A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens [1st ed.] 9783030548094, 9783030548100

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International Archives of the History of Ideas 232 Archives internationales d'histoire des idées

Amihud Gilead

A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens

A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDÉES 232

A ROSE ARMED WITH THORNS: SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY UNDER A NOVEL LENS Amihud Gilead

Board of Directors: Founding Editors: Paul Dibon† and Richard H. Popkin† Associate Editor: J. C. Laursen, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA Editor-in-Chief: Guido Giglioni, University of Macerata, Italy, Italy Editorial Board Members: Sarah Hutton, York; K. Vermeir, Paris;  J. R. Maia Neto, Belo Horizonte; M. J. B. Allen,  Los Angeles; J.-R. Armogathe, Paris; S. Clucas, London; P. Harrison, Oxford;  J. Henry, Edinburgh; M. Mulsow, Erfurt; G. Paganini, Vercelli;  J. Popkin, Lexington; J. Robertson, Cambridge; G. A. J. Rogers, Keele;  J. F. Sebastian, Bilbao; A. Thomson, Paris; Th. Verbeek, Utrecht More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5640

Amihud Gilead

A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens

Amihud Gilead Department of Philosophy University of Haifa Haifa, Israel

ISSN 0066-6610     ISSN 2215-0307 (electronic) International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées ISBN 978-3-030-54809-4    ISBN 978-3-030-54810-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

In memory of my late wife Ruth Bandel-Gilead (1942–2018), My greatest love and friendship For 36 years of bliss and authenticity In memory of my mentors And teachers of Spinoza’s philosophy, Nathan Rotenstreich (1914–1993) And Yosef Ben-Shlomo (1930–2007)

A Bibliographical Note and Something More

In this book, I cite from the English translation of Spinoza’s works in The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volumes One and Two, edited and translated by Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985 and 2016 respectively). Referring to the Ethics, I use the following abbreviations: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively, to refer to the Part, a—axiom, app–appendix, c—corollary, d—demonstration, def—definition, e—explication, l–lemma, pref—preface, p—proposition, po–postulate, s— scholium, and G I ... IV:—the pagination in the relevant volume of Gebhardt’s edition of Spinoza Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). TdIE refers to Curley’s translation of Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (op. cit.), and the number refers to the relevant section. I also cite from Spinoza’s The Theological-Political Treatise (hereafter TPT) in Curley’s translation (Curley II: 43–354) and Political Treatise (hereafter PT) also in Curley’s translation (Curley II: 503–604). As for other philosophical works of the secondary literature, the reader is advised to consult the list at the end of the book. An earlier version of this book appeared in Hebrew under the title The Way of Spinoza’s Philosophy Toward a Philosophical System (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1986).1 This book was an explanation, elaboration, and deepening of my dissertation on Spinoza’s philosophy (Gilead 1979). My supervisor and mentor was the late Professor Nathan Rotenstreich, to whom I am profoundly indebted, for he was a great inspiration and an example of an independent mind. He helped me immensely to reach the depth of my thinking, into which I had to dig in order to present the innovations I had about Spinoza’s philosophy. He guided me to try my best to think and write what no one else had said and maintain my own dialogue with the great philosophers of the past. Love has to do greatly with singularity, and my love for my great mentor, for philosophy in general, and for Spinoza’s philosophy in particular has shown me the way to reveal from within some various innovations in reading and understanding this great philosophy from a singular viewpoint.

)‫ תשמ”ז‬,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ דרכה של תורת שפינוזה לשיטה פילוסופית (ירושלים‬1 vii

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A Bibliographical Note and Something More

The reader may find some of the ideas that appear below somewhat similar to some of those that appeared in the secondary literature after 1986.2 Notwithstanding, I strictly observe the rule that whenever I find any idea, however minor, that appeared before the publication of my Hebrew research, it must be explicitly mentioned in the notes. Hebrew readers can easily detect the development of my independent or original ideas about Spinoza’s philosophy already in my PhD dissertation of 1979 and my book on Spinoza of 1986, both in Hebrew. I published some of these ideas later in English philosophical journals or in chapters of books (Gilead 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1993, and 1998). May I remind the readers that since I consider Spinoza’s philosophy highly systematic3 (or, if you prefer, “holistic”), the proper or adequate way to represent my ideas about it should be in an extensive book, not in articles or chapters. A piecemeal presentation is not an adequate way in which any profound research on Spinoza’s philosophy should proceed. Let me finish with a note on the nature of my approach to Spinoza’s philosophy. It is a sympathetic approach, without restraining the requested criticism especially about the secondary literature. My view is that any interpreter should invest his or her efforts to find a way in interpreting Spinoza in the utmost attempt to understand his philosophy and to find a strong support as much as possible for it. Only if such attempts inescapably fail, we must take a critical approach to this philosophy. After many years of investigating Spinoza’s philosophy as a whole, I have found it clearly established and meticulously systematic and coherent, relying upon strong arguments. Such attempts demand much energy, time, and imagination of the reader but it is certainly worth it. Moreover, to fully understand each proposition in this philosophy, we should embed it in the complete whole of his writings. As I have found, each detail of it gives support to the others in a coherent systematic way. Spinoza’s philosophy makes a coherent, systematic network, and it should be interpreted not linearly but as a coherent network. Let me finish with a note about the terms I use in this book. Each kind of knowledge, according to Spinoza, is a grade of knowledge. There are three of them: the first grade of knowledge—imaginatio; the second grade of knowledge—ratio; and

 For instance, Della Rocca’s interpretation (1996) of the unity of the Attributes and the psychophysical question. Readers may also be interested in Della Rocca’s recent book (2008). 3  Cf. Garrett 2018. Jonathan Israel writes on Spinoza’s systematic philosophy: “It is primarily the unity, cohesion, and compelling power of his system, his ability to connect major elements of previous ‘atheistic’ thought into an unbroken chain of reasoning, rather than the novelty or force of any of his constituent concepts which explain his centrality in the evolution of the whole Radical Enlightenment” (Israel 2001, p. 230). Notwithstanding, I consider Spinoza’s philosophy even more systematic or coherent, as I consider each of its details or constituents as innovative because its functioning and locus in this novel system render it so. Like Midas who turned into gold anything that he touched, Spinoza turns anything he considers or meditates on into a detail in the systematic or coherent Spinozistic theory as a whole. In any event, I consider Spinoza one of the most original philosophers who ever lived. 2

A Bibliographical Note and Something More

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the third, supreme one—scientia intuitiva. Hence, I do not use “grade” in the colloquial sense of the term, which is quite different from the aforementioned grades of knowledge. “Partial knowledge” is not biased, but one that is incomplete, discrete, or isolated and requires an amendment. Only partial knowledge in the first grade of knowledge is, most of the time, biased.

Preface

Abstract  Many of the issues discussed in this book have to do with the problem of the philosophical system that Spinoza had in mind. I will argue that Spinoza rejects the foundational type of philosophical system and especially its closed or total version; the deductive system pertains to this type. Instead, he follows a model of a system of coherence, which is a network. I call this system Spinoza’s “desired system.” His view of the desired system rejects self-evidence or immediate evidence, ascribed to the foundational, basic propositions (namely, definitions, axioms, and postulates). Furthermore, Spinoza’s philosophy absolutely opposes any piecemeal philosophy which, in his view, should be considered as fragmentary and mistaken. The desired system is an objective of his intellectual and emotional conatus, and not an accomplished achievement. The Ethics lays down the principles, the general scheme, and the way leading toward this system, which lies unattainable, beyond the horizon. The Ethics is a grand attempt to open the way leading to this system. In lieu of the abstracts of each of the Chapters 1–6, the list of the sub-sections should adequately inform the reader about the nature of the issues with which the book deals. A well-known fact about Spinoza has to do with his seal—a rose armed with thorns and the Latin warning “caute,” namely, “beware.” In Latin, sub rosa, literally, “under the rose,” means “under a pledge of secrecy.” In Portuguese, Spinoza’s native language, he was known as Bento de Espinoza (Baruch Spinoza in Hebrew and Benedictus de Spinoza in Latin). “Espinoza” means “with sharp thorns.” If one regards Spinoza’s great philosophy as a rose, then the thorns can be considered as keeping it from misinterpretations or misunderstandings of various kinds. Unfortunately, many of the books and papers on this philosophy are replete with misunderstandings and misinterpretations. I hope that this book has succeeded in avoiding them. Most of the footnotes are certainly polemic, but I have made strenuous efforts to expose some of these misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Many of the issues discussed here have to do with the problem of the philosophical system that Spinoza had in mind. I will argue that Spinoza rejects the foundational type of philosophical system and especially its closed or total version; the xi

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deductive system pertains to this type. Instead, he follows a model of a system of coherence, which is a network.1 His view of the desired (“wanted,” “aspired for,” or “required”) system rejects self-evidence or immediate evidence, ascribed to the foundational, basic propositions (namely, definitions, axioms, and postulates) and which puts an obstacle in the way leading toward the desired system. Furthermore, Spinoza’s philosophy absolutely opposes any piecemeal philosophy which, in his view, should be considered as fragmentary and mistaken. I am not sure whether most of Spinoza’s scholars and interpreters today have given enough thought to this Spinozistic attitude, and while analyzing his systematic philosophy they do not avoid using a piecemeal approach. Without attempting to see the whole picture from the beginning, they proceed step by step with the expectation that, in the end, the complete picture will be become clear; this is, unfortunately, not the case. The picture as a whole should be entirely clear to them before they present their interpretation or analysis to the readers. Such is the way I have taken in writing this book. It is the way of metaphysics from which the divergence of philosophical areas fields emerges.2 One cannot ascribe ethical philosophy, for instance, to Spinoza without first recognizing the metaphysical framework, which embraces the entire systematic building. Such metaphysical systematization is unfortunately still quite foreign to those who nowadays call themselves philosophers. As the readers will realize, Spinoza’s metaphysical system is a desired one, an objective of his intellectual and emotional conatus, and not an accomplished achievement. The Ethics lays down the principles, the general scheme, and the way leading toward this system, which lies unattainable, beyond the horizon. The Ethics is a grand attempt to open the way leading to this system. Each of God’s Attributes is a perspective, a qualitative totality, a comprehensive view that grasps, from a particular viewpoint, the whole of all real, particular or

1  An excellent and clear representation of the coherence model of truth and the difference between it and the foundational one is by Rescher 1973, which does not refer to Spinoza’s philosophy. 2  Though Martin Lin (2019) realizes how basic, systematic, and vital is Spinoza’s metaphysics, he limits his project concerning it thus: “the present book is certainly not comprehensive. There are many aspects of Spinoza’s metaphysics that I make no attempt to treat: personal identity, the nature of time, and the eternity of the mind, to name only a few. The conclusions that I reach here must, therefore, be regarded as tentative ones that await further confirmation by showing that they can cohere with the correct interpretation of those aspects of Spinoza’s thought as well. Indeed, given the uncommon systematicity of Spinoza’s thought, nothing short of a complete interpretation of all of Spinoza could serve as such confirmation. But that task is clearly too great for a single book or even, perhaps, a single scholar” (op. cit., p. 3). I really admire Lin’s modesty in this true words. Nevertheless, since Spinoza’s system is coherent, as I will show below in great detail, in such a way that each of its details depends on the text as a whole and this whole depends, in turn, on each detail, a devoted interpreter of Spinoza’s philosophy has to take into consideration all the aspects of it, how much ever time and effort this may require. I cannot judge if such a project is possible or not for a single author, but I have taken upon myself to achieve this most difficult task, and thus I have devoted ten of my academic years to write the current Book in different versions. Indeed, personal identity, the nature of time, and the eternity of the mind with many other issues and aspects are discussed meticulously in the current Book. The reader has to judge whether it has been a daring ambition on my part and whether my project is not a failure after all.

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singular, things. Spinoza does acknowledge philosophical systematization and definitely rejects any piecemeal philosophy, for any mistake or error, in his view, consists of fragmentation,3 of a piece of reality that is considered as if it were independent and isolated. The “entities of the imagination” (entia imaginationis)4 are simply fragmenting factors, the exclusion of which is a necessary condition for constructing the desired philosophical system. This system consists of epistemological and ontic aspects, constituting the theoretical part of the system, whereas the part of its praxis is a practical theory of freedom, happiness,5 and salvation (salus). Spinoza’s systematic theory consists of a complete correspondence between the grades of knowledge6 and our emotions as well as the motives for our actions. The totality of the desired system reflects or represents the structure of reality as a whole as it truly is, as it is in itself (in se est). In other words, knowledge is simply the reflection or representation of reality as a whole, as it truly is. The desired system of knowledge is thus simply the total reality as it is known or perceived. This reality can be known, because all its details, including the mental ones, are links in a total causal chain, each of whose links is necessarily connected with all the others. Because of this, each detail in reality and reality as a whole is entirely intelligible. This is what Infinite Intellect is all about, namely, the total intelligibility of Nature as a whole including all of its details. It is essential to realize that each detail of the system as a whole is not indistinct within it but, rather, the system guarantees the reality, necessity, or eternity of each of its details, namely, modifications, each of which is necessarily linked to the entire total causal chain, which is detectable by Infinite Intellect.7 Spinoza has thus to refer to a principle of individuation that keeps

 Cf. Lloyd, 1996, pp. 65–67.  For a different treatment of Spinoza’s entia imaginationis consult Garrett 2018, pp.  151–172. Garrett calls them “ideas that are derived from the imagination” (op. cit., p. 151). 5  Spinoza’s theory of freedom and happiness interested Stuart Hampshire, from the very beginning of his investigation into Spinoza’s philosophy. See, for instance, Hampshire 2005, p. 188. 6  In what follows, I use “knowledge” and “cognition” interchangeably or synonymously (but, in the plural, obviously I use only “cognitions”). The difference between “knowledge” and “cognition” becomes more distinct whenever the emotional properties of cognition(s) are mentioned. 7  Latin has no definite or indefinite articles. Each interpreter has to decide for himself or herself if Infinite Intellect (intellectus infinitus) is definite or indefinite. My view of Spinoza’s philosophy as an endeavor toward a total philosophical system is my reason to endorse “the Infinite Intellect” rather than “an Infinite Intellect.” Second, since the infinite intellect is an infinite mode of the Attribute of Thought, there is only one infinite intellect, which grasps anything that there is. It is a total mode. Hence, I always mention and use “the infinite intellect.” So there is one Infinite Intellect, which means that Reality as a whole is a coherent system in which all details-modes are intelligible and interconnected into one total causal chain (namely, an Attribute), which is causa sui. Therefore, one and the same Intellect can follow each of the causal links—modes—in each of the Attributes, and the Intellect perceives all the Attributes as constituting one and the same absolutely infinite Reality, namely, Substance. The Infinite Intellect does not belong to any person, mind, or subject; it rather means “the absolutely total intelligibility of Reality as a systematic whole.” About all of these points consider Section 6.21 below. 3 4

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the whole of reality intact while saving the reality of its modal8 differentiations. I will show that this principle is what Spinoza entitles “adequate causality.” Against the background of the above, it is not surprising that Spinoza is committed to a totally systematic view, side by side with pluralism and systematic openness. The infinitely pluralistic Attributes and modes should be considered one of the corner stones of Spinoza’s philosophy. He was a devoted individualist, and his philosophy clearly reflects that. His philosophy is quite unlike most of the monistic systems. Any monism that entirely excludes pluralist differentiations in reality or one that reduces them to one reality is absolutely incompatible with Spinoza’s monism, which is of a unique kind—“a monistic pluralism.”9 Yet, in one way—by rejecting any sort of dualism—Spinoza’s philosophy shares something of importance with monistic views. He maintains that any dualistic view cannot constitute a coherent system but only constructions that cannot join each other to constitute one comprehensive view. Some of these constructions are mutually incompatible. Each duality leads to a problem, which any attempt at constructing a system endeavors to overcome. Each dualistic stance thus results in a problem that should not be ignored. Spinoza clearly realizes the problematic nature of Cartesian philosophy merely because of its dualistic nature. Indeed, very early in his philosophical writing, Spinoza refers to the unsolvable problems of duality with which Cartesian philosophy confronts the reader. Arguing that, I have in mind the appendix, “Metaphysical Thoughts” (“Cogitata Metaphysica”), of Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I et II,10 the earliest of Spinoza’s publications. In it, he explicitly refers to some problems in Descartes’s philosophy, all of which are dualistic in nature and whose solution is simply “beyond human capability” or “exceeding our grasp.” The problems are as follows: the duality of the creating substance, namely, God, and His omnipresence or ubiquity in any of the individual things to guarantee their continual creation at any moment;11 the problem of the division of matter into real particles, which is the duality of the continuous substance and its independent parts;12 and the duality of human freedom or free will and the all-determining God.13 Each of these kinds of duality results in an antinomy. One could not get rid of any of its antagonistic stances, which, despite their contradicting each other, are still necessarily dependent upon one another. Each stance involved in the antinomy is indispensable, for Descartes considers each of them as “clear and distinct,” namely, as evident. Such antagonist stances are the existence of free will and God’s total determination, the extended substance and the particles of matter, the transcendent God, and God as  “Modal” in the sense of “consisting of modes.”  Which is not an oxymoron or paradox. It is the best title I could ascribe to Spinoza’s philosophy. Such a title appeared first in Calkins 1929, pp. 277–306. Nevertheless, I use it quite differently. 10  English translation: Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with Metaphysical Thoughts, trans. Samuel Shirley, Introduction and notes by Steven Barbone and Lee Rice (Indianapolis, 1998). 11  “Metaphysical Thoughts” Part II, Chapter 3, p. 115 (G I, p. 254). 12  Op. Cit., Part I, Chapter 3, p. 104 (G I, p. 244). 13  Op. Cit., pp. 103–104 (G I, pp. 243–244). 8 9

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the immanent cause or continuous creator of all creatures. Despite each of these antagonist stances, there is certainly a necessary dependence: the creatures necessarily depend upon their creator, and the material particles upon the extended substance. A p­ossible solution to all these problems can be found only in a comprehensively coherent system, embracing different philosophical areas, primarily theory or epistemology and ontology as well as praxis or ethics and political theory. In “Metaphysical Thoughts,” Spinoza refers to the problems that obstruct Descartes’s attempt to construct a metaphysical system. Spinoza himself would relate to these problems in his own philosophy, rephrasing and interpreting them differently as his novel view commits him.14 He would then attempt to challenge them in his own way. The fate of Descartes’s system depends upon the solution to these problems of dualistic nature, and the destination of Spinoza’s philosophy is to solve or eliminate them by constructing a philosophical system. He attempts to remove the obstacles that obstruct us from a systematical understanding and explanation of the world and of our place within it. All of these obstacles have to do with kinds of duality. In what follows, I will oppose the views according to which Spinoza cannot do without dualism of this or that sort.15 The achievement of a philosophical system according to Spinoza depends upon solving the following monistic difficulties: (1) The psychophysical problem, which consists of the duality of mind and body side by side with the intimate and necessary connection between them. This problem has also epistemological implications: the possibility of knowledge depends on the connection between the mind and the extended objects that it grasps. (2) The duality of the multiple random facts, mutable and passing away with time, which the intellect cannot follow or detect, and any rational lawfulness, which is universal, necessary, fixed, and eternal, namely exempt from temporal conditions. Only this lawfulness makes it possible for the intellect to orient itself in factual reality. Such is the problem to which the Eleatic school relates.

 Cf.: “It is in the relations between Spinoza’s philosophy and that of his immediate intellectual predecessor, Rene Descartes …, that we see most clearly his distinctive capacity to transform familiar ideas into something radically different” (Lloyd 1996). 15  First and foremost, Alan Donagan’s. See his “Spinoza’s Dualism,” in Kennington 1980, pp. 89–102, especially p. 91. Jonathan Bennett ascribes “property dualism” to Spinoza (Bennett 1984, pp. 41–49, 63). Bennett distinguishes this dualism from the Cartesian substance dualism and he argues that Spinoza’s monism is compatible with dualism (op. cit., p. 70). It appears that both Donagan and Bennett ascribe dualism to the irreducibility of the Attributes, each of which is indeed irreducible to the other. But this is not the main feature of dualism, especially whenever one has Cartesian dualism in mind, which undoubtedly is incompatible with Spinoza’s metaphysics. Even when Spinoza uses Cartesian terms, he endows them with quite a different meaning. I will discuss this below in greater detail. For a good example of how a Cartesian interpretation of Spinoza should fail, consult Daisie Radner, “Malebranche’s Refutation of Spinoza,” in Shahan and Biro 1978, p. 125. 14

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(3) The duality of theory and praxis. Since the days of Plato and Aristotle this duality has challenged philosophy. A paradigm-case for it is the problem of akrasia (“weakness of the will”) to which Spinoza refers at 4p17s: “I see and approve the better, but follow the worse.”16 Others have considered this duality as the one between “the is” and “the ought,” of “moral values” and “drives,” or “intellect” and “will.” Like Plato but unlike Aristotle, Spinoza attempts to challenge this duality in one comprehensive system, which has epistemological and ethical aspects. Spinoza, unlike Aristotle, does not divide philosophical considerations into fields or domains. Instead, he integrates them all into one and the same comprehensive philosophical system. It is rather the elimination of boundaries separating domains or fields that characterizes his view. (4) The duality of humans and nature. It is the question of imperium in imperio (“dominion within a dominion” [3pref]), which is a metamorphosis of the Sophists’ and Plato’s problem of nomos and physis. Plato attempts to challenge this problem by means of integration of cosmological, ethical, political, epistemological, and ontological considerations into one and the same comprehensive system (as one can judge, for instance, from Gorgias 507d–508a). So much for the kinds of duality that Spinoza had to challenge in order to construct the desired system. I will begin with the status of plurality according to Spinoza. This has to do with the problem of the necessary differentiation within Substance. There are two kinds of such differentiations: that of Attributes (which are the unconditioned total or infinite differentiations) and that of modes (the plurality of finite differentiations). Each of these differentiations should be considered a being, although not a substantial one. In this context, we have to discuss the link between the principle of individuation and personal identity on the one hand and the necessary connections, the causal connections, and integrating the plurality into one coherent system on the other. Not any kind of connection is sufficient or adequate for constructing a system, and the transient causal chain is a good example of such a kind of connection that, according to Spinoza, does not constitute the desired system. Only the immanent causal chain is sufficient to do this. Distinguishing between the transient and the immanent causal chain will refer us to the two conceptions of reality: the first is that of the imagination, according to which all things exist at a place and in time, and as such they must be contingent; the second is that of veridical knowledge, which perceives all things as they really are—necessary and eternal. This discussion has actually to do with the problem of grades of knowledge, each of which contributes something to construct the desired system.

 Which is a quote from Ovid, Metamorphoses VII, 20–21. Cf. 3p2s, Letter 58 (Curley II: 428), and 4pref: “though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the worse. In this Part, I have undertaken to demonstrate the cause of this, and what there is of good and evil in the affects” (Curley I: 543).

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Each total (infinite) causal chain is an Attribute. The Attributes are parallel, better united; they must correspond to one another. The desired system has two truth’s conditions: that of coherence, which means that all the differentiations within an Attribute are integrated into one whole; and that of correspondence. Coherence and what Spinoza calls “adequacy” go hand-in-hand. As we will realize, both are entirely incompatible with the alleged criterion of truth as immediate or self-evident, which must be rejected because Spinoza wishes to constitute a system of coherence and adequacy. Discussing the correspondence or, better, the unity of the Attributes, I will look into the distinction between the essences of entities and their properties, especially between their cognitive essences and emotive properties. I will utilize this distinction to solve the problem of the unity of the two known Attributes—Thought and Extension. Having discussed all this, we will able to analyze the contribution of each grade of knowledge—Imagination, Reason, and Intuitive Science—to constitute the desired system. Each such contribution has theoretical aspects as well as practical ones, for each grade of knowledge also conveys emotive properties. Our discussion of the second grade of knowledge—Reason—will lead us to the conclusion that a foundational philosophical system, such as the deductive system, is impossible. In contrast, the discussion of the contribution of the third grade of knowledge—Intuitive Science—will end with concluding how, according to Spinoza, an open philosophical system is possible. Haifa, Israel

Amihud Gilead

Acknowledgments

I fell in love with Spinoza’s philosophy as early as the first year of my graduate studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the city where I was born. My late teachers and mentors there were Professors Nathan Rotenstreich and Yosef Ben-Shlomo. Both were exciting teachers. But what was no less important for me was their way of teaching and guiding—not to follow them but to find my own way, quite different from theirs, in studying and understanding the systems of the great philosophers of the past. I owe these great mentors very much indeed. I tried my best until my retirement to attract my students to philosophy in the way in which my teachers had attracted me: to teach them with great love and enthusiasm. My dear friend and colleague, Saul Smilansky, did his best to persuade me to translate into English and update my Hebrew book on Spinoza, which was an elaboration on and expansion of my PhD dissertation that was devoted to a novel interpretation and elaboration of Spinoza’s philosophy. I owe much to Saul for his most devoted friendship and encouragement. Each of my books, both in English and in Hebrew, could not have come to fruition without the encouragement, support, and love from my late wife, Ruthie, who blessed me with 36 years of most happy marriage. For me, Ruthie has been the sublime example of Spinoza’s intellectual love of God, as each human being is a singular finite mode of God and, as such, he or she is perceived in the supreme grade of knowledge. I am especially proud of the publication of the current work in Springer Nature’s International Archives of the History of Ideas, their prestigious series in which the best book I have ever read about Spinoza’s philosophy, Salvation from Despair by E. E. Harris, was published together with some other fine books on Spinoza’s philosophy. I thank the editors of this series for their help in publishing my current book on Spinoza. I am also indebted to an anonymous reviewer from Springer for his or her encouragement and good advices. I thank Svetlana Kleiner for her efforts and devotion in accepting this book for publication.

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Acknowledgments

Michael Della Rocca has been most kind and generous in carefully reading the manuscript as a whole and in commenting most enlighteningly on it. I used these excellent comments to clarify some points in the text. Michael’s encouragement of my way of understanding Spinoza means a lot to me. Marion Lupu has worked most devotedly in the stylistic editorship of this book. I would like to thank them all.

Contents

1 Substance as the Systematic Unity of the Necessary Plurality������������    1 1.1 The Differentiation in Substance—Spinoza’s Philosophy Is At Odds with the Eleatic Philosophy��������������������������������������������    1 1.2 Distinctions of the Intellect and the Status of the Attributes������������   11 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   20 2 The Status of Individual Things in Spinoza’s Substance ��������������������   23 2.1 Introducing the Problem ������������������������������������������������������������������   23 2.2 Do Individual Things Really Exist in Substance or Are they Nullified in it?����������������������������������������������������������������   27 2.3 The Essence of the Individual thing��������������������������������������������������   34 2.4 The Principium Individuationis and Personal Identity ��������������������   39 2.5 Individual Things as Temporal and  as  Eternal—The Transient and the Immanent Causal Chain ������������������������������������������������������   47 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   58 3 The Truth Conditions and the Problem of the Attributes��������������������   61 3.1 The Truth Conditions������������������������������������������������������������������������   61 3.1.1 Adequacy, Correspondence, and Error ��������������������������������   61 3.2 The Interdependence of the Truth Conditions and the Problem of the Attributes ����������������������������������������������������   76 3.2.1 The Truth Condition of Adequacy and Its Link with Unity ��������������������������������������������������������   76 3.3 The Problem of the Unity of the Attributes and the Possibility of Solving It��������������������������������������������������������   90 3.3.1 The Problem of the Unity of the Attributes and the Possibility of Its Emendation ����������������������������������   90 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  107

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Contents

4 The First Kind of Knowledge: Imaginatio ��������������������������������������������  109 4.1 The First Kind of Knowledge Consists of Inadequate, Illegitimate Generalizations��������������������������������������������������������������  109 4.2 The Common Order of Nature and the Status of Individual Things—The Pretension of Constructing a System��������������������������  113 4.3 The Figments of Imaginations: Time, the Confined Occupation of the Mind, and Death as Fragmenting Factors ����������  118 4.4 The Emotive Properties of the First Kind of Knowledge and the Mentis Fluctuatio ����������������������������������������������������������������  138 4.5 The Knowledge of the Data and the Possibility of Its Emendation������������������������������������������������������������������������������  148 4.6 The Dependence of Human Beings on the Common Order of Nature; the Multitude and the Wise as Citizens of the Same State������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  160 5 The Second Grade of Knowledge (Ratio) and Its Limitations������������  161 5.1 Rational Knowledge as a Common, Universal, and Adequate Knowledge; the Common Notions, Knowing the Common Properties, and Deduction ������������������������������������������  161 5.2 The Impossibility of Constructing a Philosophical System by a Deduction from the Common Notions��������������������������������������  172 5.2.1 Why Is a Metaphysical System, Which Is Foundational-­Deductive, Impossible According to Spinoza’s Philosophy?������������������������������������  172 5.2.2 Are the Order and Connection of Things Mathematical-Deductive? ����������������������������������������������������  180 5.2.3 What Is the Meaning of “Ethics Demonstrated in the Geometrical Order”?��������������������������������������������������  188 5.3 The Influence of Reason on Passions and Akrasia—The Duality of Theory and Praxis������������������������������������������������������������  194 5.4 The Place of Human Beings in Nature—The Problem of the Duality of the Human Reason and the Reason of Nature; Democracy as the Rational State ������������������������������������  200 5.5 The A Priori (“Synthetic”) Procedure as a Method��������������������������  207 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  217 6 The Supreme Grade of Knowledge��������������������������������������������������������  219 6.1 The Supreme Grade of Knowledge, Scientia Intuitiva: The Adequate and Certain Conception of the Essences of Individual Things as Modes of the Infinite System����������������������  219 6.2 The A Posteriori (“Analytic”) Procedure and the Emendation of the Experiential Data by the Supreme Grade of Knowledge��������  226 6.2.1 The Infinite Intellect and the A Posteriori Procedure of the Supreme Grade of Knowledge������������������������������������  234

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6.3 The Relationship Between the Supreme Grade of Knowledge (Including the Intellectual Love of God as its Property) and the Other Kinds of Cognitions (Including their Emotive Properties)��������������������������������������������������  241 6.4 Human Happiness and the Desired System����������������������������������������  248 6.4.1 An Objection Concerning Human Happiness ������������������������  256 6.4.2 Human Freedom, Human Identity, and Human Happiness������������������������������������������������������������  257 6.4.3 Freedom of Choice and Human Self-Determination��������������  264 6.4.4 Human Eternity, Salvation, Happiness, and the Knowledge of Human Singularity in the Desired System�������������������������������������������������������������  273 6.5 The Contribution of the Supreme Grade of Knowledge to Canceling the Duality of Theory and Praxis and that of Human Reason and Nature’s Reason ��������������������������������������������  284 References ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  287 7 The Desired System as a Goal Lying Beyond the Horizon��������������������  289 References ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  303 References ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  305 Name Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  311 Subject Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  315

Chapter 1

Substance as the Systematic Unity of the Necessary Plurality

1.1  T  he Differentiation in Substance—Spinoza’s Philosophy Is At Odds with the Eleatic Philosophy Spinoza was not under the influence of Parmenides, but the Eleatic difficulties concerning the plurality of the mutable individual things must concern Spinoza deeply. For he, too, attempted to construct a monistic system. According to Parmenides, any differentiation in Being is just impossible. Spinoza cannot accept such a view since he writes that: it is of the nature of a Substance that each of its Attributes is conceived through itself, since all the Attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the reality, or [that is] being of Substance. So it is far from absurd to attribute many Attributes to one Substance. Indeed, nothing in Nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some Attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has Attributes which express necessity, or [i.e.,] eternity, and infinity. And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite must be defined … as a being that consists of infinite Attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence (1p10s).

Spinoza emphasizes the necessity of the plurality of Attributes also in Letter 9 (G IV: 45) and in the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being (Part I, Ch. 2, Sections 17 and 27). There is no logical impediment to differentiate and to perceive many Attributes in one and the same Substance; moreover, such is necessarily the case. The logic of Spinoza’s special way of thinking necessarily relates to “God, or a Substance consisting of infinite Attributes” (1p11). For it is impossible, according to Spinoza, not to assume the existence of an infinite number of Attributes in the absolutely infinite Being, in the reality as a whole which, as most contentful and ample, necessarily comprises everything in existence. A kind of knowledge that perceives this reality as exempt from differentiations, must be general and abstract, that is, confused and fictitious; whereas the more we conceive reality

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0_1

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“particularly … , the more clearly it is understood” (TdIE 55).1 It is rather our knowledge of individual things and the possibility to differentiate as many distinctions as possible in order to avoid blurring the differences (a blurring which generates fictitious and illegitimate generalizations), that enables an intelligible and true conception of reality. Indeed, Spinoza deliberately conjugates Intellect and the differentiation in Being: it is the Intellect that conceives God’s Attributes (according to the definition of Attribute—1def4), whether the Intellect in question is finite or infinite (1p30). The Intellect affirms a plurality of Attributes in Substance as well as an infinite plurality of modes: “From the necessity of the divine Nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under the2 Infinite Intellect)” (1p16). This has to do with the infinite abundance of the laws of Nature, which are sufficiently ample “for producing all things which can be conceived by the Infinite Intellect” (the end of 1App). To Spinoza it is obvious that the conceptions or perceptions of an Intellect, whether of Attributes or of modes, are not subjective differentiations but they must be objectively valid, for “what is contained objectively3 in the Intellect must necessarily be in Nature [that is, objectively or “extra intellectum”]” (1p30d). To this extent, there is no difference whatsoever between a finite, human Intellect and God’s Infinite Intellect. The perceptions by both kinds of Intellect have a real standing—“extra intellectum,” that is, in the reality outside the mind, as these perceptions are necessarily true and cannot be fictional or illusory. Any perception of an Intellect must be true, to the extent that the Spinozistic text is concerned. Moreover, both kinds of Intellect are modes (1p31), taking part in natura naturata (that is, Nature as an effect or as affected), and these modes are particularizations of the infinite Thought (the Attribute of Thought); they are cognitions of particulars (individuals). The Infinite Intellect conceives all the particulars or individual things as they are singularly (or clearly and distinctly) perceived in the universal frame of Nature as a whole, for each of them is a mode or a change, mutation, variation, fashion, way,4 or state of reality as a whole. What holds true for the conception of the Attributes (that is, “whatsoever can

 For a fine original commentary on the TdIE consult De Dijn (1996).  I disagree with Curley over the interpretation of Spinoza’s term of Infinite Intellect. As I argued above, I interpret this term as definitive—the Infinite Intellect. 3  That is, as a mental object existing “in the mind or intellect.” This Scholastic term is different from the current terms, according to which “subjective” replace the Scholastic “objective.” Nevertheless, “object” as a psychoanalytic term is somewhat closer to the Scholastic term. These two latter terms focus on the representative aspect of the object. In what follows, I use “objective” in the current sense. 4  Della Rocca prefers “way” to the other senses (except for “states”) of “mode.” But this sense appears to obscure the difference between modes and Attributes. Attributes are the universal “ways” in which Substance exists and is conceived, whereas modes are the particular “ways” in which Substance exists and is conceived. Still, this is not precise enough, for Attributes are not general or abstract concepts; instead, they are particular or concrete ones, especially as conceived in the third grade of knowledge, Scientia intuitiva. I thus prefer “variations” as a precise enough sense of Spinoza’s modes, for all modes are variations of one and the same Substance-Theme. The best synonym for “mode” is “difference” or “distinction.” “Change” is also acceptable. 1 2

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be perceived by [an] Infinite Intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to one Substance only” [2p7s]), holds as well for the conception of the modes under one and the same Attribute: both finite and Infinite Intellect split reality neither into independent, discrete individuals nor into independent systems. Rather the contrary is the case: any intellect, as a true conception, perceives either systems or individuals-particulars as differentiations of one, coherent reality which is an absolutely comprehensive system.5 Indeed, for Spinoza the divisibility of Substance is simply unacceptable. That is, to split Substance into independent, discrete parts is impossible under his philosophy. Contrary to those who conceive matter or material Substance as a divisible and measurable quantity, Spinoza considers matter quite differently. They assume that the parts of Substance (or the absolutely total Reality-Nature) are merely finite substances, whereas he argues that finite substances are absolutely impossible. Hence he rejects the possibility of the divisibility of Substance into parts which are substantially or really different; instead, he suggests a modal difference.6 Such a possibility involves the existence of a vacuum in Nature. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s philosophy explicitly requires differentiations in Substance. Differentiations in Substance are necessary, as long as the “parts” of Substance are inter-coordinated, excluding a vacuum of any sort, and are modal only (1p15s; and consult p12 on). A differentiation of discrete, independent parts would split, even shatter, Nature and prevent the knowledge of Nature as a continuous, unbroken Being, all of whose particulars are but modifications of one and the same Reality. In contrast, a differentiation into discrete parts is not compatible with Spinoza’s attempt to construct a cognitive system of Nature, a system in which there is a cohesive relationship between “parts” and the whole, between the modes of reality and Reality as a whole, that is, Substance. Hence, Spinoza must criticize the atomists (from their very beginning until the seventeenth century) as well as the Cartesian theory of discrete self-evidence. The latter has some transformations or implications; one of them is Humean empiricism. Hume understands well that the existence of clear and distinct perceptions prevents any necessary connections between them. This entails an entirely broken reality, which has nothing of the necessary connections, selves, and substances. Descartes attempts to construct a system, and I believe that his theory of discrete evidence and its implications are the first reason for the failure of his attempt. Moreover, Spinoza’s criticism at 1p15s was also against the attempt to conceive Nature under mathematical patterns, for this requires a measurable ­quantity 5  Against this background, I cannot accept the following clause: “How many things are there in the world? Spinoza’s answer: One” (Della Rocca 2008, p. 33). This is simply not true, for though there is only one absolutely independent being, namely Substance, there are infinitely many real modes, which are dependent beings but modally real. Moreover, this statement appears to contradict the following one: “Of course, for Spinoza, not only does God’s Infinite Intellect exist, but also finite minds, including human minds, exist” (op. cit., p.  104). Indeed, modes are “ways” in which Substance exists (following ibid., p. 33.), but these modes are real things. As I see it, contrary to Della Rocca, Spinoza’s monism is not merely the oneness of Substance, but is a pluralistic monism or a monistic pluralism. 6  Compare E. E. Harris, “Finite and Infinite in Spinoza System,” in Hessing (1977), p. 199.

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which is divisible into discrete parts. Such mathematics does not contribute to the construction of a cognitive system of Nature, and even, under some circumstances, it prevents the possibility of such a system. And Spinoza must first show that real and necessary particulars are not discrete and independent (that is, they are not finite substances: an independent part of Substance is simply a finite substance, and this is a manifest contradiction [1p13s]). Instead, all “parts” together join into one, coherent Reality, i.e., one Substance. Otherwise, Spinoza would have only a piecemeal knowledge of reality. Thus, although Infinite Intellect makes distinctions, which are valid as far as Reality is concerned, it does not separate them; rather the contrary is the case: the Intellect attaches them by means of necessary bonds (which is what clarity and distinctness are all about, as will be explained in Sect. 3.11 below). It is a necessary condition for conceiving Reality by an intellect or for Reality’s intelligibility that it is particularized abundantly. Were Reality not so, it could not be conceived by an intellect (whether finite or infinite). An undifferentiated whole, such as Parmenides’s pan estin omoion (Fragment 8, line 22), or the being which is well-rounded (op. cit., line 43), or the being which is “equal to itself on every side,” lies “uniformly within its limits” (ibid., line 49). Such a being, according to Spinoza, is unintelligible, for it has neither concreteness nor particularity,7 like a night in which all cows are black. Such is a transcendental, abstract, and illegitimate concept, a defective product of Imagination (the first grade of knowledge), a product that does not reflect Reality (see 2p40s1). As it is axiomatic in Spinoza’s philosophy that Reality is replete with differentiations and particulars; as much as our conception of it is false and fragmented, Reality is less particularized and individuated. As the first grade of knowledge, Imagination consists entirely of illegitimate, blurring generalizations, distorting the perception of Reality, which is full of particulars. On the other hand, Spinoza would agree with Parmenides that Substance (Being as a whole) is neither generated nor destructible (Fragment 8, line 3) but uncreated and imperishable, infinite or perfectly whole (op. cit., line 4), one, and continuous (op. cit., line 6). All these are God-Substance’s properties according to Spinoza. But when Parmenides states that being is indivisible (op. cit., line 22), his statement is incompatible with Spinoza’s view, although this view is phrased almost in the same words: “the absolutely infinite Substance is indivisible” (1p13). For Parmenides assumes that being is the undifferentiated whole (pan estin omoion—op. cit., line 22), whereas Spinoza, although not accepting that Substance is divided realiter, explicitly acknowledges that it is divided modaliter.8 When Spinoza claims that the

7  Cf. Hallett (1930), pp. 92, 144–5, 154–7, 158, 194, 320, and 323–5. Cf. Harris (1973), pp. 64 ff. Nevertheless Hallett and Harris do not involve this issue with the question of the intelligibility of Substance and obviously not with the question of the nature of the desired system according to Spinoza. Yet, elsewhere in his book, Harris (1973, pp. 256–7) discusses the connection between Spinoza’s philosophy and “a speculative system” that is not a procrustean bed. 8  On the problem of the differentiation of being and of Spinoza challenging Parmenides, consult William J. Edgar, “Continuity and the Individuation of Modes in Spinoza’s Physics,” in Wilbur (1976), pp. 85–105. According to Edgar, Spinoza follows Parmenides in assuming that the being is

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mode of Movement and Rest is the immediate infinite mode of the Attribute of Extension (Letter 64, G IV: 278), or when he differentiates between natura naturans and natura naturata, he, as a matter of fact, disagrees with Parmenides in principle. Spinoza attempts to refute Zeno’s paradoxes to the effect that we clearly and distinctly perceive changes in Extension, all of which have to do with movement. Thus, unlike the Eleatics, we cannot say that changes and movements, as witnessed by our senses, are incompatible with reason: as long as such changes and movements are clearly and distinctly perceived, they must be perfectly intelligible.9 In his mature philosophy Spinoza continues to maintain this stance: the immediate infinite mode of the Attribute of Extension is Movement and Rest, while under the Attribute of Thought the correspondent mode is the Infinite Intellect (Letter 64, G IV: 278). Thus, the mode of Movement and Rest is perfectly compatible with intelligible conception which is clear and distinct. In sum, despite some affinities,10 Spinoza disagrees in principle with Parmenides.11 Parmenides’s poem is dualistic: its first part denies any plurality, change, and movement, whereas its second part deals with physical problems and with the opinions of an indivisible plenum, though Spinoza states that movement in this plenum is still possible. And since the individual things are individuated by means of movement, there is a differentiation in this being (op. cit., pp. 87, 92). I do not think that movement can adequately serve as a principle of individuation worth its name, for two different bodies can move equally, as their ratio of movement and rest may be equal. 9  Compare Spinoza’s Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, Part II, Proposition 6, Note, G I: 191–196. 10  In addition to the properties of Substance, one can find the echo of the Parmenidean exclusive disjunction, “being or nothing,” at 1p11d3 (the a posteriori demonstration of the existence of God): “either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite Being also exists” (Curley I: 418). Nevertheless, Spinoza ascribes quite a different meaning to this disjunction, as he immediately adds: “we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else, which necessarily exists” (ibid.). The debt of Spinoza to Parmenides is greater than that of Plato to Parmenides: both Spinoza and Parmenides commit what Kantians name “ontologism,” namely, a type of thinking according to which conceptual analysis is, under particular conditions, sufficient to render or consider thought as existence (to turn concepts into existing entities is termed “reification” or “hypostasis”). The Cartesian cogito and the ontological proof of the existence of God pertain to ontologism. Such are Spinoza’s proofs of the existence of God. 11  Contrary to Gebhardt (1905), pp. 114–5. Gebhardt suggests that Spinoza absorbs Eleatic philosophy within his metaphysics and leaves the empirical world, which we experience, to physics. While Spinoza’s metaphysics denies movement, his physics accepts it. Thus, Gebhardt ascribes the duality that well characterizes Parmenides’s poem, consisting of two excluding parts, to Spinoza’s philosophy. I do not agree with this interpretation at all. At most, one can compare the second part of Parmenides’s poem with Spinoza’s Imagination, the first grade of knowledge, which has to do with abstractions (see 1p15s). Nevertheless, quite opposed to the second part of Parmenides’s poem, which is not compatible with its first part, Spinoza’s first grade of knowledge is well integrated into the whole of his philosophy as well as the other grades of knowledge. Contrary to Parmenides, Spinoza is thus not involved with an aporetic dualism. Parmenides is incapable of deducing the second part of the poem from its first part. Hence, he is incapable of explaining away the wrong beliefs of immortals. Parmenides is thus involved with an unsolvable contradiction between human everyday experience and his metaphysical view. Spinoza rejects the Eleatic dualism absolutely. We are entitled to conclude, then, that Spinoza does not accept a duality of empiri-

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mortals. We can compare these opinions with the abstractions of Imagination that Spinoza discusses at 1p15s. But, in definite contrast to the second part of Parmenides’s poem, Spinoza’s theory of Imagination fits perfectly with his philosophy as a whole without being engaged in unsolvable difficulties, which may endanger the entire attempt to construct a system. This is quite different from Parmenides’s philosophy: the existence of the opinions of mortals is absurd and a miserable fact in his philosophy, which, in turn, cannot explain this fact adequately, if at all. Such incapability is a symptom of a real defect in Parmenides’s philosophy. It puts an aporetic duality between the world of everyday experience and reality as it is philosophically conceived. Spinoza strongly rejects such a duality and, thus, when he begins to refute Zeno’s paradoxes,12 he states that he will not do so like Diogenes the Cynic and will not refer to empirical facts but, instead, will employ theoretical arguments. From this we should infer that according to Spinoza no duality exists between empirical facts and theory. Along these lines, Spinoza disagrees with the whole Eleatic school. It seems that his monism is closer to that of Xenophanes.13 As Aristotle puts it (Metaphysics I, Ch. 5, 896b24–5), Xenophanes, referring to the “whole of the heaven” argued that “the one is God.”14 All this is not compatible with the Hegelian interpretations of Spinoza.15 According to such interpretations, Spinoza assumes again and again that no negation in Substance is possible. Indeed, Spinoza states that (1) “if something is only infinite only in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatsoever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence” (1def6e); (2) “being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is an absolute affirmation of some nature” (1p8s1); (3) “God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which expresses an essence of substance can be denied (by def6)” (1p14d); (4) “the shape is nothing but determination, and a determination is a negation” (Letter 50 G IV: 240, Curley II: 407). The Hegelian interpreters of Spinoza explain his view as follows: it is impossible for any differentiation to exist in Substance, for any differentiation is negation, while no negation in cal facts and theory. As an example of an “Eleatic” interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy, Hallett mentions Joachim (1964). See Hallett (1957), p. 89, note 3. 12  See Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy, Part II, Proposition 6, Note. 13  As it is characterized in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I, 5, 896b24–25. Consult Spinoza’s Letter 56, Curley II: 421–2, which is similar to Xenophanes’s criticism of God’s anthropomorphism). A volume of Aristotle’s writings existed in Spinoza’s personal library. See item 12 on the list that appears in Freudental 1899. 14  Guthrie 1971, pp. 381 ff., concludes that Xenophanes identified God and the world and, hence, he should be considered “pantheist,” which is not the way that others considered Xenophanes. In Letter 56 (Curley II: 421–2), Spinoza criticizes God’s anthropomorphism. His criticism reminds me very much of that by Xenophanes. 15  To begin with Hegel himself in Part I of The Science of Logic, mentioning “the Eleatic being or the Spinozistic Substance” (Hegel 1971, p. 151). Many of Spinoza’s Hegelian interpreters follow this view. See Erdmann 1933; Robert N.  Beck, “Some Idealistic Themes in the Ethics,” in Kennington (1980), pp. 73–87.

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Substance is possible, insofar as Substance consists of the absolute affirmation of the absolutely infinite being. They believe that any attempt in “fixing” Substance and in making differentiations or discriminations in it means negating and creating a vacuum or void in it, which can entirely break its continuity into independent parts, and, finally, contradict the assumption that Substance exists. In this way the Hegelian interpreters of Spinoza attempt to render him Parmenidian or Eleatic, as if the assumption that Substance is the absolutely infinite being, in which nothing can be negated, commits Spinoza, as it were, to an Eleatic stance. It is a roundabout way of suggesting that Spinoza’s philosophy is either superfluous or that it is simply an explication or an addendum of the Eleatic monism. And if it is the latter option, this theory must deny anything experiential and phenomenal or consider it a mere deception. How can we interpret the above passages without relying on any Eleatic stance and without undermining the basic principles of Spinoza’s philosophy? To begin with, we must understand that a relationship of negation exists between the Attributes themselves, yet this negation does not entail any defect, imperfection, or deficiency whatsoever. The negation under discussion denies nothing of the perfection or the infinitude of any of the Attributes. Hence, Spinoza writes that “although Extension in itself negates Thought, this does not render it imperfect in whatsoever way” (Letter 36, G IV: 184). Passage (1) above conveys the same idea. After all, no Attribute is absolutely infinite, but only infinite in its own kind. Substance is the only absolutely infinite being, that is, Reality as a whole in its entirely exhaustive conception. Yet, any Attribute, though not absolutely infinite, lacks nothing, and nothing can condition it from without. Still, Attributes negate one another: Thought negates Extension, and Extension negates Thought. The determination of the Attributes is a mutual negation: Thought demands for itself the right and the capability to conceive and explain Reality as a whole comprehensively and unconditionally; and it cannot conceive Extension but as conceived by and in Thought, as a conception of Thought as a whole. Extension, however, can relate to Thought only as an extended manifestation, i.e., embodiment, of Thought. Yet, Extension is the absolutely infinite Substance insofar as (quatenus) Substance is extended, and Extension cannot be denied of Substance, for it expresses its essence, and to deny or negate the essence necessarily leads to denying or negating Substance itself (according to 2def2), which must be just absurd. Yet the essence of Substance, as an extended thing and as a determination of Substance, actually negates the essence of Substance as a thinking thing, and vice versa. Nevertheless, Substance’s essence, insofar as it is of the absolutely infinite being, affirms any of these infinite manifestations of reality in its totality. One of these is the manifestation of God-Substance’s essence insofar as God is a thinking thing. This essence affirms Extension as God’s Attribute and all the other Attributes as well. Substance is all the Attributes in their unity and identity. We must attribute or ascribe to Substance all the real negations, whose negating nature is cancelled when they are unified in Substance. Thus, any infinite (total) and unconditioned negation in its kind is an Attribute, and it reveals its identity also in the content which it negates (this content is the other Attribute or all other Attributes). It claims for itself a status of a total and unconditioned

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explanation for anything existing, but cannot claim for itself a status of an absolutely exhaustive explanation, which has to do with the conception of Substance alone. In this conception, the Attribute of Thought is identified in all other Attributes, which are but another total exposition of its own content. In brief, it is the discovering of the identity of the Attribute with all the others, which are simply another manifestation or distinction of its own content. The revealing of the identity of an Attribute with all the others is simply the confirmation that all the Attributes are simply different total determinations of the same being itself. Substance’s identity must be affirmed in any of its negations—in its infinite and unconditioned negations (that is, in the Attributes), in its conditioned infinite negations (that is, in infinite modes), and, finally, in its finite negations (which are finite modes of infinite modes). To confirm or affirm so is one of the most important tasks of Spinoza’s philosophy, if it attempts to become a system. It should be clear now that the total (infinite) extent of the Attribute of Thought depends on its identification in all other Attributes, at least in Extension. Otherwise no such extent can be ascribed to Thought; otherwise the possibility emerges that there are things that are not conceivable, considered, and differentiated under Thought. The absolute confirmation of the infinitude of Substance means gathering all its negations (whether infinite or finite) in it as the only absolutely infinite Being. Only under this condition can Substance be realized as the being which is richest in content, as there cannot be a being which is richer or more contentful. All things, in all of their possible forms, exist in Substance. Even a thought that does not conceive any negation in Substance as an additional affirmation, actually exists in Substance and reveals its supplementary positive content. Such a way of thinking perceives Substance simply as an abstract being: as an empty totality that includes “everything” but in a way contains nothing and that nothing can be said about it, neither discovered, nor ascribable, nothing except an empty “identity,” which is entirely devoid of content—everything is everything. In contrast, an identity resting upon the assumption that any negation of the absolutely infinite being must ascribe to it more content, and, thus, it is a legitimate identity, namely, one with content. The content of this identity comprises all modes, all individual things, but not in a way in which “we are accustomed to refer all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the most general, i.e., to the notion of being, which pertains absolutely to all individuals in Nature” (4pre, G II: 207). Referring thus is to an abstract “totality,” a product of abstraction which is severely criticized at 2p40s. In contrast, a being abundant with content is a real and concrete being, all of whose particulars are components of a coherent system. In light of the above, the transition Spinoza makes from 1p14d (see [3] above) to 1p15 (“Whatsoever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God”), and from 1p15 to 1p16 (“From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes”), becomes quite intelligible. I will explain below why, according to Spinoza’s philosophy itself, it is impossible to deduce any of the relevant particulars from the definitions of God, Substance, and Attribute. Thus, the transition under discussion is not deductive. In addition, it was impossible to deduce anything from God-Substance, if all we knew about it was that

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it was just the Whole (or that the whole is the whole), and had we enforced Eleatic interpretations on Spinoza’s philosophy. In contrast, from the viewpoint of an intellect, which begins with the concrete knowledge of finite beings and ends in the exhaustive and complete knowledge of the absolutely infinite being, the prohibition to negate anything in Substance means this: never ascribe a status of Substance, of unconditioned and absolute being, to anything finite whatsoever, but always search for the cause of this individual thing from without, and thus consider all finite things as effects and finite manifestations of one and the same Substance. In other words, all finite things together make one comprehensive system. Any finite thing is a negation in Substance, and only the systematic whole of all of them is absolutely affirmative or positive. In the absolutely infinite being there must be room for any such “negation,” and any attempt to deny this being of any of its negations must lead to an absurd situation, that is, to consider the absolutely infinite being as if it were not so. Only the absolutely infinite being lacks none of these negations. In the spirit of Letter 36, we can say that it is impossible to consider Extension as imperfect or that it lacks anything, for as far as an Attribute is concerned, negation is not privation or a defect. Yet we would say of Substance that it lacks or misses something, had we denied it any of its negations. Were it possible to say, for instance, that Substance was not also a thinking thing, we would deny its status as Substance, we would take away something from its perfection and thus turn it into something that could not be considered as absolutely infinite being at all. Before I consider other attempts in denying the differentiations in Substance (these attempts are involved with the argument that Attributes are not extra intellectum), I have to consider another argument, according to which the differentiations in Substance are necessary. Individuation or particularization is a necessary result of characterizing Substance as causa sui, for there is no cause without effect, there is no natura naturans (i.e., God as a cause) without natura naturata (i.e., God as an effect or effects). Cause and effect are correlative concepts. From this an apparently paradoxical conclusion may follow: natura naturans depends in some way on natura naturata, or causa sui somewhat depends on its particulars-effects.16 Indeed, Spinoza writes that “if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different, then God’s nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore … that [other nature] would also have had to exist, and, consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd” (1p33d). The reader is  Cf. Joachim (1964), p. 107, discussing 1p33d. Thus he mentions the dependence “in some sense” of Substance upon its modes. Nevertheless, Joachim thinks that such a consequence is impossible according to the logic of Spinoza’s philosophy. From that Joachim concludes that Substance is not differentiated in its modes. In contrast, Hallett challenges this view and ascribes to Joachim an Eleatic interpretation of Spinoza. It is of some interest that Joachim himself withdraws from this view. See Joachim (1940), pp. 22, 41 ff., in which his view comes closer to that of Hallett and Harris. Cf. note 24 above. In any case, to deny any differentiation in Substance, even to deny some dependence of Substance upon its modes, may be entitled “Eleatic.” What Joachim calls “Spinoza’s logic” is simply Joachim’s interpretation of it. As I interpret his own references to 1p33d and 1p33s2, they contradict Joachim’s interpretation.

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fully entitled to draw from this the conclusion that in some way God as causa sui must depend on its particulars-effects. I will return to this crucial point later. First, we must bear in mind that “God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself [causa sui]” (1p25s). In the beginning of this scholium we are referred to 1p16: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes.” Tschirnhaus considers 1p16 “nearly the most important proposition in Book I of your Treatise” (Letter 82, G IV: 334, Curley II: 486), and I entirely agree with him. In any case, the three corollaries of 1p16 regard God as a cause: “God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under Infinite Intellect” (1p16cor1); “God is a cause through himself [per se] and not an accidental cause” (1p16cor2); and “God is absolutely the first cause” (1p16cor3). I assume, therefore, that 1p25s clarifies and interprets the link between 1p16 and its three correlates. 1p25cor mentions that “[p]articular things are simply affections of God’s Attributes, or modes by which God’s Attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.” We must conclude, then, that Spinoza relates God’s effects to God’s particularization, insofar as God is under some Attribute. Spinoza’s philosophy binds causality and particularization or individuation together. An interesting manifestation of the problem under discussion can be found also in Short Treatise. I am not sure about the identity of the author of this treatise. We cannot tell for certain which part of it was written by Spinoza himself and which by his disciples, translators, and editors. There are many doubts whether Spinoza was the author at all. In any event, it seems that Short Treatise at most reflects an earlier stage of Spinoza’s philosophy (and even this is not certain), but not his mature and final philosophy. From time to time I will refer to this treatise, because there are some clear and interesting points which can shed some light on various problems which bothered Spinoza for a long time. Be that as it may, the author of Short Treatise writes that the “predisposing cause is his [God’s] perfection itself, through which he is both a cause of himself, and consequently of all other things” (Part I, Ch. 3, Sec. 2v). Also it is said (Sec. 2vii) that God “is, in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things.” Moreover, in The Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza writes that the more particularly existence is conceived, the more clearly it is understood (TdIE 55). He begins with the discussion of the essence of a thing. Spinoza relates the absolute necessity of Substance to its being causa sui and free17: “That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone” (1def7). This determination, which is involved in self-causation, is the necessary particularization of Substance, which means that anything existing joins one coherent whole, one absolutely total system, all the existing things in which are determined one by the other and by the entire  Harris (1973), pp. 122–3 is aware of this relationship and emphasizes that as a free cause, namely, as the cause to all determinations or negations, God is differentiated. God, according to Harris, expresses himself in all his Attributes and modes. God’s freedom means that all these determinations are his. At this point, Harris mentions the systematization of God’s determinations, all joining together in a universal system. Such view manifestly opposes Joachim’s (1964).

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whole, which is complete or perfect. Such determination implies that God-Substance must be free. Along these lines, an Eleatic being is, in contrast, not free and is not causa sui as well, for there are no determinations or any actions in it, though they are required by the definition of freedom. Moreover, Eleatic being is neither necessary: a necessary determination (“to be such and not otherwise,” insofar as finite actions and beings are concerned, or “to be all things,” insofar as the absolutely infinite being is concerned) characterizes the necessity (or the eternity and reality) of the existence of any being. If in the Parmenidian or Eleatic being there is neither negation nor differentiation and determination to act, then it is not an absolutely necessary being, contrary to Parmenides’s assumption. For it is groundless to state that such being is unconditioned and absolutely total (infinite). Parmenidian being cannot be named causa sui.

1.2  D  istinctions of the Intellect and the Status of the Attributes Some of Spinoza’s interpreters believe that the distinction of Attributes is just a creation, even an illusion, of an intellect (whether finite or infinite), a creation which is not real and has no footing in the reality outside the intellect (extra intellectum). Such are the “subjectivist” interpreters of Spinoza’s philosophy. Among them you can find Hegel, Erdmann (1933, pp. 59 ff.), Wolfson (1958, vol. 1, pp. 146 ff.), and many others.18 They rest their interpretation on the wrong assumption that there is no differentiation in Substance, which is the only absolutely total being. The subjectivists believe themselves to be the redeemers of Substance’s unity owing to the denying the Attributes of any real, objective status. But in this way the subjectivists nullify or void Substance of its content and deny it of its singular property, i.e., causa sui. As above, causa sui means “the cause of all its modes,” and Substance cannot be the cause of all its modes, unless “the modes of each Attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the Attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other Attribute” (2p6; cf. 2p7s). Thus, given the subjectivist interpretation, it is not understandable how can there be modes in Substance, and, generally, the Ethics as a whole becomes thus unintelligible from the very first proposition of Ethics 1 (“Substance is prior in nature to its affections”) until its very end. Indeed, the subjectivists turn Spinoza to Eleatic, as it were.

 Of a fine critique of the Hegelian interpretation of Spinoza consider Wetlesen (1979), pp.  39 and 415.

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They rest their interpretation upon a little word tanquam in 1def4: “By Attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of [a] Substance, as19 constituting20 its essence.” There are various convincing arguments against the subjectivist interpretations,21 and I would like to add another objectivist one of my own. Caterus, in his objections to Descartes’ Meditations (the first series of objections), already challenges the possibility of the correspondence between the intellect or the mind and real facts outside the mind, i.e., extra intellectum. In the philosophical language prevailing at that time Caterus asked: How can that which exists “objectively” (in the mind) exist in the same way “formally” (in actual reality from without) as well? Is it not possible that the conceptions of the intellect are just figments of the mind (entia rationis) and not real representations of real things (entia realia)? As it is well known, Descartes thought that such a correspondence must be necessary, and, following the Scholastic terms, that the “objective” existence of anything (namely, as it is in our mind) must have a “formal” cause (as it is outside our mind; this is evident at least in any case in which the origin of concepts is clearly outside the mind). In contrast, Spinoza denies the causal relationship between any object and its idea existing in the mind. Nevertheless, if “intellect” means true idea, there must be no doubt, claims Spinoza, that “[a] true idea must agree with its object …, i.e., what is contained objectively in the intellect must

19  Tanquam, which is also translatable into as, as if, or as it were. Subjectivists prefer the third translation. 20  Spinoza translates Deut. 34: 10 (“And there stood [meaning “arose”] not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses …”) as et non constitit (proprie surrexit) unquam Israeli propheta sicut Moses (TPT, Ch. 1, S: 14). Hence, we may say that the essence of Substance “stands and falls” upon its Attributes. See P. Wienphal, “On Translating Spinoza,” in Hessing (1977), pp. 510–11. 21  For instance, Haserot (1953), especially note 2 on pp. 500–1, which inclines toward the objectivist interpretation, according to which tanquam means “as.” Haserot diagnoses the subjectivist interpretation of the Attributes as if Substance was an “undifferentiated and attributeless substratum” (op. cit., p.  508, note 11), for what would remain of Substance if all its Attributes were removed? Wolfson’s view is the typical representative of the subjectivist interpretation, which renders Spinoza into a mystic (op. cit., p. 512), as Substance with no differentiation is beyond the grasp of reason (ibid.), and, thus, it will not be understood even for itself (op. cit., p. 513). According to this view, the subjectivist interpretation is certainly incompatible with the nature of Spinoza’s philosophy as rationalist and determinist, and thus, it should be rejected. See for well-established grounds to reject the view that Substance is a substratum in Curley 1969, Chapter 1, which ascribes this wrong interpretation to Bayle, Joachim, Wolfson, and Russell. Curley endorses a non-Eleatic interpretation of Spinoza. Bennett does not accept Curley’s interpretation especially as to Substance and its Attributes (Bennett 1984, pp. 60–6, 146 ff.). Over this issue, I prefer Curley’s interpretation to Bennett’s, but still it is not enough. Of more of the debate between the subjectivist and objectivist interpretation of Attributes consult Alan Donagan, “Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” in Grene (1973), pp.  164–81; Sprige (1977), Jarrett (1977), Aquila (1983), and Della Rocca (1996), pp. 157–171. I deem highly Pierre Macherey’s criticism of the Hegelian or “Eleatic” interpretation and especially his own view on the Attributes, according to which “Attributes and Substance are inseparable in that they cannot be conceived without one another, outside of one another; and this reciprocal dependence expresses simply the fact of their real unity.” See his “The Problem of the Attributes,” in Montag and Stolze (1997), p. 79. My interpretation differs from all the aforementioned ones and I suggest a different solution to the problem.

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necessarily be in nature” (1p30d). This holds equally for the conceptions of both infinite and finite actual intellect, which comprehend God’s Attributes and affections, “and nothing more” (1p30). In other words, there is a correspondence between our finite intellect and God’s Infinite Intellect: both comprehend God’s Attribute truly and adequately. After all, some of our ideas must be true, for our intellect is a part of God’s Infinite Intellect: “our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the Infinite Intellect of God …; hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are” (2p43s). The truth and adequacy of the intellectual ideas are not diminished at all due to the modal status of the intellect, whether finite or infinite, a status which is not that of “absolute thought” but pertains to natura naturata (1p31).22 The knowledge of natura naturata as the effect of natura naturans (Substance or Attributes), includes within itself the knowledge of God (as entailed from 1ax4: “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause”). Such knowledge is a true knowledge, and as such must correspond to its ideatum (1ax6), and thus gains the status of truth outside the mind (extra intellectum). It is understandable that, according to Spinoza, to be perceived by an intellect means to be perceived truly, while the perceived object is as it is in itself (ut in se est—Letter 12, G IV: 56, whose correspondence with 1p16s testifies to its philosophical maturity, even though the Letter was written as early as April 1663).23 To perceive an object ut in se est is to perceive it truly and adequately, and not under any bias of the imagination. Thus, when any intellect conceives Attributes it must perceive them ut in se sunt, and, contrary to the subjectivists, not under any illusion. Accordingly, Spinoza states quite clearly that “outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections. Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect thorough which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by def4), their Attributes, and their affections” (1p4d). Definition 4 is that of Attribute, and relying on it obviously demonstrates that Spinoza himself would have rejected the “subjectivist” interpretation of Attributes. For all the distinctions between different Attributes, and all the distinctions between Attributes and modes and between different modes—all these distinctions are actually findings of an intellect, findings concerning reality as it is really is, and not under any illusion or invention, entirely contrary to the subjectivists. Moreover, in Letter 9 Spinoza writes that in some sense Substance and Attribute are the same, for each of them “is in itself” and “conceived through itself,” “except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and such a definite nature to substance” (G IV: 46, Curley I: 195). In the same Letter, Spinoza

 In Sect. 7.21 below, I will discuss in great detail the problem of how the finite intellect, which is a conditioned mode, adequately or truly conceives the Attributes, which are unconditioned, and Substance, which is absolutely total. 23  We are allowed to rely upon Letter 12 to understand better some arguments in the Ethics. For there is an exact parallelism between its un-Cartesian content and 1p15s. This is sufficient to show that already at that time (April 1663) Spinoza was immersed in writing the Ethics, some whose portions were already in their final form. As early as 1661, the time of the writing of the first letters, Spinoza forms some critical views that will later appear in the Ethics. Cf. Israel 2001, p. 169. 22

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relates the abundance of reality to the plurality of Attributes: “the more reality or being a being has, the more attributes must be attributed to it” (G IV: 45, Curley I: 195). Hence, the conception of Attribute corresponds to the structure of reality as it is perceived by the intellect. As Spinoza puts it: “the more attributes I attribute to a being, the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it; that is, the more I conceive it as true. It would be quite the contrary if I had feigned a Chimaera, or something like that” (G IV: 45, Curley 195). You can find the same idea at the end of 1App: “the laws of his [God’s] nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing all things which can be conceived by … Infinite Intellect.” At this point we are referred to 1p16: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under … Infinite Intellect).” In these passages too you can see for yourself that according to Spinoza the intellect does not invent anything, neither makes fictions or imagine anything (which is what imagination does and not any intellect, all the less Infinite Intellect). Thus no intellect invents, feigns, or imagines the differentiations in reality; rather the contrary, it reveals or discovers these differentiations truly, as they really are in themselves outside the intellect (namely, extra intellectum). This holds true especially for the ontic status of the Attributes.24 It must be said that the differentiation in Substance, the differentiation of Attributes and modes as well (which is the unfolding of the entire causal chain), is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of reality as a whole. For without differentiation into Attributes there is no causal chain, which is the chain of reasons and inferences in the Attribute of Thought. Without the real existence of that chain the intellect could not comprehend reality and could not follow what takes place in it. Such differentiation does not break Substance into independent and discrete parts, but it differentiates particulars, which are necessarily linked together to constitute a complete whole. Spinoza, therefore, claims that any Attribute and its affections or modifications are truly perceived. The transparency of reality to an intellect (a complete transparency to the Infinite Intellect), its capability to be conceived by an intellect—the intelligibility of reality—is necessarily conditioned by its particularization or differentiation. An intellect cannot understand facts, unless it conceives their necessity, the necessary reasons why they are such and not otherwise. The intelligibility of Substance or Attributes rests on having reasons. Spinoza states that  Cf. Wilson (1983), pp.  181–3. On these grounds, we have to challenge Bennett in arguing, “Nature really has extension and thought, which really are distinct from one another, but … are not really fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect” (Bennett 1984, p. 147). Wolfson’s view over this matter is all the more untenable (Wolfson, vol. 1, p. 328). Wolfson argues that Substance, allegedly distinct from its Attributes, is “a concrete or real universal,” whereas its Attributes are allegedly abstract universals, which the intellect invents. This leads to a double misunderstanding, for (1) Substance should not be separated from its Attributes (which express its essence, without which Substance could not exist at all!), and (2) It is certainly wrong to ascribe concreteness and reality to Substance that is Attributes-less. Such a “Substance” is unintelligible and is simply a fictitious entity. Not in vain does Spinoza oppose Maimonides over the issue of God’s attributes, God’s differentiations or plurality, and the intelligibility of God’s essence. About this, see Strauss (1965), pp. 150–6.

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their reason (or cause) lies only within themselves, which means that their reason or cause must be their self-particularization or self-differentiation. Their intelligibility rests on the connection between natura naturans as the cause (Nature as unity) and the particularized nature, natura naturata as the effect. This intelligibility is just explicating the plurality in its relationship, which constitute a systematic whole (cf. Hallett 1930, p. 149). A necessary condition for the existence of such a system is a unity of a real plurality, which is the same condition without which the intelligibility of Substance is impossible. No wonder, then, that the statement that the plurality of Attributes is not compatible with the absolute unity of Substance, is found only in one place in Spinoza’s writing, in a treatise which, although written by Spinoza himself, does not convey his own ideas but only indirectly: in the Appendix to Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, which is entitled Cogitata Metaphysica (Part II, Ch. 5). It is written there that the distinctions by which we split God into attributes are not real; they are only entia rationis (G I: 259), for God is an absolutely simple being. But even in this chapter Spinoza writes that the intellect is in need of such distinctions, for God is not understood unless attributes are ascribed to him, although this need of the intellect does not rely upon real facts whatsoever. At this point we face a crucial duality, which makes an insurmountable obstacle in the way to constructing a system. It is an unbridgeable gulf separating God and our knowledge, for the conditions on which knowledge rests, are not those on which God rests. Cogitata Metaphysica exposes a Cartesian duality separating God as the creator of the world from the created world itself, although God is the cause of the creation as an effect. Under Cogitata Metaphysica, there is no plurality in God, and plurality takes place only in the created things (Ch. 7, G I: 263). There is no doubt that these are not the ideas of Spinoza himself, not even at that early stage of his thinking, for such is the testimony of his Letter from the same year (1663). Let us consider now a passage at 1p8s2: … we can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; for though they do not actually exist outside the intellect, nevertheless their essences are comprehended in another in such a way that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect unless it is in them themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.

First, employing “substances” in the plural in Spinoza’s text is a special way to emphasize the plurality and objective reality of Attributes. Take for instance 1p4d, at the beginning of which substances and affections are mentioned, yet, at the end of this demonstration, Attributes and affections are mentioned thus: “there is nothing outside the intellect [extra intellectum] through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except Substances, or what is the same (by def4), their Attributes, and their affections.”25 Accordingly, at 1p15s Spinoza states that

 A similar phrase appears in Letter 4, which was written apparently in October 1661 and in which Spinoza uses the expression “reality, or outside the intellect” (realiter, sive extra intellectum [Curley I: 171]. The same sentence appears at 1p4d and 1p30 & d. The Scholastic and Cartesian terms should not mislead us. See also Wolf’s comment (Wolf 1928, p. 378).

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“the extended Substance is one of God’s infinite Attributes.” Moreover, 1p10 reads “[e]ach Attribute of [a] Substance must be conceived through itself,” and the demonstration explicitly interprets 1def4 (the definition of Attribute) thus: “an Attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a Substance, as [tanquam] constituting its essence (by def4); so (by def3) it must be conceived through itself.” On these grounds I conclude that subjectivist interpretations cannot find a firm basis in the Ethics. We are now about to reach a major conclusion: since tanquam should be rendered as “as” and not “as if” or “as it were,” Attribute is really the true and adequate conception, the intelligible perception, of Substance’s essence, which is, as it is perceived, Substance’s nature which cannot be conceived but as actually, really existing. Since Attribute is the perceived essence or nature of Substance, Spinoza is entitled to state “God is eternal, or [sive—or in the sense of “i.e.,”] all God’s Attributes are eternal” (1p19). Any Attribute expresses or explicates God’s existence, just as it reveals God’s eternal essence (1p20d, referring to def4, without mentioning any intellect, but emphasizing “that itself which constitutes God’s essence at the same time constitutes his existence. So his existence and his essence are one and the same”). Given that the Infinite Intellect conceives God’s essence as it is really is (ut in se est) and relying on the definition of essence (2def2), we have to conclude that without essence no Substance can exist and that its essence cannot exist without it. In other words, if we eliminate the distinctions or differentiations, which the subjectivists ascribe to an intellect alone, we cancel Substance itself or render it empty of any content. According to this definition of essence, Substance must depend somewhat on its Attributes. Indeed, without differentiation, Substance cannot maintain its unity or identity. Without this unity, in turn, the Attributes would not have been infinite (total) and unconditioned (“self-caused”). We may learn much about the Substance-Attributes relationship also from what Spinoza writes about the mind-body relationship. It is implied from 2p11 and 2p13 that the idea of an actual existing body constitutes the mind. And 5p38d reads: “The Mind’s essence consists in knowledge.” This knowledge is simply the idea of the body. Since the essence of the mind is an idea of an existing actual body, this idea constitutes the mind, and, as Spinoza sees it, mind and body are one and the same thing as it is considered or revealed under two different Attributes (according to 3p2s referring to 2p7s, which mentions “whatsoever can be perceived by Infinite Intellect as constituting an essence of Substance pertains to one Substance only”). On the basis of these statements we may conclude that as much as the mind and the body are one and the same thing, for the mind rests on the knowledge or on the idea of the body, and this knowledge is the mind’s essence, so Substance and its infinite Attributes under their unity are one and the same thing, i.e., the absolutely infinite being. Attributes thus constitute or make the essence of Substance, as this essence is perceived by the intellect, whether infinite or finite. Attributes express God’s nature and thus are not extrinsic notions (to use the terms of 4p37s2). Thus, any phrase according to which Substance “has” infinite Attributes (e.g., 1p16d, yet this demonstration refers to def6 which mentions “constituting” instead, as do also 1p10s, 1p11, and Letter 4, G IV: 14), or that Attributes

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pertain to Substance, can mislead us, and by no means serve Spinoza well. The version that Substance consists of Attributes or rests (“stands”) on them is much better. Such is the version of the definition of God (1def6), and it is the prevailing version in the Ethics. There is more to say on the Substance-Attributes relationship. Substance is the cause of all things on the condition that it is either extended or a thinking thing (as implied from 2p6 and 2p7s). Not an undifferentiated substance is the first principle of Spinoza’s philosophy but the distinct Substance, which is determined and differentiated by itself as a causa sui under this or that Attribute. In this light we can understand the very first proposition of the Ethics: “Substance is prior in nature to its affections” (1p1). Substance’s affections necessarily exist in Substance, and, as such, they are its differentiations. Since there is no differentiation or particularization in Substance without an Attribute, Substance, as considered under this or that Attribute, “is prior in nature to its affections.” Nevertheless, many interpreters have misunderstood Spinoza at this point, to begin with Schuller (in the name of Tschirnhaus). In Letter 63, Schuller asks Spinoza for examples of what is produced immediately from God, and suggests that such are Thought and Extension (G IV: 276). Spinoza does not explicitly expose this misunderstanding but his answer in Letter 64 does so implicitly: what is immediately produced from God is Infinite Intellect under Thought, and Movement and Rest under Extension (G IV: 278). In other words, it is the infinite modes, and not any Attribute, that must be immediately produced from God (actually from God’s Attribute). From a God or a Substance, which were neither a thinking thing nor an extended thing, nothing would be produced at all, as much as ex nihilo nihil fit. The unity of God and his Attributes excludes any causal relation between them, as much as there cannot be any causal relationship between mind and body, for they are one and the same thing considered as different modes under two Attributes. To consider any undifferentiated substance as causa sui or as the first principle of Spinoza’s philosophy, or to think of Substance as if a principle which is not known in itself (as Wolfson does), simply entails denying any rationality or intelligibility from anything that is, and it must undermine any attempt in understanding Nature as a coherent system. Such are inescapable consequences, if we separate Substance from its Attributes, and if we do not identify them one with the other despite their differences. Moreover, the subjective interpretation of the Attributes is by no means compatible with Spinoza’s claim that Attributes, like Substance itself, are not conditioned but they are causa sui, existing in themselves and being conceived through themselves (these properties characterize natura naturans, as implied by 1p29s). Any conception of Substance as if separated from its Attributes would cancel the infinitude and un-conditionality of any of the Attributes. The question of what is the difference between Substance and its Attributes becomes crucial especially when Spinoza states that Substance and Attributes are one and the same. For instance, he mentions that “God is eternal, or [sive, namely] all God’s Attributes are eternal” (1p19); that “all that he [God] is, or all his attributes” (Short Treatise I, Ch. 7, Sec. 7, note b); and that although Substance and Attribute are the same, Attribute is ascribed to Substance by an intellect, that is,

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Attribute is Substance conceived truly and adequately (Letter 9, G IV: 46). The capability of an intellect to conceive Substance is the other side of the capability of Substance to be conceived. According to the example in this Letter, Substance and Attribute share the same denotation, but each Attribute characterizes or qualifies Substance “in a certain and determinate way.” Thus, Israel and Jacob are two names of the same third patriarch who is equally denoted by these two names. “Plain” and “white” denote the same surface, i.e., that which reflects all rays of light without any change whatsoever, is called “plain” (when the observer is not taken in consideration) or “white” (as seen by an observer). In this example, plain represents Extension, and white—Thought. But the analogy is not strict, for white is a secondary quality, which does not hold for reality in itself. In any case, just as we are not entitled to say that the third patriarch is the cause of Jacob or of Israel, so we are not entitled to say that “that which reflects all rays of light without any change whatsoever” is the cause of plain or white. We cannot understand “that which reflects all rays of light without any change whatsoever” without taking into consideration that it is a plain that appears white to us, just as one cannot identify the third patriarch without recognizing that he is Israel who is also called Jacob. It is a relationship of identification: Substance without Attributes is an unknown, unidentified substance. Against the background of all that, we must ask again: what is the difference between Substance and Attribute? In the definition of God (1def6), God is understood to be absolutely infinite: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., [a] substance consisting of an infinity of attributes.” The explication of this definition clearly distinguishes the absolutely infinite from an infinite in its own kind (in suo genere). The same distinction is made in Letter 4 (G IV: 13–14).26 Infinitude in its own kind is the infinitude of any of the Attributes which in turn are negations in Substance, whereas the absolute infinitude is an absolute affirmation (that is, in ascribing all the negations to God-Substance we are canceling their being negations and turn them into such an affirmation). Letter 36, too, considers these distinctions and states that any Attribute is perfect and unlimited (indeterminate) though negating any other Attribute (without diminishing its perfection whatsoever), whereas God-Substance is altogether unlimited (indeterminate) and absolutely perfect. God is not “a certain kind of being” but it is a being that expresses its absolute essence perfectly, whereas Attribute is God “in some way” (S: 208, G IV: 185–6). Equally, Spinoza writes that Substance is the Being which expresses all perfections (G IV: 182). To this we must add that both Substance and Attribute are conceived through themselves and exist in themselves, in a word—they are unconditioned. We are in a position now to sum up the differences between Substance and Attribute. First, it is obvious that Substance is not just an aggregate of all its Attributes but it is their systematic unity. The differences between Substance and Attribute are thus:

 The assumed date of this Letter is October 1661. Since the view expressed in it is parallel to the one that is taken in the Ethics, we may conclude that as early as 1661, Spinoza formed some of the views that would later appear in the Ethics.

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(1) Substance is the total (infinite) Being, comprising within itself any existing thing, and which is unconditioned (causa sui) and absolute (absolutely infinite or total through and through). “Concept” (conceptus) plays a decisive role in the definition of Substance (1def3), which is centered on the conception of Substance, a conception which is complete, full, and exhaustive. It is the conception of Reality as a systematic, united, and coherent whole. (2) Attribute is actually an expression, consideration, manifestation, qualification, or differentiation of the same total Being (1p20d, 2p5 & d, 2p7s, 3p2d, and more), which comprises every existing thing, and which is unconditioned, yet not absolutely infinite (is not exhaustive) but infinite in its own kind. Take, for example, Thinking: it comprises all existing things without being conditioned by anything which is not thinking, but in itself it is not the exhaustive or absolute expression (consideration, manifestation, qualification, or differentiation) of all these things. With regard to extension or amplitude, there is no difference whatsoever between Substance and Attribute. They are different in their “force” or intension: Attribute comprises all existing things but does not express or manifest exhaustively all their characteristics. The power of Attribute extends to all things, but is not the exhaustive power or capability of each one of them under all its manifestations. The distinction between Substance and Attributes endows Spinoza’s philosophy with a real advantage: it can conceive reality as a whole not as an arbitrary aggregate of all individual things and not as “a night in which all cows are black” but as a “qualified” or “perspective” and contentful being. Thus, Spinoza is entitled to discuss totality, i.e., the system in which all individual things take place, and which is contentful and to which many qualities can be attributed (although not all of them). Any such totality does not exhaust all the meanings of Reality, yet it comprises each one of its particulars. A qualified, perspective totality is simply Substance as it expresses or manifests itself as this or that Attribute. In this way, Spinoza raises an indispensable and most valuable contribution to the “monistic” thought and to the attempt to construct a philosophical system. This interpretation of mine implies that nothing of the Cartesian dualism has to be ascribed to Spinoza’s philosophy, especially not “properties dualism.”27 Attributes are not qualities-properties which are ascribed to an undifferentiated, unknown-in-itself Substratum. A possible interpretation is that an intellect which does not conceive all the Attributes and does not reveal their mutual identity or unity, does not conceive the entire being as Substance but only at most as an Attribute. Such an intellect may attain a total and unconditioned conception of reality, at most, but is by all means denied of an exhaustive conception. Thus, a finite intellect cannot turn the negation

 Contrary to Bennett (1984), pp. 41 ff., 61 and 63, ascribing such a dualism to both Spinoza and Descartes. The Attributes are not properties or qualities of Substance, contrary to op. cit., pp. 60–66, and like Harris (1973), pp. 41 and 73, and Curley 1969. Nonetheless, Bennett is perfectly right in reminding us that any Attribute is absolutely irreducible to nor inferable from the other and that no causal connection exists between them.

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in the two known Attributes into a complete affirmation (of Substance), but at most to know the unity of the two Attributes. The conception by such an intellect is not a complete affirmation of the total being, and thus we can think about a fuller and richer reality. As to the system, an intellect which does not know all Attributes may, at most, attain a complete system, which is the true and adequate knowledge of all real things (though a qualified and non-exhaustive knowledge of each one of them), but cannot have all the possible total systems, which are just one and the same system in all its infinite manifestations.

References Aquila, Richard E. 1983. States of Affairs and Identity of Attributes in Spinoza. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 161–179. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. De Dijn, Herman. 1996. Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press. Della Rocca, M. 1996. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2008. Spinoza. London/New York: Routledge. Erdmann, J.E. 1933. Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. 3, 41–98. Stuttgart. Freudental, J., ed. 1899. Die Lebensgeshichte Spinozas. Leipzig. p.160. Gebhardt, C. 1905. Spinozas Abhandlung über die Verbesserung des Verstandes. Heidelberg. Grene, M., ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. Guthrie, W.K.C. 1971. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. Harris, E.E. 1973. Salvation from Despair – A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Haserot, F.S. 1953. Spinoza’s Definition of Attribute. The Philosophical Review 62: 499–513. Hegel, G.W.F. 1971/1975. Wissenschaft der Logik, Erster und Zweiter Teil, ed. G.  Lasson. Hamburg. Hessing, S., ed. 1977. Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977. London/Boston: Henley/Routledge & Kegan Paul. Israel, Jonathan I. 2001. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jarrett, Charles E. 1977. Some Remarks on the ‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ Interpretations of the Attributes. Inquiry 20: 447–456. Joachim, H.H. 1940. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione  – A Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Kennington, R., ed. 1980. The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington. Montag, W., and T.  Stolze, eds. 1997. The New Spinoza. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Sprige, Timothy L.S. 1977. Spinoza’s Identity Theory. Inquiry 20: 419–445.

References

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Strauss, L. 1965. Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, trans. E.M. Sinclair. New York: The University of Chicago Press. Wetlesen, J. 1979. The Sage and the Way. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wilbur, J.B., ed. 1976. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wilson, M.D. 1983. Infinite Understanding, Scientia Intuitiva, and Ethics I.16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 181–192. Wolf, A., trans. 1928. The Correspondence of Spinoza. London. Wolfson, H.A. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza, two volumes in one. New York.

Chapter 2

The Status of Individual Things in Spinoza’s Substance

2.1  Introducing the Problem The status of individual things in Substance raises a crucial problem for Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza interchangeably employs individua, singulares, and particula. For instance, 1p25c mentions res particulares, yet 2p1d, referring to 1p24c, mentions res singulares, as if there is no difference between particulares and singulares. Moreover, Spinoza refers to a body, which according to 2a5 is res singulares, as to Individuum (2L4 [following 2p13] and 2p27d), and Nature as a whole is also considered as Individuum (2L7s). As if paradoxically, that body and Nature as a whole are complex beings. This is acceptable in the Ethics since Spinoza states that as far as several individua “concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing [ut unam rem singularem]” (2def7). Still, as we shall realize, singulares and particulares may have different meanings. Spinoza wished, I believe, to construct a philosophical system, namely, his “desired system,” in which finite things would be “saved” to the extent that arbitrariness, transience, unintelligibility, and a lack of reality can be eliminated from our conceptions of these things. If, indeed, finite things are always changing and there is nothing of constancy in them, and if they are always under random innumerable circumstances, our intellect cannot follow them and cannot detect any necessary connections binding them together. Such finite beings are among the arbitrary facts, which are without reason and unintelligible, as it were, although their existence must be considered as an undeniable fact. Such is the problem from the theoretical viewpoint whereas from the practical one it concerns the human suffering owing to our anxiety because of the endless threats to our existence and singularity. Human happiness depends on our capability to maintain and preserve our own being (4p18s), that is, the particular, unique, or singular being of each one of us. Alas, finite things in general and human beings in particular are enslaved to brutal laws of © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0_2

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existence: as “being,” “existence,” “power,” and “capability” are interchangeable concepts in Spinoza’s actualist philosophy, any finite being is merely a limited capability or power, and there are always stronger powers that govern finite beings that are minor or weaker relatively to these powers. These, in turn, inescapably surrender to stronger powers and even may lose their very existence and singularity because of them. It appears that in the end, any human being must disappear, leaving no real traces in reality (the exceptions simply justify the rule), without really knowing himself or herself (in the spirit of the Scholium which ends the Ethics as a whole). The desire of any human being to preserve his or her singular being appears to be doomed to failure or frustration for sooner or later she or he would entirely disappear, leaving no real traces in the indifferent reality. It appears to be an undeniable, undisputable fact that we are bound to be born, to die in the end, that such is our unavoidable fate, and that there is a lot of randomness in our life and existence. Spinoza’s philosophy acknowledges the ontic reality of individual (particular or singular) things and their true knowledge as well, for this philosophy challenges the Eleatics, even Plato, insofar as Platonic philosophy, although not denying the existence of individual things, ascribes to them just a phenomenal ontic status, and leaves their knowledge to hearsay or belief (doxa) exclusively. As we will see, Spinoza sets the true knowledge of individual things at the highest level, deserving the highest status of epistēmē, contrary to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (Letter 56, Curley II: 423), whose ways in coping with the problem of the ontic and epistemic status of individual things Spinoza consistently rejects. Plato attempts to handle the problem by means of a philosophy resting upon the aporetic duality, on the one hand, of the status of particular, sensual things such as phenomena, which can be known at the level of doxa only and, on the other hand, upon the existence of “really real” things, which are knowable by means of an intellectual, irrefutable knowledge. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to avoid such duality, yet even he excludes things as merely individual or particular from the domain of rational knowledge, and leaves them, as undeniable facts, to sensual perception only. Although Aristotle ascribes complete reality, i.e., substantiality, to individual things, he does not suggest any rational, intellectual principle of individuation. Matter or the material cause is the “principle” or condition of individuation or particularization in Aristotle’s philosophy. Matter is “responsible” (aitia, the cause) for the differences and distinctions between individual things sharing a common genus or species. Whereas the rational, intelligible ground is the essence of things, their form, or their eidos (their to ti en einai), which is a common ground of all the individual things, sharing a common species or genus that is subject to a common definition. With Aristotle, any individual thing consists of a unique combination of matter and form, a combination of universalization and particularization. Universality only, by no means particularity, can be directly perceived by an intellect. Particularity can be intelligibly perceived only indirectly, as a particular variation of the universal form, a variation that, to some extent, is a deviation from this form. Indeed, the domain of necessary connections, lawfulness, and predictability is that of universal forms, the realm of species and genus, whereas the realm of particularization or individuation, the material realm, is the basis on which randomness or chance of any kind prevails (about this

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consult Aristotle’s Physics II). In this empirical realm no particular thing is predictable, for unpredictable deviations from any rule or law are always possible. Thus, the empirical realm is not entirely subject to intellectual orientation. In this way Aristotle has to face another difficulty, which also is a matter of duality, though of another kind—the duality of reality and knowledge. Both Plato and Aristotle, mutatis mutandis, attempt to maintain the correspondence, even the unity, between reality and knowledge: in Plato’s view, everything real is knowable, and anything which is not—is unknowable (or is not subject to a certain and well-founded knowledge). In contrast, according to Aristotle, complete reality, the reality of substance (ousia), is ascribable to individual things only, although there is no room for a completely rational understanding of their particularity but merely for an acknowledgment of their random factuality. Thus, Aristotle must face an aporetic duality, which cannot be excluded by means of “taking Ideas away from heaven and settling them on earth.” In Metaphysics M, Aristotle deals with the Unmoved Mover, which is the absolutely real substance (the being which is wholly unconditioned and independent of anything except itself), which is entirely compatible with its entire intelligibility. But this leads Aristotle from one aporetic duality to an even worse one: the real and intelligible principle of all things, which allegedly can assist in constructing a complete, total system (of reality as a whole, a cognitive and ontic system as well), lies rather outside individual things as if it were a separate Platonic Idea. This consequence or result is crucial from the Aristotelian viewpoint, attempting so much to avoid the Platonic problems (aporiai), first and foremost those concerning the separation (chōrismos) of Ideas from particular, sensual things. Both Plato and Aristotle are forced to accept the reality in which individual things in themselves, as uniquely different one from the other, are beyond complete intelligibility. Spinoza’s philosophy is meant to construct a metaphysical system that can challenge this difficulty.1 Spinoza attempts to construct a system in which there are necessary and sufficient reasons for all of its real particulars, which can be intelligibly known and which can be exempted from the bounds of randomness, transience, and unceasing mutability, all of which preclude their identification and knowledge as real particulars (though not substantially but only modally). All this is achieved by the necessary connections between the system as a whole and each of its particulars and between themselves. These connections endow each particular or detail with its own unique place or role, for each particular, truly known, is indispensable and no other individual thing can take its place (cf. Joachim 1940, pp. 42, 144–5). Each individual thing takes its own unique locus in the total system, otherwise the system as a whole would have broken down, torn into pieces, and separated by voids. The role of each particular is not an extrinsic function, but it is its essence, its endeavor (conatus) to exist and to express its uniqueness, as an indispensable modification of the entire system. The essence, which distinguishes it from all other particulars, validates its particular existence in this system. The system itself depends on each of its particulars (which is only a secondary dependence, for they

 Contrary to Gebhardt (1905), pp. 113 ff., which leaves this to Spinoza’s physics.

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primarily, first and foremost, depend on it), and thus makes the existence of each particular necessary, for the system itself, as total and infinite with the abundance of its particulars-modifications, has a necessary requirement to secure a modal reality for each of its modifications. Each of these particulars-modifications is indispensable. As for the practical aspects of this necessity, if each human being has her or his own exclusive locus in the system of Nature as a whole, then his or her reality, his or her necessary existence, is knowable. The finitude of such an existence is indispensable and irreducible, yet its cognition as a necessary and indispensable being and the avowal that reality as a whole depends on it to some extent (in a secondary sense only2), this knowledge can purge it from any contingency, insignificance, and transience Its finitude is not only a negation but it is also a positive and necessary expression or modification of Substance. Would Substance lack it, Substance could not have been Substance, which is an absolutely infinite being (namely, it includes everything and lacks nothing). If such is the case, transient existence at place and in time and under random circumstances are merely false and distorted expressions of our finitude, which are simply entia imaginationis (i.e., figments of the imagination), which have room only in our erring mind. The main objective of Spinoza’s philosophy, if it is meant to be constructed as a system, is to secure the identity between 1def2 (“finite in its own kind”) and 1def5 (the definition of mode). Spinoza has to prove that finite things in their own kind are merely modes (“affections” or “accidents”) of Substance or God. Hence, the following is not an assumption but a corollary: “Particular things are simply affections of God’s Attributes, or [i.e.,] modes by which God’s Attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” (1p25c). The very short demonstration of this corollary refers to the definition of mode (“By mode I understand the affections of [a] Substance, that is, that which is in another through which it is also conceived”), and to 1p15 (“Whatsoever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God”). Spinoza argues that these two references are sufficient for proving adequately this corollary. Therefore, at this point, he employs the word patet. Still there is a serious doubt whether the proof is sufficient and sound enough. In this chapter I attempt to consider what are the ways by which Spinoza may solve this crucial problem (whether they are explicitly stated in his philosophy or can be reconstructed by means of my own). From the very beginning, if it were impossible to prove that all the known real individual things—bodies (extended beings and forces) and 2  As I will explain below, natura naturans (God or Substance as a cause) is the necessary and sufficient condition for natura naturata (God or Substance as including all the effects or as entirely modified to the last details), which means that the latter, too, is the necessary and sufficient condition for the former. Since, as I will argue below, Spinoza’s system is a holistic, coherent network, it is not foundational or linear, which means that the primary, first conditioning is of the modes by Substance, yet, in a secondary sense, Substance, in turn, depends on its modes. This does not contradict being God self-caused, for natura naturata, which is the realm of the modes, is God or Substance as particularized in all of Its modes, God quatenus natura naturata (to make my use of Spinoza’s terms). In any event, God is causa sui and there is nothing outside God that may determine or cause Him.

2.2  Do Individual Things Really Exist in Substance or Are they Nullified in it?

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thoughts—are modes expressing God’s essence in particular and determinate ways, the unity of Substance would have been broken down, and, then, Spinoza’s philosophy would have failed from the very beginning in constructing a metaphysical system to which it aspires.

2.2  D  o Individual Things Really Exist in Substance or Are they Nullified in it? One of the conclusions, which I draw from the last chapter, is this: the differentiations in Substance, either into Attributes or into modes, are altogether necessary. Still, we must prove that real individual things are just Substance-God’s modes, and first of all that each one of us is God’s mode, a finite mode by means of which God (i.e., Substance or Nature) expresses itself3 in a determinate and singular way. Let us now consider the following passage: … if corporeal Substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before? And why must they all be so fitted together that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really distinct from one another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in Nature …, but all Its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows also that they cannot be really distinguished, i.e., that corporeal Substance, insofar as it is Substance, cannot be divided. (1p15s)

Why is Spinoza so reluctant to divide Substance into discrete parts, which are independent one of the other or really distinct (namely, discretely or substantially distinct or distinguished) from one another? The reason is that such conception of individual things would shatter or foil the order of Nature, would put the finite prior to the infinite (see 1p12d, p13cs, and Letter 35, G IV: 181), and would consider this or that individual thing as if it were a substance. In this way, we shall found ourselves in an unbearable situation: we would consider a finite thing as if it were infinite or independent and, under Spinoza’s view, nothing can be considered more absurd than that. But all these apprehensions by Spinoza concern one and the same problem: dividing Reality into independent and discrete parts entails blocking the way for constructing a system of knowledge. For dividing so results in a position in which there would be no bond holding individual things together and there must be a vacuum separating them one from the other. It would be a situation in which Reality would turn merely into an aggregate of particular, finite things that would have nothing to do with any system whatsoever. The continuity of the whole would be foiled, and even other individual things, which were not separated from the rest, would eventually be separated so, whenever a vacuum would appear anywhere in Reality. Just one infinitesimal vacuum anywhere in the whole of Nature would be 3  Spinoza’s God is not a person, thus, “itself” would be more appropriate than “himself.” Yet, conventions and habits are strong enough and, sometimes, even irresistible. Curley refers to Spinoza’s God as “He,” not as “It” or “it.” I would prefer “it.”

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enough to destroy the possibility of coherence and systematization insofar as the whole of Reality is concerned, and all its particulars (modifications) would not concur and would not coordinate each other. In contrast, the differentiation in the system of being, a differentiation which does not break it into independent and unconditioned particulars, is perfectly legitimate and it necessarily results from the infinitude of Reality, which is infinitely abundant in details and distinctions. Yet, if there is no real distinction between these particulars but only modal distinctions, does not possibly the status of any individual thing become thus merely unreal? Do not particular, individual things thus turn into nothing or, at least, turn out to be insignificant? Not at all, for if the concordance of any particular with the others that are in Substance brought about the annihilation of that particular, what would then be the necessary correspondence between all modes? What would then be the connection between them that could not bear any vacuum or gulf? What would then guarantee the continuity and completeness of Reality? Substance is indivisible because each of its modes depends on the other. Such is the case because “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (1p16); moreover, “[w]hatever exists expresses the nature, i.e., essence of God in a certain and determinate way …, … whatsoever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things. So …, from some effect must follow …” (1p36d). In this way, the continuity or concordance of Reality must be established, and this Reality is complete and infinitely abundant with particulars and distinctions, as the cause of itself (causa sui) is the cause of all things (cf. 1p34d). On the ground of all this, it becomes clear that each expression of the infinitely many expressions of God’s power is a necessary manifestation, which is necessarily implied from God and which must have a rational justification. For it is perceived by the Infinite Intellect of God (according to 1p16), and this justification is the reason for the necessary existence of each individual thing. Hence, its existence cannot be a random, arbitrary fact. The necessity under discussion, to the extent that it comprises individual things, has a special meaning for the question concerning the mind’s power over its emotions: “The more this knowledge that things are necessary is concerned with singular things, which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects …” (5p6s). Spinoza states that “[f]or each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence” (1p11d2). This reason reflects the causal dependence of any finite thing which, as such, cannot be considered as causa sui (or as ratio sui), on Reality as a whole. This dependence entails a system. As to the necessary existence of an individual thing, it manifests itself whenever the possibility of its absence is taken into consideration, and it appears that such a possibility is indeed unthinkable: had it been really absent, the whole chain of the continuous Reality would have been broken, which would turn it into quite a different thing, quite a different causal chain, if at all, which under Spinoza’s philosophy must be entirely absurd: For all things have necessarily followed from God’s given nature (by 1p16), and have been determined from the necessity of God’s nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by 1p29). Therefore, if things could have been of another nature, or could have been

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determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different, then God’s nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore (by 1p11) that [other nature] would also have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd. (1p33d)

Or, in other words: “… if things had been produced by God in another way, we would have to attribute to God another nature, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect Being” (1p33s2). Spinoza explains that Substance is immutable. Many propositions in Ethics 1 are devoted to this matter: Substance is uncreatable and indestructible (and, hence, indivisible), for it is eternal; there is no potentiality in it which is not actual too, or any possibility in it must be actual too; there is no contingency and no external regulative aim or model toward which it has to come closer; it is not subject to fate (1p33s2), and, finally, anything taking place in it is necessarily under absolute necessity and reason. Another, different Substance or a second Substance, is merely unthinkable. We cannot think of God as the best of all possible worlds, for there are not possible worlds, as there is only one and the same possible world, which must be actual as well. It is possible for Substance to be only what it actually is. Given all this, if the differentiation of Substance is necessary (as implied from 1p33 & d, and 1p16), and if each one of its manifestations-expressions is necessary, then if one of them had not existed, an impossible situation would have arisen, that is, Substance as a whole would have been different, and the unity of all its manifestations-­ expressions would have been different. The alternative is even worse: there would have been things existing outside Substance which, in turn, would have been rendered to be finite and not total, and such “substance” should not be considered Substance at all. Thus, Substance must depend somewhat on its particulars-­ differentiations, but this dependence is perfectly compatible with the assumption that Substance is causa sui and a free cause as well, insofar as “[t]hat thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone” (1def7). Given that Substance is somewhat dependent on each of its modes, it is not conditioned by another substance whatsoever, but only by its own modes, that is, by itself alone. Notwithstanding, Substance is prior to any other conditioning, and the conditioning of any modes by Substance is prior to any conditioning of Substance by any of its modes. Similar are the mutual-conditioning relations existing between any cause and effect: although the cause is the first and antecedent condition of the effect, the cause is somewhat conditioned by its effect: if the cause is a sufficient condition of the effect, the effect is a necessary condition of the cause; and if the cause is the necessary and sufficient condition of the effect, the effect is a necessary and sufficient condition of the cause. Any correlative term must be interdependent, and if there is no effect, no cause can be. Given that Substance (as including all its modes-particulars) is the cause or the sufficient and necessary condition for each of its particulars-modes, each one of them is also a sufficient condition for Substance. Yet, this relationship is not symmetrical, for (1) the infinite power of Substance is greater than the finite power of any of its modes, and, thus, Substance (as an Attribute) must have such a causal power which no

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modes can have, and for (2) Substance conditioning each of its modes must precede its being conditioned by each of its modes and must make it possible at all. Thus the conditioning under discussion is subject to an order of priority, and yet Substance as a whole is dependent on each of its particulars-modes, owing to the fact that if any of them were different or had not existed at all, Substance as a whole would have been changed. This must be absurd according to Spinoza’s metaphysics, for Substance is the cause of each of its modes, and no other particular can take the place of any mode, which is a sufficient and necessary condition for Substance as a whole. Although Substance is somewhat dependent on each of its modes, still none of its modes can be considered as a cause of Substance. Thus, the conditioning of Substance by its modes does not undermine the precedence of Substance conditioning its modes, and the demand that “Substance is prior in nature to its affections” (1p1), which is the first proposition in the Ethics as a whole, is well fulfilled. This demand rests on the definition of Substance and that of the mode. (I understand “the concept of another thing” in the definition of Substance, 1def4, to relate to the possibility, as it were, of another substance, not to the interconditioning of natura naturans and natura naturata). Moreover, it is clear that modes must be included in Substance (as an Attribute), must exist in it, and be conceived through it. Thus, 1a4 reads: “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause”. Yet, in a secondary and derivative sense, a cause must depend on its effect, insofar as an effect as a mode must be in its cause. All this does not undermine the causal order as it really is, as long as only Substance (considered as an Attribute) has the absolutely infinite, unlimited causal power, and as long as Substance’s conditioning its modes precedes the conditioning of Substance by its modes and makes it possible. This mutual conditioning indicates that the metaphysical system under discussion is a unique network and not a deductive system. This network system has some a priori principles, which precede its details and render their rational conception possible. Nevertheless, these principles depend on their details, as well as conditioned and justified by them. I will return to this crucial point in Sects. 5.5 and 6.2 below. Against this background, any individual thing is not annihilated, though it is merely modally differentiated from all other individual things. On the contrary, the more a mode depends on other individual things and on Reality as a whole, the more its reality and necessity4 (or eternity) are revealed. Spinozistic pantheism does not 4  Contrary to Joachim (1964, first appeared in 1901), p. 107, although he changed his mind later (Joachim 1940). Cf. Hallett (1930), p. 93, and Hallett (1962), pp. 111–3. John Caird argues that in Spinoza’s philosophy there exist two opposing sides: the pantheistic unity that is all-swallowing and in which individual things have no place at all, on the one side, and the infinite self-conscious mind in which any finite entity or thought finds its real expression and explanation, on the other side (Caird 1910, pp. 304 ff.). Although, Caird writes, it is impossible to know individual things except by means of their relationship with the Being as a whole (op. cit., pp. 31, 139–42), Spinoza fails in solving the problem of their status (op. cit., pp. 162–75, 180–5, 236, and 294–300). Caird assumes that Spinoza wanted to deduce analytically all the particulars of his philosophy from the concept of Substance, which is its first principle (op. cit., p. 133, cf. p. 152). Curley rightly rejects

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annihilate the existence of individual things, rather the contrary. To the objection made by Van Blyenbergh in Letter 20, according to which “[w]e make ourselves like logs, and all our actions just like the movements of a clock” (G IV: 112, Curley I: 369), Spinoza typically responds that … if you had perceived with a pure intellect what it is to depend on God, you would certainly not think that things, insofar as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal, and imperfect… you would grasp that for that reason, and to that extent, they are perfect. So that we best understand this dependence and necessary operation through God’s decree, when we attend not to logs and plants, but to the most intelligible and perfect created things. (Letter 21, G IV: 131, Curley I: 379–380)

In contrast, if an individual thing were severed from the rest of Nature, it would have been annihilated, for its existence necessarily depends on other things in Nature. As severed, such individual thing could not be intelligible, for intelligibility rests on necessary connections between any individual thing and the entire system of Nature. No isolated thing can have a universal significance, although, in Spinoza’s view, such significance is a necessary condition for intelligibility. An isolated, severed particular is momentary, and as such it must be unreal, for it is impossible to discern and to identify such a particular which has nothing stable in common with other particulars, which share some stable (actually, eternal) common features on the background of which they have particularization and uniqueness. Such a particular cannot be even loosely associated with other particulars, for even the most subjective association requires some stability and some common or universal ground, unless no identification, without which no association is possible at all, can be made. For instance, if Peter has some most intimate associations attached to the smell of roses, from the outset he must recognize roses whenever he perceives them. This perception requires stability and universal or common ground, which is the objective ingredient in any association (“All roses are roses and nothing else”). An experience, which rests on momentary and random encounters with objects or particulars is actually impossible, for it is even impossible to discern and identify such encounters on a stable basis. It must be an unreal experience, so elusive that it has to be considered nonexistent at all. this wrong view (Curley 1969, p. 74). Indeed, such a view is impossible rather on the grounds of Spinoza’s philosophy itself (see Sects. 5.21 and 6.23 below). On the reality of the individual things in Spinoza’s philosophy see Ritchie (1904), James Wilbur, “Is Spinoza’s God Self-Conscious?” in Wilbur (1976), pp. 74 and 82, William J. Edgar, “Continuity and the Individuation of Modes in Spinoza’s Physics,” in op.  cit., pp.  85–106, and J.  C. Goncalves, “Individuality and Society in Spinoza’s Mind,” in Hessing (1977), pp. 174–82, especially 178. Bennett does not deem the individuals in Spinoza’s philosophy very highly, for he mentions universal items except for one particular “thing,” namely, the all-encompassing God or nature (Bennett 1984, p. 302). I disagree with Bennett as well as with Wartofsky over this crucial point. Wartofsky assumes that there is a contradiction or tension between Substance’s infinitude and unity on the one hand and the existence of particulars, which are finite and real, on the other. If Wartofsky had been right over this point, the problem of individuation could not have had any solution in Spinoza’s philosophy. See Wartofsky (1977). Wartofsky does not examine Spinoza’s principle of individuation, and if and how this principle is compatible with the essences of individual things as well as with the system of knowledge and intelligibility. This issue will be discussed in Sect. 2.2 below.

