A Spirited Exchange: The Wine and Brandy Trade Between France and the Dutch Republic in Its Atlantic Framework, 1600–1650 9004160744, 9789004160743

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A Spirited Exchange

The Northern World North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 AD Peoples, Economies and Cultures Editors

Barbara Crawford (St. Andrews) David Kirby (London) Jon-Vidar Sigurdsson (Oslo) Ingvild Øye (Bergen) Richard W. Unger (Vancouver) Piotr Gorecki (University of California at Riverside)

VOLUME 32

A Spirited Exchange The Wine and Brandy Trade between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650

By

Henriette de Bruyn Kops

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

Cover illustration: Autumn. David Teniers de Younger [1610-1690], oil on copper, circa 1644. © The National Gallery, London.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN: 1569–1462 ISBN: 978 90 04 16074 3 Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints BRILL, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS List of illustrations and maps ...................................................... List of tables and graphs ............................................................. Preface .........................................................................................

vii ix xi

Introduction The coastal trade in French wines and brandy ....................... Case studies: Nantes and Rotterdam ...................................... Periodization and historiography ............................................ Structure of the book ..............................................................

1 3 6 11

Chapter One The Dutch Community in Nantes .................... Settlement trends .................................................................... Anti-Dutch polemics and violence .......................................... Living conditions and integration issues .................................

17 18 34 52

Chapter Two Rotterdam’s Wine Traders and Their Business Environment ............................................................................... Importers, wholesalers, and distillers ...................................... Economic power and political power ...................................... Partnerships ............................................................................. Overlapping commodity markets and diversication ............. Immigrants from the Southern Netherlands ........................... Family life, education, and professional training .....................

77 77 81 87 95 101 107

Chapter Three Nantes and the Other French Supply Zones ........................................................................................... The sixteenth century ............................................................. The development of the brandy trade .................................... Adulterating the wines ............................................................ The supply market .................................................................. Alcohol exports from Nantes and Dutch shipping .................. Alcohol exports from other French ports by the Dutch .......... French alcohol and the Baltic market .....................................

117 119 124 132 136 149 178 190

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Chapter Four The Dutch Wholesale Market and Consumption ............................................................................... Quantifying the alcohol imports from Nantes in 1631 ........... The domestic wholesale market .............................................. Consumption estimates and impost issues ..............................

199 206 214 225

Chapter Five The Sephardim and the Dutch .......................... The political-economic climate ............................................... The Sephardim of Rotterdam ................................................ The Sephardim of Nantes ...................................................... The quest for silver .................................................................. The Espinozas of Nantes and the Dutch Spinozas ................. Evading the Spanish embargoes .............................................

244 244 252 261 265 280 288

Chapter Six The Coastal Trade and the Dutch-Atlantic Economy ..................................................................................... Cabotage—the coastal trades ................................................. Quantifying the French imports into the Republic ................. Relative values ......................................................................... The alcohol trade and the ‘Convoy & Licenses’ data ................. Trading across the oceans and along the coasts ...................... The ‘Rubik’s Cube’ model of international trade ...................

299 301 310 323 327 332 340

Appendices I. Measures .......................................................................... II. Exchange rate livres tournois—guilders, 1595–1672 ....... III. Dutch maritime imports, 1634 ........................................ IV. Veriable presence of Dutchmen listed in the1645 Moyens d’Intervention ....................................................................... V. Clustered sailings from Nantes to the Dutch Republic in 1631 ..............................................................................

343 346 349 350 352

Bibliography ................................................................................

355

Index ...........................................................................................

365

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS* Cover Autumn David Teniers de Younger [1610–1690] oil on copper, circa 1644 Courtesy and © The National Gallery, London Figure 1 Prol ou nouvelle description de la ville épiscopale et port de mer de Nantes en Bretagne engraving Published by Jean Boisseau, Paris, 1645 Courtesy and © Cliché Chantal Hémon, Musée départemental Dobrée, Conseil général de Loire-Atlantique—Nantes—France Figure 2 Rotterdam circa 1645 Joan Blaeu [1596–1673] engraving from Het Toonneel der Steden, 1649 Courtesy and © Gemeentearchief Rotterdam Figure 3 De Kuiper Jan Luyken [1649–1712] engraving from Het menselyk bedryf, 1694 Courtesy and © Collectie Amsterdams Historisch Museum Figure 4 The Winepress of Monsieur Dittyl outside Nantes Lambert Doomer [1624–1700] drawing, 1646 Courtesy and © Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge

* The illustrations can be found between pages 16 and 17.

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list of illustrations and maps

Figure 5 De Dam Lambert Doomer [1624–1700] drawing, 1645 Courtesy and © Collectie van Eeghen, Gemeentearchief Amsterdam Maps 1. Atlantic Europe 2. France in 1643 3. Dutch Republic Circa 1647

LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS Tables 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15

Nantes alcohol exports, 1631 Index of the ‘little’ wine duty of Brittany, 1635–1650 Examples of bottomry interest rates by maritime branch Personal relationships linking Rotterdam and Nantes Origin of brandy stills imported into Nantes, 1631 Average cost of Nantais wine on the supply market Imports of used, empty pipes, July 1–December 31, 1631 Estimated local market value of all wine exports from Nantes 1631 Value of the adjusted Dutch wine purchases in 1631 Bordeaux departures to Dutch Republic, 1649 Bordeaux departures to Dutch Republic, 1651 Potential value of Bordeaux’ exports to the Republic, 1634 & 1651 Estimated value of Dutch alcohol exports from France 1646 & Nantes 1631 & Bordeaux 1651 Voyages to the Baltic from the Rotterdam area, selected years Imported liquor on the Amsterdam commodity market, 1609– 1682 Dutch exports and imports from Nantes in 1631 Value of Dutch alcohol imports from Nantes, 1632 Value of Rotterdam’s alcohol imports from Nantes, 1632 Population comparison Amsterdam versus Rotterdam Dutch imports from Nantes by wine type & by region Imports from Nantes in the remaining Dutch ports, 1631 Regional shipping shares of the 1631 imports from Nantes Price of French brandy per oxhead in guilders, 1636–1648 Wholesale prices of Spanish wines in Amsterdam Municipal alcohol impost receipts, Rotterdam Provincial and municipal impost fees, 1583–1655 Retail price of wines in Dordrecht tavern, 1631 Cork imports & exports, Amsterdam 1667–1668 Estimated demand for alcohol by the Dutch eet, ca 1650

x

list of tables and graphs

5.1 Spanish trade embargoes, 1585–1700 6.1 Regional breakdown of estimated Dutch maritime imports, 1634 6.2 Tripartite division of maritime imports by region by value, 1634 6.3 Estimated size of the coastal eet arriving in Dutch ports, 1634 6.4 Estimated number of sailors on the eets to France 6.5 French exports and Dutch imports, 1646 and 1658 6.6 Employment of Holland’s labor force by sector, 1662 6.7 Wine and brandy’s share of the Dutch imports from France 6.8 Relative value of Convoy & Licenses receipts by Admiralty 6.9 Value of specie shipped to Batavia by the VOC Graphs 1.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 5.1 6.1

Dutch residents in Nantes, ve year averages, 1591–1656 Total Nantes alcohol exports 1631 and Dutch share Adjusted wine exports from Nantes, 1631 Nantes brandy exports 1631 Non-Rhine wines shipped eastward through Sound French and Spanish wines through the Sound on Dutch ships Brandy prices in guilders per oxhead Rotterdam city alchohol impost, 1580–1581 and 1644–1645 French letters of exchange disputed in Rotterdam, 1620–1641 Percentage of wines through the Sound in Dutch ‘voorbijvaart ’

PREFACE My evolution as a historian began when I was about ten years old. My grandfather Jan Ankersmit gave me unrestricted access to his study and the 21 volumes of Wagenaar’s Vaderlandsche Historie, published in the 1750s. I remember that the gruesome execution in 1584 of Balthasar Gerardsz, the assassin of William the Silent, fascinated me the most. The books still hold the white slips of paper I used to mark the pages with the engravings and signatures of famous Dutch and foreign dignitaries. I am a product of two distinct educational systems. The Dutch secondary schools gave me the linguistic tools to work in several European languages, and the exibility of the American college system allowed me at a later stage to combine motherhood, neighborhood activism, and coaching soccer with the quest for a degree in history. Little did I know when I started at Montgomery College that this quest would not end until my doctorate at Georgetown University. At Georgetown I found a demanding mentor, Hoya Open golf partner, and patient sounding board in James Collins. His early suggestion to capitalize on my Dutch background and his expertise in early modern French history led to this bilateral wine and brandy project. Jim’s never ending and wide ranging intellectual curiosity makes him the consummate historian while his willingness to share it makes him the ultimate advisor. I am privileged to have Jim as exemplar but even more fortunate to have him be my friend. The open, international, and stimulating atmosphere of Georgetown University’s History Department allowed me to work with and prot from the advice of many specialists, including John Witek, Gabor Agoston, Tommaso Astarita, and Kathy Olesko, but especially Andrzej Kaminski, Alison Games and John McNeill. I owe them heartfelt thanks. Lasting friendships with Karen Taylor and Simone Ameskamp, fellow students, developed in the graduate trenches. The Dutch academic world remains more distant, but the gap has been generously bridged by Willem Klooster of Clark University, whose critical comments and insights into the Dutch Atlantic world have been invaluable. At the University of Amsterdam, Henk van Nierop and Clé Lesger encouraged the efforts and career of this relative foreigner, and welcomed me to the colloquia of the Amsterdam Centrum voor de

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Studie van de Gouden Eeuw. I am also grateful for the support of Richard Unger of the University of British Columbia for this project. In Washington DC, this transatlantic study was made possible by the superb collection of the Library of Congress. The European Reading Room is an oasis of quiet so conducive to scholarship and I want to thank its staff for their efciency. I am also indebted to Arthur Wheelock, curator of the Northern Baroque department at the National Gallery of Art and professor of Art History at the University of Maryland. Arthur nurtured my interest in art as a eld parallel to history and provided a summer internship which gave me a chance to nd crucial information in the Gallery’s library. Helen and Doug Matthews cheerfully yielded their basement to me during the period that I was stationed in Bulgaria but had work to do in Washington. The staff of the Gemeentearchief in Rotterdam, especially Krijn van Dijk and Els Schröder, has been very supportive of this project and has gone the extra mile to grant me access to hidden gems. The unknown volunteers who spent countless hours to create the database with synopses of the old notarial records deserve all the accolades I can give them, my research was so much easier to do as a result. Their digitalization project should be the model for archives around the world. The hospitality of Elly de Jonge made my temporary residence in Rotterdam easy and very pleasant. In Nantes, the staff of the Archives Départementales de la LoireAtlantique and the Archives Municipales facilitated access to their collections. At the Musée Dobrée, Mme Parpoil, conservatrice section gravures & estampes, and Mlle Barthault, bureau d’estampes, allowed me to examine the original drawings made in Nantes by the Dutch artist Lambert Doomer. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the staff at the Archives Départementales Gironde in Bordeaux, especially M. Pierre Massé. Shortly before starting the research for this book I was told of the efforts of another Dutch historian in the same eld. Luckily for both of us, my esteemed colleague Anne Wegener Sleeswijk has focused on the wine trade in the eighteenth century so that our books complement each other. Despite living on different continents, I gratefully used our occasional meetings to gain insights and inspiration. I want to nish this preface the way I started, with family. Throughout the years, my parents Richard and Sien Rahusen and my sisters Joan and Fieke remained unwavering in their encouragement. I am sad that I can no longer share my stories [or a round of golf ] with my dad, but

preface

xiii

I carry his optimistic presence with me. My father-in-law Pim de Bruyn Kops contributed by sending countless interesting books and relevant newspaper clippings across the ocean. Last but not least I want to say an enormous thank you to the three men in my immediate family. In the earlier years, Pieter and Jan Willem good-naturedly tolerated a mother who also did her own things, and they continue to boost my morale as only terric sons can. From the very start, Oscar has supported and applauded my academic efforts, even if my research in archives or temporary jobs at universities overseas sometimes left him to fend for himself in Washington and Bulgaria. For that —and for the past thirty years—I will forever be grateful.

North Sea Sound

R hin

Hamburg Amsterdam Plymouth London Rotterdam Dunkirk Antwerp Channel Calais Rouen Paris Da Nantes Sein nube e e

Lo

La Rochelle

Bilboa

Oporto

ire

Bordeaux

e

Atlantic Ocean

Baltic Sea

Rhô

n

Bayonne

Madrid Lisbon

Seville

Mediterranean Sea

Map 1

Atlantic Europe

Danzig

INTRODUCTION This study of the wine and brandy trade between France and the Dutch Republic in the rst half of the seventeenth century bridges economic and social history, and forces a reassessment of four early modern historiographies: Dutch, French, Jewish, and Atlantic. In Dutch economic history, the fundamental strength of the trade along the North Sea and Atlantic coasts has been underrepresented or dismissed in comparison with the trans-oceanic and Baltic trades. A clear source bias lies at the root of the coastal trade’s lesser status. For the rst half of the seventeenth century, lack of coherent statistical evidence makes quantication of the sector very difcult, and the available bits of information are more likely to yield proportional than absolute values. The central record keeping of the long-distance trans-oceanic joint stock companies plus the minutely detailed Sound Toll registers which documented the Baltic trade have favored historical research in those two sectors. Eminent historians such as Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude continue to give the Baltic grain trade the top billing as the ‘mother trade’, while Jonathan Israel has championed the importance of the luxury trades.1 Both these views must be reassessed. In 1634, the economic importance of routine coastal trade at least matched that of the long distance trades, while the value of the commodities supplied by the coastal trades surpassed that of the Baltic trade by itself and came close to matching the combined value of the whole Nordic sector. The coastal trade yielded prots that owed into the Republic in the form of silver. Without this inux of bullion and ready cash, neither of the other two commercial sectors would have ourished. In the traditional tripartite division of Dutch maritime commerce, the silver-generating

1 Pieter van Dam and others, Beschryvinge Van De Oostindische Compagnie, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën. Groote Ser. 63, 68, 74, 76, 83, 87, 96 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1701–1703; reprint, 1927). Nina Ellinger Bang, Tabeller over Skibsfart Og Varetransport Gennem Øresund, 1497–1660, 2 vols. (København: 1906). Jan De Vries and A. M. Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500 –1815 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, The Oxford History of Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

2

introduction

power of the coastal sector might tempts us to promote its primacy over the importance of the Baltic and trans-oceanic sectors but their mutually benecial relationship precludes any one sector’s claim to the top spot in economic terms. In the emerging global economy of the seventeenth century we must focus instead on the interdependent relationship between the East/West luxury trades and the North/South bulk trades along the Atlantic shores of Europe. Wine was one of the key commodities shipped from south-western to northern Europe, so new evidence on the alcohol trade enables us to discover more about the coastal trade in general and to properly recognize the impact of this particular sector on the economies of France, the Republic, and by extension, the Atlantic world. The narrower focus on Nantes and Rotterdam, two sub-top port cities in their respective countries, recties the historiographical bias that has favored Bordeaux and Amsterdam, and highlights the considerable contribution of the two secondary ports to the early modern economy. The social component of the study is based on a multinational prosopographical approach. The resulting database underscores the importance of the interconnecting personal networks of Dutch, Sephardic Jewish, and New Christian merchants all along the shores of Europe. It reveals the symbiotic relationship between Dutch international traders and their Sephardic counterparts, and reemphasizes the intimate links between the Republic’s economic and political elite. Just as the social history of the Dutch Republic can only be analyzed in conjunction with the economy, so can its economic history only be discussed within the social framework. Although the wine and brandy trade with France has been recognized as one of the pillars of the Dutch economy in the seventeenth century, both by contemporary as well as modern observers, scholars have so far only paid attention to the wine trade in either earlier or later periods. The alcohol trade has been the victim of a double neglect, rst as a specic commercial sector and secondly as one segment of an under-appraised branch of the economy. By lling in the current blanks wherever possible and by subjecting earlier assumptions to a critical review, the coastal trade in general and the trade in French alcohol in particular can begin to take their rightful place in Dutch economic history.2

2

This study, with its focus on the seventeenth century, is complemented by a new

introduction

3

The emergence of Rotterdam as Holland’s premier wine trade center in the early part of the seventeenth century has hitherto escaped scholarly scrutiny. On the French side, historians have studied regional production characteristics, local trade patterns, and the eighteenth century’s domestic wine trade and traders.3 Despite several calls for a systematic study of the early modern alcohol trade, a scarcity of statistical evidence, the involvement of multiple port cities, and the difculties posed by the need for a bi-national/bi-lingual approach have stood in its way. This study is anchored by the port cities of Nantes and Rotterdam. The rise of Rotterdam as Holland’s second strongest economic center coincided with the blossoming of its merchants’ involvement in the wine and brandy trade. In exactly the same period, Nantes emerged as a center of French brandy production and as a major exporter of both types of alcohol. This dual rise was no coincidence and dictated a comparative history of the two economies. The strong commercial presence of Rotterdam traders in the city of Nantes, the peak of which occurred between in the late 1620s –early 1630s, is evidence of the close relationship between the two local economies. The Rotterdam members of the Dutch ‘nation’ in Nantes, with strong ties to their relatives and associates back home, are a key component of this study. The Dutch traders competed with each other on both the supply and demand side of the market, yet the French accused the Dutch ‘nation’ of banding together to create a virtual monopoly on the supply side of the alcohol market to the detriment of local merchants.4 Nantes served as the redistribution point for upstream Loire wines destined for the Breton consumption market. The region around Nantes itself produced inferior wines that most contemporaries considered to be

work on the eighteenth century. Anne Wegener Sleeswijk, Franse Wijn in De Republiek in De Achtiende Eeuw: Economisch Handelen, Institutionele Dynamiek En De Herstructurering Van De Markt (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2007). Together, the two studies highlight the changes that occurred in the Dutch commercial world between 1600 and 1800. 3 R. Dion, Histoire De La Vigne Et Du Vin En France (Paris: 1959) and Jean Tanguy, “Le Commerce Nantais À La Fin Du XVIe Et Au Commencement Du XVIIe Siècle” (Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Rennes, 1965) and Thomas Edward Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne: The Wine Trade in Early Modern France, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science; 115th Ser., 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 4 Archives Départementales de la Loire-Atlantique [ hereafter ADLA] C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 1645 and also Jean Eon, Le Commerce Honorable (Nantes: G. Le Monnier impr. du roi, 1646).

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undrinkable. Sometime before 1600, Dutch entrepreneurs gured out that this poor white wine was the perfect and cheap raw material for brandy—liquor distilled from wine. The Nantais wines could also be fortied and adulterated by the addition of sugars, after which they were used to strengthen other wines. A number of Rotterdam merchants, including several brewers, used their existing expertise to diversify into the production of—and trade in—brandy. The existing trade in barley for the breweries and salt for the herring processors had already made Rotterdam’s captains familiar with the French coast. Tantalizing yet mostly circumstantial evidence supports the hypothesis that Nantes was also popular with Dutch merchants because it served as a transfer point in the illegal trade in Spanish-American silver and coins. The existence of the Contractation de Nantes, a well-organized merchant group with preferential trading privileges at the Spanish port of Bilbao, allowed Dutch merchants to link their networks to those of Contractation members. It is no coincidence that the Contractation membership included Sephardic families with direct ties to the Portuguese Jewish communities in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Middelburg, and Hamburg on the one hand, and to New Christians who continued to work and trade in Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, the rest of the empire, and in French port cities on the other. Antwerp remained a vital link in the ow of information, money, and goods between the Dutch Republic and Iberia even after it had yielded its position as the commercial center of Atlantic Europe to Amsterdam. By choosing to emphasize the commercial sectors of Nantes and Rotterdam, the question must be raised why Bordeaux, France’s most important wine port, and Amsterdam, the largest commercial center of the Republic, receive secondary billing. First, because the earliest departure records date from 1649 and are incomplete to boot [they do not provide information on volumes], it is impossible to quantify Bordeaux’ export market for the rst half of the seventeenth century. Second, the strong internal organization of the Bordeaux wine traders made it difcult for outsiders to penetrate the supply market, so early Dutch settlers in the region focused on land reclamation projects instead. In the Republic, Amsterdam was clearly very important for the Dutch wine trade, but more in its role as consumption market than as commercial hub for re-exports. In addition, the plethora of books and articles that focus on Amsterdam made Rotterdam, its alcohol trade, and its traders a more rewarding research object.

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5

The lives of the merchants involved in international maritime commerce provide the study’s socio-political element. To varying degrees, the vital personal networks of the merchant class overlapped with those of the political elite at the municipal, provincial, and ultimately at the federal level. We should not see this economic oligarchy as a homogeneous group. To the contrary, competition at all these levels was erce and cooperation occurred only when all parties would benet from it. Against larger outside forces, however, the Dutch merchants often presented a united front. For Dutch traders in France, receiving or being denied commercial privileges hinged on the quality of the Republic’s political relations with the French government; at that level, the States General acted on behalf of all Dutch merchants. The Dutchmen residing in France would also be quick to appeal to local authorities as a single, unied ‘nation’. In the 17th century, international merchants thrived because they did not specialize in a single commodity. The notarial records make it abundantly clear that the Dutch diversied their business- and investment portfolios to include a variety of commodities, spread their trade over different regions, and used a range of nancial instruments.5 This diversication minimized the risk per transaction. Extensive overlapping personal networks of merchants which spanned the globe and which included immigrants from the Spanish Netherlands, their relatives who stayed behind at crucial locations within the Spanish empire, and members of the Sephardic diaspora made this non-specialization possible and protable. Commodity-specic specialization did not become the norm until the 18th century.

5

P. W. Klein and J. W. Veluwenkamp, “The Role of the Entrepreneur in the Economic Expansion of the Dutch Republic,” in The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age, ed. Karel Davids and Leo Noordegraaf (Amsterdam: Nederlands Economisch-Historisch Archief, 1993). Michel Morineau, « Hommage Aux Historiens Hollandais Et Contribution À L’histoire Économique Des Provinces-Unies », in Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, ed. Maurice Aymard, Studies in World Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1982). P. Jeannin, « Les Interdependences Économiques Dans Le Champ D’action Europeen Des Hollandais. xvie–xviiie Siecle », in Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, ed. Maurice Aymard (Cambridge University Press, 1982). Peter Mathias, “Strategies for Reducing Risk by Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern Period,” in Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf, Hollandse Historische Reeks, Vol. xxiv (Den Haag: 1995).

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Dutch records also refute Braudel’s idea that early modern merchants did not control the factors of production.6 The men [plus the occasional woman] who traded in wines and brandy also owned breweries, reneries, distilleries and textile manufacturing workshops, and they invested in herring ships and the whaling industry. The merchants did not limit their productive investments to the Republic. When Dutch merchants imported 235 brandy stills into Nantes in a single year [1631], they did so in order to control the production of brandy at the source of the raw material, to achieve a vertical integration of the brandy trade, to reduce their costs and maximize their prots. In the process they transformed Nantes’ regional economy. This study covers the rst ve decades of the seventeenth century. The period from 1585 [when the Spanish recaptured Antwerp and the Dutch government severely restricted shipping on the Schelde river] to 1609 [the start of the Twelve Years Truce] is an important transition period in the wine trade. Lack of sources, however, continues to keep those years in obscurity. Prior to the Dutch interest in Nantes and its brandy potential, commercial life in Nantes centered around the Contractation group and its focus on the textile-, grain-, and paper trade with Iberia. The alcohol [and silver?] trade between Nantes and Rotterdam boomed exactly in the years between the end of the Truce in 1621 and the Treaty of Munster in 1648, when the Spanish trade embargoes strongly inuenced trading and shipping patterns along the coast of Europe and helped to turn Nantes into a hub of Dutch activity. By the middle of the century, Spanish-Dutch trade relations returned to normal while French-Dutch relations soured amidst escalating protectionist measures. The second half of the century also saw the emergence of Nantes as the dominant port in France’s colonial trade in sugar and slaves. Already in the 1640s, several Dutch merchants owned or invested in Nantais sugar reneries; although no hard evidence suggests that the Dutch initiated the slave trade in Nantes, the possibility can not be ignored. Diabolically, the dearth of data that has led to the relative ignorance about the wine trade also formed the basis of this work’s source-driven methodology. Any usable source from these rst fty years of the seventeenth century has been employed to add pieces to the puzzle.

6 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th –18th Century, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), Vol. II, 372.

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The scarcity of reliable statistics on wine and brandy imports into the Dutch Republic and the exports from France make the macro-economic implications of the trade the most difcult ones to assess. To the extent possible, the analysis of the big picture rests on such quantitative information but the micro-economic, i.e. local, viewpoint based on notarial records has contributed much of our knowledge.7 The focus on France and the Republic doubles this combination of local and regional sources and has resulted in a bi-national socio-economic history. The economic perspective rests on continuities and adaptations; even when political events led to abrupt changes at the ofcial level, the merchants caught on opposing ends found solutions to keep the commodity ow moving. The early modern national economies of Europe were interdependent, leading to adjustments rather than momentous change. When conditions of war imposed economic sanctions, elaborate and effective evasions schemes kicked into place almost naturally. The economies of the Dutch Republic and France were closely intertwined, and the countries functioned as each other’s supply zone as well as consumer market. While France supplied alcohol and salt to Dutch consumers, commodities produced in the Republic or obtained abroad—such as woolen cloth, naval stores, cheese and herring—were transported south to satisfy French demand. The economic impact of these counter-goods consisted of the value added to raw or semi-raw materials in Dutch production centers prior to their export to France as nished trade goods. A similar interdependency can be seen within the economy of the Dutch Republic, and in particular between the economies of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Population size drove the demand for wine in Amsterdam, and while Rotterdammers did not eschew a glass of wine, the merchants in that city became specialized in the production and distribution of brandy. Nantes supplied nished brandy or its raw material because the regional wines were too inferior to stand on their own, and Rotterdammers adapted their expertise as brewers to become large-scale producers and importers of high-quality brandy. By importing large numbers of brandy stills, Dutch entrepreneurs inuenced the production of—and control over the processing—of Nantes’ wines before these arrived on the export market.

7 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Oud Notarieel Archief [hereafter GAR, ONA] and ADLA, serie 4E2.

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introduction

The existing historiography of the French-Dutch alcohol trade has suffered from the same dearth of reliable sources as that which has plagued the historiography of the coastal trades in general.8 This study addresses the seventeenth century gap in the French-Dutch wine trade historiography, but in the process the larger economic picture has been claried as well, leading to signicant adjustments of older historiographies. Beyond several small and/or localized studies on the wine trade, we only have Jean Craeybeckx’ thorough analysis of the Dutch market for French wines in the 16th century with a primary focus on the Southern Netherlands, and Thomas Brennan’s work on the domestic wine trade of France, which centers on the 18th century Parisian market.9 The new research gives substance to earlier assumptions about the trade’s importance. The relative neglect of the wine and brandy trade in economic and Dutch historiography is partially the result of one-point perspectives. Historians dealing with the macro-economy of the Dutch Republic and its position in the changing European economy of the early modern era, such as Aymard, De Vries & Van der Woude, Israel, Van Zanden, Braudel, Wallerstein, DuPlessis, and Lindblad have focused on the questions of Dutch economic supremacy, decline, and modernity. As experts in the broader eld of European economic history, they have had to rely on the availability of work by others for the details; they acknowledge that the wine trade was important, but without too much substantiation.10

8 For Nantes, we only have the 1631 port registers. The earliest [incomplete] 17th century departure records from Bordeaux date from 1649, the rst complete year is 1651. Rotterdam’s earliest port records are combined with those of its rival Dordrecht, cover broad categories and date from 1680. Only a single year worth of data [1668–1669] has survived of Amsterdam’s import and export records. Most of the Zeeland archives, including virtually all of its early modern notarial records, were lost in the bombardments of 1944. The Convoy & Licenses data on Dutch imports and exports suffer from the fact that they are heavily under-reported customs declarations and that they do not contain sub-listings by commodity. 9 Jan Craeybeckx, Un Gran Commerce D’importation: Les Vins De France Aux Anciens Pays-Bas, xiii e –xvi e Siècle (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1958). and Brennan. The work of R. Dion is focused on production rather than trade. 10 Maurice Aymard, Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism = Capitalisme Hollandais Et Capitalisme Mondial (Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de ‘Homme, 1982). Important conference proceedings, including contributions by Aymard, Braudel, Jeannin, Morineau, De Vries. The conference focused on Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1974) and especially on Wallerstein’s chapter on the position of the Dutch economy in the world system.

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9

On the other side of the eld we nd multiple journal articles and specialized works that deal specically with (small) segments of the alcohol trade in either France or the Republic, and include the contributions of Pirenne, Tanguy, Gabory, Collins, Mathorez, See, Bijlsma, and Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn.11 The rst four have approached the issue from the economic angle, while the latter four have used a socio-economic approach to focus more on the human interactions that form the basis of commerce. In their approach, these historians were driven by the sources at their disposal. Ofcial government records such as port registers enabled the rst group to deal with numbers, while reliance on notarial and guild records allowed the latter group to get closer to the merchant networks. Following in the footsteps of all these historians, this study presents a more cohesive image of the French-Dutch wine and brandy trade in the rst half of the seventeenth century. Its theoretical framework is a combination of social-, economic-, and cultural history, each perspective driven by the type of sources which contributed the information. By attacking the history of the wine trade from a single linguistic

See also: De Vries and Van der Woude. and Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1989) and Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland’s Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market (Manchester University Press, 1993), and Robert S. DuPlessis, Transitions to Capitalism in Early Modern Europe, New Approaches to European History, vol. 10 (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and J. Thomas Lindblad, “Foreign Trade of the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century,” in The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age, ed. K. Davids and L. Noordegraaf (Amsterdam: 1993). 11 Henri Pirenne, Histoire Économique De L’occident Medieval (Bruges: 1951), and Jean Tanguy. « Le commerce nantais à la n du XVIe et au commencement du XVIIe siècle », and James B. Collins, « Les Impots Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au xviie Siècle », in Actes du 107e Congres National des Societies Savantes (Brest: 1982), James B. Collins, “The Role of Atlantic France in the Baltic Trade: Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes, 1625–1675,” Journal of European Economic History 13, no. 2 (1984), James B. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and E. Gabory, « La Marine Et Le Commerce De Nantes Au xviiie Siècle (1661–1715) », Annales de Bretagne XVII (1901–1902), and Jules Mathorez, « Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes », Revue du Nord (1913), and R. Bijlsma, « Rotterdams Koopvaardij Op Frankrijk in De Eerste Helft Der Zeventiende Eeuw », Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 4 (1916), and Henri Eugène Sée, « Le Commerce De Hollandais À Nantes Pendant La Minorité De Louis XIV », Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 41, no. 3 (1926), and L. A. F. Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and M. F. B. Meeuwes, Die Importante Negotie; Geschiedenis Van De Rotterdamse Wijnhandel Vanaf De Middeleeuwen Tot in De Negentiende Eeuw (Rotterdam: Historische Uitgeverij Rotterdam, 1996).

10

introduction

perspective, be it French or Dutch, most historians working on the wine trade automatically limited the scope of their studies and thus of their conclusions. The personal nature of the trade has left relatively few traces beyond those recorded by the notaries, but combining and comparing primary and secondary sources in both Dutch and French claries the bi-lateral alcohol trade, while the use of English and German secondary sources increases our ability to assess the trade in its Atlantic setting. This project has been possible because the municipal archives of Rotterdam survived the bombardments of 1940, and the city’s notarial archives from 1600 to 1650 form its Dutch heart. The manuscript collection yielded information on the wine traders’ guild, real estate transactions, impost disputes, and glimpses of commercial transactions. The weekly Pryscouranten [ price lists] of the Amsterdam Bourse, part of the collection of the Dutch economic history archives [ NEHA], provided crucial information on consumption patterns and on the wholesale value of the imported alcohol but are silent about the quantity of wine on the market. The national archives [Algemeen Rijksarchief ] in Den Haag include the remaining Convoyen & Licenten records of the Rotterdam based Admiralty of the Maze. Holland’s provincial records yield decrees on the armament of merchant ships, as well as records which complement the information on the Convoyen & Licenten. The national library [Koninklijke Bibliotheek] holds the Groot Placaetboeck with the full texts of the rulings and decrees of the provincial States of Holland and Zeeland, a rich prescriptive source. On the French side, Nantes is host to the city archives [Archives Municipales] as well as the regional Archives Départementales de la Loire-Atlantique. Both suffer from the classic problem that survival of records from the rst half of the seventeenth century has been spotty. The regional archives hold the key French source for this study: the complete port register for the year 1631 in the records of the Prévôté de Nantes, which lists both arrivals and departures of ships, their captains, cargoes, and the merchants who freighted the vessels. The port register provides specic information on volumes, and the detailed entries make it a goldmine of hard data.12 The Moyens d’Intervention, dating from 1645, is a complaint lodged by French merchants in Nantes against the unfair, illegal, and overbearing business practices of the Dutch. In addition to explaining

12

ADLA, serie B 2976, Registre de la Prévôté de Nantes, 1631.

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11

the Dutch modus operandus, the protest is crucial for its listing of Dutch merchants and their earnings. Due to the document’s anti-Dutch bias, the values and quantities mentioned in the Moyens d’Intervention must be regarded with the necessary caution. The records of the Chambre de Commerce include pieces pertaining to disputes between the Dutch merchants and their French counterparts.13 Some of the local notaries were active in maritime trade and recorded transactions of the Dutch merchants; the registers of notaries Mariot, Verger, and Bachelier yielded the most useful information.14 Unfortunately, the baptism, marriage, and burial records pertaining to the members of the Reformed Church of Nantes, of which the Protestant segment of the Dutch nation would have been members, go back no further than 1739, while the oldest prescriptive material on the Protestant community dates from 1675. The municipal archives offer some prescriptive sources on the rules and privileges that pertained to Dutch commercial activities and have yielded several documents on actual and perceived transgressions by the Dutch merchants. Information on Bordeaux comes from a very late source in the Archives Départementales de la Gironde; we must, nonetheless, rely on the port’s Departure Registers of 1651 because they are the earliest full-year records available for this important French supply zone. Because of the scarcity of sources, from its earliest stages this study of the French-Dutch wine trade in the rst half of the seventeenth century was undertaken with the knowledge that conclusions would rest on information that was limited, one-sided or prejudiced by its sources. Nevertheless, the numerous occasions when a Dutch source corroborated or even expanded on information derived from a French source, and vice versa, conrmed the validity of a bi-national, comparative approach to commercial history. This study rests on three geographical legs: France, the Dutch Republic, and the European side of the Atlantic world. Chapter 1 focuses on the Dutch merchant community in Nantes and its role in the supply side of the regional wine and brandy trade, with special attention given to the resident Rotterdammers. The Dutch were attracted to Nantes as a supply zone for brandy and Loire wines; the traceable number of Dutch residents in Nantes peaked at the same time as Nantes’ alcohol 13 ADLA B 6781, C691, and C702; and Archives Municipales de Nantes [hereafter AM] series FF 141, HH 176, and HH 237 14 Notary Pierre Mariot, ADLA 4E2/1448–1469; Notary Mathurin Verger, ADLA 4E2/1919–1982; and Notary Julien Bachelier, ADLA 4E2/92–101.

12

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exports, clear evidence of the strong relationship between the local supply of alcohol and Dutch demand. The trade in a second commodity, silver, may have been an equally signicant draw. A solid relationship between the Dutch community and members of the Contractation de Nantes, be they New Christian- or crypto-Jewish merchants, allowed both groups to continue the Iberian trade during the many years of trade embargoes. The relatively high level of intermarriage between Dutch merchants and local women refutes contemporary accusations that the Dutch operated in Nantes in cultural isolation and proves that they were well aware of the importance of social capital that could be converted into commercial capital. Chapter 2 covers the wine trading merchants of Rotterdam and highlights the importance of their personal networks to their commercial activities. The wine trading merchants operated within well-organized municipal and provincial institutions, but were the rst to claim customary exemptions when it beneted their business. The strong overlap between Rotterdam’s commercial and political elite ensured that the business climate favored trade and manufacturing, and in this the situation in Rotterdam was representative for conditions in the other maritime ports. Strong evidence of widespread diversication refutes the idea that seventeenth-century merchants were specialists. The signicant risks of transporting high-value commodities from Asia and the Americas to Holland could be off-set by the relatively routine and predictable coastal trade in bulk goods for the European markets. Business nances saw a similar diversication, whereby merchants had current accounts in different countries to ease the international payments and to guard against a single bank’s failure. This strategy was especially important for the oft-persecuted members of the Sephardic community, who spread their nancial eggs over several national baskets to provide buffers against arbitrary conscations or levies. The second portion of the book deals with the specics of the wine and brandy trade. Chapter 3 provides its quantitative backbone to the extent possible; it relies heavily on the single-year port records of Nantes [1631] and Bordeaux [1651] for information on the alcohol’s supply zones, transport, and destinations. The port register of Nantes points to the primacy of Rotterdam as the brandy center of Holland; both registers highlight the role of Amsterdam as a huge consumer market. The validity of this position is strengthened by the overlapping evidence from the notarial records of both Nantes and Rotterdam in

introduction

13

combination with other primary source material. The chapter tracks the voyages of the ships that made up the wine eet, their captains and crews. Some of the sailing practices were commodity-specic, other aspects were standard in early modern shipping. The Dutch consumption market is the subject of Chapter 4. The weekly price lists of the Amsterdam Bourse do not allow quantication of the wholesale market by volume, but do shed light on the relative worth of a wide variety of wines and brandies and on the popularity of specic wine varieties over time. The crews of the Republic’s mercantile and naval eets constituted an important, yet mostly obscure, market for brandy and higher quality wines. The estimated demand by the eets relies on the estimates for the number of sailors employed by the different maritime sectors. At the local consumer level, anecdotal evidence in Rotterdam’s notarial registers presents wine drinkers in the taverns, arbitration over the provenance and quality of disputed wines, and the continuous efforts to elude the impost collectors. Having tracked the alcohol from France all the way to the tankards in the taverns, the last two chapters widen the scope. The symbiotic relationship between Dutch international merchants and members of the Portuguese Jewish ‘nation’ along the Atlantic coast of Europe is the subject of Chapter 5. Especially after 1621, the wide-spread and well connected Sephardic network provided the Dutch with the perfect set-up to continue the protable trade with the Spanish empire despite the fact that Spain had placed that trade under embargo as part of its ght against the rebellious Dutch. Through their membership in the Contraction de Nantes, the New Christians of that city had long-established connections with the commercial sectors in Spain and Portugal, which the Dutch used to their advantage in their elaborate system of embargo evasions. Ties with the Sephardim who had remained in Antwerp as good Catholics enabled that city to serve as a conduit in the trade between the Republic and Spanish territories anywhere. The chapter also presents the hypothesis that in addition to the local wines and brandy, a signicant reason for the Dutch interest in Nantes was the presence of Spanish silver and money that owed into France due to its positive trade balance with Spain. The sudden expansion of the Dutch ‘nation’ in Nantes exactly when the Twelve Year Truce with Spain expired and hostilities resumed hints at the trade in silver as a second draw of Nantes as a way-station in the Dutch-Iberian trade. As it is based on mostly circumstantial evidence, the bullion and money hypothesis

14

introduction

must stand as such until new hard sources can either conrm or refute it. Active participation of the Portuguese Jews of Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the coastal commodity trade, in maritime insurance and maritime lending, and their role as nanciers of Dutch merchants involved in the commodity trades disproves the absoluteness of Israel’s statement that the Jews were not involved in the bulk trades along the European coast and that they participated only in the luxury and money trades. They were an integral, exible, and mobile part of the extensive and overlapping networks of merchants who exchanged information and traded in a wide range of bulk and luxury commodities which enabled the globalization of the early modern economy.15 The pragmatic working relationship between the Dutch and the Sephardim is a good example of the cross-cultural trading diaspora envisioned by Curtin.16 The last chapter integrates the wine and brandy trade in the various layers of the Dutch maritime economy and provides estimates of the trade’s relative worth. The French wine trade was an important component of the economy, but until we can discover more about the trade with the other wine producing regions in Europe and the Levant we must place an asterisk next to the wine trade’s status as one of the six pillars of the Dutch economy. The new information on the French alcohol trade with the Republic in the rst half of the century nevertheless allows us to reassess the signicance of the coastal trade in its entirety. New calculations of the share of the different sectors emphasize the complementary nature of the three main maritime commercial branches. Exactly because of this symbiosis, the tri-partite division of Dutch maritime trade among the Baltic trade, the trans-oceanic trade to Asia and the Americas, and the trade along the Atlantic coast of Europe is only sustainable as a model if each sector is treated as a vital component of the whole. Change in one sector’s economic or political climate forced reactions and adjustments in the other two sectors. As such, Dutch maritime commerce is a good example of what I would like to call the Rubik’s Cube model of economic history. All commodities, all sectors, and all 15 Just one series of excerpts from the notarial records of Amsterdam pertaining to the Portuguese is enough to conrm extensive Sephardic activities in the Iberian salt trade, plus the trade in olive oil, grains, and timber. Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, “Studia Rosenthaliana,” (Assen: Van Gorcum), Vol. XI, no. 1, 81–96. 16 Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Studies in Comparative World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

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regional economies were interconnected and had to adjust constantly to altered market conditions. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic had the most exible economy and it allowed the Dutch to have the quickest—and thus the most protable—reactions to these ever-changing conditions.

illustrations

ILLUSTRATIONS

1

2

illustrations

Fig. 1 Profil ou nouvelle description de la ville épiscopale et port de mer de Nantes en Bretagne. The port of Nantes viewed from across the Loire with the Quai de la Fosse on the opposite bank on the left. Engraving, published by Jean Boisseau, Paris, 1645. © Musée départemental Dobrée, Nantes

illustrations 3

Fig. 2 Rotterdam circa 1645. The Wijnhaven runs along the north side of the triangular ‘island’ in the foreground. Joan Blaeu [1596-1673], engraving, published in het Toonneel der Steden, 1649. © Gemeentearchief Rotterdam

4

illustrations

illustrations

Fig. 3 De Kuiper. The cooper’s image carries the slogan ‘If it does not fit, it will leak’. Jan Luyken [1649-1712], engraving, published in Het menselyk bedryf, 1694 © Collectie Amsterdams Historisch Museum

5

Fig. 4 The Winepress of Monsieur Dittyl outside Nantes. Lambert Doomer [1624-1700], drawing, 1646. © Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge

6

illustrations

illustrations

Fig. 5 De Dam. Lambert Doomer [1624-1700], A horse-drawn wine sled in front of Amsterdam’s Weigh House with the Old City Hall on the left drawing, 1645. © Collectie van Eeghen, Gemeentearchief Amsterdam

7

8

illustrations

CHAPTER ONE

THE DUTCH COMMUNITY IN NANTES The principal income of the county of Nantes are its wines and not through those who consume it locally but through those who send it to their foreign countries and primarily via the sea. The Hollanders are the ones who taught the inhabitants of the county of Nantes how to adulterate their wines in order to preserve them better at sea, they are the ones who taught them how to make brandy, they are the ones who taught them how to make barrels . . . they are the ones who spend their days bringing into Nantes barrel staves and other things needed to keep the wines, and lastly, they are the ones who relieve the county of Nantes of its wines and brandies. Without the commerce of the Dutch, the residents of Nantes could only [arrange?] and discontinue their vines. If however the pretensions of these fake barrel-makers would be implemented, the Dutch would be forced to abandon the commerce of Nantes.1 Position paper of the Dutch community in Nantes, 8 July 1678

The sharp and condescending tone of the above statement grew out of many decades of intense Dutch involvement in the economy of Nantes and its wine producing hinterland. Periods of relatively smooth relations became progressively shorter, the result of local initiatives aimed at curbing the power of the Dutch to dictate economic life or through royal initiatives that sought to increase France’s share of the international commercial pie. During the rst half of the seventeenth century, the political situation in Europe ensured royal and ministerial backing which allowed the foreigners to rmly anchor their trade in Nantes. By the middle of the century, the situation changed signicantly. The end of the Thirty Years War—and the end of the Dutch war for independence—realigned the international power structure, while the economic power of the Dutch evoked strong retaliatory measures from England and France. With the French push for a solid and independent merchant marine came economic and political pressures. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 added religious persecution to these negative factors. Despite all this, a [reduced] Dutch colony remained active in Nantes throughout the second half of the century.

1 ADLA B 6781, 8 July 1678, Registres de la Senechaussée. This Dutch reaction to a protest by the barrelmakers of Nantes was signed on behalf of their compatriots by Simon de Licht, Gerard Pieters, Pieter Hollaert, Mathieu Hooft, and Jacob de Bie, all naturalized citizens of Nantes. My translation.

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chapter one

The growing prominence of this group over the rst ve decades invites a more thorough examination of their activities and expatriate lifestyle. We can combine the wealth of information in Rotterdam’s notarial records and those of Nantes with the trade statistics from the unique port register of 1631. Disputes and legal wrangling between Dutch and French wine traders regarding illegal or unfair business practices in 1645 add an inside view of those practices and reveal the network of Dutch traders in Nantes that year. In addition to the Dutch community’s relationships with the French merchants of Nantes, its connections with the patria and other mercantile centers along the Atlantic seaboard, the bilateral sources have also brought to light the hitherto hidden business ties between the Dutch and the Sephardic merchants in the Loire port. The Dutch used Nantes as a transshipment port in their efforts to by-pass the Spanish trade embargoes. The strong ties that already existed between the French merchants of the Contractation de Nantes—which included several Sephardim—and their counterparts in the northern Spanish port of Bilbao could be exploited by traders on both sides of the embargo. We will take a close look at this important and protable secondary network below. Settlement trends Sparse sources prevent a denitive count of the number of Dutch residents in Nantes, yet a combination of notarial records in Rotterdam, Nantes, and Bordeaux, with additional information derived from secondary sources, has at least yielded enough data to come up with a reasonable idea about residency trends over the rst ve decades of the seventeenth century and allows us to consider the impact of periods of war versus peace on the size of the Dutch expatriate community.2 The graph identies trends over the years, but the number of Dutch residents was undoubtedly higher than surviving records can reveal.3

2

The 5-year averages absorb the worst of the source-related spikes. The notaries of Nantes recorded all Dutchmen as ‘marchands Flamands’ which means they could come from anywhere in the Dutch Republic or the Flemish speaking part of the Spanish Netherlands. Not included in my data are those men whose names are not obviously Dutch. Sephardic Jews traded under a wide variety of aliases, and it is highly likely that a number of the men considered to be ‘Dutch’ were in fact originally Spanish or Portuguese Jews or Conversos. 3

the dutch community in nantes

19

Dutch residents in Nantes, 5-year averages 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

16 0 16 0 0 16 2 0 16 4 0 16 6 0 16 8 1 16 0 1 16 2 1 16 4 1 16 6 1 16 8 2 16 0 2 16 2 2 16 4 2 16 6 2 16 8 3 16 0 3 16 2 3 16 4 3 16 6 3 16 8 4 16 0 4 16 2 4 16 4 4 16 6 4 16 8 5 16 0 5 16 2 5 16 4 56

0

Graph 1.1 Dutch residents in Nantes, ve year averages, 1591–1656 Sources: notarial records in ONA Rotterdam & Archives Départementales LoireAtlantique

The biggest spikes in the data occur when a single document contains a lengthy list of names or signatures; such valuable sources immediately push the ve-year averages much higher. The rarity of such lists proves that the lower numbers—which are mostly based on notarial records—are articially low, and that the high gures derived from lists are a better indication of the true size of the Dutch community in Nantes. The early years The earliest evidence of a Dutch resident of Nantes comes with the naturalization of Jehan Henrich who obtained the coveted privileges of citizenship in 1598 after eighteen years of residence.4 Apart from his arrival in Nantes in 1580 we do not know anything else about Jan

4 Mathorez: 8. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 98/139/367, 4 January and 84/30/1026 of 21 August reveal that a certain Jan Heyndricksz den Touwer was active in Nantes in 1627, but the marriage contract between André Hendrix and Marthe Bayot did not classify the groom as ‘marchand amand’ [perhaps because André was born in Nantes]—ADLA 4E2/1461/310, 27 December 1635.

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chapter one

Hendricksz. The use of the utterly common paternal rst-name makes it difcult to link later merchants—be they Jan Hendricksz or Hendrick Jansz—to this Dutch pioneer. In the twenty years from Henrich’s arrival to the turn of the century, a grand total of four Dutch ships are recorded to have made the trip to Nantes. One of these four, a ship coming from Middelburg in 1591, contained cargo presumably destined for one of Jehan Henrich’s relatives.5 The works of Craeybeckx, Tanguy, plus Sneller and Unger, combined with the meager notarial evidence available, show that before 1600 trade between the Dutch port cities and Nantes was negligible.6 Even though the Dutch residential presence in France seems to have been sparse through the year 1620, it was already subject to competitive criticism. Anthonie Casteleyn [Quisthlin or Chastelin in the French records] from Dordrecht must have arrived in Nantes well before 1609. That year the holder of a royal brandy monopoly complained about Casteleyn’s ve stills near the bridge at ‘Pillerny’, his illegal export of 40 barrels of brandy to La Rochelle and about his Dutch assistant, a barrel cooper named Adriaen.7 Casteleyn worked and lived in Nantes until his death sometime in 1626 and had commercial ties with Rotterdam, Amsterdam, La Rochelle, Rouen, Bremen, and Emden. He dealt not only in brandy but in salt as well. Later accusations by French merchants that Casteleyn skipped town leaving behind debts of over 150,000 livres are not corroborated by the Dutch records.8 Casteleyn was far more a creditor than a debtor. A number of estate-related notarial acts in Rotterdam show that Machteltgen Michielsdr inherited all of her husband’s estate, both moveable and immoveable “debts and

5 Tanguy, 314 & ftnt 327. Unfortunately, Adrien Henric never got his merchandise because the vessel was captured by Spanish ships off the Brittany coast. 6 In comparison, ve “Flamands” came to settle in Bordeaux between 1583 and 1599. See Archives Départementales de Gironde [hereafter ADG] C 3817 folio 15 for the brothers Jehan & Abraham Vander Porte, natives of Ghent; folio 25 for Paul Boul, native of Antwerp [perhaps related to Pieter Fransz Boul who was active in the wine trade in Nantes a generation later]. For land reclaimer Conrad Gaussen and for Dordrecht native Cornelis Crooswyck see Paul-Louis Coyne, “Familles Hollandaises De Bordeaux Au XVIIe Siècle,” Genealogies du Sud-Ouest 12 (1984): 27 & 28. Michel Merman worked in La Rochelle from 1583 before moving to Bordeaux in 1603. 7 AM HH 237, 18 May 1609. James Collins notes that a Nantais lawsuit of 1605 already mentions Casteleyn, which would mean he arrived well before then. Collins, “Les Impôts Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au XVIIe Siècle,” 156. 8 A variety of notarial acts in Rotterdam & Nantes describe the Casteleyn network. For the French protest see ADLA, Chambre de Commerce de Nantes, C 652, carton 10, cote 2. Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645, p. 6.

the dutch community in nantes

21

credits” which they had owned jointly until his death. Throughout the remainder of 1626 and into 1627, widow Machteltgen collected far more debts owed to her husband than she paid creditors.9 After dealing with the estate in Rotterdam, Machteltgen returned to Nantes no later than 1630, when she signed [or renewed] the lease on a house at the Fosse which she opened up to Dutch boarders.10 If the French story of the bankruptcy of 150,000 livres had been true, the widow Casteleyn as heir to the business would have had no reason to go back to Nantes. She did go back, and the family business continued under the helm of her son Anthonie Jr. until at least 1645, when the Moyen d’Intervention lists him among the Dutchmen actually in Nantes.11 Further proof of the family’s strong ties to Nantes comes from Casteleyn’s daughter Susanna’s marriage to a Rotterdam merchant in Nantes in 1642, and from her daughter Hester’s marriage to fellow Nantes-resident Maerten Doomer by 1650.12

9 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/167/321, 30 January 1627. Statement to this effect by Mrs. Casteleyn at the request of Adryaen van Rynnenburch, merchant in Leyden. Van Rynnenburch was in Nantes from 1623–1626. If Casteleyn Sr. came from Dordrecht, why would the estate be settled in Rotterdam? Mrs. Casteleyn came from Rotterdam, where two of her brothers were active in the wine trade, so the marriage contract and Casteleyn’s will must have had their legal base there. 10 ADLA 4E2/94/2/8, 1 February 1630. Lease of a house at the Fosse for a period of four years at 200 livres rent per year, payable in two installments. ADLA 4E2/1462/211, 15 May 1638. Dutch merchant Rochus Parve lodges at the widow Casteleyn at the Fosse, the riverside quay outside the city’s St. Nicholas gate. 11 GAR, ONA and ADLA for the presence of Anthony Casteleyn Jr. in Nantes. Anthony Jr. acted as witness to numerous commercial transactions in the intervening period, which under customary law gave him the right to participate in that transaction at the same conditions, with only his signature on the contract providing the necessary proof of participation. The information about the rights of notarial witnesses comes from Étienne Trocmé and Marcel Delafosse, Le Commerce Rochelais De La Fin Du XV e Siècle Au Début Du XVII e (Paris: A. Colin, 1952), 192. Is this the reason that the signatures of witnesses on the old acts are so often very clearly written? During the grain shortage of 1644, Anthonie Jr. brought 600 tons of grain, valued at 7,800 livres, into town on a single day; see Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 265, table VIII. Anthoni Jr. repatriated to Amsterdam where he managed to obtain a coveted position as a ‘bewindhebber’ [director] of the VOC’s chamber; in 1651 his account balance in the Wisselbank stood at 150,047. GAA toegang 5077 inv. nr. 19 fol. 131. His daughter Machteltgen married Daniel Parve, the son of Rochus Parve who lodged with the bride’s grandmother in Nantes. GAR, ONA 238/168/312, 18 February 1668 for Machteltgen’s marriage contract [at this point, Anthoni Jr. is listed as deceased]. 12 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 152/424/629, 21 June 1642 for the wedding preparations of Jacobus Motte and Susanna. The couple had settled back in Rotterdam by the time of the birth of their (oldest?) son. Maerten Doomer, their brother-in-law thanks to Doomer’s marriage to Hester Chastelein, acted as witness at the baptism of Jacob

22

chapter one The silence and the surge

The Rotterdam records are silent about a Dutch presence in Nantes between 1609 and 1620, even though we know that Casteleyn Sr. continued his business. We also know that Charles de Lange of Rotterdam arrived no later than 1614, because in 1634 he declared that he had lived in Nantes “without interruption for over twenty years trading in French wines for his own account and as factor on commission for others.”13 In 1620, thirty-three year old merchant Willem Ambrosius seems to have been the second Rotterdammer to settle along the Fosse quay in Nantes, where he was joined by Dordrecht native Jan Jansz Nuye, future brother-in-law to another early Rotterdam wine merchant, Cornelis Coninck.14 Ambrosius stayed two or three years at the most, but he was followed by at least six men from the Rotterdam area who moved to Nantes in 1621—among whom we nd his brother or son Adriaen Ambrosius.15 Willem Ambrosius was back in Rotterdam in 1623 where he established himself as specialist in the domestic wine trade.16 The number of Dutchmen in Nantes rose from four in 1620 to nine in 1621, and at least ve of them came from Rotterdam. The following year, the number of Dutchmen recorded in Nantes jumped from nine to thirteen, and three of the newcomers were Rotterdammers. Why this surge in the popularity of Nantes? James Collins has tied the upswing in Dutch interest in Nantes to the violence surrounding French naval action against local pirates in the waters off La Rochelle in 1621–1622, followed by the successful siege of 1627–1628 which

and Susanna’s son Abraham in 1647 and once again at the baptism of little Anthony in 1653. Digitale Stamboom, Gemeentearchief Rotterdam. (hereafter GAR/DG) 23 July 1647 and 1 June 1653. For Hester Chastelein, see http://www.mijnstambomen. nl/doomer.htm#BM20050530_1517_054836. 13 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/224, 28 August 1634. Statement by Rotterdam wine buyer Charles de Lange on the fabrication of barrels in Nantes. The earliest surviving record of a commercial transaction by De Lange dates from 1621. 14 For Nuye, see ADLA 4E2 1449/79, 27 May 1620. Coninck had arrived by 20 November 1621, see ADLA 4E2/1449/397. 15 Adriaen Ambrosius followed up his seven-year stay in Nantes with a distinguished career in the Rotterdam wine trade, in which he was active until at least 1655. 16 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 105/179/249, 9 March 1626. At the request of Amsterdam merchant Joost Baalst, wine buyer Willem Ambrosius states that 120 last of barley were loaded near La Rochelle in December 1625 and Michiel van Lamswaerde in Nantes had nothing to do with that shipment. At this time, Willem Abrosius owned a house and warehouse called De Druif [ The Grape] along the Blaack, one of Rotterdam’s inner harbors.

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signaled the end of the city’s favorable tax climate. In this scenario, the loss of La Rochelle’s comparative advantage as a tax-free haven favored a move towards Nantes.17 Even if the problems in La Rochelle were a push factor, we must rst consider the pull of Nantes itself. 1621 The year 1621 was a watershed for the Dutch Republic and its mercantile economy. The Twelve Year Truce between the edgling republic and Spain expired in April 1621. This political factor, even more than the violence off La Rochelle, explains the sudden jump in Dutch merchants residing in Nantes from 1620 to1621. Anticipating conditions of war and a renewed Spanish embargo on trade with Spanish territories worldwide, the Dutch mercantile communities and their clients/agents in Spain and Portugal re-positioned their factors along the French coast, a neutral zone conveniently located between the Iberian peninsula and the North Sea markets. Servicing the heart of France via the Loire hinterland, Nantes was the center of the regional wine exports.18 Nantes imported large quantities of high quality wines from upstream Orleans and Anjou that were then partially re-exported to the rest of Bretagne and to foreign countries. But the strong commercial ties that already existed between the Loire port and the north coast of Spain should be regarded as the primary reason for the Dutch interest in Nantes. The city beneted from the presence of the Contractation de Nantes, a group of French, Iberian, and New Christian merchants who enjoyed ‘favorite customer’ status and customs benets in their trade with Bilbao, the port city on Spain’s north coast closest to France.19 A signicant group of Spanish and Portuguese merchant families had made their home in Nantes since the mid-sixteenth century. Through membership in the Contractation, these merchants were actively involved in the trade with Spain, dealing primarily in wool, textiles and money.20 The suggestion by James

17

Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 246–248. By the same token, Nantes was the import point of sea salt destined for the interior of France. Tanguy, 106. 19 Paul Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” Annales de Bretagne 40, no. 2 & 3 (1932). 20 Jules Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Espagnols Et Les Portugais À Nantes,” Bulletin Hispanique XIV–XV (1912–1914): 1–98. See also Henri Lapeyre, Une Famille De Marchands, 18

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Collins that the ties between the Sephardim in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Nantes may have contributed to the surge in Dutch activity in the French port around 1620 was eshed out and conrmed by the research done for this book.21 The special and privileged ties of the Contractation de Nantes group with Bilbao provided a ready-made platform from which to re-direct trade between the Republic and Iberia. The shift from La Rochelle to Nantes As one of the other Contractation ports, La Rochelle had strong commercial ties with Bilbao as well.22 Before the start of the Twelve Year Truce in 1609 La Rochelle had beneted from Spain’s trade embargo against the Dutch, who used the Huguenot port on the Charente river for the transshipment of a variety of merchandise to Spain and Spanish goods—especially American silver—to the Dutch Republic. Trocmé notes that despite French royal edicts that banned the trade between France and Spain altogether or condoned it upon the payment of a 30-percent tariff, trade between La Rochelle and Spain ourished in the rst decade of the century due to “the fraudulent introduction, in the name of French and often Rochelais merchants, of Dutch goods”.23 Trocmé does not, however, sufciently stress the signicance of the timing of La Rochelle’s role as center of embargo evasions. After Spain tightened its embargo in December 1604, the Dutch States General began to require an oath of captains and ofcers of ships traveling to France and other neutral countries that they would not drop anchor in any Spanish port. The Admiralty of Rotterdam complied, and starting 29

Les Ruiz: Contribution À L’Étude Du Commerce Entre La France Et L’espagne Au Temps De Philippe II (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955) as well as James B. Collins, “Early Modern French Jewish Identity: The Portuguese of Nantes,” (Paper given at the Western Society for French History: 2002). As New Christians or Conversos, they lived in Nantes as bons catholiques, even if back home in Spain or Portugal they had been persecuted for their Jewish roots. 21 Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 11. 22 Jeulin: 296 and 309. 23 Trocmé and Delafosse, 156. Trocmé wrote the segment that deals with the 17th century. See also W. P. C. Knuttel, ed., Catalogus Van De Pametten Verzameling Van De Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 9 vols. (Den Haag: 1889), nr. 1210 and nr. 1245. Between 15 November 1603 and 8 February 1604, French exports to Spain were allowed under the imposition of 30 percent tax. The edict of 8 February 1604 forbade all trade between France and any Spanish territories, including the Spanish Netherlands. The French tried in vain to convince the States General that Dutch trade on the common enemy under the revenue producing Convoy and Licenses-system had to stop.

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January 1605, recorded the oaths of 71 captains sailing on ‘the West’. The register, briey described by Bijlsma, lists the destination of 69 of the ships, 40 of which [or 58 percent] were poised to depart to France, followed by 21 to England. The breakdown in individual destinations shows the popularity of La Rochelle in this rst decade of the century [with 13 ships or 32.5 percent of the French total] followed closely by Rouen [12 ships or 30 percent]. Nantes attracted four ships, Bordeaux ve, Dieppe four, and Bayonne two. Bijlsma calls the list remarkable, especially because it “provides new and unassailable information on the importance of Rotterdam’s trade with France prior to the Truce”.24 By taking the list at face value and the captains at their word, Bijlsma missed the real meaning of the document. The seemingly sudden surge in Rotterdam’s trade on France from the moment that the Spanish ports were closed to the city’s eet strongly implies that some of the cargo labeled for the French ports had a Spanish port as its nal destination. Even though we do not know what portion of the goods carried to La Rochelle in those 13 ships would end up in Spain, and despite the fact that both French and Dutch ships were forbidden to sail into Spanish ports, the Admiralty document provides further evidence that Trocmé’s assessment of the Dutch contraband trade via La Rochelle is correct. This particular trade embargo lasted until the start of the Truce in 1609, which corresponds to the peak in La Rochelle’s trade with the Dutch Republic.25 Salt and barley Rotterdam’s trade with La Rochelle itself involved salt and grain (primarily barley) exports, and only the occasional export of wines.26 Both

24 R. Bijlsma, “Rotterdamsche Koopvaarders Op Westen in 1605,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 5 (1917): 55–56. Fifteen of the 21 ships sailing on England listed London as their destination. 25 We can compare the Dutch activities with the number of ships importing goods from France into the port of London over a 9-months period in 1601–1602. Of the total 9,110 tons imported into London on 151 ships, 1,549 tons [or 17 percent] arrived from La Rochelle on 16 ships. Nantes did not ship any goods to London that year. See Lewis Rex Miller, “New Evidence on the Shipping and Imports of London, 1601–1602,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 41, no. 4 [August] (1927): 753. 26 Craeybeckx, 244–245. Craeybeckx documented the strong commercial ties that existed between Middelburg and La Rochelle in the second half of the sixteenth century. It is likely that the reason for the meager information on wine trade with La Rochelle in Rotterdam stems from Middelburg’s strong hold over that trade.

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salt and barley played a signicant role in the economy of Rotterdam.27 Salt was crucial to the city’s rich herring trade, while Rotterdam’s booming beer business used massive amounts of barley. While the area immediately around La Rochelle did not often yield exportable surpluses, the grain producers of the nearby Marans region did.28 Conrming earlier ndings that Dutch re-exports of Baltic grain to France were the exception instead of the rule, the few Rotterdam records that deal with La Rochelle—both before and after the siege—indicate that the Dutch came to the city to load barley, not to deliver it.29 La Rochelle’s ability to supply both salt and barley should have meant an early and strong interest by Rotterdammers to set up shop in La Rochelle, but Trocmé found no evidence of a signicant Dutch community in La Rochelle during the rst two decades of the century, which is corroborated by the lack of Rotterdam sources that deal with the city. He does mention a handful of Dutch factors involved in salt, wine, and brandy exports in the mid-1620s, which is exactly the period when we would expect the rst wave of violence to have steered people away from La Rochelle and into the port of Nantes.30 The contradictory

27 R. Bijlsma, Rotterdams Welvaren 1550 –1650 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1918), 141. Rotterdam’s salt came from Le Crosic, the Bay of Bourgneuf, Saint Martin on the Ile de Ré, and Brouage. Most of the city’s barley came from the Marans, followed by Nantes which supplied wheat, rye, barley and buckwheat. 28 John Garretson Clark, La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy During the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 170–172. As early as 1604 Rotterdam’s brewers had a strong interest in the production of brandies and jenever [gin]. In 1621, Rotterdam’s brewers used approximately 14,880 tons of grain of which 4,800 tons produced the six million liters of beer consumed by the people of Rotterdam. See Richard W. Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 –1900: Economy, Technology and the State (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 79, 91, and 95. My calculations based on information by Unger: Per capita consumption of beer in Leiden that year was 301 liters. Each liter of beer required about one liter of grain; one liter of grain weighs about 0.8 kilograms, so a ton of grain weighed 800 kg. It is unknown how much jenever was distilled from the remaining barley, or how much of the beer was further processed into brandy. 29 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 105/179/249, 9 March 1626 describes a shipment of grain (120 last barley) from La Rochelle to Rotterdam in 1625. More barley was exported in 1634 and 1639. The one exception to the exports is a shipment of grain into France in 1644, the year following the failure of the French grain harvest, and this shipping contract allowed the captain to decide which city to land his cargo in, Bordeaux, Nantes, or La Rochelle. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 182/52/149, 23 March 1644. The sparse information not only conrms James Collins’ statement that Dutch grain imports into France in the 1620s were unimportant, but forces us to reverse the angle: If French grain was involved, it was exported rather than imported. Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 246. 30 Trocmé and Delafosse, 112–114. Indications are that the Dutch community was

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evidence supports the idea that in Dutch eyes La Rochelle remained a viable option until the siege and loss of its free port status in 1628. While the grain trade did not warrant the use of resident Dutch factors, the rising demand and expertise necessary for the production of brandy led to the increase in the number of Dutch specialists in residence. One man with indirect but strong ties to the wine traders of Rotterdam worked in La Rochelle in 1624, but by 1629 Jan de Neve had returned to Middelburg. We can only assume that the siege conditions brought him home early.31 The very fact that the notarial acts dealing with Nantes are much more numerous than those which feature La Rochelle proves that from 1621 onwards, the latter city ranked well below Nantes in Rotterdam’s commercial pecking order. The names and backgrounds of the men mentioned by Trocmé indicate that La Rochelle was the port favored by merchants from Middelburg and Amsterdam, which explains the city’s relatively rare appearances in Rotterdam records.32 La Rochelle’s ties with Middelburg nonetheless had implications for Rotterdam. After Antwerp fell back into Spanish hands in 1585 and access to Middelburg and Vlissingen became very expensive due to the blockade of—and high tariffs on—the Schelde river, the Dutch center of maritime wine imports shifted from Middelburg to Rotterdam. The strong commercial ties between Rotterdam and Middelburg in the early part of the seventeenth century do nd ample conrmation in Rotterdam’s records. The signicant growth of the Dutch community in Nantes in the early 1620s was primarily due to the re-implementation of the Spanish embargo. In the early twenties, piracy and naval actions around La Rochelle conspired with larger political issues to reduce the city’s

not ‘large’ enough to warrant being called “a large Dutch factor colony” by James Collins. See Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 243. The dearth of notarial evidence of early trade between La Rochelle and Rotterdam mirrors the same lack of material on the connections between Nantes and Rotterdam, which means that categorical statements about conditions in the rst two decades of the century are dangerous. 31 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 98/181/470, 25 August 1629. Jan de Neve was the brother in law to the Van de Luffel men in Rotterdam and Middelburg and the son of Joris de Neve Sr., Zeeland’s Convoymeester of the VOC. Willem Sybrand Unger, De Oudste Reizen Van De Zeeuwen Naar Oost-Indië 1598–1604, Werken Uitgegeven Door De Linschoten Vereniging, vol. 51 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1948), 223. 32 Trocmé and Delafosse, 112–114. The list of names compiled from Trocmé’s work gives us 11 ‘amands’ between 1594 and 1598. Nine men show up in the rst decade of the 17th, ve between 1611 and 1618, and 16 in the troubled 1620s.

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appeal as commercial center, which forced the move into smoother waters. Dutch skippers had every right to be wary of the navy. The battles between the French navy and the “Rochelloosen” at the end of September 1622 forced a group of thirty Dutch ships to ee out of fear of conscation of goods and ships by the French navy which was perennially short on the latter. Ten years later, a group of Rotterdam ‘reeders’ demanded restitution for the goods that were conscated in the name of the King of France off the Eenhoorn [ Unicorn] to assist in his war effort against La Rochelle in 1622.33 The ghting near La Rochelle undeniably reduced the city’s attraction as mercantile center, but until the loss of its tax benets in 1628, La Rochelle continued to entice some merchants foolish or eager enough to risk voyages in troubled waters in order to avoid high duties on their goods. The two periods of active maritime ghting near the Huguenot bastion should not be clumped together. The combination of the renewed embargo plus the initial wave of ghting around La Rochelle turned Nantes into the next ideal transfer station in the trade between Iberia and the Dutch Republic. The growing Dutch presence in Nantes The dramatic rise in the Dutch presence in Nantes after the mid-twenties may be explained by actions taken by the Spanish government to clamp down on Dutch evasions of the economic embargo, re-imposed upon the resumption of hostilities in 1621. Early weak spots and loopholes in the system got the government’s attention. According to Israel, the almirantazgo [customs board] established by Philip IV in 1624 was fully operational in the ports of Andalusia and near Dunkirk by 1626. Using a system of “certicates, inspections, condemnations and cons-

33 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 91/285/691, 21 November 1622. The crew of the Fortuyn from Hoorn stated that four weeks earlier they had been loading salt for a trip to England in the roadstead of La Rochelle when the French navy battled the Rochelloosen, who then ed to Saint Martin [on Ile de Ré]. Fearing conscation, the thirty merchant ships ed as well. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 165/2/2, 28 October 1632. The reeders of the Eenhoorn were Rotterdam’s ex-burgomaster Van Colster, council-member Van der Veen, the merchants Cruysert, Pietersz, and Santvoort, who also acted on behalf of Lanschot of Leyden, plus captain Bors. Why did they wait ten years before asking for their money? The political climate of 1632 favors asking the royal treasury for money, but perhaps there was a 10-year statue of limitations on reparations.

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cations”, the almirantazgo ofcers made conditions in the Spanish ports virtually impossible for anyone trying to evade the import/export ban on goods produced or transported by the Dutch.34 Israel recognizes the connection between the Spanish embargo against the Dutch of 1621 and the sudden rise of French trade with Spain from that year onwards, but considers this trade to be wholly French. Instead, I propose a direct link between the increased effectiveness of Spanish port ofcials by 1626 and the second surge in Dutch residents in Nantes, with a peak of 22 men in 1629. During the years 1627–1630, thirty-two new Dutch merchants or factors arrived in Nantes. Fifteen of those newcomers (46.8 percent) came from Rotterdam or returned there afterwards.35 The Dutch started to use Nantes as a neutral way station where their ties with well-established New Christian Iberians ensured access to the ports and commodities of Spain and Portugal. If we depend on the notarial acts and Trocmé’s account, none of the newcomers had been signaled in La Rochelle prior to the start of the siege. This argues against a direct link between La Rochelle’s problems and Nantes’ economic ascent and instead favors the embargo related shift. On the other hand, the only year in which a signicant volume of wine entered the port of Nantes by sea came between July 1628 and July 1629, exactly the period in which the siege made maritime trade with La Rochelle impossible. That year, Nantes served as the transshipment port for wines arriving by sea from Bordeaux [1,464.25 tons] and Spain [596.25 tons] plus 177 tons of other wines. These maritime imports were exceptional, at all other times Nantes imported wines from further up the Loire river and from its own region, most of it destined for re-export.36 We can only conclude that a number of factors rather than a single event turned the favorable trade winds away from La Rochelle and towards Nantes.

34

Jonathan I. Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy, and the Jews, 1585–1713 (London: Hambledon Press, 1990), 17–19. 35 The GAR, ONA records yield seven new names for just the year 1627; Adriaen Hartman and Jan Hendricksz den Touwer were Rotterdam natives while Gillis van de Luffel plus the brothers Alexander and Reynier Velters were natives of Middelburg. These last three men had strong commercial ties with Rotterdam and appear in a number of notarial acts. 36 Tanguy, 57, table VI.

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chapter one The 1630s—Nantes’ boom years

In 1632, the Royal Council issued a decree which lifted the restrictions on the removal of capital amassed in France by foreigners upon their death.37 The knowledge that their estate would be safe from royal conscation under the Droit d’Aubaine cleared away a signicant nancial drawback from the risk assessment of a Dutchman trading in France. The Droit d’Aubaine put money into the royal coffers, so why would Louis XIII hurt his own nancial well-being by granting the heirs of economically successful Dutch residents of France the right to walk away with all the earnings of the deceased?38 What triggered the benevolence of the king in 1632? At that time, Cardinal Richelieu and plenty of strategically placed ‘subsidies’ continued to keep France out of active ghting in the Thirty Years’ War, letting others do the dirty work against the Habsburg empire for them. But the Dutch campaign against Spain in the Southern Netherlands had gone very well over the summer of 1632, and the strong pro-peace sentiment in the States General of the Spanish Netherlands combined with the eagerness of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht to conclude a peace treaty with Spain.39 The “aubaine” decree of 1632 must be seen as an incentive to the Dutch government to continue the war.

37 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 15. The decree of 1632 was used by the Dutch colony in Nantes as part of their defense in a lawsuit about their privileges as foreign merchants operating in France. Mathorez does not give us the date that the decree was issued. See also Charlotte C. Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science; 113th Ser., 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 109. Wells calls it an “inducement calculated to bring the skills of Dutch merchants and artisans into the French economy.” Wells quotes but dismisses Marguerite Vanel’s earlier interpretation of the decree as a “collective naturalization”. In view of the signicant number of Dutchmen already present in France at the time, Vanel’s explanation makes more sense than Wells’. 38 Sietske Barendrecht, François Van Aerssen, Diplomaat Aan Het Franse Hof (1598–1613), Leidse Historische Reeks, vol. IX (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1965), 80–82. King Henri IV had granted Dutch nationals an exemption from the Droit d’Aubaine as early as 1595, but the royal decree was only legally valid in those provinces where the Parlement had ratied and registered the exemption. Budgetary restraints [penny pinching] caused the States General to push for ratication in the Parlements of Rouen, Bordeaux and Rennes [ Bretagne] only. Despite a urry of activities by François van Aerssen, the Dutch representative at the court of Henri IV, it seems that by July 1601 the Parlements of Rouen and Paris had ratied the aubaine exemption, but those of Rennes and Bordeaux had not. 39 Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, 515, 517, 521. A portion of the southern nobility remained in favor of the continuation of the war and was in cahoots with Cardinal Richelieu.

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If the years between 1627 and 1634 showed the most activity by Dutch merchants in Nantes, they should also be the years in which the traders mentioned in the complaint by the Nantais merchants of 1645 operated in the city. Indeed, 17 of the 36 men listed in the Moyens d’Intervention made their fortunes in exactly this period.40 The political and economic landscape changed once again, however, with the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish war in 1635. The Franco-Spanish war (1635–1659) For the rst seventeen years of the Thirty Years War, the French refrained from active military participation in the Spanish Netherlands and Germany. Heavily inuenced by the foreign policy of Cardinal Richelieu, French involvement centered on subsidies to the military efforts of the Dutch Republic, German Protestant princes, and Denmark. Increased success by the Spanish-Austrian side pushed France to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with the Dutch on 8 February 1635.41 It can be no coincidence that the decree by which the Royal Council granted all Dutch citizens residing in France commercial privileges identical to those of French merchants dates from 25 February 1635, which came less than two weeks after the signing of the ‘aggression pact’ between France and the Dutch Republic for a joint invasion of the Spanish Netherlands.42 When France opened hostilities in May by invading from the south and the Dutch attacked from the north, this twin-front ghting over the Spanish Netherlands as well as

40 ADLA C 652, Chambre de Commerce de Nantes, Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645 and various notarial acts GAR, ONA and ADLA. In 1634, for example, Charles de Lange returned to Rotterdam after a career of “more than twenty years” in Nantes, according to hiw own words. This places De Lange’s arrival there before 1614, even though his rst recorded transaction in Nantes does not occur until 1621. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/224, 28 August 1634. 41 Victor-L. Tapié, France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu, trans. D. McN. Lockie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Despite the Treaty of Munster in 1648 which signaled the end of the conict for most of the participants, the war between Spain and France and the trade ban lasted until 1659. 42 T. Malvezin, Histoire Du Commerce De Bordeaux Depuis Les Origins Jusqu’à Nos Jours, 4 vols., vol. 2 [ XVIe et XVIIe siecles] (Bordeaux: 1892), 254. On 1 December 1635 Dutch merchant Guillaume van den Platen submitted this Arret du Conseil for registration with the Parlement de Bordeaux. For the invasion agreement of February 1635, see Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, 527. In 1656, the Dutch in Nantes buttressed their claim to equal rights to French merchants with this 1635 decree.

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the menace of the Spanish navy in the Channel created serious headaches for Dutch commerce.43 In addition to the military subsidies, the commercial leveling of the trading eld inside France must have served to sweeten the pill of the disruptions caused by intensied ghting in and off Flanders. The conditions of war immediately led to the ofcial ban on commercial relations between France and Spain, acerbating the economic and thus political tensions in places heavily dependent on the Iberian trade such as Nantes. The new bi-lateral embargo on trade between France and Spain meant that the hop-scotch route from the Dutch Republic to the Iberian peninsula via neutral French ports ceased to be an ofcial option. Dutch ships had been barred from Spain since 1621, but sailing under neutral ags—including the French one—had allowed trade to continue. Hoisting the eur-de-lis on a Dutch owned uytschip now became an open invitation to enemy ships, including those from the coast of the Spanish Netherlands. The number of notarial acts that document problems with ‘Duynkercker’ privateers and the Spanish navy is legion. According to Jean Tanguy, the Franco-Spanish war “delivered a fatal blow to the trade between Nantes and Bilbao, its chief partner in Spain”.44 At rst glance, the residency gures for Nantes conrm the severe impact of the combination of the new French/Spanish embargoes plus the continuing Spanish embargo on Dutch commercial activities. The numbers for the three years 1634–1637 indicate that the Dutch community in Nantes dropped from 17 to 6 to 7 to 5, which seems to point to a signicant decline in commercial interest in the city. The situation was actually not as dire, because the records place a robust 13 Dutch merchants in Nantes in 1638.45 More signicantly, Collins’ gures indicate that the Franco-Spanish war did not have a serious impact on the wine trade of Nantes: The receipts of the wine tax of Brittany do not signal a drop in the trade at all.46

43 Jonathan I. Israel, Conicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585–1713 (London; Rio Grande, Ohio: Hambledon Press, 1997), 34–35. 44 Tanguy, 337 & 342, ftnt 431. 45 Last mentioned in 1633 or 1634 were Charles de Lange, Jan de Langhe, Tilman Goris, Jan van Ravestein and Jan van Rossum. The two newcomers of 1636 were Joris Ravestein and Cornelis Slingerland. 46 Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 54. The revenues of the little duty on wine actually increased between 1634 and 1636, remained level through 1638, and only dipped slightly through 1642. The real dip in the wine market came in 1643, when the receipts dropped to an index of 68 down from an index of 95 the previous year.

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The 1640s At rst glance, another shift in the political situation of Europe in 1640 appears to have reduced the Dutch interest in Nantes, at least for the time being: Portugal regained its independence in 1640 and the Dutch immediately resumed regular trade with Portugal and Brazil en droiture. Six Dutchmen left Nantes in this period, ve of whom had worked there for more than ten years.47 Three of them were Sephardim with strong ties to Portugal. After 1640, the mediation of the Sephardim of Nantes would no longer be needed for Dutchmen trading on Portugal or Brazil. Political instability at the top of the French government had an impact on the economy. In December 1642, the death of chief minister [and Brittany’s Governor] Cardinal Richelieu caused a reshufing of the power base at the highest level of national politics; in Brittany, Richelieu’s cousin Marechal de la Meilleraye succeeded his uncle as the provincial Governor. Less than half a year later, the death of King Louis XIII in May 1643 removed the remaining anchor of stability at the domestic level, and subsequent political inghting plunged the nation into a period of unrest that culminated in the civil wars known collectively as the Fronde (1648–1653).48

47 ADLA C 652. The timing of Bonaventura Bron’s return to Amsterdam after an 11-year sojourn coincides with the resumption of normal trade relations between Holland and Portugal/Brazil following the Portuguese independence from Spain in 1640. This would make a lot of sense if Bron indeed was a Sephardic Jew or at least closely afliated with the trading consortium of Hamburg-based Cornelis le Brun which was heavily involved in the Iberian and New World trade. See Hermann Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte Im Hamburger Portugal—Und Spanienhandel 1590 –1625 ([ Hamburg]: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 294. For more on the Sephardim of Nantes, see Chapter 6. The Veltres brothers last recorded presence occurred in 1640, they returned to Middelburg after a 13-year stay. My suspicions that the Velters were Sephardim is based on the information that “George Veiltrès”, a native of Serpa in Portugal, witnessed a Jewish testament in Bordeaux in 1604; and that “Johann Vilter” acted as a Lisbon factor for Georg Vilter in Hamburg in 1605. For George, see T. Malvezin, Histoire Des Juifs À Bordeaux (Marseille: 1976), 124 and for Johann & George, see Kellenbenz, 288. Stols reports of Joao Filter, alias Velter, who worked in Lisbon from about 1596 through 1643. Joao was active in the slave trade between Angola and Brazil. Another ‘Filter’, Jacques, lived in Den Bosch from his birth in 1596 through at least 1663. Eddy Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders of De Handel-Betrekkingen Der Zuidelijke Nederlanden Met De Iberische Wereld 1598–1648, 2 vols. (Brussel: Paleis der Academièen, 1971), 28. Vanhoute or Vanoutena left in 1639 after 12 years, Vrouling in 1639 after 5 years, while Ravestein showed up in the year 1640 only. 48 Tapié. As Louis XIV was only 5 years old, his mother Anne of Austria, assisted

34

chapter one

The renewal of the privileges of the bourgeois [ burghers/citizens] of Nantes in 1643 by the regents of the boy-king Louis XIV started a lengthy series of claims and counterclaims about the right of foreigners to conduct their affairs in the city, claims versus denial of French citizenship rights, and saw the introduction of a special tax on foreigners. The royal lettres patentes conrmed that only a bourgeois [burgher] of Nantes had the right to trade with foreigners, excluding all direct deals between the Dutch merchants and any wine producers or brokers from outside the city.49 The magistrates of Nantes decided in 1643 to crack down on the payment of the ‘Taxe des estrangers’ [tax on foreigners] of 2.5 percent on the value of their goods, this in addition to the regular taxes paid by French and foreign traders alike.50 Because the Dutch relied on their contacts and contracts throughout the Loire river basin for their supply of Anjou wines, other upstream wines and brandies, a strict implementation of the citizenship rights would severely hamper their operations. They countered the threat by claiming that the umbrella rights granted by earlier French kings [including the liberal privileges of 1635] had placed Dutch citizens on par with native Frenchmen, including their Nantais competitors. Between 1643 and 1646, the Dutch community claimed all the benets of citizenship while the French sought to deny them.51 Anti-Dutch polemics and violence The mid-40s witnessed the creation of the Moyens d’Intervention of 1645 and Jean Eon’s Commerce Honorable of 1646, two important contemporary sources on life in Nantes’ Dutch community. Previous descriptions of the Dutch activities in Nantes have indiscriminately relied on these two sources. Eon’s essay on the commercial life of Nantes and on the detrimental impact of the Dutch community’s commercial practices was clearly derived from the Moyens d’Intervention as a [one-sided] source,

by her condant and chief minister Cardinal Mazarin, acted as his regent. Louis XIV was not crowned until 1654. 49 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 14. 50 Eduard Van Biema, “Wat Hollanders Te Lijden Hadden Van Het Protectionisme in Het Frankrijk Van De 17de Eeuw,” Oud Holland 17 (1899): 204–205. See also Wells, 51. Unfortunately, Wells does not mention the original date of the foreigners’ tax. 51 In 1647, at least 20 men continued the trend of a strong Dutch presence in Nantes’ la petite Hollande.

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and has in turn been used extensively by Mathorez and echoed by Sée.52 The relatively simplistic black-and-white depiction of the Dutch in these works must be color-enhanced by knowledge gleaned from a wider variety of sources. The two contemporary documents highlight the commercial practices and successes of the Dutch community from a French—and competitive—perspective, but the modern historians who used them as a factual basis for their conclusions have been misled. Instead of whitewashing questionable practices of the Dutch merchants, we can place those practices in the context of the opportunities available to any merchant active in international trade. Both documents attack the Dutch presence in Nantes and call for measures that curtail Dutch abuses of honest French citizens. A third complaint, this one originating with the nobility of Angoumois in 1649, repeats the overwhelming sense of oppression at the hands of the Dutch. In their Cahier de doléances to the Estates General, the noblemen decry . . . the monopolies and connivance of the Flemings and the Hollanders who live in the towns of Angoulême and Cognac and even in several villages along the river of Charente, thereby depriving the local people of the trafc and business which belongs to them, the said foreigners have so far intruded themselves that they alone carry on the trade in wines, spirits, vinegars, wheat, salt, saffron, paper and other merchandise, to the great detriment of the natives of the country.53

If we position the rst two complaints in the framework of general political unrest during the regency, they can be seen as attempts by the Nantais to gain local concessions using Dutch as excuse. We should, however, not discount the possibility of a true escalation of abuses at the hands of the Dutch who could have exploited a jittery market by exacting lower prices for the wines they purchased, be it in Nantes, Angoulême, Cognac, or in the Charente valley.

52 ADLA C 652, carton 10, cote 2. Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645 and Eon. See also Henri Eugene Sée, «Un Document Sur Le Commerce Des Hollandais À Nantes En 1645 », Economisch Historisch Jaarboek 12 (1926). Jean Tanguy was the rst French historian who noted the uncritical repetition of the anti-Dutch polemic by the modern historians. Tanguy, 318. 53 Nobility of Angoumois, “Cahier De Doléances Pour Les États Généraux De 1649,” in Problèmes De Stratication Sociale. Deux Chahiers De La Noblesse Pour Les États Généraux De 1649–1651, ed. R. Mousnier, J. P. Labatut, and Y. Durand (Paris: 1965). My gratitude to Timothy LeGoff who graciously sent me a transcription of the Cahier. [my translation]

36

chapter one The ‘Moyens d’Intervention’ of 1645

In the Moyens d’Intervention, the [ French] merchants of Nantes complained to the King and his councilors about Dutch violations of their municipal privileges and other commercial laws, as well as about their inability to compete against the foreigners under conditions of a virtual Dutch monopoly of the wine and brandy export business in the region. The practice of the Dutch to get rich and then declare bankruptcy before skipping town was, according to the Nantais, as common as it was despicable. The list of seven Dutchmen mentioned by name as each having departed with fortunes greater than 150,000 livres after declaring bankruptcy was augmented by a list of an additional 26 men whose combined actions supposedly left French creditors with claims of more than 800,000 to 900,000 livres.54 The complaint contained the sweeping statement that the national economy of the Republic rested on the availability of the goods exported from France at fraudulent prices, which the Dutch then used to trade with all over the world. In other words, the Dutch should be eternally grateful to the French for the opportunity to trade with them, but instead the Hollanders were such “thankless beings” that “they have no other object than to cause their [the French] total ruin . . .”55 The Moyens d’Intervention must be read and used as a single-viewpoint, legal position paper presented by the plaintiffs. Combining the Moyens d’Intervention and its list of Dutchmen [see Appendix IV ] with other sources reveals that at the time the French complaint was written only ve of the 39 merchants mentioned can be placed in Nantes, while at least two other men worked in town but did not garner a spot on the list. Many of the men listed had long since quit town to return home, while pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn had died in his adopted country as early as 1626.56

54 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 6–7. Based on the respective silver content of the coins in 1646, the exchange rate was 1 livre tournois = 0.85 Dutch guilders. 55 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645, p. 3. 56 The actual number of Dutchmen active in Nantes in 1645 is surely higher because I have chiey relied on Rotterdam sources to cross-check the names. Due to the fact that the notarial acts frequently mention non-Rotterdam trading partners, suppliers, or purchasers we are nonetheless able to get a reasonably solid grasp of the Dutch community in Nantes.

37

the dutch community in nantes The bankruptcies —ction or fact?

According to the Moyens d’Intervention, total losses to the Nantais economy due to the Dutch bankruptcies amounted to between 1,850,000 and 1,950,000 livres.57 We can put the systematic bankruptcies in perspective by looking at what 1,900,000 livres represented: In 1629, it would have compensated the local producers for 67,857 tons of the inferior Nantais wine, while in 1630 it would have bought 7,851 tons of brandy on the local market. We know from the port registers of 1631 that Nantes exported a total of 40,652 tons of wine, plus another 1,382 tons of brandy that year. Well over half of the wine exports [58.7 percent] consisted of the higher quality and thus signicantly more expensive upstream wines.58 Table 1.1

Nantes alcohol exports & estimated production values, 1631

1631 exports Nantais wines upstream Loire wines Total wines brandy Total alcohol

tons

percent

16,760 23,892 40,652 1,382 42,034

41.3 58.7

Sources: Tanguy & ADLA

If the market value of all alcohol exports was 3,107,068 livres, the Dutch bankruptcies together represented 61 percent or [roughly speaking] the equivalent of two-thirds of a single year’s wine exports.

57

Seven times 150,000 livres plus another 800,000 to 900,000 livres. ADLA & GAR/ONA: Average price for upstream wines was 102 livres @ ton. For a very expensive shipment, see Tanguy, 69–71. The local sale price of these upstream wines in 1630 was 280 livres. ADLA 4E2/1457/251, 6 September 1630 for the sale of 15 bottes [1 botte = 1 pipe] of vin d’amont @140 livres. Average price for Nantais wines on the local market was about 28 livres @ ton, but the records yield quite a spread in prices. See for example ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 July 1630 for the wine sale @ 12 livres per oxhead = 48 livres @ ton Nantais wine. Over the period, the local market for brandy supported an average price of 242 livres @ ton; in the summer & fall 1630 the average was slightly lower at 233.6 livres @ tons, see the four records ADLA 4E2/94/2/126–139–151–181. In 1631, one livre was worth 1.13 guilders. 58

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We can assess the bankruptcies from another angle. The careers of these dishonest Dutchmen span the fteen years 1621–1636, so if we take the 1,900,000 livres mentioned by the French, the fraudulent losses to the Nantais averaged 126,666 livres per year, which comes to about 4 percent of the annual turnover based on the 1631 gures. Even the two largest single bankruptcies in the history of the Nantes-Dutch wine trade relations—the 300,000 livres [supposedly] fraudulently expatriated by Bonaventure Bron and by the Velters brothers—each represent 9.6 percent of one year’s worth of exports. Based on the above calculations we must conclude that in 1645 the French exaggerated the impact of the bankruptcies. What do other sources tell us about Dutch bankruptcies in France? Le Commerce Dis-honorable A year after the publication of the Moyens d’Intervention, Jean Eon did not mince any words in ‘Le Commerce Honorable’. He vehemently objected to the fact that the Dutch pretended to enjoy trading privileges in France that actually belonged to native Frenchmen or naturalized citizens only—but he was wrong.59 In the early fteenth century, when Brittany was still an independent territory, Duke Jean V had already welcomed Friesian and ‘Flemish’ traders to Nantes with open arms and the promise of free trade. After assuming overlordship of the province, subsequent kings of France always managed to grant or conrm privileges which leveled the trading eld enough to make it protable for the Dutch to do business in France.60 The signature of the king did not, however,

59 Eon, 61. Eon lists the rules under which foreign merchants could trade in Nantes: a) foreigners not allowed to own or rent housing, but have to live with a French host. b) foreigners not allowed to own or rent warehouses or other storage space, and have to put them up for sale immediately or give them in hands of local resident for sale. c) foreigners obliged to use local manager for all business, purchases, sales. d) foreigners forbidden to trade on commission for fellow countrymen, or other nationals. e) in case foreigner has received royal Lettres de Naturalité, it is upon condition that he not trade on commission for any other foreigners. 60 Several sources, both primary and secondary, mention or even provide a transcription of one or more of these royal decrees. They include: ADG C 3820 (naturalization with full rights of subjects of the United Provinces and the Netherlands by Henri IV,

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seal the deal. Endless claims and counter-claims regarding the privileges enjoyed by foreigners arose from the fact that the royal edicts became law only upon ratication by the provincial Parlements; in case of the Droit d’Aubaine, further approvals were needed from the Chambres de Comptes [the revenue boards] as well as the provincial Treasury. Each of these ratications required ofcial and un-ofcial payments to the power brokers, but the Dutch States General appears to have been too tight-sted to get the necessary approvals from all eight Parlements, instead limiting their lobbying efforts to those along the Atlantic coast.61 As a result, the legality of the umbrella exemption for Dutch merchants from the Droit d’Aubaine remained in question throughout the period. 62 According to Eon, the people of France witnessed so many deceits, insolvencies and bankruptcies by foreigners, the vast majority of which came at the hands of the Dutch, that a neologism appeared for declaring a bankruptcy: to ‘fair Flandre’ [doing a Dutch].63 But even Eon tempered his blanket condemnation with the observation that when Bonaventure Bron returned to Amsterdam with 300,000 livres in prots, he did so after having lived in Nantes for some time, trading on behalf of his fellow countrymen. Eon specically used the word prots, which suggests that Bron [who worked in Nantes for 12 years] actually acquired his fortune in a legal manner.64

April 1595); ADG C 3842, Lettres Patentes of Louis XIII which release the subjects of the United Provinces throughout France from the Droit d’Aubaine (1632); Royal decree of Louis XIII conrming the right to trade freely with any merchant in the country, be they French or foreigner (1635); another conrmation of equal trading rights with the French (1640), and nally, a bit more localized, the right for the Dutch merchants in Nantes to trade freely with merchants in Tours and Orleans, either through factors or by themselves (1644). 61 Barendrecht, 80–82. See also Wells, 47, 51, and 109. 62 Barendrecht, 79–82. Barendrecht used the Resolutions of the States General and the correspondence of Dutch ambassador Van Aerssen to highlight the problems around the Droit d’Aubaine. For the role of Johan van der Veken of Rotterdam in the nancial deals between Henri IV and the States General, see Van Veken’s biography: J. H. Kernkamp, Johan Van Der Veken En Zijn Tijd (Rotterdam: Erasmus Universiteit, 1953), 80. On his relationship with Oldenbarnevelt & gifts to France, see page 16 & 24. For the ‘informal’ payments, shipment of porcelain to wife of French minister in 1616, see page 16. 63 Eon, 99. Several other languages have colorful proverbs dating from the 17th century that use the Dutch as unattering examples. Is this the legacy of economic envy? 64 Eon, 103. In addition to Bron, the author mentioned a ‘Ramaluvan’ [ Hendrick Rammelman] who returned to Rotterdam with 250,000 livres, and the ‘Vueltre’ brothers [Alexander & Reynier] who left Nantes with 300,000 livres.

