A Shift in the Security Paradigm: Global Challenges: Is Europe Ready to Meet Them? (Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications) [1st ed. 2020] 3030432521, 9783030432522

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Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

J. Martín Ramírez Jerzy Biziewski   Editors

A Shift in the Security Paradigm Global Challenges: Is Europe Ready to Meet Them?

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications Series Editor Anthony J. Masys, Associate Professor, Director of Global Disaster Management, Humanitarian Assistance and Homeland Security, University of South Florida, Tampa, USA Advisory Editors Gisela Bichler, California State University, San Bernardino, CA, USA Thirimachos Bourlai, Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA Chris Johnson, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK Panagiotis Karampelas, Hellenic Air Force Academy, Attica, Greece Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada Edward C. Morse, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA David Skillicorn, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Yoshiki Yamagata, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan

Indexed by SCOPUS The series Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications comprises interdisciplinary research covering the theory, foundations and domain-specific topics pertaining to security. Publications within the series are peer-reviewed monographs and edited works in the areas of: – biological and chemical threat recognition and detection (e.g., biosensors, aerosols, forensics) – crisis and disaster management – terrorism – cyber security and secure information systems (e.g., encryption, optical and photonic systems) – traditional and non-traditional security – energy, food and resource security – economic security and securitization (including associated infrastructures) – transnational crime – human security and health security – social, political and psychological aspects of security – recognition and identification (e.g., optical imaging, biometrics, authentication and verification) – smart surveillance systems – applications of theoretical frameworks and methodologies (e.g., grounded theory, complexity, network sciences, modelling and simulation) Together, the high-quality contributions to this series provide a cross-disciplinary overview of forefront research endeavours aiming to make the world a safer place. The editors encourage prospective authors to correspond with them in advance of submitting a manuscript. Submission of manuscripts should be made to the Editor-in-Chief or one of the Editors.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5540

J. Martín Ramírez Jerzy Biziewski 

Editors

A Shift in the Security Paradigm Global Challenges: Is Europe Ready to Meet Them?

With a Foreword by Ambassador Sergio Duarte

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Editors J. Martín Ramírez Nebrija University Madrid, Spain

Jerzy Biziewski Cracov, Poland

ISSN 1613-5113 ISSN 2363-9466 (electronic) Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications ISBN 978-3-030-43252-2 ISBN 978-3-030-43253-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

IN MEMORIAM To all the victims of coronavirus. To those who passed away, and to those who are fighting on the front line to save lives Its unexpected outbreak has become a global threat, neglected in the Paradigms of Security for this 21st Century. We might pretend Security is in our hands, but ultimately it is not. Nobody could have known that a simple virus would change the life style of all the people in the world. A virus knows no boundaries… But, besides its obvious negative effects, it also may also have positive ones… It has caused countries and people to collaborate with each other to face this new threat. Never has it been more obvious that we are all in this together, because what happens to you also affects me. After this pandemic, we hope to see a positive Shift in the present Security Paradigms.

Foreword Sergio Duarte President of Pugwash Former United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

All war is in its essence ruinous. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

Traditionally, the notion of security—or more particularly national security—has been defined in terms of one specific set of means by which it is pursued, that is, military statecraft. Over the centuries, the need to achieve and maintain national security has been used by governments to justify innovation and accumulation of weapons in a quest for military supremacy, often with resort to aggression and intimidation. The advent of ever more destructive means of warfare that threaten the very existence of civilization as we know it makes imperative a paradigm shift in the way nations provide for their security. During the Middle Ages and beyond, nations fought wars that used to last for years and sometimes for several decades in order to assert dominance or conquest new territories, with great destruction and loss of life among combatants and innocent civilians. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a number of European philosophers and statesmen endeavoured to define ways to ensure security by focusing on the preservation of internal and regional peace combined with pooling common resources to discourage or resist external aggression. In 1761 the Abbot St. Pierre put forth a project for “perpetual peace” in Europe that called for an alliance of princes and the use of armed force to counter external threats. Jean Jacques Rousseau also dealt with this matter. Soon after, in 1795, Immanuel Kant proposed the philosophical basis of a set of measures for ensuring the maintenance of peace.1 In his view, mankind has a duty to enter into the ideal of a universal community of all human beings governed by the rule of law. These authors shared the belief that peace and security would be achieved by means of understandings among the rulers of the time in order to prevent wars and ensure defence against common extra-continental foes. Rulers, however, did not heed those teachings. In the following two centuries, Europe was engulfed in new and bloodier conflicts. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the widespread misery and bloodshed Immanuel Kant, “Towards Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch”.

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resulting from prolonged wars between major European powers led to the convening of two Hague Conferences that tried to enhance security by establishing agreements on limitations of armaments. In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations was created with the objective of ensuring lasting peace. Its statute required States to renounce war as a means of solving disputes. As we know, the League could not realize its lofty ideals and soon a new and wider conflict devastated Europe and a large part of the rest of the world. Together, World Wars I and II killed approximately 80 million people, among combatants and the civilian population, mostly in Europe, Japan, and Pacific Islands. The total actual death toll in developing countries during both conflicts will probably never be known. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 rearranged the pre-war international structure of power essentially based on the legacy of the Congress of Vienna. The Charter of the United Nations enunciates the principles to be observed by all nations in their relationship with one another and gives special emphasis to the maintenance of peace and security. Major decisions on threats to peace and security were reserved exclusively to the five States recognized as victors of the conflict, through permanent membership in the Security Council and the power of veto granted to those five nations. During the following decades, however, the rise of new centres of power gradually revealed the increasing inadequacy of the composition and powers of the Security Council in view of prevailing political and strategic realities. The Charter does not mention nuclear weapons, which came into being roughly three weeks after its adoption. Early attempts by the UN General Assembly to rein in the awesome power of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind as a whole failed due to the irreconcilable ideological positions of the two major powers, which soon engaged in an unprecedented armament race. A dangerous standoff between the rival military alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union lasted for the whole post-war period and beyond. Meanwhile, other nations also came to acquire nuclear military capability. Today there are nine possessors of atomic arsenals. The Preamble of the Charter states the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. To this end, it seeks to ensure that armed force be used only in the common interest. The purposes defined in the Charter contemplate the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations and cooperation among nations, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The principles that should govern the conduct of member states towards each other are in essence the recognition of sovereign equality, good faith compliance with obligations, peaceful solution of disputes and renunciation of the use or threat of use of force. From the point of view of the maintenance of peace, it must be recognized that in the 73 years from the end of World War II up to the present no major powers have resorted to direct armed aggression in their relations with one another. Since 8 May 1945, European countries have known no conflicts in their territories, except during the 1990’s ruthless wars in the Balkans. In the Far East, the surrender of Japan to the United States on September 2 of the same year brought an end to World War II in Asia and the Pacific. Since then, generalized conflict has been avoided but fully stable security conditions both in Europe and worldwide remain elusive. Suffice it

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to point out that the relations between the major powers have ranged from uneasy coexistence to mistrust and hostility. Moreover, during the seven decades since the end of World War II, local wars and armed interventions have brought insecurity, uncertainty and suffering to several parts of the world. Advanced technologies have increasingly enabled great powers to intervene in local conflicts from a distance, thus minimizing their own casualties in order to limit criticism and objections at home. Such interventions allegedly aim at protecting what those powers consider to be their own interests. This often results in increased tensions and risk to provoke escalation to wider confrontation, endangering every nation’s security as well as their own. The current international order remains anchored in the institutionalized imbalance of rights between the great powers and the rest of the international community. It does, however, impose a number of limitations and conditionings on the powerful, either through the legal system or by the general recognition of ethic imperatives. Many of the episodes of aggression by the stronger against the weaker as well as blatant abuses of human rights that were accepted with little or no resistance—and in some cases even glorified—in not so distant times are more often than not denounced and repudiated in our days. Such positive aspects notwithstanding, recent developments in the relationships between and among the major players suggest a disquieting panorama of deterioration in the overall security conditions worldwide. Uncertainty, instability, and unpredictability, together with rapid technological innovation and major power shifts have become defining features of the twenty-first century. The deterioration of the security situation, the continuing degradation of the environment, the crisis of democracy and the lack of respect for human rights, as well as the increasingly problematic access to water, food, health and education are important existential threats to the security of populations and nations alike and may cause widespread strife and violence in a not so distant future. The international community is justifiably concerned with the effects of the current trend of growing rivalry and outright antagonism among the most armed States, particularly in Europe, the Far East and Southwest Asia as well as with the recurrence of local strife in parts of the developing world, particularly Africa and the Middle East. The possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors for political or ideological motivations still haunts the world. The outlook with regard to prospects for the future in terms of peace and security seems bleaker than in any other period after the end of the Cold War. The effects of such trends are especially visible in the field of arms control and disarmament. A number of important agreements achieved during the second half of the twentieth century have been discarded and others seem at peril, endangering the overall structure painstakingly built since the end of World War II. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) was terminated in 2002 and the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) did not survive the growing confrontation between the United States and Russia. The two signatories of the landmark 2010 New START Treaty do not demonstrate sufficient interest in extending it beyond the 2021 deadline for its expiration, despite constructive

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proposals made in this direction. Unsubstantiated accusations of non-compliance with the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty seem to denote a willingness to discredit this important multilateral agreement, even though it is not yet formally into force. The Joint Common Program of Action (JCPOA) agreed in 2015 among five nuclear weapon States plus Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran received a grievous blow by one of its major proponents and subscribers. The alleged use of chemical weapons in some troubled parts of the world has also created disagreement about the proper role of the relevant international agency in verifying possible instances of their employment, thus weakening its authority. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum further shook the reliance of the international community in commitments regarding regional security. All nuclear weapon States, and particularly the two most armed among them, are engaged in a new round of the arms race that threatens to push the boundaries of confrontation to outer space, cyberspace and beyond. While the multilateral mechanism devoted to disarmament has been paralyzed or reduced to ineffectiveness for over two decades now, there seems to be little or no inclination to take forward meaningful initiatives that might lead to new approaches in arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, recent proposals seem designed to procrastinate, rather than advance progress. Last, but by no means least, the development of supersonic missiles and low-yield nuclear weapons, as well as cyber technologies, dramatically lower the threshold for the use of atomic power in battle. Nuclear weapon States and their allies increasingly advocate and promote measures of non-proliferation over action aimed at eliminating such weapons. Those States do not deny the need for nuclear disarmament, but for the past several decades have contended that this is “premature” and profess willingness to keep their atomic arsenals “as long as nuclear weapons exist”.2 This would be tantamount to arguing that as long as chemical weapons continue to exist States should keep them, or that as long as cigarettes are produced one should not quit smoking. The use of tautological, self-serving statements like the one just quoted denotes in reality little or no interest to engage in serious negotiations. The relevant fact is that, as long as nuclear weapons exist the danger of their use also exists—and with it, permanent insecurity for all. Complacency with the situation described above carries the risk that international law will be increasingly defined by decisions of the powerful and the arbitrary rule of the stronger. No significant agreements on matters related to security can be reached without multilateral cooperation guided by the enlightened political leadership. Common sense, however, seems in short supply. Some recent examples “Make no mistake: As long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.” (President Barack Obama, Prague speech, 2009). “Nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future”. (Secretary James Mattis, Preface to the United States 2018 Nuclear Posture Review). 2

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support the belief that rational behaviour will not always supplant impromptu, personal impulses of leaders or the pervasive influence of corporate vested interests. To the factors that may bring about the ominous possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war—design, accident or miscalculation—one must now add incompetence and unwillingness to recognize the need to act. The current lack of common ground among the major powers poses a serious challenge for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to reach a successful outcome. Yet, the armed States seem unable to move away from doctrines of deterrence that require a continuous increase of the size and sophistication of arsenals in order to counter perceived advantages by similarly equipped adversaries. With only one exception, possessors of nuclear arsenals refuse to commit to a “no first use” policy. It was certainly in the spirit of moving closer to the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and of increased security for all nations that a number of States pointedly proposed, debated and in 2017 adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) leading to their elimination. Unfortunately, the nuclear-armed powers spurned the process, summarily denouncing it as “counterproductive” and detrimental to the NPT, without ever explaining their positions convincingly. Their allies that participated in it preferred to raise stumbling blocks and specious objections. Some of their governments had a hard time explaining such positions to their own parliaments and public opinion, but they were ultimately successful in shunning that effort. Alleged obstacles or unfavourable conditions are often expedients to conceal lack of political will to engage in constructive multilateral action to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In their ongoing pursuit of this paramount goal, the peoples of the world should not be made to wait for a proper alignment of stars or until the nuclear weapon States decide that the time to act finally has come. A shift in the current security paradigm is urgently needed. It must contemplate serious consideration of the benefits to be derived from a return to good faith negotiation and conclusion of new arms control agreements and a resumption of earnest efforts towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, a shared and reiterated goal of the international community as a whole. Outdated Cold War concepts based on mutual assured destruction must be reviewed in the light of the existential risks posed by the intensification of the arms race and the worsening of relations among States, which entail general assured insecurity and lead to general assured disaster. The insane, relentless competition for new and deadlier weapons is inherently destabilizing and harmful to the whole international community. The catastrophic consequences of the use of such weapons would affect all nations, and not just the States engaged in the illusory race for supremacy. Renewed adherence to the principles and purposes enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations, together with a general recognition that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought are essential ingredients for action towards the reinforcement of security for all—not just for a few.

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The appropriate answer to the widespread concern about the ability of existing institutions and agreements to maintain international peace and security cannot be found in a return to nationalistic isolationism and in an irrational quest for military supremacy, but rather in the pursuit of multilaterally debated and agreed solutions for global problems that demand global responses. Bold and constructive leadership supported by the strength of world public opinion is essential to ensure success in averting this dangerous outcome. Whether we like it or not, the world is increasingly interdependent. History has taught us that progress, security and stability cannot be reached through egocentric practices that value complacency and rely on the might of arms to the detriment of the larger interest of humanity. The international community must continue to search earnestly for more trustworthy security standards and for more effective ways to promote understanding and cooperation, including ridding the world of the threat of nuclear war. The construction of a new security paradigm not based on the possession and use of weapons of mass destruction is urgently necessary. It must be non-discriminatory and inclusive in order to provide reliable security assurances for all. Peace and security are, in fact, public goods. The necessary conditions for the achievement of security for all are quite simple and do not need much further study or refinement. Such conditions are the following ones: constant exercise of responsibility and restraint, especially by the powerful; adherence to established norms and principles of international law; respect for generally accepted standards of behaviour among nations and good faith compliance with commitments accepted in the past. All States have a duty to follow those guidelines, but possessors of nuclear weapons are primarily responsible for progress. The onus is on them to act responsibly and lead by example. Public opinion has a vital role to play in achieving a non-nuclear, more secure community of nations, an endeavour that is vital to all mankind. New York, USA August 2019

Acknowledgements

This book has been a scientific fruit of a CICA (International Conference of Conflict and Aggression), organized in Madrid by the Nebrija-Santander Chair for Risks and Conflicts Management (Center for Conflict Studies), in collaboration with CICA International Foundation and the Spanish Pugwash National Group. The academic cooperation of the CESEDEN (Spanish Center of Studies on National Defence), the Training and Improvement Division of the Spanish National Police, EuroDefense-España and the Harvard Kennedy School Spanish Alumni Network is also appreciated, as well as its financial sponsorship by the Spanish Ministry of Defence, throughout its Secretaría General de Política de Defensa and, last but not least, by the Banco de Santander. Finally, we would like to finish these words of acknowledgment expressing our explicit thanks to Annelies Kersbergen, our liaison with the Springer Series of Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, in recognition of the continuous support during the edition of our books.

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The editors would like to dedicate this book to all the victims of the Coronavirus Disease 2019, as well as to those members of our societies who are fighting against it from the most diverse facets. Special thanks go to doctors, nurses, emergency medical crews, laboratory staff, pharmacists, employees maintaining the sterility of medical facilities and ensuring their continuity of operation. And thanks as well to all those ordinary citizens, but extraordinary in their sacrifice, who enable all members of society to feel safer in this difficult period. Words of appreciation belong to the nameless heroes of everyday life that enable societies to function fairly normally despite the direct risk of virus transmission. These include employees of shops, gas stations, public transport, post office, courier companies, firefighters, policemen, soldiers, border guards, energy engineers and many others. Currently, most of the countries of our globe pass the test of effectiveness in confrontation with a pandemic not noticed a few months earlier. Over the past 20 years, mankind has struggled with similar types of threats at least four times, which is why reports from China about the new disease have been treated on other continents for a long time with a grain of salt. Only alarming news from Italy made us realize the core of the problem, which is the nature of SARS CoV-2, the lack of medicine and vaccines against this virus, as well as the weaknesses of the health care systems of individual countries. The scale, extent and pace of the disease’s spread surprise governments and societies. Health care systems, in many cases underinvested and marginalized by politicians for years, are now confronted with a deadly enemy operating across administrative boundaries. The struggles resemble fire fighting rather than systemic action. Not all citizens understand the seriousness of the situation and follow the recommendations of medical services and governmental orders. In most countries, a significant number of health care facilities are unprepared to fight a pandemic. There is a lack of medical personnel trained to deal with the massive cases of pneumonia caused by the SARS CoV-2 virus. The fatigue of medical teams, the frustration associated with forced long-term separation from families and the uncertainty caused by the increasing number of personnel infected with coronavirus, the shortage of equipment and basic protection measures are just xv

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some of the factors that affect the overall mood on the front line. The example of Lombardy, which has one of the best healthcare systems in Europe, is not optimistic and indicates the need to support the activities of medical services and other state services by the whole society. Considering society as a whole, it is sad to observe the lack of desirable pan-European solidarity. There does not seem to be a common response to the present pandemic between the “hard-working ant” northern European countries and the “lazy grasshopper” countries of southern Europe, reminiscent of an Aesop’s fable we learnt at school. Both sides, whether they were previously frugal or lavish, must recognize they are stuck together: the COVID-19 crisis will trash the finances of all. A compromise between ant and grasshopper is in order. Teams of researchers are intensively looking for a medicament to save the health and lives of those infected with the SARS CoS-2, which is a short-term goal. At the same time, vaccine research and testing are underway. Its creation aims to significantly immunize humanity against a similar type of virus in the future. Past experience of the fight against CoV-2 and the progress of research in China, Italy, Spain, USA and other countries indicate the possibility of finding a potential solution to the problem within several months although the medical world is divided concerning its effectiveness. More people will die during this time. In parallel, new technology development initiatives are aimed at accelerating the detection of infection symptoms, thereby weakening virus transmission among societies and monitoring people in home quarantine. Our daily routine has been suspended for some time. Many families give up their trips to the summer houses outside the cities. Suburban rail cars and bus communication, usually full of passengers, nowadays carry the air. Most long-distance connections have been brought to a halt in some countries. City streets, parks, riverbanks and churches are empty; and restaurants, cinemas, theaters, sports facilities, hair and beauty salons, spas, dentist’s rooms and most shops and offices are closed. In the sizable supermarkets you can meet just a few individuals. Operations in hospitals as well as preventive and rehabilitation visits in health care clinics are being rescheduled. Here we have a picture of a pandemic time. Citizens’ reaction to the first decisions of the authorities in most countries regarding projects aimed at limiting the spread of SARS CoV-2 were huge purchases of food as well as hygiene and disinfection products. However, this trend has been slowed down thanks to the smooth supplies. Despite a kind of collective quarantine, despite the fatigue and stress, people endure this test extremely well while learning to live in family. Many activities have moved without problems into the virtual world. Internet connections have never before been used on such a mass scale, and their creators, managing and maintaining technical efficiency, deserve special thanks. The Internet allows not only working at a distance, but also e-learning, e-commerce, e-prescriptions, e-medical consultations, e-fitness and the use of many other services. Electronic platforms enable communication and entertainment. Thanks to the networks, banking systems, transport, administration and most enterprises operate effectively. Phone connections with a whole range of applications facilitate mutual contact work flawlessly. At the same time, a

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significant part of societies works in production plants, construction companies and other enterprises on a daily basis, contributing to the almost normal functioning of parts of the economy. Other parts of nations go through enormous financial stress as companies are slowing down production thus enabling employees to secure quarantine at home and at the same time reacting to significantly lower demand. Not everything is going well. Medical staff are becoming increasingly exhausted by the protracted crisis and the shortage of personnel reserves. Medics after on-call time do not have the comfort of safe individual rest in separate hotel zones near hospitals, thus exposing the virus to spread to other specialists or to their own families and neighbors. More and more people are dying of other diseases due to the closure of specialized departments. Respirators, protective equipment and test kits are still missing. Connections to local epidemiological centers appear to be overloaded due to lack of staff. The transport of citizens to their home countries from other distant countries where they were doing tourism or are temporary places of work and residence leave much to be desired. Consular services usually are not available on non-working days. Many activities are postponed, pending the arrival of normality. These include oncological operations, heart patients or other serious illnesses. There are questions about: final and entrance exams to schools and universities, outstanding cases in courts and offices, possible changes in the work system, salaries and pensions as well as other financial benefits. Doctors, a leading professional group at the current difficult time, recommend highly physical distancing in direct interpersonal contacts to limit virus transmission. The efficient elimination of danger depends to a large extent on our internal discipline, perseverance and patience. Governments and parliaments undergo a stress test demonstrating their real accountability. They operate under close scrutiny of public opinion and criticism of the political opposition who believe that the rulers have neglected the threat and, through inaction and underfunding, have led to inefficiency of the healthcare systems. Now, they are forced to make difficult decisions concerning changes in the law regarding border control, limiting the mobility of citizens, supporting the health care systems, functioning of the labor law, maintaining the smooth supply of stores with basic goods, helping people made redundant and owners of enterprises to mitigate the effects of the crisis, etc. Some governments have declared national emergency to free additional funds and impose strict behavioral rules to reduce the risk of virus transmission, some have acted less responsibly ignoring approaching catastrophe. In some countries, the media looking for sensation and the vague picture of the situation presented by government agencies cause anxiety and confusion among citizens. The impact of the crisis on our future lives depends on understanding our current experience. It is to be hoped that the first lesson will be adequate healthcare systems financing. Temporary restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly may tempt governments to extend their duration to achieve short-term political goals. In turn, their abolition may result in a return to increased consumerism leading us to another global crisis devastating the planet's natural environment. It is extremely important to rise above state and even regional interests for the benefit of future

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generations around the globe. The conclusions of the current crisis should become a reference point for delineating global visions of the development of societies on our planet and abandoning the particular interests of individual groups of political elites. The crisis induced change in working, learning and shopping ways makes dormant opportunities clear. The expressions of solidarity between some countries and within societies in an extremely difficult situation are encouraging. The initiatives of local groups and individuals providing free meals, transport, accommodation and primitive protective masks for medical staff testify to the unique sense of social bond and gratitude for the help provided. Financial assistance offered to hospitals by various foundations, representatives of social elites and sports stars is another manifestation of mutual respect. The temporary suspension of withdrawals by football stars for the benefit of other employees of sports clubs further emphasizes the growing brotherhood in times of crisis and is an expression of well-understood concern for maintaining business continuity in difficult times. People in quarantine are supported by friends, foundations and local authorities. The inhabitants of border towns who help drivers and their families during the long waiting time at the few border crossings deserve recognition. It is to be hoped that this solidarity will continue to develop during post-CoV-2. We don’t know what the next few months will bring us. The current struggle with CoV-2 in developed countries has marginalized the picture of the situation in Africa and South and Central Asia. Some forecasts indicate that the threat is escalating, which may exceed the crisis response capability of most countries. Past experience gives hope for slowing down the spread of CoV-2, but not for its complete elimination. So, even if humanity wins the first campaign in the near future, a lot depends on our lifestyles and the development of healthcare systems. The invention of the effective drug and vaccine for dealing with the virus can lead to minimization of the risk. However, failure to take precautions may result in an increase in the incidence again. Specialists in this topic present different opinions, and therefore it would be wise to be prepared for a black scenario assuming the prolongation of the pandemic and its recurrence. It seems unavoidable to slow down economic growth, which will directly reduce the standard of living of citizens. For a long time, stock exchanges around the world have been seeing significant price drops. There are noticeable migrations of large numbers of employees between countries who lost their current employment and return to their homelands to wait out the difficult period. Local workers, usually on junk contracts, are also losing their jobs, thus representing the economically weakest social groups being marginalized by the crisis. This will be another challenge for those in power, business representatives as well as families and individuals. The measures currently being taken to reduce the firepower of a potential economic crisis force both citizens and states to make mutual concessions and commitments. A prolonged pandemic will probably cause a temporary suspension of income and an increase in unemployment, especially in industries such as tourism, gastronomy, hotel sector, sports, culture and mass entertainment. A drop in the supply and demand for non-necessity items will likely aggravate the crisis.

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Responsible and forward-looking decisions of the authorities in consultation with the banking sector may prove helpful in surviving a difficult period and prepare the economy for recovery. Attempts currently being made in this area are not optimistic because they reveal low transparency of states administrations activities and limited communication between governments and business. If this relationship does not improve, in a few months the economies of most countries will be devastated and their reconstruction extremely difficult with the consequent political effects on the ruling elites. It should be hoped that after a period of forced production stops, entrepreneurs will start rebuilding their companies. The experience gained should be a lesson in humility leading us to understand our role and place on planet Earth. Without people, the planet will still exist. A sign of our responsibility for future generations will be a thorough analysis of the crisis answering questions about potential threats and the necessary directions to counteract. The global range of a pandemic calls for global solutions. The future brings hope, as it has been put beautifully in the endearing song Rinascero, Rinascerai by Roby Facchinetti, dedicated to the heroes of the fight against the SARS CoV-2. One year more, the CICA International Foundation contributes to the SPRINGER Series on Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications with a new book. A Shift in the Security Paradigm. Global Challenges: Is Europe Ready to Meet Them? is a scientific follow up of a CICA International Conference on Towards a Paradigm Shift in Security, held in Madrid in 2019. Our main goal has been a joint discussion on broadly understood security seen from various perspectives. Having in mind the complex nature and dimension of political, economic and social changes, we propose an integrated platform allowing for intellectual exchange between scholars and practitioners with different backgrounds—academics, politicians, diplomats and high-ranking former and currently serving representatives of several European armies. We believe that this multidisciplinary approach based on broad specialist knowledge will lead us to a better understanding of the regional and global processes already underway and the challenges ahead, and thus to formulate the goals of future activities. The leitmotiv of this book is an attempt to answer the question about the capacity of the European Union (EU) to cope with new challenges of the twenty-first century. This unique organization with significant populace and well-developed economy suffers from disputes and disintegration actions caused by populist governments. The complex process of integration of the European Union is confronted by some governments implementing only these parts of commonly agreed political visions that bring immediate electoral success in the country. They do not care about the common values of the entire organization. The diverse interpretation of the goals and paths of development of the EU leads to the violation of its cohesion. Such deep division within the organization is exploited by regional and global powers taking the opportunity to broaden their influence and achieve their own goals by playing European countries individually. The aim of the book is to present the results of multidimensional analyses regarding the role of the EU among the world’s leading economies and its

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relationship with superpowers (USA, Russia, China), as well as with the Indo-Pacific chemosphere. The authors draw the reader’s attention to the range of challenges, such as growing political and economic influence of powers in Europe, the confrontational attitude of the Russian authorities, unpredicted Turkey, restless neighbourhood, US protectionism, EU’s progressive internal disintegration and economic stagnation, uncontrolled migration of people, destruction of the natural environment, terrorist attacks, etc. They also present possible solutions that can serve the interests of the societies of the Old Continent and their neighbours, promoting peaceful coexistence and prevent future crises. One of the most important threads is the perception of trends in the security environment regarding the transformation into a multi-polar world order and the use of new technologies and weapon systems. The question of the EU’s ability to implement an independent security and defence policy in the case of NATO corrosion becomes fundamental. Most EU countries belong to NATO using the USA protective umbrella. The “hard defence” fulfils its role but at the same time it creates a situation of almost total dependence on the USA in the field of security and defence. In the recent past years, the belief of the majority of European leaders in general disarmament allowed to direct significant financial resources to other socially important projects, contributing to the formation of the EU as “soft power” with limited capabilities in the “hard domain”. The goodwill of the representatives of the USA authorities determines the scope and nature of any assistance. In the absence thereof, the EU is not prepared to carry out defensive tasks. The growing American influence in the defence sector in EU countries, especially with regard to the latest technological achievements, means that the dependence of EU states on US supplies continues, while marginalizing the development of their own defence industry. Ideas on the self-sufficiency of Europe in the sphere of security and defence meet harsh criticism of the US representatives because the existing situation assures the hegemony of the superpower. The interests of the USA armaments industry with loyal customers among most European countries are at stake. The European Commission in the newest vision concerning the future of European defence delegates responsibility for common defence both to NATO and individual states thus avoiding institutional responsibility. Such a point of view directly influences doctrinal aspects of the EU defence causing slow pace of work on strategic goals, insufficient number of strategic staff capable of defence planning, exercises and execution of potential defence operations. PESCO, the European Fund and other initiatives undertaken are baby steps forward but do not solve the fundamental problem of the EU defence self-sufficiency. The policy and military decision-makers, scientists, practitioners and students interested in security and defence matters will find the book useful and interesting and allowing them to have access to condensed knowledge. Several opinions in the text can be seen as controversial (EU defence self-sufficiency, federalization, solution on uncontrolled migrations, Russia as a close EU partner, NATO new paradigm in security) and we hope they will trigger additional discussions between the readers.

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The contributions of 24 civil and military scholars from 8 countries, in 16 chapters, are grouped in 4 parts, preceded by a Foreword by Ambassador Sergio Duarte, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Ambassador Duarte examines the stability and security situation in the world since the rise and consolidation of the structures of power that emerged after World War II. He notices that agreement on multilateral negotiations on effective measures to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons has been elusive. Recent trends suggest an erosion of the major agreements that underpin the current security paradigm. The construction of a new common security system not based on the possession of and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction is urgently necessary. Part I—Among Global Players—reflects the trends in the development of mutual relations between main actors of the global game in order to answer the question about the need to modify strategic goals and ways of reaching them. It is taken from the European perspective to ensure secure development based on equal rights with the main players. We intend to put some light on the subject holistically with the EU in the centre, interacting with superpowers and other global entities, coping at the same time with internal challenges concerning political cohesion, social and economic development as well as security. Three European generals, with extensive experience commanding NATO forces, the Spanish general Zamarripa, the Italian general Spagnol, and the Polish general Biziewski, analyse the EU relationship with some of our neighbours: United Kingdom (UK), the Indo-Pacific area, and Russia and Turkey, respectively. They highlight that the international security domain seems to drift in the direction of a power competition especially between USA, Russia and China and the EU is an arena for that. Part II—Challenges to Security—focuses on a wide spectrum of threats starting with today’s challenges to international peace and security, through a potential new arms race, hybrid, terrorist and economic threats and ends at the race to rule the space and the ocean depths. It is composed by five chapters written by the general Martinez Valero, first head of the Spanish Army Intelligence Agency, on Economic Intelligence and National Security; by three scholars–Delgado Morán, Jimenez Reina and Cremades Guisado—from Spain, Colombia and Brazil, respectively, on Hybrid Threats; the Polish scholars Czarny and Kubiak, on Outer Space and Ocean Depths; the Spanish expert on International Relations Priego, about a Terrorist Attack Model; and one of the most well-known mediators in the world the Swedish academic Wallenstein, on Today’s Challenges to International Peace and Security. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project report, the world finds itself on a continuous high level of armed conflicts. For the past 5 years, there have been around 50 annually ongoing conflicts and wars. They have predominantly been small in scale and at low intensity, but long-lasting and causing large consequences for the affected regions and populations. As a result, the number of persons forcefully displaced was estimated to be 70.8 million at the end of 2018. A large number of armed conflicts and their complexity provide an overload for global and regional major powers being de facto decision-makers. And, we can observe

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significant changes in the major powers’ attitude where each of the global players gradually has taken on a more domestically motivated policy instead of cooperation between the states. Such return of “what is good for me” does not bode well for international affairs. One of the authors warns us that the political alienation between Russia and the West, combined with new military-technological developments, will undermine strategic stability. A new arms race is looming with implications for global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. EU, NATO and Russia need to launch a substantive dialogue regarding how to reduce the risk of hazardous military activities and to prevent military escalation caused by accidents and miscalculations. We can find an interesting remark in it that the public is unaware of the breadth and depth of existing threats to their well-being. Some of them have a long lead time from the initiation of action to demonstrable results. It is very true concerning the economies of the EU countries exposed to fierce competition with regional and global players. There is also an analysis of hybrid warfare-related phenomena turning the reader’s attention towards the implementation of new means and modes generally associated with information technologies. Globalization processes facilitate the development of this type of activity and have many common features, as demonstrated by the comparison of the EU and Colombia case in this respect. Growing transnationalization, increasing access to legal and illegal markets by irregular armed actors, illegal economies, the technification and diversification of methods have been mentioned as just a few of them. It is worth noting that nowadays diplomatic delegations around the world are exposed to a new model of terrorism aimed at inflicting the greatest losses and disrupting relations between states. The author of this analysis provides details about the nature of this very specific threat usually beyond our imagination. It is optimistic that a number of examples point to the possibility of preventing this type of danger. The race to control the space is speeding up and the winner is unknown. Very few people are brave enough to make predictions as to where space competition may lead our civilization and precious few are able to understand the intricacies of space technology. Actions conducted are highly and deeply secretive and the public learn things about them years after their accomplishment. So, as a consequence there is no real international control over such activities. Perhaps, in this regard, sky indeed should be the limit. The situation in the ocean deeps is very similar. The third part deals with some Necessary Changes, analysed in four chapters: New World Stage, New Weapons, New Military Doctrines, written by the Spanish Marine Col. Diaz; Long-Lasting Solutions to the Problem of Migration in Europe, by the Spanish professor Ramirez; the Role of NATO, by the Spanish general Yaniz, vice president of EuroDefense Spain; and EU Strategic Autonomy, by the Polish strategic analysts Ochman and Biziewski. The issue of migration is clearly one of the main topics to approach by today’s security. The massive escape of young people from their underdeveloped African, Middle East and Asian states negatively influences their economies and becomes a

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burden for Europe. The best way to prevent uncontrolled displacements is to help in stabilization and development of their origin countries what may encourage people to stay home. It is in the interest of both the European Union and the underdeveloped countries. Europe, poor in natural resources and in demographic decline, needs to contribute to the unblocking of the future of Africa and Middle East in order to cement our relationships on trade, investment and education. Diversity and differences, far from being causes of destabilization, have become human, social and political values. This current reality generates new conflicts or at least very different crises to the ones happened in previous times. These cultural, social, political and economic transformations that carry a subsequent change on the way we think, feel, desire and relate to others as so deep and global that we are living in a new age. Recent trends in armed conflicts, peacemaking and peacebuilding operations are interconnected with the complexity of a world order that increasingly consists of three inward-driven major powers among a set of disunited and fragmented constellations of actors. Human qualities may entail a durable peace. The main factors influencing future conflicts in the twenty-first century will be military activities in the littoral areas, cities and densely populated urban areas as well as strong cyber and networked global stage. One of the new challenges expected will be the Anti-Access/Area Denial concept as well as the development of new weapon systems, and therefore there is a need for the new doctrines to address these changes. The EU is currently a scene of growing political and economic influence of the USA, the Russian Federation and China. Their conflicting interests influence negatively coherence of the EU and none of the superpowers is interested in a strong EU because it is easier for them to achieve their strategic goals through interactions with much weaker governments of individual countries. The Baltic and Black Seas as well as the North may become hot spots due to aggressively behaving authorities of the Russian Federation and its increased military presence in these regions aimed at protection of strategically important pipelines, lines of transportation and disputes over the raw materials. The Mediterranean is not a barrier to stop the vend effects of instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa anymore. All these factors above suggest a question about the UE’s ability to secure and defend its own interests. The EU has a chance to transform itself into an equal participant of the global game, however it is not equipped with instruments necessary to conduct an independent policy in the sphere of security and defence. Achievement of full strategic autonomy will lead to the formation of an EU federal structure. The strategically autonomous European Union, internally deeply integrated, would constitute a significant added value the reformed North Atlantic Alliance with a global reach. Some of the changes in NATO strategy have been made and have to be updated in order to address the appearance of new threats that the progress in technology has made possible. Furthermore, the evolution of modern societies has made necessary to consider new issues in relation with security and defence as many analysts consider that in the world of today the first line of defence is resilience. The rapidly

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growing use of the outer space is creating many opportunities for progress and economic advance, but it is also a new source of risks and possible threats. The evolution of the strategic environment is an ever-present classic reason for NATO to update its model in security and defence. Finally, the last part, on some Social Aspects, includes an interesting work on Information Society and the Protective Influence of Security Culture, by the Polish rector Piwowarski; as well as first-hand experience on Conflict Resolution in Prisons, written by three Spanish scholars, Millana, Fernandez-Rodriguez, and Miralles. This part is closed by an analysis article concerning the link between Security Culture, Cybersecurity Culture and Data Protection written by an expert in the field of Data Protection, Privacy, Intellectual Property, Cybersecurity and Human Rights, the Dominican lawyer Garcia-Segura. The two co-editors complete the book with an Introduction and an Epilogue. J. Martín Ramírez Jerzy Biziewski

Contents

Foreword by Sergio Duarte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction by J. Martín Ramírez and Jerzy Biziewski . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part I

Among Global Players

The United Kingdom and Its Future Contribution to the Defense of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eduardo Zamarripa

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The Indo-Pacific: The Gauntlet Thrown Down by US, India, Japan and Australia to China’s Asia-Pacific Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Giorgio Spagnol

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European Union Vis-A-Vis Russian Federation, and Turkey . . . . . . . . . Jerzy Biziewski Part II

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Challenges to Security

Economic Intelligence and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Valentín Martínez Valero Analytical Approach to Emergent Hybrid Threats Phenomena. Case Study: EU and Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juan-José Delgado-Morán, Jonnathan Jiménez-Reina, and Álvaro Cremades-Guisado Competition in the Outer Space and Ocean Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roman S. Czarny and Krzysztof Kubiak The (International) Terrorist Attack Model Against Diplomatic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alberto Priego

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Contents

Today’s Challenges to International Peace and Security: Searching for Quality in International Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Peter Wallensteen Part III

Necessary Changes

New World Stage, New Weapons, New Military Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . 121 Juan Lopez Diaz Long-Lasting Solutions to the Problem of Migration in Europe . . . . . . . 141 J. Martín Ramírez The Role of NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Federico Yaniz European Union’s Strategic Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Jacek Ochman and Jerzy Biziewski Part IV

Social Aspects

Information Society and the Protective Influence of Security Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Juliusz Piwowarski Conflict Resolution in Prisons. Education, Restorative Justice and Prisoner Facilitated Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Luis Millana, Juan Carlos Fernández-Rodríguez, and Fernando Miralles Muñoz The Necessary Link Between Security Culture and Data Protection in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Luis A. García-Segura Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

About the Editors

J. Martín Ramírez born in Madrid, at the present is Chair of the Center for Conflict Studies at Universidad Nebrija, of the CICA International Foundation, and of the Spanish Pugwash Movement (Peace Nobel Price 1995). He studied Medicine, Humanities, and Law, obtaining a Ph.D. in Medicine and Surgery (Neurosciences) and in Philosophy (Education) as well as three Diplomas and a Master in National Defense at the Spanish CESEDEN. Humboldt and Fullbright Fellow, in Ruhr Universität and Stanford, respectively, Dr. Martín Ramírez is also Research Fellow of International Security Program of the Harvard University and Visiting Fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, probably the most important left-leaned and right-leaned American think-tanks, respectively. He also served as Visiting Professor and Research Fellow at universities in Israel, France, Poland, Wales, Australia, Japan, Canada, Iran, Guatemala, Germany, and the USA. He has been awarded multiple international honors, such as being several times official of the Boarding Counsil of the International Society for Research on Aggression (ISRA), on the Advisory Board of the Society for Terrorism Research and of the Professors World Peace Academy, and Fellow of the World Academy of Art and Sciences and the New York Academy of Sciences, as well as a Professional Award on Aggression and Inter-ethnic Conflicts by the East-West Center, established by the United States Congress, among others. Dr. Martín Ramírez is author of about 500 scientific publications, among books and articles, in more than ten languages. He has also been Head of the Complutense Research Group on Sociopsychobiology of Aggression, Head of the Departments of Psychobiology at Seville and Complutense Universities, and Director of the Cabinet of the Rector at the Madrid Autonomous University.

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About the Editors

Major General (Ret.) Dr. Jerzy Biziewski performed last duties as director of Plans, Allied Command Operations at Mons, NATO. He is a graduate of the Mechanized Infantry Higher School. He earned his Ph.D. at the National Defense Academy in the military history domain. He attended numerous courses at a tactical, operational and strategic level both in the country and abroad (Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, NATO).

Part I

Among Global Players

The United Kingdom and Its Future Contribution to the Defense of Europe Eduardo Zamarripa

Outline 1 The United Kingdom in Europe During the Last One Hundred Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The “Special Relationship” Between the United Kingdom and United States . . . . . . . . . 3 The United Kingdom in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Current Situation and a Prospective Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The role that the British governments have played in the United Kingdom in recent centuries has been to favor a balance of powers in continental Europe favorable to their security and aggrandizement. Currently the United Kingdom (UK) has decided to separate from the European Union (EU) of which until now it was part. This decision is undoubtedly based on political reasons, but also influenced by an imperial idea that has not yet disappeared completely and by a peculiar and close relationship with the United States, from which the British expect a very high level of cooperation. However, neither the EU can do without British military capabilities in its Common Security and Defense Policy, of which the UK so far was a part, nor can the latter do so in the commercial relations and technological development programs that currently connects their companies with the defense industries of the rest of the Union. In summary, two sectors focus the interest of the UK in maintaining a close relationship with the European Union in the field of security and defense: mutual defense against a common enemy, which Britain sees mainly within the framework of NATO and under the leadership of the United States (USA), and the research and technological development of armaments and commercial relations with the industries of this sector in the Union. Regardless of their departure from the EU, the UK and the EU will undoubtedly reach an agreement in the specific field of security In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: November 16, 2019; Accepted: January, 6, 2020. E. Zamarripa (B) Lieutenant General of Spanish Air Force (retired), Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_1

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and common defense, and this agreement will undoubtedly be assumed by the USA and NATO. The agreement will surely be effective for the defense of Europe, but it will foreseeably affect the Union’s capabilities to provide itself with an adequate level of strategic autonomy in terms of its defense in order to achieve the role of global actor on the international scene that has long been pursuing. Keywords Brexit · “Special relationship” · United States and NATO

1 The United Kingdom in Europe During the Last One Hundred Years The UK throughout its history has been simultaneously inside and outside of continental Europe. In any case, and since the times of the Roman conquest, it maintains the same culture of Roman roots and Christian ideology as the rest of the continent, with its ethnic peculiarity of being a Saxon country and with its insular character that have conditioned forever its way of interacting with continental Europe. His role in the geopolitics of our continent has been, perhaps always influenced by its insularity, to favor the balance of powers and hegemonies that have emerged in continental Europe, while at the same time building an empire of global dimensions which led Britain in the beginning of the twentieth century to exercise its dominance or influence over the entire planet. The situation changed progressively in the twentieth century. The First World War, in which the British defended France, Belgium and Holland from the aggression of Germany, significantly eroded its capabilities, both the military ones and their socioeconomic fabric, by losing the UK hundreds of thousands of young people in the conflict. The British armed forces suffered, according to several sources consulted, around 700,000 casualties between dead and missing soldiers. The Second World War gave the final blow to the British Empire, which had needed during the conflict the constant support of the United States. The latter, by participating in the war, being the key to the Allied victory, and, very importantly, supplying a large part of the military and logistical equipment used during the conflict, emerged from it converted into the world superpower by excellence. In the fight the British had suffered more than 400,000 casualties between military and civilians. The role of the United Kingdom in the international scene changed radically. In the postwar period the United States took the reins of Europe’s security and defense while the United Kingdom accommodated itself to a new geopolitical role in the shadow of its North American allies maintaining and strengthening a “special relationship” with its former colony. This relationship between the two countries, that came from old, has been reinforced since then and has been the result of the constant support and valuable help that the United Kingdom has been providing since then to its North American ally, within NATO and outside her. An expensive investment and even socially and politically committed in terms of human lives in the military

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operations that it has shared with the United States, but certainly effective for the interests of both nations.

2 The “Special Relationship” Between the United Kingdom and United States Even within the limited dimension of this work, I believe that we must go a little deeper into the “special relationship” between the USA and Great Britain because it can probably influence the position that Britain takes in its future relations with the EU as to security and collective European defense concerns. We can find a precedent for this special relationship as early as 1935, the year in which British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, and as quoted by Henry Kissinger in his book Diplomacy, presented his vision of relations between the two countries in a speech delivered in the Albert Hall in London: I have always believed that the greatest security against war anywhere in the world, in Europe, in the East or everywhere, would be the close collaboration of the British Empire with the United States of America. Stanley Baldwin (quoted by Kissinger 2010, p. 638).

A somewhat bold interpretation of this special relationship belongs to the American John Gaddis who argues that “the British intended to influence Americans as much as possible and aspired to interpret the role of the Greeks as tutors of the new Romans” (Gaddis 2008, p. 32), and an identical statement we can find in Maier (2010, p. 231). In any case, it seems that the key word is “influence.” Obviously, the common culture and the English language have been of unquestionable importance in the relationship between the two countries, and the north American analyst Dan Smith tells us that the relationship between the two countries has been based on what Kissinger called “the value of the intangible,” who in his book Diplomacy, states that: British rulers chose, especially after Suez, to follow the path of seeking greater influence. The British leaders of both parties managed to become so indispensable for the decisionmaking process in the United States that the presidents and those around them came to see the consultations with London not as a special favor towards a weak ally, but as a vital element of his own government Dan Smith (2010, p. 63).

More recently, and as confirmation of the “special relationship” that exists between the USA and the UK, we could literally quote the words that President George W Bush dedicated to the UK in his speech at the Capitol to Congress and the Senate on 21 of September of 2001 after the terrorist attacks, and that counted on the presence of Tony Blair displaced until Washington especially to show his support:

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E. Zamarripa America has no truer friend than Great Britain. -and here he was interrupted by applause from senators and congressmen- Once again we are joined together in a great cause. I´m so honored the British prime minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity with America. Thank you for coming, friend Bush (2001).

A final point on the special relationship of the UK with its former North American colony that it would like to bring to this work has to do with British feelings about its relationship with the USA, about its Europeanness and about the persistence of its imperial ideas, feelings that obviously they also influence or are shared by their rulers. I think we can find a good button showing them in one of his most prestigious writers, George Orwell, who in the 1940s wrote his famous book 1984. In this masterpiece Orwell divides the world into three major super states, Oceania, Eurasia and East Asia, and considers the first one, in which the protagonist of the book lives, as composed of the most relevant areas of the British Empire until then, the southern half of Africa and Asia, the oceans and the Australian continent, all of South America, the British Isles and, of course, the USA. This division of the world made by the famous British author suggests to some extent the fit in which the UK sees itself in the global context, which we could summarize as an imperial vision of responsibility across the planet, an island situation close but at the same time separated from the rest of the European continent, and a particularly familiar and privileged relationship with the USA. These “feelings” are what I also believe that they may have influenced British rulers when it comes to setting up their country’s security strategy in the international context, including NATO. They may also have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the June 23, 2016 referendum on the UK’s departure from the EU, thinking that after separating from it, they could commercially rely on their former colonies and their close relations with the USA. Having said all that, a question to be asked in these moments of disconnection of the UK from the EU would be whether its special relationship with the USA has sufficient growth potential to constitute for the British an economic support capable of compensating in the future for the possible losses of its current participation in the common market of the EU. Even more, a second question would be if the political liaison position between the USA and Europe, that in many respects has been played and still plays Great Britain, would be also affected, and if in that case it would affect also the relations between the two countries.

3 The United Kingdom in the European Union In any case, the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC), currently the EU, on January 1, 1973, and it seems generally accepted it did it more with an underlying idea basically economic and to favor free trade than with the final objective of follow a path of political integration that could lead in the future to a type of federal Europe.

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Just two years later, in 1975, apparently not satisfied with the integration process, the Harold Wilson Government called a referendum in 1975 that confirmed the permanence of the UK in the EEC. Over time, in addition to maintaining different positions within the Union in different fields, in recent years the British Government has hindered the initiatives of the EU by endowing itself with a common defense policy. Now, after a referendum held on June 23, 2016, the UK has decided to leave the Union. And here we are, and wondering what the British contribution to the security and defense of Europe will be like once the separation process is over. At the time of writing these lines, Boris Johnson’s recent electoral triumph in the December 12 elections has cleared the incognito of the United Kingdom’s way of separating from the Union. On January 31, the deadline will expire and an agreed separation will be executed according to the text already agreed, which initially had not been accepted by the British Parliament. After that date, and until December 31, 2020, the future relations of the United Kingdom with the European Union will be negotiated, and of course between them the relations in the field of security.

4 The Current Situation and a Prospective Vision Michel Barnier, the main negotiator of the Union in this separation process declared at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on November 25, 2018 “the United Kingdom will remain our friend, our partner, and our ally”. The concept of ally has very important connotations in the field of security and defense and there is no doubt that it will facilitate a specific agreement on this issue in the post-Brexit negotiating process that will take place from next February on. At this time the vicissitudes of the separation process are well known and to some extent so are the generalities of the agreement that is currently pending approval. What, on the other hand, is not known, and cannot be known yet, are the precise aspects of the specific security and defense agreements that will be developed after the signing of the general agreement to separate the UK from the Union. The Minister of State for Defense of the UK, Frederick Penn Curzon, carried out a visit to Spain in April this year and declared during the same that the agreement reached initially in March specified that the defense and Security would be treated separately. For the Secretary of State this was a sign that these issues could be negotiated at a different level. He stated that “we cannot allow us a UK’s exit from the EU to deteriorate the defense and security of all Europeans”, and when asked if the UK would subsequently seek the signing of a defense treaty with the EU, Curzon literally replied that “it is possible. We pretend an agreement with the European Commission and approved by the member states of the Union”, and he added “we want something stronger than the relationship that Norway currently has with the European Union. I hope it is achievable and not only in terms of military operations, missions or training; also in the industrial field” (2019). The statements of the UK´s Minister of State for Defense last April 2019 remain valid and very illustrative today. I believe that we can foresee that in matters of

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security and defense a specific agreement will be reached regardless of the type of Brexit reached, with or without agreement. Several elements will contribute to this understanding in the area of common defense: the military and technological capacity of the UK, the need for the Union to be able to count on British military capacities in one way or another, NATO and, very importantly inside and outside the Alliance, the USA. In opinion of Alice Billon-Galand, Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network of London, despite current political turbulences, London should lean in on UK defense collaboration with the EU, and between the EU and NATO. In doing so it would encourage the strengthening of EU defense and security and of European military capabilities not as alternatives to NATO or USA leadership but as ways of making Europeans better military partners to Washington and thus retaining essential US engagement. Billon-Galand (2019, p. 1).

The issues to be considered, deeply related to each other, are those of operational nature, industrial and technological issues, and, of course, the economic aspects of the relationship established. Let’s dig a little deeper into all of them. In any case, the specific military capabilities of the EU, which are currently being tried to strengthen through the Common Security and Defense Policy, would be significantly reduced after the UK exits from it, if this will definitely happen. On the other hand, at present there is a good opportunity for the remaining members of the Union to advance in what was agreed upon in Article 42.2 of the Lisbon Treaty: “the Common Security and Defense Policy shall include the definition of a common defense policy of the Union. This will lead to a common defense once the European Council has decided unanimously”… and the UK will no longer participate in the European Council decisions once its departure from the Union is completed. In any case, total Europe’s military defense capabilities in the framework constituted not only by the EU but also by NATO will not be affected as a whole. The same British military capabilities that the EU might have on a case-by-case basis for operations under its responsibility will be available, always on a case-by-case basis, for NATO now and in the future. What will instead be affected is the degree of strategic autonomy of the Union, which will be reduced while reinforcing the roles to play politically in the defense of our continent by NATO and in particular by the USA and for the UK, which will permanently support the former. In the industrial and technological aspects the situation is more complex. The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (commonly referred to as PESCO) (Zamarripa 2019), the addition of new functions to the European Defense Agency (EDA), and the establishment of the European Defense Fund by the Commission, are all mechanisms to collaborate to the strengthening of European defense capabilities and the European defense industry, not to the benefit of the American one. Here the British position could be or to integrate to a certain extend and under conditions of inferiority with the North American armament industry or to participate in an integrative process, sharing technology and partially subsidized, and with access to a single European defense market through the necessary agreements for it with the

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Union. The latter alternative could be achieved thorough agreements such as those currently maintained by the EDA with Norway, or even stronger, as the Secretary of State for Defense of the UK seems to suggest in his statements set out above. All of the above translates into money, investment costs, maintenance of structures, and participation in operations. By the way, operations in which the UK has not participated substantially so far, but, in any case, has already put some personnel in almost all of them and in particular have made an important compromise in the case of the “Battle Groups”. The UK will surely negotiate these and other aspects of its contribution to the security and defense of Europe once the process of its political separation from the Union is completed. Despite leaving the EU, the issue of the security and defense of Europe, of which the UK in any case is a part, is a crucial issue although some nations address it differently. It is also of the greatest importance, both from the point of view of research and development and from the industrial and commercial ones, the development of the European defense industry. Finally, the financial aspects of defense investments, always enormously costly in economic and political terms, imply decisions of transcendent importance in which collaboration is better for everyone than individual efforts. All of the above allows us to predict that, once the process of leaving the UK from the Union arrive to an end, a satisfactory agreement will be reached for both parties regarding collective security…, although it will not be so much from the political point of view for supporters of advancing the process of European integration within the framework of the EU. What does not offer doubts is that in front of a common enemy the UK would participate decisively in the defense of Europe, both for self-survival reasons and for solidarity with the Euro-Atlantic society and in defense of its shared values. The way in which its participation in the defense of Europe will be established may be more or less complicated, remember that in the British Isles you drive on the left, but she will surely be effective.

References Barnier M (2018) European Commission document. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/the_withdrawald_agreement_explained_es.pdf Billon-Galland A (2019) UK defence policy and Brexit: time to rethink London’s European strategy. European Leadership Network, London, October 2019 Bush GW (2001) President Bush’s address- Com-transcript CNN, 21 Sept 2001 Curzon FP (2019) Declarations published by the newspapers El Pais and ABC (Esteban Villarejo) the 16th April 2019 Gaddis JL (2008) La Guerra Fría. RBA Libros, Barcelona, p 2008 Kissinger H (2010) Diplomacia. Ediciones B, Barcelona, SA Maier CS (2010) Hegemony and autonomy within the Western Alliance. In: Leffler MP, Painter DS et al. (2010) Origins of the cold war. Routledge. New York Orwell G (1983) Destino. Ediciones, Barcelona, 1984 Smith D (1989) Pressure, How America runs NATO, Blumbsbury, London

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Zamarripa E (2019) The permanent structured cooperation in the European Union. Its real potential value. In: Martín Ramírez J, Biziewski J (eds) Security and defence in Europe. Springer International, pp 87–95

Eduardo Zamarripa Lieutenant General Zamarripa, graduated in the Spanish Air Force Academy in 1969, has been serving as fighter pilot in different Units, flying 4500 h. He also graduated in the Air Staff Course in Madrid, the NATO Defence College Course in Rome, and the National Defence Course in the High Centre for Spanish Defence (CESEDEN), and in Economics at the University of Zaragoza and in Modern and Contemporary History at the Complutense University of Madrid. His last management and Staff assignments have been: Spanish Delegation in NATO Headquarters in Brussels as Air Defence Representative from 1986 to 1991 and as Defence Councellor from 1997 to 2000; Deputy Director General of the National Spanish Institute of Aerospace Technologies (INTA) from 2000 to 2003; Deputy Director General for Cooperation and Civilian Defence in the General Direction of Defence Policy from 2003 to 2004; Director Manager of the Air Mobility of the Air Combat Command from 2004 to 2006; Deputy Commander of the NATO Air Component Command in Izmir (Turkey) from 2006 to 2007; Chief of the Command Element of the European Union Althea Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2007 al 2010; Chief of Staff of the NATO Joint Force Command () from 2007 to 2010; and Director General of Infrastructure of the Spanish Ministry of Defence from 2012 to 2018. During his two assignments at NATO Headquarters he has been instrumental in the integration of the Spanish Airforce in NATO’s Integrated Air Defence through the NATO Air Defence Committee structure. He has also been deeply involved in assuring Spain’s full participation in various NATO programmes, such as the “NATO Air Command and Control System” (ACCS) programme, “the NATO Airborne Early Warning Programme”, and “the Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme” (AGS). He has also been Spanish representative on the “International High Level Group” that developed and elaborated the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which was approved at the Washington Summit in 1999. Under his responsibility as Deputy Director General for Cooperation and Civilian Defence in the General Direction of Defence Policy of the Spanish MOD, he was in charge of the management of the Spanish participation in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

The Indo-Pacific: The Gauntlet Thrown Down by US, India, Japan and Australia to China’s Asia-Pacific Order Giorgio Spagnol

Outline 1 2

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Russia and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 India and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Japan and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Indo-Pacific Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 The Indo-Pacific Frame and the Quad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 USA’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 China’s Expansion in the Indo-Pacific Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 How About the European Union? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The idea of the Asia-Pacific region is giving way to another construct: the Indo-Pacific, a contest with strategic implications, not least the growth of China’s power and interests. This involves recognizing that the growing economic, geopolitical, and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are creating a single strategic system with the Indian Ocean replacing the Atlantic as the globe’s busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor. The Indo-Pacific frame is closely linked to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad: a coalition of powers that are either wary or ambivalent towards China: Australia, India, Japan and the United States (USA). The increased cooperation among these four democratic countries is perceived and interpreted in China as part of a USA-driven containment strategy towards Beijing: namely a reaction to the Chinese A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: October 14, 2019; Accepted: December 27, 2019. G. Spagnol (B) Former Director Force Readiness, NATO, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_2

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maritime territorial expansionism signalling that the South China Sea is not part of China’s integral territory (as China likes to argue). As a matter of fact, China, while getting hold of Asian, African, and also European (Piraeus of Athens) commercial ports, feels encircled by the Quad countries and, by exerting political pressure, resorts to carrot-and-stick policies towards countries in the region. In such a contest, the EU could play a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific game and its contributions through imaginative mediation and political appeasement could be crucial and significant. Keywords Geopolitics · Quad · China · USA · Europe

1 Foreword Asia is difficult to understand. It is an enormous and complex part of the world where, besides the existence of multiple perspectives, the problems in the region are all inextricably linked. Focusing on one area, to the exclusion of others, is dangerous. The map of Asia is being reimagined. The idea of the Asia-Pacific, sponsored by China, which made good sense as a framework for regional order in the late 20th century, is giving way to another construct: the Indo-Pacific, a contest with strategic implications, not least the growth of China’s power and interests. To understand whether or not China is a threat to the world order, it is important to pay attention to the perspectives of its Asian neighbours. China is fringed by three great powers—Russia, India and Japan—and by numerous small powers in the region.

2 Current Situation At a time when both are being targeted by the USA with punitive measures, in two separate events Russia and China have publicly heralded a new age of diplomacy between the two countries: with the Vostok 2018 Exercise and the Joint Sea 2019 Exercise, Russia and China signalled to the West that they are working closer together to counterbalance the USA “unilateralism”. In particular, Vostok 2018, a massive Russian-Chinese military exercise, involved more than 300,000 troops, including 3,500 Chinese personnel, 1,000 planes and several warships, while Joint Sea 2019 involved two submarines, 13 ships, airplanes, helicopters and marines from both countries. As for India, many Indians see China as a Bête Jaune since the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Many Indians believe that their security depends on whether or not they can maintain advantageous positions in key parts of the South Asian Indian Ocean Region. If they think that they are losing their advantage, they may feel compelled to “defend” themselves. Not all Indians have equally serious misgivings about China, however.

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As for the Japanese, they also view China as a threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to rising Sino-Japanese rivalry: each nation came to view the USA presence in East Asia in a very different way. The Japanese sought to increase military ties with the USA and thereby increase their national security. The Chinese, by contrast, hoped that the USA would help contain the growth of Japanese power. As a matter of fact, contrary to its expectations, Japan has not emerged as the leading world economic power and remains largely dependent on the USA for its security needs. The Korea peninsula is another “powder-keg” region. North Korea is a garrisonstate, with formidable military forces and nuclear weapons. China, however, has improved relations with South Korea and now appears to be trying to foster gradual, peaceful change. In the South China Sea, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei have claims to the many resource-rich islands in the area. They also quarrel over fishing rights and transboundary pollution. The area is also afflicted by piracy. China’s dependency on oil from the Middle East is likely to increase: consequently, controlling the Strait of Malacca will be more crucial than ever. China, significantly, is developing an increased interest in sea power. While it currently recognizes the freedom of the seas, it is, by no means evident that it will continue to do so in the future. The situation could turn highly explosive were China to cut off vital energy supplies from East Asian nations.

2.1 Russia and China In the past decade, relations have improved amid large sales of weapons and energy between the two countries. According to Russian and Chinese political elites, current liberal interventionism in the West has caused many instabilities and miseries in the Middle East and much blow-back against the West in the form of terrorism, refugees, and anti-establishment populism. For Russia and China, the current harsh posture of the USA derives largely from a strong sense of disappointment and dismay over the failed effort to “change” the two large powers with a neoliberalist agenda (democracy and free market economy). Whether or not a comprehensive alliance will be formed, for Beijing and Moscow an ideal world order would be interstate relations in which multiple centres of different political, economic, and civilizational entities would coexist. This diverse world would accommodate current efforts to construct multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), while continuing to work with West-led multilateral institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, G20, G7, etc. Russia has supported China’s BRI which can provide foundation for future partnership. The BRI, also known as the “Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road” is a development strategy adopted by the Chinese government. The planned

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integration of the Chinese-led BRI with Russia’s EAEU will develop a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along the ancient Silk Road routes. Russia has launched gas supplies to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline (38 bn cm/year; 3.000 km long). There are ongoing bilateral talks on two additional gas pipelines to be constructed (Astrasheuskaya 2019). And while the personal touch in the Putin-Xi relationship guarantees political harmony, the trust between the two leaders is also enabling the two sides to overcome differences and solve problems for the common interests. As for the China–Russia exercises, such drills are significant to the People Liberation Army (PLA): only large-scale exercises can truly reveal the capacity of a military in terms of strategic planning, power projection, command, control and communication. Since the PLA has not been involved in wars since 1980, its capacity building and operational readiness can only be verified through military drills. Russian Military doctrine and Lessons Learned from wars in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria can be very useful to the PLA. China and Russia are also suggesting that the days of the USA dollars as the international reserve currency may be numbered. Russia is already using local currency in trade with China and Iran, while China has been active in setting up trade deals in its own currency, the renimbi. The role the US dollar plays as international currency could eventually result undermined. As for international politics, both China and Russia believe that the establishment of a new world order will take time and, in the meantime, serious conflicts and crises could occur. In order to prevent a large-scale war, Russia and China intend to act as security providers through their foreign and defense policies.

2.2 India and China India is, after all, a very messy, cacophonous democracy, and likely to remain so. As one might expect in a pluralist society, different interest groups have very different reactions to the rise of China. Broadly speaking, there are those who appease and muddle through, those who advocate strategic engagement, and those who take a confrontational approach (Ganguly 2002). India and China have plenty of issues between themselves: the Tibet issues, the 1962 war, the Kashmir issue and the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). And, India has yet to join China’s BRI. If the last few decades have been the story of China’s rise to prominence in the global economy, the decades ahead are seen as belonging to India. India displaced China as the world’s fastest-growing major economy in 2014, and with 7.7% annual growth forecast until 2030, the South Asian giant is universally regarded as the next global economic powerhouse (Fensom 2016). While low commodity prices have hit the other BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia and China, India status as a net commodity importer and consumer has placed the world’s largest democracy in pole position to capitalise from current global market conditions.

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As low oil, coal and iron ore prices persist, India’s trade deficit continues to shrink and consumer spending power is on the rise, while its major economic obstacle, inflation, is at its lowest level in a decade. That is not to say India does not face challenges managing the demands of its impatient populace. But the World Bank sees India maintaining its status as the world’s fastest growing economy on the back of public-sector investment and positive regulatory reforms, making India a reasonably safe bet to continue as Asia’s rising star.

2.3 Japan and China Not too long ago, Japan was the symbol of Asian resurgence. Given that Japan’s economy grew an average of 16% per annum between 1960 and 1990 to become the world’s second-largest economy, such predictions were not as radical as they appear now. While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, secure in his position through 2021, has sought to stimulate growth through his “Abenomics” policies, between now and 2030 Japan is expected to experience the largest decrease in its labour force, with the OECD urging policies to improve government finances while restructuring the economy. While India will overtake Japan in the next few years, it will cling onto the title of the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2030. Asia’s rise to global prominence is no fantasy, with many arguing that the recent emergence of China and India merely reflects a return to the historical economic norm after the post-war dominance of the USA (Fensom 2016). Halfway through the 20th century, the continent accounted for only 20% of global GDP, but spearheaded by Japan and South Korea’s “economic miracles”, the rise of the Asian tiger economies of Southeast Asia and China’s subsequent economic boom, Asia now contributes 40% of global GDP. But if we look at history, the longest standing tension is found in the relationship between China and Japan. It is this relationship that poses the most worrying problems for the future: in view of their inability to harmoniously exist side by side for the last millennia or so, can we really see ways in which a strong China and a strong Japan manage to exist alongside each other without conflict in the 21st century? (Brown 2016). A long term view of this history shows a clear pattern: fractious troughs followed by warm peaks, before the troughs reoccur again, with the recent downturn occurring in a context in which, for the first time ever, both are modernized, globally significant economies. In Japan, the consensus has been growing that the engagement with China in the 80’ and 90’ with massive Japanese support in China’s modernization, was a mistake. Their neighbour has not changed politically, nor has it developed grateful or friendly feelings toward Japan. Most worrying of all, China is now building up naval military assets that look increasingly like they are pointed directly at Japan’s interests.

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The ancient Greek historian Thucydides showed long ago that the price for peace is perpetual preparation for war. Complacency about China and Japan being able to just muddle along and never clash with each other again would run against the long history. Creating a sustainable framework in which, at the very least, they can both manage their problems toward each other without resorting to fighting is the single greatest challenge, and the source of the most worrying instability, in Asia today (Brown 2016).

2.4 China China sees itself as the regional power, believing that it deserves respect and deference. This self-perception derives in part from China’s past role as the center of a Sinic cultural world, of being the “Middle Kingdom” in which the Chinese emperor was the Son of Heaven and all other countries in the region were in some degree of subordinate tributary status to China. One of the primary goals of the PRC’s foreign policy since the founding of the communist regime in 1949 has been to return China to this status of regional power (Chambers 2002). When Deng Xiaoping became the “Paramount Leader” of China in 1978, the country’s economy was still faltering beneath the burden of decades of Maoist economic policy. The radical economic reforms that followed opened communist China up to foreign investment, decollectivized agriculture and privatized state-owned industry, propelling China to decades of unprecedented growth that saw it overtake Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. Nowadays the golden days of almost 10% average GDP growth per annum, which the nation had experienced since the 1978 reform, are over. But the economic growth burst of the world’s most populous country is far from finished. Backed by an economic restructuring, from exports to domestic demand, and from manufacturing and industry to services and consumptions, the Chinese economy will likely grow at an average of 5.2% per annum until 2030. For now, the sentiment among economists is that Beijing will rise to these challenges. If that is the case, China’s economy will close the gap on the USA, which is expected to experience growth closer to 2.4% per annum through to 2030. Although on those projections China would narrowly miss out on becoming the world’s largest economy by 2030, it would comfortably remain the dominant economic force in Asia (Fensom 2016). As for the expansion of China’s interests, diplomacy, and strategic reach into the Indian Ocean, China is undeniably expanding its influence and presence in the Indian Ocean, where its interests—particularly energy imports—have grown sharply. With growing Chinese oil demand, the building of ambitious overland pipelines will only slightly offset China’s critical reliance on the Indian Ocean. An estimated million or more Chinese nationals are also living and working in Africa, where China is a principal foreign investor. Additionally, Chinese security personnel are playing a variety of roles in Africa, including as contributors to “public

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goods” such as medical relief and evacuation of non-combatants from crisis zones (Medcalf 2015).

2.5 The Indo-Pacific Rationale The term Indo-Pacific may seem new to geopolitics, but the underlying idea is anything but new. Economic and cultural interactions between Asia’s sub-regions go back millennia, as attested by the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia. The interactions were not always from west to east: in the early 1400s, the Chinese empire sent a powerful “treasure fleet” led by Admiral Zheng He on multiple voyages into the Indian Ocean. Chinese interest in this enterprise was not sustained, but soon European adventurers began to visit the Indian Ocean and the waters and lands to its east and north, followed by European mercantile trading companies, explorers, diplomats, and military expeditions. The idea of an Indo-Pacific region involves recognizing that the growing economic, geopolitical, and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are creating a single strategic system with the Indian Ocean replacing the Atlantic as the globe’s busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor, carrying 2/3 of global oil shipments and 1/3 of bulk cargo. The powerhouse economies of East Asia depend acutely on oil imports across the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa, and this dependence is set to deepen further (Medcalf 2015). Around 80% of China’s oil imports, 90% of South Korea’s, and up to 90% of Japan’s are shipped from the Middle East and/or Africa through the Indian Ocean. This is making the Indo-Pacific the world’s economic and strategic center of gravity being China and India increasingly outward-looking in their economic and military affairs, with China’s into the Indian Ocean and India, to a lesser but growing degree, into the Pacific. The region involves the intersecting interests of at least four major powers— China, India, Japan, and the USA—, as well as significant middle players including Australia, South Korea, and the most substantial of the Southeast Asian countries. In parallel to the geographically expanding interests and reach of China and India, the continued strategic role and presence of the UE in both the Pacific and Indian oceans is a major factor defining the Indo-Pacific idea. The interests of Japan and of South Korea, which rely even more acutely than does China on energy supplies across the Indian Ocean, also need to be taken into account.