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Indeed, the dependence of any individual thing on the infinite Attribute of God or on God’s infinite modes, does not undermine the existence of any individual thing, rather the contrary: “The aim … is to have clear and distinct ideas, i.e., such as have been made from the pure mind, and not from fortuitous motions of the body … so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts” (TdIE 91, Curley I: 38). In Letter 32 as well there is an essential contribution to the problem under discussion. Spinoza does not hesitate to consider the particulars of the whole of nature as parts: By coherence of parts, then, I understand nothing but that the laws or the nature of the one part adapts itself to the laws or the nature of the other part so that they are opposed to each other as little as possible. Concerning whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole to the extent that the nature of the one adapts itself to that of the other so that they agree with one another as far as possible. But insofar as they disagree with one another, to that extent each forms in our Mind an idea distinct from the others, and therefore it is considered as a whole and not as a part. (Letter 32, G IV: 170–171, Curley II: 18)

We cannot consider particular as a whole unless in an erroneous way. Nevertheless, any particular is not blurred in the whole to which it belongs, and it is well discernible in this whole, although the particular under discussion cannot exist independently of this whole but only as a part in it. In this light we can understand the status of individual things in the desired system of knowledge, which Spinoza seeks. Moreover, from the above example by Spinoza, the influence of the whole on each of its parts involves the influence of the parts on the whole; it is a mutual influence (Op. cit., G IV: 172).5 Spinoza employs a special magic word—quatenus (as, insofar as)—for mentioning the relationship between the infinite being and the finite ones.6 Thus, he writes 5  In Short Treatise II, Ch. 18, Sec. 8, our entire sacrifice to God is mentioned. Such a sacrifice is considered there as the true worship of God, which is allegedly our true salvation and happiness. The individual is considered there to be like a slave or a vehicle to serve God. This simile is incompatible with Letter 21, as cited above. Such language of the Short Treatise has no parallel in any other of Spinoza’s writings, not even somewhere else in this treatise. On the mature grounds of the Ethics, such a sacrifice must be rejected, since it contradicts virtue, which is simply our desire to preserve our being as reason demands us. See 4p18–25. According to 4p22, no virtue is prior to the desire of self-preservation, and, according to 4p25, “no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.” See also about happiness at 4p21. Against this background, it is very doubtful whether Short Treatise II, Ch. 18 reflects Spinoza’s genuine view, or at least his mature one. 6  Various interpreters, even most of them, have misunderstood Spinoza’s philosophy. A noticeable example, to begin with, is the famous mockery of Bayle that if the modes are in God, and if a mode is God quatenus finitus est, Spinoza’s philosophy is inescapably doomed to contradictions (Bayle 1965, p. 312). For instance, when war exists, in which one party kills the warriors of the other party, God as one of the parties kills God as pertaining to another party, which is absurd. Curley 2019 has recently raised this point to substantiate his interpretation of 1969 against the inherence of the finite modes in God. Nevertheless, God “quatenus finitus est” is simply a finite mode, modification, or variation of God and, thus, there is no incoherence in claiming that in the same systematic, unified whole, which is God-Nature-Substance, there are conflicts between finite modes as imaginatio considers them. In contrast, scientia intuitiva conceives the opposition and differences of finite modes as free from contradictions, like the coherence of the different particles-parts of the

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blood according to Letter 32, answering the question of “how each part of Nature agrees with the whole and how it coheres with the others” (Curley II: 18). Hence, there is no real problem in stating that the finite modes are inherent in God and that Bayle based his wrong interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics on a misunderstanding. Nevertheless, according to Curley, Spinoza is not a pantheist following the wrong assumption that God comprises all that exists, and thus the modes are not inherent in God (however, if Spinoza is not a pantheist, what about an alternative view, called panentheism, according to which natura naturans is only a part, the causal one, of the whole, and natura naturata, to which the effects belong, is the other part, but the complete unified whole is God simpliciter? Curley ascribes such a view to Melamed and others [op. cit., p.  30], without mentioning the term “panentheism”). The problem with Curley’s wrong interpretation is that it is incompatible with Spinoza’s text as I analyze it in great detail in this book. Curley has not understood the significance of the distinction between the immanent and the transient causal chains and has completely misunderstood the major distinctions concerning nature from the viewpoints of the different grades of knowledge. Only imaginatio raises such absurd consequences, as Bayle ascribes to the Ethics, for from imaginatio’s viewpoint, conflicts, instability, and contradictions characterize nature. Curley has completely ignored the significance of the emendation of 4a1 (which is a foundation for imaginatio’s worldview) by 5p37s, referring to the intellectual love of God, the emotive property of scientia intuitiva. In the supreme grade of knowledge, such conflicts simply disappear, for each mode is compatible with the others and the supreme emotional state that guides human beings is the intellectual love of God, which overcomes all the passions and all the conflicts that they cause. Furthermore, the inherence of the modes in God does not entail a predication of God and the predicates of individual things, as they are perceived in the first grade of knowledge, are not God’s predicates. Hence, Bayle simply misinterpreted Spinoza at this point, too. At this point, Curley is right in concluding: “the relation between modes and substance was causal rather than predicative” (op. cit., p. 28). Curley’s understanding of natura naturans as the active part of Nature, and hence that God does not comprise all there is, i.e., all the finite modes, is simply wrong (otherwise, explicit propositions, such as 1p15, would have lost their meaning). In fact, in Spinoza’s mature philosophy, any existence involves activity, and the distinction between passivity and activity is only in degree. Hence, natura naturata is passive only to some extent and not entirely, namely, it is less active than the realm of causes, natura naturans, but still it, as being involved with existence, is active to some extent. Furthermore, the inherence of the modes in the immanent chain is quite different from that in the transient one, which is discrete and fragmented and does not construct a coherent system. Moreover, activity and passivity in Spinoza’s metaphysics are relative, for there is no absolute passivity in Nature, as to be, to exist, means to act (following 1p11s). Any existence according to Spinoza is a sort of action. To be an effect is also an action. Thus, the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata is certainly unlike what Curley has in mind. My criticism of Curley does not mean that I accept Melamed’s interpretation of Spinoza. I analyze the text quite differently from both of them. Charity or not, the first obligation of any interpreter or commentator is to ask himself or herself whether he or she has made the best effort to understand a complicated and most profound text such as the Ethics. Spinoza does not need the charity of any of his interpreters, most of whom have misunderstood his philosophy. Curley blames Melamed and others, following him, for misunderstanding Curley’s interpretation which, as I see it, is not the real problem that should bother us at all; the real problem is to understand Spinoza’s philosophy correctly and deeply enough instead of misunderstanding it. Finally, Curley completely misunderstands Spinoza’s actualism (or what he calls “necessitrianism”), while claiming that “there are possible worlds which aren’t actual” (op. cit., p. 22), which is compatible with Leibniz’s necessitirianism, but not with Spinoza’s actualism. Actualists, such as Spinoza, do not acknowledge the existence of pure (non-actual) possibilities (unless as ideas that exist only in the mind or in God’s intellect but have not any ideatum, i.e., referent, without it), yet present actualists, unlike Spinoza, acknowledge the existence of possible worlds. Such is not

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that “the human mind is that same power, not insofar as [quatenus] it is infinite, contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, and whose thoughts proceed in the same way as Nature, its object, does. Next, I maintain that the human Mind is this same power, not insofar as it is infinite and perceives the whole of Nature, but insofar as it is finite and perceives only the human body. For this reason I maintain that the human Mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect” (Letter 32, G IV: 173–174, Curley II: 20).7 Besides quatenus, Spinoza employs verbs such as exprimere (to express) and explicare (to explicate), both of which express the relationship between Substance and its differentiations. God’s eternal and infinite essence is involved in the individual things, which are inconceivable and nonexistent without it, as God is their cause, namely, God insofar as it is considered under an Attribute, whose modes are these particulars themselves (according to 2p45 and its demonstration). Thus, “we ought to seek knowledge of particulars as much as possible” (TdIE 98, Curley I: 41), for the “more we understand singular things, the more we understand God” (5p24). The adequate conception of Reality which is infinitely abundant with particulars is entirely impossible unless the real status of individual things has been a priori guaranteed. On the background of all this, we should ask now: Why does Spinoza state then that all particular (or singular) things are contingent and destructible (2p31c) and that the existence of a particular man is not necessary (2ax and 2p10d)? In fact, individual things are considered contingent and destructible, on the one hand, and, on the other, they are considered necessary, real, and eternal (to be discussed in Sect. 2.3 below). But first of all we must see what is the essence of the individual thing and what is the principle of individuation in general and that of personal identity in particular according to Spinoza’s philosophy.

2.3  The Essence of the Individual thing To put it in a nutshell, in Spinoza’s philosophy the essence of the individual thing does not have the meaning of the Aristotelian to ti ēn einai: in Spinoza’s philosophy the essence is not shared by many or various particulars, but each individual thing has its own unique, singular essence. Equally, each individual thing, as a singular Spinoza’s actualism, and because the world (i.e., Nature) and God are identical, there is no possibility that God could be otherwise. Curley, wrongly, does not identify the world with God, and hence he has allowed himself to ascribe Spinoza’s metaphysics an alien notion of possible worlds. Unlike Curley, Don Garrett understands correctly that, according to Spinoza’s necessitarianism, “whatever is possible is actual, and whatever is actual is necessary (see 1p16, 1p29, 1p33, 1p33s1, and 1p35d)” (Garrett 2018, p. 246). 7  For more of Spinoza’s use of quatenus consult: TPT, G III: 169; 2p11c; 2p9; 2p40d; 2p43d; 4p4d; and 5p36, the demonstration of which refers to 1p25c, which in turn is essential to the understanding of the status of individual things as God’s modes in Spinoza’s philosophy. Quatenus refer to any differentiation, finite and infinite alike, of Substance-God. Hallett considers the expression Deus quatenus finitus est (Hallett 1962, p. 104), note 1.

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mode of Substance, has a unique definition of its own, and any adequate definition necessarily expresses or describes the essence of that individual thing. Spinoza defines essence thus: “I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing” (2def2). Thus, the essence under discussion is inseparable from an individual thing, and the former cannot exist or be conceived unless the latter is given. Such a conception of essence must be incompatible with those of both Plato and Aristotle, especially as far as the problem of universalia is involved (cf. Short Treatise, Part II, Preface, Sec. 5; Part I, Ch. 6, Sec. 7; Letter 19, G IV: 89). Although Aristotle does not separate essence or form from matter (except in the case of the unmoved mover), he would not agree with Spinoza that form or essence is inconceivable without matter or individual things. It is the universality of Aristotelian essence that makes it conceivable, for in thought essence is distinguished from its concrete embodiment or depiction in matter. Such distinction or separation “merely in thought” is what that abstraction is all about. And at this point, Aristotle, quite unwillingly, is a dualist: what is separable in thinking is not separable in material reality. Not so Spinoza: he is obviously not a dualist, especially when the subject under discussion is concerned. Spinoza further explicates his definition of essence. At 2p10c,s he explains why the end of the definition of essence, i.e., 2def2, is indispensable: without God, individual things do not exist and are inconceivable, though God is not their essence. From this we should learn that the essence of an individual thing cannot be common to several things, whereas God is “common” to all things, for it is the cause of all things, the cause in which they exist and through which they can be conceived. Moreover, from the correlate we also learn that the essence of man is simply “an affection, i.e., mode, which expresses God’s nature in a certain and determinate way” (2p10c). “In a certain and determinate way” entails that the essence of an individual thing is simply a mode by which the whole system of reality is manifested or revealed in a singular, unique, and indispensable way (or, in other words, that the essence of each individual thing is a “variation” of Nature-God-Substance as a systematic whole). Hence, there cannot be two identical essences or modes in the whole system of reality, in Substance as a whole. Indeed, discussing the concept of essence, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect mentions “a particular affirmative essence,” the particularity and distinctness of an idea, “the knowledge of particulars” (Sec. 98), and the intima essentia of a thing (Sec. 95). The particular affirmative essence relates to the individual thing and to determining the intellect “to the contemplation of one singular thing rather than another” (Sec. 93). The context of these sections calls the attention of the reader to the danger and threat of universalia and abstractions. Furthermore, 2p37 reads: “What is common to all things … and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.” The demonstration explicitly refers to the above definition of essence: even if the essence were common to many things, then (according to 2def2) it still would not have been

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conceived without an individual thing, but this contradicts the hypothesis, for an essence which is common to many things cannot be conditioned by any of them. Thus, the essence of A does not constitute the essence of B or of any other thing whatsoever. Since there are different sorts of being common, and being so is a necessary condition for adequacy, though essence is not common to many things yet it is adequately conceivable (2p40s2). The third, supreme, grade of knowledge deals with the essences of individual things, not with common properties of things.8 In contrast, what is common according to 2p37 is the subject of reason (ratio), the second grade of knowledge, the general knowledge (5p36c,s), which deals only with the properties of things and not with their essences. In the light of these observations, it is well understood why Spinoza states that the mind is an idea of a particular actual thing (2p11). This idea is the essence of a man (2p11d & c) under the Attribute of Thought. And this essence is well maintained as real and eternal in its ultimate cause, i.e., God: under the supreme grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva—it becomes quite obvious that “in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human Body, under a [the] species of eternity” (5p22, whose demonstration refers to 1p16 and 25, which shows us what is the status of individual things). The actual essence (the given essence which is not merely a possibility) of an individual thing is simply its conatus— endeavor or striving—or its power and capability to exist as a particular or singular manifestation and expression—a mode—of the infinite power of God and “to persevere in its being” (3p6d and 7). 3p7d refers to 1p29, which in turn deals with the necessity in which all things are determined by the divine nature of God to exist and to act in a particular way (and 1p29d refers in turn to p16 and emphasizes that “the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily and not contingently”). The subject under discussion is the essence of an individual thing, an essence which is a singular or unique expression and manifestation of the infinite power and capability of God. This manifestation is necessarily both exclusive and indispensable, for nothing in Substance, in the system of reality as a whole, can be contingent or redundant, and nothing is not under the ultimate divine intelligibility. In other words, everything in Substance must have a singular, necessary and sufficient, reason. Any of God’s manifestations or expressions must exist, strives to exist, and resists any power which can annihilate it.9 Yet, Spinoza’s text in general deals with two sorts of essence and corresponding definition. On the one hand, essence is relevant to individual things only. Thus, Spinoza states in so many words that “the best conclusion will have to be drawn from some particular affirmative essence, i.e., from a true and legitimate definition. For from universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation of

 Recently Karolina Hübner considered this distinction. See Hübner 2015.  Della Rocca 2008, as a whole, relies heavily on explicating the importance of the principle of sufficient reason in Spinoza’s philosophy. 8 9

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one singular thing rather than another” (TdIE 93, Curley I: 39).10 Equally, essence must be a real individuum, and the function of a true definition is to explicate that singular essence, which is the content of the complete definition of an individual thing, and the singular content of its adequate, clear and distinct, conception. Nevertheless, on the other hand, Spinoza states rather that “no definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined” (1p8s2). Thus, the general definition of man does not involve any number of existing human beings, each of which must have a cause of her or his own. Man’s definition under question must be general and abstract for Spinoza writes that “we express all the singular things of a kind … by one and the same definition” (Letter 19, G IV: 91, Curley I: 359). In other words, any general and abstract definition is just an entia rationis, which has no valid status in reality and which is merely an error from the viewpoint of God’s Infinite Intellect. In sum, we are caught in a dilemma: on the one hand, essence is a singular individuum and no general definition can be legitimate, whereas, on the other, there are general essences and legitimate general definitions concerning them. 1p8s2 relates to the definition of Substance. The term “nature,” mentioned several time in this scholium (“the nature of the thing defined,” “the cause of human nature in general,” and “one of the same nature”), does not refer to the essence of an individual thing, but to its properties, which are common to it and to all the other things of the “same nature” (in the spirit of 4app9: “Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species”). Such a definition is not a particular description of an individual thing but merely a general knowledge about it and other particulars of the same kind, sharing the same nature. And if this sort of definition is not abstract and illegitimate, it is true and valid in reality ut in se est. Such definition is, then, an adequate knowledge, which is “equally common to the part and the whole.” Nevertheless, it is simply impossible to “descend” from such a general knowledge to the essence of any individual thing. This is the limitation of an adequate knowledge of this sort. Even God’s definition (and the same holds for the definitions of Substance and Attribute) does not reflect God’s concrete essence (that is, the knowledge of God as a totally comprehensive individuum, all of whose modes are comprehended clearly and distinctly under their systematic unity in it). Yet this general definition of God can teach us about God’s common properties. From this general definition, although it is legitimate, true, and adequate, it is impossible to descend to the singular things themselves and to the distinctive nature of each one of them. In other words, their essences, or the modes which express God’s nature in determinate and certain ways, are by no means deducible from this general definition, even though their common properties are  Joachim argues that essence is not infima species—a specific form which is logically an “individual” or “indivisible particle” which, in turn, is exemplified in many individual things as a common predicate or universal (Joachim 1940, p.  209). In Spinoza’s philosophy, essence is a real individual, and the function of the real definition is to explain and analyze the essence, which is the content of the perfect definition of the individual thing as well as the content of its adequate grasp (its clear and distinct idea). Such a definition is not an abstract universal.

10

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deducible in this manner. Indeed, all the modes of some God’s Attributes share some common properties. No wonder, then, that Spinoza denies any general idea, and any general definition, concerning God’s essence (Letter 50, G IV: 240), but he does not deny God a general definition, from which God’s many properties are deducible (Letter 83, G IV: 335). So we have two kinds of legitimate definitions and one kind of illegitimate definitions. The two kinds of legitimate definitions are: (1) definitions concerning the essences of singular things only, each one of them has its own, unique definition (such are the legitimate definitions according to The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect); (2) definitions concerning common properties of individual things, which share common matters, except for their essences. As for illegitimate definitions, they deal with abstractions from individual things and they relate to abstract universals. Such definitions do not adequately reflect the common properties of individual things nor, obviously, their essences. The essence of an individual thing is its individuating factor, the factor of its identity and uniqueness. This essence is inseparable from the individual thing itself (according to 2def2), insofar as this thing is considered as a finite mode of God’s Attribute, which is expressed or manifested in a determinate and certain way, which necessarily is singular and unique. There are no two identical modes in the entire system of reality, as there are no two identical essences (which are merely one and the same essence) of two things.11 To comprehend the essence of an individual thing means to conceive it as a real thing, in contrast to a universal and abstract entity, which is simply an ens rationis (2p49s), or “a metaphysical being,” which is formed out of particular or singular things (2p48s, in which no distinction is made between particularibus and singularibus). In Section 55 of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza attaches the essence of an individual thing to the reality as it is in itself (the real order of nature), to individuation and particularization, and, finally, to the clear comprehension of the intellect. Hence, following Section 98, the comprehension of the essence of an individual thing is simply the intellectual comprehension, which obviously is clear and distinct, of the individual thing maintaining its identity, singularity, and uniqueness and, as we shall realize, its eternity, too.

 Garrett thus seems to be wrong on this point (yet his interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a whole is brilliant, original, and interesting) in asserting that Spinoza “holds that a mode of extension is identical with the mode of thought that has it as its object (scholium to Proposition 7 of Part 2)” (Garrett 2018, p. 20). Mind-body unity, to which, in fact, Spinoza endorsed, is not mind-body identity. My mind and my body are two distinct, irreducible modes, and yet I am one and the same being, for my mind and my body are united. See my detailed discussion of 2p7 and scholium below.

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2.4  The Principium Individuationis and Personal Identity What is the principle of individuation (principium individuationis) and personal identity which the construction of the coherent system comprising all individual things requires? By individuation I mean also particularization and singularization, though Spinoza himself does not appear to make any difference between them. Time and space serve many philosophers to indicate the difference between things, for two different bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. But this condition is not sufficient, for time and place are quite indifferent to the particulars themselves which occupy them. Time and place are at most external to these things and do not follow from their essences. Spinoza has good reason to consider time and place simply as entia imaginationis,12 and according to Letter 12, time is simply one of the “aids to the Imagination” (G IV: 57, Curley I: 203). Generally speaking, time and place by no means tell us about the real properties of individual things, nor do they reveal to us what are the real relations between these things (TdIE 87 and 5p29s). At the end of 4pre Spinoza identifies the perfection of a thing with its reality, that is, the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect, having no regard to its duration. For no singular thing can be called more perfect for having persevered in existing for a longer time. Indeed, the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing. But any thing whatsoever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist; so they are all equal in this regard. (Curley I: 546, G II: 209)

Time has nothing in common with the essence of an individual thing, neither with its existence, nor with its activity. The differences between individual things rest, on the final account, on their different essences, even if the duration of their existence, as well as its time (i.e., its determinate and measured duration), may be rather equal. Time cannot tell, then, the real differences distinguishing one thing from another. Still, that interpretation of mine has to challenge 2p44c2d, which reads: “the foundations of Reason are notions … which explain those things which are common to all, and which … do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity.” Does it mean that the essence, the individuating factor, of a singular thing has to do with time after all? By no means. First, the end of 4pre excludes such an interpretation. Secondly, 2p44c2d can be interpreted quite differently: the essence of individual thing is mentioned here only because the demonstration relies on 2p37, which in turn mentions what is common to all things and which does not constitute any essence of an individual thing; but the divergence in this demonstration is between this common factor and time (for the imaginary and fictitious commonness by time is incompatible with the real, true commonness by Reason). In any event, the essence of an individual thing is irrelevant to the 12

 Cf. Arne Naess 1973, p. 6: time is ens imaginationis.

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conclusion of this demonstration. The foundations of Reason relate to real and adequate commonness shared by all things, and which, although cannot constitute the singularity or uniqueness of anything, is not compatible with temporal conception, which belongs to imagination and which cannot serve as an adequate principium individuationis. Hence, such a commonness is just false, contingent, random, unstable or unestablished (vaga!), and fictitious (about that see 2p44c1s). Indeed, time, like any other modes of imagination, consists of illegitimate generalization and abstraction (as implied by, e.g., Letter 12), which cannot constitute the essence of any individual thing. The adequate comprehension of essences belongs exclusively to the third, supreme grade of knowledge, which conceives all things under unqualified species or aspect of eternity; whereas Reason, the second grade of knowledge, conceives things under some species or aspect of eternity (see 2p44c1d). In other words, the completely adequate conception of Spinoza’s principium individuationis belongs to scientia intuitiva only (cf. Brandom 1976, p. 153). Furthermore, an alternative interpretation is that since Reason has no knowledge concerning the essences of individual things, it cannot entirely amend the false and inadequate conception of the imagination, which is conditioned by spatiotemporal terms of individuation. From the viewpoint of Reason, spatiotemporal conditions cannot serve as an adequate principle of individuation, but, alas, Reason lacks any alternative, adequate factors of individuation. In any case, we should interpret 2p44c2d so that time and the essence of any individual thing do not share anything in common. Another way to reach this conclusion is the following: at the end of 4pre it is said that the essence of an individual thing is its perfection or reality; 1p10s puts together reality, necessity, and eternity, and so is 1p8ex, attaching the essence of a thing and eternal truth, as no essence can “be explained by duration or time.”13 As was said above, individual things are modally, but not really (namely, not substantially), differentiated for they are not separate, independent beings. Thus, all

 Contrary to Ruth L. Saw (1969 and 1972, Ch. 8). Saw attempts to meet the problem of personal identity as comprising the time or duration of a person’s life, whereas Spinoza does not consider personal identity as comprising time but as related to the essence of the person in question. Such essence is eternal and, hence, it has nothing to do with time or duration. For instance, the example of the Spanish poet in 4p39s refers to a critical change of character that though it belongs to a temporal succession, is no longer the same character, and thus the Spanish poet before the onset of his illness was quite a different person. Saw is entirely wrong, when she writes that Spinoza takes upon himself to deduce the personal identity of any person from the principle of the supreme grade of knowledge, as if Spinoza endorsed a deductive system (Saw 1972, p. 94), which is not the case at all. Another answer to the problem of individuation in Spinoza’s philosophy is that of Rise (1971), which does not explicate the entire connection between causality and individuation or personal identity. I accept Rice’s criticism of Saw. Also I accept his view, contrary to Joachim, that individual things as integrated within the whole of reality do not lose anything of their ontic status and, thus, are real. Rice utilizes Peter Strawson’s individuation theory to show that the criterion of identification and re-identification in Spinoza’s philosophy is valid to bodies in space or to extended things and that, hence, mental identity depends on physical identity and is inferred from it (op. cit., p. 657). Such a conclusion is not compatible with the unity of Attributes and their independence; moreover, it is not sufficient to explain adequately the individuation in the Attribute of Thought. In sum, Rice, too, does not provide us with an adequate solution to the problem in discussion.

13

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bodies are extended and the difference between them is simply the ratio between their movement and rest. This is the distinguishing, differentiating and individuating mark of all bodies, all extended things (see the axioms, lemmas, and postulates between 2p13 and 2p14). This distinguishing mark serves also to indicate identity: even if all the parts of a body change, as long as the ratio between its rest and movement maintains, this thing keeps its identity (2lemma 4 and 5). Given that this is sufficient to differentiate between bodies, and that they are distinguished by means of their activity and passivity, still how can we distinguish between different minds? What is the principle of individuation under the Attribute of Thought? To begin with, the principle of individuation and personal identity in Spinoza’s philosophy consists of the necessary connection between adequate cause and its effect. In the Attribute of Thought, it is the intellectual connection between the premise and the conclusion, between the condition and the conditioned, the reason and the reasoned, the justifying and the justified, a connection which is the adequate relationship between clear and distinct ideas. In Extension, the individuation is the ratio of movement and rest,14 that is, the ratio between the activity (causation) and passivity (effectiveness) of the extended reality. Thus, Spinoza writes that “matter is everywhere the same, and … parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceived matter to be affected in different ways” (1p15s, Curley I: 424, G II: 59). Spinoza’s principle of individuation and of personal identity as well rests on the assumption that [b]y singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing. (2def7)

This definition clearly shows us what Spinoza actually believes to serve as the principle of individuation or personal identity that facilitates the constructing of the coherent, total system in which all individual things participate and in which their indispensable identity is not blurred but appears distinctly. Moreover, it is also the principle of identification and unity of natura naturans, i.e., of God-Nature-­ Substance, insofar as it is the systematic unity of all infinite Attributes, and insofar as it is the free causa sui of everything. In other words, Substance has unity and identity because it is the one, adequate, and complete cause of all existing things, all of which exist in it and are conceived through it. As much as we are entitled to say that “God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself15 [causa sui]” (1p25s), we are also entitled to say that because God is the cause of all individual things and because all of them are included in Him, He is causa sui. Spinoza assumes that the “knowledge of an effect depends

 Garrett (2018, pp. 395–317) considers this ratio as Spinoza’s principle of the metaphysical individuation, whereas I consider adequate causality as fulfilling this function. The ratio of movement and rest expresses only a modification of this principle in the Attribute of Extension but not in that of Thought. 15  Contrary to Curley, I would translate “itself” instead of “himself,” as Spinoza’s God is not a person at all. 14

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on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause” (1a4), and he states that “we cannot understand anything of Nature without at the same time rendering our knowledge of the cause, i.e., God, more ample” (TdIE 92, note, Curley I: 39). Thus, the identity of the system of reality and its unity are the object of a knowledge, apprehending that all existing things have one cause, and that the ultimate cause of any individual thing is Substance under this or that Attribute. Again, we cannot deduce the particularity or singularity of individual things from Substance. On the contrary: we should reveal Substance in the systematic joining together or association of all real finite things. We cannot conceive the identity, singularity, particularity, or uniqueness of any individual thing, unless under its association with the coherent whole comprising all individual things. The unique or singular identity of each one of them is guaranteed only by means of the causal connections, which are necessary and adequate, between each one of them and other individual things as well as the systematic whole. In other words, the same necessary connections that facilitate the coherence of the complete system of reality as a whole (which is conceived as the desired system of knowledge), the same connections facilitate our acquaintance with the singular identity of any individual thing, while adequate causality serves as the principle of individuation or personal knowledge for it. Such is the case because there is no other individual thing that can take its place as a cause and effect in the total adequately causal chain as a whole, namely, in the entire system of reality, which is Nature-Substance-God. Equally, such is the case because there is no other clear and distinct idea, which is the mode in which this thing adequately conceived by the Infinite Intellect (that is, conceived in the complete and adequate system of knowledge, which adequately reflects reality as a whole, conceiving all its distinctions under all Attributes). In this case, the singularity or uniqueness of this individual thing cannot be questionable. Otherwise, this individual thing would not have been an indispensable, necessary, and unique link (which is a finite mode or the essence of an individual thing) in the total causal chain (in that or this Attribute). Without this link, the whole causal chain would be found broken and lacking. The necessity of every individual thing rests on the rule that in “nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (1p29, whose demonstration clarifies that this rule holds for modes, the cause of which is God). In other words, there is neither cause nor reason to the identity and singularity of an individual thing, unless it is conceived as a necessary link in a system, whose all particulars are simply modes of the coherent total system of reality, all of whose particulars are combined by means of necessary causal connections. A thing which cannot be considered as such a link, as such an adequate (necessary and exclusive) cause of an effect, or which cannot be conceived as clear and distinct idea (i.e., intelligible, adequate idea), is not an individual thing which has a unique identity and singularity but, at most, a part of such a thing. We do not become acquainted with our personal identity immediately. Thus Spinoza explicitly states that the “Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the Body” (2p23); that the “human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through

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ideas of affections by which the Body is affected” (2p19); and that “man (by 2p19 and p23) is conscious of himself through the affections by which he is determined to act” (3p3d).16 In this, Spinoza obviously challenges Descartes:17: Spinoza does not separate the mind from the body, and, according to him and contrary to Descartes, it is not easier to know the mind rather than the body and, moreover, the mind does not rather know itself immediately as our self-knowledge is neither self-evident nor discrete. Our mind knows itself insofar as it is knowledge of a body, which is both active and passive. Our mind realizes its identity and unity from learning adequately what is its place in the entire system of causes and effects, as this mind is considered as knowledge of a body under the Attribute of Thought, or as it is considered as a body consisting of a certain ratio of movement and rest under the Attribute of Extension. An active body, which is stronger than another body, would determine the latter and cause it to act. Yet the former body in turn would be determined and caused to act by another body stronger and more active than it. When I identify myself as a cause to some effects, which would not have existed or would have existed differently had I not been their cause (which is simply impossible according to Spinoza’s actualism), I know myself truly and adequately. In contrast, when I am aware of my essence and existence as an effect of another cause which is not me, my self-knowledge is not adequate, and I know myself only partly, that is, only as capable to be acted as a particular effect of some cause. We should remember that in Nature there is nothing which is free from causal connections with the rest of Nature, for “nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (1p36). 1p36d, in turn, refers to the particularization or differentiation in Substance, whose infinite capability reveals itself fully in all of its particulars-modes together. There are neither breaks nor dissociations in the causal chain, and each thing has its own particular place in it. Even as a partial, incomplete manifestation of that infinite capability of Nature, which is beyond any finite exhaustibility, I serve as a cause to some effects. As any particularization or differentiation of Substance is necessary and indispensable, there are effects in the world which would have not existed, unless I am their adequate, i.e., necessary and only, cause. By means of their mediation I know myself and my identity as completely as possible, and by this way only, not immediately by means of immediate and “evident” intuition as it were. Spinoza, therefore, must reject the idea of Cartesian evidence or intuition as well as any immediate and discrete intuition (whether rationalist-Cartesian or empiricist-­ Humean), otherwise his attempt to construct a metaphysical system would have doomed to failure from the very beginning. The issue of the simplest bodies shed a further light on this matter. Strictly speaking, there is no place for the simplest bodies in Spinoza’s philosophy, even though he himself mentions “simplest bodies” several times in the Ethics. For every body is compound and, relative to other body,

 Cf. Mason 1997, pp. 240–242, concerning the relationship between the body and personal identity in Spinoza’s philosophy. 17  Contrary to Mark (1972), p. 67, and Parkinson (1954), pp. 133–4. And see Sect. 3.12 below. 16

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it can be considered “simple”: complexity and simplicity are merely relative terms.18 Each mode takes part in the infinitude of Substance, and the absolute indivisibility of Substance is manifested in the infinite “divisibility” of any mode, of any individual thing.19 The identity of any individual thing rests on its causes and effects, and it is never a simple identity, “atomic,” discrete, or immediate. Not analysis, but synthesis, discovers personal identity. Already in 1p16 and its corollaries we learn about the relationship between causality and the intellect, between Substance’s particularization-differentiation, insofar as it is intelligible, and the being of Substance as the cause of all things. About this relationship we can learn also from the link between 1a5 (“Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another”) and 1p3 (“If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other”), whose demonstration refers to 1a5, as the commonness under discussion is a necessary condition for adequacy. 1p18d reads “Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God …, and so … God is the cause of [all] things.”20 Indeed, the intellectual activity is clear and distinct (that is, adequate, following 2p36), but clarity does not consist of an analysis of simple and discrete elements, but on synthesis and necessary conditioning. Thus, clarity rather consists of associating and not of isolating and dissecting. We understand something whenever we incorporate its idea into a comprehensive system of conditions and conditioned things, a system reflecting the entire chain of causes and effects. The strong affinity between an intellect and causality becomes obvious when the question of individuation and personal identity is under discussion: I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it alone. (3def1)

Furthermore, I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e., (by def1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause. (3def2)

At this point Spinoza mentions causal concatenation and intellectual entailment interchangeably, for the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Adequacy, clarity, and distinctness are relevant to ideas, the necessary connection between which is that of inference or entailment whereas between cause and effect there is the connection of causation or concatenation. But  Cf. Rise (1971). On the simplest bodies see David R. Lachterman, “The Physics of Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Shahan and Biro (1978), pp. 84–7. 19  See M.  Geuroult, “Spinoza’s Letter on the Infinite (Letter 12 to Louis Meyer),” trans. K. McLaughlin, in Grene (1973), p. 195. 20  Note that the association between causality and an intellect is also stated in TdIE 92, and Short Treatise, Part II, Ch. 5, Sec. 11. 18

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indeed this is one and the same connection which is considered or reveals in different ways or as different modes: either “formally” or “objectively” (to use the Scholastic-Cartesian terms). For this reason, Spinoza can speak of an adequate cause, insofar as such a cause, as a clear and distinct idea, is conceived under the Attribute of Thought. And for the same reason Spinoza is entitled to consider a causation between ideas (e.g., at 2p7d), which is the causal connection as it is considered under the Attribute of Thought. 3def2 reiterates the word “alone” (solum): we are active when we cause an effect that can be caused by us alone, or whose concept can be conceived through the concept of us alone. This is the only way to get acquainted with ourselves, a way which requires relatedness to the whole, otherwise how can we know that we are the only cause to a certain action? Many of the conclusions of Ethics and 4 rest on the aforementioned definitions in Ethics 3. 3p3s is particularly illuminating: … the passions are not related to the mind except insofar as it has something which involves a negation, i.e., insofar as it is considered as a part of nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself, without the others. (cf. 4p2 & d, and 4app1)

In a positive language, active emotions, which are properties of our adequate knowledge (to be discussed later), exist in the mind insofar as it includes some affirmation in it, or insofar as it is considered and perceived as a part of Nature that is distinguished from all other parts of Nature (see Letter 32 for the example of the blood and its parts). Such a part of Nature is perceived distinctly and in itself, not as independent and separated as it were, but as a finite part, a link, in the total causal chain, in the whole system of Nature. And since not all things stem from us, and there are many facts owing to which we are considered passive, our place in the causal chain requires after all relationality to the whole of it. We depend on Nature, and cannot set ourselves independent of it. In any event, “in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly” (2p13s). The wise person knows herself, the things, and God, and her being consists of acting, whereas the ignorant one lives as if without any self-knowledge and without knowing things and God as well, “and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be” (5p42s). The self-­ knowledge of the wise consists of her knowing herself as an indispensable link in the total causal chain, which makes reality a coherent system. Some interpreters believe the ratio of movement and rest to serve as the principle of individuation in Spinoza’s philosophy. Yet 2p37 states that what is common to all things does not constitute the essence of an individual thing. The corollary refers to lemma 2, according to which all bodies agree in certain things, that is, they are common owing to a common Attribute and to movement and rest. Hence, from movement and rest alone it is impossible to deduce the essences of individual things, neither to know what ultimately distinguishes one from the other. Yet, movement and rest, as a property, may reflect the difference between bodies, although this quality cannot serve as a principle of individuation; neither can it guarantee that there are no two bodies that have the same ratio of movement and rest. Indeed,

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discussing the properties of things in 2p40s2, Spinoza refers to 2p38, and in turn— to the aforementioned lemma 2. We conclude from this too that movement and rest pertain to the properties of things, not to their essences, not to their factors of individuation and identity. The knowledge of the essences of things is prior to understanding their properties, and the former conditions the latter (TdIE 95). The properties of a thing must be deduced from its definition (TdIE 96II), and its definition refers to its “particular affirmative essence” (TdIE 93). In sum, movement and rest in themselves, as the properties of extended things and not as their essences, are not sufficient to constitute the singularity and identity of individual things, but it may serve only as a characterizing mark for them. Other interpreters believe Spinoza’s conatus (endeavor) to serve as principle of individuation and personal identity. My view, in contrast, is that conatus by itself is not Spinoza’s principle of individuation and personal identity, yet it is a factor of individuation and personal identity, provided that its cognitive-intellectual content is under consideration. Conatus under Attribute of Thought is will (3p9s), and will and intellect, better—a particular willing and a particular clear and distinct idea, are one and the same thing (2p49cd), and, thus, conatus can be considered as a clear and distinct idea, which is simply the essence of an individual thing, as it is truly conceived under the Attribute of Thought. Moreover, the supreme conatus, the greatest striving, of the mind and its greatest virtue is understanding things in the third kind of knowledge (5p25). Indeed, according to Spinoza, the greatest and most powerful capability of human mind is the intellectual one. Spinoza attaches the factor of identification and individuation (i.e., essence) to the principle of individuation and personal identity (i.e., adequate causality) and to the clear and distinct conception (i.e., that of the intellect). He relates a particular affirmative essence to a clear and distinct idea (TdIE 98), to a true and legitimate definition (TdIE 93), and to the proximate cause of a thing (TdIE 96). As we shall realize, the links of the real causal chain are the essences of individual things.21

 In Short Treatise, Part 1, Ch. 5, Sections 1 and 2, the conatus indicates personal identity. See A. Lessing (1975), which argues that the conatus is the principle of individuation and personal identity in Spinoza’s philosophy. Cf. R. Brandom (1976). Truly, Brandom argues that the second grade of knowledge conceives what characterizes the property of individuation, which is common to all things (namely, the ratio of movement and rest), while the third grade conceives each singular essence of anything. He mentions, rightly again, adequate causality, but he does not relate it clearly and explicitly enough to the question of individuation. In my view, the conatus (the essence) is not the principle of individuation, but simply Spinoza’s factor of individuation and personal identity. This too depends upon the cognitive-intellectual content of the conatus which, under the Attribute of Thought, is the will (3p9s), while will and intellect are one and the same thing (2p49c, d). Hence, conatus can be considered as a clear and distinct idea. Such an idea is the essence of individual thing, as it is truly conceived under the Attribute of Thought. The supreme conatus of the mind is to understand all things at the supreme grade of knowledge (5p25). Indeed, according to Spinoza, the typical capability of the human mind is the intellectual one. Lachterman (1978, pp. 82, 90–2, and 101) relates the conatus to the physical individuation in Spinoza’s philosophy. Garrett (2018, pp. 352–380) devotes a whole chapter to the conatus issue. He ascribes to the conatus some teleological properties.

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2.5  Individual Things as Temporal and as Eternal—The Transient and the Immanent…

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Causal concatenation combines all individual things into the absolutely comprehensive system by relating or attaching all effects to their first, ultimate cause, which, in turn, is causa sui. Nevertheless, not every causal chain is appropriate for this purpose. A transient causal chain will not do, for it transfers the function of causality from one link to another, and so ad infinitum. We shall discuss this in the next section.

2.5  I ndividual Things as Temporal and as Eternal—The Transient and the Immanent Causal Chain 1p18 and its demonstration state that God is the immanent cause of all things, the cause which relates them to Substance and to all things which are in it. We should distinguish clearly between the immanent chain of causes and the transient one. Some translators-interpreters, such as Curley and Shirley, prefer to use “transitive” instead of “transient.” Nevertheless I am convinced that they are wrong, for it is the temporal and temporary nature of that kind of causes which is the main point about its nature. The transient causal chain consists of transient, temporary “causes” which simply are individual things, each one of which is an effect of other causes, and none of these causes can terminate the causal chain but transiently referring to another cause and so on to infinity (1p28). Neither any of the links of the transient chain, nor the chain as a whole, can be finally, ultimately “responsible” for any causation. The transient chain makes at most an aggregate whereas the immanent chain makes a coherent system. Both chains are infinite but, according to Letter 12, infinitude has two quite different meanings: abstract or imaginary and concrete or adequate. The transient chain consists of particulars which are “independent” as it were and discrete, and their concatenation is random, contingent, and temporary, whereas the immanent chain consists of plurality of particulars, each is not discrete but must be systematically and intelligibly connected with all the rest. The immanent chain is the system of Reality as it is really is and intelligibly conceived by an intellect, which can follow the necessary link holding all its links together, whereas the transient chain is merely a product of our imagination, which conceives Reality in a false, wrong, unstable, and inadequate way. The first sort of infinitude involves eternity, the latter—contingency, time, generation and destruction. Each link of the transient chain is a particular relating to other links to infinity. Such a chain cannot instruct us how concretely every thing is determined to exist and to act from the divine necessity. Everything which this causal chain actually meets is the condition made by 1p36: “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.” Nevertheless, the links of the transient chain must be emended in order that they would finally create a system, in order to concretely know without any doubt that God is the ultimate cause of each one of them. Spinoza, mentioning God as the immanent cause, which must be distinguished from a

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transient cause, quotes the sentence taken from the Gospel and according to which “all things are in God and move in God” (Letter 73, G IV: 307, Curley II: 467). Spinoza’s philosophy sets a goal: to form “objectively,” namely, in our mind, a reproduction of the whole of Nature as it really is (i.e., its essence) and, in its real order and unity, avoiding abstractions and universals whatsoever (TdIE 99). This causal chain of real beings, of fixed and eternal things, is entirely different from the series of singular, changeable things (TdIE 100)—the transient chain, which has nothing of the fixed and the eternal in it. Though it is a series of singular, changeable things, yet, insofar as our intellect is concerned, this chain or series is not a real one at all, for our intellect cannot follow their infinite varieties and innumerable circumstances. Random, contingent circumstances are part and parcel of any changeable, singular thing, and each of such circumstances can cause it to exist and to act or not. This transient “chain” or “series” does not tell us the real causes of anything, the causes that are considered as clear and distinct ideas under the Attribute of Thought. These ideas are the sufficient and necessary reasons for the existence of these things and for their acts as well. Human intellect cannot render a chain of transient links into a series subject to necessary connections. Thus, insofar as our intellect is concerned, the series of changeable things consists of random combinations, for the real causal connections, which must be there, are beyond our knowledge, and for this reason only do we call them contingent (consult 1p33s2). Yet, 4def3 characterizes somewhat differently those things which are perceived as if contingent, that is, insofar as their existence is not deduced from their essence, whereas existence must be in any case necessary, whether we know that or not. Indeed, knowing changeable, singular things as links in the transient chain, we do not know their essences, which make their singularity and existence necessary (namely, real and eternal), insofar as Substance as a whole is concerned (consult TdIE 100: “their existence has no connection with their essence, that is, … is not an eternal truth”). In the light of the above, I understand 2ax1: “The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist.” This axiom is valid only for the series of changeable, singular things, that is, for the transient causal chain alone. Indeed, 2p30d refers to this axiom and interprets it as concerns the duration of our body. The following description, referring to 1p28, fits well the transient chain thus: “Our body’s duration depends neither on its essence (by 2ax1), nor even on God’s absolute nature …. But (by 1p28) it is determined to exist and produce an effect from such causes as are also determined by others to exist and produce an effect in a certain and determinate manner, and these again by others, and so to infinity. Therefore, the duration of our Body depends on the common order of nature and the constitution of things.” And 2p30 in turn states “we can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of our Body.” Duration is a determined and measured existence in time (see 3p8 & d, 5p29d, and 2def5). Hence, the transient causal chain involves time and temporal existence and, thus, does not pertain to an adequate knowledge. The transient “chain” induces in us the illusion of a chain of causes or reasons, by means of which an intellect can, as it were, follow individual things due to their necessary attachment. In a similar manner I understand Spinoza’s

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assertion that “all particular things are contingent and destructible,” for “we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration …, and that is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption [destruction],” as “beyond that there is no contingency (by 1p29)” (2p31c). Recall that 1p29 reads: “In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.” Nevertheless, our ignorance prevents us from recognizing that, and the transient chain divulges this ignorance of us. On the other hand, when Spinoza demands to know all individual things as necessary (for instance, in order to control our emotions [see 5p6s]), he actually refers to the links of the immanent chain. On the basis of the above, I interpret TdIE 100–101. The series of eternal and fixed things is simply the immanent causal chain, in which all changeable singular things exist and are adequately perceived, that is, perceived as links in the total causal chain, in the total system of Reality. Each of these links is subject to Spinoza’s principle of individuation and identity, which is adequate causality. In contrast, “changeable singular things” are the individual things perceived wrongly and inadequately as far as their fixed identity and singularity is unnoticeable or elusive under the circumstances of their spatiotemporal existence, and as far as their existence is not an eternal truth, in other words, as it is contingent, unreal, or transient. “Real things,” in contrast, are rather the changeable individual things, as they are conceived by a true and adequate knowledge, as they maintain their identity and singularity, in spite of all the changes they undergo, and as far as their essences and existence are not separated, or as far as their existence is an eternal truth, that is, necessary, real, and eternal. The links of the series of the fixed and eternal things— the links of the immanent causal chain—are the essences, or the factors of individuation, singularity, and identity, of the changeable singular things. Thus, a fixed and eternal thing is an essence and a proximate cause as well. According to TdIE 92, a thing is conceived by its essence alone or by its proximate cause, which can be understood thus: the idea of any finite being (such as a human being) is conceived by the idea of its essence and by that of its proximate cause as well. One is the adequate cause of some of his or her actions or effects, which are clearly and distinctly inferred from the idea of one’s essence alone. Yet, not all one’s occurrences or actions are caused by one alone, and of many of these acts or occurrences one is simply a partial cause. To know their adequate causes, we require the knowledge of all the ideas of the proximate causes that are outside of one (and, in the final account, to the whole of the causal chain in which one is a link). These causes, too, are essences, though of other particular beings. The overlapping, or at least, strong relatedness, of proximate cause and essence is quite clear in Spinoza’s words about the definition at TdIE 95: the definition explicates the inner essence of a thing, and the definition includes its proximate cause. Being an essence and being a cause are two aspects of any fixed and eternal thing, as far as it is a factor of individuation, singularity, and identity, on the one hand, and as far as it is a link in an adequate causal chain which, in turn, is the principle of any individuation, singularity, and identity, on the other. These two aspects necessarily condition one another: without essences no causes exist, no links in the

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causal chain of all things, and the chain as a whole cannot be possible at all, whereas without necessary connections between the links of this chain, no individuation, singularity, and identity of individual things is possible at all. The essences of the changeable singular things are simply the finite modes under this or that Attribute. The laws inscribed in these essences are Attributes and infinite modes according to which, by means of the essences, all individual things exist, act, and are systematically arranged or ordered. In other words, the laws specifically express or reveal themselves in each of the finite modes, “as in their true codes.” The changeable singular things depend so intimately on their essences that without these essences these things are inconceivable and nonexistent (consider 2def2). These essences are fixed and eternal, well reflected in the legitimate and adequate definitions of the changeable singular things (whereas other theories employ universals and genera for definitions), are present everywhere, and have extensive power. Nevertheless, following TdIE 101, how can we ascribe presence everywhere and extensive power to finite modes? Are not other interpreters, who consider fixed and eternal things rather as infinite modes or Attributes, more persuasive at this point? To support their interpretation, these interpreters consider Attributes and infinite modes as individua, or as the singularia which are mentioned at TdIE 101 and which are not abstract universals. Notwithstanding, considering this treatise as a whole, especially in the context of sections 100 and 101, it is rather much more reasonable to assume that the essences of particular or finite things constitute the real causal chain or the system of Reality (that is, “Nature’s essence, order, and unity”). “The cause of all things” is the immanent cause, which constitutes the system of Reality as a whole. Section 91 mentions “the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts.” Along these lines, the “presence everywhere and most extensive power” (TdIE 101) of singular things is rather valid for finite modes.22 Each mode conditions the complete system as a whole. Each mode is indispensable and inevitable and, hence, its presence affects or concerns Reality as a whole, and so is its extensive power: had a mode been missing from Reality, the whole Reality would have been different, which is simply impossible. It is impossible, because total Reality cannot be changed, otherwise it would not be total, i.e., absolutely infinite and perfect (1p33d & s2). The complete system of Reality would not be possible, unless it is coherent and free from any dissociation and void. The coherence and continuity of the immanent chain as a whole depend on the presence and power of each of its links, each of which is a unique, indispensable, and singular expression of God as a whole. Only as a link in the immanent chain, each one of us is a God not as infinite but as far as it is finite, as a singular, necessary mode, this and not that. Without each one of these modes Substance would no longer be Substance. Thus, the immanent chain as a whole depends on each of its links and is conditioned by each of them (which is an  This interpretation is not acceptable by most of the interpreters known to me who have paid some attention to TdIE 1o1. A partial list exists already in Richter (1913), pp. 117 ff. Richter does not accept the interpretations that the fixed and eternal things are infinite modes and not the essences of the mutable things.

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a posteriori conditioning). This conditioning is in the heart of the eternity, reality, and necessity (three traits which are one, according to 1p23d) of the essence, which is a fixed and eternal thing or a finite mode, of any singular changeable thing. The presence of the essence of a singular changeable thing has another meaning: as a concrete eternal essence its influence and power are not confined or limited by spatiotemporal conditions, which the imagination puts on real things. Time and place are means of isolation and abstraction severing any individual thing from its real causes and, finally, from its ultimate, complete cause, i.e., God as the immanent cause. As soon as we remove such fragmenting factors as place and time, which confine and restrict the causation and effectiveness of an individual thing within a confined and restricted fragment, arbitrarily cut from Reality as a whole, we also remove any barrier between this Reality and the singular changeable thing: it is perceived now as a real thing, which maintains its essence and fixed identity despite all mutations and circumstances, until there is no difference between this essence and identity. The more we know the essences of individual things, the more we get to know Reality as a whole. But to know this means to know thing sub specie aeternitatis, i.e., under a species of eternity, exempt from any spatiotemporal conditions. Since there is no individual thing that may be independent from all the rest, it is contradictory to consider things as existing in place and time, severed from the rest of Reality. On the one hand, we must realize that all things necessary pertain to a causal system; on the other, we habitually conceive them under space and time and thus isolate and sever them from a real causal chain, and set them instead in a transient chain in which no cause is a real one and, thus, it inescapably refers at random to the other links. The link in the transient chain is merely accidental and contingent, though contingency is only a matter of ignorance and by no means an ontological fact. This transient chain is the product of our imagination, and, thus, it rests on subjective, accidental, and arbitrary associations. In contrast, the conception of the immanent chain rests on an order that is real and necessary, that is, “the connection of ideas which happen according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men” (2p18s). Indeed, “we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect” (5p10). Actually, this is the order of the immanent chain of ideas, or the complete system of knowledge. Time, as a limited and restricted duration, does the opposite: it severs my existence, for instance, from the total continuity of existence and, as a result, I am considered then as a mortal severed from the eternal reality, which is immortal, whereas conceiving things under a species of eternity means “to conceive things insofar as they are conceived through God’s essence, as real things, that is, insofar as through God’s essence they involve existence” (5p30d). Spinoza writes that a person who has such knowledge “never ceases to be” (5p42s). The chain consisting of the essences of individual things, the chain of fixed and eternal things, indicates what is permanent, constant, and immutable in each individual thing as a real thing, that is, indicating its identity and unity surviving all changes and under all circumstances. The essences of individual things are fixed and eternal, and, hence, indestructible and not generable, whereas all changes and

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circumstances are part and parcel of things as changeable. Any change of an individual thing is understandable, i.e., is intellectually perceptible, if it is possible to indicate the singular and fixed identity, the essence, of a changeable individual thing, and if such a change is conceived as modal alone, and not as an “essential” or as nullifying this essence. Generation and destruction, i.e., death, are changes ascribed to changeable individual things as being considered as links in the transient causal chain, and these changes are incompatible with the conception of things as real and eternal (whose identity is still retained, despite all changes and mutations) or with their essences. In Sect. 4.3 below we shall see whether generation and destruction (death) are real or whether they are simply figments of our imagination. Be that as it may, not every change requires a measured and fragmenting time. Only changes such as generation and destruction rely on the concept of time, that is, only such changes whose conception does not reveal the fixed factor, the essence, which rather endures in the changeable individual thing. This conception belongs to the unstable experience, which pertains to the first kind of knowledge. Only such a conception of movement and rest rests on the concept of time. As must be well known, an atemporal concept of movement is possible, if the concept of time that one has in mind is fragmenting, measured, and confining. In this spirit, Bergson denies the concept of quantitative time, as he wishes to make possible a continuous movement and to solve Zeno’s paradoxes. According to Bergson, movement in itself is unmeasurable, rather only its orbit in space is measurable, whereas continuity of change and activity is incompatible with fragmenting time and place, which are defined and measured. As to Spinoza, he thinks that Movement and Rest is the immediate infinite mode of the Attribute of Extension (according to Letter 64), and, hence, this mode is eternal, as any immediate infinite mode must be (5p21 & s). And it can be conceived as it is really is, as a whole including all the particulars, only by means of an atemporal conception, for “eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time” (5p23s). The Infinite Intellect—the infinite immediate mode in the Attribute of Thought (Letter 64)—consists of finite eternal modes, each one of which is an intellect (5p40c,s which refers to 1p21). Equally, the finite modes of the infinite mode of Movement and Rest, being eternal, do not relate to time whatsoever. Owing to this eternity or atemporality, movement is possible and is not jeopardized by fragmenting due to a measured time. In the Attribute of Thought, too, there are atemporal changes and processes: for instance, logical transformations in particular and inferences in general. For instance, “if a, then b, and if b, then c, therefore if a, then c” does not require any temporal distinction or order, for such distinctions and order are inapplicable to inferences as such. There is neither temporal “before and after” nor any temporal order applicable to the logical order. Thus, atemporal changes and movement are conceivable after all: a true, clear and distinct conception of them is under some species of eternity. Not so their wrong and unstable conception. In concluding, changeable individual things are considered existing in time—as the links of a transient causal chain—as far as they are

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conceived as generated and passing away and as far as their fixed identity is unknown.23 Various interpreters of Spinoza have not really understood his distinction between time and eternity. By no means are we entitled to assume that eternity is sempiternity, i.e., an endless time or an existence in all times. As 1def8 well clarifies, eternity is not duration without beginning or end. Eternity is not an endless or beginning-less time. Rather it must be wholly atemporal. When Spinoza employs the word semper, it is not in a temporal sense at all but in an atemporal sense, say, as to an infinite being. Whenever Spinoza mentions time, it has to do with the first grade of knowledge. To further substantiate my interpretation as to the transient or immanent causal chain I would like to add the following considerations:

 As to the possibility of timeless or atemporal movement I disagree with Donagan and am apt to agree with Hallett. See Hallett (1930), pp.  84–5, and Alan Donagan, “Spinoza’s Proof of the Immortality,” in Grene (1973), p. 246. Cf. C. L. Hardin, “Spinoza on Immortality and Time,” in Shahan and Biro (1978), pp. 129–30, 132. Bennett (1984, pp. 207–11) discusses the problem of whether the measured and fragmenting time is compatible with the reality of change. He does not believe that it is (op. cit., pp. 210–11). Since Bennett does not deal with the relationship between the two causal chains, he has no adequate answer to the problem of the relationship between time and eternity. Bennett’s conclusion that “eternity entails sempiternity” (op. cit., p. 205) is wrong. Even endless time has no place in an immanent, necessary, and eternal causal chain; it has a place rather in the transient chain, in which each links refers to the other, et sic in infinitum (1p28). Hence, the combination “necessarily sempiternal” (Bennett 1984, p.  205) is a contradiction in terms. Bennett’s criticism of 5p23s, according to which “eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time” (Curley I: 607), is thus groundless. In fact, the relationship between time and eternity is that of emendation—emendation of the transient causal chain, which is the product of the first grade of knowledge. The emendation is performed by means of removing the fragmenting temporal factors, whose removal is a necessary condition for the construction of the desired system, namely, the immanent chains of reasons (I will discuss this below). Bennett, nevertheless, ignores this entirely. Steinberg (1981) another interpretation of the relationship between time and eternity. She confirms, rightly, that eternity is by no means endless time, and, thus, she disagrees with Kneale, “Eternity and Sempiternity,” in Grene (1973), pp. 227–240, which Bennett (1984, pp. 205–6) accepts. The word semper serves Spinoza in the examples mentioned by Bennett to indicate atemporality (of infinite beings) rather than all-temporality (contrary to Curley 1969, p.  107), although “sempiternity” generally relates to “semper.” Indeed, none of these examples mentions tempus at all. Spinoza employs temporal terms, whenever he relates to the first grade of knowledge (which is the case of all the examples that Bennett 1984, mentions). Watt (1972) examines the distinction between God as causing the eternal essences of individual things, on the one hand, and God as causing their existence in time, on the other. Yet, Watt ignores the status of time as ens imaginationis and instead considers time as real. Neither does he consider the nature of the two causal chains and the eternal existence of the individual things. Watt’s interpretation entirely ignores Spinoza’s view on this matter, for instance, in 5p29s, which mentions actually existing things. Harris reacts to this paper (op. cit., pp. 191–7) and corrects its view (especially about the essence of the individual thing and its actual existence). Yet, I disagree with the way in which Harris sees the relationship between the two chains concerning the relationship between time and eternity and the status of finite modes (Harris 1973, pp.  238–9). Cf. Wilson (1983), especially note 16 on p. 191. Unfortunately, she, too, does not clarify the issue sufficiently. Lennex (1976) criticizes Watt, Curley, and Joachim for the ways in which they deal with the present problem. Neither do I follow his view on the relationship between the two chains.

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(a) In 2p45s Spinoza distinguishes between two senses of “existence”—as the abstract existence, which is conceived as duration, and as the existence of singular things as follows from the eternal necessity of God (1p16). Thus, 2p45s actually refers to the immanent chain in the following words: “By existence here I do not understand duration … I am speaking … of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature.” This causal chain cannot be considered as transient, for each of its actual singular links is necessary and not contingent and each necessarily exists in God, that is, it is a necessary manifestation or modification of the entire system of Reality and not a detail of a random aggregate. In the immanent chain, actually existing singular things are considered as real, necessary, and eternal. In Spinoza’s words, their ideas include the eternal and infinite essence of God (2p45). (b) 5p25s reads: “We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, i.e., real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God (as we have shown in 2p45 and p45s).” Now, time and place are fragmenting, segregating, or severing factors, which prevent us from conceiving things as included in God and as following from God’s necessity with no break. According to my interpretation, such is the transient causal chain, in which things are considered as if generated and pass away and as if they were contingent (destruction—“corruption”—and contingency go hand in hand: according to 2p31c, destruction is a severance from the eternal continuity of Reality, that is, a resolving of the necessary connections, the causal connections, between an individual thing and Reality as a whole, a resolving which means conceiving a thing as contingent or random, as exempt from necessary connections). Note that according to TdIE 87 place and extension are incompatible, for ascribing place or time to extension is just a mistake of the imagination. It is a mistake to consider the infinitely extended Reality as if it were finite and divisible. Spatiotemporally locating or restricting means fragmenting, and fragmented and discontinuous extension is a contradiction in terms (about this consider 1p15s and Letter 12). Measuring and quantifying, made by the imagination or by our abstracting faculty, require location, restriction, and the like, in a word, dividing the infinite quantity into discrete fragments and breaking it into severed pieces of reality, each of which is finite and nothing in it leads to a totality. In contrast, to conceive things “under a species of eternity” means to perceive them as links in the causal immanent chain: natura naturans is considered as a cause of natura naturata, of all modes integrated into a one whole. The former is thus the coherent cause of all the particularizations of Reality. This is the conception of Reality as a system.

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1p3 puts a necessary condition for integrating things into a causal chain: “If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.” Thus, a thing existing in time has nothing in common with an eternal thing whatsoever, as 5p23s puts it, “eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time.” According to TdIE 102, all the eternal things are “at once,” not so in the chain of changeable individual things. Indeed, there is neither “when” nor “before” nor “after” in eternity (1p33s2), whereas there is no temporal relationship without “when,” “before,” or “after.” All this renders the question of the relationship between the two chains quite problematic, and this is the problem that bothers Spinoza at TdIE 102 and 103, discussing the aids for understanding the eternal things and their laws or, better, the aids for bridging over these two radically different causal chains. Bridging over these chains must challenge a crucial problem of duality. As long as we cannot conceive changeable individual things as real beings under the species of eternity, we cannot conceive the essence, order and unity of nature as a whole, and the system of knowledge that we desire would be still beyond our reach. Note that Spinoza’s philosophy has no need to reduce the chain of changeable individual things to that of fixed and eternal things. There is a great discrepancy between Spinoza and Leibniz over this matter. Spinoza attempts to purge individual things out of the spatiotemporal relationships in order to conceive them as they are really are, whereas Leibniz, considering time and space as well-founded phenomena and not merely as entia imaginationis, states that they are reducible to the real distinctions between things as they are really are. Spinoza should reject such a view as he thinks that no rationalization of space and time can hold true, and that they are irreducible to causal relationship, which is under the laws of the intellect. Spatiotemporal relations are not deducible from a conceptual or inferential system, as the former have nothing to do with the latter. On the other hand, Spinoza thinks that, contrary to space and time which are entia imaginationis, finite things existing, as it were, in space and time are still real. The above analyzed passages from the Ethics clearly indicate that individual things are inadequately, falsely considered as existing in space and time, but they are perceivable quite differently, namely, as they are really are, as real things. Actually, both chains refer to real things, albeit in the chain of changeable individual things they are inadequately and falsely perceived, in a fictitious and arbitrary “order,” the spatiotemporal order. The chain of essences instructs us as to the identity of changeable individual things, which preserve their identity despite all the changes they have undergone. This chain also instructs us as to the true order in which their adequate ideas, which adequately reflect the essences of these things, should be constructed, and as to the necessary connections (the “context of the intellect”) that are needed to construct the coherent system of knowledge, which adequately reflects the total system of Reality. To bridge the two chains, an emendation of the data of experience is needed.24 The transient chain provides us with the data that must be extracted out of it and be  For the question of the emendation of experiential data see Hallett (1962, pp. 18–21; and 1957, pp. 1–2, 26, 64–5). C. De Deugd mentions “a remedial procedure during which the materials …

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emended, that is, purged from their “extrinsic denominations, relations, or … circumstances” (TdIE 101) including the spatiotemporal relations. To do so, we have first to identify these data according to their fixed and eternal essences. Spinoza writes that the distinction between the “actuality or existence” of two things is the same difference that exists between their essences (TdIE 55), but this difference is not deducible from the transient chain, which deals with an “existence” that has nothing to do with the essences of the changeable individual things (TdIE 100). Only conceiving Reality more particularly would remove the duality between existence and essence, which are falsely conceived (TdIE 55). Particularly conceiving Reality is the constructing of the ideas of all changeable individual things in the light of the order of the immanent chain. In this way, the true or adequate conception of these things becomes possible. At this point, it should be emphasized that the knowledge of Reality does not, as it should not, dispense with the multiplicity or plurality of particulars and of the changes they undergo. Nevertheless, what should be removed from our conception is anything that may prevent the true identification of the individual things, anything that represents them as if generated and passing away, as if they suddenly appeared on the “stage of Reality” and suddenly disappeared from it. Such “appearance” and “disappearance” would sever or split them from the continuity of Reality and prevent them from being known truly, namely, as necessary, real, and eternal. Reality, as it truly is, is abundant with particulars, changes, and diversity, which are intelligible. Their true or adequate conception expresses all this clearly and distinctly. Spinoza states that “the eternal part of the mind is the intellect” (5p40c), and that “our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and Infinite Intellect” (5p40s). This causal chain is, obviously, not transient but immanent instead. Although its links are innumerable, each of which relates to the other to infinity (ad infinitum), and all of them together constitute the system that is conceived by and is in the Infinite Intellect. The immanent chain of ideas is coherent due to the necessary logical connections. In contrast, each “link” in the transient chain relates to the others to infinity (ad infinitum) but without constituting any coherent system and without being associated by necessary, logical connections. The infinitude of the transient chain is that of an aggregate, whose particulars are not expressions or manifestations of the same infinite Reality, whereas the infinitude of the immanent

[which the first kind of knowledge offers] are reduced to reliable elements of knowledge [namely, Reason]” (1966, p. 244). I do not think that “reduced” is the proper term to be used here. I would prefer “emendated” instead. This emendation consists of purging these data from any dross of time and place, for there is no possibility to reduce this dross to intellectual or rational principles, contrary to Leibniz’s view on this matter. A reductionistic conception of these data is incompatible, I think, with De Deugd’s illuminating and original view on the significance of the first grade of knowledge in Spinoza’s philosophy. Recently, Eugene Garver 2018 has contributed to explicating the indispensable role that imagination plays in Spinoza’s philosophy. Alas, he does not refer at all to De Deugd’s vital contribution concerning the first grade of knowledge.

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chain is valid for the abundance of one coherent Reality, which is infinitely explicated in manifestations. The immanent chain does not rest on any immediate connection between God and the finite things. Such an “immediate connection” is discussed in the Short Treatise (Part I, Section 13 in the Second Dialogue) and is compatible with the mystical nature of this Treatise as a whole. Nevertheless, it is not compatible with the Ethics. God as individuated or particularized, God as natura naturata, is revealed in all of its finite particularizations, and any necessary relation of each one of them to God is necessarily mediated by all the others. For God, as the cause of any particularization, is the cause of all of them together, and the existence, necessity, and reality of each of them is understood only by means of knowing all the other particulars. Only immediate infinite modes follow from God immediately, and immediacy serves only the relationship between these modes and God. If immediacy is not valid for the relationship between any mediate infinite mode and God, all the more it is not valid for the relationship between God and any of its finite modes (consider 1p28d & s). As a result, a direct, immediate transition from the infinite being as a cause to a finite being as an effect, that is, an a priori (“synthetical”) transition, is impossible.25 What is possible, is the a posteriori (“analytical”) procedure, which is conducted in the light of some a priori principles, proceeding from one finite being to another, to infinity, and in a systematic order. Thus, at 1p28d, while referring to the a priori transition, it is said of the finite mode that it “could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an Attribute of God.” In contrast, at 5p40s, while referring to the a posteriori transition, it is indicated that “our mind, insofar as it understands,” that is, as an intellect, which is an eternal mode of thinking, and all the other eternal modes of thinking, namely, intellects, together “constitute God’s eternal and Infinite Intellect,” which is the immediate infinite mode of Thought (according to Letter 64). In concluding, we should not ask how can our intellect deduce or a priori particularize the idea of any individual thing from the definitions of Substance, God, or Attribute. Instead of this wrong question, we should ask, how can our intellect combine all these ideas into an all comprehensive system of knowledge, or how can we proceed toward such an aim. We have reached now a partial answer to this question. Spinoza’s philosophy shows us that individuation, personal identity, and system all three need one another. It is impossible to identify an individual thing, which is singular and unique, without referring to the immanent causal chain, which constitutes the entire system of Reality as the total whole; it is also impossible to know this system in its entirety without knowing all the particulars-manifestations-modes of Reality, which is infinitely abundant. The real infinite multitude of the finite beings and the unity of Reality as a whole make together the total Reality, which includes in it any real being. This unique combination is Spinoza’s “monistic pluralism,” explicitly rejecting the Eleatic monism.

 Cf. Curley 1969, pp. 72–4, and Wilson (1983), pp. 187–8. Wilson considers this as an intricate problem to which Spinoza’s philosophy has no solution.

25

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The problems that refer to the two chains will continue to draw our attention in discussing the contributions of the different grades of knowledge for constructing the system to which Spinoza aspires. The true or adequate grades of knowledge (that is, Reason and Intuitive Science) extricate the ideas of individual things (that is, the data of experience as they are perceived by the first grade of knowledge, by the imagination) from the transient chain of ideas and emend these ideas in order to render them to serve as the foundations of the desired system, which is attainable by the supreme grade of knowledge, i.e., scientia intuitiva, alone. It is Reason (ratio) that contributes the aids mentioned in TdIE 102–3, which are needed for emending the conception of the data of the experience. These aids are the adequate ideas concerning the common properties of all things. Reason is also the origin of the method, according to which the emendation will take place and the desired system will be constructed under the logical order, which is not that of time, place, circumstances, etc. But before discussing all this, we must consider first what are the truth conditions of the desired system, conditions that relate to the infinite causal chains. In other words, we have to discuss now the problem of the unity of Attributes, of adequacy, correspondence, coherence, and also of rejecting the immediate evidence.

References Bayle, Pierre. 1965. Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H.  Popkin. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brandom, R. 1976. Adequacy and the Individuation of Ideas in Spinoza’s Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 14: 147–162. Caird, J. 1910. Spinoza. Edinburgh/London: Blackwood. Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2019. Spinoza’s Metaphysics Revisited. In Spinoza in the Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophers, ed. Jack Stetter and Charles Ramond, 3–51. London: Bloomsbury. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. Della Rocca, M. 2008. Spinoza. London/New York: Routledge. Garrett, Don, ed. 2018. Necessity and Nature in Spinoza’s Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garver, Eugene. 2018. Spinoza and the Cunning of Imagination. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. Gebhardt, C. 1905. Spinozas Abhandlung über die Verbesserung des Verstandes. Heidelberg. Grene, M., ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. ———. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Harris, E.E. 1973. Salvation from Despair – A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Hessing, S., ed. 1977. Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977. London/Boston: Henley/Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Hübner, Karolina. 2015. Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97: 58–88. Joachim, H.H. 1940. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione  – A Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Lennex, J.G. 1976. The Causality of Finite Modes in Spinoza’s Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6: 479–500. Lessing, Abba. 1975. Inability to Exist is Impotence … Ability to Exist is Power. The Human Context 7: 458–462. Mark, T.C. 1972. Spinoza’s Theory of Truth. New York/London: Columbia University Press. Mason, Richard. 1997. The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Naess, Arne. 1973. Is Freedom Consistent with Spinoza’s Determinism? In Bend, 1973, 6–23. Parkinson, G.H.R. 1954. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Richter, G.T. 1913. Spinozas philosophische Terminologie. Leipzig: J.A. Barth. Rise, L.C. 1971. Spinoza on Individuation. The Monist 55: 640–659. Ritchie, E. 1904. The Reality of the Finite in Spinoza’s System. The Philosophical Review 13: 16–29. Saw, R.L. 1969. Personal Identity in Spinoza. Inquiry 12: 1–14. ———. 1972. The Vindication of Metaphysics. New York: Russell & Russell. Shahan, R.W., and J.I.  Biro, eds. 1978. Spinoza  – New Perspectives. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Steinberg, D. 1981. Spinoza’s Theory of the Eternity of the Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11: 54–65. Wartofsky, M.W. 1977. Nature, Number, and Individuals. Inquiry: 457–479. Watt, A.J. 1972. The Causality of God in Spinoza’s philosophy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2: 171–189. Wilbur, J.B., ed. 1976. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wilson, M.D. 1983. Infinite Understanding, Scientia Intuitiva, and Ethics I.16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 181–192.

Chapter 3

The Truth Conditions and the Problem of the Attributes

3.1  The Truth Conditions 3.1.1  Adequacy, Correspondence, and Error Spinoza’s theory of truth rests on the identity (namely, the correspondence) of each Attribute to all the others and the immanent adequacy of each one of them.1 Coherence is the absolute and full adequacy. This theory of truth by Spinoza necessarily rejects immediate, atomic or discrete knowledge, and this rejection is entailed by the wish to construct a system. 1a6 defines true idea as follows: “A true idea must agree [convenire] with its object [suo ideato].” This definition refers to the assumption that body and thought are one and the same thing considered under different Attributes—Thought and Extension. 1a5 states that “[t]hings that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, that is, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.” One of such things cannot be the cause of the other (1p3). In the light of this, 1d2 becomes clear enough: since thought and body have nothing in common, there cannot be any causal relation between them. Now we must raise a question: how can all things, which share nothing in common or which no causal relation binds together (for instance, bodies and thoughts), can make together an all-comprehensive system of Reality? Spinoza’s answer, as I will 1  Mark (1972) as a whole is devoted to Spinoza’s theory of truth. I disagree with Mark over the question of the coherence that Spinoza’s theory endorses over the meaning of distinctness and clarity in this theory, and so forth. Mark, “Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Ideas,” in Shahan and Biro (1978), treats the adequacy of the ideas. I do not accept his view that our ideas of finite modes are inadequate (op. cit., pp. 21, 26) and that their adequate ideas pertain to the Infinite Intellect alone (p. 25). Another view of Spinoza’s theory of truth can be found in Parkinson, “Truth is Its Own Standard,” in op. cit., pp. 35–55. In what follows I suggest a different interpretation from all of the above.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0_3

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attempt to show, is that all the real beings that share nothing in common and that maintain no causal relations are simply the same individual things considered under different Attributes. Under any Attribute, these things are interconnected by means of a total (infinite) causal chain (which under Thought is a chain of reasons and inferences). According to 2p7cs, these total causal chains—Attributes—are identical or correspond to one another. Attributes are the total manifestations-distinctions of one and the same Reality. Such is the identity of Attributes. Thus, there cannot be a single real thing in Reality as a whole that does not find a location of its own in the complete system of Reality under this or that Attribute, and this location belongs necessarily and exclusively to it. Any real or true being, which is not identical with (corresponds to) one of the links in a total causal chain but is distinct from each of its links, must be adequate to it, in other words, must join the other links by means of causal, necessary connections. This joining is what is adequacy is all about. In contrast, each real or true being, which is not adequate to this chain, which is not a link in it, must be identical with (corresponds to) one of its links and appears as an adequate link in another total causal chain. The two chains are one and the same order of Nature, as it is considered under different Attributes. In the last account, therefore, anything which is adequate is also true, that is, being identical with or corresponds to another manifestations of it in all the other Attributes. The following is the definition of an adequate idea: “an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties, i.e., intrinsic denominations of a true idea” (2d4). The explication clarifies: “I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, viz. the agreement of the idea with its object [suo ideato]” (2d4e). Adequacy is simply clarity and distinctness, as 2p38c states: adequate, sive clare et distincte percipi, that is “must be perceived adequately, that is, clearly and distinctly” (cf. 4p52d). Yet we should not be misled: Spinoza’s clarity and distinctness are by no means Cartesian in nature, rather the contrary. Descartes ascribes clarity and distinctness to the immediate and discrete evidence (such as that of the cogito), whereas Spinoza ascribes clarity and distinctness to adequacy, joining, relatedness, linkage, and binding, all of which exclude such a sort of evidence. Cartesian clarity and distinctness imply discreteness and separation, whereas Spinoza’s clarity and distinctness, namely, adequacy, implies necessary connections and relations with the whole of Nature. Adequate ideas, according to Spinoza, take part in the widest context of knowledge. From 2p11c, it follows that adequacy is attributed to the complete true knowledge and to its parts as well, whereas inadequacy is a partial or fragmentary knowledge, which before being emended does not join the complete true knowledge and does not make even a part of such knowledge. Our mind is a part of God’s Infinite Intellect, and to the extent that an idea of our intellect exists in God’s Infinite Intellect, that is, perceived by it without requiring any addition of other ideas, which are not included in our mind, this idea of us is adequate, i.e., it is an intellectual idea (all the ideas of an intellect are adequate and true). Such an adequate idea is absolutely true and completely valid from the viewpoint of God’s Infinite Intellect as well, and it necessarily joins other ideas of God. In contrast, to the extent that inadequate or partial ideas exist in our mind, in order to emend them the Infinite Intellect

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adds to them other ideas, which are not in our mind. The human mind, insofar as it has adequate, i.e., clear and distinct, ideas, or insofar as it is active and not passive, is an intellect (following 5p40c, and TdIE 74: “ … in the intellect, i.e., … conceived clearly and distinctly” [Curley I: 33]). Adequacy is thus ascribed to knowledge that though it pertains to a finite intellect yet it is absolutely valid, no less than an absolute knowledge of the Infinite Intellect itself, which, in turn, is the coherence system of all clear and distinct ideas, most of which do not belong to our finite intellect. For this reason, Spinoza states that “[e]very idea that in us is absolute, that is, adequate and perfect, is true” (2p34). On many occasions, Spinoza considers the finitude and the limitations of human intellect. Nevertheless, he states that we have various sorts of knowledge which are absolutely, universally, and unqualifiedly true. Such knowledge necessarily remains true over the passage of time, and the more we know, the more such knowledge keeps its true or adequate standing. Its truth stands still facing all possible rational considerations, whether finite or infinite, human or super-­ human. Human intellect must have some truths which resist any considerations whatsoever, which are confirmable by any rational consideration. Thus, our intellect is a part, i.e., a finite mode, of God’s Infinite Intellect. All finite intellects, that is, all adequate ideas, constitute together God’s Infinite Intellect. Adequacy is the connection or relation between the complete true knowledge and any of its parts, all of which must share something in common, thus following the rule: “Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (2p38). The clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as God’s ideas are so, for “to have a true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly … our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the Infinite Intellect of God (by p11c); hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are” (2p43s, Curley I, p. 480). An adequate knowledge is common to all intellects, finite and infinite alike. What contributes to the “knowledge of an eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole” (2p46d). The reverse is true all the same: everything adequate can bring us closer to the knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God and, thus, we have an adequate knowledge maintaining its truth and validity also in the complete system, which is achieved by God’s Infinite Intellect. Thus, Spinoza’s theory of adequacy is meant to save any finite knowledge from doubt and to safeguard the possibility of a true finite knowledge. This theory responds to the crucial problem of the Cartesian malignant spirit. For it is reasonable to represent the Cartesian doubt as to mathematics thus: does the greatest of the achievements of human reason, namely, mathematics, an achievement which is independent of the state of affairs, of the external, objective reality, and which depends only on the human mind, does it have an absolute and universal force? Spinoza’s theory of adequacy does not raise this question with regard to mathematics, yet it refers to some other sorts of knowledge which have a universal and absolute force or authority, such as that Extension and Thought are God’s Attributes, that bodies and thoughts cannot cause one another, that the human mind is simply the knowledge of the body, and such more. Moreover, Spinoza differs from Descartes

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regarding the problem of the malignant spirit: Descartes attempts to resolve it by the Cartesian evidence, whereas Spinoza does this by his conception of adequacy. Error altogether consists of partial or fragmentary knowledge, which considered in itself is flawless, unless it is considered a complete knowledge. Thus, “the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error, that is, the mind does err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those things that it imagines to present to it” (2p17s); and “when we look at the sun, we imagine it as about 200 feet away from us, an error that does not consist simply in this imagining, but in the fact that while we imagine it in this way, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining” (1p35s). Those who have a full knowledge do not err, for all of our real cognitions take part and have their own place in the complete system of knowledge. Error thus consists of regarding a fragment alone, considering it as if it were a whole and not only a part. Only. In other words, error consists of ascribing universality to what is only partial, or on severing it from its complete context, from the whole to which it belongs as a part. Nevertheless, this part can be adequately conceived. In the same spirit, Spinoza states that “we can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; for though they do not actually exist outside the intellect, nevertheless their essences are comprehended in another in such a way that they can be conceived through it” (1p8s2). What does it mean? When it is understood that such modifications are of our mind alone and, thus, are not ascribable to ideas of objects, ideas referring to an external, objective state of affairs existing independently of our mind or from without it, i.e., extra intellectum, no error occurs. For instance, when we understand that genus and species are just products of our thought, which assists us in arranging our thoughts under some order and to classify them properly, but which have no force outside our mind and independently of it, we appreciate the capability of our mind, as we appreciate the power of our imagination to create even concepts such as time and space, provided that we are aware of the fact that these ideas do not concern the external reality as it is really is. In other cases, when things and events depend on us alone, as adequate effects of us which are in turn adequate causes, they are clearly and distinctly conceived from our mind and body alone, as our mind conceives things intellectually, i.e., adequately or clearly and distinctly. From the viewpoint of God’s Infinite Intellect, we perceive these causal links adequately, as parts of the complete causal chain. Therefore, if our imagination were conditioned by our nature alone, it would not have caused us to err at all, rather the contrary: it would have served as a source of clear and distinct ideas, and the same holds for our memory. Nevertheless, the real state of affairs is quite the reverse: all the affections of the body depend on the operation of external bodies on our body, and more than revealing the nature of these bodies they indicate how our body is affected by them, as their content reflects mainly the nature of our body and not that of the external bodies. In this case, any knowledge or conception which does not comprehend the entire order of causes, or which breaks and interrupts it, is inadequate. Thus, “these ideas of the affections, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are like conclusions without premises, i.e., (as is known through itself), they are confused ideas” (1p28d). Such ideas are conditioned terms which

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their conditions are missing, for they can be found only in the complete chain of conditions. The complete argument is adequate, not so each of its parts when severed from the rest. And, as we shall realize, Spinoza’s conclusion that “the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct” (2p28s) necessary entails a rejection of the immediate, Cartesian evidence. Thus, Spinoza’s theory of adequacy considers clarity and distinctness as constituted on necessary joining the universal and complete context of knowledge and not on splitting from it. This theory also entails the following: “All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true” (2p32) for “all ideas which are in God agree entirely with their objects …, and so … they are all true” (2p32d). Thus, the infinite (total) thinking of God entirely agrees with (or entirely corresponds to) its ideatum, i.e., its object: God as an extended being and God as an thinking being are one and the same thing under different Attributes. If there is the Totality, there cannot be discrepancy between the total Thinking and the total Extension, all the bodies under Extension are the thoughts under Thought and, finally, the order of all thoughts and their connexion is the order and connexion of the bodies as links in a total causal chain. In the complete system adequacy is also correspondence. Adequacy (i.e., clarity and distinctness) is simply an internal criterion of truth under the Attribute of Thought, that is, the identity, as it manifests itself in Thought, of Thought and Extension. Therefore, Spinoza states in Letter 60 that there is no distinction between a true and adequate idea, except that the “term ‘true’ concerns only the agreement of the idea with its object [ideatum], whereas the term ‘adequate’ concerns the nature of the idea in itself” (G IV: 270, Curley II: 432). The two terms indicate the standing of the same thing, but the term “adequate” indicates that this being is a link in a total causal chain (an Attribute), whereas the term “true” indicates that this same thing is identical with the same link itself under another Attribute. Does not the distinction between essence and existence undermine the identity of correspondence and adequacy? After all, the essence of a finite thing is eternal, whereas its existence is not: there are eternal essences (or “possibilities”) of nonexisting/nonexistent things (1p17c2, cf. Political Treatise Ch.2, Sec. 2). Nevertheless, this discrepancy takes place whenever we lack the knowledge of all the relevant causes for the existence of a thing, which does not follow from its essence alone but from the complete order of nature, that is, from the complete order of causes which must be adequate in order to be also true or identical (“corresponding”). It is only because the complete causal order is obscure or unknown, and because there is something of the contingency in our perceptions, that we must separate existence from essence (consider 1p33s1 and TdIE 52ff., and 4def3). In sum, even from the distinction between essence and existence we can learn that all comprehensive adequacy and all comprehensive correspondence are one and the same. But which of the two is primary or basic? Adequacy. At least 2p29cs and TdIE 69 agree over this point: Spinoza chooses the intrinsic criterion of truth to be primary and basic. Judging the truth and falsity of ideas must be performed under the Attribute of Thought, and so is the distinction extra intellectum. As a result, the basic truth criterion consists of adequacy, on necessary connections between ideas

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which can make a system. Adequacy guarantees correspondence too, as adequacy consists of the equality of the part and the whole, and insofar as the whole is concerned, correspondence is also well retained. The infinitude of Thought is the same as the infinitude of Extension, they both have precisely the same amplitude or scope, and the relation between the two is that of identity or unity, the relation of correspondence. The primacy of adequacy as a criterion of truth can be illustrated by the following example. A testimony in the court of law is approved according to this criterion, as there is no direct way to testify it facing the actual facts. If there is a contradiction in the testimony or if there is no full adequacy in it, it should be rejected as false, no matter what the facts were, and it should be considered not corresponding to these facts in themselves which are beyond the inspection of the court. The facts in themselves are not referred to there but the testimonies on them. Another example is this: we can imagine a winged horse insofar as there is no idea in our mind that rejects this absurd idea, whereas only when the mind realizes that such an idea is inadequate, will it deny its existence (2ps49cs). Yet the priority of adequacy by no means renders correspondence redundant. Correspondence indicates adequacy, and vice versa. In other words, Reason confirms experience, and experience Reason. Yet adequacy is quite obvious in most of the cases, and reasons are easily tested. When there are no clear reasons, experience is needed also in order to cause us to realize what are the indications for adequacy, as experience can bring us to think of the essences of things and of their definitions, although no experience alone can teach us about them (Letter 10). Still, even if there is enough experiential testimony, the adequacy test is still essential. Judging and discerning truth from falsity requires adequacy first, for justification and reasoning rest on necessary connections between ideas, which in turn guarantee the correspondence of the ideas to their objects, to the actual facts they adequately represent. The primacy of adequacy explains Spinoza’s declaration that what is as it were over Reason must be much under it (TPT Ch. 5), and that absurd facts are not real facts at all. What is absurd, is so not only from the viewpoint of our understanding, but also from that of God’s Infinite Intellect. We have something in common with this intellect in the truth and in rejecting what is absurd. Ascribing all ideas to God reveals what is positive in them and emends them. Any defect in knowledge stems from relating only to a particular mind of somebody: “All ideas are in God …, and, insofar as they are related to God, are true … and … adequate. And so there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone … . And so all ideas—both the adequate and the inadequate—follow with the same necessity …” (2p36d). It is enough to join an idea to true thoughts in order to emend any false or inadequate idea (5p4s). Emendation consists of reconstruction and not on deduction or construction of experiential data. Adequacy relates to infinitude or completeness, therefore all the ideas following from adequate ideas are themselves adequate (2p40). In this manner, infinite concatenation by the Infinite Intellect is guaranteed. A true idea is not discrete and self-­ evident; rather, it is a link in a complete chain of true ideas, and because of this

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“truth is the standard both of itself and of the false” (2p43s). The intrinsic truth criterion is not the spark of light of the Cartesian self-evidence as it were. Spinoza mentions natural light in quite a different sense, that of adequacy. A true idea reveals itself and the false, just because it links itself with a total chain of true ideas, without any obstacle blocking or stopping it from linking so, whereas false ideas do exactly the reverse. For this reason Spinoza writes that “the truth makes itself manifest … and also everything would have flowed … of its own accord” (TdIE 44); and “since there can be nothing in nature that is contrary to its laws, but since all things happen according to certain laws of nature, so they produce their certain effects, by certain laws, in an unbreakable connection, it follows from this that when the soul conceives a thing truly, it proceeds to from the same effects objectively” (TdIE 61, note [Curley I: 28]). Clarity and distinctness (or certainty) rest on the true order which does not break or interrupt the real concatenation-connection of things (TdIE 80). Equally, “when the mind attends to a fictitious thing which is false by its very nature, so that it understands it, and begins to deduce from it in good order the things to be deduced, it will easily bring its falsity to light” (TdIE 61). All this shows us what Spinoza means by saying that truth reveals itself and the false (Letter 76, G IV: 320). It does so owing to its adequacy which is the basic criterion of truth. The combination “adequate cause” (3def1) also confirms this interpretation of mine: adequacy rests on joining, connecting, concatenating, deriving, and following. 3.1.1.1  Adequacy and Coherence Coherence plays a major role in Spinoza’s philosophy in general and in his theory of truth in particular.2 From time to time Spinoza’s employs “coherence” as a synonym for “adequacy,” for instance, at TdIE 62, mentioning the coherence [cohaerentia] (Curley I: 28 regretfully renders it “connection”) of subject and predicate, which makes an idea. Hence, no idea is simple, for each idea is complex and, as a result, no discrete evidence exists at all. The combination on which the idea rests, facilitates its joining a comprehensive context of a chain of inferences or reasons. 2  Although Mark does not ignore what Spinoza has to say about the coherence of Nature, he states that it makes no sufficient condition for a coherent theory of truth (Mark 1964, pp. 81–5). It is true that Spinoza’s theory of truth refers not only to coherence but also to adequacy and correspondence alike. Nonetheless, a good part of it is devoted to the coherence of the whole of system of knowledge, which truly reflects the whole of Nature, the system of Reality as a whole. This is my first criticism of Mark’s interpretation. My second criticism is that it is not compatible with Spinoza’s theory of adequacy, as I understand it, especially not with the part that inadequate knowledge plays in the adequacy as a whole. Third, he states that Spinoza’s theory of coherence is incompatible with grades of knowledge (op. cit., p.  81). If this were the case, what would be the difference between the adequacy of the second grade of knowledge and the one of the third grade? In any event, the basic criterion of truth according to Spinoza is adequacy. Thus, even a knowledge that is not a complete knowledge may be true, provided that it can be integrated within the whole truth as its adequate part. Coherence is the truth condition of the absolutely complete knowledge alone, which is the knowledge that the only the desired system can provide, while adequacy guarantees the possibility of a finite or partial true knowledge.

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Spinoza differs from Descartes over the distinction between the intellect (conceiving an idea) and the will (passing a judgement). Moreover, he disagrees with Descartes as to the complexity of any idea, for Spinoza believes any idea to be a judgement consisting of joining and synthesis, on adequacy and coherence. The “simplicity” of an idea is simply being such a successful combination for it constitutes a real unity, to the extent that its parts, although distinct one from the other, are inseparable (contrary to Joachim 1940, p. 98). Thus, any idea which is “simple,” is actually clear and distinct, i.e., adequate and true. Had the Spinozistic idea Cartesiany discrete, “clear and distinct,” its joining the whole would been avoided from the first place; it would not have been entitled “adequate” or “coherence” according to the intrinsic truth manifestations. Indeed, Descartes needs a deus ex machina in order to combine all evident ideas into one knowledge, for each one of them is independent and discrete. The theory of the coherence of Nature is represented in the two political Treatises and in Spinoza’s Letters. They both define the relationship between Nature as a whole and its parts as coherence (Letter 30, G IV: 166; Letter 32, G IV: 171–3; TPT, Ch. 16, G III: 191, Curley II: 284; TP, Ch. 2, Sec. 8; and Metaphysical Thoughts, Part II, Ch. 9, G I: 267: natura naturata as a whole is one being and, thus, human beings must cohere with Nature as a whole). All of these passages relate to our ignorance: to know coherence we must first know the complete and full whole. Anything which appears to us as though it were ridiculous, wrong, discrete, disconnected, out of the order, lawfulness, and necessity of Nature, is simply an outcome of our ignorance, whenever the coherence of Nature as a whole is hidden from us. Thus, Spinoza states I do not think it right for me to mock nature, much less to lament it, when I reflect that men, like all other things, are only a part of nature, and that I do not know how each part of nature agrees with the whole to which it belongs, and how it coheres with the other parts. And I find, simply from the lack of this knowledge, that certain things in nature, which I perceive in part and only in a mutilated way, and which do not agree at all with our philosophic mind, previously seemed to me vain, disorderly and absurd (Letter 30, G IV: 166, Curley II: 14)

We meet the same ideas in reading Letter 32: When you ask me what I think about the question concerning our knowledge of how each part of Nature agrees with its whole and it coheres with the others, I think you are asking for the reasons by which we are persuaded that each part of Nature agrees with in whole and coheres with the others. For I already said in my preceding Letter that I don’t know how they really cohere and how each part agrees with the whole. To know that would require knowing the whole of Nature and all of its parts (Letter 32, G IV: 170, Curley II: 18)

Coherence is the complete, full, and absolute adequacy. It is the adequacy comprising the entire Whole including all its particulars each of which is unique, necessary, and indispensable. Reality as a Whole, as it is really is in itself, is Substance or Nature, which is the coherent, “formal” system referred to by TdIE 91 and 99. To know Nature as a whole is to attain the “objective” system, the desired system of knowledge reflecting the whole of Nature fully adequately or coherently. Coherence is the goal which adequacy attempts in reaching and, also according to Letters 30 and 32, this aim plays an obvious regulative role. Thus, we are “spurred to seek means that will lead … [us] to such a perfection … to arrive—together with other

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individuals if possible—at the enjoyment of such a nature … that is the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature” (TdIE 13, Curley I: 10–11).3 Or, in other words, the “aim … is to have clear and distinct ideas, i.e., such as have been made from the pure mind … and then, so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts” (TdIE 91, Curley I: 38). This objective system, this system of knowledge is the aim to which Spinoza’s philosophy aspires. Hence, there are two kinds of coherence according to Spinoza: the regulative and the constitutive. The latter is defined as follows: “By coherence of parts, then, I understand nothing but that the laws or the nature of one part adapts itself to the laws or the nature of the other part so that they are opposed to each other as little as possible” (Letter 32, G IV: 170, Curley II: 18). Actually, this is adequacy or the universal, common “coherence,” the adequacy of general rules or common properties only. The knowledge of this general coherence, i.e., adequacy, is the objective of the second kind of knowledge, i.e., ratio; whereas the knowledge of the regulative coherence, that of both the distinct parts and the whole, is the aim of the supreme, third kind of knowledge, i.e., scientia intuitiva. This strict kind of coherence concerns the community of essences of all individual things. On the universal coherence which actually is simply adequacy, Spinoza further writes: Concerning whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole to the extent that the nature of the one adapts itself to that of the other so that they agree with one another as far as possible. But insofar as they disagree with one another, to that extent each forms in our Mind an idea distinct from the others, and therefore it is considered as a whole and not as a part. (Letter 32, G IV: 170–171, Curley II: 18)

Spinoza illustrates this relationship by the example of the blood and its parts. We are likened to a worm living in the blood. Like such a worm or a micro-organism, we cannot discern the necessary connection linking all the particular parts of Nature as a coherent whole (which in turn is likened here to the blood as a whole). Our rational universal knowledge considers the distinctions between the parts to separating and isolating them one from the others, as if they were antagonist. But actually in Reality as it is in itself, as it is really conceived, there is a common nature that coheres, combines, and unifies all the parts of Nature into a one, coherent Whole which in turn is an absolutely total Individuum, all the particulars of which are simply modes or modifications of one and the same total Substance. This equally holds for thinking Nature and for extended Nature. And Letter 32 states that extended Nature as a whole maintains one and the same ratio of movement and rest. As for

3  This aim is compatible with Spinoza’s criticism of teleology. I will discuss this in Chap. 7 below. About the role of joy and pleasure in Spinoza’s ethics, consult Youpa (2020). Garrett 2018 devotes a long and important discussion to Spinoza’s “metaphysics of blessedness.” As for joy, he writes: “The content of Spinoza’s ethical theory thus emphasizes the joy (i.e., increase in self-preservatory power for action) that consists in the achievement of adequate—that is, intellectual—understanding, understanding that allows one to acquire further adequate understanding and to live freely and virtuously under the guidance of reason” (Garrett 2018, p. 24).

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thinking Nature as a whole, human mind is a part of the infinite Thought, which in turn comprises all nature “objectively.” As a part of this Nature, our mind, perceiving only a singular body, must be finite, that is, a finite part of God’s Infinite Intellect. In the same manner Spinoza portrays adequacy in 2p11c. Although the complete order of Nature is beyond us and, hence, there are still things which are contingent for our knowledge, the way toward the infinite knowledge is still open for our knowledge, and this openness is what adequacy is all about. Our mind is the idea, i.e., the knowledge, of our body whereas the idea of God is knowing God as an infinite extended being. The entire extended Nature and our body share common properties and laws, on the one hand, and the same holds for our mind and God’s Infinite Intellect or idea on the other. Only God’s Infinite Intellect can concretely know all the particulars of Nature (as natura naturata) under their common, universal, systematic unity; whereas our finite intellect has only a general knowledge of Nature’s order, and the proceeding of our concrete knowledge of the particulars, from the particular effects-modes to their causa sui, will never end. Thus, adequacy is attainable by finite intellects, such as the human intellect, and this adequacy concerns general laws and is restricted to common properties whereas the complete, unqualified coherence is attainable only by the Infinite Intellect. Insofar as human intellect or any other finite intellect is concerned, this coherence is an aim that lies on the far horizon, a regulative aim which can be approached but not attained. Coherence and deductive systems must exclude each other. Indeed, the system to which Spinoza’s philosophy aspires is not deductive but coherent. This system aims to completely reveal the mutual conditioning which exists between the whole and its real, singular particulars-parts. This conditioning bears two faces: the conditioning of the parts by the whole (the a priori conditioning), and that of the whole by each of its parts (the a posteriori conditioning). The a priori conditioning is of the effects by the immanent cause which is causa sui, and the a posteriori conditioning is that of the cause by each of its particulars-effects. The latter conditioning is the complete concretization-specification of the former. This mutual conditioning is not consistent with foundationalism in general and with deductive system in particular, but only with coherence. The desired system by Spinoza’s philosophy is coherent in a unique way which is exclusively Spinoza’s. Thus, we should not look for a universal model of a coherent system but should consider the unique demands made by Spinoza insofar as this system is concerned. Spinoza’s philosophy constructs a systematic model of its own. Moreover, Spinoza’s theory of truth rests on a unique combination of adequacy, coherence, and correspondence. Indeed, coherence is not the only demand that Spinoza’s philosophy puts to the system to which it aspires. Under this system, complete and full adequacy is coherence which is the regulative aim of Spinoza’s philosophy. Yet, Spinoza does not state that truth is attainable only by the complete desired system, just as he does not state that truth is simply coherence. He states, rather, that truth can be just a part of a whole. Some of our finite and limited cognitions are necessarily adequate and, hence, true. These cognitions are actually parts of the entire truth, the coherent truth. As parts, each of them leads us toward the regulative aim that is unattainable by us but still asymptotically approachable.

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3.1.1.2  Excluding the Immediate Evidence As I explained above, adequacy, Spinoza’s principle of individuation and personal identity, and the way by which we know ourselves are not compatible with any self-­ evidence which is immediate and discrete (“atomic”). Nevertheless, many interpreters regretfully believe that the Cartesian clarity and distinctness hold for Spinoza’s philosophy as well. But Spinoza, as I showed in Sect. 3.1.1 above, understands clarity and distinctness quite differently from Descartes. To begin with, there is a contradiction between the attempt to construct a system and an immediate, discrete self-evidence. Both empiricist and rationalists seem to be wrong at this point. Nevertheless, as David Hume puts it in his Treatise (especially in the Appendix), no necessary connections exist where there are discrete or distinct perceptions or beings, for human understanding cannot detect necessary connections between distinct beings. Hume well understands that distinct, immediate perceptions cannot meet our need to construct a connected whole, let alone a system. We can apply such a view to Descartes’s attempt to construct a system. The self-evidence of the cogito entails its being discrete, a “thinking atom” as it were, which is independent and discrete, independent of the external state of affairs and of other cognitive acts as well. On the other hand, any cognitive system requires necessary connections between thoughts or cognitions. To solve this problem, Descartes employs a rather deus ex machina. On the last account, Descartes actually fails in his attempt to construct a system because of the following antinomy: the requirement for an independent and discrete cognitive data, each of which is as it were self-caused, excludes any necessary conditioning connections between these data, and without such connections no system is possible at all but only a piecemeal knowledge of reality. Spinoza, in contrast, understands that only Reality as a systematic whole is self-caused and self-evident. Only the complete, coherent, and infinite knowledge is self-caused and self-evident according to Spinoza. Kant, criticizing the use which some philosophers do with axioms, as if they were self-evident or immediately evident (Critique of Pure Reason B760–62), states that philosophy has no axioms and that it is not entitled to adopt a priori principles without a solid demonstration (“deduction”) or justification. Although Spinoza’s Ethics has a priori principles and axioms, they are all subject to the imperative that any philosophical principle requires a well-founded justification, and no principle is acceptable on the false grounds that it is allegedly self-evident. Indeed, Spinoza fully adopts the philosophical imperative that no principle is entitled to be exempted from examination, explication, and justification. In this he follows a venerable tradition beginning with Plato. Plato’s dialectics avoids hypotheses and aims instead at reaching the unhypothetical principle, which is the first principle of a certain knowledge. If metaphysics is an independent discipline, which contributes something unique and indispensable to our knowledge, it must avoid any assumptions or suppositions which are not well-founded and well-justified. Plato himself does not fully meet that imperative, for the unhypothetical principle is assumed to justify itself and is subject to a mystical experience of some sort (hence Kant mentions Plato’s “mystical deduction of the Ideas” [Critique of Pure Reason B371 note]).