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In his thorough examination of the commercial history of Nantes, Jean Tanguy did not discover any notarial evidence of the supposedly fraudulent ways in which some of the Dutchmen amassed such gigantic fortunes either, and he found just a single case of an actual Dutch bankruptcy (which of course does not mean that they did not occur more frequently). An act by notary Mariot from 1633 denounced ‘Tilman Goris’ for leaving Nantes in order to settle in the Médoc [ Bordeaux region] without paying a debt of 17,500 livres to two local merchants.65 Goris’ debt would correspond to 625 tons of Nantais or 171.5 tons of upstream wine and equaled no more than 0.56 percent of the value of the city’s 1631 wine and brandy exports. We know why Rotterdam native Tieleman Gorisz did not repay his debts: he had better uses for his money. On 3 March 1633, Gorisz and his partner Pieter Fransz Baul signed a contract with the Duc d’Epernon to lay dry a swampy area in the Médoc, paying Epernon 1000 livres per year during the poldering process.66 By combining the records from Nantes with those from Bordeaux, it becomes clear that after a stay of at least four years in Nantes, Tieleman Gorisz used the money he owed local wine producers to speculate on an uncertain land reclamation project north of Bordeaux.67 Rotterdam native Cornelis Coninck, who resided in Nantes between 1621 and 1629, does not appear on the French list of the fraudulent Dutchmen so at rst glance he seems to have handled his affairs in

65 Tanguy, 324, ftnt 358. Tanguy refers to ADLA 4E2/1461/182, 1633. The unspecied contract leading up to the debt was drawn up in 1631. 66 Paul Massé, “Le Dessèchement Des Marais Du Bas-Médoc,” Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du Departement de la Gironde (1957): 28 & 30–31. An initial attempt to reclaim the area around Lesparre along the banks of the Gironde commenced in 1627 under the leadership of Dutchman Jean Alsein [ Jan Alessen]. Gorisz and Baul did not complete the poldering process and abandoned the project in 1639. A third group of Dutchmen nished the “Poldre de Hollande” in 1642, while a fourth group which included Jacob Alessen was very successful in expanding the reclaimed area, turning it into highly protable grain producing land. Over the summer of 1633, Gorisz and Baul recruited fellow-investors, using the promise of land ownership in the Bordeaux wine region as collateral. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/663/1087, 29 August 1633. Wine trader Hendrick Points of Rotterdam was promised ownership of 50 [morgens?] measured land in ‘a suitable spot’ in the Médoc or on the Isle d’Espernon along the “Bordeaux river”. In the fall of 1633, the land-reclaimers recruited experienced labor in Holland, asking several men to “re-enter” into their employ—so where had they previously poldered? See GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 186/78/144, 16 November 1633 plus a note added by the notary that the parties had come to an agreement on 8 December 1633. 67 Rotterdam notaries place Gorisz and his longtime partner Pieter Fransz Baul or Bave in Nantes between 1629 and 1633.

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an honest manner. This unblemished record is marred, however, by a comment registered by a notary back home in Rotterdam. In 1635, wine merchant Heyndrick Points got into an argument with Coninck’s mother. She accused Points of having stolen goods or valuable information from her son, whereupon Points replied that Aeffgen’s son “was a bad apple himself because he had been declared bankrupt in France.” No other documents shed light on this purported bankruptcy, and Coninck’s later career makes clear that even if it occurred, it did not affect his commercial- and political credit in Rotterdam.68 Making a fortune Six of the seven Dutchmen listed with earnings above 150,000 livres spent more than a decade in Nantes, so they can therefore not be considered get-rich-quick artists. The seventh man, Lambert de Gruijter, remains in the shadows of history.69 If we accept the possibility that the compiler of the list of 1645 made a mistake, another Dutchman, Jan de Gruyter, could be a candidate for the seventh slot. He signed a lease for a house in Nantes in 1621, at the start of the boom years.70 Jan may have been the scion of the Rotterdam brewer family De Gruter.71 No proof can be furnished, but it is possible that this elusive De Gruyter— be it Lambert of Jan—is not only the ‘sieur Grut’ who shipped cargo in three different ships in 1638, but also the ‘Flemish merchant’ Grust who by himself was responsible for 27 of the 235 brandy stills imported into Nantes from the Dutch Republic in 1631. Such a lengthy sojourn in Nantes would explain his ample prots and his ‘dishonorable’ mention in the 1645 litany of woes.72 Anthoine Casteleyn [Senior] had the longest ex-pat career in Nantes. He did not skip town but simply died 68 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/393/622, 24 May 1635, for the bankruptcy libel. By 1628, Cornelis Coninck had obtained his naturalization papers which exempted him from the Droit d’Aubaine. GAR, ONA inv. nr. 98/161/418. 69 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 153/165, 3 December 1644. No French record except the Moyens d’Intervention places him in Nantes and only one Rotterdam record mentions him as wine merchant of the city of Utrecht. 70 ADLA 4E2/1449/374, 9 October 1621. 71 R. Bijlsma, “De Kievits Uit ‘Den Olyphant’ En Hun Bedrijf,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje (1913): 75–77. De Kievit and De Gruter families were related by marriage. As early as 1572, the De Gruters owned two breweries in Rotterdam and belonged to the wealthiest layer of Rotterdam society. 72 ADLA 4E2/1462/22, 18 February 1638; and ADLA B 2976 for the port register of 1631. It is also possible that Lambert and Jan were related, and that Jan manned the family’s ‘factorij ’ in Nantes.

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at home on the Fosse in 1626 after a stay of more than 17 years.73 Anthoine Junior followed in his father’s footsteps and is one of the ve men listed in the Moyens d’Intervention who was actually present in the city when the French wrote down their grievances. Control over product and price One of the other complaints against the Dutch concerned the manner in which they handled the supply market: they wrote a contract for the whole crop of a grower well before the harvest, but the price would only be determined by the market conditions at the moment of the grape harvest. If the region produced a bumper crop, the glut on the market would result in low prices; but a bad wine year would yield wines of even lower quality than usual, which would also give the Dutch an excuse to keep the prices low. Were the Dutch betting on harvest conditions or did they have alternative supply zones with which to threaten the Nantais growers? Jean Eon complained that the Dutch operated as a cartel, setting the purchase price at their own convenience—i.e. as low as possible. Notarized purchase contracts from the 1620s and 1630s show, however, that the French merchants used exactly the same methods.74 By going straight to the wine producers the Dutch did indeed eliminate the middlemen, sidelining a group of French merchants who then cried foul. The city privileges of 1643 aimed to re-instate the local merchants as the brokers between the wine growers and their foreign customers. International commerce and the domestic transit trade, with their customs- and service fees, are the life blood of any port city at the mouth of a large river. The municipality’s efforts to keep control over the commercial sector—and the wine staple in particular—in French hands are completely understandable. Eon conceded that the Dutch indeed had received royal privileges for being “confederates” of the French, but hastened to add that “our Kings never intended to prejudice their [own] subjects by favoring their

73 When we rst hear of Casteleyn’s presence in Nantes in 1609, he owns ve wellestablished brandy stills and has been exporting his production. 74 Tanguy, 319. Tanguy notes that the rarity of purchase contracts after 1630 could hide more unequal practices, which could then have led to the complaints. A worsening Nantais economy during the Franco-Spanish war that started in 1635 made the Dutch successes so much harder to bear.

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allies.” Shortly after this concession his bitterness spilled over when he likened the situation of the native population of Nantes to “slavery & servitude.”75 Ten years prior to the pro-Dutch ruling of the royal council of 1656, this protectionist Frenchman could not deny that those pesky intruders had the rights they claimed to have. Even if the kings had not meant what they wrote, they had nonetheless given the northerners ample room in which to maneuver and make money. We can turn to none other than Jean Eon himself to place things in perspective. The French, says Eon, have only themselves to blame. The “nonchalance” of French merchants was the reason for the growth and the success of all foreign traders in France. Of these, the Dutch were the greatest masters of the sea and of commerce, and the French allowed this situation to develop. Because the French owed so few ships to transport their commodities, the Dutch could continue to arrive with large eets and purchase French goods [especially the wines, grains, and salt] in exchange for theirs, so “they proted twice: as shippers and as commodity traders.”76 The strong Dutch presence in Nantes and other French port cities can be explained quite simply in terms of supply and demand. France supplied large quantities of desirable products to a variety of markets, both domestic and foreign. The Dutch domestic market had a strong demand for French products, so the Hollanders sailed south to satisfy that demand. To put it succinctly, the lack of French control over its own export market caused the complaints against the Dutch and other foreigners. Local law and international diplomacy Eduard van Biema investigated the aftermath of the anti-Dutch actions of 1645 and lled in some of the gaps left by the prescriptive sources found in the archives in Nantes.77 When the French merchants submitted their Moyens d’Intervention in 1645, the city magistrates sided with their constituents and conrmed a local ordinance which forbade the Dutch to buy or sell anything in Nantes without the agency of one of its French citizens. When Beukel Dedel tried to sell the 259 barrels of whale oil sent to him by his relatives in Delft, the authorities stopped

75 76 77

Eon, 63 & 65. Eon, 34–35. Van Biema: 201–215.

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him from doing so. This drew the ire of the Dutch community and led to a counter-protest. The diplomatic follow-up included a request by the Dutch States General to its ambassador in France that the French government would ensure the full benets of the privileges granted to the Dutch at the national level. Back in The Hague, French ambassador d’Estrades promised to take up the Dutch cause after being called in for an ofcial explanation. Things got worse before they got better. The magistrates of Nantes cracked down on the collection of the ‘Taxe des estrangers’ [tax on foreigners] of 2.5 percent on the value of their goods, this in addition to the regular taxes paid by French and foreign traders alike. Because factors and brokers customarily received a commission of 2.5 percent ad valorem, the imposition of this tax on foreigners would wipe out a factor’s full prot and thus his reason for doing business in France in the rst place. This immediate threat to the Dutch pocket books triggered an ofcial visit of two Dutch residents of Nantes to the Conseil du Roi in Fontainebleau which took place sometime around August 1646. The envoys initiated a lawsuit against the citizens of Nantes who had acted against a royal decree and who tried to curtail the Dutch commercial privileges. The Royal Council gave the Nantais six weeks to produce the legal documentation on which they based their right to limit trade to the agency of its citizens. Signicantly, the municipality could not comply, so by September 1646 the Royal Council accepted the Dutch argument and the documented proof of their rights.78 The free trade and equal status privileges of 1635 were upheld, to the obvious satisfaction of the residents of “La Petite Hollande” in Nantes.79 In this legal battle, the Dutchmen and their attorneys displayed a solid sense of the intricate layering of French justice, by countering claims at the local level with legal precedents set at the higher provincial or national level. We must view the imposition of this tax on foreigners as an attempt by the city leaders of Nantes to use the period of the regency to increase their power at the local level at the expense of the power of the provincial Parlement and the central government in Paris,

78

Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 15–16. In Mathorez’ version (16), it was up to the Dutch to prove the validity of their citizenship claims. Van Biema placed the burden of proof on the municipal government of Nantes. As claimants to the Royal Council, the Dutch must have been in the legal position to provide the evidence. But the pro-Dutch outcome of the affair is not in dispute. Van Biema: 204–205. 79

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while Dutch appeals for intervention from Paris played into the hands of those who wished to tighten the grip of the central government. Despite the legal victory the relations between the Dutch and the French merchants of Nantes continued to sour. Similar problems in Bordeaux The upheavals in Nantes were not an isolated case. A complaint from monsieur Dubernet, president of the Jurade [city council] of Bordeaux, to royal chancellor Séguier on November 26, 1646, expressed outrage at “the abuses” at the hands of the Dutch factors, their secret monopolies and their horrible usury practices . . . which go against the customary ways in which our intelligent and faithful merchants do business in good faith. Everywhere these frauds and perpetual usurers . . . are called peasant-eaters . . . who devour the poor and who achieve the ruin of the entire country.80

Despite the French grumblings, it seems that the internal organization of the Bordeaux wine exporters was well enough entrenched to keep any large scale foreign appropriation of the wine trade at bay. Instead, the early Dutch arrivals specialized and invested in land reclamation projects in the marshes of the Médoc, creating new grain producing opportunities; they also focused on service sectors such as ship ownership and marine insurance. Those Dutchmen who did settle in Bordeaux tried to become naturalized ‘bourgeois’ as soon as possible, because that gave them precious privileges in the wine trade.81 Two other conditions

80 Dubernet, “Lettre Du Premier President Dubernet Au Chancelier Séguier (1646),” Archives historiques du Departement de la Gironde 19 (1879): 164–165. It is not clear if a particular incident triggered Dubernet’s bitter letter, we only know that almost two years later the States General wrote a letter to the same chancellor Séguier regarding a lawsuit by a merchant from Amsterdam against a merchant in Bordeaux. See also Alfred Leroux, La Colonie Germanique De Bordeaux, vol. 1 (Bordeaux: 1918), 38. The letter from the States General in The Hague was written on 6 October 1648. 81 For the land reclamation projects, see Massé: 26–39. For Dutch settlers in Bordeaux, see Coyne. For the relatively low number of naturalizations in the rst half of the century, see Leroux, 33–36. Jan de Ridder from Leiden is one of those who emigrated to Bordeaux. In 1641 he married Marie de Ferrand, most likely the sister or niece of Notary Jean Ferrand [sometimes listed as Deferrand]. Ferrand worked through 1682 and recorded many transactions of De Ridder and his Dutch partners. By the middle of the century Jean de Ridder was the richest merchant in Bordeaux. Jean De Ridder obtained his lettres de bourgeoisie in 1638 after having accepted the nancial burden of the annual

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made the Dutch settlement patterns in Bordeaux differ from those in Nantes: First, the production of brandy from the inferior Nantais wines was lucrative enough to attract Dutch settlers who identied the opportunity and brought the technical know-how which side-lined the French; second, the strong ties between Nantes and Spain through the Contractation network made the Loire port an ideal way-station during the Spanish embargoes. Anti-Dutch violence in Nantes Back in Nantes, the Royal Council’s ruling proved to be a paper victory for the Dutch. The Nantais authorities continued to demand the extra 2.5 percent, which they forced the Dutch to pay through the threat or actual imposition of house arrests—at least that is what the Dutch government wrote in a protest letter of 21 February 1647. This renewed effort to get satisfaction through diplomatic channels increased the anger of the French, while the Dutch merchants residing abroad showed their condence in the willingness and political power of their government to go to bat on behalf of its constituents. The French complaints of this period provide solid testimony of the Dutch hegemony in maritime commerce and the powerlessness felt by the French to compete on their own turf. They had to swallow the Dutch and their onerous methods in order to be able to market their goods, albeit “at very ruinous conditions.”82 In April 1647, the threats of violence became reality. A group of about 15 French merchants from the Fosse neighborhood attacked Beukel Dedel and his colleague Hendrick Doomer on their way home, but two passing noblemen on horseback managed to disperse the attackers. A few hours later three other Dutch merchants got surrounded and hurt by a larger crowd; it badly roughed up Johan van Rijn, who escaped a more serious attack from the sword wielding ‘city-gauger’ by jumping in the river. Unfortunately, these incidents only proved to be the prelude to much more widespread violence against the Dutch.

operating expenses of the Hôpital St. André. [ In other words, De Ridder purchased his citizenship]. When he died in 1671, De Ridder left an estate worth over 150,000 livres. [ Biographical information from Coyne: 47.] 82 Dubernet: 165.

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It should come as no surprise that the outbreak of real mob violence coincided with the run-up to Easter, when religious factionalism exacerbated the economic inferiority complex. On Palm Sunday, a sudden attack on three Dutchmen left two of them badly bloodied. At the same time, a number of French hooligans caused unrest in the area around the Reformed church in Sucé.83 They dragged two men, who were returning to the city after the service, from their saddles and battered them until two passing monks came to the victims’ rescue. The rest of the congregation ed, some of them too scared to spend the night in their own homes so that they camped out in the elds instead. The ominous threat of “kill, kill the Dutch enemies” was heard throughout Nantes that evening. When two Dutch representatives approached Governor De la Meilleraye on Monday morning, he refused to extend them his protection unless they submitted to his demands. Not having any alternative, the Dutchmen agreed and the Governor immediately changed his attitude. When a small detachment of the Governor’s guard reached the Fosse, they came just in time to prevent the murder of merchant Roze and the wholesale looting of his house.84 All these attacks had left ve or six Dutchmen seriously wounded, which made the Governor realize he had let the situation get out of control. He requested the Dutch community to send a delegation to the castle on Tuesday to try to settle the running dispute. In the negotiations with the Governor and the mayor, Beukel Dedel, Reynier Tinnebac and Guilliamme van Loon demanded the cessation of the violence and requested that the Dutch community would be granted ve or six months to settle its affairs unhindered so that it could prepare to leave Nantes. With this clear threat to remove themselves from Nantes as a group, the Dutchmen had just thrown down the gauntlet. After a mob attacked and plundered the warehouse of Dutch merchant Budde, several prominent noblemen intervened on behalf of the Dutch

83 Van Biema. Sucé was a village on the banks of the Erdre, three miles outside Nantes. Under special provisions of the Edict of Nantes of 1598, the fervently Catholic citizens of Nantes had to accept the presence of a Protestant church in exchange for the provision that it had to be at least three miles outside the city limits. 84 His name and the fact that the mob singled him out suggest that Roze was a Sephardim who may have been a practicing Jew. Corroborating evidence comes from Stols, who mentions the Iberia traders Rouzé alias Roze, with family members in Lisbon, Porto, Rouen, and Amsterdam. Even though Guillermo Rouzé lived an active Catholic life, his marriage to a French [Sephardic?] woman whose father emigrated to Pernambuco got him into trouble with the Inquisition. Stols, Annex, 57–58.

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community.85 These must have been the larger landowners whose grape harvests and wine production needed the purchasing power and the cargo space of the Dutch, and who had beneted from the preferential pricing policy by the Dutch who had anticipated the need for exactly this type of political lobbying power.86 Responding to this local pressure, Governor De la Meilleraye issued and posted a decree forbidding anyone to commit violent acts against the Dutch; the mob responded by throwing mud at the broadsheets or by ripping them apart, but seems to have reigned in its attacks. The news of the violence caused enormous consternation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Ofcial protests at ambassadorial level in Paris and The Hague, discussions in the Provincial States of Holland, plus the intervention of the States General forced the city of Nantes to withdraw its onerous 2.5 percent tax on foreigners. The ofcial French explanation blamed the commoners of Nantes for the mob violence, offered apologies, and assured the Dutch government that it could have full faith in the sincere intentions of Louis XIV—through his mother and regent Queen Anne of Austria—to protect Dutch commercial interests in his kingdom.87 The royal council’s decree of 8 May 1647 conrmed the equality of foreign merchants according to the decree of 1635 and expressly forbade any extraordinary taxes to be levied on foreigners; any ofcer or soldier trying to use force to pressure a foreign merchant to pay extra money would lose his appointment. A contemporary historian apparently mentioned the payment of a decent sum of money for reparations to the victims in Nantes. The Dutch community of Nantes was fully aware of the French power structure. For redress of perceived or actual usurpations of their

85 Van Biema did not annotate his work, so we do not know his sources nor the names of these noblemen. 86 Collins, “Les Impots Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au XVIIe Siècle,” 163. Collins notes that between 1632 and 1645, the States of Brittany paid Governor de la Meilleraye 342,000 livres for his efforts plus another 83,000 livres to run his household. The rst State of Britanny—the Breton nobility—intervened on behalf of the Dutch because the latter were the buyers of the grapes grown on the noble estates. Even if, according to Collins, between 2/3 and 3/4 of the wines were sold by the smaller farmers, this still left between 1/3 and 1/4 of the crops in the hands of the grander seigneurs. See also Eon, 112 for the Dutch practice of paying above-market prices for the wines grown on the estates of a select number of the most inuential landowners—exactly the men one could expect to have a voice in regional or local politics. 87 Van Biema.

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privileges in Nantes, the Dutch appealed to the higher-ups. In 1647 the Governor sided with the townspeople, so the Dutchmen took their protest straight to the Royal Council in Paris and found justice. The monarchy, never loath to forego an opportunity, used the foreigners to get a tighter and fuller grip over the administration of the town by claiming jurisdiction and used its clients in the Parlement de Bretagne to decide in its favor. The violence in context We must place these violent local events in a wider economic and political context. In the European arena, the French still hoped to convince the Dutch government to continue its war against Spain because peace would remove the Dutch front from the Spanish Netherlands, enabling the Spanish forces there to focus all their attention on the war against France. Domestically, the political violence of the Fronde went hand in hand with a severe economic crisis. In his work on the economy of Brittany in the seventeenth century, James Collins has documented the sharp drop in provincial tax receipts from the wine trade starting in 1643.88 Table 1.2 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642

Index of the ‘little’ wine duty of Brittany, 1635–1650 84 n.a. 98 98 95* 95 95 95

1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650

68 68 62 62 55 55 50 50

Source: James B. Collins. Classes, estates, and order in early modern Brittany (1994) 54–55. * Starting 1639, the receipts included tax on brandy.

88 Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 54–55. Collins took the receipts of the ‘little duty’ payable to the Parlement de Bretagne of 1610 as his index of 100. Following four years [1639–1642] of an index of 95, the income from the tax farm on wine sales for the years 1643–1650 went from 68–68–62–55–55–50 to 50.

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By the years 1645 and 1646, when the anti-Dutch protests reached a crescendo, wine tax receipts had dipped to their lowest point yet, a clear indication of the decline in the number of barrels sold. The tax gures do not reveal the discrepancy between the volume of wine produced [potential sales] and actual sales, but the sudden drop in sales must have led to a serious over-production and thus a sharp drop in the income of the producers. Similar conditions existed in Bordeaux, where in 1646 a member of the city council mentioned ‘very ruinous conditions” in 1646.89 Collins points to three causes for this decline, including increased tensions between the Dutch and their French competitors. Yet which came rst, the worsening economic conditions or the tensions? Or did the nationwide political unrest contribute its share to the declining prosperity of the region around Nantes?90 The revenues on wine and brandy continued to slip, rst from 1646 to 1647 and then once more from 1648 to 1649. The Treaty of Munster and its aftermath After 1648, the Dutch were once again free to trade anywhere in the Spanish empire while France continued to face the Spanish embargo through 1659. Spain’s switch from embargo enforcer to trading partner removed one reason for Dutch presence along the French coast, but strengthened another. From 1648 until 1659 the Dutch merchants in France were perfectly placed to play the role of neutral middlemen between the two warring nations. The royal decree of privilege and protection of 1647 ended a period of violent actions against the Dutch nation in Nantes. Harassment continued at a more subdued level, but overall the economic climate seems to have agreed with the Hollanders. Around the middle of the century, the economy of Nantes still depended heavily on the activities and shipping of the Dutch community: In 1654, the board of the Sanitat hospital chided the Dutchmen for having reduced their contributions to its charity fund despite the fact that “three quarters of the city’s commerce” was in their hands. Appealing to their charity, they asked if more of the Dutch prots could perhaps be set aside to help the needy

89 90

Dubernet. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 50.

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of the city.91 The pleas of the hospital directors may have fallen on ‘East Indian’ deaf ears, for two years later resentment against the Dutch once more boiled over into open confrontation. In 1656, fourteen Dutchmen, representing several other compatriots, signed a position paper countering a French attempt to get a bit more control over the local wine and brandy trade through enforcement of prescribed barrel sizes.92 The magistrates of the city must have felt that barreling was an issue on which the Dutch skated on thin legal ice. Whatever argument or ‘consideration’ weighed the most, the Parlement de Bretagne once again sided with the foreigners against the municipality. Yes, the Dutch indeed had the right to trade in the kingdom as if they were native French; merchants could once again use barrels of any size. Putting icing on the Dutch celebratory cake, any further ‘trouble or restrictions’ would cost the offending ofcials of the city 10,000 livres in nes. Yet the pro-Dutch ruling was ignored, at least in the period immediately following the decision. Dutch merchant Willem [Guillaume] Van Bullestraete was reported to the magistrates for keeping illegal barrels in his warehouse at the Fosse.93 The records are silent regarding the outcome of this dispute, but the fact that the municipality was able to ignore the directive of the provincial Parlement is an indication of the relative lack of power of the Parlement over local affairs—at least at this time. Throughout the century, the key Dutch argument against restrictions on their modus operandus continued to be economic: did the people of Nantes not realize what would happen to the economy of the whole region if the Dutch community would pack up and go elsewhere to trade? The merchants of the city of Nantes conspired to ruin the commerce and to chase the Dutch merchants out of Nantes without considering that this would be to the detriment and actually ruinous for their [the Nantais] country and to the wines and brandy . . . that they have them [the Dutch] purchase and export.94

91

Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 16. AM Nantes, series FF 141. As early as 16 June 1605 a city ordinance had prescribed the exclusive use of the Nantais measure for all barrels used in the wine and brandy trade and this served as the basis for the crackdown. 93 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 17–18. The author quoted from the ‘arrest’ of the Parlement de Bretagne of 12 October 1656. We do not know what became of Van Bullestraete and his outsized barrels; he continued to live and work in Nantes, where he died around 1680. 94 ADLA C 702, cote 8 (carton 27). 92

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The strength of this position rested squarely on the premise that the economy of Nantes needed the Dutch traders and their eet more than the Dutch needed the wines of the Loire valley. From a Dutch viewpoint, the French were ungrateful whiners who forgot all the benets they had accrued by having the wonderful Dutchmen show them the way. As quoted at the top of this chapter, the Dutch response to a lawsuit by the barrel makers of Nantes in 1678 could not spell it out more clearly: Without the activities of the Dutch, the economy of Nantes would never have amounted to much; following a possible withdrawal of the foreigners, the Nantais might as well plow their vines underground. The fact is, the vines continued to grow, the French continued to produce their wines, and the Dutch continued to ship the resulting alcohol. Were conditions truly that tense or do the more visible periods of tension and violence mask an overall solid working relationship between the Nantais and the Dutch community? Under what social as well as cultural conditions did the Dutch merchants, their families, and their servants actually work and live? Living conditions and integration issues Just like many Nantais involved in maritime commerce or in its secondary services, the Dutch and Flemish merchants lived primarily on the waterfront of the Loire river along the Quay de la Fosse and in the suburb of Pirmil. [see Figure 1] The Fosse extended west from the Saint Nicholas gate, and this meant that the foreigners lived and worked outside the walls of the city proper but at the center of economic action.95 At the Fosse the Dutch found not only the warehouses that safeguarded their incoming goods and the barrels ready for export, but also the ofces of several notaries who specialized in maritime trade. Ships destined for the Dutch Republic or beyond, as well as the lighters that supplied them, received their cargoes of wines and brandy from the warehouses along the Fosse. At least 54 of the Dutchmen who traded in Nantes in the seventeenth century are recorded as living at the Fosse.96 Local

95 Paul Jeulin, L’évolution Du Port De Nantes; Organisation Et Trac Depuis Les Origines (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1929), 173–174. Built around 1622, the Fosse was a stone quay of over 240 meters long. This section of Nantes’ port must have been so busy that only two years later the quay was lengthened to almost 390 meters. 96 The notaries in Nantes specied in which parish or area their clients lived, whereas Rotterdam notaries primarily used the name of the city to indicate a merchant’s residence.

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ordinances forbade foreigners to own real estate, so the Dutch rented their houses and warehouses. The real estate leases signed by Dutch merchants are evidence of the Fosse’s popularity. The standard lease was for either two or four years, and the annual rent charged varied between 105 livres and 200 livres.97 Rents were payable twice yearly, on the feast day of St. Jean-Baptiste and at Christmas. Some of the men boarded with their senior partners or employers, others rented a room in the house of a Dutch family. The widows of Anthonie Casteleyn and Gerrit van Rijnevelt both rented rooms of their Fosse dwellings to boarders.98 Several participants in the Contractation de Nantes, including members of the extended Espinoze family whom the Dutch dealt with on a regular basis, lived and worked along the Fosse as well.99 The panorama of Nantes of 1646 gives a good view of the ‘business’ portion of the Fosse nearest the St. Nicholas gate.100

97 ADLA 4E2/1454/198, 31 July 1627, a house and warehouse for 2 years @105 livres; 4E2/1456/122, 18 May 1629, Thomas Esturmy rents to Melchior van der Velsen and his wife; 4E2/94/2/8, 1 February 1630, Jean Hirutin rents to the widow Casteleyn for 4 years @200 livres. 98 ADLA 4E2/1462/211, 15 May 1638. Rochus Parve lodges at the ‘veuve Castelin’. and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 182/72/198, 16 May 1649 for the widow of Gerard van Ruytevelt, whose daughter is expecting a child by their 18-year old boarder Johan Verschuyr. 99 These Contractation merchants not only worked together, they also lived close together and frequently intermarried. See ADLA 4E2/95/352, 2 March 1633. ‘Jacques Despinoze, sieur de l’Espinais, rents property from Mathurin De Launay [de Coussy]: The mansion consists of 20 grand chambers overlooking the street, 8 ‘cabinets’ with anti-chambers, a central room [chambre du mitan] and a great room, all with their chimneys [hearths].’ Here we have a case in which one member of the Contractation de Nantes rents a grand piece of property to a very prominent fellow-member. Jacques d’Espinoze was ‘bursar and treasurer’ of the Contractation from 1602–1606, and again in 1629. ADLA 4E2/1464/58, 24 February 1642. The wife of Pierre Despinoze inherited a house on the Fosse from her father, De la Pellonnie Sr. The house near the Port au Vin included a cellar and high chambers on rst, second, and third oors, plus grain warehouses with the right of passage from this Maison des grandes Eaux via the house of Arnaud de Bourgues onto the grand street; neighbor on other side Pierre Valleton; annual rent on this house is 231 livres 18 sols. All four families mentioned in this notarial act were members of the Contractation. According to the association’s records, Pierre d’Espinose, sieur du Sanzy, was Consul in 1617–1618; Nycollas de la Pellonye served as Consul in 1607–1608; Pierre Valleton Sr. acted as the group’s treasurer from 1612 to 1622. And three men from the De Bourgues clan occupied the Consul’s chair in the rst half of the century. Description of another house on Rue du Bignon Lestard; see also AM HH 194. 100 A contemporary drawing of the Fosse by a Dutch artist has survived. When Lambert Doomer visited his brother Maerten in Nantes in 1645, the Fosse was one of the areas he drew in his sketchbook. The current line-up of stately stone mansions along the Fosse dates from the 18th century, the heydays of Nantes as center of the French slave and sugar trade.

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chapter one The unofcial Dutch Bourse

In order to gain greater control over commercial activities and as a counter measure against Dutch commercial practices, the municipal government constructed an ofcial Bourse in 1644, and stipulated that all merchants had to gather there between the hours of eleven in the morning and one in the afternoon to do business. During these hours it was strictly forbidden for any merchant to be at the beginning of the Fosse [nearest town] or elsewhere in the city with the goal to trade.101 The Dutch community nevertheless continued in its old habit, developed over several decades, to gather at the forbidden spot at the Fosse near the Saint Nicholas gate twice or three times per week to exchange information, to x prices and to strike deals. So entrenched was this custom that the local population gave the area the name that it carries to this very day: it is the Place de la Hollande. Leadership Presumably the gatherings of the Dutch ‘nation’ were led by its consul, but both the Nantais and Rotterdam records are silent about the position until the appointment of Jacob Roch in 1660.102 This does not mean the community lacked organization, because reactions and replies to French activities were consistently signed by a small number of merchants acting on behalf of the rest of their ‘nation’. The Dutch community did keep centralized records but this ‘Resolutieboek der Nederlandsche natie te Nantes’, tantalizing potential evidence, has unfortunately not survived.103 Based on the little evidence of the structure we have,

101

ADLA C 648, carton 9, cote 1, 14 January 1667. O. Schutte, Repertorium Der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers in Het Buitenland 1584–1810 (Den Haag: 1976), 65. See also Michel Morineau, “Bayonne Et St. Jean-De-Luz, Relais Du Commerce Néerlandais Vers L’espagne Au Debut Du XVIIe Siècle,” in 94e Congres des Societes Savantes (Pau: 1969), 317–318 and 326. Morineau reports that as early as 1623 the Dutch States General accredited Lodewijk / Louis Verssen as consul of the Dutch ‘nation’ in Bayonne; at that point King Louis XIII had already given his royal permission. 103 Bijlsma, Rotterdams Welvaren 1550 –1650, 140. According to one of Bijlsma’s unnamed sources this Book of Decisions of the Dutch Nation in Nantes included an agreement of 1654 about the minimum wage due to Dutch coopers for work done on behalf of merchants of other ‘nations’. Bijlsma, Rotterdam’s city archivist at the time, makes it clear that he did not have access to the original Resolutieboek. If it were ever to resurface, the history of the Dutch community in Nantes is bound to be re-written. 102

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the Dutch ‘nation’ in Nantes had organized itself along the lines of the Dutch merchant communities in the Ottoman empire, Constantinople and Bursa/Izmir.104 Another type of leadership concerned the Protestant congregation of Nantes and its church building in Sucé. Sources for the rst half of the century no longer exist but in the 1670s numerous Dutchmen were members of the church council, and we may assume that the situation had not changed very much since earlier times. Throughout the century, the leaders of the Dutch ‘nation’ exhibited sound political sense by calling for assistance from the Dutch ambassador in Paris as representative of the States General whenever they could not obtain the required results in conicts over local or national privileges. We should beware, however, of seeing the Dutch community as one homogeneous group. Internal competition, witness the yearly race to be the rst merchant to get the new wines to Holland or the wrangling over product quality and timely payments for cargo, coexisted with a united front in the face of issues that threatened the interests of the community as a whole.105 Partnerships and internships Dutch merchants rarely went into a deal solo. During their stay in Nantes they frequently had at least one partner, but the make-up of the partnerships could chance over the years. A man who started off as a trainee or junior partner would graduate to be senior partner to a more recent arrival. These local combinations occurred in addition to their familial and business contacts back in the Republic. The Rotterdammers often joined forces, as we can see from the 1631 port records or the joint statements they made at the notaries.106 We also nd combinations 104 Alexander H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610 –1630 (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Leiden/Istanbul, 1978). 105 Similar internal competition and external unity was exhibited by the Dutch ‘nation’ in Istanbul and Izmir. See Groot. 106 In 1631, ‘Ramelemen’ [ Rotterdammer Hendrick Rammelman, in this one instance erroneously listed as François] traded together with Tielman Gorisz, either Nicolaes or Hans Prins, and Bonaventure Bron. Gillis van de Luffel joined forces with André van Vlaenderen. Rammelman’s longtime partner and brother-in-law Reynier Dammans traded together with ‘Phes’ [ Philippes] Thibaud; it is likely that Thibaud was a French merchant. We also encounter the partnerships of Adriaensz. & De Lange & Van de Bourg (1621); Bron & R. Velters (1629); Gorisz & Baul (1629–1633); Wichelhuijsen & Slingelant (1636).

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of merchants from Amsterdam or Middelburg linking up with the men from Rotterdam. Evidence of a partnership between a Dutchman and a French merchant of Nantes is rare, most often the merchants operated within their own national communities.107 Trans-national partnerships do show up regularly in the Rotterdam freight contracts, with one partner manning the home front and one or more other partners trading elsewhere in the Republic or further aeld, for instance Hamburg, Lisbon, Antwerp and even Madeira. Barring the existence of long-term partnership contracts or a persistent pattern of joint action, we must assume that many of the partnerships only covered single voyages or deals. Inexperienced/young men started off in the foreign wine trade working under the wings of an established merchant, who was either his employer or the person to whom he was a junior partner. When Jan Holthuysen drew up a contract in 1629 with the suppliers of his wines, he still needed the guarantee of a senior merchant behind him. Pieter Fransz Baul also stood guarantee when Holthuysen signed a two-year lease of lodgings at the Fosse that same year.108 Two years earlier, Reynier Velters had arrived in Nantes from Middelburg at the age of 24. In his rst appearance in front of notary Mariot, the young man declared that he possessed 54 ‘louis’ in gold money cash (courante). He then signed a sales contract for 16 oxheads brandy on behalf of Pierre France of “Bloys”, plus the sale of 10 bales of madder—a commercial dye—on behalf of Anthonio Timmerman in Zierikzee, Zeeland, after which he pledged to donate 150 livres in alms to the poor of his ‘nation’. The guarantorship of his brother [?] Adriaen Velters and sieur Gillis van de Luffel, plus the additional signature of Adrian Ambrosius suggest that this was Reynier’s entry into the local market. He showed his liquidity, he pledged to be a contributing member of the community, but he still needed the guarantees of the two established merchants. It was quite

107 ADLA B 2976, Registres de la Prevôté—the 1631 port records. See also Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 264, for the joint grain imports by Heindricq & Vos and Bosch & Domer. 108 ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 July 1629 for the wine contract and ADLA 4E2/ 94/1/122, 4 July 1629 for the lease. Holthuysen rents a room or rooms from Jan Herutin, marchand a gabarins, for 165 livres per year. Based on this need for a senior guarantor, Jan Holthuysen probably was the son of Jacques Holthuysen from Delft, who purchased wines from Rotterdam traders on several occasions in the 1620s. Jacques Holthuysen was brother in law to the widow Dedel, whose son or grandson Beukel Dedel played an important role in the Dutch community in Nantes in the mid-1640s.

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touching to see how shaky young Reynier’s signature was on what may have been his rst day on the job. Later contracts show a much rmer and clearer hand.109 Through a female family member the Velters men were related to Balthasar van de Voorde, Master of the Mint in Bruges in 1614. We will revisit the Velters clan in this context when we investigate their possible interests in trading bullion via Nantes. The following description of a labor contract between two Rotterdammers is representative for other arrangements under which younger men came to Nantes to gain valuable experience.110 In January 1629, Joris Adriaensz ‘de Jonge’ [ Junior] signed a contract to go and work in Nantes as the chief assistant and bookkeeper of wine merchant Jochem de Wolff. The four-year contract was split in two. For the rst two years, Adriaensz had to keep the books of “commerce and trade which De Wolff was to do in France, and he would be and act obedient in all matters as behooves a faithful chief servant and bookkeeper.” He would receive 425 guilders per year plus room, board, laundry, as well as “re and light”. During that period, Adriaensz would be allowed to do some trading for his own account [presumably to build up his capital]. After those years, Adriaensz would become junior partner to De Wolff, trading on a fty-fty basis that covered all prots, “conquesten” [successful captures of enemy ships], losses and damages in France as well as in

109 For Reynier’s debut contract, see ADLA 4E2/1454/40, 8 February 1627. Zeeland was the center of the Dutch madder production, apparently unrivaled in Europe. Anneke Van Dijk-van der Peijl, Meekrap Vroeger En Nu (Vereniging van Zeeuwse Musea, 1998), 7. Adrian Velters, Reynier’s (older?) brother worked in Bordeaux from at least 1627 through 1633, where he was the partner of Herman Vanoutena, another Dutch merchant. Reynier’s (younger?) brother Alexander does not appear in the Nantes records until later in the year 1627. A fourth member of the family, Abraham Velters, worked in Amsterdam in the same period; he shows up in the maritime insurance business in a group of Amsterdam merchants which included Andries Pels, possibly the brother of Gaspard Pelt Sr. who made a fortune in the same business in Bordeaux. At the same time, their father or uncle Adriaen Velters Sr. worked in Middelburg in partnership with another son or nephew, Francois Velters. For Adrian in Bordeaux, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/123/251 & 253, 14 March 1626 and ADLA 4E2/1460/364, 16 April 1633. For Jean Velters in Amsterdam, see GAA 236/75, 8 August 1628; freight contract to ship timber from Norway to Bordeaux and to return to either Middelburg or Amsterdam with wines. For a grain shipment to Francois and [father] Adriaen Velters in Middelburg, see ADLA 4E2/94/1/135, 14 July 1629. For Abraham’s marine insurance activities, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 145/18, 2 April 1635. The importance of the trade in silver and coins between Spain and the Netherlands via France will be discussed below. 110 Collins notes similar arrangements by English merchants who sent their sons to Morlaix to learn both French and Breton. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 105.

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the Republic. As partner, Adriaensz would no longer receive free room and board. If the partners acted as ‘factors’ or agents for merchants elsewhere, the commissions would also be split in half. The tools of the trade would belong to both men, provided that Adriaensz paid De Wolff half of their fair market value. De Wolff had the option to return to Holland after the rst two years if he would leave a trusted servant under the command of Adriaensz. At the end of the four years, De Wolff could decide to continue the partnership for another two at the same conditions. The contract would be terminated in case of the death of one of the two men or when Joris Adriaensz got married. If De Wolff were to die rst, his widow [Geertruyt de Wely] would have the option to assume the contract which would have to be honored by Adriaensz as if De Wolff would still be alive.111 Three years after the start of his contract, Joris Adriaensz continued to live at the Fosse, and a bequest he made to his half-sister tells us he was still in Nantes in 1632. When he married in 1636, however, he resided in the Médoc region north of Bordeaux.112 It is possible that this Joris Adriaensz de Jonge is the same man listed as Fop Adrians in the French complaint about the Dutch of 1645—Fop being a nickname rather than a classic Dutch rst name. If Joris and Fop are one and the same man, the French claimed that he skipped town leaving unpaid debts behind him.113 The details of the apprentice- and junior partner contracts, such as the one between De Wolff and Adriaensz, show that the merchants safeguarded their investments through unambiguous business arrangements; by covering all the possibilities, the new partners avoided uncertainty and minimized the legal risks.114 Sometimes one of the partners reneged on the agreement about such an equitable split of risks and benets, which then led to either an ofcial reprimand or to the dissolution of

111

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/339/637, 12 January 1629. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 128/402/1069, 14 February 1632 and 131/78/229, 15 January 1636. Adriaensz bride was the very well connected Elisabeth Schoofs, daughter of a deceased merchant from Antwerp and niece to Rotterdam wine merchant Jan De Grande. 113 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645. According to ADLA 4E2/ 1449/397, 20 November 1621, a man unfortunately only listed by his last name Adriaensz, worked in Nantes in 1621 as partner of fellow Dutchmen Charles de Lange and ‘Vandebourg’. This early arrival could also have been ‘Fop’, but no other information on him has surfaced. The third possibility is that Casteleyn’s assistant and barrel maker ‘Adriaen’, in Nantes as early as 1609, made a career in the wine trade. 114 See Chapter 1. 112

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the partnership contract. Only two notarial acts revealed the breakdown of such ofcial working relationships, once through non-adherence to the nancial obligations spelled out in the agreement and once through suspected dishonesty of a junior partner.115 The rarity of problems indicates that almost all such partnership arrangements had been carefully thought through and legalized, leaving little to chance. The relationship between the senior merchants and the young men under their tutelage could turn sour. In 1636, Balthazar Wichelhuysen stated that Elbrecht van Rijsoort, residing in Nantes with the merchants Rammelman and Dammansz, had been unjustly conned and threatened with bodily harm by his employers because he had supposedly stolen money from them. Another Dutch merchant weakly echoed this support for young Elbrecht, saying that he was “unable to truly certify” that Van Rijsoort had short-changed his superiors.116 The two notarized statements were made at the request of Van Rijsoort’s father, who did his best to repair the damage done to the reputation of his son. Elbrecht may indeed have been dishonest, because he disappears from the Rotterdam records from this point onwards.117 Merchants and their ‘credit’ In the early modern world, a merchant’s reputation of honesty and reliability served as the keystone of his credit and was a crucial part of his working capital.118 The multiple meanings of the word ‘credit’ signal the importance of having good credit. As social capital, a man’s carefully accumulated good name and reputation [i.e. his credibility] made him worthy of the mutual trust needed to participate in business. In nancial terms, credit either meant that money or other monetary means were fronted so that business could take place, or that the repayment of a debt could be spread out over a certain amount of time. Both scenarios were based on the trust between the creditor and the debtor

115 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 167/181/296, 4 October 1636 and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/615/961, 8 February 1636. 116 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/615/961, 8 February 1636. The outcome of this dispute is unknown. 117 Pieter van Rijsoort, presumably Elbrecht’s younger brother, imported wines from Nantes in 1647. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 171/90/146. 118 Klein and Veluwenkamp, 41–42. Veluwenkamp, who wrote the segment about entrepreneurs, equates money with trust, trust with money.

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that the accounts would be squared to each side’s satisfaction. The strongly personal basis of early modern commerce meant that it was impossible to obtain nancial credit without a sufcient level of social credit. Mathias calls this “linkage between kinship and enterprise” a “universal characteristic” of the early modern reliance on credit.119 With his play ‘The Merchant of Venice’, Shakespeare has given us an excellent example of credit: When he promises to assist Bassiano in obtaining a sum of money, Antonio’s cash ow is zero but the younger man will be able to get funds in Venice based solely on Antonio’s solid credit. Thou know’st that all my fortunes are at sea; neither have I money nor commodity to raise a present sum. Therefore go forth: Try what my credit can in Venice do; . . . Go presently inquire, and so will I, where money is, and I no question make to have it of my trust, or for my sake.

Antonio pledged his person and was prepared to die a miserable death rather than soiling his reputation of trustworthiness. Luckily for him [and theatergoers everywhere], Shakespeare used the limits of law and logic to get Antonio out of his predicament while preserving his reputation, his credit.120 Factors and agents Not all business conducted in Nantes involved trade on the men’s own accounts. Even if they most often traded for themselves and their relatives or partners, they also did contract work on behalf of other rms in Rotterdam or merchants in other cities. Working on commission, they earned a fee of 2 to 2.5 percent of the value of the merchandise. Eon calculated that the earnings of Dutch factors in France amounted to 428,910 livres per year, money which should in his opinion have been earned by French factors doing the work that was now appropriated by the foreigners.121 The reverse situation, in which a Rotterdam merchant acted as the representative in Holland for a Nantais trad119 Mathias, 10–15. Mathias describes the necessity of ‘credit’ plus the importance of personal networks for the acquisition of social standing in great detail. 120 William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1600; reprint, 1992), Act 1, Scene 2 and Act 4, Scene 1. 121 Eon, 33.

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ing rm, occurred as well. Jan De Grande acted as agent for Julien Martin and Guillem Tallemant, merchants at the Fosse in Nantes, in a series of disputed letters of exchange between 1620 and 1633, one of them involving a refusal to pay by the partnership of Gorisz & Baul in Nantes.122 In another example, merchant Elis in Amsterdam conscated the St. Pieter on grounds that the ship was owned by Gillis van de Luffel in Nantes [presumably because Gillis owed money to Elis]. Protesting the seizure, Contractation member Franchoys Suardt claimed ownership of the vessel instead. Suardt’s representative in Rotterdam was none other than Gillis’ brother Jan van de Luffel.123 The purported French ownership of a Dutch ship used to transport merchandise belonging to Dutch traders suggests a classic case of embargo evasions by ying under a foreign ag. In Sickness and Health During the rst half of the century, several plague epidemics swept through Nantes. When the plague broke out elsewhere in the region, entry into Nantes from the affected places was strictly forbidden ‘on the pain of death’. Severe plague outbreaks occurred in 1602, in 1625, in 1629, in 1630–1631—when “those who were in the bad air were forbidden to show up at the police ofce in person, but they would have to communicate with the authorities through their neighbors”—and once again in 1641.124 The Sephardic physician Manuel de Mello reported

122 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 144/108/207, 22 March 1631 and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 144/272/545, 13 August 1633. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 114/179/378, 30 March 1632. Less than a year later, Gorisz and Baul skipped Nantes leaving behind angry creditors and signed the land reclamation contract in the Médoc. Massé: 28 & 30–31. Guillem Tallemant could be a relative of the Tallemant family of La Rochelle. His brother [?] Pierre Tallemant left La Rochelle for Bordeaux in 1620 and became the ‘fermier general des cinq grosses fermes de France’ in Paris in the 1630s. When Pierre left La Rochelle, his representative was Paul Gassen. Is he related to the Conrad Gaussen, marchand amand, who started the land reclamation projects near Bordeaux in the early 1600s? This would be another link between the Tallemants and the Dutch. 123 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 98/208/527, 29 January 1631. A merchant identied only as “Suhard (père)” is listed as a member of the Contractation in the period 1625–1650. Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 329. François Suhard du Fonteny served as Consul of the Contractation in the years 1666–1667. We do not know the grounds on which Elis laid claim on the St. Pieter. 124 AM GG 770, Ordonnance du duc de Mercoeur, gouverneur de Bretagne in 1583. Pity those neighbors!

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that during those years, the plague hit Nantes very severely. In his history of Nantes, the Abbé Travers describes the Dutch request in the summer of 1625 to be allowed to establish a ‘pesthouse’ for the sick members of their ‘nation’, but the authorities responded by directing them to the police just like every other resident.125 We know that the Dutch community contributed to the Hôpital de Sanitat, because in 1654 the French felt that the foreigners did not pull their economic weight as far as charitable contributions were concerned and requested a higher donation from the Dutch nation. We must assume that any Dutchmen desperate enough to risk a seventeenth-century hospital environment ended up at the Sanitat, but we have no documentary evidence.126 The non-survival of the Protestant church records with their burial information for the whole period keeps the mortality of most Dutch residents of Nantes in the shadows of history. Art Immortality is possible through a well-executed portrait. The rst half of the seventeenth century witnessed the extensively documented development of a mass market for art in the Dutch Republic.127 Only a single painting provides evidence that the men and women who made Nantes their temporary home also imported the craze to own paintings or engravings of masterpieces.128 An auction of 433 art and luxury objects by Flemish dealer Pierre le Brun which took place in Nantes in April

NB: The linguistic opposites are remarkable: While the English commit a crime “at the pain of death”, the French do so “sur peyne de la vie”—at the pain of life. One group will obtain death, the other will lose life. 125 Nicolas (1686–1750) Travers and François Charles Frédéric Auguste Savagner, Histoire Civile, Politique Et Religieuse De La Ville Et Du Comté De Nantes (Nantes: Forest, 1836), Vol. 3, 253–254. 126 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 16. 127 Marten Jan Bok, Vraag En Aanbod Op De Nederlandse Kunstmarkt, 1580 –1700 (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1997). 128 Sometimes between 1647 and 1660, the Dutch artist Jean Baptist Weenix [or one of his followers] painted the family portrait of merchant Aernout van Wijckersloot, his well-connected spouse Christina Wessels and their children. Rijksarchief voor Kunsthistorische Documentatie in The Hague, database art number 14647 and image number 31514. This is thus far the only evidence of a portrait by an artist known to have worked in France in the mid-17th century and one of the Dutch merchants of Nantes. Van Wijckersloot worked in Nantes from at least 1664 until at least 1682. Christine Wessels’ sister Catharine married Pierre van Herzeel, who came to Nantes from Hamburg in 1646. For the Van Hersel/Herzell clan, see below.

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1632 is the only contemporary evidence of any kind of art market in the city. As Collins and Croix point out, the timing of the lottery in 1632 coincided with the meeting of the Estates of Brittany so Le Brun must have targeted the provincial elite as his market, but we should not discount the strength in numbers and buying power of the Dutch community in Nantes in this period.129 Unfortunately, the auction list was not accompanied by a list with the names of the purchasers. The Musée Dobrée in Nantes owns ve aquarelles by Dutch artist Lambert Doomer.130 Doomer and his friend Willem Schellinks came to Nantes to visit Lambert’s brother Maerten, a merchant from Amsterdam who worked in Nantes from at least 1644 to 1650. The visitors stayed for about six months in 1645–1646 and left us valuable images of the city and its surrounding area, some of which are included in this work.131

129 James B. Collins and Alain Croix, “Le Marchand De Luxe. L’inventaire De Pierre Le Brun, Marchand ‘Flamand’ Aux Etats De Bretagne (1632),” in Eglise, Education, Lumieres . . . Histoires Culturelles De La France (1500 –1830), ed. Alain Croix, Andre Lespagnol, and Georges Provost (Rennes: Presses Universitaires Rennes, 1999), 207–228. Pierre le Brun was likely the Antwerp art dealer Peter de Bruyn, who organized similar lotteries in Paris in 1611, 1617, and 1619. See also Antoine Schnapper, “Probate Inventories, Public Sales and the Parisian Art Market in the Seventeenth Century,” in Art Markets in Europe, 1400 –1800, ed. Michael North and David Ormrod (Ashgate, 1998), 132 and 238. Schnapper mentions an unpublished study of Pierre le Brun’s activities in Paris by M. Szanto (Paris IV-Sorbonne). In a personal communication of 22 June 2004, Collins reported that Alain Croix identied one of Le Brun’s paintings in a museum in Nantes as having been part of a wealthy merchant family’s collection. 130 My gratitude to the staff at the Musée Dobrée, especially Mme Parpoil, conservatrice section gravures & estampes who in May 2002 allowed me to examine Doomer’s original aquarelles, and to her assistant, Mlle Barthault, bureau d’estampes, who assisted me with some of the technical terminology. 131 Lambert Doomer and Willem Schellinks were featured in an exhibition at the Institut Néerlandais, Paris; Voyages en France: Dessinateurs hollandais au siècle de Rembrandt, 5 October –3 December 2006 and at the Rembrandthuis in Amsterdam in January 2007. See also Wolfgang Schulz, Lambert Doomer Samtliche Zeichnungen (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1974), 4–5 and Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 264 and 265, Table VIII. Collins’ list of merchants importing Polish grains into Nantes reveals that on 9 April 1644 “P. Bosch and M. Domer” imported 100 tons of rye and 60 tons of wheat on a vessel from Rotterdam. Hendrick Doomer worked together with his brother Maerten in Nantes. This is the Hendrick mentioned in Biema’s account of the disturbances of 1647.

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chapter one Dutch family life and questions of endogamy

The marriage patterns of the Dutch community remain obscure for the rst half of the century due to the disappearance of the records of the Protestant church in nearby Sucé through the year 1670. From the genealogical study of Rotterdam’s elite we know that many of the men who came to France at the start of their careers in international commerce came as bachelors.132 A few notarial references to spouses dating from the earlier period suggest that most but not all of the married men brought their wives to Nantes. Brandy pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn and his wife Machteltgen Michielsdr raised a son and two daughters in Nantes. Pieter Fransz Baul and his partner Tielman Gorisz both had Dutch wives, and Tymen van Schoonhoven married the daughter of fellow wine trader Reynier Tinnebac. Revixit van Naerssen Jr. married a girl from Middelburg a few years after settling in Nantes, but less than a year after her death in 1669 he remarried the French widow of a fellow Dutchman.133 Joachim de Wolff is the lone exception to the pattern of the presence of either bachelors or married men accompanied by their families. While he worked in Nantes, De Wolff left his wife Geertruyt van Wely in Rotterdam to take care of the family and their business.134 The limited information suggests that, in the early decades of the Dutch presence in Nantes, very few Dutchmen married French women; the tendency of the Dutchmen to see their sojourn in Nantes as a temporary career-move would support this scenario. Most of the men returned to their family’s rm in Holland, leaving factors or agents in Nantes to carry on with the local trade. In the grand scheme of international business, a Dutch wife made much more sense as far as networking was concerned. Only a single notarial record points to the marriage between a Dutchman and a woman from Nantes in the 1630s. In a transaction involving Bonavontura Bron, a native of Amsterdam,

132 E. A. Engelbrecht, De Vroedschap Van Rotterdam 1572–1795, ed. J. H. W. Unger, 5 vols., Bronnen Tot De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. 5 (Rotterdam: 1973). 133 ADLA 4E2/1458213, 28 June 1631 for Baul & Gorisz; Sylvie Bizet, “Les Protestants À Nantes À La Fin Du XVIIe Siècle” (maitrise, Nantes, 1972), 170. for Tymen/Simon van Schoonhoven; and Engelbrecht, 225. for Van Naerssen. See also E. Wiersum, “Grafschriften Uit De Waalsche Kerk,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 3, no. 6 (1928). Reynier Tinnebac Sr died in Rotterdam on 8 May 1670 at the age of 72. 134 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 137/142/202, 7 February 1630.

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notary Mariot describes Madgaleine Despinay as “dame du Broon”.135 Bron’s wife likely was a member of the Espinoza clan, prominent Iberian New Christians who had settled in Nantes as outwardly devout Catholics in the middle of the previous century.136 Later documents refute a blanket rejection of exogamy. Sylvia Bizet investigated the Dutch community in the latter portion of the seventeenth century and found clear evidence a signicant rate of mixed Dutch–French marriages next to endogamic unions. The pattern of Dutch merchants leading a steady family life with Dutch wives is conrmed by the presence in Nantes of their children who form the endogamic marriage pool in the 1670s. Of the 31 Dutch men who married in Nantes between 1670 and 1684, eighteen [or 58 percent] married a Dutch woman, most often a daughter or widow of a fellow expat. At the same time, the eleven Dutch grooms who found themselves a French bride made up 27 percent of the marriages, which points to a healthy interaction between the Dutch and French communities. In addition, seven Dutch women married Frenchmen.137 The rate of the

135 ADLA 4E2/1459/226, 21 January 1632. The couple resided in the parish of St. Nicolas in Nantes, home of many of the members of the Contractation. See also AM HH 194, Registre de la Contractation: In 1629, ‘Jacques Despinoze, sieur de l’Espinays’, served as the association’s treasurer. Bron was not a member of the Contractation, but his partner Marc Serizay de Espinoze was. ADLA 4E2/1462/188, 3 April 1638 for the signature of ‘M. Serizay’ on a document of the Chapitre de Saint Nicolas. Serizay’s signature is joined by several other Contractation members, including his relatives ‘P. Espinoze’ and ‘Jq. Despinose’, as well as ‘P. Langloys’, and ‘de Coussy’. Also AM HH 194, Registre de la Contractation, entries for 1628 and 1630 for ‘M. du Serizay Despinoz’. 136 I suggest that Bron was part of the far ung Sephardic trading network, centered in Hamburg and headed by Cornelis le Brun, that dealt extensively with Spain and Portugal See Kellenbenz, 294. ‘Cornelis le Brun’ led a consortium which traded with Iberia via Hamburg, Bremen, Emden, Rouen and occasionally via Calais and London. In Kellenbenz’ opinion Le Brun was Dutch but I would modify the label to read ‘Dutch Sephardim’. 137 Bizet, 160–162. Bizet considers the Van Herzell family to be German, but I place them in the Dutch camp. In 1643, Jacob van Harsel acknowledged two debts for a total of 5,000 guilders to an ex-magistrate and the widow of an ex-burgomaster of Rotterdam. [GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 115/1/1, 25 April and 115/13/14, 2 June 1643]. It may not be coincidental that Van Harsel’s debts were so high, and I propose that the borrowed money was used to gain a lucrative position by greasing two pairs of inuential hands: In 1643, Jacob van Hersele occupied the lucrative position of ‘Ontvanger der Convoyen en Licenten’ [receiver of the convoy and license taxes] for the Admiralty of the Maze in Rotterdam. See R. Bijlsma, “In—En Uitvoer Te Delfshaven 1643–1646,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 2 (1914): 99. Such a job would not go to a foreigner. Yet a branch of the family had indeed settled in Germany. Jost [ Joost] van Herseele appears in the records of the Bank of Hamburg with an annual turnover of almost 190,000 Mark as early as 1619. Kellenbenz, 239. See also Micaud for Pierre Van Herzeel who

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mixed marriages points to a relatively high level of cultural assimilation. It would also signal the merger of the personal networks of the bride and groom, which by denition immediately led to the integration of their families’ commercial networks. The marriage of Dorothée Van Naerssen to Pierre Burelle in May 1681 linked two wine trading families, one based in Rotterdam and the other in Nantes. Opa Revixit van Naerssen had started his career as wine buyer in 1628 and Grandpère Jan Burel was selling upstream Loire wines as early as 1630.138 As the century progressed, the increased specialization of the wine traders made those kinds of networks even more important than before. Wild oats and ‘Voorkinderen’ The younger Dutchmen who came as trainees or junior partners were not yet sufciently established economically to be able to afford a wife and family. At least some of them used part of their time in Nantes to sow their wild oats. The young men who came to France to learn the tricks of the wine trade also showed signs of liberation from parental supervision, and cases dealing with disputed paternity provide evidence of the live results of their dalliances with local women. In an era when birth-control meant mostly the rst and rarely the latter, the appearance of voorkinderen [children born prior to being married] is not surprising. It speaks for the frequency of such occurrences that most cases that mention a person being a voorkind do so utterly matter-of-factly, although the level of acceptance of a voorkind by the rest of the family varied. Several paternity cases shed light on the lengths the merchant families in Holland would go to protect their patrimony in case of foreign [grand-] children born out of wedlock.139 came to Nantes from Hamburg in 1646. Pierre married Catharine Wessels, whose [sister?] Christine married Dutch merchant Arnault van Wyckersloot. 138 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 147/212/474, 3 February 1628 for Revixit as wine buyer, residence in the Wijnstraat; ADLA 4E2/1457/251, 6 September 1630 for Burel’s upstream wine transaction; GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 135/78/102, 5 May 1634 for a large wine shipment from Burel to several Dutchmen. Exogamic marriages—between spouses of different nationalities—were virtually always endogamic in religious terms. 139 The ofcial Rotterdam genealogy of respectable citizens and the dates of their rst legal marriages prove that the Dutch merchants did not always marry the women they impregnated. In this puzzle of family ties it has been an enormous bonus that during the seventeenth century, rst-born sons would routinely be named after their paternal grandfather. For example, the oldest son of Jan Pietersz is Pieter Jansz who names his rst son Jan Pietersz.

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In the Dutch community of Nantes two members of Rotterdam’s wealthy Verschuer family, both named Johannes, deserve special mention. In 1642, Johannes Verschuren found himself in the Prison de Regares in Nantes because he got an unnamed young lady pregnant. Back in Rotterdam, his father Joost issued a power of attorney to two Dutch merchants in Nantes, Coenraedt Temmincq and Rochus Parve, to use legal means to prevent a marriage from taking place. Joost Verschuren’s next step was to empower a banker in Paris to prevent his son’s marriage by coming to a settlement with the judges of the ‘Chambre de l’Edit ’ in Paris.140 Seven years later, the namesake and nephew of the rst Johannes followed in his uncle’s footsteps. In the spring of 1649, silk merchant Pieter Verschuyr and his wife received a letter from Nantes saying that their son Johan was in trouble over a woman. Eighteen-year old Johan had gone to Nantes to learn commerce under the wings of Maerten Doomer, but lived at the house of Cornelia van Ruytevelt, a Dutch ‘tavern keeper’. Johan got her 25-year old daughter Annetgen pregnant, and promised to marry her. Believing this promise to have been made ‘under duress’, Johan’s parents tried to prevent the wedding and questioned the widow’s honor and reputation. The preservation of the family patrimony was paramount, so rather than accepting an undesirable daughter-in-law, they disowned their son and stated that they would never acknowledge any of his children.141 Mrs. van Ruytevelt immediately countered the attack on her reputation with two highprole character witnesses voucing for her and her extended family’s integrity.142 Pieter Verschuyr did adhere to an Arrest of the Parlement

140 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 90/159/229, 10 March 1642 and 90/180/269, 16 June 1642. We may assume the family representatives in Nantes and Paris did their job, because a Dutch source indicates that Johannes was a bachelor as late as 1649. He served as a magistrate of Rotterdam in 1651. Patriarch Joost Verschuren Sr. was a cloth merchant who had come to Rotterdam from Antwerp. His will of 1640 indicates that his seven adult children could expect to inherit 28,000 guilders each, which means that his property was worth 196,000 guilders. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 129/366/1050, 8 September 1640 for Verschuren’s will. No wonder the Verschuren family strove so hard to keep accidental marriage partners at bay. The Chambre de l’Edit was a court that specialized in cases that crossed religious boundaries, i.e. those involving Catholics and Protestants, and it was based on the premise that nonCatholics would not be able to get a fair trial in a regular court. It had jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. Information obtained from James Collins, 24 June 2004. 141 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 182/72/198, 16 May 1649 for the disowning and its reasons. 142 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 248/133/252, 1 June 1649. Claes Matelieff, a 73-year old merchant, and Jan Domenuyt, the 83-year old Equipagemeester of the VOC, speak on Mrs. Van Ruytevelt’s behalf.

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de Paris of 9 April 1650 which ordered Johan to pay 900 crowns or 2700 guilders in support of his illegitimate child.143 This did not end the matter. Mrs. van Ruytevelt continued her defense by stating in 1651 that she was the honorable widow of a Dutch merchant and that the rumors of her bad behavior were untrue.144 Before the year was over, the case came to a sad end. Johan Verschuyr’s parents revoked their wills in which they had disowned their son, because “the reason for the disinheritance had since been superseded and no longer existed”: The only conclusion can be that the toddler had died. After this sad, but liberating event Johan Verschuyr continued to work in Nantes. In 1670, at the age of 39, he married a local woman and by 1680 he had acquired landed property.145 Both Leonart Busch and Hendrick Rammelman, two other Rotterdam merchants, had ‘voorkinderen’ in Nantes.146 The case of Rammelman’s ‘voorkind ’ provides the clearest evidence that marriage to a woman with the proper connections and pedigree overrode any personal feelings that might jeopardize a favorable match. Rammelman arrived in Nantes no later than 1631, when he is listed in the port register.147 In September 1637, seven weeks after baptizing his son Willem in Nantes, Rammelman changed his will and named his infant son as his beneciary. Rammelman stayed in Nantes at least until August 1638, but sometime later returned to Rotterdam. There he married the very eligible and well-connected Maria van Hogendorp on November 18, 1640.

143 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 502/429, 17 December 1650. The money had been fronted by Maerten Doomer, young Johan’s employer in Nantes. 144 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 146/4/19, 27 February 1651. This act also indicates that once again the Verschuer family dealt with the matter by going to a representative in Paris. 145 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 160/65/192, 14 December 1651 for the revoked will. According to Bizet, this second Johan Verschuer remained in Nantes, where at the age 39 he married a French woman on 12 June 1670. About ten years later, Jan Verschuer is ‘sieur de Fresne’, and he and Rachel Martin have two children. Bizet, 162 and 171. 146 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/352/588, 4 July 1629. for the death of Leonart’s rst son Pieter in Nantes. See Engelbrecht, 157–158. For the two marriages of father Leonart, the three daughters of his rst marriage and the baptism of his legitimate son Pieter in Rotterdam on 24 May 1637. We do not know whether Leonart spent time in Nantes early in the century and fathered Pieter there or whether Pieter was a Rotterdam-born voorkind. Collins suggests that the two Pieters are one and the same boy, and that the Protestant baptism in Rotterdam followed a much earlier Catholic baptism of the child in Nantes. Personal communication, 22 June 2004. 147 ADLA B 2976. Rammelman appears ve times as the merchant responsible for the cargo.

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What happened next was cold-blooded pragmatism. Nine months after the wedding, Rammelman revoked the will that had made little Willem the beneciary and changed it in favor of his children with Ms. van Hogendorp. The date of the new will, August 8, 1641 suggests that Maria van Hogendorp was expecting the couple’s rst baby.148 We must presume that one of the conditions of the marriage had been the disinheritance of Hendrick’s French voorkind if the couple proved to be fertile. Indications are that the Willem in Nantes did not live beyond February 1643: the genealogical records of Rotterdam show that Hendrick Rammelman and his wife baptized their rst child and son—also named Willem—on 5 February 1643.149 Religious life Unlike affairs of the heart, matters of faith did their share to keep the Dutch community in Nantes separated from the French population.

148 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 158/94/290, 23 September 1637. Willem Rammelman was about 7 weeks old when his father drew up this will. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 159/57/147, 8 August 1641 for Henrick Rammelman’s updated will. The author of an article about the portraits of Rammelman and his bride, however, implies that Rammelman was a widower when he married Maria van Hoogendorp, but states that nothing is known about his rst marriage. F. Schmidt Degener, “De Portretten Van Hendrick Rammelman En Maria Van Hogendorp,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 3 (1915): 117–118. The Rammelmans baptized their rst child in February 1643, which means no live birth occurred in 1641 or 1642. 149 The parents could not have named this boy Willem if the rst Willem Rammelman was still alive. The Rammelmans buried at least three children between 1646 and 1650, and the second Willem may have been one of them. A third Willem Rammelman was baptized Willem on 15 February 1654, he managed to live until 1684. Engelbrecht, 185–186. and Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Digitale Stamboom for the baptisms. The Willem born in 1654 lived only for 30 years and was appointed Commissaris van het Waterrecht in 1679. J. H. W. Unger, ed., De Regeering Van Rotterdam 1328–1892, Naamlijst Van Personen Die in of Van Wege De Regeering Ambten Hebben Bekleed., ed. J. H. W. Unger, V vols., Bronnen Voor De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. I (Rotterdam: Van Waesberge & Zoon, 1892), 168. In a personal communication, James Collins disputed the link between multiple children with the same name and the frequent death of children, noting that in French records, multiple living children in one family carried the same name. Dutch records do not, however, yield any evidence that this was standard Dutch practice as well and I maintain the position that only one of the multiple Willems was alive at any one time. The registers of the Protestant church of Nantes prior to 1670 have not survived so it is impossible to track down the French-born Willem’s mother or the date of his burial. I have not yet been able to return to Nantes to check Catholic church records which might shed light on Collins’ suggestion that Willem received a Catholic baptism from his Catholic mother.

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Although we do not know what percentage of the colony professed to be Protestant, generally speaking the Dutchmen were identied as such. Baby Willem Rammelman would have been baptized in Sucé, because the citizens of Nantes did not allow a place of worship for the members of the ‘religion pretendue reformée’ in their town. King Henri IV’s 1598 Edict of Nantes, which gave freedom of worship to the Protestants of France, contained secret provisions pertaining to Nantes itself as it had been the fervent center of the Catholic League. Protestants were not allowed to congregate for services within a radius of three miles outside the city lines. As a result the Protestant church of Nantes occupied a barn in the village of Sucé on the bank of the Erdre river, a little over three miles from the city. At the beginning of April 1601, two weeks after the Parlement de Bretagne had nally registered the Edict and its secret articles, the Protestant community secured land for three cemeteries. Unfortunately, the earliest surviving church records date from 1670, so the whole rst half of the century remains in obscurity. From Vaurigaud’s work on the Protestant church in Brittany we know that the Dutch were active members of the Sucé congregation and served on the church board. On Sundays, the psalms sung by the Protestants on their way to church in boats irritated the residents along the shoreline!150 The Protestants knew that their psalms were a bone of contention between the two Christian denominations and clearly used this ‘innocent’ pastime to pester the Catholic population. As we saw above, in 1647 the Sucé church and its congregation became the object of violent expressions of this antipathy. Despite ofcial rules to the contrary, religion did not stand in the way of naturalization. The three naturalizations of Dutchmen recorded in 1678 prove that the municipal authorities were willing and able to talk harshly about the required Catholicism of those wishing to become French citizens but to leave the stick at home. Mathieu Hooft of Amsterdam, Simon de Licht of Rotterdam, and Pieter Hollaer of Delfshaven (near Rotterdam) all professed to be “of the pretend Reformed religion”, but their requests to have their naturalization letters and accompanying documentation registered in the city records of Nantes received a positive response.151 150 B. Vaurigaud, Essay Sur L’histoire Des Églises Reformées De Bretagne 1535–1808, 2 vols. (Paris: Fischbacher, 1870), 55 & 138 and AM GG 650, folio 3 for a document of 1665 which refers to the registration by the Parlement de Bretagne on 16 March 1601. 151 AM GG 647, Religion Reformée, folio 3–6 and 8. Hooft had received the King’s

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Xenophobia or plain old jealousy? We can dismiss Mathorez’ assertion that the Dutch kept to themselves and had “very few relations with the other segments of the population.”152 Mathorez pretty much echoed Jean Eon who in turn echoed the Moyens d’Intervention of 1645, but the notarial records of both Rotterdam and Amsterdam show that the commercial activities of the Dutch did bring them in frequent and cordial contact with well-established trading houses in Nantes. The cases of Dutchmen siring children with French women, as well as the 27 percent rate of Dutch-French marriages in the 1670s, point to a solid level of integration and assimilation. In the Moyens d’Intervention of 1645, the French complained about the tendency of the Dutch to patronize fellow Dutchmen. Apart from employing their own in the various sectors of the wine business, they also frequented Dutch-run inns, taverns and other places of entertainment, and lodged with their compatriots. If the French dared to protest such exclusionary habits, especially the use of non-Frenchmen in the production and marketing of the wines, the Dutch reiterated their claim of enjoying exactly the same privileges as native Frenchmen. And if the French put any kind of pressure on the Dutch, those foreign cry-babies immediately appealed to their States General to intervene on their behalf by sending the Dutch ambassador to the Royal Council.153 Two aspects of this anti-Dutch complaint warrant a rebuttal. First, if it had been against local ordinances, no Dutch person would have been able to operate a tavern or other establishment. The fact that Dutch inns existed is proof that such places were legal. Second, the successful interventions of the States General or the Royal Council prove that the Dutch community did indeed hold the legal privileges it claimed to have. The Moyens d’Intervention stemmed from the frustration and sense of powerlessness felt by French merchants in view of the favorable status of their Dutch counterparts, not from an illegal usurpation of privileges by the foreigners. The fact that the Dutch belittled the professional abilities of the French by publicly proclaiming that “these Greeks [the French] do not understand commerce” and that the French

royal approval in 1673 and in his efforts to get the naturalization legalized locally he stated that he had been resident of Nantes “for a long time and that he wished to end his days [in the city]. 152 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 11. 153 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 1645, 8–9.

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were easily duped did of course only serve to pour oil on the burning waters of the Loire.154 This sense of frustration and envy emerges clearly in Jean Eon’s words on both the private and the business lives of the Dutch: “Instead of staying with the locals, [the Dutch] rent the most beautiful and spacious houses of Nantes, which they then furnish magnicently.” What nettled even more was the pervasiveness of the pesky foreigners in the retail sector. Not satised with a stranglehold over the production and distribution system of Nantes’ commerce, the Dutch also ran small shops or sold imported goods in retail quantities from their warehouses, bypassing and undercutting the French storeowners.155 All in all, life for the Nantais under the Dutch regime sounded pretty awful if we rely on the Moyens d’Intervention and Eon’s Le Commerce Honorable. Increasingly, the French government chafed under the economic power of the Dutch. Victor Tapié chronicled the government’s reaction to these and similar calls for protective measures. Starting in 1629, a series of regulations instituted by Cardinal Richelieu aimed to boost the competitiveness and the shipping capacity of France and to lessen the country’s dependence on outsiders.156 Protectionism in the second half of the seventeenth century The Dutchmen who worked in Nantes in the second half of the century were more likely to settle down for the duration, as we can see from the strong marriage market among their adult children in the 1670s and early 1680s.157 Nantes and its wine and brandy market continued to attract a steady number of Dutchmen until the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, as conrmed by the secondary literature on the community.158

154 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 1645, 7–8. The Dutch nickname for the French was ‘les Grecs’. 155 Eon, 62. Did the Dutch proverb ‘to live like God in France’ originate in Nantes’ Dutch community? 156 Tapié, 254–261. 157 Bizet, 160–162. 158 Vaurigaud, 312–313. In 1665, a petition by the Protestant congregation to the mayor and city council includes the signatures of at least 12 conrmed Dutchmen among the 47 Protestants. Notary Verger, obviously popular with the members of the Dutch community, recorded the presence of 46 Dutchmen between 1661 and 1685. Over a four-year span around 1680, the registers of his colleague Duteil provide another

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Dutch merchants also invested in the new sugar refineries that started to spring up around Nantes; in this period the Dutch market absorbed two-fth of the city’s sugar production. Since 1669, Revixit Van Naerssen Jr. and Rene Tinnebac owned two thirds of a sugar renery in Saumur. Several months prior to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, Van Naerssen sold his interest in the Saumur renery. The previous month he had already divested himself of his one-third interest in the Nantais sugar renery ‘De la Motte St. Nicholas’ for 4,500 livres. The Rotterdammers Gerard Pieters and Pierre Hollaer and the widow Van Schoonhoven purchased molasses from local reneries.159 It remains to be seen if Nantes’ boom in the sugar and slave trade of the 18th century received its jump start from Dutch entrepreneurs in the 1650s and 1660s.160 From the 1660s onwards, a two-pronged attack on the Dutch communities in France made conditions increasingly difcult. Economically, the French government’s efforts to undermine the hegemony of the Dutch Republic through a tariff war dominated the 1660s. The tax of 50-sous per ton based on the size of foreign ships arriving and leaving French ports, established by Minister Fouquet on 20 June 1659, was modied by a treaty in 1662 which conceded that the Dutch only had to pay once per voyage.161 New tariffs of 1664 increased the customs’ burden, especially on Dutch ships importing rened sugar into France. The nal straw came with minister Colbert’s new tariffs in April 1667 on all foreign commodities imported into France, with special care taken to render several key Dutch imports virtually non-protable. In the words of Jonathan Israel, the “draconian increases” were effective when seen from the French viewpoint, and “substantially reduced the volume of Dutch trade with France, and adversely affected numerous Dutch industries.”162 The mounting economic pressures on both sides

31 names, for a total of 77 Dutch residents. Twenty of the men had transactions with Verger in 1661, while another 13 show up for the rst time in 1666. 159 Veronique Michaud, “Les Negociants Étrangers À Nantes Pendant La Premiere Partie Du Regne De Louis XIV, 1661–1685” (Memoire de maitrise, Universite de Nantes, 1996), 59–60. 160 See Robert Louis Stein, The French Sugar Business in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). Stein points to the large sugar rening industry in Nantes, and to the strong connection between sugar trade levels and slave trade levels. 161 Paul M. Bondois, “La Rivalité Franco-Hollandaise,” Revue d’Histoire Économique et Sociale 11, no. 1 (1923): 13. The new tariff was called the Droit de Fret. 162 Charles Woolsey Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New

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combined with pan-European power politics led the two nations on a collision course, and war broke out in May 1672. Following seven difcult years of war, French-Dutch trade rebounded following the Peace of Nijmegen in 1679. Despite the political and economic troubles, Rotterdam’s interest in trade with Nantes continued to be strong, while its trade with Bordeaux grew signicantly. Michaud calculated that between 1661 and 1685, ships from Rotterdam carried away 62 percent of Nantes’ overall exports versus 16 percent recorded for Amsterdam and a modest 2 percent for Middelburg. These proportions reect the continuation of Rotterdam’s leading role in the Dutch trade on Nantes.163 The departure records of the port of Bordeaux reveal that by 1682, Rotterdam ships led exports to the Republic from that city as well, both in number of departures as well as the total tonnage.164 Religious troubles The steady deterioration of the macro-economic and political situation was further exacerbated by the government’s campaign against Protestants in France. The reign of Louis XIV saw an increased hardening of anti-Huguenot and thus anti-Protestant-Dutch attitudes. In 1663, a royal declaration described the ‘religion pretendue reformée’ as an illness that was only made worse by a policy of tolerance.165 Despite the worsening religious conditions, the Dutch Protestants celebrated at least 31 weddings in Nantes between 1670 and 1684.166 The leaders of the church in Nantes tried to control the behavior and actions of the

York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 438–439 and Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, 779–780. See my earlier remarks about the Tax d’Etranger of 2.5 percent ad valorem. 163 Michaud, 79. 164 Archives Departementales de la Gironde [ADG], seriess 6 B 288, Departs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1682. Ninety-four Rotterdam ships departed Bordeaux, but a total of 256 ships with a combined tonnage of 25,230 tons left with Rotterdam as destination. Amsterdam received 196 ships from Bordeaux with a total tonnage of 22,244 tons. Lack of specic cargo listings preclude precise export/import statistics. 165 Bizet, Annex V. Royal declaration of April 1663 that none of Louis subjects who previously had been Protestant, having at any time professed to be Catholic, are allowed to return to the Protestant faith; followed by a strict ban on all the king’s Catholic subjects to leave the Catholic church for the Protestant religion. 166 Bizet, 160–162.

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congregation in order not to iname the anti-Protestant sentiments. This included an attempted crackdown on Sunday-work performed in the city’s sugar reneries by publicly censoring those renery directors who were Protestant, as well as an effort to adhere to the royal declaration of 1663 by physically barring entry into the church to those who had ofcially converted to Catholicism but who continued to be de facto Protestants. In November 1684, the king further curtailed Protestant worship in Nantes by limiting worship to once every two weeks, and then only with a royal observer present.167 Some Dutchmen saw the writing on the wall and decided to sell out.168 Others, such as naturalized citizen Pieter Hollaer, placed business before the Last Judgment and converted to Catholicism.169 Anti-Protestant measures turned ugly and the Dutch community was not exempt. The government instituted the ‘dragonnades’, in which violent soldiers [dragoons] were billeted in the homes of Protestants with the object to make life so miserable that conversion to Catholicism looked like a good option.170 The harassment and intimidation of Protestants culminated in the Edict of Fontainebleau of 17 October 1685, which revoked the Edict of Nantes. Arrests of those who refused to convert started immediately, but in order to preserve the economy everything was done to prevent a mass exodus of the Protestants. The persecutions did sour the business climate but did not personally affect those members of the Dutch community who were Catholic, nor those who placed business before faith in 1685 and converted to Catholicism rather than give up their French affairs. We do not know how many Dutch merchants and their families left or ed Nantes in this violent period, but Mathorez indicates that Dutch Catholics stayed put. Following the disruptions caused by the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) business bounced back and these Catholic families “formed the basis of a new colony

167

Vaurigaud, 374–375. Michaud, 59. Rotterdam’s Revixit van Naerssen sold his one-third share in one of Nantes’ seven sugar reneries in February 1685 for 4,500 livres, followed by the sale of an equal share in the renery in Saumur—which he had established in 1669 —the following month. He then returned home to Rotterdam with his family, just in time. Not enough is known about the possible link between Dutch investments in the sugar reneries of Nantes and the rise of Nantes as France’s premier slave-trade center. 169 Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 35–36. 170 The Dutch consul Jacob de Bie managed to smuggle his account to the editors of the Gazette de Haarlem. See Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 31–32. 168

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that [through immigration] became as numerous and as successful in the eighteenth century as in the previous period.”171 The Atlantic network Throughout the seventeenth century, the Dutch merchants who worked in Nantes did so as [temporary] representatives of their family rm back in the Republic. Some of these rms were subsidiaries or ‘offshore’ fronts for multinational parent-companies in enemy territory, especially Antwerp, Lisbon, and Madrid. Other rms did have their headquarters in Holland but maintained satellite ofces in prominent commercial centers elsewhere, such as Hamburg or London. Because of the distances and time lags involved, international trade was most dependent on the overlapping highly personalized merchant networks, be they Dutch or Iberian, gentile or Sephardic. The market operated on a credit basis, and it worked because all parties involved could generally rely on the integrity of the network. In this interconnected Atlantic economy, Nantes served as one of the nodes. In Nantes, the individual networks of the Dutchmen intersected with those who focused on the Iberian trade, including the city’s Sephardic New Christians, and the combination added to the strength of the highly intricate and sophisticated marketplace that we call the Atlantic world. We now turn to Rotterdam, one of these ports. Rotterdam prospered exactly because its merchants and entrepreneurs wholeheartedly embraced the opportunities provided by the international economic framework.

171

Mathorez, “Notes Sur La Colonie Hollandaise De Nantes,” 26–28 and 36–37. René Tinnebac Jr, long-term trader in Nantes and Van Naerssen’s partner in the sugar renery of Saumur ed to Holland. His properties in France were conscated. The government would have allowed him to return but only if he converted, and Tinnebac chose to stay in Holland. See also AM HH 43 for the permission given to René Tinnebac, amand, in 1681 to make beer for the use of the Dutchmen and sailors who lived at his home at the Fosse. See also Michaud, 79. Michaud identied 16 possible Catholic families, but two appear in the surviving protestant church records of Sucé which leaves at least 14 possible Dutch Catholic families.

CHAPTER TWO

ROTTERDAM’S WINE TRADERS AND THEIR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT The merchant does his best to equip ships to the East and then to the West, for the Spanish lump [silver?] and for the sugar sweet, and many a candied fruit and salt is also very good, and wine chases away sadness: to Norway for timber, and Scotland for coals Ode to the widely renowned merchant city Rotterdam, 16231

The importers, the wholesalers, and the distillers Placing all of Rotterdam’s wine traders under a single umbrella is slightly misleading because we are actually dealing with several fairly distinct—albeit overlapping—groups. The men who imported wines into the Dutch Republic were ‘grands négociants’ in the true sense of the word; the records inevitably give them the title of ‘coopman’—merchant. The occasional widow wine merchant was identied by her title of ‘coopvrouw’. As the Ode to Rotterdam points out, the merchants dealt in a wide range of commodities from various parts of the world and they often owned all or parts of the ships that transported their goods. They thrived exactly because they did not specialize in a single commodity or a single sector. Their participation in the coastal trade in bulk goods, such as wine and brandy, formed the relatively stable basis on which they could anchor riskier investments in trans-oceanic trade. Commercial transactions concerned merchants acting solo or in partnership with one, sometimes two, other traders. Individual shipments would be combined to ll the cargo hold of a vessel, but the various merchants dealt with the ship owners independently.2

1 Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, Hare Oudtheyt Ende Hare Grootheyt, Endo Oock Hare Ghelegentheydt, Leidsche Facsimile-Uitgaven (Leiden: 1623; reprint, 1942), unpaged. [my translation] 2 The personal webs received further reinforcement by two commercial practices that ourished in the seventeenth century, ‘reederij ’ or shared ownership and exploitation of cargo ships; and ‘bodemerij ’ [bottomry] which was a form of maritime lending.

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For their business information and nancial transactions the merchants relied on a complex and international web of personal relationships, which included members of the Sephardic diaspora in the Republic as well as abroad. The international merchants who dealt in a great variety of commodities did so outside the connes of the guild system, but their involvement in—and control over—key decision making positions at the municipal level plus their tendency to class-endogamy ensured the group’s cohesiveness in the face of outside pressures. In their capacity of wine traders, the ‘grand’ merchants re-barreled the alcohol before selling it to the domestic wholesalers, the wine buyers. This second group usually specialized in preparing a variety of wines for the domestic wholesale and retail markets, as expressed in their professional title of ‘wijnkoper’—wine buyer. These specialists can be compared to their French counterparts, the provincial brokers [‘courtiers’] whose knowledge of the bewildering range of wines guided the consumer.3 In order to protect their economic niche from encroachment and to control both quality and prices, the wine buyers organized themselves in a professional association, the ‘Wijnkopers Gilde’ [wine buyers’ guild]. Rotterdam had a wine buyers’ guild as early as 1612, but the oldest surviving guild regulations date from 1660; we must assume that not too many rules had changed in the intervening decades.4 To qualify for membership, a wine buyer had to have an annual turnover of at least 25 barrels which could not be sold in quantities of less than one barrel; any sales of less than a full barrel [= four oxheads] of wine, brandy or vinegar had to be reported to the guild’s headmen. At the retail level, tavern keepers and wine sellers supplied the local consumption market. Selling alcohol in quantities of less than one oxhead, they were required to show their status by displaying a sign at their tavern—or warehouse door.5 Rotterdam’s notaries carefully noted the distinction between these groups, so we know that Hendrick Rammelman was a merchant but

3

Thomas Edward Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne: The Wine Trade in Early Modern France, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science; 115th Ser., 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xix–xx and 76–78. 4 GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/1–12 for the text of the Ordinance of 1660. Pieter Symonsz started his career as ‘gilde knecht’ [servant of the guild] in January 1625. See GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 257/250, notary Hoand, 1634. 5 GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/1. Reference to the oldest guild regulations of 26 October 1612, which were renewed on 29 June 1626. Neither of these regulations has survived. Article 12 and 13 for the membership restrictions.

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that Thomas van Essevelt was a wine buyer. Over time, successful wine buyers like Revixit van Naerssen and Adriaen Hartman expanded their operations, moved up on the economic ladder and became known as merchants. Blurring the lines between the international merchants and the domestic wholesalers/wine buyers we nd men who participated in both activities, usually in partnership with relatives or associates in other cities. Some of the merchants and wine buyers supervised the transformation of second-rate wines into rst rate brandy in their Rotterdam distilleries, often as an offshoot of the beer brewing industry. Behind the ofcial division between the merchants, the wine buyers and the retailers lays the reality of intertwined groups. A notarial record reveals that of the three men who led the wine buyers’ guild in 1633, both Adriaen Ambrosius and Willem Harmansz had lived and worked in Nantes as merchants. The gradual shift towards specialization and polarization of the various branches of the wine trade is exemplied by the fact that none of the four guild leaders who served thirty-ve years later had spent time in France.6 Legal separation of the groups The laws of the States of Holland and West Friesland distinguished between wholesalers—who included the merchant importers as well as the domestic wholesalers—and the retail sellers of wine. The Ordinance on the Impost of Wines at provincial level, in effect between 1607 and 1630, stated that the merchants, factors, and wholesalers were those who dealt in annual volumes of at least three roeden Rhine wine, eight half barrels French wine, or 10 pipes or bottes of Spanish wine, provided that they could prove that these wines were then re-sold per barrel and not in smaller volumes.7 It was illegal for this group to operate a tavern

6 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 255/242, 22 July 1633. The headmen are listed as ‘wine buyers and wholesalers’. Ambrosius worked in Nantes from 1621 through 1628, but only Willem Harmansz’s own statement that he “used to live in Nantes” places him there. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/220/344, 26 August 1634. The third man, Pieter Verbiest, does not appear to have left Rotterdam. GAR, inv. nr. Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/42 for a list of the guild’s headmen starting with Van Brouckhuijsen, Cudde, Pedy and Schot in the year 1668. 7 See Annex I, Measures. A ‘roede’ is an old German surface measure; it is likely that Cau meant three ‘voeder’, the large barrel used in Rhine wine sales. [approximate equivalents in liters: 3 voeders = 2742; 8 French pipes = between 3656–3840; and 10 bottes = 4840]. The discrepancy in the wholesale barriers is not related to the tax value

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or to sell wines by the pitcher. At the request of the impost farmer, the wholesalers were expected to swear that they only traded in barrels of four stoopen [= about ten liters] or larger. The updated version of the Ordinance, covering the years 1631–1655, further separated the wholesale wine buyers from the other sellers by setting the wholesale bar at a minimum annual volume of 25 barrels sold and delivered.8 The regulations covering Rotterdam’s Wine Buyers’ Guild echoed these rules.9 Just like the Dutch ‘nation’ in Nantes came together at the ‘Place de la Hollande’ on xed days of the week, the members of Rotterdam’s wine buyers’ guild met every Saturday afternoon between four and six o’clock “to deal with all matters concerning the processing of wines and the wine trade”. Throughout the rst half of the century, the guild lacked its own headquarters, but as the tavern ‘St. Lucas’ often featured as the venue for arbitration cases on deals [literally] gone sour, it probably served in that capacity.10 The wine buyers of Rotterdam are revealed as a group in tax documents from 1622, 1634, and 1638. The impost, a tax levied at the provincial as well as the municipal level on wholesale transactions and retail consumption of wines, led to repeated clashes between the wholesalers and the impost farmer.11 Despite efforts of the collectors to enforce the registration of the wines and the payment of the taxes, we routinely nd evidence of widespread avoidance of the hated impost. We are witness to three of these attempts at exacting compliance, or at

of the wines; Rhenish and French wines brought the revenuers of the States General the same 100 guilders per barrel, against 200 per barrel Spanish wine. C. Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-Boeck Van De Staten Van Holland En Zeeland, 2 vols. (Den Haag: Van Wouw, 1658; reprint, 1774), vol. I, 1021. Taxation list, 22 October 1643. 8 Cau, ed., Vol. I, 1665. Ordonnantien voor de Pachters ofte Collecteurs van de Wynen, Art. 13. and Art. 14. and Vol. I, 1669 for the newer version. 9 GAR inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/1. 10 Based on the earliest surviving guild regulations of 1660. GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/2, art. 4. See also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 48/192/346, 10 June 1613. Six arbiters, including Joris Joostz Vlaming and Willem Hendricksz Rammelman meet at tavern St. Lucas. The tavern was used for other ofcial business as well: When wine buyer Revixit van Naerssen purchased real estate along the Wijnhaven, the contract was signed at the St. Lucas. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 84/91/59, 27 January 1620. 11 A retroactive complaint by the widow of a wine impost farmer shows that he had experienced a shortfall of about 8,000 guilders over the years 1620–1622. See GAR inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/81. Vroedschapsresolutie 2 October 1656 concerning the claim of Willem Adriaensz Baker’s widow for retroactive restitution. The councilmen declared that a lapse of so many years did not merit “dragging such old cows out of the ditch”.

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least at getting an ofcial commitment on the part of the wine buyers. They pledged their persons and their property to obey the law, and to report each barrel cellared and each pint sold retail.12 Placing the Rotterdam lists of 1634 and 1638 next to the names yielded by the Moyens d’Intervention protest in Nantes in 1645, and combining them with ample data from notarial records in both cities, conrms the general trend that the wine buyers and domestic distributors in Rotterdam did not venture abroad to purchase their wines, but that they depended on the international merchants to bring their wares to the Republic. Sixty-four men signed the impost documents but only twelve of them also worked in Nantes at some point in their career; nine of those twelve were merchants, three were known back in Rotterdam as wine buyers.13 The delineation between the two groups is also expressed in their participation in local politics. Economic power and political power A survey of municipal ofce holders and those international merchants who appeared in front of Rotterdam’s notaries to record commercial transactions shows the high level of overlap between the city’s mercantile and political elite, directly or through close relatives.14 It also claries the separation between the grand merchants and the wine buyers. The former ran the local government, whereas the latter appear in subsidiary roles only incidentally. Several of the merchants who lived and worked in France returned to Rotterdam where they combined 12

GAR, Oud Stadsarchief [hereafter OSA], 3384, 21 November 1622; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 257/465/307, 10 November 1634; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 347/67, 29 October 1638. The 1622 list holds the names of 16 men, four of whom continued in the wine business long enough to also sign both lists in the 1630s. Two others were missing in 1634 but reappear in 1638. The list of 1634 contains 32 names, including four widows; the 1638 list holds 51 names including one returning widow and three new ones. The four men who worked as wine buyers from 1622 through at least 1638 were: Pieter Matijsz, Willebrant Pietersz, Pauwel Timmers and Jacob Jansz Nuye. 13 The document with the names of the Dutchmen in Nantes dates from 1645, a difference of eleven and seven years respectively with the Rotterdam lists. It is the closest we can get to a direct comparison.: Adriaen Ambrosius, Cornelis Coninck, Reynier Dammansz, Carel de Lange, Seger Gorisz, Adriaen Hartman, Jan Hendrix den Touwer, Jan Holthuysen, and Gillis van Luffelen were known in Rotterdam as merchants, whereas Adriaen Cattenburch, Ary Michielsz, and Jan Vermasen were the only three wine buyers/domestic wholesalers who spent time in Nantes. 14 E. A. Engelbrecht, De Vroedschap Van Rotterdam 1572–1795, ed. J. H. W. Unger, 5 vols., Bronnen Tot De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. 5 (Rotterdam: 1973).

