’s hearts at the cost of much Dutch blood and bullion. Indeed, such were the positive changes (as he presented them) in French fortunes that, as Torcy made it clear, the terms rejected by the Maritime Powers were no longer on the table. Any new talks would start from scratch. He expressed the king’s willingness to have secret talks either at Versailles or in the Republic, concluding positively if not over-optimistically that when one does not want to finish negotiations, matters are difficult, but when one’s intentions are good, difficulties are removed.250 By contrast, while chagrined by his diplomatic disappointment, Chamillart had only dimly seen the error of his ways. After confessing to ­Hennequin in December 1706 his inaptitude for diplomacy, he added that his ardent desire for peace would not prevent him from finding the necessary resources to continue the war to thwart the harsh terms the Allies had previously hoped to impose. He repudiated his earlier actions, repented of having advised the king to offer such outrageous concessions, thanked God that since rejected by the Allies they were now off the table, and expressed the hope that he might find sufficient “forces,” which could mean either strength or troops, to sustain the great task he was now obliged to take up again. In whatever portion his regret was heart-felt or merely what he was required to write as damage control, his hope that he would find sufficient “forces” still sounded less confident than Torcy likely desired.251 D’Avaux reiterated to Hennequin on 3 January 1707 that the king had made it clear that Torcy alone was to direct negotiations and serve as the sole recipient of his communications; any effort to bypass him would incur royal displeasure and impair negotiations. Hennequin’s letters were to speak to Torcy of diplomacy and only

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offer Chamillart personal greetings.252 But being without result, contact ended as hostilities resumed at the end of May 1707.253 Unfortunately, Louis’s secret du roi had raised lingering questions as to the identity of his diplomatic point man. William Gregg (or Greg), a former secretary to his uncle on a diplomatic mission to Denmark and ­presently an impecunious clerk in Secretary of State Robert ­Harley’s office, sought to retail diplomatic secrets in October 1707 by contacting Chamillart and sending him copies of confidential papers. His treason was soon uncovered by continental postal agents in British pay and he was hanged.254 Following the ratification of the treaty recognizing the loss of Milan, Ambassador Amelot, apparently under the impression that the war minister was again engaged in covert talks, wrote ­Chamillart from Madrid in July 1707 to urge him to inform Spain’s king and queen of the treaty unless it was the king’s wish otherwise. Amelot also asked that Chamillart at least keep him informed so that he could guard French interests. Chamillart assured Amelot that there were no negotiations under way, but rather than referring him to Torcy, he told him what a lack of funds had forced the king to consider conceding in future talks and authorized Amelot to impart these secrets to Ursins if he saw fit.255 At the beginning of November 1707 Bagnols in Brussels forwarded the States-General’s feelers to Chamillart, but either chastened by the Hennequin fiasco or because he thought little of this lead, he apparently deferred to Torcy, who immediately prepared instructions (dated 6 November 1707) for limited negotiations so that Bagnols could test Dutch sincerity. Torcy patiently probed and pushed the Dutch until this channel ran dry.256 Torcy’s antipathy toward Chamillart’s amateur diplomacy was apparently driven by policy rather than pride. No matter who took them or how numerous they were, France’s steps toward talks would trip over one another unless carefully coordinated. To mix metaphors, without harmonization, multiple channels produced a cacophony of proposals easily misconstrued as ploys to foster division, as that tactic had been used during the last war.257 Torcy did not permit disdain for his colleague’s impatient intrusion into his craft to blind him to the useful opportunities and operatives that were its by-product. When an associate of Heinsius sent for Helvétius in November 1707, allegedly for a medical consultation but also for a passport valid for five persons, Torcy and the king saw an opportunity to address Dutch commercial concerns. The author of the February 1706 exclusion of the Dutch from the Spanish Indies was Rouen official Nicolas Mesnager, member of the French



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Council of Commerce and Chamillart’s trade representative in Spain from December 1704 to April 1706. Chamillart first noticed Mesnager while serving in Normandy as intendant. Mesnager also had a close working relationship with Navy Secretary Jérôme ­Pontchartrain, also interested in overseas commerce.258 Torcy saw him as the perfect agent to accompany Helvétius in December 1707 to scratch the Dutch burghers’ commercial itch.259 Mesnager’s secret economic mission quickly accomplished, the Dutch tried to move him beyond his instructions to discuss territorial matters. With the limited expectations for his mission accomplished, however, a satisfied Torcy summoned him home the following February,260 but had him continue corresponding with the Dutch.261 Mesnager’s return to court coincided with Chamillart’s resignation as controller general on 20 February because of his health and the weight of work, as Torcy graciously announced to Abbé Pomponne. Clearly happy with this change and Chamillart’s replacement by his cousin ­Desmaretz, Torcy tellingly added that France herself had great resources even when they were badly managed.262 Mesnager’s negotiations are a reminder that interdepartmental rivalry over commerce was triangular because it concerned the controller general and the navy and foreign secretaries.263 A roughly contemporary bureaucratic boundary dispute led Torcy to rebuke Pomponne for following the navy secretary’s instructions to discuss with the Venetians a list of merchandise for possible trade with France. Protecting his own turf and that of his cousin, Torcy insisted that this was a matter for the controller general, not the navy secretary, and admonished the ambassador to be more careful in the future and remember that it was not for Jérôme P ­ ontchartrain to propose treaties.264 The abbé replied that formerly it had scarcely mattered to him whether trade was under ­Pontchartrain or Chamillart, but now that such matters were under Torcy’s and D ­ esmaretz’s direction, they were joined in the same hands.265 His concern was for unity of policy and voice in commercial negotiations. Given the numerous competing lobbies and networks, it was natural for Pomponne to envision Torcy as more likely to be in harmony with his kinsmen Desmaretz than with the rival Pontchartrain clan or the upstart Chamillart.266 Torcy’s differences with Chamillart related as well to the role of diplomacy during Louis XIV’s wars, which differed from what it has been since Napoleon. John A. Lynn usefully distinguishes between the dominant modern paradigm of “war-as-event” and the pre-Napoleonic paradigm of “war-as-process” characteristic of Louis XIV’s era. Whereas the

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modern war-as-event is seen as a crisis to be resolved quickly by means of a battlefield knockout blow, war-as-process reflects “the indecisive character of battle and siege, the slow tempo of operations, the strong resolve to make war feed war, the powerful influence of attrition, and the considerable emphasis given to ongoing diplomatic negotiations.”267 This had several consequences for how Torcy played his role as foreign secretary. Like diplomats in modern wars, those of Louis XIV’s era were occupied during hostilities with shoring up alliances, seeking new ones, and scheming to detach members from the coalition of their foes.268 In modern conflicts, peace negotiations typically begin only toward the end when matters have been largely determined on the battlefield and diplomacy is “little more than [a] mop-up operation,” while in Torcy’s time, combatants began negotiations early. The difference between war-asevent and war-as-process meant that “Napoleon dictated” after decisive battles, whereas “Louis XIV negotiated.”269 Cardinal Richelieu confessed that it took him several years of experience managing France’s foreign affairs to realize that “it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, whether openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits are reaped and still more in those for which no future prospects as yet seem likely … He who negotiates continuously will finally find the right instant to attain his ends, and even if this does not come about, at least it can be said he has lost nothing while keeping abreast of the events of the world.”270 His reference to the diplomat as news gatherer is a reminder of this important function separate from yet preliminary to his work at the negotiating table. Louisquatorzian battles were not without importance, but rather than being decisive and ending a war in a relatively unambiguous manner, they shared significance with two other factors. One was the ability of a state or coalition to muster and sustain the financial resources that allowed Mars to be fed in order to fight. Guy Rowlands notes that Chamillart’s “financial policies from mid-1709 onwards were placing Louis XIV in a race between utter bankruptcy and a tolerable diplomatic solution to the conflict.”271 The other was what Lynn calls “diplomatic finesse,” or the skill with which one played one’s financial cards along with those won or lost through sieges, pitched battle, and other military events.272 As Jeremy Black notes, “Diplomacy was intended to ensure profit from the use of force, just as force was seen as the way to pursue diplomatic goals.”273 In 1708 in Madrid, Louis XIV and Torcy instructed Amelot to make it clear to Philip V that talking peace was not a bad



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thing and that it was impossible to manage one’s interests without talking, especially in order that, after such a long and unfortunate war, force would not be permitted to decide the peace terms.274 Callières contended that “there is in the art of negotiating a certain dexterity, which consists in knowing how to take things by the proper handle.”275 As diplomats talked, armies took to the field and fleets sailed, hoping to avoid defeat or gain a victory to be parlayed into a more favourable settlement at the negotiating table.276 Callières reminded a Dutch agent in 1694 that the events of war necessarily change circumstances and minds, giving fresh hopes and new views to both parties.277 Torcy similarly noted in 1711 that the best way to advance peace was to prepare well for war, and the following year he labeled the loss of Le Quesnoy an evident setback to negotiations then under way at Utrecht.278 Even as plenipotentiaries negotiated, they were eager to know their foe’s financial health but anxious to conceal their own treasury’s true state, all the while making a show of their master’s ability to continue the war. Since years of victory or defeat could be undone by the defection of an ally, faltering finances, or military successes in the final round of a war of attrition, the foreign secretary had to have a finger on the financial and political pulse of all the belligerents as well as an eye on the war on land and sea.279 This was another reason Desmaretz’s rise to controller general in 1708 benefited his cousin, likewise avid for war information by way of the war minister or his own informants scattered at the fronts, along the frontiers, and throughout Europe.280 From 1709, for example, Torcy and Villars stayed in close contact so that they could coordinate negotiations and warfare to achieve the best peace possible, writing candidly and sharing the most secret information. When Prior and Gaultier arrived at Versailles in July 1711 with Queen Anne’s authorization for secret negotiations, Torcy wrote Villars that the army’s ability to carry on the war would determine his capacity to resist British demands and gain better terms. No one could better make the former crucial determination, he readily confessed, than the army’s commander.281 The legacy of Louis XIV’s secret diplomacy of 1706 lay heavily upon future contacts. Petkum, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s diplomatic resident at The Hague and Heinsius’s friend and agent, sought to mediate a settlement. He contacted Torcy, was invited to Versailles for lengthy discussions in late December 1707, and corresponded with him after his January departure to report to Heinsius.282 Autumn rumours of ­Helvétius’s return to The Hague, however, had nearly aborted P ­ etkum’s Versailles trip. Although, as we have seen, Helvétius traveled as cover for Mesnager,

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who had a mandate limited to commercial matters, the Dutch were suspicious, and Petkum, accusing Torcy of double-dealing, protested that he was being shoved aside while peace proposals were being brought daily to Heinsius by someone the pensionary disliked.283 Alluding to 1706, he was “convinced that the conduct of those who were employed last year hindered, instead of helping to, peace by giving the Allies a lower idea of France’s strength.”284 Unlike Chamillart, Torcy sparred with Petkum without revealing French weakness, but when he complained of Allied obduracy, Petkum replied that their mistrust resulted from France’s shifting propositions through different channels. Although he insisted that the king was sincere and that Heinsius should ignore those who claimed to represent him, Torcy could not so easily escape the legacy of 1706.285 When Petkum discovered that news of his contacts with Torcy on Heinsius’s behalf had leaked out, he wrote the foreign minister that he suspected Du Puy, whom he believed to be Chamillart’s agent and making his own peace overtures. However, Torcy defended Du Puy, who was in Amsterdam on his behalf and unaware of Petkum’s mission.286 He also assured Petkum that he was France’s preferred channel and that Du Puy, no longer a French agent, had no mandate and would not be a part of future talks without ­Petkum’s approval.287 French defeat at Oudenarde (11 July 1708) provoked Chamillart to new intrusions into diplomacy during the siege that led to the loss of Lille (13 August to 8 December). The Duke of Berwick, in Flanders from the Rhine front to support Lille, was in private communication with his uncle Marlborough, whose forces covered Eugene’s besieging army. When Marlborough wrote in late August that he could best foster peace talks if France first sent a proposal to the States-General, Berwick, after consulting with Torcy, replied that any such initiative would have to come from the Dutch. Chamillart, at the front to mediate between the quarreling Burgundy and Vendôme, remained skeptical of ­Marlborough’s motives, but Torcy was willing to work this opening with due caution.288 When Berwick received another encouraging letter from Marlborough on 30 October, Burgundy suggested that he forward it to the foreign minister and that Chamillart write to Torcy as well for the king’s instructions as to a reply. Torcy and his commis quickly prepared memoirs to advise the king, who then sent various guidelines to Burgundy, Chamillart, and ­Berwick on crafting a careful but positive reply. Torcy’s accompanying letter to Chamillart showed cautious optimism. The war minister reported to Torcy that he had worked with ­Berwick on a reply that he hoped would conform to the instructions, but



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a­ ccording to Berwick, Chamillart, “through excess of policy, had taken it into his head that this proposal of Marlborough’s proceeded only from the bad situation the allied army was in,” a conclusion he called “beyond my penetration.”289 Berwick believed that Marlborough, like the rest of ­Europe, wanted peace, and rather than to confess Allied doubts, he wrote to him proposing that they open a negotiations channel. When ­Chamillart dictated the reply (5 November 1708), Berwick found it so bizarre that he wrote it down in French so that his uncle would know it was not his. As he suspected, the duke “was indeed so much offended at it, that no use could be made of this opening to bring about a peace.” In Berwick’s opinion, this was the main reason Marlborough soured on the peace process.290 Torcy, put out by the rudeness of the reply, at first chided Berwick. Burgundy as well regretted the reply, and before the end of the month Berwick – doubtless contentedly – was back in Germany and no longer part of these intrigues.291 In his defence of Utrecht, Bolingbroke later wrote: “I know most certainly, that France lost, two years before [1708], by the little skill and address of her principal1 [at the bottom of the page: ‘1 Chamillard [sic]’] minister, in answering overtures made during the siege of Lisle by a principal person among the allies,2 [at the bottom of the page: ‘2 ­Marlborough’] such an opportunity, and such a correspondence, as would have removed some of the obstacles that lay now in her way, have prevented others, and have procured her peace.”292 Although we cannot know with certainty how damaging Chamillart’s actions were to real possibilities of peace at any given moment, it would be a mistake to discount the role of skilful diplomacy or its lack in the timing and shape of any peace settlement, since negotiations accomplish more than the ratification of outcomes determined by military and domestic considerations. As informal written and face-to-face discussions sputtered on during 1708 and Torcy had to float further concessions, Chamillart’s diplomatic activities continued.293 The harsh winter of 1708–09 began “a crisis of unprecedented breadth as France faced military disaster, financial ruin, and mass starvation. The king responded with the most remarkable two years of his reign, surmounting all challenges in a way that astonished his contemporaries, especially his enemies.”294 As his administrators scrambled to scrape together resources to feed the people and maintain the army in its Flanders frontier holding action, his diplomats proffered olive branches without rushing to give up too much at the peace table. Torcy pursued two channels in early 1709.295 One was by way of ­Flanders intendant Maignart de Bernières and his ­counterpart

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in the Allied-­occupied Spanish Netherlands, the States-­General’s deputy Nicolas de Pesters, in frequent contact through administrating a common frontier. Marlborough knew both and favoured this channel, but Pesters, recalling the divided diplomacy of 1706, informed Bernières that the duke was pleased that Torcy and Chamillart were working together to authorize his mission.296 The other channel ran from Heinsius through Dussen to Flanders administrator Bergeyck, from whom D ­ ussen had received French peace proposals in 1706. During Christmas 1708 ­Dussen secretly contacted his old acquaintance for talks. Bergeyck immediately informed his friend Chamillart and kept him apprised of all they discussed. On the basis of the terms he had offered Dussen on the king’s behalf at the end of 1706 and on fresh news from Madrid indicating that he could offer the Dutch unspecified commercial advantages in the West Indies trade, Bergeyck sent Dussen a peace proposal. By the end of January 1709, convinced that the Dutch were serious about negotiating, ­Bergeyck arranged a secret meeting with Chamillart at his estate, hoping to avoid questions by avoiding Versailles. It is not clear why B ­ ergeyck’s plan to work only through Chamillart failed. From the outset he had chosen to share his secret news from Madrid and The Hague only with the war minister. His Dutch contacts were clearly jealous of the other French agents at work on Torcy’s behalf, hoping that C ­ hamillart would be given sole direction of the negotiations.297 His visit turned out to be more than a clandestine meeting with Chamillart, triggering speculation at court. On 1 February Dangeau noted with curiosity Bergeyck’s three days of royal audiences with only Chamillart present, while ­Sourches recorded on 4 February his long meeting with the king, work with Torcy, and visit to Chamillart at his estate, from whence he returned to Flanders.298 Had a chastened Chamillart decided to share this promising channel with the foreign secretary or had Torcy found out about it, perhaps at some point during Bergeyck’s visit?299 In any event, the king had now charged Torcy with managing this channel. In announcing this new direction to ­Boufflers on 15 February, Torcy explained that while Marlborough thought that the Bernières-Pesters conferences were useful, Heinsius disagreed. M ­ arlborough did not approve of talks through Dussen, bu­t Bergeyck believed that this would be the sure path to peace and had so convinced the king. Although the Bernières-­ Pesters channel was now closed, Torcy noted to Boufflers that the terms ­Dussen had offered Bergeyck were unfortunately too much like those Pesters had demanded.300 The foreign secretary thus saw a fruitful lead under his care superseded by one that offered nothing better and had th­e



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­ isadvantage of running through Chamillart’s friend, exposing it to the d war minister’s meddling. The difference between the two ministers was again manifest in how each handled this channel. Chamillart wrote Bergeyck that he was impatient to have a fuller account of these clandestine contacts, adding that if they had been undertaken in good faith, Bergeyck would soon notice.301 Torcy, however, reacted with his customary mix of subtlety and patience.302 Advising a straightforward response, to which the king and Bergeyck agreed, Torcy wrote Dussen a polite, but concise, non-­ combative reply that agreed to negotiate on the proposed conditions, announced the king’s choice of councillor of state Daniel Voysin as negotiator, and requested passports for Voysin and Bergeyck.303 Although a conference had thus been settled on, the details had not, but these were clearly now in Torcy’s hands and Dussen informed Bergeyck that for security’s sake and the matter’s importance and utility, since he would negotiate only with France’s designated representative, they could no longer correspond.304 Despite Torcy’s entreaties, Voysin declined the appointment, apparently regarding it as too risky to his career; ­Rouillé, named in his place, received instructions from Torcy on 3 March 1709.305 At long last, peace talks were apparently to begin in earnest. Leaving to one side for the moment the king’s role in all of this, what beyond France’s deteriorating military and financial position accounts for Chamillart’s incursions into diplomacy? Again, the line between war and diplomacy is never crisp, and this was true in 1703, even though Chamillart had naively insisted to Torcy that the war secretary’s functions had nothing in common with those of the foreign secretary.306 Saint-Simon, however, offered a more specific explanation when he claimed that his friend Chamillart was struck by being the heir of the two great ministers Colbert and Louvois. Impressed and inspired by the latter’s forays into diplomacy, he had transcriptions prepared from ministry archives of Louvois’s numerous negotiations.307 Indeed, Chamillart reminded Hennequin in 1706 that as war secretary and controller general he not only conducted a multi-front war, but had to be concerned with tariffs, commercial treaties, and any Dutch fortress that might face France.308 He likely saw himself as the minister best placed to judge France’s ability to push the war or press for peace. As the intimate of Louis and his consort, he held the king’s ear and favour. As a minister of state, he was privy to and participant in the Conseil’s secret discussions of foreign policy. He even earned the appellation of “principal minister” from as astute a participant in the peace negotiations as Bolingbroke.309

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As one might suspect, there are no records of the war minister’s many conversations with the king. Nevertheless, it seems likely that C ­ hamillart approached the king with promises of a channel certain to produce peace quickly, but only if kept in absolute secrecy from the other ministers, including the foreign secretary, who already had agents pursuing other paths, apparently without success. D’Avaux introduced ­Chamillart and Hennequin and served as their intermediary and as the war minister’s counselor in guiding these talks. The former ambassador to the Dutch was certain that his republican friends could be brought to terms if France made enough concessions. Perhaps his wide diplomatic experience and his service at the Nijmegen peace congress as a negotiator with Croissy, father of the youngish (almost a quarter century his junior) current foreign minister, may have led d’Avaux to see himself as more skilled and knowledgeable in such matters. Moreover, d’Avaux had been a member of Louvois’s clientele and was one of his chief informants, even though he served under Croissy as an ambassador.310 Obtaining peace in such short order would surely have crowned his long and distinguished career. There is likely an element of redemption and revenge in this as well. D’Avaux probably had not forgiven Callières and Mollo for developing the negotiating channel during the Nine Years War that eventually superseded the official one he was pursuing and led to Ryswick.311 Yet even with the king’s blessing, sending out agents to initiate peace talks and keeping Torcy and the rest of the Conseil in the dark until they could be presented with a peace treaty constituted a risky trespass on his colleagues’ prerogatives. Chamillart’s and d’Avaux’s insistence on concealment suggests that they understood this but thought that a stunning success would sweep any objections aside.312 Louis, shaken by the evacuation of Flanders, likewise must have thought the same. For all his ambitions, Chamillart’s writing style nonetheless betrayed an overstated sensitivity, a lack of self-confidence, and a penchant for lamentation.313 In contrast to Torcy, neither Chamillart’s training nor his temperament afforded him the patience required to bring delicate negotiations to fruition.314 Some months following his failed attempt to broker peace, he candidly confessed to Hennequin that he had abandoned their negotiations because they had not gone well enough to give him a taste for a profession in which he was inexperienced and had been counterproductive.315 Perhaps he had an inkling of what others saw in him. Some years later Chevreuse offered Fénelon, a fellow member of the peace party, an appraisal of the Conseil’s members. While filled with praises for Torcy’s conduct of diplomacy, Chevreuse gave a startling,



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terse, and candid evaluation of his friend Chamillart: he was always useless for the important affairs (“inutiles pour les grandes affaires”).316 At the end of that year, Torcy wrote in his journal of the setbacks that resulted from Chamillart’s secret negotiations and that cost France what little good opinion the enemy still had of her forces and her affairs. He found it insupportable that the minister entrusted with war and finances would inform the enemy that an absolutely exhausted France was on the brink and that it was not in the interest of the Dutch to let her slip over it.317 Torcy’s negative assessment, shared by contemporaries and historians alike, seems justified.318 Yet Torcy omitted here anything about the king, who at least in 1706 permitted and facilitated ­Chamillart’s initiative and turned it into a secret du roi. Balancing a realistic assessment of Chamillart’s abilities and inadequacies with recognition of the double burden he bore, Emmanuel Pénicaut nonetheless characterizes his peace initiatives as somewhat maladroit.319 Still, he endeavours to place C ­ hamillart’s actions in a better light by emphasizing the network of acquaintances he had on both sides of the Spanish Netherlands frontier that, in 1709, yielded a more productive negotiating channel than Torcy’s did. He twice refers to the channel through Bergeyck as a path opened by Chamillart.320 But this is misleading on a number of grounds. It was Dussen, not Chamillart, who initiated the channel and did so through Bergeyck, and it was the latter who apparently chose not to share it immediately with Torcy. Dussen’s encouraging letters to Mesnager indicating his favourable disposition toward peace as well as his role in late December in obtaining the release of the chevalier de Croissy, Torcy’s recently captured brother, all suggest that Dussen was out to woo rather than bypass and alienate the foreign minister.321 Pénicaut also relies on Arsène Legrelle, who misleadingly cites ­Dangeau’s report of Bergeyck huddling with the king and Chamillart, but ignores Sourches’s report a few days later of the Flemish administrator also meeting with Torcy.322 Thus, Chamillart is portrayed as having successfully challenged Torcy on his own turf by opening the channel that actually resulted in peace talks. When the king restored matters to their proper order, Pénicaut continues, he thanked the Flemish administrator and turned over to Torcy the channel opened by Chamillart, who was left only with the advantage of having nourished the first contacts. This is all portrayed as an example of the normal competition among ministers that was desired and managed by the king, although as we have seen, recent research argues against this traditional competitive model, especially for the end of the reign.323 Building on Lucien

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Bély’s ­characterization of this as a division of labour and his contention that diplomacy is careful to explore every avenue of negotiation, Pénicaut says that Torcy’s role was to carry out the preliminary negotiations resulting from the war secretary’s contact.324 Bely’s discussion, however, hardly suggests that he regards this so-called division of labour as normal or healthy.325 Furthermore, working multiple channels neither requires nor functions best in the divided and competitive system that Pénicaut posits as the norm. Moreover, Torcy honoured the principle Bély cited by making the best of Chamillart’s channels when they came his way. As for the war minister having nourished Bergeyck’s contact, as we have seen, Legrelle makes it clear that Chamillart treated this contact with impatience and mistrust, whereas the king and Torcy were the ones who patiently pursued D ­ ussen’s enigmatic overtures.326 If ­Chamillart deserves any credit here, it is for standing aside and letting the foreign minister do his job, but it is not at all clear that the war minister stood aside for that reason and indeed he may have been forced to do so. While Rouillé met with Buys and Dussen in a southern Dutch village, talk of peace, as Dangeau noted on 14 March 1709, was accompanied by the understanding that envoys must report to Torcy alone, not to Chamillart, and that this returned matters to their proper order, since such negotiations belonged to the foreign secretary.327 Torcy and the other ministers, including his kinsman Beauvillier, had long resented Chamillart’s meddling in diplomacy. Saint-Simon’s account of this, as noted earlier, is not chronologically precise, but may fit here: B ­ eauvillier confronted the war minister and threatened to take the matter to the king if he did not agree to keep to his own department. Surely aware of his declining favour and record of failed diplomatic dealings, Chamillart decided that accepting Beauvillier’s terms was better than enduring their humiliating imposition by the king, which suggests that Louis XIV had already abandoned his secret du roi even if he still tolerated Chamillart’s information-gathering and diplomatic dabbling on the edges. Torcy, however, having seen Chamillart break his word in past agreements, required Chamillart’s acceptance in writing, which Beauvillier obligingly witnessed and forwarded to him. According to Saint-Simon, this ended Chamillart’s interference in foreign affairs as well as his conflict with Torcy for the remaining months of his tenure as war secretary.328 The war minister, however, continued to correspond with Hennequin, who sent him pessimistic assessments of the negotiations from which they both were excluded.329 Yet after Chamillart was forced out as war minister on 9 June 1709, the symbolism did not go unnoticed at court that



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during Bergeyck’s next trip to Versailles (7 July), it was Torcy who presented him to the king, after which the three worked together.330 If 1709 did not represent a return to the divided diplomacy of the past, we must still account for the secret du roi pursued by Louis through Chamillart in 1706. In May 1706, with his already exhausted kingdom sagging under the burden of this new war, the king boldly launched a Flanders offensive to force the Allies to the peace table, but with the stunning defeat at Ramillies (23 May) and the rapid loss of much of the Spanish Netherlands, he saw the enemy move closer to France’s frontier and the road to Paris. The strategic enormity of this disaster, the vast amounts of territory lost, and the rapidity with which it was happening made Louis desperate for peace.331 Moreover, the aging monarch was himself hardly immune to the popular notion that the kingdom’s miseries could be relieved and the golden past restored if only he – as king the only disinterested individual in the realm – governed directly and on his own, without the injurious influence of self-seeking ministers, mistresses, and courtiers, who always had personal ambitions and clients to promote.332 He was thus willing to exercise his royal prerogative to employ a secret du roi when approached by the experienced diplomat d’Avaux, who knew the Dutch well, and the trusted Chamillart, who promised peace in a matter of weeks. Claude Le Peletier believed that in general the king had become the victim of his own impatience for peace.333 As we have seen, however, when the swift results did not appear as promised and the king realized the mischief such divided diplomacy caused the pursuit of peace, he abandoned that strategy and apparently did not return to it again.334 Saint-Simon claimed that his account of ­Chamillart’s final agreement to stay out of negotiations was based on what he had gathered from his friends, the three individuals involved, and indicated that Beauvillier, not the king, had orchestrated it.335 Furthermore, Chamillart’s acquiescence implies that although Louis, weary of war and weighed down by the burdens of kingship and age, had long since abandoned the secret du roi of 1706, he had finally recognized (in 1709?) that even his favourite’s continued dabbling in diplomacy endangered prospects for peace, especially with the beginning of serious talks.336 Louis appreciated loyalty and was faithful to his friends, but Chamillart’s actions aroused growing discontent at court and with the wider public.337 Although increasingly isolated from the court and its gossip, Louis nonetheless heard the complaints of the royal family and his generals, especially Boufflers, Harcourt, and Villars, the respected voices that counted in such matters. Saint-Simon recites a ­series of other

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incidents that he believed finally forced the king to give way to opinion and dismiss his favourite, but Pénicaut prudently drops those incidents imagined by the memorialist and discounts the others to focus on Torcy’s return, on 1 June 1709, from his negotiations in The Hague bearing the terms that would decide the fate of peace and of Chamillart as well. When Louis and his Conseil rejected them, Chamillart’s fall was certain. A renewed war effort required a new war secretary to regain the confidence of the army and its commanders and to demonstrate to the Allies the will to fight on.338 Torcy recognized that France desperately needed peace, but he knew better than to say so while negotiating. Good diplomacy thrives on multiple openings and options that must be properly coordinated and managed if they are to end in success rather than in self-inflicted failure and frustration. Torcy, who had the patience to make the most of 1709’s openings, had not achieved what he had hoped for when he returned from The Hague, but at least future negotiations would be directed by the king and his Conseil working together, if not always in agreement, and controlled and synchronized by the foreign secretary, to and through whom communications to foreign and French diplomats would flow. In the New Year he wistfully confided to his journal cautious hope for a new era. With Chamillart’s disgrace, he reflected, the Conseil had been strengthened and there was more solidity to the way it handled business than before. He felt that Voysin spoke with good sense and without passion, and that such judiciousness made up for any lack of experience.339 Experience, judgment, good sense, and controlled passion rather than a desperate desire for peace would fortify the Conseil in the unrelenting and arduous pursuit of peace.

Jé rôm e P o n t c h a rt r a in , “ Mi ni ster of the Navy, C o u rt, a n d Pari s ” 340 Rivalry between the Colberts and the Pontchartrains for the control of patronage began in Brittany in 1677 when Louis Pontchartrain was appointed premier president of Brittany’s parlement, reducing the near monopoly the Colberts had long enjoyed.341 When Jérôme Pontchartrain succeeded his father in 1699 as navy and household secretary of state, including responsibility for Paris, this rivalry intensified. The new secretary had a habit of interfering in the affairs of other departments, including those of his father’s chancellery.342 The elder Pontchartrain, however, had been more scrupulous about honouring departmental boundaries,



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even as chancellor.343 Nonetheless, Saint-Simon, who detested Jérôme, was likely correct in observing that the new secretary was extremely jealous of Torcy.344 Jérôme’s personality was shaped by his appearance – smallpox had heavily marked his face and cost him an eye whose w ­ eeping glass replacement was said to be alarming – and by being the only surviving son of parents who invested in him all the family hopes. While his mother fussed over his health and future plans, his father lectured him harshly to ensure his preparation for office, which made him behave as if he always had something to prove.345 Even as a fledgling secretary of state in 1699, he wrote fearlessly to more established and powerful colleagues in an abrupt and aggressive manner sure to irritate.346 Jérôme Pontchartrain’s efforts to increase the efficiency and productivity of his department through greater specialization in more clearly delineated bureaus were also intended to block any rival ministries from poaching its functions. Likewise, prior to officially relinquishing his secretaryship to his son, Louis Pontchartrain sought to discourage poachers by securing clearer interdepartmental boundaries.347 In a 1698 memoir to the king, Pontchartrain complained that questions over departmental boundaries dating back to the Lionne era had been ignored by Croissy and Torcy and yet the latter now wanted to appropriate naval functions by labeling them usurpations on the part of the naval administration.348 To spare the king such useless and fatiguing conflict,349 Pontchartrain pointed to Torcy’s already full plate of functions. These included tending to the Rome correspondence, sending certain matters to the Paris parlement, publishing the recent Treaty of Ryswick, drawing up marriage articles for Mademoiselle, and performing a thousand other similar functions, whereas he – he claimed disingenuously – only had to follow the fortunes of a vessel.350 In October 1698 the king issued a regulation resolving these conflicts.351 Although letters to ambassadors in the king’s name had to be countersigned by the foreign secretary, the navy secretary could write to them on his own behalf when he needed to inform them of the royal will concerning commerce and the navy. The only exception was that he could address direct instructions on commercial and naval matters to the ambassadors to Constantinople, Venice, Madrid, and Lisbon, which the foreign secretary would refer to in his general instructions. Negotiations with sovereign powers for commercial treaties had to pass through the Conseil and then be drafted or approved by the foreign secretary. The navy secretary, however, could present treaties with Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to the king and countersign them, as well as present

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their envoys to him.352 This system, which largely preserved the principle of the centralization of diplomatic negotiations,353 was tested the following year when Tallard was in London negotiating with William III. The ambassador apparently resisted Pontchartrain’s request for details of the talks, but Torcy, while acknowledging the confused situation the envoy believed he was in, instructed him to write to the navy secretary, since the good of the service was the first rule.354 An additional note prescribed, however, that Torcy would receive a copy of all letters to the navy secretary so that he could manage the overall negotiations without confusing or fatiguing the king.355 As for the consular service once under the foreign office, it was a source of friction especially from 1699 when Jérôme Pontchartrain expanded its range beyond the Mediterranean to northern European ports from London to Danzig and altered its primary mission to information-gathering. The geographic range and sheer quantity of information accumulated, including commercial, naval, political, and military intelligence, allowed Pontchartrain to construct a parallel information network to rival that of the foreign ministry. Much to the annoyance of Torcy and the other secretaries of state, Pontchartrain reveled in sharing international as well as domestic gleanings with the king in their frequent sessions together.356 The Council of Commerce, created in 1700 and dominated by Pontchartrain clients, also expanded the range of his interests and influence and often put him at odds with the foreign secretary, the controller general, and the secretary of the Council of Commerce.357 The Pontchartrains were especially keen on colonial development. The Spanish succession seemingly opened a wide door to French interests. In 1702 Jérôme sent François-Ambroise Daubenton, nephew of Philip V’s confessor, to Spain as a naval and commercial agent upon the recommendation of Daubenton’s kinsman Jean Orry, the Spanish monarch’s French financial advisor. Daubenton’s conduct in promoting French commercial interests in Spain and its colonial markets was too much like that of an ambassador for Torcy’s liking. Pontchartrain regarded Spain and its empire as his preserve, since France’s navy secured its links with America. He was not above going behind Torcy’s back in negotiations with Bourbon Madrid, as he did in securing for France the asiento, or slave trade monopoly, and in delimiting the boundary between the French and Spanish portions of Hispaniola as required by the Treaty of Ryswick.358 He did the same with colonial border disputes with Portugal and England, again writing directly to France’s ambassadors at those courts and bypassing the foreign office.359



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Torcy was particularly wary of unwarranted interference in France’s relations with Rome and the affairs of the Gallican Church. In 1711, for instance, Pontchartrain asked Torcy to assist in resolving a dispute in his province of Paris that had simmered since 1708, when the Augustinians had elected Père Rast, allegedly openly protected by France’s enemies, as the order’s provincial general.360 Torcy’s reply – repeated to Cardinal de La Trémoille, French representative in Rome, and to France’s Augustinian provincials – declined to intervene directly because of the king’s fear of schism. Yet he cunningly noted that he was powerless to prevent a new election. Prior Jean Le Tort of the Grand Augustins in Paris conferred with Pontchartrain at Fontainebleau, but while preparing for a meeting with Torcy in Paris and hoping to avoid unnecessary jealousies, he cautioned a colleague not to mention to Torcy Pontchartrain’s continuing involvement.361 Pontchartrain’s contribution presumably included letters to his friend La Trémoille in Rome, which undoubtedly would have irked Torcy. The prior corresponded further with and finally met Torcy, and it appears that an approach was also made to Rome for a new election.362 However, neither the king nor Torcy were pleased with the Augustinians because of the original election. The secretary was further displeased with Le Tort’s manoeuvres behind his back. It was no coincidence that the royal commission investigating Augustinian convents found that three, including the Grand Augustins of Paris, did not have royally authorized constitutions and would now have to seek them humbly and on the king’s terms.363 As foreign secretary, Torcy was interested in the activities in Paris of foreigners, particularly those connected with the embassies, but he shared responsibility for them with Pontchartrain, whose supervision of the Paris region made him de facto minister of police. Like that of the Paris parlement, Pontchartrain’s jurisdiction over the capital could extend to the realm’s frontiers, especially as he cast his net to catch wartime spies. At times better informed than Torcy on the activities of resident and visiting foreigners, he relished being the first to report them to the king and then to pass along to his colleague the resulting royal orders.364 His extended network of consuls amplified his anti-espionage efforts, and he raised Torcy’s ire by addressing French embassies directly for information to aid his investigations and prosecutions.365 Torcy’s sarcasm is in full display in a letter to the French envoy in Lorraine. He assured him that Pontchartrain’s curiosity was quite laudable and that nothing was more worthy of a great minister than to turn his sights toward all the places that might interest the king’s service.

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­ evertheless, he continued, the job of a royal envoy abroad was not N that of a journalist. More pointedly, he reminded the envoy that it was contrary to royal intentions and orders to send news to others rather than to the king. Switching to a reassuring tone, Torcy advised him to go on with ­business as usual with the firm knowledge that Pontchartrain’s letter had not been authorized by the king.366 Torcy generally avoided needlessly encroaching on his colleague’s turf367 and would even intervene with the king on his behalf when asked.368 Pontchartrain was also capable of cooperation, lending his colleague the translating services of a navy commis or forwarding intelligence of an enemy agent in Amsterdam opening French mail.369 When he needed a letter intercepted as part of his surveillance activities, Pontchartrain had to make his request to Torcy.370 When peace negotiations began in earnest, Pontchartrain’s colonial and international commercial ambitions as well as his control over and advocacy of French fishing rights understandably made him anxious. Mesnager had worked well with Pontchartrain’s man ­Daubenton in Spain and had won his praise, but at Utrecht he proved to be Torcy’s man, provoking Pontchartrain’s anger by communicating with him less than the navy secretary desired, despite a special code provided for that purpose.371 Nevertheless, even though the overall direction and day-to-day management of the negotiations were in Torcy’s hands, ­Pontchartrain was a key player in colonial and trade matters, drafting memoirs approved by the king and Torcy as guidelines for France’s plenipotentiaries.372 ­Desmaretz did the same, also in conjunction with Torcy.373 Pontchartrain resisted colonial and commercial concessions as much as possible, complaining that the French envoys were not firm enough, but he knew that France’s desperate situation offered them few options.374 It is not true, however, that Pontchartrain tried to sabotage the Anglo-French trade treaty that had been a part of the London preliminaries that framed the Utrecht negotiations.375 Pontchartrain had already launched his program of re-­establishing French colonial power even before the Utrecht Treaty was signed. In his eyes, Britain had become France’s major overseas competitor.376 This hardly put him on a collision course with Torcy and his policy of rapprochement with Britain, as both hoped for more trade across the Channel but were unwilling to pay too high a price for it. Moreover, the impact of the crushing Whig electoral victory at the beginning of 1715 must not be overlooked. While Torcy hoped for continued cooperation with the Bolingbroke ministry, it was unlikely with the Whigs.377



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After the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, Pontchartrain pushed for closer commercial and political ties with Peter the Great’s Russia, whereas Torcy preferred the traditional alliance with Sweden, though now reoriented toward new goals.378 Religion provided new sources of tension.379 Louis Pontchartrain and Torcy together defended the ­liberties of the Gallican Church,380 but Louis XIV’s turn toward Rome left the Gallicans on the Conseil increasingly beleaguered. The papal bull Unigenitus finally led to the chancellor’s resignation (1 July 1714) after years of decreasing influence due to his dogged opposition to ultramontane influence.381 Far from weakening young Pontchartrain’s position in the government, the king’s shift in religious policy only strengthened it, since Jérôme, who was pro-Jesuit, counted on the society’s continuing cooperation as missionaries in his colonial expansion schemes.382 His vision of a colonially resurgent France had the old king’s backing, even when parts of it were clearly at odds with the spirit if not the letter of Utrecht.383 He also collaborated closely with Souzy, director general of fortifications, and Claude Le Blanc, intendant of Maritime Flanders and Jérôme’s kinsman, as they slyly sought to evade the mandated destruction of Dunkirk by aggrandizing nearby Mardick.384 Prior, writing to Bolingbroke as Britain and France attempted to implement their Utrecht settlement, quipped in code that for “Pontchartrain’s opinion I would give no more than [I would] for his word.”385 Although Jérôme Pontchartrain was a difficult colleague to work with, at least Torcy’s experience with him was shared by his fellow administrators. Despite Pontchartrain’s power from his cumul and especially from his role as a sort of interior minister,386 he never joined the Conseil and his relations with his father were such that the chancellor was hardly his passive mouthpiece in its sessions. The snappish navy secretary could be prying and meddlesome, but he never mounted an assault on Torcy’s direction of foreign policy as Chamillart had, especially when it was coupled with the king’s personal diplomacy. Louis XIV had the final word in setting foreign policy, but its formulation was open to the direct and indirect influence of a variety of actors in addition to the foreign minister: administrative colleagues, generals, courtiers, family, and especially Maintenon. In the Conseil itself, by design a place for other voices to debate and dispute policy, however, Torcy’s voice was strong because of his reporter’s role, the king’s confidence in his judgment, and the asymmetry of information afforded by his control of the foreign office. Despite challenges to that control by some of his colleagues, the normal bureaucratic procedure was that once policy was set, it remained

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Torcy’s task, with the assistance of his able staff, to see that it was implemented, although it would always be subject to further revision in conjunction with the king alone or with his Conseil. Curiously, the area in which the foreign secretary’s efforts were less subject to such interference was in domestic administration, to which we now turn.

11 Domestic Administration

Dangeau recorded in his journal for 16 November 1699 that Mme de Torcy had come down with smallpox. It was not her devoted husband, however, who stayed by her bedside until she recovered, but her brother, Abbé Pomponne. Indicative of his strong sense of duty to his royal master rather than of any disregard for his wife, Torcy did not visit his infected wife and thus was able to continue attending council meetings.1 From 1661 the highest levels of policy formulation and application took place in three royal councils. As we have seen, the Conseil focused on foreign policy and other great matters of state, while the Council of Finances managed fiscal and economic matters. Dispatches specialized in domestic administration. All three made decisions not in their own name, but always in that of the king, who varyingly attended their sessions, where decisions were either made or ratified. The four secretaries of state, the chancellor, and the controller general each headed departments with special attributes and specialized personnel, and each often worked with the king individually. Nonetheless, formulating policy and coordinating its application required working in concert. Some of this happened through letters and in meetings between individuals and in council meetings, but as the reign lengthened, the Conseil continued its frequent meetings, whereas Dispatches and the Council of Finances met less frequently. Even for matters dealt with in a council, individual ministers increasingly met with the king to regulate such business beforehand.2 Routine affairs were handled in a bureaucratic manner within departments by their heads and administrative staff.3 Courtiers, officials lower in the hierarchy, provincial officials and elites, and other suppliants all sought the favour of these ministers, who in turn sought the king’s favour. However, the path to such favour often ran through the

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administrative bureaus. The influence these clerks wielded, while impossible to measure, makes occasional yet tantalizing appearances in the official records.4

T h e C o u n c il o f Di spatches Another royal council presided over by Louis XIV and attended by all four secretaries of state was Dispatches; it was the council responsible for coordinating domestic affairs. Despite fewer meetings, Dispatches continued to play an important role during Louis XIV’s last years as the conciliar watchdog, guardian of public security, arbiter of disagreements among crown officials, occasional broker of royal patronage, and channel through which the central government was warned of provincial unrest or of conflicts that could conjure it.5 The whole state edifice was built and animated by money, so it is no surprise that the controller general’s department was the royal administration’s largest in scope and personnel. The controller general himself sat on Dispatches (and on the Conseil as a minister), headed the Council of Finances, and frequently worked individually with the king.6 His power over provincial administration was immense, in part because he named most of the intendants (excluding those in ports, dependent on the navy secretary, and those in conquered provinces or with armies, dependent on the war secretary).7 Surveys of the reign’s administrative correspondence reveal how frequently he communicated with the intendants and how widely the topics ranged, as finance and economics touched so many other matters. The intendants also had frequent and important dealings with the four secretaries of state and the chancellor. Although loath to have them intrude on what he regarded as his turf,8 Chamillart struggled to direct the war as well as finance it. When he received a letter from his client the bishop of Nantes about a squabble with soldiers over hunting encroachments, his testy marginal note pointed out that he had already told the bishop to address himself to Torcy, whose province it was, insisting that only war matters were his concern.9 When Berry’s intendant, reporting on the costs and problems connected with prosecuting a province-wide arson epidemic, asked the controller general if he might also write the chancellor and the province’s secretary of state, Chamillart heartily assented. When informed of a proposed establishment in Grenoble for the education of young ladies destined for domestic service, Chamillart’s marginalia indicated that this was Torcy’s affair.10



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Increasingly, the secretaries of state also became arbiters of Protestant affairs. Secretary of State Balthazar Phélypeaux, marquis de Châteauneuf, responsible for Protestant affairs from 1676 until his death in 1700, often consulted with the king until the 1685 Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which Saint-Simon claimed rendered his secretaryship almost nil.11 Ongoing problems with Huguenots and New Converts, however, continued to generate a steady volume of provincial administrative activity, so that Châteauneuf and his son and successor Louis IV Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, still attended to Protestant matters but now as a secretary of state in his assigned provinces.12 Although the lack of a specialty did reduce Châteauneuf’s workload and influence, he remained responsible for the usual flow of business to and from the rather considerable number of provinces and the four parlements in his charge,13 especially since controllers general following Colbert left more and more provincial matters to the secretaries of state. While stressing Châteauneuf’s dependence on his fellow secretaries because he was not a minister, Sourches nonetheless remarked upon his wit, admirable ability to report on matters in Dispatches, and expertise in Protestant affairs, which still counted for something.14 His particular grouping of provinces, based on their religious composition at the time his charge was created in 1598, contained many Huguenots. Later, La Vrillière helped suppress the Camisard Revolt, even though it brought him into conflict with the powerful war department.15 Documents issued by Dispatches included legislative acts such as various types of “lettres patentes” (letters patent) signed by the king and a secretary of state. Some were sealed with the chancellor’s grand seal, but increasingly they were sealed by a secretary with a smaller seal or not sealed at all. “Arrêts du Conseil” (conciliar decisions) were of various types and had the advantage of not requiring registration by a superior court. The secretaries of state and their clerks attached to Dispatches translated the council’s decisions into the language of an arrêt en commandement (a decision made in the king’s presence), which opened significantly by announcing that “the king being in his council …” and concluding with an endorsement by a secretary of state, signing his family name (“Colbert” or “Phélypeaux,” for example), bypassing the chancellor. Those executive directives were among the chief weapons in Dispatches’ legal armory.16 This council was an excellent training ground in domestic administration. Both Louis XIV and Louis XV used it to prepare royal heirs before calling them to the Conseil.17 The Grand Dauphin entered Dispatches in

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1688, and his son, the heir presumptive Burgundy, entered in 1699. On 6 December 1712, Berry, Louis’s grandson and heir (after Burgundy’s death), entered Dispatches and attended with his grandfather, marking the council’s persistent significance in the reign’s final years.18 Secretaries of state who were not yet – or never became – ministers worked in Dispatches with the king and other high officials on important domestic matters.19 The only detailed account of what actually transpired in Dispatches can be found in a 1710 report in Torcy’s journal and concerned the archbishop of Aix-en-Provence Charles-Gaspard-Guillaume de ­Vintimille’s request that the king confirm his right to control admission to and expulsion from the Aix seminary, to which the seminary’s priests objected. Fearing the caprice and bad temper of this archbishop or his successors, Torcy proposed what he termed a moderate and conciliatory solution: the archbishop could control entry, but not exclusively control expulsion. Torcy assessed his support: Chancellor Pontchartrain and La Vrillière agreed with him, whereas Jérôme Pontchartrain, as often happened, proposed something odd and Voysin, Beauvillier, and Burgundy supported the archbishop’s request. The archbishop’s insinuations had painted the seminary priests as Jansenists and overt rebels against both church and state, which naturally incensed Burgundy and Beauvillier. Moreover, even before he began his report, Torcy saw by the king’s gestures and few words that he had already decided in favour of the archbishop and was thus not likely to be pleased with his proposal. Louis portrayed the seminarians as motivated only by unruliness, and Torcy confided to his journal, perhaps with irony, that one must presume that the king’s understanding was superior to that of his dissenting councillors.20 As in the Conseil, debate in Dispatches often split along the lines of the néo-politiques Torcy and Desmaretz and the dévots Beauvillier and Burgundy. The swing votes included Jérôme Pontchartrain, who was so moody and unpredictable that Torcy wrote him off as a dependable ally, and Voysin, war secretary from 1709, who at first voted with the moderates but later turned against them. While much is made of interdepartmental quarrels and jealousies in Saint-Simon’s waspish memoirs, it is clear that it was the frequent need to work together and the reality of actually doing so that occasioned these clashes. Interdepartmental cooperation was a part of the routine of government.21 For example, in writing to intendant Lebret of a disputed matter on Torcy’s behalf, Blondel referenced further letters to him from Torcy and Controller General Pontchartrain and previewed Dispatches’ likely decision, ­stressing



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its desire to accommodate the losing side as well. Blondel shared that he had spoken with Pontchartrain’s commis about the details and would also consult with Clair Adam about the discussion of the matter in Dispatches. He promised that when all was resolved, Torcy would send the requested order. Although the dispute grew convoluted and dragged on, interdepartmental cooperation continued. When the king finally imposed a resolution, Pontchartrain informed Lebret, adding that Torcy would soon send him the details.22 Louis Pontchartrain remained a strong advocate of cooperation when he became chancellor on 3 September 1699. While he brought new energy to and increased the power of an office in decline since the beginning of the reign, he nonetheless streamlined it, insisting that the chancellery need not be burdened by cases that should be heard by the secretaries of state. This was clearly due in part to the shift from an older judicial-based style of administration to a more bureaucratic approach animated less by men of judicial background, but increasingly, especially at the bureau level, by functionaries trained in administrative procedures and tied to the head of a department or the king rather than to a judicial body. Pontchartrain insisted that officials looking to him for assistance, even if they were his judicial clients, follow regular channels in dealing with central or provincial administrative hierarchies.23 Thus, he wrote to the advocate general of Aix’s parlement that matters of ordinary jurisdiction were Torcy’s preserve and instructed the first president of Brittany’s parlement to submit his request to the king by way of Torcy.24 In answering a Rennes official’s letter about a financial conflict with the bishop of Nantes, he replied that such matters went through Torcy as the province’s secretary of state and were decided according to his report to the king and his council.25 As Louis XIV’s reign lengthened and greater stability and routine set in, department heads working individually with the monarch  – under Louis XIV known as the liasse (literally, a bundle of papers) – conducted an increasing volume of state business.26 This practice likely increased during Louvois’s ministry, as he preferred private work sessions. He was less of an orator than the Colberts, and individual encounters with the king better served his penchant for insinuating himself into the affairs of other departments.27 Individual consultations still met the ideal of the king “taking counsel” because decisions in the form of arrêts en commandement still required his assent and opened with the requisite reference to the king being in his council, but this prevents historians from differentiating arrêts decided in council sessions from those that were

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not. Like council meetings, the liasse tended to take place according to a flexible schedule. While some administrators had a regular time slot for meetings with the king, Torcy did not, since he frequently came to the king with the latest dispatches. Typically, a department head arrived at the Cabinet, leaving at the door the assistant who had carried his bag of papers, entered, and then sat in an armless folding chair opposite the king, seated in a large armchair behind a cloth-covered table furnished by the Cabinet staff with paper, pens, and ink. They set to work reading dispatches and jointly drafting replies or correcting those the official brought (often drafted by his clerks), with the monarch’s verbal directives written up later by the official or his staff. Throughout the session, problems and their possible resolution were turned over in a relatively informal and conversational manner, offering the administrator opportune moments to try to influence policy and secure appointments and other favours for family, friends, and clients, despite the stiff competition from other ministers and courtiers. These one-on-one sessions afforded administrators rare glimpses of their master’s personal side, but more regularly they allowed the king to monitor the state’s administrative departments.28 Although the role of Dispatches continued throughout the reign, the secretary, bearing his sheaf of papers and closeted with the king, handled an increasing portion of routine and non-contentious administrative work.29

T he R o u t in e o f P rov in ci al Admi ni strati on The relatively tiny group of ministers, officials, and clerks centred in Versailles and Paris relied on local aristocratic elites, venal office-­ holders, and the clergy to project royal power into the provinces. As we have seen, some recent scholarship focuses on a shift from a traditional state-centred concept of government to a broader process called “governance.” Governance consists of “steering” by state officials at the centre and “rowing” by local officials and non-state actors such that the state’s power is exerted horizontally and not just hierarchically.30 Steering by state actors is typically accomplished through “information-­ gathering, rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement,”31 and Torcy and his clerks employed all of these means. In the local village it was the parish priest who typically spoke the printed words written on behalf of the distant king. His vigilance and cooperation were indispensable, particularly since from 1690 the royal government’s intrusion into local affairs through regulation and monitoring was on the rise.32 Local



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office-­holders were not the passive tools of the central administration, but acted as mediators between the centre and the periphery or asked the king to referee among conflicting local interests.33 The foreign secretary kept busy granting audiences to provincial individuals and delegations.34 Torcy corresponded with thirty-nine archbishops and bishops; fourteen provincial governors, lieutenants-general, and military commandants; eight intendants; seven sovereign or superior courts (three parlements, two Chambres des comptes, and two Cours des monnaies); and three provincial estates.35 His network of provincial correspondents included above all the intendants, the trained, loyal representatives who formed a corps of information-collectors and informants,36 as well as lesser officials, Parisian officials on mission, itinerant agents, relatives, and friends. Informants on the spot facilitated the centre’s preparation of reports and recommendations to the king and his councils. Depending on the issue and an individual’s position in the hierarchy, Torcy might solicit further information37 or advice on solutions.38 This informationgathering was essential to those at Versailles who performed the four fundamental tasks of governance.39 First, based on input from state and non-state actors, they set state goals ranging from broad policy orientations to operational ends. Second, especially with the king in a council or individually, they prioritized, reconciled, and coordinated the plethora of goals that often conflicted with one another or with the state’s basic capacities, such as finances. Implementation, the third task, might also involve both state and non-state actors. The fourth task consisted of gathering and processing the feedback required to improve all governance tasks. We will catch glimpses of each of these tasks being performed in the examples that follow. Preserving public security ranked high among the monarchy’s goals. Writing to Michel V Bégon, intendant of the newly formed (April 1694) La Rochelle generality, Torcy deplored the disorders in Pons, a town south of the chief market centre of Saintes, but assured Bégon that the king was pleased to hear of the suppression of a nearby peasant uprising. To prevent a recurrence, Torcy sent him a packet of lettres des cachets with blanks for filling in names. Bégon, Torcy’s kinsman, worked closely with him, sending him lists of local landlords and establishing or reorganizing présidiaux (special appeals courts).40 This judicial reorganization prompted letters of complaint from the lieutenant-general and the court’s assessor, but Torcy replied reprovingly that before he took any report of dissatisfaction to Dispatches, it had to be written with clarity.41 Frustrated, the assessor wrote again, requesting that if the secretary

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appointed an investigator, it be anyone other than Bégon. From these letters come two observations. First, the central government depended on the royal courts and their magistrates along with a royal representative (intendant, sub-delegate, local commander, or town governor) to cooperate in order to give Dispatches early warning of trouble. Second, municipal magistrates and royal intendants served as checks and balances on one another’s authority.42 Marked by memories of the Fronde, Louis XIV abhorred public disorder. Torcy informed Lebret that the king had learned of disorders in Marseille brought on by weakness and negligence. Such a large city could ill afford such threats to what he termed safety and public liberty.43 He ordered him to coordinate with local judiciary and other provincial officials to punish the troublemakers promptly. Most citizens shared this concern for law and order, craving safety for themselves, their families, and their possessions, regarding its provision as the prerequisite to the free exercise of their rights and privileges and an essential duty of monarchy.44 The state was aware of this “public opinion” as well as of the wide range of other concerns, rumours, and mutterings expressed by and circulating among all social groups. The police and officials in the capital and provinces monitored oral as well as written expression in the kingdom’s noisy streets and other public places.45 The secretary also concerned himself with individual lawlessness. A 1706 circular letter to intendants listed items stolen from a Lyon merchant on his way home from Limoges and provided physical descriptions of the culprits and their horses, down to the colour of the harnesses.46 In another case, Sisteron’s lieutenant du roi reported intervening in a row among the local bourgeoisie involving two men who tried to force a merchant to sell them glass at a price lower than agreed on when the order was placed. When the merchant refused, the two went on a rampage, mistreating all who opposed them, including a pregnant woman, and pursuing them into a church. Because a lieutenant du roi was involved, Torcy informed the Provence parlement that the matter was for him to judge, not them.47 However, royal intervention locally was not automatic. Informing Champagne’s intendant of a request from a man claiming to have been robbed on the highway, Torcy asked if there was any problem with those already examining the case that required royal intervention to assure justice, adding that he awaited this clarification.48 Conflicts and criminal activity were best avoided through the enforcement of existing laws, as he reminded Provence’s intendant in referencing a 1691 arrêt condemning certain games of chance, including “Barsette”



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and “Pharaon.” Of course, the reminder suggests that these games were still being played despite the ban.49 Along with criminals of the lower sort, Torcy confronted upper-class miscreants. Nobles were expected to abstain from duels or be dealt with harshly, and Torcy averred that this stricture grew everyday more inflexible.50 Yet when a count fleeing his creditors sought refuge with his companions in an Augustinian convent, Torcy informed local authorities to arrest the companions but set the nobleman free, a clear example of the privilege of rank. Writing an official at the chateau of Nantes concerning a nobleman’s imprisonment, Torcy mentioned that he had also written intendant Ferrand for clarification. Two weeks later he again wrote Ferrand, this time seeking information in a case where a widow’s kin requested a lettre de cachet to imprison her for scandalous living. In cooperation with d’Argenson, who was required to report annually to the secretaries on the prisoners they had ordered detained, Torcy’s department monitored these inmates and the frequent transfers that took place.51 Mercy had its place in this scheme as well. As a thoughtful wielder of police power, Torcy sought to achieve the proper balance between gentleness and the fear of punishment in eliciting suitable behaviour.52 In 1691 he sent his intendants a circular letter listing the name and rank of malefactors who had fled, been imprisoned, or exiled. Each was to annotate his list indicating what royal grace he would advise the king to grant.53 In this as in so many matters, Torcy knew that those on the spot were often the best informed, and he did not regard it as incompatible with centralized decision-making to solicit their feedback. Indeed, civil administration could only benefit from better-educated provincial officials, which is why the king promoted legal studies in Provence to equip future bureaucrats to administer justice.54 Beyond their diplomatic implications, national security matters occupied the foreign secretary at the local level. With the king at the war front, Torcy coordinated the prosecution of someone in Champagne accused of seditious speech.55 In 1705 d’Argenson wrote him about a chevalier de Rozet in the Bastille, who had everyone there in an uproar because of his ravings about an alleged conspiracy to assassinate the king. He dismissed him as mad but promised to keep Torcy informed.56 The book trade was always monitored, especially during wartime. Furious at some anonymous pamphlets and letters he received in 1707, Torcy urged greater vigilance in tracking down and punishing purveyors of illegal books and pamphlets.57

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Foreign office clerks drew up and sent out commissions and orders for the auxiliaries of the department’s provincial governors, ­including lieutenants-­general, more localized venal lieutenants du roi (created in 1692), and commandants en chef, who were primarily military commanders.58 Lieutenants general and commandants were like vice-­governors, acting for governors normally absent at court or checking on any who were overly ambitious.59 The secretary intervened in disputes between governors and their subordinates, although he regularly backed all of them against any locals who flouted their authority.60 Appointed governor of Provence, Villars was dismayed to learn that Torcy wrote directly to his four lieutenants general. He had assumed that they were his subordinates, but none felt obliged to share the minister’s orders with him.61 In 1692, as survivancier, Torcy wrote to Henri Charles de Beaumanoir, marquis de Lavardin, lieutenant-general in Brittany, to share intelligence from soldiers and sailors saved from the Isle of Jersey and from a person in La Rochelle of a possible English coastal descent, urging him to investigate. Torcy also wrote Bordeaux intendant Louis Bazin de Bezons about a Protestant subject in Bayonne who regularly sent news to someone in Amsterdam. He was to watch the man to discover his sources, arrest him, and send word to Paris. In 1708 an official in Brest forwarded Torcy information extracted from an arrested spy. Pleased that the man had finally come clean, he eagerly requested further confessions.62 A governor might also assist Torcy with diplomatic business. ­Dangeau recorded the stir at court when word arrived on 20 June 1696 that ­Pamplona’s governor had sent the duc de Gramont, governor of Navarre and Béarn, letters from Spain’s king addressed to Louis XIV and members of his family announcing the death of the pro-Austrian queen mother.63 Her passing was important news at a Versailles closely monitoring the effect of the delicate balance of influences on the feeble ­Carlos II. Later, Gramont helped Torcy translate letters into Spanish, earning Louis XIV’s praise for his skills when the minister showed them to him.64 From 1704 to 1705 Gramont again deployed these skills when sent as ambassador to Louis XIV’s grandson Philip V. Upon his return to his governorship, Gramont remained one of Torcy’s close advisors on Spanish affairs.65 Military affairs underlined the need for interdepartmental cooperation in provincial administration. During the Camisard Revolt, La ­Vrillière sent Torcy intelligence of enemy communication with the rebels. Although already aware of this, Torcy assured his colleague that he had again passed this information on to the commandants in ­Provence and



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Dauphiné. A few months later Torcy forwarded intelligence to C ­ hamillart of Protestant movements in the Alpine valleys of Dauphiné. Fearing that they might link up with Languedoc’s rebels, Torcy urged him to provide troops to prevent it.66 Dauphiné’s intendant Bouchu kept him apprised of the Duke of Savoy’s war preparations and collaborated with him on the more mundane matter of funding Fort Barraux’s chapel. The post, recently renovated by Vauban, protected the approach to Grenoble from Savoy. The secretary assured Bouchu that this small expense would be charged to the treasurers of the extraordinary of war.67 Problems with New Converts, or as Torcy sometimes labeled them, the “mal convertis” (poorly converted),68 increased from 1685, giving the central administration and its provincial agents even greater reason for local interference.69 The monitoring of attendance at Mass and the taking of the Sacrament involved the intendant and his associates in an almost perpetual inquest requiring constant travel and the questioning of local officials. Croissy’s earlier calls for prompt and vigorous action had fallen off as war with Europe raged, but after Ryswick Torcy peppered his intendants with requests for information on local Protestant holdouts and New Converts as well as for advice on how to deal with them. Instructions to the intendants in 1699 stated unambiguously that occasional efforts no longer sufficed.70 What was required of the intendants now was long-term and constant attention, with eyes always open to anything occurring in their jurisdiction regarding religion, which they were to regard as their principal and most important undertaking.71 The municipalities of Provence were later informed that only good subjects, defined as good Catholics, could be elected to local office (subject to the intendant’s advice). Torcy promised to issue the orders necessary to assure compliance.72 Like his colleagues, Torcy worked ceaselessly to steer local officials toward the rigorous application of the regulations implementing the Revocation, on occasion quoting from them in his letters to the intendants. He wanted this accomplished, however, without causing public scandal, a phrase he employed more than once in urging that zeal be tempered with prudence.73 In a circular letter to five of his intendants, Torcy reported that the Conseil had heard from Languedoc’s Basville of the arrest of a man acting as an agent for another in reconverting New Converts. He appended a description and ordered the man’s arrest on sight.74 During the Camisard Revolt, Torcy had no qualms about treating rebels harshly. He informed Basville of a party of two refugee ministers and eight former French officers traveling to the Cevennes from Holland

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via Germany, Switzerland, and Savoy carrying letters of exchange for 25,000 to 30,000 florins drawn on banks in Lyon and a letter of introduction to the Duke of Savoy from his envoy in The Hague. The intendant was to do all he could to apprehend this dangerous group.75 As Torcy indicated to Lebret, the king wanted a list of New Converts imprisoned in Provence, with names, ranks, and dates of imprisonment, the official who had authorized their incarceration, and an account of their prison behaviour. The inquiry was intended to determine who, through sincere conversion and good conduct, might be released. While the regime dealt harshly with religious dissent, it had no desire to keep New Converts imprisoned longer than necessary.76 At one level Torcy had no pity for those who failed at their religious duties or who wanted to flee France, observing that seizing their goods should be an effective punishment.77 Yet he was not rigidly iron-fisted. While characterizing some formerly Protestant women as obstinate and opinionated, he nonetheless urged the intendant to avoid making extreme threats he could not carry out.78 He desired results with minimal disorder, urging subordinates to be firm yet flexible and pragmatic. Acknowledging that some conversions involved much more disorder than others, he nonetheless thought it better to punish a few of the most opinionated in order to hold on to the others.79 He also warmly welcomed genuine converts.80 Yet in 1692 he intervened on behalf of English Quaker William Bromfield and his wife, neither of whom was a convert. To spare them persecution by their Catholic neighbours in Pontoise, Torcy instructed the Paris police chief to permit them to live in the capital and to help them find quarters. This unexpected leniency was because a number of Quakers had remained loyal to James II and moved in Jacobite circles, incurring both Whig and Tory wrath. Bromfield was also a Jacobite agent and a merchant employed by Renaudot, the navy’s and foreign office’s “spymaster.”81 In addition to their usual religious duties and help with New Converts, Catholic clergy, especially the episcopal hierarchy, were vital components of the state’s administrative machinery, as they controlled property and personnel that afforded them influence. In 1711 the foreign office supervised 6 of the kingdom’s 16 archbishops and 28 of its 97 bishops, for a total of 34 of its 113 archdioceses and dioceses or 30 per cent of the total (table 11.1). Torcy’s share of archbishops, at nearly 31 per cent, was higher than that of his three colleagues, a legacy of the historic spread of dioceses in his provinces rather than the result of a conscious distribution. While this added to the workload of his bureaus, it also

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Table 11.1 Archbishops and bishops supervised by Torcy, 17111 Provinces2 Bordeaux

Arles Tours

Auch

Aix Lyon4 Bourges Reims

Sens Paris

Archdiocese and Dioceses Bordeaux Condom Luçon Arles Tours Vannes Tréguier Auch Lectoure Dax Aix Sisteron Lyon Mâcon Bourges St Flour Reims Noyon Beauvais Sens Paris

Angoulême Poitiers Périgueux Marseille Nantes St Malo St Pol-de-Léon Tarbes Aire Bazas Apt Gap Langres

Saintes La Rochelle

Sarlat Agen

Toulon St Brieux Cornouailles3 Le Mans Bayonne Comminges Lescar Riez

St Paul Dol Rennes Angers Oléron Couserans

Chalon sur-Saône

Autun

Tulles Le Puy Châlons-en-Champagne Boulogne

Limoges

Clermont

Laon Senlis

Amiens Soissons

Troyes Meaux

Nevers Chartres

Auxerre Orléans

Fréjus

Sources: bn mf 20756, fols 247–9, listing all the dioceses and archdioceses of the kingdom; supplemented by Bergin, Crown, Church, x (Map 1), 17 (Map 2); and aae md 1180, fol. 130r–v, 25 Apr. 1711, for those supervised by the foreign secretary.

1 Those in italics were under the foreign secretary’s supervision. aae md 1180, fol. 130r–v, 25 Apr. 1711 (a circulation list for a circular letter of that date). The foreign secretary supervised 6 of the kingdom’s 16 archdioceses and 34 of its 113 dioceses. 2 This list does not include archdioceses and dioceses added by Louis XIV’s conquests (i.e., the archdioceses of Cambrai and Besançon, the diocese of Perpignan, and the Principality of Orange) and the not yet fully integrated “Three Bishoprics” (Metz, Toul, and Verdun), still tied to the Holy Roman Empire. See Bergin, Crown, Church, 18–36, on the special status and problems of these areas. 3 Quimper. 4 In March 1708 the foreign secretary exchanged Dauphiné for Lyon with the war secretary.

increased patronage possibilities. A secretary of state officially worked with such an ecclesiastical appointment only once the choice of who was to fill it had been made by processing the paperwork for it and the full range of other benefices,82 but prior to that he had ample opportunity to promote his candidates with the king, the royal confessor, or anyone else with influence.83 Torcy worked diligently on behalf of kin, clients, clerks, and foreign prelates and diplomats loyal to France. In 1710 he

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informed his friend Cardinal Gualterio, former nuncio and French client, that the king had named him abbot of the immensely wealthy St Rémy monastery of Rheims.84 But not all division of ecclesiastical spoils was amicable. Torcy tartly advised Oléron’s bishop that he had no right to appoint a curate in the town of Vacqué, since it was not in his diocese and belonged to its patron, the king.85 When Cardinal Bouillon fled to France’s enemies in 1710, Pontchartrain and Beauvillier were at loggerheads in Dispatches over the distribution of Cluny and Bouillon’s other abbeys.86 In this highly hierarchical society, central and local officials often clashed with the clergy, as all jockeyed to protect their privileges from encroachment. Sometimes the intendant mediated, as when Torcy instructed Bouchu to resolve differences between a cathedral chapter and Dauphiné’s general hospital, but at other times those at the centre had to intervene to reconcile and coordinate conflicting goals at the local level and align them with those set by the central state. In 1691 Torcy wrote Provence’s intendant about the quarrel of Arles’s archbishop and cathedral canons with officers of the sénéchaussée (a lower court such as a présidial) over the latter’s demand for admission to the cathedral’s higher choir stalls. Having obtained further details, Torcy reported that the king, following Torcy’s advice, had ruled that the officers were not entitled to the alleged right they had wrongly exercised for some time.87 Torcy forwarded to a later archbishop of Arles a letter of complaint to the king from his diocese and cautioned him that bad treatment only exacerbated discontent, adding more soothingly yet pointedly that he would leave it to his prudence to do what he thought best.88 He reminded the bishop of Nantes, locked in a struggle with the Chambre des comptes over a chapel and its funding, of the virtue of tranquility in promoting the king’s service and public edification. He apparently took the hint, and Torcy notified the intendant of the matter’s resolution.89 Some years later, however, the same bishop attempted to bypass the secretary by writing directly to the king to complain that Torcy was frustrating his legitimate request for another chapel. The king, however, had royal confessor Père Tellier forward the letter to Torcy so that he could inform the king on the appropriateness of the bishop’s request.90 The Wisdom of Solomon was required time and again to head off a potential clash between church and state. Entirely in his own hand, Torcy replied to the intendant of Dauphiné’s report of Vienne’s disputed mayoral election and its archbishop’s reasons for his opposition. Torcy wrote reassuringly that because the intendant’s account presented all



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parties’ reasons in a clear and orderly fashion, the king easily decided the matter in accordance with the intendant’s recommendation that the election stand. He added, however, that the king did not issue an arrêt on this occasion so as not to offend a generally cooperative prelate or discourage his generosity toward the local general hospital and that the king left aside any determination of rights. In a letter making this assertion of royal power more palatable, Torcy instructed the archbishop to reach a face-saving accommodation.91 Louis XIV, believing that “in order to maintain public discipline [kings] must lend vigorous aid to those who administer their authority,” eagerly defended the rights, prominence, and dignity of those who exercised authority in his name in the provinces.92 To investigate complaints from Brittany’s governor, the duc de Chaulnes, that he had been denied due honour during a Te Deum sung in his presence in the cathedral, Torcy asked the intendant about the practice in other cathedrals. With that information in hand and the decision made, Torcy relayed to the bishop and canons the king’s strong displeasure with their lack of respect and shared with the bishop his own anger over this behaviour, signaling the severity of the rebuke by enshrining the governor’s rights in an arrêt.93 Torcy also disapproved of parish priests encroaching on civil authority, even for desirable ends, such as when a priest overstepped his rights by disciplining a couple living in concubinage. Rather than withholding the sacraments, the normal first step within his power, the priest had appealed to the ordinary judges to punish and imprison the culprits.94 More shocking was the behaviour of two nuns, already convicted of immorality and indecency, who tried to poison another nun. Torcy obligingly sent Bishop Bossuet the necessary lettres de cachet.95 Even seemingly trivial challenges or acts of disrespect to an intendant elicited a strong reaction. Torcy wrote the lieutenant de roi of Navarrins about a sentinel who had delayed the intendant at the city gate with words and actions entirely lacking in the respect owed someone entrusted with the king’s business, but insisted that the fault rested with the lieutenant’s orders to the sentry. Branding the officer’s conduct entirely contrary to royal service, Torcy informed him that he would have to justify himself to the king.96 While Torcy and the king had no patience for clerical interference in civil affairs, this administrative protocol was not reciprocal. Intendants were the king’s provincial representatives as well as his eyes and ears. Louis XIV had Torcy discreetly seek the advice of the intendant in Béarn and Navarre, François Feydeau du Plessis, on a petition from one of the

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bishop of Lescar’s priests. When Breton bishops clashed over interference in one another’s dioceses, Torcy ordered them to submit themselves to the intendant Louis Béchameil de Nointel, who acted in the king’s name. Similarly, he employed the intendant on the spot to intervene between a bishop and his chapter over honours the latter complained they were denied. Even a bishop’s word was subject to the intendant’s verification, as Torcy wrote Lebret concerning conflicting counter-­charges exchanged between the bishop of Toulouse and the canons of the church of Cuers. The canons complained of the doctrines of two curates, the bishop imputed the canons’ morals, and Torcy assured Lebret that while the king did not want to doubt the bishop, he wanted to determine what exactly was going on.97 Not all church business involved conflict resolution. Seminaries were established, as in the diocese of Oléron in 1708, or the secretary advised a chapter or a bishop’s vicar general during a vacancy. The department also authorized expenditures on behalf of clergy, including monies from goods seized from Protestant churches and redirected to priests involved in conversions. Clerks issued letters enjoining the clergy to mark public occasions such as victory with Te Deums and prayers at times of national mourning.98 Torcy also saw to it that only crown-authorized clerical establishments continued to exist and that these were well regulated through authorized inspections.99 Louis XIV required the ecclesiastical hierarchy to deal decisively with faulty doctrine, and Torcy assured and documented their compliance. In 1700 he informed Charles-Maurice Le Tellier, archbishop of Rheims, that the king wanted to know if he had made it clear to his bishops that they were to publish as widely as possible the papal constitution of 12 March 1699 condemning one of Fénelon’s works. Requiring more than assent, he requested two copies of the printed order the archbishop had sent throughout his province, which foreign office clerks filed with the request’s minute when they were received. The intendants were enlisted to prevent reprints of Cornelius Jansen’s works and stop sales of copies of subversive Dutch sermons.100 A number of letters concerning New Converts and their property touch on other royal concerns, including public welfare, charity, and education. Torcy reminded Lebret that a worthy clergyman’s request was nonetheless directly contrary to standing royal orders that material taken from dismantled Protestant temples be used in building or repairing the local general hospital.101 Indeed, the theme of building or repairing c­ haritable institutions pervades Torcy’s correspondence. The



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general hospital, regarded as a municipal rather than a religious establishment, was envisioned as a panacea for the problems of the poor.102 In exchange for funds for schools, including those to indoctrinate New Converts, the king required details of how they were to be run. Anxious that teaching take place in a proper manner, Torcy directed intendants to regulate what went on in classrooms more closely.103 In the tradition of his uncle Colbert, Torcy directed the intendants in the assembling of “a massive bank of information that the crown could use not only for reform and state-building, but also for strengthening its own power in the long struggle against the independent power of traditional nobles and the parlements.”104 Knowledge of provincial affairs aided foreign ministry bureaucrats as they steered the politics and policies of the provincial estates. While some estates assisted with local administration, their most important role was in voting, levying, and collecting taxes suggested by the crown, even though the vote itself was increasingly a formality. Estates also provided feedback by channeling provincial concerns and grievances to the king through “cahiers des doléances” (notebooks of grievances), shepherded through discussion in Dispatches by the province’s secretary of state, who then drew up a point-by-point reply.105 Brittany and Provence were among the four grands pays d’états, while Béarn, Bigorre, and Nébouzan were smaller estates along the Pyrenees frontier dependent on the Crown of Navarre. Béarn-Navarre’s various estates continued to gather but were often so disorganized that Torcy finally asked that they send a delegation of deputies to Versailles to discuss their grievances. Provence’s Assembly of Communities (which replaced the estates in 1639), presided over by the archbishop of Aix, was given to internecine squabbling, but with a mixture of promises and prodding they usually followed the leadership of Lieutenant-General Grignan and intendants Pierre Cardin Lebret (until 1704) and his son Cardin Lebret. Deputies from the towns of D ­ auphiné met in assemblies that the intendant labeled clandestine because since 1628 they had been forbidden to meet without royal permission, which was never granted during Louis XIV’s reign.106 Brittany’s estates occasionally displayed some of their former vigour, but Torcy’s department steered them with great care. Every biennium from 1695, Adam carried lists to Rennes of town deputies to be summoned, while annotations on lists of nobles noted recent deaths, derogations, and those away with the military. Adam sought out the governor, whether at court, in Paris, at the front, or at his country estate, to propose the agenda and a projected subsidy to steer the deputies in the desired

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direction.107 When the comte de Toulouse, Louis XIV’s legitimated son, became governor in 1695, Torcy tried to instruct him in his privileges and arcane duties. He later confided to his journal that when a Breton deputation arrived at Versailles for a royal audience, Toulouse vacated his place as governor and moved to the ranks of the royal princes, but as the lowest-ranking of the royal princes, this was a less favoured place than had he remained with the Breton delegation. Torcy concluded that he believed him to have been badly advised.108 After the Fronde the royal government kept a tighter rein on the often fractious municipalities, but local elites still had room for manoeuvre and clashes were common among officials within and outside city boundaries. Municipal elections were frequent flashpoints and could turn unruly when local cabals collided, as they did in Marseille in 1693.109 Before Louis XIV’s reign these disputes were typically resolved through long, drawn-out, and complicated lawsuits as part of an overall negotiating strategy, but now they were increasingly settled administratively rather than judicially by deft steering from Versailles.110 Torcy aimed to maintain public order and assure responsible local governance while defending royal rights. Louis XIV’s obsession with order extended to ceremony, no triviality since hierarchy often manifests itself in people’s arrangement in space, including proximity to a person, a position in a procession, or precedence of entry or exit into or from a place.111 More mundane jurisdictional disputes could also elicit royal intervention to maintain peace while underscoring the king’s role as arbiter of public affairs.112 Royal officials who abused their power were viewed as subverting proper order and subject to royal rebuke, as the major of Navarrins in Béarn discovered when the king received complaints of his violence toward the locals. Outraged, Louis ordered the town’s governor to investigate and if the charges were confirmed to express his displeasure with the abuse of an authority given for his subjects’ relief rather than their continual harassment.113 Likewise, complaints of scandal elicited inquiries and possible intervention, as when Torcy instructed the intendant to investigate allegations of impropriety against the bishop of Digne.114 The state sought information to better extract resources from the kingdom, especially money, men, and matériel for war, but there was also a genuine concern for the welfare of its inhabitants and for provincial improvements. After the terrible winter of 1708–09, for instance, Torcy was anxious that grain reach the hungry in Provence. He relayed to a local official the king’s and Desmaretz’s pleasure that he had adopted



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the best means possible for dealing with disorders among the local butchers and the interruption of grain boats up the Rhône. Torcy also worked with the controller general on grain shortages already surfacing in ­Toulon.115 Public health emergencies caught his attention as well. In 1691 he responded to concerns about the possible arrival of plague in Provence by interdicting commerce with its source, the Kingdom of Naples, and with the Papal States, should it spread there. He would not, however, stop the courier service to Toulon and Marseille,116 likely to maintain communications with Catinat’s army poised to attack Nice when the 1691 campaign opened. Torcy was also proactive, as when he instructed Provence’s intendant to provide public fountains for clean water and repair local canals.117 A secretary of state’s capacity for dispensing the fruits of patronage was enormous, but it is not always possible to determine precisely who influenced or made such decisions. In theory and often in practice the king had the final say.118 Nevertheless, secretaries oversaw and influenced appointments in their own bureaucracies and even more in their provinces, and they had other resources for rewarding family, friends, clients, and supplicants favoured by power brokers.119 Access to and control of the information flow between these provinces and the court frequently offered decisive leverage, even as others jockeyed to influence these appointments. In 1691 Torcy wrote an informant in his own hand that the king wanted to know the precise state of health of the lieutenant-­ general of Saintonge and Angoumois. The informant was to gather this information secretly and send it to Torcy so that he could relay it to the king.120 Both dispatch and discretion were necessary to assure Torcy’s influence in naming a replacement upon news of the lieutenant-­general’s death. News of deaths traveled quickly and set off a scramble for honours left behind, as when Tallard wrote Torcy from his London embassy about an office whose holder he heard had died.121 The routine of renewing or appointing a governor, lieutenant, or major in a town began by drawing up an authorizing document that was then sent out to the local sovereign court as petites lettres patentes under a yellow seal, with the appointment, usually to run for three years. Occasionally, however, a contretemps arose. In 1710, when Pierre du Cambout, duc de Coislin, died, his younger brother and sole heir, Henri-Charles du Cambout, bishop of Metz, claimed his title, but Louis XIV denied it, declaring that it was a military title. Although the case remained in the courts for years, the late duke’s royal offices were expeditiously divided among “worthy” courtiers, including Torcy’s younger

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brother Croissy, made governor of Crécy-en-Brie. On another occasion, when the governor of Nantes was heard to be in extremis, the post’s monetary value was immediately assessed. Miraculously, the governor survived for another five years, but when he did die, Torcy already had an assessment of his office’s revenues, and within a month that post, too, went to Croissy.122 Secretaries of state, with access to the king and any others who could influence appointments, including members of the civil, military, and ecclesiastical hierarchies and members of the royal family and court, were well placed to serve their own clients.123 Torcy helped his friend the comte de Guiscard succeed to his father’s governorships of the city, fortress, and sovereignty of Sedan and helped Lebret fils succeed his father as Provence’s intendant. At the time of the Ryswick negotiations, Torcy wrote a lettre du roi to Bayonne’s magistrates requesting that his agent and spy Daguerre, busy in Amsterdam and elsewhere, be permitted to enjoy Bayonne’s privileges even though he was presently absent.124 Torcy also obtained a mail courier’s post in Bayonne for a domestic of its governor, Gramont. Gratifying the clients of others allowed him to earn future consideration from other powerful patrons or to repay them for past ones. In extending his protection to the Duchess of Burgundy’s valet, Torcy ingratiated himself with the favoured royal heir’s wife. He instructed his own client, Champagne intendant André de Harouys, to write on behalf of the valet’s nephew, enabling Harouys to serve Torcy through his own provincial patronage network.125 A collateral part of this patronage correspondence included the letters flowing among clients, patrons, and brokers offering thanks for current favours and keeping channels open for future ones. Such compliments were often sincerely meant and a normal part of obtaining favours. Torcy received many such pleasantries, as when Vauvré, Toulon’s naval intendant, congratulated him upon Desmaretz being named minister. He offered compliments as well, thanking a priest for the concern shown his aunt, Claire Colbert, abbess of Saint Claire of Rheims. To a letter of appreciation from Achille III de Harlay, the Paris parlement’s first president, Torcy replied graciously that while always happy to do him a favour, the present one was too trifling to deserve thanks.126

T h e P o l ic in g of Pari s On 22 July 1714 Torcy received a letter from d’Argenson relating that, in accordance with his earlier instruction, his men had searched Paris for



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a Scotsman named Law, said to be a professional gambler and British spy, but alas, they could not find him. At the top of this missive Torcy scribbled that since Law was not suspected of anything, he could be left in peace; Torcy then left it to a commis to draft a fuller rely.127 This letter and other evidence counter the myth that John Law, later the regent’s financial wizard, was a professional gambler,128 but the letter is significant for an additional reason. It reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that the foreign secretary and his department played a role in the policing of Paris and its vicinity. The early modern use of the word “police” was ambiguous, serving as an omnibus term for both a jurisdictional right and an obligation to act. It has been suggested that the closest simplified modern equivalent is “administration.”129 Jurisdiction was over a given area, corporate body, or category of individuals, while “policing” was undertaken to ensure order and safety within the civil (and often civic) body. Civility was inherent in the definitions of the police in such works as Delamare’s Traité de la police or the Dictionnaire de Trévoux, which equated the policing of a state with civilization’s progress.130 The household secretary and, under him, the capital’s lieutenant of police were the two officials most responsible for policing Paris. From the tenure of Colbert, the household secretary enjoyed the significant privilege of bypassing the chancellor and reporting directly to the king.131 He was the chief conduit of Parisian news to the king and his councils. In an average year the lieutenant of police wrote him over three hundred letters, answering specific questions, commenting on the day’s news and gossip, and speculating on future developments. Court wags whispered that Jérôme Pontchartrain distilled smut from Parisian refuse to whet Louis’s prurient curiosity, but a more likely motive was Louis’s obsession with knowing the details of the lives of his court’s great families. Whether their failings or achievements, their misadventures or accomplishments, it did not matter. What mattered was that information be promptly reported to ensure that royal largesse and appointments were properly directed. The king also worried that urban riots might become uprisings. He complained to his Conseil that he saw too many beggars in the streets and that royal couriers and foreign envoys were afraid to ride abroad at night without an armed band of torch men and fusiliers.132 The first lieutenant of police in Paris, Gabriel Nicolas de La Reynie, undertook the Herculean task of serving as liaison between the central administration and the complex municipal hierarchy of magistrates, commissioners, and inspectors collectively known as the Châtelet.

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Torcy treated La Reynie as a valuable guide, and they conversed when he ­visited Versailles, so it was a severe blow when under the lash of Louis Pontchartrain’s criticism, La Reynie retired in 1697.133 His successor, Marc-René de Voyer de Paulmy d’Argenson, from an important old sword family, a Pontchartrain client, and a master politician, worked with Torcy and his bureaus on a regular basis, particularly on any matter involving a foreigner.134 The struggle of France and her few allies against the great coalition that opposed them centred on Paris and the complex of palaces surrounding it, the heart of intelligence-gathering and decision-making. This relatively small but densely packed area was awash in information and overflowing with those anxious to gain hold of it. Some sought merely to impress others with the juicy morsel they had overheard or were privy to, while others looked to turn a profit by selling privileged information to news-hawkers. Enemy agents sought intelligence, while others, if not themselves spies, were willing or anxious to pass along what they knew, whether for profit, spite, or other motive.135 The Paris post office was an especially irksome source of leaks in Torcy’s information system.136 Some postal clerks abused their position to sell what they gleaned from the letters flowing through their bureaus.137 Parisian and provincial postal clerks were frequently under police surveillance.138 The many foreigners in the capital and its vicinity attracted even greater attention during wartime.139 These included merchants, clergy, students, embassy personnel, and refugees. Considered potentially dangerous, they were monitored closely and a weekly report forwarded to the foreign office.140 Torcy’s formal relationship with the police derived largely from his judicial power as a secretary of state to arrest, interrogate, incarcerate, and release suspects by means of a lettre de cachet, a private expression of the royal will in the form of a sealed order whose object was a particular person or group. Outside the regular judicial system, a lettre de cachet did not specify a charge and the person detained was not technically a criminal until further measures were taken, which might be never.141 Like his fellow administrators who looked to the Châtelet to watch suspects and if necessary arrest and transport them to prison, Torcy engaged its Compagnie du lieutenant criminel de robe-courte. This paramilitary group, whose short military robes distinguished them from colleagues whose function was primarily judicial, had an excellent reputation and often accepted special assignments for extra income.142 Lieutenant Le Roux received a gratification of 600 livres for spying on



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foreign visitors. In 1707 Lieutenant Pommereuil and his archers spent 159 days pursuing suspects and were paid for their time, their food, and a carriage to transport the prisoners to Paris, while in 1713 another of the company’s officers brought prisoners from distant Bordeaux.143 A checklist sent to Torcy at the end of 1697 reveals the pattern of arrests and releases for that year. Of the fifty-seven imprisoned or exiled, over one-third went to one of the general hospital establishments in Paris, a dumping ground for the lower classes. “For [sic] l’Évêque”144 and the Châtelet were holding houses that received seven detainees, while the Abbaye, which housed military prisoners within the walls of Saint-Germain-des Pres, received one. Of those remaining, nine went to unspecified destinations, four were exiled from Paris, and the remaining few were confined in the provinces.145 An additional eight young men went not to a prison per se but to the convent of Saint Lazare, reserved for so-called men of quality who were feeble-minded, insane, or libertine. As we now know, the infamous lettre de cachet was often requested by families to prevent a member from bringing shame upon or injury to them all.146 Several of Saint Lazare’s inhabitants were sons of important officials, such as the chancellor’s premier commis, a police lieutenant, and an intendant’s sub-delegate. At the bottom of a page of notes, Torcy had penned the pious hope that its inmates were there for the correction of their lives and morals.147 Five prisoners went to the Bastille and Vincennes, reserved for more socially elevated state prisoners such as nobles, royal officials who had gone astray, and important foreigners.148 Prior, reporting home on one of his agents whom he called a cheat and Torcy regarded as a cross between a knave and a madman, gave assurances that his punishment would not exceed lodgings in what he playfully called “the little house.”149 Some of those incarcerated had an aura of mystery about them. Torcy entrusted the “prisonnier sans nom” (prisoner without a name) to d’Argenson to hold incommunicado in the Bastille and repeatedly question about a supposed plot to poison Philip V. The Spanish court took this threat seriously, sending Ursins’s nephew, Louis de Talleyrand, prince de Chalais, to consult with Torcy and seek a royal audience. Torcy and the king were particularly concerned with any possible link between the prisoner and the duc d’Orléans, accused a few years earlier of plotting to take Philip’s throne. The accusations against the prisoner were not proven, but so secret were the proceedings that d’Argenson, not entrusting the interrogation accounts to writing, traveled to Versailles where, on Torcy’s advice, he delivered them verbally.150

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The foreigners in the capital sometimes experienced police action as part of diplomacy’s choreography. In 1703 Imperial officials in Hamburg arrested former Danish ambassador to France Meyercroon on what the French regarded as a pretext for punishing him for having spoken out at Ratisbon against the proposal that the Empire declare war on France. As it happened, a French fleet that attacked a Dutch convoy returning from Lisbon rescued from a sinking Dutch ship the Imperial ambassador to Portugal and the Elector of Mainz’s envoy to Spain. Torcy made it clear to both and to their home governments that their treatment would mirror that given Meyercroon. Torcy and Jérôme ­Pontchartrain cooperated on these two cases, but the lead police official, who the following year shared information with Torcy first, earned Pontchartrain’s testy reminder that police matters concerning the Bastille were under his department.151 When the Duke of Savoy suddenly abandoned France in 1703 to join the Allies and had all French subjects in Savoy arrested, Torcy retaliated with Pontchartrain’s hearty endorsement and had all Savoyards in Paris detained save the ambassador and his suite.152 Worried about foreign envoys and their staffs, the department relied on the police to monitor their comings and goings, especially (since 1685) those from Protestant states. Torcy repeatedly complained to the latter about New Converts illegally frequenting their chapels or chaplains making secret forays outside embassy grounds to conduct services. “Heretical” books channeled through embassies were subject to seizure, as were embassy personnel considered to have gone too far in their relations with New Converts.153 Given French sensibilities about Gallican liberties as well as the papal role in international politics, the nuncio’s Paris residence was also under observation, with visitors and mail passing in and out carefully noted.154 The foreign office also monitored trouble in Parisian streets involving embassy staff, such as an almoner under the protection of Malta’s envoy being caught up in a violent clash.155 Whether it was an issue of Mantua’s representative being suspected of sheltering a medical charlatan, street fights breaking out involving the Savoyard ambassador’s staff, or the Venetian ambassador’s entourage infuriating locals by blocking a street, Torcy acted with the police.156 Not all interactions between embassies and the Parisians were negative, since ambassadors and their entourages were consumers of daily supplies as well as of luxury goods to furnish their residences, take home with them, or purchase on behalf of patrons and friends at home. They also typically employed locals for lower domestic positions to cut costs and because they knew French and local customs.157



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Watched as well were the several thousands of the Jacobite community in Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Spies were a concern, as were the seedy or criminal hangers-on typically attracted by an exiled population to prey upon countrymen and hosts alike. Violence was a particular problem within the community and in its relations with the surrounding French. Torcy worked with d’Argenson and even with Jacobite secretary of state Lord Middleton to monitor this often mobile and turbulent population. Numerous Jacobites served France as distinguished and loyal soldiers and agents, but their presence offered Britain an easy means of inserting agents into the French capital.158 Traditional images of isolated scriveners scribbling away in bureaus removed from daily realities to the contrary, it is fitting that our exploration of the foreign office’s workings ends in the streets amid crowds of Parisians jostling and brawling with the often pugnacious lackeys of foreign representatives to Louis XIV’s court. Leaving to one side the perhaps too easy parallel between these altercations and those on a grander and deadlier scale among these states as they jostled for precedence, profit, and power in Europe and overseas, there is another aspect worth noting. Even as Torcy and his staff directed the diplomatic apparatus of Europe’s most powerful state, sending out finely and precisely worded instructions to diplomats in far-flung embassies to shape the course of international relations, they also dealt with an abundance of mundane domestic business, whether related to diplomacy or not. Papers concerning a wide range and mixture of matters and containing a profusion of information passed between the ink-stained fingers of this small group of clerks often but not exclusively bent over writing desks in bureaus at Versailles and its environs. It is this potent encounter of ink and paper that rendered data into writing and then organized this recorded information into files that empowered these bureaucrats within the administration of perhaps Europe’s most dazzling and powerful state.

