A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at: Working for Allah [1st ed. 2022] 3030989429, 9783030989422

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A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at Working for Allah

Jan A. Ali Rizwan Sahib

A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at “This book is an important contribution to the literature on Tabligh Jama’at, one of the most important Islamic revivalist movements of the modern period. The authors provide an excellent analysis of the context in which the Jama’at emerged, its key ideas and approaches to preaching, and the resonance of its ideas and practices among Muslims. One of the most interesting contributions of this book is the application of frame theory to the study of the Jama’at, thus enriching our understanding of why the Jama’at is so effective in attracting many to its brand of Islamic revivalism. This is a timely, well-researched and highly readable work, a must-read for scholars and students of contemporary Islamic thought and movements.” —Professor Abdullah Saeed, Sultan of Oman Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies & Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor, The University of Melbourne, Australia “This is not the first publication on the Tabligh Jama’at, but certainly new in its approach. The authors offer a fresh perspective on the study of Islamic movements in the age of digital globalisation. Based on ethnographic fieldwork and the analysis of material written by the movement, they critically take issue with the implicit motivation of much of the work on revivalist movements in the Islamic world, namely to understand “how dangerous they are for the rest of the world”. The authors ask why Tabligh Jama’at is attractive to (potential) followers. They refute the common assumption that followers are deluded by leaders and lured into the movement with misleading information and false expectations. As the authors show, followers’ choices are much more thought-through than is often assumed.” —J. Thijl Sunier, Emeritus Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Social and Cultural Anthropology Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands “This book offers rare insights into the workings of Islamic revivalism, using Tabligh Jama’at as a case study. By applying Frame Theory, the authors produce a conceptually engaging and empirically rich study that probes into the internal dynamics of revivalism and opens up important avenues for further research. This is an important contribution to the fields of sociology of religion and Islamic studies.” —Shahram Akbarzadeh, Research Professor of Middle East & Central Asian Politics, Deakin University, Australia

Jan A. Ali • Rizwan Sahib

A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at Working for Allah

Jan A. Ali School of Humanities and Communication Arts Western Sydney University Penrith, NSW, Australia

Rizwan Sahib School of Humanities and Communication Arts Western Sydney University Penrith, NSW, Australia

ISBN 978-3-030-98942-2    ISBN 978-3-030-98943-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover pattern © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The tradition of tajdı ̄d or renewal (or revivalism) of Islam and its practice is not a new phenomenon in Islamic history. In fact, it is based on the well-­ known and sound (saḥı ̄ḥ) hadith that the Messenger of God (blessings and peace of God be upon him) said: “At the beginning of every century Allah will send to this Ummah someone who will renew its religious understanding”. Some Muslim scholars understand this renewal to be undertaken by a single person (Mujadid) or a group of people. This renewal or revivalism comes after the Muslim community (or humanity at large) has abandoned core values of religious teachings and succumbed to the materialism of the world. In today’s world, it can be argued, as the authors of this book do, that the “outcome of secularisation and individualism has been a negative one, as widespread man-made catastrophes have ensued”, necessitating renewal/revivalism. The last century has seen its share of human and natural tragedies, as well as the rise of individuals and groups claiming to revive Muslims’ faith. Among these groups is the Tabligh Jama’at—a transnational, intercontinental movement that has touched the hearts, minds and souls of hundreds of millions of Muslims. Apolitical in nature, the movement works at the micro level to bring about individual and social transformation. The rationale is that real societal transformation begins with individual transformation—or refinement of faith, spirituality and character. This can be attained, as the Tabligh Jama’at argues, if preaching is done in person and individuals sacrifice some of their comforts for the sake of Allah. Deep

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connection with Allah, following the Messenger of Allah and being sincere and good towards others are some of the movement’s hallmarks. The impact of the Tabligh Jama’at is now felt across the world. However, there has been little research on this movement and the work of Dr Jan Ali and Rizwan Sahib is timely and significant. This is because the world at large and the Muslim world are undergoing serious political, spiritual, environmental, health and other challenges— and the Tabligh Jama’at, like other movements and individuals, may offer some remedies. In this book, Ali and Sahib provide the reader with a succinct historical, ideological and contemporary narrative of the movement, and in doing so shed much-needed light on this significant movement. Ali and Sahib convincingly argue that modernisation, accompanied by secularisation, has systematically undermined the traditional and religious sources of authority. Further, modernity’s purported benefits of planned economic and social development, and political progress, based on scientific management and technological innovations, have failed to reach many ordinary members of the world, including Muslim societies. Thus, modernity’s promises—in many instances—remain unfulfilled. For this, many Muslims are reaching out to Allah for help and, though they may not obtain material outcomes in terms of employment and reduction in poverty, they receive a sense of solace, anchorage, fulfilment and meaningfulness. Pursuing life in full light of Allah’s prescribed rules and following the path of Prophet Muhammad and encouraging others to do so, these Muslims are doing themselves a favour and working for Allah. For them, this is most satisfying. They also argue that Islamic revivalists find the answers to fundamental existential questions, that is, the ultimate meaning of life not in modernity but in Islam. They provide a compelling argument that the Tabligh Jama’at is a revivalist movement, expressed through preaching (or tabligh), which “produces a feeling of satisfaction that pervades the life of the Muslim—a feeling that modernity has failed to provide him or her with”. Importantly, and for the first time, Ali and Sahib use the Frame Theory to offer useful insights that help to explain the ideological underpinnings of participation in the Tabligh Jama’at. To complement this understanding of why Muslims participate in the Tabilgh Jama’at, they also explore the pull factors of participation—Tablighi ideology and ideas.

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This book will be extremely useful for anyone interested in the Tabilgh Jama’at as an Islamic revivalist movement—specifically, its history, ideology and pull factors. It is also useful for anyone who is interested in understanding—and appreciating—the possible solutions Muslims have and are providing at a practical level for some of the world’s problems. 7 October 2021 The Director of the Centre for Islamic Thought and Education The University of South Australia Adelaide SA, Australia

Mohamad Abdalla

Preface

There is a symbiotic relationship between the Tabligh Jama’at and contemporary Islamic revivalism—an intensified personal religious consciousness, commitment and experience. It is for this reason studying Tabligh Jama’at is useful as it offers a window into the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. The contemporary Islamic revivalist movements like the Tabligh Jama’at that constitute the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revivalism are a response to the conditions of modernity—to the centralisation of state power, secularisation of the worldview and the development of capitalist economies—and also at the same time socio-­ cultural manifestation of modernity. The stress placed on shari’ah and Islamic values is not intended as a return to past Islamic epoch but signifies an effort to deal with contemporary life and various challenges emerging from it by renewed commitment to what is considered in the revivalist circles as authentic Islam. Contemporary Islamic revivalist movements have their predecessors working in a similar way in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that is, responding to the prevailing challenges pivotal being the dismantling of Muslim empires and the socio-cultural, economic and political intrusions into Muslim societies of European colonial powers. Inspired by earlier reformist experiences and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, Islamic revivalist movements rely on this enduring paradigm to deal with changing complexities of everyday living. The contemporary emergence of Islamic revivalist movements across the globe is a direct reaction to modernity and more specifically to its

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discontents or negative consequences. The movements are also an expression of modernity. The modernisation—that is, the idea of social progress, development of societies and a higher standard of living, including the formation of nation-states; the organisation of capitalist free-market economies, technological advancements and scientific developments; and the social and cultural rearrangements that accompany these experiences— has produced among Muslims Islamic revivalist movements. Islamic revivalist movements are involved in domestic, regional and international situations of Muslims wanting to strengthen Islamic influence in all areas of life. When they see that the changing social nature of their countries is having a negative effect on daily living and the secular governments are obstinately failing to meet the needs of their citizens, returning to Islam gives them a sense of purpose, meaning and hope. In an attempt to achieve a better sense of proportion about Islamic movements and contrary to the view of secularists, modernists and alarmists, it is worth noting that Islamic revivalist movements are not a monolithic group determined to destroy the West or are anti-modernity. If anything Islamic revivalist movements work within modernity which they see has sunk in jahiliyah (unGodliness) under the weight of secularism to save it by Islamising modernity through popularisation of Islamic symbols, principles and institutions in the society, and removing the bifurcated space of sacred and profane. The difference between Islamic revivalist movements is significant with movements differing on many basic issues and there exists explosive differences of ideology and policy between them. How to improve Muslim situation in the local or international context takes many forms and the approach taken by Tabligh Jama’at is one example among many. This book is a sociological examination of that approach through which we also get a chance to gaze into the complex inner workings of the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. 12 October 2021  Penrith, NSW, Australia

Jan A. Ali

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 The  Origins and Evolution of the Tabligh Jama’at in the Globalised World 11 3 Islamic Revivalism and Desecularisation of the World 31 4 Mobilisation, Framing and the Tabligh Jama’at 49 5 A Frame Analysis of Tablighi Texts 71 6 Tabligh Jama’at Frame Resonance 89 7 Understanding the Renewal of Allah’s World113 8 Conclusion131 Glossary137 Index139

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About the Authors

Jan  A.  Ali  is Senior Lecturer in Islam and Modernity in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at Western Sydney University (WSU), Australia. He was the Convenor of Islamic Studies in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts and Community and Research Analyst in the Religion and Society Research Centre at the Western Sydney University. Jan is the Founding Convenor of the WSU Postgraduate Islamic Studies Network. He is a religious sociologist who specialises in Islam. His main sociological focus is the study of existential Islam. His published books are Islam and Muslims in Australia: Settlement, Integration, Shariah, Education and Terrorism (2020); Islam in the West: Perceptions and Reactions (2018, co-editor) and Islamic Revivalism Encounters the Modern World: A Study of the Tabligh Jama’at (2012). Rizwan  Sahib  is a doctoral student in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at Western Sydney University, Australia. He recently wrote “Iftar at the Train Station: An Autoethnography of Muslim Cultural Citizenship” in the Australian Journal of Islamic Studies (vol. 5, no. 2, 2020).

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List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

Tabligh Jama’at ideology, framing tasks and collective action frames Tabligh Jama’at frame resonance and mobilisation Islamic revivalist paradigm

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract  In this chapter we find out about the details of the book. The book is a study of the Tabligh Jama’at (Conveying the Message of Islam Group). The central focus of Tabligh Jama’at is to work for Allah through the recreation of the jahiliyah (unGodliness) saturated world using its trichotomous paradigm of faith renewal. Tabligh Jama’at is part of the global phenomenon of Islamic revivalism—a quest for an intensified personal religious consciousness as an ideological response to modernity. Islamic revivalism is about countering the identified destructive forces of modernity, namely modernism and secularism, and replacing them with an Islamic worldview in which Allah reigns supreme. Using Frame Theory the book examines the movement’s ideology and its notion of faith renewal through preaching. Keywords  Tabligh Jama’at • Islamic revivalism • Modernity • Frame Theory • Framing • Tablighi ideology The Tabligh Jama’at (Conveying the Message of Islam Group) is an itinerant transnational movement of fervent worship and Islamic faith renewal. It is part of the global phenomenon of Islamic revivalism—an increase in religious fervour, revitalised spiritual exuberance, pietism and intensified

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_1

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personal religious consciousness, commitment and experience. Unique in its trichotomous paradigm of faith renewal working for Allah to re-create His jahiliyah (unGodliness) saturated world, Tabligh Jama’at is the largest, in its type, transnational movement in the world with a presence in over 200 countries across all the world’s continents except Antarctica and membership exceeding 80 million (Ali, 2010). It was founded by the Deoband-trained scholar Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi (1885–1944) in 1927 in a desolate town of Mewat in the Nuh district of Haryana, south of Delhi, India, in direct response to the competition over sacred space with Hindu militant groups called Shuddhi (purification) and Sangatan (consolidation) from the ’Arya Samaj sect. Reetz (2005, p. 209) explains Deobandi scholars’ concerns saying, “it was meant to rectify the perceived lack of religious education among the Muslims in British India as the religious scholars feared a loss or weakening of Islamic identity in the wake of the spread of English language education and Western values”. Muhammad Ilyas’ aim was to make the movement function as a space in which Muslim masses can be encouraged to espouse the ways of Prophet Muhammad as an archetype life-form. Ilyas anticipated that Muslims’ engagement with the movement’s activities will afford them the opportunity to remove the stains of materialism from their hearts and minds and receive inculcation of a high moral order and guidance towards righteousness and Islamic spirituality. Muhammad Ilyas developed what became known as the Tabligh Jama’at’s six rules: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Shahadah (article of faith) Salat (ritual prayer) Ilm and dhikr (knowledge and remembrance of Allah) Ikram i-Muslim (respect for every Muslim) Ikhlas i-niyat (emendation of intention and sincerity) Tafriq i-waqt (sacrifice of spare time).

These six rules have remained unchanged since the inception of the movement and evidently are the basis of Tabligh Jama’at’s longevity and success, making the movement a force to be reckoned with today (Sikand, 2002). The word tabligh originates from Arabic and means “to convey” or “to communicate” a message. The word jama’at also from Arabic is translated as “group”, “assembly” or “congregation”. The movement acquired the name Tabligh Jama’at not from its founder Muhammad Ilyas or from any

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official means but from popular discourse due to its pietist characteristic and principal goal to engage in da’wah (missionary) work. These two words—Tabligh Jama’at—thus, translate to Conveying the Message of Islam Group. Commonly known as Tabligh Jama’at, the movement is also variously called Jama’at (party), Tahrik (movement), Nizam (system), Tanzim (organisation), Tabligh (propagation) and Tahrik al-Iman (faith movement) (Bustamam-Ahmad, 2008, p.  357). Muhammad Ilyas preferred to describe his movement as Tahrik al-Iman (Haq, 1972, p. 45), but this name never entered popular Tablighi lexicon. Not necessarily new to Islamic history or in the Muslim world, Islamic revivalism as a Muslim desire for the return to Islamic origins—the basics of the faith as enshrined in the Qur’an and sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad) and the revitalisation of faith and spiritualism—is a growing phenomenon in the modern world. In comparison to older forms of Islamic revivalism, contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex multifaceted and multidimensional defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity.1 Revivalists believe, under the process of modernisation, the religion of God, Islam, has come under significant threat and the entire world has degenerated into the abode of evil and perversion or jahiliyah (Ali, 2012). They find modernity to be a faulty machine; therefore, they not only want to stop this degeneration process but reverse it by investing in desecularisation of the world employing macro and micro levels of renewal that will lead to social transformation. 1  By modernity we mean different time periods and characteristics evident in a shift from an agricultural to industrial society, and from a feudal to capitalist economic framework with the nation-state becoming the key form of territorial organisation and rampant industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation and secularisation. The crisis of modernity denotes increased human discontent, uncertainty and existential anxiety, and the unfulfilled aims and purposes of modernity. Modernisation accompanied by secularisation (the separation of religion and politics, and gradual demise of religion) was expected to replace the religious source of authority as religion became anathema and the emergence of capitalist economic production, greater urbanisation, bureaucratisation and industrialisation, the rise of modern nation-states, innovation in the fields of science and technology and the development of rationality were all to pave the way for human freedom, progress and fulfilment (Berger, 1967). Religion was to be replaced by science and technology in the organisation and management of society, and prosperity and fulfilment were to become the common characteristic features of modern living. Instead, under modernity, society has essentially departed from a religiously authorised blueprint of how individuals should behave and the values that should be upheld by the whole society, creating nihilism, hopelessness, decline, discontent and de-rootedness.

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This doesn’t mean that Islamic revivalism is about the reintroduction of traditions or return to a Golden Age or modernisation of Islam. Far from it, Islamic revivalism is about Islamic revivalist movements engaging either directly by procuring political power or indirectly through individual self-­ reformation in the reorganisation of the society based on shari’ah (Islamic law). In a sense, it can be said that Islamic revivalism is essentially an ideological response involving the reformulation and development of certain elements of Islamic social and ethico-legal teachings to enable them to better manage the challenges of modernity. Put differently, with a reactionary character, it is an attempt to confront those aspects of modernity considered by revivalists to be the most destructive and jahiliyah-­ producing, in particular modernism and secularism, and replace them with an Islamic worldview in which Allah is the central figure. Although revivalists agree the modern world has slipped into jahiliyah and needs to be desecularised and remade with comprehensive Islamisation and must be saved from self-destruction, how this can be achieved is unclear to say the least. Islamisation of the modern experience is essentially a desecularisation of the modern world by lifting all state prohibitions on Islamic symbols, processes and institutions in public spaces and making Islam part and parcel of the total pattern of everyday living. Voll explains that those who seek to revive Islam construct the Islamic discourse in a way that does not attempt to start with western forms of modern ideas … western ideological formulations, whether liberal or radical, capitalist or communist, are seen by many Muslims as having failed. The emphasis therefore has shifted from “modernizing” Islam to the Islamization of the modern experience. (Voll, 1991, p. 24)

Islamic revivalist movements differ from each other in terms of achieving the goal of rescuing the modern world from annihilation. They are differentiated theologically, ideologically, sectarianally, geographically, culturally and across time, making it difficult for scholars to identify the groups’ differences or resemblances. Also, they differ in their revivalism methods with some opting for a top-down approach and others using a bottom-up strategy. In general, Islamic revivalists consider revivalism to be an essential means of reintroducing and inculcating an Islamic way of life across a

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society governed not by piecemeal implementation of shari’ah2 but by its ­comprehensive and exclusive application. They are not anti-modernity nor seek its destruction. Islamic revival entails a return to the fundamental puritanical foundation of Islam. Islam is presented not only as a religion but as a comprehensive way of life covering the private domain and public sphere, and there is no separation between the sacred and profane. For Islamic revivalists, all society’s rules are embodied in the shari’ah, which itself is founded on the Qur’an and sunnah. They seek to re-establish the ethos of the pristine model and apply it to contemporary circumstances in order to demonstrate Islam’s dynamism and relevance to modernity. Thus, they move to advocate Islam as a broad and dynamic way of life fully capable of meeting the demands of the changing time and space (Ali, 2012). For Islam to play a complete and vibrant role, revivalists seek support from all Muslims, encouraging them to form a Muslim brotherhood and share in the construction of a just and wholesome world in which all planetary citizens can pursue a fulfilling, successful and meaningful life. According to this ideology, Muslims assume a new and prominent role as Allah’s vicegerents to restore His sovereignty on earth, founded on Qur’anic injunctions and hadithic teachings (Duderija, 2010). In this work, Islamic revivalism denotes: Muslim investment in scripture-based socio-cultural, economic and political processes, institutional development and faith renewal through systematic incorporation of scripture-defined rituals and practices and the rules of the law into the pattern of everyday living and at the same time shedding all foreign accretions in normative and ritualistic Muslim practices. The idea is to employ every peaceful means to make “good Muslims” who will work for Allah and not only represent a natural beacon of hope and light but be the re-makers of a just, successful and wholesome society.

Islamic revivalists like to distinguish themselves from “nominal” or “ordinary” Muslims as they operate within their own social enclaves often described in sociology as in-groups. Those using the top-down approach to remaking the cosmos, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), engage in activism, community and charity work, running community organisations and teaching (scripture, shari’ah and Islamic studies) centres, organising public rallies and public lectures and providing social 2  It is worth pointing out that shari’ah is not a statute law but a code of conduct that can vary in form and content based on ideology, theology and jurisprudential principles.

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services and welfare provisions. Others who opt for a bottom-up strategy for society-building strive to distinguish themselves from others through increased religious diligence such as wearing Islamic dress, offering ritual prayers, observing gender rules and engaging in da’wah (preaching) and self-restructuring processes. At the same time, they extend their sphere of influence through proselytising. They do this by encouraging ordinary Muslims to be more observant of Islamic religious essentials such as the five pillars of Islam. The Tabligh Jama’at, the subject of this book, is a suitable example of a revivalist movement focused on social transformation and the recovery of Islam by encouraging stricter religious observance. The premise of this book is that there is clear correlation between Muslim experiences of modernity and Islamic revivalism. Muslim experiences of modernity have been generally poor and this is evident in the fact that out of over fifty Muslim countries in the world only a handful fall into the category of developed country (United Nations Development Programme, 2020). Many Muslim countries are plagued by poverty and high unemployment, have poor education, lack quality healthcare, social and welfare services, have poor social justice records and are beleaguered by political upheavals. We problematise this fact and it forms the basis of investigation in this book. We, therefore, set the task of investigating why, in a world characterised by modernity, citizens particularly from the Islamic faith find themselves facing constant crises—socio-economic and political dilemmas and threats to faith and identity—and why they are returning to Islam. We argue that modernisation accompanied by secularisation has systematically undermined the traditional and religious sources of authority and modernity’s purported benefits of planned economic and social development and political progress, based on scientific management and technological innovations, have failed to reach many ordinary members of Muslim society. Modernity’s promises, therefore, in many instances remain unfulfilled. Thus, many Muslims are reaching out to Allah for help and in so doing they are not gaining material outcomes in terms of employment or reduction in poverty, for instance, but they feel a sense of solace, anchorage, fulfilment and meaningfulness. Pursuing life in full light of Allah’s prescribed rules, following the path of Prophet Muhammad and encouraging others to do so, these Muslims are doing themselves a favour and working for Allah. For them, this is most satisfying. We also argue that Islamic revivalists find the answers to fundamental existential questions— that is the ultimate meaning of life—not in modernity but in Islam.

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To develop our argument and understanding of Islamic revivalism as an ideological response to modernity in this study, we turn to Frame Theory (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988, 1992). Frame Theory dissects a movement’s ideology by identifying in it discursive constructs called collective action frames that construct a grievance that must be corrected (diagnostic framing), propose strategies and tactics for correcting the grievance (prognostic framing), and prod people to partake in the corrective action through vocabularies of motive (motivational framing). The importance and relevance of these discursive constructs to a discussion of Islamic revivalism is that they add legitimacy to Tablighi ideas of preaching and faith renewal. In this way, framing represents the ideological justification of Islamic revivalism as carried out via preaching and faith renewal. The key advantage of the framing we draw on is that it treats ideology and ideas as important variables in a movement’s successful or unsuccessful efforts to mobilise people. In the case of the Tabligh Jama’at, its mobilisation efforts rely not only on face-to-face preaching and the organisational means to coordinate this activity worldwide, but on the ideas it deploys during preaching to convince or persuade the proselytisee of the urgent need to increase one’s faith and Islamic praxis and to participate in preaching tours. Framing allows us to map this ideational facet of Tablighi mobilisation, through which we can conceptualise how Tablighi ideas and ideology impact its mobilisation outcomes. This is an important contribution of this work because conceptualisation of Tablighi ideology and ideas as mobilising variables is lacking in the literature on the Tabligh Jama’at. This situation contributes to what Jan Ali (2012) identifies as theoretical underdevelopment of Islamic revivalism, which stems from “a significant lack of detailed research into particular aspects of religious revivalism and Islamic revivalist movements” (Ali, 2012, p. 31). We address this problem in this study by advancing theory regarding the mobilisation and participation aspects of Islamic revivalism by answering the question: How does the framing activity and ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at impact its successful or unsuccessful mobilisation of members and potential constituents? Framing and ideology represent the pull factors of participation. These factors complement the push factors of participation we identify in this study: those negative conditions and experiences of modernity that compel Muslims to seek alternative means of peace, meaning and satisfaction in their everyday lives. Collective action frames and framing, as found in Tablighi written and oral texts, attract or pull people towards the

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movement. The Allah frame is particularly important as it strategically connects Allah’s will and grace to the activities of preaching, faith renewal and self-­reform performed by the Tabligh Jama’at. It also frames Allah as able to fulfil his promises of granting peace, security and meaning in one’s life. Muslims thus flock to Allah and Islamic revivalism because modernity, on the other hand, has failed to fulfil its promise to deliver these things. We apply Frame Theory in this study by undertaking a frame analysis of primary Tablighi sources: the written texts comprising the volume titled Faza’il-e-A’maal (a collection of seven pamphlets written by Tablighi ideologues) and bayan (religious sermon) given by Tablighis. We undertake a close reading of the ideas contained within the Faza’il-e-A’maal and bayan to identify collective action frames and framing processes. To gain an in-depth picture, we undertook participant observation by attending and recording several bayans given by Tablighis at their main weekly gatherings in Imam Ali Mosque, Sydney, Australia.

Outline of the Book This book has eight chapters including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction is the first chapter which introduces the subject matter of the book, and explains key concepts such as jahiliyah, modernity, crisis of modernity, modernisation, secularisation and desecularisation. It also articulates the book’s investigative and explorative focus, methodological approach and argument. Chapter 2 focuses on the origins of the Tabligh Jama’at and its development and transnationalisation. It examines the specific situation in which the movement was born, its initial struggles, its internal structure, the development of its six rules and its gradual growth into a transnational Islamic revivalist movement. Chapter 3 discusses the concepts of Islamic revivalism and the desecularisation of the world. It explains that Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon but, in comparison to past revivalisms, it is a complex multifaceted defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity and the jahiliyah-­ steeped modern world. The chapter explains that modernisation accompanied by secularisation has produced what revivalists consider to be the crisis of modernity. What follows is an examination of Islamic revivalists’ response to this in terms of remaking the modern world through systematic desecularisation.

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Chapter 4 provides the research context for introducing Frame Theory to the study of the Tabligh Jama’at. It posits that Frame Theory’s conceptual apparatus provides leverage in securing a better understanding of how the Tabligh Jama’at uses meaning making and ideas to persuade people to join its cause of Islamic revival. The chapter defines the key concepts of Frame Theory applied to the Tablighi texts in this study. The chapter concludes with a detailed description of the method of frame analysis undertaken in Chap. 4. Chapter 5 consists of frame analysis of key Tablighi written and oral texts—the Faza’il-e-A’maal and bayan. In these texts we identify and document several examples of framing, which allow us to define a set of Tablighi collective action frames and the discursive process of frame amplification. The chapter identifies in Tablighi texts a vocabulary through which Tablighi ideas are expressed, accentuated and amplified, and Tablighi values that add value to the activity of preaching and define the ideal characteristics of a preacher or worker for Allah. Chapter 6 explores the frame resonance of Tablighi frames and framing. This involves examining the characteristics of frame makers, frame receivers and frame context that contribute to favourable reception or rejection of the Tablighi framing. The chapter shows that Tablighi framing meets with acceptance and resistance due to various factors, which are identified and elaborated on. Chapter 7 explains how modernisation accompanied by secularisation has profoundly transformed the world. For Islamic revivalists, particularly the Tablighis, the transformation has led to the world degenerating into jahiliyah. This state of the world from a revivalist perspective cannot be allowed to persist; something needs to be done. The chapter, therefore, discusses revivalists’ plan, which is to save the world through Islamic renewal as a form of global social transformation as well as through proselytisation as part of the renewal process. The conclusion constitutes Chap. 8 which recaps the main arguments of this book and their implications for understanding Islamic revivalism. It summarises and conceptualises the ideological dimension of Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. It closes with suggestions for further applications of Frame Theory to the study of the Tabligh Jama’at and Islamic revivalism.

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References Ali, J. (2010). Tablighi Jama’at and the ‘remaking’ of the Muslim. Australian Religion Studies Review, 23(2), 148–172. Ali, J. (2012). Islamic revivalism encounters the modern world: A study of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sterling Publishers. Berger, P. (1967). Religious institutions. In N. Smelser (Ed.), Sociology: An introduction (pp. 329–379). John Wiley. Bustamam-Ahmad, K. (2008). The history of Jama‘ah Tabligh in Southeast Asia: The role of Islamic Sufism in Islamic revival. Al-Jami’ah. Journal of Islamic Studies, 46(2), 353–400. Duderija, A. (2010). Constructing the religious self and the other: Neo-traditional Salafi Manhaj. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 21(1), 75–93. Haq, M. (1972). The faith movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Reetz, D. (2005). Living like the pious ancestors: The social ideal of the missionary of the Tablighi Jama’at. DAVO Conference, Hamburg. Sikand, Y. (2002). The origins and development of the Tablighi Jama’at (1920–2000). Orient Longman. Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1, 197–217. Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.  Morris & C.  M. Mueller (Eds.), Frontiers in social movement theory (pp. 133–155). Yale University Press. Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Jr., Wordon, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilisation, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464–481. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 2095581 United Nations Development Programme. (2020). The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene. Human Development Report 2020. United Nations Development Programme. Voll, J. (1991). Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan. In M. Marty & R. Appleby (Eds.), Fundamentalisms observed: The fundamentalism project (Vol. 1, pp. 349–402). The University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER 2

The Origins and Evolution of the Tabligh Jama’at in the Globalised World

Abstract  This chapter outlines and analyses the origins of the Tabligh Jama’at as a non-hierarchical and itinerant transnational Islamic revivalist movement. Exploring Tabligh Jama’at’s humble beginnings in socially depraved, economically deficient and religiously syncretised Mewat, the chapter reveals how the movement’s effort to make Muslims observant and faithful believers became over time its global endeavour and preoccupation. The establishment of British colonial rule and the spread of modernisation in India and other parts of the Muslim world created the context for the moral and spiritual reform of Muslims and their remaking. Enormous spiritual sacrifices have been made by the movement in the transformation of Muslims into righteous practitioners of Islam and its persistent efforts are evidently producing “good” Muslims in all corners of the world. Keywords  Tabligh Jama’at • Islamic revivalism • Meos • Mewat • Maulana Muhammad Ilyas • Maulana Saad

Introduction This chapter sketches and examines the origins of the Tabligh Jama’at and its global spread over time. As a non-hierarchical and itinerant transnational Islamic revivalist movement, the Tabligh Jama’at emerged among © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_2

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the Meo people of India in 1927. Its aim was to purge a Muslim society of its un-Islamic beliefs and practices. At the time, the social and economic conditions of the Meos in the Mewat region were very poor and the Muslims had syncretic religious beliefs and practices. From the perspective of the Tabligh Jama’at, this was a great Muslim tragedy and they attributed the Meos’ prevailing conditions to the disappearance of authentic Islam from their lives. To counteract this, the movement planned the return to the basics of Islam and embarked on the mission of making Muslims better, that is to reform the Muslims who pursued a religious way of life based on Islamic scriptures—the Qur’an and hadith. The chapter discusses how the Meos’ situation had direct links to the broader context of the Muslim crisis about their faith and place in the society of larger India and other parts of the world. Furthermore, it discusses how the emergence of the Tabligh Jama’at interacted with the transformation brought about by the establishment of British colonial rule and the spread of modernisation in India and the broader Muslim world, which created the context for the moral reform of Muslims and their remaking.