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business with city administration and power politics. Three of the men encountered in Nantes reached the top of the ladder and served one or more terms as Burgomaster after occupying a series of increasingly inuential positions: Cornelis Coninck, Adriaen Hartman, and Hendrick Rammelman. Yielding power to the grand merchants, the domestic wholesalers and wine buyers of Rotterdam rarely appear in the compilation of public ofce holders. Only three of the 30 wine buyers on the impost protest list of 1634 served the city, while only ve (perhaps six) of the 46 wine buyers who signed the document of 1638 held public ofce.15 If the wine buyers held a municipal ofce it usually was a minor one, but Burgomaster Pieter Foppen van der Meyden proved to be the exception to the rule when he signed the 1634 protest. In 1634, wine buyer Abraham Boogaert served as a Governor of one of the city hospitals but by1638, when he had advanced to the post of Treasurer for the Grand Fishery, he no longer appeared with his erstwhile colleagues on the impost protest of that year. These observations show the strong correlation between a man’s status as grand merchant and his unofcial eligibility for public ofce; generally speaking, Rotterdam’s wine buyers did not play a role in the city’s administration. Rotterdam’s political elite remained actively involved in the city’s commercial life throughout the seventeenth century, countering a trend observed in Amsterdam. It seems, however, that we need to question the absoluteness of the commercial withdrawal by Amsterdam’s public ofce holders. They may have yielded direct involvement to others, but indirectly many men kept their ngers in the economic pie. In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, sons or nephews followed in the footsteps of their fathers or uncles—not because succession was hereditary but because the city’s leading families patted the backs of those who patted theirs. The frequency of these familial appointments highlights the

15 The lists of 1634 and 1636 both contain the names of four widows, reducing the number of active male wine buyers from 34 to 30 and from 51 to 46, respectively. Wine buyers Abram Bogaert, Henrich Poyntz, and Pieter van der Lanen held minor public positions in 1634, while in 1638 the latter two had been joined by Pieter Foppen van der Meyden, Pieter Verbiest, and Pieter Vermeulen. Wine buyer De Reus could have been number six, but the 1638 document did not provide his rst name [ Maerten Ewoutsz. De Reus and Johan de Reus both served as magistrates, and Cornelis de Reus was a lieutenant in the militia]. Grand merchant Cornelis Coninck appears on the 1638 list as magistrate [schepen]. NB: The city rolls mention his service as magistrate in 1636 and 1637.

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clannishness of Rotterdam’s leading families, which sought to exclude recent immigrants from the Southern Netherlands from public ofce. Paulus Verschuer, whose rapid rise to seven year-long appointments as burgomaster was assisted by the enormous fortune his family amassed in the cloth industry and international trade, is a rare example of a second [perhaps third]-generation southern immigrant easily reaching the peak of the municipal power structure.16 Knowledge and communication Looking back four hundred years, the efciency of the Dutch commercial network is striking. People and goods moved over long distances with remarkable ease and matter-of-factness. Granted, a notarial act would not have been the forum for the display of commercial jitters or personal emotions, but apart from a single wobbly signature of a young Dutchman signing his [probably] rst contract in Nantes, the notaries recording early modern Dutch commercial life exude a sense of ‘business as usual’. Contemporary observers noted the speed and quality of the transfer of information, so crucial to stay one step ahead of the competition. The French, for instance, cried foul over Dutch nationals sticking together and exchanging “secret information” that covered the latest developments on the supply and demand markets, which ensured that the best deals came their way.17 In addition to their personal 16 Engelbrecht, 181–182. Paulus Verschuer left an estate valued at 225,000 guilders. In addition to his municipal ofces, Verschuer held the post of receiver of Holland’s provincial taxes for the Rotterdam area. With his brother in law Johan van Berckel Jr he owned a cloth manufacturing company that was valued at 96,400 guilders in 1638. In addition to woolen cloth, Verschuer traded in silks, indigo, pepper, cinnamon and wines. His brother and his nephew, both called Johannes, appear in Nantes as trainees; brother Johannes in 1642 and his nephew in 1649–1651. Paulus Verschuer co-owned eight to ten herring ships with his brother Pieter, his Van Berckel in-laws and Henrick Rammelman. R. Bijlsma, “De Laken-Compagnie Der Van Berckels,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 1 (1913): 85–87. Paulus’ grandfather came from Antwerp, year unkown. His parents married in 1589, four years after the Spanish conquest of Antwerp. 17 ADLA C 652 Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645, 6. The effectiveness of the Dutch information sharing system echoed that of the Sephardic diaspora. See Jonathan I. Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires (1540 –1740), Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies; V. 30 (Boston, MA: Brill, 2002), 6 & 8. See also Daniel Swetschinski, Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The Portuguese Jews of SeventeenthCentury Amsterdam (London; Portland, Ore.: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2000), 158–159. Swetschinski quotes a French report from 1698: “ In these two regards—in commerce and news—one might say that [the Jews] are the rst and best informed about all that ‘moves’ in the world.”

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networks, Rotterdam’s commercial elite took active steps to promote the ow of information by institutionalizing messenger services with key cities abroad. In their meeting of 7 February 1639, the directors of the Admiralty of the Maze discussed the costs of “writing and transporting news from abroad”, and decided to continue the current courier services from Paris [at least once per week] and Cologne [twice per week].18 Several institutions provided the merchants of Rotterdam with informal and formal communication platforms. The Bourse served as the ofcial business center of Rotterdam, just like it did in Amsterdam. The city map of 1623 shows that while a sizeable patch of land between the Wijnhaven and the Scheepsmakershaven remained un-developed, the imposing looking Bourse building already existed. The Bourse stood in a strategic location at the convergence of the Oude Haven, the Haringvliet and the combined entrance to the Wijnhaven and Scheepsmakershaven. When the English Merchant Adventurers moved their ‘Court’ to Rotterdam in 1635, one of their conditions was for the Bourse to be moved to the old Vismarkt along the Blaak, another one of the inland harbors.19 After 1635, Rotterdam’s commercial and industrial sectors were serviced by the Wisselbank and the Leenbank. The establishment of Rotterdam’s own Wisselbank [ Exchange Bank] was a concession made by the municipal leaders to the incoming Merchant Adventurers, and the bank’s charter was signed on 18 April 1635. Two council-appointed commissioners supervised the bank’s operations, for which they received a yearly stipend of 200 guilders. They were supposed to be at the bank every work day between eight and ten in the morning and two and four in the afternoon. A commission [of an unknown percentage] on each transaction surely was the true attraction of the job of commissioner, but two years after the bank’s establishment the municipal council decided to remove that particular benet. The annual stipend, inside information about customers’ liquidity, plus the political visibility of

18 GAR, Handschriftenverzameling [hereafter HS] (aanv.) inv. nr. 1984 19; notulen Admiraliteit van de Maze 1639, p. 38, Monday 7 February. The Admiralty’s agent in Paris earned 150 guilders per year for his weekly reports. The twice-weekly service on Cologne on the Rhine river highlights the importance of the German hinterland for the Dutch maritime provinces. 19 GAR, the city map of 1623 lists the Beurs as #21; for the move of the bourse in 1635 and the 1665 drawing, see R. Bijlsma, Rotterdams Welvaren 1550 –1650 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1918), 147 & 149. We do not know the reason for the requested move.

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the job must have been enough to attract men to the commissioner’s position.20 Unfortunately, none of the Rotterdam account books have survived, so it is impossible to get a sense of the bank’s capitalization or of the nancial worth of individual account holders. The Wisselbank held the monopoly on all trade in gold and silver bullion as well as coins. The bank served primarily as a safe place to keep liquid assets used in current transactions, so that payment of bills and receipts of outstanding debts could be taken care of; a merchant could not sign a draft on the bank for more money than he had on deposit. Despite the ban on borrowing, the municipality of Rotterdam itself had already become a signicant borrower by mid-1638.21 The surviving Wisselbank accounts of other cities do not represent the full nancial strength of their combined account holders because as little money as possible was actually deposited, while merchants put the rest of their capital at work in active investments. Morineau cites examples from scal year 1667–1668 in which he places the annual turnover of four rms next to their available balances in the Amsterdam Wisselbank in February, August, and the following February; the highest of the twelve balances came to no more than 2.7 percent of the merchants’ annual turnover.22 It is also clear that at least some merchants avoided depositing all their liquid assets in a single bank; just as with their active investments, the diversication of deposits spread the risk. This strategy seems to have been particularly important for the members of the Sephardic communities around Europe, who kept their eggs in 20 J. G. van Dillen, ed., Bronnen Tot De Geschiedenis Der Wisselbanken, 2 vols., Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatieen, vol. RGP Grote Serie 59–60 (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1925), vol. 2, 1324–1326. The council’s decision to withdraw the commission was made on 7 May 1637. See also Engelbrecht, lii, lvii–lviii. For the list of public ofce holders throughout the century, see J. H. W. Unger, ed., De Regeering Van Rotterdam 1328–1892, Naamlijst Van Personen Die in of Van Wege De Regeering Ambten Hebben Bekleed., ed. J. H. W. Unger, V vols., Bronnen Voor De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. I (Rotterdam: Van Waesberge & Zoon, 1892). [entries by year and by ofce]. 21 Dillen, ed., vol. 2, 1324–1326, 1328. On 12 June 1638, the Rotterdam municipal council authorized the repayment of 20,000 Flemish pounds = 120,000 guilders to the Wisselbank; the council also voted to discontinue the practice of public borrowing from the bank. The disappearance of Rotterdam’s account books is lamentable, because a comparative study with those of Amsterdam [edited and discussed by Van Dillen in the above mentioned work] would have been highly enlightening. 22 Michel Morineau, “Quelques Remarques Sur L’abondance Monétaire Aux Provinces-Unis,” Annales Economies Sociétés Civilisations 29, no. 3 (1974): 769. Daniel de la Bistraete’s annual turnover came to 1,334,000 guilders; in February 1667 his Wisselbank account balance stood at 35,914 guilders.

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several baskets as insurance against arbitrary conscation or levies in one country when the religious-political climate turned against them.23 Israel ascribed the dramatic drop in the number of accounts in the Amsterdam Wisselbank by Dutch Sephardim and the concurrent vigorous expansion of their number in the Hamburg Bank to the absolute decline of the economic well-being of Sephardim in the Republic.24 It seems more realistic, however, to take a wider angle view and see the accounts held in both banks as segments of the same nancial sector. The location of the account changed, but that should not have diminished the net worth of the account holder—wherever he resided in person. The maritime insurance board In a city that depended so much on maritime trade, maritime insurance provided protection against losses to ship-owners and freighters, but investment opportunities to others. The regulations of the Chamber of Insurance, established in 1604, covered underwriting methods and claims. Three ‘Commissarissen van het Zeerecht ’ [commissioners of maritime law] handled disputes over the estimated damages and payments, and their decisions were as binding as those of a court of law. The rst group of Commissioners that we know by name was appointed in 1615 and consisted of three men active in a variety of trades, including those in wines and brandy. Both Hendrick Willemsz. Nobel, step-uncle to Hendrick Rammelman, as well as Joris Joosten Vlaming had their ngers in the global pie; Jasper Moermans brokered many deals between the Sephardic community and Dutch merchants in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. As early as 1607, however, both Vlaming and Moermans already acted as appraisers of the damages to a ship and its cargo sustained on its way back to Rotterdam from the Canary Islands. Further evidence of long-term involvement in maritime arbitration describes a meeting in 1613 by Moermans, Vlaming and Willem Rammelman, plus two other arbiters, in the tavern St. Lucas to decide a case.25 It is clear that positions on any of Rotterdam’s municipal

23 Herman P. Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript: A Seventeenth-Century Marrano Family History (1671),” Studia Rosenthaliana 9, no. 1 (1975): 29 & ftnt 94 + 96. Prior to moving from Antwerp to Rotterdam in 1646, the De Pinto brothers transferred portions of their property to Holland, Venice and Rouen. 24 Israel, 24–25. 25 Unger, ed., 85. plus GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 46/69/106, 4 April 1607 and GAR,

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boards brought the city’s commercial elite together, strengthened the network and provided opportunities for the grooming and advancement of promising young men. Partnerships Merchants also joined forces as ‘reeders’, part owners of the merchant ships. Shares in a ship could be as small as 1/64th of the value of ship plus its armament, and reederij groups of seven or eight people were common. The ease with which ships’ parts could be bought and sold on the open market made them an attractive investment option for wealthy and small scale investors alike. People active in secondary industries that supplied naval stores or trade goods to the outgoing ships often owned shares in them, ensuring that the contract for the item or service came their way. Participation in ‘reederij ’ was also an opportunity to diversify into different branches of commerce.26 Most often the reederij groups resided in the same city, but we do have evidence of merchants owning a share in a ship from another town, likely because [part-] ownership gave a merchant precedence in the use of its cargo hold, and removed the need for a freight contract.27 Maritime mortgages or ‘bottomry’ brought investors and entrepreneurs together as well. The person who issued the loan or part of the loan carried the full risk—called the ‘adventure of the sea’—to the ship and its cargo for the duration of a voyage, but the interest returned on top of the principal sum upon the successful completion of the trip made

ONA, inv. nr. 48/192/346, 10 June 1613. Hendrick Nobel’s brother Willem Nobel was partner of Willem Rammelman in their brewery; after Rammelman’s death Willem Nobel married the widow Rammelman. 26 S. Hart, “Rederij,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 106–108 & 111. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 88/415/785, 27 September 1627. Nantes pioneer Willem Ambrosius, Seger Gorisz, Jan Michelsz, Pauwels Timmer and Adryaen van der Tock were all active in the wine trade. 27 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 138/22/343, 12 April 1633. The ship owned by Pieter de Riemer from Rotterdam and Jacob Daene from Delfshaven was captured by pirates on its way home from Bordeaux with a cargo of wines. A Dutch navy ship subsequently liberated the vessel and took it to Zeeland, after which the owners demanded to get their ship and its cargo back. See also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 153/293/423, 14 September 1645. The widow of Glaudi de Rote from Den Briel and Geralde Veen, merchant in Amsterdam, co-owned the St. Laurens together with 12 men from Rotterdam. The ship carried sugar from Madeira to Amsterdam. Based on their names, the nonRotterdammers may have been Sephardim.

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‘bodemerij’ a standard type of investment. If the ship or its cargo were lost due to average, piracy, or beaching, the loan taker [quite often one or more of the freighters] did not owe the bottomry-giver anything.28 Like the market in ships’ parts, bottomry-letters also enjoyed a lively trade because they could be endorsed to a creditor for the settlement of a debt. Nantes residents Pieter Fransz Baul and his partner Tieleman Gorisz owed 2,800 guilders to Hendrick Points on a bottomry letter. As payment, the debtors shipped 62 barrels of Nantais wine to Points in Rotterdam.29 Bottomry activities nanced wine and brandy purchases in Nantes for which the payment took place through relatives or agents in Rotterdam. In such cases, the wines and brandy in question formed the loan’s collateral. In bottomry, the risks fell to the loan-giver but the interest rates he charged could be steep depending on the route traveled and the security situation at sea. Towards the end of the war between the Republic and Spain [but in the middle of the war between Spain and France] the interest rate on a bottomry loan between Nantes and the Republic was around six percent. Table 2.1

Examples of bottomry interest rates by maritime branch

Year

Route

Interest in %

1595

Southeast Asia [East Indies] and back

70 50

1597

Zeeland—Lisbon—Brazil and back to Zeeland

1623

Privateering

70

1627

Holland—Baltic and back

12

1644

Rotterdam—Nantes—Rotterdam

1655–1656

Whaling

6 22.5

Source: Hart, S. “Rederij.” In Maritieme Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert, 2, 106–125. Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976, 122–123.

28

Hart, 121–122. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/446/777, 6 January 1633. The Nantais wines in this deal were valued at 45 guilders per barrel, excluding freight charges; the price was about average for Nantais wines in this period. 29

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The interest rates quoted by Hart on a variety of other routes show that the wine and brandy trade on France was considered to be a relatively safe branch of maritime commerce.30 Practical considerations favored some cooperation between merchants in different cities. A ship from Rotterdam might carry cargo owned by Amsterdammers, or Amsterdam merchants would underwrite the maritime insurance for a ship from Rotterdam. If warfare, piracy, or stormy weather caused damage to vessel or cargo, such bilateral stake-holding would dilute the impact of nancial losses on each local economy. For example, nine Rotterdammers co-owned a ship that was conscated in Madeira because the Amsterdam merchants who had freighted it had included contraband in the cargo. The upshot of the affair was that the ransom costs for the vessel were split between the Rotterdam reeders and the Amsterdam freighters.31 Not only did such co-operation spread the risk of a voyage over businessmen in both towns, but it also extended the geographical range of the network represented by a single ship and a single voyage. Letters of exchange With a power of attorney, Rotterdam’s merchants authorized trusted colleagues in other cities or countries to act on their behalf in commercial disputes or to represent them in lawsuits. Domestic and international payments via letters of exchange further reveal the extent of the mercantile network, because each exchange bill represents at least four merchants, i.e. the drawer and the payer in the place where the transaction took place, plus the drawee and the payee in the town where the reckoning occurred. In the trade on France alone, disputed letters of exchange connected Rotterdam merchants with debtors or creditors in Bayonne, La Rochelle, Blois, Paris, Nantes, Calais, Rouen, Bordeaux, and St. Malo.32 30

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 47/4/39, 6 August 1644. Dispute over the actual interest rate negotiated back in Rotterdam. A group of ‘reeders’ was unwilling to settle for 5 percent after the bottomry deal had been struck for 6 percent on an amount of 6,880 guilders, payable at the Rotterdam Wisselbank. See also Hart, 122–123. Whaling loans charged between 4–4.5 % interest per month, and with a maximum of ve months per whaling season [ May to September] a bottomry loan would earn up to 22.5 percent interest. 31 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 99/78/153, 13 February 1636. 32 GAR, ONA, ‘wisselprotesten’ and John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600 –1775: A Handbook. (University of North Caroline Press, 1978), 20.

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Refusal to pay a proffered letter of exchange not only indicates that a transaction had gone sour, but also reveals the competition between various partnerships and networks. Despite French irritation over the cartel-like behavior of the Dutch community in Nantes, in reality the Dutch merchants and trading houses in that city strove to outmatch each other. Both Adriaen Ambrosius and Cornelis Coninck worked in Nantes in the early twenties and again from 1626 through 1628, yet the business relationship between the two men also included signs of concurrent competition. In Rotterdam, Anthony Coninck presented a letter of exchange signed by brother Cornelis in Nantes to Adriaen’s brother Willem Ambrosius, who refused to pay.33 Similar payment disputes reveal that Adriaen Ambrosius as well as the Casteleyn family worked together with the brothers Seeger and Tieleman Gorisz, but competed against fellow expat Jan Hendricksz den Touwer; the latter man owed money to the Van de Luffel brothers who worked on behalf of their brother-in-law Joris de Neve in Amsterdam.34 Each voyage, each power of attorney, each marriage contract, each baptism, each letter of exchange provides evidence of several strands in the web that connected individuals at a domestic, European and global level. This is the formidable global network that made the word for the maritime province ‘Holland’ synonymous with the Dutch Republic. The existence and growth of the network also meant that, except for the true pioneers, few merchants ventured into the ‘unknown’ when initiating trade in a new commodity or a new market. A familial relationship or a letter of introduction was all that was needed to open doors and opportunities no matter in which hemisphere. No wonder that the cultivation and preservation of the merchants’ personal integrity and the good name of the family were vital to their ability to run their business. Residential mingling Rotterdam’s merchants and wine buyers not only worked together but also tended to live in the same neighborhood. In the early decades of the century, the municipality developed the ‘Water Stad ’ [water town], a

33

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 78/436/797, 16 June 1626. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 98/135/361, 3 November 1626; 98/139/367, 4 January 1627; and 98/180/468, 3 August 1629. 34

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triangular network of interconnected harbors in the area closest to the Maas river. Together with the Oude Haven and the Blaack, the Leuvehaven (1604) on the westside of the new triangle, the Wijnhaven (1615) on its northern side, and the Scheepmakershaven (1616) on its southern side, the ‘Water Stad ’ quickly became the commercial hub of the city. [see Figure 2] Merchant houses often incorporated the warehouse, but separate warehouses appeared as well, all with direct access to water deep enough to accommodate ocean-going vessels. The quays, whose maintenance initially was made the responsibility of the residents, were paved. And in order to reduce the risk of re, all construction had to use brick or stone.35 A real estate tax assessment of around 1667 shows that at least 27 [wine] merchants and wine buyers—or their widows and children—continued to reside along the harbors.36 Engelbrecht’s study done on the municipal ofceholders of Rotterdam reinforces the evidence that the city’s commercial elite was also its political elite, and that many of the men who administered the community lived in the harbor area.37 This clustering of internationally oriented merchants in the city’s port sector mirrors the situation in Nantes, where the Quay de la Fosse served as the town’s commercial hub. Rotterdammers and their partners in Nantes The complaint by the French merchants of Nantes, the Moyens d’Intervention of 1645, mentions 37 Dutch merchants but in reality only ve of the merchants vilied in the document actually resided in Nantes at the time, so the complaint described the recent past rather than a snap-shot of the actual situation of 1645.38 Only one man who joined the Rotterdam wine buyers’ impost-protests also shows up in French complaints, not counting the registers of the Nantes notaries. Charles de Lange worked in Nantes “without interruption” from 1614 to 1634, when he was back

35 L. A. F. Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and M. F. B. Meeuwes, Die Importante Negotie; Geschiedenis Van De Rotterdamse Wijnhandel Vanaf De Middeleeuwen Tot in De Negentiende Eeuw (Rotterdam: Historische Uitgeverij Rotterdam, 1996), 12–14. 36 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 84/91/59, 27 January 1620. In the real estate assessment of circa 1667, the tax due on the house was 40 [ Flemish] pounds = 240 guilders. GAR,OSA, Register 200ste Penning. 37 Engelbrecht. 38 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645. See Appendix IV. A similar French document of 1656 gives us the names of fteen resident Dutchmen. The Extrait des Registres de Parlement, ADLA C 702, cote 8, carton 27.

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in Rotterdam to sign the wine buyers’ impost protest; soon after he returned to Nantes where we can track him until 1638.39 De Lange is the only one who personally combined the roles of international merchant and domestic wine buyer, but his lengthy sojourn in France clearly emphasizes the primacy of his international trade. At rst glance, the Rotterdam tax documents of 1622, 1634, and 1638 seem to prove that Rotterdam’s merchant-importers did not operate in the same sphere as the domestic wine buyers, but the separation between the two groups was much less stark than the lists of names imply. In addition to De Lange, ve other men who appear on either of the two Rotterdam wine buyers’ lists spent time working in Nantes early in their careers. After building up their commercial networks and their skills as oenologists they returned home as experts, well equipped to keep their suppliers honest and their customers satised.40 Quite often, the Rotterdam wine buyers worked in tandem with a close relative in Nantes, the kind of teamwork that exemplied early modern international trading practices. The following table lists the trans-national teams of brothers, fathers & sons, uncles & cousins, and brother-in-laws, plus two enterprising women, who held the fort on the Rotterdam side. Table 2.2

Personal relationships linking Rotterdam and Nantes

Rotterdam Ambrosius, Willem Busch, Leonart Pietersz Nuye, Jacob Jansz Dammansz, Reynier De Bra, Isaacq De Grande, Jan

Nantes Ambrosius, Adrian Busch, Pieter Leendertsz Coninck, Cornelis de Rammelman, Hendrick De Bra, Jacques Schoof, Jacques

Relationship brothers father —son brothers in law brothers in law unknown or same man uncle—nephew

39 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/224, 28 August 1634. Statement by Rotterdam wine buyer Charles de Lange on the fabrication of barrels in Nantes. The earliest recorded commercial transaction by De Lange, however, dates from 1621. 40 These are the minimum number of years the men spent in Nantes: Adriaen Ambrosius worked in Nantes from 1621 to 1628; Cornelis Coninck in the years 1621–1622 and again from 1626–1628; Reynier Dammansz was there from 1633 to 1636 and came back in 1642; Jan Hendricxs den Touwer spent only the year 1627 in Nantes; and Jan van Luffelen came the years 1633 and 1634.

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rotterdam’s wine traders Table 2.2 (cont.) Rotterdam De Lange, Pieter Adriaensz De Mey, Jan De Wely, Geertruyt De Wely, Geertruyt Duboys, Marya Gerritsz, Ijsbrant Gorisz, Seeger Hartman, Harman Michielsz, Adryaen Michielsz, Adryaen Pietersz, Hillebrant Poppe, Jan Gillisz Ravesteyn, Cornelis Cornelisz Rhoon, Huych Cornelisz Slingelant, Job Willemsz Van de Luffel, Jan Van Loon, Johan Van Naerssen, Revixit Van Rossum, Henrick Verschuer, Joost Sr. Verschuer, Pieter

Nantes

Relationship

De Lange, Charles Ravensteyn, Jan Cornelisz De Wolff, Jochem Van Wele, Pieter Gerardsz Van Luffelen, Gillis Gerard, Albert Gorisz, Tieleman Hartman, Adryaen Michielsz, Jan Casteleyn, Machteltgen Pitre, Jan Poppe, Willem Gillisz Ravesteyn, Jan Cornelisz

unknown brothers in law

mother—son unknown brothers father—son brothers brother-sister unknown brothers brothers

Rammelman, Heyndrick Slingelant, Cornelis Van Luffelen, Gilles Van Loon, Guillem Van Naerssen, Jacob Van Rossum, Jan Verschuer, Joannes Verschuer, Johan

stepfather —stepson unknown brothers father —son father —son unknown father —son father —son

wife—husband sister—brother

Source: Rotterdam and Nantes notarial records

Women wine merchants Geertruyt van Wely’s active participation in the family’s commercial activities is the only evidence of a husband & wife team working the international wine trade together. Joachim de Wolff resided in Nantes from 1629 through 1635, which led to my initial assumption that the marriage was just a business arrangement. This, however, was refuted

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by the couple’s mutual will of 1625 in which they named their children as their universal heirs.41 Not only must De Wolff’s activities in Nantes have been protable enough to warrant such a lengthy separation from his family, but Ms. van Wely must have been a capable business woman in her own right to make the system work. The notary respectfully listed her as ‘coopvrouw’ [woman merchant], a clear sign of her independent status.42 During the years she took care of the business in Rotterdam, Geertruyt van Wely was in her early thirties. The only other women active in the wine trade appear to have been widows who continued the business following the death of the husband. In 1626, the notary registered Marya Duboys as ‘widow of Gielis van Luffelen, woman merchant in wines’ when she demanded payment for the delivery of three pipes of French wine.43 When brandy pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn died in Nantes in 1625 or 1626, his widow Machteltgen Michielsdr continued the family business. In 1627, she signed her name to a series of letters of exchange issued in Nantes, and sold wines in her own name. In order to deal with Casteleyn’s estate and its multiple debtors, Machteltgen briey returned to her native town, Rotterdam, where her brother Adriaen Michielsz traded wine as a wholesaler. A second brother, Jan Michielsz, worked in Nantes between at least 1621 and 1632, rst alongside his brother-in-law Casteleyn and later joining his widowed sister Machteltgen Casteleyn in the local operations of the family rm.

41 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 80/175/655, 15 March 1625, for the mutual will. On the French side, ADLA 4E2/1455/277, 29 November 1628, shows that a year prior to Joachim de Wolff ’s recorded stay in Nantes, Geertruyt’s cousin or nephew Pieter Gerardz. van Wely lived in the Pirmil suburb of Nantes as a wine trader. Pieter purchased 47 pipes of wine in partnership with Rotterdam merchant Adriaen Ambrosius. Due to the lack of a partnership contract, we do not know whether Pieter van Wely and De Wolff ended up trading jointly, but it is highly likely. It is possible that the Van Wely family is same as the De Vel or Vel men who resided in Lisbon. See Hermann Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte Im Hamburger Portugal—Und Spanienhandel 1590 –1625 ([ Hamburg]: Verlag der Hamburgischen Bücherei, 1954), 204–205. for Johann Vehl in 1584. Also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 47/151/218, 29 June 1610 for Johan Vel; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/104/215, 12 November 1625 for Jan Paul de Vel. In addition, GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 137/142/202, 7 February 1630 tells us that Geertruyt’s father was Jan van Wely. 42 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 85/77/156 and 85/95/76, both dated 4 September 1630. 43 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 78/428/781, 12 May 1626.

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Overlapping commodity markets and diversication Machteltgen Michielsdr, a.k.a. Mrs. Casteleyn, was a granddaughter of Rotterdam’s most prominent brewer, Jan Dammasz Pesser.44 Rotterdam’s brewers produced high quality beer for local consumption and the export to other towns in the Republic, but a signicant number of them moved into the wine and brandy trade. In 1623, the city’s chronicler counted “around 30” breweries, and at least ten of the men we encounter in the wine and brandy trade in the rst half of the seventeenth century had roots in Rotterdam’s brewing industry. In addition to Pesser, the merchants Coninck, Kievit, Versijden, Blanckert, Dullaert, Van Coulster, Van der Duyn, Prins, Domys and Rammelman owned (or had relatives who owned) breweries before turning their attention to the wine and brandy trade.45 The expertise gained in brewing could easily be used to distill ‘brandewijn’ from wines and ‘jenever’ from grains, while the barreling process remained the same. A brewer who diversied into wines and brandy did not have to make any adjustments to his transportation-, warehousing-, and distribution infrastructure, which was already geared to the processing and barreling of large quantities of alcoholic liquids. The Pesser —Casteleyn link exemplies the blending of the various branches of the alcohol industry in the early years of the seventeenth century, yet the brewers’ deliberate move into the French wine and brandy business seems to be contraindicated by the data on the actual consumption of alcohol in Rotterdam. As we will see below, beer remained the unchallenged drink of choice for the city’s population. The steep growth of Rotterdam’s beer output between 1621 and 1631 is further proof that the brewers stayed with their highly rated basic product and merely diversied their portfolios by importing wines for the wholesale market or for the production of brandy.

44

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 52/10/1618, 29 January 1614. Pesser’s daughter names ‘her niece’ Machtelt as one of her heirs; Machteltgen’s father Michiel Jansz [ Pesser] is named executor. See also R. Bijlsma, “De Brouwerij ‘De Twee Klimmende Leeuwen’,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 1, no. 9 (1911): 127–130. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, Pesser had built up a thriving brewery in addition to his interests in outtting ships for the herring- and cloth industries; later generations of Pessers and their in-laws extended the family’s holdings in the beer and brandy business 45 R. Bijlsma, “De Rotterdamsche Vroedschappen En Hun Bedrijf, 1588–1648,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 2 (1914): 76–97. and Engelbrecht.

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chapter two Aggressive portfolio diversication

The men who imported French wines and brandy into the Dutch Republic in the rst half of the seventeenth century did not limit themselves to only one type of commodity, but spread their investments over as many potential protable ventures as possible. The rst decades of the century saw the expansion of the Dutch commercial horizon into far-ung markets. As noted by Jonathan Israel, the Dutch were almost forced to venture farther aeld because the series of Spanish trade embargoes removed Iberia as a transit point. Trade between the rebel Dutch provinces and the territories of the combined Spanish/Portuguese empire was forbidden from 1585–1590, 1598–1608 and, following the Twelve Year Truce, from 1621 until the Treaty of Munster in 1648. Boldly seizing the moment, Dutch entrepreneurs sent their ships straight to the distant supply zones.46 Apart from the geopolitics involved, it made sense to participate in a wide variety of commercial activities in order to have a stake in the enterprises from the very start, when the greater initial risks offered the possibility of high prots. By spreading your eggs over a range of baskets you curtailed the risks to your overall capital. As Antonio, the Venetian merchant, said: I thank my fortune for it, my ventures are not in one bottom trusted, nor to one place; nor is my whole estate upon the fortune of this present year: Therefore my merchandise makes me not sad.47

The standard Dutch practice to make use of part-ownerships in all kinds of ventures, from the high prole VOC shares to a 1/64th part ownership in a single ship, enabled merchants and others to maximize the diversity of their portfolios. In 1633, Charles de Lange worked in the wine trade in Nantes but participated in the whaling industry as well, a nice example of commercial portfolio diversication. He owed 1130 carolus guilders already received as payment for 20 barrels of wine that were never delivered; after arbitration, the decision was made that De Lange would ship

46 Jonathan I. Israel, Conicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585–1713 (London; Rio Grande, Ohio: Hambledon Press, 1997), 199–200. 47 William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1600; reprint, 1992), Act 1, Scene 1.

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the value of the debt in new Nantais wines. As guarantee, De Lange pledged his one-sixteenth part in the ownership of whaling vessel ‘De Jager’ which was ready to sail to Greenland, “but if (God forbid) the ship was wrecked” he pledged all his moveable and immoveable goods as secondary guarantee.48 The early Directors of the Dutch ‘Noordse Company’ invested in whaling as a sideline, dipping their nancial toes in the waters of a new industry while continuing their other commercial activities.49 Rotterdam’s burgomaster Fop Pietersz van der Meyden had sixteen partners in eight different port cities when the whaling company was established in 1608, proof that the investors not only spread their risks individually but also geographically.50 Hamilton’s work on the merchants of Vannes shows similar risk spreading behavior by the French entrepreneurs, the ‘grand négociants’ as well as the lesser merchants.51 As Veluwenkamp has noted, however, even such a medley of investments with multiple partners and overlapping trading groups in the end boiled down to “a one man business”; at the end of the day each merchant drew up his own ledger of debts and credits.52

48 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 256/129, 26 April 1633. One Carolus guilder was valued at 1.5 guilders of account. The wines were to be handed over at a discounted price of 69 guilders per barrel, 4 guilders per barrel below De Lange and his partner Galiere’s asking price for other customers, meaning that the creditors would receive more wine for their money than under normal conditions. See also Eduard Van Biema, “Wat Hollanders Te Lijden Hadden Van Het Protectionisme in Het Frankrijk Van De 17de Eeuw,” Oud Holland 17 (1899): 204–205. The attempted sale of whale oil in Nantes by Delft native Beuckel Dedel was the direct cause of severe French protests and Dutch counter-protests in 1646 and 1647. Two cousins and their partner in Amsterdam had sent 259 barrels of whale oil to Dedel in Nantes, but the city magistrates had forbidden the Dutch to buy or sell any goods except through agency of French citizens. The upshot of the affair was that Dedel was allowed to market his whale oil in Nantes. 49 Louwrens Hacquebord, Frans N. Stokman, and Frans W. Wasseur, “The Directors of the Chambers of the ‘Noordse Compagnie’, 1614–1642, and Their Networks in the Company,” in Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, Hollandse Historische Reeks, Vol. xxiv (1995). 50 Jan Willem Veluwenkamp, Archangel: Nederlandse Ondernemers in Rusland, 1550 –1785 (Amsterdam: Balans, 2000), 59–60. See also Bijlsma, “De Rotterdamsche Vroedschappen En Hun Bedrijf, 1588–1648,” 79. Van der Meyden started his career as a cheese merchant but diversied into herring shery, whale oil processing and the wine trade 51 Joanna Hamilton, “The Merchants of Vannes, 1670–1730” (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2001), 81, 103–105, 111. 52 P. W. Klein and J. W. Veluwenkamp, “The Role of the Entrepreneur in the Economic Expansion of the Dutch Republic,” in The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age, ed. Karel Davids and Leo Noordegraaf (Amsterdam: Nederlands Economisch-Historisch Archief, 1993), 36–37. The section on “The entrepreneur on the Dutch staple market” was written by Veluwenkamp.

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chapter two Diversication farther aeld: wine traders as VOC and WIC investors

While the wine trade was predominantly an intra-European affair, participation in the Dutch East and West India Companies [the VOC and the WIC respectively] led merchants to trade in tropical products such as spices, silk, and sugar, the latter sometimes intertwined with the slave trade. The seven directors of Rotterdam’s chamber of the VOC were chosen from those ‘chief participants’ who had invested a minimum of 6000 guilders [reduced to 3000 guilders in 1647], and who enjoyed the patronage of other politically inuential men. A cross-check between the list of Rotterdam’s VOC directors in the seventeenth century and the notarial records suggests that only one of the nine initiators of 1602 [ Johan van der Veken] had direct ties to the French wine trade, while twelve of the rst fty were directly or indirectly involved in the alcohol trade.53 Yet this group in particular often owned or partially owned the ships that carried their merchandize, which removed the need to notarize any freight contracts, which in turn means that those voyages left no traces. Seeing that these men traded in a wide variety of goods, we may assume that the actual involvement was higher. Another eleven of the directors had close relatives or in-laws who did trade in wines. Only the crème de la crème of Rotterdam’s commercial world managed to become a VOC director, but the lively trade in portions of a share gave even small investors the opportunity to participate in the trade on Asia, and the wine merchants and the wine buyers did indeed avail themselves of this option. Three of Rotterdam’s rst fty VOC directors worked in France as young men. Hendrick Rammelman and Cornelis Coninck are the only two Rotterdammers who spent a couple of years in Nantes before returning to commercial life augmented with public service back

53 J. H. Kernkamp, Johan Van Der Veken En Zijn Tijd (Rotterdam: Erasmus Universiteit, 1953), 16. Based on a letter from Van der Veken to a potential purchaser of his wines dated 24 March 1598. See also: Peter Grimm, Heeren in Zaken: De Kamer Rotterdam Van De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1994), 39–43. The twelve are: Daniel Adz van der Leck, Hendrick Wzn Nobel, Lenerd Pzn Busch, Pieter Foppen van der Meyden, Cornelis Jzn Hartigsvelt, Hendrick Rammelman, Cornelis Coninck, Gerard van Bergen, Johan Abrz de Reus, Harman van Zoelen, and Paulus Timmers. In 1616 Van der Veken’s estate was valued at about  600,000. [Grimm, 10 and 51–53.]

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home. A third future VOC director, Harman van Zoelen, worked in La Rochelle prior to the violence of 1622, and returned in 1629 for at least four more years.54 Given our knowledge about the wide range of goods in which the international merchants traded in this period, we can bury the notion that the men who invested in the VOC considered the European coastal trade not worthy of their attention and capital. The fact that each year only one or two East Indiamen were equipped and nanced by the Rotterdam chamber of the company enforces the idea that a more frequent and reliable branch of commerce existed and thrived next to the trans-oceanic trades, even though the potential prots from their limited number of sailings were very lucrative. The risks of transporting high-value commodities from Asia and the Americas to Holland could be off-set by the relatively routine and predictable coastal trade in bulk goods for the European markets. As a group, the Sephardim of Holland supposedly invested exclusively in luxury commodities, thus jump-starting the Dutch preeminence in the “long distance ‘rich’ trades”. Evidence amassed for this study, however, disproves the absoluteness of Jonathan Israel’s statement that “the Jews, whether Sephardic or Ashkenazic, did not and never had played any role in the European bulk trades”.55 As direct participants, as partners in embargo evasion schemes, as insurers of ships or cargo, as speculators through ‘bodemerij ’ [maritime mortgages], and as nanciers of other merchants, the Sephardim of Western Europe denitely had stakes in the non-glamorous coastal trade in bulk products. We will return to the important role played by the Sephardim in the trade between the Dutch Republic, France and Spain below.

54 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 61/111/415, 3 September 1624. According to Bijlsma, the Van Zoelen family remained staunchly Catholic throughout this period which would explain Harman van Zoelen’s quick return to La Rochelle after it had fallen in the hands of the Catholic king of France. Bijlsma, “De Rotterdamsche Vroedschappen En Hun Bedrijf, 1588–1648,” 88. Van Zoelen’s sister Aertgen Ottodr van Zoelen was married to Jasper Moermans, a merchant with strong links to the Sephardic communities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam; was he a Sephardim himself and was he related to Michel Merman or Meerman, a successful Dutch merchant in Bordeaux who originally came from Amsterdam? Anthony Casteleyn Jr. left Nantes sometime after 1650 and became one of Amsterdam’s VOC directors. See GAR, ONA 238/168/312, 18 February 1668. 55 Jonathan I. Israel, “Sephardic Immigration into the Dutch Republic, 1595–1672,” Studia Rosenthaliana 23, no. special issue (1989): 46. The habituary use of one or even multiple Dutch-sounding aliases has thrown up a smokescreen around many a Sephardic transaction.

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Outtting Rotterdam’s VOC and WIC ships allowed the members of the ‘Equipage Commissie’ [armament committee] to award contracts to merchants within their client- or patronage networks. Jobs on the armament committee were also lucrative tools to be used in building such networks.56 After a career of over twenty years as wine merchant, which also included a stint as the city’s crane master, Jan Gielisz Poppe held the position of ‘equipage meester’ of the VOC for several years in the early 1630s.57 So even if wine merchants did not hold an active interest in the long distance trade on Asia or the Americas, their diversied portfolios imply that they could still partake of the prots by supplying the outgoing ships with brandy, wines and other trade goods. Very little information on the early years of the Dutch West India Company’s Rotterdam chamber has survived. We know from Grimm’s work that the local chamber’s minimum subscription was reached with great difculties, resulting in only two directorships. It was forbidden to serve as director of both WIC and VOC simultaneously.58 Given the much greater returns on the VOC than the WIC shares, the directorship of the WIC must have been the fall back position when the VOC directorship was unattainable. Far more people, of course, invested in the WIC through the ownership of partial shares. Rotterdam merchants participated as shareholders, through the supply of trade goods

56

Grimm, 49. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 47/1/1, 1 January 1609. Jan Gielisz Poppe, age 31, is part of a group of ve Rotterdam wine merchants declaring that it has never been custom in Rotterdam to make statements under oath to the renters of the wine impost about the sale of wine. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 16/410, 28 March 1611: Abram Beerwouts serves as Poppe’s factor in Bayonne. This suggests Poppe’s involvement in the trade on Iberia. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 48/230/405, 27 November 1613: As crane master, Poppe stored 35 pipes French wine and 10 oxheads of brandy that had been salvaged from a stranded ship in the basement of VOC-director Van der Leck. [ The fact that the city’s crane master might have had a conict of interests if he was also an active wine merchant does not seem to have bothered the Rotterdam authorities. Fellow wine trader Revixit van Naerssen served as crane master in the early thirties.] For men such as Poppe and Van Naerssen, renting an income producing municipal ofce was another way to diversify one’s investments. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 98/91/255, 29 December 1623: Poppe had not yet paid the freight costs of 391 guilders for 38 barrels of ‘French wine’ shipped from the Charente area. Jan’s brother Willem Poppe was active in Nantes from 1624 to late 1631 or early 1632. 58 Grimm, 53. Henrick Rammelman’s step-uncle Hendrik Willemsz Nobel was the exception to this rule. The sale of initial WIC shares in Rotterdam had been rather unsuccessful, and Nobel may have pledged his investment to ensure enough start-up capital to safeguard the city a voice in the WIC’s board of directors, but presumably on the express condition that he would be allowed to hold both a VOC and a WIC directorship. 57

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and shipping services, and through the purchase of sugar and other tropical products.59 The capitalization of the Rotterdam chambers of both the VOC and WIC by Johan [or Hans] van der Veken highlights the importance of wealthy immigrants to the economy of the city in particular and of the young Republic in general. Immigrants from the Southern Netherlands Several studies have shown that the economy of the Dutch Republic, including that of Rotterdam, greatly beneted from the inux of migrants from the southern Netherlands.60 In the early years of the seventeenth century Rotterdam had approximately 10,000 residents of which nearly 2,000 or about one-fth had recently arrived from the Southern Netherlands.61 Four hundred-and-one of the 1308 grooms registered in Rotterdam between 1588 and 1592 had southern roots. In 1595, the ratio was 62 : 292, and three years later 75 of the 278 grooms were Flemish, Brabander or from elsewhere in the Spanish Netherlands.62 A survey of the banns-registers of the Reformed Church

59 In 1645, Cornelis Coninck and Adriaen Ambrosius [encountered together in Nantes in the early 1620s] teamed up with four other merchants as shippers of gunpowder to the island of Barbados. On his own account, Coninck invested in a sugar renery and traded in Virginia tobacco. Two years later, Coninck and two partners signed a contract with a factor to represent their affairs on Barbados. Coninck’s interest in the Caribbean sugar business continued to at least 1653, when a Rotterdam rener acknowledged a debt of 16,738 guilders to Coninck for a shipment of [raw] sugar and an old outstanding balance. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 153/323/459, 18 November 1645. Shipment of 2000 pounds of gunpowder to Barbados at the cost of 900 guilders per month in freight charges. Also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 182/56/160, 24 January 1645; 90/257/384, 16 September 1645; and 87/69/142, 19 December 1647. One of Coninck’s partners in the trade on Barbados was burgomaster Pieter Sonnemans. In both 1640 and 1645, we nd a Rotterdammer named Eduard Sonnemans acting as assistant/partner of Diego Fernandez Branco [sometimes Blanco], merchant in Funchal on the island of Madeira. Branco was the uncle of the Amsterdam merchant Michel Corssen Coreal [likely a member of the Sephardic Curiel family]. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 152/4/21, 5 January 1640 for the partnership between Branco & Sonnemans “merchants in Fonchal”; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/648/997, 17 March 1631 for Branco & Coreal. For Pieter van Assenburch’s debt, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 177/105/167, 25 November 1653. 60 See especially Eddy Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders of De Handel-Betrekkingen Der Zuidelijke Nederlanden Met De Iberische Wereld 1598–1648, 2 vols. (Brussel: Paleis der Academièen, 1971). 61 J. A. van Houtte, “Het Economisch Verval Van Het Zuiden,” in Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. J. A. van Houtte (Utrecht: W. de Haan, 1952), 190–191. 62 Bijlsma, Rotterdams Welvaren 1550 –1650, 37.

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between 1573 and 1614 shows that 19.9 percent [or 4,048] of the 20,309 brides and grooms had southern origins. By 1622, the proportion of immigrants in Rotterdam stood at 8,000 on a population of 19,532, a whopping 40 percent. To accommodate this rapid growth, Rotterdam expanded its boundaries in 1572, 1597, and 1609.63 Briels notes that compared to the large group of immigrant artisans and urban workers which struggled to make ends meet, truly wealthy southerners were relatively rare but that their impact on the local economies was disproportionately high.64 From his rst recorded transaction as a banker in 1583, Johan van der Veken [ Veeckquen] from Mechelen played a leading role in Rotterdam’s economic boom.65 As banker to raadspensionaris Johan van Oldenbarnevelt [ Holland’s leading politician]; as moneylender to the Dutch government; as major investor in the early (pre-VOC) voyages to Asia; as risk taker in the privateering sector; as one of the pioneers of the Dutch slave- and sugar trade in Africa and the Americas; and as one of the founding directors of Rotterdam’s chamber of the Dutch East India Company, Van der Veken should be considered one of the cylinders on which Rotterdam’s motor revved up.66 Notarial records from this period further illustrate the breadth of Van der Veken’s com-

63 J. E. Ellemers, “Migratie Van En Naar Nederland in Historisch Perspectief: Een Beknopt Overzicht,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 100, no. 3 (1987): 324. And for the 1622 population gure, see Jan De Vries and A. M. Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500 –1815 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 64. A higher population gure of 26,000 residents was suggested by the chronicler who praised Rotterdam’s achievements in 1623. Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, 1. Zeeland’s capital Middelburg had served as a temporary halting place for a number of people who ended up in Rotterdam. According to Briels, between 1580 and 1594 a staggering 75 percent of Middelburg’s new burghers [poorters] came from the southern provinces (1,822 of the 2,429), while it is estimated that in 1622 as much as one half of the population consisted of recent immigrants. J. Briels, “De Zuidnederlandse Immigratie 1572–1630,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 100, no. 3 (1987): 335. It is unclear how many Catholic people ed to the north in this period. With a few notable exceptions such as Johan van der Veken, they would have had to balance the possibilities of better economic conditions in the North with the prospect of discrimination and intolerance as part of a religious minority. For the impact of Van der Veken on Rotterdam’s religious life, see the segment on religion below. 64 Briels: 354. 65 Mechelen is situated about halfway between Brussels, the political capital of the Spanish Netherlands, and its commercial heart, Antwerp, a distance of about 25 kilometers in either direction. 66 Briels: 344. According to Briels, Van der Veken’s net worth was a staggering 600,000 guilders.

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mercial interests: herring to the Baltic in exchange for grain that ended up in Italy, elephant teeth from Guinea to Rotterdam, nancial deals with Hamburg, and wine from Bordeaux.67 As a wine merchant, Van der Veken guarded his reputation as an honest purveyor carefully. In the spring of 1598, his cellar was lled with wines but Van der Veken refused to sell any of them to an eager client in Leiden because he considered them inferior. Instead, he preferred to wait for the wind to start blowing from the West so that the wine eet could come into port, after which he would certainly be able to sell French wines up to the standards of his buyer.68 The importance of Van der Veken’s wine trading activities pales in comparison with the nancial and business transactions he executed as the go-between banker of the Dutch States General and the French Crown—deals brokered by his patron Johan van Oldenbarnevelt.69 In 1595 and 1596, the Dutch provided King Henri IV with gunpowder, pikes, grain, wheat and other victuals, and Van der Veken arranged those deliveries. And when the French king returned the favor in 1609, the annual subsidy of 600,000 livres—which paid for two infantry and two cavalry regiments—passed through the iron coffers of Van der Veken as well.70 We do not know the percentage Van der Veken earned as his

67 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. notary Symons, 1 February 1595, notary Duyfhuysen 12 June 1605. In 1607, Van der Veken supplied the Signoria of Venice with several boatloads of grain (mostly wheat). The grain was purchased in Danzig in exchange for herring. Between 136–160 tons each, four of the ships were medium sized vessels, but the 340 tons Oranjeboom was freighted with a full load of grains, including 55 last of wheat. 68 Kernkamp, 16, letter dated 24 March 1598. According to GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 46/35/57, 24 March 1606, Van der Veken’s factor in Bordeaux was Dutchman Jan van Lanschot. See also Archives Departementales da la Gironde [hereafter ADG], serie C 3817: Dutchman ‘Lansecot’ became a naturalized citizen of Bordeaux in 1612 or 1613 Longtime Nantes resident Charles de Lange may have been Johan van der Veken’s factor in the Loire port. According to Kernkamp (13), Van der Veken’s niece Catharina de Lange married wine merchant and [later] VOC treasurer Adriaen van der Tocq after the latter had served as Van der Veken’s assistant. See also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/194/305, 13 July 1634 Charles de Lange releases Van der Tocq from his guarantorship of 16,500 guilders which covered De Lange’s share in 8 ships involved in the trade on France. 69 Kernkamp, 24, 26 and geneology. It is a good thing that Van der Veken had died before the downfall and execution of his friend and banking client Johan van Oldenbarnevelt in 1618, as one of Oldenbarnevelt’s chief detractors in government circles was Van der Veken’s indirect in-law, François van Aerssen. 70 Kernkamp, 16 & 24. One of the “informal” payments included the shipment of a set of [presumably Chinese] porcelain to the wife of a French minister. For

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commission in these deals, but the size of his estate left no doubt that he was suitably rewarded. Van der Veken’s brokerage activities with France coincided with the efforts of his in-law François van Aerssen, the Dutch envoy to the French king, to obtain the coveted exemption from the Droit d’Aubaine for Dutch nationals residing and trading in France.71 Through his personal contacts and family ties, Johan van der Veken was exceptionally well positioned to perform these high-prole transactions. Despite his commitment to Catholicism, worldly considerations must have prevailed when two of his ve daughters married Protestant men from the Van Aerssen family. Maria’s husband Jacques van Aerssen served as the president of the Court of Holland. Jacques was the son of Cornelis van Aerssen, the long-term secretary of the Dutch States General, as well as the brother of the Dutch ambassador to France, François van Aerssen.72 When the opportunity arose to marry into a family with superb political connections, domestic as well as internationally, religion took a single measured step backwards. Hendrik van der Veken, Johan’s younger brother, emigrated to the north in the early stages of the Dutch revolt and threw his lot in with the Protestant rebels. After nancially assisting Rotterdam in its efforts to strengthen the city’s defenses, Hendrik van der Veken became mayor of the small port of Den Briel in 1575. By 1586, Hendrik had become a citizen

the 1609 subsidies, see Jean Yves de Saint-Prest, Histoire Des Traités De Paix, Et Autres Negotiations Du Dix-Septième Siècle, Depuis La Paix De Vervins, Jusqu’à La Paix De Nimegue, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: 1725), 335. [ Troisieme traité entre Henri IV et les Etats Généraux, 1609]. The value of the livre tournois and the guilder was about the same. 71 For the Droit d’Aubaine, see Chapter 1, footnote 38. Johan van der Veken capitalized on these connections when he acted as the nancial middle man for the transactions between the States General and King Henri IV of France, rst when the Dutch supported Henri prior to the Peace of Vervins of 1598, and then when Henri returned the favor by sponsoring the Dutch rebels with an annual subsidy of 600,000 livres. When Johan van der Veken signed his last will and testament at notary Symons in 1615, his estate was listed at 600,000 guilders. Kernkamp, 26 and genealogy. 72 Kernkamp, 24, 26 and geneology. The elder Van Aerssen brought his family to Holland in 1584. See also Sietske Barendrecht, François Van Aerssen, Diplomaat Aan Het Franse Hof (1598–1613), Leidse Historische Reeks, vol. IX (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1965), 1–2. Apart from allowing two daughters to marry Protestant men, Johan van der Veken’s Catholicism seems to have been genuine. In his will, Van der Veken stipulated that any grandchildren from the mixed-marriages would have to be raised as good Catholics, without any interference from their Protestant fathers. He arranged for priests to come to Rotterdam to celebrate mass at his home, turning it for all practical purposes into a very visible ‘hidden church’. He funded missionary efforts and a retirement courtyard for widows, and used his inuence as landowner to replace a hard-line Protestant minister with a more open-minded Remonstrant minister.

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of Rotterdam and occupied the strategic position of ‘CommissionerGeneral’ of the Convoy & Licenses taxes.73 Johan van der Veken was just one of the many Catholics who made start-up capital available for the VOC and whose investment portfolio showed a healthy and protable interest in trade. The well-funded Catholic immigrants and their positive impact on the expansion of the Dutch economy in the early part of the seventeenth century clearly prove that Weber was wrong: Mercantile success did not hinge on being Protestant.74 We should not discount the advantage of being a Catholic in Van der Veken’s work as a conduit between the Dutch States General and the governments of France and the Spanish Netherlands. Both Van der Veken’s coffers and the Dutch government beneted. The pragmatism and opportunism of the Dutch Republic’s vaunted religious tolerance comes through loud and clear in the respect shown to Van der Veken by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Holland’s most important politician, and by Rotterdam’s municipal leadership. Johan van der Veken must be considered Rotterdam’s number one catch in the pool of southern immigrants, but other families coming from Antwerp also contributed to the city’s economy through the breadth and dynamism of their personal networks and their readiness to send relatives to different parts of the trading world. The deliberate diffusion of an immigrant family Three generations of the Van de Luffel family covered a lot of coastal Atlantic territory. The multi-national network of the Van de Luffel family is an excellent example of the geographic reach of mercantile families seen in the Dutch economy at this stage. The men in the family worked in places that made sense economically, and married women whose

73

Kernkamp, 25. As a Calvinist, Hendrik van der Veken was eligible for public

ofce 74 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, [Student’s] ed. (New York,: Scribner, 1958), 40. Weber stated that modern capitalism developed in areas in which the Protestant Reformation had been the most successful. Unlike the Catholics, the Protestants ‘have shown a special tendency to develop economic rationalism’, and according to Weber this difference can be explained by the ‘permanent intrinsic character of their religious beliefs, and not only in their temporary external historicopolitical situations.’ The very Catholic cloth producers and merchants of late-Medieval and Renaissance Italy would have disagreed.

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connections added to their own. Originally from Antwerp, one branch of the family settled in Middelburg, the capital of Zeeland and in the sixteenth century the center of the French wine trade to the northern Netherlands. From Middelburg, they looked north. We already nd a Gillis van de Luffel trading in Rotterdam in the rst decade of the century, the period in which Middelburg’s role as wine trading capital was slowly taken over by Rotterdam. The lines between the two branches are not completely clear, but by the 1630s Van de Luffel men lived and traded in Middelburg, Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Amsterdam, and Delft in the Dutch Republic, plus Calais and Nantes along the Atlantic coast. Francois van de Luffel owned a share in the Dutch West India Company worth 3,600 guilders, evidence that the network reached into Africa and the Americas. Marya Duboys, wife of Gillis Van de Luffel Sr. of Rotterdam, brought two brothers and two important regions into the system: Lowys Duboys lived and worked in Venice, while brother Abraham Duboys operated in Hamburg.75 A decade later, this Abraham’s nephew and namesake Abraham van de Luffel worked in Hamburg as merchant, so we may assume that he was sent to his uncle to learn the trade in order to become his partner or successor. Several ‘factors’ and agents extended this already impressive network to La Rochelle, Scotland, England, Brussels, Lille, Antwerp, and the Baltic. The Van de Luffels are recorded to have traded in wine and brandy (from Nantes), canvas and tobacco (via Middelburg), coal (from Scotland), tobacco and preserves (via Hamburg), and unspecied Baltic commodities. Multiple deals with the Trip family in Amsterdam point to imports of Swedish steel, copper, or weapons.76

75 The presence of Marya’s two brothers in two of the most prominent Sephardic communities allow for the possibility that that the Duboys siblings were Sephardic Jews, but I have not found any corroborating evidence, just more hints. See also Stols, Annex, 9 and 21. Stols’ biographies mention a João du Bois who resided in Lisbon prior to 1600; João du Bois acted as an agent for a Flemish rm trading on Asia and in 1615 he held the tax farm on the African trade. In 1629, two Du Bois daughters entered a convent of Flemish nuns in Spain at the tender ages of 10 and 8, but it is not clear whether this was just for schooling or as a permanent ‘vocation’. If the Du Bois family had Sephardic roots, João Du Bois’s ties with the convent show that outwardly he was a good New Christian. 76 GAR, ONA, series of records on the Van de Luffel family between 1602 and 1658.

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Family life, education, and professional training In a study that deals with seventeenth-century wine traders, very few women appear in the foreground, but if we open our eyes a bit wider we can see them have an enormous inuence on the network in which the men operated. Tracing the familial networks of some of our wine traders has been possible due two source compilations: an important genealogical study done by E. A. Engelbrecht on members of the ‘vroedschap’ [municipal council] and J. H. W. Unger’s comprehensive listing of all holders of public ofce in Rotterdam.77 The women who married these merchants and bore their children were themselves the sisters and daughters of the economic elite of the Dutch port cities. In most cases, marriage partners were found within the city itself: classic endogamy with the object of strengthening the economic and political position of both families at the local level.78 Within the Dutch Republic, however, exogamy had signicant advantages as well. Obtaining a spouse from another town made sense economically. Familial ties with Dordrecht, the center of the riverine trade in Rhine wines, provided a link to the vast German and Central European hinterland. Middelburg, the center of the wine trade in the sixteenth century, was home to families with long and lucrative connections to the Spanish Netherlands and France. And a marriage partner from Amsterdam, the throbbing economic heart of the Republic, could provide links with pretty much the rest of the world. The reverse was obviously true as well: families in the other towns would look favorably on a match with the scion of a successful Rotterdam family with special ties to France, England, and Scotland. By 1630, Jan van de Luffel the Younger had left Middelburg to represent the family rm in Rotterdam. With his marriage to Anna de Neve of Middelburg, he immediately became part of the network around one of the most inuential merchants of the era, Balthasar de Moucheron. Anna’s father Joris de Neve Sr. was Convoymaster of the Admiralty of Zeeland and her mother Marya was the daughter of Dominicus D’Ecclesia, an Antwerp refugee who had settled in Middelburg. Dominicus was among the men who invested in the second

77 Engelbrecht and Unger, ed. Not all men who used Rotterdam as the center of their wine import business were burghers, so it was possible to be important economically without having a direct political voice. 78 Klein and Veluwenkamp, 36–43. The section on ‘Entrepreneurial behaviour’ was written by Veluwenkamp.

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voyage of Balthasar De Moucheron’s company to the East Indies.79 Following the death of Joris de Neve, his widow Marya d’Ecclesia married the chief nancial ofcer in the Chamber of Accounts of Zeeland, another well positioned ofcial.80 Jan van de Luffel’s brother-in-law Jan de Neve continued the family rm in Middelburg, while Joris de Neve Jr worked in Amsterdam. Marya d’Ecclesia’s estate reveals the family’s extensive investments and trade in land and government annuities.81 Being able to tap into his own and his wife’s family network opened up the whole world for Jan van de Luffel. Jan Proons, a Rotterdam merchant in woolen cloth, truly went the distance in order to ensure ties with the well connected and successful Van de Luffel family: In 1633, we nd him married to Anna van de Luffel, sister to Jan [ Rotterdam], Gilles [ Nantes] and Francois [ Middelburg]. When Anna died in 1653, the grieving widower turned around and promptly married his niece Johanna van de Luffel, who received two provincial annuities worth 1800 and 1200 guilders as her dowry. Jan van de Luffel, the bride’s father, had been brother-in-law to the man who now became his son-in-law.82 Holland’s merchant families considered an advantageous marriage as important as did their immigrant colleagues. Henrick Rammelman’s father Willem married into his father-in-law’s brewery but also traded on Lisbon, Madeira and La Rochelle. Willem did not live very long, but Henrick’s mother Maria Jacobsdr Roch, daughter of a Rotterdam brewer, managed to catch two more husbands. Even though Jacob Roch owned the Rode Zonne brewery in Rotterdam, the Roch fam79 Willem Sybrand Unger, De Oudste Reizen Van De Zeeuwen Naar Oost-Indië 1598–1604, Werken Uitgegeven Door De Linschoten Vereniging, vol. 51 (’s-Gravenhage,: M. Nijhoff, 1948), 221–223. That voyage had been done under tax-free conditions, so the “chest of pearls” [or “stones”] received by Dominicus d’Ecclesia from Joris van Spilbergen following the completion of that trip were not burdened by duties. 80 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 138/306/486, 15 December 1637. The division of the estate of Middelburg resident Marya d’Ecclesia [ Mrs. De Neve] in 1637–1638 is recorded extensively by Rotterdam notaries because Jan van de Luffel acted on behalf of his wife, Anna de Neve. 81 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 145/164/308, 18 May 1638 and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 145/176/360, 21 October 1638 for the division of the inheritance of Joris de Neve Sr. and Marya d’Ecclesia. 82 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 152/144/206, 15 July 1640 for evidence of rst marriage; 131/127/348, 15 May 1653 for the prenuptial agreement and 146/82/328, 24 December 1653 for the annuity transfers to Johanna. Proons diversied into alcohol and owned a brandy distillery valued at 7,872 guilders upon his death in 1674. See P.J. Dobbelaar, “De Branderijen in Holland Tot Het Begin Der Negentiende Eeuw” (PhD, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1930), 69, ftnt 3. 69, ftnt 3.

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ily must be considered part of Amsterdam’s elite, not Rotterdam’s. One of Henrick Rammelman’s maternal uncles, Mr. Jacob Roch Jr., was bewindhebber [director] of the VOC in Amsterdam, while the other uncle, Mr. Hercules Roch was a lawyer who served on the City Council and Vroedschap of Amsterdam. Henrick’s rst stepfather Willem Willemsz Nobel had been Willem Rammelman’s partner in the Rode Zonne, while his second stepfather Hugo Roon owned the brewery Twee Roode Leeuwen [ Two Red Lions] and traded in wines. In the period 1627–1640, Rammelman’s step-uncle Hendrick Nobel served as a deputy of Rotterdam to the States of Holland on three occasions and once as deputy to the States General. From 1611 until his death in 1649, uncle Nobel held a VOC directorship in the Rotterdam chamber, and traded all along the Atlantic seaboard, plus Africa, the Cape Verde islands, Italy, the Levant, and Scotland.83 Through his mother and the nancial backing of a successful brewery, Henrick Rammelman had connections in the highest places; his advantageous marriage and stellar public career are evidence that he used them well. Children as commercial capital In this era, the rstborn son was routinely named after his paternal grandfather, the second one after his maternal grandfather. This custom has made tracking family lineages easier, but has also highlighted the searing losses of families who ended up baptizing two or three sons with the same name before a child survived into adulthood.84 The availability of adult sons and/or nephews was a huge asset in a commercial system that relied so much on personal networks, economically motivated marriages, and reliable representatives in other cities or foreign ports.85 We have already seen how well the Van de Luffels used their family ties, in the wine trade and in other ventures. Rotterdam’s

83

GAR, ONA data plus Grimm, 101, nr. 11. After marrying in Nantes in 1642, Jacob Motte and Suzanna Casteleyn returned to Rotterdam where in 1651, 1653, and 1655 they christened three consecutive male babies Anthony, after Suzanna’s father —the brandy pioneer. GAR, Digitale Stamboom. Witness to the baptism of the rst Anthony was Jacob’s friend from Nantes, Maerten Doomer, who also witnessed the baptism of the second Anthony in 1653. The third Anthony survived and married in 1684. 85 As discussed below, the size of a single generation of the Vega/Viega family will exemplify that same principle created and maintained the international Sephardic network. 84

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crane master and wine merchant Revixit van Naerssen Sr. had four grown sons, two of whom worked in Nantes. His son and namesake Revixit Jr. resided there from at least 1644 until 1685, and became a naturalized Frenchman. Thomas van Naerssen, the older brother of Revixit Jr, held the position of Controller of the Admiralty’s Convoy & License revenue board.86 The frequent partnerships between brothersin-law are evidence that the availability of nubile daughters to make advantageous matches was nearly as important as having sons to carry on the business, although it did siphon off some of the family patrimony. For example, a female cousin of the younger Van Naerssens married a well-connected Hamburg-based relative of Coenraedt Temmincq, a fellow Dutch trader in Nantes.87 Education What did the merchant families consider to be a proper education for their sons and heirs? In a city increasingly dominated by commercial activities, literacy alone would not have been sufcient. The schooling available to the youths of Rotterdam in 1630 reected the multi-layered structure of the city population. The various occupations involved in the wine trade required a broad range of mental skills, from the basic reckoning of numbers of barrels moved by the ‘wijn slepers’ [the carters, even though they used sleds rather than carts] to sophisticated work with squared and cubed numbers and roots by the wine gaugers attempting to calculate the actual contents of a barrel.88 And of course, the 86

James B. Collins, “The Role of Atlantic France in the Baltic Trade: Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes, 1625–1675,” Journal of European Economic History 13, no. 2 (1984): 264–267 & 267. Collins’ transcription of ADLA B 12901 lists ‘Renexit van Aerthen’ as Dutch merchand living in Nantes’ suburb of Vretays. See chapter 1 for Revixit Jr’s further exploits in Nantes. 87 Engelbrecht, 224–225. Antonetta van Naerssen married widower Adriaen Temmingh in Hamburg in 1684, where he served as advisor to the king of Denmark. Coenraed Temmincq worked in Nantes from 1641 to at least 1646, trading on behalf of his relative ‘Jean Themminche’ [ADLA 1631] also known as ‘Jan Temmingh’ [GAR, ONA inv. nr. 152/688/1017, 20 November 1643]. For Jean Themminche, see also Jean Tanguy, “Le Commerce Nantais À La Fin Du XVIe Et Au Commencement Du XVIIe Siècle” (Thèse de troisième cycle, Universite de Rennes, 1965), 326 and ftnt 379. 88 R. Bijlsma, “Collection Bijlsma [Author’s Notes],” in Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (Rotterdam: c. 1910). Attached to Bijlsma’s notebook Brown 7 is a clipping from an unidentied newspaper dated 21 April 1940, which describes a public lecture on the science of wine gauging by Dr. A. Schierbeek, “Landmeten en wijnroeien in Leeuwenhoek’s tijd”.

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future wine merchants would have to be able to comprehend and make themselves understood in the language of the supply zone. So they went to school: The students, who are only learning to read, will have to pay at least but no less than twenty nickels tuition per quarter year. . . . Idem, who are learning to read, write and do arithmetic, will have to submit fty nickels per quarter year. Idem, those who are learning French, as above. Those who are learning both French and arithmetic every three month three guilders. From the teachers’ contract of Rotterdam, 163089

The most expensive schooling cost three guilders, or 60 nickels per quarter year, but for that sum the student received instruction in the French language. The above contract, signed by fteen schoolmasters, did not specify prociency requirements or exams. In the previous year, the “gentlemen of Rotterdam”—the city leadership—had established a French school in the Hooghstraat, so we may assume that many of the Rotterdam merchants who worked in Nantes and the other French port cities in the 1640s and 1650s received a solid grounding in the French language prior to their departure.90 Blenders, gaugers, and coopers The wine merchants and wine buyers frequently started their careers as ‘wijn verlaters’ [wine blenders]; the latter sometimes moved into the specialized eld of the ‘wijn roeiers’ [wine gaugers]. The wine ‘verlater’ had mastered the art of blending, enhancing, and properly storing a variety of wines and brandies; the wine ‘roeier’ could calculate the exact content of a barrel, necessary information for purchasers or tax collectors.91 89 “Contract Tusschen Rottterdamsche Schoolmeesters Gesloten in 1630,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 3, no. 8 (1930). “. . . die francois ende cifferen leeren yder drye maenden dry gulden”. 90 J. H. W. & W. Besemer Unger, ed., De Oudste Kronieken En Beschrijvingen Van Rotterdam En Schieland, Bronnen Voor De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. II (Rotterdam: Van Waesberge & Zoon, 1895), 355. This information came from the Chronicle of J. G. Van Waerschut. 91 Municipal council resolutions of 1612 reveal that the draft regulations concerning the wine blenders were approved. The nal version would include a division of tasks between the wine buyers, who would be banned from blending wines, whereas the professional wine blenders would be forbidden to trade in wines. GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/71; council resolution of 7 May 1612. Several later notarial records prove, however, that the two groups continued to do both tasks—a

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In 1615, the municipal council authorized the hiring of several ‘sworn wine gaugers’, employees of the city in the service of the impost board. Their job was to measure the actual volume of wines for the purposes of tax assessment by using a marked rod stuck through the bung-hole to gauge the level of wine in a barrel. Based on the size of a particular barrel and using his mathematical skills, a gauger could then determine the actual content on which the wine buyer paid his impost. That done, the voucher became akin to the barrel’s passport, by which it could be cellared by the wine buyer, sold and transported to the customer, in town or elsewhere.92 A man became a gauger after a thorough apprenticeship covering a wide variety of barrel types under the wings of an experienced gauger, followed by a practical examination supervised by another, impartial, one.93 A historical aside: At the advanced age of 47, Delft’s celebrated scientist Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek was appointed one of that city’s sworn wine gaugers in 1679.94 Rotterdam’s coopers often combined that trade with their work as wine blenders, and the two trades were organized under the umbrella of a single guild. The coopers made the casks, but also took care of the rebarreling and topping off of wines after their arrival from overseas and prior to their launch on the domestic wholesale market.95 [see Figure 3] The quality of the barrels, and thus the level of expertise of the coopers, was important enough to the Dutch wine trading community in Nantes that they brought skilled coopers over from the Republic, witness Casteleyn’s cooper Adriaen who was mentioned in the French complaint of 1609. The fact that in those early decades many coopers had also mastered the art of blending and manipulating the wines made them valuable experts.

typical case in which the prescriptive source obscures the reality. The earliest extant regulations of the wine blenders’ & wine coopers’ guild date from 1719. GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/33–37. 92 Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and Meeuwes, 120. 93 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 288/63, 25 September 1636. Pleun Jansz Kegels, resident of Gouda, passed his exam in front of a Rotterdam gauger. 94 Bijlsma, “Collection Bijlsma [Author’s Notes].” See footnote 88. 95 GAR, inv. nr. 881, collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/33–37 for the regulations of the combined wine blenders & barrelmakers’ guild of 1719. In 1620, cooper assistant Hillebrant Harmensz helped to ‘doctor’ several mute wines so that they appeared to be true Anjou wines; the Anjou-style barrels used by Harmensz enhanced the fraudulent nature of this case. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 91/140/332, 17 April 1620.

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Technical expertise, testimonials, and arbitration The merchants operating in France as well as the domestic wholesalers in Rotterdam had to be experts in quality control and conservation practices of a wide variety of wines plus brandies and wine-based vinegars. At the age of 23, Seeger Gorisz worked as an assistant wine blender to Nantes resident Jan Michielsz; six years later Gorisz had moved up the ranks and was referred to as wine buyer.96 In 1633, wine merchant Revixit van Naerssen Sr. and wine buyer Lambrecht Willemsz stated that they had been active wine blenders for 18 and 16 years respectively, and that during all those years they never had to swear publicly that they would refrain from trading in wines while continuing work as wine blenders, nor had any other Rotterdam wine verlater ever sworn such an oath.97 The Ordinance on the Wine Impost for the province of Holland and West Friesland of 1607 makes it clear that by not swearing the oath, Rotterdam’s wine blenders had avoided breaking the law against trading in wines.98 Once squarely established as experts, the wine blenders and traders often acted as arbiters in disagreements over the provenance, quality, and fair market price of wines.99 The statements of authenticity regarding a wine’s national provenance, be it French, Iberian, or Rhenish, are so often in direct opposition to the current political situation that they become amusing. When the war against Spain caused the Dutch government to subject Iberian wine to a very high tariff, the experts swore

96 For Seeger, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 78/54/111, 9 June 1621. and 88/415/785, 27 September 1627. Seeger’s move into the wine trade proper was quickly followed by his brother Tieleman Gorisz’ residence in Nantes, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 136/418/665, 24 October 1628. For Jan Michielsz’s presence in Nantes in the fall of 1621, see ADLA 4E2/1449/396, 20 November 1621. The French notary listed Michielsz as resident of the Saint Croix parish. 97 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 256/145, 31 May 1633. The statement was made at the request of a fellow wine verlater in Amsterdam who thus tried to show the precedence setting custom of Rotterdam. 98 Cau, ed., 1666 & 1667. The Ordinance was repeated in 1630, and echoed by a municipal decree of 1665. See also Bijlsma notebook Red 5, page 20. 99 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/456/749, 9 November 1630. Wine blenders Huysman and Sam stated that they sampled the 70.5 pipes of wine delivered to Jan van de Luffel; the barrels contained “good Nantais wine” [actually a bit of an oxymoron, especially when seen next to the following record. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 668/267, 16 August 1651, Leonard van Naerssen, wine merchant and Harman Hartman, wine broker, declare that the 6 pipes of ‘mute cold Nantais wines’ shipped to a village near Leiden contained exactly the type of wines that they import from Nantes with the express goal to turn it into vinegar.

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“upon their lengthy career in the business and vast experience” that the tested barrels contained French or Rhine wine. After war broke out between the Dutch Republic and France, the barrels were invariably lled with good Spanish wine, “with not a drop of French wine mixed in”.100 More frequently the experts were called in to verify the content of a barrel, either before a deal was struck or afterwards, when the delivered goods had fallen short of the buyer’s expectations. At the request of domestic wholesaler Adriaen Hartman two wine blenders stated in November 1628 that they had assessed and tasted 8 or 9 pipes of ‘Pieterssemeijnse’ wines in Hartman’s warehouse prior to their dispatch by ferry to Middelburg. The wine “was of the very best quality to be found in the city then and now”.101 Good news for Hartman, but at another occasion a buyer’s claim that he received an inferior product was conrmed by two expert wine blenders. The 12 imported pipes, which were of the type used for Rhine wines, contained “common Nantais wines, but denitely not Anjou wines which [the experts] know very well”. Further checking conrmed their verdict. The wines sent by Heynrick Michielsz who lived in Saumur were indeed Nantais and not Anjou wines. The buyer was willing to accept the shipment as Nantais, with an adjustment to the account.102 At a time when wines did not keep very long, it is likely that some cases of purported fraudulent shipping from France of inferior wines actually concerned good wines turned bad during transport.103 By serving as experts in disputed cases, the wine traders cemented their status as authorities in their eld.

100 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 1609/206, 13 July 1695. See also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 668/193, 16 Feb 1651, for sworn statement about the purity of 5 barrels “absolutely pure” Rhine wines shipped to England. Because the ship and its loading equipment were incapable of handling the large Rhenish barrels, the wines had been rebarreled into 13 smaller casks without the addition of “a spoonful or drop” of any other wines. The wine broker had 16 years worth of expertise and “knew his wines”. As additional proof he swore that over the whole year prior to the rebarreling in question, he had had no French or other non-Rhine wines in his possession. 101 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/287, 11 November 1628. Wine blender Maerten Huijsman was active as a wine blender as early as 1610. By 1629 the notary lists him as a “sworn broker in wines”. The quality of the wine was reected in its price of 48–49 Flemish pounds = 288 to 294 guilders per barrel. 102 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/316/542 and 98/171/451, both 24 March 1629. Wine verlaters Adryaen Michielsz and Lambert Willemsz were right about the wines, which had arrived on captain Martin Foppe’s ship. Foppe and his ship the St. Pieter were regulars on the Nantes—Rotterdam run from at least 1627 until 1631. Foppe is one of the three captains who made three trips in the year 1631 [ADLA B 2976] 103 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 184/153/267, 28 July 1630. The most damaging verdict on a cask of wine was not delivered by recognized experts, but instead by a pair of

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Expertise was also called upon to scout out the market conditions in the neighboring town of Dordrecht. On two occasions in the fall and early winter of 1631, the headmen of Rotterdam’s wine buyers’ guild documented the quality and prices of various wines served in the taverns and cellars of Dordrecht’s wine buyers. The second group to report their ndings consisted of three experienced wine buyers who spent three days sampling new, French, Rhenish and Spanish wines in ‘crowded taverns’ at very competitive prices. One of their Dordrecht colleagues revealed the reason for the relatively low retail prices: More than ever before, he purchased cheaper smuggled wines and could thus pass the savings on to his customers.104 We can only guess that the reactions back in Rotterdam meant more headaches for the impost farmer and a conict of interest for the headmen of the guild. According to guild regulations, people convicted of fraud through the avoidance of impost payments owed the guild a ne of 25 guilders in addition to any nes imposed by the tax collector. As wine buyers, the guild leadership must have tried to keep prices competitive, but as ofcers of the guild they were bound to punish any attempts at circumventing the revenuers. Every disputed barrel represents strife within the wine trading community, but the myriad of temporary or long-term partnerships are evidence of a strong bond as well. We have already seen the bi-lateral partnerships of family members in Rotterdam and Nantes, but these family rms dipped into a much wider pool of contacts, at home as well as in other cities. International mobility The Rotterdam traders did not just diversify their portfolios; they also physically moved around and settled for longer periods of time in places which showed commercial promise. In this, the Dutch followed the example set by the Venetians and Genoese in earlier centuries. In the

ofcers serving in a French regiment. The wine, they said, tasted like ‘wash’ [‘slootwater’ = ditch water].The ofcers served in the regiment of colonel Maisonneuve near ’s-Hertogenbosch and had been asked to taste the wines on behalf of a winebuyer from The Hague. 104 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/671, 31 October 1631 for a statement by three experts who had visited Dordrecht; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/698, 2 December 1631 for the report by winebuyers Lambert Willemsz, Revixit van Naerssen, and Adriaen van Asperen on their trip to Dordrecht from 25 to 27 November 1631.

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Netherlands, this willingness to move to centers of new opportunity was a feature of the Dutch mercantile families as well as of the Sephardic Jewish community. War and/or religious persecution forced quite a bit of this mobility upon the merchants: War disrupted established trade patterns; the Spanish trade embargoes against the Dutch blocked traditional markets; the recapture of Antwerp by the Spanish in 1585 led to the exodus of the city’s Protestant and Jewish population; and the repeated crack-downs on Jews or New-Christians throughout Europe forced many Iberians to nd a safer haven elsewhere. Apart from these cases of force majeure, however, the prot motive played a huge role as well. Even in periods of relative calm or during conditions of peace the merchants, their sons or nephews, and other ambitious young men crisscrossed the Atlantic world to set up shop in foreign ports because economic plums appeared ripe for the picking. In the early part of the seventeenth century, a growing and increasingly well-to-do population plus the sailors of the mercantile and naval eets expanded the Dutch consumer base and spurred the demand for wines and brandies from France. Specic conditions in local viticulture combined with technology imported by Dutch entrepreneurs—and especially those of Rotterdam—boosted the production of brandy in the region around Nantes and changed the nature of its alcohol supply.

CHAPTER THREE

NANTES AND THE OTHER FRENCH SUPPLY ZONES The wines from the river of Nantes are not good for anything but distilling.1 Jacques Savary des Brûlons, 1741

We can follow the ow of French wines and brandies from the harvests in the vineyards to the consumers’ glasses in Dutch taverns. This process uncovers the regional supply system; the exports from Nantes and Bordeaux; the shipment of the barrels; the imports into the Republic; the Dutch wholesale and consumption market; and the limited re-export market. Even with fragmented data on quantities, prices, supply and demand it is possible to shed some light on the Dutch wine trade in the seventeenth century, a hitherto obscure segment of the economy despite its acknowledged prominence. The two main types of sources on which we are forced to rely each have their own problems. First, the port registers of Nantes and Bordeaux: The unique port register of Nantes for the year 1631 provides the sole set of hard statistics on the wine trade between Nantes and the Dutch Republic during the rst half of the seventeenth century. As the only full year’s worth of data on mercantile movement in Nantes, the register is highly valuable as a snap shot. It does not, however, tell us if trafc that year was below average, normal, or exceptionally vigorous, nor if supply and demand had driven prices down or up.2 The port

1

Jacques Savary des Brûlons and Philémon-Louis Savary, Dictionnaire Universel De Commerce, 5 vols. (Copenhague: 1764), vol. 4, 1220. For the word ‘distilling’, Savary used the word ‘bruler’ [ burning] which is directly related to the Dutch word for brandy: ‘brandewijn’ [burned wine]. 2 The only surviving port records of Rotterdam cover the trading year 1680. Not only do they fall outside the period of this study, but the cited gures include the commodities traded in neighboring Dordrecht as well. The 1680 register does allow us to see the relative importance of the different wines imported and re-exported. N. W. Posthumus, “Statistiek Van Den in—En Uitvoer Van Rotterdam En Dordrecht in Het Jaar 1680,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 34 (1913): 529–537. Information on the commodity trade in Amsterdam is equally elusive; the only available port record for that city covers the period from October 1667 through September 1668—too far removed from the rst half of the century to be of much help. Hajo Brugmans, “Statistiek Van Den in—En Uitvoer Van Amsterdam, 1 October 1667–30 September 1668,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 19 (1898): 125–183.

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record does provide core evidence on Rotterdam’s position in the trade with Nantes versus that of other cities in the Dutch Republic, and it shows the relative importance of Nantes in the overall French-Dutch trade. The Bordeaux wine trade statistics start at the very end of the period under scrutiny. The earliest statistical evidence from Bordeaux for the seventeenth century consists of the port’s arrival records of 1640 [yielding import data] and the incomplete departure records of 1649 [providing export data]. Unfortunately the export commodities were listed without reference to quantity or volume, we only know the tonnage of the ships that took them out of France. Complete departure records for Bordeaux in the later decades, still not listing volumes, exist for the years 1651–1653, 1663–1664, 1671–73.3 Second, data culled from the notarial records yield reliable but very incomplete information on volumes and prices over the course of many decades. Notarial registers do not paint the whole picture because the many commercial transactions completed without a trip to the notary have not left a trace. Information derived from the notarial sources can never yield absolute quantities and at best serves to illustrate business practices and the personal networks of the merchants. For example, the true volume of Nantes’ alcohol trade to Rotterdam in the ve decades under discussion is much greater than the notarial gures indicate. If we based our quantitative analysis on the volumes recorded by the notaries, the exports to Rotterdam derived from the reliable port records of Nantes for the year 1631 alone would already take up 65 percent of the total number of liters alcohol supposedly imported into Rotterdam in the full decade spanning 1631–1640. This discrepancy comes as no surprise if we see what statistical information on the Rotterdam wine trade the Dutch notarial records of 1631 have left us: none.4 The Rotterdam notaries recorded one delayed

3 For the 1640 arrivals, see AD Gironde [hereafter ADG], series 6 B 213, Rapports à l’entreé des navires dans le port de Bordeaux, 1640–1643. For the 1649 and 1651 departures, see ADG, series 6 B 282 and 283; Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux. Bordeaux arrival records exist for the years 1640–1647, 1661, 1667, 1669–1670, 1672, 1682. The archives contain a complete set of arrival records from 1684 through 1699. From 1683 through the end of the century, the archives contain a complete series of departure records. 4 ADLA 4E2/1458/198, 21 October 1631. The only act that mentions a precise quantity [51 pipes of Nantais wines] is by a French notary and the barrels were shipped to a Dutch merchant in Hamburg on a relatively small French vessel. The wines were shipped to Jan Temmincq on the Francoyse, 40 tons, captained by Daniel Belliote. These 51 pipes represented 0.6 percent of the exports to German ports that year and just 0.06 percent of Nantes’ overall wine exports. For conversion in liters, see Appendix I, Measures.

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shipment of wines from either the Canary Islands or La Rochelle (the ship stopped at both locations); one full cargo of wines from Tenerife as well as Bordeaux; and debts amounting to 476 guilders for wines delivered on the Dutch wholesale market. Serious discrepancies and contradictions which have cropped up can only be attributed to the incompleteness of the notarial sources, but some of them have been included in this study in the hope that future research unearths additional and complementary information. A third source, the Pryscouranten [ price lists] published by the Amsterdam Bourse throughout the seventeenth century, provides a breakdown of the wide range of wine and brandy varieties that were traded on the Amsterdam market. The Pryscouranten reveal which wines were en vogue with the consumers and how much the whole sale market was willing to spend on them. Spotty survival of the weekly price lists covering the seventeenth century, however, has limited their usefulness and sometimes even raised questions instead of providing answers. The largest gap between two listings unfortunately occurs between the single list of November 1609 [at the start of the Twelve Year Truce] and a series of eight Pryscouranten of 1624—when Spanish authorities started to crack down on their enforcement of the trade embargo.5 Despite the drawbacks, the Pryscouranten allow a better understanding of the consumption patterns. The sixteenth century Jean Craeybeckx’s work on the sixteenth century wine trade between France and the Netherlands reveals that Nantes held a very minor spot in the wine export rankings and that Rotterdam did not warrant an import-related mention at all. Craeybeckx estimated that the total volume of French wines imported into the Netherlands around 1550 was at the most 20,000 to 25,000 tons.6 Rotterdam’s long-term rival Dordrecht 5

Nederlands Economisch Historisch Archief, Collectie Commercieele Couranten [hereafter NEHA, CCC], AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682. Seventy-ve weekly price lists that include information on wines have survived for this period, unevenly distributed over 34 separate years. I have discounted a single list of 1619 because it does not list any French wines; French brandy cost 72 to 78 guilders per oxhead; the 1619 Pryscourant further lists Piere Semeines and Malvesieven wines plus Spanish brandy. 6 Jan Craeybeckx, Un Grand Commerce D’importation: Les Vins De France Aux Anciens Pays-Bas, XIII e–XVI e Siècle (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1958), 274. Craeybeckx covers the wine trade through ca. 1580, when the import by sea was largely in the hands of merchants

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imported 7,345 tons of those wines, but a breakdown in the wines’ origin is not available. Throughout this period, the town of Middelburg in the province of Zeeland held the staple rights to wines coming into the Netherlands by sea and supplied the wines drunk in Antwerp. Wine imports from Nantes remained insignicant throughout the sixteenth century. In the shipping season 1565–1566, only three of the 162 ships loaded with French wines that arrived in Middelburg contained wines from Nantes. The bulk of the imports arrived from the Charente river valley and its seaport La Rochelle [95 ships], while Bordeaux ran a respectable second [42 ships]. Compared to the 12,005 tons of French wines imported into Middelburg in 1550, the 30 tons of wines which arrived from Nantes ve years later were a drop in the cask.7 The wine exports from Nantes did not contain any true Nantais wines, because their inferior quality made them unsuitable for longdistance transport and thus undesirable as a trade item. The 50 tons coming from Nantes in 1566 contained ‘vins d’amont ’, the wines from the upstream production areas in the Loire valley, especially Anjou and Orleans.8 The rst recorded arrival of wine from Nantes in Rotterdam did not occur until 1603. The wines from the Bordeaux region enjoyed their international reputation for excellence well before the start of the sixteenth century. Rotterdam’s share of that particular market remained limited. Only ve of the 86 Dutch ships [5.8 percent] that arrived in Bordeaux to load wine in 1589 and 1590 came from Rotterdam.9

from Middelburg. He based his analysis on Zeger Willem Sneller and Willem Sybrand Unger, Bronnen Tot De Geschiedenis Van Den Handel Met Frankrijk, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, vol. 70 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1930). 7 Craeybeckx, 29–35. For the 30 tons [1554–1555] and the 52 tons [1566–1567] shipped from Nantes to Zeeland, see Jean Tanguy, “Le Commerce Nantais À La Fin Du XVIe Et Au Commencement Du XVIIe Siècle” (Thèse de troisième cycle, Universite de Rennes, 1965), 92–93. Tanguy, 57. Information from the seventeenth century indicates that the importance of La Rochelle as a wine port for the Dutch market did not continue. It is possible that La Rochelle was used as a transshipment point between the Bordeaux region and the Netherlands, witness the sudden peak in imports of Bordeaux wines into Nantes in the year 1628–1629, when the siege of La Rochelle made those waters too dangerous for shipping. Tanguy calls the import of 1,464.25 tons of Bordeaux wines into Nantes that year “exceptional”. 8 Craeybeckx, 35 and 246. A further breakdown of the 1565–1566 arrivals: from the Charente, La Rochelle, Ile de Ré [vins de Poitou] 95 ships; from Bordeaux 42 ships plus 5 from nearby towns, so the actual contribution from the Bordeaux production area is 47. 9 L. A. F. Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and M. F. B. Meeuwes, Die Importante Negotie; Geschiedenis Van De Rotterdamse Wijnhandel Vanaf De Middeleeuwen Tot in De Negentiende Eeuw (Rotterdam: Historische Uitgeverij Rotterdam, 1996), 11.

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Despite the sparseness of hard data, it is safe to say that most of the French wines imported into the Netherlands in the sixteenth century were consumed domestically. Only about 10 percent of the wines seem to have been destined for re-export to the Baltic. Compared to the above mentioned volume of French wines imported into Middelburg in the mid-sixteenth century, the 1,033 tons of non-Rhine wine shipped to the Baltic through the Sound on Dutch vessels in 1585 is remarkably low. Even if we add the 269 tons of—presumably French—wines transported north in French vessels, the total of 1,302 tons of non-Rhine wine going to the Baltic remains paltry given the size of French imports into Middelburg almost half a century earlier. Through 1610, Dutch shipments of non-Rhine wine through the Sound remained under 2,000 tons per year.10 The re-export market from the Republic was a minor part of the French-Dutch alcohol trade. Craeybeckx focused on the southern Netherlands and did not venture much beyond the year 1580 due to the lack of sources.11 Between 1585 and 1620 the wine trade saw several signicant shifts, but the snippets of information do not provide much direct evidence on the wine trade per se. The prime political event, the Spanish reconquest of Antwerp, triggered signicant economic reactions plus a massive exodus of Protestant and Jewish inhabitants, among them many merchants and artisans. The blockade of the Schelde river, even if it was less than absolute, moved the importation of French and Iberian wines from Middelburg to ports further north. By 1620, Middelburg had lost its status as the primary import harbor for French wines coming in by sea to Rotterdam and Amsterdam, while Dordrecht had tried in vain to claim staple rights to wines ‘from the West’. In Rotterdam, the municipal government declared that the wine trade had pushed the herring industry out of rst place in the city’s economy. At the same time, the Dutch domestic market saw an increase in the wine imports from Nantes. The lists of commodity prices published by the Amsterdam bourse included wines from Nantes from at least 1626 onwards. The simultaneous rise of the importance of the alcohol trade in both Nantes and Rotterdam was no coincidence. The relationship between the two towns centered primarily on the production and export of brandy

10 Nina Ellinger Bang, Tabeller over Skibsfart Og Varetransport Gennem Øresund, 1497–1660, 2 vols. (København: 1906), vol. II, year 1585–1610. 11 Craeybeckx, 249.

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and of low grade wines. The most prevalent type of wine shipped to Rotterdam was the inferior local Nantais product, to be used as raw material for the production of either brandy or an intermediate product that helped fortify other wine types. In the description of the ‘new’ situation we can unfortunately not rely on much evidence on the processes by which the trade shifted from the ‘old’ conditions. The rare sources may or may not be representative for the true state of affairs, but at least they allow a glimpse of the early commercial environment. Nantes In 1581, captain Harmen Willemsz reported to his employer what he had heard about trade conditions in the Nantes area: The wines were very expensive, they had cost 20 and 21 French ‘greens’ [ ?] per barrel the year before; the sailing conditions were dangerous during the winter months; [compared to Nantes] the wines of the Charente area were cheaper because they were inferior, and the sailing conditions in [ La Rochelle] pleased him more. If his employer heard what merchandise might fetch French crowns of good quality, Willemsz might nevertheless go to Nantes to see if he could get [the crowns] there, because they were unavailable where he was at the time.12

The wines captain Willemsz mentioned must have been the higher quality Orleans and Anjou wines which came down the Loire river to be transferred to seaworthy vessels for export, because the wines of the Nantes area itself were of low quality and cheap.13 Willemsz’s remarks hint at an additional draw of Nantes: it had a royal mint which produced ‘mint condition’ French crowns. If we tie the availability of freshly minted coins to the inux of New World silver that reached France via its trade with Spain, the attraction of Nantes to a silver-hungry Dutch economy becomes more apparent. The link between the mint of Nantes and Dutch silver imports will be further explored below.

12 Sneller and Unger, No. 858, p. 596. The records are silent about whether the captain ended up going to Nantes or La Rochelle. 13 Tanguy, 60. Tanguy reports that of the 9,660 tons of Nantais wines brought into Nantes in 1591, the vast majority [6,014.25 tons] were unloaded at the Fosse in Nantes.

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chapter three The development of the brandy trade

Nantes had always been a transshipment point for the quality wines coming down the upper Loire valley from Anjou and Orleans, but it is signicant that the rst mention of Nantes as a center of Dutch efforts to produce exportable alcohol concerns brandy [eau-de-vie] instead of wines. The wines of the lower Loire area were deemed barely t for human consumption but they made ne brandy. The Dutch introduced and commercialized the technology which distilled the Nantais wines into excellent brandy, a highly drinkable and thus marketable product. Some of this ‘gevuerde wijn’ [red wine] was in turn used to fortify weak wines so that they lasted longer. The French government recognized this development as early as 1605 when King Henri IV granted Isaac Bernard, one of his court ofcials, a ten-year monopoly on the transport of brandies from Nantes destined for export. In 1609, Bernard lodged an ofcial protest against Dutchman Antoine Questelin [Anthonie Casteleyn] of Dordrecht who operated ve brandy stills near the ‘Pillerny’ [ Pirmil] bridge in Nantes and another four in the parish of Rezé. Not only did Casteleyn clandestinely transport local wines to his distilleries to be used as raw material, but he had also illegally shipped about 40 oxheads of brandy from Rezé to La Rochelle. We do not know the outcome of the case against Casteleyn, but Bernard himself overstepped his welcome in Nantes. The following year the municipal authorities sided with the local producers in their protest against Bernard’s monopoly because it was “disastrous” for their brandy trade and he was forced to renounce his privilege as far as it covered the County of Nantes.14

14 AM Nantes, HH 237. Isaac Bernard was secretary of the King’s chamber. The monopoly covered the territories of Touraine, Poitou, Toulouse and Guyenne [comprising Bordeaux]. See also AM HH 194: Only one of the city’s “wine and brandy merchants” who in 1609 signed the complaint against Bernard’s monopoly was a member of the Contractation de Nantes; [Antoine] Arnolet served as the group’s Consul in 1615–1616. Several members of the Chesneau family who also signed the 1609 protest dealt with members of the Dutch merchant community. In 1627, J. Chesneau and Cornelis de Coninck had a dispute over a letter of exchange; in 1634, Mathurin Chesneau and his partner Martin Le Brun did business with the brothers Alexander and Reynier Velters; and in 1640, Guill. and Louis Chesneau were part of a larger group of men who dealt with Dutchman Cornelis Fransz Kies. See ADLA 4E2/1454/226, 4E2/1461/461, and 4E2/1463/103.