2.6 The Indo-Pacific Frame and the Quad Throughout colonial times, European maps entitled “Asia” encompassed an IndoPacific arc from the Indian Ocean rim, through Southeast Asia to China, Korea, and

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Japan. But it was President Trump’s trip to Asia in November 2017 that redrawed Asia’s diplomatic geography by linking the Indo-Pacific frame and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad. The Quad comprises a coalition of powers that are either wary or ambivalent towards China and its BRI: Australia, India, Japan and the USA. On several occasions in 2017, and again in early 2018, the Quad postulated a vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” based on freedom of navigation on the seas, observance of the rule of international law, support for inclusive economic cooperation, and infrastructure projects across the Indo-Pacific and as far afield as African states bordering the Indian Ocean. The most active power in developing and advocating the Indo-Pacific idea is Australia, a middle power in the Indo-Pacific strategic game, with its unusual twoocean geography, its proximity to and monitoring oversight of the crucial sea lanes connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and its perceived status as a state that, despite being a close USA ally, is also developing important economic, societal, and even security relations with multiple Asian powers (Medcalf 2015). The potential for the middle powers to have influence in an Indo-Pacific setting has also been recognized by Indonesian leaders since 2013, as well as the way the Indian Premier Modi has characterized Australia as “The heart of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region”. As a matter of fact, the Indo-Pacific concept turned into a more coherent construct when it was first discussed and announced in the 2013 Australian Defence White Paper. Hence, since 2013, the geopolitical concept of Indo-Pacific began to be conceived as a means to connect India and the Pacific Ocean by establishing closer political and security relations between New Delhi and the other key East Asian states actors minus China. Australia, in turn, since 2013, has adapted its foreign policy strategy to the fastchanging Asian strategic landscape. The growing Chinese presence in the Pacific Ocean is further undermining Australia’s diplomatic leverage on the small Pacific Ocean countries. Thus, Canberra is aiming at closer cooperation with Japan, India, and the US. This quadrilateral relationship is gaining, in fact, a new momentum under the term and concept of Quad. However, if India, Japan, the ES, and Australia are now firmly committed to the establishment of a new strategic area for regional interstate relations, China, of course, will not be sitting on its hands. The increased cooperation among those four democratic countries is perceived and interpreted in China as part of a USA-driven containment strategy towards Beijing. To be sure, China will not passively wait for what it fears is USA–Japanesedriven containment to materialise and has its own ideas on how to position itself —possibly with partners—in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, at this stage, China is also moving towards the establishment of new strategic stances, with the objective of confronting those challenges posed by real or imaginary containment policies. From the Chinese perspective, the BRI is therefore not only a massive inter-regional infrastructure project but also an instrument to defend the country from USA-driven geopolitical and economic encirclement (Berkofsky and Miracola 2019).

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2.7 USA’s Role For the US, the main Indo-Pacific security problem is strategic competition and the risk of conflict with China. Just as China’s interests, capabilities, and vulnerabilities are extending across the Indian Ocean, so too are the reasons for the USA to respond to opportunities for cooperation or competition with China across this domain. The Indian Ocean has long been part of the USA Pacific Command’s (PACOM) area of operations; the USA-India partnership is consequential and growing; and the USA, its partners, and allies have a long record of basing, surveillance, and patrolling in many parts of the Indian Ocean. If Asia is becoming the global center of economic gravity, any conflict there involving a major power would have a global impact. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are being watched as a laboratory for how a powerful China behaves when it does not get its way. Trading nations everywhere have stakes in Southeast Asia shipping lanes, and many regional players have a deep interest in what developments in the South China Sea mean for the fate of a rules-based order. Wider questions remain about how China can be incorporated into a two-ocean regional order without worsening the security anxieties of other states. A diplomatic and maritime-security infrastructure is needed to reduce the risk of conflict as the great powers expand their interests in the Indo-Pacific. These are uncharted waters, but some basic principles can be identified. Coexistence among the significant powers, especially China, India, Japan, and the USA, will clearly be vital to the super-region’s peace and stability, but other states will require a say. Given the size and complexity of the Indo-Pacific, it is not surprising that this is a region where countries will choose different security partners for different purposes. For as long as the region experiences armed tension, uncertainty and risk at sea— such as over contested islands in the East and South China seas—China will need to come to terms with the fact that the USA alliances and partnerships will strengthen in ways that the participants see as defensive. In the final analysis, a defining characteristic of a region on the scale of the IndoPacific is that it dilutes the ability of any single country to unilaterally shape the strategic order: a set of mini-lateral arrangements for feasible security cooperation among a small number of key players are therefore needed.

2.8 China’s Expansion in the Indo-Pacific Region Current areas of contention include not only China’s territorial claims on Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and other island. Beijing has also an airstrip, structures, and buildings on the Chinese-built, man-made Subi reef in the Spratly chain of islands in the South China Sea. When thinking in a geo-strategic sense about China, the island-chain formulation is helpful. China has a first island chain, running from the Japanese islands through

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the Philippines, and down to the tip of Southeast Asia. A second island chain is running from Japan through the Micronesian islands to the tip of Indonesia. China will likely eye a third island chain, encompassing Hawaii and the Alaskan Coast before dropping south down to New Zealand and might eventually consider a fourth and even fifth island chain, both in the Indian Ocean, an increasingly crucial zone of competition between the USA and China. The fourth island chain would run from southern Pakistan (where China has created a deep-water port at Gwadar) down past Diego Garcia, while the fifth and final island chain could be considered running from the Horn of Africa down to the Coast of South Africa. Little wonder the US military has renamed its former “Pacific Command” as the “Indo-Pacific Command”. Each of the island chains will be a line contention. Both US and Chinese war plans encompass protocols for employing land-based forces from the various islands to project power to sea.

2.9 How About the European Union? The European Union (EU) is a political system with a unique structure and functioning which is neither a pure intergovernmental organization nor a true federal state. What is badly lacking is the political authority and capacity on the world scene: no major power is currently considering the EU a strategic actor. Instead, somebody is suggesting that the EU is a “start-up enterprise”. As a matter of fact, the EU, a trade/commercial giant but a political dwarf, needs to become politically relevant, more federal and united. Only a truly federal and united EU will be able to express its potential at a time when the BRICS, with China in the lead, are increasing their presence worldwide and could take advantage of a split, irrelevant and insecure Europe. Europeans must understand how much weight EU has as a block, forget about nation states, and stop complaining how small they are compared to heavy-weights like the USA and China. Seen as a block, EU is on par with these heavy weights; in political globalization, even big European countries are mere footnotes, but all together they can make the difference. The EU is, in fact, the world’s biggest trading block and its member states are the biggest trading partners of many countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU is interested in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” based on freedom of navigation on the seas: its cooperation with the Quad countries, strategic partners of the EU, could thus be conducive for economic, political, and security arrangements in the Quad framework. But the EU should be extremely careful: any possible European commitment to the Indo-Pacific should not jeopardize its current cooperation with China. This is why the EU, while engaging China economically and politically, should stress that its involvement in the Indo-Pacific is not intended to threaten or damage China.

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3 Conclusion The USA will try to short circuit China’s advances across number of strategic fields, but Beijing still has the means and more motivation than ever to accelerate its timetable and efforts towards reaching parity with Washington. Taking also in account the tight alignment between China and Russia, this new global dynamic creates an increasingly complex landscape (Stratfor 2018). Following the failure of Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”, the Indo-Pacific represents a geopolitical instrument facilitating the USA’ quest for a safe location in Asia while surveying China’s expansion and assessing the impact of BRI on the Asian continent and its strategic dynamics. The development of BRI is currently allowing China to strategically combine economic and infrastructural projects with ports expansion and maritime development. China is looking forward to building a powerful navy and thus becoming a global valuable player. As for the Quad members -Australia, the USA, India, and Japan- are now fully integrated into the Indo-Pacific strategic network. But this is perceived by Beijing as part of a USA-Japanese-driven containment strategy towards China, a reaction to the Chinese maritime territorial expansionism signalling that the South China Sea is not part of China’s integral territory (as China likes to argue). As a matter of fact, China, while getting hold of Asian, African, and also European (Piraeus of Athens) commercial ports, feels encircled by the Quad countries and resorts to carrot-and-stick policies towards countries in the region by exerting political pressure. In such a contest, the EU could play a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific game and its contributions, through imaginative mediation and political appeasement, could be crucial and significant. The EU, thanks to its millennium-old historical, cultural and civilizational legacy, is surely in the position to act as a tutor, as a mentor to a younger and less experienced America and help the USA to avoid schizophrenic, dangerous initiatives against China. But, as already pointed out, to be able to do so, the EU needs to become more federal and united. The EU needs to become politically relevant so as to prevent the fragmentation of the world and exert classical influence on the world scene: only together can EU members protect and promote their interests and values represented by democracy, rule of law, justice, freedom and respect for human rights.

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References Astrasheuskaya N (2019) Russia launches gas pipeline to China. Financial Times, 2 Dec 2019 Berkofsky A, Miracola S (eds) (2019) Geopolitics by other means: the Indo-Pacific reality. ISPI, Milano Brown K (2016) The most dangerous problem in Asia: China-Japan relations. The Diplomat, 31 August Chambers MR (2002) Rising China: a threat to its neighbors? Chapter 4 In: Pumphrey CW (ed) The rise of China in Asia: security implications. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, pp 65–91 Fensom A (2016) A weaker Yen is coming: who are the winners and losers? The Diplomat, 24 July Ganguly S (2002) Assessing India’s response to the rise of China: fears and misgivings. Chapter 5 In: Pumphrey CW (ed) The rise of China in Asia: security implications. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, pp 95–104 Medcalf R (2015) Reimagining Asia: from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. The Asan Forum (Open Forum), 26 June Stratfor (2018) 2019 Annual forecast. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/2019-annual-forecastgeopolitics-intelligence-global-risk. Accessed 26 Dec 2019

Giorgio Spagnol is Major General (ret.) Giorgio SPAGNOL was posted from 1997 to 2000 to the Italian Embassy in Islamabad (Pakistan) as Defence, Army, Naval and Air Force Attaché. In 2001 he was appointed Deputy Commander of the SEEBRIG (Southern Eastern Europe Brigade) located in Plovdiv (Bulgaria). In 2002 he attended the Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires (CHEM) and the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) in Paris (France). After commanding the Brigade, in 2004 he was appointed Italian Senior National Representative in the United States for Operations “Iraqi Freedom” (Iraq) and “Enduring Freedom” (Afghanistan). From 2005 to 2007 he was in Belgium as European Union Director of Operations (EUDO) responsible, among others, of Operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 2007 to 2009 he was in Turin as Director of the Post Conflict Operations Study Centre (PCOSC). From 2009 to 2012 he served at NATO, in Belgium, as Director Force Readiness. He has a Master in Strategic Studies and a Master in International Relations and is currently member of the: Institut Européen des Relations Internationales—IERI (Brussels—BE); International Institute of Humanitarian Law—IIHL (Sanremo—IT); and European Federalist Movement—EFM. He has cooperated/is cooperating with: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute—UNICRI (Turin); United Nations System Staff College—UNSSC (Turin); Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale—ISPI (Milan); and Istituto Affari Internazionali— IAI (Rome).

European Union Vis-A-Vis Russian Federation, and Turkey Jerzy Biziewski

Outline Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Scolded Skirmishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Political Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 In Search of Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Trouble Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The mutual relations of the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation (RF) and the Republic of Turkey (RT) are characterized by lasting economic relationships and political returns. In RF and RT, the judicial system is used to brutally combat all expressions of political disagreement with interest groups in power for decades. It is therefore not surprising that EU relations with both countries remain poor and accession negotiations with RT stalled. RF and RT leaders have many common goals that primarily serve to maintain power. President Putin is already preparing the foreground for future presidential elections in 2024. The creation of a new government in January 2020 and the simultaneous launch of social assistance programs is to improve the image of power and help win parliamentary elections in 2021. Putin has at least three options. Similarly, President Erdogan’s goal is to re-elect the country’s leader in 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. Actions in all areas of social life are subordinated to this. Moscow will attempt to make Ankara economically and politically dependent to use it as a tool in disputes with EU countries, where it will not necessarily want to be directly involved. Although this relationship has not yet occurred, RF is already using RT to force the EU to A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: July 14, 2019; Accepted: January 27, 2020. J. Biziewski (B) Independent Analyst, Cracow, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_3

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divide the gas and oil exploration and extraction zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. In turn, RT authorities will make efforts to maintain an equal distance between RF, EU and the USA. Keywords European Union · Russian Federation · Republic of Turkey · Relations · Sanctions · Trade · Competition · Cooperation

1 Introduction The European Union (EU), the Russian Federation (RF) and the Republic of Turkey (RT) are important neighbors and it seems that their interest is to maintain the best possible relations. The relatively high level of social and economic development, similar cultures and well-established positions in the world community create conditions that allow optimistic planning of the future of next generations. Never before have the leaders of the region’s states been so comfortable from the point of view of the existence of their nations. New horizons are also opening up in the form of young and developing Africa, still underinvested but creating full opportunities for native residents and their friends. A continent with enormous possibilities but also in need of support in overcoming its historical past. The ambition of EU leaders is to promote peaceful development in the neighborhood, which is, after all, the Middle East, but also in a number of countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus expanding the zone of democracy. Educational programs or undertakings aimed at building the institutions of the rule of law are starting to bring positive measurable effects and will now serve the young and future generations. There are challenges facing political elites that require close cooperation and which involve changing the way the natural environment is treated. Ignorance and arrogance of man combined with extremely intensive exploitation of natural resources and marginalization of the laws of nature are already negatively affecting our daily lives. And we don’t have a substitute planet, which leaders of countries and international organizations must understand. Everyday practice proves that this is not so obvious. Meeting the above-mentioned challenges and a number of other threats requires the effort of all the inhabitants of the globe, however, a special role is played by people who have enormous forces and resources entrusted to them by societies. Thinking about the common, instead of only about your own good should characterize the elites of this world. Acknowledgement of the importance of a single person and the surrounding natural environment should guide their compass, not the power of the state, the flash of photo cameras and the gilding of salons. This thread makes us think about the choices that shape the future of the area called Europe, Asia and Africa. An area where the fate of people and nature depends on

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the decisions of small interest groups steering others according to their own criteria, which are still ready for confrontation instead of mutual support. The chapter below is just about how the personal ambitions of individuals influence the fate of hundreds of millions of people. The political agility of the leaders, combined with ruthlessness towards those who think differently, fueled by populism and nationalism with the addition of religious sauce, is a mixture that can lead entire nations astray. And even if these large population groups succeed, they will be won at the expense of others in the current model of competition. Sooner or later it will reverse the course of events. And the current leaders will go away into nothingness. That is why it is so important to perceive the surrounding reality as a common good and to present readiness for cooperation.

2 Neighbours The mutual relations of the EU), the RF and the RT are characterized by lasting economic relationships and political returns. With regard to RF, the criminal activities of the Russian secret services in EU countries, actions that interfere in electoral processes and violations of human rights have led to a cooling down of mutual relations. And the annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in Donbas caused the EU’s reaction to introduce sanctions against the government apparatus as well as individuals and companies supporting these activities. The eastern neighbor showed the long-hidden face of a dangerous individual capable of sneaky assault and theft on a favorable occasion. The situation is a little different in relation to Turkey. A credible NATO ally seemed to be the neighbor we’d like to have all our lives around. Mutual relations were warmed up by the aspirations of both sides for accession as a natural act of developing cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, the economic recession gave rise to populist government with authoritarian tendencies playing a national and religious card, reluctant to achieve agreed European standards. Brutal fight against political opposition, violation of human rights, imposing a muzzle restricting the freedom of justice and media freedom, lack of transparency regarding the flow of EU funds resulted in suspension of the accession process on the EU side. The aggressive behavior of the Turkish authorities towards Greece and Cyprus also negatively affect the shape of mutual relations. Indignation of many EU countries was triggered by the RT invasion against Syria and Iraq and the brutal fight against Kurds. The neighbor from the south turned out to be an individual who manipulates the family and is capable of aggression against others having reasons only known to himself. Rule of law Focused on the harmonious development of societies, caring for the natural environment, proclaiming the noble slogans of unity and equality, but torn apart by the particular interests of several populist governments, the European Union as a

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whole positions itself as an area of democracy, civil liberties, observance of fundamental human rights and principles of coexistence in accordance with international legal regulations. And it is inclined to assess the actions of others through this prism. In turn, RF and RT presidents see themselves as democratically elected leaders of states aimed at ensuring the security and development of their own peoples. Compliance with the principles of democracy, civil liberties, basic human rights and the principles of coexistence according to international legal regulations is recognized as a field for interpretation in favor of their strategic goals. Different assessments of the conditions of decisions taken and their effects sometimes give rise to tension situations between the EU and RF and RT. In RF and RT, the judicial system is used to brutally combat all symptoms of political disagreement over the activities of interest groups that have been in power for decades. Political activists, journalists, representatives of cultural elites and other oppositionists are accused of terrorism or extremism. It is estimated that there are near 300 political prisoners in RF usually sentenced to long prison terms (The Moscow Times 2019a, b). The situation in this respect is downright shocking with regard to RT. Media censorship and repression of perceived government critics, journalists and parliamentarians from opposition in jails, widely used terrorism charges and brutal pacifications of Kurdish cities and villages are a day-to-day reality. This frightening picture of the state gives much food for thought, especially in the context of a country that is a popular holiday destination for many EU citizens. Societies of both countries are also tormented by corruption cancer (Transparency International 2019). It is therefore not surprising that EU relations with both countries remain poor and accession negotiations with RT stalled. The EU does not accept this type of rule of law; however, it maintains contacts with its neighbors due to the hope of resolving the problem of Donbas and Crimea and potential inflows of successive waves of immigrants. The economic factors play also significant role for individual countries. Demography matters The EU population currently has 447 million of inhabitants and will have a slow downward trend in the coming years. Negative demographic forecasts pose a serious challenge for the further development of this area. Forecasts suggest that the 146.5 million RF population will also shrink. The authorities of this country are taking measures to stop the negative trend through financial incentives and other social programs. In turn, the population of 85 million RT has a tendency to increase, which bodes well for the development of the state. The common denominator for EU, RF and RT is the fact that 60–80% of the population lives in cities (Country Meters 2020a, b: Russian Federation, Turkey, 2020; Moscow Times 2019a, b). Life standard and protection of natural environment GDP per capita income in RF and RT is similar, but definitely lower than the EU average. In turn, if you want to know the standard of living understood in a broader scope than just income, you can refer to indicators determining the quality of life. The EU countries are characterized by numbers between 192 (Denmark) and 129 (Bulgaria). RT (127) presents a level

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similar to the Bulgarian, and RF (102) stands out from both Turkey and EU countries (The World Bank). The Pollution Index indicates care for environmental protection, and thus also indirectly for the well-being and health of residents. In the EU, the common proecological policy is clearly beginning to bring positive results, although many areas still require attention. In turn, care for the natural environment in RF and RT leaves a lot of room for action1 (Europe: Pollution Index by Country 2020). Trade Both RF and RT occupy leading places in trade with the EU, just behind the USA and China. In 2018 RF was the fourth largest partner for EU exports of goods and the third largest partner for EU imports of goods. At the same period, RT was the fifth largest partner for EU exports of goods and the fifth largest partner for EU imports of goods. Among 15 top receivers of RT export the EU countries together play dominant role (31%), while the next biggest importers are China (12.5%) and Belarus (4.9%). (World’s Top Exports) The EU is by far RT number one import and export partner, as well as sources of foreign direct investment. In 2018 EU had Euro 83 bn trade deficit with Russia and Euro 1.2 bn trade surplus with RT. Trade relations between RF and RT show a large surplus of exports in favor of RF (17.1 bn), which puts Ankara as a weaker partner. Main EU exports to RF are in the categories of machinery, transport equipment, medicines, chemicals and other manufactured products. Main EU imports from Russia are raw materials, especially oil (crude and refined) and gas as well as metals (iron/steel, aluminium, nickel). The EU is the largest investor in Russia with approximately 55% of total foreign direct investment (2017). The RF investment in EU amounted 1.3% of the total FDI in the EU (European Commission Russia 2020a, b). EU exports to RT are dominated by machinery and transport material, chemical products and manufactured goods. RT exports to the EU are mostly machinery and transport equipment, followed by manufactured goods (European Commission Turkey 2020). The RF state authorities strive to develop the economy by implementing various projects, investing mainly in gas, oil and coal mining as well as transport infrastructure. The agriculture has become one of the fastest growing segments of the economy beating the arms industry. Gradual introduction of a single energy market till 2025 will enable Russia to implement lucrative contracts with Central Asia countries. Investment in the North Stream 2 and Turk Stream pipelines projects will bring soon additional income to the budget. It is estimated that reforms in the Russian economy are starting to have a positive effect, and the expected profits will contribute to accelerating the development of this country in the medium term. The RT economy has been on the brink of recession over the past two years, with GDP rising for 1.3% for the first time in 2019. The budget deficit was more than twice 1 This index is between 11 (Finland), through 29 (Germany) and 43 (France) up to 80 (Macedonia).

In RF, these indicators remain above 59 and in places reach 88, which means a significant threat to health. Similarly, high pollution is recorded in Turkey, where in Izmir it is 60 and in Istanbul it is close to 70.

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as high as a year ago, and foreign reserves fell to USD 24.9 billion. The problem of the Turkish economy is the gross external debt in the enterprise sector, which corresponds to about 60% of GDP, and an increasing number of companies are in arrears with debt repayment, which can harm the banking sector and, consequently, the government. The level of consumer confidence index is the lowest in 10 years as a result of inflation of the native currency, which lost more than twice in value during the rule of President Erdogan. The specialists’ opinions are divided as to the further development of the situation. Some expect an economic recovery from 2020 to 0.83.5% of GDP thanks to domestic demand and an increase in exports, provided that fiscal and monetary policy prevent the decline of the native currency and the debt restructuring processes of enterprises help to avoid costs for the financial system. Others forecast a downturn due to the lack of structural reforms and dangerous political games (Report on Turkey). At the same time, it should be emphasized that during last 15 years, Turkey urbanized vastly, maintained strong macroeconomic and fiscal policy frameworks, opened to foreign trade and finance, harmonized many laws and regulations with European Union standards, and greatly expanded access to public services. According to the annual report “Doing Business 2020”, RF and RT took high positions in the ranking of the most favorable conditions for doing business (The World Bank 2020), Both EU and RF and RT have all the conditions to continue peaceful development of societies thanks to relatively good economic results and the diversification of recipients and suppliers of goods and services. It allows all three actors for flexible stabilization of the situation in the event of a crisis. An opportunity for everyone is the continuation of fruitful economic cooperation and the expansion of contacts in connection with the development of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Defense Europe in the field of defense relies entirely on the North Atlantic Alliance, which is particularly evident in the protection of the eastern flank against possible aggression by the RF. The presence of American forces and other allies in this sensitive area of Europe seems to be a preventative measure against possible attempts by our eastern neighbor. The situation on the southern flank is more complicated, where RT, an ally in NATO, is a neighbor regularly violating the airspace of Greece and forcing specific behavior of the Cypriot and Italian authorities by using naval ships. Failure to respect the rights of others has become a routine act of Turkish authorities and a cause of tension. The 1 million personnel RF armed forces are an important element of the security and defense policy.2 Its nuclear component constitutes a core of the deterrence strategy. The defense budget ($46 bn, 2018) is lower per soldier than in EU countries, which means chronic underfunding. Somehow it is contradictory to the picture we see through the media as professionalization of the combat formations, numerous large-scale exercises and frequent engagement in regional conflicts show a high level of deployability, maneuverability and operational capabilities. 2 Active

duty, 1/3 are draftees for 1 year. They cannot take part in combat operations.

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The Turkish armed forces (350.000 active) with their draft service for 6-month duration and relatively low defense budget of value $18,9 bn are seen from outside as capable power. Unfortunately, devastated by post-cup retaliation actions, suffering shortage of pilots and experienced in combat commanding officers as well as staffs suggest potential problems with operational capabilities of combat formations. The course of the offensives in northern Syria proves gaps in planning capacities and training for joint combined operations. It will take several years to come to the standard (Kasapoglu 2018; Hurriyet Daily News 2019; Baume 2019; Bekdil 2019). The armed forces of both countries support the ambitious plans of the presidents to expand their influence in Africa and the Middle East. RF is present in several places in the Middle East and Central Africa, with the most important military installations in Syria, which serves to control the Eastern Mediterranean. Her interests are also defended by private armed formations located in crucial points of the region. RT, in turn, has military bases in the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Qatar, Somalia, Iraq and Syria. Both states have well-developed Navies, which facilitate power projection outside the countries.

3 Scolded Skirmishers The insidious seizure of Ukrainian Crimea and the continuous, hidden and overt actions aimed at destabilizing Ukraine and its return to the tutelage of Moscow were condemned by EU’s Heads of State. The Council of the EU urged Russia to use its influence over the illegally armed groups in order to achieve access to the site of the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 near Donetsk and to stop the increasing flow of weapons, equipment and militants across the border as well as to withdraw RF troops from the border area. In July 2014 the Council of the EU took twice restrictive measures in response to Russia’s actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine. Every six months the Council of the EU assesses the implementation of Minsk agreements, and according to the obtained results, the EC takes the appropriate decision. So far, there are in force restrictive measures on: arms and dual-use goods export, arms import, financial measures, prohibition to satisfy claims, restrictions on services and other items. RF responded with sanctions against a number of countries, including a total ban on food imports from the EU and several other countries. Due to EU’s restrictive measures RF suffered several years of financial crisis caused by much lower than expected revenues from gas and oil exports. By mid-2016, RF had lost an estimated $570 billion what forced Moscow to change slightly its policy towards Ukraine. Sanctions have also forced the Russian authorities to look for alternative solutions, both within the country and abroad (EU 2019, Sanctions Map). RT claims the right to search and drill for gas and oil in the Eastern Mediterranean acting on behalf of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Turkish navy warships forced an Italian company making search drills on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus to abandon the area. In response, in November 2019 the Council

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of the European Union established a new restrictive measures framework targeting natural and legal persons responsible for or involved in the unauthorized drilling of hydrocarbons. The restrictive measures include assets freezes and prohibition to make funds available as well as travel bans. The subject of these sanctions is only a small part of the contentious cases between EU and Turkey. They also include regular violations of the Greek airspace border by Turkish planes, control of refugee traffic with simultaneous demand for fees from the EU, tactical cooperation with ISIS, brutal treatment of the Kurdish minority in RT, invasion against Kurds in Syria and Iraq, violation of citizens’ own rights. The suspension of the EU accession process was taken by the Turkish authorities as the next run of Brussels and gave impetus to search for other partners to cooperate while maintaining existing trade opportunities (Hungerford et al. 2019).

4 Political Ambitions RF and RT leaders have many common goals that primarily serve to maintain power. President Putin is already preparing the foreground for future presidential elections in 2024. The appointment of a new government in January 2020 and the simultaneous launch of social assistance programs is intended to improve the image of power and help win parliamentary elections in 2021. As the RF Constitution limits presidential term of the office to two consecutive cadences (till 2024) Putin must take an action to preserve the power. He has at least three options. The simplest way is to change the Constitution what has already been proposed at the Parliament and CoV-19 pandemia may help achieve that goal. It is possible only assuming that the opposition is fragmented and neutralized and the social base is relatively quiet. It seems that we are currently witnessing such scenario. The second option, most desirable from a propaganda point of view, assumes taking leadership over the Union of Belarus and Russia agreed in 1999. The current course of events indicates obstructive actions of the President of Belarus and therefore this project is under question. The ideal would be if the smaller neighbor were absorbed in 2023, which would create a solid electoral platform for Putin the following year. Putin is interested in peaceful integration, because the violent seizure of power is subject to the risk of resistance of the Belarusian regime and social turbulence in both Russia and Belarus, and thus the imposition of further sanctions by the EU and the entire democratic world. The third option would be to assume the role of “father of the nation” by managing the Council of State situated above the elements of supreme power. Lifetime immunity would guarantee personal safety. As above, the goal of President Erdogan is to re-elect the country’s leadership in 2023, which is also the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Turkish Republic, which would give symbolic splendor to the election victory. Actions in all areas of social life are subordinated to this. The problem of the authorities in Ankara may be the political polarization of society due to authoritarian rule and the progressive radical Islamization of social life.

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President RT’s ambition is to be the leader of one of the decision-making centers of the emerging multipolar world order. It seems that entering such an elite group of politicians without nuclear weapons and armed forces capable of power projection worldwide will be extremely difficult. This opportunity is given by tandem with Russia; but this cooperation is subject to a high risk of political dependence. Until the next presidential election, these politically experienced leaders will make efforts to secure power at all costs. This will be served by having a strong and faithful apparatus powered by income from developing economies. Hence the search for new sources of financing within the community of interests. Both leaders have strengths that allow them to look optimistically into the future, and the rapprochement of both countries with significant economic and military potential allows the newly emerging bloc to position itself in relation to the EU in order to obtain the best economic results that can provide a platform for talks on political issues. Joint actions of both countries should be expected aimed at breaking the cohesion of the EU, which may bring the desired effect in the form of monopolization of trade exchange, especially in the energy sector. In this context, the effectiveness of the impact of European Union instruments on jointly operating RF and RT is limited. At the same time, both countries will maintain relatively good relations with the EU to protect their economic and political interests.

5 In Search of Profits RF and RT economies benefit from mutual trade at the level of $26 bn, however, the leaders of these countries are setting much more ambitious goals at the level of $100 bn in the future, which seems to be natural due to the close proximity and possibilities of both economies3 (Daily Sabah 2019a). Experts, however, are skeptical about the goals set as a propaganda game. However, time has shown that more than one forecast has already failed, and there is enormous potential in both countries. This target can be met by diversification of areas of cooperation, expanding the range of traded goods and removing the restrictions in trade, custom procedures and free movement of truck drivers. The pillar of bilateral cooperation is the energy sector with Turk Stream natural gas pipeline and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, expected to be launched by 2023. The Turkish company will construct several city hospitals and health centers in Russia. The Russian tech giant’s search engine and a range of other services were offered to Turkish users. Talks are underway about cooperation in space. RF and RT are slowly gaining momentum and are currently taking markets outside the European Union. The planned joint gas production projects near Cyprus, Syria and Libya will further strengthen the budgets of Moscow and Ankara.

3 Turkey,

Russia seek new ways to reach $100 bn in bilateral trade. 1500 businessmen invested $10 bn on Russian market. Turkish contractors have undertaken 1,961 projects worth $73 bn.

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Russian companies have started to launch operational activities or are completing the construction of several strategically important gas pipelines to China, Turkey and Germany. Soon, a stream of money will flow to Moscow in the opposite direction. By the way, Turkey will get a major financial injection for receiving, storing and transporting gas from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria to other countries. Exports of Russian and Turkish highly processed products and modern technologies as well as weapons to Asian countries will provide further funds for internal development. In recent years, the governments of both countries have made efforts to extend their influence to Africa and the Middle East. Russia is a major supplier of arms to the region and an importer of minerals like manganese, bauxite and chromium, all of which are important for industry. Russia offers energy sector expertise winning concessions to produce off-shore gas in Mozambique and oil projects in Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria. Russian company constructed the first nuclear plant in Egypt, financed by $25 bn loan4 (BBC 2019). Turkish influence extends from Pakistan and Bangladesh to Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Quatar. There are signed trade and economic cooperation agreements with 38 African countries. Turkey’s trade volume in 2015 exceeded $17.5 bn. Turkish contractors have been undertaking 1,150 projects in Africa, which are worth $55 bn, including the construction of the largest airport in Khortum (Sudan), and reconstruction and support of the operation of the airport in Mogadishu (Somalia). The total number of Africans studying in Turkey in 2017 was about 5,500 what can have long-term positive political and economic results5 (Huriyet Daily News 2018, Daily Sabah 2019b).

6 Trouble Continued In the short term, Moscow is unlikely to return Crimea to Ukraine and fulfill the provisions of the Minsk agreement regarding the Donbass. So, this point will remain in dispute with the EU for several years. The Kremlin will strive for internal destabilization of individual EU countries and disrupt the coherence of the entire organization, because a weak EU will be an ideal customer giving way to the dictation of the Russian energy monopoly. This goal may also be served by the involvement of RF and RT in Syria and Libya, from where direct migration routes from the Middle East and Africa lead to Europe. Controlling the flow of crowds of people in need will be a great tool to influence Brussels. 4 Between 2014 and 2018, the African continent—excluding Egypt—accounted for 17% of Russia’s major arms exports. Of those 17%, Algeria consumed 14%. (BBC; SIPRI). In 2017–2018, Russia had weapons deals with Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Equatorial Guinea. These included fighter jets, combat and transport helicopters, anti-tank missiles and engines for fighter planes. Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with 19 African countries. 5 Khortum, annual capacity 12 million passengers.

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Moscow will try to make Ankara economically and then politically dependent and use it as a tool in disputes with EU countries, where it will not necessarily want to be directly involved. This relationship has not yet occurred, but RF is already using RT and Libya to force the EU to divide the gas and oil exploration and extraction zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is to block competitive energy projects jointly planned by Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy and Greece under the common name The Eastern Mediterranean Forum towards the Russian–Turkish TurkStream. Right now, a dispute is being settled in this region about the shape of European energy, dominated by the Russian monopoly, or diversified through supplies from various directions. The Turkish authorities will endeavor to maintain an equal distance between the US and the RF, however it will be difficult for them to prevent the deepening dependence on the RF in the event of strained relations with the EU and the US. Their improvement, in turn, depends on meeting the previously set conditions for basic principles of compliance with the law and the withdrawal of Russian military equipment. Meanwhile, RF tempts with profits from joint economic projects, cooperation in space and in the field of nuclear energy, which tickles the ambition of the RT leader.

7 Conclusions EU countries largely finance regimes in RF and RT by developing economic cooperation individually. More effective mechanisms should be considered for the joint interaction of the EU as a whole in the field of trade in order to achieve the desired end results. The authoritarian RF and RT leaders bear personal responsibility for the current state of the relationship, and there is little hope that they will make a metamorphosis in the near future. And here is the role of the EU in supporting pro-democratic media or teams of activists trying to limit the arbitrariness of political and economic interest groups, as well as preparing the social ground for taking power in truly democratic elections. The example of recent municipal elections in RT is eloquent in this respect and shows the differences between the societies of both countries. The victory of progressive groups would allow the historical expansion of the democracy zone to the extent previously unknown to humanity and set an example to other nations. We are currently witnessing the construction of a partnership between two authoritarian leaders, extremely politically experienced but not allowing the thought of transferring power. There is no doubt who plays the dominant role in tandem and who will follow the instructions. By implementing Moscow’s strategic goal, i.e. changing the security order in Europe and the Atlantic area more broadly, the RT leader can play the role of a Trojan horse through obstructive actions undertaken within NATO and resulting in a violation of EU cohesion. At the same time, the RT leader will want to keep the Atlantic card in his hand as the ultimate guarantor of security, which will be met with Russian attempts to pull the rope to his side.

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In search of financial profits and developing a strong political position towards the EU, RF and RT will strive to develop a common platform for long-term cooperation. Although RF and RT economic interests are misaligned as Moscow wants to keep energy prices high meanwhile Ankara is a major energy-importing country preferring low energy prices it should not be a problem at the early stage of cooperation. The Russians are masters in giving preferential prices for energy resources in exchange for political concessions. Due to Russia’s greater economic potential and military superiority, Turkey may find itself in a worse position. In the near future, the EU will face a major challenge to prevent the growing dispute from dividing the exploration, extraction and transport of gas and oil from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe into an open armed confrontation.

References Baume M (2019) Germany, France to curb arms sales to Turkey over Syria operation. https://www. politico.eu/article/germany-to-curb-arms-sales BBC (2019) Russia Africa summit: what’s behind Moscow’s push into the continent? 23 Oct 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45035889 Bekdil B, Bodner M (2019) No obliteration: Western arms embargo has little impact on Turkey as it looks east. https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2019/10/24/no-obliterationwestern-arms-embargo-has-little-impact-on-turkey-as-it-looks-east Country Meters (2020) Russian Federation 2020. https://countrymeters.info/en/Russian_Federation Country Meters (2020) Turkey Population 2020. https://countrymeters.info/en/Turkey Daily Sabah (2019a) Turkey, Russia seek new ways to reach $100B in bilateral trade. https://www. dailysabah.com Daily Sabah (2019b) Turkey emphasizes cooperation, solidarity with African countries. https:// www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/05/27/turkey-emphasizes-cooperation-solidarity-withafrican-countries EU (2019) Sanctions Map. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/27/ russia-eu-prolongs-economic-sanctions-by-six-months/ European Commission (2020) Countries and regions. Russia. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ countries-and-regions/countries/russia/ European Commission (2020) Countries and regions. Turkey. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/ European Union (2019) Sanctions Map. Restrictive measures. https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/ main/details/49/? Hungerford J, Reynolds L, Whitfield J (2019) European Union Imposes Sanctions on Turkey. https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2019/11/europeanunion-imposes-sanctions-on-turkey Hurriyet Daily News (2018) Turkish firm to start building Sudan’s biggest airport. http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-firm-to-start-building-sudans-biggest-airport-138029 Hurriyet Daily News (2019) New military service law approved. http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/turkish-parliament-ratifies-new-military-service-law-144475 Kasapoglu C (2018) Robust fighting force. Turkey Remains NATO Pillar, 06 July 2018. https:// www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/robust-fighting-force-turkey-remains-nato-pillar-20939 Moscow Times (2019) Russia’s natural population declining to hit 11-year record in 2019, 13 December 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/13/russias-natural-populationdecline-hit-11-year-record-2019-a68612

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Moscow Times (2019) Russia’s political prisoner population grew sixfold in 4 years-NGO, 10 July 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/10/russias-political-prisoner-populationgrew-sixfold-in-4-years-ngo-a66348 Polska Z (2019) Leopards in a trap, 08 Apr 2019. http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/ 28016?t=Leopards-in-a-Trap Raport o Turcji (2019) https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Raport-o-Turcji-gospodarka-w-recesjilira-zagrozona-atakiem-spekulacyjnym-analiza-cz-III-7692962.html Russian military personnel—conscription. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ personnel-draft.htm Transparency International (2019). https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019 World Bank (2020) GDP per capita. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD World Bank Group (2020) Doing business 2020. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190Economies.pdf World’s Top Exports (2020) Russia’s top trading partners. http://www.worldstopexports.com/ russias-top-import-partners/

Jerzy Biziewski is a retired Polish Army Major General. He performed last duties as director of Plans, Allied Command Operations at Mons, NATO. Mechanized infantry officer by choice. He earned his Ph.D. in the military history domain and attended numerous courses at tactical, operational and strategic level both in the country and abroad. His assignments include commanding and staff positions in several units and HQs. He was the commanding officer for the 2nd Corps HQ and the 1st Armoured Brigade. He deployed to Afghanistan as the commander of the Polish Military Contingent. He was the chief of Movement and Transportation Branch at JFC Brunssum, deputy chief J5 and chief of the Crisis Response Branch at the General Staff. For 8 years he was a lecturer at the Polish National Defence Academy. Earlier he served as an infantry platoon leader, company commander and battalion commander.

Part II

Challenges to Security

Economic Intelligence and National Security Valentín Martínez Valero

Outline 1 The Changing Threat Environment and Its Impact on National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Evolving National Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Spain’s Evolving Intelligence Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract Intelligence is in fashion! Anytime, anywhere a threat materializes and inflicts damage on society, citizens demand their governments to respond rapidly with remedies. This triggers an increase in intelligence activities and information sharing among allied nations. However, in most cases, the public is unaware of the breadth and depth of existing threats to their well-being. The time from action to result of aggressive actions is not always short. Some threats have a long lead time from the initiation of action to demonstrable results. Although economic aggression can have presence in both the quick reacting and long lead time results, it is usually of a more subtle form of threat against a nation. In recent decades nations have migrated to a globalized world, and that participation is based on each nation’s economic interests and objectives. A strong intelligence capability focused on economic activities is essential to a nation’s security. This paper addresses the evolving role of economic intelligence in western nations and with specific focus on its current role in Spain. Keywords Intelligence · Economic · Security · Spain · Strategy

A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: November 14, 2019; Accepted: January 5, 2020. V. Martínez Valero (B) Former Director of the Spanish Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS), C/ Granaderos, 21, 1º C, 28024 Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_4

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1 The Changing Threat Environment and Its Impact on National Security Many analysts associate the collapse of the USSR and the lifting of the Iron Curtain in the late eighties and early nineties of the last century to the inability of the Soviet economic system to compete with capitalism and the United States of America. One major result of the Soviet collapse was the hope it gave to many nations that world peace might finally be achieved. Most nations and their citizens were optimistic about what they thought would be the outcome from the end of the cold war. The populations of these nations enjoyed more freedom, better and wider access to information and more opportunities for themselves and the future generations. And most importantly, they believed the democratic nature of the remaining superpower all but guaranteed that if something changed, it would be for the better. As a consequence, it was relatively common that many of these nations declared a “peace dividend” and began downsizing their defense budgets and the sizes of their armed forces. The downsizing in many nations included significant reductions in their intelligence services to correspond to an adversary who simply had vanished overnight. The more skilled of analysts quickly realized that the changed environment had the potential for new, dynamic, multifaceted, and multilevel threats. But the downsized intelligence services struggled to grasp exactly what kinds of threats they were confronting, and they were ill-prepared to face them. Meanwhile non-Soviet radicals operating outside of the then defunct Soviet Union were advancing their plans to attack the remaining dominant power, the United States (USA), in its own heartland. Their goals were realized when a highly coordinated Al Qaeda surprise attack used commandeered US airliners on September 11, 2001, to attack America on its home soil. The attack killed thousands of people and destroyed or seriously damaged center-piece structures of American culture, to include the Pentagon and the famed World Trade Center Towers. This was undoubtedly a first order strategic surprise, a “Black Swan”. It was an extremely rare event of severe impact followed by explanations of the widespread failure to predict the event as simple folly in hindsight. The latter is a typical reaction to almost any severe impact event. The aftermath invariably ends up with the identification of many potential warning signs and alarm signals. Reasons were offered for the failure to see the alarm signals, and the anomalous behaviors were either ignored or rapidly dismissed. And there was clearly a lack of appreciation that ideological groups with low levels of modern warfare equipment could plan, execute, and wreak such levels of physical and psychological damage on the world’s super-power. Had the intelligence communities anticipated the rapid evolution of asymmetric conflict and directed significant resources to collecting and analyzing them, the 9/11 attacks may well have been averted. Al Qaeda strongly believed in attacking the US, created an innovative approach that was previously incomprehensible to the US, and planned and executed their approach with disastrous effects on their target. The USA intelligence community was caught completely off-guard and unprepared to counter their attacks.

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The succession of events triggered by the terrorists’ attacks and the American reactions to them is well known. The purpose of this article is not to re-visit those reactions. It is to offer considerations regarding overlooked, misunderstood, and under-appreciated elements of multi-faceted intelligence and the role that it can and should play in guaranteeing state security in all domains, with emphasis on the role of economic intelligence.

2 Evolving National Security Considerations The 9/11 attack by Al Qaeda demonstrated that the most powerful nations are vulnerable in previously unimagined ways. Vulnerability of militarily powerful nations does not have to be in their warships, combat aircraft, and highly capable ground forces. Their very homeland, cities, emblematic buildings, citizens and, ultimately, their lifestyle could be targeted by other than kinetic energy weapons. The new challenges posed by the 9/11 attacks to intelligence organizations were extraordinary because what was previously deemed impossible or inconceivable became part of the new reality. The arms race between the USSR and the USA ended when the economy of the Soviet power became unable to ensure the flow of necessary economic resources for the state. The “runner” collapsed, he ran out of fuel, to put it in a simple way. This happened because its opponent, the United States of America, was and remains the most powerful economic machine in the world. It is a global giant that can run consecutive marathons. And should the US be outgrown in terms of GDP, its economic structure will remain the strongest worldwide. The emblematic US dollar is the global currency of reference. Many countries are bound to it and others hoard it as a reserve instead of gold. The USA is the world economic reference in every respect. The unquestionable economic power of the USA enables it to have the role of the world’s most powerful military force. It is capable of projecting conventional military power with state-of-the-art technology supporting its Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as its famous and efficient Marine corps. Any nation wishing to challenge the United Stated would be wise to focus on a domain other than conventional military warfare. It could be argued that one valid strategy for an opponent would be focus on weakening the economic strength of the US. If successful, the current economic power wielded by the US would be weakened, and the populace would not tolerate the huge expenditures extracted from the recurring national budgets. Thus, economic attacks may be a viable strategy to undercut the vast resources at the USA’s disposal and thereby diminish its ability to maintain its mighty military machine. In general, economic plays that might weaken the US will require a longterm strategy and patience. Examples might include things like reduced access to specific critical metals, energy sources, and specific markets, imposition of tariffs, hacking of financial infrastructures, etc.

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In their book Unrestricted Warfare, published in 1999, Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, made perfectly clear that in the face of huge military imbalance, there are ways the weaker force can inflict damage on the more powerful one without conventional battlefield combat. One of these methods is attacking its economic capability. Their document states: Hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare are among the methods proposed. Qiao and Wang (1999)

In a Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden Qiao (1999)

Unrestricted Warfare does not reflect the official posture of the Chinese government. But a review of media reports and observations underscores a close correlation between Chinese worldwide actions and the doctrine espoused in the publication. The threats generated by this shadow doctrine are both obvious and subtle. It results in an adversary who considers itself able and entitled to act in any sphere, without complying with any rules or limitations whatsoever. Nothing is prohibited. Everything, in any activity and in any way, is allowed. Their potential target areas clearly include but are not limited to the economic and financial system. The threat created by these conditions necessitates that nations potentially in the sights of the Chinese be able to foresee the possible actions that may cause damage to them. The threat is obvious, and it is real. It is one of the most important issues intelligence services of the western world must confront. It is but one of many reasons necessitating that nations have robust intelligence systems, to include that on economic intelligence. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA) of the current environment make knowledge of potential adversaries’ current and planned actions critical. Equally important are their motivations and desired outcomes. Absent that knowledge targeted nations are at risk of suffering significant loss in selected elements of their national persona. It is necessary now, more than ever, to understand all possible intentions of our adversaries. We must anticipate their actions as a way of guaranteeing the security and continuity of areas critical for society, one of these being the economic and financial sector. In 1992 Presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s campaign manager, James Carville, coined the phrase it’s the economy, stupid. This phrase became a powerful sound bite forcing the candidate and his staff to focus on what most interested the average American citizen. Carville’s creation was right on and Clinton defeated George Bush for the presidency against very difficult odds, and the sound bite certainly contributed to the outcome. Since then, the perception of the American population regarding the importance of the economy has not changed much, let alone their concern about the threats to it. The current president, who reached the position mainly by flying his “America First” flag, enacted a new National Security Strategy in December 2017, in which the defense of the homeland is established as the first principle, followed by:

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Second, we will promote American prosperity. We will rejuvenate the American economy for the benefit of American workers and companies. We will insist upon fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade imbalances. The United States must preserve our lead in research and technology and protect our economy from competitors who unfairly acquire our intellectual property. And we will embrace America’s energy dominance because unleashing abundant energy resources stimulates our economy. US National Security Strategy (2017)

The paragraph dedicated to intelligence in the National Security Strategy specifically states: America’s ability to identify and respond to geostrategic and regional shifts and their political, economic, military, and security implications requires that the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) gather, analyze, discern, and operationalize information

The document further states: Intelligence is needed to understand and anticipate foreign doctrine and the intent of foreign leaders, prevent tactical and operational surprise, and ensure that U.S. capabilities are not compromised before they are fielded” US National Security Strategy (2017)

This leads to several priority actions ● ● ● ● ●

improve knowledge of adversarial economic policy priorities; improve own skills to detect and defeat economic espionage; prevent the theft of confidential information; maintain the integrity of the value chain; deny opposing state and non-state actors the capability to attack citizens, degrade American democratic institutions; and perform offensive intelligence activities; and ● integrate/fuse all data from diplomatic, military and economic domains to enable efficient geopolitical competition. These priority actions are intended to facilitate and boost all intelligence sectors essential to national security, to include the economic one. Most nations in our environment have similar action criteria included in their national security strategies and/or equivalent guidance documents. This should not come as a surprise in today’s interconnected world. In an earlier paragraph it was asserted that we live in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment (VUCA) where the decision-making cycles tend to be significantly shortened and where the phrase We must expect the unexpected applies perfectly. An identical sentence was attributed to the British Prime Minister David Cameron in a Wall Street Journal” article, titled “Britain Begins to Rearm” (Cameron 2015), while referencing the world security situation. Cameron was obviously thinking about the tragic terrorist attacks perpetrated by jihadists in Paris only two weeks before. In relation to such a disgraceful event, the same article provided very illustrative information about the measures through which the United Kingdom intended to face

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new challenges and threats. In addition to large purchases of major weapon systems, the two billion British pound defense budget included funding for 1,900 new national and foreign intelligence agents. As clarified by Mr. Cameron to the Parliament, on 23rd November 2015, Britain “can make sure that we have the versatility and the means to answer to the new risks and threats to our security.” This action by the United Kingdom illustrates the widespread reversal from downsized national intelligence capabilities in western nations to a renewed focus on capabilities essential to confront the new and extremely dangerous threats. Being ready to expect the unexpected requires a wide spectrum of all-level and all-domain decision-making bodies with the requisite knowledge to make appropriate and timely choices. This necessitates all source, fused and focused intelligence in all subsets of the discipline. Any population exposed to potential threats of attack will demand their government authorities find more and better ways to anticipate and counter the threats. This can be achieved only through reinforced intelligence services together with better sharing of information and knowledge and increased collaboration and coordination. In order to defend their legitimate interests in the area of economics, nations need to have at their disposal capabilities allowing them to gather the relevant information and analyze it to foresee upcoming events. Most nations have initiated economic intelligence programs and many of those programs are mature and are providing valuable input to national security as well as commercial interests. But what does Economic Intelligence (EI) really mean? The answer is far more complex than it seems. Not so much for its inherent meaning as an equivalent of knowledge, but for whom is responsible for building this knowledge, and on which elements or domains it relies to support the decision-making process. Some consider EI associated and even assimilated to Competitive Intelligence which, from our point of view, is far more limited. Others consider its sole purpose as supporting the decision-making process at the organization’s highest level. This is analogous to making EI a component of Strategic Intelligence. Our vision is aligned with the description included by the European Commission (EC) in its Green Paper on Innovation: Economic intelligence can be defined as the coordinated research, processing and distribution for exploitation purposes of information useful to economic operators. It includes the protection of information regarded as sensitive for the company concerned. European Commission (1995, p. 19)

As a product EI is meant to be used by all economic operators from the government down to individual firms without exception to assist them in the appropriate decisionmaking process. The definition clarifies this universality when, at the last paragraph, it refers to the requirement of protecting the information considered sensitive by the company or firm. The EC document previously referenced designates EI as a strategic tool. This may lead to some confusion. Even though a careful reader will easily dismiss the idea that EI is only applicable to support government strategic decisions, that description could lead to thinking that is its only function. Since corporations and firms must have

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(and generally do have) a strategy of their own, EI also applies to the information they need to define and execute that strategy. Accordingly, at the firm level EI is understood as a discipline bound to provide companies with the knowledge they need in the whole spectrum of their activity. This spectrum may include their relationship with suppliers and customers (Commercial Intelligence); with the technology world (Technological Intelligence); with other competitors (Competitive Intelligence); with the resources they need to function (Financial Intelligence) and with their own structure and assets (Business Intelligence and Knowledge Management). All these sub-disciplines are developed under the conceptual “umbrella” of the EI term. At the government level EI main activities are generally associated with the socalled Influence operations. These essentially consist of creating an adequate framework at the homeland to facilitate national companies in developing their capabilities to become internationally competitive. They also include protecting the national companies from possible adverse consequences derived from agreements signed at international Forums, e.g., the World Trade Organization, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. This latter purpose is usually described as “Economic Diplomacy”. Each country has applied the concept according to its own character and culture resulting in widely varying solutions. Anglo–Saxon countries like the United Kingdom or the USA traditionally have a liberal approach. Others, like France, tend to a much more centralized vision. In all cases, however, the approach to EI is addressed in some way at all levels, from the state level (to support strategic decision making) to the business level, be it large corporations or smaller companies. Nonetheless, even if it is undesirable, it is very common to note that in most countries the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) do not participate in the EI activities due to their limited capabilities.

3 Spain’s Evolving Intelligence Doctrine As discussed in the previous section of this document, several nations have taken action to emphasize or accentuate their vision of the role of EI in their national security efforts. Those actions can in general be viewed from: (1) the perspective of national strategy and doctrine—the strategies; and from (2) what nations have done to implement their strategies and doctrine—the tactical side. In assessing Spain’s perspectives on EI, we find that at the highest level, the strategic and tactical elements have yet to be implemented in a harmonized way. Perhaps at the heart of that lack of harmonization is some variability and ambiguity in the declared strategy for EI. In 2011, the Spanish government released the Spanish Security Strategy, a Responsibility for All. It was the first document of this kind to ever be published in the country. It explicitly recognizes that “economic security is an integral part and an essential requirement for our security.”

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Among other actions, the strategy proposed the establishment of an Economic Intelligence System (EIS) “with the mission of analyzing the relevant information and enabling the State action via a better decision-making process in this domain (…) in accordance with the doings of other countries”. In this initial guidance, the decision of setting up an EIS was clearly meant to place the country on an equal footing with other nations from our environment in which the EI activity was common. But this guidance was not to remain stable. Political circumstances motivated a change of government only a few months later. This shift was paired with an evolution in the vision of EIS. Even though it was clearly a matter of state and the revision of this initial document was supposed to be done on a four-year basis, a new security strategy was released only two years later. The National Security Strategy, A Shared Project was published in 2013. It also appreciates the critical importance of the economic component for national security, but the focus it brings to EI is diminished. In the strategic lines defined to face and overcome the threat of “Financial and Economic Instability”, the EIS is only mentioned as a “support tool”. The aim of intelligence is certainly support to decision making, as established in the previous definition, but the issue here is this “tool” has had no further development at all. The Spanish government released a third document: the “National Security Strategy, a Project Shared by All and for All” in 2017. Again, there is a clear understanding that economic security is high on the agenda of the collective challenges we must face. The key change here is that Economic and Financial Instability, previously defined as a “threat”, were subsequently relegated to the assessment of being a “challenge”. Despite this, the government sees fit to set up an “Economic Security System”, through which to promote the coordination, collaboration, cooperation and information exchange between the different Public Administrations with competencies in security and economic-financial fields, as well as with the private sector, in response to the challenges limiting the development and competitivity of the Spanish economy and threatening the National Security.

To do so, it is considered necessary to reinforce the efficient use and generation of information and intelligence, technologies, legislation, education and strategic alliances to safeguard and promote the national economic interests and foster a shared responsibility against the challenges and threats to the continuity of economic activity. Spanish National Security Strategy (2017)

In other words, the Intelligence tailored to support decision making in the economic sector is understood as an activity and an instrument essential for Spain’s National Security. But while potential economic attacks on national security were once considered “threats” and later revised to the more diminutive description of “challenges”, it is understandable that those responsible for implementation felt some ambiguity in direction. And to consider EIS a “tool”, adds to the perception of diminished importance.

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Moving from the strategic actions to the tactical, we find that we have yet to discern meaningful progress toward implementation of a Spanish EIS. If there is a path forward for implementation, it has yet to reach the eyes of those who will be called upon to execute it. Unfortunately, although strongly perceived as a fundamental requirement by many, nothing has been implemented so far, and it is difficult to identify a clear way-ahead for its development and actual implementation.

4 Conclusion It is unnecessary to highlight that EI was and is becoming increasingly important as an intelligence activity. The USA and China are involved in the most visible commercial confrontation as is the USA and Russia. Competitive tensions exist at different levels between scores of other nations. Economic competition can and does become sufficiently intense to border on a new kind of warfare. This makes the intelligence activity in support of the nations’ business fabric a critical component of national security. Several nations have responded to this environment and are making significant progress, and some of these are European. Spain initiated development of policy guidance toward EIS but saw the vision change in significant ways in but a few short years. Whether or not those changes were instrumental in delayed implementation of Spain’s EIS may be arguable, but the fact remains that it needs refined definition and new implementation energy. The wealth and social stability of the nation is at stake.

References Cameron D (2015) Britain begins to rearm. Wall Street Journal, 28–29 November 2015 European Commission (1995) Green paper on innovation, December 1995. https://europa.eu/ documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com95_688_en.pdf Qiao L (1999) Interview, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (中国), PLA-People’s Liberation ArmyLiterature and Arts Publishing House, 28th June 1999 Qiao L, Wang, X (1999). Unrestricted warfare Spanish security strategy, a responsibility for all, May 2011 National security strategy, a shared project, May 2013 National security strategy, a project shared by all and for all, December 2017 US National Security Department (2017). US National Security Strategy, The White House, December 2017

Valentín Martinez Valero Spanish Army Major General Valentín Martínez Valero is an Artillery Officer, currently retired. He graduated from the Army Staff School, the National Defence High Studies Center, the Army Geodesy School, and both national and NATO intelligence centers. Co-founder of the Army Tactical Intelligence Course (1987), he was the Army member at the Operational and the Experimental Groups within the HELIOS satellite program (1988–1992).

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From 1992 to 1997, as a Lieutenant Colonel, he was an Intelligence analyst and the sole Spanish member of the BICES (Battlefield lnformation Collection and Exploitation Systems) Team, a body specifically established to investigate, experiment and facilitate the right solutions to enable a secure Intelligence exchange environment among the participating nations. The work carried out by the BICES Team was pivotal for the establishment of the current BICES Agency, responsible for providing Intelligence to both the Aliance and the participating Allied nations. Later on, as a Colonel, he was successively Head of the Technical Secretariat of the Army Staff Intelligence Division, Commander of the 71st Air Defence Regiment (RAAA71), and Director of the Army Geographic Center. Following his promotion to Brigadier General, he was under-director for Computing Science in the Army Technical Services Directorate, and later Head of the Army Air Defence Command (MAAA) (2003–2005). In September 2005, he was appointed as the first Director of the Spanish Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS), his last assignment on active duty. He was promoted to Major General in 2006. From 2006 to 2008 he had successively the responsibility of being Vice-chairman and then Chairman of the BICES Board of Directors. He retired in 2012. Since 2010, he is involved in intelligence education matter at different levels (expert to master). Initially as a teacher, and later as director of the three editions of the Economic Intelligence and Expert Analysis (Inteligencia Económica y Análisis Experto) Master, organized by the Francisco de Vitoria University, in cooperation with the ATENEA Group. Next year he will be directing a new degree on Intelligence in Support of Corporative Security. Since 2013, he is chairing the Intelligence Research Group in the Spanish National Defence High Studies Center (CESEDEN). He frequently lectures on intelligence in different centers and has published articles in several journals. He has also participated as coordinator and/or co-author of some documents published by the Spanish Strategic Studies Institute (IEEE). He is a member of EURODEFENSE-Spain.

Analytical Approach to Emergent Hybrid Threats Phenomena. Case Study: EU and Colombia Juan-José Delgado-Morán , Jonnathan Jiménez-Reina , and Álvaro Cremades-Guisado

Outline 1 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The UE in the Face of Hybrid Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Operational Capacities Against Hybrid Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Creation of Organizations to Advance in the Analysis and Understanding of Hybrid Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Increasing Resilience in the Face of a Hybrid Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Emerging Phenomena Related to Hybrid Warfare in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Globalization, the New Wars Catalytic Phenomenon in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Impact of Hybrid Warfare in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract This chapter analyses Hybrid Warfare-related phenomena, an emerging concept applied to the polymorphisms of modern wars which articulates the implementation of new means and modes generally associated with information technologies (IT), along with strategies comprising more than the battlefield. From States (at war or conflict), to terrorist groups and the organized crime, this contemporary scenario increases the complexity and difficulty to understand this kind of war or conflict. For this reason, this paper addresses the traditional and emerging illegal actors A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Bizieweski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: November, 5, 2019; accepted: January, 17, 2020. J.-J. Delgado-Morán (B) Universidad Católica de Murcia, Murcia, Spain e-mail: [email protected] J. Jiménez-Reina Escuela Superior de Guerra “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, Bogotá D.C., Colombia e-mail: [email protected] Á. Cremades-Guisado Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_5

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of asymmetric character present in the European Union (EU) and Colombia, as both cases share a wide-range of actors and/or organizations which have taken advantage of the globalization process to develop new activities which could be understood under the rubric of hybridity. Keywords War · Hybrid warfare · Insurgency · Conflict · European Union · Colombia

1 Introduction After World War II (1939–1945), the world witnessed a great political and economic transformation affecting the world order and, above other things, generating new analytical paradigms to comprehend conflict, violence, and war. War is understood here as a natural feature of human life (Osorio 2012), which can manifest itself between States and the new actors recognized by the international system. In parallel with these transformations, new social dynamics emerged, boosted by motivations and interests generated by globalization as a transversal phenomenon which came to affect the conduction of war, fundamentally due to the increasing technological development in warfare. According to Esteban (2018): these new technologies and the fast pace of social, economic, and technological change, in information above others, allowed to emerge other actors of global importance, but with inferior capacities to traditional States, and yet capable of mobilize or employ conventional resources and capacities. Esteban (2018)

This theoretical framework materializes diverse elements on the nature of war (information warfare, revolutionary warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, psychological warfare, absolute war, total war, and limited warfare, amongst others) manifesting new forms, means, modes, and ends to conduct hostilities, as it is the case when direct physical confrontation using traditional firearms occur in tandem with indirect means producing an equal or greater impact to the interests of those involved. In this sense, according to Clausewitz (1976), war is limitless because: “war is an act of force and there are no limits to its use; each belligerent imposes on the other its own law, establishing a reciprocal action which, logically, must lead to the extreme” (quoted in: García 2019, p. 29). Nonetheless, it is worthy to point out that Clausewitz acknowledged that the “destruction of the enemy forces were not the only way to subjugate the enemy”. In fact, this Prussian author declared: “at war, many roads lead to success and not all of them imply the absolute defeat of an opponent. These can go from the destruction of enemy forces, conquering their territory, temporal invasion or occupation, to political projects with immediate goals and, finally, to passively wait for further enemy attacks” (ibid. p. 37). In the particular case of hybrid warfare, we see an apparently novel phenomenon, at least in its denomination, because similar features are found on the methods of

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war described in preterit episodes in the history of humanity, and the 20th and 21st century are not the exception (Joes 1996). Early writings on the subject, according to Miron (2019), dating back to the 16th and 17th century, are found in the work of Spanish and French scholars such as Bernandino de Mendoza, Santa Cruz de Marcenado and Paul Hay du Chastelet which, even by then, faced similar problems as those afflicting many countries in recent times (Heuser 2010). In this sense, and considering the complexity of hybrid threats as a theoretical framework, in view of the disparity in examples and theoretical models used to define it, it is a good idea to begin this paper with a critically review of this concept. “Hybridity” was popularized by Frank G. Hoffman, who coined the term Hybrid Warfare in 2006 “based in the lessons learned from Israel and Hezbollah conflict in 2006, as well as other theories, such as the Fourth Generation Wars, compound warfare, or unrestricted warfare” (Hoffman 2007), to provide an answer to the polymorphisms of this phenomenon which can acquire internal forms of conflict in the sense of conventional conflicts between two antagonistic opponents using traditional forms of warfare. According to the Spanish think tank Royal Institute Elcano (2019), “hybridity in conflicts may as well be conceptualized differently from the pattern of attributing an aggression against a State to a foreign actor. A hybrid aggression may be traced back to an internal actor, such as an local subversive movement” as we have observed in different conflicts over territorial claims, as in the case of polarized societies characterized by identity struggles such as Northern Ireland, Lebanon, or Catalunya (Spain). These examples illustrate how these conflicts “present particular profiles of attacks in those fields, with the cognitive environment being a key element in all of them, as it is in this environment where the enemy’s will to fight is grounded”, a clear nod to Clausewitz’s triad where he places in the “people” the “passions to ignite war” (Esteban 2018). Part of the doctrine understands that the manifestation of hybridity in conflict has a political spectrum (another nod to the “Triad” suggested by Clausewitz which we will develop below) which employs violence on a systematic, compound, and combined way to confront regular and irregular forces, with the precision that the tactical level may be operationally different from a legally constituted force (Sánchez 2014). In this sense, hybrid warfare’s greatest advantage is that it allows an actor, state or otherwise, to confront others even in situations of disproportionate differences in terms of conventional military capacities. This situation supposes a complicated managerial threat to conventional powers. The adversary, notwithstanding its lack of conventional resources, can still combat in a favourable scenario. The military tactics employed in this kind of conflicts are very old, however it was until recently that these tactics got into the limelight due to the boom brought by the new technologies and their disruptive application in western societies. García (2019)

In retrospective, this irregular warfare, or non-conventional, phenomenon evidence that the nature of war implies multiple vicissitudes in the pursuit of a goal. Quoted by Gregory (2019), in the book “On War” Clausewitz focuses on the nature

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of war, identifying certain constant characteristics present in every war waged until his time: Not because its nature is slightly modified in each concrete case we can see war a simple chameleon, but, according to the set of manifestations, and in relation with dominant tendencies, constitute a wonderful trinity, composed of the primordial power of its elements, of the hate and enmity which may look as a blind natural urge; of the fateful influence of probability and chance, transforming it into a free activity for the soul; and its subordinate nature as a political instrument leaning purely on field of reason. Passions ignited during times of war must already exist in the people; the outcome of such action in the realm of probability depends on the qualities of the General and the Army. Clausewitz

The Spanish Army presents a contemporary martial approach to “hybridity”, defining the term “hybrid” as a “reference to an ambiguous form of confrontation, where actions are performed using available power instruments, including the diplomatic, military, economic, social (civil), and information to exploit the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a target. This definition coincides with those contained in NATO and EU documents as we will see next. According to Gregory (2019), a novel aspect of this document is the inclusion of “hybrid strategy” defined as: “the synchronized combination of accepted conventional actions by state or non-state actors (characteristic of each particular region) with other actions considered irregular (MADET 2017: 6). For Víctor-Mario and Duran (2015), on the other hand, warfare had a fracture with conventional means as a consequence of the conflicts from the 20th century, materialized by World War II and the aftermath of the Cold War (1948–1991). However, the new problem that emerged from this context is that: in the concept of hybrid warfare a great diversity of actors, from states (at war or conflict) to organizations such as terrorist groups or belonging to the organized crime intervene, increasing the complexity and difficulty to understand this type of war or conflict. Aicart (2018)

This allows to claim that in the modern world state actors are not the only subjects in place to wage wars, but it also implies addressing the existence of these other type of non-conventional actors of these “New Wars”. In this sense, the NATO has categorized this phenomenon as: “the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects” (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017). According to García (2019): this definition highlights two points of interest. On one side, it does not mention the need to limit hybrid warfare to the participation of States. This definition includes the possibility of non-state actors to compete in a conflict against a State. In addition, it includes the idea of synchronicity amongst multiple instruments in what it is supposed to be the every-level coordination on the part leading the hybrid warfare campaign. García (2019)

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This type of war is characterized by the existence of Hybrid Actors, understood by García and Martínez-Valera (2015) as subjects with command and control capacities, which may be decentralized, besides the capacity to plan and develop military operations. A characteristic feature of these actors is the combination of traditional methods, varying from direct and irregular confrontation, the employment of terrorist methods and, in some cases, criminal organization behaviour. But, in García (2019) words, the concept of Hybrid Actors found its limit because it is about a conflict situation between two adversaries with opposed political objectives where violence is employed to achieve them. A violence limited by each other capacities, but following a conventional framework. This implies in this case that is possible that a third State or actor retaliate, backed by the International Community, against those perceived to be using violence illegitimately. García and Martínez-Valera (2015)

Another particular aspect of these type of actions is an evolutive adaptive dynamic to a changing environment where hybridity is a response to the unlimited capacity to operate on the economic, political, cultural, or even religious realms without the constraints of a doctrinal framework, with the goal of breaking traditional moral and ethical paradigms which could be extrapolated to the nature of war itself. In this way, García (2019) mentions that conflict and war adversity suppose a limited objective, an objective which must be pursued through the unlimited use of means. In 1999, Chinese Air Force Colonels Qiao Liang and Wag Xiangsui, reaffirmed this theory, publishing a book by the name of “War beyond limits” discussing the pertinence of the unlimited use of the means of war: An intelligent General will not limit his means because he knows his objectives are limited. This will produce, very likely, a failure verging with the shadow of success. Thus, the limited must be searched through the unlimited Liang and Xiangsui (1999, p. 240)

Finally, according to Esteban (2018), a summary of the polymorphisms of hybrid threats may well be determined by the theoretical approach framing them, as in the cases presented by the author, such as the “red, blue and yellow” axis. As we have been arguing so far, this phenomenon does not require great leaders nor national sovereignties, because it is possible even without great merit to accomplish these objectives. The summary made by Esteban, describing broadly the axis of “contemporary hybridity” is interesting, even though in this chapter we will only analyse this phenomenon from the perspective of the UE and Colombia. Following his model, a hybrid red threat will be one who has its origin in Russia and who seek to destabilize other states, principally those situated in their area of influence, employing instruments of power over which their interests operate such as the diplomatic, economic, political, civil, information and military. The Georgian (2008) and the Ukraine-Crimea (2014) crises follow this model, as it can be said that the Russian Federation experimented with authentic mastery new network procedures and techniques of disinformation, used for warfare purposes, to the surprise of the international community. Esteban (2018, p. 20)

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This is a clear example of «sharp power», implying an effort to manipulate and influence political, economic, and informational contexts in certain countries, settling their interests as well in the Artic region as one of the most representative cases of the interdependence of global phenomena (Mazurier et al. 2018). As it may be understood from the previous example, this fear is based on the idea that Russia may use similar tactics to those employed in Georgia and Ukraine-Crimea against other former soviet republics who used to hold a membership in the Warsaw Pact” (Fiott and Parkes 2019: p. 6). It is worth highlighting an existing Russian perception about the influence of the EU and its allies in the country in the pursuit of achieving strategic objectives through unconventional means, with a clear emphasis on information pressure operations (Palacios 2019), even though the Russian doctrine uses terms as “new generation of war” or “non-linear warfare” (Wither 2016). Russian Armed Forces Chief, General Gerasimov, published the following reflection about the issue: Information resources have become one of the most efficient weapons. Their extensive use allows to destabilize a country in a matter of days. In this way, indirect and asymmetric actions and hybrid warfare procedures, allowing to strip away an opponent’s real sovereignty without needing to take control of their territory Gerasimov (2016)

Esteban’s model of blue hybrid threat, “is promoted by USA and its allies with the goal of hurting the geostrategic interests of Russia; this type of actions are clearly subversive, and are based on the organization of protest movements in the pursuit of provoking a critical event triggered by civil mobilization, leading to the occupation of emblematic infrastructure and buildings until the downfall of the government”. This will be a clear example of soft power, as it identifies the capacity to shape the preferences of others in order for them to adhere to US interests, persuading other countries to join them as allies under a common benefit narrative. “These actions are complemented with other forms of non-kinetic attacks, and, if the process stalls due to the resistance of the attacked state, they can evolve and seek for another excuse to provoke a foreign military intervention (for example Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012). In this case, military actions become more important”. In relation to the yellow hybrid threat this model suggests that it is “promoted by China, using a powerful diplomacy as an instrument of power which, on one side, present revisionist arguments against the sovereignty claims of other Asian countries, clearly observed in the disputed islands in the region”, which can also be seen as an example of sharp power, as it identifies the capacity to shape the choice preferences of others (Kurlantzick 2008). “Beijing launched an international diplomatic campaign based on the promotion of a friendly and benign image of China, with the intention to foster in the world their own «development model», positioning themselves as development projects leaders at a global scale, involving developed countries as well as regions in need of economic support, to build infrastructure and economic development megaprojects in Africa and Latin America” (Mazurier 2018).