Mewat and its Meo Inhabitants Mewat is a historical region of Haryana and Rajasthan states in northwestern India and its inhabitants are called Meos. Its geographical boundary constitutes the Gurgaon, Bharatpur and Alwar districts. The district of Gurgaon makes up part of Haryana and the Bharatpur and Alwar districts constitute part of Rajasthan. Mewat lies southwest of the Indian capital and is not too remote from central Delhi. While people with different ethnic backgrounds live in Mewat, it is largely occupied by its own people, commonly known as the Meos, who speak the Mewati dialect. As mentioned in the Imperial Gazetteer of India, essentially “the Meos are all Musalmans, and are mainly agriculturalists, being greatly helped in the fields by their women, who do not observe parda, and generally do better work than their husbands” (1908, p. 430). However, animal husbandry and sheep, goat and dairy farming form the secondary sources of livelihood. Taking shelter near the foothills of undulating terrains of the Aravalli ranges called Kala Pahard (black mountain), early history reveals the Meos as pillagers and plunderers causing the Delhi rulers terrible grief and costly resolutions (Mujeeb, 1976). As Mujeeb states,

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[I]n the middle of the nineteenth century, the Meos, who lived in the hilly areas west and south of Delhi not only plundered people on the highways around Delhi but even stole into the town. They came up to the Hand-I-­ Shamsi, molested water-carriers and maid servants, who came to draw water, stripping them and walking away with their clothes. (1976, pp. 218–219)

The Imperial Gazetteer of India adds that the Meos and Mewatis, however, retained their character for turbulence; and towards the end of the eighteenth century. Travelling in the upper and central Doab was unsafe owing to armed bands of Mewati horsemen. They gave much trouble to Lord Lake’s forces in the Maratha war of 1803, while in the Mutiny they and the Gujars were conspicuous for their readiness to take advantage of any disorder. (1908, p. 105)

The broader Meo society is a complex community of social groups and sub-groups. Meos are essentially divided into two primary exogamous clans known as pals (a pal is territorial unit consisting of a set of Meo gotras) and sub-clans called gotras (a gotra is a Meo lineage). These are hereditary clans determined by patrilineal descent. There are thirteen pals: five Jadon pals—Chhirkilat, Dalat, Demrot, Nai and Pundelot; five Tomar pals—Balot, Darwar, Kalesa, Lundavat and Rattavat; one Kachhwaha pal—Dingal; one Bargujar pal—Singal; and one miscellaneous half-blood pal—Palakra and fifty-two gotras (Crooke, 1975). The pals have individual links to a particular territory. The thirteen pals reflect the thirteen individual tracts of the Mewat region. A pal owns a tract and each tract has a corresponding pal name. Over time, the territorial boundaries of individual pals became less pronounced and the pal chief commonly known as Chaudhary, who once represented his own pal and wielded political power, no longer has a significant role in the broader political structure of the Meo society (Marwah, 1979). The individual pals are further divided into small groups or sub-groups known as thamas. A thama is a sub-group whose members are patrilineal descendants of a common ancestor. A thama acquires its name either directly from the ancestor or from the village where the ancestor was born. Like pals, the thamas have their own representative chiefs. The chieftainship is a hereditary office (Marwah, 1979). What distinguishes gotras from pals is that the gotras are smaller in size and lack a territorial connection. However, “the function of the gotras and

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pals is almost identical” (Aggarwal, 1973, p. 27). Gotras signify descendants of a common male ancestor. They are exogamous groups whose members do not live together in one village, but in a series of neighbouring hamlets whose occupants are called seghotians (people from the same gotra). It is not unusual for Meos and non-Meos such as Minas to share gotra names because, as mentioned by Crooke: the similarity of names and the legend of Sasibadani, as well as the fact that the sections of both tribes closely agree, has led to the general belief that the Minas and Meos, who are classed as distinct in their native home Rajputana, are really of common origin. (1975, p. 485)

The Meo family comprises a community of blood relations who live collectively under one roof and share a common chulha (hearth). This is called a ghar (household). The household can be divided into two primary groups. A simple household comprises the primary family, one-member family and a partial primary family, while a complex household is made up of two or more complete or incomplete non-extended families who live under the same roof and share the same chulhas (Marwah, 1979). A complex household can be further divided into two sub-groups: lineal joint families consisting of a man and his wife living with their sons and their families, and collateral joint families entailing several brothers and their families living together (Aggarwal, 1973). Meos also practise polygyny. A polygynous family consists of a man, more than one wife and their children. The practice of polygyny in Meo society arises from a social custom in which a man takes his brother’s widow in marriage and becomes her source of support. Also, a man may take a second wife if the first one proves to be infertile or “sometimes, although very rarely, rich Meos take two or more wives for reasons of prestige” (Aggarwal, 1973, p. 34). Under the patrilocal extended family system, women in Meo society move to their husband’s home on marriage. Women rarely own any property in Meo society because their inheritance rule, which is not based on shari’ah, precludes them from sharing in ancestral property (Marwah, 1979). However, a woman, whether a daughter or sister, may inherit land or property should there be no male heir or if the heir had passed away.

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Islam in Mewat The Islamic history of the Meos is a little obscure and the historical accounts paint contradictory and conflicting pictures. Meo belief holds that their conversion  to Islam occurred as early as the initial period of Islam in India, when Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sind in 711 CE and established Islam in South Asia. It is claimed that the Meos spread up to Sind and came under the influence of Islam (Shakur, 1974). But then, “according to tradition, the Meos first crossed the Jumana in the period of anarchy, which succeeded the invasion by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1018–1019” (Imperial Gazetteer, 1908, p.  104), although another account suggests in 1194 CE, when Qutb-u’d-din Ἁibek was in power, Hiraj (the brother of the last independent Hindu king Prithviraj III) made an attempt to invade Mewat but was defeated and killed (Haq, 1972). Sayyid Wajiḥ-u’d-din was given the task of invading Mewat by the sultan but was killed during the battle and his nephew, Miran Ḥusayn Jang, took charge and ultimately subjugated the Meos. Some of them converted to Islam and others remained committed to Hinduism but had to pay jizya (a land tax) (Haq, 1972). These historical accounts of the conversion of the Meos to Islam, in which Meo Muslims kept many Hindu customs and traditions and continued to worship Hindu gods while others reverted to Hinduism, reveal considerable religious syncretism. The Meos were nominal Muslims because “they observed most Hindu rituals and continued to use the services of all Hindu castes, including the Brahmins, long after embracing Islam” (Aggarwal, 1973, p. 151). Meo Muslims celebrate the Hindu festival of Holi (Hindu festival of celebrating the arrival of spring, hence the festival of colour), Dussehra (festival celebrating the triumph of Lord Rama over the demon king Ravana) and Diwali (festival of lights) as well as their own festivals of Eid al-Fitr (the feast at the completion of the fasting month of Ramaḍan), Eid al-Adha (the feast of sacrifice) and Shab e-Barat (the night of forgiveness, which some Muslims celebrate on the thirteenth or fourteenth of the Islamic month of Shaʿban). They trace their genealogy to Lord Krishna and observe his birthday, janam-ashtami. Sufi saints, such as Haẓrat Ḵhwadja Mohiuddin Čhisti and Niẓam u’d-din Awliya, are held in high regard and worshipped. The graves of these Sufi saints became shrines and sites of pilgrimage. Ḥaẓrat Madar Shah (1315–1436) is another well-respected Sufi saint whose tomb is in Makanpur and is considered sacred by the Meos. To honour Haẓrat Madar

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Shah, a procession of Meos would carry a flag as a symbol of respect to his tomb while singing and chanting praises. Other well-known Sufi saints who were religious preachers, such as Haẓrat Madar Shah and Shah Chokḥa, are also held in great esteem, their tombs are worshipped and urs (an annual celebration to mark the death of a saint) observed. As a Meo scholar Marwah attests: [A]t the local village level, certain deities such as Panchpir, Khera Devta, Chabunda, Bhomiya and Bhairon were also worshipped. These deities were represented either by platforms or by stone slabs. People used to light earthen lamps on them and offer sweets. These offerings were given to the Faqir. (1979, p. 86)

Furthermore, the Imperial Gazetteer of India adds: [T]he local saints and deities are regularly worshipped, the Brahman officiates at all family ceremonials side by side with the Musalman priest, and if in matters of creed they are Muhammadans in matter of form they are Hindus. (1908, p. 37)

It is fair to suggest the Meos, upon converting to Islam, did not pay specific attention to what constituted a pristine Islamic practice and allowed themselves to be enveloped in a syncretic lifestyle in which Hinduism and Islam contributed proportionately. Consequently, the institution of family remained almost untouched by Islam and the Meo family structure continued to be based on the pal and gotra dichotomy and marriage exogamy system. Marwah elaborates: The rule governing the selection of a spouse are complex and involve various degrees of prohibition such as the avoidance of cross cousins, those from one’s own village, or from one’s mother’s brother’s village, etc. (1979, p. 86)

These rules of exogamy are artificial and directly contrast shari’ah, which permits believers to marry blood relations as close as first cousin. Customary Hindu laws of inheritance continue to be applied because “those of indigenous origin still retain their ancient Hindu customs and ideas” (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, p. 37). Therefore, among the Meos, Hindu customary laws often take precedence over shari’ah. Thus, what might have been perceived by Meos as harmless religious syncretism

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became very problematic and undermined orthodox religious practices. Other practices of cultural syncretism include the naming of children—a Hindu prefix would be followed by a Muslim suffix, for example, Raja Khan, Darya Khan and Sunjay Khan—or the adoption of clothing customs, such as the gunghat (dress worn by Muslim women in some parts of India) but not the pardah (veil), by Meo women. As Aggarwal observes, [U]nlike both the Muslim and Hindu high castes, Meo women do not observe parda (seclusion). … Meo women, however, do avoid certain relatives in their families, especially the male affinals who are older than their husbands. In the presence of these relatives Meo women cover their faces and avoid any kind of contact. (1973, p. 33)

However, instead of the kameez (a long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers), men continued to wear the dhoti (loincloth), kamari (waist cloth) and paejama (drawers) (Crooke, 1975). Meos adopted Islamic lifecycle rituals, such as khatna (circumcision), nikah (marriage ceremony) and janazah (funeral), but with Hindu features. For example, the khatna was made a grand social occasion and celebrated with great pomp and ceremony. The nikah was performed by a maulvi or kazi (Muslim cleric) but included Hindu marriage rituals such as rubbing turmeric on the bodies of the bride and groom, getting Brahmin priests to write the note called pili chitthi to fix the date of marriage and playing the dhol (drum). In the case of the janazah, Meos adopted burial instead of cremation but maintained the Hindu funeral feast known as chehallum, observed on the fortieth day after the burial. However, these rituals and ceremonies never included recitation of the Qur’an, a crucial Islamic element. The syncretic Meo religious traditions and practices served to reinforce their local social and political position in Mewat. As the dominant landowners and leading caste, their maintenance of Hindu traditions defined their social interaction with other castes, for example, the gotra/pal system described above and the attitude of untouchability towards the “lower” castes such as the bhangis (sweepers) and chamars (leather workers). It allowed them to maintain their dominant position in the caste system despite converting to Islam. As Shams observes, there was “no pressing need to bend in either direction [towards Hinduism or Islam] because their position in Mewat was secure” (1983, p. 17).

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Upheaval in Mewat At the turn of the twentieth century, with British colonial power firmly established in India, the Meos were forced to confront their ambivalent position on the issue of religious identity. A series of socio-economic and political upheavals produced the circumstances in which the Tabligh Jama’at found fertile soil to pursue its activities. The Social and Economic Upheaval Despite the Meos owning almost all the productive land in Mewat, they were overwhelmingly poor small landholders with few local leaders or large landlords (Ali, 1970; Shams, 1983). As their economic situation deteriorated, the Meos became poorer. According to Wahiduddin Khan, one reason for their deepening poverty was their growing indebtedness to the local Hindu traders, the Banias, who charged impoverished Meos a simple non-compound interest rate of 5 per cent per month on their loans, which amounted to 60 per cent annually (Khan, 1988, p. 4). The consequence was that many Meos became so indebted to the Banias that they were forced to forfeit their land because they could not pay their debts. Shams (1983) noted that many Meos saw themselves as victims of the exploitation of Bania moneylenders whom they blamed for their poverty. In turn they became disillusioned with Hinduism to which Banias were directly linked as Brahmanic Hindus. The Meos increasingly saw the colonial regime and Hindu upper castes as their enemies. Their response was to emphasise their Islamic identity and thereby reinforce their communal identity. The Meo Peasant Insurrections of the 1930s The global economic depression of the 1930s hit Indian peasants particularly hard. In several areas of northern India, including Mewat, peasants rioted, demanding relief from the economic hardships. From 1932 to 1934, in response to the depressed economic conditions, the Meos revolted against authorities so fiercely that the period still features in their legends (Ali, 1970). The severity of the oppressive conditions faced by the Meos can be grasped from the following assertions made by Haye:

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The Meo tracts in Alwar and Bharatpur were victims of the extreme authoritarianism and ruthlessness of their rulers. Government servants would do nothing without extorting bribes. Peasants were being grossly overburdened with increased taxation. … The rights of the people were being thrown to the winds. The Mewatis were now treated as goats and sheep, as nothing better than dumb animals. (n.d., p. 8)

In addition, the Meos were still required to render forced labour to the state and pay numerous high taxes, such as servant’s tax, tail tax on different kinds of domestic animals, grazing tax and a tax for religious ceremonies (Haye, n.d.). In addition to this great economic burden, in 1933, the Raja sanctioned a quadruple rise in revenue levy (Shakur, 1974). The Meo peasants united in protest and resolved to boycott the levy increase. The Meo demonstrations became widespread, covering the entire Alwar district and subsequently spread into British territory (Haye, n.d.). After the rebellion of 1933, the Tabligh Jama’at undertook vigorous da‘wah (preaching) in the Mewat area. Haq says: At this critical moment the movement of Ilyas (d. 1944) infused new hope and confidence in the Muslims living in the riot-infested areas. Some felt that the calamities that had come upon them were a visitation from God for their negligence of religious duties. Many were drawn to the work of Ilyas which thus received great impetus. (1972, p. 44)

Initially, the da‘wah of the Tabligh Jama’at centred on British Mewat, particularly around Nuh, and only began to focus on Alwar and Bharatpur after the rebellion had broken out (Haye, n.d.). Although not a direct outcome of the revolt, Islamic revival in Mewat was a religious response to social oppression. The Origin of the Tabligh Jama’at The Tabligh Jama’at emerged in Mewat in direct response, first and foremost, to the rise of the Hindu ’Arya Samaj sect and the efforts of Christian missionaries from the West. From the ’Arya Samaj sect emerged Shuddhi (Purification) and Sangathan (Consolidation), two proselytising movements. They were engaged in rigorous large-scale efforts to “win back” Hindus who had accepted Islam during the Muslim political hegemony in India. The ’Arya Samajis claimed to be the new defenders of Hinduism,

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which they alleged had become a forgotten faith and slipped into decadence in the hands of the Brahmans. They concentrated primarily on “winning back” marginal Muslims—those who, even though they had accepted Islam previously and adopted many Islamic rituals and practices, never completely gave up the quintessential practices of Hinduism and were therefore seen as Muslims in name only. To counter the ’Arya Samaj’s proselytising, the Tabligh Jama’at embarked on a mission of Islamic faith renewal and awakening among the Meos of Mewat and the broader Muslim population of India. The Tabligh Jama’at realised that what it considered to be Islamic orthodoxy and the true teachings of Islam had been grossly neglected by Muslims, particularly those living in India. It felt the Muslim bourgeoisie was too comfortable in the lap of luxurious living and had generally given up their obligation to Allah in totality. Also, it claimed the ulama (Islamic scholars) had focused excessively on knowledge construction within the confines of educational institutions and mosques and had neglected preaching to the majority lay Muslims. The ulama’s neglect created a gap between learned and lay Muslims, which led to many Muslims “questioning the validity of Quranic injunctions” (Marwah, 1979, p. 88). The Tabligh Jama’at interpreted this trend as threatening to Muslim identity and further decline of Islam in India. To counter this division between learned and lay Muslims and the missionary efforts of Hindu revivalists in India and Christian missionaries from the West, Ilyas was inspired to act and that was to ignite Islamic zeal in ordinary mostly nominal Muslims. He aimed to make his fellow Muslims become pious, according to his own standards of proper Muslim religious praxis. He argued the responsibility of spreading Islam was not confined to the ulama but was incumbent on every Muslim. He reiterated what numerous other alims had asserted that, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, who was the last in the chain of prophets, no other prophet would descend on earth to spread the word of Allah. The discharging of the “prophetic responsibilities” he suggested was, therefore, now the obligation of every Muslim who should encourage the praising of Allah and invite Muslims to do good and refrain from doing bad. In this sense, the aim of the Tabligh Jama’at centred on purifying Muslims from religious syncretism and making them observant servants of Allah.

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The Movements’ Organisational Structure The headquarters1 of the Tabligh Jama’at is approximately eight kilometres from New Delhi in the suburb of Nizam u’d-din. The headquarters was once a small mosque known as the Bangalawali Masjid, but today, after structural renovation and extension, it has become a large seven-­ storey building that can house approximately 10,000 Tablighis at a time. Several structural changes have taken place around and on the top of the old Bangalawali Masjid, leaving most of the old structure intact. Within this large seven-storey building lies the movement’s Madrasa Kashf-ul ‘Ulum, several rooms for important guests and visitors, a few conference rooms and small rooms for resident scholars and senior preachers. Also, located in the building on the ground level next to the old Bangalawali Masjid are two fenced graves belonging to Maulana Ilyas and Maulana Zakariya. The headquarters was always headed by a single amir (leader), although since 1995 it has been headed by two amirs—Maulanas Ṣaad and Zubairul.2 At one stage, the amir received the assistance of twenty senior Tablighis and fifty volunteers, each with different responsibilities (Durrany, 1993, p. 24). At the present, however, information is sketchy, suggesting figures as high as a couple of hundred workers. The Niẓam u’d-din headquarters is an all-year round centre of activity with jama’ats coming and going all the time. They come to learn the tabligh work from senior Tablighis and scholars, discuss with officials the Tablighi activities in their own areas or countries and receive directives from the leaders. Apart from worship, such as ritual prayers, supererogatory prayers, recitation of the Qur’an, remembrance of Allah and reading the hadith, Nizam u’d-din headquarters provides accommodation to at least 2000 Tablighis at any given time, as well as three daily meals; it organises visa requirements for local and foreign Tablighis and transportation requirements, particularly for its foreign members (Ali, 2012).

1  Tabligh Jama’at split into two factions over a leadership issue in 2016. We discuss the split briefly in a later section in this chapter but here we describe the movement’s old organisational structure and organisational functions at Nizam u’d-din because not much has changed at these headquarters since the split. We acknowledge, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, like elsewhere, Tablighi activities here have been suspended. 2  Maulana Zubairul Hasan passed away in March 2014 leaving Maulana Saad the single head of the Tabligh Jama’at.

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At the headquarters, all decisions, no matter how small or big, are made by the shura (consultative committee) during the mushawara (discussion or consultation), which takes place daily. For instance, a small matter such as a Tablighi member wanting to break his khuruj for half a day to attend to a personal matter requires the approval of the shura. The mushawara is held daily; because of the presence of the large number of members, many different issues require resolution. Ordinarily, the mushawara is convened by any shura member, unless an amir is present, who then assumes the role. Shura members are still required to do tours and, for this reason, the daily mushawara is not always graced by the presence of all shura members. In India, the Tabligh Jama’at has regional headquarters in the capital cities of almost all states. Unlike the elaborate Nizam u’d-din headquarters, these are simple arrangements usually in the small back rooms of those mosques whose members have cordial relationships with the Tablighis or are tolerant of tabligh work. Each Indian state has its own amir who operates under direct instructions from Nizam u’d-din headquarters.3 At district, suburb and town levels, the same organisational structure exists. This model is reproduced in countries where the Tabligh Jama’at is an established organisation. For example, in Australia, the Tablighi organisational structure resembled the Nizam u’d-din headquarters at state and territory, regional and small city levels, until the split in the movement happened in 2016. The Tabligh Jama’at has always focused on the expansion of its organisational network rather than on consolidation. To maintain its expansionary pursuits, the movement has not diverted, even after the split into two factions in 2016, for over eighty years now, from its original recruitment strategy of Tablighi workers who go out on khuruj. Although the Tabligh Jama’at is a reasonably large organisation, it does not have paid staff or a structured and well-defined bureaucratic hierarchy. The administrative or organising work is essentially performed by Tablighi helpers, some of whom offer their services free on a full-time basis. With the transnationalisation of the movement, the need for a coordinated organisational approach and a more robust and dynamic leadership is fast growing. The 2016 split of the movement is clear evidence of this requirement. At the local level within individual countries, the need for 3  Since the split in the movement in 2016, Nizam u’d-din headquarters is no longer the sole dispenser of instructions to all Tablighis. Tablighis from the breakaway faction receive their instructions from their headquarters mosque in Nerul near Mumbai.

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further planning and a more structured organisational approach has been emerging and centres are now keeping journal entries of the tabligh work in general and khuruj activities more specifically (Ali, 2012). This not only facilitates a coordinated coverage of the targeted local Muslims for recruitment and preaching but helps in the organisation of the tabligh work with effectiveness and efficiency.

Reconstituting the Ideal Muslim Society and the Transnationalisation of the Tabligh Jama’at The Tabligh Jama’at originated to reform Muslims, rebuild the Muslim society and remake the world as a shared sacred and profane space. This development as a centralised model occurred in relation to the historical and cultural transformation of the modern world. Thus, although the Tabligh Jama’at emerged in the context of imperial India and the Muslim and Hindu political struggle for power, religion as an identifier was problematic because of the existence of syncretism in the Muslim community in India but elsewhere as well. Purging Meo life of syncretic practices developed the community along religious and political lines. The Tabligh Jama’at’s expansion and growth then took place in the context of Muslim minority communities, religious syncretism and identity crisis. The Tabligh Jama’at has always had a reconstituting society and transnational focus ever since its inception. This is evident in the fact that the Tabligh Jama’at did not only see Meos or imperial India in crisis, but the entire world’s Muslim population—the ummah (Muslim community), which it saw steeped in jahiliyah (unGodliness). The Tabligh Jama’at’s aim was to save the whole ummah and the world; therefore, it steered away from social and political ideologies generated by nationalism and remained committed to purging Muslim practices at an international level. However, with its internal woes and split, politics has evidently entered the movement, which we briefly explore in the next section. It was not only concerned with the religious conditions and welfare of Muslims in Mewat or India more widely, but also Muslims living in other regions and countries. It was even concerned with Muslims living as minority communities in Western countries such as Australia and Great Britain. The international expansion of the Tabligh Jama’at is attributed to Maulana Muhammad Yusuf (1917–1965), son of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, who took leadership of the movement in 1944 after his father’s

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death. Like his father, Muhammad Yusuf conceived of Muslims wherever they lived as an ummah—a global brotherhood. Hence, Muhammad Yusuf embarked on a more ambitious mission than his father to spread the message of Islam through tabligh to wherever Muslims lived, thus deployed many overseas preaching missions, internationalising the Tabligh Jama’at. In this endeavour, the movement’s members first arrived, for instance, in Britain in 1946, the United States in 1952 and France in 1962 (Metcalf, 1996). Today, the Tabligh Jama’at membership is spread across the globe in “more than two hundred countries” (Horstmann, 2007, p. 27), traversing all continents with the exception of Antarctica; on the Indian sub-­ continent alone, one annual gathering “today can attract a million people” (Metcalf, 1994, p.  707). This is a very large gathering of Muslims, second only to the hajj congregation (Ali, 2012). Its major impact has been felt in Muslim communities, for instance, in larger Asia, including South East Asia (Noor, 2012), the South Pacific including Australia (Ali, 2012), the Middle East, North America and more specifically in parts of Europe, such as Belgium (Dassetto, 1988), France (Kepel, 1985) and Britain (Vertovec, 2002). While it is true that the Tabligh Jama’at became a transnational Islamic revivalist movement in the 1940s, Metcalf points out that it was, however, with the substantial labor, student, and professional migrations to Europe and North America, beginning in the 1960s, that a network of support and a core audience for preaching appeared and substantial Tablighi activity began. (1996, pp. 111–112)

In countries, especially in the West, where Muslims are a minority, for example, diaspora communities without established Islamic institutions and insufficient resources, the influence and popularity of the Tabligh Jama’at is the envy of many revivalist movements. It provides a vitally important venue for Islamic learning and practices and fills the many social and cultural vacuums created by migration. This has benefited the Muslim community in acquiring an understanding of the fundamental principles of Islam and at the same time helps the movement establish and intensify its preaching networks in these countries. Though other networks for the purpose of da’wah (preaching) are regularly used, the diaspora network is employed more widely because of its broad and significant effect. In the diaspora network, the Tabligh Jama’at finds a special place, because in the absence of all major Islamic institutions, face-to-face and

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house-to-house itinerant preaching becomes even more necessary, thus allowing the movement to exercise greater influence on Muslims. By using the itinerant preaching method, Ahmad suggests: The Tablighi Jamaat has thus become an important religious training ground for aspiring [Muslims] among the small-town shopkeepers, school teachers, government clerks, artisans, and para-professionals in the private sector. (1991, pp. 515–516)

In this way, the movement believes “the people will become good Muslims not by reading books but by receiving the message through personal contacts and by active participation in da‘wah work” (Ahmad, 1991, pp. 515–516). This kind of missionary-preaching approach has placed the Tabligh Jama’at in stark contrast to its counterparts such as Al-Ikhwan al-­ Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), Jama’at-i Islami (Islamic Association) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), whose Islamic revival activities are based primarily on written communication and speech-based congregational preaching. A direct itinerant approach with a simple message and seeking a slow yet permanent transformation of “self” based on reformist ideology makes the movement a pleasant and non-threatening organisation for many Muslims across the world.

Internal Politics and Divisionalism In 2016, the Tabligh Jama’at split in two after the leading clerics parted ways with the great-grandson of the movement’s founder, Maulana Saad. After the death of Maulana Inamul Hasan Kandhlawi (1918–1995), who served as the amir of the Tabligh Jama’at from 1965 to 1995, Maulana Saad became the co-chief of the shura with Hasan’s son Maulana Zubairul Hasan. For thirty years, when Maulana Inamul Hasan Kandhlawi was at the helm of the movement, the Tabligh Jama’at operated very well with much progress and success. In March 2014, Maulana Zubairul Hasan passed away, leaving Maulana Saad the sole leader of the movement. During his co-leadership with Maulana Zubairul Hasan, Maulana Saad developed for himself a good reputation and became well-respected by the Tablighis, his peers and figures across the Muslim world, from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries of the Middle East to Turkey, UK, Europe, South East Asia and the Pacific, where revivalists’ puritanical interpretation of Sunni Islam has struck a real chord (Mahurkar, 2020). It has been

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suggested that Maulana Saad developed strong ties with the royal families of countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, and the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The validity of this suggestion is highly questionable because the Middle East is heavily influenced by Wahabism, which is ideologically different and perhaps even opposite at some levels to the Tablighi ideology. One commonality worth pointing out between Wahabism and the Tabligh Jama’at is that both reject devotional Sufism—the kind of Sufism that encourages the worshipping of religious leaders and Sufi saints. Maulana Saad has co-led the movement for twenty-five years, therefore, he is a very experienced leader. Why then has his leadership come under question in recent years or why during his sole leadership did the movement split? In our discussions in the middle of this year (2021) with some senior Tablighis in Australia, it was explained to us that in the January 2019 Tongi Ijtima in Bangladesh the shura (consultative committee) constituted by members from various Arab and European countries as well as prominent ulema (scholars) from the sub-continent, including Deoband, Mazahirul Uloom and Nadwa from India, and senior most scholars and ministers of Bangladesh found Maulana Saad deviated from the correct Qur’an and Hadith-based nahj (format) of the tabligh work. Allegation was made that Maulana Saad innovated the nahj through incorrect interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith rendering his version of tabligh work “false bidʻah” (innovation). It was suggested that Maulana Saad’s nahj was based on incomplete and imperfect study of the Qur’an and hadith and he falsely labelled his innovation based on the original teachings of Qur’an and hadith. It has been claimed that the shura noted that Maulana Saad sought to misguide the public through what the shura claimed were blasphemous statements made by Maulana Saad in his bayans (public lectures). It was also noted that Maulana Saad publically spoke ill of Allah, Prophet Muhammad and the ulema including his senior colleagues whom he forced out of Markaz Nizamuddin located in New Delhi. Claim was made that Maulana Saad declared in public that it was the divine decree that Markaz Nizamuddin is the eternal markaz (centre) for tabligh work. How true these claims are is difficult to verify as shura meetings and discussions usually are conducted in closed doors and no public statements from either party are available for scrutiny. Also, some of the claims and allegations levelled against Maulana Saad defy logic and rationality, for example, the claim that Maulana Saad publically spoke ill of Allah and

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Prophet Muhammad. Can a man of God engage in such conduct and what purpose does it serve if any? Another consideration worth highlighting is that some speculate that Maulana Saad wasn’t really an independent inspiring scholar and, after the passing of Maulana Zubairul Hasan, his sole leadership style proved inefficient and unsatisfactory, particularly for some Wahabised scholars who in the end broke ranks and founded a rival faction (Wajihuddin, 2020). These Wahabised scholars are Maulana Ibrahim Dewla of Bharuch in Gujarat, Maulana Ahmed Laat of Surat and Maulana Ibrahim of Mumbai. Together they established their own headquarters at Nerul, which is a residential and commercial node in Navi Mumbai in India. There is more to this than meets the eye. It is strange that Tablighi scholars follow the Wahabi school of thought, and if this is somehow true then what we have here is not poor leadership from Maulana Saad but a clash of ideologies. If there is no ideological clash here because Dewla-­ Laat-­Ibrahim is a Tablighi tripartite, then what we have is a political struggle for power—a struggle for power between traditional hereditarianists (Maulana Saad camp) and conservative egalitarianists (Dewla-Laat-­ Ibrahim camp). In Maulana Saad’s leadership style, hereditary authority seems to be important but the Dewla-Laat-Ibrahim tripartite leadership model movement governed by an executive council—the shura—which in this case comprises six or more members, including two from Pakistan and one from Bangladesh, is critical. It is not clear what direction the Tabligh Jama’at is heading with this split but if Islamic history is something to go by then this split is permanent and in future the Tabligh Jama’at will be a bifurcated movement, perhaps even two totally distinct entities with separate worldviews and ideologies.

Conclusion The last 100 years have witnessed the growth in movements of Islamic revivalism and reformation all around the world. Among them the Tabligh Jama’at has emerged as the most popular transnational Islamic revivalist movement in the world with membership spread across more than 200 countries. Unlike many other Islamic revivalist movements, the Tabligh Jama’at’s growth and success lies in its itinerant face-to-face missionary preaching and a focus on making Muslims better practitioners of Islam.

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Although the political decline of Muslim power in India and the establishment of British colonial rule provided the broader context for the emergence of the Tabligh Jama’at, it was in fact in light of the Hindu proselytising efforts of the Shuddhi and Sangathan movements in the 1920s that the Tabligh Jama’at found a more specific context in which to launch its tabligh work. The Tabligh Jama’at, through Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, finally realised that rigorous community-wide tabligh efforts were needed to protect Muslims from falling prey to these two Hindu proselytising movements. It also quickly realised that in light of the political decline of Muslim power in India and the resourcefulness and might of the British colonial authority, the itinerant face-to-face Islamic revitalisation efforts were the most practical means to protect Muslims from the increasing threat of apostasy and their decline. Pushing the responsibility of saving Islam and Muslims, Tabligh Jama’at looked to ordinary Muslims to play their role in the preservation of Islam and protection of Muslims. This subsequently reflected the growing shift in the nature of religious authority from one based on the idea that the ulama were the guardians of Islam to one based on the notion of the Muslims making religious decisions by drawing on the scriptural source or shari’ah. Tabligh (preaching) as the central focus of the movement emerged as a vital issue around which Muslim communal support could be secured to help reinforce the enduring project of the construction of a Muslim community and identity. The Tabligh Jama’at emerged in India as a champion of this cause and subsequently took the cause overseas, becoming truly transnational and the largest Islamic revivalist movement in the world.