Conclusion

Louis XIV played many roles as monarch – the soldier-king, the royal builder, the kingly collector of art and curiosities, the master of court ceremonial – but perhaps his most influential was that of roi-­bureaucrate, supervising a bureaucratic apparatus of remarkable sophistication and reach. Not only did he preside over this expanding system of government bureaucracy and public administration – an emerging “world of paper”  – but he was intimately involved in its creation and articulation. Historians have been loath to portray Louisquatorzian bureaucracy as fitting too closely the Weberian ideal type of “modern” bureaucracy, wisely choosing not to ignore the importance, for example, of clientage and patronage in early modern organizations. The dilemma resolves itself in part with a more realistic depiction of modern bureaucracy. One helpful approach is to see bureaucracy as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Thus, Weber himself wrote of an older “patrimonial” system of administration that contrasted with the “more mature” bureaucracies of his own times. But in recent decades others have gone on to critique both Weber’s model and his/our sense of just what modern bureaucracy looks like in practice. Modern bureaucracies have been weighed on the Weberian scale and found wanting. The ways in which administrative organizations in the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first operate internally and interact with outsiders are much less tidy than the Weberian model suggests, and yet these organizations are usually able to adjust their structure to their circumstances to accomplish the particular tasks set for them. Contingency theory helps explain how this adaptation operates through altering functional specialization, formalization, and centralization to fit an organization’s changing circumstances and especially its size. This f­ lexible and ­multi-faceted vision



Conclusion 461

of administrative organization permits a better understanding of organizations and how they change. The result is that while modern bureaucracy looks and operates less like the idealization drawn by many of Weber’s interpreters, early modern bureaucracy looks more like the modern reality of public administration than formerly assumed. Torcy, who had been carefully groomed for office within the C ­ olbert clan by formal education, travel, and apprenticeship in his father’s bureaus, plunged into the routine and work of the administrative department from as early as 1689 when he officially became Croissy’s survivancier. Nurtured within and aided throughout his career by an extensive family network that included two foreign ministers of France – his father and his father-in-law – he was hardly unprepared to assume the helm of the foreign office in 1696. However, with his appointment coming at the beginning of delicate and contentious negotiations to end a devastating war, it was a time of testing for the still-young secretary of state. In collaboration with Pomponne, Torcy and his department successfully managed the mechanics of concluding peace and then launched a series of embassies and diplomatic initiatives aimed at a peaceful resolution of the impending Spanish succession. He had critics among the capital’s resident diplomats and the powerful at court, including the king’s secret wife, but Torcy was not without influential backers and allies. For the most part he deflected the barbs and won over many former detractors, but above all he largely stood firm in Louis XIV’s confidence. Even the poaching in the foreign ministry’s diplomatic domain and domestic functions by the powerful fellow secretaries of state Chamillart and Jérôme Pontchartrain ultimately proved ineffective. Although the king decided policy with the advice of his Conseil, in which Torcy’s was but one voice, Torcy held firm as coordinator of French diplomacy and diplomatic information and master of the foreign office. A greater challenge to his control over negotiations and the flow of information relating to them came in 1706 when the despairing king briefly sought peace through secret diplomacy in collaboration with the war minister and without the knowledge of Torcy or the rest of the Conseil. Chamillart’s inept negotiations, however, further damaged France’s credibility with her enemies, unnecessarily complicating and prolonging the already tortuous peace process. Desperate to end the war, Chamillart could not refrain from further intrusions around the edges of the quest for peace, but he never again did so in collaboration with the king. Torcy’s department, as we have shown, did more than coordinate the diplomatic web woven throughout Europe and beyond on behalf

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of Louis XIV. As secretary of state, Torcy administered a portion of the realm’s provinces and was what we would call today a “hands-on” administrator, closely involved in the details of his duties. Nevertheless, he had only two hands. A hands-on approach to management at its best requires knowledge and first-hand experience of administrative processes as well as ongoing monitoring of an organization’s personnel and functioning. This certainly characterized Torcy’s tenure as foreign secretary. An administrative head who keeps all the decision-making power in his or her own hands – which in its less-glamorous reality is difficult and time-consuming decision-making work – risks any number of perils, including exhaustion and ill-informed decisions. The organization experiences bottlenecks and eventually organizational paralysis, and in the ranks there is a sense of a lack of trust from those higher up and even an unwillingness or inability to make relatively simple decisions. Unlike Philip II of Spain,1 his own uncle Colbert, and perhaps his father Croissy,2 Torcy knew how to delegate authority to his clerks, which he did increasingly as the weight of wartime duties and negotiations pressed more heavily upon him. Torcy had grown up within the Colbertian information state. The architect of this administrative edifice and the intellectual force that drove it was Colbert, ably served by his younger brother and disciple Croissy. They were the pioneers of the early days of Louis XIV’s personal reign, when its structures were assembled, its agents trained and sent out, and its libraries and archives gathered and organized to project royal power within France and abroad. Croissy, after long years in the provinces and at foreign courts, applied his sibling’s vision and methods to the foreign office by creating an archive and reshaping the way daily business was conducted so that organized, easily accessible files would result. What accounted for this difference in approach and temperament between Torcy on the one hand and his father and uncle on the other? In part, it was due to the fact that Torcy began his apprenticeship when the Colbertian information state was already in place and functioning. Thus, while Torcy gave the foreign ministry’s archives a home in the Louvre, expanded and improved its contents and organization, and utilized it in innovative ways, especially for purposes of propaganda and the training of future diplomats, it was Croissy and not his son who created the department’s archive. Unlike his father and his uncle, Torcy began his work life essentially as a commis or premier commis in the organization that he would one day lead.



Conclusion 463

Despite his humble beginnings in the bureaus of others and his utilization of elements of France’s rich administrative past, in many respects Colbert assembled, created, and shaped the bureaucracy he headed under Louis XIV. Croissy came into the foreign office as its head having previously interacted with it as an ambassador, but without having ever been a part of its central administration. In fact, as secretary he broke with its past in a number of ways, including by purging top administrative personnel and apparently altering the former bureau structure of specialized bureaus for foreign and domestic tasks. Torcy, however, who from the age of fifteen had grown up within the department’s bosom, upon his father’s death emerged as secretary of a department that, following the king’s intention, had already become the “family business” of the Colbert de Croissys. Torcy’s training was in part at the feet of his father, father-in-law, and the king, but it was also at the side of the department’s clerks, whom he saw regularly not only in the bureaus at Versailles but at the Hôtel Croissy, where many resided and were intimates of the Colberts. Such intimacy especially affected Torcy during his youth when the social distance between him and the clerks was less pronounced. This, of course, did not guarantee that he would grow up to trust and delegate authority to these clerks and those who later joined them, but it did mean that when the department became his as secretary in 1696, he belonged to the department by training, sentiment, experience, and personal relationships. One of the reasons historians frequently write accounts of events and organizations from a “great man” perspective is that this is the perspective implied by what has been preserved or by the way documents are written, despite what common sense might suggest. When narrating or analysing the foreign ministry’s activities and actions, it is easy to write in terms of “Torcy wrote” this, “Torcy ordered” that, or “Torcy instructed” this one or that one. The reality, however, was often that one of his senior clerks wrote a draft, perhaps from the minister’s annotations on the document to which he was responding, perhaps based on oral instructions, or perhaps based on what he knew or thought he knew of the minister’s or department’s usual reply to such correspondence. In some cases Torcy heavily revised the draft, but in others he revised only lightly or not at all.3 At other times a premier commis wrote a letter or note on his own behalf, often known to us only from the recipient’s surviving papers. Any order or instruction emanating from his bureaus had Torcy’s tacit if not explicit approval; otherwise the offending clerk was, at the very least, set straight on the matter. It is not possible, however,

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that all of the department’s writings originated from his pen or were seen by him personally. Indeed, his peregrinations among the three points of the Paris “communication triangle” (Versailles, Marly, and Paris), not to mention Fontainebleau, other palaces, or trips to the battle front, meant that while some decisions could be made only after awaiting his return or sending a lackey to track him down, others proceeded apace without him. By its very nature, this behind-the-scenes process appears only occasionally in the record. Even today it largely eludes the observer, leading to a fiction, whether explicit or implicit, that it was the organization itself that was acting rather than its personnel. Our account of Torcy’s bureaucracy depicts specifics when the evidence permits, but nevertheless must often rest content with merely tracing its activities or areas of responsibility and then from this inferring its clerks’ activities. The emerging picture is complex and goes beyond the usual sense of the proper work of diplomacy. From the beginning of the personal reign, a tripartite division of departmental labour was the norm, even if not always embodied in three unmistakably separate and identifiable bureaus. Two premier commis divided diplomatic business on a geographic basis, while a third supervised domestic administration. If Croissy in fact deviated from this arrangement as the evidence suggests, Torcy returned to it when he reorganized the department after Ryswick and Mignon’s death. Contrary to what is often claimed, the fundamental division of department business was based not on geography but on function. The two political bureaus typically processed long letters of news or queries for guidance from French diplomats and their staffs that often required decoding before being acted upon. These clerks additionally read through a variety of spy reports and printed materials that in some cases needed to be translated before being summarized. Likewise, out-going materials were often lengthy because distance and the vicissitudes of foreign postal services precluded frequent and rapid exchanges between an embassy and the court. Much correspondence had to be encoded before being sent out, and sometimes translation from French was required if a document was for the eyes of a foreign power that could or would not accept French text. If legal knowledge was necessary for this work, it was of international law or the “constitution” of a particular state or region, such as the composite and parliamentary English monarchy or the Holy Roman Empire when dealing with German princelings. Indeed, while the clerks of the department mostly remained in France, their minds had to range beyond its frontiers to gain and maintain knowledge of the history, customs, climate, geography, current



Conclusion 465

events, and key players in a number of foreign states and courts. Their primary contacts were with the king’s representatives and their staffs abroad, since they were the ones the clerks at Versailles worked with and often served in maintaining while abroad their private interests at home. The domestic bureau, however, received a different type of paperwork  – for example, petitions, shorter letters (due to shorter distances as well as the well-developed French postal system) from provincial administrators, and judicial documents. Neither decoding, encoding, nor translating was normally required, but a thorough knowledge of the formularies for drafting a variety of royal legal documents was. And if the minds of the clerks at Versailles handling domestic correspondence did not normally have to venture beyond the kingdom’s frontiers for this work, they nonetheless needed to know the variety of customs, histories, institutions, legal systems, and personnel of each of the provinces and areas within them supervised by the foreign office. Rule from Versailles more often meant steering locals (not always successfully) toward goals set at the centre than it did imposing the royal will. Since this was done best through the careful coordination of royal officials, local officials at varying levels of governance, and local elites in the provinces, such steering required a keen awareness of highway conditions. The differences between a pays d’élections and a province with estates, for instance, could be significant, since each required a different kind of steering; moreover, even the two pays d’état of Provence and Brittany were hardly identical. In the domestic bureau as well as the political bureaus, there were great advantages to be had from a stable staff steeped in department procedures for managing the paperwork that flowed in and out of the bureaus. Prior to the First World War, myths of modernity served to make sense of (or perhaps to exaggerate) the distance between the institutions and practices of the “Age of Progress” and those of the early modern, but even before 1914 and particularly since, they have been increasingly questioned. One of our goals has been to demystify bureaucracy, which in the modern world, we must reiterate, looks and works less like the mechanistic Weberian model than is often assumed, and is consequently in the early modern surprisingly closer to what exists today. The foreign office under Torcy was clearly bureaucratic: it had professional, full-time personnel for specified tasks who were arranged hierarchically; skill and merit played a role in their selection either from within the department in which they had undergone an apprenticeship or from the outside where they had acquired training and proven their ability for the work of the

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foreign office. Promotion within the department was largely based on technical merit. Clerks were paid something similar to a salary, although there were other rewards to be had. For the most part, these clerks were guided in their work by set procedures that in some cases were in writing and in others were enshrined in unwritten office custom. And their actions were recorded in the written records they helped create and later stored in files for future reference. Furthermore, as we have shown, early modern practices that were often derided or dismissed as irrational during the past two centuries now make more sense when evaluated in the context and light of the time. For example, with no schools of public administration, the system of survivancier offered a young man an invaluable apprenticeship as secretary of state without binding the king to his eventual promotion. Likewise, nepotism and apprenticeship often worked hand in hand to provide the department with skilled and dedicated clerks. Merit apparently played a role in this. For example, Adam remained with domestic administration rather than becoming head of a political bureau, perhaps because he did not know Latin. Torcy was not averse to bringing in skilled and tested outsiders for specialized tasks and leadership roles: for example, Ligny’s experience with war finance led to important accounting responsibilities, while Noblet and Pecquet had proven abilities that allowed them to become premier commis with little or no experience within the department. Even tasking the foreign secretary with a portion of domestic administration served Louis XIV’s desire not to have an all-powerful “interior minister” at the same time that provincial administration provided the secretary of state with a reservoir of patronage possibilities and kept him grounded in the kingdom’s economic and social realities, which formed the unavoidable context within which diplomacy played out. As royal councils increasingly concentrated on high-level decisionmaking and controversial issues, the daily administration of France increasingly fell to the experienced bureaucrats of the relatively small yet efficient central administration who coerced, cajoled, coddled, and cooperated with provincial officials and elites.4 Those searching for bureaus within the department often overlook them because they expect formal structures and fail to appreciate the ways in which a small organization is best ordered. Bureaus within the foreign ministry existed as ongoing entities under a particular premier commis or as temporary, task-oriented groups under a chef de bureau. With a bureau’s relatively small staff, it was highly rational for clerks to fill in for colleagues as the



Conclusion 467

workload or absences required, which could be a virtue rather than a vice when the goal was a quick turnaround of department documents. Torcy’s clerks were more than mere creatures of the minister or extensions of his department. The premier commis and especially the secretaries were typically rising men in possession of the standing, skills, and networks that had made them attractive to Croissy and Torcy. Indeed, those at the top of the foreign office’s administrative staff ended up extending the department’s influence and augmenting its information sources through their family connections and ties with other powerful patrons. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Blondel, who linked the department with the fiscal-financial and military-industrial complexes that provided the Louisquatorzian regime with much of its money and material muscle. The venal offices and honours that these clerks held outside the department were not always a result of their service in the foreign ministry. Before entering Croissy’s service, Mignon was already in line to be a secretary of the king, succeeding his brother René II who several years earlier had followed the childless brother of his brotherin-law. Noblet was already a secretary of the king, having succeeded his father long before he joined the department. Nevertheless, the Colberts regularly saw to it that their associates were properly rewarded for their skills and loyalty, although the exact parameters of these are not always easy to trace in the department accounts. Yet, even the payroll records we have reveal a hierarchy of remuneration that reflected the department’s organizational hierarchy that placed the premiers commis and secretaries clearly at the top, with simple commis well below them and sous-commis and office boys not even explicitly mentioned. In many ways the story of the foreign office bureaucracy under Torcy revolves around the management of information. Indeed, much of his and his staff’s administrative achievement related to the acquisition of information, its more efficient processing, its storage for future use, and the simplification of its retrieval in an organized archive. Not just bureau personnel participated in these tasks. A “brain trust” of diplomatic personnel and erudite and linguistic experts supplemented their work, drawing on the rich intellectual resources of Paris as well as those of learned friends and correspondents in France and throughout Europe. Spy-catching and censorship were reactive measures meant to control the flow of information in and out of the kingdom, but more proactive measures included the issuance of passports, sponsorship of propaganda, and management of France’s postal system. While passports were among the normal tools of the foreign office, it was Torcy and his staff

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who integrated propaganda into the ministry’s effort to preserve institutional memory. They also used the post office to support departmental purposes, such as monitoring correspondence, including that of royal family members, courtiers, and suspected or potential spies, and assuring regular and reliable courier service to embassies as well as to the active theatres of war and negotiation. As Louis XIV lay dying at Versailles, Torcy made sure that he kept French diplomats abroad updated on his health and the fact that the doctors still held out hope.5 Even so, he must have sensed that the end of the reign was near. The days ahead would be perilous for him and others who represented a monarch and administrative system that many had grown weary of and wanted to modify or replace. Although Torcy and his department superficially appeared to have been eliminated by the Polysynod in 1715, both in fact survived, albeit in different forms and in different ways. The only administrative position Torcy maintained was his considerable power over the post office, which gave him continuing access to other people’s mail. He also served on the Regency Council and was influential as the duc d’Orléans’s foreign affairs advisor until November 1721. So great was his credit with the regent that Dubois lived in constant fear of being eclipsed.6 Dubois’s English supporters shared this apprehension. Ambassador John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair, wrote home at the beginning of 1719 that Torcy was consulted so frequently and his advice followed that all he lacked was the title of foreign secretary.7 Such fears were justified. From the beginning of the Regency, Torcy acted secretly on Orléans’s behalf by making use of his wide network of international connections to write to foreigners within and outside of France for news. To protect the contents of these missives and their writers’ identity, Torcy regularly burned the letters after recording without attribution any valuable information they contained. Five volumes, beginning in 1715 and running through 1718, number 1,238 folios. Torcy’s explanatory note at the front of the first volume is revealing: despite the regent’s major administrative changes, Orléans nonetheless considered it essential to continue the late king’s secret correspondence with foreign informants and therefore entrusted it to Torcy as the minister who had long managed it.8 In the wake of rival and financier John Law’s fall in 1720, Dubois negotiated a Franco-Spanish defensive alliance (27 March 1721), cemented it with a dynastic marriage, and turned it into a triple alliance with Britain (13 June 1721). As a newly minted cardinal (promotion on 16 July 1721), Dubois brokered the Treaty of Nystad (September



Conclusion 469

1721) that ended the Great Northern War. These multiple successes convinced the regent to grant Dubois’s request to take the post office from Torcy and require him to retire to his estate at Sablé. That Dubois finally persuaded Orléans to let Torcy go, however, likely had less to do with the cardinal’s ascendancy over his rival and more to do with the fact that Torcy had served his purpose in the regent’s diplomatic manoeuvring. Dubois’s overreliance on the alliance with Britain’s Hanoverians had unfortunately served Austrian interests all too well. When Dubois finally rallied to Torcy’s middle policy between this extreme and that of the anglophobic and pro-Spanish “old court” party, Orléans could afford to allow his old tutor to indulge his personal animosity and purge his rival.9 In terms of policy, after all, Torcy was the victor. Now reconciled with her traditional foe across the Channel and her Bourbon kin over the Pyrenees, France could keep Austria in check in a manner less dependent on the unreliable Whigs. Although France continued her pragmatic cooperation with Britain to maintain peace and Europe’s balance of power, under Cardinal Fleury she emerged from Albion’s shadow to pursue her own interests more independently. This was accomplished largely through a flexible and deft diplomacy reminiscent of that pursued by Louis XIV and Torcy to end the War of the Spanish Succession with treaties better than could be expected given the kingdom’s wartime disasters. Once peace was achieved at Utrecht, Torcy and the diplomatic apparatus he directed sought to preserve it by forestalling any resurrection of the Grand Alliance and rebuilding French prestige through diplomacy rather than war. There were those in Paris and other capitals who would have welcomed war, but the direction of French foreign policy in the quarter century after Torcy’s departure largely moved along the paths he and Louis XIV had laid out.10 Although Torcy’s Regency activities lie beyond the scope of the present work, we have already seen that they offer a useful coda not only for understanding Torcy’s policy legacy, but for understanding his administrative one as well. When Stair tried to pry the regent away from his reliance on Torcy’s counsel in 1719, he suggested that the only way for Orléans to assure that he remained in power once Louis XV reached majority was “by making himself entirely master of foreign affairs, so that nobody but himself should have any perfect knowledge of the state of them.” The regent’s only rival, Stair continued, was Torcy, the “one man in the kingdom that could have it in his power to hurt, by the knowledge of that matter.” The only way to end this threat, Stair concluded, was to “break the chain” of Torcy’s information on foreign affairs.11

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Dubois himself had earlier complained to Stair that he feared for his position because “there were many things which were hid from him.”12 The power that came from access to and control of information was clear. Torcy had worked for nearly three decades at building, utilizing, improving, and maintaining information networks at home and abroad. As historians have increasingly emphasized, information encompasses much more than printed words. It includes handwritten and spoken words as well as symbols and ceremonies, but above all it is about networks of people who communicate information in a myriad of ways, locations, and circumstances. Thus, in addition to but intimately connected with Torcy’s policy legacy was the diplomatic institution he left behind in 1715. Building on the achievements of his predecessors in office and especially those of his father and father-in-law, Torcy fashioned an effective and exemplary bureaucracy and corps of envoys that set the European standard. The department, largely intact and continuing under Pecquet’s able leadership, served the regent and the specialized foreign affairs council, while its domestic section, still led by Adam and now joined by Larroque, merged with those of the other secretaries of state under the new domestic administration council. Thus, the foreign ministry’s increasingly professional and skilled personnel and its administrative procedures largely survived Torcy’s dismissal as foreign secretary to influence French diplomatic practice in the eighteenth century and that of Europe as well. Many contributed to this legacy, including the hard-working Louis XIV and the earlier foreign secretaries of his reign, but in many ways this bureaucratic apparatus was primarily the result of the efforts of the two Colberts, Croissy and Torcy, and especially of the latter’s innovative and productive collaboration with the professional, knowledgeable, and hard-working clerks of his department. The routinization of work is one of the important characteristics of any administrative organization. While diplomacy has its predictable and routine elements, it also has to deal with much that cannot be foreseen. It has been suggested that the structures and practices of diplomacy have “evolved over many centuries precisely to absorb quickly what might otherwise be considered exogenous events and circumstances at work, such as wars and sudden changes in government.”13 If the smooth operation of the daily grind of diplomatic business was one test of an organization’s efficiency, then managing the unexpected in a timely and effective manner (and possibly exploiting it for gain) was quite another. Torcy’s achievement was to reorganize and expand the king’s diplomatic



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apparatus at home and abroad at a time when the stakes were especially high due to the complex issues relating to resolving the Spanish succession. Innovative yet risky partition schemes, fighting a war in which France was abandoned by most of her allies, and negotiating a peace after an acrimonious conflict and a string of French defeats sorely tested the department and its diplomats, but the final result was better than could have been expected. Studies of modern bureaucracy suggest that the foreign ministry at the end of Louis XIV’s reign was more “modern” than we think. Or, looking at the matter from the other direction, perhaps we should say that bureaucracy during what is usually labeled the “modern era” bears a closer resemblance to early modern administrations than is often assumed. Increasing informationalization and professionalization are undoubtedly hallmarks of administrative organizations over the past two centuries, but the process was well under way before 1789.

Abbreviations

A rc h iv e s a nd Li brari es aae aae ae aae cp aae md aae ppsr aae pvr

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris aae, Acquisitions extraordinaires aae, Correspondance Politique aae, Mémoires et Documents aae, Personnel – Première série reliée aae, Service du personnel, Édits, lois et ordonnances, arrêtés et décrets, “Volumes relies” an Archives Nationales, Paris ban Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale, Paris bl British Library, London bl am BL, Additional Manuscripts bn Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris bn ag bn, Armorial Général de France bn Cab. H. bn, Cabinet des Titres, Cabinet d’Hozier bn Car. H. bn, Cabinet des Titres, Carrés d’Hozier bn db bn, Cabinet des Titres, Dossiers bleus bn mf bn, Manuscrits français, Fonds français bn naf bn, Manuscrits français, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises bn po bn, Cabinet des Titres, Pièces originales pro sp Public Record Office, State Papers, London

474 Abbreviations

P r in t e d W o r k s and Journals Archives hg France. Ministère des relations extérieures. Les archives du Ministère des relations extérieures depuis les origines: Histoire et guide suivis d’une étude des sources de l’histoire des affaires étrangères dans les dépôts parisiens et départementaux. 2 vols. Paris: Impr. nationale 1984–85 daf Académie Française. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française. 1st ed. 2 vols. Paris: Coignard 1694. Dictionnaires d’autrefois, artfl, at http://artfl-project. uchicago.edu/ gbhmc Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission ss -Boislisle Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de. Mémoires de Saint-Simon. Edited by Arthur M. de Boislisle. 41 vols. Paris: Hachette et cie 1879–1928 ss -Coirault Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de. Mémoires. Additions au Journal de Dangeau/Saint-Simon. Edited by Yves Coirault. 8 vols. Paris: Gallimard 1983–88

Notes

Introduction 1 Max Weber quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. 2 “Bureaucracy as an organizational form is nothing if not persistent. To the degree that it does not meet the governance needs of societies, we would expect that bureaucracy would be replaced with other organizational forms.” Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 66. They go on to conclude that “bureaucracy will continue to flourish in the twenty-first century for many of the same reasons that it has flourished in the last century, it facilitates the governance process in ways other organizational forms do not” (ibid., 67). 3 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 327. Although terms such as “foreign minister,” “foreign secretary,” “foreign ministry,” and “foreign office” are anachronistic and are not translations of the French terms used then, they will be employed for the sake of brevity throughout the book for the secretary of state for foreign affairs and for his department. McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 209, for example, refer to the foreign office under Torcy. Picavet, Diplomatie, 68, however, says that Torcy, a “fonctionnaire honorable et prudent … ne vaut pas Lionne” (honourable and prudent functionary … was not the equal of Lionne), the first foreign minister of Louis XIV’s personal reign. 4 André, Louis XIV, 41; and Frey and Frey, Diplomatic Immunity, 215. 5 There was not always a crisp differentiation among the department’s various types of clerical personnel, so we will often employ “clerks” or even “commis” (clerk) to embrace them all, including secretaries. 6 Church, Red Tape, 4–5. 7 Picavet, “Commis,” 103–20. Baschet, Dépôt, published in 1875, although focused on the department’s archives, details general information as well. 8 Piccioni, Commis. He cites Picavet, “Commis,” on only two pages (ibid., 167–8) and for only Brienne’s department.

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9 Samoyault, Bureaux. While Picavet’s 1926 article is listed among the sources, it was often ignored in the writing. 10 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1. Piccioni’s value and limitations are noted (ibid., 268) in this work’s bibliography, but oddly, Picavet’s 1926 article is ignored even though his others are cited. This, unfortunately, leads to several omissions and errors. 11 Michel Foucault urged the “expulsion of law” from the study of modern society thusly: “We must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.” Quoted in Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 56. Stollberg-Rilinger, “Communication Theory,” 314–15, discusses the dangers such texts presented to classical constitutional history. 12 Weber’s short description of bureaucracy: “The combination of written documents and a continuous operation by officials constitutes the ‘office’ (Bureau) which is the central focus of all types of modern organized action.” Quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. 13 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 98. Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 106, summarizes the chief legacy of Foucault’s analysis of power thus: “Power is always an exercise, never simply an attribute.” 14 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 98. 15 Quoted in Blair, Too Much to Know, 263. 16 Weller, “Introduction.” See Soll, “The Antiquary and the Information State”; Soll, “How to Manage an Information State”; and Soll, Information Master. See also Vivo, Information, on political communication in Venice in the early seventeenth century. Higgs, Information State, vii, offers a more restrictive definition of the information state as one “involved in the collection and manipulation of information on private citizens,” which suggests a largely domestic focus. Yet, more expansively, Higgs seeks “to examine the generalised and structured collection of information which is so typical of modern administration – the creation of routine administrative records, and of databases, paper and electronic, rather than the ad hoc activities of informers and ‘spooks.’ It is the ubiquity of contemporary state data gathering, and the way in which it collects information in a standardised form for ease of analysis and retrieval, that is so significant.” This seems to point toward the broader sense of the information state seen in Soll’s work and which we adopt here. 17 Headrick, When Information Came of Age, 8. 18 Cortada, “Shaping Information History,” 122. See also Cortada, “Do We Live in the Information Age?” Although I became aware of Cortada’s recent and important work only as this book was about to go to press, my thanks go to Robert J. Fulton, Jr, for introducing me to it.

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Cortada, “Shaping Information History.” Ibid., 129. Ibid., 130, 132. Ibid., 135–6. Cortada, “Information Ecosystems,” 223. Ibid., 222. Ibid., 224. Cortada defines an ecosystem as “a body of information [that] circulates within some institution or group of individuals who communicate frequently with each other – in our case, diplomats and those with whom they worked – and their employers – in our example, diplomatic ministries. This ecosystem consists of documents and publications that circulate within a community, but it also includes shared knowledge, worldviews, and the values its members have accumulated through experience and education” (ibid., 225). Ibid., 224. Ibid., 229. “Workers in all fields,” Cortada observes, “organize data, or information, in ways relevant to their work,” as reflected in the “typology, or data map” applied to Spanish diplomatic papers (ibid., 238). Croissy, Torcy, and their clerks did the same. The parallels between practices in Madrid and those in Torcy’s bureaus are striking. Clerks distributed to the appropriate colleagues incoming materials for processing, including a variety of printed materials such as news clippings, pamphlets, and maps received from agents abroad (ibid., 230–3). Both central administrations had internal sources of information for ready access (a library, an archive of current materials, and office files in current use by various clerks) and an archive of older materials still accessible for department use (ibid., 234–8). Each ministry sought legal and other expert advice from the academic community, and published treaty anthologies, and prepared historical studies and document collections primarily for internal use (ibid., 240–4). In terms of methodology, as we have done with the bound volumes the French foreign office produced, Cortada counts bundles of records in the diplomatic archive to calculate the volume of diplomatic information (ibid., 231). Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:60–1, 95, for example, devotes to provincial administration the equivalent of one page and one paragraph out of nearly ninety pages on the central administration under the ancien régime, even though it describes it as a rather heavy burden (95). Perhaps the best published biographical overview of Torcy’s kin, career, fortune, and children is Roth, “Torcy.” Although brief, it is densely packed with useful information from and references to secondary as well as primary sources, including family papers in the Archive du château de BoisDauphin.

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31 “Minister” is a term used loosely for those at the pinnacle of administrative power, even though technically it included only those called to the Conseil or “Conseil d’en haut” (literally, the council from on high), the latter a designation dating to the time of Mazarin. It refers not to the council’s place in the hierarchy of state but to its meeting on the premier étage (the first floor above the ground floor) of royal residences where the royal chambers were rather than on the ground floor. Barbiche, Institutions, 286. We will refer to it hereafter as simply the Conseil. 32 Also called the War of the League of Augsburg. While both labels have their advantages and adherents, we adopt the shorter of the two. See the note in the chronology in Hatton, Louis XIV and Europe, 297. 33 Peters, “Information and Governing,” 113.

Chapter One 1 Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 217n1, observes that referring to “international” relations is technically anachronistic and misleading given that diplomats represented dynasties rather than nations. See also Black, Diplomacy, 26, 48, 104. 2 As in Bell, Lawyers. 3 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, 1: s.v. “département.” His examples include the secretaries of state and their departments of the navy, Normandy, and Protestant affairs. Similarly, the 1694 first edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (hereafter daf) notes that département is used for the different provinces of the kingdom, the different affairs of state directed by the secretaries of state, intendants of finance, and intendants of justice. This is clearly the sense used in the listings of the “Departemens [sic] de Messieurs les Secretaires d’Etat” (Departments of the Secretaries of State) found in the Almanach royal and the État de la France, annual publications that included information on the state and its personnel. Both publications must be used with caution, however, because care was not always taken in updating and revising lists of officials. Esmonin, Études, 233–7; and Boucher, “Évolution de la maison du roi,” 360–1. 4 Collins, State, 150–1, observes that the great material advantages of the early reign had dwindled by the 1690s and France after 1688 faced a more united enemy led by William III. Opposing armies had also matched many of the measures that had once given France the military edge. 5 Ibid., 154. Torcy was among the creators of “the modern European Great Power system” (ibid., 191). Black, British Diplomats, 2, warns against neglecting dynastic concerns in early modern diplomacy. 6 For Utrecht as an early turning point toward stabilized diplomatic practice, see Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 154–5.



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7 Only three managed to serve much beyond that average: Charles-­Gravier, comte de Vergennes (1774–87), almost thirteen years; Germain-Louis de Chauvelin (1727–37), nearly nine and one half years; and Amelot de ­Chaillou (1737–44), just over seven years. These statistics are based on the chart in Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:788–9. See Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, for the biography, career, and sources on each foreign minister. 8 Piccioni, Commis, 270–2. 9 Based on data in Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, 293–4, 296, 301. 10 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 59. See Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, on the influence of French culture and consumption on European diplomacy and diplomats. 11 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 78–9. See also Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 59–64, which notes the persistence of court politics in modern diplomacy. 12 Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 243–59, 796–7, demonstrates Latin’s persistence and argues that the diplomats’ eighteenth-century switch from Latin to French was due to the latter’s wide cultural use and was not the wedge of a bid for linguistic hegemony. Diplomatic language lagged behind in other areas of use due to conservatism and a tradition of Latin as a neutral language of compromise. See Rouillé to Louis XIV, 21 Nov. 1704, on letters in Latin from Poland. bn naf 22996, fol. 8r–v; and bl am 31138, fol. 108v, Bristol to Bolingbroke, 17 Mar. 1713, on the Latin instruments at Utrecht. 13 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 60–80. See Bély, Espions, 373–548, for the Utrecht peace congress. 14 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 265. 15 Black, Diplomacy, 12–14. 16 Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 61–3, 70, 74, 82, for his chronology. Bély, Art de la paix, 557–79, profiles Callières, who served under Torcy. Pecquet fils drew on his father’s service under Torcy and after as well as his own. See also Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 93. 17 Zmora, Monarchy, 90–1, stresses the role Louis XIV played personally in his monarchy’s success. Black, Diplomacy, 46, 79, argues that the king’s role in diplomacy was central. Cole, Governing, 190–2, shows the continuing importance of the predilections of individuals by underling the fact that “institutional variables do not dictate behavior” and that under President Nicolas Sarkozy, “strengthening the Élysée as the centre of operations has been a core preoccupation” (190). 18 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 9–15, uses and endorses the idea of “proprietary dynasticism” from Rowen, King’s State. 19 Rule, “Roi-Bureaucrate.” Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 284, conclude that behind the facade of “roi de guerre” (war king), Louis XIV was a “roi de cabinet” (staff king) in the manner of Spain’s Philip II. Manal, “Comment t­ ravaillait un roi,” calls Louis XIV administrator and “grand commis” of the state.

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20 Duindam, Courts, discusses court ceremony under Louis XIV without divorcing it from the work of government or casting it in the typical Saint-­ Simonian characterization as mere manipulation. 21 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 153–4. 22 Jones, Great Nation, 124, 128, 234. Collins, State, xiii–xiv, also contrasts Louis XIV with Louis XV. See Black, Diplomacy, 107, on Louis XV’s personal diplomacy. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, especially 86, ­787–9, stress the importance of individuals and their personalities. See also Blockmans et al., “Origines,” 10; and Genet, “État moderne,” 268–9. 23 See discussions in Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 137–8; Church, Louis XIV in Historical Thought, 21–54; and Carbonell, “Origines,” ­296–312. Cole, Governing, 28–9, describes the Jacobin view of the state and those similar elements that made the Louisquatorzian state so appealing to historians such as Lavisse. See also Nora, “Lavisse’s Histoire,” ­329–90. Bonney, “Absolutism,” 94, argues that “centralization,” a neologism first employed under the Terror in 1794, “is best avoided by the historian of early modern France … Instead, [sixteenth- and seventeenth-century people] stressed the distinction between the king’s delegated and his retained justice.” 24 Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 137. Blockmans, “Origines,” 2–6, offer examples from various national historiographical traditions. 25 Recent criticisms and warnings are found in Duindam, Courts, 318; ­Rowlands, Dynastic State; Smith, Merit, 6; Runciman, “Origins,” 47; and Genet, “État modern,” 278–9. 26 Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 204n27, notes “the undeniable bureaucratic development of the central state.” 27 Collins, State, 26, demonstrates that the seemingly complex and confusing layers of judicial power were in fact rational and adapted to contemporary realities. Dubost and Sahlins, Louis XIV, les immigrés, 17–21, analyse the 1697 tax imposed on immigrants. The royal declaration of the tax and the Council of Finances’s arrêt issued a week later together demonstrate the ambiguity of old regime politics. The declaration reflects an archaic form, whereas the decree, representing modernity, addresses the measure’s practical and administrative aspects and political implications. In a memoir for the regent on the late king’s councils, administrator Louis Fagon, son of the famous royal physician, candidly noted that Louis XIV had established councils in a form that differed from what they had been previously. aae md 1206, fol. 245. 28 Zmora, Monarchy, 6, 75–94, argues that the real work of “absolutism” and its greatest practitioner, Louis XIV, was primarily “renovative” (75) or “restorative” (90), returning the state and nobility to an earlier mode of close cooperation and mutual benefit. Beik, Absolutism, 339, argues that “absolute monarchs and their ministers did improve the state apparatus in



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s­ ignificant ways, but their modernity has been overemphasized by historians.” He urges a close examination of the “traditional social climate” in which these improvements occurred. His book seeks to discover “why [absolutism] worked first so badly and then so well” under Louis XIV (4). Tilly, “State Formation,” 137 (italics in original), marks “the analysis of ordered paths” by which states were transformed by following “a continuous field of possibilities, a field itself produced by multiple combinations of the same fundamental variables.” He observes that “within each path of state formation, earlier steps constrained later ones” (143). Cornette, “Nouveau ‘Siècle de Louis XIV,’” 602–3. Schaeper, Economy of France, offers a less bleak overall assessment, even though real difficulties nonetheless remained. Collins, State, 196–7. Even at the beginning of the process of re-evaluation of the second half of the reign it was possible to argue that it was in reality “the Second Period of Reform (following on that of Colbert), or the Second Renewal.” Rule, “Royal Ministers,” 1. Church, Red Tape, 16, claims on thin evidence that “there were few initiatives in government at the end of the reign,” and thereby misses the period’s important bureaucratic advances. Collins, State, especially chap. 5; Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” 29–42; Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 206; Church, Louis XIV in Historical Thought, 58, 73, 77, 90–2; and Rule, “Royal Ministers.” This is not to say, however, that the earlier period is as well understood as is often assumed. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, 8–13. For recent works on financial developments during the reign’s final decades, see Potter, Corps and Clienteles; and McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege. Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 223. In a more theory-driven observation, Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 2–3, says, “Whereas the focus of modernity is on ‘what should be done,’ I suggest a reorientation toward ‘what is actually done.’ In this way we obtain a better grasp – less idealistic, more grounded.” Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” 29. Ranum, Richelieu, 46, warns against history “written from the legislative bones of the ancien régime; descriptions from règlements, without a thorough study of the personalities holding the office, are not only inaccurate but sterile.” Bonney, “Absolutism,” 115–17, also argues for new approaches to the study of the state. Dingli, Seignelay; Mazel, Le Peletier; Frostin, Les Pontchartrain; ­Chapman, Private Ambition; Rowlands, Dynastic State; and Pénicaut, Chamillart (which understandably leaves aside his other post as controller general). Sarmant, “Pratiques gouvernementales,” notes Mathieu Stoll’s unpublished work on Claude Le Peletier, which has subsequently (2011) appeared as Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil. Sarmant also laments the lack of studies on departments such as the prp, household, and fortifications (created in 1691 and headed by Claude’s brother Michel Le Peletier de Souzy) and of full-scale studies of

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Notes to pages 20–1 Colbert de Croissy, Arnauld de Pomponne, and Daniel Voysin. Studies subsequent to Sarmant’s comments include McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, on Controller General Nicolas Desmaretz; and Cénat, Chamlay, on Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay, Louvois’s and Louis XIV’s chief military collaborator. Especially Bély, Espions; and Bély, Art de la paix. See also Bély, “Torcy.” Collins, State, ixn1. Krygier, “State and Bureaucracy,” 4. Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 205–7, quotes and uses Clausewitz’s sobering observations on the realities of “friction” – his omnibus term for all those “factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” – and “chance” in the great affairs of state. Church, Red Tape, 11–21, despite a caveat about the limitations of the Weberian “ideal type,” appears to deny bureaucratic status to any administrative structure that was poorly planned or failed to maintain crisp Weberian parameters in the face of the inevitable kaleidoscope of changing technology, governmental purposes, bureaucratic “neighbours,” and internal and external contingencies. Likewise, in this view a department that fails to live up to the promise of its structure is denied bureaucratic status; apparently, a failed bureaucracy is no bureaucracy. Weber himself, however, did not look at the quality of administrative structures alone, noting that the “first such basis of bureaucratization has been the quantitative extension of administrative tasks.” Weber, Economy and Society, 2:969. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, especially 43–4, 48, offer a trenchant examination of modern bureaucracy’s theory and practice. Higgs, Information State, 9, notes that the British state after 1914 “did not always prove itself to be the sort of rational, Weberian state that some sociologists would have us believe.” Higgs also observes that the “modern central state is merely a particular form of polity, not the ideal type” (32). Criticisms of Weber, of course, have been around since his work first appeared. A still perceptive reading is Friedrich, “Observations,” 27–33. He faults Weber’s lack of empiricism, use of “ideal types,” smuggling of value judgments into his model, and thinly disguised preference for a Prussian-style military organization as his model’s inspiration, but nonetheless credits Weber with having “opened important lines of inquiry” (33). Runciman, “Origins,” 47, argues against such assumptions. Cole, Governing. This legacy, however, is mixed. For example, “France has a particularly costly and inefficient system of tax collection,” and this was bequeathed by Napoleon (ibid., 179). Hindle, State, ix, urges that English “state formation” be seen “less as a linear process than as a sedimentary one, in which successive waves of social, cultural and institutional development subtly reshaped the contours of the political landscape.”



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46 Bell, Cult of the Nation, 5–6, argues that much the same has been done with regard to the “nation.” He notes nationalism’s paradoxical nature in its “claims which take the nation’s existence wholly for granted, yet it proposes programs which treat the nation as something yet unbuilt” (5). Jones, Great Nation, xviii–xx, observes that due to “non-historiographical but intensely historical events since 1989 … [m]any of the old teleological certainties have been exploded, and in a post-Marxist, post-Revisionist, and maybe even post-modern world, we can explore the political culture of the eighteenth century as a whole and its diverse political projects with less of a sense that 1789 was inevitable, or linked past and future in unilinear fashion, or even that it necessarily formed part of one of the founding grand narratives of Western modernity” (xix). Burke, History and Social Theory, 147, describes teleological thinking as based on “the assumption that change is essentially internal to a social system, the development of potential, the growth of a branching tree.” For where this kind of thinking has often led, see Scott, Seeing Like a State. 47 Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 18–19. 48 Quoted in Collins, State, xxiv, who notes that Fritz Hartung demonstrated long ago that this classic phrase was apocryphal. 49 The Polysynod was not the complete break with Louisquatorzian administrative structures and procedures once assumed, but rather a rearrangement of personnel at the very top and not as radical as often supposed. Administrative structures, procedures, and personnel below this level exhibited a striking continuity. Collins, State, 223–6; Petitfils, Régent, 319–25; and the very recent full-scale study by Dupilet, Régence absolue. 50 Asch and Birke, Princes, Patronage, 16–17. 51 Krygier, “State and Bureaucracy,” 21–5; and Kafka, “Hunting,” 119–26. 52 Mommsen, Weber, especially chap. 7. 53 Ibid., 109. 54 Ibid., 109–20. Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 143–8, 152–3, discusses bureaucracy’s adaptability and the advantages and disadvantages of task routinization, but also examines those negative and self-serving aspects that promote internal turf wars, mediocre personnel, and resistance to change. 55 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 52. 56 Burke, History and Social Theory, 30–1; and Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19, 195–6. 57 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 52. 58 Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 136–41 (quotation, 140). Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 23, also sees a continuum. 59 Burke, History and Social Theory, 30. He also observes that both systems “have their benefits, but also their costs.” Adams, “Rule,” 237–66, suggests modifications to Weber’s classic formulation of patrimonialism, noting that

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Notes to pages 23–5 “grand dichotomies,” while useful, can become “quick and dirty substitutes for more flexible concepts that can register diachronic change in relationships or systems.” Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:254–9, for example, shows that while in 1700 the king had made a relatively clear division of commercial responsibilities between the controller general and the navy secretary, Chamillart later requested a change because he considered the division unworkable. Routine and standards are not to be confused with clarity, which in turn should not necessarily be regarded as inimical to bureaucratic growth. Riley, Virtue, 3, shows how the police used the “permeable and imprecise language used to define ‘crime’ and ‘sin’” to their advantage to cast their jurisdictional net more widely. While they served a monarch set upon extirpating immorality, definitions and interpretations were left to them. Dimock, “Expanding Jurisdictions,” 282–91; and Hoover Commission, “Duplication of Functions,” 291–7. Ferlie, Lynn, and Pollitt, “Afterword,” 723, report that “it has become a commonplace that the boundaries between the public sector, the private sector, and civil society are becoming less clearcut and more ambiguous.” Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 21, 23. Collins, State, 66, points to the “profoundly personal nature of rulership” in both the early modern and our own times, requiring that strong personal bonds remain important, even in a bureaucratized state. One could multiply the examples and also take them in the other direction. What about educators who use their own funds for classroom supplies and who spend weekends and holidays at home working on their public service jobs? Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 55–7. Ibid., 65. Weber, Economy and Society, 2:999. Perhaps more clearly than Burke, Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 65, formulate this factor as “occupation of offices based on expertise and training” without specifying formal education and testing. Ash, “Expertise,” 6, notes that “an important aspect of expertise is the ability to learn on the job, and especially to cope with the surprises and unexpected setbacks one is virtually certain to encounter in the course of one’s career.” Azimi, “Pensions,” 77–8, demonstrates that the administrative customs of the various ministries with regard to these pensions only later gave rise to written law. Torcy, Journal, 303, records an example of the dangers of oral communication. Louis Pontchartrain misinformed him about the sending of some important orders because he had misunderstood what the king had said.



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70 Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 138, notes “Weber’s view that bureaucratization is encouraged by the need to deal with large continuous flows of administrative jobs.” 71 Collins, State, 208, 208n24, argues that while the bureaucracies created in France and England between the 1680s and 1720s differed from later ones “in fundamental ways (such as levels of routinization, real salaries, and size),” it does not mean that they were not bureaucracies. He notes that Brewer’s argument in his Sinews of Power that a fiscal-military bureaucracy arose in England during this period is now the historical consensus. 72 Rabinow, Foucault Reader, 16. Jones, Great Nation, xxi, 18–25, 219, is a recent acknowledgment of the royal government’s often creative and humanitarian attempts from the 1690s to respond to these challenges. 73 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality,” 2. 74 “Governmentality” is discussed at length in Burchell et al., Foucault Effect, especially 1–51. Also, Miller, Passion of Foucault, 299–301; and Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 24–31, 52–6. 75 Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law, 53. Riley, Virtue, 2, notes that “Louis XIV’s efforts to discipline France and attack sin were sustained by a voracious curiosity about moral conduct, a most rudimentary religious understanding, and, for the first time, a royal bureaucracy capable of providing detailed and precise information on sin.” Louis loved detail. Collins, State, 254, says that the “transition from to the modern state, in terms of the actual activities of the state, took firm root in the second quarter of the eighteenth century … The three main attributes of the old state (military, financial, and judicial) still dominated government thinking and expenditure but new concerns grew in importance … the police, poor relief, education, and sanitation and public works.” 76 Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality,” 3. See also Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 91–3. 77 Frederickson, “Public Administration?,” 282–304 (quotation on 283). ­Hindle, State, 1–2, 23, adopts the idea of governance, but argues that Foucault’s influence has led many scholars to focus on “corridors of power” upheld by force, rather than on “circuits of authority” based on “some degree of reciprocity in that it implies the acceptance of the governed of the legitimacy of their superiors’ rule” (236; italics in original). This has resulted in too much focus on central bureaucracy rather on local administration. 78 Duindam, Courts, 228–30. 79 Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 172, 180. 80 Dee, Expansion and Crisis, 175, points out that ministerial stability contributed to Louis XIV’s “constant tone of firm authority.” Whereas his two successors weakened their authority by “sudden ministerial changes and radical

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Notes to pages 26–8 alterations in policy,” Louis XIV remained loyal to a servant like Chamillart long after his inability was patent to most. By doing so, however, the king denied the discontented, especially during the troubled final decades of the reign, a scapegoat to serve as a focus for opponents of the regime. Delavaud, Pomponne, 95. Mommsen, Weber, 112. Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 26, said that “[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational.” Former controller general Claude Le Peletier, although a member of the Le Tellier ministerial faction at court, observed that the king kept ­Louvois’s son and survivancier Barbezieux as war secretary for the sake of continuity and because of his late father’s bureaus, clerks, and the order that they provided. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 155. Frostin, “Organisation,” 202. Apropos to the aggrandizing activities of young Pontchartrain, it is worth noting that Brown, “Bureaucracy,” 143, says that a “genuinely centralized bureaucracy is not only self-maintaining but self-­ developing. Its organizational design rewards bureaucrats who extend the scope of their power by maximizing their organization’s size or wealth or budget.” Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 4–9. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 64. They also point out that “Weber … defined bureaucracy in formal, structural terms” (52). Burke, History and Social Theory, 142–51, offers a trenchant exploration and critique of the concept of modernity and modernization theories. See also Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 24, 107–30. Carbonell, “Origines,” 297n1, contends that although absurd, the historic tradition in France calls the sixteenth through the end of the eighteenth century “modern”; the period from 1789 to the ever-distant present is labeled “contemporaine,” and yet “état moderne” is often used for the state from 1789, even though many now see its origins in the Middle Ages. The state and the nation are related concepts but are frequently confounded even in scholarly discussion. Blockmans, “Origines,” 1–6, 12. For recent French administrative and political decentralization, see Cole, Governing, who highlights administrative realities often at odds with seemingly rational and precise government structures. He demonstrates how the traditional model of the unitary Napoleonic state never reflected the actual relationship between the centre and the periphery, compromised as it was by the persistence of local centres of power and by overlapping layers of central power. Cole also discusses the challenges and opportunities Europeanization poses for French public administration (87–113). See also Pollitt, ­“Decentralization,” 371–97, and various essays in Levi-Faur, Oxford Handbook of Governance.

89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96

97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

107

Notes to pages 28–32

487

Donaldson, Contingency Theory, 76. Ibid., 1. This definition is further elaborated and terms defined in ibid., 5–6. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 3–4 (quotation on 4). Ibid., 1–30. Guéry, “State,” 21–2, seems to imply this when he says that in the ancien régime, “[b]ureaucracy existed only in embryonic form.” Pollitt, “Decentralization,” 373–7, which also includes a concept map of the variety of forms “decentralization” can take on. See also Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 6–9; and Reinhard, “No Statebuilding.” Cole, Governing, 53, after tracing the outlines of the “paradigm of the unitary state” and the “Napoleonic model,” observes: “In practice, centre-­ periphery relations were much more flexible than the Napoleonic model implied, as uncovered in [various] empirical studies.” He notes “the gap between discourse and behavior” (161) in the republican citizenship model and the state. Portrayed as strictly separated, public and private spheres in reality negotiated rule exceptions to adapt to local circumstances or the needs of particular groups. The 1901 law on associations, still very much in play, “conveniently blurs the boundaries between what is public and what is private. It has become a cover to enable public funds to be directed to organizations serving private interests” (162). Black, Diplomacy, 117, in noting the complexity of concepts of modernity and modernization in the history of diplomatic practice and culture, warns against teleological assumptions. Ibid., 54. Ibid., 56. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 62. Ibid., 138. Ibid., 142. As in Mettam, Power and Faction, 38. Cole, Governing, 52–3. Rowlands, Financial Decline, as his subtitle indicates, deals with “war, influence, and money,” was “conceived and written as the western world entered a prolonged period of financial crisis,” and bears enough similarity with practices under Louis XIV as to lead him to express his concern for the damage done by “the recent profligacy and fecklessness of western politicians, bankers, and borrowers” (vii). Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 2. See also Stollberg-Rilinger, “Communication Theory.” Scott, Seeing Like a State, is an exploration of how a highly abstract rationality at the centre can create disasters when it ignores local realities.

488

Notes to pages 32–3

108 Cole, Governing, 178: “Sociological institutionalism thus frames institutions in terms of the belief systems of actors, considered as members of a profession, corps or grade, rather than as utility-maximizing individuals, as in rational choice theory. Its underlying assumption is that individuals within organizations are conservative, fearful of change and resolute in defense of their interests.” 109 Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 53. 110 Kettering, Patrons, especially chap. 6. Burke, History and Social Theory, 73, observes that “[s]ome degree of patronage exists in every society, however ‘modern.’” Peters, Politics of Bureaucracy, 90–1, observes that even today value-free bureaucrats do not exist. A spoils system could select bureaucrats both on the basis of commitment to a program and an ability to bring it about, which he labels “responsive competence.” The latter might be more important to success than “neutral competence.” Flinders, “Governance and Patronage,” 268–71, argues for an examination of the use of patronage by modern states that moves beyond its usual equation with corruption, noting that patronage “offers a form of linkage at three levels: between politicians and the state, between the state and society, and between society and politicians” (268). Claiming that “modernization” has undermined “traditional patron-client relationships,” which he terms “closed patronage,” he therefore discusses the positive role of modern “open patronage” in the guise of “party patronage” (270). Perhaps, however, he underplays the ability of traditional patron-client relationships in accomplishing what he credits to “open patronage”: “a form of social or organizational glue through which to establish low-cost high-trust relationships” (268). 111 Cole, Governing, 54. He also observes that the “bureaucracy sometimes ­functions efficiently only because rules are not enforced, but maintaining the fiction of rule-based treatment for everybody is a core belief” (178). 112 Quoted in Zmora, Monarchy, 79. Zmora’s chapter 5 characterizes absolutism as the “cohabitation” of monarchy and nobility centred on the court. It was Louis XIV’s masterful control of patronage that made him “more proficient in the craft of kingship than his colleagues” (91). 113 Rohr, “Ethical Issues,” 294. Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, 9, likewise observe that administrative science is not universal but national. ­Kettering, Patrons, 192–206, shows how what was regarded as corruption in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries differs from the twentieth-­ century view. Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, 131–6, discuss efforts to uncover the context-based rationality of venal offices. Argyriades, “Need for Comparative Studies,” 359–61, observes that modern bureaucratic elites are “deeply rooted in the political culture and historical experience of the different countries” (359) and urges the biographical study of bureaucrats.



Notes to page 33

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114 Cole, Governing, 183, urges the same for studies of today’s French administration. Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 235, emphasizes attention to “social context and history” in gauging an institution’s effectiveness, while Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 167, 195, 198, warns against judgments that ignore context. Collins, State, 26, contends that the old regime’s financial system, “seemingly so complex and illogical, actually provided a very rational adaptation to the practical realities of the early modern state,” as demonstrated in McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege. 115 Beik, “Absolutism of Louis XIV,” 222. 116 Cole, Governing, 53, 60–2, highlights the contradictions and tensions within France’s administrative and political decentralization, where even efforts to clarify and rationalize arrangements often fail or make matters worse. ­Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power, 234–6, discusses the limits of constitution writing and administrative reform. 117 Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 129, observes: “One way of dealing with the complexity of modernity, adopted by some historians and theorists, is to pluralize it … so it is possible to speak of many ‘modernities.’” 118 Collins, State, 8n10, warns against applying current standards of consistency to the ancien régime and reminds us of our own society’s contradictions. Smith, Merit, 11–56, strikes this proper balance in discussing changing seventeenth-­century views of merit. 119 Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 175. Cassan, “État ‘moderne,’” 469, demonstrates that even without venality the new professional administrators at the end of the eighteenth century used professionalization to create administrative dynasties based on mastery of technical knowledge, possession of intangible knowledge of internalized social codes, and career opportunities facilitated by kinship and professional connections. Collins, State, 191–2, cites Pierre Bourdieu’s provocative contention that academic titles today operate in similar ways to create a state-sanctioned hereditary elite serving the state. 120 Cole, Governing, 138–43. Bell, Lawyers, shows the same mixed motivations of self and public service among barristers. Weber, “Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization,” 20, tries unconvincingly to reconcile this reality with his model as follows: “Where ‘rights’ to an office exist, as in the cases of judges, and recently of an increasing portion of officials and even workers, they do not normally serve the purpose of appropriation by the official, but of securing the purely objective and independent character of the conduct of the office so that it is oriented only to the relevant norms.” Yet Weber also argues contradictorily that the “relatively great security of the official’s income, as well as the rewards of social esteem, make the office a sought-after position.” Weber, From Max Weber, 203. Compare this with Sharp, “Historical Changes in Recruitment,” 299–300, a 1931 study claiming that “the dominant

490

121 122 123 124 125 126

27 1 128 129 130 131 132

33 1 134 135 136

137

38 1 139 140 141

Notes to pages 33–6 urge that led most young Frenchmen to seek careers in government offices before the [Great] war was a desire for a calm bourgeois security they seemed to offer.” After the war, recruitment moved down the social scale as aristocrats and bourgeoisie sought more lucrative private sector careers and the draw of state service became “more strongly than ever a desire for security and steady, but not too strenuous, work” (303). Higgs, Information State, 25. Ibid., 35. Ibid., 25–6, 30–44. Ibid., 26. This is in line with what Beik and others have suggested for France. Ibid. Hindle, State, 15–24. His introduction (1–36) is aimed at reuniting “social, economic and cultural developments” into what he sees as a traditionally fragmented historiography of governance. Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 6. R.A.W. Rhodes, quoted in ibid., 7 (italics in original). See, for example, Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions.” Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 6. Quoted in ibid., 12 (italics in original). Cole, Governing, 12, 67–8, 122–3. Research on French education, welfare, and job training has “uncovered evidence of ‘layering,’ of creating new institutions, agencies and programmes on top of old ones, adding to complexity and uncertainty without improving the central state’s steering capacity” (ibid., 167). Klijn, “Networks,” 257–81, explores this area of growing scholarly attention. As in, for example, Beik, Absolutism, 303–28. Collins, State, 93–4. Petto, Cartography, 8, 35–40, 60–8. Beik, “Social Interpretation,” 160, who notes that the “government of Louis XIV perfected new advances in state management,” also says that “[d]ecentralized rule by local and regional lords was replaced by semi-centralized government run by a graduated hierarchy of venal officeholders and nobles.” Bély, Dictionnaire, 29, after describing the many obstacles faced and the resources possessed by Louis XIV’s administration, labels it more a miracle than a malfunction and asks if, given the same conditions, today’s administrations could claim to do better. Quoted in Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 3. Quoted in translation in Breen, Law, 155. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 19, 127, 129, 474, 477, 481. For the negative health aspects of the location of Versailles, see ibid., 266–316. Duindam, Courts, 82–3, contrasts the openness of the French court with the more secluded one of the Austrian Habsburgs. However, Da Vinha, Valets,



142

143

144 145

146 147

148

149

150

Notes to pages 37–8

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27–8, calls the alleged accessibility of the French monarch a “facade” and stresses instead its limitations. Newton, Espace du roi, 470–1 (ibid., 34–7, has detailed diagrams of the ministerial wings). Although each pavilion had originally been assigned to a secretary of state, this neat scheme was violated from 1682. For example, a secretary’s accumulation of offices might place him elsewhere in the palace. In 1699, as a special royal favour, Louis Pontchartrain kept his rooms in the right wing rather than move to the Chancellery (ibid., 422). A secretary might prefer another space for residence and offices, as did Louvois. Sarmant, Demeures, 47–50. Newton, Espace du roi, 17, 415–16. He marks who occupied which space in the ministerial wings and the former building superintendent’s quarters (ibid., 418–90). See also Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 284. Newton, Espace du roi, 95–6; and Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 287. Cosandey and Descimon, Absolutisme, explores this debate. Chapter 2 especially addresses the interconnections between absolutism and centralization. Bonney, “Absolutism,” 93–117; and Collins, State, xiv–xxv, survey the varieties of absolutism’s meaning among recent scholars. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, however, offers a productive and provocative reexamination, as does Potter, Corps and Clienteles. Collins, State, 173–4, says that one reason Louis sought to attract the great aristocrats, noble officials, and financiers to Versailles and Paris was to have them close by for debates over policy, since implementation of policy required their cooperation. Soll, Information Master. Scott, Seeing Like a State, discusses how the state’s quest for information as it sought resources, especially for war, promoted centralization and standardization in order to make the vast variety of local societies “legible” to those at the centre. See Parker, Global Crisis, 625–9, for the link between this quest for “legibility” and global climate change and revolutions during the seventeenth century. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 278. Samoyault, Bureaux, 220, calls Versailles a somewhat artificial administrative city where people transplanted from diverse backgrounds became administration employees. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 272–4. Hooke, a foreign office operative, reported that at Fontainebleau on 7 October 1707 he made a copy of a draft letter Torcy had personally written to be sent eventually to Scotland and did so “in M. Pecquet’s bureau.” Hooke, Correspondence, 2:487. Sourches, Mémoires, 11:328 (3 May 1709), reported the rumour that Torcy had gone to The Hague despite his precaution of leaving his secretary and one of his principal ­commis at Marly. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 254, observed in the 1660s while away from Paris and at Saint-Germain that “there is less time for paperwork in the country.”

492

Notes to pages 38–9

151 Dunlop, Royal Palaces, 159. 152 For several of the satellite courts, see Hazlehurst, Gardens of Illusion. 153 Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 286–92, urges caution in applying the solar symbolism of Versailles to the whole reign. She even suggests that the appellation “Sun King” (le Roi-Soleil) is arguably apocryphal and should be allowed to expire (292). Perhaps so, but like the term “Renaissance,” it is likely here to stay. Nevertheless, we use it with due caution. Collins, State, 104, says that the most common image of Louis in the medals struck during his reign was Mars, not Apollo. 154 Petto, Cartography, 22, 33–5, 178. 155 Nordmann, Frontières, 157–61. Symcox, “From Commune to Capital: Turin,” 242–69, traces the similar effect on the Savoyard capital of a sedentary court and a growing bureaucracy. 156 Racevskis, Time, 25–89. For a narrative of the king’s day, see État de la France (1698), 1:250–84; and Saule, Journée. Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, ­223–302, provides rich descriptions and discusses the origins and evolution of these public occasions. Duindam, Courts, 131–80, demonstrates that practices were not as rigid as Saint-Simon claimed. Collins, State, 148–50, talks of the “new civility, a new structure of manners” (149) created by this ordering of time. 157 Duindam, Courts, 295. See also ibid., 7–9; Duindam, Myths; and Zmora, Monarchy, 76–94. 158 Duindam, Courts, 295. On Saint-Simon, see ibid., 8, 13, 214–15, 261, 310. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” especially 294, discusses the myth of “Versailles as a grandiose but malevolent palace governed by Louis XIV with an iron fist ready to quash any individual will.” Zmora, Monarchy, 78, offers this succinct evaluation: “Elias’ methodologically jejune thesis, resting on the account given by one disgruntled and surreptitiously tendentious noble, is misleadingly reductionist.” Duindam, Courts, 311, mentions in passing the “impact of permanent diplomacy, itself driven by the competition among European courts” as one of the more likely factors leading to the “‘ceremonialisation’ of the court.” 159 Zmora, Monarchy, 83. Duindam, Courts, 234–42, discusses the risks of proximity to the monarch and favour. 160 Zmora, Monarchy, 7, argues that, “[r]ather than the instrument with which the monarchy shattered the might of the nobility, the state turns out to have been the instrument which the monarchy was forced to allow nobles (and other powerful people) to wield in their interest as well as in its own.” 161 Parker, Class and State, 193. Duindam, Courts, 279–87, helpfully explores what he calls “enticements and manipulations.” 162 Quoted in Duindam, Myths, 93n39. See also Levron, Vie quotidienne, especially 83–4.

163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173

174 175 176 177 178

179

180

Notes to pages 39–41

493

Duindam, Myths, 93n37. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 161–97. Duindam, Myths, 140. Kettering, Patrons, 237. Rowlands, Dynastic State, 354–61, discusses this with regard to the army. Guéry, “State,” 1–52. Duindam, Courts, 260–1; see also ibid., 48. Ranum, Richelieu, 48. Duindam, Courts, 63, 303. Ibid., 224. Da Vinha, Valets, xiv, 19–28. Louis XIII and Richelieu successfully reduced the swollen ranks of household officials, but Anne of Austria’s regency witnessed an explosion of new household offices and exemptions. Louis XIV decreased and stabilized their numbers, yet “consolidated their status by confirming their privileges and protecting their offices against creditors.” He allowed the numbers of administrators running the “day-to-day machinery of the court” to fluctuate according to the needs of the services provided. However, their social status languished behind that of the upper echelons of household officers. Duindam, Courts, 55. Da Vinha, Valets, 30–2, discusses the reduced numbers of domestics by the end of the reign. Smith, Merit, 151. Duindam, Courts, 189–91. Barbiche, Institutions, 38–41; and Bély, Dictionnaire, 777–82. Walton, Louis XIV’s Versailles, 17, 128. For numbers under Louis XIV, see Duindam, Courts, 54–61. Asch and Birke, Princes, Patronage, 78. Da Vinha, Valets, 20–1, ­107–19, ­indicates that this was also the rule among them. See also Duindam, Courts, 49–50, 287, although his remarks on p. 123 appear a bit con­ tradictory as to the clarity of distinctions. État de la France (1698): 1: passim, lists household officials by name and semester served whenever possible. Similarly, for most of the nineteenth century, many posts in the French state administration were “honorary” appointments, valued not for their monetary remuneration but for the social prestige public service conferred; the aristocrats and bourgeoisie who occupied these posts usually had enough other income to ignore the low pay and still live comfortably. Sharp, “Historical Changes in Recruitment,” 300–3. The military household played a similar role, although Louis XIV also “treated household units as something of a military school.” Lynn, Giant, 519. See also Rowlands, Dynastic State, 180–1. The king, with the advice of the war secretary, rewarded his clients and those of his ministerial collaborators with honours, appointments, missions, advancements in rank,

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184

185 186 187 188 189

190

Notes to pages 41–2 e­ nnoblements, even governorships and lieutenancies of towns and cities, especially in new acquisitions (ibid., 349–62). Duindam, Courts, 312; see also 48, 260–1. Ibid., 98; and Rowlands, Dynastic State, 42–6. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297–8. Blanning, Culture of Power, 29–36, disagrees with Himmelfarb on the centrality of the bedchamber and the sun motif, but acknowledges the late date of the move of the bedchamber to the centre. Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297. Da Vinha, Valets, 333–6, who describes the solemn surveillance of the royal bed even during the king’s absence and contends that the 1701 move was intentional, nevertheless notes that these measures were also meant to secure the king’s effects, including important state papers. Da Vinha does agree that when the court settled at Versailles, its status changed from that of a private residence to a state residence (33) and thus highlights the valets’ role in preparing the royal chamber for council meetings and in attending to the king’s needs for work in his Cabinet (36, 50–1). On the royal apartments, see Newton, Espace du roi, 124–7; and ­Himmelfarb, “Versailles,” 297. Da Vinha, Valets, 50–1. Castelluccio, Collections royales, 94–119. See Petto, Cartography. Bély, Art de la paix, 101–4; Duindam, Courts, 101–2; and Mousnier, Institutions, 2:115. Boislisle’s study of Rose in ss-Boislisle, 8:407–20, remains indispensable. bn mf 6658, fol. 37, records that cabinet secretaries received 16,000 livres per annum. See Barbiche, Institutions, 134, 174, 185, for royal letters. He notes that the secretaries of state also had “la plume,” but unlike the cabinet secretaries, they could also affix the royal signature with their counter-signature. Most of the letters destined for foreign courts were drafted by the foreign secretary (ibid., 415), but in aae cp Espagne 244, fol. 253, Torcy wrote Cabinet Secretary Callières on 1 April 1715 to write a letter from the king to the Spanish king and queen on the occasion of a new ambassador’s appointment. Torcy, Journal, 323 (26 Dec. 1710), relates that the king wanted to write ­Vendôme in his own hand. When Torcy showed him the draft he had written out imitating the royal handwriting, the king questioned a phrase and had it changed. aae md 1080, fols 141 and 142, are two letters of Louis XIV to M. Le Prince (Henri Jules, prince de Condé), 21 June 1700. Ibid., 1197, fol. 270 (1714), is an example of an ordonnance “sans adresse ni sceau” that began with “De par le Roy” and spoke the king’s will in the third person. Widely used by the royal bureaucracy, the original of this ordonnance was valid if it had the king’s signature and a secretary of state’s counter-signature.



191 192 193 194 195 196

Notes to pages 43–9

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Barbiche, Institutions, 68–9, 188. An example in aae md 1197, fol. 270, has a good imitation of “Louis” at the bottom and extensive revisions in Torcy’s hand. Is this perhaps because by that date a premier commis who was also a secretary of the king could sign these with an imitation of the king’s signature? The drafts of these short letters are marked in the foreign office’s registries with the notation “de la main de Louis 14” (in the hand of Louis XIV). Torcy, Journal, 233, 321, 334–5, 366, 381. Riley, Virtue. Mazel, Le Peletier, 128–9, notes three such visits recorded by Sourches. See also Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 232–3. Torcy, Journal, 265. Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 1:146–7. See also Da Vinha, Valets. État de la France (1698), 1:209–10.

Chapter Two 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 34. 2 Spanheim, Relation, 350–3. In his notes to this edition, Bourgeois says that Louvois, whose incursions into foreign affairs administration this measure was meant to prevent, generally respected it. If he did retain a secret agent in Savoy, he nonetheless made it clear that their contact remain sub rosa and burned all the letters he received (352n1). For Louvois’s network, see Brousse, “Réseaux d’informations de Louvois.” 3 Spanheim, Relation, 351, 368. 4 Major works on Pomponne are Delavaud, Pomponne; Pomponne, “Relation”; Rowen, “Pomponne”; Sedgwick, Travails, especially chaps 10 and 12; and Petitfils, “Pomponne.” 5 Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 154–84. Much of what follows on Torcy’s education is drawn from this article and from Rule, “Career,” 967–96. 6 There is no book-length biography of Croissy, but see Bérenger, “Croissy”; Bérenger, “Marquis de Croissy”; Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy”; and Duffo, Torcy, which draws heavily on the account left by Torcy’s daughter, the marquise d’Ancezune, published in Marchand, “Vie Torcy.” Spanheim, Relation, 350–77, offers the best contemporary portrait. See bn Cab. H., no. 9734; and bn db 203, fols 148–73, for a family genealogy. 7 Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 54–60 (on diplomats’ wives), 130 (Mme de Croissy in England). 8 Soll, Information Master, 111. 9 bn Clairambault 519, fols 327–8. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 73–5, demonstrates the growing importance of law among the specialized knowledge to be connected with diplomacy. 10 Bérenger, “Croissy,” 158.

496

Notes to pages 49–51

11 Knowledge of German among the non-Alsatian French was rare at this time. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 289n218, 432n135. 12 This network of Colbert cousins, clients, and créatures has been labeled a “lobby.” Dessert and Journet, “Lobby Colbert,” 303–36. See also Kettering, Patrons, 174. 13 Soll, Information Master, 111, 121–2, 143–52. Baluze, administrator of ­Colbert’s library, played a significant role in this. 14 bn Baluze 362, fol. 219, Colbert to Baluze, 10 Sept. 1677. 15 Ibid., fol. 234, Colbert to Baluze, 1 Sept. 1679. 16 Ibid., fol. 249, Colbert to Baluze, 28 Dec. 1681. Baluze replied that the treaties with Morocco were renewed in 1635; the articles and their history are in 78 volumes. For Orange, see ibid., fol. 261, Colbert to Baluze, 8 July 1682. Mézeray (1610–1683) was said to be in disfavour in the early 1680s, but this note would seem to question that assertion. 17 bn Clairambault 1198, fol. 144, Baluze to Torcy, 16 June 1711. For discussion of the case, see Torcy, Journal, 216, 216n2. 18 Soll, Information Master, 67–83, describes the training and work of Colbert’s intendants. 19 Ibid., 155–9. 20 Jouin, Charles Le Brun, 233; and Torcy, Journal, ix. 21 Roth, “Torcy,” 186–7; and Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 190–1. 22 Torcy, Journal, ixn2; see also Bell, Lawyers, chap. 2. 23 bn mf 6679, fol. 49r, from the journal of introducer of ambassadors Nicolas II Sainctot. 24 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 334. Croissy traveled in Germany, Poland, Austria, Italy, England, and the United Provinces. Spanheim, Relation, 354–7. Croissy’s predecessors had also traveled abroad or served as ambassadors before assuming the direction of foreign affairs. Poumarède, “Brienne”; Cras, “Lionne”; and Petitfils, “Pomponne.” The narrative of Torcy’s travels is in two manuscript volumes in the Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale (cited hereafter as ban), ms 253, ba 14–16 and E 404, portions of which are published in Delavaud, “Éducation”; Marchand, Mission Torcy; and Marchand, “Vie Torcy.” 25 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:324n2. For the 1683 royal itinerary, see Cornette, Chronique, 310. 26 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 362, cryptically assigned Croissy’s undated instructions for this trip to April 1685 because of the events concerned. Presumably, Delavaud meant Torcy’s projected trip through Germany to Denmark, announced in mid-April (see Marchand, Mission Torcy, 18, for the 13 April notice in the Gazette de France). It seems, however, that these instructions predated the Danish mission. Bearing condolences to the king of Denmark suggests that the envoy made his way to Copenhagen quickly rather than



27

28 29

30 31 32 33

34

35 36

Notes to pages 51–3

497

after numerous stops along the way and by a less direct route. While stops in Germany (although not in Mainz or Heidelberg) were projected after the Danish mission, the proposed itinerary Delavaud published begins in ­Montbelliard. Moreover, disparaging his son’s normal manner, Croissy urged him to write in a small journal every night. The letter’s content and tone sound more like observations made in the wake of the 1683 trip rather than after the later Iberian voyage, whose results pleased Torcy’s exacting father. This fits with the account from Torcy’s daughter (Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:324), who claim that her father received on the 1663 journey the parental correction and niggling otherwise usual for a boy of his age and prospects. For Torcy’s instructions, see France, Recueil, 3:163–9. Queen Maria ­Francisca Isabel, as she was known in Portugal, was the sister of Marie-Jeanne-­Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours, who was Victor Amadeus II’s mother and Savoy’s regent. The queen had been unhappily married to Afonso until Pedro became regent after a palace coup in 1667 and her husband after her unconsummated first marriage was annulled. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325n5; and Delavaud, “Éducation,” 340–2, 344, 357, 359–60. See Croissy to Torcy, 4 Feb. 1684 (ibid., 350). Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325; and Delavaud, “Éducation,” 341. The introduction to Torcy’s instructions in France, Recueil, 3:164, gives an arrival date of 21 March, but without a source. For Saint-Romain’s career and his instructions, see France, Recueil, 3:87–119, 147–62. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:325–8. Greater detail is in Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 175–8. Delavaud, “Scènes,” 265. Croissy to Torcy, 4 Feb. 1684, in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 346–50. In a 10 March letter, Croissy urged him not to be overly cautious and hold back on expressing his thoughts. Better some minor faults in his letters, he tartly observed, than the great sterility that so often appeared (ibid., 351). In 1695 Louis would criticize War Secretary Barbezieux as one who “speaks and writes crudely.” Rule, Louis XIV, 50. In later life Torcy was able to indulge his preference for a more literary style in written exchanges with such friends as Tessé and Gramont (Dubet, Orry, 46), but he also instructed his clerks on missions abroad as to his and the king’s preference for letters that were neither too long nor too dry. aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 161, Torcy to Noblet, 17 Dec. 1700. Cénat, Chamlay, 28, observes that his detailed and descriptive dispatches were what drew the king and Louvois to the otherwise obscure marshal general of logistics. France, Recueil, 3:164–9, 25 Jan. 1684. Ibid., 168.

498 37 38 39 40

41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53

54 55 56

57 58 59 60

61 62

Notes to pages 53–6 Delavaud, “Éducation,” 352. Ibid., 355. Ibid., 360. For Colbert’s son Seignelay, see Soll, Information Master, 84–93; and for Jérôme, son of Louis Pontchartrain, see Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 273–322. The letters of Argoud to Seignelay or someone in his bureau are in bn ­Clairambault 501, fol. 559 (4 July 1684), fol. 569 (13 Aug. 1684), fol. 607 (29 Aug. 1684), fol. 609 (26 Sept. 1684), fol. 612 (7 Oct. 1684), fol. 620 (23 Oct. 1684), fols 651–2 (13 Feb. 1685; the quotation is from this letter), and fol. 661 (13 Mar. 1685). Ibid., fol. 707, Argoud to ?, 1 Oct. 1685. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 352. Ibid., 353. Ibid., 354. Ibid., 355–7. Ibid., 358. The passports are in aae cp Espagne 69, fols 247ff. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 358–9. The phrase “gouverner les gouverneurs” refers to those charged with the education of children. aae cp Portugal 22, fol. 15, also quoted in Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:328n3. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 328. Ibid., 330. Ibid., 330–2. ban ms 253, ba, fols 177ff, and as recounted in Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:331–4. Modern scholars have concurred with Torcy’s assessment of ­Carlos. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 572. ban ms 253, E 404, fols 175–6. For Marianna, her regency, and her continuing influence, see Kamen, Spain Later Seventeenth Century, 328–43, 384–6. Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 178–80. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 360–1. The Italian trip was to have been made with a smaller retinue of only those necessary, since Torcy would travel with no official status and thus at Croissy’s personal expense (ibid., 359). Ibid., 361. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:335. Delavaud, “Éducation,” 343. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 46:335n3, quotes from the Gazette. Marchand, Mission Torcy, 18–19. Although Geffroy mentioned Torcy’s mission in France, Recueil, 13:217, he did not publish his instructions, which are in Marchand, Mission Torcy, 20–3. See Marchand, Mission Torcy, 19, 32, for the dates of departure. Ibid., 19, 23–6.



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63 D’Avaux to Croissy, 24 May 1685, in ibid., 34. Further praises were sent in a letter of 31 May 1685 (ibid., 37). 64 Ibid., 49. 65 Ibid. 66 Croissy to Torcy, 7 June 1685, ibid., 41, and again 18 June, although Saxony is no longer mentioned (ibid., 45). 67 Croissy to Torcy, 4 July 1685, ibid., 56. For Danish and Swedish relations during this period, see Upton, Charles XI, chap. 6. 68 Marchand, Mission Torcy, 41, 45, 51–2, 56, 58, 61, 65, 89, traces the evolving itinerary. 69 ban ms 253, ba, fols 48–50. Marchand, Mission Torcy, 52–4, 65–91, describes the final protocol arrangements and the visit. The protocol compromise set a precedent that the English consciously mimicked the following year. Sir Gabriel Sylvius to Sir William Trumbull, 3 Apr. 1686, Copenhagen, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 145. Delavaud, “France et Danemark,” 470, 470n1, reports that Torcy was lodged in Larvik with Count Guldenlöwe, who twenty-two years earlier was entertained by Louis XIV when he had accompanied Christian V to France. Delavaud, France’s first ambassador to an independent Norway, had a commemorative bust of Torcy placed in the Christiania legation in 1908. 70 Marchand, Mission Torcy, 95–112; and Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 182–4. 71 ban ms 253, ba fols 92–3, Croissy to Torcy, 15 Nov. 1685. See also ­Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:56–7, where Torcy’s daughter says that the elector refused to comply and Torcy had to keep the gift. On changing attitudes about gifts during this era, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 49–51. 72 Verjus had been in Germany since 1670 and at Ratisbon since 1679. ­Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 371–7 (for a biographical note). For the negotiations at the time Torcy was at Ratisbon, see ibid., 441–52. See also Auerbach, France et le Saint empire, 193–215, 263, who notes that ­Pomponne and Verjus did not like one another and that the latter welcomed and courted the favour of Croissy (ibid., 1987–88). Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 257, 274–5, 284, observes that the French likewise insisted that documents presented to them be in Latin rather than German. 73 Sir George Etherege to Sir William Trumbull, 25 Feb. 1685/4 Mar. 1686, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 124. 74 See Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 4:57–71, where Torcy’s daughter quotes extensively from these notes. See ban ms 253, ba fols 94–9v, for Torcy’s notes, and fols 135–44v for the final copy. Also, Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 184–8. 75 ban ms 253, ba, 134v, Torcy to Croissy, 5 Apr. 1686, Munich. See also Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 185–6; and Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:71–7. He arrived in Venice on 24 April 1686 after a journey of eleven days from Munich. 76 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:72.

500

Notes to pages 59–60

77 aae cp Rome 301, fol. 208–9r, Torcy to Croissy, 27 Aug. 1686. 78 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:73–4. Torcy’s daughter refers with regret to lost memoirs her father had written while in Rome. There is extensive correspondence between Torcy, du Pré, the d’Éstrées brothers, and Croissy from January to October 1686 in aae cp Rome 301. 79 In a letter of 18 April 1686, quoted in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 366, Croissy urged Torcy to visit Bracciano. See Torcy to Croissy, 30 July 1686, bn mf 20148, fol. 165v, on his good relations with the duchess. For Torcy’s visit, see Cermakian, Ursins, 158–9, 173–4; and for the salon, Goulet, “Cercle Ursins à Rome,” 60–71. 80 Croissy to Torcy, 18 Apr. 1686, quoted in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 366. For more on Torcy’s Roman sojourn, see Rule, “Aesthetic Impulse,” 186–9. 81 bn mf 20148, fol. 161, Torcy to Croissy, 5 June 1686. On 16 July 1686 (ibid., fol. 164), Torcy informed Croissy that d’Estrées’s insights into the papal court supplied him with much to reflect upon when the summer heat kept him from going about the city. On 30 July 1686 (ibid., fol. ­165r–v), Torcy again wrote glowingly of the instruction and favour he received from the cardinal. Perhaps whatever mistrust initially distanced them had dissipated. 82 Croissy to Torcy, 18 Apr. 1686, in Delavaud, “Éducation,” 368. 83 bn mf 20148, fol. 163, Torcy to Croissy, 16 July 1686. For Modena, see aae cp Rome 301, fol. 285v, Torcy to Croissy, 1 Oct. 1686, Florence. For reactions to Torcy’s audience with the pope, see Neveu, Correspondence Ranuzzi, 1:747, 759. 84 aae cp Rome 301, fols 283 and 287, Torcy to Croissy, 1 Oct. 1686 (italics added in the quotation). See Sourches, Mémoires, 6:34 (20 May 1698), for the dinner Torcy had at Versailles for the second son of the grand duke, who had come to France apparently without taking leave of his father and family. 85 Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:74n2, quoting the Gazette de France. 86 Ibid., 74. 87 aae md 302, fol. 194v, 1 Apr. 1687. Ibid., 1004, fol. 435, Torcy to bishop of Oléron, 9 Nov. 1690, reveals Torcy reporting directly to and receiving orders from the king; for other examples, see ibid., 1006, fol. 110r–v (29 Sept. 1690) and fol. 145 (14 Nov. 1690), showing the revisions Torcy made as the king instructed him in the form of these letters. 88 For instance, bn mf 8834, fol. 74, Torcy to Lebret, 29 Apr. 1689, on new converts; and aae md 1004, fols 180–2, 408 (in Torcy’s hand), 409–13, and 509–10. 89 Pencil marks in Torcy’s hand – such as “Provence 1682” in aae md 1730, fols 18ff – testify to his classification work in his father’s archives, perhaps during this period. Interestingly, he organized many of his own letters for later archiving: for example, aae cp Rome 301, fol. 102–3bis, where in a



90

91

92 93 94

95

96

97 98

99

Notes to pages 61–2

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1 July 1686 letter to his father from Rome he wrote, “Rome 1686” as a filing guide. Baschet, Dépôt, 59–61, publishes the royal order of 9 February 1688 authorizing payment for the binding work, which would be done in red Moroccan and with the Colbert arms. aae cp Angleterre 162, fols 157–8. The queen’s mother, the Duchess of Modena, was also Mazarin’s niece. For this and the mission to England in general, see Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:74–6. France, Recueil, 25-2:386–95, has further information, including Torcy’s original instructions, dated (probably) 21 August 1687, and additions dated 12 September and sent to him in London. For Croissy’s 19 September 1687 letter about lodgings, see ban ms 253, ba fol. 154r–v. aae cp Angleterre 162, fols 159–60v, Torcy to Louis XIV, 14 Sept. 1687, and fols 157–8r, to Croissy. He also mentioned that he was accompanied by “Mr Bontems” and that when they arrived in London on the 10th, Barillon wanted them to stay with him. Torcy’s farewell audiences are discussed in ibid., fols 173–5r, Barillon to Louis XIV, 23 Sept. 1687; and ibid., fols ­231–5v, 27 Oct. 1687. Ibid., fol. 242, Barillon to Louis XIV, 30 Oct. 1687. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 83. From the end of the 1680s, Spanheim, Relation, 173, refers to Croissy’s gout and worsening health. Examples of Torcy’s letters concerning papal affairs are aae cp Rome 317 and 318 (for 1688); and ibid., 326, fols 80r–v, 112, 192, 282, and (for 1689) 283. Ibid., fol. 328v, has a guide in table form to the cardinals and the factions among them. France, Recueil, 17:25. Chaulnes’s instructions, printed in ibid., 17:30–57, do not indicate that Torcy prepared them, but it is clear from the original in aae cp Rome 323, fols 12ff. For Crécy’s advice, see Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:189n4. According to ­Sourches, Mémoires, 3:140–1 (21 Aug. 1689), the king cancelled the permission originally granted to the young court abbés eager to go to Rome save that given to Abbé Croissy, who was to accompany his brother. Louis feared any of them dying in Rome, since the pope had the right to fill such vacancies. aae cp Rome 323, fol. 290, Chaulnes to Louis XIV, 5 Nov. 1689, describes Abbé Croissy carrying a letter to and being received by the pope. Torcy’s daughter quoted extensively from this and four other letters from Torcy to Croissy from Rome. Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:190–203. aae cp Rome 323, fol. 115, Chaulnes to Louis XIV, 2 Oct. 1689. Ibid., fol. 195r–v, Chaulnes to Croissy, 9 Oct. 1689, reported that he and Torcy had conferred on the elevation of the bishop of Beauvais. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:155, 155n2, 156 (13 Sept. 1689), says that the king used the survivance to persuade Croissy to sell his office of président à mortier in the Paris parlement to facilitate other changes in that court. The

502

100 101

102 103

04 1 105

106

107 108 109

110

111

112

Notes to pages 62–4 ­ olbert family, anxious to secure Torcy’s future as secretary of state, perC suaded Croissy to let go of an office he had held on to in order to serve in it and provide for his family should he suffer the fate of previous foreign secretaries cashiered by the king (ibid., 155n2). aae cp Rome 327, fol. 72 (15 Oct. 1689), fol. 108 (11 Oct. 1689), Abbé Herault to Croissy. Also Marchand, “Vie Torcy,” 47:200–3. Dangeau, Journal, 3:18–19; and Sourches, Mémoires, 3:172. Sourches reported (16 Nov. 1689) that it was approximately then that Torcy took his oath of office as secretary from the king’s hands and began signing outgoing dispatches to relieve his father, much burdened by chronic and painful gout (176). Monnier and Thuillier, Administration, 26–7. Burke, History and Social Theory, 75; his discussion of the difficulties in defining “corruption” (73–6) is brief but instructive. See also Aylmer, “Bureaucracy,” 195–7, and his reminder of Acton’s dictum about the corrupting nature of power, which ironically may have rendered the powerful bureaucracies of the past two centuries even more susceptible to malfeasance than those of the early modern era. Ridder-Symoens, “Training and Professionalization,” 170. He preferred to select his chief collaborators from among “those already in office or whom birth and inclination have attached to our personal service.” Louis XIV, Mémoires, 32. This and the following paragraphs are drawn from Frostin, Les ­Pontchartrain, 324–32, a useful discussion of the advantages of this system. After Barbezieux’s death in 1701, among the ministers and secretaries who worked closely with the king, only Torcy and Jérôme Pontchartrain had been trained as survivanciers (ibid., 324). Louis XIV, Mémoires, 144. Poumarède, “Brienne,” 62; Rowlands, Dynastic State, 37–8 (the Le Telliers); and Pénicaut, “Chamillart,” 303, 311. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:439, Renaudot to Croissy, 16 Jan. 1694, notes that Charles Fanshaw, apparently now a Jacobite, was known to Torcy from his visit to Portugal when Fanshaw was ambassador there. Bély, Dictionnaire, 451–3. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 73–5, points out the relatively small pool from which diplomatic personnel could be drawn, noting that even many of those who qualified by birth and breeding still lacked the requisite experience or training. aae md 1026, fol. 49, Croissy to Cardinal Bouillon, 8 Feb. 1694, reporting from Versailles that Torcy had read Forbin-Janson’s dispatches to the king that morning. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 17, 273–365, 372, discusses Jérôme ­Pontchartrain’s travels and formation and the smooth transition to his



113 114

115

116 117

118 119 120 121 122 123

124

Notes to pages 64–6

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f­ ather’s secretaryship. Luçay, Origines, 116n1, notes that survivanciers were members by right of Dispatches. See also Dangeau, Journal, 11:276 (3 Jan. 1707). Ranum, Richelieu, 51–2. Spanheim, Relation, 173. Sir William Trumbull, English ambassador to France, reported two occasions in February 1686 when he was forced to conduct business with Croissy, bedridden due to gout, through “commis” who, after conferring with their master, returned to relay his wishes. Clark, Trumbull, 188–9. See, for instance, aae md 1005, fol. 72, Torcy to Bishop Bossuet, 9 Mar. 1690; ibid., fol. 116, Croissy [Torcy] to President Rose, 21 Aug. 1690; and ibid., fol. 138, Torcy/Croissy to père de la Chaize, 3 May 1690 (two letters). Ibid., 1004, fol. 182r, Croissy [Torcy] to Bouville, 27 Apr. 1690, used a trope common to father and son: I must know what goes on because I give an exact account to the king. Torcy reported on his own to the king and perhaps occasionally filled in for his ailing father at Dispatches. Letters sent out in Croissy’s name were typically marked “Mgr,” while those in Torcy’s name were marked “Mgr Torcy,” as in ibid., fol. 413, 31 Oct. 1690. aae md 1004, fol. 96, Torcy to Le Camus, 28 Sept. 1691. Ibid., fol. 213, Torcy to Cavallerini, 10 Feb. 1691. In 1696 Cavallerini and Sebastiano Tanara, nuncio to Austria, were part of a secret effort to resolve the impending Spanish succession. aae cp Autriche 68, fols 153–7v (with Torcy’s additions). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:327, 327n2; see also ibid., 182 (for 1694). aae md 1016. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:245, 245n1; and Recueil des actes du clergé, 9:752. Dangeau, Journal, 3:230. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:323–4. Dangeau, Journal, 3:303 (18 Mar. 1691), 4:58 (8 Apr. 1692), 4:78 (19 May 1692), 4:259 (5 Apr. 1693). In 1691, along with the war secretary, Croissy went to the front, while in 1692 and 1693 he was joined by fellow ministers Pomponne and Beauvillier. Pontchartrain and Le Peletier remained in Paris. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:369–70, mentions that secretary of state Châteauneuf was also in attendance and relates that on 21 March 1691 at Le Quesnoy, he and Croissy, who had not brought tents, were ceded monastic cells in the abbey by officers who had residences nearby. All the other courtiers, however, had to be satisfied with whatever lodgings they could manage. A map of these three trips based on Dangeau is in Boutier, Atlas, 35. In mid-March 1694 while the king slept several days at Chantilly, Croissy, Pomponne, and Beauvillier slept nearby at Compiegne, where the king met with them after leaving Chantilly. Dangeau, Journal, 4:462, 464. Lynn, Wars, 216–18; and Sourches, Mémoires, 4:74 (19 June 1691).