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Nye (2011) highlights a similar idea arguing that China is at a crossroad where it must maintain the seductive soft power of cooperation with the international community while applying, at the same time, censorship as a manipulative sharp power, evidenced by the Chinese Great Digital Firewall, as it is known in English. Once presented a necessary layout of the considerations needed to grasp the object of this chapter, in the following sections we will explore the case studies of the EU and Colombia to exemplify, regardless of their geographical distance, certain interesting manifestations of hybrid threats.

2 The UE in the Face of Hybrid Threats Despite being a concept created in the mid-2000s, and that includes ancient practices associated with the conduction of war, it was only recently that hybridity was adopted as an accepted field of study at the EU through the influence of strategic allies, like the NATO, after an initial reluctant disposition to incorporate this concept into their doctrine (Peco 2017). For the EU, the concept of hybrid threat is intrinsically linked to the Russian operations taking place in post-soviet countries.1 In this way, “the EU has been called to action as a consequence of the aggressive behaviour of Russia and its occupation of Crimea in 2014” (Hicks et al. 2019). Due to the recent academic and institutional trend about the hybrid, some scholars point out that the different approaches to hybridity (hybrid threat, hybrid warfare, etc.) present conceptual problems since they try to cover a wide range of expressions in contemporary conflicts. In a similar sense, the European approach to these issues has been characterized as a grab-it-all framework with a blurry outline. This approach comprises disparate vectors, from information operations and cyber-attacks to actions directed to fight Islamic radicalization and violent extremism (Mälksoo 2018; Colom 2019; Caliskan 2019). At the light of these events, the European perception of hybrid conflicts as latent security threats have settled in the EU institutions adding these new risk vectors to more consolidated ones found in their doctrines. According to the European Union Global Strategy “even today, terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity threaten our people and our territory” (European Commission 2016a: 18–19). Three years later, after reviewing the implementation of the European Global Strategy, a specific section was added presenting these achievements in a general and positive way: “the EU has taken important steps to improve our capacity to counter hybrid threats and to increase the resilience of the EU” (European Commission 2019a: 37). With the purpose of improving the performance of European agencies in the face of hybrid threats, in recent years the European Commission has been articulating a whole institutional architecture in the European states and institutions directed to

1 This

is not always the case, as other states engage in similar activities.

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increase their understanding and awareness on the issue of hybrid threats, improving their resilience in the face of the possible materialization of these threats while privileging cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For that purpose, on April 6th 2016 a joint communication between the European Commission and the High Representative to the European Parliament and its Council was produced, seeking to articulate the axes to be addressed in order to improve the performance of European institutions in the face of these hybrid threats, despite its acknowledgment of the issue as the responsibility of each of the member states because these threats materialize in very specific forms in each country (European Commission 2016b: 2). In this document, the European Commission provides a definition of hybrid threat grounded in contemporary European institutions: “a mix of coercive and subversive actions, conventional and unconventional methods (such as diplomatic, military, economic, and technological), which can be used in a coordinated way by state and non-state agents to achieve specific objectives while keeping themselves below the threshold of an officially declared war” (European Commission 2016b: 2). In addition to contextualizing in institutional terms the UE position concerning hybrid threats, the previously cited document identifies a total of twenty-two actions directed to improve European capacities in the face of these scenarios. Below, and in retrospect, some of the main axes of analysis developed to date are outlined.

2.1 Operational Capacities Against Hybrid Threats With the purpose of guiding operational action in the EU and its member states in the face of such hybrid threats, in 2016 the European Commission elaborated the wellknown EU Playbook, which includes a four-phase procedure (prevention-mitigation, preparation, response, recover) developed at four levels of coordination (politicalstrategic, operative, technical, and action focus) (European Commission 2016a). In relation to this, the INTCEN, and particularly its fusion cell and the Centre of Intelligence and Situation of the European Union (UE SITROOM) play a significant role in the analysis and monitoring of incidents in progress, with the goal of contributing to the European decision-making processes at an operational level (Council Presidency, Deputy Secretary General of the Commission, and Deputy Secretary General for Crisis Response and PCSD), from where strategic level recommendations will be generated (President of the European Council, President of the European Commission or delegated vice-president, and the EU High Representative). Another element found in the EU Playbook is the conduction of exercises such as the European Union Hybrid Exercise Multilayer 18 (Parallel and Coordinated Exercise) (EU HEX-ML 18 PACE) which took place in from November 5th to the 23rd 2019. Presenting a North African scenario which included the fictional states of Ropperta, Loripa and Kronen, along the terrorist organization Nexsta (in a geopolitical game clearly inspired by contemporary Russia-EU relations in addition to the fight against ISIS), this simulation had the ultimate goal of “improve and increase,

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in a failproof environment, the EU’s capacity to respond to the internal and external dimensions of a complex crisis of hybrid nature” (European Council 2018: 7). In relation to the response against hybrid attacks, the cited document presents the possibility of articulating collective action mechanisms within the EU in the face of such aggression. Although there are instruments in this regard, such as the solidarity clause contained in article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the UE, according to which “the UE and its member states shall act together in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or is a victim of a catastrophe of natural or human origin” (Official Journal of the European Union 2012: 148); or Article 47 of the UE Treaty, which states that “if a member state is subject of an armed aggression in its territory, the other member state shall provide help and assistance with all the means at their disposal, in accordance with the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter” (Official Journal of the European Union 2012: 39); due to the ambiguous nature of this kind of events, there is great difficulty in establishing responsibilities that allow to activate such mechanisms. As Galán points out, “a defining characteristic of these types of threats is their ability to exploit detection and accountability thresholds of such actions—which can be considered in itself a systematic vulnerability—as well as the legal boundary between war and peace” (Galán 2018:3). Although the European Commission ordered the Hybrid CoE to resolve this legal issue, no resolution has been achieved in this regard.

2.2 Creation of Organizations to Advance in the Analysis and Understanding of Hybrid Threats On the one hand, a fusion cell was established in the organization chart of the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), whose main task is to assess “the external aspects of hybrid threats affecting the EU and its neighbours to quickly analyse relevant incidents as feedback to the strategic decision-making process of the EU” (European Commission 2016b: 4). As usual in production processes dealing with community intelligence, open data sources, as well as information provided by other European institution and member states, will be collected by this fusion cell with the main purpose of developing early warning indicators. In regard to the characteristics in the analysis produced by this fusion cell, there are “open sources research, technological tools, social network analysis, evaluations on hostile disinformation activities, and analytical reports on how the EU is perceived in different regions of interest” (Arcos and Palacios 2019: 7). On the other hand, in this same communication, it was established the European Centre of Excellence against Hybrid Threats (known as Hybrid CoE) in association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with a current membership of 24 countries, whose main purpose is to “research how strategies against hybrid threats have been applied and to stimulate the development of new concepts and technologies in the private sector, and the required industry to help member states to

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reinforce their resilience” (European Commission 2016c: 5–6). Among Hybrid CoE research production there are several products such as Strategic Analysis Documents, Research Reports, Reports on Trends, as well as workshops and seminars on the subject, making it a conceptual model to analyse hybrid threats which “integrates every relevant parameter, such as actors, tools, domains, and timelines, with the goal of offering an overview of these hybrid threats, and thus helping the experts to properly access each incident to design its countermeasure” (European Commission 2019b: 4–5).

2.3 Increasing Resilience in the Face of a Hybrid Attack One of the core concepts of the European approach to hybrid threats is resilience or, in other words, the ability of a particular state to overcome and recover after an attack of this nature. In this regard, special emphasis is placed on three elements: the protection of critical infrastructure such as electricity networks, transport (rails, roads, docks, airports), those related to space programs; cybersecurity, the industry, including energy sector operators and the financial systems are areas of greater exposure to a possible hybrid attack; public health and food security facing actions aimed to generate health emergencies amongst the civilian population (European Commission 2016a). Along with the design and implementation of different strategies, these three areas have been the ones where a greater degree of development has been achieved in the EU. In addition, strategic communication policies play a fundamental role in mitigating the social impact of hybrid threats to possible acts aiming at manipulating public opinion through misinformation campaigns. Thus, for example, in March 2019, a rapid alert system was established aimed at monitoring the information environment to facilitate the identification of possible ongoing misinformation campaigns, coordinate a response towards these actions, increase time and resources efficiency, identify good practices in the fight against misinformation, and exchange analytical products in this regard (EEAS 2019). Strengthening international cooperation On the one hand, and despite how when mentioning hybrid threats references are made to the importance of diverse international organizations has become a common trope, the EU’s collaboration with other strategic partners has, for the moment, been limited to the NATO. This cooperation efforts are based on the Warsaw Declaration of 2016, which states as aspiration “to increase our capacity to counter hybrid threats, including the strengthening of resilience, working together in the analysis, prevention, and early detection, through the exchange of timely information and, to a possible extent, the exchange of intelligence data amongst the staff; and cooperating in strategic communication and response (NATO 2016: 8). Two years later, a joint declaration would be made public, indicating progress in areas such as information exchange between the parts, the fight against misinformation, joint participation in simulation exercises, and preparation

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against possible crises (NATO 2018a, b). In this paper we have analyzed some results of these cooperation efforts. On the other hand, the European Union also aims to contribute to the stability of other countries in the face of hybrid threats, emphasizing on the link between security and development of its neighbouring policy. For this purpose, it is proposed to assist to these partners through various European agencies, including the deployment of missions of the Security and Defence General Policy to strengthen resilience and the States’ capacities against hybrid threats. To this end, the European Union has conducted so far surveys to assess the degree of vulnerability in seven partner countries (Moldova, Georgia, Jordan, Albania, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro), and to assess their needs in order to receive financial aid to implement the recommendation made in different fields, such as police reform, energy diversification, strategic communication, critical infrastructure defence, and cybersecurity.

3 Emerging Phenomena Related to Hybrid Warfare in Colombia In the particular case of Hybrid Warfare, understood by Sánchez (2014) as a political act that uses violence in a simultaneous, composite and combined way to confront regular and irregular forces. These include the tactical level which may vary from the irregular to operational characteristics of a legally constituted force. In addition to the above, Hoffman mentions that a Hybrid Threat is both simultaneous and adaptive because it “mixes conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to achieve their political objectives” (quoted by Sánchez 2014, p. 11). This type of actors is present in Colombia. According to Jiménez and Acosta (2018), these armed actors, with similar features to criminal organizations as it is evidenced in their financing schemes, characteristically behave like any other similar crime syndicate operating in every other State, even to the point where they can have their own criminal geopolitical interests to generate transnational interactions using both legal and illegal market logics. And yet, one question still remains worthy to be addressed and this is what emerging IT and hybrid warfare phenomena can be identified in Colombia? In Colombia, the expression hybrid warfare is related to the evolutionary dynamics of the threats faced by the country, which is related to the transformation of the means and modes introduced by the new information and communication technologies and how these can be used by illegal actors, not only States, to achieve their goals. Three milestones can be established as starting points for the purpose of this analysis: 1. the consolidation of insurgent actors with the creation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)

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in the 1960s, which gave birth to the internal armed conflict using warfare methods of asymmetric nature as it is stated in their insurgent doctrine; 2. the emergence of new actors, by-products of the conflict itself, not directly related to the primary actors, but derived from the collateral dynamics of the conflict, and related to organized crime; 3. the rise of asymmetric actors involved in a demobilization process, which show organizational links between organized crime and illegal armed groups. These milestones are useful references to understand that the emerging phenomena and the hybridization of the Colombian conflict are also part of the new wars of modernity due to the use of non-traditional methods to maintain hostilities.

4 Globalization, the New Wars Catalytic Phenomenon in Colombia Technological development is the product of the consolidation of globalization, because it represents an articulating axis for information exchange regardless spacetime limitations. A peculiarity of this social, political, and cultural phenomenon is the blurring between public and private domains. According to Vásquez (2008), media privatization and the gradual retreat of the state from market regulation caused the deregulation of social and power relations during the 80s and 90s. This effect gradually limited the capacity of the State to exert control, resulting in the consolidation of private actors in different fields of the market, among which the industrial sector stands out, particularly the military-industrial complex. Thus, entrepreneurship in the defence sector continues generating a high margin of profits because it is a sector based on political speculation over the increased technological capabilities of each country. In 2017, the defence companies Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, the largest industries in the world, generated profits greater than Bogotá’s GDP (96,000 million USD) (Bogotá’s Investment Promotion Agency 2019), evidencing that the war industry, even more the technological development associated with war itself, remains a profitable venue despite the decrease in interstate conflicts. However, black market networks are responsible of supplying weapons to illegal structures and mafias around the world. This last feature is related to the increase in armed violence within States as a consequence of the presence of insurgent actors in different parts of the world who, guided by their own political, economic, or religious interests, have diversified their combat strategies. This diversification involves the use of alternative means, such as terrorism, which characterization as international terrorism has ceased to be an specific event to become a systematic phenomenon, representing a clear example of hybridity, due not only to the intricate link between political hatred, criminality, global economy, national security, and social psychology, but also to the varied styles, methods, forms, and motivations which can generate support to their causes such as propaganda, destabilization of governance, political influence, etc. (Belzunegui

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2017). This shows that war no longer occur in the battlefield, but has diversified its means and modes. Regarding the first milestone, insurgent actors categorized as irregular actors (revolutionary guerrillas) have adapted to the characteristics of the digital, political, economic and cultural environment in order to diversify their illegal activities. In the case of guerrilla organizations such as ELN and FARC, keeping with ideological zeal their own strategy alluding to a war by all means (Badiou 2005), they went great lengths to permeate the political system without using any guns. For this reason, it is necessary for them to employ technological and digital media to legitimize their actions amongst the civilian population, while destabilizing in parallel the State’s governance. In the 2018 Report by the UN High Commissioner, the proliferation of illegal activities related to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling were highlighted, accompanied by the systematic increase of violence in peripheral territories in terms of political participation, far from urban centres. This demonstrates the hybridization of illegal activities, articulating armed structures with organized crime, and more worryingly, the illegal actors’ influence in politics. This last aspect of hybrid wars has been accompanied by another type of violence, generating an even more profound impact at the level of social relations than the use of weapons. For Contreras and Sierra (2004), war propaganda, misinformation campaigns, or psychological warfare were typologies that influenced the way of making war in the 20th century, when in World Wars I and II, and even in times of peace, different States influenced the public opinion of society through communications and propaganda. During the Cold War these emerging irregular actors became savvy media users, conducting hostilities through propagandistic in a new era of technological development. Some characteristics which generated the Colombian conflict hybridity, at least in the case of the FARC and the ELN, are their incursion into politics, along with the diversification in the management and control of illegal economies (drug trafficking, illegal mining, smuggling), and their use of the mass media to misinform. Another reason for why the Colombian Security Forces lists them as Persistent Threats (Barreto 2018). In addition to the FARC and ELN, self-defence groups can be found in Colombia–armed organizations derived from the conflict itself. For most part of the 80 s and the first decade of the 21st century these organization formed new illegal structures to confront the revolutionary guerrillas, as it is the case of the United SelfDefence of Colombia. In the midst of this scenario, the media remains a powerful instrument. Now, how did IT emerging phenomena impact the dynamics of hybrid warfare? For Fernández-Montesinos (2018), the increasing development in war technologies implies the diversification of strategies (means, risks, rules, goals), which is the reason why new international actors have emerged. Thus, insurgent actors, terrorist actors, transnational criminal organizations, among other actors, have diversified their criminal activities to control strategic resources in an unlawful manner. Therefore, modern security and defence scenarios are characterized by volatile and complex environment overflowing the

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State’s monopoly on violence and, above all, the employment of armed and technological capacities against legally-constituted institutions as means of control or destabilization. Following what has been said above, the second milestone to be addressed here relates to the formation of actors, such as the organized crime, which are by-products of the conflict itself. Drug trafficking, the most lucrative financing source of modern illegal organizations, gave birth to criminal actors that quickly became a persistent threat to the government’s agenda, as it allowed these organizations to articulate themselves with worldwide criminal networks. Drug Cartels, actors without apparent links to the guerrillas or the self-defence forces, but tracing their origin to the armed conflict itself, were strengthened in the 90s as destabilizing actors in the different regions of the country. According to Münkler Kaldor (cited by Vásquez 2008), there are some particularities in the new wars, such as the one related to the privatization of war, the asymmetry of violence, and the autonomy or independence of the military. More precisely, drug traffickers became great buyers of weapons and worldwide suppliers of psychoactive substances, employing unconventional methods such as terrorism to influence the political system (Miranda 2018). The third milestone presents the case of asymmetric illegal actors using irregular methods of war against enemies possessing superior armed and technological capacities, such as the legally constituted armed forces (Sánchez et al. 2012). The diversity of actors has the characteristic of adapting to the features of a dynamic environment more quickly than a State organization, since they do not submit to a formally constituted structure guided by moral, ethical, cultural, or legal guidelines. In this category are found illegal armed organization that have diversified their illegal activities and, for this reason, they have been labelled as persistent threats, such as those known as Organized Armed Groups (OAG) which include FARC dissident groups (Residual Organized Armed Group), ELN, criminal gangs such as Los Pelusos, Los Caparros (formerly known as Los Caparrapos) and the Clan of the Gulf. These armed structures have implemented their own criminal policy throughout the Colombian territory, particularly in peripheral territories. The diversification of their illegal economies allows to these structures to employ new territorial control strategies including terrorism, forced displacement, coercive actions against institutions, etc. (Jiménez and Acosta 2018). The implementation and modernization are processes related to the systematic mutation of threats, a challenge in itself, so they should not be limited to be an operational response of the security forces, requiring “provision of the latest technology (weaponry, intelligence equipment, communications, mobility, protection)” (Barreto 2018, p. 108). Certain asymmetries could be exploited by multiple actors (Metz and Johnson 2003): 1. use of methods such as doctrines and tactics such as guerrilla warfare; 2. the advantages granted by technological development though experimental processes should be exploited;

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3. the willpower, understood as the permanent intention to develop and achieve specific goal; 4. the moral aspect expressed in the tactical and operational fields, that is, related to its ideological platform of what is considered right and fair; 5. the normative asymmetry, related to the blurred limits of contemporary confrontations; 6. the organizational level, related to the adaptability to the environment; 7. the existence of timelessness, related to the enemy’s capacity to persist in their interest regardless anything. All these forms can be seen applied to the aforementioned armed actors. Therefore, the hybridity of war not only responds to using or not technological and information means, but it mostly addresses a situation of doctrinal and organizational adaptability between actors of a different nature. Galán (2018) define hybrid conflict as a “Situation in which the parties abstain from the open use of force (armed) and act by combining intimidation (without the use of conventional attacks) and the exploitation of economic, political, technological, and diplomatic vulnerabilities.” (Paragraph 8). Consequently, today we can see other layers where war unfolds, not only covering the traditional scenarios (land, sea, air), but other scenarios outside the effective control by the State, such as the cyberspace, the mass media included.

5 Impact of Hybrid Warfare in Colombia According to Sánchez (2014), what is known as information warfare is contained within the conceptual framework of the hybridization of war (revolutionary, sociological, urban, rural). This particular kind of warfare employs the most advanced technological means of information to carry out destabilization or misinformation tasks. During the past five years this last feature has materialized in Colombia in the form of an increasing fragmentation of its civil society and its political system as a consequence of what is known as misinformation. In a social system divided by the public opinion, communications have become the Fourth Power in social context characterized by the radicalization of public opinion, a phenomenon that is being exploited by illegal actors employing terror to their advantage. One question still remains: what has been the main impact of the hybrid warfare waged in Colombia? It can be said that war, in its different fields, aims to affect both governance and institutional legitimacy, because it is more devastating for a State to see its credibility and public image damaged rather than the consequences of a physical attack. In this sense, two important elements are worthy of being highlighted: 1. Multiple irregular actors employing non-conventional methods (illicit economies, terrorism, politics, cultural influence) to wage a hybrid war exist in the Colombian scenario;

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2. Traditional and emerging asymmetric actors are part the hybridization of the conflict, and because of that alternatives based on non-coercive means should be considered to confront these threats. Therefore, the scenario opened by the Peace Agreement, signed in 2017 between the Colombian government and the FARC, poses new challenges to the Colombian Security Forces (Military and National Police): they must implement strategies to counteract insurgent threats where the hybridity of means also implies to reconsider the conventional strategy concerning the use of armed means.

6 Conclusions The conceptual evolution of the phenomenon of war implies understanding the diversification of modern actors at the national level, because the confrontation of regular forces at a tactical, operational and strategic level is no longer limited to a legally constituted force. Contemporary warfare includes the convergence of proficient hybrid actors in the use of new information and communication capabilities threatening to carry out, and maintain, hostilities against the State in a general context of growing transnationalization. Furthermore, these actors rarely relegate their operations to the national borders of a single country, engaging in activities considered to be a threat to two or more States. This process of evolution of actors and capacities has globalization as the articulating social, political, and cultural axis, central to the changing relationships between subjects and states, implying, as well, the change of temporal and spatial variables as a consequence of the implementation of technology, communication and information in areas such as warfare. This evolutionary process generated an increasing access to legal and illegal markets by irregular armed actors such as guerrillas, terrorist groups, mafias, and other actors related to common and transnational organized crime since the 20th century, enhancing their armed, operational and organizational capacity as emerging threats for multiple States around the world. Therefore, hybrid warfare consists in the combination of resources, capabilities, means and strategies to take to another level of confrontation in which it is required to confront emerging actors using combat methods not accepted by the International Humanitarian Law, and who use illegal economies for their organizational purposes. The technification of war, its diversification of methods and the adaptability of these armed actors implies the diversification of strategies (means, risks, rules, ends) to achieve specific organizational goals. It is pertinent to point out here some assessments emerging from the characterization made in this article with the intention to improve the performance of state actors in the face of hybrid threats. First, it is necessary to establish a legal framework to strengthen the Public Forces in general, and the Military in particular, by creating new constitutional roles and missions because globalization blurs the limits of State

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action and, therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the institutional capacities, doctrines, and objectives based on a real map of existing threats. Secondly, it is pertinent to adopt cooperation mechanisms between institutions and the multiple levels of governance in order to articulate the efforts of the different actors involved (state, sub-national, international) to strengthen prevention, early warning, threat mitigation and resilience capacities in the face of the materialization of a hybrid threat. In sum, hybrid war is part of a conceptual trend in warfare, a paradigm to understand the typologies of threats, insurgent actors, terrorist actors, transnational criminal organizations, among others, subjects that make constant presence in the volatile international scenario and complex that seems to be overflowing the response capacity of the State.

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Juan-José Delgado-Morán has a Ph.D. in Criminology from the Universidad Católica San Antonio de Murcia, Master in Risk Prevention from the Universidad Camilo José Cela, Spain, Master in Analysis and Prevention of Terrorism from the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid, Bachelor’s in Criminology from the Universidad de Alicante. He is expert in National Security from the Universidad de Salamanca and Member of the Nebrija-Santander Global Chair on Risk and Conflict Management. Research director of this study. Jonnathan Jiménez-Reina is Ph.D. candidate in International Security from the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia -UNED-, Spain. He has a Master in National Security and Defense from the War College “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, Colombia, and a Bachelor Degree in International Relations and Politics from the Universidad Sergio Arboleda, Colombia. Junior researcher and member, with Master’s, of COLCIENCIAS attached to the research group “Centro de Gravedad” from the War College “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, Colombia. Advisor to the War College “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, as Vice-Direction of Research-VINVE- in the publication of scientific papers. Lecturer at the War College “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, the Military Academy “General José María Córdova”, and at the School of Intelligence and Counterintelligence “Brigadier General Ricardo Cherry Solano”, Colombia. Regional methodological coordinator of this study, Colombia.

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Álvaro Cremades-Guisado is Ph.D. candidate in Political Sciences and International Relation Management from Universidad Complutense de Madrid. And has a Bachelor Degree in Political Sciences and Management from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Master in Intelligence Analyst from the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and the Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. Lecturer at the Universidad Antonio de Nebrija and PhD intern at the War College “General Rafael Reyes Prieto”, Colombia. Researcher on security and armed conflicts, with special emphasis in strategic intelligence. Regional methodological coordinator of this study, EU.

Competition in the Outer Space and Ocean Depths Roman S. Czarny and Krzysztof Kubiak

Outline 1

Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 From Myths to Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Centuries Ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Outer Space During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Contemporary Competition in the Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Ocean Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 From Myth to Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Ocean Depths and Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Contemporary Competition in Ocean Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The aim of this chapter is to present in a brief manner the developments in the spheres previously unheard of, unknown or perhaps forgotten—the outer space and ocean depths. Whenever technology allows it, people reach for new frontiers and, as with everything else, what follows is a rather fierce competition between states. As all actions within the realms of outer space and ocean depths are veiled in secrecy— undoubtedly to gain advantage over the competitors—precious little is known and/or made public. Finding solid, reliable data is intentionally made extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible; therefore the material presented is based on scraps of information found or made available, without any certainty whether those bits had been offered accidentally or on purpose. There is no doubt, however, that major and lesser world powers are deeply interested in developing research and knowledge of A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: November 30, 2019; Accepted: December 7, 2019. R. S. Czarny · K. Kubiak (B) University of Jan Kochanowski, Kielce, Poland e-mail: [email protected] R. S. Czarny e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_6

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the outer space and ocean depths to the degree limited only by available technology and financial resources. As it is something quite novel, relatively speaking, the envelope is invariably pushed by the military, as it has always been in the sphere of R&D, innovations and state-of-art equipment. Sky and the bottom of the sea are no longer the limits for human quest. Keywords Outer space · Ocean depths · Competition

1 Outer Space 1.1 From Myths to Technology Putting aside religious views and beliefs, some people make a claim that humanity started either in the oceans or came from the skies, i.e. the outer space. It is the latter which is the subject matter of the first part of the article. Competition in the outer space has been quite fierce so far. In the modern history as of to date, star wars have not yet been recorded apart from the iconic TV series. Much has been written about the upcoming possibility of space conflicts and, fortunately, it still remains in the domain of science fictions books. Nevertheless, if one considers ballistic missiles, are we already there in terms of possible military confrontations, i.e. in the outer space, or not yet? As usual, one needs to start with definitions to establish the perimeters. Outer space is the physical universe beyond the earth’s atmosphere (Cambridge Dictionary 2010). The Karman line, an altitude of 62 miles above sea level, is conventionally used as the start of outer space in space treaties. If the outer space is accessible, then naturally there must a treaty outlining for what purpose this realm can be used. Outer Space Treaty enjoys a rather longish full name: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In essence, the Treaty signed on January 27, 1967 and made effective on October 10, 1967, prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in the space and limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes only. However, its weak point seems to be that it does not ban military activities in space; neither does it prohibit military space forces or the weaponization of space (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 2019). If something is not expressly forbidden, then the presumption is that it is allowed, which opens the Pandora’s Box. Definitions are trouble, be it only because we can never agree on anything. Terminology seems to pose another challenge. There is a reason why we still keep colloquially talking about “flying saucers,” for the lack of a better description. Once again, there is a reason why people painting the early likenesses of God1 made him 1 We cannot help but quote an anecdote from Sir Ken Robinson’s legendary TED lecture in 2006. “A little six-year-old girl was busy at a drawing lesson. The teacher went over to her and asked, ‘What are you drawing?’ And the girl said, ‘I’m drawing a picture of God.’ And the teacher said, ‘But nobody knows what God looks like.’ And the girl said, ‘They will in a minute.’”

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look like Zeus, because that had been the only reference left over from ancient times and readily available. We, humans, simply take everything and anything we know to describe the phenomena of which we know very little or nothing at all. How can one in Poland describe a Victorian “bathing machine” when we never ever had them in Poland?

1.2 Centuries Ago Pre-historically speaking, there seem to exist several indications that a conflict in the skies might have occurred several times before our time. People tend to describe everything in terms which are, obviously, familiar to them and at their disposal. Therefore, ancient texts talk about “chariots of fire,” “burning bushes,” “flying dragons” and the like. It is virtually impossible to relate something unknown by virtue of the non-existing metalanguage. Therefore, it is no surprise that, for example, the Bible relates stories like the following one: And there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon; and the dragon fought and his angels, And prevailed not; neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him. Revelation 12:7–17

The Bible itself might contain numerous references to cosmic or alien visitors, the writers being at a disadvantage how to describe certain phenomena, i.e. how to call a spacecraft. To mention only a few examples, of which there seem to be plenty, following UFO researchers one could present the following: 1. The wheel, or disc-shaped object described by Ezekiel; 2. the chariot of fire mentioned in the second book of Kings; 3. the cloudy chariot found in the writings of Moses, Daniel, David, Matthew, Paul, and John. In II Kings 2:11–12, 6:17; Psalms 68:17; and Habakkuk 3:8, the Old Testament writers describe cosmic craft identified as a “chariot of fire” powered by engines called “horses of fire” with “charioteers” (pilots). The chariot’s lift-off is described as a “whirlwind.” In II Kings is written: “And it came to pass, when the Lord would take up Elijah into heaven by a whirlwind, that Elijah went with Elisha from Gilgal… and… behold, there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven…”2 Obviously, the Bible is not the only source which might be interpreted in part as a report of star wars. The Hindu texts, predating Bible, contain extensive passages 2 http://www.unexplainedstuff.com/Invaders-from-Outer-Space/UFOs-in-Ancient-Times-Spacevisitors-in-the-bible-and-other-holy-books.html.

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which eerily remind one of the destruction wrought by nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. J. Robert Oppenheimer even quoted the Bhagavad Gita saying, “Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.” Oddly enough, Oppenheimer, who developed the bomb, was also a scholar of Sanskrit, and some have compared his story to that of Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita. Arjuna must be convinced to fight in a battle he does not want to take part in due to a moral dilemma, which some have compared to Oppenheimer’s hesitance in developing the atomic bomb. “The Hindu Vedas are packed with fantastic stories about the gods, their powers, and epic battles that supposedly took place long ago. Their sagas are widely perceived to be mythological stories that were created to be taken as allegory, much like we tell our children fables, so they might glean useful life lessons to apply down the road. These Hindu myths talk of noble Gods who fight off wicked forces, flying craft called Vimanas, and the nuclear war” (Gaia 2017). Whether they or not there are just allegories remains a moot point. However, something closer in terms of time and distance was related in the years 1561 and 1566. On April 14, 1561 at dawn, there was occurrence observed in Nuremberg, Germany, which was described as a war in the heavens. Clearly, as evidenced in the pictures and woodcuts, and reported in the Nuremberg Gazette, the sky was filled with the machines, clashing in battle. Some devices, described as crosses, globes and tubes, fought each other above the city. “It ended an hour later when the globes in the small and large rods flew into the sun, and several of the other objects crashed to earth and vanished in a thick cloud of smoke.”3 A similar phenomenon was reported in Basel, Switzerland, on August 7, 1566, when the city’s gazette recorded the following: At the time when the sun rose, one saw many large black balls which moved at high speed in the air towards the sun, then made half-turns, banging one against the others as if they fighting a battle out a combat; a great number of them became red and igneous; thereafter they were consumed and died out.

The description are intriguing and quite striking, including the language used there, but as usual, the sceptics will easily dismiss them while Erich von Däniken will rejoice.

1.3 Outer Space During the Cold War Historically speaking, following the Second World War, there were wide activities aiming at the development of various types of ballistic rockets in the industrially developed countries, mostly in the Soviet Union and the Unites States. The military application of these rockets clearly showed their importance: destroying the enemy in a huge distance from the launch (Anurejev 1975, p. 12). It is no secret that space warfare started during WWII, when German scientists, led by Werner von Braun, created the V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe-2, revenge weapon-2) 3 www.hidden-truth.org.

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ballistic rocket. Altogether 3480 pieces were manufactured and deployed against targets in England, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Both the USA and the SU used these rockets for the development of their own ones, with the captured rocket scientists participating (Szabo 1995, p. 1378). Both the US and the Soviet Union sought aggressively the specialists and as irony would have it, most probably Nazi scientists were behind space programs of both world powers at the time.4 When the Soviet Union launched the first satellite, the Sputnik, during the Eisenhower administration, the Americans started to worry about both the peaceful race and their strategic shortfall. During his second presidency (1953–1961), Eisenhower initially reduced the military and space research expenses. But the pioneering technical success of the Soviets, the launch of the Sputnik caused panic in the USA especially because the satellite passed several times above the country in its orbit. As it became obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of bombing any part of the planet, the USA was forced to take steps and Eisenhower announced the space race, as part of which the NASA was founded in 1958. Deák (2015, p. 10).

In the second half of the 1950s, at least in some sectors like the rocket building and space technology, the Russian constructors were ahead of most of their American and European colleagues. As is commonly known, the Soviets launched the first satellite of the world in 1957 and the first manned spaceship in 1961. For quite some time, the Soviet Union seemed to be a leader in the space race, which even the American landing on the Moon did not change much. The USA took a huge step in the field of space technology and military initiatives on April 12, 1981 when it launched the first reusable spacecraft, the Columbia. This, unlike space ships and rockets, could return to a ground base and in space it was able to do maneuvers, approach a satellite to repair or even damage it. This was to some degree a forerunner of the announcement of President Reagan on March 23, 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which attracted international attention and which was commonly referred to as the Star Wars plans. The program aimed at the construction of a defense system against military ballistic rockets. The new rocket defense system would have consisted of military equipment deployed in space, which the 1972 American-Soviet agreement about the limitation of military defense weapon systems prohibited. The long-term development program counted with reconnaissance satellites, long-range radar systems, controlled laser beam weapons deployed in space and on the ground, space mirrors to direct and concentrate laser beams, satellite destroyer aircraft missiles and various electronic control, telecommunication and other devices. In 1986, a request was made for the development of the European version of the rocket defense system. In 1993, however, the US entirely reoriented the original plans, excluding its cosmic elements. Deák (2015, p. 13). 4 The

Soviets were unsurprisingly secretive as regards the German participation and technology in their space program while Americans openly and happily broadcasted pictures of von Braun shaking hands with President Kennedy and appearing on Disney channel, advertising the “Moon” project.

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The Star Wars plans were not realized but the satellites, delivered into orbit, were used for more and more purposes—reconnaissance, prediction, communication, meteorological forecast, navigation, oceanographic observations, measurements, etc. Thus, their importance for ground warfare suddenly increased. The leading powers started the development of antisatellite systems as a very special field of the armament race. In the mid-80s the American experiments were aimed at the development of aircraft-launched ASAT (anti-satellite) weapons while the similar Soviet attempts aimed at weapons to be deployed in outer space with the help of carrier rockets. As mentioned before, the 1967 space treaty prohibited the deployment of nuclear weapons into outer space but it did not ban the temporary use of space for traditional weapons and it partially governed the issues raised by the development of antisatellite systems.

1.4 Contemporary Competition in the Outer Space Speaking today of the advances in outer space and particularly about the competition in space, there is no doubt that in our times the consequences of the changes triggered by new military technology are undoubtedly going to be unimaginable as they clearly are unpredictable. As more and more countries conquer outer space and use it for everyday communication, navigation and gathering information, wars would probably extend into space as well. This phenomenon would probably be as great as extending war into the air was during WWI. New organizations, new operational conditions, new initial strike motivators and new ways of warfare seem to keep mushrooming in front of our own eyes. As said by Michael N. Schmitt, Historically, military space operations tended to be somewhat benign… They have typically consisted of space control (passive defensive counter space missions), space support, and space force enhancement missions. Space warfare remain purely notional. That will change. In future wars, it is inevitable that war will migrate to space. In particular, offensive and active defensive forms of space control, as well as space force applications, are likely to become an increasingly prominent feature of conflict, especially as a growing number of states (and perhaps violent non-state actors) come to rely heavily on space assets to conduct terrestrial military operations. Schmitt (2006, p. 125).

In view of the above, space wars seem to inevitable. The programs, ambitions and hopes connected with them are in reality nothing new. Previously presented programs, notably President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, which is rumored to have finished the Soviet Union financially, have been developed over the years and every interested party knew about their existence. The advancements in technology keep making them more and more complex and, obviously, more and more costly. There is no doubt that behind every single space mission there is a military purpose, be it only for surveillance purposes only. The technology required to reach orbit has

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inherent military applications, and the importance of space-based military assets— communications and intelligence satellites—has only grown over the past 60 years. Much has been made of President Trump’s fairly recent announcement of the wish to form a new space branch of the American military. The U.S. President Donald Trump announced an executive order on June 19 to create a sixth branch of the U.S. military, known as the Space Force. According to the President, a new service was needed to ensure American dominance on the high frontier. President’s Trump’s announcement has been much trumped up. The headlines shouted that “Russia warns of a ‘tough response’ to creation of US space force.” Russian diplomats and politicians are promising repercussions if President Donald Trump’s order to build a U.S. space force is met, citing a treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova also criticized the formation of an American space force, according to state media. While Russia does have a branch of the military described as “space forces,”5 their activities are “purely defensive,” the spokeswoman said. Why American intentions should be considered “offensive” remains a mystery. Perhaps it is in the language of the current US President who tends to put things rather bluntly: “We don’t want China and Russia and other countries leading us. We’ve always led. We’ve gone way far afield for decades now,” Trump said (Rempfer 2018). On June 18, 2018, President Donald Trump signed Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3), which directed the Pentagon to begin planning the creation of a 6th independent military service branch that would undertake missions and operations in the rapidly changing environment of space (Williams 2019). “America must be fully equipped to defend our vital interests. Our adversaries are training forces and developing technology to undermine our security in space,” Trump said in the Oval Office as he signed a directive calling on the Pentagon to draft legislation (Kennedy 2019). It seems that what is missing from the American initiative is the word “defense” or “defensive.” Russia has had the Aerospace Defence Forces Branch (ASDFB) (Russian: Bocka vozdyxno-kocmiqecko obopony (BBKO), tr. Voyska vozdushnokosmicheskoy oborony (VVKO), which was a branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation responsible for aerospace defense, and the operation of Russian military satellites and the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. It was established on 1 December 2011 and replaced the Russian Space Forces. Although it is officially translated as aerospace in English, it covers both attacks from the air and from (outer) space, and some Russian writers translate it as “air and space” instead. On 1 August 2015, the Russian Air Force (RAF) and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces (RADF) were merged to form the Russian Aerospace Forces. The RADF duties for space defense are now with the Russian Space Forces under the umbrella of the new RAF. The RADF today only provides air defense responsibilities. The RAF, as the branch is now known, is in many ways a three-branch service combining elements of the space 5 Russian

Space Forces are a branch of the larger Russian Aerospace Forces, and provide advanced missile defense services. The units historically incorporated under the Russian Space Forces operate radars and satellites involved in early-warning systems, according to a 2002 article archived by Stanford University.

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forces, air forces, as well as air and missile defense forces under a single command. Beyond following the American example, Russia’s justification was that space is increasingly integrated, rather than separated, from everything else (Bodner 2018). Regardless of whether the purpose of existence of such forces is offensive or defensive, the major difference between the road taken by the two countries is drawing the line between air and space activities. “In broad strokes, the United States very quickly ruled everything above ground is the domain of the air force, while the Soviet Union drew a line and distinguished between air and space as zones of operation and divvied responsibilities as such” (Bodner 2018). In 2015, China established the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force as an independent service branch of the People’s Liberation Army, responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare. Prior to the SSF’s establishment of cyber, space, and electronic warfare responsibilities were split across four different departments. China has almost 300 satellites in space. President Xi Jinping of China has prioritized and accelerated Beijing’s space program, which included the first landing on the far side of the moon last year. Beijing even recorded more rocket launches than the US last year—38 versus 34—although it still lags far behind American rocket power. The Chinese leadership has set still more ambitious goals in an effort to become an “all-round space power” by 2030. It aims to complete its global navigation satellite system Beidou by 2020, an operating space station by 2025 and a permanent lunar research station by 2035 (Peel et al. 2019). The French President Emmanuel Macron announced launching the nation’s space command for the purpose of national defense, particularly to protect French satellites. French Minister of Defense Florence Parly detailed the nation’s plan for its new space force, which involves equipping satellites with machine guns and lasers, according to the French news weekly Le Point. First, the country will launch next-generation Syracuse satellites equipped with cameras that will be able to identify threats in space, such as anti-satellite weapons. The French military currently operates a constellation of three Syracuse satellites that are primarily used for communication between the mainland and French troops deployed abroad. But after the new cameras are tried and tested, France will launch another generation of Syracuse satellites that will also be able to destroy enemy satellites. The upgraded Syracuse satellites will be armed with either submachine guns or lasers that could disable or even destroy another satellite, according to Le Point; France aims to have those space weapons fully operational in orbit by 2030. Weitering (2019)

Minister Parly announced that the French air force would receive an additional 700 million euros (around $780 million) in addition to its existing €3.6 billion (about $4 billion) budget for space activities between 2019 and 2025. The new space command will consist of 220 personnel from the French Air Forces’ Joint Space Command, the Operational Center for Military Surveillance of Space Objects (COSMOS) and the Satellite Observation Military Center (CMOS). The space force will operate from the new Air Force Space Operations Center in Toulouse. In five years (2019) Japan will assemble a space force to monitor junk in Earth orbit; the unit will use telescope and radar facilities in Japan’s Okayama region; initial

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goal of the force will be to track the potentially dangerous pieces of space junk in Earth orbit. All these activities are to be coordinated with the US in what is called the ‘fourth battlefield,’ as space junk is a growing problem for satellite operators with more than 500,000 pieces thought to be a threat (O’Callaghan 2014). “In July, the EU’s Galileo satellite navigation system suffered almost a week-long outage, although officials insisted there was no evidence of foul play. In September, the ESA had to perform its first avoidance maneuver to protect a spacecraft from a possible collision with a vessel in another satellite constellation. Skirmishes between rival countries have grown as the means of interference with space infrastructure have become more sophisticated. Last year, Florence Parly, France’s defence minister, accused Russia of spying when it manoeuvred a craft to eavesdrop on a FrancoItalian military communications satellite called Athena-Fidus in 2017—an allegation the Kremlin denied. It is an indication of the lack of regulation in a zone owned by no one and still governed largely by general principles first enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article 1 says ‘the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies… shall be the province of all mankind.’ But the only explicit restriction on the use of weapons outside the Earth’s atmosphere is a ban on nuclear arms” (Peel et al. 2019).

2 Ocean Depths 2.1 From Myth to Technology Seas and oceans (including a large saltwater lake called the Caspian Sea) occupy 361.9 million km2 , which is 70.9% of the Earth’s surface. The average depth of the oceanic waters is 3,688 m, and the depth greater than 3,000 m is typical for almost half of the world’s oceans, so circa 37% of the planet’s surface is covered by a layer of salt water 3 or more kilometers thick. The depth of the sea has aroused human imagination since time immemorial. In all mythologies, there are either figures from the depths or people who, as a result of coincidence of various circumstances, possessed a divine attribute of life under water. An example of Greek beliefs can be a fisherman from Beotia, Glaukos, who after consuming the magic herb gained the ability to both live and live in the depths, in order to finally become one of the smaller gods of the sea. In turn, Alexander the Great is connected with the story that during the siege of Phoenician Tyre in 332 BC, he had to inspect the underwater part of the fortress using a device resembling a diving bell. This event was described by Aristoteles. Indeed, the scientific study of the ocean depth was initiated relatively late. The expedition of the British ship Challenger, which took place in the years 1872–1876, is considered to be the beginning of scientific ocean depths exploration. During the said expedition, among other things, the first probing between Guam and Palau was carried out, determining the depth of the ocean at 8,148 m. This area, now called the

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Challenger Deep, turned out to be the southern edge of the Mariana Trench, where the depth drops to 10,984 m (according to other data to 11,034 m) (Majewski 1991). Research on the ocean depths developed relatively slowly, but already in the 1950s the US Navy showed considerable interest in it. In 1957, the bathyscaph Trieste was bought from the Swiss scientist August Piccard, which was used to carry out the Necton project. One of its elements was the immersion into the bottom of the Mariana Trench in 1960 (Than 2012). The bathyscaphe crew was made up of August Piccard’s son Jacques and the US Navy officer, Captain Don Walsh. It should be noted that this achievement was later repeated by only one manned vehicle—an Australian, privately built, Deepsea Challenger vehicle piloted by James Cameron. This took place in 2012 (Piccard and Dietz 1961, pp. 133 and 231). There is not much exaggeration in stating that the environment of high pressures (when submerged in water the pressure increases by 1 kg per cm2 every 10 m into the deep) is in many respects much more demanding than space vacuum. After all, people visited the Silver Globe, 394,000 km away from Earth on average, six times (12 Astronauts), and the Mariana Trench, which is only 11 km away from the surface of the ocean, only twice (3 Aquanauts).

2.2 Ocean Depths and Cold War The US Navy continued its experiments by building the conventional Dolphin submarine (AGSS 555), operated between 1968 and 2006, including the unbeaten 916 m classic submarine draught record and the torpedo launch depth record, but in this case the depth was not revealed).6 In 1967–1969, a small atomic submarine NR-1 (with a displacement of only 400 tons and a length of 45 m) was built in the General Dynamic Electric Boat shipyard, unofficially bearing the name of Nerwin.7 It was scrapped in 2008. The unit has been involved in a number of different projects, most of which, despite the Information Access Act in the United States, have still not been made public for reasons of national security. It quickly became apparent that the ability to carry out activities in the oceanic depths is of great military and political significance. This was proven by events such as the search for the remains of the missing Trescher submarines, in 1963),8 the search for a hydrogen bomb lost in a plane crash near the Spanish town of Palomares in 1966 (Defense Nuclear Agency Technology and Analysis Directorat 1988), or the search for the remains of the Scorpion nuclear submarine (1968).9 From the point of view of the Cold War game, however, the most important was the raising of the remains of the Soviet conventional submarine K-129 (Golf 6 USS

Dolphin (AGSS 555), https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/agss-555.htm (2019). Description and Capabilities, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_ reports/MR1395/MR1395.ch2.pdf (2014). 8 Thresher (SSN-593) (2014). 9 Scorpion (SSN-589) (2018). 7 Nr-1

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II, Soviet project 629A), armed with three R-21 (SS-N-5 Sark) ballistic missiles, which sank in 1968 northwest of Hawaii. This operation was carried out under the camouflage of the activities of the eccentric billionaire Howard Hughes (Project Azorian 2010). Lack of reliable information about what the Americans managed to obtain from the wreck forced the Soviets to make a very costly replacement of some of the ship’s equipment, such as the secret communication devices. The second spectacular success achieved by the American agencies was the long-term installation of recording equipment on a submarine cable connecting Vladivostok with Petropavlovská Kamchatský. Ivory Bells operations lasted for over a decade, until they were revealed to Soviet intelligence by the CIA officer Robert Pelton in 1981 (Operation Ivry Bells 2019). During the Cold War, activities in the ocean depths were conducted mainly by the US Navy, with the support of other federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In a way, in response to American successes, i.e. to a certain extent reactive, deep-water research was undertaken in the Soviet Union. From the very beginning it was a centralized military program. It probably started at the turn of the fifties and sixties of the previous century. In 1963, the first recruitment to the top secret unit (military unit 90802) was launched, which was initially deployed in Moscow and then moved to Leningrad. The personnel of the formation were called, by analogy with the cosmonauts—gidronauts (hydronauts). With time, the planning and implementing structure of the activities in the depths of the ocean took the form of the Main Directorate in the Ministry of Defense and therefore equivalent to, for example, military intelligence, i.e. Main Intelligence Directorate. It is officially named Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research (Rus. Glavnoe yppavlenie glybokovodnyx iccledovani) and reports directly to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (it is excluded from the structures of the Navy despite the fact that most of the personnel originate from the fleet). After the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the deep ocean rivalry would end and be replaced by international cooperation. However, this did not happen, and there are many indications that the underwater race may gain, or is already gaining, new dynamics.

2.3 Contemporary Competition in Ocean Depths When addressing the question of the ability to obtain and maintain the capacity to act in the oceanic depths, the question is what kind of action can they enable? An overview of such Cold War activities suggests that countries are interested in two dimensions. At the outset, however, we must decisively reject the links between deep-water resources and special operations in general, understood as the transport of commandoes, smuggling of saboteurs and the like. Equipment and personnel with experience in deep-water operations are simply too valuable for that.

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By building a catalogue of tasks that make up the competition in the oceanic depths, two characteristic areas can be identified. The first can be described as routine. These routine activities include for example: monitoring of own, key elements of underwater infrastructure, such as telecommunication cables lying at great depths, aimed at eliminating possible recording devices; putting similar devices on the telecommunication cables of a potential opponent, possibly damaging submarine cables or infecting with malicious software key IT systems, such as those securing the operations of the world’s most important stock exchanges. In this context, it should be noted that currently 97% of all intercontinental information flow is carried out using fiber-optic submarine cables (satellite and other connections are therefore only used for the remaining 3%). The network of submarine transport connections covers over 1 million km. The vast majority of it is owned by commercial entities. The network is estimated to transport around 80 billion messages per day, mainly related to financial flows (Sunak 2017). Another set of tasks is related to sabotage (or having the ability to carry out acts of sabotage) within the deep-water infrastructure of oil mining. It is worth-noting that modern SPAR (Single Point Anchor Reservoir)10 platforms are anchored at depths of up to 2,500 m, and breaking the mooring system may cause catastrophic consequences (Perodado 2018). Other include search, locating and acquiring (possibly destroying) elements of hydroacoustic monitoring (e.g. SOSUS system elements)11 and other objects of military or economic importance placed at large and very large depths, deploying physical field recorders on the recognized routes of passage of ships (especially submarines) of a potential enemy in order to create libraries of their acoustic, magnetic and even—in certain conditions—hydrodynamic signatures. On the other hand, ad hoc tasks are mainly related to the search, locating and taking up objects, equipment and system components that were at the bottom of deep-water reservoirs as a result of accidents or combat operations. In the case of own equipment, the point is to prevent the opponent from taking over critical components; in the case of enemy equipment the point is to obtain their most guarded secrets. In recent years, this list includes such Russian activities as: extraction of special equipment from 10 From

design perspective a SPAR is a cylindrical, partially submerged offshore drilling and production platform that is particularly well-adapted to deep water. SPAR platforms are among the largest offshore platforms in use. These huge platforms consist of a large cylinder supporting a typical fixed rig platform. The world’s deepest production platform is Perdido, a truss spar in the Gulf of Mexico, with a mean water depth of 2,438 meters. It is operated by Royal Dutch Shell and was built at a cost of $3 billion. Perodado overview, https://www.shell.com/about-us/major-projects/ perdido/perdido-an-overview.html. 11 SOSUS, an acronym for sound surveillance system, is a chain of underwater listening posts located around the world in places such as the Atlantic Ocean near Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom—the GIUK gap—and at various locations in the Pacific Ocean. The United States Navy’s initial intent for the system was for tracking Soviet submarines. At present similar solution is used— for example—by People’s Republic of China. PRC maintains a submarine monitoring system in the South China Sea, called the Great Underwater Wall in media. China has been operating two underwater sensors since 2016, located in the Challenger Deep and off the island of Yap, Micronesia to detect movement at Naval Base Guam, and reportedly may allow China to monitor the activities of the US Navy, including its submarines.

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the wreck of the reconnaissance ship Liman, which sank in 2017 on its approach to the Bosporus after a collision with the ship for transporting live sheep Youzarsif H of the Togo flag, carried out by the research ship Selinger 12 ; regaining by the Yantar research vessel of the secret equipment from the wrecks of Su-33 and MiG29 fighters lost during the operations of the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in the eastern Mediterranean, and from the wreck of the SIGNAL intelligence Il-28 aircraft shot down in September 2018 off the Syrian coast by the Yantar research vessel (Mizokami 2018). The same group of tasks carried out in a completely different political context, but still serving to demonstrate capabilities, includes international projects such as the search for the missing Malaysian Boeing 777-200ER aircraft flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014 (flight 370), or the Argentinean submarine San Juan lost in November 2017. Based on the available information, it can be assumed that the Russian Federation has the largest capacity to act in the oceanic depths, subordinate to a single military decision-making center. The Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research already serves to group the material and human resources. This entity is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones and autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and other undersea systems. The Directorate operates the world’s largest fleet of covert manned deep-sea vessels, situated on Olenya Bay (Kola Peninsula on the coast of the Barents Sea). Currently, it is headed by Vice Admiral Aleksei Burilichev (Hero of the Russian Federation). The group of surface hydrographic units includes very modern, multi-purpose platforms already implemented or planned for implementation, such as: Selinger (project 11892, construction of the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, in service since 2012; twin units are called Ladoga and Ilmen) (Russian Navy Hydrographic Vessel 2018), also the previously mentioned oceanographic research vessel Yantar (Russian Navy Project 22010, 2015) construction of the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, in service since 2015), Akademik Alexandrov research ship with towing and rescue capabilities (project 20183, construction of the Zwiezdoczka Shipyard, to be ready by the end of 2019, Akademik Ageev (Russian Navy Project 16450, 2019), construction of the Pella shipyard from Otradnyj in the Leningrad region, planned delivery in 2020 (Russian Navy 2018)). However, the unique capabilities of the Main Directorate, more than those of surface ships, are determined by its extraordinary fleet of apparatuses and submarines capable of operating at very high depths. Moreover, by building a functional system consisting of an atomic submarine carrier and a deep-water apparatus to carry out the mission, the latter can be introduced into action in a way that guarantees a very high level of secrecy. According to relatively reliable information, the service currently has two atomic submarines at its disposal, which have been converted into special apparatus bases. The first one is adapted to the new tasks of the former ballistic missile carrier of the 667 BDRM project (Dolphin type, in NATO Delta IV code). 12 A

full analysis of the sinking of Liman, is found in: https://planesandstuff.wordpress.com/2017/ 05/29/full-analysis-of-the-sinking-of-liman/.

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The ship in its original configuration was adopted for operation on October 30, 1987 as K-64 (later it was named Podmoskovye). In 1999, the ship was withdrawn from the campaign and handed over to the Zwiezdoczka shipyard in order to be rebuilt into a carrier of special deep-water apparatuses. During the adaptation, part of the equipment dismantled from the previously carrying out such tasks submarine Orienburg (former carrier of ballistic missiles project 667A, in NATO Yankee II code) was to be used. Due to the permanent lack of resources, the adaptation was proceeding at a snail’s pace—the work lasted about 15 years. In the speeches of Russian officials, the date of reintroducing the ship into the campaign was repeatedly postponed, and finally took place on October 23, 2016. The vessel started sea trials, and on December 26th of the same year it was handed over to the navy. The second base ship was built as a unit armed with ballistic missiles of the BDM 667 BDR project (Kalmar type, in NATO Delta III code). It was rebuilt in 1996, and again directed to the shipyard for modernization in 2002. It returned to the campaign 4 years later. It is called Orenburg, not to be confused, however, with the earlier named ship of the project 667A, decommissioned in 2004, whose components were used for the reconstruction of Podmoskovye. According to some releases, Orenburg is to be (or has already been) withdrawn from service once the last of the mentioned units is ready.13 In addition to the carrier ships, the service also includes several other apparatuses: – 3 classified as miniature submarines, Project 1851, – 3 special deep-water stations, Project 1910, – 1 deep-water station, Project 1083. The most interesting construction is the last of the mentioned units. Deep-water special apparatus, Project 10831 (Kalitka) is a completely different type of construction, designed from the beginning for operation in the environment of extremely high pressures. Its construction began even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1998, but due to the financial crisis of the state it was supposedly put into operation in 2003 (however, it is certain that in August that year it was rolled out from the assembly hall, where it was photographed by an American satellite, and probably it was not a result of the carelessness of the Russians). Its strong hull is not uniform, but consists of six (or seven) spherical capsules (bathyspheres) placed in series, and therefore structures particularly resistant to high pressure (a combination of several bathyspheres similar to the one suspended under the hull of the Trieste bathyscaphe). There exists no detailed information about the unit itself. Its length is estimated at 60–70 m, displacement at about 2000 tons. It can be put into operation by the submarine Podmoskovye—it is mounted on slings under its keel. Probably during the passage to the area of tasks, the crew of Losharik is on board the base vessel. According to the public iconography, the last sphere from the stern contains a turbine block working on one screw while the penultimate one houses a nuclear reactor. In 13 K-129, KS-129, BS-129, «Orenburg» Project 667 BDR (K-129, KS-129, BS136, «Orenburg» Proekt 667BDR), http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nbrs/ 667BDR/K-129/K-129.htm (2019).

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relation to the working depth at which the unit can operate, the information varies to a large degree—values from 3000 to even 6000 m are mentioned. Similarly, the information that it is equipped with special pull-out supports enabling stable settling on the bottom and ensuring such clearance between the keel and the bottom that it is possible to put in action at least two types of cable-operated underwater robots should be treated as speculation. However, it seems certain that the bow section of the robot has a prehensile arm—a manipulator (Roblin 2018).14 In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for deep-ocean operations. Although NOAA reports to the United States Department of Commerce, its staff of around 7000 employees includes circa 300 federal uniformed services NOAA Corps. It is the smallest of the seven uniformed services of the United States Government.15 This separate structure is headed by the Director General, who corresponds to the rank of Deputy Admiral in active service. This group is uniformed and classified at the same rates as the Navy and Coast Guard officers (officers wear the same uniforms), and provides a ready source of technically skilled officers—professionals trained in engineering, earth sciences, oceanography, meteorology and other related disciplines -which can be incorporated into the U.S. Armed Forces in time of war, and in peacetime supports defense requirements in addition to its purely non-military scientific projects. NOAAA Corps officers operate NOAA ships, fly NOAA aircraft, manage research projects, conduct diving operations, and serve in staff positions throughout NOAA, as well as in positions in the United States Merchant Marine, Department of Defense, Department of State, the United States Coast Guard, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The NOAA Corps, like the US Coast Guard personnel, can be militarized by presidential decision. The organization currently operates 16 vessels and 5 aircraft (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2019). In France, the central national organization dealing with hydrographic and oceanological research is the French Research Institute for Sea Exploration (Institut français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer, Ifremer). This institution has 18 different vessels. Ifremer is a civilian organization, but its relationship with military structures is very close. For example, a large hydrographic unit, the displacement of 6600 tons, called Pourquoi Pas? (Why not?—named after the research vessel of Jean Baptiste Charcot) is currently used by the Marine Hydrography Service (Service hydrographique et océanographique de la Marine, Shom), because 45% of the naval force budget was used to finance its construction (Ifremer 2019). When comparing Russian capabilities with the US and French solutions presented above, it should be borne in mind that in western countries, due to different traditions and practices resulting from fundamental cultural differences, much of the potential associated with deep-water activities is in the hands of private entities and can be 14 Complex

pr. 10830/1083 K «Kalitka»/1083 km. AGS pr. 10831/pr. 210 «Losharik» (Kompleks pr.10830/1083K «Kalitka»/1083KM, AGS pr.10831/pr.210 «Loxarik»), http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-543.html. 15 Another six are: United States Army, United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Coast Guard, United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps.

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acquired by military structures, for example on commercial terms. Private sector companies sometimes occasionally prove to be more effective. This is confirmed by the fact that the Argentinean submarine San Juan, which disappeared in November 2017 and was unsuccessfully sought by the Russian ship Yantar, has been found by a private company. This was done by the Norwegian flag vessel Seabed Constructor (owned by Swire Seabed, owned by Swire Pacific Offshore from Singapore, which in turn is owned by Swire Pacific Hong Kong) which operates as a seven-year charter from Ocean Infinity, a company registered in the United States (Houston).16 Ocean Infinity was hired in 2017 by the Argentinean navy for 60 days based on the no find no pay formula (Argentina Navy 2017). Therefore, the private segment, guided by the profit factor, must also be taken into account when estimating the possibility of operating in the ocean depths. The above examples, chosen on purpose, prove that the oceanic depth is an area of interest for many countries. This trend is bound to intensify. It is important to underline that outside our view, due to the lack of access to reliable materials, there are activities carried out in the depths of the sea by new players, such as the People’s Republic of China. Its achievements in space conquest may indicate that it is able to surprise, and in an unpleasant way, those countries that have so far regarded themselves as deep-water powers.

3 Conclusion It appears that almost every country in the world, with proper resources, especially financial ones, wishes to or has the ambition to compete in the space, be it only to protect their own satellites. The race is speeding up and the winner unknown. For every measure there is a countermeasure and the rhetoric, as usual, is to preserve peace or protect own interests. Whether we go back to the ancient times, as described at the beginning of the article, nobody knows. Very few people are brave enough to make predictions as to where space competition may lead the human race and precious few are able to understand the intricacies of space technology. Perhaps, in this regards, sky indeed should be the limit. The situation in the ocean deeps is very similar. Two apparently different domains, the outer space and the ocean depths, are linked by at least three factors: their conquest is extremely difficult technologically, research is unimaginably expensive, and every single action conducted in either one is veiled in secrecy (one could almost say that matters related to outer space and ocean depths are highly and deeply secretive, exceedingly so). We usually learn things about them years after something has been accomplished, if at all, and the majority of people have no clue what it is/was all about. Who wins the race or the competition is unknown. Who comes on top is immaterial because if the top is the space, there always remain the ocean depths to score a win there. The real trouble seems to be how to coordinate the efforts and accomplishments 16 Shim,

http://www.shom.fr.

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in space, on earth and in the oceans to harmonize everything, be it offensive or purely defensive actions. However, these two domains present new frontiers and human beings have always been anxious to conquer, explore and possibly subject new territories. These two realms present unspeakable difficulty to be harnessed, given the available technology. Then why make the effort at all? The answer is world domination and domination means incredible opportunities. Nobody can blame a country for protecting own interests but advancing them is an entirely different matter. Probably, as usual, the answer is very simple, as coined by James Carville in 1992 during the presidential campaign of Bill Clinton: “The economy, stupid!”

References Anurejev II (1975) A rakéta kozmikus védelem eszközeip. In: Deák J (ed) Russia’s space defence from its beginning to the present time, Budapest. http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl Argentina Navy (2017) Argentina submarine: ARA San Juan found. https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-latin-america-46245686 Bible (unknown). King James version Bodner M (2018) As Trump pushes for separate space force, Russia moves fast the other way, Defense News, 21 June 2018 Cambridge (2010) Cambridge academic content dictionary. University Press, Cambridge Deák J (2015) Russia’s space defence from its beginning to the present time. cejsh.icm.edu.pl Gaia (2017) Gaia staff. https://www.gaia.com/article/do-hindu-texts-describing-the-flyingvimanas-also-detail-a-nuclear-war. Accessed 12 Oct 2017 Ifremer (2019) L’Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer. https://wwz.ifremer.fr Kennedy M (2019) Trump pushes ahead with ‘space force’ despite hurdles, National Public Radio, 19 Feb 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/695930668/trump-pushes-ahead-withspace-force-despite-hurdles?t=1574592438809 Majewski A (1991) Zarys historii oceanografii, Wydawnictwo Morskie w Gdansku ´ Mizokami K (2018) What Is a Russian spy ship doing in the Eastern Mediterranean? https://www. popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a28276/yantar-spy-ship-eastern-mediterranean/ NOAA (2019) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, https://www.noaa.gov Defense Nuclear Agency Technology and Analysis (1988) Palomares summary report, Field Command 1 defense nuclear agency technology and analysis Directorate Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87115. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a955702.pdf O’Callaghan J (2014) Japan to launch military space force in 2019: fleet will protect Earth from cosmic junk and prevent satellites being destroyed, Daily Mail, 4 August 2014. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2715695/Japan-launch-militaryspace-force-2019-Fleet-protect-Earth-cosmic-junk-prevent-satellites-destroyed.html Operation Ivy Bells (2019). https://www.military.com/history/operation-ivy-bells.html Peel M, Shepherd C, Aime W (2019) Vulnerable satellites: the emerging arms race in space, Financial Times, 13 Nov 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/a4300b42-f3fe-11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654

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Perodado Overview (2018). https://www.shell.com/about-us/major-projects/perdido/perdido-anoverview.html Piccard J, Dietz R (1961) Seven miles down: the story of the Bathyscaph Trieste. Putnam, New York Project Azorian (2010) The CIA’s declassified history of the Glomar Explorer. https://nsarchive2. gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb305/index.htm Rempfer K (2018) Russia warns of a ‘tough response’ to creation of US space force, 21 June 2018. https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2018/06/21/russia-warns-of-a-toughresponse-to-creation-of-us-space-force/ Roblin S (2018) Russian spy submarines are tampering with undersea cables that make the internet work. Should we be worried? https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-spy-submarines-aretampering-undersea-cables-make-internet-work-should-we-be Russian Navy (2018) Oceanographic vessel Akademik Alexandrov begins sea trials. https:// www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/small-craft-world/search-and-rescue/russian-navyoceanographic-vessel-akademik-alexandrov-begins-sea-trials/ Russian Navy Project 22010 (2015) Oceanographic research vessel Kruys. http://russianships.info/ eng/support/project_22010.htm Russian Navy Oceanographic Vessel Akademik Alexandrov begins sea trials (2018). https:// www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/small-craft-world/search-and-rescue/russian-navyoceanographic-vessel-akademik-alexandrov-begins-sea-trials/ Russian Navy Project 16450 (2019) Oceanographic research vessel transferred to new shipyard for completion. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/09/russias-project-16450oceanographic-research-vessel-transferred-to-new-shipyard-for-completion/ Schmitt MN (2006) International law and military operations in space. In: von Bagdandy A, Wolfrum R (eds) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol 10 Scorpion (SSN-589) (2018). http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08589.htm Shim. http://www.shom.fr Sunak R (2017) Undersea cables indispensable, insecure, London Szabo J (ed) (1995) Hadtudományi lexikon II. (M–Zs), Budapest Than K (2012) James Cameron completes record-breaking Mariana Trench dive. https://www. nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/3/120325-james-cameron-mariana-trench-challengerdeepest-returns-science-sub/ Thresher (SSN-593) (2014) Loss & Inquiry. http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08593b.htm United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (2019). https://www.unoosa.org Weitering H (2019) France is launching a ‘Space Force’ with weaponized satellites, Spaceflight, 02 Aug 2019. https://www.space.com/france-military-space-force.html Williams MS (2019) The militarization of space: what would a ‘Space Force’ Look Like? 18 Aug 2019. https://interestingengineering.com

Roman S. Czarny Ph.D. is Assistant Professor at the Department of North European Countries of the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland. Graduate of Jagiellonian University in Kraków (M.A. in English) and California State University in Dominguez Hills (M.A. in TESL, English Rhetoric and Composition); received his doctorate in Social Sciences at the University of Kielce; Consul of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles (1991–1997, 2000–2004) and Chicago (1999– 2000). Author of several scholarly articles and two monographs, the latest one: The United States as an Arctic Country. Krzysztof Kubiak Ph.D. is Professor, Commander (Ret). In 1989 graduated from Naval Academy of Gdynia (Poland), he served more than 20 years in the Polish Navy, after that he worked as the deputy of rector responsible for development in Lower Silesian University. Currently he is senior lecturer in the Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce. He published 16 books and about 100 articles focused mainly on the contemporary war, conflicts and flesh points and different aspects of

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maritime security. His newest monography is Loki’s strategy. Danish Atlantic Territories during the Second World War.