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Spinoza is entitled to attribute self-evidence only to the complete concrete knowledge of Substance, and neither to the definition of Substance nor to any other definition in the Ethics, the definitions, axioms, and postulates of which make just general cognitions. These, in turn, require justification, explication, concretization, and from time to time even qualification or restriction, in the Ethics as a whole. Only if we had reached our aim and constructed the desired system completely, we would have had an unconditional evidence, an absolutely certain knowledge. This is the complete concrete knowledge of the system of Reality with all of its particulars, that is, the coherent knowledge of Reality as the total Whole. Nevertheless, even this knowledge which can be only scientia intuitiva, is by all means mediate, for it requires complete inferences and demonstrations (as I will show in Sect. 6.1 below). Intuition in Spinoza’s philosophy is by no means a self-evident but only a complete, totally adequate demonstration. Moreover, this philosophy manifestly states that no cognitive datum is self-understood or self-evident, for understanding consists of data emendation, whose conception must be mediate. Even the simplest of the perceptions of our imagination in the first grade of knowledge involves place, time, and bodily images, which we erroneously ascribe to the data of Reality in themselves. The emendation of these data, in a laborious and intricate process, must be ample with inferences and considerations. From the very beginning this process has nothing of the immediacy in it. Although there are some major differences between the mediacy of the first grade of knowledge and that of the third and second grades, by no means is there any grade of knowledge which can be exempted from mediacy. Although the first grade of knowledge deals with individual things, it is general and constructs generalizations, which do not rely on legitimate demonstration and valid inference (2p40s2) whereas the two adequate grades of knowledge consist on demonstration and inference of legitimate and valid nature. The emendation of the knowledge of data requires integrating into a causal chain and does not consist in splitting into simple elements that are allegedly self-evident. Descartes highlights the immediacy of the evident knowledge, which in his view is the certain source of knowledge about the world. Analyzing the illustration of the wax in the Second Meditation, Descartes states that by means of a clear and distinct mentis inspectio (mental examination) our mind can be immediately acquainted with all of its innate concepts, which in turn are the origin of all our truths about real facts. What could be Spinoza’s reaction to such a view concerning immediate evidence? Consider the following: … if anyone says that, while there is no need to understand God’s attributes, there is a duty to believe them straightforwardly without proof, he is plainly talking nonsense. In the case of things invisible which are objects only of the mind, proofs are the only eyes by which they can be seen; therefore those who do not have such proofs can see nothing at all of these things. So when they merely repeat what they have heard of such matters, this is no more relevant to or indicative of their mind than the words of a parrot or a puppet speaking without meaning or sense. (S: 217, G III: 170)

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Or, the following: … the mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves. (5p23s)

No intellect can conceive or perceive things “immediately” for the mind’s eyes by means of which we have the most intimate cognitive access to the objects of our knowledge, are simply demonstrations or proofs. Contrary to any immediate contact with the known objects, Spinoza has in mind a mediate, discursive relationship with them, that is, a demonstrative intellectual relationship. Demonstration or proof, according to Spinoza, is by no means an immediate mentis inspectio, but rather an inference or a chain of inferences, which eventually makes an infinite whole. Nevertheless, in some passages Spinoza appears to state to the contrary. For instance, he mentions res perceptibiles (“things comprehensible” or “things one can perceive”), “those we’re accustomed to embrace with moral certainty and hear without wonder, even if they can’t be demonstrated in any way” (TTP, Note 8, Curley II: 185). Moreover, he adds that anyone “grasps Euclid’s propositions before they‘re demonstrated. Thus I also call perceptible and clear those stories of things, both future or past, which don’t surpass human belief … (even if they can’t be demonstrated mathematically”) (ibid.). Well, this is just a Note to a text in which Euclid’s proofs mentioned as “things quite simple and most intelligible. Anyone can easily explain his work in any language. To grasp his intention and be certain of his true meaning we don’t need a complete knowledge of the language he wrote in, but only a quite ordinary—almost childish!—knowledge” (ibid.). The things under discussion are obviously demonstrable or provable, mathematically-logically speaking, but the multitude (vulgus) accept them without any proof.4 The same holds for the other illustrations at this point: they all are demonstrable or provable for the philosopher, not for the ignorant multitude. For instance, the multitude accepts moral imperatives as evident and obligatory out of conviction and without any proof, whereas philosophers look for proof, if they believe these imperatives to be justified and obligatory according to Reason. Obvious, evident statements which are beyond any possible doubt, have no epistemic value. Such are the eternal truths, which we would entitle “analytical” in a modern language. Such are, therefore, the truths “which do not explicate anything or affection of a thing, as, for instance, nothing comes from nothing. These and similar Propositions, I say, are called absolutely eternal truths, by which they want to signify nothing but such [propositions] have no place outside the mind” (Letter 10, G IV: 47, Curley I: 196). Now, had Spinoza known Leibniz’s ambition to reduce all factual truths to eternal theoretical truths, which in turn are reducible to identity truths (which are actually analytical and absolutely self-evident as it were), he

4  Note that in 2p40s2 and TdIE 23 one mathematical example serves Spinoza in exemplifying the contribution of each grade of the three grades of knowledge. Only the first grade of knowledge grasps the mathematical proposition with no demonstration at all. In Sect. 4.6 below I will discuss the special relatedness of the multitude to the first grade of knowledge.

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certainly would have rejected it as a mere nonsense or just a groundless fantasy. For from analytical truths nothing about real facts may be inferred. Nothing extra intellectum, nothing that can have an ontological status which is independent of the mind, can come up. Analytic truths are simply products of our mind, and they cannot help it to know Reality as it is in itself, or to be acquainted with its particulars. Spinoza could not accept either the rationalist conclusions of Descartes’ wax illustration or Leibniz’s rationalist ambition. Actually, he does not accept a foundationalist model, requiring self-evident, self-understood, self-proved basis whatsoever. Spinoza’s philosophy aspires to a system, which is possible only under a knowledge excluding immediate, self-evident knowledge beyond its range of possibilities. Spinoza is committed to the assumption that understanding and justification require connecting, joining, combining, or linking, and rather not analyzing, splitting, or separating into “self-evident” components as it were. Despite all this, we can still find passages in Spinoza’s writings in which immediate cognitions are still mentioned. For instance, there are immediate (“direct”) cognitions contrary to words and images whose message is mediate (TTP, Ch. 4, Curley II: 133). But, as a matter of truth, in this passage Spinoza excludes a knowledge of a second source, e.g., from hearsay, which is not based on a first source whereas the former is independently, autonomously testable, as it is under the test of any rational being, exempt of heteronomous judgment by others, or of any unstable, unreliable experience whatsoever. Notwithstanding some resemblance in style, Spinoza does not adopt the Cartesian evidence even in Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. For instance, it seems as if Sect. 61 echoes Descartes’ Regulae 3 (although Spinoza could not know this work, for it appeared quite late): some things, although not self-evident, are known with certainty, and are deduced or inferred from true and known principles through a continuous and uninterrupted procedure of thinking. Yet, this is simply a most superficial resemblance, for the first principles in question are not apprehended according to Spinoza by means of a (Cartesian) immediate and evident intuition. Rather the contrary: according to him, a true, adequate knowledge must join the most comprehensive context of knowledge (consider again TdIE 99 ff.). Spinoza’s departure point is not a knowledge, which from the very beginning we know for sure and with complete certainty that it is true, but a knowledge, which from the outset we are entitled to assume that it is true, or which is postulated by Reason, and whose truth is being established as far as we continue in our procedure, that is, as much as it can “interact with other ideas” (TdIE 41), and interacting means combining or joining. When Spinoza writes that “truth makes itself manifest” (TdIE 44), he actually states that its possessor would never have doubted it, “and also everything would have flowed to him of its own accord” (ibid.). It is not a self-evidence but only a kernel of truth, which can be associated with the wide context of truth, which can go far beyond a discrete idea in order to join the open context as a whole. Such is the status of an adequate idea. Thus, Spinoza writes that “it is clear that, for the certainty of the truth, no other sign is needed than having a true idea. …no one can know what the highest certainty is unless he has an adequate idea or objective essence of some thing” (TdIE 35). Note that an adequate idea is mentioned not an

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evident one. Moreover, the definition of intellect, which is the true definition with which we begin our philosophical way leads to the complete knowledge concerning God, although it is clear through itself, yet by no means is it “absolutely clear through itself” (TdIE 107). In the beginning, there can be no absolutely clear knowledge. Only by the end, if attainable at all, can absolutely clear knowledge be established. In this spirit, Spinoza rejects Borelli’s conception of definition (Letter 9). This conception by Borelli considers definitions to be quite clearly known from the very beginning. But how can we explain away Spinoza’s statement that a simple idea must always be clear and distinct, free of any doubt and falsity, which may be ascribed to complex ideas (TdIE 63, 64, and 68)? Any idea is a combination of subject and predicate (TdIE 62). When the combination is coherent and legitimate, the idea must be considered simple, clear and distinct. Indeed, mentioning a simple idea, even the simplest idea, Spinoza refers to truth, i.e., to the intellect (TdIE 68), and any intellect consists of combining and linking. Any simple idea is a link in a causal chain (i.e., a chain of reasons), which makes it by no means discrete. In the same spirit, when Spinoza states that the common notions (or the “universal axioms”) are very simple (TTP, Note 6, Curley II: 156), he adds immediately that they must be connected to some divine attributes. Not separation or isolation but connection goes hand with hand with Spinoza’s notion of “simple” ideas. And since his notion of simplicity has nothing to do with Cartesian clarity and distinctness, there is much sense in his comment that “if there should be only one idea in the soul, then, whether it is true or false, there will be neither doubt nor certainty, but only a sensation of a certain sort” (TdIE 78). Only by means of knowing the connections between one idea and the others, can we know whether it is certain, false, or doubtful (cf. TdIE 61 and Note 24). Clarity and distinctness signify relationship of adequacy between ideas. If I understand him well, Spinoza means by all this to criticize the Cartesian evidence and even the cogito.5 Note again that Spinoza denies the possibility of immediate self-knowledge in so many words: “the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct” (2p28s). The mind can know itself insofar as it perceives the idea of the affections of the body (2p23 & d). Can we have more obvious evidence to show beyond any reasonable doubt that Spinoza radically differs from Descartes in the whole matter of self-evidence? Note that the title of the Second Meditation declares that the mind is better known than the body! It is in the nature of Spinoza’s philosophy to borrow from the existing philosophical 5  This conclusion is incompatible with Parkinson (1954), p. 134. Coherence is incompatible with the Cartesian evidence which, as a foundation for a foundational system, lies at the very beginning of the whole system. In contrast, coherence is a holistic term and thus it refers to the completely entire system. One comes to the strange conclusion whenever any Section of TdIE is interpreted as if Spinoza were devoted to any sort of discrete, immediate, or Cartesian self-evidence. Spinoza’s clarity and distinctness are obviously quite different from the Cartesian ones. The former serve as indications of the Spinozistic adequacy, whereas the latter serves as indications of the Cartesian immediate self-evidence. Parkinson, Lin (2019, for instance, p. 9), and others ascribe a deductive model to Spinoza, which is not the case at all, at least as I see it.

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terminology and to transform it radically in order to fit it into his coherent system (cf. Lloyd 1996, pp. 9–11). Whenever Spinoza mentions “evidence,” it is only to show an assessment of the final result of a demonstration, never a postulate of an a priori nature. It is post factum evidence, never an a priori one (consider, for instance, 1p11d2s, and 1p33s2). I insist that the axioms, definitions, and postulates of the Ethics are by no means per se clara [nota] data. They are rather statements which require a full justification, depending on their capability to join a system or to contribute in facilitating it.6 Their truth is simply their adequacy, which makes the procedure following them possible. Their justification is entirely dependent on the success of this procedure. In sum, adequacy with its strong attachment to correspondence and coherence, is a truth condition, and it is a necessary condition as well to the constructing of the desired system. In contrast, immediate self-evidence is not a truth condition at all, according to Spinoza’s philosophy. Had such evidence been possible, the possibility of the desired system would have been denied. Adequacy and immediate evidence are by all means incompatible. Spinoza understands “natural light,” “evidence,” and “clarity and distinctness” quite differently from any Cartesian. He grants these concepts unique meanings, serving his philosophy alone.

3.2  T  he Interdependence of the Truth Conditions and the Problem of the Attributes 3.2.1  T  he Truth Condition of Adequacy and Its Link with Unity 3.2.1.1  The Attribute as an Adequate Causal Chain 2p7s reads: the thinking Substance and the extended Substance are one and the same Substance, which is now comprehended under this Attribute, now under that. So also a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. … For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different Attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the Attribute of Extension, or under the Attribute of Thought, or

6  On the “Euclidean bias” researching Spinoza’s philosophy see Isaac Franck, “Spinoza’s Logic of Inquiry: Rationalist or Experientalist?” in Kennington (1980), pp.  248–250 and 257–60. Nevertheless, I do not think that at this point Spinoza follows Aristotle. He rather chooses his own way, which proceeds in two ways—a priori one and a posteriori one (in different meanings from those that Franck has in mind). Below I will discuss these two ways according to Spinoza. A wellestablished criticism of ascription of any self-evidence to the Ethics’s definitions and axioms is by Bennett (1984, pp. 293–318). See also Richard Kennington, “Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Kennington (1980), pp. 293–318. I will discuss this problem at Sections 5.1 and 5.21 below.

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under any other Attribute, we shall find one and the same order, that is, one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another. When I said that God is the cause of the idea, say of a circle, only insofar as he is a thinking thing, and [the cause] of the circle, only insofar as he is an extended thing, this was for no other reason than because the formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that mode again through another, and so on, to infinity. Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, that is, the connection of causes, through the Attribute of Thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of Extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the Attribute of Extension alone. I understand the same concerning the other Attributes. So of things as they are in themselves, God is really the cause insofar as he consists of infinite Attributes. …

This Scholium introduces in a nutshell the question with which we are dealing in the following sections: the unity of the Attributes. Note that parallelism, in contrast, is highly misleading in this context, as the Attributes make one and the same Reality, namely, the thinking Substance and the extended Substance, which are simply the same Substance considered in two ways. This unity of Attributes is one of the two truth conditions of the desired system of knowledge. The other is adequacy or containing (comprising). Both conditions are inseparably interwoven or interconditioned. In the coherent system of Nature, each real individual thing is a link in an infinite (total) causal chain, which is not conditioned by any cause whatsoever. This causal chain “exists in itself and conceived by itself.” If a thing cannot join this chain, such a thing must be identical with one of its links. Such a thing is not a link in this unconditioned and infinite causal chain, but it is a link in another infinite causal chain, and both chains are but one and the same chain, which is considered, revealed or distinguished in two ways.7 Any singular (namely, individual or particular) thing, following from God’s eternal necessity, is a real thing (2p45s), namely, a finite mode of an Attribute of God. Bodies and thoughts cannot join each other to make one total causal chain. No necessary connections of entailment or causation can link thoughts and bodies together. Bodies are extended things whereas thoughts are not extended things and are neither causing nor caused by them. If you think otherwise, namely that extended things can cause or be caused by thoughts, you must face perplexing difficulties, the basis of which is the aporetic duality of thought and extension (considering 1a5). Indeed, Spinoza is aware of the Cartesian failure in meeting the psychophysical perplexity (5pref, particularly G IV: 279ff.) as well as in meeting the epistemological perplexity concerning the mental representation of external objects (the problem mentioned by Caterus in the first set of Objections to Descartes’s Meditations). For Spinoza, no causal bond or intelligible entailment can exist between thoughts and 7  Cf. Wetlesen (1979), pp. 39–42 and notes 25 and 27 on pp. 415–6. Wetlesen relies upon Gueroult. My interpretation differs from theirs.

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bodies. Such bond or entailment must be inconceivable under Spinoza’s philosophy, which is neither materialist nor idealist.8 Spinoza could not accept any such reductive “solutions.” Thus, according to him, the reality of either bodies or thoughts is absolutely irreducible. This is understandable, for Spinoza’s philosophy constantly holds to the postulate that reality is infinitely and irreducibly ample or abundant. Against this background, he must prove that bodies and thoughts as well as the Attribute of Thought and that of Extension as a whole are identical or “united.” Equally, he must prove that all thoughts are necessarily interconnected, and the same holds for all bodies. It is impossible to tell how particular, real things follow, ensue, result or are deduced from an Attribute. This impossibility necessarily results from the limitation of the a priori procedure to reconstruct the desired system. The condition, which renders possible the joining of any real individual thing as a link in a total causal chain or as a mode in an Attribute, is adequacy, namely being comprehended, included, or comprised. Again, the desired system is the total system of knowledge of the entire system of reality. This total ontological system is Substance or Nature,

8  Nothing in interpreting Spinoza’s theory of the Attributes can be more remote from the simple truth than “Spinoza is best regarded as a kind of materialist, more metaphysically sophisticated Hobbes, anxious to incorporate into his philosophy Cartesian insights which Hobbes could not appreciate, but a materialist nonetheless” (Curley 1988, p. xiv). The same holds for Donald Davidson’s interpretation according to which Spinoza is an anomalous monist, which Della Rocca analyzes in some detail (1996, pp. 152–6; cf. 2008, pp. 103–4). As a matter of fact, no real affinity exists between Spinoza’s view and Davidson’s on this issue. From the latter’s viewpoint the psychophysical as well as the mental is anomalous, namely, they are not subject to strict laws, and the mental supervene on the physical, which is by no means Spinoza’s view. In his view, Thought is as subject to laws as Extension is, for the strict laws of nature are valid for the mental and the physical alike. Second, as entirely independent and unconditioned, the mental cannot supervene on the physical, Thought by no means supervene on Extension. Spinoza and Davidson also differ in the way in which they see causality: Spinoza excludes the possibility of any causal chain consisting of both physical and mental links, which is entirely different from the way in which Davidson understood causality. Davidson, quite mistakenly, begins his “Spinoza’s Causal Theory of the Affects” thus: “Our bodies constitute the essential link between our minds and the rest of nature” (in Yovel [ed.], 1999b, p. 95). But this is Davidson’s view, not Spinoza’s. Davidson, like many other readers of Spinoza, did not understand what it meant that the mind as the idea of the body is our indispensable medium of any knowledge. Thus, it is not the body that essentially links our minds to the rest of nature. It is undoubtedly Spinoza’s view that minds can be linked to other minds only. If Davidson’s view is that a mental event “must be physically describable” (Della Rocca 1996, p. 155), such is by no means Spinoza’s view. For, according to Spinoza, although the ideatum and the idea are one and the same thing, they are quite two, irreducible modes, either is considered in or under a different Attribute (2p7s). Thus, a person’s mind and his or her body are not one and the same, for they are different modes in different Attributes, yet it is one and the same person. Despite some similarities that Della Rocca ascribes both Spinoza and Davidson (even to the extent that “Spinoza’s position is very similar to Donald Davidson’s” [Della Rocca 2008, p. 103] concerning the psychophysical question), the difference between their views certainly overweighs any similarity of them (which also exists): Davidson is an empiricist, following Quine and adding the third dogma of empiricism to stabilize his empiricism, whereas Spinoza’s stance is a very unique mixture of both empiricism and rationalism, of the a posteriori and a priori procedures in constructing the desired system.

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which contains with it all its links-particulars, which are the mode of Substance under particular Attribute. Comprising or inclusion is the relationship between the cause of all things and these things as its effects. This causal chain is by no means linear, for the bonds between the links of the chain create a network. All the links are interconnected and interdependent, although the dependence of the links on the chain as a whole is prior to the conditioning of the whole by the links. Owing to this interdependence the total order of causes makes a system of coherence. Hence, the system’s first truth condition concerns the particularizing to infinity (ad infinitum) of any Attribute to its modes. This means that, following the first truth condition of the system, any Attribute, which is a coherent ontological system, consists of an infinite number of modes. The second truth condition of the system is the unity, identity, or correspondence of all the Attributes, namely, of all the modes that are not contained in the same Attribute, or of all the links that are not included in the same total causal chain. The system needs these two necessary conditions, which are also its truth conditions. Yet, against the background of the previous sections of the chapter, a more meticulous analysis clarifies that fulfilling the first condition, the condition of adequacy, is quite enough, for its fulfillment entails also the fulfillment of the second condition: If the causal chain is infinite and unconditioned, then any real individual thing, which is not included in this chain, is identical with (although differently expressed) one of the links-modes of this very same chain. Thus, the adequacy condition guarantees, by entailment, the correspondence condition of the system. Every thing which fulfills the adequacy conditions, also fulfills the correspondence condition of the total system, of the infinite causal chain. Nevertheless, if any real individual thing does not find its place in one of these chains and if it were not be identical with one of its links-modes, the entire system would collapse. Imagine, for instance, a particular body or any extended thing or event that has no corresponding link in Thought. Since no extended thing can be integrated into Thought, this extended thing would have had no place in the system, and the system would have lacked this possibility, and, hence, would have been imperfect, finite, and conditioned. Thus, if the identity-unity (correspondence) condition had not been fulfilled, the adequacy condition would not have been fulfilled, either. Had no extended mode corresponding to any of the modes of Thought, been found, then the chain of thoughts we know about, would not have been an Attribute at all, that is, a total and unconditioned chain. That chain of thoughts would not have made a total, coherent system. In this case, it would have been impossible to construct a one, total system, in which any real individual thing could be located and by which it could be completely intelligible. Complete intelligibility can be achieved only by an intellect that understands only what can be linked with the most comprehensive whole. Any limitation or break in such a linking or connection would have jeopardized understanding and intelligibility. If we had had two major systems, each of which is coherent but independent of the other and separate from it, a problematic duality would have arisen. A duality that should be surmounted, if we aspire to a comprehensive, complete rational explanation—an overall comprehensive system—which is unconditioned by and independent of anything external.

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In 2p7s Spinoza assumes that all the thinking modes together are included in Thought (namely, the Attribute of Thought), while all the extended modes together are included in Extension. The same connection and order, the same total order of nature, well exists in any of the Attributes, but is manifested or considered under different Attributes in different ways. Although Spinoza (and we) knows only two Attributes, he assures us that the same order and connection is well kept in any other Attribute. On what ground can he assure us this as to the two known Attributes and equally to any other Attribute? Not only the total, all comprehensive order of nature is one and the same under any Attribute, but God, consisting of infinite Attributes, is also the cause of all things as they are in themselves (ut in se sunt; reconsider the end of 2p7s). That is, the one and the same order-connection is not only total but also absolute. But on what ground can Spinoza assure this, considering that we know only two of God’s infinite Attributes? 3.2.1.2  K  nowing but Two of the Attributes as an Obstacle to Constructing the Final System As long as we certainly do not know that every Attribute comprises in itself all the real individual things considered as its finite modes, the postulate that every Attribute is infinite in its kind has still to be implemented. Every Attribute is a coherent causal chain, which is one immanent cause, the cause of itself that is the cause of all things of the same kind. An Attribute is the entire reality as it is manifested or considered as a total, namely, infinite, and unconditioned system. But only Substance is the absolutely total system, the full, complete, exhaustive system. In any case, the system is expressed and explicated in a particular and fixed way by any of its finite modes. As intelligible, as conceived by an intellect, the system necessarily meets the truth conditioned as a single, unified condition. Affirming or identifying an Attribute as infinite in its kind, and as total and unconditioned, requires negating all the other Attributes. Each Attribute comprises everything in it, because each particular real thing contained in each of the other Attributes, is included also in this Attribute as one of its finite modes that are manifested in a particular, unique way exclusively in this Attribute. The Infinite Intellect identifies all the Attributes, distinguishes one from the rest of them, and discerns each in itself. In order to achieve all this, the intellect requires two means, two that are actually one—identification (or affirmation) and negation. The Infinite Intellect recognizes each Attribute as conceived by itself and as exists in itself, only if it exhaustively knows all the finite modes of this Attribute, and negates, by way of affirming this Attributes, all the other Attributes. This Attribute is infinite in its kind and not absolutely infinite, because all that exists in it exists also in all the other Attributes, yet all the manifestations of the other Attributes are not included and cannot be included in it. Identifying and recognizing an Attribute consist of negating everything that does not exist in it, because all that exists differently as another manifestation in another Attribute. In other words, affirming as such the unconditioned, however infinite (total) in its kind, requires a confirmation by the absolutely

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infinite knowledge—the knowledge of Substance, Nature, or God. This is the confirmation or affirmation of the knowledge about all the Attributes as entirely united. Do not misunderstand what I have said: the intellect does not need other Attributes to conceive one of them.9 Otherwise, one of the Spinoza’s first assumptions would have been invalidated, namely, the Attribute is unconditioned, because it is conceived by itself alone. We need other Attributes only to ensure that the Attribute under discussion is an Attribute and not another infinite being or finite one, which does not comprise the whole of Reality. Only for this objective do we need the “affirmative negation” for all other Attributes, for their negation in the Attribute under discussion and to the affirmation of the same order in any and all of them. In other words, what we need is a means of identification to identify Thought and Extension as infinite and unconditioned Attributes. We should distinguish between means of identification and means of conception of infinite beings. We should also distinguish between an infinite unconditioned being (the Attribute) and a conditioned infinite being (the infinite mode). Each infinite mode is total, nevertheless it is conditioned by the Attribute to which it belongs and by means of which they are conceived. Each mode exists within an Attribute. Consequently, to know for certain that all thoughts on the one hand and all extended things on the other satisfy the conditions of adequacy and of being included in a system, we must secure the condition of the unity of the system. To secure it, one must know all the Attributes. In absence of such knowledge, we cannot be sure that all the bodies, for instance, will integrated into one and the same totally comprehensive system. We also cannot be sure then that the two known all-­encompassing systems, Thought and Extension, are but two sides of one and the same system. Finally, we also cannot be sure then that each real being is body and thought alike. We have to face the following question: Does Spinoza’s philosophy, although it requires the knowledge of two Attributes, facilitate or allow the knowledge of other Attributes? Only in the Short Treatise can we find sentences in which the author states that “so far” we have known only two Attributes (op. cit., I, Ch. 1, Sec. 7, note 3; I, Ch. 7, Sec. 1, note 1).10 Nevertheless, we know that all the other Attributes exist. How? The infinite Attributes themselves, states the author, “tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what they are” (op. cit., Sec. 8, Note C, Curley I: 64). At Letter 64, though, a negative answer is rather given: “the mind’s power of 9  Contrary to Joachim (1940), pp. 110–1. In this matter, Joachim endorses a Hegelian interpretation. The conception of any Attribute requires this Attribute alone and no other Attribute. Hence, Thought does not need to transcend itself in order to identify itself in its “other,” contrary to op. cit., p. 111. 10  At TdIE 22, Spinoza writes about the supreme grade of knowledge that “the things I have so far been able to know by this grade of knowledge have been very few.” Among these things the mindbody identity is mentioned. Does this indicate or hint that one of the tasks of this kind of knowledge is to know the other Attributes? In Sect. 6.2 below, I will discuss the a posteriori (“analytic”) procedure of the attempt of constructing the desired system. This procedure pertains to the supreme grade of knowledge by means of which we may gain the possibility of knowing other Attributes, if we recognize individual things that cannot be integrated into any of the two known Attributes.

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understanding extends only to those things which this idea of the Body contains as far as that which this idea of the body contains in itself, or which follow from it,” but “this idea of the Body neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God than Extension and Thought” (G IV: 277, Curley II: 438). By means of the only way that we can know anything, namely, by means of the knowledge of our body, we thus can know but two Attributes. All we know are bodies and thoughts. The essence of the mind, which determines our epistemic capability, is an idea of an actual body, and our epistemic capability is confined only to what that body reflects. We know ourselves only as caused by God as the Thinking Substance or as the Extended Substance. Hence, we can know only two Attributes out of the infinite number of them. According to 1p10, “each Attribute of a Substance must be conceived through itself.” From this proposition Spinoza must “conclude that the human mind can attain knowledge of no other Attribute of God than these two” (op. cit., G IV: 278; S: 299). Now, this answer by Spinoza is aimed at two persons: Schuller and, by means of him, Tschirnhaus. Schuller attempts to link the problem under discussion with the existence of many worlds, the number of which is that of God’s Attributes (Letter 63), which Spinoza explicitly rejects in Letter 64. This rejection has to do with Spinoza’s view on the all-comprehensive system: there must be only one such system, and the alleged existence of numerous worlds, each is independent of the others, is not compatible with the demand to construct a total system. Even if any such world were self-caused and entirely intelligible, the idea of numerous such worlds cannot satisfy our need to understand all that exists. Moreover, such an idea cannot secure even the intelligibility of each such world in itself, for the question arises why the lawfulness of such a world is not sufficient to link to it all the other worlds and to understand them. If such lawfulness is total, it should cover the other worlds too, but such is not the case at all. Nevertheless, Tschirnhaus does not accept this answer that Spinoza provides, and, thus, he furthermore asks him: “why [does] the Mind, which represents a certain Modification, a Modification expressed not only in Extension, but also in infinite other ways, why, I ask, does the Mind perceive only the Modification expressed through Extension, i. e., the human Body, and no other expression through other attributes?” (Letter 65, G IV: 279, Curley II: 440). Spinoza’s famous answer in Letter 66 rests upon 2p7s and 1p10. To understand his intricate answer, we must assume that minds are not accessible to each other. I cannot have another person’s thoughts. What Spinoza says in Letter 17 (G IV: 77–8) about “telepathic” communication does not deny this assumption; on the contrary, it strengthens it. For the intimate relationship between the father and the son, which the Letter discusses, is a connection of kinship, participation, and the like, which is based upon imagination, association, time, bodily states, and the attention to them. All these are factors relating to imagination and bodily changes (2p17 till p18s). According to Spinoza, then, a telepathic communication is at the end a connection between bodies including their changes, a connection of which we are aware. Now, if no person can have the thoughts of another person, all the more so the thoughts of any superhuman mind. Suppose that such a superhuman mind grasps its body not only under the Attribute of Extension but also under all the other infinite Attributes, of which we know nothing. The human mind, in contrast, cannot conceive its body

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under any of these unknown Attributes, for our finite mind has no accessibility to such superhuman minds. Moreover, there is no immediate connection between any mind and another. The only connection that they may have must be between their bodies alone. Each of these bodies affects the other, and these affects are conceived by the relevant mind. Since my mind is simply the idea of a particular actual body, my mind is aware of all the changes that this body undergoes. These changes reflect the affect of other bodies on my body, and, finally, the whole of the nature on my body. After all, Extension is continuous with no breaks or any vacuum at all. The connection between my mind and other minds is simply the connection between all their bodies, as this connection reflects in their minds. The Infinite Intellect alone can combine all the minds, all the cognitions or the ideas of the body as they are revealed in all the Attributes. This intellect combines them into one coherent system. The human mind can perceive particular bodies, namely, the human bodies alone. The more capable that a human body is of existing and of operating, so its mind is capable of conceiving more things and understanding them (following 2p13s). The perception of the human body is, for Spinoza, the indispensable medium of every kind of knowledge. Moreover, the mind cannot know or perceive itself immediately but only by means of the affections of its body (2p23). Even the reflexivity, which is an idea about another idea and not about any body, does not exist unless, in the final account, there is a particular body that some idea is its perception. The idea in question is of an actually existing body, of a mode in the Attribute of Extension, “and nothing more” (2p13). Why is this? Because our mind and body are such that we cannot know anything but the modes in which our body is revealed in the Extension and not in other Attributes, and we are not aware of anything but of the idea in which that body is revealed under Thought. It exists and is revealed there only as our mind. Nevertheless, we may ask furthermore: What is the reason(s) for these limitations or restrictions and how can we justify them? This question may be answered in the spirit at the end of 1App.: God “did not lack material to create all things, from the highest degree of perception to the lowest;… because the laws of his nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing all things which can be conceived by an [the]11 Infinite Intellect.” Our body has its own place in the whole of nature. Its singularity pertains, among other things, to this unique property: this body can be perceived by us only as a mode of Extension that is perceived  No definite or indefinite article exists in Spinoza’s Latin. Curley decided to translate this sentence in inserting the indefinite article. My view is quite different, since, as the reader will realize below, according to this view, there is only one Infinite Intellect, which is God’s intellect. I am quite sure that this is one of the points in which Curley completely misinterpreted Spinoza’s philosophy. Although Curley’s translation of the Ethics is quite accurate, it lacks the poetic, most beautiful, style and soul of Spinoza’s philosophy, which has had such attraction for romantic minds. Jakob Klatzkin’s Hebrew translation of the Ethics succeeded magnificently in capturing this poetic style. Unlike French, English, and German, Hebrew, like Latin, is a naturally poetic language, namely, in quite a few words you may write or say much as these languages are particularly compact. Poetry in German is Dichtung, which refers to the compact quality of poetry. Especially poetic is the language of the Hebrew bible. No less compact is the language of the Talmud.

11

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as an idea in Thought “and nothing more.” In reality, as a whole, there exists an infinitude of minds, which is an infinitude of ideas of an infinitude of bodies, each of which is a singular that is different from all the others. Because of this, Substance is an infinitely ample being, lacking nothing. Were it to lack anything, such as things that can be perceived or known under two Attributes alone, such a “substance” would not have been perfect and absolutely infinite or total. Were the human being, with all of its limitations, have been lacked and would not have existed, this reality would not have been all-encompassing Substance. What characterizes human beings is, among other things, their capability to know only these two Attributes. This is one of the negations that pertain to human beings, this is one of the negations that determine our being human beings (cf. Hallett 1957, p. 43 note). By means of perceiving my particular body I know all that causes it and all that it causes, and, by this way, I become familiar with causal chain in two of its revelations that we know. By means of the link between my body and all other bodies, I know their influence on it and its influence on them, as I am aware of this influence or can be aware of it, according to my attention under particular circumstances. Yet, there is another way to know my body, which is the way that the Infinite Intellect conceives it. The Infinite Intellect conceives it as I perceive it and as it is considered my mind on the one hand, and as this body is perceived by other minds, human or otherwise, among which there are minds whose bodies are quite different from any human body, although they all, as links in the same causal chain, share the same Attribute, namely, Extension. The Infinite Intellect joins together into one knowledge all these cognitions of my body and about it, while emending all of their mistakes and completing all that they miss. In this way I solve the problem of the equivoque of the concept “idea” in Spinoza’s philosophy: idea in the formal sense and in the objective one. In the formal sense, the idea is the mind or the mental correlate of the body, of the ideatum, whereas in the objective sense, the idea is the knowledge or the conception, namely, the idea about a particular object. Were that problem unsolvable, the Attributes’ unity (correspondence, or “parallelism”) would be endangered if not simply foiled. The correspondence between the extended things and thoughts (such as mentioned in 2p7s) depends upon the sense of the term “idea.” Either of the two senses of it should be chosen.12 In 2p17c, s Spinoza distinguishes between Peter’s idea, on the one hand, which is Peter’s mind, namely, the self-knowledge of Peter’s body that immediately expresses the essence of Peter’s body and, on the other hand, the idea that Paul has of Peter. The latter idea indicates more of Paul’s body than that of Peter. It indicates

 Hallett suggests a solution to that problem in “On a Reputed Equivoque in the Philosophy of Spinoza,” in Kashap (1974), pp. 168–188. He thus answers Barker and Pollock back. See H. Barker, “Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza’s Ethics I–III,” in op. cit., pp. 101–167. Also consider Rander (1971); Margaret D. Wilson, “Objects, Ideas, and ‘Minds’: Comments on Spinoza’s Theory of Mind,” in Kennington (1980), pp. 103–120; Allison (1975), pp. 103–4, 220, note 15; Mark, “Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Ideas,” in Shahan and Biro (1978), p. 22 and pp. 32–3, note 22; and Bennett (1984), pp. 155–8. My suggested solution to that problem differs from theirs.

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the way in which that Paul’s body is affected by Peter’s. The essence of Peter’s body is thus reflected partly, indirectly, and even distortedly to some extent by the mediation of Paul’s images. Moreover, the idea that absolutely adequately reflects the essence of Peter’s body as it really is, as it is in itself, is not Peter’s mind alone (consult 2p24 and 1p28 & s), and certainly it is not the idea that Paul has of that essence, but it is a complex idea pertaining to the Infinite Intellect. This idea, which belongs to the Infinite Intellect alone, most adequately reflects the essence of Peter’s body as a cause and an effect as well in the adequate total causal chain. Here, the essence of Peter’s body serves as a unique and indispensable link within this chain, as it is truly (or as it is in itself) expressed or revealed in Extension. In other words, this essence is a finite mode of Extension. Inadequate, partial, mistaken, or false as it may be, the idea that Paul has of Peter contains some information about Peter’s body, about the way that it affects Paul’s body and arouses particular images in it (Spinoza assumes that images, unlike ideas, are bodily). This information is a part of the true and adequate knowledge about the singular essence of Peter’s body. Hence, the absolutely true and entirely adequate idea of and about the essence of Peter’s body, the complete and absolute knowledge of it, is the idea that pertains to the Infinite Intellect alone. This idea is the complete emendation of the idea of Peter’s body and of all the ideas about it, as they are combined together into one idea that is the absolutely true and adequate knowledge of this body as it really is, as it is in itself, in its complete singularity. All the ideas about this body are the ideas of all the extended bodies that are affected by this body or cause it, as all these bodies are considered, revealed, and expressed by all the Attributes, by the infinitude of Attributes. This idea that pertains to the Infinite Intellect alone is the absolute idea of Peter’s body, the ideatum of that idea and the object of the knowledge about him. This idea is a clear and distinct, in a word— adequate—link in the adequate and total causal chain of all the distinct and clear ideas of all things as they are considered under the infinitude of the Attributes. From the viewpoint of the Infinite Intellect (and partly our finite intellect insofar as it participates in the infinite one and thus has various clear and distinct ideas), the total correspondence and adequacy are completely maintained (which comprises the infinitude of Attributes and all of their modes or causal links). The complete unity of the Attributes and their adequacy as well are adequately and completely reflected in the Infinite Intellect, which comprises an adequate and true conception of Thought. The Infinite Intellect has the absolute knowledge of the absolutely infinite (total) intellect. Nevertheless, our finite intellect, which has no such knowledge, since it does not know the infinitude of Attributes and their unity, cannot a priori guarantee that the complete chain of bodies and that of thoughts are total and unconditioned chains, each reflecting in its own special way the whole of nature, and each is an Attribute. All we know is but some parts of a part of them all. Since such is the case, we have no a priori guarantee that the piece of knowledge we have can join the continuous total causal chain, in which each thing in nature has its place. With no such guarantee, we cannot be sure about the fate of the desired system, even if it is considered in one of the Attributes. Only a total and unconditioned conception of

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all existing things and their order means that all other total and unconditioned conceptions are of the very same existing things and their order. Against this background, it is impossible to accept the following statement in Letter 56 literally: I don’t say that I know God completely, but only that I know some of his attributes, not all of them. Certainly being ignorant of most of them does not prevent my knowing some. When I began to learn Euclid’s Elements, I understood first that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. I understood this property of the triangle clearly, though I was ignorant of many other properties of the same triangle. (G IV: 261; Curley II: 423).

When Tschirnhaus attempts to make a comparison between what one may deduce from geometrical definitions and what is deducible from the concept of extension (Letter 82, G IV: 334), Spinoza’s responds: “as for what you add—that from the definition of each thing, considered in itself, we can deduce only one property— perhaps this is correct for very simple things, or beings of reason [entia rationis] (under which I include shapes also), but not for real things [entia realia” (Letter 83, G IV: 335; Curley 487). Although God’s Attributes are not discussed at this point but only God’s properties (necessary existence, uniqueness, immutability, infinitude, and the like), yet in Letter 56 Spinoza discusses the relationship between a triangle’s properties and its definition or between the properties themselves. According to this Letter, this relationship is analogous to that between the known and unknown God’s Attributes. Nevertheless, all Spinoza has said about this subject foils the analogy in question. If I do not know all the Attributes or if I cannot be sure that the two known Attributes are all of them (also for the Infinite Intellect), then I am not entitled to state with complete confidence or guarantee that I know even two Attributes. Another problem should bother us. Since real infinitude and numbers or multiplicity is entirely incompatible according to Letter 12 (Curley I, pp. 203–204) and 81 (Curley II: 484–5), why cannot the two known Attributes be considered the infinitude of Attributes? After all, infinitude means totality, and if the two Attributes constitute the totality, the whole, of the Attribute, we do not need more than two Attributes to conclude that we know all of them. In other words, should even the Infinite Intellect conceive just two of them? Why should two Attributes not exhaust the entire reality including all its infinite and unconditioned manifestations?13 We  See A. Wolf, “Spinoza’s Conception of the Attributes of Substance,” in Kashap (1974), pp. 25–7. “Infinite” means “complete, the whole, or exhaustive,” and thus there is no reason why two would not be infinite! One can say, “the infinitude of the Attributes” means “at least two, maybe more.” In any case, infinite does not mean innumerable. But see Hallett (1930), p. 291, note 2, according to which it is impossible for two Attributes to be all of them. Also see G. L. Kline, “On the Infinity of Spinoza’s Attributes,” in Hessing (1977), pp. 345 ff. He too suggests that “infinity” is not “innumerable,” and “the infinity of Attributes” is “all the existing Attributes with no exception.” I deem Wolf’s view a correct one, for the two known Attributes cannot exhaust all of them, as this is one of the prominent mark of a finite intellect. Humans are not the measure of all things (or the whole of reality). Thus, knowing only two Attributes or not knowing whether they are all the Attributes or not is the mark of the finitude of humans. Bennett too interprets “infinite” as “total” and re-raises the question whether there are more Attributes (Bennett 1984, pp. 75–9). His answer involves the

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should not confine the Infinite Intellects into the bounds of a finite intellect. Spinoza has to assume that no necessity exists that the two known Attributes would exhaust all the infinite and unconditioned manifestations of Substance. All the more so, because he emphasizes the reality or objectivity of the Attributes despite the fact that they are realized by the Infinite Intellect, which is a mode. Having considered all the above, we remain with our problem: since we do not know the infinitude of the Attributes or, at least, we do not know whether the two Attributes are all the Attributes there are, we have no full guarantee that we even know simply two of them. It is still possible that what we believe to be the two Attributes, are not Attributes at all. This skeptical tune leaves its mark on Spinoza’s philosophy. It raises the possibility that knowing two Attribute does not ensure an adequate and systematic knowledge even within the realm of any of them. Despite 2a5 and 2p13,14 the readers may detect a shred of doubt in the end of the following proposition: “The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else) (3p2, my italics). How can we be sure about any of the two known Attributes? How can we be sure that all the bodies joining together, according to the laws of movement and rest, to construct Extension? Do bodies differ from one another in movement and rest alone (to follow 2 l1) and not in other respects? On what grounds is Spinoza entitled to assume that portions of Extension should resist joining to an Attribute, should not be integrated into one causal chain of movement and rest, and, thus, should not constitute one coherent nature, which is a total individuum? Could not other Attributes, which are not Extension, still be included in Extension? Could each of these Attribute have equal status to Extension, like Thought?15 Even if Spinoza had denied us the possibility of knowing other Attributes, how he could be sure that all extended things would not constitute one causal chain but two of them instead? For instance, light as a wave and light as a particle do not constitute one and the same causal chain, although each of them is extended and both are moving and may be at rest. Each pertains to a different causal chain, none of which can provide us with exhaustive explanation of the light phenomenon, although either chain serves us in understanding and detecting this phenomenon. The field as a system view that the Ethics is compatible with Attributes’ dualism (op. cit., p. 78), which is the ground to the fact that we know only two of them. I do not accept these answers and views. 14  The demonstration of this proposition concludes that the mind’s object “is the existing Body and nothing else” (2p13d; my italics). Furthermore, Spinoza argues that “if the object of the human Mind were not the Body, the ideas of the affections of the Body would not be in God … insofar as He constituted our Mind, but insofar as He constituted the mind of another thing, i.e., … the ideas of the affections of the Body would not be in our Mind; but … we have ideas of the affections of the body” (op. cit., Curley I: 457). The question is whether such ideas can be found. Be that as it may, Short Treatise suggests the following view: “I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of Extension, but also the modes of the infinite Attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of Extension do” (Part 2, Appendix 2, Section 9; Curley I: 154). Cf. op. cit., Sect. 12. All this is entirely compatible with the Short Treatise’s view according to which till now we have know two of the Attributes. 15  Cf. Curley 1969, pp. 144 ff.

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and the particles belonging to another system serve to explain the same phenomenon, since either is sufficient or satisfactory to provide us with a really adequate explanation. The same order of nature is thus described and explained under two different systems of description and explanation. Finally, what may help us to avoid a false identification of extended systems that are not sections of one and the same Extension, which do not pertain to the same Attribute of Extension? Owing to the unity of the Attributes, the difficulties we have to face in Extension must appear differently in Thought. In either case, we have one and the same medium of knowledge, namely, the idea of our body. This idea conceives all the changes that our body undergoes. How can we know further Attributes by means of this indispensable medium of knowledge?16 If we have no idea about the way in which the ideatum of our mind, namely, our body, is expressed or revealed in another Attribute, we know of no other Attribute than Thought and Extension. The mind may have such an idea not by self-reflection or self-inspection but only by means of experience. In other word, the possibility of knowing further Attribute(s) is simply empirical. Of course, the experience is not the origin of our knowledge about the Attributes but it is, nevertheless, a condition /for such knowledge. Spinoza helps us greatly at that point: You ask me whether we need experience to know whether the Definition of any Attribute is true. To this I reply that we need experience only for those things which cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing, as, for example, the existence of Modes (for this cannot be inferred from the definition of the thing); but not for those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence, and therefore is inferred from their definition. Indeed no experience will ever be able to teach us this, for experience does not teach any essences of things. The most it can do is to determine our mind to think only of certain essences of things. So since the existence of the attributes does not differ from their essence, we will not be able to grasp it by any experience. (Letter 10, Curley I: 196).

Indeed, we know the Attribute a priori alone, not by means of empirical generalization or induction. The knowledge of any Attribute pertains to the system’s principles and to rational order, in which the data of experience should be organized, emended, and understood. These principles are about necessary connections. Though this knowledge a priori exists in our mind, we need the experience to discover how these principles are embodied in empirical reality. Hence, it is only experience that may  The intricate question of how can we know further Attributes has bothered some interpreters. See Myers (1944), pp.  46–57; and Alexander (1921). I do not find Myers’s suggestion for further Attributes convincing. Anthropology, history, sociology, and economy undoubtedly employ aspects of reality, none of which is total or synoptic (contrary to Myers 1944, p. 51). The same holds for biology, for it deals with some parts of reality, not with the whole of it. Alexander suggests substituting Thought by Time. He considers space and time as all the attributes of reality, whereas thought is empirical, not a priori, and not absolute, which does not allow it to be considered an Attribute but simply an interrelationship between modes (Alexander 1921, p.  49). Substituting Thought by Time would render the infinity of other Attributes simply superfluous, for they would be unnecessary (op. cit., p. 56). But this does not suggest a solution to the problem under discussion. Alexander does not cope with the problems of Spinoza’s philosophy but rather imposes his own theory on this philosophy. I do not believe that such imposition would benefit either philosophy.

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refer our mind to data that require an order that is not of Extension or Thought, at least as we have known them till now. Equally, it has been experience that reveals to us that bodies and thought do not pertain to one and the same causal chain. For no one can empirically detect a causal chain between those so different modes. One billiard ball causes other ball to start moving but we cannot detect any thought that may cause such a movement. Even if we believe in miracles, in magic, and the like, we cannot detect such a causal connection; at most, one may believe in it with no empirical grounds and, according to Spinoza, with no rational grounds either. The distinction between Thought and Extension is by no means empirical as a result of an inductive generalization or reasoning; it is rather a conceptual, a priori distinction. Hence, the principles of a total and unconditioned system in which we would construct those new data in an order that would express differently the order of nature that has been known to us already, the origin of these principles must be a priori and not empirical. The knowledge of the known two Attributes serves in an important way: we never attempt to detect a causal connection between bodies and thoughts. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee that we have full confidence that all bodies will be integrated within Extension, as it has been known to us in an a priori knowledge. The same holds for Thought. As a result of the above, we realize that the a priori procedure, proceeding from causa sui to the individual things as effects, is not sufficient to construct the desired system. The a priori way is necessary to constructing it but not sufficient. The a posteriori way is no less indispensable. Employing the a priori principles to know and organize the empirical data results also in explicating, knowing, and understanding these principles more and better. The new organized data shed novel light on those principles. They may shed such a light on our knowledge of the Attributes in general and that of the two Attributes in particular. Spinoza’s desired system is a network in which a priori principles and a posteriori data and findings play crucial roles. The indispensability of both procedures, the a priori and the a posteriori, in constructing the desired system will be discussed in detail in Chap. 5 below. In any case, empirical data may assist us in understanding the two Attributes better, even in emending and completing each of them, if this would appear necessary. The knowing of God is not an a priori explication of an innate idea that we have, namely, the idea of God, which is known to everybody. To know God, we need a priori principles, on the one hand, and the a posteriori experience and the knowledge of individual things as emended, on the other. God consists of the desired system as a whole.

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3.3  T  he Problem of the Unity of the Attributes and the Possibility of Solving It 3.3.1  T  he Problem of the Unity of the Attributes and the Possibility of Its Emendation 3.3.1.1  T  he Problem of the Status of the Attribute of Thought and the Objections to the Unity of the Attributes The two truth conditions of the desired system are intervened and inter-conditioned. If the unity (“parallelism”) is not safe and sound, so must be the adequacy of each of the Attributes and, as a result, the adequacy of the system as a whole. Also, as a result, the desire to know any infinite (total) and unconditioned Attribute would fail. The intelligibility of each Attribute, as an infinite and unconditioned reality, depends entirely on the unity of all Attributes. If the Attribute of Thought were found to be more comprehensive than any other Attribute, this would render it inadequate, not correspondent, and unfit to constitute a total system. Hence, the problem of the Attributes’ unity is a key in attempting of dealing with the question of whether a philosophical system is possible according to Spinoza’s philosophy. As is well known, Tschirnhaus invested much of his thought in this question, and his questions-objections, immediately or by means of Schuller, were answered by Spinoza, but this still leaves us in some darkness. In Letter 70, Schuller writes that Spinoza’s answers as well as what he writes in the Ethics, are not satisfactory at all, because “in this way the Attribute of Thought is held to extend itself much more widely than the other attributes” (Letter 70, G IV: 302, Curley II: 462). Indeed, since there certainly are “ideas of ideas”—reflective ideas—the “parallelism” between Thought and any other Attribute, especially Extension, appears to be broken. Spinoza does not understand what is so difficult for Tschirnhaus to see what he means (Letter 72). The use of the metaphor “wider” should not render the good question forceless. If the question is ill-phrased, still its content is quite legitimate.17 Whenever I mention “the Attributes’ parallelism” I equally mean their “unity,” which I prefer. 2p7s discusses this unity or parallelism in the following words: “the thinking Substance and the extended Substance are one and the same Substance, which is now comprehended under this Attribute, now under that. So also a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.”

 See Joachim (1964), pp. 136–7. Spinoza himself employs “unitas” and “simul” interchangeably. See, for instance, 3p2s, referring to 2p7, which characterizes the relationship between physical changes in our body and the order of our mental changes as simul (G II: 141, line 28). Hence, “unity” and “parallel to” are used interchangeably with no difficulty at all. Spinoza is not so meticulous about the use of “unity” in the Short Treatise and even the TIdE, in which “unity” may serve simply as “adequacy.” In any case, the question as to the unity or parallelism of the Attributes is one of the gravest problems that Spinoza’s philosophy and its interpretation have certainly to face.

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Before I refer to some objections regarding the Attributes’ unity to which I will attempt to reply, I will discuss some obscure or intricate passages in Spinoza’s philosophy, which appear to obstruct the principle of the psychophysical unity. Obstructing such unity necessarily leads to foiling the Attributes’ unity as a whole.18 Many of Spinoza’s interpreters have been mistaken about his discussion, in Ethics 5, about the immortality of the soul.19 They believe that Spinoza himself jeopardizes the thesis of the psychophysical unity, for he states that “The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (5p23). Nevertheless, Spinoza does not convert his philosophy into Platonism or any other monistic psychophysical theory. His intention is quite clear, at least to me: the body’s essence and the mind’s essence are eternal; the body’s part, however, that passes away is expressed also in Thought. This part consists of the perceptions of our imagination and memory by which our mind perceives or conceives, in the first grade of knowledge (imaginatio), the body, its images, its causes and effects. Indeed, not far from 5p23, Spinoza states: “Whenever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact

 The question of Spinoza’s thesis of the psychophysical unity was recently discussed by Della Rocca (1996). But first I would like mention Odegard (1971) and Matson (1971). Odegard argues that Spinoza’s philosophy maintains this thesis, whereas Matson attempts to show that the psychophysical question does not disturb Spinoza at all. I prefer Odegard’s view to Matson’s. The best thing about Odegard’s view on this problem is its approach that Spinoza provides us with a synoptic, unique, and rich psychophysical theory that is not simply classifiable, though it is clear that it rejects any monistic psychophysical stance or any reductionist one, materialist and idealist alike; it also clearly rejects “neutral monism” (Odegard 1971, pp.  587–84). Margaret Wilson, “Objects, Ideas, and ‘Minds’: Comments on Spinoza’s Theory of Mind,” in Kennington (1980), pp. 103–120, criticizes both Spinoza’s thesis of unity and Odegard’s interpretation of it. She makes a crucial mistake in assuming that the mind of a person is identical to the idea that God has of that person’s body. God’s idea is the absolutely perfect idea of that body, an idea that is beyond the capability of any finite intellect, such as the human. Had Wilson carried out more profound research into Spinoza’s theory of truth and adequacy, she might have realized that the Attributes’ unity as well as the psychophysical one are well defended in his philosophy. See Errol Harris, “Body-Mind Relation in Spinoza’s Philosophy,” in Wilbur (1976), pp. 12–28. Yet I think that Harris fails in clarifying the relationship between time and eternity and between mind and body. Bennett (1981 and 1984, pp. 139–151) contributes his share to the debate, to which Wilson responds (1981, pp. 584–6, which Bennett answers (1984, p. 148). I disagree with Bennett over two points. First, the mode is not an Attribute’s property; it is rather the finite essence of an individual thing. Second, I do not accept his view on Attributes. I doubt whether Bennett succeeded in solving the problem of the Attributes’ unity and of the psychophysical one as well. Contrary to Bennett (op. cit., pp. 141, 143–4, the Attributes’ unity (he prefers “parallelism” or “identity” instead) does not consist upon properties-qualities identity, for Spinoza mentions affections that have no parallels, mental or physical, which I will discuss below shortly and which does not escape Bennett’s sharp eye (op. cit., pp. 268–9). My interpretation at the point entirely differs from his. I do not use the wrong term “psychophysical identity,” for such an identity does not exist in Spinoza’s philosophy, let alone an Attributes’ identity. Thought and Extension, mind and body, are by no means identical, they are rather united. Peter’s mind differs from Peter’s body, though Peter is one and the same person, a psychophysical unity. 19  In contrast, Garber 2005 and Garrett 2018 avoid this mistake and thus refer to the eternity of the essence of the mind as well as to that of the correspondent body’s essence. 18

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that it conceives the body’s present actual existence, but from the fact that it conceives the Body’s essence under a species of eternity” (5p29; cf. 5p30 & d.). Because of this, it is not surprising that Spinoza concludes: “He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greater part is eternal” (5p39). Yet, it is more difficult to face Spinoza’s explicit statement that cheerfulness, pleasure, melancholy, and pain “are chiefly related to the body, and are only species of joy or sadness” (3affects’ def., 3d). Even more challenging is his view that “as for the external affections of the body, which are observed in the affects—such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, etc.—I have neglected them, because they are related to the body only, without any relation to the mind” (3p59s; Curley I: 530; my italics).20 There are some excellent examples of this exception: neurological phenomena that have no mental origin or background, such as Tourette’s syndrome. All the ticks involved in this harsh syndrome, including the vocal ones, echolalia, obscene language, nervous movements, and the like bear no psychological meaning at all. Still, they are bodily affects, which one cannot ignore. Another difficulty is that we may surmise about mental affections or thoughts in general that have no physical indication, for instance, those affects whose origin is reason—the second grade of knowledge—or scientia intuitiva, the supreme grade of knowledge. What are the bodily expressions of such affects? Furthermore, what is the bodily expression of any reflective idea? An idea of an idea? A possible answer may be that all of these have some parallels in our brains which, in turn, will affect our whole body (hence, their affect is not confined to the nervous system alone but reflects on the body as a whole). When we are aware or conscious, our cerebral and nervous activity is quite different from those states in which we are not aware of something, or unconscious. After all, we are quite familiar with the fact that the brain’s waves are different in different mental states, in waking or in dreaming, in a conscious mental process or in an unconscious one. There is also a difference between our brain’s waves while we are thinking abstractly or concretely. Obviously, there is a difference in my physical state, when I am aware of some sensation or not. But all this is not enough to remove the doubt as to the psychophysical unity or parallelism. We have to find another solution to the problem of reflective thinking

 David Bidney (1940, pp. 38–41) considers this as a real problem in the way of the parallelism thesis. To this he adds 3p2s, according to which some occurrences in the body are not conscious to us, which manifestly contradicts 2p12, according to which we perceives everything that occurs in our body. Bidney believes that if Spinoza had acknowledged the existence of the unconscious or Leibnizean minute perceptions, he could argue 3p2s without violating the parallelism or the psychophysical unity. In such a case, the affects mentioned above would have unconscious parallel in the mind. As I see it, Tourette’s syndrome is nothing like that, as no unconscious parallels to the bodily affects under it exist in the mind. Wilson’s paper aforementioned and Bennett (1984, pp. 188–91) point out the difficulty to the parallelism thesis owing to the existence of those affects. To my mind, there is a possibility of reconstructing out of Spinoza’s philosophy a theory about the confined attention (see Sect. 4.3 below), which serves as an adequate substitute for the unconscious, Leibnizean or otherwise. Finally, Bidney adds another difficulty to the above: there are mental affects that have no physical parallels, such as the intellectual love of God. In Sect. 3.3.1.2 I will suggest a solution of my own to that problem.

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and the affects that are indicated in one of the Attributes alone. I will suggest such a solution in Sect. 4.222 below. First, I have to relate to some major objections on the thesis of the Attributes’ unity, all of which rely upon the idea that Thought is “wider” than any other Attribute and it comprises all of them (cf. Joachim 1964, pp. 243 ff.). First objection: If Thought reflects all the other Attributes, it is “wider” or “more comprehensive” than any of them. Basically, such is Tschirnhaus’s objection. Reply: 2p7s implies Spinoza’s epistemology and ontology, which should be considered as a reply also to Descartes and Caterus’s objection (the first set of objections to Descartes’s Meditation). The reply is that the act of perception and being perceived are one and the same act, which is “objectively” considered as a perception, whereas it is “formally” considered as being perceived. It is thus the nature of Thought and thinking that avoid any state in which Thought is “wider” than any other Attribute. If the Infinite Intellect, which knows all the Attributes in their unity, perceives the formal essence of any mode, as it is considered in Attribute A, and its manifestations in the infinitude of Attributes. The Infinite Intellect realizes the unity of each idea, which is knowledge of all the manifestations of that mode in all the Attributes. Each of these cognitions is a distinct idea in finite minds or intellect between which no connection exists. In the Infinite Intellect they rather constitute one and the same clear and distinct idea (as I explained in the former Section). It is the confinement or limitation of any finite intellect, as finite, that prevents it from perceiving all these cognitions in their unity, namely, as one and the same clear and distinct idea, an absolute idea in God’s Infinite Intellect. Nevertheless, the unity of the known Attributes is well retained even for any finite intellect. For instance, any movement-rest relation between bodies, which appears as a causal necessary relation in Extension, perceived by a finite intellect as a necessary connection or relation of reasons in Thought. To perceive and to be perceived is one and the same act, which is considered or manifested in the two known Attributes. Mind is simply a perceived body, and any perceived body is a mind, which is an idea. The amplitude of Thought is the same as the amplitude of Extension or of any other Attribute, insofar as that Attribute is conceived in Thought. In any Attribute, the way that this Attribute is conceived in Thought is also reflected in that Attribute. It is reflected in a unique way, which pertains to that Attribute alone, and this holds for any of the Attributes—each uniquely reflects the way it is manifested in any other Attribute.21 In this respect, Thought behaves like any other Attribute, each reflects any of the others in its own unique way. Second Objection: Reflexivity appears to characterize Thought alone, and each idea can serve as an object to infinitude of other ideas. This amplifies Thought with many ideas that appear to have no parallels in Extension or in any other Attribute. Reply: Maybe Hallett (1930, pp. 295–6) is right in arguing that the self-reflexive nature of Thought has a parallel in each of the other Attributes, for any Attribute, as

 Cf. Hallett’s response (1930), pp. 282–300 to the objections of Joachim and Alexander, and of Myers (1944), pp. 52–3.

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an adequate manifestation of Substance, represents and reflects all the other Attributes from its own perspective. Since Thought itself is one of these Attributes, it also reflects itself. This self-reflexivity bears the name “reflexivity” in Thought. Yet in my view reflexivity should be ascribed to Thought alone, and I do not agree with Hallett at that point. Ascribing reflexivity to Thought alone by no means foils the unity or parallelism of all the Attributes. I will discuss this at the next Section. Third Objection: Spinoza mentions adequate causes (3pdef3), and, as is well known, there are inadequate cognitions, inadequate ideas, of adequate causes and vice versa—there are adequate causes of inadequate ideas or cognitions. Each adequate cause can be inadequately cognized by finite minds, and not all of their ideas can be adequate. All adequate ideas pertain to the Infinite Intellect. Each mind that has only a finite intellect must have inadequate ideas too. As a result of this, the number of the ideas, adequate and inadequate alike, of adequate causes is greater than the number of these causes themselves; and since the order and connection of causes (as “things”) is the same as the order and connection of ideas, Thought is “wider” than Extension. Reply: It appears that this objection ignores or misinterprets Spinoza’s epistemology. According to this epistemology, the emendation of each idea consists of taking its positive, namely, true, nucleus, which any idea has, and by integrating it within its complete context.22 The mistaken ideas of something are simply partial parts of an adequate or true idea, which is an “intellectual idea,” or, in short, an intellect, all of whose partial ideas or parts are combined together, by means of the act of emendation, into one coherent unity of an intellectual idea. If we have such an idea or any adequate part of it, we share something with the Infinite Intellect (following 2p43s, the end of the scholium). As a result of this, each idea, however mistaken, takes some part in the Infinite Intellect idea(s), in which each adequate cause is conceived as one adequate idea, and in which exists a full correspondence between the total causal chain and the total order of ideas. Hence, if an inadequate idea is simply a partial manifestation of an intellectual idea, and if all its partial manifestations constitute together one coherent idea, then there is a full correspondence between all the cognitions, namely, ideas, of a particular adequate cause and that cause in itself. This correspondence is entirely compatible with the possibility of a true or adequate knowledge of an inadequate cause, for an inadequate cause is a partial cause (3def1) and the adequate knowledge, namely, the true idea, of this cause is simply its knowledge as a part of a complete or full cause, not as discrete or separated from its complete context. To ascribe super status to Thought may end in an absurd conclusion.23 Indeed, philosophy maintains a special affinity to Thought and thinking (cf. Hallett 1962,  Following 2p11c, 2p32 and 33, 4p1d & s, and more.  Such as Lascola (1975). Following Wolfson (vol. 1, 1958), pp.  234 ff., according to which Thought to Extension is like the Aristotelian form to matter, Lascola suggests that Thought may serves as a form to all the other Attributes (Lascola 1975, p. 204). Such a wrong suggestion is clearly incompatible with the necessary conditions of being an Attribute: absolute independence in existence and knowledge as well. No Attribute depends on anything else. Such is definitely not the

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p. 45), but this affinity does not entail that Thought is “wider” or more comprehensive than any other Attribute or that Thought enjoys a superior status. On the contrary, if a philosophy such as Spinoza’s attempts to attain adequately understanding, reflecting, or interpreting reality, such a philosophy should seek for a full correspondence between it, as an intellectual activity, and reality. This correspondence does not diminish even slightly the strong affinity between thinking or Thought and philosophy. Spinoza’s philosophy, as I see it, appears not to be compatible with any idealistic view that ascribes super status or priority to Thought.24 All the objections to the Attributes’ unity presented above cannot resist my criticism. Yet, we have to do more to strengthen the basis of this unity, for it is indispensable for the constructing the desired system. I will attempt to strengthen that basis in the following section. 3.3.1.2  T  he Solution of the Problem Under Discussion by Means of the Distinction Between Essence and Properties: Emotions and Reflexivity as Properties of Cognitions In the former chapter, I discussed essence, which is the factor of individuation and singular identity of any individual thing and which is a link in the immanent causal chain, a link which is manifested or expressed as an infinite mode of an Attribute. Now we are going to distinguish the essence of individual thing from its properties or qualities25 and to clarify in what way these properties are manifested in Thought, namely, knowledge or idea, on the one side, and cognitive or emotive properties, on the other. Cognitive properties consist of reflexivity, whereas emotive properties consist of emotions or affects. I am convinced that this distinction, if sufficiently clarified, will remove crucial difficulties from the way leading to better understanding of Spinoza’s theory regarding the Attributes’ unity and the duality, the alleged

case of the Aristotelian form and matter. They are interdependent one upon the other. One substance alone is exempt from such dependence, namely, the unmoved mover, which is a pure form, entirely independent upon any other substance, let alone any matter. Hence, Lascola actually suggests reductio ad absurdum of the interpretations by Joachim, Wolfson, and others. 24  Thus, I disagree with Robert N. Beck, “The Attribute of Thought,” in Wilbur (1976), pp. 1–12. Without referring to Lascola, Beck relates to the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form in order to ascribe a superior status to Thought (see op. cit., p. 9 and note 24 on p. 12). A recent defense of an idealistic interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy is suggested by Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2002 , 2004). 25  It was Quine who challenged the whole distinction between essence or essential properties and properties (or secondary properties), although it has been maintained for more than 2000 years of philosophy. Saul Kripke (1970) has proven that essences should not be dismissed and that they are quite useful, epistemologically and ontologically speaking. P. Teller (1975) points to the need for explanatory essences.

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duality, of knowledge and emotions in particular and between theory and praxis in general.26 2def2 defines essence thus: “to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing” (Curley I: 447). This essence’s definition is highly compatible with 2a3: “There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the ‘affects of the mind,’ unless there is in the same individual the idea of thing loved, desired, etc. But there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking” (Curley I: 448). This high compatibility is not an identity, for while the end of 2def2 states that essence can neither be nor be conceived without the thing, 2a3, nevertheless, ends in “there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking.” But this difference, however major, breaking the symmetry of the definition and the axiom, does not undermine the Spinozistic principle according to which the idea is the essence of the mind, while all the rest that pertains to that idea is simply a property or properties of this essence. In sum, the idea is the essence of the mind, whereas emotions are simply the properties or “modes” of that essence, which pertains to that idea. In Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza often relates to the distinction between essence and its properties. For instance, TdIE 95 states: To be called perfect, a definition will have to explain the inmost essence of the thing, and to take care not to use certain propria in its place. … And though … this does not matter much concerning figures and other beings of reason [entia rationis], it matters a great deal concerning physical and real things [entia realia], because the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are not known. If we neglect them, we shall necessarily overturn the connection of the intellect, which ought to reproduce the connection of Nature, and we shall completely miss our goal. (Curley I: 39).

The “connection” under discussion is the order of ideas that should adequately and truly reflect the order of nature as a whole. In other words, Spinoza is relating at this point to the desired system that should truly and adequately reflect the system of nature as a whole. Note that TdIE emphasizes that each essence is singular, and the definition that reflects such an essence is, unlike Aristotelian essence and definition, not general but rather particular or singular. From the definition of any individual things we must infer (or “explain”) all its properties (TdIE 97). This demand appears also in the Ethics, for instance: “the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., from the very essence of the thing” (1p16d; Curley I: 425). Occasionally, Spinoza substitutes

 Such difficulties are among those mentioned in Bidney (1940, pp. 43–4). Others were mentioned in Kolakowski’s ascribing the second antinomy of freedom to Spinoza’s philosophy (1989). Kolakowski believes Spinoza’s idea of the liberty from passions to be enigmatic, for there is a duality of the intellect and emotions, which must allegedly foil from the outset any possibility of such a liberty, as only an affect can determine or restrain other affects (4p7). Kolakowski too is not aware at all of the distinction as above and, hence, sees no solution to that antinomy.

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“property” for “effect” (see, for instance, effectus, sive proprietas at 3, affects’ def. 22,e; cf. TTP, Ch. 4, Curley II: 128). This does not mean that Substance is the essence of the modes, for Spinoza explicitly excludes such a wrong interpretation (as the reader can infer from 2p10: “The being of Substance does not pertain to the essence of man…”). Substance’s properties are simply rather its qualities, such as infinity, indivisibility, immutability, and the like.27 Furthermore, Spinoza explicitly states that the definition of essence is phrased in such a way that we would not be mistaken to think the God is the essence of singular things (2p10c,s). Thus, each singular thing has its own essence, which is not God as the absolutely infinite being, namely, nature as a whole. In sum, God-Substance’s properties are not finite modes but qualities. These qualities, unlike the finite modes, are a priori inferable from God’s definition. Thus, in Letters 60 and 83, Spinoza declines Tschirnhaus’s requests in Letter 59 and 60, referring to 2p10c,s and demanding Spinoza to show how he a priori deduces the finite modes from God’s definition. In any case, the relationship between Substance and its finite modes is not the relationship between essence and its properties, just as the Attributes are not properties or qualities of Substance, but rather its essence as perceived by the intellect.28 God is the cause of all things insofar as each of them has an essence. As Letter 23 puts it, God is absolutely the true cause of anything that has an essence (G IV: 147). Bearing all that in mind, I suggest distinguishing between plain causation of the first order, on the one hand, and derivative, borrowed causation of the second order, on the other. The first causation is of the essences of singular things, as links in the immanent causal chain and as finite modes of an Attribute. The second causation is of the properties by the essence or of properties that pertain to different essences. This second causation supervenes upon the first one, for it is impossible without the first one and is performed by its mediation. Thus, only the first causation serves as a principle of individuation, whereas the second one is actually a derivation, conditioning, or determining. In any case, the properties stem from the essence, which, in turn, conditions and determines them. As long as an individual thing exists, its essence is enduring and immutable, otherwise that thing would have been destroyed (4prae). In contrast, the properties are changeable, and the change under discussion is from a perfect being to a lesser being and vice versa. Perfection as such is simply the reality, namely, essence, of each thing, insofar as it exists and acts in a particular way. This perfection or essence should be distinguished from duration (ibid.). In other words, essence is eternal.

 See 2p10s, 1 the beginning of the Appendix, and Letter 83, Curley II: 487.  I discussed this in Chap. 1 above. The relationship between Substance and its Attributes is not the one between subject-substratum and its predicates-properties. See also Short Treatise, Part 1, Ch. 7, Section 6: God is knowable by means of His Attributes, but although His properties pertain to Him, they do not explain what God is. The knowledge of the properties does not provide us with the knowledge of the Attributes or of God’s essence. See also about Bennett-Curley’s controversy, which I mentioned at notes 29 and 32 above. Against this background, Bennett’s view that finite modes are an Attribute’s properties (Bennett, 1984, pp. 92–5) appears quite groundless to me. The same holds for his critique of Curley at this point (op. cit., pp. 92–4).

27 28

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Each individual or singular thing is eternal, and its eternity is revealed to the supreme grade of knowledge alone. Essence is immutable; only its properties are changeable in increasing and decreasing the power of its activity (ibid.). The change under discussion is simply “quantitative” or modal, not “qualitative”-essential. Spinoza mentions the emotions as properties of the human mind which have causes, whose intelligibility determines also the intelligibility of the emotions (Political Treatise Ch.1, Section 4; cf. 3prae.). From the Definitions of the Affects we learn that each affect is a modification of perfection, namely, essence, which in itself is unchangeable. At the end of Ethics 3, in the explication of the General Definition of the Affects, Spinoza explicitly identifies perfection with the essence of a thing. Now, Spinoza attempts to draw all the affects from three basic, primary ones, namely, desire, joy, and sadness. But, since desire is defined as “man’s very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something” (3affects’ def.1). What is this essence as manifested in Thought? Spinoza answers this question thus: “The mind’s essence, i.e., power (by 3p7), consists only of thought (by 2p11)” (5p9d); “the essence of the mind consists of knowledge (by 2p11)” (4p37d). 3p7 is the conatus’s proposition. 2p11 and d. enlighten us that the mind consists of ideas, which is the knowledge of the body. Hence, the essence of the mind, which is singular to each human being and which distinguishes him or her from any other person (according to 3p57d & s) is simply the knowledge of that person’s body, which is a singular body by means of whose knowledge that person cognizes the whole of nature, as it is reflected in that body, affects it, and affected by it. This is an important aspect of Spinoza’s cognitivism.29 I say, cognitivism, not rationalism, for the knowledge of the body may be also of the imagination, the first grade of knowledge, as much as it may be rational or intellectual knowledge, for “in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity” (5p22). Such is the achievement of the supreme grade of knowledge, the knowledge that is scientia intuitiva. Only this grade of knowledge perceives most truly the real singularity of each human body. From 3p56d we may infer that all the basic, primary affections, including everything that is deducible from or combined of them, stem from ideas. Active affects stem from adequate ideas, whereas passions stem from inadequate ideas (5p4s). Desire, joy, and sadness indicate changes or positions of the intellectual ability of the mind and its power (or its capability of being acted upon, whether this capability is diminished or restrained—3p58 & d; 3p59 & d). 29  Cf. Marshall 2008, pp. 13 and 15. Gideon Segal (2000) has borrowed this term from me to characterize Spinoza’s theory of emotions, as he himself mentions on p.1, note. Yet he refers the readers to Gilead (1999), though I elaborate on this term already in Gilead (1979) and, especially, in Gilead (1986), p. 167 ff. In contrast, Michael LeBuffe describes Spinoza’s “conative psychology” as intellectualism, namely, “freedom with knowledge” (LeBuffe 2010, “Intellectualism,” pp. 19–24). He underlines this interpretation by relying upon 4p26: “What we strive for from reason is simply understanding.” In my view, in contrast, Spinoza psychology is cognitivist; it is neither intellectualist, nor conative. 4p26, too, relies upon Spinoza’s cognitivism, the expression “striving from reason” points out this fact quite clearly.

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Some of the major difficulties, ascribed to the problem of the Attributes’ unity, which was mentioned in the former section, and ascribed as well to the problem of the relationship between knowledge and emotions, can be removed in light of the following considerations: (1) The essence of the human being, as manifested in Thought, is a cognitive activity—idea—whose foundation is in the knowledge or knowledge of the body, in knowing the causes to its being acted as an effect and knowing as well its activity as a cause of other things. The mind’s ability is simply the ability to think and to produce adequate ideas (according to 5p4s). The mind’s impotence or passivity rests on ignorance, whereas its ability rests on cognizing or knowing (5p20s). This is beautifully compatible with the activity that lies at the heart of any idea (2def3 and e). The idea, namely, the knowledge (2p24d) is prior to all the other thinking modes and conditions them (as implied in 2pa3: all the mind’s affections exist if and only if the mind has the ideas of the objects, to which these affections refer).30 It should be emphasized that such essence is not an unqualified substratum whose properties are emotions but, rather, a cognitive activity referring to some concrete content or object. This is one of the advantages of Spinoza’s theory of essence. The essence of an individual thing, as manifested in Thought, is the knowledge or knowledge of the identity and singularity of an individuality body, which is not similar to any other body in the whole of nature. (2) The human body is an individual thing that consists of many complex individuals (2pos1). This is similar to the mind, which is composed of the many ideas of these individuals (2p15 & d). Each idea is thus the knowledge of an individual—an individual thing or individuum. The knowledge of the particular or individual human body is the idea of a complex body, whose ratio of the movement and rest of its parts, namely, individuals pertaining to the essence of the human body, is fixed (2p24d). This ratio is maintained by these parts which “communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed manner” (ibid.). In other words, all these parts together make one cause (according to 2def7), which is a singular link in the immanent causal chain. Such a link is simply a singular thing, whose individuation is determined according to the principle of individuation and personal identity. The human mind has ideas of the modifications (“affections”) or all the alterations of the human body (2p22 & d). The idea of the body as an actual individual thing is prior to these ideas. The properties or qualities of these ideas or cognitions are simply the affects of the mind, which 2a3 calls “modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the words affects of the mind.” Thus, emotion is the property of idea or knowledge of the human body.

 Short Treatise Part 2, App. 2—on the human mind—Sect. 5 restates this view with an interesting variation: the infinite idea, as the immediate infinite modes in Thought, is prior to all the thinking modes.

30

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(3) Since all emotions (the mind’s affects or the mental affects, to be distinguished from the bodily or physical affects) are simply the properties or qualities of knowledge or various kinds of cognitions, there are not emotions, unless there are prior (in nature, not temporally) cognitions about the body and its modifications or alterations, by means of which the person becomes familiar with the whole world, with them he or she gains cognitions about other persons and the order of the world as a whole. This is Spinoza’s great contribution to the understanding of the emotions. Any distressing situation in which we may find ourselves depends upon a cognitive activity that is emendable and can become clear and distinct. The salvation or recovery of the mind, according to Spinoza, is performed by cognitive means, by means of understanding and explanation (I will elaborate on this in greater detail below). Behind each emotion, stands an “ideology” that can be formed and is emendable by cognitive means. Any adequate knowledge also has its own emotive properties. I would like to strongly emphasize that Spinoza by no means ignores or denies our emotional world; the contrary is the truth—Spinoza aspires to recover it and to reveal its full reality.31 (4) Reflexivity is also the property or quality of knowledge. To distinguish reflexivity from emotions, it is rather a cognitive property, not an emotive one. The relationship between the idea and its idea is of unity, analogous to the mind-­ body unity, yet this time the unity under discussion is at one and the same Attribute (2p21 & s). To know that we know, we must know first (TdIE 34; cf. 38: “there is no idea of an idea, unless there is first an idea”). Thus, this unity conditioned by the priority of the idea to its idea: the cognitive essence is prior to its reflexive property and conditions it in the second or derivative sense of conditioning. Such a relationship cannot exist between the different modes of the same singular thing in different Attributes. We have to distinguish, hence, between the unity of essence and its properties, on the one hand, and between the unity of the different modes of the same singular thing in different Attributes. The same individual things appear as different modes under different Attributes. The unity of the reflexivity and the idea implies that reflexivity  Contrary to Joachim (1964, p. 305). He states that, as intellectual creatures reaching the supreme kind of knowledge, we are no longer emotional creatures. Nothing can be more remote from Spinoza’s theory of emotion, for at the supreme grade of knowledge we are acquainted with the greatest and strongest of all emotions—the intellectual love of God. In the supreme kind of knowledge we are exempt from passions, namely, passive emotions, whereas the emotions that are emotive properties of the true kinds of knowledge, the second and the third (which is the supreme), are active emotion. Spinoza never attempts to get rid of the active emotions; all that he wants to free us from are the passions, the passive emotions, and these emotions only. He clearly states that not all the emotions are passive (3p58 and p59; 5p4s) and that there are active emotions that are not passions at all. This is clearly in strong opposition to Bennett’s view on the nature of emotions according to Spinoza (1984, pp. 257–8, 327, 329 and more). Bennett appear to miss the most crucial points about the Spinozistic mental therapy, which is “the salvation of the mind” (see, for instance, op. cit., pp. 332–3 and his critique of Hampshire on pp. 347–352). Bennett also appears to misinterpret the relationship of emotion and thinking in Spinoza’s philosophy (op. cit., p. 343). Because of this, he misconceives Spinoza’s distinction between active and passive emotions.

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does not add any essentially new cognitive content to a given knowledge. The idea constitutes an individual thing, whereas the idea of that idea—the reflexive idea—is not an idea in itself but simply a cognitive property of the idea. Emotion and idea are thus not two individual things or two modes; an idea and its emotive properties refer to one and the same individual thing. Equally, an idea and its reflexive properties refer to one and the same idea, that is, one and the same mode in Thought (as 2p21s implies). The distinction between essence and its property is a “distinction of reason” (as 5p3d implies), and Spinoza clearly distinguishes between ens rationis—entity of reason—and real entity. Only entia realia—real entities or beings—are individual, singular things as modes manifested under this or that Attribute. (5) The Attributes’ unity is simply the unity of all the manifestations of the essences of individual things (including their parts) in the infinitude of Attributes. These essences are the modes of each of the Attributes, insofar as they are uniquely and singularly revealed in each of them. In Thought, such essence is simply an idea and not its property, which is “the idea of the idea,” the cognitive property, not the emotive one. (6) Hence, there is no need for the unity of all properties or qualities of the modes, as they appear in various Attributes, in some of them or in one of them. It is quite possible that a mode has this or that property in one of the Attributes only and not in all of them, which should not qualify or impinge on the unity of the Attributes at all. Rather, as much as a mode is one of its kind or singular, it necessarily has various properties in various Attributes. Moreover, and this should be emphasized again, there are properties that are specific to one of the Attributes but not to others. Spinoza writes, therefore: “by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate, whether it is conceived through the Attribute of Thought alone, or through the Attribute of Extension alone, or is referred to both at once” (3def. aff Ie; my italics). In the same vein, he writes: “As for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasure, melancholy, and pain, I omit them, because they are chiefly related to the body, and are only species of joy or sadness” (3def.aff IIIe). The same holds true for: “As for the external affections of the body, which are observed in the affects—such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, etc. —I have neglected them, because they are related to the body only, without any relation to the mind” (3p59s). In conclusion, Spinoza’s philosophy is committed to a complete correspondence or adjustment, namely unity, of the essences of things (the modes of the Attributes), as these essences appear and are expressed in different Attributes but it is not committed to such an adjustment or correspondence—unity—whenever the properties of these modes or essences in the different Attributes are concerned. (7) The connection between a cognitive essence and its emotive property is a second-­order causation. This causal connection is a derivative or “borrowed”

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one, a conditioned, followed, and determined one, as the emotive property is driven out of the cognitive essence.32 (8) The knowledge a, which is the essence of emotive property a, does not affect directly another emotive property b (of another cognitive essence, b), but affects it mediately, by means of property a. For this reason, Spinoza emphasizes: “An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained” (4p7; cf. d and 4p14d; at this point Spinoza opposes Stoic approaches). And for this reason, it is possible to take away or to restrain the affect of same harmful emotion by means of emendation of the knowledge that is in their basis, in their essence. This emendation is performed by exposing the positive nucleus in each knowledge, a nucleus that is not removed in the presence of the truth: “Nothing positive which is a false idea is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true” (4p1). Any idea, including the false ones, takes part in a chain of reasons or ideas. Only partiality, only a view by means of which we do not see the whole chain, causes us to render ideas false. As part of a whole chain, these ideas are true, and the whole chain ultimately implants any idea in the true context. For instance, a stick in a glass some of which contains water looks as though it is broken. This perception in itself is not false; only the judgment of the observer that the stick is broken is false. The stick necessarily, according to Newtonian  See 4p16: “a desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil;” 4p51, 4p52d, 4p53 & d, 4p57s, 4p58, 5p4s: “all appetites, or desires, are passions only insofar they are aroused or generated by inadequate ideas, and are counted as virtues when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas,” 4p28: “The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can indeed arise from the second,” 5p32cor: “From the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises an intellectual Love of God,” Letter 23, Curley I: 389. Compare with Short Treatise II, 2, iv: a knowledge is the approximate cause of the passions; with no knowledge, no one would experience love, desire and other volitions, as each kind of knowledge has its own affects, which it raises; II, 3 (“On the Origin of the Passions in Opinion”); II4ix: “the soul emotions, its passions and actions, arise from perceptions” [the four degrees of knowledge, namely, report alone, experience, belief, and clear knowledge]; II16ii; II19xviii: “So we may conclude truly that love, hate, sadness, and the other ‘passions’ are produced in the soul in various ways, according to the kind of knowledge that soul has each time;” and II, 26ii: “only knowledge [of God] is the cause of the destruction [of the passions].” About the interpretation by the late Joseph Ben-Shlomo and Abraham Kaplan (in Hebrew) concerning the relations between cognitions and emotions see Gilead 1986, p. 173n134. Joachim 1964, pp. 236–237, makes a distinction between cognitive ideas and emotive ideas. According to Joachim, any emotion is an immediate sensation, and an idea is a reflection and, as a result, precedes a partial knowledge. Nevertheless, according to Spinoza, the case is simply the other way round. Joachim interpretation concerning the relationship between emotion or affection and knowledge does not adequately clarify Spinoza’s views on this issue. Hence, Joachim ascribes obscurity to these views of Spinoza. Jerome Neu shows that beliefs are essential to emotions (Neu 1977, pp. 1–3, 71–103, and 146–152. Bennett, too, mentions the central role of cognitions and beliefs in Spinoza’s theory of emotion (Bennett 1984, pp. 269 and 276–271), but he did not clarify the issue under discussion and did not refer to the priority of knowledge to emotion and to the fact that the latter is conditioned by the former. See also op. cit., pp. 278, 286–287, 333–334, 337, 343–347. All these studies do not completely and meticulously clarify the relationship between knowledge and emotion in Spinoza’s philosophy, which is that between essence and properties-quality.

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optics, looks broken. Thus as a link in a chain of ideas, this perception is not false at all, it is clear and distinct. In the same vein, Spinoza explains how the emendation of harmful emotions, namely passions, is done by means of rendering their cognitive essence clear and distinct. The result is that the harmful emotions are removed: “For what constitutes the form of love [namely, the knowledge or the idea in the basis of that emotion, the cognitive essence of that emotion], or hate, is Joy, or Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause … . So if this is taken away, the form of love or hate is taken away at the same time. Hence, these affects, and those arising from them, are destroyed” (5p2d). In the same vein, TdIE §109 states: “I shall not linger over the other things [namely emotions] that are referred to thought [namely, pertain to the cognitive essence], such a love, joy, etc. For they contribute nothing to our present purpose, nor can they be conceived unless the intellect is perceived. For if perception is altogether taken away, then all these are taken away” (Curley I: 44) In §110 he refers to the background of this emotive emendation: “False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive … through which they are called false or fictitious, but they are considered as such only from a defect of our knowledge. So false and fictitious ideas, as such, can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought. It is rather to be sought from the positive properties just surveyed, i.e., we must now establish something common from which these properties necessarily follow, or such that when it is given, they are necessarily given, and when it is taken away, they are taken away.” The idea of God is the common ground of all ideas; in it, they are all considered true, and their emotive properties are positive, instead of being harmful. Any passion, any harmful emotion, thus can be corrected and turned to be active emotion, which is useful for us. For the knowledge that is the essence of such a passion is turned out to be, by means of emendation, clear and distinct idea. Thus, any emotion ceases to be passion as soon as the knowledge on which this emotion rests as its emotive essence. As soon as this knowledge turns out to be a clear and distinct idea, the emotion, which is its emotive property, becomes active. In Spinoza’s words, any emotion ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct, namely true, idea of it. Passion is the emotive property of confused, inadequate ideas. In conclusion, only ideas or knowledge can cause other ideas or knowledge, and a higher grade of knowledge, true knowledge, to use Spinoza terminology, determines or overcomes a lower grade of knowledge, namely, an inadequate or partial knowledge. In this way, knowledge can indirectly affect the status of emotions—rendering them active rather than passive and make them useful for us. The emendation of ideas or cognitions is performed by implementing them in the widest cognitive context accessible to us. The emotive properties of the higher grade of knowledge affect, determine, and cause the emotive properties, the passion, of the lower grade of knowledge—imaginatio. Against this background, it becomes clear now why according to Spinoza there is a strong connection between theory and praxis. Some interpreters have found this hard to grasp but

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a­ccording to my interpretation such a strong connection clearly exists in Spinoza’s philosophy. (9) A proper direct causal connection exists in the immanent causal chain between the essences of individual things. The emotive properties, too, are causally connected but these connections are driven by their cognitive essences and depend on them. Without these essences no emotional property could exist and one could not cause the other. Hence, the causal connection (or the logical inference between reasons) is the principle of individuation and personal identity only of the essences of individual (particular) things. God is the only cause of entities as having essence (Letter 23, G IV: 147). The Attributes are infinite (total) and unconditioned causal chains, and these causes or reasons are the essences of individual things. The unity of the Attributes is the unity of immanent chains of essences. These essences should appear and be expressed in all the Attributes. Reflection, as a property and not an essence, does not constitute an individuum or a particular thing, which has its own personal identity. Thus, even though reflection pertains only to the Attribute of Thought, as it is a unique property of its modes, this does not break down the unity of the Attributes. The same is valid for the emotions that appear in one of the Attributes only. (10) Two things that do not condition each other in whatever way (directly or indirectly) or if one of them is not prior to the other and does not cause it—these two things do not belong to one and the same Attribute. They can be different appearances or manifestations of the same individual thing, only if the relation between them is that of unity. Such a relation is exempt from any conditioning, priority, or causation. (11) As we do not know all the Attributes, so we do not know all the properties of the things we know; we also do not know the properties that do not appear in the two Attributes known to us. Yet, it is possible that they appear in the other Attributes. (12) Some interpreters believe that Spinoza implies that the Attribute of Thought is “wider” than that of Extension because of the special status of the Infinite Intellect of God, which perceives everything, including all of the Attributes. Such is the idealistic interpretation, which has still some supporters.33 “Infinite Intellect” is a name for the total intelligibility of everything in nature, which means that anything in it is real, necessary, and eternal. I will devote Sect. 6.21, “The Infinite Intellect and the A Posteriori Procedure of the Supreme Grade of knowledge,” to that intelligibility in a way that will clearly show that this intellect is perfectly compatible with the unity of the Attributes. According to my view through all this Book, idealistic and materialistic interpretations of  For instance, Melamed 2002. Melamed attempts (also in his PhD dissertation and in a talk he gave in The Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa) at reviving the idealistic tradition in interpreting Spinoza. So far, none of his arguments has persuaded me that the Attribute of Thought has a privileged status or that we have to relinquish the interpretation that the unity (or “parallelism”) of the Attributes is well kept in Spinoza’s philosophy.

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Spinoza’s philosophy fail, and the unity (“correspondence”) of the Attributes is well kept and intact. As a property of everything, total intelligibility, though pertains only to the Attribute of Thought, does not jeopardize at all the unity of the Attributes. I think that these considerations remove all the difficulties that I have mentioned above. At least, these considerations make it possible to remove these difficulties. In any case, we can see now that these difficulties do not obliterate or weaken the unity of the Attributes. Thus, a necessary condition for the possibility of the total system of nature is retained. In discussing the emotive properties of the various grades of knowledge, I will make extensive use of the distinction between cognitive essences and emotive properties. The same holds true for the unity of theory and praxis in Spinoza’s philosophy. How are we allowed to say that mind and body are one and the same thing, while not all their properties are the same? This sounds like a contradiction of Leibniz’s law of identity, according to which two things are one and the same things, if and only if all their properties are the same. Now, if some of the properties or the body are really not the properties of the mind, and vice versa, how can we argue that mind and body are one and the same essence, one and the same individual thing? We may say that one and the same thing, one and the same essence, may appear in two different ways; each of which expresses and indicates the extension of the meaning of that thing. The difference between these expressions or indications is only that of intension. The same holds true for the unity of the Attributes, except for the fact that each of the Attributes covers the whole reality totally. This total extension guarantees that all the Attributes extend themselves on the one and the same Substance. In the case of the Attributes, the unity of their extension is retained, only because Thought and Extension are infinite-total and embracing reality-nature as a whole. This is one and the same reality, namely, Substance. Nevertheless, such is not the nature of the finite mode which, by definition, has no total extension. Each body is expressed, manifested, or appears as a mind or idea in the Attribute of Thought. Equally, any mind or idea is expressed, manifested, or appears as a body in the Attribute of Extension. Were there an individual thing without a mind or a body, neither Attributes could have been total, as no Attribute could comprise the whole or reality or identical concerning its extension. Were there a thought that had no manifestation in the Attribute of Extension, or a body that had no manifestation in the Attribute of Extension, these two Attributes could not have been identical concerning their extension. This is valid only for modes or essences of individual things, not for their properties. It is the totality or infinitude of the Attributes that guarantee their unity and the unity of mind and body, even though some of the properties of the body and the mind are not identical but may be different. In other words, insofar as the extension is concerned, the Attributes are different one from the other, as much as a body is different from a mind despite their identity-unity in their extension. As I explained above, any Attribute is a total and unconditioned causal chain, the whole of which is causa sui, and the principle of individuation of the modes, which

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are the essences of individual things, in this chain is adequate causality. The identity-­ unity of mind and body means that they both have the same “location” in the total causal chain. The principle of individuation ensures that this body and this mind are the same link at the total causal chain that is manifested as the Attribute of Thought or that of Extension. My body is a cause and effect in this chain, and my mind is a reason and a conditioned or driven link in this chain as it is considered under the Attribute of Thought. The essence of an individual thing, which is a finite mode in an Attribute, is simply a link in a causal chain consisting of causes and effects, and this link is the same link as it considered under a different Attribute. The same causal ability or power is considered under different Attributes. In concluding, owing to the notion of the Attribute as a total causal chain and owing to the principle of individuation, which is the adequate causality, mind and body are the same essence, the same causal link in the total causal chain, whatever are its properties in each of the Attributes. Spinoza’s theory of the unity of the Attributes requires the distinction between essence and properties to demonstrate that despite the unity of the Attributes and the psychophysical unity; still Thought and Extension, mind and body, are quite distinct one from the other, respectively, and the one is irreducible to the other. The properties that are unique and restricted to a definite Attribute or to such a mode simply emphasize the irreducibility and distinctness. Each essence, each mode, is manifested otherwise by means of unique and different properties in different Attributes. Until this point, I have discussed the grounds on which rests the complete system of reality-nature as a whole. Without the following grounds, that system would have been simply impossible: The necessary differentiations of the reality-nature as a whole to Attributes and finite modes and the infinitely ample nature of reality; the real ontic status of the individual things as eternal (atemporal) in this system; their principle of individuation and personal identity that enables their joining together into the immanent causal chain, which is the complete system of the Reality-Nature as a whole, in which they depend as to their existence, activity, and singularity; the coherence of that system and its “a posteriori” dependence in any of its modes-­ details-­differentiations, as this system as a whole is manifested in each one of them in a unique and singular way; and some more. Furthermore, I have discussed the condition of that system to which we aspire: the correspondence or the unity of the Attributes; adequacy or joining all the modes into one and the same Attribute; coherence and the exclusion of the possibility of immediate evidence. Such evidence is incompatible with such system. Now it is about time to elaborate in extenso on the contribution of each grade of knowledge including its emotive properties to the possibility of the desired (“aspired to” or “wanted”) system, which is a system of theory and praxis as well. This system adequately reflects the whole system of nature as it is in itself, is it really and independently exits, as the whole of nature is Spinoza’s Substance. This system is a coherent one. The actual construction of the complete desired system is a regulative

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task and a goal on the far horizon for our finite knowledge whereas the34 Infinite Intellect conceives this system completely. On the one hand, our finite intellect can get nearer to that goal yet, on the other, our finite knowledge raises various obstacles and fragmenting factors35 in our way toward the desired system as a regulative goal on the horizon. To ensure that this way will remain open for our endeavors and will not be blocked from the very beginning, we should overcome these obstacles, to emend the data of knowledge, and to remove all the fragmenting factors.

References Alexander, S. 1921. Spinoza and Time. London: G. Allen & Unwin. Allison, H.E. 1975. Benedict de Spinoza. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Bennett, J. 1981. Spinoza’s Mind-Body Identity Thesis. The Journal of Philosophy 78: 573–584. ———. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bidney, D. 1940. The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza – A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Della Rocca, M. 1996. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2008. Spinoza. London/New York: Routledge. Garber, Daniel. 2005. “A Free Man Thinks of Nothing Less Than of Death”: Spinoza on the Eternity of the Mind. In Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christa Mercer and Eileen O’Neill, 103–117. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garrett, Don, ed. 2018. Necessity and Nature in Spinoza’s Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilead, Amihud. 1979. The Possibility of a Philosophical System: The Case of Spinoza. PhD Thesis, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (in Hebrew). ———. 1986. The Way of Spinoza’s Philosophy Toward a Philosophical System. Jerusalem (in Hebrew). ———. 1999. Human Affects as Properties of Knowledge in Spinoza’s Philosophical Psychotherapy. In Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Y.  Yovel, 169–182. New York: Little Room Press. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. ———. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

 The Infinite Intellect rather than an Infinite Intellect for in Latin there is no definite or indefinite article. Thus, it is a question of interpretation to prefer “the” to “a.” There is one infinite immediate mode in the Attribute of Thought—the Infinite Intellect– and there is only one complete system of theory and praxis, which truly grasps the whole of nature, including everything valid for theory and praxis. With this view, there are no various Infinite Intellects but only one, the Infinite Intellect of God. Of course, the expression “God’s Infinite Intellect” has no personal properties; it is rather the total intelligibility of everything in nature and nature as a whole. 35  I discussed some of these factors in discussing above the transient causal chain. 34

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Hessing, S., ed. 1977. Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977. London/Boston: Henley/Routledge & Kegan Paul. Joachim, H.H. 1940. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione  – A Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Kashap, S.P., ed. 1974. Studies in Spinoza – Critical and Interpretive Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kennington, R., ed. 1980. The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington. Kolakowsky, L. 1989. The Boundaries of Freedom. In The Presence of Myth, trans. Adam Czerniawski. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kripke, S. 1970. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lascola, R.A. 1975. Spinoza’s Super Attribute. The Modern Schoolman 52: 199–206. LeBuffe, M. 2010. From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lin, Martin. 2019. Being and Reason: An Essay on Spinoza’s Metaphysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lloyd, Genevieve. 1996. Spinoza and the Ethics. London: Routledge. Mark, T.C. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Russell & Russell. ———. 1972. Spinoza’s Theory of Truth. New York/London: Columbia University Press. Marshall, Eugene. 2008. Spinoza’s Cognitive Affects and Their Feel. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16: 1–23. Matson, W.I. 1971. Spinoza’s Theory of Mind. The Monist 55: 567–578. Melamed, Y.Y. 2002. Parallelism and Idealism in Spinoza. In Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (North American Spinoza Society), 29 March, vol. 75, 3. ———. 2004. Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (1): 67–96. Myers, H.A. 1944. The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox  – A Study of the Choice between Traditional Idealism and Systematic Pluralism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Neu, J. 1977. Emotion, Thought, and Therapy. Berkeley: California University Press. Odegard, D. 1971. The Body Identical with the Human Mind: A Problem in Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Monist 55: 579–601. Parkinson, G.H.R. 1954. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rander, D. 1971. Spinoza’s Theory of Ideas. The Philosophical Review 80: 338–359. Segal, G. 2000. Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza’s Cognitivism of Emotions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8: 1–19. Shahan, R.W., and J.I.  Biro, eds. 1978. Spinoza  – New Perspectives. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Teller, P. 1975. Essential Properties: Some Problems and Conjectures. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 223–248. Wetlesen, J. 1979. The Sage and the Way. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wilbur, J.B., ed. 1976. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wilson, M.D. 1981. Notes on Modes and Attributes. Journal of Philosophy 78: 584–586. Wolfson, H.A. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza, two volumes in one. New York. Youpa, Andrew. 2020. The Ethics of Joy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 4

The First Kind of Knowledge: Imaginatio

In this Chapter, I will show what the first grade of knowledge contributes to the construction of the desired system and what needs an emendation to render this contribution complete.1 Discussing the first kind of knowledge, we will relate to some consequences of the discussion of the transient causal chain. But first of all, I will reveal the wishful thinking of the first kind of knowledge to construct the desired system, which adequately reflects the order of the whole nature as it really is.

4.1  T  he First Kind of Knowledge Consists of Inadequate, Illegitimate Generalizations Spinoza argues that the first kind of knowledge, the imagination, relates to general knowledge. The imagination attempts to construct a general system. Indeed, it constructs universal notions (notiones universales—2p40s2). These notions are universals that have been abstracted from individual things or “signs.” These universals are strictly illegitimate and inadequate (2p40s1). Namely, they are not valid indeed for the all things that this kind of knowledge wishes to know. Whenever Spinoza discusses the imagination, he almost always mentions abstraction and generalization that are inadequate and illegitimate (for instance, TdIE §§ 75–76: abstraction as a generalization in the first kind of knowledge). The generalization made by the imagination is the origin of fiction, falsity, and error (see TdIE §55: “the more generally existence is conceived, the more confusedly also it is conceived, and the more easily it can be ascribed fictitiously to anything”). 1  For a rehabilitation of the first kind of knowledge see De Deugd 1966. De Deugd rightly insists on the indispensability of the first kind of knowledge as well as on the dependence of the second grade of knowledge—ratio—on the first and its emendation but, I believe, he misinterprets the third grade of knowledge and ignores its dependence on the first.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0_4

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Even in the first grade of knowledge, the ground for any error, fiction, and distortion of our knowledge, the mind attempts to generalize and decide about individual things. Even at this lowest grade, the mind makes general judgments about their reality. This means that even in the first, immediate contact with the data of experience and knowledge, the human mind cannot grasp them as isolated or discrete. The connection and the relationality between individual things make possible their perception, even if in a false and distorted way. Indeed, the imagination does not connect and relate them properly and its generalizations do not win any success, but it is quite important to recognize that these are the aims of our imagination. The first grade of knowledge aspires to a general knowledge. This grade of knowledge does so in two ways: (1) by means of generalization from unstable, random, or dubious experience (experientia vaga) concerning some individual things of which we have some experience, and the generalization in question is an attempt to make this experience as if it were universal, as if it were valid for all individual things, even if we have no experience of most of them; (2) by means of unexamined, groundless hearsay. In any of these two ways, our cognitions rest on generalization or universalization and on an attempt to construct a universal system. Thus, according to Spinoza, even the most primitive and erroneous of our perceptions does not exist without generalization or universalization. This means that, according to him, each act of knowledge, whether adequate or inadequate, consists of the attempt to construct a system. Each perception is not an aggregate of particulars or of discrete particulars but of a system of particulars, namely, of individual things, which have general properties, common to all these particulars. In this system there are connections, relations, and laws, which are supposed to be general and grounded. The empirical nature of the first kind of knowledge is not that of an aggregate of discrete perception. Is this generality only a pretension of the first kind of knowledge? Can our imagination construct a system of particulars that are necessary connected one to the other, that are subject to general and necessary lawfulness? Alas, our imagination, the first grade of knowledge, can construct only a system consisting of contingency and subjectivity, which are not fixed or consistent. The cognitive system that imagination can construct actually ignores the particularity or singularity of each individual thing and, thus, cannot conceive it in its complete reality. Note that according to Spinoza’s philosophy each individual thing is real, necessary, and eternal, but only the third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, can grasp it as such. The desired system attempts to save individual things in theory as well as in praxis. The desired system requires a universality, as Spinoza’s philosophy aspires to construct a whole-comprehensive system, a total one. In contrast, the imagination fails in constructing such a system, because this first and lowest grade of knowledge fragmentizes reality. Fragmenting is the basis for any error (2p17s, p35s, and 49 s). Falsity, too, does not consist of a total or absolute ignorance but on some absence of knowledge; falsity is simply a defective knowledge that requires a completion and emendation. The fragmenting nature of the imagination arises from the principal restrictions of its medium, which is the medium of all kinds of knowledge: “the human body, being limited, is capable of forming distinctly only a certain number

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of images at the same time” (2p40s1). More precisely, our attention to a particular situation is limited to a particular limited number of images that we have simultaneously, though our intention is to perceive as many images as possible at the same time. Because of this restriction we blur and obscure the differences between the particulars, which we subject to a generalization. Generalizing so, we create abstraction and universals to which 2p40s1 is devoted. Our imagination perceives a fragment of reality as if it were a whole, as if this fragment endowed us with a general true knowledge about all relevant particulars. In this way we ignore the richness and ampleness of Nature, which only the Infinite Intellect can fully perceive. Thus, we consider and relate to a fragment of reality as if it were infinite (total) and, as a result, disconnect the fragment from the rest of reality, from Nature as a whole. This is a distortion of our reality perception, because we consider this fragment as an independent whole. Any understanding and imagination require generalization, but the imagination fails in it; we have not really a general picture. In the heart of the generalizations of the imagination lies the pretension to achieve a general view. This pretension entirely fails. Even the same person cannot retain his or her imagination’s generalization for a long time; all the more so—other persons. The reason is that such universal notions are perceived and understood differently and in particular ways by different people; each one has his or her unique way of perceiving and understanding them according to one’s changed associations (2p40s1). It is simply an illusion to believe that we abstract these universal notions from our personal and particular circumstances. For instance, one thinks about the general, universal notion of house. In fact, each one of us has a different, personal house in his or her mind; each one actually does not abstract it from his or her personal experience. What is common about house is simply an illusion or self-deception, for really nothing is in common and each person has his or her image of a house in his or her mind. Moreover, each person changes his or her mind about such matter according to his or her bodily changes and states. Each person thus imagines house, for instance, according to the inclination of his or her body. As a result, the general concept or image, instead of being a common ground for accepted convention turns out to be an source of conflicts and controversies both amongst laypersons and philosophers (ibid.). In this way, the imagination’s frustration is quite a common phenomenon. The imagination attempts at universal generalization but in fact it does not achieve it at all. The imagination aspires to a universal system but fails in its attempts to achieve it. No discrete, hence distorted or false, fragment, which is disconnected from its causal context, can construct a real universal system but simply an abstraction that has no use in enlightening us as to the real differences between individual things. Indeed, what the first grade of knowledge really lacks are individual things, though this kind of knowledge aims at conceiving them. The three grades of knowledge all aim at perceiving individual things. Each of these grades necessarily relies upon the body, the knowledge of which is the medium of any grade of knowledge, and the body in question is an individual or particular one: The body is “a singular thing which actually exists” (2p11), namely, “a certain mode of Extension which actually exists” (2p13). In mediation of our perception of our body with its modifications, passive as

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well as active, we know ourselves, other people, and Nature. Yet, only with the third grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva—do we fully achieve a true and concrete knowledge of these. The imagination, though affected by singular things (TdIE §82), does not adequately cognize even these things. The imagination has no adequate (let alone coherent) or true (correspondent) knowledge of anything singular, not even of the most intimate of all singular things—one’s body. The desired knowledge turns to be abstract and general, a knowledge that alienates ourselves from ourselves, from others, and from Nature. The imagination attempts to promise us stable and established structures, which maintain their nature despite the diversity and changeability of any individual thing. It is an essential cognitive or scientific interest to base changes and diversity on stability and universality. It is an essential condition of rationality (to begin with Parmenides’s thought). Alas, this rational aspiration is doomed to frustration, when it comes to the first grade of knowledge. The generalizations of random, instable, or dubious experiences (experientia vaga) are doomed to current refutation and there is no certainty about them. There is no certainty or security in the imagination (TPTG IV: 30), all the more so in the case of “the perception we have from report” (TdIE § 19), which serves each person according to his or her inclination and character. We cannot trust any of these random and instable generalizations of the first kind of knowledge, imaginatio, in its two forms: hearsay and experientia vaga. The abstractions and generalizations are based upon the intellectual interest to integrate individual things into a universal and complete system, namely, to understand each of them. We generalize and abstract thus “from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is distorted, confused, and without order for the intellect” (2p40s2). These abstractions and generalization thus divert us from the right way to understand the essence, order, and unity of Nature, as this way goes from one real thing to the other (TdIE § 100). Contrary to the generalized and abstract “order,” that order is the only one that the intellect can detect. For instance, according to Spinoza, the fallacy that causes us to link bodies and thoughts together in one and the same causal chain is simply a fallacy of generalizing and abstracting, as we then ignore the basic difference between these two kinds of being, and attempt to link them together in one and the same causal chain. Since Spinoza’s principle of individuation and personal identity is adequate causality, in that distorted way we are unwillingly involved in an abstract “causal chain” that is not constructed according to the order of the intellect and which does not maintain necessary connections between its links. In this way, we pull out the ground from under our acquaintance with our personal identity and obstruct its knowledge. As a result, in the first grade of knowledge we do not know ourselves, as we are short of knowing the necessary connections, which are subject to adequate causality and which are indispensable for self-knowledge. This obstruction rests upon the fact that the first grade of knowledge does not reveal us anything of the essence of an individual thing (TdIE §§ 26–27). As I explained above, the essence of an individual thing is the factor of the identity and uniqueness of that thing. As a result, the ambition of the first kind of knowledge to move us nearer to the knowledge of individual things is entirely obstructed. The

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imagination does not perceive any of the individual things, it gains no general or universal true knowledge, which is adequate and valid for all the relevant individual thins and which only reason, ratio, the second grade of knowledge can achieve.