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Notes to pages 66–8

125 Dangeau, Journal, 3:312. On the evening of Louis’s first day at Mons, even after he had inspected the lines for six hours and made other dispositions for the siege, his work did not cease. After acting as a general giving orders, ­Dangeau noted, he worked as a king at state business without neglecting the least of it (306). 126 aae cp Rome 344, fols 67–84r, 9 Apr. 1691; and Sourches, Mémoires, 3:407–8. 127 For this 12 April 1691 neutrality treaty and a similar one signed 25 March with the Prince-Bishop of Münster, see aae md 1010, fol. 158ff. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:410 (19 Apr. 1691), says that this news arrived as the royal party returned to Versailles. This effort to end France’s diplomatic isolation is discussed in Fayard, “‘Third Party,’” 213–40. Sourches, Mémoires, 3:409 (18 Apr. 1691), records the arrival of news of Baltic diplomatic developments. 128 aae md 1016, fols 179ff. Torcy was assisted by at least four secretaries. Ibid., fol. 179, Torcy to lieutenant du roi at Dauphiné, 13 May 1692. 129 Ibid., fol. 189, Circular Letter, 28 May 1692; ibid., fol. 198, Torcy to ­Pontchartrain, 20 June 1692; ibid., fol. 202, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 25 June 1692; and ibid., fol. 205, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 4 July 1692. For ­Frischmann and his activities, see Fayard, “‘Third Party,’” 213–40; and ­Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 523, 531–2, 547, 560, 586, 636–9. 130 aae md 1016, fol. 204, Torcy to Montmort, 30 June 1692. 131 Ibid., 1019 fol. 55, June 1692. The rolle is discussed below on pages 314–16. 132 Ibid., 1016, fol. 266, Torcy to Daguerre, 6 July 1692, Mariembourg. 133 Ibid. 134 Villien, Renaudot; and especially Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37. 135 bn naf 7492, fol. 379, Torcy to Renaudot, 24 or 29 Jan. 1693 (?). For Torcy’s annotations on Renaudot’s letters to Croissy, see 1 Mar. 1693 (ibid., fol. 292), 19 Sept. 1693 (ibid., fol. 300), and 7 Dec. 1693 (ibid., 7487, fol. 267). See also Torcy to Renaudot, 16 Mar. 1693 (ibid., fol. 210), and 3 Mar. 1694 (ibid., fol. 321r). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 9:450, records Torcy’s work with Renaudot on Jacobite affairs in early 1694. 136 Spanheim, Relation, 173. 137 Dangeau, Journal, 4:246. 138 Ibid., 289–313 (18 May–26 June 1693), recounts the royal progress to and from the frontier. aae md 1022, fols 76ff, has traces of Torcy’s correspondence from the front. Ibid., cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693, is Torcy’s peace proposal. 139 Bossuet, Correspondance, 6:76n3, Torcy to Bossuet, 20 Nov. 1693. ­Pontchartrain asked Bossuet (25 Nov. 1692) to reply to the letter Torcy had sent the bishop concerning converts from his diocese arrested in Croissy’s department of Sedan as they fled France (ibid., 5:267). Torcy reported to ­Bossuet (16 Dec. 1693) that he had read his letter to the king (ibid.,



140 141

142 43 1 144 145 146

147 148 149 150

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Notes to pages 68–9

505

­ :100–1), and later (30 Dec. 1693) wrote Bossuet about the arrest of those 6 fleeing the kingdom because of famine (ibid., 112). In 1695 both Torcy and Croissy requested and received a memoir from Bossuet on ecclesiastical matters (ibid., 14:311–12). Dangeau, Journal, 5:72 (2 Sept. 1694). Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 86. His health was of ongoing concern at France’s embassies. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 445, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 18 May 1684; and ibid., fol. 457, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 8 June 1694. aae cp Danemark, 47, fols 556–7, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 10 May 1695; and ibid., 57, fol. 22, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 11 Dec. 1696. See Rule, “Career,” 988–96, for a fuller treatment. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture.” Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 46, 69. Torcy later developed a voice that allowed him to differ subtly with the king’s greater optimism during peace negotiations. For example, while Louis was sanguine about the progress Philip V was making in Spain, Torcy was more guarded, as can be seen by comparing the letter he drafted on behalf of the king for the Utrecht plenipotentiaries on 10 January 1712, in aae cp ­Hollande 22, fol. 31r–v, and his own letter to them the same day (ibid., 32r). Dangeau, Journal, 5:443–4. Also Sourches, Mémoires, 5:168–9. Sourches, Mémoires, 5:169; and Dangeau, Journal, 5:445, 448. Roth, “Torcy,” 184–5, discusses the marriage contract. Dangeau, Journal, 5:453. This claim apparently originated with Rowen, “Pomponne,” 547, who repeated it in Rowen, Ambassador Prepares, 16. It is repeated in Rule, “King and Minister,” 218, 218n29; and in Sedgwick, Travails, 241. Rowen, ­“Pomponne,” 547n102, cites ss-Boislisle, 6:349, but that passage only implies that because Louis and Pomponne feared that Croissy might become jealous at Pomponne’s return, Pomponne sought to win him over by personally announcing the news and asking for his friendship. Saint-Simon reports Croissy’s great surprise, but says noting of a rebuff, while Boislisle (ibid., 349n2) notes that Pomponne’s memoirs record no resentment against Croissy and even laud his diplomatic accomplishments. Torcy’s daughter offers a similar account. Mathis, “Vie de Simon Arnauld,” 5. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 165, may imply lingering discomfort between the two families in saying that the marriage was intended to “reconcile” them, but indicates no opposition from Croissy and characterizes the union as in some way Croissy’s posthumous masterpiece. Sedgwick, Travails, 229–30, says that the king’s generosity to Pomponne in his disgrace meant that Pomponne “accepted his dismissal from office with far greater equanimity than he had his earlier setbacks.” Other possible brides for Torcy mentioned in the first half of the 1690s were Mlle d’Estrées (Sévigné, Lettres, 9:459), Mlle Dangeau, and Mlle

506

152 153

154

155 156

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Notes to page 69 d’Hocquincourt (Delavaud, Pomponne, 98–9). From 20 September 1695 a match with Mlle Pomponne was expected, with the king’s favour and his and Pomponne’s monetary contributions already specified (Dangeau, Journal, 5:281). On the 28th, however, the marquise d’Huxelles wrote Antoine Escalins d’Adhemar, marquis de la Garde, that there was no longer talk of it (Delavaud, Pomponne, 102). No reason was given, but it is an unwarranted assumption that it was due to Croissy’s opposition. Secretary of State ­Châteauneuf was also bidding for Mlle Pomponne’s hand for his son, the marquis de La Vrillière, but Pomponne would not agree unless La Vrillière received his father’s survivance, which the king would not grant (Dangeau, Journal, 5:299). See also the excerpt from vol. 1, pt 2, chap. 3, sections 2 and 3 of Mathis, “Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, secrétaire d’État des Affaires étrangères de Louis XIV (1618–1699),” 2 vols., thèse, l’École nationale des chartes, 2007 (graciously provided by the author, this excerpt is cited hereafter as “Mathis, Thèse Excerpt” because it has its own pagination and footnote numbers that do not correspond to the two sections as they appear in the original document). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 10–11. ss -Coirault, 1:303. Sourches, Mémoires, 4:446 (20 Apr. 1695), mentions one such long bout and recovery, but a relapse on 1 May kept him away from the Conseil (448). He was ill again on 4 October (5:61–2). Dangeau, Journal, 5:406, 410–11, 422, 437–9. Negotiations of marriage contract terms, a complex and time-consuming process that would bind together the fortunes of both families into the future, could also generate delays as each side sought the maximum benefit. After all, both fathers were diplomats! A further delaying factor may have been the fact that the children of secretaries of state, including their designated heirs to office, tended to marry upward into the old nobility. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 173, 196–7; ­Bluche, “Social Origins,” 94; Dingli, Seignelay, 52–7; and Frostin, Les ­Pontchartrain, 241–2, 246, 251–2. In January 1696, Barbezieux had made a brilliant match and had a wedding “worthy of a prince of the blood” (Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 219). If Croissy had any qualms about marrying his son to Pomponne’s daughter, it seems more likely they resulted from the Arnauld’s lack of lofty lineage than from any lingering bitterness (besides, it was Croissy who had replaced Pomponne, not the other way around). Dangeau, Journal, 5:441. Ibid., 447 (Saint-Simon’s “Additions”). Bossuet, in a letter to his nephew in Rome on the day after Croissy’s death, confirmed this. Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:15–16. Kettering, French Society, 4, 6–9, discusses family duty and marriage strategies. Delavaud, Pomponne, 16. The full text is in Mathis, “Vie de Simon Arnauld,” 1–6.



Notes to pages 69–70

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158 André, Louis XIV, 40. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 11, reports that many contemporaries assumed the same. 159 Dangeau, Journal, 5:444. Beauvillier had married one of the Great Colbert’s daughters. 160 Ibid., 449 (5 Aug. 1696). 161 Ibid., 451 (8 Aug. 1696). Papal Nuncio Delfini’s audience took place with both Pomponne and Torcy, having been rescheduled because of the latter’s wedding. Torcy was also present when the nuncio was presented to the ­Dauphin later that day. A few days later, the nuncio visited first Pomponne and then Torcy separately. bn mf 6679, fol. 164; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:472 (19 Aug. 1696). 162 Henri III’s 1588–89 règlement specifying that a secretary of state had to be at least thirty-five years old was not strictly followed. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:86. For oaths administered directly by the king rather than the chancellor and a list of those entitled to this privilege, see État de la France (1698), 1:274–8. 163 Croissy’s widow was assigned the Pomponnes’ vacated premises. An example of this proximity of apartments at play is gbhmc, Prior Papers, 359, Prior to Jersey, 24 June 1699. He shared a report from an English officer who was at Versailles with Matthew Wall, an English agent who had been pretending for some years to be a Jacobite activist. Prior’s agent reported “that Wall did there speak with … Torcy above stairs in his own apartment, by the same token that Mons. De Heemskirk [a Dutch diplomat] dined that day with … Torcy, and that … Torcy spoke with Wall just as he rose from dinner, that Wall spoke with … Pomponne that same day in the apartment below.” 164 bn mf 6679, fol. 166. 165 Lionne was a minister nearly four years before becoming foreign secretary, Pomponne entered the Conseil the day after his arrival in Paris, and Croissy became a minister the same day he became secretary of state. Bluche, Louis XIV, 576. 166 For the Conseil’s importance for foreign affairs and Torcy’s later ministerial role, see Neveu, “Conseil d’État.” 167 In 1685 they spoke in Rome of Louvois’s hopes to replace Croissy with his own creature, and in 1689 word circulated at court of a possible disgrace. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 92, 95. 168 Newton, Espace du roi, 424. It was the ground floor of the original pavilion at the end of the ministerial wing closest to the palace. Pomponne and his wife also leased a residence in the city of Versailles. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 4n12. 169 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 4, 4n10, did not find Pomponne in any of the Correspondance Politique, 1691–96. 170 Ibid., 3; and Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–50. Lossky, Louis XIV, 170, 173, 175, 232–5, 310n30, describes a rather toxic collaboration

508

171 172 73 1 174 175 176

177 178

Notes to page 71 between Louis XIV, Louvois, and Croissy during the 1680s. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 868–8, include him with Louvois and Seignelay as the “durs” (harsh ones) of the Conseil and generally endorse Spanheim’s assessment of him, as does Sarmant, Demeures, 68–9, 83. Drawing on Spanheim, however, Bourgeois sees Croissy as less bellicose than Louvois. Spanheim, Relation, 365–7. He was also less severe with Huguenots than his nephew Seignelay (ibid., 388n1, 391n2, 407–8). Spanheim reported that he had heard Seignelay’s commis complain to Croissy’s that they trembled when Seignelay spoke to them, suggesting that Croissy’s commis had a better relationship with their master (ibid., 394). Dangeau, Journal, 3:370–1. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 133–4. They kept each other informed of what went on at Conseil meetings they missed (265). Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 25 July 1691, in Delavaud, Pomponne, 96. Lossky, Louis XIV, 247. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 140, 146, 152. His Le Tellier partisanship also led to a poor opinion of Lionne. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 86, 88. Others suggest an even lesser role in policy matters and throughout his ministry. Rousset, Louvois, 2:573–4; and Boislisle in ss-Boislisle, 6:346n3. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 162–3, while stressing Croissy’s skills, nonetheless concludes that he remained a technician and did not inspire overall royal policy, although he did not oppose it. Yet Croissy bore part of the responsibility for the reunion policy and the general resort to force and bullying during the 1680s. Cénat, Roi stratège, 127, 160; and ­Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 330–2. As a Conseil member with often like-minded ministers such as Louvois and Seignelay, it seems unlikely that the forceful Croissy refrained from helping formulate such policy until deprived of his last ally in 1691. Torcy “voulait le recherché” (wanted him sought out). Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 22 Aug. 1691, in Delavaud, Pomponne, 97. Sainctot noted that because Croissy and Pomponne differed over how the French clergy were to conduct business with Rome, a royal order of 2 October 1692 specified that the nuncio and other envoys were to address themselves to Croissy and not to other ministers. bn mf 6679, fol. 26. ­Pomponne returned the Venetian ambassador’s February 1695 visit and created a protocol problem through an excess of civility that Introducer Bonneuil had to resolve, but rather than violating the 1692 royal order, it appears that ­Pomponne was stepping in for the ailing Croissy (ibid., 84v–85), whose health issues disrupted other visits or prevented him from returning them (ibid., fols 89–90). Sourches, Mémoires, 4:446 (20 Apr. 1695), reported that Croissy was better after a particularly bad gout attack, which may have been related to Pomponne’s substitution for him that February.



Notes to pages 71–2

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179 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 263. Spanheim claimed that while Louvois had interfered in foreign office business under Pomponne, he mostly did not under Croissy. Spanheim, Relation, 336, 351–3. In his notes on the text, Bourgeois (ibid., 339n1) says that even though the war minister’s was the predominant voice in formulating policy, Louvois biographer Camille R ­ ousset’s claim that Louvois directed foreign affairs from 1680 is an exaggeration. 180 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 6–8. 181 Dangeau, Journal, 4:58 (8 Apr. 1692), noting that Beauvillier and ­Pomponne had followed the king to Flanders, tellingly observed that Croissy “suit toujours” (always follows). The initial receipt, decoding, and reading of dispatches and the expedition of paperwork required the secretary’s constant presence. It usually sufficed to summon the other royal councillors for the deliberative process of making policy. This explains Croissy’s and later Torcy’s presence with the king at Marly even when the other ministers were absent or came only for council meetings (as in ibid., 3:352, 392, 429; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:114n12). Spanheim, Relation, 165, observes that under Croissy the former practice of ambassadors promiscuously meeting with other ministers ended. It was agreed that only the foreign secretary would receive foreign envoys, render an account to the king and Conseil, arrange royal audiences for ambassadors if informed beforehand of their subjects, and remain during these audiences. 182 France, Recueil, 4:229n1, 230n5, on Poland. For Beauvillier’s role in the policy that led to Ryswick and his close connections with Callières, one of its negotiators, see Lizerand, Beauvillier, 170–6; and Pope, Callières, 85, 87, 127–8. 183 Lizerand, Beauvillier, 168, concedes that Beauvillier’s foreign policy role did not equal Torcy’s, but he then claims that foreign policy from Pomponne’s death until 1714 was especially the work of the king, Torcy, and Beauvillier. Lizerand credits this to Torcy’s deference to his kinsman, elder, and friend and to Torcy’s youth, timidity, conciliatory nature, and lack of the king’s full confidence. These propositions (ibid., 168–76) are weakly supported by thin evidence and are all dubious, as any reading of Torcy’s Journal confirms. The evidence merely supports Beauvillier’s significant foreign policy role as one of several ministers. 184 Petitfils, “Pomponne,” 80, says that Torcy was one of the best of the old regime’s foreign ministers because he knew how to join the skill (habileté) of Pomponne with the firmness (fermeté) of Croissy. For the contrast between Croissy and Pomponne, see also Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 322, 330–6. Lossky also associates Torcy with Pomponne’s “restrained opportunism.” 185 Lossky, “‘Maxims,” 291–3. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 5–6, sees Pomponne as a better councillor than administrator.

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Notes to pages 72–4

186 If Croissy appears more like a secrétaire-commis from 1691, it is likely because either his voice as a secrétaire-conseiller politique was drowned out by those of the king’s more conciliatory councillors or he had changed his tune to harmonize with them. 187 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 351–3. While Saint-Simon envisioned the replacement of the detested “all-powerful ministers” with councils to advise the regent, Dupilet argues that the Polysynod councils actually functioned as administrative rather than as policy-making bodies, which accorded with the regent’s desire for centralized decision-making. 188 Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 214, 218–20. Stoll says that Torcy became a minister in 1697, but as will be seen below, his official entry into the Conseil came only in early 1699, before Pomponne’s death. 189 Cras, “Charge de secrétaire,” 115–27. 190 Poumarède, “Brienne,” 61; and Cras, “Lionne,” 67. Nothing along these lines occurred under Croissy, even though Louvois interfered in the departments of all of his colleagues, according to Spanheim, Relation, 164–76, 188–9. As acting foreign secretary from Lionne’s death in September 1671 to the arrival of Pomponne from Sweden in February 1672, Louvois made connections with France’s ambassadors that he later utilized as surintendant des bâtiments during Croissy’s secretaryship, bypassing the secretary apparently without objection and writing directly to ambassadors to acquire paintings, sculpture, antiquities, books, objets d’art, and even plants. Sarmant, Demeures, 227–32. 191 Poumarède, “Brienne,” 57–60, 62; and Louis XIV, Mémoires, 35. 192 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 114–15. Marquise d’Huxelles to La Garde, 4 Oct. 1691, reported that the royal physician Fagon believed that Croissy also suffered from kidney stones. Delavaud, Pomponne, 98. 193 In a letter to Iberville in Geneva following Croissy’s death, Pomponne noted Torcy’s esteem for the resident and his own hope to have the same for him. Although Iberville had been at this post since 1689, Pomponne apparently had no official contact with department personnel abroad while Croissy was secretary. aae cp Genève 16, fol. 161, Pomponne to Iberville, 10 Sept. 1696. Pomponne did know bureau personnel such as Adam who had served under him. 194 Rule, “King and Minister,” 218; and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 10–12. 195 Bérenger, “Croissy,” 164, 173 (table), claims that with Pomponne and ­Beauvillier on the Conseil there were three Colberts ranged against one Le Tellier. This is misleading because the three hardly constituted a voting bloc, especially on religious issues. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 146–8, 208, while acknowledging these religious differences, nonetheless links Torcy later with Beauvillier and the Burgundy faction. 196 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 217–47, 514–20. See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 5–6.



Notes to pages 74–5

511

197 Sarmant, Demeures, 328–9, takes issue with the recent work of Jean-­ Christian Petitfils, Joël Cornette, and Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie. Collins, State, 198, likewise cautions against making too much of these two factions and points to ties among their members. Although hardly decisive, the king’s clear disapproval of encouraging such divisiveness as expressed in Louis XIV, Mémoires, 192–3, is nonetheless worth consideration. 198 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 119–26. 199 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 63–4, argues that age, not lack of ability, kept Barbezieux off the Conseil, speculating plausibly that eventually the royal summons would have come had he not died in his thirty-second year. Nevertheless, in the context of Barbezieux’s ten years as secretary but not minister, Rowlands suggests that he likely found it “galling” that Torcy, who became secretary five years after he did, joined the Conseil in 1699 at the age of thirty-four, a jealousy based on seniority rather than factional balancing. Rowlands also observes that Seignelay, secretary since 1683, became a minister in 1689, a month before turning thirty-eight. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 293–4, note that Barbezieux was humiliated when ­Chamillart, only one year after being named controller general, was made a minister. They agree that an early death prevented Barbezieux from becoming a great secretary of war but that, along with intelligence, mastery of the written word, and capacity for work, he suffered from the defects of a young courtier. 200 Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 2–3. 201 Baluze, aged sixty-six, shared with a kinsman the news that Torcy had succeeded his father, but observed that at age thirty-one he was too young and would not soon enter the council. Fage, Lettres Baluze, 119. 202 According to a 1716 reminiscence of Madame, when the noted aphorist and précieuse Anne Bigot de Cornule visited Versailles in 1690, she noted ­Seignelay’s entry into the Conseil and Torcy’s authorization to sign orders as a secretary of state, remarking that they were both quite young. Upon her return to Paris she was asked what she had seen. According to Madame, she quipped that she had seen some very curious and unexpected things, including some “ministers in the cradle.” Maintenon, Lettres, 3:476. 203 Beauvillier and Chevreuse had a poor opinion of Croissy and his son, largely based on personal and policy differences. ss-Coirault, 3:524, 5:332. 204 Sourches, Mémoires, 5:169 (28–9 July 1696). 205 Pomponne was ill with a fever that lasted over five months (July to December 1694). Delavaud, Pomponne, 100–1, notes that the marquise d’Huxelles sadly reported to La Garde 16 September 1694 that she believed Pomponne would retire from public life. Pomponne rallied enough to attend the Conseil on 29 September 1694, but according to Dangeau, Journal, 5:86, he had been unable to attend the past two months. His fevers remained intermittent

512

206

207 208 209 210 211 212

213

214 215

216 217 218

219

Notes to pages 76–8 at least until the following January (Delavaud, Pomponne, 100n6). See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 8. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 290–3; Cénat, Roi stratège, 175–85; and Rowlands, Dynastic State, 64–71. Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 312, note that in his mid-sixties Voysin’s tutelage under Boufflers was shorter than Barbezieux’s. Chamillart was not under tutelage, perhaps because he already was controller general and minister and had a close personal relationship with the king. Also, his largely administrative role as war minister and his other duties, according to Cénat, Roi stratège, 218, left Chamillart without time or desire to exceed these functions and interfere with strategy. Cénat, Roi stratège, 178–95, 217–21. From the letter’s translation in Rule, Louis XIV, 50–1. For the memoir and its history, see Saint-Simon, Mémoires complets, 8:457–8. France, Recueil, 21:475–8, 478n1–2 (on Strasbourg). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 12. aae cp Danemark 58, fols 478–80v, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 26 Nov. 1697. ss -Coirault, 1:423, in remarks on the September 1697 retirement of ­Pomponne’s friend and fellow minister Claude Le Peletier. The comtesse de Grignan, Mme de Sévigné’s daughter, made a similar mistake. She wrote Pomponne on 7 August 1696 that she had found the king and Torcy quite happy, the one for having Pomponne as secretary of state and the other for having him as father in place of Croissy. Sévigné, Lettres, 10:405. aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 412–20. Vauban’s 13 September 1696 letter to his friend Racine related his arrival in Paris to rumours of a peace made by the foreign ministers on dishonourable conditions. Vauban, Ses écrits, 2:446. Vauban saw, even at that early date, that Pomponne and Torcy operated in tandem, albeit with different roles. France, Recueil, 21:505–37. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 14. Mathis’s claim, however, that nothing changed until Pomponne’s death (ibid., 15) was not the case, as shown below. SaintSimon aptly pointed to the impossibility of a non-minister foreign secretary unless teamed with a father or father-in-law, since his handling of foreign dispatches and audiences with foreign envoys required reports to the Conseil, into which only ministers entered. ss-Coirault, 1:601. aae md 305, fols 81–2; and aae ppsr 66, fols 308–21v, 3 Mar. 1697. Dangeau, Journal, 6:158 (23 July 1697). Rule, “King in His Council,” 231–41, describes council procedures. See Vivo, Information, 31, on how the physical location of speakers in government debates reinforced the sense of hierarchy. ss -Coirault, 1:424–5, which he dates as having taken place a few days after Pomponne received the post office when Le Peletier resigned from it and left court on 18 September 1697. Forbin-Janson left Rome 27 July 1697 (France,



20 2 221 222 223 224 225 226

227 228

229

230 231 232 233 234 235

236 237 238 39 2 240 241

Notes to pages 78–81

513

Recueil, 17:93) and was formally received at court on 8 or 14 September 1697. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:627. ss -Coirault, 1:601. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:100. Dangeau, Journal, 7:157; and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 8. aae md 1046, fols 86–7. État de la France (1698), 3:6. Dangeau, Journal, 7:25–6 (13 Feb. 1699); and Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 48. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:124–9. Negotiations began on 26 February 1699 (ibid., 134). See aae md 1056, fol. 39, “Pouvoir à Mrs de Torci et de Maurepas pour traiter avec l’amb. de Maroc.” Dangeau, Journal, 7:28. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:136. Dangeau, Journal, 7:41 (4 Mar. 1699), reports that the same day Torcy and Beauvillier were named commissioners to serve with two others from England to implement Ryswick’s provisions concerning the Principality of Orange. Dangeau, Journal, 7:43, claimed that the appointment had been kept secret for six weeks. However, Sourches, Mémoires, 6:138, recorded 14 March that the rumours had grown louder and Torcy still declined to confirm them. This uncertainty likely explains Dangeau’s speculation that Torcy’s entry took place “six weeks” before 4 March, but Sourches’s “fifteen days” fits better with circumstances. bn Cab. H. 343, no. 9734 (Colberts), p. 8, notes that Torcy was declared minister in March 1699. Dangeau, Journal, 7:148. Ibid., 156. Grimblot, Letters, 2:366n, Manchester to Jersey, 30 Sept. 1699. Dangeau, Journal, 7:157; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:187–8. Lossky, Louis XIV, 259. Klaits, Propaganda, especially 86–102. In the memoir Torcy gave the ­English ambassador to justify Louis XIV’s acceptance of Carlos II’s testament, he spoke of the influence of Spanish public opinion. aae cp Angleterre 189, fol. 353v. Kettering, French Society, 18; and Adams, “Rule,” 243–4. État de la France (1698), 3:22–7. For the Conseil d’État privé and for Pussort, see McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 51–5, 238. Dangeau, Journal, 1:357 (4 July 1686), mentions a quarrel mediated by Beauvillier and Pussort. See also Clark, Trumbull, 130. Braun, “Staying on Top,” 248–9. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 171–2. Roth, “Torcy,” 188–90. Also aae md 1093, fols 17r–18, 1 Jan. 1701; and ibid., 1135, fols 236–41v.

514

Notes to pages 81–3

242 Torcy, Journal, 345n4. 243 Neuman, Robert de Cotte, 132–5. De Cotte drew plans for the Hôtel Torcy, but the actual final planning and construction were done by his rival ­Germain Boffrand. Strandberg, “Dessins et documents,” 130–46. 244 bn Clairambault 1170, fol. 117, says that the future bridegroom was well off because he had the Régiment piedmont royal, purchased for more than 80,000 francs with the Colberts’ help. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 167, details the marriage settlement. See also ss-Coirault, 1:270. 245 For Bouzols, see Bély, Espions, 306; ss-Boislisle, 3:35n1; and Courcelles, Dictionnaire historique, 7:457–8. For his Lorraine mission, see his instructions in France, Recueil, 7:97–100; and ss-Coirault, 1:483. aae cp Autriche 81, fol. 78, Torcy to Noblet, 22 July 1702, shows that the minister stayed in contact with his brother-in-law and received news of him from his agents in the field. Prior’s letter to Townsend of 16 November 1714 is in pro sp France 78/159/ pt 2, fol. 262r. 246 Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 149. 247 Ibid., 205, 246; and Sedgwick, Travails, 241–2. For Catherine’s role in politics, see Meyer, Colbert, 346–7. For the motivations for increased elite support of local general hospitals, see Hickey, Local Hospitals, 115–32. 248 Bergin, Crown, Church, 402. 249 aae md 1030, fol. 157, 2 Nov. 1696, refers to the death of Charles de Prades, bishop of Montpellier. 250 Ibid., 1006, fols 42–3, has letters of 20 July 1690 from Croissy to Nicolas de Lamignon de Basville, to the duc de Noailles, to the marquis de Laganez (Leganés), and to the viceroy of Catalonia and of Milan, concerning the exchange of a Don Juan de Marimont for the abbé’s freedom. See Dangeau, Journal, 3:60 (28 Jan. 1690), on his arrest; and ibid., 4:177 (23 July 1690); and ibid., 212 (4 Sept. 1690), for his release. 251 Charles-Joachim to Cardinal de Noailles, 26 Nov. 1711, bn mf 23217, fols 21–5. 252 Courcelles, Dictionnaire historique, 4:366–7. 253 Dangeau, Journal, 9:425. He received a gratification of 6,000 livres. aae md 1120, fol. 60. 254 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:588n4, on Croissy’s possible exchange. bl am 15284, fol. 90, Torcy to Abbé Pomponne, 4 Oct. 1705, mentions a royal pension for Croissy. 255 aae md 1197, fol. 18, 9 Jan. 1714, with 40,000 livres revenue. 256 In writing to Ursins, Maintenon confided that Croissy was to wed one of the wealthiest heiresses in Paris. Maintenon, Lettres inédites Maintenon et Ursins, 2:250, Ursins to Maintenon, 28 Dec. 1711. See Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:298–9, for Paul-Étienne Brunet de Rancy. When Rancy became a



257 258

59 2 260 261 262 263

264

265

266 267

268

Notes to pages 83–5

515

secretary of the king in 1701, one of his references was fellow secrétaire and Torcy’s premier commis Noblet. pro sp France 78/159/pt 2, fol. 298, Prior to Townshend, 14 Dec. 1714. Hatton, Charles XII, 379, 394, 401, 408 (quotes Croissy to Torcy, 27 May 1715), 410, 416. France, Recueil, 2:47–76, has his instructions. aae cp Suède 134, fol. 75, is the 14 Apr. 1715 letter to Charles XII introducing Croissy, while ibid., 133, fols 6, 8–9, 20r–v, 44, are July–Aug. 1715 letters between Versailles and Croissy in Straslund. Schnakenbourg, “Politique française Nord,” 251–74. aae md 1517, fol. 371, Croissy to Torcy, 8 July 1715. Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 95, 105. aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 295, Torcy to Noblet, 23 June 1702. For the Saint-Pierres, see Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 105–15; and ss-Coirault, 2:223, 223n4, 404, 404nn2–8; 3:1005; 8:123–4. In 1704, when FrancoSpanish prospects were still bright in northern Italy, Torcy instructed France’s ambassador to Spain to speak to Philip V on Saint-Pierre’s behalf. bn naf 23187, fol. 239r–v, Torcy to Gramont, 23 Nov. 1704. Sabionetta, near Mantua and Cremona, had been purchased from the king of Spain in 1693. ­Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 106–7. aae cp Milanais 18, fols 120–4v, in which the duke enumerates his losses. For the assurances of restitution, see aae cp Milanais 18, fol. 129, Louis XIV to Saint-Pierre, 8 Mar. 1708; and Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109. Torcy also pressured Madrid to pay out the pension promised the duke the previous year. aae cp Milanais 18, fols 125–83, letters from Saint-Pierre to Torcy and vice versa, covering the period February through July 1708; for example, ibid., fol. 152r, Saint-Pierre to Torcy, 21 Apr. 1708, on his money problems and request for a new residence in Bayonne. See aae md 1159, fol. 73, Torcy to the intendant of Languedoc Basville, 22 Oct. 1708, apprising him that since the duchess would be passing through Montpellier, he was to provide her with anything she needed, including an escort. See also Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109. bn naf 23187, fols 333–4, Torcy to Gramont, 6 Sept. 1706; ibid., fol. ­365r–v, 9 Oct. 1706; and ibid., fol. 347, 10 Oct. 1706. Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:369. See also Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 109–15. Saint-Pierre’s hopes for Sabionetta were not realized, however, because the emperor refused to return it. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, xvii, xxi. Torcy drafted a letter (26 June 1711) for her to Controller General ­Desmaretz requesting financial relief and invoking Torcy’s support. Delavaud, Pomponne, 251, 251n5, 252. The chambers in Torcy’s Versailles apartment that she had lived in with her husband were given up to Torcy’s mother, who

516

269

270

271

272 273 74 2 275 276 277 278

279

280

Notes to pages 85–7 had relinquished her former apartments to make room for others. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:191. bn Clairambault 668, fol. 313, containing the brevet retenu; also fol. 317. For his mission and instructions, see aae md 1063, fols 72ff (fol. 115 authorizes 6,000 livres for his trip); and France, Recueil, 7:97–100. See also ­Sedgwick, Travails, 244; and the following letters: aae cp Bavière 42, fols 477–84, marquis de Pomponne to Louis XIV, 14 Mar. 1699; and ibid., fol. 488, Max to Louis XIV, 27 Mar. 1699. For his embassy and instructions, see France, Recueil, 26:xiv, 127–56. The extended correspondence between Pomponne and Torcy is housed in volumes of aae cp Venise 142 through 162. See also aae md 1210, fol. 224. Torcy explained that he had consulted with Pomponne’s mother and sister, Torcy’s wife, and that they all agreed that going to Switzerland was not in Pomponne’s best interests. aae cp Venise 151, fol. 261r–v, Torcy to ­Pomponne, 15 Dec. 1707. On 18 February 1708 Pomponne wrote to Puyzieulx that Torcy had changed his mind about sending him to the Swiss cantons as his replacement, claiming that he was content with his destiny (ibid., 156, fol. 40). However, not long after (ibid., 130v, Pomponne to Puyzieulx, 28 Apr. 1708), he noted that while others were reluctant to go to Switzerland, judging it too troublesome, he, who had passionately desired to go, foresaw tranquility re-established there soon. Not yet aware of the failure of the Franco-Jacobite invasion of Scotland launched in March with such great expectations, Pomponne speculated that perhaps Torcy had another appointment in mind for him, hinting perhaps at the Jacobite court to be established in Britain. Sedgwick, Travails, 246–51, seems unnecessarily harsh in his judgment of the abbé. ss -Coirault, 1:357. See Pillorget, “Pussort,” 255–74. Hamscher, Parlement of Paris, 142, 156, 163–4, 175–8, 188 (quotation on 177). Pillorget, “Pussort,” 273; and Roth, “Torcy,” 184. Clark, Trumbull, 129–30. Dangeau, Journal, 1:357 (4 July 1686). bn Clairambault 1193, fol. 35: “Inventaire des Titres” listing the “Treasure” given “into the hands of Monseigneur de Croissy,” including 250,000 Louis d’or, a parchment signed by King Henri III establishing the Order of SaintEsprit, and many other documents. Ibid., 1170, fols 93, 103–4; and ibid., fols 210r–11. See also bn Cab. H. 343, fol. 10; ss-Coirault, 3:68, 4:466–7; and Karg von Bebenburg, Correspondance, 1:317. For his career, see Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 47–9; ­ss-Coirault, 1:452, 787; 2:213, 215, 247, 475, 483, 703; and Courcelles, ­Dictionnaire historique, 3:362–3.



Notes to pages 87–90

517

281 Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 24–7, says they quarreled especially over precedence, leading the king to issue a règlement in 1690 to clarify matters. 282 bn mf 6679, fols 198r–v, 222v, 266, 317v, 341v. Blainville’s successor, Thomas II de Dreux, marquis de Dreux-Brézé, also a soldier and Chamillart’s brother-in-law, obtained the office with his help and held it until his death in 1749. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 50–5. 283 aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 178, Blainville to Torcy, 19 May 1702. 284 Murat, Colbert, 224–5; and Péronnet, Évêques, 1:450–1. bn Baluze 218 passim contains papers revealing Baluze’s role as the archbishop’s technical expert. See also Saunders, “Library Colbert,” 283–300. 285 Bergin, Crown, Church, 402. 286 aae cp Rome 474, fols 119–20v, Torcy to Polignac, 19 Dec. 1707. 287 Bergin, Crown, Church, 404–5. Intendant Ferrand wrote in 1707 that the bishop of Saint-Malo, presiding over the Estates of Brittany, had won their esteem and confidence and that he had never seen them so tranquil. Le Moyne de La Borderie and Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne, 5: 555. With ­Brittany in Torcy’s department, this was surely welcome news. 288 bn naf 20274, fol. 83v, Tessé to Torcy, 25 Oct. 1711. See ibid., fols 33–7v, Tessé to Torcy, 20 Sept. 1710, on peace and on obtaining a royal audience for him; ibid., fol. 41r, Tessé to Torcy, 29 Oct. 1710, attaching a memoir on Sablé; and ibid., fol. 120r–v, Tessé to Torcy, 12 Oct. 1712, on passing near Sablé. For Sablé, see Roth, “Torcy,” 185–6. Not surprisingly, while in Provence Tessé looked to Torcy in patronage matters, as in bn naf 2027, fols 13–31, Tessé to Torcy, 11 Oct. 1713. 289 See Torcy, Journal, 217, 217n3, for an example of his assistance to Torcy and a brief biographical sketch. For examples of his ceremonial duties, see bn mf 6679, fols 146v, 222v, 341v. See aae md 1093, fol. 5, 6 Jan. 1701, for his orders; and ibid., fols 57–9, 27 Feb. 1701, for his account of how the princes were ceremonially received along the way, with Torcy’s comments in the margin. 290 Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 204–5. 291 What follows on Desmaretz’s life, family, and policies is based on McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, especially chap. 3. 292 Dubet, Orry, 38–41. 293 See also the discussion of his rehabilitation in Meyer, Colbert, 343–5. 294 bn naf 23187, fol. 401, Torcy to Gramont, 12 Mar. 1708. 295 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 106, 129. 296 Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:60, Prior to Bolingbroke, 13 Sept. 1712. The French had hoped that if Bolingbroke dared, Prior would be named a delegate to Utrecht, but he did not. Louis XIV to Plenipotentiaries, 21 Jan. 1712, in aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 55v. Torcy regularly entertained Prior. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 200.

518

Notes to pages 90–1

297 Dubet, Orry, 97, 121, 184. 298 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 520. ss-Coirault, 3:88, says that Maintenon and ­Harcourt among others opposed his membership. 299 Torcy, Journal, 177. 300 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 530–43; and Van Kley, Religious Origins of the French Revolution, 56–7. 301 Lizerand, Beauvillier; 109–11. Torcy, Journal, 172, noted that Beauvillier censured the maxims of the Gallican Church but did not dare condemn them. In Torcy’s opinion, Beauvillier saw them as an extravagant and childish retaliation against the wise advice of a father and a step that could lead to heresy. Torcy also criticized those who were quick to see Jansenists everywhere and served as the Jesuits’ “valets” (ibid., 213). 302 Fénelon, Correspondance, 10:27 (notes in 11:27–8), Fénelon to Beauvillier, 5 Oct. [1699]. 303 Ibid., 14:230, Fénelon to Chevreuse, 24 Apr. 1710. In ibid., 233, Fénelon complained to Chevreuse (3 May 1710) that the liberties of the Gallican Church were real encumbrances. Admitting that Rome’s pretentions were too great, he nonetheless feared the power of the laity more than a schism. He was also afraid that Torcy and the French cardinals would prevent the election of Cardinal Carlo Agostino Fabroni as pope. Fabroni, later one of the authors of the anti-Gallican bull Unigenitus, was never elected pope. In ibid., 366 (29 Apr. 1711), Fénelon sent Chevreuse a list of points to discuss with Père Tellier concerning the condemnation of a theological work suspected of Jansenism. He thought it would be better to discuss this with Rome directly through the nuncio rather than through the highly suspicious channel through Torcy. On 23 October 1711, in a coded letter, the Jesuit Guillaume Daubenton wrote Fénelon from Rome that the reluctant pope had given way to Louis XIV’s insistence on Cardinal Cornelio Bentivoglio as the next nuncio to France. Daubenton complained that the new nuncio was no theologian, had no understanding of Jansenism, was closely linked to Pomponne, Torcy’s brother-in-law, and therefore only wanted what Torcy wanted (ibid., 455; notes in 15:356–7). 304 Torcy, Journal, 162 (8 Apr. 1710); and ibid, 159–61, for the original incident. For Pierre-Jean Percin de Montgaillard, bishop of Pons, who was “widely suspected of Jansenism” because of his correspondence with several leading members of the group and whose case touched off the anti-Jansenist persecution that eventually led to Unigenitus, see Bergin, Crown, Church, 222, 292, 307, 462–3. 305 Torcy, Journal, 171 (30 Apr. 1710). 306 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. 307 Torcy, Journal, 182.



Notes to pages 92–5

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08 3 309 310 311

Ibid., 211 (25 June 1710). Ibid., 359 (25 Jan. 1711). Ibid., 424–5. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 164, 173; and Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173, do this. Meyer, Bossuet, 257–8, goes so far as to cast the conflict over Quietism as in part a clash between the Le Telliers and the Colberts, referring to the dukes as the whole Colbert clan without mention of Torcy. 312 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 619–25. 313 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. 314 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:136, Chevreuse to Fénelon, 9 Apr. 1709. 315 Bély, Art de la paix, 452–3. For the letter, see Fénelon, Correspondance, 14: 167 (notes in 15:119–22), Fénelon to Chevreuse, 18 Nov. 1709. The duke kept the archbishop informed of secret negotiations, as seen in ibid., 14:172–6 (notes in 15:128–32), Chevreuse to Fénelon, 1 and 2 Dec. 1709; in his 9 Apr. 1709 letter (ibid., 14:138), Chevreuse asked Fénelon to burn his letter after reading it for fear that others might see it. In April 1710 Fénelon also sent Beauvillier and Chevreuse a secret peace memoir (ibid., 229–30, 233, notes in 15:175, 177). 316 Torcy, Journal, 67, reported the rumour that he and Desmaretz had joined ­Beauvillier in pressing for peace at any price. Torcy and Beauvillier also ­ disagreed over how to approach negotiations with Savoy in 1710 (ibid., 128–9).

Chapter Three 1 Troost, William III, 146, argues that after the Treaty of Nijmegen (1678), “although Louis XIV’s policy of strengthening his north-eastern frontier was defensive in nature and led to only limited territorial expansion, the aggressive way in which it was implemented sent the wrong signals” that he was still aiming at what his foes feared was “universal monarchy.” See also ibid., 96–9, 296. 2 For negotiations leading up to Ryswick, see Thomson, “Louis XIV and ­William III,” 24–48; and France, Recueil, 21:405–537. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:423–515, can be supplemented by Legrelle, Ryswick. The six-volume second edition of Diplomatie is cited below unless indicated otherwise. It contains much of Ryswick word for word, but some important documents were either omitted or abbreviated. Thanks to Mr Niels van Tol of the Bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix in The Hague for providing a copy of this work. The war is recounted in Lynn, Wars, 191–265, while Lossky, Louis XIV, 233–56, weaves together war, diplomacy, and internal events. See also S­ tapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 87–106. This and the following paragraphs about negotiations before Torcy succeeded his father are based on these sources.

520

Notes to pages 95–7

3 Vauban greeted Pomponne’s return to the Conseil and his moderate policies with enthusiasm. He wrote to François Mollo, Dutch merchant, Polish resident, and diplomatic dabbler, on 12 February 1694 that the war resulted from the whim of certain powerful and ambitious individuals (Louvois and Seignelay?) who believed that to maintain their power they had to embroil the king in wars. This malign influence was now gone, he insisted, and the present Conseil was composed of men of pleasing qualities guided by serving the good of the state and their master. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 3:74 (John Rule originally consulted the letters cited from Heinsius, Briefwisseling, throughout this work in the originals at the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, but decided that for the reader’s convenience references to them would be from this authoritative edition). Writing to Mollo, 10 May 1694, Callières blamed Louvois alone for squandering his reputation with the Dutch in commercial conflicts over salted fish and woolens and claimed that Croissy had always opposed these policies. Such behaviour was no longer to be feared because the Conseil was now quite united (ibid., 82). 4 Legrelle, Ryswick, 23–43. 5 Jongste, “The 1690s,” 73; and France, Recueil, 21:417–31. 6 Mollo, variously identified as a Spanish or Portuguese convert to Christianity, a Swiss, or an Italian, lived in Amsterdam for over thirty years and married a regent’s daughter. French visitors often lodged with him, and he created a weekly newsletter for Torcy describing the current political-economic scene there and throughout the United Provinces. Pope, Callières, 71–111, is a rich and important account of these negotiations and Callières’s and Mollo’s collaboration. On Mollo, see also Keens-Soper and Schweitzer’s introduction to Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 7–8, 44n45; and France, Recueil, 21:442–3, 448, 454, 465, 471–6. 7 France, Recueil, 21:442–71; and Legrelle, Ryswick, 44–52. 8 Nordmann, “Louis XIV and the Jacobites,” 88–9. 9 Haussonville, Duchesse de Bourgogne, 1:120, quotes from Torcy’s letter to Tessé, 26 July 1696, showing this from at least Croissy’s final illness. 10 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693; Gibson, Scottish Card, 14, 18, 21, 36–8, 97–8; and Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 90–1, notes Louis XIV’s “insistence on using force to support his diplomatic initiatives.” 11 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 157–72, 10 June 1693. 12 For 1688 and Ryswick, see Lossky, Louis XIV, 231, 255. The instructions, 25 February 1697, are in France, Recueil, 21:509–37. 13 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 189–90v, for the meeting. See ibid., fols 174–85, for the “Mémoire sur la paix,” and fols 191–204 for Pomponne’s “Mémoire pour la paix.” It was in this memoir that Pomponne proposed William’s eventual recognition as king. Louis agreed to this, but intended to make William pay dearly for it. Nordmann, “Louis XIV and the Jacobites,” 86–7.



Notes to pages 97–9

521

14 France, Recueil, 21:477, 478, 478n1. Troost, William III, 250, calls this “the real breakthrough in the negotiations.” 15 Dangeau, Journal, 6:187, 420, reports that Torcy and Pontchartrain were in long discussions with the king in Maintenon’s chambers. 16 Ibid., 184, 328, 396, 434, all mention the arrival of a courier whose dispatches Torcy took to the king. 17 Callières, Letters, 57, 57n162. The marquise d’Huxelles apparently assured Callières that he was held in esteem by both Pomponne and Torcy, and he assured her that he felt the same toward them (ibid., 57–8, 62). 18 Vauban, Ses écrits, 2:445–7, Vauban to Racine, 13 Sept. 1696. 19 aae cp Allemagne 329, fols 412–20, Vauban to Torcy, 16 Sept. 1696. 20 Delavaud, “Arrangement international,” 698–705. 21 France, Recueil, 14:179–82. 22 bn naf 23187, fol. 234, Torcy to Gramont, 14 Sept. 1696. He sent the duke, who was governor of Navarre, a copy of the treaty along with a lettre de cachet on how the news was to be sung. See Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information, on the political uses of Te Deum masses. 23 France, Recueil, 14:183–7. 24 Handen, “Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II,” 253–5. See France, Recueil, 14:189, Tessé to Louis XIV, 1 July 1696. aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 10, Tessé to Torcy, 12 Jan. 1697, suggests the exchange of Montserrat for Cremona and, because the liberty of Italy was at stake, keeping a “porte” (door) open to help the Marquis of Mantua and to prevent the fall of an isolated Milan to the Austrians. Storrs, Rise of Savoy, moving beyond the traditional “perfidious Piedmont” view of Victor-Amadeus’s diplomatic volte-faces, interprets them as responses to what the duke saw as real or potential disloyalty on the part of his current allies. He intended to exploit the opportunities Great Power rivalries offered to realize his goals of enhanced security, territory, and status. Ibid., 135–8, confirms and explains much of what Tessé said about diplomatic conditions in Turin. 25 France, Recueil, 21:477–8; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:470–6. 26 Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 235–8. For the offer of Danish mediation, see Thomson, “Louis XIV and William III,” 30. The Austrians, after agreeing to Italy’s neutralization in October 1696, for a time promoted Victor-Amadeus as mediator. Storrs, Rise of Savoy, 2. 27 Pope, Callières, 93–5, 99–103. According to Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 35, “[s]overeigns might seek to impart general direction to their representatives, but it was the latter who were directly and creatively engaged in on-going negotiations.” 28 bn naf 3298, fol. 102r–v, Courtin to Callières, 10 Nov. 1696. Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 240, says that William had the same desire for ­informality, whereas Austria and the Empire’s princes insisted upon traditional forms.

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30 31

32 33 34

35

36

Notes to pages 100–1 See France, Recueil, 21:443–4, for Callières and Harlay-­Bonneuil; and ss-­ Coirault, 2:405–8. For Harlay-Bonneuil’s earlier ­negotiations with the Empire, see Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 402–6, 412–18. bn naf 3298, fols 106–7v, Courtin to Callières, 24 Nov. 1696. In a letter Leibniz wrote from Ryswick between May and September 1697, he contrasted the Imperial delegate’s furnishings, food, and suite with the more modest establishment of the French delegates at Delft, noting as well the contrast with former French practice. He said that this reflected the current spirit at Versailles, where all had seemingly become “small collar” (“petit collet”), but warned against measuring the value of the very capable French delegation by the livery of their pages. Leibniz, Briefe, Vierte Reihe, Sechster Band, 270. France, Recueil, 21:512–13. bn naf 3298, fol. 114, Barbezieux to Courtin and Harlay-Bonneuil; ibid., 115r–v, Courtin to Callières, 6 Dec. 1696; and ibid., fols 124–5, Crécy to Callières, 30 Dec. 1696. This last letter indicates that in February, even though no longer going to Holland as an envoy, Courtin had written a memoir for the use of those who were. Crécy had been involved in the 1694 negotiations in Switzerland with the Imperials concerning the Spanish succession, described in Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:407–18. bn naf 3298, fols 130–1, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 17 Feb. 1697. Ibid., fol. 126, Pontchartrain to Callières, 17 Jan. 1697; and Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 235–8. Callières, Letters, 25. Ibid., 75–6, Callières to marquise d’Huxelles, 4 Oct. 1696, is about criticism at court. Pope, Callières, 89–90, says that he was a scapegoat for what was actually the king’s willingness to consider sacrificing Luxembourg and/or Strasbourg for peace. Callières, Letters, 9–11, 14–16, 21–4; and especially Pope, Callières, 71–98, 128. These missions are detailed in France, Recueil, 21:442–504; for the king’s real intentions being kept from Callières according to the instructions of 15 October 1694, see ibid., 444–5, 456–69. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 22, observes that “[d]iplomats are conventionally not trusted by those they represent. Do they serve their Princes, themselves, or intricate and secret schemes of their collective concocting that they dignify with terms like stability, order and peace?” On Swedish mediation, see Upton, Charles XI, 201–11. On the evolution of mediation, see Katorska, “Méditations françaises,” 225–34. aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 14, Daguerre to Torcy, 2 May 1697. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1:476–7, calls the proceedings at Ryswick a chimerical congress and quotes the French ambassador to Venice, Denis de la Haye de Vantelay, as writing to the king on 1 June 1697 that everyone was persuaded that the Dutch had made a separate peace with France the previous October.



Notes to page 102

523

37 France, Recueil, 21:505. aae cp Hollande 172, fols 12–58, shows Torcy’s corrections and additions throughout the manuscript; it also has other comments in pencil marked out (perhaps Pomponne’s). 38 France, Recueil, 21:505. 39 Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 104; Morgan, “Economic Aspects,” 232–41; and Troost, William III, 245–51. 40 France, Recueil, 21:510. 41 Ibid., 509–37; and ibid., 517n1. Pontchartrain sent the plenipotentiaries a memoir on commerce in March, as did Daguerre. 42 Ibid., 507. bn naf 3298, fol. 132, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 3 Mar. 1697, Paris; and ibid., fols 140–1, Harlay-Bonneuil to Callières, 8 Mar. 1697, Lille. Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37, reproduces four of Renaudot’s reports: two to Croissy in 1696 and two to Torcy, dated 8 October 1696 and 2 January 1698. The first three contain the political, military, and financial information and analysis that shaped perceptions at Versailles of William’s ability to sustain the war (e.g., ibid., 133, from 8 Oct. 1696). Callières was the abbé’s friend and collaborator. Callières, Letters, 11–13. bn naf 3298, fol. 144, Crécy to Callières, 10 Mar. 1697, spoke of the desire for receiving news when they stopped at Ghent. 43 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 10, Daguerre to Torcy, 25 Mar. 1697, Delft; also ibid., fol. 13, Torcy to Daguerre, 1 Apr. 1697, saying that he hoped he would continue to supply advice to the plenipotentiaries. His activities on behalf of his homeland cost him a part of his fortune, while the outbreak of the Nine Years War forced him and his wife to return to France in 1689. In Jan. 1693, however, he returned to the Republic, ostensibly to see to his interests there but in reality to spy and in July received instructions for secret exploratory peace talks with Dutch agents in Brussels. These lasted until October and then gave way to the mission of Abbé Morel, who traveled incognito to Brussels as Daguerre’s merchant kinsman for further talks that lasted until Jan. 1694. Daguerre remained at his side to assist him, his knowledge of Dutch being of particular value. France, Recueil, 21:380, 380n3, 381, 413–31. From February 1697 he held a brevet as king’s agent, receiving 1,500 livres every three months. He was granted permission after Ryswick to remain in Amsterdam to continue trading. Ibid., 22:1n3. Daguerre continued to report to Torcy from Bayonne. aae cp Espagne 231, fols 65, 77, Daguerre to Torcy, 25 and 29 Aug. 1714. Daguerre was also in frequent communication with the ambassador to the United Provinces, Bonrepaus, about commerce, tariffs, and French shipping according to an inventory of a part of Bonrepaus’s outgoing correspondence covering 6 April–15 December 1699. Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 5, 6, 9, 14, 21, 41. I am grateful to Antony McKenna, who upon acquiring this inventory immediately sent me a copy so that I might use it for this book.

524

Notes to pages 103–5

44 For Briord’s mission and instructions, see France, Recueil, 14:189–201. aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 39, is Briord’s “Lettre d’Estat” to smooth his way through France, and ibid., fol. 55, is his “Lettre de créance” (both dated 29 March 1697). 45 aae cp Sardaigne 103, fols 63–4, Le Peletier to Briord, 29 June 1697. See Mazel, Le Peletier, 116. 46 Legrelle, Ryswick, 77. For English frustrations, see Legg, Prior, 53–64. 47 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 27, Daguerre to Torcy, 7 June 1697; ibid., fols 16–18, 9 May 1697; ibid., fol. 19v, 20 May 1697; ibid., fols 30, 36r–v, 13 June 1697 (two letters); and ibid., fols 68–9, July 1697. In his first letter of 13 June, Daguerre complained that he had not been paid in three months and his constant surveillance efforts were costing him dearly, and in his second, he reported that the Spanish were pressing for the Anglo-Dutch fleet’s departure. For Bart and Pointis that year, see Symcox, Crisis Sea Power, 218–19. 48 Grimblot, Letters, 1:122–3. 49 aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 188v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 2 July 1697; and ibid., Hollande 174, fol. 59, Daguerre to Torcy, 1 July 1697. 50 aae cp Hollande 174, fols 49–50, Daguerre to Torcy, 24 June 1697, about a memoir he gave to Harlay-Bonneuil; ibid., fol. 63, Daguerre to Torcy, 4 July 1697; and ibid., fol. 71, Torcy to Daguerre, 15 July 1697. Daguerre’s attempts to discredit his rival continued. On 12 October 1697 (ibid., fol. 134v) he told Torcy that Quiros’s secretary had shared with him that he had intercepted several letters from Mollo to Portland and that Mollo had accepted gratifications totaling 12,000 écus. 51 aae cp Sardaigne 103, fol. 65, Torcy to Briord, 13 July 1697; and aae md 1043, fol. 68, Torcy to Pinon, 28 July 1697. 52 bn naf 3298, fol. 156, Torcy to plenipotentiaries, 10 July 1697, is on Polish affairs. Callières, Letters, 9–11, 29–30, attests to Callières’s enduring interest in Polish affairs. 53 aae cp Danemark 56, fols 30–50, Bonrepaus to Louis XIV, 13 Aug. 1697; ibid., fol. 57v, Louis XIV to Bonrepaus, 29 Aug. 1697; ibid., Hollande 174, fol. 114, Torcy to Daguerre, 19 Sept. 1697; and ibid., fols 118–20v, Daguerre to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1697. 54 His impatience is especially clear in his letter to Heinsius, 11 July 1697, in Grimblot, Letters, 1:17–18. Although Callières did not share any secret information, his letters from Holland to the marquise d’Huxelles add insight into the milieu of the slow-paced negotiations as well as into the negotiator himself. Largely unpublished until now, the letters, with an informative introduction and helpful notes by Laurence Pope, are in Callières, Letters, and must now be counted among the important published letter collections pertaining to Ryswick.



Notes to pages 105–7

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55 These negotiations in Grimblot, Letters, 1:1–125, make lively reading. ­Legrelle, Ryswick, 77–130, includes fuller versions of the French letters. Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” offers useful analysis. 56 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 96, Daguerre to Torcy, 15 Aug. 1697; and ibid., fols 118–20v, Daguerre to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1697. Daguerre also informed Torcy on 3 October 1697 (ibid., fol. 126r) that Quiros’s secretary shared that he believed that a French prince might well be chosen to succeed ­Carlos II and that France should send a known figure as the new ambassador. Daguerre also sent Torcy talk from The Hague about the chances of ­getting the emperor to sign the treaty while France held on to Strasbourg (ibid., fol. 112, 12 Sept. 1697). In a letter a few days later (ibid., fol. 116, 16 Sept. 1697) he was hearing hopes that an equivalent for Strasbourg might make a difference. 57 bn naf 3298, fol. 178, Torcy to plenipotentiaries, 15 Nov. 1697; aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 158, Daguerre to Torcy, 12 Dec. 1697; and ibid., fol. 168, Torcy to La Closure, 23 Dec. 1697. For ratifications of treaties, see Constant, “Traités,” 240–2. 58 Pope, Callières, 111–13. 59 Lossky, Louis XIV, 235. 60 Ibid., 255–6. For similar positive assessments of Ryswick, see Bély, Relations, 371–2; Pujo, Vauban, 220–1, on the frontier; and Rule, “Roi-Bureaucrate,” 79–81, especially on the colonies. Pope, Callières, 72n4, 111, takes issue with Legrelle’s view of Ryswick as a success. For a variety of other views, see Troost, William III, 252n91. 61 Examples are Callières to Pomponne, 12 Aug. 1697, in Legrelle, Ryswick, 122–3; and plenipotentiaries to Torcy, 29 Mar. 1697, in aae cp Hollande 172, fols 73–4r. Torcy’s drafting shows up, for instance, in Legrelle, Ryswick, 113n1; bn naf 3298, fol. 148, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries, 13 May 1697; ibid., fol. 162, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries, 6 Aug. 1697; and aae cp Hollande 171, fols 16rff, Louis XIV to plenipotentiaries, 7 Nov. 1697. 62 Lossky, Louis XIV, 149–81, 212–49, discusses the foreign policy confusion and crisis that led to a radical reorientation, especially after Louvois’s death. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 327, traces the ossification of Louis XIV’s thought and its transition from the 1690s toward greater flexibility and pragmatism. 63 Bély, Art de la paix, 380, calls this an attempt to construct a rational European order. 64 aae cp Hollande 174, fol. 176, La Closure to Torcy, 24 Dec. 1697, Delft. 65 Paul, Polignac, 80. 66 aae cp Danemark 57, fol. 22, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 11 Dec. 1696. 67 Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 162–3, 517–18. The Alsatian Obrecht (1646–1701) converted to Catholicism after France’s occupation of

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71

72 73 74 75 76

77 78

Notes to pages 107–9 S­ trasbourg. He had earlier negotiated on Louis XIV’s behalf with the ­Palatinate’s prince-elector, written a memoir at his request on sovereign rights, and been an unofficial but influential foreign ministry advisor on Germany. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 479–501. See also France, Recueil, 28:113. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 174. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 58, notes that “diplomacy puts people in touch with power. It does so, however, in a complex and paradoxical way. For people who actually expect to hold power and wield power, all diplomatic missions are hardship postings where reputations can always be damaged but rarely strengthened … For those living with less great expectations, however, diplomacy promises its own attractions and the possibility of acquiring power and influence within its admittedly more modest terms of reference … [through] the symbolic role conferred upon diplomats; the opportunities provided by interactions with colleagues; and the advantages conferred by positions as expert advisors to those with real power, their political masters.” For his career, see Delavaud’s preface to Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur; and France, Recueil, 18:71–82. See also the entry in bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 128. aae cp Allemagne 330, fols 210–25, Jan. 1698, is his “Mémoire concernant l’Employ de Ratisbon,” while ibid., fols 244–9, 19 Mar. 1698, are his instructions as plenipotentiary to Ratisbon. See also ibid., fols 306–7, Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 1 Aug. 1698. In a 19 April 1698 letter to Torcy from Strasbourg, Rousseau made it clear that he owed his position to Torcy’s “protection.” Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur, 51. The treatise’s original has not been found, but a copy is among ­Tallard’s papers, likely given to him by Pomponne or Torcy as he prepared for his English embassy, his first diplomatic mission (ibid., 1–3). Rousseau’s work was not published until 1912 (ibid., 9). bn naf 7488, fols 97–8v, Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 7 July 1701, with a translation of the emperor’s latest comments on the Mantuan affair. Louis XIV to Rousseau de Chamoy, 13 Apr. 1702, quoted in Klaits, Propaganda, 99. Ibid., 98–105, 300–5. Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur, 7–8. Iberville, Correspondance, is a rich new resource. For an insight into his work in Geneva, see aae cp Genève 16, fol. 103, Louis de Pontchartrain to Iberville, 14 Dec. 1696. See also France, Recueil, 28:113–28. For his later career, see aae cp Gênes 40, fol. 319r–v, Iberville to Torcy, 16 Jan. 1709, Genoa. France, Recueil, 28:114n1, says he served from 1678 to 1688. This was a potentially fruitful field for French diplomacy because the emperor had promoted Habsburg dynastic interests at the expense of



79

80

81 82 83

84

85

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87 88 89

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Notes to pages 109–11

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I­ mperial ones at Ryswick. Iberville exploited subsequent wrangling between Vienna and the princes over Ryswick’s implications. Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 497–509, 512–38, 546–7, 566–7, 572, 588. The deputy of Geneva’s governing council reported back on 12 May 1688 that he had heard from various sources that Iberville, Croissy’s “troisième commis” (third clerk), a man of spirit and quality, had been named the new resident to ­Geneva. Dupré, Correspondance, 340n1. For instance, see aae cp Russie 3, fols 21–5, Iberville to Torcy, 17 Nov. 1703; and ibid., fols 27ff, for Iberville’s advice to Torcy on Muscovite ceremonial and on trade. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 55, 56, Torcy to Anneville, 13 and 17 June 1709. In bl am 20351, fol. 134, Iberville to Gualterio, 19 May 1710, he mentioned working in Paris and at Versailles. France, Recueil, 25-2:135–74. For Bonnac, see France, Recueil, 12:187; Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 44; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 52–3. aae cp Brunswick-Hanovre 42, Bonnac to Torcy, 30 Aug. 1701, fol. 240r–v. For the situation in Wolfenbüttel, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:502–11, ­5:53–7. Aubert de La Chesnaye-des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 19:318–22, has entries on both Bonnac and Bezac. Wentzcke, Frischmann; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 174. aae md 1016, fol. 198, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 20 June 1692, camp before Namur. In aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 300–3v, 18 Apr. 1709, Frischmann recommended himself to Torcy as French representative to the elector of Cologne. His career is recounted by his successor at Constantinople. Bonnac, Mémoire, 57–65. See also France, Recueil, 16:236, 255–6; and Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 532–3, 545–6, 567–9. For his importance as military advisor to Rákóczi, see Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 31, who also points out the contribution of the marquis du Héron (ibid., 40–7). See Frey and Frey, Societies in Upheaval, especially chapter 3, for background. aae md 1017, fol. 220, 5 May 1692, records Guiscard’s Sedan appointments. See France, Recueil, 2:188–203, for his 18 April 1699 instructions; and ­Hatton, Charles XII, 85–6, for the negotiations. bn mf 10703, fol. 97, Torcy to Guiscard, 22 July 1700; and Hatton, Charles XII, 118, 130, 143–56. See also ss-Coirault, 7:721–2. Hatton, “Charles XII and Great Northern War,” 651. aae cp Danemark 65, fol. 132, Chamilly to Torcy (no date); France, Recueil, 13:83–102; and ss-Coirault, 1:425, 2:283–4. For Chamilly in Italy, see France, Recueil, 15:327–31. Bély, Espions, 93–4, 170, 264, discusses Poussin’s spy network. Notices and instructions are in France, Recueil, 3:211–23; and ibid., ­22:178–223. See also Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 388–9. See Mathis, Thèse

528

91

92 93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102

03 1 104 105 106

107 108

Notes to pages 112–16 Excerpt, 18, for his kinship with Pomponne. He was also part of the circle of Beauvillier and Chevreuse. ss-Coirault, 2:532. In aae cp Portugal 35, fol. 151, Torcy to Rouillé, 29 Nov. 1700, Torcy jested with Rouillé that he had picked up the warlike spirit of the Portuguese. For the marquis, see Bonnac, Mémoire, 42–4; France, Recueil, 22:324; ibid., 3:226n1; and Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 82. For the abbé, see ss-Coirault, 1:387, 387n5, 399, 401, 405–7; and ibid., 2:499. Boles, Huguenots, 48. France, Recueil, 30:145–6; and Boislisle, Suisse et Puyzieulx, who notes Sainte-Colombe’s importance. Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 62–3. For a notice and his instructions, see France, Recueil, 14:189–201 (for Savoy); and ibid., 22:35–94 (for Holland). France, Recueil, 15:315n1; ibid., 19:61–73; and Flournoy, Journal, 47n21. See Dupré, Correspondance, for his eight years as resident to Geneva. France, Recueil, 17:85–297. Ibid., 15:333n1, for a brief biographical note. See also Aubert de La ­Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 1:529; and Parisse, Histoire ­Lorraine, 315–8. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 8–9v, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 14 Jan. 1708, is an example of the information he collected. See Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 355–7, for his geographical work on Germany. Malettke, France et Saint-Empire, 477–83, 488, 592. Paul, Polignac, 23–85. France, Recueil, 4:209–46 (229n1, 230n5, for Torcy’s marginalia). Paul, Polignac, 23–85. Ibid., 88–94, 129–231. aae cp Espagne 85, fol. 416, Polignac to Torcy, 19 Nov. 1700. Polignac received the cardinal’s hat at the end of 1712 at the request of the Stuart James III, who exercised his rights in the so-called Promotion of Kings. Gregg, “Monarchs without a Crown,” 403. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 170. Ibid., 157–66. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 65–8, on diplomats both far and near serving as expert advisors. Torcy, Journal, 200n1; and France, Recueil, 27:143–4n4, for a brief biography (see 299–345, for a questionnaire he submitted to Torcy). See also Blet, Nonces, 215–40. For his correspondence with Torcy, see bl am 20319, vol. 2. aae md 310, fol. 239v, which records the royal pension of 20,000 livres he received in 1715. Cermakian, Ursins, 432, 454. bl am 15284, fol. 264, Torcy to Pomponne, 20 Aug. 1706. Torcy had harsh words for Cardinal Francesco Barberini, elevated in 1690, and grandnephew of the Cardinal Francesco Barberini who had served as nuncio to France in 1625 and whose family Mazarin had promoted and protected.



Notes to pages 117–18

529

109 For his journey and first audience, see Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 207–17; and Grimblot, Letters, 1:159–63. Portland’s formal instructions are brief and say nothing directly of his real mission of ascertaining Louis’s intentions toward the Spanish succession. Legg, British Diplomatic Instructions, 2:2–3. 110 bn mf 6679, fols 222vff. Saint-Simon described Tallard as a person whom no one trusted but whose company everyone enjoyed. ss-Boislisle, 11:51–2. 111 On 24 December 1697 William III wrote Heinsius: “What the French ambassadors have said to you, that something must be done by the Republic, France, and me, towards maintaining the peace, surprises me much,” but he assured the grand pensionary that Portland “will readily be able to get to the bottom of this affair in France,” and thus William was anxious for his embassy to begin soon. Grimblot, Letters, 1:144. William, however, was not very sanguine as to a “general guarantee for the peace” from the French, as he informed Heinsius 28 January 1698 (ibid., 153). 112 Troost, William III, 253. After the peace, he and Heinsius refused to renew the Grand Alliance if it included its original article supporting Austria’s claim to Spain. 113 Ibid., 95–9, 296–7. 114 Saint-Simon, Saint-Simon at Versailles, 44. For a view of these difficulties from the viewpoint of James II’s court, see Callow, King in Exile, 345–55. James frustrated Portland’s visits to various members of the court and attendance at particular occasions merely through his own presence, knowing full well that William’s envoy could not abide it. 115 Grimblot, Letters, 1:168–74, Portland to William III, 17 Feb. 1698. Despite French hospitality, Portland’s staff was watched: aae cp Angleterre 173, fol. 218, Torcy to La Reynie, d’Argenson, and Renaudot, all 6 Jan. 1698. In March this almost led to the arrest of Portland’s chaplain for allegedly administering the sacraments to a Frenchman. Although the accusation was later withdrawn, Portland was not satisfied with the apology he received from a police underling rather than from its head, Marc René de Voyer, marquis d’Argenson. Grimblot, Letters, 1:198–201. 116 Grimblot, Letters, 1:172–3 (Portland to William III, 18 Feb. 1698); and ibid., 175 (William III to Portland, 8/18 Feb. 1698). Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 166, shows that Portland’s doubts were largely rooted in lack of parliamentary support for such an initiative. 117 Grimblot, Letters, 1:181–3, William III to Portland, 13/23 Feb. 1698; and Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 167–8. 118 Grimblot, Letters, 1:185–96, 198–204, Portland to William III, 1 and 7 Mar. 1698. 119 Ibid., 205–10. For Bonneuil, see Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 50. 120 Grimblot, Letters, 1:205–10, 220–5.

530

Notes to pages 119–20

121 Described in État de la France (1698), 1:270–1. 122 ss-Coirault, 1:464; Grimblot, Letters, 1:174–5, William III to Portland, 8/18 Feb. 1698; ibid., 211, 218, William III to Heinsius, 25 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1698; and ibid., 217–18, 227, Portland to William III, 8 and 13 Mar. 1698. 123 Torcy, Mémoires, 1:38–9. 124 Tallard’s instructions of 2 March 1698, quoted in translation in Grimblot, Letters, 1:264, 267–8. An undated “Memorandum” penned by Torcy before Portland’s arrival expressed the same confidence that he had come primarily to talk of Spain (ibid., 286–7). On Austria, see Spielman, Leopold I, 169–72. 125 Torcy’s “Memorandum,” in Grimblot, Letters, 1:287–9. 126 For Portland’s account to William III, 15 Mar. 1698, see ibid., 290–4; and for Torcy and Pomponne’s account to Louis XIV, see ibid., 294–304. See also Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 210–12. Troost, William III, 253–4, notes that William’s knowledge of Carlos II’s 1696 secret will in favour of the electoral prince also inclined him toward this solution. While in Paris, Portland visited the aged Jean Hérault de Gourville, a once-disgraced financier who had undertaken diplomatic missions for the French crown, including in the United Provinces, where he established a good relationship with William III. Gourville later wrote that when Portland asked his opinion on the best way to resolve the Spanish impasse, he replied that the electoral prince should take the Spanish throne, to which Portland responded that William was of the same opinion. Gourville, Mémoires, 2:142–3. 127 Grimblot, Letters, 1:273, 303. 128 Ibid., 304–5 (William III to Heinsius, 8/18 Mar. 1698); and ibid., 306–8 ­(William III to Portland, 9/19 Mar. 1698). 129 Ibid., 311 (William III to Portland, 14/24 Mar. 1698); and ibid., 312–13 (William III to Heinsius, 15/25 Mar. 1698). 130 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 213. 131 Grimblot, Letters, 1:461 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698); ibid., 476–7, 485 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 16 May 1698); ibid., 494 (Portland to William III, 17 May 1698); and Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 216. 132 William had Portland make it clear that he wanted the return of Dunkirk, an enhanced barrier, ports in the Mediterranean and West Indies, and the emperor placed in possession of Spanish Italy. Grimblot, Letters, 1:344–5 (William III to Portland, 28 Mar./7 Apr. 1698). Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 381–2, details the weaknesses of the informal barrier already in place. Pomponne and Torcy emphasized that although Spain belonged by right to the Bourbons, Louis XIV promised that the two crowns would never be joined and that the Spanish could choose between the Dauphin’s sons Berry and Anjou for an heir to be raised in Spain without French attendants. They also spoke of ceding the Spanish Netherlands to its governor, Max E ­ mmanuel



133

134 135

36 1 137 138

139 140 141

142

143

144 145

Notes to pages 120–2

531

of Bavaria, and of new commercial treaties with England and the Dutch. Grimblot, Letters, 1:328 (Portland to William III, 2 Apr. 1698). Grimblot, Letters, 1:385–92 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 17 Apr. 1698); ibid., 411 (William III to Heinsius, 13/23 Apr. 1698); and ibid., 415 (William III to Portland, 14/24 Apr. 1698). Ibid., 362 (William III to Portland, 1/11 Apr. 1698); ibid., 392 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 17 Apr. 1698); and ibid., 396 (Portland to William III, 20 Apr. 1698). For instance, as in ibid., 411 (William III to Heinsius, 13/23 Apr. 1698). See ibid., 428–9 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Apr. 1698), for the suggestion that as “the matter begins to assume a more definite form,” it should be discussed in either London or Paris; and ibid., 450, 452 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 May 1698), for the former’s preference for talks with William, whether in London or in Holland. Ibid., 495 (Portland to William III, 17 May 1698). Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 53, 104–6, 190–1. Dangeau, Journal, 6:370. Portland reported that their conversation “was too private and too long” for a letter but was of such importance that he would relate it to William personally. Grimblot, Letters, 2:36–7 (Portland to William III, 17 June 1698). Unfortunately, no record of Portland’s relation to William of this conversation with Louis XIV has been found. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 216. Dangeau, Journal, 6:370. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 217. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:629, 631. Tallard’s embassy had begun even before he reached London when he and Portland exchanged pleasantries in France. On 27 February 1698, the king ordered Tallard’s immediate departure for London. Dangeau, Journal, 16:301. His final audience with the king was on 11 March, the day of Portland’s first public royal audience (ibid., 309). For Torcy’s instructions for each ambassador, see, for Harcourt, France, Recueil, 11:449–81 (23 Dec. 1697); for Bonrepaus, ibid., 22:1–29 (13 Jan. 1698); for Tallard, ibid., 25-2:1–23 (2 Mar. 1698); and for Villars, ibid., 1:125–50 (16 June 1698). Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 387. See also Bély, Art de la paix, 460, on partitioning; and ibid., 577, where he says that the negotiations for the partition treaties heralded a new era. Roosen, Diplomacy, 26. The claims (there were others but these were the most plausible) were based on descent through female lines (valid in Spanish law) but complicated by renunciations of rights made upon marriage that were often disputed on various legal grounds. Also disputed was a monarch’s testamentary power: could he bind his heir, as some claimed Philip IV had done to his son Carlos II?

532

46 1 147

148

49 1 150

151 152

153

154

Notes to pages 122–3 A childless monarch’s testamentary rights, however, were not generally disputed. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 385–6, 391, is a lucid account of these claims. See also Bély, Relations, 375–7; and Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 383–6. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 328, stresses Louis’s belief that the Dauphin’s claim rested on heredity and Spain’s fundamental laws and not on Spain’s failure to pay his wife’s dowry or Carlos II’s will. Bérenger, “Attempted Rapprochement,” 133–52. William III admitted to Portland (14/24 Apr. 1698) that in weighing the two French alternatives, giving Spain to the electoral prince was “the most advantageous to all Europe in general.” Unfortunately, he continued, that would deprive the Maritime Powers of gaining the ports in the Mediterranean or Caribbean that might result from a Bourbon receiving Spain. Grimblot, Letters, 1:415. Tallard reported to Louis XIV on 11 April 1698 (ibid., 365) that William insisted that the Spanish succession was not an issue that lawyers would decide, but one to be resolved either by their efforts on behalf of European peace or by recourse to a war in which each fought for his own national interests. Ibid., 421, Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Apr. 1698, on maintaining the balance of power in Italy by assigning Milan to the Duke of Savoy. See Thompson, “Balancing Europe,” on the varieties of meaning of this term and how it was used especially in early eighteenth century Britain. Bérenger, “Attempted Rapprochement,” 146. Grimblot, Letters, 2:100 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698), indicated his willingness, even at that late date, to give the Maritime Powers Ceuta and Oran in North Africa and Santo Domingo in the West Indies in exchange for a Bourbon Spain. Ibid., 1:459 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698); and ibid., 481 (Louis to ­Tallard, 16 May 1698). Their rapprochement began during the talks to end the war. Thomson, “Louis XIV and William III,” 24–48. Claydon, “William’s War Propaganda,” ­125–42, explains William’s bitterness toward France. See also Troost, ­William III, 95–9. Even though Louis had asked Tallard to see if William would agree to revisit the idea of assigning Spain to the Dauphin’s son, the ambassador forthrightly expressed his doubts. Grimblot, Letters, 2:48 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 3 July 1698). Ibid., 1:147 (William III to Heinsius, 11/21 Jan. 1698). Information came from Renaudot and his network of informants (ibid., 228–42) and from ­Tallard, who also sent Torcy a journal of events in Parliament (ibid., 466–71, 495). Tallard wrote Louis that William would not respond to his proposals until he knew how much money Parliament would vote for troops (4 July



155

156

157

158 159 160 161

162

163

164

Notes to pages 123–4

533

1698, ibid., 2:48–9). For William’s difficulties, especially after Ryswick, see Thomson, “Parliament and Foreign Policy,” 130–2; Groenveld, “William III Stadholder,” 17–38; and Speck, “William III and Three Kingdoms,” 39–52. Of what he took to be a French ultimatum, William III wrote Heinsius, 14/24 March 1699, “I should be glad to have your sentiments thereon immediately.” Grimblot, Letters, 2:308–9. Tallard informed Louis XIV, 3 July 1698 (ibid., 48), that the Dutch had made William “resolute” on keeping a French prince off the Spanish throne. Tallard later wrote Torcy that he found Heinsius’s objections to the First Partition Treaty draft, submitted to him by Portland, to be mostly reasonable (ibid., 135, 1 Sept. 1698). For William and Heinsius, see Veenendaal, “Who Is in Charge?,” 11–12; and Onnekink, “Anglo-Dutch Diplomatic Cooperation,” 48–50. Portland reported to William III, 4 May 1698, regarding a reply to English counter-proposals, that Torcy and Pomponne informed him that “the letters [from Tallard] having just arrived, and the matter being of such importance, it would be necessary to make a report to the king in council, which would not be held till Sunday.” Grimblot, Letters, 1:442. Examples are ibid., 161–3, 168, 177ff, 185, 188, 199n, 200–10, 222–3, ­226–32, 375, 378, 395, 397, 440, 442, 445, 454–5, 492; and ibid., 2:18–19. See ibid., 1:210, however, for an occasion where Portland complained to Pomponne about protocol issues, although it was with Torcy that he resolved them. Tallard’s sense on one occasion that he needed to justify himself to the secretary of state in particular suggests the extent of Torcy’s influence (ibid., 435–6 [Tallard to Torcy, 30 Apr. 1698]). ss -Coirault, 2:308–9; and France, Recueil, 25-2:13–14. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 218. Grimblot, Letters, 2:93–5 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698). Ibid., 104 (William III to Heinsius, 10 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 147–8, 167 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 and 16 Sept. 1698). See ibid., 105–46; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:246–305, 369–428, for the steps by which final agreement was reached. France, Recueil, 25-2:35–9. In his son’s name, Louis relinquished Spain and its overseas empire to Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria. The Dauphin’s share encompassed Naples, Sicily, the Stato dei Presidi off Tuscany, the port of Finale west of Genoa, and the Spanish province of Guiposcoa on the Bay of Biscay, while the archduke received Milan. According to a secret article, if the electoral prince once king died heirless, then his father Max would inherit his portion. See Grimblot, Letters, 2:483–95, for the text of the treaty. On Harcourt in Spain, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:123–82, 306–68, 465–99; and Maquart, Espagne de Charles II, 129–31. Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, remains essential. ss -Coirault, 2:158–67, 3:383–7.

534

Notes to pages 124–7

165 Stanhope, Spain under Charles Second, 125, 133, 139, 147, 150, marks the rise and fall of the Harcourts in the Spanish public’s favour. 166 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 572, agrees. 167 Harcourt was instructed that his primary mission was to uncover the true dispositions of the principal grandees and report how they felt about the succession (France, Recueil, 11:453). See also aae cp Espagne 78, fols 34–41, 42–4, 50–1. 168 Grimblot, Letters, 1:481, Louis XIV to Tallard, 16 May 1698; ibid., 2:7–8, Louis XIV to Tallard, 29 May 1698; and Torcy, Mémoires, 1:48. 169 France, Recueil, 11:465–8, 474; and ss-Coirault, 1:720. 170 France, Recueil, 11:450; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:342–5. 171 Sturgill, Villars, 14–15. 172 Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 47n31, notes that Villars, who addressed war secretaries as “Monseigneur” until he was made a marshal in 1702, nonetheless used “Monsieur” with Secretary of State Torcy in the late 1690s. 173 Villars, Mémoires, 1:220n1. He later promised Torcy in verse that he would guard his tongue on the matter (ibid., 459–60). 174 aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 135, Torcy to Villars, 15 July 1699. 175 Ibid., Torcy to Villars, fol. 183, 31 Aug. 1699. 176 Villars, Mémoires, 1:350. 177 Ibid., 331; and ibid., 6:253n1. 178 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:429–40. 179 Villars, Mémoires, 1:303. Villars was later convinced that had he been given a free hand, he could have negotiated a partition treaty with the Austrians better than the one signed with the Maritime Powers (ibid., 2:253). Vogüé, however, cites Austrian documents that show that Torcy and the king were justified in doubting the sincerity of these Austrian overtures (ibid., 254). See also Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:440–61; and Spielman, Leopold I, 173–4, on Austria’s partition overtures. 180 Villars, Mémoires, 1:348n1, on the spy network. See Frey and Frey, Question of Empire, 15, 34–41, for the Imperial court’s factions. See also Spielman, Leopold I, 175, 179–81. 181 Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis, 31–3. 182 ss-Coirault, 1:425–6. See also France, Recueil, 22:1–2. 183 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:373–85, 419–27. Bonrepaus’s efforts to insinuate himself into the negotiations for the Second Partition Treaty were likewise rebuffed, and Tallard was confirmed as the sole negotiator. With nothing further to do and perhaps rather disappointed, Bonrepaus took leave of The Hague at the start of December for some rest in France. Grimblot, Letters, 2:338, 350, 372–4, 377–8. 184 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 110, call the post-Utrecht Anglo-French entente “as revolutionary as the later Austro-French Diplomatic ­Revolution



185

186

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Notes to page 127

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of the 1750s, and … completely foreign to the normal pattern of AngloFrench relations from 1689 to 1815.” For the Quadruple Alliance, see ibid., 111–24; and Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–35. After Torcy’s hope for guaranteeing Utrecht in partnership with the Bolingbroke ministry ended when the Whigs came to power, he looked to a “family compact” with Spain, but Philip V’s bellicosity and designs on Italy led him to support the regent’s return to accommodation with Britain. Petitfils, Régent, 433, 439, 441, 480, 578–9; and Shennan, Philippe, Duke of Orléans, 68–9. Orléans’s tutor, Abbé Guillaume Dubois, later architect of the Quadruple Alliance and a cardinal, accompanied Tallard to London in 1698 (ibid., 52), but when Tallard complained to Versailles that Dubois was secretly carrying on parallel negotiations on behalf of Orléans, Torcy recalled him. Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 1:255. Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–2. Claydon, William III, especially 121–58, argues that Louis misread William’s relationship with Parliament and still relied upon his experiences with the last two Stuarts. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 170–1, however, says that despite Tallard’s warning against equating William with the last two Stuarts, Louis correctly perceived his weakness vis-à-vis Parliament. Louis XIV wrote Tallard, 26 May 1698, that the “more [William’s] power is limited by Parliament, the greater is it his interest to unite closely with me,” hinting that whereas the emperor would require subsidies from William rather than providing them, he would be “always ready” to offer assistance, presumably in the form of subsidies. Grimblot, Letters, 1:511–12. On 2 June 1698 Tallard reminded the king that unlike the late ­Stuarts, William was “supported by Holland, of which he has the absolute control,” and concluded that William’s interest in a French alliance rested on international rather than domestic considerations (ibid., 2:13). Louis, however, persisted in thinking that William might feel more secure if he could be certain of French backing should England have one of its frequent revolutions, although he also suspected that William might use the pretext of war with France over Spain to strengthen his hand against Parliament (ibid., 29–31 [Louis XIV to Tallard, 12 June 1698]). Grimblot, Letters, 1:144 (William III to Heinsius, 24 Dec. 1697/3 Jan. 1698); and ibid., 460–1, 463 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 8 May 1698). Louis XIV wrote to Tallard, 16 May 1698, that France allied with England would end support for the Jacobites and prevent James II in France from plotting against ­William (ibid., 476–7, 485–6). This suggests that Louis intended this partitioning partnership to endure beyond Carlos’s death and extend to other international issues. Ibid., 494 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 17 May 1698). Ibid., 2:98–9 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 5 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 105–7 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 15 Aug. 1698).

536

Notes to pages 127–9

189 Ibid., 112 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 18 Aug. 1698); and ibid., 118–19 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 19 Aug. 1698). 190 Ibid., 126–8 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 25 Aug. 1698). 191 Ibid., 155 (Vernon to Portland, 30 Aug./10 Sept. 1698). See also Thomson, “Parliament and Foreign Policy,” 131–3. 192 Black, Anglo-French Relations, 1–35; and Onnekink, “Partition Treaties.” 193 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:5–176, 193–324. 194 Ibid., 2:488–99, 500–2. 195 Ibid., 533–42. See France, Recueil, 17:157–64, for Torcy’s instructions of 28 January 1699 to the prince de Monaco, France’s new envoy to Rome, with whom he shared the treaty’s contents. On Imperial policy and the Spanish succession, see Spielman, Leopold I, 169–73. 196 Grimblot, Letters, 2:255 (William III to Heinsius, 31Jan./10 Feb. 1699). Torcy, d’Argenson, and others exchanged letters from late 1702 through early 1703 concerning the possible involvement of a certain Gonzel in the alleged poisoning of the electoral prince. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:453–60. 197 Tallard also floated, among other possibilities, two exchange schemes: France to exchange, first, Milan for Lorraine and, second, her earlier awards in southern Italy to the Duke of Savoy for his current possessions. Both aimed to consolidate France’s frontiers and avoid far-flung holdings difficult and expensive to defend. Grimblot, Letters, 2:260–70 (Louis XIV to Tallard, 13 Feb. 1699). Louis informed Tallard that he knew “how much Europe would be alarmed at seeing my power raised above that of the House of Austria,” but he was convinced that if the emperor’s power, already augmented by the German princes’ submission and peace with the Turks, increased further due to a revised partition, then “it is for the general interest, that … mine shall always be able to counterbalance it” (ibid., 262). William, however, wrote Heinsius that he suspected that Louis planned to annex the Dauphin’s share to France (ibid., 338 [18 July 1699]). 198 Letters in ibid., 273–89; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:154 (13 May 1699). 199 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 219–23. William persuaded Portland to finish the talks with Tallard, even though the earl was increasingly doubtful that partitioning would succeed given the lack of domestic support. Grimblot, Letters, 2:290–332, 361–2, 375. William urged Heinsius to remain to continue backing his efforts on behalf of the Dutch (ibid., 2:306–7 ­[William III to Heinsius, 28 Feb./10 Mar. 1699]). 200 Grimblot, Letters, 2:325–6 (William III to Portland, 28 Apr./7 May 1699); and repeated in late December (ibid., 385). 201 Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 220. Louis XIV raised this possibility with Tallard even though he preferred working with William. Grimblot, Letters, 2:268–9 (13 Feb. 1699). See also ibid., 299 (Louis to Tallard, 3 Mar. 1699).



Notes to pages 129–30

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202 Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 170. See ibid., 171–2, on growing English weakness. 203 William clearly recognized this. Grimblot, Letters, 2:343 (William III to ­Portland, 21 Aug. 1699); and ibid., 347–9 (William III to Heinsius, 15 and 19 Sept. 1699). See also Spielman, Leopold I, 174–5. 204 Grimblot, Letters, 2:330–1 (William III to Heinsius, 12/22 and 16/26 May 1699). By 16 August 1699 (ibid., 341), however, he confided to the grand pensionary that it now appeared that the Austrians would have to be forced to comply, “which to me is an incomprehensible policy, and will embarrass us much.” Portland was the butt of French and Imperial suspicions, blamed variously for delaying an agreement or for wanting to force it down the emperor’s throat. Onnekink, Anglo-Dutch Favourite, 222–3. 205 See Grimblot, Letters, 2:335 (William III to Heinsius, 26 June 1699), on forcing Sweden to join such a league. See Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:444–81, on negotiations in Scandinavia. 206 Grimblot, Letters, 2:380–1 (William III to Heinsius, 24 Nov./4 Dec. 1699); and ibid., 385–7 (Manchester to Jersey, 23 Dec. 1699). See also ibid., 392 (William III to Heinsius, 5/15 Jan. 1700). 207 Ibid., 388 (William III to Heinsius, 19/29 Dec.); and ibid., 389 (Manchester to Jersey, 31 Dec. 1699). 208 This new agreement assigned Archduke Charles Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the overseas empire, but with the provision that these territories could never be inherited by one who wore the Imperial crown. The Dauphin would receive Naples, Sicily, the presidial ports, Finale on the coast west of Genoa, and Guiposcoa. Finally, France would exchange Milan for Lorraine. Ibid., 495–507, contains the English text of the treaty. For Austrian and Dutch resistance and the decision of the latter to sign the treaty, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:92–263. 209 Grimblot, Letters, 2:403–6 (Manchester to Jersey, 19 May 1700); and ibid., 406–7 (Jersey to Manchester, 13/24 May 1700). 210 Ibid., 411, 413–14 (Manchester to Jersey, 2 and 9 June 1700). 211 See the various letters in ibid., 412–21. For allied diplomatic efforts in ­Lorraine, Savoy, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:400–568. See bn mf 10703, fols 102v–3r, Louis XIV to Guiscard, 12 Aug. 1700. 212 Grimblot, Letters, 2:418–19 (Manchester to Jersey, 26 June 1700). 213 Seemingly undisturbed, he went on in this letter to discuss other issues of implementation (ibid., 421–2 [William III to Heinsius, 18/29 June 1700]). His opinion was shared by English diplomats in Vienna and France, as in ibid., 423–4 (Manchester to Sutton, 9 July 1700). 214 Ibid., 427 (William III to Heinsius, 30 July 1700). 215 Ibid., 430–1 (Sutton to Manchester, 18 Aug. 1700). Francis Schonenberg, envoy extraordinary to Spain, reported to Manchester that while the ­Spanish

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21 2 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229

230

231

Notes to pages 130–3 Council of State favoured Anjou, the “King and Queen are absolutely for the Imperial court” (ibid., 439 [23 Sept. 1700]). For details on negotiations in Vienna and Austria’s diplomatic efforts to secure the whole succession, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 3:263–336. Grimblot, Letters, 2:431–2 (Manchester to Blathwayt, 20 Aug. 1700); and ibid., 434 (Manchester to Jersey, 27 Aug. 1700), with Torcy’s complaint about the Dutch. Ibid., 435–8 (William III to Heinsius, 21 Aug. and 21 Sept. 1700). Ibid., 435–6 (William III to Heinsius, 12 Sept. 1700). Spielman, Leopold I, 181–2. The influential chapter by Jean Bérenger in Bély et al., Guerre et paix, ­1:403–27, interprets the dynamics of the French acceptance of the will largely in light of Saint-Simon’s account, but the duke’s narrative is problematic and must be carefully balanced with other sources. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” offers more broadly based reasons why Louis XIV accepted the testament. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 393–4 (quotation on 393). Roosen, “Origins,” 160; and Spielman, Leopold I, 173. Clark, “From Nine Years War,” 395–6. Roosen, “Origins,” 151–75, includes a provocative systems analysis. Onnekink, “Partition Treaties,” 161, 173. Ibid., 163. Ibid., 166–77. Troost, “William III’s ideas,” 299, apparently written before Onnekink’s article appeared. Lossky, “Intellectual Development,” 336. The Conseil was not, however, unanimous in its support of the partitioning initiative, as indicated by Pomponne’s friend and fellow peace advocate Claude Le Peletier, who wrote to the king arguing against it as the worst manoeuvre one could have made because it only served the interests of William III. André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 158. Grimblot, Letters, 2:366n (Manchester to Jersey, 30 Sept. 1699). See also ibid., 365–6 (Manchester to Jersey, 6 Nov. 1699), for his annoyance with Torcy because he insisted upon knowing the subject of any requested audience. Manchester told Jersey (ibid., 366) that he would try to keep this information from Torcy, although it would “not be very easy, considering his temper,” by which he meant his natural disposition. Torcy also held the line at disturbing Louis’s time away at Marly with diplomatic audiences. Génie, from the Latin ingenium, was often used to describe a person who made every effort to refine and perfect his natural talents. Stanton, Aristocrat as Art, 212. It signified the inclination, natural disposition, or talent of individuals. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (hereafter daf), s.v.



Notes to pages 133–5

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“Génie.” It was often used in the negative sense: the bad “genius” (mauvais génie) of Louvois, quoted in Cordelier, Maintenon, 306. Berwick remarked that ­Chamillart “meant very well, but had so little genius” that it was hard to fathom how the king could choose or maintain him as minister for so long. Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:68. The original French uses génie. Berwick, Mémoires, 2:73. 232 bn Clairambault 519 (Mélanges 668), fol. 336. 233 bn naf 7497, Bernou to Renaudot, 15 May 1685. Thanks to Laurence Pope for the copy of this letter. 234 Callières to marquise d’Huxelles, 6 Aug. 1696, in Callières, Letters, 57. 235 ss-Coirault, 5:332. Ursins, who had met Torcy when he visited Rome in 1686, confided to Marshal Anne Jules, duc de Noailles’s wife, that Philip V’s timidity reminded her of an earlier Torcy (but clearly, not the present one!). Cermakian, Ursins, 159n124, 12 Dec. 1701. In aae cp Espagne 94, fols 93, 12 Nov. 1701, Ursins made the same observation to Torcy. Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 67, sees this “timidity” as excessive prudence on Torcy’s part. Yet a letter from Ursins to Maintenon, 20 June 1714, shows her anxious that a misunderstanding caused by Philip V’s timidity would not earn for her own nephew Torcy’s “displeasure.” Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 3:416–17. 236 Villars, Mémoires, 1:145. 237 André, Deux mémoires de Claude Le Peletier, 161–3. He also considered Croissy’s génie to be limited (ibid., 140). 238 Legg, Prior, 69 (Prior to Albemarle, c. 19 Mar. 1697 – 1698 New Style). 239 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 2:438 (Wiser to Kinsky, 30 June 1698). 240 Torcy, Journal, 241 (3 Aug. 1710). 241 Legg, Prior, 317 (Prior to Jersey, 6 Nov. 1699). 242 Ibid., 293, 306 (Prior to Jersey, 17 June and 5 Aug. 1699). 243 Ibid., 301 (Prior to Jersey, 8/18 July 1699). 244 Ibid., 304 (Prior to Jersey, 19/29 July 1699). 245 Ibid., 308 (Prior to Jersey, 8 Aug. 1699). During the next round of peacemaking, Prior would write home of “our friend Monsieur Torcy’s particular courage and prudence.” pro sp France 78/158, fol. 21, 20/31 Jan. 1714. 246 Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, p. 5 of the unnumbered dedicatory Epistre. 247 Le Camus, Lettres, 2:343. 248 Joly, Converti de Bossuet, 413. 249 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:456–5; and ibid., 3:22. 250 Ibid., 2:162. At the beginning of his research into Louis XIV’s reign, Voltaire expressed doubts about Torcy’s veracity because of his position as a royal minister. Voltaire, Œuvres complètes, 52:317–18. After reading Torcy’s Mémoires, still in manuscript form, however, the skeptic reversed himself, writing in his book that Torcy had been one of the most virtuous men in

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Notes to pages 135–9 ­ urope and in a position where politics often trumped morality. Voltaire, E Siècle de Louis XIV, 1:280n. In fact, after a careful rereading of Torcy’s Memoires once published (his reading of the manuscript had apparently been cursory), Voltaire made many corrections to his own book. Brumfitt, ­Voltaire, Historian, 131, 135. In a 1767 letter he also characterized Torcy as completely candid. Voltaire, Lettres inédites, 182. ss -Coirault, 5:332. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Torre do Tombo, vol. 570; Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon, bn Fundo General, vol. 253, Dec. 1702; and Peres, A diplomacia Portuguesa, 153n2. “Caractère de la Famille Royale de France, des Ministres d’État, et des principales Personnes de la Cour en 1703 (Traduit de l’Anglois à Villefranche chez Pinceau),” bn Clairambault 228, fols 64, 72, and (on Torcy) 86, 87. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 317. See Torcy, Journal, 190n2, for Palmquist. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 157; she even complained that the hated Louvois had at least punctually delivered her letters after opening them and that Torcy distorted what she wrote when he reported to the king (ibid., 146–7). She also wrote that Maintenon, the “wicked trollop,” was behind the opening of her letters (ibid., 174). Wormeley, Correspondence of Madame, 92–3. Bély, Princes, 105. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 168: Madame to Electress Sophie of Hanover, 5 Apr. 1708, said that the court “still did not know what happened to our young King of England [James III],” which Torcy perhaps saw as a tip-off to Sophie that James was up to something, which he indeed was, having embarked with a French fleet for an attempted invasion of Scotland. Orléans, Woman’s Life, 271. Madame’s recriminations continued throughout the Regency (ibid., 206–7, 255–6, 266), and she accused Torcy of wrecking the postal service through his “avarice and greed” (ibid., 271). Ibid., 208. Cruysse, Madame Palatine, 477, called Torcy her favourite “bête noire.” Even so, Torcy worked at obtaining satisfaction regarding Madame’s claims to the Palatinate, as he wrote to Gualterio. bl am 20318, fol. 36, 14 Dec. 1701; and ibid., fol. 40, 10 Mar. 1702. Roosen, Diplomacy, 38. Ibid., for the adjectives describing each.