References Aggarwal, P. (1973). The Meos of Rajasthan and Haryana. In I.  Ahmad (Ed.), Caste and social stratification among the Muslims in India (pp. 21–44). Manohar. Ahmad, M. (1991). Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia: The jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi jamaat of South Asia. In M.  Marty & R.  Appleby (Eds.), Fundamentalisms observed: The fundamentalism project (Vol. 1, pp. 457–530). University of Chicago Press. Ali, H. (1970). The Meos of Mewat: Old neighbours of New Delhi. I. B. H. Publishing. Ali, J. (2012). Islamic revivalism encounters the modern world: A study of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sterling Publishers. Crooke, W. (1975). The tribes and castes of the North Western India (Vol. III). Cosmos Publishers.

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Dassetto, F. (1988). The Tabligh organisation in Belgium. In T. Gerholmand & Y.  Georg Litthmann (Eds.), The new Islamic presence in Western Europe (pp. 159–173). Mansell Publishing Limited. Durrany, K. (1993). Impact of Islamic fundamentalism. Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society. Haq, M. (1972). The faith movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas. George Allen and Unwin. Haye, C. (n.d.). Chaudhri Muhammad Yasin Khan—Jeevan Parichay (Hindi). Chaudhri Yasin Khan Yadgar Committee. Horstmann, A. (2007). The Tablighi Jama’at, transnational Islam, and the transformation of the self between southern Thailand and South Asia. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27(1), 26–40. Imperial Gazetteer of India. (1908). Provincial series: Rajputana. Superintendent of Government Printing. Kepel, G. (1985). The Prophet and pharoah: Muslim extremism in contemporary Egypt (J. Rothschild, Trans.). Al-Saqi Books. Khan, W. (1988). Mewat ka safar. Al-Risala. Mahurkar, U. (2020). April 18. In The divided Tablighi house. Retrieved June 3, 2021, from https://www.indiatoday.in/india-­today-­insight/story/trouble-­ for-­nizamuddin-­tablighis-­1668227-­2020-­04-­18 Marwah, I. (1979). Tabligh movement among the Meos of Mewat. In M. Rao (Ed.), Social movements in India (Vol. II, pp. 79–100). Manohar. Metcalf, B. (1994). “Remaking ourselves”: Islamic self-fashioning in a global movement of spiritual renewal. In M.  Marty & R.  Appleby (Eds.), Fundamentalism project (Vol. 4, pp. 706–725). University of Chicago Press. Metcalf, B. (1996). New medinas: The Tablighi Jama’at in America and Europe. In B.  Metcalf (Ed.), In making Muslim space in North America and Europe (pp. 110–127). University of California Press. Mujeeb, H. (1976). Indian Muslims. George Allen and Unwin. Noor, F. (2012). Islam on the move: The Tablighi Jama’at in Southeast Asia. Amsterdam University Press. Shakur, A. (1974). Tarikh-i-Meo chhatri. Chaudhri Yasin Khan Meo High School. Shams, S. (1983). Meos of Mewat. Deep and Deep Publications. Vertovec, S. (2002). Islamophobia and Muslim recognition in Britain. In Y. Haddad (Ed.), Muslims in the west: From sojourners to citizens (pp. 19–35). Oxford University Press. Wajihuddin, M. (2020, April 1). How Tablighi Movement split into two groups two years ago. Retrieved June 3, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/how-­tablighi-­movement-­split-­into-­two-­groups-­two-­years-­ago/articleshow/74922079.cms

CHAPTER 3

Islamic Revivalism and Desecularisation of the World

Abstract  In this chapter we learn that Islamic revivalism has been a constant vocation in Muslim religious experience going centuries back in Islamic history. The central focus of Islamic revivalism has always been a drive for the return to Islamic origins and scriptural practice. Contemporary Islamic revivalism in comparison to earlier expressions is a complex multifaceted defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity. This defensive reaction results in desecularisation of the modern world. It is an attempt to remake the world by removing the bifurcation of the space into sacred and profane and making Islamic scripture the sole source of the meaning-­ creation in life. Keywords  Tabligh Jama’at • Islamic revivalism • Modernity • Crisis of modernity • Secularisation • Desecularisation

Introduction Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon in Muslim societies or Islamic history. Revivalism has been a constant reality in Muslim religious experience going as far back in Islam history as the period of the Umayyad Caliphate under the rulership of Umar bin Abdul Aziz (717–720). The hallmark of Islamic revivalism has always been, as it is today, a desire for © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_3

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the return to Islamic origins—the basics of the faith as enshrined in the Qur’an and sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad). What distinguishes contemporary Islamic revivalism from earlier expressions, however, is its complex multifacetedness and new defensive reactionary ideological character (Ali, 2012). Contemporary Islamic revivalism, indeed, has manifested in a multiplicity of forms as a defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity. This defensive reaction manifests as desecularisation (the collapsing of the sacred and profane into one and returning the prominence of religion to everyday living) of the modern world. In other words, Islamic revivalism as a defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity is an attempt to remake the world in which there is no longer a bifurcation of the space into sacred and profane and in which the source of the meaning of life is the Islamic scripture—the Qur’an and hadith—and the code of conduct is governed by shari’ah. This chapter examines the concepts of Islamic revivalism and desecularisation of the modern world in some depth. It seeks to better understand Islamic revivalism as a complex multifacetedness defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity and the jahiliyah-saturated modern world. Also, it throws sociological light on the remaking of the modern world through systematic desecularisation, which constitutes one of the most pressing assignments of Islamic revivalists.

Islamic Revivalism In the last few decades, there has been a significant surge in Islamic consciousness in Muslim communities across the globe. This has come to be known as “Islamic revivalism”. Islamic revivalism as a phenomenon is not new to Islamic history. In fact, Islamic history has been punctuated by periods of revivalist activity, that is, a focus on returning to Islamic origins and scripture-based practices. However, contemporary Islamic revivalism is different from earlier expressions in that it is internally extremely complex, vastly multifaceted and has a new defensive reactionary ideological character (Ali, 2012). Contemporary Islamic revivalism in its variant forms in a complex manner is a defensive reaction to the negative consequences of modernity. Islamic revivalism is a highly contested concept. There is little scholarly agreement on the definition of Islamic revivalism and this is mainly due to the fact that it is a heterogeneous phenomenon. It has been studied as a form of Islamic consciousness under various umbrella terms as diverse as

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“fundamentalism”, “reassertion”, “awakening”, “renewal”, “resurgence”, “reformation” and “Islamism”. Despite being shrouded in ambiguity as a concept and phenomenon, Islamic revivalism occupies a prominent place particularly in the Western imagination about Islam as a religion and its adherents. For many, it connotes anti-modernity with antagonistic and intolerant Muslim attitudes towards the West and non-Muslims, threatening to Western interests, socially conservative and stridently patriarchal, and bent on establishing a shari’ah-based Islamic state as a normative political goal. Although not all Muslim revivalists harbour a universal attitude and support for Islamic revivalism across Muslim societies, Islamic revivalism as a label is often applied broadly to all Muslims as if they are all revivalists and Muslim movements. While constituting a wide diversity of movements, contemporary Islamic revivalism has always been localised and represents a defensive reaction to the crisis situations prevailing in various Muslim societies (Ali, 2012). Yet, in many ways, these uncertainties or crisis situations in different national settings are strikingly similar, giving Islamic revivalist movements a transnational character, granting the whole phenomenon global leverage. These crisis situations, from an Islamic revivalist perspective, are typically attributed to the negative impact of modernity. Modernity is seen by the revivalists as a flawed project, as it represents jahiliyah (ignorance of the Divine or unGodliness). Jahiliyah infuses society with Godlessness resulting in widespread corruption and decay of moral life. Underpinning this process is secularism—the separation of church and state and removal of religion’s influence in public and civic affairs. The aggressive attitude of secularism towards religion does not sit well at all with revivalists. Under modernity, revivalists believe the society has essentially departed from a religiously authorised blueprint of how individuals should behave and the values that should be upheld by society as a whole. Hence, in modernity, the ideals of the modern self, with its emphasis on self-­ actualisation and consumption, are perceived by them as spiritually empty. In this context, the re-establishment of tradition, they argue, offers a way to regain a sense of purpose, meaning and spiritual fulfilment. Islamic revivalists believe, through the rehabilitation of the authority of religion, social institutions will once again have clear and high moral standards, politics will have a sacred expression and the “true believers” will have full membership to the ummah (Muslim community). All aspects of life will then be influenced and governed by the comprehensive implementation of the fundamentals of the religion.

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Contemporary Islamic revivalism, then, is an attempt to directly confront modernity, which is considered to be promoting jahiliyah, in particular secularism. Islamic revivalists do not see the need to replace modernity; rather, they seek to infuse it with Islamic values. In other words, Islamic revivalism is about the Islamisation of modernity involving the popularisation of Islamic symbols, principles and institutions in the society, and collapsing the sacred and profane domains into one. For revivalists, the idea is that Islam should be the global order. Islam, they say, is God’s prescribed complete way of life and shari’ah is an immutable Divine law. They believe Islam reinforces group norms and provides for the institution of moral sanctions for individual behaviour. They argue it provides universal goals and values that in turn offer a sense of stability and unity to the ummah and contribute to its security and the maintenance of social equilibrium.

Modernity Modernity is a term linked to the late Latin adjective modernus, which is a derivation from the adverb modo, meaning “presently” or “just now”. It came into use circa fifth century basically to distinguish the Christian era from the pagan epoch. Fast forward 1200 years to the late seventeenth century and the term entered common usage in the context of the squabble of the Ancients (anciens) and Moderns (modernes) within the Académie Française, debating the superiority of the “Modern culture” over the “Classical culture” (Græco–Roman) (Lewis, 2007). In light of this debate, the Ancients and Moderns were polar opposites in their views. The former argued that contemporary writers did nothing innovative in their thinking or work but reproduced the genius of classical antiquity, while the latter argued the “Age of Reason” was more than simply a Renaissance of ancient achievements, as it achieved far more than what was accomplished in the classical period. In this context, assertions were made of a historical epoch following the Renaissance, in which the achievements in various fields in a variety of forms were made that could not be matched by the achievements of antiquity that the term modernity was first coined in the 1620s (Hunt, 2008). Generally speaking, Europe had a huge appetite for creative innovation and the general mood was utopian, springing from a perceived need to reinvigorate thinking in response to the decayed aristocratic systems. People wanted a complete cultural paradigm shift and modernism became

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associated with the examination of society’s failures and exploring often unrecognised conflicts that prevailed particularly at the periphery of society. The result was a monumental transformation of the society and modernism was essentially behind it. Berman suggests: Modernism is the name of an aesthetic movement inside modernity, yet one that sees itself as counteracting certain negative aspects of modernity—the inability, for example, to yield a contended and equitable society, despite its promises, or fully to account for the aesthetic experience as a guide to and an authorization of values, as romanticism had been able to do. (Berman, 1994, p. viii)

One of the most important focuses of modernism has been its concern with nihilism; that is, the rejection of the superiority of religious-based authority and moral teachings and religion as the only source for social guidance and progress. The modernists repudiated this not necessarily because they did not believe in God, although many considered themselves atheists, or they found life meaningless (Lewis, 2007). Rather, their rejection was of religion’s demand on conformity and its exertion of control over human feelings. The outcome of all this was a sense of newfound freedom and autonomy in everyday life. Before the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the world of nature and human beings were understood to be a part of God’s creation. Since then, human thinking changed in every field of learning. As the idea of God became increasingly questionable, the thinking regarding the universe being created at the beginning of time changed and was slowly replaced by the idea that there are infinitely different and ceaselessly active processes of evolution (Wagner, 2008). The modernists believed, for an individual to feel complete and actively contribute to socio-cultural and political processes, they must be free of restrictions on the thought process, be able to independently make rules and decisions governing life and not have to rely on religion or any transcendental force. Two specific points are worth noting about modernity in any discussion. One is that the beginning of modernity is subject to debate. Dahrendorff (1964) observes that between the Middle Ages and latter part of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the Protestant work ethic and spirit of capitalism were in a state of evolution, marks the main period of the modern world. Similarly, Parsons (1972) locates the beginning of modernity in the Renaissance and Reformation, but adds that the

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industrial, democratic and educational revolutions that followed infused further energy into modernity. Bendix (1967) also describes modernisation, which he says became fashionable after World War II, as emerging from the transformation of human societies particularly in England and France. He suggests that at the centre of modernity is the concept of progress and the best way to think of it is in terms of present-day technology with its jet-travel, space exploration, and nuclear power. But the common sense of the word “modern” encompasses the whole era since the eighteenth century when inventions like the steam engine and the spinning jenny provided the initial, technical basis for the industrialization of societies. The economic transformation of England coincided with the movement of independence in the American colonies and the creation of the nation-state in the French revolution. Accordingly, the word “modern” also evokes associations with the democratization of societies, especially the destruction of inherited privilege and the declaration of equal rights of citizenship. (Bendix, 1967, p. 292)

The other point is that the term modernity in recent history has become a serious bone of contention because, depending on the academic disciplinary field, it may refer to different time periods or characteristics including a variety of interrelated historical processes and cultural phenomena such as fashion, technological advancements and warfare, and can also refer to the existential experience and new conditions they produce constantly impacting on social relations, cultural exchange, economic activities, institutional operations and political processes (Brush, 1988). In the humanities and social sciences, modernity denotes a historical period (the modern era) or the quality or condition of being modern and a suite of particular social and cultural customs, attitudes, radical values, practices and an intellectual tendency characterised by a split from traditional ideas, doctrines and cultural values that came into being with the advent of the Renaissance of the seventeenth-century thought in the “Age of Reason” and the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment and French Revolution (Trainor, 1998). This highlights that there are different ways of examining and framing the question of modernity. Scholars address the question regarding modernity in many ways, therefore, there is a lack of convergence in answers. This does not mean the question is any less compelling or relevant. Reflecting on this point as well as attempting to better understand

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modernity is critical, and equally important to discuss and discern, as we tried to do above, are other associated concepts and processes linked to modernity, namely modernism and modernisation. In this chapter, rather than looking at modernity from different disciplinary perspectives and attempting to produce some kind of ubiquitous understanding of modernity as a concept and phenomenon, our aim is to engage in a sociological discussion of modernity and procure an understanding from a sociological perspective. In classical sociological theory, the concept of modernity has its roots in the idea of social transformation effected by processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation, democratisation and the development of an empirical-analytical approach to knowledge in essentially rural and autocratic societies in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It refers to a particular period in human history characterised by scientific thought in contrast to metaphysical or supernatural belief, rise of individualism, a focus on industrialisation and technical development and a rejection of religious conventions and traditional values. Not all sociologists believe the same when it comes to the question of modernity and, therefore, they talk about multiple modernities. However, generally speaking, the term modernity has been used by sociologists to explain the rise of industrial civilisation in Europe, which has produced a new conception of society and the social changes occurring by differentiating the “traditional” from the “modern” or the “old” from the “new”. In the works of classic sociologists, namely Marx, Weber and Durkheim, “modernity” means a new experience of the world. For Marx, modernity is intimately associated with the emergence of capitalism and the revolutionary bourgeoisie, which facilitate the extraordinary expansion of productive forces and the creation of the global market (Morrison, 2006). In Weber’s work, modernity means increased rationality where a traditional worldview is replaced with a rational way of thinking—therefore, modernity’s close connection with the processes of rationalisation and disenchantment of the world (Symonds, 2015). Durkheim has a different view about modernity which, for him, is a new form of thinking that would transform the way individuals function in society and is basically driven by industrialism accompanied by the new scientific forces (Seidman, 1985). Given these descriptions, it can be said that modernity refers to a reconstituted world made possible by people with the new sense of self through their active and conscious intervention in the reconstitution process. The new world is modern society, which was experienced as a social

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construction; that is, an experience that made people feel an exciting sense of freedom and made them think of unlimited possibilities and an open future. This was very much how modernity was understood in classical sociology. One very important fact in this account of social transformation and its impact on social relations and processes is the idea of “freedom” and “autonomy”, thus the birth of the new “individual”—the emergence of subjectivity and individuality through a new sense of self. This idea of the “individual” or “self” contrasts the traditional individual with the modern one. The sociological explanation of this difference is based on changes in the understanding of the human experience, social relations, human relationship with the environment and the supernatural, changes in economic and political relationships, and the population growth and its transformation under the process of industrialisation. Industrialisation saw the separation from traditional, rural and family based community, which meant the disappearance of historic values, age-­ old securities and a departure from relying on established forms of social authority—religion or theology, tradition and seniority. In regard to religion specifically, this separation manifested in secularisation (a process which we discuss in detail below)—the liberal separation of church and state into private and public spheres. The new urbanites, liberated from being governed by theology and religion as forms of social authority and from the old traditional mode of living, were now presented with new opportunities, new sources of wealth and freedom to remake themselves and re-create their world. However, the conditions under which this occurred were not of their choosing and the social transformations associated with modernity including the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation were taking place independent of individual input. Although these shifts created new possibilities, individuals were not instigators in this, but captives because individuals were now part of something much bigger than themselves. They were, in fact, part of a new social world— society, which had an impersonal structure, with attributes or principles of its own. Modernity promised to transform life positively, bringing about easily produced wealth, improved education and health and better living conditions all through an advanced socio-economic system, widespread scientific and technological advancements, profound innovation and good governance. Modernity, it seems, delivered on its promise as there exists the material plenty, intellectual fulfilment and social emancipation. Also,

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the development in individual subjectivity, increase in scientific explanation and rationalisation, emergence of bureaucracy, rapid urbanisation, rise of nation-states and accelerated financial exchange and communication all seem to point to a successful modernity, however, is it?

Secularisation and Secularism The terms secularisation and secularism have had various meanings attached to them since they were invented—secularisation in the mid-­ seventeenth century and secularism in the mid-nineteenth century (Keddie, 1997). Looking closely, it seems both terms are interpreted in many different ways such that they have ended up with no precise meaning. In both cases, secular, referring to the worldly realm, is the keyword, which makes the terms closely related. Secularism is understood to be a system or ideology emphasising this-worldly rather than the other-worldly based on the belief there should be a realm of knowledge, ideals and actions that is free from religious influence and directives; thus, what is often called, politically speaking, the “separation of church and state”. Secularism does not necessarily exclude religion from having any socio-­ cultural and political role in society, but its marginalisation and push away from the public realm to the private sphere makes it practically ineffective. Secularisation, however, is a process that leads to the exclusion of religion. During the process of secularisation, social, cultural, economic and political institutions throughout modern society are removed from the influence and control of religion. It involves the decline in religious influence over government, institutions, ideas and behaviour, and increasing state control of the public and private spheres, however, more so the public sphere than the private sphere (Bronk, 2012). It also involves liberation from religious control of all vital spheres of civil society and non-religious institutions such as education, social welfare, law and forums for the expression of belief and action. In brief, it involves the belief in the outgrowth of conviction in the supernatural, the privileging this-worldly considerations and bringing an end to religious doctrinal influence on the vital processes in modern society, namely legislation and education. Whatever the case may be—that is, whether religious organisations are given a lesser role or institutional authority is removed from religion and embedded in political authority or more powerful competing alternatives are established in conjunction with the religious bodies—religion, generally speaking, becomes powerless. The dominance of secularised

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institutions in modern society enables individuals a greater level of independence and freedom from religious authorities, such that they no longer have to pay heed to religious teachings and comply with religious rules or rituals outside the confines of a religious establishment such as a church or synagogue. Having defined secularism and secularisation as, respectively, the ideology and process of the decline of religion in public life, we are confronted with the question of why a religion like Islam, not only in its homeland, the Muslim world, but in foreign and faraway places such as in the West— the home of secular modernity—is thriving and advancing rapidly (Ali, 2012). Does this belie the so-called secularisation thesis?—the theory that industrialisation, urbanisation, scientisation, philosophisation, intellectualisation and rationalisation erode religion on all key levels in society— macro, meso and micro, eventually seeing the total disappearance of religion from public and private life. Resurgence of religion is one example among many that evidently discredits the secularisation thesis and brings into serious question the existence of the so-called secular modernity. We are confronted with the questions of why the secularism project, which arguably started in earnest in nineteenth-century Europe (Copson, 2017), hasn’t succeeded, that is, brought religion’s demise. And is secularism inherently a flawed concept and phenomenon? What follows in the following section is a discussion that addresses these questions. It explains that modernity particularly through the implementation of secularisation—the killing of God the Creator and sending religion to oblivion—has created for itself a predicament often noted in the literature as the “crisis of modernity”. Religiously speaking, the single most important cause of the crisis of modernity is secularism. Religion has always been a form of liberation and redemption, and the rejection of the dependence on God the Creator only leads to illiberation and irredemption. This is the argument in this chapter and by extension the argument of this work; that is, that modernity’s attempt through secularism and Western forms of contemporary materialism, to positively transform society and life by doing away with religion, has had a reverse effect, which is that the overall outcome is less positive, with the promise of modernity being unfulfilled for a large number of people. In other words, religion has been an expression of deep sense of unity, a rigorous and comprehensive method of valuing all that is experienced in life, an important determinant of identity formation, a source of ethical and moral standards and a system of legal rules, since time immemorial has

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been hindered from its structure-forming system-transforming role— bringing all constituent elements of society together in harmony and functional operation. Religion such as Islam as a divine system and complete way of life has been endeavoured by humans limited by capacity to be replaced with an imperfectly designed incomplete system of life popularly called secular modernity. Here, invoking a Qur’anic verse seems appropriate: “Remember how the Unbelievers plotted against thee. … They plot and plan, and Allah too plans; but the best of planners is Allah” (Qur’an, 8:30). The point is that man plans and God the Creator plans but His plans always work. Religion is a divine plan and transcendental project, and humans need to work with it, not against it. It is because of its working against religion, as has been the case in secular modernity, that modernity as an enlightenment project has found itself in crisis. Let’s discuss this crisis now.

The Crisis of Modernity Without going into specific details about the crisis of modernity, what follows are a few general descriptions of the crisis. Resurgent Islam is a reaction to the negative consequences or crisis of modernity and these few descriptive accounts of the crisis of modernity will suffice to understand why Islam is re-emerging to assert its pre-eminence on the international stage. It is hoped this reflection will explain “the searching of heart” and commitment to desecularisation by Islamic revivalists, in particular the Tablighis and their eventual return to “the old path” or what they might describe as the “true path” in their overall journey to bring out Islam on the international stage. What we mean by the “crisis of modernity” is that there are some ill-­ conceived ideas about modernity that ultimately lead to a crisis, so there is, with some exceptions, a general state of existential disenchantment in the modern world. The level of meaninglessness, de-rootedness, futurelessness, hopelessness, depravity, and material and spiritual deprivation are on a constant incline. Many individuals find there is a serious destruction of nature and many problems associated with human-induced climate change, there is a prevalence of large-scale conflict/wars, the economic inequality is unrelenting, homelessness and poverty is pervasive, there is an absence of government and corporate accountability and transparency, corruption is widespread, there is a dearth of food and water security, lack of education is growing, human wellbeing is declining, lack of economic

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opportunity and unemployment are worsening, and injustice and discrimination are on the rise (Loudenback & Jackson, 2018). Ali (2020, p. 81) asserts, “The last several decades have seen the world experience deindustrialisation, the decline of the nation-state, falling productivity, growing unemployment, poverty, marginalisation, inequality, violence, and the expansion of neoliberal political economies”. This is compounded by meaninglessness afflicting life  and  people are  “waiting without hope”— the pervasiveness of bleakness and hopelessness, the individuating conditions of modern life bringing people apart, and modern men and women are caught up in a perpetual “tension of existence” (Etzioni, 1975). Modernity promised individuals “the good life”, one that was to be blissful with democracy flourishing everywhere, women enjoying total freedom, rights for workers and improved living conditions for the masses guaranteed, widespread prevalence of equality and social justice, and with technological advances the distance being annihilated making mobility fast and easy and communication become immediate and large scale. However, if we look around, life is not all that rosy and we continue to wrestle with the fact that some of the chief promises of modernity remain unfulfilled. We acknowledge there will be always some level of problem in the world and individual societies, as Durkheim (1997) and Parsons (1951) point out that some level of social dysfunction in society is inevitable. However, given the scientific, technological, medical and communication advancements achieved by humans, it is worrying to say modernity is still facing a multitude of growing troubles. Problems that continue to plague modernity include the 11 September 2001 terror attacks; 2007–2008 global financial crisis; the 2010s Arab Spring across much of the Arab world; the rise of Black Lives Matter movement in 2020; the 10 May 2021 Israeli–Palestinian violent outbreak; the global refugee crisis; child marriage and racial discrimination; child labour; world hunger; poverty; mental health issues; global terrorism; Lebanese liquidity crisis; North Korea and weapons of mass destruction; replication crisis; Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict; Ukrainian crisis; territorial disputes in the South China Sea; Rohingya genocide; Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts; Uyghur genocide; financial statement fraud; corporate crime, thuggery and failure; excessive CEO-to-worker pay ratios; obstructed nationalist aspirations; unstable or illegitimate state institutions; pervasive corruption and acute economic dislocation; increase in divorce, domestic violence, suicide, drug use and trafficking; cybercrime; organisation and institutional mismanagement and dysfunction; bureaucratic inefficiency; and the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Why is modernity in crisis? The crisis of modernity is a complex reality and the purpose here is not so much to undo this complexity but to provide some insights with a few broad-based explanations. One way of understanding the “crisis of modernity” is to examine the philosophical underpinnings of modernity. At a philosophical level, the crisis of modernity is the “crisis of ideas” manifesting in the loss of its founding ideas, ideals and beliefs in the hearts and minds of people. The project of modernity was believed to be possible and provide people with life and vitality, but this is no longer the case as people doubt the project of modernity and this doubt has not been removed or replaced with a better alternative and in fact has entrenched itself and turned into nihilism. The crisis of modernity denotes modernity has become uncertain of its purpose. The purpose of modernity is to create a prosperous society embracing equally all human beings—men and women, black and white, poor and rich, young and old—a universal union of free and equal nations each comprising liberated citizens with equal rights. Modernity no longer believes in either the nobility or feasibility of its own project (Strauss, 1979), and it was only a matter of time before it was to find this out, because it was originally premised on an ill-conceived ideal. This discovery was of course bound to create nihilism, hopelessness and decline, which it did. This is what from a philosophical perspective is discerned as the “crisis” of modernity. The crisis is not the same as defeat or annihilation, but degeneration from within. Analogically speaking, modernity is a faulty machine.

Desecularisation For Islamic revivalism to achieve its objective and Tablighis to be successful in their endeavours, modernity must be transformed. The transformation will entail modernity’s desecularisation. From an Islamic revivalism perspective, desecularisation is essentially a process through which religion like Islam, which places equal emphasis on the importance of religion in public life and individual consciousness, reasserts itself and occupies a prominent position in the society. Religion’s expansion, growth, social influence and roles escalate in reaction to ongoing secularising trends, and as a process, this can be termed desecularisation. Religious growth doesn’t only mean an increase in the number of religious adherents, but growth in spirituality and religiosity in people of faith and those nominally religious. More importantly, religion becomes

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influential in other spheres of life such as economic, social, cultural and political, and seeks intervention in legislation and policy-making. This “higher form” of religious development becomes particularly noticeable in the public sphere with growing displays of religious symbols, for example, Muslim men wearing head caps and women wearing headscarves; practices, for instance, Muslims praying at work and eating halal (permissible) food in restaurants; and policies, for example, Muslim men being permitted to drive taxis wearing their Islamic attire rather than a company uniform in global cities like Sydney and Dhaka. Providing prayer facilities and services, evening and weekend meetings, scripture teaching, public lectures and food religion provoke an outburst of revival fervour and become successful in capturing the allegiance of the public. While secularisation seeks, among other things, to force religion into the private sphere, desecularisation is an attempt to bring religion—as we will see in the preceding chapters—into the public sphere and saturate it with religious activities and symbols. The study of the process and phenomenon of desecularisation in sociology is slowly growing. Indeed, in the field of sociology of religion over the last several decades, scholars have identified not a decline, but growth in religious activities and participation in the modern world (Marty & Appleby, 1995). Peter Berger, a former proponent of the secularisation thesis, changed his mind in 1999 about the claim of secularisation and popularised the concept of desecularisation to denote a variety of manifestations of global resurgence of religion in his edited volume titled The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Berger states: The world today is massively religious, is anything but the secularized world that had been predicted (whether joyfully or despondently) by so many analysts of modernity. … A body of data indicates strong survivals of religion, most of it generally Christian in nature, despite the widespread alienation from the organized churches. A shift in the institutional location of religion, then, rather than secularization, would be a more accurate description. (1999, pp. 9–10)

Building on Berger’s work, Karpov explains desecularisation as a process:

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It approaches desecularization as a process of social change associated with religions’ resurgence and their expanding societal influences. Such a perspective is consistent with the interpretation of desecularization as counter-­ secularization. Secularization is generally considered as a multi-faceted social transformation in the course of which religion's influences on society decline. It is logical, therefore, to consider counter-secularization as a process of social change that develops in the opposite direction. (2010, p. 237)

The continuing strong presence of religion in the modern world is clear evidence that religion is not dead as predicted by the secularisation thesis, but alive, well and in fact thriving with great speed that it will be not long when we will find ourselves living not in secular modernity but in religious modernity—a modernity with all its scientific and technological advancements, though underpinned by laws and principles of religion with reinstallation of God who will be privileged rather than humans in all matters of living according to Islamic revivalists. This is the kind of modernity Islamic revivalists are seeking through their active involvement in the desecularisation process. They believe Islam is the most ideal form of living because it is a complete way of life covering all spheres and aspects of life. As a complete way of life, it is a most ideal and flawless system because it is transcendentally conceived. Unlike modernity, which they see as a “faulty machine” and which, they claim, through secularisation has plunged the world into crisis, Islam is inherently “perfect” and the solution to the crisis of modernity. Desecularisation is desired by all religious revivalists and not just Islamic revivalists. However, each religion prefers modernity to be desecularised according to their own religious principles and teachings. This will mean modernity will look different under different religious control. Whatever will be the outcome, according to religious revivalists, at least the modern world will have God sitting at its apex and not humans. Hence, desecularisation is a welcome process for them because the world will then be rid of its forces such as modernism and secularism and replaced with a force— religion—whose principles and values are universal and whose aims and purposes are to serve the entire humanity regardless of age, race, sex and faith. Through desecularisation, religious revivalists seek meaningfulness, purposefulness and enchantment for all planetary citizens not for just the privileged few.

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Conclusion From Islamic revivalists’ perspective, modernisation accompanied by secularisation has plunged the world in what they describe as the “crisis of modernity”. For them, modernisation and secularisation are the bane of modernity, which is now sunk in jahiliyah. Not only in the Muslim world but even in the wealthiest of countries such as the United States, ordinary citizens battle for employment, education, social justice, healthcare, medical services and general contentment. Islamic revivalists explain the crisis of modernity as the result of making religion insignificant and irrelevant in the everyday pattern of modern living. For them, the crisis of modernity cannot be allowed to persist as this will end up in a global catastrophe. In response they have designed a strategy to bring the modern world out of this quagmire and the strategy is the dual simultaneous processes of desecularisation and Islamisation of the modern world.