4.2  T  he Common Order of Nature and the Status of Individual Things—The Pretension of Constructing a System Discussing the random experience, which pertains to the first grade of knowledge (2p40s2), Spinoza refers to 2p29c, which discusses the common order of nature (communis ordo naturae). The scholium explicates further: I say expressly that the mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused [and mutilated] knowledge, of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e., so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters2 with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions.3 For so often as it is disposed internally, in this or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly…. (2p29c,s; all italics are mine)

Only adequate knowledge takes part in conceiving the order of the whole of nature (to which 2p7s and Letter 12, G IV: 54–55 refer). It is the total order of Nature conceived as it is, as a system of whose parts are its modes and not discrete and independent parts as it were, which exist in place and time. It is impossible for the common order of nature to construct such a system, despite the pretension that the name of this order suggests. For the common order of nature attempts, but in vain, at constructing a general knowledge, which is common to all of its details. As an inadequate knowledge, the common order of nature has nothing of the real common nature of adequacy (according to 2p38: “Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and the whole, can only be conceived adequately”); it is rather a so-called share or commonness, a commonness simply in abstracto, in an abstract generalization. Such commonness lays only random connections between 2  These fortuitous encounters are external to our minds. Compare with TPTCh. 3, G III: 47, in which Spinoza opposes human reason and the security and stability of our society to fate (fortuna) or chance, hidden external causes, and miracles. Thus, “external” means all that occurs with no intervention or by means of human nature and mind, all that is not expected and conjectured by the human reason, or all that does not follow from this reason and is not accepted by it. Letter 37 writes: “all the clear and distinct perceptions we form can arise only from other clear and distinct perceptions in us, and cannot have any other cause outside us. From this it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions we form depend only on our nature, and its definite, fixed laws, that is, on our absolute power, not on fortune (that is, on causes which, although they too act according to definite and fixed laws, are nevertheless unknown to us and foreign to our nature and power)” (G IV: 188, Curley II: 32–3). 3  Compare TdIE §25II: To choose the best of the grades of knowledge we have first to “infer rightly … the differences, agreements, and oppositions of things.”

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things. It conceives all individual things as contingent and destructible, for “we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration …, and that is what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption [destruction] … beyond that there is no contingency” (2p31c). Indeed, as existing at time and in place, as if created out of nothing, individual things are contingent and destructible. They are conceived as effects whose complete causal chain is unknown to us. Hence, the common order of nature is irrational, and in which we cannot know things as they really are in themselves, ut in se sunt, namely, as necessary. According to 2p44 and its demonstration, “it is the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent” as “it is of the nature of Reason to perceive things truly …, viz. … as they are in themselves, i.e., … not as contingent but as necessary.” And the corollary adds: “it depends only on the imagination that we regard things as contingent, both in respect to the past and in respect to the future.” Any fortuitous encounter with things is an encounter that is not affected by the internal determination of one’s mind, actually blurs the differences between things, whereas an adequate knowledge of these things is clear and distinct and it perceives their agreements, differences, and oppositions with no blurring at all. This is Reason’s way of understanding, which needs no abstracting generalization. On the contrary, understanding requires a general and comprehensive view, which maintains necessary connections between its objects and which points out their agreements, differences, and oppositions. The clear and distinct understanding relates to the reality as it is in itself (ut in se est), since as an adequate knowledge, it also really corresponds with reality and it is true. The reality as truly conceived is ample with plurality whose various details have some common features and yet are different from one another. Grasping ourselves as parts of the common order of nature blurs one’s particular personal identity and even obliterates it, for in this state the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself or of its body. In this state we are affected and activated by accidental causes and factors, and we are inadequate or fortuitous causes of some other things that could have been caused by other things. As inadequate causes we cause some effects that are not necessarily implied from our nature alone. We detected above that adequate causality is the best to serve as the principle of individuation and personal identity in Spinoza’s philosophy. In contrast, the individual as a link in the transient causal chain, in a random or fortuitous causal chain, we have no fixed or stable personal identity, and our personality: “not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be” (5p42s). We cannot know one’s personal identity according to a random experience and fortuitous encounters, for in them there is no stability or necessity. In this order, any personality is perceived as most changeable, instable, and lacking a real self. As much as the common order of nature cannot construct a system of knowledge, there is no place in it to any real personal identity. Its possible system is doomed to disintegration into discrete moments that no necessary and cohesive connections or links hold them together; even as simply moments they have no identity for themselves. It is impossible for

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our fragmented, obscure, and confused impressions to construct one coherent system which has a stable or fixed identity. An interesting aspect of the issue of the common order of nature is that of praxis. In the natural, pre-political state, the natural right of any person is noting, a matter of hearsay only, which has no real existence “outside the intellect.” In this state, no one has any real security (TP Ch. II, § 15). It is the state in which human beings are separated from one another and are subject to confrontation and oppositions. In it, they behave like “wolf to wolf.” In contrast, in the rational political state, in a useful, free society and state, they behave in light of the slogan “man is God to man” (4p35c2s; or “man to man—God” contrary to “man to man—wolf”). 4p35 states: “Only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in nature.” In contrast, in the natural state of the common order of nature, they do not agree in nature, while oppositions, conflicts, and disputes split them one from the other. No rational communal life is possible, no collaboration and mutual aid. In the natural (“anarchic”) state, there is no security according to which each person can behave according to his reason and real utility. This natural is parallel, surprisingly, to the totalitarian state in which each person acts, thinks, and feels according to the guidance of the authority, like all the other citizens (TPTCh. 17, G IV: 202). In this state, the singular personality of each human being is really endangered. Each person is actually free in a political state in which he or she accepts the rational decision of the majority (the rational common decision), and he or she is more free there than in the natural state or solitude in which, as it were, he or she obeys only himself or herself (4p73). It is rather in the rational political state (the most useful form of which is the democratic one, as we will see below), that the singularity and identity of each citizen is manifested, not in the common order of nature, in which each one is destructible or destructible, whose existence is not necessary and he or she has no real personal identity. This state is either the natural, anarchic one or the totalitarian one. In both state the persons involved are guided according to the worldview of the first grade of knowledge, namely, the common order of nature.4 4  As for democracy as “the only absolute sovereignty,” which is “the power of the multitude insofar as it is held by the multitude itself,” consult Matheron 1997. Cf. Negri 1997., also, yet differently, discussing Spinoza’s view of democracy as “the absolute form of state and government.” Negri has in mind “the very concept of republican democracy” (op. cit., p. 223), which I do not follow. There is much more force in his assertion that “Spinozan democracy, the omnio absolutum democraticum imperium, must be conceived as a social practice of singularities that intersect in mass process— better, as a pietas that forms and constitutes the reciprocal individual relations that are established among the multiplicity of subjects that constitute the multitudo” (op. cit., p.  236). And pietas, which Curley translates as “morality,” is “the desire to do good generated in us by our living according to the guidance of reason” (4p37s1; Curley I: 565). See also Susan James 2008. Note especially her interesting idea that “Freedom, as Spinoza conceives it, is therefore always dependent on the extent to which particular individuals and communities are able to imagine ways of life that embody the general truths revealed by reasoning, thereby bringing co-operation within reach” (op. cit., p. 136). Against this background, it is clearly understood that Spinoza’s “own unfinished account of a stable, democratic constitution begins by listing several classes of people who are to play no part at all in government: aliens …, women, servants, children and wards, on the grounds that they are not independent; and criminals … …. these exclusions … serve to draw attention to

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Human beings who are enslaved to passions are dragged by the common order of nature: “Man is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows and obeys the common order of nature, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires” (4p4c). So much so that from such a viewpoint, the singular personality of that person disappears almost completely. This inescapably leads to the human lack of power, namely, impotence: “lack of power consists only in this, that a man allows himself to be guided by things outside him, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself, demands” (4p37s1). Complete incompetence is a complete annihilation of one’s personality whereas potency is an activity, and the most typical of human beings, as such an activity is manifested in the Attribute of Thought, is a cognitive, better—intellectual, activity. 3def2 express this precisely: “We act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e., …, when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone.” This is the clue to understand what personal identity means. It means that a person is the adequate, namely, the only, cause of some of one’s acts. Tolstoy, for instance, is the adequate cause— the necessary and sufficient condition—of writing Anna Karenina. The personal identity of Tolstoy consists of all actions of which he was their adequate, only cause. Tolstoy is thus a singular link in the total causal chain.

a limitation in his [Spinoza’s] imaginative power—a limitation he would himself describe both as a lack, and as the effect of some obstacle standing in the way of his ability to imagine a fully inclusive form of freedom” (op. cit., p. 129). James’s conclusion, “Spinoza’s sketch of how the free man negotiates with others offers us an insight into the way that reason and imagination can work together to enhance co-operation and liberty” (op. cit., p. 136). I see this quite differently: Spinoza attempts to show us that in correcting our first grade of knowledge, namely, our imagination, by means of reason, the wise persons and the multitude can live peacefully and rationally together in a genuine, liberal democratic state, which is the freest, most secure, and most stable political regime. An original and interesting interpretation of Spinoza’s conception of democracy is by Levene 2004. Her analysis of “Man is a God to man [hominem homini deum esse]” (4p35c2 and s) is worthy of special attention against this background. See, op. cit., pp. 68–76. Levene is one of the few that have grasped Spinoza’s conception of democracy adequately in the following manner: “Democracy is the only form of government that is itself rational, taken as a social body, a kind of singular thing… only in a democracy can the multitude become rational, since it is only if human law is vested in the entire community that the multitude’s obedience can be of itself alone rather than of ‘one to his equal,’ just as the most free individual is one who is able to act from his or her nature alone” (TTP, 65) (op. cit., p. 183). Israel, too, realizes Spinoza’s explicit advocacy of democracy: “Strikingly different [from Hobbes’s] is Spinoza’s conception of freedom, which is integrally linked to his advocacy of democracy and radical theory of toleration, as well as to his general philosophical system” (Israel 2001, p. 259). Indeed, Spinoza’s preference of liberal democracy over any other political regime is rooted in his philosophical system as a whole. Israel mentions that “Spinoza was the first major European thinker in modern times—though he is preceded here by Johan de la Court and Van den Enden—to embrace democratic republicanism as the highest and most fully rational form of political organization, and the one best suited to the needs of men” (ibid.).

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Each of the links depends firstly on the total causal chain but, given that, the whole chain depends secondarily on each of its links, because without it the whole chain would have collapsed. Each causal link makes its singular indispensable contribution to the whole of Nature. Each such a link is irreplaceable; in the whole of Nature, nobody can replace Tolstoy, for instance. Each link is sufficient and necessary. There is only one cause of writing Anna Karenina—Tolstoy, who is absolutely irreplaceable. Given that anything in Nature is real, necessary, and eternal, the order and nature of each causal link could not be different. Note that the whole of Nature—God or Substance (Deus sive Natura)—and each of its modes are absolutely intelligible, as they are perceived in the Infinite Intellect; given that, our mind is part of that intellect (2p11c), and all the adequate ideas of our mind construct our intellect. Our intellect, as an adequate part of the Infinite Intellect, perceives things as they are really are (2p43s), and our ideas are true just like the adequate ideas of God’s Infinite Intellect. In other words, in this way our intellect joins the total system of Nature. Spinoza writes: … the eternal part of the mind … is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act …. But what we have shown to perish is the imagination …, through which alone we are said to be acted on …. So …, the intellect, however extensive it is, is more perfect than the imagination. (5p40c)

As a part of God’s Infinite Intellect, our intellect is a part of the system of all the adequate ideas, which is the immanent total causal chain of all reasons, as this chain is manifested in the Attribute of Thought. Letter 37 states that “there must, necessarily, be a Method by which we can direct and link our clear and distinct perceptions, and that the intellect is not subject, as the body is, to accidents” (G IV: 188, Curley II: 32). Moreover, the clear and distinct perceptions we form depend only on our nature, and its definite, fixed laws, that is, on our absolute power, not on fortune (that is, on causes which, although they too act according to definite and fixed laws, are nevertheless unknown to us and foreign to our nature and power)…. From these considerations, then, it is clearly evident what the true Method must be like, and in what it chiefly consists: namely, solely in the knowledge of the pure intellect, and of its nature and laws. To acquire this it is necessary above all else to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination, or between true ideas and the rest, namely, the fictitious, the false, the doubtful, and absolutely all those which depend only on memory. (op. cit., G IV: 188–189, Curley II: 33; TdIE §108VI emphasizes this even more5) Thus, clear and distinct ideas cannot be related to external causes, for these ideas are links in an immanent total chain, namely, the Attribute of Thought. All this is understandable against the background of our accessibility to the right method. This method enables us to chain together our clear and distinct ideas in necessary connections. This knowledge is active and a priori, namely, independent of experience and empirical data. It is not a product of inductive generalization, which is illegitimate and inadequate. This knowledge is completely independent of random encounters, which characterizes the random 5  “The clear and distinct ideas that we form seem to follow so from the necessity of our nature alone that they seem to depend absolutely on our power alone. But with confused ideas it is quite the contrary—they are often formed against our will.” Note that, according to Spinoza, intellect and will are one and the same.

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4  The First Kind of Knowledge: Imaginatio e­ xperience, which is not guided in light of our Reason or intellect. Our a priori knowledge is the origin of our knowledge of necessary connections or necessary lawfulness, according to which we construct, emend, and understand experience and understand it. In this way we replace the arbitrary, random, and unstable connections with the necessary ones. We govern these connections. They pertain to the intellectual order, the order of the intellect’s system, which reflects Nature as a whole. In contrast, the common order of Nature, the worldview of our imagination, shutters our knowledge of the world … the fictitious, the false, and the other ideas have their origin in the imagination, i.e., in certain sensations that are fortuitous, and (as it were) disconnected; since they do not arise from the very power of the mind, but from external causes, as the body (whether waking or dreaming) receives various motions. But if you wish, take imagination any way you like here, provided it is something different from the intellect, and in which the soul has the nature of something acted on. For it is all the same, however you take it, after we know that it is something random, by which the soul has take it, and at the same time know how we are freed from it with the help of the intellect. (TdIE §84)

In the imagination’s order there is an obstacle to the attempt to construct a system that reflects the order of Nature at it really is. Nevertheless, it is not an accident that Spinoza calls it “an order,” as the common order of nature has a partial conception, though quite distorted and mutilated, of the common order of Nature as a whole. The reason for this is that error, fiction, falsity, and mutilation, which are the modes of our imagination, are not an absolute ignorance but a certain lack of knowledge, which requires a completion, an insertion in the complete, total context. Such an incomplete and fragmented knowledge is certainly emendable, as we will see. In any event, even the failed attempt of the imagination to construct the desired system, even this kind of attempt has some partial expression, false, erroneous, and mutilated of the desired system itself, the system that any grade of knowledge endeavors to seek.

4.3  T  he Figments of Imaginations: Time, the Confined Occupation of the Mind, and Death as Fragmenting Factors The common order of nature is, as I argued, the erroneous, fragmented, partial, and mutilated feature of the first grade of knowledge, namely, the imagination. This order consists of random or fortuitous connections, which are arbitrary and lacking any universal legitimate grounds. Because of this, those connections cannot join together individual things to construct a comprehensive system, which reflects adequately the system of Nature as it is in itself (ut in se est). Time plays a central role in that erroneous and mutilated conception. Spinoza relates our body’s duration to the common order of nature (2p30d), while temporal existence is simply a measured and confined duration. Since our body as cognized is our medium of knowledge in general, the relatedness of our body to time affects the whole scope of our knowledge. There are various indications that Spinoza considers time as a means of the imagination: First, Letter 12 defines time as only one of the imagination’s aids or modes

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(IV: 57). Secondly, according to 4p62d & s, adequate, rational knowledge is not restricted by temporal distinction, and hence it is “under the same species of eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis) with no temporal conditioning or restricting. As we have no adequate knowledge of the duration of things (and all the more of their temporal measurement), we are unable to regard temporal distinction as means of an adequate knowledge. Indeed, “we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (by 2p31), and we determine their time of existing only by the imagination (2p44s), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and the image of a future one…. the judgment we make concerning the order of things and the connection of causes … is imaginary, rather than real” (4p62s). We likewise infer from 2p44, Scholium, demonstrations, and corollaries that Spinoza ascribes time to our imagination only. Since “it depends only on the imagination that we regard things as contingent” (2p44c1), the temporal distinctions, which cause us to see things as contingent, are simply the products of imagination. Indeed, Spinoza concludes that “no one doubts … that we also imagine time, viz. from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly, or more quickly, or with the same speed” (2p44c1s).6 Unlike the imagination, “it is of the nature of Reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity” (2p44c2), and, thus, “to regard things as necessary and not as contingent, … and it perceives this necessity of things truly … i.e., as it is in itself [ut in se est]” (2p44c2d). Generally speaking, “the foundations of Reason are notions … which explain those things that are common to all, and which … do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity [quadam sub specie aeternitatis]” (2p44c2d). In sum, things as they are truly conceived, namely, as they are in themselves with no restrictions of our imagination, are conceived with no relation to time but as real, necessary and eternal. Anything real, according to Spinoza, is necessary and eternal (as he mentions, in one breath, reality, necessity, and eternity [1p29]), namely, with no relation to time or with no temporal distinctions. Duration, time, and temporal distinctions or measurements are simply the products of our imagination; and, as such, they are obstacles to perceive anything in Nature truly, as it is really is—real, necessary, and eternal. Contingency, chance, or anything fortuitous or random, as I explained above, is simply an effect of our ignorance, when the complete order of Nature is beyond us (1p33s1); only a discrete part of it, allegedly an isolated island, is revealed to our mind. What is exactly the inseparable connection between time and contingency? Reality, the whole of Nature, consists of individual things and their necessary connections, namely, causal connections that are manifested as chains of reasons, 6  On this basis, Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, too, reach the following right conclusion: time “is a product of imagination, dependent on the mind’s capacity for comparison. We imagine time … (2p44s)… the appearance of contingency is an illusion” (Gatens and Lloyd 1999, p. 29). Hence, “Time, in contrast to duration, is more removed from the existence of things—a product of the imagination’s capacity to compare different experiences, rather than part of the very fabric of our experience of particular things” (op. cit., p. 30).

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inference, and conditioning in the Attribute of Thought, which links all the included individual things into a totally comprehensive system, namely, the immanent causal chain. This system is coherent and utterly intelligible. In contrast, a temporal order can at most construct a transient causal chain, which I elaborated on in Sect. 2.3 above. The transient chain does not relate to the eternal essences of singular things, nor to the necessary connections holding them together as a one chain. This chain does not reflect the ample nature of reality, its infinitely variability, richness, in which no individual thing or detail is missing; it cannot reflect Nature’s infinitely multiple nature, nor its unity and coherence. In the transient causal chain neither the multiple aspect of Nature nor its general aspect is reflected or grasped. In Spinoza’s philosophy, time cannot serve as part of an individuation principle. Indeed, in the closing paragraph of the introduction to Ethics 4, Spinoza writes: “by perfection in general I shall … understand reality, i.e., the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces and effect, having no regard to its duration.” As we shall realize, in discussing below, the supreme grade of knowledge, namely, scientia intuitiva, essence is the factor of individuation of an individual thing. Moreover, time cannot construct a general system. These two aspects are interconnected, for the principle of individuation, according to Spinoza, consists of necessary connections between each detail, each individual thing, and the whole. It is not a chance that Spinoza relates his discussion on the modality of contingency (1p33s1) to his stance that there is no earlier or later in eternity (1p33s2), for had we ascribed temporal order to reality itself, we could have had in mind another order of things, different from the actual one, and in such a case the order of things would have not been necessary at all; it could have been different. Undoubtedly, temporal order is not necessary, for there is no necessity in such an order. From post hoc one is not entitled to infer propter hoc. It is invalid. Hence, one cannot reduce temporal order (post hoc) to logical order (propter hoc). We cannot deduce any temporal order from the causal, rational order, which is a necessary individuating order, according to Spinoza— adequate causality is Spinoza’s principle of individuation, and adequate causality means sufficient and necessary conditioning. This principle reflects the necessary infinite multiplicity of the system of the whole of Nature, which is a total coherence of all individual things. Thus, the necessary connections upon which that system rests are not formal and indifferent to contents but fully contentful. In contrast, the temporal order is entirely indifferent to the particulars involved. From the temporal aspects, all particular moments are equal, namely, temporal differences do not reflect any essential differences, in Spinoza’s terms, namely, differences on which the essences, the individuating factors, of individual things rest (to follow the paragraph ending 4preface). Because of that lack of difference, time could not serve as the principle of individuation, which means that temporal order ascribes contingency to its details or moments. From the temporal aspect, there is no difference whether moment a precedes moment b, or vice versa. The only temporal demand or restriction is that either a or b precedes the other. These are the temporal “before” and “after,” which have no logical necessity about them, whereas in the immanent causal order there is no “before” or “after” but logical, necessary order instead, as in eternity there is no “before” or “after.” The immanent causal order is eternal and

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thus does not relate at all to time and temporality. Time leaves details and individual things to contingency, whereas Spinoza wishes to exclude any contingency out of the true conception of the fully contentful and infinitely detailed reality. Furthermore, Spinoza argues that time, like the other aids of the imagination, separates or abstracts the modes from Substance. To understand this, the following clauses should be quoted in extenso: … if you ask why we are so inclined, by a natural impulse, to divide extended substance, I reply that we conceive quantity in two ways: either abstractly, or superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the aid of the senses; or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is what we do most often and most easily, we find it to be divisible, finite, composed of parts, and one of many. But if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, then we find it to be infinite, indivisible and unique … Next, from the fact that when we conceive quantity abstracted from substance and separate duration from the way it flows from eternal things, we can determine them as we please, there arise time and measure—time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity in such a way that, so far as possible, we imagine them easily. Again from the fact that we separate the affections [modifications] of substance from substance itself and reduce them to classes so that as far as possible we imagine them easily, arises Number, by which we determine [these affections of substance]. (Letter 12, G IV: 56–57; Curley I: 202–203)

Compare this with the following clause: If someone should now ask why we are, by nature, so inclined to divide quantity, I shall answer that we conceive quantity in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, as we … imagine it, or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone [NS7: without the help of the imagination]. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a substance, which happens [NS: seldom and] with great difficulty, then (as we have already sufficiently demonstrated) it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible. This will be sufficiently plain to everyone who knows how to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination—particularly if it is also noted that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different way, so that its parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really. For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another—insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal substance. For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted. (1p15s, Curley I: 423–424).

The striking similarity between these two sections clearly demonstrated that by April 1663, Spinoza had clear ideas about some principal parts of the Ethics. Concerning the issue in question, both sections show how the imagination breaks down the right conception of Nature and actually distinguishes between its details, variations, or modes as if they were separate, discrete parts, which is not the real,  Namely, De Nagelate Schriften van B.D.S, which are the contemporary Dutch translations of Spinoza’s writings that appeared as a posthumous edition (1677).

7

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true case at all. In contrast, truly or adequately conceived by the intellect, Nature-­ Substance is indivisible. Letter 12 specifies what are the aids of imagination, which split the true picture of reality into as if they were separate, discrete parts. These are measure, time, and number. We will discuss measure and number separately but, for the time being, we should conclude that time is a fragmenting, abstracting factor, which keeps us away from the true conception of Nature and the modes of Substance as well. As any fragmenting factor, time puts an obstacle in our way of understanding Nature, as understanding, which is the act of the intellect, consists of the necessary connections of each individual thing to the rest and, in the end, to the whole of Nature as a coherent system. Place, time, and number are fragmenting factors, for they obstruct our endeavor to grasp reality as it is really is, namely, continuous and successive. Fragmenting factors break our picture of reality. For example, a baby bursts into tears, just because his parents leave his room. He cannot even imagine that they are in the next room, as for him the whole world is what he actually sees at the moment. For him, the borders of his room are those of the world, at least as long as he stays in that room. In quite a similar way, place serves in our imagination as a fragmenting factor (following 5p29s and 5p37s, and TdIE §87 and Section 23 above). The same holds true for time. Spinoza is well aware of the discrete moments of Galilean-Cartesian time. According to Galileo, the temporal succession is like that of the dots in a line, whereas according to Descartes this line is broken into discrete moments (the very same holds true for the discrete moments of thought). Time puts fences in our imagined reality, as if reality were broken into discrete islands of reality, each of which is independent of the other. Before the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus (independently by Newton and Leibniz), numbers had been considered not to construct a successive continuum of an arithmetic series. Nothing could be further from Spinoza’s view of reality than the dividing of it into separate, discrete atoms. Likewise, his Attribute of Extension is quite different from that of Descartes, for its continuity or successiveness lies upon the power and activity of expansion. We may compare it with an electromagnetic field (to borrow a brilliant idea from Jonathan Bennett). Against this background, time, space, and number are simply entia imaginationis, namely, entities of imagination.8 The imagination thus limits the duration of individual things, as if they were isolated one from the other. It ignores their dependence one on the other and on the whole as well and considers them as though they were created out of nothing and passed away. As isolated, these things must be conceived as if fortuitous or random, namely, as contingent. Only by realizing their dependence on reality as a whole, can we discover their necessity too (Letter 12, G IV: 54). Reality in itself is not divisible, 8  To be distinguished from real entities (entia realia), on the one hand, and entities of Reason (entia rationis), on the other. Real entities are all the entities that exist outside of the intellect (extra intellectum), exist in reality as it is really is, whereas the entities of Reasons do not exist so, yet, as aids of Reason, they serve us to find our way in reality and do not mislead us as entia imaginationis actually do. Such entities of Reasons are species and genera, maps in general, longitudes and altitudes in particular, and the like.

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neither is it finite (ibid.). Spinoza relates the knowledge of the enduring individual things to their knowledge as contingent and destructible (2p31c). Again, we can cognize only most inadequately the duration of our body (2p30) and that of other individual things outside of us (2p31). Generating something out of nothing and passing away depend on time, namely, on a determined or measured duration; moreover, they have to do with contingency too. Why so? Anything that passed away (died) is disconnected, as it were, from the total causal chain. There is no causal chain that connects the dead with the living. As passed away or dead, anything is beyond our knowledge (in Spinoza’s words: “the order of causes is hidden from us”). In contrast, we can understand only something that is necessarily connected with the causal chain that we have already known, whereas a generation out of nothing or destruction, which actually is the imagined nullification of things, implies an alleged fragmentation of the whole chain and breaks it with gaps. Such is the case as the order of causes is hidden from us (1p33s1). Contingency, according to Spinoza, is simply a defect in our knowledge and nothing more. Fragmenting and separating are the obstacles for our mind to know reality as it really is. They are thus the grounds for being our knowledge inadequate or partial. From the former paragraph, it should be inferred that death is another fragmenting factor, and, perhaps, a most crucial one. Most of our fears and anxieties have to do with death. But what is death? Like creation and passing away, death is simply an ens imaginationis, for it is our imagination only that inserts death into the map of reality, even though there is nothing like that in reality as in se est, as much as creation or passing away, or any miraculous passage from nothingness to being or from being to nothingness, are simply other entia imaginationis. What is a miracle? It is the most striking example of breaking the causal chain into separate, isolated, or discrete islands, whereas no such islands exist in Nature, in which no causal breaking or void can exist, in which everything is necessary, namely, necessarily and absolutely inseparably connected with the rest of that chain and with it as a systematic whole. As fragmenting or breaking down the causal chain, miracle, death, birth or creation (which are simply generating out of nothing) have no ontic status out of the intellect (extra intellectum) but are just entia imaginationis. Finally, each ens imaginationis is inadequate, obscure, and confused ideas. In contrast, all entia realia, which are certainly extra intellectum, are by no means fictions, errors, mistakes, illusion, or delusion. All those ideas are clear and distinct, namely, adequate. Clear and distinct—adequate—causes are those “whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it alone” (3def1). The “being alone” of any adequate cause is not “loneliness,” namely, it does not involve detachment, separation, or isolation; instead, it involves distinction (note that in Spinoza’s philosophy, distinction does not entail separation but, rather, the contrary). Adequacy, according to Spinoza, consists of a necessary, inseparable connection; it is a solid relationship between parts and the whole. Whenever something follows from our nature and can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone, we act and are not acted on (3def2: “On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause”). The relative

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independence of the adequate causes is implied by Spinoza’s principle of individuation and personal identity, as I explicated it above. In contrast, any fragmenting factor is a product of the first grade of knowledge, namely, our imagination, and it is entirely incompatible with adequate causality, which is, undoubtedly, ens realia. The Spinozistic necessity of individuation and differentiation, without which Nature could not have been infinitely ample and complete, is the necessity of the existence of individual things, each of which has a unique essence. Nevertheless, all these individual things because of the singularity, distinctness, and individuality of each one of them, require necessary inter-connections. Only against the background of the whole of Nature as a coherent system the distinction of its variations, modes, or finite, can individual things be realized. Again, distinctness according to Spinoza is not Hume’s distinctness, which entails separation. On the contrary, Spinoza’s distinctness entails necessary connections with other individuals as well as with the whole of Nature. As free agents, human beings, as individuals acting and existing within Nature, are, hence, not independent of Nature; as a free agent, the free individual takes part in the activity of the whole of Nature as a free cause, as a causa sui. Separating or isolating individual things from the whole of Nature is simply an abstraction, which the first grade of knowledge performs. Performing so, this grade of knowledge blurs the singularity of each individual thing and ignores the personal identity of each individual. The imagination thus grasps each individual or individual things as unreal, corrupted or passing away, or contingent. As much as any part of the whole reality is independent, relatively speaking of course, its effectiveness and impact upon the reality around it, is greater. Effectiveness or impact consists of strong necessary connections between individual things and the whole of Nature. The more independent an individual thing is, the more dependent is the rest of Nature upon it, and the more is its sensitivity to the rest of Nature. In any case, such independence does not entail separation from the rest of reality; the case is rather the opposite. There is no individual thing that is separated from the rest of Nature and which is not dependent on it, and vice versa—the rest of reality depends, though in a secondary sense, upon it. In other words, also used by Spinoza, each individual thing, each distinct part of Nature, each mode, is a cause of a particular effect (according to 1p36), as much as this thing is an effect of another particular cause. If a cause is adequate, it must be conceived as inseparable from the rest of Nature, better, from the total causa sui. Each “fragment” of reality is simply a modal part of the whole, a mode of an Attribute. Thus, no mode or individual thing is a fraction, fragment, or a separate, discrete moment, for no division of Substance into real separate or discrete parts is possible at all (see Sect. 2.12 above). Imagination’s fragmenting factors, the first of which is time, cause us to consider individual things as separated fragments, even as if substances (for instance, in the Aristotelian sense of the term), for “substance” is a strictly independent being or entity. The temporal order, which pertains to the common order of nature, requires an invalid generalization. The real order of Nature is not the common one and temporal moments do not construct together a one coherent system. Temporal moments thus remain discrete and separate one from the other. This implies that temporal continuity is simply impossible. There is no time without measurement. Temporal existence

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is impossible without a measured duration, but to measure time requires fragmenting, dividing temporal sequence into discrete parts, namely, hours, minutes, seconds, and so on. In this way, temporal succession is abolished: “If someone conceives duration in this abstracted way and, confusing it with time, begins dividing it into parts, he can never understand how an hour, for instance, can pass by … to say that duration is made up of moments is the same as to say that number is made up simply by adding noughts together” (Letter 12, G IV: 58). As abstracted or imagined, durational moments wrongly conceived as temporal cannot establish one, infinite continuous or successive time, for continuity or durability requires necessary connections and necessary order, whereas measurement requires discrete temporal moments, which are independent of one another, or, at least, are not necessarily dependent one on the other and, hence, they are separable. An infinite time is impossible in Spinoza’s philosophy (ibid.), also because the capability of our imagination is quite limited. No abstraction can escape limitation, and limitation is a necessary condition of the imagination, which is simply a generalizing faculty. The generalizations that our imagination constructs consist of a false and erroneous conception of reality, in which we construct the whole of it in the measure of a part of it, a part that we perceived under particular circumstances. In this way, because of our imagination, we mistake a part of reality for reality as a whole. This built-in limitation of our imagination renders it impossible for us to conceive all the real differences between individual things beyond a quite limited section or region of reality, a section that is inescapably arbitrary (related to the conceiver and his or her bodily perception, which is one’s medium of any kind of knowledge). In this manner, when perceiving time, our capability to imagine temporal distances distinctly is finite and limited—beyond a particular temporal distance, which is arbitrary, too, we must imagine all the other temporal moments as if all of them were in the same temporal distance from a particular present moment. The same holds true for local distances. In this way, beyond a certain distance, we can no longer distinguish between temporal moments or places in space (following 4def6). As a result, we cannot imagine infinite time, space, or number. The common temporal order is not the order of reality as it is really is. The real order of Nature (reality) is really infinite and not abstract. Any common, abstract order is valid for only a limited section of reality and never for the whole of it, to Nature as a whole. Finally, even this limited perception of ours (by means of our imagination, the first grade of knowledge) is wrong, erroneous, and misleading. Even in respect of our imagination, time has only a relative status. Time indicates only relations, such as between different speeds of bodies, and no absolute determination can pertain to it. Moreover, these relations depend on the various and accidental experiences of each of us, also on various states of our bodies, on personal associations, all of which lack any constancy (2p17d; 2p17cor & d & s; and 2p44c1s). The fluctuations, so typical of our imagination, memory and temporal distinctions, in fact reduce or cancel even the distinctions made by our imagination: In some cases, we consider past episodes as actually existing in the present (according to the description at 3p47s), which is the case of many of our images of things (2p17c,s). Thus, imagination itself even abolishes the temporal distinction and

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indicates their relativity. No relative, no instable order can serve as a true order of Nature. As much as no generalization of our imagination can establish a real universal or common order, so a temporal generalization cannot establish any real common or common order. Upon our agreement, we can accept one universal temporal order, but this is a matter of an arbitrary convention only (such as GMT, for instance). As an arbitrary convention, it requires an imagined, alleged commonness, which is merely a product of our imagination (ens imaginationis and nothing more). Such, according to Spinoza, is the epistemic status of language, memory, and personal associations, all of which depend upon our accidental bodily changes (I thus apply what Spinoza states in 2p18s to the temporal conventions). We construct abstract concepts, none of which is really common to all of us, for each of us has a different association with it. Time does not flow or pass equally for each of us. In situations of boredom, anxiety, or pain, time flows very slowly for us whereas in times of happiness or bliss, time flows extremely rapidly even though according to strict measurements the same section of time has elapsed. For each of us there is a particular temporal flow and succession, each according to his or her bodily or mental states under this or that circumstance. Each of us, captures time individually, differently, and variously under various circumstances and individual bodily or mental states. Like any abstract universal, time, too, consists of imagined, false abstraction, which is a part of the common order of nature. So much for showing that time does not adequately reflect the real order of Nature, and, thus, time pertains to imagination only.9 The worst thing about time is that it is a chief fragmenting factor, which hinders our attempt to conceive reality or Nature as it is really is (ut in se est). Fragmentation and error go hand in hand in Spinoza’s philosophy. Error is simply ignorance about the causal context of things, in which we grasp only a fragment of reality as if this section were not an island, a product of our mere imagination, but the whole or reality. No section or fragment is in itself misleading, as long as we are aware that it is only a fragment, an arbitrary segment of reality as a whole, or only a link in an infinite, total causal chain. As soon as we become aware of this, we can use any fragment or segment as a building block in our ongoing cognitive construction of the world. Being aware of this, we never consider such a section as accidental or contingent. While detecting its causal links with the total causal chain, we in fact study its necessity. As a link in this chain, any section is real, necessary, and eternal, for it is exempt from any temporal limitations or distinctions. There is no time without succession, the order of before and after, early and late. This temporal order cannot be the order of Nature as it truly is, namely, as it is perceived as eternal: “in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after” (1p33s2; cf. TdIE §102: in the series of fixed, eternal things all exist “at once”). Eternity is simply “existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the 9  Compare with Bennett 1984, pp. 198–202. He is quite right in analyzing Spinoza’s concept of time as a fragmenting or dividing factor (op. cit., p. 203: “the concept of a cut, a borderline, a demarcation” and discontinuity), although he does not realize the most significant connection between time, contingency, and the first grade of knowledge.

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definition alone of the eternal thing” (1def8; and as the explication clarifies that this existence “cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end”). Nevertheless, individual things can be perceived as if in succession. In this way they are erroneously perceived, namely, perceived by our imagination. Moreover, we are doomed to perceive things in succession, and we can perceive only a few of them at once. Take, for instance, a huge picture. It is impossible for any spectator to perceive all its parts and details at once. He or she inevitably needs time to perceive the picture as a whole, though all its parts and detail exist at once and in no temporal order. The same is valid for a long argument: it is impossible even for an expert logician to conceive all its premises at once; he or she needs some time to conceive and calculate the validity of such a long argument, even though no part of it, neither the premises, nor the conclusion, exist in time. In each of such cases, it takes us some time to conceive or perceive the whole thing. Such is the nature of our limited and conditioned mind. Much depends on our attention, which is inescapably limited. Our confined attention dictates the way in which we perceive in succession what happens in our body and the way in which that Nature reflects itself on it. At a particular moment, one’s attention focuses on a particular detail, event, or object. We cannot perceive at once everything that happens in our body or is reflected upon it. In this way, our limited attention dissociates some details from the rest of the immediate environment of our body. We ignore the context to which these details belong. This detachment or ignorance follows our immediate needs and the priority that our attention, interests, and needs determine. In any event, the details of the activity and entities that we perceive at a specific moment are ordered in succession only in our perception of them, not in reality as it is in itself. In it, everything eternally exists, not in temporal order. This includes events. Strange as it may sound, changes and events, according to Spinoza, do not need time. They are eternal modifications of the whole of Nature, not as perceived as an eternal, real, and necessary whole, but as particularized, better, modified, into individual things. Modes and modification can be perceived as eternal, as much as Attributes or infinite modes can be. Let me elaborate on the possibility of change without time or temporality. Think of a very long logical argument. There is a necessary, irreversible order in it, for instance, the following one: “If a, then b; if b, then c; if c, then d; if d, then e; if e, then f; if f, then g; if g, then h; if h, then i; if i, then j; if j, then k; if k, then l; if l, then m; if m, then n; if n, then o; if o, then p; if p, then q; if q, then r; if r, then s; if s, then t; if t, then u; if u, then v; if v, then w; if w, then x; if x, then y; if y, then z; Therefore, if a, then z.” It takes some minutes to understand, calculate, and diagnose it as valid. There is a strict, necessary, and irreversible order in it; you cannot and would not change anything in it without rendering it invalid. Even though it may take you some time to grasp and check it, there is nothing temporal in it, as it is truly in itself (ut in se est). The logical order in question is obviously a-temporal or, in Spinoza’s terms, eternal. There is no before and after, early and later in it. It is an erroneous, inadequate way to describe it in temporal terms. Our intellect refers to the logical order of the argument, whereas our imagination perceives it as it is temporally ordered.

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The same is valid for Nature and each of its variations: each variation, each mode or modification, of God-Nature-Substance is logically ordered, by no means temporally. Only our imagination ascribes it—quite wrongly or inadequately, namely obscurely and indistinctly— to a temporal order. And our imagination does so, only because it is a faculty of a limited and confined mind, the human mind that can never completely liberate itself from the “common order of nature” (4p4c, cf. Political Treatise Ch. 1, Sec. 5, Curley II: 505). Think about quite a different example to demonstrate how change is possible without time: musical variations on a theme. Think, for instance, of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. The whole symphony consists of various variations on one and the same theme that the first four notes of the symphony express. It takes about 50 min to listen to the whole symphony, and it takes some time to read the score (partitura) as a whole. Nevertheless, nothing in the score is temporal. Even though the meaning of the musical order of the notes is, as applied in performance, temporal, the score in itself, like a text or a whole book, is not temporal at all. In the score we find signs indicating how long this or that part of the score should take, but there is nothing temporal in the order of the notes. We can translate a score into a mathematical, algebraic language, which in itself, as in logic, has nothing temporal about it. A whole symphony consisting of many variations on one and the same theme needs no time or temporal order to exist; only its performance, without the printed or written score, requires time and temporal order. As much as grasping and checking the long argument requires time and temporal order. Think now of the infinite variations-modes-modifications of one and the same theme—God-Nature-Substance. Sub specie aeternitatis, nothing in this absolutely total (infinite) Reality requires time or temporality. Of course, this reality can be grasped by us only as segments after the others, never at once. Only our grasp through the faculty of our mind—imagination—proceeds in time and in temporal order. Only this faculty needs and takes time to perform its function. The eternal existence of variations-modes-modifications strictly means that in Spinoza’s world there is infinitude of changes that are not temporal at all. None of them should take time, except for our imagination. In reality, ut in se est, nothing is ordered in the succession, which reflects the operation of our imagination, as our mind is limited. In reality as itself, nothing exists as an individual thing after or before (in a temporal order) another individual thing, or such a thing next to or side by side (in a spatial order) to other things. As a product of our imagination and the chief fragmenting factor, time obliterates any possibility of constructing a coherent cognitive system of Nature, in which each mode is inseparable from the rest of Nature. Time divides duration into a succession of separable, discrete moments whereas Nature is an infinite continuum in which there is no void and nothing is missing. The dissociation and separation that are typical of time and perceiving a fragment as a whole—these two grounds forestall together an attempt of adequate knowledge of Reality. In this way, our limited mind can ignore the rest of Reality that is relevant to our perceiving Reality adequately. This error can be emended, if we replace the associative, subjective order of each of us by the really common, universal order of the intellect.

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In sum, temporal or local fences exist only in our imagination, and yet they obstruct our perceiving it as it really is. In Nature no fences exist, for it is absolutely continuous. No void nor “islands” of reality exist there but only in our imagination. Given that time is a succession of discrete moments, our temporal perceptions are corrigible. Because the succession in itself does not need any isolation or separation of its moments, it needs neither their dissociation nor separation from Nature as a whole, our temporal perceptions are corrigible or emendable. In contrast, time really dissociates our mind from the true knowledge of reality. It mainly associates succession from this reality. Time frustrates our attempts at knowing Nature adequately (in Spinoza’s terms). Indeed, there is no succession without before and after, early and late, which do not pertain to the true, adequate order of Nature, for these are relations and not real distinctions in Nature. Nevertheless, succession as such does not mislead us, whereas temporal perception entails ascribing early and late, before and after to reality as it is in itself. Such an ascribing is certainly misleading. Only those who are aware of the fact that the parts of a huge picture are not temporally ordered, only they can perceive these parts as they really, actually are truly, extra intellectum. They can reconstruct the true picture as a whole out of their partial perception. Our partial perceptions are, after all, part of the complete knowledge of reality. Our adequate, true perceptions must be, thus, purged from any temporal and local restrictions (“fences”), which fragmenting or shredding our perception of reality and forestalling its adequate and coherent idea. Like the common order of nature, which is the product of the first grade of knowledge, time is an attempt to construct a universal idea. Time is an attempt at constructing a universal construction. But this attempt is bound to fail. No discrete moments can result in constructing a universal, continuous, and coherent system. Thus, time and place cannot serve as a principle of individuation, contrary to the belief of classical and modern empiricists. Quite a different principle of individuation is required in order to adequately reflect the infinite ampleness of reality in an infinite number of variations. Thus, time puts a barrier between our minds and the adequate idea of reality, which is a coherent system, infinitely ample with all the possible variations. Other fragmenting and shredding factors in our knowledge are the confined attention of mind and death. Both are in fact figments of our imagination (“entia imaginationis”). I will begin with the confined attention. “Confined attention”10 is not one of Spinoza’s terms; it is rather a term that I have coined. Yet, it is well compatible with what Spinoza says about the occupation (“determination”) of our mind. In the beginning of the general definition of the affects, Spinoza’s writes: “An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea, by which the mind affirms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, when it is given, determines the mind to think of this rather than that” (3, General Definition of the Affects). This

10

 “Occupation” and “engagement” may serve as substitutes for “attention.”

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determination of the mind signifies the confined occupation of the mind, as I called it. Our attention is confined to a fragmented, as if isolated, piece of reality. Spinoza refers to the confinement of our imagination in the context of the absurd belief in miracles (TTP, Ch. VI, Curley II: 163–4). Indeed, among the effects of the occupation (“determination,” occupation) of our imagination, we may detect one’s belief in miracles. Only because one dissociates the occupation of his or her mind, due to a great lost or mourning, for instance, one may believe in miracles. Such a belief results in fragmenting and isolating one’s knowledge, which mean that one’s does not adequately know the real causal order. As a result of his ignorance, things appear to him or her, as if they were an outcome of miracles. The biblical episode of the golden calf is a fine example for the occupation of one’s imagination—a small section of reality appears to be as it were God, namely, reality or Nature as a whole: “When they [the Israelites] were convinced that Moses had departed from them, they asked Aaron to give them visible deities, and their idea of God, formed after all their many miracles, was—a calf!” (TPT, Ch. VI, Curley II: 159). In other words, they imagined God as if it were a calf. They committed such an irrational error because the occupation of their minds was confined to a very small, as if isolated, part of reality. Such a confinement of our imagination and our mind as a whole is typical of all our prejudices, imagination’s distortions of reality, or all our entia imaginations, which always mislead us in conceiving or understanding reality. The episode of the Golden Calf is a typical example of the misleading force of one’s imagination: it compels one’s mind to the extent that it silences one’s Reason. Our imagination turns, as it were, the finite into an infinite, total reality. It is an absurd misdeed. In this one, our mind forms an inadequate idea, an expression of the mind’s passiveness. Another example of a confined occupation or distraction of the mind is its distraction by wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure, which many consider as the highest good (TdIE §3). In contrast, Spinoza writes about the intellectual love of God, which is the real supreme good for all human beings: this love of God “must occupy or constitute the greatest part of the mind” (5p39d and 5p16: “must engage the mind most”). Without mentioning the term “mind’s confined occupation,” “attention,” or “engagement,” Spinoza writes that the power of pleasure “can be so great that it surpasses the other actions of the body …, remains stubbornly fixed in the body, and so prevents the body from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways” (4p43d). Hence, when our occupation or attention is confined, we in fact exhaust only a little part of the possibilities that are open for us, even insofar as pleasure is concerned. Spinoza elaborates on this issue thus: the affects by which we are daily torn are generally related to a part of the body which is affected more than the others. Generally, then, the affects are excessive, and occupy the mind in the consideration of only one object so much that it cannot think of others. And though men are liable to a great many affects, so that one rarely finds them to be always agitated by one and the same affect, still there are those in whom one affect is stubbornly fixed. For we sometimes see that men are so affected by one object that, although it is not present, they still believe they have it with them.

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When this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is mad or insane. Nor are they thought to be less mad who burn with love, and dream, both night and day, only of a lover or a courtesan. For they usually provoke laughter. But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit, or money, and an ambitious man of esteem, they are not thought to be mad, because they are usually troublesome and are considered worthy of hate. But greed, ambition, and lust really are species of madness, even though they are not numbered among the diseases. (4p44s)

It should be most interesting to analyze this passage from a Freudian viewpoint. Instead of the Freudian cathexis—usually defined as concentration or investment of emotional energy on an object or idea—Spinoza deals here with our mind’s occupation which is confined. Such an occupation results in dissociation from reality as it is really or actually is. Thus, in such a state we imagine that something of our past is as if it were present whereas, in reality, it is not present at all. In Freudian terms such is the case of transference or projection neurosis. At this point, the connection between dream, psychosis, and the confined occupation of the mind becomes clear. Freud writes that while dreaming we are in a state of temporary psychosis. There is thus a passage from dreaming, neurosis, and psychosis. From Spinoza’s viewpoint, in each of these states our knowledge and psychical state is confined to our images or ideas and dissociates ourselves in reality as it is in itself. These states, according to Spinoza, are variations of madness. The confined occupation of the mind causes us to ignore the diversity and multiplicity of our needs. As Spinoza emphasizes, “The human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things at once” (4p45c2s). Nevertheless, our confined occupation causes us to ignore most of the nourishment that our mind and body require. It also causes us to ignore most of the connections and relations that our body and mind maintain with Nature. Spinoza’s critique of our confined occupation is an attempt to open what we actually close and confine in our daily life because of our temporal conception. Instead of paying attention to the infinite richness and ampleness of Nature we, because of our confined occupation, reduce them to something very little, confined, and insignificant. Because of this, we confine our attention to a minuscule part of reality. Our imagination magnifies such a detail, and, like the yellow press, makes something significant and important out of this minor and insignificant thing, even though not much time has to lapse to make us ignore it completely. All the things that we dub as bad are simply products of our confined attention whenever we consider only our utility and needs and disregard the fact that we are only a tiny part of Nature as a whole whose laws refer to what is common to all modifications of Nature and are not confined to our needs and utility (4p57s). Alas, the power of emotion is so strong that it is sufficient for a strong affect to captivate the mind and to draw the whole of our attention to the object or subject of that emotion. Instead of considering the infinite abundance, the occupied mind considers one or a few objects only with no attention to other, relevant objects:

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An effect is only evil, or harmful, insofar as it prevents the mind from being able to think …. And so that affect which determines the mind to consider many objects together is less harmful than another, equally great affect which engages the mind solely in considering one, or a few objects, so that it cannot thing of others. (5p9d)

Only because we are determined to pay attention or to consider an individual thing as if it were isolated or separated from the rest of Nature, do we consider it as accidental or contingent, without knowing what causes it or prevents it (following to 4def3). In this way, our confined attention contributes greatly to our ignorance, which is about the causal order as it really is. In such state of mind, this causal order remains obscure and enigmatic for us. As a result, our confined attention fails our attempt to understand ourselves and Nature as a whole as a coherent, one system. The fragmenting and misleading activity of time is a special outcome of our occupied attention whose confinement arises from the nature of the medium of any of our cognitions, namely, the body, as “the human body, being limited, is capable of forming distinctly only a certain number of images at the same time” (2p40c1). Likewise, “the human mind will be able to imagine distinctly, at the same time, as many bodies as there can be formed at the same time in its body… when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinction, and comprehend them as if under one attribute, viz. under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc” (ibid.), namely, abstract, void concepts, which greatly mislead us. Our ideas of time and place (according to 4def4) as well as our confined attention cause our imagination to mislead and deceive us. Only because of our confined attention, which renders us incapable of perceiving all the relevant details at once, while our attention focuses only on some of them, do we perceive things in a temporal order. Our mind is not determined exclusively by logical conditions but also by some other conditions, and because of this conditioning, we cannot grasp a long chain of reasoning at once as one long argument but only in a subsequent temporal order, which is not a logical order. Thus our discursive thinking process proceeds as if it were in time. As for the confined attention, Spinoza does not follow Descartes, who relates intuition and evidence to our mind’s attention, whenever it is entirely focused on a particular thing. Descartes deems this focused attention as an advantage, for it is an antidote against doubt (following Rule 3 of Rules for the Direction of the Mind). In contrast, Spinoza entirely rejects any momentary, discrete, or immediate evidence. Moreover, we can analogize Descartes’s conception of evidence to his idea of time (for instance, in the “Third Meditation”): as much as any clear and distinct act of thought do not depend one on the other (and, thus, each one of them has all it needs to be undoubtedly true, namely, evident), so each temporal moment is independent on the rest and is completely discrete. Spinoza rejects both Cartesian ideas, which are interdependent—Descartes’s idea of time and that of evidence, for both are incompatible with Spinoza’s idea of a philosophical system. Indeed, Descartes’s theory of time is not systematic, for he needs God as a deus ex machina to compose the discrete temporal moments into a continuous time and to compose the discrete thoughts to constitute a thinking substance.

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Owing to the imagination, confined attention, and time we observe a limited scene or piece of reality that we, nevertheless, consider as it were reality as a whole. Owing to these factors, we deem a confined horizon as a complete reality. We believe that anything that no longer appears in this confined scene has passed away. In such a situation, we behave like little children who burst into crying just because their parents have left the nursery, believing them to have deserted their miserable children in a cold and strange world. After all, such is the behavior of most of us when mourning our dear ones. Such is our attitude to death. But, according to my understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy, the dead have not passed away from the world; rather, we believe that things are generated and pass away, that they are destructible, only because the complete causal order is beyond our grasp. Hence, we consider things as contingent, and as much as contingency has nothing to do with the things as they truly are, so destruction or passing away has nothing to do with them. Only the first grade of knowledge conceives things as generated and passing away, whereas true knowledge grasps them as eternal. The infinite variety, the infinite plenty of Nature, and the endless activity of causation are not involved with generation and passing away but with the infinite activities, expressions, and appearances of the whole of Nature, each of which is an actual part of Nature and is not temporal and local but real and eternal. Hence, in Letter 4, Spinoza writes that “men are not created, but only generated, and that their bodies already existed before, though formal differently… if one part of matter were annihilated, the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same time” (G IV: 14, Curley I: 172). From the viewpoint of eternity—“under a species of eternity”, too, there is a perpetual activity of causation. It is not a “frozen” reality. The infinite and eternal immediate mode of the Attribute of Thought is “Movement and Rest.” In the Attribute of Extension the parallel mode is the Infinite Intellect. Neither mode relates to time (see Sect. 2.3 above). The perpetual activities of all the finite modes are both real and eternal as much as they are intelligible. Yet, it is not the way that individual things are perceived in the common order of nature, the worldview of the first grade of knowledge. In it, their existence is separated, as it were, from their essences, and they are perceived not as eternal but only as existing in time and as contingent. As such, these things constitute only a transient causal chain, not an immanent one. Thus, they are perceived not as necessarily interconnected. As a result, they are perceived as separated, as it were, from one another as well as from the whole of reality as we can know it. As separated so, they are perceived as generated and passing away. In such a temporal view of the individual things no permanence exits. There is no permanence in the mutability of things under the aspect of temporality in the first grade of knowledge, and, hence, they can be identified only in a confined temporal sequence, which is arbitrarily measured, as if they do not exist before and after that sequence or temporal section. As such, they serve as links in the transient causal chain (see Sect. 2.3 above). The problem is that there is no “before” and “after” in the eternal—true—order of nature. The common order of nature, as a product of our imagination, cannot thus correctly perceive the activities and individuation occurring in Nature. Their singularity and their partnership in constituting a coherent total system, which is the total immanent causal chain (see

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Sect. 2.3 above), are thus not perceived, let alone correctly. In contrast, the true and correct (namely, under a species of eternity) conception of reality as a systematic whole is valid for “the presence everywhere and most extensive power” (TdIE 101) of the essences of individual or singular things. These essences are eternal and are not generated or pass away (corrupt). Their presence everywhere is not confined by any temporal or local restrictions. Hence they serve as links in the immanent causal chain. The ceaseless activity and mutability of the real things is compatible with their fixed and stable identity, for such is the stable factor, namely, essence, that exists ceaselessly in each individual thing despite all its changes. The identity in question is immutable from any aspect of the total reality, but its influence and presence in this reality can be metamorphosed. Though these influences and presences are limited and restricted, as they are the essences of finite individual things, yet we should not describe them as ceasing to exist at a particular moment. Any finite real entity is the adequate cause, namely the necessary and sufficient cause, of particular individual things (inside that entity or outside of it), and yet it is a partial cause of what occurs within itself and, indirectly or in mediate ways, of all other individual things. Such is the nature of any partial, inadequate cause. In other words: each individual thing affects, to some extent, the entire causal chain in which it functions as both cause and effect. This causation is partial or inadequate whereas as the adequate cause of some effects, this individual thing is the necessary and sufficient condition of such effects. In any event, were it absent from the causal chain, which is a seamless network, this would have changed it as a whole, which is impossible: the whole of nature, as a causa sui, is immutable. It is absolutely complete, lacking nothing. In this secondary sense, the whole causal system actually depends on each of its modes, which are links in the immanent causal chain. And this chain is absolutely exempt from any temporal or local restriction. In Spinoza’s Nature, as it is conceived as an immanent, total causal chain, no barrier, no partition exists, let alone temporal or local. Indeed, time and place are simply fragmenting factors, serving the false worldview, the common order of nature, which is the transient causal chain. In Nature, as it truly is, no fragmenting factor can break the continuity of the immanent causal chain, which is the seamless causal network. Ontological fences, barriers, or partitions, which we wrongly ascribe to Nature, exist only in our imagination, in our knowledge in the first grade of knowledge, whose means are place and time, among other things, all of which are termed “aids of the imagination.” It is only the Infinite Intellect that perceives the whole of the immanent causal chain down to its “last” detail. This intellect perceives adequately, with no restriction, the causal status of each of the causal links, as partial (inadequate) on the one hand and as adequate on the other. Hence, only the Infinite Intellect can completely detect “the presence everywhere and most extensive power” of each of the modes. We, possessing only a finite intellect, which is simply an adequate part of the Infinite Intellect, can detect these presences and powers only in part yet adequately. In other words, we can know only partly the singularity of each individual thing. To know that completely, the Infinite Intellect has to be familiar with the combination of all the ways in which each particular thing affects the whole of Nature, as causa sui.

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What may surprise the reader is that death is one of the fragmenting factors by means of which our imagination distracts us from the true, adequate knowledge of Nature. Death is one of the fences or partitions, which our imagination wrongly ascribes to Nature. Death is simply a metamorphosis, in which one identity replaces another. Spinoza writes: “I understand the body to die when it parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another… the human body can … be changed into another nature entirely different from its own” (4p39s). No individual thing is endless. Other things, other forces, limit the duration of each thing, which must be, thus, not everlasting. There is no passing away, destruction, or death in Nature, as it is conceived as the immanent causal chain. No identity, personal or otherwise, can be destroyed. It is simply limited. Our imagination wrongly perceives this limitation as passing away, destruction, or death. Such is the case, as our imagination is blind to the continuity, coherence, or seamlessness of Nature as a whole. Under a species of eternity, nothing could break this continuity or coherence. The identity of an individual thing is its essence, and each essence-mode is actually and truly eternal, and no essence-mode is destructible or generable, as each essence is “fixed and eternal,” as I showed in Sect. 2.3 above. The perception made by our imagination cannot grasp the eternal essence of any individual thing. For this kind of perception, each human being is transient, generated, and destructible. Hence, the first grade of knowledge is incapable of perceiving the real personal identity of any person; neither can it perceive the real identity of anything. Against this background, a true knowledge of the proportion of motion and rest of an individual body requires the knowledge of it as causing, as active, as well as being caused (passive), as affect and affected under some limitations (following 4p38). Any change of that proportion means that an individual body is no longer recognizable as the one and the same (according to 4p39d & s). Nevertheless, such a change, in which the personal identity of the Spanish poet (4p39s) appears to be destroyed, is simply a false perception by the imagination, because the mind and the body of the Spanish poet radically changed, though he did not clinically die. In this context, there is another example—an infant who has become an adult lacking any infantile memory (to use a Freudian term). Is this the same person or not? Of course, this is one and the same person, even though she cannot remember anything that happened to her before, say, the age of five. The same holds true for the Spanish poet, too—though he lost his memory and can no longer recognize his own poems as his, from the viewpoint of adequate, true knowledge he is one and the same person, though from viewpoint of the first kind of knowledge it appears as if he had become quite another person. Undoubtedly, the proportion of motion and rest in the body, better, the brain, of the Spanish poet radically changed. Yet following my interpretation of Spinoza’s view of personal identity, this proportion does not serve as a personal identity; it serves only as a partial indication of some of the bodily manifestations of that identity, as it appears in the Attribute of Extension. If the Spanish poet before his devastating illness and after it are perceived as two different individua, it is because the imagination does not capture his factor of personal identity, namely, his essence. The true knowledge of these “two” individua perceives them as one and the same

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person, insofar as these “two” constitute one and the same adequate cause of one and the same effect (according to 2def: “if a number of individuals [individua] so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing”). Suppose that no two persons can have the same fingerprints. The Spanish writer before his illness and after it has the same fingerprints whose only adequate cause can be one and the same Spanish poet. The body of the Spanish poet is the necessary and sufficient condition for these fingerprints. The same holds true for the same person as an infant and as an old person as well, or for an old person who has lost his or her memory and remembers nothing of his former life—in each of these cases, if two individua are joined together as one and the same cause of one and the same effect, they are considered as one and the same individuum. If the cause in question is an adequate one, it serves as an identity, personal or otherwise, of that one and the same individuum. Note, that in the case, as in any case of adequacy, both cause and effect are not temporally restricted. They are entirely exempt from any temporality or locality. Any adequate cause, however finite or limited, is eternal. It is a link of the immanent causal chain, which consists of eternal modes-essences. In this chain, each individuum, each individual entity, is truly perceived as real, necessary, and eternal, which means that death does not hold (is not valid) for any of these individua. It is only from a confined viewpoint of an observer that an individuum appears to be generated or destroyed, born or pass away, at a particular moment. The confined occupation of such an observer does not grasp the real impact, however limited, on the whole or reality. This impact or influence cannot disappear at any moment. Temporality cannot restrict this impact at all. Only when the observer grasps an individuum as detached (at particular moments—before “death” or after “birth,” before generation or after passing away) from the total causal chain, is this individuum considered as temporal and, hence, as generated and passes away. As a link in the transient causal chain, no individuum maintains its identity before a restricted temporal section (“life-span”) and after it; in any event, its singular identity as well as its necessary connections with the causal chain as a whole cannot be grasped. Against this background, if Spinoza calls the radical change in the mind and body of the Spanish poet “death,” this throws a vivid light on the concept of death according to him. The singular effects of the Spanish poet, whether after the death of his memory or after his clinical, “final” death, cannot disappear. He has left his eternal effects, owing to the fact that he has been their adequate cause, on Nature as a whole. He is the adequate cause of his poetry, and this fact cannot be changed after his death, that of his memory or his clinical one. This is an example of the general rule that death, according to Spinoza, is simply an ens imaginationis. No dead person appears on the stage of our “present existence” (this expression is taken from 5p29d) or “present life” (5p20s). This stage is limited owing to our confined attention, which is simply a partial and limited knowledge of our body including its mutations while affecting or being affected by other bodies. Anything that does not appear “anymore” in this confined section of a causal chain or that appears not to influence it “anymore” (only because its influence is beyond our cognitive capability at the first grade of knowledge)—such a thing simply does not

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exist for us or is “dead,” as if this person had passed away and has been excluded from our present life. Nevertheless, he or she has never passed away from reality, as it is adequately perceived. Such reality is not constructed according to the confinement of our knowledge, namely, our confined attention. As long as we grasp this reality from the viewpoint of the first grade of knowledge, time, place, and confined attention are simply symptoms of our imagination, our first kind of knowledge, which is emendable. Time, place, and confined attention are thus fragmenting factors, which we project onto reality. Though the first grade of knowledge attempts to construct its own comprehensive system, it fails to do so, for it simply fragments reality, enforces partitions on it, breaks it, as it were, into isolated, discrete segments, and, in sum, perceives it, quite wrongly, in a piecemeal fashion, never comprehensively, systematically, and coherently. Only from the viewpoint of the imagination as a confined attention, are there time, place, and death, all of which are simply entia imaginationis. All of which are simply cognitive fragmenting factors. There is no death in Nature; there is only the confinement of our attention, which is incapable of detecting the continuous influence of the dead. When we are no longer aware of the causal impact of a person, we call him or her “dead.” We mourn our dear dead, only because we do not accept their finitude, for death is simply a false and misleading indication of the confinement of our knowledge and capability. Out of nothing, nothing comes; and something cannot become nothing. To become nothing or to be generated out of nothing signifies ignorance about the real causal connections in Nature. This ignorance is the origin of contingency, whereas in Nature no contingency exists, and everything is necessary, namely, causally connected with the rest of Nature. No essence can be really temporal; only the imagination perceives things as temporal. Just as the essence of the body is no less eternal than the essence of the mind, the “death” of the body (which is mentioned, for instance, in 4p39s) is imagined just as the “death” of the mind is imagined. Both kinds of “death” are products of false fragmenting of reality. We are eternal after all. Owing to our confined attention, we cannot grasp at once all the parts or details of a big complex painting. We should not assume that when our attention is focused on this or that detail, the others disappear (“gone” or“died”). Equally, we should not assume that when our attention is focused on our “present life,” incapable of capture the whole of reality, those persons that we can no longer perceive are really dead. They simply “escape” our attention owing to its limitations. Our confined attention is the symptom of the human provinciality or parochialism. Having removed those fragmenting factors from our knowledge of reality, we should conceive it as a coherent system, whose details are all links of the immanent causal chain, in which each individual thing is conceived truly as it is, namely, real, necessary, and eternal. As we shall see below, our happiness depends on our ability to emend our knowledge. Our happiness thus depends on our ability to remove the fragmenting factors of our imagination. No person can be happy, if he or she lets the idea of death overcome or occupy most of his or her mind. No happiness is compatible with the anxiety of death. To remove the impact of the image or idea of death from our

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self-knowledge is a necessary condition for our happiness. The freedom from the anxiety of death is in the power of the wise. In this section, I have reconstructed the idea of the confined attention from some principles and other ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy. This idea is an adequate replacement for what Spinoza’s philosophy lacks— the later idea of the mental unconscious. In this philosophy, no unconscious thought exists in our mind. Nevertheless, the confined attention can explain how it is possible that some even occur in our mind or body and yet we are not aware of them at all. Spinoza writes that “nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind” (2p12). Everything that happens in our body is necessarily represented as an idea in the mind. The idea of our confined attention easily explains how something may occur in our body, and yet we are not aware or conscious of it.

4.4  T  he Emotive Properties of the First Kind of Knowledge and the Mentis Fluctuatio In this section, I will analyze the nature of the emotive properties of the first grade of knowledge. The nature of these properties is frustrating, paradoxical, and even absurd. All the affects of this kind of knowledge are passive and, thus, are called “passions,” for they stem from external causes that affect us when we are passive. When imagining, when our knowledge is in the first grade of knowledge, our mind is passive (3p56d) and it is dragged by any accidental event. When passive, our mind has inadequate or confused ideas and our attention is very confined. Each of the inadequate, confused ideas pertains to the first grade of knowledge, and “so … this knowledge is the only cause of falsity” (2p41d). Moreover, in the first grade of knowledge, our mind is most unstable, as much as our experientia vaga is inescapably random, unstable, and dubious. The emotive properties of our imagination render our mind confused, unsettled, and unstable. They cause our mind to vacillate between extreme emotional poles, resulting in great confusion and frustration. Thus, while referring to the phenomena of love and hate toward something or somebody at the same time, Spinoza coins the expression fluctuatio animi—vacillation of the mind. Hence he writes: “This constitution of the mind which arises from two contrary affects is called vacillation of mind” (3p17s). Our mind emotionally vacillates, as “any thing can be the accidental cause of joy, sadness, or desire” (3p15). As long as our mind is dominated by the first kind of knowledge, it depends, cognitively and emotionally, on external, accidental causes to which it is enslaved. Thus, the vacillation or fluctuation of our fate determines our miserable emotional state. In such a state, we feel entirely unstable and insecure, subject to fear and anxiety and, even worse, vacillate between fear and hope. This must be extremely frustrating. In such a state of mind, we are doomed to servitude, as we are enslaved to a fluctuating fate.

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Our imagination facilitates emotional ambivalence: in our imagination, things that we imagine to love are similar to things that we hate (3p17 & s). This ambivalence is based upon the nature of our body. As it is a body composed of many physical individua whose natures are diverse and even contrary, we may be affected by the same object, and because of the nature of these contrary individua, we are doomed to be caught in the trap of emotional ambivalence. Spinoza devotes a major part of the Ethics to the emotional contraries and to the vacillation of the mind (as he declares in 3p59s: “With this I think I have explained and shown through their first causes the main affects and vacillations of mind … But I said that I have shown only the main, not all the conflicts of mind that there can be”). The passions, namely, the emotions of the first grade of knowledge, are involved with ceaseless conflicts to which no stability can pertain (see, for instance, 3p23s). In such a way, love is metamorphosed into hate and vice versa; and we can feel love and hate for one and the same object even at the same time. The emotional vacillations of the mind are well characterized in the case of fear and hope: I do not think it worth the trouble to show here the vacillations of mind which stem from hope and fear—since it follows simply from the definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear, and no fear without hope … Moreover, insofar as we hope for or fear something, we love it or hate it; so whatever we have said of love and hate, anyone can easily apply to hope and fear. (3p50s)

In the Preface to the Theological-Political Treatise (hereafter TPT), Spinoza relates such vacillations of emotions (as people are “wretched victims of alternating hopes and fears … when they are wavering between the emotions of hope and fear”) to the self-ignorance generally ascribed to people, when they feign things and interpret Nature as if it were as mad as they are (TPT, Preface: “as if the whole of Nature were a partner in their madness”). Such emotions indicate “a defect of knowledge and a lack of power in the mind” (4p47s). Imagination and inconsistency go hand in hand: the same imagination that forms its typical emotions is the one to abolish them. Similarly, it is one and the same imagination that produces time and abolishes it. Ethics 3 as a whole is devoted to the analysis of that inconsistency involved in the emotional vacillations of the mind. For instance, “love is joined to repentance, contempt, shame, etc.” (3p59s); “a vacillation of mind born of love and hatred together” (3p35s); “Although despondency is contrary to pride, the despondent man is still very near the proud one” (3p57s); and, finally, “all love that has a cause other than freedom of mind, easily passes into hate—unless it is a species of madness. And then it is encouraged more by discord than by harmony” (4App.19). This paradoxical nature of all the affects of the first grade of knowledge is absolutely necessary and inescapable. And this wavering nature, this vacillation, well characterizes the cognitive aspect of this grade of knowledge as experientia vaga— an unstable, dubious, or unreliable experience. Each of the generalizations of the first grade of knowledge, based upon fortuitous encounters with things and events, is inescapably subject to refutation by a contrary state of affairs and is doomed to be

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switched by other unstable generalizations. The whole of the emotional edifice based upon such an unstable kind of knowledge is also doomed to destabilization and, in the end—to be crushed because of contrarieties and contradictions. The emotional passive structure is unstable as much as its cognitive foundation is. Among the emotions of the first grade of knowledge, competition (aemulatio) plays a special role. Competition is “the desire for a thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire” (3p27s). This desire characterizes the false generalizations of the first grade of knowledge; it is a typical product of our imagination. In reality, each human body or each mind is a singular or unique entity, each mind or body is different from other minds or bodies, otherwise the principle of the sufficient reason, which Spinoza endorsed, would be invalidated. Each individual has individual desires, characterizing that individual only. Each has its unique conatus. We must differ in our desires and in our ways of satisfying them. In contrast, our imagination ignores such individual differences and generalizes instead, as if there were common desires of many different persons. These generalized desires are, in fact, imaginary with no standing in reality as it truly is. Indeed, emotionally and cognitively, we are in need of some common goals: each individual seeks, knowingly or unknowingly, a great, vast, and everlasting strength in which he or she participates. Because of such participation, each participating individual might gain such strength that he or she could be liberated from the bonds of destruction and became as if immortal, as if he or she were totally independent of fate and its vacillations. Gaining such strength, each individual would not be afraid of death, as if he or she were indestructible. Alas, only one really common strength exists that can satisfy such desires—the strength of the whole of Nature (God-Substance), in which all of us live and act. From this really common strength we draw our own powers. In contrast, imaginary commonness eventually only increases the frustration of the individual because of his or her finitude. The destruction of his or her confidence in the imaginary commonness will cause him or her to vacillate toward the despair from which he or she attempted to escape. This will bring about cognitive and emotive alienation as if separating him or her from the rest of Nature. An imaginary, fictitious common aim leads to the opposite—separation, isolation, conflicts, and splitting. From time to time, Spinoza describes the emotional vacillation of the mind as insanity or madness. When our common ground is imaginary, there is room enough for imaginary aims that are subject to competition. All such aims are imaginary as they are not really shared by various persons, each of whom is a singular entity; each of whom has a singular essence—a singular conatus—that cannot be shared by different people who compete about some imaginary aims as if they were really common. Indeed, each of our desires, even those which are mutilated or distorted in the first grade of knowledge, is different from those of other people, but whenever our aims are products of the imagination, namely, the first kind of knowledge, these aims cannot reflect any of one’s authentic desires, each of which expresses one’s singular conatus. In such a case, we desire things that we only imagine as desirable but, truly, they exist only in our imagination, which ignores the singularity of each conatus, of each of our true desires. The global commercial worldview nowadays heavily relies upon

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that nature of our imagination and makes the best of it for the interest of the few rich individuals. In our globalized era, manufacturers and merchants want consumers to buy their products all over the world as if these products were made especially for the personal tastes and needs of each singular consumer. Thus, they subject these products simply to imaginary commonness. The function of the advertisements to the consumer is to create such commonness. Globalized commerce thus heavily relies upon the first grade of knowledge and its emotional properties. Imaginary commonness is a source of unhappiness for many of us. Our ambition for what appears to be desirable in our eyes and in the eyes of others though this is not really the case, and it does not stem from the singular essence of each of us, requires great, sometimes horrendous, sacrifices or forfeiture from us with no real compensation. These “common” aims are usually changeable and never really durable. They are subordinate to caprices, ever-changing fashions, and random inconsistency (which, according to 4p58s, is typical of the hearsay of the multitude). Hence, they are quickly destroyed, and their destruction causes much frustration and vacillation of the mind to those desiring such ends. In this way, such ends, which used to be desirable, turn out to be the opposite—most adverse. Sometimes they cause an ambivalent state of mind, which is torn between desires and aversions. Nobody can enjoy emotional rest in such an ambivalent and vacillating state of mind. One must become unhappy in such a state. Even if the absurd nature of this state is not aware to one, one experiences its emotional frustration as a dismal failure. Those who are in the first grade of knowledge cannot love anybody as a singular human being, who is not similar to any other human being. As an emotional property of that grade of knowledge, love does not hold to singularity. Those who know themselves, other people, and Nature in the first grade of knowledge, do not love real persons but some replaceable, quite imaginary, objects that anybody can replace. At this grade of knowledge, there are always imaginary substitutes for any person. The first grade of knowledge does not capture the real individuation of Nature, neither the real essence of any person. Any love that relies upon this sort of knowledge cannot be satisfied. Owing to its abstracting and generalizing nature, our imagination blurs the real differences between persons. It is incapable of grasping the singularity of any person, which only the supreme grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva—can grasp adequately. Singularity reflects real individuality as it really is. Our mind and body have variable individual needs that should not be ignored (4p45c2s). The same is valid for love. At the basis of the most evil deeds that people can inflict on one another, there are some traces of the first kind of knowledge. Racism, for example, stems from arbitrary or capricious generalizations, blurring the differences between members of the same race. The same holds true for anti-Semitism or xenophobia, which stem from beliefs based upon abstract generalizations concerning societies or nations (3p46; in Short Treatise, Part II, Ch. 3, Sec. 8), the hatred of the ignorant mob toward foreign nations and different religions, a hatred that is nourished by hearsay only. All such hatred is based upon mistaken knowledge and a mutilated or false love of one’s own nation or society, a fragmented or isolated love, which was wrongly or erroneously conducted and which has no satisfaction at all. What

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remains is only destructive or deadly power. Persons who do not really know themselves and other persons as well, hate themselves, other people, and Nature, in such a way that they damage themselves, the others, and their environment.11 In contrast, our desire to know ourselves and the others, to free ourselves from randomness and fate, to liberate ourselves from the fear of death and to be happy—none of these can be fulfilled by the emotions (which are passive, namely, passions) of the first kind of knowledge. Our frustration would be increased and may falsify our personality even more. This will result in violence, hatred, and degrading the others. All these lead to the self-denial of us, which brings about sadness (Short Treatise, Part II, Ch. 6, Sec. 5). The ambivalence, vacillation, and paradoxical nature of the emotional properties of the first grade of knowledge indicate to what extent our mind needs an emendation. This emendation will cancel the hatred with all which is involved in it, and will reveal reality as it really is. In this reality, each entity, each particular thing, is linked to the others; each entity is a necessary link in the immanent continuity of causes. In contrast, the worldview, consisting of contraries and destruction, is nothing but the image of the “present life” (5p20s, or “present existence” [5p29d]). One’s “present life” is driven by competition; it is the life of the moment, which Spinoza analyzes in Ethics 3 and 4. The worldview lies in the ground of the “present life” is the maximal falsification of the true worldview, which is crystalized as a total coherent system. This system, as epistemic, reflects reality as a whole, in which no partition exists; there is no separation between one human being and the other, or between any human being and Nature as a whole. This reality is clear of conflicts, and wars for existence and survival but, rather, consists of cooperation and harmony. In this worldview, each person keeps his or her place, as he or she is a singular modification of the whole of Nature, as a total epistemic system. The falsification of this system as it is in the first kind of knowledge, still retains (as in the case of any falsification, which still keeps something of the correct origin) the aspiration for the true, complete system. The knowledge of this system reveals reality as it is in itself, as truly is. In any event, the tendency to construct such an epistemic system is retained, even in any radical falsification of it. Our search for a common, universal goal concerning our aspirations or wishes and for a comprehensive knowledge of Nature as a systematic whole, this search is conserved even in the first kind of knowledge, however falsified a cognition it is in fact. The desired common goal has to sustain the status of each individual as a singular real entity, necessary, and eternal. Such a goal does not blur the

 Arne Naess originally discusses the implications of Spinoza’s philosophy on ecology (see Naess 1977a, b). Unfortunately, he does not relate this discussion to the question of the grades of knowledge (except for a brief remark in Naess 1977b, note 7, p. 424), especially the first one, namely, imaginatio. Consider also Wetlesen 1979, p. 162. Spinoza’s statements, for instance, in 4app. and in the end of s1 to p37 puts an obstacle for the “ecological” interpretations of his philosophy.

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singular individuality of each person, although the first kind of knowledge makes an endeavor to blur it.12 All this holds true also for Spinoza’s political theory, in which the radical falsification of the true political conception is analyzed. In fact, the totalitarian13 idea is the radical distortion of Spinoza’s political conception. Spinoza is very much against making use of any citizen as a tool to reach some end, enslaving the individual to an imaginary, false commonness (as we shall realize, such a Kantian idea is not foreign to Spinoza’s way of thinking, which shares some essential features with Kant’s moral philosophy). In the name of such a “common” goal many evil injustices are made, many cases of cruel bloodshed.14 In free, liberal, and rational state each citizen keeps his or her singular individuality (though as a finite mode of Nature), and each is free and fully secured. As an emotive property of the first kind of knowledge, competition (emulatio) is related to ambition (ambitio), praise and vilification, which are strongly attached to the psychology of the mob or the multitude. Ambition is the desire to be popular in the vulgar mentality of the multitude. In Spinoza’s words, “this striving to do something (and also to omit doing something) solely to please men is called Ambition, especially when we strive so eagerly to please the people that we do or omit certain things to our own injury, or another’s” (3p29s, Curley I: 510). So absurd is this emotional property of the first grade of knowledge; because of it we may desire what is bad for us. Spinoza strongly criticizes popularity and everything that the mob likes. At this point, Spinoza’s philosophy appears to be even more interesting and actual in a serious attempt of understanding the meaning and significance of the social networks nowadays, which have become so prevalent in the Internet. On the basis of the above, I can surmise what Spinoza would say about the vulgar popularity of the social networks especially because of its fake news, which today, under the unfortunate circumstances, pertain to the enemies of liberal democracy, of any democratic freedom, any free and individual thinking, and the right to be provided with true information rather than with a fake one. The mentality of the popular, social networks of the binary of “like” and “dislike” belongs to the infantile imitation (at 3p32, Spinoza’s mentions the emotional imitation—imitatio affectuum—so

 Ursula Renz is one of the few interpreters who reject “the Hegelian notion that Spinoza takes individual subjects to disappear into the one substance.” See Renz 2018, p. ix. 13  Which, of course, is not a concept that Spinoza could use. It is quite a modern concept. Yet Spinoza meant it, whenever he referred to the political state that lies remote from liberty and freedom. 14  Short Treatise, Part II, Ch. 3, Sec. 5 ascribes patriotism, which drives individuals to sacrifice themselves for the state, to the emotion of the first kind of knowledge! Spinoza compares patriotism to paternalism, which suits little children and not adults. As we shall realize below, Spinoza argues for the stability, reliability, and efficacy of democracy. A totalitarian state and rational, liberal democracy strongly contradict each other. The common goal of the citizens of democracy is rational and, thus, really universal or common. I leave this discussion to my understanding of the second kind of knowledge, ratio (see the next Chapter below). 12

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typical of children15) that the first grade of knowledge brings about. In such a state of mind, we measure ourselves according to an abstract, imaginary, or fictive standard, which implies an alienation to ourselves and our real needs, and especially to the singular identity of each one of us. As our essence, namely, our uniqueness or singularity, is the conatus of each one of us, whenever we aspire for something that is foreign to our nature, we are mistaken and harm ourselves. Competition, pertaining to the first grade of knowledge, is related to commercial products, whose producers wish to provide to as many consumers as possible. These producers want these products to become the common objects of the desire of as many people as possible. Such desired common goals do not reflect the real, rational needs of the consumers, but draw them toward a false end. The ambition of the producers to supply as many of their products as possible is just as wrong as that of their consumers; it is a false aim that must fail in the end. For nothing can satisfy the artificial needs that they bring about in the minds of the consumers. Later needs follow the earlier ones, and the new ones are never enough, and so there is a race without end and with no real satisfaction. The consumers are always left in need of something that is really not their own and the producer is incapable of ultimately satisfying them. In this way, competition and global productions (take pharmaceutical competition and globalization for example; for instance, the marketing of statins) lead people to misery and deprivation. This is the nature of the global market in which we live today. It seems to be liberal and truly universal, but, in fact, it is a worldview of the first grade of knowledge. Spinoza predicted this disastrous trend when depicting this grade of knowledge and its emotive properties. The emotions stemming from the first kind of knowledge are instable and involved in animi fluctuatio.16 Indeed, experientia vaga has nothing permanent or stable in it, and neither have the emotions that are its properties. Nor hearsay has stability or any permanency. Thus, all the emotive properties of the first grade of knowledge suffer from the same animi fluctuatio, which prevents our minds from  “… we find from experience that children, because their bodies are, continually, as it were, in a state of equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry. Moreover, whatever they see others do, they immediately desire to imitate it. And finally, they desire for themselves all those things by which they imagine others are pleased—because, as we have said, the images of things are the very affections of the human Body, or modes by which the human Body is affected by external causes, and disposed to this or that” (Curley I: 513). This perfectly holds for the herdlike behavior of the users of the social networks. The victories of political figures such as Trump and Netanyahu rest strongly on such behavior that the social networks greatly encourage. These networks are generally used as a means of commerce for mental or material products. Thus, they can serve as a clear example of the effect of the first grade of knowledge. 16  Namely, vacillation of mind (3p31). For this vacillation (animi fluctuatio) see Gatens and Lloyd 1999, esp. “Imagination and time: hope, fear and contingency,” 28–40. Indeed, time “is a product of imagination, dependent on the mind’s capacity for comparison. We imagine time … (2p44s)… the appearance of contingency is an illusion” (op. cit., p. 29). Compare with my discussion above of the function of time in the first grade of knowledge. Indeed, “Time, in contrast to duration, is more removed from the existence of things—a product of the imagination’s capacity to compare different experiences, rather than part of the very fabric of our experience of particular things” (op. cit., p. 30). 15

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enjoying any peace and tranquility. The emotions of the first grade of knowledge are thus the causes of our misery and mental sickness. Although, unlike Spinoza, Sextus Empiricus was a skeptic, their approaches to the mental sickness that is based upon cognitive and emotive instability and animi fluctuatio in general are quite similar. Both thinkers deal with mental disturbances, based upon a sort of knowledge, from a sort of a medical point of view. Among the emotive properties of the first grade of knowledge there are imaginary joy (3p30s) and imaginary love (3p31s), which is the striving to bring it about that everyone should approve his love and hate is really Ambition (see 3p29s). And so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants the others to live according to his temperament; when all alike want this, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and when all wish to be praised, or loved, but all, they hate one another. (Curley I: 512)

This ends with conflicts and a tormenting vacillation of the mind. People are different from each other, and to force a common standard upon all of them contradicts the nature of each one of them. To make everyone love a particular product, which is made according to a producer’s will or ambition, results in adverse consequences. No finite existent can become infinite, namely, total, and no wish of one person can be really common to many persons. Each finite being, such as a human being, remains finite and he or she cannot share his or her ambition with other people, except in one’s imagination, which does not grasp reality as it is truly in itself. “One leader, one nation, and one state” is a product of the first grade of knowledge, and thus cannot be stable and trustworthy. No finite entity can turn out to be total. The false universality of the first grade of knowledge must frustrate us and become its contrary, into a fragmented, incoherent worldview. Any attempt to generalize a part of reality is doomed to failure. The legitimate wish of any human being to leave his or her stamp on reality as complete and eternal must be frustrated in the first grade of knowledge. It is doomed to be an illegitimate compulsion (see, for instance, 4p37s1). It is an act of abstraction, in which a person measures himself or herself according to a general and abstract criterion, which is a generalization of accidental, arbitrary, fragmented, and dubious experiences. In this act, a person forces his or her worldview on others. Such a worldview is not general or broad enough but very confined. This act of generalization is not legitimate; it rests upon turning an imaginary finite fragment of reality into, as it were, an infinite whole. This is a failed attempt of constructing a general system. The first grade of knowledge aspires to conceive what is special about any individual thing. It does so by way of comparison between it and other things, and the comparison made by means of abstract generalization, which is illegitimate. Such is Spinoza’s approach to self-love, self-esteem, and jealousy (3p55cor1s). Thus, “everyone will have the greatest gladness from considering himself, when he considers something in himself which he denies concerning others” (Curley I: 525). However, this must end in frustration, for “if he relates what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of man or animal, he will not be so greatly gladdened” (ibid.). Each human being always seeks the knowledge of his or her personal identity, and

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this holds true even for the first kind of knowledge, but alas, this grade of knowledge cannot be acquainted with one’s personal identity. It lies far from the reach of this kind of knowledge, which rests upon abstract, illegitimate generalizations. Our imagination is incapable of surveying all the differences between the individuals that it attempts at comparing and generalizes (2p40s1). Such is the gloomy fate of the abstract concept “man” or “human being.” Such, also, is the gloomy fate of competition. We say of an athlete, for instance, that her achievements make her exceptional and greatly different from her athletic mates. However, this distinction mark could pertain to another athlete, and does not exclusively belongs to her, unless by way of accident and arbitrary fact. In contrast, artistic or philosophical achievements are beyond competition and comparison. Who is greater: Bach or Mozart? Mahler or Rachmaninov? Tolstoy or Dostoevsky? Plato or Aristotle? Spinoza or Kant? Such questions are stupid. One would like to read again and again Thomas Mann, Kafka, Proust, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gogol, Nabokov, and other genius authors, without being enslaved by stupid or childish comparisons and competitions. Little children frequently ask their parents whom they love more, themselves or their brothers or sisters? Yet no mature parent can give an adequate answer to such infantile questions. The particular essence of each human being is, in fact, incomparable. Art and love reveal this basic truth. Literary competition and prizes are, most of the time, effects of the first grade of knowledge. As such, they are based on faulty judgement; they are basically mistaken. The great pleasure we have from literary pieces, artistic masterpieces, philosophical insights, and the like is not measurable or comparative. Such is the case of the objects of intellectual love of God (the emotive property of the supreme, third grade of knowledge) in contrast with the jealous love (zelotypia).17 The first is really universal and shared by all human beings alike, each according to her singularity, whereas the latter is competitive, entirely ignoring the singular essence of each of the involved individuals and is doomed to a miserable vacillation of the mind. Genuine love (the highest of which is the intellectual love of God) and the joy of art rest upon the singularity of the persons involved, and the joy they share if really common, sustaining the singular individuality of each one of them. The contrary is the case of the “love” in the first grade of knowledge, a false love that easily and most of the time becomes a hatred. Such “love” is greatly unstable, and its objects are easily replaceable with making no difference. Real individuality is achieved only in the supreme, third grade of knowledge, which captures eternity, whereas the “love” in the first grade of knowledge must be temporal and temporary. On the first grade of knowledge, 4a reads as follows: “There is no singular thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the first can be destroyed” (Curley I: 547). Note that while referring to the intellectual love of God and the supreme grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva—Spinoza  “This Hatred toward a thing we love, combined with Envy, is called jealousy, which is nothing but a vacillation of mind born of Love and Hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied” (Curley I: 514).

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undermines this axiom in so many words: “4a concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place” (5p37s). Time and place pertain to the first grade of knowledge whereas the eternity of singular things pertains only to scientia intuitiva. This axiom indicates what is so typical of the worldview of the first grade of knowledge. This worldview frustrates our intention to find the individuality of each one of us in the system of the whole of Nature. Instead of revealing such an individuality, we encounter a world image in which everyone cheats, fights, and competes against the others, in the spirit of the Hobbesian saying “A man to man is a wolf,” and thus everyone endangers the other’s life and interests. No one is provided with a real, rational, and enduring benefit from such a world. In Political Treatise, Ch. I, Sec. 5, Spinoza describes this worldview in the following harsh words: Men are necessarily subject to affects; they are so constituted that they pity those whose affairs are going badly, and envy those who are prospering; they are more inclined to vengeance than to mercy; moreover, everyone wants others to live according to his mentality, so that they approve what he approves, and reject what he rejects. Since everyone wants to be first, they fall into quarrels and try as hard as they can to crush each other. Whoever turn out the winner prides himself more on harming the loser than on doing good for himself. (Curley II: 503–504; cf. 4p58s)

Such, in fact, is the common image of the world in which we have been living since the First World War. We are different from one another also because of our emotions, for the difference of one’s essence from the essence of another person is reflected in the difference of their emotions (3p57). Nevertheless, such a difference cannot be captured in the first grade of knowledge unless it is in a distorted and fragmented manner. In this kind of knowledge, we are acquainted with ourselves by means of external and contingent factors, which cannot constitute an adequate knowledge of ourselves. In such a mental state, there is a special place for historical religions, which are the causes of various conflicts, hatred, destruction, and many ills amongst human beings (see the Introduction to Political Treatise). Religious superstitions, based upon passions, which are the emotive properties of the first grade of knowledge, bring about the damage that follows that kind of knowledge; these superstitions are intended as it were to love and peace, but the contrary is actually done (op. cit.). The first grade of knowledge falls short of conceiving a system in which each detail is distinct from all the others without conflictual results. Only true kinds of knowledge can construct a desired system in which the completeness or abundance of reality as it truly is, is shown. This has a practical side: on the basis of the false system that the first grade of knowledge is capable of constituting, no stable social or political system can be constructed, let alone a religious system that is genuinely universal, in contrast to the “common order of nature,” which is the worldview of the first grade of knowledge. In such a system, human beings are enslaved by their passions, dread of death, do not know the taste of happiness or blessings, and do not know themselves. They grasp their existence as contingent, accidental, and transient. An emendation of the data that the first grade of knowledge provides us with will lead to the true worldview, in which the coherent, total system is revealed.

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4.5  T  he Knowledge of the Data and the Possibility of Its Emendation The only way to be acquainted with the data of our cognition is the first grade of knowledge. As we shall see in our discussion of the second kind of knowledge (ratio) below, contrary to Leibniz’s program, there is no way to deduce any datum from any a priori principle and there is no way to reduce any datum to a rational principle. Finally, there is no way to liberate our cognition from the idea of the body as the medium of any knowledge that is available to us. Only by means of this medium can we know something about us as well as about the world. To show this clearly, the following example will suffice. Even an eminent astronomer continues to see with her naked eye the sun as small as her hand. No knowledge, no experience, and no mathematical calculation can change such a datum of our sight (following the example in 4p1s). Such is the case of all optical illusions. Spinoza’s denial of the Eleatic approach, in which the manifold and any change in our experiential data are simply an illusion and wrong perception, this denial is incompatible with any reduction or elimination of the experiential data. If such data are problematic, in this way or another, there is only one solution—emendation.18 Instead of reduction, Spinoza advises us to extract the experiential data out of their fragmented context, which is temporal and spatial, and to combine it within its context in eternity (namely, in God). There is no way to perceive any experiential datum in isolation, as if it were a “bare fact,” which is exempt from any addition and interpretation. The same experiential datum is captured by all grades of knowledge. Nevertheless, the first grade captures it distortedly and fragmented as embedded in space and time and as arbitrary and accidentally connected with other experiential data, whereas the third grade captures it as complete and amended. In this supreme grade, the datum is necessarily connected with other experiential data. The first grade of knowledge perceives its data as links in a transient causal chain, whereas the supreme one perceives this datum as a link in the immanent, eternal causal chain (eternal, in Spinoza’s terms, is atemporal, to be distinguished from sempiternal, which exists for all time). The true knowledge of such data is simply their emendation, which is their embedding in the complete and amended context, which is the  De Deugd 1966 is a fine work about Spinoza’s view of such an emendation (cf. Hallett 1962, p. 57, Hallett 1930, pp. 127–128, and Hallett 1957, pp. 84–85; Curley in Grene 1973, pp. 25–59). De Deugd writes that the ideas of the imagination cannot be excluded and they require an emendation (op. cit., p. 24). The imagination is simply a distorted cognition that can be emended by the intellect (op. cit., p. 52). According to 2p35 and d, falsity is simply the privation of knowledge that inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas involve. This privation and inadequacy can be emended and completed. Error or falsity is not a complete (or “perfect”) ignorance, there is always some partial, inadequate, and distorted truth in any error of falsity, which, in fact, mistakes the fragment and the confined for a whole or infinite. We have only one origin for all kinds of knowledge—the empirical one, and there is only one medium of any knowledge—the human body. As we shall realize, even the third, supreme grade of knowledge is supplied with its data by the first kind of knowledge. It is in the third kind that these data are entirely completed and purged from their fragmenting factors.

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desired system in which knowledge reflects the order of reality as it really is (ut in se est). The emendation of the first grade of knowledge relies also upon the continuity of the three grades of knowledge. There is one example for all three grades (2p40s2, TdIE Sec. 23, and also in the relevant examples in Short Treatise) answering the question what is the fourth proportional number, provided that the other three numbers are given. Hence, the difference between the three grades of knowledge is not in their content, which is the same. The difference lies in the proofs, evidence, and the truth. Thus, in the first grade the context of evidence is quite poor whereas such a context is maximal in the third one. In this process, we never cancel the datum, which should be discovered, but we confirm and affirm it. There is a kernel of truth even in the first grade, which the true, adequate grades confirm more and solidly establish. Despite the difference between the intellect and the imagination, they are similar (TdIE Sec. 86; and Letter 17 reads: “the imagination … follows the traces of the intellect in everything and links its image and words together in order, as the intellect does its demonstrations” [Curley I: 353]). The imagination is a mutilation of the intellect, a mutilation in which some traces of the real intellect are retained. The title of TdIE raises a question: Why the emendation of the intellect? After all, the issue is the emendation of the imagination, not of the intellect. The answer is, in my opinion, that the imagination is a mutilated intellect that requires an emendation. In this sense, Spinoza mentions an intellect that imagines (TdIE Sec. 108v). More precisely, it is the mind that imagines, and the same mind can act as an intellect. Because of this, Spinoza mentions the need of the emendation of the intellect and its purification (TdIE Sec. 16). Knowing the datum in its full reality, necessity, and eternity is an act of reconstruction and identification according to a priori principles of the ratio. The second and the third grades of knowledge capture the truth and the false as well (2p42 and d). As the only cause of falsity is the first kind of knowledge (2p41), the two higher grades of knowledge must conceive the data adequately, which the first grade falsely perceives. These data are common to all grades of knowledge. The positive kernel of each idea is not cancelled in the presence of truth (4p1). Falsity is simply a privation of knowledge, which inadequacy involves (4p1d). Falsity consists of privation and incompleteness. Spinoza demonstrates that “the ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related only to the human Mind, are not clear and distinct but confused” (2p28). Fragmentation and isolation extract or uproot a cause out of its causal context, and hence falsity arises and the first grade of knowledge enters the scene. In contrast, within the complete causal context, falsity disappears, as the former isolated fragment is now rooted in the complete context. The false, inadequate, and confused idea “follow with the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct idea” (2p36). The trouble is that the first grade of knowledge does not recognize that truth, as this kind of knowledge perceives only isolated fragments of reality as if they were not linked to the complete causal context, which is God or each of his attributes. As Spinoza concludes,

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All ideas are in God (by 1p150); and, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by 2p32) and (by 2p7c) adequate. And so there are not inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular Mind of someone (see 2p24 and 2p28). And so all ideas— both the adequate and the inadequate—follow with the same necessity (2p6c). (2p36d, Curley I: 474)

This is the basis of emendation: any idea can be corrected, while embedded in the complete causal context, namely, in God or in any of his attributes. As no idea is truly isolated, and each is truly a link of the total causal chain (which Spinoza calls causa sui) in the Attribute of Thought, the way to emendation is always open. Any subjective viewpoint belongs, in the end, to a total causal context, which is the Attribute of Thought. Any subjective viewpoint can be emended and thus turning to be completely objective. For instance, someone’s pain is certainly subjective, as it exclusively pertains to a single mind. Nevertheless, as a finite link in the infinite, total causal chain that is the Attribute of Thought, this pain is an objective, though finite, link in a total causal chain. Such a moment of pain, as a finite mode, is an event in Nature-Substance, which no truth can ignore. In concluding, any idea, however false and distorted, can be corrected in principle. Extracting or uprooting it out of fragmenting or isolating factors (namely, temporal, local, and circumstantial) is enough to reveal its kernel of truth. In other words, uprooting it from the transient causal chain is enough for such an emendation. The transient chain is an aggregate, whose links are devoid of necessity and systematization. To discover the truth of an idea is to consider it as a link in a chain of clear and distinct ideas, in the immanent causal chain that is the Attribute of Thought as an eternal systematic totality. On the basis of the above analysis, we can clearly understand Spinoza’s statement that “to every action to which we are determined from an affect which is passion [namely, a passive emotion], we can be determined by reason, without that affect” (4p59). Any passion is an emotive property of the first grade of knowledge. Determined by a passion rather than by reason, we are drawn by the common order of nature or fate. It is in our hands to perform the same act according to an internal determination (an autonomous determination) or, else, because of an external, random determination. Internal determination is an active act of our intellect, which, according to Spinoza and unlike Descartes, is the same as our will. Insofar as we understand such an action, we can join it with different kinds of images or ideas. Spinoza demonstrates this with a clear example: The act of beating, insofar as it is considered physically, and insofar as we attend only to the fact that the man raises his arm, closes his fist, and moves his whole arm forcefully up and down, is a virtue, which is conceived from the structure of the human Body. Therefore, if a man moved by Anger or Hate is determined to close his fist or move his arm, that (as we have shown in Part 2) happens because one and the same action can be joined to any images of things whatever. And so we can be determined to one and the same action both from those images of things which we conceive confusedly and [from those images of things?] we conceive clearly and distinctly. It is evident, therefore, that every Desire that arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no use if men could be guided by reason. (4p59s, Curley I; 580)

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The idea of any situation in my life can be joined to confused, inadequate ideas or to clear and distinct, namely, adequate, ones. In the last case, I understand the situation, and any of my understandings strengthens me. Then, I initiate my active action (to which my intellect or will is an adequate cause) and I am not drawn by random, external factors, which I do not understand. To understand, according to Spinoza, is to will. What is done according to my will and not forcefully, is free, a free action of mine, which is active (or the adequate cause of whose is within me). My free actions follows my intellect. In this way, I can always govern my passions (or passive actions) instead of being governed by them. While under the influence of the same desire, I can be active (while acting according to my intellect or will) or passive (while acting because of my passions). For instance, people wish others to think and act like themselves; while affected by a passion, such people act out of ambition, which is an emotive property of the first grade of knowledge (3p31s), whereas acting according to the dictates of reason, the same affect should be called by quite a different name—morality. From this example, Spinoza draws some important conclusions as follows: … human nature is so constituted that each of us wants the others to live according to his temperament … And, indeed, in a man who is not led by reason this appetite is the passion [namely, passive emotion] called Ambition, which does not differ much from Pride. On the other hand, in a man who lives according to the dictate of reason it is the action [namely, active emotion], or virtue, called Morality … In this way, all the appetites, or Desires, are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and are counted as virtues when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the Desires by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate ideas as from inadequate ones … And … we can advise no other remedy for the affect which depends on our power and is more excellent than this, which consists in a true knowledge of them. For the Mind has no other power that that of thinking and forming adequate ideas … (5p4s, Curley I: 598–599).

In this way, we can liberate ourselves, to some extent, from the common order of nature and to emend it as much as possible (following 2p29s). We exchange the external determination, owing to a random encounter with things, with an internal, active, and rational determination. In this way, we liberate our mind from abstractions, hasty and false generalizations, and random associations. Instead, we join the cognized data within the corrected order, which reveals their particularity and singularity. In this way, we reveal reality as it really is. All we change, then, is our approach toward reality and our knowledge of it. It is a change in our attention to reality, in rendering this attention as encompassing as possible rather than being confined and restricted. In concluding, the first grade of knowledge is the only source of our acquaintance with the data of our knowledge as well as with the data of the desired system. Such is the contribution of this kind of knowledge to the reconstruction of the desired system. Each of those data rests upon the perception of our body, which is the medium of our cognition in each of the grades of knowledge. By means of our cognition of our body, we are acquainted with ourselves, with other persons, and with the world as a whole. Our perceptions of what takes place in our body, whether causing or caused, are our data of knowledge. In emending them, we fulfil some part

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of our desire to reconstruct the desired system. This desire is partly embodied already in the first grade of knowledge, though in it, the system is fulfilled only in an inadequate part. Our final desire is to know Nature as a whole including each of its finite modes. The common order of nature is simply a false, distorted expression of the desired system, whereas the emendation of this order and its completion help our coming closer to this end. This emendation, which brings about a radical change in our emotional state, bringing us nearer to our happiness and salvation, takes part in the adequate and true grades of knowledge—the second one (ratio) and the supreme, third one (scientia intuitiva).