The (International) Terrorist Attack Model Against Diplomatic Interests Alberto Priego

Outline 1 2 3 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The State of Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methodological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Terrorist Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 US Embassy in Sana’a (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 US Consulate in Istanbul (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 US Consulate in Benghazi (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Spanish Embassy in Kabul (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract Since 9/11 terrorism has hit everywhere in the world. However, the War on Terror has reduced the number of attacks in the West even though the terrorists have kept Europe, Australia and the US as their main targets. Faced with the difficulty of attacking the territory of Western states, terrorist groups have tried to attack Western targets in their own countries. One of such targets has been diplomatic facilities which have become the main target of Al Qaeda or The Islamic State since 2005. Keywords Terrorism · Security · Diplomacy · Middle East · Far

A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted. October, 20, 2019; accepted: January 7, 2020. A. Priego (B) Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_7

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1 Introduction Although it is true that terrorist attacks against diplomatic delegations is hardly a new phenomenon,1 these practices have become more and more common in the last decades. Far from ceasing, this trend is on the rise and, nowadays, there is almost no country that has not suffered an incident of this kind.2 Terrorist attacks against diplomatic interests began taking a certain direction in the 1980s. The turning point likely came with the attack on the US Embassy in Tehran at the hands of the so-called “Theology Students”. Over the course of 444 days, 52 Americans were held hostage in their own embassy, a manifest violation of the immunity granted by article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention. The hostages were finally released with the arrival of Ronald Reagan to the White House and the acceptance of the captors’ requests. Despite the resulting break in US diplomatic relations (Berridge 2010: 121), Iran was held internationally liable through the International Court of Justice. This case led to the passing of the first diplomatic delegation protection measures: The Hostage Relief Act of 1980. For the purposes of this paper, the attack on the US embassy in Tehran set an example of violence against Western delegations which continues today with many terrorists seeing it as inspiring. The second major attack against diplomatic delegations occurred in Lebanon in 1983. The US Embassy in Beirut suffered a suicide attack with a car bomb leading to the death of 241 Americans, including 17 embassy employees. This attack gave rise to an investigative commission (Inman Commission) which began the process of constructing new embassy models, evolving towards a transformation into real bunkers. Despite the changes made following the attacks in Tehran and Beirut, there were another two major attacks also against US delegations. In 1998, Al-Qaeda attacked the American diplomatic delegations in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks made it clear there was a need to speed up the process that began in the 1980s building new embassy buildings and, above all, one particular thing that changed diplomatic activities: diplomatic delegations would be removed from “unsafe” locations; in other words, they would leave the city centres where their defence is more complicated. All of these facts suggest that security3 and diplomacy4 are two areas which are sometimes hard to reconcile. The situation is quite atypical in the context of threat as the Accrediting State must trust in the Receiving State to guarantee its security which, in many cases, leads the Accrediting State to adopt passive and defensive 1 The very first attack against diplomatic interests dates back to 1829, in Tehran. There, the then Russian ambassador -Tsarist Empire- Alexander Griboyedov was assassinated by a crowd protesting the signing of the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Gulestan through which the Persian Empire ceded the Caucasus territories to Russia. 2 Spain has also been the subject of serious attacks with the attacks on the Embassy in Lisbon (1975), in Guatemala City (1980), and more recently, its delegation in Kabul (2015) particularly standing out. 3 We’ll use the -traditional- definition for security by Arnold Wolfers: the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (cited by Baldwin 1997, p. 13). 4 Watson (1982: 10).

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measures within the boundaries of its own mission due to a lack of inherent trust in an anarchical international society. To this end, most diplomatic missions are trapped in a contradiction: the absence of security greatly complicates the work of diplomats, yet excessive security prevents the duties inherent to diplomacy from being carried out.5 However, the Receiving State may begin to feel uncomfortable as a result of this lack of trust and, thus, adopt extreme measures. The foundations of this complex relationship can be found in the fact that immunity from coercion (Vienna Convention 1961)6 forces the Receiving State to provide security to the Accrediting State. Two aspects of this immunity, which is actually inviolability and protects or should protect the Accrediting State, can be highlighted: (a) A Passive Aspect whereby the Receiving State may not apply any compulsive rule to beneficiaries of diplomatic status nor may it exercise actions of such nature against them. (b) An Active Aspect whereby the Receiving State must protect the delegation with its own security forces against any person or group that may attack it or its members. Thus, one can see how Receiving States not only may not exercise actions against the mission or against its members,7 but they also have an obligation to defend it if groups that have nothing to do with their security forces decide to attack it. Moreover, if such an attack does occur and it causes damages, the Receiving State would actually be legally liable and, therefore, the Accrediting State could demand international liability. There is just one case where the Receiving State would be released of such liability: if it is declared incapable of guaranteeing internal order and communicates such condition to the diplomatic missions accredited there. Only in this case, it would be released from its responsibility to guarantee the security of these delegations. In reality, there are very few cases where the Receiving State has acknowledged such a situation despite the fact, at times, that such guarantee is absolutely impossible, such as it may be in Libya or in Syria today. So, on the one hand, the Accrediting States are forced to apply extreme security measures which, as already mentioned, hinder and nearly restrict the exercise of the diplomatic institution. On the other 5 Such as the representation or promotion of friendly relations between the two countries, for example. 6 Art 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention:

1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. 2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution. 7 If the diplomatic mission is being attached, consent from the Head of Mission would be necessary.

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hand, in response, terrorist groups have been putting together a new attack model with particular characteristics targeting diplomatic delegations.

2 The State of Art From an International Relations perspective, few authors have worked on the complicated relationship between security and diplomacy and, in a more detailed manner, the relationship between terrorism and diplomacy. Some of the most significant contributions worth highlighting include work exclusively focusing on US diplomatic security conditions, such as it has been done by Kopp and Gillespie (2008). These two authors analyse the security of diplomatic delegations as one of many elements that affect the diplomatic careers of American agents. With a similar perspective, yet more focused on the personal experience of American diplomats, there is the work coordinated by Dorman (2005) with a few chapters analysing the personal experience of diplomats in detail and their perception of the security problems. In a similar line, from a Spanish viewpoint, the work by Pico de Coaña de Villacourt and Casáus (2015) and especially Cajal (1999, 2000) must be emphasized. Although they are approached from the personal experience of a diplomat, all of this work offers some very interesting cases and must be taken into account when trying to understand this phenomenon since they are first-hand sources. Following this approach, many diplomats narrated their experiences in diplomatic delegations that have suffered different types of attacks. Due to their innovative nature, the work of Loeffler (2004) and Kosowatz (2002) must be mentioned, as they analyse, from an architectural prospective, the consequences that diplomatic security may have on the life and occupations of US diplomatic and consular agents. Other work worthy of special attention was done by Berridge (2012), one of the great diplomacy academics, who analyses the situation of diplomatic delegations during armed conflict as well as the consequences that may derive for the development of these activities during crisis situations. Although it is true that the author approaches a reality related to security, his valuable contribution is limited to times when diplomatic delegations are located in a territory that is either at war or at least subject to military intervention. If the subject of study is reduced to focus solely on the phenomenon of terrorism,8 only some work has been found from a non-traditional perspective of diplomacy covering the complex relationship between Terrorism and Public Diplomacy (Peterson 2002; Omar Bali et al. 2018; Van Ham 2003).

8 Due to the lack of consensus as to the definition of terrorism, we have chosen to accept the five characteristics identified by Hoffman (2006: 40) as inherent to the groups that engage in these activities.

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Therefore, after reviewing the literature, our view is that there is a lack of scientific publications that analyse the very interaction between the concepts of security, terrorism and diplomacy. However, and despite this lack of academic interest, the world in which we live is becoming more and more dangerous and insecure and, consequently, diplomatic missions and the very diplomats themselves have become a target for terrorists when committing their acts. Many times, the impossibility and frustration involved with acting against the Far Enemy in their own territory can be overcome by attacking them in the territory inhabited by the terrorists themselves. Consequently, companies, tourists and, above all, diplomatic delegations and consular offices have become a feasible target for international terrorism (Reinares 2004: 5). In fact, if we use the definition for national security used by Morghenthau (1960: 562), it would be threatened not only when attacked in its own territory but also when the target is its institutions wherever they may be. Leaving the issue of whether diplomatic delegations and consular offices are the territory of the Accrediting States to one side, there is no doubt that they are institutions of said states.

3 Methodological Approach Therefore and after studying the state of affairs, a few research questions can be posed, such as: whether terrorist activity since 2005 has focused on regions such as MENA, Central Asia and Southern Asia; whether terrorist groups believe diplomatic and consular delegations are priority targets; and whether these attacks form a new terrorist attack model or are an extension of previous ones. The answer to these questions could largely be resolved by checking the following hypothesis: the measures adopted in the West against terrorism have been successful as reflected in the number of attacks recorded. This success has led to an increase in attacks in the regions where these groups originate, targeting diplomatic and consular delegations since they represent the Far Enemy to these terrorists. In order to conduct the research and, thus, verify the hypothesis, we shall work with a methodology that attempts to combine both quantitative and qualitative aspects. As concerns the qualitative one, we shall use the Global Terrorism Database9 for two purposes: (a) Firstly, we must prove that terrorism in the West has decreased in the study period (2005–2015) and that, at the same time, it has increased in the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia and Southern Asia. (b) Secondly, we have segmented cases using time (2005–2015) as our criteria along with geography (57 Organization of the Islamic Conference states) and the target of the attacks; in other words, diplomatic and consular delegations. 9 The Global Terrorism Database was chosen over others like ITERATE or RAND MIPT since GTD follows Hoffman’s definition for terrorism, on the one hand, and because it is the only one that completely covers the timeline for this study.

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This segmentation led to a total of 779 cases which shall be used to construct the characteristics of the theoretical model of terrorist attacks approached herein.10 From a qualitative point of view, we shall put this model into practice by using a comparative method. Thus, we have selected four particularly significant cases following a reduced and diachronic concept of time (2005–2015) which will help verify the hypothesis and implement the model. The most different cases were sought in an effort to select common elements which are found in all cases and which, therefore, would allow for the creation of the ideal type or model discussed. The selected cases are as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4)

US Consulate General in Istanbul (Turkey) (2008) US Embassy in Sana’a (Yemen) (2008) US Consulate in Benghazi (Libya) (2012) Spanish Embassy in Kabul (Afghanistan) (2015)

Although the selection reflects certain similarities, it was made by considering the varying nature of the diplomatic delegations and consular offices. Therefore, we chose a consulate general, an embassy of a smaller scope (Yemen), a special mission (Benghazi) (Berridge 2013) and a diplomatic delegation (Kabul).11 On the one hand, cases were selected—such as the one in Istanbul- where the attack was on a building of Standard Embassy Design, but others were also selected such as in Yemen or Kabul where these special security requirements are not considered.12 Thus, the idea was to cover the maximum number of diplomatic and consular realities possible in order to maintain the most different case strategy and ensure the model proposed herein could be generalized to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, and by combining these two different methodological approaches, the aim is to verify the hypothesis and create a model that may be helpful to future investigations.

4 The Terrorist Attack Model As already mentioned, the one proposed herein as a new model of attack against diplomatic interests began to be formed with the attack on the American Embassy 10 The 779 cases are available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1& casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2005&end_yearonly=2015&dtp2=all& country=4,5,6,16,18,19,23,28,31,33,37,41,42,46,56,60,72,73,74,84,85,86,93,94,95,97,99,102, 103,106,107,110,113,119,120,121,122,123,128,136,137,146,147,153,164,173,174,176,182,1004, 195,200,202,208,209,210,215,219,155,349,228®ion=7,10,6,11&weapon= 1,2,6,7,5,8,9,4,12,3,11,13,10&attack=2,1,3,7,4,5,6,8,9&target=7&charttype=line&chart= overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table. 11 Due to the great media repercussions and because of the fact that their later timings imply better constructed models, the cases of Benghazi and Kabul will be processed in more detail. 12 In Benghazi, there is still no consensus as to whether the compound was compliant or not with Department of State recommendations.

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in Tehran even though it was not configured as such until well into the 21st century. Perhaps it was consolidated as a model back in 2018, upon the attack against the US Embassy in Yemen. This model has not only been used against US delegations, but also against diplomatic missions from other states. Therefore, this is a case of international terrorism as understood by Reinares (2004: 5). The explanation of the rise of this trend must be found in the anti-terrorism measures adopted in the wake of 9/11, 11/M (Madrid) and 7/J (London) that caused a drop in the number of terrorist attacks committed in the West (Graph 1). On the other hand, the increase of terrorist attacks in other regions such as Central Asia, Southern Asia and, above all, the Middle East (Graph 2) can be explained by the impossibility of attacking the West. That may have forced terrorists to seek out Western targets in less protected territories where they find fewer obstacles to prepare terrorist plots. A very clear trend is observed in this terrorist activity transfer logic, as shown in the following graphs (Graph 3), in the increase in the number of attacks against Western diplomatic interests in Central Asia, Southern Asia and the Middle East. 1. Characteristics of the model: Having observed the terrorism-related trends in the regions subject of the study in addition to their targets, we can state that the terrorist attack model proposed herein has four clear characteristics that make it a singular and unique methodology: the symbolism, the modus operandi, the suicidal nature and a will to damage diplomatic relations. These four characteristics, which were previously constructed with the 779 cases studied, differentiate these cases from other cases previously explained meaning it is a new phenomenon that affects only the scope of diplomacy. 800

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100 79

80

70

60

49 38

40

52 39

39

29

20 0

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Graph 3 Terrorist attacks (779 cases) against diplomatic and consular delegations in Muslimmajority countries (We selected the 57 Muslim-majority countries included in the Organization of the Islamic Conference). Source Global Terrorism Database

2. Symbolism: Attacks against diplomatic delegations have a clear symbolic vocation. Since they involve violence against delegations -mostly Western ones- terrorist cells believe that they are directly attacking the territory of the corresponding State through their actions. Looking at terrorist narratives, it is obvious they are using these attacks to directly attack the Far Enemy even though the attacks

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occur thousands of kilometres away. The logic behind these acts (Pape 2002: 345)13 is not only to physically damage the delegation and its members but also win over acolytes for their cause by attacking those considered to be causing all their ills. Furthermore, the fact that they are committed against external organs of Western states’ foreign policy, these actions receive an international echo not achieved with other attacks which may kill many more human beings, but do not receive the same media attention. Pursuant to our segmentation using GTD, a total of 431 attacks were aimed at diplomatic delegations accredited in the area studied. Of these attacks, 102 were committed against states that directly participated in the 2003 Iraq invasion (23%), and 150 (34%) against states that participated in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Moreover, 177 attacks were carried out against either Western states or against Western allies,14 accounting for 41% of the total. If you add the 348 attacks committed against international organizations (UN, African Union) to this figure, 67% of all attacks targeted either a Western state or an international organization which, in the eyes of terrorists, defend the interests of the Far Enemy. The percentage rises to 75% when including countries that participate in ISAF. 3. Modus Operandi: Confusion caused by a massive preliminary attack is used in these types of attacks for a small heavily-armed group to take commando action for the sole purpose of inflicting the most damage possible on those present. These groups use particularly lethal tactics,15 such as wearing explosive vests or driving cars inside the target in order to cause more damage (Pape 2003: 346). Sometimes a protest is used to confuse the guards protecting the embassy or a car bomb is used to focus their attention elsewhere. Once the attention of those protecting the mission’s entrance is successfully diverted, the commando aiming to attack it begins the attack using automatic weapons and explosives to do so. When looking at the 779 (GTD) attacks committed in the study area in the time period established, it is obvious that this modus operandi was used in 512 cases which indicates that 65% of all attacks committed followed this methodology. 4. Suicidal nature: Unlike traditional terrorism,16 this new version of terrorism has one unique characteristic—a suicidal nature- which also makes it unpredictable and uncontrollable. In the terrorism model analysed herein, terrorists accept their death right away as their sole motivation is to cause the most possible damage,

13 Some

authors, such as Robert A. Pape, believe the two functions of terrorism are to coerce the opponent and seek support among the population. This symbolic element would be more focused on the second function. 14 We have included those expressly mentioned by Bin Laden in his “Message to Muslims in Iraq: Fight the Crusaders” (Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen) Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/15/world/threats-and-responses-bin-ladens-message-to-muslims-in-iraq-fight-the-crusaders.html. 15 Many times, the commandos have either trained with an army or have been trained or fought in places like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan or Somalia. 16 The fourth wave (Rappoport 2002) of terrorism also generalizes the suicidal aspect of the attackers.

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even by sacrificing their own life. This vocation, not only to suicide but destruction, is not exclusive of attacks on diplomatic delegations but rather is applicable to most of today’s international terrorism (Pape 2003). It is the logic coined by Schelling (1966) as “the rationality of irrationality”: a terrorist act in and of itself is an act of absolute individual irrationality; however, on the whole, it is part of a bigger strategy which is absolutely rational. If you look at the very essence of the type of attack being analysed, you realize that the terrorists’ goal is to become entrenched in a building causing the greatest possible damage knowing that they will be killed as soon as the security forces arrive. To classify this type of terrorism, we must recall Pape’s distinction (Pape 2003: 345) between: (a) narrow definition of suicide terrorism: actions where the death of the terrorist directly causes the death of their victims.17 (b) broad definition of suicide terrorism: actions where the terrorist expects to die while committing the act, yet they are not directly responsible for their own death. The actions from our model would mostly fall under this very broad definition of suicide terrorism. 5 A will to damage relations between the accrediting state and receiving state: As seen above, the legal liability for an attack is the Receiving State due to the particular legal status enjoyed by diplomatic delegations18 even when their own forces have not participated or have even attempted to stop the act. Therefore, the Accrediting State can demand international liability from the receiving state even when the attack is by a third party which no doubt could harm the relationship between the two. Although this may cause damage in terms of image, these types of actions may also have worse consequences. It may be, as was the case of Yemen in 2008, that when the minimal security conditions are not or cannot be guaranteed for the delegation, the Accrediting State decided to reduce their mission as much as possible which in and of itself worsens bilateral relations. The figure of international representation could even be sought, leaving the defence of a state’s own interests in the hands of another state which continues to maintain diplomatic presence. In any case, it is clear that terrorists use these actions to erode relations between the states as diplomatic relations can even be terminated following an attack of this kind even when the Receiving State had nothing to do with the attack. The terrorist groups use these actions to harm the government of the state where the attack occurs, not in and of itself, but in its relations with its international partners and particularly with Western ones. Although Crenshaw (1981) does not expressly include it as a cause of terrorism, we can identify a will among terrorists to either seek an over-reaction by local security forces to violate the

17 It

is impossible to study this sample because Global Terrorism Database uses Pape’s narrow definition of suicide terrorism. 18 Art. 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention.

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Vienna Convention or demonstrate their inability to manage the security of foreign delegations. We must again emphasize the importance of attacks committed against both Western delegations as well as the United Nations, since it is considered to be the main international support in places of high dependency abroad, such as Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar, which are clearly pro-Western aligned. Again, looking at the Global Terrorism Database sample, one can observe how these attacks account for 67% of the total which proves a will to alter or harm diplomatic relations. Having described the characteristics of this model, the cases chosen can be analysed in detail in order to verify whether they feature the four characteristics of the model proposed herein.

4.1 US Embassy in Sana’a (2008) On 17 September 2008, a group of six terrorists from the Al-Qaeda affiliated group Islamic Jihad in Yemen attacked the US diplomatic delegation in the capital of Yemen, Sana’a. It was the second attack on the American Embassy that year.19 At 9:15 a.m., they attacked the missions’ security ring from a car, with machine guns and grenades. The assailants were uniformed in camouflage to confuse the Yemeni security forces protecting the embassy. After a 20-min fight, a suicide terrorist drove a car into the wall protecting the delegation in order to open up a hole and enter the compound to cause as many human casualties as possible. The final result of the attack was 16 deaths20 including all the members of the terrorist cell. All of the elements highlighted above as inherent to this terrorist attack model can be found in the attack on the American embassy in Yemen. Firstly, the symbolism of the attack must be underlined as the terrorists attacked the US Embassy, a target that was subject of terrorism actions in 2003, 2008 and later in 2009. The attack in Yemen on the destroyer USS Cole could even be included in this logic. The reiteration of the American target in the terrorist attacks in Yemen indicates its importance for terrorists in representing the Far Enemy. In short, terrorists -due to the media repercussions- manifest their will to attack the US. However, in view of their inability to do so in American territory, the country’s diplomatic delegation, just as the USS Cole, was an attractive target as well as feasible. Along with choosing a target, there is another element that must be mentioned: the attack occurred right in the middle of Ramadan (Worth 2008), a sacred month for Muslims and which, in the minds of terrorists, only reinforces the symbolism of the attack. Secondly, the modus operandi is similar to other terrorist attacks. Strong men armed with automatic rifles, grenades and explosives acting in an organized way with the sole purpose of causing as much chaos as possible. In the case of the 19 After

the April 2008 attack, the Department of State decided to reduce all mission personnel as much as possible. 20 Besides the six assailants, 4 civilians and 6 guards who were protecting the embassy also died.

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attack against the Embassy in Sana’a, the assailants did not take advantage of any preliminary uproar; however, all the other elements in the model do coincide with the model suggested herein. Thirdly, the suicidal nature of the terrorist cell must be emphasized. The assailants did not seek to survive their actions but rather cause all the damage possible, by even sacrificing their own lives. In fact, some aspects which were later repeated in attacks such as the one in Paris (2015) can be observed in this one. Specifically, this means the fact that one of the assailants was wearing an explosive belt21 to be detonated if pressured by the security forces. Fourthly and finally is the will to harm diplomatic relations and, in the case of the relations between Yemen and the US, the diplomatic history has been quite convulsed (Sharp 2015). Events such as the division between North and South Yemen, attacks against US interests and poor relations between Washington and Sana’a have been at times unsalvageable pitfalls in the relationship between these two states. Therefore, any added incident, such as the one that occurred in 2008, creates an even further burden on the always-complicated relations between the US and Yemen. Besides this terrorist attack, which may be considered the most serious in recent years, since 2008 the US diplomatic delegation in Yemen has suffered seven attacks against US diplomatic interests, which have deteriorated the relationship between the two states (Table 1).

4.2 US Consulate in Istanbul (2008) On 9 July 2008, the US Consulate General in Istanbul was attacked by a terrorist cell of Kurdish origin.22 A group of four men got out from a vehicle and began shooting at the Turkish police protecting the facilities. It resulted in the death of three assailants and three police officers. The fourth member of the cell was able to escape. Although there were mortal victims, the tragedy could have been worse if not for the fact that the American consulate had been built following the Inman recommendations. These types of buildings do not feature any dissuasive effects, but they are able to lessen the damages from attacks which in some way fosters a continuation of diplomatic relations to the extent possible. In any case, it is worth considering whether the attack in Istanbul meets the characteristics of the model being analysed or not. Firstly, the attack had a symbolic vocation as they attacked the US consulate in Istanbul, the most mediatic and touristic city in Turkey. Moreover, the then Secretary of State visited Istanbul in April of that year reaffirming the US commitment to Turkey. The visit was followed by an official trip by his Turkish counterpart Ali

21 This

technique had been previously used by Chechen terrorists who used explosive belts not as their main weapon but rather as a last resort to cause damage if they were detained. 22 There is no consensus as to their ties to Al-Qaeda.

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Table 1 Attacks against US interests in Yemen. Source Bureau of Diplomatic Security (2013). “Significant attacks against US Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel” Department of State (1998– 2012). Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211361.pdf Date

Description of the attack

Damages

14th January 2009

Shooting against a US Embassy vehicle in Sana’a

Materials

11th January 2011

The launch of a large-size stone against the vehicle of the US Embassy Head of Mission

Materials

25th October 2011

The launch of a hand grenade against a Yemeni guard who was protecting the US Embassy

Materials

13th September 2012

Attack on the US diplomatic delegation in Sana’a. Attack against the hotel where members of the delegation were staying

Materials

11th October 2012

Shooting against a member of the Foreign Service. Claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

A dead member of the Foreign Service

2nd March 2013

Shots fired against a US Embassy vehicle in Aden

Babaca in June. There was also an imitation effect as the Consulate in Ankara suffered another attack in 2013, during which a woman died as well as the assailant. Secondly, the modus operandi in this case coincides with the “methods” used in other similar attacks: an armed suicide cell with machine guns seeking the largest number of victims. Creating a climate of confusion was not necessary in this case as there were a significant number of visa applicants at the door of the consulate generating the confusion needed to perform the attack. Thirdly, the aforementioned suicidal will of the cell is present even though the fourth member of the cell came out alive and did not choose to commit suicide. In any case, just as occurred with Saleh Abdeslam in the attacks in Paris, this fact does not eliminate the suicidal will of the attack, as it should be considered isolated conduct within the group. This is probably a case of a difference in the degree of commitment between one specific member and the rest of the cell. Nonetheless, this behaviour cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the group or the nature of the attack. Fourthly and finally, the ultimate purpose of the attack must be identified which, in this case, also coincides with the model being constructed: to harm the relations between Turkey and the US. In fact, the authorship—a Kurdish group—offers a few clues into the cell’s goal: to harm the already battered relations between Ankara and Washington.23 Obviously, poor relations between Turkey and the US could benefit the interests of Kurdish separatists whose ultimate goal is the independence of Kurdistan. 23 US–Turkey

relations became quite deteriorated after the Iraq War.

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4.3 US Consulate in Benghazi (2012) On 11 September 2012, the US24 Consulate in Benghazi suffered a harsh terrorist attack. Despite the fact that US diplomatic and consular missions are attacked relatively frequently, the case of Benghazi was particularly painful for the White House due to the ensemble of particular characteristics, such as some errors committed by Department of State security, Hillary Clinton’s infamous emails and, especially, the death of Ambassador Stevens. The Benghazi case became a real blackspot in the history of the Foreign Service. The attack on the Consulate25 occurred amidst a climate of widespread protest in the Arab-Muslim world due to the release of the film “The Innocence of Muslims”. The uproar generated in response to the release of the film was taken advantage of in order to carry out the attack. In fact, these protests were not only occurring in Libya but also, as mentioned, they were more or less widespread throughout the Arab-Muslim world.26 The attack was divided into two parts: a first attack began at about 9 at night and the second well into the next early morning. (a) First attack: Ambassador Stevens went to his room at 9:00 p.m. An attack began just a few minutes later which would last 40 min. The Consulate security decided to place Ambassador Stevens in shelter along with security agent David Ubben and information agent Sean Smith in a “safe” room. The assailants poured gasoline on the building and lit it on fire. Ubben jumped out of the window, leaving Stevens and Smith inside. A group of CIA agents tried to rescue them, but they only found Smith on the ground, transferring him to another building. He was fatally shot by the assailants along the way. The ambassador was found hours later by a group of civilians who transferred him to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Ambassador Stevens died from asphyxia after inhaling so much smoke. (b) Second attack: at 4:00 a.m. against the other building in the compound. Some 30 people took shelter there, including Smith and Ubben. After 15 min of mortar rounds, security agents Glen Doherty and Tyrone Wood, who were employed to defend it, died. In any case, it must be said that the attack on the Benghazi consulate meets the four aspects highlighted as inherent to the model being analysed. Firstly, the symbolic nature thereof stands out. Not only did it occur against a US delegation, which in and of itself is symbolic, but it was carried out on a very 24 Although

it has been referred to as a consulate, the American facilities in Benghazi were in all reality a special mission which some authors like Berridge (2013: 1) have described as hybrid. 25 Ambassador Stevens, the two SEALS, G. Doherty and T. Wood, as well as four assailants died in the attack. 26 Along with this element, the fact that the US had already withdrawn its support for Gaddafi and that, in September 2012, it cannot be ignored that the US had recognized the National Transition Council as the legitimate government of Libya.

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important date: 11th September. Moreover, the attack in Benghazi opened the door to other attacks against other delegations accredited in Libya which was being turned into a paradigm of change following the Arab Spring: Secondly, the modus operandi of the attack is a methodology which was repeated once again. A group of men attacked the consular delegation using automatic weapons and hand grenades. Just as occurred in other cases, the assailants used the chaos caused previously by the film’s detractors to camouflage themselves and be able to more easily reach their target (Table 2). Thirdly, the suicidal vocation in the assailants must be mentioned. The cell sought not so much to survive but rather to cause damage to anything within the consulate facilities. Although the number of assailants who initiated the attack is unknown, the lifeless bodies of four terrorists were found in the end. It must be underlined that they made no attempts to escape and that all their effort focused on causing damage which proves their suicidal vocation and allows their inclusion in the second category of suicide terrorism mentioned by Pape (2003: 345). Finally, the primary goal of the attack was to harm relations between post-Gaddafi Libya and Washington. The idea was to prevent the US from having a delegation open in rebel Libya, a political project that had just been “relieved” of the weight of the Gaddafi regime. The fact that the US had a top-level diplomatic mission in Tripoli was in and of itself a declaration of intent and, therefore, the attack against the Consulate in Benghazi sought to harm the recently established relations between the National Transition Council and the White House. Table 2 Attacks against diplomatic delegations in Libya. Source Own work Date

Embassy

City

Deaths

Wounded

23rd April 2013

France

Tripoli

0

0

25th June 2013

UAE

Tripoli

0

0

29th June 2013

Pakistan

Tripoli

0

0

3rd October 2013

Russia

Tripoli

3

0

13th November 2014

Egypt

Tripoli

0

0

13th November 2014

UAE

Tripoli

0

0

17th January 2015

Algeria

Tripoli

0

3

22nd February 2015

Iran

Tripoli

0

0

12th April 2015

South Korea

Tripoli

2

1

13th April 2015

Morocco

Tripoli

0

0

21st April 2015

Spain

Tripoli

0

0

12th June 2015

Tunisia

Tripoli

0

0

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4.4 Spanish Embassy in Kabul (2015) On 11th December 2015, a group of four armed men attacked the Spanish diplomatic delegation in Kabul. Although it is not clear that the target was the embassy building, the claim did outright express a desire to attack Spain. Two Spanish National Police officers, Jorge García Tudela and Isidro Gabino Sanmartín, died in the attack, the first suffered by Spanish diplomacy in Afghanistan. The attack took place in an area of Kabul where there are many diplomatic delegations. In addition to the Spanish embassy, the US, UK, French, Japanese and German missions are also located there. The attack began when a car bomb went off, aimed at creating chaos. One of the four assailants died in this deflagration. Immediately afterwards, the other three terrorists entered the grounds and that is where the fighting lasted for more than 12 h (Attitar 2015). The final result was a total of 10 deaths including the two Spanish police officers, four Afghan security agents and the four aforementioned terrorists. Just as occurred in the cases analysed above, the attack on Spain’s diplomatic delegation in Afghanistan fits into this terrorist attack model being constructed herein. Thus, we shall analyse how the attack on the Spanish delegation perfectly adapts to the characteristics mentioned as inherent and unique to this model. Firstly, the symbolism of an attack must be discussed. As already said in the paragraphs above, the area where the attack occurred—the Shepur district- is where most diplomatic delegations accredited in Afghanistan are located. Besides the diplomatic buildings and the university buildings, this neighbourhood is also home to most government buildings including the Afghan Ministry of Justice and the Presidential Palace. Therefore, the area may be considered not only the most cosmopolitan in Kabul but also the most official. To this end, the repercussions of a terrorist attack in this area of the city would always be greater than one in any other point in Afghanistan. The claim27 was rather ambiguous because the spokesman for the Taliban who claimed responsibility for the attack stated that, although it was aimed at Spain -a member of ISAF-, it was not aimed at its delegation. At first, the Spanish government declared that the target was a “guest house” which, according to local sources, was used to house foreigners. However, the government later acknowledged that the attack was carried out not only against Spain but also very clearly against its delegation. In any case, a few of the survivors have indicated that the attack was clearly targeted at the Spanish embassy in Kabul (Attitar 2015). In any case, the attack does meet the element of symbolism as all other terrorist attacks under this new model. The idea of an especially symbolic attack with the greatest possible repercussions was in the minds of the members of the terrorist cell that attacked the Spanish embassy in Kabul. The modus operandi of the attack in Kabul is quite similar to what has been found in the other cases chosen to construct this new model: a heavily-armed group with semi-automatic rifles and grenades entered the compound with a method that 27 Responsibility

for the attack was claimed by Zabihullah Mujahid via Twitter which was quite new in comparison to previous ones.

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reflected their military training. In the case of Kabul, the attack began at six in the evening when there was a strong explosion that caused the necessary confusion to be more effective in the attack. According to members of the Spanish delegation, a very powerful deflagration28 was what caused the enormous hole in the compound wall through which the terrorists entered.29 The Federal Police Union had previously denounced some technical deficiencies in the embassy’s security. The main door of the compound had been covered to prevent attacks. So, a small non-armoured metal door was being opened in an adjacent street to make up for the lack of an entrance. It was to be activated with a remote control which failed at the time of the attack. Thus, you had to get out of your vehicle to open the door in order to enter the delegation. This fact significantly reduced the safety of the members of the delegation. The diplomatic compound was comprised of three adjacent buildings connected to each other through a shared courtyard. One of the buildings was being used as an embassy and consulate general. The second was being used as a residence for delegation personnel and two were about 10 m from the wall that was broken by the terrorists to be able to enter the grounds. The first police officer assassinated, José García Tudela, was in his room (ground floor) when he was killed, meaning there was little he could do to defend himself. The second, Isidro Gabriel Sanmartín, was hit by the terrorists’ gunfire when he went out to search for him. The terrorists got up onto the building rooftop and began shooting at everyone trying to rescue him. A few witnesses have mentioned that it seemed that the terrorists knew the building, given the way they moved and the conviction with which they got up onto the roof; it seems as though someone who worked for the delegation had given them information. A third police officer, José Manuel Sánchez Fornet, tried to convince the Afghan forces to help the victim who agonized for three hours until he bled to death. Despite receiving no cooperation from the Afghan forces who should have protected the diplomatic agents, Sánchez Fornet was finally able to get him out of the shooting angle. The rest of the diplomatic delegation took refuge in the building bunker, yet it was not completely safe because the door could not be completely closed due to the damage cause by the explosion. The third element in the model is the suicidal nature of the cell. The assailants resisted for the entire twelve-hour attack. In fact, the attack did not cease until special US forces with support from the Norwegian forces entered the building and killed the three assailants who remained there reflecting the broad view of the concept of suicide as set forth by Pape (2003). Finally, there is a clear will to harm diplomatic relations between the two countries. Although it is true that Spain and Afghanistan do not have a very convulsive diplomatic history, it is no less certain that the Taliban nowadays seeks to isolate the Afghan government. Therefore, the choice of Spain may seem due to a greater ease

28 The

explosion was so large it damaged the entire block. detonated a car bomb against the door which destroyed half a block and a minute later, entered for the attack” (Atitar 2015).

29 “They

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of attack; however, the Taliban aim to isolate the Afghan government by coercing accredited diplomats.

5 Conclusions After analysing the four cases selected to demonstrate how our theoretical model can be seen in case studies, we shall draw some conclusions. We have seen an all-out revolution since the 1990s as far as the nature of terrorism. Authors such as Hoffman (2006), Rapoport (2002) have written several academic papers attempting to explain how international terrorism has changed in the last two decades. However, in the last decade, we have been witnesses to changes in the targets of the actions as well as the resources used. Although mass transport seemed to be the main target for terrorist organizations in the early years of the century, this has been changing over the last several years. The reason for this change would be the efficacy of the security adopted following the attacks of 11th September, 11th March and 7th July, measures that have been able to halt terrorist attacks against mass transport.30 Thus, it seems as though terrorists are no longer focusing their actions really on means of transport but rather other targets: leisure spots, especially in the West (Paris, Manchester, etc.) and diplomatic delegations and consular offices in mostly-Muslim areas. Of these two new terrorist targets, this chapter has focused on the latter. However, in many cases, such as with the Bataclan theatre in Paris, the modus operandi used for the two are the same. These trends lead to the belief that, since 2005, there has been a new unique terrorist attack model which is mostly developed in mostly-Muslim countries and which, in this case, is aimed at diplomatic delegations and consular offices, especially of Western countries. The model, as developed above, would have four characteristics: (a) (b) (c) (d)

Special symbolism. A unique modus operandi. A suicidal vocation. A desire to harm bilateral (diplomatic) relations.

Firstly, the attacks are loaded with symbolism, especially as concerns the target. Up to 67% of the attacks were committed against diplomatic delegations of Western states or their allies; in other words, against the Far or Near Enemy, something that is often present in their claims of responsibility. The impossibility and frustration of attacking the Far Enemy means terrorists are continuing to rely on attacking diplomatic delegations whom they accuse of keeping the Near Enemy in power. Of all the cases analysed, the Benghazi attack could be considered as the most clearly reflecting this symbolic feature as the assassination of Ambassador Stevens was 30 A

few examples of this success include the aborted attack in 2006 in the United Kingdom and the frustrated Bojinka plot which aimed to destroy several planes at the same time while in the air.

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interpreted by radicals as a real victory in the fight against the US. If we focus on the attacks suffered by the states participating in ISAF, including the one in Kabul in 2015, the percentage of attacks against these states totals 75%. The second element inherent to this model -the modus operandi- is perhaps the most innovative. Ever since the middle of the last decade, we have seen how automatic weapons and explosives have become the main tool used to create terror in attacks such as the ones in Beslan, Mumbai and Paris. In the segmented 779 cases used to determine the characteristics of the model, a total of 65% of the attacks were committed by following this means of action. Moreover, each and every one of the cases analysed reflects the same means of action: a cell indiscriminately attacks a public space with the sole purpose of causing as many victims as possible. At times, attacks begin with prior uproar (Benghazi) or an explosion caused by the terrorists themselves (Sana’a and Kabul) in order to distract attention to generate a surprise effect that multiplies the possibility of damage and, therefore, success. The third element in the model is a vocation for suicide in assailants. Although it is true that the assailants in most previous attacks sought to survive, nowadays they are quite willing to sacrifice their own lives in the very attack. This special characteristic, which has been highlighted by both Hoffman and Rappoport in their respective writings, makes it much more difficult to detain terrorists, as they are more dangerous and unpredictable. In the four cases analysed, we have identified terrorists who have died fighting with the sole purpose of causing the most damage possible. The fourth and final element comprising this new terrorist attack model is a will to harm bilateral (diplomatic) relations. The 1961 Vienna Convention makes it clear that even when the Accrediting State is not directly involved in an attack, it is legally held liable internationally for any attack and, therefore, it must repair any damages caused. However, the Accrediting State many times believes that the Receiving State has done everything possible to avoid or prevent an attack and, therefore, there is no purpose in demanding any type of liability or even declaring them guilty. Nonetheless, and despite this premise that is normally respected, relations between the two states are negatively affected by attacks of these characteristics. Therefore, in cases like Afghanistan or Libya where international interventions have taken place or even where there has been a change in regime with support from the West, the diplomatic delegations in these countries are often priority targets for terrorist attacks. This is precisely the reason for the fact that 67% of the 779 attacks analysed were against delegations in such states. In conclusion, there is a new terrorist attack model with very specific characteristics aimed at diplomatic delegations of what is known as the Far Enemy. On the other hand, although not exclusive, the modus operandi has adapted to the methodologies used in the most recent wave of terrorist attacks. This model of attack, which is essentially carried out with automatic weapons, has a clear vocation for suicide which greatly complicates prevention and dissuasion. Finally, the ultimate aim of the assailants is not only to cause the most possible personal damage but also to spoil and complicate bilateral relations of the states involved in the diplomatic relationship.

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References Attitar M (2015) Así fue el asalto a la embajada: los talibanes dejaron al policía agonizando como cebo” El Español, 11 de diciembre. Disponible en http://www.elespanol.com/mundo/20151211/ 85991421_0.html Baldwin DA (1997) The concept of security. Rev Int Stud 23:5–26 Berridge GR (2010) Diplomacy: theory and practice, 4th edn. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire Berridge G (2012) Embassies in armed conflict. Continuum, New York Berridge GR (2013) A weak diplomatic hybrid: U.S. Special Mission Benghazi, 12 Jan 2011, Disponible en http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/ Bureau of Diplomatic Security (2013) Significant attacks against US Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Department of State (1998–2012). Disponible en. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/211361.pdf Cajal M (1999) Saber quién puso el fuego ahí: Masacre en la Embajada de España. Siddharth Mehta, Madrid Cajal M (2000) Massacro in ambasciata. Sperling and Amp, Kupfer Crenshaw M (1981) The causes of terrorism. Comp Polit 13(4):379–399 Dorman S (2005) Inside a US Embassy. How the foreign service works for America. AFSA, Washington D.C Hoffman B (2006) Inside terrorism. St. Andrew’s University Press, London Kosowatz JJ (2002) Balancing security, visibility takes US mission to Suburbs. Eng News-Records 249(13):229–256 Loeffler JC (2004) The American embassy: design excellence vs. security?. Archit Rec 192(7):1954–1960 Kopp HW, Gillespie C (2008) Career diplomacy. Life and work in the U.S. foreign service. Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C Morgenthau H (1960) Politics among nations: the struggle for peace and power. Knopf, Nueva York Omar Bali A, Karim MS, Rached K (2018) Public diplomacy effort across Facebook: a comparative analysis of the US consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan representation in Washington. SAGE Open 8(1):1–9 Pape RA (2003) The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Am Polit Sci Rev 97(3):343–361 Peterson P (2002) Public diplomacy and war on terror. Foreign Aff 81(5):74–94 Pico de Coaña de Villacourt Y, Casáus M 2015. Guatemala: Consecuencias del asalto de la Embajada de España en Guatemala (1980). IUDC-UCM, Madrid Rapoport DC (2002) The four waves of rebel terror and September 11. Anthr J Gener Anthropol 13(1):1–17 Reinares F (2004) Conceptualizando el terrorismo internacional. Análisis Real Instituto Elcano (ARI) 82:1–6 Schelling T (1966) Arms and influence. Yale University Press, New Haven Sharp JM (2015) Yemen: background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service, 15th February. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf Van Ham P (2003) War, lies, and videotape: public diplomacy and the USA’s war on terrorism. Secur Dialogue 34(4):427–444 Watson A (1982) Diplomacy: the dialogue between States. Eyre Methuen, Londres Worth R (2008) 10 are killed in bombings at Embassy in Yemen. The New York Times, Disponible en. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/world/middleeast/18yemen.html?_r=0

Alberto Priego holds a Ph.D. from Complutense University (International Relations). He currently is a Associate professor at the Universidad Pontificia de Comillas in Madrid, where he has been a faculty member since 2010. His research interests lie in the areas of Middle East Studies, Islam, and Diplomacy. He has collaborated actively with researchers in several other disciplines of history, economy, and political science. During 2007–2009 he was postdoctoral fellow at SOAS (The University of London).

Today’s Challenges to International Peace and Security: Searching for Quality in International Affairs Peter Wallensteen

Outline 1 Trends in Armed Conflict: Reasons for Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Return of Particularism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 In Search of a Universalist Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract To evaluate today’s challenges to peace and security it is appropriate to take a long-term perspective. A look at the trends in armed conflicts is a startingpoint. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) help us in this regard. The assessment also requires a study of the relationships between the actors most responsible for keeping international peace and security, the major powers, again observing pertinent trends. This will be approached in terms of particularistic and universalistic relations. Finally, it needs a discussion on possible alternatives in order to keep a focus on a world of peace and security that is beneficial for the entire international system and, in that sense, for the planet as a whole. This chapter is devoted to these three tasks. Keywords Armed conflicts · Big powers · European Union · Quality peace · Particularism · Peace processes · Universalism · United Nations

In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: 7 November 2019; accepted: 4 December, 2019. The author is grateful for comments on this chapter from participants at XLVIII CICA International Conference (Madrid, May 27–29, 2019) and to Bill Montross for editorial comments. He remains solely responsible for the content. P. Wallensteen (B) Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_8

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1 Trends in Armed Conflict: Reasons for Concern UCDP reports that the world finds itself on a continuous high level of armed conflicts. For the past five years it has been around 50 annually ongoing conflicts or wars. There is no period with such a constantly high number since the end of the Second World War (Pettersson et al. 2019; UCDP 2019). This is one worrying aspect to consider. Another observation is that, lately, the number of battle-related deaths has been reduced. This is particularly true since the peak year 2014 (ibid.). Thus, a challenge is to understand that there are many armed conflicts but their intensity is lower. Let us consider this in some more detail. The declining war intensity is largely true also in a longer time perspective. Available data demonstrate that the Chinese Civil War at the end of the 1940s, the Korean War of the 1950s, the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, and the Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan wars of the 1980s were far more destructive than any of the wars since the end of the Cold War. Such information has spawned a legitimate discussion on whether the willingness to use war as a political instrument has declined over a longer period of time or at least since the end of the Second World War (Mueller 1989; Väyrynen 2006; Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011). There is some support for such a conclusion if we consider the number of people killed in armed conflicts and war. The likelihood for an average living person to die in war has declined in absolute numbers (Pettersson et al. 2019), and even more pronounced if we estimate the ratio between battle-related deaths and the world’s population. However, this does not provide comfort. “Smaller” conflicts still have large consequences for the affected regions and populations. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era with the large number of independent actors, such “limited” conflicts can still generate enough fear and terror for this to have a chilling effect on human life in general and for international affairs in particular. Entire regions are affected, for example, if we consider the Middle East and parts of Africa. One effect can be seen in the number of refugees: It has been on the rise in recent years. The number of persons forcefully displaced was estimated to be 70.8 million at the end of 2018 (UNHCR 2019). The continuation of conflict, even at a lower level, makes it impossible for people to return. Neighboring countries have to host large populations, with obvious difficulties in supporting and absorbing the newcomers. Thus, the number of conflicts is important and affects human conditions, even if the number of directly killed is reduced. Unended wars provide continuous suffering, pain and lack of development. Another effect of this large number of armed conflicts is that the sheer size and variation in challenges provide an overload for decision-makers. Which one of these situations deserves the most attention in Washington, New York, Moscow, Beijing, Paris, New Delhi or London? Should it, for instance, be the ones with the most recent spike in activity? Or is it those with the largest humanitarian consequences? Or is it those with the most direct consequences for one or another major center? They also add a level of complexity that may make it more difficult for decisionmakers to have a full grasp of events. New actors appear (and disappear). Which actors are legitimate representatives and thus deserve international recognition and

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support? Which ones are actually autonomous and have genuine, popular support and which ones are merely proxies of neighbors or major powers? Should the international approach be one of siding with particular actors (notably governments) or remaining as impartial as possible? The large number includes conflicts that have become protracted. Some examples illustrate this: For the case of Somalia we talk about close to three decades: for the Democratic Republic of Congo more than two decades; for Afghanistan close to two decades following on previous decades of conflicts; for Libya and Syria we may soon note that they are into their tenth year; for Yemen nearly five years have passed since the Saudi intervention (which, like too many earlier wars, was expected to be a short affair); for Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russia’s involvement has generated neither victory, nor agreement, but more than five years of conflict. There are good reasons to talk about many of these situations as “endless wars” as stated by both U.S. Presidents Trump and Obama (Wertheim 2019). It also means that most of these conflicts are already well-known. Continued warfare does not come as a surprise to world leaders. It makes it even more remarkable that there has been so little concerted action to bring them to an end. As is often the case, it appears easier to build alliances to continue war than to make coalitions to end them. Most recent statistics on the use of vetoes in the UN Security Council testify to this. There is no increase in measures such as initiating peacekeeping and invoking international sanctions on the parties, corresponding to the recent upsurge in armed conflict. Rather, the number of UN peace operations has remained the same throughout this recent period, staying at 14 ongoing operations and no new ones in an armed conflict since the short-lived UN supervision mission in Syria in 2012 (UN Peacekeeping 2019). The same is largely true for economic sanctions where, however, measures have been undertaken in the recent conflicts in Libya and Yemen (SPITS 2019). Actions that were useful in reducing the number of conflicts in the 1990s have not been used in the same way in the 2010s. The civil war in Syria is typical: There were no UN-imposed sanctions on the Syrian parties and thus no restrictions for outsiders to supply them with economic or military support. In this case Russia took particular advantage of this with huge deliveries to the Assad regime as well as being directly engaged in bombing campaigns against different anti-regime movements. Obviously, there was no planning for an international peace operation to cement a future, reasonable and negotiated settlement. Instead there was a record-breaking number of refugees, displaced people, destruction of world heritage sites and the emergence of fundamentalist Islamic actors, notably ISIS and others. The international community seems largely to have settled for the impossibility of ending this war in other ways than through the defeat of certain actors. It remains to be seen if victory of internal or outside actors (notably Turkey and Russia) provides the chance of building a durable peace or becomes a way in which the humanitarian consequences can be handled satisfactorily. The crisis of Syria, in its internal and international manifestations, is illustrative for our present concerns over the ability of the international community to deal with other conflicts in the future.

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2 The Return of Particularism The reasons for this concern are many and varied. But one seems particularly pertinent: significant changes in the leading actors, i.e., the major powers. Specifically, it could be seen as a shift away from the universalistic approach that was dominant in the 1990s to a particularistic perspective, where each of the major powers gradually has taken on a more domestically motivated foreign policy. Instead of arguing in terms of the importance of international cooperation, common understanding and shared solutions, the focus has turned to “what is good for me.” The economic crisis of 2008 definitely was instrumental in bringing this about, but it also coincided with Russia’s action against Georgia that very year. It was also the time of the Olympics in Beijing, organized under the leadership of Vice President Xi Jinping, soon to become the prime leader of China (he took that position in 2012, also the year when Vladimir Putin returned as President of the Russian Federation). In a world of increasingly nationalistic tendencies among the other major powers (Russia under Putin, China under Xi), U.S. President Obama had less support both internationally and domestically for a continuation of the universalistic approach. With the assumption of Donald Trump to the Presidency, the world was again in a situation where all major power leaders were primarily thinking of their own countries’ interests in narrow nationalistic and geopolitical terms. Historical evidence suggests that this does not bode well for international affairs. Similar shifts occurred in the early 1850s, resulting in a period of many great power wars in following decades. The same pattern could be seen in the first decade of the 20th century, leading up to World War I and in the 1930s and World War II, or the 1940s, giving us the Cold War. Thus, the turn to particularism is, historically, known to increase dangers, result in armaments, tensions, local conflicts and bringing the world into an era with increasing fear of escalation of minor disputes to major confrontations (Wallensteen 1984; Travlos 2016). With this historical record in mind the inability of the major international actors to deal with the many crises of the late 2010s adds to the concern expressed in the first section of this chapter. The world in the late 2010s witnessed a shift away from a shared management of terrorism into one where worries arose over major power relations, also among the major powers themselves. The ability to coordinate against terror was losing its significance. To many it appeared that al-Qaeda was defeated and the same goes for ISIS. Thus, major power relations themselves could become the concern. No matter that remnants of these groups were still active and that experience indicates that they may prosper when there is little attention. A scenario for the future suggests that, with souring big power relations, there will be additional concerns to those mentioned in Sect. 1. In such a scenario there is increasing space for misunderstandings and a larger potential for escalation from local issues, as an element in deterrence theories. If it were to color a large set of major power relations (e.g., U.S.–China arising from trade conflicts; China–India, India– Pakistan around territorial issues, notably Kashmir; U.S.–Russia, EU–Russia over the sovereignty of Ukraine, etc.), the complexities for the international community would

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become even more pronounced. Furthermore, this takes place at a time when it was again demonstrated that even a “local” nuclear war would have global consequences through its impact on the global climate (Wallensteen 2019, Chap. 14). The prospect of a return to big power rivalry makes it necessary to consider what the alternative could be. The theoretical counterpoint to particularism is universalism. Let us see what that could entail for the 2020s.

3 In Search of a Universalist Future As we face a world of increasing dangers, the more entrenched particularism becomes, the more important it is to search for alternatives. Are there actors that can contribute to this? Are their agreements to build on for such alternatives? Is their academic insight that might be helpful in such an endeavor? Each of these three questions has an answer. First, we can note that, at this moment (late 2019), many of the relevant actors are shaken by particularism and, thus, under pressure to change their course. The EU project is an expression of a universalistic approach, at least with respect to the regions North, East and South of the Mediterranean. Once Britain has left, the EU might have a chance to reconnect the lost threads and re-establish a role as an actor bridging nationalist cleavages within and around its core area. The EU idea largely runs counter to the nationalist ideology of only promoting the individual state and its narrowly defined interests. This is also why there is an increasing antagonism between nationalistic movements in several countries in Europe and EU institutions. The reduced consensus on maintaining and deepening EU evidently also affects EU’s role globally. It cannot act with the same confidence and coherence to external crises. EU is on the defensive, due to the forces mentioned in Sects. 1 and 2. This is so even to the point that the very openness of EU’s member states allows for big-power interference in EU affairs, for instance, by supporting nationalist movements that will further shake EU structures. To the consternation of many, however, the messy British Brexit process seems not to have inspired other states to follow suit—at least for the time being. Universalism is largely vested in international organizations. The United Nations takes a primary position in this. Its complex structure means that, if the Security Council is not able to operate, there are other parts of the organization that still can pursue universalistic policies. The Secretary-General is a key office for providing caution against narrow policies, and for emphasizing concerns on a planetary level. As indicated in Sect. 1 the particularistic trend already affects the UN’s ability to act in crises that are defined to be close to national interests of some of the major powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, P 5. Thus, the loss of momentum for UN action is a strong indicator of the trend and changes in the Security Council agenda would be a sign that the trend might be broken. However, other international bodies are also affected, notably UNESCO. What happens to the UN is an indication

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of what could happen to the world. Being both an indicator and an actor, support for the UN remains central in changing the present direction of global affairs. Universalism can sometimes be close to regionalism. This is not unexpected as most of the regional governmental organizations exist to further common demands. The EU has already been mentioned and we can also find some remedy in the increasing sophistication in the African Union, primarily in its work against military coups on the continent. Also OSCE, ASEAN and others are on the list of the thirty regional organizations concerned with international security matters (Wallensteen and Bjurner 2015). However, few have the resources and member-state support like EU. Many are highly dependent on particular countries dominating the organization. There is less concentration of power within the EU (definitely true legally speaking, but also to some extent politically). NATO has also a degree of member-state participation, but remains an organization dominated by the U.S. and with a narrower mission, with its emphasis on common defense. Thus, a weakening EU also means weakening the entire category of regional institutions. If the EU does not continue to be a strong supporter of, say, international war tribunals, international climate control, or of human rights and democracy, those efforts will be weakened globally. Universalism requires a reversal of the trend away from multilateralism. Indeed, there is also a plethora of civil society bodies that have become important. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) bring people together in shared concerns about matters such as the promotion of human rights, prevention of climate change or solidarity for causes such as women’s rights, minorities, refugees and humanitarian concerns. There is a close connection between INGOs and the international governmental institutions. Both need each other. For many INGOs, pursuing issue along with, for instance, UN, is one of the roads forward. However, unlike international governmental institutions, INGOs can also operate at a national level without this being seen as an infringement on sovereignty—at least in countries that allow freedom of association, assembly and expression. A strong civil society, in its domestic and international components, is an important remedy against particularism, when it actually promotes universalistic purposes. Lately, however, we have also witnessed international cooperation between nationalist parties and organizations. It may appear paradoxical, but they share a concern about the role of international bodies. Actually, they often exaggerate the importance of international institutions, but such bodies constitute handy targets for their agitation. At an interesting in-between position are the multinational corporations, also pursuing interests that could contradict nationalistic states, but not for a common good beyond what the shareholders would want. Similarly, the Internet and social media provide services that connect people for a variety of purposes across borders. This contributes to transparency and reduces the concentration of power in state bureaucracies, again with the caveat that such freedoms are allowed. However, the resources for action in the field of international peace and security remain largely vested in the states and, thus, what happens on the intra-state level continues to be central for international peace and security. Domestic politics continue to be decisive for international action, at least with respect to the dominant actors. The hope remains that international economic entanglements also would contribute

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to make one major power more sensitive to the concerns of other major powers or smaller states, as can be surmised from the work of Angell (1913). The fear of direct war among the major powers is still low and their mutual dependencies may be part of that. Recent experiences of tariff conflicts and unilateral (non-UN) economic sanctions suggest that these dependencies can be turned into measures of conflict, thus, reinforcing particularistic tendencies. Second, there are universalistic agreements to build on in order to change the tide. The international fabric of cooperation is still intact, although its further development and deepening appear to have been halted. Among the shared interests, such as those expressed in the Paris Agreement on climate change or the JCPOA regulating Iran’s nuclear capacity, are severely challenged. Nonetheless, most of the partners still find it important to follow the accords. This is true even in view of U.S. criticism, withdrawal or active sabotage. Seemingly, it is an indication of the U.S.’s declining influence, when traditional allies do not see a value in following its lead (they might even not have been consulted prior to U.S. decisions). This means, for instance, that the sustainable development goals of the UN General Assembly remain and progress is regularly assessed. In particular, SDG 16 is relevant in this context with its strong focus on domestic action to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” There is similar language in Security Council resolution 2282 from 2016 (also accepted by the UN General Assembly). This provides a particular role for the UN Secretary General in monitoring implementation building on the strength of an unusual global consensus. To this we may add that there are some notable successes in peace processes, particularly in situations where the great powers are not directly involved. Examples include the Bangsamoro agreement in the Philippines (finalized in 2014, implementation started in 2018), Colombia (finalized in 2016, implementation slowing down since 2018) or the efforts with respect to the Central African Republic, Mali and the initiatives for the Horn of Africa and Southern Sudan. Some of these have benefitted from international support, e.g., through the offices of the UN Secretary General. Many, however, have rested on local initiatives and are associated with political leadership (e.g., President Santos in Colombia, rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, awarded the same prize in 2019 and President Aquino in the Philippines). However, the more concerned global or regional powers are from their particularistic interests the more complex the peacemaking appears (witness, for instance, repeated setbacks in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Yemen). Thus, an old lesson of trying to insulate local conflicts from major-power conflagration remains true. This also includes the idea of early prevention: to find a settlement as quickly as possible before other interests are able to enter. Indeed, the longer a civil war with international intervention goes on the more difficult it is to end it, but also to win it Regan (2002), Regan and Aydin (2006). As we observed above, a large part of all ongoing conflicts are highly protracted, illustrating this dynamic. A particular set of agreements refers to the ending of wars. There is also increasing knowledge about what types of war endings result in more durable peace, or what we could label “quality peace” (Wallensteen 2015a; Joshi and Wallensteen 2018). The

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elements include matters such as respect for human dignity (which can be operationalized as human, women and minority rights), human security (i.e., physical and economic safety) and a hope for the future (that a non-war situation will be sustained for the foreseeable future). Certainly, a victory can meet such requirements (and there are historical examples of this), but they are more likely to be found through an implemented peace agreement among the warring parties and the participation of the society as a whole. Thus, the way peace agreements are implemented is important and leaves much to be desired (Joshi and Darby 2013). In most circumstances this is still preferable to continuation of war or a brutal victory of one side over the other, with the prospect of a reemergence of war in the future. Thus, policies that provide more space for peace making through negotiations would be an additional way of halting the trend toward particularism. Finally, there are insights in what policies, in general, would be good for a world able to handle the challenges ahead. Democratic states do not fight wars with each other. This is a common observation and it largely remains true (Wallensteen 1973; Russett 1993; Russett-Oneal 2001). It has been termed “the democratic peace,” suggesting that genuinely built democratic states—on the whole—will be beneficial for the world. Even if nationalist parties have gained power in countries such as Hungary, Poland and Brazil, it has not resulted in armed conflicts with other countries (no matter what one may say about their internal policies). Thus, the promotion of human rights and democratic values and the peaceful support for such efforts from external sources may in the long-run provide for a more universalistic world. Another important finding for inter-state relations is the “territorial peace,” i.e., that finding solutions to territorial disputes has an important long-term effect on inter-state relations as well as on democratization domestically (Gibler 2012). It has been observed that the formation of the first EU treaty in 1958 was preceded by the agreement between France and Germany on the last remaining territorial dispute between the two (Saarland). Thus, regions full of territorial disputes need to give priority to their settlement, in order to be able to build lasting constructive relations. A case in mind is East Asia (Wallensteen 2015b). The response to the three questions of Sect. 3 is in the affirmative: There are actors favoring universalistic policies, there are agreements to build on and there are academic insights, notably on quality peace, that are useful. Trends can be changed!

4 Conclusion Today’s challenges are deep and worrying. There are trends that give rise to concern: Armed conflicts and wars are many, protracted and devastating, resulting in human suffering that should be within the power of humankind to prevent. The particularistic trends of emphasizing one’s own, narrow interest are part of the picture and make joint action increasingly difficult. At the same time there is considerable insight in how to move the world in a more positive direction. There are alternatives and increased

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attention to them is needed now in order to prevent an increasingly problematic and dark future.

References Angell N (1913) The great illusion: a study of the relation of military power to national advantage. Putnam and Sons, New York. https://archive.org/details/cu31924007365467. Accessed 20 Sept 2019 Gibler DM (2012) The territorial peace: borders, state development and international conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA Goldstein JS (2011) Winning the war on war: the decline of armed conflict worldwide. Dutton/Penguin, New York Joshi Madhav, Darby John (2013) Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989–2007. Peacebuilding 1(2):256– 274 Joshi M, Wallensteen P (eds) (2018) Understanding quality peace. Peacebuilding after Civil War. Routledge Mueller J (1989) Retreat from doomsday: the obsolescence of major war. Basic Books Pettersson Therése, Högbladh Stina, Öberg Magnus (2019) Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements. J Peace Res 56(4):589–603 Pinker S (2011) The better angels of our nature. Viking, New York Regan Patrick (2002) Civil wars and foreign powers: outside intervention in intrastate conflict. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Regan P, Aydin A (2006) Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in civil wars. J Confl Resolut 50(5):736–756 Russett BM (1993) Grasping the democratic peace. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Russett BM, Oneal JR (2001) Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. W.W. Norton, New York SPITS (2019) Special program on international targeted sanctions, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Downloaded on 7 October 2019. https://pcr.uu.se/research/ smartsanctions/spits-sanctions-list/ Travlos K (2016) From universalism to managerial coordination. Major power regulation of the use of force. Asian Int Stud Rev 17(2):27–53 UCDP (2019) Uppsala conflict data program. https://ucdp.uu.se UNHCR (2019) Global trends in forced displacement. https://www.unhcr.org/ph/figures-at-a-glance UN Peacekeeping (2019) Downloaded, 7 Oct 2019. https://peacekeeping.un.org Väyrynen R (ed) (2006) The waning of major war. Theories and debates. Routledge, London, New York Wallensteen P (1973) Structure and war: on international relations, 1920–1968. Rabén & Sjögren, Stockholm, p 1973 Wallensteen P (1984) Universalism vs. particularism: on the limits of major power order. J Peace Res 21:243–257 Wallensteen P (2015a) Quality peace: peacebuilding, victory and world order. Oxford University Press, Oxford Wallensteen P (2015b) Comparing conditions for quality peace. Int Secur Stud Soc Sci 1(1):59–76. Academic Press (China), Beijing Wallensteen P (2019) Understanding conflict resolution, Fifth edn. Sage, London Wallensteen P, Bjurner A (eds) (2015) Regional organizations in peacemaking. challengers to the UN? Routledge, London Wertheim S (2019) The only way to end ‘endless war’. New York Times, 14 September

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Peter Wallensteen Senior Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Richard G. Starmann Sr. Research Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, USA. Until 2015 he directed the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). He was the first holder of the Dag Hammarskjöld Chair at Uppsala University, 1985–2012, and of the Richard G. Starmann Chair at University of Notre Dame, 2006–2018. His Quality Peace (2015) broadens the approach to post-war peacebuilding. Edited with Dr. Madhav Joshi Understanding Quality Peace (2018) further deepens this perspective. With Anders Bjurner he edited Regional Organizations in Peacemaking (2014), with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa. His globally used Understanding Conflict Resolution is now in its 5th, revised, extended edition (2019) while earlier editions are available in Arabic and Korean. With Isak Svensson he published The Go-Between on Ambassador Jan Eliasson’s mediation experiences (2010) and their book Fredens Diplomater (2016) covers 47 Nordic mediation efforts since 1948. Wallensteen has been involved in mediation in armed conflicts, notably Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Israel-Palestine, Cambodia, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus.

Part III

Necessary Changes

New World Stage, New Weapons, New Military Doctrines Juan Lopez Diaz

We are accustomed to speak of naval and military strategy as though they were distinct branches of knowledge, which had no common ground. It is a theory of war [that] brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that embracing them both is a larger strategy [that] regards the fleet and army as one weapon, which coordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must move to realize the full power of both. Sir Julian Corbett (1918).

Outline 1 2

3 4 5

The World Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Tendencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Megatrends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toward a New Offset Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Archipelagic Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Expeditionary Aerodromes Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Rapid Raptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Air Sea Battle (ASB) and Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: December 17, 2019; Accepted: December 31, 2019. J. Lopez Diaz (B) SP Marines Colonel, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_9

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5.6 Offshore Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Distributed Lethality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Amphibious Forces for Emerging Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 New Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract This presentation starts with a brief of the situation of the current world stage after the period of post Cold War. The author shows a short brief of the three main powers: United States of America (USA), People Republic of China (PRC), and Russian Federation, as well as other countries such as North Korea or Iran. He concludes it with the main aspects of the future conficts in the XXI Century: in the littoral areas, in the middle of people and strong cyber and networked global stage. Colonel Lopez presents the new threats, mainly the concepts of Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) as well the new doctrines to oppose them. Follow it, the Author expose the main concepts and changes in the development of future weapons in the Land, Air or Maritime Landscape and fnally he presents conclusions about all of it. Keywords New world stage · New conficts · Anti-access · Area denial threats · Amphibious and expeditionary operations · Littoral war

1 The World Stage The paper intends to highlight trends driving global strategy, unveil new threats and challenges appearing on the horizon, signal development in weapon systems and get acquainted with the outline of new doctrines. When we read the opinion of the highest ranking American military leaders about the new strategic situation, we can notice a certain fear. And so, here we have just some examples to bring the challenge closer: “We are at a warfare inflection point; one that eclipses the introduction of nuclear weapons, the introduction of the air domain, and the transition from battleship to aircraft carrier…” Gen. Martin Dempsey, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dempsey (2012) “We are in an antebellum situation similar to first half period of the last century…” Gen Mark. A. Milley, US Army Chief of Staff, 2017 “The next fight is going to start in cyber and space… to blind the enemy or to blind us. The center of gravity that we have to protect is the network, and the network is dependent on space. If we lose space, we are back to HF radio and yellow stickies on the map.” Gen Robert Neller USMC Commandant (2017)

In these statements we can perceive a certain fear, what was unusual just ten or even fve years ago, and the reason is because Generals are afraid of the unknown future. Last years the military perception of the new warfare has been dominated by transformation processes from three military domains into fve: land, air, sea, cyber and the space. In addition, a growing number of terrorist organisations came

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to the stage having access to modern weapon and communication systems allowing them operate world-wide. Globalization, religious, ethnic, populism, nationalism, are without any doubt, causes to explain the gloomy prospects expressed by Generals with a big experience on the feld.

2 The Tendencies As a brief of the most visible tendencies that make up the strategic world stage, we can quote the following ones: 1. A decline in the role of states, due to the fact of the increase of supra-nationalities and the interrelation that exists in the events due to the phenomenon of globalization and the connectivity, as had never before existed, as well as the proliferation of armed groups out of the states control. All of this means that we have lost the feeling of security that existed at the end of the period of the cold war. We have change from a stable situation to other which are unpredictable and dangerous. 2. The high human and industrial development in the big countries of Asia has shifted power from the West to the East and the Indo Pacifc zone. 3. The so-called global commons are being threatened and certain countries unilaterally restrict the transit through the air and maritime space. On the other hand, the current ubiquity of cyber domain and space has revolutionized the existing order, because the dependency of both felds in multiple everyday applications. 4. After the two World Wars and the Cold war, half of the world States are weak, failed or are failing. We can say that today’s strategic situation is worse than before mentioned wars periods. 5. Radical Islamism constitutes a threat worldwide, even though its territory had been reduced, its infuence is not negligible. 6. Due to the recklessness of the USA engaged in their land and counter-insurgency conficts, its competitors have reduced technological distance in weapons issue, thus rising A2AD threats to prevent or limit the ability to access certain areas. 7. The characteristics of wars until now have changed and a new typology of wars have appeared: (a) The so called Four Generation Warfare, named in acronym (4G), that means the end of the state monopoly with intermediate states or “proxy” groups, (b) the “hybrid” war, to prevent superior power from using his advantages, (c) the asymmetric warfare which allows to attack the vulnerabilities of the opponent and (d) the “gray zone”, fght at the limit of peace (white) or war (black). In short it has been a kind of dirty war, between people, with no defned limits, where the rules have evaporated and where the human factor as well as new domains and new types of leaders have become relevant (Fig. 1).

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Fig. 1 Dhaka (Bangladesh). Source Ciudades al extremo, The New York Times Style Magazine: Spain, September 12, 2017

2.1 China We will briefy analyze exposure of the actor states starting with China. The population, economic and military growth of the Asian giant in recent years is remarkable. In the maritime arena China is the country that builds the largest tonnage of merchant ships. In the military feld the number of warships of the Chinese navy could exceed the US Navy. By the 2030, it is estimated the People Liberation’s Army (PLA) Navy will consist of some 550 ships: 450 surface ships (including 34 destroyers, 68 frigates and 26 corvettes) and 99 operational submarines (12 Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN’s) and 12 Nuclear (SSN’s), however, it remains unclear if the U.S. Navy of 2030 will ever reach a total of 355 ships and submarines (Lee et al. 2019). Nevertheless, the current difference of Carrier Vessels (CV’s) will be 12–2 in favor of US Navy with the simultaneous construction of two new aircraft carriers “Gerald Ford” Class ordered in January 2019. On the other hand, China has launched its second aircraft carrier and the third carrier is under construction, and its intention is to build one every fve years. Some sources considered that four CV’s are scheduled to be completed by 2025 (Nielsen 2018). The Chinese Navy has shift its usual areas, and has built the largest foreign military base in Djibouti, opened in July 2017. Djibouti host also Us Navy base, French Air base and Japan base. Since 2012, China and Russia have teamed up for several exercises round the globe like: the “Joint Sea 2015” at Mediterranean Sea; the “Shared Waters 2016” at South China Sea; the “Joint Sea 2017” in Baltic Sea waters. In addition, the Chinese feet operates independently in Bering Sea of Alaska and is going to take part in the future exercise in Barents Sea waters in cooperation with the Russian North Fleet. All these activities signal global ambitions of both powers looking to make a counterweight to the USA. China expands its Belt and Road Initiative investing heavily in Greece (Pireus) and Sri Lanka (Hambantota).

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2.2 Russia Following the infuence the state actors, Russia has resurfaced as a power after the end of the Cold war. The annexation of Ukraine, its undoubted prominence in the war in Syria and the renewal and improvement of its military might testify to this. On the other hand there are attempts to infuence the elections results in USA, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and could be in others which have not been reliably proved. All of these, there are signs of its desire to retake the leadership role in the world, similar to USA and China, based on breaking the cohesion of the EU, and EU/USA relationships.