Chapter Four 1 Bély, Princes, 98. 2 bn mf 21564, fol. 73. Another succinct description is in the April 1700 provisions of office for Louis IV Phélypeaux, marquis de La Vrillière, at the time he was granted his charge as secretary en survivance to his father. It said that the secretary must read and sign all documents leaving his office, such as



Notes to pages 139–41

541

payment orders, confirmation of commissions and titles, powers to act in the king’s name, and all of his department’s dispatches. bn Clairambault 664, fol. 536. 3 Barbiche, Institutions, 173–6. The secrétaire label first appeared in the sixteenth century. Luçay, Origines, 3–4, 12; and Michaud, Grande Chancellerie, especially 126–54. 4 A greffe was the place where the registers were kept, where in a jurisdiction judges issued sentences and decrees. daf, s.v. “greffe.” A greffier was an officer who ran such a registry. 5 Barbiche, Institutions, 181. Dangeau, Journal, 6:439, noted that when a marriage involved a foreign prince, it was Torcy who read the contract aloud and handed the king the pen at the formal signing ceremony. 6 A secretary was defined as one whose job was to write and draw up letters and dispatches for his master. daf, s.v. “secrétaire.” 7 Barbiche, Institutions, 185–91, summarizes the types of “actes en comman­de­ ment” issued by secretaries of state. 8 Ibid., 192. 9 Ibid., 184. The controller general’s vast department accounted for a large portion of this. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 113–16. Even a Parisian chronicler who on the eve of the Revolution remarked upon “bureaucracy” as a “word recently coined to indicate … the overgrown power possessed by simple clerks” nonetheless, under the Directory, called it a “mania for the quill, which dates to Monsieur Colbert.” Quoted in Kafka, “Hunting,” 113, 115. 10 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 283. 11 daf, s.v. “ministre d’État.” 12 Barbiche, Institutions, 291–2. 13 Ibid., 282–3, 291–300; the charts on pages 287 and 294 are especially helpful. Luçay, Origines, 120, drawing on Dangeau, recounts that Torcy attended the Conseil des parties to see the swearing-in of his brother-in-law, Abbé Pomponne, but then requested permission to withdraw before any business was conducted, even though he was entitled to attend. 14 daf, s.v. “Rapport.” 15 Barbiche, Institutions, 184. Antoine, Conseil du Roi, 124, says that he was the principal reporter, but when the war and navy secretaries were also ministers, they reported on these matters. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 65, points to a discussion on trade where Desmaretz served as reporter. 16 Barbiche, Institutions, 173–93. See also Mousnier, Institutions, 2:143–6; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:53–92. Luçay, Origines, 156, reports that in his final years Louis XIV granted to those secretaries who were not ministers the same 20,000 livres annual pension as those who were. See also Bély, Dictionnaire, 159–60, 451–3.

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Notes to pages 141–2

17 Ranum, Richelieu, 52. 18 bn mf 21564, fol. 83. 19 Outrey, “Administration,” 306–8. He observes that while the secretary was a royal minister, he was also the first and the best of the king’s clerks (ibid., 308). 20 bn mf 21123, fol. 351v, Pontchartrain to Gaufredy de Trels, July 1704. 21 Justinian, Digest, 13, 23, 28. On 7 January 1711 Torcy wrote to LouisJoseph, duc de Vendôme, commanding Spanish and French troops in Spain, of the importance of the Hungarian revolt for the Bourbon cause. At the end of the letter he suggested that Vendôme speak to Philip V about helping France subsidize the Hungarians, remarking that although he added this without having first run it by the king, he doubted that his master would disapprove. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 55. 22 On the lex animate, see Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 127–43. 23 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:53–60. For the pre-1661 foreign secretaries, see the entries in Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, 3–63. Luçay, Origines, 582–93, has tables of attributions from the various règlements up to 1661. Outrey, “Administration,” 304–5, argues that making Louis Revol the first foreign secretary had more to do with creating order by entrusting foreign correspondence to a loyal servant than with promoting a specialization agenda. 24 aae md 1043, fol. 336, Torcy to Barbezieux, 4 Dec. 1697, relaying the Swedish resident’s request that the frontier intendants treat the inhabitants of the Duchy of Deux Ponts (Zweibrücken) favourably. The Treaty of ­Ryswick restored it to Sweden’s monarch after French occupation during the reunions. Ibid., 1073, fol. 8, Torcy to bishop of Metz, 7 July 1700, apparently again addressed the issue. See bn mf 17435, fols 74ff, for Torcy’s letters to Achille III de Harlay in 1699 concerning French subjects with lands in Lorraine and the jurisdictional questions raised by the duchy’s return to its duke at Ryswick. aae md 1189, fol. 142, Torcy to intendant of Champagne, 27 Aug. 1713, requested information concerning the bishop of Liege’s lands, the inhabitants of the Ardennes village of Montcornet, and the elector of Cologne. 25 Torcy directed the bishop of Metz to speak to the Swedish resident concerning Lutherans in his jurisdiction. aae md 1077, fol. 8, Torcy to bishop of Metz, 7 July 1700. 26 When a Liege Carmelite was elected provincial of the order’s French province, Torcy was concerned that it would allow a foreigner access to the “heart of the kingdom” as he visited convents. Torcy consoled Ange de Cambolas, general of the Carmelites, that the king had likewise opposed the election. He instructed him to name a French provincial vicar to govern and visit these convents. bn mf 15772, fol. 141, Torcy to Cambolas, 24 Sept. 1706.



Notes to pages 142–3

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27 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Einundzwanzigster Band: 82, 113–14, 117–18, are letters between Leibniz and Sophie, Oct.–Nov. 1702. Leibniz’s 3 Dec. 1703 letter to Burnett explained the whole affair (ibid., Zweiundzwanzigster Band: 705–7), while that of 12 May 1704 urged him to thank those French and Danish diplomats who had served his cause (ibid., Dreiundzwanzigster Band: 362). For the two Burnet[t]s, who spelled their names differently, see Leibniz, Controversies, 457–8. 28 Leibniz to Anton Ulrich, 23 April 1699. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Einundzwanzigster Band: 4. Leibniz to Bossuet, 14 May 1700 (ibid., Achtzehnter Band: 630), and Leibniz to Anton Ulrich, 21 June 1701 (ibid., Zwangister Band: 7). Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:190, 4 July 1701, says that Bossuet dined at Torcy’s to discuss German Lutheranism with the Duke of Saxe-Gotha’s envoy and was there again the next two evenings. Le Dieu (ibid., 196, 250, ­252–3) suggests that Torcy was apprised of Bossuet’s correspondence with ­Leibniz and that the letters and other writings were actually exchanged through Torcy. When Bossuet composed a treatise on the conciliation of Germany, he provided copies to Torcy and the pope, sending the latter through the nuncio (ibid., 247, 250, 255, 257). For this dialogue, see Hazard, European Mind, 217–36. 29 Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 74, 76, 78, strongly suggests that modernity implies a separation between internal and external functions of government. Hamilton and Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy, 72–3, seemingly imply the same. 30 In the related areas of public finance, venality of office, and provincial governance, for example, Potter, Corps and Clienteles, 22, argues that “absolutism under Louis XIV was neither ossified nor in crisis, but rather dynamic and flexible.” 31 Barbiche, Institutions, 176–81. See also Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 51–64. Ranum, Richelieu, 49, suggests that the geographic organization of the departments was originally and reasonably a function of the courier services. He also points favourably to the flexibility and adaptability of administrative arrangements under Louis XIII (ibid., 50–2, 59, 63). Cosandey and ­Descimon, Absolutisme, 149–62, also stress the flexibility and pragmatism that typically led to innovations being introduced with the trappings of tradition; this has blinded later historians to their true nature, although many contemporaries clearly saw through this disguise. Chaline, Année des quatre dauphins, 194–6, discusses how this could be accomplished even in royal mourning ceremonial. 32 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:60–1. 33 On early modern frontiers, see Black, Maps and Politics, 121–30; and ­Nordmann, Frontières. The eighteenth century would see a move toward greater linearity.

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34 Luçay, Origines, 582–3. Functional specialization was also subject to experimentation. A 1626 règlement in bn Clairambault 664, fol. 133, noted that each secretary of state was in charge of the fortifications within his department, but from 1661 onward fortifications were consolidated under Colbert’s and Louvois’s departments, under Louvois upon Seignelay’s death in 1690, and upon Louvois’s death in 1691 under a new department not held by a secretary of state but under Director General of Fortifications Michel Le ­Peletier de Souzy. Trotter, “Vauban and Administration.” Torcy had occasion to deal with fortifications, although usually in conjunction with Souzy. He also solicited from his intendants a listing of fortifications in their intendancies. aae md 1012, fol. 100, Torcy to the intendants of Provence, Béarn, Brittany, Berry, and Limousin, 15 Aug. 1691. Sedan’s engineer sent Torcy information on its fortifications (ibid., 1057, fol. 95v) that Torcy later shared with Souzy (ibid., fol. 15, June 1699). In bn mf 8874, fol. 183, Souzy to Lebret, 29 Sept. 1702, Souzy informed the intendant that he had not received clarifications from Chamillart’s and Torcy’s bureaus on property damage resulting from the building of some fortifications. 35 Luçay, Origines, 581–3, 596–7. Lyon was a frontier city until Henri IV conquered Bresse from Savoy. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 235–6. 36 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 67–8, 99, 103–4. 37 Soll, Information Master, 154–9. 38 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 214–20, offer a reminder not to confound the controller general’s department, commonly regarded as the heart of the state, with its head. It took an accumulation of other functions to create Colbert’s exalted status, something not usually enjoyed by his successors. 39 Engrand, “Clients du roi,” 90. 40 For these crises, see Lachiver, Années de misère. James Dayrolle, British resident at The Hague, reported home to Secretary of State Henry Boyle on 3/14 June 1709 that “strong reports that marquis de Torcy had secretly contracted with merchants at Amsterdam” for eighteen shiploads of Baltic grain, paid for in silver. bl am 15876, fol. 253r. 41 bn Clairambault 664, fol. 247. The broadsheet confusingly calls these units “generalities,” whereas the names listed are actually those used for provinces and for gouvernements, which were territorial units under governors. Generalities were late-Valois fiscal units named for the cities where their bureaus of finance were located. The practice of listing a secretary of state’s provinces as generalities is attested to in État de la France (1661), 371–3, 338ff, 409ff, and editions for subsequent years. An intendance was a late-seventeenth century term for an administrative unit under an intendant. The complex term province had connotations that were political, ethnic, cultural, and in certain cases solely administrative. A province should not be confused with a gouvernement or a généralité. In the pays d’élections, which had no



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Notes to pages 145–8

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­ rovincial estates, an intendancy was equivalent to a generality, whereas in p the pays d’état, which had estates, they were equivalent to a province. These definitions are from Barbiche, Institutions, 313–19; and Bély, Dictionnaire, 601. There appears to have been a department of the intendancy of Sedan that included Rocroi, Chateauregnault, Meziers, Maubertfontaine, Aubigny, ­Launybogny, Ligny le petit, Signy l’abbaye, Domery, Launoy, Donchery, Charleville, Sedan, and Raucourt under Sr Melesieu. On 27 August 1692 it was joined to the Champagne intendancy under Michel Larcher. aae md 304, fol. 13v. The foreign secretary appointed Sedan’s governor, lieutenant du roi, and sergeant major. Ibid., 1011, fol. 106, 4 Mar. 1691. In April 1694 La Rochelle became an intendancy when the port city’s navy intendancy was joined with territories taken from the surrounding generalities of Poitiers, Limoges, and Bordeaux. Until 1717 Rochefort’s navy intendant also served as provincial intendant. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1346. The Angoumois remained with Limousin, while Saintonge was largely transferred to La Rochelle in 1695. Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 40. There was enough of Saintonge left with the Angoumois for it to remain linked with Limousin on the list of the foreign secretary’s generalities in 1715. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. Almanach royal (1706), 42. For provinces and their parlements, see Mousnier, Institutions, 2:255–7. aae md 1080, fols 73–8, 18 May 1701. Ibid., 1191, fols 154–5v, 5 Apr. 1713, Torcy to Jérôme Pontchartrain, Voysin, and La Vrillière. See also ibid., fol. 119r–v, Torcy to Pontchartrain, 10 Mar. 1713. Antoine, “Remonstrances,” 87–122. He appends a remonstrance from the Chambre des comptes of Nantes sent through Torcy and gives an example of Torcy digging deeper into the complaints of the parlement of Aix against its lieutenant-general, François Adhémar de Monteil, comte de Grignan. Depping, Correspondance, 1:932–4, 950. The origins of Dispatches are explored in Barbiche, Institutions, 286–8, 293; and Luçay, Origines, 36–8. État de la France (1698), 3:443–6; ibid. (1702), 3:449–53; and ibid. (1708), 3:450–2. The distinction and terminology – “organes extérieures d’exécution” and “organe central de commandement et de contrôle spécialisé” – are from ­Outrey, “Administration,” 300–2. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 287–8, differentiate between the “culture of service” (culture de service) and the “culture of the service” (culture du ­service) that developed in each ministry with the rise of a new type of man, the administrator. Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 37, notes that “[r]everse-engineering of cultural artefacts must be complemented by evidence of ‘insider’ perceptions. But such evidence is especially hard to find, because for insiders cultural

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56 57 58

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Notes to pages 148–50 practices are normally too self-evident for comment. The explicit discussions generated during moments of crisis … are extremely useful.” Pénicaut, “Commis,” 78–9, demonstrates this for the advent of Chamillart as war secretary in 1701. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 307, call the commis the living memory of their department. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 7–25, 54–78, 129, 137, 148–9, 219, 243, 284–5, 307. aae md 1206, fol. 211. Piccioni, Commis, 181, says that Pecquet was selected because of his erudition and his editorial skills, but Bély, Espions, 348, suggests that it was also due in part to the favour he had gained through his correspondence with the Utrecht negotiators, including Huxelles. This could also account for Saint-Simon’s report that in the Regency Council, of which he was a member, Huxelles said little and was closeted nearly every morning with Pecquet for “his lesson.” ss-Boislisle, 11:427. On the other hand, since Huxelles was among those of his enemies the regent hoped to mollify and monitor by inclusion within his government (Dupilet, Régence absolue, 129–30), it seems unlikely that Huxelles’s was the decisive recommendation. Pecquet had already served many years as head of the foreign office’s key bureau (ibid., 220–1) and surely had Torcy’s endorsement. In any event, most of the council secretaries had been premiers commis in the old departments (ibid., 146), although Pecquet had the distinction of being the only one named in a preliminary list of council secretaries and members dated 19 September 1715 (ibid., 159). This was more than merely a matter of the mechanics of protocol. La ­Closure, resident in Geneva, had received no official notification of Louis XIV’s death as late as 7 October 1715, although the news had been known in Geneva for a month. He lamely apologized to the Republic’s rulers that although he had written Torcy many times for orders, it was likely that a reply had gotten lost amid all the disruption at court. Brandli, Résidence, 80. aae md 1206, fols 212, 215. According to Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054, Pecquet had become a secretary of the king by 1717. aae md 1206, fol. 212r–v. Ibid., fols 212v–13v. This was, in fact the way foreign affairs were largely carried out under the Polysynod. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 260. Pecquet had also handled Torcy’s secret correspondence (ibid., 220). The regent also made wide use of la liasse to expedite the work of the other councils, even though this was in violation of what Saint-Simon and others had envisioned as one of the essential breaks with Louisquatorzian practice (ibid., 244, 259, 284). aae md 1206, fols 213v–214. For ordonnances au porteur, see Barbiche, Institutions, 190; examples in the accounts under Torcy are in aae md 1201, fol. 274 (for 1 Mar. 1714), and ibid., 310, fol. 346 (for 1 Jan. 1715). See



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Notes to pages 150–2

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ibid., 1137, fol. 13, where in 1705 Torcy noted that some particular funds were spent for secret department business that he could not mention. aae md 1206, fols 214–15. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221–2, notes that Pecquet worked closely with Huxelles in preparing reports to be delivered in the cae and Regency Council and even served as reporter to the cae on particular matters. aae md 1206, fols 215–16v. Utrecht having been a rare exception, its written negotiations between France and Britain are thus “a boon to historians.” Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 481. aae md 1206, fols 216v–17. Attached to aae md 1206, fols 216v–17, was a memoir listing these personnel; unfortunately, it is missing. His fears proved unfounded, since three of the four cae members were experienced diplomats. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 138. Ash, “Expertise,” 17, notes: “Well realizing the nature and extent of their importance, some early modern experts worked to establish themselves as indispensable tools of effective governance and traded on their status as vital intermediaries to advance their own positions.” aae md 1260, fols 232–4, which begins “Toute la Mechanique du Conseil,” is labeled and dated by a different hand as regulations for the cae, 26 Sept. 1715. Comments – mostly “good” – and one alteration are written in another hand, perhaps that of the regent or Huxelles (ibid., fols 220–2, is the corrected copy). A third draft (ibid., fols 218–19v), with “Depar Le Roy” as a heading, is a draft of an ordonnance defining the cae’s functioning and is based on the first four articles of the “Toute la Mechanique …” documents. It is also labeled by the same hand that labeled the 26 September manuscript as a project from 20 September 1715 for the establishment of a cae and ends with the phrase “given at Vincennes” and blanks for the day and month. However, unlike all the other councils of government except the Regency Council itself, there was no ordonnance issued for the cae for reasons of secrecy, according to Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 524. Picavet, Diplomatie, 27, 68, calls the ministry’s bureaucracy a “machine.” While cae members helped draft letters to France’s diplomats, Huxelles alone signed them. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 273. He also reprised Torcy’s role as reporter on foreign affairs to the Regency Council, where Torcy now sat (ibid., 260). Almanach Royal (1716), 55. Torcy had moved to the rue Bourbon in the ­Faubourg Saint-Germain (ibid., 54). Dupilet, Régence absolue, 154. Rule, “King in His Council,” 216–41, especially figures 4 and 5. aae ae, Cote 8–22, from the archives of Charles Mignon, however, contains a few commis notes among papers labeled as letters and notes of the Ryswick plenipotentiaries. There are also fragments of premier commis Du

548

71

72

73

74

75

76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Notes to pages 152–5 Fresne’s journal covering 1659 to 1672, in Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 385–97. Archives hg, 2:25. An example of this is seen in Armand Baschet’s list of all the correspondence in the aae cp exchanged between the foreign office and France’s embassies and agents in England, 1698–1714, in gbhmc, ThirtyNinth Annual Report Public Records, 772–826. There are roughly fifty to seventy items listed on each page, but in all there are only thirteen notes or letters to or from Pecquet, the premier commis responsible for Britain. Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 94, 114–15, 119, 156, 162, quotes letters (from aae cp Suède 110) to Pecquet from Groffey, a French agent serving as secretary to Count Sapiéha, the grand treasurer of Lithuania, traveling with Charles XII at the same time as Jean Victor, baron de Besenval, French ambassador to Sweden (ibid., 15, 52–3). gbhmc, Thirty-Ninth Annual Report Public Records, 772–826. Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 64–6, 67n2, 130–1, 140–1, 148–50, are minutes of Besenval’s letters to Pecquet from Leipzig and Danzig in 1707, all drawn from the Besenval family papers. Besenval called Pecquet (spelled “Peuquet” by Syveton) his friend and wrote to him quite candidly. Blondel was another friend who received similar letters (ibid., 247–9). English diplomat Matthew Prior’s letters are another source. Prior to Jersey, 27 June 1699, also enclosed a note from “Mr Adams” concerning the arrest of a person accused of murdering a certain Captain Mansell. Legg, Prior, 293 Hooke, Correspondence. For his career, see Pope, “Mucking about in ­Germany”; Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke”; and Byrne, “Hooke and Saxony,” 409–28. For the instructions for his 1711 mission to Saxon King Augustus II of Poland, see France, Recueil, 4:266. Hooke, Correspondence, 1:42, Hooke to Pecquet, 4 Jan. 1704. Ibid., 162, Hooke to Adam, 15 Mar. 1704, is an even shorter note asking him personally to give Torcy the accompanying letter. Ibid., Pecquet to Hooke, 8 Jan. 1704 (the printed edition says “1764,” which is clearly a misprint). Ibid., 186, Pecquet to Hooke, 28 May 1705. Ibid., 187, Pecquet to Hooke, 28 May 1705. Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke,” 306–11; and Pope, Callières, 167–76, on the 1705 Scottish mission. Hooke, Correspondence, 1:214 (Chevreuse to Hooke, 19 June 1705); and ibid., 215 (Hooke to Chevreuse, 19 June 1705). Ibid., 231–2 (Adam to Hooke and Hooke to Adam, both 4 July 1705). Ibid., 233–4 (Pecquet to Hooke, 4 July 1705). Ibid., 232–3 (Pecquet to Adam, 4 July 1705). Pecquet’s earlier letter to Hooke had indicated that it was he who had retained Hooke’s lackey despite his



85 86 87

88 89 90 91

92 93

94

95

96

Notes to pages 155–7

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orders to return at eleven (ibid., 234). Ibid., 231 (Adam to Hooke, 4 July 1705), indicated that the admiralty as well as the war office had made difficulties with the passports. Ibid., 234 (Hooke to Pecquet, 4 July 1705). Ibid., 234–5 (Adam to Hooke, 5 July 1705). Ibid., 2383–9 (Hooke to Torcy, to Adam, and to Le Fevre, all 10 July 1705). Le Fevre wrote Hooke from Antwerp (12 and 13 July 1705) of his efforts to see what had caused the delay, which included writing to the postmaster at Dunkirk (ibid., 244–5). Ibid., 244 (Hooke to Torcy, 12 July 1705). Ibid., 459–60 (Pecquet to Hooke, 28 Nov. 1705). Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 18. Austrian ambassador Sinzendorf addressed a letter to Torcy from Paris, 25 August 1699, explaining that he was writing to ask a question, since he had not seen him recently. Sinzendorf related that he had been told at Torcy’s Paris residence that the minister, who was at Marly, where the diplomatic corps was not permitted, would return home only in eight days. aae cp Autriche 70, fols 179–80. Dangeau, Journal, 10:360–1. If both premiers commis were at Versailles, it seems unlikely that they would have needed to write one another. Hooke, Correspondence, 2:169 (Adam to Hooke, 11 Mar. 1707), informed him that he had codes for him at his estate of Glatigny on the northern outskirts of the city of Versailles. Since he would not be at the palace, where Hooke was staying, until the next day, Adam sent his note by carriage so that the colonel could avail himself of it should he come to Glatigny. Ibid., 2: 423–24 (Hooke to Moray, 1 July 1707), instructed a colleague whose horses had been seized at Meaux to seek help from Torcy and ­Pontchartrain. Hooke, at Versailles, sent messages to both secretaries of state but found that they were out of town. He assured Captain John Moray (or Murray), who was in Paris, that he would approach Pontchartrain when he returned but urged him to go see Torcy personally in the rue Vivienne as soon as he received his note. Two days later Moray wrote Hooke that his note reached him only on 2 July and that when he rushed to Torcy’s residence he discovered that he had left for Versailles on the previous night. Hooke replied on the 4th that he had seen Torcy at Versailles on Saturday the 2nd and was promised the needed letter, which was written – presumably by a commis – that night, but given that Torcy “being very busy,” it was not signed until the evening of the 4th even though Hooke sent for it often (ibid., 2: 426). aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 104r–v, Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil. The only date Adam supplied was “a jeudy matin,” but the reference to the Sunday audience allows us to date the letter 21 Feb. 1697. Dangeau, Journal, 6:77. Piccioni, Commis, 108.

550

Notes to pages 158–60

97 As with the aide-mémoire or agenda (for the Conseil?) Torcy wrote on the back of a letter relating to Sweden in late August 1715. aae cp Suède 133, fol. 51v. Torcy also used the back of a letter of Christmas greetings he had received. Torcy, Journal, 104–5. 98 For examples of letters with disparate notes on them, see aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 74v, 25 Dec. 1698, letter from Cardinal Guillaume-Egon von ­Fürstenberg; ibid., Brunswick-Hanovre 42, fol. 14v, 1 Mar. 1701 (which one must turn upside down to read Torcy’s notes); ibid., Denmark 65, fol. 114, 31 Oct. 1702; ibid., md 1119 (although numbered inside as 1118), fol. 50, 6 Feb. 1704, letter from Chamillart; ibid., fols 221v and 362v, 1704 letters from Jérôme Pontchartrain. 99 Soll, “From Note-Taking,” 355–75, reflects on this whole process. Adam’s 4 July note to Hooke also enclosed Pecquet’s notes for Adam and for Hooke, but apparently Pecquet or Adam chose not to include the note Pecquet received from La Touche in the navy department. aae md 1102, fol. 190 (1702), is a letter with a note from Torcy scrawled across its top instructing a commis to see if he had responded to a letter. Ibid., 1197, fol. 337v (1714) appears to be some notes about an edict concerning notary acts and the date it was sent in the department. A note at the bottom asks commis AntoineFrançois Faucard de Beauchamp not to shred or tear it up when he finished with it; this apparently would have been its fate otherwise had it not been deemed worth retaining. Torcy, Journal, 42, in recording the king’s request that he retrieve some documents for him, remarked that his request was written on a slip or scrap of paper. It is unlikely that he saved this or other such notes. 100 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fols 104v, 107, 110v. 101 Vivo, Information, 12n63. 102 Ibid., 12–16. 103 Favier, Archives, 36, 53, notes that as archives seek to preserve papers, they must nonetheless destroy the portion of them deemed of no or less value to avoid overwhelming mountains of paper. Even if the archives retained every scrap of paper produced around an event, Vismann, Files, 8–11, reminds us of the problems with the Rankean assumption and hope that records can yield a full picture of the past. 104 Vaillé, Postes, 5:372–8, on Louis-Léon Pajot’s lease of the postal system in the Spanish Netherlands from 1701. The Antwerp postmaster was French. 105 Peters, Politics of Bureaucracy, 89, emphasizes that “public administrators, even those at relatively low levels in the organizational hierarchy, are decision makers.” 106 Hooke, Correspondence, 1:460 (Pecquet to Hooke, 28 Nov. 1705). 107 Ibid., 238–9 (Hooke to Torcy and to Adam, 10 July 1705). 108 Ibid., 2:168–9 (Adam to Hooke, 11 and 14 Mar. 1707).



Notes to pages 160–1

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109 The naval intendant at Dunkirk, Henry-Jules Du Guay, proved cooperative in this and other matters, allowing Hooke to place a mark on the passports he had so he could use them at Dunkirk as if it were the authorized port. Ibid., 242 (Hooke to Perth, 12 July 1705). 110 Racevskis, Time, 25–44. See Landes, Revolution in Time, 87–8, 98–103, on miniaturization. 111 Racevskis, Time, 13. 112 Ibid., 54–6, 68–70. 113 When the Académie politique was established, a pendulum clock costing 250 livres was purchased for the “Cabinet du Louvre.” aae md 1192, fol. 423 (1713). 114 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 165, note that while the departments of all the secretaries marched to the rhythm of Dispatches, the foreign office also marched to that of the Conseil and the department of the controller general to that of the Council of Finances. 115 aae md 1206, fols 214–15. 116 Rule, “King in His Council,” 219–23. 117 Boislisle, Conseils, 90–108. Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 310, argues for “several stages of development” during the reign as opposed to the traditional notion of “a steady decline in power and influence.” 118 When long encoded letters arrived during a session, the king ordered his ministers to reassemble that evening in Maintenon’s chambers so as to give the foreign office clerks time to decode them. Torcy, Journal, 152. 119 Ibid., 291, 380. 120 Feyel, Annonce, 475. 121 Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 20, 21–3. 122 Banks, Chasing Empire, 45. 123 Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” studies France’s northern diplomatic networks at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Ellis, “British Communication and Diplomacy,” 160–3, is a useful comparison for the whole century. See also Black, Diplomacy, 49–50, 95–8. 124 Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 661, shows that a letter could reach Constantinople from Marseilles in a little over a month in 1707, whereas in a 4 December 1707 letter to his brother in Paris, Amabassador Ferriol indicated that only three days earlier he had finally received by way of Venice his letters dated 20 April and 20 July (ibid., 705). 125 See Bély, Art de la paix, 438, 453–6, on information and relative isolation both at court and at postings abroad. 126 aae cp Venise 148, fol. 231, Pomponne to Torcy, 19 Nov. 1706, related that all the September and October mail to Venice had come via Genoa. bl am 15284, fol. 320, Torcy to Pomponne, 22 Nov. 1706, concerned the further precaution of reducing the paper size of Paris dispatches to make them easier

552

127 128

129

130

131

132 133 134

135 136 137 138

Notes to pages 162–3 to hide. Torcy to Pomponne, 4 Dec. 1706, announced that they would also be sent in triplicate (ibid., fol. 325). aae md 1175, fols 207–37 (1703). From 1707 Torcy made postal routes and schedules public in the semi-­ official, annual Almanach Royal and in the separate, periodically revised Liste Generale des Postes de France. Its title page notes that Torcy had it drawn up for the king’s service and the public’s convenience. Fordham, Routes de France, 11–15, 20, 54–5, and plates I and II. Le Quien de La ­Neufville, Origine des postes, 74, notes that Torcy had an exact map drawn up of all the postal routes of the kingdom, also for official and public use. État de la France (1706), 117–32, gives the following schedule for the departure of postal couriers from Paris: for the United Provinces, Mondays and Fridays at 8 a.m.; for southern Germany and Austria, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays at noon; for Spain and Portugal, Sundays at midnight; for Rome and other Italian cities, Monday evenings; for Soleure in the Swiss Cantons, Mondays at noon; and for the British Isles, Wednesdays and Saturdays at 8 a.m. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 583 (Ferriol to Louis XIV, 4 Apr. 1700), reported from Constantinople that the precipitous departure of the Imperial ambassador’s courier prevented him from writing as long a letter as he desired. He wrote Pontchartrain (28 Apr. 1700) that as no French boat had departed Constantinople for France during February, he had been unable to send him news earlier (ibid., 586). État de la France (1706), 132, says that postal couriers going to the court, whether in Versailles, Marly, Saint Germain-en-Laye, or Fontainebleau, left Paris daily at 8 p.m. Service from Paris to ministerial country residences was as follows: to Torcy, every evening at 6 p.m.; to Pontchartrain, Wednesdays and Saturdays, at 8 p.m.; to Beauvillier, daily at noon; and to Villacerf, daily at noon (ibid., 118, 124, 130). Racevskis, Time, 91. Arblaster, “Posts, Newsletters, Newspapers,” 29, on the unreliability of sea links. Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 292, with a map (ibid., 299) showing the diffusion of news of the 1709 Russian victory over Sweden at Poltava. Grimblot, Letters, 2:18–19 (Portland to William III, 4 June 1698). Ibid., 109 (Tallard to Louis XIV, 16 Aug. 1698), remarked that five to six days was the normal time for a courier to travel from Loo to Versailles and back. Duindam, Courts, 140–7, on the Habsburg schedule. Torcy, Journal, 222, recorded that when a dispatch from Huxelles at ­Gertruydenberg arrived during a morning meeting, it was deciphered for Torcy to share before the Conseil adjourned.



Notes to pages 163–6

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39 Ibid., 209, 215. 1 140 aae md 1118, fol. 146, 9 Sept. 1703, is a note from Torcy to his clerk Charles-François Noblet instructing him to burn a letter he had sent earlier for the Duke of Burgundy, since it was now outdated by later news. 141 Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 309–10, discusses how space affects the “horizon d’efficacité” (horizon of effectiveness) for any state’s diplomacy. 142 Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 128–36, describes the dilemma of France’s ambassador to Sweden Besenval upon receiving orders from Torcy in 1707 that he take a bold approach to the Austrian ambassador about the possibility of peace talks. Subsequent to sending Torcy the letter that had prompted this order in light of what had then seemed a reasonable risk, Besenval had new information that now made such an initiative dangerous to any hopes of a Swedish alliance. At pains not to appear insubordinate, he was eventually congratulated by Torcy and the king on his prudence and initiative. Ambassador Isaac de Feuquières grumbled to Secretary of State Pomponne from Sweden in 1673 that he recognized the danger of being as far away as he was, with only himself for counsel. Given that it could be six or seven weeks before he received a response to his letters home, he could easily make major blunders, especially when diplomatic decisions in Sweden were pressing. Mathis, “Ambassadeur du Roi Soleil,” 33. 143 Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 47–8. 144 aae cp Lorraine 73, fols 208–9, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 10 Mar. 1710. 145 Parker, Grand Strategy Philip II, 52. 146 Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 48. When Charles made an exception for diplomats while campaigning in Saxony in 1707, this required Besenval and his Versailles contacts to improvise a whole new communication system. 147 This list suggests that each political bureau kept its own ongoing or summary list of dispatches expedited. 148 Iberville, Correspondance, 1:xin4. 149 Mathis, “Pomponne,” bases this analysis on Pomponne’s ministry. A dispatch was a letter concerning public business. daf, s.v. “Depesche.” 150 Barbiche, “Diplomatics,” 426, notes that “the form of the documents provides invaluable evidence regarding the decision processes and activities of an administrative body.” He also notes that “diplomatics for the modern era is still a young field” owing to the historic focus on pre-modern documents and the explosion of sealed documents from the fifteenth century with the decentralization of the royal chancery to provincial “lesser chanceries” and increased sealing in the bureaus of the secretaries of state (ibid., 423). 151 For 1711, for example, see aae md 1177 through 1180. Archives hg, 1: 118, notes that these volumes contain only outgoing items. 152 Vismann, Files, 6.

554

Notes to pages 166–8

153 aae md 307, fols 39–47, for example, is a short list covering 16 September 1705 until the end of that year, whereas ibid., 309, fols 60–70, is a list for all of 1711. 154 For example, ibid., 309, fols 111ff (1711). 155 Dangeau, Journal, 10:504 (1705), mentions this practice. For examples, see aae md 1168, fols 109–30, 169–77v. They are listed as covering 17 March– 28 April and 28 April–19 May 1710, to coincide with meetings of Dispatches on those three days (Dangeau, Journal, 13:126, 148, 161). Each list begins on the initial date of its period of inclusion but ends (24 April and 14 May) some days before the closing date. According to aae md 1044 (1697), Mignon signed the council decrees (“arrest du cons”). bn mf 8833, fol. 143v (1689), has Mignon’s signature at the end of the list of arrêts. Mignon and later Adam signed because they were secretaries of the king, whereas Pecquet was not until the Regency. 156 Boislisle, Conseils, 105. 157 For example, aae md 1168 (1710), contains those countersigned by ­Pontchartrain, Voysin, La Vrillière, and Torcy arranged in chronological order. These separate volumes, which first appeared beginning in late March 1667 (ibid., 922), constitute an unbroken series until the end of the reign and stand out because their coverage typically begins with a year but ends on a specific date early the following year, which appears to be the date of the first meeting of Dispatches for the new year. These volumes are normally in excess of 500 folios. Examples are ibid., 1168 (1710–27 Jan. 1711); and ibid., 1176 (1711–9 Feb. 1712), as confirmed by meeting dates recorded in Dangeau, Journal, 13:329, 14:82. The correlation cannot be confirmed for many of the volumes, since Dangeau does not always note Dispatches meetings. 158 aae md 1083, 1108, 1115, 1119, 1131, covering the years 1701–05, were each entitled “Letters of the Secretaries of State to M. de Torcy.” The number of folios in each was as follows, in order: 235, 569, 217, 377, and 209. This experimental series was not continued and ministerial correspondence was again mixed in with other letters received, perhaps because it had not been really possible to keep it completely separate. Samoyault, Bureaux, 65n11, relates that the letters exchanged between Torcy and his fellow secretaries of state were drafted by his premier commis. 159 aae md 950, covering the period 1679–1701, contains formulas for the department’s typical expéditions. 160 Vismann, Files, 103. 161 aae md 1181, fol. 141 (1711). Ibid., 1044, fols 214–29 (1697), is a “Formulaire pour le Cabinet du Roy 1663 (avec des notes qui finis en 1696),” while ibid., fols 230ff, has “Observations” by Rose. Ibid., 309, fols 258–66v, is a complete “Protocole pour les lettres du Roy seulement 1712” dated 31 Dec. 1712; and ibid., 310, fols 161–3, is a heavily corrected draft ­“Formulaire



162

163

164 165

166 167

168

Notes to pages 168–9

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du cabinet du Roy pour les lettres de la main de sa Mte,” 31 Dec. 1714, that was eventually sent to the marquis de Saint-Thomas, minister of Victor-­ Amadeus, king of Sardinia, presumably to instruct him in such matters for the new monarch. aae cp Russie 3, fols 27–32, Iberville to Torcy, 22 Nov. 1703, includes details of Russian court epistolary ceremonial. For salutations, closings, and the “hierarchy of material, space and graphics,” see Sternberg, “Epistolatory Ceremonial,” 33–88. See also Archives hg, 2:27–8, 30–1. aae md 1149, fols 37–9, 10 Jan. 1707. Ibid., 1169, fols 207–10, 20 Feb. 1710, is the same for the birth of the duc d’Anjou, but using “fresh” model letters. Ibid., 1081, fols 301–2v (1700), is a model relating to Sedan, complete with explanatory notes in the left-hand column. aae md 1057, fol. 29, 7 Jan. 1699, is a model letter from the king to the archbishops and bishops of Champagne, listing the five sees in the left-hand margin. It is preceded (ibid., fols 16–28v) by the king’s memoir for all provincial intendants and has a notation on its first page instructing the commis to send it to the intendants and bishops along with the king’s letter of 7 Jan. 1699. Ibid., 1064, fol. 3, is another such memoir dated 31 Jan. 1699. A notation at the top indicates that an original has been sent to the intendants and a copy to each bishop. Esmonin, Études, 179–80. aae md 1201, fol. 253r–v (1714), requests 500 blank passports, 1,000 payment authorizations, 125 treaties of peace and commerce, and 200 “Constitutions du Pape” (Unigenitus), all at a cost of 1,509 livres. Adam’s monopoly for printing treaties thus included other departmental printing. Although Archives hg, 2:27, says that there were no printed headers on department stationary before the Revolution, the question of preprinted forms clearly deserves further research. Denis, Histoire identité, 19–31, 69, dates the model for the printed passport to 1716 and the war department’s form for granting leave to soldiers. Utilizing front and back, the latter was compact and printed on a material sturdier than ordinary paper to facilitate and withstand frequent handling by officials. While it is not surprising that we have not uncovered any of the foreign office’s printed passports, they clearly predated the army’s forms by two years and were likely similar. aae cp Venise 149, fol. 242. The secretary also appears to have numbered these as issued (this one is “num.o Trente six,” or number thirty-six). aae md 1206, fol. 182r. This form, although not filled out, had already been signed by Torcy and his postal secretary Claude de Prailly, probably to expedite their issuance by the court postal clerks. It uses what appears to be a carved cursive typeface below the Colbert arms (a serpent). Ibid., 1186, fol. 277 (12 May 1712). The total cost was 147 livres 15 sou. Archives hg, 2:26–7, addresses paper only briefly.

556

Notes to pages 169–73

169 aae md 1192, fol. 423 (Dec. 1713), for 250 livres for a clock; and ibid., fol. 423v, concerning furniture. 170 Barber, Diplomacy, 444–5. 171 Baschet, Dépôt, 63. 172 Marchand, Maître de poste, 288. 173 Baschet, Dépôt, 79, mentions an order for a large sheet of vellum to be glued to a piece of wood and upon which was written an abbreviated table listing all the bound volumes of negotiations.

Chapter Five 1 Devos, Inventaire Guerre, 2n5, prefers the term “département” to the anachronistic terms “ministère” and “secrétariat,” because, in its earliest sense, it embraces the attributions of the secretary of state as well as, later, the administrative organs under his direction charged with these attributions. 2 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100. The absence of a bright line between household and departmental personnel is demonstrated in Furetière, Dictionnaire, 3: s.v. “Secrétaire,” which includes one marking them as domestics of great lords or men of the robe. 3 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:979–8, on the third bureau added after Torcy. Devos et al., Inventaire Guerre, 4–5, contrasts the war department’s more flexible structure with the controllor general’s more hierarchical one. Like the foreign office, the war department’s central bureaucracy responded to war and peace with fluctuations in numbers and organization. 4 daf, s.v. “Commis.” Nicot, Thresor de la langue francoyse, notes that the term had expanded beyond its original connection with secret matters. 5 Vismann, Files, 60, based on Jack Goody. 6 Samoyault, Bureaux, 36, says that Le Dran’s notes specify that there were two or three premiers commis at any one time during Louis XIV’s reign and nine simple commis in 1715. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:124, say there were a total of fourteen commis and secretaries in 1727, thirty-seven commis and a few secretaries in 1766, and thirty-eight commis in 1774. These figures are approximate and those for earlier periods are even more so. Devos, Inventaire Guerre, 4n13, notes that even in the highly structured department of the controllor general, determining the number of commis serving under a premier commis is difficult. 7 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 323, offer an estimate of foreign ministry personnel (excluding diplomatic personnel abroad): seventy-one recorded between 1661 and 1715, approximately fifteen in service c. 1691, and approximately twenty c. 1715. They define a department’s “effectifs” (numbers) in a restrictive sense as those employed by the central administration in Versailles or



8

9

10

11 12 13 14 15

Notes to pages 173–5

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Paris, but unfortunately do not specify which positions and individuals they classified among them. Other than saying generally that they utilized ministry and notary archives, they do not list the sources for their estimates, which exceed those we have established. Although their greater numbers may well be correct, it is not possible to verify them. Given the uncertainties about the years of service of Torcy’s commis, Bénigne Brameret, Martin, and Delisle de La Drevetière, the numbers during his tenure are likely understated (see chapter 6 below for these three individuals). In 1588 each secretary of state was to be assisted by a commis and six clerks of his choosing but approved by the monarch. Two of these clerks specialized in summarizing all incoming dispatches for the king and copying all incoming and outgoing correspondence. A commis was paid by the piece of paper produced. In 1599, apparently, clerks became commis, while the original commis was elevated to principal commis, drafting letters and acting as a bureau chief. By the mid-seventeenth century pay per piece gave way to regular salaries as the number of premiers commis increased, varying from two to three. Outrey, “Administration,” 309–12. In 1694 a premier commis was defined as “le premier Commis d’un Secrétaire d’Estat” (head clerk of a secretary of state) who has “plusieurs Commis sous luy” (many clerks under him). Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “premier commis”; and Furetière, ­Dictionnaire, 2d ed., 1: s.v. “premier commis.” Furetière, Dictionnaire, 3: s.v. “Secretaire,” makes a distinction between the high-status officer who by order of his master “expédie” (sends out) ­various documents, rendering them authentic by his signature (e.g., secretaries of state) and the humbler domestics of great lords or men of the robe who serve them by writing their dispatches, conducting their affairs, making extracts of materials upon which they must report, and offering useful information to help them get at the facts of a case. These latter, he notes, were called the “clercs” (clerks) of various judicial officials. Piccioni, Commis, 158, also points to the domestic nature of commis and especially secretaries as men of the household. While all secretaries were commis, not all commis were secretaries. Samoyault, Bureaux, 192, calls the secretaries an intermediate category between the premier commis and the commis. See also Antoine, “Entourage,” 15. Again, caveats about the years of service of Aubert and Marolot make these numbers tentative (see chapter 6 below). Piccioni, Commis, 48. Scott, “Diplomatic Culture,” 63. Parker, Class and State, 178. For pencil marks by Torcy or a commis on a long letter indicating the important parts, see aae cp Rome 540, fols 8v–15r, La Trémoille to Louis XIV, 13 Nov. 1714.

558

Notes to pages 175–7

16 As when Petkum came to Versailles in 1706 for secret peace talks. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 318. 17 Ash, “Expertise,” 3, 5–6. 18 Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81 (for the quotation), 85, 88. 19 The same had been the case in Venice. Vivo, Information, 50–1. 20 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 108. The note, dated “at Versailles Saturday evening,” does not name the addressee, but it was clearly Harlay-Bonneuil. Mignon mentioned having missed the recipient at the Chancellery (ibid., fol. 107), then the residence of Chancellor Louis Boucherat whose daughter was married to Harlay de Bonneuil. Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:586. Tornézy, Bergeret et Fragonard, 2, notes that Mignon’s late colleague ­Bergeret was Boucherat’s kinsman, which may explain Mignon’s inclusion in this circle. 21 The lists in the secondary sources do not always match. Picavet, “Commis,” 116–18; Piccioni, Commis, 163–83; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 159, 217, 301, all attest to Adam, Pecquet, and Mignon. Piccioni, Commis, 162–3, 270, adds Aubert, while Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100, list all four. ­Piccioni, Commis, 190, says that Fournier only attained that rank in 1715, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, suggests that it was in 1698 (Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100, do not list him either before or after 1715). Picavet, “Commis,” 116, includes Noblet, but Piccioni says he was only a commis and Baschet, Samoyault, and Baillou ignore him altogether. See chapter 6 for Noblet and Marolot. 22 Pénicaut, “Commis,” 83–5, notes the same arrangement in the war department. However, Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221n7, is correct to point out that between Pecquet and Fournier, each the head of a political bureau, the relationship was not hierarchical. 23 Baschet, Dépôt, 275, calls Blondel a premier commis, as did d’Argenson, head of the Paris police, writing to Chamillart (1 Dec. 1703), in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:133. He is called this as well as Torcy’s secretary in bn po 371, fol. 33, Dec. 1711. As for Ligny, he is labeled Torcy’s premier commis by Danish ambassador Henning Meyer, comte de Meyercroon, writing to d’Argenson (16 Dec. 1703), in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:64. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 175n4, 350; and Baschet, Dépôt, 523, also give Ligny both labels, but Piccioni, Commis, 157–8, says Ligny was a simple commis and Pomponne’s secretary, while Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30, 290 (where he calls him “Goullet”), says only that he was Torcy’s premier secrétaire. 24 aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 114, Louis XIV to plenipotentiaries, 20 Mar. 1712, is an instance of the king adding a note in his own hand. On Louvois’s preference for dictation, see Sarmant and Stoll, “Style de Louvois,” 60. 25 For example, Torcy wrote Gualterio, 20 September 1709, to express his and Mme de Torcy’s regrets at a death in the cardinal’s family. bl am 20319, fol.



26

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28 29 30

31

32

33

34

Notes to pages 177–8

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31r–v. For letters in Torcy’s hand to Gualterio during 1702, see ibid., 20318, fols 36–207. Léonard de Mousseau Du Fresne served until 1663 and assured Pomponne in a 1671 memoir on department organization that attending council meetings, reading dispatches, and spending at least five hours each day in just the ordinary audiences would leave him little time to draft dispatches and instructions. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378. Examples in letters to Abbé Pomponne are bl am 15285, fol. 164, 16 Aug. 1708, on Mme de Pomponne’s health; and ibid., fol. 300, 12 Apr. 1709, expressing hope that the frank and open advice Pomponne wrote to Ferriol in Constantinople would not fall into enemy hands. Piccioni, Commis, 28–9, 188–9; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:92–6. Barbiche, Institutions, 182. Ibid., 85–7. According to Luçay, Origines, 152–3, four venal offices of commis of the secretaries of state were created in 1694, but soon suppressed. Although Luçay does not say so, they were probably created as fiscal expedients. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:132, note that there were seven in 1788. The number under Croissy and Torcy is unknown. daf, s.v. “Garçon,” indicates that the term was also used for a valet. Thus, an office boy was not necessarily a youth since daf, s.v. “Valet,” defines him as a domestic who serves in “bas employs” (low jobs). Controller General Claude Le Peletier also had his commis at his table to hear their concerns. Mazel, Le Peletier, 121. Samoyault, Bureaux, 231, says that most clerks rented modest rooms or houses in Versailles but when on duty would often sleep at the bureau when distant from their own residences. Antoine, “Entourage,” 18–20, points to the growing gap between ministers and their staffs as the former allied with the great court nobility and premier commis could no longer aspire to ministerial status as they had earlier in the century. Ministers were increasingly dynastic, while outsiders who became ministers after the Fronde were drawn largely from the ranks of the provincial intendants. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 475–8. There is little written on his household, but see Piccioni, Commis, 46–7; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:133–5. Bély, Espions, 642, mentions du Pré, a “laquais” (young valet in livery), Petit, Mme de Torcy’s valet de chambre, and Lestre, one of Torcy’s coachmen. Duhard, Torcy’s cook, had a reputation for fine cuisine that attracted many at court to the minister’s table and even drew a student from Lille to study with him (ibid., 651). ss-Boislisle, 17:347, notes the fame of Torcy’s table. Courier runs to Rome and Spain in 1714 by du Pré and Petit are recorded in aae md 1201, fols 275v, 276v, 290, and 300.

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Notes to pages 178–9

35 Gutton, Domestiques, 17–67, on households. The wife and children of great personages required additional personnel or their own households. A Mme Belin was governess of Torcy’s oldest son, Jean-Baptiste, born 25 January 1703. She was a relative of Jacques Belin, curé of Blainville, who had begun his career as tutor to Torcy and his brother. Galland, Journal, 1:381, 381n552. He served as tutor only to 1680. Allix, “Protégé de Colbert,” 8. 36 Abbé Louis Bossuet in Rome indicates that Torcy’s valets de chambre served as couriers between Paris and Rome. For examples, see Bossuet, Correspondance, 10:118, 146, 160–1; and ibid., 14:333. aae md 1192, fol. 432v, is a 3 February 1713 authorization for payment to du Pré for carrying dispatches to Rome; and ibid., fol. 442v, 10 June 1713, is to Petit for riding to Madrid. 37 Blet, Nonces, 242, relates that Torcy sent his écuyer to Nuncio Cusani with a reply to his request for a royal audience. Dangeau, Journal, 4:239 (22 Feb. 1693), reports that Croissy’s écuyer delivered royal parting gifts to the visiting Prince of Denmark. bn mf 6679, fol. 260r–v (1698), records Torcy’s écuyer explaining a matter of protocol to the complaining Dutch ambassador. Ibid., fol. 326 (1700), reveals Charles Emmanuel des Balbis, comte de Vernon, Savoy’s ambassador, taking advantage of Torcy’s absence to place his carriage ahead of the minister’s, occupied by his écuyer as his representative. 38 For Maugin, see bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 125; for Presle, see ibid., fol. 96; Chaix d’Est-Ange, Dictionnaire des familles, 7:296; and letters in Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 3:201, 203–4, 299. Bély, ­Espions, 651, mentions that a certain Bonnet may also have served Torcy as écuyer. 39 For Torcy hunting, see Duindam, Courts, 148n66; and Haile, Mary of ­Modena, 433. Torcy, Journal, 441, reports hunting with the king at Marly. 40 Vailleé, Postes, 5:231, 231n5. aae md 1192, fols 19–21, 7 July 1713, is a request for reimbursement from de la Tournelle and a detailed list of the cloth, buttons, and other materials he purchased for the tailor, who made four uniforms. See ibid., fols 429 and 437v, for examples of monthly payment orders for lodging for Maugin de la Tournelle and his four mounted postal guards in Paris. Ibid., 1201, fols 269–302 passim, 1714’s annual accounts, show an average of 608 livres authorized the first of every month for their food and lodging expenses of the previous month. 41 aae md 1192, fols. 269–302, accounts for 1714, for example, show that he was issued twenty-three travel reimbursements that year, each typically for multiple trips. The royal household’s couriers du cabinet (discussed below) also carried department dispatches. 42 Ibid., 310, fol. 364v. 43 Picavet, Diplomatie, 40. According to Piccioni, Commis, 20, it was only in 1714 that two bureaus with clearly distinct functions were created. In 1970 Roth, “Torcy,” 192, said the same. Interestingly, in 1926 Picavet, “Commis,”



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48

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117–19, speculated that there must have been a “bureau du chiffre” (code bureau) and an “office de traduction” (translation office). Samoyault, Bureaux, 35–6. Apparently returning to Piccioni’s thesis, Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, claim (without indicating when) that Torcy first divided the department into two bureaus. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 311–25, 354–5, offer a perceptive discussion of this evolution. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 375, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Dec. 1693; ibid., fol. 350v, Bonrepaus to Adam, 15 Dec. 1693; bn mf 8863, fol. 141, Adam to Lebret, 10 Feb. 1698; and aae md 310, fol. 293, listing a payment in 1715 for the three commis of Pecquet’s “bureau.” As in 1713 for the “commis de” (clerks of) Fournier and of Pecquet, and in 1715 for those of Pecquet, of Fournier, and of Adam. aae md 1192, fol. 419r–v (2 Jan. 1713); and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10 (1715). The term chef de bureau, while not a contemporary one, is suggested by Pénicaut, “Commis,” 83. Outrey, “Administration,” 312, says that each political bureau typically included three to six commis in addition to its chief. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, faults Piccioni for claiming that there were four political bureaus from 1715 to 1723 because he counted four premiers commis during that period. Samoyault says that Piccioni misinterpreted the classic description of Torcy’s bureau, penned in 1751 by Le Dran and now in aae, Organisation et Règlement du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ­1547–1801, vol. 1, fols 47–8. Samoyault, Bureaux, 32n2, says that Le Dran’s count of premier commis was four rather than the actual three because he confounded Mignon and his nephew Fournier. Although Piccioni, Commis, 193, does repeat Le Dran’s miscount, he actually rejects the notion of a fourth bureau and labels Fournier as “hors cadres” (outside the normal hierarchy), without any discernible specific function. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 312. Antoine Pecquet fils, son of Torcy’s premier commis and later himself to hold that position (1723–37), penned Pensées diverses sur l’homme (1738), in which he observed that “[a] premier commis des affaires étrangères held the highest position in the Secretariat of State and was outranked only by the Secretary of State himself.” Quoted in Pecquet, Discourse Art of Negotiation, 89. daf , s.v. “Bureau.” For examples of this extension of meaning, see Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:489–90, Adam to Saint-Mars, 17 Jan. 1706, explaining that a letter he wanted could be found in the bureaus; and aae cp Venise 147, fol. 187, Abbé Pomponne to Torcy, 26 June 1706, concerning letters feared lost in the late Noblet’s bureau. Académie Française, Nouveau dictionnaire, 1:194, listed the clerks who worked in the offices of the secretaries of state as an example of a bureau also meaning the people who worked in it.

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52 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:100. 53 Even as it grew during the eighteenth century, the foreign office remained a relatively small group of men and in daily interaction with the secretary and with one another. Masson, Département des affaires étrangères, 11. ­Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 323, provide the following approximate estimates of the growth in numbers of commis in the following ministerial departments from 1691 to 1715: finances, from 80 to 100–20; war, from 40 to 50–60; household and navy, from 25 to 50; foreign affairs, from 15 to 29; and rpr, remaining unchanged with 10. Outrey, “Administration,” 318, observes that the old regime appears to have attached less importance to the form of institutions than it did to the choice of the men and their abilities who occupied them. 54 Canbäck et al., “Diseconomies of Scale” 33–4. This research is suggestive but does not consider early modern bureaucracy either theoretically or empirically. 55 For example, Piccioni, Commis, 35–6, describes the duties of the premier commis who headed the code service as creating, distributing, and maintaining tables of codes. With two assistants for these tasks this could hardly have fully occupied him or them. Yet because the premier commis Moncheny received a foreign envoy and assisted the minister in collating a treaty, ­Piccioni sees this as evidence of premiers commis having attributions that were “ne sont guères fixes” (hardly fixed) until Torcy. His first example, however, rests on a misreading of Vendegies, “Biographie Vuoerden,” 543, a journal entry from 22 February 1661 where Michel-Ange, baron de ­Vuorden recorded that when he went to Lionne’s to inquire about his health, Moncheny, whom Vuorden calls Lionne’s secretary, replied that Lionne was too ill to receive him. Before departing, Vuorden commented that this delayed their work together on a matter entrusted to him. Yet at this point, prior to Mazarin’s death on 3 March 1661, Lionne was not the secretary of state and neither was Moncheny his premier commis. 56 Mathis, “Pomponne,” shows that premiers commis frequently decoded dispatches and that many commis might communicate with the same envoy abroad. His conclusion that this indicates that there were not yet specialized bureaus within the department, however, is debatable. He also concludes from his statistical study of the department’s document output that it was not yet the work of an organized and modern administration because nearly half of the documents sent out were highly personalized, being drafted or dictated by Pomponne himself. Again, this hardly disqualifies the department from consideration as organized or modern given its small (compared with later in the reign) size and volume of work. Pomponne’s preference for personally creating most first drafts is understandable, since he was the one answerable to the king. His predecessor Lionne, who regarded his charge as quite



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l­aborious, nonetheless personally drafted all of the king’s foreign dispatches rather than delegating them to his commis, he said, out of a desire to perform his duty. Although he noted that the crush of correspondence with the provinces demanded his constant attention, he did not claim to generate those drafts. Luçay, Origines, 58–9. Picavet, “Commis,” 119, notes that bureaucratic roles varied depending on the secretary and that Lionne allowed his clerks less initiative than did Pomponne. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 324, observe that the relatively small size of the central administration implies radically different social relationships from those that prevail in large, anonymous administrations. It was a bureaucratic chain of command of only a few links. Organizational fluidity and intramural interaction remained common, they insist, because the first specialized bureaus had yet to establish themselves as watertight compartments or bureaucratic strongholds. The king might know most of his domestics by sight, but his department heads (except for the controller general) knew those who served in their bureaus better, even if those at the lowest level they knew only by sight. Samoyault, Bureaux, 216–17, notes that neither the presence of the minister nor that of his four premiers commis at the 1713 wedding of Jean-Nicolas de Bernage, a simple commis, was repeated thereafter, observing that in Torcy’s time relations between upper and lower ranks, while respectful, were quite amicable. aae md 1208, fol. 57, Clairambault to Torcy, 25 May 1715, referred to the archives as Torcy’s Louvre bureau. Samoyault, Bureaux, 155, mentions such a bureau in the foreign office only as early as 1723, after the demise (1718) of the Regency’s fleeting consolidation of domestic administration. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:95, imply that evidence for the first separate domestic bureau comes only in 1727. Antoine, “Entourage,” 20, notes the emergence of this layer of intimate ministerial collaborators who could then link him with the increasingly specialized and numerous bureaus. He cites Torcy’s two secretaries as examples. Samoyault, Bureaux, 33–4, makes the same observation for Louis XV’s era. Blondel apparently coordinated ciphers, according to Bonrepaus’s letters from Copenhagen to Blondel in aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 375 (1 Dec. 1693); fols 416–17 (2 Mar. 1694); fol. 419 (9 Mar. 1694); and ibid., 57, fol. 26r (18 Jan. 1697). Blondel is called Croissy’s secretary in aae md 1004, fol. 264 (20 July 1690); ibid., 1017, fol. 169 (1692); and ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 354 (1693). He is called Torcy’s commis in aae md 1019, fol. 235 (1693). Piccioni, Commis, 28–9, 188–9, says that Torcy originated the secretariat as a separate service and had only two secretaries during his tenure: first secretary Blondel and a second he never identifies. Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30,

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Notes to page 182 claims that at the end of the reign Torcy had only two secretaries: Ligny, the first secretary, and de la Porte du Theil, the second. Samoyault says little of Blondel, identifying him (ibid., 159) as Torcy’s secretary and (ibid., 294) as Croissy’s secretary, but never specifying his exact role. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:92–6, offer a useful overview of the functions of the secretariat, but most of his examples are after 1715. He mentions du Theil, but not Blondel and mistakes the engineer, diplomat, and mathematics professor François Blondel (1618–86), who was unrelated, as the father of premier commis Blondel’s son, the future diplomat Louis-Augustin Blondel (ibid., 229). See Roman d’Amat, “François Blondel,” 699–700 (the engineer), and “Louis-Augustin Blondel,” 702–3. Archives hg, 2:29. Bonrepaus wrote Jean-Baptiste Henri de Valincour that Blondel sent out the (ordinary) post for Denmark from Paris on Mondays and Wednesdays before noon. aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 216v–17, 19 July 1697. He wrote ­Iberville, French resident in Geneva, that his letters reached him by way of Lyon, whereas those from Provence and Italy come by way of Blondel in Paris (ibid., 47, fol. 308, 23 May 1693). Ibid., Angleterre 237, fol. 20, is a note for Blondel in Torcy’s hand instructing him to mail the letter in Paris on Wednesday, 20 January 1712. On a 15 August. 1708 letter from d’Argenson Torcy scrawled at the top a few words in answer with instructions that it was to go to his secretary Ligny, who would draft a reply (ibid., md 1160, fol. 128). Joseph Stafford, Mary of Modena’s secretary, wrote Gualterio, 20 March 1712, that he had complained to Torcy’s commis about delays, observing that even though few mail pouches had been lost in the past five or six years, more attention was paid to security than to speed. bl am 31258, fol. 50r–v. The letters and packages Abbé Bossuet sent to his uncle Bishop Bossuet from Rome went through Blondel’s bureau. Bossuet, Correspondance, 9:387–9. See also Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:166–7. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 308, Bonrepaus in Copenhagen to Iberville in Geneva, 23 May 1693, urged his colleague to send news directly through a contact in Lyon rather than via Paris. aae md 307, fols 137–53v. Ibid., 310, fols 301–4, lists pensions and ordinary gratifications sent abroad by Torcy. It is in the same hand, reflects the last full year of the reign, and was likely prepared for the regent by Blondel. Ibid., fols 311–12, deals with payments 1713–15 and is also in Blondel’s hand. See Syveton, Louis XIV et Charles XII, 48–50, for a letter from Ambassador Besenval to Pecquet via a M. Pandry, cloth merchant, rue de l’Arbre Sec, Paris, apparently one such letter drop. aae md 307, fol. 149r–v. Blondel likely kept this registry and not Ligny, since for Poussin in Denmark there is no address listed, but merely a note that Ligny would be able to supply it.



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69 aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 144r–v, unsigned and undated. Petkum recalled that in his winter 1706–07 meeting with Torcy they formulated means for concealing their future correspondence, since as the agent of an Imperial prince he was forbidden contact with the enemy. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 319. 70 Bonrepaus wrote to Mignon, 15 Dec. 1693, asking that he send his gratification payment of 6,000 livres to Blondel, who would give it to M. de Lubert. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 350. Louis de Lubert, presumably ­Bonrepaus’s banker, was treasurer general of the marine and a financier close to the ­Colberts. Dessert, Argent, 638. Blondel acted as Bonrepaus’s personal agent. See letters from Bonrepaus to Blondel in 1697 in aae cp Danemark 58, fols 45v–7r (26 Mar.), fol. 153 (9 June), fol. 188v (2 July), fol. 203r (9 July); and (to Mme Blondel in her husband’s absence), fol. 398 (15 Oct.). 71 Samoyault, Bureaux, 114. Landosle, “Congrès de Bade,” 322n1, says that Blondel appears to have been specifically charged with keeping these accounts. 72 aae md 1102, fol. 192r, Torcy to Bouchu, 18 Mar. 1702. 73 Bonrepaus complained to Adam 10 August 1699 about the losses he suffered from the exchange rate between France and Holland and on 17 September 1699 requested reimbursement for money advanced to Protestant refugees returning to France. Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 22–3, 32. 74 Samoyault, Bureaux, 37. This is the distribution of countries between the two political bureaus in 1715 under Torcy. Pecquet created a third bureau under the Regency to handle the growing correspondence with Iberia and Italy. 75 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, note Du Fresne’s 1671 advice to Pomponne, who was contemplating how to organize his new charge. Relative to the Electorate of Mainz, of which he was resident in Paris, he faulted the department’s division of its affairs between two commis, one for the electorate itself and the other for its dealings with the Imperial Diet in Ratisbon. Baillou concludes from this that the division of these responsibilities was not yet done in a very rational fashion, but this is misleading for several reasons. Du Fresne was not referencing arrangements under Lionne but under Brienne when he and Ariste, both experts on Germany, divided its courts between them. In addition, his quarrel was not with division per se, even that of Germany, which he said was workable, but with that for Mainz’s affairs. Yet that arrangement was not without merit, since the paper flow was to two locations, Mainz and Ratisbon, with the differing dynamics of a prince’s court versus the Imperial Diet, especially given the latter’s reliance on Latin. In any event, we should be open to a variety of rational alternatives when trying to understand the past (and the present, for that matter!). 76 Archives hg, 2:30. aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fols 49ff, “Extraits de Despeches de M. du Heron et des Mémoires concernant la Hongrie,” is an

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Notes to pages 183–7 example from 1701. Ibid., md 1146, fol. 170, has brief extracts from the king’s and Torcy’s letters (30 Dec. 1706) about Hungarian subsidies. Vismann, Files, 103–4. Handbooks of form letters took the place of the detailed knowledge necessary to the chancellery clerks of the past. Samoyault, Bureaux, 65–76; and Archives hg, 2:23–5. aae cp Angleterre 224, fols 15ff, has extracts from the London gazettes from 25 December 1707 to 1 January 1708 about such news as movement of naval vessels, Baltic shipping, and losses to the French. These papers were typically separated in the foreign archives from the Correspondance politique and placed in the Mémoires et documents. Archives hg, 2:24–5. Henri-Auguste de Loménie, comte de Brienne, was foreign secretary from 1643. His son Louis-Henri became his survivancier in 1651 and increasingly his collaborator. The foreign secretary served as “agent de transmission” (transmission agent) for paperwork for the Marine du Ponant (Atlantic fleet). After Nicolas Fouquet’s 1661 arrest, the actual administration of both parts of the navy increasingly fell to Colbert, who, by a regulation of 11 May 1667, generated all navy orders and read them to the king but sent them to Foreign Secretary Lionne to be prepared for sending out. The foreign office was finally relieved of all navy business when Colbert became a secretary of state in March 1669. Taillemite, Colbert, 11–21. That same year, Lionne traded with Colbert responsibility for commerce for supervision of Berry, Navarre, Béarn, and Bigorre. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 220–1. Picavet, “Commis,” 104–6; and Piccioni, Commis, 19–20. Piccioni, Commis, 107–27. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:197–8, had nothing but praise for Du Fresne: his dispatches were exemplary and he prepared drafts of letters from the king. See also Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” ­385–97. Livet, Intendance d’Alsace, 190, notes his knowledge of German affairs. Lists of all the departments’ diplomats and their appointements from 1658 to 1661 among Du Fresne’s papers suggest that they were all within his competence. Boislisle, “Addition aux Mémoriaux,” 275–80. Piccioni, Commis, 127–43 (Ariste died in 1697). Picavet, “Commis,” 107, says that from 1662 Colbert employed Ariste on navy business, although he still may also have served Brienne. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:200, wrote that the inability of the highly skilled Ariste to come up with ideas easily was offset by his devotion and the quality of his work. For Ariste and consular affairs, upon which he wrote a treatise, see Poumarède, “Naissance d’une institution,” 68n18, 77, 83, 88. Piccioni, Commis, 103–7. Piccioni calls Parayre a premier commis, apparently following Baschet, Dépôt, 86, who cites a 1707 inventory of the late Parayre’s papers that uses that label, but the inventory’s creator also believed that one of Lionne’s principal commis was Le Roy, who actually served ­Louvois. Brienne, however, divided his first commission (the premier commis



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post) between Du Fresne and Ariste (Brienne, Mémoires, 3:200), and each time he mentions them it is as his premier commis (ibid., 2:58, 3:57, 154, 197). Parayre’s name, however, is mentioned without further label between two others labeled as commis (ibid., 199–200), the latter of which, Dautiège, he calls elsewhere his “second commis” (ibid., 2:17). Piccioni, Commis, 136, dismisses Brienne’s evidence, but without explanation. Brienne found ­Parayre proficient, but he could not adapt (“m’accommodais”) himself to Parayre as much as he could to Dautiège (ibid., 279). Parayre’s influential uncle was the anti-Jansenist Jesuit Père François Annat, Louis XIV’s confessor from 1654 to 1670. Bluche, Louis XIV, 390. The Jansenist Abbé Silvain Gaudon, linked with Pomponne’s uncle, Henri Arnauld, bishop of Angers, wrote ­Pomponne in 1671 that the capable Parayre had been reluctantly retained by Lionne for his connection to Annat and ecclesiastical appointments, despite ­Brienne’s warning that he was divisive and malevolent in his ambitions. ­Delavaud, “Changement,” 383–4. Gaudon and his brother Jean were among the first recluses at Port-Royal, but Sylvain later renounced Jansenism. Rapin, Mémoires, 1:126, 566. 84 Baschet, Dépôt, 63; and Picavet, “Commis,” 146 (for “Maretz”). Ibid., 104–7 (for Du Fresne, Ariste, Dalencé, Dautiège, Parayre, and Azemart); and ­Piccioni, Commis, 103–46 (for these plus Boulleau). Dalencé (or d’Alencé) served Chancellor Pierre Séguier as secretary (1663–72) and then entered Louvois’s service as a purchasing agent for books, medals, and other curiosities in the United Provinces and Germany. He also reported back economic, political, and military intelligence. Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois”; and Sarmant, Demeures, 228–9. Dalencé also expedited books for Bayle and his network. Bayle, Correspondance, 7:184–5, 372. Dautiège later served controversially in Sicily as secretary to Marshal Louis Victor de Rochechouart, duc de Vivonne, commander of the French naval force occupying the island. Laloy, Révolte de Messine, 2:13–14, 212, 351, 474. 85 See Cras, “Charge de secrétaire”; Poumarède, “Brienne”; and Cras, “Lionne.” 86 In 1671 Gaudon noted to incoming secretary Pomponne that the foreign ministry had a provincial department or bureau (“département des provinces”). Delavaud, “Changement,” 382. He also referred to Pomponne continuing Pachau and Parayre in their “commissions,” a shorthand for the position of premier commis (ibid., 381). Pomponne also implied that ­Parayre was one of his predecessor’s premier commis (ibid., 374–5). Du Fresne nonetheless continued to serve Lionne intermittently and assisted Colbert as a trusted consultant on navy and colonial matters. When he took formal charge of the navy and colonies in 1669, Colbert considered Du Fresne for his premier commis, which garnered him anticipatory letters of congratulation from Pomponne in The Hague and Croissy and his secretary Charles Mignon in London. Nothing came of it, however, likely because Du Fresne

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93 94 95

Notes to pages 188–90 was already occupied on diplomatic missions in Germany. Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 387–95. Pagès, Contributions, 64. Picavet, “Commis,” 106–10; Delavaud, “Changement,” 368–85; and Piccioni, Commis, 147–53 (Pachau). Pachau had responsibility for correspondence with the papal nuncio. Dainville-Barbiche, Correspondance Spada, 22n131, 644n2. While Lionne remained bedridden in Paris, Pachau traveled with Berny, Lionne’s son and survivancier, to the front with the king in 1667 during the War of Devolution. Picavet, “Organisation,” 206–12. Piccioni, Commis, 35, calls Moncheny the first chief of a code service. ­Gaudon, in an 18 September 1671 letter to Pomponne, referred to a ­“Mouchérier” – likely Moncheny – who worked with codes but who was now dead (Delavaud, “Changement,” 384). Since Gaudon noted that Pachau had been handling codes for two years (ibid., 383), it is likely that Moncheny died in 1669 or earlier. See Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. Morel later had a distinguished career as an envoy until his death in 1719. France, Recueil, 21:417–20. Delavaud, “Changement de ministre,” 382; Cras, “Hugues de Lionne,” 53, 55; and Cras, “Lionne,” 68. This is supported by documents in Lionne, Lettres, 41, 129, 136, 141, 165, 203, 219; and Peyron, Documents des Hôpitaux de Paris, 4:243–4, 257–9, 261, 264, 266, 275–6. Picavet, “Commis,” 107; and Piccioni, Commis, 152, note Luc de Rives’s honorary title, but Picavet sees him as inactive and Piccioni assumes he remained only Lionne’s secretary. Documents for this affair are in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 3:445–9. ­Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:127, say that La Pause was born around 1639. See Lionne’s comments to his uncle (21 Mar. 1664) in Lionne, Lettres, 200–1; and those to d’Estrades (20 Mar. 1664) in Mignet, Négociations, 1:277–8, 285. For Bigorre in England, see Jusserand, French Ambassador, 147. See also Piccioni, Commis, 158–9. Delavaud, “Changement,” 376, 381. Gaudon published Latin verses separately celebrating Mazarin and Lionne after the 1659 Peace of the Pyrenees. His older brother Jean Gaudon was Lionne’s advisor. Loskoutoff, Rome des Césars, 276–7, 435, 455. Le Tellier wrote Lionne (4 Nov. 1667) to acknowledge receiving dispatches from his lackey. Picavet, “Organisation,” 215. Delavaud, “Changement,” 375. Ibid., 368–85. Parayre sought support from the new minister’s father. Mme de Grignan, acting for her husband, lieutenant du roi in Provence, and her mother, Marie Rabutin-Chantal, marquise de Sévigné (known as Mme de Sévigné), also lobbied on his behalf (ibid., 395). Despite his anti-Jansenist uncle Annat, Parayre was also recommended by the bishop of Angers, Pomponne’s uncle (ibid., 374). Gaudon tried to poison Pomponne’s mind



96

97

98

99 00 1

101 102 103

104 105

Notes to pages 190–2

569

against Parayre by labeling him a Jesuit spy and disloyal partisan of Pierre de Bonsi, archbishop of Toulouse (ibid., 383–5), an experienced diplomat mentioned as Lionne’s successor. Bergin, Crown, Church, 208. See also the summary by Mathis, “Pomponne”; and Picavet, “Commis,” 110–12. Both Pachau and Parayre served Louvois during the interim between Lionne’s death on 1 September 1671 and Pomponne’s arrival on 14 January 1672. For Tourmont, see Piccioni, Commis, 154–6; Delavaud, Pomponne, 54, 60, 63, 72, 75, 76, 124, 128, 169, 311; Pénicaut, “Commis,” 128–9; and Pagès, Contributions, 64, who says that Tourmont’s hand appears most often in Pomponne’s drafts. ss -Boislisle, 9:18n7. He goes unmentioned by Delavaud, Picavet, and Piccioni. Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, add that he was replaced around 1678 by the minister’s young son (“le jeune fils du ministre”) but without naming him. Since Pomponne’s oldest son was born in 1662, with the others following in 1664 and 1669, this is a puzzling claim. Piccioni, Commis, 156–7, says that Lebeau (or Le Beau), who served under Parayre, shared with him the treaty-printing privilege granted in 1678, but his source, Baschet, Dépôt, 285, provides no citation. However, according to the privilege printed in Traité de paix entre le Roy et Suède et Zell, it was granted 31 May 1673 to Pachau, Parayre, and Tourmont. On 25 June 1678 the same three ceded the printing monopoly to Frederic Leonard for twenty years. Leonard, Recueil des traitez, vols 3 and 6 (no consecutive page numbers). Iberville, Correspondance, 1:lxxxviii–lxxxix. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 313; and Mathis, “Pomponne.” Du Fresne’s 1671 memoir to Pomponne on department organization stressed that the man supervising provinces needed to understand them and what related to them and to be accurate and honest in his paperwork, since it concerned governors, magistrates, the people, communities, individuals, and justice. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 155. Peters, “Information and Governing,” 113. Brienne, Mémoires, 3:196–7. The vituperative Abbé Gaudon, who also regarded skills for drafting diplomatic papers as superior to those for ­domestic and other paperwork, was perhaps unfairly dismissive of the latter. ­Delavaud, “Changement,” 381–3. Vismann, Files, 102–4, who calls them “Baroque secretaries” in contrast to legally trained chancellery clerks. Antoine, marquis de Pas wrote (8 Mar. 1680) his father, Isaac de Pas, marquis de Feuquières, ambassador to Sweden, that when he approached Croissy on his behalf for an office he was purchasing, he was greeted with the remarkable coolness (“prodigieux froid”) that, like his brother, he had adopted upon becoming a minister. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:100.

570

Notes to pages 192–3

106 Tourmont wrote Feuquières (late Nov. 1679) of the misfortune of ­Pomponne’s disgrace, adding that he had been ordered to remain in his post (ibid., 4–5). On 29 December he wrote that he would learn his fate only when Croissy arrived (ibid., 31). In mid-February he was growing hopeful (ibid., 103), but on 15 April 1680, he reported that dismissals were issued on the 13th and pensions awarded (Pachau 3,000 livres, Tourmont 2,000 livres, and Parayre 1,000 livres). With fulsome praise, Croissy assured ­Tourmont that the king would employ him in a foreign country (ibid., 127). Rébenac wrote Feuquières from Berlin (26 Apr. 1680) that he had learned of ­Tourmont’s disgrace and the order for the others to retire, but that all were nonetheless happy that, knowing all that they knew, they had not been arrested. He attributed the dismissals to the little love Croissy had for his predecessor’s creatures (ibid., 137). In June Tourmont wrote Feuquières of his satisfaction with his new position in Louvois’s bureau (ibid., 165). 107 In 1680 Pachau compiled a list of former Brienne clerks who might have official papers for the archive Croissy was assembling. Parayre paid a visit to Strasbourg on the king’s behalf, perhaps in preparation for its occupation in September 1681. Piccioni, Commis, 106–7, 153, 160. Parayre was wealthy enough to become a secretary of the king in 1680, an office he held until his death in 1707. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1036–7. Torcy may have employed him, as he is listed among his commis granted an acquit patent. aae md 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid., 1074, fol. 66 (1700); and ibid., 1134, fol. 60r–v (1705). His widow received a pension of 600 livres (e.g., ibid., 1160, fol. 162, for 1708; and ibid., 308, fol. 36v, for 1709). 108 Traces of his activities are in Colbert, Lettres, 1:439 and vol. 2, pt 2: 533; and ibid., 7:49, 49n3, 342, 352. Faille, who knew German, was the sovereign council of Alsace’s greffier (1658–61) when Croissy was its president. Livet and Wilsdorf, Conseil Souverain d’Alsace, 146, 171, 186, 806. Livet, Intendance d’Alsace, 195, 200–2, 206, reveals that Faille, a Provencal, had served Croissy since the latter’s 1654 stint there as intendant des armées. Villain, Fortune Colbert, 136, relates that when Colbert added to his Paris holdings, Croissy and his secretary Faille became tenants by judicial lease of an acquisition next to his rue Neuve-des-Petits-Champs residence. The Croissy household resided there in the 1660s. Neymarck, Colbert, 2:501, notes that Faille was Croissy’s legal representative (“mandataire”) and a treasurer of France at Caen in 1673. When Croissy became minister, Faille was still serving, delivering a gratification to Nicolas Clément in 1681. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 368. The 1682 record of Faille’s acquisition of a substantial house at the entrance of the park at Vincennes indicated that he resided at the Hôtel Croissy on rue Vivienne in Paris. France, État des communes: Joinville-lePont, 9.



Notes to page 193

571

109 Tourmont confirmed to Feuquières on 24 June 1680 that Mignon was his successor. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:165. On 26 April 1680, Rébenac had written Feuquières of Mignon’s entry into the department (ibid., 137), and he wrote on 28 August 1681 to ridicule what he termed Mignon’s gross stupidities in a matter of purchasing horses from Brandenburg (ibid., 249–50). The two diplomats were relatives and Pomponne’s clients (ibid., xiv, 10), while Tourmont was a client of Rébenac’s family (e.g., ibid., 27, 29–30, 37, 88–92, 107). 110 Chaix d’Est-Ange, Dictionnaire des familles, 3:391–2; Prévost, “Bergeret,” 1525; and Michel, Biographie Parlement de Metz, 25, for his service there, 1672–86. See Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–50, for background. Mignon is listed with Bergeret as one of two “principal commis” in the 1692 payroll list in aae md 1017, fol. 162. 111 Spanheim, Rélation, 360, 360n2. Bourgeois’s note indicates that he was asked to become premier commis in December 1680. Rébenac wrote Feuquières from Berlin on 26 April 1680 (Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:137) that Mignon was known to be a new premier commis, but the other had not yet been named. Livet, Histoire de l’Académie française, 2:296n1, agrees that it was likely from Metz that Croissy knew Bergeret. 112 Mousnier, Institutions, 2:257. Tornézy, Bergeret et Fragonard, 2, mentions the Boucherat connection. See also Labatut, “Boucherat,” 87–101. When Boucherat was named chancellor, Bergeret was part of the Académie française’s select congratulatory delegation. Mercure galant (Dec. 1685), 99–101. The Metz parlement’s president asked Colbert (3 Feb. 1675) to order its councillors then in Paris – especially that term’s general counsel Bergeret – to take up their charges and not abuse the favour of receiving their gages without having yet served. Depping, Correspondance, 2:199–200. Antoine ­Barillon de Morangis, intendant at Metz, wrote Colbert (18 Mar. 1676) that he awaited Bergeret’s arrival for help evaluating the Cathedral chapter of Metz’s manuscripts to determine which merited transfer to Colbert’s library. Delisle, Cabinet des manuscrits, 1:450. Colbert instructed Baluze to send Bergeret all material concerning the Metz chapter so that he could draft the necessary letter. bn Baluze 362, fol. 217, 29 June 1676. 113 Dangeau, Journal, 1:77, 103, 105. Olivet, Histoire de l’Académie Françoise, 215–16, is wholly negative, whereas notes in the work’s critical edition offer a more balanced view, citing praise from members Racine, Abbé Saint-Pierre, and Jean de La Chapelle. Livet, Histoire de l’Académie française, 2:294–6, 497. Gilles Ménage, passed over in preference to Bergeret, later charged that Bergeret’s friend, royal confessor Père de La Chaise, strongly promoted his selection as did the whole Colbert clan, specifying Seignelay, Croissy, the coadjutor of Rheims (Colbert’s second son), the duc de Saint-Aignan and his

572

114

115

116

117 118

119

120

Notes to pages 193–4 son the duc de Beauvillier (Colbert’s son-in-law), and many great ladies at court. Ménage and de La Monnoye, Anti-Baillet, vol. 7, pt 1: 278–80. This supports the proposition that Bergeret was a long-time Colbert client. Ash, “Expertise,” 8–11, 18. Blair, Too Much to Know, 85–7, marks the respect among early modern scholars for note-takers on a variety of subjects, including those whose results did not lead to publication, since their notes might be useful to those friends and correspondents permitted to consult them. Choisy, Mémoires, 1:113–14; and Pagès, Contributions, 64n3, 65. Someone named Cottereau, sent by James II to Paris to acquire plants and wine (and likely also to spy), spoke of “Bergère, one of … Croissy’s clerks, a boasting fellow, on whom de Croissy much relies.” Cottereau to Sir William Trumbull, 5 Aug. 1686, in gbhmc, Papers Trumbull, 203. Spanheim, Rélation, 370. He recalled that a navy intendant from Brest once reported to Bergeret in his presence on the level of the fleet’s preparedness, unaware that he was a foreign envoy (ibid., 558). Bourgeois (ibid., 360n2) mistakenly thought that Bergeret purchased the secrétaire du cabinet office from the marquis de Crécy in 1682, but Dangeau, Journal, 1:6–7 (10 and 16 Apr. 1684), noted that he secretly purchased it from Jean Talon, former intendant of New France, and finally took his oath and possession of his right to enter the king’s presence on 7 November 1684 (ibid., 68). His term was April through June. État de la France (1692), 204. gbhmc, Seventh Report, 285, a 1683 contretemps over an alleged attempt to pressure a dying coachman into converting to Catholicism. Petit, Souvenirs, 81. Antoine Joly, marquis de Blaisy, was an intimate of ­Harlay de Bonneuil and his father-in-law, Chancellor Boucherat, Bergeret’s kinsman (ibid., 54–62). Piccioni, Commis, 162, says that the earliest document indicating that Aubert was a premier commis is from 1688, but does not identify or cite it. Yet Aubert was not named a premier commis in the 1694 and 1695 lists of acquits patents. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. The first time he appears as one is in May 1701. aae md 1069, fol. 264. Piccioni, Commis, 163, 165, mistakenly asserts that Mignon became a premier commis only in 1688. Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 354, lists letters from Mignon and Blondel to the Chamber in 1690 and 1691. The papers of Pierre-Cardin Lebret, intendant of Provence, has printed copies of a May 1689 “Arrest du Conseil,” all with Mignon’s name signed on the last page just below the printing. bn mf 8833, fols 115v, 117v, 119v, and 143v. aae md 1004, fol. 157v, expéditions for 1690, was signed by Mignon to indicate that a law had been registered. In ibid., fol. 122v (late 1686 or early 1687), Mignon signed that he read through the arrêts of the Conseil d’État. Mignon was embroiled in an administrative dispute with Breton clergy in 1688. Flavien de Blois, Capucins, 54–6. Letters between Croissy and the bishop of Gap, who requested



121

122

123

124

Notes to page 194

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modifications to an earlier royal regulation concerning celebratory bonfires, show that ­Bergeret was part of this process and was well known to the bishop and his brother, also his Parisian agent. Guillaume, Inventaire HautesAlpes, ­4:205–6. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 8:246–7, recounts a 1683 case involving the procurer general of the Metz parlement who falsified a lettre de cachet to avoid his creditors and confessed to sending Bergeret a letter, presumably because of his Metz connection and foreign office responsibilities. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 349, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 8 Dec. 1693; and ibid., fol. 375, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Dec. 1693, complaining about delayed letters and even more egregious negligence by Mignon’s bureau. See also ibid., fol. 515, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 15 Feb. 1694; ibid., 58, fol. 44, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 26 Mar. 1697, apologizing for the trouble he caused his bureau; and ibid., fol. 90v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 23 Apr. 1697, again with complaints about Mignon’s bureau. Bély, Espions, 141, mentions Mignon corresponding with embassy personnel in Denmark, Saxony, Sweden, and Brunswick. Ambassador d’Avaux wrote to Croissy (20 May 1693) from Sweden of obtaining a copy of a code from Mignon. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212. However, a 1685 letter in Marchand, Mission Torcy, 61, shows Bergeret involved with Scandinavia or at least Torcy’s visit there. Picavet, “Commis,” 115, 119n2 (England and Mantua); and Pagès, Grand Électeur, 436, 550n, 555n (Brandenburg). In 1680 the Council of Geneva, seeking the favourable resolution of a matter with Croissy, sent Bergeret a gift. Flournoy, Journal, 85n60, 91n12. Bergeret approached Choisy on Croissy’s behalf concerning Siam, although he also admitted that because of the need for naval participation the mission depended entirely on Seignelay. Smithies, Chaumont and Choisy, 187–9. Records of payments to Bergeret as “principal commis” include aae md 1011, fol. 170r–v (1691); ibid., 1013, fol. 292 (1691); ibid., 1017, fol. 162 (1692); and ibid. 1021, fol. 202r–v (1693), contradicting the contention of Piccioni, Commis, 162, that Bergeret’s administrative existence ended in 1688. When Mignon handled Spanheim’s request for a passport in Paris in 1681, it was likely in a domestic capacity. Joret, “Formont,” 110. Mignon’s 21/31 May 1686 letter to Spanheim announcing a proposed settlement over a disputed ship likely reflected an issue raised in Croissy’s audiences for foreign diplomats. Joret, “Voyageur Tavernier,” 272. Acquits patents for 1694 and 1695. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. For Le Melle, see Baschet, Dépôt, 78, 79n1; and aae md 1017, fol. 162, a 1692 payroll list. Montreuil appears in an 8 May 1691 list for acquits patents for commis (ibid., 1011, fol. 170; and ibid.,1013, fol. 293), and one for 1692 (ibid.,1017, fol. 162) but disappears thereafter. Marolot appears on the 27 April 1693 acquits patents list (ibid., 1021, fol. 202r–v).

574

Notes to pages 194–9

125 Piccioni, Commis, 20–1, 270 (chart). He mistakenly places Mignon, who died in 1698, at the head of the second bureau until 1715, ignoring Fournier, who he says became a premier commis only in 1715 (ibid., 193). However, aae md 1192, fol. 419, 16 Dec. 1712, lists a gratification for the “commis de M. Fournier,” and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10r, 1 Jan. 1715, lists a payment for the “commis de Fournier.” This lends weight to Samoyault, Bureaux, 7, 35n2, 36, 286, who contends that Fournier was a premier commis in succession to his uncle Mignon. He notes that Fournier joined Adam, Ligny, and Pecquet as premier commis signing commis Jean-Nicolas Bernage’s marriage contract in 1713 (ibid., 217). The second bureau’s areas are listed as Germany and the countries of the north and the Levant (ibid., 37). 126 aae cp Venise 148, fol. 144, Fremont to Pecquet, 2 Oct. 1706; ibid., fol. 217, Fremont to Pecquet, 13 Nov. 1706; ibid., Espagne 191, fol. 95, Amelot to Pecquet, 20 May 1709; ibid., Rome 502, fol. 58, Abbé Rioux (secretary to Polignac, auditor of the Rota) to one of Torcy’s commis, mentioning Pecquet and enclosing a letter for him; ibid., Espagne 203, fol. 434, Bonnac to ­Pecquet, 2 Nov. 1710; and ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 114, du Luc to Torcy, 29 Dec. 1713. Prior, History, 392, records his interactions with Pecquet in September 1713. aae md 309, fols 111–34, which is a partial registry of “Depeches du Roy” for 1711–13 listing these same recipients plus Portugal and the United Provinces, is surely a registry for Pecquet’s bureau. 127 While neither fully inclusive nor completely accurate, these tables are nonetheless suggestive. A 1701 list would likely have included missions still in England and the United Provinces, balancing the count between the two bureaus. The years 1698–1700 marked a rapid expansion of French diplomatic missions abroad, which more than doubled from the Nine Years War levels. Figure 5.9 is based on an analysis and summary of lists of French diplomats serving between 1692 and 1715 compiled by Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:207–45. Here, too, figures are not exact and could be further refined, but likely without seriously altering the overall trend shown in the table. 128 The data is based on the lists of volumes (dates and very brief description of contents) of political correspondence from individual states in France, État numérique correspondance politique. The inclusion of volumes was based on dates of coverage; those covering multiple years were usually not counted when they also covered years outside the 1696–1715 time frame. When months of coverage are specified, volumes from before August 1696, when Torcy became secretary, and after 1 September 1715, when Louis XIV died, were not included in totals. Information in the supplemental cp series for the various states was also excluded because its volumes mostly cover long periods of time and their inclusion would have only minimally altered the counts. This is a crude and rough measurement because the volumes, as well as the letters in them, are not of uniform length. Also, not all i­ncoming ­written and



129 130 131

132 133

134

135

36 1 137

38 1 139 140

Notes to pages 199–201

575

printed materials were kept and what was not included in aae cp ended up in aae md. For the composition of the two series, see Archives hg, 1:113–16; and France, Inventaire sommaire: Correspondance politique, 1:v–x. Kahn, Codebreakers, especially chap. 5. Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 141, 145–6. aae ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 146r–v, undated and unsigned, but in Mignon’s hand. Null ciphers are so called because “in any given cryptogram the greater portion of the letters are null, a certain few being significant, and perhaps a few others being significant only in that they are indicators for finding truly significant letters.” Gaines, Cryptanalysis, 4. France, Recueil, 13:72, instructions for the extraordinary ambassador to Denmark, 22 Oct. 1688. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35–6, 68–73, 128–30; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:106–8. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 220, agrees that code work took place in each political bureau. Bély, Espions, 154–7, for codes and decoding under Torcy. aae cp Venise 148, fol. 239, a 1706 letter of whose contents the king will be informed, has a note on it saying that it is to be deciphered by Pecquet. Ambassadors might also decipher their own correspondence, as Ferriol indicated from Constantinople to Jouvancourt, 16 October 1708, in Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 803. Even Philip V personally encoded part of a letter to his grandfather. Torcy, Journal, 280. aae cp Rome 502, fol. 16, Polignac to Torcy, 12 Jan. 1709, apologized for writing without code (“en clair”), since time did not permit him to encode his letter. Charles Auguste d’Allonville, marquis de Louville, writing to Torcy from Spain (ibid., Espagne 114, fols 298–304, 18 July 1703), contended that while it was always dangerous to write without code, even more dangerous were code clerks with loose lips. Adam to Billard, 13 May 1688, in Piccioni, Commis, 168–9. For the Rossignols, see ss-Boislisle, 13:149–50, 525; Piccioni, Commis, 96–7, who suggests that one of Brienne’s code clerks was Antoine’s student and subordinate; Arvencas, “Rossignol,” 511–16; and Kahn, Codebreakers, ­157–63. See Delavaud, Pomponne, 140n1, for the family connection. An example of the annual 5,000 livres to the Rossignol children is aae md 1192, fol. 11v (4 Oct. 1713). Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 133, notes the intergenerational nature of much cryptographic knowledge. Ash, “Expertise,” 5, 14–15. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212, d’Avaux to Croissy, 20 May 1693, shows Mignon working with codes for Sweden. Piccioni, Commis, 187, says that Lullier served continuously under Croissy and Torcy, but a note in ss-Boislisle, 13:150n1, says that, along with ­Rossignol, Lullier served Louvois as code clerk. Financial records list ­Lullier

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Notes to page 201

as Barbezieux’s commis in 1692 (aae md 1019, fol. 59v) and 1693 (ibid., 1029, fol. 61; and ibid., 1009, fol. 144), but by 1699 show him with Torcy (ibid., 1068, fol. 179). He was still active in 1701 (ibid., 1082, fol. 287, gratification for 1,500 livres), but on the retired pension roll by at least 1706 (ibid., 1145, fol. 6; and ibid., 1192, fol. 429v, for 1713). Boislisle ­(ss-Boislisle, 13:150n1) notes that according to Mercure Galant (Nov. 1703) Lullier was one of Louvois’s decipherers. Although he does not say, the Mercure reference was to Lullier’s retirement (since this particular issue is not available online, this could not be verified). Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, say that he worked for Croissy as a code clerk, which means that he left Barbezieux before or during 1696. In 1723–24 Lullier was still alive and, based on his forty-five years under different ministers as decipherer without key, advanced age, and neediness, requesting pensions for his three daughters, which were granted. aae md 313, fol. 232 (Alexandre Cojannot graciously provided a copy of this document). If he retired sometime after 1701 and before 1706, then he began serving c. 1660, plausibly putting him in his eighties when he requested these pensions. 141 Bonrepaus complained to Blondel, about a possible breach of the code and the need for its replacement. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 419, 9 Mar. 1694. On the same day (ibid., fol. 420r–v) he requested that Mignon send a new code via Dunkirk on the first ship to the Baltic. Torcy wrote to Pomponne in Venice that since his letters had apparently been intercepted and deciphered, he would send him two new codes: a larger one for regular dispatches and a smaller one for extraordinary occasions. bl am 15284, fol. 309v, 29 Oct. 1706. 42 Villars urged Puyzieulx to employ codes upon codes (“faire chiffres sur les 1 chiffres”) for security’s sake. aae cp Allemagne 350, fol. 17, 21 Jan. 1708. When Cardinal Joseph-Emmanuel de La Trémoille complained from Rome that he could not make sense of the code used in Villars’s letters, Torcy responded that he would write to Villars about it (ibid., Rome 540, fol. 229v, 25 Dec. 1714). 143 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443, reports that in 1691 Adam claimed to know several codes by heart. Writing to Adam, Bonrepaus claimed that the code he employed was unbreakable and the best ever made. He suggested that Adam experiment by having the Paris code clerks attempt to decode a letter written in one of his best codes. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 461r–v, 15 June 1694. Adam asked Hooke to see him to confer on the words and names to be used in his codes (ibid., Angleterre 221, fol. 267, 11 Mar. 1707). Although ill, Hooke was set on departing for his mission as soon as he recovered and asked Adam to send the codebooks to him (ibid., fol. 267v, 14 Mar. 1707). That day Adam sent him two codes of a different type from which one could not derive tables for decoding (ibid., fol. 268). Villars reported to Puyzieulx, having received a code from Bernage, who apparently worked under Adam



144 145

146

147 148

149 150 151

152

Notes to pages 201–2

577

(ibid., Allemagne 350, fol. 14, 20 Jan. 1708). Bonrepaus forwarded a copy of a code from Croissy to Frischmann in Münster (ibid., Danemark 47, fol. 101, 1693). See ibid., Gênes 52, fol. 187, for an example of a code table with explanation, presumably for agents in Italy. Bély, Espions, 610–11. Samoyault, Bureaux, 124. Bély, Espions, 610–53, analyses passport issuance and recipients. Pontchartrain to Bignon, 26 Jan. 1700, is an example of another secretary of state issuing a passport. Depping, Correspondance, 4:615. Regarded as foreigners, Jewish residents of Paris required passports. Although welcomed earlier in the reign, governmental hostility increased after 1685. Benbassa, Jews of France, 50–1, 59, 70–2. Although Jews were not legally permitted to reside in Paris, Torcy was not averse to granting exceptions. aae md 1040, fol. 16, Torcy to La Reynie, 6 Jan. 1696, a passport for Abraham Mosés Vallich (renewed on 19 Jan. 1705, ibid., 1137, fol. 15). A list of numbers of Jewish families and individuals in French cities in 1701 shows four families (of sixteen persons) and 150 “others” residing in Paris (ibid., 1093, fols 119–21). For Jews in diplomacy, see Bély, Espions, 171–4. Bély, Espions, 623–4, 642. aae md 1103, fol. 62v, 5 Sept. 1702, notes passports delivered to Blondel and another to Adam; and ibid., 1118, fol. 271v, 1703, notes one delivered to Noblet in Paris for a man traveling to Venice and Rome. Bély, Espions, 618–19. aae md 1044, fols 1–8, for the count; ibid., fols 90–3v, for the 1 June 1697 “Estat”; ibid., fols 97ff, for “Estats” for 13 and 19 June and for 13 Aug. 1697. In 1711 Torcy scandalized many in the Republic of Letters by denying the passport request of Pierre Coste, a savant and translator of John Locke, because he was a Huguenot refugee and minister. In 1713, however, Coste was permitted into France and in the following year Torcy’s brother, ­Montpellier’s bishop, entertained him and opened his library to him. Goldgar, Impolite Learning, 187. Bély, Espions, 621–53, is a detailed analysis of the 1712 passport list. For the lists for 1713 and related documents, see aae md 1196, fols 57–164. Bély, Espions, 611. aae md 1196, fols 129–45. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 132–3, says that the Mainz apothecary Speslas, highly regarded by Torcy, sponsored many passport-­seekers desiring to visit France during the War of the Spanish Succession. See also Bély, Espions, 632 (as Spitzlay); and Bouvet and Dauphin, “Successeurs,” 29–30 (as Spitzley). aae md 306, fol. 9r. Aubert was a premier commis by at least May 1701 (ibid., 1069, fol. 264). Mignon and Adam may have coordinated passports earlier (ibid., 1044, fols 97 and 118v, 1697).