4.6  T  he Dependence of Human Beings on the Common Order of Nature; the Multitude and the Wise as Citizens of the Same State A complete emendation of the common order of nature is simply the revealing of the desired system. Such a completion is not in our hands, as our intellect is finite. Only the infinite intellect can grasp such a system in full. Hence, Spinoza writes: “Man is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows and obeys the common order of nature, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires” (4p4c, Curley I: 549). Proposition 4 implies that no person is the adequate cause of all the changes that take part in him or her. Were any human being such an adequate cause, he or she would have been infinite rather than finite. In other words, no human being is a causa sui. Any human being is an adequate cause only to some of such changes, for he or she is only a part of the total (infinite) power of God or Nature (4p4d). Of course, no human being is the cause of the order of Nature. Nothing can be more absurd than stating that a human being can be infinite. As a result, no human being can be exempt from all the passions. In any one of us there must remain always something that requires emendation. None of us can emend all his or her cognitive data and thus we are necessarily subject to the common order of nature as a cognitive and emotive system as well. Hence, no one of us is completely exempt from the fear of death, from cognitive randomness, from temporal vicissitudes, and the spatial boundaries (which is the tyranny of place). For this reason, the final Scholium that ends the Ethics as a whole (5p42s), in which Spinoza distinguishes between the wise human being and the ignorant person who pertains to the mob, reads: … it is clear how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be. On the other hand, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity [quadam species aeteritatis], conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of mind. (5p42s, Curley I: 616–617)

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Spinoza does not argue that the wise man is never troubled in spirit but only hardly troubled in spirit. Moreover, Spinoza does not ascribe to the wise man eternal species with no restriction but only certain (quadam) eternal necessity. Full peace of mind and full, unrestricted eternal reality can be ascribed only to an infinite, total being. All this implies that even the wise cannot reach the end, cannot grasp the desired system. He or she can approach it as nearer as possible, but never to reach what only the infinite intellect can. This leaves even the wise person with some passions. He or she is also doomed to have some part in the common order of nature. He or she is doomed not to get rid with some of his or her inadequate ideas. All this restricts human freedom. We are free to the extent that our ideas are clear and distinct, namely, adequate, and as our emotions are active. As long as some of our ideas are inadequate and some of our emotions are passive, we are not absolutely free but only to some extent. Full freedom is a freedom from passions, which makes God fully free (5p17 and d), and, since passions are the emotive properties of inadequate ideas or knowledge, freedom is, to begin with, freedom from inadequate ideas or knowledge. Hence, Spinoza writes about the supreme grade of knowledge that “insofar as the affects are passions, if clear and distinct knowledge does not absolutely remove them … , at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the Mind” (5p20s, Curley I: 606). As a result, the supreme affect of the third grade of knowledge occupies the mind maximally but not entirely (5p20s and 5p16), for there must be some passions to remain in any human, finite mind. The multitude is enslaved by their passions, and the passions occupy the most of their mind whereas the wise, free persons are not enslaved by their passions, which occupy minimally their mind. This does not mean that death does not bother them at all, for “a free man thinks of something less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (4p67). In other words, the fear or anxiety of death occupies a minimal part in the mind of the wise, free person. No finite being is absolutely liberated from the fear or anxiety of death. No finite being, like all human beings, is absolutely free. As enslaved to some extent, each of us is under the influence of some passions, and thus each of us takes some part in the common order of nature and cannot be liberated entirely from the first grade of knowledge and its affects. Some confused, false ideas necessarily take place even in the mind of the wise, free person (4p73s).19 The activity of the mind rests upon its adequate ideas whereas its passivity rests upon its inadequate ideas. Only all the ideas of the infinite intellect are adequate, and hence this intellect is exempt from all passions. The intellectual love of God is its only emotive property. However great and supremely strong, the intellectual love of God cannot absolutely overcome and remove all the passions. Spinoza writes: “Insofar as the affects are passions, if clear and distinct knowledge does not  “… whatever he [the wise, free man] thinks is troublesome and evil, and moreover, whatever seems immoral, dreadful, unjust, and dishonorable, arises from the fact that he conceives the things themselves in a way that is disordered, mutilated, and confused… he strives most of all to conceive things as they are in themselves, to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, like Hate, Anger, Envy, Mockery, Pride, …” (4p73s, Curley I: 587).

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absolutely remove them … , at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the Mind” (5p20s, Curley I: 606). The intellectual love of God “must engage the Mind most” (5p16) but not absolutely or completely. There is always some part of the mind that remains passive, based upon some inadequate ideas and passions which, because of the mind’s finitude, are ineradicable. Yet this passive part cannot dictate the way of the wise person. It is reason that shows him or her the way. The wise person is well aware of this part, and when he or she considers person or events as evil, stupid, nasty, and the like, he or she is well aware that this is because of his or her failure to know them clearly and distinctly and to understand them. On these grounds, we should not rely upon a utopia about the multitude: … though we have shown that reason can do much to restrain and moderate the affects, we have also seen that the path reason teaches us to follow is very difficult. So people who persuade themselves that a multitude, which may be divided over public affairs, can be induced to live only according to the prescription of reason, those people are dreaming of the golden age of the Poems. They are captive to a myth. (op. cit., Curley II: 506)

As we shall see, this reveals the shortcomings of democracy, even though Spinoza writes that it is the best political regime in order to achieve political ends and it is the most stable of all political regimes.20 Despite all the differences between wise, free persons and the multitude, all of them are still subject, to this or that degree, to the passive emotions based upon inadequate ideas. There is a radical difference between Plato, the philosophical aristocrat, and Spinoza, the democrat, in considering the wise person in comparison with the multitude. Spinoza argues that liberal democracy is the most rational regime, in which wise persons and the multitude alike, can peacefully and steadily live whereas Plato writes that philosophers should be the only leaders of the stable and just state, in contrast with democracy, in which the mob is the misleading and biased leader. Spinoza would say that this idea of Plato’s is simply utopian. After all, the political myth of The Republic and The Timaeus is utopian, as these dialogues depicts regimes that lack any place in which to be established: they seem to have no place on earth. Despite the difference between the wise person and the multitude, both are subject, in quite different degrees, to the passions, and hence they need the coercive power of the laws. Both kinds of persons need the fear and the hope, the penalty and the reward, concerning the laws. If both the wise persons and those pertaining to the multitude submitted only to the voice of reason, no political regimes or states would be needed, and anarchy (which Spinoza calls “the state of nature”) would be good enough for secured, stable, and peaceful life. Because each human being is

 Spinoza states: “if there’s any absolute rule, it’s the rule which occurs when the whole multitude rules” (PT Ch. 8, Sec. 3, Curley II: 566). Such is the democratic regime. Hence, it is necessarily the most stable of all regimes. In it, the power of reason is greater than in any other regimes, all of which are influenced, to this or that degree, by the common order of nature, which is the source of any instability, whereas reason is eternal, universal, and the source of all stability. The stability under consideration is of peace, which “does not consist in the privation of war, but in a union or harmony of mind” (PT Ch. 6, Sec. 4, Curley II: 533). The stability of reason, in contrast to the instability of passions, safeguards the stability of democracy.

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passionate or passive to some degree or other, we need political coercion, we need laws. The wise person needs the common decision of the democratic community. As a person who obeys reason, each citizen needs the common life with the multitude: “A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself” (3p73). According to Spinoza, solitude, like any fragmentation and isolation, is, to some extent, irrational. Nevertheless, to be subject to passions is no less irrational, and the coercive power of the state restricts one’s passions and renders him or her a more rational agent, helpful for him or her and the society as a whole. In sum, In order … that men may be able to live harmoniously and be of assistance to one another, it is necessary for them to give up their natural right and to make one another confident that they will do nothing which could harm others. How it can happen that men who are necessarily subject to affects (by 4p4c), inconstant and changeable (by 4p33) should be able to make one another confident and have trust in one another, is clear from 4p7 and 3p39. No affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained, and everyone refrains from doing harm out of timidity regarding a greater harm…. In this way Society has the power to prescribe a common rule of life, to make laws, and to maintain them—not by reason, which cannot restrain the affect … but by threats. This Society, maintained by laws and the power it has of preserving itself, is called a State, and those who are defended by its laws, Citizens. (4p37s2, Curley I: 567)

The natural state (anarchy) in which all human beings are subject to passions is much more harmful than the political state, in which their passions are restrained by the intimidation of laws. Both the multitude and wise persons need such a state to be more free and flourishing. Both are finite and confined and thus enslaved to passions, however to different extents, and both share the universal reason, even though to different extents. Both need the state and its laws to restrict their unavoidable share in the first degree of knowledge, including its worldview of the common order of nature with its emotive properties, namely, passions, and in which each human being can be the rival, competitor, and enemy. Although Spinoza is greatly against Hobbes’s worldview, in which everyone fights the other, and Spinoza rests our emotive reality on the basis of love and our need of love, to some extent only, whenever the first kind of knowledge still guides any one of us, even if to a lesser extent, we fight and compete against one another, even according to Spinoza (as I have explained above). Because both the multitude and the wise persons share something of the reason and of the passions, they can live together in the same state, especially if it is a democratic and liberal one, guided by the free majority, and which is described in Chapter Twenty of the TPT. In this Chapter Spinoza defines the end of the state (“the Republic”) thus: … [the Republic’s] ultimate end is not to dominate, restraining men by fear, and making them subject to another’s control, but on the contrary to free each person from fear, so that he can live securely, as far as possible, i.e., so that he retains to the utmost his natural right to exist and operate without harm to himself or anyone else. The end of the Republic, I say, is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or automata, but to enable their minds and bodies to perform their functions safely, to enable them to use their reason freely, and not to clash with one another in hatred, anger or

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d­ eception, or deal inequitably with one another. So the end of the Republic is really freedom. (TPT Ch. 20, Secs. 11–12)

In such a state, both wise persons and those of the multitude are free to the greatest extent. Both are safe and live in peace. They live in the most natural state possible as a political state. In such a state, the citizens are as free as possible from the common order of nature and, instead, are free to submit, as much as practically possible, to their common reason (you may replace “common reason” with “common sense”). Since the complete or absolute rational emendation of the common order of nature is beyond any human being, we need the coercive power of the laws to restrain the damaging passions, which still remain with us. This fits well the continuity of the degrees of knowledge. No degree of knowledge, however adequate and rational, can dispense with the data of the first degree of knowledge and with something of the Common Order of Nature. Hence, the absolute emendation is beyond our reach and must remain on the horizon to which we aspire but can never reach. There is thus always a gap between our finite intellect and the infinite intellect of God. In this matter, there is no radical difference between wise persons and those of the multitude. We should not ignore, however, Spinoza’s recoiling of the mob or multitude. No reader of Spinoza’s works should ignore his harsh words against such persons. Moreover, as if contrary to his statement that the wise, free person should live in a liberal democratic state, he also states: “A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he can, to avoid their favors” (4p70). Nevertheless, he clarifies: “I say as far as he can. For though men may be ignorant, they are still men, who in situations of need can bring human aid. And there is no better aid than that. So it often happens that it is necessary to accept favors from them” (4p70s). Indeed, Spinoza assumes that “without mutual aid men must live most wretchedly and without any cultivation of reason” (TPT, Ch. 16, Sec. 12, Curley II: 284). For Spinoza, it is a fact that “only free men are very useful to one another, are joined to one another by the greatest necessity of friendship … and strive to benefit one another with equal eagerness for love” (4p71d). The ground on which free men flourish is the liberal democratic state, which is guided by the common reason of all of the citizens. Such a state is remote from the Common Order of Nature, which is the worldview of the first grade of knowledge, in which passions govern the citizen in the most unstable state of mind. People are slaves, whenever they do not listen to their reason but let their unstable passions lead them. Free persons are those who live peacefully together in a democratic, liberal, and rational state. Nothing is more useful for each human being than a person who lives according to the guidance of reason (4p35c). The conclusion is heart-moving: “This saying is in almost everyone’s mouth: man is a God to man…. that definition which makes man a social animal has been quite pleasing to most. And surely we do derive, from the society of our fellow men, many more advantages than disadvantages” (4p35s). This common political state, in which the wise and the person of the multitude live together in the most useful way, is meant to overcome the passions, restraining and educating them. As the wise has to restrain so his or her passions, the other

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citizens should follow this example. In other words, in the mind of the wise, free person there is something of the state of mind of the person pertaining to the multitude, and he or she shares something of the unstable world of the passions. So there is no real division to separate them, but there is much more to let them live in unity according to the dictates of the common wisdom. Not only does common reason unite them, but also a common passion—the fear of solitude (PT Ch. 6, Sec. 1). Despite all the differences between them the way of emendation is always open for these two kinds of persons: “each of us has—in part, at least, if not absolutely—the power to understand himself and his affects, and consequently, the power to bring it about that he is less acted on by them” (5p4s). Indeed, no one is exempt from some enslavement to the Common Order of Nature. Yet each of us can liberate himself or herself to some extent from the enslavement to passions and that Order. Such is the case that, for instance, the wise person, too, has to fight his or her own akrasia (“weakness” in ancient Greek), which is a state of mind in which we realize what is good or advisable for us and what is wrong, and, nevertheless, we follow the bad, because of our desire for it (3p2s, the Preface to Ethics 4, 4p17s, and Letter 58). The same holds true for superstitions, from which nobody is exempt (TPT Preface), for everybody who experiences fear, relies upon some superstition. One of these superstitions, according to Spinoza, is the belief in free will, which all of us share from birth on (Letter 58). All these reasons have to mitigate Spinoza’s reservations and rejection of the mob (TPT preface, Ch. 1, Ch. 4, Ch. 5, Ch. 6, Ch. 16, and Ch. 17). The picture that can emerge from reading such reservations and rejection is that there is nothing really common to the mob and the wise persons. But, against our analysis as above, this is a mistake, which meets only the eye. There are several ways to explain such a mistake, one of which is a demonstration that Spinoza himself did not liberate himself completely from the first grade of knowledge, and, hence, he judges the mob so harshly because of his fear of them. The lesson of his reason and wisdom is quite different, for there is an ample place for helpful common life in a democratic and liberal state for both kinds of persons who, despite the differences between them, have much more in common, both in reason and in passions. Thus, “the greatest good of those who seek virtue is to know God, i.e., … a good that is common to all men, and can be possessed equally by all men insofar as they are of the same nature” (4p36d). The mob and the wise persons are of the same nature: all of them are, first of all, human beings. The differences between them is only of degree (of reason and of emotions) but not in their common, dominant nature. Returning to the issue of emendation, my idea is that the state of mind of the multitude or mob and that of the wise, free persons maintain a special kind of relationship. The state of mind of the multitude is the false, distorted image of the state of mind of the wise and free person. Similarly, as we shall realize, the first kind of knowledge is the ultimate falsification or distortion of the third grade of knowledge. According to Spinoza, any mistake or error is a false fragment of true knowledge. The second grade of knowledge is a true, adequate fragment of the third, supreme kind of knowledge, whereas the first grade of knowledge is the false, isolated fragment of the second and third kinds. We shall discuss this important point below. In

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this vein, the person in the mob is the ultimate falsification or distortion of the wise and free person. Thus, they, like the different grades of knowledge, share much in common, despite all the differences between them. After all, these are grades, and there must be a continuity between them, and not separating walls. We can and should emend the state of mind of the mob, as much as we can and should emend the first grade of knowledge in order to bring it as near as possible to the goal—to construct the desired system of knowledge. The wise, free person is the “exemplar” (model) for such an amendment. In Spinoza’s words: “I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves” (4Preface, Curley I: 545). This is the emendation that is supposed to disentangle persons of the mob and the wise, free person, too, from the fluctuation of passions, for there is no wise, free person who is absolutely exempt from any passion. If such an interpretation is solid enough, Spinoza wrote TPT to both multitude and wise, free persons. I argue so despite the end of the Preface to TPT, in which Spinoza makes harsh accusations against the multitude and its hopeless state of mind. In such accusations and judgment, Spinoza behaves exactly like a person who pertains to the mob. After all, no person, even the wisest of them, is free from any passion, from fear, disgust, fury, and the like. Thus, each human being has some share, however minimal, of something of the state of mind of the mob or the multitude. Nobody but Spinoza himself knows how to express this fact as follows: What we have written may be ridiculed by those who think the vices common to all mortals belong only to the plebeians [the mob, the multitude] … But everyone shares a common nature—we are just deceived by power and refinement…. Moreover [the reason] “there is no moderation in the common people,” [the reason] “they are terrifying, unless they themselves are cowed by fear,” is that freedom and slavery are not easily combined … To suspend judgment is a rare virtue…. If the plebeians could restrain themselves, and suspend judgment on matters they know little about, or judge things correctly from scanty information, they would be more worthy to rule than to be ruled…. But as we have said, everyone has the same nature …. (PT Ch. 7, Sec. 27, Curley II: 558–559)

Spinoza argues that equality and community are stronger than any dichotomy between the multitude and the wise, free persons. Hence, liberal democracy, including the multitude and wise, free persons is possible in theory as well as in praxis. On this basis and on Spinoza’s assumption that any emotional state that stems from the first grade of knowledge is unstable and, hence, changeable, I conclude that the Preface of TPT is aimed at the multitude. For Spinoza hopes that it is possible to change the multitude, eradicate its superstitions, and emend it to maintain a stable liberal state. In contrast, the Ethics is aimed at the wise, liberal persons. Spinoza ends the Ethics in distinguishing between the wise and the multitude, and he devotes major parts of the Ethics to the description of the passions (most of Ethics 3 and 4). The appendix of Ethics 2 is devoted to entia imaginations, the cognitive products of the first grade of knowledge, which belong especially to the multitude. The opinions of the multitude (for instance, 5p41s) are discussed widely in Spinoza’s writings. The major parts of Ethics 3 and 4 are devoted to the mob and its emotional state, and

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only the minor parts refer to the wise, free person. The persons who belong to the mob are, in fact, all of us whenever we are enslaved by our passions. Thus, most of the Ethics is devoted not to the wise, free person but to the multitude, whose emendation is at the heart of Spinoza’s thought. The wise, free person has his or her share in the state of mind of the multitude. Hence, the recipient or addressee of the Ethics, the meant-to-be intended readers of it, are everymen! After all, this is the main aim of the Ethics—to emend the first grade of knowledge, to eradicate superstitions and entia imaginationis (such as a teleological worldview), and to emend the emotive state of this grade of knowledge in everyone, in every possible reader of this text. This is the meaning of the Ethics’ salvation (salus), the mentioning of which ends this great work. To emend the passions means to turn them into active emotions based upon true, adequate knowledge (of the second and third grades of knowledge). Moreover, in the competition over the mob’s popularity, the emendation is meant to exchange the “false supreme good” (“a good thought to be highest,” as 4p58s puts it) with the true supreme good, which is the intellectual love of God (5p20d). It appears that nothing human can be absolutely free from the influence of the mob and the passions. We should be very careful about this endless danger to our liberty and happiness. This emendation is the main aim of the TdIE (Secs. 3, 6, 11), which requires the cooperation of “ordinary people,” namely, the multitude. Spinoza moderates his antagonism to the mob and his fear of it in the Ethics thus: “The mob is terrifying, if unafraid. So it is no wonder that the Prophets, who considered the common advantage, not that of the few, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. Really, those who are subject to these affects can be guided far more easily than others, so that in the end they may live from the guidance of reason, i.e., may be free and enjoy the life of the blessed” (4p54s). In this way, a sophisticated use of passion can serve the common utility to which our common reason shows the way. Though this is a kind of an emotional manipulation, Spinoza, nevertheless, finds it quite helpful, when it is compatible with the commandments of our reason. A better way, of course, is to influence the mob’s passions by reason alone and its active emotions. But, in many circumstances, this way is not good enough and the leaders of the public also need a use of the passions in order to reach rational ends, which are in the common good of the public. The rare and difficult way of the wise, free person is also a paradigm for the mob. It is a universal paradigm, for each person in his or her grade. Note that rational means are, to a significant extent, useful for the mob, too, as ordinary people have their share in the universal reason. Hence, again, “each of us has … the power to understand himself and his affects, and consequently, the power to bring it about that he is less acted by them” (5p4cs). The mob is the principal obstacle blocking the way to the free rational state. To prepare the multitude for citizenship in such a democracy, we need, first of all, our reason, but we cannot do without some emotional aids (for instance, in political rhetoric) and in manipulating the fear of punishment for breaking the laws. Spinoza states that in this way the leaders of the states “have tried, as far as they could, to restrain the common people [vulgus], as you might rein in a horse” (TPT Ch. 4, Sec.

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6, Curley II: 127). The mob is mentioned at this point yet this holds good also for the wise, free person, who has always something of the mob in his or her state of mind. Yet emotional manipulation, because of the instability and fluctuation that characterize passions, is not the effective or reliable way to guide the mob or the mob in each one of us. The best way is of course, as much as possible, the way of reason. Caution is always a reliable means, in the eyes of Spinoza, and he highly recommends us to be quite cautious with the mob. The wise, free person should respect the multitude and not consider himself or herself superior to it. Whenever the multitude shows hate, anger, or disdain toward the wise, free person, he or she should repay this approach with love or nobility (according to 4p46). All the above does not blur the difference between the wise, free person and the mob. Yet, what is common to them, in their reason and their emotions as well, is stronger than the differences. Equally, despite the differences between the grades of knowledge, there is a solid continuity between them and no dichotomy separates the one from the other. The continuity between the different grades of knowledge makes possible the emendation, in which any distorted and inadequate part finds its proper place in the whole of the adequate system. Because of the human finitude, the emendation in question is only partial and cannot become absolute. Only the infinite intellect of God can grasp the complete total system of reality in the whole of its adequacy.

References Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. Gatens, Moira, and Genevieve Lloyd. 1999. Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present. London: Routledge. Grene, M., ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. ———. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Israel, Jonathan I. 2001. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press. James, Susan. 2008. Democracy and the Good Life in Spinoza’s Philosophy. In Huenemann, 128–146. Levene, Nancy K. 2004. Spinoza’s Revelation: Religion, Democracy, and Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matheron, A. 1997. The Theoretical Function of Democracy in Spinoza and Hobbes. In Montag and Stolze, 207–216. Naess, Arne. 1977a. Spinoza and Attitudes Toward Nature. In Rotenstreich and Schneider, 1983, 160–175. ———. 1977b. Spinoza and Ecology. In Hessing, 1977, 418–425. Renz, Ursula. 2018. The Explainability of Experience: Realism and Subjectivity in Spinoza’s Theory of the Human Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wetlesen, J. 1979. The Sage and the Way. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Chapter 5

The Second Grade of Knowledge (Ratio) and Its Limitations

5.1  R  ational Knowledge as a Common, Universal, and Adequate Knowledge; the Common Notions, Knowing the Common Properties, and Deduction The second grade of knowledge—ratio—has achieved more success than the first grade—imaginatio—in contributing to the desired system. The reason for this is that ratio, unlike imaginatio, is an adequate knowledge, namely, although unlike the supreme grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva—ratio is not complete or full, nevertheless, to the extent that truth is concerned, any part of ratio is equal to the whole, namely, each of ratio’s parts and whole are equally true. Adequacy is an equality in truth of the part and the whole. Where the finitude of the human knowledge is concerned, adequacy plays a crucial role, for although we know only a part of nature, this knowledge in a sense is equally true to the knowledge of the whole. For example, the principle that each part of a bodily whole is different from the others in its ratio of movement (activity) and rest (passivity) holds true for the bodily whole, which maintain its respective ratio. The whole confirms the partial knowledge and is coherently compatible with it. This is vital for the constructing of the desired system on data of partial, incomplete knowledge. The second grade of knowledge is universal but, unlike the first one, this universality is adequate and never false. Let me give another example of the adequacy of the rational knowledge (ratio). Because of the limitation and finitude of our cognition, we cannot know all the bodies existing in nature; we know only some of them. Nevertheless, we adequately know what are the common properties of all bodies; for instance, that all bodies are extended. Thus, even though we know only part of all existing bodies, and all of the bodies pertain to this part are extended, nevertheless, based on the adequacy of ratio, which is the universal knowledge of common properties, we may conclude (not on the basis of induction) that all bodies are extended. The proposition that some bodies are extended and the proposition that all bodies are extended are © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0_5

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equally true. Ratio’s partial knowledge and Ratio’s complete knowledge are equally true. In other words, when it comes to Ratio, the part is true as much as the whole. Rational knowledge, ratio (hereafter, reason), produces general concepts “from the fact that we have common notions [communes notiones] and adequate ideas of the properties of things” (2p40s2). As Spinoza states, “The essence of reason is nothing but our Mind, insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly” (4p26d, which refers to the definition of reason in 2p40s2). Clarity and distinctness are the criteria of adequacy. Or, “clarity and distinctness” are equal to or synonyms for “adequacy.” Spinoza also writes, “Things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things or deduced from them” (5p12d). Moreover, the definition of reason in 2pf40s2 refers to 2p38, which reads: “Those things which are common to all, and which are equal in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (See the example of extended entities that I have suggested above). This definition also refers to 2p39 (“If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human Body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the Mind”), and to 2p39c (“the Mind is more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its Body has many things in common with other bodies”), and to p40 (“Whatever ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the mind are also adequate”). In 5p36cs, Spinoza distinguishes between the supreme grade of knowledge— scientia intuitiva—and the second one, reason, thus: The supreme grade is a knowledge of particular, individual, or singular things, whereas reason is “a universal knowledge” (ibid.). Scientia intuitiva deals with the essences of individual things, namely, with the factors of their individuation whereas ratio deals only with their common properties. Note that 2p37 reads: “What is common to all things … and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing,” which is rather the function of scientia intuitiva only. Scientia intuitiva affects us more than ratio, not because the second grade of knowledge relies on insufficient proofs and demonstrations. Such is not the case at all. The proofs and demonstrations of ratio are rational, convincing, solid, adequate and, moreover, “beyond any doubt.” Nevertheless, only scientia intuitiva shows us concretely how these demonstrations and proofs are specifically valid for each relevant individual thing and, against the background of Spinoza’s nominalism, these demonstrations are clearer. Thus, ratio proves that all individual things depend on God and that they are necessarily connected with Him1 but scientia intuitiva shows this most specifically, concretely, and fully. The supreme grade of knowledge brings about our supreme happiness because it clearly demonstrates how specifically each one of us is necessarily connected with the most powerful and eternal being—the whole of Nature, Substance, or God. As we shall see, death cannot sever such a solid connection that joins us to God and integrates us with His absolute and eternal

1  Of course, Spinoza’s God is entirely impersonal. However, to refer to Him as “it” appears improper to me, and, thus, I use the familiar way in referring to God, personal or impersonal.

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power. Hence, both true grades of knowledge show, each in its own way, how each individual takes an indispensable part in the coherent system of reality, the knowledge of which is the desired system. Both true grades of knowledge, thus, contribute to the construction of this system. The universality of reason is quite different from the “universality” of the first grade of knowledge. (Bearing in mind the “Common Order of Nature”). The first is adequate and the latter—inadequate or false.2 Ratio’s general ideas are valid and legitimate whereas imaginatio’s general ideas are abstract, illegitimate, and are involved with unavoidable contradictions. Thus, imaginatio’s general ideas destroy themselves. Reason is the source of common laws and real universality for all human beings (4p72s). Reason’s generalization rests upon real communio (commonness). It is the community or commonness of the properties of individual things but not of their essences. Such is the commonness that our adequate general knowledge has, but it is not the case of the knowledge of individual things relying upon their essences. Each essence is the factor of the singularity of each individual thing. Commonness plays a crucial role in reason, for without commonness one cannot understand one thing from another: “Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other” (1a5). If ideas have nothing in common, there is no intelligible connection or relation between them. Understanding, according to Spinoza, rests upon connections, relations, or integration. It thus rests upon synthesis, and the aim of synthesis is to integrate ideas into a common, systematic whole. Moreover, there is no causality without commonness: “If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other” (1p3; and 1p3d, relating to 1a5, reads: “If they have nothing in common with one another, then [by 1a5] they cannot be understood through one another, and so … one cannot be the cause of the other”). As the Attribute of Thought is the total causal chain of thoughts, it is absolutely clear why causality, intelligibility, and commonness are inseparable. To understand anything completely is to realize, relying upon commonness, how this thing participates in the total system of Nature. That is, to understand its commonness with the whole of Nature as a total system. Causal connections are expressed in the Attribute of Thought as intellectual connections of inference. Each such connection is a necessary condition of the total system that reflects reality as it really is (ut in se est) with no barrier that the imagination produces. Intellectual or logical inferences are such necessary, inseparable connections, constructing a cognitive system that strictly and truly reflects the order and connection of things ut in se sunt. Each of the particulars in reality necessarily depends on the totality of the whole of Nature. Each of these particulars is thus a finite mode of God under this or that Attribute. The identification of an individual thing as a finite mode of God under this or that Attribute means referring to the 2  Cf. De Deugd 1966, p. 243 and Joachim 1964, p. 173. Indeed, what is shared by the part and the whole is not abstract. Abstraction, so typical of imaginatio, relies upon wrong ascription of socalled common properties to many individuals, as if they allegedly wereintegrated into a common whole.

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common nature or commonness of all thoughts (under the Attribute of Thought) and all bodies (under the Attribute of Extension). Note that from time to time Spinoza exchanges “commonness” for “agreement” (for instance, 2l2d: “all bodies agree in that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute;” and note that 2p37, which refers to this lemma, deals with “what is common to all things”). Commonness, agreement, and adequacy each term refers to the same thing, namely, all individual things are truly modes or expressions of one and the same total being (namely, Substance), which the desired system truly represents. These three terms refers to what we called above “the truth condition of adequacy” of the desired system. Spinoza emphasizes the commonness of bodies and relates it to adequacy (see his discussion from 2p27 on). From this kind of commonness Spinoza continues to the ideas: “There are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men. For (by l2) all bodies agree in certain things, which … must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all” (2p38c). As modes of Extension, in which there is no void or vacuum, all bodies must agree with one another. Thus, there must be an adequacy of any body and the whole of Extension, in which commonness (all bodies are extended) and continuity prevail, and this adequacy is fully reflected in the modes of the Attribute of Thought. Hence, there must be ideas that are common to all human beings. This commonness, agreement, or adequacy is the basis for the adequacy of reason. Therefore, the definition of reason, in 2p40s2III refers to 2p38c. The commonness of all bodies, which is reflected in the commonness of all ideas, is what reason is all about. Adequacy and reason go hand in hand, and the adequacy of bodies entails the adequacy of ideas: “If something is common to and peculiar to the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human Body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the Mind” (2p39). And, “the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its Body has many things in common with other bodies.” Analyzing the way in which adequacy relates to commonness somewhat differently, we may argue that commonness enables adequacy, or that without commonness there is no adequacy. This throws a special light on the expression “to take part in.” Each mode under the Attribute of Extension or that of Thought takes part in this or that Attribute. “To take part,” means to have properties in common, which means to constitute an adequacy with the relevant Attribute. To constitute this means that a finite knowledge concerning the modes is entirely valid from the viewpoint of the infinite intellect, which means universal, absolute intelligibility of everything existing. For the infinite intellect, any idea is intelligible. The term “the infinite intellect” has nothing of a knowing personality in it; it truly means that everything in Nature is intelligible and that there is no limit or restriction to the intelligibility of the parts and the whole of Nature. Any finite intellect takes part in the infinite intellect; hence, the relation between them makes an adequacy (“equality in part and the whole”). This adequacy means that any part of the infinite intellect, any finite intellect, is a true knowledge and understanding valid also from the viewpoint of the infinite intellect. The adequate part of the whole truth is no less true than the whole. Spinoza’s adequacy is his answer to any kind of skepticism, radical or not.

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Reason is the knowledge of the universally common properties but not of the essences, which are the individuating factors of finite modes. The knowledge of commonness or adequacy is not the knowledge of individual things as they are in themselves (ut in se sunt). The common, universal knowledge is not the knowledge of individual things, sharing common, universal properties with all of them as a one, systematic whole. Instead, ratio is the knowledge of the common, universal properties of individual things. As a nominalist, Spinoza rejects the notion of universal things such as the Platonic Ideas. Instead, he endorses the notion of common, universal properties of individual things. As is customary in Spinoza’s philosophy, the knowledge or perception of the body is the medium of any knowledge, which means that all we know about the whole of Nature and about its finite modes is necessarily by means of the perception of the changes of our body (assuming that the Extension suffers no void or vacuum and that it is full and continuous with no breaks). For this reason, the commonness or adequacy of the bodies as the extended modes (rather, the extending modes, as any detail in nature is also active) implies the commonness or adequacy of the ideas as the modes of Thought. All the above references show that although our knowledge is finite and partial, as true it is completely valid also as considered from the viewpoint of the complete whole, from the viewpoint of the infinite intellect. In other words, we have some pieces of knowledge that are universally valid. The complete, full, and infinite knowledge and our true finite, partial knowledge are both necessary; both share a common, universal necessity. Nevertheless, there are two provisions. The first proviso is that this common necessity is not that of the essences of individual things but only of their common, universal properties. The second proviso is that these common properties are limited to all the ways in which our body is linked with other bodies. If there are bodies in which our body does not maintain any perceived or sentient relation, we do not share common properties with such bodies. Spinoza does not exclude such a possibility. The medium of our knowledge is the cognition of our body and all the alterations or fluctuations that it undergoes. Those bodies that adequately affect or are affected by our body share something common and peculiar with it (see 2p39). The definition of reason in 2p40s2 refers to 2p39, which indicates that the second grade of knowledge explicates for us all the relations and connections that our body maintains with the rest of the universe. Nevertheless, our body maintains some peculiarity with all the bodies with which it shares some relations or connections. This peculiarity is not derived from the common properties. Reason is not sufficient to understand or explain such a peculiarity, as reason does not conceive the essences of individual things (TdIE, Sec. 19III and note 6; cf. 2p44c2d). However, reason can infer from a general determination that a particular property pertains to it as a rule. Only scientia intuitiva, the supreme grade of knowledge, is capable of conceiving Nature as a whole in its full concreteness, comprising all the essences of all individual things. Therefore, reason is capable of knowing all things as they truly are only partly, whereas only scientia intuitiva is capable of knowing them as entia realia with no proviso of any kind. This partiality is expressed in Spinoza’s claim that reason conceives things only “under a certain species of

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eternity [quadam species aeternitatis, under some provision of eternity]” (2p44c2), whereas scientia intuitiva perceives them “under a species of eternity” with no limitation or proviso of any kind. Eternity, reality, and necessity are different terms for one and the same referent (as implied from the definition of eternity of Ethics 1, and 2p44c2d, these connotations are of the same denotation). Hence, “under a certain species of eternity” entails “limited necessity and reality,” which means “not in the full, complete truth about things.” Though ratio is a knowledge of all things ut in se sunt, nevertheless, in the light of the above, concerning quadam species aeternitatis, in fact, ratio conceives all things ut quadam in se est. Ratio is thus half-blind to the concrete, individuating part of reality. Hence, ratio cannot solve the apparent antagonism between the human conatus, as ratio conceives it, and the conatus of the rest, non-human parts of Nature, which Nathan Rotenstreich called the total norm of Nature to be distinguished from the partial, human norm of Nature (1977). Spinoza emphasizes that the infinite intellect, which conceives the whole of nature and all the individual things in it, cannot render the human interests and conatus as a standard for the whole of Nature. After all, humanity is only a tiny part of Nature as a whole (PT, Ch. 2, Sec. 8). As reason does not conceive the essences of individual things, it is conditioned by scientia intuitiva, which conceives them. Such is the case because “the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are not known” (TdIE, Sec. 95; Curley I, p. 39; cf. op. cit., Secs. 26 and 27). The knowledge of the essences of things, the complete knowledge of individual things, is prior to the knowledge of their universal properties. Without the knowledge of the essences, we cannot follow the systematic order of things whereas the knowledge of their universal properties endows us with the knowledge of the laws of Nature. Spinoza writes that “universal consideration concerning fate and the connection of causes cannot help us to form and order our thoughts concerning particular things” (TPT, Ch. 4, Curley II: 126). As long as we have no knowledge of the essences of things, we must treat them as possible only although, according to Spinoza, possibility is only a matter of a lack of knowledge and does not have an ontological status. Ut in se est, nothing is contingent or possible but necessary. In this way, a gap appears between all the individual things as they truly are and their universal properties. This gap confines the validity of the universal properties as they depend upon the essences of individual things. This gap seemingly renders the necessary connections, the laws that are valid for all things in Nature, into possible or contingent connections only. This is a problem that cries out for a solution, in order to safeguard the constitution of the cognitive system of reality as a whole. When real entities (entia realia) are concerned, essences are prior to the properties of these entities whereas when “entities of reason” (entia rationis), such as geometrical figures, are concerned (TdIE, Sec. 95), there is no such priority and we can fix the order as we wish. Spinoza involves the cognition of the universal properties of all things with the important issue of the common notions (notiones communes that are mentioned in

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2p40s1)3 that are the foundations of our reasoning (ibid.; in 2p44c2d Spinoza calls them fundamenta Rationis). Spinoza calls the common notions simply “notions” or “axioms” (2p40s1). As 2p38c reads, “there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all man” (Curley I, p.  474), whose context is the clear and distinct knowledge, namely, the adequate and true knowledge. The foundations of knowledge—the common notions—do not pertain to the kind of analytical propositions, which has a formal significance only, but they are ontic data, which convey vital information about reality as it truly is. The foundations of knowledge pertain, thus, to metaphysical knowledge concerning reality as it is in itself (ut in se est). As such, they indispensably contribute to the construction of the desired system, though this contribution is not enough, as the contribution of the supreme grade of knowledge is even more vital. The foundations of knowledge constitute the lawfulness of Nature and of our knowledge as well.4 They are the foundations of knowledge in any of the known Attributes. Therefore, 5p12d reads: “Things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things or deduced from them” (Curley I, p. 603; at this point, Spinoza refers to the definition of reason in 2p40s2). The desired system requires a general and common foundation, which is valid for all its modes or particulars, but only reason can provide us with such a foundation. The false ambition of the first grade of knowledge (imaginatio) to provide us with the knowledge of allegedly universal properties (concerning images and words) turns out to be a true achievement in the second grade of knowledge, which requires independent and free judgement (TPT, Curley II: 191). In contrast, the judgement in the first grade of knowledge is not independent and immediate (or free), as it relies upon rumors and the arbitrary opinions of other persons. In the TPT Spinoza claims that “the foundations of Philosophy are common notions” (Curley II: 271; cf. p. 133: “opinions and teachings universal to the human race, i.e., to common and true notions”). Spinoza thus exchanges philosophy for reason. At this point, the following question should be asked: Can philosophy proceed in the supreme grade of knowledge or can it be achieved only in the second one, ratio? In his translation of TPT (Curley II: 133, note 17), Curley raises a difficulty: Spinoza appears to attribute supernatural knowledge to Christ (op. cit., p. 84). How can this happen?! As I see it, there is no contradiction between these two passages taken from the TPT, as the one (op. cit., on p. 133) refers to ratio, and the second (on p.  84)—to the scientia intuitiva. Both passages deal differently with Nature and none goes beyond it, namely none of these is supernatural. In this way, I interpret the following passage: “For a man to perceive by the mind alone things which are not contained in the first foundations of our knowledge, and cannot be 3  See Abraham 1977. Abraham is right in arguing that the adequacy of a notion rests upon its function, namely, to enable the expansion of knowledge and its development (op. cit., pp. 37–38). 4  Spinoza, like Kant after him, does not think that formal logic (as it is embodied in Euclidean geometry) pertains to the building blocks of reality, and this view of is perfectly compatible with his rejection of the view, as we shall see below, that Nature is deductively systematized. For quite a different and most interesting and original view, which pertains formal logic to the laws of nature.

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deduced from them, his mind would necessarily have to be more excellent than, and far superior to, the human mind” (Curley II: 84). Such is the distinction between common human knowledge, the natural light,5 which is in the second grade of knowledge and which is the customary grade that humanity in general shares most of the time, and the supreme one, which very few persons, the “sages,” reach quite rarely. Such is the rare way of the sage that the Ethics refers to in the ending of the whole book (5p42s, Curley I, p. 617). The judgment in this discussion is not that of the lonely Cartesian thinker but a free and independent judgment, acknowledging only the authority of reason. It is adequate, namely, referring and resting upon the rational and universal order of things. In this way, we liberate our mind from the arbitrary order of associations, memories, and the passive affections of our body, all of which characterize the first grade of knowledge. In contrast, in fact our mind is linked to the intellectual order of all things in Nature, in which things are ordered according to the first cause of things, which is a common order that all human beings universally share (2p18s) and which is in the second grade of knowledge. It is important to note that despite the universality of reason, its imperatives are products of the personal, “immediate” determination of each human being (this is one more similarity to Kant’s concept of reason). No external authority dictates them for us. A rational independent decision of each of us is the reason for our adopting them. Hence, freedom of thought is a necessary condition for such a decision, which is entirely free, namely, determined by each one of us with no coercion whatsoever. Indeed, according to Spinoza and contrary to Descartes, will and intellect are one and the same. No real rational decision negates the singular personality of any one of us (even though such a decision does not express the singularity of each of us, which is the business of scientia intuitiva only and not of ratio). In contrast, the apparent “universality” of the Common Order of Nature, which imaginatio feigns, is an attempt to negate the free decision and the singular personality and will of each of us. In this spirit, Spinoza writes: … true virtue is nothing but living according to the guidance of reason, and so lack of power consists only in this, that a man allows himself to be guided by things outside him, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself, demands. (4p37s1)

The Common Order of Nature is a worldview according to which each human being stays in a permanent war with the rest of humanity and with Nature as a whole and according to which each of us is a contingent being, existing in place and time. In contrast, in reality as it is (ut in se est) each human being, like any individual thing, is eternal (existing with no relation to time and place) and necessary. In the true order of Nature, each individual thing, for instance, each human being leaves its

5  As TPT reads, “the natural light common to all, not any supernatural light or external authority” (Curley II: 191). Spinoza thus refers to the natural light “that must also be so difficult that only the most acute Philosophers can apply it; it must be accommodated to the natural and common human the natural and common human mentality and capacity” (ibid.).

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singular mark on the coherent whole reality. In the second grade of knowledge, this singularity is not expressed yet it is not denied. Against this background, there are three kinds of commonness or sharing: (1) The imaginary, abstract commonness of the first grade of knowledge, which denies the singularity of each individual thing (for instance, such is the totalitarian nature of the historical religions); (2) The adequate commonness, which does not constitute the essence of any individual thing and which is, yet, the rational, true commonness of the universal properties of all individual things; (3) The coherent commonness, constituting the essence of every individual thing, which is the commonness of the supreme, third grade of knowledge. Each of these kinds of commonness is an attempt to construct the desired system of knowledge, but only the third, supreme kind of knowledge fully succeeds in doing so. The first kind contributes something vital to the constructing of the desired knowledge—it is the only kind of knowledge that provides us with the empirical data of any kind of knowledge. The common notions play a vital role in the issue of the deductive system. The axioms of the Euclidean geometry have been called “common notions.” Spinoza himself calls the axioms of the Ethics “common notions” that all human beings accept. If everybody would consider the true nature of Substance, they would accept 1p7 not as a theorem but as an axiom pertaining to the common notions (1p8s2) that everybody shares. 2p40s1 treats common notions and axioms as equivalent concepts.6 Against this background, we should not be surprised that many of Spinoza’s interpreters consider reason as a deductive knowledge or inference.7 Those who accept these axioms and follow them logically will reach the same conclusions.8 Such persons follow the rational and Common Order of Nature. In several places, Spinoza refers to “deducere” (to deduce) not in the strict sense of the word but in the sense of “ to relate to,” “to connect with,” or “to construct with or according to” (see, for instance, TdIE Secs. 44, 47, 68, and 91). In none of these places, does Spinoza forget his consistent warning that it is impossible to deduce anything individual from a universal or general concept or notion alone. As I have argued above, according to Spinoza, rationality that produces new or novel information, which relates and integrates its data, is not compatible with explication and analysis but only with a kind of synthesis. In many cases, when using “deducing,” Spinoza aims at synthesis or connotation and association. It is an act of integration, which is meant to construct a coherent system. The common notions, according to such an interpretation, are nuclei of knowledge, to which other parts of knowledge are integrated to construct a coherent system. In an analogous way, in chemistry we are acquainted with the beautiful phenomenon of crystallization of a matter around actual crystals of the same chemical molecules (cf. Abraham 1977 considering them as adequate ideas, which means that they serve as a means to integrate any partial knowledge within the complete knowledge of the whole).

 See Wolfson II 1958, pp. 118, on the alternations of the concept “axiom.”  See, for instance, Parkinson 1954, pp. 159 and 166–168. Cf. Joachim 1964, p. 175. 8  Such, for instance, is the well-known stance taken by Blaise Pascal. 6 7

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The common notions are beyond any possible doubt (TPT, Curley II: 156: “notions whose truth is so firm and steady … they must appear to us when we infer God’s existence from them, if we want to infer it beyond any chance of doubt”). This means that for our reason there is no possible doubt that these notions are true and stable. Such are the demonstrations of geometry, which resist any possible doubt and controversy. Only skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus dare to doubt the truth of axioms (Letter 56).9 As long as the demand of reason for adequacy is maintained, no doubt exists. The rational knowledge with each of its aspects is adequate in any case and, as adequate, it is beyond any doubt. All the relevant cognitions that will join it or condition it should establish its adequacy and strengthen it. Nevertheless, rational knowledge, in the second grade of knowledge, does not fully satisfy our desire to know and understand all things completely (that is, by the knowledge of their essences). Discussing the method of the interpretation of Nature, Spinoza writes: In examining natural things, we strive to investigate first the things most universal [maxime universales] and common to the whole of nature: motion and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes and through which it continuously acts. From these we proceed gradually to other, less universal things [minus universalia]. (TPT, Curley II: 176)

Note again: In this method of investigation, one does not deduce individual things from the universal things. Such a deduction is simply impossible according to Spinoza. In this issue, there is a radical difference between Spinoza and Leibniz. It is a grave mistake to consider Spinoza as one of the rationalists in such a sense.10 The indispensability of empirical data for any kind of knowledge, the vitality of the cognition of the body and its alterations as the medium of any kind of knowledge, and the necessity of the first kind of knowledge, any of these is enough to show that Spinoza should not be considered as a rationalist. Neither is he an empiricist. As in Kant’s philosophy, with all the relevant differences, rationalist elements (the a priori ones) and empiricist ones (the a posteriori ones) are both vital. One is capable of deducing the less universal things from the most universal things. A most universal thing, for instance, is the Attribute of Extension, and the less universal entities that are deduced from it are the infinite modes of movement and rest. This means that all extended things are subject to movement and rest, which are the universal properties of all extended things, which are the bodies. As we have explained above, universal properties (such as movement and rest) are not essences of individual things. Such essences, following 2p37, cannot be deduced from any universal or 9  Such as “the whole is greater than its part.” Spinoza writes: “There are a great many people who are such lovers of contradiction that they have mocked geometrical demonstrations themselves. Sextus Empiricus and the other skeptics whom you mention say it is false that the whole is greater than its part, and they judge similarly concerning the other axioms” (Letter 56, Curley II: 422). Whether Sextus denied such an axiom or not, this is a nice example. Cantor’s mathematics of transfinite numbers denies this axiom. Thus, doubting it is certainly possible. 10  Unless he is considered as a rationalist in another sense, endorsing the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the identity of the indiscernibles. Della Rocca rightly ascribes such a rationalism to Spinoza. See Della Rocca 2012.

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general property. Thus, Spinoza explicitly clarifies: “From universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation of one singular thing rather than another” (TdIE, Sec. 93; Curley I, p. 39). In this view, we cannot infer or deduce the meaning of each event or things from such universal laws or properties. All bodies are subject to the laws (properties) of movement and rest, and all bodies are subject to the laws of gravitation. From these laws we can deduce the laws of the mechanisms that are valid for the human body (for instance, those that are valid for our blood circulation). Nevertheless, such a deduction is very limited and it should be subject to what is common to all bodies or extended things. Thus, we cannot deduce what is peculiar only to the human body from such a universal or general knowledge. In the same vein, we cannot deduce what is to our utility or advantage from the universal laws of Nature, as any human being is only a tiny part of Nature (TPT, Curley II: 284: “Nature is not constrained by the laws of human reason, which aim only at man’s true advantage and preservation. It is governed by infinite other laws, which look to the eternal order of the whole of nature, of which man is only a small [tiny] part”). The knowledge of common properties and not of individuating factors (i.e., the essences of individual things) pertains to ratio, which uses the method of deduction. For ratio, the individuating factors and the individual things are data, which cannot be conceived and captured by ratio. Ratio sets out the general scheme and laws for the knowledge of individual things, but is incapable of perceiving them as individual things. Spinoza names the knowledge of common notions, such as those upon which Euclidean geometry is based and which are “quite simple and most intelligible” (TPT, Curley II: 185), “a quite ordinary—almost childish!—knowledge” (ibid.). Though such knowledge is very simple, common to all human beings, it is still in the second kind of knowledge. Neither is it a Cartesian natural light, as Spinoza’s natural light is, as I have explained above; it is quite different from the Cartesian one. Spinoza’s clarity and distinction is by no means the Cartesian clarity and distinction, resting upon analysis and separation. In any event, according to Spinoza, the difference between primitive people and the sage ones in accepting such knowledge is that the simple minds accept them without any proof whereas the sage ones rely upon proofs, best of all—those that are subject to mathematical proofs, which are meticulous, strict demonstrations. In any event, this ordinary knowledge does not pertain to the first kind of knowledge, imaginatio. It plays a role in the continuity of the grades of knowledge (see, for instance, 2p47s), as this ordinary knowledge is closer to the first one than to the other kinds of knowledge in the second grade. It is thus a rational knowledge, but not in a higher grade of rationality. If some of the ideas, especially when emended, of the first grade of knowledge, are somewhat true, their truth can be established only by the second grade of knowledge, in using demonstrations. The supreme authority of truth is reason, for “having something beyond reason … is far beneath reason” (TPT, Curley II: 152). The “reason of the multitude” and “the reason of the few chosen sages” are different kinds or grades of reason in the second grade of knowledge, ratio.

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As for the prime sentences of a deductive system, namely, the definitions, axioms, and postulates, which are not proven and are not subject to any proof, are they self-evident? I do not think so. Any of these fundamental or prime propositions (or antecedents) requires rational justification that they are suitable for serving as methodological means, principles, and prescriptions. They pertain to the method of the desired system. They serve as crystallization nuclei of knowledge and not as principles of individuation. This crystallization or organization is the way in which Spinoza’s way of emendation proceeds. It is a kind of synthesis, not of any sort of analysis, which Leibniz and other rationalists supported. The common notions are such crystallizing nuclei, organizing and integrating the data of our cognitions into a systematic whole. For example, the laws or properties of movement and rest indicate the causal links that integrate all the bodies or extended things into a comprehensive extended system. Causal links, as I have explained above, serve us in constructing a universal system of knowledge and as individuating principles (which pertain to the section of adequate causality). Ratio’s universal principles require concretization, which only the supreme grade of knowledge, the knowledge of the essences of individual things, can provide us with. As long as these principles are not concretely proven as valid for all individual things, they are in the status of hypotheses or postulates only. To render them into categorical propositions, a concretization is required, but such a concretization does not initiate the process of knowledge; rather, it must end it. Thus, any of the first principles of our knowledge are not self-evident but share instead the methodological necessity of ratio’s principles or universal properties. In any event, they are perfectly valid and are beyond any doubt within the certain and well-established knowledge. This section and its conclusions aim at priming the way in order to clarify whether reason can establish the desired system by means of deduction based upon the common, universal notions of reason or of its axioms, definitions, and postulates. To begin with, we should answer the question, Is a foundational-deductive metaphysical system possible according to Spinoza’s philosophy?

5.2  T  he Impossibility of Constructing a Philosophical System by a Deduction from the Common Notions 5.2.1  W  hy Is a Metaphysical System, Which Is Foundational-­Deductive, Impossible According to Spinoza’s Philosophy? Many interpreters wrongly assume that Spinoza’s desired system is foundational-­ deductive, constructed in the image of Euclidean geometry.11  For instance, Steenbakkers writes: “Because God is the immanent cause of all things (1p18), the deduction by means of rational thought of the systematic connections of things from God’s nature

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If, however, the existence of individual things is real and necessary, it should be concluded that, for various reasons according to Spinoza’s philosophy, the desired system cannot be foundational-deductive. The following are the reasons and considerations why it is impossible to deduce12 or to infer the particular details of a system from its definitions and axioms, which are the foundations of a deductive system: (1) The act of reasoning alone is unable to deduce nothing but other general notions from the common, universal notions of the system. Therefore, no deduction can constitute or discover the essences of individual things. No deduction can serve as a source of knowledge of any individual thing, let alone the exclusive source of it (such an exclusive source is empirical, yet needs an emendation, according to Spinoza’s first kind of knowledge). Reasoning can lead us only from a legitimate universal general knowledge to a more specific generalization (“less universal thing”) but never to the knowledge of individual things (TPT, Ch. 7, Curley II: 176). Letter 32 implies that the coherence of the parts is valid for the general laws of the parts and not for the individual parts themselves. Indeed, the second grade of knowledge deals with common, universal properties and not with the essences of individual things. 1p28d explicitly states: “what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite” (Curley I: 432). We need a given finite mode, serving as an auxiliary means, in order to deduce from an Attribute another finite thing (ibid.; cf. 1p15s).13 The need for such an auxiliary means is indicated also by the example given in 2p8s. The auxiliary means are ideas of some given individual things, which are neither derived from the definitions or axioms, nor from other principles of reason, but their source is given and empirical, an a posteriori source of knowledge. In the same vein, we should interpret Spinoza’s answers to the problem of the deduction of the individual bodies from is not a merely conceptual construct, but will reflect the state of affairs in reality” (Steenbakkers 2009, p. 53). Nevertheless, this is simply a prevalent unexamined or dogmatic view in the literature on Spinoza. Recently, Curley has joined the large camp of interpreters who have adopted this wrong view as he, rather dogmatically, claims: “Spinoza did, I think, agree with Descartes that the various sciences dealing with particular kinds of extended things could be organized into a deductive system” (Curley 2019, p. 27; cf. op. cit., p. 32, the necessity of the infinite modes “postulates a deductive science of extended things, from whose axioms there will follow a system of laws capable of explaining whatever happens among particular extended things”). As I show in this chapter, in a meticulous examination of the text such an unexamined or dogmatic idea is shown to be completely groundless as far as Spinoza’s philosophy is concerned. 12  Quite effortlessly, even naturally, Spinoza replaces “deduction” by “connection” or “direction” (regulation). For instance, “for us to be able to conceive God’s nature clearly and distinctly, we must attend to certain very simple notions, called common notions, and connect with them those pertaining to the divine nature” (TPT, Ch. VI, ADN. VI [hereafter, Note 6], Curley II: 156; my italics), or, “If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, there must be some foundation that directs our thoughts to it” (TdIE, Sec. 105, Curley I: 42; my italics). 13  Cf. Curley 1969, pp. 72–74.

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the a priori definition of Extension (Letters 60, 81, and 83). We can know such bodies only in the completely detailed (modified) representation of God as an efficient cause of His effects. Such is God as natura naturans (God as the cause, the cause of itself—causa sui—of all things) of the natura naturata (God as all of its effects, God as completely modified). Such is God as an Attribute, which is completely detailed or particularized into all of its relevant finite modes. In other words, such knowledge is of the desired coherent system, in which alone we can know all individual things, which can be known only a posteriori, never a priori. From natura naturans, namely, Substance and any of the Attributes, only universal common properties can be deduced. Spinoza’s notion of extension has some advantages over that of Descartes, which is quite inert, yet Spinoza’s causal and active notion of extension, the Attribute of Extension, is not a factor of individuation. Individuation must be given, not derived, from common notions. The existence of plurality and change cannot be derived from the notion of the Attribute. The a priori notion of Extension does not constitute the essence of any individual body. Indeed, in Letters 60 and 83, Spinoza does not commit himself to derive such essences from the Attribute but only the common properties of all finite bodies. The same holds true for the Attribute of Thought: no finite idea can be derived from it but only the common properties of all finite ideas or thoughts, such as their intelligibility (as we shall see, the Infinite Intellect is a universal property of all thoughts). It is von Tschirnhaus (in Letter 82) who erroneously understands that properties are individual things or finite modes, whereas Spinoza never accepted such a wrong view. While universal properties are derived from the notion of an Attribute, no finite modes or individual thing can be derived from this notion alone. There is no a priori knowledge of individual things or finite modes. Individual things are given by empirical means only and, thus, their knowledge is a posteriori only. (2) Any deductive system requires self-evidence for its basis (fundamentum), which is composed of primary or basic propositions, namely, definitions, axioms, and postulates. None of these propositions in the Ethics is self-evident or clear in itself.14 Each of them needs further explanation or explication by the text to fol-

 T.  C. Mark ascribes a traditional deductive model and self-evidence to Spinoza’s philosophy (Mark 1975, p. 274). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that none of the propositions of the Ethics is beyond any doubt. Yet, Mark continues, Spinoza ascribes self-evidence or immunity against any doubt to the foundations of his system, to the foundations or basis that his contemporaries considered as self-evident and beyond any doubt. From these foundations, Spinoza tried to deduce rigorously all the conclusions of his system. These conclusions, by contrast, were not accepted by his contemporaries, and, hence, he attempted to enforce them on his readers. In fact, Mark considers these foundations as received views, but this has not rendered them at all into truths that should be self-evident and immune to any doubt. In my view, to consider any of the definitions, axioms, or postulates of the Ethics as self-evident and as taking part in a secure basis, which is immune against any doubt, has no well-established grounds at all. Although Wolfson (1958, vol. I, p. 58) was right in considering all the basic propositions of the Ethics as simply an accepted view at the time, which are no less more immune to doubt or not self-evident than the theorems, he was wrong in considering the deductive method as simply an external shell of the Ethics (see Sec. 5.23 below).

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low. A fine example is the definition of causa sui, the first definition of the Ethics as a whole, which reads: “By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” (Curley I: 408). Only in 1p25s, Spinoza explains this axiom: “God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself” (Curley I: 431). At this point only, we finally understand what does causa sui mean: God is causa sui because He is the cause of everything, and nothing is not caused by God or exists in God. There are many examples like this in the Ethics. Because no proposition in this book is self-clear or self-­ evident but it depends on the rest of the text for being fully clear and demonstrated, Spinoza’s Ethics, unlike Euclid’s Elements, is not and cannot be a foundational system. As we shall see, the model of Spinoza’s system is the coherent, network-like one, not the deductive model, which serves him for quite a different purpose. The “stable basis” (stabile fundamentum) that Meyer ascribes to the Cartesian deductive system15 cannot be found in the mature philosophy of Spinoza (and even at the time of the publication of Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae). Despite the formal structure of the Ethics, its content was never constructed in the image of any deductive-foundational model. Occasionally, Spinoza uses the prevalent terminology and mentions a deduction from a stable foundation (for instance, TdIE, Sec. 104: “when the mind attends to a thought—to weigh it, and deduce from it, in good order, the things legitimately to be deduced from it” [Curley I: 42], my italics), but immediately he, using his own terms, exacts: “If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of all, there must be some foundation that directs our thoughts to it” (TdIE, Sec. 105, Curley I: 42; my italics). The deduction under discussion is not a Cartesian-­ constitutive one; it is, rather, a regulative principle (to borrow from a famous distinction made by Kant). Such a principle is general and, unlike the foundational model, does not relate to any particularization from a general principle. Only at the end of the complete a posteriori process, having ordered the ­empirical data according to this principle, will it become particularized. The particularization under discussion cannot be performed a priori at all. In the last account, Spinoza borrowed from Descartes the terms “intuition” and “deduction” and modified their meanings. Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva does not rely upon any deduction from a firm foundation. Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza’s notion of intuition is subject to demonstration and inference (2p40s2, at the end of the scholium: “we infer the fourth number from the ratio” [Curley I: 478], 2p47s, 5p36c,s, and see Sec. 6.1 below). In Spinoza’s terms, “intuitive” means particularizing or individuating and, hence, it holds for the essences of individual things. Contrary to the Cartesian intuition, Spinoza’s intuition is not immediate and discrete; on the contrary, it is mediate and connective, for Spinoza’s intuition relates to a principle of individuation that is causal ade-

 Ludovicus Meyer’s introduction to “Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae,” In: Baruch de Spinoza: Opera, Ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. I, p. 127.

15

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quacy. Hence, strictly opposing Descartes’s philosophy, 2p28s reads: “the idea that constitutes the nature of the human Mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct” (Curley I: 470). While Descartes begins his system with the intuitive foundations, Spinoza rather ends his system with the intuition. While in Descartes’s foundational system, intuition comes first as the test for the clarity and distinction of the foundations of the system, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, intuition, as the supreme grade of knowledge, comes after the deductive ratio, as the second grade of knowledge (2p47s). The intuition as the complete knowledge of the system as a whole including all its finite modes (of individual things) is achieved only in the complete system, at the end of the whole process. Thus, there is a great difference between a Cartesian deductive model and the coherent, network-like model of Spinoza. Cartesian self-evidence starts the veridical process of knowledge but Spinoza, who rejects immediate self-evidence, should accept evidence only at the end of the whole process, as a result of it and not as its start. Spinoza’s ratio is general knowledge and not the knowledge of the essences of individual things; it is the guide of the general method of the system, and no more. The natural light according to Spinoza is not Cartesian evidence. All that this light shows us requires demonstrations, well-established proofs. All what pertains to this natural light requires legitimate intellectual proof. A “natural light” that is exempt from intellectual proofs is like a miracle, which is simply impossible according to Spinoza. Such a “light” is, as it were, “beyond reason” (supra rationis) and hence it is less than reason, it is infra rationis, for example in the following case: Nor do I intend here to refute the opinion of those who maintain that the natural light cannot teach anything sound about the things bearing on true salvation. For a person who does not grant himself any sound reason cannot prove this by any reason. And if they seek to recommend themselves as having something beyond reason [supra rationis], that is a mere invention, and far beneath reason [infra rationis], which their ordinary way of living has already sufficiently shown. (TPT, Ch. 5, Curley II: 152)

What ratio leaves without proof or sufficient proof, scientia intuitiva should prove. Descartes and Pascal, who grasped intuition as self-evident, believed that there was some grade of knowledge that it is above reason. Not so Spinoza. He believed that the supreme grade of knowledge is above the second one, because it is more rational (in the highest degree of rationality, namely, intelligibility that is based upon most detailed and strictest demonstrations). For Spinoza, unlike Descartes, “the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves” (5p23s). In contrast, according to Descartes, intuition or self-evidence, the immediate evidence, is prior to the demonstration, which starts with it as given. The Cartesian cogito needs no demonstration, needs no proof at all, for it is immediate evidence, whereas no such immediacy exists in Spinoza’s notion of rationality, which always requires demonstrations. To be more precise, ratio and scientia intuitiva are both rational but the rationality of the supreme kind is higher than that of the general knowledge of the second grade. Of course, Spinoza relies upon some basic assumptions, which are not self-­ evident and their meanings and truth rest upon a network, a coherent system as a

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whole. Such basic assumptions are subject to reconsideration and revision. Only the final achievement of the desired system, if attainable, can terminate any revision or reconsideration of them. Sometimes, Spinoza uses terms from which the reader may conclude that he holds a self-evident view after all. But this is only a superficial impression. Take for example the following text: Since God’s existence is not known through itself, it must necessarily be inferred from notions whose truth is so firm and steady that no power can be or be conceived by which they could be changed. At least, so they must appear to us when we infer God’s existence from them, if we want to infer it beyond any chance of doubt. For if we could conceive that the notions themselves could be changed by some power, whatever in the end it was, we would doubt their truth, and consequently also doubt our conclusion, viz. God’s existence, so that we could never be certain of anything. (TPT, Ch. 6; Curley II: 156; my italics)

Hence, the evidence in consideration is only subjective; or so it appears or seems to us. A per se nota proposition is simply a received view for Spinoza’s contemporaries but not necessarily for him. Doubt or certainty in this context pertain to our mental state, not to objective reality (ut in se est). This is not Cartesian self-­evidence, which is based upon ultimate veridicality. One’s full knowledge of God, to the last details, to the last finite mode, is the only basis for an objective, ultimate truth, which is beyond any possible doubt. But such knowledge terminates the whole cognitive process and never starts it. (3) If we could exchange self-evidence for analyticity (in modern terms) and consider the first sentences of each part of the Ethics as analytical sentences, this book could not fulfill such an absurd demand. Spinoza calls analytical propositions by the name of “absolutely eternal truths”: these propositions “signify nothing but … such … have no place outside the mind” (Letter 10, Curley I: 196). As intra intellectum—inside the intellect—such “analytic” propositions have no reference without our mind. Hence, they could not serve as Spinoza’s common notions, which truly represent extra intellectum truths. Translating these ideas into modern terms may be thus: analytical sentences teach us nothing new about the world but they refer only to relations among concepts. Whenever these relations are not recognized at the first glance, an explication will reveal them to us. Such sentences function in a deductive model but not in the desired system, which adequately reveal reality as it truly is. Deductive systems may not contain propositions about empirical facts.16 The Ethics’s axi-

 Following Strawson 1952, deduction is an inference of analytical sentences from basic analytical sentences. This kind of system may be called the pure deductive system which, in fact, is tautological. Cf. Harris 1973, pp. 21 ff. No tautology provides us with information about the world. Such pure deduction is not valid for Spinoza’s philosophy. Hence, Harris suggests another deductive model that will suit well this philosophy. This model starts with particular propositions about empirical facts, which are connected by necessary laws. Such a model relies upon experience, too. The empirical facts constitute together a deductive-coherent system (op. cit., pp. 25–26). Such a deductive system reminds us of Newton’s physics, which he called “a deduction from the phenomena.” It can be ascribed also to Einstein (1935). As Harper and Smith write, “Einstein’s arguments

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oms are not analytical propositions. Take, for example, 1a1 and 1a2, respectively: “Whatever is, is either in itself or in another” and “What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself” (Curley I: 410). Each of them is not clear in itself but needs an explication within a context, in the body of the text. The best way to understand the Ethics is to detect the reference on which each theorem is based, that is, to read the text also regressively, namely, from the theorems to the basic sentences, the “foundations,” on which the theorem relies. This is not a linear reading but a network-like reading. And the reason for the fruitfulness of such a reading is that the prior sentences are not clear in themselves but become clearer only after reading the rest of the text. No sentence in the Ethics as a whole is self-evident or per se knowable. No sentence in it makes sense or complete sense in isolation from the rest of the text. Hence, the meaning or truth of the definitions and the axioms depends on are indeed reversible into a deduction from the phenomena of all his novel hypotheses” (Harper and Smith 1995, p. 141). Such a deduction is not formal and not analytical, and thus it can be compatible with Spinoza’s nominalism. Hubbeling 1967 refers to such a system and states that the suitable method for constructing Spinoza’s system of reality is deductive. Still, I wonder, why such a system will be called deductive. There are many more decisive reasons, as I will argue in the following chapter, to call it coherent, following a model of coherence, in Spinoza’s understanding of this term (in Letter 32, for example). Hubbeling is perhaps the most prominent adherent of ascribing a classic deductive model to Spinoza’s philosophy. He, wrongly I am convinced, considered Spinoza as a rationalist who purged his philosophy from any empiricist traits and molded it in the image of a mathematical ideal. Spinoza’s deductivism is perfectly compatible, Hubbeling argued, with nominalism, as the common notion of his system are not abstract universals at all. As I have argued above, there is no way, according to Spinoza, to deduce individual propositions from the basic ones, concerning the notiones communes. Hubbeling argued that Spinoza failed to achieve that (op. cit., p. 23) but, as I see it, this was not a failure at all since Spinoza never attempted to deduce from these basic notions any particular proposition about an individual thing. Parkinson 1954, too, thought that any piece of knowledge in Spinoza’s philosophy is traditionally deductive (pp. 20 and 88–9). According to Parkinson, even the supreme grade of knowledge is deductive (op. cit., p. 186). Yet Parkinson acknowledged the limitation of deduction in relating to reality, for the deductive system cannot overcome the problems of multiplicity, individuation, and activity, without which Nature cannot exist (op. cit., pp. 62 ff). Moreover, Spinoza cannot deduce even any Attribute from the definition of Substance without relying upon experience or observation (op. cit., p.  69). Of course, Spinoza cannot deduce the finite modes from the definitions of Substance and Attributes. No wonder that Parkinson, too, admitted to Spinoza’s “failure” concerning such deductions (op. cit., pp. 69–72). Hintikka 1973 rejects the notion of a deductive system that attempts to deduce analytical sentences from other analytical sentences. This was the notion adopted by logical positivists such as Ayer, Hempel, Mach, and others (op. cit., pp. 222 ff). Nevertheless, as empirical facts are entirely independent on the deductive system itself, using it as a source of information about the world as it truly is, is simply redundant! Whereas coherence between empirical facts is really about the world as it truly is (see, for example, Letter 32). Hintikka’s attempt to save a deductive system for reality does not follow the foundational model. The propositions in Hintikka’s notion of the deductive model are not analytic but a priori synthetic. His deductive model is not based upon self-evident foundations. As soon as the foundational properties are removed from the model, there is no obstacle to replace the linear factors by a network of coherence. Note that Jonathan Bennett, too, does not ascribe self-evidence to the axioms of the Ethics although he considers Spinoza’s method as hypothetical-deductive (Bennett 1984, pp. 20 ff.), which I do not accept for the reasons given above.

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the rest of the text, which is clearly not the case of any deductive or foundational model of a system. (4) “No definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals” (1p8s2; Curley I: 415; cf. Letter 34, Curley II: 25), even though everything has necessarily a particular cause or reason, for each individual thing is a necessary existent, which exists in this and not in that way (following Letter 34, Curley II: 25: “There must necessarily be a positive cause of each existing thing, through which it exists”). Each definition is common to some individual things, and yet there is no way to deduce their number from their common definition. Again, what is common to all individual things tells us nothing about their essences. And Spinoza explicitly claims: “from universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to contemplation of one singular thing rather than another” (TdIE, Sec. 93, Curley I: 39). In contrast, the definitions that relate to the essences of individual things enjoy another fate (op. cit., Sec. 95). Such definitions are not those of God, Attribute, and the mode in the Ethics. They are, rather, adequate descriptions of individual things with which the a posteriori procedure starts (in Descartes’s and Spinoza’s time the term for it was rather a priori, in which the analysis of the consequences leads to the antecedents; likewise, what they called “analysis,” we call “synthesis”). (5) The data are not included, in general, in the axioms or the definitions. The source of these data is the first grade of knowledge and they require an emendation by the higher grades of knowledge (see Sect. 4.5). It is impossible to reduce these data to the rational principles, namely, those of the second grade of knowledge. Hence, there must be another procedure to construct the desired system, a procedure that is not a priori, and it requires an emendation of the data according to a priori, rational principles. We cannot derive these data from these principles, but the principles are used as a means to perceive these data intelligibly, namely, as finite modes of a comprehensive system. (6) Another, more popular consideration, is that the deductive method fits well mathematics and mathematical sciences (including mathematical logic) and, thus, it does not fit the special field of metaphysics, which is the philosophia prima, the first philosophy. For instance, Plato correctly understood that the method of mathematical sciences (dianoia) should not fit the method of dialectica. Mathematics allows, more precisely, obliges itself to accept prime, basic, or foundational sentences without any proof or clarification whereas first philosophy should justify each of its propositions and cannot accept them as a matter of fact or without proof and explanation. It appears that Spinoza, too, ascribes such a veridical status to his metaphysics, as he claims: “the necessity of things concerns metaphysics, the knowledge of which must always come first” (Letter 27, Curley I: 395). This necessity, which concerns metaphysics (namely, first philosophy), requires a cause or a reason because of which an individual thing exists and is known in this and not in that way. Metaphysically speaking, the existence and knowledge of any individual thing depends on the system as a whole. As long as the metaphysical reason of each axiom and defi-

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nition is unknown, there is no necessity in such a definition or an axiom, including in mathematics. (7) There are some cases in which Spinoza rather uses the term of deduction in describing his demonstrations, yet this term in such a use, is not an analysis or reduction (contrary to the case of a foundational model) but of relating, connecting, or synthesis. For instance, in Section 41 and note 15 of TdIE, “interaction,” “producing,” and “deduction” serve interchangeably. Section 91 of TdIE reads: “all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts” (Curley I: 38, all italics are mine). Which recalls 5p10d: “the Mind has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing some from others … And hence, so long do we have … the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the Body according to the order of the intellect” (Curley I: 601; all the italics are mine). Again, Spinoza interchanges “deducing,” “connecting,” and “ordering.” Our acquaintance with individual things is not an outcome of their explication, analysis, or deduction out of general or universal principles; it is not knowledge that has been deduced from common notions. It is rather the emendation of the data, whose empirical source is the first grade of knowledge, and the emendation takes place according to those a priori principles. (8) Our knowledge of two Attributes only implies also the blocking of the a priori way to know other Attributes. Only our empirical acquaintance with data that cannot be integrated into any of the two known Attributes, will lead us to detect another, unknown-yet Attribute (following the spirit of Letter 10). We will not infer or deduce such an Attribute from our empirical knowledge, but this knowledge will show us the way to detect it and to find the essence of such an Attribute. Without relying upon experience, our mind cannot discover new Attributes or to be sure that the two known Attributes are all the Attributes that there are. Our mind cannot deduce the number and essences of all the possible Attributes simply from the definition of the Attribute. In light of these eight considerations or reasons, we are not able to deduce the particulars, singulars, or individuals of Spinoza’s system from its rational principles, from its axioms and definitions. According to Spinoza, a metaphysical foundationaldeductive system is impossible. Such is not the desired system that he tried to construct.

5.2.2  A  re the Order and Connection of Things Mathematical-Deductive? As we have realized above, according to Spinoza, the desired cognitive system cannot be foundational-deductive. Nevertheless, what is it about the system that is reality as a whole (God, Nature, or Substance), independent of our knowing it? Can it

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be a foundational-deductive system? Were such a reality such a system, it could be mathematically enlightening for us. Such questions are essential as Spinoza’s philosophy demands the desired system to fully reflect the system of reality. In Spinoza’s terms, the system of reality is called “Nature’s Order as a Whole,” which is the absolutely total causal connection (following 2p7s). The order and connection of (individual) things is the order and connection of causes, which is the order and connection of reasons, namely, ideas (following 2p20d, referring to 2p7). The same total (infinite) order is expressed and embodied in each of the Attributes. But what about the system that is reality as it truly is, the reality as independent of our mind and cognition? Descartes was well acquainted with Galileo Galilei’s dictum that the Book of Nature is written in a mathematical language (Galilei 1842, p. 71). Descartes was convinced that, in general, mathematics and mathematical sciences reflect completely and adequately the structure of reality. He conceived reality as a system that is embodied or actualized perfectly according to a geometrical plan. What is mathematically written is what exists in reality, extra intellectum, namely, outside of our mind and independent of it. He saw all the differences between entities as quantitative-­enumerative, which are mind-independent, and not qualitative properties, which are clearly mind-dependent. They exist only because of our mind, namely, they are only intra intellectum. Sensual qualities do not reflect reality as it really is, as it is in itself, but only as it affects our senses. Extension, without which there is no external reality, is simply quantitative and by no means qualitative. All extended things are quantitatively distinguished, according to their number, measurements, geometrical figures, their places, and time as the measure of their endurance. Such is Descartes’s clear worldview in the “First Meditation” of his Meditations on the First Philosophy. The positions of these things and their movements are also measurable and quantitative and, hence, mathematically describable. Is this strictly Cartesian view acceptable by Spinoza? Surprisingly enough, by no means. Contrary to the received views, Spinoza’s philosophy is not Galilean in any sense and, according to him, the system of reality as a whole is not foundational-­ deductive at all. Did Spinoza accept the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as did Bacon and Descartes? In Letter 6, Spinoza distinguishes between the multitude’s conception of qualities and “pure notions” thus: … notions derived from ordinary usage, or which explain Nature, not as it is in itself, but as it is related to human sense perception, ought neither to be counted among the chief kinds, nor to be mixed (not to say confused) with pure notions, which explain Nature as it is in itself [ut in se est]. Of the latter kind are motion, rest, and their laws; of the former are visible, invisible, hot, cold, and as I will say at once, also fluid and solid, etc. (Curley I: 181)

Spinoza’s “pure notions” are not Descartes’s primary qualities. Indeed, from Letter 12 and from 1p15s1 we learn that time, number, and all measurable quantities (namely, discrete entities) are simply entia imaginationis, entities of the imagination, contrary to entia realia, real entities, which are mind-independent and pertain

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to reality as it truly, in itself, is.17 This view is greatly different from Descartes’s view of mathematical objects. In The Principles of Philosophy (Secs. 57 and 58), Descartes considers time and numbers as entia rationis, yet in these sections he discusses the abstractions (like the Scholastic universals) of these entities and not time and numbers as they really are. In contrast, according to Descartes, the non-­ abstract notion of duration and numbers, as attributes of the things themselves, are valid for the created things. Thus, they are not entia rationis. Even the abstract and universal time and numbers are not entia imaginationis, according to Descartes, whereas time and numbers in any sense are entia imaginationis according to Spinoza’s Letter 12! Note that entia imaginationis, unlike entia rationis (which are useful fictions, as we will see) distort any perception of reality. Section 87 of TdIE refers to errors, such as “that extension must be in a place, that it must be finite, that its parts must be really distinguished from one another, that is the first and only foundation of all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another” (Curley I: 37). All these errors are “completely opposed to the truth” (op. cit., p. 38). Such errors are typical of the first grade of knowledge, imaginatio. The true perception, that of the ratio, considers the differences among extended entities as modal only (following 1p15s). In concluding, Spinoza in fact does not accept most of the Cartesian “primary qualities” and considers them as distorting the perception of reality as it truly is, ut in se est. According to Spinoza, these excluded entities are not entia realia, and they are not even entia rationis but simply entia imaginationis. As auxiliary means of the imaginatio, these entities do not serve true knowledge at all but simply cause errors. Nevertheless, such an interpretation raises a striking difficulty. Mathematical calculus and the deductive method or system pertain to the ratio and they necessarily help us perceiving reality sub specie aeternitatis. If such is the case, why on earth have I argued above that the deductive system as a rational construction does not truly represent the system that is reality as a whole? I have not argued that the deductive method and system are entia imaginationis. They are entia rationis, that is, they help us perceive reality even though they are fictions (do not exist extra intellectum) that have no parallels in reality as it is in itself. There are major differences between these two kinds of entities: entia rationis are modes of thought that assist us in sorting, remembering, ordering, explaining, and conceiving more easily what we already know. Entia rationis are not true or false; they are simply cognitive tools which are useful for our true knowledge of reality. According to Spinoza, sortal terms are entia rationis.

 In Letter 6 Spinoza, relying upon Descartes and Bacon, writes: “all the tangible qualities depend only on motion, shape, and the remaining mechanical affections” (Curley I: 178). Nevertheless, it does not prove that Spinoza relates to these properties as primary qualities of things as they are in themselves. In fact, those secondary qualities depend one on another, and such are the entities of the imagination or of thought (entia imaginationis or entia rationis, all of which are mind-dependent). For instance, Spinoza claims explicitly that shape is not a real entity but merely an entity of thought (TdIE, Sec. 95 and Letter 83).

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Contrary to entia rationis, entia imaginationis, as products of the imagination, indicate the state of our body and the senses, when we are passive and perceive reality accidentally, temporally, and discretely. In constructing entia rationis, though fictions, our mind is not entirely passive and it becomes more active. Entia rationis help our mind in processing our acquaintance with reality. In this spirit, in the Appendix of Ethics 1 Spinoza mentions the contribution of mathematics to purge our mind of the teleological entia imaginationis. Mathematics provides us with a method of thinking that is exempt from any teleological concept. Mathematics purges our mind from such errors and from many other superstitions and prejudices. Spinoza relates superstitions and prejudices to the first kind of knowledge whereas mathematics is an efficient medication against them. In this spirit, Spinoza mentions geometry in the Preface to Ethics 3 (“I should undertake to treat men’s vices and absurdities in the Geometric style. … I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies” [Curley I: 492]) and in TP, Ch. 1, Sec. 4 (“To investigate the matters pertaining to this science [the political science] with the same freedom of spirit we’re accustomed to use in investigating Mathematical subjects, I took great pains not to laugh at human actions, or mourn them, or curse them, but only to understand them” [Curley II: 505]). The desired, chosen method is mathematical or, better as we will see, formally logical, whereas the desired system itself is not formal and its contents do not make a foundational-­deductive system. Entia rationis has no constitutional function in our knowledge. The function of mathematics and entia rationis in general is to remove entia imaginationis from our mind. It is a methodological function. It is a new conceptual construction in our mind (4p57s) that makes our mind ready to know reality truly. The deductive method plays a role in preventing our mind from being failed by prejudices, images, and fictions. Mathematical demonstrations are beyond doubt (Letter 56), but their force is only formal. They do not provide us with new knowledge or information about the world. They serve us methodologically only. They put an end to controversies (1app, Curley I: 445). Notwithstanding, such demonstrations do not serve as a source of new information about reality and real data. Mathematics and other entia rationis, as formal, are exempt from spatiotemporal distinctions or relations, which prevent our mind from knowing reality as it truly is. As I interpret it, according to Spinoza, mathematics functions as what we consider now as a formal logic. Mathematical demonstrations are in fact related to formal validity. Spinoza and his contemporaries were not aware of the independence and priority of formal logics to mathematics. They did not make a distinction between these two fields. In fact, they considered mathematics (as it is embodied as Euclidean geometry) as a paradigm-case of valid logical thinking. It should be emphasized that Spinoza does not choose mathematics to serve as the desired method for knowing reality. In TdIE, Spinoza warns the reader not to mistake intellectual order for a geometrical order. In Sec. 95, he warn not to mix “figures and other entia rationis” with entia Physica et realia (Curley I: 39). When entia realia are concerned, their essences are prior to their properties (“the

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properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are not known”), but when entia rationis, such as the mathematical entities, are concerned, this order does not make any difference. The priority of the essence to the properties is the order of real things, which is reflected in the order of the intellect. Hence, the order of the intellect is not a geometrical or mathematical order. In our terms, the order of the intellect is not a formal logical order. The major reasons why, according to Spinoza, reality is not constructed in the image of the foundational-deductive model are as follows: (1) Reality does not consist of discrete entities. Despite his sympathy for the atomists (Letter 56, Curley II: 423), Spinoza actually rejects atomism, together with its influence on Galileo and Descartes, for atomism is not a correct worldview. A mathematical or atomist worldview would break reality into discrete parts and prevent its knowledge as a coherent system. The mathematics that was known to Spinoza did not construct a necessary continuity. Spinoza could not know the infinitesimal calculus, which Leibniz and Newton discovered. Discrete parts are like independent substances, which contradict Spinoza’s notion of one, absolute Substance. The epistemological ambition to organize multiplicity into a one, absolutely total system is incompatible with the foundational-­deductive model. Even the infinitesimal calculus is not exempt from notions such as limit, number, and measure that, according to Spinoza, are auxiliary tools for the imagination (Letter 12) and are not real entities. Even the modern Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell would not satisfy Spinoza, for its analytical mathematics, which was aimed to be reduced to formal logics, was considered by him as made of “eternal truths” (to quote again Letter 10), tautologies in our terms, which cannot represent the order of the intellect, which reflects the intelligible order of reality as it really is, as it is in itself. The mathematics of Principia Mathematica is not extra intellectum. Moreover, any mathematics that cannot dispense with the notions of number and measured quantity does not reflect the system of reality. (2) A cause is a sufficient condition for the effect and, thus, the cause is ontologically prior to the effect. The same holds true for the Attribute and its finite modes—it is ontologically prior to them. Nevertheless, taking part in the network, holistic system, the Attribute depends, in a secondary dependence, on its finite modes, whereas the primary dependence is of the modes on the Attribute. The unity of natura naturans (all the Attributes constitute the absolutely infinite, absolutely total, Substance as united) is prior to the multiplicity of the modes (natura naturata); nevertheless, again, the Attribute depends, in a secondary dependence, on its modes. The Attributes-Substance unity is prior to the modes, but the dependence of the Attribute on its modes is a necessary result of being the whole of reality a network, a coherent system and not a foundational, deductive, or linear one. Hence, the Attribute depends on each of its modes. Were even one of them missing, the whole reality could not be considered as absolutely total (infinite), for in such an absurd case, it would have been lacking this particular mode. As Letter 4 “cheerfully acknowledges”: “if one part of

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matter were annihilated, the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same time” (Curley I: 172). As an absolute total, the desired system needs all of its modes, all of the modal possibilities or “variations.” Without any of its modes, the Attribute and, as a consequence, Substance, would have been different, which is absolutely impossible according to Spinoza (following 1p33d: “if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different, then God’s nature could also have been other than it is now … which is absurd. So things could have been produced in no other way and no other order” [Curley I: 436]). It is the absolutely adequate knowledge, the knowledge of the essences of all individual things—scientia intuitiva—within the absolutely total causal chain, which is causa sui, namely, Substance that will discover the secondary dependence of the Attribute on each of its finite modes. Scientia intuitiva discovers the singularity of each individual thing and its necessity and eternity as well. Singularity is explicit against the background of reality as a whole. In contrast, the mathematical-deductive system, as it was known to Spinoza and his contemporaries, cannot dispense with its linear nature, which maintains only the dependence of each of the theorem on the basic, primary sentences, on the foundations of the deductive-foundational system. The mathematical-deductive “cause” conditions the effects in a linear way whereas Spinoza’s view of reality as a whole follows the network system of coherence, as Letter 32, for example, describes it. The whole of reality, namely, God, Substance, or Nature, as perceived as an Attribute by the infinite intellect, conditions first the particulars (the finite modes of an Attribute, which are variations or differentiations of it) but, secondary, this whole depends upon each of these particulars, variations, or differentiations. Indeed, there is no cause (any cause, even causa sui) that is not dependent on its effects,18 equally as there is no unity without its distinctions or particulars, or equally as there is no natura naturans without natura naturata. In concluding, the mathematical-­ deductive system as known to Spinoza and his contemporaries, and which was strictly foundational and linear, cannot represent reality as it really is, ut in se est. No such a system can provide us with an adequate description of reality. Finally, an adequate knowledge of the data, given in reality, emends them and, for it, there is no self-evident basis (“the foundations”) that is unchangeable or unconfirmable within the process of knowledge from the beginning to the end. (3) Contrary to the mathematical-deductive order, the metaphysical one puts the essences before the properties in the ontological and epistemological priority. This is the ontological and epistemological order that the TdIE warns us not to change. This order is exempt from abstractions, which are intra intellectum and not extra intellectum, namely, these abstractions are fictions that are not valid  Although it is expected to consider causality as linear, one should not ignore the secondary dependence of the effects on the cause. A non-linear worldview, such as some of the quantum theory interpretations (for instance, that by Yakir Aharonov and his co-authors), refer to backward causation, from the future to the present and the past.

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for reality ut in se est (TdIE, Sec. 93). The correct order is valid for the concrete particulars (TdIE, Secs. 75, 76, and 93) as finite modes of the systematic whole (TdIE, Sec. 41) of reality (God-Substance-Nature). In fact, the linear model of the mathematical-deductive system, which is indifferent to the priority in the order of essence and its property, “overturns the connection of the intellect, which ought to reproduce the connection of Nature, and we completely miss our goal” (Curley I: 39). This warning does not prevent Spinoza from using various mathematical examples (for instance, TdIE, Sec. 79; 1p17s; 2p8s; 2p49s; 3pref; 4p18s; 4p57s; Letter 21, Curley I: 378; Letter 76, Curley II: 475; and TPT, note 6, Curley II: 156), which serves him for formally logical matters.19 Mathematical deduction is about numbers, figures, or forms that are entia rationis, not entia realia. The order of the desired system and the order of causes (in the immanent causal chain) begin with essences and end with properties. Such is not a mathematical-deductive order. The necessary connections that constitute the causal immanent chain, which is completely reflected in the desired system, are not compatible with a measured quantity, which rests upon discrete parts, which are really distinct from one another. The essence of the individual thing, the essence which is a link in the causal immanent chain, is not compatible with isolated, fragmented, discrete individual entities. Contrary to the mathematical-deductive order, the real order of things, the real causal chain, rests upon the dependence of the causal chain as a whole on each of its links. Hence, the order and connection of things is not the geometrical order. Contrary to the view of many of Spinoza’s interpreters,20 Spinoza’s desired system follows the model of coherence and this system is a network one, not a linear one. According to Spinoza, the “book of Nature” is not written in a mathematical language, even though mathematics prepares our mind, when purged of prejudices and other fictions, to perceive reality as it truly is.

 Like Spinoza, Aristotle refers to mathematical examples, which he, contrary to the skeptics, such as Sextus Epiricus, also considered beyond any doubt (see, for instance, Aristotle’s Physics, Part II, Ch. 9, 2000a17; cf. Spinoza’s Letter 56, Curley II: 422: “There are a great many people who are such lovers of contradiction that they have mocked geometrical demonstrations themselves”). 20  Such as Hubbeling 1967, pp. 14, 38–41, 57–58, and 80–84. Hubbeling referred to the quantitative-mathematical structure of the world and the thought as well. It is quite plausible to refute such an interpretation while relying upon Letter 12 and 1p15s. Joachim refers to the geometrical “coherence,” the order and connection of things, and the causal connection (Joachim 1964, pp. 231–232). Cf. Harris 1973, pp.  17–19. McKeon equated deduction and causation (McKeon 1930, pp. 178–179). Wilhelm Windelband described Spinoza’s philosophy as a “mathematical pantheism” (Windelband 1919, p. 215). Consider also Steenbakkers 2009. 19

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5.2.2.1  T  he Order of Nature Is not Written in a Mathematical Language—A Note on Spinoza and Galileo Spinoza’s view as it appears in TdIE, Sec. 95 in his distinction between (a) figures and other entia rationis, existing only in the mind, and (b) real beings, existing outside of the mind and independently of it; this view is incompatible with Galileo’s view of physical bodies or real entities as geometrical figures (Galilei 1967, pp. 207 ff.; cf. Burtt 1967, p. 68: “physical bodies … are always geometrical figures”). It is a received view, 21 wrong I deem, that Spinoza follows Galileo and Descartes in this matter; in fact, he strongly disagrees with them. Well known is Galileo’s view that the book of nature (or the universe) is written in a mathematical language whose letters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which human beings cannot understand even one word in this language and hence they stumble on their way in darkness (Galilei 1842, vol. 4, p. 171, and in other writings by him). To understand better Galileo’s position in this question, it is advisable to follow Alexander Koyré’s analysis of Galileo’s view (Koyré 1978, pp.  108–109 and 202–209). Galileo is non-Aristotelian in his approach to the study of nature; in fact, he is Platonic. The Platonic Galileo and Descartes as well attempted to make a mathematization of nature. Galileo thought that nature was the realm of measure and quantity and that phenomena existed in time, which is not a matter of imagination but of reality. Koyré believed that the notion of time in Galileo’s physics functions like real causation in Descartes’s philosophy (op. cit., p. 109). If such is the case, the disagreement between Spinoza and Galileo is greater, for Spinoza claims: “no one doubts but that we also imagine time, viz. from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly, or more quickly, or with the same speed” (Curley I: 480). This sounds very much against Galileo’s notion of time and causality. The context of this scholium is that while reason perceives things as

 Recently Piet Steenbakkers has argued that Galileo’s idea that nature is a book written in the language of mathematics whose characters are geometrical or arithmetical figures, left a deep impression on the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. He emphasizes that “the radiation of mathematics affected every intellectual activity that had scientific aspirations—theology included” (Steenbakkers 2009, p. 52). To be more specific, Steenbakkers aims at the ontological proof of the existence of God that “evidently considered suitable case for mathematization, procedure to which its independence of any empirical prerequisites certainly contributed” (ibid., p. 52). He believes that this proof “became the keystone of the construction of rationalist philosophical system: it is indispensable for an a priori demonstration of the correspondence between thought and reality” (ibid.). One of the central points in my research is that Spinoza was not a rationalist, as empirical data plays an indispensable role in his philosophy. He is not an Eleatic either, and the correspondence between thought and external reality is safeguarded by some quite other means— the unity of the Attributes. The main point is that, according to my interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy, Steenbakker’s following conclusion is entirely groundless: “the application of the ordo geometricus finds its ultimate justification in Spinoza’s concept of God. The rational, geometrical form matches the systematic arrangement of nature and is thus its appropriate expository mode. This, then, constitutes an important link between form and philosophical method, touching a crucial methodological issue, namely the guarantee that reality can be known” (Steenbakkers 2009, p. 53).

21

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necessary, imagination perceives them as contingent (2p44c1). As I have argued above, time, as a fragmenting factor, functions in the transient causal chain. Causality, which is necessary, and temporality, which is contingent, are not compatible in Spinoza’s philosophy whereas time and causality are strictly compatible in Galileo’s physics. Adding to this Spinoza’s view of imaginary quantity, which is finite and measurable (Letter 12 and 1p15s), and we are allowed to conclude that Spinoza greatly disagrees with Galileo’s conception of the mathematical order and its validity insofar as nature is concerned. Contrary to most of the interpreters, I am convinced that according to Spinoza the order of things or causes is not mathematical-deductive, and that the book of Nature, as Spinoza reads it, is not written in mathematical language whose letters are, as it were, geometrical figures.22

5.2.3  W  hat Is the Meaning of “Ethics Demonstrated in the Geometrical Order”? What we have just said appears not to be compatible with the title of the Ethics as “Demonstrated in the Geometrical Order.” The nagging question is: What is the relation between the form in which the Ethics is written and its content? This question should bother each of Spinoza’s interpreters and readers. Some argue that this kind of demonstration is simply external to the content and does not indicate anything significant about it. For instance, Gebhardt attempted to expose the text with no such geometric form (Gebhardt 1925). Wolfson (vol. I, pp. 54–56; cf. De Lucca 1968) and Snow (1923) argued that this external shell has only a rhetoric function or a didactic one. Such interpretations are quite problematic for the form of the Ethics is a matter of demonstration and not simply of an exposition. Spinoza devoted much of his energy and time to the demonstrations in this book, and it is a dubious idea to say that the form of this book is simply external, didactic, rhetoric, and so on. Other interpreters (such as Hubbeling 1967; Parkinson 1954; Allison 1975) have argued that the form in which the Ethics is written—in the fashion of geometry, more geometrico—is essential for understanding this book. Some have argued that the Ethics as a whole is the product of the second grade of knowledge, reason, and hence it naturally relies on the deductive model of reasoning. Selsam (1935) thought that this form of demonstration bears an aesthetical meaning, which affects theory and praxis alike. Nevertheless, Spinoza, unlike Kant, does not associate ethics with aesthetics. Such a view is Pythagorean rather than a Spinozistic one, for beauty, according to 1app, is an entity of the imagination and not a real entity and it pertains to prejudices only (cf. Letter 54 [Curley II: 414: “Beauty … is not so much a quality

 If such is the case, Collingwood was wrong in arguing that Spinoza fully accepted Galileo’s physics, even though he attempted to overcome the philosophical dualism that lies at its basis (Collingwood 1964, p. 106).

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of the object one sees as an effect of the object on him who sees it”]). Spinoza attempts at removing such entities from our mind. I do not accept any of these interpretations. Spinoza took quite seriously the structure of his work and devoted much energy in constructing it meticulously. The Ethics’s more geometrico is not lip service. It is a commitment and obligation (see, for instance, the beginning and end of 4p18s). On the other hand, as I have shown above, no particular content can be deductively derived from the definition of God or Nature, Attribute or Substance. It has been the Ethics’s logical validity that has concerned philosophers and logicians since Spinoza’s time and until today. George Boole devoted a special chapter to the question of the logical validity of the first part of the Ethics, and his answer was in the negative (Boole 1854 [1951], pp. 185–218). In contrast, Joel I. Friedman’s formalization showed that this part of the Ethics is logically valid (Friedman 1978, pp. 74–79; cf. Mark 1975 and Jarrett 1978). Friedman used modern set-theoretical logical tools of which Boole could not dream (Friedman considered Spinoza as a precursor of the transfinite set-theory!). Friedman showed that Spinoza’s philosophy is logically valid even though, unlike Euclid’s Elements, it is not perfectly logically powerful. He refers the reader to a full formalization of Ethics 1, which has not been published so far.23 Nevertheless, there are still interpreters who argue that there are logically invalid arguments in the Ethics (such as Hooker 1980 and Bennett 1984, pp. 25–28). Bennett is perfectly right in concluding that despite these logical flaws, the Ethics’s more geometrico means validity according formal logics. Nevertheless, I disagree with some of the interpreters, though not about logical matters but about the content of their interpretations. When one interprets Spinoza differently from them, the formal validity of his argument becomes apparent. Moreover, those who ignore the network argumentation of the Ethics and judge it only from the aspect of its so-called linearity, can easily miss its validity even from a formally logical viewpoint. Some later theorems of the Ethics justify and explicate the former propositions, even the definitions and axioms. Even if one can show that the Ethics as a whole is formally logically valid, this as such does not show that the content of this masterpiece is justified and well demonstrated. Moreover, the foundational-deductive model of the formally logical validity is not the model according to which the content of this book stands. The necessary connections that are logically valid is indifferent to the content of Spinoza’s philosophy. This content is constructed according to quite a different model—that of the coherence of the network, which is a non-linear system. This indifference is explicitly expressed in Letter 15 (Curley I: 215) concerning Spinoza’s representation of Descartes’s Principles. It is clear enough that the more geometrico demonstrations that Spinoza added to Descartes’s text are independent of the content of it and, hence, indifferent to it, for in Letter 13 Spinoza expresses his criticism of the content of this book (“I did not acknowledge all the opinions contained in this treatise as my own, since I had written many things in it which

23

 “Formalization of Spinoza’s Ethics, Part I (1975).”

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were the very opposite of what I held” [Curley I: 207]). From this I infer, returning to the Ethics’s more geometrico, that the Ethics’s demonstrative strength and validity according to the demands of what we call today formal, or mathematical, logics are simply and only necessary conditions for its truth! Validity according to formal logics is not sufficient for the truth claim of the book. This validity does not confirm the content. Formal logical validity is a necessary condition for the constructing of the desired system as a veridical or true system but not a sufficient condition for doing so. As metaphysical, the desired system has to relate to our mundane reality, to the data of our experientia vaga and its radical instability and, most importantly, to the emendation of these data according to ratio’s a priori principles. The desired system also requires a perfect compatibility of the theory and praxis. The content of the Ethics is aimed at changing our attitude toward ourselves and Nature and to render us happy. No formal logical validity can provide us with all this. Formal logical validity, which Spinoza and his contemporaries called more geometrico (for Euclidean geometry is an excellent paradigm-case of a valid logical reasoning), leaves us with (following Letter 10) “eternal truths” (or, in our terms, analytical propositions) and, hence, cannot provide us with new knowledge. Spinoza is one of those philosophers who do not mistake formal system for a metaphysical one. Formal logic, at least according to Spinoza, is not a source of metaphysics. Moreover, a formal system could not be called “Ethics.” As formal, it does not relate to the reality in which we live. Such a system cannot redeem us from our misery and render us happy. Of course, formal logic pertain to the formal aspect of the second grade of knowledge, but it does not deal with any content. A formal system has nothing to say about the common properties of real things. The kinship between formal logics and ratio does not imply that the desired system is a foundational-deductive one. Ordine geometrico is incompatible with perceiving all things “at a glance” (4app, which is exempt from the ordine geometrico of the rest of the book). Deducing one proposition from the other is incompatible with perceiving them at a glance, whereas perceiving them at a glance is what a system of coherence provides us with. Undoubtedly, the Ethics does not deduce any particular item from its definitions and the axioms. 1def2 of “finite in its own kind” refers to bodies and thoughts, which are not deduced from any of the Ethics’s definitions or axiom. Bodies and thoughts are data empirically given. 2a5 says this in so many words: “We neither feel nor perceive any singular things … except bodies and modes of thinking” (Curley I: 448). The postulates after 2p13 are about the bodies, and, of course, none of these postulates can be deduced from the definitions and the axioms of Ethics 2 or 1. Moreover, the definition of mode is not, of course, deduced from the definitions of Substance or of the Attribute. The reason is simple—there is no way to deduce individuals from the general definitions, axioms, and postulates of the Ethics, and there is no way to render any axiom into a theorem, which is deduced from an axiom, definition, or postulate. As late as 1p25c, Spinoza identifies the finite things in their own kind as the modes of an Attribute or as the affections of the Substance. The identification of the empirical data is carried out by the process of emendation. The true identification

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makes us realize that nobody can affect any thought and vice versa. It helps us distinguish between the modes of two Attributes. The correct identification requires the emendation of the empirical data and cannot rely upon any a priori source of individuation (which is impossible according to Spinoza). This correction is an outcome of a synthesis, not of any analysis. Furthermore, from the definition of the mode we are incapable of deducing what is the immediate or mediate infinite mode in any of the Attributes. No wonder, then, that interpreters vary about these questions. As common, general properties, these infinite modes can be deduced from the definition of a particular Attributes. Thus, the fundamental property of the Attribute of Thought is the infinite intellect whereas the fundamental property of Extension is movement and rest. Nevertheless, as essences, there is no way to deduce these modes from the definition of any Attribute. Each Attribute is an efficient cause of its modes, and it is absurd to think about Thought without an intellectual activity.24 Equally, any activity of Extension is a movement. Nothing finite can be deduced from something infinite alone: “anything in any attribute of God … follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the attribute itself, it must necessarily be infinite” (1p21d; Curley I: 429–430). It is simply impossible to deduce any finite mode from the knowledge of any Attribute as infinite. Hence, 1p28d reads: “what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite (by 1p21). It had, therefore, to follow either from God or from an attribute of God insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode” (Curley I: 432). Such is the case not because Spinoza’s philosophy fails to fulfil the vain ambition of a so-called “mathematical-­deductive pantheism” but because it is, according to Spinoza’s philosophy, that such an ambition must fail from the outset. It is the analytical-a posteriori procedure that has to link finite modes with the absolutely infinite being which is God, not the synthetic-a priori one, proceeding from effects to their cause thus: “our Mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect” (5p40s; Curley I: 615). From the finite entities, as they are perceived sub specie aeternitatis in the supreme grade of knowledge, which perceives the eternal essences of all individual things, we proceed further to the knowledge of the particular essence of an infinite mode, including all its finite modes. Such is the analytic-a posteriori way of knowledge, from the eternal effects to the total (infinite) mode, and from it to the unconditioned infinite Attribute. From such unconditioned infinite entities, we proceed finally to the absolutely infinite entity, which is Substance-­ God-­Nature. By no means can we proceed in the reverse direction, from the absolutely infinite entities (from God’s essence), to the unconditioned infinite entities (as essences), and from them to the conditioned infinite entities (as essences, which are  Which is not personalized. Intellectual activity is a causal power that is total and is valid for any thought as a finite mode, for all that exists or is active is intelligible. Any causal power of existence and activity is intelligible.

24

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the immediate and mediate infinite modes), and end with finite modes as the essences if individual things. Such a procedure of knowledge is definitely impossible according to Spinoza, impossible for the infinite intellect and impossible for our finite intellect as well. The problem that Spinoza’s philosophy has to challenge is not how to individuate finite modes from the definitions of Attributes and Substance, but to identify “finite things” with “finite modes” and to combine these modes together in order to construct a unified total system, unifying all the finite modes into a total causal chain. It is the problem of how to integrate all the bodies into a complete coherent system, and the same is true with all the thoughts into another such a system. Finally, the aim is to recognize that these two systems are one and the same Substance, the absolutely infinite being. In this way, we can prevent ourselves from being misled by an episodic worldview, which is the product of our imagination and in which the particulars are measurable quantities, subject to mathematics, and which is described, in fact, in 1p15s. A meticulous examination of the Ethics’s formal demonstration ends in an interesting result: at least some of the definitions and the axioms are not self-evident and their soundness is not beyond question. There are axioms that are restricted and conditioned in what follows later in the text. What meets the eye as a linear demonstration will be discovered not to be really so. A most beautiful and interesting example is that of 4a1—“There is no singular thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the firsts can be destroyed” (Curley I: 547)—which is radically restricted in 5p37s: “4a1 concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place. I believe no one doubts this” (Curley I: 613). I really wonder why so many interpreters ignore this amazing reservation. 4a1 refers to a Hobbesian worldview in which each human being is a wolf-like enemy to other human beings. Such a worldview is a product of the first grade of knowledge, whereas in Ethics 5, Spinoza describes quite a different worldview, that of the supreme grade of knowledge, according to which the intellectual love of God is the focus. As we shall see, the worldview of the supreme grade of knowledge, in which temporality and death have no dominion, is the complete emendation of the imaginatio’s worldview, which is enslaved to temporality. Hence, no contradiction comes up between 4a1 and 5p37, for each of them refers to a radically different worldview. Indeed, Ethics 4 mainly discusses the psychical state of human beings in which they are enslaved to their passions and do not submit to the intellectual love of God, in which they love each other. In order to depict the worldview of the first grade of knowledge, Spinoza needs to adopt another false or mistaken assumption, such as 2a1: “The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist” (Curley I: 447). This is the way in which imaginatio perceives finite beings such as human beings, as contingent and not as necessary, but such is not the way of the supreme grade of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, which perceives each thing, including each human being, as necessary, real, and eternal. 2a1 and 4a1 are indispensable to describe the contingency that characterizes the “Common Order of

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Nature,” which is the mistaken worldview of the first grade of knowledge and which requires an emendation, which the supreme grade of knowledge completes. In the end, we look quite differently at the given data with which we began, and this difference implies a reservation of the former assumptions. In any event, in the Ethics, we never begin an argumentation with foundations that are not revised, sometimes radically, in what follows. Other examples of that are, for instance, 2p10c,s in which Spinoza clarifies the definition of essence, 2def2, which thus is not self-clear or self-evident. In what follows, he explicates the reasons for accepting this definition. In 2p44d, Spinoza clarifies 1a6 (“A true idea must agree with its object”) in claiming that the true knowledge of things is to know them not as contingent but as necessary. This is a most important clarification of truth according to 1a6, which is not clear enough. There are more examples of later propositions that shed light on the former ones and clarify them: 3p57d reduces the affects to three basic ones, and even reduces them to two; in 1p33s1 Spinoza does not distinguish between possible and contingent whereas, later, in 4d3 and 4d4 he makes such a distinction, for it is required in making a distinction between the strength of the affects of the possible and of the contingent; in 4p37d, the kinship between the mind’s essence or the conatus and cognition, which was implied before in the text but only now does it become explicated and is explained sufficiently and, furthermore, in this demonstration there is clarification and elaboration of what 2p11 implies. Many references are, in fact, clarifications, explanations, and even interpretations of what appears before in the text. Spinoza always sheds new light on the prior propositions by the later ones. It is, in fact, a network system, not a linear one, despite what meets the eye. The Ethics’s linearity is simply an appearance or the presence of the formally logical demonstration or validation. No wonder, then, that Spinoza writes about 5a2 that “this axiom is evident from 3p7” (Curley I: 597), as if this axiom were a theorem and not an axiom! In 3po1 (which he calls also “an axiom”), he says: “This postulate rests on 2po1 and lemmas 5 and 7 after 2p13.” In this way, the status of a primary proposition, such as a postulate, is treated as if it were a theorem. This is another proof that a network system rather than linearity suits well the text of the Ethics. Spinoza’s Letters teach us that the final versions of the definitions were formed only after Spinoza had completed the penultimate version of the text as a whole. Hence, he did not use them as self-evident or self-clear starting points that their understanding is independent of the text as a whole. In such a manner, in Letter 9 (probably that of March 1663) and in Letter 12 (that of 20 April 1663) appear some passages that will be integrated as they are in 1p15s and in which Spinoza mentions definitions that will later change in the Ethics (especially the third definition, which is mentioned in Curley I: 195 and which is valid for the Attribute and Substance alike, whereas in the Ethics there is a sharper distinction between the Attribute and Substance). In the year 1663 and even earlier, Spinoza used tentative definitions that he would later use in the Ethics after modifications and improvements. These definitions served him as general notions or knowledge that would be crystallized, restricted, and changed together with the elaboration of his philosophy. They served

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him as regulating principles. Hence, the status of the axioms and the definitions was not fixed from the outset; they were subject to revisions as long as Spinoza’s philosophy was in process. The understanding of these definitions and axioms depends on the text as a whole. In concluding, the text of the Ethics does not construct a foundational-deductive system, which is a linear system. The Ethics is a network. “Ethics Demonstrated in the Geometrical Order” means Ethics that is formally-logically valid.