References Ali, A. (1938). Roman transliteration of holy Quran with full Arabic text. Sh. Muhammad Ashraf. Ali, J. (2012). Islamic revivalism encounters the modern world: A study of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sterling. Ali, J. (2020). Islam and Muslims in Australia: Settlement, integration, shariah, education and terrorism. Melbourne University Press. Bendix, R. (1967). Tradition and modernity reconsidered. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 9(3), 292–346. Berger, P. (Ed.). (1999). The desecularization of the world: Resurgent religion and world politics. William Eerdmans Publishing. Berman, A. (1994). Preface to modernism. University of Illinois Press. Bronk, A. (2012). Secular, secularization, and secularism: A review article. Anthropos, bd. 107. H., 2, 578–583. Brush, S. (1988). The history of modern science: A guide to the second scientific revolution, 1800–1950. Iowa State University Press. Copson, A. (2017). Secularism: Politics, religion, and freedom. Oxford University Press. Dahrendorff, R. (1964). Recent changes in the class structure of European societies. Daedalus, XCIII, 225–270. Durkheim, E. (1997). The division of labour in society (W.  D. Halls, Trans.). Free Press.

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Etzioni, A. (1975). The crisis of modernity: Deviation or demise? International Journal of Comparative Sociology, XVI(1–2), 1–18. Hunt, L. (2008). Measuring time, making history. Central European University Press. Karpov, V. (2010). Desecularization: A conceptual framework. Journal of Church and State, 52(2), 232–270. Keddie, N. (1997). Secularism and the state: Toward clarity and global comparison. New Left Review, 226, 21–40. Lewis, P. (2007). The Cambridge introduction to modernism. Cambridge University Press. Loudenback, T., & Jackson, A. (2018). The 10 most critical problems in the world, according to millennials. Business Insider Australia. Retrieved May 27, 2021, from https://www.businessinsider.com.au/world-­economic-­forum-­ world-­biggest-­problems-­concerning-­millennials-­2016-­8?r=US&IR=T Marty, M., & Appleby, R. (Eds.). (1995). Fundamentalisms comprehended, the fundamentalism project (Vol. 5). Chicago University Press. Morrison, K. (2006). Marx, Durkheim, weber: Formations of modern social thought. Sage. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Free Press. Parsons, T. (1972). Das system moderner gesellschaften [the system of modern societies]. Prentice Hall. Seidman, S. (1985). Modernity and the problem of meaning: The Durkheimian tradition. Sociological Analysis, 46(2), 109–130. Strauss, L. (1979). The mutual influence of theology and philosophy. Independent Journal of Philosophy, 3, 111–118. Symonds, M. (2015). Max Weber’s theory of modernity: The endless pursuit of meaning. Routledge. Trainor, B. (1998). The origin and end of modernity. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(2), 133–144. Wagner, P. (2008). Modernity as experience and interpretation. Polity Press.

CHAPTER 4

Mobilisation, Framing and the Tabligh Jama’at

Abstract  How does the Tabligh Jama’at mobilise individuals for its cause of working for Allah? In this chapter, we suggest a theoretical and methodological approach through which to explore this question. We identify Tablighi ideology as a pull factor that may facilitate participation in the Tabligh Jama’at. The literature on the Tabligh Jama’at does not provide conceptual clarity in regards to how this factor impacts Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. This leads us to identify Frame Theory as a theoretical framework that can provide such clarity. After an overview of Frame Theory, we detail the method of data collection used in this study to undertake a frame analysis of Tablighi texts. Keywords  Tabligh Jama’at • Ideology • Mobilisation • Frame Theory • Framing

Introduction We suggest in Chap. 2 that Muslims have turned to Islamic revivalism in order to restore harmony and justice to a world suffering from the negative impacts of modernity. The experiences of alienation, marginalisation and deprivation that modernity produces drive Muslims to search for solutions, satisfaction, meaning and social solidarity in Islam. The way to achieve this for many Muslims is through undertaking Islamic revivalism. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_4

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The adverse experiences and conditions of modernity may be seen as the push factors of participation in Islamic revivalist movements. These push factors represent one side of the equation of how Islamic revivalist movements can mobilise people for their cause. The other side of the equation requires activity on the part of movements where they attract and sustain members. This is to say, many Muslims who experience the negative experiences of modernity do not become Islamic revivalists or they join one revivalist movement over another. How do we explain such non-participation and selective participation? The answer to these questions lies in the ideological activity in which Islamic revivalist movements engage to convince people that a grievance— for example, crisis of modernity or Muslim crisis—exists and that correcting the grievance is worth one’s time and energy. Movements must also convince people of the legitimacy and efficacy of their methods and tactics for achieving Islamic revival. These points hint at the important relationship between ideas or ideology and mobilisation. Ideas and ideology may thus be seen as the pull factors of participation. In this chapter we lay the groundwork for undertaking an exploration of the ideological dimension of Islamic revivalist mobilisation through the example of the Tabligh Jama’at. To undertake this line of enquiry, we use Frame Theory (also called the framing perspective on social movements). Frame Theory analyses the discursive (framing) processes that movements use to package their ideas about some aspect of reality in such a way as to create grievances, suggest solutions to correct the grievances and propose incentives for why people should implement the solutions. Frame Theory not only dissects the ideology of an organisation in this way but examines why these aspects of its ideology might resonate with individuals—frame resonance—such that they mobilise for a cause. Frame Theory thus provides a holistic account of the ideological dimension of mobilisation, accounting for the content of ideas and their mobilising potency. We find there is a need for applying a conceptual framework like Frame Theory to Tablighi ideology because, while references to Tablighi ideology are commonplace in the literature, the treatment and conceptualising of it as a variable in the Tabligh Jama’at’s mobilisation outcomes is absent. In the remaining sections of this chapter, we first explore how the issue of Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation has been handled in the literature. We identify in that discussion the absence of a theoretical approach with which

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to conceptualise how Tablighi ideology relates to Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation and identify Frame Theory as a theory source to address this gap. Following that we elucidate Frame Theory by defining its key concepts and posing the questions that its application in this study seeks to answer. The chapter closes with a description of the method of frame analysis.

Explaining Tabligh Jama’at Mobilisation Farish Noor describes this scene at an airport in Indonesia in 1955: One day in the month of February in the year nineteen fifty-five, a group of eight men landed at the Kamoyoran International Airport, Jakarta. … None of the eight men spoke Bahasa Indonesia and their leader spoke only a few words of English. They were … of Pathan origin and they had flown all the way to Jakarta from India. Their knowledge of Jakarta and rest of Indonesia was scant at best. … They had flown all the way to Java with no knowledge of local environs, no knowledge of local language or customs, no knowledge of the political situation of the country … and no local friends or contacts. (2009a, pp. 1–2)

Noor (2009a) goes on to describe these travellers’ taxi ride to the home of an individual of Indian descent, whom the travellers did not know beforehand, and only learnt about from asking the local taxi driver whom they met outside the airport. Upon reaching the individual’s home, a productive meeting took place from which the beginnings of the Tabligh Jama’at in Indonesia took root. How do we explain these incredible circumstances of this Tabligh Jama’at preaching tour? First, we might point to the macro-level factor of freedom of movement within a friendly political territory as allowing the travellers to enter the country, roam its neighbourhoods and carry out preaching of religion. Second, we could point to the meso-level factor of organisational resources, which the Tabligh Jama’at draws on to conduct preaching tours. The travellers in the above journey would have had to pay for their own tickets, not to mention contributing to food and other costs. They would likely have spent at least a few months at the Tabligh Jama’at headquarters at Nizamuddin, Delhi, gaining invaluable training and experience in the Tablighi method of preaching. Third, we posit that, prior to these factors facilitating the travel and movement of these individuals, they

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must have been motivated and inspired to undertake the journey, especially one requiring immense personal effort and sacrifice. This points to the micro-level factor of ideas, which would inform the preachers of the necessity, efficacy and positive outcomes of preaching. In turning to the literature on the Tabligh Jama’at, we find that researchers have made the link between these three factors and Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. First, researchers point to friendly or sensitive political environments as facilitating or restricting Tabligh Jama’at activities: for example, in Thailand (Braam, 2006; Noor, 2012); Malaysia (Horstmann, 2006; Noor, 2007); Indonesia (Noor, 2009b; Bustamam-Ahmad, 2015, pp. 45–46); Fiji (Ali, 2018); Central Asia (Nasritdinov, 2012; Toktogulova, 2014; Balci, 2015; Pelkmans, 2017; Reetz, 2017); Gambia (Janson, 2016); South Africa (Moosa, 2000; Haron, 2005); Britain (Pieri, 2015); China (Stewart, 2018); India (Haq, 1972; Ahmad, 1986; Sikand, 2006); Bangladesh (Alam, 1985; Sikand, 2002; Siddiqi, 2018); Pakistan (Ahmad, 1991; Ali & Minxing, 2020) and South Asia in general (Reetz, 2014). Generally speaking, the Tabligh Jama’at’s pacifist, pietist, self-reform agenda is compatible with the separation of religion and politics in the secular liberal state; thus, governments in most countries allow it free reign over its activities (Mandaville, 2010). Second, researchers note various facets of Tabligh Jama’at as an organisation that provide an immense pool of human, cultural and material resources that underpin and sustain its activities. The following aspects of the Tabligh Jama’at, identified in ethnographic studies from around the world, are pointed out as positively impacting its mobilisation efforts: a structured leadership or “faith bureaucracy” (Reetz, 2008; see also Reetz, 2004, pp. 301–302), which manages global and local networks of Tablighi communities that foster “glocal activism” (Timol, 2019); the Nizamuddin markaz (religious centre) in New Delhi as an international “hub” where Tablighis from around the world can visit and learn the tabligh method and receive instructions for tabligh work (Sikand, 2002, p. 81); the mushawara (organisational meeting via mutual consultation) and annual ijtima (international, national and regional congregational meetings), which are recognised, respectively, as the vehicle for coordination of preaching activity and means for networking among Tablighis not to mention increasing their zeal for tabligh work (Bustamam-Ahmad, 2015; Siddiqi, 2018, pp. 86–87). Also highlighting organisational factors, researchers identify its interconnectedness at global, national and local levels of activity as an

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important facet of Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. They point to “communal structure” comprising “intense personal relationships” (Ahmad, 1991, p. 515); “friendship networks” (Amrullah, 2011); “quasi-familial” social networks (Stewart, 2018); “Tablighi networks” (Horstmann, 2009); “local organic networks” (Noor, 2010); elite networks comprising “high profile politicians, bureaucrats and military officers” (Rashid, 2006, p.  363); in Indonesia, Tablighi pesantren [educational institutes] (Nisa, 2014); in India, a “chain of Islamic madaris [educational institutes]” (Sikand, 2002, p.  116); “mosque-oriented communities” (Dickson, 2009); “Tablighi mosques” (Hermansen, 2008); co-operation with Deobandi mosques (Siddiqi, 2018; see also, King, 2002); “mosque groups” (Horstmann, 2006); mastura programme that mobilises female preachers (Arifin et  al., 2021); “a wide net of markaz and missionary tours” (Horstmann, 2007, p. 114); “transnational human infrastructure” (Ismailbekova & Nasritdinov, 2012, p. 181); “transnational South Asian trading castes” (Reetz, 2014); “diaspora network” (Ali, 2010a); “Indian Muslim network” (Noor, 2012) and Indian sub-continent diaspora (Azmi, 2000; Gaborieau, 2009; Roul, 2009; Wong & Levitt, 2014). Third, researchers point to Tablighi ideas that either aid its spread by inspiring individuals to perform tabligh (Metcalf, 1993; Talib, 2000; Moosa, 2000; Ali, 2003, 2010b, 2012; Balci, 2015; Khan, 2020) or impede its growth (Noor, 2007; Pelkmans, 2017). These scholars refer to Tabligh Jama’at’s “ideology”, which is perceived either as a blueprint for how to overcome the depravity of the world and thereby achieve success and salvation or as an out-dated authoritarian system of ideas and values that restrict progress and personal lifestyle choice. For example, illustrating the latter scenario, in Kyrgyzstan a Muslim woman says, “Never will I join them. Their idea of a woman is to be submissive, to serve her husband, and to stay at home with the children” (Pelkmans, 2017, p. 107). Overall, the studies mentioned here are useful in making the connection between political, organisational and ideological factors that aid or impede Tabligh Jama’at’s spread and growth. However, they lack a theoretical approach with which to conceptualise each of these factors as variables in their mobilisation efforts. It is this lack of conceptualisation that creates a gap in our theorising and understanding of the Tabligh Jama’at’s mobilisation. Considering the Tabligh Jama’at’s emphasis on movement and social mobilisation, we identify theories of social movements and mobilisation as possible sources of theory to address this gap. Three theories may assist in conceptualising each of the three factors—political,

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organisational, ideological—we have identified above as playing a key role in facilitating or impeding Tabligh Jama’at activity. These are (1) Political Process Theory1 (political factors), (2) Resource Mobilisation Theory2 (organisational factors) and (3) Frame Theory3 (ideological factors). In this study, we take the opportunity to address the third of these factors—ideas or ideology.4 We do so by applying Frame Theory to key Tablighi written and oral texts.5 We take a framing approach because, as will be shown in the following chapter, the Tabligh Jama’at, like social movements, “frame[s], or assign[s] meaning to and interpret[s], relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilise potential adherents and constituents” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Framing describes the signifying work that social movement activists engage in to create a perception of certain events and circumstances as unjust or immoral—in short, a grievance that must be corrected.6 Framing also pertains to a movement’s activity of justifying its chosen strategies and tactics to correct a grievance, and its offering of material or immaterial incentives 1  The key theoretical works for the Political Process Theory are Eisinger (1973), McAdam (1999) and Tarrow (2011). 2  The key theoretical works for the Resource Mobilisation Theory are Zald and Ash (1966), Oberschall (1973) and McCarthy and Zald (1977). 3  The key theoretical works for the Frame Theory are Snow et  al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988, 1992), Benford and Snow (2000), Gamson et  al. (1982) and Gamson (1992, 1995). Gamson’s assertion that all “collective action frames are injustice frames” (Gamson, 1992, p. 68) does not align with the framing we identify in the Tabligh Jama’at texts. As Benford and Snow (2000, p. 615) observe, “in the case of many religious, self-help, and identity movements, for example, it is questionable whether a well-elaborated collective action frame need include an injustice component”. Therefore, in this study, we use Snow et al. (1986) and Snow and Benford’s (1988) theory of framing, and not Gamson’s theory of framing. Despite this, Gamson’s view of framing may be useful in the study of other Islamic revivalist movements with a strong theme of social or political injustice in their ideology. 4  Due to space limitations, in this study we do not apply the Political Process Theory or Resource Mobilisation Theory to examine the Tabligh Jama’at. For examples of how these and other theories of social movements are applied to Islamic revivalist movements and organisations, see Wiktorowicz (2004). 5  Farish Noor’s (2012) close reading of the Faza’il-e-A’maal where he identifies in it a “discursive economy” comes closest to a Frame Theory method of examining Tablighi ideology. His study thus provides a point of departure for our undertaking a frame analysis of the Faza’il-e-A’maal. 6  For a history of Frame Theory and its empirical application to studying social movements and collective action, see Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp.  3–16), Snow et  al. (2014), Almeida (2019) and Snow et al. (2018).

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for participation. In view of these points, we may say that political opportunity and organisational resources are the freedom and means a movement needs to act, whereas framing communicates the grievances, tactics and incentives that animate its activities. Our turn to Frame Theory in exploring the ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation is grounded in the notion that framing’s conceptual apparatus and empirical method provides more conceptual clarity than the term “ideology” in understanding Tablighi mobilisation. As will be seen, Tablighi texts contain the “kind of discursive work required to elaborate the array of possible links between ideas, events, and action” (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 119). Frame Theory unpacks this discursive work in which Tablighi texts engage to legitimate preaching and faith renewal. By doing so, Frame Theory provides leverage to secure conceptual clarity vis-à-vis the ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at’s mobilisation activity. This section has provided the research context for the frame analysis undertaken in Chap. 5 and the exploration of frame resonance undertaken in Chap. 6. In the next section, we elucidate Frame Theory, defining key concepts applied to our study of the Tabligh Jama’at texts.

Frame Theory Frame Theory evolved out of increasing attention given to ideas in research on social movements or collective action.7 A consequence of this trend was the re-emergence of the topic of ideology in discussions on what impedes or enhances mobilisation. A key work in this vein, and one that frame theorists drew on, was John Wilson’s (1973) Introduction to Social Movements. Wilson defines ideology as composed of three interrelated elements or structures that have an influence on the mobilisation of individuals: (1) diagnosis of present problems, (2) a solution to these problems and (3) a rationale for action and who should act (Wilson, 1973, pp. 95–144). Wilson posits that the outcome of a movement’s mobilisation efforts is largely determined by its attention to these elements of its ideology. A second key work that frame theorists drew on was Bert Klandermans’ (1984) paper on mobilisation in which he identifies two stages of 7  For an overview of the treatment of ideas in studies of social movements, see Benford and Snow (2000, pp. 381–384) and Snow (2004).

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mobilisation: consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation. Through consensus mobilisation, a movement aims to convince people that their circumstances are a grievance that must be corrected, and it offers the most viable tactics and strategy through which to correct the grievance. Through action mobilisation, a movement proffers material (e.g., financial) and immaterial (e.g., social status) incentives or compensators that are attainable through participation in its activities. In the late 1980s, frame theorists Snow et al. (1986)8 and Snow and Benford (1988) combined Wilson’s (1973) view of the structure and function of ideology and Klandermans’ idea of mobilisation with the concept of “frames” and “framing” to come up with the conceptual apparatus of Frame Theory. The term “frame” was borrowed from Gregory Bateson (1972), who defined it as a mental construct that defines “what is going on” in interactive situations. Simply put, frames guide action and organise experience. Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (Goffman, 1974) introduced the concept of frame to sociology. He articulates frames as “cognitive schemata”, which assist people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” experiences and events within their own living universes and much broader general world (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). Collective action frames, the products of Snow and Benford’s (1988) three framing tasks, defined below, are in one sense like everyday frames in that they guide action and organise experience. However, they differ from everyday frames in that they perform these functions in a “more agentic and contentious” manner “in the sense of calling for action that problematizes and challenges existing authoritative views and framings of reality” (Snow, 2004, p.  385). Collective action frames are thus definable as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). We briefly define here the Frame Theory concepts that are applied to examine the framing contained in Tablighi texts (Chap. 5) and the reasons why that framing may or may not resonate with Muslims in contemporary society (Chap. 6). First, the processes that produce collective action frames are called “core framing tasks” (Snow & Benford, 1988, pp. 199–204). The three framing tasks are “diagnostic framing”, which identifies some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration, and a source of the blame for the ills; “prognostic framing”, which proposes a 8

 For a biographical sketch of the Snow et al. (1986) paper, see Snow et al. (2014).

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solution to the problem and the tactics and strategy for implementing it; and “motivational framing”, which provides a “call to arms” or rationale for engaging in corrective action. Diagnostic framing and prognostic framing correspond to Klandermans’ (1984) concept of consensus mobilisation, while motivational framing corresponds to his concept of action mobilisation. Second, Snow and Benford (1988) and Benford and Snow (2000) formulate a set of framing processes through which collective action frames are articulated, punctuated, bridged, extended or amplified. In the next chapter, we explore one of these processes: the discursive process of frame amplification.9 Frame amplification involves the use of slogans (e.g., “Power to the People!”) to punctuate or highlight those issues or beliefs that are most symbolic of the underlying frame and movement ideology. A common example of frame amplification is the bumper sticker that people place on their cars to symbolise a cause they support; for example, the sticker “Abortion is murder” used by pro-life supporters. In addition to theorising how a movement structures and packages ideas via framing tasks and framing processes, frame theorists also explore why a movement’s framing is successful or unsuccessful. They measure this aspect of framing, what they term “frame resonance”, through several factors: empirical credibility, narrative fidelity, credibility of frame makers, experiential commensurability and consistency (Snow & Benford, 1988, pp.  207–211; Benford & Snow, 2000, pp.  619–622). Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp. 11–16) distil these factors into a simple three-factor model of frame makers, frame receivers and frame content. In Chap. 5, we use this three-factor model of frame resonance to illustrate why Tablighi framing may or may not have mobilising potency. Together, collective action frames, framing tasks, framing processes and frame resonance are the constructs and processes with which to conceptualise the ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. Through applying these constructs to Tablighi ideology, we aim to answer the following questions at the intersection of ideas and mobilisation: (1) How is Tablighi ideology packaged via framing tasks and framing processes? (2) Why or why not does the Tabligh Jama’at framing resonate 9  This is not to be confused with the frame amplification that Snow and Benford (1988) identify as one of their four “frame alignment processes”. Rather, frame amplification as used here refers to one of the two “discursive processes” described by Benford and Snow (2000, pp. 623–624).

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with individuals in contemporary society? These questions are answered, respectively, in Chaps 5 and 6. Before moving on, we attend to two key points in relation to applying framing to a study of the Tabligh Jama’at. First, there is the issue of defining framing in relation to ideas and ideology, as each of these terms is used in this chapter and following chapters. Oliver and Johnston (2005, p. 193) define the difference between ideology and framing as “framing points to process, while ideology points to content”. Snow and Benford (2005, p. 209) say ideology is a “cultural resource for framing activity”. Westby (2005, p. 222) posits that “framing processes … are clearly derived from movement ideology”. Drawing on these statements and definitions of framing (e.g., Snow & Benford, 1988), we relate framing, ideas and ideology to each other in the following way: framing constructs and promotes certain interpretations of the social world by weaving together ideas from the cultural cloth of a movement’s ideology. In other words, framing takes slices of ideas from a movement’s ideology in such a way, to use frame theorists’ language, as to articulate, punctuate, amplify, bridge and extend certain themes or aspects of that ideology to align with the values, beliefs, experiences and interests of participants and potential constituents. These slices of ideas or “frames” become symbols and metaphors for the movement’s ideology and allow the quick and easy communication of that ideology. Second, it is important to justify why framing, commonly applied to study social movements with civil or political goals, may be applied to an itinerant religious-pietist movement like the Tabligh Jama’at. Sociologist Quintan Wiktorowicz (2002, 2004) has called for the application of theories of social movements—including Frame Theory—to Islamic movements and organisations. He specifically mentions the Tabligh Jama’at as a group to which framing may be applied (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.  17). Broadly speaking, he argues for applying social movement theory to Islamic movements and organisations because, among other things, the “patterns” in how movements “articulate interests” and “frame contention” are similar whether the movement or organisation is non-religious or religious (Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.  189). We draw on Wiktorowicz’s point to argue that in mobilising an Islamic ideology or framing Islam and the social world in a certain way to convince people of the need for Islamic revival, the Tabligh Jama’at is akin to social movements that mobilise race, feminism and other ideologies to convince people of the moral impropriety of racism, sexism or some other issue. While the ideas between the

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Tabligh Jama’at and rights-based social movements vary significantly, ideas, whatever their colour, are packaged via frames and framing processes. Thus, framing transcends the specificity of Islam pertaining to the Tabligh Jama’at.10 With these points, we posit that it is not necessary to define the Tabligh Jama’at as a social movement to apply Frame Theory. Rather, in this study we identify the immense ideological work that the Tabligh Jama’at engages in as lending itself to being examined via Frame Theory. We therefore define the Tabligh Jama’at as an Islamic revivalist movement because, first, most scholars of the Tabligh Jama’at refer to it as a religious movement and, second, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, founder of the Tabligh Jama’at, preferred the name “Tahrik-i-Iman” (Nadwi, 1985), which translates as “faith movement”.

Method A frame analysis requires examining movement texts. Johnston describes the method as follows: “Verification of framing activities or of a frame’s content is based on evidence embodied in what people say and do … [and that] all too often a frame is ‘discovered’ through participant interviews, movement documents, speeches, songs, and slogans” (Johnston, 2002, pp.  66–67). The frame analysis we undertake in this chapter examines primary sources in the form of the Tabligh Jama’at’s written and oral texts. First, pertaining to written texts, Masud (2000, p.  79) observes that Tabligh Jama’at literature is divided into three types: books written about the movement by scholars associated with the movement, books and pamphlets recommended by the movement and statements and letters by the movement’s three leaders. Our frame analysis examines the second category of literature mentioned by Masud, in particular the work called Faza’il-e-A’maal (Zakariyya & Hasan, 1994) (translated: Virtues of Actions), which comprises seven pamphlets written by Maulana Zakariyya and Maulana Hasan, both of whom were Tablighi elders closely associated with Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, and whom the latter nominated as 10  The application of framing to a religious-pietist group is not without precedent. Of the movements that Snow et al. (1986) use as an example to elaborate their theory of framing is the Buddhist revivalist missionary revivalist movement Nichoren Shusho (now called Soka Gakkai International). This movement bears similarities to the Tabligh Jama’at, in particular its goal of reviving religion through proselytisation.

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successors to his leadership. These pamphlets are titled, in their translated form, as Stories of the Sahabah, Virtues of the Holy Qur’an, Virtues of Salaat, Virtues of Zikr, Virtues of Ramadan, Virtues of Tabligh and Muslim Degeneration and its Only Remedy. Originally titled Tablighi Nisab, Faza’il-e-A’maal took its name in 1985. Shortly thereafter, in 1987, an official copy translated from Urdu to English was published by Darul Isha’at publishers in Karachi, Pakistan. This official copy is the one carried by most English speaking Tablighis across the world and is the one we analyse in this study. In referring to Faza’il-e-A’maal, Masud (2000, p. 79) says, “[T]here has been no official statement of ideology by the [Tabligh] Jama’at itself. There is, however, what we call the Tablighi literature.” Faza’il-e-A’maal is important because the pamphlets contained in it represent the Tabligh Jama’at’s exegesis of the Islamic scriptures (the Qur’an and hadith). Three of the pamphlets contained in Faza’il-e-A’maal were commissioned by Maulana Ilyas and thus can be said to be a distillation of the philosophy of the movement. Farish Noor (2012, p. 75) reports of the pamphlets as a whole that “it is in these texts that we find the key ideas and principles that mark out the movement [i.e. Tabligh Jama’at] and which gives the movement its coherence in vision and praxis of Islam as well”. For these reasons, Faza’il-e-A’maal is the recommended literature for Tablighis to read and study. It is meant to be read aloud and repetitively in Tablighi gatherings (Metcalf, 1993). As such, it is used during ta’leem (religious learning session) on preaching tours (Ali, 2012, pp. 177–179; Bustamam-Ahmad, 2015, pp. 177–178), during community ta’leem sessions outside of preaching tours (Sikand, 1999; Faust, 2000; Reetz, 2004; Janson, 2016; Koch, 2017), before or after congregational prayers (Kepel, 1987, pp.  202–205; and, as we have witnessed in mosques in Sydney, Australia), in one’s home (Horstmann, 2009; Toktogulova, 2014) and in Tablighi-associated pesantren (educational institute) in Indonesia (Nisa, 2014). Faza’il-e-A’maal is also the source of bayan (sermons) given by Tablighis at their weekly gatherings (Braam, 2006). The pamphlets that constitute Faza’il-e-A’maal are an important source of framing as their authors attempt to persuade the reader of the legitimacy and need for tabligh using various arguments. Its role as the textual vehicle for Tablighi ideology and in altering the subjectivities of Tablighis and potential constituents (Noor, 2012, p. 61) lends to Faza’il-­ e-­A’maal a strategic role in the movement. Masud (2000, p. 80) observes that Maulana Muhammad Ilyas recommended Maulana Zakariyya’s books

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“as they were useful for motivational purposes”. In the preface to the pamphlet “Muslim Degeneration”, which is included in Faza’il-e-A’maal, Maulana Hasan indicates the strategic and discursive underpinning of his writing: I have been commanded by the distinguished gentleman referred to above [Maulana Ilyas] to write an account of this work [tabligh], so as to bring out clearly the special features of this propagation (Tabligh) and also to highlight the burning need for this, the Supreme Islamic activity, at this critical juncture, so that, as many Muslims as possible are able to understand and benefit from what is going on (Hasan, 1994, p. 3).

The ideas contained in Tablighi literature are also circulated through oral texts, namely bayan (religious sermon). Bayan is thus also an important source of data in which to identify Tablighi framing. This study examines the Tabligh Jama’at’s Friday evening bayan that took place, up until a few years ago, at Imam Ali Mosque in Sydney, Australia. The Tabligh Jama’at had a long-standing tradition of Friday night gatherings at Imam Ali Mosque.11 Here, Tablighis from Sydney, interstate or overseas, would spend the night at the mosque after attending the bayan. Those in preaching groups would sleep in the mosque that evening and depart the following morning to the mosque in the suburb where they are designated by the shura (planning committee) to conduct preaching tours that weekend. The programme for the Friday night bayan at Imam Ali Mosque was: after the Maghrib (sunset) or Isha (evening) congregational prayer, a chair and microphone were set up in the prayer hall. A person chosen by the shura would deliver a thirty-minute to hour-long talk. In our observation of these gatherings over several months we noticed that a different individual delivered the bayan each week. The speakers we observed included Australian locals and foreigners, the latter speaking in Bangla or Urdu and accompanied by a translator, who translated the sermon into English. The Friday night bayan is significant in relation to a discussion on the ideological underpinnings of participation in the Tabligh Jama’at because it addresses up to a few hundred Tablighis and non-Tablighis (regular local mosque attendees) whom the Tabligh Jama’at views as potential recruits. In view of their audience, bayan speakers in mosques around the 11  For a detailed description of this Friday night gathering in Lakemba, Sydney, see Ali (2012, pp. 170–173).

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world use numerous anecdotes and analogies to argue for the necessity of participating in the Tabligh Jama’at (Aziz, 2004, pp. 505–506) and deliver their sermons with passion and emotion (Braam, 2006; Amrullah, 2011; Bustamam-Ahmad, 2015). In this sense, the bayan becomes what Gamson (1992, p. 72) terms a “mobilising act”. The bayan we observed were immediately followed by the tashkil (registration session). The tashkil is where individuals volunteer for preaching tours. Individuals stand up, and those sitting are asked to stand, give their name, the duration of the preaching tour they are available for and the month in which they are available. Since bayan immediately precedes the tashkil, it is an important source of motivational framing. This point is supported by Jan Ali’s observation from his fieldwork in Sydney, Australia, that “At the end of the bayan some members of the audience become so emotional and passionate that when the jama’at (group) starts its Tashkil (recruitment), they volunteer their time and energy with great enthusiasm” (Ali, 2010a, p. 116). The method of data collection for the bayan that we undertook was participant observation. This method is particularly useful for studying the Tabligh Jama’at, which has a disinterest in scientific methods of attaining knowledge, thereby limiting opportunities for interviews or surveys. As Jan Ali (2012, p. 97) observes, this attitude lends difficulty to researching the Tabligh Jama’at, and without participant observation the task would be “almost a practical impossibility”. We undertook participant observation in the role of “observer-as-­ participant” (Denzin, 1989, p. 165). In this role, the researcher does not attempt to create a relationship with the subjects under observation. Denzin (1989) describes this role by giving the example of a sports fan taking photographs of players during a match. In this sense, as observer-­ as-­participant, we took snapshots of the Tabligh Jama’at ideology as presented in the bayan. To do this, while seated alongside non-Tablighi Muslims in the prayer hall, who also listen, we used an audio recording device to record the bayan. We observed and recorded twelve bayan between January 2014 and August 2014. Within a few hours of the bayan, away from the mosque, we wrote field notes about its contents. When examining the texts, a researcher using Frame Theory can identify patterns of ideas expressed in repeated words and phrases. Entman (1993, p. 52) says that frames “are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of

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facts or judgments”. In view of these points, in Chap. 5 we identify frames and framing in repeated words and phrases that permeate the Faza’il-e-­ A’maal and bayan.