578

Notes to pages 203–4

153 Samoyault, Bureaux, 30, mentions Ligny’s later work with passports. ­Meyercroon wrote d’Argenson that Ligny would send the necessary passport allowing a Dane to prolong his stay in France. Ravaisson, Archives ­Bastille, 11:64, 16 Dec. 1703. Paris bankers applied to Ligny for passports for ­Polignac in Utrecht. aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 53, 10 Mar. 1712. 154 aae md 1596, fols 227–30, 31 Jan. 1713, lists foreigners in Paris, noting their nationality, business, and a description of their passport. 155 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Zweiundzwanzigster Band: 706–7. A report for d’Argenson’s office (from 1714?) refers to a prisoner claiming that when war broke out he applied for a passport to leave France, but Torcy’s commis assured him that nothing had been resolved yet on that subject. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:473. 156 Legg, Prior, 292, Matthew Prior to Earl of Jersey, 17 June 1699. 157 aae md 1124, fol. 71, Torcy to d’Argenson, 14 Jan. 1704, concerning a letter from Lord Middleton. For Torcy and the police who dealt with suspected spies, see Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 12:22, 27, 44–6. 158 Delavaud, “Adam,” 445. Piccioni, Commis, 166, 175, repeats this date, but goes on to claim that Bergeret, who he mistakenly claims left the department in 1688, was replaced by Aubert, who he wrongly claims was let go in 1694 upon Adam’s promotion (ibid., 162). Piccioni’s own chronological chart of premiers commis (ibid., 270), however, contradicts this by dating Aubert’s service as 1685 to 1705. 159 Acquits patents for 1694 and 1695 name Mignon and Adam as premiers commis. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. aae pvr, 1, fol. 173v, says that Adam was Torcy’s intendant and his commis for the administration of his department’s provinces. Dangeau, Journal, 5:90, says Bergeret died unexpectedly after two days of illness (confirmed by Sourches, Mémoires, 4:393, 10 Oct. 1694). Department historian Le Dran, writing in 1724, placed Adam’s promotion in 1696 when Torcy became secretary of state, but his dates are not always correct. Piccioni, Commis, 169–70. The duties that Le Dran listed for Adam are those of a household intendant, a charge Adam did in fact officially assume when Torcy succeeded his father and established his own household in August 1696. 160 aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 350v, Bonrepaus to Adam, 15 Dec. 1693. D’Avaux mentioned to Croissy (20 May 1693) that he had obtained a copy of a code from Mignon. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:212. 161 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443, notes that codes never fully occupied Adam’s time. Two letters from Bonrepaus to Adam in aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 414, 23 Feb. 1694, and fol. 461r–v, 15 June 1694, may imply Adam’s involvement with a code service, but do not specify whether it was done while he continued in Mignon’s bureau or in another capacity.

Notes to pages 204–5

162 163

64 1 165

166

167 168

169

170

daf ,

579

s.v. “Employ,” also means the occupation or function of the person employed. aae cp Denmark 47, fol. 352, Bonrepaus to Adam, 30 June 1693, acknowledging receipt of Adam’s “Journal du voyage du Roy.” According to Le Dran, Adam accompanied Torcy on his travels throughout Europe between 1685 and 1687. Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. However, Piccioni, Commis, ­170–1, disagrees, arguing that Le Dran could only have meant Torcy’s 1689 trip to Rome, since individuals other than Adam accompanied him on his earlier travels. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 15n53. bn mf 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696, on affairs in Marseilles. Even shortly after Croissy’s death (25 Aug. 1696), Baluze wrote to his niece’s husband that he had sent copies of his letter about a local matter to the ministers Beauvillier, Pomponne, and Le Pelletier and to Mignon as well. Fage, Lettres Baluze, 121. aae md 1012, fol. 101, 19 Aug. 1691, Fournier’s reimbursement for travel to Brest by way of Nantes. Adam received one to go to the camp d’Andernech (?) near Brussels to carry the convocation of the Estates of Brittany to Louis Alexandre de Bourbon, comte de Toulouse (ibid., 1032, fol. 418, 21 Sept. 1695). Delavaud, “Adam,” 445, says that Adam traveled to Brittany by virtue of being premier commis. Adam was also interested in the Breton estates as an investor in their annuities. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-etVilaine, 2:350. Provincial estates were important proxies for the crown in raising credit. Rowlands, Financial Decline, 79–80. bn mf 8858, fol. 158, Mignon to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696. aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 45v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 26 Mar. 1697; ibid., fol. 90v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 23 Apr. 1697; ibid., fol. 44, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 26 Mar. 1697; and ibid., fols 491–4, Bonrepaus to Mignon, Nov. 1697. bn mf 8863, fol. 141, Adam to Lebret, 10 Feb. 1698. In ibid., fols ­112–15v, Blondel earlier wrote Lebret on 29 January 1698, apparently to explain Adam’s involvement in working with Torcy on a tangled dispute in Marseilles. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:97, 99, 100, 102, repeat Piccioni, Commis, 163, who claims, based on Le Dran, that Mignon served until 1725. Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, however, shows that Le Dran confounded Mignon with his nephew Michel Fournier. Samoyault cites Dangeau, Journal, 6:323 (2 Apr. 1698), on Mignon’s retirement and royal pension and the 7 July 1698 provisions in Mignon’s dossier as secretary of the king indicating his death. Racine wrote to his son Jean-Baptiste on 5 June 1698 of Mignon’s death, referring to the obligation the youth owed him for mentoring him at

580

171

72 1 173

174

175 176 177

Notes to pages 205–6 the foreign office. Racine, Œeuvres, 7:249. Mignon’s testament is dated 12 March, and his “inventory after death” 9 June 1698. Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 481n23, 479n16. Legg, Prior, 307 (Prior to Jersey, 5 Aug. 1699), reports that Adam, among others at court, shared with him speculation as to what the coming session of Parliament would do to limit William III and his “wise reflexions [sic] of our Kingdom’s being le païs des revolutions [the land of revolutions].” Adam’s dealings with Prior the past June had concerned what was apparently a domestic matter (ibid., 293). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 16n56, claims that Adam was the sole premier commis after Mignon’s death until apparently 1706. Although the reasons for this conclusion are unclear, if as his note suggests he is basing this on acquits patents lists from 1698 in which Adam was the only clerk listed at the 3,000 livres rate, then it is unwarranted. A premier commis did not always receive the higher rate and might be listed with simple commis and secretaries at the lower rate (see table 7.11 below, e.g., Mignon in 1693 and Pecquet in 1709 and 1710). He also implies that ­Pecquet was a premier commis only after 1706 (ibid., 17n61). See chapter 7 below. Piccioni, Commis, 181, says incorrectly that he served under Croissy as a commis. The correct year derives from provisions (10 Sept. 1713) for his office of treasurer of France in Brittany’s Chambre des comptes, which mention his thirteen years as Torcy’s premier commis. bn po 2220, fols 2–3r. His letters of nobility (ibid., fols 8–9r, July 1715) mention fifteen years at that post. The earliest notice of him in department records called him premier commis and noted that he received 600 livres. aae md 1093, fol. 153 (May? 1701). Although Adam had experience with foreign and domestic business, he did not become head of one of the political bureaus. This may have been his preference or related to Le Dran’s remark that Adam never learned Latin. ­Piccioni, Commis, 169. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 187–291, demonstrates that Latin was still much used in diplomacy, especially with the Empire. Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17, notes that Torcy’s changes did not call into question his father-in-law’s organization or working methods. Picavet, “Commis,” 118. aae md 1205, fol. 110, 1 May 1715, authorized 2,400 livres for Adam’s clerks. An unknown sender wrote Adam (ibid., 1517, fols 103–4v, 20 May 1707) about a matter in Nantes that he then forwarded to Torcy the same day (ibid., fols 105r–v). A note in Torcy’s hand concerning the archbishop of Rheims (Champagne) and his need for a papal bull for a particular abbey has Adam’s name written at the top (ibid., 1191, fol. 21, 13 Jan. 1713). Several expéditions for Dauphiné (9 and 14 Apr. 1705) were in the hand of Aubert,



178 79 1 180

181

182

183

Notes to pages 206–7

581

who apparently served under Adam (ibid., 1553, fols 394r–5). In May 1703 Abbé Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:422, noted dealing with Torcy’s commis in charge of the affairs of the department of Champagne. Four lists cover three-month periods and one covers six months. For gouvernements and their officials, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 604–8. For Louis Ravat, see Monahan, Year of Sorrows, 56–7. The types of dispatches sent out in our samples are not specified, but they likely included only those sent out by the secretary, since those from the king – at least when sent out by the political bureaus – were normally listed in a separate registry, such as aae md 309, fols 111–34v. For the variety of these and the specifications for their preparation, see ­Barbiche, Institutions, 185–91. Additional typical tables of contents are in aae md 1026 and 1040 (for 1694 and 1696, under Croissy); ibid., 1042 (for 1697); and ibid., 1180 (for Apr.–June 1711). Adam signed the 28 February 1710 paperwork raising the Duchy of Harcourt to the peerage. ­Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, 2:535. After their presentation to the parlement, ­Villars instructed Lebret to return his credentials as Provence’s new governor to Adam (who had likely issued them) as the surest way to reach him at court. Villars, Mémoires, 6:36. A royal brevet sealed with the grand seal authorizing an individual’s monetary gratification. An acquit served as a receipt and legal discharge to the entity making the payment. Académie Française, Dictionnaire historique, 1:736. See also Barbiche, Institutions, 169, 189. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:95, claim that passports and naturalization letters were the foreign office’s preserve, which is incorrect as we have already seen for passports. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 77–8, 330, says that naturalization letters were sealed and issued by the Grand Chancellery, but sent out by the secretary of state for the household (ibid., 77, 366–7). The draft of the letter, accompanied by a request submitted to the household secretary, had to be written by a secretary of the king (actually, the household secretary’s commis), who was paid roughly 70 livres by the applicant. Sahlins, who says nothing of how the other secretaries of state fit into this system, uses only the department archives of the household secretary for the database he readily describes as incomplete and random (ibid., 329–33). Yet naturalization letters are among the foreign office’s expéditions. aae md 1041 (1696), ibid., 1074 (1700); ibid., 1158 (1708); and ibid., 1182, fol. 297 (1 July 1711), for Cardinal Gualterio. The entry for a sent naturalization ­letter notes that it was sealed (ibid., 1148, fol. 364v, 1707). Perhaps applicants could approach the foreign office and have their letters drafted (probably still for a fee) by a premier commis or secretary who was a secretary of the king (Mignon, Adam, Blondel, or Noblet) and could thus countersign the king’s name.

582

Notes to page 207

184 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:93, suggest this, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–34, says nothing of it in his description of the secretariat. 185 Former premier commis Du Fresne cautioned Pomponne at the beginning of his ministry that provincial administration required a trustworthy man because issuing legal documents afforded so many opportunities for bribery. Delavaud, “Changement,” 378–9. Gaudon advised Pomponne that the provincial department (“département des provinces”) prepared arrêts for which a commis needed only a bit of style and sharpness of mind to draft with adequate detail and give the reasons for their issuance (ibid., 382). Along with recording letters sent out, registration served short- and long-term institutional memory and centralized records of authentication. Vismann, Files, 77–8. daf, s.v. “Enregistrer,” defines it as putting something in a registry containing public acts in order to make it more authentic and give it force. 186 aae md 1068, passim (1699), indicates that Adam took turns with Marolot, Noblet, Fournier, and, later in the year, Lullier. Ibid., 1129, fols 277–94 (1704), shows that Adam served alone all of December, while Aubert, who equaled him in days, served the previous two months, followed by Marolot and, on many fewer days, by Fournier, likely because he headed a political bureau, albeit the one with less work than Pecquet’s. 187 Ibid., 1010, for instance, contains a listing of countersigned expéditions showing that Croissy’s department sent out 351 expéditions for 12 March–7 May 1691, 101 for 18 June–2 July 1691, and 131 for 16 July–27 August 1691. Ibid., 1075, shows 579 expéditions for September–December 1700, while ibid., 1199, shows 445 for the same period in 1714. 188 Ibid., 1554, fols 35, 36, 43, and 87, are examples of letters or routing notes; and ibid., fols 214–24, is a summary for Torcy. Villars wrote Lebret from the front that Torcy’s support was essential for retaining the valley for Provence, of which he was the new governor. Villars also wrote Torcy on behalf of Provence to enlist his natural eloquence (“eloquence naturelle”). ­Villars, Mémoires, 6:56, 58–9. The king decided in Provence’s favour, since the inhabitants still saw themselves as Provencals. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 161. 189 aae md 1069, fols 134–5, is an example from the turn of the century. D’Argenson wrote Adam about aubaine and a Lille banker (ibid., 1060, fols 27–31v, 25 Mar. 1708). The droit d’aubaine was “the king’s right of escheat [forfeiture to the state] to the property of an unexempted foreigner” who died in France, since such individuals were not permitted to make a valid will. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 35–6. 190 aae md 1160, fol. 21, is a 1708 memoir to Adam concerning Paris. The following relate to police matters: Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:489–90, Adam to Saint-Mars, 17 Jan. 1706; ibid., 13:27–6, Le Quien de La ­Neufville to Adam, 20 Feb. 1713; and ibid., 60, Adam to d’Argenson, 30 July 1713. Yet aae md 1553, fol. 441, 27 June 1709, records a petition addressed to



191

192

193

194 195

96 1 197 198 199

Notes to pages 211–12

583

Pecquet that a certain prisoner be liberated from the château of Grenoble and Voysin’s request to Torcy that it be granted; Torcy mentioned having made the same request to Pecquet, to whom he would send two further letters (ibid., fol. 443, 29 June 1709). Pecquet also handled some orders for incarcerations in the Bastille and the citadel of Amiens in 1713 (ibid., 1196, fols 26v–7r). Since Pecquet’s bureau handled Italian and Dutch relations, perhaps these instances were connected with diplomatic affairs and, in the case of Amiens, especially with negotiations under way in Utrecht. Adam’s bureau may have specialized in prisoners in the Paris region. Also, we should not discount such factors as temporary absences or illnesses that required senior clerks to fill in for one another. In any event, these examples demonstrate that boundaries within the department were permeable. Kerhervé, Bretagne en 1665, 24–5, 30n. For the workings of the estates, see Rebillon, États Bretagne, 164–76, 183–4. Records of Adam’s trips include the following orders for related travel reimbursement: aae md 1032, fol. 418, 21 Sept. 1695, to the camp at d’Andernech near Brussels to Brittany’s governor, the comte de Toulouse; ibid., 1056, fol. 212, to Brest, 15 Oct. 1699; ibid., 1190, fol. 406v, 20 Oct. 1703; ibid., 307, fol. 43v, to Brest, Oct. 1705; ibid., 1176, fol. 423 (1711); ibid., 1182, fol. 167 (1711); and ibid., 1190, fol. 406v, 20 Oct. 1713. Adam likely profited from these trips, since among the estates’ 1702 gratifications was 2,000 livres for Torcy’s two commis. Letaconnoux, Relations, 93n2. For the estates’ strategy of gaining influence and protection through widely distributed pensions, see Collins, Classes, Estates, ­195–6. Adam, who owned rentes issued by the Breton estates, received arrears of 6,618 livres and 3 sous in 1685. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-etVilaine, 2:350. Along with a letter concerning provincial business, Adam sent Lebret a letter of sympathy for the loss of his third wife. bn mf 8895, fol. 265, 6 Apr. 1711. Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 547, 547n54. Torcy’s domestics received New Year’s gifts (ibid., 545). Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:385, also notes Blondel’s and Adam’s connections with the group running Marseille. Lacroix and Faure, Inventaire Drôme, 254; and Lacroix, Montélimar, 8:205–7. The foreign ministry and post office fit together so well that Dubois continuously lobbied the regent to take the post office from Torcy and award it to him as foreign minister, which he did in 1721 when forced to choose between the two. Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 126–7. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61. Klijn, “Networks,” 259. Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 14–16. Ibid., 260–7; and Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61–2.

584

Notes to pages 212–14

200 Marchand, Maître de poste, 184–9, traces the creation of this network. To extend its reach, Torcy sought to push postal routes deeper into Brittany. 201 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 240–1; Vaillé, Postes, 5:8–19; and Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 113. 202 aae md 1017, fols 7v and 16, lists several travel reimbursements to ­Hainfray during 1692. Ibid., 1069, fol. 243, is a Dec. 1701 request (granted) for a grace from the rolle for Hainfray, and ibid., 1148 fol. 454v, is a reimbursement for following the court from Versailles to Metz and back in 1707. According to Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:127, Hainfray also received an annual gratification of 100 livres from the superintendent of the king’s buildings in consideration of the care taken with that department’s letters and packages, paid from 1691 through 1715 (ibid., 3:636; and ibid., 5:927). Vaillé, Postes, 5:217 and note 6, lists Louis Hainfray among those postal commis Torcy ordered arrested and sent to the Bastille for leaking information gleaned from the mails to gazetteers, but this was in fact Louis ­Hainfray fils, as noted in Torcy’s letter to d’Argenson, 23 December 1709, in ­Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:431. Despite this, the father retained his post. aae md 1192, fol. 430, for 1713. 203 In 1713 Guyot was reimbursed for twenty trips from Versailles to Paris. aae md 1192, fol. 430v. The annual Fontainebleau sojourn of 1713 cost 9,481 livres paid to postal personnel, including money for lamed or dead horses and 300 livres for a visit to Rambouillet. A detailed breakdown is in ibid., fols 426–8v. 204 Ibid., 1093, fols 238–9 (1701). Marchand, Maître de poste, 247–86, describes these major economic enterprises. 205 aae md 1106, fols 64–5, 25 Apr. 1702, is a summary for Burgundy’s trips. It notes 600 livres reimbursed to five different relay postmasters for dead or crippled horses and other damaged equipment, while a listing for relays includes costs for postilions, another 8,373 livres, 16 sous. Ibid., 1108, fol. 56, Pajot to Torcy, 23 Apr. 1702, expressed his near despair at finding enough horses for Burgundy’s journey. See also the two letters in Louis and ­Beauvillier, Lettres, 219, 335–6. 206 Brillet, De la Voirie, 580. Brillet, royal prosecutor at the Admiralty, helped the aging Nicolas Delamare produce the fourth and final volume of his famous Traité de police. On 1 January 1713, Pigeon was reimbursed for thirty-seven such trips. aae md 1192, fol. 430v. Pigeon served from at least 1695 until his death in 1716. Marchand, Maître de poste, 287–8. There was also a maître de poste at Fontainebleau. aae md 307, fol. 41, 15 Oct. 1705. 207 Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–31; and Brillet, De la Voirie, 564, 574–80. On cabinet couriers and Louvois’s unsuccessful bid to appoint them, see Vaillé, Postes, 4:135–41. The king’s valet de chambre Louis Blouin also served as a diplomatic courier. Couriers might serve as Torcy’s eyes and ears. ­British ­resident



208

209 210 211

212

213 214 215

Notes to pages 214–16

585

James Dayrolle dourly reported from The Hague that “Maison Neuve,” who had arrived 26 January/4 February 1710 with the reply to the latest Allied peace terms, was still there on 1/11 February, “walking and talking and examining how matters are disposed.” He added that “the arrival of the ­[cabinet] courrier causes a great ferment of joy here upon the hopes of a sudden peace.” bl am 15876, fol. 285v. Dangeau, Journal, 12:423–6 (May 1709), shows that couriers were likewise watched for and eagerly awaited in France. For a cross-Channel comparison, see Cady, English Royal Messengers. Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–31. For urgent occasions, such as Torcy’s 1709 negotiations at The Hague, Louis’s personal courier Claude Guichon rode back and forth. bl am 15876, fol. 246v. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 73, written for and dedicated to Torcy, noted that cabinet couriers wore a distinguishing medallion bearing the arms of France. They received a fixedrate reimbursement based on the number of postal stops on their journey. Vaillé, Postes, 4:140. Raisin and Guichon were paid for several trips between the court and Utrecht in 1712. aae md France 1183, fols 271 and ­370v–2. In 1714 La Vrillière’s cabinet courier Étienne Coiffier de Beaulieu also served Torcy (ibid., 1201, fols 270v–1, 272, and 281). For a list of couriers, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:227–8; and État de la France (1712), 1:210, which also reports that cabinet couriers received 225 livres in gages. France, Recueil, 17:153, 153n1. Maintenon, Maintenon d’après sa correspondance, 2:263–4. Zmora, Monarchy, 32. For the chivalric orders, see Ducourtial, Ordres, 31–5; Barbiche, Institutions, 42–3, which notes that because membership in the older Order of Saint-Michel was required for entry into the Holy Spirit, members of the latter came to be known as chevaliers of the Royal Orders; and Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 74–84, for their social significance. Dangeau, Journal, 5:452 (12 Aug. 1696). On 29 July 1696, the day after Torcy’s father’s death, the king granted Torcy a brevet de retenue for the grand treasurer’s post of 350,000 livres, augmented to 500,000 livres on account of Croissy’s long illness (ibid., 442–3). A brevet de retenue fixed the sum that the holder of a non-venal, non-transferable charge was to be given by his successor. Barbiche, Institutions, 82, 191. Sourches, Mémoires, 7:3 (8 Jan. 1701). ss -Coirault, 2:31. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1384–8, discusses its ceremonies and includes a list of all the chevaliers. See also Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, 285–93. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:119, notes that on 2 February 1699, alongside the king, Torcy performed the ceremonial duties of the absent provost. Such ceremonial work continued even as war spread. Dangeau, Journal, 8:397 (24 Apr. 1702). Torcy also received 10,000 livres to hire two commis.

586

Notes to pages 216–17

216 Clairambault wrote Adam, 5 April 1699, concerning a recipient of the Order of Saint-Michael. aae md 1064, fol. 26. Torcy had to arbitrate among conflicting requests of members (ibid., 1137, fols 2–12, 10 Jan. 1705). Payments for the order’s officers went through the foreign ministry (ibid., 1055, fols 89 and 266; and ibid., 1056, fols 89 and 103r–v, both for 1698), Adam signed the treasurer’s accounts for 1699, for which he received 1,200 livres, and he received another 400 livres for other work for the various orders (ibid., 1064, fols 229–44). Bontemps signed a receipt for a collar of the Order of the Holy Spirit received from Adam, listed as Torcy’s intendant and premier commis (ibid., fol. 245). 217 See État de la France (1698), 1:207–8, 277–83, for the office and its functions. If a council meeting took place in the royal chamber, then these duties fell to the huissier de chambre (usher of the chamber). It was also the duty of the first valet of the chamber to stand by the entrance of any chamber in which a council met (ibid., 279, 283). According to Newton, Petite Cour, 89–92, the two cabinet ushers served at the same time, but this may have been an eighteenth-century practice. A member of the Vassal family had served in this office since at least 1661. Mémoires Rambouillet, 19:191; and État de la France (1661), 103. Vassal’s colleague, Baudoüin Chauvin, apparently did not receive a pension from Torcy. For payments to Vassal, see aae md 1055, fol. 8v (1698); ibid., 308, fol. 34v (1 Jan. 1710); and ibid., 309, fol. 65v (1 July 1711). In 1714 he was paid 600 livres for the last six months of 1713 and 600 for the first six months of 1714 (ibid., 1201, fols 269v and 285), with 600 every six months thereafter (ibid., 310, fols 346v and 363v; and ibid., 1207, fol. 179v). 218 aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 488v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 12 Oct. 1694. Earlier, in ibid., fol. 431r, 19 Apr. 1694, Bonrepaus had congratulated Blondel on his purchase of the office of treasurer of France with a gratification the king had given him to do so, calling it a mark of the monarch’s satisfaction with his service. This made Bonrepaus’s speculation plausible even though it proved not to be the outcome. 219 Callières’s close ties with Beauvillier and Chevreuse perhaps also afforded him “a power base of sorts of his own.” Nevertheless, he and Torcy continued to labour cooperatively and apparently without rivalry. Pope, ­Callières, ­116–17, 127–8 (quotation 128). He was Louis XIV’s second and last principal cabinet secretary, although he may have spent less time at his side as Louis’s health and activity waned (ibid., 191). Cabinet secretaries enjoyed lodgings at Versailles. Newton, Petite Cour, 92–4. The two venal posts of lecteur du roi (reader to the king) also offered access to the king and possible career advancement without requiring actual reading (ibid., 95–6). They enjoyed la première entrée (the first entry) to the king while he was still in his bed. Saule, Journée, 25–8. The influential and ambitious diplomat ­Bonrepaus,



220

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226 227

228

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reader to the king 1685–1719, was often posted abroad. Newton, Petite Cour, 96n3. The other reader, Nicolas-Guillaume de Bautru de Vaubrun, Abbé Cormery, purchased his charge in 1696 but was in exile in Anjou from 1700 to 1710. ss-Boislisle, 5:342n3. Past secretaries and readers retained first entry even when no longer holding the office. État de la France (1698), 1:259. Although they received their gages through the household, they also received extraordinary gratifications from the foreign office. Master of Ceremonies Desgranges and his son, his “ayde des ceremonies” (aide for ceremonies), received 8,000 livres for their part in the trip through the south of France by the new Spanish queen on her way to Spain, including for travel expenses for themselves and a valet. aae md 310, fol. 350r–v. See Berger and Hedin, Diplomatic Tours, especially 66–7, for the May 1704 tour given to the Duke of Mantua and Torcy’s part in it. Quotations from Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:256. Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81, uses and develops this concept. See Ash, “Expertise,” on the role of such experts. Vittu, “Instruments,” 163. Baschet, Dépôt, 102–9; and Klaits, Propaganda, passim. For Renaudot, see Burger, “Spymaster,” 111–37; and Niceron and Hardion, Mémoires, ­12:25–41. For Dubos, see Lombard, Du Bos; and for his interactions with Bayle, Lieshout, Making of Bayle’s Dictionnaire, passim. See ibid., 89, 214, 277, for Clément’s contributions. Renaudot had originally condemned the Dictionnaire on religious grounds, but he and Bayle later tried, at least on the surface, to reconcile (ibid., 36–7, 39–41, 43). For Bayle, “the single most widely read and influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment,” see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 331–41. Klaits, Propaganda, 177. Torcy had earlier tried to engage Davenant’s services for French propaganda (ibid., 107–12). Bayle, Correspondance, 9:xv. For Larroque, see chapter 6 below. Two letters from Dubos to Bayle, one from 1695 and another from 1696, are filled with literary news (ibid., 519–30, 577–89; the editorial notes are invaluable). Goldgar, Impolite Learning, 174–83; and Hauréau, Singularités historiques et littéraires, 286–324. Croissy’s friendship dated to his 1704 passage through Rotterdam on his return from England as a prisoner of war. Cerny, Theology, Politics, and Letters, 132–3. Lauer, Catalogue Clairambault, v–ix, discusses Pierre’s life and the history of the Order of the Holy Spirit he would eventually compile. ­Clairambault wrote Torcy, 26 June 1701, about the statutes of the Order of the Holy Spirit. aae md 1093, fols 264–5. He also wrote the minister about his research on the order’s profession of faith (ibid., 1175, fol. 193, 3 Dec. 1703). Torcy wrote Chamillart, 15 December 1706, to authorize 1,200 livres

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Notes to pages 219–20 to ­Clairambault for research, registers, and writings, and 90 livres for the binding of eight volumes relating to the order (ibid., 1144, fol. 326). They exchanged other letters on research, ceremonies, and abuses of the order’s rituals and its ceremonial cordonne bleu (sky-blue ribbon) (ibid., 1160, fol. 116, Clairambault to Torcy, 15 Aug. 1709 [sic – in a volume for 1708]; and ibid., fol. 119, Torcy to Clairambault, 16 Aug. 1708). Torcy again wrote C ­ hamillart to authorize 1,200 livres to Clairambault for research and ­writing and 300 livres for the Sieur Le Clerc, who made designs for the order’s ceremonies, both drawn on marc d’or funds (ibid., 1169, fols 57–9, 13 Jan. 1710). Clairambault objected to Torcy that Cardinal Forbin-Janson’s desire to appeal to the pope about the rights of the Chevaliers of Malta and the Order of the Holy Spirit violated royal sovereignty. aae md 1106, fols 93–4, 18 July 1702. Clairambault reported to Torcy, 6 May 1703, that he had received a memoir printed in Spain on the incompatibility of French chivalric orders with those of Spain. bn Clairambault 452, fol. 41. On 12 May 1703, Le Grand sent Clairambault from Madrid three notebooks about the Spanish nobility (ibid., fol. 44). Someone wrote Torcy, 8 February 1704, reporting that Clairambault had visited him on the minister’s behalf concerning the rights of the marc d’or. bn naf 22940, fol. 2. The marc d’or was separate from the Royal Orders. ­Bluche, Dictionnaire, 962. Adam examined the accounts of one of the treasurers of the marc d’or on behalf of order grand treasurer Gilbert Colbert, marquis de Saint-Pouange. aae md 1193, fol. 93, Adam to Saint-Pouange, 27 Jan. 1704. This and the following paragraph are largely based on Niceron and Hardion, Mémoires, 26:123–50; Baschet, Dépôt, 102–5; Klaits, Propaganda, 246–66; Thuillier, Première école, 15–16, 32–53, 57–8, 63–74; and Delavaud, Pomponne, 280n1. Concurrent with his work for Torcy, Le Grand made extensive use of primary sources for a manuscript on Louis XI that he left unpublished. Bakos, Images of Kingship, 9, 59, 78, 117–21. bn Clairambault 452, fol. 44, Le Grand to Clairambault, 12 May 1703, Madrid. Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 452–3 (based on a note on Le Grand in bn mf 22585, pp. 85–8). Le Grand appeared at the Regency’s outset among the department’s personnel. aae md 310, fols 292–3. Michaud et al., Biographie Universelle, 48:293–9. Ash, “Expertise,” 4–11, 17n on the definition of experts. Maber, “Knowledge as Commodity.” For Bayle’s Paris networks, see McKenna, “Conclusion.” Black, Diplomacy, 55–6, 89, underlines the importance of legal matters in diplomacy because of questions over protocol, sovereignty, and dynastic rights.

39 2 240 241 242 243 244

245 246

247 248

249 250 251

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Notes to pages 220–5

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Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 249. Cerny, Theology, Politics, and Letters, 128–38. Iberville, Correspondance, 1:lxxxviii–cvi. Pope, Callières, 49–52; and Schweizer, “Callières,” 621–2. Lieshout, “Retouches au portrait Bayle,” 57. Galland, Journal, 1: 500–1, 503, 505, 508, 520, 525–8. Brue sent his friend the orientalist Antoine Galland the design of an intaglio seal that belonged to the “chevalier de Torsy” to see what he thought of it. The editorial note identifies the chevalier as Torcy’s second son, Charles, who it says died in 1708 as a navy captain (ibid., 526, 526n1091). Charles, however, died as an infant in 1707, so it is likely that Galland meant his son Jean-Baptiste, who was not yet seven years old. bn mf 6679, fol. 100, 5 Jan. 1696, relates that he substituted for the ailing Introducer Bonneuil. See France, Recueil, 14:163n1 (for biographical data), 163–5, on his mission in Savoy; on Genoa, ibid., 19:181–200; and on guarding Ranuzzi, Blet, ­Nonces, 159–63. This embassy and Saint-Olon’s role in its reception are described in Breteuil, Mémoires, 47–84. Cossé Brissac et al., Sources du Maroc, 5:10. See aae md 1056, fol. 36r–v, 8 June 1699, for Saint-Olon’s travel reimbursement and gratification payment. Grenet, “Their Masters’ Voices?,” 10–12, discusses the elements of etiquette and control in such missions. See Hossain, “Employment and Training,” for Petit de la Croix and royal interpreters. Breteuil, Mémoires, 100–54. For these relationships, especially before 1691, see Trotter, “Vauban and Administration.” Virol, Vauban, 287, 293–4, 333–5, 373. Torcy thanked Vauban for sending a memoir from a former member of Besançon’s parlement concerning the king’s rights to the County of Montbelliard. aae md 1146, fol. 68, 20 May 1706. Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 40–1, 54–6, 223–35; and Torcy, Mémoires, 1:111, 112. aae md 1186, fol. 352, is an “État et estimation des Merchan­ disses faite à Bordeaux qui M. de Menager a demandé par sa lettre du 26 juillet 1712.” The author added a note that if Mesnager wanted any other such compilations he need only inform him. Sydney Smith, quoted in Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 505. Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 61; and Donaldson, Contingency Theory.

Chapter Six 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 125. 2 These are the descriptions of Samoyault, Bureaux, 220.

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Notes to pages 225–8

3 Torcy’s residence was on rue Vivienne. Adam lived on the nearby rue Neuve des Petits-Champs. Almanach Royal (1706), 168; and ibid. (1712), 86. Blondel lived on the same street (ibid.), as did Pecquet, at least by 1716 (ibid. [1716], 55). 4 Piccioni, Commis, 132, notes that most of them emerged from the lesser nobility or were soon ennobled by the king. 5 The title of commis was not one that offered great prestige when one reached a certain social level, which is why premiers commis were typically identified by the titles of the offices they held or at least they listed them first. See ­Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 294. For an example, see aae md 1197, fols ­16v–17r, a list of acquits patents for Jan. 1714, where Clair Adam is described as “[s]ecrétaire maison couronne de France et de nos finances, Trésorier général de nos Ambassadeurs et Ministre dans les Cours Étrangères et premier commis.” 6 Antoine, “Entourage,” 19. 7 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 445, uses this racing analogy. See Braun, “Staying on Top,” 258, on the need to be adaptable. 8 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 520–5. The chart in ibid., 525, exaggerates these changes by disconnecting commis from ministers in the period after 1691. See also Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 467–78. However, they overlook Torcy’s control of the post office (ibid., 476) and thus do not include him with Pontchartrain as an exception to the fact that the other great state servants no longer possessed accumulations of offices. 9 Unlike the position of premier commis based in part on skill, a venal office could be passed on to sons regardless of their ability. This fit nicely with a family strategy aimed at maintaining achieved status. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 141–3. Even outside of court offices, there was an “all-­ pervasiveness of dynastic thinking” (ibid., 166). On strategies of “socio-­ cultural reproduction” and the need for adaptability, see Braun, “Staying on Top.” 10 Antoine, “Entourage,” 19. 11 Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 13–14. 12 Mettam, Power and Faction, 45–54, especially 58; Smith, Merit, 57–91 (chap. 2, “Family and the Personal Modality”); and Braun, “Staying on Top,” 246, who observes that “intergenerational transfer of ‘property rights’ [which he says includes economic, social, and cultural capital (ibid., 233)] requires family planning in the broadest sense of the word” and “a degree of selfdenial on the part of all individual family members” (ibid., 247). 13 Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 125–75, especially 137. Although focused on the upper levels of offices/charges in the king’s household, this article offers insights that apply to the more humble premiers commis. See also Braun, “Staying on Top,” 255–6.



Notes to pages 228–30

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14 For Mignon, also a secretary of the king, see bn po 1963, fol. 63; aae md 1017, fol. 35; and ibid., 302, fols 122–4, 194. See also Piccioni, Commis, 163–5; Samoyault, Bureaux, 35n2, 159, 167; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:967. 15 As will be explained below, parts of the family tree remain uncertain. 16 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 152. 17 Numbers (I and II) have been added to the name René Mignon for the sake of clarity. 18 For the Pot de Rhodes connection, see Cher, Inventaire Cher, 2: (série D) 131–2, 137. Several entries make it clear that Mignon loaned money to various members of the family and their spouses. For the Pot de Rhodes family and the household, see Duindam, Courts, 189–90; and Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 41–7. 19 Babelon, “Mansart et Châteauneuf,” 81–96, a useful overview of ­Châteauneuf’s career, mentions René I Mignon’s work on various building projects. 20 The earliest record of him in l’Aubespine’s service is on 21 May 1623 in an entry in the Registres des insinuations (registers of donations) involving his wife Gertrude La Houst and a house. It names him his secretary and guard of the small seal of justice, and dwelling at l’Aubespine’s residence on rue Grenelle (St Eustache parish). This summary in an y 163, fol. 492v, as well as other helpful information about the Mignons and their connections, was generously provided by Patricia M. Ranum (communication to the author of 7 Jan. 2011). 21 Mignon’s arrest is discussed in a letter from Laffemas to Séguier in ­Depping, Études Jars, 61–2; in Richelieu, Lettres, 4:428n1; in Cousin, Chevreuse, 403–4 (he was interrogated by Claude de Boullion and Claude and Léon Bouthillier); and in Bassompierre, Journal, 4:152–3. 22 Mazarin, Lettres, 6:48–9, Mazarin to Abbé Fouquet, 19 Sept. 1653, informs him that the king approved the proposal for Châteauneuf’s heirs made by the new first president of the Paris parlement, Pomponne II de Bellièvre, who himself had acted equivocally during the Fronde (ibid., 759–60). Chosen by Châteauneuf as his sole executor, he in turn gave “full executionary powers” (3 Oct. 1653) to Mignon. Olson, Poussin, 82, 261n75. 23 For his role in seeing to Châteauneuf’s funeral and tomb, see Jongleux, Chroniques, 1545–5; Chaleix, Buyster, 142–4; and, for Mignon as agent, Chauleur and Louis, Mansart, 369. See also Babelon and Mignot, Mansart, 123–5 (Montrouge), 222–3 (the tomb). 24 Babelon and Mignot, Mansart, 193, 198nn8–9. It is worth recalling that the Colberts of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were masons, entrepreneurs, and architects. Murat, Colbert, 1–2. 25 Bergin, Richelieu, 44.

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Notes to page 231

26 Ibid., 41–4, 68, 140. Bergin’s study of the cardinal’s fortune offers insight into this often hidden or ignored milieu of wealth management. One need only recall the position, albeit an extreme example, of Colbert in Mazarin’s service to see how this could rebound to the servant’s advantage. Taking on such a seemingly servile occupation hardly constituted a loss of status for someone on the rise. For Colbert in this regard, see Dessert, Royaume Colbert, especially chap. 2. 27 Her name comes from the marriage contract of Charles Noblet and Gertrude Mignon on 5 June 1644 in an mc/et/lix/101 (graciously provided by ­Alexandre Cojannot, conservator at the Archives des Affaires étrangères). Gertrude La Houst’s origins are noted in Paris, Inventaire-sommaire HôtelDieu, 1:92, which indicates that she was born in 1601. Her naturalization letter is in Archives ap-hp, Hôtel-Dieu 1522. A 1639 extract from the 21 May 1623 marriage contract notes that her uncle Pierre Fouquet, who apparently died in 1639, had given her a sum at her marriage and subsequently made her his heir (ibid., 1523). Maïlys Mouginot, archivist at the Service des Archives de l’ap-hp in Paris graciously provided copies of both these documents, and Alexandre Cojannot kindly transcribed and commented on them. 28 Seine, Montrouge, 11 (dated 21 Aug. 1654). Montrouge is just outside and to the south of Paris’s encircling peripheral boulevards. The agreement provided that should the church ever be rebuilt, the churchwardens would place the Mignons’ pew in the most eminent place in the church, as it was presently, and do the same for their tomb and epitaph if they were deceased. It listed them as “sieur et demoiselle Mignon” (Mr and Mrs Mignon). Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “demoiselle,” says it was an old term for the wife or daughter of a gentleman of noble extraction, whereas now (in 1690) madame was preferred and demoiselle was reserved for an unmarried daughter of merchants and their social betters. See Braun, “Staying on Top,” 257, on church pews as insignia of rank. 29 Magny, Nobiliaire universel, 6:166. Their eldest son, Robert-Richard ­Marpon, was fifty-three years old when he died in 1691. Perrot, Journal, 132. Thus, Jean and Charlotte likely wed before 1638, although if born legitimate, Charlotte must have been quite young, since her parents wed in 1622. 30 In 1662 he was called “écuyer, conseiller-secrétaire du roi, maison & couronne de France, & de ses finances” in papers for their daughter Marguerite-­Aimée’s wedding to Antoine-Hercule Picon, sieur de Pousilhac, king’s councillor. Pièces fugitives, vol. 1, pt 2: 308. Picon, Colbert’s premier commis, decoded his secret correspondence. Colbert, Lettres, 4:314n1. Michel fils was son of the famous master stonemason Michel Villedo and related to the architect Libéral Bruant. Grouchy, “Artistes français,” 88, 88n2. Bauchal, Dictionnaire architectes, 568–9, 589, either ignores Michel Villedo



31

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33

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Notes to pages 231–2

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fils or confuses him with his father, as does Fournier, Énigmes, 179–92, and Moulin, Maçons, 15, 130, 145 (she suggests that he was born c. 1580 and died in 1650 or c. 1670). Letters of provision were issued in 1652, however, to Michel Villedo and Michel Villedo fils, master stonemasons of the king, bridges, and highways of France. Robillard de Beaurepaire, Inventaire Seine-inférieure, 2:40. Tessereau, Histoire Chancelerie, 1:552, notes for March 1668 the succession of a new secretary of the king to the office held by the late Michel Villedo, likely Michel père. Francastel, Architectes, 2:264, notes that Michel fils frequently served as entrepreneur for the architect Louis Le Vau. He also collaborated with his brothers in creating new streets and houses in Paris. Fournier, Butte des Moulins, 79–86 (again, he mistakes Michel fils for his father). According to Ballon, Le Vau, 99, Michel fils died in 1685. Jeanne Mignon was Claude Bécuau’s widow. Boyer et al., Inventaire Cher, 73. Jeanne died in 1701. They had four sons: two cathedral canons; a priest who served Cardinal La Trémoille; and a captain in the Regiment of ­Piedmont. Guère, “Mémoires Gassot,” 246. A bailliage was a royal court of appeal from seigneurial courts or first instance for other cases, while a présidial was a special appeals court above it, but below a parlement. These are the parents of Charles Mignon’s nephew, Michel Fournier. Nothing is known of the father’s background, but there were a number of Fourniers who were master stonemasons and royal architects at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries such as Isaïe Fournier, an architect who served Henri IV and Louis XIII. Bauchal, Dictionnaire architectes, 225–7. For an earlier Nicolas Fournier, master mason in 1607, see Berty and Legrand, Topographie historique, 76–7. Ballon, Le Vau, 94, notes that mason families typically intermarried. Given her sister Anne’s marriage to Villedo fils, it is plausible that the Nicolas Fournier that Marguerite Mignon wed was descended from this earlier Nicolas and also a mason. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. For Charles Noblet’s death, see an y 5330, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 230, 24 Jan 1687, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres /zoom.php?idcollection=101&page=230. For Gertrude’s death, see an y 4090, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 266, 7 Oct. 1700, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=1327&page=266. See Lainé, Dictionnaire véridique, 2:276, on Charles Noblet and his son, Charles-François, later Torcy’s commis. For Charles’s service with Vitry since at least 1648, see Lhuillier, “Recherches L’hospital-Vitry,” 114. Thanks to Alexandre Cojannot for pointing out the Noblet-Vitry connection. Boyer et al., Inventaire Cher, 4:298. It is not clear when Marpon served as artillery commissioner. Jean was not a part of the naval appointments ­Colbert made in the 1680s. Since he was born in 1609, he may have held the

594

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Notes to pages 232–3 post during the Richelieu era, possibly owing to the influence of his kinsman Richard. For Richard Marpon, see Tessereau, Histoire grande Chancelerie, 1:359 (he became a secretary of the king in 1634); and Bergin, Richelieu, 130, where he acted on Richelieu’s behalf in a land sale. For the family, see Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 8:100–3; and Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 49:325–9. Lainé, Dictionnaire véridique, 2:276, calls him the family’s “author.” For loans to and connections with Pomponne from at least the beginning of the 1660s, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 137, 163, 168, 245, 328, 334. Favre-­ Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:15–18, shows that during this period the Grand Chancellery was a businessmen’s club facilitating the rise of the legion of fiscal capitalists who served the royal treasury. Sedgwick, Travails, 195–202, discusses Pomponne during this period. His marriage to the daughter of Nicolas Foucquet’s wealthy cousin had become a political and fiscal liability, forcing him to borrow to renovate his family estate. The Arnaulds were suspected as Frondeurs (ibid., 140–62). Chatelain, Foucquet, 362, 495, discusses Villedo fils at Vau, while Tiberghien, Versailles, 94–5, 335, does so for Versailles. Colbert, Lettres, 5:447 (Louis Le Vau to Colbert, 11 Apr. 1663), describes his work at Saint-Germain with the architect and gardener Le Notre (ibid., 447n2, says that Villedo fils had been master of masonry works of the king’s buildings since 1654). See also LaCaille, “Partage du palais Mazarin,” 331–2. Colbert could be difficult for Villedo to please. Laprade et al., Orbay, 120. For his brothers François and Guillaume Villedo, who also served Colbert, see Fournier, Énigmes, 187–92; and Tiberghien, Versailles, 320. Pallet, Histoire du Berry, 5:46, says he was from a family of mayors and aldermen. Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, nouv. éd., 447–53, details the manoeuvrings by Claude’s brother Pierre while the princes were in ­Bourges in 1651. Intendant Auguste Robert de Pomereu observed to Colbert that Bécuau, while financially comfortable, was as a judge too influenced by friends. Pomereu included him among the many judges lacking in capability, knowledge, and devotion to duty. Michaud, “Basoche provinciale,” 180, 183–4. Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, nouv. éd., 483–92; and Marsy, “Médailles,” 156–7. Under his leadership and with the help of the intendant Mathias ­Poncet de la Rivière, Bourges received part of the augmentation of a local wine tax they requested for local needs. Toureau de Maisonneuve, “Vin vendu Bourges,” 235–7. Bourdel, “Nouveaux documents,” 216–19. The houses were lost in the early 1670s to Louis Le Vau’s creditors. Ranum, “Lully Plays Deaf,” 18–20, notes that René I Mignon, guardian of the bride of Marc-Antoine Charpentier’s cousin, had connections to a circle of Orléanist servants and clients that



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Notes to pages 233–4

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included the Lullys. For the quarrel with Lully, see ibid., 15–31; and Livet, Intrigues de Molière, 239. Ballon, Le Vau, 92–4. Michel, Biographie parlement Metz, 368–9; and Michel, Histoire parlement Metz, 125–33. An infantry captain was ordered imprisoned on 12 May 1661 after assaulting an avocat général of the parlement, identified in Boislisle’s notes as Jacques Mignon. Boislisle, “Mémoriaux Conseil 1661,” 1:285, 288. Advielle, Histoire de Sceaux, 220, lists him among the notables and servants of great personages, mostly dwelling in Paris, who appear in the parish records of Colbert’s estate outside Paris. René had given the house and land at Montrouge, less than four miles north of Sceaux, to Jacques and his brother René II in 1662. Meuvret, Problème des subsistances, 167. The legal minimum age for serving as an avocat general was thirty, but this was often gotten around by obtaining a dispensation, so that many entered the parlement in their mid-twenties. Hamscher, Parlement of Paris, 25–6. If Jacques Mignon was around twenty-five years old when he entered the parlement in 1656, this suggests that he was born c. 1631 and was thus the oldest son (if René II, born c.1638, was the oldest son, then Jacques would have been seventeen or so when he entered parlement, which seems unlikely). Jacques, who apparently led a dissolute life, lost his fortune before dying c. 1695 and left his widow dependent on charity for her lodgings. Bourdel, “Nouveaux documents,” 215–18, 234. Ballon, Le Vau, 108–26, convincingly accounts for Colbert’s actions in the context of his anger and disappointment over Le Vau’s “approach to architecture” (ibid., 7) and his failure to meet the exacting minister’s many expectations. Self-interest and a desire not to defend a dead father-in-law against a living patron likely account for Jacques Mignon’s actions, as did his own bad reputation (ibid., 216n78). Goy, “Journal Deffens,” 305, 305n2, records that Marguerite died in 1714 and René II in 1716. They married in 1675, but had no children (editor’s note says that he was seventy-eight years old, which would mean that he was born c. 1638). Mercure de France (May 1736), 1034, has François-Roger’s (1658–1736) obituary (Claude I was married in 1633 and died in 1685; the obituary mistakes his grandparents for his parents). Dessert, “Marine royale,” 83n30, discusses Robert’s career, but mistakes René II for Charles Mignon, Croissy’s premier commis. Révérend, Titres, 6:101, discusses Claude I but notes only two children. Rey, Château de la Chevrette, 29n1, says that Claude Robert, avocat au parlement, and his son, royal prosecutor at the Châtelet, owned Chevrette in 1663. Boislisle, Mémoires des intendants, 201, notes Claude II’s 1674 appointment and his death in 1719 at age eighty-six (born c. 1633), while Neymarck, Colbert, 2:468, marks Claude II’s presence during the drawing up of Colbert’s “inventory after death” as representative of his absent daughter, Marie-Anne Colbert, and her husband, Louis de

596

45 46

47

48 49

50

Notes to pages 234–5 Rochechouart, duc de Mortemart. The État de la France (1683), 2:507, notes his judicial connection with Villedo fils. Bély, Dictionnaire, 775–6, explains the Chambre des bâtiments. Tessereau, Histoire Grande Chancelerie, 1:467. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:47–8, discusses the practice of “rotation.” Meuvret, Production des céréales, vol. 2, pt 2: 167. François de l’Aubespine was a lieutenant general in the army and governor of Breda. Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:560. Fosseyeux, Hôtel-Dieu, 367, reports that on 20 May 1665 Jacques and René II, domiciled together on rue de l’Université, parish of Saint-Sulpice, sold two houses in Paris to the Hôtel-Dieu of Paris for 35,500 livres in order to pay the creditors of their father’s estate. See also Paris, Inventaire-sommaire Hôtel-Dieu, 92, 151. For Charles de l’Aubespine, see Moréri et al., Grand dictionnaire, 1:483–4. Villain, Fortune Colbert, 261, refers to René II in 1679 as l’Aubespine’s former secretary. From 1679 he was Colbert’s legal representative in various financial matters (ibid., 261–2, 266, 271). Colbert, Lettres, 7:90–1, 1313–12; ibid.,vol. 2, pt 2: 77; and ibid., 5:426. See also Loriquet, “Papiers Colbert récemment acquis,” 231–2. Connecting the various Mignons has been difficult. Samoyault, Bureaux, 208, 286, 299–300, for instance, mentions only some of Charles Mignon’s siblings: Marguerite, who married Fournier; and two other brothers, Michel and Pascal, who are known only insofar as each had a son, Pierre and Henry respectively, whom their uncle Charles brought into the department as commis. How can these Mignons be connected with the offspring of René I Mignon? Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006, notes that Gertrude Mignon, wife of Charles Noblet, was Charles Mignon’s sister, while Patricia Ranum (email message to author,7 Jan. 2011) expands upon and corrects Ranum, “Lully Plays Deaf,” 19n10, and cites the 1673 marriage contract from an mc/et/lxxv/164, 7 Feb. 1673, for René-Charles Noblet d’Ozonville, son of Gertrude and Charles Noblet, where René Mignon is listed as the groom’s maternal uncle. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 19–28. For his intendancies, see Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 44. Mignon received 400 livres from the Estates of Brittany in 1663. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:226. He countersigned documents issued by Croissy. One, dated 29 November 1663, is in Imbert, “Registre,” 69, while another, dated 18 August 1666 at Amiens, is in Huguet, Grand maréchal, ivn5 and appendix 3. Devèze, Admirable réforme, 119n43, mentions Croissy carrying out forestry reforms in Picardy on 30 July 1666 with Mignon as greffier. Mignon was likely with Croissy when he returned to Brittany in 1665 for the estates’ meeting and then inspected the coasts in September and October before returning to Tours.



Notes to pages 235–8

597

51 Baschet, Dépôt, 63, notes Mignon’s time in England, but Piccioni, Commis, 163–4, based on his error in dating Mignon’s death in 1725 rather than in 1698, denies that letters from a “Mignon” in London in 1668 and 1669 to Du Fresne are from Charles Mignon. bl am 65138, fols 155 and 158–60, are accounts that Mignon kept in London of French subsidies paid to a ­ W. Chiffinch from 1670 to 1672. For Mignon and Pepys, see Holmes, Pepys in Paris, 10–11; Pepys, Further Correspondence, 280; and Pepys, Letters and Family Circle, 104, 118. 52 For Mignon at Nijmegen, see Doppler, “Journal du chanoine,” 177, 181–3. See also Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 480–1. Two further medals with the likeness of the king of Sweden were likely awarded Mignon by that monarch in conjunction with the 1679 signing of the Treaty of Saint-Germain between France and Brandenburg, restoring Swedish holdings on the Baltic. 53 Henri Gascard (1635–1701), “The Signing of the Peace between France and Spain” (oil on canvas, 161 x 274.5 cm), is now in the Valkhof Museum in Nijmegen. A black and white copy with an explanation is in Barber, Diplomacy, 111–12. 54 The comic actor and playwright Raymond Poisson had retired to Nantes in Brittany. On 15 September 1685, he wrote his friend Lagrange, ordinary comedian of the king at Fontainebleau, about the finances of an office he was requesting, ostensibly for himself, but actually for his son. Poisson asked Lagrange to go to controller general Le Pelletier with his request, but if he could not, then he was to approach Mignon, whom Poisson called obliging and the greatest of his friends. Lagrange was to persuade Mignon to speak on Poisson’s behalf and present the controller with his request. Poisson also mentioned that an M. Reval (?) of Nantes, a local notable who backed his request, was Mignon’s intimate friend. Curtis, Crispin Ier, 63–4. 55 Limon, Notaires au Châtelet, 170–2, 286, 371–2; and Dumas, “Conseil des prises,” 348–50, 367–9. 56 These visits are recounted in Holmes, Pepys in Paris, 10–11. Although he does not name the “Greffier of the Paris Naval Office,” it can only have been Lefouin. 57 Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 388, 394, 429, 436–7. For this family connection, see also Surun, Marchands de vin, 377–8. 58 After ten years as tutor, these cares ruined Lefouin and he lost all his furniture in a judgment of 1709. Marraud, Bourgeoisie, 431–3. 59 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:967, mistakes Mignon’s nephews for his sons. 60 Samoyault, Bureaux, 299–300. Pierre Mignon, who died childless (ibid., 223), had three sisters: one married a “voiturier” (carrier of goods), another a “charpentier” (carpenter), and a third a “maçon” (mason) (ibid., 208n25). Piccioni, Commis, 165, mistakenly calls Pierre one of Charles Mignon’s two sons.

598

Notes to pages 238–40

61 Piccioni, Commis, 190–3, says Fournier left the navy in 1678, whereas Samoyault, Bureaux, 37, 167, 286, says it was in 1683. Yet Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 84, note that Charles [sic] Fournier went to Nijmegen with his uncle Charles Mignon in 1678 and later became a commis. Fournier’s birth date is unknown, but Piccioni notes a 1774 statement by his grandson that his aged and ill grandfather retired in 1723 after forty-five years’ service. Since he went to Nijmegen as a youth, he was likely born c. 1660. Piccioni, Commis, 192. aae md 1017, fol. 63r–v, 6 Feb. 1691, calls Fournier Croissy’s commis, as did a 1692 payroll list (ibid., fol. 162). 62 Piccioni, Commis, 193; and Bély, Espions, 629. 63 Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, notes Péronne but without a date. For his treasurer’s offices, see Frondeville, “Registres-mémoriaux,” 208, 224. bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 35, says Fournier was king’s councillor, treasurer of France at Rouen, and Torcy’s commis. Traces of his financial activities surface in his 1691 loan of 14,000 livres to Paris mercers and a 1712 purchase of rentes from the Breton estates for 3,000 livres. Saint-Joanny, Registre marchands merciers, 178; and Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:356. Samoyault, Bureaux, 175, says that Louis XIV ennobled Fournier, whereas Piccioni, Commis, 191, thought this took place after his 1723 retirement; however, bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 35, indicates that he was ennobled by Louis XIV at least by 1711. 64 Piccioni, Commis, 192; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 285–6. 65 Gautier, “Histoire Grandchamp,” 240–1, 247–8. He says that Michel ­Fournier’s wife was “Mme Marie-Anne Guerreau,” although he is unsure of her surname’s transcription. Samoyault, Bureaux, 286, says they had eight children and that she died in 1741. The grant of Grandchamp is recorded in aae md 1210, fol. 120v. Fournier purchased an important cartulary for his son’s abbey in 1720. Michel-Georges was interred in the abbey church as were his two maiden sisters, in 1784 and 1786. 66 For biographical notes, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 168n1, 334 (a correction and addition); Piccioni, Commis, 186–7; Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1005–6. 67 For the elder Noblets, see Lainé, Dictionnaire, 2:276; Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1005–6. Lainé and ­Bluche say the father received his office in 1653, but Favre-Lejeune says it was in1651. For officers of the corporate “collège” of the secretaries of the king, see Olivier-Martin, Organisation corporative, 301–10. Sévigné, Lettres, 3:507–8, recounts a 1675 anecdote concerning Mme Noblet of the Hôtel Vitry, who was playing a Venetian card game with Monsieur. 68 France, Recueil, 4:151–60, details the mission. Forbin-Janson’s return is noted in Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 1:429. Traces of Noblet’s activities in Poland occur incidentally in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 8:129,



69

70

71 72 73 74

75

76 77

Notes to page 240

599

as part of the judicial process against one of Vitry’s staff who sold codes after Noblet’s departure. For Forbin-Janson and Pomponne, see Dainville-­ Barbiche, Correspondance Spada, 47. For Marie-Anne Contenot, see an y 5309, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 227, 21 July 1687, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=137&page=227. Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2; and Chazaud, Inventaire Allier, 429, lists her as his wife, but without indication that she was his first. Her father, Claude Contenot, became an auditor in 1650 and her brother of the same name became one in 1680. État de la France (1674), 2:330; and ibid. (1683), 2:463. Marie-Anne, daughter of Noblet and Marie-Anne Contenot, in 1706 wed Pierre-François Maissat, honorary councillor in the Grand Chamber of the Paris parlement. Mercure de France (Nov. 1741), 2547 (her obituary). For her guardianship, see an y 4023a, Registres de tutelles, fol. 476, 15 May 1691, http://doc.geneanet.org/ registres/zoom.php?idcollection=4396&page=746 Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006, mention his second wife, but not his first. Favre-Lejeune mistakes Toussaint’s step-sister Anne-Marie for a daughter of Marguerite Navarre, as does the entry for Toussaint Noblet in “Nobiliaire et armorial Grand collège,” 293–4. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. Toussaint was later secretary to d’Argenson, garde des sceaux during the Regency. ss -Boislisle, 7:344n3. See Marion, Dictionnaire, 84, for this office. France, Recueil, 15:312–14. He received it from Cardinal Forbin-Janson in Rome on 2 April 1697. Marsy, Liste des chevaliers, 40. Diplomats were often rewarded with membership in this order. Ducourtial, Ordres, 36. The audience was noted in the Gazette. Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:626. See ss-Boislisle, 4:246n2, for Forbin-Janson to Pontchartrain, 22 July 1697; and Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314, Bossuet to Abbé ­Bossuet (in Rome), 5 Aug. 1697, on his meeting with Noblet. Abbé Bossuet, the bishop’s nephew, regularly sent him news from Rome. On 20 October 1698 (ibid., 10:261–2) he asked his uncle to praise Poussin, secretary to the new envoy to Rome, in the hearing of Noblet (his predecessor as secretary), Torcy, and Pomponne. On 17 November, Bossuet reported that he had sung ­Poussin’s praises before both ministers and would continue to do so, also promising not to neglect Noblet (ibid., 293). In 1699 Bossuet appealed to Torcy on his nephew’s behalf in his dispute with the irascible Cardinal Bouillon (ibid., 12:47–51, 54–8). Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 16n57. ss -Boislisle, 4: 246–7. On 19 August 1697 (ibid., 7:344n3a) Ursins had written Pomponne from Rome that Noblet was good to her in a thousand ways (“m’était bon à mille choses”). For her salon, see Goulet, “Cercle Ursins à

600

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79

80

81 82

83

84 85

Notes to page 241 Rome.” It is almost certain that someone like Noblet attended this salon while in Rome. Anne-Madeleine Goulet, email message to author, 7 and 12 July 2012. Princess Lanti to Prince Lanti, 30 June 1698. A transcription of his letter from the fonds Lante of the Archivo di Stato in Rome was kindly provided by Anne-Madeleine Goulet. Piccioni, Commis, 186–7, says Noblet entered Torcy’s department in August, but Lanti’s letter suggests that it happened a bit earlier. For Pomponne and the Le Telliers, see Sedgwick, Travails, 147, 195, 198, 218. Pomponne, however, had poor relations with Louvois, who considered him a rival minister and later joined with Colbert to engineer his fall. Denis, Archives Cogner, 70, shows him arranging leases in 1677. A 12 August 1680 document calls him Louvois’s intendant. Loizeau de ­Grandmaison, Inventaire Indre-et-Loire, 377. Dessert, Argent, 513, 659. Pénicaut, “Commis,” 92, 92n34, says that d’Ozonville’s marriage was in 1688, but this is contradicted by the marriage contract in an, Minutier central, Étude LXXV, 164, 7 Feb. 1673 (from Patricia Ranum, email message to author, 7 Jan. 2011). Marguerite married (6 July 1684) Georges-Hélie Gardien, nephew of Hélie du Fresnoy (d. 1698), Louvois’s and Barbezieux’s premier commis, who, probably on his uncle’s recommendation, served from c. 1696 to 1715 (ibid., 111). There were two other sisters. Anne Noblet married Philippe de Bonnet de Thou, councillor in the Bourges présidial. Guère, “Mémoires Gassot,” 231, 235; and Thaumassière, Histoire de Berry, 57. An unnamed sister wed Charles Belet, secretary of the queen, farmer of the large and small duties of the Breton estates, farmer general of salt of Lyon, Provence, and Dauphiné, receiver general of finances at Rouen, and a secretary of the king, 1676–89. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:185. Martin, Catalogue Arsenal, 6:29, records that sometime during 1697–99 an unspecified “Noblet” approached Pomponne about acquiring a charge of secretary of the king. It was probably Charles-René d’Ozonville, as his brother already held one. Dangeau, Journal, 7:449, 8:25–6; Lizerand, Beauvillier, 199, 415–16, ­419–22, 431–2, 435, 447–8; and Louis and Beauvillier, Lettres, 406. Dangeau, Journal, 7:449 (5 Dec. 1700), initially labeled Noblet Torcy’s commis but later his premier commis (ibid., 8:394, 20 Apr. 1702). Saint-Simon (ss-Boislisle, 7:344), only calls him a premier commis, but Boislisle’s notes say that Noblet was listed as a simple commis in 1700 acquits patents (ibid., 344n3). Sourches, Mémoires, 7:11, 9:434, called him a commis in 1701 and 1705. Piccioni, Commis, 186–7, says that he remained a simple commis. However, an editor’s note in Bossuet, Correspondance, 8:314n2, says



86

87

88 89

90

91

Notes to page 242

601

that Noblet became a premier commis upon his return from serving Forbin-­ Janson in Rome and before going to Spain at the end of 1700. Bourgogne and Beauvillier, Lettres, 114, 414 (on Pajot); aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 28, Torcy to Noblet, 5 Dec. 1700 (on Pajot); ibid., fol. 47, Noblet to Torcy, 8 Dec. 1700 (on his lodgings); ibid., fol. 37, Torcy to Noblet, 7 Dec. 1700 (on sending a Spanish formulary for Philip V’s letters); ibid., fol. 156, Noblet to Torcy, 9 Dec. 1700 (detailing his translation work); ibid., fol. 161, Torcy to Noblet, 17 Dec. 1700 (entrusting him with the composition of letters because he knows it will be done well, but nonetheless urging him to work quickly and to write letters that are neither too long nor too dry); and ibid., fol. 337, Noblet to Torcy, 18 Dec. 1700 (explaining how he is using Torcy’s formulary to devise forms of address). See also Beauvillier’s request (9 Dec. 1700) and Louis XIV’s marginal notations the next day about sending formularies to Noblet. Bourgogne and Beauvillier, Lettres, 406. When in 1710 the ailing Spanish queen wanted to take the waters at Bagnères-deLuchon across the border in France, Torcy made the protocol arrangements. Torcy, Journal, 311. aae cp Espagne 86, fol. 253r, Torcy to Noblet, 26 Dec. 1700, about a diamond in his care. For the portraits, see ibid., fol. 200, Desgranges to Torcy, 12 Dec. 1700. Not surprisingly, Torcy signed the wedding contract when Rigaud married in 1703. Guiffrey, “Contrat de marriage,” 58, 61. ss -Boislisle, 8:64; Sourches, Mémoires, 7:11; and Levantal, Louis XIV: Chronographie, 2:676. Dangeau, Journal, 8:394, 436; and Lizerand, Beauvillier, 527–8, B ­ eauvillier to Noblet, 2 July 1703. After Noblet’s death, Sourches, Mémoires, 9:434, observed that while there was no appointements attached to the post, it was a coveted one. Noblet, temporarily employed in the royal household, counted Beauvillier among his protectors, reporting that the duke would intercede to obtain him lodging at Fontainebleau during his return to court. Noblet to Torcy, 11 Sept. 1703 (aae cp Autriche 84, fol. 56). For negotiations: aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 144, Torcy to Noblet, 9 May 1702; ibid., fol. 145r, Noblet to Torcy, 9 May 1702; and ibid., fol. 207, Torcy to Noblet, 30(?) May 1702. For news-gathering: ibid., fols 157–8v, May 1702 (Noblet sent pamphlets in German); ibid., 81, fol. 200, Noblet to Torcy, Aug. 1702 (questioned prisoners); ibid., fol. 223, Noblet to Torcy, 30 Aug. 1702 (news from Brandenburg); ibid., 83, fol. 32r–v, an intercepted letter of 8 July 1703 from Prince Louis of Baden to Zinzendorf; ibid., fols 77ff, intercepted letters of Zinzendorf to the Emperor, 16 July 1703; and ibid., fol. 215v, Torcy to Noblet, 15 Aug. 1703 (news-gathering through the Strasbourg post office). aae cp Autriche 83, fol. 69 (an order of battle for the 1703 Rhine campaign); ibid., fol. 164, Noblet to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1703 (on Vauban and ­Tallard);

602

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93 94

95 96

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Notes to pages 242–5 and ibid., fol. 268, Noblet to Torcy, 27 Aug. 1703 (on conflicts between ­Vauban and various officers over siege technique). British Museum, Catalogue of additions, 225, 228. At the bottom of a letter to Gualterio in Paris, Forbin-Janson added a note asking the nuncio to deliver a letter enclosed for Noblet. bl am 20356, fol. 65r, 4 July 1705. aae cp Venise 145, fol. 205, Pomponne to Torcy, 21 Nov. 1705. Ibid., Rome 462, fol. 288, Torcy to Forbin-Janson, 8 Nov. 1705. Favre-­ Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:49, says that Noblet resigned his office in 1720; and ibid., 2:1005, says he died in 1732, while Bluche, Origine des magistrats, 329, says he died around 1729. His 1705 death, however, is recorded by Dangeau, Journal, 10:490 (11 Dec.); and Sourches, Mémoires, 9:434 (7 Dec.), who says he died of an inflammation of the lungs. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1006. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, 60–2, 102; and Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:252–4. Louis and Elisabeth had nine children. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, ­1:227–8, with entries for Joseph and François, says that both were born in 1661. Joseph, however, was likely the older of the two, since along with being sieur de Gagny he inherited the Azincourt title after the death of Paul in 1701 (Paul, forty-seven when he died, was the eldest son, born in about 1654). Favre-Lejeune is the only source for Louis Blondel’s alleged connection with a parlement and apparently the source for its repetition in Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:252. As an avocat en parlement, Louis Blondel may have been a titular barrister, that is, one with legal training but not actually practising before a parlement. See Bell, Lawyers, 27–8, on barrister titles. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253, says that Charles-François was born “9 février 1693,” but this is clearly a misprint, perhaps for 1663, a date more in line with those of his siblings. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 102, confuses Marie with Catherine-Charlotte, who is not listed among the nine children. The remaining siblings had religious vocations. For the sake of clarity, Paul will be referred to as Azincourt, Joseph as Gagny, François as Blondel, and Charles-François as Jouvancourt. Piccioni, Commis, 188, bases this date on aae md 314, fol. 61, a 1725 order from Louis XV based on the petition of that year from Blondel’s widow the day following Blondel’s death. It spoke of his thirty-five years as Croissy’s and Torcy’s secretary (he left the department with Torcy in 1715). See also bn Car. H. 99, fols 310–11. The title of his position varies among commentators. Sahuc, Archives Saint-Pons, 1:1909–2, calls him Croissy’s commis in descriptions of legal papers for grants made in 1689–92. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228, calls him principal commis under father and son. Rott, Inventaire, 4:479, lists Blondel as Torcy’s secretary in 1698 and as a commis in 1699 (ibid., 343). Baschet, Dépôt, 275, says he was both a secretary and a premier commis, whereas Piccioni, Commis, 188–9, says that Baschet was mistaken in calling him a premier commis. The primary sources also use these labels



98

99

100

101 102 03 1 104

105

06 1 107

Notes to pages 245–7

603

inconsistently and interchangeably. bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 2 (Nov. 1711), calls him Torcy’s secretary, while bnpo 371, fol. 33 (Dec. 1711), lists him as Torcy’s secretary and premier commis. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61. For Blondel’s marriage contract, see bn, Car. H. 99, fols 310–11v. For Marin, see Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228; and Villain, Fortune Colbert, 145, 147n9, 167–9, 183, 186, 213–14, 220, 261, where Marin is also called Colbert’s commis and secretary. For Marin’s office in the queen’s household, see État de la France (1665), 2: n.p. aae md 1009, fol. 144 (Mar. 1693); and ibid, 1019, fol. 235 (June 1693). Bonrepaus still called him Croissy’s commis in a letter of that year (ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 354). aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 431r, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 19 Apr. 1694. As a further sign of Blondel’s enhanced position, Bonrepaus solicited his help in obtaining a pension for his brother, Lieutenant General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac. Frondeville, “Registres-mémoriaux,” 221–2, reports that Rouen’s Chambre des comptes received a royal order that Blondel receive the office’s gages in 1696, the same year he sold it. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 488v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 12 Oct. 1694. Samoyault, Bureaux, 219–20; he lists several such interdepartmental friendships, albeit from after 1715. Meyer, “Marine française,” 488–9, 506–8; and Bergin, Richelieu, 94–118. Taillemite, Colbert, 16; Luçay, Origines, 588–92; Ranum, Richelieu, 34–5, 72n1, 98–9; Sarmant, Ministres guerre, 84, 205; Bluche, Dictionnaire, 41; and Bély, Dictionnaire des ministres, 31–3, 36. Luçay, Origines, 49, 593, says they were reunited in 1644 but only briefly, and Taillemite, Colbert, 16, concurs. Barbiche, Institutions, 178, 212, says they were united from 1642 until 1661. Dessert, La Royale, 22, says the navy was entrusted to Foreign Secretary Brienne when Mazarin assumed power and then Louis XIV gave the Levant to Le Tellier in 1661. Why this confusion? When Michel Le Tellier was named secretary of state for war on 13 April 1643, he exercised his duties only by commission. Secretary François Sublet de Noyers refused to relinquish the office, so Le Tellier lacked full legal standing as secretary until 20 October 1645 with Sublet’s death. André, Michel Le Tellier, 93–101, 665–6; and Sarmant, Ministres guerre, 238. Thus, it is likely that Brienne handled Le Tellier’s official paperwork for the Mediterranean fleet from 1643 to 1645. Brienne also filled in for Le Tellier as head of the war department when he was in exile during the Fronde (ibid.). In any event, the documents generated on behalf of the diminished Mediterranean fleet paled in volume and importance beside those of the new war secretary’s military responsibilities. Meyer, “Marine française,” 512–13. Taillemite, Colbert, 17–21; and Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 180–1.

604

Notes to pages 247–9

108 Consulates returned to the foreign ministry briefly from 1762 to 1764 and then definitively in 1793. 109 The règlement of 7 March 1669 is in Colbert, Lettres, vol. 3, pt 1: 104–5. See also Poumarède, “Naissance d’une institution,” 65–128; Mézin, ­Consuls, 3–4, 9–11, 16–17, 20–3; Barbiche, Institutions, 220–2; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 201–11. Mansel, Levant, 1–15, offers a quick introduction to the Levant and describes Pera, a suburb outside the walls of Constan­ tinople by the Christian district of Galata, where the embassies were located. 110 See Mézin, Consuls, 362–3, on La Chausse. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 4:32–3, La Chausse to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1711, reported on the magnificent decorations for the memorial service for the late Grand Dauphin and the complaints of a cardinal of the Austrian faction. He sent the minister a copy of the relation of the service he had written and published in Italian for propaganda purposes. He also assisted Torcy with his own art purchases (ibid., 100). In 1712 there was a flurry of letters about an incident in which Roman constables accosted a liveried porter of the French Academy of Painting and Sculpture while he bathed in the Tiber (ibid., 116–17, 123, 135, 138, 148). When the affair was finally resolved to the satisfaction of Louis XIV’s honour, La Chausse wrote Torcy (10 Sept. 1712) implying that Cardinal La Trémoille, the French envoy, had lacked force in defending French honour (ibid., 146). He also worked with Torcy to purchase on behalf of Philippe d’Orléans the art collection of the late Queen Christiana of Sweden from her indebted heirs. Ancel, “Tableaux Christine,” 223–7. 111 Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 179. See Colbert, Lettres, vol. 3, pt 1: passim, for his letters to Croissy in London on naval matters. 112 Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 128. For Smyrna, see Paris, Histoire du commerce, 437–5; and Mansel, Levant, 16–35, who notes that the city of 100,000 was known as the “eye of Asia” and the “pearl of Asia.” 113 Mansel, Levant, 27. 114 Mézin, Consuls, 29–44, on the “nation” and consular functions. On these tensions, see Masson, Histoire du commerce, 2404–3; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:3–34, 231–6. 115 Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5: 44–64; and Masson, Histoire du commerce, 193–7, 242–7. Bonrepaus, who later formed a close relationship with the Blondel brothers, was sent by Seignelay to Provence to mediate differences among the company directors. Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 117–18, has summaries of Gagny’s letters. 116 Masson, Histoire du commerce, 243–4, 258–68; and Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:67–71. 117 The letters from Châteauneuf to the navy secretary and others are summarized in Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 121–31 (the



118

119

120 121

122

123

124

125

Notes to pages 249–50

605

index mistakenly credits all of its Blondel references to Charles Blondel de ­Jouvancourt, Joseph’s brother). Neuville, État Archives marine, 32; Peter, Manufactures Marine, 184–6; and Taillemite, Archives marine Série B Tables, 269, which says that Gagny retired from this post in 1695. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 33. The date and location are from Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253. Marie-Madeline’s obituary is in Le Mercure (1723), 621–2. ­Dessert, Argent, 586, notes Augustin Ferriol’s role as a financier. See Asse, “Président de Ferriol,” 129–40, 161–71, for fuller biographical information. For the Ferriol family, see Michel, Biographie Parlement de Metz, 159–60. For Charles Ferriol, see France, Recueil, 29:150–1. As aptly named and described by Dessert, Royaume Colbert, 19; and Dessert, La Royale, 74–7. Dessert, Argent, 699–700; and Boislisle, “Bonrepaus,” 88–91, 105–11, ­153–9, 166–75, 181–92, 196–203, provide biographical details. Bonrepaus served as a galley officer, commissioner general of the marine en Ponant, intendant general of the navy, and inspector of the classes, undertaking missions to England and Denmark for the foreign secretary. He was also a tax farmer and businessman involved in various Colbert royal companies and furnishing the navy with food supplies. Dessert, La Royale, 58–9. cp Danemark 47, fol. 350, Bonrepaus to Mignon, 15 Dec. 1693, instructed him to send his 6,000 livres gratification to Blondel, who would give it to his banker Lubert. On 27 July 1694 Bonrepaus wrote Blondel about funds owed to him. Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 323. cp Danemark 47, fols 365–8, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 1 Oct. 1693. Ibid., fol. 368v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 8 Dec. 1693, said that he wanted 18,000 livres for the commissaire, but would ask 14,000, and that he had already drawn 1,500 écus from his banker Lubert. For the sale of such commissions, see Barbiche, Institutions, 82, 191. An inventory of Bonrepaus’s outgoing correspondence (other than official dispatches to the king and the foreign secretary) for 6 April–15 December 1699, the period of his second ambassadorship in The Hague, mentions all three acting on his behalf: for Blondel, Mensonides, “Inventaire Correspondance Bonrepaus,” 9, 18, 25, 27, 30–2, 35–8, 40; for Gagny, ibid., 13, 32, 37, 40; and for Azincourt, ibid., 25. Mensonides, however, misidentified (ibid., 13) “Blondel” as the recipient of a letter congratulating him upon becoming a treasurer of the king’s buildings, which was clearly intended for his brother Gagny, identified elsewhere in the inventory as “Blondel, trésorier des bâtiments.” This suggests that other letters in the inventory marked as to Blondel were in fact to Gagny, who was a large-scale financier. Bonrepaus’s letters to Blondel, 1693–99, are excerpted in Picard, ­Corpus Racinianum, 300, 314, 323–6, 343, 348–50. See also Picard, “Racine

606

126

127 128 29 1 130

131

132

133

134

135 136

Notes to pages 251–2 courtisan,” 726–43. For Cavoye, see ss-Coirault, 1:137, 275–7, 610 (his friendship with Racine). For the Bontemps, see ibid., 808–10. Mme B ­ ontemps promoted her son in the household. He accompanied Philip V to Spain as first valet of the wardrobe and confidant (ibid., 7:855–6). Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 324–5, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 10 Aug. 1694. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 171, 171n122, stresses that absent ambassadors needed friendly forces at court to watch out for their interests. Picard, Corpus Racinianum, 343, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 5 Feb. 1695. Ranum, Artisans of Glory, 292–6, 310, 316, 316n97; and Picard, “Racine courtisan,” 728–9. Hampton, “Tragedy of Delegation.” Biographical details for Jean-Baptiste are in Racine, Oeuvres, 1:120–2, ­164–7. Ibid., 7:139n2, 159–60, 193, 193n2–195, 198–202, 226–8, 249, 256, 258–60, 265, 272–4, 280–2, are relevant letters between Racine family members. Ibid., 226; and Turgeon, “Letters Racine to Renaudot,” 172–83. For the positive assessment of young Racine that Torcy gave to his father, see Picard, “Racine courtisan,” 742. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 125. For his titles, see Hozier and Tupigny, Armorial Paris, 1:55. For her death, see an y 5331, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 307, 19 June 1692. http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom. php?idcollection=100&page=307 These duties are described in Ordonnance de Louis XIV, 209–14. ­Azincourt’s position as a treasurer is unclear. Ibid., 403–34, describes the accounting procedures and the role of the two general treasurers of the navy (one for the Atlantic and one for the Mediterranean) and their commis at each port. See also Legohérel, Trésoriers généraux. The Atlantic general treasurer from 1678 to 1705 was not Azincourt but Lubert (ibid., 67), Bonrepaus’s banker. Perhaps Azincourt was Lubert’s commis at Dunkirk, but his title of trésorier confuses matters. The marriage was to Ludwine-Charlotte-Louise Van der Mersch ­(Vandermeersch) and produced four children. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 125. Her father, François Van der Mersch, was the “utérin-frère” (half-brother on his mother’s side) of Bart’s second wife, Marie-Jacqueline Tugghe. ­Mancel, “Famille de Jean Bart,” 333–4, 435; and Van der Mersch, Révolution ­Belgique, 46, 49. Van der Mersch was a volunteer with Bart from 1688 and entered the navy in 1703, continuing as a corsair with a royal vessel and advancing in the fleet. Malo, Corsaires, 2:430–1. Lesmaires, “Imprimeries,” 225–6. Jal, Dictionnaire, 1252–4, has an entry on Vergier. Wijnne, Négociations d’Avaux, 1:22 (although the editor could not identify the brother, Azincourt seems likely).



Notes to pages 252–3

607

137 Dangeau, Journal, 4:211 (20 Dec. 1692), on their departure from court; and ibid., 247 (16 Mar. 1693), on Bart’s safe return to Dunkirk. 138 Writing from Denmark, Bonrepaus mentioned to Blondel that his brother was traveling on his behalf to Provence with a letter of exchange. Writing to Blondel’s brother the same day with further instructions, Bonrepaus addressed him as councillor and secretary of the king and “général des vivres de la Marine” (commissary general of the navy). aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 45v, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 26 Mar. 1697; and ibid., fols 47r–48, ­Bonrepaus to Azincourt, 26 Mar. 1697. Not long after, Blondel received a letter from Bonrepaus’s brother, Lieutenant General Jean d’Usson, marquis de Bezac, assuring him that the ambassador owed his brother a great deal (ibid., fol. 108). See also ibid., fol. 203r, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 9 July 1697. Bluche, Dictionnaire, 393, observes that the label councillor and secretary of the king was given so widely as to be almost meaningless. However, in aae cp Danemark 58, fol. 399, Bonrepaus wrote Blondel on 15 October 1697 that because he had not received a response from Torcy to his letters, his ordonnances were in the hands of “Mr Blondel [d’Azincourt] général des vivres.” 139 Azincourt was among the notables, including navy intendant Claude Cébéret and Jean Bart buried in choir of Saint-Eloi in Dunkirk. Lemaire, “Peut-on espérer retrouver les restes de Jean Bart?,” 296. After his death his widow, who apparently moved to Paris to be near her powerful Blondel kinsmen, was in possession of a good library. On 29 May 1710 Iberville wrote ­Gualterio that the books he wanted were kept chez Mme d’Azincourt, widow of Blondel’s brother. He would find a way of sending them to London. bl am 20351, fol. 138. 140 Dessert, La Royale, 62–5, describes this system, while ibid., 290–3, lists the members of the companies. On Lubert and du Pille, see ibid., 66. Dessert, Argent, has brief biographies of many of the two companies’ financiers, but his only mention of Joseph Blondel de Gagny (ibid., 586) mistakes him for his brother the général des vivres. 141 Both labels are from Dessert, La Royale, 74–7. For discussion of these groups, especially in connection with Chamillart, see Rowlands, Financial Decline. 142 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:227. 143 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, dates his appointment 1 September, whereas Deschard, Organisation, 105, dates it 1 November. 144 Chapman, Private Ambition, 117–29. 145 Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 77, on Ferriol’s military career in the east. For his early missions and instructions, see France, Recueil, 29:149–62. ­Bonnac, Mémoire, 48–9, claims that Ferriol originally fled to Poland because of a liaison with the daughter of a great family. When a quarrel with a Polish

608

146 147

148 149

150

151 152

153

154

Notes to pages 254–5 magnate over a gambling debt threatened to turn violent, the French ambassador to Warsaw sent Ferriol to Hungary to join the rebels. France, Recueil, 29:150–1. For Jouvancourt, see Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41; and Deschard, Organisation, 105. Deschard, Organisation, 105. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41, mistakenly says Toulouse rather than Toulon. The duties of the various écrivains are outlined in the 1689 Ordonnance de marine, 182–3, 267–72. Bonnac, Mémoire, 49. Ibid. For Fonton, see Testa and Gautier, Drogmans, 48–50, 163–4. ­Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 775 (Ferriol to Augustin Ferriol, 26 May 1708), relates the outrage that his surgeon Duchin had received the bastinado from the Turks for being caught on a horse in Constantinople, even though he was rushing to the side of a seriously ill patient. He added that Mme de Croissy would be greatly vexed when she heard of this, suggesting that the surgeon was perhaps her client. Sareil, Les Tencin, 18–19; and Vaillot, Madame de Tencin, 40–1. In a 1 August 1707 letter to Torcy, Ferriol called the minister his protector. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 683. aae md 1040, fol. 69, 15 Feb. 1696. France, Recueil, 29:163–74, instructions dated 28 May 1699. See Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:91–2, on relations with Turkey from 1697 to 1715. Rousseau, Relations Turquie, 1:64–94, notes that persuading the Turks to attack the emperor in Hungary took on greater urgency as war in Europe looked increasingly likely. This underlined Ferriol’s experience in Hungary and his value as ambassador. Bonnac, Mémoire, 113–33, is Ferriol’s 10 August 1711 account for the king of his mission in which he defends his actions, beginning in Hungary in 1676. Topin, Homme masque de fer, chaps 11–14, counters the mid-eighteenth-­ century speculation that Armenian Patriarch Avedick was the mysterious “man in the iron mask.” Topin shows how Ferriol worked in concert with Versailles to promote missions and had cover from the king, Pontchartrain, and Torcy for kidnapping Avedick on his way into exile and secretly diverting him to France to be imprisoned at Mont Saint-Michel and then the Bastille. Topin is harshly critical of Ferriol. A more favourable assessment of him as a diplomat is Asse, “Ferriol et Aïssé,” 1–48, 97–144, 169–210, which includes biographical details. Asse, “Ferriol et Aïssé,” 74–94, is an account of Jouvancourt’s 1703 mission. For Maurocordato (1641–1709), see Somel, Historical dictionary, 176. Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 184, indicate that Ferriol had also sent Jouvancourt to court with Turkish responses to his demands in the late summer of 1701. Ferriol to Blondel, 8 Nov. 1707, extols the continuing value of the pension to Maurocordato. Varenbergh, ­“Correspondance



155

156 157

58 1 159

160 161

162

163

164

Notes to pages 255–7

609

Ferriol,” 695. Bonnac, Mémoire, 50–1, reports that he had it from ­Jouvancourt that if Ferriol had been more moderate and worn only a ceremonial “short” sword rather than insisting upon a long dueling sword the incident could have been avoided. Jouvancourt kept the sword as a curiosity. Mézin, Consuls, 44–6; and Masson, Histoire du commerce, 262–7. From 1691 the king took responsibility for the appointment and pay of chancellors. Mézin, Consuls, 10–11, 22–3. This was true even after he had largely lost the right to appoint them. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 655–7, 679, 685, 691, 717, 726, 817–18, 838. On 4 January 1709, Ferriol wrote his brother’s wife that Pontchartrain would answer to God for the injustice he had done him (ibid., 820). Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 189–97. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 696–7 (Ferriol to Blondel, 8 Nov. 1707), with a list of suggested candidates to fill consular openings. On 2 February 1708 Ferriol wrote Jouvancourt requesting that he ask Blondel and Salaberry to intervene with Pontchartrain for approval of the two positions of enfant de langue he had requested long ago (ibid., 735–6). Kroell, ­“Billon de Cancerille,” 133, is another example of their combined influence in obtaining appointments. Salaberry was premier commis of the bureau of the Levant from 1688 to 1709. Vergé-Franceschi, Marine française, 206. Carrière et al., Marseille, ville morte, 241–2; and Hozier and Tupigny, Armorial général, 495–7. For the Richard family, see Mézin, Consuls, 519–20; “Tablettes généalogiques et nobiliaires,” 254–5; and Rédit and Richard, Inventaire Vienne, 1:101. A curious journal kept by Charles Demaillasson, avocat du roi in Montmorillon, records the marriage of Joseph Richard and Catherine Blondel, the birth of their children, and various trips to Paris. Bardet, “Journal de Demaillasson [vol. 2],” 71, 74, 83, 92, 103, 105, 112. Bardet’s notes show that the Blondel siblings remained close: in 1713, when the chambermaid of Marie Blondel, widow of Gabriel de la Porte du Theil, married a Montmorillon merchant, the bride assembled her own dowry from 900 livres owed to her by Gagny and 500 livres owed by Blondel (ibid., 395n1). For the enfants [or jeunes] de langues, see Dupont-Ferrier, Du Collège de Clermont, 3:349–63, 418–21 (listing the enfants under Louis XIV); and Hossain, “Training of Interpreters.” Teissier, Inventaire Chambre, 96 (Ferriol’s letter to the chamber of 29 Aug. 1700); and Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 180 (Ferriol’s letter to Pontchartrain of 24 Aug. 1700). For the Gleises, see Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 539–40, ­552–4; Marchand, Intendant, 132–42; and Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:384–5, ­Harlay to Desmaretz, 6 July 1711.