5.3  T  he Influence of Reason on Passions and Akrasia—The Duality of Theory and Praxis So far, we have mentioned the indispensable contribution of reason to construct the desired system and to know for knowing reality adequately and beyond any doubt. Reason plays a vital role in our valid argumentations. Nevertheless, reason has some limitations that prevent it from being a perfect kind of knowledge, otherwise there would be no need for a higher grade of knowledge, the supreme one. On such limitations, Spinoza writes: I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things I have called intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind (see 2p40s2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind. For although I have shown generally in Part 1 that all things (and consequently the human Mind also) depend on God both for their essence and their existence, nevertheless, that demonstration, though legitimate and put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not affect our Mind as much as when this is inferred from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God. (5p36c,s; Curley I: 613; all italics are mine)

The fifth part of the Ethics, discussing human freedom and supreme happiness, i.e., blessedness or beatitude, ascribes this function to scientia intuitiva only because this supreme grade of knowledge refers to the individuality of each one of us and is not only general or universal as ratio is. Thus, scientia intuitiva affects our mind more effectively than ratio. The supreme grade of knowledge shows concretely that a particular individual, a singular human being, depends in his or her essence and existence on God and thus this particular being, though finite, is real, necessary, and eternal, and thus no death can overcome him or her, and he or she is much more liberated from passions (a complete liberation is impossible for us, as 4p4c reads). Each individual human being takes a vital part in the eternal and necessary power of God, but only scientia intuitiva can reveal this in particular and not only in general. As we take part in this power, we are most alive and vital, we fully acknowledge our strength and capability, and thus we know how blessed and happy we are in fact. Spinoza, well acquainted with human psychology, knew quite well the pathological mental phenomenon called akrasia (in ancient Greek, “weakness” or

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“incontinence,” misleadingly translated as “weakness of the will”).25 Akrasia is a mental state in which the akratic persons know clearly that the akratic actions are very bad for them, strongly decide never to perform such actions, hate and despise themselves for doing them, and want candidly not to perform them again, and yet, when such an opportunity occurs, they do not resist the strong temptation and commit these undesirable acts. Akrasia has created a real problem for philosophers, since the days of Plato and Aristotle, and it still troubles philosophers at present.26 There are serious difficulties in understanding and explaining such an intricate mental state. Because Spinoza identifies the will and the intellect, akrasia appears to make a special difficulty for him. Spinoza attempted to solve this problem by relying upon the difference between ratio and scientia intuitiva, between the general or universal knowledge and the fully particularized knowledge of individual things as finite modes of God. Spinoza occasionally mentions the impotence of ratio to some extent in constraining passions and commanding them (4p17s; 4pre; 3p2s; 4p4c; 4p35s; 5pre; and more). Ratio is a universal knowledge and its objects are general, common properties of all things and not their essences. Of course, these properties have some affect on our passions and active emotions as well (3p56s; 5p20s). Such an influence is not complete. The general claims of ratio cannot reveal the eternity and necessity of any individual human being as such. Hence, ratio is not sufficient to eradicate our fear of death. Thanks to scientia intuitiva, the free person has almost no fear of death (4p67). Only he or she who knows himself or herself as God, not as infinite, but as finite (as a finite mode that the Nature as a whole is modified in it, too), as this or that human being enjoys freedom to the maximal possible extent from passions, including the fear of death. Such a knowledge must be of the supreme grade. He or she who can know himself or herself in this way is only the wise, whose cognitive state is in the supreme grade of knowledge. Only in this grade of knowledge, can one recognize oneself as an indispensable link in the absolutely infinite (absolutely total) causal chain, which is God-Nature-Substance. On these grounds, Spinoza suggests a convincing explanation of akrasia as follows: if our cognitive state is in the grade of ratio, we know only in general, at the level of principles only, that the akratic action is assumed to be harmful for us, most dangerous for our health in the short and the long run as well (for instance, “The Surgeon General warns you that smoking is very dangerous”). It is obvious that this knowledge and the Surgeon General’s warning are simply general, and are not directed to a particular individual. The strong temptation to smoke and the desire to do so challenge this general warning. In such a way, the akratic person succumbs to the obsessive belief that despite the general rule he or she is exceptional! The damage will not happen to him or her. This example makes a fine solution to the problem of akrasia, especially because Spinoza assumes that will and intellect are one and  For a different, later discussion of akrasia in Spinoza’s philosophy, consider Garver 2018, pp. 141–162. 26  I have devoted a special paper to discuss this problem, and have suggested an original solution for it. See Gilead 1999. 25

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the same. This means that if the akratic strongly believes that smoking is good, or at least causes no harm but only joy and pleasure, he or she wants and decides to smoke in spite of the general rule that smoking is harmful. For the akratic, there are exceptions to this rule or imperative. In the second grade of knowledge, our intellect assumes that smoking is bad for us only in general, but this does not mean that in particular it is bad for us at all and even maybe it is good for us because of the pleasure and relief it brings. In any event, knowledge in the second grade, as ratio, is not sufficient for us to oppose the akratic action in such a way that we will efficiently resist the temptation. While his or her cognition is only in the second grade of knowledge, the akratic person will say to himself or herself: Smoking is good for me, for it does not harm me as an individual and, thus, the Surgeon General’s warning is not valid in my case. In this way, based on the distinction between imaginatio and ratio, one wants and decides to keep on smoking despite the general knowledge warning all of us against it. There are thus strong reasons for the akratic action, such as smoking, even though the akratic persons are well aware of the Surgeon General’s warning. Even while performing the akratic action, we may admit that the Surgeon General is still, in general, right. Thus one sees before him or her the laudable aim, e.g., to avoid smoking, and praise it, yet one decides, because of his or her state of cognition, not to follow it. In concluding, akratic action is intelligible, explainable, and certainly possible on the basis of the distinction between ratio and scientia intuitiva. As the supreme grade of knowledge, scientia intuitiva is more powerful against the passions than ratio is. While in the second grade of knowledge, no person is acquainted with his or her full singularity, with his or her singular place in the absolutely infinite causal chain, which is God-Nature-Substance. Ratio provides us only with a rule to get such a concrete knowledge but not this knowledge as such. While in the grade of ratio, one has not the knowledge of his or her singular essence. The first kind of knowledge, imaginatio, is the source of our passions, which cannot pertain to what is really common to human beings. Ratio, in contrast, provides us with the knowledge of such common properties but is incapable of revealing on the basis of them the individual differences between human beings, differences that, unlike in imaginatio, are not involved with conflicts and instability. Although ratio is not influenced by the passions, it tends to ignore the differences between human beings (as if their minds were one mind and their bodies one body [4p18s])27 and especially the singularity  Such is the typical way of ratio to treat human beings: “we can of none more excellent than those that agree entirely with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one. To man, then, there is nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the Minds and Bodies of all would compose, as it were, one Mind and one Body; that all should strive together, as far as they can, to preserve their beings; and that all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all” (Curley I: 556; the italics are mine). This view by Spinoza naturally invites a reservation. A political or social association that is so harmonious may sound Utopian, contrary to his declared intention (PT, Ch. 1, Sec. 1). Moreover, for a modern reader, there is no way of ignoring the Fascist tone of such a view (concerning “one mind, one body”). Furthermore, as Berlin, defending a “humanist pluralism,” mentioned, it is quite

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of each one of them. This shows ratio’s incapability in overcoming the passions completely, as long as the passions express also the singular differences of human beings (“men are affected differently by one and the same object … and to that extent, disagree in nature” [4p33d; Curley I: 562]), however distortedly and erroneously. Because ratio does not interfere with the realm of individuality or singularity, it does not have complete command over our passions and there is an unbridgeable gap between the theory and praxis involved in it. The rules and moral imperatives of ratio cannot completely challenge the conflicts and conflictual differences between human beings owing to their enslavement to imaginatio. The paradigm-case of the gap between ratio’s theory and praxis is the mental and behavioral phenomenon of akrasia. Here is a fine description of it: Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call Bondage. For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune, in whose power he so greatly is that often, though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the worse. (4pref; Curley I: 543; my italics). 28

This does not restrict at all the free rational judgement and decision of the wise person (4p70d). Even though ratio’s judgement is universal, it is left to the discretion of each wise person subject, unlike prejudice and “public opinion,” to his or her freedom and independence (4p73, TPT, Ch. 20, Curley II: 346; PT, Ch. 2, Secs. 10–11, and Ch. 3, Secs. 3 and 8). Ratio puts a universal end to all human beings, which is their supreme good. Once people accept this end, which is in their common interest, there are no conflicts among them, conflicts that are produced by our imagination and fictions. The duality of praxis and theory is typical also of the first grade of knowledge. Although its cognitive basis is erratic, this kind of knowledge can serve rational, good ends. For instance, the morality that the prophets preached is in the lowest dangerous to look for a harmonious system of values that ignores the contrary values (Berlin 1966, for instance, p.  158, and many more comments). Pierre Bayle ridiculed Spinoza’s harmonistic view, as it were (Bayle 1965, p.  312). Spinoza’s way of treating antagonism based upon the approach that “minds . . . are conquered not by arms, but by love and nobility” (4app11; Curley 589). An honest and brilliant scholarly study of the behavior both of animals and human beings clearly shows that wars and quarrels damage humanity in every case whereas cooperation contributes greatly to our welfare and security (see, for instance, Montagu 1976, Ch. 7). This is strictly compatible with Spinoza’s harmonious approach in 4app11–16 (Curley I: 589–590). I am a great believer in such an approach. Spinoza’s approach in considering all quarrels, wrong-doings, suspicions, and enmities that arise “from love for a thing which no one can really fully possess” (5p20s; Curley I: 606), that rational ways of life can prevent clashes of interests and can fulfil many of our needs (4p37s2) and that, contrary to Hobbes, “reason advises peace in all circumstances” (TPT, Curley II: 289, Spinoza’s note 33). Spinoza was not a Utopist, and he realized that in many cases we are not rational and thus not free (4p37s2). Nevertheless, we have nothing more helpful than our reason and intellect in solving our problems and defending ourselves. 28  Cf. 4pref: “men are moved more by opinion [of the imaginatio] than by true reason, and … the true knowledge [i.e., ratio] of good and evil [utility and harm] arouses disturbances of the mind, and often yields to lust of every kind. Hence that verse of the Poet: ‘I see and approve the better, but follow the worse [Ovid, Metamorphoses VII, 20–21]’” (Curley I: 554).

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grade of knowledge, but it can cause people to be better, to behave morally (although not out of real freedom). Such knowledge does not improve a human cognitive state, but it can promote ethics and morality (TPT, Ch. 2, Curley II: 94 and 100). In order to complete the constructing of the desired system, the gap between theory and praxis should be bridged. Both imaginatio and ratio, each in its grade, fail to achieve that. They must leave the completion to scientia intuitiva. Ratio perceives adequately the common properties of all our emotions, including all the passions, and emends all those which concern these properties. However, the essences of the emotions, including the passions, are beyond its capability. Spinoza claims that our only remedy against the passions is our true knowledge of them (5p4s), which renders them active emotions. The full remedy relies upon the knowledge of the essences of the passions. Spinoza lays down a rule: “an affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an effect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained” (4p7; Curley I: 550). Moreover, “no affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (4p14; Curley I: 353). The affects that are the emotive properties of ratio can restrain to some extent or can partly take away the passions. The extent under discussion is the common properties of the emotions but not their essences. How can we reconcile 4p7, 4p14, and 3def3? 3def1 defines affect thus: “By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, added or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections” (Curley I: 493). Does this mean that to change our emotional state, cognitive state, and mental state in general we have first to change our bodily state? How can an active emotion overcome or restrain a passive emotion unless the bodily power has been increased and the bodily passive state has been restrained? Of course, any bodily change has to be accompanied by a corresponding cognitive and mental change, but this also means, based on Spinoza’s psychophysical correspondence or unity, that any cognitive and mental change (such as the cognitive and mental emendation of our emotive properties, i.e., the passions of the first grade of knowledge) has to be accompanied by a corresponding bodily change. When the cognitive or mental emendation takes place in my mind, there must be a corresponding change in our brain. The result is that in order to change our cognitive and mental state, it is sufficient to change the grade of knowledge in which we are. This change is sufficient to have a corresponding change in our brain. Thus, the cognitive and emotive emendation also means that the body’s power of acting is increased or added, likewise the ideas of this change. From this we should infer that, according to Spinoza’s philosophy, psychotherapy is not carried out by the administration of medications, electroshocks, and other physical or biological means but by cognitive change only, for this change implies also a mental change of the emotive properties of our ideas; and the change in the

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whole, the change in our mind, is necessarily accompanied by a change in the action and vitality of our body, which causes it to increase in power.29 In any event, ratio in itself without its emotive properties cannot affect any of the passions. Only these properties can emend our passions to some extent and render them more active. The conflicts are not between knowledge and emotions, but between opposing emotions. There are cases in which the emotive properties of imaginatio help ratio to emend our emotive state and render it more active. Historical religions, which are based upon imaginatio, may help the multitude to behave morally as if guided by ratio (Hegel would call such a phenomenon “the cunning of reason”).30 Thus, 4p54s reads: “the Prophets, who considered the common advantage, not that of the few, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. Really, those who are subject to these affects can be guided far more easily than others, so that in the end they may live from the guidance of reason, i.e., may be free and enjoy the life of the blessed” (Curley I: 576). Hence, there are some points in which the Prophets’ morality is compatible with that of Spinoza. The imginatio’s emotions, which are those of the Prophets’ morality, cannot bring about the highest blessing upon their beholders, for this is the benefit of the supreme grade of knowledge but they may bring some blessing and happiness to religious persons. Ratio is not sufficient to emend human passions completely, rather the contrary: passions may help reason to achieve its political and social ends. Every person, including the wise one, must fear the laws in order to obey them. Laws, however useful and rational, need the help of passions to cause us, even the wisest amongst us, to obey the laws. There are no laws without some sanctions, and sanctions use our fear and intimidation to make us obey them. Thus, passions such as fear, hope, and confidence may help reason to cause people behave rationally in social life and, especially, in the state, in political life. These passions may motivate the citizens to obey the laws, which are rational and useful for them. The ambition to conduct our life according to reason alone is not compatible with such passions, which enslave us and which “show a defect of knowledge and a lack of power in the Mind” (4p47s; Curley I: 573). Such passions, however, are vital for us insofar as we cannot free ourselves completely from the common order of nature and thus we are “necessarily always subject to passions” (4p4c). This enslavement to passions means that without some passions we cannot obey the imperatives of reason. In order to accomplish its imperatives, reason necessarily depends on some of the passions that are incompatible with the genuine nature of pure reason. The emotive properties of ratio have a limited power on the passions, for these properties can affect only what is common to the emotions and not on what  Cf. Kisner 2011, pp. 1–16.  Cf. Garver 2018, p. 1. The cunning of imagination, according to Garver, is “using the imagination to rise above the imagination” (op. cit., p. 5) and “The plot of the Ethics is the cunning of imagination, the way the imagination, without aiming at anything more than survival, becomes, for some people, something other than imagination, namely understanding or intellect” (op. cit., pp. 12–13).

29 30

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individuates each from the other. Ratio, in general, has to do with common properties, not with essences. Hence, ratio can reveal what is false and mistaken in what seems to be common or general in the passions, which, in fact, are unstable and can easily change to contrary passions (for instance, love of the first kind of knowledge easily turns into hate, and so on). Ratio in general undermines the apparent generality or universality (for instance, of prejudices) of imaginatio. In such way, ratio undermines the basis of passions, which are the emotive properties of imaginatio. Spinoza assumes that the source of our misery, unhappiness, and emotional fluctuation lies in our knowing ourselves in our world only in the first kind of knowledge. Ratio begins to emend this wrong worldview and self-knowledge but it does not complete the project; only scientia intuitiva can complete it and provide us with the supreme happiness and blessedness. Only in the supreme grade of knowledge, does no gap remain between theory and praxis. This holds especially true insofar as the desired system is concerned, in which our salvation is fully achieved. Only ethics that demonstrates all its claims concretely and not generaliter (which is all that ratio can accomplish), only ethics that treats the essences of individual things and not only their common properties, only such a theory can provide us with complete self-knowledge and with the knowledge that reveals the reality, necessity, and eternity of each one of us and thus makes each of us completely happy.

5.4  T  he Place of Human Beings in Nature—The Problem of the Duality of the Human Reason and the Reason of Nature; Democracy as the Rational State We have now to challenge the duality between human reason and the universal reason, which governs the lawfulness and intelligibility of Nature as a whole, in which human beings are only a particle, a tiny part. Human reason has to do with the advantage, endurance, security, and peace of humanity (PP, Ch. 2, Sec. 8; TPT, Ch. 16, Curley II: 284;31 4p18s; and 4app, secs. 4 and 32). Only part of Nature is useful for us and supports our happiness. There are many obstacles in Nature which endanger us. Thus, there is some discrepancy between us and Nature. There is some clash or foreignness between our rational way of thinking and the universal rationality of Nature (Letter 37, Curley II: 33). Here is Spinoza’s contribution to “expel” human beings from the “center” of the universe (which started with a heliocentric worldview of modern science and has advanced with the worldviews of Darwin and Freud). Spinoza emphasizes that we are only a tiny part of Nature, as much as our reason is only a small part of the universal reason (or our finite intellect is only a part in the infinite intellect). Nevertheless, the difference between the universal reason of

 “Nature is not constrained by the laws of human reason, which aim only at man’s true advantage and preservation. It is governed by infinite other laws, which look to the eternal order of the whole of nature, of which man is only a small part.”

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Nature and our finite reason does not render us a dominion within a dominion (imperium in imperio [3pref; PP, Ch. 2, Sec. 6]). We are always a part of Nature, we exist within Nature and the universal reason is valid for us, too. To think otherwise means to render us as if making us an isolated island in reality, and to render our reason as though we were autonomous. This brings about a problematic duality, and such a duality will jeopardize any attempt to construct the desired system. Thus, in order to construct the desired system, we must overcome this duality first. Any attempt to perceive Nature as “bad,” “good,” “beautiful,” “ugly,” “just,” “wrong,” “ordered,” or “chaotic” is a grave mistake. Nature is not subject to human teleology or anthropocentrism (1app). Only human ignorance and supreme arrogance cause us to treat Nature thus. Nature is not meant to serve us and our needs but only to a very small extent (after all, thanks to Nature we exist and act). To consider human ends as Nature’s “ends” is absurd, misplacing a part before the whole (ibid.). Nature cannot be explained according to its parts and there is no way to turn human finitude into God’s absolute infinitude. There are some effects in Nature of which we are their adequate causes (that means, without us these effects could not have been there) but, obviously, the whole of Nature is not an adequate effect of human causality. As a result, we are subject to changes that cannot be inferred from our nature alone (4p4).32 Therefore, to some extent we are inevitably enslaved or subject to passions and following the “common order of nature” (4p4c), which is imaginatio’s worldview, the failed attempt of constructing the desired system. While under the influence of this wrong worldview, we are not guided by our reason but by fortuitous external causes: “the Mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused … knowledge, of itself, or its own Body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e., so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally” (2p29s; Curley I: 471). To be determined internally is to be determined by our reason. Yet, only by means of our reason are we able to grasp the laws of nature, the necessity of nature, in which, in fact, nothing occurs fortuitously as “in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (1p29; Curley I: 433). Fortune, chance, or accident is nothing but contingency, which we ascribe to Nature only when we do not know the causes of what exists and occurs in it and only when the rational order and lawfulness of all there is is not apparent to our reason and is beyond it (1p33s1; Letter 37, Curley II: 33).33 Spinoza ascribes power to well-established knowledge and reason. Such a

 “It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause” (Curley I: 548). 33  The “clear and distinct perceptions we form depend only on our nature, and its definite, fixed laws, that is, on our absolute power, not on fortune (that is, on causes, which, although they too act according to definite and fixed laws, are nevertheless unknown to us and foreign to our nature and power). As for the rest of our perceptions, I confess that they depend on fortune to the highest degree” (Curley II: 33). 32

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power reflects our status in the infinite causal chain that is the attribute of Thought and in which we act as thinking beings, as thinking agents. Furthermore, whenever we adequately know our small or limited part in Nature, we are guided by our reason, and in any such situations, we are powerful. True knowledge brings about great power. Whenever we obey our reason and follow it, we are powerful. Spinoza’s philosophy endows the notable maxim “scientia est potentia” with a very solid, well-established basis. In contrast, there is a complete compatibility between our dependence on fortune and our impotence as thinking beings, who are ignorant of the rational, correct order of things in Nature. Though our intellect is a finite part in the infinite intellect, and thus we must have inadequate ideas, too, being a part of the infinite intellect is, nevertheless, very significant and shows to what extent we are not intellectually impotent. Nevertheless, because Nature is not sufficient to help us endure, and the natural, prepolitical state (or anarchy) is not safe enough for us, we need political collaboration and unity; we need to organize or lives in states. The political life aims at rendering us more secure against natural disasters and threats from other human beings as well (TPT, Ch. 3, Curley II: 114; 4p35s). Is such a political unity not a dominion within a dominion? Yes, to some extent. The antagonism between physis and nomos becomes in Spinoza’s philosophy as the antagonism between human reason and the universal reason of Nature, between the natural state of human beings and their political state. As Spinoza writes, “God directs nature as its universal laws require, not as the particular laws of human nature require, and … God takes account, not of the human race only, but of the whole of nature” (Curley II: 160). This duality entails a most interesting result. According to Spinoza, as I have explained above, there is no contingency or possibility in reality as it truly is (ut in se est). Nevertheless, because of our limitation and finitude not all our ideas are adequate and we have many inadequate ideas about Nature, our place in it, and ourselves. Thus, it is inevitable for us to see many things not as necessary, as they really are, but as contingent and possible. Fortunately, this result can be useful for us: …. we are completely ignorant of the order and connection of things itself, i.e., of how things are really ordered and connected. So for practical purposes it is better, indeed necessary, to consider things as possible. (TPT, Ch. 4, Curley II: 126)

Furthermore, according to 4def4 ignorance and possibilities are associated. Nevertheless, there is a continuity in nature and there is no vacuum to separate one part of nature, such as that of human beings, from other parts. Moreover, our happiness requires also reconciliation with the rest of nature, which is not of human beings and which may act against human interests and advantages. Our peace of mind obligates us to accept this, even if it is beyond our reason and utility (4p53d; 4app32). It is in the nature of the adequacy of our reason to accept its limitations and know them as much as possible. We have to acknowledge our cognitive impotence, too (4p37s1), and to do our best to maintain our virtue, which means to conduct our life according to our reason as much as we can. Still, there are many dangers awaiting us in Nature, against which we have to defend ourselves. This splits nature into a dual antagonism based upon the difference between the universal reason, in which

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Nature as a whole exists and acts, and our limited reason. Thus, we have to face this duality and acknowledge it. Spinoza states: “the whole of nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole Individual” (the last scholium before 2p13; Curley I: 462). This claim should be compared with the following: “Man … can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the Minds and Bodies of all would compose, as it were, one Mind and one Body; that all should strive together, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all” (4p18s; Curley I: 556), which appears to be a project of human reason. This may sound again like a piece of “a dominion within a dominion.” Can such a unified human society be an organic part of Nature as a whole? In an attempt to answer this question, Spinoza may refer to the common properties of all entities in Nature. Despite the differences between human beings and the rest of Nature, Nature as a whole and human beings all share the same common properties (for instance, all bodies, including our own, are subject to the laws of movement and rest). Reason can grasp only these common properties and thus it has no power to overcome conflictual differences between us and Nature, or between our reason and the universal reason of Nature. As for the conflictual differences between human beings, all of them share the same common properties and construct a social communality. Moreover, nothing can deny that we are a part of Nature as a whole: It is impossible for man not to be a part of nature and not to follow the common order of nature. But if he lives among such individuals as agree with his nature, his power of acting will thereby be aided and encouraged. On the other hand, if he is among such as do not agree at all with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without greatly changing himself. (4app7; Curley I: 589)

Is this not a satisfactory answer to the question under discussion? As our reason cannot construct a commonality of essences, it is unable to overcome all the conflicts between us and the rest of nature. Our reason is in short of rendering us citizens of Nature. At most, it successfully renders us citizens in a rational state (as we will see soon, such a state is democratic). Spinoza, following Aristotle, calls us social animals (4p18s; TP, Ch. 2, Sec. 15). Nevertheless, as long as there are conflicts between our interests and the rest of nature, there is a difficulty in classifying us as “animals.” As social or political creatures, we may be considered as defenders of ourselves against nature. As a result of this discussion, the problem of “a dominion within a dominion” is still there, waiting for a better treatment or solution. So far, our discussion shows that Spinoza postulates that there is a solution for this problem, but the case seems to be that he did not show that concretely as long as his discussion of ratio continues. It seems that he (or, rather, ratio) did not show how the political condition can be emended in such a way that we can have a clear and distinct conception of the place of human beings in nature, a place that is wrongly and distortedly perceived by the first kind of knowledge as a war of each human

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being against the others. It seems that our reason has no alternative but to accept something of the worldview of this grade of knowledge of the place of us in nature. Our reason is capable of offering us a decent political life, which serves best our interests but no more. Our conflicts with the rest of nature appear not be calmed down by our reason, which is incapable of completely emending the worldview of the imaginatio. If our conflicts with nature (for instance, in cases of illness, death, and scarcity) are not settled, we cannot be happy. We may feel ourselves as misplaced in nature. The desired, all coherent, system remains thus far beyond us, as long as scientia intuitiva does not raise its voice. As long as ratio speaks alone, it is not sufficient to remove the crucial conflicts between human interests and reason and Nature as a whole. As long as scientia intuitiva does not complete its achievement, the worldview of imaginatio leaves its marks on our knowledge and, according to this worldview, antagonism and conflicts are typical of the “common order of nature.” In other words, the duality between human beings and Nature as a whole remains in place. As for our political life, the most useful political regime for our common interests (security, prosperity, free activity, using reason freely, a peaceful life free of conflicts, hatred, anger, and of deception, and so on) and is most stable is that of a liberal democracy (following TPT, Ch. 20, Curley II: 346). This regime is based upon human reason (4p73). It safeguards private liberty, as it is valid for the common properties of the citizen and does not interfere with their essences, which pertain to the domain of privacy. Spinoza’s liberal democracy is the radical opponent of totalitarian regimes of all sorts. It is the safest regime against internal enemies and external ones for, despite the coercive nature of its laws, this regime legislates the minimum of laws and hence does not incite the citizen to revolt, and as it can live peacefully with the citizens it can live peacefully with other states. The liberal democratic regime leaves untouched the essential human rights. In it, the citizens are free to think, to judge, to believe, and to speak, free to defend themselves, and are free from dispensable laws and from religious coercion of any kind (TPT, Pref., Curley II: 71–72). Any other regime has no absolute rule, for there is only one regime with an absolute rule—the rule of the public as a whole and not of any part of it (TP, Ch. 8, Sec. 3: “if there’s any absolute rule, it’s the rule which occurs when the whole multitude rules” [Curley II: 566]; Ch. 11, Sec. 1). As TP, Ch. 3, Sec. 7 puts it: … just as … in the state of nature the man who is guided by reason is the most powerful and the most his own master, so a Commonwealth will also be the most powerful and the most its own master, if it is founded on and directed by reason. For the Right of a Commonwealth is determined by the power of a multitude which is led as if by one mind. But there is no way this union of minds can be conceived unless the Commonwealth aims most at what sound reason teaches to be useful to all men. (Curley II: 520)

The rational independent judgement of each of the citizens is completely liberated from any political or lawful coercion. Just as is the case in the natural state, namely, the prepolitical state in which each person obeys only himself or herself. Spinoza’s political theory is certainly liberal and it leaves each citizen a private domain, free from any intervention of without, free of laws and politics.

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As I have argued above, Spinoza’s liberal democracy, the most stable of all regimes, is the antagonist of any totalitarian regimes, “democratic” or otherwise. Hence, Men must be so governed that they can openly hold different and contrary opinions, and still live in harmony. There can be no doubt that this way of governing is best, and has the least disadvantages, since it’s the one most compatible with men’s nature. For we’ve shown that in a democratic state (which comes closest to the natural condition) everyone contracts to act according to the common decision, but not to judge and reason according to the common decision. Because not all men can equally think the same things, they agreed that the measure which had the most votes would have the force of a decree, but that meanwhile they’d retain the authority to repeal these decrees when they saw better ones. The less we grant men this freedom of judgment, the more we depart from the most natural condition, and the more violent the government. (TTP, Ch. 2o, Curley II: 351)

Or, I have shown sufficiently clearly what the foundations of the democratic state are. I preferred to treat it before all others, because it seemed the most natural state, and the one which approached most nearly the freedom nature concedes to everyone. In it no one so transfers his natural right to another that in the future there is no consultation with him. Instead he transfers it to the greater part of the whole Society, of which he makes one part. In this way everyone remains equal, as they were before, in the state of nature. (TPT, Ch. 16, Curley II: 289)

Spinoza’s notion of liberal democracy must result in the conclusion that “anyone who wants to limit everything by laws will provoke more vices than he’ll correct. What can’t be prohibited must be granted, even if it often leads to harm” (TPT, Ch. 20, Ch. 24, Curley II: 348). This is one of the most important principles of liberalism. Indeed, “the end of the Republic [namely, the public domain, which is formed as a political life] is really freedom” (TPT, Ch. 20, Curley 346). Each citizen in the free state is the supreme master of his or her thoughts. There is a limit to the political public domain and in a liberal regime there is nothing that can invade the private domain, in which each person is free as he or she would be in the natural, pre-­ political state. This domain includes the freedom of thought, speaking, beliefs and religion, research, studying and teaching (especially in universities), and being influenced by the public life in general. Spinoza does not let the state save or redeem the citizens. They are neither slaves nor children under the guidance of their parents, and each is responsible for his or her way of life, as long as this does not violate the laws and the freedom of other citizens. The liberal state has no part in the ideology and the religion of the citizens, which remain private matters. To some extent, Spinoza’s liberal democracy is entirely separate from religion, unless the religion that the citizens or some of them endorse harms or breaches the liberty of other citizens. The liberal state is a pragmatic tool, which is free from ideology and values. It safeguards the individual’s liberty and the independent existence of each citizen that could not be secured in a natural, pre-political state (see, for instance, PT, Ch. 2, Sec. 15). Following these considerations and claims, Spinoza concludes thus: “A man who is guided by

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reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself” (4p73; Curley I: 587). What can overcome any conflict or conflictual differences, in which something in nature appears to us as bad or harmful, just because it is incompatible with our reason, is not the knowledge of common properties, is not adequacy alone, but coherence in which the essences of all different things are properly grasped. Thus, what can overcome any duality in nature is the coherence of all the essences of individual things and not adequacy alone; and coherence, valid for all the essences of individual things, pertains to the supreme knowledge alone. Such is the way to understand what follows: … when anything in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, that’s because we know things only in part, and for the most part are ignorant of the order and coherence of the whole of nature, and because we want everything to be directed according to the usage of our reason—even though what reason says is evil is not evil in relation to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in relation to the laws of our nature. (TPT, Ch. 16, Curley II: 284)

No doubt, for instance, cancer is very bad for us, causing the patient most agonizing pain and suffering and, in many cases, terminating their life. Cancer is bad for us, and medicine uses everything possible to combat it with the most rational and skillful means and devices that we can muster. Nevertheless, from the larger, biological aspect, the laws of biology are valid for cancer, too, and what is considered as pathological for us and for our life, has the conatus, to use one of Spinoza’s terms, to live and endure as much as possible. Thus, from a purely biological viewpoint, cancer is not bad or good; it is simply a necessary biological phenomenon, caused by the need of our cells to be divided in order to continue the life of the tissues and the organism as a whole. The same holds true for death. Death is bad for any individual organism, obviously for us, but death is an intrinsic part of life and without it life would be completely distorted, if, indeed, it would continue to exist at all. In these two examples, what appears to be bad and damaging from our point of view, even from our rational point of view, is neither bad nor good from a more universal point of view. We are living in an era in which medicine has very aggressive methods in combating cancer, but there are some original immunologists34 who think that it is not the best way to handle this disease; the best way is to try to live with it, as though we could reach an “agreement” according to which cancer continues to exist in one’s body but in a moderate or restrained way that enables the organism to keep living reasonably. As long as a cancer does not destroy the body and does not cause major damage to it, we can live with it. What we try to achieve at the global ecological level, we have first to achieve within the ecological system that is our body. Such is the advice of the more universal reasons to us. Our rational attitude can be occasionally very narrow and shallow, taking into consideration only our limited personal interests for the short run. In

 Such as Irun Cohen from the Weizmann Institute of Science, at Rehovot, Israel (in a private conversation).

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contrast, our aspiration for the unity and coherence of Nature as a whole is guided by the universal reason that is still reflected in our part within it, as owing to human reason. For it is our aspiration to have a part in the “knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature” (TdIE, Sec. 13, Curley I: 11). This “is the end I am at: to acquire such a nature, and to strive that many acquire it with me” (TdIE, Sec. 14, Curley ibid.). In other words, “we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied” (4app32, Curley I: 594). To be familiar with this unity or coherence is the task of the supreme grade of knowledge. In the grade of ratio, we know only the coherence that the laws of Nature guarantee whereas the coherence of the essences of individual things is beyond us. In Spinoza’s words to Oldenburg: … you are asking [me] for the reasons by which we are persuaded that each part of Nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the others. For I already said in my preceding Letter that I do not know [absolutely] how they really cohere and how each part agrees with its whole. To know that would require knowing the whole of Nature and all of its parts. … By the coherence of parts, then, I understand nothing but that the laws or the nature of the one part adapts itself to the laws or nature of the other part so that they are opposed to each other as little as possible. (Letter 32, Curley II: 18)

Laws, naturally, are general or universal and, hence, they are subject to ratio, whereas the knowledge of individual things, which take part in it, is subject to scientia intuitiva. As I see it, in this Letter Spinoza admits that he knows the coherence or unity of Nature in general, relying upon the knowledge of the universal laws and rules of Nature (3pref) but not on the knowledge of the essence of any individual thing in it. Of course, ratio directs us to the final end of our knowledge—the knowledge of the desired system, in which each detail is an essence of an individual thing all of which together cohere and are united. No duality is left in the desired system. No conflict and conflictual differences are left in it because it is the emotive property of the scientia intuitiva, namely, the intellectual love of God, that prevails.

5.5  The A Priori (“Synthetic”) Procedure as a Method Our reason changes our approach to reality as follows: (1) Perceiving reality in quadam species aeternitatis, which is the way of ratio, removes from our perception of reality any spatiotemporal conditions, which are obstacles in the way of constructing the desired system. Space and time are isolating or fragmenting factors, which separate and segregate parts of reality from the whole of it. These factors divide our perception of reality into allegedly “independent” and “discrete” entities and create an antagonism of entities which appear to be incapable of being united or coherent. In truth, there is no vacuum in Nature, but the wrong view of it relies upon the wrong assumption that there is a vacuum, based on the wrong idea that Nature’s parts are discrete

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because of their distinctions one from the other (1p16s; Curley I: 423). Moreover, time and place are imagined conditions of individuation. Only removing them will pave the way for real individuating principles—adequate causality—which relate each individual entity to the rest of Nature (see Sect. 5.2.2 above). Removing the entia imaginationis, which distorts the correct order of Nature and which puts the conclusions before the assumptions, the finite before the infinite, and the part before the whole. Entia imaginationis are obstacles in the construction of the desired system, and they should therefore be removed from our knowledge. To replace imaginatio’s illegitimate generalizations by legitimate general notions.35 In order to construct the desired system, we have first to replace the illegitimate universals with the legitimate ones, which are the necessary, lawful connections reflecting the common properties. The notions of these properties are clear and distinct, namely, adequate (5p12d). The desired system necessarily requires these common notions. Equally, it requires adequate causality. Note that only if things have something in common with one another, one of them can be the cause of the other (according to 1p3). Without common notions and adequate causality, the desired system cannot be constructed. Imaginatio fails in making such necessary connections, but ratio succeeds in constituting them. By constituting entia rationis, ratio prepares our mind to perceive reality adequately. These entia rationis replace the entia imaginationis that occupied our mind. Although entia rationis do not reflect reality as it really is (ut in se est), they contribute methodically to prepare our mind to perceive reality adequately. Ratio’s emotive contribution for constructing the desired system. The emotive properties of ratio are active emotions that restrict and occasionally overcome passions (i.e., passive emotions), the emotive properties of the imaginatio. As true knowledge, ratio is also a clear and distinct perception of passions, a perception that converts them into active emotions. Active emotions, as lenient to coherent systematization (unlike passions whose instability and fortuitous nature obstruct such a coherence), are necessary building blocks of the desired system, whereas passions are obstacles to its constitution.

Nevertheless, the main contribution of ratio to constructing the desired system is the a priori procedure of constructing it. A priori is our term but in Spinoza’s time it was called “synthetic” (whereas the a posteriori procedure, on which we elaborate in the next chapter, was then called then “analytic”). This procedure is, in fact, the method of this constructing, or the systems of rules guiding it. Spinoza emphasizes the importance of the a priori principles of knowledge. Imaginatio, contrary to ratio, is under the strong influence by occasional and accidental, as it were, occurrences, which are beyond our rational control. Such a drifting does not provide us with orientation in reality, and, in fact, it is source of confusion. Imaginatio’s worldview is the “common order of nature” according to 35

 For this distinction consult Hasserot 1950 and Bennett 1984, p.40.

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which we are not determined rationally, internally but by occasional or accidental external occurrences in which we have no rational and stable orientation (according to 2p29s and TdIE, Sec. 25II and its context). This worldview is entirely unstable, which prevents any secure orientation, if orientation at all. Orientation, in other words, needs internal determination, which is an a priori one. Ontologically and epistemologically, this determination is antecedent to any experience or empirical observation. Thus, in Letter 37, Spinoza writes: “all the clear and distinct perceptions we form can arise only from other clear and distinct perceptions in us, and cannot have any other cause outside us. From this it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions we form depend only on our nature, and its definite, fixed laws, that is, on absolute power, not on fortune” (Curley II: 32–33; my italics). The context of these words is Spinoza’s discussion of the true method, “the knowledge of the pure intellect, and of its nature laws” (op. cit., Curley II: 33). The strong connection between a priori knowledge and ratio is clear enough. The a priori procedure begins with the reflection of the intellect, observing itself carefully (TdIE, Sec. 90). This intellectual self-reflection rests upon the distinction between truth and falsehood. This distinction is chiefly made by an intrinsic denomination (TdIE, Sec. 69), and Spinoza assumes that truth and intellect share the same denotation (TdIE, Sec. 68). In the same vein, “the form of the true thought must be placed in the same thought itself without relation to other things, nor does it recognize the object as its cause, but must depend on the very power and nature of the intellect” (Curley I: 31). Of course, this is not the complete picture of what truth is. The intellectual capability is not sufficient to attain the truth, as this capability is quite restricted, for it cannot deduce any particular factors of the truth from any thought. The a priori procedure is restricted to deducing or inferring less general truths from a more general, or universal, one, as I have argued above. Moreover, contrary to Descartes, our mind, and the same holds for our intellect, does not know itself immediately (i.e., with no mediation) in an adequate way. As 2p23 reads, “the Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the Body” (Curley I: 468; cf. 3p9d: “the Mind [by 2p23] is necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the Body’s affections”). The affections, i.e., alterations, of the body are a posteriori data and are by no means a priori. Indeed, contrary to the rational, a priori principles of our knowledge, its data are supplied by empirical means, from experientia vaga which, as its name indicates, is unstable and unreliable. As fortuitous, our data, before being emended, come thus from the first grade of knowledge. Reflection is a cognitive property of our ideas (namely, reflection is an idea of an idea [TdIE, Sec. 38]). Hence, reflection as such cannot serve as a source for cognitive content. Only an idea, which is an idea of an extended entity or action, provides our knowledge with such a content. This idea reflects an affection (change, alteration, or modification) of our body. All the definitions, axioms, and postulates of the Ethics are general propositions only. As such, they pertain to the second grade of knowledge but by no means to the supreme one. Some of them pertain even to the first grade of knowledge, for instance, 2a1 and 4a. 2a1, referring to contingency or possibility and relying upon

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the order of nature, namely, the common order of nature, certainly refers to a datum that the first grade of knowledge provides us with. Referring to this axiom, 2p3od reads: “the duration of our Body depends on the common order of nature and the constitution of things” (Curley I: 471). As 2p30 itself reads, the knowledge of our Body’s duration is entirely inadequate. There is no doubt, then, that 2a1 pertains to the first kind of knowledge and, as such, it requires an emendation by the a priori principles of ratio and, finally, by scientia intuitiva. 2a2, 2a4 and 2a5 also refer to empirical data, although these data do not require emendation by ratio but only by scientia intuitiva. What they need from ratio is a rational confirmation, which changes their epistemic status. The Ethics teaches us that there is an infinity of Attributes but, in fact, the text refers to only two of them, Extension and Thought. This knowledge is not deduced from the general definition of Attributes but rests on empirical facts, which are a posteriori data (in the terms of 2a5: “We neither feel nor perceive any singular things … except bodies and modes of thinking”). We interpret these data according to ratio’s a priori principles. According to these principles, we know that in each Attribute there are an immediate infinite mode and a mediate infinite mode, which are the common properties of all the modes in the relevant Attribute but, resting upon rational, a priori principles alone, we do not know even one essence of an individual thing. Only by interpreting and understanding empirical data, can we finally attain, in the supreme grade of knowledge, the knowledge of the essences of individual things. In any event, our acquaintance with any of the Attributes is not an inductive generalization of empirical data, though these data guide us in identifying an Attribute (or, even, a yet-unknown one). Our knowledge of an Attribute is a general one according to which we interpret the relevant empirical data. A fine example of an a priori principle concerning any Attribute and its finite modes is the rule that there is no causal connection between a mode in a particular Attribute and one in another Attribute (hence, there is no causal connection between a particular thought and a particular body). The right order of the knowledge of things proceeds from the a priori to the a posteriori, the knowledge of the cause to that of the effect, and that of the complete and infinite to the partial or incomplete and finite (following 2p1oc.s; cf. TdIE, Sec. 85). Nevertheless, our knowledge does not begin with the concrete and full knowledge of God’s essence. Albeit in the ontological order, God’s essence is prior to the sensuous entities, we cannot begin our process of cognition with the concrete and full knowledge of God’s essence, for such a knowledge ends the process and does not begin it. The concrete and full knowledge of God’s essence is the knowledge of the systematic order of the finite modes of all individual things. Hence, what guides our knowledge from the start is the rational, general knowledge of that essence. This general or universal knowledge is an adequate knowledge of the properties of this essence. It is the knowledge of the universal laws of Nature with all its modifications. With it, the a priori (“synthetic” in Spinoza’s terms) procedure begins. Only at the end of the process, will the concrete and complete knowledge of this essence be achieved. Thus the rest of the Ethics, having all the definitions, axioms, and postulates exposed, is not an explication of what is hidden or implicit in them. According

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to Sect. 5.2.1 above, such an explication is simply impossible according to Spinoza’s philosophy. When Spinoza writes that “the human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (2p47), he refers to knowledge of this essence in the second grade of knowledge, for 2p47s compares such clear knowledge with the knowledge of the common notions, which is typical of ratio. Only from this grade on, do we reach the knowledge of this essence in the supreme grade of knowledge (that, according to 2p47s, we still have to form). Also 2p46d reads: The demonstration of the preceding Proposition is Universal, and whether the thing is considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or a part …, will involve God’s eternal and infinite essence. So what gives knowledge of? an eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole. (Curley I: 482)

As 2p45 reads, “Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God” (Curley I: 481). And, as the demonstration of this proposition is universal, it pertains to the second grade of knowledge. This knowledge perceives the essence of God as comprising the common properties of all the modes in an Attribute, and these properties are truly reflected as common notions, which are the business of ratio. God’s essence in this discussion is not that of an individual thing that is absolutely infinite, namely God, but it is an Attribute of God (or God as perceived by the infinite intellect, according to 1d4, the definition of Attribute). Thus, we know God’s essence as an Attribute of God, as it is perceived in the second grade of knowledge and, as such, it is a universal knowledge, known to everyone, as long as rational individuals are in discussion and is, in fact, about what is common to all the modes pertaining to the same Attribute. Hence, God’s essence is equivocal. The first sense of “God’s essence” is essence as a factor of individuation, which is the essence to which 2p37 refers: “What is common to all things … and is equally in the part and the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing” (Curley I: 474; cf. the definition of essence by 2d2). And the second sense of “God’s essence” is what is common to all the modes in any of God’s Attributes. In this second sense, “God’s essence” is referred to by 2p46 and 2p47. The first sense is the subject-matter of ratio, the universal knowledge, whereas the second sense is that of scientia intuitiva, the knowledge of the essences of individual or singular things. In Letter 50, “God’s essence” is in the second sense, namely, the factor of individuation of God as a singular thing that is absolutely infinite. Spinoza writes: “since the existence of God is his essence, and we can’t form a universal idea concerning his essence, it’s certain that someone who calls God one or unique does not have a true idea of God, or is speaking improperly about him” (Curley II: 406). To argue that God’s existence is God’s essence is to follow 2d2 and 2p37. The knowledge of this essence is not universal; it is, rather, the knowledge by scientia intuitiva, which completes the process of knowledge as a whole. Following Section 76 of TdIE, it is impossible to have a universal, abstract idea of God, which is the “origin of Nature.” God’s essence as a Universal is an absurd idea of God that imaginatio has. God is neither genus nor species. There is no universal true idea of God’s essence as an individuum or a singular thing. There is only

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universal knowledge of God’s properties, known as common notions. In this spirit, Letter 83 reads: “from the mere fact that I define God to be a Being to whose essence existence pertains, I infer many of his properties: that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, immutable, infinite, etc.” (Curley II: 487). Section 76 of TdIE also mentions two of God’s properties, namely, being unique and infinite. In note 26 of this section, Spinoza writes that these properties, which ratio perceives, are simply God’s Attributes, indicating (“showing”) God’s essence. In sum, the true and adequate God’s essence that opens the whole process or the procedure of knowledge is known to us only generaliter and not particular or singulariter. My late mentor, Joseph Ben-Shlomo, in his comments on the Hebrew translation of TdIE, cited TdIE, Sec. 75: proceeding “as far as we can in a manner that is not abstract, and begin as soon as possible from the first elements, i.e., from the source and origin of Nature” (Curley I: 33). He interpreted this passage differently. Does it mean, despite what I have argued just now, that we begin the proceeding of our knowledge of reality with the concrete idea of God’s essence? Of course, we cannot know the system as a whole at the very beginning of explicating it or elaborating on it. A cognitive situation to the contrary, which suits Ben-Shlomo well, can be possible only if our starting point is mystical, as it were, and based upon self-evident principles. In this book, I entirely deny any attempt to interpret Spinoza’s philosophy as mystical. As the reader will realize, I reject the interpretations that consider scientia intuitiva as a mystical experience.36

 Can mysticism and rationality be compatible? Can pantheism (or panentheism) and mysticism be compatible? I do not think so. The debate over these questions took place very intensively before the Second World War, between The Hague and Reinsburg schools. It was born anew in the 70s. See Pflaum 1926; Hessing 1977, pp. 323–329, 479–494; Hubbeling 1967; Wetlesen 1979, pp. 128, 132–133; Bend 1974; Wienpahl 1979; and Bennett 1984, pp. 373–375. In any event, if a mystical interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy implies a denial of any individuation and differentiation in Substance (which is the view of Wienpahl 1979, pp. xi, 93, 98, 155, and 160–162), this is another good reason not to ascribe mysticism to this philosophy, for such individuation and differentiation are essential for his philosophy, as I have argued above in Sect. 1.1. A mystical experience that is beyond our reason, must be, according to Spinoza’s famous dictum, supra rationis est infra rationis (TPT, Ch. 5, Curley II: 152). In this vein, Spinoza denies any super natural light; he accepts only natural light (TPT, Ch. 7). There is no place in Spinoza’s philosophy for mystical revelation or salvation that are, as it were, beyond the second and supreme grades of knowledge. Mentioning the three grades of knowledge, Spinoza explicates that there must be continuity from the first one to the supreme one. Thus, his description of the proceeding of scientia intuitiva is of a kind of inference which, as I see it, excludes any mystical jump. I thus reject Bidney 1940, Part 2, p. 265, considering scientia intuitiva as an immediate kind of experience. Bidney thought that God’s idea is perceived immediately with no inferential proceeding and, thus, it is given owing to a mystical experience without relying upon rational demonstrations or proofs (op. cit., p. 287). According to Bidney, Spinoza attempted to combine Descartes’s conception of mathematical intuition with a neo-Platonic metaphysics including its mystical nature. I quite disagree, for the mature philosophy of Spinoza (which is incompatible with some claims in the early Short Treatise) rejects any immediate knowledge that is not based upon solid reasons, demonstrations, or proofs, as much as it rejects Descartes’s conception of evidence and the Cartesian intuition. I have argued so occasionally above.

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Ratio’s general knowledge is a method, which shows the way to knowledge. Such is its treatment with God’s idea and God’s essence, if these notions begin the process. They have to show the way, not to provide us with an answer what these notions concretely and fully are. This is the meaning of Spinoza’s dictum that “it is a first and eternal truth that God is” (TdIE, Sec. 54, note 20), or that “everyone … must concede that nothing can either be or be conceived without God” (for instance, 2p10c,s). The general and true idea of God implies that no finite thing can be considered as an independent and unconditioned substance (contrary to Aristotle) and, instead of any deduction from it, we have to detect the systematic connection between this idea and other entities, as there are common properties to all finite things that relate them to the absolute infinite Substance. TdIE, Sec 42 may mislead the reader for it calls to bring all ideas “forth from that idea which represents the source and origin of the whole of Nature” (Curley I: 20). Again, “bring forth from” is not a deduction but a connection of all the ideas with God’s idea. We have to connect all our ideas with that of the “source and origin of Nature,” from which nothing individual or singular can be a priori deduced. As I have argued above, no analysis or deduction can produce a particular truth from this universal idea. Indeed, in TdIE, Sec. 44, Spinoza writes about “acquiring other ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of the given true idea” (Curley I: 21). As for the truth that makes itself manifest (ibid.), this does not imply self-evidence but that the connection with other ideas is not interrupted or blocked, and the connection is made according to universal notions or laws. Spinoza returns to this point in TdIE, Sec. 49, in a concluding clause: “we learned which is the first path our mind must enter on to begin well—which is to proceed in its investigation according to certain laws, taking as a standard a given true idea” (Curley I: 22). The given true standard is the universal idea of God or God’s essence. It is the idea of the most perfect being (ibid.), and this idea is an a priori one: “before all else there must be a true idea in us, as an inborn tool; once this true idea is understood, we understand the difference between that kind of perception and all the rest” (TdIE, Sec. 39, Curley I: 19). The idea of the source and origin of Nature is a standard, a paradigm, and not an idea from which all the rest is a priori deduced. There are two kinds of data on which we rely on our way to know ourselves and the world as well: (1) Finite a posteriori data, which are empirical. The knowledge of these data requires either confirmation, resting upon a sound basis, proof, and interpretation. The universal principles are as follows: we perceive or feel only bodies and thoughts, each body is limited or restrained by another body, and each thought by another thought, “man thinks,” and so on. The knowledge of other empirical data requires emendation and radical change, such as the datum mentioned in 2a2, considering the existence of individuals as contingent, or that mentioned in 4a1 (the only axiom of this part). This kind of data requires emendation according to (2) as follows. (2) Universal a priori data, which are the rules of reason. These rules constitute a method. Such rules are: all that exists and acts is necessary; possibility or con-

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tingency are simply notions that are based upon ignorance and have no ontic status. The ignorance in question is of the causal order and being of the relevant things. Other rules are the excluding of the notions of time and place, of the subjective and fortuitous associations, and of any unstable, weak, and accidental connection pertaining to “the common order of nature.” These connections will be replaced by the necessary ones, which are conceived sub quadam specie aeternitatis (in a particular aspect of eternity). The emendation will show that 4a1 is restricted to things existing in time and place, whereas the removal of the spatiotemporal restrictions will help to construct quite another worldview, that of the desired system. The emendation will also show that 2a1, in fact, pertains to the “common order of nature” which requires complete emendation in the rational and truly universal order of things. The more the emendation rests upon coherence, the more it opposes the traditional deduction. Contrary to Leibniz, it is impossible to reduce empirical data to the principles of the a priori intellect. These data can be, instead, connected by means of necessary intellectual connections. Because the empirical data cannot be deduced from a priori, rational and universal principles, the whole of the a priori (“synthetic”) procedure is simply the a priori method of the emendation and adequate identification of the empirical data without which we could not have any knowledge.37 The method will identify the finite things as finite modes. This identification is not given from the outset, and the first time it is mentioned is in 1p25c: “Particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” (Curley I: 431). The requested identification consists of perceiving all individual things as finite modes of one Substance, as it is perceived as an Attribute. This means that all these individual things are perceived as particulars of one and the same coherent, absolutely total system. According to Spinoza, method is a reflection (TdIE, Sec. 38). Reflection must be on given ideas. Thus, method, despite its a priori nature (of a system of rules to know as yet unknown things [TdIE, Sec. 49]), does not come first; it has to follow given ideas on which the methods necessarily depend. In fact, the method is the second grade of knowledge, which does not come first, as it requires the empirical data that only the first grade of knowledge can provide us with. These empirical data are the modifications or changes occurring in our body, each of which is felt by us. On these data the reflection-method operates or elaborates. This method is the general part of the desired system, which is completely and entirely detailed, perceived in the supreme grade of knowledge.

37  Cf. Hallett 1962, pp. 18–21. About the limitations of the “synthetic”-geometrical method in the Ethics, consult Kennington 1980, pp. 293–318. I disagree with Yosef Ben-Shlomo’s interpretation that there is confusion and inconsistency over this matter in the TdIE and that in the Ethics Spinoza proceeds consistently in the a priori, “synthetic” way from the definitions, axioms, and postulates to the theorems. The reasons for such a disagreement have been detailed in this chapter.

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The cognitive emendation means to turn the transient causal chain into an immanent one (following TdIE, Secs. 102 and 103). The transient one pertains to the “common order of nature” by the first grade of knowledge. The immanent chain pertains to the desired system. The emendation thus turns the system of spatiotemporal, contingent, and fortuitous things into the system of real, eternal, and necessary things. The emendation relies upon aids, and these aids are the universal and a priori rules of ratio. Ratio is the method of the emendation of the properties of the transient causal chain into those of the immanent one. Ratio is an adequate part of the desired system. It is the universal a priori part of it, but not that of the essences of all individual things. Spinoza’s adequacy and universality go hand in hand, namely, although it is a part, its properties are the same and, in this respect, the part being equal to the whole is true. Nevertheless, despite being an adequate part, ratio is not a sufficient condition for constructing the desired system. Ratio does not provide us with the knowledge of the essences of individual things and with that of the infinite modes and the Attributes. Relying upon this grade of knowledge, we do not know all the Attributes nor are we certain that the two we know are all the Attributes. Relying upon ratio, we do not know or understand the laws of Nature that are foreign to our nature, to the demands of our human reason. Finally, while relying upon ratio, we are still enslaved to the first grade of knowledge and its worldview, namely, the “common order of nature.” This common “order” is not a real order, and by no means can it make a real system. It is, rather, a fortuitous aggregate whose generality or “universality” is faked and obviously dubious. The connections commanding this aggregate are, in fact, fragmenting factors, such as time and place, which should be removed in order to construct the desired system. Even as a vital adequate part of the desired system, ratio is partial or incomplete and insufficient. In this grade, we have not even a complete system of the a priori rules; for instance, we do not know all the Attributes or whether the two that we already know, are all the Attributes there are (infinitude is not a matter of number but of totality, of all there is). Moreover, the a priori procedure of knowledge depends on the a posteriori procedure and vice versa. The a posteriori procedure is the only one by which we may start knowing more Attributes if such exist. Thus, the a posteriori way instructs us how to discover more a priori properties. Another example is the proof of God’s existence. The a posteriori proof of God’s existence (the second alternative demonstration for 1p11, Curley I: 418) relies Spinoza on an a posteriori datum—we exist— and on two a priori principles (that is, on 1a1—“Whatever is, is either in itself or in another,” and on 1p7—“It pertains to the nature of substance to exist”). Even the ontological proof of the existence of God relies upon an a posteriori datum, namely, that empirically there is something rather than nothing. The way to construct the desired system is always open. New empirical data can provide us with indications for more a priori information and knowledge. The dependence of the a priori on the a posteriori reflects the dependence of each Attribute on its finite and infinite modifications. Of course, the dependence of the a posteriori on the a priori procedure precedes and renders possible the dependence

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of the a priori on the a posteriori procedure. The same holds true equally for the dependence of the modes on the Attribute and vice versa. Ratio’s rules are phrased as imperatives or demands but, in fact, their status is hypothetical, for they have no immediate self-evidence. They are somewhat hypothetical, for their veridical status depends on their success in helping us to construct the desired system. If these universal rules are applied to each of the relevant individual things, these rules are acknowledged as evident. After all, the knowledge of the common properties depends upon the relevant essences, which are the individuating factors of all individual things. In exactly the same way, the evidence of ratio’s rules and imperatives depends on their full concretization in the case of each individual thing. If we know Substance in the second grade of knowledge, we know it generaliter only, at the level of the common notions about the common properties of all the relevant individual things. Thus, in this stage, we do not know God’s essence particulariter, that is, as an individual absolutely infinite entity. It is from this essence that the common properties are derived or implied a priori. To the extent that the a posteriori procedure continues, more and more common properties of Nature are discovered by us. It also means, that what we began with, namely, the a priori principles with which we start, can be changed. Indeed, foundationalism is not Spinoza’s way, and the so-called secured and immune-to-any-doubt principles, such as those of Descartes, start the process of our knowledge not because of any self-evidence, which is discrete and completely independent on any theorem or other basic propositions, but because they are hypothetically secured, as long as they succeed in fulfilling their function and proceed further. In Spinoza’s way of the emendation process, the rules and principles of emendations are themselves emended, when this is needed. At the end of the whole process, ratio’s imperatives and rules will turn into a complete description of Nature as it truly is. In any event, as long as there are no indications that ratio’s tasks cannot be fulfilled in our true knowledge of reality, the way to complete knowledge remains open, even if not attainable (after all, our intellect is finite). This openness is the main point that should concern us. Ratio is a sort of introduction to scientia intuitiva. It is also the method according to which scientia intuitiva proceeds. Ratio cannot provide us with the complete, full emendation of the “common order of nature,” which is imaginatio’s worldview. Only scientia intuitiva, the supreme grade of knowledge, can achieve such an emendation, which is fully expressed in the desired system. Ratio, or the method of emendation, is the general part of this system, just as the common properties of all individual things or all the general principles and rules construct the general part of Nature as it truly is. The desired system completely reflects the whole system of reality, which is Substance-Nature-God.

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References Abraham, R.D. 1977. Spinoza’s Concept of Common Notions: A Functional Interpretation. Revue internationale de philosophie 31: 27–38. Allison, H.E. 1975. Benedict de Spinoza. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Bayle, Pierre. 1965. Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H.  Popkin. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1966. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bidney, D. 1940. The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza – A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Boole, George. 1854 [1951]. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought. New York: Dover Publication. Burtt, E.A. 1967. Ch. 3: Galileo. In The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London. Collingwood, R.G. 1964. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2019. Spinoza’s Metaphysics Revisited. In Spinoza in the Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophers, ed. Jack Stetter and Charles Ramond, 3–51. London: Bloomsbury. De Lucca, John. 1968. Wolfson on Spinoza’s Use of the More Geometrico. Dialogue 6: 89–102. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. Della Rocca, M. 2012. Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond. In Förster and Melamed (eds.) 2012, 7–26. Einstein, Albert. 1935. The World as I See It. London: John Lane. Friedman, Joel I. 1978. The Appendix of Spinoza’s Denial of Free Will in Man and God. In Wetlesen, Jon. 1978. Spinoza’s Philosophy of Man, 74–79. Oslo. Galilei, Galileo. 1842. Il Saggiatore. In Opera Complete di Galileo Galilei, vol. 4. Firenze. ———. 1967. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World System, trans. S.  Drake. Berkeley: California University Press. Garver, Eugene. 2018. Spinoza and the Cunning of Imagination. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. Gebhardt, C. 1925. Spinoza von den Festen and Ewigen Dingen. Heidelberg. Gilead, Amihud. 1999. How is Akrasia Possible After All? Ratio 12: 257–270. Hallett, H.F. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Harper, William, and George E.  Smith. 1995. Newton’s New Way of Inquiry. In The Creation of Ideas in Physics: Studies for a Methodology of Theory Construction, ed. Jarrett Leplin. Greensboro/Dordrecht: University of North Carolina Press/Springer. Harris, E.E. 1973. Salvation from Despair – A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Haserot, F.S. 1950. Spinoza and the Status of Universals. The Philosophical Review 59: 469–492. Hessing, S., ed. 1977. Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977. London/Boston: Henley/Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1973. Logic, Language-Games, Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hooker, Michael. 1980. The Deductive Character of Spinoza’s Metaphysics. In Kennington, 17–34. Hubbeling, H.G. 1967. Spinoza’s Methodology. Assen: Van Gorcum. Jarrett, Charles E. 1978. The Logical Structure of Spinoza’s Ethics, Part I. Synthese 37: 15–65. Joachim, H.H. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Kennington, R., ed. 1980. The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington. Kisner, Matthew. 2011. Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy, and the Good Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koyré, Alexander. 1978. Galileo Studies. Sussex: Hassocks.

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Mark, T.C. 1975. Ordine Geometrica Demonstrata: Spinoza’s Use of the Axiomatic Method. The Review of Metaphysics 29: 263–286. McKeon, Richard. 1930. Causation and the Geometric Method in the Philosophy of Spinoza. Philosophical Review 39: 178–189. Montagu, Ashley. 1976. The Nature of Human Aggression. New York: Oxford University Press. Parkinson, G.H.R. 1954. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pflaum, H. 1926. Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Spinozas. Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft and Geistgeschicthte 4: 127–143. Selsam, H. 1935. Spinoza: Art and the Geometric Order. Studies in the History of Ideas 3: 225–269. Snow, A.J. 1923. Spinoza’s Use of the ‘Euclidean Form’ of Exposition. The Monist 33: 473–480. Steenbakkers, Piet. 2009. The Geometrical Order of the Ethics. In Koistinen (ed.), 2009. Strawson, Peter F. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Routledge. van der Bend, J.G., ed. 1974. Spinoza on Knowing, Being, and Freedom. Hassen: Van Gorcum. Wetlesen, J. 1979. The Sage and the Way. Assen: Van Gorcum. Wienpahl, Paul. 1979. The Radical Spinoza. New York: New York University Press. Windelband, Wilhelm. 1919. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. I. Leipzig. Wolfson, H.A. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza, two volumes in one. New York.

Chapter 6

The Supreme Grade of Knowledge

6.1  T  he Supreme Grade of Knowledge, Scientia Intuitiva: The Adequate and Certain Conception of the Essences of Individual Things as Modes of the Infinite System At the end of 5p36s, Spinoza refers to the inferences of the third kind of knowledge, which is called scientia intuitiva. This inference is “from the very essence of any singular thing” (Curley I: 613). Scientia intuitiva is the knowledge of individual (particular or singular) things. This knowledge is not immediate, with no procedure and evidences; on the contrary, it rests upon a special kind of sound inference. For instance, this supreme grade of knowledge demonstrates concretely and completely how each individual thing necessarily and eternally depends on God, whereas ratio teaches us about this dependence generaliter only, in a general way only, as a general rule. The major question that scientia intuitiva should answer particulariter, fully concretely is: “How our Mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follow … from the divine nature, and continually depends on God”? (ibid.). Ratio, like scientia intuitiva, is beyond any doubt, and yet only scientia intuitiva can demonstrate all that is needed concretely, namely as an inference from the essence of the relevant individual thing.1 The concept “inference” is crucial in this context, for the supreme grade of knowledge does not rely, as we will see below, on any “mystical leap” (such as that referred to in Plato’s “Seventh Letter,” whether Plato himself wrote it or some of his fateful disciples) or on mystical experience in general. The particular individuation of each individual thing is determined by its integration within the desired system. As adequate causality is Spinoza’s principle of individuation (see Sect. 2.2 above), this is a vital conclusion because individuation, in Spinoza’s terms, depends on adequate causation. As any cause or reason is a mode  Cf. Bennett 1984, p. 365, who, in this matter, follows Parkinson 1954, Chap. 9, pp. 183–184.

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in an Attribute, which is a total (infinite) causal chain (though only Substance is absolutely infinite), and as adequacy implies a common truth of the part and the whole, then adequate causality ends in constructing the desired system, in which the individuality, better singularity, of each individual thing gains a ultimate support. After all, what is singularity? It is the vital difference between an entity and all the other entities in Nature-Substance-God as a whole. Hence, the individuality of any entity can be ultimately known only within a total system, comprising everything in a systematic way. It must be systematic, because otherwise we cannot compare each individual thing with all the others to realize that it is singular. Each individual thing is a singular cause, which uniquely functions in a causal chain as a whole. Namely, there is nothing that is identical to it, otherwise one of the two identical things is redundant or lacks any reason. This is perfectly compatible with the total intelligibility of anything in Nature and with the principle of the sufficient reason, according to which nothing in Nature is accidental or contingent, and hence there is no redundancy and contingency in reality and each individual thing has a unique reason for its existence and acting. Each raises its intelligible and singular contribution to the whole of the infinite causal chain. Such also is the significance of the infinite intellect as follows: total intelligibility means that there is nothing redundant, contingent, and fortuitous in Nature, and that everything is connected with all the other entities in necessary, causal connections. As a result of all this, the desired system and the necessity of intelligible individuality are perfectly compatible. As adequate causality is Spinoza’s principle of individuation, inference and not any mystical leap is the correct way to know reality as it really is. In this sense, scientia intuitiva is even “more inferential” than is ratio. Scientia intuitiva culminates in the exposition of God’s infinite intellect: “Our Mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect” (5p40s, Curley I: 615). In fact, this is a concise description of the immanent causal chain in the Attribute of Thought. God’s infinite intellect is the systematic integration of all the clear and distinct, namely adequate, ideas. As the unity of the Attributes implies, this intellect reflects completely and fully the total causal chain that constitutes the Attribute of Extension. God’s infinite intellect integrates any adequate idea within a coherent whole, which is the desired system. The infinite intellect is valid for the plurality or variety that is so typical of Spinoza’s philosophy (1p16 and the end of 1app) only if the ultimate unity of this infinite variety is acknowledged. As I have argued in the first two chapters above, the Eleatic interpretation to Spinoza’s metaphysics is a failure, a grave misunderstanding of Spinoza’s philosophy. It is entirely incompatible with the text. It is the infinite intellect that distinguishes between finite and infinite modes and between the Attributes themselves. Making all these necessary distinctions, the infinite intellect constructs the unity of Substance that comprises all these distinctions together. Any variety and duality in Spinoza’s metaphysics are subject to the ultimate unity of Substance-Nature-God. The desired system reflects these varieties, duality, and unity most clearly and distinctly. Diversity of any kind is vital to Spinoza’s

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philosophy as long as this variety does not break the unity of his system, which is no less vital than its variety in both realms—that of Natura Naturans and that of Natura Naturata, both are the faces of the same Nature-Substance-God. Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata are a duality that makes a unity. In other words, God-Nature-Substance is self-caused, causa sui, and all His effects are comprised in the unity of this absolutely total cause. God, as a causa sui is the cause of all things (1p25s), all are included within Him. Any adequate or true perception of any individual thing is an idea participating in the infinite intellect. The true perception of any individual thing is a clear and distinct, namely, adequate idea, and any such an idea is a part of the infinite intellect. This intellect apparently perceives this individual thing, but it perceives this thing not as an infinite intellect but as (qua) a finite intellect: “when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human Mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human Mind, has this or that idea” (2p11c; Curley I: 456). All the ideas of a finite intellect (to be distinguished from a finite mind) are adequate and, hence, their status as true is the same as the truth of the infinite intellect itself as a whole. In Spinoza’s words: “it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are” (2p43s; Curley I: 480). Spinoza’s essence in the strict term is an individuating factor. The essences of individual things are links in the immanent causal chain. Hence, these individuating factors are causal links and, as such, they entail the desired system as a whole. Spinoza’s individuating factors, unlike time and place, are also integrating, systematizing factors. The essence of an individual thing demonstrates that this is a singular thing, which nothing in the whole of Nature can replace. Each link in the immanent causal chain is an adequate cause of some effects, which could not exist if this cause not existed The perception of all this is scientia intuitiva, the science of the essences of individual things. Adequate causality, thus, reveals the singularity of each adequate cause, which has no substitute in the whole of Nature. The more general and abstract our knowledge, the more it is ignorant about the diversity of Nature. Scientia intuitiva is the complete, full knowledge of this reality as ultimately united and as completely differentiated as well. From the end of 2p40s2, the reader may wrongly infer that perceiving things in uno intuitu (in one intuition, in one glance) means that the supreme grade of knowledge perceives reality in one glance, as it were, in one intuition, and not in any inferential way. Such is an entirely wrong interpretation. Intuition in scientia intuitiva means a cognition of particulars or singulars. Unlike Descartes’s notion of intuition, Spinoza’s is not an immediate cognition; it is rather highly inferential; it brings its conclusions to the most detailed outcomes. Of course, such an intuition relates to the whole of Nature as it is reflected in the desired system, and hence this intuition is connective and not separating. Unlike Descartes’s intuition, Spinoza’s intuition does not isolate its objects. On the contrary, it integrates them within the desired system whose particulars or individuals are necessarily connected to one another and to the whole in a systematic unity (cf. Joachim 1964, pp. 183–185).

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According to the mathematical example that Spinoza gives for the three grades of knowledge, that of the proportional numbers, ratio perceives the common properties of these numbers but not the particular structure that these numbers share. This structure is perceived by scientia intuitiva only. In both grades of true knowledge, we infer (concludimus) the fourth numbers from the others three. Spinoza claims: “we must never infer anything from abstractions … But the best conclusion will have to be drawn from some particular affirmative essence, or, from a true and legitimate definition” (TdIE, Sec. 93; Curley I: 39). Spinoza explains this claim thus: “I have also said that the best conclusion will have to be drawn from a particular affirmative essence. For the more particular an idea is, the more distinct, and therefore the clearer it is. So we ought to seek knowledge of particulars as much as possible” (TdIE, Sec. 98, Curley I: 41). This is a vital combination referring to the supreme grade of knowledge—scientia intuitiva, which is an inference from a singular idea of a particular affirmative essence. Only this grade of knowledge “comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and is without danger of error” (TdIE, Sec. 29, Curley I: 16). Inference and no mystical leap is the way of scientia intuitiva according to the TdIE, 5p36s, and 2p40s2. This inference discovers the dependence of any individual thing on the whole of Nature. It has nothing super-rational in it, nothing of a revelation, miraculous or not, nothing of irrational illumination. The inference of the supreme grade of knowledge is the completely rational, detailed, and concrete of all possible inferences. It is thus more rational than that of ratio. I believe that so far I have said enough to persuade my reader that Spinoza’s supreme grade of knowledge is not involved with any mystical properties. No unio mystica (the union of the mystic with God until there is no way to distinguish between him or her and God) has left its stamp on this kind of knowledge. There is no mystical transcendence, no jump, or spark, very unlike the Platonic description in the “Seventh Letter” of the sudden leap that is typical of Plato’s dialectical end. The same holds true for the demonstrative power of this grade of knowledge. It provides us with the most convincing, simply overwhelming or most conclusive, demonstration that affects our intellect and emotions as well. The common reality of all the essences of individual things is fully covered by the demonstration of scientia intuitiva. This grade of knowledge cancels the apparent dichotomy between the essence of any individual thing and its existence (following 1p24 and c; 4def3; and TdIE, Sec. 55). In other words, they show the necessity about the essence and existence of any individual thing. As much as ratio grasps that the essence of any infinite thing necessarily involves its existence, so scientia intuitiva grasps that there is no separation between the essence and the existence of any individual thing whose singular essence this kind of knowledge grasps.2 In this way, each individual 2  In a private corresspondence, Michael Della Rocca challenged me in arguing that Spinoza explicitly states that, unlike individual things, only God’s existence is inseparable from His essence. However, individual things are like God, for scientia intuitiva grasps them as God quatenus natura naturata est (to put my answer to that challenge in a Spinoza-like way of thinking and to use his terms for my interpretation). This clearly refers to the holistic nature of Spinoza’s desired system and to the way in which the supreme grade of knowledge grasps individual things.

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thing, including finite individual things, is shown to be real, necessary, and eternal. I will elaborate on this below. Ratio is incapable of showing that any finite individual thing is dependent on God in such a way, that it has a singular reason for being and acting as it actually does (existence, according to Spinoza, is a kind of acting, is a manifestation of power). Scientia intuitiva shows this fully, explicating how particularly each finite individual thing plays a vital, indispensable role in the whole, absolutely infinite, causal chain. The necessity, not only of infinite things, but especially of that of finite things is grounded on Spinoza’s assumption that the whole of Nature and all things in it could not be different (1p33d). Could things be different, could even one finite thing be different or simply missing, the whole of Nature would have changed, which is impossible. Otherwise, there would be possibilities that were not actualized and the whole of Nature would have been contingent or fortuitous. Such a reality, because of its instability and contingent, would be not intelligible. The sufficient reasons of scientia intuitiva for the essence and existence of any individual things are the best reasons we may have. They reveal the necessary connection that any finite individual thing maintains with Nature as a systematic whole. The work of scientia intuitiva is that of integration, connection, dependence, and conditioning, not of any irrational or super-rational illumination. As I have explained above in Sect. 5.21, Spinoza’s intuition, unlike Descartes, is not immediate; it is mediate instead.3 Only Short Treatise employs some Cartesian or mystical terms concerning intuition: “we call that clear knowledge which comes not from being convinced by reasons, but from being aware of and enjoying the thing itself” (Part 2, Ch. 2, Sec. 2; Curley I: 99). Moreover, “I say a [ratio’s] strong proof based on reasons, to distinguish it thereby from opinion [which pertains to the first grade of knowledge], which is always doubtful and subject to error, and from science [scientia intuitiva], which does not consist in conviction based on reason, but in an immediate union with the thing itself” (op. cit., Chap. 4, Sect. 1, Note 1; Curley I: 102; cf. op. cit., Chap. 22, Sect. 3). No wonder that the mystical flavor of the Short Treatise entirely disappears from Spinoza’s mature writings. This early treatise reflects a very early stage in Spinoza’s philosophy and there are many doubts whether the scribes of this early text twisted it according to their interpretations. There is no evidence, let alone a reliable one, that Spinoza himself wrote this text and not some of his early disciples. There is also no evidence that the two versions 3  Contrary to Wolfson 1958, Vol. 2, p.148 (cf. p. 155). His interpretation of this matter is not compatible with the continuity and graduation of the three (or four) grades of knowledge. Bidney 1940, Part 2, p. 285 ascribes immediacy to the supreme kind of knowledge. Bidney thinks that the idea of God is immediately perceived from the outset by a mystical way without relying upon any rational proofs of any kind (op. cit., p. 287). The immediacy of this grade of knowledge is exempt of sensuous perceptions and of ratio’s common notions as well. Bidney assumes that Spinoza attempted to integrate a Neo-Platonic mystical metaphysics with Descartes’s notion of mathematical intuition (op. cit., p. 289). I do not accept such an interpretation, as Spinoza’s mature philosophy (that is, after the Short Treatise) rejects any immediate knowledge that is not based upon reason, as much as this philosophy rejects Cartesian self-evidence and intuition. I have argued thus occasionally in the current Book.

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of it were not translations from some original Latin text. Moreover, in the Ethics there is a principle that excludes such a view concerning Spinoza’s notion of intuition: “the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves” (5p23s, Curley I: 608; cf. TPT, Ch. 13, Curley II: 260). Demonstrations, obviously those that the Ethics endorsed, are not based upon immediate intuition but are obviously discursive, proceeding step by step. On the contrary, demonstrations proceed step by step, to begin with basic sentences and to end in theorems. It is in reverse of the Cartesian self-evidence or intuition (yet one may argue that Descartes’s self-evidence or intuition, such as that of the famous cogito, is the final outcome of a meticulous process of doubt that finally failed or failed itself). For Spinoza, to treat otherwise, without relying upon meticulous demonstration, the objects of our knowledge is dogmatic, like “the words of a Parrot or an automaton, which speaks without a mind or without meaning” (op. cit., Curley II: 261). In Spinoza’s terms, intuition means individuating (Kant will follow him in this matter). Therefore, the immediate infinite modes in each of the Attributes (Letter 64; Curley II: 439) are universal factors of individuation. The infinite intellect and movement and rest are immediate infinite modes that are in charge of the individuation in the relevant Attribute. Thus, bodies are distinguished one from the other by their ratios of movement and rest, and the infinite intellect plays a vital role in the adequacy of any cause, while adequate causality is the principle of individuation in Spinoza’s philosophy. The immediacy of the supreme grade of knowledge, thus, simply means that it is the knowledge of individual things not of their common, universal properties. In the other grades of knowledge we also intend to perceive individual things but in these grades we perceive them in a mediation of universal lawfulness (in the first an illegitimate and dubious one, in the second one—a legitimate and solid one). However, these grades of knowledge fail to grasp reality in its concreteness and as fully individualized. Another sense of immediacy or immediate intuition in Spinoza’s terms is, according to 2p40s2, “grasping in one glance” (uno intuitu, better, “at a glance”). The other side of this analogy of the four proportional numbers is the whole of Nature, which scientia intuitiva grasps with all of its individual modes as if at one glance. In this context, the immediacy of intuition means a systematic grasp of Nature. This grasp as completely achieved is by the infinite intellect, which, naturally, is in the supreme grade of knowledge. “One glance” excludes the grasping by imaginatio, all of whose perceptions are subject to various confined occupations (see Sect. 4.3 above). Confined occupation and “one glance” exclude each other. Scientia intuitiva completes the work of ratio in rendering its general a priori principles into concrete complete descriptions of reality as a whole. Scientia intuitiva thus completes the a priori, synthetic procedure by the a posteriori, analytical one. In a few words, this supreme grade of knowledge achieves full emendation of the vital empirical data in light of ratio’s a priori universal principles. The ratio’s inferences and their conclusions are beyond any doubt yet their evidence is fully demonstrated and established by the achievement of scientia intuitiva. The inferences of the supreme grade of knowledge are unconditional and refer to each

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individual thing. This grade of knowledge ends the whole procedure of knowledge in complete concretization of the definitions, axioms, and postulates with which ratio starts its procedure. The individual essence is prior to the universal properties, which are implied from this essence, and scientia intuitiva is the science of any individual essence. Ratio’s hypothetical principles are turned into non-hypothetical descriptions of reality. Ratio’s adequate knowledge is turned into a completely confirmed full knowledge. Spinoza states that “our Mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God . . . hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are” (3p43s; Curley I: 480). Likewise, all that is true according to ratio, is true also according to scientia intuitiva. Nevertheless, this supreme grade of knowledge is more complete and full than the second grade of knowledge. The relation between them is that between the whole and its general part. As for the part that consists of modes and the whole that consists of Attributes and Substance, we have first to explain the relationship between a sufficient condition and a necessary one, and between conditions that are sufficient and necessary. A very basic and simple logic instructs us that if a is a sufficient condition for b, b is a necessary condition for a. And if a is a sufficient and necessary condition for b, b is a sufficient and necessary condition for a. A necessary condition is a one without which the conditioned would not existed. A sufficient condition is one that when it takes place, the conditioned must take place too. A sufficient and necessary condition is a one that if occurring, the conditioned must occur too, and, moreover, there is no other condition for the conditioned. Now, the relation between natura naturata (the realm of modes or effects) and natura naturans (the realm of causes or Attributes and Substance) is that the latter, as the adequate cause, is the sufficient and necessary condition for the former, and vice versa (on which I have elaborated in Chap. 2). This means that even though the prior conditioning is by natura naturans, yet natura naturans is also conditioned, although secondly, by natura naturata. The effects are sufficient and necessary conditions for the cause, namely, the finite modes are sufficient and necessary conditions for the Attributes and Substance. Scientia intuitiva reveals the necessary dependence of each one of the finite modes on the whole of Nature, which is absolutely causa sui. Hence this science reveals the sufficient and necessary reasons for the essence and existence of each of the finite things. Whereas, ratio provides us only with the method that is necessary for constructing such system or revealing the system of reality as a whole. This method is not a scaffold that will be removed after the constructing of the desired system; it will remain as a part of the structure as a whole. The way leading to the goal, which is the desired system, will remain as a part of it. The method is the general part of the system, a part that indicates its universal lawfulness, which is valid for all its finite modes (“parts”) including their common properties. When scientia intuitiva finishes its work, it will produce the truth as a whole, while ratio grasped only a part of it, though an adequate part. Of course, the complete knowledge of the whole is preferable to the knowledge of an adequate part of it.

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6.2  The A Posteriori (“Analytic”) Procedure and the Emendation of the Experiential Data by the Supreme Grade of Knowledge In Sect. 5.5 above, I discussed the difference between the a priori, synthetic procedure (from the infinite causes to the effects) of constituting the desired system and the a posteriori, analytic one to do so (from the finite effects to the infinite causes). I use these terms in the Spinozistic sense, not in the Cartesian one. Scientia intuitiva is, as I have emphasized again and again, the science of the essences of all individual things. How is this compatible with the following scholium concerning the supreme grade of knowledge: “this kind of knowing proceeds from (ab) an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essences of [individual] things” (2p40s2; Curley I: 478)? Moreover, Spinoza argues that “the knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect” (2p46; Curley I: 482). Can we, contrary to what I have said above, begin our process of knowledge with such an idea of God? After all, Spinoza emphasizes that the proper order of philosophizing must start with the “divine nature, which should . . . [be] contemplated before all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in nature)” (2p10c, s; Curley I: 455). Nevertheless, it is obvious that it is absolutely impossible for us to start the process of knowledge with a fully developed cognition of God’s essence. We rather start with the general properties of this essence. We rather start, partly, with the universal knowledge of ratio concerning God’s essence, namely, about what without which God could not be known and could not exist. The universal properties that we know, to begin with, about God’s essence are His Attributes and their infinite modes. In other words, we start the whole process with the universal properties of the systematic whole of reality, which is called God-Nature-Substance. Mentioning the idea of God as starting the process of knowledge means that Spinoza begins with a cognitive imperative or a project of knowledge: we should know Nature truly as an absolutely infinite system in which each finite mode is caused by the whole of this reality, which is God. Being caused by God means that the entity under discussion is implied or derived from the idea of God, which reflects or expresses God’s essence. Even though we cannot deduce anything finite from the idea of God’s essence, we have to proceed as if we can do so. Only in finishing the a posteriori procedure can we realize how the knowledge concerning finite individual things is derived from the idea of God’s essence, as all these things are contained in God as their causa sui—the cause of Himself that is the cause of all things. This imperative will finally, at the end of the whole process, turn to the exhaustive description of reality as a whole. This description will end the whole enterprise of our knowledge, of attaining the desired system. In the desired system, all individual things are recognized as real, necessary, and eternal. Each one of them is realized as a finite mode, a finite variation, of the whole system. Each of them has a singular identity, which shows that no finite mode in the system as a whole, which fully reflects Nature as a whole, is identical with another

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finite mode. Thus, each of these modes is necessary, vital, and indispensable. Nothing can replace it. This complete and full knowledge of Substance-God-Nature and all its modes-­ variations is the knowledge of each Attribute in its unity. The variety of each Attribute does not breach this unity but rather sustains it. In the beginning of the process, this unity is only a general knowledge concerning the common properties of all things and is also a method to treat any entity in Nature, whereas at the end of the process the fully-detailed idea of God’s essence appears. A meticulous examination of the text of the Ethics clearly demonstrates this interpretation. Considering the context of 2p46 and 2p47, 2p45d mentions the adequate, immanent cause of individual things, and that “they have God for a cause insofar as He is considered under the Attribute of which the things are modes” (2p45d; Curley I: 482). Any Attribute is God’s essence as it is perceived by the infinite intellect (1def4 and 6). Now, 2p46d reads: “what gives knowledge of an eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole. And so . . . this knowledge will be adequate” (Curley I: 482). In so many words, Spinoza refers at this point to the essence of God not as a singular but as the common properties of all things. Remember that 2p37 reads: “What is common to all things . . . and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing” (Curley I: 474). Hence, the idea of God that starts the process of systematic knowledge is not about the essence of God as a singular but of the common properties of this essence. These common properties are the laws of any relevant individual thing in Nature and of Nature as a whole. As there is only one Substance, these common properties are not of two or more “Substances,” which cannot exist, but of all the modes of a God’s Attribute. Against this background, we have to understand 2p47s: God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in p40s2. (Curley I: 482)

The “deduction” in discussion is, as I have explained above, an integration, combination, and involvement according to universal principles and not a mathematical deduction, which is impossible in this case. According to Spinoza, there is no way to produce knowledge about individual things from general principles. The above-­ cited passage does not put the singular essence of God at the beginning of the process but only at its end. The knowledge of the singular essence of God, which is the achievement of the supreme grade of knowledge, terminates the process as a whole and does not begin it. To sum up, we start with the idea of God, as it is perceived by the second grade of knowledge, and end with this idea, as it is perceived by the supreme grade of knowledge. In other words, we start with common properties and end with God’s essence in its full singularity. Or, we start with the universal laws of Nature and end with the desired system in full. Any Attribute, as the intelligible essence of God, is a common property of all the modes of the Attribute under discussion. Thus, the idea of God that begins the

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cognitive process as a whole is about an essence that is common to all the modes of a particular Attribute. As common, an Attribute is not the factor of the individuation and identity of any of each modes (in Spinoza’s terms, God’s essence is not the essence(s) of finite individual things). Thus, from the definition of God as the absolutely unconditioned infinite Substance we cannot deduce or infer any of His modes but only properties, such as God’s uniqueness (namely, there is only one God). As for the definition of any finite thing, we cannot infer or deduce the number of its tokens. The common definition of such tokens does not indicate their number (following 1p8s2 and Letter 34, Curley II: 25). Any definition of an individual and positive essence, according to TdIE, Sec. 93, is of individual finite things only. Spinoza’s warning, in TdIE, Secs. 75 and 76, against perceiving things as abstractions, is not against the general, universal adequate definitions in the beginning of the process. According to Spinoza, adequate definitions, though general, cannot be abstractions. The uniqueness and infinitude of God that TdIE 76 mentions are not God’s Attributes (see the note to this Section, Curley I: 34).4 The term “essence” has various meanings in Spinoza’s philosophy: 1. Essence as a factor of individuation. Such an essence is the object of the supreme grade of knowledge alone. This meaning has two senses: (a) essence as the individuating factor of a finite thing; this sense is referred by the definition of essence (2def2). In the Attribute of Thought such an essence is a sufficient and necessary reason why the finite thing is such and such and not otherwise. This is the eternal truth about that thing; (b) the factor of individuation of infinite entities, while their detailed contents are systematically unified under one and the same unity of the Attribute or Substance. This is the unity of infinitude of variety, in which each individual thing is distinguished from all the others and is perceived in its singularity and identity. 2. The essence or nature that is reflected in the definition of a finite entity, such as “the essence of man.” Such essence is common to all the tokens that shares a common definition (for instance, type and tokens, genus and species). Such an essence is not a sufficient and necessary reason for the existence, action, and 4  Following Gueroult, Curley identifies the “first elements of the whole of Nature” as God’s Attributes and on this basis wrongly concludes that “God is not to be identified with the whole of Nature, but only with Natura Naturans” (Curley I: 33, note 56), namely only with the causal, active part of Nature. Curley does not distinguish between God’s essence whose idea starts the cognitive process as a whole, and God’s essence that finishes the whole process. Natura Naturans, which pertains to God’s Attributes, does not express the singular concrete essence of God but only its Attributes, each of which is common to all of its modes. To see that Substance and its Attributes contain all there is, that they are the whole of Nature, one needs first to consider them as the “origin of Nature” or Nature’s “first elements,” in the second grade of knowledge. Only at the end of the whole process, as the desired system becomes attainable by the supreme grade of knowledge, one can realize how each finite thing is a finite mode of God, hence contained in God. As the definition of mode is as follows: “the affection of a substance, or [sive] that which is in another through which it is also conceived” (1pdef5; Curley I: 409), it is entirely clear that the modes are in an Attribute of God and that God comprises all the things that exist. Both Gueroult and Curley are, thus, wrong regarding this crucial matter.

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number of the tokens under discussion. An adequate conception of such an essence is the business of ratio. Such an essence implies a specification or distinction not of individual entities but of species or genus. Such an essence refers to what is common to all the species under one and the same genus but not to all things in Nature. 3. The formal essence of an infinite unconditioned entity in itself, namely, an Attribute, to distinguish it from other Attributes. We know that there is an infinitude of Attributes but we know the formal essences of only of two of them, namely, Thought and Extension. This knowledge also pertains to ratio. The third meaning of “formal essence” (2p40s2; Curley I: 478) serves Spinoza in describing the rational starting point of the a posteriori procedure, for scientia intuitiva stems from the adequate idea of one of the two known Attributes. Thus, the starting point of the a posteriori procedure is an idea that pertains to ratio! The gradation of the kinds of knowledge is continuous and there is no break in it. Imaginatio, ratio, and scientia intuitiva, despite the clear differences between each of them, together form a systematic continuity. As I will elaborate on below, the relation between them is that between a whole and its parts, while the first grade of knowledge and the second one are parts of the whole of true knowledge that the supreme grade of knowledge attains.5 The formal essence of an Attribute is only the essence of this Attribute and not that of any other Attribute. Concerning the third grade of knowledge, Spinoza states that “the more we understand things, . . . the more we understand God” (5p25d). 5p24 reads: “The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.” The demonstration of this theorem refers to 1p25c, which reads: “Particular things are nothing but affections of Gods’ attributes, or modes by which God’s Attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.” From these propositions we must infer that scientia intuitiva advances in knowing God by knowing the essences of finite individual things. This is the way in which the a posteriori procedure proceeds; it which ends with the concrete, full knowledge of God as an absolutely infinite individuum. In this vein, TdIE, Sec. 92 claims that the knowledge of the cause is really the knowledge of the effects. It is the knowledge of singular finite things that contributes most to our knowledge of God (TdIE, Sec. 92, note, and Sec. 98 emphasizes the eminent important of the knowledge of these things). TPT, Ch. 4 (Curley II: 128) explains that “the more we know natural things, the greater and more perfect is the knowledge of God we acquire—or, since knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing but knowing some property of the cause, the more we know natural things, the 5  In a private correspondence, Michael Della Rocca asked me as follows: Given that Spinoza denies the existence of parts that might break the continuity of Substance (1p12 and 1p13) and given that imaginatio and ratio are parts of scientia intuitiva, how can there be a systematic continuity between the grades of knowledge? I have in mind Spinoza’s special mereological idea that while adequacy is concerned, the relationship between the parts and the whole do not break this continuity but reflects well Spinoza’s holistic view. The relationship of adequacy means that in this respect parts and whole are equal (2p37 and 2p38). Hence, imaginatio is an inadequate part of scientia intuitiva, whereas ratio is an adequate part of it.

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more perfectly we know God’s essence, which is the cause of all things.” All these passages clearly validate my interpretation of what begins the a posteriori procedure and what ends it. TdIE, Sec. 91 sums up the aim of the a posteriori procedure in the following words: “The aim . . . is to have clear and distinct ideas, i.e., such as have been made from the pure mind, and not from fortuitous motions of the body. And then, so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shalt strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature [as it is in itself, independent of our mind or extra intellectum], both as to the whole and as to the parts” (Curley I: 38). Being “led back to one” is not any deduction, let alone the mathematical-logical one, and the aim is to reproduce in the mind, as the cognitive desired system, the mind-independent (extra intellectum) system of Nature as a whole. The parts of this system are no less important than the system as a whole. Spinoza’s whole of Nature is not an Eleatic being, the One into which all variety will be reduced. TdIE, Sec. 99 reads: “to unite and order all our perceptions” in the light of our knowledge of “the cause of all things, so that its objective essence [as it represented in our mind] may also be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will . . . reproduce Nature as much as possible. For it will have Nature’s essence, order, and unity objectively [as represented in the mind]” (Curley I: 41). In the Sections to follow in TdIE, Spinoza clarifies that the causal chain of the real things is the chain of the fixed and eternal things, that is, a chain in which the essences of individual things and their existence are one and the same; their existence is an eternal truth. The a posteriori procedure is guided by the general rules of ratio, according to which we emend the empirical data with which imaginatio provides us. The rules or laws are as follows: thoughts and bodies are finite in their kinds; no body can be limited or conditioned by a thought, and no thought by a body; a mode is an affection or variation of an Attribute of Substance; no finite individual thing is a substance, which is an entirely independent being, but only a mode of such a being; we know concretely the cause by the knowledge of its effects (according to the principle of 1a4, as it is interpreted by 2p45d) and, thus, the more the known effects are, the more is our clear and distinct knowledge of their first cause, which is causa sui, that is God-Nature-Substance. Even though our experience is not the source for knowing the Attributes, it serves in drawing our attention to our a priori knowledge of them (following Letter 10). 2p1d begins with singular thoughts as modes that express God’s nature in a certain and determinate way. From this fact, Spinoza infers the following: “Therefore [ergo] . . . there belongs to God an attribute whose concepts all singular thoughts involve, and through which they are also conceived. Therefore, Thought is one of God’s infinite attributes, which expresses an eternal and infinite essence of God, . . . or God is a thinking thing” (Curley I: 448; my italics). An analogous demonstration, concerning Extension, is 2p2d. 2a5 explicitly refers to the empirical data that we need in order to draw our attention to our innate ideas of the Attributes: “We neither fell nor perceive any singular things . . . except bodies and modes of thinking” (Curley I: 448).

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As I have argued above, the knowledge of more Attributes needs experience in order to stimulate the mind to discover the a priori truths concerning the Attributes, insofar that such truths are in our mind and are independent of experience. The fact is that we know only bodies and thought as an inductive generalization, whereas the idea concerning the existence of any Attribute is a priori or innate, namely, it is not inferred from our experience or empirical data. If we encounter an entity that cannot be integrated into one of the Attributes known to us, we should seek a concept of another Attribute. It is the a posteriori procedure that can stimulate us to look for other Attributes if such exist, or to bring about the conclusion that there are no more Attributes other than the two known to us. 5p31d describes the beginning of scientia intuitiva as the perception of the body’s essence as a starting point, and this essence is eternal. According to Spinoza, the perception of the body is a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge and in any grade of knowledge. The body’s perception is the medium of any of our knowledge or cognitions. The parallel to the body’s essence is the mind’s essence, which is also eternal. And Spinoza adds: “the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God . . ., i.e., of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge [i.e., scientia intuitiva] . . ., therefore, the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge” (Curley I: 610). Thus, the a priori procedure begins with two kinds of data that are necessary for constructing the desired cognitive system: (1) the adequate knowledge of our body, not as being born and as dying in time, not as located in some place (5p29s), and not as an singular thing within an aggregate of fortuitous changeable things that “offers us nothing but extrinsic denominations, relations, or at most, circumstances, all of which are far from the fixed and eternal things” (TdIE, Sec. 101, Curley I: 41). This adequate knowledge is of the “innermost essence” of our body as an eternal thing whose existence is necessary; and (2) universal principles that renders this adequate knowledge possible. The aids that TdIE, Secs. 102 and 103 mention, help remove the alienation between the two causal chains—that of changeable, spatiotemporal things and that of fixed and eternal things. The second chain is the immanent one, which is the product of scientia intuitiva; whereas the first chain is the transient one, which is the product of imaginatio. The immanent chain maintains its systematic unity firmly and, thus, it is identified as the desired system; whereas the transient chain cannot preserve any unity but is simply an aggregate that does not make a system. The order of the immanent chain does not rest upon the empirical data as they are given but is a priori known, independent of experience but depends on God’s nature (2p10c,s). The order of fortuitous occurrences of isolated things is, as it were, as if each of them were an independent substance or “island.” The mind that perceives the immanent chain considers it at one glance, while the mind is active and is determined internally and not externally (2p29s, namely, by a priori ideas and principles and not by empirical data as they are given by our experience). In the immanent chain in

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the Attribute of Thought all ideas are clear and distinct, namely, adequate. Such is the achievement of emendation6 that ratio begins and scientia intuitiva finishes. The emendation in consideration is a reconstruction. It is not a reduction of the empirical data to rational principle. It is not an Eleatic removal of these data which, according to Spinoza, we cannot get rid of (see Sect. 4.5 above). In emending them, we extract the empirical data from their fragmentary context of spatiotemporality and the confined occupation of our mind) and integrate them into the context of eternity and necessity. Contrary to Plato, Spinoza does not turn our mind from the phenomena to their Ideas as their causes. Spinoza, contrary to Plato, does not turn our mind from immanent reality to the transcendent one (which he does not acknowledge at all). Rather, Spinoza changes our perception of the reality around us, not as imaginatio perceives it but as ratio and scientia intuitiva perceive it. It is the same, one reality, as perceived from different grades of knowledge. Ratio serves as the method of scientia intuitiva, and its universal principles are the source of the universal lawfulness of the system as a whole. The knowledge of the essences of the finite singular things is the final product of the emendation of the empirical data, with which imaginatio provides us. The removal or purification of all the traces of the fragmenting factors, such as time, place, external denominations, and fortuitous circumstances leaves us with the adequate causal chain, which is necessary and eternal. In this way, we identify each of the data of our knowledge as real, eternal, and necessary. In this way, we come nearer the desired system. Spinoza’s way is not that of Plato or any of the rationalists. Had he endorsed their way, he would have begun with a principle from which he would have deduced all the singular true ideas in a a priori procedure (such is Leibniz’s way of knowledge, which Kant called an intuitive intellect; this cannot be a human intellect but only a divine one, much beyond the human intellectual capability). Spinoza’s way of knowledge cannot rid itself of the empirical data, contrary to the Eleatic way, but it necessarily relies upon these data in emending them according to ratio’s principles, method, and reflection (method and reflection are identical according to Spinoza). Any temporal or local datum is perceived as fortuitous, contingent, and ephemeral (2p31 and c). As such, it is severed from any necessary causal chain, and is considered as possible or contingent, while possibility and contingency are simply the products of our ignorance, whenever the true causal order is concealed from us (1p33s1). Our ignorance is the cause of our errors or false cognitions: as 2p35s explains, “error consists in the privation of knowledge” (or inadequacy) when we do not know the cause of our position or action. In Nature, nothing is contingent (1p29). Contingency is not an ontological fact; it is rather an epistemic deficiency, a partial knowledge that is inadequate. Temporality, as the product of the imagination (Letter 12), is a factor of isolation, separateness, fragmenting, and falsifying because of our confined occupation of our mind. Imaginatio isolates its objects from their real and 6  Hallett relates the analytic, a posteriori procedure or the method to the emendation and identification of the cognitive data (Hallett 1962, pp. 18–21). Nevertheless, Hallett does not consider the relations between the two procedures, the a priori one and the a posteriori one, which I have considered above.

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necessary causal context. It perceives them as isolated fragments, which is not the real case at all. This perception is due to inadequate ideas, which are confused, as they depend on an individual mind only (2p36d). In another way, the cognition in the first grade of knowledge is subjective and not objective or general; it is confined to an individual mind. This is the source of falsity, which ratio and scientia intuitiva emend and turn into truth. 2p42 reads: “Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false” (Curley I: 478). The true grades of knowledge turn the transient causal chain into an immanent, true, or adequate one. Removing the fragmenting factors integrates the ideas into their coherent, systematic whole in which “all ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true” (2p32; Curley I: 472). Not all incomplete or partial ideas are false, some of them are adequate. Only the ideas that are isolated from the necessary context of all of God’s ideas are inadequate and require emendation. Our adequate ideas, though partial or incomplete, are as true as those of God’s infinite intellect. Integrating the fragmented ideas into their whole systematic context renders them adequate or true. As necessary and eternal, each idea is a vital link in the whole causal chain. Without such a link, the chain would miss a vital finite mode and would have not been the complete system (such a change is simply impossible). Relating all ideas to God makes all of them true or adequate. Hence, Spinoza states that there is something positive, a nucleus of truth, in any idea (4p1d), as each idea can be related to God. “The common order of nature,” as the worldview of the first kind of knowledge, is the false image of the desired system, and the complete emendation of this image turns it into the desired system. The complete emendation of this image is beyond the capability of our finite, limited intellect (see Sect. 4.6 above). This means that the complete desired system pertains only to God’s infinite intellect, and we have only a part, albeit adequate, of it. In summing up, the challenge of Spinoza’s desired system is not to deduce individual finite ideas from a prioiri principles, for from the outset Spinoza clarifies that such an achievement is simply impossible. The challenge is how to emend all the empirical data in order to make them fit the desired coherent system. Rejecting the Eleatic ontology, Spinoza clarifies that the absolutely infinite being is abundant with an infinity of variety (following 1p16). Thus, there are real distinctions in the Attributes and Substance. These distinctions do not fracture the unity of this total system. Scientia intuitiva takes on itself the task of describing reality in its infinity of distinctions, in the whole of its variations. Each of the finite modes of this reality is real, eternal, and necessary. This is the only knowledge that refers to the necessary connection between any individual thing, as a finite being, and Nature as a whole, which is an absolutely total (infinite) being. This is the challenge that Spinoza’s philosophy takes upon itself.

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6.2.1  T  he Infinite Intellect and the A Posteriori Procedure of the Supreme Grade of Knowledge The function of the infinite intellect in perceiving the Attributes has been discussed in Sects. 1.2 and 3.212 above. Now, I would like to substantiate the conclusions I have made in these sections. Spinoza states that the intellect, whether finite or infinite, pertains to natura naturata, the realm of modes and not to the realm of the Attributes and Substance, which is natura naturans. He calls the Attribute of Thought “absolute thought” (1p31d), and writes: “by intellect . . . we understand not absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking” (Curley I: 434). As an effect, the intellect is conditioned and not a causa sui. Indeed, if Thought were not, no intellect could be. Yet, the infinite intellect perceives the Attributes (as pertaining to God’s essence) and Substance, in which they are all united (2p7s). This means that the infinite intellect perceives the absolute reality, including all its unconditioned total (infinite) expressions and aspects as well as its infinite modes (which are conditioned—by the relevant Attribute, to which such a mode belongs). The infinite intellect perceives everything, as this intellect is total (infinite). The question is this: How can it be that a conditioned mode, such as the infinite intellect, gets an absolute and unconditioned knowledge about reality as a whole, in its unity and in its infinitude of variations? It appears as though there is no congruency of the absolutely or unconditioned knowledge of reality as a whole and the intellect as a conditioned being. In this case, it also appears that the idea (the conditioned intelligibility) and the ideatum (the absolute, unconditioned Substance and Attributes) are incongruent. Is this idea true or adequate?7 Does this idea answer Spinoza’s truth conditions of correspondence (namely, the agreement between an idea and its ideatum)? It should be noted that the intelligibility of reality depends on its real varieties and distinctions, whether of the Attributes or of the modes (contrary to the Eleatic being). Without the differentiation of the Attributes there is no causal chain, which in the Attribute of Thought is the total chain of reasons and inferences. Without reasons and inferences, no intellect can perceive reality and can be oriented within it. This differentiation does not break down the unity of Substance into independent

7  Cf. Wilson 1983, pp. 188. Wilson rightly refers to the connection between the infinite intellect (as 1p16 mentions) and scientia intuitiva. Nevertheless, because she does not relate to the function of the a posteriori procedure in this matter and to its relationship with the a priori one, and because she does not clearly distinguish between the two kinds of infinite causal chains and, finally, because she does not distinguish between essences and properties, she could not overcome the problem of the transition from the infinite Attributes to the finite modes and she fails in clarifying without further problems how scientia intuitiva proceeds also in the light of 2p40s2. We should not ignore the fact that 5p40s, which discusses the a posteriori procedure, refers the reader to 1p21. Wilson herself associates this proposition with 1p16 (op. cit., p. 187). However, she does not see what this association can contribute to the solution of aforementioned problem and the way in which scientia intuitiva proceeds.