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By emigrating to Nantes, Anthonie Casteleyn exported his expertise as a brandy distiller and set up production at the source of his raw materials. From a transportation—and thus commercial—viewpoint, distilling the young wines in situ made a lot of economic sense because it reduced the volume of the liquid by a factor of between four and seven. Men like Casteleyn avoided the cost of shipping high volume inferior wines to Holland and instead could ship the concentrated and much higher value brandies.15 The subsequent emphasis on the cultivation of inferior grape varieties as the raw material for brandy lowered the overall quality of the wines produced in the region as growers no longer bothered to cultivate higher grade grapes.16 Collins has noted that the timing of the Dutch inroads into brandy production from the Nantais wines coincided with a consumption shift by the poorer segments of Brittany’s population from heavily taxed wines to cider.17 The decline in the demand for wine on the local consumption market left the producers with unsold wines, a perfect match for the rising demand for brandy on the Dutch market and a splendid opportunity for the Dutch to obtain the oversupply of Nantais wines at low cost. Casteleyn’s pioneering work in the production of brandy [and the activities of the Dutch entrepreneurs who followed in his footsteps] changed the cultivation methods of local wine producers, and transformed Nantes from a place in which the Dutch had little interest to an Atlantic port with a thriving Dutch community. The demand for brandy, brandewijn and jenever The supply from the Nantes area fed Dutch demand for a strong alcoholic drink that could brighten a dreary winter day and that kept well during long maritime voyages. Dutch brandy consumption has been documented as early as 1536, when tavern keepers were prohibited from selling it for consumption off the premises. Jumping at this opportunity, 15

R. Dion, Histoire De La Vigne Et Du Vin En France (Paris: 1959), 428. Dion’s reduction gures are between four and six. Jean Tanguy uses reduction gures of four to seven barrels of wine for each barrel of brandy. Tanguy, 69–70. 16 Dion, 426–427. 17 James B. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 40 & 44 and also James B. Collins, “Les Impots Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au XVIIe Siècle,” in Actes du 107e Congres National des Societies Savantes (Brest: 1982), 165.

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the States of Holland started taxing ‘all red wines’ in 1583, a sign that brandewijn consumption was high enough to warrant the revenuers’ attention. By 1588, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen had resident distillers. The Dutch did not conne their operations to the distilling of wine into proper brandy, but knew how to distill ‘jenever ’ [gin] from a variety of raw materials, including beer, malt, wheat and barley. The step from brewing beer from grains to distilling wine, beer or grain into brandy was a natural one, and Dutch brewers quickly embraced the brandewijn industry. Rotterdam’s distillers produced enough brandy by 1604 that they had a surplus that could be exported.18 Not all brandy exported from Nantes was made from wine and not all Dutch brandewijn was actually jenever derived from grains. The employment contract of a Delft jenever distiller to work for the Van Loon brothers in Nantes in 1639 dispels the assumption that all the ‘brandy’ shipped from Nantes was made from the region’s inferior wines. Robbrecht Pietersz Storm was brought to Nantes to “burn grains into brandy”, i.e. he was to make jenever [gin] from the local grains.19 Although we will never know the ratio of wine- versus grain-based brandy, French complaints about the switch from growing grain to planting grape vines plus lamentations about the increased production of inferior vintages must mean that Nantais wine remained the predominant raw material for the exported brandies.20 The details of the brandy business will be discussed at a later point in this chapter. The port register of 1631 This work is heavily indebted to Jean Tanguy for his detailed study of early modern Nantes entitled Le commerce nantais à la n du XVI e et au commencement du XVII e siècle. Tanguy was the rst scholar to mine the

18 Richard W. Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 –1900: Economy, Technology and the State (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 256–260. Unger notes that in the sixteenth century few people bothered to make the distinction between wine-based brandy, jenever, and the other gins made from the grains. We must place the 1583 tax on all types of brandy in Holland next to the relatively late 1639 starting date of a consumption tax on brandy in Brittany. See Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 55, ftnt c. 19 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 145/203/413, 18 August 1639. France continued its traditional role as supplier of grain, especially barley, to the Republic. Notarial records mention far more grain imports from than exports to France. 20 For the ripple effect of the switch from grains to grapes on Brittany’s economy, see Collins, “Les Impots Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au XVIIe Siècle,” 155.

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‘Registre de la Prévôté ’ of 1631, the sole surviving port record of Nantes for whole century.21 Tanguy’s thesis, unfortunately left unpublished, provides the authoritative quantitative analysis of Nantes’ domestic and international commerce.22 When James Collins used the 1631 port records for his important study of the Dutch grain trade between Nantes and the Baltic, he also shed light on Dutch trade in other commodities, including wine and brandy.23 The port register not only lists the arriving and departing vessels, but most importantly, provides a detailed breakdown of both the incoming and outgoing cargoes. As such, the records of 1631 have been essential for the analysis of the bi-lateral trade relations between Nantes and the Republic in general and Rotterdam in particular. The registers provide ample information about Nantes’ ties with a number of Dutch ports, so it has been possible to measure Rotterdam’s share in the overall Dutch trade with Nantes at that particular point in time.24 In 1631, the Dutch imported a wide range of goods into Nantes, including herring, cheese, madder [dye], pine planks, pepper, sugar, and last but not least—235 brandy stills.25 Even though the production and export of woolen cloth was a mainstay of the Dutch economy at the time, woolens are glaringly absent from the list of imports. Grains, another group of products that Holland supposedly re-exported in abundance, are also barely part of the imports. Dutch ships brought a mere 223 tons of grain despite the fact that Nantes was in the middle of a severe grain shortage that had caused a famine.26 This corresponds 21

ADLA B 2976, ‘Registre de la Prévôté’ 1631. Tanguy. I have on a few occasions found bits of evidence in the port registers that led me to adjust Tanguy’s numbers, but this does not detract from the validity of his overall conclusions and observations. 23 James B. Collins, “The Role of Atlantic France in the Baltic Trade: Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes, 1625–1675,” Journal of European Economic History 13, no. 2 (1984). 24 The few surviving arrival and departure records for the port of Bordeaux are from later decades; they only list the type of cargo but not the exact quantities. They can be used to track Dutch shipping patterns but do not allow a quantitative analysis of Bordeaux’ wine exports to the Republic. 25 Among the 1631 Dutch imports were 1413 barrels or 117.75 last of herring; 29,960 pounds of cheese; 6,250 pounds madder [dye]; 32,060 pine planks; 23,500 pounds pepper; and 5,550 pounds sugar. The gures differ slightly from those of Collins, an adjustment caused by my reluctance to grant Dutch origin to vessels other than the 99 or 100 ships I identied as such. For an extensive list of Dutch imports in 1631, see Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 254. 26 Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 254. The ‘grains’ consisted of 108 tons of beans, 90 tons of rye and beans, plus only 25 tons of wheat. For a description of the grain shortage of 1630–1631, see Tanguy, 113–116. 22

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with evidence from the Rotterdam notarial registers which point to a strong tradition of grain—especially barley—being exported from Brittany and Nantes to the grain decit Dutch Republic in normal harvest years. The Dutch imports into Nantes in 1631 were not representative of the types and relative quantities of imports into France as a whole, because Brittany was self-sufcient in the commodities typically brought in by the Dutch, such as textiles and grains. It is not surprising that the herring imports all came from the Maas river ports, the stronghold of the Dutch herring ‘industry’. Rotterdam ships brought in 1,209 of the 1,413 barrels [or 117.75 last] of herring. Seventeen of the 36 Maze ships came to Nantes with barrels of herring and one other ship brought in cod. Upon their return to the Republic, the Maze ships brought back wines but the type of wine depended on the time of year the ships arrived with their sh. Before the wine trade took over as the number one motor of Rotterdam’s economy, the city leaders considered the herring shery and trade, with the accompanying secondary service industries such as shipbuilding and salt rening, the pillar of the local economy. When this statement was made in 1599, the city’s herring eet was estimated at about 100 specialized herring ships [haring buysen] while in 1623 a chronicler of Rotterdam stated that the herring eet comprised of “over 80 ships”.27 The herring industry used large quantities of salt, imported from the salt marshes near La Rochelle [the Brouage] and Nantes [ Bourgneuf & Guerande]. Exports of herring to France, and Rouen especially, were signicant enough to give the highest quality export herring the name ‘Rouen brand’. Well before the start of the seventeenth century, this complementary trade in herring and salt, together with the need for barley for Holland’s breweries, had made Dutch merchants and captains very familiar with trade conditions in the French sea ports. As a result of this experience, it was simple to augment the herring- and salt trade with the trade in wines and brandy when conditions in the Schelde basin decreased Middelburg’s appeal as the primary import harbor for French and Iberian wines.28 Several of Rotterdam’s leading 27 Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, Hare Oudtheyt Ende Hare Grootheyt, Endo Oock Hare Ghelegentheydt, Leidsche Facsimile-Uitgaven (Leiden: 1623; reprint, 1942), 1. 28 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 138/22/343, 12 April 1633. In April 1633, herring reeders and Bordeaux wine merchants Pieter de Riemer of Rotterdam and Jacob Dane, reeders of the Fortuyn, authorize captain Hendricksz to collect the ship from the Admiralty of Zeeland. Coming from Bordeaux with a cargo of wine, the Fortuyn was rst captured by Duynkerker pirates and then relieved by a warship from admiral Enkhuizen and taken to Zeeland.

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families started out in the herring trade and added or moved into the wine trade in later generations, either as full-edged merchants or as the owners of the wine eet.29 Importing brandy stills: a supply zone revolution A signicant portion of the wines produced in the region around Nantes was distilled into brandy prior to its shipment overseas. We have no information on the number of stills already active in the region around Nantes at that time, but we do know that Casteleyn got off to a productive start with his nine stills well before 1609.30 In 1631, Nantes exported 1,382 tons of brandy. Seeking to boost the production of brandy at the source and signicantly reduce transportation costs led Dutch entrepreneurs to import 235 stills into Nantes in that year alone. The total of 245 brandy stills imported into Nantes aboard 29 Dutch and two French ships in 1631 warrant a closer examination. Such a concerted effort to increase the volume of brandy produced from the local vintages changed the economy of Nantes and its surrounding area and tightened the region’s reliance on Dutch exporters. Table 3.1

Origin of brandy stills imported into Nantes, 1631

Home port Amsterdam Pouliguen Rotterdam Schiedam Vlaardingen Zaandam other Dutch ports total

Number of ships

Brandy stills

4 2 15 1 1 3 3 29

62 10 115 6 8 29 15 245

Source: ADLA B 2976

29 R. Bijlsma, “De Rotterdamsche Vroedschappen En Hun Bedrijf, 1588–1648,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 2 (1914) 77–97. For example, Fop Pietersz van der Meyden, Pieter Leunisz. Hollaer, and Hendrick Willemsz. Nobel. 30 AM HH 237, 18 May 1609; complaint against Casteleyn’s illegal exports of brandy from the suburbs of Nantes.

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In addition to the stills sent over from the Republic, the port register lists at least ten more stills arriving aboard two French vessels from the small port of Pouliguen near the entrance of the Loire. It is highly likely that those stills had also arrived from Holland but were transferred onto lighters that could advance all the way up to Nantes.31 Dion described the impact of this focus on brandy on cultivation patterns, which included a switch from grains to grapes much lamented by the authorities who wished to avoid bread shortages. Particularly in the region around Nantes, the emphasis on brandy led to the cultivation of very inferior types of grapes, especially the ‘gros-plant ’ variety. The relatively high yield of 5.5 to 6.5 tons per acre of ‘gros-plant ’ as compared to some of the other local varieties made it even more lucrative from a Dutch brandy-producing view.32 The distillation of four to seven tons of wine into a single ton of brandy can be considered as a reversed economy of scale, because the reduced volume meant an increased value of the product per se in addition to the reduced shipping costs. The emphasis on the production of brandy, whether distilled locally or following the wines’ arrival in the Republic, also increased the demand for labor in French viticulture and its secondary services. Rotterdam’s interest in Nantes’ brandy production In 1631, thirty-three Dutch and seven French vessels participated in the brandy trade by either importing stills or exporting the nished product. The prominent role of Rotterdam in the brandy business emerges through several rst place nishes: Rotterdam supplied 18 of the 40 ships involved in the brandy business; those ships carried 115 [or 47 percent] of the 245 imported stills. If we add the contributions of the neighboring towns of Schiedam and Vlaardingen, the participation of the Maas river ports in the expansion of Nantes’ brandy trade rises to 24 ships [or 60 percent] and to 150 [or 61 percent] of the imported stills.33 Rotterdam’s commanding presence in the brandy trade relative to that of Amsterdam is highlighted by the fact that only 5 ships

31 ADLA B 2976. Six stills were brought in by the intriguing ‘Sylvester of Aragon’ who returned to Hamburg on 11 October with 49 tons of Nantais wines. 32 Dion, 456–457. The yield was between 5000 and 6000 liters per acre. 33 A recent work on brandy production in Schiedam unfortunately does not include any information on the production of wine-based brandy in the city. See Nathalie Lans, Schiedam Builds on Jenever History (Schiedam: Schiedam Gedistilleerd Museum, 2000).

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[or 12.5 percent] of the ‘brandy ships’ came from Amsterdam; they brought in 62 [or 25.3 percent] of the incoming stills. Lest we stare ourselves blind on the ‘big two’, another 29 [or 11.8 percent] of the stills arrived from Zaandam, a village normally associated with sawmills instead of distilleries.34 At this stage the suppliers of the brandy stills were for the most part not [yet] involved in the export of the brandy, nor did those who shipped the brandy overseas participate in the expansion of the production capacity by importing stills. The stills arrived on 29 ships, but only three of these left Nantes with brandy. Eleven other ships exported 1,032 tons of brandy without bringing a single still to the region.35 Investing in the production process Who imported the stills? Lacking freight contracts that mention the inclusion of brandy stills in the outgoing cargo, we depend on the port registers of Nantes to tell us that all but ten of the stills arrived aboard 27 Dutch ships and that all but three of these vessels returned to the Republic.36 If we add the virtual monopoly on the importation of stills to the Dutch majority stake in the export of the nished product, it is tempting to assume that all the stills were destined for Dutch merchants operating in Nantes. Can we poke a hole into this argument? The port records list the names of the merchants responsible for the commodities taken out of Nantes, but we do not know whether these men were also the importers of the goods brought in by the Dutch ships. The register of 1631 mentions seven conrmed Dutchmen, and one other man who is possibly Dutch. Five of the 27 ships that imported the stills were freighted for the outgoing voyage by Dutchmen. If the

34 None of the brandy produced in Nantes that year was shipped back to Zaandam. Was it too risky to promote the consumption of hard liquor in a town where men worked with mechanical saws? 35 The three still-importing ships exported 350 tons of brandy to the Republic; 270 tons of which left as the only cargo on two ships returning to Rotterdam. Grust exported 80 tons, a certain ‘Prelisman’ [otherwise unidentied] shipped 140 tons, while a third shipment of 130 tons was not accompanied by the name of the responsible merchant. 36 One of the 27 ships did not return to its homeport Rotterdam but continued on to ‘Spain’ instead. Hendrick Florispet’s ship the ‘Gouden Roos’ [Golden Rose] carried 600 r planks, 400 r poles, 1000 barrel staves, and 20 bales of paper. ADLA B 2976, 6 April 1631.

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exporters were also the importers, Gillis van de Luffel, André de Vlaming, Henrick Rammelman and his future brother-in-law Reynier Dammans had ordered 50 stills from Rotterdam, while Bonaventure Bron had eleven brought over from Amsterdam. A sixth man [a certain Grust] may have been Dutch as well; if he was, he almost certainly came from Amsterdam because that is where Grust obtained two shipments of 27 stills each, brought in by captain Ysbrand Jansz on his ship ‘De Visser ’ in July and October 1631. Even if we add Grust’s 54 stills to the 51 brought in by the ve conrmed Dutch importers, this leaves 140 stills which were imported by other merchants. Seventy-seven of those ‘anonymously’ imported stills came on ships freighted for the return voyage by named French exporters, leaving 63 stills that could have been claimed by either French or Dutch importers. None of the ve [conrmed] Dutch importers of stills exported brandy in the year they brought in those stills, but they did export wines that year. Twenty-six of the still-importing ships returned to Holland with 576 tons of upstream wines, 166 tons of Anjou, and 1,120 tons of Nantais wines. Later activities by the ve men show that none of them focused on brandy exclusively. Brandy became an important export commodity and changed regional cultivation patterns, but we must keep in mind that the great majority of all the wines shipped to the Republic from Nantes still consisted of the wines that came down the Loire river from the supply zones near Anjou and Orleans. Adulterating the wines Apart from their heavy involvement in the process that distilled brandy from a variety of French wines, the Dutch became quite adept at improving inferior wines by mixing them with sweeter types or by adding sugar. The exact timing of this development remains unclear, but by of the turn of the seventeenth century the Dutch had mastered the ‘frélater ’ and ‘mueter ’ techniques. Known as “working” the wines in Dutch and as “frélater” in French, this sweetening improved a wine’s longevity and transportability. When in 1629 Germain Le Lou and his son Claude contracted to sell next year’s crop of white Nantais wine to Jan Holthuyzen, they specied that the Dutch buyer would supply ‘new and fresh’ casks and that he would “work and silence” [ frélater et mueter] the wines.37 Both sides thus acknowledged the benets of sweetening the 37

ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 July 1629. The white wine came from vineyards in

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wines. Working the wines could also be used for fraudulent means. An inferior wine, obtained at a low price from the producer, was “worked” and re-barreled to present it to potential buyers as a superior wine, for which the price would of course be higher. In 1659, a group of Rotterdam wine traders shed light on the practice of working the wines: The Dutch imported wines with the elegant name of “mute wine” [eylanse stomme wijn] for no other reason than to “refresh and rejuvenate old and over-ripe [verlegen] wines”. None of the ‘mute’ wines would ever be drunk ‘as-is’ because they were unt for human consumption. After adding sugar and working the mute wine, it turned into “red wine” [gevuyrde wijn] which was then used to turn the inferior wine into a marketable product. According to the group, this method had been known for many years. To emphasize the spread of the frélater practice, not just Dutch but Flemish and Brabantian wine traders used mute wines for this purpose as well.38 It is unclear exactly when and how the Dutch gured out how to work inferior wines. Casks of wine were taken aboard the ships leaving in 1598 on one of the earliest Dutch voyages to Asia. The casks probably contained the stronger Iberian wines, but if they held French wines these must already have been adulterated to ensure their drinkability during the lengthy passage.39 As early as 1613, the Dutch government decreed that the importation of any ‘stomme’ [mute] wines as well as any wines that had mute wines in their blend was henceforth forbidden. The decree itself lists two reasons for the ban: First, the mute wines “have

the paroisse ‘la Caier la Chappelle’ outside Nantes. The contract also specied that after the harvest, the new wines had to be ready to be shipped on the rst Dutch eet sailing from Nantes that season. Father & son Le Lou earned 12 livres/guilders per pipe of wine. 38 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 395/340, 23 January 1659. “. . . dat de wijn die men onder andere mede met den name van “eylanse stomme” noempt, in den arbeyt is raeckende ende t’eenenmael tot wijn werdt, twelck men dan gevuyrde wijnen noemt, gelijck als alle deselve stommen daertoe allenlijck uyt Vranckrijck in dese provincien comen off ontbooden ende gesonden werden om oude ende verlegen wijnen daermede weder te verversschen ende frisch te maecken ofte oock wel andere wijnen daermede te doen arbeyden; ende dat alsulcke soorten van stommen noyt alleen en werden gedroncken als daertoe onbequaem synde, . . .”. In this particular case, the mute wines came from “the island”—Ile de Ré off the coast at La Rochelle. 39 Willem Sybrand Unger, De Oudste Reizen Van De Zeeuwen Naar Oost-Indië 1598–1604, Werken Uitgegeven Door De Linschoten Vereniging, vol. 51 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1948), 23–24. Goods taken aboard Frederick Houtman’s agship ‘De Leewinne’ [ Lioness, 250 tons] on 26 January 1598 included “50 pipes of wine”, and another 60 pipes of wine were loaded onto captain Pieter Stockman’s ship ‘De Leeuw’ [ Lion, 400 tons].

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not been properly cleaned of their impurity, but have contradictorily by violent means been forced to retain this impurity.” This makes them hazardous to the consumers’ health. Second, and perhaps closer to the core of the problem, the ‘mutes’ are illegal because they inltrate and blur the strict order of the economic classications and thus give rise to fraud and other shady practices. At a time when economic life remained ordered in rigidly prescribed hierarchies based on a product’s raw material, the introduction of an undrinkable liquid in regular wines could not be tolerated. The ban was applicable at the import-, the domestic wholesale-, as well as the retail level. Casks found to contain either mute or mute & other wine mixtures would be conscated and perpetrators would be ned.40 Rotterdam’s municipal council anticipated the ban on the ‘stommen’ by about 10 months, deciding not to do anything until they had more information on the specics of the pending decree.41 It is bafing that Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, one of the most enthusiastic promoters of Rotterdam’s economy and its burgeoning wine trade, supported and signed this ‘anti-frélateren’ decree of the States General.42 A statement by a group of wine traders in 1618 that the wines shipped from the Cognac river “were unadulterated and would not damage your health” must be seen as a reaction to the government’s crackdown on adulteration of wines out of concern for the public health.43 Despite the States General’s ban, the use of stomme 40 C. Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-Boeck Van De Staten Van Holland En Zeeland, 2 vols. (Den Haag: Van Wouw, 1658; reprint, 1774), vol. I, 1214–1215. Placaet tegens ‘t inbrengen van Stommen, 19 August 1613. “. . . seeckere Wynen die men Stommen is noemende, de welcke van hare vuylicheyt niet nae behooren en zijn ghesuyvert, maert ter contrarie door violente middelen ghedwongen werden de selve vuylicheyt by heart te houden . . .”. [certain mute wines that have not been properly puried but which to the contrary are forced by violent means to preserve their impurities] 41 GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, brown notebook 1/71. Vroedschapsresolutie 22 October 1612. 42 The initials of Van Oldenbarnevelt, the raadspensionaris of the province Holland, appear above the full signature of Cornelis van Aerssen, secretary of the States General. Israel mentions the ‘subservience’ of Cornelis van Aerssen to the politically more powerful Van Oldenbarnevelt. [ Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, The Oxford History of Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 239.] At the time of the decree, Van Aerssen’s son François still served—or had just been recalled—as Dutch ambassador to the French. It is a mystery why Van Oldenbarnevelt supported the ban on ‘stomme wines’. If we are to believe a group of wine experts who declared that no one in his right mind would ever drink pure mute wines, perhaps the answer lies in power politics. Did Van Oldenbarnevelt sacrice an internationally delicate issue to appease his domestic foes whose votes he needed for other decisions? 43 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 50/52/83, 31 March 1618.

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wines continued unabated through the period so the ban existed on paper only. By July 1673, ‘stomme Petouwen’ [mute Poitou] wines became an ofcial category on the commodity price-lists of the Amsterdam bourse.44 So much for the effectiveness of government to regulate the commercial affairs of the Republic. The growth in Dutch and Flemish use of the frélater-technique coincided with the greater trouble to obtain sweet Spanish and Portuguese wines due to the conditions of war and the economic embargoes. One solution was to buy French wines and sweeten them by adding sugar or syrup, alternatively they could also be fortied with a bit of brandy; following these treatments they could—with luck—be passed off as a superior and more expensive product. The earliest reference to syrup imports is a freight contract with Captain Jacob Dircksz in 1610 that called for him to sail the Neptunus to Madeira and to return with a cargo that included syrup as well as wines, sugar, and candied fruit.45 French reactions to the Dutch manipulations of wine Jean Eon, the anti-Dutch author, stated in 1646 that the Dutch had “introduced the practices of clarifying, muting and adulterating the wines in order to preserve them better during transport and to sell them in the Northern countries.”46 Jean Tanguy notes that the practice of adulterating wines does not appear in the notarial records of Nantes until 1626, but does suggest a link between the early activities of the Dutch in the production of French brandy and its use to strengthen weak, inferior wines.47 French governmental acknowledgement that the adulteration of wines made commercial sense came from none other than the vehemently anti-Dutch minister Colbert, whose description of Dutch manipulation of wines was linked to improved transportability and

44

NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 fol., 10 July 1673. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 33/221, 24 September 1610. The Neptunus sailed under contract of Rotterdam merchant Jacques Merchijs and his son-in-law Jan Willemsz Domijs; the latter’s brother Jacob Willemsz Domijs resided on Madeira and acted as their factor. Not all syrup came directly from the Atlantic sugar belt. In 1631, one of nine quartelen syrup imported from Rouen had leaked. See GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 93/26/37, 23 May 1631. It is unclear where the sugar from which the syrup was made originated. 46 Jean Eon, Le Commerce Honorable (Nantes: G. Le Monnier impr. du roi, 1646), 90. 47 Tanguy, 39–40. 45

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carried a neutral tone: After drinking about a third of the imported French wines, “the other two thirds are preserved, manipulated and adulterated” before their re-export to countries further North.48 The most critical voice comes with the hindsight of several centuries. Roger Dion described the long-term and powerful negative impact of the adulteration techniques on the superior wines of France, noting that the draw of the Dutch market for inferior wines led plenty of French vintners to lower their standards and reduce the quality of their wines. High quality wines were preserved in their natural state when it made economic sense to do so, as was the case with upstream Loire wines that were superior and expensive enough to warrant payment of the custom duties at Ingrande, upon their entry into Brittany.49 Because French wine producers caught on and emulated the Dutch so rapidly by adulterating their products in preparation for the export market, it is clear that the benets of manipulating wines outweighed the reservations they may have had about tampering with the nature of those wines.50 Minister Colbert himself commented on the pro- versus contra-adulteration issue swirling around Bordeaux in 1683. Choosing his words carefully, he did ask for a cost-benet analysis of Bordeaux wine exports to Holland and England before as well as after the practice of mixing and adulterating wines had commenced. If the cut wines sold better, the producers should be allowed to continue that practice.51 The supply market In the earlier decades the Dutch purchasers seem to have been in charge of the adulteration process, witness Jan Holthuysen’s contract with vintner Le Lou. In a contract drawn up on 3 July 1629, Germaine Le

48 P. Clement, ed., Lettres, Instructions Et Mémoires De Colbert (Paris: Imperiale, 1859), II–1, 462–463. Letter to ambassador De Pomponne in The Hague, 21 March 1669. 49 Dion, 426–427 and 451–455. 50 Even if the mixing of wines has become standard practice, a recent newspaper report reveals that it still leaves room for fraudulent activities: “Wine fraud in Bordeaux: The French police suspects a Belgian-Dutch enterprise, in charge of the production of and trade in wines of the Bordeaux region, of fraud. The company supposedly mixed the wines with wines of a lesser quality without acknowledging this on the labels. In the recent past, regional police and the French anti-fraud department DCF have raided about fteen domains.” NRC Handelsblad, 18 February 2002. 51 Clement, ed., II–1, 745. Letter to the intendant at Bordeaux, 18 January 1683.

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Lou & his son Germaine Jr. sold white Nantais wine cultivated by the Le Lous in the parish of la Caier la Chappelle to Jan Holthuysen, and promised to sell the same in following year. Holthuysen was responsible for the adulteration of the wines by frélater [adding sugar] and mueter [adding alcohol], as well as for the supply of new and fresh barrels to the winegrowers; all wines had to be ready to be shipped on the rst Dutch eet leaving port. Another Dutch merchant, Pieter Fransz Baul, guaranteed payment for the wines at a price of 12 livres tournois per pipe delivered to Baul’s residence at the Fosse. The specication that the wines had to be delivered to the waterfront at the Fosse corresponds with the normal practice that the producers were responsible for the transportation of their wines to “owing water”. This price and these conditions would be the same next year provided the quality of the wines remained constant as well.52 Although pretty rare in its kind, the Holthuysen contract provides solid information on the working methods of the Dutch wine traders and their French suppliers at the peak of the Dutch presence in Nantes. The Dutch buyer dealt directly with the producer, thereby eliminating the need for a (French) middleman. This allowed the growers to bring their wines to market without having to include the mark-up of an intermediate layer. As we have seen, this practice was a persistent thorn in the eyes of the Nantais merchants and featured prominently in Eon’s position paper. The prices paid to the wine producers in the Loire area obviously depended on the type and quantity of wines, as well as on the abundance or scarcity of wines on the market. Reliable but sporadic information on the cost per barrel of new Nantais wines to the Dutch exporters exists for the period 1620 to 1650. For example, in 1629 the whole production of one vintner was purchased for 9,227 livres, which at 56 livres per ton would translate in a yield of 165 tons of Nantais wine.53 Prices were quoted in either tons or pipes, so I kept the two listings separate. Wine prices uctuated, but the average went up steadily throughout those decades.

52

ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 Jul 1629. ADLA 4E2/1456/265, 16 November 1629: Marc Serizay buys whole crop of Nantais wines from a certain Graue. 53

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1620–1629 1630–1639 1640–1649

Average cost of Nantais wine on the supply market average per ton in livres

average per pipe in livres

average per oxhead

56 55 ** 72

23 32.5 47

11.5–14 13.8–16.2 18–23.5

Source: notarial records GAR, ONA and ADLA. ** Not an average, just a single source

Manipulating the market Jean Eon accused the Dutch community of manipulating the supply side of the wine market by a two-pronged approach. Echoing complaints raised in Bordeaux by a certain Sieur Canasilles, Eon said that the Dutch obtained the inferior wines at a very low price by capitalizing on the small farmers’ lack of bargaining power, while at the same time bribing a few of the region’s most inuential growers—most often men who were also the local landlords—by promising them “three or four ecus” [9 to 12 livres] per ton above the market price.54 As noted before, the Dutch applied this practice to other local products as well as to the wines, which bought and brought them political inuence on the decision making process. The purchase of wines from grower Germaine le Lou is a perfect example of this early modern form of lobbying. Le Lou, sieur du Brect, held the ofce of royal councilor and served as ‘maître ordinaire’ of the king’s treasury in Bretagne.55 Eon forgot to mention that nothing would nor should have stopped French merchants from applying similar tactics. The question why they did not do so was actually answered by Eon himself early on in his book: The growth in the number and the success of the foreign merchants in France was the fault of the “indifference of our [= the French] merchants.”56 The scarcity of written contracts covering the purchase of grapes or new vintages raises the question whether few contracts between the

54

Eon, 112. ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 Jul 1629. Germaine Le Lou, sieur du Brect, was “conseiller du Roy & Mr. ordinaire de son comptoir de Bretagne”. Le Lou Sr. held public ofce and marketed his own wines, a bit of proof that a minor noble and royal ofcer could and did engage in commerce, albeit on the production side. 56 Eon, 112 & 30. 55

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Dutch buyers and the French vintners were written to begin with, or whether the documents did not survive. One notarial record suggests that the Dutch normally shook hands on verbal deals and did not bother to notarize written contracts. Two Rotterdam wine buyers declared that the members of the Dutch community “simply talked about and reserved from the nobility, farmers, or commoners and others the cellared wines or crops without mentioning any price or making contract to buy; and that actual purchase and price of the reserved and promised wines was made long after its receipt.” Contrary to Eon’s polemic against false practices and untrustworthiness, this suggests that after setting aside the proverbial bad apple, French growers and Dutch buyers dealt on the basis of mutual trust. The statement also acknowledged that this custom sometimes resulted in a price that was higher than what “the nal purchaser had anticipated”.57 Even if the market conditions in France caused the price of the wines to rise, the Dutch merchants simply passed on their increased costs to the wine buyers in the Republic, who then merely raised the retail price; in the end, the consumers paid according to market conditions. Skilled expatriate labor One of the French complaints concerned the Dutch practice to employ compatriots as warehouse workers, barrel makers, and wine blenders, by-passing the local artisans and reducing them to “extreme need”.58 We have already seen that Anthony Casteleyn employed a Dutch barrel maker in Nantes as early as 1609.59 The use of skilled expatriate employees is brought into focus by the only extensive description of the working conditions in Nantes at the height of Dutch involvement in the wine trade. Two Rotterdam wine blenders left us a statement on their activities as employees of Gillis van Luffelen in Nantes. Because it offers a unique glimpse of Dutch participation in the production process, it is reproduced in its entirety. Anthony van Cattenburch and Cornelis Roest acknowledged

57 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/220/344, 26 August 1634. Wine buyers Willem Hermansz and Jan Vermase used to live in Nantes and describe the reliance on verbal agreements between the Dutch and the local growers. Jan Vermase was included in the list of fraudulent Dutchmen in the Moyens d’Intervention of 1645, ADLA C 652. 58 ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 1645, 8. 59 AM HH 237, 18 May 1609.

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chapter three . . . how it is true that they lived in the years 1630, 1631 and 1632 in the warehouse of Gillis van Luffelen in Nantes; also that during the harvest season of 1631 Van Cattenburch acted as supervisor of the stomping [crushing] of the grapes in the county of Nantes and of the laborers employed by Van Luffelen. The two Rotterdammers never received orders from Van Luffelen to mix the cold wines with ‘red’ ones, but only orders to ‘re’ and ‘cut’ [blend] them. This they did for every kind of wine, such as Courten, Vourijen, Anjou, Nantais as other kinds; the wines were left alone as they had been received at—or as they were shipped from—Van Luffelen’s warehouse. Nor did they ever hear other workers say that Gillis van Luffelen ordered such practices, except once with eight or ten barrels red Nantois wine which Van Luffelen received from the priest De la Haye, which was found to be ‘full’ [?] and which was mixed with muted Vourijen [ Vouvray] wine, and then shipped to Calais. They also had to re-barrel [the wines stored in] many Rhenish pipes, which were rimless due to faulty staves, into French barrels. Also, that due to the abundance of wines, [both] staves to make barrels and workers were in short supply, and that the price of both a new and old French barrel was between 4.5 and 5 guilders, and that of a Rhenish barrel between 6 and 8 guilders.60

The controversy that led to the above statement concerned adding ‘red’ wine to other types, not the adulteration or blending of the wines per se. The key wording seems to be that the wines were left in the state in which they were received at the warehouse [my italics]. The warehouse workers indeed mixed the new wines with sugar or syrup or plain stomme wines, just not with red ones. As by this time the French producers could and did frélater with the best of them, some of the wines undoubtedly arrived at the warehouse in their post-adulteration state. Another possible explanation for Van Cattenburch’s categorical denial of receiving any orders to add red wines is that the mixing of new and red wines was such an established practice that no specic orders were deemed necessary. Roest and Van Cattenburch’s comment has provided the only direct Dutch reference to the production and purchase of a red Nantais wine, one good enough to be shipped to Calais after the addition of a red wine.61

60

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/97/171, 3 April 1634. According to Collins, French documents conrm the production of and trade in red Nantais wines. 61

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‘Stomping’ the grapes Anthony van Cattenburgh supervised the ‘stomping’ of grapes during the 1631 harvest, but we may underestimate the sophistication of the operation if we were to conclude that he was in charge of workers crushing the grapes underfoot. In 1645, Dutch artist Lambert Doomer visited his merchant brother Maerten. The series of sketches and watercolors he made of Nantes and its environment include one which depicts the interior of a barn/wine processing plant. [see Figure 4] The commercial size wine press which dominates the drawing is a far cry from low-tech human ‘stomping’ efforts. On the back of the drawing, Doomer noted that the wine press and barn belonged to ‘Mos Dittyl just outside Nantes’, and we see him directing the transformation of Nantais grapes into juice that may soon have been wine or brandy on its way to the Republic.62 The worker on the right is standing in a large vat, probably the lower half of a ‘tonneau’, and he may indeed still be crushing some of the grapes by foot. The three barrels in the left foreground are drawn in a way that precludes a denitive statement about their size and type, but are likely to be oxheads.63 The Dutchmen employed in the wine trade in Nantes were men with multiple skills and responsibilities—as processors of the grapes, as supervisors of other workers, and as barrel makers.64 Despite the French griping, we have evidence that the reverse occurred as well: In 1642, a twenty-ve year old Frenchman named ‘Charles’ worked as assistant-

62 Wolfgang Schulz, Lambert Doomer Samtliche Zeichnungen (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1974), 4–5 and ill. 35. My gratitude to Arthur Wheelock Jr. of the National Gallery in Washington for giving me the opportunity to explore that institution’s rich library. The drawings made by Lambert Doomer and his traveling companion Willem Schellinks in 1646 were featured in a recent exhibition at the Rembrandthuis in Amsterdam. The drawings have been reprinted in Erik Spaans, Tour De France 1646: Le Val De Loire En Dessins/De Loire Vallei Getekend Door Rembrandts Tijdgenoten (Paris: Fondation Custodia/Institut Neerlandais, 2006), 41 for the wine press drawing. See also Jean de la Robrie, “Nantes En 1646 D’àpres Le Journal De Guillaume Schellinks, Ses Dessins Et Ceux De Lambert Doomer,” Bulletin de la Societe Archeologique et Historiquede Nantes et de Loire-Atlantique 109–110 (1970–1971). 63 Lambert Doomer betrays his training under Rembrandt van Rijn by the way he has let the light stream in from the open door of the warehouse. Lambert and Maerten’s father Herman Dommers was Rembrandt’s framemaker, working mostly in ebony. Lambert worked in Rembrandt’s studio in 1644–1645. 64 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 150/97/171, 3 April 1634.

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barrel maker in Henrick Rammelman’s warehouse in Rotterdam.65 We do not know if he came to Holland to learn the trade or if he was such a valued employee that Rammelman brought Charles back with him when he left Nantes. Barrels—new or ‘gently used’ Another issue covered by the men’s declaration concerns the insufcient supply of suitable barrels. The shortage of the favored German-style barrels and of the wooden staves used to build them had pushed their price well beyond that of the local barrels, be they new or used. According to custom the wine producers were responsible to obtain their own barrels which would make sense in a predominantly domestic market. As we saw in the purchase contract between the Dutchman and his suppliers of 1629, however, Holthuysen promised to supply the “new and fresh” casks.66 From the early days of their activities in and around Nantes, the Dutch community had tried to ensure the availability and quality of the barrels used by employing Dutch coopers. The activities of Casteleyn’s resident cooper Adriaen already sufciently irked the authorities that he received a specic mention in the 1609 complaint against his master.67 The Dutch buyer could have specied ‘used and smelly’, because Nantes was home to a lively trade in ‘previously owned’ barrels. A few of the Dutch ships imported used wine barrels among the many other goods they brought to Nantes, but the 1631 port records show that overall this trade was in the hands of the French. The port records of 1631 reveal that trade in used barrels occurred throughout the year but was especially brisk in the period leading up to the new wine season. In the last half year of 1631 at least 1,137 old pipes were imported into Nantes. Most of the recycled casks were brought in on French vessels but the Dutch imported no fewer than 180 empty casks, indicating that it was cheaper to ship them back from Holland than to import the lumber and make them in situ.68 Resident merchant Henrick Rammelman was

65

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 152/631/937, 12 August 1643. Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 273, ftnt 88. 67 See chapter 1 for more details of Casteleyn’s activities. 68 ADLA B 2976. One hundred of those barrels were imported from Rotterdam; captains Frans Joppe of the Liefde and Maerten Foppe of the St. Pieter each brought in 50 empties on August 19th and 21st respectively, well before the start of the wine harvest. 66

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responsible for the arrival of the 80 casks brought in by Nic Dircksz and the 50 casks aboard Maerten Foppe’s ship. Frans Joppe imported the remaining 50 empty barrels at the request of Gillis van de Luffel and André van Vlaenderen. [ Taking care of both the contents as well as the packaging, Captain Dircksz of the St. Jan from Edam imported not just the 80 empty pipes but eight brandy stills as well.] Captains Foppe, Joppe and Dircsz made a combined total of eight trips from Holland to Nantes that year and took away 745 tons of wines and brandy. The 180 empty barrels had been pipes, so only 12 percent of their exports would have been covered by the casks they returned to Nantes. Table 3.3

Imports of used, empty pipes between July 1 and December 31, 1631

ships

July

August

September

October

November

December

French Dutch total

387 0 387

248 100 348

214 0 214

70 0 70

20 80 100

18 0 18

Source: ADLA B 2976

Despite the recycling at the behest of these three resident Rotterdammers, it is clear that the French remained in rm control over the supply of used casks on the wine market. Through 1631, the Dutch barely participated in the supply market of staves and other lumber needed to construct new barrels. Tanguy’s survey of this market segment shows that the woods around Nantes and the upstream hinterland furnished the necessary raw materials.69 Over the course of the century, however, the local supply of suitable barrel wood diminished sufciently to make Dutch imports of barrel staves a common practice by 1678. Barrel types and sizes In a period in which each town carefully guarded its own system of dry and liquid measures, the size of the wine and brandy barrels remained a hot topic.70 Appendix 1, Measures, shows only a partial selection of the measures used by particular towns. According to Tanguy, a Nantais ‘ton’

69 70

Tanguy, 194–195. AM FF 141 and HH 176.

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contained between 770 and 775 liters throughout the rst part of the seventeenth century.71 The municipal government tried to ensure that only barrels conforming to the ofcial measures of Nantes were used in the wine trade, but their repeated efforts to elicit compliance show that wines continued to be barreled in a variety of casks. The Dutch were the biggest offenders, ordering their wines to be delivered in casks ‘of the German type’ [ façon Allemande], which could hold about 914 liters. In the Republic, importers paid customs duties based on the alcohol’s country of origin and per barrel, regardless of its size, so the tariff per volume was lower when the wines came in the larger Rhine-type barrels.72 Use of those barrels not only allowed for easier transshipment to northern European markets by removing the need for a second inventory of Rhenish barrels, but it also undoubtedly facilitated the marketing of adulterated cheap French wines as sweeter and higher quality wines, be they Rhenish, Iberian, or superior French products. When Heynrick Michielsz tried to market his common Nantes wines as true Anjous, he shipped them to Rotterdam in Rhenish barrels.73 Jean Tanguy has suggested, on the other hand, that the attraction of barrels ‘de façon Allemande’ rested not in their greater volume but in the higher quality of the barrel which kept wines in good condition for a much longer period.74 When in the summer of 1656 the magistrates of Nantes cracked down on the decree that no other wine casks could be used except those which conformed to the ofcial measures of Nantes, the Dutch community turned to the Parlement de Bretagne in Rennes to ask for its intervention. They wished to be allowed to continue the use of barrels of the type and size used for Rhine wines—“barriques à la façon allemande”—or casks from other wine producing areas including the upstream Loire region, all of which held more liters than the local oxhead.75 The notarial

71 Tanguy, 4–8. Tanguy derived his gure of 770–775 liters per ton Nantais from all the available, and sometimes contradictory, information he had access to. 72 Dion, 441. 73 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/316/542, 24 March 1629. 74 Tanguy, 319. Tanguy’s idea rests on a single notarial record from 1631 which stipulates barrels “of the Nantais measure of the German type”. In a personal communication, 22 June 2004, James Collins conrmed that the age of a barrel has a signicant impact on the taste of the wine and that oak barrels are normally used for three years only. This has led to the practice of blending wines from three different years to come to a more evenly tasting, recognizable product. 75 ADLA C 702, cote 8 (carton 27), Extrait des Registres de Parlement, 12 August 1656.

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records in Nantes, however, counter the idea of widespread aversion of the French against the use of non-local barrels. Only one of the four acts which specically mention delivery in oxheads à la façon allemande involves a complaint, in the other three the French seller readily agreed to furnish the brandy in the larger ‘German’ barrels. For example, in 1630 the French buyer of 30 oxheads of brandy specied that the seller, a fellow countryman, had to deliver barrels à la façon allemande which contained 29 velters each.76 We must assume that the buyer planned to re-sell the shipment to Dutch merchants to whom it mattered that brandy came in the Rhenish-type barrels, or that the French had already adopted their use for the domestic market.77 Once again, commercial reality overcame customary law and the Parlement de Bretagne sided with the Dutch. The Dutch controlled the construction of the barrels by using the labor of Dutch instead of French coopers, a practice that in 1678 drew the comment from the municipal government that ‘these strangers did bring in large quantities of staves with which they make barrels using Dutch boys and [barrel] makers who know how to construct them so much better than these miserable rebels’ [local coopers who protested against the Dutch].78 A month after this endorsement, the city leaders added a gilded edge to their support by stating their admiration about the trustworthiness of the foreign merchants in their commercial dealings, in their use of barrels of the proper size, adding for good measure that [the Dutch] “had never done anything fraudulent to the community”.79 This last statement seems to refute all the earlier complaints, including Jean Eon’s polemics of 1646.

76

ADLA 4E2/94/2/151, 3 September 1630. Seller Goupil promised to deliver the German sized barrels of brandy to buyer Trubillard. One velte [ French] measured 6 liters in Nantes but 7.54 liters in Bordeaux. The viertel [its Dutch equivalent] measured 7.35 or 7.43 liters in Amsterdam. See Appendix I for all measures. See also ADLA 4E2/94/2/181, 8 October 1630 for 12 oxheads sold by merchand Rougemond to Dutchman Alexander Velters; ADLA 4E2/1458/18, 12 January 1631 for the partial document regarding the complaint by Guisset (torn page); ADLA 4E2/95/35, 12 February 1632 for 90 oxheads which Le Court received from merchants in Amboise. 77 In his work on the (mostly 18th c.) brandy trade of France, Louis Cullen does not discuss the squabbles about barrel sizes. L. M. Cullen, The Brandy Trade under the Ancien Régime: Regional Specialisation in the Charente (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 78 AM HH 176, fol. 11, 9 June 1678. Letter by the municipal government in support of the Dutch community which faced a protest by the city’s coopers. 79 AM HH 176, fol. 12, 13 July 1678. My italics.

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The French coopers tried to wrest the business away from the Dutch, but the municipal council sided with the foreigners; it reported to the Royal Council that the land owners and wine producers of the area around Nantes had such a need for solid barrels that the products of Dutch coopers were utterly necessary. They emphasized their support for the Dutch import- and export activities in Nantes by stating that the full annual value of these transactions amounted to over 200,000 ecus [more than 600,000 livres] in either silver or in trade goods.80 While acknowledging the region’s need for the labor and products of the Dutch barrel makers, the French authorities did try to promote the local barrel-making industry through a series of tariffs. They levied 6 sols 1 denier per hundred-weight on barrels imported from abroad, plus another 3 sols 1 denier per hundred-weight upon their re-export; new barrels made in the nearby countryside were exempt from these duties. Wood to be used for the construction of new barrels was imported tax-free, but was charged 2 sols 6 deniers if exported. Empty barrels brought in from the rest of France were charged 2 sols 6 denier per dozen, regardless of their size.81 By the year 1684 a new set of city rules governing all types of barrels shows that the demands of the marketplace, both foreign and domestic, had over the course of the preceding period determined the reality: . . . and for the ease and benet of the trade in these brandies with the foreigners, the barrel makers are authorized to make barrels that can hold from 48 up to 65 and 70 veltes. . . .82

80

AM HH 176, fol. 36. 23 August 1679, report of the city government to the King and the Royal Council. See also ADLA B 6781, Proces des Hollandais contre les Tonneliers, statement of 20 October 1678. The initial rebuttal to the French coopers’ charges was signed by sixteen Dutch merchants, each and every one of them a “citizen and merchant” of Nantes, who acted on behalf of their fellow countrymen in and around Nantes. For the value of the ecu, see Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 273, ftnt 88. One ecu = slightly more than three livres. 81 ADLA C 691, Chambre de Commerce, Traites Foraines, carton 24, cote 2. Arreste au Conseil royal des Finances, 13 June 1671. 82 AM FF 141: For the strict adherence to the Nantais measure, see cote 18, 16 June 1605. “No barrel that is not of this measure”. For the rules that followed in the footsteps of reality, see cote 28, 23 August 1684 “Et pour la facilite & bien du Negoce desdites Eaux de vie avec les Etrangers, est permis ausdits Tonneliers & faiseurs de Futailles de batir des Futs a mettre Eau de vie depouis cinquante-huit Veltes, jusqu’a soixante cinq & soixante-dix Veltes & en cas que lesdits Futs excedent soixante Veltes, pourront lesdits Tonneliers faire les Futs de deux pouces plus long que les Pipes ordinaires, observant aproportion les regles du bouge du fond & des peignes cy-devant.”

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So much for standardization within an individual town. It is clear that in Nantes, the law followed in the footsteps of the economy. Leakage and salt-water damage to the wine casks Virtually all wines were re-barreled after their sea voyage, irrespective of the level of treatment the Rotterdam trader thought necessary to make the wines ready for the domestic wholesale market. This was the time when discrepancies in recorded and actual contents became apparent. The records abound in protests about serious leakages of wines in cargo holds, some of it due to rough Atlantic weather and some to incompetent stowage.83 Under normal circumstances a certain amount of leakage could be expected, in which case the reports merely listed the volume shipped from France plus the re-barreled volume of the wines in Rotterdam. Normal leakage sustained on a trip would be at the risk of the wines’ seller.84 The port register of Nantes lists two quantities for the wine exports, and tax was paid on 90 percent of the actual volume shipped to allow for an expected 10 percent loss due to leakage and spoilage.85 If stormy weather opened seams in the ship’s hull and seawater entered the cargo hold, it could lead to serious damage to the wine in the now submerged casks. Imagine the unwelcome surprise of the merchant who tasted nothing but salt water after unloading his precious shipment of Bordeaux wines.86

83 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 47/189/275, 4 December 1610. Assuming that the crew’s statement was made soon after arrival in Rotterdam, the ship sailed the stormy Atlantic in late November/early December. 84 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 396/295, 10 October 1662. A shipment of high quality Bordeaux wines, listed as a total of 76.5 barrels, lled only 69.25 barrels after the transfer. The buyers did not complain and paid 7,500 guilders into the Rotterdam Wisselbank accounts of the sellers in Bordeaux. [ The cost to land the wines in Rotterdam were thus about 100 guilders per barrel]. In 1627, one of the oxheads with brandy shipped from Nantes to Rotterdam by Alexander Velters was completely empty upon arrival. The buyer debited this loss to the account of Velters. [GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/235/425, 6 November 1627] 85 Information supplied by James B. Collins, January 2004. 86 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 48/230/405, 27 November 1613. Three of the 35 pipes of French wine unloaded from a stranded ship contained salt water; and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 50/107/180, 21 December 1619. Due to bad weather, both the wines and the prunes shipped from Bordeaux suffered damage on this trip. Wine contaminated by salt water was ruined, but a cargo of wet wheat was sent out for “washing and drying” before being sold to a grain buyer! (GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 54/163/379, 17 May 1613).

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If one ship transported the wines of multiple merchants, how did the buyer know which casks were destined for him and how did the captain know whose barrel was damaged during transport? Every cask placed in the hold of a merchant ship sported the mark of the merchant who shipped it. Most often, these marks were intertwined initials, but an unidentied supplier in Bordeaux used a cloverleaf, albeit a three-leaf instead of a four-leaf version.87 Wine casks did face the real risk of dropping out of the ropes of the cranes used to load and unload the ships. Most of the time such falls were fatal (to the wine), but one enterprising crew stated that it managed to salvage half of an unfortunate oxhead Spanish wine into two smaller barrels.88 When we are told that this loading accident occurred at night, we must wonder if the crew drank half a barrel and then covered it up with the story of the accident. The danger to a barrel’s well-being continued to be threatened on shore. Horse-drawn sleds were used to transport of wine and brandy barrels in the harbor area and from one warehouse to another. [see Figure 5] A rough trip, a speeding carter, or a bumpy stretch of road could put undue stress on a barrel, causing it to burst, but the single case unearthed in Rotterdam suggests that such accidents were the exception rather than the rule.89 We can, on the other hand, only speculate about the percentage of cases in which the crew surreptitiously drank some of the wine before blaming lousy barrels for the resulting discrepancy between a barrel’s volume upon departure and what remained in the cask upon docking in Rotterdam. One pretty blatant case describes a cargo of 16 pipes of 480 liters each that had arrived from Nantes; four of the pipes lacked 64, 85, 71, and 83 liters wine respectively. The master cooper who inspected the shipment found evidence of repaired drill-holes in each

87 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 93/208, 17 June 1633. The rst evidence of this practice is found in GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/301, 24 March 1629, when 12 pipes French wine in Rhine wine casks are marked with Jan Heynricxsz Touwer’s initials. The clover leaf appears on oxheads “Touchaen” wines from the area around Bayonne, sold as genuine Bordeaux but found to be less spectacular Toussane wines barreled in Bordeaux casks; the same clover leaf returned on Toussane wine in 1641; see also GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 393/303, 15 July 1652, for 12 different marks, of which the three-leaf clover is one. 88 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/200/199. The crew loaded Spanish wines “at night”. The long summer evenings at that latitude do not rule out that visibility was good, but if the job needed the cover of darkness, they would still have had several hours to complete the loading. 89 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 397/305, 8 June 1666. The witnesses agreed that the carter was driving slowly and carefully, not faster than a person walking. The bottom of one oxhead burst, while the barrel itself remained on the sled.

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of these barrels, and could not discern any obvious damage that could have been caused by a rough passage.90 Yet the crewmembers of the Vergulde Vos [Gilded Fox] crossed their hearts and hoped to die with their declaration that they did not tap “one drop” of the two oxheads brandy they brought over from Bordeaux, but that part of the brandy had leaked away through the “air holes drilled by the stevedore and the steerman” and the subsequent movement of cargo.91 Unfortunately the records do not reveal whether this story about air holes in brandy barrels was greeted with stony silence or hoots of laughter. Alcohol exports from Nantes and Dutch shipping The wine carriers ranged widely in size, at least if we go by the port records of 1631, but we need to differentiate between ships that exported the wines to Holland and beyond and those that supplied the rest of Brittany. Some of the smaller ships may have been used as lighters that supplied the larger, ocean-going vessels of over 100 tons [or 50 last] which increasingly had trouble reaching the quays of Nantes due to the silting up of the Loire.92 The sale in Nantes of a ‘uyt ’ ship of 200 tons in 1630 conrms the idea that navigation up to the city itself had become impossible for the larger ships. When Dutch merchant Bonavontura Bruin purchased a 1/16th part in the ‘St. Pieter ’ and its cargo for 1,200 livres, the ship was anchored somewhere on the Loire. We have no way of knowing at which point of the estuary the St. Pieter had dropped anchor, but the two likeliest possibilities are Paimboeuf or

90

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 396/195, 21 November 1661. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 140/330/552, 4 May 1628. In defense of the crew, it is just possible that the stevedore did indeed drill holes to reduce the pressure on the barrels due to expansion of the volatile liquor in rising temperatures. [ Yet the early spring date argues against that theory]. Pieter van Dam, the chronicler of the VOC, described how between 1630 and 1640 the company banned the practice of carrying brandy after a disastrous re on a rich return ship in which brandy was the suspect. Pieter van Dam and others, Beschryvinge Van De Oostindische Compagnie, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën. Groote Ser. 63, 68, 74, 76, 83, 87, 96 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1701–1703; reprint, 1927), 521–522. 92 Tanguy, 5–8. Tanguy analyzed a series of sometimes contradictory gures over a long period to conclude that the 100 tons could very well be a generous estimate and that the actual size of the boats that loaded along the Fosse itself dropped from a maximum of 50 tons in the 1620s to no more than 30 tons in the 1630s. See also Jeulin’s analysis of the maximum draught allowed by the silting of the Loire. Paul Jeulin, L’évolution Du Port De Nantes; Organisation Et Trac Depuis Les Origines (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1929), 11–13 and 164–165. 91

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St. Nazaire, situated about 41 and 55 kilometers downriver from Nantes where deep anchorage was available.93 The cargo space needed for those 42,003 tons of wines and brandy exported from Nantes in 1631 alone would already translate into a eet capacity of 44,556 tons, and this is without considering the demands on cargo space created by other commodities. The port registers prove that the wines exported to Brittany and other coastal ports of France were transported on the small cabotage [coastal trading] ships that called a variety of smaller local ports their home. In 1631, the combined cargo capacity of the ships of Nantes and the ports of the lower Loire was an estimated 9,245 tons.94 We do not know the number of trips made by the local eet in a single year but it could have been substantial, which would boost the area’s shipping capacity exponentially. A deal that backred in 1633 reveals the value of a ship involved in the French wine trade. Captain Aert Roelen offered an investor a part in a recently purchased ‘spiegel ’ ship which could carry up to 140 wine barrels, which means that the ship measured at least about 150 tons or 75 last. A deal was struck for a 1/16th partnership at the price of 350 guilders, which means that the ship’s full value was 5,600 guilders.95 With one possible exception, none of the Dutch ships exported cargo from Nantes to one of the other French seaports, which puts a denitive end to the assumed importance of the Dutch as the providers of cargo space to French domestic commerce, or at least to the exporters of Nantes. The port register suggests that only 105 of the 2,560 vessels that called in Nantes in 1631 had a Dutch home port, destination, or owner/freighter. Of these, the vast majority—91 ships—returned to the Republic. Only twelve sailed elsewhere; of these twelve, ve sailed to northern Europe [4 x Hamburg, 1 x Danzig], two to Spain, and four to unidentied ports.96

93 ADLA 4E2/94/2/89, 31 May 1630. In this case the full value of ship and unspecied cargo was 19,200 livres [21,696 guilders]. The ship’s part was sold by French merchant Jan Baugé. [ Is there more than meets the eye? Martin Lubece is very likely captain Martin from the Baltic port of Lubeck. Is this a case in which the ship of a Dutch consortium sailed to Iberia under a French ag with a German captain, evading the embargo? 94 Tanguy, 21–22. 95 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/477/829, 28 January 1633. It is not clear whether captain Roelen actually owned the other 15/16th, if other investors participated in the reederij. Roelen lied to his investor and apparently had not purchased the ship after all, but through his investor’s protest we got a better idea of the value of merchant ships in this period. We do not know the age of the ship being sold. 96 If anyone can identify the ports of ‘Sandalle’ and ‘Escagne’, the author would

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The fourteen ships that arrived from Amsterdam in 1631 all returned to their home port, but only half of them brought in trade goods from Holland or elsewhere. Ten of them left port after 15 September, carrying the new Nantais and upstream wines. Almost three times as many ships returned to Amsterdam after leaving Nantes instead of sailing to their home ports. This last fact illustrates the strong pull exerted by the Republic’s largest city and commercial heart: it had the consumers and it had the connections to the potential re-export market. The great majority of the 2,560 vessels that made an appearance in the port of Nantes in 1631 were French. Displacing less than 50 tons, they were too small to be considered viable participants in international maritime trade, but we can not dismiss the possibility that some of these small vessels acted as lighters that carried merchandize to the larger oceangoing ships anchored in deeper waters. According to Tanguy, this left 253 French ships of 50 tons or larger; no more than 60 of the latter had a tonnage over 100 tons or 50 last.97 The port register yields 90 voyages made by ships that had a Dutch home port [plus another 15 with a Dutch destination or merchant involved in the trip]. This means that Dutch ships were responsible for a mere 3.5 percent of all the recorded voyages, but if we take the smaller French vessels out of the equation and only consider the Dutch share among the 253 potential long-distance traders, the percentage shoots up to thirty-ve and a half. Taking the adjustments one step further, we can use information from the Dutch records to state that most of the Dutch ships that sailed to Nantes fell in the category of the largest vessels. The Dutch share may have been modest by absolute arrivals, but the cargo capacity of those 90 ships was disproportionately large. At a minimum, the 9,665.5 tons of wine and brandy exported by the Dutch required a shipping capacity of 10,282 tons, which translates to an average size of 114 tons per Dutch vessel.98 These gures match the calculations by Jan Lucassen on the size of the eet sailing between Holland and France in the early decades of the seventeenth century.

be much obliged. The destinations of two other ships did not get registered by the port authorities. 97 Tanguy, 249. Tanguy counted a total of 2,560 vessels, of which 2,307 registered as small barges of less than 10 tons or barges of up to 50 tons. 98 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/403/758, 24 September 1629. A ship’s capacity is listed as “96 last salt or 180 large wine barrels”. One last cargo capacity equals two tons, so this ship was 192 tons large. Each wine barrel thus required 1.06 tons shipping tonnage.

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We can compare the 90 Dutch ships that entered the port of Nantes in 1631 to the 360 ships expected to arrive in the Republic in 1634 from the southwestern coast of France. A quarter of the ships [25 percent] would have stopped in Nantes; and it is likely that a good number of them also stopped in one of the other ports [ La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz].99 The arrival of the new wines on the market At least in the year 1631, the new Nantais wines were ready for shipment by the middle of September. A single puny pipe of new Nantais left the harbor for Le Croisic at the mouth of the Loire on 13 September, followed by 5.5 tons to Ile d’Yeu plus another 22.75 tons to Vannes on the eighteenth. The rst export of new Anjou wine to the domestic market occurred on 11 October, followed three days later [14 October] by the appearance of the new upstream wines [vins d’amont]. Despite the availability of the new local wines in Nantes in September, the rst export of those wines to the Dutch Republic did not take place until one month later. On 14 October, captain Ysbrant Jansz left port with 93 tons of Nantais wines destined for Amsterdam, followed by captain Cornelisz who exported 106 tons of Nantais wines to the same port on 17 October. Considering the Dutch habit to sail as part of the wine eet for mutual protection, the lag between the marketing and the export of the wines is probably due to the time it took to gather enough barrels to ll the cargo holds so that the expenses of a sea voyage could be recouped. Dutch exports of new upstream wines showed a similar lag, with the rst 40 tons leaving for Rotterdam on the Fortuyn on 12 November.100 After a hesitant start through the beginning of December with three Maze ships departing with just 120 tons, the exports of new upstream

99 ADLA B 2976. See also ADG serie 6 B 213, Bordeaux arrivals 1640: In the month of November alone, 122 Dutch ships arrived in Bordeaux, most of them in ballast which points to a swift, direct trip to collect the new wines. The Bordeaux arrival record is unfortunately not matched by the departure records for that same year. 100 ADLA B 2976. The port register differentiates between vins d’amont [upstream wines] and vins d’Anjou [from the Anjou region also upstream from Nantes]. Jean Tanguy combined the two categories under the label ‘vins d’amont ’, but for the purposes of determining the Dutch focus on the new wines I have kept them separate. The percentages thus refer to the separated categories.

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wines exploded during a single week before coming to an abrupt halt. Fifty-ve percent of all upstream wines [1,441 tons] destined for Holland were taken away by the ‘second’ wine eet between 7 and 13 December. The 1,561 tons exported between 12 November and 13 December were the new wines, which represent 59.8 percent of all Dutch upstream exports that year. It is clear that the Dutch shipped their upstream wines in two separate batches, even if the two periods may have overlapped that year. The earlier shipping period ran from 7 February all the way through 9 August, but within that so called spring-season several separate windows can be identied. The 400 tons exported in a single week in February could still be considered relatively new wines that might have missed the December eet by the onset of winter. They were followed by a clearly discernable stretch of four days from 7 through 10 May in which 341 tons left port. Nevertheless, the Dutch market clearly preferred its new upstream wines over those that overwintered in a French cave. The Dutch demand for Anjou wines was modest and focused on the slightly older wines. Despite the appearance of new Anjou in the second week of October, only 36 tons—a mere 7 percent of the exports—left in the fall shipping season that year. Between the end of January and early May, 476 tons of Anjou wine from the 1630 vintage left Nantes for the Republic. In case of the Anjou, the Dutch consumer chose maturity over freshness. The port records reveal an interesting discrepancy between Dutch and German sailing habits. Dutch exports from Nantes to the Republic continued through 13 December; if we add the standard twelve to fourteen days it took to sail from Nantes to Holland, it seems as if the captains and crews tried their best to be home for Christmas that year. If that is the case, the Dutch crews yielded in sentimental hardiness to their colleagues from Hamburg because departures for the Elbe port continued through the very last day of the calendar year.101 Is it possible that the labor market in the Republic was so tight that crewmembers could dictate the terms of their contracts? Seen in a more positive light, we can also suggest that the Dutch were much better organized and were able to depart from Nantes before the worst of the winter storms, leaving their Hamburg competitors to scramble in their wake.

101 During the last two weeks of the year, ve ships left for Hamburg; the last two departed with cargoes of upstream wines on the eve of the new year.

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Seventeenth century wines did not keep well and even the better-quality ones turned bad after about a year, so the “new wine” race made more sense in those days than the modern hype around the ‘Beaujolais nouveaux’.102 The departure dates listed in the 1631 port register prove that two separate races brought new wines to Holland every fall instead of a single one. The November ships sped home to deliver the new Nantais wines, whereas the December eet delivered the new upstream Loire and Anjou wines to the Republic. Captain Jacob Jansz. from Edam managed to take part in both runs that year, hoisting the sails of the St. George to leave Nantes on 12 November and once again on 13 December. Competition among the Rotterdam wine merchants and their captains was erce. In the urge to return to Holland with the rst ship to carry the fall season’s new wines, the pursuit of greater prot often overrode the quest for protection against piracy. A freight contract between Geertruyt van Wely, coopvrouw [woman merchant] and captain Jacob Jacobsz. in September 1630 called for the captain to do a good job outtting his ship ‘De Roos’, and to sail in ballast from Rotterdam to Nantes with the rst favorable wind without waiting for a convoy. In Nantes, the captain was to wait for the rst new French wines, which would be brought aboard ship by Ms. van Wely’s husband Joachim de Wolff who resided there at the time. Without waiting for a return convoy, the captain was to return to Rotterdam immediately and dock at the city crane for speedy unloading. For each barrel safely transported to Rotterdam, Jacobsz. would earn 20 carolus guilders, which seems to have been 5 carolus guilders above the normal freight fees. Ms. van Wely would pay cash on delivery. The captain also received two oxheads of the wine to be used or sold as he saw t; as an additional premium, Ms. van Wely promised Jacobsz. a bonus [caplaecken] of 25 carolus guilders if his was the rst ship to unload the new French wines in Rotterdam.103 The bonus may have been generous but its presence in the contract was standard. Captains customarily received a caplaecken

102

Tanguy, 62 and Dion, 426. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 85/95/76, 4 September 1630. I have not found an earlier version whose timing corresponds to this unprotected trip home. When Geertruyt contracted Jacobsz. for this trip, she stayed close to home: A real estate transaction of 6 January 1627 lists Captain Jacob Jacobsz. as next door neighbor of the De Wolff/Van de Wely family in the Wijnstraat. [Gifteboek 19/454 and Bijlsma Red 5/21–22] 103

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[bonus in cash or kind] upon the successful completion of the voyage. The captains—and occasionally other senior crew members—were also entitled to ship one or two oxheads of wine for their own account without having to recompense the ship’s owners for freightage; this perk was known in Dutch as ‘voering’.104 The components of this freight contract did not differ from many of the others, only the level of remuneration seems to have been geared towards enticing the captain to a no-holds-barred, full-canvas voyage to Nantes and back.105 It appears that the plan succeeded, because the records do not include claims for damages and insurance that would have followed an unsuccessful trip.106 A decree by the States of the maritime provinces of 1651 acknowledges that the transport of new wines to the Republic warranted an exception to the rule to sail under ofcial naval protection or to join forces with other merchant ships. Ships carrying new wines (and chestnuts) from the southwest coast of France were allowed to sail solo, provided they sailed within four weeks of the rst deliveries of the new wines to the French ports, “after which the voyages no longer had the need to be hurried”.107 Transit times Without post-trip evidence of any one of races that took the rst new wines to Holland in the early fall it is not possible to say what constituted a record-breaking voyage. We do know that new wines were being sold

104 S. Hart, “Rederij,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 116–121. Too much import-tax evasion led the States General to eliminate the tax-free perk in 1657, which had a decidedly negative inuence on the recruitment of sailors for Dutch eets. 105 ADLA 4E2/95/216, 16 September 1632. On at least one occasion, a French freight contract drawn up by two Dutchmen specied a speedy, unescorted voyage with a cargo other than new wine. After loading the Arbus Noix [the nut tree] with salt and 10–12 oxheads of brandy, captain Busman was not to wait for the rest of the eet nor for the convoy ships, but had to sail to Rotterdam as quickly as possible. The Arbus Noix had a capacity of 120 tons. A barrel of wine coming from France held between 904 and 960 liters, to which we must add the weight of the cask. For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that 1 barrel equals 1 ton. If it carried 12 oxheads = 3 barrels brandy, the 120-ton ship had 117 tons of capacity left over for about 62.5 last salt. 106 Two years later, Dirck Bernard, a Dutch merchant in Nantes, promised a similar bonus to a captain who was getting ready to transport Bernard’s new wines and some brandy on the condition that the ship would be the rst one of the group from Nantes to arrive in Rotterdam. ADLA 4E2 95/216, 16 September 1632. 107 Cau, ed., Vol. I, 959. Placaet ende Ordonnantie “against careless and reckless voyages by the mercantile captains of these lands. . . .”; 25 August 1651.

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in the taverns of Dordrecht on November 25th in the year 1631, but we do not know the departure date of the voyage that brought them there.108 Transit times between the “Bocht” [the ‘Bend’, the southern coast of Brittany towards Bordeaux] and Rotterdam depended on a slew of factors, obviously including the ship’s potential top speed and the weather conditions. In the spring of 1631, Captain Aert Roelen left the port of Nantes on May 9th and 26 days later [on June 5th] his crew made a statement at the Rotterdam notary that tells us that Roelen “recently arrived from Nantes”. Allowing for speedy unloading and reloading of the Engel [Angel] in Nantes, the return trip must have taken less than 25 days.109 On Roelen’s third and last trip to Nantes that year, one of the Dutch convoy ships collided with his Engel while it was anchored near ‘Santeliseere’ [St. Nazaire?] on December 26th. By January 23, 1632 a group of Rotterdam captains had already been able to assess the damages, which means that Roelen sailed his boat back home in the dead of winter in less than 28 days, and that the 552 guilders worth of damages had not overly affected the ship’s seaworthiness.110 The Engel must have been a reliable yet plodding vessel. A notarial act from Nantes in the summer of 1629 reveals that a voyage from Nantes to Middelburg was expected to take twelve days.111 If we add one or two additional days for the extra distance from Middelburg to Rotterdam, we can conclude that a two week period was deemed sufcient for a trip from Nantes to Rotterdam. The 1631 port registers conrm the validity of the two weeks per one-way trip. Captain Jacob Jansz made the fastest turnaround-trips on his St. George of Edam. The port authorities recorded his rst departure from Nantes on 12 November and the next one on 13 December 1631. If we consider that it must have taken at least one or two days to unload the 116 tons of Nantais wines in Amsterdam at the end of November, and another one or two to load 108 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/698, 2 December 1631. Rotterdam winebuyers explored the retail business in Dordrecht. 109 ADLA B 2976, entry of 9 May 1631 and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 141/204/313, 5 June 1631. Roelen himself provided a statement about the impost exemption on wines brought in from overseas. 110 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 141/245/368, 23 January 1632. The assessment was made in order to claim restitution from the Admiralty of the Maze, responsible for the convoy eet. 111 ADLA 4E2/94/1/135, 14 July 1629. The ‘Pecheur’ of 80 tons was to take 76 tons of rye from Nantes to Middelburg; the captain was allowed one additional ton for his own account.

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the 105 tons of upstream wines plus 17 tons of Nantais wine in midDecember, each leg took no more than two weeks. The turnaround time in Amsterdam at the end of November was kept to a minimum by not taking in any cargo and sailing in ballast.112 The fastest one-way trip on record was made in 1651 by the aptly named ship De Haes [ Hare]. The bill of lading was signed in Nantes on March 19th and eleven days later the 30 barrels had been unloaded in Rotterdam.113 Another way to derive at the speed of the trip between Nantes and Rotterdam is by looking at how quickly correspondence arrived at its destination. Letters of exchange signed in Nantes were offered for payment in Rotterdam as early as 13 days later, but the average was about 23 days.114 Again using the letters of exchange, sailing from Bayonne to Rotterdam seems to have taken three weeks. Oddly enough, the fastest time between Bordeaux and Rotterdam on record was 25 days, slower than from Bayonne which was farther south. Explanations for the relatively slow transit times from Bordeaux include possible stopovers en route, contrary currents or wind patterns, or the Rotterdam merchants giving the paying party more days of grace.115 Multiple and clustered sailings Three of the 90 ships made three trips to Nantes in 1631, while another seven ships came to port twice that year.116 The triple trips of Martin Foppe on the St. Pieter, Frans Joppe on the Liefde [Amour] and Aert Roelle on the Engel have been thoroughly analyzed by James Collins.117

112 ADLA B 2976, the 1631 Port registers. Entries for Jacob Jansz and his St. George on 12 November and 13 December. 113 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 142/260/399, 3 May 1651. At least three of the barrels contained ‘Grois Noir’ [probably Gros Plant]. 114 For the purpose of establishing sailing times, I did not include letters of exchange which clearly were presented after the maturation of the grace period. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 144/60/119, 144/190/394, 144/213/430, 144/156/336, 144/231/459, and 144/303/600, with intervals between signings in Nantes and presentations in Rotterdam of 13, 33, 24, 23, 20, and 27 days respectively. 115 For Bayonne see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/380/718, 14 April–4 May 1632; and for Bordeaux see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/781/1206, 14 Nov. –9 Dec. 1631. 116 At rst glance two other Dutch captains also came twice, but the ships, port of origin, and destinations differ from one voyage to another so we must conclude that these were two sets of men who happened to share the same names: Nicolaes Dircksz and Dirck Jansz. 117 Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 255–256.

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Dutch records reveal that these three Rotterdammers specialized on the trade with France and had lengthy careers. Among the double-trippers, captain Henry Florispet is an anomaly because he is the only one who did not turn north upon departing Nantes. Florispet and his Gouden Roos [Golden Rose] sailed from Rotterdam to Nantes and continued from there on to an unspecied destination in ‘Spain’ [once] and Malaga [once]. It is possible that the crew of the Gouden Roos stayed in southern waters after having left Rotterdam in the spring. On 6 April their incoming cargo included herring, which means that they came from Holland, but their imports on the second voyage in October included lemons, which are an Iberian product and sugar, a New World product. Spanish consumers had no interest in the wines from the Loire area and Florispet did not transport any wines or brandy; instead, he took timber and textiles to Spain.118 At rst glance, the port register of Nantes does not always conrm the habit of group sailings, but a closer look shows that most of the Dutch departures occur within one to ve days of each other. The ships may not have left the connes of the port area together, but subsequently anchored further down river until the whole group was assembled before venturing out onto the Atlantic. [Appendix V shows the larger clusters.] The May eet seems to have been more important for the herring and other goods it carried to Nantes than for its return cargoes. This group consisted of ve ships from the Maze area, three from Zeeland [ Vlissingen] plus a single vessel from Amsterdam. The ships brought 133 barrels and another 17 last [ca. 34 tons] of herring plus 57 brandy stills, while the meager exports of 341 tons of upstream plus 141 tons of Anjou wines did not match the cargo capacity of these ships. None of the barrels contained brandy or Nantais wines. Contrary to the new upstream and Anjou wines exported in a hurry as soon as they were ready in early December, these wines had been warehoused over the winter months and must have been sufciently fortied to allow for this storage period and the subsequent sea voyage. The next cluster catered to a totally different market. Over a twomonth period between 21 July and 18 September, a mere nine ships exported all the brandy from Nantes after having imported 39 stills plus

118 ADLA B 2976. For the trips made by captain Florispet, see 6 April and 11 October 1631.

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a large quantity and variety of other goods that included metals, naval stores, empty barrels and cheese. Five ships from Rotterdam exported 690 tons of brandy at an average load size of 138 tons per ship. A ship from Akkersloot joined two Amsterdam vessels in taking 330 tons to Amsterdam, and the ninth ship from unidentied ‘Estresot ’ [perhaps Eerstwoude] took the last 120 tons of brandy to that same mysterious port. A whopping 810 tons of brandy or 71 percent of the total exports left in the three-day period of 19 to 21 August. Why would the export market for brandy be conned to a mere eight weeks at the height of summer? Two Dutch brandy distillers have left us the reason for the seemingly sudden supply of brandy towards the end of the summer. Relying on their extensive experience as distillers, rst in Nantes and then in Rotterdam, the men testied that any kind of brandy distilled during the summer had a higher alcohol content than brandies red during the colder winter months.119 Distilling the older wines over the summer must have made sense on two fronts: rst, the Nantais wines would have been at the very end of or even beyond their drinkable [for locals] lifespan and thus very cheap as a raw material; and second, the distilling process would have required less costly fuel [wood or coal] due to the higher summer temperatures. Ten of the seventeen ships that traveled home together in midNovember came from the smaller ports in northern Holland such as Enkhuizen and Medemblik, and the two Amsterdam ships raised the North-Holland contingent to twelve. Timber products from northern Europe dominated this group’s incoming cargoes, and they sailed home almost exclusively with new local wines. The 60 tons of upstream Loire wines stand in stark contrast to the 1,925 tons of Nantais wines; the absence of any brandy in the return cargoes emphasizes the focus on the new local wines by the November exporters. By early December, the new vintage of upstream Loire wines had come down to the Nantes market, resulting in another shift in the exporters’ focus. The rst modest shipment of new upstream wines to Zaandam left Nantes on 3 December, but the true ‘wine eet’ did not start leaving port until a week later. The 27 ships that sailed between December 10th and 13th carried 1,351 tons of the Loire wines in addition to a

119 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 433/50, 2 October 1631. Adriaen Michielsz [the brother of Machteltgen Michielsdr, the wife of brandy pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn] and Jan Eldertsz worked in Nantes for several years before returning to Rotterdam.

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still respectable 1,508 tons of Nantais wines. Three ships destined for Amsterdam were loaded only with Nantais wines, but the other 24 ships carried both wine types. Eleven of the combination-carriers shipped a much larger percentage of upstream wines and eleven carried more Nantais than upstream wine, while one carried an exactly balanced cargo. A ship’s destination did not predict the contents of its cargo hold, meaning that a ship loaded with a larger portion of upstream wines was as likely to end up in Amsterdam as in Rotterdam or Middelburg. Like the November eet, this group of ships did not return to the Republic with any brandy or Anjou wines.120 The stipulation made in the contract between Jan Holthuysen and his French suppliers in 1629 that the wines had to be ready for shipment on the ‘rst wine eet’ must be a reference to those ships that left in mid-November.121 The ‘rst’ wine eet brought Nantais wines to the Republic whereas the ‘second’ wine eet left in December with the new upstream wines. Wine-ing and whaling The cargo vessels used for the wine trade sometimes performed double duty in the transport of whale oil from northern Europe. Under normal circumstances the two seasons did not overlap, the peak of the wine exports from Nantes and other French ports to Holland occurred in the late fall and early winter when the harbors further north were already frozen solid. Both commodities were shipped in barrels, so stowage and unloading could be done with the same equipment.122 [ We must assume that no one was stupid enough to use the same barrels for both products] Problems arose when the whaling ships were delayed, which meant that the wine merchants missed out on the lucrative early wine runs of October. Thirteen of the fourteen part-owners of the aptly named Jonas lodged a worried protest against one fellow owner who

120 This group brought another large batch of herring and cheese to Nantes, plus pepper and planks. 121 ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 Jul 1629. 122 Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and Meeuwes, 23. Similarly, the herring shery season complemented the Baltic trade, at least in terms of the labor force. See Jan De Vries and A. M. Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500 –1815 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 635.

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had apparently made a deal with the Amsterdam based “Groenlantsche Compagnie”, the joint stock whaling company.123 The protest was lodged on September 27, the time when the wine eet should already have left the Dutch ports in order to be ready at quay-side when the new wines were brought down from the estates of the French producers.124 The tonnage of the wine eet In 1629, a Rotterdam ship sailing on the south of France was listed as being capable of carrying “96 last salt or 180 barrels wine large”. Based on this information, we can come much closer to the minimum size of the ships involved in the Dutch-French wine trade. The displacement tonnage of the ship—the value most often presented in port records and notarial acts—must be multiplied by 0.9375 to yield the maximum number of wine barrels, measuring one ton each, that the ship could carry.125 The average volume of wine per ship taken from Nantes in 1631 was 101.9 tons. We know that a ship of 100 tons had the cargo capacity to transport about 94 large barrels. This means that the minimum average size of the Dutch eet that came to Nantes in 1631 must have been around 116 tons or 58 last. The Chasseur [ Jager] of captain Dirck Cornelisz ’t Kint, called a ‘koopvaardijschip’ or merchantman by the notary, carried the largest shipment of 145 barrels of wine back to Rotterdam, which means that the Jager measured at least 154 tons or 77 last.126 The fewest barrels were exported by the Trois Roys [Drie Koningen] of Rotterdam. Captain Starreman took back only 54 barrels of wine after importing a paltry 11 barrels of herring. From an earlier visit of the

123 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 88/415/785, 27 September 1627. Among the fourteen owners of the Jonas we nd wine buyers Jan Michielsz, Seger Gorisz, and early Nantes resident Willem Ambrosius. 124 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/275/523, 18 April 1628. Willem Ambrosius had since died and was represented by his widow. 125 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/403/758, 24 September 1629. One last = two tons. The ship could carry either 192 tons of salt or 180 casks of 1 ton each of wine, yielding a conversion ratio of 0.9375 ton wine per shipping ton. 126 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 94/213/367, 11 July 1638. At the age of 48, Captain ’t Kint had sailed on the ‘Jager’ for the last 17 years. The ship was owned by a group of ‘reeders’ from both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, but the ship’s account books were kept in Amsterdam. François Vlaminck of Rotterdam, recently deceased, had owned a 1/8 share in the ship. Was François Vlaminck related to Andre de Vlaminck, who resided in Nantes from 1630–1632?

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Drie Koningen in Nantes that same year we do know, however, that the ship had a much greater capacity than the 54 barrels seem to indicate. It arrived from Rotterdam in early May with a wide range of products, including 13 brandy stills, 12 barrels of herring, 600 pounds of ‘white iron’, 900 pounds of pepper, 6000 pounds of cheese, 500 pounds of hemp, 6 barrels of tar and 600 pounds of dry goods. Similar discrepancies between available cargo space and the number of wine barrels shipped to the Republic show that we can not calculate the true size of the wine eet from the size of the wine shipments. All the Dutch ships that arrived in port managed to secure return cargoes of 54 barrels or more. This could imply that the Dutch merchant community had an informal distribution system which spread the exports over the whole eet. In cases where a captain was contracted to sail to Nantes and return with “a load of wine” he would be at the mercy of the market conditions at the supply side—which could be under the informal control of the Dutch ‘nation’.127 More often, however, the captains were ordered to get in touch with the rm’s partner or factor in Nantes who would supply the return cargo. The December wine eet chose speed over a full load, which matches the bonus system that rewarded the captains for a quick delivery of the valuable new wines to the Dutch ports. The importance of being among the rst to dock at a city crane in Holland, however, was clearly muted by the need for a safe passage home. The December eet may have sailed in an informally arranged ‘admiraalschap’, but the ships coming from Nantes were often met by one or two armed convoy ships for the dangerous passage through the Channel and along the [Spanish] Flemish coast. Convoy protection The various Admiralties were responsible for the outtting and deployment of speedy and well-armed navy ships that were responsible for the protection of the Dutch merchant eets. The number of convoyers

127 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/301/504, 26 August 1632. Jan Dircksz, captain “next to God”, to sail the Neptunus to Nantes and return with a ‘load’. His Scottish colleague William Black received only slightly more detailed instructions: His ship the “Blaue Doffer” could hold 130 barrels and the contract stipulated that he had to bring “as much new wine as possible” back to Rotterdam. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/306/514, 30 August 1632.

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depended on the size of the commercial eet and the level of potential piracy on particular routes. In January 1640, the outgoing eet was of such ‘excellent quality’ that the Admiralty decided to assign six warships, one of which was borrowed from the herring convoyers, but this show of strength seems to have been exceptional. In late March of the same year, the merchants in charge of the ‘Bochtvaerders’ told the Admiralty that the eet would be ready to sail in ve days time, and requested that the four warships promised as protection would be ready as well. The convoy ships did not all stay with the eet until the nal destination. Three navy ships took a eet south in 1642, but as the merchant ships reached their various destinations along the French coast, their escorts dwindled accordingly. One war ship sailed as far as Le Havre and Dieppe, two went on to Nantes and La Rochelle, but only one continued to protect the group that ended up in Bordeaux. For the trip back home, the same three convoy ships gathered at Saint Martin on Ile de Ré to await the returning merchant ships no later than ve weeks following the arrival of the Bordeaux eet at the Garonne river.128 Minus the sailing time, the captains were given about a month in which to conclude their transactions. Because the Admiralties were perennially under-funded, ships had to do duty in a variety of waters, with or without the knowledge of the short-changed party. One convoy case highlights two aspects of commercial life in Holland: the economic and thus political muscle of the VOC compared to the other branches of commerce on the one hand, plus the value of an individual merchant’s inuential position on the other. On 18 April 1640, Rotterdam’s burgomasters and VOC directors Joost van Coulster and Pieter Sonneman requested that the richly loaded VOC retour-ship ‘Maestricht’ receive the dedicated protection of two convoy ships which ofcially had been assigned to cover the merchant eet returning from France. The Admiralty board agreed, stipulating that the two convoy captains were to use ‘discrete seamanship’ to ensure the arrival of the East Indiaman in safe waters without alerting the captains of the coastal eet to the fact that their escorts had a richer prize to cover.129 A job as a VOC director allowed merchants

128 GAR, HS (aanvulling) inv. nr. 1990 6a, AA 136; Notulen Admiraliteit van de Maze for the year 1640, 23 February 1643. Similar instructions for the four navy captains who escorted the ‘horse ships’ to Rouen and the rest of the Bochtvaerders in 1641, see iv. nr. 1990 6a, AA 136, 7 December 1641. 129 GAR, Handschriften (aanvulling) inv. nr. 1989 31, AA 135, Notulen Admiraliteit van

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to make specic requests, and a job on the Admiralty board inuenced the convoy assignments that protected their investments in ships and or cargo. Not-so-hidden perks like these make it clear why Holland’s commercial elite was eager to hold public or corporate ofce. Armed or loaded? Recognizing that a merchant ship which sailed without some decent means to defend itself had much more room for protable cargo, the States General moved to order compensation by the non-armed ship owners to those who gave up precious space to properly arm their ships. The compensation levels were based on the same categories in ship sizes as used for the armament requirements, and took both weapons and personnel into consideration. If, for example, the 150 last [or 300 tons] St. Niclaes had joined the eet to Rouen, Nantes, La Rochelle, Bordeaux and Bayonne in the so called ‘Bochtvaart ’ on south-western France without proper armament, its owners would have been required to pay a combination of set fees based on its 150 last size: 1800 guilders to compensate for the cast cannon, 96 guilders for the stone cannon, 400 guilders for gunpowder, 100 guilders for muskets, and 18 guilders per month for each crewmember or 306 guilders for a crew of 17 men. Additional fees covered the interest and insurance on the weapons themselves: 24 guilders per 2 months of interest on the ship, 148 guilders for the insurance premium, 30 guilders for gunpowder, and 72 guilders for victuals.130 The armament decree of 1603 and the compensation decree of 1625 are evidence of the relatively tight regulation of the privately owned merchant eet at federal level, which counters the image of power localized at city level. The requirements placed a heavy burden on the shipping sector which tried to keep costs down to preserve its competitive advantage. The Admiralties of the maritime provinces of Holland, Zeeland and West Friesland petitioned the States General to reduce the crew and armament requirements as

de Maze for the year 1640. For the quality of the eet leaving for France, see 15 January; for the borrowing of one of the herring convoyers, 31 January; and for the siphoning off of convoy ships to VOC duty, 28 April. 130 Algemeen Rijksarchief (hereafter ARA), toegang 3.01.04, inventaris nummer 01/1357DD1, 25 March 1625. Buying off the requirement to arm a ship was not allowed at all for those ships destined for the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar [known as ‘Straatvaart ’, due to the high risk of piracy along the Barbary coast.

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decreed in the renewal of 1627, but to no avail.131 The burdensome regulations must have been ignored on a wide scale, as evidenced by the stream of the decree’s renewals the following years. Merchants eager to safeguard their cargoes used a monetary incentive to pressure ship owners and captains to arm their ships. In 1632, Amsterdam merchant Marten Calschuur signed a freight contract with the owners of the Stroojoncker, at 110 last or 220 tons a sizeable ship, for a trip from Amsterdam to Nantes and back to fetch wine, brandy and vinegar. If the ship was armed with at least 6 cast cannon [gotelingen], the freight price would be 10.5 guilders per barrel, but if the owners decided to let the Stroojoncker sail without its own protection, the freight price would be reduced to 10 guilders per barrel. At 110 last, the ship would have been able to transport about 207 large wine barrels, which means that the bonus for being armed came to a little over 100 guilders. In other words, the reeders and their captain had to decide whether the risk to sail unarmed was outweighed by the opportunity to ship more barrels in the space not occupied by cannon.132 Even if reeders and freighters decided to rely on convoy protection instead of the ship’s own repower, they covered their bets by insuring both ship and cargo. Maritime insurance The costs of insuring ships and cargo for voyages to specic destinations were listed in the Dutch Pryscouranten as early as 1626.133 Destinations were clustered, and between 1631 and 1633 the clustering changed from three to four groups. Through 1631, voyages to Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Saint Jean-de-Luz carried the highest premiums, from 4.5 percent in 1626 to 8 percent of the combined value in 1631.134 The

131

ARA toegang 3.01.04., inv. nr. 01/1357M, and Cau, ed., vol. 1, 876–878. GAA, 829/178, 13 February 1632. In this case the 103 guilders bonus would have covered the freight charges of ten additional barrels. 133 NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682. 134 According to Gautier, insurance rates for voyages between Bordeaux and the Republic remained fairly level at 5 to 8 percent throughout the period 1630–1660. Several Dutch merchants residing in Bordeaux invested in maritime insurance, including Middelburg natives Adriaen Velters [ brother of Reynier and Alexander in Nantes], David Dierckens and Jan van Herlaer; Jean de Ridder from Leiden; plus Ysbrant Vanderwower and Herman van Waerthuysen. B. Gautier, “Commerce Et Marchands Bordelais Dans La Premiere Moitie Du XVIIe Siècle, 1630–1660,” Bulletin du Centre d’Histoire des Espaces Atlantiques 6 (1993): 51. 132

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middle group was made up of St. Malo and Nantes, with premiums ranging between 4 and 7 percent. Trips to Rouen, Dieppe and Calais carried the lowest risk and drew premiums of 2.5 to 5 percent. From 1633 onwards, Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz in the far southwest of France merited their own category, while Nantes started to be grouped with Bordeaux and La Rochelle; the mouth of the Somme river was added to the Channel group that year as well. Through 1634 insurance premiums for Bayonne and Saint Jeande-Luz ranged between 7 and 8 percent, the highest of any French destination, closely followed by the ports in the ‘Bocht’ which drew premiums of 5.5 to 7 percent. On 19 May 1635, the war between France and Spain broke out but instead of raising the insurance rates, the Pryscourant of 18 June 1635 shows that the premiums for Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz had dropped from 8 to 6 percent, two whole percentage points compared to those of February 1634. Did the active participation of the French military forces, at sea and on land, provide additional safety to Dutch shipping against the Spanish, thus enabling lower insurance rates? Or did the rates reect the results of private initiative to counter force with force? Pieter de la Court noted that inefcient convoys had allowed Duinkerker pirates to wreak havoc on Dutch shipping in the year 1632: . . . so that the insurances from Rochel and Bourdeaux [rose] to 8 and 10 percent. Upon which divers good patriots tted out ships for that end; and this small strength being in the hands of those who really intended to destroy the enemies ships . . . [was so effective and] the Dunkirkers so discouraged and weakened, and the seas so well cleared, that the insurances from Rochel and Bourdeaux fell to three in the hundred [3 percent].135

The peace between the Dutch Republic and Spain of 1648 is barely reected in the premiums listed in December 1646 and the next Pryscourant of August 1648: On the Bayonne/Saint Jean-de-Luz trip premiums only fell from 5–6 to 4–5 percent and on the Nantes, La Rochelle and Bordeaux trip they went from 3–3.5 to 2.5–3 percent.

135 Pieter de la Court and Johan de Witt, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republic of Holland (1662), The Evolution of Capitalism (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 175.

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‘Admiraalschappen’ The threat of seizure by enemy warships, privateers or pirates forced captains to sail in groups, where safety might be found in numbers.136 The Dutch merchant ships on their way home from the ‘Bocht’ used a xed position off the port of St. Martin on Ile de Ré as the staging area for these eets.137 Ideally, one or more Dutch navy ships provided armed escort for the merchant eets, but without naval protection the captains relied on each other’s company and more limited re power. Such an impromptu eet for a specic voyage was called an admiralty [admiraalschap]. It provided greater protection to all and enabled inexperienced men to follow in the wake of the more senior captains. The States General codied the use of admiraalschappen as early as 1603, but the frequent renewals of the decree in the period between the end of the Truce [1621] and the Peace of Munster [1648] indicate that owners and captains continued to decide on a case by case basis whether to sail in an admiraalschap or not.138 Leadership of an admiraalschap was not a matter of strict seniority, and may have been inuenced by the size, speed, and armament of the various ships. In 1628, the captains of an unspecied number of Dutch ships anchored at Nantes agreed to sail back to the Dutch Republic in admiraalschap. At the age of 56, Aert Roelen was the oldest of the four chosen leaders and an experienced sailor on the route, but the eet chose 25-year old Arent Heyndricksz De Lieffde to be the admiral. If his ship was the fastest, it made sense to have De Lieffde and his ship act as mother hen. The four captains received “several coins” each for their greater responsibilities on this trip, but the money did not end up in their pockets. The poor [of the respective home ports?] received a portion, and the rest of the money was “consumed” [we hope in the

136 At least in one case, a falling out between two captains who in Nantes had agreed to sail together ended up with one of them being captured by pirates. When the other captain broke ranks and returned to Nantes 4 days after leaving port, the aforementioned Frans Joppe and his ship were taken to St. Sebastian in Spain. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 167/140/232, 25 May 1636. 137 Cau, ed., Vol. I, 960. Placaet of 8 November 1652. 138 GAR inv. nr. 881, Collectie Bijlsma, doos 3, Admiraliteit & VOC. Placaet Staten Generaal 9 April 1603: The Placaet stipulated that small groups of two to four ships could leave the Maas river if they each carried a minimum of 12 ‘gotelingen’ [cast cannon] and only if they sailed in an ‘admiraalschap’; renewals in 1607, 1625, 1627, 1629, 1632 and 1643.