610

Notes to pages 257–8

165 A Gleise had served as consul at Salonika from 1685 to 1688. Saint-Yves, “Consulats,” 276. Another was involved in 1658 with another Marseille family for the consulate of Cairo. Paris, Histoire du commerce, 5:207–8. 166 Marchand, Intendant, 132–3; and Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 16–21. 167 Klijn, “Networks,” 262. 168 R.A.W. Rhodes, quoted in ibid. 169 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21–3; and especially Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 538–9, 544–51, detail Marseille’s lobbying efforts. See also Kettering, “Brokerage,” 81–2. Rambert, Histoire du commerce, 42–5, offers a case study of Blondel’s involvement. bn mf 18979, fol. 104v, lists payments Blondel received for distribution; and ibid., 8867, fols 9ff, describes his fortune. When the parish church of his lordship of Vaucresson was repaired, he contributed to the design and supervised the project’s contractor. He also petitioned Mme de Maintenon for funds for the work, to which he also contributed. Ferté, Vie religieuse, 91–3, 97. The Saint-Cyr convent of which Maintenon was the protector had the right to appoint Vaucresson’s priest. Hurtaut and Magny, Dictionnaire, 772. 170 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21. 171 Ibid., 38–63, on the Fabres. Joseph Fabre was deputy to the Council of Commerce 1700–03, and his younger brother Mathieu served 1703–14. bn mf 8867, fols 9ff, is a list in chart form maintained by Lebret from 1699 to 1709. It includes all of Marseille’s municipal posts and those who held them, noting time of service, personal characteristics, and connections. Many were marked as family or followers of the Gleise. 172 Kettering, French Society, 56. Takeda, “Absolutism, Marseillais Civic Humanism,” 722–34, argues that from at least 1700 the crown made use of traditional municipal language of public good to promote absolutist goals. Joseph Fabre played an important role in this as the city’s deputy to the Council of Commerce. 173 See Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:385, Harlay to Desmaretz, 6 July 1711, for Anfossy and Sossin. Babeau, Villars, gouverneur de Provence, 102–3, cites a 1713 letter from Lebret to Villars informing him “en secret” that Grignan was one of the causes of Marseille’s disorders because he was the long-time protector of the cabal that ran it. Under the Regency, Villars headed the commission that investigated the cabal’s affairs and led to a new municipal regulation in March 1717 (ibid., 107–11). 174 Klijn, “Networks,” 263–4. The realities of policy implementation make it likely that such networks existed in other sectors of the government as well. 175 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 21, says that Blondel was not without his own links to Marseille, citing his brother-in-law, Jean-Baptiste Estelle. However, that marriage did not take place until 1699. Carrière et al., Marseille, ville morte, 242. Schaeper, “Government and Business,” 540, mentions



176

177

178 179

180

181

182

Notes to pages 258–9

611

J­ ouvancourt’s marriage to a Gleise and his position as Marseille controller of the galleys as two of the reasons Blondel remained as lobbyist even after Marseille was represented in Paris from 1700 in the new Council of Commerce. That marriage, however, was on 26 September 1703. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3. As for Jouvancourt’s galley position, it began in 1704. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3, on the marriage. Among their children were Roseline, who became a nun (Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:253n3), and a son who died as commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille 7 July 1746 (Deschard, Organisation, 105n2). When his father-in-law purchased one of the charges of secretary of the king created in 1704, Mathieu Fabre and Gagny were among his references (“témoins”). Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:631–2. Deschard, Organisation, 24–6, 105. His particular office was Marseille’s “commissaire des galères en charge et contrôleur” (commissioner of galleys in charge and controller). Zaïmova and Henrat, Correspondance consulaire, 204–5, Jouvancourt to “son frère à la cour,” 21 Jan. 1705. Deschard, Organisation, 105: 15 Jan. 1714, commissaire ordonnateur des galères at Marseille; 30 Apr. 1716, commissaire General des galères at Marseille; 1 Apr. 1722, intendant des Iles du Vent (the Lesser Antilles and Martinique); and intendant des galères at Marseille. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1: 253n3, gives his death date. ­ 12–13, Taillemite, Inventaire archives marine B7, 1:29, 51, 72, 79, 100, 110, 1 117, 119, 122, 137, 141–2, 144, 155, 157, 159, 162, 164, 172, 174, 180, 195, 199, 201, 204, 206, 211, 216, for the years 1709–11. Plantet, Correspondance Deys d’Alger, 2:71, Bekir-Reis (Algerian ambassador) to Pontchartrain, Mar. 1711, lists Jouvancourt among those amassing naval supplies requested for his return voyage. In Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 647–865, most letters are to ­Jouvancourt or Augustin Ferriol. Gagny makes an appearance in these financial matters (ibid., 648, 764), as does Michel Gleise (ibid., 674, 755, 773), who traded in Constantinople and was one of the two deputies of the “nation” with whom Ferriol worked as Constantinople’s consul. On 5 January 1709 Ferriol wrote Blondel (ibid., 822) to thank him for taking his part against those who were smearing his name. He cast about for who might have complained about him, lighting on Michel Gleise, Jouvancourt’s kinsman by marriage, whom Ferriol accused of being a scandalous libertine whom he had nonetheless favoured and raised above his rank. Nothing apparently came of this wild accusation. Thereafter, Ferriol’s ire was reserved for Pontchartrain and the Turkish agent who visited Versailles to request his recall (ibid., 828, 836). Jouvancourt’s role as a financier is also signaled by

612

183 184 85 1 186

187

188

89 1 190

91 1 192 193

Notes to pages 259–61 his office of treasurer of France in Auch from 1719 to 1729. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 41. Among other places, this is recounted in Maulde-La-Clavière, Mille et une nuits, 197–204. Montaiglon, Correspondance des directeurs, 4:112, 134, for letters to d’Antin and Torcy, 7 July and 7 Aug. 1712. Ringot and Sarmant, “Surintendance des Bâtiments,” 64–5. Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:570, 5:571. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:139 (21 Mar. 1699), says Blondel purchased the office of intendant des bâtiments from Mansart for himself or one of his brothers. Dangeau, Journal, 7:49 (16 Mar. 1699), also mentions the purchase. Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61, says it was in 1700, but that was actually his first full year of service. État de la France (1708), 1:329, lists Blondel, Torcy’s secretary, as alternatif among three Intendants & Ordonnateurs des Bâtiments serving by year. Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:306, 5:840, 930. According to État de la France (1702), 322, Gagny served in 1701, while his fellow treasurer was to serve in 1702. Ibid., (1708), 1:329, lists Blondel [de Gagny], secretary of the king, as one of the two who owned the three offices of treasurers. Sarmant, Demeures, 89–95, 111. The intendants and treasurers served triennially. In a 6 August 1708 letter to Jouvancourt, Ferriol wrote from Constantinople that he thought that “M. Blondel” will be happier with d’Antin as head of Bâtiments than he had been with Mansart since the duke will deal with matters more nobly (“traittera les choses plus noblement”). It is likely he meant Gagny, since he typically referred to Blondel as either “M. de ­Vaucresson” or your brother (“monsieur votre frère”) (e.g., in Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 711, 716). Ringot and Sarmant, “Surintendance des Bâtiments,” 65–7. Tiberghien, Versailles, 504 (54 for the quotation and 54n1 for Joseph Blondel [de Gagny]). Guiffrey, Comptes des Bâtiments, 4:953, notes that Gagny was paid 2,312 livres on 1 August 1703 (9 per cent interest for six months on 50,000 livres) and the same on 12 September. Asse, “President Ferriol,” 136–8. Claeys, Dictionnaire, 1:254, 254n1; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1: 227. Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 714 (Ferriol to Blondel, 4 Dec. 1707). Two days later Ferriol shared with Jouvancourt that he hoped Blondel would be able to sort out a thorny matter with Bernard on his behalf (ibid., 716). On 1 December 1703 d’Argenson wrote Chamillart that Blondel, one of Torcy’s premiers commis, was intimate friends with Bernard. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:133. aae md 1186, fol. 246r–v, a 6 May 1712 letter to Bernard about transfers of funds and written on Torcy’s behalf appears to be from Blondel.



Notes to pages 261–2

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194 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61. Melleville, Dictionnaire de l’Aisne, 2:204, notes the 27 June 1706 contract in Paris for the acquisition with his wife of the domain of Sissonne, for which he rendered homage on 16 July. 195 Nouailhac, Les Blondel, 61–2. For Vintimille, see Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 482–3; for Daspe, see Couaix, “Monographie d’un village,” 521–2; and for Berthelier, see Tessereau, Histoire Grande Chancelerie, 2:514. Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 22, reports that in 1704 Blondel’s daughter received from the Marseille Chamber of Commerce a wedding gift of rich fabrics. Hyrvoix de Landosle, “Congrès de Bade,” 322, notes du Luc’s close marital and professional ties with Blondel. 196 Fournier, Chambre de commerce, 23. 197 an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 28, 19 Dec. 1725, http://doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=28 198 Colbert wrote of this in a secret journal. In December 1663 he arranged for the boy to be cared for by Gury Focard (Focart) de Beauchamps and his wife Clémence Pré, who lived on rue aux Ours, informing them that the child belonged to one of his brothers and a woman of quality. Thinking they were saving his sibling’s honour, they accepted the infant when he was secretly given to them at 6 a.m. on a street near the Hôtel Colbert and had him baptized at their parish church. A M. de Lincour and demoiselle ­Elisabeth du Beux were listed as parents and the Beauchamps as godparents. Père Anselme, the genealogist, said that the child, who would have been known as Louis de Bourbon, died unlegitimated on 15 July 1666 and was buried at Saint-Eustache. A later marginal note on Anselme’s manuscript adds that Beauchamp was the father of Torcy’s secretary Beauchamp, believed to have married Marin’s daughter. Colbert, Lettres, 6:462–4. Anselme skips a generation, however, since Torcy’s secretary was Gury’s grandson. A 1653 contract shows Guy [sic] Focart de Beauchamp leasing a house on rue aux Ours and the corner of rue Salle-au-Comte, while a 10 February 1667 contract shows him in possession as owner. A 13 July 1684 record, however, lists Jeanne Marie Marin, widow of M. Antoine Faucart de Beauchamp, and M. Fiacre Dufour as joint guardians of “Antoine François Faucart de Beauchamp,” son and sole heir of his late father and owner of the rue aux Ours house. Brièle, Supplément inventaire hospitalières, 148. This means that Antoine died and Antoine-François was born sometime before mid-July 1684. 199 Curiously, Samoyault, Bureaux, 294, says nothing of Beauchamp’s time in the foreign office when tracing his career, but adds concerning his daughter (ibid., 211n32) that her father had been Torcy’s secretary in his youth. Baschet, Dépôt, 284, also says nothing of his foreign office service. Beauchamp receives no mention in either Piccioni or Baillou. aae md 1517, fol. 109, is a 20 May 1707 note from Beauchamp, apparently to Torcy, informing him that with Fournier’s help he had found the requested clarification and

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201 202 203

204

205

206

207

208 209

Notes to pages 262–3 was sending the copy he made of a document along with extracts he had taken from some others. See accounts in ibid., 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v; ibid., 1186, fols 361–2r; and ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v. Potier de Courcy, Nobiliaire Bretagne, 3:72. Fourmont, Histoire Chambre des comptes, 343, says that he was received 8 July 1713, having purchased one of two offices created in October 1711. At one point he was authorized by the chamber to borrow 100,000 livres in its name. France, Inventairesommaire Loire-Inférieure, 1:181. Samoyault, Bureaux, 211n32, 285, 294. For Marie-Françoise’s marriage, see p. 261. Affiches, annonces, et avis divers (1754), 263. For his career, see aae ppsr 66, fols 147–9 and 173; Baschet, Dépôt, 275–91 (along with some extracts from letters, including a 1705 letter from Spain from du Theil to Blondel); La Porte des Vaulx, Histoire généalogique, 304–9, 337 (a list of documentation), 345–7 (for dates); Piccioni, Commis, 194–206; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 38, 159, 293–4. La Porte des Vaulx, however, mistakes François Blondel for the engineer and mathematician of the same name (Histoire généalogique, 304). Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 2d ed., 12: 141–3, is also useful, but mistakenly calls Marie Blondel, Torcy’s secretary’s sister, his daughter. His father died in 1689. an y 5310, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 11, 10 Dec. 1689, http://doc.geneanet. org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=138&page=11 aae ppsr 66, fol. 148. Baschet, Dépôt, 278, says the end of 1705; and ­Piccioni, Commis, 197, says 1706; but Samoyault, Bureaux, 294, and La Porte des Vaulx, Histoire généalogique, 305, have the correct date. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 96, Juan de Herrara to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1709, Madrid, is an example of his knowledge of Spain being put to use. The letter has a note on it saying that du Theil will make an extract of it. Samoyault, Bureaux, 165, mentions his knowledge of Italian. aae ppsr 66, fol. 148. Baschet, Dépôt, 279, excerpts the king’s 29 May 1713 letter appointing him, while his 3 November 1713 letter of provision is in aae md 1190, fol. 480v. aae cp Suisse 254, fol. 69, du Luc to Torcy, 20 Aug. 1714. Writing from Baden, he offered an honest assessment of du Theil, insisting that it was not based on the fact that he was Blondel’s nephew, to whom the ambassador was obligated. He found du Theil to be worthy of the minister’s protection and esteem because of his composed yet lively and quick mind. The ambassador also praised his fidelity in preparing dispatches, neither adding to nor subtracting from their necessary content. For Richard de Tussac, see Samoyault, Bureaux, 165, 3040–5. For François Faucard and his career, see ibid., 285; and France, Recueil, 31: 233ff. Fould, Diplomate; and Roman d’Amat, “Blondel (Louis-Augustin),” 702–3.



Notes to pages 265–6

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210 Adam died in November 1724, having retired from public office in 1718. See aae pvr, 1, fols 173–5; bn db 3, pièces 66 and 67, listing the ­Chalons connection; bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 2–3; and an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 36, 25 Feb. 1725, http://doc.geneanet. org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=36. See also ­Boislisle’s notes in ss-Boislisle, 26:182–3, 523; Piccioni, Commis, 166–79 (who says he was born c. 1650); Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:40, on témoins (witnesses) for secretaries of the king; and ibid., 123, on Adam (which says he was born c. 1645). The fullest and most authoritative biography, Delavaud, “Adam,” 443–7, says he was born between 1640 and 1650. Quesnet and Parfouru, Inventaire Ille-et-Vilaine, 2:350, notes the Breton annuities. Tourmont to Rébenac, 12 Apr. 1680, in Feuquières, Lettres, 5:126, mentions the Berlin trip. For the Paris residence he owned until 1721, see Vitu, Maison mortuaire Molière, 120, 351. In 1671 Pachau was said to have had two “garcons” since 1669 to do the actual code work because of his poor eyesight. Delavaud, “Adam,” 443. 211 aae cp Angleterre 221, fol. 267, Adam to Hooke, 11 Mar. 1707, Glatigny. Piccioni, Commis, 178, unaware of Adam’s earlier Parisian residence, notes his purchase of a house on rue de la Sourdière in 1720, mistakenly claiming that he lived only at Versailles until then. For this purchase, see bnpo 8, fol. 24. 212 Delavaud, “Adam,” 443–5, gives a fuller account of this diplomatic errand than does Piccioni. On the rather shady La Neuville, see Madariaga, “Foy de La Neuville,” 21–30. For the canal project, see Marcel, Inventaire papiers de Cotte, 12. 213 For his gratification, see aae md 1012, fol. 59. See also Delavaud, “Adam,” 443; and Piccioni, Commis, 169–70. aae md 1044, fol. 8 (28 Jan. 1697), is a payment for his role with tutors. For tutelage in law, see Chéruel, Dictionnaire historique, 2:1232. 214 Roth, “Torcy,” 188. 215 Piccioni, Commis, 176. 216 aae md 1160, fol. 21 (1708). 217 Piccioni, Commis, 176. It was Beauvillier, however, who acted as reporter in the Conseil. Lizerand, Beauvillier, 169. A similar situation occurred when Louvois’s premier commis Saint-Pouange opened letters during his absence and reported their contents to the king. Saint-Pouange became a trusted advisor to both king and minister. Baxter, Servants of the Sword, 204. 218 bn mf 6944, fol. 245, Torcy to duchesse de Noailles, 6 Sept. 1710, refers to papers he gave to Adam, who had the honour of her protection and was zealous in her service. 219 Dangeau, Journal, 15:390; ss-Boislisle, 26:182–3, 523; and Cermakian, Ursins, 537–8.

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Notes to pages 266–7

220 Piccioni, Commis, 169–70, quotes Le Dran’s low opinion of Adam, but Baschet, Dépôt, 85, calls him Torcy’s “commis de confiance” (confidential clerk). 221 Piccioni, Commis, 178, reports that Adam headed one of the three bureaus of the Polysynod’s “Conseil des affaires du dedans” (Council of Interior Affairs), which is confirmed by the Almanach Royal (1716), 60–1. See aae md 1212, fols 3, 9–10, and 24–5, for some of his work on the regent’s behalf in 1715. Ibid., 1095, fol. 54, 4 July 1718, is a petition concerning a benefice addressed to Adam at his home. 222 For Adam fils, see Piccioni, Commis, 169, 172–3, 188. He appears consistently in payroll accounts from 1709 until 1715. See, for example, aae md1163, fol. 292v; ibid., 1196, fol. 150v; ibid., 1197, fols, 16–17; and ibid., 1208, fol. 23. For Nicolas Adam, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:289; and aae md 1148, fol. 175v, for a reimbursement for a trip to Spain in 1707. For Prévost, see Piccioni, Commis, 186; and aae md 307, fols 82–8, Dec. 1706. ­Dupilet, Régence absolue, 211, mistakenly says that he served his father-in-law as a commis. Adam’s other daughter, Charlotte Michelle, married Jacques Le Diacre, écuyer, sieur Daingreville, and king’s councillor and royal avocat in the Paris Bureau of Finances and Chamber of the Domain. an y 5283, Registre de clôtures d’inventaires après décès, fol. 36, 25 Feb. 1725, http:// doc.geneanet.org/registres/zoom.php?idcollection=119&page=36 223 Leclercq, Histoire, 1:149 224 bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2; bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 2–10; ibid., pièce 74, fols 178r–80; aae md 1204, fol. 87ff; and ibid., 1207, fol. 176r, for references to his letters of nobility. For biographical details, see Delavaud, “Éducation,” 336n3; “Nobiliaire et armorial (dixième article),” 337; Piccioni, Commis, 179–83; Samoyault, Bureaux, 301–2; and Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054–5. Most secondary accounts place Pecquet’s retirement due to illness in 1725, but Marais, Journal, 2:632, has a 16 March 1723 entry noting ­Pecquet’s illness and Cardinal Dubois’s sorrow over losing such a good “second.” Pecquet’s son joined him that same year, so perhaps though largely sidelined by health the father nonetheless officially remained as premier commis until his son could succeed him in 1725. 225 Antoine fils entered the foreign office as a commis in 1723, succeeded Antoine père as premier commis in 1725, wrote the Discours sur l’Art de Négocier (published in 1737), and was disgraced and imprisoned in 1740 for having too close an association with foreign secretary and garde des sceaux Germain Louis de Chauvelin, who had fallen three years earlier. Pecquet, Discourse sur l’Art of Negotiation, xiii–xv. The editors provide some information on the father but unfortunately confuse father and son when discussing the latter’s service upon his father’s recommendation as secretary to SaintSimon during his embassy to Spain (1721–22). Saint-Simon to Dubois, 13 Jan. 1722, in Saint-Simon, Siècles et jours, 228.



Notes to page 267

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226 Michel Pecquet was employed on fortifications from 1675 until his death in 1688. See bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2r–v; and bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8. Lequoy, Maisons Senlis, 1:169–70, 174, records property acquisitions in Senlis of “Michel Pecquet marchand et Madeleine Desvoies sa femme.” Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, mistakenly calls Michel a Paris merchant. 227 bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8, notes that from 1682 Antoine served in the “fortifications de … places, et qu’il a continue de faire, tant dans nos bastiments et ouvrages publics.” See also bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2r–v. 228 Chotard, Louis XIV, Louvois, Vauban, 273, quotes from and summarizes Souzy’s 30 January 1686 letter to his collaborator over the years Chazerat, director of fortifications at Ypres, requesting “des renseignements sur les mœurs, la capacité et la fidélité du sieur Péquet, ingénieur, qu’on lui propose pour l’inspection et la direction des ouvrages publics que le roi fait faire, et qui a travaillé à Ypres.” Although Antoine at this date was just eighteen years old, Souzy’s letter likely concerns him rather than his father, since bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8, and bn db 514, #1336 H, fol. 2 and 2v, make it clear that the senior Pecquet was employed with fortifications, whereas Antoine also worked on “bastiments et ouvrages publics.” See ­Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1466, for Souzy. Chotard mistakenly thought that Souzy was a high functionary in the war department (although he later supervised fortifications as a separate department upon Louvois’s death). Souzy left Flanders in 1683 and the following year became an intendant of finances under his brother Claude Le Peletier (although Souzy spelled the family name “Pelletier,” we use the common modern spelling here). Both were Le Tellier clients. Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, claims that Antoine worked on “fortifications” under “Le Peletier” from 1682 to 1696, likely mistaking Claude for Souzy. 229 Baschet, Dépôt, 163, notes that Pecquet had previously served the controller general Le Peletier, which Piccioni, Commis, 181, interprets to mean that Pecquet was a “commis aux finances” and claims that this was from 1683 to 1689. Samoyault, Bureaux, 167, says the same, but then ignores it in his summary of Pecquet’s service (ibid., 301). Even if Pecquet served the controller general as a commis, it could have been only for three years at most. 230 bnpo 2220, Pecquet I, #50,197, fol. 8. 231 Pecquet’s supervision of construction at the Hôtel d’Effiat is discussed in Gady, “Grande demeure disparue,” 150–1, 154. Gady calls Pecquet Le ­Peletier’s “homme de confiance” who with care and forcefulness directed the work and consulted knowledgeably with architects and other experts, which is not surprising considering his background. Mazel, Le Peletier, 168, also mentions Pecquet’s 1696–97 supervisory role. Le Peletier’s long-time intendant died in November 1694, so it is perhaps then that Pecquet became his intendant (ibid., 117).

618

Notes to pages 267–8

232 Pecquet and Adam witnessed the signing of Bossuet’s will at Versailles on 27 August 1703, but Pecquet was listed as a commis, while Adam was listed as premier commis. Bossuet, Correspondance, 14:255. aae md 1553, fol. 439, contains a 27 June 1709 letter from Paris with an envelope addressed to “Monsieur Pecquet premier commis de Monsrg Torcy. En cour.” As already noted, however, the listing of exact titles was far from consistent. Samoyault, Bureaux, 301, dates Pecquet’s entry to 1700, as do Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 655, and earlier, Baschet, Dépôt, 163, and Bourgeois, Diplomatie secrète, 1:175. Piccioni, Commis, 179, 181, however, speculates that since Pecquet was a premier commis from 1696, he must have entered the foreign office as a simple commis in 1689, when Le Peletier left office. Favre-­Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054, adopts this incorrect chronology, as does ­Dupilet, Régence absolue, 393 (speculating that he joined the department in the 1690s as a commis). 233 When Le Peletier retired in September 1697 the post office went to ­Pomponne. Mazel, Le Peletier, 166–7. 234 Bély, Espions, 231, 588. 235 Legg, “Torcy’s Account,” 525. Its multiple folios are entirely in Pecquet’s hand. 236 Mercier, Vie d’Ambassadeur, 191. aae md 1191, fol. 22, Torcy to Karg, 26 Feb. 1712, indicates that Pecquet was coordinating embassy ceremonial mourning following the Dauphin’s death. 237 Legg, Prior, 158–9. 238 Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:140–1. In aae md 1135, fol. 269, 5 Sept. 1705, Torcy described Pecquet as one of his principal commis, and for that reason requested that the Nantes Chambre des comptes afford him a prompt reception audience because his need for him for the king’s service did not permit a lengthy absence. 239 For example, aae md France 1208, fol. 30r–v, Puyzieulx to Pecquet, 23 Feb. 1715, where the former ambassador mentions their long-time friendship and Pecquet’s affection for him. 240 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1008, 1054; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:243. 241 Meyer, Noblesse Bretonne, 1:216–17. The first cost more than 30,000 livres and the second 45,000 livres; with the 100,000 livres required to become a secretary of the king in 1716, Meyer concludes that this shows that Pecquet was quite rich. While the treasurer’s office required no real work, it yielded profit and prestige (ibid., 226). His auditor’s office entailed enough effort that on 25 January 1711 the king requested that the Chambre admit the man who Pecquet wanted to commission to fulfil his duties even though he was three months short of the age requirement. The request noted that Pecquet was unable to be there to perform his functions because he was attached to royal service at Torcy’s side. aae md 1177, fols 69–70.



Notes to pages 268–9

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242 bnpo 2220, no. 50197, fols 8–10. 243 Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 2:1054. Wiesener, Regent, Dubois, 2:217, says that during negotiations for the 1718 alliance with Britain, Pecquet loaned his eloquence to Huxelles. On Dubois’s jealousy and struggle with Torcy, see P ­ etitfils, Régent, 578–9, 605; and Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:270, and 3: 138–43, 240–3, 253, 277–8. In 1723 Dubois referred to Torcy as “notre ennemi ­mortel” (our mortal enemy) in conversation with the British (ibid., 470). 244 Weber, Economy and Society, 2:959. 245 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 112, for instance, remark that in 1716 “the secretariat of the French council of foreign affairs and their diplomats abroad were hostile to the new direction of French policies under the Regent and were sympathetic to Philip V.” 246 Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:217–19; and Leclercq, Histoire, 2:22–3. 247 Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:282. Stair wrote to London from Paris (1 Sept. 1719) that Pecquet remarked to one of his undersecretaries that it was clear to him that Stair was a skilful minister who did with Dubois as he pleased. Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, 2:592. 248 Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 330, means to criticize Pecquet when he says that he “had suffered no pangs of conscience in the move from serving Torcy to serving” Dubois, but this is to miss the growing professionalism of the time. It also rests on the unwarranted assumption that Pecquet had cut his ties with Torcy and served Dubois with full confidence in him. Another source of information from the new foreign affairs council was member Abbé d’Estrées (Dupilet, Régence absolue, 382), who was as we have seen close to Torcy. 249 Tessé, Lettres, vii. 250 Maber, “Texts, Travel,” 231. Especially helpful on the Republic of Letters’ workings during the era of Torcy’s ministry is Goldgar, Impolite Learning. 251 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 3–22. 252 For biographical details in this and the following paragraph, see Labrousse, Inventaire Bayle, 371–4; Labrousse, Bayle, 1:54n1, 182n56, 218–21, 266; Briggs, “Larroque Author”; Briggs, “Larroque”; Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre 287n2, 434n15, 481n2, 567 (Larroque to Bayle, May 1686), 587n1; and, for much that we know about Larroque, a work by Abbé Olivet and Jesuit Pierre Desfontaines’s 1739 pseudonymous polemic rebuttal, both of which must be used with caution in light of the detailed editorial notes on them in Bayle, Correspondence, 8:87–135. For Bayle in Rouen, see Bost, Bayle, 83–91. Larroque is not mentioned in the standard works on the foreign office such as Baschet, Picavet, Piccioni, and Samoyault, and is mentioned only briefly in Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:223, as SaintPrest’s adjunct. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 338, who says more about him, does not mention his ties to the Republic of Letters.

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Notes to pages 270–1

253 Lennon, Reading Bayle, 126–32 (quotation 126). 254 These letters of Larroque to Bayle are from the modern critical edition, Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre: 287, 10 June 1684; 299, 6 July 1686; 304, midJuly 1684; 307, 28 July 1684; 327, Aug.–Sept. 1684; and 357, 27 Nov. 1684. The ample editorial notes are especially helpful. Unfortunately, we have few of Bayle’s letters to Larroque because he burned them, numbering more than two hundred. Bayle, Correspondence, 9:3n10. Only two have turned up (ibid., 8:530n18). In 1692, in the context of sharing that someone had made public a deceased individual’s private letters, Leibniz wrote Larroque that letters between friends must be a sacred thing, to which Larroque largely agreed. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 547, 579. 255 Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre 387, Bayle to Jean Rou, 17 Feb. 1685 (date corrected from earlier editions). 256 Ibid., Lettre 434, Rondel to Bayle, Apr.–June 1685; and Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1300–1, on Rancé. 257 Larroque to Bayle in Bayle, Édition électronique, Lettre: 481, 9–20 Nov. 1685; 546, Mar.–Apr. 1686; 567, May 1686; 568, May–June 1686; and 587, June–July 1686. Also Larroque to Bayle in Bayle, Correspondence, 7:33–9, 12/22 1686; and ibid., 170–83, Sept.–Oct. 1686. 258 Bayle, Correspondence, 8:132n50. 259 Colt was there from 1689 until 1692. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 238, 587. Larroque knew Leibniz’s reputation through their mutual friends, the English scientist Robert Boyle and the Huguenot librarian Henri Justel. Larroque to Averardo Salviati, 30 March 1691, ibid., 424, and Larroque to Leibniz, 25 May 1691, ibid., 498. Bayle wrote David Constant on 24 October 1690 that it had been four or five months since Larroque had left him to return to France (“nous quittez depuis 4o ou 5 mois pour s’en retourner en France”). Bayle, Correspondance, 8:179. This would have been June or July 1690, which given Leibniz’s June 1690 return from Italy, means that Larroque likely left Hanover in May or earlier. 260 Leibniz briefly mentioned Larroque’s Copenhagen conversion to Hessen-­ Rheinfels, 10(?) January 1691 and 20/30 July 1691. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 155, 238–9. He also noted it to Henri Justel 13/23 January 1691 (ibid., 355). According to Bayle’s 23 November 1690 letter to Gilles Ménage, Larroque had given fellow scholar Abbé Claude Nicaise in Paris a letter dated 19 October to include in his packet to Bayle. Bayle, Correspondence, 8:206. His pension is noted in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258n1, although Briggs, “Larroque,” 210, puts it at 400 livres. 261 Briggs, “Larroque,” 215, 219–20. Briggs speculates that he may even have carried secrets from Colt’s Hanover mission to bargain with in Paris. ­Jurieu claimed that Larroque returned to France as agent of Holland’s “French cabal” (ibid., 214).



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262 In a 9 April 1691 letter Leibniz offered effusive thanks to his Tuscan friend Averardo Salviati, marquis of Montiéri, for introducing him to Larroque. His friends, including Gerhard Wolter Molanus, a Lutheran theologian and his collaborator in irenic initiatives, spoke so highly of Larroque that ­Leibniz said that it increased his regret at not having met a man of such “force” (penetration and ability) as was rarely encountered in Wolfenbüttel or even larger cities. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 456. Leibniz wrote Larroque on 21/31 July 1691 that the duke, duchess, and others at court recalled with pleasure his merit and praised his deep knowledge (ibid., 587). For Molanus, see Leibniz, Controversies, 465. 263 Larroque wrote Leibniz on 25 May 1691 that the current war would likely prevent him from seeing in Hanover some recent books published in Paris. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 497. Vittu, “Instruments of Political Power,” 170, on news hunger. He also offered to procure a Parisian printer for some of Leibniz’s works, affirming that as a “good fellow countryman” (“bon compatriote”), presumably of the Republic of Letters, he would be delighted to see some “German enlightenment” (“les lumières de l’Allemagne”) transported to France (ibid., 498). Although Paris was renowned for its libraries as a centre of research, they contained few German and English books. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 123–6, 138, 149. Anglophone libraries also had few German books (ibid., 137–8). 264 Lennon, Reading Bayle, 132, says that he showed clear signs of an “incipient deism.” In a 10 July 1692 letter to Leibniz, Larroque asserted that Catholic conduct frequently quenched morality while inflaming a dogmatism that contributed nothing to the sanctification of children. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 325–6. 265 For Bayle’s inclusive idea of toleration and his alleged deism, see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 152, 331–41; and Tinsley, Bayle’s Reformation, 5–26. See Lennon, Reading Bayle, 127n57, for Bayle’s defence of Larroque. 266 Briggs, “Larroque,” 216, mentions this supervision. Letters between Larroque and Bayle through December 1692 are in Bayle, Correspondence, 8: letters 772, 791, 796, 806, 862; and ibid., 9: letters 987, 994, which does not include Bayle’s letters to others that mention Larroque. 267 Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 466. See also Dew, Orientalism, 84n11, 126n143, 239; and of course, the various letters in volumes 8, 9, and 10 of Bayle, Correspondence. For his friendship with Huet, see Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, ­Sechster Band: 425, 472, 587. 268 Larroque to Leibniz, 19 Dec. 1692. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achter Band: 579. Leibniz informed Pellisson (19 Nov. 1691) that he had been in regular communication with Larroque on a historical question for the past six months (ibid., Zweite Reihe, Zweiter Band: 466). See also Leibniz to Enst von HessenRheinfels, 7/17 June 1691 (ibid., Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 215–16).

622 69 2 270 271 272 273 274

275

276

277

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80 2 281

282

Notes to pages 271–4 Leibniz to Larroque, 21/31 1691 (ibid., 588). Ibid., 590–1. Lieshout, “Retouches au portrait Bayle,” 38–41, 47. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 97–103, 331. Bayle, Avis, 7–49. Mori raises questions about Briggs, “Bayle ou Larroque?,” a recent incarnation of the thesis that Larroque authored the Avis. The brief account of Larroque’s arrest, imprisonment, and eventual release found in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258–9, which appeared in 1920, was given wider currency in Labrousse, Inventaire Bayle, 2727–3, but unfortunately it ignored the fuller documentation published in 1879 in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:23–41, and used here. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 92–3, briefly synthesizes all three accounts. For a recent critique of earlier notions about the pamphlet’s identity, see McKenna’s note in Bayle, Correspondence, 8:133n56. Bayle to Pinsson des Riolles, 6 Dec. 1694, in Bayle, Correspondence, ­9:381–83 (see also ibid., 469–71); and Leibniz, Briefe, Zweite Reihe, Dritter Band: 7783, 7800, 7808, 7830. François Janiçon to Bayle, 14 Nov. 1695, in Bayle, Correspondence, 9:503. See also the 14 December 1695 letter to Bayle from Mathieu de Larroque fils, Daniel’s half-brother and captain in the Piedmont Regiment (ibid., 513–14). Mathieu, also a pastor, abjured in 1685 and entered the army (ibid., 506n12). Ibid., 514, 622. For the period April 1696–July 1697, see ibid., 10:5–6, 72–5, 82, 93–4, 116, 139, 182–3, 210, 322, 378, 538, 563, 604 (Antony McKenna generously shared these references prior to volume 10’s publication for inclusion here). For Vitry, see Albertan, “VITRY.” Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:37–8. Informed by a friend of this news, ­Galland hoped for Larroque’s complete freedom soon. Abdel-Halim, “Correspondance Galland,” 245–6. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:39, Pontchartrain to Bossuet, 24 Mar. 1699 (a slightly different version is in Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:258–9). ­Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Sechster Band: 497, is Larroque’s 25 May 1691 letter to Leibniz passing along Bossuet’s favourable public remarks about him; and ibid., ­588–9, is Leibniz’s delighted reply (21/31 July 1691). Pontchartrain to de Rey, 13 Jan. 1700, in Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:39. Ibid., 39–41. Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:259n4, quotes (without dating it) Pontchartrain’s 28 July 1700 letter to d’Argenson, but mistakes Daguesseau for its recipient. Galland to Nicaise, 12 Feb. 1700. Abdel-Halim, “Correspondance Galland,” 283. Larroque’s two letters to Galland (14 and 22 July 1700, the second written from Caen) contain literary news and philosophical reflections, but say nothing of a new position in the foreign office (ibid., 323–26 and ­328–30), suggesting that he had not yet entered Torcy’s service.



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283 Clément, Abbesse de Fontevrault, 205n3, 213, 216–18, 244, 248–9, 255, 258–9, 348n1, also highlights Larroque’s connections with her and ­Gaignières. Saint-Léger, “Éditions,” 94, remarks on his linguistic skills, to which must be added Latin and Greek thanks to his classical education. It does not appear that his primary duties were in the domestic bureau, as speculated by Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221. 284 Coirault, “Tour de France,” 17–20; and Bottineau, Art cour de Philippe V, 137, 137n165. 285 Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Achtzehnter Band: 466, Pinsson des Riolles to Leibniz, 19 March 1700. 286 Bayle to Pinsson de Riolles, 24 Feb. 1705, mentioned receiving a 16 February letter from Larroque, and in his 12 April 1705 letter to Pinsson des Riolles, Bayle referenced receiving one dated 3 March. Gerig and van Roosbroeck, “Letters Bayle,” 21–4. Bayle to Larroque, 22 Nov. 1706; and Fagon’s “Consultation,” 27 Dec. 1706, in Bayle, Oeuvres diverses, 192–4. The favour of such a consultation reflects the esteem the king had for Bayle and Larroque. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 186, 189, 191–2, 194. 287 Bittner and Groß, Repertorium, 1:535. 288 For the years 1708–09, see Galland, Journal, 1:216, 216n136, 217, 260, 525, 528. Thanks to Richard Waller for sharing invaluable references to meetings between Galland and Larroque in Galland, Journal, vol. 2 (forthcoming), for 1710–11. Galland, who was with Larroque at the moment of his arrest, was arrested as well, but soon released. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 92–3. 289 For the disputed appointment, see Galland, Journal, 1:256n256, 267–8, 268n287, 277–8. For the 9 June 1709 dinner, see ibid., 381. Galland and Le Grand were friends. Abdel-Halim, Galland, 177–8. He and Dubos were old friends but had a heated scholarly quarrel during the 1690s (ibid., 89, 91, 94, 95, 106, 234, 344, 360–80). Galland was a member of Caen’s royal academy along with Larroque’s friend Vitry and Abbé Belin, its perpetual secretary and Torcy’s old tutor (ibid., 100–3). Torcy and Galland also encountered one another at the salon of Marie Anne de la Vergne de Guilleragues, marquise d’O. (ibid., 122). 290 Galland, Journal, vol. 2 (27 Dec. 1710). 291 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:223, quoting from aae pvr, 1, fol. 95. The two had been in contact since at least 1697 when Le Grand visited with Larroque while confined in Saumur. Larroque to Bayle, 8 Dec. 1697 (text graciously communicated by Antony McKenna). 292 Saint-Léger, “Éditions,” 93–9. 293 Thuillier, Première école, 94n7. 294 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 228–9, 388. His suggestion that Larroque’s move to this council with Adam might indicate that he, too, worked with domestic affairs under Torcy (ibid., 221) seems unlikely, since he was primarily a

624

295

296 297

298

299

300

Notes to pages 276–7 t­ ranslator and writer. Bossuet, Correspondance, 11:259n4, lists an annual pension of 4,000 livres. Moréri et al., Dictionnaire, 6:164–5, detail his literary output, which includes a life of the royal historiographer and libertine François Eudes de Mézeray (or Mézerai). See Ranum, Artisans of Glory, 197–232, on Mézerai. A letter from Bouhier to Marais, 17 Apr. 1725, says that after his retirement Larroque complained of his misfortune “ayant tout perdu au papier” (having lost all to paper), an allusion to the Mississippi Bubble of John Law that burst in 1720. Duranton, Correspondance Bouhier, 8:139. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 502, 509, on Leibniz. See ibid., 11–12, for the moderate/radical distinction. Picavet, “Commis,” 110, 110n1, based on Aubert’s 16 September 1705 titre de pension, verifies his long service as a commis beginning under Lionne, but says nothing of his becoming a premier commis. Alexandre Cojannot kindly attempted to locate this document in the aae but could not because Picavet’s citation is incorrect. Sourches, Mémoires, 9:365 (21 Sept. 1705), noted that Aubert, Torcy’s premier commis, retired with a pension of 2,500 livres. aae md 1168, fol. 397 (1710), notes a pension of 2,500 livres with a 500-livre augmentation for Aubert, formerly one of the principal commis. Aubert appears in the following department documents: ibid., 1012, fol. 63, 31 July 1691, awarded a confiscation from the rolle; ibid., 1017, fol. 162, received a gratification for 1692 (Bergeret and Mignon are listed as premiers commis and paid accordingly, but Aubert is listed with the other commis who receive half the amount); ibid., 1069, fol. 204, Aubert is specified as Torcy’s premier commis (May 1701); and ibid., 1129, fols 277–94 (1704), expedited documents. Baschet, Dépôt, 63, 523, says that Aubert was a premier commis in 1688 and earlier under Lionne and Pomponne, but without citing evidence. Piccioni, Commis, 161–3, makes the same claim and refers to unspecified documents from 1688 and 1694; Piccioni’s chart (ibid., 270) says that Aubert was premier commis from 1685 until 1705. aae md 1080, fols 306–11, 4 Nov. 1700. Fischer, “Conseil,” 53–4, mentions a sieur Aubert who was Furstenberg’s treasurer. Furstenberg began his Parisian exile in December 1689. His contacts with the foreign ministry could easily have facilitated Aubert’s appointment when Furstenberg was named abbot in 1690. O’Connor, Negotiator, 188–97. Lefeuve, Histoire de Paris, 1:21, notes that in 1723 several houses were seized by court order from an Aubert. Piccioni, Commis, 162–3. This is the only source that provides a first name for Aubert if indeed this is the same individual. Perhaps Piccioni ran across commis Aubert’s first name elsewhere or assumed, not implausibly, that the contract’s presence in the foreign archives suggests that the two Auberts are one and the same.



Notes to page 277

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301 aae md 1021, fol. 202r–v, acquits patents for 27 Apr. 1693. He is not mentioned in the standard accounts by Baschet, Picavet, Piccioni, Samoyault, or Baillou, but Rott, Inventaire, 4:133, lists a letter from Marolot, “commis de Msgr de Croissy,” to Ambassador Amelot transmitting a letter from Le ­Peletier, 18 Feb. 1694. aae md 1033, fol. 292, Nov. 1698, is a request for lods et vents from “Marolot, commis de M. de Torcy.” Gallet-Guerne and Baulez, Versailles. Dessins d’architecture, 465, notes grants of land to him in the city of Versailles; he is still listed there in 1709 (ibid., 471). Two contemporary sources call him a premier commis: Bourde de la Rogerie, “Inventaire Kériolet (Finistère),” 382, 24 Oct. 1706, recording a royal gift to him of lots for building in the Parc-aux-Cerfs, rues Saint-Louis and Saint-Antoine at Versailles; and bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fol. 81 (Nov. 1711). “Armorial de Versailles (1697–1701),” 5, suggests that his title of nobility was registered by at least 1701. He was married to Louise Madeleine Desrousseaux, and they had a son, Jean Baptiste, c. 1700, according to the record at GeneaNet, http:// gw3.geneanet.org/pyl?lang=en&p=louis+benigne&n=marolot 302 According to aae md 1068, fols 146–7, he was among the commis expediting the department’s paperwork in 1699. That same year he accompanied Adam in late September on an unspecified mission that took them to Compiegne, passing by Chantilly (ibid., 1056, fol. 164). At the top of a letter from Chamillart to Torcy, 26 Jan. 1702, about “chicanes continuelles” at the government of Nice is written the routing instruction “M. Marolot” (ibid., 1108, fol. 14). Ibid., cp Autriche 80, fol. 144, Torcy to Noblet, 9 May 1702, says Marolot copied out the project for a treaty he was sending him. 303 aae md 1170, fols 441–2r (1710). He makes no appearance in the subsequent lists of pensions. Samoyault, Bureaux, 217, does not list him among the four premiers commis who signed the marriage contract of commis ­Bernage in 1713. Marolot is also not on a 1715 list of Torcy’s commis prepared for the regent. aae md 310, fols 292–3 (other current personnel are also absent, but the reasons for each can be accounted for). 304 aae md 1010, fol. 81, letters of nobility for “le Sr Ligny.” Croissy’s purchase was on 30 September 1687 for 3,478 livres. See Bérenger, “Croissy,” 170. Although in Rule, “Commis,” 74, Ligny is referred to as “comte de Ligny,” it now appears doubtful that he used that title, since it is found nowhere in the archival materials consulted for this book or in the few printed sources concerning Ligny. Of all those discussing the commis, including Baschet, Picavet, Delavaud, Piccioni, and Baillou, only Samoyault, Bureaux, 29–30, 114, calls him “comte,” but even Samoyault in his main entry for him (ibid., 290) lists him only as “Sr de Ligny.” 305 Pomponne’s will listed 550 livres for the remaining gages of “sieur Deligny,” his secretary. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 175n4, 350. See also Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n62. Feuquières, Lettres, 5:367–8n, has a copy of a ­passport

626

306 307

308

309 10 3 311

312

Notes to pages 277–8 issued to the Savoyards by Feuquières on 15 May 1691; a note says that it was signed on his behalf by “de Ligny.” aae md 1102, fol. 192r, Torcy to Bouchu, 18 Mar. 1702, replied to the intendant’s request on behalf of “trésorier des armées” Ligny. For the Extraordinary of Wars, its treasurers or commis, and the 1701 collapse, see Rowlands, Dynastic State, 112–43; and Rowlands, Financial Decline. For Bouchu, see Rey, Intendant de province, 10–12, 74–85. France, Recueil, 22:116n2. aae md 1103, fol. 178, 30 Nov. 1702. See also Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:123. Ligny was involved with passports for Henri Bernard fils, falconer to the Danish king, and Christian Iogems, a falconer wanting to transport birds from Holland. Charliat, “Documents inédits,” 190–2, provides no date but says the letter is from aae cp Danemark 65, which covers 1701–03. aae md, 1106, fol. 164v, notes Bernard’s passport (20 Apr. 1702); ibid., fol. 174, records a gratification for him upon his return from Denmark (7 Dec. 1702). Danish diplomat Meyercroon’s letter to d’Argenson on 16 December 1703 referred to “M. de Ligny, premier commis de M. de Torcy,” to whom he will send a passport to extend the stay of a Danish subject in France. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:64. Both of these call Ligny a premier commis. A copy of a receipt for subsidies received by the Bavarians in August 1712 in aae cp Bavière 64, fol. 237, called him “Monsieur de Ligny, premier commis.” On a 1708 letter from d’Argenson to Torcy dealing with postal affairs, Ligny’s name is written at the top. Ibid., md 1160, fol. 33. Another letter from d’Argenson (ibid., fol. 117, 15 Aug. 1708) informed Torcy that postal commis were still leaking news despite the minister’s warnings. Torcy scrawled at the top of page that the guilty should be arrested and questioned, and referred the matter to Ligny. D’Argenson also helped Torcy coordinate secret diplomacy. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 48. aae cp Autriche 82, fol. 266v, Noblet to Torcy, 28 June 1703. Reference to an encoded thistle was perhaps an elaborate joke that both Ligny and Torcy would enjoy. “M. de Ligny expedié ordce le 200 [livres] 26 aoust.” aae cp Autriche 83, fol. 199, Noblet to Torcy, 6 Aug. 1703. Ibid., fol. 215v, 15 Aug. 1703. Ibid., Hongrie-Transylvanie 15, fol. 66, 17 June 1709. See ibid., Venise 150, fol. 53v, 12 Feb. 1707, for Ligny working with Samuel Bernard and ­Pomponne on letters of exchange for Italy; and ibid., 156, fol. 331v, for letters of exchange sent by Ligny to Pomponne in 1707 and 1708. Ligny continued sending funds to Venice after Pomponne’s 1710 departure, channeling them through consul Le Blond (ibid., 160, fols 307–8, Le Blond to Torcy, 21 Mar. 1711). aae md 1175, fol. 27, Jan. 1710.



Notes to pages 278–80

627

313 Ibid., cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 16, fol. 14, Ferriol to Ligny, 3 Mar. 1711, Paris. In Varenbergh, “Correspondance Ferriol,” 792, Ferriol wrote his brother Augustin Ferriol, 12 September 1708, acknowledging his report that the ambassador’s memoir on his annual extraordinary expenses had been accepted and that Ligny had been ordered to send him his payment for it. See Samoyault, Bureaux, 30, for du Theil. 314 aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 52v, Mesnager to Ligny, 27 Feb. 1712; and ibid., fol. 55, Masson to Ligny, 10 Mar. 1712. 315 Fonck, “Huxelles,” 107. 316 Samoyault, Bureaux, 275–6; and Dupilet, Régence absolue, 221. Villars wrote Puyzieulx, 20 January 1708, that he had received a code from Bernage. aae cp Allemagne 350, fol. 14. A volume of “Mémoires des expéditions” from 1712 through 10 January 1713 indicates that it was done by Bernage (ibid., md 1183). He shows up in payroll records, for instance, in ibid., 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v. 317 Samoyault, Bureaux, 213, 216–18. 318 aae Organisation et Règlement, 1: fols 49–50r. 319 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:96. He appears in the acquits patents for 1711 (aae md 1180, fol. 2) and other payroll records for that year (ibid., fols 526–7v). 320 Samoyault, Bureaux, 40, 160–1, 164–5, 167, 175–6, 205, 218–19, 296; Piccioni, Commis, 214–19; and Baschet, Dépôt, 117, 173, 184–201, 275, 292–319 (he mistakenly calls Charles-Joachim Torcy’s uncle, ibid., 184). aae Organisation et Règlement, 1, fols 49–50r, calls him talented and wise. Archives hg, 1: passim, attests to the importance of his work as departmental historian. His younger brother Pierre Le Dran, who had begun as a treasurer of the king’s troops, became his assistant at the Louvre under Louis XV. Baschet, Dépôt, 184. For the three physicians in the family, see Dechambre, Dictionnaire médicales, 134–6. 321 Samoyault, Bureaux, 216, 306, does not list a date for the beginning of his service under Torcy but lists the wedding date. Sermenté first appeared in the accounts in 1711 on the acquits patents list and through 1714. aae md 1180, fol. 2; ibid., 1186, fols 361–61r; ibid., 1193, fol. 16r–v; and ibid., 1197, fol. 16. For Armenonville and his office, see Antoine, Conseil du Roi, 81. See Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 103–4, on Fleuriau Armenonville and Fleuriau Morville. Secretary of State La Vrillière still handled most of the expéditions, however. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 388. 322 Separating the brothers in the accounts is not always simple, but the following clearly identify a commis Maugin: aae md 1011, fol. 170 (acquits patents for a group of commis, 1691); ibid., 1145, fol. 123 (“commis de Torcy,” 1706); ibid., 1181, fol. 527v (“commis,” 1711); ibid., 1186, fol. 362 (listed with commis, 1712); ibid., 1197, fol. 17v (“commis,” 1714); and ibid., 310,

628

323 324

325

326 327

328

329

330

Notes to pages 280–2 fol. 293 (“Supple. d’appointemens au Commis de M. Le Mis de Torcy,” 1715). aae cp Autriche 84, fols 56ff, 11 Sept. 1703. Piccioni, Commis, 151, 156–7; and Delavaud, Pomponne, 175–6. Lebeau’s wife was charged with care for the daily expenses of Mme de Pomponne and her household (ibid., 176) and was left 300 livres in rentes when Mme de Pomponne died in 1712 (ibid., 261). Acquit patents lists in aae md 1067, fols 180v–2r (1698); ibid., 1074, fol. 66, (1700); ibid., 1134, fol. 26r–v (1705); and Mathis, Thèse Excerpt, 17n60. Piccioni, Commis, 187–8; Samoyault, Bureaux, 91, 169n14, 187, 209, 231, 241, 283; and Thuillier, Première école, 94n7, 96n2. Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, 348 (where he adds “Larrechef” to his name). He appears in department accounts in aae md 1180, fols 2 and 526–7v (1711). A Du Parc is mentioned in the post office in 1715 and after. Vaillé, Postes, 5:30–1, 30n3. Gallet-Guerne and Baulez, Versailles. Dessins d’architecture, 2:233, indicates that in 1706 a “Sieur Martin, premier commis de M. de Torcy” had built a residence in the Parc-au-cerfs quarter in 1706. With only this one reference, he has not been counted among the premiers commis. Marais, Journal, 2:472, 472n4. Spada, “‘Arlequin sauvage,’” 96n2, notes that there is no trace of him in the archives, including the aae. He was born in 1682 and died in 1756. His L’Arlequin sauvage (1721) was of the “noble savage” genre used to criticize contemporary French society. Anticipating ideas he would later develop, it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s favourite play. Michaud et al., Biographie universelle, 2d ed., 11:7–8. Had he served (briefly?) as a sous-commis or copyist, he was likely to have remained unnamed in the records. Garnier, Inventaire Côte-d’Or, 1:552. Hozier and Bouchot, Généralité de Bourgogne, 203, has Fabarel’s coat of arms. France, Catalogue général des manuscrits, 5:239, lists a memoir of receipts and expenses made on behalf of Brameret and his wife from 1 September 1703 by Fabarel, corrector of Burgundy’s Chambre des comptes.

Chapter Seven 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 24. 2 Quoted in Brewer, Sinews of Power, v. 3 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 136, justified subsidies by observing that “meager sums spent with judgment often save states from infinitely greater losses.” 4 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 69–76, clearly and succinctly explains the controller general’s functions. He observes that even though



Notes to page 283

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Louis XIV “regulated expenditures with each secretary of state and left it to the controller general to find the funds to pay them,” the latter nonetheless exercised some restraint on spending (ibid., 72). However, Rowlands, Financial Decline, 33–4, 134, stresses that in practice there was little oversight. 5 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 206, 231. 6 aae md 307, fols 138–53v (1701–08). On the difficulties of determining exchange rates, see Rowlands, Financial Decline, 96–100. Rowlands details the financial strain on France from funding the many armies it required because of its overstretched commitments during the War of the Spanish Succession (ibid., 23–30). Although they involved much smaller sums, the extensive missions, subsidies, and other diplomatic expenses of that conflict also strained the foreign office’s finances. Torcy, Journal, 230–1, lamented this lack of funds and its consequences for diplomacy. 7 aae md 305, fols 226–7v, has tables from 11 October 1699 for navigating the complexities of French money and that of England, Holland, Germany, Cologne, Strasbourg, Flanders, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Ibid., cp Brunswick-­Hanovre 38, fol. 114, is a draft treaty with the bishop of Münster and the dukes of Wolfenbüttel from 1701. It specifies subsidies, a portion calculated in French money but payable in Hamburg presumably in local coin, and another portion payable in French coin. 8 Piccioni, Commis, 37–8; and Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:122. See aae md 1030, fol. 204, “Etats des appointements des Ministres Étrangères pour les six premiers. Mois de 1697,” 10 July 1697, to be paid by guard of the royal treasury Pierre Gruyn; and ibid., 306, fols 65–72, 31 Dec. 1701, for an order to Gruyn to pay the appointements of French diplomats abroad for 1701. For examples of these secretaries’ work on finances, see ibid., cp Danemark 47, fol. 350, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 15 Dec. 1693, concerning his gratification ordinaire; ibid., 58, fol. 153, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 9 June 1697, concerning his delayed gratification and giving directions as to where to send his ordonnance de deuil (for mourning); ibid., md 1103, fol. 178, a 30 Nov. 1702 receipt to Ligny for an ordonnance au porteur for 4,000 livres; ibid., cp Venise 156, fol. 331v, listing letters of exchange sent by Ligny in 1707 and 1708; and ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 130, du Luc to Jérôme Pontchartrain, 28 Mar. 1714, informing him that he has written to Blondel to make remonstrances to Pontchartrain concerning some pensions. See bn naf 22940, fol. 7, Adam to Lebret fils, 6 Jan. 1704, advising him that he will be sending the 420-livre pension Torcy authorized for a resident of an Ursuline convent in Pau. 9 aae md 307, fols 82–5, “Édit du Roy, portant création de trois ­Trésoriers des Appointements des Ambassadeurs, & de trois Offices de principaux Commis y joint,” Dec. 1706. See Piccioni, Commis, 39, 177–8, 186. Adam paid 150,000 livres for his office.

630

Notes to pages 283–6

10 aae md 1148, fols 78, 114v, 176r–v, 230, and 451r–v, show that Prévost served in 1707, while ibid., fol. 435v, which begins with January 1708’s accounts, indicates that Adam served in 1708. Each treasurer was responsible for clearing up his accounts when he could, even if during his colleague’s year: ibid., 1168, fol. 122, for instance, shows that Adam disbursed appointments to Abbé Pomponne for the first three months of 1710 (3,000 livres), while Prevost disbursed the 24,000 livres owed him for the previous year (1709). Ibid., fol. 123, represents the same situation for Bonnac in Poland. 11 Piccioni, Commis, 38, says Prevost had three commis, but the accounts suggest otherwise. aae md 309, fols 12v–13, is the end of the treasurers’ accounts signed by Torcy on18 January 1711. It specifies the following: ­Prévost, trésorier général alternative, received gages of 7,500 livres and 9,500 livres for les taxations fixes for the present year, as well as 2,000 livres for the costs of filing the accounts with the Chambre des comptes; Adam, trésorier général ancien, received 7,500 livres gages for the present year; Pierre Odeau, contrôleur général ancien, received 3,000 livres gages and 1,500 livres “pour ses taxations” for the present year; and the sum of 345,200 livres was to be used by Prévost for his part of 1708 to pay diplomats (for the year 1709, “8” was crossed out and “9” was added). Taxations were the percentages of the sums they managed to which financial officers were entitled as part of their remuneration. Barbiche, Institutions, 83. 12 “Estats générales des Ordonnances.” For example, see aae md 1201, fols 269–302, the “Estat” for 1714. 13 aae cp Hollande 242, fol. 52, 27 Feb. 1712, where Mesnager thanked Ligny for expediting his ordonnance de gratification; and ibid., fol. 55, 10 Mar. 1712, Paris bankers to Ligny about funds for Polignac. 14 Picavet, Diplomatie, 39–40. 15 Boislisle, “Documents relatifs finances,” 175–223, for 1699; Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:600, 604; and ibid., 3:662, for the other years. For a brief but enlightening look at budgets, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 180–2. Reconciling these totals with those that Picavet published would require more information than either set provides. 16 For examples from 1699, which provides detailed lists, see Boislisle, “Documents relatifs finances,” 202–4, 218, 220. 17 Ibid., 189, 215. 18 Ibid., 195. 19 Ibid., 196–9. 20 Ibid., 220, describes this category as for journeys by postal conveyance within and outside France and for fees for officers (“vacations d’officiers”). 21 Ibid., 215, notes a global sum for ordinary garrisons, for appointements and food for governors and lieutenants general, and for governors of strongholds within France and the pay of their guard companies.



Notes to pages 286–92

631

22 Ibid., 211, for Offrandes et aumônes. For the régale, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 1063–5. 23 Picavet, Diplomatie, 40. 24 Ibid., 39–40, gives other and overlapping figures for annual expenditures for ambassadors’ appointements (in livres): 810,000 (1680); 675,000 (1688); 836,000 (1699); 606,000 (1700); 924,000 (1707); and 1,000,000 (1715). 25 aae md 1201, fols 268–302, “Estat général des Ordonnances … 1714,” shows that the treasurers of ambassadors authorized 630,686 livres that year. A similar rise in the giving of diplomatic gifts of volumes of engravings after Ryswick and then a falling off with the return of war are seen in Richefort, “Présents diplomatiques,” 273–4. 26 aae md 1043, fol. 37, reads “Estat pour les ministres estrangers [i.e., French envoys]” for half the year, 1697. 27 aae Service de la comptabilité, Comptabilité “Volumes reliés,” Finance du Ministère 1661–1767, vol. 1, fol. 9 for the year 1698. 28 Not all diplomats were necessarily recorded in these lists. For example, that for 1701 (table 7.3) did not list Jean Lanfranc des Hayes, baron de ­Forval, who was sent under the name of “comte de Brosses” to the Grisons in Switzerland in July 1700 to secure the Valtelline Pass from being used by Imperial troops during any crisis involving the Spanish succession. His mission ended in December 1700. See France, Recueil, vol. 30, pt 2: 703–10, for his mission and instructions. In aae cp Grisons 13, fol. 305, 25 Aug. 1701, Torcy informed Forval that since he traveled secretly and without a formal authorization of title, he had not been included in the previous year’s register of ambassadors. Nevertheless, Torcy assured him, he would receive his appointements at the same time as the others as well as 2,000 livres for official mourning for Monsieur. 29 aae md 310, fols 296–7v. 30 Mercier, Vie d’ambassadeur, 19–21. 31 Sourches, Mémoires, 3:287. 32 France, Recueil, 19:xlvi, liii, 61, 67, 70, 78, 83–6, 125–6. Although he and his children were naturalized in 1716, neither the bailiff nor his son comte Lorenzi, likewise French chargé from 1735 to 1741, was named French resident (ibid., 17:555n1). 33 For Gergy, see Auerbach, France et le Saint empire, 264–72. 34 Picavet, Diplomatie, 82, 87. The same was true in more financially advanced Britain. Black, British Diplomats, 109–14; and Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 11–13. 35 Polignac wrote Torcy in December 1712 from Utrecht on Pecquet’s behalf saying that the latter’s “poverty” might force him to leave Torcy’s service. Reminding the minister of the critical role his premier commis played in the

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36 37 38

39 40 41

42

43 44

45

46

Notes to pages 292–5 current negotiations, Polignac suggested that a pension might bind Pecquet to Torcy’s service. Torcy, while acknowledging that Pecquet’s merit had not been matched by his luck, nonetheless insisted that “la pauvreté dans nos employs est honourable” (poverty in our occupations is honourable). Quoted in Bély, Espions, 347. Azimi, “Traitements,” 433–6. aae md 1201, fols 277v, 283v, 292, and 299r–v. Ibid., fols 278, 279v–80, and 293v. See Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, ­165–70, on court mourning practices at Versailles. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 22–6, discusses the costs of official mourning and the outfitting of chapels at late Stuart embassies. aae md 1201, fols 269–302, shows at least thirty-five of such ordonnances de voyages in 1714. Ibid., cp Venise 147, fol. 157, 12 June 1706. An authorization for 62,500 au porteur issued at the camp at the siege of Le Quesnoy on 30 May 1693 adds that it was to be employed in secret affairs for the king’s service. Ibid., md 1020, fol. 260. Other references to “Affaires Secrettes” or “Dépense Secrettes” are in ibid., 1016, fol. 202, 25 June 1692, Torcy to Pontchartrain; ibid., 1026, fol. 75, 2 Apr. 1694, ordonnance au porteur for 21,600 livres signed by Torcy; and ibid., 1135, fol. 260, 1 Sept. 1705, for 50,000 livres for “affaires secrètes” to be paid to the bearer for a letter of exchange for the same amount issued by Samuel Bernard for Madrid. A pioneering article is Hatton, “Gratifications,” 68–94. aae md 1201, fols 269–302 (1714), records gratifications, for instance, for the entourage of the Prince-Bishop of Liege, including one for Liege’s Paris resident, Jean-Baptiste Valdor under the pseudonym of “Dorwalde.” See France, Recueil, 30:xlviii, 172. Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:604. Torcy, Journal, 4n2. A big spender, he was pursued for his debts in 1710. When in 1718 Max asked for an accounting of the subsidies received from France, Monasterol committed suicide. For Bombarda and the administration of the Wittelsbach subsidies, see Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:263–74; and Hartmann, “De la musique à la finance,” 322–36. At the time of his death in late 1712, Bombarda’s commis was Gaspard-­Hyacinthe Caze, a kinsman of Mme de Croissy who became treasurer of the post office, couriers, and relays under Torcy in 1715. Hartmann, “De la musique à la finance,” 332. Caze was protected by Torcy and from 1721 to 1750 was a farmer general in the General Tax Farm. Durand, Les fermiers généraux, 96. An excellent, brief summary of the revolt is Frey and Frey, Societies in Upheaval, 61–81. See also Ingrao, Quest and Crisis, 123–60; and Bély, Art de la paix, 525–31.



Notes to pages 296–99

633

47 One led from Danzig to Lublin, Cracow, and then across the Carpathians. The second began in Constantinople, continued to Nish, Belgrade, and into the Hungarian plain. The third and fourth both began in Venice, either across the Adriatic to a port like Ragusa and across Bosnia to Hungary, or across land to Laibach (Ljubljana) and then down into the plains. 48 Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, details Des Alleurs’s role. 49 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 13, fol. 126, Des Alleurs to Torcy, 17 May 1708. 50 Ibid., 13, fol. 131, Torcy to Des Alleurs, 28 June 1708. 51 Ibid., 15, fol. 66, Ligny (for Torcy) to Bonnac, 17 May 1709. See ibid., Suède 119, fols 43 and 241, for payments to Rákóczi made through Bonnac in 1708. 52 Ibid., md 1201, fol. 282v, brevet of 20 June 1714. The Hungarian Baron Georges Ráttky, colonel of Hussars, received 4,620 livres annually (ibid., fol. 269). He had campaigned with Rákóczi before entering French service in 1707 and being naturalized in 1715. A further 40,000 livres went annually to the Hungarian lords who had accompanied the prince in exile (ibid., 310, fol. 238). For Ráttky, see Choppin, Cavalerie française, 100. 53 aae md 1201, fol. 286; and Table Gazette de France, 1:291. 54 Two such lists were drawn up after Torcy left the department, apparently for Huxelle’s and the regent’s instruction. aae md 310, fols 237–41v and 301–4. 55 Ibid., 1201, fols 269–302. 56 For Caffaro, see Sue, Jean Bart, 226, 234, 242, 265, 296. A member of a related Sicilian family, the Cigala, also received a pension of 400 livres and is mentioned in ibid., 221, 223, 233–5. aae md 1062, fol. 14, is the draft of the ordonnance for his quarterly payment for 8 July 1699. 57 Sourches, Mémoires, 8:299, 299n1, says that he was originally from Burgundy and was the brother of French diplomat comte de Gergy. 58 Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 4:658–9. 59 See chapter 10, note 80, below. 60 Broglie, Société Saint-Germain des Prés, 161–3; and Moréri, Dictionnaire, 10:475. 61 Dangeau, Journal, 11:265, 265n1. Dangeau and his wife stood in for the king and the Duchess of Burgundy as godparents. 62 Gregg, Queen Anne, 375–6. 63 Dahlgren, Relations commerciales, 89n2. A French translation of his Théâtre naval hydrographique … (Paris: Gissey 1704) was dedicated to the comte de Toulouse. 64 Denis, Bohême, 1:390–1. 65 Anselme, Histoire généalogique, 6:286; and Recueil des actes du clergé, 9:750, 1105. As vicar general for Cardinal Forbin-Janson in 1701, Mornay likely knew Noblet, perhaps leading Torcy to take notice of the abbé.

634

Notes to pages 299–301

66 Aubert de La Chesnaye des Bois, Dictionnaire noblesse, 9:220–1. 67 Pelus-Kaplan, “Gallica aux archives de Lübeck,” 197–8. 68 Espitalier, Évêques de Fréjus, 475–8. Both Lyon and Provence were in Torcy’s department. 69 Le Paulmier, “Amonio,” 33–50. One of his uncles was a master of the chamber for Innocent XI (1676–89). O’Connor, Negotiator, 144, 150–1, 226n34, discusses his work for Ranuzzi as liaison with the French court. 70 Strayer, Huguenots and Camisards, 335–52, describes the workings of what was described by some as “fraternal charity” and by others as “bribery.” 71 Walton, “Era of Louis XIV,” 199–213; and Richefort, “Présents diplomatiques,” 263–79. aae md 1016, fols 256–9r, 15 Sept. 1692, is a register of “stones and jewels” listing 225 luxurious gift items. In reporting Louis XIV’s gift of a ring to Bolingbroke, it was noted that it had been the Dauphin’s and was valued at 50,000 livres. bl am 33273, fol. 180r, Sutton to Watkins, 2 Sept. 1712. Diplomats’ wives also received gifts from Louis XIV. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 60. 72 Bimbenet-Privat, “Pierreries de Louis XIV,” 81–96. 73 Torcy asked a Swedish diplomat what kind of gift his colleague might prefer (ibid., 92–3). 74 Thépaut-Cabasset, “Présents du Roi,” 4–18. 75 Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 9: 450 (Petkum to Heinsius, 22 Nov. 1709). 76 Of 56 marks in weight, each displayed the royal arms. aae md 1192, fol. 446, 9 July 1713. See also ibid., 1205, fol. 369, an order for two silver boxes for seals for delivery to Pecquet; ibid., 310, fol. 288, 450 livres to Ballin for two silver boxes for the ratification seals for an alliance with the Catholic Swiss cantons; and ibid., 1148, fol. 290v, 12 Sept. 1707, authorizing Ballin to make a gift of approximately 130 marcs of silver for Nuncio Cusani. 77 aae md 1041, fol. 197v, 16 July 1697. In 1714 Bonnac received 30,000 livres for the customary gifts from a newly arrived ambassador to the Porte’s ministers. Ibid., 1201, fol. 284. 78 Boislisle, Correspondance, 3:279 (Torcy to Desmaretz, 18 Mar. 1710). 79 Haile, Mary of Modena, 368–73, 381, 387, 400–1, 445, 454. 80 Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:600. 81 In addition to the widow of Jersey already mentioned, there was also ­Elisabeth Bryerley, probably related to Joseph Bryerley, the Duke of Berwick’s equerry, and Abbé Butler, a doctor of the Sorbonne and kinsman of James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormonde. Of course, secret agents were listed elsewhere. Toby Bourke (“Bourg”), officially listed as serving the English king in Spain, received two gratifications of 3,000 livres. 82 Boislisle, Suisses et Puyzieulx, xxvi–xxvi. For examples, see aae md 301, fol. 301 (31 Dec. 1714); and Rott, Inventaire, 4:488–90, 503–13. See also ­Mercier, Vie d’ambassadeur, 167–78.



Notes to pages 301–5

635

83 Boislisle, Suisse et Puyzieulx, i–xxxviii. The Swiss subsidies were so important that in 1694 Croissy sent Louis Pontchartrain an urgent, indeed peremptory, note reminding him to remit funds to the League treasurers. aae md 1026, fol. 51, Croissy to Pontchartrain, 5 Mar. 1694. In 1709, when word reached Pomponne in Venice that the French princes were contributing their silver to pay for an autumn offensive, he wrote Torcy a plaintive letter underlining the importance of these subsidies and suggesting that he be sent the crown’s jewels to pawn to Venice’s Christian or Jewish bankers. He claimed he could raise enough to pay the annual Swiss pensions or subsidize a revolt in Naples. aae cp Venise 158, fol. 113r–v, Pomponne to Torcy 29 June 1709. 84 Based on aae md 1201, fols 269–302. 85 Ibid., 1553, fols 427–8r. Since 1702, John William Friso, Prince of NassauDietz, was locked with King Frederick I of Prussia and another prince in a succession dispute over the inheritance of William III as Prince of Orange. Although Friso died in a drowning accident in 1711, he left a posthumous son, William Charles Henry Friso (later known as William IV, Prince of Orange), as his heir. Rowen, Princes of Orange, 148–51. The Nassau-Dietz claims were recognized at Utrecht in article 10 of the treaty signed 11 April 1713 between France and Prussia. Frederick I, who died on 25 February before the formal signing, ceded the Principality of Orange to France and agreed to indemnify the young prince. Vast, Traités de Louis XIV, 3:125–6. In fact, however, it was Louis XIV, anxious for better relations with Prussia, who paid the one million–livre indemnity to Nassau-Dietz on Prussia’s behalf. France, Recueil, 16:288–9. 86 There are several sums given for reimbursements for the care and conduct of prisoners, but these are not listed as vacations and seem to involve officers in Torcy’s provinces (e.g., aae md 1201, fols 285v and 288). 87 Barbiche, Institutions, 83; and Marion, Dictionnaire, 549. 88 aae md 1201, fol. 278. 89 Ibid., cp Liège 18, fols 11ff, show the mail service’s increasing disruption through that state with the onset of war from early 1702. Eventually the French developed a new route to Liege that avoided Spanish postal tariffs (ibid., fol. 196). 90 aae md 1186, fols 218–19v (1712); ibid., 1192, fols 419–22r (1713); ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v (1714); and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10 (1715). Torcy’s letter to Pajot, 3 Feb. 1712 (ibid., fol. 68), announced that Desmaretz had assigned 2,650 livres 10 sous to be paid from postal funds and that he was sending a register of the ordonnances so that Vincent could make the payments. 91 Dessert, Argent, 102–3, 131, 136, 144, 231, 259, 270, 323, 332–3, 549–50; and Antoine, Dictionnaire biographique, 56, for the Brunet family. 92 La Closure, Iberville’s successor in Geneva, in 1704 wrote to Torcy about Jean-Henri Huguetan, Bernard’s Amsterdam associate and grandson of a

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93 94

95 96 97 98 99

100

101 102 103 104 105

106

107

Notes to pages 307–9 Lyon Protestant refugee, declaring that never did a man know so well how to put money in motion. Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:150–1. Lévy, Capitalistes, 38, 73, 76, 77, 205, 349–51; and Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:78–9, 83. aae md 1041, fol. 124, Bernard to Torcy, 6 Mar. 1697. At the top of the letter is written “M. Bernard banquier.” See Lüthy, Banque protestante, especially 1:74–5, 121–5; Levy, Capitalistes, 49–50; and Dessert, Argent, ­192–202, 532. aae cp Venise 158, fol. 124, Pomponne to Torcy, 6 July 1709. Ibid., md 1181, fol. 49v, Bernard to Torcy, 7 Mar. 1711. Ibid., 1042, fol. 22, Torcy to d’Avaux, 10 Jan. 1697. Quoted in Dickson and Sperling, “War, Finance,” 284. There is no comprehensive work on the financial crisis (crises) of 1709, but see Lüthy, Banque protestante, 1:188–230; and Monahan, Year of Sorrows, 81–6. aae md 1181, fol. 49, Bernard to Torcy, 7 Mar. 1711. See also ibid., fols 29, 51, 99, and 128 (1711); ibid., fol. 101, Torcy to Bernard, 19 May 1711, acknowledging that Pecquet had received four letters of exchange; and ibid., 1186, fol. 285 (1712). Dessert, Argent, 565–6; and Lévy, Capitalistes, passim. Antoine financed the plenipotentiaries’ journey to Utrecht (ibid., 151). aae cp Suède 133, fol. 40, Torcy to Crozat, 11 Aug. 1715. Memoires histoire de Louvois, 159–60. Samoyault, Bureaux, 157–65 203–23. Azimi, “Traitements,” 429–31, discusses the tension between the ideal of public service and financial reality. There are few traces of rewards to Torcy’s household, but Bély, Espions, 642, has uncovered some. For instance, the payment orders in the general registry for 1710 (aae md 308, fols 29–39), 1711 (ibid., 309, fols 60–70), and 1713 (ibid., 1192, fols 3–13v) are all brief summaries, listing (from left to right) only amount, type of payment (e.g., gratification, pension, au porteur), and term (e.g., three or six months), name of recipient, and date. Those for 1714 (ibid., 1201, fols 269–302) and 1715 (ibid., 310, fols 346–68), however, include details about the recipient (e.g., if a diplomat, where stationed; convert to Catholicism; nationality; actual services performed, such as the particulars of an investigation), and in a format (from left to right): date, amount, recipient, details about the recipient and reasons for payment, and type and terms of payment. Barbiche, Institutions, 78, 83; and Azimi, “Traitements,” 432. These forms of remuneration applied to any premier commis also holding a venal office. Samoyault, Bureaux, 179–202, must be used on this topic with care, since it is based largely on the period after Torcy and reaches conclusions often at odds with the practices of that earlier period. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:127–32, also deals largely with the post-Torcy department.

108 109 110 111

12 1 113

114 115

116

117

118

Notes to pages 309–10

637

Barbiche, Institutions, 84–7; and Azimi, “Traitements.” Furetière, Dictionnaire, 1: s.v. “appointements.” A gift or gratuity given to someone. daf, s.v. “gratification.” A pension was what a king, prince, or great lord gave annually as a gratuity, recompense for services, or to induce someone to favour their interests. Ibid., s.v. “pension.” See above, pp. 314–16. Pierre Clairambault recorded the revenues drawn from the fiscal patchwork of the “Appointments.” They included partial reimbursements and gratifications to departmental commis, secretaries, messengers, translators, and ushers, as well as payment for brief trips and even books, pens, ink, and notebooks for the Académie politique’s students. Torcy’s own pensions from the Appointments reached over 40,000 livres. Around 1700 his total income from this source reached over 120,000 livres; Barbezieux drew nearly 140,000 livres; Jérôme Pontchartrain, 144,000 livres; and ­Châteauneuf, 75,000 to 80,000 livres. bn Clairambault 664, fols 615–16. See also ­McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 76–8. Azimi, “Traitements,” 441. aae md 1192, fols 419–22r (1713), ibid., 1201, fols 249–51v, and ibid., 1205, fols 109–10, 114r, 158r, and 188r (1715). The only specified gratification for Adam is from 1691 and for 3,000 livres, but it is not clear whether it was ordinary or extraordinary, since it coincided with his mission abroad (1690–91) and his purchase of an office of secretary of the king (1691). The increase and decrease in the sums for Pecquet’s and Fournier’s bureaus may be due to the addition of a new staff member or an internal transfer from another bureau. This figure could represent both a 900-livre extraordinary gratification like that for Fournier’s commis in 1712 and 1,500 for their ordinary gratifications, explaining the 2,400-livre total. aae md 310, fols 292–3. Samoyault, Bureaux, 218, says that Bernage, Du Parc, and Le Dran were in Pecquet’s bureau, and (ibid., 300) adds Pierre Mignon to this group, although he may actually have begun in his uncle Fournier’s bureau in 1710 and after the latter’s retirement in 1723 (ibid., 286) served under Pecquet from 1723 to 1740. This leaves Adam fils, ­Sermenté, Beauchamp, Charles Fournier, Maugin, and perhaps Pierre Mignon for the bureaus of Adam and Fournier prior to September 1715. This is a total of nine simple commis, which conforms to the later count by department historian Le Dran, cited in Samoyault, Bureaux, 36. Indicative of the imprecision of terminology at the time, two others listed by the regent as commis are Larroque (2,400 livres) and Abbé Le Grand (3,000 livres). Again, Adam had gone to the new domestic council, Beauchamp had moved to the post office, and Blondel probably retired when Torcy left office.

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Notes to pages 310–13

119 The absence of an amount for Fournier in 1715 may be due to the fact that these accounts were apparently interrupted by Louis XIV’s death on 1 September. 120 The 300-livre increments clearly represent six-month payments but the 800 livres in 1714 may have been an extraordinary gratification. 121 It is not clear what the other sums au porteur paid Du Theil in those three years were for, but it is not likely that they were all gratifications, since the totals were 10,000, 10,000, and 4,000 livres respectively. 122 Samoyault, Bureaux, 188, misreads aae md 310, fol. 292v as 1,500 for ­Pecquet’s three commis for half a year, whereas it clearly specifies “par an” (per year). Azimi, “Traitements,” 435, notes that such disparities in remuneration were ubiquitous in the ancien régime. 123 aae md 1192, fols 419–21v (1713). The figure for Pecquet is labeled a gratification, whereas the figures for his commis are au porteur, but since it is not the same as their annual sum, it can be assumed that it too is extraordinary. Later sums for Pecquet that are listed au porteur appear to be ordinary gratifications, although as indicated above some au porteur payments were likely extraordinary gratifications even though not marked as such. 124 Azimi, “Traitements,” 453–8. 125 aae md 1197, fol. 16. 126 Samoyault, Bureaux, 185. 127 aae md 1062, fol. 56, is the 20 August 1699 ordonnance for his 3,000-livre gratification for the previous year. Ibid., 1077, fol. 68 (1700), records the raise. Ibid., 1192, fol. 240 (1713), for example, records the usual 4,000 livres. The extraordinary gratification is in ibid., 1201, fol. 250v (1714). 128 Ibid., 1145, fol. 16 (1706), authorized “500 au porteur” for two months of appointements for documentary research. The rate was fixed at 250 livres per month (ibid., 308, fol. 29v, 1 Jan. 1710), but could include supplements, such as the 600 livres paid that same year (ibid., fol. 31v). Neveu, “Vie érudite,” 453, says that Torcy paid Le Grand a 1,000 écus (3,000 livres) pension every October. 129 aae md 309, fols 64 and 69 (1711). 130 Ibid., 310, fols 292–3. 131 The secretary of state’s recommendation could help secure positions outside the department. In 1698 Pierre Clairambault, with the support of Torcy, the Royal Orders’ treasurer, outbid his rival Charles d’Hozier for the office of the chivalric orders’ genealogist, a venal post for which he paid 40,000 livres. Within the year he designated his nephew Nicolas-Paschal Clairambault as his survivancier. Lauer, Catalogue Clairambault, 1:v–viii. 132 aae md 1013, fol. 188. Klaits, Propaganda, 182–3, on Dubos’s meagre rewards.



Notes to pages 313–14

639

133 aae md 308, fol. 38v (1710). On 15 January 1700 La Chapelle also received an acquit patent of 3,000 livres in consideration of his services in the past year. For Hooke, see Pope, “Mucking about in Germany.” 134 Azimi, “Pensions,” 92, discusses “pension” as an omnibus term under the monarchy. 135 aae md 1093, fol. 153 (1701); ibid., 308, fol. 33 (1710); ibid., 309, fol. 64v (1711); ibid., 1192, fol. 7 (1713); ibid., 1201, fol. 250 (1714); and ibid., 1205, fol. 110 (1715). 136 Azimi, “Pensions,” 85–6. 137 aae md 307, fol. 39 (Aubert); ibid., 1145, fols 6 and 203 (Lullier); ibid., 1160, fol. 162 (1708, “veuve Parayre”); ibid., 1201, fol. 293 (1714, ­Rossignol); and ibid., fol. 280v (1714, Fonton). For the Rossignol pension, see also ss-Boislisle, 13:149–50. Samoyault, Bureaux, 186, mentions that certain retired commis also received pensions from their original departments. 138 aae md 1201, fols 273, 280v, 281v, and 295 (1714). 139 For a rare example and not for a commis, see ibid., 1056, fol. 36, for SaintOlon, a secretary, and a valet to journey between Versailles and Brest twice to accompany the Moroccan ambassador in 1698 and 1699. 140 Ibid., 1066, fol. 11 (1699), says that Adam received 2,000 livres for voyages, while ibid., 1094, fol. 13r (1701), specifies 2,100 livres paid to Aubert. 141 aae cp Autriche 81, fol. 129–30, Torcy to Noblet, 2 Aug. 1702, assuring him that he had again pressed Pontchartrain for his payment, but that for ­Noblet it was far more important that he please the Duke of Burgundy, for which the king would see him well rewarded. As Burgundy’s secrétaire des commandements, Noblet was paid through the royal household. Noblet thanked ­Pontchartrain, 21 August 1702, for sending the payment (ibid., fol. 196). 142 For examples of Adam’s trips to Brittany, see aae md 307, fol. 43v (1705); ibid., 1182, fol. 167v (1711); and ibid., 1190, fol. 406v (1713). Ibid., 1056, fol. 164 (1699), shows Adam and Marolot traveling to Compiegne via Chantilly the night (25 Sept.) that Pomponne lay dying at Fontainebleau. Ibid., 1187, fol. 81, records an unspecified ordonnance de voyage for Adam, while ibid., 310, fol. 294, reports payments to Fournier for four round trips between Calais and London in 1715. 143 Vaillé, Postes, 4:140, notes that under Louvois cabinet couriers were paid at a rate of 100 sols per relay station to their destinations. The numbers of relay stations to some important destinations were 40 to The Hague, 50 to London, 130 to Rome, and 150 each to Madrid and Warsaw. Until 1716 postal inspectors were paid 8 livres per relay station visited and 12 livres per day during the visit (horses were gratis) (ibid., 5:290). 144 For details, see Rule, “Rolle,” 84–92, from which this and the following paragraphs are largely drawn. The king and secretary of state literally read

640

145

46 1 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155

56 1 157

158

Notes to pages 314–17 down the list of names, writing assent, denial, and other comments as they read. Records of this are in aae md 1011 (1691); ibid., 1012 (1692); ibid., 1019 (a summary of the years 1692–94); ibid., 1033 (1695–98); ibid., 1069 ­(1699–1701); ibid., 1118 (1703); ibid., 1129 (1704); ibid., 1160 (1708); ibid., 1181 (1711); ibid., 1194 (1713); and ibid., 1208 (1715). Antoine, Conseil du roi, 286–7. Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 45–64, describes how the aubaine was used in contradictory ways for “absolutist” state-­ building and fiscal expediencies. For these domain rights, see Barbiche, Institutions, 371. For placets and their “language,” see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 117–21. État de la France (1698), 1:284–5; and, briefly, Barbiche, Institutions, 181. Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 118, 120–1. aae md 1011, fol. 62, 30 Nov. 1691. Ibid., 1012, fol. 364. Ibid., 1069, fols 3–23, covering 1699 to 1701, is the fullest account discovered. Bély, Dictionnaire, 1144–6; and Barbiche, Institutions, 163–4. According to ibid., 310, fols 283v–4, Odeau received for each half of 1714 gages of 1,500 livres and taxations fixes of 750 livres; see ibid., 309, fol. 13 for 1711.  aae cp Angleterre 173, fol. 186v; and, ibid., md 1064, fols 112–13 (10 Sept. 1699). Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 309–36, 372, discusses the published treaty series that indicated a growing audience for such reading matter outside diplomatic circles. See also Black, Diplomacy, 80. Mignon and Bergeret together were granted this privilege for ten years on 7 July 1684 (Leonard, Recueil des traitez, vols 3 and 4 [no consecutive page numbers]), but when it expired in 1694, Bergeret was dead and there were no public treaties to print. With the July 1696 peace treaty with Savoy, Mignon was granted the privilege on 10 October 1696 (aae md 1064, fols ­112v–14v), as noted in the privilege’s extract printed in 1697 in Traité de paix entre la France et la Savoye. A 1697 grant of permission to print the Treaty of ­Ryswick names him as sole privilege-holder (ibid., cp Angleterre 173, fol. 186v). The late 1700 printed edition of Testament de Charles II, however, refers to the late Mignon in the 10 September 1699 grant of the privilege to Adam (see also aae md 1064, fols 112v–14v). Adam’s grant was renewed for twelve years on 1 September 1712, as noted at the end of Traité de suspension d’armes entre la France et l’Angleterre, 12–14. Mignon’s brother, René II, and Noblet’s father. aae cp Danemark 47, fol. 431r, 19 Apr. 1694, Bonrepaus to Blondel, offering his congratulations on the gratification the king had provided for the office’s purchase as a mark of satisfaction with his service. Favre-Lejeune, Secrétaires, 1:228. Sourches, Mémoires, 6:139, noted on 21 March 1699 Blondel’s purchase of Mansart’s charge.



Notes to pages 317–21

641

159 See aae md 1194, fol. 178 (1713), for a “Lettre de Compatibilité” in favour of Pecquet. 160 bn ag 35, Cotté V, Versailles, fols 35–6. 161 aae md 1129, fol. 286. 162 Bluche and Solnon, Véritable hiérarchie, 103–4, 118–19, 130–1. See Kwass, Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité, 69–70, for a critique of Bluche and Solnon’s assertion that the tax mirrored social hierarchy. 163 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 1–2, 37–42. 164 aae md 1056, fol. 103r–v; and ibid., 1064, fol. 238bis r. bn Clairambault 1193, fol. 93 (1704), shows Adam working for Saint Pouange, the Royal Orders’ grand treasurer, apparently examining the accounts of Louis-­ François Moufle de Champigny, one of the treasurers of the marc d’or. Champigny received the office from his father-in-law, Nicolas Chuppin, and served with Nicolas’s brother Jean Chuppin. Du Chesne and Haudicquer de Blancourt, Recherches ordre du Saint Esprit, 2:451–4. Champigny and the Chuppins were Colbert kin and close to Croissy. Nagle, Droit de marc d’or, 50. Receipts for marc d’or payments are found in aae md, 1064, fols 1–2r. Adam’s work for the Orders may have begun as early as 1690 when Croissy was grand treasurer and likely lasted through 1700, at which point Torcy was promoted to chancellor, a position he held until 1716. The accounts for 1698 and 1699 show the chancellor’s secretary receiving 400 livres annually. Adam likely served in this capacity. 165 aae cp Angleterre 221, documents dated 11 Mar. 1707, written from Glatigny. 166 Symcox, Crisis Sea Power, 241–3.

Chapter Eight 1 Quoted in Swedberg and Agevall, Weber Dictionary, 19. See also the illuminating chapter on “Diplomats and the Information Society” in Black, British Diplomats, 118–45. 2 Ash, “Expertise,” 14–15. 3 Ibid., 16, on “action at a distance.” 4 Blair, Too Much to Know; and Headrick, When Information. For a general discussion of models of state information-gathering and the extent of early modern data collection in England, see Higgs, Information State, especially 10–27. 5 Allen, Post and Courier Service. 6 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 171–2 (22 Sept.). 7 Black, Diplomacy, 20. 8 Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:110. On the distinction between documents and records, see Vismann, Files, 71–72. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-

642

Notes to pages 321–2

Empire, 255–78, details how French and Imperial delegations appealed to tradition concerning the use of Latin and French in past negotiations to play for time during negotiations. Venice pioneered in “the collection and systematic storing of information.” Vivo, Information, 49–50. 9 Vismann, Files, 58, says that archives re-purpose records as reminders of a state’s past. This first took place under the Romans. Favier, Archives, 20–2, explains that in France until the eighteenth century all “public” papers were regarded as private, even those of the monarch himself. Public servants were personally responsible for their activities on behalf of the king, so their papers, as evidence of their work, were regarded as a surety for their heirs to use to defend both the late crown servant’s reputation and their own fortunes. Even Venice was plagued by this confounding of public with private documents. Vivo, Information, 54–7. 10 Baschet, Dépôt, 4–67. On 1 September 1671, the day Lionne died, Colbert went to his Paris residence with a royal order to seal his papers, assisted by Lionne’s son Berny and Luc de Rives. Louvois, acting foreign secretary until Pomponne arrived from Sweden, received those papers needed for daily business, but the others remained under seal with Colbert (ibid., 64–6), probably at his residence. They were eventually transferred to Pomponne’s new residence at Place des Victoires, purchased 1 July 1672. For Pomponne’s Paris residences, see Delavaud, Pomponne, 109–12, 221. There is no clear indication where these papers were stored in the interim, but given Louis XIV’s animus toward the Arnauld family, it is unlikely that it would have been at the ancient Arnauld residence in the Hôtel Pomponne on rue de la Verre­ rie, where until 1672 Pomponne resided when in Paris. They more likely remained at the Hôtel Colbert until Pomponne’s return. 11 See Clément’s 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers …” of the foreign secretary in Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 361–2. 12 Vismann, Files, 58–9. 13 According to Marchand, Dictionnaire, 223, Jacques Tubeuf, a president of the Chambre des comptes, had three residences constructed by the architect Le Muet. Mazarin purchased two and incorporated them into his palace. The one Croissy acquired was constructed between 1648 and 1655. A 5 June 1688 purchase contract with Tubeuf’s heirs leads Bérenger to conclude that Croissy owned what came to be known as the Hôtel Croissy at 16 rue ­Vivienne, only from 1688. Bérenger, “Croissy,” 170, 170n1. However, ­Delavaud, “Grande dame,” 99, notes that Croissy, who rented a house on rue Vivienne, only realized his dream of purchasing one on that street in 1670 when he purchased the Hôtel Tubeuf upon Tubeuf’s death. A 27 January 1681 legal document signed by Croissy apparently supports Delavaud by indicating that the Croissys resided in their rue Vivienne townhouse from at least the beginning of the 1680s. Loriquet, “Papiers Colbert,” 256. Croissy



14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25

26

27

28 29

Notes to pages 322–4

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wanted to be close to his brother, who in 1665 purchased the Hôtel Beautru (later Hôtel Colbert) at the corner of rue Vivienne and rue Neuve-des-PetitsChamps. Neymarck, Colbert, 2:495. Mazarin, Colbert’s master, had resided on rue Vivienne since 1643. Vismann, Files, 98–9. Ibid., 98. Soll, Information Master. Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 43–9. Blair, Too Much to Know, 6. Baschet, Dépôt, 73–8; and Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 360, 362 (for ­Clément’s own words in his 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers” of the foreign secretary). The original bundles are described in Archives hg, 1:214. The geographic classification scheme remains to this day, although in 1896 the chronological arrangement of materials within this framework was replaced by one based on subject matter. It remains controversial (ibid., ­113–15; and 2:65–6). See Duplessis, “Nicolas Clément,” 94–100. Vismann, Files, 95. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 433–5, 479, ­discusses how such correspondence was used by foreign office commis to write policy memoirs to guide French interpretations of German law and treaties. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 362–8. Le Melle (or Le Melles) was still on the department’s payroll in 1692. aae md 1017, fol. 162. Vismann, Files, 98. Ash, “Expertise,” 20–2, on the emergence of “operative knowledge.” Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 132. Delavaud, “Documents coloniaux,” 396, 396n3, relates that when Du Fresne died, Clément had Parayre examine the papers, and Bergeret assumed the same task some months later. For reasons unknown, however, these valuable papers escaped the department’s grip until a 1910 purchase. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 356–9. Baschet, Dépôt, 74–82, made use of Delisle’s material before it was published and printed selections from it (and, in some instances, selections that Delisle did not publish), but apparently mixed up some of the details. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 356–9. Although Delisle faults Baschet for downplaying Croissy’s contribution in an earlier work, by 1875 Baschet had reversed himself. Baschet, Dépôt, 75. Clément’s 1681 “Mémoire concernant les papiers” of the foreign secretary, in Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372. The yearly binding began at the end of 1680 with twenty-five volumes for that year, then thirty volumes for 1683–84, twenty-seven volumes for 1685 (perhaps early in 1686, with six volumes for 1685 having been bound in November of that year), and thirty-three for 1686–87 (ibid., 362, 370–2).

644

Notes to pages 324–5

30 Perhaps we catch a glimpse of a filing system in the Moroccan leather portfolios with ribbons that Croissy took with him to Nijmegen (ibid., 368). Le Dran later referred to liasses, which were packets of many papers joined together in the centre fold by means of ribbons or strings, but papers were damaged by their frequent removal and replacement in these packets. Archives hg, 1:213–14. 31 See Vismann, Files, 100–1, on the importance of this “planning ahead” as a step beyond “archival cleanup.” 32 Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372. Baschet, Dépôt, 79, mentions it without further comment. Not surprisingly, this object has apparently not survived, probably because of its size and eventual obsolescence. It was most likely a chart that listed volumes, the years they covered, and the agent involved, all grouped under the appropriate geographic rubric and presumably with space for adding volumes as they were bound. If this was the case, one wonders if once the original was filled up a new one replaced it. Ellis, “British Communication and Diplomacy,” 163, relates that the British foreign office pasted large printed copies of ciphers on boards to facilitate code work. 33 Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 372, lists the move’s costs. Baschet, Dépôt, 79, misquotes this as “quatre charriots” and fails to include the further information that only one wagon and one man to drive it were hired. Counting the 540 volumes of correspondence through 1679 and the volumes generated by Croissy’s department by 1685, the move may have comprised over six hundred volumes. It is not clear, however, how many volumes remained at the Hôtel Croissy in Paris, but Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:88, 109, suggest that it may have been substantial, whereas Baschet, Dépôt, 116–17, insists that in 1710 all volumes for 1660 to 1698 were at Versailles before being transported to the Louvre. 34 Leather binding cost 3–4 livres per volume, whereas parchment cost only 30 sous (there were 20 sous per livre) and marbled paper over cardboard only 25 sous per volume. Delisle, “Origine des archives,” 370–2. The cost differential likely reflected the pride of place diplomacy held as a kingly craft and the practical consideration that negotiation narratives were the most likely of these papers to be consulted again and again. For the royal bindery and for the difficulties obtaining the expensive red Moroccan leather, leading to the substitution of vellum early in the next reign, see Archives hg, 1:214–15. 35 Baschet, Dépôt, 79. For Clément’s cataloguing 1688 work, see Balayé, “Bibliothèque du Roi,” 210–11. A 25 November 1698 payment authorization by Torcy suggests that the volumes of negotiations between 1688 until Croissy’s death in 1696 were not bound until 1698. Baschet, Dépôt, 83–4. This interruption to the annual binding of political correspondence coincided with the outbreak of war in 1688 and the return of peace in 1697. Perhaps the press of affairs or, more likely, binding costs delayed this final step in



36 37

38

39

Notes to page 325

645

the ­preservation process. The payment authorization’s cryptic reference to 11,692 livres for binding and to the additional cost of clerks suggests that Croissy’s system broke down further during these war years; perhaps political correspondence was either partially sorted or not at all, requiring extensive preparation before later binding under Torcy. Baschet (ibid., 87–8) mentions (without citing or quoting) a document that he reads as suggesting that Torcy did not get around to having his own papers bound until August 1706. Archives hg, 1:214, notes that in 1706 the foreign ministry gave the binder Dubois such a large and lucrative work order that he was harassed by the community of binders. During the next war, volumes were again apparently not bound immediately. When the king asked Torcy in 1709 for a 1707 report, he retrieved it the next day, but the king said not to bother having it copied, since he would return it shortly, which he did some weeks later. Torcy, Journal, 16, 18, 42. Had these papers been from a bound volume, a copy would have been necessary. Torcy sent Chamillart two documents from the 1690s and asked for their return when he had looked at them. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:26. Thuillier, “Première école,” 22–4. Piccioni, Commis, 32, is mistaken in calling him a premier commis. When he died, he had a library of 1,434 volumes worth 1,678 livres and composed of numerous religious books, including the Bible in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, many Jansenist works, books of other confessions, and Arab and Persian works. He had an extensive legal library of civil, canon, and customary law, as well as works on astronomy, astrology, and chronology. His collection included paintings and prints of religious subjects, small landscapes, birds and flowers, and a portrait of the king. Samoyault, Bureaux, 242–5, 258–9. See Thuillier, Première école, 56, 56n6, for Bruno Neveu’s comments on his Jansenism. Saint-Prest’s friend Abbé François de Camps was a numismatist and legal scholar who had Jansenist connections. Bergin, Crown, Church, 259–60. The separation may have been connected to debts that forced Saint-Prest in 1715 to sell two hotels inherited from his mother. For these details, see especially Thuillier, Première école, 55–7; and Samoyault, Bureaux, 166, 205, 207, 210, 220–1, 233, 309. Piccioni, Commis, 183–6, relies largely on Baschet, Dépôt, passim (but especially chaps 2, 3, and 4). For Anne Chomel, see Popoff, Prosopographie, 439. Their affairs were also the subject of correspondence between the police lieutenant and the household secretary. D’Argenson, Rapports inédits, 387. Petitfils, Regent, 29. Thuillier, Première école, 56, says he served Madame from 1670 to 1718, but Samoyault, Bureaux, 309, dates it from 1692, as does Baschet, Dépôt, 143. Available issues of État de la France (1678, 1684, 1686, 1698), however, list someone else as Madame’s secrétaire des

646

40 41

42

43 44

45 46

47

48

Notes to page 326 ­commandements during those years, whereas Saint-Prest appears first in 1702, the next available issue (ibid., 2:156), Several of the inventories he made for her have survived and at least two were signed by Blondel as crown auditor. bn po 2774, fol. 21. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 524–5, notes Saint-Prest’s writings on the Palatinate question. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 525–33. Delavaud, Pomponne, xxviii–xix, 302–3; and Baschet, Dépôt, 83–4. For example, France, Inventaire des mémoires et documents: Fonds France et fonds divers, Rome, 2–4, lists Saint-Prest’s histories of negotiations between France and the pope at Pisa (1664) and between France’s envoys at Rome and the popes (1661–91, in six volumes, and over 750 folios in two volumes of the memoirs of French ambassadors in Rome (1675–93); ibid., Hollande, 2–6, shows negotiations with the United Provinces; and ibid., Venise, 2, is a 1704 account of relations with Venice since 1701, prepared presumably for Pomponne, who was appointed ambassador the following year. Thuillier, Première école, 56; and Piccioni, Commis, 185. Rott, Inventaire, 4:491, notes a 24 November 1688 memoir penned by Saint-Prest on the thorny question of international law relating to Swiss troops employed for and against Austria and the Empire. aae cp Angleterre 173, fols 256–274 (1697); and ibid., Hollande 231, fol. 248r–v. France, Archives du ministère des relations extérieures, 1:152–4. The first series appeared in a two-volume pirated edition in Amsterdam in 1725. SaintSimon possessed a manuscript copy of the second series. Lombard, Du Bos, 392. “Histoire du roy Louis XIV, depuis la paix des Pirénées jusqu’à celle d’Aixla-Chapelle, par les négotiations de ses ministres dans les cours étrangères, écrite sur les Mémoires du bureau de M. le Mis de Torcy, ministre et secrétaire d’État.” bn naf 3064 (235 pages) and aae md 412 (126 folios). It goes only as far as 1663. The aae catalogue lists Saint-Prest as author, but with a question mark. The bn copy has penciled corrections on it, including some in Torcy’s hand (e.g., fol. 21). What makes the case for Vertôt’s authorship compelling is a 1708 letter from Vertôt to Jean-Antoine de Mesmes of the Paris parlement in the same hand as that of the bn manuscript. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 213–34. bn naf 3064, fol. 3. Delavaud, Pomponne, xviii, xviiin6, attributes the work to “Saint-Prez,” but in his “Additions et Corrections” (ibid., 302–3), along with quoting from the manuscript, he notes that Jean de Boislisle, the only other historian who had utilized this source, attributed it to the students of either Saint-Prest or Legrand, presumably as part of the Académie politique. bn naf 3064, fol. 5. Because this particular work was not for the general public, the abbé offered candid analyses of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louvois. His view of the latter was especially negative (ibid., fol. 202).