Conclusion This chapter lays the groundwork for applying Frame Theory to the study of the Tabligh Jama’at. We identify, with scholars of social movements, that the ideological dimension of a movement is an important factor in a movement’s ability to mobilise people for its cause. We identify in Frame Theory’s conceptual apparatus a theoretical approach with which to gain conceptual clarity regarding the ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at’s mobilisation efforts. In the next chapter we undertake a frame analysis of the Tablighi written and oral texts to illustrate how, through framing, Tablighi ideology is packaged strategically in a way that makes preaching and faith renewal legitimate, relevant and attractive pursuits.

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CHAPTER 5

A Frame Analysis of Tablighi Texts

Abstract  This chapter undertakes a frame analysis of Tabligh Jama’at’s written and oral texts to illustrate how, through framing, Tablighi ideology is packaged strategically in a way that makes preaching and faith renewal legitimate, attractive pursuits. In the central Tablighi written text Fazail-e-A’maal and oral text of bayan (religious sermon) we identify Tablighi collective action frames (“Muslim crisis”, “iman”, “tabligh”, “self-reform”, “Allah”, “rewards” and “responsibility”) and frame amplification where the tabligh frame is amplified through describing tabligh or preaching as work, effort and sacrifice. We define work, effort and sacrifice as Tablighi values that define the ideal preacher and lend value to participation in preaching tours with the Tabligh Jama’at. Keywords  Frame analysis • Tablighi texts • Core framing tasks • Framing processes • Collective action frames

Introduction Frame scholars find that “mobilising people to action always has a subjective component” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p.  2). In other words, aspects of reality and the meanings attached to them are not in an isomorphic relationship (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). In other words, movement activists must engage in reality construction such that the targets of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_5

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framing or the potential constituents are convinced that some aspect of the social world is an issue or grievance, that the issue is critical and they will gain something from participation in correcting the issue. Reality construction or meaning making is strategic, discursive activity. Such activity is defined as “framing” by scholars of social movements (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988; Benford & Snow, 2000). As we shall see in this chapter, framing is a key activity of the Tabligh Jama’at, as evidenced in the written text Faza’il-i-A’maal and oral text of bayan (religious sermon). This chapter first explores diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing in these two texts. We then formulate a series of Tablighi collective action frames. The section following explores the Faza’il-e-A’maal and bayan through the process of frame amplification, where the activity of tabligh, via the “tabligh frame”, is amplified or accented using certain actions. In ending this chapter, we discuss three key findings from the analysis of Tablighi texts.

Core Framing Tasks Diagnostic Framing Diagnostic framing has two main functions: (1) to identify an event or issue as problematic and in need of change or repair; and (2) to attribute blame or responsibility for the event or issue having come about. Regarding the first function, we find that Tablighi texts contain a Muslim crisis frame that identifies a crisis in the lack of faith and Islamic praxis in Muslims, and adverse socio-economic and political circumstances beleaguering Muslims. Describing the Muslim crisis, Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 4) says, “Muslims of today [are] sunk in misery and disgrace, a people who possess no real strength or power, honour or dignity … completely demoralised, apathetic, shallow and helpless”. Maulana Zakariyya also elaborates on the crisis theme, saying in the foreword to his pamphlet “The Virtues of Zikr”: Today there is a wave of discontentment in the whole world; and the letters that I receive daily contain mostly accounts of worries and anxieties. The object of this booklet is that people who lack peace of mind, whether in an individual or collective capacity, may be told how to overcome their malady. (Zakariyya, 1994a, p. 11)

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Zakariyya’s statement, found as it is in a pamphlet used in Tablighi circles, demonstrates the concern of the Tabligh Jama’at ideology with the adverse circumstances of Muslims. The second aspect of diagnostic framing is the attribution of blame for the event or issue having come about. Maulana Hasan singles out two causes of the Muslim crisis: an internal one and an external one. Pointing to the external cause, he observes the deplorable state of Muslims stems from foreign influences: “today all our sentiments and feelings for Islam are practically dead, because of the continuous onslaught on our faith and social structure by various foreign elements and forces” (Hasan, 1994, p. 23). The acknowledgement of external sources of blame notwithstanding, Maulana Hasan attributes blame for the Muslim crisis to Muslims. The following statements in “Muslim Degeneration” (1994) reflect this discursive move: The current disease in the body of Muslims has sprung from the extinction of the true spirit of Islam in our hearts. (p. 24) Those [Muslims] who had once taught the world the golden lessons of etiquette and culture are today found wanting in these very adornments. (p. 5) The deplorable condition of the present-day Muslims is the result of weakness in their faith and character. (p. 8) Real sentiments and love for Islam are practically dead in us and our belief in it has dissipated. (p. 9)

The same theme of Muslim culpability for the Muslim crisis is also present in bayan. Abdullah said, All of the Baraka [blessing] and the khayr [goodness] and the greatness that was seen in the lives of Sahabah [Companions of Prophet Muhammad] and those that followed them in what they did, why that is not being seen today in the lives of Muslims here. Because we have left that duty. Because we have left that responsibility that Allah has given us. (Abdullah, 1 August 2014)

Maulana Hasan’s statements and the statement of this speaker show that for the Tabligh Jama’at there exists a crisis that sees Muslims in a deplorable state owing to their own fault, namely their lack of faith and Islamic praxis.

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Prognostic Framing Prognostic framing is the stipulating of remedies or solutions to the diagnosed condition. Prognostic frames must “identify strategies, tactics, and targets” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 201). In Tablighi texts, the solution or strategy that is posited to alleviate the Muslim crisis is the revival of faith. To this end, Tablighi texts constantly evoke the term “iman” (faith). We call this discursive activity the iman frame. Illustrating this frame, Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 7) states, “the way to regain to honour, grandeur, exaltation, glory and virtues by Muslims, lies only in their being strictly faithful”. The iman frame does not merely pertain to belief in the Divine, but to the spirit of faith that underpins religious activity and attachment to religious ideals and values. Maulana Hasan illustrates this aspect of the iman frame saying Muslims must launch a “counter-effort, where we are able to revive the dead spirit of each and every Muslim and rekindle in him the love and attachment for Islam” (Hasan, 1994, p. 23). The iman frame was heard often in bayan. Faith renewal or iman was described as the mission of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the Tabligh Jama’at. Khairuzzaman, for example, related the story of somebody who had met Ilyas and asked him: “What do you desire with your effort [of preaching]?” Ilyas replied: I do not want kingdoms. I do not want the countries. What I actually am making effort for is, where the Prophet Muhammad left his umma [nation] in that condition of iman, my nation will come up to the same level of iman. (Khairuzzaman, 11 April 2014)

Tablighi texts justify faith renewal by framing it as the mission of the prophets, including Prophet Muhammad. In bayan, speakers would elaborate on this discursive move by giving examples of the practice of da’wah or calling people to faith in God that the prophets spent their lives undertaking. In one bayan, for instance, the speaker narrated how Prophet Muhammad would knock on people’s doors and say to them: “Oh people, say la ilahaillallah [There is no God but Allah]. When you do, you will be successful” (Khalid, 8 August 2014). Corresponding to the iman frame, the Tabligh Jama’at promotes two key tactics through which faith may re-enter Muslim lives: preaching and self-reform. These activities are articulated using what we identify as the

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“tabligh frame” and “self-reform frame”. We provide a few examples of these frames as expressed in Tablighi texts. Elaborating the tabligh frame, Maulana Hasan states: Real sentiments and love for Islam are practically dead in us and our belief in it has dissipated. Obviously, when the very source becomes dry, the channels of virtue, good deeds and fine attributes, which can flow from it, are not to be seen any longer … the only means for the building up of this source, and maintaining a constantly proper flow of religious benefits from it, is the act of “Tabligh,” which really and truly is the life-blood of Islam. Unless we are able to revive it, we cannot achieve anything in this life. (Hasan, 1994, p. 24)

In this statement, Maulana Hasan first expresses the Muslim crisis frame—that the spirit of Islam has left Muslims. He follows this with the iman frame by suggesting the need for building up this source of religious spirit. The tabligh frame is then deployed where tabligh is described as the “life-blood of Islam” through which iman can be revived. Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 24) also connects the tabligh frame and iman frame: “It is now up to us to set about the revival of the obligatory task of ‘Tabligh’. It will be only then that we can hope to regenerate the true faith of Islam in the masses.” Like the iman frame, an important discursive move the tabligh frame makes is to define tabligh as the act of the prophets mentioned in the Qur’an including Prophet Muhammad. In the following statement from a bayan, the speaker defines tabligh as “effort” and then defines the actions of the prophets as effort: Prophets came and made this effort [tabligh]. And they made this effort by visiting people, going to the people, and knocking on every door. And the Prophet Muhammad, he came, and he also did the same effort. Went and visited people, knocked on every door. (Mustafa, 7 February 2014)

In addition to the tactic of tabligh to revive faith, Tablighi texts propose the tactic of self-reform. This idea is expressed using the self-reform frame. A key idea of this frame is that Muslims must first reform themselves before using other means of change if their situation is to improve. Maulana Hasan expresses this idea when discussing how Muslims may benefit from other means of Islamic revival, such as Muslim seminaries: “Even to derive full benefit from these institutions, we have to create within ourselves a

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true and a deep respect for the faith of Islam and a burning desire to adopt it in our practical life” (Hasan, 1994, p. 22). He reinforces this idea by saying that when people have changed their condition “only then can we derive full benefit from the existing religious institutions which, in turn, can serve the community in a befitting manner” (Hasan, 1994, p. 23). In bayan, speakers elaborate the theme of self-reform by describing the goal of participating in preaching tours as correcting one’s own negative traits, such as egoism. Thus, one speaker, Abdullah (1 August 2014), said, “your purpose is not jama’at [group], your purpose is islah al-nafs [reformation of the self]”. To elaborate on this point, he went on to mention a statement from a Tablighi who said to a group of Tablighis, “say to yourselves that we are going on the path of Allah externally to reform ourselves internally” (Abdullah, 1 August 2014). The discussion in this section highlights the use of the iman, tabligh and self-reform frames in Tablighi texts. These frames combine to provide a roadmap to Islamic resurgence and revival, which will correct the grievances of the Muslim crisis. Motivational Framing While prognostic framing justifies the strategy and tactics a movement uses to correct an issue or grievance, it does not tell us why people should participate in efforts to implement and achieve that strategy and tactics. Here, a movement must engage in motivational framing. Motivational framing provides incentives and reasons to join the cause. This concept draws on C. Wright Mills’ (1940) idea that a movement must prod people to action using what he terms “vocabularies of motive”. Robert Benford (1993, p. 34), in applying Mills’ phrase to examining motivation in the nuclear arms movement of the 1980s, identifies four generic vocabularies of motive: severity, urgency, efficacy and moral propriety. In this section, we describe Tablighi motivational framing in reference to Benford’s (1993) four vocabularies of motive. Demonstrating the first vocabulary of motive—severity—Maulana Hasan (1994, p.  3) describes the timing of his writing the pamphlet “Muslim Degeneration” as occurring “at this critical juncture”. He also makes remarks that speak to the severity of the Muslim crisis: It will be fatal for us not to check the present negative attitude towards Islam. (pp. 19–20)

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The task is stupendous, considering our present weaknesses and the extent of the problem. (p. 22) But alas! Today … we remain totally unmoved by the fact that every particle of Islam is being destroyed one by one before our very eyes. (p. 31)

The theme of severity is also common in bayan. This is illustrated often by the harsh tone of a speaker when articulating the Muslim crisis frame. Muslims are especially harshly spoken about as those to blame for the crisis. In addition to a harsh tone, there are also stark anecdotes that drive home the seriousness of the current situation. One speaker illustrates the dire situation at hand by mentioning a hadith in which Prophet Muhammad says, “My example and the example of you, the ummah, is like a person trying to save insects attracted to a fire” (Khalid, 8 August 2014). After relating this hadith, the speaker said: “The Prophet is not here today. His companions are not here today. So, who is going to worry about the ummah? Everyday hundreds of thousands of people pass away. How many of them die without iman?” (Khalid, 8 August 2014). A closely related theme to severity is urgency. This vocabulary of motive permeates Tablighi texts. Often the writer or speaker tugs at the audience’s emotional strings by framing the situation of Muslims as in need of urgent attention. This strategy and discursive move are found in Maulana Hasan’s (1994) statements in “Muslim Degeneration”: The time is moving fast and so is the pace of deterioration in the religion of Islam. The situation demands a strong, quick, and determined effort by one and all for arresting the rot and stopping further degeneration. (p. 20) We must act quickly and wrest the initiative from the hands of opposite forces. (p. 23) A joint and collective campaign will automatically ensure the growth and expansion of Islam in its true form, which is the real and urgent need of the day. (p. 30)

Expressing vocabularies of severity and urgency, Maulana Hasan says: The present emergency and the critical situation [emphasis added] demand that everyone of us should put his shoulder to the wheel and strive hard for

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the propagation of the ‘Kalimah’ (testimony of faith) and the protection of the Muslim way of life. (Hasan, 1994, p 17)

In addition to severity and urgency, Tablighi texts are replete with ideas of the efficacy of preaching. This was the most common vocabulary of motive found in bayan. The discursive move that speakers used was to frame the outcome of one’s action as dependent not on one’s efforts but on the will and grace of Allah. We refer to this discursive activity as the “Allah frame”. Owing to the central role the Allah frame plays in Tablighi texts, we spend a bit of time here discussing it. We identify four key ideas that underpin the Allah frame: (1) Allah fulfils His promises; (2) Allah is the main cause of effects in the universe; (3) Allah’s power and will are especially focused on preaching and Tablighis and (4) Muslims must have belief in Allah’s power at the forefront of their minds at all times. Regarding the first of these four ideas, in bayan, speakers constantly mention Allah in combination with the word “promises”. For example, in one bayan, Yusuf (28 March 2014) asks, “What is the way to get this reality [of understanding the religion]? We have to follow the way of the people who had this reality. For the people who do this, the promises of Allah are there for us.” Another speaker references Islamic scripture in relating the idea that Allah fulfils his promises: “Allah mentions, ‘if you spend for me, I will not only return but I will give you more’” (Khairuzzaman, 11 April 2014). This story thus conveys the idea that Allah makes promises and fulfils them. The second idea underpinning the Allah frame is the belief that Allah is omnipotent—the cause of whatever occurs in the universe. This theme is found throughout bayan. One speaker, Dawud (14 March 2014), says, “There is nobody except Allah who does anything. Allah is the only one who does everything.” Dawud (14 March 2014) went on to cite the Qur’anic verse: “And if He [Allah] desires a thing He says ‘kun fa yakun’ [Be! And it is]”. To elaborate on this verse, he then refers to the creation of the sky as an example of Allah’s power: “no pillars hold up the sky; only Allah’s power holds it up” (Dawud, 14 March 2014). Another speaker, Khalid (8 August 2014), elaborated on the theme of Allah’s power by narrating the Qur’anic story of Prophet Abraham and the tyrant Nimrud (Nimrod). Nimrud ordered Abraham to be thrown into a fire. At the point when Abraham entered the fire, angels came to him and asked, “Do you need help?” Abraham replied, “No, I do not need any of your help, my Allah is sufficient for me”. Khalid (8 August 2014) then commented

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on how Allah removed the characteristic of burning that a fire usually has, thus Abraham was not harmed by the fire. These references to Qur’an stories and verses reinforce the idea of Allah as an almighty being. The third idea of the Allah frame is that Allah’s will and grace is inclined towards those who undertake preaching and faith renewal. In one bayan, for example, the speaker said regarding travelling for preaching: “get out and you will see. The change will come in every part of your family, and your people. Allah will make you the means and Allah will accept you” (Ibrahim, 14 February 2014). This theme is also seen in another bayan statement: The little sacrifices we make, we are changing the world. Through small sacrifices Allah is changing conditions. In this Australia, the people who came here before knew what was the condition. There were no mosques full of people listening to talks. Allah is changing conditions. (Abdullah, 1 August 2014)

The speaker here describes Allah as a co-helper in changing society in that He helps those who sacrifice for preaching. Preaching is thus a special activity that garners Allah’s special attention. The fourth idea or discursive move of the Allah frame is that Tablighis must believe in the power of Allah. What is meant here is not a philosophical topic where attributes of a Deity are defined against scripture and rational arguments. Tablighis, like most if not all Muslims, believe that Allah is omnipotent. What the Allah frame does is turn this belief into a motivating force that gives Tablighis a sense of optimism and confidence in the efficacy of preaching—because Allah has the power to make preaching effect change. These ideas are found in Jibreel’s bayan: Da’wah [calling people to belief in Allah] has an effect on the heart of the da’i [propagator]. This is because he has strong certainty that for whom He is calling He is listening. He is with him. Every single thing in the universe moves with the permission of Allah. Nothing can harm, nothing can benefit except with the permission with Allah. … The daʻi must have certainty that every single thing in this world is going to support me because “I am a caller of Allah.” The ocean will not go against me. … Every single thing is supporting me. … The power is with Allah. (Jibreel, 21 March 2014)

The following statement also brims with optimism:

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Believe in the power of Allah, and the mountains will move. … This thought has to be in your hearts. … If you have this thought then the effect is there. We have the way, we have the structure. We do not need anything else. We need to implement. (Dawud, 14 March 2014)

Clearly expressing this idea of the Allah frame, another speaker said, “We have to create an environment where everybody is saying that Allah is doing everything” (Abdullah, 1 August 2014). The practice of remembering Allah’s power is thus a key element of Tablighi society. Each member of this society is characterised by belief in the power of Allah. Hence, another speaker in bayan said: “If we want to become a da’i [caller to Allah] we want firm belief on Allah. That no benefit or harm can reach without the permission of Allah” (Hisham, 15 August 2014). Moral propriety is the final vocabulary of motive, which can be identified in Tablighi texts. Here, we identify the “responsibility frame”, which defines preaching as a duty or responsibility. Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 5) demonstrates the use of this frame in saying that “inaction and complacency on our part in these circumstances will be an unforgiveable sin and crime [emphasis added]”. This statement presents preaching as a moral duty because its absence or lack is equivalent to a sin or crime. Thus, Maulana Hasan says “to enforce the righteousness among the people … is the responsibility of all other Muslims” (Hasan, 1994, p. 16). The idea of tabligh as the responsibility of every Muslim is constantly evoked in bayan. Take the two following examples: Allah has given us a big responsibility! … There is no Prophet to come. This is our responsibility. That’s why the elders say, this is our biggest sin! [that we do not make effort]. We have not taken up this responsibility. … The past year 90 million people have gone without iman. We are responsible. (Khairuzzaman, 11 April 2014) We have been given the responsibility of the ambiya. The reality of this responsibility needs to come into us. … All the barakah [blessing] and the greatness that was seen in the Sahabah [companions of the Prophet Muhammad], why this is not being seen in the lives of the Muslims here? Because we’ve left that duty, we’ve left that responsibility that Allah has given us. (Ibrahim, 14 February 2014)

We see in this language a motivational impetus where Tablighis are incited to act because it is their personal duty or responsibility to do so.

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In addition to the four vocabularies of motive—severity, urgency, efficacy and moral proprietary—mentioned above, an additional type of motivational framing in Tablighi discourse is the “rewards frame”. The rewards frame presents incentives for participating in tabligh. In the bayan we observed, rewards are mostly defined as material things that one can experience in Heaven. For example, in one bayan, the speaker gave an anecdote of a person who owns a fifty-storey building in this world. In relating the anecdote, he said: But this is not real success. … A person who spends his life building up his faith, even if it is only so much as a mustard seed’s weight, this effort will be rewarded with a space in Paradise which will be bigger than the universe. In this space he will be gifted a mansion which will be so amazing it will dumbfound the owner. (Jibreel, 21 March 2014)

It is no coincidence that this anecdote was given in the context of convincing the audience of the need for tabligh and iman. These activities were constantly embellished as being the means to Heavenly wealth. And what one will experience in Heaven is much better than anything one experiences in this world. The Faza’il-e-A’maal, on the other hand, does not go into detail about exactly what rewards Tablighis will attain in Heaven. Rather, Maulana Zakariyya in his pamphlets encourages readers to think in terms of rewards. In “Virtues of Qur’an” (1994c), fourteen out of the forty hadith mentioned about the virtues of reciting the Qur’an pertain to some sort of reward or blessing. In “Virtues of Salaat” (1994d), two chapters are titled “the rewards of salat” and “the rewards of jamaat” (congregational prayer). In the booklet titled “Virtues of Zikr” (1994a), seventeen out of the forty hadith included on the merits of kalima (the testimony of faith) are about some sort of reward or benefit. And in “Virtues of Ramadhan” (1994e), Maulana Zakariyya dedicates a chapter to the “blessings and rewards of keeping fast”. The strategy Maulana Zakariyya uses in these pamphlets inculcates in the reader a focus on the rewards as much as the actions. Tablighis may thus be said to develop a rewards mentality, which provides impetus for Islamic praxis and preaching. The abovementioned examples from the written and oral texts of the Tabligh Jama’at illustrate the variety of frames used by Tablighis to communicate the movement’s ideas. They show that the Tabligh Jama’at is engaged heavily in the discursive work of framing.

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Fig. 5.1  Tabligh Jama’at ideology, framing tasks and collective action frames

Qur’an & Hadith

Deobandi Tradition

Sufism

Tabligh Jama’at Ideology

Diagnostic Framing

Prognostic Framing

Motivational Framing

“Allah” “Muslim Crisis”

“Iman” “Tabligh”

“Rewards” “Severity” “Urgency” “Responsibility”

Tablighi Collective Active Frames

In Fig.  5.1 we illustrate the connectedness of the Islamic elements, Tablighi ideology, framing and collective action frames. At the bottom of the diagram, we see several collective action frames that are the products of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. These three framing tasks derive ideas from Tablighi ideology. Tablighi ideology derives its values and beliefs from three main sources, shown at the top of the diagram: the Qur’an and hadith, Deobandi reformist Islam and Sufism.

Framing Processes Collective action frames are not static images or ideas; rather, they are articulated through discursive processes, which Benford and Snow (2000, pp. 622–627) term framing processes. Here, we provide an in-depth look at one of these processes called frame amplification. Benford and Snow

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(2000, p.  623) define frame amplification as “accenting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more salient than others”. In this section, we illustrate frame amplification of the tabligh frame. We find that Tablighi texts amplify the tabligh frame through four actions: enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, work, effort and sacrifice. The first of these actions, enjoining the good and forbidding the bad, is a principle found in Islamic scripture and one that carries status as an important form of social justice and activism. Its mention in Tablighi texts therefore adds to the activity of tabligh a layer of status and prestige. Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 16) says, “To assign the obligation of Tabligh (amr bil maruf wa nahi anil munkar) solely to the ranks of the ulama, and not to ourselves, is a sign of grave ignorance on our part”. Thus, the implementation of this principle has historically been limited to an elite segment of Muslim society, but Maulana Hasan democratises its practice by connecting it with the grassroots activity of preaching and in doing so raises the status of tabligh. The second action with which Tablighi texts amplify tabligh is work. This is one of the most commonly heard terms in Tablighi texts. In the pamphlet titled “Virtues of Tabligh”, Maulana Zakariyya (1994b, p. 13) cites seven hadith about “Tabligh work”, showing “how important Tabligh is in the eyes of the Holy Prophet, and what serious consequences follow from its neglect”. Also undertaking this discursive move, Maulana Hasan (1994, p. 30) says regarding tabligh that “it was exactly this type of work which every prophet of Allah Ta’ala had to do as his sole occupation”. The amplification of tabligh as work is also heard in bayan. Several speakers mentioned the “tabligh work” undertaken by the prophets and Companions of Prophet Muhammad. For instance, one speaker said, “Allah has given us the work of the prophets” (Yusuf, 28 March 2014). Another speaker also mentioned the terms “workers” and “work” in the context of discussing the need for preaching: We are the workers of Prophet Muhammad and Allah. Not just the men, but the women and the kids also. If we see a burning fire, we will go to stop the fire. So, what about the millions of people who have already died and are going to jahannam [hell]? It is our fault! We have failed to do this work. (Mustafa, 7 February 2014)

Tabligh of course is not ordinary work in the sense of a nine-to-five job. The above statements must be considered in the wider ideological

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universe of the Tabligh Jama’at, especially the Allah frame, mentioned earlier. Tabligh as work is working for Allah. This is a different class of work, more akin to a vocation, as one is not working for a company but for God. Again, like the connection of tabligh with the principle of commanding the good and forbidding evil, this discursive move raises the status and prestige of tabligh. The third action with which the tabligh frame is amplified is effort. This term is used frequently in bayan and tashkil. For example, after one bayan, during the tashkil, the speaker who had just given the bayan preceding it said, “Make four months in the path of Allah, to learn this effort. We came to listen to the bayan, but also to make intention to go out for the path of Allah” (Abdullah, 1 August 2014). In another bayan, the speaker said, “This is the effort on which Prophet Muhammad made effort, and He made every Sahabah [Companions of Prophet Muhammad] to stand up with this effort. And Sahabah did the effort” (Dawud, 14 March 2014). The idea of making effort is articulated through mention of characters from Islamic history. Often this is done to connect the actions of those characters with the concept of making effort for preaching. For example, in one bayan, the speaker, Hisham (15 August 2014), related the story of Mus’ab bin Umair, a Companion of Prophet Muhammad, whom the latter sent as a teacher and guide for the new Muslims of Madina. After a year, Mus’ab returned with seventy new Muslims from the people of Madina. Regarding this, Hisham (15 August 2014) said Mus’ab bin Umair “made such an effort that some ulama say that there was not single house [in Madina] left that did not have a Muslim”. The final action regularly invoked in bayan in reference to tabligh is sacrifice. Sacrifice is illustrated through the actions of the Companions of Prophet Muhammad. One speaker spoke of the sacrifice the Companions made in leaving Mecca and Madina, the two holiest cities of Islam. He said, “they left their wives, they left their children”, thus “because of the feeling of responsibility they [i.e. the Companions] were able to make the sacrifices” (Ibrahim, 14 February 2014). Importantly, the Companions made their sacrifice for preaching or tabligh. As with the aforementioned examples of frame amplification, connecting tabligh with the idea of sacrifice undertaken by characters from Islamic history has the strategic effect of enhancing the status of preaching. This section documents the strategic way the activity of tabligh is accentuated or amplified by associating it with actions associated with the prophets and Companions of Prophet Muhammad. The association of

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tabligh with these characters and actions tells Muslims that preaching is an immensely important task, one inherited from the chosen workers of Allah.

Discussion Three main implications emerge from the foregoing frame analysis. First, we find in Tablighi texts a clear example of meaning making and reality construction. The central act in this is the construction of a grievance— Muslim crisis—for which Muslims should mobilise. While external forces are partly responsible for this crisis—what we identify in Chap. 2 as modernity, broadly speaking—the Muslim crisis frame resourcefully identifies Muslims as the main targets of blame for their own deplorable situation. This discursive move puts Muslims in an uncomfortable position. However, there is reason for optimism in changing their situation because the iman, self-reform and tabligh frames indicate that Muslims have agency to effect change, as each of these activities is within the grasp of the ordinary believer. The Allah frame offers further optimism to Muslims because self-­ reform, faith renewal and preaching receive the special attention of Allah where He becomes a helper to all those who undertake and promote them. Combined, these framings represent a reality construction of a world where Muslims find themselves in a crisis situation but have the opportunity through preaching to rectify it. Importantly, Allah is on the side of those who preach. The outcome of these discursive moves is that preaching takes on the meaning of nothing less than a God-favoured mission to save all Muslims. Second, through a reading of Tablighi texts, we identify a Tablighi vocabulary,1 what Barbara Metcalf (1993, p. 590) calls the “lexique technique of the Tablighis, the words used over and over to tell them who they are, and what they do”. The Faza’il-e-A’maal and bayan use several repeated words: yaqin, iman, a’maal, da’wah, Allah, effort, sacrifice, work and job. These words are not inventions of the Tabligh Jama’at; however, their repeated use in the context of bayan, which are intended to mobilise people to participate in preaching tours, lend them a uniqueness specific to the Tabligh Jama’at. In this sense, they become “master signifiers” that punctuate and hold together Tablighi discourse (Noor, 2012, p. 86), and in doing so, articulate the necessity, efficacy and satisfaction of ­participating 1  This idea draws on Talib’s (1997, p. 36) phrase, “vocabulary of the tablighis”, which he uses to describe the words in Irsadat-o-Maktubat of Maulana Ilyas.

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in tabligh. The Tablighi vocabulary thus provides a compelling argument for why one should become a preaching Muslim. Third, the amplification of tabligh using the actions of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, work, effort and sacrifice turn these actions into what we may call Tablighi values. As values, they add layers of justification to tabligh or, to put it another way, they lend value to tabligh. In turn, these values become key traits of a would-be preacher. To be a Tablighi, one must make sacrifice, effort, work, enjoin the good and forbid the evil.

Conclusion To summarise this chapter, we turn to Noakes and Johnston’s (2005, p. 2) definition of framing: “framing functions in much the same way as a frame around a picture: attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and away from extraneous items in the field of view”. To use this definition in understanding the above findings, we may say that Tablighi frames capture those things most important to elevating Muslims in contemporary society: preaching, faith renewal and self-reform. Tablighi framing works as a discursive chisel that carves out a special place for these actions, such that other practices, such as social welfare or physical jihad, are lost sight of because they are outside the frame. The framing we identify in this chapter helps us to answer the first research question underpinning this frame analysis: How is Tablighi ideology packaged via framing tasks and framing processes to mobilise individuals to participate in the Tabligh Jama’at? We answer this by pointing to the Tablighi diagnostic frame (“Muslim crisis”), prognostic frames (“iman”, “self-reform” and “tabligh”) and motivational frames (“Allah”, “responsibility”, “severity”, “urgency” and “rewards”). We also point to Tablighi texts’ amplification of tabligh through defining it as enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, work, effort and sacrifice. Together, these framing tasks, collective action frames and framing process provide ideological scaffolding to embellish and legitimate tabligh and faith renewal. In the next chapter, we explore why the Tablighi framing documented in this chapter might resonate with Muslims in contemporary societies around the world.