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form of high quality wine]. We know that two of the four lead-ships came from Vlissingen, while Roelen operated from Rotterdam.139 This episode shows that in the face of potential piracy, captains from a variety of Dutch towns cooperated and sought each others’ company. Not all impromptu eets, however, showed a similar sense of collegiality. In the spring of 1642, captain Frans Joppe’s sizeable vessel, together with four other unfortunates, got stuck on a sandbar at the mouth of the Maas river due to stormy weather, but the assistance by both the river pilots as well as the other 22 captains of the return eet was deemed “insufcient”. The crew spent so much time salvaging as many as 210 barrels from the whole cargo that they had no time left to save the ship itself. The other ships may have “helped” to transport some of the salvaged cargo to the port of Brielle, but once there unethical persons “stole grossly”.140 In captain Joppe’s case, two issues conspired to reduce his fellow captains’ eagerness to come to his assistance. Instead of facing an enemy ship, Joppe got stranded on a sandbar—if not due to bad seamanship, an act of God rather than an act of war. And second, the stranding occurred so close to home port that the other captains must have given priority to the sprint to the nish line—which in this case was the city crane of Rotterdam. Foul weather could make tempers y as well. Rough seas on the river of Nantes in January 1633 caused Captain Roelen’s ship to bump into a vessel from Vlissingen, whose captain—in his zeal to protect his own vessel—proceeded to cut and slash so much of Roelen’s rigging that it became unusable.141 Despite the occasional violence, the overall impression given by the Rotterdam records nevertheless conveys cooperation in the face of a common enemy or a shared misfortune, and competition when circumstances did not call for assistance to a fellow sailor in distress. The lack of French —Dutch freight contracts Freight contracts between the Dutch merchants and the captain/owners of a vessel for a trip to the Dutch Republic rarely show up in the 139 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/421/695, 12 June 1630. The four leaders of this admiraalschap came to notary Van Aller to make a statement concerning their trip from Nantes in 1628. 140 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 152/412/614, 24 May 1642. 141 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/461/801, 15 January 1633.

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registers of the notaries of Nantes. This lack of information on the French side has two main reasons: First, if the owners (rarely owner) of a ship were also the ones who shipped their own merchandize on it, it was an ‘in-house’ arrangement which did not require a notarized contract. The Rotterdam records do indeed conrm that, generally speaking, the international wine traders were also ‘reeders’, or part owners of several vessels. The only time we have evidence of such voyages is when something went wrong and the captain and crew had their account of the trip recorded by a notary back in Holland. Second, if conditions warranted an ofcial freight contract on a Dutch ship, it was drawn up back home for both legs of the voyage. Trips originating in the Republic would not appear in French notarial records, even if the ship called at several French ports before returning north. The scarcity of port registers for the period prevents the tracking of such port-hopping trips. Some of the Dutch freight contracts gave the captain very specic instructions on which ports to call, but most mention just a single destination. The captains To what extent did the captains of the Dutch eet specialize in voyages on one fairly xed route? Repeat voyages allowed captains & crew to build up valuable experience in dealing with sailing conditions specic for that stretch of water as well as with local agents and ofcials. In 1631, seven Dutch captains made the trip from Rotterdam to Nantes at least twice and three of them came a third time. The port register of Nantes of 1631 lists three separate trips by Roelen on the Engel, shipping wines and brandy back to Rotterdam (twice) and Amsterdam (once). The rst of the two trips made by the vessel De Drie Koningen was captained by the George Cornelisz. Stuurman, and the second voyage by his father or son, Cornelis Stuurman.142 When we track the men listed in the Nantes port record of 1631 in the archives of Rotterdam, more evidence shows up that the Dutch merchants relied on very experienced men to transport their goods. Captain Maerten Foppe arrived in Nantes on December 2nd of 1631, sailing into a harbor that he had visited at least 5 times since his rst recorded visit in 1626.

142

ADLA, B 2976—port records of the Prevoté de Nantes for the year 1631.

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Alongside Foppe’s St. Pieter that day docked De Liefde of captain Frans Joppe, who had served on Foppe’s ship as steersman on a voyage to Nantes in 1627.143 The earliest available arrival records of Bordeaux prove, however, that despite a seeming specialization, the captains who sailed on Nantes did include other ports in their itineraries. Both Arien Roelle and Frans Joppe showed up in Bordeaux in the fall of 1640. Joppe arrived on the 170 ton large St. Martin on 25 October, carrying a lot of ballast and some herring. Another ship from Rotterdam, this one measuring 200 tons, arrived that same day in the company of eleven ships from Vlissingen, 1 from Middelburg and 2 from Amsterdam. On 8 November, two ships from Rotterdam arrived in ballast, including Arien/Aert Roelle’s 140 ton large Lion Noir [Zwarte Leeuw].144 Aert Roelen was an exceptionally well connected captain. In 1636, at the age of 65, Roelen not only described himself as a 10–12 year veteran of the ocean-going shipping trade, but also as the brotherin-law of two men who dealt extensively in the wines of the Nantes region, Rotterdam notable Cornelis Coninck and Jacob Jansz Nuye.145 We saw that Roelen sailed on Bordeaux in 1640, and three years later Aert Roelen was asked to transport a suitcase & hat on his next trip to Nantes. If this is the same Aert, the captain was virtually indestructible and continued to sail at age 72, but it might be one of his sons.146 Not much is known about the level of formal education of the captains. They kept their ships’ logs and cargo registers, and signed their names under the notarial records, so we can assume that they had mastered basic reading, writing, and arithmetic skills. The sworn declaration by captain Joachim Jansz Hooch of Rotterdam that the sums pertaining to his receipts and expenses that he listed in ‘a certain small

143 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/235/425, 6 November 1627. Joppe continued to ply the French Atlantic coastal waters until at least 1642, when his report of a disastrous shipwreck near the mouth of the Maas river offers the nal glimpse of this captain’s cabotage career. 144 AD Gironde [hereafter ADG], series 6 B 213, Rapports à l’entreé des navires dans le port de Bordeaux, 1640–1643. Entries for 25 October and 8 November 1640. Roelle came to Bordeaux to load cargo owned by merchant Labatut. One other ship from Rotterdam plus one from Middelburg, both 180 tons large, arrived for Labatut that same day. 145 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 167/140/232, 25 May 1636 for Roelen’s age & relatives. and GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 170/169/257, 4 August 1643 for the hat’s transport. 146 See ADG series 6 B 213, Rapports à l’entreé des navires dans le port de Bordeaux, 1640–1643.

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register’ were correct. His ship, the St. Joris, had been wrecked on a voyage to the Canary Islands, but he obviously had been able to salvage the records kept on behalf of two Dutchmen trading in Naples. It is possible that the circumspect way Hooch mentioned this register means that he had practices double bookkeeping in the most basic sense of the word; another register was kept presentable for inquisitive ofcials while this one was the true but secret account of his forbidden trade with an embargoed Spanish territory.147 Some of captains dealt with foreign port ofcials without having to resort to translators, which points to a working knowledge of at least one foreign language.148 Regardless of the formal education levels of these captains, we know that they were entrusted with the working capital of numerous merchants. How much precious cargo did they transport across the waves? Quantifying the wine and brandy exports What do actual statistics tell us about the volume of the wine and brandy exports? The port register of 1631 and Tanguy’s study—which relies extensively on the gures of 1631—reveal the total export volumes plus the actual quantity and percentage of wines and brandies exported from Nantes to the Dutch Republic. In 1631, Nantes exported a total of 40,651.75 tons of wine and 1,382 tons of brandy. Tanguy notes that this level of wine exports was the highest Nantes would ever record.149 We can attempt to calculate the value of the wines trade in Nantes in 1631. Collins reports that in 1631 the receipts of the Prévôté de Nantes, the tax farm on import and export duties, totaled almost 70,000 livres. Taxes on wines, grains, honey and nuts coming into Nantes from the upstream Loire region and on the re-exports of the same goods accounted for 36.5 percent or 25,259 livres. The lion’s share of these taxes, at least 95 percent [or 23,996 livres] came from wines. The wines

147 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 61/108/403, 31 August 1624. The shipwreck occurred towards the peak of the Spanish crackdown on illegal Dutch trade. In their capacity of guarantors of the two men in Italy, two merchants from Amsterdam tried to get legal redress from the captain and took the case all the way to the Dutch provincial and supreme courts. 148 Some of the French notarial records specically mention the name of a translator, so the absence of a translator suggests that no translator was deemed necessary for the particular transaction. 149 ADLA B 2976 and Tanguy, 69–71, table VIII. Other years may have seen higher export numbers, but if they did their records have disappeared.

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were taxed at 5 sous per pipe [so 10 sous = 0.5 livre per tonneau], which would mean that 47,992 tons of upstream wines were taxed by the Prévôté authorities of Nantes in 1631.150 The duties were raised both at import and at export, so we can cross-check the above tax base with the actual volumes as reported by Tanguy by adding the 27,795 tons of imported upstream wines to the 23,891 tons that were re-exported. At half a livre per ton, the 51,686 tons of upstream wines should have brought the tax farmer 25,843 livres.151 The Prévôté de Nantes taxed at 1/40th of the value of a commodity, so at 5 sous per pipe or 0.5 livre per ton, each ton of upstream wine was assessed at 20 livres.152 This means that in the eyes of the authorities, the 23,891 tons of upstream wines exported from the Loire basin in 1631 were worth 477,820 livres tournois on the quays of Nantes prior to their shipment. Compared to the prices paid by Dutch merchants to local producers in the Loire region, as reported by Nantes’ notaries, the value placed by the French authorities on the wines subject to their import and export tax seems low. In 1631 the Dutch took 3,452 tons of upstream wines [including Anjou wines] away from Nantes which the tax authorities would have valued at 69,040 livres. At an exchange rate of 1.13 guilders per livre, the Dutch share of the upstream wine exports had been valued at 78,015 guilders. We have solid evidence, however, that the actual prices of all the wines on Nantes’ export market were much higher than the at rate of 20 livres per ton assessed by the revenuers. The low assessment proves Collins’ point that the authorities kept the tax burden low for the producers [the landowners] while they burdened those who actually drank the wines with high consumption taxes.153 The Dutch paid about 14 livres per pipe or 28 livres per ton of Nantais wine, while a barrel of upstream wine cost them about 102 livres and the relatively few barrels of Anjou cost about 93 livres. We can apply those prices—based on the wines’ delivery to the loading docks of Nantes—to all of the city’s alcohol exports of 1631.154

150 Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 250. and also Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 52. Collins notes that less than 5 percent of the upstream tax receipts came from grain, nuts and honey. The upstream wines were thus responsible for 23,996 livres and we can just double that gure to arrive at the number of tons. 151 Tanguy, 43 and 71. 152 Jeulin, 193–195. 153 Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 45–46, 64, and 243–245. 154 Tanguy, 43.

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nantes and the other french supply zones Table 3.4

Estimated local market value of all alcohol exports from Nantes in 1631

1631 exports Nantais wines Anjou wines other upstream wines Total wines brandy Total alcohol

tons

livres/ton

16,760 8,264 15,628 40,652 1,382 42,034

28 93 102 242

livres 469,280 768,552 1,594,056 2,831,888 334,444 3,166,332

Source: Tanguy, 43 and Jeulin, 193–195

The higher quality wines from the upper Loire region represented close to sixty percent of Nantes’ overall wine exports, but the Dutch countered that trend by exporting more of the inferior wines [plus the brandy] from the area around Nantes. The Dutch alcohol exports from Nantes in 1631 The Nantais wines dominated the Dutch export market in Nantes. Slightly adjusting Tanguy’s ndings, Dutch ships and/or Dutch merchants were responsible for the export of 9,665.5 tons of alcohol from Nantes that year.155 At rst glance the portion of wine exports in Dutch hands does not seem overwhelming: 8,525.5 tons or 20.9 percent of the wines. But the Dutch dominated the segment of the alcohol market they had created over the previous decades: Dutch vessels took away 1,140 tons or 82.5 percent of Nantes’ brandy, while Hamburg absorbed the other 17.5 percent.156 These numbers must then be adjusted to show the impact of the demand on the local supply of grapes and wines created by the 1,382 tons of brandy. Even this number is misleading, because 253 tons

155

Import and re-export gures reveal the consumption of upstream wines in the city of Nantes: 3,903.25 tx in 1631. Tanguy 63. Consumption of all wines remains pretty much a guestimate, but Tanguy puts it at a minimum of 4,000–5,000 tons per year. 156 ADLA B 2976. Based on the fact that captain “Pierre Pitresen” [ Pieter Pietersz] and his ship the St. Pierre departed Nantes with 120 tons of brandy in the company of ve Rotterdam ships sailing home, it is all but certain that the port of “Estresot” is actually the North-Holland port of Eerstwoude, victimized by mangled spelling. If Estresot is not a Dutch destination, 1,020 of the 1,140 tons or 89.5 percent of the Dutch brandy exports went to the Republic.

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Graph 3.1

Total Nantes alcohol exports 1631 and Dutch share, in tons Alcohol exports Nantes 1631 & Dutch share 9,665.50

total alcohol

brandy

41,791.75 1,140.00 1,382.00

total wines

Nantais wines

upstream & Anjou wines

8,525.50 40,651.75 4,985.50 16,760.00 3,540.00 23,891.75 Total Nantes exports in tons

Dutch exports in tons

Source: ADLA B 2976

of brandy arrived ready-made from upstream producers; 143 tons of these left for Hamburg and 130 tons were sent to Amsterdam. Because it took between four and seven tons of wine to produce one ton of brandy, the remaining 1,129 tons of brandy represented the equivalent of an additional 4,516 to 7,903 tons of wine produced and sold by the region’s growers.157 The Dutch share alone led to the purchase of an additional 4,040 to 7,070 tons of local wine, so their total demand for Nantais wines came to 9025.5 to 12,056.5 tons. By adding the upstream and Anjou wines to the Nantes wines purchased, the Dutch share of the local wine export market ranged between 12,566 and 15,596 tons. We must combine the wines used for the brandy production to Tanguy’s wine export gures, so the region actually produced between 21,196 and 24,523 tons of Nantais wine for the export market. The total adjusted volume of wine that was exported thus ranged from about 45,088 to 48,415 tons. The following chart shows the export gures and the share taken out by the Dutch after the multiple adjustments

157 The twin sets of numbers depend on the distillation ratio of wine to brandy: the low adjustment is derived from a ratio of 4: 1, whereas the high adjustment uses a ratio of 7: 1.

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nantes and the other french supply zones Graph 3.2

Adjusted wine exports from Nantes, 1631, in tons158 Adjusted wine exports from Nantes 1631 in tons

high adjusted total exports

15,596 48,415 12,056

Nantais, high adjustment

upstream wines

24,523 3,540 23,892 12,566

low adjusted total exports

45,088 9,026

Nantais, low adjustment

upstream wines

21,196 3,540 23,892 Total exports

Dutch exports

Source: ADLA B 2976 & Tanguy, 71

made by the conversion of those Nantais wines used in the brandy production. With these adjustments, the Dutch share of upstream wine exports remains at 14.8 percent, but its share of the market for Nantais wines ranged between 42.6 and 49.2 percent depending on the reduction level of the distillate. At four tons of wine per ton of brandy, the Dutch share of the total exported wine production of 1631 stands at 27.9 percent, but if the distillers used seven tons of wine per ton of brandy, the Dutch were responsible for the purchase of 32.2 percent of all wines produced for the export market. An impact beyond mere commerce The Dutch focus on the production of brandy in the region around Nantes transformed them from moderate to serious participants in the

158 In order to work with Tanguy’s numbers, the Dutch totals for ‘upstream’ wines reect the sum of the upstream and Anjou wines mentioned in the 1631 port records.

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wine trade. In Tanguy’s words, the arrival of the Dutch in the wine producing area around Nantes and their interest in the inferior wines caused a “signicant upheaval” of the supply zone’s internal structure. Dutch demand for the Nantais wines spurred farmers to switch from low prot yielding grain to higher yielding grape vines, albeit of an inferior kind. Tanguy compared the average of 9,111 tons of Nantais wines exported annually in 1554–1557 to the 16,808.5 tons exported in 1631, but we must add the demand for Nantais wines as the raw material of brandy and place the mid-sixteenth century gure next to the adjusted 21,196 to 24,523 tons of Nantais wines produced in 1631. It is important to stress that the Dutch demand for the higher quality and more expensive wines of Anjou and the upstream Loire region remained modest. Brandy drove the Dutch interest in the viticulture of Nantes. Table 3.5

Value of the adjusted Dutch wine purchases in 1631

Type of wine Nantais low adjustment Anjou other upstream Low adjusted total Nantais high adjustment Anjou other upstream High adjusted total

Volume in tons

Livres per ton

Value in livres

Value in guilders

9,026

28

252,714

285,567

520 3,020 12,566

93 102

48,360 308,040 609,114

54,647 348,085 688,299

12,056

28

337,568

381,452

520 3,020 15,596

93 102

48,360 308,040 693,968

54,647 348,085 784,184

Source: ADLA B 2976 plus series of notarial acts for values @ ton159

When we convert these adjusted volumes to values, the low estimate for the total value of Dutch purchases on the wine market of Nantes in 1631 is 609,114 livres, while the higher adjusted volume translates into a total estimated value of 693,968 livres.160 With such an impact on

159 For the exchange rates of the livre tournois versus the guilder, see Richard Unger’s online currency converter at www.history.ubc.ca/unger/currcon. 160 ADLA 4E2/94/1/119, 3 Jul 1629: local producers sold one ton of Nantais wine for about 24 livres per ton, which is 4 livres per ton higher than the price used to assess the taxes of the Prevoté de Nantes. Anjou wines averaged about 70 livres per ton. The costs of

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nantes and the other french supply zones Graph 3.3

Nantes brandy exports 1631 in tons Nantes brandy exports 1631 in tons

other Dutch ports

120

Rotterdam

690

Hamburg

242

Amsterdam

330

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Source: ADLA B 2976

the local economy it is no wonder that the foreigners drew so much comment and criticism over the years. Rotterdam’s share of the Nantes brandy market Rotterdam supplied 16 of the ships that returned home with 690 tons of brandy, which was fty percent of the total brandy exports from Nantes. On the Dutch import market alone, the city’s import share of brandy rose to 60.5 percent compared to Amsterdam’s 28.9 percent. The other Maze ports, Schiedam and Vlaardingen, did not import a drop of the nished product. Information from the later part of the century indicates that Rotterdam continued its strong interest in the brandy trade. A French study of the Dutch community in the 1680s, based on limited notarial evidence, suggests that brandy had overtaken wine as the number one alcoholic drink exported from Nantes to the Republic. In 1683, Rotterdam

the other upstream Loire wines varied greatly but were clearly higher than those of the Anjou wines and have been given the conservative estimate of 90 livres per ton.

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received 2256.5 tons [or 79 percent] of the 2,848.5 tons of brandy exported to the Republic, this against the 592 tons shipped to Amsterdam.161 In 1685, the year that saw the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, French and Dutch Protestants faced persecution and expulsion, and the brandy export numbers from Nantes tumbled to 980.5 tons versus 243.5 tons respectively.162 Alcohol exports from other French ports by the Dutch How did wine exports from Nantes compare to those shipped from some of the other French wine ports? The expert on the early modern economy of La Rochelle provides a conservative estimate of annual Dutch alcohol exports from La Rochelle and the Charente region in the early part of the seventeenth century, ranging from 8,000 to 14,400 tons. In view of Trocmé’s hesitant estimate it is difcult to accept Tanguy’s gures of between 10,000 and 30,000 tons per year for La Rochelle’s wine exports in the same period.163 The last Pryscouranten-listing for ‘Seranten’ [Charente] wines occurred on 25 September 1628. Almost two years earlier, on 28 December 1626, the Charente wines actually made their last appearance on the Amsterdam market. In the years that both Charente and Nantais wines were marketed, the latter were valued higher.164 The conventional wisdom that La Rochelle functioned as a major wine trade center must be dismissed. In the seventeenth century, only Bordeaux stood above Nantes in the rankings of the French wine exporting towns.

161 Veronique Michaud, “Les Negociants Étrangers À Nantes Pendant La Premiere Partie Du Regne De Louis XIV, 1661–1685” (Memoire de maitrise, Universite de Nantes, 1996), 80. Michaud based her conclusions on the registers of just two notaries, so we can only use the information to show the preeminence of Rotterdam over Amsterdam in the brandy business. 162 Dutch demand for hard liquor could be satised by domestically produced grainbased jenever and brandewijn distilled from beer. These last two alcoholic drinks appeared in the Pryscouranten of the Amsterdam bourse during the war years 1673 and 1674. NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682. 163 Étienne Trocmé and Marcel Delafosse, Le Commerce Rochelais De La Fin Du XV e Siècle Au Début Du XVII e (Paris: A. Colin, 1952), 109. According to Trocmé, the early high of 14,400 tons was reached in the years 1618–1621, while exports in the years 1623–1635 did not go higher than 8,000 tons. Tanguy, 71. 164 NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 and CCC 20.

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The ‘Toussaint’ or ‘Toussane’ wine from the far south-west of France was the only truly local product that drew commercial attention from the Dutch. The variety was listed in the Amsterdam Pryscouranten from 1609 onwards, except for a two year gap at the start of the French-Dutch war in the 1670s.165 The real attraction of Bayonne and St. Jean-deLuz, however, was their proximity to the Franco-Spanish border. The work of both Kellenbenz and Israel provides ample evidence that the embargo on trade between Spain and the Dutch Republic resulted in a lively overland trade between the commercial centers of Castile and Aragon and the two French ports. Virtually all Dutch cargo shipped to Saint Jean-de-Luz and Bayonne was destined for Spain and—apart from the Toussane wines—the goods sent north from these two ports actually originated in Spain. Sparse quantitative information on the Dutch exports of the high quality Toussane wines from Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz comes from Morineau’s local study. He estimates the wine exports for the shipping season 1628–1629, supposedly a peak year for the whole seventeenth century, to have been about 4,000 tons of wine plus an additional 400 to 500 ‘pieces’ [ca. 215 to 268 tons] of brandy.166 The notarial records show regular, if not spectacular, shipments of wine from Bayonne to Rotterdam. The Amsterdam Pryscouranten prove that the Toussane wines from that area appealed to the consumers in the Republic. At a domestic wholesale price of 144 to 168 guilders per ton, a barrel of ‘Tosane’ wine was at least 60 percent more expensive than a barrel of Bordeaux city wine, so the Toussane wines made up in quality for what they lacked in volume. Apart from their role as departure ports for the regional wines, Bayonne and St. Jean-de-Luz featured prominently in the embargoed trade between Spain and the Republic, and specically in the smuggling of bullion. As one of the most important sectors of early modern commercial life, the silver trade and its role in the economy of Nantes will be discussed below.

165 In 1631 the southern ports of France received 433 tons of Nantais wine, of which 180 tons went to St. Jean-de-Luz. It did not make sense for low grade wines to be imported into an area with its own production or to be shipped beyond Saint Jean-de-Luz to Spain. Tanguy, 90–91. For the listing of ‘Tosanen’ at the Amsterdam bourse, see NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682. 166 Michel Morineau, “Bayonne Et St. Jean-De-Luz, Relais Du Commerce Néerlandais Vers L’espagne Au Debut Du XVIIe Siècle,” in 94e Congres des Societes Savantes (Pau: 1969).

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chapter three Quantifying the Bordeaux wine exports before 1650

The available estimates for Bordeaux for the rst half of the century contradict each other. According to a report by the intendant Verthamon of Guyenne dating from early 1637, Bordeaux sold about 50,000 oxheads of wine per annum at the price of 20 crowns or 60 livres per oxhead. The 12,500 tons of wine would thus have been worth 3,000,000 livres, the equivalent of 2,670,000 guilders.167 Less than a decade later, Jean Eon quoted a report by a certain Monsieur Canasilles. It tells us that in the mid-1640s the Dutch alone already exported about 60,000 tons of wine plus an additional 3,000 oxheads of brandy from Bordeaux. The oxhead-versus-ton contradiction warrants further analysis, but before we turn to the thorny issue of questionable quantities, a brief mention of the wines’ possible value is in order. Canasilles suggested that the Dutch made a prot of 1,800,000 livres on the wines [at 10 ecus = more than 30 livres per ton] and another 90,000 livres on the brandy [at 10 ecus per oxhead].168 Can we check Canasilles’ gures through other sources? We do know that in 1634 [the only year for which a Bordeaux Pryscourant has survived] the price for a ton of city wine on the Bordeaux export market ranged from 21 to 23 ecus [63 to 69 livres or between 54 and 59 guilders]. The freight costs from Bordeaux to the Republic ranged from 10 to 14 guilders per ton. The purchase price plus freight charges per ton of Bordeaux city wine thus ranged from 64 to 73 guilders. On the Dutch domestic market the price for a ton of Bordeaux wine ranged from 84 to 126 guilders in the mid-1640s.169 The Dutch importer realized a gross prot of at least 20 guilders and at the most 53 guilders per ton. These two extremes yield a median prot of 36.5 guilders or 42.7 livres tournois per ton. This does not seem close enough to Canasilles’s 30 livres or 25.5 guilders per ton to make his statement about Dutch prots fully believable. In addition, we do not know the importers’ xed and operational costs, so we can not come up with a value for their net

167 Victor-L. Tapié, France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu, trans. D.McN. Lockie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 357. 168 Eon, 114–116. 169 NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, Pryscourant of 21 September 1643 and 31 July 1645; also BOR.1.01, Pryscourant Bordeaux of 14 February 1634. For the exchange rates of the livre tournois versus the guilder, see Richard Unger’s online currency converter at www.history.ubc.ca/unger/currcon. In 1646, 1 livre = 0.85 guilder.

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earnings on their participation in the Bordeaux wine market. To get a better grip on the true volume of the export market for Bordeaux wines we must turn to Zeeland, the other Dutch maritime province. Throughout the sixteenth century Middelburg had been the center of the French wine trade with the northern Netherlands, with strong ties to both Bordeaux and La Rochelle.170 The trade in Bordeaux wines remained robust throughout the following century as well. Bertrand Gautier’s survey of Bordeaux’s commerce based on notarial records, incomprehensive by denition, indicates that 58 percent of Bordeaux’ exports to the Republic in the years 1630–1635 were destined for Middelburg; a third of the wines [34 percent] left for Amsterdam, while a mere 6.2 percent ended up in Rotterdam. By the middle of the century, a signicant shift had occurred: Middelburg’s share had dropped sharply to only 26.6 percent, while Amsterdam now took in almost half [48 percent] of the Bordeaux wines and Rotterdam’s portion in the trade had risen to 14.3 percent. The growth of Rotterdam’s stake at the expense of Middelburg continued in the next decade. Between 1655 and 1660, Rotterdam imported 31 percent of Bordeaux’s alcohol against Middelburg’s 13.3 percent; at the same time, Amsterdam solidied its hold over that market with 53.3 percent of the imports.171 The earliest surviving port arrival records of Bordeaux reect Zeeland’s predominance in that city’s wine exports to the Republic. On 25 October 1640, two ships from Rotterdam arrived in port plus two from Amsterdam but these four came in alongside twelve ships from Zeeland [eleven from Vlissingen and one from Middelburg]. The next day, four more Zeeland ships dropped anchor, followed on 30 October by three more ships from Vlissingen.172 The authorities in Bordeaux kept their arrival and departure records separated and failed to be as precise as their colleagues in Nantes, omitting the specic quantities of the cargoes.

170 Craeybeckx. and also Zeger Willem Sneller, “Wijnvaart En Wijnhandel Tusschen Frankrijk En De Noordelijke Nederlanden,” Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde V, no. 9 (1922). 171 Gautier: 27. Gautier’s export quantities are based on notarial records that cover three periods of ve years each: 1630–1635, 1645–1650 and 1655–1660. Due to the ckleness of notarial sources, his numbers can not be considered representative of the actual trading volumes. I did use his statistics to show the relative strength of the various Dutch cities in the Bordeaux trade. 172 Archives Départementales de la Gironde [ADG] serie 6 B 213, Registre d’Entrées 1640–1643; entries for 25, 26, and 30 October 1640.

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The earliest surviving departure register dates from 1649.173 Unfortunately, all data from the peak of the new wine season are missing; the October entries start on the 20th, the crucial November entries only run through the 19th of that month, and no data exist for December at all. Even if 1649 is not a representative year, the entries do conrm the traditional and continuing strength of Zeeland’s merchant eet in the export of wines from Bordeaux, and the draw of the province of Holland as the wines’ destination. Table 3.6 Bordeaux departures to Dutch Republic, 1649* # Ships # Ships # Ships Tonnage of wine/ with home Tonnage Tonnage carrying Destination brandy carriers port wine/brandy Amsterdam Holland Middelburg Rotterdam Schiedam Vlissingen Zeeland total

20 0 17 14 1 45 0 97

3,320 0 3,233 1,941 295 7,919 0 16,708

17 63 6 9 0 17 6 118

3,166 11,582 1,149 1,353 0 2,654 1,241 21,145

10 60 4 8 0 14 5 101

2,231 11,022 689 1,023 0 2,064 1,101 18,130

Source: ADG, series 6 B 282; Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1649 * Partial record: serious gaps in the October and November listings, no records at all for December.

The port authorities listed the destination of 63 of the ships—by far the largest segment—as ‘Holland’, which prevents a denitive conclusion about the nal destination of the Bordeaux wines in the Republic. Based on other evidence, Amsterdam would have taken in the lion’s share of the ‘Holland’ alcohol. Zeeland continued its traditional role as Bordeaux’ link with the Netherlands. The truncated port register of 1649 yields total of 150 ships with Dutch origins or Dutch destinations; and of these 97 ships with a combined size of 16,708 tons listed a Dutch home port while 118 ships with a combined cargo capacity of 21,145 tons departed for a Dutch destination. Middelburg and Vlissingen contributed 62 ships or 63.9 percent of the Dutch cargo space, but only 26 returned to their home province while the rest took the Bordeaux wines to ‘Holland’. With its 45 ships versus Middelburg’s 17, Vlissingen won the provincial shipping competition; another 5 ships came from neighboring Zierikzee. 173

ADG, series 6 B 282; Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1649.

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The overwhelming majority of Dutch ships sailing to the Republic carried wines, or wines & brandy exclusively; the few that did not, added grains, prunes and chestnuts to their cargo. Those ships that exported only alcohol had a combined size of 18,130 tons. The departure record does not specify the quantity of wines and brandy loaded in each vessel, but if this latter group came back fully loaded, the maximum estimated volume of Bordeaux wines and brandies shipped to the Republic that year was 16,860 tons.174 An export break-down by city is useless, because the port clerks listed the destination of 60 percent of the Dutch ships carrying a maximum of 10,250 tons of alcohol merely as ‘Holland’, compared to 1,860 tons shipped specically to Amsterdam plus another 1,165 tons taken to Rotterdam. Rotterdam’s share of the 1649 Bordeaux wine market pales in comparison with that of the Zeeland ports and Amsterdam. Of the 118 Dutch ships that left Bordeaux with a cargo of wine, only nine listed Rotterdam as their nal destination while an additional seven Rotterdam ships departed for an unspecied port in ‘Holland’. This means that at the most sixteen of the 118 Dutch wine ships [13.5 percent] sailed for Rotterdam.175 Compared to the 13,275 tons of alcohol that could have been exported to the province of Holland, Zeeland received 3,584 tons. In other words, 79 percent of Bordeaux’s exports to the Dutch Republic in this incomplete statistical year 1649 ended up in Holland versus 21 percent in Zeeland despite the latter province’s 62 percent share in the eet. 1651—a truer view of Bordeaux’ export market A full year’s worth of departure data from 1651 highlights the signicance of the November –December gap of 1649 and allows a much more realistic assessment of the wine and brandy trade between Bordeaux and the Dutch Republic.176 During October 1651, a total of 427 ships left port for various countries, and the single-day departure record of 174 We know from GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/403/758, 24 September 1629 that a Dutch ship of 96 last or 192 tons could carry a maximum load of 180 large wine barrels, which boils down to 0.93 wine barrels per ton ship size. 175 ADG, series 6 B 282, Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1649. The combined tonnage of the 16 ships that sailed to Rotterdam can be broken down by the make-up of their cargo: Wine only, 5 ships and 607 tons; wine & brandy, 5 ships and 999 tons; wine & vinegar, 1 ship at 60 tons; wine and other goods, 4 ships and 537 tons. A single Rotterdam ship returned home without any wine, it carried 100 tons of wheat. 176 ADG, Serie 6 B 283, Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1651–1653.

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64 ships was set on the last day of the month. Another 256 ships left Bordeaux in November. October and November also showed the largest number of ships leaving for the Republic, with 64 and 63 departures respectively. With 17,221 tons displacement, November was the top departure month for the Dutch eet followed by 12,464 tons in October. The Bordeaux records also conrm that a signicant quantity of wine and brandy was kept to mature in French caves before being released for shipping in February and March. Contrary to Nantes’ focus on the late fall wine season, Bordeaux clearly experienced two shipping seasons.177 Table 3.7

Bordeaux departures to Dutch Republic, 1651

# Ships # Ships Tonnage of Maximum # Ships Destination with home carrying wine/brandy wine/brandy Destination tonnage port wine/brandy carriers in tons Amsterdam Holland Rotterdam Schiedam Vlissingen Middelburg others D.R. total

66 5 46 11 129 36 119 412

142 82 47 1 75 46 21 414

27,843 13,538 7,039 160 11,809 6,832 2,765 69,986

129 76 46 0 70 44 17 382

25,562 12,413 6,919 0 11,068 6,602 2,149 64,713

23,773 11,544 6,435 0 10,293 6,140 1,999 60,183

Source: ADG, Serie 6 B 283, Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1651–1653

The combined tonnage of the Bordeaux eet sailing for the Republic that year came to almost 70,000 tons, of which 73.3 percent returned to ports in Holland and 26.6 percent to Zeeland. Once again using a wine/brandy cask-capacity to displacement ratio of 0.93 to 1, we can calculate the maximum volume of alcohol [60,183 tons] that could have been shipped from Bordeaux to the Republic if the wine eet returned fully loaded with wines and brandy—which it certainly did not. Amsterdam alone absorbed 39 percent, but the combined ports of Holland took in 69 percent of the Dutch imports from Bordeaux. With 16,433 tons, Zeeland could have imported 27 percent of the alcohol, still a respectable share of the market. The departure records of 1651 conrm the report by ‘monsieur Canasilles’, as quoted 177 Maurice Isaacson was the only captain who came to Bordeaux three times that year, while at least 17 captains made two trips, once in the fall and once during the spring shipping season.

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by Jean Eon in 1646, that the Dutch exported 60,000 tons of wine per year from Bordeaux. The approximate value of the 60,183 tons of Bordeaux wines and brandy that could [at the most] have been exported to the Republic in 1651 can be assessed at two levels, if we are willing to use slightly older French export market gures. The Bordeaux Pryscourant of February 1634 gives us the range of the wines’ value on the French export market, while the Amsterdam Pryscouranten of the 1634 and 1651 reveal the domestic wholesale price of the same wines in the Republic. [ In those two years, the low price moved from 108 to 102 guilders per ton while the high price remained at 120 guilders]. Table 3.8 max. tons exported

Potential value of Bordeaux’ exports to the Republic, 1651

Bordeaux Bordeaux Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam 1634 1634 1634 1651 1634 & 1651 low high low low high 71

60,183

78

108

102

120

4,272,993 4,694,274

6,499,764

6,138,666

7,221,960

guilders @ ton value in guilders

Source: NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682

Obviously, the above values of the Bordeaux wines reect the cost price to the buyers at both market points; they do not reveal the prot margins of the sellers, nor do they indicate how much a retail consumer might end up paying for his glass of wine. We can only state that the Dutch alcohol exports in 1651 represented a signicant boost to the Bordeaux economy. The relative value of the Nantais and Bordeaux wine exports In order to assess the impact of the Dutch wine trade from Nantes and Bordeaux to the overall French export economy, we can project these export values onto the data supplied by Jean Eon in 1646. The calculations suffer from a 15-year gap in the case of Nantes and a 5-year gap in the case of Bordeaux, but we must use Eon’s numbers because they are the only ones available on the value of overall French exports to the Dutch Republic during the rst half of the century.

186 Table 3.9

chapter three Estimated value of Dutch alcohol exports from France 1646 & Nantes 1631 & Bordeaux 1651 Value of alcohol exports Percentage of French by the Dutch in livres alcohol exports

France 1646 Nantes 1631 low estimate Nantes 1631 high estimate Bordeaux 1651 low estimate Bordeaux 1651 high estimate

6,192,632 609,114 693,968 3,791,529

100 9.8 11.2 61.2

4,152,627

67.0

Source: Eon, Jean. Le commerce honorable (1646) 34–35 and ADLA B 2976 (1631) and ADG Serie 6 B 283 (1651–1653)

Jean Eon compiled his statistics from a variety of municipal records, but he did not supply a breakdown for the various ports, nor do we do know what sources he used for Nantes itself. The Dutch demand had a signicant impact on the wine production in the region around Nantes, but in the grand scheme of things these Dutch exports represented only a modest share of the total French export market for alcohol. Even if the actual volume of Dutch exports from Bordeaux may have been lower due to less than full cargo holds in the wine eet, they signicantly outstrip the alcohol exports from Nantes. The discrepancy between the two towns is obviously related to the higher quality of the wines and brandies from the Bordeaux region which made them easier to preserve and transport, more drinkable and more protable. Nantes’ market share makes us wonder if there is more than meets the eye in Eon’s polemic stance against the Dutch in Nantes, because their participation in the wine trade alone does not seem threatening enough to warrant his report. Eon’s critique becomes much easier to understand in view of the Dutch interests in the money and silver trade, an issue that will be addressed below. Wine exports from Bordeaux and Nantes to Hamburg Twenty years after the robust exports from Bordeaux to the Republic in 1651, the market experienced an enormous dip due to the war between France and the Republic; in 1672, a mere 18 ships with a combined

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capacity of 2,172 tons left Bordeaux for the Republic. The concurrent increase in the departures to Hamburg strongly suggests that the wines from Bordeaux entered the Republic via the neutral backdoor as ‘Rhenish wines’ that year.178 Following a return to peaceful conditions in 1678, the Dutch share of the Bordeaux export market once again reached the 60,000 ton range. The Admiralty departure records for 1682 show that 467 ships owned by Dutch or destined for a Dutch port left Bordeaux with a cargo of only wines or a combination of wines and brandy. The combined displacement of this ‘Dutch’ eet reached 63,555 tons, which reects the size of those ships; the maximum volume of alcohol that they could have carried north in 1682 would have been 59,106 tons.179 The greater role of Hamburg in the Bordeaux exports of 1672 leads to us to question Hamburg’s role in the wine and brandy exports from Nantes as compared to that of the Dutch maritime towns. In 1631, the city of Hamburg imported 3,801 tons of wine plus 242 tons of brandy from Nantes on 87 ships. All the brandy was imported by ve French ships: 119 tons of brandy from Nantes, 88 tons from the upstream Loire region, plus another 35 tons of brandy from Anjou for a total of 242 tons.180 This partial reliance on non-local brandy suppliers suggests that the Hamburg merchants had no or just a minor stake in the Nantes-based distilleries. Jean Tanguy expresses amazement that not one Dutch ship took wines from Nantes to Hamburg and that—despite the size of Hamburg’s commercial eet—not a single ship registered in Hamburg appeared in Nantes that year. Instead, he concludes, the transport of the wines ‘en droiture’ to Hamburg was left up to 76 vessels from the lower Loire river area.181 Two matters lead me to adjust

178 T. Malvezin, Histoire Du Commerce De Bordeaux Depuis Les Origins Jusqu’à Nos Jours, 4 vols., vol. 2 [ XVIe et XVIIe siècles] (Bordeaux: 1892), 401. 179 ADG, series 6 B 288, Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1682. 180 Tanguy’s gure for the brandy exports to Hamburg [74 tons] does not correspond with the numbers provided by the port records. Tanguy, 94. See ADLA B 2976 for the exports to Hamburg on 16 May, 20 June, 7 July [2 ships], and 30 August 1631. See also Gerhard Treutlein, “Schiffahrt Und Handel Zwischen Nantes Und Dem Nordund Ostseebereich Von 1714 Bis 1744” (Ruprecht-Karl Universitat, 1970), 122. For the year 1622, Treutlein uses ADLA C 699 [not seen by me] to mention what he considers to be “exaggerated” export gures. That year, Nantes supposedly exported about 20,000 tons of wine, of which 6,090 tons went to the Dutch Republic; 3,944 tons to the Spanish Netherlands; and 2,511 tons directly “North”. 181 Tanguy, 93–94.

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Tanguy’s stark picture of non-involvement by the Dutch and the Hamburgers themselves in transporting goods up north. In 1631, ve of the Breton ships leaving for Hamburg were freighted by Bonaventura Bron of Amsterdam, Reynier Dammansz, Tieleman Gorisz and Nicolaes Prins of Rotterdam [the latter resided in Saumur]. Bron also shipped wine to Danzig on a fourth vessel.182 The ships were French but the merchants in charge of the freighting came from Holland. Tanguy may have unwittingly provided a possible answer to the transportation riddle when he added that plenty of ships from Hamburg called on the port of Rouen, and that the Portuguese merchants of Hamburg, who were primarily interested in trade with the Iberian peninsula, had most of their goods from Nantes transported to their fellow-Portuguese in Rouen.183 This could lead to a hypothesis about the role of Rouen as transshipment point for trade between Nantes and Hamburg, which nevertheless contains a serious aw: the captains of the Breton coastal eet listed Hamburg and not Rouen as their nal destination. If the goods were to have been transshipped onto German vessels in Rouen, the Breton eet would have had that port as their most northern stop, but Rouen is not mentioned as a destination at all that year. On the other hand, the existence of the highly systematic and very regular ‘beurtvaart’ [regularized cargo ferries] between the Republic and Rouen still allows for the possibility that Rouen did serve as a transit point for goods to Hamburg, even if such a system required one more stop along the way.184 Hamburg’s 3,801 tons of wines imported from Nantes in 1631 place it behind Amsterdam as offset market but well ahead of Rotterdam. The combined German ports received 4,225 tons of wine, so Hamburg alone accounted for almost 90 percent of the German market for wines from Nantes.185 Given the availability of good quality Rhine wines, the Germans probably also used the Nantais wines as the raw material for brandy or vinegar.

182

ADLA B 2976, Port register of 1631, 2 May and 28 June for the trips to Hamburg; 23 May for the departure for Danzig. 183 ADLA B 2976, Port register of 1631 and Tanguy, 325–326. The Sephardic network between Nantes and Hamburg will be discussed in Chapter 5. 184 Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam had designated a section of their harbors as the ‘Rouen quay’ [Rouaanse kade], from which the ‘beurtvaarders’ took turns leaving. For the total absence of Nantes wine exports to Rouen, see Tanguy, 91. The ample supply of wines arriving in Rouen from its Normandy hinterland explains this indifference to the wines from the Loire area. 185 Tanguy, 325.

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The true focus of the Nantes wine market Ships leaving Nantes transported almost three times as much wine into Brittany as they did to the markets controlled by the Dutch, and it is important to emphasize that the health of the Nantes wine trade depended on the soundness of the Breton economy more than it did on the demands of the Dutch market. According to Tanguy’s calculations, Brittany received 21,515 tons of wine transported from Nantes by sea plus an additional 935 tons by land. This brings the total exports from Nantes to Brittany to 22,450 tons or 44.6 to 48.6 percent of Nantes’ [adjusted] export market for wines.186 The Breton demand for wine uctuated with the prosperity of the people and the severity of the taxes levied on wines. The regional economy began to decline after the start of the war against Spain in 1635, a drop that continued throughout the century. Based on the price of the tax farm on wines in Nantes, Collins has called the state of the wine trade in Nantes starting from 1640 onwards a ‘disaster’, and the hard times for Brittany’s producers and brokers was exacerbated by the ‘loss’ of the Dutch market for Nantais wines between 1656 and 1678.187 In 1645, the municipal tax farmer petitioned the city council for a reduction of his rent by 5,000 livres per year because of the drop in taxable trade all over France, a situation he described as “the grand universal sterility”. The tax farmer singled out the wine trade as the principal and most important source of revenue, mentioning that the Dutch-driven international market was severely hit by war in the Baltic, piracy in French waters, and pesky English who conscated French ships.188 We must see Eon’s lamentations against Dutch commercial practices and superiority of 1646 in light of the deterioration of the French economy as a whole. At such a time, the foreign merchant community could serve as a useful scapegoat for local ills, even though

186

Tanguy, 58. Collins, “Les Impots Et Le Commerce Du Vin En Bretagne Au XVIIe Siècle,” 161– 162, 164 & 166. See also Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 52–55. As noted by Gautier, exports from Bordeaux to the Republic show a similar decline in the century’s middle decades, but the problems at Nantes might have been exacerbated by an increased participation of Rotterdam’s wine traders in the higher quality Bordeaux wines. Gautier: 25 and 28. Gautier’s data are derived from the registers of only ve notaries. 188 AM CC 390, fol. 2, 17 September 1645. René Hérve had to wait until 1647, but he did get his rent reduced by 6,250 livres. See also fol. 3, 3 June 1647 for the city council’s positive decision and fol. 5, 26 September 1647 for the approval of the Chambre de Comptes of Brittany. 187

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Eon was honest enough to place part of the blame on the inertia of the French mercantile community. Placing the ties between Rotterdam and Nantes next to the strong link between Bordeaux and the Zeeland ports shows that the Dutch wine trade was informally organized along regional lines. While Rotterdammers specialized in the trade on Nantes, merchants from Zeeland solidied their historic link with Bordeaux, and Amsterdam was the nal consumption market for a steadily increasing portion of all this alcohol. Although Rotterdam’s municipal council boldly proclaimed the wine trade to be the city’s number one economic motor in 1618, very few wine transactions surface in the notarial registers of the century’s rst two decades. The unsubstantiated claim must be viewed in the context of Rotterdam’s violent competition with Dordrecht in that same year which centered on ‘wines that came in via the sea’, i.e. French, Iberian, Canary Islandic and Levant wines. The unofcial settlement of the dispute delineated two distinct supply zones, by which Dordrecht retained the staple rights on all the Rhenish wines coming down to Dordrecht from its upstream hinterland, and by which Rotterdam was successful in keeping all wines coming in from the sea out of Dordrecht’s staple clutches.189 French alcohol and the Baltic market Ideally we would like to know how many barrels of the wines and brandy brought into the Republic were subsequently re-exported, but no sources exist that can answer that question. William Temple’s comment about the liberal consumption of French alcohol by the Dutch people indicates that little wine survived a stay in the Republic to be exported elsewhere. The more inferior the wine, the less suitable it was for long-distance transportation and the sooner it turned sour. Adulteration and mixing did help to overcome the worst deterioration, but the lower quality and intrinsic value of the French wines made re-export with its accompanying freight costs a less protable, most likely even money losing, proposition. Apart from the high consumption levels, Rotterdam’s position in the re-export market must have been impacted by the fact that the city’s merchants specialized in the inferior wines from Nantes and the 189 The 1631 port records list a single ship bringing 70 tons of Nantes wine to Dordrecht—but a vessel from Medemblik actually took care of the transport.

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Loire valley instead of their higher quality cousins from Bordeaux and the Bayonne hinterland. The only reliable information on Dutch re-exports comes from Nina Bang’s valuable edition of the Sound Toll Registers which details shipping and trade volumes entering and exiting the Baltic Sea.190 Amsterdam and the other ports of northern Holland continued to be strongly represented throughout the period, but from the all-time high of 51 trips in 1597, ships and voyages originating in Rotterdam show a wobbly but overall steady decline through 1645, after which the pace quickens once more until the outbreak of the Northern War in 1700. In Bang’s volume on the movement of commodities, Rotterdam did not even warrant its own separate listing. One has to turn to the footnotes for any information specic to Rotterdam. Several of the Zuiderzee ports received a separate mention, but the statistics for Rotterdam’s trafc with the Baltic remain hidden in the balance left for ‘Holland’ after deducting the gures supplied for all the named ports. Table 3.10 Voyages to the Baltic from the Rotterdam area, selected years

Rotterdam ships

1597

1608

1609

1621

1622

1635

1648

1649

51

37

17

4

3

0

12

24

Source: Ellinger Bang, Nina. Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund, 1497–1660. København, 1906. Vol. I

In 1609, for example, a total of 1460 Dutch ships made the eastward voyage through the Sound, of which 1160 came from the province of Holland alone. Specically, 17 ships from Rotterdam sailed through the Sound, dwarfed by an impressive 159 ships from Enkhuizen, a solid 140 vessels from Hoorn, plus 133 from the island of Terschelling, and a decent contingent of 100 ships from Amsterdam. Friesland’s contribution of 268 eastward trips is highly respectable. With a total of 19 outgoing voyages, on the other hand, Zeeland’s contribution to the Baltic trade was comparable to that of Rotterdam.191 In other words, Rotterdam’s mercantile eet managed a mere 1.5 percent of the province’s—and just 1.2 percent of the nation’s—Baltic

190 191

Ellinger Bang. Ellinger Bang.

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shipping. This conrms Jonathan Israel’s observation about the lack of interest in 1644–1645 by Rotterdam, the other towns of southern Holland, and the province of Zeeland to contribute either funds or a eet to exert pressure on the Danish government when that country’s alliance with Spain caused a rise in the tolls levied through the Sound. In the opinion of these naysayers, “it was more essential to maintain maximum naval pressure on the Flemish privateers, and seaports, than send a eet to deal with the Danes”.192 We again notice the regional specialization of the towns of Holland in international trade, so the limited volume of French wines deemed worthy was re-exported to the North on ships of the towns of northern Holland and Friesland. Until 1623, the Dutch took far more Rhine wines north through the Sound than ‘other’ wines with the exception of 1603. [‘Other wines’ were all wines except Rhine wines] The two gures had come closer during 1622, with 55.4 percent Rhine wines and 44.5 percent ‘other’. A remarkable shift occurred during the next sailing season, when suddenly 5,696 of the 6,961 tons of wine [or 81.8 percent] carried eastward on Dutch ships contained ‘other’ wines.193 The boom in ‘other’ wine exports coincided with the growth of the Dutch community in Nantes, but also with the end of the Twelve Year Truce. In 1624, Dutch ships took 5,696 tons of ‘other’ wines versus 1,252.5 tons of Rhine wines to the Baltic; these number include both the wines shipped directly from the original supply zone as well as wines reexported from the Republic. Shipments from the Dutch ports amounted to 3,607.5 tons, in other words almost two-thirds of the ‘other’ wine shipments were re-exports. The remaining 2,088.5 tons of ‘other’ wine shipped through the Sound represent the wines that the Dutch exported ‘en droiture’ from their place of origin, for example directly from Bordeaux to Danzig or from Spain to Riga. French ships transported only 209.5 tons of the 2,632.8 tons of ‘other’ wines shipped directly from France. In his review of the Baltic market, Morineau noted that Colbert was mistaken in his belief that Dutch re-exports of French wines to the Baltic formed a major source of prot. In reality, only a fraction of the wines were re-exported, which corresponds to information about similarly low direct exports from France to the Baltic. Morineau quotes an undated letter sent to Colbert in the second half of the century

192 193

Israel, 543–544. Ellinger Bang, v. 2, table 1, column C1–4, by year.

nantes and the other french supply zones Graph 3.4

193

Non-Rhine wines shipped eastward through Sound in tons non-Rhenish wines through Sound

6,000.0

5,000.0

tons

4,000.0

3,000.0

2,000.0

1,000.0

16

0 16 0 0 16 2 0 16 4 0 16 6 0 16 8 1 16 0 1 16 2 1 16 4 1 16 6 1 16 8 2 16 0 2 16 2 2 16 4 2 16 6 2 16 8 3 16 0 3 16 2 3 16 4 3 16 6 3 16 8 4 16 0 4 16 2 4 16 4 4 16 6 4 16 8 50

0.0

Dutch ships

French ships

Dutch departures

French departures

Source: Ellinger Bang, Nina. Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund, 1497–1660. 2 vols. København, 1906

which lists French exports to the Baltic, including Sweden, of 2,637 to 2,787 tons of wine plus a mere 406 tons of brandy. At a time when the exports from Bordeaux alone were estimated at 80,000 to 100,000 tons per year, the Baltic was denitely not a signicant market.194 The Baltic market for French and Spanish wines Based on volume, much more French wine arrived in the Baltic on Dutch ships than wines from Spain. The numbers conrm Collins’ observation that more than 70 percent of the ‘other wines’ carried to the Baltic on Dutch ships in the 1620s was French.195

194 Michel Morineau, “Le Commerce De La Baltique Dans Ses Rapports Avec Le Commerce Hors De La Baltique Du Milieu Du XVIe À La Fin Du XVIIIe,” in The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic Region, 1400 –1800. De Nederlanden En Het Oostzeegebied, 1400 –1800, ed. J. M. van Winter (Leiden: 1983), 35–36. The export gures for Bordeaux come from Morineau’s footnote 11. 195 Collins, “Dutch Traders and Polish Grain at Nantes,” 243. See also Craeybeckx, 254. In the late sixteenth century, less than half [47.6 percent] of the non-Rhine wines

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Graph 3.5

French and Spanish wines through the Sound on Dutch ships French vs Spanish wines through Sound

10000 9000 8000 pipes = 1/2 ton

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000

48

45

16

42

16

39

16

36

16

33

16

30

16

27

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24

NL ships French wine

16

21

16

18

16

15

16

12

16

09

16

06

16

03

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16

00

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NL ships all Spanish wine

Source: Ellinger Bang, Nina. Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund, 1497–1660. 2 vols. København, 1906

The higher quality and corresponding higher price of the Iberian wines made them a more important segment of the Dutch alcohol trade than the number of barrels would suggest. If the Dutch used adulterated French wines as substitutes for the embargoed Iberian wines, the end of the Truce in 1621 should have signalled a relative rise in the transport of true Iberian wines. Yet this did not happen, the supply trends continued to follow more or less parallel tracks through the 1620s. The surviving commodity price lists published by the Amsterdam bourse which cover the seventeenth century include two Pryscouranten from Danzig [Gdansk], dating from 1608 and 1632 respectively. Those two Baltic lists are close enough to those that cover the Amsterdam market in 1609 on the one hand and both the Amsterdam and Bordeaux markets in 1634 to permit them being placed side by side. This yields

sailed through the Sound on Dutch ships. Of the total 2,452.7 tons of non-Rhine wine shipped to the Baltic in 1595, 1,455.2 tons or about 60 percent were French wines. Forty-two percent of these were shipped directly from France, while 490.2 tons [or 33.7 percent] arrived after transshipment in a Dutch port.

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useful information about the re-export market of French wines.196 By unfortunate coincidence, the Sound Toll Registers for the year 1634 have not survived, but we have the statistics for the years on either side of 1634.197 The cost of a barrel of Bordeaux city wine was the lowest among the French wines for which a price is available in 1634. If we assume that the prices on the Amsterdam market represented the cost of a barrel of wine on the Dutch wholesale and re-export market, and if we take the price quoted in Danzig as representative for the whole Baltic, we can get an idea of the minimum value of the non-Rhine wines that came through the Sound. In February 1634, a ton of city wine cost 71 to 78 guilders in Bordeaux and 108 to 120 guilders on the Amsterdam market. After being re-exported to the Baltic, the ton of Bordeaux fetched 180 guilders in Danzig. The 1,925 tons of non-Rhine wine transported on Dutch ships must at a minimum have represented a value of 346,500 guilders upon their arrival in the Baltic. Plenty of other, more expensive wines were also included in the ‘other’ category—one ton of Pietersemeynse wines for example fetched 1,350 to 1,380 guilders in Danzig—so the true sales’ value of all the re-exports to Dutch merchants was decidedly higher than the prots indicated by the Bordeaux transaction.198 In the case of the Bordeaux city wines, the trade between the supply zone and the Republic shows a gross prot margin that ranged between 38 and 69 percent. The prot margin in the wine trade to the Baltic depended on whether the alcohol came straight from France or if it had been transshipped in and re-exported from Holland. Direct trade between Bordeaux and Danzig left the merchant a gross prot margin of 130 to 153 percent, but if the wines had made a stopover, the price difference between Amsterdam and Danzig left a gross prot of 50 to 66 percent on that second leg alone. Surely these margins left enough room for the freight charges and business overhead to allow the exporter a tidy prot.

196 NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01 fol, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609–1682; for Bordeaux, see BOR.1.01, 14 February 1634; and for Danzig see GDA.1.01, 7 December 1608 plus GDA.1.02, 27 March 1632. 197 Ellinger Bang, Nina. Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund, 1497–1660. København, 1906. Vol. II–A, Table 1, column C1–4 and C10. 198 NEHA CCC, GDA 1.02, 27 March 1632. One pipe of Pietersemyn cost 225–230 Flemish pounds, so 1 ton = 450–460 Flemish pounds. One Flemish pound = 6 guilders.

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By volume, the contribution of Iberian and Mediterranean wines to the drinking pleasure of the Baltic populations was minimal compared to their French counterparts. In 1624, Portugal supplied 22 tons, Spain 172 tons, and the rest of the Mediterranean added 290 tons of their wines.199 The Pryscourant of Danzig that was published in 1632 nevertheless included seven non-French wine types next to the six French wines plus a French vinegar that made the list. The four Iberian/ Mediterranean wines for which prices were noted indicate their superior quality and their status as an elite drink for special occasions. A ton of Alecante wine fetched ten times as much as a ton of Bordeaux city wine, and the ‘Pietersemeyne’, the ‘Secten’ and ‘Malvasayen’ were about 7.5 times as expensive.200 The specication also shows up in the Sound Toll Registers. Whereas French wines got listed as ‘French wines’, the clerks at the toll ofce differentiated between generic ‘Spanish’ wines, plus ‘Malvasir’, ‘Pietersemin’, ‘Sek’, ‘Thint ’, and ‘[Aeble]Most ’ wines. The volume of southern wines may have been small, but the Nordic consumers were sufciently discerning to specify a certain variety when ordering from abroad and they were willing to pay for top quality wines. The inferior wines from the Nantes region did not appear as a listing on the Danzig Pryscourant of 1608, which is hardly surprising when they are equally absent from the Amsterdam price list of 1609. By 1632, ‘Nantoser’ wines had made it to the Danzig list, but the lack of an actual price means that no such wines had been offered for sale in that city—at least not in that particular week. In any case, the end of May would not have been a good month for the sale of six- or seven months old Nantes wines. A set of seven price lists from 1697 indicate that the Danzig bourse kept the Nantes wines on the pre-printed lists, but without an actual price being recorded. The seven lists are spread out over the year, so the absence of a price for Nantes wines is not due to the unseasonability of such an offering.201 If their quality led to a low or non-existant demand, it is odd that the Nantais wines continued to be printed on the standard form.

199

Ellinger Bang, vol. II, Table 2, C38–40. NEHA CCC, GDA 1.02, 27 March 1632. 201 Elias Kohl, Prys Courant Van De Coopmanschap in Dantzig (Goldsmiths’-Kress Economic Library, 1697–1698). The lists are dated 19 January, 2 March, 1 June, 12 October, 1 November, 6 November and 16 November 1697. 200

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Brandy and the Baltic Despite their ability to survive long distance sea voyages, their durability and their drinkability, French brandies are notably absent from both the 1608 and the 1632 lists from Danzig, nor do they appear as a potential trade good on the lists of 1697. From this we could conclude that not a single barrel of brandy made its way from France to Danzig, be it directly or via Holland, but that would be a mistake. The supply of brandy must have been too small to warrant a separate listing in the Pryscouranten. The Sound Toll Registers reveal that ‘braendevin’ did get transported north on Dutch ships. The quantities were negligible compared to the volume of wine taken North. In 1620, for example, the Dutch brought 28.3 tons of brandy to the Baltic against 1,763 tons of French wine and 1,117 tons of Spanish wine. When we check the place from which the brandy was shipped, we nd that 23.4 tons came from a Dutch port and only 7.5 tons arrived directly from France. This lack of straight imports of French brandy must be combined with the overwhelming evidence of the French wine imports which did occur ‘en droiture’ that year. A total of 1,633.5 tons of wine arrived directly from France, and only 378.3 tons of French wine had been re-exported from a Dutch port. This means that the meager brandy shipments were not due to a lack of ships going straight to the Baltic, and it also leads to the conclusion that the majority of the brandy that actually made its way north had been produced in the Republic itself. The source remains silent about the raw material used for the Dutch production: it could have been ‘brande wijn’ distilled from Nantes wines or it could have been grain-based ‘jenever ’. All in all, the wine merchants of the Republic, and of Rotterdam in particular, had little interest in the Baltic trade, and the Baltic consumers had very little demand for the wines and brandy those men obtained in and shipped from Nantes. From supply to demand The Dutch wine trade saw a regional specialization, both at the supply side in France, at the demand side in the Republic, as well as in the small re-export market to the Baltic region. Apart from the likely but unproven importance of Nantes as a sluice for the money and silver trade between Iberia and the Republic, the commercial connections between Rotterdam and Nantes were driven by the Dutch focus on the inferior wines of the Nantes region. The Dutch community—in Nantes

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and back home in the Republic—used the Nantes wines as the raw material for brandy, vinegar, or after adulteration as the intermediate product used to boost the longevity and the strength of other wines. The demand for Nantes wines as the basis for brandy had a major impact on the cultivation of wine along the Loire river. The port register of Nantes for the year 1631 proves that Rotterdam merchants focused on the brandy production in France itself, whereas the larger portion of raw Nantes wines ended up in Amsterdam. The narrower focus on the activities of the Dutch in the wine trade with Nantes should not blind us to the fact that the province of Brittany remained the most important offset market for the vintners in the lower Loire region. While wines and brandy from Nantes contributed about ten percent of the French alcohol export market to the Republic, Bordeaux took care of the lion’s share. The Dutch market for higher quality Bordeaux wines and brandies, traditionally in the hands of merchants from Zeeland, remained strong throughout the seventeenth century. Merchants and ships from Rotterdam increasingly took part in the exports from Bordeaux to the detriment of the Zeelanders. Amsterdam, with its burgeoning population and booming economy, continued to grow in importance as the consumption market that drove the French-Dutch alcohol trade.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DUTCH WHOLESALE MARKET AND CONSUMPTION Their great Forreign Consumption, is French-Wine and Brandy; But that may be allow’d them, as the only Reward they enjoy of all their pains, and as that alone which makes them rich and happy in their voluntary Poverty, who would otherwise seem poor and wretched in their real Wealth. Besides, what they spend in Wine, they save in Corn to make other Drinks, which is bought from Forreign parts.1 Sir William Temple, 1672

In addition to the above observation, Sir William Temple also stated that “never any Countrey traded so much and consumed so little”. The liberal consumption of imported wines was seen as an extra-ordinary habit that ran counter to the overall staid and frugal character of the people. Despite the lack of information on volumes, we do know which wine varieties made life more bearable for those who could afford to spend their money on wine instead of beer. By the mid-1580s, the brokers’ guild had started to publish the commodity prices on the Amsterdam Bourse on a weekly basis. These ‘Pryscouranten’ have thus far been used in Dutch price history, but as Anne Wegener Sleeswijk has pointed out, they also allow us to discern early modern consumer preferences.2 The sole sixteenth century survivor of the series [a single week in 1586] does not list any wines, but various French and Spanish wines and brandies were listed on a regular basis starting with the one remaining list of the rst decade of the seventeenth century, dating from 1609. A total of 75 weekly ‘Pryscouranten’ have survived for the period from 1609 to 1682, but the lists are unevenly distributed over 34 separate years.3 Because the printer kept the formatted list intact and only

1 William Temple, Observations Upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1672; reprint, 1972), 120 and 119. 2 N. W. Posthumus, Nederlandsche Prijsgeschiedenis (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943). My gratitude to my esteemed colleague Anne Wegener Sleeswijk for suggesting this approach. 3 Nederlands Economisch Historisch Archief [ hereafter NEHA] CCC, AMS.1.01 fol., Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609 –1682. I have discounted the only Pryscourant of 1619 because it does not list any French wines. One list from 1626 has disappeared

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changed the information on prices fetched in a certain week, we can compare the make-up of the potential market basket with the actual trading of commodities on the Bourse. When a wine variety is listed without its minimum and maximum prices it means that the wine did not actually appear on the market that week, but that the variety was popular enough to be included in the Pryscourant. When the wine was dropped from the printed list altogether, we know that it no longer appealed to the Dutch consumer. The variety of imported wines and brandies available to the Dutch consumer at this point in time is impressive, especially considering the ample supply of quality beers that supplemented this offering: Table 4.1

Imported liquor on the Amsterdam commodity market, 1609 –1682

Pryscourant listing Alecante Anjouwen Bordoense brandewijn Franse brandewijn Conjack brandewijn Nantes brandewijn Bordoense brandewijn Rijnse aem brandewijn Spaense ½ boot brandewijn Spaense oxhoofd brandewijn Spaense quarteel Bier brandewijn Koorn brandewijn Canary Condaetse bastert Condaetse secken Conjacken Courte Hooghlandse Libornse Malvesieven

translated & corrected listing Alicante Anjou Bordeaux brandy French per oxhead brandy Cognac per oxhead brandy Nantes per oxhead brandy Bordeaux per oxhead brandy Rhine per aem brandy Spanish per ½ botte brandy Spanish per oxhead brandy Spanish per quarteel brandy from beer per aem brandy from grains per aem Canary [ Islands] bastard Condaet—Spanish dry Condaet—Spanish Cognac wines Courtenay—upper Loire region Haute Pays—Bordeaux Libourne Malvesey—Levant

from the NEHA collection, while of the sole 1642 Pryscourant only the top half which lacks the wine entries has survived. In addition to the commodity price lists for Amsterdam, the NEHA collection holds similar lists for numerous other cities, including Bordeaux [1634] and Gdansk [1608 and 1632] which increase our understanding of the wine trade in those cities. Later Pryscouranten form part of Wegener Sleeswijk’s study on the French-Dutch wine trade in the 18th century.

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Table 4.1 (cont.) Pryscourant listing Petouwen Piere Semeines Seranten Serese secken Sipioense bastert Tinte Tosanen

translated & corrected listing Poitou Pietersemeynse—Spanish Charente—La Rochelle region ‘Jerez’ dry wines—Spanish sherry bastard Scipion—Spanish Tinte—Spanish red wine Toussane—Bayonne region

Source: NEHA Collectie Commerciele Couranten, AMS.1.01, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609 –1682. Unless specied, all prices were listed per ton

Seven steadfast wine varieties show up in the Pryscouranten throughout the eighty-four year period: The French imports ‘Bordoense’ [ Bordeaux city wines]; ‘Conjacken’ [Cognac]; ‘Hooghlandse’ [vins d’Haut Pays = upstream Bordeaux region]; and ‘Libornse’ [ Libourne]. Demand for two Spanish wines, the so-called ‘Piere Semeines’ [Pietersemeynse] and the ‘Sereese secken’ [dry Jerez = Sherry] continued to be strong. Wines from the Canary Islands, on the other hand, featured on all the lists but actually appeared on the market in only six years. An eighth variety, the ‘Petouwen’ [Poitou] wines, appeared on the list as early as 1609 but in 1673 the wines were given the adjective ‘stomme’ [mute] and under this title they remained listed throughout the rest of the period. French brandy was listed from 1609 onwards, initially under the generic heading of ‘French’ brandy, but starting with the list of 1630 the French brandies were sold under their regional label. Brandy from Bordeaux and the Cognac area made the list in 1630, followed by those from Nantes from 25 April 1633 onwards. The Dutch beer- or grain-based brandies only appeared during 1673 and 1674 at the start of the French-Dutch war. With a single exception, the siege and fall of La Rochelle in 1628 signaled the end of the Pryscourant listing for ‘Seranten’—the wines from the Charente region. Dutch demand was not strong enough to force their reappearance on the market after the situation had stabilized.4 The outbreak of the Franco-Dutch war in 1672 caused a temporary halt in the listing of both Anjou as well as Toussane [from the region around 4 On 25 September 1628, the Charente wines were included in the list, but did not receive a price notation. The next available list, 13 May 1630, no longer includes Charente wines.

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the Adour river upstream from Bayonne] wines; neither wine type shows up as a potential entry in the 1673 and 1674 Pryscouranten, only to reappear by the fall of 1675. Seven other alcoholic drinks became important enough to make it into the Pryscouranten at later dates: wines from Nantes [12 August 1624] and Langon [1651], plus the brandies from Bordeaux [1630], Cognac [1630], Nantes [25 April 1633] and the Dutch beer- or grain-based brandies [1673]. Compared to their Iberian and Levantine counterparts, French wines were cheap and thus affordable to many more people. If we take the Pryscourant of 20 February 1634 as an example we nd that at 162–168 guilders the most expensive French wine—a ton of Toussane wine from the Bayonne area—was almost half the price of the top Spanish wine, a ton of ‘Bastard wine of Scipion’ listed at 282–300 guilders. Some of the wines listed in the Pryscouranten warrant a further mention. Malvesey wines came from the Aegean region, including the islands of Chios and Lesbos; it was a sweet wine of high enough quality to be reserved for important guests.5 The Poitou wines had the same color as Rhenish wines, but were inferior to their German cousins. The price difference made it tempting, however, to mix the two and sell the result as a pure Rhine wine. According to Sneller, several cities banned the wine retailers [tappers] to keep the two wines in stock at the same time.6 Yet if the adulterators did their job right, who would have been able to spot the deceit? The ‘bastard ’ wines brought into Holland had been ‘red’ by the addition of must imported from Spain.7 The prices those wines fetched on the Amsterdam market reveal that the ‘bastardization’ helped rather than hurt the wines. With prices ranging from 204 to 234 guilders per barrel in 1609 and 300 to 360 guilders in 1645, these wines could hold their own against the best the market had to offer. In addition to the wines listed in the Amsterdam Pryscouranten, notarial records show that the following wines also appeared on the

5 For Malvesey, see Bijlsma, “Collection Bijlsma [Author’s Notes].” Red notebook 1/18. Bijlsma suggested that the name derived from the port of Napoli di Malvasia in the Moreau region. See also Savary des Brûlons and Savary, vol. 4, 1215. Vin Malvoisie comes from Greece, in particular from Candie, Chio, Lesbos, Tenedos & other islands 6 Sneller, “Wijnvaart En Wijnhandel Tusschen Frankrijk En De Noordelijke Nederlanden,” 18n. 7 Tanguy, 84, ftnt 127. See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springeld: 1989), 782. ‘Must’ [Moût in French] can be either grape juice expressed before or during fermentation, or it is a mixture of the pulp and skins of the crushed grapes.

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Dutch market: ‘Bouvreetse’ [Vouvray] and ‘Corte’ or ‘Courte’ [Courtenay], both from the upstream Loire river; and ‘Bleydsche’ [Blaye on the shore of the Gironde].8 Pietersemeynse wines—Rotterdam’s own? According to Bijlsma, Pietersemeynse wine was named after Dutchman Pieter Simonsz who was the rst to plant a Rhenish grapevine in the soil near Guadalcazar. The resulting sweet wine made its debut on the Rotterdam market no later than its rst notarial mention in November 1628. That particular shipment must have been truly exceptional, because the professional tasters expressly stated that these wines “are the best lot of wines ever to be found in this city”. A Pryscourant for commodities on the Danzig market from the 1632 highlights the superiority of this Spanish wine with German roots: an oxhead Pietersemeynse wine fetched between 675 guilders cash or 690 guilders on credit, while at the same time an oxhead of Bordeaux city wine cost between 187.5 guilders cash or up to 250 guilders on credit.9 The Pietersemeynen must have combined the steadfastness of their German genes with the eriness of their adopted homeland. It is possible that innovator Pieter Simonsz was none other than Rotterdam wine broker Pieter Symonsz. A notarial act of 1633 lists his age as 63, placing the time of his birth around 1570. This leaves sufcient time for a younger Symonsz to have roamed around Spain and for the transplanted vines to have reached maturity by the time of their listing in the 1609 Pryscourant. In 1608, a Pieter Symonsz captained a ship for Rotterdam merchant Jacques Merchijs that brought wines and coins from Bayonne, and in 1615 a Peter Symons sailed as steer man on a trip that brought his ship to St. Lucas de Barrameda and Alicante in Spain. We can only speculate that all three cases concern the same Symonsz. We do know that the elderly wine broker Symonsz served as ‘gildeknecht’ [chief administrator] of Rotterdam’s wine buyers’ guild from 1625 to his retirement in 1634. In this capacity, Symonsz supervised not only the registration of all imported wines and the

8

GAR, ONA and Bijlsma, Rotterdams Welvaren 1550 –1650, 40. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/287–288, 11 November 1628 and GAR, inv. nr. 881, Collection Bijlsma, red notebook 2/15 and NEHA, Collectie Commerciele Couranten, GDA.1.02, dd 27 May 1632 for the Danzig prices. 9

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organization of the wine carters but also the men who guarded any wine barrels held on the city’s quays prior to their warehousing. Given his early and heavy involvement in Rotterdam’s wine trade, the famous ‘Pietersemeynse’ wines could indeed have been named after this hardworking Rotterdammer.10 The identity of Pieter Simonsz and—by inference—the timing of his innovative actions in Spain have been cast in doubt, however, by a report on the early days of the Dutch wine trade. Breen suggests that the Bastard wines which appear in Amsterdam’s wine trade regulations as early as 1492[!] are the same as Pieter Simonsz-wines, and this would mean that the Pietersemeynse wines long pre-dated Rotterdam’s Pieter Symonsz. Breen does concur that the Pietersemeynse wines were “named after the Dutchman who rst planted a Rhenish grapevine near Guadalcazar.”11 Our Rotterdam wine expert Pieter Symonsz could be the innovator if Breen mistakenly applied the label ‘Pietersemeynse’ on all Bastard wines. The Pryscourant of 1609 actually list ‘Condaetse bastard ’ and ‘Sipioense bastard ’ wines in addition to Pietersemeynse, which were not given the adjective ‘bastard’, which leads me to stick to my theory that Rotterdam’s own Pieter Symonsz gave his name to a very expensive wine. The wines from Nantes and some contradictions Signicantly, the wines from Nantes did not show up in the list of 1609 which conrms earlier observations about the lack of Dutch interest in the wines from that area. Following their appearance in the Pryscourant of 12 August 1624, the Nantais wines continued to be listed throughout the period. The huge gap in available Pryscouranten between the single list of 1609 and the eight lists of 1624 unfortunately obscures the timing of their actual debut on the Amsterdam market. As the 1631 port registers indicated, wines from the area around Nantes had a well dened ship10

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 14/38, 6 May 1608 and 257/250, 1634. The notarial act of 1634 refutes Barjesteh and Meeuwe’s conclusion that Symonsz. successor, Niclaes Willeboortsz, was the rst gildeknecht whose name is known. When after nine years of service Symonsz voluntarily stepped down due to inrmity and old age in 1634, he nominated Willeboortsz as the person who would serve the guild as diligently and competently as Symonsz himself had done. Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn and Meeuwes, 77. 11 Johan Breen, “Uit De Geschiedenis Van Den Amsterdamschen Wijnhandel,” Jaarboek Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Wijnhandelaars (1917): 134.

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ping pattern based on the fact that they were exported only when in their infancy, but oddly enough the Pryscouranten indicate a much more diffused distribution pattern on the Dutch market. The lack of price indications in the lists of 25 September 1628 and 26 October 1665 buttress the argument that only new Nantes wines held any appeal for Dutch purchasers and that those had not yet come to market that year. In both cases it would have been too soon after the harvest for the wines to have made their way to Amsterdam. The absence of prices on the single lists of both 1673 and 1674 date from the month of July when the previous year’s vintage would already have turned to vinegar, another reason not to offer them for sale. Yet how do we correlate these logical explanations with the contradictory information yielded by the eleven Pryscouranten of 1626, the largest single-year set? From the middle of July through 19 October, at a time when new wines would denitely not yet have been available, a barrel of Nantes wine fetched 90 to 96 guilders in Amsterdam. Had these wines already been fortied and adulterated in Nantes to the extent that they still found buyers in the middle of the summer? Further indications that Nantes wines appeared on the market much past their prime come from the four Pryscouranten of 1633 which show that at the end of each month from February through May a barrel of Nantes wine had been brought to market at a price of 84 to 96 guilders.12 To confuse matters even more, no price was listed for Nantes wines on 16 November plus 7 and 21 December 1633, right when we would expect the new vintage to ood the Amsterdam market. Wines from Poitou, Charente, Toussane and Anjou were available in mid-November, but like the Nantes wines none of the wines from the region around Bordeaux had made it to market yet. Because none of the other French wines received a price indication in those two weeks in December, the lack of entries for that month may have been caused by winter storms in the Atlantic that prevented the Dutch wine eet from setting sail. From this jumbled information we can only conclude that after leaving Nantes immediately following the harvest, the new wines from that area showed up on the Dutch market throughout the year, which in turn implies that the wine professionals managed to adulterate and conserve

12 NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01 fol., 1626 the lists of 13–20 –27 July, 3–17–24 August and 19 October. See also 1633, the lists of 21 February, 21 March, 25 April and 23 May.

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them –in France or in the Republic—to the extent that later re-sale was still possible. What do the Pryscouranten tell us about the value of the wines and brandy from Nantes on the Dutch import market? Quantifying the alcohol imports from Nantes in 1631 At the end of their voyages north, the alcohol exports from France became Dutch imports. Can we quantify the actual import and consumption gures for the rst half of the century? Although we do not know the overall quantity of wine imported into the Republic in 1631, the port register furnishes the exact number of tons that arrived from Nantes that year.13 Almost all the alcohol exported on Dutch ships or by Dutch merchants ended up in the Republic: Table 4.2

Dutch exports and imports from Nantes in 1631 in tons total Dutch exports from total Dutch imports from import Nantes 1631 in tons Nantes 1631 in tons percentage

upstream wines Anjou wines Nantais wines total wines brandy total alcohol

3,020.0 520.0 4,985.5 8,525.5 1,140.0 9,665.5

2,533.0 490.0 4,862.5 7,885.5 1,140.0 9,025.5

83.9 94.2 97.5 92.5 100.0 93.4

Source: ADLA B 2976

More than half [54 percent] of all the alcohol imported from Nantes that year consisted of the unheralded Nantes wines. The fact that the local wines featured prominently in the imports from Nantes is not surprising if we consider the Dutch use for those wines as a raw material for their brandy production and for the adulteration of other wine types. On the other hand, the relatively modest contribution of the much higher quality wines from the upper Loire region [the combined share of the upstream and Anjou wines stood at 33 percent] suggests that wines from other French and German supply zones were able to compete successfully with the upstream Loire wines.

13

ADLA B 2976.

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Value of Dutch alcohol imports from Nantes, 1632

DUTCH IMPORTS TONS from Nantes 1631 upstream Anjou Nantais brandy total alcohol

2,433 490 4,683 1,140 8,746

February 1632 Pryscourant in guilders per ton

import value in guilders —low

114–126 102–108 87–96 288–312

277,362 49,980 407,421 328,320 1,063,083

import value in guilders —high

%

26.0 4.7 38.3 30.8

306,558 52,920 449,568 355,680 1,164,726

%

26.3 4.5 38.5 30.5

Source: NEHA, CCC 20, Pryscourant of 8 February 1632

Table 4.4

Value of Rotterdam’s alcohol imports from Nantes, 1632

upstream wines Anjou wines Nantais wines total wines in tons brandy total alcohol in tons

tons

import value —low

794.0 226.0 958.5 1,978.5 690.0 2,668.5

90,516 23,052 83,390 196,958 198,720 395,678

%

50.2

import value —high 100,044 24,408 92,016 216,468 215,280 431,748

%

49.8

Source: NEHA, CCC 20, Pryscourant of 8 February 1632

The Pryscourant of 8 February 1632 allows us to calculate the approximate value of the 1631 alcohol imports from Nantes on the Dutch domestic wholesale market. We end up with two numbers because the Pryscouranten list a commodity’s minimum and maximum price fetched that week. By value, almost one-third of the Nantais alcohol that had arrived on the Dutch market consisted of brandy, a very respectable share. Repeating the same exercise for Rotterdam alone, the value of all alcohol from Nantes imported into that city was between 395,678 and 431,748 guilders. At 198,720 to 215,280 guilders [a 49.8 to 50.2 percent share of the city’s alcohol imports from Nantes], the 690 tons of brandy alone equaled the combined wine varieties in importance.14 Rotterdam’s brandy share represented 18.5 to 18.7 percent of the total alcohol value imported from Nantes into the Republic.

14

NEHA, CCC 20, Pryscourant 8 February 1632.

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Map 3

Dutch Republic Circa 1647

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Population and consumption In 1701, the city council of Amsterdam pointed to the city’s commercial superiority compared to the towns of the Maze region and stated with pride that . . . in these lands the comparison between the city of Amsterdam with her commerce and location, contrary to that of the Maze quarter with its own commerce and location, had even caused the remark that it is not the port that makes the commerce, but that it is the commerce that makes the port.15

The geographic position of Rotterdam and its neighbors along the wide and deep Maas river, with direct access to the North Sea, contrasted positively with Amsterdam’s shallow port that could only be reached via the treacherous entry into the Zuiderzee between the tip of Holland and the island Texel. The councilmen did not, however, understand or acknowledge that one of the key reasons for Amsterdam’s dominant position in the Dutch economy was directly related to the consumer demand created by its disproportionately large population. Population gures for the seventeenth century are few and far between, yet they sufce to prove this point. Table 4.5 Population comparison Amsterdam versus Rotterdam16

1622 1662 1675 1680s

Amsterdam

Rotterdam

105,000 200,000 n.a. 220,000

19,500 or 26,000 n.a. 45,000 n.a.

Source: Beschrijvinghe der stadt Rotterdam, 1 and De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 64–65, and Bonke, De kleyne mast van de Hollandse coopsteden, 76–77

15 Johannes De Vries, Amsterdam-Rotterdam, Rivaliteit in Economisch-Historisch Perspectief (Bussum: C. A. J. van Dishoeck, 1965), 8. The municipal council copied the words written by the British ambassador in 1672: Sir William Temple noted the inconvenient and dangerous maritime approach to the port of Amsterdam and concluded “that ’tis no a Haven that draws Trade, but Trade that lls a Haven . . .”. Temple, 108. 16 The higher of the two population gures for Rotterdam comes from an anonymous chronicler of Rotterdam in 1623. Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, 1. The lower number is quoted as part of the provincial population statistics by De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 64–65. For the later years, see Hans Bonke, “De Kleyne Mast Van De Hollandse Coopsteden: Stadsontwikkeling in Rotterdam, 1572–1795” (Stichting Amsterdamse Historische Reeks, 1996), 76–77.

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We do not know the percentage of the alcohol imports destined for local consumption versus that for distribution on the domestic wholesale market but few of the imports were re-exported, which means that the large majority of the wines and brandy imported into the Republic was destined for domestic consumption. Just based on the number of consumers present, the demand for wines would have been between four and ve times as high in Amsterdam as in Rotterdam. Paraphrasing Temple’s remark, ‘trade did not make the port, but consumer demand did’.17 The consumer market comprised of the cluster of Maze river ports, with Rotterdam at its center, can be compared to that of Amsterdam. Table 4.6

Dutch imports from Nantes 1631 by wine type & by region in tons

destination Maze ports Amsterdam other Dutch ports total

Upstream

Nantais

Anjou

brandy

920 1,321 292 2,533

978.5 2,663 1,221 4,863

226 234 30 490

690 330 120 1,140

Source: ADLA B 2976

Given its relatively modest population, the Maze area’s 26.9 percent share of the wine imports from Nantes is quite impressive, but its 60.5 percent share of the market for Nantais brandy is truly out of proportion. Amsterdam absorbed 53.5 percent of the wines and 28.9 percent of the brandy imported from Nantes.18 Seven smaller ports in North Holland plus Dordrecht took in 1,162 tons of wine and 120 tons of brandy, while the Zeeland ports of Middelburg and Vlissingen only imported 126 tons of upstream Loire wines and 255 tons of Nantais wines. The meager share of the two Zeeland ports in the trade with Nantes is especially noteworthy in view of their strong position in the Bordeaux trade.

17

Temple, 108. See footnote 15 for the ambassador’s observation. In 1622, the urban population of the province of Holland stood at 362,187; in other words, Rotterdam’s population was only 5.4 percent of the provincial total. De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 64. 18

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Imports from Nantes in the remaining Dutch ports, 1631, in tons upstream Nantais Anjou

Akkersloot Dordrecht Edam Eerstwoude Enkhuizen / Akkersloot Hoorn Medemblik Zaandam total for rest of Holland Middelburg Vlissingen total Zeeland total Dutch ports [excluding Amsterdam and Rotterdam]

total brandy wines

total alcohol

0 0 0 0 0

90 70 228 0 136

10 0 0 0 0

100 70 228 0 136

0 0 0 120 0

100 70 228 120 136

0 100 66 166 126 0 126 292

152 140 150 966 135 120 255 1221

0 0 20 30 0 0 0 30

152 240 236 1162 261 120 381 1543

0 0 0 120 0 0 0 120

152 240 236 1282 261 120 381 1663

Source: ADLA B 2976

In 1631, Rotterdam was king of the Nantais brandy trade, but the high percentage of Nantais wines shipped to Amsterdam suggests that people in that city, too, must have distilled those inferior wines into brandy and frélate-ed others. Yet why would the Rotterdammers do their distilling in Nantes and would the Amsterdammers be stupid enough to ship a large volume of cheap wines from Nantes instead of high quality distilled liquor? It is possible that the infrastructure to distill in situ was just then being imported [witness the 54 stills sent from Amsterdam that year for the account of Grust]. Amsterdam’s only set of import statistics in the seventeenth century show that in 1667–1668 the city imported 23,360 tons of French wines versus a very respectable 11,950 tons of all kinds of brandy [the city had imported a mere 330 tons of Nantais brandy in 1631]. Neither category provides a breakdown by supply zone, which makes it impossible to assess the growth or decline of the share of Nantes on Amsterdam’s alcohol market. The port record provides rm evidence on the quantities and specic destinations of the alcohol exports from Nantes to the Republic in the year 1631 alone, but they obviously are

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Regional shipping shares of the 1631 imports from Nantes

total imports on imports Rotterdam 1631 ships in tons upstream 2,533 Anjou 490 Nantais 4,862.5 total wines 7,885.5 brandy 1,140 total alcohol 9,025.5

830 104 700.5 1,634.5 690 2,324.5

R’dam imports Maze imports on Amst. shipping on Maze shipping Amsterdam shipping share ships share ships share % % % 32.8 21.2 14.4 20.7 60.5 25.8

1,128 104 1,029.5 2,261.5 690 2,951.5

44.5 21.2 21.2 28.7 60.5 32.7

192 174 745 1,111 200 1,311

7.6 35.5 15.3 14.1 17.5 14.5

Source: ADLA B 2976

not representative for the overall domestic market for all French, Spanish, and Rhine wines. We must differentiate between the destination of the wines and the provenance of the ships which transported the barrels to the Republic. Ships from Rotterdam, Delfshaven, Schiedam and Vlaardingen, the other three neighboring towns along the Maas estuary, brought 60.5 percent of the brandy and 26.9 percent of the imported wines to Holland. Instead of sailing home, six of the Maze ships unloaded their wine cargoes in Amsterdam—while all the Amsterdam ships took their wines back to their home port. At least for the alcohol brought into the Republic from Nantes, Rotterdam ships provided far more cargo space than vessels from Amsterdam. All in all, Dutch ships took 4,218 tons of the Nantais alcohol to Amsterdam and 1,978.5 tons to Rotterdam. Upon arrival, the captains had to face the dreaded federal revenuers. Federal taxes—the ‘Convoy & Licenses’ fees The international merchants took great pains over the years to safeguard their customary exemption from municipal impost charges on ‘wines brought in by the sea’ and made sure that the captains in their employ echoed their opinions. Two captains returning from Nantes in 1631 stated that never in their career, when arriving with wines and being unloaded at the city crane, had they declared those wines to any impost renter or collector, nor did they ever obtain an impost voucher prior

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to unloading. The only taxes they paid concerned the federal Convoy & Licenses fees. They added that they had never been “accosted or molested” by any impost renters when coming in with overseas wines, not even by the current renter during their last voyage or previous ones, and that all wines were always landed without anyone objecting.19 The federal government levied Convoy & Licenses [ hereafter C&L] fees on the various alcoholic drinks, which differentiated between liquids imported into and exported from the Dutch Republic, and between commodities traded with friends or foes.20 The lists of C&L receipts per Admiralty ofce, extensively documented by Becht, do not show the breakdown between the various commodities. We only know the relative tax revenues per ton of alcohol by country of origin. The tariff on French wines entering the Republic under the C&L tax was set at 1.5 guilders per barrel in 1603 and remained at that level through 1655. Re-exported French wines were taxed at an average of 2.5 guilders per barrel from 1603 onwards, but new tariffs of 1651 lowered the tax to 1.25 guilders per barrel. A comparison with wines imported from other countries shows that for tax purposes, French wines were the cheapest to bring into the Republic. During the Twelve Year Truce importers paid 1.10 guilders per barrel on French wines of any type, while the same quantity of Spanish or Rhine wine was assessed 3.00 guilders. Duty on an incoming barrel of brandy was 8.00 guilders, regardless whether the brandy was produced from wines in France, Spain, England or the Rhine area. Exports of all types of brandy, including domestically produced jenever or brandewijn, were charged the same 7.50 guilders. Upon resumption of the war in 1621, trade with enemy territories was once again penalized. Compared to the duties of 1609, the C&L duties on imports of Spanish and Levant wines rose by 250 percent [from 3.00 guilders to 7.50 guilders] while the duty on re-exports rose by 160 percent [from 5.00 guilders to 8.00 guilders].21 The qualitative and cost difference between French and Spanish wines continued in later decades. In 1643 a new tax was levied on imports to nance the leasing of privately owned armed ships to assist with national defense. 19 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 141/204, 5 June 1621. Captains Aert Roelen and Jan Rombouts had just returned from Nantes with full cargoes of wine. 20 H.E. Becht, Statistische Gegevens Betreffende De Handelsomzet Van De Republiek Der Vereenigde Nederlanden Gedurende De 17e Eeuw (1579 –1715) ( Den Haag: Boucher, 1908). 21 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag, [ hereafter ARA], Staten van Holland, 1572–1795, toegang 3.02.04.01, inventaris nr. 1291c. C&L lists of 13 October 1609 and 12 June 1625, printed side by side.

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Incoming goods were charged 0.5 percent and exports one percent of their value; the accompanying commodity list valued a barrel of French as well as Rhenish wine at 100 guilders, and regular Spanish wine at 200 guilders, while the upscale Muscadel and Malvasie wines from the Levant and Spain rated 240 guilders per barrel. All brandies, irrespective of their origin, were valued at 84 guilders per barrel.22 Thanks to widespread and consistent smuggling efforts of all kinds of commodities, the government’s C&L receipts never reached their potential. Westermann notes that in the seventeenth century, through unofcial yet standard arrangements between merchants and the revenue collectors, a reduction of about 20 percent applied to all commodities, which means that the recorded receipts at the most reect 80 percent of the taxes due. To these accommodations we must add outright noncompliance and under-reporting of incoming quantities. Van Dillen, reacting to Westermann’s calculations, used information from 1751 which suggested that more than half of the goods imported into the Republic did so without the burden of taxation.23 Johannes de Vries, revisiting the issue ten years later, rst points to the contemporary conviction that in the Dutch Republic, smuggling equaled the level of legal and duty-paying trade goods. He concludes that, despite vast regional differences, the overall tax evasion amounted to at least one-third of the values actually reported and received.24 As careful managers of their assets, the Dutch merchants and their captains paid their federal C&L taxes—but as few guilders as they could get away with. The domestic wholesale market Following the arrival in the Dutch ports, the wines and brandies had to be distributed to their intermediate and nal consumers. The domestic wholesale market, consisting of wine merchants in other towns, tavern keepers and large institutions, remains mostly unexplored. The export data from Nantes [and to a lesser degree those from Bordeaux] show us exactly which port in the Republic received the alcohol, but we

22

Cau, ed., vol. 1, 1021. List drawn up by the States General, 20 October 1643. J.C. Westermann and J.G. van Dillen, “Statistische Gegevens over De Handel Van Amsterdam in De Zeventiende Eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 61 (1948): 4–5 and 16. 24 Johannes De Vries, “De Ontduiking Der Convooien En Licenten in De Republiek Tijdens De Achttiende Eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 71, no. 1 (1958): 358–359. 23

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remain in the dark about the level of diffusion in the regional wholesale markets. The limited evidence unearthed for the bilateral wine trade indicates that the wholesale market beneted from the comprehensive network of Holland’s inland waterways that made the transport of the heavy barrels feasible, both physically and nancially.25 Almost half [958.5 tons or 48.4 percent] of the wines imported into Rotterdam from Nantes in 1631 consisted of the less heralded Nantais wines.26 The wine merchants knew how to enhance its taste and strength by adding sugar or mixing it with other wines, so they appreciated it for its good value as an intermediate product. We know that the Rotterdammers already imported ready-made brandy from Nantes, but unknown portions of these imported Nantais wines were also used to produce brandy and vinegar. At the request of wine merchant Leonard van Naerssen, wine broker Harman Hartman shipped three barrels of ‘cold Nantois wines’ to a vinegar maker in the village of Warmont in August 1651. The quality of the wines was similar to what Rotterdam vinegar makers “use on a daily basis with the express purpose to produce vinegar”. Hartman had also tasted the wines and concurred with the assessment and their designation as future vinegar.27 So Van Naerssen had ordered the Nantais wines specically as the raw material for vinegar. Leonard van Naerssen was the son of wine buyer and city crane master Revixit van Naerssen Sr. He was the brother of long term Nantes resident Revixit Jr; of Jacob who worked in Nantes at least from 1647–1651; and of Thomas, who held the lucrative post of Comptroller of the Convoy and Licenses tax.28 Undoubtedly, Leonard obtained this shipment of inferior wines from his brothers in Nantes. The Van Naerssen family is a nice example of the vertical integration of the Dutch wine trade, in which a family rm tried to control as many segments of the market as possible. The different activities of the Van Naerssen men also highlight the fact that early modern Dutch merchants diversied their investment portfolio’s to include public and/or venal ofce. Most often the wines which had arrived in full tons or in pipes were adulterated [ if necessary] and then re-barreled into either oxheads or ‘smaltons’ [of 117 liters]. In December 1617, wine importer Hans 25 26 27 28

De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy. Tanguy, 93–94. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 668/267, 16 Aug. 1651. Engelbrecht, 224–225.

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Princen complained that captain Jan Daniels, recently returned from Nantes, had delivered two oxheads fewer than the agreed upon number. The captain claimed that he did indeed deliver them ‘on land’, and many harsh words were exchanged until the cooper [most likely in Princen’s employ] remembered that two oxheads had already been shipped to Den Haag by mistake.29 The rushed delivery may have been triggered by the potential sales of wine destined for Den Haag’s posher Christmas dinners. After shipping one pipe of an unspecied kind of wine to buyer Aelbeeck in early 1645, wine buyer Pieter Matthijs acknowledged receipt of the payment of 54 guilders which means that a full ton of that wine would have cost 108 guilders on the domestic wholesale market.30 The Pryscouranten on either side of 1617 show a full ton of Petou wines listed for 54 to 66 guilders; the Bordeaux city wines were listed at 120 to 144 guilders in 1609 but by 1624 a wine buyer in Amsterdam would have had to pay only 78 to 84 guilders per ton.31 Aelbeeck may have purchased a relatively good Petou or a relatively low grade Bordeaux. At least some of the wines were imported into Rotterdam on behalf of merchants elsewhere, i.e. the shipping data would indicate a Rotterdam destination but the international commercial transaction should actually have been marked in Amsterdam’s column. In 1645, a brewer in Rotterdam shipped 46 oxheads of unspecied French wine via Gouda to their new owner, a merchant in Amsterdam. The freight charges for the trip from Rotterdam to Amsterdam came to 30 guilders, which translates into 1.53 guilders per oxhead.32 It is unclear why the merchant did not have his wines shipped directly from France to Amsterdam. Was the Rotterdam vessel the only ship in the French export harbor that had cargo space available? Or did the Amsterdammer not have his own factor in France?