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and isolated parts or “atoms.” It does distinguish between finite modes that are necessarily connected and constitute a unity. The solution for this intricate problem lies in the integration of my interpretation of adequacy—which is the causal and intellectual connection between the whole and its parts, in which the parts and the whole are equal considering their truth (2p37 and 2p38)—and my interpretation of the a posteriori procedure concerning the supreme grade of knowledge. First we have to remember that any mode, and obviously the infinite one, is God not as absolutely infinite but as (quatenus) a conditioned infinite or finite mode. This means that Substance as a whole appears and expresses itself in any of its modes. For instance, each human being is God insofar as He is a human being. Thus, Nature as a whole, including all its modes and universal properties, is embodied in each of its modes, insofar as Nature is this mode. All the universal properties and laws of Nature are embodied in each of these modes. All the universal properties and laws of Nature are valid for each of these modes, which are inseparable from Nature as a whole. According to the truth condition of adequacy, each individual thing as a finite mode takes part adequately in the whole of Nature. Thus, each finite mode represents Nature as a whole from a particular perspective. All the more so does an immediate infinite mode such as the infinite intellect. This intellect, despite all the differences between it or its infinitude and Substance or the Attributes and their infinitude, perceives (or represents) Nature as a whole insofar as this intellect is God as an immediate infinite mode in the Attribute of Thought. This partaking is compatible also with the correspondence condition of truth: as much as the Attribute of Thought is reflected in or expressed by each of its modes, so the Attribute of Extension is reflected or expressed by each of its modes, i.e., bodies. Each idea, as a mode, perceives God and each idea perceives the Attribute of Thought. In this light, there is no real problem in stating that even though the infinite intellect is a mode, which is not absolutely infinite, nevertheless, the infinite intellect perceives, entirely and adequately, God-Nature-Substance as a whole and its absolute infinitude as well. The Ethics proclaims so in so many words. Spinoza ascribes an absolute idea to a finite intellect, too, in the following words: “Every idea that in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true” (2p34; Curley I: 472). Furthermore, “the knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect” (2p46; Curley I: 482). Moreover, “our Mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God . . .; hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are” (2p43s; Curley I: 480). As an adequate part of God, our mind, and all the more the infinite intellect, takes part in the absolutely infinite knowledge. Nevertheless, the infinite intellect is conditioned (by the Attribute of Thought), whereas the absolute infinite knowledge is unconditioned. How can a conditioned idea or intellect perceive the unconditioned being, which is natura naturans? The infinite intellect is the immediate infinite mode in the Attribute of Thought (see Letter 64). Its correspondent mode in the Attribute of Extension is movement and rest, which expresses the endless activity of Extension (Letter 81). The

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correspondence in this case is valid also for the activity of Thought, for any actual intellect, finite or infinite, is the activity of intellection (1p31s; Curley I: 435). There is a complete correspondence between the primary property of Thought and that of Extension, for both mean activity, modification, and individuation. This is the common law of all modes in natura naturata. Each immediate infinite mode, as a primary or basic universal property common to all of the modes in the respective Attribute, is deduced from this Attribute or God’s essence as the intellect perceives it. The infinite intellect, as such a property, indicates that there is no unconditioned Thought (namely the Attribute of Thought) whose basic universal property is an endless individuating activity to the last detail. This activity, in the Attribute of Thought, is called intellection. Spinoza puts all these in a nutshell thus: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinity many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under . . . [the]8 infinite intellect” (1p16; Curley I: 424). The activity of each Attribute produces effects, each of which is individual or particular. The effectivity in consideration is simply individuation or particularization. The effectivity is the modification of the Attribute, which reveals the qualities of Substance. In the same vein, the Attribute of Extension is also an activity of producing effects and individuating or particularization. The activity of Extension is movement and rest and the universal law that is valid for all the bodies, i.e., the modes of Extension, is that all bodies are distinguished from one another in their ratio of movement and rest; namely, each body has a unique ratio of movement and rest, of activity and passivity. That means that each body is a causal link that has a unique place and function in the causal chain that is Extension. Again, there is no a priori way to deduce the knowledge of finite modes from the knowledge of the absolutely infinite “divine nature” (cf. Curley 1969, p.  74). A conclusive passage about this is 1p28d, according to which from this divine nature only eternal and infinite beings can be deduced or inferred. 1p28 explicitly reads: …what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite. . . . It had, therefore, to follow either from God or from an attribute of God insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode. . . . But it also could not follow from God, or from an attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a modification which is eternal and infinite [such as the infinite intellect].9 . . It had, therefore,

8  Unlike Curley (for instance, I: 424) I use “the infinite intellect” rather than “an infinite intellect,” which is Curley’s wrong choice. In Latin, there are no definite or indefinite articles and the reader has to decide for herself which translation to take. According to my understanding of the Ethics as a whole, there is only one infinite intellect and not a number of them, a possibility that Curley does not consider. This choice is compatible with his (entirely wrong, I think) interpretation of Substance or God as only the active part of Nature and not as the systematic whole of Nature and of everything there is, all causes and all effects. In my interpretation, there is God-Substance-Nature that contains all that there is. I have repeatedly elaborated above on this crucial matter in detail, relying on various striking referents. 9  This clearly shows that Spinoza’s infinite intellect is not an intuitive one, which Kant would exclude as an intellect that is beyond the human one. The human intellect is only discursive and

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to follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence (Curley I: 432).

According to 1p23d, what can be deduced or inferred from Nature as the Attribute of Thought is the infinite intellect but, as has just been clarified,10 no finite idea or any finite intellect (i.e., a set of clear and distinct ideas) can be deduced, in an a priori procedure, from the idea of such an intellect. What remains open is the following: “Our Mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinite; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect” (5p40s; Curley I: 615). This is a fine example of the a posteriori procedure. Only in the case in which that God’s nature is qualified or specified in an a posteriori way by any of each finite modes, only then can we realize that nature is a cause of a specific, concrete mode. In Spinoza’s words: I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see 1p16). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one preservers in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. (2p45s; Curley I: 482)

Such is the immanent causal chain in the Attribute of Thought, and such is also the case in the Attribute of Extension. In any event, there is no way to know how singular things follow from any Attribute by an a priori way. The infinite intellect, like the finite one, proceeds in an a posteriori way and, yet, it proceeds according to the ratio’s a priori and universal principles. God’s infinite intellect is not an efficient cause of all things, for the intellect, any intellect, pertains to natura naturata and not to natura naturans. Ths, first of all, God’s intellect is an effect and not a cause (no intellect can serve as the Attribute of Thought, which is causa sui). The infinite intellect, too, which does not pertain to God’s essence or any of the Attributes, proceeds a posteriori and not a priori. Relying upon 1p29s, as there is an ideatum for any idea of the intellect, and as such an ideatum exists formaliter or extra intellectum, there can be clear and distinct ideas of an intellect. These ideas also exist “objectively” (as objects for the mind or intellect). Thus, the intellectual cognitions proceed a posteriori, on the basis that

gets its particular ideas or perceptions only from our senses and empirical experience. An intuitive intellect is unintelligible for our Reason. An intuitive intellect is beyond our constitutive capability and serves us only as an ideal of systematization (as though all the details of the system are deduced, as it were, from one principle). We may refer to some conceptions of such an intellect in examples taken from Leibniz-Wolff’s metaphysics or from Thales’s idea to deduce everything from the first principle, “All is water.” This holds true for the Miletus school as a whole. 10  For another clear passage that claims this, see: “All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite” (5p21; Curley I: 429). It is obvious that any finite thought cannot be deduced by an a priori procedure from the concept of God’s Attribute.

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there is a corresponding ideatum for any true idea, which follows it (such ideas are clear and distinct, namely, adequate, and as such they pertain to an intellect). This, too, demonstrates that Spinoza’s infinite intellect is not an intuitive intellect, to borrow from Kant’s terms, which deduces, without relying upon any empirical datum, all its ideas from an a priori, one principle. All singular adequate ideas form together the infinite intellect. All singular ideas form together the Attribute of Thought, the whole, unconditionally total, causal chain, whose links are reasons. This chain is causa sui. There is no cause of it outside of it. Such is not the infinite intellect, whose infinitude is conditioned (by the Attribute of Thought). The infinite intellect is the vital link that relates all ideas to God. All of them, as perceived by the infinite intellect, are true (each corresponds to its ideatum, and each is adequate, or clear and distinct). The infinite intellect expresses two aspects of Nature-God-Substance as follows: the infinite variety of it and its unity (which is the mediate infinite mode, i.e., God’s idea, that is deduced from the immediate infinite mode; in other words, the unity of intellection follows from the activity of the infinite intellect, which is an activity of individuating). Substance is abundant in an infinitude of singulars or particulars, and all of them, in a coherent unity, constitute one, fully intelligible, system. Unlike an Eleatic being, Spinoza’s Substance is abundant in real distinctions (such distinctions are not in the Cartesian sense, which is a difference between substances, but in Spinoza’s sense of the real differences between God and His modes). An undifferentiated substance makes no sense in Spinoza’s philosophy. In his eyes, contrary to Della Rocca’s interpretation in several papers (such as Della Rocca 2019), the Eleatic project was doomed to complete failure. The activity of Spinoza’s intellect is of individuating and differentiating within the context of inferences, necessary connections, and the unity of the whole of them. The intellect perceives all the effects of which God is their cause (1p16c1), the intellect distinguishes between the Attributes and their modes (1def4, 1p30) and makes inferences about them. This intelligible variety is integrated into an absolutely total unity: “[the] infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God’s Attributes and His affections. . . . But God is unique . . . . Therefore God’s idea, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes, must be unique” (Curley I: 449–450).11 Such is the nature of Spinoza’s monistic pluralism. The infinite intellect identifies natura naturans by means of natura naturata to which this intellect belongs. It identifies the unity of God-Substance-Nature by means of the individual effects from the aspect of these effects. Nevertheless, while making an infinity of distinctions, the infinite intellect reveals the necessary connections between all the expressions of the natural variety, which renders this variety a systematic unity. All God’s finite modes are integrated together into an immanent causal chain, all of whose links are real, necessary, and eternal. As such, they all belong to one and the same total causal chain, which is a unified system. All the

 I render Curley’s “God’s attributes,” “an infinite intellect,” and “his affections” to “God’s Attributes,” “the infinite intellect,” and “His affections,” which suit well my interpretation.

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Attributes and all their modes are expressions or embodiments of one and the same absolutely total reality, which is called God-Substance-Nature. This is the way that the infinite intellect proceeds in the supreme grade of knowledge, which perceives reality as a whole, including all of its distinctions and modifications, in an a posteriori procedure that is guided according to ratio’s a priori universal principles. The infinite intellect perceives the essence of any being, namely, the essence of each of the Attributes and the essence of each individual thing. Only the infinite intellect perceives, completely and fully, the infinitely, endlessly abundant system of reality. This perception is infinite (total), unconditioned (the perception of all the effects as united in a causa sui), and absolute (the perception of all the Attributes as united in Substance), and it completely reflects or represents its ideatum, namely, reality as a systematic whole, which this perception considers from a particular viewpoint or aspect. Considering so is a qualification or conditioning by the immediate infinite mode, but this conditioned mode (and any mode is conditioned by its Attribute) perceives adequately what conditions it. There is no intellect without the Attribute of Thought, but the infinite intellect completely perceives the absolute thought, which is the Attribute of Thought. As absolutely intelligible, this Attribute, including all its finite modes, are necessarily perceived by God’s infinite intellect. God’s capability of understanding cannot be limited or restricted, otherwise it would not have considered as pertaining to God’s capability. All the ideas of the intellect, finite or infinite alike, are clear and distinct and, yet, it perceives all the ideas as relating to God; and as such they are all clear and distinct. This also includes the false or inadequate or partial ideas, which within the complete context, which is God, are all true. Within this context, there are not fragments or isolation, which are the source of error or mistake. Only while uprooted from this context, true ideas turn to be false and inadequate or partial: All ideas are in God . . . and, insofar as they are related to God, are true . . . and adequate. And so there are not inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular Mind of someone. . . . And so all ideas, both the adequate and the inadequate, follow with the same necessity. (2p36d; Curley I: 474)

To be related to a singular mind means to be confined to a finite entity regardless of the universal context to which any finite entity necessarily belongs. The infinite intellect perceives all other modes, finite and infinite alike. As any other idea, this intellect is self-reflective, which is the cognitive property of any idea. The intellectual love of God is the emotional property of the supreme grade of knowledge and of the infinite intellect as well. As I will elaborate on in Sect. 6.3 below, all the other emotive properties are parts of the intellectual love of God; those of ratio are adequate and those of imaginatio are inadequate parts of these highest emotion. As an immediate infinite mode, the infinite intellect is a common property of all modes of Thought. It is the a posteriori procedure that shows this in the grade of the ratio. Perceiving natura naturata in its unity means that the infinite intellect perceives the individuating aspect of reality as a whole; the other aspect is causal. These are the two aspects of reality. In this vein, Spinoza writes: “God must be

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called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of Himself” (1p25s). Natura naturans (all the infinite causes) and natura naturata (all the effects of natura naturans) are the two faces of one and the same God-Nature-­ Substance. The infinite intellect adequately perceives this unity. This intellect demonstrates how this unity is embodied in its variety to infinity. In this way, the absolute infinite reality is adequately and fully perceived (as a total ideatum) by the infinite intellect, whose conditional nature does not diminish even slightly this adequate perception and intelligibility. Perspectiveness, individuation, and concreteness, which are entirely compatible with unity, pertain to the essence of Spinoza’s substance, unlike the Eleatic being. The relationship between any Attribute and its modes is that of adequacy, and complete, full adequacy is called coherence in Spinoza’s terms (see Sect. 3.111 above). The perception by the infinite intellect fulfills completely the two conditions of truth—adequacy and correspondence, as the correspondence of the various Attributes and of the modes as well (namely, their correspondence between the Attributes) as well are firmly maintained. The conclusions of the current section are as follows: the infinite intellect perceives Substance and Attributes as they truly are. Second, this perception is absolute and unconditioned. Third, it is also true and adequate. Therefore, Spinoza writes that A true idea must agree with its object…, what is contained objectively [mind-dependent] in the intellect must necessarily be in nature. But in nature … there is only one substance, viz. God, and there are no affections other than those which are in God … and which can neither be nor be conceived without God. … Therefore, an actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God’s Attributes and God’s affections, and nothing else. (1p30d; Curley I: 434)

This correspondence is possible only because the infinite intellect proceeds in an a posteriori way in the light of the universal principles of ratio. This intellect reveals that these principles, as universal properties, are concretely and individually embodied in each of the relevant finite modes, which are the essences of individual things. This is revealed in the supreme grade of knowledge, constructing the desired system. Because our intellect is a part of God’s infinite intellect, we obtain a part of the desired system. All the rest remains open for us, as the desired system is open. After all, our intellect is an adequate part of the infinite intellect, and adequacy means that the truth of the part is equal to that of the whole. Thus, the limitation or finitude of our intellect does not render our adequate knowledge inadequate or false (this limitation or finitude means that not all of the ideas in our mind are adequate, clear and distinct, but some of them are false, inadequate, or partial). The path to know Nature as a whole remains always open for our intellect, however finite and limited it is. We cannot reach the end of this path, but we can always advance along it more and more. In the end, there is nothing in Nature that is not intelligible and there is no false or inadequate knowledge that is incorrigible. All kinds of partial knowledge can be emended according to Spinoza. The path of our intellect is the path to an open system.

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6.3  T  he Relationship Between the Supreme Grade of Knowledge (Including the Intellectual Love of God as its Property) and the Other Kinds of Cognitions (Including their Emotive Properties) Each of my cognitions is related to my body, a particular body that actually exists (cf. Joachim 1964, pp.  177–179) and to its perceptions. Contrary to Descartes’s philosophy, our mind does not know itself nor is immediately conscious of itself. Our mind knows and is conscious of itself by means of the ideas of the changes (“affections”) that my body has undergone (2p23 and 3p9d; cf. Letter 64, Curley I: 438). As perceived, as an idea, my body is the medium of any of my cognitions and its data. There is no other medium of my knowledge in each of its grades. Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza argues that there is no knowledge without the body. Thus, each grade of knowledge is related, in each own particular way, to the cognition of the body. The first grade consists of a limited and inadequate knowledge of the changes in my body, as affected by other bodies (2p28 and d). This cognition is the confined occupation of the mind and is the source of our superstitions and prejudices and all abstract universals and transcendentals as well (2p40s1). The second grade of knowledge, too, is necessarily related to the knowledge of our body. In the definition of this grade of knowledge, the definition of ratio (2p40s2), the reader is referred to the adequate knowledge of what is common to our body and to other bodies (2p38c and 2p39 and c). 2p38c reads: “There are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men. For… all bodies agree in certain things, which . . . must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all” (Curley I: 474; and 2p39 reads: “If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human Body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the Mind” [Curley I: 474] and the corollary reads: “From this it follows that the Mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its Body has many things in common with other bodies” [Curley I: 475]). In Sect. 4.1 above, I have argued that the attempt of constructing the desired system is also in the “ambition” of the first grade of knowledge, however unsuccessful it is. This ambition is invalid. Yet, the making of knowledge, according to Spinoza, is involved with an attempt to construct a system, whether this attempt fails or not. While imaginatio fails in this attempt, the other grades of knowledge, the true and adequate ones, succeed in accomplishing their aim, partly (the second one) or fully (in the case of the supreme one). The ambition to integrate all the individual things, as finite modes, within a comprehensive and coherent system is fully accomplished by scientia intuitiva. This ambition begins with the adequate perception of our body and ends with the knowledge of Nature as a whole. All the finite modes are thus recognized as variations (in Spinoza’s terms, modifications) of one and the same theme, which is called God-Nature-Substance. Scientia intuitiva is the knowledge of all essences, those of finite individuals and those of infinite ones. Ratio, because it perceives only the common properties of individuals (which

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Spinoza also calls particulars or singulars), attains only partially the aim of knowledge, and thus it perceives only the general part and the universal laws of the desired system. As for the relationship between the various grades of knowledge, it is the relation between properties and their essence, or a mereological relationship, namely, the one between a whole and its parts in terms of adequacy and inadequacy (following 2p37 and 2p38). The whole is a coherent system (as opposed to an aggregate). And the complete knowledge concerning it, is the knowledge of God’s essence (in the sense according to Sect. 6.1 above). This relationship between the various grades of knowledge maintains their continuity. There is no leap or separation between them. As the supreme grade of knowledge is of the essence, this grade conditions the other grades as its properties. Namely, the first and the second grades of knowledge are the properties of the supreme grade of knowledge, which serves as the essence of the other grades. Nevertheless, the supreme grade, too, is secondly conditioned by the two others, as the whole, too, depends on its parts. Thus, the supreme grade gets its data from the first one and its universal properties, principles, and laws from the second one. There is a necessity in the various grades of knowledge. There is a necessity not only in the whole of knowledge, full of an infinitude of finite modes, but also in the general part of the whole (a part that consists of universal properties, general principles, and laws) and, no less, in the part that consists of the data of knowledge, all of which are empirical. Moreover, as has been said above, according to Spinoza’s philosophy, falsity and inadequacy are just as necessary as truth and adequacy, as the adequate knowledge is of both truth and falsity, and there are also adequate ideas of the false (2p42d). Who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false “must know the true and the false by the second and third kind of knowledge” (ibid., Curley I: 479). In concluding, scientia intuitiva is the essence of imaginatio and ratio, which are the common properties of scientia intuitiva. Imaginatio and ratio are partial expressions or manifestations of scientia intuitiva, imaginatio—an erroneous part, and ratio as an adequate part. And there is something positive, something of the truth, even in false ideas, because bodies cannot err but only minds can (2p35d). For instance, optical illusions are based upon true perception (we see indeed the object in this way) that is wrongly interpreted (the size of a tall building is not as small as that of my finger, even though it looks so from a particular distance). My eyes do not err while my brain is affected by optical illusion. The error or mistake are mental whereas the sight has nothing wrong with it: the tall building necessarily looks as small as my finger, when I see this building from a particular distance. Nothing can correct this image about the size of the building. And the illusion is valid for the perceptions by means of the body and not for the perceived object as it truly is. We misjudge or mistake what we see, whenever we identify our perception with the real object or state of affairs as it truly is, ut in se est, and the true fact is that the building is bigger than my finger. The false identity creates the illusion. No perception is free from our interpretation or judgment (as I explained in Sect. 4.1 above, and in the first grade of knowledge we must make many misinterpretations and misjudgments). Even the simplest datum involves an interpretation or judgement, as any

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cognitive datum belongs to a system, true or false. The false system of imagination is the common order of nature whereas the truly common order of nature can be perceived, generally, by our ratio, and the truly complete perception— by our scientia intuitiva. The perceptions of imaginatio are simply fragments that only in their complete context become integrated in the comprehensive and coherent system. Hence, as each grade of knowledge makes an attempt to construct the desired system, the grades of knowledge are also grades of systematization. Each grade of knowledge seeks what is coherently common to all entities in Nature as a whole. The erroneous generalizations that imaginatio makes do not satisfy this aspiration and yet provide us with the vital, indispensable data for any grade of knowledge. Only the supreme grade of knowledge succeeds in revealing what is really common to all the entities in Nature to the last detail. A common starting point (the cognition of our body) and a common end (constructing a comprehensive coherent system) are sufficient to guarantee the continuity, with no break or leap, of the grades of knowledge. This continuity finds various expressions in Spinoza’s philosophy. Take, for example, the expression “the emendation of the intellect.” As a combination of true, adequate ideas, the intellect needs no emendation (cf. Eisenberg 1971). TdIE, Sec. 108 mentions, and Sect. 16 demands the following: “Before anything else we must devise a way of healing the intellect, and purifying it, as much as we can in the beginning” (Curley I: 11). Spinoza also mentions cases in which the intellect imagines things (Curley I: 44). Thus, the expression “the emendation of the intellect” means that the partial grades of knowledge are of the supreme one, which is the achievement of the infinite intellect. Imaginatio is the false property (or part) of scientia intuitiva, a property that requires a complete emendation, and ratio is the adequate property (or part) of scientia intuitiva that though adequate is yet in need of a completion by details, which are finite modes. In other words, imaginatio and ratio are variations of one theme which is scientia intuitiva. Indeed, all ideas are true and adequate insofar as they are related to God-Nature-Substance, which only scientia intuitiva completely and adequately perceives in full detail. As noted above, there is something positive in any idea, including an inadequate one. Our perception of our body, even if most inadequate, still has something of the truth, something adequate, in it. Any inadequate idea requires purification or emendation. It has always been a capability of our mind to develop intellectual, adequate ideas and to know things eternally (and not temporally). This knowledge did not begin at a specific time; it has been eternal (5p31s and 5p33s). In the first stage, while under the influence of imaginatio, we are not aware of our intellectual capability, nor of our eternity. Hence the need for emendation or purification. In the final stage, that of the supreme grade of knowledge, we recognize that this capability and our eternity was latent in the first stage. This is the kernel of truth that has been there from the very beginning of the first stage of knowledge. The highest stage explicates this and reveals the eternity of the mind and of the intellectual knowledge. As soon as we complete the emendation of our knowledge, we become acquainted with the eternity of our mind and we identify our mind as an intellect. Our intellect is, in fact, the fully concrete perception of our body, i.e., of the essence of our body,

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sub specie aeternitatis, purified from any fragmenting factors. These factors bring about considering our mind as it is in the first grade of knowledge, i.e., imaginatio. In the end, we realize that the mind as an intellect (after the emendation) and the mind as an activity of our imagination (before the emendation) are one and the same. This is a process of reflection and also of emendation. Each of the grades of true knowledge is the emendation of the lower grades respectively (cf. Hallett 1957, pp. 84–85). The essence of the mind does not change in the process of the emendation of our knowledge. It always remains the same. Only the properties-parts change (the same rule is valid for Nature as a whole and its parts). Ratio as a method is a double reflection: an emending reflection of the first grade of knowledge and a reflection of the universal aspect of the supreme grade of knowledge, which is the essence of any knowledge in any of its grades. There is no change in scientia intuitiva itself. It remains as it always was from the very beginning of the process of knowledge (as imaginatio), although we were not aware of it then. The change is in our awareness and recognition that imaginatio and ratio are parts or properties of scientia intuitiva. The change is in the properties, not in the essence. Hence, scientia intuitiva concerns the perception of our body and all its consequences as eternal; it was “always” (to use a wrong temporal term) there, waiting for our awareness and recognition of this fact. The integration of both kinds of reflection means the emendation of the empirical data which, to begin with, we know in the first grade of knowledge, and finally in the supreme grade, which perceives our body as real, necessary, and eternal. Nevertheless, also without our awareness and recognition, it has been always real, necessary, and eternal. When we discover (and not invent) the essence of our body, we emend completely its perception. Hence, the process of emendation is not a progression. There is no progress of the essence. There is another expression of the continuity of the grades of knowledge: Spinoza calls both ratio and scientia intuitiva “reason.”12 Ratio has a capability of a partial restraining and command of the passions, whereas scientia intuitiva is endowed with the complete command and restriction of such passions (4p17s and 5pref). The continuity of the true grades of knowledge is noted in Spinoza’s statement that from the second grade of knowledge it is possible to ascend to the supreme one (2p47s). The striving or desire to know things by the third grade of knowledge cannot arise from the first grade but from the second (5p28). Does this extend the distance between knowledge consisting of inadequate ideas (pertaining to imaginatio) and the adequate knowledge by the second and the third grades of knowledge? No, for if my arguments at the current section are valid, the positive kernel of truth that any inadequate idea shares, safeguards the solid continuity between the inadequate knowledge and the adequate one. All clear and distinct ideas take part in the infinite intellect, and there is no idea that cannot be emended and cannot turn to be true. This holds true even for the most inadequate ideas, which belong to the first grade  Cf. De Deugd 1966, pp. 179–181. He thought that the two true grades of knowledge are mixed together in such a way that occasionally the distinction between them was blurred. In scientia intuitiva, there are principles of ratio and its proofs and demonstrations as well. On this basis, De Deugd concluded that the distinctions between the grades of knowledge are simply relative.

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of knowledge. Finally, in Sect. 5.1 above, I have mentioned various grades in imaginatio. The higher a grade in imaginatio, the closer it is to ratio. This adds to the clear impression that Spinoza keeps the continuity between all grades of knowledge firmly intact. In Sect. 3.222 above, I have discussed the relationship between essence and its properties, a relationship that is valid for cognitions and their emotional properties. In Sect. 4.4, I have discussed that relationship as valid for the emotive properties of imaginatio, and in Sect. 5.3—of the emotional properties of ratio. We have to discuss now the emotive properties of scientia intuitiva. Scientia intuitiva is the cognitive essence of a very special emotional property, which Spinoza calls the “intellectual love of God.” In Spinoza’s words, “From the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises an intellectual love of God … not insofar as we imagine him as present… but insofar as we understand God to be eternal” (5p32c; Curley I: 611). This eternal love is not of a highest person or judge, as imaginatio considers God but as He truly is, namely, the absolutely eternal God-­ Nature-­Substance. Our supreme happiness, our highest stage of being blessed, is our intellectual love of God, which is turned to all which is included in God and to the whole reality that is called God. The intellectual love of God is thus directed also toward our most intimate beloved ones, each of whom is a singular being (namely, God not as infinite but as finite, as this singular finite mode of God) that no other being can serve as a substitute for. Spinoza writes: “Blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind that stems from the intuitive knowledge of God” (4app, Sec. 4; Curley I: 588). This peace or tranquility of the mind, its blessedness, and happiness stem from our knowledge in the supreme grade of knowledge, the full knowledge of God’s essence. The basis of this intellectual love of God is joy (5p32c and 5p27d). Such is our joy of the idea of God. The definition of joy is: a “passage from a lesser to a greater perfection” (3def of the affects2; Curley I: 531). This love is an activity (to be distinguished from love in the grade of imaginatio, which is an unstable passion, one which can be easily turned into its opposite, i.e., hatred). The intellectual love of God indicates the most intensive affect we may experience. It is more robust, stable, and overwhelming than any other affect or any other kind of love. The intellectual love of God is the strongest of all affects. It is the only eternal love (5p34c) and it cannot turn into hatred (5p18c). There is no affect that can restrict this love or destroy it. As a rule, there is nothing in Nature that opposes it or can cancel it (“There is nothing in nature which is contrary to the intellectual love or which can take it away” [5p37]). Spinoza considers this love as the “end of all human actions” (TPT, Ch. 4; Curley II: 128). Nevertheless, despite its great power, the intellectual love of God does not entirely abolish all the passions (5p20s). All that this great love can achieve is to allocate the least part in our mind to passions. Instead of the excluded passions, the intellectual love of God thus occupies the greatest part of the mind. Indeed, “The love toward God must engage the Mind most” (5p16), for “this love is joined to all the affections of the Body… which all encourage it” (5p16d). How can we understand these claims and how can we justify them?

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At 5p20s, which refers to our ability to overcome the passions, Spinoza suggests a most enlightening insight concerning the relationship between love and other affects: Sickness of the mind and misfortunes take their origin especially from too much Love toward a thing which is liable to many variations and which we can never fully possess. For no one is disturbed or anxious concerning anything unless he loves it, nor do wrongs, suspicions, and enmities arise except from Love for a thing which no one can really fully possess. (Curley I: 606)

In other words: These evils seemed to have arisen from the fact that all happiness or unhappiness was placed in the quality of the object to which we cling with love. For strife will never arise on account of what is not loved, nor will there be sadness if it perishes, nor envy if it is possessed by another, nor fear, nor hatred—in a word, no disturbances of the mind. Indeed, all these happen only in the love of those things that can perish. (TdIE, Sec. 9; Curley I: 9)

When we are addicted to or obsessed by wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure (libido, in particular), we replace a real, stable object of love for the passions for such objects. While being passionate about them, we actually falsify the intellectual love of God, which is aimed toward God and all its modes, and degrade it into these passions. But our love of these inferior objects is nothing but a falsified or distorted love of God and its modes. Sensual pleasures, honor, and wealth belong to Nature. Instead of turning our great love to Nature as a whole and to all its modes, we invest our energy in these inferior ends. No sensual pleasure, honor, and wealth will satisfy our need for love. Now the relationship between our intellectual love of God and passionate love, which aims at sensual pleasures, honor, and wealth, is equal to the relationship between the supreme grade of knowledge, as I have discussed above, and imaginatio. This relationship is valid also for the emotive properties of these two radically different grades of knowledge. It is thus the relationship between passions and the intellectual love of God. This is the relationship between properties and their common essence, or it is the relationship between the whole and its part. In concluding, the intellectual love of God is the whole or the essence of all other emotions, whether active or passive, which are properties or parts of the intellectual love of God. Our discussion above, concerning the continuity or succession of the grades of knowledge, and the conclusion that ratio takes the general part of scientia intuitiva and that ratio is the cognitive property of scientia intuitiva, which is its cognitive essence, implies that the emotive properties of ratio, which are active emotions are, on the last account, also properties of the intellectual love of God. Hence, the intellectual love of God is the inclusive whole in which all emotions are included as properties or parts. While active emotions are adequate parts and properties of the intellectual love of God, passions, in contrast, are the inadequate, falsified parts and properties of this love. Experiencing the intellectual love of God, we are completely aware of our strength, both cognitive and emotive, and we really know ourselves as real, necessary, and eternal finite modes of God. As such, we know that God-Nature is our

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ultimate cause, which brings about our blessedness and happiness. We feel a deep gratitude that this cause endows us with life, vitality, and provides us with all we need. Nature gives us life and provides us with all we need for our perseverance. The awareness of this makes us happiest, and the love toward Nature, its properties, laws, and all it contains occupy our mind to the utmost. Spinoza writes: “Humility or sadness arises from the fact that a man reflects on his own lack of power” (4p53d). Humility or sadness “does not arise from a true reflection, or reason, and is a passion, not a virtue” (ibid., Curley I: 576). “Reason” at this point refers to the true grades of knowledge, i.e., ratio and scientia intuitiva. That is, no one infers the idea of one’s sadness (melancholy or depression) or humility from a true knowledge. The source of this state of mind is imaginatio. Once our cognitive state has been emended, we are liberated from this passion and enjoy the intellectual love of God with no change in our existence and action. The change is only mental or subjective, cognitive as well as emotive. More precisely, it is the change in becoming aware or conscious. Whatever is our state, it is a sufficient reason for being happy and blessed. We have no reason to complain about what Nature endows us with. On the contrary. Nothing can show more strikingly that such is Spinoza’s approach to our place in Nature, than the following words: …that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature. (4app32, the end of part 4; Curley I: 592)

This accord, in which both intellect and will (which, according to Spinoza, are one and the same) are involved, is the outcome of the supreme grade of knowledge. Our satisfaction of our essence, existence, and activity is because of the intellectual love of God, which is the emotional property of scientia intuitiva. As scientia intuitiva is also self-knowledge, this love is also self-love. Experiencing the intellectual love of God, we love ourselves as we actually are. We do not wish to be otherwise. As I have argued above, the medium of any of our cognitions, at whatever grade of knowledge, is the perception of our body. Any perception or idea of one’s body, “which is a singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves … [the] eternal and infinite essence of God” (2p45; Curley I: 481). The idea or knowledge of this essence implies the intellectual love of God. Just as the perception of our body and its various mutations is a common source of any kind of knowledge, so the intellectual love of God is the source and basis for all our emotions. It is the whole of all of them as making a most vigorous emotional force. All the other emotions, passions and active emotions alike, are parts and properties of this emotional whole. All emotions as emotive properties are based upon one, comprehensive cognitive essence, and the cognitive essence that includes within itself all essences, particularly of finite individual or singular things, is God’s essence. The idea of God’s essence raises in our mind, which is aware of this idea, the most vital of active emotions—the intellectual love of God. Hence, investigating deeply any of our ideas

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will finally end in this most powerful, eternal, and necessary love. The most real of all emotions. The inferior and passive part that is included in the intellectual love of God consists of passions, which are the reasons for our misery and depression. Spinoza’s strict determinism is valid for each of our actions; no action could be replaced by another. Yet the very same act can be performed out of very different emotions. Spinoza says so in so many words at 4p59: “To every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, without that affect” (Curley I: 579). An essence is prior to its properties, just as a whole is prior to its parts. The same holds for emotions. Moreover, when emotions are considered, there is also a priority of power: The emotive whole, namely, the intellectual love of God, is prior also in the respect of power and, thus, this love is more powerful than any of its properties or parts, that is, it is the most powerful of all emotions. Hence, following the intellectual love of God, we can allocate as little room as possible to our passions, from which we cannot liberate ourselves completely (4p4c), as we are finite and limited beings. Even in the utmost degree of activity, we must maintain some passive traces in our mind, which means that not all of our ideas are clear and distinct (namely, adequate) and not all of our emotions are active. Some of them must permanently remain passive; there are always some passions in our mind. We necessarily have, even when we reach the supreme grade of knowledge, some inadequate, obscure, or false ideas as well. Yet at this highest grade, these ideas and the passions, which are their emotive properties, do not finally determine our thoughts, emotions, and actions.

6.4  Human Happiness and the Desired System Spinoza declares the aim of the Ethics as a whole in the following words: I pass now to explaining those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or the infinite and eternal Being—not, indeed, all of them, for we have demonstrated … that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many modes, but only those that can lead us, by the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the human Mind and its highest blessedness. (2pre; Curley I: 446)

Indeed, all the attempts to construct the desired system have a common end—our happiness (felicitas) and blessedness (beatitudo). All sciences aim at one end (TdIE, Sec. 16, note e; Curley I: 11), and Spinoza declares: “I wish to direct all the sciences toward one end and goal, viz. that we should achieve … the highest human perfection” (TdIE, Sec. 16; Curley I: 11). This perfection is “the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature” (TdIE, Sec. 13; Curley I: 11). Is this a sort of mysticism or “unio mystica,” at which Curley hints (ibid., note 9)? Nothing of the sort. At this point, Spinoza mentions our end or goal, which is inseparable from our great happiness or blessedness. This end or goal is the desired

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system, the knowledge of our unity with the whole of Nature including all its modes. In Spinoza’s words: “The aim … is … so that all ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts” (TdIE 91, Curley I: 38). No mystical experience is mentioned here but a system, a unity of a whole and its parts in a particular order. Knowing our place within this system is a source for firm confidence, peace of mind, happiness, and blessedness for us. This knowledge shows us concretely how each one of us takes part in the reality, eternity, and necessity of God-Nature-Substance of which we are finite modes. Each of us is God, not as infinite but as a finite singular being. This knowledge thus liberates us from our fear of fate, and of what is foreign to our reason in Nature. Nature thus becomes our loving and safe home. Spinoza, who was so economical with words in the purely metaphysical part of the Ethics (i.e., part 1), is very generous in describing passions and their damage to us in Ethics 3 and 4. For the question of our misery and our blessedness occupies most of his mind and energy. Spinoza’s thought is focused on our misery and suffering while our mind is determined by imaginatio, and its passions occupy our mind. Nothing can contribute more to our happiness and blessedness than scientia intuitiva and its emotive property, i.e., the intellectual love of God. This most active love (to be distinguished from the passion of love, which is based upon our reception and passivity) is our salus, namely, salvation. Spinoza writes: … insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently that God’s love of men and the Mind’s intellectual love of God are one and the same. … From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or Freedom consists, viz. in a constant and eternal Love of God, or in God’s Love for men. And this Love, or blessedness, is called Glory in the Sacred Scriptures … For whether this Love is related to God or to the Mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from Glory. (5p36 and c; Curley I: 612) True salvation and blessedness consist in true peace of mind, and we truly find peace only in those things we understand very clearly. (TPT, Ch. 7; Curley II: 185)

What is the radical difference between salvation according to the historical religions and Spinoza’s sense of this term? If there is a radical difference, why does Spinoza use the same term, i.e., salus? Salvation, according to the historical religion is passive, is a benevolent act of God whereas human beings receive this blessedness in a passive way. Second, as miraculous, as it were, historical religious salvation is beyond our understanding. Notwithstanding, there are no miracles, according to Spinoza, and all occurrences are strictly natural, whereas miracles are “supernatural” and, as such, are “below reason” (infra rationis), i.e., sheer nonsense. In contrast, Spinoza’s salvation is a human activity based upon understanding our place in Nature. As such, salvation strictly follows the laws of Nature and is entirely compatible with our reason. Yet Spinoza uses the term, salvation, on purpose. Stripped of all its religious and mystical connotations, Spinoza’s salvation replaces the religious or mystical salus. It endows us with all the blessedness and happiness that historical religions have

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falsely promised us. These are vain promises, based on shameful superstitions whereas Spinoza’s philosophical redemption keeps its promise fully, as it is based upon the adequate knowledge of Nature and our place in it. Spinoza transfers the glory, peace of mind, and salvation that the historical religions have promised us to his philosophical achievement. True philosophy is a fine substitute for religion and is much more sound and robust than it. Spinoza uses mystical terms for a radically different purpose, for our real liberty instead of the slavery that the historical religions have actually offered us. Our salvation depends entirely on scientia intuitiva, the only grade of knowledge that can show each one of us in what concrete way God is his or her cause and how concretely he or she draws his or her reality, eternity, and necessity from this supreme cause. This supreme grade of knowledge removes any duality between theory or knowledge and praxis, which ratio cannot remove. Our intellectual love of God cannot change and turn into hatred (5p18cs). Why? Suppose that one assumes that God is the cause of all his troubles. Can one hate God for this reason? Spinoza writes that sadness and misery can stop being a passion and, instead, turn into an active emotion, once we understand its causes. According to 5p3, a passion stops being a passion, once we form a clear and distinct (namely, adequate) idea of it. Scientia intuitiva reveals the necessity of our existence within Nature, for without us, Nature could not have been absolutely infinite. It would have been lacking us as indispensable modes of it as a whole. In this way, this supreme grade of knowledge reveals our reality, necessity, and eternity despite our finitude. Only imaginatio considers us as mortal beings whose existence is temporal and temporary. Imaginatio causes us to fear death and to be anxious of our existence, whereas scientia intuitiva completely liberates us from such fears and anxiety. There is no death, no sudden disappearance in Nature as it is perceived sub specie aeternitatis by scientia intuitiva. Moreover, this supreme grade of knowledge removes all reasons for being unhappy and dissatisfied. Whenever we understand that our existence and everything that happens to us are necessary, and because our intellect and will are one and the same, we want our existence and all that happens to us to be exactly as they necessarily, actually, are. We accept, intellectually and willingly, our “fate” and wish it to be like that. So we are blessed and fully satisfied. In this supreme grade of knowledge no place is left for fear or hope, which are passions pertaining to imaginatio. In this way of knowing and understanding, in this cognitive way, we enjoy a radical amendment of imaginatio and the occupation of our mind by the passions that this inferior grade of knowledge brings about. Instead of the false worldview of the common order of nature, we become acquainted with the true, systematic, and coherent order of Nature as a whole including all its modes. Such is the source of our salvation and blessedness. Thus, fully satisfied, we become absolutely happy. Scientia intuitiva thus removes the duality of understanding and our mental state, the duality that ratio could not remove (see Sect. 5.3 above). Fear, hope, and other passions turn into active emotions as soon as we understand their causes and make the ideas, which are their essences, clear and distinct. Thus, knowing that God is ultimately the cause also of all our miseries and misfortunes does not make us

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unhappy but, on the contrary, happy. Active emotions are the causes of our vitality and happiness. Hence, we accept with a complete peace of mind all the misfortunes that we have to face, for all of them have adequate causes that we clearly and distinctly perceive. Consider the following example. An eminent researcher studies a horrible, fatal disease that has no cure, and the suffering it causes the patients is irredeemable. Yet, for her, her research and study is extremely interesting and fascinating. Most unfortunately, this horrible disease has inflicted her body. Since then, she has been granted a golden opportunity to be fully acquainted with this disease and its bodily and mental effects. Is she miserable and unhappy? If she knows the disease and studies it in the supreme grade of knowledge, her experience, her work, and her study bring her sheer happiness. She considers herself blessed. She knows that all things necessarily exist and operate in such a way. She knows that her fate is necessarily determined and that it follows from the laws of Nature. She is completely happy to be fortunate enough to know all this and to succeed in her research and understanding of Nature whose necessary part is such a disease. Indeed, some patients have considered calamities and misfortunes in their life, such as a fatal illness, as a gift, for this calamity has granted them the opportunity to appreciate their life much more fully and to find its meaning for them. Norman Malcolm, who did not ignore the misfortunes in Wittgenstein’s life, wrote that near the end of it, as a patient suffering from an agonizing disease (bone cancer), Wittgenstein said to the couple who had been nursing him devotedly, that he wanted them to say to those who knew him that his life had been wonderful (“Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life”) (Malcolm 1958, p. 99). In a similar vein, at the end of Oedipus at Colonus, after all the calamities that had happened to Oedipus, as a blind man entirely relying upon his daughters-­ sisters who led him, begging them: “Approach your father, child, and let me hold the form that I despaired would ever come to my embrace again” (Sophocles 450 BC, 1100 (2014)).13 Furthermore, after Oedipus’s death, the chorus urges the mourning daughters: “Since his end has been accomplished well, cease from grief, my dear ones” (op. cit., 1720).14 In this way, Oedipus ended his life blessed, happy, and fully satisfied despite all the horrible calamities in his life, from childhood until his death. What drove Oedipus and determined his fate was his determined wish to know and to understand his real identity and the causes of his history. At the end, he knows and understands all he wished for and is embraced by his loving and most devoted daughters. Oedipus thus reaches the supreme grade of knowledge, which, in the end, grants him complete blessedness and happiness. As all emotions, active and passive alike, are parts or properties of the intellectual love of God, the passions involved in one’s calamities are, in fact, as integrated

 Alternative translations: “Come, my darlings, come and let me embrace you, a hope I had lost” (by G.  Theodoridis) and “Come to your father’s arms, O let me feel a child’s embrace I never hoped for more” (by F. Storr). 14  Theodoridis translates as follows: “But girls! Since his death was a happy one, why grieve so deeply?” 13

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in this love, become actions, which cannot be causes of misery and unhappiness but are causes of happiness and blessedness. In this vein, 5p18s reads: …while we understand God to be the cause of all things, we thereby consider God to be the cause of Sadness. To this I reply that insofar as we understand the cause of Sadness, it ceases… to be a passion, i.e., …, to that extent it ceases to be Sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be the cause of Sadness, we rejoice. (Curley I: 604)

We thus love God-Nature even for the calamities He has brought upon us. We are gratitude for what we are and for all that happens to us thanks to our source of life and energy, namely, God-Nature-Substance. Based upon inadequate cognition, our misery is not fully understood. In such a state, we do not know the complete adequate causes of our misery. Knowing them, we are turned into active persons instead of being simply patients, i.e., passive persons. While in an active state, we no longer suffer. Our suffering was only subjective or only mind-dependent; namely, there was inadequacy or falsehood in it. It partly reflected our limitation and confinement but not our real state as agents. Our misery, like any of our “good” or “bad” states, has no substantial reality in it. It is a product of our imagination.15 In Letter 23, Spinoza writes that God is the cause only of “everything that has essence” and, hence, “what constitutes the form of evil, error, and knavery does not consist in something that expresses essence, and that therefore we cannot say that God is the cause of it” (Curley I: 388). This is an extremely important passage from which we can infer that any real causal chain, according to Spinoza, consists of essences as its links. Nothing but an essence can serve as a causal link. These essences are modes of an Attribute. Indeed, the same action can be conceived as “bad” or “good,” depending on its cognitive and emotive motives. If I attack somebody on the basis of a rational consideration and not out of rage or hatred, it can be considered as good, whereas if the very same attack on the same person stemmed from rage, hatred, or revenge, which are passions, Spinoza would define it as a “bad” action. Misery and unhappiness are simply false additions that our mind, in the grade of imaginatio, produces and attaches to what occurs to us. The mind misinterprets and corrupts occurrences on the basis of inadequate ideas of them. Contrary to the Stoics (5pre), Spinoza admits that even the wise person has pains and sicknesses or that there is no wise person who does not experience pain or sadness. Nevertheless, these feelings occupy a minor place in his or her mind and they do not make him or her miserable or unhappy. Some very sick persons report that they have some illness but they are not ill. They feel, behave, and act as healthy human beings do, even though they have pains and the symptoms of a fatal illness leave their mark on them. Some may say, “We are in pain, we feel pain, but we do not suffer from it.” These are examples of an attitude that Spinoza would ­recommend  Is pain a product of our imagination? Undoubtedly, no. Is pain bad? Not necessarily, for it is a sign that we have to change something or need help. Thus, in some case at least, pain is a blessing and may save life or, at least, health. Must pain be bad? No, for bad and good are simply entia imaginationis, which have no status of existing extra intellectum. Undoubtedly, pain is minddependent, and while unconscious and even lacking awareness, we feel no pain and we are not in pain.

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adopting. Such a person wants to have insights into any occurrences in his or her life. Pains, illness, and calamities are occasions for such a person to learn something new, to understand more and more, and to gain joy from such learning and understanding. Such is the way of the wise person. Another valid inference from the cited-above passage (5p18s) is that properties do not serve as links in any causal chain. This leads to some important conclusions, which help immensely our understanding of Spinoza. Indeed, the following optimistic idea is quite striking and it follows from what I have argued in the current section: … we must bear ourselves concerning matters of fortune, or things which are not in our power, i.e., concerning things which do not follow from our nature—that we must expect and bear calmly both good fortune and bad. For all things follow from God’s eternal decree with the same necessity as from the essence of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles. This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us to hate no one, to disesteem no one, to mock no one, to be angry at no one, to envy no one; and also insofar as it teaches that each of us should be content with his own things, and should be helpful to his neighbor, not from unmanly compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand. I shall show this in the Fourth Part. (2p49s; Curley I: 490)

In this situation, in which we cannot change anything that our fate has caused us, we should aspire for the necessity, we should want what we know clearly and distinctly and really understand. We find the utmost satisfaction in what is necessary and true (4app32). According to Spinoza, nothing can be more desirable than the truth. The wise desire is the desire of truth and necessity. Knowledge and understanding in Spinoza’s philosophy are powerful. The Attribute of Thought is an infinite causal chain, and causality is related to power. Thus, knowledge and understanding as clear and distinct ideas are quite powerful. Possessing such a power gives the owner of it much satisfaction, happiness, and blessedness. The calamities mentioned above oppose what follows from our nature. Their causes are external to our nature and we cannot command or restrict them. We can command what follows from our nature. Reason, in both true grades of knowledge, can command and restrict this, but it cannot command or restrict what unhuman, foreign fate has dealt us. We should bear these natural calamities with some peace of mind and tranquility. We should try our best to learn and understand them, but what we cannot avoid we must take with a spirit of happiness and blessedness with no fear and hope, which are a matter of passions, pertaining to imaginatio. Different are the catastrophes that are human made. They follow from our nature, our cognition and emotions that can be changed and emended. Nevertheless, none of our actions can be changed or be otherwise. They are not emendable, contrary to their knowledge and emotional properties. Actions have essences; they are not properties. As essences, they are links in an entirely deterministic causal chain. They could not be otherwise from what they actually are. Our will is our affirmation of, first of all, our body. 3p10d reads: “The first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is the idea of any actually existing Body, the

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first and principal [tendency] of the striving of our Mind … is to affirm the existence of our Body” (Curley I: 500). Such is our conatus, our essence, in which intellect and will are identical. As much as our conatus is increased and developed, we enjoy ourselves, love ourselves, and are happy and blessed. The greatest of our joys is the intellectual love of God, which means that the supreme aspiration of our mind is to know all things in the supreme grade of knowledge (according to 5p25, whose demonstration refers to the conatus). 5p25 reads: “The greatest striving of the Mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge” (Curley I: 608). Nothing can affirm our body, whose idea is the medium of any kind of cognition or knowledge, more than the supreme grade of knowledge to which the full perception of the most comprehensive of all the systems pertains. Taking a part in such a knowledge, we affirm our body, as a necessary mode of God, by the highest grade of knowledge. Thus, our greatest aspiration is to know things, especially our body, in the third grade of knowledge. Spinoza concludes: “The more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, i.e., the more perfect and blessed he is” (5p32s; Curley I: 610). The essence of any human being is our ability to know and understand ourselves, and on this basis to know and understand whatever we perceive. Hence, 4p26 reads: “What we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; nor does the Mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anything else useful to itself except what leads to understanding” (Curley I: 559). Thus, the most striking example of what is our conatus is in the Attribute of Thought, in which existence and action are mental. Our conatus, as it expresses itself in this Attribute, is a matter of knowledge and understanding. Bacon “scientia est potentia” finds its unique expression in Spinoza’s philosophy, in which knowledge and understanding, especially of ourselves, is the basis of all of the virtues and the source of our power. “We act only insofar we understand” (4p24d), and “He who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently, of all the virtues” (4p56d; Curley I: 576). The basis for Spinoza’s morality is cognitivist and, correspondingly, so is the basis for his psychology and the theory of emotions. The same holds true for his philosophy of action. Thus, the reasons for action or avoiding it are crucial in his eyes. (This reminds me of something of Donald Davidson’s view on action and his classic analysis of akrasia). For Spinoza, our power of understanding (intelligendi potentia) is our power of activity (agendi potentia) (ep52d). There is no understanding but as related to the adequate cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God (4p36s). From 4p37d we must conclude that the essence of our mind, as the knowledge of our body as a singular being actually existing, involves in it the knowledge of God. Our desire to know all things in the supreme grade of knowledge is the most authentic expression of our conatus. Each human being aspires to know himself or herself and to preserve his or her existence as a thinking existent, and this cannot be done without knowledge and awareness. Human activity is, first of all, a cognitive one. The question of our personal identity is the prime question that we would like to answer. In Spinoza’s words, “The ultimate end of the man who is led by reason, i.e., his highest Desire, by which he strives to moderate all the others, is that by which he is led to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall under his

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understanding” (4app4; Curley I: 588). Human impotence is simply a human lack of self-knowledge and understanding. Such a human being is mentally most unstable to such a degree that his or her self-identity is in danger. Thus, from the viewpoint of the common order of nature, the worldview of imaginatio, no human being is necessary (2pa1). In contrast, an adequate knowledge of one’s self-identity reveals one’s necessary, real, and eternal existence (despite one’s finitude). As such, each human being is considered as a link in the immanent causal chain. TPT, Chap. 4 declares: …the love of God is man’s highest happiness and blessedness, and the ultimate end and object of all human actions, the only one who follows the divine law is the one who devotes himself to loving God, not from fear of punishment, nor from love for another things, such as pleasures or reputation, etc., but only because he knows God, or because he knows that the knowledge and love of God is the highest good. … In spite of this, the man of the flesh [homo carnalis] cannot understand these things. To him they seem hollow, because he has too meagre a knowledge of God, and finds nothing in this highest good to touch or eat or affect the flesh, which is what gives him his greatest pleasure. This good consists only in contemplation and in a pure mind. But those who know that they have nothing more excellent than the intellect and a healthy mind will doubtless judge these things very solid. (Curley II: 128 – 129)

As we should remember, TdIE warns us not to succumb to the temptations of wealth, honor (ambitio) and sensual pleasures. The self-knowledge of the sage rests upon scientia intuitiva and the sage’s blessedness draws from the intellectual love of God, whereas the mob, the people of the flesh, recognize themselves and are pleased to possess wealth, honor (especially social and political ones), and to enjoy sensual pleasures to the upmost. They do not know themselves except for the first grade of knowledge, so their self-knowledge is dubious, erroneous, and very unstable (it is only vaga). Their choices of these objects and aims are false and unconscious ways to express themselves, to feel like living intensely as though they were powerful and valuable. But this is a grave illusion. Those who run after honor are dependent on the mob’s instability and fluctuations (think of popular “leaders” such as Netanyahu and Trump who are, in fact, slaves of the mob). Such persons do not know themselves and are, in fact, extremely passive relying upon “fake news” and false images. Their wealth and enslavement to “sensual pleasures” are notorious. Those who are slaves of their carnal desires delude themselves that they know other persons intimately and conquer their hearts. Those persons “know” themselves as sexually attractive. But, in fact, their carnal desires enslave them and prevent them for knowing themselves truly. The love of wealth, honor, and sensual pleasures are thus simply distorted and mistaken parts of the real love, which is the intellectual love of God. Only in the supreme grade of knowledge, do we know ourselves completely in a way that causes us much joy, happiness, and blessedness, for it is extremely pleasant to be acquainted with our intellectual power, which no other finite being in the whole of Nature has. Hence, “Self-esteem can arise from reason, and only that self-esteem which does arise from reason is the greatest there can be” (4p52; Curley I: 575). Moreover, “Self-esteem is a Joy born of the fact that man considers himself and his power of acting … But man’s true power of acting, or

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virtue, is reason itself” (4p52d; ibid.). Finally, “Self-esteem is really the highest thing we can hope for. For…no one strives to preserve his being for sake of any end” (4p52s; ibid.). Human desires for wealth, self-esteem, and libidinal objects can be reasonably satisfied to our true utility if we use our reason for such a purpose. Spinoza recommends us to enjoy rightly the pleasures that life offers us (4p45c2s). He does not accept any reduction of wealth, honor, and sensual pleasures to the highest pleasure of all, i.e., the intellectual love of God. As emended and rationally restrained, such properties can find their place in the highest pleasure as adequate parts and properties of it. Our self-esteem is valid not only for our mental or intellectual life but also for our body, bodily needs, and pleasures. Thus, our highest desire, namely, the intellectual love of God, does not exclude our “inferior” desires. Each of our desires can find its necessary place, as an adequate part, in our greatest pleasure. All of our desires are attempts to express the singular personal identity of each one of us. All of them are ways of affirming our body. Each human body is a singular finite being that can be completely and most truly known by scientia intuitiva. The body plays a crucial role in our pleasure, well-being, and capabilities, physical and mental alike. Thus, Spinoza states: …if we pass the whole length of our life with a sound Mind in a sound Body, that is considered happiness. And really, he who, like an infant or child, has a Body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes, has a Mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things. (5p39s; Curley I: 614)

Pain, suffering, and diseases bring about a narrow occupation of our mind. Suffering narrows our awareness and knowledge. Instead of contemplating the whole of Nature and our place within it, we are concentrating on the deterioration of our body. This may make us unhappy. In this state, our awareness and knowledge are confined to a limited part of reality, which we wrongly perceive as severed from the rest of it. We thus become dependent on the fluctuations of fate with no stability and security. The objective suffering of our body and mind are also causes of unhappiness, because this suffering obstructs our way to our greatest pleasure, namely, knowing ourselves in our full power and vitality. Knowing ourselves as real, eternal, and necessary finite modes of the greatest power of them all, the power or existence of God-Nature-Substance.

6.4.1  An Objection Concerning Human Happiness We are not allowed, rationally speaking, to complain because of our bodily and mental weaknesses. God-Nature has endowed us with, or allocates to us, what is necessarily determined. There is no place in Spinoza’s philosophy for a term such as “desert.” One is thus unjustified while complaining about one’s poor health (Letter 78). Hence,

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no one can reproach God because he has given him a weak nature, or a mind lacking in power. That would be as absurd as if a circle were to complain that God did not give it the properties of a sphere, or a child who is suffering from a stone, that he did not give it a healthy body. Similarly, a weak-minded man can’t complain that God has denied him strength of character, and a true knowledge and love of God himself, so that he cannot restrain or moderate his desires. For nothing else belongs to the nature of anything than what follows necessarily from its given cause. (Letter 78; Curley II: 480)

This can be acceptable, for the clear and distinct knowledge shows us that there is an infinitude of distinctions and variations in Nature, and thus an ill body and a weak mind have a necessary place in Nature no less than a sound mind and a healthy body. Finite beings are not only active, they must be passive, too, and passivity brings about suffering and dependence upon external causes, which are alien to our reason. This is acceptable. Yet Spinoza demands much more from us. He demands us to be happy about this!16 He wants us to be happy about the fact that our suffering is necessary and inescapable. If there is a necessity about our happiness, there must be also a necessity about our misery. Such a demand appears to be far beyond our reason. In order to answer this objection we have first to discuss the relationship between the desired system, as an open one, and our liberty or freedom and our eternity as well. We will now realize how Spinoza attempts to answer this objection.

6.4.2  H  uman Freedom, Human Identity, and Human Happiness In this section, I will discuss the connection between the desired system, i.e., the adequate knowledge of Nature, and our freedom and happiness. First, human freedom appears to be incompatible with the definition of freedom, which reads: “The thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone” (1def7; Curley I: 409). As finite beings, we do not exist “from the necessity of our nature alone” and we are not determined to act by ourselves alone. This definition is valid for unconditioned infinite beings alone. According to 4p4d, each of us is the adequate cause of only some of our actions and not of all of them. We serve only as partial, inadequate causes of

 Feuer 1966, p.  218 wondered whether the intellectual love of God is not neurotic or even an inadequate idea, whenever we rejoice about the calamities in our life. Does a solider love the bullet that will soon kill him, because he enjoy the laws of physics that govern the movement and velocity of this bullet? (op. cit., p. 217). God is indifferently individuated in theorems that we should enjoy, although they are completely indifferent to us and our fate (op. cit., p. 242). God is thus a geometrical merciless tyrant. Why should we love such a God? Why should we submit to Him? After all, humility is not a virtue (4p53). Are we, as the Short Treatise (Part 2, Chap. 18, Sec. 8) demands from us, simply slaves who submit to their Master and worship Him in scarifying themselves? 4p25 and its demonstration, as well as 4p52s, entirely reject such an absurd demand (cf. Letter 19, which opposes such an absurd idea).

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our other actions simply as parts of the adequate causes of these actions. In fact, we have to distinguish between an absolute freedom and a conditioned and restricted one, which is allocated to finite beings such as us. Absolute freedom pertains to God alone. Nevertheless, each finite being enjoys a conditioned and restricted freedom. According to TP, Chap. 2, Sect. 3, the freedom of each one of us is his or her natural right following his or her capability to exist and act. Each one of us has some limited share in God’s freedom. One’s freedom is the freedom of God, not as (quatenus) absolutely infinite but as a finite being, namely that one. Our freedom is thus partial and limited. If there were no particular finite freedom to any finite being, God’s freedom could not exist. His freedom is conditioned by the existence of the freedom of each of His finite modes. God’s absolute liberty exists only because the freedom of each finite mode of it is comprised in God-Nature-Substance. Terms such as “necessary,” “eternal,” and “real” have various senses (to borrow from the Aristotelian term of being, these terms by Spinoza are “said in many ways”). They are ascribed in an absolute and not restricted sense only to God. Hence, we are allowed to say that we, too, are free because we, to some extent, exist and act according to our necessity. There are some acts that are done to us or by us and are produced by us as adequate causes. The maximal human freedom is allocated to a person who obeys his or her reason (TP, Part 2, Sec. 8). Since persons act out of necessity, they are not coerced to do these acts. Hence, they are rightly called “free.” Each one of us is an adequate cause and, as I have argued above (Sect. 2.2), adequate causality is Spinoza’s principle of individuation and personal identity. Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza states that we do not know ourselves and our identity directly or immediately. Instead, we are acquainted with our identity by means of knowing the causal chain in which each of us is a link, which is an adequate cause. To know any of these links completely, we must know first the infinite causal system, in which he or she serves as an adequate cause. Each thing or occurrence in this world would not exist unless its adequate causes actually exist. For instance, Tolstoy, the author of Anna Karenina, is the only adequate cause of this masterpiece. Had Tolstoy not been born, Anna Karenina would not have existed. No other author could have written it. As an adequate cause, each person is the only and necessary cause of some of his or her actions and of some of the events that occur to him or to her. Each thing has a sufficient reason for its existence. Each thing has an adequate cause of its existence and action. An adequate cause is the one that is sufficient for inferring from it the clear and distinct ideas of its effect(s) (following 3def1). As active agents, we serve as adequate causes of some effects (3def2). Our mind is, in part, active and, in part, passive. Having adequate, i.e., clear and distinct, ideas, we are active (“our mind acts”), whereas having inadequate ideas we are passive (“our mind undergoes other things”) (3p1). Only while understanding (or having an intellect), are we acting (4p24d). Acting is self-determination that is internal (which is the way of ratio and scientia intuitiva), whereas being passive is being dragged by the common order of nature, which is imaginatio’s worldview. Hence, only free persons have adequate ideas, as 4p68d reads: “I call him free who is led by reason alone. …he who is born free, and remains free, has only adequate ideas” (Curley I: 584). Moreover, “acting from reason is nothing but doing those things

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which follow from the necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone” (4p59d; Curley I: 579). We, thus, return to adequate causality. Contrary to adequate causes, there must be partial causes. For example, Tolstoy, the adequate cause of Anna Karenina is a partial cause of infinitely other effects in the whole of Nature. Actually, each one of us is such a partial cause of all the other effects, whose adequate causes is not that person. As a vital, necessary link in the immanent causal chain, each of its links is indispensable and thus affects the chain as a whole; it takes part in the completeness or fullness of the whole chain. For had this link been absent, the whole chain would have been changed and been different, which is impossible. As an infinite causal chain, it is a causa sui, which means that only the whole chain is the cause of that unconditioned infinite causal chain; and this causa sui cannot be changed. It never could lack any of its links. The identity of each of these links cannot be changed, either. It is necessary and eternal. Each of these links has its own singular function within the whole immanent causal chain. A primary condition for awareness of my personal identity is the knowledge of the absolutely total coherent system, the absolutely infinite immanent causal chain, which is God-Nature-Substance. Each of the links of this chain is an adequate cause and, as well, a partial cause of all the other effects in Nature as a whole. Hence, the causal chain is not linear but a network in which each link is necessarily connected to all the others; and each link cannot be removed from the whole chain, which contains all there is. Each link has its own necessary, vital place in it. Each cause in this chain is not entirely passive. There is some activity of any cause whatsoever. Each finite mode takes part in the total activity of Nature. To be entirely passive means not to take part in this activity, but this means that such an entity does not exist. In the last theorem of Ethics 1, Spinoza writes: “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (1p36; Curley I: 439) and “whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of God in a certain and determinate way” (1p36d; ibid). For this reason, there is no vacuum in Nature. The continuity of the absolutely infinite causal chain lacks nothing. Each causal link is also a necessary condition for all the rest. As an adequate cause, it is also a sufficient condition for some effects. The absolutely infinite causal chain does not end in one of its links; it is always continuing. Even from the viewpoint of imaginatio, we are not entirely passive. After all, all the entia imaginationis are the products of our imagination, are the effects of its activity, even though relative to ratio, imaginatio is passive to some extent. Our passivity is simply an inadequate or partial use of our capability. There is no human condition in which any of us is only passive and reactive. There is no person who reacts entirely to an occurrence without any self-initiation. Even in similar situations, Nature as a whole depends to some extent, however small, on a passive person. Nevertheless, any human positivity is to some extent only. For each one of us takes a vital part in the activity of Nature as a whole. For 4p4d reads: the power by which singular things (and consequently, [any] man) preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature …, not insofar as it infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man’s actual existence. The man’s power, therefore, insofar as it is

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explained through his actual existence, is part of God or Nature’s infinite power, i.e., of its essence. (Curley I: 548–549)

It appears that we have two ways—the first is inadequate or erroneous and the second is adequate or true—to consider and interpret our finitude, which is an undeniable fact. The first is to consider ourselves as enslaved and passive, lacking any singular identity and, thus, any other human being can replace us. The second, the adequate way, is to perceive ourselves as active, namely, as taking part in the absolutely infinite power of Nature as a whole. Perceived or interpreted in this way, each of us has a singular identity, which, despite our finitude and limitations, is not blurred in the whole of Nature but its singularity is clearly revealed. We are acting completely within the boundaries of our capability, whenever we act according to our will-intellect, namely, as fully understanding what we do and what is done to us, as willing this to be so, and as fully aware of the universal significance of each of us. In such a position, we are not foreign to Nature and it is not foreign to us.17 Our awareness of this state replaces the erroneous worldview that leaves its mark on 4a1 with an adequate, true one according to which there is nothing in Nature that opposes or contradicts the intellectual love of God (5p37). In such a state, our mind, as the idea of our body, is considered as an eternal truth in the divine Nature (5p37d). Only those individual things that we consider as existing spatiotemporally appear to us as if there were an everlasting war among them, or between them and Nature as a whole (5p37s, referring to 4a1). This everlasting war or competition is implied from the worldview of imaginatio according to which each particular thing exists in place and time (which are entia imaginationis) and is contingent and mortal or “corruptible”18 (as I have explained in Sect. 4.3 above, death is also ens imaginationis). Thus, 5p29s reads:

 Contrary to Kolakowski 1989, the free man does not lose his freedom while he is considered as a finite mode of God. Contrary to Kolakowski’s understanding of Spinoza, in the eternal and infinite sphere the self-identity of each one of us gains its complete support. Thereis no incompatibility between the freedom of the individual and Spinoza’s philosophy, rather the contrary. It appears that Kolakowski does not reject the Eleatic interpretation of Spinoza’s Substance, as Kolakowski contrasts the free individual to the whole universe as having no differentiations. In fact, Spinoza’s modal differentiation (a differentiation of Substance to modes and not to separate, substantial parts) is rather compatible with robust self-identity of each one of us. The conditioned freedom of each one of us is part of God’s absolute and unconditioned freedom. In fact, Kolakowski does not leave room for the notion of “a human being as an adequate cause” in a theory that assumes a mutual linkage of all phenomena. With Spinoza, the singularity and uniqueness of each one of us is not foreign to the world. Hampshire 1960 and 1977 interpret Spinoza’s idea of the freedom of the individual. Cf. McShea 1971. 18  In an Aristotelian term. Aristotle assumed that particulars are temporary, hence corruptible owing to the contingency of matter, whereas forms, kinds, genera, etc. are eternal. Such is not Spinoza’s view according to which the objects of ratio and scientia intuitiva, as the true kinds of knowledge, are eternal and necessary. Hence, from the viewpoints of these grades of knowledge, singular or particular things are eternal and necessary. 17

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We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. (Curley I: 610)

Of the objects of imaginatio, 2p31c reads: …all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge of their duration …, and that is what we must understand by contingency of things and the possibility of their corruption. (Curley I: 472)

Nevertheless, contingency or possibility are simply entia imaginationis, for they are the results of our ignorance concerning the adequate causes and their order that are of the things that we considered as if contingent or possible. Considered as contingent and corruptible, we see ourselves as helpless creatures, enslaved by our fear of death and anxiety concerning our existence, feeling ourselves foreign in Nature, nor do we know our personal identity. In contrast, as soon as we perceive ourselves in scientia intuitiva, we feel secure as taking part in the eternity and power of Nature as a whole, and, in addition, as endowed with universal significance. For as an adequate cause, each of us has a universal significance, for the whole causal chain necessarily needs each one of us. This knowledge or awareness brings us the greatest joy, which is the intellectual love of God. We feel ourselves as being loved by Nature as a whole. Nevertheless, this love is active and not passive. We take part in this eternal love that Nature endows us with. Hence, as involved in this love, we also love ourselves as much as Nature loves us. Nature endows us with existence, activities, needs, and aspirations. In return, we contribute our share in the absolutely total activity of Nature. It is expressed as our joy of life that without love and gratitude means nothing. This joy or vitality can be clearly termed as our love of God and His love of us, and it is also the self-love of God: “Insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently that God’s love of men and the Mind’s intellectual love of God are one and the same” (5p36c; Curley I: 612). This active love is entirely different from the passive love of those who are mentally considered slaves. No passive love, the passion of love, is ascribable to God (5p17). In such a passive sense of love, God loves no human being and of course does not hate him or her. In contrast, our active love reveals us that Nature is our soil, as Mother Earth, the real alma mater of us (namely, not as a university, which is traditionally called alma mater). This is the essence of Nature that is not hostile to us; it is not a hostile fate, foreign, or cruel, which is alien to our needs and intimidates our existence. Removing all alienation and strangeness between each of us and the whole of Nature is a source of eternal joy, the joy of salvation, blessedness, happiness, and glory (5p36s). This removal is inseparably involved with the constructing of the desired system. It should be emphasized that the intellectual love of God has nothing to do with teleology. We do not exist for any end, aim, or purpose. Our end is our conatus, our aspiration to exist and act according to our nature and singular identity. Such is the conatus of the free human being, not of the slave who acts according to the utility of another entity and not merely for the sake of his or her own. No free human being

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wishes to “preserve his being for the sake of everything else” (4p25) but only for the sake of himself or herself. This conatus is the essence of each of us, and nothing is prior to the essence. To know one’s essence requires a knowledge in the supreme grade, which is a kind of reason (Spinoza includes both true kinds of knowledge— ratio and scientia intuitiva—under the title of “reason”). A desire that is not based on rational knowledge is that of a slave, not of a free human being. Reason’s percepts or imperatives (“dictates”), self-usefulness, and self-advantage are entirely compatible (4p18s; 4p24 and d.). Acting according to them is making ourselves perfect (Letter 19), namely, participating more or maximally in God’s activity. In this way, the free man can obtain self-advantage from his or her illness and misery. There are many examples of great authors who have turned their wretched lives into a source of creativity. Think of Kafka’s miserable life and fatal illness; think of Proust’s chronic ailments and his loneliness. Think of Virginia Woolf, whose misfortune drove her to commit suicide. Think of many such great authors in so many different times; all of them have produced joy and even happiness out of their miserable circumstances, and have brought great pleasure to their readers. The great masterpieces are personal and singular expressions of the mind of the authors. In contrast, those who are enslaved to their illnesses and wretched fates and losses are recorded as anonymous statistical cases and not as creators who learnt how to be satisfied and happy with their lives in general and creativity in particular.19 A creator’s suffering or misfortune thus becomes a part of his or her singular personality and, as such, it is a virtue for this person and for those who enjoy his or her creativity. The suffering has endowed the creator with a great advantage without which he or she would have been nothing more than another human being and perhaps not as a creator. Such a creator is not a victim of a misfortune but an active, creative person, who is entitled to be called happy and blessed. Not all of us are creators, but all of us are responsible for our way of life. To live well is an art per se, perhaps the most important one. To turn our misfortune into a good fortune is the art of life. It is in our capability not to be considered as victims of our misfortune but as free, active agents, taking part in the power and capability of Nature as a whole. It is in our own hands to live our lives as passive beings or as active and free human beings, whatever our fate. It is in our hands to live a happy and blessed life or to suffer from a miserable one. We can live as patients, as passive beings, or as active agents doing our best to maintain our rational interests and to safeguard our self-advantage. A great author, such as Dostoevsky, produced from his wretched life (as a victim of imprisonment, facing execution, years of poverty, chronic illness, losing a great amount of money because of his addiction to gambling, and two unhappy marriages, in an addition to a miserable childhood) some masterpieces that have served as sources of bliss for so many readers as well as the author himself. Misunderstanding Spinoza, Dostoevsky’s protagonist, Ivan Karamazov, attacks the merciless geometrical way of Spinoza’s philosophy  In a brilliant and esteemed paper, Saul Smilansky (1994) has suggested various striking examples of the ways in which people turn their misfortune into an exciting fortune. Yet, Smilansky has considered it as a paradox.

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(Dostoyevsky 2004, pp.  225–226). Mentioning “our Euclidean understanding,” Ivan Karamazov has in mind Spinoza’s proof of the existence of God but he entirely ignores the emotional and volitional properties of Spinoza’s ratio and scientia intuitiva. Ivan completely ignores the way that Spinoza considers human suffering (especially that of children) that can be turned into good fortune instead of as misfortune. Spinoza did not treat Nature in the way of theodicy. He does not justify the ways that God takes, for his God is not personal at all, but he refers to the ways that human beings can treat their misfortune in free and active ways. Spinoza says “Happiness consists in man’s being able to preserve his being” (4p18s; Curley I: 556). Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Proust, to name but a few, achieved their happiness in preserving their being as expressed authentically and eternally in their masterpieces. For it appears that such masterpiece will live for eternity. Such an eternal life is derived greatly from the authors’ suffering and misfortunes. A great author’s personal identity as an adequate cause is expressed adequately in his or her masterpieces. Spinoza emphasizes that we can emend each of our inadequate ideas and that the way of emendation is always open for us. Moreover, “to every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, without that affect” (4p59; Curley I: 579).20 Our capability can be expressed as passivity and weakness or as activity and powerfulness. Any finite being takes part in the absolutely infinite power of God. The same finite being can be considered as passive, helpless, and weak or as active, strong, and powerful (however limited). As active and free we are considered as parts of a coherent, most powerful and all-­ comprehensive system whereas as passive we are considered as discrete parts, isolated as temporal and local. As such isolated fragments, we take part in the common order of nature, which is imaginatio’s worldview. This worldview constructs a false system, in which we cannot know our true self-identity whereas the desired system reveals to us our true, adequate self-identity as free, wise, active, happy, fortunate, and blessed beings. The more we learn how to turn the misfortune in our life to good fortune, the more free and creative we are and, thus, the singularity of each one of us becomes obvious and crystal clear. We have the capability to transcend our misery and misfortune and thus we become happy and blessed. This is the transcendence over the prison of time, space, and fragmented perception. This transcendence makes us blessed citizens of the world, liberated from the parochial prison of imaginatio. Flaubert was a great artist who showed us how to study with great interest and pleasure the miserable fantasies of Madame Bovary. In such a way, we can study the life of a person who is a prisoner of his or her imaginatio. Studying, learning, and understanding give us a lot of pleasure and joy. Such is the way of the freedom of our mind. Understanding our inadequate ideas and passions liberates us from their slavery. Studying and understanding them, we are not under the influence of errors,  “We can be determined to one and the same action both from those images of things which we conceive confusedly and [from these images of things] we conceive clearly and distinctly” (4p59d2; Curley I: 580).

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mistakes, and passions. Studying and understanding our mind is like our studying and understanding the weather or any other natural phenomenon. The calamities of the weather threaten us and yet, as objects of studying and understanding, they bring us great joy and pleasure (following 3pre). In such a way, we gain our liberty: liberty from the passions and cognitive obstacles in our attempt of studying and understanding reality, whether mental or physical. The passions are symptoms of our mental lack of power (impotence [4p47s]). Our liberty means our command of emotions: “Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call Bondage. For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune [i.e., fate]” (4pre; Curley I: 543). In the same vein, the title of Part 4 of the Ethics is “On Human Bondage, or the Powers of the Affects.” Spinoza’s notion of freedom or liberty is not a “retreat to the inner citadel” (contrary to the interpretations of Berlin 1969 and Kolakovsky 1989); it is not a Stoic freedom. Our freedom or virtue is “acting, living, and preserving our beings … by the guidance of reason” (4p24; Curley I: 558). To achieve that, we have nothing more useful than true, adequate knowledge. Thus, this knowledge has most important practical consequences.

6.4.3  Freedom of Choice and Human Self-Determination Many interpreters and readers of Spinoza’s philosophy have argued that his notion of human freedom and his hard determinism are incompatible.21 Apparently, freedom is not compatible with the negation of free will, free choice between alternatives, and free decision (2p35s; 2p48d and s; and the final note of Ethics 2; 3p2s, and more).22

 For an exception, consider Hampshire 1971. Nevertheless, I do not think that his treatment of the problem is satisfactory, although he was right in resting human freedom on a liberty from the common order of nature, on self-determination of the mind, and on individuality. He did not treat the choice between alternatives according to Spinoza and he did not explain how changing our psychophysical state is compatible with Spinoza’s assumption that there is not potentiality that was not actualized (which is Spinoza’s actualism, following 1p17s; 1p31s; 1p33s2; and 3p7d). I will suggest quite a different way to challenge these issues. 22  Berlin, for example, argued for this incompatibility (Berlin 1966, introduction and pp. 78 and 80, 142, 146–147; and 1978, pp. 181–186). Thus, he did not consider Spinoza’s concept of freedom as a real, literal freedom. Berlin also criticized Hampshire’s defense of Spinoza’s use of the notion of freedom. I do not follow both Hampshire and Berlin in their treatments of the problem of the compatibility of Spinoza’s notion of freedom and his hard determinism. I also disagree with Parkinson that Spinoza’s freedom rests only upon self-determination (by the conatus) and not on free choice between alternatives (Parkinson 1971). Arne Naess’s arguments according to which Spinoza’s determinism is atemporal, are, obviously valid and sound, as time is ens imaginationis (Naess 1973). However, he misunderstood what determinism of essential relations should be. According to Naess, this determinism is of classes of individual things, which reminds one of Aristotle’s notion of essence, but not that of Spinoza. 21

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Spinoza himself defends his theory of freedom against some attacks (Letter 21; Letter 56; and Letter 58). Indeed, there is much in his philosophy that is compatible with the individual’s freedom, because this freedom requires a choice between alternatives, an individual’s self-government, self-determination, and self-judgment, which are free and independent. All these factors are essential for the individual’s freedom. The universal determination fixes the essence of the capability and power of any person and his or her limitations, but it does not determine the ways in which he or she chooses to use such capability and power. The decision about this use is up to him or her, as a rational free human being, only. It is up to us, as free rational beings, to choose whether to continue living in a state of self-unawareness, while our worldview is of imaginatio and, as such, enslaved to passions, tyranny, superstitions, and so on, or to become self-aware of ourselves as rational, free persons. In the Preface of TPT, Spinoza writes: “Most people, I believe, do not know themselves” (Curley II: 66) and from this miserable state of mind they can liberate themselves. Our natural weakness, into which we were born, is a lack of power, in which “man allows himself to be guided by things outside him, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself, demands” (4p37s1; Curley I: 566). In contrast, a maximal use of the capacity that is allocated to each of us by the universal determination of Nature allows each one of us to liberate himself or herself from the tyranny of passion, to live peacefully in a free, liberal democratic state (when it is actual), and to enjoy being in our prime of cognition, intellect, active emotions and activity, and to be happy and blessed. All this rests upon the assumption that there is no idea of any change in our body that we cannot emend: “There is no affection of the Body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept” (5p4; Curley I: 598). Thus, we can emend any of our ideas and, thus, its emotional properties, too. It is only because such an emendation is up to us. We are free to choose to emend or to leave the data of our knowledge without such an emendation. The choice between the alternative of slavery to inadequate ideas, superstitions, and passions, on the one hand, and the alternative of freedom, adequate ideas, rational approach, and active emotions, on the other—this choice is free and depends only on each one of us. Thus, contrary to many, too many, received interpretations, Spinoza’s philosophy acknowledges a free choice between alternatives. In what follows, I will explain how such a free choice is possible, actually necessary, according to this philosophy. The strict determinism of Nature as a whole does not coerce us to remain slaves to our passions, superstitious, and wrong ideas. It allows us to choose freely between emotional and cognitive alternatives, even though it does not allow us a choice between different actions (which are determined strictly by the causal necessity of Nature as a whole). To explain this, we have first to remember that each one of us is a link in an infinite causal chain and that each of the finite modes of that chain is an

Naess thus misunderstood what Spinoza’s concept of essence really means. Naess also confused self-determination with free choice. They are not the same.

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essence of an individual thing (in this case, each one of us). Nevertheless, each of my free choices or decisions is not a link in that chain. The chain determines only actions and beings, which are essences; it does not strictly determine properties. Cognitive and emotive properties are not determined by the universal determinism; these are left to the individual’s discretion. Properties are not links in that causal chain. For this reason, properties, unlike essences, have no parallels in other Attributes (see Sect. 3.222 above). For instance, reflection is a property of ideas, whereas each idea has a parallel mode in the Attribute of Extension; reflection has no such parallel, for it is ascribed only to thinking modes. In the same vein, each Attribute has properties of its own. Spinoza’s commitment is only to the parallelism or unity of links in the total causal chains, which are Attributes but he has no commitment to the parallelism of properties of different Attributes, properties that are not such links. In concluding, Attributes’ parallelism and strict determinism are valid only for causal links, each of which is a mode (i.e., the essence of an individual thing), and not for their properties. All my free choices and decisions depend only on my essence and not on any other essence, including God’s essence. Each of my free choices or decisions concerning my cognitions and my emotions depends only on my essence alone. Nothing coerces such a choice or decision. As a result, I am a link in a strictly deterministic causal chain whereas my cognitive and emotional properties are not such links. Strict universal determinism is valid for modes only, not for their properties, none of which is a link in the unconditioned infinite causal chain, which is an Attribute. The state of affairs concerning the balance of powers in all of Nature, a balance that is the total ratio (proportion) of movement and rest cannot change; this state of affairs is not affected by any of my free choices or decisions. Thus, Nature and the universal strict determinism are entirely indifferent to my happiness or misery, which are absolutely up to me and to me alone. More precisely, Nature has endowed me with all I need to be happy and blessed. It is up to me whether I use fully these happiness and blessedness, this liberty, or only a part, even a very small part, of it. This will not change my personal identity. I will be the same person, whether fortunate or unfortunate, happy or unhappy. All of my actions will remain exactly the same, whether I am happy or unhappy. In Sect. 3.222 above, I distinguished between causation of the first order, namely, the causation by essences or finite modes, and causation of the second order, the causation of properties, for instance, when an active emotion overcomes a passive one, i.e., a passion. The causation of the second order of my cognitions and emotions is entirely up to me and is not determined by the causation of the first order, i.e., the causation of essences or modes. This causation depends only on me and it does not change the universal state of affairs concerning the balance of the powers, which is a matter of essences or modes only. As for the causation of the first order, Spinoza declares loudly and clearly: “God is absolutely and really the cause of everything that has essence” (Letter 23, Curley I: 388). Spinoza writes also that good and evil have no essence. Good and evil are what are to my advantage or disadvantage, respectively. Thus, the immanent causal chain is entirely indifferent to

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what is good or bad for me. It is only up to me. So are my happiness and unhappiness, which have no extra intellectum status. They are clearly mind-dependent. My essence does not change, whether I am happy or unhappy. I am one and the same person, who has one and the same personal identity, entirely irrespectively of my happiness or unhappiness. No eternal essence can be changed. The change in my cognitive state (for instance, a cognitive emendation) does not change my essence at all. Thus, since imaginatio and ratio are the cognitive properties of their cognitive essence, which is scientia intuitiva (see Sect. 6.3 above), and since this eternal essence cannot be changed, all that can be changed are the cognitive and emotional properties, including my unhappiness or happiness, sadness or joy. In a way, I am eternally doomed to be happy, but it is up to me whether I will experience this mental state of mine as happiness or as unhappiness. Thus, our cognitive emendation, too, does not change our essence or personal identity at all, whereas the universal determinism is valid only for essences, identities, or modes. The ratio (i.e., relation or proportion) of the movement and rest, the ratio of the activity and passivity, of my body, whose idea is my mind, is not changed due to my cognitive and emotional state. My reflection is changed, whenever I become aware of my identity and my states, but this does not change the idea that is my mind, the idea of my body, whose ratio of movement and rest is eternally fixed, unless I am abolished and become another, different entity (following 4p39d and s). Of course, subjectively, my happiness or unhappiness makes all the difference to me. In any event, we should not forget that, consistently, Spinoza is an actualist, namely, according to him, there is no potentiality or possibility that has not been actualized (following 1p17s; 1p31s; 1p33s2; and 3p7d. 1p26, 27, 29, and 33, mentioning “thing” in the sense of an individual thing, which has a singular essence). Only actualities exist. Thus, the solution of the problem of the compatibility of the individual freedom and the universal strict determinism does not depend upon any distinction between non-actual entities or powers and actual ones. Everything, according to Spinoza, is actual. Any change that is only up to us is not an individual thing (res singulares) but only a particular detail (singularium). As such it is not a link in a causal chain. The essence brings about such details, which are its properties, in a causation of the second order. This causation, as implied only from the relevant essence, is also necessary but this is a free necessity, not a coerced one. Nevertheless, the determinism is not valid for these properties but it is valid concretely or specifically for the modes of the Attributes. It is valid singulariter only for essences, and only generaliter on properties (which pertain to ratio). For the universal lawfulness, according to which “all things have been predetermined by God” (1app; Curley I: 439), it makes no difference which decision or choice I will make while changing my cognition and emotions. Any such decision or choice results only from my singular essence and from nothing else, including God. This is a free necessity. All is made and exists from necessity, but nothing without me determines what will be my rational decisions and choices concerning my cognitions and emotions, each of which is not an individual thing that has an essence of its own. They are singularia but not singular

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things. My essence alone is the essence of my cognitions and emotions. All my rational decisions or choices are up to me alone. They are entirely autonomous. On the basis of distinguishing between causation of the first order (namely, of essences or modes) and that of the second order (of properties), I have tried to solve, in the current section, the problem of the compatibility of Spinoza’s commitment to the individual’s freedom, as the title of Ethics 5 declares in so many words, and his commitment to strict universal determinism. Nevertheless, according to Letter 58 and 3p2s, the case appears to be that Spinoza excludes the possibility of a free decision and that of free choice. In other words, Spinoza writes that freedom is not a free decision but a free necessity (Letter 58; Curley II: 429). In fact, the decisions that this Letter discusses are about actions, which are modes-essences, and not about properties. Moreover, the examples that Spinoza presents in this Letter are not of the decisions of free human beings but of those of ignorant people who are conscious only of their appetites and drives and not of the real causes of their actions. None of these examples are of free choices or decisions and all are reactive. The “freedom” about them is fictitious, a product of imaginatio only. The causes that are mentioned in this text are all external to the agent. Thus, the necessity under discussion is a matter of coercion, the coercion by external causes. Hence, the agents in these cases, mentioned in Letter 58, are not the adequate causes of their actions but only partial, inadequate ones. All these examples are not of a real individual freedom but of a fictitious one. The agent, who is the inadequate cause of his or her action, imagines a freedom that he or she does not have in fact. Such an agent takes part as a spatiotemporal link in the transient causal chain and not in the immanent one. In the transient chain, as a product of imaginatio, each link is in fact discrete, as if independent from the rest. Under the influence of the notion of such a chain, we imagine one’s will to be as though it is independent and uncaused, as if it were a kind of a causa sui. Nevertheless, such a will is not free at all but is, in fact, determined by external causes and does not follow from one’s essence as an adequate cause. Real freedom pertains only to links in the immanent chain, in which each link is real, necessary, and eternal. In this chain, all links constitute together a total cause, which is causa sui, the absolutely free cause. In 3p3s, too, when Spinoza denies the existence of free choice or decision, he does not discuss the change from passivity to activity or the emendation of imaginatio. In this scholium, he discusses only passions and not the emotions of free, wise human beings. Moreover, here too, he does not refer to cognitive or emotive properties but only to the causes of actions: “Men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined … the decisions of the Mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the Body varies” (Curley I: 496–497). It is a clear picture of the mind’s fluctuations, which are so typical of imaginatio. There are no free decisions or choices concerning actions, each of which is a mode, an essence as it is in this or that Attribute. Our freedom is, first of all, our liberation, as far as possible, from passions whereas all the examples given in this scholium are of persons who are governed by their passions or the fluctuations of fate. In this scholium, Spinoza deals with fantasies, dreams, imagination, memory, or “ludic

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dreams” (dreaming while being awake) and not with conscious, sober states of mind. In such states of mind, none of our decisions is really free. Thus, “those … who believe that they either speak or are silent, or do anything from a free decision of the Mind, dream with open eyes” (ibid.). Such are not our decisions or choice to emend our cognitive and emotive states of mind. Such decisions or choice are really free. Nevertheless, a free will is simply an ens imaginationis, which is philosophically illegitimate, as Spinoza concludes at the end of Ethics 2. In contrast, a rational, free choice or decision is a property which is not an ens imaginationis that is necessarily deduced from the essence of a free orrational person. Free choice or decision does not pertain to a little child, a fool, one who has decided to commit suicide, and a lunatic, because all of them are in the hands of a fluctuating fate, in the hand of fortuitous, as it were, external causes, which have overcome and coerced such people against their nature (about suicide, see 4p20s and 4p18s, third conclusion). Spinoza suggests various ways to the reader to emend his passive states within the boundaries of the capability of his body and mind. Undoubtedly, Spinoza denies the possibility of any free will, which is independent and unconditioned. Such a will is not an intellect; neither is it finite. Thus, according to Spinoza, the notion of free will is an absurd idea. Denying that, he does not exclude the possibility of free decision or choice. He acknowledges a rational choice between alternatives. He also acknowledges our capability of preferring the “good” (namely, what is useful for us) to the “bad” (which is not useful but may damage us) although occasionally we are attracted by the “bad” and wish for what may damage us. Unlike Buridan’s ass, a human being can choose between two apparently identical or equal alternatives and can pick one of them. Unlike this stupid ass, we prefer not to preclude both alternatives. Being governed by ratio, we are governed by universal rules or imperatives. Ratio is the real “governor” of common properties and of our public or political life. The fact that free choice or decision is about properties and not essence leaves room for the individual’s freedom, while there is room enough for human liberty in the democratic state, in a free republic (see Sects. 4.6 and 5.3 above). Even though human beings are not a (political) kingdom within the kingdom of Nature, our political or social freedom is not determined by external causes in Nature. Thus, we are the adequate causes of our political or social realms. Thus, Spinoza writes: Though I grant, without reservation, that everything is determined by the universal laws of nature to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate way, nevertheless I have two reasons for saying that laws of this second kind depend on a decision of men. First, because insofar as man is a part of nature, he constitutes part of the power of nature. So the things which follow from the necessity of human nature—i.e., from nature itself insofar as we conceive it to be determinate through human nature—still follow, even though by necessity, from human power. That’s why we can say quite properly that the enactment of those laws depends on a decision of men: it depends mainly on the power of the human mind, but in such a way that the human mind, insofar as it perceives things as either true or false, can be conceived quite clearly without these laws [that depend on a human decision], although it cannot be conceived without a necessary law, as we have just defined it.

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Second, I have also said that these laws depend on a human decision because we ought to define and explain things through their proximate causes. That universal consideration concerning fate and the connections of causes cannot help us to form and order our thoughts concerning particular things. Furthermore, we are completely ignorant of the order and connections of things itself, i.e., of how things are really ordered and connected. So for practical purposes it is better, indeed necessary, to consider things as possible. (TPT, Ch. 4; Curley II: 126)

Indeed, the laws that we legislate are subject, like anything else, to the universal laws of Nature but this necessary subjection is general and not particular. It is impossible to deduce what we legislate as laws from these universal laws. The laws that we legislate are deduced from our nature, from our capability, which is Nature’s capability or power, not as (quatenus) infinite but as finite, as human. Following from Spinoza’s rejection of the Eleatic being, any distinction, which is mind-­ independent or extra intellectum, is real. Thus, although the human realm is not a kingdom within a kingdom, it is still a real, distinct realm within the whole of Nature. This realm is governed by particular laws, different from the universal laws of Nature. These particular laws are entirely up to us. And their existence is necessary, as it is necessary that there is room enough for the human realm within the absolutely infinite, containing all, Nature. In the human realm there is room enough for free decisions, which are rational and human-dependent. They are derived from human necessity. Our observation of the universal laws of Nature will not show us, in an a priori deduction, the particular laws that are human made. The realm of these particular laws can be considered, apparently contradicting Spinoza’s formal approach, as a realm of possibilities. Notwithstanding, do not misunderstand this: the possibilities in consideration are actual, they are not purely possible, as Spinoza’s actualism is well-maintained. Such possibilities mean that the universal laws of Nature do not show us concretely how the human laws are a priori deducible from those universal laws. In this way, they leave the human laws in a realm of possibility, the realm that none of its laws is particularly or concretely determined by the necessity of the universal laws. This is the realm of human possibilities that are subject to human necessity for they follow from our nature and not from the universal nature of reality. Human free, rational decisions or choices are possible as they follow from the free necessity of the essences of human beings. These human laws are free because they are not forced upon us by Nature. We wish to live in security and physical health and, to some extent, these aims are up to us because we are their proximate causes. Nevertheless, there is also a place for external causes, those of fate or fortune, that determine our physical health and security and are not under our command (TPT, Chap. 3). The political or social realm itself is restricted, for within it there is the realm of the privacy and freedom of each of the citizens or members. There are private free decisions and choices that are determined specifically by the essence of the individual and not by the universal laws of Nature and those of the society and state in which this individual lives independently, to some extent, of Nature and of the state as well. The individual is the approximate, adequate cause of such decisions and choices.

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The realm of the privacy of individual persons is a faculty (potestas).23 In the same vein, it is up to us, or it is in our power to emend our cognitions and emotive properties and to legislate political laws.24 Our faculty or power (potestas) indicates our capability of making decisions and choices, command, and determinations. It includes self-command and sovereignty, possibility, opportunity, and giving permission and liberty. Potestas is compatible with free necessity, which is valid for general and common properties, which are the object of ratio. These properties, which have no essences of their own (instead, they are properties of an essence), leave room enough for an independent faculty of our capability of choosing and deciding. This faculty is compatible with Spinoza’s strict determinism, which is valid for essences and is not compatible with contingency or fortuitous factors (Letter 37). Fate or fortune is not in our hands; it is not up to us and is foreign to our reason. In contrast, our potestas to choose, decide, to be happy, and so on is up to us and without it there would not have been any reason for writing the Ethics. Without such a potestas, no ethical praxis would have been possible. Each of our free, rational decisions reflects adequately our essences without changing anything concerning Nature as a whole, whose universal laws do not “consider” anything concerning our happiness or unhappiness, our advantage or disadvantage. Consider the following: …nature is not restrained by the laws of human reason [alone], which aim only at men’s true advantage and preservation, but [also] by infinitely many other [laws], which are concerned with the eternal order of the whole of nature, of which man is a small part [particula]. It’s only in accordance with the necessity of this eternal order that all individuals are determined to exist and produce effects in a definite way. (TP, Ch.2, Sec. 8; Curley II: 511)

Now, according to TP, Ch. 2, Sec. 11, …a Mind is completely its own master just to the extent that it can use reason rightly. …I call a man completely free just insofar as he is guided by reason, because to that extent he is determined to action by causes which can be understood adequately through his own nature alone, even though they determine him to act necessarily. (Curley II: 512)

The necessity under discussion is that of the universal determinism allocating to each one of us a capability or power within which we are free to act according to our nature. Ratio, governing this determinism, is a knowledge of common properties and not of individuating essences. Our properties are not particular things that are subject to the universal determinism.  Spinoza is a precursor of the Enlightenment’s idea of the separation, of the various faculties, first of all, philosophy and theology, and, also, the state and religion. The Enlightenment demands that the state should be, as much as possible, separate from religion, especially a historical one. Kant and the German Enlightenment borrowed some of its major principles from Spinoza’s philosophy, especially from the TPT. 24  For example, it is in our power to order the bodily affections according to the order of the intellect (5p10). Cf. 2p47s: “we can [posse] deduce;” 5p4: “There is no affection of the Body of which we cannot [possumus, namely, up to us, we can] form a clear and distinct concept” (Curley I: 598); 5p3c: “The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power [in nostra potestate est], and the less the Mind is acted on by it” (Curley I: 598); 5p14: the mind can (potest). 23

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Individual or singular things, which have essences of their own, are subject to Nature’s universal laws but also, compatibly, to particular determinism of their own, that of essences only. Indeed, according to Sect. 2.2 above, Spinoza’s philosophy acknowledges a principle of individuation that is valid for essences alone but this philosophy has no principle of individuation that is valid for properties or particulars which have no essences of their own but they supervene on some modes. Were such a principle in Spinoza’s philosophy, even an entirely fictitious being would have an adequate cause that rests upon false and distorted perception of the finitude and limitation of our cognition or knowledge. In such an absurd case, there would not have been a difference between entia imaginationis, such as time, place, and death (to be elaborated on below), and entia realia (which are real individual things, including their essence and properties). Also, in such an absurd case there is no difference between passions, whose true knowledge cancels them and abolishes their effects (5p2 and 3), and active emotions, which a true knowledge discovers their reality and increases their good effects on us. A principle of individuation for essences only (which cannot be changed) makes possible the change and emendation of the properties that are deduced from these essences. Universal determinism rests upon the notion of adequate causality (see its definition in 3def1), which is valid also for the faculty or power of the individual person and its liberty. Any conditioning of myself by the system of Nature as a whole involves the secondary conditioning in which I condition that system including all its finite modes. Each one of us is a cause of everything: for some effects, one is an adequate cause, for all the others—one is only a partial cause. This necessarily follows from the nature of Spinoza’s notion of causality, which is not linear but a network causality. As a link in the immanent causal chain, I condition it a posteriori. Each of the links of this chain maintains a proportion (ratio) of activity and passivity. Insofar as my activity is greater than my passivity, I am more free and liberated, and I am more self-determined. My self-determination involves no coercion but a free necessity, which determines the boundaries of the capability of my faculty or power. Within this faculty, I am free to choose between alternatives and to make free decisions concerning my cognitive and emotive states but not my actions. It is true that only God-Nature-Substance is absolutely causa sui but in a specific and limited sense I myself, as a finite mode of God, a causa sui of some of the changes that I undergo or create. Only God is absolutely free of external restrictions whatever but His finite modes are free, to some extent, subject to restrictions. According to Spinoza’s philosophy, there is room enough for free self-determination. Finally, the capability of free judgment is up to any of us albeit in a restricted realm (TP, Chap. 2, Sects. 9–11), and there is no political authority that can take it from us. Any political authority that attempts to do so eventually invalidates itself. In concluding, Spinoza’s philosophy maintains the three following conditions without which the individual’s freedom is impossible: a free choice between alternatives, a realm of the individual’s self-command and self-determination, and a free

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personal judgment.25 Spinoza’s notion of individual’s freedom is not a pretense, deception, or vacuous concept. It is serious, meaningful and sound. Whenever Spinoza excludes the possibility of free decision or choice, he refers to fictitious freedom, a product of our ignorance and imaginatio. In such cases, he does not discuss true freedom, which pertains to any free, wise person.

6.4.4  H  uman Eternity, Salvation, Happiness, and the Knowledge of Human Singularity in the Desired System Any free, wise human being is exempt from the fear of death: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (4p64; Curley I: 584). The reason is that the free person knows that he or she is eternal.26 No eternal being should fear death. According to Spinoza, the notions, “eternal,” “necessary,” and “real,” share the same denotation (following 5p29s and

 Contrary to Berlin’s (1969) interpretation, Spinoza is committed to the freedom and liberty of individual persons within the restrictions of the universal determinism and the power of the state. 26  As we shall realize in the current section, our eternity, being entirely atemporal, is neither sempiternity (existence in all times; always) nor immortality. Hence, LeBuffe’s intepretation of Spinoza’s immortality of the mind after the “death of the body,” as it were, is entirely groundless (LeBuffe 2010, p. 211). LeBuffe has entirely misunderstood Spinoza’s notion of eternity in, for example, arguing the following: “[Spinoza allows] for an interpretation of the eternity of the mind under which that eternity is a kind of sempiternity . . . there is a time at which I exist as a mind without a body” (op. cit., pp. 211–212), and “before the body existed, I did not experience passions, and after the body is dead, I will once more be free of those bonds” (ibid.). Much better is the following: “the misidentification of eternity for sempiternity is an entrenched delusion . . . the false supposition that the eternal part of the mind endures” (op. cit. p. 213). In contrast, Garver 2018 demonstrates that the project of the Ethics “is to show how people can become immortal” (op. cit., p. 6). Nevertheless, this cannot render them infinite (following, for instance, 2p11d). For another solution of the problem of the immortality of the mind, based upon the analysis of Spinoza’s idea of the formal essence of the human body (which, in this case, is an essence of a thing that has no actual existence), see Garrett 2018, pp. 243–262. The question how can we reconcile Spinoza’s actualism with the existence of formal essences that, apparently, have no correspondent ideatum (or actuality) can be solved differently from the interesting solution that Garrett’s suggests (op. cit., pp. 247–248), as, unlike him, I do not think that such essences are infinite modes. The eternity of the mind is perceived by scientia intuitiva, which is, as I have explained above, the knowledge of the individual, particular, or singular essences. This holds true also for formal essences. Thus, in the case of the human body, for instance, any essence, under this grade of knowledge, is perceived as individual. One may think of the formal essence of a thing that does not actually exist, or no longer exists (as in the case of the dead), and this idea that one has, has a correspondent, an actual extended mode in one’s brain. In the same vein, the ideas of non-actual things exist in God’s intellect or infinite idea, and as such these ideas must have a correspondent ideatum in God’s Attribute of Extension. For another treatment of the problem, see Garber 2005. 25

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5p30d). The eternal presence of the real individual things,27 as perceived by scientia intuitiva, is not restricted by any temporal or local conditions and is not fragmented and uprooted from the immanent order of causes. As connected by necessary, inseparable bonds, this eternal presence is necessary and cannot be contingent. The real individual things, which are the actual existing bodies and minds, are perceived sub specie aeternitatis. This supreme grade of knowledge reveals how Nature as a whole depends, in a secondary sense, on each of the eternal essences of singular things. This also indicates their reality, necessity, and eternity. We are afraid of death because we perceive our body as something that endures in time, limited by local conditions, while our mind is imprisoned in our narrow associations, subject to cognitive and emotional fluctuations, and it is not aware of the necessary connections that relate it to the intelligible desired system. As though we were an isolated fragment of Nature, we perceive our mind and body as perishable (or, at least, our body, and as a result there is an absurd duality of our mind and body). In this way, we perceive our mind and body as helpless, passive beings subject most of the time to the peril of death. Those who believe in the mortality of the body but in the immortality of the mind do not liberate themselves from fear and hope, doubts, and uncertainties and, especially, the dread of God’s punishment. If such a personal God is omniscient, He must know all our sins, including those of which we not aware, and for these sins He will punish us harshly. Historical religions, assuming the immortality of the mind and the mortality of the body, rule the believers by means of their dread of God’s punishment. As for rewards, who knows … only God knows. In contrast, adequate knowledge minimizes the fear of death and its place in our mind (5p38: “The more the Mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death;” and 5p38d: “the more the Mind knows things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the greater the part of it that remains”). Scientia intuitiva constitutes the desired system, which explicates the necessary bonds that connect each of us with that system in the following way: …our mind insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect. (5p40s; Curley I: 615)

Each thinking mode is a necessary, indispensable link in an infinite immanent causal chain. This chain is the desired system, which shows concretely and clearly “how our Mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and consequently depends on God” (5p36s; Curley I: 613). In Sect. 5.22 above, I have argued that the Attributes-Substance unity is prior to the modes, but the dependence of the Attribute on its modes is a necessary result of the whole of reality being a network, a coherent system and not a foundational, deductive, or linear one. Hence, the Attribute necessarily depends on each of its  Spinoza refers to the “presence everywhere” of “these fixed and eternal things [that] are singular” (TdIE, Sec. 101; Curley I: 41).