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References Benford, R. D. (1993). You could be the hundredth monkey: Collective action frames and vocabularies of motive within the nuclear disarmament movement. Sociological Quarterly, 34, 195–216. Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611 Hasan, I. (1994). Muslim degeneration. In Fazail-e-A’maal (pp.  1–39). New Delhi. Metcalf, B. (1993). Living hadith in the Tablighi Jama’at. The Journal of Asian Studies, 52(3), 584–608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2058855 Mills, C. W. (1940). Situation actions and the vocabularies of motive. American Sociological Review, 5, 904–913. Noakes, J. A., & Johnston, H. (2005). Frames of protest: A roadmap to a perspective. In H. Johnston & J. A. Noakes (Eds.), Frames of protest: Social movements and the framing perspective (pp. 1–29). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Noor, F. (2012). Islam on the move: The Tablighi Jama’at in Southeast Asia. Amsterdam University Press. Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1, 197–217. Snow, D. A., Rochford Jnr, E. B., Wordon, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilisation, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464–481. https://doi. org/10.2307/2095581 Talib, M. (1997). The Tablighis in the making of Muslim identity. Comparative Studies of Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 17(1), 32–51. https:// doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-­17-­1-­32 Zakariyya, M. (1994a). Virtues of zikr (S.  Ahmed, trans.). In Fazail-e-A’maal (pp. 1–245). IdaraIsha’at-E-Diniyat. Zakariyya, M. (1994b). Virtues of Tabligh (M. M. Qureshi, Trans.). In Fazail-e-­ A’maal (pp. 1–46). IdaraIsha’at-E-Diniyat. Zakariyya, M. (1994c). Virtues of Qur’an (Aziz-ud-Din, Trans.). In Fazail-e-­ A’maal (pp. 1–114). IdaraIsha’at-E-Diniyat. Zakariyya, M. (1994d). Virtues of Salaat. (A.  R. Arshad, Trans.). In Fazail-e-­ A’mal (pp. 1–104). Idara Isha’at-E-Diniyat. Zakariyya, M. (1994e). Virtues of Ramadhan (Y. A. Karaan, Trans.). In Fazail-e-­ A’mal (pp. 1–84). New Delhi: Idara Isha’at-E-Diniyat.

CHAPTER 6

Tabligh Jama’at Frame Resonance

Abstract  This chapter unpacks why or why not Tablighi collective action frames and frame amplification identified in Chap. 5 resonate with individuals in contemporary societies around the world. It explores several factors that underpin frame resonance: credibility of frame makers, narrative fidelity, experiential commensurability, frame consistency and empirical credibility. Through this exploration, we identify in Tablighi ideology a hierarchy of grievances that justifies the need and efficacy of preaching and working for Allah. The outcome of this chapter’s analysis is a model of the ideological dimension of Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation that accounts for both the strategic or discursive structure of Tablighi ideology (collective action frames and frame amplification) and its mobilising potency (frame resonance). Keywords  Frame resonance • Frame makers • Frame recipients • Frame content • Modernity • Mobilisation

Introduction In this chapter, we explore the reasons why the Tabligh Jama’at frames and frame amplification identified in Chap. 5 may or may not resonate with Muslims in contemporary societies. To do so, we use secondary sources that contain observations from fieldwork conducted by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_6

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researchers of the Tabligh Jama’at from countries around the world. Drawing on Noakes and Johnston’s (2005) tripartite model of frame resonance, we divide the chapter into frame makers, frame recipients and frame content. After identifying the resonance factors underpinning these three dimensions, we provide a model of the Tabligh Jama’at frame resonance. We conclude with a discussion of key findings from the analysis carried out in this chapter.

Frame Makers Credibility of Frame Makers Benford and Snow (2000) describe the personal characteristics of movement activists as an important variable in whether what they say has an impact on their audience. They describe this factor as “credibility of frame promoters”. In their description of this factor, Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 13) state, “[B]ecause collective action frames are constructed by movement activists and promoted by movement organisations, how the target population perceives frame promoters affects frame resonance”. In this section, we identify three characteristics of Tablighis that may enhance their credibility: their lived Islamic selves, their commitment to Islamic revival and their Indian heritage. We also identify three perceptions Muslims have of Tablighis, which show that some people see the latter as lacking in credibility; these are lack of Islamic knowledge, lack of sincerity and lack of welfare for their immediate families. Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 8) observe that, in addition to words, “frames can also be communicated through nonverbal devices, such as presentation of self, tactics, and organisational forms”. In relating this to Tablighis, we find they are renowned for their presentation of self: they dress, grow facial hair, eat, drink and sleep in a Prophetic manner. They do so in such a way that Barbara Metcalf (1993) describes them as “living hadith”. This aspect of Tablighis grants them a charismatic aura, which impacts onlookers. A female Muslim in Indonesia remarks: “When I see this humble group, it is so different. They practise carefully every detail of Islamic teachings as practised by the Prophet Muhammad” (Amrullah, 2011, p. 146). Tablighis’ Islamic praxis lends credibility to the iman and self-reform frames, premised as they are on the belief that Muslims must live a complete Islamic way of life to regain success in this world.

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Tablighis also gain credibility because of their commitment to tabligh. They show commitment through exerting immense personal efforts in preaching. Here, the “sacrifice” and “effort” frame amplification that we saw in the previous chapter would resonate with onlookers observing Tablighis spending of time, money and energy in conveying the message of Islam. It was for their commitment to preaching that the initial Mewati villagers who made up the first Tabligh Jama’at preaching tours in India received respect. In this regard, Haq (1972, p. 121) notes, “the attitude of the local Muslims changed to kindness and respect when they saw the sincerity, enthusiasm and spirit of sacrifice of the Mewatis”. Another characteristic of Tablighis that resonates with onlookers is their predominantly Indian sub-continental heritage (Noor, 2012, p. 134). While Indian Muslims are certainly no more learned in Islam than Muslims in other parts of the world, some Muslims perceive them in this way and this perception is enough to lend to Tablighis of Indian background an added layer of credibility to preach Islam. In Indonesia, for example, an indigenous Muslim says, When I meet the Tablighis from India, they are all good, pious men and they live the lives of real Muslims, not like us in Indonesia … In Indonesia … We are not yet fully Islam, unlike in India where there are many good Muslims and they show other Muslims how to live like good Muslims, like during the time of the Prophet. (Noor, 2009, p. 204)

This Indonesian Muslim sees Tablighis from India as credible representatives of Islam because of India’s rich Islamic history. However, Tablighis are not always seen as credible preachers of Islam. Sometimes they are seen as lacking in Islamic knowledge, hampering the resonance of the tabligh and iman frames. Tablighis are predominantly lay preachers and lay Muslims who lack formal education in the Islamic sciences (e.g., aqida, fiqh, tafsir, usul al-hadith) and may be seen as lacking the qualifications to preach Islam. In her fieldwork with Muslims in Indonesia, Bustamam-Ahmad (2015, p. 24) reports some non-Tablighis advised her that Tablighis are not fit to answer questions about Islam as they are not ulama (religious scholars). Also commenting on this aspect of frame resonance, Amrullah makes the following observations of Tablighis in Indonesia:

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What is somehow missing from the Tablighi Jama‘at’s followers, especially from these women who are excited to perform da‘wa [calling to Allah], is arguably a deep understanding of Islam. These women’s lack of either formal or informal education in matters of Islamic studies, such as tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), hadith (prophetic tradition), and fiqh (Islamic law), has made them unable to talk or discuss any religious themes outside those written in their sacred Tablighi books. As a result, Muslim women of different groups tend to criticize them for being immature da‘iya (female preachers). (Amrullah, 2011, p. 151)

These sentiments are also found in the statement by a Muslim man in Kyrgyzstan: “Why would I listen to those dawatchis [Tablighis] who only know the basics of Islam?!” (Pelkmans, 2017, p. 106). The Faza’il-e-A’maal in particular is sometimes singled out as a cause of the Tablighis’ lack of knowledge of Islam. A Muslim in Bangladesh said: “Tablighi Jamaat followers keep themselves limited within the Fazayele Amal [i.e. Faza’il-e-A’maal] but in Islam acquiring knowledge is an important part that is not possible only by reading the Fazayele Amal” (Siddiqi, 2018, p. 92). While we mention above that Tablighis are considered sincere workers for Allah, not all Muslims perceive their sincerity. Pool reports the following from ethnographic work with Muslims in Joygram, India: The sincerity of the Tablighis and devout Deobandis in Joygram was questioned: tropes of irony and mockery were very common in Joygram, and the Tablighis were not spared. The Tablighi’s attitude was considered by some to be condescending and pretentious, with too much importance attributed to aesthetic performance rather than to an actual Islamic lifestyle. (2021, p. 20)

Of course, sincerity is something hardly measured easily and its perception is highly subjective. But in terms of frame resonance, all that is relevant is the perception of those whom the Tabligh Jama’at reaches through preaching tours. The above statement shows that Tablighis may not always be able to control what onlookers think of them. Another characteristic of Tablighis that critics focus on is their looking after immediate family. Tablighis are sometimes considered lax in looking after their immediate family members because they sometimes spend up to several months away from their partners and children. This is perhaps the most common accusation against Tablighis and one that impacts their

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credibility as frame makers. A Muslim man in Gambia remarks about Tablighis: “They spend all their time praying and preaching, while they should work so that they can support their families” (Janson, 2005, p. 467). Also negative in their assessment of Tablighis in this regard are Muslim youth in South Africa, as Haron reports: [E]mphasized as strong evidence that even though the TJ is concerned with ‘Allah’s work’ (God’s work), its members neglect their duties towards their kith and kin, particularly when the male breadwinner goes on the [khuruj] for 40 days at a time. (2005, pp. 268–269)

In Thailand, “TJ [Tabligh Jama’at] members are frowned upon for leaving their mothers and children behind and for their escapist attitude” (Horstmann, 2007, p. 110). In all these views, preaching is perceived as leading many Muslim men to shirk the duties in their household. This perception of Tablighis negatively impacts the resonance of the tabligh frame. It is not that Muslims are against preaching, but they are concerned about the time that preaching takes away from one’s household responsibilities. To summarise this section, we see that Tablighis have a certain amount of credibility in promoting the iman and tabligh frames and the sacrifice and effort frame amplification because of their Islamic praxis, Indian origin (for those Tablighis from India), and personal commitment and dedication to preaching. However, some Muslims see Tablighis as flawed preachers who lack the knowledge credentials, sincerity and concern for family welfare that Muslim preachers should have. These points show that the resonance factor of credibility for the frame makers is highly subjective.

Frame Receivers In this section, we explore two resonance factors theorised by Snow and Benford (1988): narrative fidelity and experiential commensurability. Noakes and Johnston (2005) categorise both factors as components of frame content. We categorise them as components of frame receivers because they depend on the personal characteristics and experiences of the Muslims to whom the Tabligh Jama’at preaches.

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Narrative Fidelity Snow and Benford (1988, p. 210) define narrative fidelity as “the degree to which proffered framings resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage”. Elsewhere, they define the term as “cultural resonance” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.  622). Noakes and Johnston (2005, p.  15) define narrative fidelity as “cultural compatibility”, saying, “When there is considerable overlap between a frame and the cultural stock of the potential constituents, the frame can be considered culturally potent”. Applying these definitions to Tabligh Jama’at framing, we posit that it resonates with many Muslims because of its simple orthodox message, which references the Qur’an and hadith and characters from the Islamic tradition, such as Allah, prophets and the Companions of Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the Allah, iman and tabligh frames would resonate with Muslims with some amount of Islamic upbringing and acculturation into Islamic beliefs. Having an Islamic heritage often results in exposure to Islamic symbols and meanings during one’s childhood. Timol posits that this is an important facet of why Tablighi ideas and ideology resonate with second- and third-generation Muslims in the UK: The messages he hears here [i.e. during the preaching tour or bayan]—and often the cultural idioms through which they are delivered—can resonate in emotionally charged ways with the content of the meaning-system first internalised as taken-for-granted reality during the powerful experience of childhood primary socialisation. (Timol, 2020, p. 347)

Timol goes on to suggest that there is “emotional attachment” between Muslims and “core tenets of the Islamic faith” (Timol, 2020, p. 355). The Allah, iman and tabligh frames, with their elaboration via references to Allah, core Islamic beliefs and characters from the Islamic tradition, would tap into this emotional attachment; therefore, it resonates powerfully for second- and third-generation Muslims. Apart from Islamic heritage that Tabligh Jama’at framing taps into, there are also cases of harmony between local cultures and Islamic culture promoted by the Tabligh Jama’at. In India, for example, Reetz (2014, p.  32) observes: “The format and history of the movement suggest a strong bond between the religion of Islam and the culture of the South

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Asian subcontinent”. In China, also, there is consonance between Tablighi ideas and local culture. Stewart reports: The carefully scripted behaviour of Tablighis protects them in their inward struggles against desires and ego as they continually implore others to join the struggle against their own internal demons. This method meshes well with a Chinese culture that has long relied on clearly defined public norms for acting, thinking, and feeling that are taught by memorization and recitation of moral parables and dogmatic texts in both Confucianism and socialism. (Stewart, 2018, p. 1226)

These points show the self-reform frame with its idea of refining one’s conduct would resonate with Chinese Muslims. However, cultural compatibility does not always ensue when the Tabligh Jama’at engages with ethnically indigenous Muslims. Commenting on the lack of cultural compatibility between Tablighi teachings and indigenous Muslims in Kyrgyzstan, Balci notes: Among minority ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan, and especially among Uzbeks in Osh and Jalalabad regions, the JT [Tabligh Jama’at] is not that influential. Some believe the reason might be rooted in cultural history, especially in the long survival of a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life among the ethnic Kyrgyz that prevented orthodox Islam taking hold. (2012, p. 73)

In Southern Thailand, Braam (2006, p.  43) and Horstmann (2009, pp. 123–124) observe that indigenous villagers view the Tabligh Jama’at’s orthodox brand of Islam as alien to their local cultures and its prejudice towards un-Islamic elements of Thai culture polarises villagers. In all these examples, the iman frame fails to resonate with indigenous Muslims whom the Tabligh Jama’at preaches to because of its focus on pristine scriptural-­ based Islam, which contrasts with the non-Islamic customs and practices of those Muslims. Sometimes the Indian background of Tablighis causes non-Indian background Muslims to perceive the religion preached by Tablighis as an Indian religion. In Malaysia, for instance, Farish Noor (2007) notes the Tablighis of Indian origin who established the Tabligh Jama’at in Indonesia were initially met with resistance from the indigenous Malays:

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The fact that the new movement was being led and promoted by Haydar and his brothers—all of whom were obviously Indian Muslims, albeit Malaysian citizens—added to the impression that this was an alien form of Islam that did not reflect the local customs and traditions of the Kelantanese. (Noor, 2007, p. 15)

Here, the iman frame fails to resonate not because it promotes any beliefs particular to Indian Muslims, but because it is deployed by Indian Muslims, thereby resulting in perception of it as promoting an Indian religion as opposed to orthodox Islam. Sometimes it is Indian culture that is the problem. In Canada, Azmi (2000, p. 233) reports that many Muslims from non-Indian background found it difficult to sustain involvement in the Tabligh Jama’at due to barriers of “attire, food, and language”. In Britain, Sikand (2002) observes a cultural clash between the British adapted culture of British-born Muslims and the South Asian culture of Tablighis. Thus, there is a “growing failure to attract many younger, British-born Muslims” to the movement (Sikand, 2002, p. 242). These cases of cultural clash would hamper the resonance of the iman frame because for most Muslims iman is not based on being Indian or having Indian culture. Considering these points, narrative fidelity of Tablighi frames is sometimes found and other times lacking. It is found where people have an orthodox Islamic upbringing and exposure to beliefs about Allah and stories from the Qur’an and hadith about prophets and the Companions of Prophet Muhammad. It is also found where the cultural stock of the targeted people is non-Islamic, but the Tabligh Jama’at can adapt its Islamic teachings to resonate with local culture. However, this attempt is not always successful, as some locals reject the Tabligh Jama’at’s orthodox or South Asian Islam and hold onto their more syncretic, popular customs and beliefs. These mixed results of narrative fidelity show that “ethnicity, which has been the movement’s greatest strength, has emerged also as its greatest weakness” (Azmi, 2000, p. 233). Experiential Commensurability In this section, we explore the resonance factor of experiential commensurability. This is measured by the extent to which framing provides answers and solutions to problematic circumstances in people’s lives in a way that

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harmonises with how those circumstances are being or have been experienced (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 208). Modernity is the key experience and set of circumstances into which the Tabligh Jama’at’s framing taps. Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, along with Muslims in general in the early twentieth century, saw modernity as a challenge or threat to overcome (Hermansen, 2008). Jan Ali (2012, p. 14) says, “[T]here is a correlation or relationship between the experience of modernity and Islamic revivalism”. What exactly is it about modernity that is problematic and would make Muslims want to become Tablighis? Drawing on Chap. 3 of this book, we identify two experiences of modernity that Tabligh Jama’at framing may tap into: socio-economic deprivation (i.e., unemployment, poverty and lack of social mobility) and meaning deprivation (i.e., lack of belonging, rootedness and sense of purpose). Turning first to socio-economic deprivation, we see that in the early days of the Tabligh Jama’at in the Mewat region outside Delhi, India, the Meo Muslim inhabitants were suffering from social and economic hardships, due in large part to Hindi Bania moneylenders (Sikand, 2002, pp.  115–116). The Tabligh Jama’at entered the social landscape at this critical juncture and provided the Meos with Muslim identity and social mobility. We can imagine the rewards frame with its ideas of Heavenly riches would be highly attractive to a Meo who had no wealth and was experiencing social dislocation. Muslims today also are on the margins of society socially and economically (Ali, 2012, 2020). Scholars of the Tabligh Jama’at report socio-­ economic deprivation as playing some part in Muslims opting for participation with the Tabligh Jama’at (e.g., Dassetto, 2000; Ali, 2012; Balci, 2012; Janson, 2009). In Central Asia, for instance, Balci observes of Tablighis: Their message, based on the simple need for faith and religious practice, is easily understood and appeals to the victims of social exclusion. In both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, a large majority of JT’s [Tabligh Jama’at] first activists and sympathizers are those left out of the economic boom. (Balci, 2012, p. 68)

The idea that faith and religious practices resonate with people who are experiencing social and economic exclusion points to the Muslim crisis

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and iman frames. As we saw in Chap. 5, the Muslim crisis frame identifies the deplorable state of Muslims materially and spiritually. This would resonate with “victims of social exclusion”. The iman frame would resonate with such individuals by providing them with a solution to overcome their lowly situation. And the Allah frame would play a part in giving people who seem to lack all hope a sense of optimism because Allah can change conditions. In situations of socio-economic deprivation, we suggest the frame amplification of tabligh as work that we saw in the previous chapter would also resonate strongly. Tabligh work would fill the hole in people’s lives of lack of meaningful and satisfying employment. The following statements from Tablighis in Australia illustrate this idea: Tabligh is working for God. It is the work of believers. With this work … Allah is going to put blessing in your life. (Ali, 2012, p. 198) For me, tabligh brings peace and calmness to my heart because in my heart I feel I am doing a great work. (Ali, 2012, p. 223) Tabligh work takes your worries of this world away and gives you so much pleasure and happiness … this work gives satisfaction in life. (Ali, 2012, p. 202)

The second experience of modernity we identify as impacting Muslims is secularisation. Sociologists of religion see secularisation as a defining characteristic of society (e.g., Heelas, 1998).1 Charles Taylor (2007, p.  307) describes secularisation as the feeling that “our actions, goals, achievements … have a lack of weight, gravity, thickness, and substance. There is a deeper resonance which they lack, which we feel should be there.” Taylor’s observation of contemporary secular societies aligns with the point we made in Chap. 3 that there exists “a general state of existential disenchantment in the modern world”. A consequence of secularisation for many individuals is “the search for an over-arching significance” (Taylor, 2007, p. 309). The Tabligh Jama’at is aware of this situation. In France, Kepel (2000, p.  203) reports “the Tabligh [Tabligh Jama’at] … has targeted people that suffer from deep disorientation, ethical crises and loss of direction”. For Muslims suffering 1

 On the effects of secularisation on Muslims, see Olivier Roy (2004).

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from these ailments, the iman, Allah, self-reform and tabligh frames, with their weaving together of purposeful means and ends to undertake and reach in life, provide a framework that offers an over-arching significance. It is not surprising then that researchers report that Tablighis find meaning and purpose in preaching that alleviates a sense of disorientation and aimlessness that was experienced in their pre-Tablighi life. In Malaysia and Thailand, for example, Farish Noor reports: The spectacular success of the movement in recruiting a large number of urban followers was explained in terms of its ability to provide a sense of meaning and a comfort zone for working-class laborers who were suffering the alienating effects of rapid modernization and mass rural migration to the cities. (Noor, 2007, p. 8)

A young Tablighi in Pakistan describes the impact of preaching on his life: Before I was on the wrong life’s routine, just eating, sleeping, listening to songs, etc. It was aimless. I had no understanding of life, I was just following others. But now I have a new objective in life which is nothing else than what Allah told us in the Quran. I have a mission for the ummah. (Blom, 2017, p. 133)

For this individual, the tabligh frame’s association with the preaching activity of the prophets and Companions of Prophet Muhammad would lend it meaning and purposefulness, thereby enhancing its resonance. Farish Noor (2012) documents several conversion narratives of Tablighis in South East Asia that speak to the resonance of Tablighi framing in terms of being experientially commensurable with secularisation or a sense of purposelessness. For instance, one Indonesian Tablighi mentions about his pre-Tablighi life: “with all that money and material things, I was not really happy. After a while I began to feel depressed because my life was meaningless and I was not going anywhere” (Noor, 2012, p. 119). This individual one day meets a group of Tablighis to whom he asks who they are, and they reply: “that they were here to help other Muslims return to the path of Allah, and to become better people so that Allah would love us more” (Noor, 2012, p.  120). After meeting the Tablighi preaching party, the individual goes on to become a Tablighi, feeling “so loved by Allah at that point”. In this account, we see the resonance of the Allah

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frame, with its focus on Allah as a social actor with whom one can have a satisfying and meaningful relationship, things which modernity has failed to provide for many people. Unlike modernity, according to the Allah frame, Allah fulfils promises; therefore, the Allah frame would resonate with people who feel let down and disillusioned by modernity. To summarise this section, in terms of experiential commensurability, we find the tabligh frame, Allah frame, tabligh as a work frame amplification and rewards frame tap into the everyday experiences of socio-­ economic deprivation and secularisation. Preaching becomes an attractive activity because it is meaningful and its returns are rewards, peace and satisfaction in life—things modernity has failed to provide. Thus, as Jan Ali (2012, p. 262) notes, “like a job, a career and a social recognition in society with its inherent meaning, purpose and reward, opting for a Tablighi path allows the Tablighis an alternative way of making sense of life and being satisfied”. To conclude this section, we say with Pieri (2019, p. 367), “Bringing lapsed Muslims back to Islam is an objective that still resonates in the contemporary period”.

Frame Content In this section, we explore two characteristics of a movement’s framing that impacts its resonance: frame consistency and empirical credibility. Frame Consistency Frame consistency refers to the congruency between what activists say and do (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 620). Applying this measure to Tablighi framing, the amplification of the tabligh frame using the words “effort”, “sacrifice” and “responsibility” is reinforced visually by the scene of individuals travelling in groups expending their time, finances and energy to convey the message of Islam. In other words, Tablighis not only “talk the talk”—literally by conveying their message—but they “walk the walk” by roaming towns and villages all over the world. The tabligh frame requires physical movement outside one’s home and locality, and Tablighis are consistent in this activity. This aligning of words and actions lends to the Tablighi framing the quality of frame consistency.

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Empirical Credibility Empirical credibility is “the apparent fit between the framings and events in the world” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.  620). More specifically, “are there events or occurrences that can be pointed to as evidence for substantiating the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational claims of the movement?” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 208). The Muslim crisis frame posits the idea that Muslims are lacking in faith and Islamic praxis. There are real-world situations that evidence this idea. For instance, the Tabligh Jama’at emerged at a time when Muslims in the Mewat region of northern India were being converted in large numbers to Hinduism by Hindu missionary activity (Sikand, 2002, pp. 26–37). This situation was compounded by the fact that Meos were already worshipping Hindu deities and observing Hindu rituals (Marwah, 1979, p. 86; Aggarwal, 1978, p. 151). In fact, Shams (1983) suggests the Meos were nominal Muslims until well into the 1940s. Considering these points, the Muslim crisis frame would have had empirical evidence for Maulana Ilyas and the first Tablighis he recruited to assist his mission. Evidence for the validity of collective action frames may also be found in one’s personal life. Tablighis find evidence for the tabligh frame in the positive outcomes of participating in preaching tours. The following statement by a Tablighi in Pakistan captures the evidence for the tabligh frame: “When we come back home from dawat [preaching tour], we come back with a sense of peace. Dawat creates softness of temperament and makes us feel calm and cool … dawat awakens your spirit and brings Allah’s support” (Khan, 2016, p. 107). In Bangladesh, a Tablighi also relates positive personal circumstances to tabligh: “If I stay with this work [tabligh], I feel peace at home and work goes well, my boss never complains. Interesting, isn’t it? This is not a coincidence and it did not happen only once. If I do dawah [calling to Allah], I get this result regularly” (Siddiqi, 2018, p. 85). Both statements are examples of what Barbara Metcalf reports about Tablighis: “the participant gains through experiential states in this life the assurance that what he is doing is receiving divine blessing” (Metcalf, 1996, p. 243). Tablighis’ increased religiosity after participating in tabligh also lends the tabligh frame empirical credibility. A Tablighi in Australia says about tabligh: “I have changed. … My religious life has increased” (Ali, 2012, p. 197). He finds further evidence for the efficacy of tabligh in the positive impact that preaching has for other people he has come across:

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By the way, not only me but khuruj [preaching tour] has made other people change too. In Australia I have seen, for example, a lot of drug addicts and gangsters becoming involved in the religion because of the Tabligh Jama’at. They left the bad things and they don’t do bad things. … There are a lot of misbehaving teenagers and dysfunctional and dismantled families. A lot of broken families in Australia. Tabligh Jama’at has a lot of good effect on them. (Ali, 2012, p. 197)

Along the same line, in Indonesia, Arifin et al. (2021, p. 145) quote a female Tablighi as saying “There is increased spirit in performing religious practice after participating in Masturah [female Tablighi] program”. In the Fiji Islands, Jan Ali reports that the Tabligh Jama’at’s presence has had a noticeable impact on Muslim religiosity: Muslims, both men and women, who once did not know how to pray, were unaware of the distinction between halal (permissible) and haram (impermissible), could not read the Qur’an, had no basic knowledge and understanding of Islam (for example, of its five pillars), practiced gender integration, stayed away from the mosque, and engaged in secular pursuits, became pious and devout Muslims through the Tablighi initiative inspiring spiritual enlightenment and self-reformation. (Ali, 2018, p. 17)

Participating in the Tabligh Jama’at also helps young men in Central Asia to improve their lives. Reetz reports from Kyrgyzstan: Repeated narratives of respondents emphasised how young men in a particular village who used to drink and neglect “religious and social duties” after being out of work in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet system, started modifying their behaviour and attending religious services at local mosques after they had joined TJ [Tabligh Jama’at] activities (Reetz, 2017, p. 32).

Perhaps the most striking evidence or empirical credibility of the tabligh frame came with the transformation of the Meos of Mewat in the early days of the Tabligh Jama’at in India. Haq comments: In short time signs of the diffusion of faith began to appear in Mewat. … [Meos] began to give up Hindu mode of dress for the Muslim. Men stopped wearing bracelets and earrings and [started] growing beards. (Haq, 1972, pp. 114–115)

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For Muslims at the time, the transformation of the rugged, nominally Muslim and Islamically un-orthodox Meo Muslims into soft, pious, orthodox Muslims would have lent an incredible amount of empirical credibility to the tabligh frame. In addition to the tabligh frame, Tablighis also find in their personal lives evidence for the Allah frame, with its ideas of Allah as a powerful and merciful aid. Aziz (2004, p.  497) reports from his fieldwork with Indonesian Tablighis: “thus far, they can prove Allah’s promise, because their families are generally fine, their wives are well and their children are faithful and well behaved”. The following statement by a Tablighi in Pakistan shows that, for him, the Allah frame is reinforced in some of the simple facts of life: For 20 years, a person is mostly studying and does not really do any work. Who is feeding a person for those 20 years? Allah is feeding you! Who puts love in the hearts of mothers and fathers? Allah puts love in their hearts. Who puts the passion in parents’ hearts that they must nurture their child, one must care for the child, buy the child’s clothes, feed the child? Who puts this love in their hearts? Allah puts it in their hearts. (Khan, 2018, p. 63)

The natural world with daily miracles provides this individual with evidence of Allah’s power and aid to humans. In Kyrgyzstan, researchers report the evidence that local Muslims gave for the Allah frame at a time in 2010 when ethnic violence whirled in some parts of the country. During that time, there was relative peace in the town of Uzgen. For the local Tablighis of Uzgen, the peace in their town was seen as resulting from the tabligh work that had been undertaken up until that time in the immediate area (Pelkmans, 2017). Thus Pelkmans (2017, p. 119) reports: “it was proof that Allah protects those who go on dawat [calling people to Allah]”. Aligning with the concept of empirical credibility, she concludes her observations saying that khuruj (preaching tour) provides the atmosphere “in which signs of God’s presence became more credible” (Pelkmans, 2017, p. 122). Tablighi frames, however, are not always perceived as empirically credible. For instance, one Tablighi recalls how “a detractor of the group had challenged him by pointing out that, despite all of the tabligh activities taking place in Pakistan, the country remained unreformed, corrupt, and un-Islamic” (Dickson, 2009, p. 108). For this detractor, the iman, tabligh and self-reform frames are not supported by real-world transformation,

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because even with the implementation of these activities there remain aspects of society that are corrupt and unchanging. Ameer Ali, an academic, also finds a lack of evidence for the efficacy of iman and tabligh: In a number of countries where the movement is strong, “Going out on Tabligh” has resulted in dereliction of duties by professionals, neglect of studies by students, abandonment of family care by married individuals and bread-winners, and even demoralisation of team-spirit where collective effort is needed as in sports. (Ali, 2006, p. 57)

This statement shows that, rather than improving society, the iman and tabligh frames, with their attention to improving one’s Islamic praxis and the need to participate in preaching, are perceived as having a detrimental impact on several areas of public and private life. To summarise this section, in terms of empirical credibility, Tablighis find all the evidence for the iman, tabligh and Allah frames in their own lives. Positive outcomes in personal circumstances are explained as having resulted because of having participated in tabligh, increasing one’s iman, or because of Allah’s grace. However, we also find that, for others, there is a lack of evidence for Tablighi framing having a positive outcome in Muslim lives because for them the fact of the matter is that numerous problems continue to plague Muslims around the world.