29 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 100/84, 27 December 1617. In the late 1620s, a Nicolaes Prince [also Prinsen] lived and worked in Saumeurs. See among others ADLA 4E2/1456/183, 12 July 1629. 30 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 100/43/36, 20 September 1617. 31 NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01, 23 November 1609 and CCC 20, 27 February 1624 32 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 96/8, 9 February 1645. The three cents above the 1.5 guilders may indicate the captain’s ‘caplaacken’ or bonus of 2 percent over the actual freight costs. See also NEHA CCC, AMS.1.01, 31 July 1645. Petou wines cost 14–16 Flemish pounds, Conjacken 16–18 pounds, vins Haute Pays 16–20 pounds, and Nantais a very respectable 17–18 pounds. 1 Flemish pound = 6 guilders.

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Wines were expensive, and the domestic buyers refused to accept wines that were ‘over the hill’ or sour. After Hugh van Rhoon had delivered a small barrel of ‘French’ wine containing 24 stoopen, his client discovered that the wine ‘tasted of the barrel’ and was undrinkable. Van Rhoon immediately offered Neismet the choice of a refund or another barrel with good wine.33 Even if some of the importers and wholesalers tried to pass off wines of a lesser quality as being a more expensive one, most aimed to keep their customers satised and their reputation unsullied. Fraude We have evidence that the lure of prots was enough to lead some merchants astray; they mixed their old wines with some of the new ones and then tried to sell the whole lot as all new wine. Disputes inevitably followed, and arbitration always included a wine tasting by experienced wine professionals. In one such case, the experts agreed that the 15 barrels contained “no or too little new wine, or that they had been mixed with old wine, which was sour and over-the-hill wine”.34 Other methods to defraud the buyer involved mislabeling and selling an inferior wine as if it were of higher quality. One protest concerned the purchase of nine barrels of Anjou wine at 96 guilders each on the condition that the wines were ‘true Anjous’. The cooper’s assistant involved in the case had known, however, that ve or six pipes of the lot actually contained lesser quality ‘mute’ wines. He had helped to adulterate those wines, which were then shipped to the new owner in barrels that make them look like a high quality product.35 The use of a particular type of barrel seems to have been the easiest way to pretend a wine was what it was not. In 1629, several experts tasted the contents of twelve pipes of French wine which were barreled in Rhine wine-sized kegs and which had been brought into town by 33

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 499/5, 16 January 1645. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 737/7, 17 November 1656. This particular batch of low quality [“gepousseerde”] wines sold for 7.5 Flemish pounds @ 6 guilders per pound, so each barrel sold for 45 guilders. The only available wholesale price indication for true Anjou wine dates from 1620, when it fetched 96 guilders per barrel [GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 91/140/332, 17 April 1620]. Even if this comparison over 4 decades is utterly imprecise, it suggests enough of a price difference to tempt an unethical merchant to misrepresent his wares. 35 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 91/140/332, 17 April 1620. 34

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captain Maerten Foppe in his ship the St. Pieter. Supposedly, the kegs contained Anjou wine, but the tasters concluded that the agent in France had shipped ordinary and cheap Nantais wine instead. This led to the ofcial protest by the buyer, who obviously was not prepared to pay the price for real Anjou wine at about 96 guilders per barrel if what he got was worth no more than 60 to 64 guilders.36 Disguising wines to sell them as a higher quality product must have been a risky and ultimately short-lived practice, because a reputation once blemished by this type of fraude would have made future customers quite wary. Other cases, however, involved expert testimony that positively veried and certied a shipment’s quality and market value. In the sale of four oxheads of Toussane wines from the Bayonne region that had arrived in Bordeaux barrels, the packaging led the buyer to assume he was buying decent Bordeaux but not superior Toussane. In this case the local factor of the Dutch merchant in Bordeaux requested an ofcial tasting by experts to assure the potential buyer that he was indeed about to receive the higher quality Toussane wine which warranted the price difference of 60 guilders per ton.37 When 43 full pipes arrived from the Cognac area in 1618, the Rotterdam merchant who had ordered them asked three colleagues to taste their contents. The verdict could not have been more positive: this was “good merchandize, unadulterated nor detrimental to the health of the human body”. They added that both in the previous as in the current year, they had sold wines of similar quality at higher prices than those fetched by the best of other French wines.38 Bordeaux wines and other high quality wines would often be left alone, because tampering with their quality would not do much for a wine trader’s reputation. This did not mean, however, that it was not tempting to claim that a shipment of inferior wine contained expensive Pietersemeyn-wine, the superior Spanish wine which fetched about 294 guilders per ton on the domestic wholesale market in 1628.39 A solid knowledge of the various wines and business practices prevented a merchant from being ripped off and enabled him to come to the rescue of colleagues who needed 36 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/301–302, 24 March 1629 and Pryscourant of 13 May 1630. 37 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 93/208, 17 June 1633. Bordeaux resident factor Franchoys van de Bergen [perhaps a member of the Sephardic Delmonte or Belmonte family?] had shipped the wines to Rotterdam as being true Toussane wines. 38 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 50/75, 31 March 1618. 39 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 92/287–288, 11 November 1628.

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conrmation. Granting outside experts access to wines prior to their entry on the domestic market did carry a certain risk: An assessment by two Frenchmen stationed in the Republic is a most eloquent verdict on the quality of a shipment of wine destined for a wine buyer in Den Haag: “Slootwater” [ditchwater].40 The owner of a barrel of Nantais wine had multiple options. He could adulterate it with sugar or syrup so that it turned into ‘red’ wine which could fortify others; he could distill it into brandy; or he could distill it into vinegar. The condition of the wine upon arrival in Holland most likely dictated the fate of a barrel Nantais. If the wine was still in decent shape, it would be ‘red’; if it was past this secondary prime, it ended up as ‘gebrande wijn’ [brandy]; and if the wine already came suspiciously close to tasting like vinegar, it received a bit of a boost and became high quality, wine based vinegar. If this scenario is true, vinegar imports with a lower impost duty may have masked actual wine imports. The impost regulations of Holland decreed that all good wines that were brought into the workplace of the brandy makers had to be declared just as if they were purchased by a wine wholesaler. However, no impost was due on wines that had soured and were to be transformed into vinegar.41 So it paid to import ‘sour’ wines, declare them as future vinegar, and then distill them into brandy instead. The market for brandy The Pryscouranten provide straightforward information about the availability of several kinds of brandy on the Dutch market.42 In 1609, French brandy was rather expensive at 126 to 132 guilders per oxhead of 30 viertels; ten years later the cost had dropped to 72 to 78 guilders per oxhead, the range it would occupy for many years to come. Between 1609 and 1628, ‘French brandy’ was listed as such, without a further specication of origin. One notable exception is a single Pryscourant of 40

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 184/153/267, 28 July 1630. In an era when ditches often served as sewers, the wines might even have tasted like ‘sewage’. The record does not reveal the fate of the wines, but we can be sure that the wine buyer did not accept the shipment. 41 Cau, ed., vol. I, 1660 & 1664. Ordonnantien voor de Pachters ofte Collecteurs van de Wynen . . . [for the years 1607–1630], article IV & article XII. The same rules applied under the later set of wine impost regulations that covered the years 1631–1655 [pages 1668–1670], articles III & XI. 42 NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 and CCC 20.

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3 December 1624, which lists brandy from Nantes at the same price [84 to 90 guilders] as the generic ‘French’ brandy. Eight years of not being listed pass by before Nantais brandy reappears in the summer of 1632, this time for the duration. No later than the spring of 1630, the Dutch consumers were able to choose from two French brandies, differentiated by regional name, upon which the generic ‘French’ brandy disappears from the listings. The consumer could choose between brandy from the Cognac or the Bordeaux area at prices ranging between 58.5 and 96 guilders per oxhead. Bordeaux brandy continued to be available throughout the century, but from 1633 through 1654 brandies from Cognac disappeared from the lists and were replaced by those from Nantes. Following a ten-year gap in the records Cognac brandies once again took their place on the list starting 1664, from this time onwards competing with those from Nantes as well as Bordeaux. Prices for the different brandies occupied the same range, but the occasional differences show that rst Cognac and then Nantais brandies were considered to be of a higher quality than the distilled wines from Bordeaux. In 1630, Cognac brandy cost 84 to 96 guilders and brandy made of Bordeaux wines between 78 and 90 guilders. Was the even lower price of French brandy in the 1630s the result of Dutch-produced brandies from Nantes ooding the market? Although they did not make a regular appearance in the Pryscouranten until 1632, we know that the Dutch already produced brandy in Nantes for export to the Republic as early as 1609. The port registers of Nantes of 1631 also tell us that no fewer than 245 brandy stills were imported into the region that year, and that 235 of those arrived on Dutch ships.43 While Nantes’ distillers went to work, word must have gotten out about the pending surge in availability. In 1631, there is still no listing for the hard liquor from Nantes, but the price for the other two French brandies dropped to 75 guilders. The major breakthrough of Nantes brandy occurred in the summer of 1632 and was accompanied by a price war on the Dutch brandy market. The Pryscourant of 7 June 1632 showed that the price for Cognac brandy had declined to 66 guilders and that its Bordeaux competitor was even cheaper at 60 guilders per oxhead. One month later, the list of 5 July 1632 included the renewed

43

ADLA B 2976, port registers of Nantes, 1631.

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the dutch wholesale market Graph 4.1 Brandy prices in guilders per oxhead Price of French brandy per oxhead in Flemish pounds 30

25

20

15

10

5

16

0 16 9-1 2 116 4-0 23 2 216 4-0 27 2 516 4-0 14 2 816 4-1 12 2 216 6-0 03 2 716 6-0 13 2 716 6-0 27 2 816 6-1 17 2 016 6-1 19 2 216 6-1 07 3 216 0-1 28 3 516 1-0 13 3 816 2-0 18 3 616 2-0 07 3 716 3-0 19 3 316 3-0 21 3 516 5-0 23 3 516 6-0 21 4 316 0-0 03 4 916 1-1 24 4 116 5-0 11 4 716 8-0 31 4 816 8-1 03 4 016 8-1 26 4 116 9-1 09 5 116 1-1 29 5 116 3-1 06 5 016 3-1 27 5 216 4-0 08 5 216 4-0 16 6 416 4-1 20 6 216 9-0 01 7 216 1-0 11 7 416 4-1 20 75 0-2 16 -1 9 82 0-1 -0 4 406

0

French brandy minimum

Cognac brandy minimum

Nantes brandy minimum

Bordeaux brandy minimum

Source: NEHA, Collectie Commerciele Couranten, AMS.1.01 and CCC 20

entry for brandy from Nantes at the competitive price of 61.5 guilders, while Cognac suddenly disappeared from the list and Bordeaux brandy was not brought to market that week. Two weeks later, the buyer had a choice of Nantais brandy at 63 guilders or Bordeaux brandy at 60 guilders. With the reappearance of brandy from Nantes, Cognac brandy disappeared for a 31-year period. Even though the Pryscouranten did not start a regular listing of Nantais brandies until 1632, it is highly likely that during the rst three decades of the century the importers of Nantais brandy simply marketed their liquor as ‘French’ brandy.44 In the years 1640 –1643, the prices for both Nantes and Bordeaux brandy saw a huge spike, the reason for which remains a mystery. Instead of a short supply and corresponding high prices, the domestic malaise in the Breton wine trade should have made more and cheaper raw materials available for the production and export of brandy by the Dutch to the Republic.45 During the whole rst half of the century only four years saw Dutch ships bring more than one hundred tons of brandy to the Baltic, so this trade does not seem important enough to

44 45

NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 and CCC 20. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 50 –54.

222 Table 4.9

1636–03–03 1638–06–14 1640 –09 –24 1641–05–13 1641–11–11 1643–09 –21 1645–07–31 1646–12–21 1648–08–03

chapter four Price of French brandy per oxhead in guilders, 1636–1648 Nantes brandy

Bordeaux brandy

73.5 45 114 150 132 117 81 54 64.5

69 43.5 108 144 120 108 66 49.5 57

Source: NEHA, Collectie Commerciele Couranten, AMS 1.01 and CCC 20

have been greatly bothered by the anti-Dutch protectionist tariff hikes instituted by the King of Denmark at the Sound toll.46 Between 1645 and 1665 prices for French brandy uctuated between about 60 and 96 guilders, but they showed a sharp rise in 1673 when the war between France and the Republic caused the price of an oxhead to zoom to 126–132 guilders. By October 1674 the situation had apparently stabilized sufciently to return the prices to nearly their pre-war levels. The difference in the price of French brandy between war-torn 1675 and that of post-war 1679 is a striking example of the cost of war to the consumer: The price for the three French brandy varieties fell from 105 guilders to 43.5–54 guilders per oxhead, undoubtedly the result of the release of bottled-up [or rather casked-up] supplies in France. We can only imagine the resulting hangovers in Holland. The treatment of Spanish brandy by the clerks at the Amsterdam Bourse seems more complicated than necessary. Between 1609 and 1636, Spanish brandy was listed by the oxhead, but from 1643 onwards the listing for Spanish brandy disappears altogether. In November 1609, the buyer could choose from Spanish brandy in barrels containing either half a ‘botte’ [242 liters] for sale at 117 guilders or a ‘quarteel’ [235 liters] at 108 guilders. These two listings reappear once more in 1626, but the lack of actual prices means that no Spanish brandy made it to the market that week. 46 Ellinger Bang. Brandy transported eastwards through Sound on Dutch ships: 1617–121.5 tons; 1625–115.25 tons; 1626–159.5 tons; and 1638–184 tons. For the anti-Dutch policies at the Sound between 1638 and 1645, see Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, 543–544.

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Three other types of brandy each make a sporadic appearance in the Pryscouranten. The only offering of Rhenish brandy in 1609 lists the price of an aem [152 liters] at 80 to 82 ‘dalers’ [rixdaelders @ 1.5 guilders each], which would put the price per aem at 120 to 123 guilders. If we convert those prices to oxheads, the Rhenish brandies cost between 180 and 184.5 guilders per oxhead. Compared to the price of French brandies, Rhenish brandy was very expensive which may explain its swift disappearance from the market. Brandy made of either beer or grain was only listed in 1673 and 1674, two years at the start of the Franco-Dutch war. The availability of all three French brandies in these years—Cognac, Bordeaux, and Nantes—rules out any temptation to conclude that the beer and grain brandies served as wartime substitutes. The relatively exorbitant prices listed for the domestic brandies show that Dutch consumers placed a premium on the home-grown alcohol. Brandy derived from beer fetched between 204 and 288 guilders per aem [or 306 to 432 guilders per oxhead] while grain based brandy [the famous jenever] cost between 180 and 240 guilders per aem [or 270 and 360 guilders per oxhead. Surely these high prices for jenever must have left the lower end of the market wide open to the brandies coming in from France. French versus Iberian wines From a Dutch wine buying perspective, the years 1645 to 1648 must have been very difcult. The French supply market suffered from civil unrest and the violence that accompanied the Fronde. Between 1640 and 1645 Portugal and Madeira could act as alternative supply zones for wines, but with the revolt against Dutch power in coastal Brazil by the Portuguese sugar planters in 1645, conditions of war between the Republic and Portugal/Brazil returned while Spain continued to be ofcially off-limits until 1648. With the vigorous resumption of direct trade between Spain and the Republic after 1648, Spanish wines were back in contention and could once again compete with the higher quality wines from the upper Loire region. One would assume that the open market would increase the supply and thus reduce the price of Spanish wines but apart from a single-year dip in 1649 [sherry and the Pietersemeynse wines] that did not happen. Spanish wines had become more expensive by late 1649 compared to their cost in 1646, and the upward trend continued with a signicant

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1645–07–31 1646–12–21 1648–08–03 1648–09 –21 1648–10 –26 1648–11–02 1648–11–09 1649 –10 –04 1649 –11–29 1651–11–06 1651–11–06 1652–08–12 1653–10 –27 1653–12–01 1653–12–08

Wholesale prices of Spanish wines in Amsterdam in guilders per ton

Serese Secken MIN

Serese Secken MAX

204 240 252 246 252 252 252 240 270 330 330 276 324 324 336

252 264 276 276 276 276 276 270 282 360 360 324 360 360 378

Piere Piere Malvesieven Malvesieven Semeines Semeines MIN MAX MIN MAX 204 252 264 270 270 300 300 234 264 360 360 252 336 336 348

270 276 282 288 288 312 312 264 288 420 420 300 372 372 396

300 276 330 330 330 330 330 348 348 480 480 600 600 600 600

312 300 342 342 342 342 342 360 360 600 600 660 660 660 660

Source: NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609 –1682

jump in the fall of 1651.47 The only logical explanation I can come up with is that the so-called ‘Spanish’ wines sold during the Eighty Years’ War were most often adulterated French wines and that with the arrival on the market of the true, pure Spanish products the prices rose to reect their superior quality. Gross prots The rare Pryscourant from Bordeaux of 1634 can be placed next to the Amsterdam list which appeared only one week later to shed light on the difference in the price of the same wine on the supply market versus the [wholesale] demand market. The Bordeaux list is far more detailed in the breakdown of the local types of wine, as behooves a

47 NEHA, CCC, AMS.1.01 fol., Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609 –1682. Pryscouranten of 21 December 1646, 29 November 1649, and 6 November 1651. The cost of ‘Sireese Secken’ rose from 240 –264 to 270 –282 to 330 –360 guilders per ton; the ‘Pietersemeynse’ wines rose from 252–276 to 264–288 to 360 –420 guilders per ton. The ‘Malvesieven’ wines from the Levant showed the largest increase, rising from 276–300 to 348–360 to 480 –600 guilders per ton.

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production area. Several wines, however, carry the same name on both sides of the trading spectrum and can thus be laid side by side. On 14 February 1634, Bordeaux city wines were sold for 63 to 69 guilders per ton in Bordeaux; six days later the Amsterdam Bourse listed their price at 108 to 120 guilders per ton. If we ignore the few weeks it took to ship the wines to the Republic, the two sets of prices indicate that the margin between the supply market and the Dutch import market was at the most 57 guilders per ton. The wines of the Haute Pays fetched 84 to 90 guilders per ton on the Bordeaux market and were traded in Amsterdam for 150 to 162 guilders. The Haute Pays wines were more expensive and offered a margin of at the most 78 guilders per ton. The exporter still had to deduct freight charges, overhead, and operational costs before he could count his actual prots. In 1634, freight charges for a trip from the French ‘Bocht’ to Amsterdam were listed at 9.5 guilders per barrel of wine, but in general the price ranged between 10 and 14 guilders per barrel. If the exporter owned or partially owned his ship, he had to include the vessel’s depreciation to his costs. Ships depreciated at 5 to 10 percent per year, even more over the course of the rst year.48 Without knowing more about the ratio between a merchant’s gross income and his expenses it is impossible to gauge the true protability of the Dutch alcohol trade. Consumption estimates and impost issues In addition to Sir William Temple’s observation that the prominence of French wine and brandy in Holland’s domestic consumer market was caused by its role as ‘the single luxury’ the frugal population allowed itself, another strong and steady market consisted of the large number of sailors and soldiers aboard the Dutch mercantile and naval eets.49 How much wine and brandy was actually needed to make the Dutch feel ‘rich and happy’ in their voluntary poverty? How much demand

48 Hart, 108–109. The gures provided by Hart list the value of a ship of 160 last [320 tons] in 1642 at 14,400 guilders; two years later the ship was sold from the estate of the owner for 10,112. A second ship, even larger at 180 last or 360 tons] depreciated by 2,800 guilders over two years from its new value of 18,400 guilders. Both these examples concern vessels much larger than the ones used in the coastal trade between the Republic and France, but the wear and tear should have been similar regardless of the vessel’s size. 49 Temple, 120.

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for brandy was created by the personnel aboard the combined forces of the mercantile and naval eet? We must rst temper Temple’s generalization with the observation that beer continued to claim an overwhelming share of Dutch alcohol consumption. Calculations based on Richard Unger’s study of the Dutch beer industry show that in 1621, Rotterdam’s brewers imported 14,880 tons of grain, of which 4,800 tons were used for local beer consumption. The other 10,080 tons were processed into beer or jenever and sold on the domestic export market. In 1631, grain use in the beer industry had increased to a total of 23,808 tons, of which domestic exports absorbed 19,008 tons.50 We do not what proportion of the grain used for the domestic alcohol market ended up as beer or jenever. Receipts from Rotterdam’s wine impost paled in comparison to those of the beer impost, a logical situation at a time when beer was a staple of people’s daily life whereas wine remained a luxury item. Brandy was used as medicine, at least some of it was consumed to cure gout or fever.51 The only available municipal statistics for the century, those for scal year 1644–1645, show that the city coffers received 415,722 guilders in beer impost versus 6,600 guilders for ‘brandewijn- and 31,800 guilders in wine imposts. Table 4.11 Municipal alcohol impost receipts, Rotterdam

Beer Wine Brandy Total

1580 –1581 guilders

1580 –1581 %

1644–1645 guilders

1644–1645 %

53,628 7,410 1,296 62,334

86 11.9 2.1 100

415,722 31,800 6,600 454,122

91.5 7 1.5 100

Source: Unger, J.H.W., and W. Bezemer, eds. De oudste stadsrekeningen van Rotterdam

50 Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 –1900: Economy, Technology and the State, 73, 79, 91, 95 and 256. Calculations based on population of 20,000 and a per capita consumption of 300 liters = 300 liters of grain; 1 liter of grain = 0.8 kilogram of grain. Total Rotterdam production of 5000 brews = 18,600,000 liters of beer requiring 14,880 tons of grain. The gure for the amount of grain used for beer exports is overstated, because it is based on the same 1622 [ten-years old] population gures. The grain required for Rotterdam’s daily bread amounted to another 300 liters per capita. 51 P.J. Dobbelaar, “De Wonderwerken Van Bacchus,” Jaarboek Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Wijnhandelaars (1932): 103. The author edited an ode to the wine god written in 1628. Dirck Pietersz rhymed that “against gout or fever, there the brandy is the chosen art, the right medicine”.

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Rotterdam city alchohol impost, 1580 –1581 and 1644–1645 Rotterdam municipal impost revenues 1580-1581 and 1644-1645

500,000 450,000 400,000 350,000 300,000 guilders 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 Beer

Wine 1580-1581 guilders

Brandy

Total

1644-1645 guilders

Source: Unger, J.H.W., and W. Bezemer, eds. De oudste stadsrekeningen van Rotterdam

The impost was a municipal consumption tax, so alcohol produced for sale outside Rotterdam’s city limits would not have featured in its revenues. In 1644–1645, Rotterdam’s total public income amounted to 923,298 guilders, of which a solid 454,122 guilders [or 49 percent] came from the alcohol consumption tax; beer receipts alone already supplied 45 percent, brandewijn a mere 0.7 percent while the revenue from wine came to 3.4 percent.52 Lacking population gures for the two impost years as well as a more detailed breakdown of the all-encompassing wine impost number, it is impossible to assess the per capita consumption of wines and brandy in Rotterdam itself or aboard its ships.53

52 J. H. W. Unger and W. Bezemer, eds., De Oudste Stadsrekeningen Van Rotterdam, ed. J. H. W. Unger, Bronnen Voor De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. III (Rotterdam: Van Waesberge & Zoon, 1899). The earliest surviving records for a complete year are those of 1644–1645. Unger collected the earlier gures from incidental documents. (introduction, x). The Flemish pound was valued at six guilders of 40 grooten each. (introduction, xv, for the values of various coins). 53 Between ca. 1550 and 1622, the population of Rotterdam had seen dramatic growth, from an estimated 7,000 to about 26,000. The only population numbers available for the rst half of the seventeenth century—the census of 1622 and a contemporary chronicler’s estimate—fall in between these surviving impost years. According to the chronicler, 26,000 people lived in the city in 1623; the census of 1622 puts the

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Provincial and municipal impost fees, 1583–1655, guilders per ton

Origin of the wines and the types of barrels used on the domestic market Rhenish or Spanish wines [aems] French wines, red or white [ poincons] French wines, red or white [oxheads]

Provincial Municipal 1583–1606 1583–1606

Provincial 1607–1655

Municipal 1607–1655

132

48

288

96

54

18

124.5–144

27

54

16

128–144

32

Source: Cau, ed., vol. I, 1656–1657.

In addition to levying provincial consumption taxes, the States of Holland and West-Friesland authorized the municipal governments to levy their own imposts based on the origin and barrel type of the wines.54 We only have the total revenue derived from all wines, so it is impossible to assess the share of the different geographical supply zones. Exaccerbating the uncertainty about the consumption levels of the different wines in Rotterdam in 1644–1645 is the [understandable] lack of information about the level of tax fraude and under-reporting. The notarial records prove without a doubt that all kinds of tax dodging schemes existed—both with and without the connivance of the revenue ofcials. Drinking in the taverns The various taxes placed on imported wine made smuggling an interesting option. Tax evasion allowed a tavern keeper or retail seller to keep the prices lower than the ofcial market could sustain, and this worried those distributors who complied fully or at least more fully with impost regulations. On behalf of the wine buyers of Rotterdam, gure at 19,532. This discrepancy could be attributed to the number of ofcial poorters/ citizens versus actual residents. 54 Cau, ed., vol. I, 1656–1657. Malvesey wines from the Levant received a mention together with the Rhenish and Spanish wines starting 1623. That same year, provincial tax on French wines was raised to 144 guilders @ton, regardless of the size of the barrel they arrived in. The listing for the poincons was dropped in 1630.

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Revixit Van Naerssen and Adriaen Van Asperen went on a fact-nding mission to neighboring Dordrecht in the fall of 1631 to visit several taverns. In an unlicenced tavern, a house “lled with so many people that it had been difcult to nd a place to sit”, they drank new wine at ‘ve stuivers’ [0.25 guilder] per pitcher. In tavern ‘De Colff ’ they spoke to Dordrecht wine buyer Jan Fiat who readily admitted that he “sold much more smuggled wines than before”, but that he was loath to draw too much attention by having too many people come to his house. The Rotterdam visitors reported Fiat’s prices on a variety of wines, whereby one stoop of about 2.4 liters equalled two ‘kannen’ or ‘mengels’ of 1.2 liters: Table 4.13

Retail price of wines in Dordrecht tavern, 1631

Wine type & market new [ French] wine Spanish wine retail Spanish wine retail old Rhenish wine wholesale new Rhenish wine wholesale new Rhenish wine retail

Measure kan = pitcher kan stoop stoop stoop kan

Guilders Guilders per ton 0.25 0.60 1.20 0.90 1.00 0.60

182 436 436 327 364 436

Source: GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 148/698, 2 December 1631

In several other taverns Spanish and Rhine wines were readily available at the below-market price of ‘twelve stuivers’ [0.60 guilder] per pitcher.55 Spanish and Rhenish wines cost 2.4 times as much as the new French ones, which suggests that only better-heeled Dutchmen could afford to have their glasses or tankards lled with the higher quality imports. A moralistic publication of 1641, rediscovered by Dobbelaar, warns the Republic’s youth against debauchery in taverns. The two upperclass protagonists, sent to the Latin school in town for their education, instead spent much of their time drinking and playing cards in several taverns. One evening’s drinking in The Rose cost one of them a whole guilder, and in The Prince’s Ship a group of four revellers ran up a tab of 55 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/698, 2 December 1631. A similar statement was made at the request of the headmen of the Winebuyers Guild by three other men on 31 October 1631, GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 148/671. Two ‘kannen’ or pitchers = 1 stoop = about 2.4–2.5 liters; and 364 stoopen per large ton. Each kan or mengel held 8 ‘mutsjes’; by comparison, the VOC wine rations ranged between 2 and 3 mutsjes, i.e. 0.3 to 0.45 liter of wine per day.

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24 guilders. After losing all their money, they rst pawned their clothes to the innkeeper but later even resorted to theft to pay for their wild ways. The intervention of the schoolmaster saved the young gentlemen from the gallows, but they were expelled from school and returned to their mothers. The verses of “Whitebread’s Children or Spoiled Youngsters” include many references to the different types of wines offered for sale in Holland’s taverns.56 The ‘revenuers’ and the consumers Under normal circumstances, drinking a glass of wine or brandy did not create a situation that led to the gallows or required a trip to the notary, so almost all evidence we have of drinking at the retail level comes either from plays such as The Spoiled Youngsters, from paintings depicting a ‘merry company’ or from those occasions where the attempt to avoid the consumption tax failed. The case of the June bride allows a glimpse of the occasions for which the Dutch burghers splurged on wine. Afraid to offend their wedding guests by serving inferior wine, a bride-to-be and her brother traveled to the home of wine buyer Jan Michielsen in Rotterdam to test the quality of a barrel Toussane wine. Michielsen’s assistant Seger Gorisz conrmed afterwards that they had placed an order for one oxhead of the wine to be shipped to the bride’s home in Den Briel.57 It must have been one grand party to warrant the purchase of 228 liters of upscale French wine. The fate of another woman must have been less pleasant than that of our bride. Impost ofcials caught a woman leaving wine buyer

56 P. J. Dobbelaar, “De Wijnen Onzer Voorouders,” Jaarboek Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Wijnhandelaars (1935): 128–132. The wine types are not mentioned in any order, it seems that their ability to rhyme with another word dictated their place in the morality play. I have listed them in their Dutch spelling, as published by Dobbelaar: Vin d’Anjou, Bacherach, Neuren, Vin de Court, Manebach, Dele-wine, Vin d’Ay, Vin Muscat, Menser, Elsaters, Rinckhouwers, Pictouwers [ Pitou], Vin de Bourdeaux, Orleans, Rhenish, Vin d’Amboise, Most, Griekse wijn, Spanish Malveseien, Seck, Canary wine, Conjacken, Aioco, PereSavenes [ Pietersemeynse], Baulm, Toussain, Vin de Fronte Jacquen [ Fronsac?]. The various types of brandy mentioned are: Franckfoortse, Anise, Jenever, Aqua Vitae. Tavern ‘The Prince’s Ship’ was probably purchased with prize money earned by the innkeeper in his days as a crewmember on a privateer. In Dutch, money earned through the sale or ransom of a captured ship was called ‘prince’s money’ [ princengelt ]. 57 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/54/111, 9 June 1621. Both Jan Michielsz and Seger Gorisz appear in Nantes in later years; Jan as the brother-in-law to brandy pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn, and Seger as brother and partner of Tielman Gorisz.

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Revixit van Naerssen’s house with a pitcher of wine for which she had not paid tax, and tried to arrest her. As a mob armed with knives gathered, Van Naerssen himself got into a stght with a bailliff, but in the end the woman was taken to City Hall.58 Chances are that the unnamed woman was someone’s servant, sent to buy the wine clandestinely; presumably, a servant girl was expected to charm her way out of an arrest if caught while her employer could remain outside the legal spotlight. Another case involved Trijntge Maertensdr, maidservant to the honorable Cornelis Dorrenboom who asked her to get 2 stoopen [about 5 liters] of wine from merchant Evert Dullaert. She received a good sized jug full of wine for 22 stuivers or 1.10 guilders in cash, after which she too was caught by the revenuers.59 Another case highlights the sub-letting of a venal ofce. In his capacity as ‘licensee of public means’ Jan de Vos served Jacob Bontebal, the renter of the wine impost farm. De Vos stopped a woman who had bought a bottle of wine without having paid for the necessary impost voucher. The wine had cost her employer 14 stuivers or 0.7 guilders—without the ne that undoubtedly followed the arrest.60 Bottles and corks De Vos’ arrest is noteworthy because it involved the tax-dodging sale of a bottle rather than open wine in a pitcher. This suggests that the wine was of such a quality that bottling made sense, in which case the wine was relatively more expensive than the stuff bought by Trijntge, ergo the contents of the bottle would have been less than one stoop.61

58 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 147/212/474, 3 February 1628. This is the same Revixit van Naerssen who also held the venal ofce of Master of the City Crane, a position that supposedly put him on the side of the revenuers but which in reality allowed him to make impost-dodging deals with fellow merchants entering wines and other goods into Rotterdam. 59 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 280/11, 9 October 1650. Price of the wine: 1.10 guilders for 2 stoopen, so 0.55 guilder per stoop. 60 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 162/102/164, 2 September 1627. The tax farmers sub-leased their collection efforts to revenuers who actually did the work. 61 Horace Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel Des Poids Et Mésures Anciens Et Modernes (Bruxelles: M. Hayez imprimeur de l’Académie royale, 1840). According to Dourshter, one tonneau of Nantais wine [775 liters] equalled between 300 and 350 bottles, so each bottle would hold between 2.2 and 2.58 liters. One Dutch stoop equals 2.38 liters, so we may assume that the bottle in question held at the most one stoop of wine. Doursther did not repeat the same exercise for Bordeaux wines, which came in barrels of 900 liters, so we do not know the bottle-yield of one ton of Bordeaux.

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If the smuggled wine came in a bottle, it needed a stopper presumably made of cork. Just two references to corks have surfaced so far, both came from Amsterdam. Bloom reports that in 1661, a Rotterdam merchant purchased 200 dozen corks at 4.5 guilders per dozen from Amsterdam based ‘Jacob Semagh Cortises’ [Cortez?].62 The second reference lists corks in Amsterdam’s only surviving import and export statistics dating from 1667–1668. Not all of the following varieties of cork actually made it to the Republic that year but their presence on the list means that they were a standard feature of the market: Table 4.14

Cork imports & exports, Amsterdam 1667–166863

Type / origin of cork Portuguese Spanish per dozen sherman’s cork, Spanish of 1.5 and 2 palms by the dozen unspecied cork of 3 and 4 palms Portuguese cork per bundle of 100 feet French cork

imports

exports

none 1,300 dozen none 980 dozen none none 280 guilders

none none none 50 dozen none none 402 guilders

Source: Brugmans, Hajo. “Statistiek Van Den in- En Uitvoer Van Amsterdam, 1 October 1667–30 September 1668

This meager evidence of the corking of bottled wines conrms Craeybeckx’s observation that the early modern wines were drunk young before they turned sour, in which case bottling did not make any sense. Even when adulteration made longer conservation possible, the emphasis clearly remained on new wines in barrels.64 The use of bottles, especially for the relatively mundane French wines, remained a rarity for much of the rst ve decades of the century. At the opposite end of the container-spectrum we nd a jolly group of men drinking wine straight “from the big barrel”. After getting a

62 Herbert Ivan Bloom, The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1969). Footnote reference to this transaction,taken from GAA #2889 & 2890, notary Pieter Padthuysen, 2 September 1661. 63 Brugmans: 141–142. 64 Craeybeckx, 3. The author further stated that with the arrival of the new wines on the market, the previous year’s vintage lost its value.

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hold of “an eighth” of oysters, wine buyer Pieter van Huchtenbrouck, his colleague Symon Dusing, notary Arnout Wagensvelt, and Pieter’s brother in law Christiaen Struijs decided to wash the shellsh down with ‘house’ wine. They had installed themselves on small barrels around the large barrel in Van Huchtenbrouck’s warehouse when the impost renter plus an echevin caught them red handed. Dinner had been seafood, so perhaps we should call it ‘white handed’ instead.65 The outcome of the raid is not mentioned: did the revenuers come to an agreement with the drinkers, as they did in the next case? The group of ve or six English merchants who came to Van Huchtenbrouck’s warehouse in early October 1651 also received an unannounced visit by the impost ofcials, but none of the men were ned. The only payment made was by Martijn [Martin] Comber for two small barrels of wine that he purchased.66 The notary did not indicate whether Comber was forced to buy the barrels of wine in order to make the drinking bout look like a pre-purchase quality test. The wine impost: rules versus reality We can use the impost disputes of 1634 and 1638 as descriptive sources for the names of Rotterdam’s wine buyers but should beware to take the content of the pledges to obey the law at face value. The sheer fact that the pledges of 1634 were soon followed by a new round in 1638 should alert us to the difculties faced by the impost farmer. Hendrick Points personnaly swore that he “never sells wine from a stoop or a pitcher”, two smaller liquid measures. He conveniently excluded mention of any larger measures, keeping the door open for impost avoidance at the domestic wholesale level. Neither is it surprising that when the impost farmer came to get the pledges in 1638, twenty-eight of the wine buyers managed not to be at home and had a wife, a maid, a manservant, a barrelmaker, or a daughter pledge adherence to the rules on their behalf.67 It is even more remarkable, however, that the impost ofcials allowed these proxies. Was the game played at multiple levels?

65 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 273/64, 16 October 1650. The oysters came as an ‘achtendeeltje’, presumably a 1/8 part of a large oyster bushel. 66 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 142/272, 5 December 1651. 67 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 347/67, 29 October 1638. A stoop measured 2.38 liters.

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A series of Ordinances issued by the States of Holland and Zeeland, combined with the Rotterdam municipal impost resolutions, give us the prescriptive framework in which the wine buyers purchased from the importers and sold on the domestic market. Seemingly exhaustive in detail about what a wholesaler had to do and could absolutely not do, the Ordinances make a nice foil for the ingenious ways in which wine buyers and retail sellers managed or tried to avoid paying the hated imposts. Ofcially, the impost farmers were strictly forbidden to turn a blind eye or to give anyone a break. Ofcially, no wines could be drunk inside a merchant’s warehouse. Ofcially, the farmers of the wine impost had to swear not to have any business interests or partnerships with anyone earning their money in the wine trade. Ofcially, merchants importing wines into Holland had to register his wines to receive a permit to unload the barrels.68 Yet what really happened on the quays of Rotterdam? The earliest reference to a less rigid modus operandus is a statement made in 1601 at the request of a resident of Gouda that the renter of Rotterdam’s wine impost “would sometimes be willing to accept less than the full amount owed”.69 This seems odd, but similar declarations made later in the century explain the system under which the tax ofcial would take less than his due. On July 11, 1631 one of the masters of the city crane declared that by customary practices, all wines arriving at the Crane from overseas were habitually unloaded without a voucher from the impost farmer or his collectors, nor had any of the impost ofcials ever indicated to the crane master the need to do so. What’s more, similar practices had prevailed under previous impost farmers.70 Lambert Willemse’s co-crane master is none other than wine buyer Revixit van Naerssen, another overlap of two jobs that seems highly questionable to us but apparently not to the city government which sold the position of crane master as a venal ofce. How much room for maneuvering Van Naerssen had in this position is made clear by his own words: During the ve years that he operated the city crane, not a single merchant ever declared his brandy to the impost renters; such declarations were unnecessary “because all the records were kept

68 Cau, ed. Ordonnantien, voor de Pachters ofte Collecteurs vande Wynen . . ., 1607–1630, Art. 5, p. 1662; Art. 13, p. 1664; Art. 21, p. 1667; and Art. 22, p. 1667. 69 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 45/21/39, 11 April 1601. 70 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 141/212, 11 July 1631.

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by the crane master”—i.e. Van Naerssen himself.71 We can only guess at the level of quiet cooperation with or without a small token of a merchant’s gratitude. Conrmation of this customary non-compliance with the reporting rule comes with a declaration in 1644 by a group of wine blenders that wines are left unreported after arrival in Rotterdam and do not require vouchers, sometimes for several days, until the moment that they are actually moved from the quay to the warehouses.72 Problems only arose when barrels were found in a warehouse or cellar without the impost voucher. In 1645 Meijndert Pietersz. Emaus, farmer of the city’s wine impost, discovered seven unreported oxheads in the warehouse of Pieter Fiool. Despite or because of the [lame] excuse by Fiool that he had assumed his broker had paid the impost fees, Emaus conscated the lot.73 Given the mutual understanding exhibited in other cases, the conscation may have been due to non-payment of the customary token of appreciation. Enforcement of the rules appears to have been lax at another level as well. Unlike the persistent efforts of the French authorities to control the size of the barrels used in the wine and brandy trade, the Dutch authorities faced reality several decades before their counterparts. At the request of his colleagues from The Hague, a sworn wine gauger of Rotterdam stated in February 1654 that the rule to gauge the content of the wine barrels was not strictly observed in city of Rotterdam. Wine buyers cellared barrels of all kinds without registering either their type or size; in earlier times, impost renters had indeed performed measurements.74 Rotterdam’s impost precedence As early as 1609 the wine merchants of other towns in Holland used precedents set in the wine trade in Rotterdam to claim and conrm privileges due to them or to buttress their arguments that certain

71

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 149/355/599, 15 October 1632. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 153/168, 8 December 1644. 73 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 391/322, 6 May 1645. We do not know the type of wine conscated, but if we use the cost price for the cheapest wines cited by the Amsterdam Pryscourant of 1645, Fiool’s loss was at least 21 guilders per oxhead or 147 guilders for the seven conscated oxheads. 74 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 394/19, 19 February 1654. 72

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municipal or provincial regulations did not comply with ‘custom’. Five experienced Rotterdam wine traders were requested by one of their colleagues in The Hague to certify that “it has never been, nor is it nowadays, the custom in this city of Rotterdam that they or any of the other wine buyers swear an oath of any kind to the renter of the wine impost regarding the retail sales of the wines”. We may assume that Peter Snouck used the Rotterdam example to plead his own refusal to swear to the strict observance of The Hague’s tax rules.75 The more concrete understanding between Rotterdam’s wine buyers and the impost farmers which followed the confrontations of 1634 and 1638 had become sufciently entrenched by the mid-1640s to set a welcome precedence for wine buyers from other cities in Holland. A set of declarations by wine-coopers and -blenders in 1646, made at the request of a wine buyer from Gouda, proves that several impost farmers were pragmatists who worked around the law. According to the wine workers, all their employers [i.e. the wine buyers of Rotterdam] had made a deal with the farmer of the wine impost for a xed sum, so that none of the employees ever required vouchers for any of the wines they imported or exported for their bosses. To emphasize their case, they added that this was customary practice.76 The following day, as icing on the Gouda cake, the notary took down a statement from one of the collectors of the brandy impost himself ! The ofcial declared that wine buyer Pieter van der Laan had come to an accord with his master, the farmer of the brandy impost, so that no vouchers were ever used for brandy coming into or leaving his warehouse.77 A few years later, three other wine buyers stated that their wines had never been gauged during the term of ofce of the new farmer of the wine impost, and that it was their understanding that none of the city’s other wine buyers had had their wines gauged either. When we see that the

75 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 47/1, 1 January 1609. At the ages of 77, 58, 66, and 58, four of the ve wine buyers were old enough to claim a long career in the wine business. The fth one, Jan Gillisz Poppe, was 31 years old but the records indicate that he was a very active importer/buyer of French wines. In 1611, Poppe imported wines from Bayonne via his agent Adam Beerwouts /Berewouts. Willem Gielisz Poppe, presumably Jan’s brother, worked in Nantes in 1626 but died there around 1632. Jan Gillisz Poppe continued to be successful and served as the ‘equipagemeester’ [master of ship armaments] of the Rotterdam Admiralty from at least 1632–1636. 76 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 499/263, 25 January 1646 and 499/264, 26 January 1646. Were the wine buyers from Gouda getting ready to point to Rotterdam’s precedent and reduce the costs of their own wine deals? 77 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 499/263, 26 January 1646.

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notary has listed Symon Duysing not only as one of the three wine buyers but also as one of Rotterdam’s “sworn wine gaugers”, we are witness to the extent to which some of the impost ofcials collaborated with the wine buyers.78 By the middle of the century, the practice is spelled out in unashamed detail. Wine buyer Duysing and two colleagues declare, this time at the request of a wine buyer from Delft, that the Rotterdam wine buyers “are in no way subject to gauging by the impost ofcials nor do they ever pay anything for wine missing due to leakage . . . apart from a wholesaler’s fee of ve Flemish pounds [thirty guilders] per year, being two pounds for the city [impost] and three pounds for the state [impost].”79 How a barrel ended up containing less than its full content was thus no longer an issue. This, combined with the normal practice of re-barreling wines prior to their sale on the domestic wholesale market, allowed for unknown amounts of wine to be sold without the burden of impost fees. The above cases point to a working relationship between the wine traders and at least some of the impost ofcials, and the explicit ban on impost farmers having a business relationship with a wine buyer, be it directly on indirectly, is an implicit acknowledgement that such practices did take place.80 The farmer of the municipal wine impost in 1644–1645 collected a total of 5,300 Flemish pounds, but it is impossible to nd out how much of it came in such individual contributions of 2 pounds. We do not know the number of wine buyers active in Rotterdam at the time, nor is it clear if all of them participated in the pre-payment plan. An unknown, but surely sizeable, portion of the annual impost receipts must have come from the consumers through payments by tavernkeepers and retail wine shops. This ts with the Dutch pattern of lightening the burden on the entrepreneurial class and making the consumers pay most of the taxes.81

78

GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 482/84, 12 January 1648. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 502/334, 29 September 1650. This statement and the same sums were repeated by another group of wine buyers in 1654, see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 505/652, 22 December 1654. Five Flemish pounds = 30 guilders. 80 A notarized statement by a widow wine merchant at the end of the century conrms the continuation of arrangements between the impost renters and the wine merchants. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 1334/463, 18 July 1693. 81 James D. Tracy, Holland under Habsburg Rule, 1506–1566: The Formation of a Body Politic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 135 and 144. 79

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To a modern observer, the tax ofcials’ habit not to differentiate between a high quality Bordeaux, an Anjou, a Toussane, and a lowly Nantais wine by classifying all as ‘French wines’ seems odd, but proper identication of wines may have been too difcult or cumbersome a process at a time when even higher quality wines were much less robust than modern wines. The difference in the impost duties levied on French versus Rhenish and Spanish wines undoubtedly increased the temptation to import French wine, adulterate it by adding sugar, syrup, or some brandy, and then market it as true Rhenish or other high quality wine. This would have been one of the reasons for the relatively large volume of Nantais wines being shipped to the Republic, and it was also one of the reasons that the Dutch merchants in Nantes preferred to obtain wines barreled in Rhenish casks—the famous ‘fuste façon allemande’. Regardless of the ways and means, it is clear that the collection of the wine impost under a tax farm system worked because impost fees entered Rotterdam’s treasury, men were willing to rent the tax farm, professional wine buyers seemed pleased with the pragmatic status quo, and last but not least, the taverns were lled with wine [and beer] drinking customers. The low municipal impost gure for ‘brandewijn (which in this period could be wine-based brandy or grain-based jenever) in conjunction with the small volume of brandy exported to the Baltic lead to the conclusion that Rotterdam’s brandy production was destined for the domestic export market and for consumption on the nation’s naval and mercantile ships.82 Wine and brandy consumption on Dutch merchant eets A signicant portion of the wines and brandies imported into the Republic were destined to be taken aboard the ships of the naval and mercantile eet. The duration of the voyage determined the demand for the alcoholic drinks. Water deteriorated so quickly that the crews’ rations of liquids were always supplemented with wine and often with brandy, but the longer the distance between revictualing the greater the

82 Ellinger Bang, vol. II, 1620, table 1 (1–4), table 2 (36) and table 3, C1–4. In 1620, the volume of brandy transported by Dutch ships through the Sound—56.75 pipes—was a negligible 0.89 percent of all the non-Rhine wines shipped eastwards; 46.75 of those pipes were shipped from Dutch ports.

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chance of scurvy and other ailments due to malnutrition. The crews working the European coastal trades, where each leg of a voyage might at the most take two or three weeks, did not face the specter of scurvy yet they too were entitled to a daily ration of wine. In the wine trade, the merchants provided the drinking wine for the crew “in front of the mast”, but considering the number of cases in which the crew seems to have tampered with the ofcial cargo, the casks for the crew probably contained wines that were inferior to the ones in the hold.83 The shipping merchants had a choice to make: they could either provide the crew with quality drinking wine, comparable to what they shipped commercially, or provide inferior wine to the crew but risk “accidental leakage”—i.e. surreptitious tapping and drinking—of the good wines during transit. Thanks to Pieter van Dam’s detailed history of the Dutch East India Company of 1701, the maximum possible demand for wines and brandy can be estimated if we accept the [probably faulty] proposition that the crews of the coastal trade were entitled to alcohol rations similar to those prescribed by the VOC. In reality, the more extreme conditions of the long-distance trades likely required larger daily rations of alcohol than the shorter voyages in European coastal trading, where regular access to fresh food supplies and drinks was the norm. The VOC victualing regulations changed over the course of the seventeenth century. A ration of two-and-a-quarter ‘mutsjes’ or 0.3 liter of French wine was issued to each man per day in 1603 for the rst nine months of the projected 27–months voyages, while sweeter and more durable Spanish wines were stocked for the last 18 months. By 1634, the weaker French wines were permanently rejected in favor of either the high quality Toussane wines from the southwest of France or the Spanish wines. The ships were required to carry 944 liters of brandy per 100 men as a medicinal drink for the whole two-way trip. After a disastrous shipboard re in 1630 brandy lost favor, only to regain it in 1640 when it became clear that the benets outweighed the negative of the liquor’s volatility. Even though brandy held its place as a medicinal restorative, the VOC leadership recognized that “the Spanish wines, containing body, yield some nutrition but brandy is nothing but

83 GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 143/403/758, 24 September 1629. This particular crew received the right to ship chestnuts or walnuts for their own accounts on the return voyage from Bordeaux.

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spirits”. When brandy once again became part of the daily rations in 1640, the amount of Spanish wine issued to the men decreased; over a 3–day cycle, sailors received brandy on two consecutive days followed by Spanish wine on the third day. By 1656, the VOC regulations prescribed the following weekly rations, which have been combined with Lucassen’s estimates about the employment levels in the combined Dutch eets in the decade 1630 –1640 in order to come up with a rough idea of the maritime sector’s potential total alcohol demand.84 Table 4.15 Estimated maximum demand for alcohol by the Dutch eet, ca. 1650 [ in liters based on year-round employment of all men] LITERS Spanish wine Brandy

1656 weekly 50,000 ration men / weekly 2.33 0.285

116,500 14,250

1656 yearly ration

‘tons’ = barrels @912 liters

6,058,000 741,000

6,643 812

Sources: Van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie; and Lucassen, Zeevarenden

These estimates are clearly too high, but impossible to quantify with more precision without knowing the actual size of the crews instead of the prescribed size; the actual number of days the men were employed; and the type plus size of the rations on maritime routes other than the roundtrip to Asia. For example, the freight contracts specify that crews on the Dutch ‘wine eet’ to France were issued drinking wine, but we have no evidence of brandy being part of their daily fare. Despite these uncertainties, it is safe to say that the demand of the Dutch eet greatly contributed to the strength of the Dutch market for imported wines and brandies. It is also clear that only the highest quality French wines

84 Dam and others, 516–517 and 521–523 and Jan Lucassen, “Zeevarenden,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 132. Lucassen’s estimates range from 35,000 men around 1610 to 50,000 men in the 1630s; by about 1680, the weight of the different branches had changed but the absolute number of men remained fairly steady at about 55,000. Lucassen points out that the actual number of sailors is perhaps 25 percent less, due to the same men signing up for several voyages per year to regions relatively close to home. My gratitude to Willem Klooster who noted in a personal correspondence that scurvy sufferers on Piet Heyn’s famous eet of 1628 were issued two ‘mugs’ [mutsjes? = 0.15 liter] per day, one to drink and one to rinse their bleeding gums with. Original source: S. P. L. Honoré Naber, ed. Documenten uit het archief van den Luitenant-Admiraal Piet Heyn [ Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1928], cix.

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were deemed strong enough to withstand the rigors of transoceanic travel. The wines from the region around Nantes certainly never qualied—but the brandy did. Incomplete information on consumption in the second half of the century The only other information that sheds some light on the level of alcohol consumption in the Republic comes from the second half of the century, and it has been included despite being outside our period. A single-year’s worth of port records for Amsterdam does not mention the different varieties, so all we know is that from 1 October 1667 to 30 September 1668 a total of 23,360.5 tons of “French wines” were unloaded in the city. Only 2,738 tons of French wines left Amsterdam that same year, which misleadingly suggests that the good people of Amsterdam consumed 20,622.5 tons or 88.3 percent of that year’s imports. If we dare abuse De Vries & Van der Woude’s population estimate of 220,000 people in the 1680s, the per capita consumption of French wines would have been 85.6 liters per year or almost 0.25 liter per day for every man, woman, and child. This would correspond nicely to the daily ration of 0.3 liter of wine per VOC crewmember, but not every Dutch family was able to afford wines as part of their daily diet. In reality, most did not drink wine but the happy few did. In Amsterdam, the slightly more affordable French wines dominated the market; the gures for Spanish wines in the same period are 2,067 tons imported and 545 tons exported. The quantity of French brandy is buried in one all-encompassing listing for brandies and brandewijnen, of which 11,950 tons were imported and 1,105 tons were destined for the export market. Before we draw the conclusion that the burghers of Amsterdam were lushes who—in addition to the wines—warmed their bellies with 10,845 tons of hard liquor [an annual consumption of 45 liters of brandewijn per capita, or 0.12 liters per day] we must point out that a signicant quantity of brandy was destined for the crews of the city’s navy and merchant marine.85

85 Brugmans: 180 –181. For the population estimate, see De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 65. For the estimates of the number of sailors / crewmembers who left port in the employ of the Dutch navy or merchant marine, see Lucassen, 131–132.

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The single set of available statistics for French wine and brandy imports into Rotterdam for that same period is even less usable as a source for a consumption estimate because the Convoy & Licenten register of 1680 combines the information on Rotterdam with that on its Maas-river rival Dordrecht. If we accept the standard division of ‘labor’ between the two towns, Rotterdam imported the bulk of the French and Spanish wines ‘brought in by the sea’, while Dordrecht took care of the Rhine wines coming downstream. Contrary to the situation in Amsterdam twelve years earlier, the 5,829 tons of re-exported French wine took up a respectable 67 percent of the 8,709.75 tons imported that year. A modest 155.5 tons of Spanish wine arrived, of which 74 tons again left the Maze region. No imports of Rhine wines were registered that year, but someone’s warehouse yielded 89.6 tons for export. Against the 1,287.5 tons of imported brandy, the register lists 641.6 tons of exports, suggesting a minimum consumption in the Maze area of almost half of the foreign brandy.86 We must, however, place these odd import data next to reports of brandy exports found in the registers of a single notary in Nantes. In 1683, Rotterdam imported 2256,5 tons of brandy against 592 tons leaving for Amsterdam. Two years later, the volumes decreased to 980.5 tons to Rotterdam and 243.5 tons to Amsterdam.87 If the exports to Rotterdam alone, recorded by a single notary in a single French port already surpass the gures cited in the Dutch list of 1680 that combines both Rotterdam and Dordrecht, we must place even more of an asterisk next to the latter document as a source of statistics. We must also keep in mind that the brandy import statistics, no matter how incomplete, reveal nothing about the volume of brandewijn, be it grain or beer based, that was produced and then consumed domestically. The journey of the brandies and wines from the French vineyards to the taverns’ tankards must be placed within the wider context of Dutch coastal trade. The international merchants who purchased the alcohol in France and shipped it to the Republic did so as part of the vast network of traders, nanciers, and entrepreneurs that made Europe’s early modern maritime sector such an essential part of the

86 Posthumus, “Statistiek Van Den in- En Uitvoer Van Rotterdam En Dordrecht in Het Jaar 1680,” 536–537. The brandy imports obviously remain silent about the quantities of brandewijn, be they grain or beer based, produced domestically. 87 Michaud, 80.

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greater Atlantic economy. The next chapter discusses the close link between Dutch international traders and Sephardic merchants in port cities all along Europe’s coastline that provided this multilayered system with such exibility.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SEPHARDIM AND THE DUTCH The mayors, magistrates and councilmen of the city of Rotterdam let it be known that in order to promote trade and commerce in this city, we nd it useful to invite the merchants of the Portuguese nation to come and reside in this named city by extending several privileges and freedoms . . . .1 Rotterdam’s Jewish charter, 26 August 1610

The political—economic climate The wars of the late 16th and rst half of the 17th century disrupted established commercial patterns along the Atlantic coast of Europe. By manipulating economic conditions, governments attempted to create nancial difculties for the treasuries of their opponents. The Spanish government imposed embargoes in order to stop the ow of goods and bullion to the Dutch Republic, which traditionally had a positive trade balance with Iberia. The idea behind the Spanish trade embargoes against the Dutch, in place most of the years from 1585 through 1647, was to make maritime commerce so difcult and thus expensive that it would break the Dutch budget, which would then force the Republic to sue for peace at terms favorable to Spain.2 Overall, idea is similar to an arms race in which you assume that the resources of your enemy are

1 Hugo Grotius and Jakob Meyer, ed., Remonstrantie Nopende De Ordre Dije in De Landen Van Hollandt Ende Westvrieslandt Dijent Gestelt Op De Joden (1615) (Amsterdam: 1949), 45. Opening sentence of Rotterdam’s Jewish charter as reproduced in Jakob Meyer’s Introduction. 2 P. J. Blok, “Een Merkwaardig Aanvalsplan, Gericht Tegen Visscherij En Handel Der Vereenigde Nederlanden in De Eerste Helft Der 17de Eeuw,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 19 (1898): 53–60. The anonymous writer of a report to the Archdukes in Brussels in 1607 buttressed his argument with a slew of statistics on the eet size and crew requirement of the Dutch merchant marine and the navy that was needed to protect it in the various regional trades. The embargo was lifted thrice: from 1590 –1598; during a brief window from 1603 to 1604 when trade was allowed upon the payment of 30 percent duty; and during the Twelve Year Truce [1609 –1621] when normal trade occurred. A royal directive lifted the trade embargo as per 2 August 1608, so the commercial truce lasted longer than the diplomatic Twelve Year Truce.

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the sephardim and the dutch Table 5.1 against: 1585–1590 1598–1604 1604–1609 1621–1635 1635–1647 1647–1655 1655–1659 1659 –1660 1689 –1697

Spanish trade embargoes, 1585–1700

Dutch Republic X X X X X

France

England X X

X X X

X X

X

never going to be as great as yours, so you break their economic power by breaking their treasury. It did not quite work for Spain, but later in the century it worked for the combined naval forces of England and France, because the internal divisions between Dutch maritime versus landlocked provinces prevented a united revenue-raising front to up the naval ante sufciently. The Dutch government’s attitude to the economics of warfare showed a more pragmatic side. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Netherlands was permitted, but tightly controlled under a system of Convoy fees—which paid for the naval protection of the merchant eet—and Licenses which generated custom revenues.3 The French government actively supported the Dutch in their ght against the Habsburg empire through cash subsidies to the States General and through trade privileges to Dutch merchants operating on its soil. Of course the ofcial bans on trade diminished neither supply nor demand for import/export commodities, but only forced merchants involved in coastal trade to create new routes, new destinations, and new commercial connections. The ports of southwestern France, including La Rochelle, Nantes, Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz, were ideally situated to act as transit points in the Dutch trade on Iberia, while Hamburg provided a neutral base for Dutch shipping between the Baltic and Spain. The importance of the Sephardic Jewish slash New Christian network in the various schemes to evade the embargo has been discussed by a

3 Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy, and the Jews, 1585–1713, 1–41 and 189 –212.

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number of historians, but their models do neither reect the full extent of the symbiotic relationship between the Sephardic and gentile trading communities, nor the elasticity of their geographic interconnectedness along the European coast. Prosopographical information derived from a combination of Dutch and French notarial records, genealogical studies and a multinational variety of local histories conrms that the relationship between members of the Jewish diaspora and early Dutch multinational mercantile families enabled a successful—albeit incomplete—circumvention of the economic and political obstacles created by the embargoes.4 A relative welcome Odette Vlessing’s detailed study of Amsterdam’s Sephardic community has shown that the early Dutch regulations governing the commercial activities of the ‘Portuguese’ in the United Provinces reect the acute awareness of the States General of the group’s economic value. Safeconducts issued by the government in 1581, 1588 and 1592 give the Portuguese the same trading privileges as Dutch merchants, but with two important provisos. The Jewish merchants had to work within the Dutch legal framework and, even more signicantly, all trade had to be channeled via the northern Netherlands. In other to bring much needed cash into the nascent government’s coffers through custom revenues and other staple fees, ‘voorbijvaart ’ or direct trade by-passing Holland was strictly forbidden. Just as the government knew the value of the Sephardic contribution, the members of the Portuguese nation realized that this gave them solid leverage in any negotiable situation.5 We nd an echo of Sephardic threats to pack up and go elsewhere if 4 The anti-Inquistion method of using one or more aliases makes identication of Portuguese families as Sephardim very difcult, but as Hermann Kellenbenz has noted, historians are able to track some Portuguese merchants exactly because of the denunciations in the Inquisition registers which mention the victim’s real and assumed name. Cross-referencing is crucial; historians have had the tendency to focus on a single town, region, or country and have therefore missed some obvious links. 5 Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam,” in Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times; Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf (The Hague: 1995), 223–224. Vlessing uses a case dating from as early as 1601, which proves that at least 18 Jewish merchants living in Amsterdam at that time owned over 300,000 guilders worth pepper, sugar, cash, and jewels spread over six ships captured by the English. The States General did indeed go to bat on their behalf.

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the government could not solve problems to their satisfaction in the haughty attitude of the Dutch community in Nantes when faced with French restrictive measures.6 Both groups knew their worth to the local economy and set their demands accordingly. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, a double push and single pull led to a renewed surge in Portuguese migrations within Europe: The Spanish reconquest of Antwerp in 1595 negatively affected the city’s business climate, and the ban on Jews under the regime of the fervently Catholic archdukes as well as a renewed clampdown on New Christians suspected of Judaism in Portugal in 1606—after a brief hiatus—forced the members of the Sephardic community to look for safer and more protable havens. The Sephardim settled in places that offered the best conditions in which to continue their Atlantic trade, and these included Rotterdam and Nantes. Carefully considered and much debated, the Dutch welcome to Sephardic immigrants was based on the recognition of the economic benets of hosting a nancially solvent group of international traders with excellent connections to their counterparts in the Spanish empire. Rotterdam opened its commercial arms in 1610, six years before Amsterdam issued its Jewish charter, most likely because of the strong commercial ties between some of Rotterdam’s most successful merchants and their Sephardic business partners in the old economic powerhouse Antwerp.7 Rotterdam’s leadership discussed a possible Jewish settlement and the idea to recruit emigrants from Antwerp’s Sephardim in 1604–1605. But those Sephardim who were already in Holland opposed this last plan, “fearing that a ‘Jewish colony’ would jeopardize their goods in Spain and Portugal.”8 Commercial ties between outwardly Catholic ‘New Christians’ in Iberia and openly Jewish traders in Holland would be tantamount to an open invitation to the Grand Inquisitor to investigate and prosecute the Iberian

6 ADLA B 6781, Proces des Hollandais contre les Tonneliers, 8 July 1678; see the top of chapter 1. 7 Grotius and Meyer. Introduction Meyer, 16–17 and 37–38. As early as 10 May 1604, the city of Alkmaar in northern Holland had granted its Jewish residents the rst proper Jewish charter which incorporated the freedom of worship and civic equality with burghers. Civic duties included the payment of taxes, but militia duty was avoided through the payment of a fee. 8 Jacob Zwarts, in Geschiedenis Der Joden in Nederland. Amsterdam, ed. Hendrik and A. Frank Brugmans (Amsterdam: Van Holkema & Warendorf NV, 1940), 383–384.

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merchants.9 Yet the discussion continued, and the States of Holland commissioned Hugo Grotius, the most eminent legal mind of his time and Rotterdam’s representative, to report on the positive and negative aspects of ofcially tolerating Jewish communities within the province. Grotius’ treatise of 1615 argued in favor of open—albeit conditional— acceptance of Jews in the towns of Holland.10 At a time of enormous tensions between two competing factions of the Protestant faith as well as continued confessional strife between the Protestants and the Catholics, the Dutch Republic offered a relatively safe and guardedly tolerant environment for openly Jewish people eeing areas where they were persecuted as crypto-Jews and fake-New Christians. The inux of Sephardim with their commerce, connections, and capital provided a conduit for the unparalleled expansion of the Dutch economy, while at the same time it offered the signicant benets of a Dutch residency to the Sephardim. As noted by Israel, the symbiotic relationship had all the ingredients of a win-win situation, especially when seen in the greater context of the Dutch struggle for ofcial independence from Spanish overlordship.11 It is impossible to prove

9 The power of the Calvinists in Amsterdam had negative impact on initial settlement and attempts to openly live as Jews. The city’s Jewish charter dates from 1616, but as late as 8 April 1618 the municipality withheld permission for Jewish cemetery, so the early burials of the Amsterdam Sephardim took place in neighboring Oudekerk instead. Miriam Bodian, Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation: Conversos and Community in Early Modern Amsterdam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 47 & 61. Despite its strong commercial ties to Antwerp and its role as the commercial center of Zeeland, the city of Middelburg did not ofcially open its doors to Sephardic immigrants when the refugees left Antwerp. As early as 1591 the town had received a suggestion from the “Jewish envoy of the Sultan of Marocco” to welcome the Sephardim. The city’s ministers had bristled against the stipulation of religious freedom for the Jews, and as a result the Jewish leaning Sephardim initially bypassed Middelburg in favor of several towns in Holland. Pieter Jacobus Meertens, Middelburg Zevenhonderd Vijftig Jaar Stad (Middelburg, 1967), 7–8, speech. This did not mean, however, that no Jews settled there. By 1668, interrogation evidence from Inquisition les proves that the situation had changed dramatically: “possible motive for deciding to live [ in Middelburg] was so as to live freely as a Jew.” Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 285–286. 10 Grotius and Meyer. 11 Israel, “Sephardic Immigration,” 44. and Jonathan I. Israel, European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550 –1750, 3rd ed. (London; Portland, Or.: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998). Israel also focuses on the pro-Sephardic conditions and the attractiveness of the “central position of the Republic . . . in international trade, the nancial market and shipping . . .” to Sephardic Jews. “These circumstances offered unparalleled opportunities, not just for native or immigrant Jews but also for experienced traders of a variety of origins.” Jonathan I. Israel, “De Republiek Der Verenigde Nederlanden Tot Omstreeks 1750,” in Geschiedenis Van De Joden in Nederland,

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which came rst, the attractive conditions for Jews in Holland or the Dutch realization that a close alliance with the Sephardic community offered clear opportunities at an international level.12 The Sephardic diaspora certainly preceded the period of the most rapid Dutch economic expansion, but the signicant role of the Sephardic communities in Holland—and especially in Amsterdam—developed in conjunction with this expansion and to the mutual benet of both parties. A global instead of national framework Israel has presented the diminishing Sephardic immigration into the Dutch Republic—and especially into Amsterdam—following the end of the Twelve Year Truce in 1621 as a purely negative factor that beneted commercial centers elsewhere along the Atlantic coast, but this uctuating immigration pattern should in my view be seen in the context of the global diaspora.13 Instead of focusing on the movements of the Sephardim from a purely Dutch angle, we should consider the bigger picture. Fluid movement of Sephardim among Atlantic port cities happened in response to the business climate at the supply and demand sides, as well as to the shipping climate that was inuenced by politics, i.e. the embargoes, especially since transportation services were such an important segment of the Dutch economy. Rather than hurting the economy, the mobility and elasticity of the Sephardic network beneted Dutch and Spanish commerce because it ensured the continued ow of goods and prots. We only need to consider the active support of such mobility by Holland’s municipal governments through supple immigration and emigration policies. Numerous studies have examined the longevity and permanence of Sephardic communities, especially Amsterdam and Hamburg, but it seems that the commercially oriented members of the Portuguese nation viewed their settlement in one place as a temporary solution to specic conditions of the global market place. For the rst half of the seventeenth century, the addition of a national label to almost any

ed. J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuks-Mansfeld, and Ivo Schöffer (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 98. My translation. 12 Daniel Swetschinski grants the initiative to “Christian merchants from the Dutch Republic in the last quarter of the sixteenth century”, but the situation was so uid and multi-layered that this issue dees a denitive answer. See Swetschinski, 105. 13 Israel, “Sephardic Immigration,” 50 –52.

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Sephardim is shortsighted and ignores the reality of a vast network of relationships that spanned both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.14 Swetschinski even states that “to all intents and purposes—socially and economically as well as culturally—Amsterdam-Hamburg-London must be considered one single community.”15 In other words, the moniker ‘Dutch Sephardic Jew’ is a modern name for someone who was a member of the Sephardic “nation” who happened to reside in the Dutch Republic at a certain point in his career.16 The records abound in evidence of ‘city hopping’ within the Sephardic network, but we must recognize that the Dutch commercial community was as mobile and elastic in its business decisions as its Sephardic counterpart. Economic rather than religious motives decided the place of residence, and the residence prescribed the religion. Before twenty-two year old Luis Vaz Pimentel fell into the hands of the Portuguese Inquisition, he had worked in Antwerp and Rouen and he had visited both Rotterdam and Hamburg. While visiting relatives in Hamburg, his uncle initially tried to convince him to embrace Judaism, but then conceded that in view of Luis’ plans to return to Lisbon it might be wise remain uncircumcised and Catholic. Luis’ younger brother João moved from Antwerp to Amsterdam, converted, and was circumcised.17 A career in Portugal prescribed Catholicism, a sibling’s settlement in Holland made it advisable and possible to be openly Jewish. Sephardim who continued to work in Antwerp [and any other place within the Spanish empire] did so as outwardly committed [New] Christians. Once inside the Dutch Republic, it behooved to revert to Judaism. Boyadijan noted that as Catholics, refugee New Christians were not welcome in the still jittery Calvinist provinces, but as [re-converted]

14 In his article on Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz, Michel Morineau talks about “the uidity of the Jewish diaspora which often legitimizes a plurality of labels”. Morineau, “Bayonne Et Saint-Jean-De-Luz,” 316. My translation. 15 Swetschinski, 69. 16 Examples of Sephardic ‘city hopping’ include Mardochay Franco alias Christovao Mendes (Amsterdam, Porto); Manuel Rodriguez Vega (Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam); Francisco de Medina alias Frederick Wolf (Bordeaux, Amsterdam, Middelburg); Josiau Pardo (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Curacao, Jamaica); Lopo Ramirez alias David Curiel (Amsterdam, Rotterdam); Fernao Alvares Melo alias David Abenatar Melo (Lisbon, Amsterdam, Hamburg) and João Nunes Henriques alias Moseh Cabessaeo alias Abraham Nunes Henriques (Antwerp, France, Rotterdam, Jerusalem). 17 Herman P. Salomon, “The Case of Luis Vaz Pimentel. Revelations of Early Jewish Life in Rotterdam from the Portuguese Inquisition Archives,” Studia Rosenthaliana 31 (1997): 17 and 19.

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Jews they were allowed to settle, trade, and worship in private.18 In many cases, the return to the old faith was thus an economic decision, illustrated by numerous examples in which members of the same family professed adherence to that particular creed that was acceptable to their location, as well as instances in which men switched back and forth depending on where they worked. One of the more calculating decisions occurred towards the end of the Thirty Years War when the De Pintos, among Antwerp’s richest New Christian families, placed portions of their capital in Amsterdam, Venice, and Rouen. Depending on the nal outcome of the war, the family could move to Venice or Rouen and remain Christian, or to Holland and adopt Judaism. The De Pintos ended up in Rotterdam, where the men in the family were circumcised on only their second day in residence.19 Kellenbenz observes that it continued to be crucial for any rm involved in the trade on Spain, Portugal, the Spanish Netherlands and Spain’s American and Asian territories to have an outwardly Christian representative in Antwerp, the commercial center of the Netherlands. As part of the Habsburg empire, Antwerp’s merchants imported and exported “domestic” goods, including silver, with relatively few restrictions; non-citizens channeled their merchandize for the New World via these middlemen in Antwerp. Gil Lopes Pinto took care of the Antwerp side of the business—which included trade in salt, Brazil-wood, and royal contracts for the nancing of the Spanish Army in Flanders—for his brother Andre Lopes Pinto in Lisbon and for the rm’s partner Bento Osorio in Amsterdam.20 By the strength of their trade with Iberia and as nancial centers, Bruijn considers Antwerp and Amsterdam each other’s equal until about 1650.21 What he omits to spell out is that the end of the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch in 1648 removed the need for Antwerp to serve as an intermediate station in the Iberia/colonial Spanish trade for either goods or their paperwork. The cessation of that role heralded the migration of another wave of New Christians from Antwerp to Holland.

18 James C. Boyajian, “The New Christians Reconsidered: Evidence from Lisbon’s Porguguese Bankers, 1497–1647,” Studia Rosenthaliana 13 (1979): 149. 19 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 29 and ftnt 96. 20 Kellenbenz. For the De Pinto network, see Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 21–22. and the very informative footnotes 77 & 78. 21 J. R. Bruijn, “De Vaart in Europa,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 230 –231.

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If Amsterdam was considered to be the Dutch magnet for Sephardic settlers, how do we assess the contrary movements of Antwerp native Manoel Rodrigues Vega?22 According to Swetchinski, Vega came to the Rotterdam ‘with several of his brothers’ around 1609 after living and working in Amsterdam as a ‘poorter’ for about nine years. During that period, Vega had invested in the VOC, attempted to establish a silk-spinning workshop, imported sugar, and traded on a global basis. This far-ung trading house beneted from the presence of a total of six adult Vega brothers who, at various stages in their lives, resided in Antwerp, Rouen, London, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Brazil, and Guinea. Their brother-in-law Gaspar Sanches may have been the brother of the rm’s trading partner in Lisbon, Bartolomeo Sanches.23 In addition to the places where a family member held the fort, the Vega’s also traded with Madeira, Morocco, Venice, Emden and Danzig. Despite Manoel’s attempt to establish rm roots in Amsterdam, he moved to Rotterdam around 1609, where he was joined by several of his brothers and by Gaspar Sanches.24 22 Bloom, 37 and 102. Bloom places Rodrigues Vega in Nantes for a period of two years starting in 1601. This would reduce the number of years he spent in Amsterdam. 23 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 33/129/188, 2 January 1611 & 33/143/213, 16 February 1611 & 33/152/224, 9 March 1611. “Jasper Samsches” = Gaspar Sanches and a “Portuguese” partner in Antwerp signed a contract with the captain of the 90 last large Grifoen to sail from Rotterdam to the Canary Islands and to Guinea, but in mid-February the captain protested that the freighters had not fullled their part of the agreement to load the outgoing cargo within 40 days of the original contract. By early March, captain Jansz received compensation for the cancellation of the planned voyage to Africa. The aborted trip to Guinea was not an exceptional venture into new waters for Sanches and his partners. On January 11, 1611 Sanches joined forces with Gaspar Fernandus Vega, fellow Rotterdammer, for a contract to bring a cargo of hides and coral from Porto Douala in Guinea to Rotterdam. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 33/132/196. 24 Daniel Swetschinski, “Tussen Middeleeuwen En Gouden Eeuw, 1516–1621,” in Geschiedenis Van De Joden in Nederland, ed. J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuks-Mansfeld, and Ivo Schèoffer (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 88–89. Further information on the Vega family is provided by E. M. Koen, “Duarte Fernandes, Koopman Van De Portugese Natie Te Amsterdam,” Studia Rosenthaliana 2, no. 2 (1968): 181. A certain Duarte Fernandes Vega, baptized in Antwerp in 1587, may have been one of the brothers. He arrived in Rotterdam either before or in 1613, where he acted as agent for Josuah Habilho alias Duarte Fernandes, native of Porto and an important and early Sephardic immigrant to Amsterdam [1598] who was one of the co-founders the Dotar. Another brother, Michel Viegas, was the son-in-law of Francisco Gomes, Portuguese merchant in Amsterdam; see GAR ONA 241/97/154, 11 February 1646.

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As the timing of this move coincided with the beginning of the Truce, are the two linked? In that year, the Spanish Archdukes in Brussels banned all remaining Jews from Antwerp, forcing those who chose to stay to live as good Catholics. In the competition between the various cities of Holland and Zeeland, the economic clout of the Sephardic refugees was a trump card that Rotterdam was eager to get and Amsterdam unwilling to compromise its religious orthodoxy for. Rotterdam’s leaders paved the way by providing a solid legal framework for Sephardic settlers like Vega. It is also possible that the rapid growth of Rotterdam’s commercial sector made the presence of at least some well-connected members of the Sephardic diaspora an economic necessity. On August 24, 1610 Rotterdam’s municipal council passed a resolution to invite the Portuguese community to make the city their new residence. It is likely that Rotterdam made a preemptive move to welcome Antwerp’s rich refugees with open arms in order to deect a mass movement into Amsterdam.25 Economic gain was denitely a prime consideration: The actual charter of 26 August starts with a statement that the city council “nds it useful to invite the Merchants of the Portuguese Nation to come and reside within this city with some privileges and freedoms in order to improve trade and commerce”. Rotterdam’s Jewish charter of 1610 specically used the word ‘merchants’ to indicate the targeted group, a clear indication of the narrow aim of the charter. The attractive settlement guarantees included the right to openly practice the Jewish faith, their own burial ground, and the right to a synagogue once at least thirty families had settled. Apart from these religious benets, Rotterdam’s city fathers promised to act as champions for any Jew whose merchandise was to be conscated in Spain, Portugal, and any other foreign country, which sets the plight of Jews persecuted by the Inquisition in a purely economic context as well. If a Jewish resident of Rotterdam had ed from the Inquisition of Rome or any other tyranny that had robbed him of his possessions and capital, the charter stipulated that his foreign creditors would not be allowed to harass or force the merchant to pay, but that the parties would have to come to a settlement instead. In other words, debts made overseas could not be collected while the debtor resided in Rotterdam,

25

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J. M. Droogendijk, “Een Vergeten Kerkhof,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 3, no. 8 (1930):

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and as an additional bonus the moveable goods of those who arrived by sea were exempt from import custom duties. In order to assure these internationally oriented merchants that their investments and goods would remain rmly under their control, the immigration welcome-mat was accompanied by a liberal e-migration policy, which covered persons, goods, and real estate.26 [ The immigration and emigration policies echo the relaxed regulations under which foreign bullion owed into and out of the Amsterdam Wisselbank.] If “God forbid ” the city fathers would ever change their minds, they promised to give the Portuguese two years notice so that the latter could arrange their affairs to their satisfaction. In view of these privileges, the freedom from the local wine and vinegar impost seems almost an afterthought. For unspecied reasons, the charter and its liberal privileges were withdrawn just two years later, when the city council gave notice to seven representatives of the ‘Portuguese nation’: Magnus de Mom, Emanuel Rodrigues de Vega, Lopez Zanches, Daniel Salom, Anthonis des Toscano, Francisco Lunicensio, and Zymon Rodriges.27 Despite this, Gratia Rodrigus Vega, ‘widow of Gasper Sangez’ and the sister of the above Manuel Rodrigues Veiga, purchased land for a Jewish cemetery for 200 guilders in 1612 or 1613.28 Two of these men have emerged from the shadows of history through the voice of an Inquisition informant. Rotterdam merchant Lopes Zanches was host to the future Inquisition informer Luis Vaz Pimentel; when arrested by the Inquisition in Lisbon, Pimentel initially accused ‘Lopo Sanches’, ‘Manuel Rodrigues de Vega’ plus three other Rotterdam Jews of forcibly circumcising him in September 1612. He later withdrew that accusation and admitted that the circumcision, performed by Rodrigues de Vega, had been done at his own request, i.e. his conversion to the Jewish faith had been voluntary. According to Pimentel, the Jews of Rotterdam met in a room of Sanches’ house which had been set up as a synagogue. Lopo Sanches, “a thin and very pale man of about 40 years of age, with a blond beard reaching half-way down his chest”, planned to go to Lisbon in January 1613 on a ship he had

26 Grotius and Meyer, 45–46. See also Morineau, “Quelques Remarques Sur L’abondance Monétaire Aux Provinces-Unis.” 27 Grotius and Meyer, 45–46. The full text of Rotterdam’s Jewish charter is reprinted in Meyer’s introduction to Grotius’ position paper. The charter was withdrawn on 12 September 1612. 28 Droogendijk: 67.

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chartered himself, ostensibly to visit a son and an estranged brother.29 The testimonies conrm not just the intricate family ties that bound the Sephardim together, but also the active participation of Rotterdam’s Sephardim in the trade on Iberia in the early decades of the century. According to Israel, the Jewish community in Rotterdam that existed around 1610 had disappeared by the time Gil Lopes Pinto and his brother Rodrigo Alvares Pinto immigrated to that city from Antwerp in November 1646.30 This is refuted by Rotterdam’s notarial records plus two contemporary documents that overow with names and family connections. At least fourteen “Portuguese” men, especially members of the Vega/Veiga family, traded in Rotterdam in the rst half of the century. We also know that some members of the Espinoza clan, especially the father and uncle of the philosopher Spinoza, settled in Rotterdam. In addition to those, it is likely that the aliases of a few other merchants were sufciently Dutch to mask their Sephardic roots.31 Notarial acts conrm the activities of Emmanuel Rodriguez Vega in 1612–1613, Gaspar Fernandus Vega from 1611 through 1625, and Duarto Fernandes Vega from 1613 (when he was 24 years old) until 1646. The men traded not just for the family rm but acted on behalf of the wealthy and powerful Lisbon rm of Andre Lopes Pinto and its Amsterdam partner Bento Osorio.32 From the earliest days of settlement

29 Salomon, “Early Jewish Life in Rotterdam,” 15–24. According to another 17th century source, the synagogue was located in the attic of João Veiga alias David Namias. See Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 40. If we are dealing with the same synagogue, the owner of the house used three different names: Lopes Sanches alias João Veiga alias David Namias. This suggests that Lopes Sanches was one of the brothers of Manuel Rodrigues Vega. 30 Israel, “De Republiek Der Verenigde Nederlanden Tot Omstreeks 1750,” 107. The only possible explanation for Israel’s statement is that under the Jewish laws the minyan, the minimum number of 10 men needed to conduct Sabbath services could at some point no longer be mustered. This would have meant the theological disappearance of a Jewish community. 31 GAR, ONA notarial records from 1611 through 1646. The use of multiple aliases both helped and hindered to identify Sephardic merchants throughout this study. Where possible, I cross-checked the names with lists compiled by other historians. I did not include Joachim de Wolff [possibly a Medina], Abraham and Jacques Motte [possibly linked to the Espinozes of Nantes and David Motte Sr & Jr in Hamburg in 1619], Jacques l’Heremite [with family members in Bordeaux, Antwerp and Hamburg], Isaac & Jacob Castel [van de Castel/Castille?]; Jacob van de Riviere [Ribeiro or de los Rios?]; Alexander van den Berge [Delmonte?]; and Isaac & Jacob van der Marct [de Mercado?] The other two documents, both edited by H. P. Salomon, are the memoirs of Ishac de Pinto and the Inquisition records pertaining to Luiz Vaz Pimentel. Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 1–62. and Salomon, “Early Jewish Life in Rotterdam.” 32 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 101/76/105, 27 October 1619. On the orders of Osorio in

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in Rotterdam, the new immigrants got together for religious services in the attic of João Veiga, alias David Namias, almost certainly Vega brother number four. João lived until at least 1647, because after the De Pinto family emigrated from Antwerp to Rotterdam in 1646, they attended services in his attic.33 There is no reason to doubt that João was none other than the man known in Dutch records as ‘Jan Viegas’, trading in Rotterdam from 1628 through 1642. Jan Viegas worked closely with [ his brother?] Francisco Rodrigo Viega in Lisbon, and acted as agent for Amsterdam merchant Diego Martijns.34 Jan’s son Michiel joined his dad as junior partner by 1636 and continued trading through at least 1646. One other Amsterdam Sephardim copied the Vega family’s move to Rotterdam. Isaacq de Coste lived in Amsterdam as a 31 year old in 1633, but when he disputed the sale of ve barrels of tobacco in 1637 he resided along Rotterdam’s Schiedamsendijck. Rotterdam’s Jewish community was very small compared to that of Amsterdam, but contrary to reports of its early demise it denitely continued to exist as an active trading hub throughout the rst half of the century. Rotterdam versus Amsterdam It is not possible to quantify the economic power of the Jewish settlement in Rotterdam versus that of Amsterdam. The history of Amsterdam’s Sephardic community has greatly beneted from the survival of its archives, whereas those of the Rotterdam group have disappeared. Vlessing has used the internal assessment of the Portuguese community in Amsterdam, the Imposta, to analyze the individual wealth of its members. The Imposta was levied on the value of the annual business turnover and has yielded solid economic information.35 Without similar records on the Portuguese community in Rotterdam, the survival of the

Amsterdam, Duarte and Gaspaer Fernandus Vega acquired 100 quintals Brazil wood from Pinto in Lisbon. The wood was transferred from the ocean going vessel onto a lighter for trans-shipment to Amsterdam. For the Lisbon rm of Andre Lopes Pinto and Osorio’s role as factor in Amsterdam, see Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 21–22 and ftnt 77–78. 33 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 40. As noted before, João Vega probably also used the alias Lopes Sanches. We will return to the De Pinto clan below. 34 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 99/14/27, 20 January 1633 and GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 150/810/1233, 16 September 1636. 35 Vlessing, 226–229.

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Imposta registers of Amsterdam has skewed the historical balance even further towards Amsterdam. In addition to those internal records, the accounts of the Amsterdam Wisselbank survive and were critically edited by Van Dillen who also used them to illustrate the economic clout of the city’s mercantile elite and to highlight the important role played by the Sephardic account holders. The account books of the Rotterdam Wisselbank have disappeared, once again preventing a comparison of the two economies based on hard data.36 We should modify our idea of a sharp a differentiation between Amsterdam’s Sephardic community and that of Rotterdam. The various trading houses were so closely intertwined by marriage that it remains unclear in whose ledger the ultimate prots showed up. Even if those prots entered the coffers of the Amsterdam based trading houses, notarial records highlight an intensive and seamless commercial cooperation with Rotterdam merchants using Rotterdam factors in foreign ports as well as Rotterdam ships to import or export commodities on behalf of Amsterdam’s merchants. Take, for example, two transactions that took place during the Truce years when trade between Spain, Portugal and the Republic owed freely. Notarial evidence conrms the close working relationship between the merchants of Amsterdam—be they gentile or Sephardim—and those of Rotterdam. First, when the ‘Portuguese’ merchant Gaspar Sanches died in Rotterdam [early in 1612?], three members of the Van Papenbroeck rm formerly of Antwerp but now based in Amsterdam empowered Rotterdam merchant Jasper Moermans to take care of “all their business” pertaining to Sanches’ estate.37 Second, in the fall of 1619, Duarte and Gaspar Fernandus Vega, acting on behalf of Bento Hosorio [Osorio] in Amsterdam, imported 100 quintals of Brasil wood into Rotterdam from Lisbon on the ‘Fortuyne’ after which a lighter took the wood from Rotterdam

36 Dillen, ed. Documents pertaining to the Rotterdam Wisselbank merely cover its establishment and early administration; the account registers are lost. Kellenbenz has published a list of the initial account holders of the Hamburg Exchange Bank dating from 1619. See Kellenbenz, 239. 37 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 54/98/207, 7 February 1612. Jasper Moermans may have been related to Michel Meerman, who became a naturalized citizen of Bordeaux as early as 1603. See Leroux, 36. In 1585, Michel, Simon and Lion ‘Marman’ and their families emigrated from Antwerp to Middelburg. See J. L. M. Eggen, De Invloed Door Zuid-Nederland Op Noord-Nederland Uitgeoefend Op Het Einde Der Xvie En Het Begin Der Xviie Eeuw (Ghent: Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie, 1908), 214.

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to Amsterdam. This case also points out the danger of stressing the superiority of Amsterdam, because the man who supplied the exotic wood in Lisbon was the head of a far-ung trading house for which Osorio acted as its Amsterdam correspondent.38 Given the lack of clear borders, under what heading do we le transactions such as the above: Rotterdam trade, Amsterdam trade, Lisbon trade, Iberian trade or for that matter Brazil trade? Compared to Amsterdam, Rotterdam was not the Sephardic backwater that historians have made it out to be, at least not in the rst part of the century. Not only did the Vega clan move from Amsterdam to Rotterdam, but several decades later a very wealthy and well-connected New Christian family of nanciers migrated from Antwerp to Rotterdam instead of going to Amsterdam. The De Pinto family left Antwerp and the protable patronage of the Spanish court in Brussels in the summer of 1646 when negotiations between Spain and the Republic were well on their way to create peace between the long-term enemies.39 Once the decision was made to leave Spanish territories, why did they come to Rotterdam instead of Amsterdam or one of the other towns in Holland that welcomed Sephardim? The family’s chronicler does not enlighten us. Perhaps it was because more money could be made in a market where fewer competitors meant a greater share of the pie, or perhaps the presence in Rotterdam of a close relative ensured a smoother immigration.40

38 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 101/76/105, 27 October 1619. At this stage, Bento Osorio was the richest Jewish merchant in DR. As agent of Lisbon merchant Andrea Lopes Pinto, Osorio chartered over 200 ships for salt transport from Setubal in Portugal to North in the years 1615–1618. With 6000 guilders, Osorio was the biggest Jewish investor in the WIC, indicating his interest in the sugar and/or slave trade. Biographical information in Israel, “De Republiek Der Verenigde Nederlanden Tot Omstreeks 1750,” 114. 39 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 28 and ftnt 91–92. The Pinto brothers served as nanciers who bankrolled the expenses of the huge Spanish army in Flanders. Their nancial clout raised envious eyebrows. Salomon explains that sometime before 1641, the brothers had been offered knighthoods in the Order of Santiago. The knights could not have any interests in commerce, and would also be required to pay “an enormous annual tax and other pecuniary obligations to the crown. Under [minister] Olivares (1623–1643), such a title . . . became a positive liability.” It was time to skip town. For token New-Christians contemplating a move to the Dutch Republic where Judaism could be embraced, the knights’ solemn vow to serve the Virgin Mary may have been another factor which led the Pinto brothers to decline the honor. 40 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 179/68/121, 18 April 1642. When Gil de Pinto’s brother in law Diego Soares [ here listed as Diego Suares Drago] migrated from Antwerp to Rotterdam in 1642, the convoluted way in which he rst rented a house indicates that the family tried to keep things under the radar screen. Ofcially, the Dutch owner of

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The decision may actually have been made for them. As royal nanciers and “vassals of the king of Spain” the De Pintos were classied as enemies of the still-rebellious Dutch state, so they needed permission from the States General to settle in the Republic.41 Rotterdam’s delegate to this institution, wine merchant and Nantes-veteran Hendrik Rammelman may have exerted enough pull on this occasion to haul these very fat sh out of the Sephardic refugee pond. I believe that a ‘lobbying fee’ paid to Rammelman for his interventions in The Hague came in the form of a real estate transaction: It is just too much of a coincidence that sometime in 1647, Rammelman sold Gil Lopes de Pinto his newly built house on the southern quay of the Wijnhaven for the outrageous sum of 36,000 guilders, which was more than 29,000 guilders above the construction costs.42 Ishac de Pinto conrms that another house in Rotterdam cost his uncle [and future father in law] “a huge amount of money” in 1647.43 As the century progressed, the gap between the Sephardic communities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam grew in numbers and in cultural richness. By the time of the death of Gil Lopes/Abraham de Pinto in Rotterdam in 1668, two of his sons and a daughter had moved to Amsterdam, and a third son had settled in Hamburg. Son Ishac de Pinto, the author of his family’s detailed history, gives the reason for his secondary move from Rotterdam to Amsterdam: “. . . we decided

the house rented it for 620 guilders per year “to Jan Viegas, local Portuguese merchant, on behalf of Hendrick Fernandes, merchant in Amsterdam, in order to be inhabited by Diego Suares Drago, Portuguese merchant in Antwerp”. 41 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 35. 42 Engelbrecht, 185. Rammelman held multiple municipal ofces, and served as one of Holland’s deputies to the States General in the 1645, 1646, and 1653. See also Jacob Zwarts, “De 17e Eeuwsche Rotterdamsche Leerschool “Jesiba De Los Pintos,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 10 (1922): 56. In 1654, the value of this house was 40,000 carolus guilders. Ishac’s father purchased a stately mansion for 36,000 guilders soon after it was built for wine merchant and city notable Hendrik Rammelman for no more than 6,600. The two houses purchased by the De Pinto brothers were “the two best city houses”, but in other real estate transactions in Rotterdam that same year the two highest prices paid for houses were 9,400 guilders and 9,000 guilders respectively. The only more expensive transaction on record involved the sale of a warehouse on the water’s edge for 12,670 guilders. So yes, the De Pintos paid way above the market price. 43 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 40. Gil Lopes Pinto and his brother Rodrigo Alvares Pinto purchased “what were then [1646] and are even now [1671] the two best town houses, without paying regard to the huge amount of money we had to lay out for them.”

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we couldn’t stand the isolation of Rotterdam any more”.44 Ishac de Pinto refers to the city’s social isolation with the remark that “it was depressing for young people to live in Rotterdam”, but when he tells us that several other family members had already moved to Amsterdam “because they couldn’t get ahead or do business in Rotterdam” the relocation sounds driven by economic motives.45 The information available from the Convoy & License receipts conrms that the economic power and pull of Amsterdam in the decades after 1650 far outstripped that of Rotterdam.46 The outstanding level of preservation of records pertaining to the large Sephardic community of Amsterdam has to a certain extent obscured the level of interactions between other Dutch communities, including Rotterdam, on the one hand and the Sephardic settlements along the Atlantic on the other. Yes, the Dutch Sephardic center lay in Amsterdam, but not to the exclusion of commercial and social relations between the Portuguese community of Rotterdam and its counterparts elsewhere. At a minimum, the Sephardim of Rotterdam worked as agents or factors for Sephardic trading houses in Lisbon, Madrid, Antwerp, Amsterdam and elsewhere. Rotterdam was an integral part of the greater Sephardic network. According to Swetschinski, this wide-ranging geographic and social network of the Sephardim was, . . . at the nal tally, no more than the unconsciously pursued product of a large number smaller, interrelated family networks that spanned political and religious boundaries and that thereby created a commercial dynamism and power which made them so valuable in the eyes of the Antwerp, Venetian, Florentine and Dutch authorities.47

I take exception to the idea that the efciency and protability of the global network was the result of unconscious business decisions and social actions. To the contrary, the growing literature on the importance of family networks in commercial life—be they Dutch, Sephardic, or any other—points to deliberate, rational marriage policies for both

44 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript,” 43. Ishac de Pinto’s new house in Amsterdam’s Breestraat cost him 19,000 guilders cash in addition to the sale price of his Rotterdam house. 45 Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript.” 44. 46 Westermann and Dillen: 15. 47 Swetschinski, “Tussen Middeleeuwen En Gouden Eeuw, 1516–1621,” 89. My translation and italics.