2.3 North Korea North Korea in its challenging role, especially with the US, has taken a dangerous path of nuclear testing, every time with greater range, with the ultimate aim to reach the territory of the US and Europe. In case of a possible attack on South Korea, United States will be involved and ready to defend this country.

2.4 Iran In 2015 Iran signed a nuclear deal with the US and the G5 countries (Germany, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom), under the name of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) This agreement was unilaterally denounced by President Trump, bringing back tension in the region with the risk that this entails for world energy supply through the Strait of Hormuz. The reason because President Trump take the decision to break the deal we can deduce in an speech at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee annual conference in March 2016 when he told that his “number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran”—outlining what he saw as the agreement’s failure to address the nation’s destabilising infuence in the region and the development of its ballistic missile programme. Another reason is Trump full-throated support of Benjamin Netanyahu and the hard-line Israeli side of Middle East peace negotiations. “It doesn’t help if I start saying I’m very pro-Israel,” Trump said in a Republican candidate debate in February 2016 (Zurcher 2018).

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2.5 Megatrends When talking about the different factors that make up the current scenario, I consider three important megatrends, which mark a guideline for the paper at hand. The frst is the importance of the littoral. 70% of the world is occupied by seas or oceans, 80% of population lives on the coast or its vicinity and 90% world trade is carried out by sea. By controlling the coastline, 70% of the earth surface is controlled. The need to guarantee the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC’s) to ensure access to resources, which are increasingly scarcely, can cause conficts. The second megatrend is that in addition to the tendency of the population to live mostly near the coast, there is an increase in the population diffcult to control and according to forecasts it seems that in 2025 more than 50% of world population will live in megacities. This will lead to megacities with large uncontrolled and ungovernable nuclei, with few resources and excessive violence, drugs, arms traffcking and urban uncontrolled agglomerations which will take place on the littoral. The third megatrend in these environments previously described, there will be a particularity, compared to other times that is “connectivity”. Everyone will be able to connect with each other included in those degraded areas, where links can be maintained with outlaw groups anywhere on the planet. It seems clear that to deal with this scenario, forces accustomed to work in the littoral areas are needed, these forces must have great capacity of readiness and with ships that allow them not to depend on a host nation and freedom of action to act where required with little margin of alert.

3 The Threats The measures known as by the acronym A2AD (Anti Access, Area Denial), have their origin in the humiliation caused by President Clinton to China when he settled the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 by deploying two groups of aircraft carriers in the area. Twenty years later and two land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, added to China’s persistence, have resulted in China having today a panoply of weapons from hypersonic, cruise, ballistic and anti ship missiles, nuclear submarines, passing through mines, ships of different sizes, including aircraft carriers, integrated air defense (IAD), aircrafts, intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) network, and so on, that interfere with or prohibit access to an area if it doesn’t cause big losses. Generally speaking, A2AD capabilities are those which challenge and threaten the ability of enemy forces to both get to the fght and to fght effectively once there, specifcally: The A2 (Anti-Access) capabilities are actions intended to slow deployment of forces into a theater or cause forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of confict than they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement to a

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theater. It is included in this concept, the attack on enemy homeland or allied or advanced bases. The AD (Area Denial) are actions intended to impede operations within areas where an adversary cannot or will not prevent access. AD affects movement to a theater (Air-Sea Battle Offce 2013). There are those who think that with these concepts the Chinese intention is not to fght with the ships of the US Navy but rather remain far from the reach of the weapons of the US Navy by sheltering under the umbrella of the A2AD system, as did the Russian feet in Port Arthur, with little success, by the way. The real objective would be to prevent access from the US Fleet or other feets in other parts of the globe. Americans do not accept this challenge, and the former Us Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Richardson, in the New American Security’s annual conference, 20th June 2016, referring to the real threat that constitutes the system, said that: I think there is this long range precision strike capability that certainly – everybody says A2AD. A2AD is sort of an aspiration. The actual execution of that is much more diffcult. (…) exercising anti-access and area denial is really nothing new. It’s been something that’s been part of warfare since, you know, it began. The combination of ubiquitous ISR, long-range precision strike weapons takes that to the next step and demands a response Admiral Richardson (2016)

In the opinion of Navy Offcials “weapons such as anti-ship ballistic missiles require an extensive “kill-chain”, including ISR sensors, data-networks, command and control and other systems-in order to be effective. “Our response would be to inject a lot of friction into that system”, Richardson said, “disrupting the enemy kill chain” (Richardson 2016).

4 Toward a New Offset Strategy After analyzing the many challenges facing the USA, they decided that an offset was necessary. This is something that had already happened in the past at least in two occasions. In 1950 at the time of Eisenhower’s and in 1970 with Secretary of Defence Brown. Both responses were produced by an increase in the Soviet superiority in the military feld. In the frst, with Eisenhower, the new defence policy increased the number of nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and missiles. As a second Offset the Secretary Brown military reform included the development of stealth, precision strike weapons and improved concept of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. And What about the Third offset? The philosophy of the third offset exploits USA advantages in unmanned operations, long-range and low-observable air operations, undersea warfare and any kind of complex systems in order to project power in spite of adversary efforts with the A2AD capabilities. The idea of the new offset is to try

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to be ready to fght in a new paradigm period and to avoid the operational risk with the traditional military approach to an enemy area taking into account that: – Any homeland port and airbase are vulnerable to an attack – Surface ships as well as CV’s are easier to detect, track and attack at longer ranges than before – Every non-stealth aircraft is vulnerable to the integrated Air Defence System (IADS) – Space is no longer a sanctuary. To react to these new paradigms, it was considered that the criterion should be to try to deepen those technological felds in which the US currently has an advantage. These felds are: – Unmanned Operations: To achieve permanent ISR/Strike capacity, it is necessary automatic air refueling mainly for two platforms: Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) stealth, high altitude long endurance (HALE) and stealth unmanned combat aerial system (UCAS), based on land and sea. – Extended range air operations: Long range bombing program for mining and Antisurface Warfare (AsuW), precision bombing and buried targets, Electronic Warfare (EW) attack capability and surveillance of large areas. – Low-observable air operations: It is compulsory a big amount of stealth aircraft and with better characteristics than those of 4th generation. – Undersea warfare: More SSN “Virginia” payload module are required to increase their carrying capacity from 12 to 40 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), increase the range of Anti Submarine (A/S) warfare weapons and to create Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) for the littoral warfare. – Complex systems engineering and integration: to create a joint global surveillance strike (GSS) network. It will permit to develop advanced battle management system to fuse and correlate ISR data, as well to allocate ISR and strike resources quickly and effciently. In brief to be able to attack any target, in any time, weather and circumstances as soon as possible. And the network should be resilient under any attack (Martinage 2014).

5 New Doctrines In addition to the technological offset to counter A2AD threats, various doctrinal theories have been launched by the US Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Marines as well as joint scope to fght the A2AD threat. Let’s look at some of them, in case of a Pacifc Campaign, and with China as the enemy, even that some of them could be used in any worldwide maritime scenario.

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5.1 Archipelagic Defense It is an idea that comes from Andrew Krepinevich, a defense policy analyst who is a distinguished senior fellow at and former longtime president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He suggests a concept in which Army or Marines land-based units conduct maritime interdiction in the so called frst island chain. Armed with anti-ship cruise missiles and air defense assets as well as mines and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones, these units would “deter by denial,” and, according to James R. Holmes, change the cost calculation of any future Chinese territory occupation.

5.2 Expeditionary Aerodromes Network Multiple service concepts imagine future war and crisis management conducted by separated systems optimized for similar cost-imposing campaigns. It is a US Marines Corps experiment with a new theory that envisions employing F-35Bs to activate a shifting network of expeditionary airfelds with runway, tactical landing zones (LZ), and forward arming and refueling capacity. The idea is every aerodrome with two or three F-35’s with the intent of complicating enemy targeting solutions (Jensen 2015).

5.3 Rapid Raptor The Air Force has a similar plan consisting of deploying detachments of three or four F-22 together with all support maintenance personnel and material on C-17s to friendly air bases on short notice, and capable of being operational within 24 h after being in the area (Jensen 2015). The Air Force idea is strengthening its “Rapid Raptor” program to fast-track four F-22s to war—anywhere in the world—within 24 h, on a moment notice, should there be an immediate need for attacks in today’s pressured, fast-moving global threat environment. The program, in existence for several years, is ready to execute a fast-attack “frst-strike” ability in remote or austere parts of the world. First strike options are, according to military planners, of particular signifcance for the F-22 Raptor, given its technical focus on using stealth and air-to-air combat technology to attack heavily defended or “contested” enemy areas. Rapid Raptor was originally developed by Air Force Pacifc Command and has since been expanded to a global sphere by Air Combat Command. The Air Combat Command (ACC) Rapid Raptor program’s aim is to take the concept, as developed in PACAF (Pacifc Air Command), and change it from a theater specifc to a worldwide capability (Osborn 2019) (Fig. 2).

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Fig. 2 Island chain strategy Source Yoshihara, T. (2012), China’s Vision of Its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower. Asian Politics & Policy, 4: 293–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1943-0787.2012.01349.x

5.4 Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) It is the ability to hit anywhere on the globe within 1 h (Jensen 2015). This capability may intensify U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fugacious targets” at the start of or during a confict. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modifed Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM) (Congressional Research Service 2019).

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5.5 Air Sea Battle (ASB) and Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) In 2010 the US Navy and the Air Force created the Air Sea Battle Concept that suggested a campaign with in-depth attacks that destroyed the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) elements on which the A2AD measures depended. The ASB seeks to ensure freedom of action in the Global Commons and is intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. In 2015 the concept became joint and was called “Joint Concept for access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” (JAM-GC). The purpose of ASB JAM-GC is not simply conduct operations more jointly. It is to increase operational advantage across all domains, enhance service capabilities and mitigate vulnerabilities. The concept is not an operational plan or strategy for a specifc region or adversary. Instead, it is an analysis of the threat and a set of classifed concepts of operations (CONOPS) describing how to counter and shape A2AD environments both symmetrically and asymmetrically, developing and integrating force with the necessary characteristics and capabilities to succeed in those environments. The ASB concept’s solution to the A2AD challenge is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack in depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3). ASB’s vision of Networked, Integrated, and attack in depth (NIA) operations requires the application of cross –domain operations across all, the interdependent warfghting domains (air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace) to disrupt, destroy, and defeat (D3) A2AD capabilities and provide maximum operational advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces (Air Sea Battle Offce 2013).

5.6 Offshore Control A system opposed to all of these is the so called offshore control strategy, which aims to disrupt Chinese SLOC’s and threaten his economy. The corso war is to avoid an open war. It is a type of war critized by Mahan perhaps the most celebrated naval historian of his era, an infuential promoter of United States naval and commercial expansion during America’s rise to world power in the late nineteenth century. Mahan says that this kind of war, the corso war is executed only by weak powers or nations in closed seas. It was the case of Germany in the Second Wold War. Much earlier, Mahan also promoted the belief that any army would succumb to a strong naval blockade (Mahan 1890). The key point of the Offshore Control strategy is that China is a nation that relies on maritime trade to sustain its economic growth so, China has a disadvantage because the geography of the “frst island chain” restricts its access to the region. It can interdict China’s energy and raw material imports and industrial exports, while protecting U.S. partners (Hammes 2012).

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Offshore control avoids strikes at sites on the mainland—the most questionable part of Air-Sea Battle, as needlessly escalatory in a campaign for limited aims (Holmes 2013).

5.7 Distributed Lethality It consists of dispersed groups of surface action (SAG), to provide a constant presence that can infuence and control events at sea and on the littoral, applying suffcient force to each target, and offering those capabilities to the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) The objective is to cause the adversary to shift his own defenses to counter our thrusts. The enemy will be forced to allocate critical and limited resources across a larger set of defended targets, thereby improving our operational advantage to exploit adversary forces (Rowden et al. 2015).

6 Amphibious Forces for Emerging Demands Has the A2AD threats which are thought to block Naval Forces from approaching the coasts stopped the construction of surface ships and especially the construction of amphibious ships (Fig. 3)? Well, it does not seem so, on the contrary we are witnessing an authentic revolution in the construction of all types of amphibious ships, even for countries we would never have imaged, not long ago. Considering a few years ago, the group of the countries with amphibious tradition was certainly reduced, nowadays it is diffcult to fnd a maritime country of certain importance, which does not have some type, major or minor, of amphibious expeditionary capacity. It is believed that 100 diesel-electric submarine specialized for anti-submarine duties. (SSK’s) (K suffx means that it was a hunter-killer) and 1000 surface ships of different class will be built in Asia until 2032. From East to West, we will make a quick presentation of that amphibious boom: New Zealand, one Landing Platform Dock (LPD) built in the Netherlands and based in the Spanish LPD class “Galicia”. Australia has built two Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) under licence of the Spanish shipyard Navantia, inspired in the Spanish LHD class “Juan Carlos I”. Japan, 3 Helicopter Carrier Destroyer, (sic) but it is a real Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) and 2 LHD, South Korea: 2 Landing Platform Helicopter LPH (15 Helos, 2 Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). To these will be added the construction of amphibious ships in: The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, France, Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Peru, Brazil, Poland… and so on.

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Fig. 3 LHD SP Navy. Juan Carlos I. Source Almirante Gregorio Bueno Murga. Puente de Mando. Juan Carlos Diaz, La mar en mi Camino. June 30, 2019. https://www.puentedemando.com/author/ juancarlos

7 New Weapons To help carry on current operations, there is a myriad of ongoing projects, sponsored by all services, although given the greater use of naval forces in the feld of the expeditionary capacity, it is in this feld where more assets are being studied to able the transition ashore from the sea despite the A2AD threats. We will see a frst batch of aerial means: First of all, this great AAV from Boeing for refueling from a CV and capable of transporting 15.000 lb to 500 miles. The project is to acquire 75 units that will be deployed on board the CV’s in 2020 (Fig. 4). Terrain diffculties and threats, such as ambushes and explosives devices (IED’s), can make ground transportation to and from the front a dangerous challenge. Helicopters can avoid this problem, but they are usually scarce, and they themselves are also subject to threats. On the other hand, they are expensive and will not always be available specially for evacuation missions. This vehicle called ARES, acronym for Aerial Reconfgurable Embedded System, provides logistic, medical evacuation, and ISR capabilities. Its carrying capacity is 3000 lb (Fig. 5).

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Fig. 4 MQ25 STINGRAY drone tanker 15.000 lb load capacity range 500 NM

Fig. 5 Aerial Reconfgurable Embedded System (ARES) 3000 lb, LOG, MEDEVAC, ISR. Source Ares Locked Martin. Illustration by Doug Moore

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Fig. 6 Hydra (UUV) To insert UAV’S/UUV’s stealth to a rapid answer in any emergency around the world. Echo Voyager: Photo Boeing

The submarine is one of the felds where I have seen more innovation in, although it is thought that perhaps underwater there is still a feld where detection is more diffcult, and of course it is considered as a redoubt from which to launch long-range weapons. The HYDRA project is an unmanned submarine with the mission of being able to launch STEALTH UAV’s (unmanned aerial vehicle) or UUV’s (underwater unmanned vehicle) anywhere in the world where they are needed (Fig. 6).

Fig. 7 US Navy trials unmanned boats to defend valuable units. 19-12-2016. Source Offce of Naval Research. 140814-N-ZZ999-01 demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology held on the James River in Newport News, Va. During the demonstration as many as 13 Navy boats, using an ONR-sponsored system called CARACaS (Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command Sensing), operated autonomously or by remote control during escort, intercept and engage scenarios (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

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Another feld that will undoubtedly revolutionize the conficts of the future is the one of autonomous ships, unmanned and controlled over long distances. In the fgure you can see a formation of small boats being tested by the US Navy in 2016 (Fig. 7). Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) is an unmanned ship prototype capable of navigating the high seas for long periods of time with the mission of detecting SSK’s, and which is also being studied for mine detection (Fig. 8). The Electromagnetic Rail Gun (EMG) is a weapon that launches projectiles at high speed, by means of two parallel metal rails connected to an electric current supply, using magnetic felds. The problem is that it can only be launched from a ship capable of having a 25 MW power plant, enough for a city of 18.000 families. The price of the projectile, between 25.000/50.000 US dollars, is cheap compared to an interceptor missile, 10 million dollars (Fig. 9).

Fig. 8 ACTUV: Antisubmarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ANTI–SSK, MINES). Source Darpa

Fig. 9 EMRailGun.Mach10 (12.250 km/H). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30ZINwOSE0A

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Fig. 10 Laser (DEW) 300.000 km/sg, 50.000 times faster than ICBM. https://www.lepoint.fr/hightech-internet/l-us-navy-a-deploye-un-canon-laser-dans-le-golfe-persique-11-12-2014-1888879_ 47.php

Finally, the above laser weapon was tested on American ship LPD “USS Ponce” in 2017, with great success, its cost is only the electricity it consumes, less than a dollar, for the time being the range is low: even if and it is intended to reach a power of 150 kw. Up to now only 30 kw has been achieved. The weapon is also being tested in planes and helicopters as well as land vehicles (Fig. 10).

8 Conclusion 1. The new strategic scenario is maritime, littoral, urban and very connected, and it will be in these areas where future conficts will most likely arise in these areas; demanding expeditionary naval forces with high readiness level and able to take action in a short period of time. 2. The scenario has changed from concentrated land and naval forces to dispersed distributed forces. From the employment of large units to “ad hoc” task oriented operational organizations. 3. Given the threat of being unable to control the battle or the situation it is vital to protect communications and C4I systems. 4. The fact that conficts will take place in middle of people implies that population control is a key for success to avoid collateral damage thus, the so called information operations will become equally important: electronic warfare, computer network ops, cyber defense ops, psychological ops, deception ops and communications security ops. 5. Something that stands out as of great importance is the need to detect which technology will be necessary in a future confict, as it was the Blitzkrieg in the second World War where, even if only 30% of the German Army was mechanized, that difference was enough to conquer Europe.

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6. Finally, and related to the Defense industry and based on the above, we must be innovative, neither depending always on the same companies, nor return to old patterns; we must be very up to date on the latest breakthroughs all over the world, and not settle for the idea, wrongly assuming, that “everything has already been invented”.

References Air-Sea Battle (2013) Service collaboration to address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, Air-Sea Battle Offce, May 2013 Congressional Research Service (2019) Conventional prompt global strike and long-range ballistic missiles: background and issues. Congressional Research Service: Updated 14 August 2019 Corbett J (1918) Some principles of maritime strategy. Green and Co., Longmans Dempsey M (2012) Joint education white paper Hammes TX (2012) Offshore control: a proposed strategy for an unlikely confict. INSS. Strategic Forum, National Defence University, June 2012 Holmes JR (2013) Air-Sea Battle vs offshore control: cant the U.S, blockade China? The Diplomat, 19 August 2013. https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/airsea-battle-vs-of Jensen B (2015) Distributed maritime operations: back to the future, 9 Apr 2015. War on the rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/distributed-ma Lee KE, Aaron K (2019) China’s long march of modernisation. Blueprint & road map for the nations full development 2016-2049, Beijing 2019 Mahan AT (1890) The infuence of sea power upon history, 1660–1783 Martinage R (2014) Toward a new offset strategy. Exploiting U.S. long-term advantages to restore U.S global power projection capability. CSBA. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Offset Milley MA, Neller R (2017) The next fght: the commandant is pushing the corps to be ready for a “violent, violent fgh. Jeff Schogol, 18 September 2017. Marine times. https://www. marinecorpstimes.com/news/2017/09/18 Nielsen T (2018) Russia’s Northern Fleet works on increasing ties with Chinese Navy. Eye on the Artic, 31 July 2018 at 10:29 https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2018/07/31 Osborn K (2019) Rapid raptor: the air force can attack anywhere with a Stealth F-22 in 24 hours. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/rapid-raptor. Accessed 13 Mar 2019 Richardson J (2016) A discussion on Asia-Pacifc security with chief of naval operations Admiral John Richardson. In: 2016 tenth annual conference on Center for a New American Security’s (CNAS). https://www.cnas.org/publications/transcript/cnas Rowden T, Gumataotao P, Fanta P (2015) Distributed Lethality. In: US Naval Institute, proceedings, vol 141/1/1,343, January 2015. https://www.usni.org/magazines/distributed-lethality Zurcher A (2018) Three reasons behind Trump ditching Iran deal, BBC News, US & Canada, 08 Mar 2018. https://www.bbc.com/world-us-canada-43902372

Juan López Diaz Marines Colonel Juan Angel Lopez Diaz was born in Ferrol on 11 April 1954. He joined the Naval Academy in Marin in 1973 and was commissioned as Marine Offcer in 1978. He served in a variety of appointments from Lieutenant to Captain level in the Tércio de Armada (Brigade Size Unit) in San Fernando (Cadiz) in the First and Second Infantry Marines Battalion. After the Staff Course, in 1992 he was appointed as Operations Offcer of the Amphibious Infantry Regiment. During this period he was posted in Mostar City as UNMO during the Balkans war in 1993. After this commission, he was appointed as Operations Offcer of the Mechanized and

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Artillery Amphibious Regiment, in San Fernando. In 1997 he was posted to the Plans Branch in the Navy General Staff (Navy HQ) (Madrid), in the Area of the Strategic Plans. In this post he was in charge of all the topics regarded to multinational organizations: NATO, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Spanish Italian Amphibious Force SIAF), EUROMARFORCE, and he was in many multinational meetings as Spanish Navy representative in Brussels, Italy, France, Greece and so on. In 1998 he was ranked to Lt Col. In 2000 he was appointed as Commander Offce of the Second Marines Battalion, in San Fernando. In 2002 he was posted in the Joint Staff (EMACON) in Madrid in Current Operations Area (J-34) in the Operations Branch. In 2003 he was ranked to Colonel, and he was posted to the Ministry of Defence, in the Education and Recruitment Directorate. In this post he was in charge to change the compulsory recruitment model to the all volunteer model for the troops and sailors. In 2005 he was appointed as Defence Attache in South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Lesotho. In 2008 he was appointed as Commanding Offcer of Tercio Norte (Regiment Marines size unit) in Ferrol. In 2010, he joined again in the Education General Directorate where he was in charge of the Multinational Cooperation Program in Military Education, with more than 66 countries involved and close to 1000 students (Offcers and warrant offcers) every year. In this post he has been more than 6 years. Currently he is working in the Naval Thinking Center of the Sp Navy. Also he writes about Spanish History in XVI Century. He is member of EuroDefense-Spain.

Long-Lasting Solutions to the Problem of Migration in Europe J. Martín Ramírez

Outline 1 2 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Problem of Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Towards Some Long-Lasting Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Going to the Roots in the Countries of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Dealing with the Countries of Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Adequate Control of Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Measures in the Countries of Destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract This is the following of a previous publication on the refugee crisis in Europe and its security challenges. Here we suggest some long-lasting solutions to the problem of migration. These may be summarize in four points: dealing with the countries of origin and of transit, adequate control of borders, and positive measures to facilitate the integration of the newcomers in their countries of destination. Keywords Migration · Traffickers · Control of borders · Integration · Security

1 Introduction In a previous publication on the refugee crisis in Europe and its security challenges, I concluded that a global problem like this one could not be solved without an adequate orderly, and controlled immigration policy, creating systematic and controlled arrival and integration programs, because the mental structure of European societies is not In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: 27 June 2019; accepted: 8 January, 2020. J. M. Ramírez (B) Nebrija-Santander Chair on Risk and Conflict Management, Nebrija University, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_10

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prepared to face a disorderly increase in migration flows (Ramirez 2017, 2019). It is thus vital to regulate the arrival of migrants if we want to achieve their real integration in our culture (Espaliú Berdud 2019). Here I will try to go forward, pinpointing the terrible damage made by the massive escape of young people from countries that desperately need them in their struggle for development; their great problem is precisely the continuous loss of human capital. Besides of that, who emigrate are not the “poor among the poor”, but people with certain economic means to be able to afford the trip and contacts in the place they are going to. What is more important, according to me, is to argue that the best way would be to encourage migrants to stay home, preventing massive uncontrolled displacements, is addressing the factors that drive emigration of their own origin countries. To stop unwanted migration, the developed countries must promote a profound democratic and economic stabilization and development. We must always remember that the first right of every human being –after the right to live- is the right not to emigrate and to have the opportunity of living peacefully and prospering in our own home, as Pope Pius XII wrote in the Apostolic Constitution Exsul Familia: “All men have the right to a family living space in their place of origin”. The right to emigrate is only subsidiary to the main right to have a family living space in the place of origin, when this cannot be assured.

2 The Problem of Migration Migration has been a sensitive and contentious topic for ages. Escaping violence, war, poverty and environmental disasters, more people than ever are migrating worldwide. Since it is not a cyclical, but a structural phenomenon, which means that whatever the method put forward migration cannot be stopped. Currently, according to the UNO estimates, 258 million people live outside their country of birth (3.4% of the world’s population). In 1970, about 2% of the world’s 3.7 billion people lived abroad (UNHCR 2017). This figure grows due to inequality, climate change, conflicts, and the interconnectivity that facilitates the movement of people.1 Migration itself affects values, identities, cultures, assimilation capacities of societies, and, far from being a problem in se, it may be a solution to many problems; e.g., benefits the demographic catastrophe present in the aging Western societies. But it doesn’t always engender positive changes; it may also show important disadvantages. This is why immigration must be orderly, capable of duly regulating the massive arrival of people; otherwise our social protection systems will not resist. The illegal immigration requires proper vetting to identify criminals and terrorists- the crime rates of the foreign immigrant population are significantly higher than those

1 According to the Border and Coast Guard FRONTEX 2018 risk report, only 16% of the immigrants to Europe in 2017 came as refugees from war and conflicts zones where their lives were endangered, whereas 45% confessed to have done it because of economic reasons.

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of the natives-, and sometimes, to put in metaphorical terms, surgical excision procedure without anesthesia will frequently induce pain. No country needs a Trojan horse. But we will leave this so interesting aspect for another parliament. Although mass emigration to developed countries is a global phenomenon -it happens even within each country, internally displacing for instance from rural areas to urban ones: China is a clear example-, the present chapter will be focused mainly on what would be the better long-lasting solutions to its present situation in Europe, one of the leading destinations in the world in terms of migratory flows, with 77 million migrants, Russia included, according to the UN’s Department for Population.2

3 Towards Some Long-Lasting Solutions Immigration is an irresolvable problem at short-term. Migration policies should follow a long-term vision, addressing economic, security and sociological points of view (De la Cámara 2019), creating systematic and controlled arrival and integration programs of security, trade, development and employment issues. But, being a global problem, migration will only be solved as a consequence of a frank and sincere joint co-responsibility between all countries of origin, transit and destination, sharing the burden of dealing with both regular and irregular migration whenever possible. This was the intention of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, signed at the end of 2018 by 165 representatives of the 193 countries of the United Nations (UNO) met in Marraquesh, in a non-mandatory and rather controversial document that says, in an indirect manner, that for the entry to be safe, orderly and regular, the conditions of entry must be safe and not subject to the mercy of smugglers, seekers’ and workers’ entry profiles should be differentiated, and entries should be legal. Its 23 “objectives” were peppered with vague declarations, platitudes and split differences, such as the fight against the mafias that deal with human beings, the defence of the rights of immigrant workers or a change in narrative about migration towards a more positive approach. Partly in the spirit of other global agreements like the Paris climate deal, it encouraged states to co-operate on tricky cross-border matters without forcing them to do anything, and urged governments to treat migrants properly, but also to work together on sending them home when necessary. At least, it may help build the trust between “sending” and “receiving” countries that is the foundation of any meaningful international migration policy (Economist 2018). Let us offer some recommending ways of improving migration at four different levels: going to the roots in the countries of origin, dealing with the countries of transit, having an adequate control of borders, and suggesting some measures in the countries of destination. 2 intra-European migrations have increased significantly, whilst the southern shores of the Mediterranean contribute to the majority of extra-European migration (Maghreb, Egypt, Middle East and Turkey).

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3.1 Going to the Roots in the Countries of Origin I have critized elsewhere (Ramirez 2019) the saving buenist attitude3 of a migrationist maximalism that wants to open the doors, the ports, the windows and throw all the walls, in favor of a Weberian realism (the ethics of convictions versus the ethics of reason) (Leguina 2019): even if we would welcome forty or fifty million Africans a year, Africa will continue to have the same population. It would be good if they start helping Africans in their own countries and avoiding as much as possible the reasons why they want to emigrate (Ramirez 2016). We want the potential migrants to have a better future in their countries. As Ousman Umar repeats like a mantra, “the solution is in the country of origin, not in the destination. You have to feed minds (well); if you feed the mind you are satisfying hunger for more than a hundred years” (Umar 2019). Some African prelates within the Catholic Church are calling attention to the most forgotten aspect of this debate: the terrible damage made by a massive escape of young people from countries that desperately need them in their struggle for development. In a book released recently, cardinal Robert Sarah, currently prefect of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments,4 declares his personal position on immigration: “All migrants arriving in Europe are crammed, without work, without dignity. Is this what the Church wants? The Church cannot cooperate in this new form of slavery into which mass immigration has become” (Sarah 2019a, b; Indelicato 2019). The European Union (EU), thus, has to structurally turn over economic resources for the development of Africa (and of Middle East), tackling the problems that are the main cause of migratory movements, analysing them and offering real help in their own home. Consequently, their priority has to be to invest in the countries of origin, because migration control has to be paid with money: financing, companies, information, facilitating their institutional, social, political and economic conditions in order that nobody will be obliged to leave their home, and creating sources of employment in those countries of origin. Some political party has proposed in its program that the EU should prepare a sort of “plan Marshall” for Africa, similar to the one USA did for the post-war Europe.5 3 According to the Spanish Royal Academy (RAE) dictionary, buenismo is the attitude of who reduces the seriousness of conflicts, acting with excessive benevolence and tolerance. This “goodism” is a demagogy destined to hold power through emotional blackmail, quite different to a real goodness, born of charity or philanthropy (Robles, 2019). 4 Cardinal Robert Sarah is a native of Guinea Guinean who grew up under a harsh Marxist dictatorship and became archbishop at the age of 34 with the task of guiding the diocese of Conacry, when still in his country there was the socialist regime of Sekou Touré. So, I think he knows what he’s talking about. 5 In the forties of the last century, America passed the Economic Co-operation Act, better known as the Marshall Plan, because its inspiration from a speech at Harvard University by George Marshall, America’s secretary of state. The Marshall aid, aimed to revive Europe’s war-ravaged economies, encouraged the Europeans to quash inflation and to narrow their deficits while eventually dismantling price controls and import barriers. These reforms had enormous benefits. Before 1948 fear of inflation and taxation prompted German farmers to feed their harvests to their cattle, rather than

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It is not enough with assigning cooperation funds. As De la Concha stresses (2019), a proper management of migration flows requires working as much as possible in cooperation with the countries of origin taking into account, as appropriate, the various causes of migration (economic, security, political prosecution, climate, etc.). Thus, a more ambitious measures are required, such as generating opportunities for the local population and offering fiscal incentives to the investments of European companies in those regions that seem to be condemned to diaspora. This move will also offer new markets for European products and services, as well as opening of EU markets to exports from these countries. And, what is more important, besides of contributing to the economic development of those countries, Europe has to improve their social and political quality of life, which is precisely what they try to find in Europe. Our main objective, therefore, has to be to strength the production base and the creation of jobs in the countries of origin, the provision of basic services (health, education) to the local populations, and the literacy, ensuring that students in their countries have the tools to decide their future and thus avoid the temptation to migrate to Europe, avoiding future victims (De la Cámara 2019).6 Either we offer them opportunities in their own countries, or they will come to ours looking for them Zalba (2014). The best practical means for achieving it are probably inter-governmental agreements with the origin countries, giving them a generous economic aid. This is the stance taken by the Visegrad Group (V4) (Check Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia): instead of uncontrolled massive immigration, we have to act in their origin countries; instead of importing problems, exporting help in situ. This attitude would also be “much more inexpensive”, as is honestly admitted by Juho Eerola, a Finn of the Nordic Freedom, or by the then Slovak prime minister, Peter Pellegrini, during his first visit to Brussels: “what we have to do is to invest in the countries where the problem is originated. Each euro spent in northern Africa is more efficient than 10 spent in the migrants who arrive massively to EU” (Eerola, 13 April 2018). But, there is need to build up conditions to create secure environment within the transit African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The North African governments are responsible for effective and transparent governance aimed at management of emigrants flows through their territories. EU’s money poured into their accounts are wasted as they do not cooperate as they can. Another effort to stem the flow of migrants to Europe is “to save and protect the lives of migrants and refugees”, motivating “operations of urgent evacuation” returning them to their origin countries through a repatriation programme that encourages those who have made it to northern Africa to go home voluntarily, rather than risk sell it to the cities for money that might be diluted by inflation or seized by the government. Its true significance laid not in the cash it provided but in the market-friendly policies it encouraged. To receive aid, European governments had to commit to restore financial stability and to remove trade barriers. 6 We have a similar problem within our own countries, migration towards big cities is up siding the living in small rural areas; we have to stop it offering them “the needed modern technology to have the best of both worlds. It is not an easy problem, but I feel a deep analysis needs to be done so we understand more of the dynamics behind the movements”! (Lindhard, 2018).

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a rickety boat across the Mediterranean. This is what UNO, EU and African Union (AU) jointly agreed in Abiyan (29 Nov. 2017): people who turn back get a free flight—cutting out the need for a perilous return journey across the Sahara. The programme has repatriated some 15,000 migrants to various west African countries, which barely scratches the surface because it reckons there are about 1 m of them in the African shores, waiting for their risky jump to Europe (Economist 2018). The Spanish government did this unilaterally in 2006, after 39.000 immigrants arrived to the Canary Islands in open boats, known as cayucos: some direct forms of operative cooperation with those countries through which migrants come or transit, sending there some specific police units for working jointly with the local security forces with the aim of restraining subsequent invasions from other Western African countries. Since the devolution of immigrants to their origin countries is one of the best deterrent action to avoid the “calling effect”,7 governments have to launch adequate information campaigns in their own origin countries to discourage potential migrants. The EU member states are Africa’s largest donors, supplying more than half the aid the continent receives. Africa exported twice the value of goods to the EU as it did to China in 2017. But it is not just a matter of addressing the factors that drive emigration. Europe and Africa share something much more fundamental: a future dependent on one another. As Moroccan King Mohammed VI pointed out in 2017, solidarity between Europe and Africa has to be “built on shared responsibility and mutual dependence.” The European continent is a global player worthy of genuine partnership of equals with Africa that priorities concerning mutual interests through rapid funding in education, health and infrastructure for Africa’s youth would contribute to global growth. Europe’s investment must be bolder in terms of financing, policy and governance reforms than what is currently on the table (Cole 2019). Economic development, government reforms, institutional strengthening, will result in common prosperity. Europe, poor in natural resources and in demographic decline, desperately needs to contribute to the unblocking of the future of Africa. Up to now, the -economically important- European efforts have to qualify as at least disappointing. The EU needs to encourage, promote opportunities in Africa, move from a policy built around aid to cement our relationships on trade and investment (Palacio 2019a). Cooperation between states that produce migrants and those that receive them can help to streamline migration flows. The European Union has to structurally turn over resources for the development of Africa and Middle East, which are the main source of migrants nowadays, through agreements with extra communitarian countries for stopping irregular immigration towards Europe. And this requires patience and diplomacy, treating the partner governments as equals.

7 As an anecdotic comment, this is precisely the etymologic root of Venice, Venezia = veniunt etiam

= they (the fugitives from other places) kept coming.

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3.2 Dealing with the Countries of Transit The optimism of the “refugees welcome” campaign in 2015—Wir schaffen es— led towards an uncontrolled flood of refugees which destroyed the perception of order and stability. In June 2018, there was a great turn in the attitudes of the rulers regarding immigration, with a broad consensus at the European Council around much more restrictive. This practical agreement intended to hand over the decision-making capacity over who enters and who does not in the “Fortress Europe”, strengthening the policies of controlling the external borders; fighting against traffickers; and more aid in the countries of origin instead of endless aid in Europe. There is a need to strengthen collaboration with transit countries.

3.2.1

Strengthening the Control of the External Borders

It is necessary to prevent ships from leaving their points of origin. In cases where this is not possible, the practice should be implemented that those rescued at sea should be assisted and returned to the point of origin or departure of navigation. This is the specific task of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency: provide technical assistance and support to the countries of origin and transit to help strengthen border controls, even if it cannot replace national competence; it is converted into an authentic border police, but not in charge of rescuing. I will to come back to this point later.

3.2.2

Fighting Against Traffickers

According to the NGO African Center for Strategic Studies, there is a migratory flows that move 3.5 million people from one place to another from and within Africa in the hands of traffickers; 50% of them are minors, and only 1% of those 3.5 million, will try to reach Europe; the remaining 99% travel between African countries.8 In this context, I point out at a report by the Department for Human Rights at the UN, marking the horror of criminal smuggling networks which lead to humanitarian scandals such as: enslavement; imprisonment; rape; prostitution; the sale of organs; and camps, whose living conditions are beyond imagination. What alternative do citizens of many African countries have to come to Europe? If the European states renounce their ethical convictions, delegating their responsibility, mafias and some connected “heroic” NGOs will occupy the scene doing the dirty work. Those still determined to reach Europe may have to pay large sums to people-trafficking gangs and risk their lives in the sea (we may say the same about 8 F.inst. there are many refugees in the Lake Chad region, intersection of four countries of the Sahel, as, (Alupo et al. 2019); and a huge wave of immigrants towards South Africa or other rich countries, blamed by locals for supposedly taking jobs from locals, committing crimes, or the spread of infectious diseases.

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America, substituting the word “sea” by “desert”). The more borders, bureaucratic obstacles, closed routes and prohibitions the immigrant finds, the more profitable for the trafficker. No one moves as many people on the planet as immigration traffickers, nobody determines human flows as much as their implementation in a given territory, nobody has their flexibility to change plans and adapt to changing circumstances and nobody gets so many benefits as they do. Their criminal business is more lucrative nowadays than drug or arms trafficking. Some of those traffickers have changed tactics. Before, they put hundreds of immigrants in old overloaded wooden boats with the aim of trying to reach Europe. Nowadays, after cashing from them, the immigrants are taken in safe boats from African territorial waters, until they know that the ship of some NGO is a few miles away. Then, once in international waters, they put on life jackets, crammed them in zodiacs, which can barely sail a few hours and warn by radio that there are shipwrecked people in the area. The more rescue boats they have, the more immigrants will try to cross the Mediterranean…, and the more deaths, drowning in the sea, those claimed heroes of the goodism will provoke. A NGO director denounced on television that although he had managed to rescue 60 people from a zodiac, another 340 had perished. What nobody asked was if he did not realize that by telling those who leave Libya that there are boats a few miles away they are contributing to the death of hundreds of people who, for one reason or another, cannot be picked up.9 Trafficking in human beings to the European destination is more profitable than drug trafficking: it moves around the Mediterranean, according to the latest UN report published last year, about 7 billion dollars. Just take the account: boats for 30 people are used for 120, crammed, standing, and almost unable to move for hours. At 4,000 e per head,10 it gives 480,000 e per trip. It is paid in two parts: the first 2,000 e to take them from their country of origin to the ports of Libya and the other 2,000 to move them to European port, in an offshore mothership, and then in small boats that launch into the sea in a point located by GPS where they can be picked up by the rescue boats of the NGOs, or by merchants, fishing or recreational. If they do not find this type of boats in the area, they make a distress call with a satellite telephone with the coordinates. If the trip is frustrated and they are returned to their countries, they try again when they have collected the money. And several thousand have not even had that opportunity because they have lost their lives. With that turnover, there is no problem in paying the corresponding bribes in each place (Fernández Arribas 2019). “The good trafficker tries not to lose the immigrants who have been his clients. His goal is to get them to Europe and earn money. If they lose, e.g., a truck with 40 immigrants between Agadez and Algeria or a boat that sinks with 100 people, is not a problem, because they have already paid; but if they lose 500 kg of cocaine or two 9 The

reception in several European countries of migrants collected by NGO ships reinforce the effectiveness of the mafias that can sell their services in the market to attract new customers they will charge plus. 10 This price depends on the time of the year, the state of the sea, and the amount of bribes the mafias have to face, paying to local authorities, even with Coast Guard or as in Niger, with the Army.

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boxes of Kalashnikov, then they do have a serious problem. That is the difference”. And how are these people’s traffickers? “These gangsters are criminal entrepreneurs, but entrepreneurs. They must have many contacts, be credible, creative, charismatic, with the power of conviction, knowledge of the routes, the laws, the latest news… which make them very fast, elastic and flexible. They also participate in other businesses; f. inst., when the vehicles that bring immigrants back through the Sahara return, they never make them empty: they carry weapons or drugs back to take advantage of the trip” (Musumeci and di Nicola 2016). Fernández Arribas (2019) offers a very detailed description of how tens of thousands of human beings are stranded in territories dominated by mafias, in their expected way towards Europe. Although every corner of the world retains its specificities, the human traffic mafias analyzed by the UN reflect some common patterns. All of them have recruitment agents from the main groups that are victims of extortion. A second level is that of the local mafias, who know the land and generally pay the collectors. One more step is that of small-scale service providers: trucks, boats and other means of transport. The most dangerous level is that of the big international mafias, who control the entire process and also add links to large international crime groups and use immigrants as a way to earn money quickly and easily. Infrastructures built for the exploitation of the mineral resources of the desert, oil in Libya and uranium in Niger, facilitate trips through the desert. According to reports from the Spanish Police, Nigeria and Libya are the most active and most established bases of immigration mafias in Central Africa, with ramifications in other countries, where Sudanese mercenaries act unscrupulously. In the waiting time, they live in abysmal conditions, suffering very serious violations of the human rights, such as abuse, harassment, violence, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, common torture and rape. In North Africa they have their point of convergence in Agadez, a town north of Niger, or in Sehba, south of Libya, where control is exercised by heavily armed tribal groups. From that point of confluence, they are transferred to the coastal cities of the Tripolitana region, where trips are negotiated and where part of the population collaborates with their garages as a temporary shelter at an abusive but obligatory price for those who see the end of Your nightmare Construction, agriculture or any job in order to get the money. The boats used are manufactured in Libya and the fishermen always have on board some drum of gasoline, pure gold for the weak boats of the new slaves of the 21st century. In Libya, each link in the chain receives its commission, especially those who seek protection and security, from militias to corrupt authorities. This action—paying poorer ones to set up vast holding-pens for humans in unhuman conditions- is a big business for a few behind the misery of many others, and involves something which would not be tolerated at home, but it seems somehow acceptable in these situations because it is out of sight. Stopping these traffickers, which is the solution that many politicians in Europe offer to regulate immigration, is almost impossible; they are always ahead of a European immigration policy, without the necessary coordination. A clear example has been the failure of the military Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia (from 2015 to 2019), which ambitious goal of dismantling the mafias that traffic with people from

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the Libyan coasts to Europe has not been fulfilled, partially because the closing of the Italian ports to illegal immigrants has left it out of play. Due to the fact that operation SOPHIA no longer uses ships but only unmanned aerial vehicles, it cannot continue rescuing people at sea. Federica Mogherini, at that time High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, explored a new mission, with more modest goals: to train the Libyan Coast Guard to control their own waters and avoid the departure of irregular immigrants; but there were also no practical results. This shows the external and humanitarian action of the EU, as it really is: “lack of criteria, commitment and agreement on immigration issues…. Public opinion will continue to show ships coming from the Libyan coasts and criminal organizations will increase their profits” (de Ramón-Laca 2019; see also Espaliu 2018, Espaliú Berdud 2019). As accurately pinpointed by Bitzewski (personal communication), though, it is not the EU administration to blame but the heads of states not being willing to take the action. They point their fingers out towards the EU but, when the EU puts proposals on the table, they get reluctant to contribute to the common effort. It starts with the frontier countries, crying but doing very little to protect their own borders, and goes to the rest of Europe raising any reason not to commit themselves to the program. The EU should be tougher on the North African governments, corrupted and ineffective. A carrot and stick should be one of the ways to start discussion with them. It’s their obligation to control migrants movement within their territories but they make money on it! Turkey and Egypt are perfect examples of the game. When they want they can stop trafficking! But, obviously, the money is the main reason for action. The North African countries are interested in this business and it is up to us to give them a signal “do not be too smart”. We deal with state controlled trafficking and we are very naïve not forcing these governments to take the responsibility. We can help them but we cannot work for them.

3.2.3

Aid in the Countries of Transit, instead of endless aid in Europe

A key move to avoid the “calling effect” is to guarantee security and economic agreements -migration control has to be paid with money-, with those countries migrants transit through in their way to Europe, preventing them from leaving its coasts and returning to their country of origin those people whose asylum in the EU has been denied. In November 2015 the EU established the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) with an allocation of e 647.7 million covering Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, aimed “to contribute to safe, secure, legal and orderly migration from, to and within the region and support an effective management of migration flows that protects human rights” Turkey is the main starting point for the arrival of potential refugees from Middle East to Europe. There are more than 3 millions Syrian refugees, and almost another one in Lebanon. The repatriation agreement signed by Brussels and Ankara in March 2016

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-entering 6,000 million euros annually in the Turkish coffers11 + VISA free travel for some Turkish citizens- has been a quite good example of efficacy, convincing them to keep refugees from Europe’s shores: more than 900,000 migrants—three fifths of the detainees came from Afghanistan and Pakistan- have been detained in Turkish territory since the document entered into force (Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management 2019). According to Gerald Knaus, leader of European Stability Initiative (ESI), the entry of refugees into Greece was reduced “by 96% and even higher in the number of deaths”. And, in a more global view, the more than one million irregular migrants (mainly refugees) who arrived in Europe in 2015 have fallen to 171.635 in 2017. Turkey thus has played a leading role as a dam to contain migration outside Europe. In the future, EU will have to invest more in integration and public awareness programmes in Turkey. Erdogan himself has proposed resettling at least some of the refugees in a safe zone he wants set up in northern Syria. All of this is legally possible. Syrians in Turkey do not enjoy formal refugee status, which would protect them from deportation, but “temporary protection”, which does not. According to the High Commissaire of United Nations for Refugees (ACNUR, in French), a Turkish meltdown would send economic shockwaves or new surges of migrants onto the European mainland. Erdogan has encouraged such fears (July 22nd, 2019), threatening the suspension of the migration deal over the EU’s sanctions.12 Another point for the arrival of potential refugees from Africa is the Maghreb. Those EU southern members with close ties to it have an special interest in encouraging the reform of state structures, as well as working to reduce the socioeconomic disparities and lack of opportunities that remain the public’s most pressing problems in those countries. Two successful cases have been the attempts of cooperation of the EU with Morocco and Tunisia, as well as a. very important job in the control of migratory flows and the fight against mafias, terrorism and drug trafficking is due to the creation of a Coordination Authority for the Gibraltar Strait. By way of example, there is a positive counter-terrorism cooperation carried out by several EU countries working closely with Northern Africa on security, providing training and equipment for counter-terrorism and conducting some joint operations. Morocco might be a capable security partner as the authorities closely monitor its population and controls its religious sphere. It has been successful in preventing attacks and obtaining information that can benefit its European partners, but its counter-terrorism efforts fit within a framework of conserving rather than transforming the state’s unaccountable relationship with its subjects, which relies on a repressive political system and resists outside calls for reform. 11 NATO

has also awarded US$ 5 billion to Turkey. years later, just when this book is going to press, the crisis has returned. Turkey does not seem proactive anymore. Tayyip Erdogan has called for more European support for ending the war in Syria and for receiving millions of refugees. And as a pression measure, on February 28, 2020, Turkey decided to open its borders for migrants to move to the European Union. This has brought together more than 35,000 migrants along the border with Greece. Three weeks later, though, following the strategies of the other countries to avoid a further spread of COVID-19, Ankara has announced just the opposite: the closure of the EU’s borders.

12 Four

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The Spanish authorities have observed with relief a downward trend in arrivals in mid-January 2019, with a significant reduction of a 39% of the figures of irregular immigration: the entries, an average of about 1.200 a month, confirm that the flows have been considerably reduced since then and that they have fallen to levels below those registered the previous year, when Spain became the main European gateway for irregular immigration. This proactivity of Morocco, deploying agents to reinforce the fight against the mafias, stop the exits by sea and employed its coastguard in the rescues on the high seas, has been highlighted both by Spain and by an internal report of the European Commission as the most effective tool to contain migrants. This change of attitude coincided with the announcement of the visit of King Philip VI to Rabat, which was finally held on February 13, 2019. On that trip, the Spanish monarch asked Mohamed VI to go “beyond” in the control of irregular immigration. Later, the fisheries and agriculture agreements, signed by EU and Rabat with an injection of 140 million euros to contain migratory flows, have also been key to boost Moroccan collaboration. Besides of that, Spain has approved to add the almost 60 million that Rabat asked last year to contain the exit of immigrants; that is to purchase surveillance equipment “to combat irregular immigration, immigrant trafficking and trafficking in human beings”, as well as for fuel, maintenance of patrols, diets and salaries (Palacio 2019b). The Moroccan and sub-Saharan return agreements are also praised as a “deterrent factor” to avoid the “call effect”. Morocco moves many sub-Saharan people to the south, leaving them lying in the middle of the desert, or locked in small cells inside an illegal detention center in Arekmane (20 km from Melilla) and then deported to their countries. Tunisia has also made significant advances in its security policies, but it has yet to find balanced ways to deal with its porous borders and the disproportionately large number of radicalized people. Unfortunately, the attempts to solve the problem of migration with Libya have been rather frustrating. Libya is a too fragile state, a territory without government since a few years ago, which is key in the irregular migratory flows towards Italy and, in the late times, increasingly diverting the flow of west African migrants to Spain, via new Algerian routes (Fernández-Sebastián 2018). Nowadays it is the largest and more serious migration corridor, due to the use of mafia “facilitators”, as we had previously commented. In this context, some Libyan militias behind much of the people-smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean claim that EU and, more specifically, Italy have given them money and equipment to improve the coastguard stopping migrant boats from setting sail. This may explain the falling of the number of migrants crossing the sea. Finally, the European leaders seem delighted with the cooperation with Egypt, where immigrants no longer arrive due to the decision of this country to prevent them from leaving its coasts. If all the countries of the south did like Egypt, there would be no immigrants at sea.

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A punctual example of joint collaboration of countries of both sides of the Mediterranean Sea is the cross-border military exercise Neptune, with the strategic objectives of unifying efforts and coordinating action plans among the Mediterranean countries,13 especially in terms of detention and combating the movement of foreign terrorists through ports on both sides of the Mediterranean. Thus, passenger and freight transport vessels were included in the controls and the use of Interpol databases could be activated participation. This activity has been developed between several ports such as Tangier Med, Tangier City and Bni-Ansar (Nador). In sum, the EU should remain committed to encouraging and supporting the most significant pressing remaining security challenges faced by those countries, such as: (1) the reduction of the social frustrations, economic inequality, lack of opportunities, and governance problems that increase the likelihood that people will join extremist groups and recruit radicalized individuals; and (2) the reform of state structures, especially in relation to: (a) improving security governance based in an adequate culture and professionalism of the security forces (f. ins., training of police officers, courts judges and staff, customs and coast guard officials); and (b) developing systematic approaches to prevent further radicalization and addressing conditions that facilitate it, such as: exploring better ways to handle radicalized individuals than large-scale incarceration; distinguishing between committed jihadists and those who are more open to reintegration into society; and developing programmes to promote religious education and awareness, gearing them towards pupils and their families from an early age, so relevant to the treatment of radicalized individuals and the prevention of further radicalization (Dworkin and El Malki 2018).

3.3 Adequate Control of Borders Although the priority has to be focused on the countries of origin and transit, the fact is that we have to face a massive amount of irregular migrants who are arriving to our borders, because a chaotic, uncontrolled immigration cannot be allowed. The main objective of EU policy in this topic should be to encourage legal and orderly immigration and deter illegal flows. What should be the European criteria for who is welcome to Europe and who is not, to avoid an uncontrolled migration into our continent? How could be accomplished the aims to become a historic leap in the consolidation of a European area of freedom of movement without internal borders? A Spanish writer, de Prada (2019), has recently reminded the clairvoyant solutions offered by Thomas Aquinas already in the Middle Age on the obligations and limits of hospitality, making clear that the help demanded by those who suffer should not be confused with their unconditional reception. He refers to several possible types of peaceful immigrant: who passes through our land in transit to another place; who comes to settle in it as an outsider; and who wants to fully join the nation that receives 13 In

the Neptune-2 activity, in August 2019, have participated Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Spain, France and Italy, together with experts from the Frontex and the World Customs Organization.

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it “embracing their religion” (their culture, we would say nowadays). He always puts the notion of common good, which requires a desire to integrate into the life of the host country; and he is inclined not to admit them until examining their degree of “affinity” with the nation that receives them. And, as a measure of legitimate defense, we should reject those immigrants considered hostile, understanding as such not only those who have the purpose of perpetrating crimes or violence, but in general those who harbor intentions contrary to the common good of the nation that receives them (see also: Ramirez 2019). The decision on who is welcome and who is not does not belong to the humanitarian people, even less to the people-smugglers, but to each state. Security and protection of the borders is competence of each state member. Without borders there are no states and no one else can supplant a state’s right to manage and protect them, treating migrants humanely but also firmly, swiftly returning those who arrived illegally or whose claims to asylum have failed.14 Even if the EU lacks competence over it, it does not preclude the convenience of an Europeanization of the migration management, through a joint cooperation for specific purposes, even if it means losing part of the national authority over a very sensitive area of the territory. The political leaders of the EU must improve their coordination and develop common legislation on borders and immigration, creating systematic and controlled arrival and integration programs, focused on the new scenarios, such as the solution of the migratory crisis, with a common, effective, and decisive security policy, finding a balance between the implementation of measures that guarantee the security of the states, while respecting the rights of those migrants who no longer enjoy their protection in their respective countries of origin. The EU not only lacks competence over the management of the flow of refugees, but also lack of homogeneous response, as it is shown by of the Dublin Regulation (EU European Parliament 2013), which has resulted an absolute failure, inept to establish a coordinated strategy with minimal effectiveness. The EU foreign policy remains hopelessly underpowered, limited to coaxing national capitals towards agreement and supporting their ad hoc initiatives (The Economist Economist 2019a, b; Niño 2019). It is good to remind again that it is not EU to blame but the states not taking actions. The Dublin Regulation (2013) determines the EU member state responsible for the examination of an application for asylum seekers of international protection under the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (EU 2013). According to this legislation, the first member state in which the asylum application is submitted will be responsible for the examination of the request for international protection and the asylum seekers have to stay there. This, the so-called “one stop one shop”, burden the countries situated at the entry to Europe, notably those in the South, and the individual preferences –that is, where people arriving into Europe actually 14 We

have to admit, though, that this is easy to prescribe but hard to enact. It requires a lot of time and patience. Courts are overstretched, many cases are hard to allocate and poor countries may not want their citizens back.

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want to go to and where do they wish to live– are bound to not be properly taken into account. Consequently, if they move later to another European country –known as secondary movements-, this second receptor may return them to the first state. This secondary migration penalizes those southern countries, because most refugees arrive to the coasts just as a transit towards other northern European countries, where many of the newcomers had linguistic and cultural or family ties. or with better job opportunities and welfare provision. As a matter of fact, most of them live already in Germany.15 In front of this, the different EU Member States have rather antagonistic approaches: (a) Northern countries, preferential asylum for most of the refugees, are in favour of a quotes policy imposed by Brussels’ “eurocrats” for the reubication of refugees,16 and suggest an EU budget with more funds for those regions with higher number of asylum seekers. (b) Mediterranean countries, plus Portugal and France, suffering a heavy migratory pressure in their borders, have the feeling of being left alone to cope with immigrants, and reject the responsibility of attending by themselves everybody who arrives to their borders, because it would mean establishing a sort of sanitarian cordon with the rest of the communitarian block. Their aim is a reform of the Dublin Regulation and the help of the other EU countries in the sharing of the irregular immigration arriving to the outer borders. For instance, the Greek government and aid agencies argue that the EU must overhaul the Dublin Regulation, so that asylum-seekers are distributed more evenly. The current system, they say, is unfair. Five countries—Greece, Italy, Spain, France, and Germany— received over three-quarters of Europe’s asylum applications in the first half of 2018. Greece has had to deal with 70 times as many claims as Hungary, a country of comparable size and wealth. The rules are also ineffective: EU money is not an adequate replacement for relocation. Southern countries are also reluctant to expand Frontex because this affects their rights to the sovereignty of control of the territory, but also concerns related to better registration of migrants…. This is the key problem! (c) the Visegrad countries (V4) -Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakiaplus Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania) and some recent addings (at least, Austria, and partially Italy), call for reform, and refuse to consider any binding sharing 15 In

2017, Germany received 222.560 applications, almost double that of any other EU country, requesting the return of 64.267 refugees to other EU countries, but only managed to execute 15% of the returns of asylum seekers requesting from the EU. Based on that, the German home minister, Horst Seehofer, wants to send tens of thousands of migrants to Italy, and, on the contrary, Italian home minister, feels legitimized to send those who arrive to the northern European countries; f.ins.,“France was to welcome 9,816 immigrants, but in reality accommodated only 640” (France has returned to Italy 10,949 people in 2018). 16 Following the principle of solidarity, which is included in the Lisbon Treaty (2007), Jean-Claude Juncker called on the Member States of the EU to share refugee quotas according to the wealth of each country and population size, but it shattered and the European policy of immigration and asylum was marked by increased sovereignism in the States of Europe.

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out of asylum-seekers.17 Based on their right to security, they insist that their priorities are more about controlling Europe’s outer borders, in order to preserve the free movement of persons within the Schengen space, than about managing the burden of refugees who cross them. What should be a reasonable attitude to avoid an uncontrolled moving of illegal migrants within the Schengen area? The intended distribution of the burden of refugees imposing a quota system -i.e. every EU state had to admit a fixed amount of people- has not worked: only a 28% of the quota has been achieved by the different members. This system of quotes was firmly opposed by the Central Europe Defence Cooperation (CEDC),18 arguing that the structures of their countries are not “ready” for supporting the social weight of the newcomers: it would be highly detrimental to the national security and sovereignty.19 They felt marginalized by Angela Merkel decision to keep Germany’s borders open to refugees at the peak of the crisis in 2015, without any previous consultation; it seemed to them, the chancellor had turned them into transit corridors for undesirable migrants drawn by the promise of a cushy life there. They suggest as alternative to accept the free choice of country. Following this rationale, the Polish minister of Foreign Affairs in years 2015–2018, Witold Waszczykowski, was backing the disagreement of his president, Andrzej Duda, to force the entrance of immigrants against the wishes of the Polish people, asserts that “the security of Poland is more important than the unjustified decisions of the European institutions on the issue of the refugees”. Viktor Orban even dares to declare Central Europe a “migrant-free zone”. The Central European countries are pushing for the EU to get involved in the custody of the external borders and accuse the southern countries of letting irregular migrants pass unchecked through their territory to the rest of the EU, and ending up circulating in Europe at will. For instance, Sebastian Kurz, at that time Austrian Kanzler and rotatory President of the Council of the EU, told in a local newspaper “I am afraid that many are trying to avoid the high number of migrant records that they would have to do” (referred in ABC, 9/9, 2018). His words suggested that national authorities sometimes turn a blind eye to not registering migrants and that, on the 17 In a French interview, the African cardinal Sarah declares to support the countries of the V4: “These

countries do well to want to maintain their identity: globalization becomes a medical prescription mandatory. The mondo-patria (homeland world) is like a liquid continuum, a space without identity, a land without history”. 18 CEDC groups seven Central European countries: the four integrating the V4 plus another three ones (Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia). 19 Based on this assertion, Slovakia has contested the extraordinary measures adopted by Decision 2015/1601 of the EU Court of Justice on the application of a system of quotes in the reubication of refugees, mandatory for all the members, based on the argument that “it is inappropriate, because it would destroy the social coexistence and the democracy, and unnecessary for the achievement of the pursued goal”. For example, an uncontrolled acceptance of any asylum seeker would be a danger for the needed social cohesion or the hosting countries and, what is even worse, the infiltration of terrorists among the refugees would be a serious risk for the security in the European space (Eslovaquia y la reubicación de Refugiados, 2017).

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other hand, a community official who did not work directly for any state would not allow those distractions. The EU summit in Brussels on June 28th 2018, following a suggestion of Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer, reached a transitory agreement based in two points: (a) bilateral agreements between different states, stopping secondary movements in their inner borders, i.e. sending the refugees back to the state in which their asylum application was first submitted, obviously with an economical compensation; and (b) more resources for setting up centres of transit (internment) or “landing regional platforms” with the task of reviewing asylum applications, “distinguishing between economic migrants and those needed of international protection”. This move would speed up the deportations, disincentives dangerous adventures and reduce drownings at sea. This seems to partially accept Sebastian Kurz’s proposal of a “Copernican revolution” in asylum policy migratory model, as a new possible alternative similar to the one applied in Australia: to implement the number of naval patrols for intercepting boats with refugees and confine them in islands like Nauru o Papua-New Guinea”: control first; then generosity. Following this model means two things: First, taking tough action along borders, at sea and “upstream” (inside Africa) to slash the number of asylum-seekers smuggled to Europe; thwarting smuggling, the argument goes, would reduce drownings at sea, and reassure voters who might otherwise be tempted by the far right. Second, striking deals with poorer countries to establish camps, run with UN agencies, to receive, detain and, eventually, return migrants. It is a laudable but ill-defined goal, because it is unclear where to establish those camps. It was mentioned “in safe countries outside the EU”. But where? Some members want deals with North African countries to reduce departures,20 but it still unknown which non-European countries would be willing or able to host such centres.21 In front of this North African rejection, the Danish prime minister at that time, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, revealed that some communitarian countries are 20 Austria,

which occupied the EU presidency that semester, hoped for a quick agreement to equip Frontex with a supranational force of up to 10,000 members and to establish a landing platform for irregular migrants in North Africa. 21 ALGERIA: Just the day after the summit, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel said in an interview with the French broadcaster RFI: “I believe that Europeans have enough capacity, means and imagination to manage these situations.” “It is excluded that Algeria opens any retention zone. ”MOROCCO: the next day, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Naser Burita, emphatically stressed that this country has always “rejected and rejected” in its territory the detention centers for foreign migrants. TUNISIA: For logistical and political reasons, it could be the ideal candidate to host this type of centers: its coasts are the closest to the maritime zone where the majority of migrants sailing from the western strip of Libya are rescued; and, its democratic transition seems to be quite consolidated, being the country in the region that receives the highest volume of EU aid funds per capita. However, the Tunisian ambassador to the EU, Tahar Cherif. abounded in categorical rejection by his political class and public opinion. “For Tunisia, the creation of reception centers is a red line,” says Valentin Bonnefoy, a researcher at the Tunisian FTDES, a NGO specialized in migration. More than seven years after the revolution, this Maghreb country does not have an asylum law, something that many observers attribute to a veiled strategy to avoid becoming a host country. EGYPT also rejected the possibility, although in a not-so-sharp way: “the EU migrant reception facilities in Egypt would violate the laws and the constitution of our country,” said Parliament President Ali Abdel

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seeking to establish camps for failed asylum-seekers in a continental country, but out of UE, more specifically in the Balkans. There is even a third possibility to consider: within the own EU border. Jean-Claude Juncker, in his 2018 speech on the state of the EU, proposed to establish a more efficient control of the EU’s external border, converting Frontex, created in 2004 and reinforced in 2016 as a European Guard of Coasts and Borders, into an authentic border police, but not in charge of rescuing. Although still subject to the control of the national authorities, it is provided with broad competences in areas such as the control of irregular migratory flows from outside the EU, the return of irregular migrants to their countries of origin, the detection of illegal steps between countries of the club and the fight against the channels of transit in third countries. On November 8th 2019, the EU decided to grow it from 1,300 s to a standing corps of 10,000, with a 26% jump in funding next year, to 421 m. e, For the first time, the EU will be able to dispatch gun-toting men and women clad in EU uniforms to patrol its fringes, without asking member-states to cough up guards. In this way, the surveillance capacity in European territory will be reinforced. This necessary hard-headed policy of tough border controls, swift return of illegal immigrants and encouraging would-be migrants to stay home obliges governments to work with others in the control of its migratory flows. Europe cannot maintain the Schengen system of internal free migration if it does not control its external borders. And, we have to admit it, it does not. The EU has so far failed in all its attempts to establish a common policy to address the problem; it has become impossible to have a level-headed conversation about managing migration in Europe. The Malta agreement (September 23rd, 2019) is a tentative deal, signed by a group of five EU interior ministers (Germany and France, as well as Finland, Italy and Malta), on a temporary scheme for a rapid relocation in other countries of asylum seekers, who are rescued from the Mediterranean Sea. It could open the way to a comprehensive overhaul of the Dublin Regulation by which the migrant’s country of arrival is responsible for verifying the right to asylum of each person.22 It states that “the relocation Member State will assume responsibility for the relocated person” and contemplates a quick procedure to say in advance the number of potential refugees each state is willing to host, setting a period of only four weeks to relocate rescued refugees in the Mediterranean in other Member States. This would allow the frontline first-arrival countries (the Mediterranean), to be discharged from the responsibility of participating in their reception, quite heavy in periods of strong migratory pressure. In return, Berlin and Paris hope to achieve a reduction in the socalled “secondary movements” or movements of irregular migrants from the country of entry to other EU states.

Aal in Welt am Sonntag. In addition, Aal said that his country already has millions of refugees from nearby countries, such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq or Sudan, so its reception capacity is at the limit. 22 The EU Ministers discussed on 8-10-19, in Luxembourg this proposal to relocate asylum seekers rescued at sea, but they got a lack of solidarity of the whole European bloc, and the sole support of Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland.

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The agreement also speaks of a return protocol “immediately after landing”, redoubling diplomatic pressure on migrant countries of origin, using “appropriate incentives to ensure full cooperation, including consular cooperation, from countries of origin”, although at least it includes everyone passing a “medical and safety exam”. It also underlines the need to “commit to improving the capabilities of the coastguards of Mediterranean third countries”. It is hoped that the deal will put an end to the game of pass-the-migrant spectacle of some countries squabbling over which should accept responsibility for small numbers of asylum-seekers, breaching in what until now has been a guiding principle: that irregular migrants must be dealt with by their country of first arrival. Since participation in the system will be voluntary, much will now depend on how many countries will take part, how many asylum-seekers each will accept and whether penalties are to be imposed on those countries that refuse to co-operate (this last seems unlikely, given that such an idea would have to be approved by all the EU’s members, including the countries liable to be affected (Economist 2019). Summarizing, there is a widespread perception that a series of instruments to control its external borders are not working well —the Dublin asylum agreements, refugee quotas, Frontex, return and development policies…- and that a lack of trust has grown not only between the Member States, but also between the States and the European institutions, especially after the refugee reception crisis in 2015. In few words, there is a deficient management of migration and a weak European solidarity on this issue (de la Cámara 2019; De Wenden 2019). The call thus is now for a joint cooperation towards a true common policy on asylum and immigration with a complete and efficient control of the EU’s external border, reinforcing the role of Frontex. Everybody accepts this priority as the only possibility left for preventing a reinstatement of inner borders controls which would lead to the end of one of the most valued achievements of the EU, the Schengen space. A positive step in this direction has just being announced, after the starting of their new mandate, by Margaritis Schinas, Vice President of the European Commission in charge of completing a new architecture that guarantees solidarity to the countries of the external border: the EU is going to make sure that there is a sufficient dimension of responsibility in terms of border control and returns. And as tangible measures in that direction, they promise an improvement of the management of external borders with 10,000 permanent staff; moving towards a federalization model of border management, this coming spring there will be the first community corps with their own boats and carry weapons, with the deploying the first 700 European coastguards.

3.4 Measures in the Countries of Destination The responsibility concerning the immigrants does not finish at the border. Once accepted as our guests, we cannot forget about them. And, among our humanitarian obligations, we have to help properly integrating newcomers into our own society, avoiding their eventual fondness towards a multiculturalism, which only produces

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ghettos of their own culture, or wrongly thinking that the mere acceptance as migrants give them the right to have a claim to social welfare. And, on the contrary, who arrive without being invited cannot impose the host other people’s rules. Once they find a home in a new country, they have to accept the laws, rules, traditions and culture of the adopted society that welcomes them, learn the local language, mix with the natives, and be aware of the specific needs and priorities of their new home. In few words, they come to European territory with equal rights and obligations, but no more. Whoever is not able to assimilate to their new society, should better return to their origin (Ramirez 2017, 2019). According to the Dublin Regulation, asylum-seekers are the responsibility of the first country to record their presence and, if they move later to another European country, this second receptor may return them to the first state, most of them arrive to the southern coasts heading north, trying to slip there unnoticed, as illegal paperless “invisible migrants”, to avoid being picked up and returned to their first country of arrival. Officials in the country of arrival can also use bureaucracy to slow the process of registration. And so, after six months, the new host state becomes responsible. This gives a strong incentive for foot-dragging. The recent Malta tentative deal (2019) tries to partially solve this problem, allowing the frontline states to be discharged from the responsibility of participating in the relocation of the newcomers. Once accepted as our guests, what to do with them? Let us focus on the policy towards them in Sweden and Germany, preferential asylum of most migrants. Strange enough, they are far from coincident at all. In Sweden, immigrants received ample food and shelter, a generous welfare benefits, 1.5 times higher than the ones received by host taxpayers, as well as many facilities for family reunification, without any special focus on their social integration. Even more, most of them are not allowed to work. This almost open bar policy, paying migrants to do nothing, has produced (a) an increment of the social expenses on the foreign population, with the consequent reduction of the benefits for the natives -the newcomers have priority to the Swedish people;23 (b) a call effect on other tentative immigrants; and (c) increase of criminality and insecurity, which triggers the anti-immigrant feelings of host taxpayers who feel swamped. In my opinion, migrants should be encouraged to work, getting them language classes and education and offering job training, and introducing them into the labor market, meeting the main demands of the host country: f. ex, in Nordic countries, anticipating a shortfall of geriatric nurses. In Germany, the arrival of nearly one and a half million asylum seekers since 2015 polarized the country, with a consequent rise of a climate of political anxiety. 23 This

also happens in other European countries, like mine. For instance, in Madrid, the benefits and economical public grants for renting a home are higher for migrants than for Spaniards: for each Spaniard that gains access to official protection housing, paid by the taxes of the Spanish residents, are 19 migrants, who have paid nothing for it. Another example: the municipality proposed to regularize illegal unqualified immigrants offering them jobs, forgetting the priority rights of local jobless qualified legal workers (only in the building sector, in Madrid there is a waiting list of 31.000 qualified legal workers), and each illegal migrant gets 550e monthly, which is more than the 430e many local jobless people get.