Discussion The frame analysis undertaken in this and the previous chapter underlines the idea that the Tabligh Jama’at’s existence is owed in part to discursive activity that positions faith renewal and tabligh strategically in such a way that these practices resonate with individuals in contemporary societies. Figure 6.1 provides a visual summary of how Tablighi framing is structured and related to frame resonance and mobilisation. We see in it the interconnectedness of frame makers, frame receivers and frame content, a relationship we now dissect. Frame content and frame makers reinforce each other, with the former providing the beliefs, values and practices, which the latter actualise in their daily lives, what we might call “living the frame”. Frame content and frame makers interact directly with frame receivers, shaping how Muslims experience Tablighi ideas. Frame content provides the frames that communicate the grievances (“Muslim crisis”), strategy and tactics (“iman”,

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Frame Content Muslim Crisis Iman

Frame Receivers

Frame Makers

Muslims

Sub-Continent Heritage

Marginalised

Tabligh Self reform Allah Responsibility

Sincere

Aimless Alienated

Islamic praxis

Socio-economically deprived

Committed

Rewards Narrative Fidelity Consistency

Experiential Commensurability

Empirical Credibility

Credibility of Frame Makers

Frame Resonance

Consensus Mobilisation

Action Mobilisation

Fig. 6.1  Tabligh Jama’at frame resonance and mobilisation

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“tabligh”, “self-reform”) and motives (“Allah”, “rewards”, “responsibility”) that tell how and why Muslims should participate in faith renewal, while frame makers’ non-verbal and verbal devices assist in communicating Tablighi frames. In terms of how each factor contributes to frame resonance: from frame content what is required is frame consistency and frames that are supported by empirical evidence in the world; for frame receivers the necessary components are narrative fidelity and experiential commensurability; and frame makers’ contribution to frame resonance depends on the credibility of those communicating the Tabligh Jama’at’s frames. The extent to which these elements of the three factors are present or absent determines the overall frame resonance. If frame resonance is attained, a movement achieves consensus and action mobilisations. In addition to this mapping of Tablighi framing’s frame resonance, we identify two key findings of the analysis in this chapter. First, Islamic revivalism has differential resonance; that is, it appeals to some, but not all Muslims. We put this down to Muslim cultural, socio-economic and demographic heterogeneity: the immense variety of individuals to whom the Tabligh Jama’at preaches stretches beyond its message. Not all Muslims around the world follow the same “Islam”—some are orthodox while others hold onto pre-Islamic customs and beliefs. Thus, the iman frame, for example, which promotes orthodox Islamic rituals and beliefs in a South Asian tongue, may find mixed success in terms of the resonance factor of narrative fidelity. Second, we see in the Tabligh Jama’at the deployment of a hierarchy of grievances. At the top of this hierarchy is the Muslim crisis frame, which forwards the idea that all problems besetting Muslims are due to their decline in faith and Islamic praxis. Lower in the hierarchy are secondary grievances of socio-economic and meaning deprivations. This hierarchy was preached by Maulana Ilyas to the socio-economically deprived Meos at the beginning of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sikand (2002, p.  145) notes: “The Meos were repeatedly told that all their woes and miseries stemmed from a fundamental lack of faith in God and that if only they were to become true Muslims everything would be set right”. According to the tabligh and self-reform frames, to become a true Muslim one must undertake preaching and self-reform. Because these activities are available in the Tabligh Jama’at, many Muslims decide to become Tablighis and through participation in the movement solve their problems. Here, the Allah frame plays a key role in the hierarchy of grievances, as it frames Allah as not only

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aiding Tablighis during preaching tours, but in all aspects of their lives. The Allah frame thus becomes an important mobilising tool as stories about Allah’s grace and favour towards Tablighis “are told, retold and reworked as Tablighi activists narrate them to attract others to join the movement or to strengthen their own commitment” (Sikand, 2002, p. 191). To provide a few examples of the hierarchy of grievances at work in Tablighi discourse, we return to the bayan we attended at Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba, Sydney. In one bayan, we recorded: Allah will insha Allah change our ahwaal [i.e. conditions] through our a’maal [religious practices]. If we have the good ‘amals, this will change our condition. Today we are trying to change our condition through conditions. This is not going to be effective. The other way, if a condition comes, we try to change it through our a’maal. (Hisham, 15 August 2014)

Here, the speaker forwards the notion that faith renewal or Islamic praxis is the key to changing one’s personal conditions instead of what might seem to some the common-sense idea of resorting to more material means. This speaker went on to relate the story of a Companion of Prophet Muhammad. The Companion approached Prophet Muhammad with the problem of having many family members and not enough food to feed them all. He asked the Prophet what he should do. The speaker, Hisham, said: “the Prophet showed him some a’maal [religious practices]” (15 August 2014), which were litanies including recitation of verses of the Qur’an and blessings on Prophet Muhammad. The Companion began doing these a’maal and just as the Prophet had promised him, his conditions changed. Another speaker, Khairuzzaman (11 April 2014) relates a story with a similar message. A man had approached Maulana Muhammad Ilyas to ask him to blow on some water that his wife would drink and recover from an ailment. Maulana Ilyas said to the man to participate in a preaching group that was about to embark on a jola (local preaching round). The man responded in astonishment, “Maulana my wife is in pain, and you are saying for me to go on jola!” Ilyas said to him, “if you do the a’maal, through a’maal your problem can be solved much easier”. The man agreed to join the jola. During the jola, the man was able to check into his home. He saw that his wife was doing some cleaning around the house. On returning to

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Maulana Ilyas, the man informed him that his wife was now fine. Maulana Ilyas said to him, “learn to solve your problem through a’maal”. The message we gain from these stories is that personal problems should be addressed through religious practices.

Conclusion In this chapter we have aimed to answer the second research question identified in Chap. 3: Why or why not does Tabligh Jama’at framing resonate with individuals in contemporary society? Regarding this, we posit that Tablighi ideas can mobilise Muslims for tabligh because of a high degree of frame resonance of its frames owing to the credibility of frame makers, narrative fidelity, experiential commensurability, frame consistency and empirical credibility. Therefore, Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation is due in part to framing that packages Tablighi ideology coherently and relevantly, such that tabligh, faith renewal and self-reform become highly attractive, reasonable and satisfying practices to partake in.

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CHAPTER 7

Understanding the Renewal of Allah’s World

Abstract  This chapter examines the process of renewal of the modern world. Islamic revivalists including the members of the Tabligh Jama’at note that the processes of modernisation and secularisation have transformed the modern world in a very profound manner. They find the epoch in which we live—modernity—has become a new jahiliyah (a state of unGodliness). This jahiliyah has to be reversed and in the revivalist ethos it involves investing in the global renewal or social transformation, which is effectively building a God-focused global society. For the Tablighis the renewal or social transformation of the world is indirect through proselytisation. Proselytisation is a new revivalist tool used to cleanse syncretised religious beliefs and practices as well as bring about global social and cultural changes. Keywords  Modernity • Renewal • Social transformation • Jahiliyah • Islamic revivalists • Tablighi ideology

Introduction From the general Islamic revivalist perspective and the Tabligh Jama’at standpoint in particular, modernisation accompanied by secularisation has profoundly transformed the world in the epoch known as modernity. For many Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis, modernity is jahiliyah—a state © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. A. Ali, R. Sahib, A Sociological Study of the Tabligh Jama’at, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98943-9_7

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of unGodliness or Godlessness. This, they claim, has come about through the process of secularisation in terms of all or any of the following ways: • separation of the secular sphere from that of religion—profane-­ sacred dichotomy • a decline of religion through beliefs, practices and rituals • the privatisation of religion by removing it from the public sphere and confining it to private domain. As discussed in Chap. 3 in the reasonings of enlightenment and modernism, religion is perceived as opposed to reason and rationality, and is understood as separate from the public realm and confined to the private life of individuals. Perceived as the “bane” of political life, religion is thought to weaken in personal and social life through the process called secularisation. The process of modernisation is argued to have facilitated the major social transformations through industrialisation, urbanisation, rationalisation, bureaucratisation and globalisation affecting local communities and national societies. The concern Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis hold about modernity is that although in many ways it made life profoundly better with its manifest benefits it has at the same time brought a special variety of troubles into our lives. They claim that first and foremost the purposes of the practice of modernity are not to achieve the goals of salvation for oneself and others. They say individualism is a good example. Individualism makes the individual its focus based on the premise that the individual is a complete and most important entity in society whose interests take precedence over the interests of the state and a social group. Individualism promotes the exercise of one’s goals and desires, gives the individual the right to total freedom and self-realisation, and value independence and self-reliance. Individualism has produced popular sovereignty and displaced the sovereignty of God in society. Individualism has led to anthropocentrism, meaning humans have identified themselves as the most important entity within the cosmos— independent, self-reliant and self-sufficient. God has been “killed” and consequently God-focused society has been replaced with modernity at whose apex sits humans. Humans manage the world themselves, have their own rules, set of “moral” guidelines and create their own destiny as they will; humans are sovereign.

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All this, affirms Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis, is based on the tenet of modern society that science, technology and rationality can lead to human perfection and overcoming all that bedevils us. Humans, based on the conception of “perfection”, are made to refuse to accept that some things are inevitable and beyond human control. Humans are then led to believe that even death may one day be conquered and life will be everlasting. The problematic outcome of this grand vision of modernity, notes Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis, is that modernity has stripped life of meaningfulness and purposefulness to motivate performance and deliver life satisfaction. Many people, whether religious or not, are in a state of crisis and despair. Human perception of progress and mastering of nature have overshadowed human ongoing imperfections and complex multidimensional crisis of modernity. Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis assert that the world is Allah’s creation; therefore, humans have no claim of ownership over it. Humans are simply its custodians or vicegerents. As such, Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis want to renew or re-make this world, that is, to reinstate God as something bigger, mightier and nobler than us, to guide and protect us. As we saw in Chaps. 4 and 5, these ideas constitute the Allah frame. This frame posits that goodness, security and prosperity are attainable through Allah’s will and grace, and Allah’s grace is only attainable through turning to Him through iman (faith), self-reform and tabligh (preaching). Thus, modernity, notes Islamic revivalists and the Tablighis, no doubt needs science, technology and rationality but more than that it needs God to avert its ever-growing crisis. In this chapter, we will examine the renewal paradigm of Islamic revivalists, in particular the Tablighis. The principal aim is to understand the renewal process or social transformation of the modern world within the Islamic revivalist framework. In Chap. 3 we discussed what Islamic revivalists have identified as the problem of the modern world or modernity so will not be explored again here. Instead, we will concentrate on Islamic revivalists’ investment in renewal or social transformation, which is effectively building a God-focused society. A point worth noting here is that Islamic revivalists such as the Tablighis don’t seek the direct active social transformation or remaking of God-­ focused world. The renewal or social transformation of the world is indirect through personal transformation known as proselytisation to affect social transformation. The proselytisation efforts not only involve merely

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personal effects but also socio-cultural effects. Proselytisation as a sociological phenomenon is not limited only to a transformation in religious beliefs and activities but accompanied by social and cultural changes. Proselytisation alters an individual’s identity and leads to renewal or social transformation.

Renewal as a Form of Social Transformation Renewal is a process of seeking the state of purification and religiously motivated social transformation. Thus, in this work we use the terms renewal and social transformation interchangeably. It is a form of activism involving a variety of efforts for the welfare of all citizens and proselytisation including teaching and appealing to the scripture. It involves the power of religion and forces of religious vitality reasserting themselves as personal and public phenomena. Renewal is an apolitical form of “resistance” carried out by revivalists as active agents in the creation of meaning and the selection of religious possibilities in response to humiliating conditions of life in local and international contexts brought about by modernisation. It denotes the reconceptualisation and reconstitution of particularly the public sphere and the collapsing of the sacred and profane into one. Often following a period of spiritual decline and dramatic social changes leading to a sense of moral decline and cultural crisis renewal is when religious beliefs and practices change swiftly, and religious enthusiasm increases rapidly. Sometimes referred to as “awakening”, renewal is often accompanied by en masse proselytisation and broad-ranging social reforms. For Islamic revivalists, renewal is a means to follow Prophet Muhammad as a disciple and refers to a religiously conceived social transformation through which transition from religious exclusion to religious inclusion in all spheres of life occurs. In this endeavour, previously excluded Muslims and their activities in the society are now thought by revivalists to be included in social, economic and political opportunities and processes, structures and power. The transformation, they believe, manifests in Muslims’ positively altered condition, growing potential for spiritual salvation, new opportunities for upward mobility for those unable to prosper in the inequitable materialistic system and them living together in organised communities. The renewal undertaken by Islamic revivalists is seen by them as contributing to the formation of new Muslim identity, new social

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equality and to the growth in integration of spiritual ideas and practices into socio-economic and political order and processes. However, how Islamic revivalists bring about renewal in society varies from movement to movement. Revivalists’ applied methods are not singular or in any meaningful unison. The only common factor is Islam; whatever it is or means, Islamic revivalists define “Islam” to be the global system. This is because Islamic revivalism is not a unitary phenomenon and Islamic revivalists are not a single movement. Due to space restriction, it is not possible to enter a deep discussion about this here, but suffice it to say that Islamic revivalism constitutes a diverse range of actors and movements with no centre or overall pan-Islamic revolutionary leadership, thus making it multifarious and varied. Importantly, Islamic revivalists differ from one another in their epistemology and hermeneutics and there is a wide proliferation of worldviews and political readings of Islam. The revivalist thoughts, theories and practices from which to initiate the project of establishing an Islamic state and a new global social cosmos as the core objective and purpose of Islamic revivalism also vary widely. The social transformation occurs, what we discussed in Chap. 3, in response to the crisis of modernity and specific factors such as social inequality, economic challenges and political conflicts. Crisis also pertains to the frustration and personal dissatisfactions felt by individuals. In modern societies, a shift has occurred, resulting in religion asserting certain power and authority. Although attempts by modernisation to undermine “religious cosmology” have been incessant, and religious beliefs and practices have been profoundly affected by the process, these factors have not killed religion but laid the foundations for religious resurgence (Giddens, 1991). As the technological, economic and cultural chaos increases and modernity loses its grip on individuals through increased individualism, individuals become increasingly isolated, disillusioned and question the purpose of life. Individuals encounter problems in constructing their own individual self-identities because the modern institutions fail to provide adequate structure to guide them through life. Individuals pursue life in a moral vacuum with a sense of personal meaninglessness and purposelessness. They suffer in large numbers from “ontological security”, meaning “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344) and “existential anxiety”—they don’t really know what to do or how to pursue a meaningful life. It is in such a situation of de-rootedness, disillusionment and emptiness that religion acts as a panasea, a  source of

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meaningfulness, motivation and values that nourish an ethics of productive citizenship and a saviour providing individuals with a moral compass, a sense of purpose and direction, grounding and anchorage, solidarity and mutual respect (Ali, 2012). In appreciation of the fact that religion has not faded away under the weight of modernisation, religion assumes a global vitality and pivotal role in these individuals who then seek social transformation to further better their lives. The social transformation describes how global processes of change influence local communities and national societies. Social transformation is often used in conjunction with “social change”; therefore, there is repeated interchangeability between them. Generally speaking, in the concept of social transformation, “transformation” denotes a complete or marked change and is concerned with qualitative growth, usually for the better, involving a process of change to alter the fundamental features in a system or producing shifts in structures, that is, institutional and cultural changes, and in agency enabling individuals to employ different pathways (Polanyi, 1944; Hackmann & St. Clair, 2012; Schoon et  al., 2011). Transformation in the context of religious revivalism refers to change usually from something irreligious to something with an improved religious appearance or usefulness or the shift from exclusion to inclusion in all spheres of everyday living. When transformation occurs, the previously disadvantaged and excluded individuals in communities become included in social, cultural, economic and political processes, institutions and structures of power. Social transformation then can be explained as a process of change in institutionalised relationships, norms, values, interactions and interpersonal relations, and practices over time. It is the way society undergoes changes based on economic growth, scientific and technological innovations and political manoeuvrabilities. From the sociological perspective, change is connected to the structure that undergoes modifications and to the cause that produces the change. Groenewald offers a very helpful explanation of the concept of social transformation remarking that to transform is to change in form or appearance; in condition, nature or character. The social is concerned with human beings in their relations to each other, their living conditions, and living together in organized c­ ommunities. … Social transformation, accordingly, refers to change in human relationships, communities and the living conditions of people. It is the processes of change in the condition of life of people, and the qualitative change in the nature and character of human societies. (Groenewald, 2000, p. 18)

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The term also means a change of form or situation; therefore, social transformation is understood as comprehensive social change in terms of socio-cultural, economic and political restructurings or transformations. Okanlawon (2012) maintains the first takes place with the individual and the second happens with the social system. He goes on to explain that “Social transformation, in the context of social system, requires a shift in the collective consciousness of a society, such that reality is refined by consensus” (Okanlawon, 2012, p. 463). Castles (2001, p. 15) also makes an important contribution to the discussion of the concept, arguing that social transformation materialises in response to factors such as social disharmonies, cultural challenges, economic crises and political disturbances. To put it another way, social transformation explains how global processes of change impact local communities and national societies (Castles, 2001, p. 18). Applying these parameters to the phenomenon of religious revivalism and drawing on the notion of inclusion mentioned earlier, it means that social transformation is revivalists’ demand to be included after a long period of social, cultural, economic and political exclusion. Social transformation is a micro and macro phenomenon. On a macro scale, the activities of the state, social organisations and civil institutions, which offer vast opportunities, services and support, for example, educational centres, affect national societies and the entire world, spreading their influences and impacts far outside the local setting in which they initially operate and move beyond that space and directly influence individuals. This means the activities of individuals and the society operate within the network of macro and micro forces, sometimes independently and sometimes in conjunction with one another. These two levels cannot be treated as separate but are closely connected because they in fact have significant relations to one another as we will see below. From a sociological perspective, Islamic revivalists work at two levels to transform society: at macro and micro levels. Sometimes these levels are connected and sometimes not, as we will see below.

Macro Level At the macro level of renewal as a form of social transformation in the specific context of Islamic revivalism and Islamic revivalist endeavours, changes are sought in the entire society and beyond this in the whole world. As mentioned earlier and in other chapters, Islamic revivalists find the modern world has drowned in jahiliyah (a state of unGodliness).

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According to them, the plight of the modern world is jahilic—a state in which a “false” system of government and worshipping “false” Gods other than one “true” Allah are pervasive. They claim, in Muslim societies in particular and societies of the world generally, that God’s sovereignty has been discarded and replaced with popular sovereignty. They say that life in modern societies is governed under manmade law. In them, people worship human leaders and their ideologies instead of God. They argue this has led to the prevalence of turpitude, decadence, corruption, injustice and tyranny as widespread illnesses in society. Thus, the absence of God’s sovereignty and people worshipping creation and not the Creator, they say, are the basic proofs of the existence of jahiliyah warranting immediate actions from the righteous believers. Islamic revivalists’ concept of renewal or social transformation originated from these conditions involving countering the prevailing state of ignorance in the society, and freeing individuals from what they consider to be the clutches of unGodliness (Mohamed, 2013). How renewal is pursued varies, in terms of method, from movement to movement, because of varying prognostic frames, but all revivalists start with putting Islam first and foremost, that is, Islam as a universal religion with a universal message and the sole purpose of human welfare. One of the most prominent twentieth-century architects of Islamic revivalism, Mawdudi, elucidates: Islam is not a ‘religion’ in the sense this term is commonly understood. It is a system encompassing all fields of living. Islam means politics, economics, legislation, science, humanism, health, psychology and sociology. It is a system which makes no discrimination on the basis of race, color, language or other external categories. Its appeal is to all mankind. It wants to reach the heart of every human being. (2006, Ch. 7)

At the heart of this message is an idea of tawhid (oneness of God) and the Divine notion of justice, “O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives. Whether one is rich or poor, Allah is more worthy of both” (Qur’an 4:135). Mawdudi’s protégé, Qutb, explains: One consequence of belief in the Oneness of Allah is that Allah Most High is the Lord and Sovereign of men not merely in their beliefs, concepts, consciences, and rituals of worship, but in their practical affairs … the Muslim

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believes that there is no true rules above him except Allah, no legislation for him except Allah, no one except Allah to inform him concerning his relationships and connections with the universe, with other living creatures, and with one’s fellow human beings. This is why the Muslim turns to Allah for guidance and legislation in all spheres living [emphasis added], whether it be political governance, economic justice, personal behavior, or the norms and standards of social intercourse. (Qutb, 1991, p. 191)

Hence, Islamic revivalists make the point that humans are Allah’s khalifah (vicegerent) on earth and it is everyone’s responsibility to contribute to the establishment of a just society in which individuals can live in peace and harmony under God’s law and spread His teachings. However, not all human beings are believers and, from those who are, not everyone is righteous; therefore, from Islamic revivalists’ viewpoint, although all Muslims should work and struggle for justice and remove corruption, immorality and tyranny (Nasr, 1996), only the righteous can do this with precision and success (Ali, 2012). These righteous believers are seen by revivalists to be God’s vicegerents on earth and their main task is to engage in establishing a just and virtuous caliphate. Upon establishing the caliphate, these righteous believers, suggest revivalists, will operate the caliphate with God as the sovereign and in light of His law—shari’ah. The caliphate will operate as an organ of national sovereignty, in centre stage of collective life, anticipate the revivalists. From the Islamic revivalist point of view, establishing the caliphate is part of the broader agenda of global social transformation. This agenda is based on Islamic scripture—the Qur’an and hadith—and the transvaluation of Islamic early history to make Islamically appropriate and legitimate responses to upheavals in modern societies and the crisis of modernity. Without going into detail, it is acknowledged there is a problem with this process because there are many different interpretations of Islamic scripture and Islamic early history that how global social transformation will be carried out by revivalists is as vague as the idea of a caliphate. Nevertheless, the transformation for revivalists is necessary and revolutionary, involving total restructuring of society including its social, cultural, economic and political dimensions. They expect the transformation will deliver revolutionary changes in the economic structures, development and expansion in infrastructure, improvements in advanced industries and technologies, increase in opportunities of universal upward mobility for all, advancement in vocational training and education, efficiency in bureaucracy,

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affordability in healthcare and medical services, improvement and transparency in state and political accountability, amelioration in social and economic inequalities, correction in marginalisation, and an anchorage in Islam proper. Not just this but the revivalists expect that, with the establishment of the caliphate, there will be total Islamisation not only of the knowledge and society but the entirety of life with the state institutions, for instance, handling all marital issues such as marriage, divorce and burial and all state institutions will have statutory status including education, law and medicine. The superiority of the state over religion and Islam as a form of civil religion (series of beliefs, prayers and rituals) will no longer exist and instead state and religion will become one and Islam will become a complete comprehensive way of life. With this will follow the gradual “Islamisation” of Muslim identity—a return to Islamic religiosity as well as a conspicuous return to an Islamic identity. Bayat (2007) explains that Islamic revivalists construct an Islamic ideology that responds to society’s prevailing socio-cultural, economic and political malaise. They see, he suggests, Islam as an all-encompassing foolproof system and ultimate solution to the crisis of society. Islam is a fully “universal” faith—a din (religion) and wa dunya (temporal world). It is a complete living Islamic tradition that needs to be embedded in the modern world and must form a real part of the overall experience of global living. According to this revivalist line of thinking, Islam is not merely a “religion” in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayers and rituals and practices but a complete way of life with guidance for social behaviour, religious practices, economic endeavours and political processes. Bayat asserts that Islam is a divine system, with its superior political model, cultural codes, legal structure and economic arrangement—a system that responds to all human problems. More importantly, this Islam was to offer Muslims a sense of self-respect, self-confidence, and a discursive autonomy. (Bayat, 2007, p. 14)

Shahin explains that the goal of Islamic revivalists is not based on accelerating the process of development, nor on a desire to block ongoing changes taking place in society. On the contrary, they aim at redirecting the political orientation of their respective countries from secularism to Islamism. (Shahin, 1997, p. 241)

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Islam is seen by revivalists as the source of satisfaction, salvation and success. It is understood as a total “living universe”. Living in such a universe is the only way to experience “true” success. They want to infuse the new global social universe with Islamic symbols, rituals and institutions in the public sphere, rendering religion a private and public affair. By lifting the ban, they argue, on Islamic symbols in public spaces and making Islam part and parcel of private and public life, the modern experience can be one in which Muslims can freely express and enjoy their Islamic identity and heritage (Ali, 2012). They posit that the “God-Man and universe-­ centred” worldview is central to Islam, which secular material modernity has ripped apart. Revivalists’ project of building a new global social universe involves, in essence, what Voll says is the process of “Islamization of the modern experience” (1991, p. 24). Islamisation of the modern experience entails the reintroduction of Islamic symbols, rituals, processes and institutions in the public sphere, rendering Islam faith and practice as a private and public matter. The Islamic revivalist paradigm can be explained diagrammatically, as illustrated below in Fig.  7.1. It shows that crisis of Islam and Muslims manifest itself (highlighted in the middle circle) in a variety of forms (identified in the surrounding four circles), for example, Westernisation and secularisation of Muslim society, Western usurpation and exploitation, weak Muslim political regime, and rampant poverty and discrimination in Muslim society. The crisis of Islam and Muslims then generate several responses for Islamic revivalists, four of which are noted in the diagram with arrows pointing downwards towards the “crisis of Islam and Muslims”.

Micro Level At micro level, a level at which the Tablighis work, the transformation of society is sought indirectly in the power of “self-reformation” or what is often referred to as proselytisation, by which qualities of character within an individual are changed, improved and aligned with Allah’s instructions. Proselytisation is not a single event but a process over time of religious change that occurs in people, ideologies, institutions and orientations. The context in which proselytisation takes place is by nature macro and micro but more micro than macro because it encompasses the total situation in which an individual lives including the social, economic, interpersonal and political. Proselytism is the action where potential proselytisees

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Westernisation and secularisation of Muslim society

Crisis of Muslim society - Unemployment - Poverty - Discrimination - Ineqaulity - Marginalisation

Crisis of Islam and Muslims

Western usurpation and exploitation

Weak, inefficient, unprofessional and corrupt Muslim political regimes

Fig. 7.1  Islamic revivalist paradigm

put themselves in situations where their need for resolution or meaning can be fulfilled and at the same time due to their willingness they incorporate all they learned during proselytisation into their life experience.

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The reformed self is a “good” Muslim who acts as a human agent for Allah receiving His guidance, grace and help to spread Allah’s message and bring about positive changes in society. The Tabligh Jama’at’s self-­ reform frame, its theological doctrine of self-reformation or regeneration, teaches its members that Allah produces this change in a person when a sacred path is preferred over a profane path. The person’s qualities of character are being changed by yearning for Allah and following the sunnah (sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) then the individuals are turned into a greater likeness to Prophet Muhammad. Thus, there will be a change of heart, feeling, value, purpose, cause and will. Individuals will feel new sources of happiness, make new friends and memories and follow new desires. The whole self and life will change following the path of Prophet Muhammad. Yet, this newness is not achieved instantly or in one hit, or in some cases even in this lifetime, but is a slow process that takes time to reach maturity. This change shouldn’t be interpreted as merely personal because personal change affects changes at social level in society and Tablighis see these changes occurring to make society and culture more like Allah’s will being done on earth. The religious change—proselytisation—results not only in personal transformation but social transformation as well. Rambo (1993) notes that the effects of proselytisation in any religious context are not merely personal but socio-cultural. Robinson (2003, p. 314) remarks that proselytisation “as a sociological phenomenon is rarely limited only to a transformation in religious beliefs. Social and cultural changes always accompany it”. Iyadurai (2014) emphasises that proselytisation leads to social transformation. Describing proselytisation as a form of conversion, he asserts that [t]he effect of religious conversion is not only personal transformation but also social transformation. The core of the transformation is the new identity obtained in conversion. The new identity enables the community to have a positive self-image in light of the conversion experience. Conversion is an ongoing process both for individual and community. (Iyadurai, 2014, p. 14)

Tablighis note the Qur’an and hadith are replete with narrations that explain transformation of societies happening in the past with Allah’s help and will. Tablighis acknowledge that transformation of society is not exclusively based on revival in terms of self-reformation but they posit the

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power of this aspect of revival shouldn’t be underestimated. Also, what shouldn’t be underestimated is the power of prayer; praying to Allah and appealing for His help so society can be changed into a greater degree of closeness to His kingdom on earth is vitally important from the point of view of the Tabligh Jama’at. Tablighis therefore emphasise prayer (salat) as a means of achieving selfless unification with Allah and through prayer they attempt to unite with Allah. This unification is critical because, once united with Allah, Tablighis claim they can then seek His grace and help directly and promptly. One very useful tool used by the Tablighis in their endeavours to reform individuals and re-make the world is khuruj (preaching tour). Khuruj is built on the Tablighi ideology, which centres on the relationship between the faithful and Allah, what we observed in Chaps. 4 and 5 as the Allah frame. The Allah frame’s central claim is that nothing is as important and worthwhile as establishing, then cherishing, this relationship. More broadly, according to Tablighi ideology, Islam consists first of certain beliefs, such as believing in one unique God, the existence of angels, believing in God’s revelations and in prophets, the Last Day and the next life, and the manifestation of these beliefs in the form of worship such as salat (prayer), charity and fasting, all of which relate to the faithful’s relationship with Allah. Second, a framework of morality, which relates to human beings’ relationships with each other and manifests in particular institutions and laws such as family, marriage and social and criminal laws. However, the basis of this faith, the spirit that gives it meaning and life, is the faithful’s relationship with Allah. This relationship is responsible for the source, importance and final approval of the values of morality and their incorporation into a distinct socio-cultural and legal structure. If the inside is in direct communication with Allah and draws guidance and inspiration from Him, then this compares to the spirit within the essence of the outer religion. However, if this diminishes, becomes weak or disappears totally, the outer appearance or outer essence of the faith becomes meaningless and the relationship between the faithful and Allah remains merely in name. In other words, it is the faithful’s inner relationship with Allah that gives meaning and value to their outward expression of belief and the performance of their religious obligations. Khuruj is a dynamic process and the “engine” that drives the Tabligh Jama’at. As we saw in Chap. 4, a key component of Tablighi ideology is the tabligh prognostic frame, which posits that the solution for faith renewal and revival is Muslims’ personal striving in preaching. Khuruj is a

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trichotomous paradigm entailing ta‘lim (teaching), jola (preaching mission) and bayan (religious sermon). Essentially, khuruj can be described as an institutionalised form of worship in which efforts are harnessed to move closer to Allah through spiritual enlightenment and the abandonment of all material pursuits. The process of khuruj is about reforming oneself as well as others; its aim is to form a group and embark on a preaching tour for a specific period—three days, forty days or four months—to learn din (religion) to reform oneself and then help others embrace din in their lives. At a time when human living is globally dictated by the imperatives of material capitalism, Tablighis argue it is therefore particularly important to retreat from this form of living for a brief time and engage exclusively in worship and pure spiritualism. The purpose of a khuruj is simple and straightforward. It is to invite towards the Right Path those who have become engrossed in the world of materialism and consequently have given no thought to or made no preparation for the life in the Hereafter. The principal purpose of a khuruj is to remind wrongdoing and negligent Muslims that preparations should be made for the life awaiting them in the Hereafter. The best preparation is not in the accumulation of wealth but in doing good deeds, that is, any engagement in the service of Allah. The best way these deeds can be earned and multiplied is by leaving loved ones and the familiar pattern of everyday living behind, making sacrifices and spending one’s earnings and material possessions in the path of Allah. Tablighis claim that khuruj provides a kind of spiritual retreat during which one finds not only peace and serenity but closeness to Allah. As Barbara Metcalf (1994, p. 709) notes, “the tour [khuruj] is meant to represent a radical break with all enmeshments, including the intense face-to-­ face hierarchies of family and work typical for most people”. Consumed by the everyday hustle and bustle of material life, the khuruj provides an outlet to develop a bond with Allah. Instead of seeking serenity and relaxation in mainstream activities, such as sports, weekends away, picnics and expensive entertainment, the khuruj for the Tablighis acts as a substitute. Khuruj is a mobile means of training and learning through which one seeks the withdrawal from matters of controversy and mundane activities by devoting time and effort in the exaltation of Allah. Thus, learning and expressing respect, showing tolerance, communicating in a gentle and kind way, using simple and polite language, exercising self-control and making every effort to implement shari’ah in all spheres of life are some of the achievements of going out on a khuruj.