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sons and daughters, carefully chosen internships for sons, and multiple partnerships that all aim at the broadest coverage of international commercial space. Sephardic exogamy and settlement decisions were economic decisions, with the goal to either preserve or expand the family patrimony.48 The Sephardim of Nantes Nantes, the Atlantic seaport at the mouth of the Loire river, was one of the places in which the Sephardic and the Dutch multinational networks intersected. The Twelve Year Truce between Spain and the Dutch Republic expired in April 1621. Anticipating the renewal of the Spanish embargo, Dutch and Spanish traders adjusted their satellite ofces accordingly. With direct trade between Spain and Holland once again prohibited, trading had to be done via straw-men who could arrange shipping of goods in neutral vessels to transit ports in neutral countries. In Northern Europe, Hamburg with its sizeable Sephardic community and Antwerp with its New Christians as conduit to the Spanish court served that purpose, while several French port cities closest to Spain were active hubs in the Dutch-Iberian trade. In 1621, Nantes became an important trading base for the Dutch and especially for the merchants of Rotterdam. The suggestion by James Collins that the ties between the Sephardim in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Nantes may have contributed to the surge in Dutch activity in the French port around 1620 has been eshed out and conrmed by my own research in the archives of Nantes and Rotterdam while exploring the wine trade.49 The [incomplete] records reveal that, after little activity during the rst two decades of the century, the traceable number of Dutch merchants in Nantes surged from 3 in 1620 to 13 in 1621, and that at least 22 Dutchmen resided along the Loire in 1629.

48

Contemporary sources which conrm the policy of very deliberate alliances through marriage include Glückel, The Memoirs of Glückel of Hameln, trans. Marvin Lowenthal (New York: Schocken Books, 1977). and the memoirs of Ishac de Pinto, published as Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript.” The similarly careful choice of partners in Rotterdam’s gentile circles can be traced in Engelbrecht’s genealogy of the city’s elite, Engelbrecht. Modern works that highlight the care with which Europe’s mercantile class chose its partners include Klein and Veluwenkamp.; Mathias.; and Hamilton. 49 Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 11.

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Strong commercial ties that already existed between Nantes and the north coast of Spain were apparently the primary reason for the Dutch interest in that city at the resumption of the war against Spain. A signicant group of Spanish and Portuguese merchant families had made their home in Nantes since the mid-sixteenth century and were actively involved in the trade with Spain and Portugal, dealing in wool as well as money.50 To all appearances, the New Christians who moved to Nantes in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century remained loyal Catholics, presumably for exactly the same practical reasons that had convinced their kin to convert to the Jewish faith upon their arrival in Holland. Religious conditions in Nantes dictated the lives of the city’s Sephardim. Jews had ofcially been banned from French soil since1396, but small communities of de jure New Christians continued to live relatively securely in France as de facto ‘Portuguese’, i.e. Jews. But as the center of the Catholic League, Nantes was fervently anti-Protestant and anti-Jewish, so the Sephardim who resided there outwardly embraced Catholicism. Tax rolls and naturalization documents reveal, however, that a small Jewish community did exist—if quietly—in Nantes in the 1590s.51 By the early decades of the seventeenth century, economic success had enabled some of the earlier arrivals to become members of the Contractation de Nantes, a group of French and Iberian merchants who enjoyed reciprocal ‘favorite customer’ status and customs benets in their maritime trade with Bilbao, the port city on Spain’s north coast closest to France.52 The ‘Contractation de Nantes’ In the trade relations between Bilbao, the Spanish port city on the Gulf of Biscay, and maritime trading centers along the European shoreline, the Contractation played a signicant role from its start at the beginning of the sixteenth century until 1733. It provided commercial links between Bilbao, Malaga and Seville in Spain; Portugal; Bayonne, La Rochelle, Saint-Malo, Nantes and Rouen along the French coast; Bruges in the Spanish Netherlands; the Hanseatic ports of northern Europe; England; the Canary Islands; and by the seventeenth century some ports in the

50 51 52

Lapeyre. Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 9. Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 296 & 309.

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New World. The Contractation can be dened as an organized network of merchants, (court) ofcials and captains based in these ports who protected and promoted trade with Bilbao on the basis of exclusivity. If you did not belong to the ‘Universidad de mercaderes y maestres de navios’, you were not allowed to participate in your city’s lucrative commerce with Bilbao nor ship merchandize on the jointly chartered or owned Contractation vessels.53 It paid to belong to the Contractation because the group received advantageous tax breaks, such as the exemption from Nantes’ import duty on Spanish woolens exported from Bilbao. This tax break saved the Contractation importer up to 40% of the wool’s value.54 Such reductions in the purchase costs of a vital commodity obviously gave Contractation-members a huge competitive advantage and larger potential prots. Local membership consisted of native as well as Spanish merchants who owned, outtted and freighted ships bound for Spain. A Spanish consul in each port promoted Spain’s commercial interests in the area.55 We should not underestimate the pull of this network on the Dutch traders, who at an early stage seem to have realized the opportunities of a close alliance with members of an existing association who had the scal privileges and the local contacts necessary for protable deals throughout the Spanish empire, which was off-limits to the Dutch. In his localized study, Mathorez states that the success and power of the Contractation de Nantes reached its pinnacle at the end of the 16th century.56 This was precisely the moment that Spanish trade embargoes

53 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 286. The author’s dened the Contractation de Nantes as follows: “une association ou confrérie ayant existé, du début du XVI e siècle a 1733, entre certains negociants, courtiers, capitaines de navires, nantais ou espagnols résidant à Nantes, formant un groupement particulier, et l’ensemble des négociants, capitaines de navires, etc., faisant tous partie obligatoirement de la de Bilbao.” For the addition of the Canary Islands to Jeulin’s list, see Jules Mathorez, « Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne, » Bulletin Hispanique XV, no. 1 (1913): 77–78. The Contractation group closed its doors to newcomers from Iberia: In 1623, a group of Portuguese traders who had arrived in Nantes around the turn of the century attempted to claim the same benets as the Contractation members, but this usurpation of privileges was denied and the cargo holds of the Contractation ships remained offlimits to the wares of the newcomers. Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne,” 80. 54 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 292. and also Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne,” 77–78. 55 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 286. For the addition of the Canary Islands to Jeulin’s list, see Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne,” 77–78. 56 Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne,” 83.

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against the rebellious northern Netherlands started to require alternative ways to ship commodities between the Iberian peninsula, the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic. It is important to remember that the need for continued shipping existed at both ends of the embargo, not just at the Dutch end. Lest we focus on one side of the coin only, we must also consider the benets to the Contractation members in the whole network of using the large and experienced Dutch mercantile eet to transport their precious cargoes. Money could only ow if commodities could get from supply zone to demand zone economically, and in the rst half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch eet provided a major portion of the overall cargo space available for the trade along Europe’s Atlantic and North Sea coasts.57 La Rochelle, another Contractation port, fullled the requirement of a neutral transfer station with proven ties to Iberia up to the start of the Twelve Year Truce in 1609, but during the Truce no such port was necessary. In anticipation of the renewal of the war and its concurrent economic barriers in April 1621, the commercial communities adjusted their business plans. The members of the Contractation in Nantes and the other ports in the system were in a perfect position to take advantage of the changing commercial landscape, and the Dutch Sephardic community plus their gentile Dutch trading partners did not let such an opportunity slip by unnoticed. The privileged ties of the Contractation de Nantes group with Bilbao provided a ready-made platform from which to re-direct trade between the Dutch Republic and Iberia. Through the Sephardic network, they had excellent ties with the twin ports of Bayonne and St. Jean-de-Luz, which both served a vital role in the transfer of goods to and from Spain via the land route across the Pyrenees.58 Due to the civil war fought out on the waters near La Rochelle, that Huguenot stronghold became an unsafe destination in exactly the same period that the Truce expired. Jonathan Israel’s extensive work on the embargo evasions focuses on the strong links between Amsterdam and the Sephardic communities in Bayonne and St. Jean-de-Luz but he dismisses the importance of the

57 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 404–405. By the mid-17th century the Dutch merchant eet is estimated to have been larger than the combined shipping capacity of France, England, and Spain, while the Dutch eet may have been more than four times the size of the English eet alone. 58 Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Espagnols Et Les Portugais À Nantes,” 1–9, as well as Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes”.

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New Christian community of Nantes exactly because they were committed to Catholicism and ‘lost’ to the crypto-Jewish network.59 Others have also failed to recognize the importance of the Catholic Iberians in Nantes, ignoring the benets of having a group of outwardly committed New Christians as part of the greater Sephardic network.60 In addition to its gentile French members, the Contractation included Spanish and Portuguese merchants with Sephardic roots. Through the Contractation, they operated ofcially and openly with their Catholic/New Christian correspondents in Bilbao, Lisbon and elsewhere in the Spanish empire. In this sense the New Christian merchants of Nantes can be compared to their New Christian counterparts in Spanish-controlled Antwerp who [as citizens of the Spanish empire] imported and exported “domestic” goods, including silver, with relatively few restrictions and who could produce or whitewash necessary paperwork.61 In the Dutch scheme to evade the Spanish trade embargo, Nantes became the next ideal mid-way station and the Sephardic members of the Contractation played a key role. All evidence points to a conscious decision by the Dutch merchant community, be they native Dutch or recent Sephardic immigrants operating under their Christian aliases, to use the Iberian community of Nantes as one of the bridges across the embargoed Atlantic. The wines and brandies exported from Nantes to the Republic were an important and valuable added attraction, but denitely not the sole reason for the Dutch interest in the Loire delta. The quest for silver Bullion, and especially silver from the Spanish Americas, played a vital role in early modern economic life. The mercantilist principles that many European governments adhered to called for the stockpiling of as much bullion as possible.62 The Dutch federal government, so infused 59

Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 245–268. Lapeyre, 51. Ofcially, only Catholic citizens were members of the Contractation de Nantes, and they worshipped in their own chapel of Our Lady of Spain in the Church of St. Michel of the Cordeliers convent; the private chapel of the Ruiz family was part of the same church. 61 Kellenbenz. and Bruijn, 230 –231. 62 Clement, ed., Vol. II–1, cclxix. Mémoire sur le Commerce, 3 August 1664. “. . . qu’il n’y a que l’abondance d’argent dans un Estat qui fasse la difference de sa grandeur et de sa puissance”. See also Cole. 60

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with merchants, had instead gured out that bullion in the coffer was good but bullion invested in commercial or productive activities was even better.63 The rapidly developing trade with Asia and the ‘mother negotie’ to the Baltic both required the export of bullion to cover the negative trade balances. As Pieter de la Court observed in 1662: the Holland merchants, who carry money to most parts of the world to buy commodities, must out of this single country of all Europe [Spain] carry home money, which they receive in payment for their goods, without benet and by stealth. . . .64

Before their successful ventures in silver-rich Japan in the late twenties and thirties, the Dutch had to rely on the intra-European trade and their positive trade balances with Spain and France for their silver supplies.65 In 1672, the English ambassador William Temple noted the abundance of silver in the streets of the Republic: And little [return merchandize] coming in to be consumed at home; The rest returns in Coin, and lls the Countrey to that degree, That more Silver is seen in Holland among the common Hands and Purses, than Brass either in Spain or in France.66

A second source of silver was the trade in the commodity itself, silver for silver’s sake. The volume of the Spanish silver imports into the Republic—directly or indirectly—is impossible to quantify due to the duty free status of bullion, the secrecy surrounding shipments of bullion

63 Artur Attman, Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550 –1800, Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum Et Litterarum Gothoburgensis. Humaniora, 23 (Göteborg Sweden: Kungl. Vetenskaps—och Vitterhets-Samhället, 1983), 26–28. 64 Court and Witt, 233. The words near the end of the sentence are obscure, but I assume that ‘without benet’ means that actual trade resulted in little or no prots; the ‘stealth’ on the other hand can only imply that silver smuggling continued even in a period of cordial commercial relations between the two countries. 65 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 395, table 9.5. Between 1613–1620, the VOC shipped 1,437,000 guilders worth of gold or silver coins to its Asian headquarters in Batavia. The next decade they exported 1,236,000 guilders worth. The ow of silver from Japan in the intra-Asian trade reduced the need for Dutchgenerated bullion in the 1630s to 850,000 guilders; it remained fairly stable through the 1660s, with exports of 920,000 guilders in the forties and 840,000 in the fties. Artur Attman, “The Bullion Flow from the Netherlands to the Baltic and the Arctic 1500 –1800,” in The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic Region 1400 –1800, ed. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief. (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1983), 20. The Baltic region received an estimated 3,750,000 –5,000,000 guilders worth of bullion around 1600; the estimate for the mid-seventeenth century ranges between 5,000,000 and 6,250,000 guilders. 66 Temple, 120.

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in an age of rampant privateering and piracy, and the smuggling of bullion out of Spain during the long years of the Dutch revolt. Stols lists some of the code words used for silver in merchants’ correspondence: “white gs, Spanish gs, hard gs, white bastards, passo de pina, old genero [money], white pasta, candied fruit, or white sugar”. The use of code words also means that all references to the trade in gs, candied fruit, and white sugar must be reassessed.67 The cargo of ‘white tin’ mentioned in an early Rotterdam record may also refer to silver coins.68 Smuggling silver was so pervasive, Stols points out, that “every quantitative and conjunctural study on the Spanish asientos and on the spread of Spanish silver over the rest of Europe generally speaking becomes dangerously hypothetical.”69 It is noteworthy that—for the sheer lack of information—even the section entitled “Supplies of Spanish precious metals to Holland” in Attman’s book on the Dutch bullion trade does not contain any import gures for Spanish bullion. The earliest annual import estimate of 15 to 18 million guilders dates from a Mint-masters’ report to the States General in 1683; about 13 million guilders worth of that silver was re-exported.70 The silver trade, with metal itself as the commodity, was cloaked in secrecy yet all descriptive indications conrm that the networks of Sephardic, North- and South Netherlandish merchants and their colleagues in Hamburg joined forces to keep a protable ow of bullion streaming north. Despite the lack of hard data, historians agree that ‘great quantities’ of American silver ended up in Northern Europe due to the large trade imbalance between Iberia and the north. As early as 1600 an anonymous witness, quoted by Kellenbenz, stated that so few commodities

67 Stols, 333–334 & ftnt 322, 324. Some of Rotterdam’s notarial records that mention gs are sufciently ambiguous that they deal with silver, others talk about barrels of gs that arrived rotten so that we can be reasonably sure that we are dealing with actual gs. 68 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 46/33/55, 24 March 1606. Trip from Bordeaux to Hamburg and from there to Vlissingen, cargo included wines, prunes, and white tin [ ‘wit blick’ ]. 69 Stols, 332. 70 Attman, Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550 –1800, 31–38. Signicantly for this study, the annual re-exports of silver to France were estimated at 3 million guilders, indicating that counter to the situation described in ambassador Boreel’s report of the late 1650s, the trade balance had by 1683 swung in France’s favor. See also De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 472 & 487. France’s positive trade balance hinged on the increasingly large quantities of sugar imported by the Dutch from the French colonies.

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were available in northern Spain, Andalusia and Portugal as return cargoes that the local factors of the northern European merchant houses shipped enormous amounts of money . . . via San Sebastian and Bilbao to Saint Jean-de-Luz, Bayonne, La Rochelle, Nantes, Rouen, Dieppe, Calais to the factors of the rebels who re-rout these shipments to Holland and Zeeland.71

And in 1607, the Archdukes in Brussels were warned that the rebel’s trade on Spain brought them “lots of silver and gold”.72 Quantication of such observations has proven to be impossible. Michel Morineau has warned against an over-reliance on information about cash transactions- and deposits as a barometer of the early modern Dutch economy. Merchants tried as much as possible to reduce the number of cash transfers in favor of revolving accounts with nal reckoning through credit instruments such as letters of exchange. Signicantly, the Amsterdam Wisselbank accounts never held more than the absolute minimum necessary to cover the most immediate requests for payment.73 A merchant made money by putting his money out to work, as conrmed by Shakespeare’s merchant Antonio: “Thou know’st that all my fortunes are at sea.”74 If we can not quantify the silver ow, can we at least verify the statement dating from around 1600 that Nantes was one of the places via which silver and bullion streamed North? Secondly, were the merchants of Rotterdam involved in the silver trade? And thirdly, did the Sephardim of Nantes participate in the bullion trade as middlemen between the suppliers of silver or coins from Iberia and the Dutch factors in Nantes? As discussed below, the answer to the rst question is a qualied yes, while we have solid evidence that Rotterdammers dealt in silver. The third question must remain unanswered due to the lack of proof—although it seems highly unlikely that the Contractation group with its close connections to both Bilbao and the Dutch multinationals did not manage to prot from this trade.

71

Kellenbenz, 66. Blok: 17. 73 Morineau, “Quelques Remarques Sur L’abondance Monétaire Aux ProvincesUnis,” 773 and 769. 74 Shakespeare. Act 1, Scene 2. 72

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In his landmark study of the money ow in France, Frank Spooner highlighted the rapid acquisition by the Dutch of Spanish silver upon its arrival in the Atlantic ports due to the strong performance of France vis à vis its trading partner Spain, whereas France had a negative trade balance with the Republic. The silver reals that arrived in Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz via the route across the Pyrenees as payment for French imports into Spain “were almost immediately scooped up by the Dutch ships”. Brittany especially, with its strong commercial ties with Iberia, received a signicant portion of the silver imports.75 Almost three hundred years before Spooner talked about “silver brushing by the Atlantic coast”, Jean Eon complained that it is [ France’s] misfortune that all the gold and silver that is brought in seems to be thrown into a bag full of holes; and France resembles nothing more than a canal through which the water ows unceasingly without stopping.76

Following the start of the Franco-Spanish war in 1635 the monetary situation worsened to the extent that the royal mints in the Atlantic port cities of Bayonne, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Rennes, and Nantes had trouble getting bullion. The mint masters struggled to obtain enough silver for their operations, but the market price for silver far outstripped the ofcial government price, so trade in Spanish reals and their illegal exports became even more protable. The Dutch paid for their purchases in copper and ‘very light’ Flemish coins, then sailed back home carrying the silver reals. The protable imbalance became a bit less so [for the Dutch] with the French government’s monetary reforms of 1641 which raised the ofcial price of silver, thus keeping more Spanish silver in the hands of the French mint masters.77 Several questions beg an answer: Is it coincidence or not that the wine exports from Nantes saw, in Collins’ words, a “catastrophic decline” starting around 1642 or soon thereafter? In addition to blaming quarrelsome Dutch, heavy taxes in Brittany, and the Baltic wars for the decline—the reasons listed by Collins—would we be amiss if

75 Frank C. Spooner, The International Economy and Monetary Movements in France, 1493–1725, Harvard Economic Studies, V. 138 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 164–166 and 171–174. The aggressive Dutch pursuit of Spanish silver in the French port cities was noteworthy as early as 1587. 76 Eon, 100, Spooner, 174. 77 Spooner, 182–186. Spooner focuses on the French mints and does not venture an estimate on the overall size of the silver ow from France to the Republic.

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we tied the lower wine exports from Nantes to a lessened interest of the Dutch in the region due to the smaller prot margins in the silver and money trade?78 If at least some of the Dutchmen working in Nantes dealt in silver and money, do we know how much they proted from their deals? Jean Eon mentions several Dutchmen by name, each of whom left Nantes after several years of successful trading with ‘fortunes’ ranging from Antoine Castelin’s 100,000 livres to Bonaventura Bron’s 300,000 livres. We do not know what percentage of those prots came from the silver/money trade, the wine trade, or the commodity trade on Iberia. According to Eon, the Dutch paid for their merchandize with imported coins whose real value stood below the ofcial price and then cashed in on their prots in coins with a higher real value than their ofcial value.79 We may take Eon’s report on this technique at face value; while he most likely exaggerated his gures for their propaganda value, Eon had no reason to distort the facts about the business practices of the Dutch when he wished and recommended that French merchants emulate the Dutch examples. So yes, the Dutch community in Nantes was involved in the sluicing of Spanish silver to the Republic. The Velters clan Reynier and Alexander Velters left Nantes after amassing a capital of 300,000 livres during their residence that lasted from 1627 to 1644.80 It is highly likely that, based on the activities and strategic locations of a slew of their relatives, the Velters brothers manned the clan’s eld ofce in Nantes in order to direct the trade in Iberian silver to Middelburg. It is also possible that the Velters had Sephardic roots. None of the following sources mention the silver and money trade, but taken together the picture becomes clearer. First, we take Stols’ report that ‘João Filter alias Velter’ worked in Lisbon from circa 1596 to after 1643, where he was well positioned in the slave trade between Africa and Brazil. Between 1635 and 1663, a Jacques Filter worked in Seville.81 If you take the road from Seville [arrival port of the yearly ‘Silver Fleet’ 78 79 80 81

Jean.

Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 50 & 54. Eon, 103–106. as well as ADLA C 652, Moyens d’Intervention, 24 April 1645. Eon, 104. Stols, Annex, 28. João is the Portuguese equivalent of John/Johan/Johannes/

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from New Spain] to Lisbon, you can stop overnight in Serpa, Portugal, the original home of Georges Veiltres. In 1604, Georges witnessed a Jewish testament in Bordeaux.82 Georges’ stay in Bordeaux may have been temporary, because in the next year he sent a business letter from Hamburg to his brother Johann Vilter in Lisbon.83 In Eggen’s work on Southern immigrants into the Republic we nd a reference to Judith van de Voorde, the widow of a Reynier Velters and the daughter of an echevin of Bruges.84 Apparently, this Reynier Sr was an uncle of the Reynier in Nantes. In Enthoven’s discussion of Zeeland’s role in the development of the Republic, a Balthasar van der Voorde appears on the list of those who invested in the establishment of the Guinea Company in 1614. Even more signicant than Van de Voorde’s interest in the slave [and gold] trade between Africa and Brazil was his position as Master of the Mint of Zeeland, a job that required a steady supply of bullion or meltable coins as raw material. The Mintmaster’s position also allowed Van de Voorde’s partners and clients to take their smuggled bullion to him to be minted into legal tender. By 1623, Adriaen Velters, the father of Reynier and Alexander, served as burgomaster of Veere and had sufcient capital invested in the Zeeland chamber of the VOC to qualify as ‘chief participant’. Through him, the network covered the Asian waters.85 The account books of the Amsterdam Wisselbank conrm the nancial worthiness of Abraham Velters, brother to Reynier and Alexander, in the period 1644–1651.86 The Adriaen who stood guarantee at the start of Reynier’s career in Nantes in 1627 was likely an another brother whose base of operations lay in Bordeaux where he was active in marine nancing.87 Through ‘sieur’ Gillis van de Luffel, fellow Middelburger and the other guarantor, Reynier Velters’ personal network in Nantes intersected with the widespread Van de Luffel-Duboys-De Neve network, which included

82

Malvezin, Histoire Des Juifs À Bordeaux, 124. Kellenbenz, 289. 84 Eggen, 161. 85 Victor Enthoven, Zeeland En De Opkomst Van De Republiek: Handel En Strijd in De Scheldedelta, C. 1550 –1621 (Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1996), 434. 86 GAA toegang 5077 inv.nr. 5/969 and 7/117 and 20/118—Wisselbank registers 1644, 1645, 1651. 87 Gautier: 44. This Adriaen could also have been a son of the Georges Veiltres whom we met in Bordeaux in 1604, in which case he was an uncle, not an older brother, of the Velters of Nantes. 83

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Hamburg and Venice and which tied into the network of the inuential Balthasar de Moucheron. As seen below, this also gave the Velters-clan access to the Swedish copper trade network led by the Trip family.88 If this exercise looks like a game of ‘connect the dots’, it is—but what emerges is a tantalizing picture of a widespread and active personal network which covers several distinct economic branches across the globe and which leads me to conclude that the men in the Velters’ family network were primarily interested in the bullion trade. Rare evidence The Dutchmen in Nantes obtained some of their silver through the commodities trade with Spain and France, and some through astute reactions to the imbalances between the prices of coins on the open market versus their ofcial price. A rare pair of notarial acts that specically mentions the trade in money exemplies such exchanges. In September 1634, Rotterdam merchant and brewer Michiel Sem pledged his guarantee for fellow merchant Charles de Lange who was about to return to Nantes. De Lange acted as a courier, bringing a shipment of [unspecied] coins from the Republic to France. The coins were being transferred from a merchant in Antwerp to Jacques Gallier[e] in Nantes, via the mediation of a jeweler in The Hague; the nal recipient of the cash, however, was Galliere’s partner Jean Firens, merchant in Paris. Two months earlier, three other Rotterdam merchants had withdrawn their guarantee for the transaction, which involved at least 16,500 guilders. Charles de Lange, acting also on behalf of his French partner Jacques Galliere, pledged his shares in eight ships instead.89

88 ADLA 4E2/1454/40, 8 February 1627 for Van de Luffel’s guarantee; see the Rotterdam chapter for the extent of the Van de Luffel network. 89 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 174/171/262, 1 September 1634 and GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 150/194/305, 13 July 1634. At least two of the eight ships partially owned by De Lange and Galliere had French captains and presumably ew the French ag. The St. Philips [Saint Philippe] of Nantes was captained by Guillaume Roguet, the St. Pauwels [Saint Paul] by Matheu Delahaye. De Lange and Galliere also appear as partners in the wine trade—GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 256/129, 26 April 1633. Charles de Lange had one of the longest recorded residencies of all the Dutchmen in Nantes. In 1634 he had been a resident of Nantes for over 20 years. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 150/224/352, 28 August 1634. Jacques Galliere, a resident of the Fosse, had solid connections with the Dutch community. As early as 1625, Galliere stood surety for a captain from Middelburg—GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/249/481, 4 April 1625.

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Graph 5.1 French letters of exchange disputed in Rotterdam, 1620 –1641 French letters of exchange disputed in Rotterdam, 1620 - 1641 35 32 30 25 20 16

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In addition to his commercial transactions, Galliere’s Parisian partner Jean Firens acted as a banker. Notarial records show that in 1631 and 1632, Firens nanced a series of disputed letters of exchange offered for payment in Rotterdam.90 Letters of exchange were a proven route via which Spanish silver could be channeled from France to the Republic, and it probably is no coincidence that the peak of the number of disputed letters occurs in the period when the silver drain drew so much comment in France. Several of the Dutch wine traders residing in Nantes feature prominently in the trafc in letters of exchange, and we must assume that—with their business partners back home—they actively participated in the money trade and money laundering that went on between Spain and the Republic. The fact that the majority of the letters were signed by a combination of two Dutchmen suggests that they joined forces in order to reduce the individual risk. Jan Verpoorten teamed up with Adryaen van Rijnenburch, Adryaen van der Tocq with Paulus Timmers, Pieter Fransz Baul with Tieleman Gorisz, and of course Charles de Lange with his French partner Jean Galliere.91 In Rotterdam, the 90

GAR, ONA, inv.nr. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/417/763, 30 April 1626; 144/18/40, 5 July 1630; 144/60/119, 20 July 1630; and 144/126/242, 30 May 1631. As noted before, the 91

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Sephardim João Ribeiro [alias Jacques or Jacob van de Riviere] acted as agent for Nantes residents Van der Tocq and Timmers, as well as for the partnership of Charles de Lange and Dirck Dierkens for who he later nanced the purchase of a ship’s part. Ribeiro was active as a nancier and wine buyer in Rotterdam from at least 1626 to 1642, and was a blood relative of the wealthy De Pinto family that moved from Antwerp to Rotterdam in 1646. Ribeiro’s widow Catherine Vlamincx remained active in the Rotterdam wine trade until at least 1654.92 Jacob van de Riviere’s activities are a good example of the close links between the gentile and Jewish networks that tied the economies of Rotterdam and Nantes together. However sparse the evidence on a concerted money trade system, it nonetheless offers tantalizing information on the links between various trading networks in Nantes, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Amsterdam if we check out the individuals involved in the deals. A single letter of exchange dated 10 February 1632 in Paris connected a member of the copper dealing Trip family of Amsterdam to the envoy of the Swedish king in the Republic to Johan van de Luffel in Rotterdam and his brother Gillis van de Luffel in Nantes to Jacques de Letter in Antwerp.93 Pieter Trip made a fortune in Swedish copper as part of his family’s hegemony in the arms trade, and also acted as nancier of both the Swedish as well as the English crown.94 Jacques de Letter was the son and brother of two of the MintmasterGenerals of the Spanish Netherlands in Antwerp and he was married to a Ms. van Immerseel. As early as 1616, Guillermo van Immerseel requested that his partner Thomas de Letter [Mintmaster-to-be and

Verpoorten family had strong ties with Hamburg, where in the year 1619 Johann, Pieter, and Jacob Verpoorten had a combined annual turnover in their Bank of Hamburg accounts of 682,778 Mark. See Kellenbenz, 239. 92 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 143/217/425, 24 August 1626; 94/213/367, 11 July 1638 [the men in Nantes purchased the 1/8 share in the Jager from the estate of François Vlaminck—was he Jacob van de Riviere’s father—or brother in law?]; 347/67, 29 December 1638; 152/461/678, 13 August 1642; for the activities of his widow Catherine Vlamincx, see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 393/303, 15 July 1652; 393/322, 19 September 1653; and 670/127, 24 April 1654. 93 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 98/223/560, 6 March 1632; 98/228/573, 10 April 1632; and 98/229/575, 13 April 1632. 94 P. W. Klein, De Trippen in De 17e Eeuw; Een Studie over Het Ondernemersgedrag Op De Hollandse Stapelmarkt (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965), 482–488. In this year, the debt of the Swedish government to the Trip rm amounted to about 1,000,000 guilders. It is unclear whether the Swedish envoy, Erik Larsz van der Linden, was somehow related to the Pedro vander Linden, native of the Spanish Netherlands, who settled in Seville around 1590. See Stols, 44.

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the brother of Jacques] would “. . . in the future refrain from mentioning this [silver] trade in his main correspondence and to also advise his employees to unload [the silver] in secret”.95 If we add the network of the Trip rm to the circle around the De Letter family in Antwerp and to the vast web of the Van de Luffels, as outlined above, we get an idea of the importance of personal contacts at play in early modern international trade and of the intricate yet mostly hidden system that brought American silver to the Republic. Swedish copper played a signicant role in the portion of the Dutch bullion trade that was channeled via business partners in Hamburg. In February 1635, a merchant in Leyden wrote the States General with a request for diplomatic assistance in his transactions with the authorities in Hamburg. In presenting his case, Wouter de Vries stated that his Hamburg partner Jan van Sorgen had sent him “a great quantity of silver”.96 Not too noteworthy, until we nd Kellenbenz’ reference to the “Swedish Postmaster and future government representative in Hamburg Leenart van Sorgen” and his banking activities via a lively trade in letters of exchange. Just like any self-respecting Hamburg merchant who traded with Iberia and the Baltic, Leenert van Sorgen had close ties to the Swedish envoy at Helsingör, the location of the Sound Toll ofce. Kellenbenz concluded that a portion of the Swedish copper exports to Spain—in exchange for silver—ran via Leenart van Sorgen and Hamburg.97 Notarial records show that De Vries’ silver supplier Jan van Sorgen was indeed Leenart/Leendert’s son, and that the two men were related to the Van Sorgen cloth merchants of Rotterdam.98 95

Stols, 333. Dillen, ed., 76–77, nr. 84. 97 The link between Jan van Sorgen and his inuential highlights the importance for historians to cross-check information in a variety of languages. For Leenert van Sorgen, see Kellenbenz, 306. [the Van Sorgen reference is not dated but Kellenbenz’ book covers the Iberia trade between 1590 and 1625] For further links between the De Vries rm and Hamburg, see GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 78/363/680. As early as 8 December 1625, Jan Franszn de Vries signed a freight contract in Rotterdam with the captain of the 100 last [200 tons] large St. Jacob to sail to Bordeaux, receive cargo from De Vries’ factor François Libaert, sail to Hamburg, unload, and receive cargo from none other than Jan Verpoorten of the widespread Verpoorten/De la Porta clan. Jan Verpoorten worked in Nantes in the years 1624–1626, while Johann Verpoorten made serious money in Hamburg as Iberia trader. Is this the same man, well traveled, or are we dealing with two close relatives? Rotterdam records feature François Libaert/Liebart as merchant/factor in Bordeaux between 1619 and 1627, often in connection with letters of exchange. His last appearance came as creditor to the estate of Nantes’ brandy pioneer Anthonie Casteleyn. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 88/30/58, 27 February 1619 and 98/139/367, 4 January 1627. 98 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 163/41/56, 7 July 1628. “Jan Leendertsz van Sorgen, merchant 96

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Prosopographical evidence combined with the notarial records and information from secondary sources prove that merchants all along and across the Atlantic used their overlapping family and business networks to keep their ngers in the silver pie. The silver trade hypothesis It is possible that the primary reason for the Dutch interest in Nantes was Spanish silver coming into France as the result of its positive trade balance with Spain rather than the wines and brandies of the Nantes region. Evidence, mostly circumstantial but in Eon’s case at least contemporary, indicates that the money trade was very important, especially before the monetary reforms of France in 1641. Lack of hard data does not allow this hypothesis to be quantied. We have evidence of a lively trafc in letters of credit between merchants in Rotterdam and their correspondents in Nantes, especially in the early thirties, but they can not be linked directly to bullion transactions. At the same time it is possible to argue against the primacy of the money trade in the Dutch interests in Nantes: If the money trade was more important than the wine trade, the vigorous resumption of direct trade between the Republic and Spain should have resulted in an immediate and permanent drop in Dutch interest in Nantes after 1648 because the need for a transfer station no longer existed. This did not happen. Yes, the veriable numbers dropped signicantly between 1647 and 1653, but then rebounded to a near record high by 1656. From this we could conclude that the attraction of the bullion trade as the primary motivator for Dutch interests in Nantes is false. Then again, the residential dip after 1648 may indeed have been bullion-related, and the renewed interest in the mid-fties could signal the start of serious Dutch interests in Nantes as it emerged as France’s leading sugar and slave trade port. The hypothesis about the attractiveness of Nantes in the Dutch silver trade must stand until new research can conrm or debunk it. In the

in Hamburg”, has sent ‘eastern cloth’ to Jan Claesz van Sorgen, woolen cloth merchant in Rotterdam; the woolens were then sent on to Adriaen Claesz van Sorgen in Amsterdam. A second reference to Jan in Hamburg involves a shipment of ‘tin in leaves’; the fact that the designated recipients were a tin-smith and a plumber indicates that the tin in question was not a secret shipment of silver or coins. GAR, ONA, inv. nr. 112/23, 6 November 1636.

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end, there is no reason to disagree with the contemporary observers or with those who have studied the bullion ows in depth: During the rst half of the seventeenth century, Nantes appealed to the Dutch as a transit station for goods destined for and exported from Spain—and American silver in particular. The smooth ow of this silver was facilitated by the existing ties between Nantes and Bilbao through the Contractation network and through the personal network of Sephardic merchants in ports all along the Atlantic coast of Europe. Nantes’ position in the silver trade coincided with the city’s draw as the Loire port from which upstream as well as regional wines and brandies could be exported. New Christians and crypto-Jews In Nantes, the fervently pro-Catholic and pro-League religious climate forced all Sephardic families to publicly embrace Catholicism, to get married and to baptize their children in the city’s churches.99 The Nantais considered the old Contractation families with their long-term profession of Catholicism to be French- and Catholic enough to be able to purchase royal ofces and marry into local families.100 We do not know how Catholic [or Jewish] these well-established Spanish and Portuguese families considered themselves to be. Tax rolls from the St. Nicholas parish for the year 1592, collected by James Collins, shows however that a small Jewish community did exist—if quietly—in Nantes in the 1590s. Not only did these Portuguese pay municipal taxes, they paid relatively large sums into the city coffers.101 Louis XIII renewed the royal decree that ordered the expulsion of covert Jews in 1615,

99 AM GG 181, no date 1622, a baptism in St Nicholas included a Despinoze and a De Santo Domingo; and another undated one the same year was attended by a Rodrigue and a Gomez; GG 182, 4 April 1624, a baptism in St. Nicholas included members of the Vaz and Gomes families; GG 421, 9 May 1630, a baptism in St. Croix included an Alvarez de Mattos, the physician Vaz, and a Gommel [Gommez]; and on 20 October 1630, another St. Croix baptism included a De Matte, Loppes, Alvez, and a Dies [Diez]; and GG154, 12 July 1633, a baptism in St. Leonard included a Goume [Gomez] and two members of the Vaz family. See also AM GG 210, 29 December 1650. In the parish church of St. Nicholas, a High Mass was said for Mr. Rodrigues on December 29th, 1650. 100 Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, 88–89. 101 Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 8–9. The high assessments are in Collins’ opinion evidence of either signicant personal wealth or of a hidden municipal ‘protection premium’.

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but despite the ban the Portuguese community continued to live and work in Nantes. In reality, the attitude towards Jewish or New Christian immigrants from Portugal must have been much more ambivalent and exible. Royal approval of the naturalization of a certain A. Vaz, “Portuguese”, and his wife in 1630 elicited protests from the “merchants of the Fosse”, the burgomaster and the municipal council-members.102 It is likely that the King’s signature on the naturalization letters had followed a generous donation to the royal purse. In the 1630s, a Spanish priest involved in enforcing the Catholicism of France’s New Christians reported that Nantes held just ten Portuguese converso families—it is signicant that not even Father Cisneros used the word Jewish.103 After war broke out between France and Spain in 1635 and the Spanish army marched north, the animosity of the Christian population boiled over into serious rioting against the Portuguese in 1636.104 Dutch Sephardim who wished to trade in France would not advertise their Jewish leanings, but would instead focus on their status as subjects of the Dutch States General which ensured privileges and duties similar to those of native born Frenchmen. None of the Dutchmen entered the notarial records of Nantes as ‘marchand Portugues’, instead all of them received the label ‘marchand Flamand ’. These same men [or their relatives] could openly work and live in the Republic as Jews. The Dutch notarial acts abound in the adjective ‘Portugees coopman’ which ofcially

102 ADLA B 230, Chambre de Comptes de Bretagne, Minutes des Audiences. One more reason to remain wary about taking prescriptive sources at their historical face value. This A. Vaz may be Anthony Vazes who is mentioned in the 1645 Moyens d’Intervention [ADLA C 652] in the company of all the fraudulent Dutchmen. Another possibility is Alvearo Vaz Nogierez, a merchant living at the Fosse [ADLA 4E2/95/161, 10 July 1632. The physician André Vaz who was a naturalized citizen by 1598 no longer existed, he was buried on 7 June 1617. [AM GG 204, St. Nicolas parish] 103 Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 257 and 262. See also Swetschinski, Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The Portuguese Jews of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam, 79. At the same time, more than 60 converso families lived in Bayonne and about 40 in Bordeaux. 104 Salo Wittmayer Baron, Resettlement and Exploration, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, vol. XV (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 86. and Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 7–8. The Nantais municipal archive indices which I surveyed mention the baptisms, marriages and burials of the Portuguese families (based on their names) in the city’s Catholic parish churches, i.e. in their public lives and deaths they were Christian. [AM GG, listings by parish church] See also Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 7–8. The riot of 23 November 1636 took place in a sector of the St. Nicolas parish inhabited by ‘Portuguese’—i.e. Jewish—residents, clear evidence that the community survived through this period.

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acknowledged that the man was Jewish. By contrast, just a single notarial act was found in the Nantes archives which acknowledged that two brothers living in the parish of St. Nicholas, Jacques and Gaspard Vaz, were ‘marchands juif ’.105 The tax rolls used by Collins did use the word ‘Portuguese’ as well, but in this case the person’s religion was left up in the air. It is quite certain that a pocket of practicing Jews lived in Nantes with tacit approval of the authorities, but it remains impossible to make a denitive statement about the true religious leanings of Nantes’ Sephardim as a group. Within half a year of the anti-Semitic riots in Nantes and Bordeaux, the legal status of Jewish-leaning Sephardim improved dramatically, provided that they could prove that they were Dutch citizens. Had the government received a wake-up call? In March 1637, a royal Lettres Patentes granted Sephardic merchants who were residents of the Dutch Republic the same commercial privileges in France as enjoyed by the “other subjects of the [Dutch] States General . . . without being harassed on the pretext that they might be Jewish” on the condition that they could present a letter from the authorities of their home towns that certied their domicile.106 Considering the uidity of Sephardic migration and temporary settlement patterns, such certicates of residency would have been quite easy to acquire.107 The royal welcome mat to Sephardic traders followed the important exemption from the Droit d’Aubaine to Dutch merchants in France [1632] and comes remarkably close on the

105 ADLA 4E2/320/3, 8 January 1631. The brothers residence in St. Nicholas strengthens Collins’ assumption that those classied as ‘Portuguese’ residents of that parish were practicing Jews. 106 Gérard Nahon, “Les Rapports Des Communautés Judeo-Portugaises De France Avec Celle D’amsterdam Au XVIIe Et XVIIIe Siècles,” Studia Rosenthaliana X, no. 1 & 2 (1976): 159 –160 and 163–164. Nahon provides the transcript of the royal Lettres Patentes: “. . . que lesd[ it]s Marchands Portugais qui se sont retiréz d’Espagne & demeurent actuellem[en]t ès pays de l’obeissance desd[ it]s s[ ieu]rs les Estates, en rapportant certicates en forme authentique des Magistrats des villes de leur demerue, soyent admis & reçus en n[ot]re Royaume & ès ports d’iceluy, pour leur commerce & y jouissent de la mesme liberté et favorable traitement que les autres subjects desd[ it]s s[ ieu]rs les Estates, sans y ester troubléz ny inquiétéz sous prétexte qu’ils sont juifs de religion.” 107 Predating the French requirement of certicates of domicile by nine years, a declaration made by Jan Viegas, Portuguese merchant in Rotterdam, on behalf of a ‘Portuguese merchant’ of Amsterdam veried that Cristoffel Mendos Franco, Portuguese merchant currently trading in Porto, used to be a ‘poorter’ [citizen] of Amsterdam. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 106/231/314, 4 February 1628. The Sephardim may have found it useful to be able to prove Dutch citizenship well before the French demanded such proof.

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heels of the start of the mutual trade embargoes between Spain and France which accompanied the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish War on 19 May 1635.108 It seems likely that the French government saw the benets of liberalizing the restrictions on Dutch Jews in order to take advantage of the existing Sephardic network in France as well as in Holland.109 When Minister Colbert championed the cause of the French ‘Portuguese’ in 1681, he chided the gentile merchants for their persistent pestering of their Jewish colleagues and suggested that the Frenchmen rise above their jealousy by realizing the advantages of the global Sephardic network to the State.110 Not only did the State protect the Jewish Sephardim, but with his statement Colbert also proved the continued and prosperous existence of Jewish a.k.a New Christian communities in France. The Espinozas of Nantes and the Dutch Spinozas Conrmation of the existence of a Jewish community in Nantes also comes from a Dutch source. In 1615, the directors of the newly established Santa Companhia de Dotar Orphas e Donzellas in Amsterdam, a charity beneting Sephardic Jewish orphans and girls in need of dowries, bestowed the rst dowry on Ester Rodrigues [or Soares], daughter of Lianor Rodrigues [alias Judit Soares] of Nantes on March 14, 1615. A few months later, the Dotar board appointed Manuel Rodrigues Espinoza as its representative in Nantes.111 In October of that year,

108 ADG C 3842, Lettre patente of Louis XIII which releases the subjects of the United Provinces throughout France from the Droit d’Aubaine. 109 Nahon: 160 –161. Nahon credits these royal privileges with moving the French Sephardic communities, which at the beginning of the seventeenth century still wavered between the Jewish and Catholic faiths, towards a rm and open commitment to Judaism in its second half. 110 Clement, ed., Vol. II, 1–2, p. 722. 111 Nahon: 43. See also: Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Les Espinosa, Une Famille D’hommes D’affaires En Espagne Et Aux Indes a L’époque De La Colonisation, Affaires Et Gens D’affaires (Paris: SEVPEN, 1968), 122–126. It is unclear whether or how the Espinozas of Nantes were related to the Seville bankers, royal nanciers, Asia traders and wine merchant family Castellanos de Espinosa. Pedro de la Torre was treasurer of the Mint in Seville. In 1589, his three sons were accused and convicted of having minted coins of low weight and lesser alloy, but family connections spared them from the death penalty. In 1599, Juan Castellanos de Espinoza shipped 3599 pipes of his own wines to Mexico, 850 of which were smuggled aboard without registration or the payment of custom duties. In 1600, Juan Castellanos shipped more wine to New Spain. That the Espinosa’s commercial

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Espinoza mediated for “Mademoiselle Mendez of Nantes” to appear on the lottery list of Dotar petitioners. Two Jewish girls from Rotterdam, not identied by name, also made the list. By June 1616, Manuel had emigrated to Amsterdam, where he changed his name to Abraham de Spinoza. His brother Pedro Rodrigues [ Espinoza] assumed the Dotar responsibilities in Nantes. Revah points out that the ‘winner’ of the rst lottery, Ms. Rodrigues, may have been a relative of Manuel Espinoza and Pedro Rodrigues [ Espinoza].112 If this was the case, the Dotar ‘lottery’ was rigged to favor a relative of the group’s representative in Nantes. It also casts doubt on the proclaimed aim of the group to fund poor, dowerless young Jewish girls. Regardless of the duplicity, the Dotar was one more vehicle by which the Sephardic diaspora continued to reinforce its internal ties. Members of the extended Espinoza family had been active in Nantais commerce since the 1530s, were respected members of the city’s Iberian community, and seemed to have committed themselves fully to Catholicism.113 The register of the Contractation de Nantes reveals that the Espinoza clan of Nantes lived and traded as ‘bons Catholiques’, and that they frequently held leading positions in the Contractation

and nancial transactions took place on a very high wire became clear upon the rm’s bankruptcy in 1602, when property on both sides of the ocean showed debts of 380,000 ducats versus a still considerable 92,393 ducats in assets. 112 A. M. Vaz Dias and W. G. Van der Tak, “Spinoza Merchant and Autodidact,” Studia Rosenthaliana XVI, no. 2 (1982): 113–115. Pedro/Pierre Rodrigues [Espinoza] was the paternal grandfather of the philosopher Baruch Spinoza through Pedro’s son Michel/Micael. When Pedro himself emigrated from Nantes to Rotterdam, sometime between 1616 and his death in 1627, he assumed the name Ishac Israel Despinoza. When Ishac died in Rotterdam in 1627, his body was taken to the Jewish cemetery in Oudekerke, outside Amsterdam. Vaz Dias cites the Oudekerk burial records: “Isaac Espinoza, who came from Nantes to Rotterdam, where he died; row 9, nr. 20.” The authors are not certain that Abraham and Isaac were actually the great-uncle and grandfather of the philosopher, but information from Revah’s work leaves little room for doubt. See I. S. Revah, “Les Débuts De La ‘Santa Companhia De Dotar Orfans E Donzelas Pobres’ D’amsterdam,” Boletim Internacional de Bibliograa Luso-Brasileira IV, no. 4 (1963): 660 –663. The author conrms the latter’s identity by including a transcript of a letter sent by Pedro Rodriguez dated 5 February 1620 in which Pedro notied the Dotar board that his brother Manoel Roiz Despinoza could give them more information, and signed as ‘Jshac JsRael despinoza’. [My thanks to Dr. Iêda Siqueira Wiarda at the Library of Congress for her help with the translation from the Portuguese]. NB: more conrmation that the use of Rodrigues was interchangeable with that of Roiz or Ruiz. 113 Mathorez, “Notes Sur Les Rapports De Nantes Avec L’espagne,” 77. and Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27–28. See also Lapeyre. on the Ruiz family of Nantes.

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organization.114 In the rst quarter of the century at least ve d’Espinozes were part of the group: the aforementioned A. Roiz; Diego, Jacques, Pierre, and Rodrigue.115 Jacques d’Espinoze acted as the group’s treasurer from 1602–1606 and again starting in 1629, when he added his title of Sieur de l’Espinays to his signature. Espinoza men held the most important position, that of consul, in 1613–1614 ( Jacques, sieur de la Rostanerie); in 1617–1618 (Pierre, sieur du Sanzay); and twice more in the second half of the century (a Jacques in the 1650s and a Michel in the 1690s).116 The example of one city-hopping member of the Espinoze clan must sufce as a warning against sweeping statements on religion and reinforces the idea that location dened a man’s religion and not vice versa. Manuel Rodriguez Espinoza, both great-uncle as well as grandfather to the celebrated philosopher Baruch Spinoza, arrived in Nantes from Lisbon around 1591–1592. In 1596, Amsterdam merchant Emanuel Rodriguez Vega empowered Manuel Rodriguez Espinoza in Nantes to represent him, two merchants in Antwerp, two traders in Lisbon, one merchant in Porto, and one other trader. This truly international group requested Spinoza to try and recover cargo seized by Spanish authorities from a Dutch ship destined for Viana in Portugal.117 This implies that Espinoza had connections with the Spanish authorities in his capacity as an honest Catholic trader, perhaps even as a new member of the Contractation. The ship must have been involved in illegal trade between Holland and Portugal, but although the Republic and Spain were in the middle of their long war, the timing of the case does not match the ofcial periods of embargo.118 In 1598, Espinoza obtained his French naturalization papers, which means that he had lived and worked in Nantes as a conrmed Catholic during the preceding years.119

114 AM HH 194, Registre de Contractation. The register includes lists of signatures of all the members present at the annual elections of the consul from 1602 through at least 1701. The lists appear to be signed in order of seniority, so it is possible to track the social rank of an individual merchant over the course of his career. Michel Despinoze, sieur de la Ravellonniere became a member of the Contractation in 1682 and stood at its pinnacle in 1691–1692. 115 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 326–327. 116 AM HH 194, Registre de la Contractation. Information based on the signatures conrming the annual consular elections. 117 Nadler, 27–28. The records are silent about the outcome of Spinoza’s efforts. 118 The rst embargo ran from 1585 to 1590, and the second embargo was not instituted until 1598. 119 Collins, “Portuguese of Nantes,” 9.

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Membership in the Contractation is further proof of Catholicism. The list of Contractation members between 1600 and 1625 mentions several members of the Espinose clan, as well as ‘Manuel Rodriguez’ who in my view is none other than Manuel Rodrigues Espinoza. This Rodriguez was already a member of the group in 1601.120 Based on these pieces of evidence we might be tempted to label M. R. Espinoza a Catholic but the Dutch evidence counters that idea. The Dotar information and the knowledge that as ‘Abraham de Spinoza’ he became a valued member of the Jewish community in Amsterdam after migrating to Holland show that Manuel Rodriguez Espinoza led a double life in Nantes. To the world he presented himself as a Christian, while he hid his Jewish leanings like so many other Iberian residents.121 Abraham de Spinoza’s brother Pedro/Pierre Rodrigues left Nantes for Holland sometime after 1620 —but instead of joining his brother in Amsterdam he moved to Rotterdam where he adopted the name of Ishac Israel Despinoza.122 Pedro’s son Michael d’Espinoza, the philosopher’s father, became his uncle [and future father-in-law] Abraham’s business partner.123 When Vaz Dias and Van der Tak studied the Spinoza rm in Amsterdam, they reported on Michael Spinoza’s deals with at least two merchants in Nantes, assuming both to be fellow Jews. On 31 January 1639, Michael Spinoza signed a power of attorney authorizing Pedro de Faria in Nantes to conscate goods present in Nantes owned 120 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 326–328. At rst I thought that a second family member on the list, Rodrigue d’Espinose, was our man but he continued to be a member of the Contractation between 1625 and 1650, while Abraham de Spinoza had arrived in Holland by June 1616. 121 The reputation of Abraham Spinoza received a blow. Vaz Dias and Van der Tak report that on 3 December 1620, Emanuel Rodrigues Spinoza, Portuguese, and his maid-servant ‘Toboda Ockema of Nantes’ were released from custody awaiting trial. Vaz Dias and Van der Tak: 119. They had violated one of the regulations of Holland’s Jewish Charter of 1615: Article 38e: “If a Jewish man or woman has eshily conversation outside of wedlock with a Christian woman or man, both will be punished with whippings, exile from the lands and conscation of the goods”. For the text of the charter, see Grotius and Meyer, 120. The fact that Abraham de Spinoza continued to live and work in Amsterdam shows that the judges showed leniency and/or that Spinoza paid enough to avoid punishment. Ms. Ockema sounds more Friesian than Nantais. 122 Revah: 660 –663. 123 Vaz Dias and Van der Tak: 120, 136–138, and 144. The authors conclude that Michael Spinoza was also known as Gabriel Alvares Dispinoza. He married Abraham’s daughter, i.e. his own cousin Rachel, the mother of Baruch Spinoza. Confusing the religious picture further, the authors also found the evidence of Michael Spinoza’s third marriage in 1641 in the [Calvinist] Nieuwe Kerk of Amsterdam, and of the marriage of Baruch Spinoza’s sister Mirjam in that same church in 1650.

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by a Hamburg based merchant. Two months later, Spinoza acted as a witness in an inheritance dispute between members of the De Mello family in Amsterdam and Nantes.124 The historians failed to connect their work with that of Jeulin on the Contractation de Nantes: both Pedro [ Pierre] de Faria and the De Mello family of Nantes were members of the Contractation—an organization of Catholic merchants.125 This does not deny that the De Faria and De Mello families can not have been Jewish in private and Catholic in public, but it does emphasize the need to be very cautious with our religious labels and pigeonholing. From at least 1644 until 1652 ‘Michiel di Spinosa’ had an account at the Amsterdam Wisselbank.126 In 1651–1652 his semi-annual turnover amounted to 61,883 guilders and involved debit transactions with 41 different merchants. Spinoza owed the largest sum, 3,315 guilders, to Jan Romboutsz.127 In that same period Michael Spinoza traded with Lourens de Collenaerts for 724 guilders. De Collenaerts worked and traded in Bordeaux, where notarial transactions record his activities starting 1647 and where his widow or daughter continued to trade and participate in maritime ventures through 1666.128 Based on their names, at least 26 of the 37 merchants who traded with Spinoza were fellow Sephardim but the Dutch names of the rest may very well include several aliases used by the Portuguese to protect relatives and business partners in the Spanish empire.

124 A. M. Vaz Dias and W. G. Van der Tak, “The Firm of Bento & Gabriel De Spinoza,” Studia Rosenthaliana XVI (1982): 146–147. 125 Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 327. 126 Gemeentearchief Amsterdam [ hereafter GAA] toegang 5077 inv. 5, fol. 427 and fol. 428 for 1644. In this year, Spinosa’s turnover came to 49,303 guilders over both accounts. 127 GAA toegang 5077 inv. 20, fol. 518 for 1651. It is possible that this Romboutsz is the same man who twenty years earlier had captained his ship the ‘Zeepaard’ [Seahorse] from Rotterdam to Nantes, where Rombouts delivered eight brandy stills, planks, steel, and a bale of pepper before returning home with 130 tons of brandy; see ADLA B 2976, port register of Nantes, 21 August 1631. 128 See GAA toegang 5077 inv. 20, 6 December 1651 plus Wisselbank account #1246 for Lourens de Collenaerts and also ADG 409, notary Despiet, 1647 for ‘Laurans Colenart’ in Bordeaux. His daughter or widow Anne-Marie de Colenaer appears in Bordeaux’ notarial records as trader and nancier through 1666 when she marries Abraham Braconnier. See ADG 1178, notary Jean Ferrand. Anne-Marie de Colenaer was a creditor to Jean van Poulle, member of the Amsterdam based rm of the Poulle brothers. ADG 296, notary Jean Ferrand, 1665.

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Marc du Serizay Despinoz and the merchants of Rotterdam Nantes’ Contractation membership list of 1628 contains 25 names, including three members of the Despinoze family. One of these Espinozas features prominently in the commercial relations between the Contractation and Rotterdam.129 The man known to Rotterdam merchants as ‘Marc Zerezay’ was none other than Contractation member Marc du Serizay Despinoz. In 1617, Serizay, two other Contractation members plus two more Nantes merchants show up as owners of a richly laden vessel that was captured by ‘Algerian pirates’ together with two other ships belonging to Nantes’ Spanish community. Losses amounted to more than 200,000 livres and caused the municipality to request tax relief from the king.130 The case highlights the nancial stakes of the Contractation trade and its importance to the economic well-being of the city. A notarial act of 1629 reconrms Serizay’s ongoing involvement in the Contractation in the early days of his participation in French-Dutch commerce. Serizay joined fellow Contractation member Jacques Turpin in the sale of a part ownership of a ship sailing on Portugal.131 Marc Serizay’s active participation in the French-Dutch trade (1629 –1641) coincided with the peak of Dutch presence in Nantes as well as the most intense enforcement of the Spanish trade embargo.

129 AM HH 194, Registre de Contractation. Serizay signed the Contractation registers of 1628 and 1630 as ‘Serizay Despinoz’. See also GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 144/322A, 16 May 1634 which describes a dispute over a Letter of Exchange worth 800 pounds paid out by Zerezay that remained unpaid in Rotterdam; also GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 150/615/961, 15 February 1636 in which Jan Garnier in Rotterdam acts for Serizay in Nantes, who is in turn acting on behalf of Gilles Tanevott in Nantes, acknowledges receipt of 1708 guilders from Jan van de Luffel in Rotterdam. 130 AM EE 218, Marine, 10 February 1617. Report of more than 200,000 livres lost due to the capture of 3 ships by Algerian pirates. See also ADLA 4E2/94/1/150, 28 March 1629 for Serizay’s part ownership of a vessel sailing on Portugal. All the following merchants lived along the Fosse in Nantes. Serizay owned the ‘Nicolas’, 50 tons, jointly with Contractation colleagues Pierre Valleton and François Boylleau, plus Juan le Sose and René Libaud. The ‘Pierre’, 200 tons [and most likely Dutch-built] was owned by Contractation members Anthoine Arnollet, Jacques de Bourgess and François Huet, plus Jan Goulter. The high concentration of Contractation members in the Fosse neighborhood was matched by a similar concentration of the Dutch merchants, who often rented lodgings and warehouses along the Fosse. See also ADLA 4E2/1464/58, 24 February 1642. 131 ADLA 4E2/94/1/150, 28 March 1629. Sometime between 1600 and 1630, Jacques Turpin lived and traded in Bilbao, and he served as consul of the Contractation de Nantes in 1633–1634. Was the Jan Regnier mentioned by the notary the same as Contractation member ‘Yvon’ Regnier? See Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 329 and 331.

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Over the years, Serizay acted as nancier in a number of deals with at least six Dutch merchants in Nantes, ve in Rotterdam, three in Middelburg, and one in Amsterdam.132 In September 1629, no fewer than ve Dutch merchants living in Nantes signed a letter of exchange conrming they owed money for the transport of a full cargo of wheat from Bilbao to San Sebastian in a ship partially owned by Serizay. The debt had to be paid to Antoine Jouret, the Contractation’s agent in Bilbao. Why would Dutch merchants bother to have Serizay transport wheat from one Spanish port to another, only about 50 kilometers away? Did the ship actually carry silver hidden among the grains? In a period in which the French cabotage ships tended to be small, the 200 tons of the St. Pierre point to a Dutch built cargo ship. The captain of the St. Pierre is listed as Martin Lubersen, who was denitely neither French nor Spanish, so it is probable that the ship actually belonged to the Dutch traders and was leased—or sold on paper—to the Contractation group to make it sail under a French/Contractation ag. Now that the ‘wheat’ had been delivered, the Dutchmen wished to ‘recover’ the ship.133 Despite the questionable transaction, it is clear that the Dutchmen used their contacts within the Contractation de Nantes to channel their trade with Iberia, and that members of the Espinoza clan were heavily involved. With his widespread activities, Marc Serizay d’Espinoze personies the close ties between members of the Contractation de Nantes and the Dutch merchants involved in the illegal trade on Iberia. Digging a bit deeper, the overlapping worlds of the Dutch and Sephardic networks are revealed even more. The notarial act of 1629 which features Serizay and his Dutch contacts also mentions a certain René Dantigallier, merchant in Bordeaux, whose role in the case could

132 In Nantes, Serizay dealt with Bonaventura Bron [Amsterdam], Tielman Gorisz [Rotterdam/Goes], Cornelis de Coninck [ Rotterdam], Gillis van Luffel [ Middelburg/ Rotterdam], Jan van Rossum [ Rotterdam], and Reynier Velters [ Middelburg]. His contacts in Rotterdam included his agent Jan Garnier, Jan van Luffel, Pieter Adriansz de Lange, Willem [Guillaume] Harmans and Isaac de Bra. Serizay’s deals in Middelburg involved Jean le Moyne, Gillis Schillemans and Abraham Trouwers; the residence of a fourth, Abraham van Roosebeecken, remains unconrmed. 133 ADLA 4E2/1456/218, 8 September 1629. The Dutchmen were Bonnaventura Bron, Tilman Gorisz, Cornelis de Coninck [turned into Le Roy by the notary], Gilles van Luffel, and Reynier Velters. Why did the ship sail to San Sebastian and not to Bayonne or Saint Jean de Luz? See also Jeulin, “Aperçus Sur La Contractation De Nantes,” 331.: Marc Serizay’s contact in Bilbao was Anthonie Jouret, likely the same man as Antoine Joanet who participated in the consular elections of the Contractation in Bilbao in 1632.

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not be deciphered.134 An earlier document in the Rotterdam archives reveals, however, that Dantigallier may be related to Alexander Dagilaer, merchant in Saint Jean-de-Luz. In the spring of 1622, Diogo Gomes Duarte, a Rotterdam-based Portuguese merchant shipped a cargo of beans to ‘Alexander Dagilaer’ on behalf of Anthoni Thomas, Portuguese merchant in Amsterdam.135 The case highlights Duarte’s obvious reluctance to place the label of ‘Jew’ on a fellow Sephardim: the notarial act specied that the Rotterdammer could not say if Thomas was in fact Jewish, nor if Thomas was the father or just a friend of Dagilaer in Saint Jean-de-Luz. In 1624, the year that Marc Despinoz rst appears in the Contractation register as ‘Serizay’, the group of 24 signatories included two other Espinoza men. Over the next couple of decades, the yearly rolls featured at least three d’Espinozas. It may be coincidence, but the ratio of Espinosa men to the rest of the membership is the highest in the years 1622 through 1662, the period in which the Spanish trade embargoes caused the city of Nantes to play a central role in the commercial relationship between the Dutch Republic and the Iberian peninsula. It also corresponds to the era of the greatest commercial success of the Amsterdam-based branch of the Spinoza family.136 The merchants of Rotterdam participated in—and made use of—the extensive networks of the Dutch and the Sephardim. These international networks were so much intertwined that in many cases it is unclear if we are dealing with gentile or Jewish merchants, a situation exacerbated by the Sephardic practice to use at least one if not more Dutch-sounding aliases.

134 It is quite possible that ‘Dantigallier’ was the pseudonym of a fan of the poet Dante Alighieri. 135 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 91/248/612, 26 May 1622. 136 See Vaz Dias and Van der Tak, “The Firm of Bento & Gabriel De Spinoza.” as well as Vaz Dias and Van der Tak, “Spinoza Merchant and Autodidact,” 147. In 1641, Michael Spinoza’s account at the Amsterdam Wisselbank showed 28,052.88 guilders worth of activity over a 5 month period. His creditors at that time included Francisco Mendes Chillon, Jan de Pas, Abraham da Fonseca, Denis Jennes, Lopo Ramirez, Isak Coronel, and Willem Peacock. Between 21 August 1651 and 28 January 1652, his turnover came to 61,883.18 guilders. See also W. G. Van der Tak, “Spinoza’s Payments to the Portuguese-Israelitic Community; and the Language in Which He Was Raised,” Studia Rosenthaliana 16, no. 2 (1982): 94. Van der Tak used Amsterdam notarial records to show that the Spinoza rm had agents in Rouen and Le Havre in 1652.

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As part of the overall embargo-evading system, Dutch and Sephardic trading houses also set up shop in Hamburg. In his work on the trade between Hamburg and Iberia, Hermann Kellenbenz clearly links the evasion of Spanish embargoes and the use of the neutral ports of southern-most France to the cooperation between the ‘Portuguese’ community of Hamburg and their colleagues in Saint Jean-de-Luz. He added that “[the Sephardim] had their special smuggling routes across the Pyrenees and the Portuguese in Bayonne, Nantes and other French ports played similar mediation roles.”137 The strong interest of the ‘Portuguese’ community of Hamburg in the trade with Nantes echoes those of the Dutch port cities and is one of the indicators of the important and multi-national role played by the Sephardic community along Europe’s Atlantic coast in maintaining commercial ties with the Iberian peninsula. In Kellenbenz’ opinion, thirty-two of the 42 Hamburg rms with an annual turnover in the year 1619 of at least 100,000 Mark were Dutch. Twenty-one of those Dutch rms were recorded as trading with Spain, while two more owned ships that sailed on Iberia.138 Yet several of those ‘Dutch’ rms clearly had Sephardic roots, while the widespread use of Christian aliases may have hidden several other Sephardic families under a Dutch cover. It is true that they were headquartered in Holland, but did that make them Dutch owned and operated? If we look at the situation in Nantes, we again see a blend of nationalities that belies denitive labeling. Of the twelve Hamburg-based merchants who traded with Nantes around 1631, Jean Tanguy identied nine certain Sephardim and three men who—based on their names—could be either Dutch or German.139 When Tanguy’s

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Kellenbenz, 255–256 and 303–305. Kellenbenz, 239. For the following case, see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/447/817, 20 July 1626 The cargo aboard the ship from Calais was conscated. Daniel Bally from Hamburg was imprisoned by the Admiralty of Seville because the goods were guaranteed by two Dutch merchants and sold by a merchant in St. Lucas de Barrrameda who thus traded with persons from “unfree countries against Spain”. This is a clear case of a failed attempt by the two Dutch traders to evade the embargo via trade on Hamburg using a ship registered in Calais. 139 Tanguy, 326 & ftnt 379. Antoine Engelbrecht, listed by the Nantais notary as a ‘Dutch merchant of Hamburg’ appears in Kellenbenz’ list of the Bank of Hamburg of 1619 as a Dutch ‘reeder’ in the Iberia trade whose annual turnover that year was 128,378 Mark. Kellenbenz, 239. Tanguy’s questionmark at the ‘Berranberge’ name got claried with the appearance in the French records of Hans Berenburg, merchant of 138

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information is placed next to Kellenbenz’ exhaustive study of the Iberia traders of Hamburg, at least one of the question marks gets answered. More importantly, we get a much clearer sense of the extent to which trade with Spain and Portugal inuenced commercial life along the whole Atlantic coast of Europe, including the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Nantes. Of the three Hamburg traders whose antecedents eluded Tanguy, the man called Jan Temminche had the strongest links to Holland. This merchant of Hamburg ordered 51 pipes of Nantais wine to be shipped North in 1631.140 Rotterdam records prove that Jan Temmingh lived in Hamburg in 1643, when he stored tobacco and preserves belonging to Pedro alias Pieter Valck [ Falcon] in Antwerp. Valck’s Rotterdam agent Michiel van Diest authorized Abraham van de Luffel, who is based in Hamburg, to take possession of the goods. That same year, Michiel van Diest and his brother Gillis also gave goods, to be traded in the Canary Islands, in consignment to Pedro Valck.141 As resident of the Spanish Netherlands, Valck could openly trade with other parts of the empire and was the ideal front-man. Jan Temmingh’s relative [ brother/ nephew/son?] Coenraedt Temmincq traded and lived in Nantes from at least 1641 [ in partnership with Rotterdammer Rochus Parve] until 1646, when Adriaen van Immerseel was his partner. Starting with Jan Temmingh, we have proof once more of the chain of blood-ties and commercial partnerships which connected the Sephardic community that remained in Antwerp (Pedro Valck’s use of the Dutch alias does

Hamburg, and two Dutch merchants in Nantes in 1640. See ADLA 4E2/1463/201, 2 June 1640. The trouble concerned 141 bales of [presumably Spanish] wool owned by Berenburg. Kellenbenz classies Hans Berenberg as Iberia-trader and a Dutch resident of Hamburg; in 1619, Berenberg’s annual turnover in the Bank of Hamburg amounted to 165,615 Mark. His relative Paul Berenberg had a turnover of 163,382 Mark that same year. Kellenbenz, 239. 140 ADLA 4E2/1458/198, 21 October 1631. Freight contract between Nantes merchant Jac Guillet and captain Belliotte to take 51 pipes of Nantais wine to Temminche in Hamburg aboard the Françoise [40 ton]. See also ADLA B 2976. The port register of Nantes lists St. Nazaire as the Françoise’s home port. The ship had arrived with 50 barrels of coal. Over a month passed between the signing of the freight contract and captain Charles Belliote’s departure for Hamburg on 26 November. Interestingly, the captain only declared a cargo of 18 tons of upstream wines and made no mention of the 25.5 tons of Nantais wines supposedly in the hold for the account of Jan Temmingh. The port register does not list the name of Guillet, the freighter, either. Is this a classic case of under-reporting for tax evasion purposes? Jan Temminche’s long-term residency of Hamburg is conrmed by GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 152/688/1017, 20 November 1643: Jan Temmingh. 141 ONAR152/626/928, 10 August 1643 and 152/645/954, 21 August 1643.

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not hide his Sephardic origins), and Dutch merchant houses (Van Diest) in Rotterdam and Middelburg (Van de Luffels) with their factors in Hamburg. The Temmingh clan had a further connection with both Rotterdam and Nantes: In 1684, a cousin of the Van Naerssen family in Nantes married the widower ‘Adriaen Temmingh, councilor of the King of Denmark’ in Hamburg.142 Yet more chain-links have popped up. In April 1646, Coenraedt Temmingh shows up as partner of Adriaen van Immersael of Rotterdam in a deal involving brandy imported from Nantes, and we know that Pedro Valck had a Ms. van Immerseel as mother or grandmother.143 One of the Van Immerseel women, Françoise, married Jacques de Letter, one of the three sons of the Mintmaster General of the Spanish Netherlands in Antwerp, thus providing the Temmingh—Valck—Van Immerseel—Van de Luffel network with a vital link to the European money trade. Stols noted that “the three brothers gained social prominence in Antwerp despite their reputation as smugglers” of colonial goods to Holland. Jacques’ public ofces included those of second treasurer of the city of Antwerp while his brother Thomas followed in their father’s footsteps and became Mintmaster General.144 Who would be better positioned to launder the silver obtained in the illegal trade with Iberia and the rest of the Spanish empire? The Rotterdam notarial archives conrm that Jacques de Letter dealt in letters of exchange drawn up in Paris as early as February 1632.145

142 Engelbrecht, 225. Antonetta van Naerssen was the granddaughter of Rotterdam’s crane master and wine merchant Revixit van Naerssen Sr, and a full cousin of Revixit Jr and his brother Jacob, both of whom worked in Nantes. It is possible that ‘Adriaen’ Temmingh is none other than ‘Jan’ but in 1684 he would have been an old groom compared to Antonetta’s 35-years. 143 For Coenraedt Temmincq’s stay in Nantes, see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 90/159/229, 10 March 1643; and GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 171/69/113, 14 April 1646, when he was in partnership with Adriaen ‘Emmersael’ [= Van Immerseel ]. Van Immerseel was a blood relative of Valck, see below. For Pedro Valck, see Stols, 66. Valck was the son or brother of Juan Valck, a merchant in Seville ca 1609. Juan’s mother was the very well-connected Catharina van Immerseel, who thus was either Pedro’s mother or grandmother. 144 Stols, 344. Thomas de Letter resided in Seville from ca 1607 to 1612. The son of one of the three brothers, Jan Jr, worked in Seville ca 1645–1646 together with one of Thomas’ sons, Juan de Letter. 145 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 98/223/560, 6 March 1632. Jacques de Lettre is mentioned as one of the signatories on a letter of exchange worth 1000 ecus and dated 10 February 1632. The letter was presented for payment to Jan van de Luffel in Rotterdam to settle the account of his brother Gillis who was in Nantes at the time.

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The Verpoorten clan provides another example of the interconnections between the Dutch and Sephardic rms trading along the Atlantic coast. From 1624 to at least 1626, Jan Verpoorten and his partner Adriaen van Rijnnenburch worked and traded in Nantes as ‘marchands amands’. They shipped Bordeaux and upstream Loire wines to Hamburg, rye from Brittany to London, and dealt in money through an active trafc in letters of exchange. It is highly likely that Jan Verpoorten was a member of the Hamburg based Verpoorten family, which by 1619 had already made several fortunes in the trade with Iberia, and I further propose that the Verpoorten name was the alias for members of the Sephardic De la Porta family. A Jacques de la Porte traded in Lisbon around 1630. Peter Verpoorten is directly linked to transactions between Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp. Based on information on the aliases used by the Dutch Sephardim, Peter’s partner in Hamburg Carel Groenendael was a Sephardic Jew and this reinforces the idea that the Verpoortens were Sephardim as well. In 1628, Willem Verpoorten in Middelburg became creditor to Nantesbased Bonaventure Bron [who had married to a woman of the Espinais family]. Other possible members of the same family include the brothers Jean and Abraham ‘Vandan Pourt’, naturalized citizens of Bordeaux in 1612 and Paul Desporta, Jewish merchant in Bordeaux in 1660.146

146 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/131/281, 4 July 1624 for the partnership of Jan Verpoorten and van Rijnnenburch in Nantes. For Jacques de la Porte in Lisbon, see Stols, 54. See also GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 143/196/390, 8 June 1627: Isaacq de Bra, merchant in Rotterdam, transfers a claim of 1745 daalders 9 schellingen on Peter Verpoorten and Carel Groenendael in Hamburg to his Antwerp-based brother Louys de Bra. See also Kellenbenz, 233–235 & 238–239 & 295. With an annual turnover of 383,404 Mark, Peter Verpoorten and his partner Carel Groenendael rank second in the list of Hamburg’s rms who were active in the trade on Spain in 1619. In fth place comes the company of Jacob and Johann Verpoorten with a turnover of 299,374 Mark. Jan Verpoorten in Nantes may even have been the same person as the Johann Baptista de la Porta who was in Seville around 1610. For evidence of Groenendaal’s Jewish roots, see Israel’s report on a list of aliases used by Amsterdam Sephardim received in Madrid in 1656. Amsterdam’s Juan Gonzales used several aliases, including Albert Wighman, Jacobus van Gruenendal and Abraham van Gruenendal. Jonathan I. Israel, “Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609 –1660,” Studia Rosenthaliana 12 (1978): 60. See also GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 97/81/193, 24 August 1628. Transfer of all the debts of Bonaventura Bron, Dutch merchant in Nantes, from his creditor Jan van Renssen in Middelburg to Willem Verpoorten, also in Middelburg. For the naturalization of Jehan and Abraham Van dan Pourt, see ADG C 3817. According to Leroux, the brothers had requested naturalization as early as 1602: “Jean et Abraham Vandenpom”. Leroux, 33. For Paul Desporta, see Gautier: 32.

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The Dutch links to the Sephardic network became even more important as it stretched into Spain and Portugal. Evading the embargo via Hamburg Kellenbenz identied the method used to white-wash goods that were banned from Iberian harbors: goods shipped from Hamburg to France in 1605 received ofcial certicates of origin ( Hamburg), even though nothing in French import regulations required it. The real reason was that the cargoes mentioned were all destined for transshipment to Bilbao, for which the importers had to produce a certicate that the goods had not originated in the territories under embargo. La Rochelle, Calais, Rouen, and Nantes all fell into this category of transfer-ports, while the growth in importance of Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz for these transfers occurred after the end of the Twelve Year Truce in 1621. Was it coincidence that in those years the tax farm on overland imports was in the hands of Sephardim?147 The notarial records of Rotterdam are understandably quiet about the Dutch/Rotterdam voyages to Portugal and Spain, but we are offered the occasional glimpse. Bayonne and Saint Jean-de-Luz were perfectly legal destinations for Dutch cargo, but we can not know how many of the goods imported into southern France were destined for the Iberian peninsula. In his works on the Spanish trade embargoes Jonathan Israel noted both the ‘sudden drop’ and the ‘virtual collapse’ of Dutch business during embargo years, both before and after the Twelve Years Truce, as well as the “astonishingly vigorous boom”, the “sudden recovery and tremendous expansion” as soon as restrictions were lifted. Other nations beneted from this clamp-down on Dutch activities to the detriment of the Republic. The period between the re-imposition of the embargo in 1598 and its lifting prior to the ofcial start of the Twelve Year Truce dovetailed nicely with the “suddenly ourishing Spanienfahrt in the north German ports between 1598 and 1609 . . .,” with Hamburg as the prime beneciary of the restrictions placed on the Dutch.148 Yet how German was this upsurge in the Hamburg trade with the Spanish empire? We must place a question mark next to the suddenness of both collapse and boom. In crediting the German merchants with a quick witted 147 148

Kellenbenz, 303–304. Israel, Conicts of Empires, 40, 210.

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reaction to the opportunity offered by the embargoes, Israel seems to have overlooked an obvious, practical point: Whose ships transported the goods between Spain and northern Germany? And whose sailors manned the sheets and hoisted the anchors? For example, after captain Abraham Pieters had provided a clerck of merchant Manuel Consalves with a safe passage from Rotterdam to Madeira on Consalves’ ship in the summer of 1632, the clerk stupidly told several Portuguese residents of the island that the crew consisted of men from Holland—instead of Hamburg as ofcially stated. Fearing imprisonment, Captain Pieters hardly dared to set foot ashore after this.149 Israel is not the only one to stop short of connecting all the dots in the embargo evasion scheme. When the French historian Jean Tanguy investigated the commercial sector of the economy of Nantes, he too observed the sudden surge in the importance of Hamburg as port of origin and destination in the early decades of the seventeenth century. In 1631, the port records of Nantes lists the departure of 87 ships for Hamburg.150 Tanguy noted the odd situation that not a single ship belonged to the Dutch merchants, and expressed his amazement at the equally strange fact that none of the ships listed Hamburg as their home port. Both Israel and Tanguy admire the surge in Hamburg’s importance as a center of maritime trade, but they both stop short of what has become rather obvious. When the available hard evidence is placed next to all the circumstantial evidence, we must conclude that at the re-introduction of the Spanish embargo in 1621, the Dutch-Iberian trade collapsed on paper only. The shipping patterns alone are not indicative of the actual nancial outcome of the commodity trades. Indications, sparse as they may be due to the illegality of the practice, are that the Dutch eet continued to sail, albeit under a variety of foreign ags, until the coasts were clear again. Evading the embargo via Bayonne & Saint Jean-de-Luz In a letter to the States General in February 1599 the directors of the Rotterdam Admiralty requested guidance on the level of enforcement they could expect regarding the Dutch restrictions on the Iberian trade. The Rotterdammers indicated that trade on Spain and Portugal would 149 150

GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 141/298/460, 4 September 1632. ADLA B 2976 and Tanguy, 326.

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continue, and that “the merchants would now join in convoys sailing to Bayonne, Rochelle, Saint Jean-de-Luz and would even sail to the nearby towns in Spain, the way they have done all along”.151 Despite the ofcial restrictions on the Iberia trade and the passport or license system for authorized transactions, unofcial i.e. illegal trade continued throughout the war years. Jonathan Israel’s extensive work on the Sephardic network and the way it enabled an international evasion of Spanish trade embargoes reinforces Kellenbenz’ position on the importance of Bayonne and neighboring Saint Jean-de-Luz. Israel quotes a Spanish report of September 1630 which stated that the annual value of Dutch trade goods moving south from Bayonne via the overland route across the Pyrenees into Spain was between two and three million ducats [or between six and nine million guilders]. The only commodities Spain could furnish in return were wool and New World silver, and these crossed the mountains in the opposite direction for transshipment at Bayonne or rode the waves; regardless of the route and the mode of transportation, the return goods had Amsterdam as their prime Dutch destination.152 The connection between Rotterdam and Saint Jean-de-Luz seems to have been minimal, but as early as 1608 at least one man went there to trade in person [it is not clear if this was a one-time deal or if Jacob van Reysinghen resided there as factor for Rotterdam merchant Jacques Merchijs.153 Rotterdam’s ties with Bayonne, on the other hand, were very strong and relied heavily on resident factors such as Abram Beerewouts, Dircq Groenewege, Lodewijk and Jan Verssen, Gelein Isaacxsz, Cornelis Hals, and Niclaes van Bambeecq. Dutch residencies in Bayonne seem to have peaked between 1625 and 1635, the period

151 N. Japikse and H. H. P. Rijperman, eds., Resolutien Der Staten Generaal Van 1576 Tot 1609, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, vols. 9 –13 ( Den Haag: 1926–1957), 780. Nr. 414, 20 February 1599. The letter from Rotterdam had been received in The Hague the previous day. The records of the States General for this period are awash in authorizations for the issuance of passports. 152 Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 253–255. 153 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 32/242, 29 April 1608. Jacob Van Reysinghen, originally from Den Bosch but now a burger of Rotterdam, agrees with Jacques Merchijs that he will go to Saint Jean-de-Luz where he will trade in a variety merchandize (including cloves) on behalf of the partnership. Van Reysinghen is nanced by Merchijs to the tune of 4,860 guilders. The Sephardic community of Saint Jean-de-Luz was large enough to have 13 of its nubile young women participate in the Amsterdam Dotar ‘lottery’ of 1616; the next year 35 Jewish girls tried their luck in the dowry scheme. Nahon: 68.

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in which the Spanish crackdown on embargo evaders was the ercest. Despite the fact that it dates from 1605 [the middle of the pre-Truce embargo era], the rst notarial evidence documents a shipment of wines from Bayonne to Rotterdam. It is likely that merchants kept a very low prole about their trade in contraband from Iberia, which would explain the high ratio of notarial acts that deal with the legal exports of Bayonne’s regional wines. In 1611, Abram Beerewouts worked in Bayonne as factor for Rotterdam merchant Jan Gillisz Poppe, to whom he shipped 22 oxheads of Toussaint wine. The ship sailed straight from Bayonne to Rotterdam, and afterwards the crew declared that all the goods loaded in Bayonne were delivered to Rotterdam.154 Two other Beerewouts brothers worked in Rotterdam through at least 1625, where they conducted business with Sephardic merchants of both Rotterdam and Amsterdam.155 Upon the re-imposition of the trade embargo by the Spanish authorities in 1621, Bayonne resumed its role as transit port.156 A variety of initiatives poked large holes in the embargo, some authorized, some illegal. Stols reports that a Bayonne merchant had purchased the municipal ofce that issued ‘certicates of Spanish origin’, i.e. a provenance from somewhere in the Spanish empire. Commodities could be ‘certied’ with an original certicate from the Spanish Netherlands for “4 stuivers” or the smuggling merchant could risk getting away with a 154 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 16/410, 28 March 1611. Without information on the rest of the cargo, we can only speculate that those barrels of wine may have been the g leaf covering contraband silver, or even that the oxheads themselves contained bullion instead of wine. Jan Gillisz Poppe ended up as Equipagemeester [purveyor] of the Rotterdam Admiralty in 1636. Rotterdam brewer Pieter Jansz Blanckert was married to their sister Ysabelle. The extensive use of multiple aliases by Sephardic families in Europe make it is possible that Godella van den Bergh, the mother of the Verssen siblings, was a member of the Sephardic Delmonte family. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 109/21/36, 20 January 1632 for the will of Mrs. van den Bergh. For Jacob Del Monte = Jacobus van den Berg, see Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 265. 155 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 46/173/319, 3 Aril 1608 for Jan and Lenart Berewouts in Rotterdam and GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 143/217/425, 24 August 1626 for a dispute over a French letter of exchange involving Lenart, his son Jan [in Bordeaux?], the Godin brothers in Amsterdam and Jan van de Riviere [ João Ribeiro] in Rotterdam. 156 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 98/47/135, 14 February 1622. One of the rare documented cases involves the transshipment of ‘Nordic parts’, cordage and tar that had arrived in Rotterdam on a ship from Hamburg for the account of Diego Gomes, Portuguese merchant, who arranged for the delivery of the cargo to Bayonne. A second notarial act covers a cargo of 70 barrels of wine, wool, and feathers shipped by Gelain Ysaacxs in Bayonne. We must assume that at least the wool had originated on the back of a Spanish sheep. GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 147/182/412, 18 November 1627.

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Dutch-made fake certicate for “2 stuivers”. The author’s footnote does not include an explanation, but my assumption is that the authentic certicates cost 20 percent of the goods’ value [4 x 0.05] while the cheaper fakes cost 10 percent. Other traders did not take chances and busted the embargo via ofcial channels. Against the payment of 60,000 ducats [180,000 guilders], the Madrid-based representative of the Paes rm received permission to import up to 1 million ducats [3 million guilders] worth of merchandize from the rebel provinces, which means that the Spanish government charged a 6 percent “commission”. A strategically timed ‘loan’ to the ailing treasury in 1643 obtained an Amsterdam conglomerate the right to purchase ‘fruits’ in Andalusia, further indications that the political will to subdue the enemy by economic means was a lofty principle thrown overboard when faced with the realities of the international marketplace.157 The height of Rotterdam’s interests in Bayonne came with the residencies of the Verssen brothers. We do not know when they started trading in Bayonnne, but by the end of 1624 the States General accredited Lodewijk [ Louis] Verssen as Dutch consul in a dispute over Dutch rights to adulterate the local wines. This appointment had already been conrmed by the French king [we can only wonder at the size of the douceur into the royal purse], but Bayonne’s municipal council claimed jurisdiction and refused to acknowledge Verssen’s new status. The consulate was never conrmed but soon after Verssen’s ‘defeat’ the local grandee sided with the Dutch against Bayonne’s native wine producers and gave his permission for the adulteration of the wines. Once again, a French ofcial and large landowner sided with the foreigners who purchased the local commodities. Eventually, however, the animosity between the local merchant community and the leader of the Dutch community subsided to the extent that Lodewijk obtained the coveted status of ‘bourgeois de Bayonne’ [citizen] in 1632. This gave him exemption from the 5 percent customs duty levied at both imports and exports.158 The notarial registers of Rotterdam reveal that Lodewijk worked in tandem with his brother Jan Verssen. The last mention of Lodewijk dates from 1635, but Jan remained very active in Bayonne through at least 1640. In December 1639 he was involved in the transshipment of

157 Stols, 36 & 46. The fruit-exemption cost the Amsterdam group between 400,000 to 600,000 ducats. Did the conglomerate actually deal in the forbidden fruit, i.e. silver? 158 Morineau, “Bayonne Et Saint-Jean-De-Luz,” 317–318 and 326.

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Spanish wool via Bayonne to Hamburg.159 The extensive use of multiple aliases by Sephardic families in Europe make it is possible that Godella van den Bergh, the mother of the Verssen siblings, was a member of the Sephardic Delmonte family. Several Dutch Sephardim used the alias of Van den Bergh instead of their family name Delmonte.160 A Sephardic background would have made the Verssens ideal candidates to bridge the connections between Spain and the Dutch traders who used Bayonne as their way-station. Louis Verssen’s Sephardic roots would also explain the animosity of the local merchants at the time of his royal appointment as Dutch consul. A freight contract from 1639 highlights the internationalism of the embargo evasion system. Cornelis van Bambeecq from Amsterdam, ofcially acting for an English buyer, signed a contract with the captain of an English ship currently in Rotterdam to sail to Bayonne, report to local factor Jan Verssen, load [un-identied but surely Spanish] wool, and deliver the wool to Hamburg.161 Despite the solid connection between Rotterdam and Bayonne in the form of the Verssen brothers,

159 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 147/135/309, 18 August 1627 for Lodewijck and Jan Verssen in Bayonne and 152/255/358, 18 December 1640 for the purchase of 400 barrels of wine by Rotterdammers Rammelman & Dammansz via Jean Verssen in Bayonne. See GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 86/160/287, 22 December 1639 for the freight contract by an Amsterdam merchant, ofcially acting on behalf for a merchant from Dover, to ship Spanish wool from Bayonne to Hamburg on an English ship. 160 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 109/21/36, 20 January 1632 for the will of mother Verssens, née Godella van den Bergh. Rotterdam notary Philip Verssen was the brother of the Bayonne men; his son or nephew François followed in his footsteps. I suspect that “the brothers Alvaro and Jacome Luiz, the leading ‘Portuguese’ merchants at Bayonne” were none other than the Verssens. Such a high economic prole would also explain the concerted efforts of the local French merchants to thwart Verssen’s appointment. See Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 252–253 and 264–265. Morineau’s article on Bayonne includes the full cargo list of the Roos of Amsterdam upon its arrival in Bayonne on 30 September 1628. Morineau, “Bayonne Et SaintJean-De-Luz,” 328–330. The cargo’s total value was worth 180,539 livres. “Louys et Jean Verssen” received goods worth 23,065 livres on which they paid half of the 3.5 percent duty; the last entry on the list refers to goods worth 19,921 livres destined for “Jacome et Bonte Louys”, none other than Jacome and Alvaro Luiz. The word ‘bonte’ in Dutch refers to a bird with many different colored feathers, and I suggest that ‘Alvaro Luiz’ = ‘Bonte Lodewijk’ = Lodewijk Verssen, a man with a variety of aliases. Rotterdam brewer Pieter Jansz Blanckert was married to their sister Ysabelle Verssen. For Jacob Del Monte’s alias of Jacobus van den Berg, see Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 265. In 1625, an Amsterdam member of the Belmonte family arranged a ransom of prisoners in Saleh with Jacome Luiz in Bayonne—or should it have been Jacome and Luiz? 161 GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 86/160/287, 22 December 1639.

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those ties pale in comparison with the ones linking Rotterdam with Nantes. The maritime route between Rotterdam and Bilbao via Nantes, arranged in cooperation with the Sephardic members of the Contractation de Nantes and men like Mark Serizay d’Espinoze must have provided a fairly reliable way for Rotterdam’s trade with Spain to continue without having to bother with the more cumbersome and riskier overland route. Indications are that in the commercial world of the Rotterdam merchants, France’s most southern ports actually were more signicant for the ‘Toussane’ wine trade than for the trade with Spain. The existing literature and the empirical evidence on the Iberia trade, the Spanish trade embargoes, and the ways in which they were circumvented all point to a rational, multinational, and above all symbiotic collaboration between Christian-, New Christian-, and Jewish merchant communities along the length of Europe’s Atlantic seaboard. In their quest for as wide and as elastic a network possible, merchants ignored confessional differences and relegated nationality to a background position. The resulting cooperation beneted the producers on the supply side and the consumers on the demand side. The multinational expertise of the Sephardic and Dutch commercial communities combined with the cargo capacity of the Dutch eet ensured that throughout this period the commodity trade ourished and that the Dutch continued to control international maritime transportation.

CHAPTER SIX

THE COASTAL TRADE AND THE DUTCH-ATLANTIC ECONOMY My ventures are not in one bottom trusted, Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate Upon the fortune of this present year William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice1

In the economic history of the Dutch Republic, the coastal trade along the North Sea and Atlantic coasts has been given relatively little attention in comparison to the Asian, transatlantic and Baltic trades. The historiography of the Asian and New World trades has beneted from the centralized administration and accounting systems of the large joint stock companies, while the Sound toll registers have enabled a detailed study of the Baltic trade. By contrast, the commodity trade along the Atlantic coast of Europe was in the hands of individual trading houses and small commercial partnerships. Apart from the all too rare surviving port registers, the coastal traders left few traces of their activities beyond those transactions that needed notarization. These merchants worked at an international level but left documentation at a local level, further complicating attempts to assess the overall economic impact of the European coastal trade. To get closer to a quantitative picture of the Dutch portion of this trade will require the joint efforts of several historians to compile detailed studies of commercial life in each of the port cities and of every signicant economic sector. French economic history of the rst half of the seventeenth century not only suffers from similar restrictions but is complicated by the meager participation of French merchants in the coastal trade, a situation much lamented by observers such as Jean Eon and Jean-Baptiste Colbert. In studies of integrated economic systems, the tendency has been to come up with a ‘champion’ sector or commodity which is then presented as the motor of the economy. In Dutch economic history, the

1 William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1600; reprint, 1992), Act 1, Scene 1.

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‘moeder negotie’—the grain trade with the Baltics—held that position, until challenged by the growth of the ‘rich trades’.2 Instead of assigning primacy to one particular sector, however, early modern economic history requires us to consider the horizontal integration of local, regional, and international networks. Economic globalization came into its own in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, forcing people and markets in every corner of the navigable world to make decisions about participation, cooperation and/or competition for a slice of the pie.3 One nascent country along the European coast of the Atlantic, a tiny rebel nation comprised of seven bickering ‘united provinces’, used its location, technological know-how and population density to push itself to the top of the seventeenth century’s economic food chain.4 In this process, an efcient distribution system for commodities— both those covering essential needs and those satisfying unnecessary luxuries—was of paramount importance. The trade in French wines and brandies was just one of the many sectors that fueled the Dutch economy. The myriad activities and investments of the wine trading merchants of Rotterdam exemplify the need to see even local trading practices as part of the much greater whole. We can position the French alcohol trade in ever wider circles, from it place within the Dutch economy to its place in Europe’s coastal trade, which in turn links it to the emerging colonial economies of the Americas—themselves intertwined with the trade in slave labor from Africa—and which nally connects it with the trade in Asia’s exotic and luxury commodities.

2 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, The Oxford History of Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 307–321. As noted by Van Tielhof, it is also possible that the Baltic grain trade earned this contemporary title because it was a mother’s job to feed her children, i.e. the Dutch population. M. Van Tielhof, The ‘Mother of All Trades’: The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 4. 3 The rulers of Japan and China kept foreign trade and Europeans at bay and under tight control. 4 The primary struggle continued to be between the maritime—and the landlocked provinces. Domestic competition further pitted Holland against Zeeland, and within Holland the city of Amsterdam against the other commercial centers of the province. These oppositions found expression in the non-payment of proportional contributions levied by the States General. “. . . most of the provinces, except Holland, in the payment of their proportion of 1,108,870 guilders designed [to establish another Admiralty board] were always slow and remiss, as to the whole, or else decient in part.” See Pieter de la Court and Johan de Witt, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republic of Holland (1662), The Evolution of Capitalism (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 187.

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The coastal trade that connected the European supply and demand zones provided a steady base for this global economy. Coastal trade diversied the market baskets throughout Europe and enabled, at least in the Dutch Republic, a hitherto unheard of level of specialization. Pieter de la Court emphasized the vital part played by commercial shipping in Holland’s economy: Yet generally it is certain, that in a country where there is shing and trafck, manufacturies and freight ships may easily be introduced. For from them there must of necessity rise an opportunity of bringing commodities to be wrought up out of foreign parts; and the goods manufactured may be sent by the same conveniency beyond seas, or up the rivers into other countries.5

Foreign and domestic demand for manufactured and semi-processed goods stimulated local industries, which in turn increased the demand for labor in the cities—a demand met by immigration from rural areas and abroad. The surge in urban populations not only boosted the demand for bulk staples such as grain and sh, but was followed by a growing demand for non-essential products such as wines and brandy from southern Europe, sugar and tobacco from the New World, plus silks and spices from Asia. In time, some of these items moved from being ‘wants’ to ‘needs’. Wine and brandy, however, remained luxury commodities that merely enhanced the quality of life. ‘Cabotage’—the coastal trades The commodity trade along the Atlantic shores of Europe is also known by its French title, ‘cabotage’. A ‘cabot’ is an oxhead, and the French label thus acknowledges that much of the merchandize was shipped in barrels of various sizes, including the oxhead which held about 228 liters or a quarter ton. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, Rotterdam emerged and then consolidated its position as a town with strong commercial ties to the British islands across the Channel and to ports further south along the Atlantic coast, the French ports in particular. Far more than Amsterdam, Rotterdam’s commercial sector focused on the Atlantic coastal trade.

5

Ibid., 29.