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It seems they have finally realized that the solution of the problem is to integrate into the labor market those who are already in the country, and relax the requirements to allow the entry of more workers. With this purpose, in December 2018, the German government approved the Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz (“skilled workers immigration law”), an ambitious legislative package to attract qualified labor from non-EU countries and alleviate the pressing lack of workers in some sectors and regions of the country. This will extend the rules covering foreign graduates to vocationally trained workers, cautiously opening the door for rejected applicants for asylum, but who are already integrated into the labor market, and recruit more workers from outside the EU with medium and high education to find qualified work under certain conditions. Germany economy enjoys enviable health, registering an unemployment rate of 4.8%, the lowest since the reunification of the country. Figures from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), under the Ministry of Labor, estimate that there are about 1.2 million jobs vacancies, while posts actually registered in employment offices in November 2018 amounted to 807,000 (35,000 more than the same month of the previous year). However, one of the biggest concerns of the German businessmen, the so-called Mittelstand, the motor of the exporting power and the backbone of the German economy, is the lack of skilled workers. Unlike in other European countries, small and medium-sized German companies are distributed throughout the country, not necessarily concentrated in industrial centers. This often hinders the recruitment of workers who prefer to live in urban areas. There is a shortage mostly of workers with a level of professional training, such as plumbers, or drivers, and diploma courses, for example, of children’s educators. Elderly care and tourism, are also crying out for workers. This legislative text allows non-EU citizens to go to Germany to seek work for six months provided they have the necessary training, know the language and have the means to survive during that time. In the case of persons with temporary permits, such as rejected asylum seekers, they must show that they have been working in Germany for at least 18 months and that they do not have a criminal record. The head of the employers’ association, Ingo Kramer, recently indicated that 400,000 of the asylum seekers who arrived in 2015 are working or receiving some vocational training. In addition to the labour shortages, there are also demographic forecasts, which warn of a marked aging of the population. These projections will also affect Eastern Europe, where a good part of foreign workers in Germany come from and whose arrival is expected to decrease in the coming years. According to Thomas Liebig, expert on migration issues at the OECD, “these countries are becoming places of immigration. We have to look for workers outside the EU”. Although the labor integration of immigrants advances, experts warn that it will take time. “It’s a slow process; sometimes they are people who do not speak a word of German, and many of them come from Afghanistan or Somalia, where they have not had schooling” explains Liebig (2018). Tangible achievements, indeed!

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Milanovic and Branco (2018) proposes an intermediate position between open to all or closed borders, under the name of “circular migration”: to admit workers who cover specific positions, having salaries and work conditions similar to those of the locals, but with not vote rights, nor social benefits for children, retirement or free education; and at the end of their contracts, they will have to return to their countries. In few words, they will be partial citizens for a limited time, like it is already happening elsewhere: in Gulf, Singapore, Iraq, USA, Canada. Perhaps one country may need extra workers and be in position of offering them stable working conditions; but this may not occur in other EU members. This is also suggested by Alejandro Portes, Princess of Asturias of Social Sciences Award 2019: offering a temporary, flexible and comprehensive program of visas to allow access to young people who want to come to work or study for a while, allowing a fruitful flow between countries. Come in that way would also be much more economical, and would do a lot of damage to the traffickers, because those who come in that way would not have to pay them (17 October 2019). But, let us close here our considerations, stressing that a revision of national and EU legislation is required, focused towards a cooperation with the countries of origin and transit; and that, instead of dreaming naively in a chimeric –non-existingEuropean Eldorado, we have to promote the great possibilities that African continent has, knowing that, as the journalist Lucia Mbimio says, “we must not stop dreaming, but change the compass of dreams! Returning from Europe to Africa is not a failure.” (2019, 66).

References Alupo BA, Oginni SO, Opoku MP, Torgbenu EL (2019) Psychological experiences of refugees and the response of the community in the Lake Chad region. Behav Sci Terror Polit Aggress 11(3):215–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1463552 Aquinas T (1947) Summa theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province Translation, Prima Secundae, Question 105, Article 3) Cole T (2019) Letter to the editor, The Economist De la Cámara M (2019) The EU migration challenge. Boletín EuroDefense-España 4 De Prada JM (2019) Inmigración y Cuestión Religiosa, ABC, 17 ago De Ramón-Laca J (2019) Operación Sophia: paradojas de la Acción Exterior Europea. Análisis en 3 minutos | Nº 228, Agosto 2019 De Wenden CW(2019) A new European pact on immigration and asylum in response to the “migration challenge”. European Issues 537, 26th Nov 2019 Dworkin A, Malki F-Z (2018) The southern frontline: EU counter-terrorism cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco. Eur Counc Foreign Relat Economist (2018) European governments in melt-down over an inoffensive migration compact. The Economist, 6th Dec 2018 Economist (2019a) The problem with EU foreign policy. Too much historical baggage, The Economist, 17th Apr 2019 Economist (2019b) A migrant move in Malta. The EU reaches a tentative deal to share out migrants rescued at sea. The Economist, 24 Sep 2019

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Espaliu C (2018) Taking European defence seriously: the naval operations of the European Union as a model for a Security and Defence Union, Cuadernos europeos de Deusto, pp 157–183 Espaliú Berdud C (2019) Los buques de la Operación Sophia en el dique seco: elementos de un revés para la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, vol 64, 2019, pp 829–858. http://www.cepc.gob.es/publicaciones/revistas/revistaselectronicas? IDR=4&IDN=1425&IDA=38839 EU Court of Justice (2015) Decision 2015/1601 of the EU Court of Justice on the application of a system of quotes in the republication of refugees EU European Parliament (2013) Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. http://www.ipo.gov.ie/en/ipo/pages/eu_dublin_ regulations Fernández Arriba J (2019) El maridaje perverso entre las mafias libias de tráfico de personas y las ONG, ABC, 8 Sept 2019 Fernández-Sebastián M (2018) Maritime dimension in the fight against illegal migration on the Western Mediterranean route. In: Ramirez JM, Biziewski J (eds) (2019) Security and defence in Europe. Springer, Cham, pp 165–176 Gaceta (2017) Eslovaquia y la reubicación de Refugiados, La Gaceta. https://gaceta.es/europa/ eslovaquia-reubicacion-refugiados-25062017-1659-20170626-0833/. Accessed 26 June 2017 Indelicato M (2019) Sbarchi? Un nuovo schiavismo, Il Giornale.it, 07 Apr 2019 Kurz S (2018) (referred in ABC, 9/9, 2018) Leguina Joaquín (2019) Migraciones sin respuestas. ABC 10(9):2019 Liebig T (2018) Alemania busca extranjeros para 1, 2 millones de empleos, El País, 20 dic. 2018 Lindhard T (2018) How to stop migration towards big cities? Research gate. https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_stop_migration_towards_big_cities#view= 5d6388220f95f15c270003d3. Accessed 26 Aug 2018 Mbimio L (2019) Mundo Negro, Madrid, October 2019 Milanovic B (2018) La inevitable migración hacia Europa, El Pais, 18 Nov 18) Musumeci G, di Nicola A (2016) Confessioni di un trafficante di uomini. Reverse Niño Elena (2019) Terrorismo e inmigración: cambiando el foco. Artículo 30:2019 Palacio A (2019a) Lazos y nudos con Marruecos, El Mundo, 11 Feb 2019 Palacio A (2019b) Europe’s Partnership with Morocco. Proyect Syndicate, 29 Jul 2019 Pellegrini P (2018) Future of Europe. News. European Parliament, 12 Mar 2018 Pius XII (1952) Apostolic constitution Exsul Familia Nazarethana, Castel Gandolfo Portes A (2019) Princess of Asturias of social sciences award (17 October 2019) Ramirez JM (2016) Realismo vs. Buenismo ante el Problema de los Refugiados, Migraciones en el siglo XXI: Riesgos y Oportunidades, Comunicaciones, Publicaciones Ministerio de Defensa, pp 309–320 Ramirez, JM (2017). Terrorismo yihadista e Islam. In: Claudio A. Payá & Fernando Tomé (eds) El Terrorismo como Desafío a la Seguridad Global. Thompson Reuters ARANZADI, pp 211–222 Ramirez JM (2019) The refugees issue in the frame of the European security: a realistic approach. In: Ramirez JM, Biziewski J (eds) Security and defence in Europe. Springer, pp 47–62 Robles P (2019) Bondad y buenismo, ABC, 14 ago Sarah R (2019) Le soir approche et déjà le jour baisse, Fayard Sarah R (2019) Interview at Valeurs Actuelles, 5 Apr 2019 ˘ Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (Turkish: Göç ˙Idaresi Genel Müdürlügü) (2019) Migration Management, 24 Sept 2019 Umar O (2019) Viaje al país de los blancos, Plaza & Janés UN Global Compact for Migration (2018) Global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration. Marraquesh, 19 Dec 2018 UNHCR (2017) Global trends: forced displacement in 2017. Accessed from http://www.unhcr.org Zalba Pablo (2014) Reflexiones europeas a mitad de camino. Una visión sobre Europa, EIUNSA, p 2014

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J. Martín Ramírez Chair of the Center for Conflict Studies and Honorary Professor at Nebrija University, Dr. Martin Ramirez is also Fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science and Chair of CICA International Foundation and of the Spanish Pugwash Movement (Peace Nobel Price 1995). He studied Medicine, Humanities, and Law, obtaining a Ph.D. degree in Medicine and Surgery (Neurosciences) and in Philosophy (Education) as well as three Diplomas and a Master in National Defense at the Spanish CESEDEN. Research Fellow of International Security Program of the Harvard University and Visiting Fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. Several times official of the Boarding Council of the International Society for Research on Aggression (ISRA), he is member of the Advisory Board of the Society for Terrorism Research and of the Professors World Peace Academy. He has also chaired the Complutense Research Group on Sociopsychobiology of Aggression and the Departments of Psychobiology at the Seville and Complutense Universities, as well as being Director of the Rector Office at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Dr. Martin Ramirez was a Humboldt and Fullbright Fellow, in Ruhr University and Stanford, respectively, and is author of more than 500 publications, among books and articles.

The Role of NATO Federico Yaniz

Outline 1 Evolving Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Cooperative Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Partnership Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Security Concerns Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Deterrence and Collective Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 New Paradigm in Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Resilience and Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract NATO, the most successful defensive alliance in history, was born in 1949 and through its already long life has been able to adapt to the evolving security environment. At the end of the second decade of the XXI Century, NATO needs again to adapt its doctrine end structures not only for an ever-changing security environment but also for the appearance of a new model of security that has to assure the resilience not only of defence structures and military units but also of civil structures, public services and essential resources. Today to preserve the continuity of proper functioning of services is on the first line of security and defence for modern societies. But there are other factors that must be considered to understand the very relevant paradigm shift in security in NATO on its 70 years of life. The Washington Treaty (see Epilogue) (NATO 1949) was signed by 12 countries on the 4th of April 1949. Seventy years later the 6th of February 2019 the Permanent Representatives of the 29 member countries of the Alliance signed (see Epilogue) (NATO 2019) the Accession Protocol for the future Republic of North Macedonia. There have been 17 Accession Protocols signed before this one and as a matter of fact, Article In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2019 Springer International. Submitted: September 28, 2019; Accepted: January 11, 2020. F. Yaniz (B) EuroDefence-Spain, Apartado 50359, 28080 Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_11

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10 of the Treaty has been the most frequently used during the 70 years of life of the Alliance. Although the Washington Treaty has not been modified since 1949, the Atlantic Alliance security model has changed significantly through the years, especially since 1989. Keywords NATO · Atlantic alliance · Summit · Strategic concept · Partnership for peace · Mediterranean dialogue · NATO-Russia council · NATO-Ukraine charter

1 Evolving Security Model The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 marked the beginning of a new era on the European security model and by extension on the global security paradigm in the whole world. NATO was able to respond swiftly and properly to the totally new security environment. The Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance NATO (1990), issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The London Declaration”) on 5–6 July 1990, was a pivotal moment in the history of the Alliance. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner recognized the significance of the moment: “The Cold War belongs to history. Our Alliance is moving from confrontation to cooperation.” The London Declaration was NATO response to the dramatic changes in the security environment that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. NATO’s Heads of State and Government at the already mentioned meeting in London in July 1990, agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance maintaining in force the basic principles that inspired the Washington Treaty and they made an in-depth strategic review. The result was NATO’s first unclassified Strategic Concept. In November 1991, the Strategic Concept was released to the public and although maintained the security of its members (collective defence) as its essential purpose, it sought also to improve and expand security for the whole of Europe in cooperation with former Warsaw pact countries. Nuclear forces were reduced to a minimum level, enough to preserve stability and peace. Its article 57 gives a short and meaningful description of the Strategic Concept: This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order. NATO Strategic Concept, Article 57 1991

After that announcement of a major transformation and new approach to security, the seeds of the new Cooperative security policy were sown during the Rome Summit that took place in the capital of Italy on November 7th and 8th 1991. Article 2 of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (NATO 1991) is a message of hope for all Europeans:

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The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members’ security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity. Rome Declaration (1991)

To materialize the creation of a new community of values, in the above-mentioned Rome Declaration was announced the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the forum which served for five years as the focal point for cooperation between NATO and its new Partners. Article 11 of the Rome Declaration states: Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. Rome Declaration (1991)

After the meeting Secretary General Wörner wrote “The meeting of Alliance Heads of State and Government in Rome on 7 and 8 November 1991 marks a watershed not only in the history of NATO but also of Europe.” On 20 December 1991, the NACC met for the first time, the same day on which the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The NACC was established as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact countries and was a tangible manifestation of the “hand of friendship” extended at the July 1990 summit meeting in London. Eleven former Soviet republics of the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were invited to participate in the NACC. Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the NACC in 1992. Very soon Central Asian republics joined the Council. Albania also joined in 1992. On its first years of life, the consultations within the NACC focused on post-Cold War era security issues, such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. Regional conflicts that were breaking out in parts of the former Soviet Union were under the attention of the NACC that those years paid also attention to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The NACC was a pioneer body in many ways. Multilateral political consultation and cooperation helped build confidence in the early 1990s, preparing the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. The PfP program offered partners the possibility to develop practical bilateral cooperation with NATO, choosing their own priorities for that cooperation. Initially, invitation to join the PfP was addressed to all states participating in the NACC and to other states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation (from 1995 the Organization for Security and Cooperation, OSCE). Article 13 of the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council that took place the 10 and 11 of January of

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1994 in Brussels (see Epilogue) (NATO 1994) states: “We have decided to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership—a Partnership for Peace.” The purpose of this initiative was: Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the PfP, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation. Brussels Summit Declaration (1994, Article 16)

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council replaced the NACC in 1997. This change reflected NATO Allies’ desire to build a cooperative security forum for the increasingly complex relationships being developed with partner countries. At that time, I had the opportunity to witness the eagerness of many partners to deepen their cooperation with NATO, in the area of defense reform. At the same time, several partners were those years already supporting the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 Cooperative Relationships Since January 1994, NATO’s cooperative relationships have evolved and today are not limited to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. The NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in December 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The Mediterranean Dialogue aims to contribute to regional security and stability, to achieve better mutual understanding between its members, and to dispel any misconceptions about NATO. Another NATO’s cooperative relationship is the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative that was launched at the Alliance’s Summit in June 2004 in the Turkish city of Istanbul. It aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with the Alliance. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates are the four non allied countries involved in ICI. To improve relations between NATO and partners, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was launched in the NAC ministerial meeting at Sintra on May 29, 1997. The EAPC is a multilateral forum successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and it works alongside PfP created in 1994. NATO-Russia relations started after the end of the Cold War, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace program (1994). Russia is still a member of PfP but the formal basis for its special

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relation with the Alliance was provided by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Dialogue and cooperation were strengthened with the establishment of the NATORussia Council (NRC) at the NATO-Russia Summit in Pratica di Mare (south of Rome) on 28 May 2002. For more than 20 years, NATO has made significant efforts to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Cooperation was suspended in response to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, which the Allies condemn in the strongest terms. NATO ministers of Foreign affairs made on April 1st 2014 the following statement: We have decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Our political dialogue in the NATO-Russia council can continue as necessary, at the ambassadorial level and above to allow us to exchange views, first and foremost in this crisis. We will review NATO’s relations with Russia at our next meeting in June… NATO ministers of Foreign Affairs, July 2014

Nevertheless, political and military channels of communication have remained open. The NATO-Russia Council met the 19th of April of 2016 for the first time since June 2014. Two more meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place in 2016, three in 2017; two in 2018; and, to date, one in 2019. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful political dialogue with Russia based on reciprocity. After the NATO Summit in Brussels (see Epilogue) (NATO 2018b) in July 2018, allied leaders declared: We remain open to a periodic, focused, and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC. With a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, an to increase transparency and predictability. NATO Summit in Brussels, 11-12 July 2018

Ukraine started cooperation after the end of the Cold War, when after its independence Ukraine joined in 1991 the NACC and PfP in 1994. The 9 of July 1997, at the NATO Summit in Madrid took place the signing ceremony of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine (NATO 1997b), which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to strength relations and to take cooperation forward (NATO 1997a). A new Declaration of 2009 to complement the NATO-Ukraine Charter mandated the NUC, through Ukraine’s Annual National Programme, to take forward reforms aimed at implementing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Cooperation has deepened since then and is considered mutually beneficial. Furthermore, Ukraine contributes in a significant way to NATO-led missions and operations. Comprehensive reform in the security and defence sector is considered the most important item in Ukraine’s Annual Program. The Alliance has reinforced its support for capability development and capacity building in Ukraine in response to Russian-Ukraine conflict. Since the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO’s practical support for Ukraine has been subsumed in the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). NATO-Georgia relations started after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Georgia joined the NACC (1992) and PfP (1994). The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was established in September 2008 to serve as a forum for both

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political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia to become NATO member. A Framework Document was signed by NATO’s Secretary General and the Georgian Prime Minister on 15 September 2008 in Tbilisi. The inaugural session took place immediately afterwards, during the visit of the NAC to Georgia. The NGC provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Georgia on the process of reforms and on regional security issues. In December 2008, NATO decided to further enhance work under the NGC through the development of an Annual National Programme (ANP). The ANP, which was finalised in spring 2009, replaced the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), in force since 2004. Today the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for close political dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Georgia in support of the country’s reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. NATO maintains also relations with partners across the globe and cooperates with a number of countries which are not part of its formal partnership frameworks that have been mentioned above [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)]. In fact, in addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. The countries with which NATO has relations on individual basis are often referred to as “Partners across the globe”, these countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way. The partners across the globe include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. As a whole NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with 41 countries and engages actively with other international actors and organizations on wide range security-related issues. NATO cooperates mainly with the following international organizations: United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In July 1997, Heads of State and Government agreed at the NATO Summit in Madrid (NATO 1997a) that the Strategic Concept of 1991 should be reviewed to ensure that it remained consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges. The North Atlantic Council was requested to initiate the work to be completed for its approval at the Summit in Washington in 1999, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary: The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges … This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link. NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999

Allied leaders adopted in Washington the 1999 Strategic Concept which recognised the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It identified also the new risks that had emerged

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since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. In fact, a significant paradigm shifts on security. The 1999 Strategic Concept stated that the Alliance’s fundamental tasks were security, consultation, and deterrence and defence, adding that crisis management and partnership are also essential to enhancing security and stability. The Concept called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for all type of Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations. It also stated that the Alliance would maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. As described above, NATO is actively engaged in cooperative security activities with many partners from Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the Gulf regions as well as individual countries from across the globe. NATO’s partners also comprise international organizations, including the UN, the EU, the OSCE and other international actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Partners cooperate with NATO in a very broad range of security-related areas and, when taking part in a NATO cooperation program, they can take advantage of a Partnership Cooperation Menu comprising approximately 1,400 activities. A significant number of initiatives are opened to all partners, allowing them to cooperate bilaterally with NATO beyond existing regional partnership frameworks. The cooperative initiatives focus mainly on interoperability and building capabilities and include supporting defense and security related reform activities. Hundreds of meetings take place every year with the participation of partners in many different NATO bodies at all levels. The partnership tools comprise, for instance, the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The areas in which partners cooperate with NATO include defense reform, demobilization and reintegration, cyber defense, education and training, logistics and disarmament. Some new tools for cooperation have been launched recently and are presented below.

3 Partnership Policy NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 identifies “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s three essential core tasks. It states that the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and international organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks. Many of NATO’s formal Partners as well as other non-member countries offer substantial capabilities and political support for Alliance operations and missions. A focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy was launched at the Lisbon Summit to make dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. This resulted in a new partnership policy, which was endorsed by NATO Foreign Ministers

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at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011. As mentioned in the Strategic Council “the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security” by contributing to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. NATO has launched through the years a significant number of initiates aim to deepen NATO’s security cooperation with partners. To deepen cooperation with partners, the Allies launched two initiatives at the Wales Summit in 2014. One of them is the Partnership Interoperability Initiative that aims to maintain and deepen the ability of partner forces to work alongside Allies. This initiative recognizes the essential role that partners play in addressing security threats. The other initiative is the defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCB) that builds on NATO’s extensive record in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building support of the Alliance. NATO agreed to extent this initiative to Georgia, Jordan and Moldova. DCB is aimed at reinforcing NATO’s commitment to partner nations and helping the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces. The DCB Initiative reinforces NATO’s commitment to partners helping them to improve their defense and related security capacities, as well as their resilience, and, therefore, contributes to the security of the Alliance. It can provide various types of support, from strategic advice on defense and security sector reform and institution building, to the development of local forces through education and training. The complexity of today’s peace-support and stabilization operations and the multifaceted nature of 21st century security challenges call for a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military instruments. The DCB packages for Georgia, Iraq, Jordan and the Republic of Moldova are working quite well. Allies approved a DCB package for Tunisia at the Brussels Summit in July 2018. Building Integrity (BI) was launched by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) with the aim to develop institutional capabilities in key areas. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, Building Integrity established as a NATO education and training discipline within the framework of the Allied Command Transformation (ATC) Global Programming. NATO’s BI Policy was endorsed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (see Epilogue) (NATO 2018a) in July 2016: Corruption and poor governance are security challenges which undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, Allies, and partners alike. To further our work in this area, today we endorsed a new NATO Building Integrity Policy which reaffirms our conviction that transparent and accountable defence institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation. NATO Summit in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016

The document NATO Building Integrity Policy (NATO 2016b), endorsed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016 give us the basic principles that aims BI Policy: The NATO Building Integrity policy, described in this document, draws upon experience gained through the implementation of the Building Integrity Programme launched in 2007

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by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The NATO Building Integrity Programme is part of NATO’s commitment to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability in the defence and related security sector. Integrity is the link between behaviour and principles. In institutional terms, integrity is directly linked to good governance. Reinforcing an institution’s integrity is a question of institutionalising the principles that we want the institution to stand for, as well as a question of socialising these norms and values among its personnel. NATO Summit in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016

The BI activities are open to NATO Allies, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Partners across the globe including Colombia. BI promotes good practices and provides participating countries with tailored expertise and support to make defence and security institutions more effective and efficient. The Building Integrity policy supports NATO’s priorities on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and related resolutions, on Women, Peace and Security. Therefore, the gender perspective will be imbedded into the NATO BI tools and programme of activities. The already quoted NATO BI Policy document makes clear that: “NATO Building Integrity is in line with the NATO Partnership policy. It will continue to strengthen the synergies with partnership tools such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP), the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) and the Professional Development Programme (PDP). NATO Building Integrity will also continue to contribute to the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI) and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII).

4 Security Concerns Today To understand NATO security concerns today it is very useful to take a close look to the document the Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security (see Epilogue) (NATO 2016c) issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016. This interesting document begins with a list of security challenges: “terrorism…; Russia’s actions, especially in Ukraine, …; and the instability in the Middle East and North Africa.” And then, the declaration makes a clear statement: We stand together, and act together, to ensure the defence of our territory and populations, and of our common values. United by our enduring transatlantic bond, and our commitment to democracy, individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law, NATO will continue to strive for peace, security and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security, Warsaw 8-9 July 2016

The declaration continues stating that the decisions taken in Warsaw, will make NATO stronger in defence and deterrence and will be able to do more to project stability beyond the borders of the Alliance. NATO’s fundamental responsibility is collective defence and its deterrence and defence is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence

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capabilities. That deterrence and defence is against threats from any direction. NATO will enhance the presence in the Eastern part of the Alliance building on the Readiness Action Plan (see Epilogue) (NATO 2017a). NATO is bolstering defences and resilience against cyber-attacks and hybrid threats furthermore the Alliance is increasing its defence against ballistic missile attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. All measures are defensive, and NATO remains committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. NATO poses no threat to any country and remains ready for a meaningful dialogue with Russia and continues to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible. Allied countries are united against terrorism, which represents an immediate and direct threat to our nations and to the international community. We are ready to do more to help our partners provide for their own security. NATO will step up political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa. NATO will enhance training and capacity building for Iraq, and NATO AWACS aircraft will be made available to support the Counter-ISIL Coalition. NATO countries sustain their support to Afghanistan, a partner to which we are committed for the long term. NATO will provide more support to Ukraine and Georgia, will continue to assist the Republic of Moldova and will deepen our engagement with partners in the Black and Baltic Sea regions, and in the Western Balkans. NATO will also maintain our operation in Kosovo. Strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union is increasingly essential for the security of our nations and the EuroAtlantic area. NATO remains committed to NATO’s Open-Door policy, which has contributed to Euro-Atlantic security and we look forward to welcoming Montenegro, to our community of values. Our Alliance faces complex and evolving security challenges. NATO will continue to assess changes in the security environment and continue to adapt to play its essential roles, based on the enduring transatlantic bond that unites our countries. The Brussels declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity (NATO 2018a) is a comprehensive document issued after the 2018 NATO summit that took place in Brussels on the 11 and 12 of July 2018. The Brussels and the Warsaw declarations on Transatlantic Security have 13 articles, some of them almost identical. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention some significant changes on the emphasis put in the two texts. In fact, the language of the Brussels declaration is in general stronger and the document begins with a clear and forceful statement: NATO guarantees the security of our territory and populations, our freedom, and the values we share – including democracy, individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law. Our Alliance embodies the enduring and unbreakable transatlantic bond between Europe and North America to stand together against threats and challenges from any direction. This includes the bedrock commitment to collective defense set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO will continue to strive for peace, security and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area… Brussels declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity, 11 July 2018

The 2018 Brussels declaration, points out also the most significant security challenges that NATO must address:

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Russia is challenging the rules-based international order by destabilizing Ukraine including through the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea; it is violating international law, conducting provocative military activities, and attempting to undermine our institutions and sow disunity. In any case, NATO countries continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible. At the same time, a multitude of threats emanate from NATO’s Southern periphery. While significant progress has been made in defeating ISIS/Daesh, terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to threaten Allies and the international community and to undermine stability. Instability contributes to irregular migration, trafficking and other challenges for our countries. Allies stand firmly in unity and solidarity in the fight against terrorism. Brussels declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity, July 2018

In the 2018 Brussels declaration special attention is also given to funding: Real progress has been made across NATO since our last Summit in Warsaw, with more funding by all Allies for defense, more investment in capabilities, and more forces in operations. But even if we have turned a corner, we need to do more, and there will be further progress. We are committed to the Defence Investment Pledge agreed in 2014, and we will report annually on national plans to meet this Pledge. Brussels declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity, July 2018

5 Deterrence and Collective Defense Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and collective defense based on “an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities” is an idea present in both documents. However, in the Brussels declaration of 2018 it is added: “Today we are strengthening further our deterrence and the collective of all NATO territory and population, building on our Forward Presence …” and that allies have agreed an “adapted and strengthened NATO Command Structure.” NATO is also strengthening its capacity to prepare against, deter and respond to hybrid threats and to make our societies more resilient against them. Nevertheless, NATO is fully committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The fight against terrorism is also present in the 2018 Brussels declaration with special attention to the establishment of a training mission in Iraq and to NATO assistance to the Afghan Security Forces as the Afghan Government makes a significant “political effort to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. NATO will also do more to help Allies to tackle terrorism at home and to provide advice and support to partners, including through the new Hub for the South. Furthermore, allies have agreed a “Package on the South” to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation “with our partners in the region, including Jordan and Tunisia.” The support for Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine is expressed in almost identical terms in both declarations. However, in the Brussels declaration appears also Bosnia and Herzegovina and that allies “will also boost NATO’s cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea, as well as with our partners in

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the Black Sea, Western Balkans and Mediterranean regions, each of which is important to Alliance security. We are maintaining our important operation in Kosovo.” NATO will remain a transatlantic alliance and maintaining the transatlantic link will be essential for its future. However, “NATO will retain its global perspective.” In both declarations appears the statement: “The NATO-EU strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area.” In the Brussels Summit declaration, the leaders of NATO welcome the Joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation signed on the 10 of July 2018 by the NATO Secretary General and the Presidents of the European Council and Commission (EU-NATO 2018), which sets out the significant progress being made in NATO-EU cooperation. In this document it is stressed the importance to focus on implementation and that NATO and the EU will aim for swift and demonstrable progress in: “military mobility, counter terrorism, strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related risks and in promoting the women peace and security agenda.” NATO allies consider that the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund are going to contribute to bolster European security and defense. This very positive vision of NATO-EU cooperation must be put in prospective, and Stoltenberg made clear some caveats to that cooperation in his intervention the 13th of February 2019 at the 55th Munich Security Conference (MSC). In response to a question of the moderator, the SG made some interesting comments: I really believe that by developing new capabilities, by addressing the fragmentation of the European defense industry, by increasing defense spending, that will be good, of course, for European Allies, for Europe, for the European Union and for NATO. There is no contradiction. So, and therefore I also welcome, of course, close cooperation between NATO and the European Union. (…) But my message, and that answers also the question about duplication, is that we have only single set forces, we have limited resources, and we cannot duplicate each other. (…) I welcome stronger EU efforts on defense, and I welcome stronger European unity. But European unity cannot substitute for transatlantic unity. And sometimes there is this misperception out there, that EU efforts, or European efforts on defense is something which is an alternative, can replace NATO. That’s not the case. Stoltenberg, Munich 13 February 2019

Both, Warsaw and Brussels, declarations on Transatlantic Security point out the idea that NATO’s Open-Door policy strengthens the Alliance and contributes to EuroAtlantic security. In the 2016 declaration, Montenegro, then newest member, was welcomed to the Alliance and in the 2018 document, the agreement between Athens and Skopje was also warmly welcomed. NATO faces complex security challenges and will continue to modernize the Alliance to be able to act at the speed required. NATO’s policies to support for Women, Peace and Security agenda and for the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict, are a demonstration of the determination of allies to improve the Alliance’s role in those areas.

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6 New Paradigm in Security It is a fact that NATO strategy has evolved dramatically trough the last 70 years. Some of the changes in NATO strategy have been made and must be updated in order to address the appearance of new threats that the progress in technology has made possible. Furthermore, the evolution of modern societies has made necessary to consider new issues in relation with security and defense, as many analysts consider that in world of today the first line of defense is resilience. The rapid growing use of the outer space is creating many opportunities for progress and economic advance, but it is also a new source of risks and possible threats. Finally, the evolution of the strategic environment is an ever-present classic reason to update any model in security and defense. New technologies are changing everyday life of people all over the world. A new technology like cybernetics, is behind a very significant improvement in communications and information. At the same time, digitally based communication and information systems are the subject of new threats and risks. Cyber threats continue to evolve and new cyber-attacks against NATO members have made clear the need to strengthen cyber defense. Since the Warsaw Summit in 2016 (NATO 2016a), cyberspace is considered by NATO a domain of operations just as air, land and sea: “Now, in Warsaw, we reaffirm NATO’s defensive mandate, and recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.” NATO’s actions in cyberspace are defensive and in line with international law. In the Brussels Summit Declaration¡ (NATO 2018b), NATO makes clear that: “We are determined to deliver strong national cyber defences through full implementation of the Cyber Defense Pledge (see Epilogue) (NATO 2016d), which is central to enhancing cyber resilience and raising the costs of a cyber-attack.” Since 12 February 2019, NATO cyber defenders have a new community launched by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). This new community is the first step toward the creation of a Cyber Security Collaboration Hub. One of the key roles of NATO in cyber space is to act as a hub for information sharing, training and expertise. Space-based capabilities are becoming increasingly important for NATO operations in all areas but specially in the field of early warning, ground surveillance, intelligence and navigation. NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP 3.3 (B)) (2017) (NATO 2017b) gives a comprehensive definition of the role of space in operations: Space support to operations includes all activities that provide capabilities through space in order to support NATO operations. Space is congested, contested and competitive. Freedom to act in the space domain and employ space capabilities is crucial to the outcome of conflicts. NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP 3.3 (B) (2017), Chapter 5.1.1.

The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) is sponsored by 16 NATO nations, providing experienced officials, called Subject Matter Experts (SME). The JAPCC chooses the most suitable SMEs for the task and combines their knowledge and experience to fully contribute to transforming NATO’s Air&Space (A&S) Power (NATO 2014). The JAPCC is not constrained by the need for consensus in developing

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ideas and can offer independent military advice across the spectrum of A&S Power to NATO HQs and national policy-making bodies. The Alliance must develop a more focused space policy, legislators from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly insisted during its four-day 64th annual session, held in Halifax (Canada) 16-19 November 2018. French Senator Jean-Marie Bockel (see Epilogue) [Bockel (2018)] presented a draft resolution urging NATO governments to adopt a series of policy recommendations. The recommendations were approved in the NATO PA’s Economic and Security Committee and were adopted by the whole Assembly on November 19th, at the end of its four-day annual session becoming Resolution 449 (NATO 2018c) on opportunities and challenges in a changing space arena. In article 11-point f, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly urged member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: “to encourage NATO to develop a focused space policy, interoperability and capability sharing across the Alliance, not because space will be the next frontier of conflict, but because NATO capabilities are increasingly dependent upon space-based assets.”

7 Resilience and Budgets Resilience is the ability to recover strength, spirits, etc. quickly. Although the idea behind this word has been present in NATO since the 4th of April 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the actual word has not been used very often till recently. It is considered that the concept of resilience is embedded in article 3 of the Treaty where: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” In the Strategic Concept (NATO 2010) for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, November 2010, the word resilience appears once: “All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption.” Today, resilience can be considered a link between security and defence. In the Warsaw Summit Communiqué resilience appears 16 times and article 73 is dedicated to explaining the position of NATO on this topic: Today we have made a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience and to maintain and further develop our individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian

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infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means. In this context, we welcome the Resilience Guidelines approved by Defence Ministers in June 2016. Warsaw Summit, 8-9 July 2016

As a matter of fact resilience became a leading topic for the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. We need to recall that civil preparedness (civil emergency planning during the Cold War) was quite well organized then, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall the structure and capabilities dedicated to civil preparedness were reduced dramatically. The evolving strategic environment since 2014 has made necessary to improve resilience of NATO and NATO members. The document Commitment to enhance resilience (NATO 2016e), issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, establishes that: “Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.” At the Warsaw Summit In 2016, Allied chiefs of state and government committed to enhancing resilience by trying to achieve seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Assured continuity of government and critical government services Resilient energy supplies Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people Resilient food and water resources Ability to deal with mass casualties Resilient civil communications systems Resilient civil transportation systems.

The commitment was based on the recognition that the strategic environment has changed, and that the resilience of civil structures, resources and services is the first line of defence for today’s modern societies. In the Brussels Summit Declaration (July 2019), the word resilience is used eight times. The first one is very illustrative of the general use of the word today in relation with security and defence: “While nations retain the primary responsibility for their domestic security and their own resilience, NATO adds value and has a role to play, in complementarity with wider international efforts and in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Cooperation within the Alliance can enhance Allies’ national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism.” The Budget Committee recommendations for 2019 Military Budget (NATO 2018d) and 2019 Civil Budgets were presented to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) considering the less stable and predictable security environment. At a meeting of the NAC on Tuesday (18 December 2018), Allies agreed a civil budget of e250.5 million and a military budget of e1.395 billion for 2019. All member countries contribute to these budgets, according to an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income. In the face of a more demanding security environment, NATO continues to adapt—including through the modernization of the NATO Command Structure, and a functional review of the Alliance’s Headquarters in Brussels. The 2019 Military Budget sees continuation of the increases in the NATO Command Structure Entities

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and Programmes (18% since 2016, Appendix 6) and for key strategic capabilities (NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force + NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force). The Budget Committee (BC), in addition to normal reallocation during execution, recognizes it will need to adjust the budgets during 2019 to accommodate potential changes relating to the NATO Command Structure Adaptation (NCS-A) and development of other initiatives, such as the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI). During the final preparation of its 2019 recommendations, the Budget Committee has taken some decisions to allow the Military Budget, particularly the NATO Command Structure Entities and Programmes and Allied Operations and Missions budget groups, to maintain continuity of operations while conforming to the late planning direction received. It has funded emergent major increases related to cyber defence (NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)). On the 2019 Civil Budget the attribution of funding for 2019 continuous to reflect the three NATO core tasks: crisis management and operations, collective defence and cooperative security.

8 Final Remarks The Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon the 19–20 November 2010, is still the official guidance for the evolution of NATO “so that it continues to be effective in a changing world”. Nevertheless, since 2010 the strategic environment has evolved in a very significant way. The concern of NATO about the violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was expressed in a clear way by Mr. Stoltenberg Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance in his intervention at the 55th Munich Security Conference (MSC) that took place from February 15–17, 2019. In relation with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) he said: The problem was that what also continued was the deployment of new Russian missiles. And at some stage this is not working, because if we have a treaty which is violated by one side and respected by the other, then that treaty doesn’t deliver security. Then it’s not a real arms control treaty. And therefore, we have raised it with Russia, at different levels. … And I think we have to understand that not only United States, but several Allies, have independently determined that Russia is in violation. There are no new US missiles in Europe but there are more and more Russian missiles in Europe. … In December all Allies agreed that Russia was in violation. All Allies supported the US decision to start the withdrawal process within 60 days, if Russia didn’t come back. Now they haven’t come back and United States have started the withdrawal process. That leaves then, six months for Russia to come back. So, again, come back to compliance with the INF Treaty. That’s the best way to reduce tensions and to avoid an arms race. Stoltenberg, Munich, 13 February 2019

The MSC brought together decision-makers from many different countries. Some relevant issues in the agenda were the possible renewed great power competition, the future of transatlantic relations, European defence, and the role of medium and

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small countries in international affairs. The MSC 2019 Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger delivered a paper, on February 13, stressing the idea that we must think about how we can preserve the core pieces of the international order. He finished his intervention with a no very positive assessment: Unfortunately, this situation has not improved over the last year – quite the contrary. From climate protection and free international trade to respect for human rights and the inviolability of national borders: the core pieces of the international order are breaking apart, without it being clear whether anyone can pick them up – or even wants to. Wolfgang Ischinger, Munich, 13 February 2019

Having in mind the unstable situation of the international order and the dramatic change of the strategic environment, some experts think that it is almost time for NATO to have a new Strategic Concept. I concur with the opinion that since 2014 there have been dramatic changes on the security situation in Europe and in MENA. These changes and the developments in the Asia-Pacific region makes it advisable to adapt the strategic foundations of the Atlantic Alliance to the new situation. But there are also other strong reasons to have a new Strategic Council. Some of them, without asking for a new Strategic Concept, were named by NATO Secretary General at the World Economic Forum (Stoltenberg 2019) in Davos, 24 January 2019: So, we have to do collective defence. Provide security in a very different world where we have many threats, many challenges at the same time. Cyber, terrorism. We have proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction. We have tendencies to great power competition between China, Russia, United States. And we have also a Russia which is much more assertive, responsible for aggressive actions from the Kerch Strait to the streets of Salisbury using their agent there. So, we have to do fundamentally the same in a very different security environment. The good news is that NATO is adapting and that is the reason why we should celebrate is that NATO has been able to change while the world is changing. We have implemented the biggest reinforcement of collective defence since the end of the Cold War with higher readiness of our forces. Stoltenberg and Davos January 2019

There are other good reasons to review the Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010. Among them: the use of new technologies for rogue attacks and the need of proper defence against them; the uncertainty about the treaties on nuclear forces; the greater importance of space-based capabilities for defence; and the need to address seriously resilience against attack or disruption. With a new Strategic Concept and the updating of related documents, NATO would complete a paradigm shift in security.

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Federico Yaniz joined the Air Force Academy and, after several operational and logistical assignments, in 1986 he graduated as Staff Officer, being assigned to the Air Force Staff. In 1991, after receiving his diploma as Joint Staff officer, he got a planning position at the Joint Staff of Armed Forces. In the summer of 1993, he joined the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters. After being promoted to General in 1997, general Yaniz was appointed Chief of the Second Division of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. In June 2001 he joined the International Military Staff as Assistant Director for Cooperation and Regional Security. During those four years he was very active in implementing NATO initiatives Partnership for Peace and the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialog. In 2006, he was appointed Director of the Museo de Aeronáutica y Astronáutica. General Yaniz has a Doctor degree in Ciencias de la Empresa, a Master in Statistics plus many other diplomas and qualifications. He obtained a degree in journalism in 1973 and is an experienced journalist. He is the author of five books, has collaborated in many others and has written more than 300 articles mainly related with Strategy, Aeronautics, Economics and History. Doctor Yaniz belongs to several nonprofit associations and he is vice-president of Eurodefense-España and member of the Board of the Atlantic Council of Spain. He has a monthly section on the Air Force magazine on NATO affairs and on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Unión. Dr. Yaniz is very active on strategic issues and he has made many presentations and has given many lectures on NATO affairs, European defense issues and Aviation history. Since May 2019, general Yaniz is a member of the Academy of Military Arts and Sciences (ACAMI).

European Union’s Strategic Autonomy Jacek Ochman and Jerzy Biziewski

Outline 1 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All Creative Policies, Great and Small . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 State of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 USA: In or Out? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Economy and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 New Level of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Bone of Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Military Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Strategy We Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract It is hardly to understand, why the European Union (EU), an organisation of 27 member states on a single continent with close economic and cultural links, with a population of almost 450 million, does not have its own effective instrument for implementing security and defence policy. Its dependence on the USA in this respect has not given rise to much refection so far. The general detente and relative state of security after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact corresponded to the European elite, recognising that Europe is basically free of external threats. This made it possible A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: January, 14, 2020; accepted: January, 17, 2020. J. Ochman Independent Strategic Analyst, Gdynia, Poland e-mail: [email protected] J. Biziewski (B) Independent Strategic Analyst, Cracov, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_12

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to allocate more funds in favour of social development programmes at the expense of security and defence. It was only Russia’s actions against Georgia and Ukraine, internal integrity challenges, fading unipolar system and the uncontrolled infux of immigrants in the aftermath of the unrest in the Middle East and Northern Africa that caused anxiety among the European establishment, as the lack of effective tools for counteracting the threats facing the EU’s borders was exposed. The full strategic autonomy in the security and defence domain should be the middle-term future goal (10 years). The essential objective is the ability to take decisions and implement them within the whole spectrum of the provisions of Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, including the mutual defence task so far delegated to NATO and taken out of the prerogatives of the EU administration. This fundamental change requires from national political elites to be prepared to accept and support a federal structure of the organization and centralization of the governance. The European Union’s strategic autonomy does not cross NATO, on the contrary. Its achievement should strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance. In the new format, the NATO EU pillar would be one of the NATO’s regional hubs, together with NATO North Africa, NATO Middle East and NATO Asia if this organization is developed in this way. Other NATO pillars are not excluded. The NATO EU hub would primarily be responsible for European Union’s security and defence as well as promotion of peace and development in its neighbourhood working with partners. Keywords EU · Strategic autonomy · Threat assessment · Defence industry · Opportunities · Level of ambition

1 Introduction On August 7th, 2019, President Trump has expressed an opinion that protection of the allies in the Pacifc area costs the United States (USA) too much (Gould 2019). He also has voiced an opinion that the sum of 990 million dollars, which South Korea pays annually to the United States is not enough. He threatened that if the situation did not change, he shall withdraw some of the US forces from the region.1 Two days later, within an interview with the DPA agency, the ambassador of the USA in Germany has conveyed a similar message regarding the stationing of the US armed forces in Germany. He has also mentioned a possibility of moving a part of them to Poland (Jones 2019). The US does not deny that the presence of their armed forces in Europe or other geographical regions has absolutely nothing to do with friendship, loyalty towards the allies or defence of common values. All protected countries have to pay for remaining within the area of American infuence a measurable price of constant contribution to the American budget. With that being

1 Finally, South Korea paid in 2019 924 million USD, which marked 8.2% increase compared to the previous year. It covers roughly 50% of current costs of stationing of the United States Forces Korea, (USFK).

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said, one could ask some questions which should be answered by the policymakers of the European Union’s (EU) Member States: – Is it worth, in the long run, to pay the US for their protection and being aware that the price of it will be a subject to the laws of the market? – Will the trustworthiness of this protection lay within the common interest or only within the interest of the protecting country? – Accordingly, wouldn’t it be better to develop the EU’s own defence system that guarantees the EU’s decision-making independence and defends primarily the EU’s interests?

2 All Creative Policies, Great and Small The EU is not ideal organisation but, so far, we do not have better one. This structure is plagued by disputes between the elites of individual Member States (MS) presenting different threat assessments, ways of ensuring security and defence and other visions of development. The EU is also threatened by politicians pursuing their own makeshift business to maintain power at all costs. The EU as a monolith could play a leading role on a global scale, but because of the internal turmoil, its importance is limited, and its potential is not used on a full scale. The problem is to agree on a common foreign policy as well as a security and defence policy in the context of the clashing infuence of the leading superpowers on the Old Continent. Global powers and regional players are not interested in the existence of an effective structure of the European Union, as it is easier for them to achieve their own interests by playing each country individually. Brexit also gives additional arguments to populists who beneft from the EU and at the same time accuse it of everything wrong. The slow rebirth of the multi-polar world order raises the question of the future place and role of the EU. Until now, it has taken a principled stance on the observance of the peaceful coexistence and human rights, and has been increasingly active within the UN, which gives it legitimacy to continue to operate on a broader basis. Her cooperation with NATO can be an example of a harmonious division of tasks in the feld of security and defence despite the growing sense of dependence in this area. It seems logical, therefore, to adopt a vision of achieving strategic autonomy to participate in the global game on an equal footing with the great and the good. The problem is that the vision providers make self-limitations. This is due to the fear that some will see the Union as breaking the existing order and threatening NATO cohesion, while others will see it as a risk for their nearly reborn independence. This may not allow the fnal result to play its role and may deepen existing internal divisions. Achieving full strategic decision-making autonomy would allow for the integration of MS leading to a confederative structure similar to that of many other global players. This ambitious vision is likely to be met with suspicion or even reluctance

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by the US and parts of the MS that see NATO as the only Alliance providing collective defence. The ferment triggered by a new initiative may also be a signal to the authorities of the Russian Federation (RF), Turkey and China to take action to break up the unity of both the EU and NATO, which would allow for a change in the balance of powers in this part of the world.

2.1 State of Play The vision of the EU strategic autonomy in the feld of security and defence has been the subject of public debate by the EU’s political elite for years. Recently, two fundamental views on the necessary changes to the future security and defence architecture of the European Union have been extensively discussed. The frst one emphasizes the necessity of having a strategic autonomy (EEAS 2016a, b). It assumes an indepth cooperation with NATO, with simultaneous delegation of the responsibility of individual MS for the implementation of Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty (mutual defence/common defence) to NATO, as it has been done so far under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (European Parliament 2012; European Parliament 2016). However, the crux of the problem is that European Union would seek to achieve ‘certain autonomy’ to respond to external conficts and crises, building the capacities of partners, end protecting the Union and its citizens thus imposing a limitation on the desired state. For this purpose, mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), European Defence Fund (EDF) and European Peace Facility (EPF) have been activated2 (EU External Action 2018). The steps taken may contribute to a gradual improvement of the situation, but the weakness of this idea seems to be the undefned responsibility and role of EU bodies when Article 42.7 needs to be applied. Thus, at best, the EU can achieve only limited strategic autonomy in terms of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and this in relation to smaller-scale crisis tasks.3 This results directly from the Member States’ priority commitments to NATO. France, on its turn represents slightly different concept. President Emmanuel Macron, on the 26th September 2017 told to the auditorium at the Sorbonne University: The Europe of today is too weak, too slow, too ineffcient, but Europe alone can enable us to take action in the world, in the face of contemporary challenges. (…) European sovereignty requires constructing and we must do it. (…). In Europe, we are seeing a two-fold movement: 2 PESCO provides a framework for Member States to work closely together on common defence projects. CARD allows Member States to share their defence spending plans for greater coherence, to identify shortfalls or overlaps and possible economies of scale to be realized by working together. EDF will fnance joint military research and development. EPF will enable the funding of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy that have military or defence implications. 3 Only France presents some kind of strategic autonomy thank to its air and submarine components of nuclear deterrence. Concerning the conventional forces France is not be able to project power and autonomously sustain operations abroad on a large scale.

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gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States, and a long-term terrorist threat with the stated goal of splitting our free societies. (…) We need (…) to combat the fnancing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda online (…). In the area of defence, our aim needs to be ensuring Europe’s autonomous operating capabilities, in complement to NATO. (…) But we need to go further. (…) I propose (…) to build a common strategic culture, by proposing a European intervention initiative (…). At the beginning of the next decade, Europe needs to establish a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action. Macron (2017)

Moreover, within an interview with The Economist, President Macron concluded that: Europe with strengthened defence capability and enhanced sovereignty will better counterbalance the United States and China and should re-examine strategic partnerships, including with Russia. (…) Europe must become autonomous in terms of military strategy and capability. (…) We need to reopen a strategic dialogue, without being naïve and which take time, with Russia. Because what all this shows is that we need to reappropriate our neighbourhood policy, we cannot let it be managed by third parties who do not share the same interests. Macron (2019) and Baker (2019)

President Macron mentioned that it is not about a move to undermine the NATO agreement. However, recently he declared a problem of ‘NATO’s brain death’. In a similar tone the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel told the European Parliament: In light of the development of recent years, we should work on the Vision to one Day create a true European army. A common European army would show the world that there will never be another war between the European countries. That is not an army against NATO. It can be a good addition for NATO. Angela Merkel (2018)

The visions presented raise questions about the unclear message of the proposed changes and the potential implications for the functioning of both the EU and NATO. Their implementation takes place at a time of internal political disputes within the EU, revival of the super-powerful ambitions of the Russian Federation combined with political and economic interests of some political parties of European countries, the growing role of China in the Old Continent and its peripheries, worrying changes in Turkish policy and the growing infuence of the USA in Eastern Europe. A common risk assessment does not always correspond to the perception of risks by EU MS governments. Countries in the Mediterranean basin express concerns about the migration blackmail of Turkey linked to Kurdish political demands, increased control of gas felds in vicinity of Cyprus, and the possibility to circumvent sanctions against Russia. France and Hungary do not share the concerns of the Northern Flank (Finland, Sweden) and the Eastern Flank (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and insist on the need for rapprochement with Russia. The panic among the governments of the Northern and Eastern Flank states would be caused by Russia’s assumption of total control over Belarus. An immediate threat would push these governments to cooperate even more intensively with the US at all costs. Turkey and Russia, working together in the economic and military felds,

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may soon play a more signifcant role in the Black Sea and Mediterranean region and dictate the conditions for political and economic change in the Middle East. Increasing economic and military cooperation between China and the RF could signifcantly shift the focus of the global game. Some European countries already have strong ties with these powers, which will not foster EU cohesion. In turn, the anti-American sentiment in Germany and France, verbalized by the leaders of these countries, may negatively affect the superpower’s reaction to the EU’s strategic vision of autonomy and shift interest further east. Consequently, in terms of the perception of external threats, EU Member States can be grouped into: – These surrounded by other Member States, considering themselves militarily relatively safe from the immediate neighbours and focusing on defending their interests in remote areas. – “Bordering” states, having direct contact with “strangers”. It should also be mentioned the differences resulting from the scale of the pursued policies. Let’s use an example of the Central Europe. From the military point of view, for Russia a region of geographical interest would be the so-called Baltic-Carpathian Narrowing, being the most important latitudinal land route between Europe and Asia. Germany in this context is talking about smaller in size Berlin-Brest Plain, and for the security of Poland, barely about 100 km-long Suwałki Corridor is of paramount importance, where the involvement of battalion combat teams is being considered. As can be seen, one of the fundamental elements in building a common EU defence policy would be to set defnitions and a hierarchy of challenges common to all. Achieving this goal is as diffcult as the interests of individual countries are different on a tactical, operational and geostrategic scale. Consequently, one of the fundamental elements in building a common EU defence policy would be to set defnitions and a hierarchy of challenges common to all. Achieving this goal is as diffcult as the interests of individual countries are different on a tactical, operational and geostrategic scale. One of the mistakes constantly committed by European politicians is not noticing these differences and thinking only on a macro scale: EU relations with the US, with Russia, China, the Middle East or Africa. By adhering to the “think big” principle, they do not see a whole range of seemingly small, but extremely important (and often contradictory) internal problems that really affect the societies of the Member States. These, however, exploding during the very next elections, often undermine efforts to converge views on a common defence and security policy. In order to prepare the ground for a real harmonization of security and defence policy, an information strategy is necessary, showing the role of the armed forces in its the implementation. It’s best to do it by copying the American examples and not reinventing the wheel. Army is deep-seated in the American popular culture while in Europe is barely residual. The same applies for the feature flms or popular science programs in television promoting products of the EU’s own defence industry products. Only when the stories of invincible soldiers armed with best ever weapons “Made in EU” sweep away all the evil characters of the world attract more viewers

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to the cinemas than information about the birth of the new Royal Baby, we would be able to say that that PR has fulflled its task.

2.2 Governance There is the need to consolidate many different EU policies to shape them into the likeness of a Security Sector Reform (SSR) system aimed at raising the level of security of EU own Member States. The security sector itself is often misinterpreted and associated with military-police activities. In reality, this term has much broader meaning. It is also education, agriculture, legal system… everything that makes country stable and secure. The problem is currently the lack of institutional, political and personal responsibility for the tasks arising from the obligation to provide EU citizens with security and defence. Today’s EU does not have yet fully prepared governance structure and procedures to cope with crises and potential armed aggression against its interests and territory. And yet, there’s no even European Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence but only a sub-committee4 dealing with these matters. Furthermore, the Council has to vote unanimously on issues that have military implications, while in many other areas decisions are taken only by a majority. In the context of the project to achieve strategic autonomy, this is the frst priority to be addressed. It concerns both the civil and military component, especially in terms of hybrid threats. The lack of unique and appropriate level structure responsible for policy-making and synchronisation of EU institutions, Member State governments and security and defence partners makes it diffcult to defne problems and propose solutions for the beneft of both EU and its MS. The frst steps in this regard are already being taken, but the effects will have to wait for as full capabilities of such institutions can be achieved only through real actions in the feld and lessons learned stemmed from them (Lazarou and Dobreva 2019; EEAS 2019). As it was already mentioned, the defence policy of each state, individually and all together, will be determined by threats to their economic and political interests. However, to maintain Community cohesion, the principle “one for all, all for one” should work at the same level as the current principle of persuading to pursue one goals over the other. This is not a task for one term of offce of EU and national politicians, but a goal for years to come, that will allow a gradual separation from attempts to fnd common areas of activity for defence integration. The key to success, which would be the interest of all Member States in investing in common defence, seems to be the acceptance of the principle that burden sharing and fair proft sharing are equally important.

4 Sub-committee

on Security and Defence—SEDE.

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Of course, the individual interests—by defnition—will never overlap completely, and the security environment is shaped by a large number of variables. Therefore, it depends on political decisions whether these differences will be deepened (playing on separatism, nationalism, fragmentation) or diminished. We must also realize that the admission to the Community of any new member who has its own borders, interests and concerns adds new variables. This, in turn, can undo the integration process or at least halt it. Possible border problems of a new member automatically become problems of the entire Community and result in reshaping security and defence assumptions. The EU, implementing an autonomous security and defence policy, must also be aware that it can be seen as a counterweight to the US or moreover—a destabilizing factor for NATO. Even the implementation of the US postulate to increase the level of defence spending by over 2% of GDP but allocating them primarily to the EU industry would most likely be taken unkindly overseas. Therefore, EU’s action must be balanced and the Community internally integrated and trustworthy. From the EU’s point of view NATO still maintains its relevance. It does not change the fact that an effective defence policy should be based not only on sound military foundations, but also contain well-developed elements of soft power. For this reason, it should have thriving diplomacy supporting a well-developed network of various properly orientated “non-governmental”, relief and aid organizations. Coordinated actions of all these actors can secure EU interests around the world and contribute to the security of their own territory.

2.3 USA: In or Out? The EU MS cooperate with the USA both by participating in the production of many platforms and systems and by purchasing fnished equipment, as well as selling European defence related products to the USA.5 Both parties are interested in generating profts from sales, but the acquisition of cutting-edge technologies plays an extremely important role. Each European country has a different experience with the US in this 5 German industry cooperates with the US companies producing together: air defence missile systems, maritime reconnaissance aircraft and A400M transport aircraft. German Rheinmetall’s 120 mm gun is mounted on US M1 tanks. Italy-USA major defence programs are the Chinook CH47H transport helicopters, the C-130H/J transport aircraft, C-27J transport aircraft, the KC 767 tanker, the Medium Air Defence System (MEADS). Italy bought 90 F-35s and built up a Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility as the European Regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Centre serving all European nations operating F-35s. Italian companies’ are present in the US selling pistols to the all branches of the US DoD (Beretta), providing advanced infrared weapon sights for the U.S. Army (Leonardo) and operating in naval sector (Fincanteri Marine Group). A French–American partnership on production of dual-use turbojet engines (Safran-General Electric, 50/50 joint venture) is an next example of such cooperation. Very similar deal we can observe in the case of Thales and Raytheon joint venture specialized in air operation command and control systems, surveillance radars, and ground-based weapon-locating radars, the ballistic missile defence systems. Airbus Group cooperates with Northrop Grumman about tankers.

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area as contracts are concluded individually. As a rule, each European country faces an experienced global contractor from the US with incomparably greater negotiating potential, which affects the fnal effect. The EU as an organisation has still little to say in this regard, and this is precisely the domain where centralised contacts at European level would be required for such transactions. A common position is likely to have a positive impact on the negotiating position on arms contracts. Even the most developed EU countries do not have the appropriate industrial facilities or know-how to meet operational requirements and must purchase the most sophisticated weapons platforms and systems in the US. An example of this is contract for the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle MQ-9 sets by Italy (6), France (16), the Netherlands (4), Belgium (4)6 (Reim 2019; Defense Post 2019). Several EU countries have equipped their air force with US F-16 aircraft, which also involves the use of the US training package, soft- and hardware maintenance and longstanding dependence on supplies of ammunition, missiles and aerial bombs.7 Italy has already joined the most advanced technologically F-35 program, and some other EU countries are also aspiring to buy a new US multirole aircraft. Sometimes contracts are surrounded by protectionist actions of the U.S. government under the “Important for national security” clause, preventing foreign companies from competing.8 Sometimes, it takes 4 years to get approval from the US Department of State to purchase, deliver and use advanced systems.9 Contracts for the sale of the US weapon systems usually contain reservations as to conditions of their use10 (Belin et al. 2017). The fact that the feld of defence policy remains in the hands of national governments as well as the historically shaped bilateral relations between particular MS and the USA in the trade of defence industry products contributes to a structural imbalance on the transatlantic defence market. The U.S. defence industry has already gained a solid foothold in Europe and has a chance to increase its sales volume. At the same time, it should be emphasized that European—US cooperation in the defence industry feld contributes to the fow of expertise and technology, making products sold for defence purposes have good parameters to effectively serve the tasks and ensure a high level of interoperability. Military cooperation with the US on a partnership basis is equally desirable. Once the EU has achieved full strategic autonomy, the Armed Forces of the United States 6 A set usually encompasses: an aircraft, ground station, spare engine, targeting system, spare parts, readiness package, other equipment, training and other services. 7 Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania. In 2018 Slovakia signed a contract on 14 F-16s (Block 70/72) worth of $1.6 billion, date of purchase 2022–2023. 8 See contract on 179 aerial refuelling tankers. 9 See contract for UAVs Reapers for Italian government. 10 The Javelin systems were allowed to be used only in Afghanistan, so France had to rely on its old MILAN posts when French forces were sent to Mali and Niger. Concerning REAPERS, France is contractually obliged to ask permission to American authorities if it desires to deploy its own REAPERS on another area.

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and other members of the North Atlantic Alliance will remain natural allies within the reformed NATO. The high level of mutual trust and the experience gained so far from joint operations lead to the continuation of long-term fruitful military cooperation.

3 Economy and Technology EU, despite its economic power, does not have an adequate military force. It prefers to act without becoming involved for many years in regional conficts, which as a matter of fact, sometimes cannot be resolved. The still functioning stereotype of a European colonizer, which it tries to avoid, also plays a big part. It assumes that longterm profts from economic entry into regions requiring reconstruction and assistance are much more important than spending funds on armaments. Therefore, economic interests, which must be guaranteed before deciding to invest material and human resources in military activities, will be an important element of the future defence policy of the EU. According to the data presented by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at the World Economic Forum in 2019, the scale of trade in military equipment and armaments between 2014 and 2018 increased by 7.8% compared to 2009–2013 and by 23% compared to 2004–2008 (SIPRI 2019). The sales data and their geographical repartition can easily be compared with the map of the most important humanitarian missions and crisis management operations to get a clear picture of the regions of economic interest of largest arms and dual-use goods exporters. It is often associated with felds of activity in the area of defence, energy security and the elimination of outbreaks potentially dangerous for the socioeconomic stability of major world’s actors. Every potential buyer of foreign-made military equipment must be aware of the automatic limitation of its decision-making sovereignty. In addition, its purchase primarily strengthens the supplier’s economy, not European, critics say. This is an argument that will undoubtedly be raised in the course of discussions on the future shape of defence policy of the EU Member States. According to the quoted SIPRI report, in the years 2014–2018 EU countries imported 41% of military equipment and armaments from the US, and this tendency may get even taken further. It makes the EU ask itself a question whether it should develop navigation, information and communications technology (ICT) and other systems, giving it independence from the will and interests of even the best ally from outside their close circle. Who will guarantee that the latter will suddenly not state that, if necessary, Article V is just a guidance, not a rule? There is nothing wrong with the EU’s industrial and technical cooperation with the USA, it is even deemed desirable. However, the EU should strive for a situation in which a scenario where one decision of the US President depriving the entire continent of its ability to act would be impossible. It is worth noting that the US, imposing sanctions on a country, often treats them not only as a means of pressure, but also as one of the methods to eliminate competition. The decision-making and actions

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autonomy postulated here should therefore be understood not as independence from someone or something, but as an opportunity for independent action. In this context, it should not be forgotten that having a decisive package of arms contracts with a given country is a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, the buyer becomes dependent on the supplier, and on the other hand, the collapse of the statehood or at least the economy of the importer causes economic problems for the exporter.

3.1 New Level of Cooperation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is one of the key projects aimed at implementing the vision of partial strategic autonomy and to some extent corresponding to the European Defence Industrial Development Programme. The so far EU’s action to implement PESCO projects should be seen as a step to encourage cooperation based on joint defence investment. Building in this way the foundations for future economic and military cooperation can have positive long-term effects. Inclusiveness of PESCO allows smaller countries to feel as full providers of defence capabilities to the strategically autonomous EU, however PESCO, as it is, does not change the current division of tasks in the defence industry in Europe. The economically strongest states, such as Germany and France, have not included their fagship armaments projects in this new EU defence cooperation initiative. Neither the joint development of a future multi-purpose aircraft nor this of a European main battle tank are on the PESCO list, which puts other EU states in the role of clients and not partners building common defence capabilities. The fact that the weaker countries remain on the margins of the joint defence initiative automatically gives a feld of activity to the American arms industry lobby, as we are currently witnessing.

3.2 Bone of Contention The European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) is fragmented what leads to parallel production of several platforms and weapon systems of similar tactical value but different technical solutions and needed separate logistical requirements11 (European Commission 2017). It is clear that most of individual EU MS do not have the production potential to meet their own needs. Maintaining the status quo is and will continue to be for many years to come, the cause of reduced levels of compatibility and interoperability during training, exercises and operations, as well as additional logistical problems. 11 More

than 20 different types of main battle tanks and ICVs, 30 types of destroyers and frigates, 20 different fghter planes. According to the European Commission, defence markets are “creating (…) opportunity cost at least Euro 30 billion”. And it is obvious that “Member States are simply too small to deliver on their own.”

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The main dividing line in the defence industry is at the junction of the “old and new” Union due to different end products, applied technologies and organisational solutions. This division is particularly deep if we look at the scale of sales of defence industry products in individual countries. In the EU, the leading role in arms exports is played by France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, which refects both the level of applied technological solutions and their volume. The top collaborative areas in Europe are Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD), armoured vehicles (including main battle tanks), helicopters (light and medium), medical support, cyber defence, satellite communications, tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), maritime mine countermeasures and maritime security. All these collaborative opportunities are linked to the recently approved 2018 EU Capability Development Priorities. (EDA) At the same time, France, Germany, Italy and Spain all together spend roughly 74% of the total defence expenditure in the EU what clearly visualize today’s centre of gravity of the European defence capabilities (AmCham EU 2019; HCSS 2019). The remaining EU countries have far less capacity in this respect, and the socalled Eastern fank countries are additionally burdened with a decline in the form of outdated technologies, ineffcient management structure and ownership relations12 (Trading Economics 2019). In 2018 the Eastern Flank states together spent more than EUR 21 billion on defence. If current economic trends persist this amount of money will be almost doubled by 2030. It means that there will be at least EUR 4.2–8.4 billion to be spent on procurement in the coming years. Where the money will go it is up to the political elites. So far, the US representatives win consecutive bids in Poland, Slovakia and Romania concerning modernization of the air and air defence forces. Situation seems to be even more complex as Member States carry out defence planning and acquisition mostly from a national perspective and the EU has very little to do to move it towards a systemic defence planning (EDA 2018). The armed forces of most EU countries have signifcant amount of obsolete platforms and weapon systems, largely in service for over 35 years, which is an opportunity for the defence industry for decades to come. In the countries of the Eastern Flank, the situation is particularly diffcult and here about 70–80% of the weapon systems need to be replaced in the next 10 years. This need may be an opportunity to divide the roles of countries in achieving certain capabilities in the confguration of international groups in the European dimension and a feld of negotiation for the defence industries. Cooperation can be modelled on Franco–German or Dutch–German initiatives both in the military dimension and in relation to the development of multinational industrial projects. And it is nothing new as the biggest European defence companies cooperate with partners across the Old Continent extensively. For instance, Swedish companies have more than 18% of subsidiaries in the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Belgium and 13% of German

12 Weapons sales in 2018 in USD Million: France-1796, Germany-1277, Spain-1188, Italy-611, the

Netherlands-369, Sweden-134, Finland-68, Czech Republic-64, Denmark-27, Poland-21, Belgium16, Slovakia-12, Romania-2.

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companies have their links with Czech Republic, Poland, Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands and Spain.

3.3 Technology Technology gives advantage and more and more steer the development of military strategy. However, the military must take into account that highly sophisticated software and hardware can lead to mental indolence of their users. Technological development is increasing the availability of weapons of mass destruction, while activities in cyber space should also be counted as such. Afterall, it is a weapon of unimaginable power. Even more dangerous since it’s not in the hands of the governments, but those of a common man. Already a properly planned and carried out cyber attack can destroy a given country as well as civilization in the form as we know it. It is important to realize that highly developed societies as such are not prepared for the fact that at some point something as prosaic as power supply may be cut off permanently. Unaffected survival of a multi-million metropolis population, deprived for 48 h from supply and energy, seems doubtful. The global fnancial system is also based on the virtual fow of virtual funds. If someone would just fip the switch off, it would simply disappear. We must realize that the widely discussed and gradually implemented solutions regarding the network centricity of the battlefeld or the “soldier of the future” will present the assumed values only when: – we will be able to create an algorithm that predicts every possible and impossible sequence of events. – we will provide them with 100% certainty of having uninterrupted power supply and exchange of information which by its very defnition is not possible. The risk of global confict, as it is understood now, is reduced and at the same time it is redefning itself. In the foreseeable future, classic conficts will not disappear. However, the tasks of the armed forces are increasingly taking on the shape of these of the police (confict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, stabilisation, etc.). Meanwhile, defence against cybercrime is no longer the domain of internal affairs, but slowly an element of broadly understood state policy, including defence policy. Too often it is painfully apparent that there is not enough of regular training and exercise of the civil defence system, if any at all. Knowledge of how to act in emergency remains the domain of specialized services, although it should be the subject of universal education. Today, the average citizen is more likely to flm an event with the intention of sharing it on social media than to help victims. The future defence policy should therefore provide the implementation of perhaps not the most effective, but certainly the most efficient training system in the feld of widely understood civil defence (from patching up something to the reconstruction of the ICT system), regardless of the declared worldview and philosophy. At the same time, the widespread trend of uncritical fascination with fully automated systems

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(often referred to as “intelligent”13 ) and the new possibilities offered by technological progress may turn into a resistance against its sources, against stripping the individuals of their privacy. In absolute terms, this would be no different from the rebellion of the Flower Power generation, as it redefned the US defence policy for many years. Is there perhaps a remedy then? Of course not. However, it is reasonable to consider whether really the basic factor that allows effective and durable prevention of adverse situations is the modernization of existing equipment, consisting only of the introduction of technological innovations? In the course of considering future defence policy, it is necessary to use all possible experiences and balance the use of technical miracles blinding us with their possibilities with regular and arduous training conducted with “traditional” means—so that a power failure would never turn into a mental blackout.14 Every organizational solution must be carefully thought out and form a coherent, systemic wholeness. Even the Bugatti 16.4 Veyron engine ftted to the Citroën 2CV would prove useless. Similarly, meeting the requirement to spend 2% of GDP annually is not reliable. It is important not how much, but how these funds are used. The best evidence is that on September 14th, 2019, 25 cruise missiles and drones successfully attacked two refneries in Saudi Arabia. None of them was intercepted, although according to SIPRI this country spent USD 67.6 billion on armaments last year.