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modes. Were even one of them missing, the whole reality could not be considered as absolutely infinite for, in such an absurd case, it would have been lacking this particular mode. As Letter 4 so “cheerfully acknowledges”: “if one part of matter were annihilated, the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same time” (Curley I: 172). As an absolutely total, the desired system needs all of its modes, all of the possibilities or “variations” of the modes. Without any of its modes, the Attribute and, as a consequence, Substance, be different, which is absolutely impossible according to Spinoza. Now, this dependence of the desired system as a whole on each of the thinking modes, and, correspondingly, on each of its extending modes, means that these modes, though finite, are eternal. On this basis, our acquaintance with the desired system is sufficient to minimize our fear of death to such a point that it no longer affects us. Our fear of death is basically infantile. Infants burst into tears, when their parents leave the room and are not seen for a while. In a similar manner, we mourn our dear departed. They seem to disappear from the world, not as an eternal system, but from the common order of nature, which is the world as imaginatio considers it, as spatiotemporally existing. Infants know nothing about a “space” in the terms of Spinoza’s Extension and, thus, as imaginatio considers it, they consider their nursery or room as isolated from everything and even as the world itself. Similarly, a poor and illiterate peasant, before the twentieth century, living in a remote, deserted OR abandoned village, who had never travelled outside of his village, could believe that the village and its surroundings were the whole world. Such a confined worldview, which is subject to spatiotemporal conditions, makes such people believe in death. As if the dead had suddenly left our world. Nevertheless, such is not the case with Nature, which is continuous without any breaks, miracles, or vacuum and which is not temporal at all. Nature and all its modes are eternal. Each entity that “was” in our world and has disappeared, has left its effects in the world. As an adequate cause it continues affecting the world, immensely or very little, and yet for the infinite intellect these effects are discernible and real. In this way, in a continuous reality with no vacuum, lacuna, or void, each real entity is eternal. Yet, only conscious entities may fear death, and for us, human beings, Spinoza offers a very special philosophy that can minimize our fear of death and its affects upon us. Nothing that has disappeared from our world did not turn into nothing. It lost its limited identity, its ratio of passivity and activity; its conatus, changed into a different ratio of passivity and activity, into a different conatus. Remember, the principle of personal identity is adequate causality, and since the dead are continuing to affect our world, their personal identities are also retained. In other words, the dead are timeless (atemporal) namely, eternal. Their affects, like those of living people, are limited but, nevertheless, real and necessary. Scientia intuitiva shows us the way to realize that death and destruction, equally to the contingent or the “possible” (namely, the non-actual, “pure” possible), are nothing but entia imaginationis. There is no reason for being afraid of ens imaginationis of any kind (what Hamlet calls “false fire”) and, hence, death should not terrify us. The fear of death is one of the most powerful reasons for our misery, and

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thus, eradicating this reason contributes significantly to our happiness and wellbeing. As much as no ens imaginationis is extra intellectum, as each of such entities is not mind-independent, we should not ascribe death to reality as it truly is. Death is only “in our head” (namely, it is only mind-dependent). Only our limited attention makes us consider mundane reality as subject to destruction and death although there is nothing in the nature of the things in themselves (ut in se sunt) to justify our fear of them. They are products of our imagination, misinterpreting the limitation of individual things. Indeed, being far from us as finite beings, our effect on Nature diminishes, but the infinite intellect can perceive it even when the effect lies in the farthest causal distance. In the long run of history, the effects of Napoleon’s activities will diminish but will never disappear entirely. The same holds true for each one of us. For each one of us leaves its marks and effects on Nature as a whole, each one of us, in essence, in existence, and in activity, has a universal, infinite significance, which is eternal. No passage of time, however long, can destroy the universal effects of each one of us as necessary, indispensable beings. Each one of us takes part in the eternity, necessity, and reality of Nature as a whole, of the eternity and necessity of causa sui, of the immanent causal chain. In each one of us, the eternity of God-­ Nature-­Substance expresses itself as God qua finitus est, namely God as one of us, one of the finite modes. Any modal variation of God is eternal. Thus, after death, the dead continue to affect us and others of their acquaintance. The apparent void that they leave behind them is simply nothing, for they continue to affect us in various ways. The dead continue to function as adequate causes, though their effect has changed after their death. Only those who wrongly believe that what really affects us are spatiotemporal beings, do not ascribe such causal affects to the dead. In contrast, Spinoza’s way of knowing and understanding reality does not allow him to consider the dead as non-entities deprived of causal power. Each one of us, including the dead, takes part in a system, all of whose modes are necessary and eternal. As ens imaginationis, death puts an obstacle, as a fragmenting factor, in our attempts to construct the desired system. Such fragmenting, severing factors make us consider real things as created and which finally died. As a misinterpretation of our finitude or limitation, death appears real to us but, in fact, there is no reason to mourn our finitude or that of our beloved dead. Spinoza is perfectly right in comparing such mourning to that of a circle which complains, unfortunately, that it is not a sphere (Letter 78, Curley II: 480). The fact is that in Nature circles and spheres both are necessary. Our eternity is a fact. Hence, Spinoza declares: “We feel and know by experience that we are eternal” (5p23s; Curley I: 607–608). On the one hand, the experience in consideration is not experientia vaga, the way of imaginatio, but of emended experience according to the principles of ratio. Such experience has nothing mystical or of the first grade of knowledge. On the other hand, no one can experience one’s own death, which lies beyond any human self-experience. Self-experience testifies nothing about death but only about life and activity. Even one’s imaginatio cannot provide us with any data concerning one’s death. Since imaginatio or empirical cognition is the only source for cognitive data, and death is not among them, insofar

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as self-awareness is concerned, there is no self-knowledge concerning one’s death and death means nothing for each one of us. The question is this: How are Spinoza’s ideas concerning our eternity compatible with his claim that it is absurd to think that a human being always [semper] exists28 and has to perish (4p4d) and with 2a1?29 Even though the essence of human beings does not involve necessary existence (for only the essence of an infinite being [a priori] involves existence), the order of Nature that 2a1 mentions is the common order of nature, which is imaginatio’s worldview. I infer this from 2p30d, which refers to 2a1 and which mentions the duration of our body; hence, both axiom and demonstration refer to the transient causal chain. Indeed, the way of imaginatio is to perceive individual things as contingent; they are created in a specific moment of time, and perish in the other. In fact, 4p4d is meant to prove that no human being is infinite. This demonstration proves, then, that we are not allowed to ascribe infinitude to any finite being. Infinitude is allowed to be ascribed only to infinite beings. The infinite being is that one mentioned at 1def8. Only our passive aspect is destroyed, in most cases in “the long run,” which is temporal. This passive aspect includes all our false, inadequate ideas that we have as well as all our passions. In contrast, each of us as an adequate cause is not subject to time, birth, and death. The effect of any adequate cause covers reality as a whole, albeit not alike that of an infinite being. In concluding, 2a1 is compatible with our eternity as well as with 4p4d, 2p11d, and so on. In any case, ratio demonstrates generaliter that all real individual things, including our minds and bodies, are necessary and eternal, insofar as they are adequate causes. Such real things should not be perceived as temporal, local, nor as generated and destroyed (i.e., dead). In light of this conclusion, the whole discussion, beginning at 5p29 till the end of the Ethics, proceeds. Our mind has been always eternal, whether we are conscious of its eternity or not. Our consciousness of this fact does not change the state of affairs concerning our mind and body (following 5p31s). It is not a temporal process beginning with imaginatio and finishing with scientia intuitiva that makes us familiar with our eternity. We have always been eternal. For us, as limited beings, it “takes time,” as it were, to know and understand this, but time is only in our imagination, not in reality that is mind-independent. It takes us some time to understand and check a long, intricate argument, but neither the argument nor its premises, theorems, and

 This demonstration, thus, mentions sempiternity, to be distinguished from eternity, which is entirely timeless. It does not exclude our eternity. It only excludes our sempiternity. The demonstration proves that human eternity, like that of any finite entity, cannot be a priori deduced from one’s definition or essence. Though scientia intuitiva is governed by ratio’s universal and a priori principles, its unique way is a posteriori, as I have showed in Sect. 6.2. Though 2p11d reads “an infinite thing . . . must always exist necessarily” (Curley I: 456), it is not sempiternity that is discussed but the necessary existence of an infinite being. 29  “The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist.” 28

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conclusion exist in time. They are all atemporal. And so is reality as it truly is, in itself, and not as subject to our imagination. Spinoza writes: “The Mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our fiction, now come to it, and that is accompanied by the idea of God as an eternal cause” (5p33; Curley I: 611). He relates our eternity to our awareness of it and to our self-consciousness (5p31s). The change that occurs, when we realize that we are eternal, is not a change in any cognitive essence, as change of essence is impossible, but a change in the realm of cognitive and emotive properties only. Consciousness is a reflection, an idea of an idea (idea ideae) which is the cognitive property of ideas, not an essence. Hence, the change is only in the property of the knowledge that we are eternal, a knowledge that itself never changes. For ever we have been eternal and blessed. Only our imaginatio has prevented us from being conscious of this fact of perfection. Imaginatio is partial knowledge, in which we are not fully conscious of our real capability and power. In the first grade of knowledge, we were blind to our perfection, eternity, necessity, and blessedness. We were enslaved to the common order of nature. Emotionally and cognitively, we were slaves. We were slaves who were ignorant of their freedom and salvation. Spinoza’s salvation (which is also termed happiness, blessedness, and freedom) is neither eschatological nor a matter of historical progress. It is also not a Utopian end. This salvation reveals our eternity forever. Our “present life,” as Spinoza calls it, is the approach of imaginatio in perceiving ourselves, but such a perception blinding us to our real self-identity, for those who are dragged by the common order of nature do not know themselves adequately (2p29c). Constructing the common order of nature by our imaginatio, we alienate ourselves and our self-identity. Thus alienated, we are determined by fortuitous circumstances, unstable fluctuations, external rationality, which we cannot understand, and blind fortune. In this passive state of mind, our fortune is really bad, namely, it acts against our advantage. In Spinoza’s words: …not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be. On the other hand, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of mind. (5p42s; Curley I: 617)

This is a key passage also for understanding what Spinoza meant by our eternity. No real entity in Nature is temporal, for each of God’s modes is eternal, as the supreme grade of knowledge perceives it. The ignorant (or we ourselves when enslaved to imaginatio) is perceived as temporal, having being born and die. Nevertheless, in reality as it truly is, neither the ignorant nor the wise are born and died. We all are eternal. From the perspective of our passivity, cognitively and emotionally, we are temporal, whereas from the perspective of our activity, of ratio and scientia intuitiva, we are always eternal, with no change in our essences but only in our cognitive and emotional properties, especially our consciousness. The eternity of the essence of the human body and that of the human mind are absolutely guaranteed as “in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or

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that human Body, under a species of eternity” (4p22; Curley I: 607). As an idea is the knowledge of the human body (2p20), the idea that expresses the essence of one’s human body is the essence of one’s mind, which, too, is eternal. Some of Spinoza’s phrases have been misunderstood by various interpreters (for a recent example, see LeBuffe 2010). Spinoza speaks of the body as enduring and temporal, in the same vein of his mentioning the ignorant, but all these phrases are about the imaginatio’s perception of us, of our mind and of our body. The essence of our body and that of our mind as well are strictly eternal from the viewpoint of scientia intuitiva, which is the adequate perception of the essences of individual things (such as our body and mind). The ignorant and the wise man both are eternal, insofar as perceived in the supreme grade of knowledge. As the body’s essence corresponds with the mind’s essence, and as the Ethics especially acknowledges the mind’s eternity, there is no doubt that the body’s essence is eternal as that of the mind. When Spinoza mentions the body’s endurance and temporality, he does not mean to say that the mind is immortal while the body is mortal. The body’s mortality is simply the disappearance of the false, inadequate perception of the body. In the same vein, mind’s mortality is simply the short-lived imaginatio, which, contrary to the adequate kinds of knowledge, does not endure in the instability of the fluctuation of experientia vaga, of the unstable experience in the first grade of knowledge. All in all, Spinoza’s notion of the eternity of the mind does not jeopardize the parallelism or correspondence of the two known Attributes,30

 Contrary to the wrong impression of 5p20s: “It is time now to pass to those things which pertain to the Mind’s duration without relation to the body” (Curley I: 606), or 5p23: “The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (Curley I: 607). In both statements, the body in discussion is an ideatum of the ideas of imaginatio. Indeed, not far from these statements, Spinoza mentions the idea of the essence as it is perceived sub specie aeternitatis (5p23d: “this something that pertains to the essence of the Mind will necessarily be eternal” [Curley I: 607]; 5p29d and s; 5p30; 5p39: “He who has a Body capable of a great many things has a Mind whose greatest part is eternal” [Curley I: 614]; and 5p29). 5p31d explicitly reads: “The Mind conceives nothing under a species of eternity except insofar as it conceives the Body’s essence under a species of eternity” (Curley I: 610). On this basis, I disagree with all the interpreters that have argued that the eternity of the mind is incompatible with the parallelism or correspondence of the Attributes. For instance, Steinberg 1981 did not interpret correctly Spinoza’s view, as she argued that the eternal part of the mind has no bodily correlate. Cf. Bennett 1984, pp.  356–363, and 374. All the difficulties that Bennett ascribed to Spinoza in this matter can easily be removed should Bennett treat adequately Spinoza’s notion of the essence of the body and that of the mind and their correspondence. Essences are true, extra intellectum, and actual; they are not merely possible, as Bennett took them to be. Bennett was wrong in arguing that our consciousness renders our mind eternal. Indeed, Spinoza explicitly writes: “the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge” (5p31d; Curley I: 610; cf. 5p31). This is enough to invalidate Bennett’s interpretation over this matter and to prove that our consciousness discovers our eternity and not vice versa. Contrary to Bennett’s interpretation, Spinoza’s notion of our eternity coheres perfectly with his philosophy as a whole. This notion logically follows Spinoza’s principles and does not rest upon any mystical experience or doctrine (contrary to Bennett 1984, pp. 373 and 375). All the more so, it does not rely upon passions (like the fear of death) and unstable and dubious experience, i.e., experientia vaga (contrary to op. cit., p. 375).

30

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for it holds true also for the extended modes of the Attribute of Extension. As 5p29 states, “Whenever the Mind understands under a species of eternity [sub specie aeternitatis], it understands not from the fact that it conceives the Body’s present actual existence, but from the fact that it conceives the Body’s essence under a species of eternity” (Curley I: 609). The actual presence, pertaining to temporality, is a matter of the imaginatio, whereas scientia intuitiva perceives the essence of the body as eternal. Spinoza, in all of these examples, systematically maintains the unity of mind and body, which interpreters call the mind-body’s parallelism or correspondence. The actual presence, as temporal, does not adequately reflect the singularity of our mind and body. As dead, we can be perceived as strictly eternal, which is not the case in the perception of the actual existence of our body as a temporal being. In concluding, mind and body, perceived by the supreme grade of knowledge, are eternal. Spinoza’s salvation of human beings rests upon their being uprooted from the transient causal chain, from the bonds of temporality and contingency, and roots or implants them within the immanent causal chain, whose links are eternal. It is a salvation from the isolating and unstable nature of imaginatio and its emotive properties, i.e., passions. This salvation makes us acquainted with the singularity, necessity, and indispensability of each one of us. Each of us is irreplaceable in Nature as a whole. This knowledge serves as an inexhaustible source of happiness and blessedness. Being acquainted with the eternity of each one of us, we are necessarily happy, for “happiness consists in man’s being able to preserve his being” (4p18s; Curley I: 556).31 In imaginatio, the first grade of knowledge, we attempt to leave our singular marks on reality but in vain. Alas, the individual associations of any of us cannot be turned into something really universal, which is valid for every one of us. The universality that imaginatio can provide is false and not real and our fortuitous associations and memories pertaining to experientia vaga do not leave the marks of singularity upon reality. Only the supreme grade of knowledge, scientia intuitiva reveals to us the singularity of each one of us in the whole of Nature. The attempt to apply our entia imaginationis on other people must finally fail. Nothing of the imaginatio, especially its emotional properties, namely, passions, can really be shared by various people. Contrary to reason, passions are sources of quarrels and disagreements (4p32, 33, and 43 including their demonstrations and scholia). We cannot successfully enforce the way of life of one person on other persons. Nevertheless, the attempts made by imaginatio have something positive (following 4p1 and d), some kernel of truth in them, and this kernel is discovered whenever our intellect 31  This includes not only an egoistic happiness, but also the happiness of humanity as a whole. For “Man, I say, can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the Minds and Bodies of all would compose, as it were, one Mind and one Body; that all should strive together, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all, together, should see for themselves the common advantage of all” (ibid.). This unity and fraternity is based upon the universality of human reason, which ignorant and wise people alike share.

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relates the relevant ideas, including those of our memory and imagination, to God’s idea or essence (following 6.2 above, 2p32 and 2p36 and d). This kernel of truth is revealed by ratio, and the rational model that liberal democratic implements can be successfully shared by all the citizens and social members. This paves the way to acknowledging fully the singularity of each one of us. This acknowledgement is the achievement of scientia intuitiva. The illusion of imaginatio as though it governs our private properties is rendered into truth in the supreme grade of knowledge. Note that the memory and imagination, to which Spinoza refers in this context, are subjective, whereas the personal singularity for which eternity is valid is entirely objective. The effects that each one of us, as an adequate cause, eternally leaves on reality are entirely objective, namely, they are valid also from the perspective of the infinite intellect. Such is the meaning of adequacy of causes and ideas, as I have explained above. The personal singularity in discussion is objective, for it is the object of the infinite intellect or the supreme grade of knowledge. Thus, the eternity under discussion is valid for the singular personality or personal eternity of each human being.32 Spinoza writes that our personal eternity is not valid for our memory and imagination but only for our intellect (5p21d; 5p23s; 5p34d and s; 5p38d and s; 5p39s, and 4p40c and s). Our intellect is simply our clear and distinct cognition making us active. Usually, unlike Spinoza, we attribute personality traits to our memory and, occasionally, to our imagination. Is our intellect sufficient to maintain our personal traits? We should remember that any cognition, according to Spinoza, has emotional and volitional properties. Thus, our intellect is not only our clear and distinct perception of our body, most of all the essence of our body (if our cognition is in the supreme grade of knowledge), our intellect also includes the active emotions that accompany our clear and distinct ideas, constituting our intellect. Emotions and volitions take a major part in the singular personality of each one of us. Hence, if memory and imagination are removed, insofar as our eternity is concerned, the eternity of one’s singular personality is still maintained in one’s intellect, emotions, and volitions. Moreover, the memory and imagination under discussion are not reliable; they are, instead, the erroneous results of imaginatio, which is enslaved to temporality and fragmentarity and, as such, keeps us away from eternity. In concluding, from the viewpoint of scientia intuitiva, the personal singularity of each one of us is eternal. Yet, Spinoza’s notion of the intellect is associated with the order of the intellect, which is the same order in the intellectual perspective of all human beings (2p18s), whereas memory and imagination concern the duration of the body (5p21d and 5p23d), and each body is unique (on the grounds of sufficient reason). Even though the order of the intellect is universal and the same in all people, nevertheless, the content of one’s clear and distinct ideas is the perception of one’s body and its

 Over this major issue I agree with Hallett 1930, pp. 75 and 77; Harris 1973, p. 245, and Wolfson 1958, vol. 2, pp. 295 and 318–319. Each of these interpreters shows that Spinoza is committed to the notion of personal eternity. Also consider E. E. Harris 1975, pp. 245–252. In contrast, I do not accept, in principle, Allison 1975, pp. 155 ff.

32

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modifications, and each body is not only unique, it is also singular. Thus, the adequate ideas or perceptions of the body and its modifications are also singular. We aspire to extricate what is singular about our personality from the confined occupation of the mind, from the contingent and fortuitous circumstances, arbitrary fragmentation and severance, temporality, and from locality. We wish to reveal the imprints of our personal identity in Nature as a whole. We wish to know it sub specie aeternitatis. The great literary masterpieces, such as Remembrance of Things Past by Marcel Proust serves us well in demonstrating how art, for example, can extricate a singular personality from arbitrary and contingent circumstances and to secure it in an eternal, timeless context. It also reveals the eternity of the author’s singularity, as Proust is the adequate cause of this eternal masterpiece. The same holds true for Spinoza. He is the adequate cause of the Ethics, which expresses adequately the eternal imprints of his singular personality on Nature as a whole. Nevertheless, what about common human beings with no literary aspiration or genius? All of them are adequate causes, and thus eternal or timeless, of some effects, but to realize these effects we need a most perceptive mind (for a good analogy, think of the butterfly effect according to chaos theory, although it is practically impossible to detect the causal chain that links an act of the butterfly, yet the mathematical equation clearly demonstrates that there must be such a link). The aim of Spinoza’s philosophy is to know the union of our mind with Nature as a whole (TdIE, Sec. 13), which is the task of the desired system. Spinoza emphasizes the significance of each individual mind in achieving this goal, for “The universal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individuals together” (TPT, Ch. 15, Curley II: 282). The political and social union that can achieve human freedom, security, welfare, and happiness is practically the rational regime, which as its best is the liberal democratic state. The practical goal of the desired system is such freedom and happiness or blessedness. For the reasons that I have suggested above, and contrary to various horrifying facts in human history, I strongly believe that such a goal is achievable and is not Utopian. Horrible facts concerning the attitude of human beings toward one another are testimonies about the power of these relations that can be turned into quite different ones, based upon friendship, fraternity, and love. We may falsify and distort this immense power and, yet, are free to use it for our common advantages. The falsification and distortion of the intellectual love of God lead to quarrels and wars but, as I explained above, we are free to use this love for the sake of our common advantage. The same human power can serve two quite different aims: to contribute to the advantage of humanity in freedom and happiness, or to preclude these two gifts. Whether one acts as a cognitive and emotive vagabond, one who is subject to the mind’s fluctuations, or as a wise and free person, nothing could be changed in the balance of powers in Nature as it truly is. This is our freedom of choice, and it is up to us. Spinoza’s philosophy paves the way to an open system (the way to wisdom, which God’s left hand holds according to the beautiful image by Lessing), in which the idea of the singular personality of each human being is maintained and so is the idea of our happiness, blessedness, and freedom, and most of all—our eternal

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presence in reality. Spinoza delineates a part of this road, in which there is room enough for each one of us, for infinite human variety, the individuality of each human being, and the welfare of each of us. Since no finite being can be absolutely liberated from the common order of nature and the passions of imaginatio, there will be some antagonism left in human life, but this will not overcome our common end and our advantage. This is a system that is, thus, not harmonist, but it is much better than any totalitarian or authoritative system and even than the natural, apolitical state (in which people are enslaved to their passions and in which a human being behaves like a wolf to another human being). In the liberal political society, the citizens are much freer than in the natural, apolitical state, in which each obeys himself or herself, or, more precisely, each obeys his or her passions. As a genuine liberal, Spinoza lets each of us to live according to his or her choice. Each of us is allowed to choose either ratio’s order or the imaginatio’s common order of nature. This liberal tolerance instructs Spinoza himself in the following words: “I permit each to live according to his own mentality. Surely those who wish to die for their good may do so, so long as I am allowed to live for the true good” (Letter 30, Curley II: 14). Spinoza’s theory of freedom is not a “liberalism based on rationalist metaphysics” (Berlin 1966, p. 149; Spinoza is explicitly mentioned on pp. 146–147). As I have argued in Chap. 4 above, Spinoza is not a rationalist. Discussing Spinoza’s philosophy, Berlin had in mind a closed system, not an open one. The closed, final system is a harmonist system which is all-inclusive. Spinoza’s metaphysics is liberal, but not traditionally rationalist for, according to his philosophy, the first grade of knowledge is indispensable, as the only source for our cognitive data is experience, including, to some extent, experientia vaga. Imaginatio is the only source of data for Spinoza’s desired system, upon which our happiness, freedom, and blessedness rest. Spinoza’s philosophy is cognitivist rather than rationalist. In any event, the indispensability of empirical data for the desired system should not allow interpreters to define Spinoza’s philosophy as rationalist. Neither is it empiricist. Strictly speaking, it is only Spinozist. This is one aspect of the openness of this system. The second aspect is the fact that ratio cannot grasp the essences of individual things, including human beings. Hence, Spinoza’s desired system, as constructed according to ratio’s principles and universal properties, leaves open or “free” the question of essences. Spinoza’s open system is thus exempt from intervention in our practical privacy (contrary to the Judaism of his time). The praxis’s aspect of this system leaves alone the private realm of each person and it is not compelled on him or her. The third aspect of the openness of the desired system is that there is no retreat in it to the inner citadel (to use Berlin’s terms), contrary to the Stoics, but a cognitive, emotional, and practical coping with reality. Spinoza’s desired system invites every human being to overcome his or her misery and suffering, and to turn his or her passivity to activity. In Letter 30, Spinoza explicitly rejects the assumption on which any closed system rests: I do not know how each part of nature agrees with the whole to which it belongs, and how it coheres with the other parts. And I find, simply from the lack of this knowledge, that certain things in nature, which I perceive in part and only in mutilated way, and which do

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not agree at all with our philosophic mind, previously seemed to me vain, disorderly and absurd … .(Curley II: 14)

And, since the desired system must reflect the system of Nature, these words are certainly valid for the desired system itself. Indeed, we cannot rid ourselves completely of imaginatio and its common order of nature. This leaves the desired system imperfect or partial to some extent and, from the ratio’s viewpoint and even more so from the scientia intuitiva’s one, the system is never completed but remains open forever. Equally, this leaves us always with some of our passions, although not governed by them. Thus, Spinoza’s praxis, in the public and political realm as well as in that of the individual, ascribes significance and importance to the freedom of the individual. This holds equally for the ignorant and the wise persons. This liberalism helps much in contributing to human happiness and blessedness, even though each of us is subject, to some extent, however minimal, to the common order of nature and its emotional properties, namely, the passions. In any event, the individual’s freedom and happiness are the principal aims of Spinoza’s ethics and the desired system.

6.5  T  he Contribution of the Supreme Grade of Knowledge to Canceling the Duality of Theory and Praxis and that of Human Reason and Nature’s Reason To overcome two kinds of duality is a necessary condition for constructing the desired system. Ratio is unable to overcome completely the duality of theory and praxis (Sect. 5.3 above) and that of the human reason, which supports our real utility, and the reason that pertains to Nature as a whole (ibid.). Should not scientia intuitiva, the supreme grade of knowledge, succeed in cancelling these two kinds of duality, the way leading to the desired system will be blocked. As scientia intuitiva possess the most powerful active emotion we can muster— the intellectual love of God—it can, in principle, overcome all the passions, the emotive properties of imaginatio. This overcoming is supposed to cancel the duality of theory and praxis, which ratio fails to overcome (and the case of akrasia, which I have discussed in Sect. 5.3 above, is a very good example of such a duality, as we realize what is good or useful for us, and yet we, occasionally, do what harms us and is bad for us). Thus, 4p17s draws our attention to the fact that in the fourth part of the Ethics, Spinoza analyzes the impotence (“lack of power”) of our reason in restraining or moderating the passions. Only in the fifth part of the Ethics, does Spinoza discuss the power of Reason over the affects (ibid.). In this part, scientia intuitiva raises its powerful head (5pref). Scientia intuitiva is much more powerful than ratio in moderating and even overcoming the passions. Nevertheless, even this capability or power of the supreme grade of knowledge is limited. It can overcome the passions only to some extent for, as finite and limited beings, we cannot liberate ourselves completely from the common order of nature and its emotive properties,

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which are the passions (4p4c). Yet, scientia intuitiva and the intellectual love of God can be dominant in our mind, can occupy it maximally, even though not completely (5p16). As a result, From what we have said, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge—and especially that third kind of knowledge … whose foundations is the knowledge of God itself— can accomplish against the affects. Insofar as the affects are passions, if clear and distinct knowledge does not absolutely remove them … , at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the Mind . … And then it begets a Love toward a thing immutable and eternal … , which we really fully possess …, and which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in ordinary Love, but can always be greater and greater …, and occupy the greatest part of the Mind … and affect it extensively. (5p30s; Curley I: 606)

Criticizing the Stoic theory of affects, Spinoza reports that, unlike the Stoics, we have no “absolute domination” over the passions (5pref; Curley 595), for “experience cries out against this, and has forced them, in spite of their principles, to confess that much practice and application are required to restrain and moderate them” (ibid.). Stating that, I have to answer the following questions: Are the principles of Spinoza’s philosophy necessary to imply that scientia intuitiva should be limited in restraining or moderating the passions? Or is it only the experience (even simply experientia vaga) that shows us that the capability or the power of the supreme grade of knowledge is thus limited? Finally, can this grade of knowledge, which we possess, cancel absolutely the duality of theory and praxis? Only God is absolutely free of passions (following 5p17), for all the ideas that God possesses are true and adequate (5p17d), while passions are properties of false or inadequate ideas (following 5p3d). In contrast, not all of our ideas are true or adequate. Our intellect is limited and is not valid for all of our ideas. There is a major difference between our intellect and the infinite intellect of God. Our intellect is simply a part of God’s infinite intellect. Yet, our adequate ideas are absolutely true as much as the ideas of God’s intellect are true. Having necessarily some inadequate ideas, we cannot dispense with all the passions we have. Since each inadequate idea brings with it passions, these ideas and these passions require emendation. Such an emendation is always open to us. In principle, each idea and each passion of us is emendable. So the way leading to freedom and liberty is always open for us. In Spinoza’s words: “There is no affection of the Body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct idea” (5p4), because relating any idea to the complete context of all ideas in God, renders it clear and distinct, namely, adequate. Yet, practically, not all of our ideas are adequate and not all of our affects are active, even though the way of emendation is always open for us. This way will not end for us, as we cannot render our finite intellect into an infinite one. Our intellect will remain forever only a part of the infinite intellect. The complete and absolute knowledge of all the particulars of Nature, of all their eternal essences, is beyond us and lies in the horizon. We can approach it and get nearer and nearer to this knowledge but we will never attain it completely. We always have only a part of it. In principle, scientia intuitiva can remove completely any duality of theory and praxis and it raises only active emotions in us. This grade of knowledge removes

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any possibility in which we know what is good for us and yet we are attracted by what is bad for us and we follow it. Thus, scientia intuitiva entirely removes the duality that ratio alone is incapable of removing. Yet, we do not know everything that is good for us. Were all of our mind in the supreme grade of knowledge, there would remain no gap between our knowledge and our capability of removing all the passions in order to make us happy and blessed. The capability of our mind is only in 0thinking and in producing adequate ideas. Our strongest knowledge, which is in the supreme grade, is the best remedy against the passions, which are the causes of or reasons for our misery. We have nothing better than that (following 5pds). The mind’s lack of capability (“mind’s impotence”) or its passivity is simply our ignorance, our lack of knowledge (5p20s). Scientia intuitiva overcomes, as much as possible, the gap separating theory from praxis, a gap that ratio fails in bridging. In this way, a prominent obstacle for the attempt to construct the desired system completely is left for us forever. Now, we are turning to another major question: Does scientia intuitiva remove the duality of human reason and the reason governing Nature as a whole? Ratio fails to remove all the phenomena of antagonism between us and other entities in Nature and even Nature as a whole (see Sect. 5.1 above). Spinoza employs a striking analogy to show that (in Letter 32). The universal laws of Nature and the common properties that all of its modifications share are not enough to establish the coherent unity of Nature, the unity of all the singular essences of its individual entities (see Sect. 3.111 below). This coherence is the task of scientia intuitiva. In contrast, ratio may interpret all that is not useful for us; it may even harm us, endangering us, even as absurd or ridiculous, and the reason for this is that the complete coherence of Nature is beyond our consciousness and knowledge (TPT, Chap. 16 and TP, Chap. 2, Sect. 8). We differ from one another in our nature and hence disagree with one another, insofar as we are subject to passions (4p33). It is “insofar as men are torn by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another” (4p34; Curley I: 562). In contrast, “only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in nature” (4p35; Curley I: 563). Ratio does not infer or deduce the individuating differences, which are the essences of individual things, from what is common to all of them. Hence, ratio has to accept the findings of imaginatio concerning the differences and antagonism between people. In this way, we can understand the function of the axiom of Ethics 4. Even though ratio is required for our utility and advantage, it cannot remove all the findings of imaginatio and cannot emend all its cognitive and emotive properties. On the one hand, people seek power and security and each wishes to maintain his or her own each own personality and singularity, yet, on the other hand, they are influenced by antagonism and quarrels. It is the aim of scientia intuitiva to demonstrate that what unifies all people also, at the same time, sustains their individual differences and the awareness of the personal identity of each person. Such is the supreme good that is shared by all those who progress in the way of virtue (4p36, like Kant after him, Spinoza thought that virtues are universal and shared by all rational human beings). All human beings can equally enjoy this supreme good. With no conflict and antagonism, each human

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being can enjoy this supreme good in his or her own way. Scientia intuitiva reveals the identity of the conatus of each one of us and the intellectual love of God insofar as each one of us is God, not as (quatenus, or insofar as) infinite but as finite, as each one of us. Thus, 5p36 reads: “The Mind’s intellectual Love of God is the very Love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by the human Mind’s essence, considered under a species of eternity; i.e., the Mind’s intellectual Love of God is part of the infinite Love by which God loves himself” (Curley I: 612). The wish of any being to exist and to act in its singular way as a finite mode is entirely compatible with the intellectual love of God. No struggle for existence, no war of survival of any singular being should arise from this universal love. Hence, what ratio demands, scientia intuitiva provides. Hence, in the final part of the Ethics, discussing the intellectual love of God, which is the emotive property of the supreme grade of knowledge, Spinoza confines the axiom of Ethics 4 and, in fact, restricts it to imaginatio, the first grade of knowledge, in these explicit words: “4a1 concerns singular things insofar as they are considered in relation to a certain time and place. I believe no one doubts this” (5p37s; Curley 613). Singular things as considered in relation to a certain time and place are perceived only by imagintio, whereas ratio and scientia intuitiva perceive all things sub specie aeternitatis, namely, entirely atemporally. Scientia intuitiva perceives the existence and essence of each singular thing as an eternal truth (5p37d). This supreme grade of knowledge emends what ratio does not complete. This also includes the emotions. What the supreme grade of knowledge destroys is not what we all really share but only what imaginatio believes that we share. Nothing can destroy our real communion. Ratio reveals the universal laws and common properties that are valid for Nature as a whole and for all its modes, and scientia intuitiva fills this general frame with an infinitely detailed content. This supreme grade of knowledge successfully removes all duality between human reason and utility, on the one hand, and the universal reason of Nature as a whole, on the other. The rational communion is a necessary condition for constructing the general frame of the desired system, which is entirely coherent system. Hence, scientia intuitiva finally removes the two kinds of duality, whose removal is a necessary condition to construct the desired system according to Spinoza’s philosophy.

References Allison, H.E. 1975. Benedict de Spinoza. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1966. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1978. From Hope and Fear Set Free. In Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, 173–198. London: Hogarth Press. Bidney, D. 1940. The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza – A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

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Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. Della Rocca, M. 2019. The Elusiveness of the One and the Many in Spinoza: Substance, Attribute, and Mode. In: Stetter and Ramond (eds.) 2019, 59–86. Fyodor Dostoyevsky. 2004. The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Garnett. New York: Barnes and Noble. Eisenberg, Paul. 1971. How to Understand the ‘Intellectus Emendatine’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 9: 171–191. Feuer, L.S. 1966. Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press. Garber, Daniel. 2005. “A Free Man Thinks of Nothing Less Than of Death”: Spinoza on the Eternity of the Mind. In Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christa Mercer and Eileen O’Neill, 103–117. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garrett, Don, ed. 2018. Necessity and Nature in Spinoza’s Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garver, Eugene. 2018. Spinoza and the Cunning of Imagination. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. ———. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Hampshire, Stuart. 1960. Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom. Proceedings of the British Academy 46: 195–215. ———. 1971. Freedom of Mind and Other Essays. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ———. 1977. Two Theories of Morality. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. Harris, E.E. 1973. Salvation from Despair – A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ———. 1975. Spinoza’s Theory of Human Immortality. In Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. E. Freedman and M. Mandelbaum. La Salle: Open Court. Joachim, H.H. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Kolakowsky, L. 1989. The Boundaries of Freedom. In The Presence of Myth, trans. Adam Czerniawski. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. LeBuffe, M. 2010. From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Malcolm, Norman. 1958. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McShea, R.J. 1971. Spinoza: Human Nature and History. The Monist 55: 602–616. Naess, Arne. 1973. Is Freedom Consistent with Spinoza’s Determinism? In Bend, 1973, 6–23. Parkinson, G.H.R. 1954. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1971. On the Power and Freedom of Man. The Monist 55: 527–553. Smilansky, Saul. 1994. Fortunate Misfortune. Ratio 7: 153–163. Sophocles (450 BC). Oedipus at Colonus, trans. Robin Bond (2014). http://hal.handle. net/10092/10505 Steinberg, D. 1981. Spinoza’s Theory of the Eternity of the Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11: 54–65. Wilson, M.D. 1983. Infinite Understanding, Scientia Intuitiva, and Ethics I.16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 181–192. Wolfson, H.A. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza, two volumes in one. New York.

Chapter 7

The Desired System as a Goal Lying Beyond the Horizon

If you would like to read Spinoza’s complete system you cannot find it in the most important of his works, the Ethics. This work is not the complete emendation of all the relevant empirical data (or of the imaginatio’s common order of nature) by the supreme grade of knowledge (Sects. 4.6 and 6.2 above). Moreover, it lacks even the complete method or the full list of the a priori principles that Spinoza’s philosophy requires and which pertains to ratio, the second grade of knowledge. In fact, the Ethics rests upon imaginatio and ratio and it refers to or describes some part of scientia intuitiva, but this essential information about this supreme grade of knowledge does not provide us with even one example of this grade of knowledge. In other words, there is not even one proposition in the Ethics that pertains to scientia intuitiva. There is no idea in it that is about the essence of an individual thing.1

1  Hallett was right in concluding that the major part of the Ethics is an expression of the second grade of knowledge, yet he thought that there is some presence of scientia intuitiva (Hallett 1957, pp. 116 and 120; Hallett 1930, pp. 50 and 317; and Hallett 1962, pp. 203 and 204, note 1). Even though he argues that the second half of Ethics 5 expresses scientia intuitiva, he does not give even one example of a proposition pertaining to this grade of knowledge. Such a proposition should refer to an essence of an individual or singular thing. There is no such proposition in the Ethics as a whole. It appears that Hallett did not distinguish between mentioning and using scientia intuitiva. Ratio, for instance, refers to this supreme grade of knowledge but it cannot make any use of it. Joachim, too, believed that the major part of the Ethics is an example of using ratio, but this work contains some consequences of scientia intuitiva (Joachim 1964, p. 175, note 1). In contrast, Harris believed that Spinoza considered the Ethics as an example of scientia intuitiva (Harris 1973, p. 21). Fløstad 1973 argued that most of the Ethics’s propositions pertain to ratio, but the third grade of knowledge presents in it much more than what is accepted by various interpreters (including Parkinson). Distinguishing between mentioning scientia intuitiva and using it, Fløstad argued that such a use is implied from Spinoza’s theory of method, for were such use not available to him, he could not write the Ethics (op. cit., p. 127). Such is Spinoza’s basic knowledge without which he could not create any ontology, epistemology, psychology, and moral theory all of which the Ethics refers to. As I see it, Fløstad did not prove this claim. It is certainly possible and legitimate to refer

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This holds true for all the parts of the Ethics. For example, the general example of the wise and free person is not singular or individual but only general (4pref). Or 4p67: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (Curley I: 584). Such a general language is typical also of all the propositions of Ethics 5, for instance, 5p38: “The more the Mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death” (Curley I: 613) and 5p42s: “the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit …” (Curley I: 617). Not even one of these propositions refers to an essence of a singular or individual person. Hence, none of them is in the grade of scientia intuitiva. Instead of discussing a singular body and its essence, a general proposition claims: “He who has a Body capable of great many things has a Mind whose greatest part is eternal” (5p39; Curley I: 614). In many of these propositions, the word “all” appears. Even in 5p36, whose scholium mentions the superiority of scientia intuitiva in demonstrating that a particular singular being is determined by God on Whom it is necessarily dependent, it is the general essence of the human mind and no particular mind or singular essence of it is mentioned. This, too, is a general or universal example and not a particular, singular one. As in Ethics 4, the exemplar about which the text argues is general. A general rule or maxim should be concretely or particularly applied, but such an application does not exist in the Ethics (contrary to Parkinson 1973, pp. 99–100). In TdIE, Sec. 22, Spinoza writes about the supreme grade of knowledge that “the things I have so far been able to know by this kind of knowledge have been very few” (Curley I: 14). The mathematical examples given in this section are only for the sake of a weak analogy for, in this Treatise, Spinoza does not deem mathematics very much because of its ontological status. According to Spinoza, mathematics deals with entia rationis rather than with entia realia, in which the essence is prior to the properties (TdIE, Sec. 95 and see Sect. 3.222 above). Spinoza explains to the reader that in his eyes the objects of the supreme grade of knowledge are similar somewhat to those of a mathematical demonstration. This may remind the reader of Descartes’s intuition, but this aims just for the reader’s information, a kind of Cartesian lip service. There is nothing of the essences of scientia intuitiva in Section 22 of TdIE. Nothing about the essence of singular things, for mathematical objects, according to Spinoza, are not such things. None of Spinoza’s philosophical works establishes the complete desired system that he wished to attain but they contain only a part of the method for attaining it. This method, consisting of reflection and universal properties, is a part of the complete system. Spinoza’s method is not only a way but also an organic part of the desired system. This part is general and requires concretization of the essences of all individual things. The complete system is the achievement of the supreme grade of knowledge in the possession of the infinite intellect. Even that general part is not

to scientia intuitva from the viewpoint of Spinoza’s method and project without relying upon a description of it as an actual achievement of our knowledge.

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complete, for it does not include all the common properties of all individual things. It is not the complete method. For instance, this incomplete part is lacking the complete knowledge of all the Attributes, as we know only two of them. As I have explained in Sect. 5.5 above, in this part of the system there are some data of the imaginatio, which require emendation. Occasionally, in the Ethics, Spinoza mentions that the text is lacking in detail and that he did not elaborate enough on some major issues. A striking example is 2p7s, which mentions the mind-body unity and the parallelism of the Attributes (namely, the Attributes’ unity in God).2 He ends the discussion with the following words: “So of things as they are in themselves, God is really the cause insofar as he consists of infinite attributes. For the present, I cannot explain these matters more clearly” (Curley I: 452). Another example is his refraining from completing the discussion of the idea that God is an extended Substance (1p15s; Curley I: 424: “But enough of this for the present”). A third example is about the distinction between legitimate common notions and illegitimate, abstract universals (universals or transcendentals). Discussing this, Spinoza states: “Other things I have thought about, from time to time, concerning these matters. But since I have set these aside for another Treatise, and do not wish to give rise to disgust by too long a discussion, I have decided to pass over them there” (2p40s1; Curley I: 476). A fourth example is the question of personal identity about which he writes: “But rather than provide the superstitious with material for raising new questions, I prefer to leave this discussion unfinished” (4p39s; Curley I: 570). Finally, in Letter 83 (of 15 July 1676), Spinoza replies to von Tshirnhaus’s question, “Whether a variety of things can be demonstrated a priori from the concept of Extension alone” (Curley II: 487) very briefly. Spinoza concludes it with these words: “But perhaps I will pursue these matters more clearly with you some other time, if life lasts. For up till now I have not been able to set out anything concerning them in an orderly way” (ibid.). This is a crucial question for the attempt at constructing the desired system. It is about the limitation of the a priori procedure of establishing it (see Sect. 5.5 above) and the dependence of this procedure on the a posteriori one (Sect. 6.2 above). All the gaps in these important discussions do not jeopardize the successful progress in the way leading to the desired system and it cannot prevent this progress in advance, but it shows that an infinite, endless way is waiting for us in our progress toward the desired system.

2  Cf. Marshall 2009. Garrett (2018, pp. 264–292) discusses at length the question of the mind-body identity. Both disagree with Della Rocca 1996s approach to this problem. Unlike Garrett and like Marshall, I think that mind and body, according to Spinoza, are not identical; instead, they are different modes in different Attributes of one and the same thing, such as a human being. For instance, Spinoza is one and the same human being under each of the two known Attributes. In the Attribute of Extension he is considered as a body, while in the Attribute of Thought, he is considered as a mind. This fact, by no means, makes him two individuals. Obviously, he is one and the same individual.

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I thus conclude that Spinoza’s system was not completed in his writings.3 The question is whether the desired system is possible and can be completed. Undoubtedly, Spinoza attempted to accomplish it. To Oldenburg’s complaint For so long as it is not clear to me by what cause and how things have begun to be, and by what connection they depend on the first cause …, everything I hear and read seems to be thrown into confusion. (Letter 5; Curley I: 172)

Spinoza answers: As for your new question, how things have begun to be, and by what connection they depend on the first cause, I have composed a whole short work devoted to this matter and also the emendation of the intellect. (Letter 6, Curley I: 188)

Oldenburg appears to assume that we cannot know things adequately in a piecemeal way. Only a systematic way in which all the known things are integrated is the one to provide us with an adequate knowledge. Such is the desired system that Spinoza attempted to construct. In TdIE, Sec. 91, Spinoza explicitly writes: “The aim … [is] so that all our ideas may be led back to one, we shall strive to connect and order them so that our mind, as far as possible, reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the parts” (Curley I: 38). It is “the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature” (TdIE, Sec. 13, Curley I: 11). The objectivity of the desired system (the system as the mind perceives it) represents the formality of Nature, namely, as it is truly or really is (ut in se est) independently of any mind. Spinoza distinguishes between the coherence of all the modifications of God, a coherence that we do not know, for to know it, we must know the whole of Nature including all its “parts” (Letter 32, Curley II: 18),4 and the coherence of the universal laws reducing as much as possible the antagonism between Nature’s laws (Letter 32, ibid.). In Sect. 3.111 above, I have described the first kind of coherence, which we cannot know but can come closer to it, asymptotically. Such is the regulative and asymptotical coherence, while the second kind of coherence one is a constitutive one. Namely, according to this second kind, we construct the part of the desired

3  Nevertheless, many of Spinoza’s researchers think that such a system exists in his works (first of all, think of Hegel and Spinoza’s Hegelian interpreters). They relate to it as if it were an actual fact. See, for instance, De Deugd 1966, p. 234. He refers to Spinoza’s system as a striking example of an all-embracing metaphysical system. In contrast, Hallett 1930, pp. 3 and 70, did not think that Spinoza’s system was accomplished as a closed, rigid, and final system. Spinoza’s works, according to Hallett, only mark the stage in which he succeeded in developing that system according to the principles of his philosophy. The readers and interpreters have to add more to it in order to complete it as such a system. Along these lines, Hallett entitled his book with the subtitle of “A Spinozistic Study” (op. cit., pp. vii–viii). Cf. Pollock 1899, pp. 76 ff. and p. 181. Cf. Kolakowsky 1989, p. 230. Smith 1977 wrote that Spinoza attempted to construct such a system but, alas, failed. Cf. C. Wilson 1977, pp. 525 and 531–533. 4  In this Letter, Spinoza replies to Oldenburg’s “question concerning our knowledge of how each part of Nature agrees with its whole and how it coheres with the others” (ibid.). Spinoza discusses this problem in other works. See Letter 30 (Curley II: 14), TPT, Ch. 16 (Curley II: 284), and TP, Ch. 2, Sec. 8 (Curley II: 511).

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system that we can attain. The aim is to come as close as possible to the knowledge of the whole of Nature with all its individual modifications. Only the infinite intellect in the supreme grade of knowledge (the infinite intellect quatenus infinitus est and not quatenus finitus est, namely, as the human intellect) can attain the first kind of coherence (see Sect. 6.21 above). In Spinoza’s words: … the human Body is a part of Nature. But as far as the human Mind is concerned, I think it is a part of Nature too. For I maintain that there is also in nature an infinite power of thinking, which, insofar as it is infinite, contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, and whose thoughts proceed in the same way as Nature, its object, does. Next, I maintain that the human Mind is this same power, but not insofar as it is infinite and perceives the whole of Nature, but insofar as it is finite and perceives only the human body. For this reason I maintain that the human Mind is a part of a certain infinite intellect. (Letter 32, Curley II: 20)

To perceive “only” the human body means that the perception of the human body is our sole medium of all kinds of knowledge. Through this medium we perceive the whole of Nature, of which this body is a finite mode as a whole. This whole is perceived from our perspective, which is finite and limited, and not from the perspective of the infinite intellect ut in se est, namely, as infinite. Our desired aim is to know Nature as an all-encompassing Individuum all of whose individual modifications are known as real, necessary, and eternal. But such an end lies beyond the horizon, far from the reach of our intellect (Letter 32, Curley II: 20). The road that leads us toward this end is infinite or endless. We shall never reach this end, but the progress toward it never ceases. The way always remains open for us. This means that the work of emending our empirical data is never finished. Nevertheless, our partial knowledge is adequate, for such is the definition of adequacy. Our clear and distinct ideas are as adequate as those of the infinite intellect of God. This means that all our true ideas can be integrated into the complete desired system. They are true also from the perspective of God’s infinite intellect. The part of the desired system that we attain is true also from this highest perspective. Thus, our knowledge, as it is, takes part in the truth as a whole. Let me clarify now that the idea of the complete desired system is entirely compatible with Spinoza’s explicit rejection of teleology (1p33s2; 1app; and 4pref), which some interpreters doubt. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s rejection of teleology is the rejection of Aristotle’s notion of teleology. According to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Physics, ends pertain to nature as it is in itself. The “teleology” that no philosopher since Aristotle and Spinoza until Kant did not exclude is to ascribe ends only to human wishes and actions.5 Thus, Spinoza writes explicitly that our desire,  Contrary to Bennett 1984, pp. 215–221, I do not think that Spinoza’s rejection of teleology is valid also for human desires and actions. Bennett, inter alia, argues that the effects never determine the cause (as teleology seems to assumes) (op. cit., pp. 216–217), but this is certainly not true for the a posteriori procedure, as I have presented it above. This procedure, relying on a posteriori knowledge of effects and modes, teaches us many things about the cause, and especially about causa sui. Spinoza explicitly writes: “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause” (1a4; Curley I: 410). TdIE, Sec. 92 writes: “For really, knowledge of the effect is nothing but acquiring a more perfect knowledge of its cause” (Curley I: 39). If I want to

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namely, each of our conatus, is an aim or end and nothing else can serve us as an end or aim. Spinoza rejects any teleology that is subject to external norms (which are not imbedded in personal wishes and desires) or relies upon non-actual (“pure”) possibilities, potentiality that is not actuality, counter-factual assumptions, transcendence, free will, temporality, ascribing infinitude to finite beings (such as human beings) or to limit the absolutely infinite Nature in human limitations. Any end that is subject to such notions is an ens imaginationis only and it has no place in true reality or extra intellectum. Thus, Spinoza writes: All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God (1app; Curley I: 439–440) Nature has no end set before it, and … all final causes are nothing but human fictions … this doctrine concerning the end turns nature completely upside down. For what is really a cause, it considers as an effect, and conversely … What is by nature prior, it makes posterior. And finally, what is supreme and most perfect, it makes imperfect…. This doctrine takes away God’s perfection. For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something which he lacks. (ibid.; Curley I: 442)

Stating that, Spinoza still acknowledges that we are doing everything for an end. Nevertheless, “all men are born ignorant of the causes of things … and they all want to seek their own advantage, and are conscious of this appetite” (ibid., Curley I: 440). At 4def7, Spinoza defines end in the following words: “By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite” (Curley I: 547). A complete satisfaction of our appetites or desires is impossible. Nevertheless, as long as the end of our desires is not a non-actual possibility but is a part of the actual reality or, in fact, included in our body or mind, such an end is capable of directing our knowledge and actions and guiding them, even if such an end is not completely attainable in the protect my eyes and for this reason cover them by my hand (Bennett’s example at op. cit., p. 215), the covering of my eyes takes part, as an aim, in the causal explanation of my action. Thus, Bennett’s approach to Spinoza’s use of the notion of ends is not robust enough if at all. Note also that Spinoza’s causality is not linear but a network. Bennett ignores the fact that finite modes, too, condition, though in the secondary sense of conditioning, the Attributes and Substance. Like Harris (1973, pp. 125–132), I distinguish between Spinoza’s notion of a legitimate teleology and his rejection of illegitimate one (for instance, an Aristotelian one or that of Leibniz). Harris realized that in Spinoza’s philosophy there is room enough for non-linear causality resting upon mutual determination (op. cit., p. 129). In fact, Harris did not devote his efforts to discuss teleology according to Spinoza but to the concept of systematic organism. I have a reservation at this point, for the desired system of coherence is not restricted to organism of any kind, and the relationship between its finite parts and the whole is not that of end and means, unlike the case of organism. I disagree with Harris’s interpretation that the supreme grade of knowledge is teleological (op. cit., p. 130). For an extensive, different treatment of Spinoza’s use of teleology, which “holds the position on teleology and teleological explanation nearest to that of Aristotle,” see Garrett 2018, pp. 321–351. Garrett concludes that “far more thoroughly than Leibniz, Spinoza makes a teleological explanation of particular events and features of nature part of the methodology of natural philosophy” (op. cit., p. 347).

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mind-independent reality. In the same vein, each power existing in Nature and there is a “striving,” “aspiration,” or “tendency” (Spinoza calls this a conatus, which all beings share) in each entity. Each aspiration, striving, or tendency, according to Spinoza, is an efficient cause and not a teleological one. Spinoza’s critique of teleology as a prejudice is compatible, thus, with his claim that “men act always on account of an end, viz. on account of their advantage” (1app; Curley I: 440). This end, as one’s conatus, is, in fact, an efficient cause. In Spinoza’s words, “What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite insofar as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of something” (4pref; Curley I: 544). The end in discussion is actual and not purely possible. The appetite or conatus of each body and of each mind is an efficient cause; it is not an aspiration or striving toward a non-actual possible end. The conatus of each human being is his or her aspiration or striving that expresses the essence of each personal singularity. There is nothing teleological in such a view. Even if we fail in implementing our ends in a reality that is independent of our mind (in Spinoza’s terms, extra intellectum), they are actual factors operating within our mind. Likewise, the true ideas of non-­existing modifications, namely, of non-actual modifications, are actually existing in our mind (1p8s2). Indeed, Spinoza’s actualism, denying any existence of non-actual (“pure”) possibilities is well-maintained.6 Spinoza’s desired system, lying beyond the horizon of our cognitive and emotive capability, is not a non-actual (“pure”) possibility that should be actualized. Epistemically, this system reflects objectively (in our terms, mind-dependently) the general structure and the complete concrete contents of the formal (mind-­ independent) system, in which reality is truly, as it is in itself (ut in se sunt). Let me suggest an analogy. The structure of the DNA molecule (as the double helix) has been an actuality, a solid fact, which was so also before its discovery by Rosalind Franklin, James Crick, and Francis Watson. The model that served Crick and Watson was mind-dependent, a brilliant conjecture that eventually was discovered as a solid fact. Hence, the structure of the DNA was never a non-actual fact; it has been always a solid, actual fact. The old desire of scientists to discover the structure of this vital molecule had not rendered it non-actual even before its actual discovery. Similarly, were we capable of attaining the desired system fully and completely, we would have discovered it as a full and complete actual fact and never only as our aspiration or desire toward an end that is, as it were, non-actual. The actuality of the complete desired system was never up to us. We are not its creators, just as we are not the creators of the world. As for God, He, too, is not the creator of

6  My original metaphysics, panenmentalism, does not accept any kind of actualism, including Spinoza’s. We can gain a great advantage in assuming the existence of mind-independent individual pure (non-actual) possibilities in various philosophical fields (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of literature, philosophy of fiction, ethics, aesthetics, and axiology). Panenmentalism is realist about such possibilities, rejecting the prevalent notion of possible worlds (which many actualists have adopted). Nevertheless, adopting a special kind of actualism, Spinoza’s philosophy is strictly consistent and coherent.

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the desired system. He is, ut in se est, rather this very system itself and we are finite modes of it in each of the Attributes. The full, complete system is attainable by God’s infinite intellect alone. This means that this system is wholly and completely intelligible and so is the independent reality which it fully represents whereas we can attain only an adequate part of this system. Our finite intellect can represent it quite adequately yet only partly (remember, insofar as adequacy is concerned, the part and the whole are equal in respect of truth). Thus, ontologically and epistemologically, the desired system is a complete actual fact, insofar as God’s infinite intellect and reality as it truly is are concerned. As finite modes of this system, we aspire to obtain as much as possible of its knowledge. The more we know about the complete desired system, the more we know ourselves, which brings about our supreme happiness and blessedness, our supreme satisfaction. The relation between our intellect and the infinite intellect is not between the means and an end. It is rather that of adequacy, in which our adequate ideas are as true as the ideas in the infinite intellect. In this adequacy, our striving plays a crucial role: … we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow … If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving [appetere] of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature. (4app33; Curley I: 594)

The end toward which we strive is not transcendent. Rather, it is immanent; it is the striving of a part to agree and coheres with the whole, and this agreement or coherence is in the nature of adequacy, as Spinoza defines it. This end is thus actual and it is within each one of us. Each person strives to persevere and to be happy and blessed. Our intellect accepts and desires (as intellect and will are the same) its limitation. We, thus, in our true knowledge, aspire or strive to what we truly are, for this is the gift of happiness, blessedness, and satisfaction that Nature has endowed us with. And what we truly are is our part within Nature as a whole. In other words, our conatus is inseparable from the desired system or from our place and function in the immanent causal chain. Spinoza’s notion of conatus is about the singularity, self-­ perseverance, self-identity, happiness, blessedness, and freedom of each one of us. Spinoza’s adequacy has nothing in it of the traditional teleology. The desired system is not an end in the terms of this teleology, instead, it has to do with our actual conatus, desire, aspiration, or striving. Indeed, we are incapable of attaining the complete desired system to which we aspire and, hence, it lies beyond the horizon, but this does not threaten our conatus as it actually is. As limited, finite being, our aspiration so is necessary. Only a limited, finite being aspires for or strives toward a completion. Yet Spinoza ascribes perfection not only to Nature as a whole, but also to each of its finite modifications, which is perceived in scientia intuitiva as real, necessary, and eternal.

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Getting closer or approaching nearer to a desired end is termed in the Ethics in the following passage: … nothing belongs to the nature of anything except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause.… because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words [“good” and “bad”] with the meaning I have indicated [namely, what harms us and what is for our advantage or utility]. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model [exemplar] of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model. (4pref; Curley I: 543)

This may serve us as an example for our approach to the desired system. However, this system is not mind-dependent but mind-independent. It is not simply an exemplar that exists in our mind. It is an actual reality. The desired system is an ens realia and not an ens rationis, let alone an ens imaginationis. The model or exemplar to which the passage above is entirely different from what 1p33s2 harshly criticizes. At this scholium, Spinoza entirely rejects the idea that “God does all things for the sake of the Good. For they seem to place something outside God,7 which does not depend on God, to which God attends, as a model [exemplar], in which he does, and at which he aims, as a certain goal [tanquam ad certum scopum]. This is simply to subject God to fate” (Curley I: 438–439). Such a goal (scopus) or end is entirely different from that of the desired system, which is immanent in God and by no means transcendent. Getting or approaching closer or nearer to the desired system as an end does not mean that Spinoza rests this idea upon progress, historical process, potentiality, transcendence, non-actual possibilities, and temporality. The desired system, albeit lying beyond the horizon of our attainability, is entirely actual. Neither Aristotelian nor Hegelian notions of end are compatible with Spinoza’s philosophy. The desired system (which is desired for us or for any finite intellect) is entirely actual for the infinite intellect, which is, in turn, actual, too. This intellect is actual for it is, in fact, the complete intelligibility of Nature and all of its modifications. From the perspective of the balance or ratio of the powers in Nature nothing changes whether we getting closer to the desired system or not. The change in our knowledge is only in its properties and not in its essence, and it is not temporal (with no regard to duration, as “the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing” [the end of 4pref; Curley I: 546]). As I have explained above, imaginatio and ratio are parts-modifications of scientia intuitiva, and scientia intuitiva are the real cause of our true, adequate ideas and false, inadequate ones as well; there is no change in our essential knowledge and the aim, namely to know and understand as many things as possible in the supreme grade of knowledge, is certainly immanent and not transcendent. In Nature, the part 7  Such as the Platonic idea concerning the transcendent paradigm according to which the Demiurge (i.e., a God that is the creator) creates or forms the world.

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exists in the whole, and there is no change in the whole. Thus, the desired system is the whole of which our true, adequate knowledge is an immanent part. The parts and the whole are actual. The desired system, again, is actual and not potential. As for our ultimate end (finis ultimus), Spinoza writes: “the ultimate end of the man who is led by reason, i.e., his highest Desire [summa Cupiditas], by which he strives to moderate all the others, is that by which he is led to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall under his understanding” (4app4; Curley I: 588). This ultimate end is the desired system. Striving for or aiming at the desired system is an unfinished business because a complete emendation of the empirical data of any kind of knowledge is impossible, for we cannot completely remove the common order of nature, the knowledge in the grade of imaginatio and its passions (4p4c). We cannot get rid of what is left of it even after the maximal emendation we can muster. To accomplish the desired system completely is beyond the capability of limited, finite beings like us. The horizon beyond which the desired system lies is within Nature, not transcendent of it. Our unity with Nature as a whole is not created by an intellectual process; it is, rather, eternally given. This unity is an eternal truth. As adequate parts of the infinite intellect, our finite intellect has two faces. The first is open to the final aim at the horizon, and the second is the indispensable limitation of this finite part. The road to the complete desired system is always open but it will never reach this system completely. We can reach only a part of it. The way of emendation is always open for us, as there is no modification of our body that we cannot form of it a clear and distinct idea (5p4 and 14). Note that the limitations and boundaries of our adequate knowledge are not fixed for once and for all. There will always be such limitations and boundaries to our knowledge but they are always changeable, depending on our intellectual achievements. The point is that there will be no end to such limitations. Our intellect will never become infinite. The vital a posteriori procedure of our knowledge also guarantees that the way for it is always open, for our experience is not rigidly fixed and will never be exhausted. We have always to experience new things. In this vein, though we know only two Attributes, as we are composed of body and mind; still, the a posteriori way to know more Attributes is always open for us (Sects. 3.212 and 6.2 above). Our cognitive limitation and the open way in which our knowledge proceeds have another aspect: our body, whose idea is the medium of any kind of our knowledge, is limited, and yet this body is influenced by Nature as a whole, and this nature is reflected in a special way in our perception of our body and its variations. Hence, our knowledge, in each of its grades, is necessarily limited and yet always open to emendation and enlargement. Our perception of ourselves and the whole of Nature is never closed and exhausted. In Letter 67, Burgh asks Spinoza: See what a wretched foundation all your ideas rest on. You presume that you’ve finally discovered the true Philosophy. How do you know that your Philosophy is the best of all those which have ever been taught in the world, are still taught, or will ever be taught in the future? Not to get into the discoveries of future ages, have you examined all the Philosophies, both ancient and modern, taught here, and in India, and everywhere else on the planet? And even if you have examined them all properly, how do you know that you have chosen the best? (Curley II: 441)

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It is time-honored debate, namely, which is the better criterion for truth, that of belief (more precisely, religious belief) or that of reason? Is the authority of reason the supreme one? Can Spinoza construct an absolutely certain system on the foundations of reason alone? It appears that Burgh assumed that Spinoza’s intention was to construct a philosophical system that would be truth’s last word. A system of scientia or, the Greek, episteme, in the style of Aristotle’s sophia (to be distinguished from philosophia, which, as a love of wisdom, must lack at least some of such a wisdom, which is completely only within God’s capability). Is the case like that of Aristotle before him (in Metaphysica I) and Kant and Hegel after him, it was also the aspiration of Spinoza to attain a system of philosophical knowledge that would be final, perfect, closed or unchangeable forever? Kant thought so about the rational (a priori) sciences, such as formal logics, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics (as a mathematical-physical theory), which are independent of empirical reality. He wished to do the same with metaphysics and turn it from a natural tendency to a completed certain science like these. Was this also Spinoza’s idea to construct a final, closed system like those? Answering Burgh in Letter 76, Spinoza writes: I do not presume that I have discovered the best Philosophy; but I know that I understand the true one.8 Moreover, it you ask me how I know this, I will reply: in the same way you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles… . For the true is the indicator of itself and of the false. (Curley II: 473)

It is clear that by “true” Spinoza means adequate. Spinoza does not accept what Burgh ascribed to him. He did not find the truest of all philosophical systems; rather, he found a one true. That the adequacy of Spinoza’s philosophy is in consideration at this point is quite clear from the analogy of the triangle. A triangle and its angles are entia rationis and, as such, there is no correspondence between them and ens realia. As a result, truth as correspondence is not the right concept for us in this context. The right notion at this point is, thus, adequacy. Many years after Spinoza’s death, we know that the truth that three angles of any triangle are equal to two right angles is solid according to the Euclidean geometry but not according to non-Euclidean geometries. This reservation does not invalidate any truth that Euclidean geometry confirms. Spinoza, unlike Kant, did not believe that Euclidean geometry is the last mathematical truth. For him, such geometry, although logically flawless, has not the status of a truth as corresponds to reality as it truly is. Why did Spinoza take such an example from the realm of entia rationis (let alone entia imaginationis)? The reason is simple: for him geometry is an actual formal logic. His intention in giving this example is that he was sure about the truth of his system; first of all because it is logically valid and secondly, moreover, that it is adequate. It is truer than Euclidean geometry because it is not only logically valid and adequate, but also true in corresponding to reality as it truly is. Thus, in his

8  The late Shlomo Pines, in a brilliant paper, suggested another translation: “I do not claim to have discovered the best philosophy, but I know that I grasp the one that is true” (Pines 1977, p. 153, note 19).

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answer to Burgh, Spinoza acknowledges that his philosophy is not the ultimate truth, which is beyond our finite intellect. All he has is a true philosophy, which is only a part of the whole truth, and yet it is valid and sound no less than the whole truth. Considering all these, I would translate Spinoza’s claim that his philosophy is true, one that he grasps as an adequate part of the complete desired system, one which is grasped by the infinite intellect. In other words, the philosophies of the future will not cancel the truth of his philosophy. Indeed, Hegel, who was fascinated by Spinoza’s systematization, considered Spinoza’s philosophy as the true beginning of any philosophy in the past and in the future. A similar attitude toward Spinoza’s philosophy was that of Henry Bergson. For many years analytic philosophers ignored Spinoza’s philosophy but since the 1970s (following the three hundredth anniversary of Spinoza’s death in 1677) some very prominent analytic philosophers have shown great interest in his work and have devoted great efforts to interpret and understand it (beginning with the late Stuart Hampshire). Hampshire, Bennett, and Donald Davidson, for instance, have contributed to our understanding of this great philosophy. All these philosophers have found truth and great value in it. Even those who have criticized him, sometimes quite harshly, have found good reasons to adopt at least parts of his philosophy. Thus, its adequacy has prevailed. Spinoza’s death did not bring an end to his achievement. It is still very much with us. I believe that in the distant future, people will read the Ethics and will try their utmost to understand it. This is compatible with the idea that Spinoza thought that although he did not grasp the desired system as a whole (which can be grasped only by the infinite intellect in the complete supreme grade of knowledge), he succeeded in grasping adequately a part of it. This part is true and adequate and is confirmed by the complete knowledge of the desired system as a whole. In any event, as I have argued above in Sect. 3.111, Spinoza was well aware of the limitations of his philosophy in the following explicit words: “I do not know how each part of nature agrees with the whole to which it belongs, and how it coheres with the other parts” (Letter 3o, Curley II: 14). Moreover, answering Oldenburg’s question, What are “the reasons by which we are persuaded that each part of Nature agrees with its whole and coheres with the others?” (Letter 32, Curley II: 18) Spinoza replied: “I already said in my preceding Letter that I don’t know [absolutely] how they really cohere and how each part agrees with its whole. To know that would require knowing the whole of Nature and all of its parts” (ibid.). Namely, the complete, full coherence of the desired system, which completely reflects Nature as a whole, is beyond Spinoza’s knowledge. Spinoza does not ascribe totality, finality, or closure to his systematic philosophy. By no means, did he consider it as a concluding one. He thought that it is an adequate part of all-inclusive truth. The question is: Upon which grounds did Spinoza rely when he considered it so? What prevented him from making errors or mistakes? An error or a mistake is to consider partial knowledge as if it were complete. The positive kernel in every false, mistaken, or erroneous idea is kept within the total context in which all the ideas relating to the idea of God exist. Insofar as an idea is

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considered as a part of the complete truth, no mistake or error may occur to us. Insofar as Spinoza refused to consider his system as final or complete, he did not mistake or err in considering it as true or adequate, insofar as it was valid and sound. Valid—from the logical point of view, which is formal; sound—insofar as it is compatible with all the relevant empirical data. Saying that, Spinoza, nevertheless, could not consider all the details of his philosophy as absolutely true. As a part, such a philosophy still needs emendation and completion. Spinoza left various crucial questions for the readers to answer. For instance: What is the principle of individuation and personal identity in his philosophy? What is the relationship between cognition and its properties, emotive (passions or active emotions) and cognitive (reflection)? What are the relationships between the various grades of knowledge? And there are many others. In the current book, I have attempted to suggest some completions and answers that his philosophy needs, for instance, answering the abovementioned questions. In this way, my current text is not simply an interpretation, it is also a reconstruction attempting to complete some crucial missing parts. My reconstruction, I believe, robustly stands on clear solid foundations that actually exist in Spinoza’s philosophy, and yet I have gone further, beyond what actually appears in the text. What is crucial for Spinoza’s philosophy is that the road leading to emendation and completion is always open. As the a priori procedure of the attempt to construct the desired system necessarily depends on the a posteriori procedure to complete, concretize, and validate it, the validation of the a priori procedure depends on our expanding and growing experience. This is another meaning of the openness of Spinoza’s philosophy and its growing richness. This makes this philosophy ready to accept any well-established criticism (unfortunately, most of the critiques of Spinoza with whom I am familiar are groundless and are based upon various misunderstandings, lack of knowledge, superficial and biased readings, and even a lack of imagination and philosophical creativity). Spinoza legitimately relied upon the general principles of his philosophy. For instance, the rule that modes of different Attributes cannot be considered as links of the same causal chain, or that all thoughts are integrated into a one, coherent whole, and the same holds true for all the bodies or physical entities that are integrated into the Attribute of extension, or the rule that the two known Attributes are of one and the same absolutely infinite Nature or reality. And, above all, there is the law that any finite entity in our world is not separable from all the other entities, all of which are united into one whole. Only the absolutely infinite reality is independent and unconditioned. As a rule, a really open philosophy may gain some immunity against errors and mistakes. Insofar as Spinoza’s philosophy keeps its open nature, the more immune it is against such failures. The ambition of finality and closure increases the vulnerability of a philosophy. Such is the vulnerability of some of the greatest systems in the history of philosophy. Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel attempted to construct closed, final systems. They

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obviously failed. Spinoza did not take any part in such efforts.9 He never claimed that his system could be closed or final. Spinoza would have considered such attempts as failures, as would the history of philosophy. None of these great philosophers put an end to the history of philosophy; none of them succeeded in establishing a final philosophical system, closed and completed, forever. A final, closed, and complete philosophical system is an achievement of an infinite intellect, much beyond the capability of any finite intellect, such as we have. It is impossible for us to reach the complete desired system, as much as it is beyond our capability that all our ideas would have been absolutely true. Equally, it is impossible for us to entirely emend the common order of nature, which is imaginatio’s worldview, and to turn all our passions into active and useful emotions. Spinoza’s critique of teleology is compatible with all these conclusions. No philosophical system can be the end of all the possible philosophies. Spinoza’s philosophy is a partial, albeit adequate, philosophical knowledge and, as well, it is about the complete knowledge that only the infinite intellect can reach. Terms such as “the end of history” or the “finality of philosophy” cannot be ascribed to Spinoza’s philosophy. They are entirely incompatible with it. In the same vein, the all-embracing system, lying beyond the horizon, is not an end for the philosophical efforts, for the relationship between the whole and its parts is not that between the end and its means, and the desired system is not an organism but a network system of coherence. Spinoza’s desired system always maintains all its individual modifications, whereas the individual parts of an organism are replaceable (for instance, the cells in our body) and their status within the organism as a whole can be blurred and is unstable. In an organism, the part is a means for the whole and in most of the cases it is simply transient. I consider Spinoza as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, individualist philosopher, as he put great weight on the status of the singularity of any individual entity (including, of course, human beings) even from an absolute, all-encompassing viewpoint. The way is always open for us to emend our cognitions and to turn our passions into active, useful emotions and such will be the case forever. Getting nearer the desired system, lying beyond the horizon, is always possible for us. Spinoza is the greatest challenger of the idea of piecemeal philosophy as he adopted the notion of open system, rejecting that of a closed, final one. I would say that the notion of a closed, final philosophical system is a product of the first grade of knowledge, i.e., imaginatio. It is an error, a philosophical failure, at least according to my interpretation of his philosophy. Behind this view of Spinoza lies an imperative: Never consider any achievement of our knowledge and understanding as final or closed. Any intellectual achievement of us, however great, is only a part, albeit adequate, of the complete desired system. The confidence of Spinoza in the truth of his philosophy is simply methodical. His method opens for us an infinite way leading to the desired system. The method guarantees that Nature is a coherent system, in which all its parts are united within

 Contrary to H. Smith 1977, C. Wilson 1977, and Foss 1971.

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an all-comprehensive whole. Each detail of Nature is necessarily, inseparably connected and united with the rest of them. Insofar as this method is not refuted, the way remains open. The truth of the method depends on the actual success of the emendation of the empirical data of our knowledge and that of our emotions. The truth of the method and its promises is conditioned by the particularization and concretization of its general rules and laws. In any case, the method is the constitutive part of the desired system. The open and incomplete nature of Spinoza’s system requires the efforts of other philosophers, now and in the future. Each can contribute her or his part to the desired system. Hegel similarly considered Spinoza’s philosophy but, alas, he believed his own system to be final and closed. A crucial part of Hegel’s system, its starting point, was, in his view, Spinoza’s system. Such was also the view of the Hegelian interpreters of Spinoza. For years, I have studied and researched the history of philosophy (especially Plato, Spinoza, and Kant). Since 1999, I have attempted to create and develop my own philosophy, very much un-Spinozist, and yet my panenmentalism10 (the title of my original metaphysics) could never have been born without the tremendous impact that Spinoza has had on my philosophical thinking and love.

References Bennett, J. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. Della Rocca, M. 1996. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fløstad, G. 1973. Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics. In Grene, M. (ed.), 102 ff. Foss, Laurence. 1971. Hegel, Spinoza, and the Theory of Experience as Closed. The Thomist 35: 435–446. Garrett, Don, ed. 2018. Necessity and Nature in Spinoza’s Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilead, Amihud. 1999. Saving Possibilities: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 80. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi – Value Inquiry Book Series. ———. 2020. The Panenmentalist Philosophy of Science: From the Recognition of Individual Pure Possibilities to Actual Discoveries, Synthese Library. Vol. 424. Cham: Springer. Hallett, H.F. 1930. Aeternitas – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague. ———. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza – The Elements of His Philosophy. London: Athlone Press. ———. 1962. Creation, Emanation, and Salvation – A Spinozistic Study. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Harris, E.E. 1973. Salvation from Despair – A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Joachim, H.H. 1964. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press. Kolakowsky, L. 1989. The Boundaries of Freedom. In The Presence of Myth, trans. Adam Czerniawski. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 To which I have devoted papers and some books, to begin with Gilead 1999 and endings with Gilead 2020.

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Marshall, Eugene. 2009. The Mind and the Body as ‘One and the Same Thing. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5): 897–919. Parkinson, G.H.R. 1973. Language and Knowledge in Spinoza. In Grene (ed.), 73–100. Pines, Shlomo 1977. On Spinoza’s Conception of Human Freedom and Good and Evil. In Rotenstreich and Schneider 1977, 147–159. Pollock, F. 1899. Spinoza – His Life and Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul. Smith, H. 1977. “Forward” to Hessing 1977, xi–xii. Wilson, C. 1977. Spinoza – The Outsider. In Hessing (ed.).

References

Abraham, R.D. 1977. Spinoza’s Concept of Common Notions: A Functional Interpretation. Revue internationale de philosophie 31: 27–38. Alexander, S. 1921. Spinoza and Time. London: G. Allen & Unwin. Allison, H.E. 1975. Benedict de Spinoza. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Aquila, Richard E. 1983. States of Affairs and Identity of Attributes in Spinoza. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 161–179. Bayle, Pierre. 1965. Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H.  Popkin. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Bennett, J. 1981. Spinoza’s Mind-Body Identity Thesis. The Journal of Philosophy 78: 573–584. ———. 1984. A Study in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1966. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1978. From Hope and Fear Set Free. In Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, 173–198. London: Hogarth Press. Bidney, D. 1940. The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza – A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Boole, George. 1854 [1951]. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought. New York: Dover Publication. Brandom, R. 1976. Adequacy and the Individuation of Ideas in Spinoza’s Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 14: 147–162. Burtt, E.A. 1967. Ch. 3: Galileo. In The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London. Caird, J. 1910. Spinoza. Edinburgh/London: Blackwood. Calkins, M.W. 1929. Monistic Pluralism: The System of Spinoza. In The Persistence Problems of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. Collingwood, R.G. 1964. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Curley, I.E.M. 1969. Spinoza’s Metaphysics  – An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2019. Spinoza’s Metaphysics Revisited. In Spinoza in the Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophers, ed. Jack Stetter and Charles Ramond, 3–51. London: Bloomsbury. De Lucca, John. 1968. Wolfson on Spinoza’s Use of the More Geometrico. Dialogue 6: 89–102. De Deugd, C. 1966. The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Assen: Van Gorcum. De Dijn, Herman. 1996. Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

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Name Index

A Abraham, R.D., 102, 167, 169 Allison, H.E., 84, 188, 281 Aquila, R.E., 12 Aristotle, xvi, 6, 24, 25, 35, 146, 195, 203, 213, 293, 299, 301 B Bayle, P., 12, 32, 33, 197 Bend, J.G. van der, 212 Bennett, J., xv, 12, 14, 19, 31, 53, 76, 84, 86, 91, 92, 97, 100, 102, 122, 126, 178, 189, 208, 212, 219, 279, 293, 294, 300 Berlin, I., 196, 197, 264, 273, 283 Bidney, D., 92, 96, 212, 223 Boole, G., 189 Brandom, R., 40, 46 Burtt, E.A., 187 C Caird, J., 30 Calkins, M.W., xiv Collingwood, R.G., 188 Curley I, E.M., 13, 31, 63, 121, 166, 219, 290 D Davidson, D., 78, 254, 300 De Deugd, C., 55, 56, 109, 148, 163, 244, 292 De Dijn, H., 2

Della Rocca, M., viii, xx, 2, 3, 12, 36, 78, 91, 170, 222, 229, 238, 291 De Lucca, J., 188 Descartes, R., xiv, xv, 3, 5, 6, 12, 19, 43, 62, 63, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 93, 122, 132, 150, 168, 173–176, 179, 181, 182, 184, 187, 189, 209, 212, 216, 221, 223, 224, 241, 258, 290 E Einstein, A., 177 Eisenberg, P., 243 Erdmann, J.E., 6, 11 F Feuer, L.S., 257 Fløstad, G., 289 Foss, L., 302 Friedman, J.I., 189 Dostoyevsky, F., 263 G Galilei, G., 181, 187 Garber, D., 91, 273 Garrett, D., viii, xiii, 34, 38, 41, 46, 69, 91, 273, 291, 294 Garver, E., 56, 195, 199, 273 Gatens, M., 119, 144 Gebhardt, C., vii, 5, 25, 175, 188

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0

311

Name Index

312 Gilead, A., vii, viii, 98, 102, 195, 303 Guthrie, W.K.C., 6 H Hallett, H.F., 4, 6, 9, 15, 30, 34, 53, 55, 84, 86, 93, 94, 148, 214, 232, 244, 281, 289, 292 Hampshire, S., xiii, 100, 260, 264, 300 Harper, W., 177, 178 Harris, E.E., xix, 3, 4, 9, 10, 19, 53, 91, 177, 186, 281, 289, 294 Haserot, F.S., 12 Hegel, G.W.F., 6, 11, 199, 292, 299–301, 303 Hessing, S., 3, 12, 31, 86, 212 Hintikka, J., 178 Hooker, M., 189 Hubbeling, H.G., 178, 186, 188, 212 Hübner, K., 36 I Israel, J.I., viii, 12, 13, 18, 116, 206 J James, S., 115, 116 Jarrett, C.E., 12, 189 Joachim, H.H., 6, 9, 10, 12, 25, 30, 37, 40, 53, 68, 81, 90, 93, 95, 100, 102, 163, 169, 186, 221, 241, 289 K Kant, I., 71, 143, 146, 167, 168, 170, 175, 188, 224, 232, 236, 238, 271, 286, 293, 299, 301, 303 Kennington, R., xv, 6, 76, 84, 91, 214 Kisner, M., 199 Kolakowsky, L., 292 Koyré, A., 187 Kripke, S., 95 L Lascola, R.A., 94, 95 LeBuffe, M., 98, 273, 279 Lennex, J.G., 53 Lessing, A., 46, 282 Levene, N.K., 116 Lin, M., xii, 75 Lloyd, G., xiii, xv, 76, 119, 144

M Malcolm, N., 251 Mark, T.C., 43, 61, 67, 84, 174, 189 Marshall, E., 98, 291 Mason, R., 43 Matheron, A., 115 Matson, W.I., 91 McKeon, R., 186 McShea, R.J., 260 Melamed, Y.Y., 33, 95, 104 Montagu, A., 197 Myers, H.A., 88, 93 N Naess, A., 39, 142, 264, 265 O Odegard, D., 91 P Parkinson, G.H.R., 43, 61, 75, 169, 178, 188, 219, 264, 289, 290 Parmenides, 1, 4–6, 11, 112 Pflaum, H., 212 Pines, S., 299 Pollock, F., 84, 292 R Rander, D., 84 Renz, U., 143 Rescher, N., xii Richter, G.T., 50 Rise, L.C., 40, 44 Ritchie, E., 31 Rotenstreich, N., vii, xix, 166 S Saw, R.L., 40 Selsam, H., 188 Smilansky, S., xix, 262 Smith, H., 177, 178, 292, 302 Snow, A.J., 188 Sophocles, 251 Sprige, T.L.S., 12 Steenbakkers, P., 172, 173, 186, 187 Steinberg, D., 53, 279 Strauss, L., 14 Strawson, P.F., 40, 177

Name Index T Teller, P., 95 W Wartofsky, M.W., 31 Watt, A.J., 53 Wetlesen, J., 11, 77, 142, 212 Wienpahl, P., 212

313 Wilson, C., 292, 302 Wilson, M.D., 14, 53, 57, 84, 91, 92, 234 Windelband, W., 186 Wolfson, H.A., 11, 12, 14, 17, 94, 95, 169, 174, 188, 223, 281 Y Youpa, A., 69

Subject Index

A Actualism, 43, 270, 295 Adequacy, adequate, 13, 36, 61, 110, 161, 219, 293 Anarchy (“state of nature”), 154 A posteriori procedure of knowledge, 104, 215, 226, 229, 234–240, 298 A priori procedure of knowledge, 215 Attributes, viii, xii–xvii, 1–3, 5–20, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36–38, 41–43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 57, 58, 61–107, 116, 117, 120, 122, 124, 127, 132, 133, 135, 149, 150, 163, 164, 167, 170, 173, 174, 179–182, 184, 185, 189–193, 202, 210–212, 214–216, 220, 224–240, 252–254, 266–268, 274, 275, 279–281, 291, 294, 296, 298, 301 Axioms, vii, xi, xii, 36, 41, 48, 71, 72, 75, 76, 96, 147, 167, 169–175, 177–180, 189, 190, 192–194, 209, 210, 213, 225, 277, 286, 287 B Blessedness, 69, 194, 200, 245, 247–253, 255, 261, 266, 278, 280, 282–284, 296 C Causal chain, 14, 28, 62, 109, 163, 220, 296 immanent, xvi, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 56, 97, 104, 117, 120, 133, 134, 136, 148, 150, 186, 215, 220, 221, 233, 237, 259, 266, 268

transient, xvi, 47, 48, 53, 54, 56, 120, 133, 136, 148, 150, 215, 233, 268 Causality, 10, 44, 47, 112, 163, 187, 188, 201, 253, 272 Causality, adequate, xiv, 42, 46, 49, 106, 112, 114, 120, 124, 172, 208, 219–221, 224, 258, 259, 272, 275 Caute, xi Cognitions, xiii, 2, 26, 64, 70–72, 74, 83, 84, 93–107, 110, 132, 142, 148, 151, 161, 165, 166, 170, 172, 181, 193, 196, 210, 221, 226, 231–233, 237, 241–248, 252–254, 265–268, 271, 272, 276, 281, 301, 302 Coherence, xii, xvii, 32, 42, 50, 58, 61, 63, 67–70, 75, 76, 106, 120, 135, 173, 189, 206–208, 214, 240, 286, 292, 293, 296, 300 Common order of nature, 48, 113–118, 124, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 147, 150–160, 163, 168, 169, 192–193, 199, 201, 203, 204, 208, 210, 214–216, 233, 243, 250, 255, 258, 263, 264, 275, 277, 278, 283, 284, 289, 298, 302 Conatus, xi, xii, 25, 36, 46, 98, 140, 144, 166, 193, 206, 254, 261, 262, 275, 287, 294–296 Connections, xv, xvi, 3, 4, 15, 19, 23–25, 28, 31, 41–45, 48, 50, 51, 54–57, 62, 63, 65–67, 69, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 101, 103, 104, 110, 112–114, 117–120, 122–125, 131, 136, 137, 162, 163, 165, 166, 173, 181, 186, 189, 208–210, 213–215, 220, 223, 233–235, 238, 257, 270, 274, 292

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Gilead, A Rose Armed with Thorns: Spinoza’s Philosophy Under a Novel Lens, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 232, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54810-0

315

316 Contingency, 26, 29, 47, 49, 51, 54, 65, 110, 114, 119–121, 123, 126, 133, 137, 144, 192, 201, 202, 209, 213–214, 220, 232, 260, 261, 271, 280 Correspondence, xiii, xvii, 12, 13, 25, 28, 58, 61–76, 79, 84, 85, 94, 95, 101, 105, 106, 187, 198, 229, 234–236, 240, 279, 280, 299 D Data, empirical, 89, 117, 169, 170, 175, 190, 191, 210, 213–215, 224, 230–233, 244, 283, 289, 293, 298, 301, 303 Death, 52, 118–138, 140, 142, 147, 152, 153, 162, 192, 194, 195, 204, 206, 250, 251, 260, 261, 272–277, 290, 299, 300 Deductive systems, xi, xii, xvii, 30, 70, 169, 172–175, 177, 182 Definitions, vii, xi, xii, 2, 8, 11, 13, 16–19, 24, 26, 30, 35–38, 41, 45, 46, 49, 50, 57, 61, 62, 66, 72, 75, 76, 86, 88, 96–98, 101, 105, 127, 129, 139, 156, 162, 164–167, 172–175, 178–180, 189–194, 209–211, 214, 222, 225, 228, 241, 245, 257, 272, 277, 293 Desires, 24, 55, 90, 96, 98, 99, 138, 140–144, 150–152, 157, 170, 195, 244, 253–257, 262, 293–298 Determinism, 248, 264–268, 271–273 Differentiations, xiv, xvi, xvii, 1–12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 27–29, 34, 43, 106, 124, 185, 212, 234, 260 Distinctions, xvii, 2, 4, 8, 11–20, 24, 28, 33, 35, 36, 38, 42, 52, 53, 55, 56, 65, 68, 69, 89, 95–107, 119, 123–126, 129, 132, 146, 168, 171, 175, 176, 181, 183, 185, 187, 193, 196, 208, 209, 220, 229, 233, 234, 238, 239, 244, 257, 267, 270, 291 E Eleatic being, 6, 11, 230, 234, 238, 240, 270 Eleatic philosophy, 1–11 Electromagnetic field, 122 Emendations, vii, 10, 35, 38, 55, 58, 66, 72, 74, 85, 90–107, 109, 110, 142, 147–152, 156–160, 172, 173, 179, 180, 190–193, 198, 210, 213–216, 224, 226–240, 243, 244, 263, 265, 267, 268, 272, 285, 289, 291, 292, 298, 301, 303

Subject Index Emotion active (action), 103, 198, 266, 284 passive (passion), 103, 198, 266 Entities, xvii, 38, 101, 104, 122, 124, 127, 134, 136, 140, 142, 145, 162, 166, 170, 181, 182, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 203, 207–210, 213, 216, 220, 226–229, 231, 239, 243, 259, 261, 267, 275, 276, 278, 286, 295, 301, 302 Entities of reason (entia rationis), 12, 15, 37, 86, 96, 122, 166, 182–184, 186, 208, 290, 299 Entities of the imagination (entia imaginationis), xiii, 26, 39, 55, 122, 123, 129, 137, 159, 181–183, 208, 252, 259–261, 272, 275, 280, 299 Errors, xiii, 37, 61–76, 109, 110, 118, 123, 126, 128, 130, 157, 182, 183, 222, 223, 232, 239, 242, 252, 263, 300–302 Essences, xvii, 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 24, 25, 27, 28, 34–40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48–52, 54–56, 63–66, 69, 74, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91–93, 95–107, 112, 119, 120, 124, 133–135, 137, 140, 141, 144, 146, 147, 162, 163, 165, 166, 169–176, 179, 180, 183–186, 191–196, 198, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207, 210–213, 215, 216, 219–232, 234–237, 239–248, 250, 252–254, 259–262, 265–272, 274, 276–281, 283, 285–287, 289, 290, 295, 297 Eternity, xiii, 1, 11, 30, 36, 38–40, 47, 51–55, 91, 92, 98, 119, 120, 126, 133–135, 146–149, 166, 185, 195, 200, 214, 227, 232, 243, 249, 250, 257, 261, 263, 273–284, 287 Evidence immediate, 62, 74–76, 106, 132, 216 self, xi, xii, 3, 67, 71, 72, 74–76, 174, 176, 177, 213, 216, 224 Existence, xiv, 1, 3, 6, 10–12, 14–16, 23–26, 28, 31, 32, 34, 39, 41, 43, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 64–66, 82, 86, 88, 92, 106, 109, 115, 118, 124, 126–128, 133, 136, 142, 147, 170, 173–175, 177, 179, 191, 192, 194, 205, 211–213, 215, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 236, 237, 247, 250, 254–256, 258–261, 263, 268, 270, 274, 276, 277, 280, 287, 295 Extension, xvii, 5, 7–9, 17–19, 41, 43, 52, 54, 61, 63, 65, 66, 76–78, 80–90, 93, 94, 101, 104–106, 111, 122, 133, 135, 164,

Subject Index 165, 170, 174, 181, 182, 185, 191, 210, 220, 229, 230, 235–237, 266, 275, 280, 291, 301 F Factor of individuation, 46, 49, 95, 120, 174, 211, 228 First grade of knowledge (imaginatio), viii, 91, 109–160, 167, 283 Fragments, 4, 51, 54, 64, 111, 124, 126, 128, 137, 145, 149, 157, 233, 239, 243, 263, 274 Freedom, xiii, xiv, 11, 98, 115, 138, 139, 143, 153, 156, 158, 194, 195, 197, 198, 205, 249, 257–273, 278, 282–285 G Geometrical figures, 166, 181, 187, 188 Geometrical order, 183, 186, 188–194 Geometry, 167, 169–172, 183, 188, 190, 299 Geometry, Euclidean, 169, 171, 172, 183, 190, 299 God, xii, xiv, xix, 1, 2, 6–11, 13–18, 26–29, 31, 32, 34–38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 65, 66, 70, 72, 75–77, 80–83, 86, 89, 97, 98, 103, 104, 114, 115, 117, 130, 132, 146, 148–150, 152–154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 170, 173–175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 201, 202, 207, 210–216, 219–223, 225–231, 233–263, 266, 267, 272, 274, 276, 278, 281, 282, 284, 285, 287, 290–295, 297, 299, 300 God’s infinite intellect, 2, 3, 13, 37, 62–64, 66, 70, 93, 107, 117, 220, 233, 237, 239, 240, 285, 293, 296 H Happiness, xiii, 23, 126, 137, 138, 147, 152, 159, 162, 194, 199, 200, 202, 245–284, 296 Holistic, 26, 75, 184, 222, 229 I Idea, viii, xv, xix, 7, 12–16, 25, 32, 35, 36, 38, 41–46, 48, 49, 51, 54–58, 61–71, 74–77, 82–85, 88–90, 92–96, 98–103, 105, 117, 118, 121–123, 129–132, 137,

317 138, 143, 145, 148–151, 153, 154, 157, 162–165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 180, 181, 188, 193, 198, 202, 207, 209, 211–214, 220–223, 225–227, 229–235, 237–245, 247–250, 252–254, 258, 260, 263, 265–267, 269, 271, 277–279, 281, 282, 285, 286, 289, 291–293, 295–300, 302 clear and distinct (adequate), 13, 41, 42, 45, 63, 68, 85, 123, 149, 151, 153, 220, 221, 232, 235, 238, 240, 244, 248, 250, 258, 285, 293 inadequate, 66, 94, 98, 103, 130, 151, 153, 154, 202, 233, 243, 244, 252, 258, 263, 265, 277, 285 Ignorant, 45, 64, 73, 86, 114, 141, 152, 156, 202, 206, 221, 254, 268, 270, 278, 279, 284, 294 Immortality, 91, 273, 274 Infinitude, 7, 8, 17, 18, 28, 44, 47, 56, 66, 84–87, 93, 101, 105, 128, 201, 215, 228, 229, 234, 235, 238, 242, 257, 277, 294 Intellect finite, 4, 16, 19, 63, 81, 87, 93, 94, 121, 134, 152, 156, 200, 202, 216, 221, 223, 235, 237, 239, 240, 285, 297, 298, 302 infinite, xiii, 4, 16, 66, 73, 81, 84–86, 93, 94, 104, 111, 121, 134, 152, 153, 156, 160, 200, 202, 216, 220, 221, 225, 234–240, 243, 275, 276, 281, 285, 293, 296–298, 300, 302 L Liberty, 159, 204, 205, 250, 257, 258, 264, 266, 269, 271, 272, 285 Logical, formal validity, 183, 189 Logics, 1, 128, 179, 183, 184, 189, 190, 225, 299 Love, vii, xix, 96, 99, 103, 130, 131, 138, 139, 141, 145–147, 153–156, 159, 160, 192, 200, 207, 239, 241–252, 254–257, 260, 261, 282, 284, 285, 287, 299, 303 Love, intellectual of God, xix, 130, 146, 153, 159, 192, 207, 239, 241–251, 254–256, 260, 261, 282, 284, 285, 287 M Mathematics, 4, 63, 170, 179–181, 183, 184, 186, 192, 290 Mentis fluctuation, 138–148

318 Metaphysics, metaphysical, xii, xiv, xv, 6, 25, 27, 30, 38, 43, 68, 71, 167, 172–180, 185, 190, 220, 249, 283, 293, 299, 303 Methods, 58, 117, 170–172, 176, 179, 182, 183, 206–216, 225, 227, 232, 244, 289–291, 302, 303 Mind-body unity, 38, 100, 291 Mind-independent (extra intellectum), 2, 9, 11–15, 64, 65, 74, 123, 129, 177, 181, 182, 184, 185, 230, 237, 267, 270, 276, 277, 279, 294, 295, 297 Mistakes, xiii, 54, 84, 123, 125, 157, 170, 183, 190, 201, 239, 242, 264, 300, 301 Modes, 2, 26, 69, 113, 164, 220, 296 finite, xvi, 8, 11, 29, 38, 50, 52, 57, 79, 80, 97, 105, 106, 133, 165, 176, 179, 184–186, 190, 192, 195, 210, 214, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, 234, 235, 238, 241, 246, 256, 265, 266, 272, 296 infinite, xvi, 11, 28, 29, 36, 50, 52, 57, 80, 97, 117, 127, 133, 170, 185, 191, 210, 215, 219–225, 227, 233–235, 239, 241, 250, 265 Multitude, mob (vulgus), 73, 143, 156–159 N Natures, viii, xi, xiii–xvi, xix, 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 23, 26–32, 34–38, 42–45, 47–50, 54, 55, 57, 62, 64, 65, 67–70, 72, 75–78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87–89, 93, 96–100, 104–106, 109–147, 151, 152, 154, 157, 158, 161–171, 173, 175, 176, 180, 181, 183, 185–192, 195–197, 199–216, 219–233, 235–238, 240, 241, 243–251, 253, 255–257, 259–263, 265, 266, 269–272, 274–278, 280, 282–287, 292–298, 300–303 Necessity, xiii, 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 14, 26, 28–30, 36, 40, 42, 47, 49, 51, 54, 57, 66, 68, 77, 87, 114, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 165, 166, 170, 172, 179, 180, 185, 191, 195, 200, 201, 220, 222, 223, 232, 236, 237, 239, 242, 249, 250, 253, 257–259, 261, 265, 267–272, 274, 276, 278, 280, 297 Networks, viii, xi, xii, 30, 79, 89, 134, 143, 144, 176, 184–186, 189, 193, 194, 259, 272, 274, 302 Neuroses, 131 Notions, common, 75, 161–194, 208, 211, 212, 216, 291 Numbers, vii, 1, 13, 15, 37, 41, 79, 82, 86, 94, 96, 110, 111, 113, 121, 122, 125, 129,

Subject Index 132, 136, 149, 175, 179–182, 184, 186, 215, 222, 224, 228, 229 O Order, vii, xvi, 2, 9, 27, 29, 30, 32, 38, 44, 47–52, 55–58, 62, 64–70, 74, 76, 77, 79–81, 86, 88, 89, 94, 96, 97, 100, 109, 112–114, 117–120, 123–130, 132, 133, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157–159, 166, 168, 171–173, 175, 180, 181, 183–188, 192, 194, 198, 199, 201, 202, 206–208, 210, 213–215, 226, 230–233, 247, 249, 250, 257, 261, 266–268, 270, 271, 274, 277, 281, 283, 286, 292, 296 P Personal identities, xii, xvi, 34, 39–47, 57, 71, 99, 104, 106, 112, 114–116, 124, 135, 145, 146, 254, 256, 258, 259, 261, 263, 266, 267, 275, 282, 286, 291, 301 Philosophy piecemeal, viii, xi, xii, 302 systematic, viii, xii, 9, 70, 300 Places, xv, xvi, 14, 15, 19, 25, 26, 29, 30, 39, 42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 54, 58, 64, 65, 68, 72, 73, 79, 83, 85, 96, 113, 114, 122, 125, 129, 132, 134, 137, 142, 147, 151–154, 157, 160, 168, 169, 177, 180–182, 192, 196, 198, 200–208, 214, 215, 221, 225, 231, 232, 236, 247, 249, 250, 252, 256, 257, 259–261, 270, 272, 274, 287, 294, 296, 297 Plurality, xvi, 1–20, 47, 56, 114, 174, 220 Postulates, vii, xi, xii, 41, 72, 76, 78, 80, 172, 174, 190, 193, 203, 209, 210, 225 Powers, 19, 24, 28–30, 33, 34, 36, 50, 51, 64, 81, 98, 106, 116–118, 122, 130, 131, 134, 138–140, 142, 151, 152, 154–159, 162, 168, 177, 180, 183, 194, 197–199, 201–204, 209, 222, 223, 245, 247, 248, 253–257, 259–267, 269–272, 276, 278, 282, 284–286, 293, 295, 297 Praxis, xiii, xv, xvi, 96, 103, 105, 106, 110, 115, 158, 188, 190, 194–200, 250, 271, 283–287 Principle of individuation, xiii, xvi, 5, 24, 31, 34, 39–42, 45, 46, 49, 71, 97, 99, 104–106, 112, 114, 120, 124, 129, 175, 219, 220, 224, 258, 272, 301 Properties, 4, 36, 62, 110, 161, 222, 290 cognitive, 95, 100, 102, 105, 166, 198, 239, 243, 246, 247, 265–268, 286

Subject Index emotive, 95, 100, 102, 105, 106, 138–147, 153, 198, 199, 239, 245–248, 266, 268, 271, 278, 284, 286, 287 Psychophysical (mind-body) problem, xv, 77 Psychotherapy, 198 R Real entities (entia realia), 12, 86, 96, 101, 123, 165, 166, 181–184, 187, 272, 290 Reality, xiii–xvi, 1–4, 6, 7, 11–15, 18–20, 23–28, 30, 34–42, 45, 47, 49–51, 54–57, 61–64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 86–88, 90, 95, 97, 100, 105, 106, 110, 111, 114, 119–131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 160, 163, 166–169, 177, 180–187, 190, 194, 200–202, 207, 208, 212, 216, 220–226, 232–234, 239, 240, 245, 249, 250, 252, 256, 264, 270, 272, 274–278, 280, 281, 283, 294–297, 299, 301 Reality as it really is (ut in se est), 13, 16, 37, 114, 118, 119, 123, 126–128, 142, 149, 151, 163, 166–168, 177, 181, 182, 184–186, 202, 208, 220, 242, 292, 293, 296 Reflection, reflexivity, xiii, 83, 88, 93–95, 100, 104, 209, 214, 232, 244, 247, 266, 267, 278, 290, 301 S Salvation, xiii, xix, 32, 100, 152, 159, 176, 200, 249, 250, 261, 273–284 Second grade of knowledge (ratio), 113, 161–216, 289 Skepticism, 164 Species of eternity, under a (sub specie aeternitatis), 119, 280 Species of eternity, under some (quadam sub specie aeternitatis), 119 State democratic, 115, 155–157, 203, 205, 265 liberal, 143, 155–157, 205, 265, 283 Substances, xiv–xvi, 1–20, 23–58, 68, 69, 72, 76–82, 84, 87, 90, 94, 97, 105, 106, 117, 121, 122, 124, 132, 143, 162, 164, 169, 174, 180, 184, 185, 189, 190, 192, 193, 213–216, 220, 225, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233–236, 238–240, 275, 291 System closed/final, 80–89, 283, 299

319 of coherence, xi, xii, xvii, 79, 185, 186, 190, 302 deductive, 179, 182, 184, 274 desired, xi–xiii, xvii, 32, 42, 58, 68, 70, 72, 76–78, 89, 90, 96, 106, 109, 110, 112, 118, 147, 149, 151, 152, 158, 161, 163, 164, 167, 169, 172, 173, 177, 180, 183, 185, 186, 190, 194, 200, 204, 208, 214–216, 219–221, 225–227, 230, 232, 233, 240, 241, 243, 248, 263, 274, 275, 282–284, 286, 287, 289–303 foundational, xi, xvii, 175, 179, 184, 274 opens, xi, xii, xvii, 212, 215, 240, 263, 282–284, 298, 302, 303 philosophical, vii, xi, xiii, xv, xvii, 19, 75, 90, 172–194, 290, 299, 302 T Teleology, 201, 261, 293–296, 302 Temporality, 53, 121, 127, 128, 133, 136, 188, 192, 232, 279–282, 294, 297 Theories, xiii, xv, xvi, 3, 6, 7, 50, 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 84, 91, 95, 96, 99, 103, 105, 106, 110, 132, 143, 158, 185, 188, 190, 194–200, 204, 250, 254, 265, 282–287, 299 Things individuals, xiv, 1, 2, 9, 19, 23–58, 62, 78, 80, 89, 96, 100, 101, 104–106, 109–112, 114, 118, 119, 122, 124–127, 133, 162–166, 170, 171, 173, 175, 179–181, 185, 190, 195, 200, 203, 206, 207, 210, 211, 214–216, 219–230, 260, 267, 276, 277, 279 order and connection of, 163, 180–188, 202 singulars, 23, 24, 28, 34–39, 41, 48–51, 54, 100, 106, 111, 112, 116, 119, 120, 134, 146, 162, 171, 179, 190, 192, 194, 210, 211, 220–222, 229–232, 237, 259, 267, 287, 290 Third, supreme grade of knowledge (scientia intuitiva), 152 Thoughts, viii, xii, xiv, xv, xvii, 2, 5, 7, 8, 12–14, 17–19, 27, 34–36, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 57, 61–66, 68, 70, 71, 76–85, 87–95, 98, 99, 101, 103–106, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 131–133, 138, 150, 159, 163–166, 168, 174, 175, 182, 187, 188, 190–192, 194, 202, 205, 209, 210, 213, 220, 228–232, 234–239, 248, 249, 253, 254, 270, 286, 289, 291, 293, 299–301

320 Times, viii, ix, xv, xvi, 10, 12, 13, 16, 26, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51–55, 58, 63, 64, 67, 72, 82, 100, 103, 106, 111, 113, 114, 118–140, 146–148, 164, 168, 175, 179, 181, 182, 185, 187–189, 192, 198, 207, 208, 214, 215, 221, 231, 232, 243, 253, 260–263, 272, 274–278, 283, 286, 287, 291, 297 Totality, xii, xiii, 7, 8, 19, 54, 65, 86, 105, 150, 163, 215, 300 Truths, xvii, 13, 15, 40, 48, 49, 58, 61–107, 146, 149, 150, 161, 164, 166, 170, 171, 176–178, 182, 184, 190, 193, 207, 209, 213, 220, 221, 225, 228, 230, 231, 233–235, 240, 242–244, 253, 260, 280, 281, 287, 293, 296, 298–303

Subject Index U Unity, xvii, 1–20, 25, 27, 29, 37, 41–43, 48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 58, 66, 68, 70, 76–107, 112, 120, 157, 184, 185, 198, 202, 207, 220, 221, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233–235, 238–240, 249, 266, 274, 280, 286, 291, 298 W Will, xiv, xvi, 46, 68, 142, 145, 150, 151, 157, 168, 195, 211, 230, 247, 250, 253, 254, 268, 269, 294, 296, 298 Wise, the, 45, 138, 152–160, 195, 197, 199, 252, 253, 278, 279, 284, 290