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The North—South orientation of Europe’s cabotage system, combined with its primary—but not exclusive—focus on the movement of bulk staples such as grain, salt, sh, wines, and timber, integrated the European markets. Port cities situated at the mouths of the major rivers acted as anchors for the economies of their hinterlands as a whole. Radiating inland from the Atlantic ports, supply zones of one commodity acted as demand zones for goods brought from elsewhere.6 Opportunities for protable trade exist where demand and supply are in des-equilibrium. Morineau called the imbalance between supply and demand the motor of Dutch commercial success.7 The sheer volume of trafc, no matter how small the individual vessels, ensured a high frequency and regularity of arrivals and departures, except in the harshest winter conditions or during periods of intense warfare. The relative speed combined with overlapping circles of distribution networks to ensure a fairly elastic interaction of demand and supply. The distribution tempo of the coastal trade also allowed for the transport of moderately perishable foods such as herring, cheese, citrus fruits, and—last but not least—wines. How important was the coastal trade for the economy of the Dutch Republic in its ‘Golden’ century? Buried in a footnote of an article by Odette Vlessing that focused on the economic power of Amsterdam’s Portuguese community we nd an important revision of economic data as presented in a taxation proposal of 1634. Vlessing concludes that maritime trade brought about 44,280,000 guilders worth of goods into Holland, West-Friesland and Zeeland every year, but has stopped short of applying her ndings to a broader quantication of the Dutch economy.8 By combining Vlessing’s numbers with J. R. Bruijn’s regional 6 Rosman highlighted the role of Polish Jews of Gdansk as traders who specialized in secondary commodities in which the grain producing estate owners were not interested, and in the distribution of imported goods up the Vistula river. Moshe J. Rosman, “Polish Jews in the Gdansk Trade in the Late 17th and Early 18th Centuries,” in Danzig, between East and West: Aspects of Modern Jewish History, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 114–116. 7 P. Jeannin, “Les Interdependences Économiques Dans Le Champ D’action Europeen Des Hollandais. XVIe–XVIIIe Siecle,” in Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, ed. Maurice Aymard (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 157–161. See also Michel Morineau, “Le Commerce De La Baltique Dans Ses Rapports Avec Le Commerce Hors De La Baltique Du Milieu Du XVIe À La Fin Du XVIIIe,” in The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic Region, 1400 –1800. De Nederlanden En Het Oostzeegebied, 1400 –1800, ed. J. M. van Winter (Leiden: 1983), 35. The necessity to import grain became the opportunity to ship Dutch-produced or Dutch-traded commodities north. 8 Odette Vlessing, “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth

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distribution of the commercial sectors, we can arrive at fresh insights into the relative strength of the various branches of Dutch maritime trade. By adding the import values contributed by the VOC, the WIC, and the commission trade to the Baltic and the Atlantic coastal trades, we can recalculate the individual shares of the various regional trades.9 At 39.2 percent, the value of the trade along Europe’s Atlantic coast nearly equaled the value of the ‘moeder negotie’ with the Baltic region plus the Artic destinations. In a tripartite division of Dutch maritime trade, the share of the celebrated long distance luxury trades stood at a modest 16.2 percent in 1634. These recalculations of the values as well as the percentages must be placed next to a radically different estimate of the strength of the Republic’s [trans]-Atlantic trades. Enthoven offers a much higher estimate for the two Dutch India companies, including a whopping 17.5 million guilders or a 31.3 percent import share by the trans-oceanic trades alone. Klooster seriously questions these early estimates and believes that the hard data from Amsterdam’s imports in 1667–1668, which show that almost 3.3 million guilders worth of trans-Atlantic commodities entered that city that year, provide a more realistic picture of the relative strength of the Dutch economy.10 Concurring with Klooster, I stand behind the recalculated estimates as listed in Table 6.1. These gures also force us to re-assess the historiographical emphasis on the relative importance of the Baltic trade to Dutch commerce. Yes, the Baltic supplied much needed grain to the urban populations of the Republic, but the value of commodities supplied by the Atlantic cabotage sector surpassed that of the Baltic trade itself and came close to matching the combined value of the whole Nordic sector. The economic value of the long distance trades pales in comparison

Century Amsterdam,” in Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times; Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf (The Hague: 1995), 229, ftnt 29. According to Vlessing, the original document did not include Zeeland’s contribution to the import economy, which contemporaries reckoned worth an additional 20 percent. 9 J. R. Bruijn, “De Vaart in Europa,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 200 and 213. The two tables have been reproduced in Appendix III. 10 Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven, eds., Dutch Trans-Atlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 437–438. My gratitude to Willem Klooster who provided his reassessment of Enthoven’s gures in a personal communication, May 2006.

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Regional breakdown of estimated Dutch maritime imports, 1634

Region/Sector Baltic Norway northern Russia northern Germany England, Scotland, Ireland northwestern France southwestern France Spain, Portugal, Mediterranean direct Dutch trade between France and the Baltic whaling sector Dutch East India Company Dutch West India Company ‘commission trade’ for foreign rms Total [ percentages rounded off ]

Percentage

Value in guilders

33.9 4.1 4.1 5.4 11.9 4.6 8.1 8.1 1.1

15,000,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 2,400,000 5,280,000 2,040,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 480,000

1.1 13.5 2.7 1.4 100.0

480,000 6,000,000 1,200,000 600,000 44,280,000

Source: Vlessing, 229 and Bruijn, 213 [Atlantic coastal trading sector in italics].

Table 6.2

Tripartite division of Dutch maritime imports by region by value, 1634

commercial sector trade with the Baltic, Norway & Russia trade along Europe’s Atlantic coast trans-oceanic share

percentage

value in guilders

42.1 39.2 16.2

18,600,000 17,400,000 7,200,000

Source: Vlessing, 229 plus Bruijn, 213.

to that of the less glamorous coastal trades to both northern as well as southern Europe. More importantly, without the cash—in most cases the silver—generated by the coastal trading sector, the other two branches of Dutch maritime commerce would not have been able to function as well as they did. If we qualify the importance of the different trade branches on the basis of their ability to deliver ‘needs’ or ‘wants’, we must downplay the role of the long distance trades even further while elevating the signicance of the under-appreciated coastal trades. Vlessing suggests that less than half of the ships estimated to arrive from sea every year would have been Dutch, the other half foreign. Two issues preclude, however, a hasty conclusion that only half of

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the goods were imported by the Dutch and on Dutch ships. First, the 50 –50 distribution applied to the number of vessels, not their size, and we know that the cargo capacity of Dutch merchant ships tended to be larger than that of the foreign competitors. By value, then, the ‘Dutch’ portion of the imports into the Republic would have been much higher than half. Second, the taxation estimate was made in the middle of the last Spanish trade embargo period, and the most favored evasive tactic of the Dutch was to pretend that ship, cargo, and crew were anything but Dutch by ying a foreign ag. So these estimates present a reliable picture of the relative weight of the individual regional markets within the maritime sector of the Dutch economy but not of the Dutch-ness of these trades. The merchant eet Even if exact numbers remain elusive, the control over a large portion of Europe’s shipping capacity that gave Dutch merchants and ship owners the exibility to react swiftly to shifting market imbalances has never been doubted. The ships that carried all those goods from their supply zones to the consumption centers elsewhere in Europe were on average much smaller than the celebrated behemoths of the Asian trade, but we must stress the fact that Holland’s coastal eet made multiple trips per year, raising the available cargo space to very respectable levels. The proposed taxation scheme for marine commerce dating from 1634 has led to two estimates on the size of the combined merchant eets of Holland, West Friesland and Zeeland involved in the coastal trade. First, Bruijn presents an estimate of 1750 merchant ships, excluding the shery eet and the VOC vessels; he estimates the cargo capacity of these ships at 310,000 tons.11 Further research by Vlessing revealed that Zeeland’s ports and eet was omitted from the 1634 reckonings and that half of the arrivals were expected to be foreign-owned. Using Bruin’s distribution of the cabotage sector, Vlessing has estimated that about 1,050 cargo ships from Holland, West-Friesland and Zeeland were involved in coastal trade in 1634, i.e. half of the total number of ships arriving in Dutch sea ports from abroad.12 [see Table 6.3]

11 12

Bruijn, 200. Vlessing, 229, ftnt 29.

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Table 6.3 Estimated size of the coastal eet arriving in Dutch ports, 1634 Region/Sector

Ships

Average tons

Total tons

Baltic Norway northern Russia northern Germany England, Scotland, Ireland northwestern France southwestern France Spain, Portugal, Mediterranean Total coastal eet Dutch share according to Vlessing

480 420 60 180 200 168 360 240 2,108 1,050

200 200 240 40 70 80 200 300

96,000 84,000 14,400 7,200 14,000 13,440 72,000 72,000 373,040 185,812

Source: Bruijn [1976] 200 & 213 and Vlessing [1995] 229.

The number of arrivals in the Republic does not, however, equal the number of ships in the Dutch coastal eet. Two issues complicate attempts to come up with an estimate on the total volume of cargo transported by the Dutch. First, freight contracts reveal an abundance of cargo transported from foreign supply zone to foreign demand market without ever stopping over in a Dutch port. Those ships would not have been accounted for, leading to an underreported low estimate in 1634. Second, depending on the distance to their ultimate destinations, coastal ships could and did make multiple trips each year. This implies that these ships may have been counted twice or thrice, skewing the estimate towards an articial high. For example, we know that the standard duration of a one-way trip between Rotterdam and Nantes was set at 14 days, even in the middle of the winter. Even with a full month lay-over in port at either side of the route and allowing one month per year for maintenance, it would theoretically have been possible to make four round-trips to south-western France per year. The port register of Nantes of 1631 proves that three round trips per year were not exceptional. Multiple stops along the way were a standard feature of the coastal trade and these would add to the time spent in various ports and reduce the time spent sailing. Three round trips allowed the captains to call into several ports, a system that is conrmed by Rotterdam freight contracts.13 13

Ibid. See also Bruijn, 200 and 213. For the triple arrivals in a single year, see ADLA B 2976, port register of Nantes 1631.

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The practice of multiple trips per year has led Lucassen to propose to reduce these eet estimates by 25 percent.14 This would mean that the Dutch coastal eet would number fewer than 800 vessels. We must weigh this reduction against the uncertainty about the true nationality of that second half of the arrivals which Vlessing considers ‘foreign’. Plenty of those so-called foreign ships must have had Dutch owners and crews, because at that time the number of vessels sailing under a foreign ag in order to avoid conscation under the Spanish trade embargo was substantial enough to have drawn widespread comment. Additional uncertainty comes from the lack of specic knowledge about the carrying capacity of the ships, be they Dutch or truly foreign. The true combined tonnage of all 2,100 ships is virtually impossible to estimate, we only know that Dutch ships were generally larger than those of their foreign competitors. Employment in the merchant marine The impact of the alcohol trade on Rotterdam’s maritime labor market can only be guessed at because the ships that carried the wines and brandies from France to the Republic were involved in other commodity trades as well. Lucassen’s study of the Dutch merchant marine around 1610 and in 1633 estimates that 4,500 sailors mustered for voyages to France annually. Because ships involved in the coastal trade usually made multiple trips per year, the total number of employed sailors has to be reduced by as much as a quarter.15 Lucassen’s numbers do not agree with the States General’s armament decree of 1603, which specied that ships of 40 last should be crewed by seven men and one boy, and those of 100 last by thirteen men and two boys.16 If Dutch ship owners did adhere to the guidelines, and we use Lucassen’s gures for the size

14 Jan Lucassen, “Zeevarenden,” in Maritieme Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert (Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976), 132. 15 Ibid. Unfortunately Lucassen does not mention his source for the 1633 gures. How many of the 200 ships of 150 last [crewed by a total of 6,000 men] sailing on the Mediterranean and the Iberian peninsula stopped in French ports en route to remains anyone’s guess. 16 C. Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-Boeck Van De Staten Van Holland En Zeeland, 2 vols. ( Den Haag: Van Wouw, 1658; reprint, 1774), vol. 1, 876–878. Placaet of 9 April 1603 on the armament and crew of merchant and shery ships. The required number of men rose by one for each 10-last increase in the ship size, so a 20 -last ship would ideally be crewed by 5 men and 1 boy.

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chapter six Table 6.4 Estimated number of sailors on the eets to France

ship’s size in last 20 40 100 total

# of ships

# men

# boys

total crew

10 140 300 450

50 980 3900 4500

10 140 600 750

60 1120 4500 5680

Source: Cau, vol. 1, 876–878 and Lucassen, 132. 1 last = 2 tons

of the eet operating on France, the total number of males employed in French commerce would have stood at 5,680 per year. The frequency at which the government had to repeat the decree following the resumption of war in 1621 leads to the conclusion, however, that smaller crews were the norm, most likely as a cost cutting and prot boosting measure by the ships’ owners and operators. Although we do not know if the ships that frequented Nantes in 1631 represented the whole of Rotterdam’s ‘French eet’, we can attempt to calculate the eet’s demand on the city’s labor market. Twenty-nine of the Dutch—or Dutch owned ships, or 26 percent, listed Rotterdam as their home port. If we add the other two Maas-river ports of Schiedam and Vlaardingen, the number rises to 35 ships or 31.5 percent.17 Without claiming that the Nantes situation was representative for the whole make-up of the Dutch—French trade, an application of these percentages to Lucassen’s eet gures would suggest that approximately 1,988 men and boys were used to man the ships from the Maas area, of which 1,477 sailed on Rotterdam’s own ships—yet further adjustments are necessary. First, the multiple sailings of the ships each year drastically lower the number of males actually employed on the eet; and second, we do not know the percentage of non-residents who mustered on the Rotterdam eet. The anonymous chronicler of 1623 mentioned that “in addition to” the resident population, Rotterdam’s naval and commercial eets attracted “a large group of [non-local ] sailors”. The following gures should be used as a comparative exercise only: Projecting the 1,477

17 ADLA B 2976, Registre de la Prévoste, 1631. Schiedam home port: 4; Vlaardingen home port: 2. For comparison’s sake, 14 ships listed Amsterdam as its home port, a mere 12.6 percent of the total arrivals. Amsterdam’s demand for crewmembers for the trade on France would have been about 715 men.

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Rotterdam sailors onto the city’s 1623 estimated population gures of 26,000 means that those who sailed on France equaled about 5.7 percent of the residents of Rotterdam. If we cut the female half of the population out of this equation, the impact on the labor pool rises to the equivalent of 13.6 percent of the male population of Rotterdam.18 We must add the crews of the ships which provided naval protection to the merchant eet to the labor requirements of the trade on France. Again, we have to row with the only oars available: In 1631, the Admiralty of the Maze based in Rotterdam owned seven ‘ordinary’ convoy ships, a group of vessels that could be assigned to protect specic voyages of segments of the merchant eet. Depending on the actual number of merchant ships leaving for southwestern France, these ‘Bochtvaerders’ were escorted by between two and ve of these warships which had an average crew size of 60 men each, which translates to another 120 to 300 sailors dedicated to the French trade per voyage.19 Sailing under the wings of the warships never guaranteed a safe passage, so ship-owners and freighters took out insurance to protect themselves from natural or man-made disasters. How valuable were the goods that needed both naval escorts and an insurance policy as a back-up plan? Can we quantify the coastal trade on France?

18 Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, Hare Oudtheyt Ende Hare Grootheyt, Endo Oock Hare Ghelegentheydt, Leidsche Facsimile-Uitgaven (Leiden: 1623; reprint, 1942), 1. For the population gures for 1623 and the information about the non-citizen sailors. The chronicler uses the word foreigners, but this includes non-Rotterdammer Dutchmen and non-Dutchmen alike. 19 R. Bijlsma, “Collection Bijlsma [Author’s Notes],” in Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (Rotterdam: c. 1910). Doos 3, Admiraliteit Rotterdam. Staat van Oorlog te Water voor 1631. Bijlsma listed the size of 5 of the 7 convoy ships: 170, 140, 120, 100 and 90 last. In addition to the ‘at large’ convoyers, four Rotterdam warships patrolled the coast of Flanders, ve covered the mouth of the Maas river, six protected the herring eet and four the ‘small shery eet’. In addition, the Admiralty employed 28 ships to patrol the inland waterways. For the number of warships assigned to the Bochtvaerders, see GAR, HS (aanv. t/m 1966) inv. nr. 1984 19, AA 134. Minutes of the Admiralty of the Maze for the year 1639, entries for 28 January, 5 and 19 February 1639. For the size of the Rotterdam naval contingent in 1653, see GAR, HS (aanv. t/m 1966) inv.nr. 1988 120. List of navy ships, 4 April 1653. The Admiralty Board published a report on the actual and necessary strength of the Dutch navy in 1653, during the First Anglo-Dutch war. The Admiralty of the Maze, based in Rotterdam, owned twelve of the 104 warships under Admiralty control or 11.5 percent of the war eet. If, according to Lucassen, the average crew size of a navy ship stood at 60 men, 720 sailors from the Maas area served the Admiralty.

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chapter six Quantifying the French imports into the Republic

In 1634, Dutch maritime trade with both northern and southern France was expected to bring in 5,640,000 guilders, or 12.7 percent of the 44,280,000 guilders that constituted the total maritime imports. Based on their value, almost two-thirds [64 percent or 3,600,000 guilders worth] of the French imports came from the port cities of Nantes, La Rochelle, Bordeaux and Bayonne/St. Jean de Luz. These southern ports thus furnished 8.1 percent of the overall Dutch imports. Seemingly solid evidence, but are those single year estimates and percentages representative for French trade relations throughout the seventeenth century? Are they corroborated by reports about the volume of French exports to the Republic? We must be careful to differentiate between the value of the exports to the French economy and the value of the same commodities to the Dutch economy as imports. Acknowledging the additional problem that twelve years separate the above gures from the export data compiled by Jean Eon in 1646, the lack of more contemporary material nevertheless forces their comparison.20 The livre devalued a whopping 24.6 percent between 1634 and 1646, but the guilder kept the same silver value from 1620 through 1659.21 In 1646, Eon reported that the value of all Dutch exports from France amounted to 16,701,466 livres; this would have equaled 14,196,246 guilders. The difference between the Dutch estimate of about 5.6 million guilders worth of French imports into the Republic in 1634 and Eon’s claim that similar imports were worth over 14 million guilders to France’s export economy in 1646 is signicant. What circumstances could have led to such a remarkable increase in the value of the trade? First, the Dutch gures cover maritime imports into Holland, WestFriesland, and Zeeland only, completely ignoring the [unknown] value of all the goods brought in over land, while Eon estimated the total

20

Jean Eon, Le Commerce Honorable (Nantes: G. Le Monnier impr. du roi, 1646), 30 –34. 21 The relative silver values have been published by Richard Unger at www.history. ubc.ca/unger/currcon. Based on its silver content, the livre tournois used in Eon’s book was worth 0.85 guilder in 1646. Between 1634 and 1646, the two currencies swapped places; the exchange rate of 1634 gave 1.13 guilders per livre tournois. In 1634 the livre contained 11.61 grams of silver against 10.28 grams for the guilder; in 1646 the silver content of the livre had dropped to 8.75 grams while the guilder’s content remained steady at 10.28 grams.

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exports. Second, the Dutch estimate is low due to the [erroneous] assumption that half the ships involved were foreign, in combination with the discrepancy in cargo capacities of the larger Dutch ships. Third, the 1634 gures are based on an estimate of tax revenues on maritime imports by the provincial authorities who cautiously may have erred on the low side due to the pervasive under-reporting and under-payment of custom duties. As a realistic attempt at projecting future revenue, the tax document did not reect the actual value of the imported goods. The Convoy & Licenses receipts are ample proof of this. Consequently, the 1634 numbers are probably on the low side; the actual volume and value of all the goods imported into the maritime provinces must have been higher. And nally, the French numbers of 1646 may have been articially high. The goal of Eon’s book was to prod hitherto reluctant French entrepreneurs into embracing maritime commerce as a protable as well as honorable way to make a living. Because of its propagandistic aim—“just see how much money you Frenchmen can make this way”—Eon’s quantication of Dutch successes in the bi-lateral trade between France and the Republic may have been overly rosy. The next quantication of the Dutch import market for French goods came from ambassador Boreel in 1658. He reported to the States General that the total imports from France amounted to ‘over 35 million guilders’ [44.8 million livres tournois], which is two-and-a-half times the 14.1 million guilders [16.7 million livres] worth of exports taken from France by the Dutch as presented by Jean Eon in 1646. According to the ambassador, the wine exports amounted to ‘more than 5 million guilders’, plus an additional 1.5 million guilders worth of brandy, vinegar, and cider. The value of all French alcohol imports in 1656 thus came to at least 6.5 million guilders. Twelve years earlier, Eon had estimated the annual value of French alcohol exports to the Dutch Republic to be 5.26 million guilders—which makes both estimates fairly reliable.22 Boreel’s gures were used by several contemporary

22 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag, Staten van Holland, 1572–1795, toegang 1.01.03, inventaris nummer 146. Resoluties 1658, July–September. NB: the number on the box differs from the number on the volume by 1 digit. The ambassador’s son, J. Boreel, took the condential report, including the list of Dutch imports into and exports out of France, to the States General on 7 September 1658. The amounts are all listed in guilders. See also Lieuwe van Aitzema, Saken Van Staet En Oorlogh, in Ende Omtrent De Vereenigde Nederlanden, Beginnende Met Het Jaer 1621 Ende Eyndigende Met Het Jaer 1632, vol. 6 ( Den

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French exports and Dutch imports, 1646 and 1658 Eon 1646 in livres

French wine, brandy, vinegar exported to the Dutch Republic wine, brandy, vinegar, cider imported from France into D.R. Total Dutch exports from France Total Dutch imports from France

6,192,632

Eon 1646 in guilders

Boreel 1658 in guilders

5,263,737 6,500,000

16,701,466

14,196,246 35,000,000

Source: Eon, 34–36 and Aitzema, 241–242

chroniclers, who indiscriminately either used livres tournois or guilders for the same numbers. The exchange rate of 1.28 livres per guilder or 0.78 guilders per livre in 1658 requires a clear answer to the currency question: the original list uses guilders.23 The sketchy gures from the start of the trade wars between France and the Republic reveal that Boreel’s generous estimate does not agree at all with Minister Colbert’s 1664 assessment of France’s export sector. Misread by Cole, who attributes the gures to the account of the Dutch only, Colbert’s “Memoire sur le Commerce” states that French exports to all foreign nations, not just those to the Republic, were worth between 12 and 18 million livres [9.8–14.7 million guilders]. Colbert denitely singled the Dutch out as France’s chief competitors but did not specify the size of their share in his country’s exports.24 Boreel’s

Haag: 1669), 1664 edition. Aitzema copied the list verbatim and specied guilders as well. The Koninklijke Bibliotheek in The Hague has multiple versions of Aitzema’s work; the information came from the 1664 edition, volume 9 [1657–1658], book 38 [1658], pp. 238–242. 23 Boreel’s report was also cited by Pieter de la Court in 1662, but De la Court confused matters by citing some of the import statistics in livres but other categories in guilders. Court and Witt, 229 –230. De la Court’s numbers match those cited by Huet in 1718, but Huet quoted everything in livres. Pierre-Daniel Huet, Memoires Sur Le Commerce Des Hollandois Dans Tous Les États Et Empires Du Monde . . . Nouvelle edition augmentée de plusieurs mémoires & du tarif general d’Hollande ed. (A Amsterdam: Chez Du Villard & Changuion libraires . . . 1718), 82–83. The next set of numbers agrees with both Huet and De la Court, but in this case Ricard conrmed the numbers to be in guilders. Jean Pierre Ricard and Yudin Collection (Library of Congress), Le Négoce D’amsterdam (A Amsterdam: Chez N. Etienne Lucas libraire, 1722), 507. 24 Charles Woolsey Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 437. And also P. Clement, ed., Lettres, Instructions Et Mémoires De Colbert (Paris: Imperiale, 1859), Vol. II–1, cclxix–cclxx.

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gures as cited by Aitzema are far removed from both Eon’s as well as Colbert’s estimates. It is possible that the 35 million guilders quoted by the ambassador are the sum of both Dutch imports into France as well as Dutch exports from France [i.e. the value of all Dutch trade with that country], because the report deals with the ramications of potential trade sanctions. The alcohol trade as a pillar of the economy? Both contemporary as well as modern observers have acknowledged that the wine and brandy trade with France was one of the pillars of Dutch economic activity in the Golden Century, but that claim lacked quantitative evidence. In their comprehensive treatment of the Dutch economy, De Vries and Van der Woude repeat the economic importance of wine as one of the ‘foundation stones’ of the economy while registering the gap in statistical knowledge: A small number of goods accounted for a very large portion of the Republic’s total foreign trade. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, six commodities held an importance that deserves our special attention: grain, wine, salt, herring, textiles, and timber. Wine, if the scraps of evidence at our disposal are any guide, ranked among the most important trade goods of the 17th and 18th centuries. Regrettably, nearly nothing is known about the organization and development of the wine trade in the Republic.25

The earliest import—and export statistics used by these authors date from 1668–1669 and concern just Amsterdam. Other information on the volume of wine, brandy and vinegar traded in Amsterdam is derived from a local tax on wine that beneted an orphanage from 1671 onwards. Those gures, covering just the last three decades of the century, lead one to believe that annual imports into Amsterdam of all types of alcoholic drinks plus vinegar from France, Iberia, the Atlantic islands, and the Rhine area averaged 3,388 tons in the 1670s, 4,016 tons in the 1680s, and 2,896 tons in the 1690s.26

25 Jan De Vries and A. M. Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500 –1815 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 412–413. 26 First published by Hajo Brugmans, “Statistiek Van Den in—En Uitvoer Van Amsterdam, 1 October 1667–30 September 1668,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 19 (1898). See also Clé Lesger, “De Mythe Van De Hollandse

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Those gures pale in comparison to the hard evidence of wine and brandy imports from just two separate French supply zones much earlier in the century and should be treated with circumspection. Even if the wine trade suffered from the political and economic upheavals created by the French-Dutch war of 1672–1678 and the War of the League of Augsburg of 1689 –1697, the Amsterdam gures used by De Vries and Van der Woude fall too far short of known wine imports from France in the mid-seventeenth century to be considered representative for the whole century, nor do they reect the situation in the whole country. In 1631, Amsterdam already imported 3,958 tons of wine and 330 tons of brandy from Nantes alone, excluding all the other wines on the market for which the Pryscouranten quote a wholesale price.27 The rst complete year of departure records of Bordeaux [the year 1651] shows that 382 ships with a maximum capacity of 60,183 tons of wine left the Gironde estuary for a port in the Dutch Republic. Every ship exported wine, most also carried brandy, and about one third of them took other commodities as well. One hundred twenty nine ships carrying at the most 23,773 tons of alcohol specically registered Amsterdam as their destination.28 As noted before, the departure records do not divulge the actual export volumes nor the share of wines and brandies of the total cargo, but theoretically the maximum value of the exports from the city of Bordeaux alone to the Republic that year could have amounted to more than six million guilders. We know that many ships brought in mixed cargoes or did not ll up to capacity, so the actual value is certainly lower.29 Regardless of the unknown actual volumes and values, the above makes it clear that the importance of the trade in wines and brandy to the economy of the Republic is conrmed far more readily by foreign documents than by Dutch records. The formal conditions under which wines and brandy appeared on the market,

Wereldstapelmarkt in De Zeventiende Eeuw,” NEHA Jaarboek (1999): 19 –20. These single-city data cover only a single year, yet Lesger has presented them as being representative of the early modern Dutch wine trade in general. 27 ADLA B 2976, port register of Nantes for the year 1631. For the Pryscouranten, see NEHA Collectie Commerciele Couranten, AMS.1.01 and supplements in CCC 20, Cours van negotie t’Amsterdam, 1609 –1682. 28 ADG serie 6 B 283, Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux, 1651. Another 76 ships [carrying a maximum of 11,544 tons of alcohol] sailed for an unspecied port in Holland. A fair portion of the latter must have ended up in Amsterdam, the provinces’ largest consumer market. 29 See the wine trade chapter.

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however, is claried by numerous Dutch sources, both prescriptive as well as descriptive. Regulations and the legal framework of commerce Just like other branches of the Dutch economy, the trade in wines and brandy was subject to formal local, provincial and federal regulations. As noted by Peter W. Klein: The international trade of the Republic would never have been able to reach such volume if the institutional organization of the domestic tertiary sector would not have been attuned to it. This was accompanied by a strong framework of civil law covering the organization of the transport-, harbor-, and transit sectors.30

The decrees of the States General dened and constantly rened the rules of commerce, and we can use the changes to gauge the level of compliance.31 Notwithstanding the regulations, informal adjustments to those requirements due to market conditions were as inevitable as they were necessary. Following legislation, the collection and administration of taxes at all three levels required an efcient bureaucracy. The federal government imposed and collected the Convoy and License fees; the provinces such as Holland subjected alcohol to a sales tax; the municipalities collected a large portion of their total income from the imposts on alcohol consumption; and most of the impost receipts came from the consumption of beer. Throughout the early modern era, the daily dietary staple beer far outstripped the luxury drinks wine and brandy as revenue producer. Wine, a bulky luxury product Although some might disagree, humans can do without wine. In contrast to bread and beer, those absolute necessities for human life in early modern Europe, wine clearly occupied a spot in the luxury category. Both bread and beer required grain, and lots of it, while the temporary preservation of sh and other foods used up huge amounts of salt. It is

30 P. W. Klein, “De Zeventiende Eeuw, 1585–1700,” in De Economische Geschiedenis Van Nederland, ed. J. H. Stuijvenberg (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1977), 106–107. 31 Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-boeck van de Staten van Holland en Zeeland, 1658.

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not surprising, therefore, that Dutch coastal trading initially focused on grains from the Baltic and France plus salt from the pans of Iberia and France. Maritime transport of wines made economic sense only due to their high retail value which could absorb the freight charges and still turn a prot for the merchants and tavern keepers. The higher quality the wine, the longer a distance it merited to be transported. As a commodity, wine straddled two product areas: As an alcoholic beverage, wine continued to be a luxury product that merited meticulous inclusion into the celebrated Dutch still-life paintings of the era. As cargo, the barrels, pipes, and oxheads of wine clearly belonged in the category of bulk products. The booming Dutch economy of the rst half of the century brought imported wines within nancial reach of a larger segment of the population, but beer continued to be the basic drink of everyday life.32 In 1631, a skilled journeyman earning 1.03 guilders per summer day had the choice of paying 0.04 guilders for a liter of beer [3.9 percent of his salary] or 0.21 guilders for a liter of wine [20.4 percent of his salary].33 In other words, wine was more than ve times as expensive as beer—but then it also contained a higher concentration of alcohol. Rotterdam’s rise as a center of the Dutch alcohol trade—and the brandy trade in particular—coincided with the vigorous expansion of the city’s brewing industry. The rst fourteen years of the century saw the establishment of eleven new breweries, plus another ten in the seven years leading up to the end of the Truce. The growth of Rotterdam’s population and that of other nearby urban centers to which the city’s high quality beer was exported fuelled the demand. In the year that Rotterdam imported 1,978 tons of wine from Nantes, Rotterdam’s brewers produced 248,000 barrels of beer, the equivalent of about 32,560

32 According to De Vries and Van der Woude, 628, g. 12.4., annual per capita consumption of beer stood at 621 liters, which means that the daily ration was 1.7 liters. This corresponds to the rations set by the States General for crewmembers of its navy in 1636, as reported by Yntema: in the winter the men were entitled to 1.6 liters per day versus 2 liters during the summer months. See Richard J. Yntema, “The Brewing Industry in Holland, 1300 –1800: A Study in Industrial Development” ( PhD, University of Chicago, 1992), 91. Noteworthy is the absence of any mention of wine, jenever, or brandy. 33 For wages in the western part of the Republic, see De Vries and Van der Woude, 610. For the price of beer, see NEHA online datale ‘Prices and wages and the cost of living in the western part of the Netherlands, 1450 –1800’. For the retail price of French wine, see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 148/671, 31 October 1631.

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tons.34 The importance of beer as a dietary staple is also expressed in the share of the various types of alcohol in Rotterdam’s city impost accounts for the year 1644–1645. As we saw earlier, the consumption tax on beer furnished a whopping 91.5 percent of the alcohol impost receipts, while the tax on wines came to just 7 percent; the share of all types of brandy amounted to a mere 1.5 percent of the impost revenue. Wine continued to be a pleasant luxury for those fortunate enough to have a bit of discretionary spending power. In 1662, Pieter de la Court clearly identied wine—and imported French wine in particular—as a luxury item: It is clear that the Hollanders do buy up most of the French wines and salt that are exported; and that salt might be had in other countries, and particularly in Portugal, Spain and Punto del Rey. As it is likewise true, that we can better forbear those wines in Holland, than the French nobility and ecclesiasticks (to whom most of the wines belong) can forbear our money.35

If push came to shove, the Dutch could refrain from drinking wines but the French producers needed the Republic as one of their major outlet markets. If foregoing French wine altogether was too much of a sacrice for the good burghers of Holland, they could always substitute wines from other supply zones. Specialized links to specic supply zones Every glass of wine consumed in the Republic came from foreign and warmer climatic zones. Every barrel arrived by ship. Wines from Iberia, the Levant, and the Canary Islands arrived by sea, while German and Swiss wines were transported on the Rhine and Maas rivers. Wines from some production zones in the French interior, such as Bourgogne, could use the riverine network that owed into the Maas river. Most of the French wines arrived by sea but had started their journeys on

34 Richard W. Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 –1900: Economy, Technology and the State ( Leiden: Brill, 2001), 73, 79, 86 and 255–256. Rotterdam’s breweries produced about 8000 brews @31 barrels. A barrel or ‘smalton’ of beer held about 120 liters, and I have reckoned a French ‘tonneau’ of wine at 914 liters, which produces a ratio of beer to wine of 7.6 to 1. See Annex I for Measures & Conversions. 35 Court and Witt, 230 –231. The ‘ecclesiastics’ is the Catholic Church in its role as major landowner.

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rivers owing westward; the ‘upstream wines’ arriving in Nantes from the upper Loire valley are the best example. Dutch consumers had access to a multinational variety of wines and brandies, but this diversity in the products offered for sale masks the tendency of local specialization in the commerce of wines from specic supply zones. That such concentrations shifted over time due to political or supply-related changes does not diminish the basic trend. Ever since the sixteenth century, merchants and ships from Zeeland’s provincial capital Middelburg focused on the export of wines from Bordeaux. Following the fall of Antwerp in 1585 and the economic sanctions that affected river trafc on the Schelde, the focus of the wine trade shifted north. Yet vessels from Zeeland continued to frequent the Gironde basin for its wines, even if their return destination increasingly shifted to one of the port cities in neighboring Holland. In the rst ve years of the 1630s, Middelburg still imported well over half of all wine shipped from Bordeaux to the Republic. Vlissingen superceded Middelburg as the port from which most vessels arrived in Bordeaux later in the century, but as destination the huge consumer market of Amsterdam increasingly dened trade patterns between Bordeaux and the Republic. Rotterdam’s share of imports from Bordeaux crept up from a measly 6.2 percent in the early thirties to a respectable 31 percent by the middle of the century, but the city always had to yield to the Zeelanders in the transportation sector and to Amsterdam in the demand sector.36 Within the hierarchy of French wines and their export harbors, Nantes always yielded to the superior quality of the Bordeaux wines. Domestic exports of the wines from the upper Loire production regions—the Anjous and the ‘vins d’amont’ or upstream wines—to the Breton market had dened the role of Nantes through the sixteenth century.37 The arrival of Dutch entrepreneurs who realized they could distill a high quality brandy from the inferior and cheap wines of the Nantes area itself caused a revolution in grape growing and wine production. In the third and fourth decades of the century, the economy of Nantes thrived on the wine and brandy trade with the Republic. This trade created

36 B. Gautier, “Commerce Et Marchands Bordelais Dans La Premiere Moitie Du XVIIe Siècle, 1630 –1660,” Bulletin du Centre d’Histoire des Espaces Atlantiques 6 (1993): 27. 37 Jean Tanguy, “Le Commerce Nantais À La Fin Du XVIe Et Au Commencement Du XVIIe Siècle” (Thèse de troisième cycle, Universite de Rennes, 1965), 73, Table IX.

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the symbiotic ties between the economies of Nantes and Rotterdam. The wine importers of Rotterdam and the other Maas river ports, led by beer brewers who used their expertise to diversify, specialized in the production of ‘gebrande wijn’ or ‘brandewijn’. They either distilled the brandy from cheap wines such as the Nantais or they used grains, a type of ‘brandewijn’ which eventually became known as ‘jenever’. The Nantais wines occupied a separate niche in the French wine market and their role as raw material for brandy led to Rotterdam’s specialization in the production and distribution of brandy, but without losing sight of the regular wine trade. By 1672, Sir William Temple commented on the protable habit of Dutch towns to specialize in certain commodities, “and so improving it to the greatest heights, . . . Rotterdam by the English and Scotch Trade at large and by French wines”.38 The alcohol trade’s secondary impact on Rotterdam’s economy The wine trade depended on a healthy consumer demand for the imported product, as well as on a local economy that could furnish the necessary labor, equipment, and trade goods that could be used as exchange commodities in France, at the supply side of the whole business. The wine trade itself employed people to transport, blend, distill, barrel, store, and sell the wines, plus municipal ofcials to administer and tax the alcohol. The trade goods sent to France in exchange for the wines had to be produced locally, often from raw materials purchased elsewhere and taken to Holland for processing. The port records of Nantes for the year 1631 reveal that the trade goods brought in by ships from Rotterdam included: 158 brandy stills, herring, timber, cheese, sugar, madder, iron, and pepper. How Dutch were those products? The stills must have required a Dutch coppersmith, but the copper could have come from either Sweden or Japan; the timber came from Norway or Russia but was likely sawn in a winddriven mill in Zaandam; the sugar had arrived from Brazil or the Caribbean but was rened in one of the city’s ‘sugar bakeries; the iron probably originated in Sweden; and the pepper had arrived from Asia on a VOC ship. The only three ‘home grown’ products were cheese [even

38 William Temple, Observations Upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1672; reprint, 1972), 116. Dordrecht continued as the import center of Rhenish wines.

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four hundred years ago Dutch cows were famous for their rich milk]; madder [ grown and processed in Zeeland ] and herring [caught and barreled by the Dutch using French or Iberian salt].39 One renowned Dutch product is glaringly absent in the list of Nantes imports: Even though Rotterdam itself had a thriving textile industry, none of its ships brought any type of woolen cloth, nor did any one of the other Dutch vessels carry it.40 Brittany had a thriving textile sector, but it produced linen instead of wool, so the Bretons still had to acquire their woolens from elsewhere.41 Another potential supplier, the Contractation group, imported Spanish wool but not the nished product. Despite Eon’s statement that each year the Dutch imported 6,889,960 livres [5,856,466 guilders] worth of textiles into France, their absence in the imports of Nantes in 1631 remains odd. The unavailability of hard statistics makes it impossible to translate the 1631 product-list into an economic impact chart, so we are limited to an overview of the secondary industries. Bijlsma’s work on the economy of Rotterdam provides snippets of information on several industries tied to maritime trade. The production of brandy from imported French wines was in the hands of Rotterdam’s wine buyers or of the brewers who set up brandy stills as a side line. In 1674, well beyond the period under discussion, at least 56 brandy distillers operated in the city excluding the combined breweries—distilleries. It is not known if these distilleries produced {brandewijn [brandy] from wines or the grain based {brandewijn called jenever.42 The fact that 158 stills were exported from Rotterdam to Nantes in 1631 indicates that at least the 39 On the cultivation and processing of madder in Zeeland, see Anneke Van Dijkvan der Peijl, Meekrap Vroeger En Nu (Vereniging van Zeeuwse Musea, 1998). Bijlsma concluded that Rotterdam must have served as distribution and export center for the Zeeland madder because the supply of madder entering Rotterdam far outstripped local demand. R. Bijlsma, “De Zuidnederlandsche Immigranten En De Manufactuurverwerij in Oud-Rotterdam,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 3 (1915): 45. 40 Ernst Baasch, Hollandische Wirtschaftsgeschichte ( Jena: G. Fischer, 1927), 96–99. According to Baasch, Rotterdam’s textile industry reached its production peak around the middle of the 17th century. See also R. Bijlsma, “De Laken-Compagnie Der Van Berckels,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 1 (1913): 85–87. The city’s largest cloth producing rm operated three ‘workhouses’ and was valued at 96,400 guilders in 1638. Johan van Berckel Jr owned the rm with his brother in law Paulus Verschueren; Johan’s sister Petronella had married John Quarles, a member of the Merchant Adventurers [who held England’s monopoly on the wool and woolen cloth trade]. 41 James B. Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46–48. 42 R. Bijlsma, “Oud-Rotterdamsche Gebrandewijnbranders,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 3 (1915): 47–48.

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merchants who organized those shipments were not interested in promoting the distilling of brandy in Rotterdam but that they preferred to add the value to the product in France prior to the brandy’s shipment to the Republic.43 Maritime service industries proliferated in Rotterdam. Between 1620 –1630, the area along the Maas river dedicated by the city government to the private shipbuilding industry held about 30 [small] shipyards and slipways, in 1632 complemented by the VOC’s own shipyard. In 1623, one hundred men were recognized as masters in the carpenters’- and blockmakers’ guild. As headquarters of the Admiralty of the Maze, the city hosted the Admiralty’s shipyard and armory.44 Demands by the herring shery, the navy, the merchant eet and the inland/riverine trade mean, however, that the impact of the wine trade per se on the total output of the Rotterdam shipwrights must have been limited. In addition to the timber needs of the shipbuilding industry, the merchant eet needed sails, cordage, rigging, anchors, oakum, tar, etc. before it could take to sea. The demand for these products led to trade in raw materials such as canvas, hemp, iron, and tar, and to a steady demand for skilled workers to create the nished product. Rotterdam had ve or six rope-walks, which not only supplied cordage and rigging but nets for the herring eet as well. The rope-products were treated with tar for a longer lifespan, which created the need for a few tar-producers. Wine merchant Hendrick Rammelman’s stepfather Willem Nobel owned one of Rotterdam’s three tar-smelting potteries and traded in tar as well.45 Rotterdam’s port sector The raw or semi-nished materials entering Rotterdam had to be taxed, unloaded, transported, stored, processed, taken back to the harbor, reloaded, taxed, and transported. An army of crane personnel, carters, coopers, warehouse workers, and impost ofcials made sure the commodities kept moving, but it is impossible to come even close to an

43 By distilling the brandy at the source of the wine, the merchant-entrepreneurs reduced their freight charges of the alcohol by 1/4 to 1/7, equal the reduction of the liquid. 44 Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, 2. 45 R. Bijlsma, “Rotterdams Waterstad-Nijverheid 1588–1648,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 5 (1917): 47–53.

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chapter six Table 6.6

Employment of Holland’s labor force by sector, 1662

Fisheries [sea] plus related service industries

450,000

Agriculture, including turf making Manufacturing, domestic shipping, trade in goods produced Shipping and foreign trade

200,000 650,000 250,000

Source: Court, Pieter de la, and Johan de Witt. The true interest and political maxims of the republic of Holland (1662) The Evolution of capitalism. New York, Arno Press, 1972, 35.

estimate on how many people would have been employed in the port sector.46 The only estimates on the distribution of the labor force by economic sector come from Pieter de la Court in 1662. The numbers deal with the province of Holland alone, and we can only guess at the distribution of Rotterdam’s workers. All we know is that through the active pursuit of new commodities, by promoting institutions that could support their commerce, and especially by embracing the whole Atlantic as their potential marketplace, the native and immigrant entrepreneurs of Rotterdam had transformed the sleepy town of the mid-sixteenth century “which had very little commerce” into a vibrant commercial center, Holland’s second largest, by 1623.47 We must see Rotterdam’s secondary status as the result, among other things, of the economic and migratory pull exerted by the sheer size of Amsterdam. As early as 1622, at least four times as many people resided in the city along the Amstel. Once Amsterdam had reached the critical mass, the interplay of immigration that supplied labor and investment that created demand for workers made a move of either immigrant or investor to Rotterdam less obvious. Yet a city which grew from about 10,000 souls at the start of the century to around 20,000 –26,000 residents two decades later can only be called a boomtown.48

46 Information on the sugar reneries, see H. Van Oordt van Lauwenrecht, “De Suikerrafnage Te Rotterdam,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 6 (1918): 48 & 50. In 1594, three ‘sugar bakers’ operated in Rotterdam; Jan de Mey established a successful renery in 1632, but his signature on both the 1634 as well as the 1638 impost documents reveals he was a wine trader as well. A very late reference [1815] indicates that “in earlier times” Rotterdam had over 30 reneries employing between 20 and 25 workers, but we do not know exactly how much earlier. 47 Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, 1. 48 The gure of 20,000 is based on the 1622 census gure [19,532] quoted by De Vries and Van der Woude, 64, and the population size of 26,000 comes from the 1623 description, Beschrijvinghe Der Stadt Rotterdam, 1.

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How important was the alcohol trade for Rotterdam? In 1618, the city council announced that the wine and brandy trade had replaced beer brewing as Rotterdam’s number one economic earner.49 Yet the veracity of the statement must be questioned in view of the above mentioned primacy of beer in the 1644–1645 impost data. Rather than reporting the reality, the council’s announcement may very well have been part of its propaganda in its violent competitive clash over the French and Spanish wine staple with its rival river port Dordrecht. Touting the importance of wine could be considered verbal ammunition in the inter-city dispute, which ended with Rotterdam’s control over the import of wines ‘from the Sea’.50 Relative values The following attempt at quantication moves from a calculation of alcohol’s share of the overall Dutch trade with France to an educated estimate about the relative worth of the trade between France and the Republic within the Dutch economy as a whole. Only a few checkpoints exist from which we can derive enough information. Brulez estimated the value of all imports into the Habsburg Netherlands in the midsixteenth century at about 14.5 million guilders, of which imports from France accounted for 1.8 million guilders or 12.4 percent.51 As explained below, this corresponds nicely to the French share of the Dutch economy of 12.7 percent that resulted from combining two separate surveys of a Dutch taxation document dating from 1634.52 Lacking information on the value of all Dutch imports in 1646 and 1658 precludes using the numbers presented by Eon in 1646 and ambassador Boreel in 1658 to assess the relative weight of the French trade on the Dutch economy in those later years. Next, we turn to the share held by the wines and brandies in the overall imports from France. Around 1550, the 1,150,000 guilders

49 R. Bijlsma, “Aanteekeningen Aangaande Den Handel in Wijnen Met Frankrijk, in De Eerste Helft Der Seventiende Eeuw,” Jaarboek Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Wijnhandelaars (1919). The city council made this observation during its deliberations over Dordrecht’s claimed rights to the wine staple in 1618. 50 H. C. H. Moquette, “Een Miniatuuroorlog in De 17de Eeuw,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 3, no. 5 (1927): 16–32. 51 W. Brulez, “The Balance of Trade in the Netherlands in the Middle of the 16th Century,” Acta Historiae Neerlandica 4 (1970): 296. 52 Bruijn, 200 and 213 and Vlessing, 229, ftnt 29.

324 Table 6.7

chapter six Wine and brandy’s share of the Dutch imports from France Percentage of French imports c. 1550 1646 1658

63.9 37.0 18.6

Source: Brulez, 296; Eon, 30 –34; Aitzema, 241–242.

worth of wines took up almost two-thirds [63.9 percent] of all French imports into the Netherlands. Brandy did not yet feature as a commodity.53 A long gap in time and information follows before we get to the information from 1634, which unfortunately is not commodity-specic. The ‘Commerce Honorable’ of 1646 focuses on the promotion of France’s maritime commerce, but we can nevertheless use Eon’s numbers as indicators of the relative worth of each of the individual sectors of the imports into—and exports from France by the Dutch. Eon claimed that 5,263,737 guilders worth or 37.0 percent of all French exports by the Dutch consisted of alcohol [wines plus brandies]. Another twelve years later, ambassador Boreel’s report to the States General showed that 18.6 percent of the more than 35 million guilders of imports from France were in the form of wines and brandies. Boreel made separate mention of more than 5 million guilders of wines and the 1.5 million guilders of brandies, which means that wines claimed 77 percent and brandies 23 percent of the share of the Dutch market for French alcohol.54 If we dare to link those three remote points of reference, we could conclude that among all the commodities imported by the Dutch, the share held by wines and brandies diminished considerably. Rather than signaling a decline in absolute imports, however, the lessening share is the result of a broadening of the commodity range available for export from France. Brulez’ mentions just three trade items in his survey of trade in 1550: wines, woad, and salt. Almost one hundred years later, Eon uses seven broad categories in which he includes numerous specic products. For French wines alone, he mentions eleven geographic supply

53 Brulez, 296. We can compare the 1,150,000 guilders worth of French wines imported into the Netherlands around 1550 to the 720,000 guilders of Rhenish wines and to the 500,000 worth of vaguely attributed ‘southern wines’ from the Mediterranean region. No wines are identied as having arrived from either Spain or Portugal, but some of those ‘southern wines’ must have come from the Iberian peninsula. 54 Huet, 82–83, and Court and Witt, 229 –230.

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zones, regrettably without listing each region’s individual share-by-value. The proportional weight of French alcohol declined, but increased in absolute terms. In 1646, over 5.2 million guilders worth of French alcohol arrived in the Republic against 6.5 million guilders in 1658. The moderate growth in the imports of French alcohol between 1646 and 1658 may be due to the enthusiastic re-opening of the supply market of high quality Spanish wines following the Treaty of Munster in 1648. Nantes’ market share The alcohol exports from Nantes in 1631 were recorded by volume, not by value. The estimated value to the French producers of all the wines and brandies exported from Nantes by the Dutch ranged between 609,114 and 693,968 livres. At the exchange rate of 1.13 guilder per livre tournois, the alcohol from Nantes was worth between 688,299 and 784,184 guilders at the time of its departure from the Loire port. The alcohol’s value on the Dutch domestic wholesale market is derived from the Amsterdam Pryscouranten of 8 February 1632, which gave both a minimum and a maximum price for commodities in that particular week.55 On the Dutch market, the imported wines from Nantes were priced from a low estimate of 1,015,203 guilders to a high estimate of 1,089,486 guilders. Applying Eon’s 37 percent share of alcohol in all Dutch exports from France to the maritime import estimates of 1634 would mean that 2,086,800 guilders worth of French alcohol arrived in the Republic that year. Nantes’ share of the supply market would have been between 48.6 and 52.2 percent. Given the fact that Nantes had to share the supply line with all the other wine regions, but especially Bordeaux, its portion of the alcohol pie can not have been this high. The 1631 values for Nantes are reliable because they are based on specic quantities while the Dutch import numbers of 1634 are based on unsubstantiated tax projections. The discrepancy between the actual value and the estimated share conrms the idea that the Dutch maritime imports in 1634 were higher than the estimates suggests. In other words, the whole pie [and at a minimum the French layer] must have been larger.

55

See Chapter 4, Table 4.3.

326

chapter six The French market share

As a group, the wines from France were less expensive than those imported from Iberia, the Mediterranean, and the Rhine area. During the rst ve decades of the seventeenth century, the price of French wine on the Amsterdam wholesale market ranged from 54 guilders for a barrel of Poitou wine in 1609 to an extraordinary 198 guilders for a barrel Toussane wine in 1628. In that same period, the cheapest Spanish wine cost 180 guilders [in 1632] but prices normally ranged around 240 guilder per barrel while the top price of 348 guilders was fetched in that same year by a barrel of Spanish ‘Tinte’ wine. Due to their relative cheapness, the French wines garnered the greatest share of the consumer market, while the expensive and longer-lasting wines from southern Europe could only be afforded by the elite and would have been reserved for special occasions.56 In an attempt to approximate the value of the wine and brandy market in years for which specic and hard data are unavailable we once again project market shares derived from one historical marker onto information of the total market in another period. Assuming that alcohol was responsible for 37 percent of French imports in 1634 just like in 1646, the projected value of the wine and brandy imports in 1634 would have been 2,086,800 guilders. By inference, this would mean that 4.7 percent of the overall Dutch imports by value that year comprised of French alcohol. By itself, therefore, the trade in French alcohol can not have garnered the inclusion among the top six commercial sectors. This title must have been earned by the combined weight of the wine and brandy trades with France, Spain, Portugal, the Rhine region, the Canary Islands, and the Levant. At this point, not enough is known about those other supply zones to quantify the inclusion of alcoholic drinks in the top six. But even if we can not put an absolute value to the overall alcohol trade, we can follow Sir William Temple in saying that the presence of imported wines and brandies made life much more pleasant for the Dutch.

56 As the English ambassador noted: “Their great Forreign Consumption, is French Wine and Brandy”. See Temple, 120.

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The alcohol trade and the ‘Convoy & Licenses’ data In reaction to the political and military upheavals of the Dutch revolt, the coastal trade between Iberia plus the Spanish Netherlands on one side and the rebel provinces on the other side became subject to economic sanctions imposed by both parties.57 The nancial woes of the Republic led its political leadership in the States General, closely aligned with the country’s mercantile elite, to pragmatism and to the institution of the Convoy and Licenses [ hereafter C&L] system. The burgeoning trade between the northern Netherlands and the Spanish empire, including the southern provinces still claimed by the Habsburgs, remained a vital contributor to the Dutch economy. An outright ban on trade with Spain would seriously hurt the economy of the infant state, whereas a permit and tariff system supplied the central government with much needed income. It regulated at least those transactions that the merchants and owners of the ships in question chose to report to the authorities. The relatively complete data available on the C&L receipts form the only available statistics that cover the rst half of the seventeenth century, and were rst thoroughly examined by Harold Becht in 1908 and much used by later historians. The C&L duties were assessed on maritime imports and exports and, to a lesser extent, on goods shipped in and out on the large rivers.58 Revenue was based on the volume of the goods reported by the merchants or captains, and smuggling was rampant. Actual receipts were much lower than the potential revenue under full compliance and honest declarations, as any other taxation that is based on voluntary reports. Compliance and enforcement levels differed from town to town; the merchants and captains of Zeeland were apparently the most efcient tax-dodgers, paying the government on only 20 percent of their turnover, while receipts in Amsterdam are estimated to have been 40 percent and those in Rotterdam about 30 percent below their full potential. The overall C&L tax evasion nationwide is thought to have amounted to 30 percent, so any attempts to calculate the value of

57 By extension, these measures also affected the northern leg of Dutch commerce, the trade with the Baltic and Russia. 58 H. E. Becht, Statistische Gegevens Betreffende De Handelsomzet Van De Republiek Der Vereenigde Nederlanden Gedurende De 17e Eeuw (1579 –1715) ( Den Haag: Boucher, 1908), 68–70 and the statistics.

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the commercial sector to the Dutch economy which are based on the C&L receipts must acknowledge this large and opaque gap.59 Another decit of the Convoy and Licenses system is that the data do not include any merchandize that passed by the ports of Holland in ‘voorbijvaart’ or ‘droiture’ from southern to northern Europe and vice versa. This drawback has led Lesger to warn that even if eventual prots from this direct trade owed into the coffers of Dutch rms, those cargoes and the Dutch ships which carried them to their foreign destinations had no impact on the government’s revenue nor on the statistics used by many historians to assess the health of the Dutch economy.60 Not stopping in one of the Dutch ports allowed captains and merchants to avoid burdensome and prot-eating customs fees. It also reduced the duration of the voyage which in turn increased the chance that perishable goods, including wines, would still be sellable, edible or potable upon reaching their consumers. In the wine trade, the benets of a stop in the Republic combined with trans-shipment seem to have increasingly outweighed those of sailing in ‘voorbijvaart’. Proportionally, the direct transport of ‘other’ wines to the Baltic peaked as early as 1607, when 75.3 percent of the nonRhenish wines brought in by the Dutch came straight from their port of origin. By volume, the year 1623 saw the highest level of ‘voorbijvaart’, with 2,618.5 tons of wines brought north on Dutch ships that had not stopped in the Republic. With one odd exception, the proportion of wines that the Dutch brought north in ‘voorbijvaart’ between 1627 and 1655 stayed below twenty percent.61 The low quantities of alcohol traded north mean that the re-exports had no signicant impact on the overall C&L revenues of the Republic. Two explanations for this early and rapid decline in ‘voorbijvaart’ crop up. First, the supply side of the Dutch wine trade saw a clear regional

59 J. C. Westermann and J. G. van Dillen, “Statistische Gegevens over De Handel Van Amsterdam in De Zeventiende Eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 61 (1948): 4–5. And also Johannes De Vries, “De Ontduiking Der Convooien En Licenten in De Republiek Tijdens De Achttiende Eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 71, no. 1 (1958): 358–359. 60 Lesger, 14. See for example GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 78/363/680 and 84/279, both 8 December 1625 for trips from Rotterdam to Bordeaux to Hamburg to Rotterdam. The ‘voorbijvaart’ could also cover trips that evaded the embargo on trade between Spain and the Netherlands; see GAR, ONA, inv.nr. 86/160/287, 22 December 1639 for a long-term contract to transport Spanish wool from Bayonne to Hamburg on behalf of a merchant in Amsterdam, his counterpart in Dover, and their agent Jan Verssens in Bayonne. 61 In 1643, 1,504.5 tons of wine [ 99.2 percent] came straight from their supply zones, while a puny 12 tons arrived via a Dutch port.

329

the coastal trade Graph 6.1

Percentage of wines through the Sound in Dutch ‘voorbijvaart’ STR other wines

percent Dutch 'droiture'

120

100

80

60

40

20

57

54

16

51

16

48

16

45

16

42

16

39

16

36

16

33

16

30

16

27

16

24

16

21

16

18

16

15

16

12

16

09

16

06

16

03

16

00

16

97

16

94

15

91

15

88

15

15

15

85

0

Source: Ellinger Bang, Nina. Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund, 1497–1660. 2 vols. København,, 1906. Vol. 2, table 1/C1–4 and table 2/C 36.

specialization. Ships from Zeeland and the Maze delta sailed to southern Europe where they loaded the wines for the trip back to the Republic; their interest and share in the Baltic trade was limited. Those wines not absorbed by the Dutch consumer market could be re-exported to the Baltic, a market that Amsterdam and the Zuiderzee ports specialized in. The absence of Rotterdam as a port warranting its own separate listing in the Sound toll registers conrms this specialization. As Dutch consumer demand for wine grew, a larger portion of French imports was drunk instead of re-exported. Second, the high preponderance of trans-shipment seems to conrm the suspicions of contemporaries who accused the Dutch of adulterating and fortifying inferior wines in their cellars prior to selling them as high quality wines for which they could fetch a fortied price. Whereas the C&L receipts do not reect actual volumes of maritime imports and exports, they do hint at the relative revenue generating capabilities of the regional administrative units, the Admiralties. Due to the disparate compliance levels among the provinces, even the relative proportions must be taken with a chunk of salt. The annual receipts compiled by Becht have been used to chart the increasing gap

330 Table 6.8

chapter six Relative value of Convoy & Licenses receipts by Admiralty, in percentages 1624–1625

Admiralty Amsterdam city of Amsterdam Admiralty of the Maze Rotterdam Admiralty of Zeeland Middelburg Vlissingen Maze & Zeeland combined

47 39 22.5 7.5 18 5 4 40.5

1641–1650 1651–1660 1661–1670 48.5 46 21 8 23 6 4 44

53 50 19 7 18 6 3 37

54 50 20 8.5 16 n.a. n.a. 36

Source: J. C. Westermann and J. G. Van Dillen. (1948), 15, Table VII.

in commercial power between Amsterdam and all the other Admiralties.62 The combined strength of the Admiralties of the Maze and Zeeland, whose ships played such an important role in the trade with France and the Iberian peninsula, remained close to the Admiralty of Amsterdam through the rst half of the seventeenth century. From a national perspective, Westermann and Van Dillen are correct in viewing the whole Maas river delta as a single destination, but we must keep in mind that within this ‘Maze’ economy individual trading rms competed with each other. Given the close integration of the trade between Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Middelburg in particular, I nevertheless hesitate to yield all honor to Amsterdam. Yes, that much celebrated and populous city was the powerful core of Holland’s economy, but two points should be emphasized. First, Amsterdam attracted a sizeable chunk of commercial trafc just because of the size of its consumer base, a point rst raised by Morineau. We only need to look at the city’s import—and export statistics for 1667–1668 to realize that for basic commodities like grain, wines, wood, beer, and wool, re-exports paled in comparison to the imports.63 And second, Amsterdam operated within a much wider network and can not be discussed in isolation. If a Rotterdammer 62

Westermann and Dillen, 15. Brugmans. This point was rst raised by Morineau, who saw Amsterdam’s demand for almost 1/3 of all Dutch grain imports from the Baltic and Dutch demand on the whole as the trade-imbalance [des-equilibrium] which became the motor of Dutch commercial supremacy. Morineau, 35. Lesger revisited this point in his work about the Dutch ‘gateway’ system. Lesger, 19. 63

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331

purchased wines in France, transported them north in his ship with its local crew, and sold the alcohol to a wine buyer in Amsterdam, the prots from the trade owed to Rotterdam but the customs receipts credited the admiralty of Amsterdam. The C&L revenue came from the goods brought in and out of Amsterdam, but this does not necessarily mean that Amsterdam trading and shipping rms proted from all these commercial transactions. In short, the hegemony of Amsterdam as expressed in the C&L receipts reects the multi-source movement of goods to a huge urban consumer market and not necessarily the dominance of the commercial and shipping sectors of that city. This more comprehensive approach considers the overall income of Holland, West-Friesland, and Zeeland as an indication of the economic health of the maritime provinces as a unit. As De Vries and Van der Woude put it: “The core of the Dutch economy was not so much a single city as it was the larger urbanized region of the maritime zone.”64 It was the combined success of these integrated economies, not of individual towns, which drew the attention of foreign observers. Grudging admiration for Dutch commercial supremacy gradually made way for jealous protectionist counter-measures, only to end in open warfare. Overland trade The stepchild of early modern economic commercial history, the overland trade, falls outside the jurisdiction and thus the records of the Admiralties. Very little is known about the Republic’s overland imports and exports, but indications are that they were signicant. In 1662, Pieter de la Court argued in favor of establishing lower duties and tariffs on maritime trade [which obviously beneted the provinces of Holland and Zeeland] than those applied to goods brought in overland, but alas: “. . . on the contrary we see daily that very many Levant, Italian, etc. ne wares are brought in by the land-carriage.” Unfortunately, De la Court’s exposé includes neither volumes nor values for the overland trade.65 Despite a similar dearth of data for Northern Europe, Jeannin’s comparison between that region’s sea-borne and overland trade routes ends with his tentative conclusion that the value of the east/west overland trade was signicantly lower than the

64 65

De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 177–179. Court and Witt, 80 –81.

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chapter six

north/south seaborne trade. More important, however, is his observation that in many cases, overland trade initiated or nalized the distribution of commodities which traveled the longest portion of their transport aboard an oceangoing vessel. Jeannin counters the view that overland trade routes competed against maritime routes, and instead called their relationship ‘complementary’.66 Whenever maritime trade occupies center stage, we must remember that in the vast majority of the cases the initial transport to the export market as well as the distribution to the nal consumer market occurred over land. The overland trade in land-locked areas formed as much a part of the overall commercial network as the vaunted maritime trade. Trading across the oceans and along the coasts No branch of the Dutch seaborne empire has been as celebrated as the Dutch East India Company’s trade with and within Asia. The lengthy, risky and thus expensive voyages to the Far East favored the centralized and concerted approach developed by joint stock companies under the protection of national governments. The Dutch- and English East India Companies are early and successful representatives of these ‘monopoly’ companies. The Dutch initiated or at least attempted similar setups in other high-risk endeavors as well: the ‘Noordse Compagnie’ outtted whaling expeditions to Arctic waters, while the Dutch West India Company focused on the triangular trade in manufactured goods, slaves and sugar between the Republic, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas.67 To pay for their precious return-cargoes in the Far East and West, the outgoing ships of the VOC and the WIC carried the silver obtained as prots of the coastal trade along the shores of Europe. The outgoing ships also carried the trade goods obtained through—or manufactured from commodities imported by—European cabotage.

66 P. Jeannin, “Seaborne and Overland Trade Routes of Northern Europe in the xvi–xvii Centuries,” Journal of European Economic History 11, no. 1 (1982): 18 and 32. 67 Louwrens Hacquebord, Frans N. Stokman, and Frans W. Wasseur, “The Directors of the Chambers of the ‘Noordse Compagnie’, 1614–1642, and Their Networks in the Company,” in Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. Leo Noordegraaf, Hollandsche Historische Reeks, XXIV ( Den Haag: 1995). For the Dutch West India Compagnie, see De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 396–402.

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333

By combining Vlessing’s and Bruijn’s calculations derived from the 1634 tax proposal we can come to a decent understanding of the relative worth of the cabotage trade versus that of trans-oceanic commerce.68 The VOC’s trade with Asia contributed 13.5 percent of the Republic’s annual imports by value. The 6,000,000 guilders agree with De Vries and Van der Woude’s estimate of 6,600,000 guilders in annual revenue of the 1630s.69 The WIC was supposed to add another 2.7 percent to the total of 16.2 percent for the account of the two branches of the Dutch transoceanic trade in luxury goods. [see Table 6.1] Burdened with the highest overhead and operational costs, Dutch trade with faraway Asia was based on luxurious and exotic—as well as expensive and protable—commodities such as Chinese silks and porcelain, plus pepper and other spices from the islands of modernday Indonesia. Until about 1630, when the intra-Asia trade developed under the guidance of the VOC-Governor Jan Pietersz Coen started to generate a substantial ow of silver from Japan, the Dutch paid for Asian luxury articles with solid coins [mostly silver] obtained in the Republic.70 Lacking its own silver mines, the Dutch managed to turn their commercial skills into a proverbial silver mine. The Dutch silver trade along the shores of Europe has been discussed in conjunction with the activities of the Sephardim and their symbiotic relationship with Dutch multinationals. Table 6.9

Value of specie shipped to Batavia by the VOC, in guilders Shipped from Dutch Republic

1613 –1620 1620 –1630 1630 –1640 1640 –1650

1,437,000 1,236,000 850,000 920,000

Acquired in Japan — about 400 2,338,000 1,519,000

Source: De Vries, Jan, and A. M. Van der Woude. The rst modern economy, 395, table 9.5.

68 Bruijn, 213. combined with Vlessing, 229, ftnt 29. Coastal trade consists of all maritime branches minus the trans-oceanic trade of the VOC & WIC and minus the whaling industry. In her article, Vlessing suggested that “the proportions of Dutch colonial and Baltic trade should be re-examined” but did not pursue it any further. 69 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 389, table 9.3, column A. 70 Ibid., 395, table 9.5.

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Most of this ‘Dutch’ silver had owed into the Republic as prots of the European coastal trade, and especially of Dutch commerce with Iberia and France. Spanish silver from the empire’s New World mines spent little time in Spain before being shipped off to Holland and France, both of which had a positive trade balance with Spain. The Dutch trade balance with France then led to a further drain of erstwhile Spanish silver from France into Dutch pockets, a situation much lamented by Eon and Colbert. Nothing typies the spider web of symbiotic commercial relationships better than the VOC’s urgent need for and dependence on specie obtained in the coastal trade. This dependency lessened in the thirties with the expansion of the intra-Asian trade and the resulting inow of Japanese silver, but the company continued to need a substantial supply of specie generated in European cabotage. By their 1634 values, the inter-European coastal trades dwarfed the contributions of the trans-oceanic trades by a ratio of about 5 to 1. Compared to the eet involved in cabotage, the number of ships involved in the long distance trades was disproportionately small. In 1640, the VOC equipped and dispatched only 17 ships to Asia. In the full decade 1640 –1649, one-hundred and sixty-three ships left Dutch ports for Asia. The voyage there and back took about two years, a far cry from the double and triple trips to and from France so common in the coastal sector. Of course, the 600 tons capacity of the standard VOC ‘retourship’ made any coastal vessel look insignicant, while the value of the cargo brought back from Asia only served to reinforce the exalted image of VOC domination of the maritime sector. In 1634, the government listed the single-year value of the VOC imports at 5 million guilders, which agrees with Van Dam’s register of the values that the company assigned to its stock of unsold imports. The 163 ships that sailed in the 1640s brought back cargo which had cost the company 23,741,598 guilders in Asia, an average of 145,654 guilders per ship. The estimated value of this VOC stock prior to auction in the Republic for this ten-year period reached 56,112,491 guilders, or 5.6 million guilders per year. The VOC’s overhead and equipment costs were notoriously high, with the result that only two of these ten years actually showed a net prot.71

71 Pieter van Dam and others, Beschryvinge Van De Oostindische Compagnie, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën. Groote Ser. 63, 68, 74, 76, 83, 87, 96 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1701–1703; reprint, 1927), Book 1, vol. 1, 364–365. [table of equipments,

the coastal trade

335

The risks and expenses of the trans-oceanic trades meant that the commodities shipped back home all belonged to the luxury category. The coastal trades included bulk as well as ‘rich’ commodities; contemporary sources clearly classied the trades on southern Europe and the Mediterranean as being part of the coastal trading network. Israel states that the Dutch ‘primacy’ of world trade was the result of a “massive penetration of the ‘rich trades’ ”, which he juxtaposes against declining bulk trades. These luxury or rich trades should, however, not solely be identied with the trans-oceanic sectors covered by the VOC and the WIC. Rather, the search for luxury items such as sugar, silk and spices initially led to an increase in the coastal trade with the Iberian peninsula and the Levant, the sixteenth century transfer points of exotic goods from the Far East and New World into the Old.72 By the turn of the seventeenth century, political events and a series of economic embargoes by the Spanish empire caused enterprising Dutch merchants to by-pass the Iberian middlemen and to move aggressively into the original supply markets. Once Dutch access into Asia, Brazil, and the West Indies was [sort of ] secured, the Levant and Iberia lost the pull of the rich trades. The long-distance trades were risky, exotic, and potentially superprotable; their histories have also beneted from outstanding book— and record keeping. This has tended to obscure the fact that the coastal trade among European nations had a far greater impact on all the different supply- and demand zones. Dutch urbanites could not have done without the products supplied by the coastal trade, might have turned bitter without the sweetness of sugar and the pleasure of tobacco, would increasingly have balked at eating slightly spoiled meat without the buffer provided by pepper, but could easily do without the silks and porcelain of China. In a way, the Asia trade provided the icing on the cake whereas the European coastal trade furnished the bread and butter. What the upscale Dutch consumers did not buy could always be tucked away in a coastal freighter to supplement a shipment of bulkier, more mundane export products such as the celebrated Dutch woolen cloth. The trades in luxury and bulk products formed one overall market, but

returns, prots/losses, and dividends, 1640 –1702]. The average value of the return cargo per ships is 344,248 guilders. The prots for 1644 reached 341,153 guilders, for 1647 they were 591,567 guilders. 72 Israel, 310 –318.

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as shown by the distribution of the various economic branches in 1634, the coastal sector was in no danger of losing its prime position. Dutch coastal trade clearly stood on two legs: One comprised of the commercial transactions that transferred ownership and transported the goods, in other words pure coastal trade. The second leg covered all the domestic activities that transformed raw or semi-raw materials—most of which had arrived in the Republic by cabotage—into consumables or export products with a higher value. The strength of the early modern Dutch economy lay in the symbiotic relationship between those two cabotage branches, neither of which could have survived without the other. Merchant capitalism In the seventeenth century, Dutch international trade beneted from the fact that those making the political decisions were the same people who controlled the factors of commerce and early modern production. Van Zanden denes this group as merchant-entrepreneurs, men who “combined commercial activities with intervention in the production process, and thus in labour relations; although the commercial activities (still) outweighed the latter.”73 In Rotterdam, brewers diversied into the brandy business by shipping stills to Nantes or by importing cheap wines as raw material. Marriages bound the Verschuer and Van Berckel men to their English brother-in-law, the Merchant Adventurer John Quarles. Apart from trading in textiles, wines, and herring, they jointly owned several textile weaving workshops in the city. Several members of the two Dutch families served Rotterdam as burgomaster, and service on the municipal council or in other public ofces was par for the course for virtually all Verschuers and Van Berckels.74 The activities of the

73 Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland’s Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market (Manchester University Press, 1993), 4. 74 R. Bijlsma, “De Rotterdamsche Vroedschappen En Hun Bedrijf, 1588–1648,” Rotterdamsch Jaarboekje 2, no. 2 (1914), and also Bijlsma, “De Laken-Compagnie Der Van Berckels,” 84–88. In addition to their textile business, Verschuer and Van Berckel teamed up with Nantes-veteran Hendrick Rammelman in 1644 to become owners of 8–10 herring shing vessels. See also J. H. W. Unger, ed., De Regeering Van Rotterdam 1328–1892, Naamlijst Van Personen Die in of Van Wege De Regeering Ambten Hebben Bekleed, ed. J. H. W. Unger, V vols., Bronnen Voor De Geschiedenis Van Rotterdam, vol. I (Rotterdam: Van Waesberge & Zoon, 1892).

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337

merchants of Rotterdam, of which the above are but two examples, fully conrm Van Zanden’s position and clearly refute Braudel’s view that the early modern merchant may have been a proto-capitalist but that he was not seriously interested in production.75 The Dutch mercantile elite managed to overcome intense inter-city, inter-provincial, and inter-national competition because the institutional and legal framework that supported trade was erected by those who stood the most to gain. Sir William Temple recognized the importance of such a symbiotic, often nepotistic, relationship between those leading the country’s political branch and those holding the economic reigns: The Government manag’d either by men that trade, or whose Families have risen by it, or who have themselves some Interest going in other men’s Trafque, or who are born and bred in Towns, The soul and being whereof consists wholly in Trade, Which makes sure of all favour that from time to time grows necessary, and can be given it by the Government.76

Conicts of interests existed between competing sectors and competing towns and this created political tensions. In the end, though, the fact that the same class of people controlled Dutch political and economic life led—albeit after plenty of bickering, lengthy negotiations and compromises—to pragmatic adjustments that favored trade and traders in general. Such blanket coverage of two important segments of society was only possible due to multiple overlapping personal networks. Networks and diversication The spider web of personal networks that allowed this level of integration in the domestic arena also drove Dutch commercial globalization. Like the merchants of Rotterdam whose personal and business ties are revealed in the notarial records, the Dutch ‘coopman’ covered all bases and traded in any commodity that made commercial sense at a particular moment, letting the international market conditions set the

75 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), Vol. II, 372. 76 Temple, 116. In a way, Temple paved the way for Karl Marx’s view that those who controlled the factors of production controlled a nation. In the seventeenth century, the men who controlled commerce were most often also the ones who controlled the manufacturing plants that provided the trade goods.

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pace and direction of his ventures. This wide ranging non-specialization gave the coastal trading system its lasting power and turned it into one of the legs on which the Republic’s global trade network could thrive. Morineau has called the linkages between various commercial sectors the “greatest strength” of the Dutch economy, one that in earlier historiography suffered from studies which focused on a single sector, while his colleague Jeannin identied the “active omnipresence of Dutchmen and their personal networks” as the core of Dutch economic success.77 In reality, both these primary causes can be seen as a single one. The myriad commercial sectors were linked through the interacting and overlapping personal networks of merchants scattered around the globe. In his denouncement of the time-honored image of Amsterdam as the physical ‘warehouse of the world’ and in presenting the Dutch ports as ‘gateways’ to the supply and demand zones of their hinterland instead, Lesger also identies the merchant networks as the prime motor of Dutch commerce—networks that obliterated the need for commodities to actually be brought to the Republic prior to re-distribution.78 Lesger, however, omits one group from his discussion of the interacting groups of merchants which reduces the scope and the importance of his otherwise excellent model. The Sephardic community, spread out over commercial centers around the world, added a crucial layer to the “network of Flemish-Dutch trading colonies” identied by Lesger. The examples provided by the Sephardim of Nantes and Rotterdam prove that as merchants, nanciers, insurers, factors or agents working on commission, the ‘Portuguese merchants’ were actively involved in all kinds of commercial sectors, not just the luxury trades that had their foundation in Spain’s hold over the New World. The pragmatic and protable cooperation between the Republic’s gentile traders and their ‘Portuguese’ colleagues extended the commercial reach of merchants on both sides of the religious divide.

77 Michel Morineau, “Hommage Aux Historiens Hollandais Et Contribution À L’histoire Économique Des Provinces-Unies,” in Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism, ed. Maurice Aymard, Studies in World Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1982). and Jeannin, “Les Interdependences Économiques Dans Le Champ D’action Europeen Des Hollandais. XVIe–XVIIIe Siecle.” 78 Lesger, 16–18. As early as 1672, ambassador Temple called the Republic “the general Magazine of Europe”, a phrase that presumably led Braudel to come up with the ‘warehouse of the world’ image. See Temple, 108 and Braudel, 39.

the coastal trade

339

Israel has emphasized the vital contribution of the western Sephardicand New Christian diasporas to the development of the early modern global economy, and that of the Atlantic world in particular, but he virtually ignores the symbiotic working relationship between the Sephardim—those inside as well as those outside the Republic—and their internationally focused gentile [ Dutch] colleagues and competitors.79 Ample evidence of economically driven decisions about professions of faith shows that Israel’s treatment of the Sephardic communities as islands dened by their religious leanings yields too much precedence to faith.80 Nor does it do justice to the complexity of Sephardic participation and integration in the municipal, regional, and national economies through their direct and indirect ties with Christian merchants. The interaction between Dutch and Sephardic merchants in Brazil [ prots and convenience for the Dutch and tolerant protection for the Jews], exemplies this symbiotic relationship. When the Portuguese re-established control and drove the Dutch out of coastal Brazil, it triggered the concurrent Jewish exodus from the region.81 For all merchants, no matter their religious or national backgrounds, inter-dependency was grounded in the widespread and essential use of personal contacts, be they direct through relatives and factors or indirect through a series of intersecting personal networks. Experienced merchants acted as guarantors for young men trying to establish themselves, letters introduced an immigrant as an ‘honest man’ of reputable character, and marrying the right girl could open a new series of very protable doors. The down-side of these tight personal and business

79 Jonathan I. Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires (1540 –1740), Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies; V. 30 (Boston, MA: Brill, 2002), Introduction, esp. 20 –22. 80 Examples abound in Herman P. Salomon, “The ‘De Pinto’ Manuscript: A Seventeenth-Century Marrano Family History (1671),” Studia Rosenthaliana 9, no. 1 (1975) and Herman P. Salomon, “The Case of Luis Vaz Pimentel. Revelations of Early Jewish Life in Rotterdam from the Portuguese Inquisition Archives,” Studia Rosenthaliana 31 (1997). Israel does acknowledge the religious ambivalence of the Sephardim in his chapter on the Crypto-Jews of France, but seems to put too much emphasis on the cohesiveness of the various communities. Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, esp. 256–258. Similar hedging of religious bets occurred in the Netherlands, especially in the early decades of the religious upheavals of the Protestant Reformation. As outlined above, the choices made by the family members of Rotterdam immigrant Johan van der Veken were similarly driven by pragmatism. 81 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 ( Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973).

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relationships was that the bankruptcy or mismanagement of one man could spell disaster for the innocent man who had pledged his credit as surety. Just as in commercial transactions themselves, diversity was of paramount importance. The risks associated with early modern trade would make it imperative for any merchant to be part of a network with as many layers and connectors as possible, so that the weakness of one segment could be absorbed by the mobility and elasticity of the other components. The Rubik’s Cube model of international trade The traditional image of early modern commerce is bi-lateral and two-dimensional, as at and distorted as Mercator projections of the longitudinal routes of the coastal trades or of the latitudinal patterns of the long distance trades in colonial & exotic goods.82 Yet those North—South and East—West routes combine to cover a round globe. The trade routes along Europe’s shores were joined by similar coastal networks in the Mediterranean, along the African coasts, within SouthEast Asia, and in the Atlantic Americas. Just as a two-dimensional map of the world does not fully do it justice, a two-dimensional representation of early modern connections misses the reason why those networks functioned as well as they did. Economic history must drop the standard model of a series of heliocentric systems revolving around a single commercial center—for example Amsterdam—or a single trade route—take Holland to Batavia, but should instead use the Rubik’s Cube model: The early modern world was a multi-cogged machine of interconnected national and local economies that performed well despite frequent political re-alignments. The example of the Dutch Republic and the Spanish empire shows that, even if they were on opposing sides of a conict, countries remained economically inter-dependent. This mutual dependency was—and continues to be—the driving force of international competition. The cube will never cease to be in motion. Just as we think we have solved the puzzle, a natural or man-made event causes one component to shift

82 The East-West trading system in the Indian Ocean is an example of latitudinal coastal trade.

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341

direction and the adjustments start all over again.83 Economic survival drives the human race, which leads to the conclusion that a perpetual motion model of economic history is equally applicable as a model of history as a whole.

83 Contrary to Braudel’s dismissal of events as movers of history, events act as catalysts.

liter liter liter liter liter meter3 kilogram liter liter liter liter liter kilogram liter liter liter liter liter liter liter liter liter kilogram liter liter 7.58

156 904.8 979.01 7.54 904.8

236 117.7 19 2.38 457 608 135.1 914 1000 7.14 –7.43 914

377

509.85 2.16 0.4944

226.2 152.3 2.88 1958

150.8

Bordeaux

254.9

Anjou

0.4941

2.26 2000 1.19 0.15 457 304.6

152.4 38 228.5

Amsterdam

7.6

578.33

205.46

Cognac

139.1 868.8 968.8 7.24 868.8

1.81 0.4844 0.9

434.4

144.8 36.2 217.2

Hamburg

146 860.3 793.15

0.459

430.15

215.07

Lisbon

6

150 775

1.8 0.4944

480

240

Nantes

7.6

142 913.2

228.3

La Rochelle

Source: Doursther, Horace. Dictionnaire universel des poids et mésures anciens et modernes. Bruxelles: M. Hayez imprimeur de l’Académie royale, 1840.

botte/boot aime/tierçon anker barrique/oxhead lette last vol. last wgt mengel = kan mutsje pipe/pijp poinçon pot pound wgt quart quarteel smalton steekkan stoop stuk toelast ton grain ton liq. /vat ton wgt veltes/viertel voeder/vat

Unit

MEASURES

APPENDIX I

968.2 920.05

242.05

484.1

Spain

344

appendices Barrel sizes and wine prices

Two linguistic problems prevent a conclusive statement about prices paid for various wine types and the prots generated at the successive stages in the marketing process. First, as the leeway allowed in the new law of 1684 suggests, the lack of uniformity in barrel sizes turns the quest for exact volumes into a guessing game. The volume of a specic type of barrel varied depending on the measure adopted by each municipality. The popular oxhead, for instance, held between 197.57 (Rouen) and 254.9 liters (Anjou) of wine; the Dutch oxhoofd held 228.5 liters. The measures used in Nantes are problematic. A nineteenth century historian listed one ton of wine to hold between 863 and 877 liters, while Jean Tanguy’s research brought him to a volume of 770 to 775 per ton, and the Bordeaux barrel still holds 900 liters today.1 Based on a city rule from 1578, the half-ton or ‘pipe’ of Nantes was supposed to measure 232 ‘pots’ of Nantes—but no one knows the metric equivalent of the ‘pot’ of Nantes! For his study, Tanguy applied the oft used measure of the ‘pipe’ of Saumeurs which in 1578 contained 232 ‘pots de Paris’ @ 1.86–1.89 liters, or about 385 to 387.5 liters. In that year, Nantes adjusted the size of its pipe to correspond to that of Saumeurs. To complicate matters, the ‘pipes’ which came down the Loire with wines from Anjou contained between 220 and 240 pots, so we are faced with a spread of 37 liters per pipe of Anjou wine. In other words, an oxhead of Nantes wine contained either about 193 liters if we accept Tanguy’s calculations or a robust 240 liters if we go by Doursther.2 Second, the use of the word ‘vat’ or ‘ton’ in the Dutch connotes not only a specic barrel of 914 liters but is also the linguistic equivalent of the English word ‘cask’—a hoop-ringed barrel of any size. Add to this the ample use of the diminutive “-tje”, denoting small, and the opportunities for confusion are legion. When a buyer purchased a vaatje or tonnetje, what size small cask did he pay for? Because the 17th century Dutch measures used in the wine trade fell somewhere in the mid-range of the spectrum, I have consistently used the Dutch measure for a ton of wine [914 liters] in all cases where the Rotterdam notary mentioned a ‘vat ’ [cask] but not a specic municipal measure. The propensity of the Dutch to re-barrel the wines prior to shipment

1 2

Tanguy, Annex I-A, 5–8. Doursther.

345

appendices

and to use their own barrel sizes instead of the myriad of French types has led me to use the following liter-equivalents throughout the shaky exercise of trying to estimate actual quantities:

1 1 1 1 1 1

ton of wine pipe = 0.5 ton oxhead = 1 barrique = 0.5 pipe = 0.25 ton poinçon = 1/3 ton = 2/3 pipe aem Rhine wine = 1 tiercon = 1/3 pipe = 1/6 ton anker = 0.25 aem = 1/12 pipe = 1/24 ton

LITERS 914 457 228.5 304.6 152.4 38

APPENDIX II

EXCHANGE RATE LIVRES TOURNOIS—GUILDERS, 1595–1672

Year

1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627

grams of grams of silver exchange rate exchange rate silver per livre per guilder 1 guilder in 1 livre in guilders tournois livres 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.39 12.09 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61

11.44 11.55 11.17 11.17 11.17 11.17 11.17 11.17 11.17 10.84 10.84 10.84 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.71 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28

0.92 0.93 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89

1.08 1.07 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13

347

appendices Table (cont.) Year

1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668

grams of grams of silver exchange rate exchange rate silver per livre per guilder 1 guilder in 1 livre in guilders tournois livres 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 11.61 10.31 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.06 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.3 7.72 8.74 8.75 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.02 8.9 8.75 8.75

10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 10.28 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74

0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.24 1.33 1.18 1.17 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.09 1.11 1.11

1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.9 0.9

348

appendices

Table (cont.) Year

1669 1670 1671 1672

grams of grams of silver exchange rate exchange rate silver per livre per guilder 1 guilder in 1 livre in guilders tournois livres 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75

9.74 9.74 9.74 9.74

1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11

0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Source: The conversion tables edited by Richard W. Unger, www.history.ubc.ca/ unger/currcon.

APPENDIX III

DUTCH MARITIME IMPORTS, 1634 Regional breakdown of estimated Dutch maritime imports, 1634 Region/Sector Baltic Norway northern Russia northern Germany England, Scotland, Ireland northwestern France southwestern France Spain, Portugal, Mediterranean direct Dutch trade between France and the Baltic whaling sector Dutch East India Company Dutch West India Company ‘commission trade’ for foreign rms total [ percentages rounded off ]

Percentage

Value in guilders

33.9 4.1 4.1 5.4 11.9 4.6 8.1 8.1

15,000,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 2,400,000 5,280,000 2,040,000 3,600,000 3,600,000

1.1 1.1 13.5 2.7 1.4 100.0

480,000 480,000 6,000,000 1,200,000 600,000 44,280,000

Tripartite division of Dutch maritime imports by region by value, 1634 Commercial sector trade with the Baltic, Norway & Russia ** trade along Europe’s Atlantic coast trans-oceanic share

Percentage

Value in guilders

42.1 39.2 16.2

18,600,000 17,400,000 7,200,000

** Excluding the whaling sector Sources: Bruijn, J. R. “De Vaart in Europa.” In Maritieme Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, ed. G. Asaert, 200 –241. Bussum: De Boer Maritiem, 1976, 213 and Vlessing, Odette. “The Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam.” In Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times; Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf, 223–243. The Hague, 1995. 229, ftnt 29.

APPENDIX IV

VERIFIABLE PRESENCE OF DUTCHMEN LISTED IN 1645 MOYENS D’INTERVENTION 3

Merchant Adrians, Fop [ Joris Adriansz. De Jonge?] Bave, Pieter Fransz [ Baul ] Bleu, Jacob Bron, Bonnaventure Bucenet, Henry Chasteleyn, Anthoine Senior Chasteleyn, Anthoine Junior De Langhe, Charles De Langhe, Jan Goris, Tilman Grutter, Lambert de Honthorst, George Michiels, Adryaen [ Jan?] Noe, Gerard Poupe, Adrian [Guillaume Foppe??] Rammelman, Henry [Hendrick] Ravestein, Joris [ Jan Corneliszn??] Slingerland, Nicolaes [Cornelis?] Sondach, Jean Staers, Melchior [ Staes] Tap, Jan [alias for Jan Stochius] Tennebac, Rene [ Tinnebac] Traudeny, Paul

First mention Last mention

Length of stay

1632

1636

5

1629 n.a. 1628 n.a. 1609 1629 1614 1631 1629 1638 n.a. n.a. or 1627 1644 n.a. or 1621

1633

5 n.a. 12 n.a. 18 17 25 4 6 1 n.a. n.a. or 6 4 n.a. or 1

1639 1626 1645 1638 1633 1634 1632 1647

1631

1643

13

n.a. or 1630

1640

n.a. or 11

n.a. or 1630

1636

n.a. or 7

1645 1631 pre-1640

1647

3 1 ?

1637 n.a.

1647

11 n.a.

3 ADLA C 652, carton 10, cote 2; Moyens d’Intervention, Chambre de Commerce, 24 April 1645. The men with an n.a. or * were listed by the French clerk with last or rst names that are close but not similar enough to names encountered in the notarial records. If we assume we are dealing with linguistic/clerical errors, then the ‘n.a.’ men can be tracked down in Nantes through other sources.

351

appendices Table (cont.) Merchant Van Develde, Pieter [ Van Vel/Del Campo?] Van Lamsweert, Michel Van Luffel, Gillis Van Luffel, Pieter Van Ravestein, Jacob Van Ravestein, Jan Cornelisz Van Rinsen, Jacob [Aaron? ] Van Rossen, Gerard [ De Rouzé alias Roze?] Van Rossum, Jan [ De Rouzé alias Roze?] Vanhoute, Guillaume [ Vanoutena?] Vazes, Anthony [Gaspar or Jacques Vaz?] Veltres, Alexandre [ Velters] Veltres, Reynier [ Velters] Vermasen, Jan Vos, Paul Vrouling, Guillaume

First mention

Last mention

Length of stay

1628

1629

2

1624 1627 n.a. 1624 1630

1626 1631

3 5 n.a. 6 5

1629 1634

n.a. or 1622 n.a.

1624

n.a. or 3 n.a.

1632

1634

3

n.a. or 1627

1639

n.a. or 13

n.a. or 1631 1627 1627 pre-1634 1643 1634

Sources: GAR-ONA, ADLA, and AM Nantes HH 23

2 1644 1644 1645 1639

18 18 ? 3 6

APPENDIX V

CLUSTERED SAILINGS FROM NANTES TO THE DUTCH REPUBLIC IN 1631

Captain

Date

Home port

Nicolaes, Jacob Dircksz, Jan Dircksz, Nicolaes Fransz, Cornelis Heihuis, Martin Joppe, Frans Roelsz, Andries Starreman, George Cornzn Jonnard, Adrien Joppe, Frans Pietersz, Pieter

7–May 8–May 8–May 8–May 9 –May 9 –May 9 –May 9 –May 10 –May 19 –Aug 21–Aug

Enk, Martin Foppe, Martin Roelle, Aert Romboutsz, Jan Jansz, Jan

21–Aug 21–Aug 21–Aug 21–Aug 10 –Nov

Vlissingen Amsterdam Vlaardingen Vlissingen Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Vlissingen Rotterdam Estresot [ Eerstwoude?] Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Enkhuizen

Hendricksz, Arnoud Gerardz, Laurens Jansz, Nicolaes Jansz, Jacob Jansz, Dirck Dircksz, Dirck Graan, Jan Adriaensz, Dirck Jacobsz, Albert Simonsz, Pieter Pietersz, Cornelis Jansz, Hidde

10 –Nov 12–Nov 12–Nov 12–Nov 12–Nov 12–Nov 13–Nov 13–Nov 13–Nov 13–Nov 13–Nov 13–Nov

Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Edam Medemblik Rotterdam Calais [ ? ] Enkhuizen Enkhuizen Enkhuizen Hoorn Medemblik [ ? ]

Dircksz, Nicolaes Crijsman, Jan

15–Nov 15–Nov

Jansz, Gerard

15–Nov

Edam Enkhuizen & Akkersloot Vlissingen

Destination Rotterdam Amsterdam Vlaardingen Amsterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam same port Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Hamburg or Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Middelburg Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Hoorn Medemblik [?] Amsterdam Enkhuizen & Akkersloot Vlissingen

353

appendices Table (cont.) Captain

Date

Calf, Simon Raaimsz, Nicolaes Adriaensz, Jan Marinusz, Jacob Jacobsz, Adriaen Jansz, Dirck Jansz, Jan Starreman, Cornelis Cornelisz, Cornelis Jansz, Eufet Jariksz, Ysbrant Gerardz, Hendrick Cornelisz, Pieter Jansz, Cornelis

15–Nov 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 10 –Dec 11–Dec

Diverse, Jacob Marcken, Jacob Pietersz, Adriaen Pietersz, Job Cornelisz, Claes Roelle, Aert Gerardz, Floris Cornelisz, Jan Cornelisz, Martin Jacobsz, Herman Jansz, Jacob Albertsz, Philip Cornelisz, Dirck Adriaensz, Reindert

11–Dec 11–Dec 11–Dec 11–Dec 12–Dec 12–Dec 12–Dec 12–Dec 12–Dec 13–Dec 13–Dec 13–Dec 13–Dec 13–Dec

Home port Zaandam Akkersloot Amsterdam Kampen Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Schiedam Stavoren Stavoren Vlaardingen Zaandam Elhaven [ Delfshaven?] Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Enkhuizen Zaandam Zaandam Amsterdam Edam Enkhuizen Rotterdam Schiedam

Source: ADLA B 2976, port registers of Nantes, 1631

Destination Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Middelburg Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Middelburg Rotterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Zaandam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam

BIBLIOGRAPHY Archival sources: ADLA Archives Départementales de la Loire-Atlantique, Nantes series B 230 Minutes des Audiences series B 6781 Registres de la Senechaussée series B 2976 Registre de la Prévôté de Nantes, 1631 series C 652 Moyens d’Intervention, 1645 series C 691 Traites Foraines series C 702 Extrait des Registres de Parlement series 4E2 Notarial registers Julien Bachelier Pierre Mariot Mathurin Verger ADG

Archives Départementales Gironde, Bordeaux series C Chambre de Commerce series 3 E Notarial registers series 6 B Rapports à l’Entrée des navires dans le port de Bordeaux & Départs des navires du port de Bordeaux

AM

Archives Municipales de Nantes series EE 218 Marine series FF 141 Police, Jauge, Règlements series GG 647 Religion Reformée series GG 770 Baptêmes, mariages, sépultures series HH 176 Tonneliers series HH 194 Registre de la Contractation series HH 237 Commerce des eaux-de-vie

ARA

Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag toegang 1.01.46 Archief Admiraliteitscolleges, 1586–1795 toegang 3.02.04.01 Staten van Holland, 1572–1795

GAA

Gemeentearchief Amsterdam toegang 5077 Amsterdamse Wisselbank

GAR

Gemeentearchief Rotterdam Collectie R. Bijlsma DS – Digitale Stamboom HS – Handschriftenverzameling ONA – Oud Notarieel Archief OSA – Oud Stads Archief

NEHA

[municipal archivist’s transcripts] [on-line genealogical records] [manuscript collection] [old notarial registers] [old municipal archives]

Nederlands Economisch Historisch Archief, Amsterdam Collectie Commerciele Couranten—CCC [ price lists published by the Amsterdam Bourse]

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