4 Military Perspective The EU does not have its own coherent military strategy and there are no European armed forces. The main military activity is carried out within national frameworks and in contacts between individual states. Sometimes, extremely rarely because of the small scale, the military participate in planning and operational activities as part of CSDP missions being prepared. They also occasionally prepare for the duty of EU battle groups, which have never been used in real operations so far. Some forces are periodically delegated to NATO roster and operations, and some to other activities, e.g. UN or tasks within their own country. So far, the development of the national armed forces of the member states takes place mainly as a result of the work of national and NATO planners setting goals and specifying operational needs. There is no such activity in the EU.

13 Though one could say that a programmer or chimpanzee can be intelligent, not a washing powder

or a computer program. therefore the US naval forces command fnally re-introduced in 2016 the obligation to train cadets in classical astronavigation. However, the results of these activities will be visible after a few years.

14 Perhaps

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4.1 Command and Control The EU neither has today the command and control structure enabling strategic autonomy. Consequently, defence planning capabilities as well as command and control functions are very limited15 (EDA 2018). Establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability flls a vacuum in the military-strategic and operational command and control of the chain of command. It may constitute a step towards a permanent EU military HQ. So far, it is designed to run CSDP non-executive missions as the de facto Operation Headquarters what fts into the EU’s vision on strategic autonomy.16 Ironically, Brexit may help to make this project working. So far, one of the most ambitious CSDP missions has been executed in Mali (580 personnel) showed importance of effcient military strategic command as a single point of contact and allowed the Force Commander to focus on the theatre problems and avoid micromanagement from the political level (Reykers 2019). In the current confguration, the MPCC seems to be unable to perform more ambitious tasks, especially if it comes to commanding fve–six non-executive missions simultaneously. Undoubtedly, establishment of the MPCC is a step in the direction towards building capacities to command and control executive operations under CSDP. This achievement will allow to build a more robust structure capable of conducting the article 42.7 mutual defence operation. At present, almost all the necessary European capacities have been accommodated by NATO. So, the problem is not with the resources but with their allocation. It is necessary to take clear political decision about EU and today’s NATO as both organizations are competing for the same national scarce resources. This does not mean NATO disbanding, but reconfguring it by extending the scope of responsibility and geographical coverage. The European Union would play a signifcant role within NATO based on a regional contribution to the common concept of maintaining world peace.

4.2 Mobility Europe needs a plan to facilitate military mobility within and across the EU. The initiative taken by the European Commission responds both to the needs of the CSDP and clearly meets the requirements of collective defence. Thus, this step brings 15 The EU does not have available all required military capabilities necessary for the implementation

of the EU CSDP military Level of Ambition derived from the EU Global Strategy. European Defence Agency, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. 16 OHQ runs main planning processes like: the Force Generation Process (FORGEN), prepares the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) accompanied by the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). It coordinates the establishment and launch of the non-executive missions, the deployment of forces, the termination of mission and the re-deployment of forces. It is obliged to provide with frequent reports and contributes signifcantly to the strategic reviews of the missions. It provides strategic direction and guidance to the Mission Force Commander, prepares budgetary follow-up and coordinates with stakeholders.

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Europe closer to self-suffciency in defence. The plan contains defnition of military requirements for military mobility within and beyond the EU in strategic and technical terms. It identifes the sections of the trans-European transport network suitable for military transport, including necessary upgrades of existing infrastructure. The plan imposes also necessary legislative changes concerning transport of forces, platforms, weapon systems and hazardous materials through state borders across the European Union. The EC designated fnancial support for dual use civilian-military infrastructure projects of Euro 6.5 billion in the years 2021–2027 (The EU Global Strategy; Lazarou, Dobreva). They assume optimistically that the implementation of the above-mentioned projects would be the frst stage of the reform and would lead to discussions on the progressive framing of a European defence union in the future. Given the time frame outlined, the second phase could start after 2025. And this is the ideal time to start practical steps to achieve full strategic autonomy of the European Union. If we do not set ourselves this goal in the given timeframe, the European Union will not fully integrate and will be condemned to the ruthless actions of other global actors without being able to pursue its own foreign policy effectively.

5 Strategy We Need The European Union deserves recognition. Today’s world order has been dominated for decades by nuclear powers sitting at the United Nations Security Council as permanent members. They represent the old order with tendency to preserve and expand their infuence worldwide and the global commons. There is a little room at the table for other actors having capacities and ambitions to make better life for people in need on the planet. The European Union is one of them and should have an equal voice with others. The full strategic autonomy in the security and defence domain should be the middle-term future goal (10 years). The essential objective of achieving full strategic autonomy is the ability to take decisions and implement them within the whole spectrum of the provisions of Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, including the mutual defence task so far delegated to NATO and taken out of the prerogatives of the EU administration. This fundamental change requires from national political elites to be prepared to accept and support a federal structure of the organization and centralization of the governance. Delegating national prerogatives to a single decision-making centre at pan-European level should contribute to the effective synchronisation of the implementation of commonly agreed objectives and lines of action. The European Union’s strategic autonomy does not cross NATO, on the contrary. Its achievement should strengthen the North Atlantic Pact. In the new format, the NATO EU pillar would be one of the NATO’s regional hubs, together with NATO North Africa, NATO Middle East and NATO Asia if this organization is developed in this way. Other NATO pillars are not excluded. The NATO EU hub would primarily be responsible for promotion of peace and development in its neighbourhood working with national partners.

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Level of Ambition (LoA) of the EU should aim to provide a reliable answer to the commonly accepted threat assessment to which the planners build scenarios and calculate roughly required capabilities. It is closely linked with the defence and operational planning. Simplistically, today’s LoA should cover two strategic defence directions: North-Eastern with potential Russian aggression and the South-Western with immigration fows and requirement for high intensity executive operations in neighbourhoods as well as CSDP operations run simultaneously. Each region should also have the capacity to assist the other in the event of an emergency. These forces should be built on the basis of Standing Defence Plans and Contingency Operations Plans, which would help to synchronise the building of common forces and minimize shortfalls. The European Defence Forces can be built on the assumption that the NATO EU pillar should have the capacity to conduct and sustain at least one major joint operation at a Corps level for mutual defence under art. 42.7 Lisbon Treaty on the European continent and two–four smaller land heavy operations (Division/Brigade size), as well as two–four air and naval heavy operations for crisis response operations outside Europe. Airspace, naval, special operations, and other combat and combat support and logistic elements should be included. It is important to make all, national and EU politicians aware of such requirement as it infuences directly the build-up of European Defence Forces through allocation of responsibilities and tasks and informs the defence industry. It is interesting to note that at present, the forces of all EU countries taken together far exceed the future needs of a united European Defence Forces. The problem is in their geographical distribution and subordination/assignment. The forces and resources allocated so far to NATO within the Reaction Force largely correspond to the needs articulated in the Level of Ambition. One should take into account the tendency to preserve some of the capabilities as purely national armed forces. This will be a major obstacle to building new panEuropean forces and a source of dispute between the EU’s central administration and national governments. The command and control system should be confgured to be capable of commanding European armed forces and civilian resources. Majority of the command and control elements at all levels are already located on the European soil and manned mainly by Europeans but they are under the NATO fag. Even the geographical locations of these installations ft perfectly the EU needs. So, there is a question of discussion between NATO and the EU about their transfer. Friendly relations with NATO other elements and other partners should be one of the pillars of mutual cooperation. Historically driven special links with the USA and UK may constitute the stabilizing factor for the region. An effective information strategy is needed to explain the objectives of the new initiative to the elite of the EU Member States, as well as to other NATO and UN countries. The current “Shared Vision…” project has been unnecessarily worrying Washington for a long time, as it threatens NATO’s cohesiveness. In addition, other NATO countries, but not belonging to the EU, such as the UK, Canada, Norway, Turkey, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Iceland, should receive a convincing explanation of the nature of the planned changes concerning both the advisability of implementing the vision of full

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strategic autonomy of the EU and the processes and effects, as their support will also depend on the success of the project. It is in our interest to convince them that actions undertaken by the EU will allow the organization to take over more responsibility for the Old Continent and ease the burden put on US, Canada and UK shoulders. A common military language within the post-Brexit EU in which English would be no longer the mother tongue of any of its member state’s nation may become a hard nut to crack. In our view, from purely pragmatic point of view, it should remain English. The possible temptation to introduce an alternative language could negatively affect the day-to-day operations of HQs as well as crews of ships and aircraft cooperating in an integrated communication network of the whole NATO, of which the European Defence Forces will be one of the elements. The need to maintain English as the primary communication tool is also supported by the achievements to date in interoperability within NATO and the EU, as well as by its widespread use in the wider context, such as in United Nations operations. The extension of NATO’s geographical scope of infuence is likely to further unify communication in relation to the English language due to the need to use similar decision-making processes, education as well as training and exercises systems. In any case it will remain longterm entirely evolutionary process also linked to the strategic independence issue. Chosen infrastructure in the EU’s countries not suitable for weight and size of military assets being transferred through defned sections of the trans-European transport network should be upgraded. Cross border regulatory and procedural issues to be solved as they hamper mobility of forces and transport of dangerous goods. The defence industry needs to become truly pan-European to meet the EU all needs in the security and defence domain. It does not exclude cooperation with partner companies with global reach. Inclusiveness should be a norm. Fair share of defence industry opportunities combined fair purchasing will build trust and should strengthen EU cohesion. It would lead directly to foundation of the European Defence Union. It should be borne in mind that achieving strategic autonomy for the EU will involve taking over part of the fnancial commitments from the US. Assuming an equal distribution of burden, this would mean taking over at least 35–50% of the costs of implementing joint operations under EU/NATO fag.

6 Conclusions Mao Zedong was once supposed to comment on one of the anniversaries of the outbreak of the French Revolution: “not enough time has passed to draw defnitive conclusions”. We cannot therefore clearly predict the impact of the “Brexit story” soap opera on the EU’s defence policy in fve to ten years’ timeframe.17 A large 17 However,

the negotiation process clearly showed that the UK has not learnt very much from the 1956 Suez crisis and still does not accept that the times when it dictated conditions to others is ancient history.

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proportion of publicly available analysis of the medium- and long-term perspective of international situation have little to do with reality. It is mainly due to the: – rapidly changing dynamics in an interdependent and globalized environment. – assumptions formulated back in the day by Chancellor von Bismarck himself, who allegedly has said: “Man who wishes to keep his respect for sausages and laws should not see how either is made”. In any case, in the near future, the EU will probably deal with two main concepts of its own security and defence. First, assumes the dominant position of NATO while tolerating EU’s activity in this feld until it doesn’t undermine NATO’s (US) leading role. This concept is primarily supported by the US, UK, Norway, Finland, Sweden and the Eastern Flank countries. If this concept is continued, the EU will be the scene of centrifugal manipulation of national governments, and as an organization it will drift among global players fghting for survival. Second, developed mainly in France and Germany, assumes limited short-term goals aimed at progressive integration. Achievement of these goals may lead to full strategic autonomy in mid-term perspective. Its outcome is uncertain due to complexity of the process. However, having regard to that the EU has a potential to establish a strategically autonomous bloc of Member States in the feld of security and defence, it would constitute a signifcant added value to the reformed Alliance. If this concept is implemented, the EU is likely to transform into a federated structure, with a process of deep internal integration. At the same time, the role of the EU will increase signifcantly. The strategically autonomous European Union will promote common values as part of a larger defense structure to maintain balance with global players. Good experience of EU member states from cooperation within NATO leads to the decision to join this organization after its appropriate reconfguration. Defending the EU’s territorial integrity and supporting the peaceful development of countries in close proximity would be its main tasks. Nevertheless, there is something much more important than indicators, fgures and charts. The EU will never gain a genuine real strategic decision-making autonomy without a complete overhaul of its society’s mentality. Only when every citizen of the Union will (like the Americans do) speak about himself with pride: “I am a European from Italy, Poland, Sweden or Malta”, this process will have a chance to be implemented. Apart from the possibilities of strengthening the defence potential using tactical level solutions,18 factors that may affect (positively and/or destructively) the shape of the EU’s defence policy in the next 5–10 years may be primarily: 18 Such would for example include the contents of Ottawa Treaty (Convention on the Prohibition of

the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction). The treaty itself was not signed by, among others, the biggest EU’s competitors: Russia, USA and China. Anti-personnel landmines are simple and cheap to produce and can be used on a massive scale. It has been proven in many conficts, effectively stopping many potentially much stronger opponents. And that use of cheap anti-personnel mines potentially poses a threat to the many expensive “soldier of the future” projects.

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1. US policy. It can increase the fear of being overly dependent on technologies controlled by the Big Brother, while its credibility as a loyal and unshakable ally recently is considered as quite low. Therefore, it is in the best interest of America itself to overcome the fears it has recently raised in others. Very reluctant EU reaction on US activities towards Iran/Iraq in January 2020 shows, that the US must deeply “redevelop” its rhetoric and wording. 2. NATO’s ability to flexibly adapt to changing conditions. Handing over responsibility for a particular space of activities to the EU would force actions aimed at viably increasing EU’s defence capabilities. However, this would also have to result in a reduction of huge disparities in defence spending between the Union and the US and a modifcation of the decision-making system. 3. The level of convergence of American and European interests, as well as the level of egoism of both parties in the process of their implementation. Quick solutions should not be expected here in the era of intensifed international competition for infuence, markets and natural resources. 4. The amount of social expenditure of EU countries. They will be one of the determinants of the amounts of defence as well as research and development works in this feld. These, in turn, will affect the need (or lack of coercion) to seek technological support outside the EU. 5. The structure of the defence expenditures. Quality and advisability over quantity principle should be a key factor. 6. Accuracy of information policy. The EU must, like the USA, create an ethos of a maverick-soul invincible defender of freedom to whom nation owes a profound and enduring debt of gratitude and reverence. 7. Concerted system of education, service and promotion of military personnel from different Member States. This is a sine qua non condition for the existence of trust in potential comrades-in-arms, and hence a step towards a joint army. 8. Consistency in pursuing a goal. Every six months, a Member State, taking over the Presidency of the EU Council, announces its priorities. This also applies to CSDP. Even if it does so in consultation with two successive presidencies, it gives us an accumulation of an incredibly large number of ambitious initiatives, ideas, directions and views that prevent us from focusing on one or two and bringing them to an end. 9. The direction in which (and when) the butterfy faps its wings. Futurists’ predictions almost never come true. A hundred years ago there was a widespread belief that the end of Pax Britannica would lead to civilizational Armageddon. It never came and neither did the end of history. So why would the EU fear the strive for a strategic autonomy?

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References AmCham EU (2019) Space, security and defence. http://www.amchameu.eu/sites/default/fles/ publications/fles/digital_space_security_and_defence_2019.pdf Baker L (2019) On Russia and EU enlargement, Macron pushes a radical agenda. World News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-macron-geoplitics-on-russia-and-eu-enlargement Belin J, Hartley K, Lefeez S, Linnenkamp H, Lundmark M, Masson H, Maulny J-P, Ungaro A (2017) Defence industrial links between the EU and the US. ARES Group (2008) Consolidated texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. https://www.gov. uk/government/publications/consolidated-texts-of-the-eu-treaties-as-amended-by-the-treaty-oflisbon (1999) Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction. https://www.informea.org/en/treaties/conventionprohibition-use-stockpiling-production-and-transfer-anti-personnel-mines-and (2017) Defence Industrial Links between the EU and the US. www.iris-france.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/09/Ares-20-Report-EU-DTIB-Sept-2017.pdf Defense Post (2019) General atomics awarded $123 million Netherlands MQ-9 Reaper drone contract. https://thedefensepost.com/2019/03/22/netherlands-general-atomics-awarded$123-million-mq-9-reaper-drone Economist (2019) Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead. https://www. economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-braindead European Defence Agency (2018) Coordinated annual review on defence. www.eda.europa.eu/ docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-11-26-factsheet_card.pdf European Commission (2017) Refection paper on the future of European defence. https://ec.europa. eu/commission/sites/beta-political/fles/refection-paper-defence_en.pdf European External Action Service (2016a) Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fles/eugs_review_web_O.pdf European External Action Service (2016b) Implementation plan on security and defence. https:// eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34215/implementation-plan-security-anddefence-factsheet_en European External Action Service (2018) https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/ implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and-defence_en European External Action Service (2019) The European Union’s global strategy. Three years on, looking forward. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/64034/vision-action-euglobal-strategy-practice-three-years-looking-forward_en European Parliament (2012) Provisions on the common security and defence policy. Offcial Journal of the EU. C326/38. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf European Parliament (2016) Implementation of the Lisbon treaty provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573285/ EPRS_BRI(2016)573285_EN.pdf Gould J (2019) Trump says South Korea will pay more for US military protection. Defence News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/08/07/trump-says-south-koreawill-pay-more-for-us-military-protection/ HCSS Security (2019) The closing window: Dutch relevance in space examined. https://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621784/IPOL_BRI(2018)621784_EN.pdf Jones T (2019) Deutsche Welle News. https://www.dw.com/en/us-threatens-to-withdraw-troopsfrom-germany/a-49959555 Ketelsen M (2018) Merkel: The vision to create a real European army // The future of Europe. https:// www.euractiv.com/section/politics/video/merkel-the-vision-to-create-a-real-european-army Lazarou E, Dobreva A (2019) Security and defence. European Parliament. http://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635533/EPRS_BRI(2019)635533_EN.pdf

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Jacek Ochman is retired Captain at the Polish Navy. Graduated from Polish Navy Academy and Warsaw University, he attended the ESDP High-Level-Course 2006/07 and various professional NATO courses. Former head of International Cooperation Branch of the Polish Navy, Deputy Polish Military Representative to the EU Military Committee and Deputy Chief of the Strategic Planning Branch, Polish Armed Forces General Staff J-5. He was also involved in the development of national military position on NATO’s New Strategic Concept 2010 and co-ordinated PAF GS’s works for Polish Presidency in the EU, 2011. Jerzy Biziewski (retired Polish Army Major General) performed last duties as director of Plans, Allied Command Operations at Mons, NATO. Mechanized infantry offcer by choice. He earned his Ph.D. in the military history domain and attended numerous courses at tactical, operational and strategic level both in the country and abroad. His assignments include commanding and staff positions in several units and HQs. He was the commanding offcer for the 2nd Corps HQ and the 1st Armoured Brigade. He deployed to Afghanistan as the commander of the Polish Military Contingent. He was the chief of Movement and Transportation Branch at JFC Brunssum, deputy chief J5 and chief of the Crisis Response Branch at the General Staff. For 8 years he was a lecturer at the Polish National Defence Academy. Earlier he served as an infantry platoon leader, company commander and battalion commander.

Part IV

Social Aspects

Information Society and the Protective Influence of Security Culture Juliusz Piwowarski

Outline 1 2 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transformations of the Social World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Digital Revolution—Its Origins and Initial Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Plan of Transforming Japanese Society into an Information Society . . . . . . 3.2 The Continued Transformation of American Society into an Information Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Process of Transforming the Communities of the European Union into an Information Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Instead of Conclusions—Several Social Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The author assumes that all human societies ever created have been information societies. This is because without the information flow, enabled by communication, it is impossible for the security environment—a fundamental component of every society—to arise and develop. Communication is of interest for a researcher in security sciences, especially in terms of the second energy stream of security culture. This paper aims to organize these observations, particularly in terms of the ontology of the contemporary social world. The author first discusses changes in the social world and the developments in communication up to 20th century’s digital revolution, that has brought computers and that still lasts. This discussion allows for distinguishing, characterizing and comparing three development models of contemporary information society: the American, the Japanese, and the European one. The author also indicates the threats stemming from losing control over digital progress, In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. The chapter is based on the speech given by Prof. Juliusz Piwowarski at the XIV Security Forum—XLIX CICA, which took place on 6 and 7 June 2019 in Kraków. Submitted: 7 August 2019; accepted: 9 January, 2020. J. Piwowarski (B) University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Kraków, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_13

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e.g. those pertaining to the perception of reality by computer users, the upbringing of children with visual media, and the low quality of information on the Internet. On this basis conclusions of a warning character are formed on the functioning of the contemporary human in the world of the media. Keywords Information society · Ethics · Security · Security culture · Digital revolution · The media

1 Introduction It can be assumed that virtually all societies built by the human race, even those established long ago, were information societies to varying degrees. They must have been information societies for the second stream of energy of security culture, with its group nature, to function properly and enable their members to successfully interact in social (Searle 1996; Schütz 1997) and natural reality (Kaebnick 2013). The aforementioned energy of the streams of security culture enables us to persist and survive in these realities, primarily as a result of maintaining individual and group tendencies which drive the multi-dimensional processes of human development which comprise human security. In order to analyse a security environment, it has always been necessary to possess up-to-date information regarding the aspirations of the neighbouring peoples, their possible actions and the threat they may pose. Of similar importance is knowledge of animal migration patterns, methods of hunting these animals, the health of one’s leaders, of the leaders of allied and hostile peoples, as well as knowledge of how to prepare for threats which await in forests, deserts, on the sea or in mountainous areas, and knowledge of how to find and secure drinking water and how to make fire in field conditions. No community, whether large or small, can function properly without communicating or if its communication is of poor quality or scarce. Society and its internal relations, which manifest in the form of reciprocal communication, are nearly synonymous from the sociological perspective. For a securitologist, i.e. one who deals with a wide range of matters related to threats and security, communication constitutes an important element of the power which emanates from the aforementioned second energy stream of security culture, which is collective at its core. Also relevant to the discussion is the shared etymology of the words communication and community (Vogl 2016). Today, humanity utilises innovative means of communication and, in addition to new methods of communication, new social forms are also produced. It is highly likely that the aforementioned phenomena require new theories to be constructed in relation to the ontology of the social world of today.

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2 Transformations of the Social World We live in a time where humanity is experiencing a new stage of its social development. The breakthroughs which preceded it and the resulting stages of this development are the Agricultural Revolution1 and the Industrial Revolution.2 The term revolution (revolutio = inception, in early Mediaeval Latin) means a sudden breakthrough in the life of a society and its state. It can be claimed that it is the highest form of class struggle, which manifests in overthrowing the existing social order and establishing a new one in its stead. The world revolution can also mean abrupt transition. Such social changes can have a sudden and profound impact on how humanity functions. They differ in character and affect various areas of human activity, and indicate the appearance of dynamic, even abrupt, socio-culturally based changes in behaviour, including in politics, military activity, the economy, management and culture as a whole. As an example, agriculture replaced the hunter-gatherer life style nearly simultaneously in three separate parts of the world—in Mesopotamia, Mesoamerica and South-East Asia. Researchers have long been interested in the global cause of this social revolution. One possible reason could be what is referred to as demographic pressure—a result of increasing human numbers in certain areas. Another equally valid reason for the revolution could be climate change—the end of the Ice Age and the Neolithic Revolution occurred at the same time, resulting in various animal and plant species moving to new places. Yet another cause for eschewing the hunter-gatherer life style in favour of agriculture could be increasing social complexity (von Bertalanffy 1984). The origins of complexity science can be traced back to the general systems theory, created by Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 1937. The area is concerned with systems as such, regardless of their type. The isomorphism principle, which is based on structural similarities between the objects of research of various disciplines, renders it possible to study various systems (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, pp. 147– 160). This is possible due to the fact that the factors which influence how scholars observe and study phenomena and the accompanying processes, explored by scholars from various fields, even though they differ from one another, also follow universal, systemic rules and laws, which are identical for all of them. Increasing social complexity and the accompanying phenomena, including social stratifcation and social division of labour (in turn accompanied by increasing specialisation), contributed to increased needs of human communities with regard to 1 Twelve thousand years ago, humanity started what is now known as the Agricultural Revolution, during which parts of the human population engaged in the cultivation of plants and the rearing of animals; this occurred independently in multiple parts of the world. 2 The Industrial Revolution was an industrial breakthrough and a process of technological, economic and social change resulting from the transition from an economy based on biological, renewable sources of energy (human muscle, water, wind, wood) to an economy based on mineral sources of energy (18–19th century—coal, 20th century—oil); the breakthrough originally occurred in England and Scotland and involved the mechanisation of production—machines replaced human labour and manufacturing by hand was slowly replaced by mass-production on an industrial scale.

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food production and consumption, which could not be met by small nomadic groups of hunter-gatherers. In response to this internal pressure, culture, its part which functioned as security culture to be precise, particularly its military and organisational aspect, caused the intensification and systematisation of human activities related to food production, laying the foundation for an agrarian society in the process (Lewin 2005, pp. 151–156). Setting aside the so-far undetermined main cause of the Agricultural Revolution, it is beyond all doubt that the transition from the hunter-gatherer economy to agriculture resulted in a significant increase in human population. As a result of certain technological inventions3 of the 19th century, an era of fascination with technology began. This technology, if used correctly, powers the third stream of security culture. Industrial production capabilities grew, which was the hallmark of this new era—the era of industrialisation. In 1899, Charles H. Duell, head of the New York patent office, said that “everything that can be invented has been invented,” and so petitioned for the office to be closed down. However, history proved that humanity’s scientific and inventive potential was far from exhausted (Adamczak 2018, p. 16). As early as in 1903, Polish-Russian scholar and inventor Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857–1935), in his article Issledovanie mirovyh prostranstv reaktivnymi priborami (The Exploration of Cosmic Space by Means of Reaction Devices), published his theory of rocket flight, which took into account changes in mass. It was the first article on astronautics, written before brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright flew their plane for the first time in history in 1903. In addition to scientists, entrepreneurs who capitalised on new inventions were also active at the time—industrialisation did not stop either, continuing into the 20th century. The process involved mechanisation, production concentration and clear division of labour. Industrialisation was characterised by increasing numbers of industry jobs. The impact of the Revolution was not limited to the economy, however. New social challenges and economic opportunities tend to influence social relations. Traditional burgher and farmer societies were transformed into modern industrial societies. The increasing number of people working in the industry had a revolutionary impact on the social structure. A new social class emerged—the working class, whose power had an enormous impact on the history of 20th-century Europe and the shape of family relations—women became increasingly active professionally.

3 The 19th century is referred to as the age of steam and electricity; in the second half of the 19th century, the following devices were invented and built, among others: 1860—first coal gas-powered two-stroke engine (É. Lenoir, France), 1862—first plastic—Parkesine (A. Parks, Great Britain), 1867—dynamite (A. Nobel, Sweden), four-stroke gas engine (N.A. Otto, E. Langen, Germany), 1869—the periodic table (D. Mendeleyev, Russia), 1876—telephone (A.G. Bell, Canada), 1879— lightbulb (T.A. Edison, USA), 1884—machine gun (H. Maxim, USA), 1882—first urban power station (T.A. Edison, USA), 1885—petrol engine (patent: G. Daimler, Germany) petrol engine car (C.F. Benz, Germany), 1893—photoelectric cell (H. Geitel and J. Elster, Germany), 1895— cinema (brothers A. and L. Lumiere, France), 1896—radio (G. Marconi, A. Popow and N. Tesla), 1898—magnetic recording of sound (V. Poulsen, Denmark).

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The Industrial Revolution was also accompanied by urbanisation, which was a result of mass migrations of rural inhabitants into cities (Park and Burgess 1984), the expansion of our knowledge of medicine and hygiene, decreasing numbers of farmers and a surge in industry-related jobs. Other related phenomena included the emergence of labour unions and workers’ movements, labour laws, increases in population and mass migrations from rural to urban areas, social structures transitioning from agricultural, primarily rural, to industrial, with the majority of the population living in cities. The role of artisans, farmers and landowners was diminished in favour of workers, technological intelligentsia and industrialists. Democratisation, which had hitherto been absent on such a large scale, became present in social relations. At the same time, however, negative phenomena related to industrialisation also entered social reality, such as anomie, the weakening of a certain type of social bonds, i.e. family bonds, trust and solidarity. This, as well as other similar phenomena, began to have a detrimental effect on the frst and second energy stream of security culture.

3 The Digital Revolution—Its Origins and Initial Stage Similar to the Industrial Revolution, which began in the 18th century in England and Scotland and resulted in technological, economic and socio-cultural changes, the Digital Revolution is currently having a profound impact on societies. The actual beginning of information society, followed by its development, was closely tied to the technological revolution which took place in the second half of the 20th century. An important side note: a keen observer of socio-cultural changes would be amazed by the increasing pace at which the subsequent changes occurred. Two Polish scholars could be referred to as observers of these phenomena: Tomasz Goban-Klas and Piotr Sienkiewicz. To illustrate this progression, they presented the history of mankind up to the year 2000 using a symbolic clock. The clock depicts the history of humanity as symbolic 24 h, i.e. one hour represents 1500 years. According to the model, at midnight, humans communicated with one another using words, gestures and facial expressions, at 8:00 AM, they mastered painting, and it was not before 8:40 PM that they began using hieroglyphs. Alphabet-based writing first saw usage at 9:38 PM, and print was invented at 11:30 PM. Device referred to as personal computers first became operational less than a minute (49 s) before midnight. In this moment, several seconds after midnight, we are witnessing a world of computerisation available to the common man (Goban-Klas and Sienkiewicz 1999). ∗ ∗ ∗ American sociologist Daniel Bell probably contributed the most to the creation of the concept of information society. Developed by Bell in the 60 s and 70 s, the theory posited that a new social need had emerged—the need to innovate with regard to socio-cultural changes. The direction of those changes, indicated by Bell, would lead the United States to maintain long-term economic growth and enable it to

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achieve a competitive advantage on the newly-established, technogenic global world of computers and digitisation (Webster 2002, p. 314). According to Bell, the same held true for the adoption and stimulation of a new, digitisation-related, socio-cultural and economic direction of development, which would ensure that corporations would adopt optimal action strategies and multiply their expected profits. Bell also noted that his thesis, which de facto presented as necessary the construction of not only a completely new sector of the industry, but, most importantly, also a new area of culture—a thesis related to his theory—did not constitute an extrapolation of currently existing trends, but instead pointed to completely new rules and means necessary for the social world—rules and means which changed the way it was organised (Bell 1989, pp. 164–167). He also emphasised that, in his opinion, the socio-cultural changes resulting from the information revolution were inevitable. Manuel Castells, on the other hand, defined information society as a new form characteristic of what I term the future stage of human development, the result of the modern process of restructuring the capitalist economy. He also claims that information society organises itself around various processes in which humans are involved. These processes comprise historically-determined relations between elements of the social world such as production, experience and power (Castells 2000, p. 13). ∗ ∗ ∗ The Digital Revolution thus began in the mid-20th century and is yet to end. It was started by attaching a new element to the existing culture and, within it—primarily by attaching new elements to the third stream of security culture. These elements were the first digital machines. These devices functioned thanks to the knowledge discovered by mathematicians and which could process information and conduct arithmetic and logical operations on numbers and symbols. They were originally used in the military sector of national security. One such machine was ENIAC, i.e. Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer, built between 1943 and 1945. Its creators were John Presper Eckert (1919– 1995) and John William Mauchly (1907–1980), engineers and researchers from the University of Pennsylvania in the United States. For the present chapter to retain its scientific objectivity, it is necessary to add that ENIAC, considered by many to be the first electronic computer ever created, was designed and used primarily for calculations conducted at the US Army’s ballistics lab. Its first task was to test the potential of the thermonuclear weapons designed in the final phase of World War II. ENIAC was completed and first used in December 1945. Before 1975, it was commonly accepted that ENIAC was the first electronic computer ever constructed. Today, after the disclosure of certain top-secret files, e.g. data held in British archives, we know of other inventors who could be also be considered to have invented the first digital computer.

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These include Alan Turing,4 the mathematical genius and creator of the British computer Colossus,5 as well as German engineer and inventor Konrad Zuse, a pioneer in the field of computer science.6 Zuse was the creator of the Z series of German electronic computers during World War II, the most well-known of these devices being the Z3. Another pretender to the title of the first computer ever created is the ABC (Atanasoff-Berry Computer), built at Iowa State University.7 The machine was developed between 1937 and 1942. Its creator was Bulgarian-American engineer John Vincent Atanasoff, who worked on the device together with his assistant, Clifford Berry. Regardless of which of the above-mentioned computers first emerged in the third dimension of security culture, initiating the process of the Digital Revolution in the social world as a result, the introduction of these devices into the military security arms race of the late 20th century gave birth to an era of rapid development of computational technology. The technology offered both easy and extremely fast access to hitherto unheardof quantities of information, as well as making available previously unthinkable, easy means of communication between people, including those powering the second energy stream of security culture. ∗ ∗ ∗ For the sake of clarity, it is important to make a distinction between the terms “information” and “communication”—both important constituents of the frst and second stream of security culture. It is a common belief that information is to be communicated, and communication is the efficient relaying of relevant information. However, if we analyse the matter further, the truth of the matter is different. It is known that a great deal of effort was put in the past, and still is, into collecting particular categories of information, to which access is later granted to a select few individuals, who are the only ones allowed to use the data. For the remaining members of society, this information will forever remain classified. In addition, “most acts of human communication do not convey what could be referred to as true information, 4 Alan Mathison Turing (1912–1954)—British mathematician and cryptologist, creator of the Turing machine concept, one of the creators and pioneers of computer science, also considered to be the father of artificial intelligence as a concept. 5 Colossus—series of digital machines based on the theories of Alan Turing; the Colossus project was led by Max Newman and Tommy Flowers, with Turing himself as a contributor; the first computer of this type was built for the British army in 1943 at the Bletchley Park cryptography centre, and was used for e.g. cracking German cyphers. 6 Konrad Zuse (1910–1995)—inventor of the first binary-based computer; in 1936, he patented mechanical memory; he also constructed electromechanical and electronic computation machines used for e.g. designing aircraft wings. 7 Atanasoff-Berry Computer, ABC—electronic machine used for solving systems of linear equations, considered to be a prototype digital computer due to its use of vacuum tubes; it worked very slowly and required constant human supervision; nevertheless, it was approx. one thousand times faster than mechanical devices.

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instead conveying communications woven from selectively chosen and deliberately interpreted facts” (Mikułowski-Pomorski 2004, pp. 5–6), the most common example of which are media news. Communication is the process of communicating, i.e. connecting people, accompanied by creating common content which participates in the creation of culture (second energy stream of security culture).8 It can thus be a source of growth for social potential and the sense of identity9 of human communities. In simple terms, communication is a process of connection based on the exchanging of information. The dictionary definition of communication is “the imparting or exchanging of information by speaking, writing, or using some other medium”.10 Information is a term which refers to facts and communications noted down as observations, which are then recorded, analysed, and also frequently have a profound impact on the beliefs of individuals (frst energy stream of security culture). Interest in information as such has its source in mathematics, though in addition to theoretical knowledge, it is firmly based in practice. For example, it is related to the various challenges, opportunities, risks, values and needs of the state. Communication and properly targeted information can assume various forms. Information can be relayed unidirectionally when the sender relays it to the recipient without receiving a response. It can also be communicated bidirectionally. In such cases, the informer and the informed exchange content between each other. Yet another form of information as a method of communication is multidirectional communication. This form involves multiple informers, who also become recipients of information. In the early 20th century, Max Weber’s model of the perfect bureaucracy was utilised to process increasingly large amounts of data (Weber 2004, pp. 50–52). The model gave rise to stable legal structures and impartial administration, which rendered the social world more predictable, and rational thinking, as well as all planning, choices and decisions based on it, received proper recognition. Collecting and processing growing amounts of data using both ordered and expedient means was made possible by the advent of computers. This took place during World War II. Since then, technology has caught up with mathematics, which had previously been ahead of it by three hundred years in Europe. I am referring here to the achievements of philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), as well as and Isaac Newton (1643–1727), who developed differential equations and calculus by reducing the base operations used in differential equations to an algorithmic approach.

8 Culture

(Latin colere—cultivation)—the term comes from the Latin expression cultus agri (agriculture) and is interpreted differently by various disciplines; it refers to all material and non-material products of human activity characteristic of a given society, that which is learned, as opposed to that which is biologically inherited. 9 Social identity is related to identifying others and oneself with certain elements of the social world; it is the psychological, sociological and cultural identity of an individual or group, through which we see ourselves in a given area of social reality or are placed in reality by an observer. 10 Communication, Lexico.com, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/communication (access: 23.03.2019).

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Also indispensable was the contribution of George Boole (1815–1864) from Ireland, who laid the foundations for a separate subfield of mathematics (algorithms) in 1854, which was necessary for computers to be invented. In order to briefly, perhaps even selectively, analyse certain events which led to today’s information revolution, let us return to the 20th century. We already know that, in 1936, British mathematician Alan Turing (1912–1954), whose work was an attempt at constructing an electronic brain, joined the ranks of those inventors who had a profound impact on the Digital Revolution. The second half of the 20th century saw the beginning of the Digital Revolution, which is still in progress. It began with the construction of the first digital machines—mathematical devices which processed information and conducted arithmetic and logical operations on numbers and symbols. These electronic devices, which constituted parts of the third stream of security culture, were the aforementioned ENIAC, Z3, ABC and Colossus. In actuality, the Second World War never really ended formally due to no proper peace treaty ever being signed. The war broke out again in 1946 when Churchill gave his famous speech in Fulton11 and started the hostile polemic between the superpowers and their allies or, some may say, in the case of the USSR, their vassals. That phase of the conflict, this time between the East and the West, assumed the form of what became known as the Cold War, which was accompanied by an intense arms race, which also involved technology used to electronically process information. As a result of this turn of international events, the second half of the 20th century became witness to the not purely peaceful, but still scientific, Space Race, in which victory necessitated the development of advanced computer technology. In addition to simulations aimed at testing aspects of nuclear conflicts, the United States began to utilise artificial satellites and improve data processing for the purpose of limited military operations doctrine. These operations were carried out during the John F. Kennedy administration. This was also a reaction to the increased leftist guerilla activity in third world countries. It should be noted that, in the 1960s, the then-Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, a mathematician, implemented management methods in the Pentagon which were aimed at improving the “relationship” between humans and computers. This constituted evidence of new tendencies emerging on two intersections of the energy streams of security culture—the frst with the third and the second with the third. In the mid-1960s, more than 50% of the US GDP was generated by those employed in the production, processing and distribution of information (Doktorowicz 2005, p. 61). In the USA, as a result of the rapid development of information society driven by the information revolution, a transition took place into a “public discussion concerning the utilisation of latest technologies for the common good. The discussion’s initiator was the US Government, which began legislative and organisational work promoting the idea of information society in the 1970s” (Nowina-Konopka 2006,

11 Winston

Churchill gave his Sinews of Peace speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946, using the term “iron curtain” to refer to the post-Jalta order.

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p. 20). In 1979, the US National Research Council published a report on the direction of changes implemented as a result of the country’s progressing digitisation. The American government also implemented legal and fiscal changes, before limiting its interventions into the development of information society, which became the domain of science and business. In 1993, the Clinton administration announced the implementation of the National Information Infrastructure strategy. The strategy involved the construction of a national ICT infrastructure and granting every citizen commercial access to ICT. As a result of this, as early as in 2006, more than half of all the largest companies were active in the telecommunications and IT area (Doktorowicz 2000). The successor governments continued to prove Bell right regarding the validity of transforming the US into an information society and treating it as the driving force behind the economy and the West—including the strengthening of the USA as the global and technological leader, constituting an increasingly important element of the third strength stream of national security culture. In the USA, competitiveness is key to increasing the pace of development. Planning is still limited to “not interfering” and focusing on legal and organisational frameworks (second energy stream of security culture), that is to eliminating hurdles and avoiding generating formal complications which could render operation more difficult. The situation is different in the Far East, which prefers far-reaching state interventionism, though of a variety which is understood and intended to have the aim of supporting development. This is particularly true for Japan, where great amounts of public funding are still being spent on supporting the development of new technologies, research and innovative projects (Tadeusiewicz 2001, pp. 16–18). Europe’s communal traditions result in the tendency to build information society by way of strategic, top-down design and planning aimed at providing equality of opportunity for different countries and the creation of a common economy able to compete with the USA, China and Japan. The three differing developmental traditions have generated three major paths for information society to develop—the American, Japanese and European paths.

3.1 The Plan of Transforming Japanese Society into an Information Society In Japan, after the publication of two articles by Tadao Umesao (Asahi and Tadao 1963; Tadao 1969) and Yoneji Masuda (1981), which were key for the development of the information society model, in 1972, a government commission developed a plan for the implementation of information society in Japan by 2000. The Japan Computer Usage Development Institute began working on an ambitious and challenging project. The plan was dubbed the “national goal 2000”. In his article, Masuda claims that “the civilisation which we are going to build towards the end of the 20th century will

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not be a material civilisation recognised for its large structures, but an actual invisible civilisation. To be precise, it should be referred to as an information civilisation. The homo sapiens, who became part of the first, material, civilisation towards the end of the Ice Age, after ten thousand years is about to become part of a new one—the information civilisation” (Masuda (1981, p. 14). In Japan, of importance was the philosophical, social and cultural canon existing in the minds of the Japanese people, which led to actions that were in line with the assumption that a social need exists related to achieving harmony between continuity and change. The result was the social need for constantly intersecting elements of tradition and modernity. This approach, so characteristic of Japanese security culture, was based on the premise of always striving to build the new atop the old. A different tendency was dominant in Europe. The destruction of the Bastille was a watershed moment after which the destruction of the “old” would frequently be a means to obtaining the space necessary to build the “new” and separate oneself from that which was claimed to be obsolete. The influence of Japanese security culture was that the risk of the negative consequences of affirming digital devices, as a modern form closely related to consumerism, was to be limited by the combination of intellectual creativity, ethical self-discipline and being in harmony with nature (Piwowarski 2011). These are undoubtedly the recurring echoes of the samurai ethics code of bushido, which forms the base of Japanese security culture. This naturally-occurring Japanese model of security culture focused on the idea of “restoring agency”, which is one of the main goals of a nation evolving into an information society, while at the same time acknowledging the need to retain its national identity as a vital element of internal security. Japan protected itself against the threat of potential domination by foreign capital in data processing services.

3.2 The Continued Transformation of American Society into an Information Society The US administration also engaged in computerisation and began to promote the concept of information society nearly at the same time as Japan (Mattelard 2003, pp. 73–98). The implementation of this policy was of course supervised by the White House, also for reasons related to protecting the domestic national security culture, hence the important role of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, which answered to President Richard Nixon. By the time the Moon landing took place in 1969, the US had reached a technological peak regarding the conquest of space, and also began to promote the idea of expanding the use of electronics for social purposes. Under the Reagan administration, the Department of Defence began (in 1983) implementing new innovative solutions related to the computer technologies

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utilised as part of the Strategic Defence Initiative, a programme also referred to as “Star Wars”.

3.3 The Process of Transforming the Communities of the European Union into an Information Society The concept of information society began to undergo a dynamic internationalisation in the mid-1970s. The Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), which comprised the twenty-four richest countries on the planet, used the term information society for the first time in 1975. In 1979, the Council of Ministers of the European Community also used the term for the first time. The concept of information society was implemented by a five-year programme named FAST (Forecasting and Assessment in the Field of Science and Technology—1980). In 1980, the Council of Europe adopted the “Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data”, with the OECD also adopting these rules. It should also be noted that, in 1979, IBM began its historic, global, extremely far-reaching (and thus also encompassing Europe) advertising campaign, which heralded the coming of the “information age”. I believe that the first important step towards a unified Europe in this context is the Bangemann Report—Europe and the global information society, Recommendations of the Bangemann Group to the European Council, Brussels, 1994 (Dabrowska et al. 2016, pp. 11–12). The Bangemann Group report was aimed at convincing the EU elite to support market mechanisms and treat them as a credible and rich source of power which could help us reach the information age. This means that actions must be taken at the European level and by Member States to strike down entrenched positions which put Europe at a competitive disadvantage: • it means fostering an entrepreneurial mentality to enable the emergence of new dynamic sectors of the economy • it means developing a common regulatory approach to bring forth a competitive, Europewide, market for information services • it does NOT mean more public money, financial assistance, subsidies, dirigisme, or protectionism. In addition to its specific recommendations, the Group proposes an Action Plan of concrete initiatives based on a partnership between the private and public sectors to carry Europe forward into the information society. Recommendations to the European Council (2016).

In the mid-1980s, profound and global changes took place, including the introduction of the free flow of capital as a result of financial market deregulation, which coincided with anti-monopoly efforts in the US against telecommunications and computer giants such as AT&T. The deregulation of telecommunications also intensified during this technological transition, which saw the emergence of fast networks and

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the digitisation phenomenon, optoelectronics and devices offering quantities of memory which greatly exceeded what had previously been available, all this accompanied by decreasing costs. In 1989 Tim Berners-Lee proposed a worldwide hypertext-based project which he termed the World Wide Web (WWW). WWW was supposed to enable humanity to work together on a global scale by connecting information by different authors into a network of hypertext documents. Berners-Lee also built his first server, named the HTTPD, as well as the first client application, World Wide Web—a browser and a WYSIWYG, NeXTStep-based hypertext editor. The World Wide Web software was made available in the CERN network in October 1990, and to the wider audience, i.e. on the Internet, in the summer of 1991. Today, this network can be considered part of culture, as a recorded part of human achievement, and, to a certain extent, also to security culture, based on the intentions and deliberate actions of particular security subjects using the network. It is frequently abbreviated to WWW or referred to as the Web. It constitutes a hypertextual, multimedia, online information system based on the commonly accessible and open standards IETF and W3C. The World Wide Web is an online service that, due to its current popularity, is with frequency erroneously conflated with the Internet by laypeople. However, WWW and the Internet are not one and the same. The Internet constitutes a global system of interconnected computer networks. WWW, on the other hand, is one of a number of services available on the Internet, as well as a collection of resources and documents connected with one another via hyperlinks12 and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) addresses.13 In short, the Web is an application operating on the Internet. The WWW information system was constructed with the aim of storing already existing and new knowledge acquired by humanity. As an example, it enables collaborating scholars living in remote parts of the planet to effectively share their ideas, doubts, comments and proposals, and to study all important aspects of a given research project. It should also be noted that Tim Berners-Lee established the World Wide Web Consortium shortly after he had left CERN in October 1994. The Consortium’s headquarters was located at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for Computer Science (MIT/LCS). It received support from important institutions such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which was a pioneer regarding developing the Internet, and the European Commission. The first WWW page was http://info.cern.ch, published in 1990. As part of the WTO, an agreement was signed in 1997 between 608 government institutions concerning the opening of competing markets. The agreement entered into force one year after it was signed. 12 Hyperlink (or simply link)—links are used on web pages and electronic documents (e.g. text, graphics, videos, animations, PDF or HTML files) which refer to other documents or places in the same document; a link can be activated by clicking on it, which results in the desired information being displayed. 13 An URL address specifies the location of a certain resource on the Internet, e.g. www.apeiron. edu.pl/pl.

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Certain countries, such as Japan and Canada, in line with their approaches to internal security systems, restricted the right to sovereignly specify the upper limit on foreign capital present in their national telecommunications networks, but this did not prevent international competition from emerging in this field. In the early 1990s, the USA and Europe began the construction of a powerful information infrastructure, the aim of which was the creation of an unprecedented field of security culture, the idea of which stemmed from the intensifying efforts to perfect the human security environment. The western civilisation (presumably not alone) reached a point in time and space where it is possible to hypothesise that “the country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other. America has apparent strength in military power and economic production. Yet, its more subtle comparative advantage is its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information […]. The information edge is equally important as a force multiplier of American diplomacy […]” (Nye and Owens 1996, p. 20). It is referred to as soft power, which is related to several types of information, such as strategic information (Keohane et al. 1998, p. 81–94), trade information and the ubiquitous common information, broadly understood to refer to media information. Strategy experts and researchers are interested in administering information within the context of security. Today, we are witnessing conflicts provoked by terrorists, drug cartels and guerilla movements. It is thus quite important to predict the level of vulnerability of computer networks to unexpected hacker attacks. In relation to the above, the US Army established the Netwar and Cyberwar units for the purpose of waging war in cyberspace. However, every cyberattack, regardless of its nature and target, is launched by a hacker or by a group of hackers. The organisation and launching of a cyberattack, in order to cause significant damage, requires a highly specialised set of skills. Many such specialist hackers simply sell ready-made products: trojans and viruses of their own making. These are deceptively easy to utilise for average users, who, unaware of their purpose, put them to use. The development of technology, including computers, resulted in the longing for fair warfare, conducted in accordance with the “zero casualty warfare” doctrine, which strives to wage war in the form of “surgical strikes” (Toffler and Toffler 1993). In practice, however, the doctrine is a utopia that cannot be fully implemented, as evidenced by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Irrespective of the praxeological aspects involved, in relation to the use of IT for military and non-military purposes, we are struggling to maintain a high level of security culture. One of its important aspects is the moral and ethical dimension. We live in an age where countless people profess a lifestyle characterised by the worship of wealth and speed, excessive consumerism, superficiality of thought, anarchic, egoistical freedom and social atomisation. This constitutes an important socio-cultural issue, that is still poorly recognised by the elites, despite its key significance for security culture. It should be restated that, according to my definition, security culture refers to the total of solidified, material and non-material products created by humans, serving its resilience and defence in the broad, military and non-military sense; the phenomenon is three-dimensional and comprises three energy streams: the mental-spiritual, the

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organisational-legal and the material; security culture enables individual and group security subjects to: (a) overcome threats, (b) return to a specific level of security, should it ever decrease, (c) optimise security as a multi-sector phenomenon by harmonising the sectors’ potentials, (d) raise on the social and personal level the awareness of developmental needs, engage in self-improvement and motivate others to engage in individual and collective action for the purpose of meeting these needs, as well as actions increasing resilience and defensive potential of individual and group security subjects. ∗ ∗ ∗ Within the context of security culture research, two conflicting socio-cultural tendencies can be seen in the era of post-modern information societies: First, both security culture and modern technology, particularly digital technology, require an increasing degree of multi-aspectual perfectionism from humans in numerous areas related to these phenomena. Second, post-modern trends direct human behaviour towards a falsified version of freedom which, among others, will supposedly enable humans to eschew the bonds of culture restricting their nature, external obligations and the requirement to be precise and always on time, as well as the exhausting education process. To put it mildly, perfectionism and moral and ethical reliability unfortunately are not an important element of the zeitgeist. While modern technology does require from its users an increasing degree of perfection and reliability, today’s education systems, media, entertainment and populism have a strongly eroding effect on these values. The crisis of values, considering the current speed and possibilities offered by digital devices, can result in losses on an unimaginable scale within a single second. At this point, I would like to clearly state my reservations towards the deeply utopian and the, in my opinion, premature praise of the idea of a global (perfect) civic society. Let us analyse only a few arguments concerning the threats to security culture related to the rapid, spontaneous, and thus uncontrolled, development of IT networks and the billions of increasingly socially atomised individuals existing in the world. First—the billions of humans inhabiting the planet would have to constitute a single society, or at least a certain number of harmonious social organisms based on the principles of a consensual social paradigm in their functioning. Second—new information technologies and media are complicated to such a degree, and the relevant infrastructure is so costly, that the “information revolution […], when left to its own devices, [will generate] a wider gap between the rich and poor countries” (Dertouzos 1999). This may also relate to members of various

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social groups in the United States, which is an extremely wealthy state. Los Angeles can serve as an example in this case—Manuel Castells describes it as an extremely modern, but also socially-diverse agglomeration, where the impressive number of computerised children is only surpassed by the number of homeless persons (Castells 1989). Third—the avalanche of unfiltered information reaching incompetent information recipients may become a modern Pandora’s box. In addition, recipients are becoming increasingly incompetent due to the fact that intellectual and moral development, which originally took place in traditional schools and which was to a large degree based on age- and educational needs-specific literature, has been replaced by a chaotic selection of information originating from the Internet or television, information which is frequently pictorial in nature (i.e. lacking in mental depth). The Internet contains incredible amounts of information and data, a large percentage of which lacks substance, in addition to a significant portion of it remaining impossible to interpret, not to mention data which poses a threat due to the fact that it is simply false. An average seven-year-old, whose parents have little time for them in their day, is carelessly “entrusted”, along with the complex issue that is maturation, to television and computer entertainment and advertising. Acquiring access to violent video games and videos depicting hardcore pornography or brutal torture during leisure time and as a result of unbridled curiosity is currently no longer difficult. Youths raised on a diet of visual media are characterised by a different type of perception—a much more impoverished type compared to those still capable of reading a traditional book with satisfaction and comprehension. Today’s “digital illiterates” have shorter attention spans, which has profound personal and social consequences in the education process (Krzysztofek 1995/1996, p. 151). Those people, who are still very young at this point, will soon become parents, leaders, doctors and members of uniformed services that ensure the security of citizens. Their contribution to security culture may soon prove to be of very dubious quality as a result of the Internet supplanting an all-round, autonomising education. This is because nothing can replace advanced brain training based on processing abstract, hand-written characters we refer to as letters into first individual sounds, followed by words and concepts, then into sentences and, eventually—into entire images of events constructed in one’s own imagination, not yet amputated by the imposition of ready-made products by servile screen owners. Screens, carelessly “allowed” to explore our brains excessively and without limits, amputate the imagination within them, and the progressing crippling is accompanied by a speech and logic impediment and, to make matters worse, significant deficiencies in imagination, the role of which is to support empathy and develop emotional intelligence (emotional maturity). ∗ ∗ ∗

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The cortex of the human brain receives and analyses information sent by the organs responsible for all senses in the form of harmonised data packets; for example: sight + hearing + smell + touch + spatial perception (depth, distance). This part of the brain is where association processes based on a wealth of stimuli take place, and it is also the place from which instructions originate regarding the appropriate motoric responses. The senses most commonly utilised by Internet users are sight and hearing. Visual and aural stimuli are received, processed and then synthesised. This is the first step of information processing. Stimulus patterns reflect fragments of the reality which surrounds us and which is perceived by us. Experiments have shown that physical and mental activity enables the brain to build new neural connections or strengthen existing ones, but those which are not used may weaken or even disappear completely. If we cease to train our mental abilities, or, to be broader, our psychophysical abilities, then not only will we forget these abilities, but the space in our brains occupied by them will be handed over to other, more primitive skills, e.g. those which we actually utilise on a daily basis. It is known that our ability to reason, perceive and act is largely determined by genes, as well as important childhood experiences related to the initial association law. These factors are all important, but not exclusive, and explain why these abilities change throughout the human life cycle. However, the technology that helps humans perceive reality is also changing. Humans are currently at a stage that, in a sense, forces them to utilise increasing amounts of information which is also collected in very short intervals. The speed with which a given subject of action acquires information, as well as the accuracy of that information, may have a profound impact on the future performance of a company, on decisions regarding future plans and actions, on managing one’s own time, even choosing one’s own life style or preferred forms of entertainment. The Internet is a unique system which effectively and quickly poses questions— multiple times if necessary—and answers. By clicking on new links leading to new portions of information, a computer user receives answers to new questions or moves on to the next stage of acquiring the information they need. This also necessitates a quick verification of every element of this rapid stream of information. However, information found online is frequently superficial, of low cognitive value, and the data found may be unsatisfactory. If the subject of action does not find the answer to their question, they click on another link. The process repeats until the subject of action acquires satisfactory data. Browsing content assumes different forms: shifting text, images, video material or new links marked with coloured font or underline or virtual buttons enticing users to click on them. This way, most frequently when acting quickly, these simple, physical and mental actions are repeated. The content displayed on the screen is usually analysed very superficially. The Internet provides us with regular, recurring sensory and cognitive stimuli, interactive in character. The eye tracks on the screen only those elements that appear attractive.

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Rapidly changing content is not conducive to maintaining the necessary concentration to thoroughly analyse it. This is greatly conducive to cursory reading, chaotic thoughts and superficial learning. The subject of action is completely focused on flashing images. At the same time, they are distracted by the overwhelming pace at which communication and stimuli are generated, rendering it more difficult to act deliberately. The cacophony of stimuli so characteristic of the Internet occupies the conscious and unconscious mind of the subject of action, preventing them from thinking deeply or insightfully, in addition to limiting creativity. The brain of the subject transforms into a collection of individual units processing individual signals that rapidly introduce information and then quickly eject it (Carr 2010). The more frequently we browse the Internet, the more rarely we encounter well-thought-out sets of data deliberately structured by responsible, non-anonymous authors. Such sets of data include books. Browsing the Internet is a much simpler process than reading a traditional book, which the subject of action would be required to acquire from a bookseller, whose pages must be turned, and on which notes must be taken without using the copypaste function—instead, the hand muscles must contract to write. Reading a book requires a greater degree of concentration than browsing the Internet, in addition to being able to comprehend text recorded in the form of unmoving characters, which instead stimulate the imagination. Of importance is the individual interpretation of these characters and the accompanying graphics by the subject of action. A similar pattern can be observed in relation to communicating with others via text messages, usually limited to a few words or simple sentences. These sequences are increasingly expressed using crude language and slang unintelligible to foreigners. Emojis are added to convey emotion. On the Internet, users encounter ready-made snippets of needed information. Search engines, which help discover the world, usually provide fragmented answers, limited to several words or sentences about what is currently needed, without encouraging users to see the entire picture. The information on the screen is aimed at grabbing the attention of a hastily-acting recipient. Thus, the information environment must be properly designed to enable users to quickly navigate it. Yet another important issue is the form of communication and its legibility. A data architect renders data access easier for others by: • collecting various data units, • grouping these units into useful categories, • assigning names to data and their categories which are simple and recognisable by the majority of the population, • placing information in locations which are maximally conducive to it being found (Lange-Sadzi´nska 2011, p. 99). The primary goal of a data architect is to satisfy data recipients. A recipient is satisfied when provided with quick access to information, and when the information itself is concise or “easy”. This means that simplification and non-contextual superficiality are preferred over content, including in terms of “catchy” crudeness.

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A visitor pays attention to the layout of the website and how they can navigate it (the menu). This is important especially in relation to searching for information which is similar in meaning or content. In this case, the accuracy of an answer is determined by the recipients themselves. A properly-constructed piece of information is at its most effective when it does not force the user to think (Nojszewski 2004), thus slowly reducing their proficiency in the field studied. Quality of life solutions have a spoiling effect on the users’ brain, preventing them from engaging in deeper reflection on the content of the information ingested and its quality. The learning condition necessary for mastering a skill and its unthreatened persistence as a result of solidification—i.e. the condition related to that which is required of humans by security culture—is to constantly repeat (train the application of) certain knowledge and the related experience in real life, not in virtual reality. It is also important to add the ability to correct one’s actions in the future, regardless of whether it is a fragment or the entirety of our conduct results in failure or guarantees success. This training must be continued for a given value to be maintained. Increasing precision and facilitating information influx renders it possible to save energy, and proper reaction to information helps achieve goals in a more expedient manner. If an experience proves to be good for us or at least acceptable, we strive to successfully repeat it in the future. If the speed with which we acquire information on the Internet and its accuracy is satisfactory, then we repeat the process of searching the web. Deeper reflection proves unnecessary for achieving effectiveness. However, it is important to remember that an inevitable result of this is an overwhelming amount of superficial information, which is quick to access but incomplete, and sometimes also fake. Knowledge collected in the virtual space is promoted as instant knowledge. It is a tempting concept, but oftentimes the price of this speed is cursory information, which, to make matters worse, can be false, and the knowledge acquired as a result is shallow. Operating based on such information (which also overloads the brain) detracts from deep thinking. Only short-term memory develops as a result, which, in normal circumstances free from the information cacophony, would serve an important purpose in committing information to long-term memory. However, the pressure of time, the shallowness of knowledge and thought and information chaos frequently prevent us from absorbing into long-term memory portions of trusted, tested knowledge. Users (subjects of action) frequently forgo reflecting upon the information they acquire in their search, instead jumping to other information. Their actions are less focused on analysing and concentrating on content and assessing its value. As I have already mentioned, information acquired in this manner is usually shallow and it is frequently overlooked how much data is actually necessary to have complete knowledge of a subject. In addition, this leads users to the development of a new function necessary to operate in this information rush. In a risky move, networks are entrusted with the human task of storing knowledge and the related data in one’s brain. The human brain, especially at a young age, must undergo educationallychallenging processes and receive stimuli during its development. If the tools and sources of cognition are unilateral and based on the excessive use of computers and

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other media, the brain’s tasks are reduced to remembering where certain information can be found. This leads to the shallowing of the brain’s functioning. As a result, the subject of action no longer possesses a brain well adapted to sovereign reflection on everything it should store in its separate, always-available memory. What I am referring to in this context is the long-term memory and deeper reflection of users. Users, due to possessing a (not always conscious) need for individual intellectual sovereignty, separate from the risks and threats posed by other directedness, are treated in this article as security subjects. ∗ ∗ ∗ Apart from the issue of educating young individuals (human capital), the issue of upbringing is also important from the perspective of security culture. I believe it should precede the process of socialising the younger generations, and eventually dominate it. Only these two elements combined: upbringing and knowledge, when effectively solidified, enable the strong socio-cultural capital (social capital) to be built, serving as an important factor integrating the components of the frst and second energy streams of security culture. This capital is related to social usefulness or uselessness, as well as an entire spectrum of possibilities which present itself between these two extreme values of security culture present in a given subject. According to Pierre Bourdieu, social capital “is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital” (Bourdieu 2012). And for Robert Putnam, social capital determines the level of “features of a social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al. 1995, p. 258; see also Putnam 2000; and Putnam et al. 2003). Putnam’s definition is a valuable complement to the works of Bourdieu. Perhaps it is also an important signal for researchers of security, a sign that the West has become too individualistic and perhaps even self-destructive. This issue, if not detected in time, may result in a needles increase in the number and scale of threats, as well as the creation of an ineffective or unreliable method of managing security. In an atomised, post-modern society, nearly every media user risks disrupting his/her vigilance and inner focus when sitting in front of the “cerebral vampire”— the screen, in addition to risking the diminishing of interactions, and thus one’s social bonds with the environment, due to the attractiveness of the addictive medium. The sense of connection with society and being responsible for it becomes more distant, and the level of security culture decreases (in its individual and group dimension) along the level of intellectual ability, creative social activity and real opportunities for self-improvement with a chance of self-actualisation.14 The topmost need 14 Self-actualisation, otherwise known as self-realisation—a psychological term used to refer to the

constant striving to realise one’s potential, develop talents and abilities, the process of becoming

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of self-actualisation rests atop deeper individual self-improvement and development as part of mutually-influencing social groups, free from the shallowing effect of excessive screen use. Tangentially to this reasoning, it can be conjectured that the last few communities which enjoy a higher chance of achieving this are the modern warrior communities—uniformed services operating based on hierarchies, the need for education and training and the inner need for cultivating one’s ethos, which determines their identity. This ethos is the modernised version of security culture, which stems from the honour culture celebrated by Mediaeval knights and later by modern armies, the inheritors of noble military traditions and promoters and preservers of what is referred to as chivalry. Using a computer, laptop or smartphone has a profound impact on our perception of reality. These devices, available in all conditions and at any time, become tools for collecting, processing and retrieving all forms of information, including text. This form of information, before being invented and made available to entire societies via the Internet, as a modern technology of world discovery, was not the dominant part of all discovery-oriented endeavours of the human race.

4 Instead of Conclusions—Several Social Facts 1. The level of the security culture of an individual human or social group is determined by the level of quality (breadth and depth) of world cognition of these security subjects. Humans, as cognitive subjects, are formed as security subjects in their childhood, when they are still learning. They learn by seeing and hearing, but they are also kinaesthetics, i.e. they learn through non-virtual movement and touch. Articulation (reading aloud, repeating from memory) is also a physical (and mental) effort. 2. A simple example of the mind and the body working together is the first contact of a subject with mathematics, and the related counting on fingers. Brain development requires early, simple, kinaesthetic and non-virtual forms of learning (Korab 2010), as without them, it is later difficult to develop abstract thinking (Spitzer 2013, p. 147). Experiments have shown that activity-based patterns of activation in the human brain are recorded as conceptual structures only when learning is accompanied by real, i.e. nonvirtual, manual, actions. Cognition via a computer mouse is related to a decreased ability to reflect upon this cognition (Spitzer 2013, p. 157). 3. The validity of the above claim is also proven by the fact that the most effective method of learning the alphabet is to write the letters by hand, not using a keyboard (Kiefer et al. 2008), and the fact that the same has an impact on the ability to read. “who one wants to be” (and not “whoever”), striving for inner cohesion, fulfilling one’s destiny and calling.

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4. A child is able to master using the computer or television relatively quickly, but is not prepared to receive the overwhelming amounts of stimuli generated by these devices, and its eyes should be prevented from watching moving pictures until it is at least three years old to avoid “damage”. The eyes of children are not adapted for this and should learn to see in three dimensions. They can use the media later, but only under the strict supervision of a parent, who interprets everything that is happening on the screen. 5. Another example of media abuse is using them in the bedroom and leaving them there and not in the day room. This leads to excessive, disorderly Internet use which leads to less time spent sleeping. Moreover, children who have more friends in the real social world sleep better and longer (Pea et al. 2012, p. 327). 6. Parents may believe that video games are part of the young people subculture and that disallowing them may have a detrimental effect their children’s relations with peers. Children are given games that provide an attractive adrenaline rush— which can be achieved by depictions of violence. It is believed that such games improve the social skills of young individuals and protect them from feeling alone. Science, however, demonstrates that it is not so. Research on personality development in teenagers demonstrates that an hour spent in front of the television or computer screen increases the risk of the child’s relationship with their parents deteriorating by more than ten percent. This decrease is also accompanied by deteriorating bonds with peers and friends. The human brain is at its most efficient when working directly with other humans, and learns best when engaged in a direct exchange of opinions and experiences in a social group. In addition, the human tendency to mimic serves as a catalyst for the process of skill acquisition. ˙ nska For this purpose, the brain activates structures known as mirror neurons (Zyli´ 2013), especially visible in small children, who are eager to learn by mimicking adults. This type of interaction cannot fully manifest when communicating with a computer. 7. Video games and films depicting violence have a negative impact on those attributes of a security subject which are important factors constituting the potential of their security environment, such as empathy and good relationships with one’s social environment. Experiments by Brad Bushman and Craig Anderson concerning the impact of violence in the media on the behaviour of observers, when analysed from the securitological perspective, are alarming. Two groups of participants were given video games to play: the first group played violent games, the other group played non-violent games. After 20 min of gameplay, when the participants were filling out a psychological questionnaire, they could hear the sounds of a fight from the adjacent room, as well as voices implying that someone has been injured. Those who had played violent video games were four times slower to help the injured than those who had been playing games that did not depict violence. The thesis was that the negative impact of certain video games might erode empathy in humans, which is an important part of being an active security subject (Bushman and Anderson 2009). 8. The impact of Internet addiction, which has become part of the social world, is the emergence of the progressive degradation of the following security culture

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factors in security subjects: the ability to focus, family bonds and the influence of parents, being active socially, having real friends and entering into direct interpersonal relationships instead of illusory virtual ones, having passions and hobbies, willpower, a regular circadian rhythm, learning something new every day, eating regular meals, openness and empathy instead of egocentrism and egoism, grounded perception of one’s own identity, intellectual ability, orderly sexual life, self-control regarding e.g. the time spent browsing the Internet, being naturally interested in one’s health and hygiene, self-actualisation thanks to being in a good place at work (Kiedrowicz 2019). 9. Hardell and colleagues published an analysis of the risk of malignant neoplasms which is extremely important from the point of view of this discussion (2008, 2010), because they prove that the risk of developing acoustic neuroma in those who used cell phones regularly for more than ten years was higher by 240%, in addition to the 200% higher risk of brain glioma and 70% higher risk of meningioma. This elevated risk affected those who frequently talked on their phones and primarily used one ear for this purpose. It appears likely that the detrimental influence of the cellular phone electromagnetic field may also affect other systems and organs. It is also possible that the radiation emanating from mobile phone may itself be genotoxic.

5 Summary Let the following story serve as a summary for this chapter. Imagine a traveller who ambitiously climbs a steep mountain using a cane as support. The traveller never entertains the mad idea that, since he has a wonderful, modern cane in his hand, he could cut off one of his legs. Natural law15 and common sense, also in relation to information society—when supported by scientific reasoning, offer more than both of our legs and a helpful cane combined. They are a core element of the value system of an active security subject and their source of motivation to internalise and reinforce moral conduct by way of constant ethics training, which thus assume the form of a security culture.

15 Natural

law (lex naturalis)—a universal, primordial law (set of norms) resulting from human nature and the mere fact of human existence, it is not imposed by rulers, elites, judges or institutions and is binding regardless of being sanctioned by state authorities; it is unalienable and it is not possible to deprive someone of it or cancel it. Note: thus construed, the law of nature must not be conflated with the laws existing in nature and described by life sciences. Cf. K. Haakonsssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge—New York 1996.

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These exercises, which are not occasional in nature, but constitute regular and behavioural training of virtues, originate from aretology.16 The truly ethical individual “not only knows, but also can”.17 They can appreciate the positive sides of that what is new and is conducive to development, and are also able to avoid that which, in contact with the new, can prove erroneous and bring about undesirable dysfunctions and threats.