Notes to pages 326–8

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49 This was likely Vertôt’s generous description of his colleague rather than Saint-Prest’s flattering self-portrait, which is another point in favour of the former’s authorship. 50 Ibid., fol. 5. Among the outside sources he employed were Jean du Tillet’s 1550 La Chronique des Roys de France (fol. 17); Antoine Aubery’s 1695 L’Histoire du cardinal Mazarin (fol. 93); Charles Bernard’s 1646 Histoire de Louis XIII (fol. 96); and Samuel Puffendorf’s historical works (fols 97 and 99). 51 Thuillier, Première école, 46–8, 61–2, 70, 82–3, 85. Some tables had already been gathered, such as aae md 1080, fols 39–41v, 17 Apr. 1700, of Chambre des comptes accounts in the chancellery from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (ibid., fol. 42, is the transmission letter and explanation). Archives hg, 1:238, indicates that Torcy envisioned alphabetic directories and analytical tables for the bound volumes later known as Mémoires et Documents. 52 Torcy, Journal, 197, reported that in 1710 when preparing a request for a dispensation from Rome for the duc de Berry’s marriage, he searched for a precedent and found one from 1692. 53 Klaits, Propaganda, 191–2. 54 Ibid., 295. 55 Ibid., 113–70 (La Chapelle), 171–93 (Dubos), 246–66 (Le Grand). La ­Blinières is discussed in ibid., 223–7, 237, 240, 270; and Bély, Espions, 348. Saint-Prest, however, does not appear in Klait’s account. For Dubos at ­Gertruydenberg, see Torcy, Journal, 128n1. 56 Dubos was a Parisian man of letters from the 1690s. He began writing for Torcy in 1701 after much travel through England, the Low Countries, and Italy. He became fluent in English, corresponded with Bayle from 1695, and visited him while in Holland. He not only used Torcy’s archives to write his works but also drew on English sources unavailable to the minister. Klaits, Propaganda, 172–3, 175–6. 57 Ibid., 190. Kaiser, “Rhetoric in Service of King,” 182–99, offers insights into Dubos’s aesthetic principles and his Lockean view of public judgment. On Dubos’s views of public opinion and its importance, see also Gunn, Opinion, 106–11. 58 Picconi, Premiers commis, 184–5, seems to be responsible for the claim, repeated by Thuillier, “Première école,” 23n10, that Saint-Prest headed a “bureau de presse” (press office) that attempted to use the archive to influence contemporary news writers. While Piccioni implies that his major source on Saint-Prest is Baschet, Dépôt, nothing in it supports the press bureau claim. Delavaud, Pomponne, 303, speaks of Saint-Prest’s archival work and quotes Jean de Boislisle about the historical work executed at the reign’s end by Saint-Prest’s “special services” collaborators. A little further on ­Delavaud says that the king’s foreign ministry had a true press bureau like that in a modern foreign office and that Torcy himself took up the pen for its work,

648

59

60

61 62

63

64 65

Notes to pages 328–9 implying that Torcy rather than Saint-Prest coordinated this initiative. Since Piccioni used Delavaud’s notes for his book (Piccioni, Commis, 9), he may have misinterpreted the latter’s thoughts on this matter. Thuillier, Première école; and Archives hg, 1:16–23. From 1663 to 1715, exactly 1,843 volumes were bound with the Colbert arms (ibid., 67–8), revising the earlier estimate in Baschet, Dépôt, 161, of just over 2,000 volumes. Williams, Police, is excellent on the police under Louis XIV. Ranum, Paris, is elegantly written and thought-provoking. Jones, Paris, chap. 5, is a recent and expansive account. Jones, Paris, 157–60 (quotation on 160). During the Utrecht negotiations, Torcy received a prospectus from Dom Michael Féliben for a new multi-volume history of Paris, including what was of special interest to Louis XIV, a collection of medals, coins, jetons, seals, and inscriptions. Torcy, who knew Féliben’s work, granted him a royal subsidy. aae md 1195, fols 182ff. For the Louvre’s other occupants, see France, Archives du ministère des relations extérieures, 1:177. Baschet, Dépôt, 142, speculates that Torcy’s one reservation about this otherwise desirable location was being relegated to the top floor. He details the division of holdings (ibid., 116). Volumes remaining at Versailles presumably occupied the same shelves that once held the whole collection in the department’s library (ibid., 63). Vismann, Files, 99. Torcy, Journal, 76. Torcy’s journal was discovered and published by ­Masson in 1884, after Baschet’s volume appeared. Nevertheless, Masson notes (ibid., 76n1) that Baschet, Dépôt, 115–16, quoting Dangeau’s entry for 9 March 1710, misreads it, incorrectly assigning Torcy’s request for space in the Louvre to that date. In fact, the entry for 9 March 1710 (Dangeau, ­Journal, 13:119) notes that both Torcy’s request and the king’s assent had come some months earlier and that work on the rooms was in progress (“Le roi a accordé depuis quelques mois à M. de Torcy ce qu’il lui demandoit; l’on travaille pour cela”). Baschet, Dépôt, 116, misassigns the move to the end of 1710 or the beginning of 1711, whereas it took place in the spring of 1710. ss -Boislisle, 19:362, 362n4, likewise misreading Dangeau, dates the order from March 1710. Saint-Simon also claims that Torcy had previously established a public depot in a detached pavilion of the Petits-Pères near Place des Victoires and accessible from the Hôtel Torcy’s garden on rue Vivienne. Both Boislisle (ibid., 363n4, 364n3) and Baschet, Dépôt, 116–17, show that Saint-Simon was mistaken, since it was the household and navy archives that Jérôme Pontchartrain established at that location in 1699. Baillou et al., Corps diplomatique, 1:88, suggest that this error may have arisen from the fact that Torcy of necessity kept many papers at his Paris residence for work or storage.



Notes to pages 329–31

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66 Archives hg, 1:175–9, 213–16. From 1680 until shortly after Torcy left office, the volumes were bound in expensive calfskin and Moroccan leather imported from the Levant and then stamped with the Colbert coat of arms. Thereafter they were marked with the royal arms. England’s foreign office trailed France in this area, as seen in Higgs, Information State, 54. aae md 1186, fols 218v and 277, lists payments in 1712 to porters and to a merchant for paper, pens, and other supplies. 67 Rathery, “Notice cabinet du roi,” 1013–22. aae md 1064, fol. 114, 10 Sept. 1699, specifies that copies of treaties and anything else printed by permission of Adam’s monopoly be placed in the Royal Library, in the Louvre’s Cabinet des Livres, and with the chancellor. 68 ss-Coirault, 6:636, 1363. 69 Boislisle, “Place des Victoires,” 264; and Grandmaison, Gaignières, 77–9. 70 Lister, Journey to Paris, 108. 71 Ibid., 128–30. Torcy acquired books for it through his contacts abroad. aae cp Rome 510, fol. 18, Torcy to Gualterio, 20 Feb. 1710, inquiring about books being sent from Rome. 72 This is the context of Le Grand’s proposal for “tables” from each of them. He listed several of these libraries, their collections, and the disorder found in many of them. Thuillier, Première école, 46–7. 73 aae md 1040, fol. 52, Torcy to Nicolay, 2 Feb. 1696; and ibid., fol. 100, Torcy to de la Tour, 28 Jan. 1696. 74 Ibid., 1080, fols 39–42. Rousseau de Chamoy to Torcy, 7 Apr. 1700. Ibid., 1169, fol. 45r–v, 9 Jan. 1710, ordered the opening of the Nantes archives. Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 3. 75 In 1713 Blondel received an order concerning the late Cardinal Forbin-­ Janson’s papers. Baschet, Dépôt, 159n. 76 bn mf 21591, fol. 245, Torcy to Delamare, 6 Feb. 1697; and ibid., fol. 246, 6 Mar. 1697, Saint-Prest’s order. See accounts in Thuillier, Première école, 56n1; and Baschet, Dépôt, 85–6. The same happened when Parayre died in 1707 (ibid., 86; for the inventory, see ibid., 86–8). aae md 1041, fol. 156, is a 1696 note relating that Delamare turned over to Saint-Prest the papers of a “Sr Drift [?].” 77 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fol. 77, d’Argenson to Torcy, 24 Aug. 1702. 78 Richelieu, Papiers, 1:21–30. 79 aae md 1135, fol. 278r, 7 Sept. 1705. 80 Younger brother of Pajot, Henri Pajot-des-Marches, sieur du Boucher, secretary of the king, had an interest in the ferme des postes. Aubert de la Chesnaye-­Desbois and Badier, Dictionnaire de la noblesse, 11:154. When he died on 4 October 1713, his papers were ordered sealed and retrieved. aae md 1194, fol. 260; and ibid., 1190, fol. 348, both 7 Oct. 1713.

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Notes to pages 331–4

81 aae cp Russie 3, fols 124ff, for an inventory of Krock’s papers submitted to Torcy and the items themselves (he died in Paris in April 1711). The Russian code (ibid., fol. 155) is especially interesting because it used symbols for its notations. France, Recueil, 8:119–20, has a brief note on Krock and prints a letter to him from Torcy. Notations of gratifications paid to Krock in aae md 1011, fol. 242, 27 June 1691; and ibid., 1017, fol. 194, 23 Apr. 1692, show that he had long been on the French payroll. Ibid., cp Russie 3, fol. 117, Krock to Torcy, 24 June 1710 (from Villars’s camp at Remy), concerned the tsar’s offer to mediate a peace. 82 Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:311–22. 83 Favier, Archives, 7, 22–5. 84 aae md 1208, fol. 26, Torcy to Puyzieulx, 20 Feb. 1715, discussed ­Gaignières’s cabinet; and ibid., fol. 52, 12 Apr. 1715, had an account of ­Gaignières’s death and the disposition of his treasures. Concerning the division of the spoils, see ibid., 57r–9, Clairambault to Torcy, 25 May 1715; and ibid., 1205, fols 289–92v, Torcy to Clairambault, 27 May 1715. For ­Gaignières and his collection, see also Delisle, Cabinet des manuscrits, ­335–56; ­Grandmaison, Gaignières, especially 72–8, 81–2, on Torcy’s role in its acquisition; and Ranum, Portraits around Charpentier, 475–84. 85 For example, aae md 445, fol. 57r–v, Burgundy to Forbin-Janson, 27 Sept. 1703, was ostensibly a personal letter from the duke justifying the length of the siege of Brisach and “spinning” the siege itself as a means of pushing the Allies to talk peace. He referred to the false stories circulating in Rome and his hope that the pope would hear the truth. A note on the draft indicated that it was written for the cardinal to make public in Rome. 86 Baschet, Dépôt, 232. 87 aae md 1187, fol. 14r, Torcy to d’Argenson, 2 Aug. 1712. On the “culture of news” monitored by police spies, see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 112–14. 88 From Cologne’s electoral court-in-exile in Valenciennes and Lille, Baron Karg regularly supplied Torcy with copies of the Gazette de Leyde and the Nouvelles Publiques of Liège. Karg de Bebenbourg, Correspondance, 1:36–532. 89 France, Recueil, 30:145–67. Also, Boislisle, Suisses et Puyzieulx. 90 Klaits, Propaganda, 116–21; and France, Recueil, 30:184–6. 91 aae md 1080, fol., 231, 27 July 1700, indicates that La Closure was on a secret mission for Torcy; ibid., cp Lorraine 73, fols 6ff, consists of pamphlets and decrees of the Lorraine government sent to Torcy by d’Audiffret; and ibid., md 449, d’Audiffret to Torcy, 24 Apr. 1711, includes gossip from the Duke of Lorraine’s household concerning Marlborough. 92 aae cp Suisse 132, Torcy to Puyzieulx, 10 Oct. 1701. 93 Ibid., Venise 151, fol. 89, Pomponne to Torcy, 13 Aug. 1707, spoke of difficulties with the Fischer brothers (see also ibid., fol. 120); however, in



94 95 96 97 98 99 00 1

101 102

103

104

05 1 106 107

Notes to pages 334–7

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ibid., 153, fol. 28, 28 Jan. 1708, Pomponne told Torcy that he would rather deal with the Fischers than trust sending the post through Milan. See ibid., 156, fol. 20, Torcy to Pomponne, 9 Feb. 1708, on the Fischers as Imperial servants. Ibid., Suisse 249, fol. 8v, du Luc to Torcy, 20 Jan. 1713. As made clear in Vial-Bergon’s introduction to Iberville, Correspondance, xiv–xxi. Brandli, Résidence, 78–9, for La Closure’s career. Torcy made his acquaintance in Ratisbon in 1685. Lévy, Capitalistes, 54–5, 198–214. aae cp Milanais 18, fol. 75, Nouvelles d’Italie, dated 15 June 1707; and ibid., fols 76–7v, a report on the state of Imperial troops. Ibid., fols 78–86. In a 5 April 1707 letter to Pomponne, Cardinal Gualterio said of Torcy that “absolument il ne vous aime pas moins que si vous estiez son propre frère.” bl am 20340, fol. 32. Pomponne was chosen before the end of 1704. aae cp Venise 141, fol. 67, Torcy to Santa Buono (Spanish ambassador to Venice), 29 Dec. 1704. The important Pisani and Delphini families were among his informants. For the Pisani, see bl am 20338, fol. 163r, Pomponne to ­Gualterio, 7 Jan. 1708; and aae cp Venise 153, fol. 183, Pomponne to Louis XIV, 8 Apr. 1708. For the Delphini, see ibid., 148, fols 231 and 239, ­Pomponne Torcy, Oct., 1706; ibid., 156, fols 61ff, Pomponne to Delphini, 14 Apr. 1708; ibid., 157, fol. 73, Pomponne to Torcy, 2 Feb. 1709; and bl am 15285, fol. 259, Torcy to Pomponne, 14 Feb. 1709. Vivo, Information, 5, 70–1, 75. aae cp Venise 160, fol. 50v, Jérôme Pontchartrain to Torcy, 3 Apr. 1709, containing memoirs from Pomponne; ibid., 149, fols 104–6v, Pomponne to Torcy, 17 Apr. 1706; ibid., 157, fol. 38v; and ibid., Grisons 13, fol. 223, “Mémoire” sent to Torcy, 10 Apr. 1701, and fol. 433. bl am 15285, fol. 230r–v; ibid., fol. 343, Torcy to Pomponne, 1 Aug. 1709, on the Duke of Lorraine’s intercepted letters and papers Pomponne was sending him. aae cp Gênes 30, fol. 7, Iberville to Torcy, 17 Feb. 1709, reported on papers from Naples and packets from Pomponne and Gualterio. aae cp Lorraine 77, fol. 318, Torcy to d’Audiffret, 28 Apr. 1712. Torcy asked that a copy of a book on the origins of the House of Lorraine be sent to him at once, before the formal opening of the congress at Utrecht. Ibid., Angleterre 237, fols 52–63, d’Argenson to Torcy, 8 Feb. 1712. Raymond, “Introduction,” 16. Lankhorst, Renier Leers. aae md 1195, fol. 122, d’Argenson to Torcy, 13 Nov. 1713, about an anonymous letter that alerted the police that sieur de Lorme was bringing forbidden books from Holland and would have to be followed to determine the accusation’s truth. See also Bots, “Recueil des

652

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110

111 112 113

114 115 116 117 18 1 119

20 1 121

122

Notes to pages 337–40 informations,” 55–6. Martin, Livre, pouvoirs et société, 752, discusses Renier Leers in Paris, 1694–96. gbhmc, Manuscripts Portland, 4:678, Leers to Stratford, 25Apr./5 May 1711, although Leers was willing to withhold judgment. Depping, Correspondence, 4:638, 18 June 1705 (Depping says the letter is to “De Torex,” but this is likely a misprint, since the context almost certainly points to Torcy as its recipient). Ibid., 644–5. aae md 1168, fol. 171, Torcy to Trudaine, 12 Feb. 1710; ibid., 1169, fol. 48, Torcy to Trudaine, 9 Jan. 1710; ibid., fol. 152, Torcy to Tellier, 4 Feb. 1710; and ibid., 1170, fol. 49, Torcy to Du Gas de Rigoley, 10 Apr. 1710 (ibid., fol. 50, a copy to Tellier). See Bray, César-Pierre Richelet, 103–4. aae md 1118, fol. 202, d’Argenson to Torcy, 22 Dec. 1703, and Torcy’s undated reply (ibid., fol. 205). Martin, Livre, pouvoir et société, 759–65. Vittu, “Instruments of Political Power,” 160 (quotation). Gunn, Opinion, 97, 105, 116. This pushes Habermas’s beginning date for the concept back from 1750 and widens it to include court politics (ibid., 122–5). Parker, Global Crisis, 570–7, dates the emergence of a public sphere in Europe to even earlier in the seventeenth century. Several postal clerks were arrested for opening letters and selling the information in them to commercial news hawkers. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:429–31. Feyel, L’Annonce, 1–6, 435–7, 486. Dooley, “News and doubt,” 275–83, 287 (quotation on 279). Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 16–18. Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 315, 320–2, 324–6, 344, 363, 367, 374–8, 380, 477, 479. Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 16. Feyel, L’Annonce, 436, 442, 456–503. Popkin, “New Perspectives,” 4–7, 26, stresses state support for the press and downplays Habermas’s overly oppositional model. Enaux and Rétat, “‘Gazette d’Amsterdam.’” Klaits, Propaganda, 46, 145, 145n68. Raymond, “Introduction,” 7–9, observes that propaganda did not operate on a passive audience and that print especially created a dialogue between the public and the state that was not so easy to control once unleashed. Klaits, Propaganda, 113–70. La Chapelle’s association with the House of Conti-Bourbon and friendship with the Colberts, especially with Torcy, aroused the suspicions of Chamillart, who blocked La Chapelle’s advancement in the government. Torcy wrote to La Chapelle: “[Y]ou would have to be an angel to avoid suspicions … [of those] who blame the impartial for all the difficulties they are encountering” (ibid., 120). See also Boles, Huguenots, 47–67.



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123 Klaits, Propaganda, 81. 124 Ibid., 145n66, mentions the assistance of Blondel and La Chapelle’s wife. 125 Anti-Habsburg polemics drew in other members of Torcy’s brain trust. In 1708 d’Avaux passed on to Torcy a prospectus from Vertôt for a book on the negotiations of the Treaty of Münster that would show that the treaty was founded on Habsburg ambitions. aae cp Allemagne 350, fols 213–34. 126 Coombs, Conduct of the Dutch, 43: “The Whole City of Amsterdam … declare very openly against prohibiting Commerce with France.” As French sources reveal, bills of exchange from France helped finance the purchase of supplies from Dutch suppliers for the French army. 127 Klaits, Propaganda, 147. 128 an k 1327, no. 22, p. 4. Torcy described the Duke of Savoy as a man of “la plus grande dextérité”; also, ibid., no. 23, p. 5. Klaits, Propaganda, 198–9. 129 Klaits, Propaganda, 191, 192–3. 130 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 435, Marlborough to Heinsius, 11 June 1709, relayed Prince Eugene’s doubts that Louis would comply. René Saunière de l’Hermitage, French Huguenot and London correspondent of Heinsius and the States-General, reported these rumours to Heinsius (11 June 1709) but did not credit them. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 8:592. 131 pro sp Holland 84/233/pt 1, fol. 113r, Walpole to Tilson, 14 June 1709. 132 Torcy, Journal, 193. 133 The letter to the governors is in Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 1:404–7 (full text in aae md Hollande 57, fols 163–8). Torcy later claimed to have proposed going to The Hague to seek peace or at the very least to ascertain the Allies’ “real intentions” and “of making the king’s real sentiments known, as well in France as in foreign countries.” Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:242. For penetrating analysis of this episode, see Klaits, Propaganda, 207–20 (ibid., 218n54, is the letter to the prelates); and Petitfils, Louis XIV, 635–9. Saunière de l’Hermitage wrote Heinsius, 25 June 1709, of the singularity of the letter’s circulation and appeal. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 8:646. Rameix, “Justifying War,” 186–7, explores the preaching of sermons to spread royal wartime propaganda during the Nine Years War. 134 Churchill, Marlborough, 2:559. 135 Klaits, Propaganda, 221–45. Villars, Mémoires, 3:281, Villars to Torcy, 20 July 1710, raised the possibility of another manifesto. Breen, Law, 25–8, 151–2, 204–6, agrees with Lucien Karpik, David A. Bell, and Sarah Maza that Habermas’s eighteenth-century emergence of a “bourgeois public sphere” of rational discussion of public affairs actually began among avocats, but unlike them, he places it in the seventeenth century. 136 Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 220–4, discusses Le Peletier’s tenure. Matthew Prior informed London of his summer of 1699 complaints to Pomponne about problems with the mails. Prior appears to suggest that Pajot (presumably

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139 140 141 142

143

144 145 146 147 148

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Notes to pages 342–4 Léon II) was the real force to be reckoned with in resolving these matters. Legg, Prior, 299, 301, 303, 310–11. For its organization, see Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 72–6; Brillet, De la Voirie, 564, 574–80; Vaillé, Postes, 5:25–9, 288–9; Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 92–107; Bély, Dictionnaire, 1002, 1006–8, 1237–9, 1320; and Marchand, Maître de poste. Vaillé, Postes, 5:1–11, 98–9. Postal couriers were obligated to carry the letters and packets of governors and other superior officers in the provinces. See also Brillet, De la Voirie, 564; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 223. See Arblaster, “Posts,” 22, 26, 30. Vaillé, Postes, 5:12, 12n6. Ibid., vol. 4. Ibid., 5:25–7, 33–72, 94–106; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 103. Delavaud, Pomponne, 119, 136, 143, 151, 162, 163, 171, 175, 260, 3 ­ 44–5. Babelon, Nouveaux hommages, 1:89, reflects his guardianship. Prailly provided Le Quien de La Neufville information for his treatise on the post office’s origins. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, Foreword. Marchand, Maître de poste, 110–12. Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 75, says that there were 900, counting those bureaus that followed the armies. Brillet, De la Voirie, 584–96, discusses the December 1703 list of rates and rate hike, the first since 1676 and brought on by rising costs and war needs. Vaillé, Postes, 5:47–8, says that these were created in 1704. Ibid., 4:105–14; and Marchand, Maître de poste, 161–83. Marchand, Maître de poste, 233, 247–86. Vaillé, Postes, 5:288–91. Bély, Espions, 152, relates that a postal inspector in 1712 reported to Adam and Torcy. Inspectors were Nicolas Adam, brother of Clair Adam, and Nicolas Cottebrune. Until 1716 they were paid 8 livres per relay station visited and 12 livres per day during the visit (horses were gratis) (ibid., 290). aae md 1148, fol. 175v, records a 1707 payment to N. Adam and Cottebrune for a trip to Spain to improve its postal connections with France. Cottebrune, formerly Pomponne’s valet de chambre, had carried his dispatches from Saint-Germain to Nijmegen and Hamburg in 1678. Upon Pomponne’s death, Cottebrune entered Torcy’s service. Mme de ­Pomponne left him a bequest of 300 in rentes when she died in 1712. Delavaud, Pomponne, 175, 261, 335. aae md 1093, fol. 238v, indicates that there were at least three postal inspectors in 1701, including a Sieur Simonnot. See bn mf 8862, fol. 276, Pomponne to Lebret, 4 Oct. 1697, about a visit by postal inspectors. Vaillé, Postes, 5:233–91; and Brillet, De la Voirie, 552–637. Allen, Post and Courier, 70–1, says the stations and their inns were generally considered good and well regulated.



Notes to pages 344–6

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150 Marchand, Maître de poste, 241 (ibid., 239–46, on their many privileges). 151 aae md 1175, fol. 155, Torcy to Richebourg, June 1710. 152 Vaillé, Postes, 5:276. See also McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 199. 153 Vaillé, Postes, 5:249. In 1702 the postal inspectors reported to Torcy that Le Bourget was provisioned with twenty-seven horses, Soissons and Metz with twenty, Lyon and Limoges with seventeen, Meaux with thirteen, Orléans with eleven, and Fontainebleau with ten. 154 “Allée de Metz” occurs in aae cp Autriche 82, fol. 213, in a note of 23 June 1703. Noblet, while on the frontier with the Duke of Burgundy and his army, inspected postal routes and set up new ones. Ibid., 84, fol. 56, ­Noblet to Torcy, 11 Sept. 1703. Noblet also described the Tyrolean postal route and routes through Lorraine (ibid., 82, fols 103 and 108). See also ibid., md 1177, fol. 189, Torcy to Saint Contest (provincial intendant at Metz), 23 Feb. 1711, on courier service in the Metz-Nancy area. 155 aae md 1108, fol. 56, Pajot to Torcy, 23 Apr. 1702, reported that he had forwarded Rouillé Chamillart’s request for service to Bonn. 156 Italian routes are discussed in aae cp Gênes 40, fol. 10r–v, Torcy to Iberville, 22 Nov. 1706; ibid., Rome 501, fol. 264, La Trémoille to Pomponne, 13 July 1709; and ibid., md 1160, fol. 69, Torcy to Pajot, 21 May 1708. Vaillé, Postes, 5:312–24, treats the wartime postal routes. 157 Vaillé, Postes, 5:94–106. For the Pajots, see Viton de Saint Allais, Nobiliaire universel, 6:218–21. 158 “Éloge de M. d’Onsenbray,” in Grandjean de Fouchy, Histoire Académie des sciences, 143–54. Onsenbray, of which there are various spellings, including Ons-en-Bray, Onz-en-bray, and Onzenbray, was raised to a comté (county) in 1702. 159 Marchand, Maître de poste, 104–5, is a lively description of that post office’s operation. 160 Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 106–37. Although Torcy might open letters, delay the departure of the post, or otherwise interfere with its normal operations for reason of state, he was adamant that others not appropriate that regal right. In 1706, after the director of the Rennes postal bureau complained to Torcy that the agent of Hercule Mériadec, duc de Rohan, had arrested a postal courier who was on his way from Paris to Rennes for the purpose of removing several letters, the minister informed Brittany’s intendant that he had written to Rohan to express his displeasure. aae md 1144, fol. 226, Torcy to Ferrand, 23 Nov. 1706. Torcy ran little risk in pressing this peer, as he was one of the king’s least-liked people in the realm. ss-Coirault, 1:433. 161 gbhmc, Prior Papers, 276, Prior to Portland, 17 Oct. 1698. 162 Orléans, Woman’s Life, 208. 163 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 2:1126–7.

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Notes to pages 346–7

164 Vaillé, Cabinet noir, 127. 165 Villars complained to Torcy, 27 July 1709, that his mail was being opened and delayed, denying the accusation that his couriers were carrying too many of his personal letters. Villars, Mémoires, 3:258–9. Torcy replied (ibid., 259, 2 Aug. 1709) that he had written Pajot to echo his outrage and instruct him to spare Villars this nuisance, occupied as he was with the most important affairs of state. 166 This disrupted the Allied system of mail intercepts, led to the creation of a Dutch Black Chamber, and facilitated Allied interception of mail from the Bavarian court-in-exile at Namur. The Dutch also intercepted French diplomatic correspondence with the north in Amsterdam’s post office. Leeuw, “Black Chamber,” 141–53. Schnakenbourg, “Chemins de l’information,” 304, discusses the convergence of postal and spy networks in northern Germany. In 1703 Leibniz wrote to a Polish officer that when he was next in Hanover he would share with him an intercepted French diplomatic letter commenting on Poland’s primate, Cardinal Radziojowski. The letter was decoded in ­England. Leibniz, Briefe, Erste Reihe, Zweiundzwanzigster Band, 165. 167 bl am 15876, fol. 246v, Dayrolle to Boyle, 29 Apr./10 May 1709: “There is no body of any distinction with marquis de Torcy, only Monsr Pajot, Director General of the Post Office.” See also aae cp Hollande 200, fols 4r–10v, “Mémoire sur l’État présent des affaires de l’Europe.” 168 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 3:1211. 169 Torcy, Journal, 47. 170 aae md 1191, fol. 265, Torcy to Pajot, 13 May 1713. Letters from the Empire arriving in their bureaus were to be “parfumer exactemnt” (fumigated) in line with the miasmatic theory of disease. Bad air was to be dispelled by burning something that produced a strong odor, such as gunpowder or sulfur. daf, s.v. “parfumer.” For an example of the same practice in Florence in 1630, see Parker, Global Crisis, 630. 171 aae md 1172, fol. 299, Torcy to Basville, 13 Dec. 1710. Also an g7 302, ­Basville to (Torcy), 31 Jan. 1694, reporting on the disappearance of a courier. 172 aae md 1102, fol. 32, Torcy to Saint Contest, 17 Jan. 1702. 173 Ibid., 1181, Torcy to d’Argenson, 30 Sept. 1711. 174 Nougaret, Histoire de la Poste Bourgogne, 32, 43. 175 aae md 1200, fol. 217, Torcy to Dondell (1711). Ibid., 1191, Torcy to d’Argenson, 19 June 1713, passed on information from Pajot about individuals in Paris suspected of complicity in the Lyon courier’s murder. 176 Ibid., 1209, fols 117–23, “Mémoire concernant les Postes,” 31 Dec. 1713. 177 Vaillé, Postes, 5:29–32. The September 1715 document codifying changes under Torcy and governing his successors is in aae md 1206, fols 247–8v (also in Brillet, De la Voirie, 561–3).



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178 Vaillé, Postes, 5:31, 31n1. A 17 December 1720 report from d’Argenson’s bureau recorded that a prisoner claimed to have applied to the foreign office for a passport with a recommendation from Torcy’s commis ­Beauchamp, to whom he had first applied. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 13:320. ­Prudhomme, Inventaire l’hôpital Grenoble, 153, notes a 13 September 1723 letter from Pajot announcing that Beauchamp was resuming his post. 179 He or his brother André, later a commis à la recette des Postes, served the Army of Italy early in the 1690s as its postal clerk. For the Vincents, see Vaillé, Postes, 5:49, 72, 301–2; and aae md 1186, fols 246 and 294 for 1712 (in which Vincent is called “postal cashier”). 180 aae md 1206, fol. 247; and Le Quien de La Neufville, Origine des postes, 73–6. 181 Torcy, Journal, 223–6. 182 Bély, Espions, a rich and indispensable study of this topic, is reviewed by Rule, “Gathering Intelligence.” 183 Bély, Espions, 56. Roosen, Diplomacy, 129–61; and McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 208–9, question the value of much of the intelligence gained. A Béarn priest wrote Cardinal Noailles in Paris of letters from Marlborough inciting the locals to revolt and offering a leader and tax exemptions. Although highly skeptical, Torcy ordered Gramont to investigate. bn naf 23187, fol. 363, 28 Nov. 1706. See Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 121–3, on police fears of plots against the king and the psychology behind the fabrication and denunciation of false plots. 184 Bély, Espions, 91. 185 Ibid., 223–5. 186 Klaits, Propaganda, 270, 272. 187 Bély, Espions, 293; and Kamen, War of Succession, 86n7. 188 aae cp Venise 141, fols 162–3, Champigny to Torcy, 21 Feb. 1705; ibid., fol. 167r–v, Champigny to Torcy, 28 Feb. 1705; ibid., fol. 184, Torcy to ­Champigny, 30 Mar. 1705; ibid., fol. 196, Torcy to Champigny, 12 Apr. 1705; ibid., fol. 203, copy of a letter from Printemps, 6 Mar. 1705, Augsburg; ibid., fol. 205, Torcy to Champigny, 19 Apr. 1705; ibid., fol. 213, Torcy to ­Champigny, 24 Apr. 1705; and ibid., fol. 251, Champigny to Torcy, 2 May 1705. 189 Bély, Espions, 91, 234. The Martine newsletters in the Blenheim archives are “almost totally ignored, but undeservedly so.” Snyder, Marlborough-­ Godolphin Correspondence, 2:993n1. 190 Torcy, Journal, 231–2. 191 Bély, Espions, 93. See Klaits, Propaganda, especially 45–7, for Basel’s importance as a centre for disseminating French propaganda. 192 Bély, Dictionnaire, 177–80. See also Bély, Espions, passim. In April 1713 Torcy wrote Gaultier to congratulate him on receiving from the king the

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195 196 197 198 99 1 200

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02 2 203

Notes to pages 350–4 Abbey of Savigny’s income and to remind him that he would also receive a pension from Philip V, a silver bowl and 6,000 pounds from Queen Anne, and an apartment at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Sèze, “Louis XIV a perdu ­Tournai,” 523. bn naf 20274, fol. 116, Tessé wrote Ursins, 14 Aug. 1712, upon ­Bolingbroke’s arrival in France for direct negotiations with Torcy, with Prior and Gaultier in tow, that the latter two were two little junior genies of the great peace machine (“petits génies subalternes … la grande machine de la paix”). See Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 42–3, 194, 227–9, 342–3; and Bély, Espions, passim. Coirault, Manuscrits de Saint-Simon, 140–3, discusses the TorcyGualterio correspondence. Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 80, famously applied this label to ambassadors. Torcy, Journal, 9. See Bély, “Poussin,” 423–42, for his career. Bély, Espions, 93–4; and Villars, Mémoires, 1:348, 348n1. aae cp Danemark 58, fols 44–5, Bonrepaus to Torcy, 5 Feb. 1697; and ibid., fol. 399, Bonrepaus to Blondel, 15 Oct. 1697. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 248. This and the following paragraph are based on Rostand, “Voyages et Négociations,” 3–133 (which incorrectly gives his birth date as 1671); France, Recueil, 19:xxxi, 238n3, on Genoa; and France, Recueil, 28:129n1, 130–6, on Mainz. Lüthy, Banque protestante, 154, 177, on the Sacerdoti brothers’ bank. For these negotiations, see France, Recueil, 19:xxix–xxxvi, 238; and Torcy, Journal, 58–9, 227–8. aae cp Gênes 52, fol. 50, Anneville to Desmaretz, 25 May 1709, indicates that Sacerdoti was secretly arranging grain shipments to France. This useful distinction is from Bély, “Secret et espionnage militaire,” 28–39. Intelligence from the foreign office was factored into the war department’s strategic planning. Cénat, Roi stratège, 185. Torcy ordered the extraordinary envoy to the Grisons to inform Villars, who was bringing substantial numbers of troops into Italy, of any movement in the crucial Valtelline Pass route from Germany to Lombardy. aae cp Grisons 13, fol. 299, Torcy to Forval, 17 Aug. 1701. Pomponne in Venice shared intelligence with the war ministry, although cooperation locally between diplomats and soldiers could earn the latter Chamillart’s reproaches. Bély, Art de la paix, 422–5.

C h a p t e r Ni ne 1 Watkins, “New Diplomatic History.” 2 Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,” 732. 3 Black, Diplomacy, 12.



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4 Lindemann, “Diplomatic Archive,” discusses these rich yet underutilized resources that have much to offer many disciplines in addition to diplomatic history. 5 Black, Diplomacy, 77 (and 35). 6 Blet, Nonces, 265–6. Grimblot, Letters, 1:168, 445, 454; and ibid., 2:189n, 365–6, offer further examples. 7 Austria’s ambassador wrote Torcy on 30 April 1699 expressing hope for an audience between the time the king returned from Marly and departed for Fontainebleau. aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 181. 8 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 200–1. 9 ss-Boislisle, 28:341–2. He says they are called “secret” merely to distinguish them from those given without ceremony to anyone. 10 In 1655 Sainctot inherited the master of ceremonies charge held by his uncle and father, but conflicts with Blainville led him to sell the office to Michel Desgranges in 1691 and purchase the semester as introducer held by Michel Chabente de Bonneuil. Contemporaries regarded Sainctot as authoritative in protocol matters. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 67–8. 11 bn ff 6679, “Journal de Sainctot,” fols 21–2, includes an August 1692 description of the nuncio’s first visits. 12 Ibid., fol. 23v. These envoys might be there to offer the king compliments for a royal birth, victory, or other notable event. Torcy was typically the only officer of state in attendance. For a description, see also Saule, Journée, 29, 33–9, and the even more detailed description of the Venetian ambassador’s audiences in Breteuil, Mémoires, 85–96. 13 Leferme-Falguières, Courtisans, 293–4. 14 État de la France (1698), 1:272–3. See also ss-Boislisle, 28: 342; and Saule, Journée, 30–2. 15 Grimblot, Letters, 2:18–20 (Portland to William III, 4 June 1698). He and Louis spoke of proposals for a partition treaty. Given the secrecy of these negotiations, precautions were likely taken so that they would not be overheard. According to État de la France (1698), 1:264, talking among those witnessing a levee was permitted so long as it was not too loud. This background noise may have permitted greater privacy on the other side of the balustrade. Torcy, present at Portland’s audience, had the right of entry to the king’s levee (ibid., 261). Blet, Nonces, 206, 213, 226, 285, indicates Torcy’s presence during the nuncio’s royal audiences. 16 bn mf 6679, fols 23v–4. 17 Ibid., fol. 26r–v (1692). 18 Ibid., fols 26–32 (1692). Bély, Princes, 469–509, discusses the purposes and operations of princely visits incognito and notes their further relevance to Torcy for such long-term visitors as James III, Elector Max Emmanuel, and Rákóczi.

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Notes to pages 357–8

19 Bély, Princes, 294–9; État de la France (1698), 1:274; Breteuil, Mémoires, 47–84, 97–154; and Berger, Versailles, 59–63. The sixteenth-century Hôtel du Nivernais became the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs extraordinaire in 1630 under the control of the grand écuyer. Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 12–13. It is now the Tournon Caserne of the Garde Républicaine. aae md 1201, fols 295v and 300, notes 6,000 and 12,000 livres paid out for the expenses of the Persian ambassador and his entourage. See Grenet, “Their Masters’ Voices?,” 13–17, on changing approaches to these royal interpreters’ function. For this experience from the perspective of English ambassadors, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 37–40. 20 In 1698 when the doorkeepers at Versailles prevented their pages from accompanying them into the royal apartments, the diplomatic corps complained that their honour had been compromised. Torcy responded that the aim was to exclude all non-authorized pages, including those of the king, from his crowded apartments. aae md 305, fol. 146. Breteuil, Mémoires, 243–6, in later years lamented that the decline of public ceremonies where ranks were clearly delineated had resulted in people no longer staying in their “natural” rank. Roosen, “Diplomatic Ceremonial,” 452–76, analyses the purpose and operation of the often-ridiculed diplomatic ceremonial. Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 134–56, is a recent analysis of diplomatic ceremonial. 21 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 253–7. 22 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 347–51, 434–8; and Black, British Diplomats, 100–1. The organization and development of ceremonial was more pragmatic than doctrinaire. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 137. Diplomats abroad also had to be familiar with foreign protocol. Rousseau de Chamoy, newly posted to Ratisbon, wrote Torcy, 3 May 1698, for a copy of the protocol followed in the Colleges of the Electors and of the Princes. Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait Ambassadeur, 52. Louis XIV regulated a dispute among resident diplomats over precedence in taking leave and presenting condolences. Dangeau, Journal, 10:334. 23 Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies.” The grand master of ceremonies had to be present for diplomatic events involving the military household (ibid., 88). His department also managed visits by foreign sovereigns, though in conjunction with the foreign secretary (ibid., 116–18). The registers of ceremonies that the grand masters were obliged to keep became research sources for past practices and for resolving disputes over court, diplomatic, and other types of protocol (ibid., 79–82, 119–35). 24 The staircase, completed in 1680 and demolished in 1752, is described in Berger, Versailles, 29–39. Its two staircases accessed the premier étage in what were to become the Venus Salon and the Diana Salon. One proceeded from there to the Hall of Mirrors through a series of rooms that included the Throne Chamber and the Salon of War. For these offices, see Nguyen,



25

26

27

28

Notes to page 358

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“Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 85–8. Duindam, Courts, 188–93, argues that the increasing significance of diplomacy and its protocol helped push the introducers’ position above that of the masters of ceremony. Nguyen, “Grands maîtres des cérémonies,” 86; they also took their oaths before the grand master of ceremonies. See also État de la France (1698), 1:627–32; and Breteuil, Mémoires, 29. It was to Torcy that Claude Labbé, sieur de Villeras, ordinary secretary for the conducting of ambassadors, turned in May 1700 with his petition requesting the same exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the household’s other commensaux. Torcy presented his request to the king and wrote Jérôme Pontchartrain to see to its implementation when granted, likely to his testy colleague’s annoyance. aae md 305, fols 258–60, 19 May 1700. This secretary served all year. État de la France (1702), 1:641. bn mf 6679, fols 138v–9v, 19 Feb. 1696, has notes exchanged between Torcy and Sainctot. See Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 50–3, for brief notices on those under Louis XIV. Continuity of practice came largely through the journals they kept. René Girault served with distinction for sixty-seven years (ibid., 29–30). When he died in March 1697, Dangeau, Journal, 6:91 (who called him “sous-introducteur”), records that Sainctot and his colleague ­Bonneuil disputed with Torcy over who had the right to fill the vacancy. The king, however, reserved the right for himself. In 1713 the introducers persuaded the king to clarify their status as being above that of the ordinary secretary so that their brevet could now read that he served près (near) rather than avec (with) them. Boppe and Delavaud, Introducteurs, 30. bn mf 6679, fol. 260r, note Sainctot to Torcy, 21 Aug. 1698. Ibid., 260v, Torcy to Sainctot, 22 Aug. 1698, dealt with the Dutch ambassador’s concern over the distance between his and the foreign minister’s coach and its implications for rank. Torcy, claiming indifference to this detail, nonetheless recommended the model followed by the English and other ambassadors. He dealt with a similar dispute in January 1700 (Dangeau, Journal, 7:233). On 31 December 1698 Prior shared with Portland concerns about the order of carriages for the Earl of Jersey’s formal Paris entry and alleged that “these people are playing their old tricks over again” (gbhmc, Prior Papers, 306–7). On coaches as luxurious symbols of power, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 29–36, 108–11. bl am 15285, fol. 75r–v, Torcy to Pomponne, 9 Apr. 1708, discusses questions of precedence and protocol for the Venetian ambassador’s Versailles audience. aae cp Venise 146, fol. 210, Torcy to Pomponne, 23 Mar. 1706, shows the secretary’s concern even for the way the ambassador referred to the Doge in his dispatches home. See also Duindam, Courts, ­188–93; and Loomie, “Conducteur des ambassadeurs,” 333–56. Breteuil, Mémoires, 20–31. This volume contains several letters between Torcy and Breteuil. His predecessor was Bonneuil, with whom Torcy clashed

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29 30 31 32

33 34

35 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43 44 45

Notes to pages 358–60 during the Portland embassy. For Bonneuil and Breteuil, see ss-Coirault, 1:569–70, 1444. See aae md 1106, fol. 36, 18 Mar. 1702, for extracts from Breteuil’s registers for that year that concerned the ceremonial between introducers and nuncios. Breteuil, Mémoires, 72–3, is an example of his reliance on the king and close work with Torcy. Ibid., 47–84, recounts the Moroccan ambassador’s visit. Ibid., 79–81. aae cp Rome 491, fol. 124, Torcy to Gualterio, 18 July 1708. Torcy, Journal, 138–9, also describes a February 1710 contretemps with the two nuncios then at court. Calling the incident unnecessary and ridiculous, he blamed ­Breteuil for provoking it. They met weekly on Tuesdays. Blet, Nonces, 198, 225. Torcy also held scheduled and unscheduled meetings with individual ambassadors, some with public knowledge and others meant to be secret. bl am 20318, fol. 74r, Torcy to Gualterio, 22 June 1703, arranged a seemingly secret meeting with the pro-French nuncio at a house rented by his secretary Blondel. Picavet, Diplomatie, 36, argues that these regular audiences were less important under Torcy than they had been under Croissy. pro sp France 78/157, fols 35–7r, 11 Nov. 1713. Legg, Prior, 313. See also Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 108, 197. Breteuil, Mémoires, 217–20, reports that ambassadors’ wives were not entitled to any special consideration at court. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 9. According to Sainctot, Pomponne and Torcy dropped Croissy’s distinction between envoys and residents whereby he had not given his hand to residents or allowed them to be seated. bn mf 6679, fols 209–10. pro sp France 78/158, fols 1123–5, Apr. 1714, Paris. Legg, Prior, 240–1. An example of a log is aae md 304, fols 302–29v, audiences for 7 July; 14, 21, and 28 Aug.; 14 Sept.; 3 and 10 Oct.; 19 and 27 Nov.; and 10 and 17 Dec. 1696. After noting the date, the secretary listed the diplomat either by title – “M. le Nonce” or “L’Envoyé de Portugal” – or by name – “M. ­Mayercron” (Denmark) or “Le sr Palmquist” (Sweden), and followed that with a summary of the issues raised. Bourgeois reports in Spanheim, Relation, 352n1, that the foreign office’s series of registries of these audiences began with Croissy in 1680. aae md 1108, fol. 150, is an example of Torcy’s penciled notes from 1702 on three folds of a sheet of paper folded four times. aae md 304, fols 308, 314, and 319 (for 1696); and ibid., 305, fols 121, 124v, 128v, 140v, 142, 143, 192, 202, and 211 (for 1698 and 1699). For example, ibid., fol. 199. See Torcy, Journal, 300, for Torcy’s conclusion regarding the audience of 6 November 1710.



Notes to pages 360–1

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46 Records of audiences are scattered for this period throughout volumes in aae md 304, 305, 306, 307, and 308; and ibid., 304, fol. 308, 21 Aug. 1696, for example, shows the corrections and annotations made in Torcy’s hand. 47 For the hierarchy of diplomatic ranks, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 82–4; and Roosen, Diplomacy, 59–64. For the function and “character” of residents, see Brandli, Résidence, 27–83, on Geneva. This work, despite the dates in its title, has much to say about developments under Louis XIV. 48 Gunn, Opinion, 148, 151. Roosen, Diplomacy, 5–6, reminds us that, despite usage then and now, diplomats represented rulers, not nations or peoples. 49 Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 48, 53–4, 228. 50 État de la France (1698), 3:443–6. On the evolving diplomatic hierarchy, see Anderson, Modern Diplomacy, 82–4; and Bély, Art de la paix, 483–501. 51 Côté, “What Did It Mean,” 235–50, is a useful study of the selection criteria, but the attempt to compare the results of a case study of approximately fifty ambassadors to Rome, London, and Vienna with the ideal of the “perfect ambassador” reflected in the treatises of the time falls flat. Côté correctly concludes that Abraham de Wicquefort and Callières were not “utopian idealists” (236) in the standards they prescribed, but fails to adequately explain why. Côté gives only perfunctory attention to the backgrounds of the two theorists drawn upon the most: Callières is merely a “French diplomat” and Wicquefort a “diplomat” (242). Their “new concern with political content” (239) is mentioned but not accounted for. Côté speculates that although Louis XIV “might never have read authors such as [Pedro de] Vera or Wicquefort, his selection of diplomats seems to suggest that he shared some of the theorists’ ideas” (250). But why? Any explanation of Wicquefort’s and Callières’s realism must recognize that both were diplomats experienced in the practices of France’s foreign office. 52 Roosen, Diplomacy, chap. 3. According to État de la France (1698), 3:445, ambassadors to Rome, the Empire, Spain, and Britain were always drawn from the great lords, while those to Venice, the United Provinces, and the Swiss were from the robe nobility. Ambassadors to Savoy and Constantinople could be either, although for the latter post a robe noble had to be raised to the sword. Residents, envoys, and agents sent to Italy’s and Germany’s princes and republics could be drawn from either stratum. However, Picavet, “‘Carrière’ diplomatique,” 389, demonstrates that this was often violated in practice. For the social origins of diplomats, see also Bély, Espions, 291–5, 297–300. See also Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,” 743–7. 53 Soldiers serving as diplomats became more common on the eve of and during the War of the Spanish Succession. Bély, Art de la paix, 487; and Sarmant and Waksman, “King and Generals,” 164–65. The English journalist ­Addison, in a 1712 satirical article in the Spectator on the establishment of Torcy’s Académie politique, unfavourably contrasted Louis XIV’s current generals as

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54 55

56 57

58 59 60 61

62

63 64 65

Notes to pages 361–2 potential diplomats with those of the previous war, who he said had served well in both roles. Thuillier, Première école, 89. Black, British Diplomats, 44, notes that military men as diplomats was also common in Britain due to “the absence of notions of specialization and technical training in diplomacy, and their already-demonstrated willingness to serve the Crown and availability in peacetime, but also the sense that such envoys were especially appropriate for particular courts.” See also Black, Diplomacy, 72. Black, Diplomacy, 26, 48–9, 68, 73, 116; and Craveri, Age of Conversation, 290. Picavet, “‘Carrière’ diplomatique,” an admittedly tentative and partial comparative study based on the data available at the time, is nonetheless valuable on recruitment and social origins. Picavet concludes that there was not yet a diplomatic career in the modern sense of training for, and advancement in the context of, steady and exclusive employment. Black, Diplomacy, 102–3. Revealingly, Torcy wrote early in 1706 to Forbin-Janson, recalled from Rome owing to ill health, of his difficulty finding a good replacement during wartime. aae cp Rome 462, fol. 348. Torcy, Journal, 243n4, 315–17. aae md 1192, fol. 458 (1713), is a payment to Rossi. Black, Diplomacy, 100. Horowski, “Great Advantage,” 137n26. Dangeau, Journal, 15:278 (14 Nov. 1714), notes that at that morning’s Conseil several suggestions were made for embassies to Vienna, Madrid, and London. Torcy approached two candidates after the meeting, giving each twentyfour hours to respond. Both accepted and Torcy presented them to the king the next day (ibid., 279). For other rumours of possible choices, see ibid., 7:177, in 1699, and 9:204, in 1703. Rule, “King and Minister,” 221, 231n100. ss-Coirault, 2:562, claims that in 1705 Harcourt drew close to both Pontchartrains even though Maintenon was distant from them. Maintenon remarked to Ursins in a 3 January 1712 letter that even though Huxelles, on the Utrecht negotiating team, was “said to be jealous of the friendship that subsists between M. de Torcy and the Abbé Polignac,” she was optimistic that the work toward peace would overcome such feelings. Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 1:357. Dubet, Orry, 41, relates that Harcourt had opposed sending Desmaretz to Spain in 1701, which did not likely endear him to Torcy. Kettering, French Society, 64–80. Roosen, Diplomacy, 87–91. Roosen’s work remains invaluable on diplomatic practice and the workings of embassies. For Michel Amelot, marquis de Gournay, see Torcy, Journal, 48n4; and Kamen, War of Succession, 48, who concludes that “the years of his ­ambassadorship were not therefore simply the high point of French influence



66 67 68 69

70

71 72

73

74

Notes to pages 363–4

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in this period: they were also the most active years of change and development during the war, and the most favorably remembered.” Rule, “King and Minister,” 213–14, 218. Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 135–6. See Poisson, “Secrétaires-interprètes”; Bély, Espions, 349–50; and aae md 1192, fol. 456. Chaplains were usually under the authority of the grand almoner of France, although the chaplain at Geneva was under the bishop of Annecy. They were subject to the foreign minister’s approval and sometimes acted for an absent resident. Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 231. Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:194–5, 204–14; Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 229–30; and Roosen, Diplomacy, 91–102, 141–3. Roosen notes that all but a few of the French secretaries were ambassadorial secretaries rather than embassy secretaries, a situation Torcy tried to remedy with his Académie politique. aae cp Suisse 254, fol. 78, plenipotentiaries to Louis XIV, 7 June 1714, informed him that they would combine their secretarial staffs as they had done at Rastadt. For disbursements for the Stockholm chapel, see ibid., fols 3, 5v, and 8 (1713). Baillou, Corps diplomatique, 1:205, notes that personal servants and cooks might also accompany an ambassador, while other servants were recruited locally. aae cp Portugal 44, fol. 13, Châteauneuf to Torcy, 14 Mar. 1704, however, shows that the ambassador had a suite of twenty-four French domestics, which helps explain his pleas for more funds. Black, British Diplomats, 56–7, notes that secretaries likewise supplemented the missing linguistic skills of British diplomats. aae, ae, Cote 8–22, fol. 104r, Adam to Harlay-Bonneuil. aae md 1192, fols 432v, 433v, 435r–v, 436, and 438v, are examples of payments to couriers during 1713, a busy time for negotiations at Utrecht and elsewhere. At Gertruydenberg in 1710 Polignac used his valet de chambre as a courier. bl am 15876, fols 305v and 306r. aae cp Hollande 230, fol. 259, lists the following as Mesnager’s household at Utrecht: four friends, one secretary, one gentleman, one almoner, one écuyer, four pages, one “maître d’hôtel” (butler), three valets de chambre, one officer, two aides to the officer, one cook, two aides to the cook, one “patissier” (pastry cook), two “rotisseurs” (broilers), one “garçon pour le Me d.” (butler’s boy), four “valets de pied” (footmen), two coachmen, two postilions, one Suisse, four valets, fourteen carriage horses, six saddle horses, two ceremonial coaches, one coach for the staff, and one “chaise de poste” (a light vehicle for one person and rapid travel). And Mesnager was not even a nobleman! In Stockholm in 1671, Pomponne had three secretaries, a chaplain, three pages, seven lackeys, two carriages, and eight horses. Delavaud, “Changement,” 371–2. For a comparison with the households of later Stuart diplomats, see Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 54–64. aae cp Espagne 189, fol. 100, 11 Feb. 1709.

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Notes to pages 364–7

75 Torcy, Journal, 251. 76 Craveri, Age of Conversation, 289–92. On the influence of late Stuart diplomats on culture and consumption when they returned from abroad, see ­Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, especially 1–8. 77 bn mf 6658, fol. 50v (27 Jan. 1701), 98 (18 Feb. 1701), and 102v (19 Feb. 1701). 78 aae md 1202, fols 46–8 (1714) and 211. See also Köpeczi, France et Hongrie, 315–16. 79 Neveu, Correspondence Ranuzzi, 1:36, 56. 80 aae cp Rome 323, fol. 92, Torcy to Croissy, Rome, 27 Sept. 1689. 81 Blet, Nonces, 215–40. 82 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 162, 240. 83 Ridder-Symoens, “Training and Professionalization,” 159, 161. 84 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 123–43, but cf. Black, British Diplomats, 32–4. Black also rightly insists on the importance of social skills, noting that inexperienced aristocratic diplomats were not necessarily mediocre (ibid., 2, 7–8). For this as part of wider changes during the final decades of Louis XIV’s reign, see Bély, Art de la paix, 576–7, and Rule, “Royal Revisions,” 50–5. On the fin du règne and Callières, see Pope’s introduction to Callières, Letters, 32–5. 85 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice.” 86 Pecquet, Discourse on the Art of Negotiation, xii–xxvii. For this group of negotiators, see also Colson, “Ambassador between Light and Shade,” ­179–95. At least 176 diplomat manuals appeared in print between 1625 and 1700 (ibid., 181). These authors reflected the “abstraction or distillation of theory from practice” that was a hallmark of expertise. Ash, “Expertise,” 7. 87 Rousseau de Chamoy, Parfait ambassadeur. See the comments of Bély, Espions, 335–6. 88 François de Callières, De la Manière de Négocier avec les Souverains (Paris, 1716). For its writing and publication history, including on the Internet, see Waquet in Callières, Art de négocier, 9–37, 75–105, 176–7. For an English translation, see Callières, Art of Diplomacy. 89 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 38n123, observes that Pecquet fils may have begun his treatise as early as 1710 under his father’s influence. A recent English translation is Pecquet, Discourse on the Art of Negotiation. 90 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 173. 91 Translation from Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 123–4. 92 Bély, Art de la paix, 575–6; and Pope, Callières, 4–5. 93 McClure, Sunspots and Sun King, 253–60 (quotation on 256). 94 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:167 (notes in 15:19–22), Fénelon to Chevreuse, 18 Nov. 1709.



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95 Quoted in Horn, British Diplomatic Service, 124. aae cp Venise 147, fol. 189v, Pomponne to Torcy, 26 June 1706, requests a secretary, referring to a young man at Ryswick with Callières as a possible candidate. Ibid., fol. 196, Torcy to Pomponne, 16 July 1706, remarks that such men were hard to find but nonetheless promised to speak with Callières. 96 In his introduction to Thuillier, L’E.N.A., 10–13, Pierre Chaunu emphasizes that this bold initiative of establishing an academy likely emerged because of rather than despite the period of tension, crisis, and painful introspection that followed the hard-won yet unsatisfactory peace of Ryswick. 97 See Klaits, “Men of Letters”; Keens-Soper, “French Political Academy”; Thuillier, “Première école”; Thuillier, Première école; and Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 170–9. Callières’ participation, once merely suspected, has been confirmed by the discovery of new documents. Schweizer, “Callières,” 621–22. On the creation and evolution of the foreign archives, see Nathan, “Archives anciennes,” 193–204. 98 aae md 1192, fol. 423r–v, lists expenses for the “Élèves du Louvre” and includes student names as well as funds for a clock and furniture. 99 Quoted in Keens-Soper, “French Political Academy,” 323–4. 100 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 179–241. 101 Lynn, Wars, 356–7. Braun, Connaissance du Saint-Empire, 279–88, dismantles the myth of French linguistic imperialism against the Empire at Rastadt by demonstrating that French rather than the usual Latin was used for this treaty owing to the parties’ haste to conclude an agreement. It was Eugene who proposed signing the French draft so that he would not have to consult with Vienna over the meaning of certain technical Latin terms. Furthermore, the Treaty of Baden that grew out of the Rastadt accord was in the traditional Latin. 102 Villars, Mémoires, 4:12–16. Villars also blamed the defence of Ursins’s interests if war returned, and claimed that by requiring him to send his letters through the war minister, Voysin and the king had made Torcy his mortal enemy. Villars to Voysin, 28 Jan. 1714 (ibid., 379). Vogüé, Villars, 2:46–130, recounts these negotiations. Ever the diplomat, Torcy personally replied to Villars’s attack on his professionalism. Vogüé (82) says that it would be difficult to find a more tastefully and courteously delivered lesson. Sturgill, Villars, 147–8, likewise shows Torcy attempting to “salve Villars’ ruffled ego” despite the king’s annoyance with the marshal. 103 Villars, Mémoires, 4:369–71, Voysin to Villars, 22 Dec. 1713. 104 Vogüé, Villars, 2:60. 105 Black, Diplomacy, 73–4. 106 Villars, Mémoires, 4:365 (Eugene to Charles VI, 6 Dec. 1713). Villars admitted to the king that he had not imagined that being a negotiator required so much finesse. Vogüé, Villars, 2:76.

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107 Thuillier, Première école, xvi, 1. 108 Thuillier, L’E.N.A., 17–21, 28; and Thuillier, Première école, 3–25. 109 Ash, “Expertise,” 18. Brandli, “Personnel diplomatique,” 218, argues for an understanding of diplomatic practice as a cross-cultural experience of understanding and operating within a context of different political cultures. For success, diplomats had to understand the ideologies that informed the beliefs and principles that influenced their fellow diplomats and those who directed their efforts. Along the same lines, see Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 75–92. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, cxvi, cites a Hamburg pastor who feared the “open outlook of persons – courtiers, diplomats, soldiers, and ‘men of the world – who traveled widely, continually mixing in different cultural and religious contexts.” 110 Thuillier, L’E.N.A., chap. 1. 111 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 178–9; Chaunu, introduction to Thuillier, L’E.N.A.; and Thuillier, Première école. 112 Childs, Entresol, 8 (quotation), 67, 134–5, 156–7. 113 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 54–62, also stresses that a variety of reform ideas were emerging and circulating within central government circles during Louis XIV’s final decades. 114 Kugeler, “Theory and Practice,” 246–8.

Chapter Ten 1 Perez, Santé de Louis XIV, 148–65, 474, 477. 2 André, Louis XIV, 40. 3 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 239. 4 Roosen, Diplomacy, 34; and Bély, Art de la paix, 393–4. Torcy, Journal, 202, records Torcy’s 1710 discussion with the Bavarian elector in which he assured Max that he only spoke on his own behalf and could say nothing decisive until he reported back to the king. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 663, remarks on the king’s intense supervision of the Utrecht negotiations that matched his practice since 1661. 5 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 47, refers to the “information scarcity that is traditionally associated with diplomacy and diplomats.” Control of information was likewise key to the controller general’s power. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 62–4. 6 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 30. See also ibid., 215–16, 238–9. 7 Black, Diplomacy, 14, 73–4, 82, 103. 8 Of the three primary tasks of diplomacy – representation, information-­ gathering, and negotiation – the last has been most under the control of diplomats, although rulers, favourites, and ministers outside the foreign office can diminish it (ibid., 14–15).



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9 “Information-gathering has tended to be least under the control of the formal diplomatic process” (ibid., 14). 10 “Secrétaire général de la monarchie administrative,” from Frostin, “Organ­ isation,” 201, who also says that he acted as a sort of “secrétaire de direction” (executive secretary), transmitting royal orders to his colleagues (ibid., 210). 11 Sarmant and Stoll, “Croissy,” 83–4; and Antoine, Conseil du roi, 303. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 22, acknowledges that kings “owe … a public accounting of all their actions … and yet cannot render it to any of their contemporaries without disclosing the secrets of their conduct and neglecting their greatest interests.” 12 Bély, Art de la paix, 514–15. 13 Picavet, Diplomatie, chap. 3, “Le Roi, chef et centre de l’action diplomatique.” 14 Cénat, Roi stratège, 178–95, summarizes and contributes to recent research on this. Barbezieux eventually gained more independence, but his influence over strategy remained limited and often negative, which led to conflicts with various generals. 15 Ibid., 178–9; and Petitfils, Louis XIV, 515. 16 Petitfils, Louis XIV, 519. 17 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 32–3, acknowledges that “it is wise to listen to everyone, and not to believe entirely those around us,” but nonetheless he saw it best “for the important interests of the state and for secret affairs” to rely on a small group of advisors who could devote to them “more time and concentration than all the others.” See also ibid., 74, 162–3, 173, 228, 238–9, 254–5. 18 Saint-Simon, Écrits inédites, 4:55. 19 “We obviously cannot do everything, but we must provide for everything to be done well, and this depends primarily on whom we choose [as our agents].” Louis XIV, Mémoires, 255. See also ibid., 82, 188, on balancing the need to delegate and its dangers. 20 Apropos of an otherwise unspecified complaint raised by the controller general concerning Navy Secretary Jérôme Pontchartrain, Torcy reminded Chamillart (8 June 1705) that when memoirs prepared by the navy secretary had previously gone before the Conseil, it was because the elder ­Pontchartrain, while navy secretary and controller general, also served on the Conseil. Torcy informed Chamillart that he was mistaken in believing that Louis ­Pontchartrain had done so because he was then controller general. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:25–6. 21 Vivo, Information, 7 (quotation), 32–9. See also Cornette, Roi de guerre, 260–1. 22 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 238–40.

670

Notes to pages 376–9

23 As the king wrote secretly to Philip V, 26 July 1709. Baudrillart, “Intrigues,” 252. 24 Torcy, Journal, 411; and Picavet, Diplomatie, 25, 63–5. 25 Torcy, Journal, 294, 372, 383. 26 Ibid., 356–8. 27 Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois,” 77. Stoll, Servir le Roi-Soleil, 217–18, 223–4, mentions Le Peletier’s network of informants but offers no evidence that it was as extensive as that of the foreign secretary, although his control of the post office and its Cabinet noir certainly extended its reach. Stoll also notes Beauvillier’s network, but his reference to Lizerand, Beauvillier, 412–13, reveals nothing of an extensive nature. 28 Torcy, Journal, 183, reported that, after the Conseil meeting, he shared with the king the letter Polignac addressed to him from Gertruydenberg concerning his relationship with his fellow plenipotentiary Huxelles. The king instructed Torcy to keep it a secret. 29 Ibid., 68–70. On another occasion Torcy was careful to exonerate ­Beauvillier as the source of rumours that the foreign secretary wanted peace at any price, observing that those actually responsible for this misinformation were even more the duke’s enemies than his. Among their mutual enemies Torcy included Maintenon (ibid., 241). See Louis XIV, Mémoires, 228, for his recognition of the value of frank advisors. 30 Torcy, Journal, 125. 31 Ibid., 234–5. Pomponne was ambassador to Venice at that time. Torcy labeled the appointment a “piège” (trap) that God mercifully helped him avoid. Earlier that month Torcy recorded that the king used a tone with him in rejecting his advice concerning the Duke of Savoy that, had he used it with someone else, would suggest the king suspected that individual of having a secret understanding with the duke (ibid., 229). 32 Ibid., xvii–xviii. 33 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 182. 34 The following is adapted from Rule, “King in His Council,” 216–24; Rule, “Emergent Bureaucracy,” 277–8; and Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 320. See also Mousnier, Institutions, 2:130–46; and Antoine, Conseil du roi, 43–79. 35 aae cp Hongrie-Transylvanie 9, fol. 49, extracts of Héron’s dispatches and memoirs concerning Hungary, 16 Nov. 1701, shows Torcy’s pencil markings, as does ibid., fol. 60, Héron to Torcy (?), 30 Jan. 1702. 36 Sourches, Mémoires, 11:324 (27 Apr. 1709). 37 Picavet, Diplomatie, 55–6. 38 Torcy, Journal, 314. 39 Ibid., 204. For other examples, see ibid., 238, 276, 298, 307, 332, 356. On one occasion, however, Torcy believed that the king had referred to the Conseil his advice to send someone to compliment Philip V on the victory at



40

41

42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50

51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Notes to pages 379–82

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­ rihuega because he no longer supported the idea and wanted to delay havB ing to make a decision (ibid., 323). From a sketch by Charles Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre, dated 3 July 1702. an r4 825, 3 July 1702. Thanks to Gary McCollim for this reference. See Rule, “King in His Council,” 233, fig. 6 (based on it). Perkins, “Councils,” 395–7. Perkins discovered from another source that the letter from which the extract was taken was from Abbé Dangeau, brother of the memorialist. Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 2:162. Torcy, Journal, 75, 112, 147, 383, 438. Ibid., 57. Perkins, “Councils,” 92–3; and Torcy, Journal, 211–12. Rule, “King in His Council,” 223, fig. 5. Torcy, Journal, 39, 90–1, 134–5, 140–1, 165–7, 200, 322. On Monday 6 April 1711, a letter from Gaultier opening the prospect of peace negotiations with Great Britain required an immediate reply (ibid., 420). Similarly, on Monday 25 May 1711, a letter from Philip V of Spain to Austria’s Archduke Charles necessitated an immediate response (ibid., 434). Ibid., 215. Ibid., 134. See Rule, “King in His Council,” 221. pro sp France 78/159, fol. 216, Prior to Stanhope, 12/23 Oct. 1714: “Monsr de Torcy is gone for 2 or 3 days to an Estate of his own, and this is a sort of Holy day-week for all the Ministers: there will be no counsel [sic] ’till the beginning of the next – he will return to Versailles Saturday.” On 17 July 1710 (Torcy, Journal, 227) Torcy noted that he was going to Croissy until the evening of the 19th, since the Gertruydenberg plenipotentiaries’ courier had been sent. Torcy, Journal, 425. bn mf 6679, fol. 49, c. Apr. 1694. Picavet, Diplomatie, 56–7. On the debates, divisions, and discouragements among the king and his ministers from September 1709 to March 1710, see Rule, “Preliminaries.” Torcy, Journal, 231, which relates that he spoke to Desmaretz of the usefulness of the northern alliances. Torcy, Journal, 33. Ibid., 356–8. Ibid., 176. Ibid., 359. Chapman, Private Ambition. Cénat, Roi stratège, 40. For such discussions, see Torcy, Journal, 158, 159–60, 163, 197–204, 218–19. For conflicts with Beauvillier, see ibid., 170–3, 187–8, 211–13.

672

Notes to pages 382–4

62 Ibid., 212. 63 See ibid., 204 (for the king’s decision), 220 (for the meeting of ­Dispatches). For Boullion, see Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 107–8; and ­ss-Coirault, 3:951–70. 64 For both, see Bluche, Dictionnaire, 146–7, 374–5. Avignon, with a population of about 24,000, had dual sovereigns: the pope (since 1348) and the king of France (since 1535). Louis XIV occupied it and the Comtat twice, in 1662–64 and 1688–89. The Comtat, papal property since 1229 and with a population of approximately 100,000, was governed by a resident rector from its capital, Carpentras. Embedded in the main portion of the Comtat’s territories since 1544 was the smaller Principality of Orange of the House of Orange-Nassau. Occupied during Louis XIV’s wars with William III, it was restored to the latter at Ryswick, reoccupied by France in 1702, and then ceded to France in 1713 at Utrecht (ibid., 1119–20). Boutier, Atlas, 26–7, shows these enclaves. 65 Blet, “Nonce en France,” 223–35, 257–8; and Blet, Nonces, 7–12. 66 aae md 1016, fols 48ff, Torcy to archbishop of Auch and bishops of Montauban, Tréguier, Tarbes, Alét, and Die, 23 Jan. 1692. See Bergin, Crown, Church, 256 and chap. 5, for the crisis. 67 In 1713 Torcy sent such a message by courier to Henri-Pons Thyard de Bissy, bishop of Meaux. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 4:405. 68 bn mf 17431, fol. 76, Torcy to President Harlay, 25 Oct. 1696. Also aae md 1041, fol. 168, Torcy to Père Garden, 7 Apr. 1697. 69 Bergin, Crown, Church, 36–41. 70 Torcy, Journal, 42–7. 71 Ibid., 187–8. 72 Blet, Nonces, 167, 177, 197–291. 73 Ibid., chaps 10–13, passim. See, for example, aae cp Rome 430, fol. 301, Torcy to J. Pontchartrain, 13 Dec. 1702, about the nuncio’s complaints of ships attacked and a fortress shelled in the Gulf of Venice. 74 Bély, Dictionnaire, 123–5; and Bergin, Crown, Church. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 221–2, explain that the household secretary of state’s role, although formally charged with the affairs of the clergy, was largely confined to paperwork and was of secondary importance among his attributes. Torcy’s extensive role in clerical affairs is detailed in Blet, Clergé de France. 75 Le Roy, Gallicanisme, details Torcy’s role. 76 For such commissions, see Bluche, Dictionnaire, 368–9. 77 bn mf 6679, fols 254–5, Aug. 1698. Harsany, Cour de Léopold de Lorraine, 45–8, describes these marriage negotiations as recorded in aae cp Lorraine 46. The other commissioners were Beauvillier and Pomponne (ibid., fol. 102, 4 Aug. 1698). Dangeau, Journal, 6:439 (12 Oct. 1698), specified that Torcy read the contract to the king and handed him the pen to sign it because it



78

79 80

81

82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90

91

Notes to pages 384–8

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entailed a marriage with a foreign prince. Thanks to Douglas Clark Baxter for sharing information about this wedding. aae md 1067, fol. 21, lists the commissioners, as does Dangeau, Journal, 6:467 (29 Nov. 1698). See bn mf 8863, fol. 450, Torcy to Lebret, 17 Apr. 1698, concerning William III’s request for monies owed him by Orange’s clergy. See also Dangeau, Journal, 7:41 (4 Mar. 1691). The convention’s ratification, dated 26 August 1699, is in aae md 1064, fols 109–10v. Marchand, Intendant, 290, 293–5. bn mf 8873, fol. 39, Chamillart to Lebret, 5 May 1702. See Frey and Frey, Dictionary, 317–20. With Orange in French hands, Torcy informed Grignan (aae md 1144, fol. 64, Louis XIV to Grignan, 13 Oct. 1706) that the king had authorized the opening of Orange’s archives to the marquis de Mailly concerning his rights in the principality. aae md 1144, fol. 398v. For Birkenfeld and his son, see Courcelles, Dictionnaire des généraux, 1:425–6. See also Piquet-Marchal, Chambre de réunion, 73–80; and ss-Coirault, 6:343–4. Borrowed from the title of Bryant, “Partner.” Maintenon, Lettres, 5:391, 22 Oct. 1698. aae md 1137, fols 161–3. For such songs, see Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 108–12. Le Peletier claimed that Maintenon and Louis Pontchartrain often cooperated to set policy. He also seemingly implied that Chamillart’s foray into peace negotiations developed out of his meetings with the king and Maintenon. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 157, 160, 168. Bryant, “Partner,” 77–106. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:402. Picavet, Diplomatie, 50. For her role and that of the Colberts in ecclesiastical patronage, see Bergin, Crown, Church, 264–76; and Bryant, “Partner,” 93–4. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:509. Bryant, “Partner,” 89. She wrote to Archbishop Noailles of Paris, 29 May 1698, that her choice for an ambassadorial post was receiving consideration. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:347–8. In a 14 November 1704 letter to Noailles, however, Maintenon claimed that she had no influence over Puyzieulx’s possible ambassadorship to the Swiss and that any lobbying on his behalf should target Torcy. She assured the cardinal that the king did not want her even to appear to enter into such matters and that if she passed on to the king a memoir on Puyzieulx’s behalf, he would only forward it to Torcy. Maintenon, Lettres à Noailles, 4:245–6. In 1714 she influenced the appointment of Abbé Mornay as ambassador to Portugal. His parents were her old friends. Bryant, “Partner,” 97. Vaillé, Postes, 5:22–7, 69–70, 92–3, 312–25; and Vaillé, Cabinet noir. See also Bély, Espions, especially 56–150; and Rule, “Gathering Intelligence,”

674

92 93

94

95

96 97

Notes to pages 388–9 732–52, a review of Bély. Fénelon, Correspondance, 17:199n1, indicates that Torcy kept an eye on letters between Beauvillier and Fénelon. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 174; and Bély, Art de la paix, 392. Philip V, for example, sent two letters dated 13 April 1709 through ­Maintenon to Louis requesting that the duc d’Orléans not be returned to Spain. The bitter and accusatory letter detailing his reasons was for the king alone, whereas the shorter and more-reserved one could be shared with the Conseil and even Orléans. Baudrillart, “Intrigues,” 29–30, 246. Torcy, Journal, 372, discussed a February 1711 secret letter from Philip V to his grandfather that also arrived through Maintenon. See Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:101–5, Amelot to Maintenon, 7 Dec. 1708, sending her his reflections on peace proposals involving Spain. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:564ff; and ibid., 509, 515; and to Ursins she wrote that the mails to Spain passed through Torcy’s hands (ibid., 195). On another occasion she complained to Ursins that if she had not heard from her, it was because Torcy controlled the couriers. Maintenon, Lettres à d’Aubigné et Ursins, 144. Bryant, “Partner,” 89–91. For examples, see Maintenon, Secret Correspondence, 1:31–4 (29 Aug. 1706); ibid., 63–4 (5 Sept. 1706); ibid., 100 (1 May 1707); ibid., 430 (12 June 1713); and ibid., 2:97 (28 Jan. 1715). For Ursins’s letters to Maintenon: ibid., 166–8 (6 Nov. 1707); and ibid., 299, 318 (3 Nov. 1706 and 7 Feb. 1707), where she complained that Torcy had not been writing her very often. By the end of the year, according to letters of 18 September and 25 December 1707 (ibid., 3:96, 159), she apparently saw herself on better terms with Torcy. Lynn, Wars, 317. For the losses of 1708, see ibid., 316–25. Ibid., 329; and Bryant, “Partner,” 92–3. For Torcy’s support of Vendôme, see his letter to him in aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 39, 15 Dec. 1710. Torcy thanked Vendôme in a letter of 9 February 1711 (ibid., fols 68–9) for protecting a kinsman and helping him become a colonel sooner than expected. Vendôme was governor of Provence, under Torcy’s supervision (see ibid., fol. 120, Torcy to Vendôme, 22 June 1711, in which he sends to Spain materials on the marshal’s gouvernement). Ironically, in 1712 Vendôme was succeeded at his death by Villars. Torcy, Journal, 65, is a 12 December 1709 entry expressing his hope that Villars had not won over Maintenon to the Scottish invasion plan he was then promoting. In 1715 when Villars succeeded the deceased Grignan as lieutenant-general of Provence, he immediately put in for the 10,000 to 12,000 livres he claimed Grignan had received annually from Arles and Marseilles. Torcy instructed the intendant to look into this right away, which Lebret did with great thoroughness, finding no basis for Villars’s claim. Given his difficulties with Villars, it perhaps pleased the foreign secretary to pass on these negative findings in such detail. bn naf 22940, fols ­270–1r,



98 99

100

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111

112

Notes to pages 389–90

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Torcy to Lebret, 14 Jan. 1715, and fols 272r–5r, Torcy to Villars, 27 Jan. 1715. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 141, Torcy to Vendôme, 30 Nov. 1711. Ibid., fol. 58v, Torcy to Vendôme, 18 Jan. 1711. Torcy’s letters to Vendôme while he was commanding in Spain are peppered with English and Dutch political news and with Torcy’s view of peace prospects. One letter reported on Hungary and a possible Russo-Turkish war (ibid., fol. 55, Torcy to ­Vendôme, 7 Jan. 1711). Torcy discussed the Noailles family in bl am 20320, fol. 133, 12 May 1714. In aae md 449, fol. 22, 29 May 1706, Torcy sent Noailles “felicitations” on his promotion to lieutenant-general and related that he had personally taken the news to the Noailles family. Noailles sent Torcy news of the Spanish campaign and congratulations on Bouzols’s promotion in ibid., fol. 45, 8 July 1708. In Bolingbroke, Letters, 3:373, 388, Prior informed Bolingbroke that he and the Colberts dined “very splendidly” with the Noailles on several occasions. In aae md 1175, fol. 32, 12 Nov. 1706, Torcy wrote Noailles that, according to a tip from Ambassador Ferriol in Constantinople, Noailles should warn his personal physician not to invest with a bankrupt merchant established in Pera. Durand, Jansénisme et Joachim Colbert, 22–40. Cermakian, Ursins, 191, 191n150; and Bryant, “Partner,” 88. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:547, 551. aae cp Espagne 204, fol. 7, Torcy to Vendôme, 22 Sept. 1710. Chamillart, Correspondance, 1:7–11. Pénicaut, Chamillart; and Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:v, vii, viii. See also bl am 46357, fols 344–5. Maintenon, Lettres, 5:530. Le Roy Ladurie, Saint-Simon, 141. Maintenon, who had loathed Louvois, had good relations with his son. Chamillart, Correspondence, 2:323n1. In January 1708, Chamillart’s son, the marquis de Cany, married Marie-Françoise de Rochechouart, daughter of Torcy’s aunt, Marie-Anne Colbert, who had married Louis de Rochechouart, duc de Mortemart. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:117. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 633, calls him a hard-working but political nonentity whose appointment allowed Maintenon to retain a creature on the council even with Chamillart’s departure (see also ibid., 649, 677–8, 682). FalqueCador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 307–17, however, argue that Voysin, although primarily an administrator, eventually gained enough credibility with the king and his generals, who decided strategic matters, to be able to offer his opinion. ss -Coirault, 2:158–62; and 3:228–9, 231, 383–9.

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Notes to pages 391–4

113 Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs, 1:72–3, 77, 89, 102. Torcy, Journal, 43, discusses the “liberties” of the Gallican Church. For her conflicts with La Chaise, see Langlois, Maintenon, 175, 183–4, 249. 114 aae md 1173, fol. 178 (1712). 115 Lizerand, Beauvillier, 305–15. 116 Maintenon, Maintenon d’après sa correspondance, 2:238; and Torcy, Journal, 125–6. 117 Torcy, Journal, 122. 118 Ibid., 240–3. 119 Ibid., 319–20. 120 Ibid., 372. 121 Cornette, Roi de guerre, 244–7. 122 The war and foreign portfolios were held jointly by several ministers from 1594 to 1624. Bély, “Origines sociales,” 552–6; and Clausewitz, On War, 99. 123 Louis XIV, Mémoires, 72. 124 Ibid., 225. 125 Ibid., 77, 249. 126 Ibid., 96, 169. 127 Roosen, Diplomacy, 1. 128 aae md 306, fol. 243, Memoir, Chamillart to Torcy, 6 Sept. 1703. Examples of such negotiations include Catinat and Tessé with Savoy (1691–96), Boufflers with Portland (1697), Berwick with Marlborough (1708), and ­Villars with Prince Eugene (1713–14). According to Haussonville, Duchesse de Bourgogne, 1:121, during his negotiations Tessé wrote daily to the king, Barbezieux, and (after Croissy’s death) Torcy. For this mixture of the military and diplomatic, see Tessé, Mémoires et lettres, 1:16–78; Stapleton, “Prelude to Rijswijk,” 87–106 (on Boufflers); Legrelle, Négociation inconnue; and Sturgill, Villars, 137–49. 129 Rowlands, Dynastic State, 70. 130 Ibid. 131 Chamillart informed Torcy, presumably so that he could make the necessary protests, that Venice had furnished the emperor with 4,000 horses and forage. aae md 1108, fol. 40, 20 Mar. 1702. This dialectic as well as the lack of clear boundaries, is demonstrated in the military and diplomatic activities and thought of Chamlay. Cénat, Chamlay, 41, 63–5, 72–4, 75–82, 112–14, 127–31, 138. 132 Hippeau, Avènement Bourbons, 2:291–3 (Blécourt to Louis XIV, 1 Nov. 1700). 133 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:145–7. Antonio de Ubilla, secretary of the Despacho Universal, reported that Blécourt arranged for the Junta’s courier to be stopped so that his would arrive first (ss-Boislisle, 7:293n1), but this appears unlikely and corroborating evidence is lacking. Torcy, Mémoires,



134

135

136

137 138 139

140 141

Notes to pages 394–6

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1:83, reports that Harcourt had never trusted the Maritime Powers as partners. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:148–9, Harcourt to Barbezieux, 7 Nov. 1700, is a longer letter outlining his reasons against the treaty (the high cost of enforcement) and for the testament. Replying to Harcourt’s earlier letters, Barbezieux (8 Nov. 1700, ibid., 149–50) indicated that he preferred the treaty because it added to France’s borders through exchanges with Savoy and ­Lorraine, hopefully without the expense of war, but he agreed that the testament was preferable to a costly fight to enforce the treaty. However, reluctant to enter into political discussions, Barbezieux downplayed his own sentiments and expressed willingness to leave this matter in the hands of those tasked with disentangling it. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:145, says that as an officer Harcourt was motivated by a scrupulous observance of proper channels, but this is less likely than the military expediency indicated in his letter, perhaps combined with Saint-Simon’s suggestion in ss-Boislisle, 7:293. aae cp Espagne 85, fol. 355, ­Harcourt to Torcy, 5 Nov. 1700, informed him of the exhausted courier and that his packet would arrive by way of Barbezieux. This was wise, since Torcy had his own agents at the frontier monitoring couriers. Ibid., fol. 305, Gibaudière, lieutenant du roi at Bayonne, to Torcy, 24 Oct. 1700. Dangeau, Journal, 7:411–12; and Sourches, Mémoires, 6:300. Rowlands notes that Saint-Simon relates a similar incident with couriers and a colleague in 1692 that garnered Barbezieux a royal reprimand, as such unseemly undermining of a colleague annoyed the decorum-obsessed monarch and may have postponed his admission to the Conseil. Rowlands, Dynastic State, 70–1. Harcourt may thus have unintentionally sabotaged Barbezieux’s advancement. aae cp Autriche 92, fol. 231r–v, Torcy to Villars, 24 Aug. 1713, is a reply to his request for instructions as to whom to address correspondence concerning negotiations. The king ordered that his couriers could still go to the war office first but were then immediately to take any dispatches concerning negotiations to Torcy. Villars was not to share copies of these letters, since that would preclude Torcy replying to Allied offers in secret. In negotiations, Torcy reminded him, it was essential that such information not pass through multiple hands. Foreign office replies to Villars would come by the marshal’s returning courier or those from the war office. Lynn, Wars, 274. McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 62. By 1708, while the Grand Alliance had realized most of its original objectives of 1701–02, new objectives had been subsequently added, especially regarding Iberia, making peace more difficult to achieve. Ibid., 60–2. Dangeau, Journal, 12:429. Torcy, Memoirs of Torcy, 2:98.

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Notes to pages 396–8

142 What is at issue here is not the war secretary’s information-gathering – a perfectly legitimate activity necessary to his responsibilities – but his efforts to initiate and conduct peace talks with the enemy. 143 Vreede, Correspondance, 260 (D’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Oct. 1706). D’Avaux, managing this negotiation on Chamillart’s behalf, urged ­Hennequin to consider sharing with the Dutch negotiators the negative comments written about them by two of Torcy’s agents, Mollo and Callières (ibid., 140–2 [4 Oct. 1706]). Black, Diplomacy, 16, 47, underlines the importance of unaccredited agents in any state’s diplomacy. 144 Black, Diplomacy, 46, 79, 104–5. Summit diplomacy, a kind of personal diplomacy, was used during and after the Second World War (ibid., 209–10). 145 Ibid., 29. 146 aae cp Brunswick-Hanovre 38, fol. 182v (7 Aug. 1701). “Anticiper” sometimes meant “to usurp.” daf, s.v. “anticiper.” 147 Black, Diplomacy, 12, 52, emphasizes this often-neglected role of diplomacy. 148 Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 73. 149 A cryptic reference to a controversy between the two is in Torcy’s 8 June 1705 letter to Chamillart apparently centred on the controller general’s prerogatives. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:26. 150 Bély, Art de la paix, 392. This includes even letters ostensibly in the monarch’s own hand. The sheer volume of the Spanish correspondence in part accounts for increases in the number of foreign office personnel during these years. 151 Bély, Art de la paix, 391–406; and Kamen, War of Succession, 42–56. ­Baudrillart, Philippe V, discusses Spain’s tangled and shifting politics and often troubled relationship with France. Requests for advice from Spain’s Council of State passed through Torcy’s hands for Louis’s consideration (ibid., 120). Torcy also helped the king fill posts in the Spanish government (ibid., 122). He secured patronage as far afield as Naples through Ursins, as he wrote to Gramont, 16 Nov. 1704. bn na 23187, fol. 258. Torcy was disgusted with the infighting among the French in Madrid, which he said was more harmful “than all the plotting of the disaffected.” Kamen, Philip V, 36. For a sense of the matters that passed through Torcy’s hands as he drafted the king’s letters to Spain and made his replies, see the two volumes of Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot. 152 For Orry’s relationship with the ministers, see Dubet, Orry, especially 23, 38–41, 93–7, 169–72, 184. Interestingly, Orry’s three French and one or two Spanish commis were paid 6,400 livres annually by the foreign office (101). After the failed Franco-Spanish siege of Barcelona, Louis held audiences in his Cabinet on 22 and 23 November 1705 with Spain’s ambassador and other Spaniards. Only Torcy joined him even though Chamillart was at Versailles. Dangeau, Journal, 10:476.



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153 aae md 306, fols 240–4 (also an appendix to ss-Boislisle, 12:538–40). Following his signature, Chamillart added that he retained neither draft nor copy of this letter. Earlier letters from Spain urgently requesting French troops and commanders to prevent an invasion via Portugal are Louville to Torcy, 12 July 1703; Louville to Beauvillier, 28 July 1703; and Ursins to Torcy, 17 Oct. 1703 (ibid., 534–7). See Chamillart to Torcy, 17 Jan. 1702, asking that he write to Ambassador Marcin in Spain to ask Philip V to supply the funds Charles-Henri de Lorraine, prince de Vaudémont, requested to defend Milan. aae md 1108, fol. 56. 154 aae md 306, fols 245–6 (also in ss-Boislisle, 12:540). 155 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 81. He goes on to examine the diplomat’s double sense of being regarded as and feeling like a stranger that leads to distinctive attitudes and ways of dealing with others (99–109). 156 Pénicault, Chamillart, 174n53. Ilie, “Exomorphism,” cites the anti-Spanish cultural bias, for instance, of Louville, Gramont, and Tessé, and underlines its negative effect on French efforts in Spain, but notes Torcy’s more accommodating attitude (379, 384n28). Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 150, warned against such prejudice. See also Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 36, on diplomatic corps as “epistemic communities with their own way of seeing the world and their own solutions to problems.” See also ibid., 71. 157 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173–4. 158 Kamen, War of Succession, 19. Berwick, Mémoires, 1:227, notes that when he arrived in Spain in 1704, Philip V formally appointed him captain-general of his armies. See Petrie, Berwick, 166–7, on the ambiguities of this position. This arrangement explains Torcy’s letters sent to Vendôme in Spain in 1710 after the French withdrawal to satisfy the Allies during negotiations. For example, in aae cp Espagne 203, fols 332–3v, 5 Sept. 1710, Torcy reported that he read the king Vendôme’s letter requesting troops and was now sending the royal reply. 159 Walsh, “Toby Bourke,” 143–53. He was also Ursins’s client. 160 From Toulon, for instance, an official sent him news that a battalion of royal artillery and a company of cannoneers had embarked for Spain. aae md 1144, fol. 97, for Torcy’s 23 Oct. 1706 letter of thanks; and ibid., 1158, fol. 99, 23 Aug. 1708, for another. 161 bn naf 23187, fol. 365, 5 Dec 1706; and ibid., fol. 360, 17 Nov 1706. Torcy also thanked Gramont, in Bayonne, for Spanish news (ibid., fol. 327, 1 Aug. 1706). 162 Torcy, Journal, 243, 324–7. 163 Ibid., 259, 269, 291, 317. 164 Stapleton, “Grand Pensionary at War,” 203, draws on a model typically used with later periods, such as the First World War, but argues convincingly for its earlier application.