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A khuruj, therefore, provides a more favourable environment in which doing good deeds are made easier, helping the participants achieve the much-desired bond with their Creator. Metcalf (1994, p.  709) explains this by saying, “At the simplest and most explicit level, travel, [khuruj] like a retreat, allow for focused worship and attention to spiritual life and obligations”. This bond, suggest Tablighis, is important because in it is a Divine promise and a path to Heaven in the afterlife. This, they see, is the ultimate purpose of life. Tablighis claim that, like anything in life, initiative, effort and commitment are required, and if Muslims can do these and take up the challenge by going out in the path of Allah, they will succeed. Their success will be in the open for all to see and emulate, and this emulation is social in character with the power to transform and remake the society and the world currently steeped in jahiliyah. The focus here is the “self” as the social agent (Turner, 1974). As we saw in Chap. 4, the self-reform frame urges Tablighis to engage in total self-reformation, seeking the elimination of individual problems through a change in personal character and individual improvement as a means of contributing to social transformation. Self-reformation, from the perspective of the Tabligh Jama’at, is the first step towards social transformation. It is the self that needs to be remade first before embarking on the mission of remaking the world. Self-reformation demands personal renewal and individual reform for the betterment of self. Motivated by Qur’anic promises of a blissful existence in the next life and the idea of salvation in inviting people towards good and stopping them from doing evil, the movement carves out a path to conquering the “hearts” of Muslims. Seeking to penetrate the core of Muslim consciousness and making Muslims seek Allah’s forgiveness, a faith in Allah is evoked again. By calling others towards righteousness (khuruj), one learns about the “self” first. One learns about their own strengths and weaknesses. In material modernity, a “good life” and “successful life” are measured by the possession of material wealth. The Tabligh Jama’at sees the “good life” purely in a spiritual sense; it is devoid of materialism. Halal (permissible) earning, peace of mind, contentment, pleasure in worship, love for Allah and worldly success procured by lawful means constitute “authentic success”. Therefore, “authentic success” is the success in this world and in life after death. It is described as a complete “package”, which the modern world so desperately needs and the movement is involved in delivering.

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Conclusion The modern world, according to Islamic revivalists, is in a state of jahiliyah. Over the years, the world has gradually moved towards this state because, as the Muslim crisis frame posits, Muslims, as the vicegerents of God on earth, have been derelict in their religious and social duties. Modernisation accompanied by secularisation has been progressing at such a lightning pace that catching up to it has been a serious challenge for Muslims. The aim of revivalists is to change this jahili (anti-Islamic) state of the modern world by infusing Islamic values and practices into it; it seeks to do this through the revival of Islam or what we have described above as renewal as a social transformation. To affect social transformation of the modern world, micro- and macro-­ level approaches are needed. Islamic revivalists in general take a macro approach, seeking social transformation from above with the establishment of the caliphate—a top-down approach. A specific movement such as the Tabligh Jama’at with an apolitical posture seeks to affect change in the jahiliyah-steeped world with a micro-level approach. Anticipating the world to transform the movement seeks proselytisation in Muslims and self-reformation so reformed Muslims can become models for fellow Muslims and non-Muslims to emulate. Once enough Muslims are reformed and Islam becomes a standard pattern of global living, renewal is complete and the world is saved from self-destruction.

References Ali, J. (2012). Islamic revivalism encounters the modern world: A study of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sterling Publishers. Bayat, A. (2007). Islam and democracy: What is the real question? Amsterdam University Press. Castles, S. (2001) Studying social transformation. International Political Science Review, 22(1), 13–32. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Polity. Groenewald, C. (2000). Social transformation: Between globalization and localization. Scriptura, 72, 15–29. Hackmann, H., & St. Clair, A. (2012). Transformative cornerstones of social science research for global change. International Social Science Council. Iyadurai, J. (2014). Religious conversion and social transformation. In D. Leeming (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion (pp. 1513–1514). Springer.

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Mawdudi, S. (2006). Towards understanding the Quran (Z. Ishaq Ansari, Trans.). The Islamic Foundation Metcalf, B. (1994). ‘Remaking ourselves’: Islamic self-fashioning in a global movement of spiritual renewal. In M. Marty & R. Scott Appleby (Eds.), Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements (pp.  706–725). University of Chicago Press. Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma. European Journal of International Relations, 12(3), 341–370. Mohamed, Y. (2013). Muslim fundamentalism: The case of Sayyid Qutb. Scriptura, 99, 379–387. Nasr, S. (1996). Mawdudi and the making of Islamic Revivalism. Oxford University Press. Okanlawon, S. (2012). The church in the apostolic period as an agent of socio-­ religious transformation: Implications for the Church in Nigeria. In A. Samuel (Ed.), Biblical studies and social transformation in Africa (pp.  461–475). Nigerian Association for Biblical Studies. Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. Rinehart. Qutb, S. (1991). The Islamic concept and its characterizations. American Trust Publications. Rambo, L. (1993). Understanding religious conversion. Yale University Press. Robinson, R. (2003). Sixteenth century conversion to Christianity in Goa. In S. Clarke & R. Robinson (Eds.), Religious conversion in India: Modes, motivations, and meanings (pp. 291–317). Oxford University Press. Schoon, M., Fabricius, C., Anderies, J., & Nelson, M. (2011). Synthesis: Vulnerability, traps, and transformations—long-term perspectives from Archaeology. Ecology and Society, 16(2), 24. http://www.ecologyandsociety. org/vol16/iss2/art24/ Shahin, E. (1997). Political ascent: Contemporary Islamic movements in North Africa. Westview Press. Turner, B. (1974). Weber and Islam: A critical study. Routledge. Voll, J. (1991). Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan. In M. Marty & R. Appleby (Eds.), Fundamentalisms observed: the fundamentalism project (Vol. 1, pp. 349–402). The University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Abstract  In this chapter we provide closing remarks vis-à-vis the main thesis of this book that working for Allah or the renewal of Allah’s world with the Tabligh Jama’at is a personally satisfying activity that grants Muslims meaning, social solidarity and satisfaction—the things that modernity has failed to provide them. We conceptualise the ideological dimension of working for the renewal of Allah’s world as Tablighi framing where, through collective action frames and frame amplification, Tablighi texts construct a reality in which preaching is a meaningful and rewarding activity. We end by suggesting avenues for further research into the ideological dimension of working for Allah. Keywords  Tabligh Jama’at • Islamic revivalism • Modernity • Frame Theory • Frame analysis • Mobilisation Islamic revivalism is a reaction to modernity—a concerted effort to infuse the modern world with an Islamic consciousness and blueprint for the establishment of just and God-centred social, economic, cultural and political institutions in society. We argue in this study that in the case of the Tabligh Jama’at revivalist movement, this reaction is expressed and carried out by working for Allah through preaching. Preaching or tabligh

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work produces a feeling of satisfaction that pervades the life of a Muslim—a feeling that modernity has failed to provide them. Tablighis are thus not only motivated by an important mission to overturn the jahiliyah (Godlessness) found in the world, but by the enjoyment and satisfaction this mission brings them. The Islamic revivalist reaction against modernity has come about because of centuries of social transformation under modernity. The processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation, democratisation and the development of an empirical–analytical approach to knowledge ushered in the transition from a rural-based and church-influenced way of life to urban, industrialised, secular ideas of success and happiness. The transition saw rationality and science replace tradition and religion as the forces shaping society. A consequence of the social transformation of society under modernity was the disenchantment or de-religionisation of society. In Chap. 3 we identify two key trends underpinning this phenomenon: secularism and secularisation. Secularism is an ideology that emphasises the separation of church and state, and purports the need for knowledge, ideals and actions to be free from religious influence. Secularisation is the process through which secularism materialises. Via secularisation, key social, economic, cultural and political institutions of society become religion-free. The attempt to extirpate religion from any meaningful place in society corresponds to replacing God with the human being at the apex of society. In Chap. 7, we identify individualism as the result of this process. Individualism sees the flooding of greed and selfishness into society because it purports that the interests of the individual take precedence over the interests of the social group and society. No longer do people aspire to equality, social cohesion and social solidarity with fellow humans, but each person desires to have the most power, wealth or importance—in other words, people desire to be like God. Ostensibly, the outcome of secularisation and individualism has been negative, as widespread manmade catastrophes have ensued: wars and genocides, devastation of natural environment, corruption in government, economic inequality, social injustices and lack of wellbeing and mental health to take just a few examples. These conditions produce in people feelings of meaninglessness, de-rootedness, futurelessness, hopelessness, depravity and material and spiritual deprivation. We argue then that due to these crisis situations all over the world, the project of modernity—the

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re-­making of the world according to secular ideas of progress—has failed drastically. It is this historical process of modernity, culminating in the present crisis situation, that has compelled religious revivalists from all religions to act to restore the world. Sociologists such as Peter Berger (1999) identify this resurgence of religion as the desecularisation of the world. For their part in this desecularisation, Islamic revivalists pursue social transformation of society at two levels—macro and micro. At the macro level, revivalists posit that Islam must become the source of the ideals, norms and values that inform government policy-making and the running of social, economic, cultural and political institutions. At the micro level, revivalists posit that Islam must provide the beliefs, rituals and values that colour people’s everyday lives and aspirations. The Islamic revivalist movement such as the Tabligh Jama’at plays a key role at the micro level of social transformation. It does so by face-to-face preaching where Tablighis visit Muslims in their own homes and local mosques. This preaching reminds Muslims of Allah, the Afterlife and the lives and mission of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. In this way, Tablighis are workers for Allah, working to restore remembrance of Allah and the way of life Allah has ordained for human beings. Working for Allah has an end in mind—the eventual transformation of the world along Islamic lines—which no doubt inspires Tablighis to invest their time, money and energy in preaching. However, the “working”—the preaching as well as self-reform and faith renewal undertaken during preaching tours—is an important facet of Islamic revival, because through it Tablighis gain identity, social solidarity and social mobility, and experience a sense of personal satisfaction via developing a deep and lasting relationship with Allah (Ali, 2012). Coincidentally, modernity had promised these things, but it failed to deliver on its promises, leaving a gaping hole in people’s lives. This is where preaching, faith renewal and self-reform carried out by the Tabligh Jama’at become important sociological phenomena in contemporary society, because the positive outcomes they produce for Muslims have filled the hole in their lives created by negative social processes of modernity. In summing up these points on Islamic revivalism and the crisis of modernity, we posit that the negative experiences of modernity—disorientation, alienation, socio-economic deprivation and dissatisfaction—that secularisation has produced in societies around the world, represent the push factors of participation in the Tabligh Jama’at. Push factors are those

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experiences and conditions that cause people personal dissatisfaction and suffering; therefore, they create an urge to seek an alternative way of life that might garner meaning and personal satisfaction. To complement this understanding of why Muslims participate in the Tabligh Jama’at, in this study we have also explored the pull factors of participation—Tablighi ideology and ideas. We did this by applying Frame Theory to the study of the Tabligh Jama’at. In Chap. 5 we undertook a frame analysis of Tablighi written and oral texts, where we explored their strategic discursive constructs (collective action frames) and framing process (frame amplification). We saw, through motivational framing, the incentivisation of faith renewal and preaching through their association with Heavenly rewards and a relationship with Allah. We identified the Allah frame—the idea of Allah as a powerful being who grants special attention and grace to those engaged in faith renewal and preaching—as the central node that lends meaning and potency to the other Tablighi frames. The frame analysis in Chap. 5 also allowed us to posit that mediating Tablighi ideology and Tablighi social action are Tablighi values—effort, work, sacrifice, enjoining the good and forbidding the bad—which represent the desirable traits of preachers. In the Faza’il-e-A’maal and bayan, these values and tabligh more specifically are articulated in reference to the lives and actions of the prophets and Companions of Prophet Muhammad. Through this linkage, Tablighi values and tabligh gain legitimacy and status where being a worker for Allah becomes nothing less than inheriting the Prophetic character and Prophetic mission. In Chap. 6 we explored why the Tablighi framing documented in Chap. 5 might resonate with Muslims in contemporary societies. The findings there allowed us to achieve one of the aims of our study: to conceptualise the ideological dimension of the Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation. In doing this now, we say the Tablighi Jama’at can mobilise people in part because its ideology achieves frame resonance. That is, Tablighi ideology’s dissemination via collective action frames and frame amplification taps into the personal characteristics and everyday negative experiences of Muslims, and the resonance of this interaction creates sparks in the individual and an urge to join the cause of Islamic revival. Further, we use the findings of our frame analysis in this study to conceptualise the ideological dimension of the renewal of Allah’s world we explored in Chap. 6. We posit that the renewal of Allah’s world has an ideological dimension called the Allah frame. Tablighis wish to reinstate

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Allah as bigger, mightier and nobler than humans. The Allah frame underpins this desire by emphasising Allah as the ultimate cause of any effects in the universe. While this idea of Allah is not unique to the Tabligh Jama’at— indeed, most if not all Muslims would hold this view of Allah—what is unique about the Allah frame is its contention that Allah’s will and ultimate power are especially concentrated on the activities of faith renewal and preaching. In other words, for Tablighis, these activities act like magnets for Allah’s special attention and grace, where Allah effects change in a person. When enough individuals are touched by Allah’s grace—when there is widespread personal transformation—at that time there will occur a macro-level social transformation of society. These findings from the frame analysis of Tablighi texts allow us to reinforce the point we made in Chap. 4 regarding the Tabligh Jama’at mobilisation: the Tabligh Jama’at can mobilise Muslims not only because of political freedom and vast organisational resources but also because of its ideological appeal to Muslims in contemporary societies. This appeal comes about through sophisticated discursive work (framing) where Muslims are convinced of the existence of a Muslim crisis, the need for faith renewal, self-reform and preaching to address the crisis, and the return for investing time, money and energy in Islamic revival in the form of Heavenly rewards and the special attention, care and grace of Allah. This discussion shows that Frame Theory offers useful insights that help to explain the ideological underpinnings of participation in the Tabligh Jama’at. We offer avenues for further research that may advance theory in this area of enquiry. A fruitful line of research applying Frame Theory to the Tabligh Jama’at would be comparative frame analysis, where framing is used to illuminate the ideological dimension underpinning intra-Tablighi differences. While Tablighis all over the world convey the same message, the way they frame that message differs as they adapt the Tablighi message to different socio-cultural contexts (Pieri, 2015; Mandaville, 2010; Noor, 2009). Additionally, comparative frame analysis may be able to unpack the ideological dimension of different mobilisation outcomes of the Tabligh Jama’at and other Islamic revivalist movements. Here frame resonance would be a useful conceptualisation of such differences. These points hint at the fact that in this study we have only touched the surface of applying Frame Theory to a study of the Tabligh Jama’at and Islamic revivalist movements. More research is required to understand the impact of Tablighi framing on members and potential recruits, not to

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mention critics and former members. As long as the Tabligh Jama’at maintains an active ideological dimension in its proselytisation activities, Frame Theory will be relevant to its study. In making concluding remarks, we observe that much work remains for Tablighis to remake the world. However, they are more than eager to undertake this work because, as we have argued, it brings them immense satisfaction, which alleviates the ails of modernity. Propelled as it is by a vast number of committed workers for Allah, Tabligh Jama’at and Islamic revivalism looks to be here to stay for the long term, as long as there remains the need to renew Allah’s world.

References Ali, J.  A. (2012). Islamic revivalism encounters the modern world: A study of the Tabligh Jama’at. Sterling. Berger, P. (1999). The desecularization of the world: A global overview. In P. Berger (Ed.), The desecularization of the world: Resurgent religion and world politics (pp. 1–18). William Eerdmans Publishing. Mandaville, P. (2010). Muslim networks and movements in Western Europe. The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. Noor, F. A. (2009). The spread of the Tablighi Jama’at across Western, Central and Eastern Java and the role of the Indian Muslim Diaspora (Working Paper Series No. 175). Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies/Nanyang Technical University. Pieri, Z. (2015). Tablighi Jamaat and the quest for the London mega mosque: Continuity and change. Palgrave Macmillan.

Glossary

Ahwaal  Condition A’maal  Religious rituals and actions Ambiya  Prophets, mentioned in the Qur’an Amr bil maruf  Commanding the good and forbidding the evil ’Aqida  Theological dimension of belief in God Barakah  Blessing Bayan  Religious sermon Da’i  Propagator or preacher Dawah  Calling to Allah through missionary work Din  Islamic way of life; religion Dunya  Temporal world Faza’il-e-A’maal  Central Tabligh Jama’at text translates as “Virtues of Action” Fiqh  Jurisprudence Hadith  A report of the words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions Halal  Permissible Ijtima  International, national or regional congregational meeting of Tablighis Iman  Faith Islah al-nafs  Reformation of the self

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GLOSSARY

Jahili  Anti-Islamic Jahiliyah  unGodliness; ignorance of the Divine Jama’at  Group, assembly or congregation Jola  Preaching tour of local area Kalimah  Testimony of faith Khalifah  Vicegerent of God on Earth Khayr  Goodness Khuruj  Preaching tour Markaz  High ranking, central Tabligh Jama’at centre; Islamic educational institute Mastura  Female-only preaching tour Mushawara  Organisational meeting via mutual consultation Nahi anil munkar  Forbidding the evil Sahabah  Companions of Prophet Muhammad Salaat  Prayer to God Shariah  Islamic law Shura  Planning committee Sunna  Words and practices of the Prophet Muhammad Tabligh  To “convey” or “communicate” a message. In the context of Islamic revivalism, tabling means to convey the message of Islam Tablighi  An individual who is a member of Tabligh Jama’at; also, a description of any aspect of Tabligh Jama’at (e.g. “Tablighi ideology”) Tabligh Jama’at  Convey (message of Islam) Group Tafsir  Exegesis, interpretation of Qur’an Ta’leem  Religious learning session Tashkil  Preaching tour registration session, following bayan Tawhid  Oneness of God Ummah  Muslim community; community of believers Yaqin  Certainty and conviction of belief, strong belief in God Zikr  Remembrance of God

Index1

A Afterlife, 128, 133 Alienation, 44, 49, 133 Alim, 20 Allah, v, vi, 2, 4–6, 8, 9, 20, 21, 26, 41, 73, 74, 76, 78–80, 83–86, 92, 94, 96, 98–101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 113–129, 131, 133–136 Allah frame, 8, 78–80, 84, 85, 98, 100, 103, 104, 106, 107, 115, 126, 134, 135 Allah’s world, 113–129, 134, 136 Amir, 21, 22, 25 Anthropocentrism, 114 Antiquity, 34 Ash, R., 54n2 Authentic success, 128

B Bayan, 8, 9, 26, 60–63, 72–81, 83–85, 94, 107, 127, 134 Bhangis, 17 Bureaucratic, 22, 42 Bureaucratisation, 3n1, 114 C Caliphate, 121, 122, 129 Chamar, 17 Chehallum, 17 Chulha, 14 Collective action frames, 7–9, 54n3, 56, 57, 72, 82, 86, 90, 101, 134 Companions of Prophet Muhammad, 73, 83, 84, 94, 96, 99, 134 Comparative frame analysis, 135 Conceptualisation, 7, 53, 135

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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INDEX

Crisis, 3, 3n1, 8, 12, 23, 32, 33, 40–43, 45, 46, 50, 72–77, 85, 97, 98, 101, 106, 115–117, 121–123, 129, 132, 133, 135 Crisis of modernity, 3, 3n1, 8, 32, 40–43, 45, 46, 50, 115, 117, 121, 133 D Da‘wah, 19, 25 Decadence, 20, 120 Democratisation, 36, 37, 132 Deprivation, 41, 49, 97, 98, 100, 106, 132, 133 Dhol, 17 Dichotomy, 16, 114 Din, 122, 127 Discursive, 7, 9, 50, 55, 57, 61, 72–75, 77–79, 81–86, 104, 122, 134, 135 Disenchantment, 37, 41, 98, 132 Dissatisfaction, 117, 133, 134 Diwali, 15 Doctrinal, 39 Dussehra, 15 E Effort, ix, 7, 19, 20, 28, 52, 53, 55, 63, 74–78, 80, 81, 83–86, 91, 93, 100, 104, 115, 116, 127, 128, 131, 134 Eid al-Adha, 15 Eid al-Fitr, 15 Emancipation, 38 Empirical-analytical, 37, 132 Emulation, 128 Enjoining the good, 83, 86, 134 Enshrined, 3, 32 Equilibrium, 34 Etiquette, 73 Existential anxiety, 3n1, 117 Exogamy, 16

F Faith renewal, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 20, 55, 63, 74, 79, 85, 86, 104, 106–108, 126, 133–135 Faza’il-e-A’maal, 8, 9, 54n5, 59–61, 63, 72, 81, 85, 92, 134 Forbidding the evil, 83, 86 Frame amplification, 9, 57, 57n9, 72, 82–84, 89, 91, 93, 98, 100, 134 Frame analysis, 8, 9, 51, 54n5, 55, 59, 63, 71–86, 104, 134, 135 Frame resonance, 9, 50, 55, 57, 89–108, 134, 135 Frame Theory, vi, 7–9, 50, 51, 54–59, 54n3, 54n5, 54n6, 62, 63, 134–136 Framing, 7–9, 36, 49–63, 72–86, 94, 96, 97, 99–101, 104, 106, 108, 134, 135 Framing process, 8, 50, 57–59, 82–86, 134 G Ghar, 14 Glocal activism, 52 God, v, 3, 15, 19, 27, 34, 35, 40, 41, 45, 74, 84, 93, 98, 103, 106, 114, 115, 120, 121, 126, 129, 132 Gotra, 13, 14, 16, 17 Grace, 8, 78, 79, 104, 107, 115, 125, 126, 134, 135 Gunghat, 17 H Hadith, v, 12, 21, 26, 32, 60, 77, 81–83, 92, 94, 96, 121, 125 Hajj, 24 Heavenly, 81, 97, 134, 135 Holi, 15

 INDEX 

Humans, v, 3n1, 35–38, 41–43, 45, 52, 103, 114, 115, 118, 120–122, 125–127, 132, 133, 135 I Identity, 2, 6, 18, 23, 28, 40, 54n3, 97, 116, 122, 123, 125, 133 Ideological, vi, 4, 7, 9, 27, 32, 50, 53–55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 83, 86, 134–136 Ideology, vi, vii, x, 5, 5n2, 7, 23, 25–27, 39, 40, 50, 51, 53–58, 54n3, 54n5, 60, 62, 63, 73, 82, 86, 94, 108, 120, 122, 123, 126, 132, 134 Immemorial, 40 Individualism, v, 37, 114, 117, 132 Industrialisation, 3n1, 36–38, 40, 114, 132 Inequitable, 116 Institutions, x, 4, 16, 20, 24, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 75, 76, 117–119, 122, 123, 126, 131–133 Interchangeability, 118 Islam, v, vi, ix, x, 3–6, 12, 15–17, 19, 20, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 40, 41, 43, 45, 49, 58–60, 73–77, 82, 84, 91, 92, 94–96, 100, 102, 106, 117, 120, 122, 123, 126, 129, 133 Islamic revivalism, ix, x, 1, 3–9, 27, 31–46, 49, 97, 106, 117, 119, 120, 131, 133, 136 Islamic revivalists, vi, vii, ix, x, 4–9, 11, 24, 27, 28, 32–34, 41, 45, 46, 50, 54n3, 54n4, 59, 113–117, 119–124, 129, 132, 133, 135 Islamisation, 4, 34, 46, 122, 123

141

J Jahilic, 120 Jahiliyah, 33 Jama’at, 2, 3, 21, 62, 76 Janazah, 17 Jizya, 15 K Kamari, 17 Kameez, 17 Kazi, 17 Khatna, 17 Khuruj, 22, 23, 93, 102, 103, 126–128 L Liberation, 39, 40 M Macro level, 51, 119–124, 129, 133, 135 Manoeuvrabilities, 118 Marginalisation, 39, 42, 49, 122 Maulvi, 17 Meo, 12–20, 23, 97, 101, 102, 106 Metaphysical, 37 Mewat, 2, 12–20, 23, 97, 101, 102 Micro level, v, 3, 52, 119, 123–129, 133 Mobilisation, 7, 9, 49–63, 104–106, 108, 134, 135 Modernisation, vi, x, 3, 3n1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 36, 37, 46, 99, 113, 114, 116–118, 129, 132 Modernity, vi, ix, 4, 32, 34–39, 41–43, 49, 85, 97, 113, 131 Motivational framing, 57, 62, 72, 76–82, 134 Multifacetedness, 32

142 

INDEX

Mundane, 127 Mushawara, 22, 52 Muslim crisis, 12, 50, 72–77, 85, 86, 97, 98, 101, 104, 106, 129, 135 Muslims, v, ix, 2, 12, 31, 49, 72, 89, 116, 132 N Narrations, 94, 125 National, 33, 52, 114, 118, 119, 121 Nature, v, x, 28, 35, 41, 44, 115, 118, 123 Nihilism, 3n1, 35, 43 Nikah, 17 O Obligation, 20, 83, 126, 128 Obscure, 15 Observant servants, 20 Observe, 12, 15, 17, 35, 54n3, 59, 60, 62, 73, 90, 94–97, 136 Ontological security, 117 Organisational, 7, 21–23, 51–55, 90, 135 P Paejama, 17 Pagan, 34 Pal, 13, 14, 16, 17 Paradigm, 2, 34, 115, 123, 124, 127 Pardah, 17 Participation, vi, 7, 25, 44, 50, 55, 56, 61, 72, 97, 106, 133–135 Peasant, 18–19 Personal transformation, 115, 125, 135 Philosophisation, 40 Pili chitthi, 17 Political freedom, 135 Polygynous, 14

Polygyny, 14 Popularisation, x, 34 Preachers, 9, 16, 21, 52, 53, 86, 91–93, 134 Preaching, v, vi, 6–9, 19, 20, 23–25, 27, 28, 51, 52, 55, 60–63, 74, 76, 78–81, 83–86, 91–94, 99–104, 106, 107, 115, 126, 127, 131, 133–135 Prognostic framing, 7, 56, 57, 74–76 Proliferation, 117 Prophetic character, 134 Prophetic mission, 134 Prophet Muhammad, vi, 2, 3, 6, 20, 26, 27, 32, 73–75, 77, 80, 83, 84, 90, 107, 116, 125, 133, 134 Prophets, 20, 74, 75, 77, 80, 83, 84, 91, 94, 96, 99, 107, 126, 134 Proselytisation, vi, vii, 9, 15, 59n10, 115, 116, 123–125, 129, 136 Pull factors, 7, 50, 134 Push factors, 7, 50, 133 Q Quagmire, 46 Qualitative, 118 Quality, 6, 36, 100, 123, 125 Qur’an, 3, 5, 12, 17, 21, 26, 32, 60, 75, 79, 81, 82, 94, 96, 102, 107, 120, 121, 125 R Ramaḍan, 15 Reconceptualisation, 116 Reformation, 27, 33, 35, 76 Religion, 3, 3n1, 5, 23, 32, 33, 35, 38–41, 43–46, 51, 52, 59n10, 77, 78, 94–96, 98, 102, 114, 116–118, 120, 122, 123, 126, 127, 132, 133 Renaissance, 34–36

 INDEX 

Renewal, v, 3, 9, 33, 113–129, 134 Resurgent, 41 Revivalism, v, ix, 4, 7, 8, 31, 118, 119 Rewards, 81, 86, 97, 100, 106, 134, 135 Rituals, 2, 5, 6, 15, 17, 20, 21, 40, 101, 106, 114, 120, 122, 123, 133 Rootedness, 97 S Sacrifice, v, 2, 15, 52, 79, 83–86, 91, 93, 100, 127, 134 Satisfaction, vi, 7, 49, 85, 98, 100, 115, 123, 132–134, 136 Scientisation, 40 Secularisation, v, vi, ix, 3n1, 6, 8, 9, 38–41, 44–46, 98–100, 98n1, 113, 114, 123, 129, 132, 133 Secularism, x, 4, 33, 34, 39–41, 45, 122, 132 Self-actualisation, 33 Self-reform, 8, 52, 74–76, 85, 86, 95, 99, 103, 106, 108, 115, 125, 128, 133, 135 Shalwar, 17 Shura, 22, 25–27, 61 Social action, 134 Social mobility, 97, 133 Social transformation, v, 3, 6, 9, 37, 38, 45, 114–121, 125, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135 Society, vi, ix, x, 3n1, 4–6, 12–14, 23–25, 31, 33–43, 45, 56, 58, 79, 80, 83, 86, 89, 97, 98, 100, 104, 108, 114–123, 125, 126, 128, 131–135 Socio-cultural, ix, 5, 35, 39, 116, 119, 122, 125, 126, 135 Stridently, 33 Subjectivity, 38, 39, 60 Sufi, 15, 16, 26

143

Sunnah, 3, 5, 32, 125 Synagogue, 40 T Tabligh, vi, 3, 75, 83, 84 Tablighi frames, 9, 86, 96, 103, 106, 134 Tablighi ideas, 7, 9, 53, 94, 95, 104, 108 Tablighi ideology, vi, 7, 26, 50, 51, 54n5, 57, 60, 63, 82, 86, 108, 126, 134 Tablighis, 8, 9, 21, 22, 22n3, 25, 26, 41, 43, 52, 60, 61, 76, 78–81, 85, 85n1, 90–93, 95–101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 113–115, 125–128, 132–136 Tablighi texts, 9, 55, 56, 71–86, 135 Tablighi values, 9, 86, 134 Tabligh Jama’at, v–vii, ix, x, 1–3, 6–9, 11–28, 49–63, 72–74, 81, 82, 84–86, 89–108, 113, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133–136 Tabligh work, 21–23, 26, 28, 52, 83, 98, 103 Texts, 7–9, 54, 54n3, 55, 59–63, 72, 81, 95, 134 Thama, 13 Theology, 38 Transcendental, 41 Transcendental force, 35 Tripartite, 27, 90 Turpitude, 120 U Ulama, 20, 28, 83, 84, 91 Ummah, v, 23, 24, 33, 34, 77, 99 Unification, 126 Universal union, 43 Urbanisation, 3n1, 37–40, 114, 132

144 

INDEX

V Vicegerents, 5, 115, 121, 129 Virtues of Ramadan, 60 Virtues of Salaat, 60, 81 Virtues of Tabligh, 60, 83 Virtues of Zikr, 60, 72, 81 W Wahabism, 26 Withdrawal, 127 Working for Allah, vi, 2, 6, 84, 131, 133

Worldly, 39, 128 Worship, 1, 15, 21, 120, 126–128 Y Yearning, 125 Z Zald, M. N., 54n2 Zeal, 20