References Adamczak A (2018) Innowacyjny Urz˛ad Patentowy w innowacyjnej gospodarce. Rozmowa z dr Alicj˛a Adamczak, prezes Urz˛edu Patentowego RP, interview by Z. Biskupski, „Kwartalnik Urz˛edu Patentowego RP” No. 3/2018, pp 13–21 Asahi H, Tadao U (1963) Information industry theory: dawn of the coming era of the ectodermal industry. VP, Tokyo Bell D (1989) The third technological revolution and its possible socioeconomic conse˛auences. Dissent, Spring 1989:164–176 von Bertalanffy L (1984) Ogólna teoria systemów. Podstawy, rozwój, zastosowania, Pa´nstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa Boche´nski JM (1995) Cnota ambicji. In: Dzieła zebrane, vol 5. Etyka, Wydawnictwo Philed, Kraków Bourdieu P (2012) The forms of capital. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/ works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htmp. Accessed 15 Aug 2012 Bushman BJ, Anderson CA (2009) Comfortably numb desensitizing effects of violent media on helping others. Psychol Sci 20(3):273–277. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02287.x Carr N (2010) The shallows: what the internet is doing to our brains. W.W. Norton & Company, New York Castells M (1989) The informational city. Blackwell, Oxford Castells M (2000) The rise of the network society, 2nd edn. Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA, p 2000 Communication (2019) Lexico.com. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/communication. Accessed 23 March 2019 D˛abrowska A, Jano´s-Kresło M, Wódkowski A (2016) E-usługi a społecze´nstwo informacyjne. Difin, Warszawa Dertouzos M., (1999). Entretien, Le Monde, 23 Feb 1999 DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev 48(2):147–160 Doktorowicz K (1983) Europejski model społecze´nstwa informacyjnego. Polityczna strategia ´ aski Unii Europejskiej w kontek´scie globalnych problemów wieku informacji, Uniwersytet Sl˛ w Katowicach, Katowice 2005 Doktorowicz K (2000) Koncepcja społecze´nstwa informacyjnego w polityce Unii Europejskiej. Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza w Krakowie, Kraków Goban-Klas T, Sienkiewicz P (1999) Społecze´nstwo informacyjne: szanse, zagro˙zenia, wyzwania. Wydawnictwo Fundacji Post˛epu Telekomunikacji, Kraków, p 1999

16 Aretology—the

study of virtues (from the Greek arete—virtue). See Z. Kalita, Wprowadzenie, [in:] Etyka w teorii i praktyce. Antologia tekstów, Z. Kalita (ed.), Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Wrocław 2001, p. 13. 17 J.M. Boche´ nski, Cnota ambicji, [in:] Dzieła zebrane, vol. 5: Etyka, Wydawnictwo Philed, Kraków Bochenski 1995, p. 287.

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Ph. D. Juliusz Piwowarski , Prof. WSBPI, is Rector of the University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Kraków, Poland.

Conflict Resolution in Prisons. Education, Restorative Justice and Prisoner Facilitated Mediation Luis Millana, Juan Carlos Fernández-Rodríguez, and Fernando Miralles Muñoz

Outline 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Prisoner Facilitated Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Education in Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract This document analyses the importance of techniques focused on peaceful conflict resolution, the engagement of perpetrators through restorative justice processes and prisoner facilitated mediation. Likewise, it analyses the impact of education and treatment programmes to reduce interpersonal and intrapersonal violence and assaults in prisons. Two programmes are highlighted as examples; the first, for reducing violent behaviour and the second, a programme consisting of a new model for useful, realistic and universally-applicable social harmony for achieving the prison’s therapeutic, training, educational and social harmony objectives, called respect units. Keywords Criminals · Violence · Aggression · Empathy · Education · Mediation · Conflict resolution · Treatment programs

In: A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Biziewski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: November 13 2019; Accepted: January, 6, 2020. L. Millana (B) · J. C. Fernández-Rodríguez Universidad Antonio de Nebrija, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] F. M. Muñoz Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, Spain © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_14

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1 Introduction Prisoners have been intentionally and consciously excluded from society for committing various crimes and going against socially accepted values. In these places in which people coexist and live side by side, there are conflicts that can lead to violence, confrontations, repressive responses from the prison etc. Both the people and the prisons present and develop different resolution strategies. But, sooner or later, their time behind bars and their subsequent return to society do not appear to be enough to combat the cycle of crime and violence. However, is it possible to reduce the rates of crime, violence and conflict by increasing offenders’ education while in prison? Is it cost effective compared to other crime prevention measures? Is it possible to put an end to conflicts, assaults and fights in such a way that they are resolved? Is it possible to bring peace back to their lives inside prison? Prisoners’ participation in the field of education and mediation could alleviate risk and increase security in prisons. One of the main challenges that prisoners have is the routine, the lack of change, the passage of time in the same unit with deadly boredom, which often leads to frustration, thus increasing the risk of assault both for prison staff and prisoners. With resources being limited, the fact that there are not enough programmes and activities for all prisoners in a prison gives rise to the experience of monotony, homogeneity and boredom, which generates among prisoners the feeling of being abandoned by the prison, with the resulting negative effects on their attitude and behaviour (Ruiz 2006). Prison life is marked by institutional violence (no one is in prison of their own accord and all are subject to established regulations) as well as interpersonal violence among prisoners and in the relationships they have with the staff guarding and monitoring them (Ríos Martín 2007). The law of the strongest, the code of silence, drug dealing, the lack of control, abusive relationships and relationships based on self-interest, as well as prisoners that are institutionalised, make them see the need to put on a front and protect and defend themselves from others, even from one’s own feelings. Showing any sign of weakness is dangerous. In these conditions, fundamental elements for human development, such as trust, empathy, communication, support and, therefore, lack of self-control and camaraderie, cannot come about (Ronzón 2009). As they are so frequent and forceful, the different kinds of violent acts and situations have ended up being second nature for interacting with others behind bars, which hinders reintegration and social rehabilitation and leads to enhanced criminal development (Giraldo and Solano 2016). Different studies have established the relationship between an individual’s maladjusted or violent behaviour and their reoffending (Gendreau et al. 1997; Zamble and Porporino 1988, 1990). The harmful relationship between violent behaviour in prison treatment and the reintegration process in prison is well known. It is difficult to act and reconcile the two areas that are seemingly in conflict with each other in a prison. On the one hand, security and management, and on the other, reintegration and conflict resolution, mediation and restorative justice, as well as educational, sports, cultural and occupational activities and, therefore, treatment.

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2 Prisoner Facilitated Mediation When a violent dispute starts between several people, a conflict arises that has to be addressed to prevent it from being repeated. The prison administration’s intervention does not usually involve finding out the reasons for the dispute or settling it, which prevents solutions being found through dialogue, and punishes some or all of the people involved in the conflict, which generates feelings of revenge in the losers, thus sustaining and reproducing the dispute. Traditional strategies are based on security, discipline and control: treating violent conflicts as a breaking of the rules, punishing those who participate in fights and disputes, taking preventive measures with individuals that prison staff identify as being aggressive and separating assailants from those assaulted. These reactive measures do not provide a sufficient basis for effective prevention. On the contrary, conflict resolution focused on analysing the source and causes of disputes opens new doors to finding a peaceful solution to the same. This includes: analysing and identifying the causes, prison staff use dynamic security and prison intelligence, opportunities are provided to resolve differences, conflicts are managed in a shared and responsible manner and prisoners’ opinions and points of view are welcomed and taken into account (Kimmett 2018; Ríos Martín 2007). The key to reducing the level of violence in prisons lies in determining the appropriate turning point between formal and informal social control mechanisms. These include: Transparency in prisoners’ demands, the need to use evidence-based techniques and practices, and the use of innovative strategies (Byrne 2007). This section analyses the importance of reconciliation through restorative justice processes and prisoner facilitated mediation. According to Pascual et al.: In the absence of a universally valid definition, we understand Restorative Justice to mean the philosophy and method of resolving conflicts that primarily address victim protection and the restoration of social peace through community dialogue and face-to-face between those directly affected, with the aim of effectively meeting the needs expressed by the same, giving them a key role in the process and its possible solutions, obtaining the offender’s accountability and the reparation of personal and social injuries caused by the crime Pascual et al. (2008)

Mediation has been conceived under the theoretical framework of Restorative Justice as a tool within it Bernabé (2012), Dhamia et al. (2009). Mediation is a process that enables the resolution of interpersonal conflicts that are specific and admitted, provided that the people involved are not able to resolve them by themselves, using restorative justice aiming for social reintegration. This system allows the people involved to play a key role in the process, go deeper into their conflicts through dialogue and resolve them peacefully. They take responsibility for their actions and can establish interpersonal relationships as a way of reducing aggressive and violent acts in prison. In addition to resolving confrontations, this process is a means of teaching peaceful conflict resolution techniques. It results in the acts being admitted by those involved and said parties asking for forgiveness, thus improving social harmony in

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prisons (Ríos Martín 1998, 2007, 2004; Ríos Martín et al. 2014). It is not about mediation between victim and aggressor (criminal mediation), nor between prisoners and prison staff (mediation requires a balance of power between the parties involved), but it is about dialogue and the active search for solutions between prisoners who are sharing a space and who have expressed their differences through aggression (Lozano 2010). Following Cañada-Pancorbo (2015) and Ríos Martín (2007), the objectives of prisoner facilitated mediation are as follows: 1. Objectives for the treatment of prisoners. ● Taking responsibility for the offending behaviour and their involvement in the interpersonal conflict. ● Learning behaviours aimed at recognition of the truth. ● Informal training in dialogue behaviours for conflictive interpersonal relationships, which can also promote readiness for life after being released. ● Learning to make personal, autonomous decisions about the conflict. 2. Objectives for social harmony in prison. ● Peaceful internal relationships inside the units through the dissemination among prisoners of this system for dialogue in conflict resolution. ● Reduction of reoffending due to the punishment being suspended, dependent on agreements being met. ● Reduction of administrative and judicial interventions, giving rise to the principle of discretion and procedural economy. ● Decrease in the number of people who cannot live side by side in prison through the opportunity for dialogue. 3. Objectives for the benefit of people deprived of liberty. ● Reduction of anxiety, fear and emotional strain. ● Increased perception of control over one’s own life. ● Reduction of harm caused to the convict and their family due to the application of Prison Regulations. The prisoner facilitated mediation process starts with a stage involving gathering and receiving information on the dispute between two or more prisoners held by the prison administration (parties involved, date of the fight, disciplinary measures etc.) and the referral of people who have a conflict to the mediation service at the voluntary request of one or both parties. Requests are also received in which prisoners themselves ask to meet with the mediation team, as are requests that come through lists to facilitate the prison’s management of prisoners who cannot live side by side others or maintain day-to-day relationships. At this point, the mediators decide on the strategy to be followed. When making contact for the first time, the mediator’s job should be focused on: (1) addressing the conflict at the emotional level using active listening techniques, building confidence in the process and releasing the negative emotional content, (2) building confidence in the process, explaining the basic rules of the mediation, the role of the mediator and each of the parties, instructing the parties

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as to the content and development of the mediation and gathering information on the conflict and the legal situation of the people involved. The second stage involves accepting and committing to the mediation process; the mediators initially meet each of the parties in the conflict individually to find out about their willingness to meet each other. It is at this stage that all the parties, mediators and parties in the conflict meet for the first time. The content of the mediation, the rules of the process, the objectives and the role of the mediator are explained in depth. Any questions are answered and they all sign the joint document resulting from the session, handed over during the welcome stage. Subsequently, the dialogue and negotiations take place. A face-to-face meeting is enabled so the parties in the conflict have the same information and the common objective of resolving the problem with the possibility of a balance of power between them. At this stage, the process is theirs. They are responsible for leading the exchange about the conflict and the agreements they want to reach, the mediator redirects, reformulates, legitimates, recognises and, in short, participates to increase the effectiveness of the meeting (Lozano 2010; Pastor and Huertas 2014). The mediators write up the agreements reached, reading and correcting them, creating a document that records the changes occurring. This face-to-face is held in several joint sessions, spaced out over time (time for reflection) depending on the level of the conflict. The length of each session is determined by the disagreements, difficulties in maintaining attention, fatigue, participatory attitude etc. More than an hour and a half is not recommended. The mediation does not have to end formally, or conclude with an agreement (signing a record of the agreements reached), but can be used to put two people in communication with each other so they can meet in the future without violence. Subsequently, it is advisable to follow up the mediation to verify the degree of compliance with the agreements, the relationship between the parties and the possible changes in their prison regime as a result of the mediation (Lozano 2010; Kaufer et al. 2014; Rios 2007; Fernández-Caballero et al. 2012). The mediation team should be made up of professionals from outside the prison to guarantee confidentiality, although it is possible to include two prison officers who are trained and who do not have the authority to initiate disciplinary action. Mediators must meet the following requirements: neutrality with respect to the outcomes, impartiality and equality with respect to the parties, confidentiality, flexibility and openness, not giving advice or offering their opinions, ability to learn from experience, respect for the prisoners’ engagement, helping the parties to offload their emotions, adoption of partial agreements that will make up a final agreement, informing the administration of the agreements reached and not having any professional or personal interest in common with any of the parties (Ríos Martín 2007; The Foresee Research Group and National Institute of Criminology 2010; Pastor and Huertas 2014).

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3 Education in Prisons According to the UNESCO Adult and Prisoner Education Report (1997), there have been many countries that have signed international legal conventions and regulations that regulate the conditions and human rights of prisoners, guaranteeing minimum prison conditions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Geneva 1955) cover and protect human rights while imprisoned, including the right to education. Education while in prison, isolation and confinement has been studied from different approaches and priorities. The problems that the person deprived of freedom generates for themselves and those generated in the family environment are among the most diverse; it could be said that the prison population as a whole is difficult and problematic. Any activity to be developed inside a prison is complex and problematic. How does the prison regime influence the development of educational programmes? Do the prison authorities’ decisions have an impact on education? How do prison regulations have an impact on educational decision making? Current research indicates that educational programmes are effective in reducing violent acts and crimes (Wilson et al. 2000; Hall 2015; Michals and Kessler 2015; Devillya et al. 2005; Veselak 2015; O’Donnell and College 2015), but other authors such as De Maeyer (2002) believe that when there are educational programmes in prison, it is usually a pretext, an occasion and reason to keep prisoners occupied in as intelligent a way as possible. Educational programmes and, therefore, the school within the prison, are presented to people deprived of liberty as a specific place where they can think about a more just, more developed, more constructed, more inclusive society, for all, that is more supportive and more human, but complex, organisations within other organisations, within an organisation, the prison, with a vertical, rigid and closed structure that hinders the educational offer due to the constraints of its regulations that are at odds (García et al. 2007). On occasion, the schools take on these closed, rigid, structured organisational styles, being based on the offer without taking into account the demand, whether explicit or potential. Several common deficiencies have been described among offenders: impulsivity, concrete reasoning, lack of perspectives and social skills, desire for prominence, a history of school failure or poor experiences with the education system (high rates of illiteracy and functional illiteracy), low self-esteem, affective disorders, high levels of aggressiveness and deficiencies in resolving their interpersonal problems. Prisoners form heterogeneous school groups both culturally and cognitively, which is reflected in different levels, manners, styles and rates of learning. By way of an example, there are: (1) groups with high percentages of illiteracy including functional illiteracy, (2) groups of older people, between 40 and 45, who did not go to school during childhood; (3) groups of young people with serious learning difficulties caused, in some cases, by disorders that were never diagnosed or treated (relating to unstructured families, psychological problems, drug addiction issues etc.), (4) groups of people from different countries who were never inside the education system in their country of origin. Many efforts to understand and improve prisoner literacy have focused

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on reading, while it is also necessary to focus on written communication skills, which have an impact on their success. Writing is essential for finding and holding down competitive employment, communicating in writing with other people, filling out requests and forms, including skills such as clarity, precision and correct use of grammar (Shippen 2008). There are a variety of reasons to attend educational programmes, sometimes linked to acquiring knowledge, sometimes learning a trade, sometimes work experience in the form of workshops, but there are also reasons with less clear objectives, such as connecting with other prisoners to establish criminal groups within the prison, to break the unit’s routine (“some fresh air”) or simply to take a walk. Antagonistic attitudes, disinterest and reluctance are also observed (Izquierdo 2002; Herrero 1997). Prisoner commitment rates to education are low, mainly during the first years of serving their sentences or while awaiting sentencing. The low rates of participation in educational programmes are essentially explained by the following three reasons: (A) limited availability of programmes, (B) the prison environment, and (C) the attitudes, perceptions and available time of prison workers (Vacca 2004; Shippen et al. 2010). We will briefly highlight two programmes; the first, for reducing violent behaviour (hereinafter, PICOVI) and the second, a programme consisting of a new model for useful, realistic and universally-applicable social harmony for achieving the prison’s therapeutic, training, educational and social harmony objectives, called respect units (hereinafter, MdR). The majority of programmes in prisons are carried out in a group, among other reasons because it is necessary for the interventions to reach the largest possible population and because the group itself actively participates at the therapeutic level and synergistic relationships are established between the different members of the group (García López 2019). With respect to the violent behaviour programme (Prison Institutions 2017), it is intended for prisoners who, as a result of violent behaviour, have a victim of their aggression, whether inside or outside prison, with particular emphasis on prisoners who have displayed violent behaviour within the context of their personal relationships, with whom it is precisely the existence of bonds and living side by side others that precipitates their criminal activity. The general objectives are as follows: ● Helping the prisoner recognise their behaviour and motivate them to change by creating a conducive environment that facilitates a therapeutic alliance and group cohesion. ● Developing cognitive, emotional and behavioural skills that allow participants to identify and control cognitive distortions and thoughts that cause distress and/or facilitate violent behaviour. ● Training in emotional self-regulation and alternatives to violence. ● Promoting a framework of values and a lifestyle in line with the common norms of social harmony and prosocial behaviours. The programme participants will be prisoners who, as a result of their violent behaviour, have a victim of their aggression, whether inside or outside prison, and who are not classified under any of the categories in which a specific therapeutic

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programme already exists. Specifically, the prisoner profile to which the programme is directed is as follows: ● Prisoners convicted of family violence crimes (excluding gender-based violence): child abuse, elder abuse, child-to-parent violence (many of them convicted of breaking restraining orders). ● Prisoners convicted of crimes committed in rural areas (community violence): the parties involved know each other and it is precisely the existence of bonds and living side by side others that precipitated their criminal activity. ● Prisoners convicted of violent crimes such as murder, battery, assault, robbery with violence etc. ● Prisoners who have displayed aggressive behaviour in the past or the present, whether inside or outside prison. ● And any other prisoners who, at the discretion of the professionals concerned, need to be included because of the potential for aggression they display. The programme designed is divided into 8 intervention units: motivation, violent behaviour, emotions, dysfunctional thinking, distortions and beliefs, empathy and moral reasoning, personal values and goals, positive coping strategies and relapse prevention and positive lifestyle. Each unit has specific objectives, techniques and activities designed to achieve them. In addition to the methodology, the programme includes an evaluation procedure for assessing the effectiveness of its results (PICOVI 2017): I. Motivation The aim is for the participating prisoner to have an adequate degree of motivation, which is realistic and in line with the programme’s objectives, and which sufficiently guarantees both the completion of the treatment and beneficial participation during the sessions. The therapeutic group is also prepared to act in a cohesive, active way. II. Violent Behaviour The aim is for the aggressor to understand the explanatory mechanisms that lead to violent behaviour. This is caused by a chain of events that can be controlled at each step. Attention is paid to contextual, social and personal determinants and the interconnections between them all. III. Emotions The aim is to improve the prisoner’s emotional awareness, as well as their understanding of how affective states can determine certain behaviour. This also starts with training in emotional regulation strategies. Learning these emotional skills helps to decrease aggressive behaviours and other socially and personally inappropriate behaviours. IV. Dysfunctional thinking, distortions and beliefs This develops skills that allow participants to identify, manage and modify patterns of thinking that tend to justify violent behaviour. The aim is also to dismantle cognitive

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mechanisms that reduce the assumption of responsibility; other alternative flexible and rational thinking processes are developed. V. Empathy and moral reasoning People who display violent behaviour need to know and come to understand the emotions and thoughts of the victims of their aggression, whether direct or indirect, as well as the consequences arising from it. On the other hand, the development of empathy constitutes a basic factor for developing prosocial behaviours based on mutual respect and seeing things from another person’s point of view. VI. Personal values and goals Each individual has a hierarchical system of values that guide their behaviour and personal aspirations. This system is not immutable and can be redirected towards new patterns of thinking that ensure respect for universal values in favour of social harmony. At the same time, the aim is to create a new non-criminal lifestyle. VII. Positive coping strategies This is aimed at areas relating to the appearance and continuance of violent behaviour, the time when alternative behaviours should be used. Training is provided in social skills, conflict resolution skills, emotional self-control techniques, as well as sociallyacceptable methods for coping with difficult situations. VIII. Relapse prevention and positive lifestyle The final unit in the programme brings together and incorporates the content that was previously developed. The prisoner needs to be aware of their own ability to curb a possible relapse, not only by avoiding risky situations, but also by acting from the moment when the first warning signs appear. To do this, different potential scenarios are practised and a positive attitude based on a sense of self-efficacy is encouraged. The difficulties we face when implementing such a programme include the following: Other foreseeable difficulties in the prison environment when implementing a violence control programme include: (a) security measures are often defended more vigorously and are more widely praised than treatment programmes are, (b) a longterm perspective is needed to measure the effectiveness of programmes against violence (it is difficult to appreciate it in the short term), requiring exposure to different contexts and timescales, (c) the treatment of violent behaviour in prison is more based on positive punishment than negative punishment and negative reinforcement, and (d) following the instructions of prison staff and disciplinary regulations have a negative impact when it comes to using a system based on rewards and prison privileges that have a decisive impact on the prisoner’s attitudinal change. Respect units (MdR) are, among other things, a system of organisation of life in prison that has proven to be useful, realistic and universally-applicable for achieving the prison’s therapeutic, training, educational and social harmony objectives. These are intervention programmes with tools, dynamics and structures, as well as defined and systematised guidelines for action and evaluation (Prison Institutions 1011).

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The emergence of MdR is contextualised by a continuous search made by prison professionals to overcome prisons’ traditional, rigid internal classification and by the commitment of Spanish Prison Institutions to a broader vision that is closer to the pedagogy of the concept of treatment as set out under the law and prison regulations. Monteserín and Galán establish that respect units aim to modify the traditional sense of prison through specific objectives to achieve change (Monteserín and Galán 2013); changes in the prison officer and in the nihilistic time spent in prison, taking into account the fact that the prisoner’s natural enemy is the prison officer and that the time spent in prison represents an additional problem, these two elements have to be repurposed. The prison officer’s involvement in the programme makes them more accessible to the prisoner without losing authority. By creating a closer relationship, levels of hostility go down; they become a source of support for the prisoner and the programme works better (Galán 2015). The prisoner’s inclusion is voluntary and implies their acceptance of the unit’s rules, which prioritise respect for people and which regulate: A. The personal area relating to hygiene, appearance, clothing and cell care. B. The environment care area (unit tasks) relating to the use and maintenance of common spaces. C. The interpersonal relationships area, which includes all the person’s interactions with other prisoners, prison officers, therapists and outside professionals. D. The activities area, which regulates each prisoner’s schedule of activities, regardless of the tasks in the unit pertaining to their group, including every day of the week and all the hours of the day, in which it is determined which activities should be performed at any given time and leisure times are planned. The program is structured around three points, namely: a group organisation system, an immediate evaluation procedure and a participation structure for prisoners, with the following structures for prisoners’ participation available: A Daily Meeting or General Assembly of all prisoners in the module with a member of the Technical Team, generally the educator, a Meeting of Responsible Parties that meets at least once a week and the Reception Committee and Social Harmony Committee. The general objectives include: ● The creation of a standardised social climate to be used as a framework for specific treatment programmes. ● The breakup of prison dynamics through the modification of group relationships. ● The development of treatment programmes in habits, values and attitudes. And among the specific objectives we have, grouping them into the personal, community and interpersonal relationships categories: ● ● ● ● ●

Developing and maintaining personal hygiene habits (care of self-image). Promoting care for and organisation of personal space. Assessing punctuality, work and effort when performing activities and tasks. Engaging in caring for the environment and taking responsibility. Accepting other people’s ability to organise.

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Taking responsibility towards the group and the community. Developing habits of participation and dialogue. Eradicating all kinds of violence and aggressiveness, both physical and verbal. Resolving conflicts and problems in socially-acceptable ways. Developing empathy and encouraging supportive behaviour.

Fulfilling these objectives results in considerable improvement in prisoners’ quality of life, little or no conflict and increased job satisfaction for prison workers (Belinchón and García Casado 2014). In 2017, Spanish prisons had 253 Respect Modules at their different levels of intervention implanted in 67 prisons and 3 Mother Units. 18,518 prisoners in this program are made up of a total inmate population of 51,983 prisoners, still reaching a minority of the prison population. It should be noted that the penitentiary centers called “social insertion centers” function entirely as modules of respect, promoting this program throughout the year. This model of respect modules, for example, is being implemented in France. The results of different investigations point out that the model of operation of these programs in these modules is a determining factor in the decrease of violent and aggressive behavior perceived by both prisoners and employees of penitentiary institutions (Khaled and Gijón-Puerta 2017; Redondo 2017; SGIIPP 2017). In general, the programs mentioned above along with others, are of cognitivebehavioral sign, since they have shown greater efficacy in various evaluation measures, affecting a reduction in criminal relapse (Cooke and Philip 2001; Ward and Eccleston 2004; Redondo and Frerich 2013, 2014; Zara and Farrington 2016). Thanks to these and other programs, prisoners establish a greater number of prosocial attitudes and behaviors that will help them face their reintegration into society, although other authors indicate, for example, that one of the indicators for the evaluation of the evolution of internal, participation in treatment activities, generate a suspect or simulated motivation in prisoners moved perhaps and only by the rewards obtained (García Borés et al. 2015). Other authors indicate that when evaluating programs and their results there are small differences or significant absences between the experimental and control groups, indicating that intervention programs have a small and non-permanent effect. The author refers that he does not know so far any research carried out in prisons in Spain that has demonstrated with sufficient clarity this effectiveness in specific programs (Medina 2012). Among the lessons learned from the application of the various programs we find: (1) the need for structured, clear and managerial programs based on solid techniques that guide intervention procedures and allow monitoring of the program’s operation, applying them with integrity until the end of the treatment with an adequate duration and intensity, (2) taking into account the experience of the treatment teams allowing to incorporate improvements or adjustments based on the practical experience of the teams that implement the programs, (3) using evaluation instruments structured that allow to collect relevant information to design individual interventions, specifically design programs for both the male and female population, (4) having response capabilities to the different contingencies that occur in a prison that modify the initial

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planning of the programs, (5) multidisciplinary teams, having committed and motivated work, an intervention as close to prison admission, (6) peer learning and (7) an analysis of strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for program improvement (UNODC 2017; Medina 2012, Sapouna et al. 2015).

4 Conclusions The incorporation of reconciliation and restorative justice programmes in prison and disciplinary procedures would result in reduced rates of violence inside prisons and peaceful conflict resolution techniques and calm and peaceful behaviours being learned. One of the main objectives of prisoner facilitated mediation is that the parties, on equal terms, make independent and autonomous decisions about the conflict that arose, with them being responsible for resolving the dispute themselves. We would be able to improve prisoners’ lives, walk towards obtaining certain prison privileges and take steps towards the prisoner’s re-education and social reintegration. Current research indicates that educational programmes are effective in reducing crime and violence. Several common deficiencies have been described among offenders: impulsivity, concrete reasoning, lack of social perspectives and deficiencies in resolving their interpersonal problems. Educational training in these areas, with an emphasis on the development of the skills needed in the management of the same, substantially reduces reoffending, has an impact on appropriate and positive functioning and increases employment rates. The literature supports the value of educational intervention as an effective strategy for reducing violence and reoffending among offenders. On the contrary, prisoner commitment rates to education are low, mainly during the first years of serving their sentences or while awaiting sentencing. Implementing the appropriate educational programme reduces the violence committed by prisoners who participate in them and tends to promote a more positive prison environment. Educational programmes that are effective help prisoners with their social skills, development and techniques and strategies to help them deal with their emotions, emphasising academic, vocational and social education and increasing their opportunities to improve their ability to look for and retain work once released. Formal education has a major impact on rebuilding prisoners’ life path by separating them from reoffending and thus strengthening family ties. The adequate acquisition of habits, attitudes and values for socially-acceptable behaviours suffers from the con-

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ditioning of overcoming the deficiencies in people’s education and psychology. These kinds of interventions cannot be carried out in an antisocial, aggressive, violent or confrontational environment. At present, prisons are spaces where the pedagogy of education and social education have a place.

References Belinchón E, García Casado H (2014) La intervención sociocultural en el marco del tratamiento penitenciario. In: De-Juanas Oliva A (coord.) Educación Social en los Centros Penitenciarios. UNED Bernabé JL (2012) Experiencia de la mediación penitenciaria. In: Morales MA, Calvo F, Carretero E, Colomer I, Cucarella LA, Segovia B et al (eds) Sobre la Mediación Penal. Posibilidades y límites en un Entorno de Reforma del Proceso Penal Español. Editorial Aranzadi. Navarra Byrne JM (2007) Myths and realities of prison violence: a review of the evidence. Vict Offenders 2:77–90 Cañada-Pancorbo L (2015) Mediación penitenciaria y trabajo Social. Trabajo fin de grado. Universidad de Jaen, España. https://hdl.handle.net/10953.1/1744 Cooke DJ, Philip L (2001) To treat or not to treat? An empirical perspective. In: Hollin CR (ed) Offender assessment and treatment. Wiley, Chichester (Reino Unido), pp 17–34 De Maeyer M (2002) Educación en las Cárceles. Palabras Liberadoras. In: Educación de Adultos y Desarrollo, 49. Argentina. Instituto de Cooperación Internacional de la Asociación Alemana para la educación de Adultos Devillya GJ, Sorbello L, Eccleston L, Ward T (2005) Prison-based peer-education schemes. Aggress Violent Behav 10(2):219–240 Dhamia MK, Mantleb G, Foxc D (2009) Restorative justice in prisons. Contemp Justice Rev 12(4):433–448 Fernández-Caballero M, Del Hierro E, Archilla M (2012) Mediation in Prisons”. A new proposal to mediate in a women’s prison. Revista de Mediación 10:39–43 Galán D (2015) Los módulos de respeto: Una alternativa al tratamiento penitenciario. Tesis doctoral. Facultad de Educación. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. España García-Borés J, López Gonsálvez T, Oviedo P, Garés C (2015) Lógicas, Contenidos y Límites del Modelo Rehabilitador. Revista Crítica Penal y Poder 9:62–90 Garcia Lopez V (2019) Programas específicos de tratamiento en las prisiones españolas: control de la agresión sexual, atención integral a enfermos mentales y unidades terapéuticas y educativas. RESED, Revista de Estudios Socioeducativos 7:184–200 García MB, Vilanova S, Del Castillo E, Malaguitti A (2007) Educación de jóvenes y adultos en contextos de encierro. Una experiencia de extension universitaria en la escuela de un penal. Revista Iberoamericana de Educación 44(1):1–9 Gendreau P, Goggin CE, Law MA (1997) Predicting prison misconducts. Crim Justice Behav 24:414–431 Giraldo JX, Solano FJ (2016) Violencia en el establecimiento penitenciario de mediana seguridad y carcelario de Buga, Valle del Cauca: entre el orden alterno y la legalidad. Prospectiva. Revista de Trabajo Social e Intervención Social 22:201–227 Hall LL (2015) Correctional education and recidivism: toward a tool for reduction. J Correct Educ 66(2):4–29 Herrero Herrero C (1997) Criminología. Dykinson, Madrid Instituciones Penitenciarias (2001) Módulos de Respeto. Manual de Aplicación. Ministerio Del Interior. Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias. España

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Instituciones Penitenciarias (2017) Programa de intervención en conductas violentas (PICOVI). Documentos Penitenciarios 17. Ministerio Del Interior. Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias. España Izquierdo Moreno C (2002) Delincuencia juvenil en la sociedad de consumo. Bilbao, Mensajero Kaufer L, Noll DE, Mayer J (2014) Prisoner facilitated mediation: bringing peace to prisons and communities. Part II, Cardozo J Conflict Resolut 16:187–219 Khaled M, Gijón-Puerta J (2017) Módulos de respeto y prevención de violencia en Centros Penitenciarios: percepciones de profesionales e internos. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 319748282. Consultado el 3 de enero de 2020 Kimmett E (2018) Ensuring a safe environment: a conflict centred strategy. Prison Reform Trust. http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Ensuring_a_safe_prison.pdf. Consultado en septiembre 2019 Lozano F (2010) La Mediación penitenciaria en el Centro Penitenciario de Madrid III, Valdemoro. Familia 41:119–125 Medina PM (2012) Evaluación experimental de la eficacia de los programas psicológicos de tratamiento penitenciario. Ministerio Del Interior, Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias Michals I, Kessler S (2015) Prison teachers and their students: a circle of satisfaction and gain. J Correct Educ 66(3):47–62 O’Donnell A, College MI (2015) Curriculum as conversation: vulnerability, violence, and pedagogy in prison. Educ Theory 65(4):475–490 Pascual E, Bibiano A, Segovia JL, Ríos Martín JC (2008) Mediación Penal y Penitenciaria. Experiencias de dialogo en el Sistema Penal para la reducción de la Violencia y el sufrimiento humano. Editorial Colex. Madrid Pastor E, Huertas E (2014) Mediación penitenciaria. Una alternativo a la resolución pacífica de conflictos entre internos Pedagogía Social. Revista Interuniversitaria 23:199–299 Redondo S (2017) Evaluación y tratamiento de delincuentes Jóvenes y adultos. Madrid. Editorial Pirámide, España Redondo S, Frerich N (2013) Offender Rehabilitation in Europe. Applications, achievements and challenges. In: Khun A, Margot P, Aebi MF, Schwarzenegger C, Donatsch A, Jositsch D (eds) Kriminologie, Kriminalpolitik und strafrechtausinternationaler perspective. StämfliVerlag AG Bern, Berne Redondo S, Frerich N (2014) Crimen and Justice reinvestment in Europe: possibilities and challenges. Vict Offenders Int J Evidence-based Res Policy Pract 9(1):13–49 Reglas Mínimas para el Tratamiento de los Reclusos aprobadas en el Primer Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre Prevención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente, celebrado en Ginebra en 1955 Ríos Martín JC (1998) Mil voces presas. Universidad de Comillas, Madrid Ríos Martín JC (2004) Manual de ejecución penitenciaria. Defenderse en la cárcel. Editorial Colex, Madrid Ríos Martín JC (2007) La mediación penitenciaria. In: Cerezo y García España (Coords.) La prisión en España. Una perspectiva criminológica. Editorial Comares. España Ríos Martín JC, Etxebarría X, Jiménez JC, Santos E, Pascual E, Santisteve P et al (2014) Manual de Ejecución Penitenciaria. Defenderse en la Cárcel, Cáritas Madrid Ronzón I (2009) La libertad está dentro. Historias desde la cárcel, Plataforma testimonio, Barcelona Ruiz JI (2006) Clima emocional y sobreocupación en prisión. Una evaluación mediante informantes clave. Suma Psicológica 13(2):159–172 Shippen ME (2008) A pilot study of the efficacy of two adult basic literacy programs for incarcerated males. J Correct Educ 59(4):339–347 Sapouna M, Bisset C, Conlong AM, Matthews B (2015) What works to reduce reoffending: a summary of the evidence. Justice analytical services Scottish government. http://www.gov.scot/ Publications/Recent. Consultado el 3 de enero de 2020

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Shippen ME, Patterson D, Dunn C, Derzis NC, Nelson CL, Houchins DE (2010) An examination of the written expression skills of incarcerated males. J Correct Educ 61(3):189–202 The Foresee Research Group and National Institute of Criminology (2010) Resolution of conflicts involving prisoners. Handbook on the applicability of mediation and restorative justice in prisons. European Commission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security Torres MC, Añanos-Bendriñana FT (2018) Mujeres en prisiones españolas. Violencia, conflictos y acciones para la paz. Relaciones Estudios de Historia y Sociedad 155:9–41 UNESCO (1997) Educación de adultos y reclusos. Quinta Conferencia Internacional de Educación de las Personas Adultas. http://www.unesco.org UNODC (2017) Hoja de ruta para la elaboración de programas de rehabilitación en las cárceles. Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito, Viena Vacca JS (2004) Educated prisoners are less likely to return to prison. J Correct Educ 55(4):297–305 Veselak KM (2015) The relationship between educational attainment and the type of crime committed by incarcerated offenders. J Correct Educ 66(2):30–56 Ward T, Eccleston L (2004) Risk, responsivity, and the treatment of offenders: introduction of the special issue. Psychol Crime Law 10(3):223–227 Wilson D, Gallagher C, MacKenzie D (2000) A meta-analysis of corrections-based education, vocation, and work programs for adult offenders. J Res Crime Delinq 347–368 Zamble E, Porporino F (1988) Coping, behavior and adaptation in prison inmates. Sringer-Verlag Publishing, New York Zamble E, Porporino F (1990) Coping imprisonment and rehabilitation: some data and their implications. Crim Justice Behav 17:53–70 Zara G, Farrington DP (2016) Criminal recidivism: explanation, prediction and prevention. Routledge, Tylor and Francis Group, New York

Luis Millana works at the Spanish Home Ministry, in the Secretaria General de Instituciones Penitenciarias, as a Prison administration officer. Luis has a Ph.D. in Psychology from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, was a member of the Sociopsychobiology of Aggression research group of the UCM. Presently he is a lecturer at Nebrija University and researcher of the NebrijaSantander Chair on Risks and Conflicts management. His research focuses on the study of aggression and pleasure in criminals. Juan Carlos Fernández Rodríguez is Professor at Universidad Antonio de Nebrija of Madrid. Director of Psychology Department and Degree in Psychology. Academic background: Degree and Ph.D. in Psychology, thesis and research proficiency with outstanding rating “suma cum laude” unanimously court (Universidad Complutense of Madrid). Technician in Occupational Risk Prevention and University Expert in Management of People in Global Environments. He has participated in different research projects dealing with Educational Technologies, Knowledge Economy and Globalisation, Managing stress and any other psychological topics. He has written several papers and books. Fernando Miralles has a Ph.D. in Psychology, Specialist in Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, endorsed by official organizations. He combines his work as a teacher in the Psychology Department of the Medicine School, in the University CEU San Pablo located in Madrid, with the research activity about the line of anxiety and depression. He is also a member of the military forces, with the rank of commander. Dr. Miralles is member of the Global Network of Clinical Practices in the World Health Organization. Currently he has as scientific production, 27 books published, 20 book’s chapters and several articles in scientific magazines. Also coordinates the research commission of anxiety and stress, in the educational field of the SEAS (Spanish Society for the Study of Anxiety and Stress).

The Necessary Link Between Security Culture and Data Protection in the European Union Luis A. García-Segura

Outline 1 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Security Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 European Union Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cybersecurity Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The European Cybersecurity Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 EU Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract Appropriate behavior is indeed a major factor in Security culture, along with the mechanisms available to supervise and sanction, when needed be, wrongful actions. The concept of Security culture was interlinked with Information Security, thus spawning a new concept of Information Security culture, that later evolved to Cybersecurity Culture, which is a concept that has been developed in CSS’s all over Europe and the world. Cybersecurity culture, as opposed to Security culture, is a term that can be applied not only to companies, organizations or institutions, but also to the general public of a given nation or even a region. CSS’s have been the instrument to explain and develop this term. Keywords Europe · Cyber security · Data protection · Security culture · Information security A Shift in the Security Paradigm—Global Challenges: is Europe ready to meet them? Edited by J. Martín Ramírez, and Jerzy Bizieweski. © 2020 Springer International. Submitted: December 15, 2019. Accepted: January 29, 2020. L. A. García-Segura (B) Nebrija–Santander Chair on Risks and Conflict Management, Antonio de Nebrija University, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9_15

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1 Introduction Upon entering the third decade of the 21st century, we can look back and wonder upon the progress, for good and for bad, that the Cyberspace domain has had on Humanity. Every aspect of collective and individual life has been altered or transformed in some way. Even though these transformations have come at a very rapid pace, there have been voices all over the world that have predicted some of the negative impacts of this hyper connected world. Some of them have been scholars, researchers, politicians or even ordinary citizens. As a result, some scholars, me included, are taking further time to analyze and rethink the best ways in which these rapid changes can have the least negative impact on citizens’ rights, while improving the quality of life for ordinary people everywhere. This article seeks to briefly develop some insight into the link between Security, Cybersecurity and Data Protection, centered on the human cultural element, and why it is important for governments and international organizations to pay attention to these growing issues.

2 Security Culture Culture, for the last three decades, has been a concept that has been applied to multiple aspects of society: companies, entertainment, law, etc. Unsurprisingly, it has also been applied to the area of Security, as we will demonstrate in the following section.

2.1 Definition According to Roer (2015, p. 23), Security culture are the “ideas, customs and social behaviours of a particular people or group that helps them be free from threat and danger”. This definition points out the fact that Security culture has always been focused on an organizational level, meaning that it is mostly applied to a particular company or institution. This has been corroborated by other researchers, like Schlienger and Teufel (2002), when they have pointed out the most important topics concerning the development of a Security culture:

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In this graphic we can see two distinct categories of topics: people (Top management and Individuals) and policies (Politics). These categories coincide with two of the three elements that conform a Security culture, according to Roer (2015): ● Policies: the rules, laws, regulations, standards, ethics and moral codes. ● Technology: the tools, mental models, patterns and templates. ● People: who use the Technology and form and inform the policies. Out of these three elements, we think that policies have been the focus of most researchers in the past two decades. Nonetheless, an element that was equally important and has gained great notoriety in the past decade is the people element. After all, it is their actions that determine the success or failure of any Security and Cybersecurity strategy. Comparatively, Ruighaver, Maynard and Chang stated the following regarding the people involved in Security culture: In an ideal security culture, end-users, security administrators and managers will be motivated to reflect on their behaviour at all times, to assess how their behaviour influences security and what they can do to improve security. To create this attitude to security, it is important that a degree of trust is involved and that responsibility to act in an appropriate manner is delegated to employees themselves. Ruighaver et al. (2007, p. 59)

Appropriate behavior is indeed a major factor in Security culture, along with the mechanisms available to supervise and sanction, when needed be, wrongful actions. With this in mind, lets briefly explore the concept from a European standpoint.

2.2 European Union Scope Jolyon Howorth had this to say about European Security culture at the beginning of this century:

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How might one go about defining the concept of a “security culture” for the European Union? First, to define it negatively, it would have to involve continuing effacement of the major divergences which throughout history have marked the approach to war, peace and security of the various European nation-states: differences between allies and neutrals, between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”, between those favouring power projection and those prioritising territorial defence, between emphases on military as opposed to civilian instruments, between large states and small states, between weapons systems providers and weapons systems consumers, between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Howorth (2002, pp. 3–4)

This statement by Howorth clearly sums up the complex nature in which the European Union (EU) has tried to put forward a common framework for Security. Notwithstanding, the EU adopted in December 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS), establishing principles and objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests. The key threats identified in the ESS where (European Union Council 2003): ● ● ● ● ●

Terrorism Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Regional Conflicts State Failure Organised Crime

The ESS called for the development of a “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Union Council 2003, p. 13). In contrast, there was no mention of the Internet, Cyberspace, Cybersecurity or even Education. This is very important, given the fact that the United States of America (USA) articulated its first Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) in 2003. Under these circumstances, the EU published in 2006 the seed of what would later become a full-fledged CSS, a document titled “A strategy for a Secure Information Society-“Dialogue, Partnership and empowerment”. In this document there are several mentions to Security culture: ● Drawing on the experience acquired by Member States and at European Community level, the ambition is to further develop a dynamic, global strategy in Europe, based on a culture of security and founded on dialogue, partnership and empowerment (European Commission 2006, p. 3). ● As a part of its response to security threats, the European Community decided in 2004 to create the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). ENISA contributes to the development of a culture of network and information security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organisations throughout the European Union (EU) (European Commission 2006, p. 4). ● Nonetheless, one of the cornerstones in developing a culture of security is improving our knowledge of the problem (European Commission 2006, p. 6). ● A secure Information Society must be based on enhanced NIS and a widespread culture of security. To this end, the European Commission proposes a dynamic and integrated approach that involves all stakeholders and is based on dialogue, partnership and empowerment. Given the complementary roles of public and private sectors in creating a culture of security, policy initiatives in this field must be based on an open and inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue. (European Commission 2006, p. 6).

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As we can deduct from these fragments, the concept of Security culture eventually was interlinked with Information Security, thus spawning a new concept of Information Security culture, that later evolved to Cybersecurity Culture, which is a concept that has been developed in CSS’s all over Europe and the world. In essence, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) defined Cybersecurity culture as: Cybersecurity Culture (CSC) of organizations refers to the knowledge, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, norms and values of people regarding cybersecurity and how they manifest in people’s behaviour with information technologies. CSC is about making information security considerations an integral part of an employee’s job, habits and conduct, embedding them in their day-to-day actions. ENISA (2017, p. 7)

This definition and our own research (Cayón Peña and García-Segura 2014) have manifested that Cybersecurity culture, as opposed to Security culture, is a term that can be applied not only to companies, organizations or institutions, but also to the general public of a given nation or even a region. CSS’s have been the instrument to explain and develop this term.

3 Cybersecurity Strategies Before we define what a CSS is, let us refresh the definition of Cybersecurity, in its simplest form, according to the Merrian-Webster (2020) dictionary: “measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack”.

3.1 Definition The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defined that a National Cybersecurity Strategy or CSS is: ● an expression of the vision, high-level objectives, principles and priorities that guide a country in addressing cybersecurity; ● an overview of the stakeholders tasked with improving cybersecurity of the nation and their respective roles and responsibilities; and ● a description of the steps, programmes and initiatives that a country will undertake to protect its national cyber-infrastructure and, in the process, increase its security and resilience. ITU (2018, p. 13)

CSS’s are always public documents that vary in length and depth, not always developing all of the elements mentioned above.

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According to the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) of 2018, 58% of countries in the world have a CSS (ITU 2019):

The first known CSS was published by Russia in 2000, followed by the USA in 2003 (Cayón Peña and García-Segura 2014). The first European CSS’s were from Estonia and Slovakia in 2008. The EU did not publish a CSS until 2013, as we will see in the following section.

3.2 The European Cybersecurity Strategy The EU’s CSS was published in 2013 and called for an “Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”. The Strategy laid out five principles that should guide cybersecurity policy in the EU and internationally (European Commission 2013): I. II. III. IV. V.

The EU’s core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world Protecting fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy Access for all Democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance A shared responsibility to ensure security

The text specifically mentioned Cybersecurity culture and its importance for business: The take up of a cybersecurity culture could enhance business opportunities and competitiveness in the private sector, which could make cybersecurity a selling point European Commission (2013, p. 6)

It also referred to Data protection regulation and its importance and relation to Cybersecurity:

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● Any information sharing for the purposes of cyber security, when personal data is at stake, should be compliant with EU data protection law and take full account of the individuals’ rights in this field. European Commission (2013, p. 4) ● Also, the EU data protection legislation requires data controllers to ensure data protection requirements and safeguards, including measures related to security, and in the field of publicly available communication services, data controllers have to notify incidents involving a breach of personal data to the competent national authorities. European Commission (2013, p. 5)

Given the content and timing of the strategy, along with the efforts of EU members to compete with other Superpowers in technology advances, the EU positioned itself as one of the leaders in Cybersecurity policies, regulation and implementation. The ITU’s GCI of 2018 concluded that Europe as a region, as well as most European countries have a high level of commitment in all five pillars of the index. These five pillars include the following measures: I. II. III. IV.

V.

Legal: Measures based on the existence of legal institutions and frameworks dealing with cybersecurity and cybercrime. Technical: Measures based on the existence of technical institutions and framework dealing with cybersecurity. Organizational: Measures based on the existence of policy coordination institutions and strategies for cybersecurity development at the national level. Capacity building: Measures based on the existence of research and development, education and training programmes, certified professionals and public sector agencies fostering capacity building. Cooperation: Measures based on the existence of partnerships, cooperative frameworks and information sharing networks.

As we can see in the following graphic, Europe has 6 countries in the top 11 of the GCI (ITU 2019, p. 16):

Rank

Member states

GCI score

Legal

Technical

Organizational

Capacity building

Cooperation

1

United Kingdom

0.931

0.200

0.191

0.200

0.189

0.151

2

United States of America

0.926

0.200

0.184

0.200

0.191

0.151

3

France

0.918

0.200

0.193

0.200

0.186

0.139 0.155

4

Lithuania

0.908

0.200

0.168

0.200

0.185

5

Estonia

0.905

0.200

0.195

0.186

0.170

0.153

6

Singapore

0.898

0.200

0.186

0.192

0.195

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(continued) Rank

Member states

GCI score

Legal

Technical

Organizational

Capacity building

Cooperation

7

Spain

0.896

0.200

0.180

0.200

0.168

0.148

8

Malaysia

0.893

0.179

0.196

0.200

0.198

0.120

9

Norway

0.892

0.191

0.196

0.177

0.185

0.143

10

Canada

0.892

0.195

0.189

0.200

0.172

0.137

11

Australia

0.890

0.200

0.174

0.200

0.176

0.139

These standings reveal a very hopeful panorama for Cybersecurity culture implementation in Europe in the years to come. Be that as it may, does this panorama also transcend to the Data Protection field? We believe so, as we will demonstrate in the following pages.

4 Data Protection The term Data, as mentioned in the rest of this paper, refers to a specific type of Data: the one called Personal Data. This category may include: any information identifiable to a natural person, such as a name, location, identification number, photo, video, etc.

4.1 Definition The ability to digitize, store, analyze, and transport data around the globe has had profound effects in every sector of society, and has changed the way we conduct personal, business, and political affairs (Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 2019). Hence, Data protection is recognized as an important field of law, policy development and regulation. It combines elements of human rights and consumer protection and, in many international agreements and individual jurisdictions, Data protection is considered a fundamental right (UNCTAD 2016). The World Economic Forum (2019) in its annual Global Risks Report, placed “Data Fraud or theft” at the number four spot in its “Top 10 risks in terms of Likelihood”, while placing “Cyber-attacks” at the number seven spot in the “Top 10 risks in terms of Impact”:

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As we can appreciate in this graphic, much has changed in the world since the beginning of this century. This can be concluded upon analyzing the risks and threats pointed out in the ESS of 2003 versus the worldwide risks mentioned by the World Economic Forum in 2019. Consequently, ENISA in its latest “Threat Landscape Report” (Marinos and Lourenço 2019) identified the following top 15 cyber threats: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Malware Web Based Attacks Web Application Attacks Phishing Denial of Service Spam Botnets Data Breaches Insider Threat Physical manipulation/damage/theft/loss Information Leakage Identity Theft Cryptojacking Ransomware Cyber Espionage

Of the above threats, we believe that number 6, 8, 11 and 12 are directly associated to Data Protection (Marinos and Lourenço 2019): ● Spam: Spam is the abusive use of email and messaging technologies to flood users with unsolicited messages.

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● Data Breaches: Defined as a collective term for a successful incident from the leakage or exposure of data (including sensitive information related to organisations or simply personal details of individuals, i.e. medical information), it relates directly to the outcome from other cyberthreats. ● Information Leakage: Is one of the significant cyberthreats covering a wide variety of compromised information, from personal data collected by internet enterprises and online services to business data stored in IT infrastructures. ● Identity Theft: Identity theft is the fraud committed from the theft of personal identifiable information strengthened by the massive digitisation of people’s personal data which most of the times, include information related to their legal and civil substance. All of these threats have at their core the human element: people’s actions that put themselves and their companies at risk. Accordingly, the EU developed the most advanced and comprehensive Data Protection framework in the world right now, putting the individual and his rights at the forefront of the digital ecosystem.

4.2 EU Scope Daniel Coats, Director of US National Intelligence had this to say at the beginning of 2018: The European Union and European national governments will struggle to develop common approaches to counter a variety of security challenges, including instability on their periphery, irregular migration to their region, heightened terrorist threats, and Russian influence campaigns, undercutting Western cohesion. Daniel Coats (2018, p. 25)

This statement was published just before the implementation of the EU Regulation 2016/679, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, generally known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR (European Parliament 2016) issued a series of principles relating to the processing of personal data: I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Lawfulness, fairness and transparency Purpose limitation Data minimization Accuracy Storage limitation Integrity and confidentiality

It also established a series of rights for individuals regarding their personal data: I. Right to be informed II. Right to rectification

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III. IV. V. VI.

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Right to erasure (right to be forgotten) Right to restriction of processing Right to portability Right to object

Both principles and rights are people centered: the principles are obligations for companies and the rights are prerogatives for individuals. Correspondingly, the Security and thus Cybersecurity components are one of the pillars of the GDPR, as we can confirm by these excerpts: ● This Regulation is intended to contribute to the accomplishment of an area of freedom, security and justice and of an economic union, to economic and social progress, to the strengthening and the convergence of the economies within the internal market, and to the well-being of natural persons (European Parliament 2016, p. 1). ● The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security (European Parliament 2016, p. 9). ● Restrictions concerning specific principles and the rights of information, access to and rectification or erasure of personal data, the right to data portability, the right to object, decisions based on profiling, as well as the communication of a personal data breach to a data subject and certain related obligations of the controllers may be imposed by Union or Member State law, as far as necessary and proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard public security (European Parliament, 2016, p. 14). ● In order to maintain security and to prevent processing in infringement of this Regulation, the controller or processor should evaluate the risks inherent in the processing and implement measures to mitigate those risks, such as encryption. Those measures should ensure an appropriate level of security, including confidentiality, taking into account the state of the art and the costs of implementation in relation to the risks and the nature of the personal data to be protected. In assessing data security risk, consideration should be given to the risks that are presented by personal data processing, such as accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed which may in particular lead to physical, material or non-material damage (European Parliament, 2016, p. 16). ● Article 32. Security of processing. Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk.

As of this moment, no legislation on the planet imposes more security measures to companies and organizations related de Personal Data processing. Therefore, GDPR is a great advancement towards Security culture, Information Security culture and Cybersecurity culture in Europe and the world. Nevertheless, the EU continues to innovate and pursue better and more comprehensive and people centered policies regarding Cybersecurity, which are ultimately linked to the digital economy and the Single digital market provisions of the Union. As a result, the European Parliament stated the following regarding the European Cybersecurity landscape:

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In light of the increased cybersecurity challenges faced by the Union, there is a need for a comprehensive set of measures that would build on previous Union action and would foster mutually reinforcing objectives. Those objectives include further increasing the capabilities and preparedness of Member States and businesses, as well as improving cooperation, information sharing and coordination across Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Furthermore, given the borderless nature of cyber threats, there is a need to increase capabilities at Union level that could complement the action of Member States, in particular in cases of large-scale cross-border incidents and crises, while taking into account the importance of maintaining and further enhancing the national capabilities to respond to cyber threats of all scales. European Parliament (2019, p. 2)

This is why the Parliament passed the Regulation 2019/881 of 17 April 2019 on ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013, known as the Cybersecurity Act. This legislative text proposes major changes to ENISA and the creation of various Cybersecurity certification schemes. These schemes are defined in art. 46 of the text (European Parliament 2019): Article 46. European cybersecurity certification framework 1. The European cybersecurity certification framework shall be established in order to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market by increasing the level of cybersecurity within the Union and enabling a harmonised approach at Union level to European cybersecurity certification schemes, with a view to creating a digital single market for ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes. European Parliament, art. 46

At the same time, the Cybersecurity Act introduces a series of novel terms and measures directly related to the general public and in line with a Cybersecurity culture for the masses: ● Cybersecurity is not only an issue related to technology, but one where human behaviour is equally important. Therefore, ‘cyber-hygiene’, namely, simple, routine measures that, where implemented and carried out regularly by citizens, organisations and businesses, minimise their exposure to risks from cyber threats, should be strongly promoted (European Parliament 2019, p. 2). ● ENISA should contribute to raising the public’s awareness of cybersecurity risks, including through an EU-wide awareness-raising campaign by promoting education, and to providing guidance on good practices for individual users aimed at citizens, organisations and businesses. ENISA should also contribute to promoting best practices and solutions, including cyber-hygiene and cyber-literacy at the level of citizens, organisations and businesses by collecting and analysing publicly available information regarding significant incidents, and by compiling and publishing reports and guidance for citizens, organisations and businesses, to improve their overall level of preparedness and resilience (European Parliament 2019, p. 7).

The concepts of Cyber-hygiene and Cyber-literacy are also integrated in article 10 of the Act:

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Article 10. Awareness-raising and education ENISA shall: (a) raise public awareness of cybersecurity risks, and provide guidance on good practices for individual users aimed at citizens, organisations and businesses, including cyberhygiene and cyber-literacy; (b) in cooperation with the Member States, Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and industry, organise regular outreach campaigns to increase cybersecurity and its visibility in the Union and encourage a broad public debate; (c) assist Member States in their efforts to raise cybersecurity awareness and promote cybersecurity education; (d) support closer coordination and exchange of best practices among Member States on cybersecurity awareness and education.

In carefully reading this article, we can see that there is a clear and distinct interest in educating not only the general public, but also organisations and businesses of all types. In other words, brining Cybersecurity culture to ordinary citizens at the same time as companies and institutions.

5 Conclusions After briefly highlighting the link between Security culture, Information Security, Cybersecurity culture and Data protection regulation in the EU, we can conclude that this link constitutes an important issue in the Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU and thus will remain like this for the years to come. We think that further steps have to be taken in order to effectively carry out a Cyber-hygiene and Cyber-literacy crusade in the EU, therefore we offer the following recommendations: I.

Design an incentives scheme for national education authorities of member states aimed at all levels of public education, including pre-school. II. Promote lifelong learning programs for Cybersecurity, specially targeting citizens that are out of work and/or above 50 years of age. III. Develop free online and onsite short courses for the general public. Make this short courses mandatory to a certain extent in public education institutions. IV. Promote entrepreneurship and research in Cybersecurity through EU level programs, targeting all kinds of business and organisations, but especially small and medium enterprises. Once again, these measures target the human element which should remain the main focus of all policies and regulations in the EU for the years to come.

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References Cayón Peña J, García-Segura LA (2014) The critical role of education in every cyber defense strategy. Northern Kentucky Law Rev 41:459–469 Coats D (2018) Worldwide threat assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Accessed from: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA—UnclassifiedSSCI.pdf European Commission (2006) A strategy for a Secure Information Society-“Dialogue, Partnership and empowerment. Accessed from: https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/doc/com2006251. pdf European Commission (2013) Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union: an open, safe and secure cyberspace. Accessed from: https://ccdcoe-admin.aku.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ EU-130207-CSS-1.pdf European Parliament (2016) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Accessed from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj European Parliament (2019) Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European parliament and of the council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act). Accessed from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0881&from=EN European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) (2017) Cyber Security Culture in organisations. Accessed from: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber-securityculture-in-organisations European Union Council (2003) A secure Europe in a better world. European security strategy. Accessed from: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (2019) Advancing cyberstability. Accessed from: https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Digital-GCSC-Final-Report-Nov2019_LowRes.pdf Howorth J (2002) The CESDP and the forging of a european security culture. Politique européenne 8(4):88–109. https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.008.0088 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2018) Developing a national cybersecurity strategy. Accessed from: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-CYB_GUIDE.01-2018PDF-E.pdf International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2019) Global cybersecurity index 2018. Accessed from: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf Marinos L, Lourenço M (eds) (2019) ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2018. Accessed from: https:// www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2018 Merrian-Webster (2020) Definition of cybersecurity. Accessed from: https://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/cybersecurity Roer K (2015) Building a security culture. IT Governance Publishing, Cambridgeshire Ruighaver AB, Maynard SB, Chang S (2007) Organisational security culture: extending the end-user perspective. Comput Secur 26(2007):56–62 Schlienger T, Teufel S (2002) Information security culture. The socio-cultural dimension in information security management. In: Ghonaimy et al (eds) Security in the information society. IFIP international federation for information processing. Accessed from: https://link.springer.com/ content/pdf/10.1007/978-0-387-35586-3_15.pdf United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2016) Data protection regulations and international data flows: implications for trade and development. Accessed from: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2016d1_en.pdf World Economic Forum (2019) The global risks report 2019. Accessed from: http://www3.weforum. org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf

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Luis A. García-Segura Coordinator of the Nebrija-Santander Chair on Risk and Conflict Management and Director of the Data protection, Innovation and Security LLM at Nebrija University, Madrid, Spain. Earned his Master’s Degree in Business Law in 2010 and his Ph.D. in Law in 2015. Expert in Data protection, Privacy, Intellectual Property, Cybersecurity and Human Rights. He is also a practicing lawyer, admitted to the Madrid Bar Association (ICAM) and a faculty member of the American Bar Association (ABA).

Epilogue

Each generation improved their home in the name of their own ideals, for which the next generations often had to pay a lot. Jalu Kurek

Global Governance Established in 1945, the United Nations and its global security management has not changed for 75 years. The key decisions in the Security Council are made by permanent members with the right of veto, in the decorative environment of the rotating delegations of other countries. The UN, supported in its efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, proclaims noble slogans and sometimes even achieves minor successes, but generally speaking it is not an effective organization. Dozens of conflicts and wars that destroy entire generations and the approach of humanity to the brink of threat of existence due to allowing for catastrophic climate changes during the organization’s activities are the worst example. And we don’t think anyone should blame the UN administration for this, but ask the leaders of the member states about proposals to improve things. The current division of roles in the Security Council is a legacy of the times of colonialism and settlements of World War II and is not rationally justified. Specifically, in the light of equalizing the potentials of many countries and the emergence of new structures. Of course, countries such as the USA, China, Russia, UK and France will play an important role, but it is difficult to understand why 75 years after the Second World War, Germany, Japan and India cannot be treated similarly. The European Union with its aspirations for strategic autonomy is a unique case. This

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. M. Ramírez and J. Biziewski (eds.), A Shift in the Security Paradigm, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43253-9

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relic of the past, based on nuclear weapons and military strength as well as revenge, needs change. The concern for peaceful social development and protection of the planet should be its priorities.

Global Trends At present, the political, economic and military dominance of the USA raises no doubts. The state cares about maintaining and expanding contacts by creating advanced regional centers marking presence in the world. One of them is the US cooperation with Canada and Mexico. The second center is cooperation within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and USA). The third one is the NATO connecting North America with Europe. Of course, there is a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, however, one gets the impression that the three centers under the tutelage of the US serve world domination. Traditionally, based on the experience of previous decades, the US presents a confrontational attitude towards a potential competitor in the global game, forming alliances and gathering forces and resources near the center of interest, which carries the risk of conflict. In the last 5 years, the US has been allocating more strength and resources to preventing the return of Russian influence in the former post-Soviet area, thus striving to ultimately consolidate its achievements after the victory of the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States play a special role in this context. It seems that the time when the USA played the role of a global stabilizer is slowly passing away with the emergence of increasingly developed regional areas of socioeconomic development, such as the European Union. This status was achieved thanks to the support of the USA in the past. Other areas of the world still need support, but similar processes should be expected as the security situation and economic development improve. Thus, there may be a moment when the US military presence in its current form will not be necessary in the aforementioned centers. In parallel, the People’s Republic of China has been growing economically for over a decade, establishing intensive economic and political contacts with many countries on several continents. For the time being, her actions can be characterized as cooperation through consensus building. The Chinese authorities opted for a model called "distributive globalism" based on more intensive production and trade between distant parts of the globe, made possible by ensuring good transport infrastructure as well as raising global standards for the flow of people, goods and services. The impact of China is particularly evident through infrastructure investments in Africa, Central Asia and southern and eastern Europe. From the EU’s point of view, China’s cooperation with Russia and European countries is promising. The emergence of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with a significant share of the representation of European Union countries, is a preview of deepening Asian-European relations and changes in global financial management. It is too early to talk about the effectiveness of the operation of a newly created

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institution, especially in the context of the obstruction of the USA and Japan, however it is worth noting this trend in relation to already existing global financial institutions. We are witnessing the initial phase of the process forming a new shape of geostrategic relations with two major decision-making centers: the USA and China. Both these centers create on the map of the globe advanced areas of intensive cooperation and at the same time economic competition, interpenetrating each other. The currently visible difference in potentials still gives the US an advantage, but trends are already appearing that will equalize them over the next decade. Will we really create a balance system, we’ll find out in a few years, because the multitude of components can change the emerging configuration. It is unclear what roles the two powers will play in the global security management system; however, their extremely broad economic and political connections will constitute a liability. It seems that the philosophy of participation in the global game presented by representatives of both powers is different. The US, apart from political and economic instruments, is willing to use military force to achieve its goals, while China mainly counts on expanding influence through economic expansion, although signs of building additional expeditionary military capacity are beginning to appear. The tendency to create regional forms of cooperation seems to be a natural phenomenon and by all means a positive one, because so far disputes have arisen in the regions regarding access to raw materials, the course of borders, ethnicity, religion etc. Sometimes they are focused on specific projects, such as common infrastructure energy or transport. An example would be the Eastern Mediterranean Forum aimed at exploring, extracting and transporting gas together. Sometimes it is multifaceted cooperation, like cooperation between Russia and Turkey. A look at security aspects from the perspective of social development, with particular emphasis on the economy, shows us a broader than just their military dimension. Interesting are the changes in the behavior of national governments that give way to demands to meet specific conditions for the development of activities by supranational corporations. Technical and organizational changes have a significant impact on the dynamics of mutual exchange. One example is multimodal transport possible thanks to containers and infrastructure investments, such as seaports, transshipment bases, and highways. The use of transport standardization has revolutionized trade, making deliveries faster, safer and cheaper. This invention supported by a global Internet network enabling near real-time commodity orders, planning their transport, tracking displacement and deliveries to the final recipient multiplied mutual exchange contributing to strengthening contacts over long distances—enterprises and countries on remote continents. An example of such a trend may be the construction of land connections from China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Latvia or sea connections from China to Greece and Central Europe. There is a noticeable change in the world currency market regarding the particularly rising position of the Chinese renmimbi (RMB) against the dollar. As a result of a such tendency, the Europan Central Bank and the Bundesbank have added a currency reserve package in this currency.

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New trends manifested in openness to cooperation between corporations and countries have positive geopolitical implications. The role of transnational corporations in international cooperation is growing, as they have considerable capital, sometimes exceeding the budget of many nation-states. The combination of capital advantage supported by political lobbying is in this case a vivid example of dependence in complicated international relations. In the construction of global security management structures, transnational corporations should be involved as they have an impact on the policies of states in the field of resource management, the style and quality of life of societies. The current model of national management seems to be not very effective. Thanks to the World Trade Organization, the world has been gradually moving towards the removal of barriers related to the crossing of state borders by people and goods and services, as well as lowering tariffs. Economic trends create new forms of political and economic relationships affecting the disappearance of current political constraints.

Europe Perception of security depends on geographical location. In recent decades, the US, Canada and EU societies have had the unique happiness of comfortable development without wars in their territories. At the same time, many nations of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, South America, and in Europe-the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus were torn apart by devastating, often long-lasting internal conflicts or wars with neighbors. So, continents and countries with real existential problems should be allowed to speak, because Europe and America are in a much better position. The EU with increasing economic potential, progressive integration and aspirations of strategic autonomy can play its part in creating a new global balance of power. The currently chilled relations between the EU and the US with the simultaneous increase of economic cooperation with China may contribute to this relatively young organization playing a greater role in global governance. The condition is a complete EU integration. A trend in the diminishing role of a nation-state in favor of the international format may play a role in the configuration of forces. This is due to the fact that economy is organized on a global basis. Meanwhile, political governance is still implemented through a national prism, which does not always coincide. In the future, Europe and China will not only cooperate in the economic sphere, but there will also be competition between them for energy supplies and raw materials. Both partners will turn to Russia and Africa for these goods. Whether it will be a model of cooperation or competition requires resolution in the near future. Perhaps there will be joint management in selected areas of cooperation. In relations with China, there is a danger of maintaining EU integrity because Asian partners are looking for gaps between countries to achieve the greatest benefits.

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Other Problems The global trend of increasing spending on armaments requires discussion and radical joint action to reduce them. Preventing an arms race in different regions of the globe and various military technical areas would allow to avoid devastating conflicts. Thanks to the analyzes, we are aware of how much human misery, infrastructure damage, harm caused to the surrounding natural environment and measurable financial burdens are waged by numerous wars around the world. At the same time, we calmly read reports on the growing production of weapons and admire technological innovations that allow for more effective killing. The omissions of politicians are evident and outrageous. It is surprising that there is no global effective social movement to limit, or perhaps even stop, the production of conventional killing systems, euphemistically called defense systems. The strength of the lobby of the arms industry and the ease of social acceptance for killing others are strikingly surprising. Like environmental protection, arms race is a global problem, and as such should be dealt with at that level. From recent history, we have had positive attempts in Europe to reduce significantly an excessive military potential after the end of the Cold War (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). Just go a few steps further. This also applies to a return to the constructive dialogue of the countries possessing nuclear weapons on measures leading to further disarmament and non-proliferation, which is one way to avoid a nuclear war disaster. We don’t know where we will get during our race in the outer space and ocean depths. We are currently only able to coordinate some activities by individual countries to a small extent. Thinking in categories of competition instead of cooperation in the use of the common good dominates among decision-making bodies. The race is speeding up and the winner is unknown. Our generation has made irreversible havoc in the natural environment. Approaching the edge of nature’s endurance seems imminent. Therefore, this field deserves separate in-depth analysis, extensive discussion and effective action. Its global dimension requires a global vision and common action and encourages such management through the distribution of regional initiatives. The migration crisis of recent years seems to have helped politicians visualize the real problem of the lack of a coherent social policy in the face of a decreasing and aging European population. Defining the need for joint action in this area gives cautious optimism. Support for opportunities to jointly build decent living conditions for potential immigrants in their place of residence and to enable them to learn temporary work in Europe may contribute to reducing migration pressure and the development of African nations. Jerzy Biziewski January 2020