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165 For example, since 1708 Torcy had favoured and urged on the Conseil the opening of a second front in Germany to relieve pressure on Flanders. When this was finally done in 1711, it was quite successful. Klaits, Propaganda, 274. Torcy also held discussions with Max Emmanuel in November 1709 about a possible German campaign. Torcy, Journal, 5–13. 166 Rowlands, “Stratégie de cabinet,” 25–34 (quotation on 34). See also ­Drévillon, Impôt de sang, 30–9; Cénat, Chamlay; and the correspondence analysis in Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals,” 156–74. Louis XIV was “an officer-king more than a soldier-king … chief of a general staff rather than a warlord” (ibid., 174). 167 Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals”; and Rowlands, “Stratégie de cabinet.” See also Petitfils, Louis XIV, 594–6, 632–3. 168 Pamphleteer Peter Samson wrote Horatio Walpole in 1716 affirming Torcy’s devotion to James II on the basis of assurances from the Dutch diplomat Buys, who referenced his conversations with Torcy and his brother Croissy. Walpole, Honest Diplomat, 174–5. Despite fulsome praise from Queen Mary of Modena and her son, Torcy doubted they fully trusted him, and he felt the same about them, relying instead on his own operatives and increasingly on James III’s half-brother, the Duke of Berwick, who placed French interests ahead of Jacobite dreams. Gregg, Protestant Succession, 100–2. Torcy often had to balance carrying out royal Jacobite policy with which he disagreed with playing his best diplomatic hand. Corp, Court in Exile, 11–179, especially 55. See also Bennett, “Jacobitism,” 142–9; and Nordmann, “Louis XIV and Jacobites,” 82–111. Thomson, “Origins,” 153–7, discusses the background and reasons for Louis XIV’s controversial recognition of James II’s son as James III in September 1701. Although Torcy and the other ministers were opposed, Thomson argues that Louis’s decision was likely “in accordance with principle and expediency alike” (ibid., 154). 169 Gibson, Scottish Card, is a detailed account of the expedition and its origins. See also Byrne, “Life and Career of Hooke”; Pope, Callières, 103–85; and Corp, Court in Exile, 164, 164n32. Although many, including the king, also blamed the failure on the lack of coordination between Chamillart and ­Pontchartrain, Torcy was generous to his rivals and absolved them both, pointing instead to the delay caused by James III’s illness and to British naval superiority. Torcy, Journal, 63. Against the advice of some of his ministers, during the 1709–10 campaign intermission Louis again considered an invasion to get negotiations moving. Corp, Court in Exile, 164–5. For Torcy’s on and off enthusiasm for these 1709–10 plans, see Rule, “Preliminaries,” 100–2. 170 France, Recueil, 22:113–15; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 4:13–14. These approaches were through Rotterdam merchant Gualterus Hennequin and



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Holstein-Gottorp’s resident in The Hague, Herman van Petkum. Hennequin was in Paris early in 1703. See also ibid., 5:231; and aae cp Hollande 200, fol. 17, d’Argenson to Torcy, 20 Jan. 1703. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:34–110. A memoir dated c. January 1704 mentioned possible Swedish mediation. aae cp Hollande 200, fols 5–11v. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:232–4. Marlborough wrote Godolphin on 4 May 1705 that he had learned this from Leopold’s minister. Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:424–5 (since our topic is a continental one, to avoid confusion only New Style dates are given from this collection). France, Recueil, 22:116n2. Torcy, Journal, 415–20, remarked on Du Puy’s contacts with Orangeist circles. He was former deputy governor of the young Johan Willem Friso, Prince of Nassau-Dietz (1687–1711), a relative of ­William III and his chosen heir for all the holdings of the House of Orange. Israel, Dutch Republic, 959–68. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:235. Du Puy’s 9 April 1705 memoir is in aae cp ­Hollande 202, fols 55–6. Letters are in Vreede, Correspondance, 224–6 (Du Puy to Heinsius, 17 Apr. 1705, Paris); Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:423–4 (Marlborough to Godolphin, 4 May 1705), 450 (Du Puy to Heinsius, 20 May 1705, reference only), 452 (Marlborough to ­Godolphin, 6 July 1705); and Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 187 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 26 June 1705). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:236–37; Pope, Callières, 138–40; and ibid., 209–14 (Callières’s memoir in translation). ss -Boislisle, 8:91–6. France, Recueil, 22:117–26, has his instructions. ­Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:552, says that he was also connected with M ­ aintenon and Pontchartrain. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:237–44; and Bély, Espions, 33, 788nn47–9, discuss his negotiations. Saint-Simon respected him as a physician and person, but criticized his lack of diplomatic skills and said that the choice of a physician for diplomacy was ridiculed in France and abroad. ­ss-Boislisle, 17:181–4. His son was the philosopher Claude Adrien Helvétius. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:240. He was to reside with and be guided by Willem Nieupoort, the Rotterdam customs farmer. See France, Recueil, 22:123n1, 124; and Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:35–51. Dangeau, Journal, 10:436. For Heinsius’s close collaboration on foreign policy with Dussen and especially Buys, see Stork-Penning, “Ordeal,” 110–12. Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:35–51 (Helvétius to Torcy, 2 Oct. 1705; ibid., 122n2, notes Helvétius’s authorship). aae cp Hollande 202, fols 214–15, Torcy to Helvétius, 12 Oct. 1705. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:240–1 (Helvétius to Chamillart, 23 Oct. 1705).

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183 aae Hollande 202, fols 238–43, Helvétius to Torcy, 2 Oct. 1705; and ibid., 203, fol. 103, 15 Oct. 1705 (reporting that he has been issued his passport). See also France, Recueil, 22:119–20. 184 Marlborough shared with Godolphin on 27 August his sense that the French could not “offer even what they have a mind to give” for fear of alienating Spain, while the Dutch, whose yearnings for peace worried him, were afraid to “disoblige their allyes [sic].” Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:477. 185 It was also alleged that Rouillé was there masquerading as the doctor’s secretary. Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:551–4. Rouillé, representing France to Max Emmanuel in Brussels, had sent the elector’s cabinet secretary Richard ­Reichard on a secret mission to see if Heinsius was open to talks. Reichard received a 3,000-livre annual French pension. bn na 22996, fols 22–3, ­Rouillé to Louis XIV, 1 Dec. 1704. 186 Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:550–1, mentioned anonymous feelers said to have emanated from Elector Max, speculation about Venetian diplomats coming and going from London, and suspicions about former Spanish ambassador to The Hague Don Bernardo de Quiros and Antonin Nompar de Caumont, duc de Lauzun at Aix-la-Chapelle. 187 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:241 (Bagnols to Torcy, 6 Nov. 1705). 188 France, Recueil, 22:115. He thought this unfortunate because it fed Allied perceptions of a weak France. 189 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:446. Marlborough also wrote Godolphin (1 July 1705) that Du Puy’s letter to Heinsius of 10 June 1705 mentioned that the internuncio was “zealous for peace” (ibid., 450, 450n1). Yet holding this widespread sentiment hardly proved that Bussi, on instructions from France, sought to initiate peace talks. Neither France, Recueil (vol. 22), Legrelle, nor Stork-Penning mention such a mission ­(Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 446n1). Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:721–31. Israel, Dutch Republic, 1034–5, explains this internal Catholic conflict. 190 Marlborough wrote Heinsius of Alègre’s request for a pass and his “very good reputation.” Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 199 (2 Aug. 1705). The same day he wrote Alègre granting his request. Marlborough, Letters and Dispatches, 2:195–6. 191 France, Recueil, 22:127n2, 135n4. 192 Chamillart, Correspondance, 2:41. Heinsius informed Marlborough (20 Sept. 1705) of two letters from Aix-la-Chapelle from someone formerly employed by Briord offering his services as a peace emissary. ­Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 213. However, Torcy neither trusted nor currently employed Abbé Saint-Remy (Bély, Espions, 185) and assured ­Helvétius ­(Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:242n1 [12 Oct. 1705]) that he had never heard of him. Legrelle suspects otherwise, since Torcy’s later (6 Nov.



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1707) ­instructions for intendant Bagnols observed of Saint-Remy that the moment his first negotiation began, its secret was public (ibid.). But this reading of Torcy as claiming responsibility for Saint-Remy’s first mission is unwarranted; he merely noted it. In reporting Lauzun’s departure for Aixla-Chapelle on 12 September 1705 and the suspicions it aroused in Paris, ­Dangeau dismissed the latter by claiming that it was a health-related visit to the waters (Dangeau, Journal, 10:417). But Saint-Simon, married to ­Lauzun’s wife’s sister, and with whom Lauzun often shared episodes from his life, claimed that the illness was feigned and the journey was yet another of ­Lauzun’s attempts to regain favour. Lauzun hoped to meet important foreigners so that he could capitalize on the widespread desire for peace by poking his nose into what he apparently knew were the first tentative steps in that direction (Saint-Simon’s additions in ibid.). Saint-Simon’s longer account claimed that Lauzun did not linger, since he met no one there of sufficient importance. ss-Coirault, 2:615–17. The required passport had to have come from the foreign office. However, Saint-Simon noted that part of Lauzun’s rehabilitation strategy was his promotion of the 1702 marriage of their mutual brother-in-law, the duc de Lorges’s son, to Chamillart’s daughter (ibid., 615). Chamillart borrowed nearly two-thirds of the price of Barbezieux’s secretaryship from Lauzun. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 125–6, 324n45. Dangeau, Journal, 10: passim, usually attuned to leaks from Conseil meetings, is silent about rumours of peace feelers from the beginning of May through the end of the year. Even if not actually Chamillart’s agent, Lauzun nonetheless likely learned from the war minister that tentative steps toward peace were afoot. If Lauzun acted independently on what he had (over)heard, so might Saint-Remy have acted on what he (over)heard at Aix-la-Chapelle. Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance,” 193–4, acknowledges that despite Dutch perceptions, many who approached the Dutch with peace proposals in these years were not authorized by Louis. France, Recueil, 22:120–6, 134–5; and Stork-Penning, “Ordeal,” 114 (quotation). Although suspicious of French sincerity, Stork-Penning nonetheless concedes that England was willing and able to make peace without her Dutch ally and eventually did so (ibid., 116, 119–20). France, Recueil, 22:122. Torcy, Journal, 8, 260, has similar observations, but in 1711 he followed up on an anonymous letter from England (ibid., 399). Other than at peace conferences, Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 180, warned that having more than one diplomat in a given country would only lead to quarrels and disrupt the carrying out of their duties. Haveskercke’s mission is recounted in Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 21–36. The “Articulen ende Conditien,” whose spelling of the baron’s name is adopted here, were printed in Ghent in 1705 (alternate spellings are “Haverskerke,” “Haveskerke,” and “Haveskerckes”). It is not clear whether

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Notes to pages 406–7 Heinsius received a copy of Torcy’s letter or was merely allowed to read the baron’s copy, but in any event he did not forward a copy to Marlborough. ­Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 202–3. Marlborough also called for Dutch garrisons in Antwerp, Namur, and Luxemburg, and something “for the advantage of Protestants” and for Savoy. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 203 (19 Aug. 1705). ­Godolphin’s 18 August 1705 response (ibid., 209) was requested by Marlborough to make English opposition to Haveskercke’s proposals clear to Heinsius. Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:478–9. Heinsius’s reply (Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 205 [21 Aug 1705]) also mentioned greater protection for trade with the West Indies and more control over the southern Netherlands garrisons, but added that none of this was possible if the archduke must have Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands, which the French were currently unwilling to yield. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:309 (Buys to Heinsius, 25 Aug. 1705); and ibid., 4:312 (Heinsius to Buys, 26 Aug. 1705). Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 1:482–3. See also ­Marlborough to Godolphin, 7 Sept. 1705, on the same subject (ibid., ­1:484–5). For other examples of Marlborough’s July–September efforts to frustrate any Dutch moves toward peace talks, shared, of course, with ­Godolphin or the Duchess of Marlborough, but not with Heinsius, see ibid., 1:452–3, 461, 481–5, 491–3, 498. See Stork-Penning, Het grote werk, 35; Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:327 ­(Dussen to Heinsius, 4 Sept. 1705); and ibid., 4:331–2 (Heinsius to Buys, 7 Sept. 1705). Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 202. With Louis’s permission, Max had sent his agent Witkmann to sound out Heinsius about peace and in particular the possibility of an exchange of Bavaria for Sicily and Naples. Witkmann’s March–April sojourn in The Hague elicited nothing specific from Heinsius, but it did lead to rumours. France, Recueil, 12:138–9. There is a likely reference to this in Lamberty, Mémoires, 3:550. Heinsius, Briefwisseling, 4:332 (Heinsius to Buys, 7 Sept. 1705). Heinsius would later report to Marlborough that Haveskercke was quite jealous of Alègre’s talks with the Dutch burghers. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 220 (24 Oct. 1705). Berridge et al., Diplomatic Theory, 77, says that “[i]t was Richelieu’s view that negotiations would never be effective unless they were directed from home by a single mind … aware that continuous negotiation made this even more essential, as it multiplied the possibilities of contradiction and inconsistency … Though often more honored in the breach than in the observance.” Alègre and Mollo coordinated their efforts. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:251; aae cp Hollande 203, fol. 88, Alègre to Torcy, 8 Dec. 1705; ibid., fol. 116, Alègre



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to Louis XIV, 18 Dec. 1705; ibid., 205, fol. 45, Alègre to Louis XIV, 12 Jan. 1706; and ibid., fol. 106, Alègre to Torcy, 5 Feb. 1706. For Callières’s hand in this, see Pope, Callières, 141. For Alègre and his 6 October 1705 instructions, see France, Recueil, ­22:127–51; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:244–56. See also Dangeau, Journal, 10:15. The exchange of Bavaria for Naples and Sicily had already been proposed to the Dutch by Max through his emissary Witkmann in March and April 1705. France, Recueil, 22:138–9. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:40–1, notes that since 1701 Louis XIV and Torcy had considered reintegrating into France the domains of the counts of Flanders, perhaps with an exchange for Roussillon. He suggests that these secret plans prepared Louis for his later willingness to dismember the Spanish monarchy after his 1702–04 military defeats – not to aggrandize France but to maintain her intact. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 1st ed., 4:351. The proposals Torcy sent Alègre were similar to those that Callières, influenced by what he was hearing from Mollo, had floated to him in May 1705. Pope, Callières, 138–40. aae cp Hollande 202, fol. 238, Helvétius to Torcy, 26 Oct. 1705; and ibid., 203, fols 72–6, Alègre to Torcy, 1 Dec. 1705. France, Recueil, 22:131 (Torcy to Alègre, 10 Jan. 1706). For the negotiations, see ibid., 128–31; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:248–54. As early as 1 November 1705, Marlborough wrote Heinsius that he did not think that “any conversation of [Alègre’s] would much forward the inclination for peace.” Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 220. On 12 February 1706 Marlborough indicated that it was time for the prisoner of war to come to England (ibid., 225). On 13 February 1706 Mollo reported to Callières that the talks were pretty much played out. aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 134. Torcy related to Alègre (5 Nov. 1705), perhaps because it was not his preference, that the king had decided to entrust the doctor with any unfinished negotiations when the time came for him to go to England as a prisoner of war. ­Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:241n5. Torcy advised Alègre to consult Helvétius about his health before leaving for England. aae cp Hollande 204, fol. 280, 19 Nov. 1705. aae cp Hollande 203, fol. 123, Alègre to Torcy, 22 Dec. 1705; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:254. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 225 (19 Feb. 1706). On 26 February 1706 he repeated that “[p]eople here are very impatient to have M. d’Allègre [sic] in England” (ibid., 226), and in a letter the same day from Heinsius, the grand pensionary said that people in the United Provinces had long been anxious for his departure (ibid.). aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 52, Alègre to Louis XIV, 19 Jan. 1706, stressed Dutch security fears lingering from 1672. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:255–6; and Goslinga, Mémoires, 7, 13–15, 29, 41–4.

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211 aae cp Hollande 205, fol. 154, Torcy to Alègre, 1 Mar. 1706. 212 Bély, Espions, 107–10. See ibid., 108, for a chart that traces the connections between the various participants in these negotiations. On Bergeyck’s initiative, see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:258–60. 213 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:273–84; and Gaeddert, “Franco-Bavarian Alliance,” 139–201. See also Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 248–9, 251, 254–5, 262–4, 269, 279–80. 214 Pope, Callières, 142–3; and see Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:260–2, for Mollo’s proposal. 215 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:13n5, 261–76. Roosen, Diplomacy, 68–71, summarizes d’Avaux’s career. His conviction that the way to peace was through the Province of Holland is seen in his letter to Hennequin, 8 Nov. 1706, in Vreede, Correspondance, 177–8. 216 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:264 (d’Avaux to Chamillart, 30 July 1706). 217 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 253 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 3 Aug. 1706). For the commercial terms, see Chamillart to Hennequin, 2 Aug. 1706, in Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:265. 218 Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 255 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 7 Aug. 1706). Chamillart likely got the idea of two kings in Spain from a 1704 proposal from Helvétius. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:237–8 (especially 237n5). 219 Marlborough and Heinsius Correspondence, 258 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 18 Aug 1706); and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:271 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 22 Aug. 1706). 220 Vreede, Correspondance, 245–52. 221 D’Avaux wrote Hennequin (13 Aug. 1706) that if Chamillart did not hear from the States-General soon he would withdraw his proposals and leave the matter with those charged with negotiations, that is, with Torcy. Vreede, Correspondance, 249. Chamillart worried to Hennequin (19 Aug. 1706) that word of his efforts was leaking out, making a quick resolution imperative (ibid., 251), and d’Avaux warned (27 Aug. 1706) of negotiations afoot between Max and Marlborough (ibid., 252–3). Marlborough and Heinsius corresponded during September about (false) rumours that Callières was in Holland, which Heinsius dismissed but said were fueled by French peace proposals whispered about by a public anxious for details. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 267–8. 222 Vreede, Correspondance, 252–3 (27 Aug. 1706). 223 Helvétius to Chamillart, 26 Aug. 1706. Chamillart, Correspondance, ­2:122–9. This would-be negotiator mystified the British. Marlborough’s quartermaster general, William Cadogan, answering an inquiry in early 1708 from Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby and 3rd Earl of Strafford, extra­ordinary ambassador in Berlin, reported that “[Helvétius] passed by this place [Brussels] attended



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with a secretary and a Valet de Chambre, what an odd equipage for a Dutch Quack.” He later averred that “those Proposals of Peace you mentioned to have been shown at Berlin are purely Chimerical. I may say that … further overtures from Helvétius have rather prejudiced than advanced the matter [of peace].” bl am 22196, fol. 130, Cadogan to S­ trafford, 19 Jan. 1708, and fol. 133, Cadogan to Strafford, 30 Jan. 1708. Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, 55, 56–7. Vreede, Correspondance, 250 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 19 Aug. 1706). Jamel Ostwald, email message to author, 15 Dec. 2012. Bergeyck told Torcy on 12 February 1711 that the Dutch believed that France was open to them and they had only to penetrate her frontiers. See also Torcy, Journal, 377. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 253 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 3 Aug. 1706). See Colson, “Ambassador between Light and Shade,” 185–7, on such a breach of secrecy during negotiations. Vivo, Information, 41–5. After the failure of the 1710 talks at Gertruydenberg, Torcy also went through a period of despair and uncertainty. Torcy, Journal, 206–8; and Bély, Art de la Paix, 432–5. He was careful, however, not to express this outside the council chamber or his journal. Percy Bysshe Shelly’s Demogorgon in Prometheus Unbound, quoted in Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 497; and Napoleon, quoted in Peter ­Tsouras, The Book of Military Quotations (St Paul, mn: Zenith Press, 2005), 247. Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance,” 194, says that Louis “did not leave the conduct of all negotiations in the hands of his able foreign minister, Torcy,” whereas Roosen, Diplomacy, 36–7, mentions interference in diplomacy by other secretaries, but says that Louis tried to prevent it. ss -Boislisle, 17:179–86. Ibid., 181n7. Although he mentions Helvétius’s other journeys, Boislisle identifies the two in question as those of December 1707 and March–April 1708, but without explanation as to why these rather than the others. After quoting Saint-Simon’s description of this divided diplomacy, Chamillart’s parallel network of agents, and Helvétius’s missions, Bély, Espions, 107–9, says that the secret negotiations of 1706 are sufficient to illustrate the parallel network. He does not, however, offer here or elsewhere evidence of Chamillart having been engaged in rival negotiations other than in 1706 through Hennequin. Sourches, Mémoires, 11:56, mentions in the same sentence that despite illness Chamillart had gone to Torcy’s and was two hours in his Cabinet with the physician, who then departed for Flanders with Chamlay and other military men on a trip whose purpose was not known. Boislisle’s note concerning Chamillart’s Brussels agents (ibid., 180n4) refers to correspondence with Hennequin, Mollo, and Mesnager and to Abbé Lenglet du Fresnoy’s service to him. Yet of these four, only Hennequin is known to have negotiated secretly with or on behalf of Chamillart behind Torcy’s back.

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Notes to pages 412–14 In 1705 Torcy sent Lenglet du Fresnoy as secretary for French and Latin languages to the Elector of Cologne’s Lille court-in-exile to watch his ministers Karg and Carlo, Baron Siméoni, for any anti-French activities. From the 1708 fall of Lille, the abbé established relations with Prince Eugene and continued a foreign correspondence that facilitated his spying. Michault, Vie Lenglet du Fresnoy, 28–32. He also spied for Flanders intendant Bernières, Boufflers, and then Chamillart. Bély, Espions, 187–8. In July 1710 Torcy thought him a scoundrel – as did Boufflers – and ordered his arrest over some purloined atlases, but he had left for Tournai ahead of the police. Torcy, Journal, 232. Saint-Simon, Écrits inédites, 4:55–6. Vreede, Correspondance, 250–1, Chamillart to Hennequin, 19 Aug. 1706. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:265, mentions Chamillart’s long individual work sessions with the king during this period. When in 1709 Torcy referred in his Journal, 85, to the 1706 negotiations with Hennequin that Chamillart wanted to conduct secretly (“secrètement conduire”), he surely meant those that were kept secret from the Conseil and not from the king. ss -Boislisle, 17:184–5. This is the description of the secret du roi under the regent and Louis XV in McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 181. See also Black, Diplomacy, 107–9. Monnier, “Secret du roi,” 236, observes that “classic” secret diplomacy, while in the shadows and often leaving no documentary trace, differs from Louis XV’s secret du roi, which was conducted in opposition to official diplomacy. Whether Torcy appreciated the irony or not, after 1715 he helped the regent pursue his own secret personal diplomacy. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 399. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:275–83. See Louis XIV to Rouillé, 14 Aug. 1706 (ibid., 278–81). There was suspicion then and since that Max was floating his own proposal and pretending that it originated with Marlborough (ibid., 276). Vreede, Correspondance, 252–3 (27 Aug. 1706). Ibid., 254–5 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 2 Sept. 1706). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:285, 285n6, Chamillart to Hennequin, 20 Sept. 1706, and a quotation from the king’s 6 September 1706 letter to Orléans confirming Chamillart’s self-criticism. D’Avaux informed Hennequin (1 Oct. 1706) that he had defended him against false reports that had temporarily cost him Chamillart’s faith in him. Vreede, Correspondance, 258–61. Vreede, Correspondance, 138–9 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 3 Oct. 1706). D’Avaux also wrote Hennequin pointed complaints about Mollo’s alleged intrigues (ibid., 258, 1 Oct. 1706). Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 269 (23 Sept. 1706). Vreede, Correspondance, 260–1 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Oct. 1706); and ibid., 148, 150 (8 Oct. 1706). Fulminating against Mollo’s alleged attempts



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to discredit Hennequin, d’Avaux suggested that he return the favour by going to Heinsius to destroy Mollo’s credibility (ibid., 140–2 [4 Oct. 1706]) and later sent news of Rouillé’s negotiations and further anti-Mollo barbs (ibid., 152–3 [11 Oct. 1706]). Pope, Callières, 144–7, notes that Mollo’s and ­Callières’s concerns about the channels through Max and Hennequin earned them Torcy’s and Chamillart’s wrath. Vreede, Correspondance, 138–42, 258–61. Ibid., 175 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 1 Nov. 1706); ibid., 176 (5 Nov. 1706); and ibid., 178–9. Chamillart also wrote to Hennequin of the new arrangements (ibid., 178–9, 21 Nov. 1706). For Torcy to Hennequin, 22 Nov. 1706, see ibid., 179–81. As Torcy later wrote to a like-minded Villars (26 Aug. 1710), the Allies would not see reason while they believed that France’s situation was so desperate that all they had to do was hold firm to gain all they demanded. Villars, Mémoires, 3:284. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:287–94. Vreede, Correspondance, 171–2 ­(Marlborough to Heinsius, 23 Oct. 1706), shows the former’s suspicions. Writing to Hennequin on 8 November 1706 (ibid., 177–8), d’Avaux shared that he and Chamillart did not trust Marlborough. D’Avaux claimed to differ with those in charge of the French negotiations and vented his distrust of and disdain for Mollo. For Callières’s peace proposal, see Pope, Callières, 147. Vreede, Correspondance, 182–5 (Torcy to Hennequin, 5 Dec. 1706). Torcy repeated his condition that the talks be secret and between fully empowered envoys (ibid., 194–6 [23 Dec. 1706]; and ibid., 204 [30 Dec. 1706]). Torcy added that Du Puy, returning to Geneva, would no longer be able to write Hennequin as he had earlier proposed (ibid., 208 [6 Jan. 1707]). See ibid., xviii–xix (Heinsius to Marlborough, 7 Dec. 1706), expressing the very fears of Vienna’s intentions toward Milan raised by Torcy. Ibid., 189–90 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 16 Dec. 1706). For this double meaning, s.v. “des forces,” Académie Française, Dictionnaire, 4th ed. Vreede, Correspondance, 206–8 (d’Avaux to Hennequin, 3 Jan. 1707). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:295–9. Callières’s involvement in these negotiations ended, likely because he had become too identified by Torcy and the king with the Chevreuse-Beauvillier faction and its willingness to accede to any Allied demand for peace. Pope, Callières, 152. The Whigs made much of this incident not only against Harley, but also against the network of French agents Torcy had in Britain, with whom the Whigs falsely believed Gregg was linked. Alsop, “Gregg, William”; and Bély, Espions, 348. Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:218–20 (Amelot to Chamillart, 11 July 1707, and Chamillart’s 25 July 1707 reply). Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:299–301; and France, Recueil, 22:151–9.

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Notes to pages 416–18

257 It did, however, later succeed in prying the English away from their allies. Pope, Callières, 149–52, offers perceptive reflections on these negotiations. 258 Dahlgren, Relations commerciales, 481–95, describes the Franco-Spanish negotiations that unsettled the Dutch. For Mesnager and his mission, see Bély, Espions, 576–81; ss-Boislisle, 22:157–8; ibid., 24:284–5; Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 34–41, 233–4; France, Recueil, 22:159–77; and Torcy, Memoirs, 1:118–19. This English translation, likely by Prior’s secretary Adrian Drift, follows the French edition precisely; for that reason we use it for all translations of Torcy’s Mémoires. 259 Helvétius wrote Torcy hoping to serve as a secret channel to Dussen. aae cp Hollande 212, fol. 170, 19 Sept. 1707. 260 His journal and letters during these negotiations are in aae cp Hollande 211. Ibid., 214, fols 11–88, is his correspondence with Torcy. Also related is ibid., Espagne 188, fols 35–47. 261 Examples are aae cp Hollande 215, fol. 50r–v, Dussen to Mesnager, 31 Aug. 1708; and ibid., fols 124r–5v, “Mémoire au Roi,” 30 Sept. 1708. 262 bl am 15285, fol. 27r, Torcy to Pomponne, 26 Mar. 1708. 263 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176–84, shows that these clashes could be quite bitter (although he cautions against ignoring the background of ongoing cooperation) and were exacerbated by rivalry for the king’s ear on domestic as well as commercial matters. The Pontchartrains also regarded Chamillart as an upstart. On Franco-Spanish colonial trade and Chamillart, see Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 225–6; and Kamen, War of Succession, 140–51. 264 bl am 15285, fol. 52r, Torcy to Pomponne, 26 Mar. 1708. 265 aae cp Venise 153, fol. 221, Pomponne to Torcy, 21 Apr. 1708. 266 See Rowlands, Financial Decline, 40–3, on Chamillart’s circle. 267 Lynn, Wars, 367. Bély, Art de la paix, 498–9, likewise cautions against anachronism in discussing past diplomacy. Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 216n3, notes that Louis XIV did revert to a war-as-event approach in 1693 and 1706 as the fighting dragged on at great cost and with little to show for it. In both campaigns, however, this change failed to produce the desired breakthrough, “forcing the Sun King to continue the wars of attrition” ­(italics in original). 268 For other parallels, such as using propaganda, subversion, and “diplomacy by conference” (direct consultations on intergovernmental relations among allied leaders), see Hamilton and Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy, 140–6. 269 Lynn, Wars, 375. 270 Richelieu, Political Testament, 94–5. 271 Rowlands, Financial Decline, 230. This was in addition to the chronic financial problems with which France began the war, which Rowlands analyses with clarity.



Notes to pages 418–19

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272 Lynn, Wars, 373–4. Henry Kissinger observes “that the way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first, and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the issues.” Quoted in Roosen, “Origins,” 173n36 (italics in original). 273 Black, Diplomacy, 53. 274 Louis XIV, Correspondance avec Amelot, 2:90. 275 Callières, Art of Diplomacy, 146, based on a quotation from Epictetus. 276 Sarmant and Waksman, “King and His Generals,” 172. On vain hopes for a decisive battle during Louis’s last war, see Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 17–19, 304–5; and Ostwald, “‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies,” 649–78. See also Lynn, Battle, particularly chap. 6. 277 Heinsius, Het archief raadpensionaris, 3:80 (Callières to Mollo, 12 Apr. 1694). Torcy assured Villars that his military efforts had appreciably improved France’s negotiating position. Villars, Mémoires, 3:257 (29 June 1709), a point Torcy repeated on 3 August 1711 (ibid., 305). Polignac wrote Villars (1 June 1710) from the floundering Gertruydenberg talks that only his battlefield action would bring the talks to a successful conclusion (ibid., 276), a sentiment Torcy repeated to Villars a few days later (ibid., 280). 278 bl am 20139, fol. 151v, Torcy to Gualterio, 23 Jan. 1711. He earlier expressed the same to Villars. Villars, Mémoires, 3:284 (Torcy to Villars, 26 Aug. 1710). For Le Quesnoy, see aae cp Allemagne 352, fol. 70v, Torcy to Harcourt, 8 July 1712. At Ryswick in 1697 Leibniz recalled hearing Croissy respond years earlier to those who complimented him on the significance of his being named to negotiate at Nijmegen: do not expect anything from him because it is the king’s armies that make matters (“fassent les affaires”). It was likewise at Ryswick, Leibniz added, that highly skilled diplomats had real weight given to their words by Louis XIV’s well-maintained and deployed army. Leibniz, Briefe, Vierte Reihe, Sechster Band, 270. 279 Lynn, Wars, 374. See also Bély, Art de la paix, 490–5; and Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 17, 21. 280 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 102, 106. aae cp Autriche 80 and 81, passim, contain Noblet’s letters to Torcy from the Rhine front in 1702; ibid., 82, 83, 84, passim, are letters from 1703. See ibid., 80, fols 178ff, for letters to Torcy from his cousin Blainville, an officer at the front. In one (ibid., fol. 178, 19 May 1702), Blainville sent news from Kaiserworth, telling Torcy that he would receive it even sooner than Chamillart. Noblet kept a journal of Burgundy’s campaign that he sent to Torcy (ibid., fols 174–7). On 23 May 1702 (ibid., fol. 189), Noblet informed Torcy that his brother Croissy had earned glory by being wounded. Torcy’s brother-in-law Bouzols also sent useful news from Germany (ibid., 81, fol. 78, Torcy to Noblet, 22 July 1702).

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Notes to pages 419–21

281 Villars, Mémoires, 3:302 (Torcy to Villars, 24 July 1711). See also ibid., 42, 44–7, 185, 246–50, 292–3, 296–7, 305–7. 282 Bély, Dictionnaire, 342–3; and Bély, Espions, 94, 464. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:425–30, says that Torcy never really trusted Petkum, who received French gold but was Heinsius’s man. For Petkum’s correspondence with Torcy, see gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 317–66. 283 gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 325–6. There were also rumours that Max was seeking negotiations again, although Torcy denied them (ibid., 324–6). 284 Ibid., 324 (1 Dec. 1707). 285 Ibid., 325–6, 328. 286 Ibid., 328 (Petkum to Torcy, 16 Aug. 1708, and Torcy to Petkum, 23 Aug. 1708). Torcy’s contention is confirmed in Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 396 (Heinsius to Marlborough, 11 Aug. 1708). 287 gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 328–30 (quotation 330, Petkum to Torcy, 13 Sept. 1708). Petkum’s concerns about Du Puy are confirmed in Marlborough to Heinsius, 16 Aug. 1708, and Heinsius to Marlborough, 18 and 22 Aug. 1708. The latter relates that, at the duke’s behest, Heinsius sent an associate to dissuade Du Puy from going to see Marlborough. Marlborough and Heinsius, Correspondence, 396–8. Du Puy continued to send Torcy memoirs over the years, as in 1709, aae cp Hollande 212, fols 19–26. 288 Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 20–1. For Chamillart at the front, see Pénicaut, Chamillart, 198–9. Torcy wrote Petkum several times (4 and 25 Oct. 1708) that discussion sometimes smoothed over difficulties. gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 330, 332. 289 Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:48. For this episode see Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 5–6, 16–44. Berwick had little respect for Chamillart, whom he blamed for the failure of the 1708 Scottish invasion by passing him over as its leader. Instead, Chamillart selected the ineffective Charles Auguste de Goyon de Matignon, comte de Gacé, the brother of a friend, and for the expedition had him created Marshal Matignon. Gibson, Scottish Card, 109, 126. 290 Berwick, Memoirs of Berwick, 2:49. 291 Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 38–40. Torcy later approved another (unsuccessful) attempt to nudge Marlborough toward actively pushing peace talks. A Portuguese Jew named Henriquez hoped to use to this end the officer Arnold Joost van Keppel, 1st Earl of Albemarle, and his wife, both particularly esteemed by the duke (ibid., 44–8). 292 Bolingbroke, Defence of Utrecht, 109. The siege of Lille began 13 August 1708, the city capitulated on 22 October, and the citadel on 8 December. Its length was particularly nerve-wracking and frustrating for the Allies. ­Ostwald, Vauban under Siege, 204, 232. 293 Torcy denied to Petkum rumours that Helvétius was on his way to Holland (15 Nov. 1708). gbhmc, Manuscripts Round, 334. He had to do the same



294 295

296 297

298

299

300

301 302

303

Notes to pages 421–3

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with rumours concerning Chamillart writing to Heinsius for talks or traveling to Flanders with peace offers. Ibid., 337; and aae cp Hollande 217, fol. 5r–v, Petkum to Torcy, 1 Jan. 1709. Collins, State, 180 (quotation), 185–6. Hennequin had renewed his correspondence with Chamillart, while Mollo was again actively writing to Callières. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 69. Torcy later characterized Chamillart’s 1708 use of Hennequin as aimed at making peace abruptly. Torcy, Journal, 53. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 52–67. See ibid., 67, for Pesters to Bernières, 2 Feb. 1709. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:431–40. The agents from Dussen to Bergeyck who insisted on going through Chamillart rather than Torcy were intriguers probing French sentiments for peace and were increasingly disavowed as the prospect of talks became a reality (ibid., 341). Dangeau, Journal, 12:321; and Sourches, Mémoires, 11:266. See also ­Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 54–9, 69–80. See Dangeau, Journal, 12:130, for Chamillart and Bergeyck’s close friendship. For Bergeyck, see Kamen, War of Succession, 50–3. Torcy, Journal, 85, said that he was instructed by the king to write a reply to either Heinsius or Dussen at Bergeyck’s suggestion. Torcy does not, however, specify what led the Flemish administrator to do so. Bergeyck’s 11 February 1709 letter to Chamillart, however, suggests that like the war minister he had come to have doubts about this channel. Bergeyck thought that the king had decided to have Torcy respond to Dussen in order to force Heinsius to declare his true intentions and stop wasting time with the other channel. ­Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:442. Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 55. Writing to Chamillart, Bergeyck revealed that his channel was definitely in competition with that of Pesters and suggested that there was some information-sharing going on behind the foreign minister’s back. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:439 (21 Jan. 1709). Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 80 (22 Jan. 1709). Torcy, Journal, 125, recorded that the king chided him for being the slowest of all men in his negotiations. aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 30, Jan. 1712, Torcy wrote the Utrecht plenipotentiaries on the king’s behalf that they must be prepared to show patience and moderation. In his own letter to them, Torcy reiterated the importance and necessity of not becoming impatient. The advantage in negotiations as in war is to the one who endures more, he observed (ibid., fol. 84r). Torcy and the king again urged patience, since the pressure of the need for peace would eventually make the Allies more reasonable (ibid., fol. 208, 21 Feb. 1712). See Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 81, for Torcy’s 3 February 1709 letter. Bergeyck wrote to Chamillart (11 Feb. 1709), endorsing the plan (ibid., 82).

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Notes to pages 423–5

04 See ibid., 85, for Dussen to Bergeyck, 19 Feb. 1709. 3 305 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:445–6; and Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 310. France, Recueil, 22:178, notes that the king had thought of naming ­Alègre prior to appointing Voysin. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:116–17, notes with barely disguised scorn that Voysin turned to Maintenon to head off any ill will from the king resulting from his refusal to take what the foreign minister considered an honourable appointment. 306 aae md 306, fol. 240. 307 ss-Boislisle, 17:179–80. For these transcriptions, Louvois’s negotiations, and Chamillart’s use in 1709 of Adrien Cazier, one of Louvois’s principal agents in the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands, see ibid., 179n3. 308 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:264–5, Chamillart to Hennequin, 2 Aug. 1706. Even when Torcy instructed an envoy, Chamillart had input regarding the king’s wishes for the article concerning the barrier, as in the 6 November 1707 instructions for Dugué de Bagnols, France, Recueil, 22:158. 309 Bolingbroke, Defence of Utrecht, 327. 310 Brousse, “Réseaux d’information de Louvois,” 62, 69–70, 73. 311 See Pope, Callières, 75, on this rivalry. 312 [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 1:389–96, relates the strange case of René de Renneville, a French spy employed by Chamillart but suspected of turning double-agent. Torcy had him arrested in 1702. From his Bastille cell he protested his innocence, writing flattering verses to win over the king and Torcy. Kept incommunicado, he wrote a letter to his wife that was never sent, begging her to tell Torcy and Pecquet that his papers contained signed orders from Chamillart. If this was true, perhaps Torcy, with or without the king’s full knowledge, sought to spare Chamillart potential embarrassment. 313 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 203–4. Rowlands, Financial Decline, 36–40, 163–6, sees the overburdened minister as lacking the skills and temperament for his many functions. 314 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 173, says that for these reasons Chamillart felt no need to bother with the files of negotiations entrusted to Torcy. Cénat, Chamlay, 114, notes that Chamlay’s diplomacy was also hobbled by a lack of patience. 315 Vreede, Correspondance, 189 (Chamillart to Hennequin, 16 Dec. 1706). 316 Fénelon, Correspondance, 14:136 (Chevreuse to Fénelon, 9 Apr. 1709). He said the same of Chancellor Pontchartrain. 317 Torcy, Journal, 85. For further remarks on the war minister’s meddling, see Rule, “King and Minister,” 223–4; Chamillart, Correspondance, 1:42ff; ibid., 2:5ff; Bély, Espions, 110; and Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:305–6. 318 Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:305–6, referring to years of multiple and confused negotiations and a lack of unity in French peace efforts, singles out ­Chamillart’s diplomatic missteps. Le Peletier’s memoir on the king’s affairs



319 320 321 322 323

324 325

326 327 328

329 330 331 332 333 334

Notes to pages 425–7

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(finished March–April1707) noted the imprudence of Chamillart’s admission of weakness to France’s foes. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 169. Pénicaut, “Temps difficiles.” Pénicaut, Chamillart, 175. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:430–1. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 175; and Legrelle, Négociation inconnue, 80. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:440, also ignores Sourches. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176. Claiming to be in line with Bély, Pénicaut contends that if this division of labour resulted in competition, it was because the king was convinced that good diplomacy leaves no channel unexplored. Yet Bély, Espions, 109, makes clear that if there was a division of labour, it was not the norm, but only emerged once Torcy learned of Hennequin’s negotiations and was drawn into them. Bély, Espions, 109; and Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176. Bély, Espions, 110, due to the fact that it is good diplomatic practice to explore every avenue of negotiation, raises the question of whether this competition was desired. Without offering an explicit answer, he implies one in depicting Chamillart’s failures and frustration with the Hennequin mission and the king’s subsequent decision to renounce multiple secret channels (ibid., 110). Other than gathering information and poking his nose into Torcy’s initiatives, there are no further examples of Chamillart pursuing separate and secret negotiations in Bély’s massive volume. Moreover, the remarks of Saint-Simon that Bély quotes clearly indicate that whatever the extent of this royally sanctioned divided diplomacy, the duke meant to condemn rather than commend the monarch for it. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:440–1. Dangeau, Journal, 12:357. ss -Boislisle, 17:179–86. During Torcy’s delicate negotiations at The Hague, his letters to the king were addressed through Beauvillier, who read them to the Conseil. Torcy, Mémoires, 1:212. Le Peletier had privately warned the king against appointing Chamillart war secretary, citing his (commendable) preoccupation with finances and his lack of knowledge of military administration. Mazel, Le Peletier, 125. See also André, Deux mémoires de Le ­Peletier, 168–9, for his low opinion of Chamillart’s negotiating skills. Legrelle, Diplomatie, 5:461, 467–8. Dangeau, Journal, 12:463. See Lynn, Wars, 303–11, for what he calls the annus horribilis of the war. Engels, “Dénigrer, espérer,” 114–17. André, Deux mémoires de Le Peletier, 169. Picavet, Diplomatie, 66–7, discusses Louis XIV’s diplomatic secrets that sometimes excluded his Conseil, the foreign secretary, and certain ambassadors, but concludes that they were for the most part related to small or

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338 339

40 3 341

342 343

344 345

46 3 347

Notes to pages 427–9 family matters and were too sporadic to represent the “politique personnelle du roi” (king’s personal politics) or what we have characterized as a secret du roi. ss -Boislisle, 17:185. Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 252, observe that when vital state interests were at stake, as in 1709–14, it was imperative that France speak with one voice, which favoured the foreign secretary. As one popular song intoned, for peace negotiations the king turns to his physician, while for war plans he looks to his apothecary. ss-Boislisle, 17:184n1. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 151–9; and McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 125. Torcy, Journal, 107 (12 Jan. 1710). According to Falque-Cador and Pénicaut, “Voysin,” 315, Voysin did not seek to interfere in the departmental operations of the other secretaries of state. McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 125, notes that Desmaretz and Voysin began by cooperating, but in 1709 they clashed over the treatment of receivers general of finance and the quartering of troops. They were able, though, to work through these differences. This characterization of his triple ministry is in Frostin, “Organisation,” 212. Chapman, Private Ambition, 36, 52–3. The Pontchartrains became serious rivals to the Colberts and Le Telliers after Louis Pontchartrain’s appointment as controller general and entry into the Conseil in 1689 (ibid., 57–9). Le Moyne de La Borderie and Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne, 5:536, report that in 1677 the Breton estates awarded Colbert, Seignelay, Croissy, and Torcy gratifications totaling 41,000 livres. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 276–7. Chapman, Private Ambition, 145–64, details the increased vigour Pontchartrain brought to his office and his insistence that judicial officials follow “proper channels” in their work. Antoine, “Remonstrances,” 97, offers an example: the Aix parlement’s procurer general sent a remonstrance to Pontchartrain, who upbraided him for sending Torcy only an extract. Torcy needed the entire document, Pontchartrain insisted, since such remonstrances had to go through him as that province’s secretary of state. ss -Coirault, 2:562. This was in part because Torcy was a minister and he was not. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 301, 302. See ibid., 285, 298–9, on his relationship with his mother, and ibid., 285, 296–8, 318, on that with his father. He later served as intermediary between his parents, whose own relationship was tense (ibid., 317–20). Ibid., 368, 385. Ibid., 353–4, 360.



Notes to pages 429–31

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348 The règlement printed in Luçay, Origines, 130n1, is from a manuscript in the navy library and dates from the end of the 1690s. Another copy is bn ­Clairambault 664, fols 487r–9. Ibid., fols 290v–1, is a matter-of-fact “[m]émoire sur les fonctions des charges des Secrétaires d’État de la Marine et des affaires Étrangères,” tracing this history, but without reaching any conclusion. Ibid., fols 293ff is an extract from the naval registers of the king’s dispatches to foreign countries from 1669 to 1698. A memoir along the same lines on the king’s letters from1680 to 1698 (ibid., fols 321–464) may also have been part of research done for Torcy that raised his apprehension about navy encroachments on his turf. 349 Ibid., fol. 488. 350 Ibid., fol. 490. 351 Roosen, “True Ambassador,” 323, says this was largely a lengthier recapitulation of parameters established between Lionne and Colbert in 1667. 352 bn Clairambault 664, fols 499–500, “Règlement fait par le Roy, entre Mr de Pontchartrain et de M. de Torcy sur les fonctions de leurs charges,” Oct. 1698. Torcy forwarded to Pontchartrain a petition he had received from an Algerian prisoner in the Châtelet that, upon its translation, seemed to belong under Pontchartrain’s jurisdiction. aae md 1189, fol. 80, Torcy to ­Pontchartrain, 18 Sept. 1712. 353 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 232, call it the foreign secretary’s first mission. 354 bn Clairambault 664, fol. 505, Torcy to Tallard, 13 Mar. 1699. 355 Ibid., fol. 507. 356 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 342–4. For examples of clashes between Torcy and the Pontchartrains over Venice and Constantinople, see ibid., 140–1. See also Frostin, “Organisation,” 212–23. On consulates, see Mézin, Consuls, 16–17. For a sampling of the information Pontchartrain gathered from his foreign contacts, see bn Clairambault 297, fols 239ff, on Genoa, Sardinia, Florence and Siena, Vienna (including the latest opera lyrics sent by Ambassador du Luc in 1713, ibid., fols 301–8), Italy (the latest pamphlets), and Spain (from Toby Bourke). 357 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 345–50; Meyer, Colbert, 346; and Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 226. 358 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 356–7, 398–400. Daubenton left Spain in 1709. 359 Ibid., 401–3. 360 bn mf 15772, fols 268–9, Torcy to Jérôme Pontchartrain, 18 Aug. 1711. 361 Ibid., Le Tort to another priest, 13 Sept. 1711. See ibid., fol. 280, Le Tort to Rast, 14 Sept. 1711; and ibid., fols 284–5, Le Tort to Torcy, 19 Sept. 1711. 362 Ibid., fol. 290. 363 Ibid., fol. 312. Torcy, Journal, 262–6 (Sept. 1710), concerns a dispute with the nuncio over royal efforts to re-establish discipline in several houses of “Augustins déchaussés” (bare-footed), also called the Petits-Pères. The pope

698

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366 367

368 369

370 371 372

Notes to pages 431–2 contended that Louis could hold monks to their rules, but he could not make the rules. Both the Conseil and Dispatches discussed this matter. While some wanted to take it to the parlement, Torcy and the king prevailed in their desire to offer the Gallican Church and the nuncio a face-saving way to avoid a crisis at a time when France desperately needed papal diplomatic support. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 392–3. For example, see bn mf 6658, fol. 20v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 21 Jan. 1701, for cabaret violence by men wearing the English ambassador’s livery. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 394–6. In contrast, although perhaps because they did not have a network of independent agents abroad, the comte de ­Toulouse, admiral of France, asked Torcy to perform a favour for him if it was not too burdensome. He wanted French diplomats to gather foreign regulations from the last war concerning privateering and prizes so that he could create an exact compendium of them for admiralty use. He also offered to pay any expenses involved. aae md 1205, fol. 189–90, Toulouse to Torcy, 25 Apr. 1715. aae CP Lorraine 77, fol. 288, Torcy to d’Audiffret, 28 Jan. 1712. Ibid., md 1118, fol. 37, Torcy to d’Argenson, 21 Jan. 1703, informed him that because the report he had sent him of a New Convert who merited chastisement really belonged to Pontchartrain’s department, he had forwarded it to him, although perhaps in a bit of turnabout, after having first read it to the king. See Torcy, Journal, 274, for a matter of pay for navy department commis. Torcy thanked him for Joseph Pellerin’s help in reading important coded letters seized in 1706 from a Spanish frigate before it delivered the Austrian archduke to Genoa. Mascart, Vie Borda, 193–4n5. See aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 173r–v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 23 Dec. 1711, on Amsterdam. Ibid., md 1108, fol. 64, 17 May 1707, Pontchartrain passed on to Torcy intelligence from consuls in Italy. Frostin, “Organisation,” 218, accuses Pontchartrain of not respecting Torcy’s prerogatives as post office head when he requested that Etampes’s prévôt de la maréchaussée (a sort of locally based royal mobile police force) write him of the outcome of an incident involving the mistreatment of postilions by a naval captain. The letter Frostin quotes, however, acknowledged that it was for Torcy to order a punishment. Pontchartrain’s request for a full report may also be interpreted as a reasonable desire to see that his department personnel receive justice. bn mf 6658, fol. 260v, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 25 Apr. 1701; and Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:450–2. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 351–3, 403–6. Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 464–78; and Miquelon “Envisioning the French Empire,” 653–77, especially 656n18.



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373 For instance, aae cp Hollande 232, fol. 125r, plenipotentiaries to Torcy, 1 Feb. 1712. Ibid., 236, fol. 24, Mesnager to Torcy, 4 July 1712; Mesnager told Torcy that he had written Desmaretz about the Castile trade. 374 aae cp Hollande 233, fol. 14r, Torcy to Huxelles, 20 Mar. 1712, reports that while Pontchartrain feared that the delegates had not done enough, the foreign secretary had defended them. On Pontchartrain’s willingness to sacrifice colonies in order to preserve the state and the gains from earlier in the reign, see Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 400. Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 478, argues that Pontchartrain’s “great failing was not his policy but his neglecting to offer guidance for the Utrecht plenipotentiaries and the king … Pleas for information from Utrecht were answered with terse, unhelpful lectures on boundaries and mercantilism. The plenipotentiaries were left to infer much.” At one point Torcy vented his frustration during negotiations to his English friend Prior, showing him a “very confused letter to himself from Monsieur Pontchartrain relating to Newfoundland and comparing the Dates of Several Letters upon which Monsieur Pontchartrain has grounded new fears and apprehensions that some Mistakes may arise upon the Orders given in that Affair.” pro sp France 78/157, fol. 373, Prior to Bolingbroke, 29 Nov. 1713. 375 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 407–10, makes this claim. It is refuted convincingly, however, in Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire,” 660, 671; and Miquelon, “Ambiguous Concession,” 459–86. Schaeper, “French and English Trade,” 1–18, discusses the depth and breadth of French disgruntlement with the commercial treaty, a dissatisfaction shared by Torcy despite his strong desire for close relations with the Tory government. ­Schnakenbourg, “Commerce et diplomatie,” 349–65, shows that in 1713 the French accepted an unfavourable trade treaty in order to gain peace, but in subsequent discussions of those parts left for negotiation once peace returned, they made their objections clear. When Parliament refused to ratify the commercial treaty, French negotiators made a show of continuing to talk for a variety of political reasons, letting the blame for failure fall on the British. The French wanted a trade treaty but not this particular version. Frostin, Les Pont­ chartrain, 408, apparently mistakes Pontchartrain’s foot-dragging for a rogue effort to sabotage the treaty, whereas it was in fact part of a coordinated French negotiating strategy. 376 Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 407–10. 377 From early 1715 French Baltic policy became focused on limiting British and Hanoverian influence. Schnakenbourg, “Politique française Nord,” 272. See Petitfils, Regent, 221, on the Whig victory. Campbell, Power and Politics, 53, says that Torcy “had been partly excluded since 1713” from the formation of foreign policy “because of his anglophobia” and that although Torcy “was still a councillor for foreign affairs … his opinions were not always

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384 385 386

Notes to pages 433–6 respected” (54). Given his collaboration with the Tories in bringing about the Utrecht treaty, attributing Torcy’s policy stance to anglophobia is implausible. Moreover, his role of advising the regent was significant. Petitfils contends that the regent only gratified Dubois’s desire to be rid of his rival when he was sure that Dubois had finally come around to Torcy’s more flexible and balanced view of foreign policy. Petitfils, Regent, 322, 324, 341, 433–6, 439, 441, 468, 478, 480, 578–9, 599. Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 457. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 109–10. For Louis Pontchartrain’s loss of influence and resignation, see ibid., 411–25. Ibid., 424. See ibid., 428–53, for Jérôme’s post-Utrecht colonial initiatives. Finances for his plans also led to some friction with Desmaretz (ibid., 442), with whom Louis Pontchartrain, but not Jérôme, got along (ibid., 171). ­Desmaretz apparently took a strong hand in commercial matters concerning Marseilles, which was sure to provoke Jérôme’s anger. See, for example, ­Desmaretz’s letters to Lebret in bn naf 22940, fols 301r–v (10 Aug. 1708), 308 (2 Apr. 1710), and 314 (5 June 1713). Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, 426–8. The king and his navy secretary saw Utrecht as a “truce of recuperation” before France could once again challenge Britain colonially and commercially (456), which Frostin links to du Luc’s mission to Vienna to sound out Austria on a possible rapprochement. Bély, Dictionnaire, 139–47, 266–70. pro sp France 78/157, fol. 287, 22 Sept. 1713. Pénicaut, Chamillart, 176n62, contends that Frostin’s emphasis on the extent of Pontchartrain’s administrative empire is perhaps excessive when compared to Chamillart’s.

Chapter Eleven 1 Dangeau, Journal, 7:190. 2 Torcy, Journal, 294 (1 Nov. 1710), reported that the king gave him a memoir to read and comment upon without divulging to anyone the proposition it contained. 3 Breen, Law, 205–12, shows that routinization also extended to Dijon’s municipal government. 4 Meyer, “‘Décideurs,’” 81–97. For Marseille’s Gleise faction and their connections within the foreign office, see chapter 6 above. 5 For Dispatches’ role, see Rule, “Louis XIV at Work,” 309–20; but cf. Collins, State, 111. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 203–4, empirically establishes that the Regency’s domestic council continued Dispatches’ specialization in contentious matters and administrative conflicts.



Notes to pages 436–7

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6 See McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, for the controller general and his department. 7 Smedley-Weill, Intendants, 24–6, 35–6, 88, 96, 108, 120, 155. Intendants were not removed or switched around just because a new controller or secretary of state took office. While ministers sought to influence postings, the decision was the king’s, based often on provincial circumstances (ibid., 84–5). 8 Pénicaut, Chamillart, 87–8 (especially 87n165); ibid., 176–84, traces ­Chamillart’s conflicts with both Pontchartrains, including in his role as war secretary (Pénicaut also emphasizes that cooperation took place), although Chamillart and his successor as controller general, Torcy’s cousin Desmaretz, got on fairly well (ibid., 184–7). 9 Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:366 (30 Nov. 1706). 10 See ibid., 323, 329, for Chamillart’s marginal notes on letters of 2 and 28 May 1706. Of course, the controller general continued to confer with his colleagues individually as necessary. For example, bn mf 8867, fol. 400, Torcy to Lebret, 12 Mar. 1700, in discussing the various memoirs submitted by the nobility’s syndics on a variety of subjects, noted that Torcy reported to the king after having communicated with Chamillart. 11 ss-Boislisle, 4:254. Bourgeon, “Balthazar Phélypeaux,” 145, largely follows Saint-Simon in his evaluation of his post-Revocation role. 12 As Boislisle observes in a note in ss-Boislisle, 4:255. 13 Luçay, Origines, 131. 14 Sourches, Mémoires, 1:17. For a list of what was in his department, see État de la France (1698), 3:27–8. Evidence of Châteauneuf’s administrative role, both for the Religion prétendue réformée before 1685 and for the general administration of his provinces, can be found in France, Correspondance des intendants, passim. 15 Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 3:213n23, 214n27, shows that La Vrillière was among those receiving copies of military dispatches from Nicolas Auguste de la Baume, marquis de Montrevel, commander of the royal troops in Languedoc, a province in La Vrillière’s department, as well as from that province’s intendant Basville (ibid., 375). While La Vrillière was among those Villars originally consulted when he replaced Montrevel in March 1704 (ibid., 366), Chamillart granted him a dispensation from writing to La Vrillière, leaving the secretary to rely on the regular correspondence from Basville for military news. Chamillart wrote dismissively of what he labeled the little minister’s effort to be somebody, maintaining that Villars’s waiver was only granted because this was an extraordinary war (ibid., 392n12). See ibid., 657–60, 682nn13–14, for a clash between La Vrillière and Villars. Although Villars came out largely the winner in this, it is telling that he was worried enough about what La Vrillière was saying at court and to the king that he

702

16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23 24 25

26

Notes to pages 437–9 sought and received Chamillart’s intervention on his behalf with Louis and Maintenon. bn mf 8863, fol. 645, Adam to archbishop of Aix, 1 June 1698, informed him that an arrêt was being sent as a result of the memoir Torcy carried to the council that morning. For Dispatches and actes en commandement, see Barbiche, Institutions, 167, 184–93, 293, 294 (a helpful chart of the composition of all the councils), 301, 304–8; and Luçay, Origines, 116–19, 134–47. Blanquie and Cornette, Institutions, 49. Burgundy was invited to attend from 25 October 1699, but at first only to listen and learn. By the following year, however, he had a deliberative voice. ss -Coirault, 1:663, 751. For Berry, see Dangeau, Journal, 14:276. Certain and Pénicaut, “Barbezieux,” 290, relate that in November 1685 only eighteen-year-old Barbezieux received the survivance and right to sign as ­secretary of state. On 31 March 1687 he entered Dispatches alongside his father. Torcy, Journal, 209–11. aae md 1146, fol. 102r–v, Torcy to Chamillart, 30 July 1706; Torcy enlisted Chamillart’s help arranging a prisoner exchange for France’s envoy to ­Wolfenbüttel, his wife, and his servant, captured by the Allies. Torcy informed Iberville, resident at Genoa, that Pontchartrain would recommend using his department’s galleys to help transport the mails (ibid., cp Gênes 40, fol. 87v, to, 6 June 1707). Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, chap. 7, on tension and collaboration among ministers, is a balanced treatment. Dupilet, Régence absolue, 179, argues that Regency councils continued the Louisquatorzian tradition of interdepartmental cooperation. bn mf 8863, fols 112–16, Blondel to Lebret, 29 Jan. 1698; ibid., fol. 101, Pontchartrain to Lebret, 22 Jan. 1698; and ibid., fol. 110, Torcy to Lebret, 24 Jan. 1698. Bély, Dictionnaire, 28–31, is a perceptive overview. For Pontchartrain’s insistence on regular channels, see Chapman, Private Ambition, 146–50, 157–64. bn mf 21123, fol. 351v, Pontchartrain to Gaufredy de Trels, July 1704; and ibid., fol. 379v–80r, Pontchartrain to Brilhac, 2 July 1704. Ibid., fol. 612v, Pontchartrain to La Monneraye, 6 Oct. 1704. Other examples of such letters from Pontchartrain are Depping, Correspondance, 1:933, to Toulouse’s Academy of Floral Games, 14 Jan. 1709 (Desmaretz); ibid., 934, to Agen’s présidial officers, 5 Feb. 1709 (La Vrillière); ibid., 932, to Gimont’s mayor and consuls, 2 Oct. 1707 (La Vrillière); and ibid., 950 (to Toulon’s mayor and consuls, 2 Nov. 1712 [Torcy]). See also Hamscher, Conseil privé, 118n21. Torcy, with similar sensitivity to proper channels, instructed the bishop of Chalons to rewrite and send to Pontchartrain what was clearly a financial matter. aae md 1022, fol. 158, 31 Aug. 1693. Barbiche, Institutions, 133.



Notes to pages 439–42

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27 Sarmant, Demeures, 276–77. Louvois’s work as superintendent of buildings especially lent itself to this way of work. 28 Sarmant and Stoll, Régner, 177–83. 29 Hamscher, Conseil privé, 7, 108–12 (see especially 111n6). See also ­McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, especially chap. 2. 30 Levi-Faur, “‘Big Governance,’” 5, 9, 12, 14–15. 31 Ibid., 14. 32 Collins, State, 6, 12, 115, 228–9. 33 Holenstein, “Empowering Interactions,” 19–31. 34 Spanheim, Relation, 406. 35 According to a list in aae md 1186, fols 111–12r (1712). In March 1708 Dauphiné was traded to the war secretary for the Lyonnais. Luçay, Origines, 596–7. Torcy no longer supervised Grenoble’s parlement. 36 Soll, Information Master, 68 (his chapter 5 develops this theme). Intendants looked to Torcy to pay their sub-delegates’ gages. bn mf 8879, fol. 298 (1704). 37 aae md 1186, fol. 205, Torcy to Jean-Charles Doujat (Hainault’s intendant), 16 Apr. 1712. 38 For example, ibid., 1144, fol. 105, Torcy to intendant André de Harouys (Champagne), 25 Oct. 1706, concerning a conflict between a town’s governor and its aldermen over control of prisoners; bn mf 8839, fol. 233, Torcy to intendant Pierre-Cardin Lebret (Provence), 28 Feb. 1692, instructing him to investigate the case of a Marseilles woman who complained to the king that because her husband has gone to America by royal order she had to close her shop; and aae md 1144, fol. 59, Torcy to de Miane, 12 Oct. 1706, about a nobleman imprisoned in the Château de Nantes, mentioned that he has also written intendant François-Antoine Ferrand for clarification. 39 As outlined in Peters, “Governance,” 22. 40 aae md 1032, fol. 380r, Torcy to Bégon, 23 Aug. 1695; also ibid., 1477, fol. 431, Bégon to Torcy, 14 June 1701. 41 Ibid., 1477, fols 385ff, for letters between Torcy and the authorities at Saintes. 42 See also ibid., 1031, fols 189–90v. Torcy to Bouchu, 15 Jan. 1691. ­Parker, Global Crisis, 511–12, shows that local officials and elites carefully monitored the popular mood and tried when possible to derail any ­movement along the continuum of resistance that might eventually lead to open rebellion. 43 bn mf 8867, fol. 197, Torcy to Lebret, 31 Jan. 1700. 44 Breen, Law, 161–3. 45 Gunn, Opinion, 128–34. 46 aae md 1144, fol. 225, 23 Nov. 1706. 47 Ibid., 1159, fol. 127, Torcy to De la Garde, 4 Nov. 1708.

704

Notes to pages 442–4

48 Ibid., fol. 318, Torcy to Harouys, 18 Dec. 1708. 49 bn mf 8856, fol. 382, Torcy to Lebret, 23 Dec. 1695. See Riley, Virtue, for Louis XIV’s attitudes toward sin/crime and his important but unsuccessful efforts to stamp it out. 50 bn naf 5096, Torcy to the plenipotentiaries at Ryswick, 4 Nov. 1697. 51 aae md 1159, fols 25 and 26, Torcy to d’Argenson and intendant Jean Phélypeaux, 5 Oct. 1708; ibid., 1144 fol. 59, Torcy to de Miane, 12 Oct. 1706; ibid., 1137, fols 43–6, 26 Mar. 1705, listed prisoners Torcy had ordered to the Bastille since 1701; ibid., fols 47–8, d’Argenson asked Torcy the next day to check the list; and ibid., 1144, fol. 335, Torcy to Jérôme Bignon, 22 Dec. 1706, discussed a prisoner transfer from the Amiens citadel to Vincennes. 52 bn naf 3517, fol. 43, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Nov. 1702. 53 aae md 1012 fol. 195, 8 Oct. 1691. bn mf 8858, fol. 156, Torcy to Lebret, 20 Apr. 1696, ordered an individual’s exile ended. 54 aae md 1159, fols 210–215, Nov. 1708. 55 Ibid., 1022, fol. 111, Torcy to Procureur General, 16 June 1693. 56 Ibid., 1137, fol. 95, d’Argenson to Torcy, 7 July 1705. Ibid., cp Autriche 80, fol. 167r–v, d’Argenson to Torcy, 7 June 1702, concerned the surveillance of a man writing to Vienna who had known and perhaps served Imperial Ambassador Zinzendorf during the Nine Years War. 57 Ibid., 1731, fol. 38r–v, Torcy to Lebret, 3 Apr. 1707; and ibid., 1016, fol. 101, Torcy to Michel Larcher (Champagne), 29 Feb. 1692, ordered a bookseller arrested for printing books prejudicial to the king. bn mf 8842, fol. 39, Torcy to Lebret, 2 Jan. 1692, is an example of such regulation under less stressful circumstances. 58 Barbiche, Institutions, 328–31. aae md 1514, fol. 178, 6 July 1701; and ibid., fol. 257, July 1703, are commissions for lieutenants-general. Ibid., 1553, fol. 361, concerns officer commissions in a bourgeois militia in 1703. Torcy resolved a dispute between Béarn’s parlement and local syndics and militias (bn naf 23187, fol. 315r, Torcy to Gramont, 6 June 1706), and between the bourgeois militia and Sisteron’s garrison (ibid., 22940, fol. 276, Torcy to Lebret, 13 July 1715). aae md 1148, fol. 172, May 1707, ordered the Chambre des comptes to suppress the office of intendant of fortifications for Champagne. 59 aae md 1553, fol. 358, Louis XIV to Tessé, 18 Oct. 1703, appointed him commandant because of the absence of its governor, Louis d’Abusson, duc de La Feuillade. Ibid., 1020, fol. 239, Torcy to Béchameil de Nointel, 16 Mar. 1693, explained that although the honours of lieutenant de roi and governor of Rennes had hitherto been joined, the king had separated them. 60 Ibid., 1514, fols 201ff, 20 Oct. 1702, concerning the conduct of Mme de Sévigné’s son, Charles de Sévigné, and coastal defence at Nantes, where he



61 62

63 64

65

66

67 68 69

70 71 72 73

Notes to pages 444–5

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was lieutenant du roi. Governor d’Estrées intervened and put his men in Nantes, and when Sévigné reacted, d’Estrées threatened a severe and exact justice. Torcy wrote Pucelle, commandant in Provence, about his dispute with Marvellin’s new mayor (ibid., 1022, fol. 123, 14 July 1693). Babeau, Villars, gouverneur, 40–1. aae md 1514, fol. 368, Torcy to Lavardin, 2 Oct. 1692; ibid., 1012 fol. 189, Torcy to Bezons, 1 Oct. 1691; and ibid., 1159, fol. 211, Torcy to de la ­Fontaine, 11 Dec. 1708. Ibid., 1032, fol. 187, Torcy to Lavardin, 10 Apr. 1695, informed him that the duc de Choiseul was to be lieutenant-general under him and Vauban was to supervise coastal defences. He urged them all to work together in concert. Ibid., fol. 239, Torcy to Vauban, 5 June 1695, discussed difficulties over ranks and promotions. Dangeau, Journal, 5:428. bn naf 23187, fols 230–1, Torcy to Gramont, 25 Aug. 1696. Ibid., fol. 219, Torcy to Gramont, 8 Aug. 1696, asked the governor to assist the Bavarian elector’s courier to Madrid who carried the news of the birth of the elector’s daughter. France was seeking Max’s support for the Spanish succession. See France, Recueil, 12:89–132, for his lengthy instructions and short mission. Their discussions on Spain, Gramont’s management of the provincial estates, and Torcy’s favours to his followers are reflected in Torcy’s 1706 letters to Gramont in bn naf 23187 (fol. 319, 4 July; fol. 321, 18 July; fol. 327, 1 Aug.; fols 329–30, 15 Aug.; and fols 333–4, 6 Sept.). aae md 1553, fol. 345, Torcy to La Vrillière, 9 Jan. 1703; and ibid., fol. 355, Torcy to Chamillart, 12 Apr. 1703. See also ibid., 1517, fol. 12v, for Torcy’s agenda of c. 1705/06, labeled as a memoir of things he had to talk to ­Chamillart about concerning Brittany, such as troops and their movements. Ibid., 1108, fol. 64, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 17 May 1702, passed along news from Italy, including information from the navy’s consul in Sardinia. aae md 1553, fol. 357, Torcy to Bouchu, 14 Oct. 1703; and ibid., fol. ­359r–v, Bouchu to Torcy, 30 Dec. 1703. bn naf 22940, fol. 253, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. Petitfils, Louis XIV, 486. See bn mf 8845, fol. 37, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Nov. 1692, for earlier concerns about New Converts possessing munitions of war in their houses. Marchand, Intendant, 289–98. Quoted in ibid., 291. bn naf 22940, fol. 257, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. For examples of Torcy’s letters to Lebret urging enforcement, see bn mf 8848, fol. 62, 20 July 1693; ibid., 8850, fol. 76 (the order follows in fol. 78), 26 Jan. 1694; and ibid., fol. 139, 12 Feb. 1694. aae md 1186, fols 261–2, Torcy to Antoine-François Méliand, Lyon’s intendant, 9 May 1712, did the same. For words of caution, see ibid., 1017, fol. 93, Torcy to Béarn ­intendant

706

74 75 76 77

78

79 80

81

82

83

Notes to pages 445–7 François du Feydeau Plessis, 12 Feb. 1692; and ibid., 1163, fol. 38, Torcy to Berthier, 11 Apr. 1709. Intendants shared their thoughts on how to handle New Converts, as in bn mf 7487, fols 486–503, Bégon to Torcy, 4 May 1698. aae md 1149, fol. 147, 17 Feb. 1707, is a letter expressing the king’s concern with the bad example set by graveside ceremonies of relapsed New Converts who had refused last rites. The clerk who drafted it focused on the scandal caused by New Converts, whereas Torcy’s revisions insisted on proceeding prudently so as to avoid the false accusations that only created scandal. Torcy was sensitive to public opinion in France and abroad. aae md 1041, 21 June 1696. Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 3:282–3, 287n36. bn naf 3517, fol. 126, Torcy to Lebret, 2 Mar. 1704. aae md 1011, fol. 15, Croissy (in Torcy’s hand) to the bishop of Oléron, 2 Jan. 1691 (a clerical error due to the change of year marks it “1690”). Torcy, who had little patience for fraud, years later informed d’Argenson of a young woman who went about Paris acting scandalously and claiming to be from the comte du Hamel’s family. His inquiries to the intendant of Champagne, where part of that family still resided, showed her to be an imposter. She was consigned to the general hospital (ibid., 1191, fol. 156, 5 Apr. 1713). Hamel, a Protestant who had fled to Holland in 1685, left behind two daughters who were educated as Catholics at royal expense. See also Hérelle, Documents inédites sur le Protestantisme, 2:260n2. bn naf 22940, fol. 256, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. Bosc, Guerre des Cévennes, 1:28, notes that Torcy reflected the royal opinion that force should be avoided if at all possible in getting New Converts to Mass. bn naf 22940, fol. 253, Torcy to Lebret, 5 July 1702. aae md 1144, fol. 211, Torcy to Dauphiné intendant Nicolas Prosper Bauyn d’Angervilliers, 17 Nov. 1706; and ibid., fol. 48, 10 Oct. and 22 Dec. 1706, concerning Johnston, a Scot and former Protestant pastor. Ibid., 1016, fol. 56, Torcy to La Reynie, 29 Jan. 1692. For Bromfield, see Monod, Jacobitism and English People, 105n40, 156, 156n41; and Burger, “Spymaster,” 114–15. aae cp Autriche 80, fol. 163, d’Argenson to Torcy, 31 May 1702, reported that Bromfield had been arrested, had been taken to the Bastille, and had had his rooms searched. From Croissy’s time, separate volumes recorded expéditions of awards of benefices (meaning anything with money attached) and other clergy matters. aae md 1030 (1694–1701); and ibid., 1174 (1710), are examples. Bergin, Crown, Church, 171–9, 262–3, on ministerial patronage. aae md 1186, fols 161–4, lists benefices awarded 26 March 1712 and pensions drawn on benefices. The benefice list, numbered 2 through 45, tells what is given to whom and has in the left-hand margin annotations such as “to soand-so.” What these annotations signify is unclear, but they suggest that if



84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91 92

Notes to pages 448–9

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those listed, including foreign office personnel (Pecquet, Fournier, Du Theil, and de Presle), Abbé Pajot, and Cholet, Maintenon’s footman, did not receive something directly in these grants, the recipients were likely their clients. Ibid., 1210, fols 119–21, of abbeys granted since the Regency, lists only the abbey and (presumably) its recipient (including Pecquet and Fournier). Ibid., fols 18–19 (1715), lists vacant benefices and the revenues of each. Ibid., fols 20ff, lists requests for benefices, noting the reasons and letter(s) of recommendation received. Bossuet, Correspondence, 12:84–5, Torcy to Bossuet, 23 July 1699, sought his opinion on instructions from the king concerning a disputed appointment. The bishop of Nantes, thanking Chamillart for supporting his request for an abbey, asked permission to solicit Torcy’s support as well. Boislisle, Correspondance, 2:305 (16 Feb. 1706). bl am 20324, fol. 3, Pressiat (expeditor of bulls at Rome) to Gualterio, 30 July 1710. aae md 1004, fol. 435, Torcy to bishop of Oléron, 9 Nov. 1690. Torcy, Journal, 220. aae md 1005, fol. 79, Torcy to Bouchu, 17 Mar. 1690. For Bouchu as intendant, see Bouchu, Intendance Dauphiné 1698, lxxxix, xcii–xciii. Disputes between local elites and the clergy over hospitals are discussed in Hickey, Local Hospitals, 114, 130. For Provence, see aae md 1012, fol. 207, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Oct. (indicating that the matter had been raised in Dispatches); and ibid., fol. 268, 20 Nov. 1691. In November 1706 Bossuet complained to Torcy that Meaux’s municipal officials had denied him the required Easter visit and compliments. The mayor responded to Torcy’s inquiry by traveling to court to defend (unsuccessfully) his conduct. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 4:39–40. Torcy wrote Rheims’s archbishop and présidial to resolve their dispute over who should kneel when the prelate gave his benediction. aae md 1191, fols 41–2v, 16 Jan. 1713. aae md 1075, fol. 357, Torcy to archbishop of Arles, 14 Dec. 1700. Ibid., 1159, fol. 279, Torcy to bishop of Nantes, 9 Dec. 1708; and ibid., fol. 323, Torcy to Ferrand, 19 Dec. 1708. See also ibid., fol. 53, for this dispute. Ibid., 1517, fol. 225, Tellier to Torcy, 29 Sept. 1710; and ibid., fols 223–4, for the bishop’s letter of 20 September 1710. Bypassing the secretary and going directly to the king was not permitted, but one could ask a patron to intervene with the secretary. For example, bn mf 8839, fol. 244, Torcy to Lebret, 28 Feb. 1691, informed him that royal confessor Père de La Chaise had sent Torcy a letter of complaint from convent clergy in conflict with local officials. Torcy told him to see to the matter and write to both the convent and La Chaise. aae md 1013, fol. 189r–v, Torcy to Bouchu, 15 Jan. 1691; and ibid., fol. 191r–v, Torcy to the archbishop of Vienne, 15 Jan. 1691. Louis XIV, Mémoires, 188.

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Notes to pages 449–51

93 aae md, 1020, fol. 288, Torcy to bishop of Saint-Malo, 28 July 1693; bn mf 8839 fol. 289, Torcy to Béchameil de Nointel, 28 July 1693; and aae md 1020, fols 454 and 455, Torcy to bishop of Saint-Malo and to the canons, 20 Oct. 1693. See ibid., 1043, fol. 57r, Torcy to Grignan, 23 July 1697, informing Grignan that the king approved his resolution of the conflict between the governor and the consuls of Arles at the time of the Te Deum for the taking of Ath. In fact, the king would turn Grignan’s solution into a general regulation. 94 bn naf 22940, fol. 261, Torcy to Lebret, 11 July 1701. 95 Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:454 (15 July 1703). 96 aae md 1043, fol. 144, Torcy to Pertu, 19 Aug. 1697. 97 Ibid., 1004, fol. 180, Torcy to Feydeau du Plessis, 27 Apr. 1690; ibid., 1020, fol. 350, Torcy to bishop of St Pol-de-Léon, 26 Aug. 1693; ibid., fol. 76, Torcy to Bouchu, 29 Apr. 1693; bn mf 8863, fol. 673, Torcy to Lebret, 5 June 1698; and ibid., fols 674–6, for letters the previous day informing the bishop and canons that Lebret would investigate. 98 aae md 1159, fol. 238, Nov. 1708, a “Déclaration du Roy”; ibid., 1144, fol. 99, Torcy to Marloz, vicar general of Bishopric of Limoges, 24 Oct. 1706; bn naf 22940, fol. 252, Torcy to Lebret, 26 June 1702; aae md 1004, fol. 251r–v, a 1690 circular letter list for a Te Deum; and ibid., 1180, fol. 128, 25 Apr. 1711, prayers for the late Dauphin. Ibid., 1041, fol. 33, 5 Sept. 1696, is a circular letter announcing the king’s improving health. On the Te Deum as royal spectacle, see Petitfils, Louis XIV, 424–5; and Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information. 99 aae md 1012, fol. 145, Torcy to Feydeau du Plessis, 6 Sept. 1691, ordering closure of an unauthorized convent; and bn mf 17431, fol. 76, Torcy to Achille III de Harlay, 15 Oct. 1696, for a visit to a Carmelite house. 100 bn mf 20756, fol. 135, Torcy to Archbishop Le Tellier, 5 Aug. 1700; and ibid., fol. 136r, Le Tellier’s circular letter, with a copy of Torcy’s letter he sent along with it. For intendants, see ibid., 8867, fol. 303, Torcy to Lebret, 1 Mar. 1700. 101 bn naf 22940, fol. 252, Torcy to Lebret, 26 June 1702. 102 aae md 1011, fols 201–7, May 1691, detailed orders for a general hospital in Brest; ibid., 1180, fol. 323, Aug. 1711, on a hospital in Brest; bn mf 8839, fol. 296, Jan. 1691, a memoir to Torcy; ibid., 8842, fol. 118, Torcy to Lebret, 17 Jan. 1692, reconfirming the Aix hospital’s director; and ibid., fol. 122, Torcy to Lebret, 18 Jan. 1692, directing him to speak to Tarascon’s consuls about establishing a hospital there. For general hospitals, especially in smaller cities and towns, see Hickey, Local Hospitals, xvi, 54–5, 109–12. 103 aae md 1004, fol. 409, Torcy to Lebret, 23 Oct. 1690, concerning schools that should have been established in Orange to instruct New Converts; ibid., fol. 509, Torcy to Lebret, 20 Dec. 1690, on the administration of the ­Collège d’Orange; and ibid., 1022, fol. 48, Torcy to Larcher, 4 Mar. 1693, about



104

105

106

107 108

109 110 111

112

Notes to pages 451–2

709

instruction in schools. Ibid., 1191, fols 333–4, 16 June 1713, two letters from Torcy about religious instruction for Lyon silk workers not yet converted. Soll, Information Master, 73. Torcy requested general provincial information from his intendants in 1691. aae md 1012, fol. 100; and ibid., 1013, fol. 57. He received other such reports, including those for the Duke of Burgundy at the end of the 1690s. Ibid., 1753, fols 200–64v, for Bourges, drawn up by Louis-François Dey de Séraucourt (1698); ibid., fols 60ff, for La Rochelle; and ibid., fols 180–99, for Béarn and Basse Navarre. For provincial estates, see Barbiche, Institutions, 98–102; and Mousnier, Institutions, 1:610–11. aae md 1517, fols 28–9v, is the 1703 cahiers of Brittany’s estates. The royal response in ibid., fols 31–2, is to the 1705 remonstrances. aae md 1144, fol. 107, Torcy to bishop of Tarbes, 25 Oct. 1706, thanking him for a report on Bigorre’s estates over which he presided. Cardin Lebret, Intendance de Provence, 132–6, 345–7, discusses the estates and civil and military government (ibid., 213–18, 337–45). aae md 1190, fol. 406, 20 Oct. 1713. Torcy, Journal, 362–3. Rebillon, États Bretagne, 184, says that Toulouse never visited the province. Breen, Law, 93–6, 131–2, 207–8, however, shows that even absentee governors, such as the Condés in Burgundy, could wield considerable power locally. aae md 1020, fol. 349, Torcy to Lebret, 26 Aug. 1693. For a later Marseille election, see ibid., 1144, fol. 196, Torcy to Lebret fils, 15 Nov. 1706. Breen, Law, 131–2. Ibid., 81. aae md 1144, fol. 95, Torcy to archbishop of Aix, 23 Oct. 1706; ibid., fol. 197, on the entry of the mayor and aldermen into Marseille; ibid., 1163, fol. 33, Torcy to the officers of Marseille’s sénéchaussée, 11 Apr. 1709; and ibid., fols 44–5r, Torcy to Lebret and de la Garde (of Provence’s parlement), 13 Apr. 1709, asserting that the king, not the parlement, resolved public ceremony issues. Ibid., 1020, fols 308 and 309, are Torcy’s letters to Angoumois’s lieutenant du roi and the sub-delegate of the maréchaussée, 4 Aug. 1693, supporting the former in his dispute with the latter over honours due him and instructing both to look to Limoges intendant Michel-André Jubert de Bouville for a resolution. Le Dieu, Mémoires, 2:385–6, 399–402, 422, discusses a 1702 conflict between judicial officers and monks in Meaux over the former’s absence from Te Deums. Torcy instructed the local intendant to investigate. Although Bossuet eventually successfully interceded with Torcy on behalf of the chapter, the conflict dragged on. bn naf 22940, fol. 276r–v, Torcy to Lebret, 13 July 1715, resolved a conflict between the lieutenant du roi and a mayor, consuls, and lieutenants of police over the use of citadel troops to restore order. aae md 1144, fol. 105, Torcy to Harouys, 25 Oct. 1706, asked for details of a conflict between a town’s

710

113 114 115

116 117 118

119

120 121

122 123

Notes to pages 452–4 governor and aldermen over the control of some prisoners so that the king could resolve it. aae md 1017, fol. 431, Torcy to governor of Navarrins, 19 Nov. 1692. bn mf 8874, fol. 249, Torcy to Lebret, 4 Nov. 1704. aae md 1163, fol. 30, Torcy to Ravat, 9 Apr. 1709; and ibid., 1159, fol. 195, Torcy to Chalmazel and Toulon’s mayor, consuls, and lieutenants du roi, 30 Nov. 1708. Torcy and Desmaretz clashed over grain when the latter resisted Torcy’s requests for passports for grain exports to Spain. Desmaretz feared the effect on public opinion but proposed a means of arranging shipments discreetly. Ibid., cp Espagne 203, fol. 389, Desmaretz to Torcy, 18 Oct. 1710; and ibid., fol. 402, Desmaretz to Torcy, 3 Nov. 1710. Torcy enlisted the episcopal hierarchy to help feed the poor during bad harvests. Ibid., md 1020, fol. 79, 15 Feb. 1693, circulars to bishops and archbishops. According to Parker, Global Crisis, 589, climate change between 1691 and 1701 and the Great Winter of 1709 killed well over one and a half million of the approximately twenty million French. He also notes that by 1700 states had become somewhat more responsive to the needs of their people – especially for food – because of the earlier global crisis (ibid., 322–3, 611–41). aae md 1011, fol. 107, Torcy to Grignan, 5 Jan. 1691. Ibid., 1144, fol. 46, Torcy to Lebret, 10 Oct. 1706. Ibid., 1012, fol. 238, 5 Nov. 1691, on François de Rohan, prince de Soubise’s replacement as Berry’s governor. The letter of provision originally read comte d’Aubigné, Maintenon’s brother, but his name was marked out and replaced by that of Emmanuel II Crusso, duc d’Uzès. However, Aubigné did become Berry’s governor, while Uzès was appointed the governor of Saintonge. See also ss-Coirault, 1:57, 428–9. For examples of appointments under Torcy’s care, see aae md 1017, fol. 492; and ibid., 1144, fols 170–1. Dauphiné’s military government, for instance, comprised a governor, a lieutenant-governor, four lieutenants de roi particuliers (created during the Nine Years War), and nineteen gouverneurs particuliers of towns and fortresses. Bouchu, Intendance Dauphiné 1698, 66–7. aae md 1011, fols 114 and 119, 6 and 13 Mar. 1691 (addressee not noted). Ibid., cp Angleterre 178, fol. 45, Tallard to Torcy, 23 Mar. 1698. Ibid., md 1043, fol. 133, 14 Aug. 1697; Torcy informed François Henri be Montmorency-­Bouteville, duc de Luxembourg, that he had recommended his second son, Pierre-Henri de Montmorency-Luxembourg, known as Abbé de Luxembourg, for a post and urged that the abbé get to Paris quickly. Torcy, Journal, 184; aae md 1171, fol. 254, 1 Sept. 1710, concerning Crécyen-Brie; and ibid., 1197, fol. 18, 9 Jan. 1714, concerning Nantes. aae md 1032, fol. 271, Torcy to La Chaise, 1695, about a vacant abbey; and ibid., 1144, fol. 213, Torcy to Chamillart, 17 Nov. 1706, on a pension for a member of the Taras chapter.



Notes to pages 454–6

711

124 Ibid., 1017, fol. 220, 5 May 1692, for Guiscard’s appointments; ibid., 1731, fol. 4, Torcy to Lebret fils, extended his protection; and ibid., 1055, fol. 349v, lettre du roi to Bayonne, 1698. Ibid., 1016, fol. 147, Torcy to Le Camus, 15 Apr. 1692, on behalf of a man employed in Italy by Ambassador Rébenac and now in Paris in extremity, needing money and other help. 125 Ibid., 1175, fol. 201, Torcy to Pajot, 16 Dec. 1703, noted that Gramont was pushing hard for the post currently held by a former courier who did not actually serve. Ibid., 1144, fol. 80, Torcy to Harouys, 17 Oct. 1706. bn mf 8874, fol. 322, Torcy to Lebret, 24 Oct. 1702, noted that Burgundy supported a Marseille merchant’s request to be the exclusive supplier for a game known as mail or pale-mail, a mixture of boules and croquet. 126 aae md 1159, fol. 327, Torcy to Vauvré, 19 Dec. 1708; ibid., 1144, fol. 224, Torcy to Père Lescaut, 23 Nov. 1706; and bn mf 17431, fol. 73, Torcy to Harlay, 15 Jan. 1696. 127 aae cp Angleterre 262, fol. 287, d’Argenson to Torcy, 22 July 1714. 128 Hamilton, “John Law.” 129 Bluche, Dictionnaire, 1216–17. For a different approach, see Bély, Dictionnaire, 993–5. 130 Williams, Police, 9–10, 20–1. aae md 1170, fol. 103, Torcy to Delamare, 16 Apr. 1710, thanked him for a copy of the second volume of his treatise. 131 For the household secretaryship, see Barbiche, Institutions, 239–51. 132 Anderson, “Police of Paris,” 218 (quoting Jérôme Pontchartrain to d’Argenson, 22 Nov. 1700). 133 Examples of Torcy’s letters to La Reynie are aae md 1012, fol. 137, 4 Sept. 1691, involving a widow, letters in her possession, and a lettre de cachet to place her in the Bastille; and ibid., 1016, fol. 321, 17 Nov. 1692, on the arrest of a suspected spy. Pontchartrain’s opposition to La Reynie is explained in Chapman, Private Ambition, 74. 134 D’Argenson, Rapports inédits, 9, 63–7, 89–90, 195–6, 342. 135 On learning of d’Argenson’s suspicion of a provincial priest, Torcy thought he recalled that the same priest had visited him at Versailles claiming to have intelligence for the king about Austrian activities in Franche-Comté. Torcy ordered his arrest and interrogation (28 Sept. 1702). Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:438–46. [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 2:24, lists a penniless wanderer arrested by Torcy in 1703 who first claimed to be a Protestant but then asked to convert. He was regarded as an enemy spy sent to stir the New Converts to rebellion. In aae cp Venise 152, fol. 173r–v, however, Torcy told d’Argenson he was convinced that the man the police chief identified as a spy was not one. 136 Torcy denounced (unauthorized) leaks but was apparently not above allowing them for his own purposes, if Lamberty is correct in tracing the

712

137 138

139

140 141 142 143

144

145 146 147 148

Notes to pages 456–7 source of a scurrilous gazette report about Carlos II’s wife in 1700 to one of Torcy’s commis. Lamberty, Mémoires, 1:114. Ravisson, Archives Bastille, 11:429–31. aae md 1137, fol. 20, Torcy to d’Argenson, 22 Jan. 1705, alerted him about Bellevaux, son of the Dinan maître de poste who aroused suspicion by his presence and conversations in Paris and the letters he received from Germany. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:228–36, adds that he was in Paris so often meeting with postal clerks that he was eventually arrested and put in the Bastille, despite his claim that Torcy would protect him. aae md 1187, fols 80ff, is the transcript of the interrogation of a Marseilles postal courier arrested 24 September 1712. A January 1699 incident shows that foreigners attracted suspicion even during peacetime. An Italian count who appeared at Versailles, although clearly a man of quality, nonetheless horrified those who heard him speak loquaciously about his scandalous life. He mingled with courtiers in the king’s apartments, but Louis, offended that he had not been formally presented and that his clothes and mustaches were “foreign,” ordered his arrest. He was caught near Torcy’s apartments, allegedly seeking his favour. Although he was himself unarmed, the large arms cache and papers found in his lodgings caused further alarm. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:176–9. Williams, Police, 41. aae md 1175, fol. 14, Torcy to d’Argenson, 3 Sept. 1703, requests surveillance of a Hamburg merchant. Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 1–9. Funck-Brentano, Lettres de cachet, passim, lists the prisoners sent by Torcy. See also Cottret, Bastille à prendre, 35–50. See Williams, Police, 84–6, for the Robe courte (short robe), created in 1526. aae md 1186, fol. 63, 1 Feb. 1712. Further listings of his missions are in ibid., 1148, fol. 177, 19 June 1707; and ibid., 1187, fols 142–4, d’Argenson to Torcy, Nov. 1712. See also ibid., 1192, fols 118v–119, d’Argenson to Torcy, 23 Aug. 1713. Ibid., 1016, fol. 321, Torcy to La Reynie, 17 Nov. 1692, orders that a likely spy at the Jacobite court who stole letters from an Irish priest be taken there immediately. bn Clairambault 668, fol. 1687. See Williams, Police, 233–5; and Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 43–57, on these places of confinement. Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 11–30; and ibid., xi–xxxiii, discusses these myths. bn Clairambault 986, fols 6, 12–13, 32, 51, 70, 122, 134, 161, and passim to fol. 473. aae md 1118, fol. 284v, records that in 1703 the chevalier de Rosset was sent to the Bastille for having contact with Cevennes rebels. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 10:478–96, tells of the prince de la Riccia, a pro-Austrian Neapolitan noble arrested and transported to France in 1702 and imprisoned at Vincennes. Despite years of papal pleas, Riccia was released in 1713 only



149 150 151

152 153 154 155 156 157 158

Notes to pages 457–66

713

to please Queen Anne during the peace negotiations. Torcy kept a careful eye on his activities and mail during his incarceration. A Genoese serving the Duke of Lorraine went there in 1711 on suspicion of espionage but hanged himself after his first interrogation, which d’Argenson took as confirmation of their suspicions (ibid., 12:45–6). Another occupant, labeled a young libertine, was a banker’s Milanese kinsman and clerk who robbed him of a considerable sum [Carra], Mémoires Bastille, 2:130. Legg, Prior, 290 (Prior to Jersey, 10 June 1699). Strayer, Lettres de Cachet, 59–115, discusses myth and reality in both prisons. Kamen, Philip V, 61–2. Ravaisson, Archives Bastille, 11:94–117 (116 for Pontchartrain’s letter). The Imperial ambassador was only released at the end of 1703 and sent back to Portugal when Villeroy, captured earlier that year at Cremona, was released. Ibid., 105–6. Douen, Révocation à Paris, 2:540–50. Williams, Police, 41. For such a list, see aae cp Rome 326, fols 25–7 (Feb. 1689). aae md 1108, fol. 60, Pontchartrain to Torcy, 6 May 1702. bn mf 6658, fols 50v, 98, and 102v, letters of Pontchartrain to Torcy, early 1701. Jacobsen, Luxury and Power, 31, 47, 61–2. Genet-Rouffiac, “Jacobites in Paris,” 15–38.

Conclusion 1 Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, especially chap. 1 and pp. 72–5. 2 Tourmont noted that Mignon, who replaced him as premier commis, was expressly forbidden to write to any of the king’s diplomats abroad. Feuquières et al., Lettres, 5:165. Illness, however, forced Croissy to delegate increasingly to his clerks and his son. 3 aae cp Autriche 70, fol. 214r–v, for example, is a 1699 draft letter to a foreign ambassador that Torcy completely rewrote; and ibid., 74, fols 41–51, is a 6 May 1700 letter from the king to Villars that he extensively corrected and revised. 4 Hurt, Louis XIV Parlements, insists upon the “authoritarian core” of Louis XIV’s rule that he contends has been underestimated by those who emphasized the elements of conciliation and cooperation with provincial authorities. Dee, Expansion and Crisis, offers a balanced revision to “revisionism,” suggesting that while Louis XIV’s “willingness to collaborate and compromise” with provincial elites helps account for the success of his rule, he did so as “the dominant partner in this relationship” (178). Meier and Hill, “Bureaucracy,” 60, observe that “although bureaucratic relationships contain

714

Notes to pages 468–9

more than coercion … at the end of the day bureaucracies are an ordering of power.” Breen, Law, 135–7, 148–50, demonstrates that from 1668 Dijon’s avocats became less active participants in municipal government and were instead “reduced to little more than local agents of the expanding administrative monarchy, responsible primarily for putting into effect decisions made” by the royal council, the intendant, and the governor. Additionally, “mid-level notables” lost a voice in municipal governance as the local political elite narrowed. At the same time, local elites were increasingly squeezed financially to replenish a royal treasury increasingly drained by war. 5 aae cp Suède 133, fol. 68r–v, 26 Aug. 1715, circular letter from Torcy to ambassadors. 6 Just months before his death, the ailing cardinal shared with the English that he was working to ensure that the regent did not choose Torcy as his successor. Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 3:470. 7 Ibid., 2:311, 314. 8 Dupilet, Régence absolue, 346–7. 9 Petitfils, Régent, 578, 599. Cf., Wiesener, Régent, Dubois, 2:319–20, who says that the regent won Torcy over to his policy of war on Spain in 1719. Wiesener sees as surprising and disingenuous Torcy’s defence of the regent’s policy as an extension of the Sun King’s post-Utrecht balancing diplomacy aimed at maintaining the peace. He also notes the striking similarity between Torcy’s discourse in the Regency Council and the public defence of the unpopular policy written on Dubois’s behalf by Fontenelle, whose pen Dubois frequently employed. He then asks who inspired whom (ibid., 320). Wiesener too narrowly identifies Torcy with the old court faction and fails to appreciate his pragmatism and moderation. Leclercq, Histoire, 1:519, does the same and with Pecquet as well, based on what Dubois was hearing from his nephew (ibid.; and ibid., 2:1, which is at odds, however, with Pecquet’s behaviour, as in ibid., 8). Dupilet, Régence absolue, 143, however, calls Torcy a neutral among the Regency’s factions who only appeared to be of the old court because of his former function and his family ties. For international relations during 1720–21, see McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 110–11, ­117–23. In September 1719 Stair met with the regent, secretly on Dubois’s behalf, to urge him to dismiss Torcy as a threat to his control of foreign affairs, but to no avail (ibid., 3:140–3). Stair recounted the meeting to James Craggs the Younger, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in a letter of 23 September 1719. Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, ­2:594–6. See ss-Coirault, 7:863–5, for Saint-Simon’s description of the manner of Torcy’s dismissal – unsavoury on the part of Dubois, but generous on that of the regent – and his own refusal to help Dubois implement it. 10 McKay and Scott, Great Powers, 97–8, 101, 105–6, 126, 132–3, 137–9, 142, 145, 148, 150–4.



Notes to pages 469–70

715

11 Hardwicke, Miscellaneous State Papers, 2:595 (italics added; Stair to Craggs, 23 Sept. 1719). 12 Ibid., 590 (Stair to Craggs, 9 Sept. 1719). 13 Cortada, “Information Ecosystems,” 247.

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